BRITISH RELATIONS WITH TANJORE.

(1748 - 1799)

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ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the policy followed by the British towards Tanjore from the beginning of the Carnatic Wars to the end of the century. They came into close contact with that state during the course of the first Carnatic War and found her alliance and co-operation invaluable in establishing their power in India. By the end of the century, when their power was supreme, they found it convenient to annex Tanjore into their dominions.

Throughout this period, Tanjore had not engaged herself in any hostilities towards the British; on the contrary, she had remained a faithful ally and to a great extent a protected power. But the fact that she was considered a tributary of the Nawab of Arcot, who in turn was dependent upon the British for his existence, reduced her to the position of discharging the demands of both the British and the Nawab; and suffer the consequences of heavy payments, which she could ill-afford.

With the increase in the Nawab's dependence and their superiority, the British came to control the
affairs of both the Nawab and the Raja. Since Arcot was of greater importance and the Nawab considered a particular ally, the interests of Tanjore were sacrificed to the dictates of his avarice and Tanjore itself was left under his complete control for a few years. When restored eventually to the Raja, the British found it opportune to establish their authority in Tanjore, reducing the Raja to complete dependence upon them.

Their primary concern was the subsidy Tanjore paid for the protection she received from them. The treaties concluded in 1787, 1792 and 1799 were all in theory voluntary agreements between two independent states; but on each occasion, the British move was only to safeguard and secure the punctual payment of that subsidy. When Tanjore found herself incapable of shouldering this heavy responsibility, the British found it necessary to annex the territory, leaving the Raja with a pension.
INTRODUCTION

No other period, perhaps, is more significant in the History of India than the eighteenth century. In that century we witness the disintegration and fall of the Mughul Empire; the rise of the Marathas to a position of power and eminence as well as their decline due to internecine jealousy and rivalry. It was in this period, that a political vacuum was formed which paved the way for a foreign power to establish an Empire in India. By the second quarter of the century, the relative positions of the European Companies had simplified into a rivalry between the British and the French. Portuguese power and prosperity had long disappeared. The Dutch, who had ousted the Portuguese, had been so weakened by their war with France that the British found themselves relieved of their most formidable rival at sea. Coote's victory at Wandewash reduced the French power to five small trading stations. By the end of the century, the East India Company, from the holding of a few scattered trading centres on sufferance, rose to the control of vast territories, a position which entailed tremendous power, the greatest in India.
THE CARNATIC
From almost the beginning of the seventeenth century, the penetration of the Muslim power into South India, the establishment of European Factories there, and the decreasing spirit and vitality of the indigenous Princes that fostered no absolute control in particular, made the South the ideal ground for the foundations of an Empire in India. It was here that the effects of the chaos and confusion that had resulted from the disintegration of the Mughul Empire were most felt. To an extent, the founding of an independent dynasty by Asaf Jah at Hyderabad, though in name a vassal of the Emperor, seemed at least temporarily, to give political stability to the South. Asaf Jah, Subahdar of the Deccan, had his subordinate in the Nawab who had the control of the Carnatic. Even in his days of power, Asaf Jah's control over the Carnatic was weak and the power of the Nawab of the Carnatic was no more absolute or appreciable. It was the instability of the Nawab's power and succession disputes in Arcot and Hyderabad that afforded the rival British and French East India Companies profitable opportunities.

1. In the eighteenth century, the term Carnatic denoted the dominions and dependencies of the Nawab of Arcot and extended from the Guntur Circar, the northern boundary being the small Gundalakama river, over the coast country as far as Cape Comarim. The territory south of Kolladam river was rather tributary to the Nawab than his real possession. Central Carnatic extended from the Kolladam to the North Pennar, while Northern Carnatic stretched from the North Pennar to the Gundalakama.
Even in the seventeenth century the French had set up factories, in competition with their rival, in all three areas of British enterprise in India. But the two European Companies were prevented from actively participating in the internal disputes of Indian Politics. In Bombay, there was the growing power of the Marathas which made interference impossible. In Bengal, the British had managed to obtain a firman from the Mughul Emperor Fakrudeen in 1717 to land around Calcutta, but they were unable to occupy most of it and existed in a condition of veiled hostility with the Nawab, till Siraj ud Daula's attack on Calcutta in 1756.

It was in Madras that the complexities of Indian Politics reached their height. It was there, where the weakness of the indigenous Princes became so conspicuous, that the Anglo-French rivalry was to have results of great significance. It had seemed, when the two Companies concluded an unofficial truce during the Spanish Succession War, that the Anglo-French wars, fought out in all parts of the world where their nations had influence, might pass India by, but the arrival of the British fleet under Boscawen and the chaotic political condition of the peninsula led instead to decisive conflict between them.
The French were not slow in accepting the challenge and the capture of Madras in 1746 was the result. Though Madras was restored very soon, the episode opened the inevitable clash of their ambitions. The situation in the Carnatic, already tense due to the ambitions and intrigues of the native Princes, was aggravated by the aspirations of the two Companies. While their nations were at peace, they were precluded from mutual hostilities, but a way out of the embarrassment was soon found. They embarked upon the profitable business of interfering in alien affairs by appearing in the contests of Indian Powers as the "mercenary troops of these polished barbarians". The motive had been there, the opportunity was present and the means had now been found.

The foundations for subsequent European participation in Indian politics had been laid during the war between the French and English Companies. Soon after the news of the declaration of war between England and France reached India in March 1745, Anwar ud din, Nawab of Arcot, paid a visit to both Pondicherry and Fort St. David. He had already directed the two Companies to live in peace. He wrote

again in July to the Madras Council "not to raise any disturbances on shore"\(^1\). Governor Morse replied that he would not be "the first to disobey" the Nawab's commands, provided the French paid "the same deference\(^2\). But the Nawab's letter was to prove as effective as Napoleon's Berlin Decrees; not having the means of enforcement at his command, his wishes were disregarded by both with impunity.

When La Bourdonnais captured Madras, Anwar ud din was naturally displeased and sent his son Mahfuz Khan to expel the French. The battle of the Adyar that ensued, in which the Nawab's army was defeated by the French, not only brought out the superiority of the European military skill and discipline\(^3\), but also established the attachment between Anwar ud din's family and the British, which was to play an important part in the next decade and form the foundations of British power.

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3. Dodwell, while claiming that this "action was important" observes that historians have tended to lay the emphasis in the wrong place. "It can not be supposed that the Europeans had ever admitted the individual equality of Country troops .... But the action on the Adiyar announced emphatically the value of that development of arms and tactics which had been introduced in the preceding eighty years" - Dupleix and Clive, Dodwell, p. 20.
The defeat and death of Anwar ud din at Ambur opened a new but decisive phase in the History of South India. Chanda Sahib, in open alliance with the French, sought the Nawabship of Arcot against Mohammed Ali. Though only as auxiliaries, the British and the French came face to face to settle the question of their survival as a power in India. Because of past relations with Anwar ud din, and more to counteract the French support to Chanda Sahib, the British upheld Mohammed Ali's cause.

It was by successfully supporting Mohammed Ali that the British were first able to lay the foundations of their political existence in India. By establishing him as the Nawab and destroying the influence of their most formidable European rival, they were in a position to lay claims to dominance. Macaulay's description of Dupleix's policy was equally true of that of the British: the easiest and most convenient way a European company could exercise sovereignty in India was "to govern the motions and speak through the mouth of some glittering puppet, dignified by the title Nabob or Nazim". The method was adopted and the British had become successful.

1. Critical and Historical Essays - Macaulay, p.215,
With Mohammed Ali came the virtual control of the Subah of Arcot, a major political unit of the South. It meant not only the overthrow of the French power, but also a constant check upon the slightest attempt at growth of their rival, whose main strongholds lay on the Coromandel Coast and who could never hope to project their influence from any other part of India.

A study of the Carnatic Wars clearly reveals that the establishment of Mohammed Ali as the Nawab was not the result of British initiative alone. The part played by Tanjore in supporting Mohammed Ali's cause and indeed in successfully defending Trichinopoly, the sole and vital seat of the allies, in its precarious state, was the deciding factor of the eventual outcome of the war. Without Tanjore's support, Trichinopoly could never have survived the enemies' onslaught and with its fall the French would certainly have obtained a different result. Chanda Sahib to an extent and Lally to a greater degree had appreciated this point and hence the siege of Tanjore itself was attempted on two occasions. But the Raja successfully withstood their attacks and by his delaying tactics indeed alleviated the pressure on Trichinopoly; thus contributing in a great measure towards strengthening the allies' chances. It is
probable that, had Tanjore, at any time during the Carnatic wars, been brought to support the French cause, the British victory would have been impossible, Mohammed Ali would not have become the Nawab of the Carnatic and there might not have been a British Empire of India. Yet, after the end of the war, proper recognition of the Raja's services was denied. He was compelled by the Nawab of Arcot to take the position of a tributary and his services in accomplishing such a definite and beneficial result was deemed an obligation on his part; whereas the other ally, the British, went on to reap the many advantages of the result of the enterprise.

The East India Company, despite its acquisition of an administrative character, continued to hold the same fundamentally commercial views as before and finance was its major stimulus and paramount concern. If the history of the British enterprise in India until the Carnatic Wars is to be accepted as a simple narrative of a mercantile body attempting to obtain and hold a monopoly, their subsequent activities in the next half of the century, through acquisition of land and trading advantages, is nothing but a more steadfast adherence to the same policy, though in a magnified manner. Sir Thomas Roe's opinion that "war and traffic are incompatible" had long changed, generally due to
the fall of the Mughul Empire and particularly due to the European competition for trade. The Charter of Charles II in 1661, conferring upon the Company the power to make war and peace with non-Christian powers was the portentous opening for the future activities of the British in India. The celebrated instructions of the Directors to their Representatives was the inevitable result; "increase of our revenue is no less the subject of our care as much as our trade; .... 'Tis that must maintain our force when twenty accidents may interrupt our trade; 'Tis that must make us a nation in India. Without that we are but as great a number of interlopers, united by His Majesty's Royal Charter, fit only to trade where nobody of power thinks it their interest to prevent us. This gradually led to a new phase in their activity in India, the pure and undeterred desire for revenue, which was to manifest itself in all their policies and dealings with the princes and result in their Empire. Along with the gradual growth of their power and influence and with every opportunity that presented them with the smallest right or pretence either to interfere or join the abundant

3. This was also in a sense merely adopting, as a natural source for revenue for increasing expenses, the example already set by the Dutch; defraying the expense of fortification by raising revenue from those protected.
intrigues, disputes and dissensions in the chaotic political scene, they expanded and perfected the policy to its fullness, both in its structure and in its results. Their first gains in the Carnatic Wars took the shape of exaction of money from, and the right of collecting revenue on behalf of, the Indian Ruler who happened to be their protegé.

The elevation of Mohammed Ali to the Nawabship, a feat which not only formed the base of their future Empire, but also proved the first footing of authority, was deemed a service to him and as such he was to defray the expenses of the war. He was asked to pay for the deference of Madras (1759) because it was the residence of his friends. After the capture of Pondicherry, he was to pay for its siege operations, because it was the residence of his enemies. In this can be seen the materialistic attitude that the British policy was to assume in their growth as a power in India. However willing Mohammed Ali was to meet these expenses, his financial resources were insufficient to meet their demands. Greatly indebted and absolutely dependent

1. Pres. & Coun. – Court of Dirs, 9 Nov. 1762 – Mds. Letters Received Vol. 1A
upon the British, he was willing to serve their purpose by whatever means as long as it was of some advantage to him. The "inflated ambition of this political pretender was nourished and incited by the still more absurd and corrupt counsels of his European advisers". In their need for revenue the position of Tanjore came to occupy a prominent place; and disregarding the much solicited and greatly enjoyed benefits from its Ruler during the war, conditions were imposed upon him to replenish their treasury. This was mainly due to the instruction from the Directors in 1761 to the Madras Government that revenue was necessary and that the Nawab's debt should be reduced. This could be termed the significant beginning of their relations with Tanjore. Again a similar desire to replenish their treasury, exhausted by their war with Haidar, was expressed by the Directors in 1769. This led to the extraordinary addition of the Tanjore Raj to the Nawab's dominions, the introduction of the British garrison in Tanjore, and the beginning of the gradual annexation of that kingdom.

Interference in questions of succession was the initial step adopted by the British which led to their

eventual Empire in India. It was in this manner that they first introduced themselves to the Tanjoreans in 1749. In a similar manner again in 1799, while deciding the question of succession, they took over the administration of that state. The treaties entered into with the Raja in 1787, 1792 and 1799 were all in theory voluntary agreements between two states, each party recognising the others independence, but in every instance, the purpose was to safeguard the payments due to the British and even when the administration was finally assumed, it was only to secure on a permanent footing, the payment of the annual subsidy.

The British established their relations with the Raja considering him an independent ruler. They obtained his help against their enemy as an ally. They controlled his affairs with the Nawab of Arcot as a tributary. They sacrificed his rights to the Nawab only because they stood to gain more from the latter. Finally, they annexed Tanjore into their dominions, leaving the Raja with only a pension, because they wanted to safeguard Tanjore's pecuniary commitments to them. The ominous feature of their policy is that it was directed against a ruling family that showed itself loyal and friendly and bound by treaties and agreements with them.
An analytical study of the British relations with Tanjore has not been attempted before. With the Restoration of the Tanjore throne to Tulaji in 1776, the question of the British relations with the Nawab and the Raja attained sudden interest. Pamphlets were written in support of the Nawab's rights to the Tanjore Kingdom and in answer to them George Rous produced his "Restoration of the King of Tanjore Considered" in the form of a report to the Directors. This report was primarily to justify the Restoration, which had been authorised by the Directors and which had come to be severely criticised. It only concerns the events leading up to the Restoration and was written at the invitation of the Directors "for refuting the charges which have been brought against the Court of Directors and for justifying them to their Constituents and to the Public". Orme, Fullarton, Mill and Wilks make passing references to the role Tanjore played in the eighteenth century; and many of the Maratha historians have only given importance to the Carnatic Expedition of Shivaji and his contact with Venkoji.

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1. "State of Facts" "Facts Relative to Tanjore".
A complete history of the collateral branch of the Marathas at Tanjore was not written until the beginning of this century. William Hickey gives a brief outline of the Maratha Rule at Tanjore in his book "The Tanjore Maratha Principality". He traces the ancient dynasties and disposes of the Maratha Rajas in one chapter.

Venkasami Row gives a brief account of the Tanjore Marathas in his "Manual of the Tanjore District". The pioneer work in the field is the "Maratha Rajas of Tanjore" by Subramanyam. He brought out a connected history of Tanjore under the Maratha Rule. A detailed narrative of the rise and fulfillment of the Maratha power in the Carnatic is given by Srinivasan in his book "The Maratha Rule in the Carnatic". But these works deal mainly with the history of the Maratha Rajas at Tanjore without particular reference to the neighbouring powers; and more especially without relation to the growing power of the British and their connections.

It was by successfully establishing friendly relations with Tanjore that the British were able to effectively support Mohammed Ali. Their triumph in the Carnatic Wars, which marks the beginning of their empire
in India, brought them in close contact with both the Nawab of Arcot and the Raja of Tanjore. This led to their initially controlling them both and eventually annexing their territories. The fact that the independent Maratha power in Tanjore finally succumbed to the British naturally leaves a study of the relations between the two necessary; and an attempt is made in the following pages to cover the entire history of their relations from the time the British came into contact with Tanjore to the period when they absorbed that state into their territories.
Following the cessation of hostilities in Europe in 1748 and consequently in the Carnatic, the British and the French had to cease open hostilities. Yet, because of their mutual jealousy, they were not prepared to disband the forces they had raised. The indirect method of lending troops to the rival Indian princes, in order to back their own manoeuvres, was an obvious way of extending the influence of the Companies. There was also the chance of turning the heavy drain of their military establishments to a profit with the possibility of gaining valuable trade concessions and even territory at the expense of a rival. The temptation was too strong to resist and the British were the first to embark upon this policy. The first war waged by them with any Indian prince was that with the Raja of Tanjore in 1749. The first treaty of peace on an equal footing with any Indian power was the treaty of Devikkottai with him in 1749. Their acquisition of territory from that prince in the same year marks the beginning of the British conquest of India.

1. The Company's attempt to seize Chittagong in 1686 and the consequent rupture with the Mughuls in Surat and Bombay in 1688 cannot be held as a war waged by them. There was no shadow of hope to impose terms upon the Indian Princes. The attacks were mainly to safeguard their commercial interests. Active interference in the affairs of the Indian Princes led to the British Empire of India and the war with Tanjore was their first gratuitous interference.
The kingdom of Tanjore extended about seventy miles from north to south and about sixty miles from east to west. The River Kolladam in the north, the coast and the country of Rammad in the east, the kingdom of Trinchinopoly and Pudukottai in the west formed its boundaries. Tanjore had been the seat of the ancient Hindu dynasty of the Cholas and in all ages one of the chief political, literary and religious centres of South India. The modern history of Tanjore begins with its conquest by the Marathas. The Maratha rule forms the connecting link between the Chola and the Nayak rule and the intrusion of foreign powers into the land. Thus, after the decline of the indigenous Tamil rulers it passed under the sway of the Telegu Chiefs coming from the north, and after them the Marathas, before it became absorbed into the British dominions by the end of the eighteenth century.

The Marathas first came to South India in 1638 under the leadership of Shahji, father of Shivaji. As General of the Bijapur Kings, he led an army and forced the old Nayak Chiefs of Tanjore and Madura to submit to the authority of Bijapur and pay annual tribute. Shahji deserves to be styled the founder of the Maratha Rule in South India.

1. See map opposite.
as his famous son, Shivaji, proved to be the founder of the Maratha Empire in India.

The internecine disputes between the Nayak rulers of Tanjore and Madura came to head in 1673 and the Tanjore Prince, Vijayaraghava, was defeated. A surviving child of his, Changamaladas, was taken to the court of Bijapur and Venkoji, who had meanwhile succeeded his father Shahji, was charged by the Sultan with the responsibility of placing the child on the Tanjore throne. Venkoji marched at the head of an army of 12,000 men and obtained a great victory over the Madura forces and placed Changamaladas on the Tanjore throne. Then he made a demand for the expenses of the expedition, "the account of which actually doubled the actual amount, which the Tanjorean was either unable or unwilling to defray." The adherents of the Prince were not well disposed towards each other and Venkoji was invited by one of the factions to seize the fort of Tanjore. Presented with such an opportunity, he took possession of the Fort and Kingdom in 1676.

5. Varying dates between 1674 and 1676 are assigned to Venkoji's accession. The Tanjore temple inscription dates the accession as Saka 1597 Anala Charita, which corresponds to 1676.
Venkoji met his brother Shivaji, during the latter’s South Indian Expedition\(^1\), but, refusing to agree to a demand of three-quarters of his patrimony to Shivaji and one quarter to himself, he took flight\(^2\). In order to satisfy his brother, Shivaji generously yielded all his claims to his patrimony. It would have been of great advantage to Tanjore if only he had strengthened his hold or established a definite link between her and Satara. By his abandonment of the Tanjore kingdom to Venkoji, he cut it off completely from the Maratha nation. Tanjore suffered grievously by its isolation and it was not very long before it was hemmed in on one side by the British and on the other by Mysore.

After Venkoji’s death in 1686, his son Shahji succeeded him\(^3\). The principal event in his reign, which lasted from 1686 to 1712, was the invasion of Tanjore by the Mughul general Zulfikar Khan. This took place in the course of the Mughul attack on the Maratha kingdom, during which Rajaram, Shivaji’s second son, had been driven from western India to take refuge in the Carnatic. It was while besieging Rajaram in Gingee that Zulfikar Khan levied contributions from the Tanjore Raja Shahji and made him

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1. Maratha Rajas of Tanjore - Subramanyam, p.20.
acknowledge the authority of Delhi. Thus began the payment of annual tribute by Tanjore which was to be so important politically in the second half of the eighteenth century; both as an opening to the Nawab of Arcot, who claimed payment as the representative of the Imperial Mughul and to the British, who always sought to enforce payment so as to enable the Nawab to clear his debt to them.

Shahji's successors on the throne of Tanjore, Serfoji (1712-1728) and Tukkoji (1728-1736) were able to extend their power over the Maravar country, compelling the Zamindars of Ramnad and Sivaganga to accept the suzerainty of Tanjore. Tukkoji died in 1736 and between that date and 1738 when a certain Shahuji is found on the throne, various persons are said to have ruled. Shahuji was deposed in 1738, by whom it is not clear, got back the throne in the same year and was again deposed in the following year by Pratap Singh.

2. The tribute of Tanjore was a Royal Tax, not due to the Nawab of Arcot or the Nizam, but to the Court of Delhi. The Emperor had expressly commended that the tribute should not be paid to anyone but him. It was never paid regularly, but Saadatullah Khan in 1715 and Dost Ali in 1736 compelled Tanjore to pay tribute.
3. The Navaks of Madura - Sathianathier, p.296.
4. It seems Tukkoji had three sons at the time of his death, Baba Sahib and Saiyaji (or Shahuji) who were legitimate and Pratap Singh, an illegitimate child. From 1736 to 1738, Saiyid the Killadar of the Tanjore fort, is said to have played the role of king-maker. Baba Sahib, who succeeded Tukkoji, was soon removed to be succeeded by his wife Sujana Bai. She was deposed shortly afterwards in favour of Shahuji. In 1738 Shahuji himself was deposed and a nephew of Tukkoji was placed on the throne. - Maratha Rule in the Carnatic - Srinivasan, pp. 242-244.
Pratap Singh held power until his death in 1763. Both Pratap Singh and Shahuji seem to have been the sons of Tukkoji, the former possibly an illegitimate child, but great confusion surrounds their exact relationship to the dynastic line and to one another\(^1\). It was Shahuji, who in 1749 was to approach the British for assistance in regaining his throne.

Before the first interference of the British in Tanjore affairs, the relations between the two seem to have been very cordial. In fact the Tanjore Raja was considered by them as a Sovereign, whose help and assistance was deemed valuable. When Madras was attacked and plundered by the French during the first Carnatic war in 1746, Pratap Singh had sympathised with the British\(^2\). He had already lost Karaikal to the French through the efforts of Chanda Sahib\(^3\) and his sympathies for the British suffering at the hands of the French is quite understandable. Floyer, the Governor

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1. Orme regards both Savai Shaji and Pratap Singh as the sons of Serfoji and places them one after the other in succession. Mill clearly speaks of the pretended son of Serfoji and Shahuji [Saiyaji\(^3\)] the youngest son of Tukkoji. Dodwell supports the Memoir of Elias Guillott, the Dutch Governor at Negapatam, which identifies Shahuji and Saiyaji as one and the same person. Subramanyam refutes the existence of Saiyaji; he contends that Tukkoji died without issue.  
Maratha Rajas of Tanjore - Subramanyam, p.45.  
3. Karaikal was taken by Chanda Sahib in 1739 and was given to the French.
of Madras, on hearing this, wrote to the Raja suggesting an understanding between them. The Raja could be supplied with help to take Karaikal back from the French and doubtless would help the British if Madras was attacked again. The purpose of the letter, as generously hinted by the Governor himself, was to let the Raja know that it was a "great honor to be upon such Terms with your Majesty as may be convenient to both..."¹. Pratap Singh was quite willing to enter into such an understanding and was even prepared to cede to the British one of his coastal cities as a reward for the promised assistance². The Raja was assured on 3 January 1747, that he would receive assistance soon after the arrival of British ships on the Coast from England³. Again after two weeks, the Governor intimated his hope of placing Karaikal in the Raja's possession in a short while⁴. But soon after this letter was written, the British and the French in India ceased hostilities following the end of the War of Austrian Succession in 1748 and nothing more was said or done about the suggested understanding. With the change in their situation, the British dropped their precocious

interest in placing Karaikal under Pratap Singh and abandoned their negotiations with him. But such an abortive negotiation did not, however, prevent them from looking for any benefits they could obtain, even though it was to mean a reversal in their policy.

As we have seen, in February 1749, Shahuji, Pratap Singh's rival, approached the British for assistance to regain his throne. He had acquainted both Governor Floyer and Admiral Boscowen that he had affairs of great consequence to discuss with them. He was invited to Fort St. David where he requested them to assist him in his plan. Assurance was given to the Governor that the matter could be settled with little difficulty as Shahuji had already received letters and messages from the officers and principal men of Tanjore who would join him, if he could raise a body of troops and march towards Tanjore. He promised to cede to the Company the Fort of Devikkottai with as much lands around it as would yield them twelve thousand rupees annually.

1. It is stated by Willson that Shahuji solicited assistance through the "overlord" Nawab Anwar ud din. But this is not corroborated by any of the Ft. St. David Consultations where it is mentioned only as an offer coming straight to Floyer and Boscowen from Shahuji - Ledger & Sword - Willson, Vo.II, p.87.
Hardly a couple of years before, the same Governor Floyer, had been corresponding for an understanding against the French, with Pratap Singh, against whom he was now asked to grant assistance. Yet, how very eager he was to take advantage of the situation could be seen from his Minutes. Even before granting help or considering the locus standi of the Prince, he refers to him, who had been deposed ten years before, as "the right and Lawfull King of Tanjore". The Prince had only his arguments to justify his case; he had no proof of support by any party in Tanjore, yet the deal was concluded without any further enquiry.

A closer study of the facts only reveals that Shahuji's ambitions proved nothing more than a mere excuse for the British. It was not any real concern for the deposed Prince, nor any zeal for the justice of his cause, that swayed them to support him. Even assuming his claim to have been well founded, they were under no obligation to render him assistance. Had he only insisted upon the

2. The deliberations about the offer of the Prince were carried on only by Floyer, Admiral Boscowen, Richard Prince and Maj.Lawrence. The Council itself was notified of the whole affair only on 10 April, a day after the detachment had marched towards Devikkottai - Home Misc. Series, Vol.128, p.710.
validity of his title, his mission might not have succeeded. Of this he seems to have been well aware for he solicited their assistance by associating his restoration with prospective advantages to them. It appeared that to obtain the Fort of Devikkottai with lands around it would prove advantageous to their commercial interests. The greater part of that country was fertile. Besides there was a river running around the Fort, capable of receiving small ships, which could be made fit to admit larger ones and thus prove a great service. There was no doubt of the great "Want of such a conveniency on This Coast...". These advantages could be gained by merely granting assistance to the Prince.

It was also felt that the purpose of assistance to the Prince could be achieved with little difficulty as the major part of their force was then in garrison. There was the definite consideration that "the risk but small in Comparison to the benefits that might be gained on the Occasion." It was agreed to grant the required assistance provided Shahuji would enter into an obligation to give up Devikkottai.

"in case he was put in possession of the Kingdom of Tanjore and further to pay the whole charge of the expedition, if he succeeded therein". This condition needs particular attention as its importance shifted even during the course of the hostilities from being the primary cause for the rupture with Pratap Singh to that of the basic stipulation to the eventual settlement of a peace with him; thus questioning the purpose of the British in interfering with the Tanjore Succession. To enable the Prince to raise a body of troops from among his countrymen, he was lent five thousand five hundred rupees.

That the Governor was prejudiced in the matter is certain. He had agreed to Shahuji's solicitations without any regard for justice or past relations with Pratap Singh. His anxiety to implement the condition was equally lacking in morals or procedure. The approval of the majority of his Council for the measures he had promised was obviously doubtful to him. A detachment under Captain Cope was despatched on 9 April to attack and capture Devikkottai. But this was not communicated to the Council until the next day when the detachment had actually

left Fort St. David. The deliberations about Shahuji's offer and the decision to support him was taken only by the Governor, Boscowen, Lawrence and Richard Prince, a member of the Council. Intimation to the Council, a day after the detachment had marched, must have been with the deliberate intention of thwarting any opposition to the expedition. The Council did not approve of the decision taken. Since it was too late to recede, a majority was induced to acquiesce in the design.

It was equally peculiar that as a place of attack, Devikkottai and not Tanjore, the Capital of the Kingdom, was chosen, without any definite plan of continuing the

1. "As the greater the secrecy the more to advantage is the Design of Expeditions of this nature brought to perfection of which the President does not in the least doubt, but the rest of the gentlemen of the Board will join with him in the same opinion ... and now acquaints them that the Forces above mentioned began their march yesterday morning early ..." - Fort St. David Cons, 10 April, 1749 - Home Misc.Series, Vol. 128, p. 710.

2. Though their action suggests some secret understanding with the prince, the fact that the latter had to be lent five thousand five hundred rupees clearly indicates that he could not have possibly offered them any money.


4. "... as our Troops were Ten miles on their way and our Credit somewhat at stake as well as the certain loss of the money already advanced in case the troops were recalled ... Messrs. Holt and Wynch agreed as the Expedition had been already set afoot, it was better to proceed on it ..." - Ft. St. David Cons, 10 April, 1749, Home Misc.Series, Vol.128, pp.711-712.
action. It is hardly conceivable that the question of the Tanjore throne could have been settled by the seizure of a mere foothold on the coast. One must suspect that the Governor's action was never seen as the means to the end proclaimed. The attack on Devikkottai did not prove successful and the troops returned to Ft. St. David on 11 May, 1749. The Tanjoreans seemed united in their efforts to prevent the British imposing Shahuji as their Ruler. Perhaps they were prescient to the disaster that would follow if foreigners were allowed to meddle in their affairs; their action, at any rate, though not strictly against the British, was at least due to the fact that their Ruler was popular. It was obvious that Shahuji's cause was destitute of supporters amongst his own countrymen.

Even with the first victory, the Tanjore general, Monaji, sent a message to the Governor on 20 May, desiring to know the terms for a peaceful settlement. But he was informed that the Fort of Devikkottai must be delivered with lands yielding ten thousand rupees annually; the expense of the expedition must be met by the Raja and as though to reward the person who gave them the excuse to

interfere in Tanjore affairs, the deposed Prince should be
given a handsome allowance. But even while stipulating
such exorbitant conditions, either because he considered
them too severe to be complied with or too unjust for any
consideration, Floyer felt that the Tanjoreans had sent
the message "to amuse" the British after their defeat.
In either case, the Governor seemed as decided to obstruct
any settlement as the Tanjoreans were in favour of it.
He was of the opinion that Devikkottai was "a place of
great consequence to them" and would not be given away so
easily "without being pressed hard."

Again it is evident that the Governor had no consider­
ation for the justice or fairness of his demands on the
Tanjoreans. An opportunity was opened by them for
accommodation and yet, the Governor seemed determined to
realise his demands. It was decided to continue the war

1. Ft.St.David Cons, 22 May, 1749, Home Misc.Series,
Vol.128, p.715.
2. Regarding the message from Monaji, the Governor gave it as
his opinion that "this message is only sent to amuse Us
(the Tanjour Country now being in Troubles, occasioned by
some Polyeags making an inroad into that Country, and
Monjee being actually gone against them, leaving only
about six or seven hundred Horse, and some foot on the
Banks of Coleroon River) ..." - Ft.St.David Cons, 22 May,
p.716.
and launch another expedition\textsuperscript{1}. Heavy expenses had already been incurred and "the only way of recovering it", was "to second the Expedition". The first had proved more expensive than expected and to reduce expenses, the second expedition to Devikkottal was to be by sea. Floyer even assured the Council that "if no unforeseen accident happens", the Tenjoreans "will reimburse the whole of the Expedition, and perhaps give up the Fort of Devicottah likewise"\textsuperscript{2}.

The Governor's desire to second the expedition can easily be explained. He could not be expected to see his project prove fruitless, without making an attempt to redeem the loss. But his Council was also unanimously in favour of the second expedition. It can only be attributed to the sole consideration that the English wanted to wipe away the indignity of having retreated before the arms of an Indian Prince. Acquisition of territory seems to have become the major objective; the restoration of Shahuji was no more the compelling motive. As Malcolm says, they felt that "the capture of Devecottah, not the restoration of Shahojee, should be their first object"\textsuperscript{3}. The decision to make the

\begin{itemize}
  \item[1.] \textit{Ft.St.David Cons, 22 May, 1749, Home Misc.Series, Vol.128, p.719.}
\end{itemize}
second attempt by sea was mainly due to the consideration that it would result in their taking that place, if the Tanjoreans did not "make peace on such Terms as may be approved of". But they did not leave much chance for a settlement as they were not in favour of accepting any other port but Devikkottai as it was "the only one near us that can be of any service to the Company". Quite clearly, they had lost interest in settling the disputed succession and "set to work to claim the reward by capturing Devicottah, without the performance of their part of the bargain".

The army under Lawrence attacked the Fort of Devikkottai and the capture of that place resulted in June 1749. Pratap Singh solicited terms and his Ambassadors were received at the Fort. The British wanted possession of the Fort with lands around it to yield a revenue of ten thousand rupees. They also wanted the Raja to bear the expenses for both expeditions and to grant "a handsome annual allowance" to Shahuji. But the last condition seemed the main obstacle.

3. The struggle between England and France for supremacy in India - Rapson, p.53.
for any consideration of these demands. The Ambassadors, quite naturally, seemed "highly incensed at the article of allowing a maintenance for the support" of Shahuji. They were not only against it but insisted that Shahuji should be delivered to them as the basis of any agreeable terms.

Major Lawrence was of the opinion that "no better terms could be obtained" and those obtained were "very advantageous." Pratap Singh was willing to pay a lakh of rupees for the expenses of the expedition as well as to cede Devikkottai with lands around it worth ten thousand rupees annually. Now it seemed that it would be unwise to offend the de facto ruler of Tanjore by insisting on an allowance for Shahuji. Therefore a secret article was inserted that they would prevent Prince Shahuji from giving any further molestation to Pratap Singh. To ensure the fulfillment of this clause, it became necessary to secure his person. It is likely that he would have been handed over to Pratap Singh but for the humanity of Boscowen, who interposed and insisted upon their refusing the sanguinary demand of the Raja. The British renounced any support for that Prince and no

mention of an allowance to him was made in the treaty that was concluded on 25 June, 1749.

The British acquired possession of the fort with thirty-one villages around it. They were given the right to export and import and also within those parts to "Govern and Administer Justice according to their Own Laws". Such was their first annexation of territory by force of arms and the beginning of their rule in India. This episode, which was the beginning of British relations with Tanjore, forms the pattern, though not the base, of future diplomatic agreements, which were eventually to lead to the British taking over the administration of that Kingdom.

The British had interested themselves in the Tanjore succession by supporting Shahuji. He had been deposed in 1739 but they had not only refrained from disputing the succession then, but had even entered into correspondence with Pratap Singh with a view to forming an understanding against the French. Even in 1749 the capture of Tanjore

3. "Never perhaps has every idea of justice been more completely set aside for interests" - The Struggle between England and France for Supremacy in India - Rapson, p.58.
Kingdom for Shahuji would have been an impossible task.
But no such idea was revealed when a zeal for the justice of his cause was upheld as the compelling motive to the first expedition. As the trend of affairs changed, his interests were callously ignored. It is interesting to note that Shahuji had to find means to escape from "his faithful allies" who had pretended to fight for him as the legitimate Raja of Tanjore. But "in revenge they seized his Uncle" and kept him in confinement for nine years until he was released by the French in 1758.

It may well be supposed that the British entered into the conflict to gain possession of Devikkottai rather than to place Shahuji on the Tanjore throne. The only excuse that can be urged for their action was that they needed thereby to counterbalance an advantage in Tanjore secured by the French. When the pretender Shahuji had just been deposed in 1738, he had solicited French aid and had then offered Karaikal to Dumas, as he now offered Devikkottai to Floyer, in return for material assistance in the recovery of the Tanjore throne. Dumas had agreed to supply Shahuji with money and stores and in return had received a

formal cession of Karaikal and the adjacent country. In pursuance of the agreement, French ships were sent to Karaikal. However, Shahuji had meanwhile managed by bribery and intrigue to regain his throne unaided. He thereupon notified the French fleet that its assistance was not required, and informed Dumas that with Chanda Sahib threatening him from Trichinopoly he could not cede Karaikal, a place essential to his safety.

Dumas however now allied himself with Chanda Sahib, who took Karaikal and handed it over to the French. Shahuji, unable to retake Karaikal, and anxious to cover up his own duplicity, thereupon gave his formal agreement to the cession of the town. Soon after, Shahuji was again deposed in favour of Pratap Singh. The French continued to hold Karaikal, with enhanced prestige, overshadowing the Dutch upon that coast. However, the French had acquired Karaikal in 1739 and for ten years the British had remained quiet. Moreover there is no mention in the Consultations of any need or desire to combat French influence in those parts. It cannot be maintained, then, that Floyer's move to acquire Devikkottai was remotely connected with the French.

Devikkottai seemed likely to be of great advantage to the Company: that was sufficient excuse for the questionableness of the means by which it was acquired. "It constituted the first example and the first fruits of the Company's wars which were to end in the conquest of India".

As it happens Shahuji had provided good reason for British action, for before approaching Fort St. David, he had sent his vakil to negotiate with Dupleix. Dupleix would have nothing to do with the project, perhaps for fear of provoking the enmity of Pratap Singh at a time when the British fleet was expected on the Coast. Moreover, in 1748 La Riche, from Karaikal, had reported the time unpropitious for such an enterprise, while Shahuji's behaviour in 1739 provided good enough reason to expect little advantage from joining him. Shahuji's approach to the French would have provided good ground for the British had they known of it - but there is no evidence that they did. It was only after the event that the Council expressed a fear of intervention in support of Shahuji, and they allowed him three hundred rupees a month, "to engage him to be contented with his situation." The French were aware,

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however, that Shahuji was powerless, commenting in 1750 that the British had been fighting for a phantom and not for a legitimate ruler.

If the motives behind British support for Shahuji were questionable, and their subsequent treatment of him thoroughly unscrupulous, the results of the Devikkottai adventure proved even more favourable than expected. The capture of the town doubtless impressed Pratap Singh with the military and political potential of the British, and the treaty brought the two powers into close association. That association was soon to prove most useful, so that the blunder of Floyer’s first attack in the end led to great advantage. The fortunate outcome was the result, however, not of British foresight, but of the extraordinary changes in the circumstances of the Carnatic which followed from the death of the Nizam in 1748. The death of the Nizam

1. According to Abbe Guyon, the historian of French India, Pratap Singh stifled Saiyaji in the bath to avoid future troubles of dispute in succession. By this version, Shahuji was none other than Savai Shahji or Kattu Raja, who conveniently appropriated for himself the legitimacy associated with Saiyaji.

2. Shahuji’s real value was as an instrument for blackmailing Pratap Singh. The French in 1749 dismissed his claims to the throne, but in 1758 when they captured Fort St. David and Shahuji with it, they carried him off to Pondicherry with the deliberate intention of making use of him to put pressure on Pratap Singh. “Thus”, observed Lavaur to Lally, “you will obtain at easy cost, the means of equipping your force for Madras, and of gaining at the same time a considerable augmentation of influence”. - History of the French in India - Malleson, p.525.
opened fresh possibilities for European interference in the Carnatic affairs. It put an end to the period of settled government and comparative peace which he had given to the Deccan. There were two claimants to the succession. His eldest son Ghazi ud din, who was holding the high office of Amir ul Umara at Delhi, was now too deep in the Imperial affairs to stake a claim. His second son Nazir Jang, who had resided for the most part in the Deccan, now assumed the power and titles of Subahdar of the Deccan; but he was immediately challenged by Muzaffar Jang, a grandson of the Nizam.

Almost at the same time a conflict began for the Nawabship of the Carnatic. The holder in 1748 was Anwar ud din, who had been installed by the late Nizam in order to prevent the office becoming hereditary in the family of Dost Ali. Now he was challenged by Chanda Sahib, son-in-law of Dost Ali and the only representative of the dispossessed family. News of these events reached Tanjore while the British were at Devikkottai and influenced the decision of both Pratap Singh and the Company to make an early peace.

Between Pratap Singh and Chanda Sahib there were many grounds of enmity and the prospect of the latter becoming the Nawab of Arcot was a source of great alarm to the former. As Nawab of Trichinopoly, Chanda Sahib had constantly demanded money from the Tanjore Raja and had attacked his country. Pratap Singh had responded in 1740 by calling in the Marathas who had captured Chanda Sahib and taken him off a prisoner. Chanda Sahib's release by the Marathas and his bid for the Nawabship now made Pratap Singh anxious to come to terms at Devikkottai so as to be free to deal with his old enemy.

The British for their part were also anxious to come to terms quickly, while conditions in the Carnatic were so uncertain. Their anxiety was the greater because the bid for power by Chanda Sahib was backed by Dupleix. Dupleix was an old enemy of Anwar ud din and he had played a great part in securing Chanda Sahib's release from Maratha hands, and when on 3 August 1749 Chanda Sahib defeated and killed Anwar ud din at the battle of Ambur he was supported by

1. Chanda could have bought his freedom by paying eight lakhs of rupees which was demanded of him by the Marathas. As he was unable to raise the amount, he was taken away as prisoner to Satara. - The East India Company in Madras - Banerji, p.88.
his French ally. The British had not regarded Anwar ud din as an ally and had lent him no support\(^1\). The Governor and his Council at Madras heard news of his death quite calmly: the fact was recorded without comment and the next paragraph in the Consultations is an order to the Company's bricklayer\(^2\). They made no immediate move to support Anwar ud din's son Mohammed Ali against Chanda Sahib, and as late as November 1749 were inclined to think that if the French "would but be neutral", they would have "but little to dread on the occasion"\(^3\) (x).

The arrival of Muzaffar Jang in the Carnatic, and Dupleix's championship of his cause as well as that of Chanda Sahib soon led however to a reconsideration of the position. As Lawrence was to recall, it became necessary to combat French progress "whether as an act of justice to assist the lawful Prince [Mohammed Ali] of the Country

1. It was asserted by the Madras Council in 1775 that when Anwar ud din faced Chanda Sahib assisted by the French, "the Company had not then any connections with Anneverdy Cawn". - Ft.St.Geo.Cons, 26 June, 1775 - Mds.Mil. & Sec. Proceedings, Vol.78

(x) After the battle of Ambur, many of the Kiledars had submitted to Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang. But Mir Asad, the Kiledar of Chetpet, stood out. He was successful in his resistance in spite of a body of French troops that was despatched against him from Pondicherry. Mir Asad wrote to the British in November, complaining that they had not congratulated him in his successful resistance. - Country Correspondence, 1749, p.54 - Madras Records.
against Rebels or as an act of self defence and to prevent an increase of Power in a neighbour that must at least have proved our ruin ..."¹. Even so, for a while longer they hesitated, realising the danger but "incapable of taking the rigorous measures which the necessity of their affairs demanded" so that they allowed Boscawen with his powerful fleet to sail for England². It was only with the coming down of the Nizam Nazir Jang into the Carnatic that the Council finally committed themselves to the cause of Mohammed Ali, now sheltering at Trichinopoly. They still followed a cautious policy of "shewing the least outward attachment to either Party ..."³. But they could not openly refuse any support for Mohammed Ali considering Anwar ud din's services to them when attacked by the French in 1746. So "that we might not be deemed ungrateful", it was decided to send a small body of troops "just as a token of remembrance". Even this did not require any special effort on their part, for they then had "an opportunity of doing so in a very convenient and private manner": they had already resolved to discharge all their sepoys, now

they directed them all to Devikkottai "to be delivered into Muhammad Ally Cawn's service and forwarded at his expense to him at Trichinopoly ". At the same time, they caused it to be published that these sepoys were discharged from their service. Their intention was only to convince Mohammed Ali of their goodwill "in case he should hereafter regain his right and be made Nabob of the Province".

As it turned out, it was the British support that saved Mohammed Ali from destruction and gave him all he possessed. They were initially hesitant to support him; and even their decision to support him was only because of the fact that the French supported Chanda Sahib. Yet, once they had plunged into the conflict, they "had represented themselves as contending only for him; had proclaimed that his rights were indisputable; and that their zeal for justice was the great motive which had engaged them so deeply in the war".

It was with his alliance that they destroyed the French influence and established their dominance in South India. But, if the British successfully supported Mohammed Ali, it could not have been without the alliance and support of Tanjore. When the question of the Nawabship of the Carnatic

arose in 1749, the British were at war with Pratap Singh to decide the succession to Tanjore. Yet, with the apparent ascendancy of Chanda Sahib's interests, we see them both rallying to oppose him by supporting Mohammed Ali.

In the long correspondence between the successive Governors and the Raja of Tanjore, it appears that the Raja was not only acknowledged as a power but also as an ally. During the war his alliance and support proved necessary. His country fed the army at Trichinopoly; letters to him requesting provisions for the attenuate state of that place, and acknowledging assistance in troops and provisions, are many. Immediately after the truce at Devikkottai, a small supply of cannon was escorted from there to Trichinopoly by order and by the troops of Pratap Singh¹.

After the defeat of Anwar ud din, Chanda Sahib, with the assistance of the French, attacked Tanjore and demanded that the Raja should pay a large sum of money as compensation for the expenses of the war. The Raja, by negotiations, promises and stratagems, endeavoured to occupy them till the very end of December 1749², when Nazir Jang was on his

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march to attack them. As we have seen, Nazir Jang's march proved the great factor that moved the British to support Mohammed Ali. The attack on Tanjore by Chanda Sahib turned out to be most ill timed for his cause and the part played by the Raja, of great consequence. Pratap Singh knew that by protracting time, he could increase the distress of his enemies and expressed himself with such humility in his letters that Chanda Sahib suffered himself to be amused till the middle of December without having settled any terms. Meanwhile, Pratap Singh corresponded with Mohammed Ali and joined him in exhorting Nazir Jang to come and settle affairs in the Carnatic. He also solicited British assistance. The British desired him to defend himself to the last extremity, and sent him twenty Europeans who were detached from Trichinopoly. Dupleix himself affirms that had the victorious army marched against Trichinopoly without delay, while the consternation of defeat remained, they would have obtained immediate possession of that place and the success of their enterprise would have been assured.

Even if this was too great an assumption, there is no doubt

that their attack on Tanjore caused considerable delay and was extended until the arrival of Nazir Jang, which swayed the British to afford effective assistance to Mohammed Ali.

When the scene of the Anglo-French struggle soon shifted to Trichinopoly where Mohammed Ali was closely besieged by Chanda Sahib and the French, Tanjore threw in her lot with Mohammed Ali. In April, 1752, Monaji, the Tanjore general, acting on the instructions of Major Lawrence captured Koviladi from the French. By June, Chanda’s position became serious and he was surrounded in the Srlrangam Temple. He surrendered to Monaji on 16 June and was murdered two days later. Though there are different opinions regarding Chanda’s death, one positive result of his disappearance

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2. Lawrence – Watson, 8 Oct., 1755, Palk letters, European MSS. Reel 551, p.86.
3. It is alleged that Chanda could have been saved if Lawrence had taken pains. His death was caused by Monaji to avoid the unpleasant results when each party was demanding that Chanda should be handed over to them (A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan - Orme, Vol.I, pp.240-241). Mill maintains that "It is true that Lawrence showed an indifferance about his fate which is not very easy to be reconciled with either humanity or wisdom. He well knew that his murder was, in the hands of any of them, the probable, in those of some of them, the certain consequence, of their obtaining the charge of his person. He well knew, that if he demanded him with firmness, they would have all consented to his confinement in an English fort" (History of British India, Vol.III, p.87). Wilson says that Lawrence suggested the idea of Chanda being handed over to the British which was not accepted. "At this period, the English were not so well assured of their power as to pretend to dictate to the native princes with whom they co-operated" (History of British India, Vol.III, p.87, F.N.1). However, it is quite probable that Monaji decided to take advantage of the opportunity and his subsequent assassination of Chanda was with the deliberate intention of preventing any further threat to Tanjore.
from the field was that it left Mohammed Ali supreme and without a rival in the Carnatic.

In May 1753, Mohammed Ali, Lawrence and Palk, a member of the Madras Council, met the Raja and were promised his continued support. But no troops from Tanjore had reached Trichinopoly till June and to expedite matters, Palk went to Tanjore and successfully persuaded the Raja to send an army of 3,000 horse and two thousand men under his general Monaji. This army reached Trichinopoly in July and was of great help to the allies in successfully withstanding the French assault. Meanwhile the Raja had also sent about "two months stores" to Trichinopoly.

The Raja's alliance had proved so advantageous during the previous struggle that even before the beginning of the hostilities occasioned by the Seven Years War of 1756, the British considered his support not only important, but vital to their cause. In order to strengthen their alliance with

2. Dupleix had mounted his second and last siege of Trichinopoly in April, 1753, in a last bid to turn the tables on Mohammed Ali and the British.
5. "... we continued our march near the Capital[Tanjore] at the King's request and promise of a speedy junction .... the assistance we so much wanted". Lawrence - Watson, 8 Oct., 1755, European Mss, Reel 551, p.165.
him, Lawrence suggested in 1754 that Palk should go to Tanjore once again. Though the Raja was friendly, Sukkoji, the new Prime Minister of Tanjore from November 1753, was not well disposed toward the British. It was even understood that he had been bribed by the French. Moreover, Madame Dupleix had written to the Raja in "her own hand" making great promises to him if he would quit his assistance to the British; on the contrary, if he did not, he would be punished with "fire and sword." Even though Lawrence felt that the Raja was "hesitating and very little was wanting to turn the scales against us", he was certain that, at the most, the Raja would have signed "a neutrality.

According to Lawrence's suggestion, Palk was sent to Tanjore in 1754 with particular instructions to "press the King to join them." While Palk was at Tanjore, Pratap Singh suffered an attack from the French and he was not

1. Sukkoji was bought over by the French for 30,000 Rupees and he managed to remove Monaji from the Raja's favour - Lawrence-Watson, 8 Oct., 1755, European Mss, Reel 551, p.154.
2. Lawrence is the only source for this letter of Madame Dupleix to the Raja. Even in this, there is no mention of the French trying to sign the Raja into their camp. The attempt was only to secure his neutrality.
6. It is said that the "Mysoreans and Morari Rao, already sounded by Dupleix, withdrew from the coalition, and Tanjore returned to neutrality" (Cambridge History of India Ed. D. D. Advisory Ed. P. 130). This is not correct for Tanjore had not become neutral. Madame Dupleix had written to the Raja, but Lawrence assures us that though the Raja was hesitating, he was still a British ally. If indeed he had become neutral, it would be difficult to understand the French attack on his country.
only friendly towards the British, but was actually keen to get their help against the enemy. Sukkoji had meanwhile been dismissed from his post and Monaji had returned to the Royal favour. After his visit to Tanjore, Palk was convinced that he had "kept the Rajah of Tanjore in friendship and alliance with the Nabob." As soon as the news of the War between England and France reached India, the intelligence was communicated to Pratap Singh, who declared that his troops were "ready to act jointly with those of the Company, wherever occasion may require." How eager the British were to have his support can be seen from what the Governor wrote. The British were ready to join Pratap Singh with all their forces and desired to be soon favoured with his answer and with his "opinion in what manner the war should be carried on." 

Though Mohammed Ali was confirmed by now as the Nawab of the Carnatic, "yet very much is wanting to settle him in

the Government". If the Raja had been prevailed upon to take part with the French, the reduction of Trichinopoly would have been inevitable. Lally seems to have realised this when he laid seige to Tanjore. The Raja presented an obstinate defence and finally compelled Lally to retire.

While Tanjore was besieged by Lally, a detachment was sent from Trichinopoly to assist the Raja.

In this connection Willson states the "Pertab Singh had certainly not behaved very well to the Company in former transactions, but policy demanded that he should be supported at this juncture against the French. Clearly the author has overlooked the unfortunate episode of 1749, when the Company, without any provocation or justice, adopted the means of force against the ruling Prince of Tanjore. In addition he seems to suffer from the assumption that the French threat was only against Pratap Singh and the British were rendering him assistance in a conflict that had no


2. "without victuals, money or munitions, barefoot and half-naked, worn out with fatigue and in despair at having been engaged in so wild an adventure" - so described Lally the situation of his army after the expedition to Tanjore; (quoted in) Dupleix and Clive - Dodwell, p.167. As a result of the defeat, Lally reached Pondicherry in a "rotten condition losing all the implements of war and equipage, and entered it sneakingly with his horse deprived of saddle and cropper, ashamed of his own pride" - Tuzhuki Wallajahi - (Translation) NAINAR Vol.II, pp.199-200.


relation either to their ambitions or existence. No doubt the Raja had not seemed quite anxious to ally himself with the British just before the outbreak of the Seven Years War. It was mainly due to the compelling fact that both the British and the French had settlements in his dominions. But however hesitating he seemed for a short period to ally with the British, there is no evidence to prove that he had, at any time, contemplated alliance with the French. With Palk's visit to Tanjore the Raja's alliance was confirmed and Willson's accusation of his behaviour is quite unjustified.

When his Capital was besieged by Chanda Sahib and subsequently by Lally, the Raja put up a bold defence. Writing to the Governor in 1757 he says that he "did not mind the Enemies who were powerful but on the Contrary continued my hatred to them". Though the Raja was much disturbed by Lally's attack on his Capital, yet in the following year he spared 600 horse for the assistance of besieged Madras, as Governor Pigot thankfully acknowledged. Throughout the war moreover, the safety of Trichinopoly, the most important centre of all, depended upon the support of Tanjore. As Mohammed Ali himself had stated, but for Tanjore's support,

the defence of the Fort would have been "attended with a
great difficulty" and its inhabitants would not have been
able "to get even a grain of provisions". Indeed, Mohammed
Ali himself could not have stayed at Trichinopoly, which was
vital to his interests during the course of the war.

With the final overthrow of the French influence, the
British had accomplished the grand object of laying the
foundations for their power in India. At the heart of
their success lay the establishment of Mohammed Ali as
Nawab of the Carnatic, depending upon them for his authority,
a source, they might reasonably expect, of many privileges.
Yet, his establishment as Nawab was not due solely to British
initiative and exertions. The effective co-operation of
Tanjore proved not only of great consequence during the course
of the struggle, but had actually made it possible for the
British to successfully combat the French influence, thus
resulting in the establishment of Mohammed Ali as the Nawab.

The success of Mohammed Ali was the success in reality
of the British power and influence in India. This was the
beginning of their Empire, which was completed in the next
half of the century. Though the Anglo-French struggle may

be said to have extended over a period lasting until the end of the century, the real contest for supremacy lasted only about fifteen years from 1746 to 1761. With the fall of Pondicherry, the French power was completely overthrown and the question of European superiority may be considered settled. No doubt, the French made subsequent attempts to open the question and for a short period during 1781 to 1783, a part of South India seemed seriously imperilled, but by then the British position in India was too deeply entrenched to be shaken by any local reverse.

Reference can be made here to the assistance rendered to the Nawab by the British. In the beginning, in their own opinion, it was a token of appreciation for the patronage that they had enjoyed in the past, and happily it could be rendered without any inconvenience. Nevertheless, there was a particular hope to reap many advantages, should Mohammed Ali ever succeed in his claims. At the beginning of the conflict their services were insignificant compared with the Raja's response to Mohammed Ali's appeals for help. With the gradual improvement in Mohammed Ali's chances and growing need to combat French influence, British vacillation and token support turned into a firm alliance. Similarly, Pratap Singh's support and even attachment to Mohammed Ali's
cause was born out of dislike and aversion of Chanda Sahib. But, after the latter's murder, his effective support could only be attributed to a genuine attachment to Mohammed Ali and an opposition to the French influence.

It is only fair to surmise that had the French cause proved successful, the advantage to them would have been similarly immense and perhaps there would never have been a British Empire of India. Dupleix, who visualised such a possibility, came within a measurable distance of success. Trichinopoly had been the centre of attraction and the command of that place assured the control of the Carnatic. Assuming as a question of hypothesis, since in that manner alone the importance could be adequately explained, that the capture of Trichinopoly had been effected, either in the beginning or at any period during the conflict, it would have assured to the French all that Dupleix had schemed to achieve. If only Tanjore had been brought to co-operate with the French, their task would have been easy, the capture

1. "the plain of Trichinopoly having been so long the seat of war, scarce a tree was left standing for several miles round the city; and the English detachments were obliged to march five or six miles to get firewood". - A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan - Orme, Vol.1, p.343.

2. "If Trichinopoly is lost, the Nabob's principality would be in Utopia". - Orme - Holderness, 5 Jan., 1755 - Orme Miss. (O.V.) Vol.17, p.255.
of Trichinopoly would have been assured, and the results of the Carnatic Wars would have been quite different. As it was Tanjore proved to be the first, and an invaluable ally of the British.

Yet, when Mohammed Ali was safely placed in Arcot as the Nawab, under the recognised British patronage, Tanjore was compelled to revert to her position of tributary to Arcot. Not only was any credit and recognition, rightly due to her for her prolific efforts during the struggle, refused, but even her subsequent claims for concession were treated with contempt and as unjust. This proved the beginning of troubles to the Tanjore Raj.
GUARANTEE OF STATUS

With the fall of Pondicherry in January 1761, Mohammed Ali began to look upon himself as the absolute ruler of the Carnatic. But he possessed neither the resources nor the power required to hold the government in his hands without British support. Apart from depending on them for the very survival of his position and power, he hoped to achieve the realisation of his ambitions with their support. That he was now the Nawab of Arcot, he fancied, left him completely free to look to greater schemes of increasing his influence and dominions.

Mohammed Ali realised the possibility of raising money from the provinces of Tanjore, Vellore and from the Zamindars of Ramnad and Sivaganga. Since becoming the Nawab, he had not received the customary tribute and tokens of allegiance from these tributaries. He was not himself powerful enough to command their obedience, of which he was doubtful, let alone to demand tribute from them; to assert his authority, he had to seek British assistance. Immediately after the British success at Pondicherry, he suggested "as the most adviseable measure to be next pursued" that their army should recover the arrears of tribute due to him from his tributaries.

During the course of the war the Nawab had become indebted to the British for a large amount of money. The British were desirous of embracing every opportunity that would enable the Nawab to pay off his debt to them. It was in their interest that he should discharge his debt; they were even more anxious to recover the amount than the Nawab was to clear it. But they were of the opinion that they were not in a position to venture into the plan the Nawab had suggested. There was the uncertainty of their affairs in Bengal, which threatened to demand their complete attention and resources. The elevation of Mir Kasim to the Nawabship of Bengal had led to a rivalry between him and the British, both trying "to assert themselves and each urgently requiring funds which they could only obtain at the others expense." The Marathas had suffered a severe setback in the north by their defeat at Panipat, but there was no certainty as to how they would react to this defeat in the south. An officer in the Mysore army, Haidar Ali, had succeeded in making himself the undisputed master of Mysore and the direction his ambition would take was also uncertain.

1. The Nawab's debt was as follows: 1760-1761, 22, 25, 373 Rupees. 1761-1762, 25, 98, 801 Rupees.

2. The Oxford History of India - Smith, p.470.
The British treasury at Madras had been greatly depleted and the amount needed for the army to march for any military operation was in itself an argument of sufficient weight to induce them to confine their troops to garrison. Consequently the Nawab was advised to maintain peace in his country and "be content with the Income he now received rather than run the Risque of being engaged in another War".

In such circumstances, the question of the Nawab's tributaries might well have been postponed for a long time. Yet the very depleted condition of the Madras treasury was always pushing the Company in a search for money which could be cheaply acquired. The British had appraised Mohammed Ali well and knew that he was entirely dependent upon them. In their need, the Madras Government required of the Nawab payments amounting to fifty lakhs of rupees. The Nawab was not in possession of this amount; he informed the Governor that the arrears of tribute due to him amounted to a crore and twenty two lakhs of rupees.

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1. In November 1760 the Bengal Government sent two and a half lakhs of rupees to Madras "whence a letter had been received, declaring that without a supply the siege of Pondicherry must be raised". - History of British India - Mill, Vol.III, p.218.


3. In their letter to the Directors, the Madras Government explained that the amount required of the Nawab was "larger on account of that necessity than we should otherwise have chose". - Government & Coun.-Court of Dirs, 2 Oct., 1761 - Mds.Letters Recd.Vol.1A.
Government would help him to collect the arrears, he would pay two thirds of the amount towards his debt as well as defray the military expenses of the collection.

Now it appeared to the Madras Government that the eventual outcome of the Nawab's suggestion would be mutually beneficial; the Nawab would be able to extricate himself from debt, and they could realise a considerable amount of the money that he owed them. Though the Nawab had stated a very large amount as due from his tributaries, the Madras Government realised that it was far from probable that a half or even a third of the sum would be collected. Nevertheless, there was the prospect of obtaining two thirds of the amount collected and they felt it "highly necessary to reduce the several tributaries to obedience". The Nawab was acquainted in general terms of their intention to furnish him with a force to collect the arrears of tribute. They would not, however, disclose the manner in which they proposed to act and "the most profound secrecy" was recommended.

It is obvious that the principal motive of the Council in furnishing the Nawab with assistance was the reduction of

his heavy debt. They hoped that a flow of cash would thereby enter their Treasury and enable them to "begin an Investment and support that Burthen of expense which is annually incurr'd". But many other aspects had also to be taken into consideration. They were aware of the fact that the Raja of Tanjore was not only the most considerable but the most powerful debtor. A new argument was advanced to justify a move against Tanjore, which was that if ever the French returned to the Coast, he alone seemed likely to give them a footing and assistance. It was not fair to consider the Raja unreliable, especially after his long and continuous support to them during their conflict with the French. This argument seems quite unjustified as the Raja had not committed any act hostile to their interests. While forwarding such an argument, the Madras authorities do not offer any reason. Such a baseless doubt in the Raja, within a year after the cessation of hostilities, can only be attributed to the fact that it was put forward to justify their policy. He was therefore the first to be reduced to the Nawab's obedience.

At the same time, it was supposed that the Raja would not pay any considerable sum without their proceeding to

extremities. He might not even acknowledge the Nawab's authority to its full extent. Again, a lack of consideration for the Raja and his stand is apparent. He had not been approached and no demand had yet been made upon him. It was presumed that he would not comply and might even remonstrate against the Nawab's authority. To counteract and if necessary, to overcome such stubbornness, they realised that they must be in a position to take his capital. But, considering the distance of the place, the great quantity of stores required for such an enterprise, the difficulties of transportation and the near approach of the monsoon, they decided that it was prudent to let the matter rest till the following year.

Meanwhile, the Council agreed that the Raja should be acquainted with their motives "in assisting the Nabob in collecting the arrears of Tribute justly due to him from several Princes...". The Nawab had incurred heavy expenses during the war, which was justified in that it brought about the complete expulsion of the French and peace to the whole province. As every prince enjoyed the benefits of such a happy change, it was but reasonable

that everyone contribute a share towards the expenses. They therefore recommended the Raja\(^1\) to comply with the demand and avoid the necessity of their marching their army into Tanjore\(^2\). Such a step of writing to the Raja was decided upon because they felt that it would not lead to evil consequences. On the contrary, it might save the "heavy Expenses of money and Stores which will be required for the undertaking of so distant an Expedition"\(^3\).

It was also thought proper that a letter should go from the Nawab to the Raja, demanding the tribute due from him. But such a letter was suggested only "in order that the Nabob may be the better informed of our Intention and thereby enable to judge what it will be proper to write on the Occasion"\(^3\). It is clear that the Nawab had not till then approached the Raja regarding the tribute. Now the Raja should get the demand from the Nawab as well as the British recommendation, coupled with a threat of conquest.

It is also clear from the Records that there had been no discussion in the Council of the Nawab's demand, nor

1. Such a letter was not sent to the Raja till the following year - Ft.St.Geo.Cons. 24 Aug 1761, Mds.Mil.& Sec. Proceedings, Vol.45.
of the justice and propriety behind it. They had not only agreed to assist the Nawab in collecting tribute but had also expressed their willingness to proceed to hostilities without ascertaining whether the Raja was willing to comply with the demand or how much it would cost him to do so. No doubt they recommended the Raja to comply with the Nawab's demand and the major argument to support their recommendation was that he should share the expenses the Nawab had incurred during the war. But there certainly was no discussion about the amount the Nawab demanded and how far it concerned the war expenses alone, and how much of it was just. Again a certain lack of consideration for the Raja's interests and unquestioned support for the Nawab seems very obvious. It is also clear that the entire motive behind the affair was to obtain money from the Raja and as much of it as was possible.

In his letter to Pigot of August 1761, the Nawab stated his claims on Tanjore. The Raja had not paid tribute for the past fourteen years on which account the arrears with interest, "lawfully and reasonably" due from

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1. Though he confessed that he had already given the Raja a sanction exempting him from tribute, he maintained that he was forced by circumstances to sign the sanction. Nawab - Pigot, Recd. Aug. 1761 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol. I, pp. 50-51.
him, amounted to a hundred and twenty nine lakhs and fifty thousand rupees. Not content with this, he represented that it was customary "sometimes to lay an extraordinary tax" upon the tributary princes "according to their ability and strength of the Nabob". It is difficult to accept his statement for there was no proof offered to corroborate his accounts. He himself avowed that "the affairs of Peshcush are not under the same rule and regulation, for it always depends upon the strength of arms; and according as we make use of force, so they meet with success". He also considered himself more powerful to obtain money from the Raja than his predecessors for they "never had the English troops with them".

Meanwhile, there were repeated reports of the Raja making preparations for the defence of his country, particularly of his collecting large quantities of grain. The Council considered it proper to have large stores kept in Trichinopoly and "that magazines be also formed in the neighbourhood of Tanjore". This was to enable them, "whenever it may be found expedient, to proceed upon the intended Operations ...".

The British recognised that the Nawab's demand on the Raja was "greater than all the rest", and that no idea could "be formed of what is justly due to him by his demand...". Truth and justice had no place in the accounts of Eastern Princes and the only principle was to demand a large sum. It was not uncommon to accept a tenth in the end. But, "whatever may be the just Tribute due from the King of Tanjore", observed the Council, "certain it is, that his Country has been preserved by our successes ...". It was but reasonable therefore that "he should contribute something towards defraying the expences". The Nawab had mentioned a large amount, but without assessing the demand they felt that the Raja "should contribute something". This was the main argument for supporting the Nawab's demand.

As agreed in October 1761, it was decided to despatch a letter to the Raja. Apart from acquainting him of their intention to help the Nawab to collect his dues, it was also "to set forth in a proper light the motives of Justice upon which we proceed". The consequences that would necessarily follow an ill-timed obstinacy on his part were clearly pointed out. It was decided that a copy of the letter be sent to the Nawab to make him realise that their

1. Pres. & Coun. - Court of Dirs, 8 April, 1762, Mds. Letters Recd. Vol.IA.
desire was "rather to settle amicably with the Rajah than to bring matters to an open rupture with him". The Nawab was also asked to write to the Raja to the same effect.

The letter was nothing short of a demand on the Raja to comply with the Nawab's demand. There was no mention of the avenues for an amicable settlement, which they professed they were seeking. Indeed they claimed that their letter to the Nawab was to make him realise their eagerness to settle the matter without any hostilities. But, unfortunately, sufficient proof of such a gesture was totally absent in their letter to the Raja. He was not given any other alternative but to satisfy the Nawab's demand. Under the disguise of arbitrators, they were only playing the role of the Nawab's agent.

But soon enough, the British authorities had to descend from their emphatic tone to a moderate one of negotiation. In September 1761, as the preliminary part of the plan to help the Nawab to collect his dues, they had begun operations against the Killedar of Vellore, Murtaza Ali. They had hoped that "an example made of him may be a means of the other powers coming easily to terms". But the siege

of Vellore, quite contrary to their expectations, lasted for three months; and revealed many disadvantages and caused enormous expenses. Tanjore was known to be more powerful than Vellore. No doubt the feeling still existed that Tanjore's "ill-timed obstinacy should sooner or latter meet with adequate punishment". Perhaps it was better later than sooner and Pigot, the Governor of Madras, considered it proper "to try what can be done with the King of Tanjore by way of Treaty more especially as the expense of men, of stores, and of money, should force be used, will be unavoidably greater than we can well bear". This is the first mention of negotiations and quite probably, it would not have been tried at all, but for their experience at Vellore. Pigot would himself recommend moderation to the Nawab "as most consistent with the part I undertake to act in this negotiation...". Writing to the Nawab in January 1762, he observes, that he must be considered as a friend both to him and the Raja,

1. "when our army first took the field, neither ourselves, nor perhaps any of the tributary Rajahs... could have any notion, that the reduction of one fort only would have cost three months to such a force as lay before Vellore; an event so unexpected...". Pigot-Nawab, 2 Jan. 1762, Tanjore Appendix-Rous, Vol. I, p. 52.

2. "the first object was the reducing of Vellore... but in this we were disappointed... made a gallant defence which has cost us many men and stores...". - Pres. & Coun. - Court of Dirks, 15. Jan. 1762, Ms. Letters Rec'd, Vol. IA.

engaged to do justice between them. He hoped he would succeed, but should the Raja "obstinately refuse to accept of my friendship and mediation", he would "then compel him to submit by force". From what seemed an alliance with the Nawab in the shape of assistance to collect his dues, the British had now moved to the position of an arbitrator-cum-enforcer in the dispute.

The Nawab, quite naturally, resisted this mode of adjustment; "and rather than adopt it, would have postponed the enforcement of his claims, trusting to the chapters of accidents, and a time to come, at which the Raja might yield at discretion". As ruler of the Carnatic, it was in his interest to include a principality of some importance in his dominions. It is obvious from his persistence in seeking to obtain British assistance that annexing some territory to his own was the principal motive of his policy. But their mediation was not the kind of assistance which he had bargained for. It would not only mean a different trend to the whole dispute, but might also occasion the loss of his control over the matter. Moreover, it might also enable the Raja to settle matters amicably, which possibility the Nawab seemed eager to avoid. It is

not difficult to conclude that the Nawab's intention was to provoke the matter to a stage that was anything but friendly, when he would have the opportunity of gaining more advantages suitable to his schemes. He requested the Madras Government not to send their letter to the Raja then. He expressed his firm opinion that the Raja would not settle payment unless he was compelled; and the letter was not to be sent until the army was in a position to march.

In order to convince the Nawab of their genuine interest in negotiating a settlement, Pigot planned to meet him and discuss the matter. The Nawab was quite adamant in his views and insisted that his plan would be the best. The letter was only to be sent when the army was on its march to support the letter. Because of the distance, negotiations would take a long time and in any case he was opposed to that. He had already expressed a desire that the British army, marching on the expedition, should be placed under his command.

The Council felt that although negotiations "unsupported by the Presence of the army" might not have the desired effect, it was not to be "apprehended that any bad consequence or even Inconvenience would result...". It seemed the sensible attitude to adopt as there was at least a possibility of success. It was certainly advisable to settle with the Raja for a lesser sum, by way of negotiation, than that which might be obtained by compulsion, as "the Charges of the army and loss of men and stores would probably be of much greater Consideration than the Difference of the sum".

The Governor, in his letter to the Raja of 30 January 1762, acknowledged the fact that he had afforded greater assistance to Mohammed Ali during the war than any other prince in the Carnatic. But in so doing, he had only fulfilled his obligations, for the benefits arising from the large country he governed were substantial. It was well known "how heavy a charge the Nabob has sustained for more than ten years to subdue the common enemy". Everyone was enjoying the benefits of his success and it was but reasonable that everyone should "contribute to reimburse him the large sum he is indebted to my nation for their assistance".

The Governor's letter was not without a definite tone of threat and warning. While observing that it would be his great regret to be obliged to spill human blood, or forcibly dispossess any prince of his country, he did not fail to emphasise that "rebels must be punished if they will not hear reason". He quoted the case of Vellore and expressed his sincere hope that it would not be necessary to carry war into any other country, "particularly the fertile kingdom of Tanjore, which must suffer very severely from the hands of a superior enemy". The Raja was still left with no option but to comply with the Nawab's demands, failing which, he was warned in no uncertain terms, of the disastrous consequences to him and his Kingdom.

Despite this letter containing such a serious warning, the Raja's attitude did not seem favourable. In his reply, he gave an account of his services during the war and the ravages to which his country had been exposed. Far from having it in his power to pay any tribute, he was distressed for means to discharge the arrears to his own troops. The British felt that the Nawab's demand was perhaps extravagant;

but the Raja was "unreasonable in denying his ability to pay any Tribute to the Nabob". It was apparent that his intentions were to protract time, and if possible, "evade payment".

The method of negotiation had not proved as successful as expected; the Raja had not even accepted any grounds for negotiation and seemed, if pressed, ready to pursue the matter to the bitter end. As a matter of fact, the Raja's position was such that nothing but acceptance to pay the demand, and that alone, would have opened the way for negotiations. Such a step would naturally have defeated his attempts to have the amount reduced. The Council, however, was of the opinion that it should make a further attempt at negotiations. They desired to avoid extreme measures, in consideration of the Raja's services and assistance during the war. There still existed the major factor of the immense expense of marching the army to Tanjore. Consequently, he was once again informed of the reasonableness of his contributing towards the war expenses, "exhorting him at the same time to come to peaceable accommodation with the Nabob", and to avoid obliging them "to march a Force to compel him". Such a warning, in case of his non-compliance, had already been conveyed to him.

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But to make matters look more serious, the Council decided to place a body of troops at Chidambaram bordering the Tanjore Country\(^1\). It would make no difference in their expenses whether the troops were cantoned in one part of the province or the other. But such a move could "awe the King of Tanjore into a reasonable accommodation."\(^1\) In case of the Raja's continued defiance, the troops at Chidambaram could proceed against him\(^2\).

Despite their move to place troops at Chidambaram, the situation remained unchanged and the Raja had not returned any definite answer. It was still difficult to construe his silence as refusal, and commence hostilities, especially as the consideration of the expenses still weighed heavily on the Council. A position of stalemate had been reached and the Council recorded on 24 May, 1762, that there was no probability of its receiving a "determinate answer from the King of Tanjour by Writing..."\(^3\). If a peaceful settlement was to be still sought after, they were left only with the way of establishing personal contact with the Raja. Hence it was agreed that the most expedient method would be for one of the members of the Council to

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1. Pres.& Coun. - Court of Dir., 8 Apr.1762, Mds.Letters Recd., Vol.IA.
proceed to the Raja's Court. Such a visit would enable them to come to a final decision. Accordingly, Josias Du Pre, was recommended for the mission.¹

This decision to establish personal contact with the Raja, before allowing matters to take a drastic turn, resulted in a definite change in the dispute. As we have seen, the argument so far had been more than one sided and the letters to the Raja bore the semblance of an ultimatum to comply with the Nawab's demand. The Raja's hesitation to accept the British recommendations was justifiable. He was not willing to acquiesce in the demands of the Nawab and the British attitude did not seem sympathetic or considerate to his interests. They had been recommending the Raja to pay the Nawab's demands without giving him an opportunity to explain or discuss the demands, while the Nawab seemed determined to press for an enormous advantage and resisted British suggestions for reasonable accommodation. But with the proposed mission to Tanjore, the British arbitration became a reality. Instead of proceeding to extreme measures against the Raja, which had been the deliberate and unequivocal desire of the Nawab, they now opened the way for a reasonable accommodation.

It had now become more a matter of informing the Nawab than of seeking his acquiescence to the proposed mission. While informing the Nawab of the mission, the Governor failed not to stress the fact that the British alone could bring about the treaty between him and the Raja. He had already offered to act as the mediator and hence the negotiations for a treaty must be conducted by him. Moreover, he considered the Raja of Tanjore, a sovereign prince, with whom it was "neither your Interest nor mine to enter into a War if it can with prudence be avoided". It was customary, when two states disagreed, to call in a third, equally a friend of both, to judge between them. The method of corresponding with Tanjore, the Governor maintained, was "likely to be tedious". The best way, as had been decided by the Council, was to send a gentleman to Tanjore with "full power from you and from me to settle the affairs". Du Pre was also instructed to meet the Nawab and discuss the negotiations before leaving for Tanjore.

The British had now gained complete control of the affair. They now held the negotiations and the settlement of the dispute became their affair. They had originally entered into the dispute at the Nawab's request to help

him collect his dues. They had proclaimed their zeal for such an enterprise and held that the Raja, failing to comply with the Nawab's demands, should be put down. But now, they considered the Raja a sovereign Prince, a fact which had till now escaped their attention, and decided that they alone could mediate a settlement between them. Though their desire for such an accommodation seems genuine, their reasons for it are questionable. It certainly was not born out of any consideration, much less an interest, for the Raja of Tanjore. Their sole object was to avoid an open rupture with the Raja, which would have entailed enormous expenses. The Nawab, no doubt, was willing to bear such expenses, but it was not in their interest to let him increase his debts. Moreover, the Nawab had suggested the whole plan with the sole motive of promoting his own importance and influence. Should this be achieved, it was possible that it might alter the political situation in the Carnatic, which was then quite conducive to the Company's interests. Above all, it was of greater benefit to them to play the role of arbitrator than that of a mere party to a project.

There was still no certainty that the Raja would comply with the Nawab's large demand, but whereas the Council had
originally backed it with great threats, now they declared that it seemed to them "to have been intended to admit of a very great abatement"\(^1\). Du Pre was asked to support the demand to the utmost but not to break off the negotiations on any account. It remained the main object of his mission to obtain from the Raja as large a sum of money as possible in ready money or bills. But where the Nawab had demanded a crore and twenty two lakhs of rupees, Du Pre was told not to accept anything less than twenty lakhs. If he could achieve this, he was then empowered to assure the Raja that no further demand would be made on him by the Nawab, except such annual acknowledgement as had long been paid to the Nawabs of the Carnatic. If any other demands were made, beyond these, the British would defend him against them\(^1\).

Had it been in the Nawab's power to act on his own or to refuse the British efforts, he might well have rejected Pigot's move. Though he had originally sought British assistance to settle what he considered his own affair, he was now told that it was a different case, the solution of which was possible only through British mediation. His reluctance

to accept the proposed mission is evident from the fact that on the very day on which he intimated to the Governor his approval of Du Pre's mission, he tried to persuade them to adhere to his original proposal. The British troops were still in cantonment at Chidambaram. He suggested that they should take advantage of the opportunity and compel the Raja to pay his demand. But soon he realised that there was not much chance of his bringing about any change in Company policy. Indeed he was not left with much choice, for the advice of Du Pre's mission was sent to him only through that gentleman himself on his way to Tanjore. Under these circumstances, the Nawab could only agree to the mission and he informed the Raja of his readiness to leave his demand to "be settled by our mutual friend, the Governor of Madras", who was sending Du Pre, adding that if the Raja did likewise "it will be a means of happiness to us all".

Du Pre left Trichinopoly on 20 June and reached Tanjore on 22 June 1762. He had an audience with the Raja the next day. He discovered that the Raja was raising an army, and of greater consequence to the British, had engaged

the Marathas to enter the Carnatic to his assistance. "Everything wears the appearance of war", observed Du Pre, though the Raja seemed "truly affected with his situation, almost to a Degree of Despondency". The Nawab claimed seven lakhs of rupees as annual tribute from the Raja. He maintained that this was the agreed amount in the days of Anwar ud din and as the Raja was still in possession of the same territory as in the days of his father, he should continue to pay the same amount. He also desired another two lakhs as Durbar charges, and Coillady to be turned over to him. Du Pre was of the opinion that considering the value of the Tanjore Country the demands of tribute and Durbar charges were not exhorbitant. But it was only to be expected that the Raja would not agree to the amount, as the tribute was only two lakhs by the Mughul accounts. Even if he was brought to pay the amount demanded by the Nawab, Du Pre felt that he would not agree to cede Coillady.

For the Raja asserted that it was originally with the Kings of Trichinopoly and was bought by his ancestors. It was captured by Chanda Sahib, but after its recapture, the Nawab himself had it annexed to the Tanjore Kingdom for the grant of which the Raja produced the seal. The Nawab himself had not dealt with Du Pre very openly and indeed his demands were not exactly corroborated by evidence.

Another point of dispute was over Arni. Though Arni had remained with the Raja for several years, the Nawab wanted possession of it claiming that it was originally part of the Carnatic. "The more I reflect on the state of the Country", observes Du Pre, "the more I incline to wish for an accommodation here even if Concessions be made in respect to Arni, the future tribute, and Coillady, for indeed they are founded in Justice". This mission proved very beneficial to the Raja in that the British could understand his arguments against the Nawab's demand, the more so because he was given an opportunity to explain his points. The Nawab's demand for seven lakhs had already been paid by the Raja for which he provided proof with bills. He also had an authentic grant by which he had been released payment of ten years tribute. These were circumstances,

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Du Pre rightly felt, "which the Nawab should not have concealed from me"\(^1\).

The Raja proposed to pay a total of twenty seven lakhs of rupees to the Nawab, twenty two lakhs to cover all arrears, and five lakhs as a present subject to the following conditions. The British should procure for him a discharge from the Nawab for all tribute up to July 1762. The Nawab should also promise not to demand any more tribute than that stated in the Mughul accounts. The fort of Arni and its killedar should be placed in his possession\(^2\).

These conditions appeared quite satisfactory to the British but not so to the Nawab. Though he agreed to the proposals, he considered them not as advantageous as might have been obtained\(^3\). It now actually became a matter for the British to criticise the Nawab for his attitude. Pigot took the liberty of observing to the Nawab that regarding Tanjore he seemed "much more desirous of making a Conquest of his [Raja's] Country, than of settling amicably with him..."\(^4\). Though the Nawab disapproved of every article

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of the proposed terms, yet it was evident that he would accept the sum the Raja had offered. Pigot told the Nawab that he seemed to wish to take the money "but still be left at liberty and resolve in your own mind to attack him whenever you should find yourself able to do so".1 It was clear to the Governor that the Nawab's future plans extended far beyond the limits of his power and his objectives were contrary to his true interests.2 He was strongly advised to settle affairs on a just and equitable footing as "the sums levied by former Nabobs by oppression and force of arms cannot be brought as an example".3

It was quite beyond the Nawab to do anything but accept the proposals. They were not exactly the same as he hoped to gain when he originally put forward his proposals. But matters had changed to such an extent that even his allies and staunch supporters, the British, doubted his motives in constantly refusing a settlement with the Raja. Any refusal on his part would certainly not be advantageous to him; but an acceptance still left him with future opportunities to execute his schemes. In the circumstances, the

Nawab was almost compelled to give his assent to the proposals\(^1\). Du Pro was asked to proceed to Tanjore once again to get the proposals executed by the Raja and to be guaranteed by the British\(^2\).

Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the Nawab and the Raja in October 1762. The Raja was to pay twenty seven lakhs, five lakhs as a present\(^3\), and twenty two lakhs to cover all arrears - three lakhs on signing the treaty and the rest before 1764. He was also to pay four lakhs annually to the Nawab. In return the Nawab confirmed the possession of Coillady and Elangad to the Raja. In case of either party failing in the performance of the article, the British would "to the utmost of their power, assist the other party to compel him who shall fail to fulfill his agreement and to render due satisfaction for his failure therein"\(^4\).

1. The Nawab was not agreeable to the treaty and Pigot "took his Chop and put it with his own hand to the treaty":- Nawab - Palk, 8 Oct., 1776, Palk Ms - (Ed.) Love, p.305
3. This sum is not mentioned in the treaty for "It was not the custom, in transactions between the Indian powers, to mention in public writings the sums given as presents...". Of this amount of five lakhs, one lakh was distributed among the Raja's principal officers as a present from the Nawab and the rest was "placed to the credit of his account with the Company":- Pigot - Du Pre, 20 Sept., 1762 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.I, p.80.
What in the beginning appeared as a matter of the British helping their dependent, the Nawab, to collect his dues, had resulted in their gaining another dependent, the Raja of Tanjore. They were now the absolute interpreters and guarantors of the treaty, by which they could not only demand the due compliance with the conditions of it by both parties, but could also threaten the very existence of whichever party failed therein. They had managed to secure this advantage without the least expense, which would have been very great, had they really entered into a war with Tanjore. The question of expenses had been the primary motive behind their anxieties for a peaceful settlement, for they did not consider themselves "by any means in a condition to enter into such a war, with the small number of Troops" they had on the Coast. Moreover, a rupture with the Raja might well have brought other powers into the province in assistance to him, and "where such a scene would have ended, cannot easily be foreseen". Considering all these, they could not "but reflect with satisfaction that the Treaty is so happily settled".

The Court of Directors considered the treaty between the Nawab and the Raja "as an event so much to be desired" that they could not but be highly pleased with it. The avoidance of a rupture with the Raja, which would have engaged them in the quarrel as an ally to the Nawab, was of great benefit. The twenty seven lakhs recovered from the Raja by the treaty was in fact "an happy acquisition to the company" as it was to be applied towards the discharge of the Nawab's debt.

Though the British considered that the terms were favourable to the Raja, "all circumstances weighed", they were "no less so to the Nabob". He certainly could not have entertained hopes of recovering a rupee from the Raja without their help. Nevertheless, the outcome of the dispute was totally different to his expectations. Not only was he restrained in his aggressive policy towards Tanjore, which till then was solely subject to his discretion, but he had also lost his absolute control over

2. Though the treaty specified the amount to be paid to the Nawab, the Raja was desirous of paying the actual amount to the British. He was obviously suspicious of the Nawab's accounts. Consequently the Nawab was asked to write to the Raja to pay the amount to the Company as part of his debt to them - Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 11 Oct. 1762 - Mds.Mil.& Sec. Proceedings, Vol.48.
the Raja. The Raja still paid his annual tribute, but with British protection and supervision. It looked as though the Nawab had lost his tributary to the British.

Having failed to achieve his major object in the dispute, the Nawab hoped that with the amount promised by the Raja, he could at least lessen his financial dependence upon the Company. But the Madras Government would not allow him even the semblance of independence. Though they were the guarantors of the treaty and the Raja was to pay according to its conditions, they looked upon "the security we have for the Nabob's debt (by the possession of his forts) to be more certain than the promise of the King of Tanjore".

The definite advantages of the treaty were to the British. They had shown their willingness to help the Nawab without entering into hostilities or incurring expenses. Their mediation was with the specific view to avoid expenses, and in their concern for their own interests they had failed to achieve the most important object, the complete pacification and agreement of the parties. They were aware of the disagreement between the Nawab and

1. Pres. & Coun. - Court of Dir's., 9 Nov. 1762, Mad. Letters Read., Vol. IA.
the Raja when the treaty was concluded, but hoped that further disputes would not arise. Disputes did arise and it was only natural that they would arise between parties who had agreed to a treaty only because of the circumstances. The treaty was not based on any strong foundation of friendship or understanding and it was doomed to lose its significance and purpose.

One important outcome of the treaty was the settlement of the amount of tribute to be paid by the Raja to the Nawab. Though this reduced the Raja to a tributary of Arcot, his status, in fact, was left completely ambiguous. As an independent prince, the British had received Devikottai from him. His assistance during the Carnatic Wars was sought and obtained as an independent power. The British had mediated a peace between him and the Nawab as their intervention was necessary between two independent powers. Yet the Raja was made to agree to the treaty as tributary of Arcot. Such a questionable position led to various interpretations.

Another important outcome was that what had been a Royal tax paid by Tanjore to the Imperial Court at Delhi

had become a tribute to be paid to Arcot. The Emperor had "expressly commanded" the Raja to pay the tribute to no one but the Court of Delhi¹. The Nawab had claims only as the assistant of the Subahdar, who in his turn was the Imperial Representative in the south; "and Governor Pigot was the first Englishman who ventured to propose or even hint at coercive measures, for compelling the King of Tanjore to pay this tribute to the Nawab of Arcot"². Once the Nawab was established in his right to collect tribute from the Raja, he found it an opportunity to complain about any delay in payment and to consider it as well as a source of revenue for his needs; and in both ways to precipitate affairs to suit his schemes of aggrandisement. Events following in the next decade bear ample proof to such effects.

1. "Don't pay the tribute money to any. About this and other affairs you are to apply to my Court". - Emperor-Raja (Quoted in) Raja-Floyer, Recd. 9 Jan., 1751 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.I, p.5.
The treaty of 1762 had left the clash of interests between the Nawab and the Raja of Tanjore a source of perpetual contention. It had, no doubt, defined the terms of their pecuniary relations; but in leaving everything vague and disputable a want of foresight was conspicuous. The necessity for the treaty was well known to the British. It was not just a tribute from the Raja that the Nawab was after, but the kingdom of Tanjore itself.

As guarantors of the treaty, the British held the control of the relations between the two. Had they been absolutely unbiased, they could have perhaps established and maintained a certain amount of cordiality between them. But their position in reality was just that of protectors of the interests of the Nawab, who, far from contemplating schemes privately, always hoped to achieve his ambitions with the aid of British arms. The British themselves were not unaware of this fact or that their strength and safety in the Carnatic largely depended upon their safeguarding the Nawab's dependence upon them. However, they were not willing to be a party to his schemes, unless it was to their advantage as well.
The Nawab had made no secret of his hopes of adding Tanjore to his dominions. His demand on the Raja seems to have been made with the sole motive of using it as a pretext to provoke hostilities. But the treaty, which he opposed and impeded in no small measure, had at least checked him in the question of financial dues from Tanjore. But he was not to give up his ambition, just because he had been checked in one direction. He seemed to have adopted the attitude that Tanjore must be added to his dominions at any cost. Undoubtedly, the British had not proved favourable to his plans; but he knew that policy could well change with personalities in the British Carnatic, and that he had only to wait for his opportunity.

The Nawab had decided to do everything possible to bring his relations with Tanjore to a crisis, when a rupture with the Raja would be a measure that the British would adopt without his persuasion. As it was, he could not convince them that the Raja was inimical to his as well as to their interests. If he could provoke the Raja to some hostile action, it would then prove to them the reasonableness of his views.

The first opportunity to provoke a rupture with the Raja came in 1763 when Yusuf Khan, the Governor of Madura
and Tinnevelly, rose in revolt against the Nawab. Whatever motives instigated him to revolt, the British, in support of the Nawab's government, were obliged to reduce him. The siege of Madura commenced in June 1763, and the place was taken by October 1764. During the whole of this period, the Nawab seems to have laboured to provoke the Raja into hostilities with the aim of adding Tanjore to his dominions.

Early in 1763, the Nawab complained to the British that the Raja was assisting Yusuf Khan. It is true that the Raja's sympathies were with Yusuf Khan. It was well known that the Raja was apprehensive of the ambitious designs of the Nawab who wished to treat him as he had treated Murtaza Ali of Vellore. Yusuf Khan was aware of the injuries the Raja had sustained from the Nawab and hoped that he was sufficiently irritated to join him.

The Nawab did not in 1763 substantiate his claim that the Raja was implicated in Yusuf Khan's rebellion. However

2. "If you make it the interest of Your dependents to wish well to your enemies, it is not at all surprising that the Tanjore Rajah should in his heart be a friend to the rebel ...". - Palk-Nawab, 24 May, 1764 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.I, p.204.
3. "... as perhaps he is in dread of Your resentment, seeing that we have upon our hands more than we can well manage, you are not even scrupulous of increasing this burden". Palk-Nawab, 24 May, 1764 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.I, p.204.
in 1776, the Nawab did produce three letters which he claimed were incriminating.

In the first letter the Raja had written to Yusuf Khan advising him that he "should take security from some man of consequence at Madras and then you'll be safe", and suggesting that since he knew the disposition of the British, he should go to Madras and personally approach the Madras Government. Such a suggestion that aid might be sought from a third party could have been interpreted as a hostile move by the Raja had the third party been other than the Company. But since everyone knew the closeness of the ties between the Nawab and the Company the advice of the Raja, though painfully pinpointing the Nawab's subservience to the Company, could scarcely be used as proof of active enmity. To the British, of course, Pratap Singh's letter must have been very acceptable, and further proof of the confidence reposed in them by their faithful Tanjorean ally.

The second letter produced by the Nawab showed that Yusuf Khan had plainly hoped to secure the assistance of

1. Clearly in the case of all three letters there had been time to falsify or forge, while that of Pratap Singh to Merchant could no longer be denied by the Raja since he was conveniently dead.

Raja Tulaji, who had succeeded Pratap Singh in December 1763: "the great Raja Pertaub Singh showed me great favour and friendship, and I expect the same from you ..."¹. There is no doubt that both Pratap Singh and Tulaji were friendly to Yusuf Khan, but there is nothing in the letter to suggest that the latter was getting help from Tanjore.

The third supposedly incriminating letter was from a French officer Monsieur Merchant stating that he had been sent by Pratap Singh to assist Yusuf Khan². It is true that Merchant was in the Raja's service until 1763 and had then joined Yusuf Khan; but it is difficult to say whether he was actually sent by Pratap Singh to assist Yusuf Khan. Pratap Singh himself had written to the Madras Government in early 1763, explaining that after the conclusion of the treaty between him and the Nawab in 1762, he had allowed the sepoys and the French in his service, whom he had disbanded, to join Yusuf Khan; but then, he was not aware of Yusuf Khan's intentions to rebel. Soon after, he promised the British that he would not send Yusuf Khan any assistance³. Apart from this unintended support to Yusuf

¹. Yusuf Khan-Tulaji (n.d) - Letters of Mohammed Ali Khan to the Court of Directors (Section III), p.49 - Affairs of the East Indies.
². Merchant-Tulaji (n.d) - Letters of Mohammed Ali Khan to the Court of Directors (Section III), p.50 - Affairs of the East Indies.
Khan, the Raja gave assistance to the British and the Nawab throughout the operations against Madura.

The Governor wrote to the Raja on 6 December 1763 that on account of heavy rains the British had suspended their operations but that the siege would be continued. He therefore particularly desired the Raja to continue his assistance, "if possible more than you have hitherto done". In January 1764, Tulaji, in answer to a letter written to his father, observed that a body of his horse had attended the army from the beginning of the expedition. On 19 March, the Nawab, while informing the Governor of his scheme for dispersing the rebels in Tinnevelly observed that "300 horse from the King of Tanjore are arrived here this day". In a letter from the Governor to the Raja dated 25 April, it was said that three hundred Tanjorean horse had joined the British Forces before Madura, and "lately double that number".

5. With reference to this, Hill states that this was an assistance which the Raja "had at last found himself compelled to send" (Yusuf Khan, The Rebel Commandant, pp.188-189). It would seem to imply that this was the first assistance from Tanjore, which is not true. Tanjorean forces were taking part in the operations from the beginning and Governor Palk himself, in his letter to the Raja of 6 December 1763, acknowledged his continued assistance.
There is ample evidence to prove that at no part of the siege was co-operation and assistance lacking from the Raja. As a matter of fact, the Tanjorean horse, with the British cavalry under Captain Thomas Fitzgerald, played a prominent part in repulsing "several attacks made by a superior force from the fort" of Madura. Yusuf Khan himself seems to have counted upon the defection of the Tanjoreans during the siege. But they fought extremely well, "as well as Europeans." Campbell, the British commander at Madura, gave each man a present and saluted the Tanjorean force with nine guns in acknowledgement of their valour.

Trichinopoly during this period, as in the days of the Carnatic Wars, depended very largely upon Tanjore for provisions. Any obstacle to supplies created on the part of the Raja would not only have put into confusion an army despatched from there to the south, but might also have proved fatal to such an army. During the whole campaign, there is no evidence to show that the Raja failed to support the allied army; on the contrary, he co-operated vigorously.

1. Yusuf Khan, the Rebel Commandant - Hill, pp. 188-189.
in the operations against Yusuf Khan. Thus, though the
Raja was well aware that the Nawab hoped to embroil Tanjore
and to secure British assistance against both Madura and
Tanjore, he showed himself entirely faithful to the treaty
of 1762. His steady co-operation with the British forces
committed against Yusuf Khan made nonsense of the Nawab's
accusations of collaboration with the rebel.

While the operations against Yusuf Khan were in progress,
the Nawab was afforded another opportunity to try to add
Tanjore to his territories. Raja Pratap Singh died quite
unexpectedly on 16th December 1763. While informing the
Madras Council of this, John Wood observed that it was thought
that Pratap Singh had been murdered "by his son and Monagee,
between whom there had been a long quarrel subsisting". He
added that "two days before the King's Death, a son of
a former Rajah of Tanjour who was kept there a state Prisoner
and a very promising Youth, was put to Death ... by the same
hands". This information had been supplied by the Nawab.

1. The date of Pratap Singh's death is wrongly given by Hill
   as 15 December (Yusuf Khan the Rebel Commandant, p.165).
   The death occurred on 16 December according to John Wood,
   the Nawab and the Madras Consultations.
2. "Yesterday morning Partebar Sing Rajah of Tanjore died
   suddenly". - Nawab-Palk, 17 Dec. 1763 - Home Misc.Series,
4. "I am requested by the Nabob to acquaint you ...". - Wood-
   & Sec.Proceedings, Vol.49.
who hastened on the following day to write in the same vein to Palk. In his letter he passes easily from saying that it is "not without suspicion that his son [Tulaji] and Monagee were the perpetrators", to a downright reference to the "strange and cruel murder" — and does so without adducing any evidence or proof. After thus sowing suspicion that Pratap Singh had been murdered, the Nawab goes on to cast doubt on the loyalty of the new Raja: "from the incapacity of the young Rajah and the ambition and impetuosity of Monagee who will be absolute in the name of the young Rajah, after the example of Haidar Naigue, no dependence is to be put on their promises". And then, once again, he moves directly from suspicion to certainty declaring that Tulaji and Monaji will use British failure to suppress Yusuf Khan as occasion for acting against them.

What then is the remedy? He answers: "Prudence dictates that we be beforehand with them if possible in the measures to be pursued before they are fully settled and their power established".

To all this prompting by the Nawab the British turned a deaf ear, refusing to view the manner of Pratap Singh's death with any apparent concern. The Council recorded their opinion that whatever might be suspected, it would not "be prudent for the Nabob or Us to take any Notice thereof, as it might possibly interrupt the present Expedition which must employ our whole Attention". They likewise dismissed Wood's report of correspondence between Tanjore, Yusuf Khan and Haidar Ali as without moment. Instead they agreed to send a letter to Tulaji "condoling him on the Death of his Father and congratulating him upon his Succession and expressing our desire of maintaining the good Friendship subsisting between the Government of Tanjore and the English", and a further letter to the Nawab "recommending him to the same cautious Measures".

Accordingly, on 22 December the Governor wrote to the Nawab pointing out that any steps to interfere with the succession in Tanjore would cause discussions and disputes which would naturally interrupt the course of the expedition against Yusuf Khan. Since that expedition must be prosecuted wholeheartedly by the Nawab, he therefore urged

"the most cautious methods to be observed with regard to Tanjore". He thus made it clear that he was not ready to change his policy towards Tanjore because of the Nawab's suspicions. He passed no opinion on the validity of those suspicions, commenting merely that if foul means had been used to procure Pratap Singh's death, then doubtless secret parties would be formed against the usurpers. If that happened, Palk commented, then they would have "a more favourable opportunity to bring the offender to justice". Meanwhile he would observe the most wary conduct and accept the Raja's death as having been natural. As for the correspondence suspected between the Tanjore party and Haidar and Yusuf Khan, he was of the opinion that it would not in any manner affect the affairs of Tanjore or "our views for the one is at Present too far off engaged in other matters and the other ... will very soon be in our power".

Once again the Nawab had failed to obtain British support for a scheme of interference in the affairs of Tanjore, tempting though succession questions always were. He had therefore to accept Tulaji's succession, and on

The Cauvery Delta

R. Kolladam

R. Cauvery

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BAY OF BENGAL
31 December he duly sent his letter of congratulation to the new Raja. The story of the murder of Pratap Singh was never heard of again. Palk had made it clear that if murder was proved he would be ready in future to reconsider the question, but it was never once mentioned by the Nawab in all his accusations against the Rajas of Tanjore.

While the Nawab had been thus unavailingly seeking to bring about the Raja’s destruction upon political issues, he had also been trying to weaken Tanjore’s economy. To see how he attempted this, it is necessary to understand the working of the irrigation system upon which much of Tanjore’s prosperity depended. The river Cauvery, about six miles to the north-west of Trichinopoly, divides into two branches, of which the northern takes the name of Kolladam and joins the sea at Devikkottai, and the southern, retaining the name Cauvery, passes through Tanjore. However the two branches, after flowing apart for about twenty miles, converge again forming the island of Srirangam, and are only prevented from joining one another by a narrow neck of land, the Mound of Cauvery. At this point the Kolladam, the northern branch, has a straighter course and

2. See map opposite.
a lower level so that any destruction of the Mound would lead to a loss into the Kolladam of much of the water flowing in the Cauvery. Such a loss would in turn entail the breakdown of the great network of irrigation channels drawn from the Cauvery by the Grand Anicut, a weir across the Cauvery constructed in the 11th Century A.D.\(^1\), upon which much of Tanjore's agriculture depends.

The maintenance of the Mound of Cauvery was of paramount importance to the Kingdom of Tanjore, and the Madras authorities reported that "for many years past the Banks had been kept up by the King of Tanjore and Repairs made occasionally whenever he thought proper"\(^2\). However, the Nawab, as sovereign of Trichinopoly, could claim authority over the Mound, and by March 1763 the Tanjore Raja was complaining of great distress threatening his country "for want of water from the River Cavery's discharging more than usual into the Kolladam"\(^3\), and was appealing to the Madras authorities to approach the Nawab on his behalf for permission to repair the banks. But when the Madras Council did write, the Nawab long delayed an answer to

\(^1\) India and Pakistan - Spate, pp.717-720.
their letter\(^1\), while his vakil claimed that the repairs, if undertaken, would "Cause the Waters to rise to such a Height in the little Cavery as to endanger the Fort of Trichinopoly ..."\(^2\). It was clear that the Nawab was anxious to avoid repairs to the Mound, or at least to defer them as long as possible. The only explanation for such an attitude was his enmity towards the Raja of Tanjore.

The dispute involved two points. The first was the sovereignty over the Mound which undisputably belonged to the Nawab. The second was the question of the preservation and repair of the Mound, in whose adequate preservation the Raja could justifiably claim to possess an interest\(^3\).

Unhappily, as James Mill put it, "ignorantly and awkwardly, and not without English co-operation, they blended them together in one question; and the dispute became interminable"\(^4\). The situation became a delicate one. The Nawab claimed that the right to undertake repairs was inherent in his sovereignty. But unfortunately, along with


\(^3\) "Kavery ... where it is always in the Nabob's Power to ruin in a Manner the Tanjore territory as Its Cultivation entirely depends on the Water that flows in this River". - Pres.& Coun.-Court of Dirs, 20 Oct.1764 - Mds.Letters Recd. Vol.2.

his right to repair the mound he tacitly included the right to omit all repairs whenever he pleased. The British, though guarantors of the treaty between the Nawab and the Raja and anxious to encourage good will between them, would not take a definite stand without further information. They could only reply to the Raja that they would seek the liberty he desired "if it might be done without prejudice to the Nabob", and instruct Andrew Newton at Trichinopoly to make himself "master of the subject on both sides".

Newton, after studying the situation, reported to Madras on 25 April 1763 that the matter of repairs was of great consequence and required immediate attention. The absolute need, he observed, "of a supply of water to the Tanjore country by the lesser Cavery is obvious from known experience, and to anyone who is the least acquainted with the country ..."; he therefore urged that repair of the breaches should be undertaken at once. However, even with this clear recommendation from their agent on the spot, the Madras Council recorded that they found it impossible "to come to the true knowledge of the good or ill consequences that may attend making the Repairs", and they thought

it "unreasonable to persuade the Nabob to permit those repairs to be done if the Damage to be apprehended there- from be so great" as he had represented. It seems obvious that the Council's hesitancy was not based on any real doubt about the need to reinforce the Mound, but rather on the political consideration that intervention would necessarily breed antagonism. To the Nawab therefore they wrote in May reminding him of the need to maintain good relations with the Raja and requesting him to allow the Raja to make such repairs as might be done without prejudice to Trichinopoly. In effect they left control of the situation firmly in the hands of the Nawab.

The Nawab informed the Raja that he would carry out the repairs himself but the eruption of Yusuf Khan's activities in June 1763, the subsequent operations against him and the Succession in Tanjore in December, made the question of repairs to the Mound a lesser issue. By February 1764 however, when the harvest was completed, Tulaji realised that the lack of repairs to the Mound had resulted in a heavy fall in his revenue. He found that the Nawab in fact had employed "about 25 or 30 coolies at the Coleroon and the Cavery rivers, to bring sand and throw it

there"; and was naturally concerned that "if this business is thus carried on, it will take up two or three years to finish it". It was not in his interest to delay the repairs any longer and he once again complained to the Madras authorities about the Nawab's attitude "in not suffering the Banks of the River Cavery to be repaired, notwithstanding his frequent solicitations".

The reaction of the Madras Council to the renewal of the Cauvery dispute was one of annoyance at the prospect of having to commit themselves to any positive action. In their Consultations of 16 April 1764 they recorded their distaste, observing that it concerned the Nawab "particularly at this Juncture to be careful not to make the King his Enemy ...", while it was "undoubtedly much in his power to prejudice our Affairs". It was clear that both sides had exaggerated their grievances at a time when Yusuf Khan's rebellion ought to have brought them into close co-operation. But the Council were still most unwilling to intervene actively, contenting themselves with ordering that letters be addressed to both the Raja and the Nawab "Setting forth the advantages that will accrue to them both from maintaining a strict Friendship with each other".

This proved to be no more than wishful thinking: stressing the advantages of cordiality would not settle the dispute. In the absence of any definite British pressure, the Nawab was quite happy to let the matter rest, but for the Raja it was vital to force the Nawab to undertake the necessary repairs. His only chance was to bring some pressure to bear upon the Nawab, and that was only possible through the British. In May, therefore, the Raja appealed to the Council again, and sent his vakil to Madras to explain the immediate necessity of repairing the banks. The Nawab at the same time repeated his complaints of the unreasonableness of the Raja's requests and how prejudicial the repairs would be to his country. Thus assailed from both quarters at once, the Council was finally driven to recognise that the question of repairs to the Mound must be faced and settled. They therefore directed James Bourchier at Trichinopoly, to go to the spot and "make the most particular enquiry into the Affair" so that they might decide how far Tulaji's request could be complied with. Bourchier's going also had the additional advantage "as his being there may prevent the Nabob and the King from pursuing any steps to our prejudice."

Before Bourchier's report, the Council seems to have believed that both sides were almost equally in the wrong: that the Raja was requiring more than the Nawab could grant "without endangering his own Country and the Nabob is perhaps too tenacious of his own Privileges to comply with the King's request as far as in reason he ought". Bourchier however, like Newton before him, was quite decided that repairs should be carried out, and the Nawab should be pressed to permit them without any further delay. He made it clear that closing the breaches could not injure Trichinopoly while leaving them open would be of great detriment to Tanjore. On 18 June 1764, the Council at last agreed that the Nawab should be "pressed to order it to be set about immediately or give permission to the King to get them repaired". Major Campbell, who was then at Trichinopoly, was asked to "enforce our request all in his power".

Bourchier had made it clear that the repairs could cause no injury to the Nawab's territories. When therefore the Nawab still failed to grant permission for repairs to

the mound to be undertaken, there could be little doubt that he was actuated by malice towards Tanjore. In August 1764 Bourchier complained of the Nawab's wilful delay\(^1\), and on 27 August the Council at last recognised that the delay was caused only by "obstinacy", and that the Nawab could have no other motive "than an unaccountable desire of coming to an open rupture" with the Raja\(^2\). But as "such an Event must undoubtedly be very Detrimental to the Company's affairs", it became necessary that some measure should be taken to prevent it. They decided to insist upon the Nawab to repair the banks himself or allow the Raja to do it, as they were thoroughly convinced that the Raja's request was not "only reasonable, but absolutely necessary, for the safety of the Pagoda and Island of Syringham, as well as for the Cultivation of the Tanjore Country, and can be no ways prejudicial to the Nabob's Districts"\(^2\).

Even now, when the British realised the justice and the necessity behind the Raja's request, their attitude was not as stern as was justified by the case. They agreed to let the Raja have the right to repair the banks, but tried to

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negotiate the matter with the Nawab instead of taking control of it themselves. The Nawab did not give his consent for repairs until January 1765. Even then he had not accepted the justice and reason of the Raja's case. Governor Palk had had to undertake a long personal interview with the Nawab, stressing the need to maintain friendship, before he had with "some difficulty prevailed on him to permit the King to repair the Breaches in the Cavery ... 1.

The Madras Council in reporting to the Directors the successful outcome of their diplomacy, expressed the hope that it would enable them to preserve "that Harmony which is so much for their mutual Benefit, as well as the Interests of our Honourable Masters" 2. It would seem that they still laboured the delusion that the Nawab would accept their view of the common interest. But while the Council hoped for a common front with the Raja and the Nawab against Yusuf Khan within and their other enemies outside the Carnatic, a triple alliance, the Nawab, looking to purely dynastic aims, viewed the Raja as a tributary to be oppressed and not as an ally. Curiously enough, the Court of

Directors showed a clearer awareness of the true situation than did the local Council. In April 1765 though they argued that the Nawab, if aware of his true interests, "should be desirous above all things of maintaining peace and friendship with the King of Tanjou", they recognised that he was unreasonably opposing the repair of the Mound. They reminded the Council therefore that "the Nabob's existence as such depends on the strength of the Company", and while recommending a "respectful decency" in the Council's negotiations with the Nawab, stressed that they should have shown "a firmness becoming the power you represent ...". And in a later letter of December 1765, after they had heard of the Nawab's acquiescence in repairs, they recorded their satisfaction "whether he is sincere or not in these professions, it is well that he seems so", and ordered the Madras Council "to keep him in that temper and preventing his attempting any thing unjustly to the Rajah's prejudice".

It seemed in 1765 that the Nawab had abandoned his plans for provoking Raja Tulaji into some act of enmity, so

securing British intervention on his side against Tanjore. Early in 1767, however, the Nawab renewed his scheme, this time by opening a channel near the upper Anicut, west of Srirangam. This diverted the waters of the Cauvery into the Kolladam, greatly damaged the Anicut, and inflicted "great prejudice" on Tanjore\(^1\). It must be noted that this took place soon after Palk left the administration of the Madras Government. It is clear that the Nawab had realised that under Palk's control, his schemes did not have much chance of British approval.

The Raja had complained for months about this latest injury while the Nawab did nothing but make unfulfilled promises\(^2\). The Council, however, were in no mood to see the painfully settled dispute re-opened, and they pressed the Nawab vigorously to give the Raja all due satisfaction. They were not ready to watch the Nawab try "to make all his neighbours his enemies", while Arcot, Tanjore and Madras all lay under threat of attack by Haidar Ali\(^3\). The Nawab was driven to realise that the British would not permit him to

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2. "The President ... understands from the King's vacquil, that this has been a subject of Complaint for these Ten months past, and the Nabob had repeatedly promised to redress it" - Ft. St. Geo. Cons., 15 July 1767 - Mds. Mil. & Sec. Proceedings, Vol. 59.
violate the agreement already arrived at, whoever might be Governor at Madras. The incident worked, in fact, in favour of the Raja, for the Council, realising the threat posed, abandoned negotiation with the Nawab in favour of direct control. The Council informed the Court of Directors that they "would be careful by their interposition to prevent it causing a breach between them"¹, and the Directors in reply told the Council to lose no opportunity of raising in the Raja "the idea of a firm dependence on our Friendship ..."². The Directors had seen the danger that the Nawab would "ever be seeking pretences to provoke him [Raja] in order to draw you into the quarrel in hopes of annexing" some part of Tanjore, and their instructions to Madras were clear². The Nawab never did attempt to interfere with the water supply from the Cauvery again.

The check on this issue did not, of course, bring about any change in the Nawab's disposition towards the Raja. The more he was urged to be friendly with the Raja, the more he pursued his hostile ambition. Thus in August 1766, he complained to the British that the Raja was maintaining a correspondence with Haidâr Ali, was sending presents to the

Nizam, and what was worse, was doing so without informing the Nawab. It was true that the Raja had a vakil at Haidar's court, but unfortunately for the Nawab the Madras authorities were well aware of this, for it was the Governor himself who had desired the vakil "to procure intelligence" whence the flow of letters. The Council likewise were sure that the Raja's presents to the Nizam were "not with any bad view". The Nawab might justly have objected to such transactions being kept secret from him by his two allies, but he dropped the matter without comment once he saw that he could not embroil the British with the Raja over the matter. The Council on their part proceeded to recommend the Nawab "not to suffer such little jealousies to interrupt the Friendship so necessary to the Mutual advantage of his and the Tan jour Government".

The Raja was well aware of the Nawab's attitude towards him, and of the danger to Tanjore from Arcot. He knew that his security lay in the British guarantee of 1762, and that peace with the Nawab depended upon the continuance of British friendship. In December 1766, therefore he again declared

2. "I am well satisfied of Your inclination to assist Madras on every emergency, ... convinces me more and more of Your sincere friendship and attachment to the prosperity of the Company". Palk-Raja, 18 April 1766 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.I, p.183.
his sincere attachment to the British and his hope that they would "continue to oblige the Nabob to the faithful Performance of the Treaty"\(^1\). So far his trust and reliance seemed well placed, and before leaving for England Palk wrote to the Raja that he would "represent to the Company, in a proper manner, the sincerity of your attachment, and your dependence on their support"\(^2\). He went to the extent of promising "in their name, that while you continue the friendship and good conduct which you have hitherto observed, Your government will be entirely protected, and no infringement of the treaty will be suffered to take place"\(^2\). But if the Raja was reassured by these large promises, he might also have reflected that they derived more from the Company's need to safeguard their own interests by maintaining peace in the Carnatic, than from any sense of responsibility for the treaty they guaranteed.

The year 1767 marked a new era in the history of South India. The rising power of the British was challenged by Haidar Ali, who had consolidated his rise to the absolute power in Mysore and proved one of the most formidable opponents they were to encounter. Because of this new phenomenon, the relations between the Nawab and the Raja came to suffer great changes. It was no secret that the cordiality between them was more professed than real, and that the Nawab was aspiring to add Tanjore to his dominions. Since any disturbance in that part of India would have been detrimental to their commercial interests, the British were mainly concerned to preserve peace and to that end strove to prevent a rupture between them. But once they themselves were involved in a war with Haidar, preservation of peace between Arcot and Tanjore was no longer their primary aim, and they descended from the position of an unbiased arbitrator to that of a party in the struggle. The suppression of grievances between the Nawab and the Raja lost importance. What the British were now concerned with was their right to receive assistance in their distress from both of them. The Nawab
had necessarily still to lean upon the British, but by identifying himself with the Company in the struggle with Haidar, and then making claims upon the Raja on behalf of the Company, he could open a breach between Tanjore and Madras to his own advantage.

The cause of the war between the British and Haidar was the assistance promised by the Madras Council to the Nizam by an unnecessary treaty concluded in 1766. The British were granted the "ceded districts" by Salabat Jang in 1759, but were unable to occupy them because of the struggle for power in Hyderabad. Nizam Ali, who succeeded Salabat Jang, would allow the British occupation of those districts only if they would promise him assistance in his troubles with the Marathas. The British were not willing to strain their relations with the Marathas and consequently were unable to take possession of the districts. In October 1765, after the battle of Buxar, Clive obtained from the Emperor sanads for these districts, and the Madras Government decided in January 1766 to take

1. "...what Your Honours have recommended regarding our preserving the Nabob's Dependence on the Company, has been our constant and invariable Practice, and indeed He becomes daily more and more dependent". Pres. & Coun.-Court of Dirrs., 22 Jan. 1767 - Mds. Letters Recd. Vol. 2.
2. The 'ceded Districts', or the Northern Circars, were the districts of Ganjam, Chicacole, Rajahmundry, Ellore and Guntur.
possession of them. At the same time, as they were not willing to rupture their relations with the Nizam, the Madras Council came to an agreement by which they took possession of the districts in return for a tribute of nine lakhs of rupees and a body of troops "to settle the affairs of His Highness' Government in everything that is right and Proper, when required"¹. At that time, the Nizam was known to be preparing, in conjunction with the Marathas, to attack Mysore². Though the authorities of Madras had given assurance to Haidar only in June 1766 of their desire to remain in peace with him, in their anxiety to avoid giving offence to the Nizam, actually plunged into the conflict³.

The whole thing was a blunder in as much as there was no need for promising assistance to the Nizam; much less

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3. "But the truth is that Soubah asked for help, we gave it. He told us he would attack Hyder, and we rejoiced because it coincided with our interests. We even went further and sent a powerful body of troops, hoping by that step to engage the Soubah to root out Hyder Ally entirely". John Call-Palk, 6 Apr. 1767 - Palk Mss. - Love, p. 43.
4. It is contended that the Treaty of Hyderabad was not the main cause of the Mysore War; the "violation of the spirit of the Hyderabad Treaty accounts more for the war than the treaty itself". There was no specification of the amount of British assistance, but more troops than necessary were sent from Madras. - English Relations with Haidar Ali - Sheik Ali, pp. 166-167.
antagonising Haidar. Even while contracting the agreement, the Madras Council had reason to apprehend that the Nizam was inclined "for the sake of a large sum, to make up Matters" with Haidar. By September 1767 the British found themselves alone against Haidar, who had not only settled matters with the Marathas and the Nizam, but had also obtained the latter's co-operation for an invasion of the Carnatic. The British agreement with the Nizam was severely criticised by the Court of Directors, for they had always been averse to assisting the Nizam with any troops. They were "much alarmed" at the state of their affairs and rightly felt that the Madras Council had "quit all ... Caution at once, and not only join the Soubah with a greater force than ever was before suggested, but enter into a war with Hyder Ally, and keep a future war with the Morattas in reserve."

When Haidar's attack was obviously imminent the Raja was called upon to participate in the resistance to Mysore.

2. "History offers few instances of so sudden a change in policy where an enemy became overnight a friend and a friend an enemy". - English Relations with Haider Ali - Sheik Ali, p.160.
In strict terms, Tulaji was not allied with the British by any mutual defensive treaty, nor was he bound in any way to assist them. He was in the political sense a tributary of the Nawab, who was for all practical purposes, in turn a tributary of the British. But this did not make him owe any allegiance to them, who were only the guarantors of his relations with the Nawab. Even so, when informed about the threat of invasion of the Carnatic by Haidar for which his aid was solicited, he did not question the validity of their request. His reply was discouraging, since he explained his inability to send immediate assistance, his troops being long in arrears of pay, but he promised to set about satisfying them and ordering his army to march to Trichinopoly as soon as possible. It must be noted that though immediate assistance was not forthcoming, there was a definite promise of help and expression of sympathy.

The allied army of Haidar and the Nizam was defeated by Colonel Smith at Changama on 2 September 1767, and subsequently by Colonel Wood at Tiruvannamalai on 25 September.

Heidar's son, Tipu, who had advanced with his cavalry to the neighbourhood of Madras, made a hasty retreat after this defeat. During this period the Raja had not sent any assistance; and by October, a month after his promise, no kind of help had actually moved out of Tanjore. The Madras authorities were by no means satisfied with mere assurances from the Raja. They considered it their right to expect help from him because of "the benefit he reaps from the Company's friendship...". Accordingly, a letter was despatched expressing their surprise at his behaviour and complaining of the "little regard" he had shown to the Company's interests. The Raja would have deserved these accusations had his delay been unreasonable. But to the Council's letter dated 1 October, he replied the same month that 1200 horse had already crossed the river and were ready to join their army. This assistance, though quick and encouraging, did not in the event prove of immediate value, since because of the rains, the British army now went into cantonment, but the Raja was asked to keep his horse ready.

at Trichinopoly\(^1\) so that they could join the British forces as soon as they were ready to march\(^2\).

Despite his reversal at Ohangara, Haidar invaded the Carnatic once again and had seized Vaniambadi and Tirupattur before he was defeated at Vaniambadi on 8 December. Though the Raja had earlier informed the British that his cavalry was ready to march, it had not moved even by the middle of December. His conduct appeared extraordinary to them for they felt that it was owing to their friendship and protection that he had "hitherto enjoyed such a series of peace and tranquillity"\(^3\). If the enemy were to gain any advantage, his country would also be exposed to the ravages of the war along with the Nawab's territories. Therefore, they considered it his interest to assist them with all his power in opposing Haidar, and he was once again requested to despatch assistance with all speed\(^3\).

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1. Throughout the war the Raja's assistance was requested only in the form of his cavalry. His sepoys were considered of little service and were ordered into the Morriopayalayam District to maintain peace in those parts. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 24 Oct. 1767 - Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.60.
The Madras Government had blundered into a desperately confused political situation. It was clear, however, that the conflict with Haidar was too deep for any compromise, that Mohammed Ali was also a committed enemy of Haidar, and that since Haidar's defeat at Changama the Nizam was wavering in his support for Haidar. The Bengal Government therefore urged Madras to disengage the Nizam completely from his alliance with Mysore by threatening Hyderabad itself. Madras sanguinely went further: they proposed not merely to detach the Nizam, but having come to terms with him, to obtain a sanad from him and a firman from the Emperor granting the Company the Diwani of Mysore on the same terms as they had acquired the Diwani of Bengal.

1. Haidar's hostility towards the Nawab is disclosed in his correspondence with Yusuf Khan, which came to light after the fall of Madura in 1764. He had actually instructed his garrison at Dindigul that "everyone under pretence of being dismissed his service, should repair to Eaur Cawn", who had already been sent by him to help Yusuf Khan. - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.I, p.193.

In 1767 Mohammed Ali seems to have been particularly fearful of Haidar's intrigues. Mahfuz Khan, his elder brother, left him in July 1765 on a pilgrimage to Mecca, but had stopped at Hyderabad. Later in May 1766, he joined Haidar, and Mill states that it was through him that "Hyder effected his alliance with the Nizam" (History of British India, Vol.III, p.331). Raja Sahib, the son of Chanda Sahib, was also with Haidar and Mohammed Ali "was always suspicious that Mahfuz Khan and Raja Sahib, who had better claims to the Carnatic, might induce Haidar to espouse their cause". - English Relations with Haidar Ali - Sheik Ali, p.110.


They believed the Nizam was anxious for the destruction of Haidar, and the Marathas likewise. They held therefore that the Nizam would be willing to co-operate in Mysore’s destruction, since this would enhance his power as well as that of the Company. Since they proposed to give the Marathas “as little territorial possessions as possible” for their aid in overthrowing Haidar, Madras expected the Nizam to co-operate the more readily in the proposed shift in the balance of power in the Deccan.

The Madras Council envisaged themselves playing the same role in the Deccan as Clive in Bengal, and they cast the Nawab for the role of Mir Jaffar – the instrument through which their control should be exercised in Mysore and the cloak to their power. They argued, simply mindedly, that such an arrangement would preserve peace in South India and that since Haidar’s rivalry with the Nawab was so bitter, action against Mysore would be necessary sooner or later. Haidar’s removal would also reduce the Company’s expenses, for while he remained in power they

had to spend more on the defence of the Carnatic than it yielded in revenue\(^1\). It was even suggested that Mohammed Ali, when he obtained possession of Mysore, would "resign the territory of Arcot to the Company for his private and public debts and all the expenses of the war"\(^2\).

The plan appeared excellent, if it were feasible, but the Madras Government obviously lacked a certain essential sense for the practical. The Mughul was by now a name only and the Nizam possessed not much authority either. The assent of either was not much of a political weapon and even if it had been, Haidar was not to be supposed likely, considering his power and strength, meekly to agree to any such sanction\(^3\). He had already invaded the Carnatic and the position of the contending parties did not suggest that either could impose itself easily upon the other. The plan seems to have been made with as much ease as the Madras authorities found it difficult either to explain the reasons for their awkward situation or to extricate themselves honourably.

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3. When the British obtained a sanad for the control of Mysore by the Nawab, Haidar, to counteract the move, obtained a sanad from the Nizam appointing him the Nawab of the Carnatic. - *Pres. & Coun. - Court of Dirs., 6 Feb. 1771 - Mds. Letters Recd., Vol. 5*. 

The Nizam had already suffered heavily and the invasion of his dominions by a contingent from Bengal led to his complete withdrawal from Haidar's alliance. He was now solicitous for a treaty with the British. The British were thus in a position to dictate terms to the Nizam, and had they wished it would have been simple to revoke their original 1767 agreement with him, the major cause of their war with Haidar. Instead, they worsened their prospects by committing themselves to bigger schemes, for with the Nizam entering into an alliance with them, they believed they had found the means to remove Haidar from power and bring Mysore under their control. Accordingly, on 26 February 1768, an agreement was concluded between the Nizam, the British and the Nawab.

The treaty publicly declared Haidar "a Rebel and an Usurper" and authorised the conquest of Mysore; all his "Rights and Titles to the Diwany of the Mysor Country" were

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2. "They set free an enemy, despite his extraordinary conduct, without making him pay a single rupee, or cede a single village for all his perfidy. Worse still, they agreed to pay him the tribute, which was to cause them another major war in 1780. All this ... to make the Nawab master of Mysore". - English Relations with Haidar Ali - Sheik Ali, p.169.
to be made over to the Company; and the management of Mysore was to be given to the Nawab and the British would apply to the Emperor "for a confirmation". The Marathas were also particularly included in the treaty in order to avoid giving them "Cause of Jealousy or Disgust"; and the British themselves agreed to be answerable to the Marathas for their annual Chouth from Mysore.

The plans of the Madras Council for the acquisition of Mysore and its management by the Nawab as their agent were not only foolish but directly contrary to the known wishes of the Home authorities and of Bengal. The ambition of Mohammed Ali to become Subahdar of the Deccan had been clear as early as 1765, and had been scornfully dismissed by Clive. In the same year the ambitions of the Madras Council had likewise been reproved by the Court of Directors, who expressed the earnest hope that the "spirit of conquest... will never suffer to gain the ascendent" of them.

3. Mohammed Ali had no official sanction for his authority until Clive obtained from the Emperor in 1765 a sanad for his title to the Carnatic. It is clear from Clive's letter that Mohammed Ali "wanted Titles as great as the Vizir and to be made Subadar of the Deccan, but it was thought time enough to confer that on him when he has conquered it". - Clive-Palk, 20 Aug. 1765 - Home Misc. Series, Vol.262, p.356.
Madras Council must have been aware that the agreement of February 1768 was unlikely to be approved. Nor was it approved. The Directors' response to the news of the treaty was a denunciation of any scheme for supporting Mohammed Ali in Mysore as repugnant to their wishes. They made it clear that the preservation of British influence in Bengal was the primary objective, that the Carnatic must be treated as a defensive outwork of Bengal since "all political connexions in the rest of India are only important as they may affect us there", and that the exclusion of French power and influence should be the main concern of Madras. The Council was severely reprimanded for having deviated from the Court's orders "in so important an Instance as that of extending our Influence and Possessions beyond the line we judged it proper to prescribe"; the Governor, Bourchier, was dismissed, and a Select Committee of four members was appointed to control military and political affairs. This step was taken, the Court stated, "professedly with a view to the confining


The Council with its sixteen members was to transact the general affairs of the Presidency. This constitution remained until 1777, when the Council was reduced to a Governor and five Councillors. - Court of Dirs.-Pres.& Coun., 11 June 1777 - Despatches to Madras, Vol.7, p.231.
of our influence and possessions and to retarding them back within those limits which our Governor and Council had exceeded, by attempting to extend the possessions of the Nabob of the Carnatic. Six days after issuing these orders, the Court of Directors wrote again expressing astonishment at the Madras Council's plan "to create and bring upon us and the Nabob, a formidable and dangerous enemy, by attempting to put the Nabob in possession of any part of the Mysore Country." Two months later, in June 1769, the Court returned once again to the subject, pointing out the urgent need for peace and retrenchment in Madras, and the folly of engaging in political adventure a Nawab "whose Debts and Embarrassments will have no end till he confines his views to the Carnatic."

The reproofs of the Court of Directors and their orders for a reversal of policy were not received at Madras, however, until the autumn of 1769. Meanwhile the Nawab was able to exploit his new importance in the schemes of the Madras Council. Even before the Nizam had ratified

the treaty of 26 February, the Nawab was again proposing to put pressure on Tanjore. On 9 March, at a time when three thousand of the Raja's troops were acting with Colonel Wood near Trichinopoly, the Nawab informed Bourchier that since the Raja had escaped the ravages of the Nizam, he proposed to demand twenty five lakhs of rupees from him: "when the Prince of the Country stands in need of it, his dependents are to assist him with money and troops. The "scarcity of money in the Company's treasury and the importance of the expedition now on foot to remove a powerful enemy" were sufficient grounds, he argued, for making the demand upon the Raja. The measures he declared to be "consistent with the customs of the country", and as he temptingly pointed out, it would enable him to pay off his debts to the Company and help defray the expenses of their future operations.

It is clear that the new demand was yet another move in the Nawab's continuing campaign against Tanjore - a move

1. The treaty with the Nizam was concluded on 26 February and was ratified by the Nizam on 13 March, 1768.
3. The Nawab, having been promised Mysore, was to pay the whole expenses of the war, but as the issue was unfavourable he agreed to pay ten lakhs of rupees. - Home Misc.Series, Vol.271, pp.30-31.
which he could now make as a partner of the British in their war against Haidar. He had artfully put forward the British need for money to pursue the war as the main reason for collecting money from the Raja. And he had glibly talked of custom as sanction for the demand, ignoring the precise figures of tribute payable laid down in 1762 and the fact that a force of Tanjorean cavalry was currently operating with the British forces in the field. Of this the British seem to have been quite aware, for the Governor in his reply to the Nawab, emphasised the impropriety of the demand.

The Governor agreed that the Raja had "too evidently proved his little regard" for the Nawab's as well as for the British interests; but as no mention was made in the treaty that the Raja was obliged to join them on any occasion, the Governor declared that he could not, "with any propriety, and without acting contrary to the said treaty", agree to the Nawab's plan. There was also the consideration that the Raja had "in some measure made amends" as a body of his troops was then employed with Colonel Wood. It was true that the British and the Nawab were the protectors of Tanjore and it was but reasonable that the Raja should "contribute

towards the heavy burthen of expense ...". The Governor was willing for the Raja to be asked for a contribution and even "urged to a compliance"; nevertheless, he was of the opinion that by the treaty they had deprived themselves of every pretence to insist upon it. If they were to make it a demand "it might be construed a violation of the Treaty and bring a reproach both on Nabob and the Company for a breach of Faith".

The Nawab was thus allowed now to prefer a demand but was not guaranteed British support. The treaty of 1762 had to that extent proved beneficial to the Raja: he was not to be threatened with force to comply with the Nawab's demands. But, the benefit proved only temporary. Though the validity of the claim was questioned, the necessity for it was accepted. The Raja was not to be compelled to pay and yet it was felt justified that he should. It was left open to question whether the treaty of 1762 was a just answer to the new political situation. The Nawab, denied the promise of British support, chose not to make any demand upon the Raja for the time being. He was content to allow the temptation to work for the time being within British imagination.

By the end of 1768, Haidar had recovered all the territories that he had lost to the allies, and by January 1769 he had penetrated into the district of Trichinopoly and no part of the Southern Carnatic seemed safe from his forces. Early in February, therefore, the Madras Council recorded their conviction that the Raja should now be pressed "in the strongest manner" to furnish 4,000 horse against Haidar. Hope of such aid might be faint, but they could not justify themselves to the Directors if no such demand were made. The position of the Raja was a difficult one: he had reluctantly supplied cavalry in 1768 and as a result Haidar had remained posed for an attack on Tanjore until he was bought off with money and provisions early in 1769. The Council in making their demands were aware of this - they commented that the Raja was furnishing Haidar with money and stores "not we believe from inclination, but fear...", and if they expected to be "amused with promises" when they asked for cavalry, they knew that had they sent a sufficient force "as being joined

2. In December [1768] it was generally thought Haidar was going to attack Tanjore in revenge for the fact that his country had been obliged to assist Mohammed Ali with a few thousand horses... In the beginning of 1769 the immediate danger was averted when Tanjore lent Haidar two lakhs of rupees and sold him victuals". - The Dutch East India Company and Mysore - Lohuisen, p.66.
to what he might add would promise a likelihood of driving out the enemy ..., the Raja would undoubtedly have co-operated. Yet knowing this, they did not offer to protect exposed Tanjore. In their proceedings they recorded their belief that the Raja "to save his country from being laid waste" would be "fearful of doing anything, which might again expose his country to the Ravages of the Enemy" - and then on the same day they despatched Samuel Ardley, a member of the Council, to reinforce their demands upon Tanjore.

Ardley's mission appeared to have some effect. The Raja promised a body of horse with bullocks and sheep, which would join the British army as soon as he was informed of its movement. At the same time, he expressed an earnest desire that these arrangements "might be kept an entire secret from Hyder". It is evident that he was apprehensive of Haidar's resentment, should he gain knowledge of his assistance to the British. There was no want of friendly attitude towards the allies and their cause, nor was he remotely inclined to act against them. His fear of Haidar prevented him from open participation in the hostilities.

2. "... leave Us but little hopes that having thus by a temporary expedient saved his country from ruin he whilst the Enemy is yet at his door provoke him by giving assistance". - Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 11 Feb. 1769 - Mds.Mil. & Sec.Proceedings, Vol.65.
At a later date the accusations that the Raja had been disloyal\(^1\) were to be supported by three letters which passed between him and Haidar Ali. One of these states that Haidar received four lakhs of rupees from the Raja\(^2\), in another Haidar asks the Raja not to fear the allies but to depend upon his own strength "and give no money to them, nor send them any troops, but put them off by delays"\(^3\), and in the third the Raja writes to Haidar, "you write me that now there is friendship between us, I should consider your troops, and your wealth as mine, and repose myself in pleasure, and ease my mind"\(^4\). Accepting these undated letters as authentic, what weight might be attached to them? It will be remembered that the Raja was not a direct party to the war, nor was he bound by any treaty to assist the British who had provoked it. Nevertheless he had supplied cavalry to the Company and these had joined in ravaging the Mysore country. The Raja had then been left to face the

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1. The Raja "entered into close connections with Hyder Ally; he gave him valuable presents and he furnished him with provisions, which enabled him to carry the war to the gates of Madras". - "State of Facts" - Original Papers Relative to Tenjore, p.X - Affairs of East Indies.
enemy's attack without assistance from either the Company or the Nawab. It was under these circumstances that the Raja had bought Haidar off, making a payment of four lakhs under duress, and as the Madras authorities testified "not from inclination". Again the letters show that Haidar did not expect any military aid from Tanjore - the utmost he demanded was neutrality, that the Raja should put off sending troops to assist the Company; any reference by the Raja to friendship subsisting between him and Haidar was no more than a form of words. The Raja had given the allies such military assistance as he could and then, when he was left to face the Mysore forces single handed, had done the very minimum to Haidar to safeguard Tanjore.

Nevertheless the Raja's behaviour in the course of this was greatly to affect relations between the Raja and the Nawab in subsequent years, and was to expose the Raja to severe criticism by the Directors. Though Governor Bourchier had clearly upheld the right of the Raja to withhold assistance and had condemned the Nawab's demands upon

2. Mill says that "Hyder was solicitous to gain" the Raja's alliance. There is no evidence to prove that Haidar at any time approached the Raja for help or invited him to join his troops. History of British India, Vol.III, p.334.
him, the Home authorities took a different line. They declared it very unreasonable that the Raja should "hold possession of the most fruitful part of the country, which can alone supply our armies with subsistence, and not contribute to the Defence of the Carnatic". They agreed with the Nawab that the Raja who had escaped the ravages of war, as they asserted because of British protection, should be made to bear a part of the expenses. They therefore directed that the Nawab should be given such support in "his pretensions on the Rajah of Tanjour as may be effectual ..., should the Raja refuse to contribute "a just proportion to the expences of the war". It is clear that the bait so skilfully offered by the Nawab had been greedily swallowed by the Directors, for they laid down that whatever sum was collected from the Raja "should be applied to the Discharge of the Nabob's Debt to the Company": they added, and this was most sinister, that "if more than sufficient for that purpose, to the Discharge of his Debt to Individuals".

The Directors' instructions were completely at odds with the terms of the treaty of 1762. Then they had

guaranteed the Raja in his possessions, subject to the payment of a set tribute; now they placed the Raja directly under the Nawab's authority, subject to his unlimited demands backed by the force of the Company's arms. In 1762 when the Nawab had pointed to the instances in which Dost Ali and Safdar Ali had levied money from Tanjore by force of arms, as good precedent for his new demands, the argument had been rejected by Governor Pigot, and the Directors had approved of his action. Now when the Nawab stated that "the Zemindars of the Carnatic have been supported, and their countries preserved to them by the operations of our forces employed in his cause; and that nothing was more notorious, than that three former princes of the Carnatic had received from the Tanjore Rajah seventy, eighty, nay even one hundred lacks of rupees at a time", the Directors accepted his plea and authorised the Madras Government to support him in his claims. Years later, in 1775, the Directors were to argue that their instructions only authorised support to the Nawab in his just demands. It was unfortunate that this did not appear more clearly in their orders of 1769, for the Madras

authorities interpreted them to mean that henceforth the Raja was to be considered only as a tributary of Arcot, to whose Nawab full and independent authority had been restored.

The reason for such a sudden change in policy must be sought in the desperate need at Madras to consolidate the Company's finances, and in London in the political difficulties of the Company. The Madras Council's war with Haidar had cost them dear in money as well as reputation, while the Nawab's debt had risen enormously and offered no hope of an early settlement. He had owed the Company twelve and a half lakhs of rupees, and to this was added ten lakhs on account of the war with Haidar. Under these circumstances - "our distress for money great; our whole dependence being on the Nabob, who though he promised largely we had doubts of his performing", as Bourchier put it, the Company clutched at the prospect of securing money from Tanjore, however questionable the means.

The Court of Directors welcomed such financial prospects likewise, but by 1769 the matter was no longer

wholly in their hands. Mounting Government dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Company's servants in Madras and Bengal¹ boiled over when news reached England in May 1769 that Haidar was ravaging the Carnatic and that the French were massing naval forces at Mauritius. The price of East India Stock fell, and the Directors' financial position worsened, and the suspicion that a new "bid on the part of France to revive her ambitions in India" led the Company to ask for naval aid "and some alarmists even clamoured for military aid as well"². The Ministry responded by taking "a new and agitated interest in the affairs of the Company"³, a part of that interest was devoted to the doings of the Nawab, perhaps a disproportionate share of that interest.

This arose from the peculiar nature of the financial relationship between the Nawab and the British at Madras. The Nawab owed the Company some twenty two and a half lakhs of rupees, and since he had also to pay seven lakhs a year

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1. In 1768, the Bengal Government had allowed the French at Chandernagore, contrary to the Treaty of Paris, to mount cannons on the walls of the fort there. There had been received complaints from the Ambassador at Constantinople about the conduct of the Company servants. - Cambridge History of India, Vol.V, p.278.
2. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - Sutherland, pp.193-198.
3. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - Sutherland, p.193.
towards the maintenance of the Company's troops protecting his territory as well as four lakhs rent for the Jaghir district and Poonamalli, there was no immediate prospect of his discharging the whole amount. The solution elsewhere adopted for such financial difficulties was usually for the Company to take territory in discharge of the debt. But in the Carnatic the Nawab had met his difficulties by borrowing from private persons, the bulk of them British merchants and servants of the Company. He paid his creditors by assigning to them drafts, called tankas, which entitled them to the revenue of specific territories, revenue which they drew directly from the collectors. This method was disastrous in that it diminished the Nawab's power and his resources, but it had the great advantage of creating a body of persons with a strong personal interest in the continued existence of the Nawab's Government. "The band of Englishmen, and others, who surrounded the Nabob, for the purpose of preying upon him, wished of course to see all power in his hands, that

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1. In the grant given by the Nawab to the British in October 1763 of lands yielding 366,000 rupees, there were many excepted villages. The Nawab ordered on 29 October 1763, the inclusion of these excepted villages with his own endorsement: "In consideration of the true friendship of the English East India Company and their remaining always in alliance with me, let a sunnud for the whole Jaghire without any exception be made out" (Treaties, Engagements and Sanads - Aithchison, Vol.X, p.2). The jaghir district constituted roughly the present Chinglepet district, and had been farmed out by the Nawab from the British to whom he had earlier granted it.
they might prey the more abundantly. They filled every place with their outcries against every restraint which was placed upon him: and in particular had endeavoured, and with great success, to disseminate an opinion in England, that he was an oppressed and ill-treated prince, while the servants of the Company were his plunderers and tyrants.\(^1\)

The Nawab had also established a direct influence with the authorities in England, by sending John Macpherson to London in 1768 as his agent, to appeal to the State against the Company's representatives at Madras. Macpherson had succeeded in seeing the prime-minister, the Duke of Grafton, and had given him "a tendentious but not altogether inaccurate account" of the relations between his master and the Madras Government. Though his mission had not received formal recognition, it can be safely assumed that it had the effect of strengthening the Ministry's desire to interfere in the Company's affairs; and as later events proved, such an interference was in favour of the Nawab and his interests.

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2. "In undertaking this mission he [Macpherson] established his position as the pioneer of the shady ranks of European agents sent over to England in the coming years to further the interests of the princes of India by appealing to the State against the Company". - East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - Sutherland, p.198.
3. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - Sutherland, p.198.
One outcome of Macpherson's activity seems to have been the inclusion of special instructions about relations with the Nawab in the orders given by the Government to John Lindsay. This naval officer had been chosen to lead the frigates to India. The Directors, at the same time, had decided to send three Commissioners to India to carry out a reform there of the Company's administration. The Ministry had wished that Lindsay should be included in the Commission and that he should be granted extraordinary powers to deal independently of the Company with the Indian powers with whom the British were in contact. Among these the Nawab was specifically mentioned, with the particular argument that since the Nawab had been recognised in the Treaty of Paris, Lindsay rather than the Company should negotiate with him, as it being "highly improper, that the King should trust the Execution of Engagements which He has contracted with other Crowned Heads, to the Company's servants".

The Directors were not agreeable to the grant of special powers to Lindsay, at Madras or elsewhere in India,

1. *East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics* - Sutherland, p.195.
and "in the Company, almost all interests rallied to the
defence of its independence"1. The Ministry realised
that they could not impose their claims upon the Company
and consequently a compromise was arrived at: Lindsay
was to be given the powers of Plenipotentiary in the
Persian Gulf, and in all matters regarding India he was
merely to assist the Company's representatives2. This
agreement might have worked satisfactorily in India —
though the loss at sea of the three Commissioners makes
the question hypothetical — had it been adhered to. But
the Ministry was so determined to interfere on behalf of
the Nawab that they issued secret instructions to Lindsay
which went counter to the agreement with the Directors.
The grounds for issuing these instructions were that by the
eleventh article of the Treaty of Paris the Nawab had been
acknowledged as an ally of the British Crown, and that in
that capacity he was entitled to the friendship and pro-
tection of King George III3. The substance of the
instructions was that Lindsay should carry out an inquiry
into the complaints received from the Nawab, through

1. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics —
   Sutherland, p.153.
3. Weymouth-Lindsay, 13 Sep. 1769 — Home Misc.Series,
   Vol.101, p.112.
Macpherson, about the unsympathetic treatment he received from the Madras authorities. In his instructions to Lindsay, Weymouth, the Secretary of State, stated that there was great reason to fear that the Nawab "had been treated in a manner by no means correspondent to the friendly stipulations which His Majesty procured in his favour" in the Treaty of Paris. It was therefore necessary that Lindsay should make "the strictest inquiry" into the Company's conduct towards the Nawab "in order to judge how far it has coincided with His Majesty's friendly declarations". He was further instructed that if he found any difficulty in obtaining satisfactory information from the Company's servants "which there is too much Reason to expect, it is His Majesty's express Command, that you apply directly to the Nabob ...".

In this manner a new channel was opened for the Nawab to influence the course of British politics in India. If the new interpretation of the Treaty of Paris was politically ironic, the secret instructions given to Lindsay proved diplomatically a blunder. The role he had to play naturally resulted in his antagonising the Madras Government, and he

attached himself to the Nawab in a manner that proved of great strength to the latter. It is not difficult to assume that the Ministry's interference in the Company's affairs was decidedly in favour of the Nawab; and that Macpherson's mission to England was not without favourable results¹.

The stress laid by the Ministry upon the special status of the Nawab under the Treaty of Paris, led the Directors in their instructions to their three Commissioners to show that they too had no desire to countenance any depreciation of his dignity and power. They enjoined the Commissioners "to provide effectually, for the honour and security of their faithful ally, Mohammed Ali, Nabob of Arcot². They added that "when we reflect on the long experience we have had of Mohammed Ali's faithful attachment to the English Company, we are surprised at the idea entertained by the Governor and Council [Madras] in their letters of 8th March and 21st June 1768 to reduce him to a mere nominal Nabob". In their turn, they also placed importance on the

1. Macpherson claimed the support of Lindsay and his successor Sir Robert Harland on the grounds that their appointments were due to his mission to England. Harland-Rochford, 1 Sep. 1772 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.110, pp.493-494.

Treaty of Paris and explained that the sanction of the treaty would "be of little use to him, if notorious infringements of the rights and powers usually inherent in and dependent on such title, should be by us countenanced and permitted to take place".

This zeal for the Nawab's rights under the Treaty of Paris came rather oddly from the Directors since for six years they had left the Nawab in ignorance of the significance of its eleventh article. There can be little doubt that their concern for the Nawab's rights and dignity was due to their fear of involving themselves "in the very disagreeable necessity of answering at some future period, for the infraction of the public treaty ...". Moreover, it appears that they were still in fact unwilling to give the Nawab the importance that would go with the interpretation of the eleventh article. Their real attitude towards the Nawab can be seen in their separate instruction to their representatives at Madras: "As to what relates to the Nabob and the conduct which you are to hold in the present parts

2. The Company kept the Nawab ignorant of "the full import of the new relation in which he was placed to the British throne; as calculated most imprudently to inflame that spirit of ambition and love of independence, with which it was so difficult already to deal, and with the gratification of which the existence in the Carnatic, either of his power or that of the Company, was altogether incompatible". History of British India - Mill, Vol.IV, pp.49-50.
of India, a great deal must be left to your decisions on the spot. You have certainly more knowledge than we, of coming at the true knowledge of the causes, the origin and the tendency of disputes, as on a sudden arise among the powers of India, as of relations of interest in which we stand to them. It was therefore with two rather contradictory instructions from the Directors and a set of secret orders to Lindsay from the Ministry, that the Commissioners set sail on the Aurora in October 1769.

Long before the Commissioners could have arrived in India, even before the Directors' order of March 1769 authorising support for the Nawab in his claims against Tanjore had reached Madras, the war with Haidar had been brought to an end by the Treaty of Madras, signed on 4 April 1769. The form which the treaty finally took was of considerable importance in defining the status of the Raja. Originally the British plenipotentiaries had not included the Raja's name as a party to the treaty, though they had specified the inclusion of the names of the Raja of Travancore and Murari Rao as their allies. The assumption must be that the British wished to infer that the Raja of Tanjore was not their ally.

Throughout the hostilities, the British had considered the Raja an ally, and on that count had claimed a right to expect his assistance against their enemy. Now at the conclusion of the treaty, they were reluctant to give him that status. They did not give any reason for the sudden change in their attitude. Haider, on the other hand, took exception to their attitude and insisted that the Raja should be included as a party to the treaty\(^1\). He had apparently realised that the proposed exclusion of the Raja was with the deliberate intention of enabling the allies to wreak vengeance on the Raja for his inadequate assistance during the war\(^2\). Apart from insisting on the Raja's inclusion Haider also wanted an assurance from the British that the Raja would not be "molested, and only customary tribute to be taken from him\(^3\)." The British maintained that the Raja "had nothing to do with the war" and that inclusion in the treaty was therefore unnecessary\(^4\). Had this been indeed true, they would not have been justified either in seeking the Raja's help against Haider, or in allowing the Raja's troops to join theirs and operate against the enemy. Haider

seems to have rejected the British contention, for Du Pre's¹ attempt to convince him of the Madras Government's friendly disposition towards the Raja was not successful. Haidar insisted that if the British were determined to exclude the Raja from the treaty, they should exclude the Raja of Travancore and Murari Rao as well².

It is clear that Haidar was not essentially interested in securing protection for the Raja from the allies. Undoubtedly, he had realised that there was the possibility of the allies taking measures to punish the Raja; but he seems to have been mainly concerned with the possibility of wreaking his own vengeance on the Raja of Travancore and Murari Rao, who both had co-operated with the allies against him. Their inclusion in the treaty would prevent him from taking any measures against them: if the allies wished to exclude the Raja with a view to taking punitive measures against him, a similar opportunity should be afforded him by a similar exclusion of the other two. This is evident from the fact that his insistence on the Raja's inclusion was only conditional and not absolute.

1. For negotiating the treaty Haidar would not agree to anyone but Du Pre; he advised the Madras Government of "his being arrived at the Mount, where he desired Mr. Du Pre, for whom he had sent a Cowle, might meet him, when everything would be adjusted". - Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 29 Mar. 1769 - Mds.Mil. & Sec.Proceedings, Vol.65.
The British would not agree to the exclusion of the Raja of Travancore and Murari Rao from the treaty and so expose them to Haidar's punitive measures; they were equally averse to the Raja being included in it. However, their circumstances were such that they could not postpone the conclusion of the treaty. In such circumstances, it was felt that it would appear less disgraceful if the Raja as "Tributary of the Carnatic should be taken in on the Part of the Carnatic than as one protected and indemnified upon the Demand of a foreign Power". Consequently, as a "merit of necessity", they agreed to the Raja's inclusion in the treaty.

In a recent study of British relations with Haidar Ali the Raja's inclusion in the Treaty of Madras has been

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1. The British position was not by any means hopeless, but they were compelled by circumstances to seek terms with Haidar. Bourchier's letter clearly explains that they were anxious to settle with Haidar for "the promised succors of horse by the Nabob and Mora Raw not arrived, nor likely to be for some months, and our distress for money great; our whole dependence being on the Nabob, who though he promised largely we had doubts of his performing; and it also being the Company's positive orders to make peace, we were under the necessity of doing it almost at all events". Bourchier - Palk, 29 June 1769. Palk Mss. - Love, p.106.


At the same time, they confessed that their agreement was not "with the most distant Intention of procuring safety" to the Raja from Haidar. - Pres.& Coun.-Court of Dirs., 6 Feb. 1771 - Mds.Letters Recd., Vol.5.
declared to be remarkable. Dr. Sheik Ali argues that the Raja was not a party to the war, and since he had not offended Haidar, he had no right for a place in the treaty. The first argument can not be taken seriously for the Raja had indeed been asked by the Madras Government to assist them against the enemy; and he had actually sent troops which co-operated with the allies in the hostilities. The second argument is also not true for the Raja's initial assistance to the allies was the immediate cause for Haidar's antagonism and the consequent threat that Tanjore faced from him. It could be said that since the Nawab was not mentioned in the treaty, the Raja as his tributary, should not have been included. But the Nawab's exclusion was only due to his unwillingness to give Haidar the status of Nawab; and even this difficulty had been overcome by mentioning in the treaty the Nawab's territories instead of his name. In a same manner, the inclusion of at least the Raja's territory would have been a reasonable measure. Considering the fact that the Raja was a tributary of Arcot, had participated in the

2. Because of the rivalry between the Nawab and Haider, the former would not agree to his name appearing in the treaty; it would seem to give the latter the recognition of the title of Nawab of Mysore. Pres. & Coun. - Court of Dirs., 16 Sept. 1769 - Mds.Letters Recd., Vol.4.
war as an ally of the British, and had to pacify Haidar because of his participation, it is not difficult to conclude that his inclusion as a party to the treaty was just and proper.

It is reasonable to assume that the attempt to exclude the Raja from the Treaty of Madras sprang from a desire to leave the Company free to support the Nawab in his demands upon the Raja. If the Raja did not appear as an ally, he could be treated as a mere feudatory of the Nawab. By September 1769 this attitude, if it had existed, was greatly strengthened by receipt of the Directors' letter of March 1769, directing that the Nawab be supported in his claims on the Raja. In February 1771 the Madras Council were to argue, indeed, that even the Raja's inclusion in the treaty afforded him no protection against the Nawab, since "neither the implied sense, nor the words can shelter him from any claim the Nabob might have had on him for a quota in the war". Nevertheless, the Madras authorities did not proceed in 1769 to extort a contribution from Tanjore and one must ask why? Their consultations of September 1769 and their letter to the Directors in January 1770 supply the answer.

In the first place they had almost exhausted their treasury during the war and a fresh expedition was quite beyond their resources. Their situation was such that even if they had been able to surmount other obstacles, "want of money" alone would have placed it out of their power to undertake an expedition against Tanjore. Then again there was the threat that Haidar, as a party to the Treaty of Madras, might engage himself to support the Raja. The enmity between Haidar and the Nawab was likely to induce the former to adopt any opportunity to interfere in favour of the Raja. There was also the possibility of the Raja seeking Maratha help. These considerations prevented the Madras authorities from undertaking an expedition to compel the Raja to pay; and they felt that any attack on Tanjore at that juncture was "clearly impolitic and unwarrantable". Nevertheless they were determined, they said, to ask the Raja for a contribution and if he persisted in his refusal, they would take measures "when our situation will admit of it".

Having stated their determination to demand a contribution, the Madras authorities then proceeded to justify their resolve. The Raja, they reported, had stated that his expenses of

assistance against Haidar amounted to four lakhs of rupees. It had been customary to make allowances for such expendi-
ture, and he claimed a deduction from his annual tribute. But having noted the Raja's claim for a reduction, the Council then proceeded to deny that he had given any assistance during the war. They declared that it was his failure to give such assistance that had been a major reason for the ravages that the Carnatic suffered. Since the Raja himself had escaped those ravages, it was reasonable that he should contribute towards the expenses incurred in repelling the attacks of the enemy, for though such a principle had not been established by any particular contract, it was clear and "determinate, as resulting from Equity, and the natural Rights of Governments". The Raja's failure to co-operate effectively gave them a "just plea" for calling upon him to contribute. They were fortified in this belief and in the justice of their cause by the warmth with which it was recommended by the Directors. The treaty of 1762, which had specifically prohibited any contribution from the Raja, beyond his annual tribute, might seem a barrier to such a recommendation, but as the Council said, they were satisfied that the Directors, who had accepted that treaty, were

"competent to Judge how far that Guaranty or Engagement ought to operate". Equally, the Treaty of Madras was not thought of as any more an obstacle to hostile measures against Tanjore; they saw nothing in that treaty that ought to restrain them from proceeding against the Raja. Nevertheless, they were still not in a position to undertake an expedition against Tanjore. Their financial position was still bad, for they were not in a "condition to pay a detachment in the Field, should the Attempts of any of the Country Powers make it necessary". More startlingly, such was the Council's enthusiasm for despoiling Tanjore that they now proposed not merely to compel the Raja to make a contribution to the war expenses, but, as a matter of good policy, to take complete control of the Tanjore Kingdom. If they proceeded against Tanjore, they would only be acting as the supporters of the Nawab; and as a result the Nawab would obtain the control of that country. They were averse to such a result. If the reduction of Tanjore was adopted at all, it would be advisable for "the Company to retain it in their possessions ...". They could then place the management of the country in the hands of the Raja, or any other prince of Tanjore, "subject to such Limitations and Conditions".

In view of the enthusiasm of the Madras Council it was ironic that the Directors, upon whose instructions the Madras Government had based their hostile policy against Tanjore, found it necessary in 1770 to revoke their former orders. The intelligence of the Treaty of Madras had not reached them till March 1770. They found that if the war with Haidar had been "improperly conducted", it was by this treaty "most disadvantageously concluded"...¹. They were especially disappointed with the inclusion of the Raja, against whom they had decided to act because of his inadequate assistance in the war, as a party to the treaty; for if the Madras Government had at least received assistance from him, and had he thereby drawn upon himself Haidar’s resentment, "there might have been some merit in procuring the King of Tanjour safe terms in the treaty". Haidar’s insistence that the Raja should be included could "scarcely be unknown to that Prince". In their opinion, the Raja, who had not contributed troops, was unfairly styled a "Friend to the Carnatick"¹. It was obvious that he was protected by Haidar for not having assisted the British and was now "effectually sheltered by the faith of Treaty, from being

compellable to contribute a single Rupee towards defraying the Charges of the War*. In such circumstances, they could not but suspend their formal orders, because those orders were "by Your conduct rendered utterly impossible to be carried into execution, without committing a breach of the Treaty you have concluded".

It should be noted that it was the Treaty of Madras alone which constrained the Directors. It was not any concern for the Raja, nor the spirit of the treaty of 1762, that compelled them to revoke their former orders. It is understandable that they should not have wished to proceed against Tanjore so soon after acknowledging the Raja as an ally; but it is peculiar that after flagrantly violating the agreements of the treaty of 1762, they should have attached such great importance to the terms of the Treaty of Madras. It seems probable that the consideration that Haidar might interfere in favour of the Raja, in the event of any hostility against the latter, was the real obstacle; and it is reasonable to suppose that had that obstacle been removed, their original instructions would have been implemented.

The Directors' original instructions were to have important effects. Even if the intelligence of their subsequent suspension had reached India more quickly, it is unlikely that it would have saved the Raja from the demand for contributions. As it happened, the letter suspending their orders did not reach Madras till 1773, and the Madras Government had meanwhile been left to believe that the original instructions were valid. In this manner, the Directors' letter of March 1769 became the besetting sin in the history of their relations with Tanjore and the portentous opening for the subsequent hostile measures of the Madras Government against Tanjore in 1771, and again in 1773.
Early in 1771, despite the demands of the Nawab hanging over his head, the Raja of Tanjore turned south and undertook an expedition against the Sethupathi of Ramnad and the Raja of Sivaganga. There had long been conflict between Tanjore and these poligars. In 1720 the ruler of Tanjore had intervened in a disputed succession and placed Bhavani Sankara on the Ramnad throne. During nine years rule the Sethupathi contrived to make himself thoroughly unpopular, and in 1729 he was defeated and killed by Tanjore forces while his kingdom was divided into a truncated Ramnad and a new chiefdom of Sivaganga. In 1755, Tanjore forces under Monaji again invaded Ramnad and took the fort of Arantangi and adjacent lands. In 1763, however, Dalavy Damodaram Pillai of Ramnad, aided by the Sivaganga chief, retook all the areas lost to Tanjore in 1755, taking advantage of the Tanjore Raja's preoccupation with his assistance to the allies against Yusuf Khan. Now, in 1771, with the war with Haidar Ali at an end, the Raja launched an army against Ramnad to recover the territory lost in 1763.

The Sethupathi at once informed the Nawab of the Raja's designs and implored him to come to his aid. The Tondaiman of Pudukkottai, fearing the danger that would threaten him in the event of the fall of Ramnad, requested the Nawab to help the Sethupathi. The Raja of Tanjore, meanwhile, had captured most of the forts of the country and laid siege to Ramnad. Terms were agreed upon and the Raja was allowed to remain in possession of the tracts captured. Then the Tanjore forces marched against Sivaganga. On the appearance of danger, the Raja of Sivaganga also appealed to the Nawab, representing that the Tanjorens held part of his country by force.

To the Nawab this was a most agreeable excuse for interfering in the affair. Yet to the appeals of both the Sethupathi and the Raja of Sivaganga, both of whom he declared to be his tributaries, he made no immediate offer of help at all. Nor did he open any correspondence with the Raja, either to prohibit or mediate in the dispute. Instead, he informed the British of the Raja's dangerous activities and solicited their intervention. He pointed out that the Raja, his tributary, had attacked Ramnad and

Sivaganga, also tributaries of his, without advising him or seeking his consent. Tanjore, which had pleaded inability to provide forces to oppose Haidar, had now despatched a large army against Ramnad and Sivaganga, without even a formal notification of intent and without explanation.

To this the Raja replied that the poligars had been established in their respective governments by his ancestors and that Tanjore had possessed the disputed territories since 1755. When Ramnad had encroached upon the Tanjore dominions, he had only refrained from counter measures because the Nawab and the Company had required his support during the dangerous period of Yusuf Khan's rebellion. Now that that danger had passed, he was doing no more than to make good the losses suffered in 1763. Moreover, since then the Raja of Sivaganga had further insulted him by seizing his elephants on their way from the Dutch at Negapatam. There could be no security for Tanjore unless these chiefs were punished for their misdeeds.

The Select Committee at Madras refused to accept these arguments, and held that the Raja's conduct was "unjustifiable".

To the Directors they denounced his proceedings, as contrary to the treaty of 1762, since his commencing hostilities against a dependent of the Nawab was "virtually taking up arms against the Carnatic"¹. The treaty of 1762, it was true, only regulated the Raja's financial relations with the Nawab, and they were therefore not obliged by its terms to interfere in this affair. Yet, they said, as the Nawab ought to be supported in "all his just rights", and "as the Ministry have of late warmly espoused the Nabob's cause", they could not remain mere passive spectators of the Raja's warlike preparations. They pointed out, however, that they lacked the means to undertake a military expedition, or at least, if one were undertaken it ought "not to be at the expense of the Company"².

To the Raja the Madras authorities pointed out that he must have known that the Tanjore claims to the Maravar territory were disputed by the Nawab. By taking upon himself the decision on this question, which he ought to have reserved for the Nawab and the British, he had made himself an aggressor. He had acted without "the least previous intimation" to the British, the guarantors of the 1762 treaty.

And, they said, "Whatever may have been the ancient rights of Trichinopoly, Tanjore and the Maravar"¹, the Raja's making himself "a judge in the cause in which you are a party [was] not equitable, nor agreeable to the treaty". He was therefore asked to recall his troops and restore peace with the Maravar².

Such an approach did not, of course, appeal to the Nawab. He was not interested in seeing the Raja disengage from hostilities, for he wished to have him punished as an aggressor. He therefore emphasised the importance of the Company's acting without delay or backwardness in affording him assistance "and putting a stop to the Rajah's unwarrantable proceedings". To do otherwise, he pressed, would not be consistent "either with the honour of the Company, who are my protectors ... or with my reputation"³. Within the week, however, the Raja had denied that he was acting contrary to the treaty, which certainly did not forbid his clearing Tanjore territory of encroaching pugarees. He denied that he had concealed his intention from his allies; his desire

¹. The Rajas of Ramnad and Sivaganga were also referred to as the Matavars.
to regain his lost territories was well known to both the Nawab and the British, whom he had frequently requested to settle the matter. The British were the protector of his government. "Notwithstanding", he complained, "you have not settled even a single affair belonging to me". Even so he would still rely upon them and act in future, as he had done in the past, entirely in accordance with the treaty of 1762.

With these demands and counter claims before them, the Madras Select Committee met on 13 March 1771 to decide upon their policy. They were not sure how far they were empowered to proceed against the Raja. It would be rash on their part to commence hostilities according to the Nawab's suggestion. At the same time, they felt that the Directors in their letter of March 1769 had suggested that the Raja was "favoured by this Government". They were apprehensive that if they did not give the Nawab the assistance he had required, it might be represented as "refusing the Company's protection to him; refusing our aid to secure the peace of the Carnatic, to vindicate the honour of the Nabob's government and support his consequences in the eyes of the country powers". Under the circumstances it appeared

that whatever course they adopted, "nothing but great success" would save them from severe censure. Consequently, a decision was arrived at to collect provisions and troops at Trichinopoly, but at the same time not to make any declaration of their intentions, until they were prepared to execute them. Though no definite measure against the Raja had been decided upon, he had now been recognised as an aggressor. The only question was how to call him to account.

In their discussion the Committee had paid scant regard to the rights and wrongs of the case before them. They had ignored the Raja's contentions, and had accepted without question the Nawab's claim that Rammad and Sivaganga were tributary to him. The records of the Select Committee show, however, that history was against any such attitude. In particular, correspondence exchanged in the spring of 1755 between the three powers reveals that both the Nawab and the Madras Government then fully supported the claims of Tanjore. Thus in March 1755 Mohammed Ali not only drew the attention of the Madras Government to the Raja's complaint of the

2. The Raja had sent some presents to the Governor, which were not accepted; for "although the present is merely complimentary, and such he [the President] would think it improper to refuse from any of the Country Power, yet ... the present conduct of the Rajah rendered it proper for him to decline accepting it". Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.II, p.590.
protection given by the British to the Maravar, but he himself wrote to Colonel Heron, the British commander, urging him to abandon the Maravar. Reminded he told Heron, he had acted as an enemy these five or six years past, we never reaped any advantage from him, we should not lose the King of Tanjore... by giving our protection to the Maravar\(^1\). He also wrote to Pigot asking him to order Heron "as soon as possible to quit his protection to the Maravar"\(^1\). At the same time, the Nawab also asked Remmed to restore the Raja’s districts and deliver them as soon as possible\(^2\). The British in 1755 were equally upholders of Tanjore’s rights. Governor Pigot wrote to the Raja to say that he understood the Tanjore army was ready to march into the Maravar country and retake possession of parts "which belonged to you before the war"\(^2\). Since it might create fresh troubles, the Raja was desired to defer the expedition. The Governor added that the Maravar was to enter into an agreement with the British, but "I have wrote my officer, the Moravar is your enemy, and sent positive orders not to conclude any matters, or make any friendship with him, unless he does at the same time give you satisfaction concerning the afore mentioned districts, nor enter into treaty without your concurrence"\(^3\).

Clearly in 1755 if the Raja was dissuaded from attacking the Maravar it was not because his claim upon the Maravar was considered unjust, or because his action would infringe the rights of the Nawab.

Indeed it is questionable whether the Maravars were really dependents of the Nawab and tributaries of Arcot. During the siege of Yusuf Khan in Madura the Nawab sought the aid of the Maravars against Tinnevelly, but they "did not choose to come" until he had granted various requests of theirs. In 1755, the Maravar, far from showing himself tributary, seized two districts, Triponam and Palliandi, from Arcot. In 1771 when the Raja was driving on the Maravar capital, the first thought of the Nawab's agent at Madura was that this was a good opportunity to secure the two lost districts of the Nawab, and a little later the Maravar, hard pressed by Tanjore agreed to deliver the two districts in return for aid against the Raja. It will be noted that

1. During the Carnatic Wars, the troops of Captain Cope and Mohammed Ali, which had advanced to take Madura, were attacked by the Maravar capturing 3 cannons and a large number of muskets from them. Cope himself escaped with wounds, while about 100 British soldiers were said to have fallen. - Oriental Historical Manuscripts - Taylor, Vol.II, p.48.


by the end of 1771, when the Nawab had overrun Tanjore, he applied to the Madras authorities for assistance in attacking the Maravars. This shameless change of front surprised even the Madras authorities, who pointed out that he had been ostensibly the friend of the Maravar against the Raja. But much as they questioned his reason for attacking the Maravars — that the Maravars "although summoned to attend with their troops neither did so, nor furnished any supplies or provisions", they did not let it be an obstacle.

Though they were aware of the Nawab's "exaggeration of their disobedience", he was allowed to attack the Maravars, and in June 1772 Ramnad was taken. Nothing could have more clearly revealed that the Nawab's complaints of 1771 against Tanjore were trumped up charges.

Had the settlement of those complaints in 1771 rested solely with the Madras authorities, it seems very likely that they would have promoted some accommodation between the Nawab and the Raja. However strong the Nawab's arguments, they

could not have swayed the authorities into exploiting the Raja's conduct as pretext for an expedition; for the Committee clearly desired that "if affairs could be honorably accommodated, without drawing the sword, it would be the best mode of adjusting them". But the Nawab had acquired new strength from the appointment of Sir John Lindsay as Minister Plenipotentiary of George III, who had arrived in India in July 1770 with "letters and presents from their Majesties to the Nawab of Arcot and the Carnatic". Soon after his arrival, Lindsay had antagonised the Madras authorities by demanding a "full and succinct account" of all their transactions with the Nawab since the Treaty of Paris. He informed them that he would also inquire into the late war with the Nizam and Haidar and "the reasons for its unfortunate consequences". The authorities had not been informed of Lindsay's private role and were quite naturally alarmed at hearing that he was indeed invested with "great and separate powers". They had been transmitting duplicates

4. The Directors themselves came to know of Lindsay's secret powers only through the Madras authorities; "The first intelligence the Company received of their existence was communicated to them by their Presidency of Madras". Court of Dirs.-Earl of Rochford, 8 Apr.1771 - Home Misc. Series, Vol.105, pp.111-117.
of all their consultations to the Court of Directors, and through them to Parliament, but they had never heard of the Company's records being demanded by or submitted to the Ministry alone. Holding Lindsay's demand to be unconstitutional, they refused to show their records to him. Lindsay, provoked in turn, naturally soon became a partisan of the Government to whom he was deputed against the Madras authorities. During his stay in India, Lindsay encouraged the Nawab to play off the Crown against the Company in fostering his ambitions. To the Madras authorities, on the other hand, he stressed that they had not shown enough attention to the Nawab's interests. He felt that the "national and the real Interests of the Company in India" were so connected with the Nawab's safety and peace of his country that "all should be considered as one and each regarded with the utmost watchful attentions". All the tributaries of the Nawab "whoever have acknowledged his authority and who have paid him Tribute should be obliged to

1. The Directors defended the Madras authorities' action in not complying with Lindsay's demand; "we express our hope, that our servants in the situation and circumstances they found themselves, will stand fully excused in Your Lordship's sight, as they do in ours, for not considering themselves warranted to comply with such a demand". Court of Dirs.-Earl of Rochford, 8 Apr.1771 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.105, pp.111-117.
More particularly Lindsay also strongly advocated that the Nawab should be supported against Tanjore. It was inconsistent to let the Nawab suffer one of his tributaries "to dispise his authority and with impunity to make war upon another...". The Raja had clearly broken the terms of the treaty of 1762 and as such was an aggressor. He implored the Madras Government that they were "bound in honour to see justice done".

Lindsay was not content with merely pleading for assistance to the Nawab at this juncture. He endorsed his arguments with strong suggestions that the Nawab's affairs, ever since the Carnatic Wars, had been hopelessly neglected by the Madras authorities. His partiality to the Nawab blinded him, indeed, to the realities of the politics of the previous decade. Thus he argued that the Nawab had been promised assistance to collect his tribute after the fall of Pondicherry in 1761, but immediately after the event the Madras Council had quite neglected his interests. At that time, he said, "when all India were awed by the rapid success of the English arms, a small force on the frontiers of Tanjour" could have obliged the Raja to agree to any terms.

Instead, the Nawab was reduced to accepting from Tanjore a sum not equal "to a fourth part of what was due". He also denounced the Madras Government for having allowed the waters of Cauvery to be conducted into Tanjore. This, he maintained, increased the "Rajah's revenue by making his countries more fertile; and by diminishing the demand for Rice, reduces the income of the Carnatic".

The Madras authorities found themselves in an awkward position. They were pressed hard, both by the Nawab and by Lindsay, to take immediate and effective measures against the Raja. The Nawab, in his letter of 24 March, had expressed his surprise at their inability to proceed against Tanjore, and his fear that failure to punish the Raja would weaken his authority. They were also aware of the consequences that might result if they did not abide by the recommendations of the King's representative. But military action was not to be contemplated in their financially exhausted state, especially as an attack upon Tanjore might provoke Maratha intervention in the Raja's favour.

The Marathas were at this time engaged in a war with Haidar, and this development had brought the British themselves to the "brink of war". The authorities were clearly against any involvement, but feared that all their efforts might be insufficient to prevent their being entangled in the hostilities. By the second article of the Treaty of Madras, it had been agreed that if either of the contracting parties should be attacked, the other should afford assistance against the enemy; and Haidar now solicited British assistance against the Marathas. The Marathas themselves were likewise anxious to obtain British assistance. Consequently the authorities found themselves in a dilemma. If they assisted Haidar, it was certain to bring the Marathas against them; but if they assisted the Marathas, it might result in a vast increase in the Maratha power, which would be a constant danger to the Carnatic. In such a situation, it was their desire to avoid involvement in the war and for that purpose to stay neutral. They were scarcely anxious to move against Tanjore, if the Raja were supported by the Marathas.

As the Madras consultation of 28 March 1771 shows, the Select

2. "That in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out". Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads - Aitchison, Vol. IX, p.219.
Committee thought this might well be the case. They had received a letter from the Raja advising them that he had settled his differences with the Maravar and that he would soon settle affairs with Sivaganga also. Such defiance of their warnings appeared to them to show that he did not depend upon his own strength alone in his audacious action. It seemed probable that his apprehensions of the Nawab’s desire to acquire Tanjore, which had been increased since the arrival in India of Lindsay, had led him to intrigues; if he could involve the Carnatic in troubles, the Nawab would be prevented from disturbing him. This clearly led to the further possibility that the Marathas themselves might have encouraged the Raja to entangle the British in a war to prevent them from assisting Haidar.

Under such circumstances the Select Committee was prepared to denounce the Raja’s attack on the Maravars as unjustifiable. And though well aware that the Nawab’s desire to proceed against Tanjore was "not out of any tender regard to the Marawar, Nalcooty [Sivaganga] or Tondaiman", but "with views of either to make a complete conquest or to levy a contribution" in Tanjore, they were prepared to

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swallow all his claims to be interfering on behalf of his tributaries against Tanjore aggression. They were likewise ready to make the fact that the Raja was nine months in arrears in his payment of tribute to Arcot grounds for intervention. But, while secretly preparing supplies for an expedition against Tanjore, they refused to make any overt move which could lead to involvement in the Maratha-Mysore conflict. For the moment neither the Directors' instructions of March 1769, nor the pressure from Lindsay and the Nawab would make them act.

In this cautious attitude they were certainly wise, for it seems the Nawab, too, had recognised the possibility of Maratha interference in the Tanjore affair. More than that, the Select Committee was aware that the Nawab was attempting to force Madras into an alliance with the Marathas to serve his own interests. As their consultations of 30 April shows, they knew that the Nawab was terrified lest the Marathas should penetrate the Carnatic and plunder his dominions. The Marathas at this time were in possession of a great part of Mysore and had advanced to the borders of the Carnatic.

2. The tribute due from the Raja was for 1770-1771. He had cleared all previous arrears in July 1770. Raja-Du Pre, Recd. 14 July 1770 - Tanjore Appendix-Rous, Vol.II, p.568.
and they had threatened the Nawab that unless he persuade the British to assist them against Haidar Ali, they would invade the Carnatic. But the Madras authorities had not forgotten the disastrous results of their close connection with the Nizam in 1767, they wanted no more adventures, and they had already clearly stated to Lindsay their determination not to enter into any alliance with the Marathas. Now the Maratha vakil had already made it clear that they would support the Raja in the event of any hostilities against Tanjore. Since the Nawab had already encouraged Maratha hopes of a British alliance, and he was eager to play the role of mediator, his bold advocacy of an attack upon Tanjore seemed designed to create a situation in which the British would be compelled to accept an alliance with the Marathas against Mysore as the price of their abandoning Tanjore to its fate.

The plot might seem Machiavellian in its complexity, but its advantages to the Nawab were clear: he would secure

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4. "... the offensive alliance and assistance which they [the Marathas] and the Nabob are so desirous of ...". Gov. & Coun.-Lindsay, 25 Apr.1771 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.104, p.549.
Tanjore, see his hated rival Haidar Ali destroyed, and the Marathas held at arm's length from the Carnatic. The Madras authorities seem not to have fully realised what the Nawab was up to, but in refusing to act they destroyed the whole plan. As soon as the Nawab realised that the Council would not take up arms and that they were quite determined to avoid any alliance with the Marathas, he dropped all plans for an expedition against Tanjore. He made it plain that under these circumstances their preparations for collecting troops and supplies at Trichinopoly might be abandoned. The Select Committee, not unnaturally, expressed their great surprise that the Nawab should decline their covert aid after having been so anxious for the expedition.

There the matter might have rested, but for the activities of Sir John Lindsay. He was not only in favour of the expedition, but also sided with the Nawab in recommending an alliance with the Marathas, which the Council ardently desired to avoid and which was their major objection to the expedition. Less than a month after hearing the

2. In their letter to Lindsay, the authorities assured him that once they were relieved from their "apprehensions of the Marathas, and the Nabob's desire to entangle with them", they would "undertake to call the Rajah to account". *Pres.& Coun.—Lindsay*, 29 May 1771 — *Home Misc.Series, Vol.104*, pp.579-581.
Council's explanations, he reported to the Secretary of State that the Raja still "remained in the same state of defiance" to the Nawan and had "plundered them [the Maravars] so much of money" that they "have not been able to pay their usual peshcush to the Nabob". He added that the Raja had been preparing his capital for defence and had even "advanced a body of men within a stage or two of Trichinopoly". It was his information that the Raja had intended taking "six thousand Mahrattas into his pay, who with the troops of Tanjore, will make him a very formidable enemy". That Lindsay was impatient with the delay in proceeding against Tanjore is clear. Such delay might enable the Raja to prepare himself, which would result in the execution of the task becoming difficult. He was solely concerned with humbling the Raja and the sooner it was done the better.

It is only proper at this point to take into account the peculiar circumstances that confronted the Madras authorities. To a great extent, their independent action was checked. Their blunder in allying with the Nizam in 1767 and thereby originating the war with Haidar, and the subsequent instructions from the Directors to proceed against Tanjore in support of the

Nawab, which their precarious condition prevented them from implementing, contributed much to shatter their confidence. The enormous sympathy and favour that the Nawab had gained with the Ministry and the more independent action that he was allowed, had reduced them to a body which was apprehensive to take any definite measure. They were neither sure of what plan to adopt, nor confident of the success of any plan which they should choose. As they plaintively wrote to the Directors, they could not but leave them "in doubt what measures will be pursued in respect to Tanjour", as they themselves were "in a state of uncertainty". But having once been driven into making military preparations at Trichinopoly, they found themselves in a situation which demanded further action. They could not drop the whole matter, for that would be "a show of weakness and fear of Marattas". But, in fact, they were heartily afraid of the Marathas. They dare not take them as allies, lest they assume a dominant role in the Nawab-Raja conflict, securing "an acknowledged right of interposing between the Nabob and his Tributary". Moreover the Directors had clearly expressed their objection to any alliance with the Marathas. These

considerations compelled them to reject the prospect of an alliance with the Marathas; but, at the same time, they could not openly oppose it, for they feared that "all subsequent misfortunes would certainly be laid at Our door and Our objection would be imputed to a rooted obstinacy and enmity" to the Marathas. Their concentration of troops at Trichinopoly was designed to frighten Tanjore - it was inadequate to prevent the Marathas from ravaging the Carnatic, with dire loss of revenue, should hostilities commence.

Unhappily for the Select Committee the Raja, confronted as he was with an attack, was making preparations to defend his country. There was information of great quantities of arms supplied to Tanjore by the Dutch, as well as of a regular correspondence between the two capitals. It was also rumoured that some Danish officers had arrived to discipline the Tanjore army. The Raja's precautions, precipitated by their move, made inaction more difficult: it was in the logic of politics to treat them as hostile and aggressive. The Nawab and Lindsay were ready to press this interpretation and the Committee realised that if they declined taking preparatory

measures for chastising the Rajah, every misfortune which should befall the Carnatic would have been imputed to our supineness and refusal to vindicate the Nabob's honour and support of his Government".

The full extent of the Committee's helplessness was brought out when they received a letter from the Raja, which made it clear that he was anxious for a settlement. His letter implied that the tribute he owed would be paid, if the British guarantee remained as before. The issue here raised, the only one recognised as valid by the Raja, was one on which the Madras authorities scarcely touched except by way of presenting it as an additional excuse for hostilities. There is no doubt that at the time the Committee decided upon measures against Tanjore, a part of the tribute from Tanjore to Arcot was still unpaid. But the Raja had not refused to pay, he was only disputing the amount to be paid. He pleaded that whenever he sent forces to assist the Nawab, "the extraordinary Expense and betta incurred, should be deducted out of the annual paschush", and in a letter of 20 January 1770 he had put his expenses for assistance against Haidar at fourteen lakhs of rupees. He pointed out that just such an

allowance had been granted him in similar instances in the Carnatic Wars and in the expedition against Yusuf Khan. It is true that in April 1770 Du Pre had complained that part of the tribute for the preceding year remained unpaid, but in May the Raja had paid two lakhs, and when in June the Governor complained that there was still a balance of fifty thousand rupees, the Raja had gone on to clear this amount too. By July 1771, therefore, the only tribute which could have been due was that for the year 1770-1771, against which the Raja's claim for a deduction for his expenses was still outstanding. The Raja had appealed to the Madras authorities, as guarantors of the 1762 financial settlement, to recognise his claim, leaving it to them to agree the amount of any deduction. Had they decided on the validity of the Raja's claims and made a financial award, there seems little reason to doubt that he would have paid the amount due, for he did not deny the Nawab's right to tribute. The way was thus

6. The Madras authorities had little moral right to complain of any delay in payment of tribute. In 1749 when they acquired the fort of Devikkottai from Tanjore, they did so on condition of annual tribute to the Raja. In 1756, they were five years in arrears!
opened for negotiations with the Raja which could rescue them from their embarrassing predicament. The Select Committee refused to take the opportunity: they would negotiate only "if the Nabob should think it advisable", leaving it to him "to digest his plan or find alternatives". No more abject abandonment of responsibility could have been displayed.

The Nawab for his part, realising that the authorities had already surrendered to him the right to decide the course of action, piled on the pressure, giving out that it was better to abandon the whole plan. If the matter was to be pursued at all, he claimed, it could only be by leaving the entire question of negotiations to him supported "merely by the Company's power as auxiliary". The Nawab had played his hand admirably. The authorities were forced to take a definite stand in the affair. They were left with three courses to follow; they could abandon the expedition as the Nawab himself had suggested, take complete control and responsibility of the negotiations, or they could take the risk of military action.

The first course was out of the question. They had moved so far in the affair that even a total inaction would not restore the situation to normal. The Nawab would not agree to it: his expressed desire to see the expedition abandoned was designed to compel them to his line of action. Moreover, if the danger of an expedition was considerable, the danger which threatened them if the expedition was abandoned was greater. Unless the Raja was compelled to settle the affair quickly, it was probable that the consequences might be fatal to the Carnatic. The French, with whom a war was expected to break out soon and who had forces in Mauritius, might employ themselves as auxiliaries and unite with the Raja. It was also better to deal with the Raja before a settlement took place between Haidar and the Marathas. That way the Marathas could be kept away from the Carnatic. Should the matter be prolonged, there was every reason to apprehend a union of the forces of Tanjore, the French and the Marathas.

The third course, an attack upon Tanjore by the Company, was also impossible without the Nawab's concurrence and support. Apart from the moral aspect that it was for him that the

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expedition was originally contemplated, it could not be undertaken, contrary to his inclinations, with any degree of safety or prudence. Moreover by the eleventh article of the Treaty of Paris, which had recently assumed so much importance, they were prevented from entering into an armed conflict, and engaging the Nawab in it as well, contrary to his desire. Such a breach of that treaty would not only involve them "in ruin, but subject the Company to a forfeiture of their Charter". Here the Select Committee were driven by their apprehensions of censure from the Directors. The Directors had shown only too plainly that they believed Madras to be "actuated by personal prejudice in their contacts with the Nabob". The Select Committee dare not act contrary to the Nawab's wish, for however judicious their proceedings, there was no hope that "a vindication of our conduct will anywhere be listened to". "Had we but grounds to hope for candor in the judgement to be passed on our conduct", they said, there were many things they would have ventured to do for the public good. But the Nawab was against them, the King's representative was against them, the Directors were against them, and "may God grant that the Parliament be not as much against" them.

In such circumstances, negotiations seemed the only course open to them. But the Nawab, jealous of the British appearing of more consequence than himself, objected to this too. They had no other alternative but to leave the entire matter of negotiations to him. That would not only be agreeable to his views and desire, but would also be in the spirit of the Directors' instructions. The Governor, therefore, informed the Raja's vakil that he should approach the Nawab to negotiate a settlement. This was a new development in the British relations with Tanjore and the surprised vakil naturally expressed his apprehensions that the British attitude seemed to imply a declaration that their guarantee of the treaty of 1762 was at an end. The Nawab had been given the right to deal with the Raja in a manner that suited him. It was no more a question of their showing the justice or otherwise of his demands, but only of supporting him in his decisions.

This was in fact the triumph of Mohammed Ali, who had strenuously striven towards a full control of his relations with the Raja, without British protection to the latter, or interference in the matter. He had now gained what he had

lost by the treaty of 1762. Placing the control of
negotiations with him amounted to the British renouncing
their rights under that treaty and surrendering the Raja
to him. The Nawab could not be expected to miss the
opportunity by allowing a friendly settlement to take place,
especially when the prize he had been seeking for so long
was well within his grasp. He intended to enforce his
demands on the Raja in the manner he had proposed. But
realising perhaps, that an attempt at a friendly settlement
would justify his stand as well as satisfy the British, he
made a fresh demand upon the Raja. No doubt, it bore the
appearance of an opening to the Raja's vakil for negotiations;
but the Nawab seems to have meant it to be no more than an
appearance. His demands were so exorbitant that the Raja's
compliance seemed quite impossible. The arrears of tribute
were demanded with interests as the Nawab had "assigned it to
his creditors" and as an indemnification for the military
preparations he had already made, a further sum was claimed.
Far from being reasonable, these demands clearly suggest that

1. In his meetings with the Governor on 22, 23, 26 and 28 July,
the Nawab desired to enforce his demand, and declined
settling the dispute by negotiation. Ft.St.Geo.Cons.,
3. The Nawab did not give a specific amount in his declaration
of his demands.
the Nawab was determined to defeat every chance for a peaceful settlement. Even then, the vakil explained, obviously with the desire to hold on to the slenderest chance, that it would take him a fortnight to get a reply from the Raja. But the Nawab would not suffer the delay and expressed his conviction that nothing but a waste of time would result from negotiating through the vakil. He proposed that "more spirited measures" should be adopted: his eldest son, Omdat ul Umara, representing him, should proceed to Trichinopoly to make his demands on the Raja and "to require a positive and direct answer". The authorities agreed to this proposal and to enforce it, decided that the remainder of their forces should also proceed to Trichinopoly and be prepared to march against the Raja, should he delay or refuse to meet the demands.

Having allowed the conduct of negotiations to pass into the Nawab's hands, so that their direct responsibility had been shuffled off, the Madras authorities showed themselves

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1. The Governor, even before the Nawab made the demands, was "well assured" that the Nawab was determined to make difficulties by demanding an excessive sum of the Rajah as an indemnification and by insisting on the terms, which it is not probable the Rajah will comply with. *Fs.St.Geo. Cons.*, 24 July 1771 - Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, Vol.57.
ready to support decisive action. The Raja seemed anxious to delay compliance and they even felt it highly improbable that he would agree to any terms. Apparently, no importance was attached to the letter that they had received from him, in which he had sought a peaceful settlement. It was necessary to settle the affair quickly before the expected monsoon, and the method of deputing Cudat was "the more necessary" in order that the affair might be "fully and firmly determined". The authorities resolved to support the Nawab’s proposal in the most effectual manner, and to "use military Compulsion with the Rajah, even to the Reduction and Capture of his Capital, if necessary...". Accordingly, General Smith was instructed that "whenever the Nabob’s Plenipotentiary ... shall signify to you the Propriety and Expediency thereof, to act in the most effectual manner to the attainment of thos Ends marching towards Tanjour without committing Hostilities, or in a Hostile manner to enter the territory ... and even to invest and besiege and take the Capital without waiting for further orders from us".

The Nawab had now obtained, along with the liberty to treat with the Raja independently, an effective weapon, in the use of the British army, to support his policy. The troops commanded

by Smith were subjected to the control of Umdat ul Umara. To enable the army to remain under one command, the Nawab's troops were placed under Smith; but in reality they were all under the Nawab's control. To Smith's queries regarding his duties, the Committee observed that they never meant to place him "under the Nabob's orders", but only empowered him "to act in conformity to his recommendation": it was "the time of commencing hostilities, and the continuation of hostilities" that were to be determined by Omdat, but "the mode of conducting them, and the Plan and execution of the operations" were left to Smith. They explained that their part in the affair was only as auxiliary to the Nawab; they were acting according to the spirit of the Treaty of Paris and could not with safety to the Company's Charter give greater powers to Smith, not possessing greater themselves. The Madras authorities were devious in their instructions and methods, but the results of their manoeuvres were clear: they had overthrown the treaty of 1762, and in the name of non-interference, they permitted the use of their forces by the Nawab to his own ends.

In answer to the Raja's letter, the Committee now decided to inform him that he should comply with the Nawab's demands.

Very conveniently, they assumed that the treaty of 1762 was still valid, and pointed out to the Raja that in case of his failure, they would be obliged to support the Nawab. The Nawab approved of the letter, but did not approve of the mentioning of the treaty. He seems to have been more sensible of the implications involved in the venture undertaken. At least, he did not consider the treaty as valid any more. The expression in the letter that the "Company is guarantee" was not proper, he argued, it should be "was" and not "is", as the treaty was void. To this the Select Committee made no demur, though the Nawab's suggestion was obviously "declaratory of his senses and intention to annihilate entirely the treaty of 1762". They seemed quite happy to accept the fact that the Nawab's interpretation would free him completely from the British guarantee and would release them as well from being "obliged to see so much of it performed as had not been done so".

From the Committee's proceedings it would seem that the Nawab was asking for what had been achieved by him. The authorities had violated all the principles of the treaty of 1762. They had agreed to his proposal to demand money from the Raja, which had not been authorised by that treaty. In

1762, in a similar situation, when the Nawab demanded money from the Raja, they had shown a great desire for peaceful settlement and had brought about a treaty. Now in 1771, when the interpretation of that treaty was most needed, they preferred to remain aloof from the affair. Furthermore, they did not hesitate to delegate to the Nawab the power to negotiate, which power they had claimed and held with great zeal for a decade. They had also granted him the use of their army and thus exhibited utter disregard of their former agreements with the Raja. It was an illegal decision to set the army of the guarantor as an implicit instrument in the hands of one party for the specific object of conquering the territory of the other.

What reason can be assigned for the Madras authorities' behaviour in allowing themselves to drift from measure to measure so much against their desire and their understanding of the situation? They were fully aware of the Nawab's desire to capture Tanjore, and of Lindsay's efforts to that same end, yet till July 1770 they had successfully resisted their influence; and further postponement of the operations until they obtained specific advice from the Directors would have been the proper measure. As it turned out later, the Directors were in complete agreement with their resisting the
influence of the Nawab and Lindsay. In fact, the authorities were commended for their "prudence" in not having rushed into what "at the desire or recommendation of any person whatsoever". It would seem that if any one factor can be pointed to as a predominant influence, it was the Directors' letter of 1769 with its reproof for their championing of the Raja's rights and their coolness towards the Nawab's ambitions.

It is not possible, however, to absolve the much harassed Select Committee from blame. No part of the instructions from the Directors either prevented them from discharging their responsibility as guarantors of the treaty of 1762, or warranted their drastic action in allowing the Nawab to invade Tanjore. They had all along been aware that the Raja was particularly apprehensive, ever since the arrival of Lindsay, that the Nawab might succeed in revoking the treaty of 1762. They had themselves taken special care to assure him that as long as he made regular payments of the tribute, there was no reason to be alarmed; and yet, to the Raja's attempts to pay the tribute, they had shown not the least consideration.

The authorities had observed that the Raja's conduct "had in some measure proceeded from apprehensions of the Nabob

and the disability of the Company to protect him against the Nabob, supported by the representative of the Crown. It was their opinion that if the Raja was "reinstated in the former confidence he had of the Company's impartial adherence to the treaty of 1762", they would find him a peaceful tributary. Even on the very day when they resolved to proceed against Tanjore, they observed that the Raja "has long been, but since the arrival of ... Lindsay more than ever, apprehensive that the Nabob had determined to conquer the whole Tanjour Country, whenever he shall be able". Yet, they failed to explore the possibility of removing the suspicion and fear in the Raja, and their failure is all the more apparent because of their complete disregard of the opportunities for a settlement which the Raja himself provided on more than one occasion.

It became clear, even before the British had decided to undertake the expedition against Tanjore and to allow the Nawab complete control of their army, that the Nawab's ambition was not confined to the question of defaulted tribute, but included the desire to annex the kingdom of Tanjore. It was believed that the Raja would not agree to terms unless compelled by force. It was certain that the Nawab would not willingly go to extremes "whatever political necessity there may be", unless the whole of Tanjore were promised to him. The Nawab had indeed always feared that if Tanjore were captured outright by the British, they would retain the conquest for themselves. This was why he had insisted that all negotiations be left in his hands, and why he had been willing to offer ten lakhs of rupees to the Company if Tanjore were handed over to him upon capture. This was why the Nawab had been "greatly alarmed" when the Governor proposed to retain Tanjore Fort until orders from Home had been received, why he had stressed that any British garrisoning of the Fort must be at his discretion, and why he stressed that the Raja was after all a zamindar under his
authority, whose territory like that of other conquered dependents belonged to Arcot¹.

The Madras authorities' decision to go to war and abandon negotiations had landed them in a dilemma. They believed, a delusion, that they were authorised to proceed against Tanjore, but to capture the kingdom and transfer it to the Nawab was clearly not a step within their competence. Yet, if the Nawab were not satisfied, "his Fears and jealousies of the Company", they reported, "will be so quickened and strengthened" that he might accept any terms from the Raja "rather than risk even the Commencement of Hostilities, lest any Conquest shall fall into, and be retained in, our hands". Moreover, not to act with the Nawab might cost them their legal right to interfere in Tanjore affairs. They had failed in their responsibility as guarantors of the earlier treaty, but were reluctant to refuse the Nawab's demands, lest in any future treaty between the Nawab and the Raja, they should be given no such status. Should they defer action and shelve the matter, they envisaged nothing but "certain danger and probable Ruin". The Nawab, more fearful of them "than the Enemy he is contending with, will be as ready to betray the Interests of Us his real Friends, as to subdue the power and

pride of the Rajah ...". They were uncertain of what the Nawab might do, but certain that "it will be short of what he should do ..."\(^1\). It would be "impolitick and dangerous to the last degree" to abandon the Raja in a state\(^2\) which might leave him no alternative other than to unite with the French\(^1\).

Concluding it to be "less dangerous to let the conquest... pass as of course into the Nabob's hands and possession" than to leave the Raja possessed of power "to become dangerous", the authorities felt obliged to agree to the Nawab's proposal as "an act of Political necessity". After all, the Court of Directors had maintained that the Nawab's loyalty and devotion to the Company was such that any increase in his power was but an extension of British authority\(^1\). In that case, the decision to leave Tanjore Fort to the Nawab would be approved and they would only be "liable for censure for having doubted the propriety of doing so"\(^3\). Should his additional possessions make him over ambitious, then force might be applied "with great Ease to control the Nabob". The remedy for any danger

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2. The authorities were clearly of the opinion that the Raja would not put himself into the hands of the French, if he could be reinstated in his former confidence in the British. To such an effect, they did not give any consideration. *Ft.St.Geo.Cons.*, 27 July 1771 - Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, Vol.57.
from the Nawab, they believed, was "at home and there only. And Legal Orders on the British Delegates of the national power on the Coast may Model and restrain it, within such Bounds as shall be thought fit"\(^1\). Thus, finally they agreed to the Nawab's demand that the Fort of Tanjore, after its capture, should be delivered to him\(^2\).

Early in September 1771, Omdat ul Umara signified to General Smith that as the Raja had refused to comply with the demands, military compulsion must be applied\(^3\). The Nawab reported that the Raja's attitude left no room for a peaceful settlement. The Raja was still defiant and was preparing himself for war; he had also asked the Marathas to create troubles in the Carnatic. The Nawab proposed that the "country and Fort of Tanjore may be taken" and that would be "of Use in preserving the Tranquility of the Carnatic"\(^4\). The army marched from Trichinopuloy on 13 September\(^3\).

The Governor explained that the Company's part in the affair was "not as a principal"; it was in support of the

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Nawab's government and "partly as Guarantee of the treaty of 1762". This was a complete contradiction for if they had acted as guarantors, they could not have acted but as a principal. Nevertheless, the Governor agreed to act according to the Nawab's proposal and that "whatever shall be taken from the Rajah of Tanjore and that shall fall into my hands, possession or power ... shall be left" at the Nawab's disposal. As far as their ally, the Raja, his family and dependents were concerned, the British would leave them to the Nawab's "clemency and humanity".

The army arrived before Tanjore on 23 September. There were strong rumours that ten thousand Maratha troops were ready to enter the Carnatic in response, but as the Governor rightly saw, there could be no Maratha move before the monsoon. Nevertheless, for three weeks, Omdat ul Umara carried on negotiations without any sign of a settlement. General Smith reported on 6 October that even at this late hour the Raja was willing to accept the Nawab's demands, but only if the British would guarantee the settlement, for he would not "trust the Nabob's Word or his son's for a halfpenny". The Council

however refused even to consider the possibility of interfering in the negotiations as mediators or guarantors, though on 17 October Smith reported again that without British intervention the Raja would "run all risques" rather than agree to the demands of Omdat ul Umara. Instead, on 20 October the British forces were pushed forward to positions before the Fort of Vallam, one of the great bulwarks of Tanjore city. On 21 October the Tanjore garrison stole out of Vallam Fort, and the British army moved into position to breach and assault the walls of Tanjore city itself. Within the city supplies were running out, and by 27 October a practicable breach had been effected in its walls. Then, when the army was about to assault, Omdat ul Umara informed General Smith that he had signed a treaty with the Raja, and that further military operations were unnecessary. Under the terms of the treaty the Raja agreed to pay eight lakhs of rupees for the arrears of tribute, and thirty two and a half lakhs for the expenses of the expedition; he would restore all the lands he had taken from the Maravars and would aid the Nawab with his own troops in times of war; the Fort of Vallam was to be restored to the Raja, but should be demolished if

the Nawab demanded it; and the Nawab was to receive the
jaghir district of Arni.

The treaty represented a triumph for the Nawab, secured
at the expense both of the Raja and of the British. It is
ture that it left the tribute due from the Raja unchanged at
four lakhs of rupees a year, though two years tribute had to
be paid at once in cash. Similarly the provision that the
Raja in time of war should supply men and provisions to the
Nawab was scarcely a new burden, for in no Carnatic war since
1749 in which the British or the Nawab had been involved, had
the Raja failed to supply such aid, though the obligation had
not been so clearly expressed. The requirement that the
Raja should make no agreement with any power without the Nawab’s
approval was new, but the Raja had not in the past involved
himself in any agreements subversive of his relations with the
Nawab and the Company. But the Nawab now had possession of
the key stronghold of Vallam, and he had saddled Tanjore with
the costs of the expedition, thirty two end a half lakhs of
rupees, which opened up possibilities of further interference.
That the Nawab had won a victory over the British was also
clear from the chagrin displayed by the Select Committee at
the outcome of the expedition. They had earnestly hoped, as

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is clear from their Consultations, that the Raja would not agree to the Nawab's terms, that the effecting of a breach would be followed by assault, and that no other terms would be accepted than "the surrender of the Fort at discretion". They lamented that the signing of the treaty had deprived British arms "of the eclat, which they were on the point of acquiring", and it is clear that they had hoped that, despite their delegation of authority to the Nawab, Smith would have realised that "the reduction of the Fort was what they wished for". It is said that the Nawab had raised the siege of Tanjore and evacuated the country "with more humanity than policy", but the Select Committee were well aware that the Nawab's earnest desire was to possess Tanjore "and all Hindostan if he could", and that his raising of the siege had been cleverly contrived to deny them any opportunity to interfere. The Nawab had succeeded, as they acknowledged, in what "next to the possession of the whole, he had been most anxious to effect". The treaty of 1762 had been a rankling thorn in his side: by the new treaty, they reported, he "fancies he has removed that Restraint". He had acted as

1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 1 Nov.1771 - Mds.Select Committee
Proceedings, Vol.60.
2. Gov.& Coun.-Smith, 1 Nov.1771 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 1 Nov.1771-
Vol.6.
Series, Vol.271, B.95.
Recd., Vol.6.
principal in the expedition, the Company as mere auxiliaries, and in the now treaty they had no part, there was no word of the treaty of 1762, "nor a Word in respect to the Payment of the Peishcush in future, nor of its Remission". In their letter of 28 February 1772 to the Directors, they had even to express their doubt as to whether or not the treaty of 1762 was now void.

The Nawab had also successfully dealt with the Marathas. By coming to an early settlement with the Raja he had ended any fear of their "espousing the cause of Tanjore seriously ... not out of attachment to the Raja, but to share the Booty". It is true that immediately after the signing of the treaty a Maratha army invaded and plundered some parts of the Carnatic. But though the Nawab blamed the Raja for having prevailed upon Trimbak Rao to invade the Carnatic, it soon appeared that the real cause for such an invasion was entirely different.

Before the expedition against Tanjore, the Nawab had come to an understanding with Trimbak Rao; he would pay the Maratha General a lakh of rupees, if he did not interfere in the measures against Tanjore. As the Nawab had not kept his promise, Trimak Rao marched his army to the outskirts of the Carnatic. When the money was paid the Maratha army promptly

withdrew. The Madras authorities were well aware of the Nawab's duplicity and did not charge the Raja with any breach in his agreements with the Nawab.

The Madras authorities realised after the event that they had been outwitted. They admitted that after the Nawab "had irritated the Raja into unjustifiable acts, 'twas necessary to call him to an account", but they also admitted that "if we had the power of doing justice, it might have been done without firing a Gun". Under the treaty of 1762 their formal renunciation of their right to interfere in Tanjore-Arcot relations was unwarranted. Now they confessed that, despite the tone of the Directors' instructions of 1769, they ought to have intervened to maintain peace between the Nawab and the Raja. They should have required deputies from both to state their demands, and upon a fair discussion, they could have settled the dispute. But if, after the unwelcome outcome of the event, they felt that they could have justly intervened, any such attitude was flagrantly absent from all their deliberations leading up to the expedition.

The Madras authorities could now only comfort themselves with the belief, or hope, that the treaty was frail and

unlikely to last since the Nawab had not the least security for the Raja's fulfilling its conditions. Though the possession of Vallam Fort was undoubtedly a great check upon Tanjore, and Smith had been ordered in November 1771 "on no account either to restore it to the Rajah or destroy it" but to garrison it strongly, they still presumed that the Raja would evade compliance with the treaty, "as the measures which had been taken against him could only tend to increase his resentment without disabling him". They added that the Tanjoreans had been so exasperated by the Nawab, and were so fully convinced of his intention ultimately to conquer their country that they would be dangerous if the Carnatic were again involved in war, and that therefore the whole of Tanjore ought to be reduced. As the Governor put it to Palk, "Either the Rajah must be supported in his Government as that he may have confidence in the Company, or he must be reduced. To leave him in a continual fear of the Nabob will ensure his enmity whenever it may be dangerous to us and when we shall need his friendship".

A reading of the correspondence of the Fort of St. George authorities leaves one uncertain whether they hoped that the

treaty would break down so that they might reassert that right to intervene in Tanjore affairs which they had surrendered in 1771; whether they were really anxious to seize Tanjore for themselves, as the Nawab suspected; or whether they did believe that Tanjore, half reduced, was dangerous. What is clear is that the Madras authorities were quite in the dark about the wishes and intentions of the Court of Directors.

It was not until 1775 that the Directors gave a clear decision upon the measures adopted by the Madras authorities in 1771¹.

The Madras authorities were thus left without specific instructions. They had confessed that they were led by the Nawab from one step to another. "In this manner had Tanjore been humbled and fleeced: in this manner the two Marawars had been conquered, and delivered up as a dominion to the Nabob"².

While the Madras authorities were uneasy and uncertain about their proceedings, the Nawab showed himself increasingly confident. In 1771 he had refrained from outright capture of Tanjore for fear that his British forces might take possession of it themselves, but the manner in which the Maravars had then been left under his complete control now emboldened him in June 1773 to grasp again at Tanjore. His excuses for asking

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¹ The Directors' letter sent in 1773 gave no clear lead at all. See ch. VIII p. 242.
for British assistance in a renewed attack upon Tanjore were that the Raja had not contributed towards the operations against the Maravars in 1772, that the Raja had mortgaged Nogore and the adjoining districts to the Dutch, a move contrary to the interests of both the Nawab and the Company, and that the Raja owed ten lakhs of the amount stipulated by the treaty.

The Nawab’s complaint about the tribute due from the Raja was a frivolous one. The Raja had not only paid in 1771 for the expenses of the expedition, but had also mortgaged to the Nawab lands worth sixteen lakhs of rupees. Only two years had since elapsed, and it was quite improbable that any amount was still due from the Raja. The Nawab maintained that some deficiency had appeared in the revenues of the mortgaged lands. However, the Raja, recognizing the deficiency, had sent bills to cover the amount due to the Nawab. But the Nawab would not accept the bills and maintained that the Raja had defaulted in his payments. If the Nawab had been genuinely concerned

3. Kumara, the dubash of Paul Benfield, a contractor at Madras, was employed “in lending money on mortgages. To him the Raja addressed himself; through him, he mortgaged to Mr. Benfield some districts which had been formerly mortgaged to the Nabob; and obtained from Comera bills on his master, Mr. Benfield, payable at Madras, for the twelve lakhs which, by the treaty of 1771, were still to be paid. But it was not the intention of the Nabob to receive this last instalment. His confidence in the servants of the Company was increased. And he now determined at all events to get possession of Tanjore. He therefore sent for the dubash, and, by proper application, prevailed on him to deny that he gave the draughts”. Defence of Lord Pigot, p.64.
about the tribute, he would surely have accepted the Raja's bills; or if the bills were unacceptable, he could have approached the Madras authorities to settle the matter. That he considered himself the sole master in his relations with the Raja is quite evident; for he never entertained the idea of British mediation. He declared that the Raja was in arrears and that as a result of the breach of the treaty he would take action against him.

The Nawab's supposed agitation regarding the Raja's transactions with the Dutch seems equally irrelevant. By the treaty of 1762 and again by the treaty of 1771, the Raja had been brought to pay the annual tribute to the Nawab. The Raja was still master of his country and had the inherent right to dispose of his lands in whatever manner he thought fit and proper. It is true that he had mortgaged Nagore and the adjoining districts to the Dutch, but such an agreement was contracted only to enable him to pay the Nawab the amount he owed by the treaty of 1771. The Nawab had not objected to the agreement when it was concluded, nor was his concurrence considered necessary. It should also be noted that similar instances of the Raja's mortgaging lands had not been objected to. The British occupation of Devikkottai with lands around it, was never considered, either by the Nawab or by the British
themselves, to be a matter that required the sanction of Arcot. It is probable that the Raja's crime in the present instance was borrowing money from the Dutch. Had he formed the habit of borrowing money from Madras, he might have created an interest in the authorities there, which would have effectively shielded him from the Nawab's imputations of disloyalty to Arcot. The Nawab claimed that it was a serious matter that the Dutch were assisting the Raja; the authorities agreed with him and after a second expedition against Tanjore in 1773, they supported the Nawab and obtained for him the lands which the Raja had mortgaged to the Dutch.

Behind these ostensible reasons for a further attack on Tanjore there seems to have lain the fear that if Tanjore were not taken, this would allow the Marathas or the French to obtain an influence in Tanjore, which would make its hostile independence irrevocable and permanently disturb the tranquillity of the Carnatic. The Nawab in his meeting with the Governor complained that the Raja had applied to the

1. Had Tulaji formed the habit of borrowing from Madras "with more constancy and to a much larger extent, the Great Folks at Madras might have had an interest in overlooking, for some time longer, his designs. But Tulaji, though not more faithless, was less prudent than his father, Pertaupa Sing, who had always an expert agent at Madras to negotiate a loan, when he wished to obtain a favour". The History and Management of the East India Company - Macpherson, p.219.

2. The idea that the Dutch should enjoy possession of Nagore was not pleasant to the Nawab. And though the Madras authorities realised in September 1773 that the Dutch in lending money on mortgage to the Raja did so without any hostile design toward the British (Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 23 Sept.1773), after the reduction of Tanjore they prepared for war with the Dutch to obtain Nagore for the Nawab. See Ch. VII p.224.
Marathas and to Haidar for troops and had encouraged them to ravage the Carnatic. He could not bear with such behaviour much longer and expressed his strong desire to subdue the Raja\(^1\). To drive home his argument he offered, if the Fort of Tanjore were taken and placed in his possession, to pay a gratuity to the British army and ten lakhs of rupees to the Company\(^1\).

The Select Committee showed itself very ready to accept the Nawab's proposals. The one scruple which they showed was in questioning whether or not the treaty of 1762 was still in effect. It is surprising that after the expedition against Tanjore they should have raised any such query, but they readily disposed of it, arguing that the Raja's conduct in obliging them to take up arms against him had annulled every obligation contained in that treaty. Thus relieved of any treaty obligation, and having assured the Nawab in 1771 that they would not interfere in negotiations between him and the Raja, they now held that they ought not to refuse assistance in reducing to obedience tributaries of the Nawab who might "render themselves obnoxious to him"\(^1\).

Such a stand was the easier to take because the treaty of 1771 between the Nawab and the Raja contained no mention of the

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1762 treaty and did not include the Company as guarantors of the 1771 settlement. The Raja had been very anxious for British mediation; and even after his treaty with the Nawab in 1771, had been eager to see the old harmony between Tanjore and the Madras authorities renewed on a more solid and lasting basis. For this purpose he had sent the Reverend Swartz to Madras. The Raja's vakil had also come back to reside in Madras and had tried in vain to resume his relations with the Madras Government. But these efforts of the Raja had proved unsuccessful for the authorities then made it clear that the Raja's relations with the Nawab were not their concern.

The Nawab had proposed the reduction of Tanjore on 18 June; without any consideration of the validity of his complaints, the Madras authorities on 22 June agreed to make the capture of Tanjore their objective. The major argument for such a decision was their apprehension of the Raja's future conduct. It appeared to them that because of the humiliation he had suffered and the constant fear he entertained of the Nawab's desire to annexe Tanjore, he would join any hostile power at the first opportunity to regain his authority

2. "the Nabob did not even allow his [Raja's] vakkeel to visit the late President [Du Pre]." Ft. St. Geo. Cons., 22 June 1773 - Mds. Select Committee Proceedings, Vol. 60.
and dignity. The Raja was already aware of their intention not to interfere in his relations with the Nawab, so that it was certain that the Raja would ever seek an opportunity to act against both the Nawab and the British. Since no remedy was sought by way of check or control over the Nawab in his ambitions, the Raja must remain hostile. But since it would be dangerous to leave the Raja in such a threatening position in the Carnatic, it was necessary as a matter of self-defence totally to destroy him.

The authorities realised that the application for aid the Raja was known to have made to Haidar was "not likely to prove efficacious"; and they were even doubtful "whether he had seriously made such ...". Haidar, they felt, knew his own interest too well to engage in any attempt on "light Grounds, which may make the Company his Enemy". There was reason to believe that he was himself immersed in essential affairs in his own country; far from interfering in Carnatic affairs, his first object would be to recover the territories he had lost to the Marathas.

Overpowering Tanjore would certainly exasperate the Marathas, but the authorities believed that the Tanjore question  

of itself would not induce them to break with the British. Rather, whether Tanjore was taken or not, the Committee was of the opinion that the Marathas would invade the Carnatic when it suited them. If the Marathas came south, they were bound to press the authorities for assistance against Haidar. The authorities had already decided to stay neutral in the Maratha-Mysore conflict, and in the circumstances it was likely that the Marathas would join the Raja against the British. Mostyn, the British representative at Poona, had already advised them that the Raja had actually applied to the Marathas for permission to raise ten thousand horses to be employed against the Nawab. If the Raja was not now overpowered, therefore, there was "not the least doubt" that he would join the Marathas against the Nawab and the British.

With such political reasons for war the Select Committee felt that they could not refuse their assistance to the Nawab when they had "no particular or cogent reason to urge against" the expedition. Moreover, Sir Robert Harland, the successor of Lindsay, had brought a letter from George III to the Nawab, in which was expressed the Royal "satisfaction to hear that the

Governor and Council of Madras had sent the Company's troops ... to reduce your tributary, the Rajah of Tanjore to obedience"¹. The Directors had not replied to their intimation of the first expedition against Tanjore and therefore the authorities conveniently inferred that "they had approved also" the measures regarding Tanjore². In such circumstances, if the Raja was left with an opportunity to ally himself with the Marathas, the authorities felt that they would "undoubtedly be blamed by the Company, charged may be with the consequences & accused both by them & Administration at home of not supporting when necessary the firm Friend of the former, & the ally of the Crown of Great Britain"³. Mill rightly says that "never ... was the resolution taken to make war upon a lawful sovereign, with a view of 'reducing him entirely', that is stripping him of his dominions, and either putting him and his family to death, or making them prisoners for life, upon a more accommodating principle". The Raja had been subjected to great injury; and there was no intention to give him justice. This was of "sufficient reason for going on to his destruction. Do you wish a good reason for effecting anybody's destruction?

First do him an injury sufficiently great, and then if you destroy him, you have, in the law of self-defence, an ample justification¹.

It was decided that the control of the expedition and negotiations should be left with Omdat ul Umara. The Fort and country of Tanjore were to be reduced and were to be delivered over to the Nawab as it was on his account that the expedition was undertaken². The Governor informed the Nawab that the total reduction of Tanjore was necessary to the safety and tranquillity of the Carnatic³. A large army was assembled at Trichinopoly and General Smith was instructed to proceed against Tanjore³.

To secure an appearance of fairness, which could neither effect an alteration in the proceedings, nor produce any injury to his ambitions, the Nawab presented an ultimatum to the Raja's Vakil. This stated that the Raja had appeared to him as an enemy and so it was necessary to remove him and "place one of his relations or brothers" in authority. The ultimatum added the hypocritical declaration that it was not the Nawab's intention to "take away his Country and Fort".

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but to secure them for the Raja's family, "in placing a proper person of his kindred to govern them". If the Minister of Tanjore should take his advice and remove Tulaji and place on the throne either a brother or a proper person, "it's well"; otherwise the Nawab was determined to accomplish this task himself¹. The ultimatum was nothing but an impossible demand, neither meant, nor expected to be taken seriously. A certain antagonism towards Tulaji was obvious, but it was no secret that it was not the removal of the Raja but Tanjore itself that the Nawab was after². There was no certainty, nor did the military preparations bear any appearance that the removal of Tulaji would have precluded the invasion of Tanjore. The Nawab, in all his preceding discussions with the Madras authorities, had not suggested the removal of Tulaji as the primary, or even as one of his objectives; nor did the authorities themselves even remotely consider it. Evidently, the ultimatum was of no real significance excepting to declare that there was no room for negotiations and that the invasion of Tanjore would be undertaken.

It was only to be expected that the Raja, finding himself in such a difficult situation and confronted with such

antagonism, would grasp at any available opportunity for the preservation of his throne. There was the probability of his getting some help from the Marathas. Harland was in favour of threatening the Marathas by informing them that if they tried to interfere in the Tanjore affair, the British would not "remain quiet in the Malabar Coast, where it will be in our Power, with the assistance of His Majesty's formidable Squadron to destroy their shipping and to do them further Harm". The Select Committee was clearly against such a step, and decided merely to advise Mostyn of the invasion of Tanjore and to ask him to keep "the most watchful eye on the Motions or Designs" of the Marathas. He was told that it would not be prudent to give them the least hint of the measures regarding Tanjore until there was the certainty of their marching in support of the Raja. Mostyn informed the authorities that the Raja's attempts to obtain help from Poona were not likely to succeed; there was "not the least Appearance" of the Raja obtaining "a Body of Horse or any other assistance".

It is interesting to note the unsympathetic attitude that was adopted towards Tanjore by the Marathas. They had shown some irritation at the way in which Tanjore was treated and had

indeed protested against the Nawab’s policy\textsuperscript{1}; yet now they showed not the least consideration for the Raja in his distress and they failed to give him any assistance. They did protest against the capture of Tanjore at the end of the year, but only when that country was safely in the Nawab’s possession; even then it was not a vehement protest\textsuperscript{2}. It would have been legitimate, and indeed appropriate, if they had helped the Raja at this moment as the Tanjore administration was but a branch of the Marathas. Moreover, their championing the cause of Tanjore might have been of immense benefit to themselves. They had been soliciting British assistance against Haidar for some time and had even tried to influence the Nawab to bring that about. A shrewd threat on their part to interfere in the Raja’s favour could quite possibly have secured for them the desired alliance with the British. As it was, the opportunity was lost and no consideration was given to the cause of Tanjore. Mostyn early reported that there was "little probability" of the operations against Tanjore being impeded. He added, and this may explain Maratha inaction, that it was a most favourable juncture for the enterprise against Tanjore being undertaken, since a fresh dispute between the Marathas and the Nizam occupied the former’s complete attention\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{1} See Ch. VII p. 214.

\textsuperscript{2} In a letter to the Nawab, the Marathas claimed assistance against Haidar "or the Payment of Arrears of Chauth, together with the Restoration of the Tanjore country. It is not indeed clear from the letter whether the Restoration of Tanjore is not required at all Events". Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 3 Jan. 1774 - Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, Vol. 60.

The troops left Trichinopoly under the command of General Smith on 31 July, 1773 and arrived before the Fort of Tanjore on 6 August. Even at this late hour, the Raja tried to persuade the British to intervene. He sent a letter to the British Governor through the Danish Governor of Tranquebar, wherein he enumerated his country's services during the Carnatic wars and cited the treaty of 1762 of which the British were the guarantors. He pointed out that even before his payment became due, he had borrowed money and sent bills to the Nawab. He had faithfully fulfilled all the obligations of the treaty of 1771; so "surely some offence should have been proved before an expedition was undertaken." If only the British would intervene and bring about a peace, he would grant them lands worth a lakh of rupees a year, and permission to build a fort wherever they considered proper; and he would also pay four lakhs of rupees, two to the Governor and two to the Council. He implored their support and assured them that they would "reap the fame so good an action deserves." This was indeed the last opportunity for the Madras authorities to interfere in the affair, and one which presented them with an excellent chance to extricate themselves honourably.

Furthermore, honour might have been accompanied by the lucrative gains, generously offered by the Raja and wholly satisfying to their interests. Regrettably though, there is no mention in the Consultations of their even discussing the chances of settling the affair peacefully. The Raja's plea was ignored, and his letter, as though the Council had no concern, much less right in the affair, was referred to the Nawab\(^1\). The Nawab could not have been expected to view the letter with anything but contempt, and the hostilities proceeded as had been planned. The troops entered the Fort of Tanjore on 17 September, and the Raja and his family were taken prisoners\(^2\).

Smith was of the opinion that the Fort of Tanjore would not be safe unless held by British troops; but the Nawab would not agree to such a measure and proposed that he should keep the place under his own control\(^3\). However much the Governor endeavoured to prevail upon him, he remained unconvinced of the expediency of the former's proposals. He considered the place perfectly secure in the possession of his troops. If he were to make an application for a British force, it might seem "to imply a mistrust" which he did "by no means entertain.

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of his own Troops". He also put himself forward as a benevolent ruler striving to safeguard the rights and interests of the vanquished Tanjoreans: he had, it seems, promised the inhabitants of Tanjore not to admit Europeans "as they were afraid of their killing Cows, which is forbid" by their religion. His arguments, if genuine, were also absurd. It was well known that all his possessions from the time of his accession had been protected by British troops, and as for the people of Tanjore, it could have mattered little to them whether their cows were killed by Europeans or Muslims, there being little to choose between them as far as this question was concerned. But if the arguments were trivial, the point at issue was not. The Nawab, after all his ambitious schemes, was not prepared to see the Fort of Tanjore garrisoned with British troops. He expressed himself "much alarmed" at their pressing the measure, and since the Madras authorities had agreed at the beginning of the hostilities to deliver the Fort to him, they had to concede the point and make it over to him.

The fall of Tanjore seems to have raised the Nawab's hopes, for he went on to plan the acquisition of Nagore and its adjacent districts, which had been given to the Dutch by the Raja and which were in their possession. Even before the operations

against Tanjore, the Nawab had maintained that the Raja was getting help from the Dutch; this was one of the reasons given for action against Tanjore. The Dutch themselves seem to have been apprehensive of the Nawab's operations against Tanjore and had been making preparations to defend Nagore against a probable attack. The Nawab now desired to approach the Dutch authorities to protect against their assistance to the Raja, and the Madras authorities agreed to his sending his own vakil to Negapatam. The Nawab warned the Dutch that his power and the "assistance of my friends, are great, and I shall spare no pains in doing what I esteem my duty, in protecting my friends and dispersing their enemies and my own." The Governor of Negapatam denied having sent any assistance whatsoever to the Raja, and assured the Nawab of his friendly relations with him as well as the British. However, Dutch possession of territory that belonged to Tanjore was not acceptable to the Nawab and after the fall of Tanjore, he applied to the Madras Council for help to gain possession of Nagore.

1. See Ch. VII p. 208
The Nawab maintained that the possession of Nagore and the district would enable the Dutch to keep "a handsome force" which would be "prejudicial to the interests of the English Company". He argued that the Dutch were dangerous and their interest was that "besides themselves no European should be possessed of power in this country". The authorities were in complete agreement with the Nawab; the possession of those lands would increase the power and influence of the Dutch, and they might prove troublesome neighbours. However, they refused themselves to take a decision as the question of proceeding against the Dutch involved points of a serious nature, which needed discussion with the Ministry's representative, Harland.

Harland was clearly of the opinion that the British "assisting the Nabob in the recovery of lands which his feudatory had unjustly alienated to the Dutch could not in any respect be considered as a breach of the treaties between England and Holland". Consequently, the authorities determined to support the Nawab in gaining possession of Nagore from the Dutch, and if necessary, "even to act offensively against them ...". The Nawab was informed of their decision.

and at the same time, the Governor cautioned him that he should be willing to settle the affair amicably with the Dutch, if they seemed amenable. Smith was instructed to march towards Nagore and to take possession of it, if the Dutch refused to settle the affair peacefully.

In fact, the Dutch had a definite claim to the possession of Nagore; it had been given to them by the Raja in return for the money advanced by them. The Raja was a tributary of Arcot and he had to pay the annual tribute; but was not prevented from contracting agreements regarding his lands. The authorities themselves were aware of this, but had advanced the theory that as the Raja held his lands from the Nawab in fee, he could not make over any part of them without the Nawab's acquiescence. Indeed, they wrote to the Directors: "We flatter ourselves we have made it appear from the system of Government and the Nature of Tenures in India, that the Rajah of Tanjore being not Lord Paramount of his country but Tributary to the Nabob, had no right to alienate any Part of

3. See Ch. ox p.30q.
his lands, without the consent of his liege Lord. The assistance that the Dutch were accused of having sent the Raja was not taken seriously; the authorities felt that "the conduct of the Dutch was not to be wondered at, as it was good policy in them to assist the Rajah, and endeavour to counteract the Nabob's views to the conquest of Tanjore." On the ground that Tanjore was a feudal power, the Nawab was given the assistance he had requested to possess Nagore.

It is clear that a rupture between the British and the Dutch in India could have resulted but for the latter's anxiety to come to a peaceful settlement. As Smith advanced towards Nagore, the Dutch withdrew; they were not willing to open hostilities, and sent two deputies to Madras to treat with the Nawab. It was agreed on 23 November 1773 that the Nawab should re-imburse the Dutch for the money that they had paid to the Raja, and the Dutch would formally give up possession of Nagore.

3. "Such a thing as a feudal system or a liege Lord, never had a moments existence in India, nor was ever supposed to have, except by a few pedantic, and half-lettered Englishmen, who knew little more of the feudal system than the name. If this doctrine was true, the English had originally no title, either to Calcutta or Madras."- History of British India, Mill, Vol.IV, p.81.
The authorities reported to the Directors that many circumstances had come to light after the capture of the Fort of Tanjore which retrospectively justified their action. The intrigues of the Raja would certainly have disrupted the tranquillity of the Carnatic. If the Nawab had not been assisted, the Raja would have introduced foreign troops, which would have been exceedingly prejudicial to their influence and interests. As a result of the expedition, the Nawab had been induced to make good some payments to the Company "even if Troubles should arise in the Country, whereas in all his former Engagements, the performance of them depended upon the Tranquillity of the Carnatic". They had already recommended to the Nawab, "both before the Commencement of the Expedition... and since the conquest" of Tanjore, to treat the Raja and his family with "that respect and Attention due to their former station ...". In his letter to the Nawab, the Raja testified to the remarkable consideration that he was being given in his imprisonment, obviously a timid declaration in his affliction. This was accepted by the authorities, and they duly reported to the Directors that they were indeed satisfied that the Raja and his family were treated with "much attention and humanity in their confinement".

The Nawab had at last realised his ambition. He had removed the Raja and held the country of Tanjore under his direct authority. To the Governor-General and Council he happily reported that he "did feel a pleasure" on securing so valuable a treasure, and he assured them that there was now no fear of either the French or the Dutch ever securing an inch of ground in the Carnatic, or of the Marathas being invited by the Raja to "establish him in an independence". There could be no question of a restoration - that was "too capital an object to be easily induced to yield up on the Requisition or on the Threats" of the Marathas. Clearly, as far as the Nawab was concerned, everything seemed most satisfactorily settled.

Not content with the control of Tanjore, the Nawab sought to establish his permanent possession of the newly acquired territories by making his second son, Amir ul Umara, the Nawab of Tanjore. It had been known for some time that Amir ul Umara was anxious to obtain a grant of the Tanjore Kingdom. Despite this knowledge, the Madras authorities believed that the Nawab would not be prevailed upon to agree to such a measure. In March 1775, it was confirmed, however, that sanads were being prepared to grant Tanjore to Amir ul Umara.

The Council were alarmed at this development. As long as the Nawab was in possession of Tanjore, he could be controlled by them, as his forts were manned by their troops. But the position of Amir ul Umara was a different one; he was already the commander of his father's forces and if installed as ruler of Tanjore, would in fact become an independent power. He was not bound by any engagement with the Company. Since they were the self-declared protectors of the Carnatic and their major objective in reducing Tanjore was to prevent its falling under any influence hostile to their interests, it became necessary to discourage the Nawab from transferring the government of Tanjore to Amir ul Umara.

It is clear that the authorities' objection was not due to any consideration for the Raja or wish for his possible restoration at a future date; it was due to their apprehensions of Amir ul Umara, whose conduct since the first expedition against Tanjore, had drastically changed. He had publicly expressed his "dislike of all Europeans" and seemed desirous of throwing "off all dependence on the English". He was offensive in his relations with the British and was far more ambitious and intriguing than his father. Such a person with absolute power and independent territories could prove harmful.

to their interests\textsuperscript{1}. They would not express their objections candidly, but informed the Nawab that it would be "too dangerous to place too much power in the hands of anyone". Despite the breach with past treaty relationships caused by their action in dispossessing the Raja of his kingdom, they conveniently pleaded with the Nawab that as they had no advise from the Directors regarding the settlement of Tanjore, they could not allow him to dispose of that country in the manner he had proposed\textsuperscript{1}.

The Nawab, as could only be expected, was not pleased with the attitude of the authorities. Indeed, he took umbrage "on being wrote to on his family affairs, contrary to the established rules". He claimed that he was the best judge of his own affairs, "the absolute Lord of his Country"; he would take such measure as he "shall conceive will prove most beneficial to his own affairs". If some of his measures were contrary to the sentiments of a few, it was never his intention to contradict the Company's affairs\textsuperscript{2}. He was in fact well justified in his claim for he had been clearly allowed a free hand regarding Tanjore since 1771.

\textsuperscript{1} Governor's Minute - 27 Mar.1775 - Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.77.
It now became the question within the Madras Council whether the Nawab intended to make "a perpetual grant" of Tanjore to Amir ul Umara or merely to send him as "Rector" of the country. Two members of the Council, Smith and Johnson, opposed the majority's decision to write a letter to the Nawab regarding this matter. They argued that the Nawab had not been given an opportunity to explain himself as to the capacity in which Amir ul Umara was to be sent to Tanjore. The Governor once again wrote to the Nawab; and the Nawab in his answer was not only vague about the intended status of Amir ul Umara, but also explained that any information he could give the Governor was "not to ask advice on the occasion, but to acquaint him of his intention." He showed no readiness to heed the objections of the majority, and in fact accused them of having been actuated by other motives. He declared that unless he was allowed a free hand in settling Tanjore, which indeed formed "the internal Management of his Dominions", he had no other alternative but to refer the matter to a higher authority - a bold threat to turn to London, if necessary, for support, which


was the result of his acquiring a new agent, Lauchlin Maclean. The Nawab also added that he could have recourse to his friendship with the Crown of England.

It is probable that the Madras authorities would have floundered into agreeing to the Nawab's proposal and into proceeding to act upon it themselves with due pageantry, had

1. In May 1774, Lauchlin Maclean had come to Madras from Bengal and was introduced by Governor Wynch to the Nawab. There is no doubt that the Nawab was impressed with Maclean, who had been Under-Secretary of the Southern Department, a member of Parliament and held "an office of trust" in Bengal. It was Maclean himself who suggested to the Nawab that he should send someone to England to remove "the bad odour" in which his relations stood with the Directors. Naturally, the Nawab offered Maclean the position of his agent. Maclean did not accept the post in 1774, but in January 1775 when he had to resign his post with the Company, he became the Nawab's agent. Wynch maintained that he left Madras "charged with some secret negotiations from the Nabob" (Wynch-Chairman, Court of Directors, 4 Feb.1775 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.286, p.15). There is little doubt that the Nawab had already made up his mind to make over Tanjore to Amir ul Umara and that Maclean was entrusted with the task of getting it approved in London. Maclean himself later explained that the Nawab's instructions related to the succession, but only of Umdat ul Umara to the Carnatic (Maclean's Narrative, 13 Feb.1776 - Home Misc.Series Vol.286, pp.41-48). However, it is not difficult to conclude that the channel opened by the new agent, Maclean gave the Nawab more confidence in challenging the Madras authorities.


There is little doubt that the Nawab was confident of continued support of the British Crown in the form of its representative at his Court. "I can not be thankful enough", he wrote to George III, "for indulging me so long with Sir Robert Harland at my Durbar, who has done everything in his power to preserve peace to my mind; and by such means to convince me that notwithstanding the conduct of others the Company and the English nation take a concern in my welfare". Nawab-George III, 3 Feb.1774 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.113, pp.293-294.
it not been for their particular apprehension of Amir ul Umara. If the Nawab had suggested any of his other sons, or for that matter anyone else, he might have obtained their approval without difficulty. It is also clear from the Council's discussions that there was never any concern that such an increase in the Nawab's possessions must cause the greatest injury to the Raja and his interests, nor that their own interests would be threatened, should one of the Nawab's nominees who was friendly to them hold the government of Tanjore. However, since the Nawab seemed determined to press on with the appointment of Amir ul Umara, the Madras authorities, in their dilemma, found it expedient to approach the Bengal Government for their opinion. The Nawab himself had contacted the Bengal Government regarding this issue, and in this direct approach to the Supreme Government, it is not difficult to assume that his confidence was partly due to the fact that his agent, Maclean, who had left Madras for England in February 1775, was also the agent of Warren Hastings, the Governor-General. From

2. The Bengal Government assumed in November 1774 the position of Supreme Government in India.
3. Maclean had to resign his post with the Bengal Government because of his close association with Hastings. On Philip Francis' arrival, he realised that the only way to avoid dismissal was to resign - Reward is Secondary - Maclean, p. 29.
4. Warren Hastings was a member of the Madras Select Committee which decided to carry the first expedition against Tanjore in 1771.
the outset the partiality of the Supreme Council to the Nawab's interests was clear, for the dispute, they declared, was a delicate one and did not come under their "cognizance, either by the controlling powers vested in us by the Act of Parliament, or by the instructions of the Court of Directors"; they would only consider themselves "voluntarily chosen as arbitrators by each party" and on that basis would try to effect a reconciliation between them. After the example set by the Crown, the Ministry and the Court of Directors, it was now the turn of the Supreme council, and in forming their opinion they "allowed great consideration to the several orders of the ... Court of Directors on the extent of the Nabob's authority, and the right of interference given" to the Madras Government. The Nawab, they declared, was the master in his internal administration in which Madras had no right to interfere. It was their opinion that "the greatest tenderness and delicacy should be observed" in every communication with the Nawab. This was a rule "repeatedly enjoined and in the strongest terms" by the Directors, "recommended by the example of the King himself, and consistent with the strictest policy". They declared that the Nawab's right to nominate his son to the throne of Tanjore was indisputable, and

that the Madras Council's reluctance to approve the measure was contrary to procedure. Indeed, they criticised the Madras Council for their "Reflections which you have cast upon the character of that son & the Reproach & Contempt with which you have expressed your sentiments of the Nabob's honour and understanding".

The Madras Council had assumed that in agreeing to support the Nawab in his outright conquest of Tanjore they were acting as the Directors would wish. They had been assured by Holland that in threatening war with the Dutch to secure Nagore for the Nawab they were acting as the Crown would wish. Now the Governor General and Council had made it clear that they ought to consider themselves enjoined to permit the Nawab to dispose of Tanjore as he wished. In every case the Madras authorities seemed to have been supported in surrender of their initiative to the Nawab. And likewise, in every instance, they seem to have been supported in ignoring the rights of the Raja of Tanjore. By the close of 1775 the removal of Tulaji from the Tanjore throne seemed settled as far as the British were concerned, and his imprisonment in the hands of the triumphant Nawab bore all the signs of permanence.

During the period of five years from 1770, the Madras authorities in their dealings with Tanjore had violated every principle and had exceeded each limit prescribed by the Directors. They had never been authorised to bring about the complete reduction of Tanjore, nor had they any right to disown or disregard their obligations by the treaty of 1762 to mediate between the Raja and the Nawab. The treaty of 1762 was never declared void and although it is possible to appreciate their anxiety, it is difficult to condone their actions, which were directly opposed to the spirit and stipulations of that treaty. Even if the Raja had appeared so obstinate and hostile as to necessitate his subjection, that necessity did not warrant their relinquishing all rights of negotiation to the Nawab and their acceptance of the role of mere auxiliaries. Nor was it clear that the Raja's dethronement and his supersession by the Nawab was an expedient measure for securing the long term safety of the Carnatic.

The Madras Council had all along maintained that every step that they adopted was subject to the approval of the Directors, and yet they had not hesitated to contract permanent agreements sans ceremonie. While the first expedition had not been specifically approved, they had no sanction to
follow it up with a second one, still less to crown that expedition with the complete removal of the Raja and the absorption of Tanjore into the Nawab's territories. They had agreed to the Nawab's sole control of the country, as though that was politic in the interests of the Carnatic, but they had still sought to install a British garrison at Tanjore. There was no principle in their actions and no justice in their arrangements. It was the Madras authorities who were mainly responsible for the callous and unethical action against Tanjore that was to cost that country so dear in revenue as well as in status. Indeed, as Marshman says, "it is difficult to believe that Englishmen and Christians, even in that period of profligacy, could have adopted such a train of reasoning to justify the ruin of an innocent Prince".

Yet if the Madras authorities must be seen as the primary and immediate cause of the ruin of Tanjore, both the Court of Directors and the Ministry at home must share the blame. The Madras Council were certainly misled by the Directors' instructions of 1769, which may properly be seen as setting the entire tone for subsequent events. Instructions to support the Nawab effectively in his complaints against the Raja, by force if

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necessary, did not enjoin injustice, but made it easy for
the Council to swerve from their policy of considering the
interests of the Raja and the Nawab alike, and of maintaining
at least an apparent cordiality between them. This shift in
Madras policy was further encouraged by the growth of a special
relationship between the Crown and the Nawab, the extraordinary
importance given to the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris,
and the active Ministerial patronage to the Nawab in the form
of a Plenipotentiary from England. The Nawab never failed to
take advantage of his connections with the Crown, while the new
interpretation of the 11th article further strengthened his
position, and allowed him absolute liberty to follow schemes
of ambition without question and with the certainty of British
support. The appointment of the Plenipotentiary in his secret
capacity was unwarranted and his dealings in India were undesir-
able, for his presence at Madras gave the Nawab's interests
enormous importance and contributed in great measure to the
success of the Nawab's designs. It is indeed unfortunate
that the three Commissioners failed to reach India; their
arrival would have checked the influence of the Plenipotentiary,
prevented the increase in the Nawab's power, and would have
introduced moderation in the decisions of the Madras authorities.
As it was, the arrival of the Plenipotentiary proved disastrous and "the first attempt of the State to interfere in the Company's affairs by agent on the spot was unsuccessful, damaging and even ignominious". But, granting that the Madras authorities were thus exposed to unusual pressures, granting that the continued silence of the Directors and their failure to define clearly their policy made for misunderstanding and misinterpretation, it seems impossible not to conclude that the Madras Council's dealings with Tanjore were wrong, both morally and politically.

1. *East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics* - Sutherland, p.201.
At long last in April 1775, as though rudely awakened from long slumber, the Court of Directors proffered their inexcusably procrastinated reflections on the changes wrought in Tanjore by the authorities at Madras. Their belated directions combined a complete disapproval of past proceedings relating to Tanjore, a trenchant censure on the Madras Government, and a prescription of future policy, the restoration of the Raja, which opened a most extraordinary chapter in the history of the Madras Presidency. For while avowedly seeking to set right past wrongs and to make reparation for injuries inflicted, by the dramatic reversal of the deposition of the Raja, the Directors also stipulated that a British garrison should be placed at Tanjore. The way was thus paved for a continuing interference in the internal affairs of Tanjore even after the restoration of sovereignty. If the ambition of the Nawab of Arcot was thwarted, there were dangerous signs of territorial ambition in the Raja's British protectors.

The Directors' letter suggested that they viewed with total consternation and stern disapproval the sequence of events in Tanjore. It may well be asked whether they had any right...
to adopt an injured and censorious tone, whether they were
not themselves to blame for the misfortunes of Tanjore. It
is necessary here to pay particular attention to the timing
of the letters and instructions passing between Madras and
London. The Madras Council, it will be noted, did not send
notice of their first expedition against Tanjore until
28 February 1772\(^1\). Their letter only reached the Court of
Directors in June 1772, and even then it contained only a
copy of the treaty between the Nawab and the Raja, without
details of the engagements entered into with the Nawab by the
Madras Council. On 10 September 1772 a second despatch
reached London, informing the Directors of the pecuniary
advantages gained by the Nawab from Tanjore and requesting
the Directors' sentiments on this first expedition\(^2\). Until
the arrival of this Madras despatch, the Directors were clearly
too ill-informed to give any guidance to the Madras Council.
But once it had arrived, the very fact of an attack on Tanjore
was evidence of divergence from earlier policy and warning
that positive orders were needed to check any further encroachment
on Tanjore's autonomy. However, despite the Madras
Council's appeal for guidance, it was not until April 1773 that

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2. This letter was received by the Court on 10 September 1772 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.116, p.77.
the Directors made any reply to this request - and then only to explain that they must defer consideration of the issue "as the objects are too much of importance to admit of a hasty determination". There was no sign of disapproval, no inkling of the severe censure that they were to express two years later. The Madras authorities might not unreasonably interpret the letter as one giving approval, even encouragement for their actions and policy.

This letter was sent by the ship Harcourt, which did not arrive at Madras till 6 September, 1773. Even if it had arrived before the Madras authorities had embarked upon the reduction of Tanjore, it is very doubtful whether this letter would have prevented them from proceeding with their attack, since it contained no specific sentiments of disapproval, and no request that they postpone their measures. The Directors tried to place great importance on this letter, claiming that the Madras Government should have delayed further action regarding Tanjore, until they were cognizant of the Court's reactions to the first expedition. No doubt Madras should

1. "... however desirous we may be to explain ourselves on such points as may require our decision, we must defer consideration of those now until we shall have leisure to deliberate fully and maturely on them more especially as the objects are too much of importance to admit of a hasty determination". Court of Dirs.-Pres.& Coun., 7 Apr.1773 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.116, pp.77-78.
have waited, but the singular lack of interest and forethought displayed by the Directors, their failure even to imply their attitude, clearly destroyed the opportunity of restoring the position reached in 1762. But without admitting this defect, the Directors proceeded to reprimand the Madras authorities when "without waiting the arrival of our instructions, you proceed to reconsider the treaty of 1762, and positively declare it annulled, though no one circumstance had happened to affect it since your last advices".

Again, intimation of Tulaji's deethronement and of the Nawab's control of Tanjore reached the Directors in March 1774. But, as Mill puts it, "Upon so great a change effected in the state of their dominions, without advice or authority, the Sovereign body, as if they had no opinion to express ... maintained absolute silence". It was not until April 1775 that they decided to declare their opinions, before which, "if acquiescence might be taken for approbation, the actors in India had reason to congratulate themselves upon a favourable construction of their conduct".

It is asserted by Wilson that the long delay of the Directors was not because they "disregarded or acquiesced in the transactions in Tanjore", but because affairs in England so occupied their attention till 1774 as almost entirely to diminish their concern for political events in Madras\(^1\). There is much truth in the argument, for from 1769 to 1774 the Home authorities were confronted with financial and political crises and with negotiations for the renewal of their Charter. Famine in Bengal, a panic flight from the Company's stock ruinous to leading Directors such as Colebrooke and Sullivan, the loss of the three Commissioners sent out to restore administrative order in India, the increasing demands of Grafton's Ministry for a voice in the Company's political activities, harassed the Directors from 1769 to 1771. Further financial difficulties followed, Sullivan's efforts at reform failed with the loss of his Recruiting and his Judicature Bills, in April 1772 Burgoyne secured a Select Committee to investigate the Company's administration. From the summer of 1772 the Directors were beset by a credit crisis which drove them to beg Government assistance. The price paid was submission to six months detailed enquiry by a Select Committee under Jenkinson and acceptance of the Regulating Act\(^2\).

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Even after the Act had been passed, there was a difficult period before the election of a new Court in April 1774, during which a body of Proprietors led by the Duke of Richmond vigorously fought the old Directorate. Not until the new Court had come into being and Clavering, Monson and Francis had sailed in April 1774 was comparative calm restored in the home administration of the Company. Moreover, though news of the dethronement of the Raja reached London in March 1774, it was not until August that the minutes of the Consultations, required to explain the decisions of the Madras authorities, arrived.

Delay and uncertainty in dealing with Tanjore affairs was probably inevitable under such circumstances. But the statement of Wilson that after the Consultations reached London, "the Court lost no time in preparing papers necessary for an attentive investigation" seems less than just. For from the receipt of news of the Raja's dethronement, thirteen months, and from the receipt of the Consultations, eight months elapsed before in April 1775 the Directors despatched their orders for the Raja's restoration. Such a delay is not to be passed over lightly. Even assuming the Court's difficulties to have been more constraining than they really were, its

failure to give decided advice in their letter of 7 April 1773 to Madras is still difficult to understand. The effects of such slackness were certainly deplorable, for had due warning then been sent, the Nawab's ascendancy over Tanjore would never have been established, the 'Arcot interest' would never have attained such undesirable proportions, and the humiliation and impoverishment of Tanjore, a British ally, would have been prevented. Lucy Sutherland has commented on the Directors' failure, "it was not so much the instructions which they sent out to India which were at fault as their incapacity to enforce them and to maintain steady authority at home and abroad". But in this instance, it was not only their ability to direct efficiently concurrent interests in England and India, but their very policy which was in question.

The Directors' attempt to pin the blame for the Raja's deposition upon the Madras authorities by an appeal to their despatch of 7 April 1773 can scarcely be thought to have succeeded. Nor does the argument that the Madras authorities should have continued to adhere to the treaty of 1762 seem much better based. They argued that the Raja's inclusion in the Treaty of Madras, which they had criticised and because of which they felt compelled to suspend their previous orders, did

1. *East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics* - Sutherland, p.55.
not preserve him from the conditions of his treaty with the Nawab in 1762. This rendered it necessary for the Madras authorities to call the Raja to account for arrears due to the Nawab. But in doing so, the authorities were not "warranted in recurring to arms", so long as the Raja was ready and willing to settle matters with the Nawab under their protection and guarantee. Moreover, while they were obliged to help the Nawab to obtain the tribute, they were equally obliged to prevent him from enforcing new conditions, not provided for in the treaty of 1762. But this argument is valid only if the Directors' letter of March 1769 ordering the Madras authorities to support the Nawab in his claims on Tanjore for a share of the expenses of the war with Haidar is ignored. For such a demand was neither within the written conditions nor the spirit of the treaty of 1762, and in supporting it the Directors incurred responsibility for prompting further infractions of the treaty. But, blindly ignoring the significance of their letter, they reminded the Madras authorities that in December 1765 they had prohibited any extension of the Company's or the Nawab's territory and that in 1767, as guarantors of the 1762 treaty, they had urged the Council to

2. Ibid., p. 6.
lose no opportunity of raising in the mind of the Raja "ideas of firm dependence on our friendship". Likewise, though themselves prompting illegal demands upon the Raja, they declared themselves unable to conceive what motives could have induced the Madras Council to decline the office of mediator when in 1771 the Nawab made his unjust demands upon Tanjore - "at a time when their friendly interposition might have prevented the horrors of war, and more especially as they were compelled by solemn stipulation to guaranty the treaty of 1762". With fine self-righteousness the Directors declared that the Council were "by every principle of justice, policy and humanity" forbidden to sacrifice the Raja to the Nawab, and denounced the Council's agreements with the Nawab as "altogether improper, and utterly unwarrantable".

The Court of Directors then went on to deride the arguments by which the Madras Council had sought to defend their first attack upon Tanjore. They denounced the orders given to General Smith as extraordinary, and the Council's interpretation of their tenor as still more baffling. When independent powers had been given to Omdat ul Umara, why was the Council shocked

3. Ibid., pp.6-8.
when the general acted according to those orders? They refused to allow any credit to the Council for the suspension of hostilities: the peace treaty agreed by the Nawab was "in no way respecting to your moderation". They denied that the increase in the Nawab's power which followed from his territorial gains could easily be checked by them, as the Council had suggested. They declared that the whole adventure had been "unnecessary ... very dangerous, the embarrassment occasioned thereby almost insurmountable and that air of indifference with which you delivered your sentiments ... extremely unreasonable". True, indeed, and well said. But how can the Directors' concern and indignation be squared with their seven month delay in responding to the news of this first aggression and with their failure even to hint at disapproval when they did reply to Madras in April 1773?

The Court of Directors were even more scathing in their denunciation of the second than of the first Madras expedition against Tanjore. They pointed out that the Madras Council, after humbling Tanjore in 1771, which was ostensibly all that they desired, had expressed their belief that given proof of their impartial justice, the Raja would still be firmly attached to the Company. But, by the second expedition undertaken before

2. Ibid., p.7.
they knew the Directors' sentiments, they had put it out of their power to do justice to the Raja. Indeed the second expedition was itself a grievous injustice, undertaken upon grounds which were totally false. Legally the Council had no cause to compel fulfillment of the treaty of 1771, since they were not guarantors of that treaty. Since they made little attempt to ascertain the truth of the statement by the Raja's vakil that bills for the tribute outstanding had been despatched, they had no grounds for action in equity. The Directors dismissed the Nawab's arguments as equally mischievous. He had suggested an attack on the Maravars because "they had neither sent a man, nor supplied a grain of provisions" for his army operating against Tanjore: and having by your assistance cut off those unfortunate people, he immediately urges as one motive for reducing Tanjore, that the Tanjorean King had not contributed towards carrying on the war against the Polygars. They were utterly shocked that their troops should have been employed "on such services and on pretences so frivolous ...". As for the charges that the Raja might have obtained help from the Marathas and the French, they felt that "there was certainly more reason to expect it before the first expedition, whilst his treasury was full, than afterwards, when it had just been

2. Ibid., p. 9.
exhausted by the Nabob*. Indeed, had the Raja resorted to such negotiations, they had no evidence whatsoever that the "least inconvenience was likely to have happened ...". Finally, they derided the plea of self-defence put forward by the Madras authorities, declaring that it seemed "so very inconsistent" that they were sorry to find them "capable of making the assertion". In reality it was the success of the second expedition which endangered the Company's possessions, rendering "self defence on the coast of Coromandel an object of very serious consideration". The Madras Council in 1773 had not been in possession of any fact which made it necessary to break the peace concluded with the Raja in 1771. The expedition, the Directors roundly declared, had been "unjustifiable, and your conduct therein wholly inexcusable".

The Directors thus threw all the blame on Madras, passing over their own failings. In punishing those who had failed in their duty they were equally partial, for while they dismissed Alexander Wynch, the Governor, for breach of instructions, they let off the rest of the Council with a reproof and a misplaced hope of reformation. It is difficult to see why only the

3. Wynch became the Governor after Du Pre's departure in 1773 and remained in that post till Lord Pigot's arrival in December 1775.
unfortunate Wynch should have been held culpable, it was certainly unfortunate that the other members of the Council, deeply involved with the Nawab in the Tanjore business, were left in authority. Once again, however, the Directors showed themselves indecisive, contenting themselves with the observation that "as the concurrence of the members of our Council in the breach of our orders renders them very undeserving of our favour, we should have proceeded to like extremities with them, had we not been willing to hope, that their future conduct may in some degree atone for past offences. On this ground alone we are induced to continue them in our service".

Such half-heartedness might have been less dangerous had the Directors' intention been to accept the situation created by the conquest of Tanjore. But instead, they went on to reverse the position outright. In order to remedy "the inconveniences occasioned by the misconduct of our late President and Council", they ordered that the Raja of Tanjore should be restored to the Tanjore throne, which "by every tie of honour" they conceived themselves bound to do. The treaty

1. "the only instance of my conduct that the Court of Directors have pointed out as reprehensible, is that part of it which relates to the last expedition of Tanjore ... it was a measure of the Government here, not of the Governor alone". Wynch-Pigot & Coun., 7 Feb.1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.133, p.1
3. Ibid., pp.19-21.
of 1762, despite the various interpretations it had suffered, was to continue to be valid. The British were still to be guarantors of that treaty; and the Raja was to continue to pay the annual tribute to the Nawab. The Raja was to be informed of their determination to replace him on the throne. But such a restoration was to be "upon certain terms and conditions to be agreed upon for the mutual benefit of himself and the English East-India Company without infringing the rights of Mahmud Ally Khan ..."¹.

In this manner was introduced the new aspect of their influence, the placement of a British garrison at Tanjore. Because of the unstable administration there, the Directors argued, other Europeans had attained undue influence, which if allowed, would operate unfavourably against their interests and make it difficult for them to perform their duties as guarantors. They were not in possession of any security for the Raja's due performance of his engagements; his payments in the past had been delayed and many had been his attempts of evasion. Establishing a garrison at Tanjore would ensure the regular payments of the Nawab's "just demands", and also enable them to guard effectively the movements, and counteract the views to their prejudice, of any other power in the region.

But to make possible so beneficial a measure it was necessary for the Raja to assign a portion of land "for the maintenance of the said Troops and for providing military stores necessary for the Defence of the Garrison". As their principal views were the safety of Tanjore and the preservation of their influence there, they required, however, "no greater a Portion of Revenues to be assigned to the Company than shall be deemed absolutely necessary" for the support of the garrison: "but if any unforeseen circumstances shall render such Revenue inadequate there to the King must ... cause payment of the Troops to be made from his other Resources". At the same time, the Raja was to be assured that "no diminution of his authority over his subjects" was intended; and any military officer or Company's servant "who shall in any respect interfere in the affairs of his government" would be severely punished. Nevertheless, special care was to be taken to secure from the Raja his agreement that "no treaty with foreign powers shall be concluded by the King without our concurrence; nor shall any alliance be formed by him to the prejudice of the Company, nor any aid or assistance given, directly or indirectly to the enemies of the British nation".

3. Ibid. p.303.
In restoring Tulaji to his throne and in condemning the actions of the Madras authorities, the Court of Directors were acknowledging an injury unjustly inflicted and were making restitution. And in returning to the treaty of 1762 as the basis of British relations with Tanjore, they were acknowledging that the Madras Council had been wrong ever to depart from its provisions. The moral stand the Directors thus took did not, however, prevent them from taking advantage of the Raja's weakness to their profit and his further injury. Having censured the breach of the 1762 treaty in two expeditions, before each of which the Raja had expressed his readiness to accept British mediation if they would guarantee his settlement with the Nawab, the Directors now breached the treaty themselves. For in restoring Tulaji they not only required that he pay the tribute to Arcot specified in that treaty as the limit of the demand upon him, but insisted that he pay for a British garrison in Tanjore, and publicly announced that in time of war he would not be obliged to comply with any requisition for troops "unless our Governor and Council join with the Nawab in making such a requisition ...", which was as good as to say that he would always have to provide troops. Likewise, while assuring the Raja that they intended "no diminution of his authority", they laid down that no other troops but the Company's would be

permitted within Tanjore city, and that the Raja himself
might maintain only so many royal guards as they should decide,
a number which should not be "exceeded or augmented by the King
on any account or pretence whatever". The Raja was thus
penalised for past British failures to honour their obligations.

Unhappily, too, the good intentions of the Court of
Directors were further marred by that ambiguity in their
instructions which had caused such trouble in the past, as
Lord Pigot discovered when he took charge of the administration
of Madras in December 1775. That the Raja was to be restored
to the throne was clear, but the date at which this was to be
done was left quite vague. Since the Directors had also left
decision of such issues in the hands of the old Council, merely
observing "that success must in a great measure depend upon the
wisdom of your Councils, the integrity and firmness of your
conduct...", such imprecision at once opened the way for the
unscrupulous and speculative element in Council to join with
the Nawab and his entourage in interpreting the instructions
so as to suit their own selfish ends.

The Madras authorities from the beginning expressed the
opinion that "great caution and delicacy" would be required

1. Court of Dirs.-Pres.& Coun., 12 Apr.1775 - Home Misc.Series,
2. Pigot took charge of the administration on 11 December 1775 -
   Vol.79.
3. Court of Dirs.-Pres.& Coun., 12 Apr.1775 - Home Misc.Series,
in implementing the Directors' instructions. Having strenuously striven to obtain Tanjore for more than a decade, and after actually possessing it for two years, the Nawab could not be expected to agree to measures alien to his interests. Moreover, the Council was hampered by the Directors' orders that matters be adjusted without hurting the Nawab's dignity or importance: the Nawab's acquiescence in the Raja's restoration had thus to be secured. Nevertheless, in their first consultation of 11 December 1775, they expressed their confidence that the Nawab would not be so imprudent as to oppose the measure, and that having been made "sensible of the necessity of an absolute compliance on his part", he might be induced "to request himself that the orders of the Company may be put in force".

There were two aspects or stages of Tulaji's restoration to be dealt with. The first was to secure the release of Tulaji, who was then a prisoner of the Nawab in Tanjore. This involved the giving up of the fort of Tanjore, and that, as the Nawab well knew, was a major step in giving up the control of the Tanjore country, the whole of which had been in his complete possession for the past two years. The Nawab began, therefore, by arguing that neither step should be taken. Having given

Pigot the "strongest assurances that he would be guided by
his advice upon all occasions"¹, he proceeded in January
1776 to resist any application of the Directors' orders.
Quite naturally, he pointed out that the Directors, at the
time of issuing their instructions, were "totally unacquainted
with the circumstances of affairs here ... the just reasons
for the taking of Tenjore, and my rights ..."². His surprise
was that the "Gentlemen of the Company" after approving of,
should now again disapprove of the measure³. He "depreciated
the policy adopted by the Company, of doing one thing by their
servants in India, and the very reverse by their Directors in
England, and declared that he was unable to understand them in
this double capacity"⁴. He followed this argument with an
appeal to Pigot to "relent and listen to his proposals, as well
as to have some regard to his rights". And with this appeal
went a proffered bargain - he would yield on the one issue, if
he were allowed to retain complete possession of the country
until another decision, based on a fuller consideration of his
arguments and rights, could be received from the Directors⁵.

   Vol. 136, p. 35.
2. The Nawab's conference with Pigot on 12 January brought upon
   him a severe indisposition. The next conference, four days
   later, had therefore to be negotiated by his two sons.
   p. 44.
   p. 46.
And in the hope that by conceding one point he might gain another, he wrote on 25 January that having perused the strict orders of the Company, he agreed to allow a British garrison into Tanjore 1.

This was a great relief to the Madras authorities, since at any rate it enabled them to secure the Raja's liberty. Accordingly Colonel Harper was ordered to proceed to Tanjore 2, where he took possession of the Fort under the direct authority of Madras as distinct from that of the Nawab, and the Raja was released on 9 February 3. It must be noted, however, that this was to result in little change in the Raja's position, but merely a transfer of his subjugation. It is a remarkable fact that the Governor had specifically directed the commanding officer at Tanjore to consider the Raja a prisoner under British protection even after this so-called release 4.

The Nawab had yielded where he could scarcely resist unless he chose to oppose the advance of the British garrison, but on the broader point he continued the argument. He wrote to the Bengal council on 19 February urging that the restoration of the Tanjore country would be "equally disgraceful and ruinous to

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the Character and Interests of the English Nation" as to him. He appealed over the head of the Company to the King. By what law or justice did the Directors take it upon themselves to send orders for the restoration, when His Majesty's Government, "in the person of the King's Representative", had given sanction to the conquest. Was it prudent for a few Directors in Leadenhall Street "to abrogate the deed of the Nation?" And he pointed to the Directors' orders that Pigot and his Council should secure his consent to the restoration as proof of his independent authority, asking "if the scheme of separating Tanjore from the Carnatic of all which I am the undoubted Nabob, was considered by the Company as just and right, and they had a legal authority to do so; - where was the Necessity for my Consent being obtained to the measure?".

On the latter point one must admit that the objection raised by the Nawab seems justified, for he had indeed been awarded title to Tanjore by both Crown and Company. As Mill points out the Directors had put themselves in the wrong: "Hypocrisy was the cause which produced the difficulties resulting to the English from their connexion with the Nabob. They desired to hold him up to the world, as an independent

Prince, their ally, when it was necessary they should act as his lord and master. If they succeeded in persuading no other person that he was an independent Prince, they succeeded in persuading himself. And very naturally, on every occasion, he opposed the most strenuous resistance to every scheme of theirs, which had the appearance of invading his authority. Having acknowledged the Nawab's title, to compel him to renounce it after two years in possession of Tanjore, in order to right an earlier wrong of the Directors, was certainly impolitic and possibly illegal. One other point should also be noted in considering the Nawab's arguments—that his letters raising them with the Governor and Council were sent in English. The Nawab had an English staff to draft his letters, Paul Benfield was acting as his agent in financial matters, and members of the Madras Council were regular visitors to his palace in Chepauk.

Again it should be noted that John Macpherson had been dismissed from the Company's service in January 1776 for his

3. Macpherson "when he came out as a Company's Writer .... contracted great friendship with the Nabob, and gives him all the intelligence he possibly can of what passes amongst the Gentlemen here .... And since the present circumstances commenced between his Lordship & c., and the Nabob, he was found frequent [ly] going [to] the Nabob in an unseasonable hour, that is, at eleven or twelve at night ....". - Chikkappa - Palk, 2 Feb, 1776 - Palk Mss.- Love, p.264.
past actions as agent in England for the Nawab\(^1\), that he now became a close associate of Benfield, that he was also in contact with the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, and that after Maclean's death in January 1777 he was again to be agent for the Nawab in London. The style of the Nawab's letters, no less than their contents, suggest that in his struggle with Pigot, he was already being fully briefed and advised by Englishmen who may have included members of the Council.

If the Nawab seemed determined to resort to every kind of argument and artifice in an attempt to invalidate the Directors' instructions, the Governor was equally obstinate to effect the Restoration. The over-enthusiasm, or indeed fanaticism with which Pigot set about his mission not only makes questionable his integrity and impartiality, but also renders him largely responsible for the scandal that soon exploded. It is clear that the original mistake was in entrusting him with these important measures\(^2\). It is true that he already had experience of Madras affairs, and it was perhaps logical that the man who had been responsible for mediating between the Raja and the

2. Pigot and Rumbold were the two claimants for the Governorship of Madras. Pigot was advising for the complete reversal of policy and the Court adopted it after his appointment, see 31 March 1775, and 4 April 1775 - *Court Book, Vol.83* (also p.455 and p.462).
"Nothing is done regarding Madras, Pigot and Rumbold are still candidates and the appointment is kept back, that the chapter of accidents may disappoint Pigot". Palk-Hastings, 25 Dec. 1774 - *Addl.Mss.29135*, p.407.
Nawab, and for imposing the treaty of 1762, should have been charged with reasserting its validity and restoring it to force. But he had never shown much tact or finesse in dealing with Mohammed Ali - the Nawab complained to Palk that Pigot had compelled his signature to 1762 treaty and he was known to have political and personal ties which made his impartiality very suspect. As Dr. Sutherland points out his eagerness for office sprang rather from the need to restore his private fortunes than from any public zeal. He had acted during the twelve years of his retirement as agent for the Nawab, but had failed to receive "those remittances which made the place of agent desirable", and may therefore not have been unprejudicial in his dealings with the Nawab. Again his favourite Dubash, Manalai Muthukrishna Mudali, with whom he had maintained a steady correspondence since leaving India, and for whom he obviously retained a partiality, had lost by the Nawab's acquisition of Tanjore, for he had been a considerable revenue farmer under the Raja. It was later recorded that the

1. The 1762 treaty was "the act, and a favourite act, of Governor Pigot". - History of British India - Mill, Vol. IV, p. 84.
3. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - Sutherland, p. 289 (f.n).
5. Muthukrishna Mudali succeeded Paupa Bramhny in June 1749 as the Company's interpreter. In 1754 he accompanied Palk and Vansittart to Sadrass as translator in their mission. He was the Governor's Dubash to Pigot and his successors - and had long been the Company's chief merchant and a prominent citizen of Madras.
Nawab and his son Amir ul Umara suspected Muthukrishna of being "the cause of the rendition of Tanjore"¹, and the Nawab's supporters also claimed that Pigot's delay from December to February in ordering the handing over of the revenue administration was connected with the fact that the Dubash had claims on the Tanjore revenues which presumably he wished meanwhile to make good. It should be noted that of all the Indian officials under Pigot who were later suspended by Stratton, all but Muthukrishna were restored by Rumbold². It is impossible to say what weight to give to this evidence, but the total effect is to make Pigot appear an interested party in his dealings with the Nawab.

Pigot's actions certainly showed no desire to conciliate the Nawab, for in face of the various arguments over rendition put up by the Nawab, Pigot reached by demanding on 23 February that he should be furnished with precise information as to what and how many orders for payment had been made upon the Tanjore land revenues by the Nawab. These details the Nawab, in a letter of 25 February, refused to furnish, emphasising his desire that nothing should be done until the receipt of further instructions from England³. To this Pigot, on 6 March,

reached by retrospectively fixing 30 December 1775 as the date from which the Nawab's authority in Tanjore should be deemed to have ended. He ordered the Nawab to instruct "all Your Amuldars in the Tanjore Country to relinquish all manner of authority when called upon by me to do so, and to account with such persons I may name for all sums collected from the day I delivered the Company's letter to you".

This order brutally cut across all the Nawab's pleas for delay, and also perhaps across an arrangement made with him on or before 14 February by Pigot and his Council. In a letter to the Directors of that date, the Madras authorities had reported that the Nawab had pleaded that in his expedition against Tanjore he had incurred so much debt that the produce "of the whole Arcot Province, for the 12 months to come, will barely pay his Creditors ...", and that such enormous sums were due to his garrison in Tanjore that for their evacuation it would be "necessary to grant assignments on the Tanjore Country".

On 14 February the authorities, to "make a virtue of necessity", had agreed to this proposal and had engaged to discharge the

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amount of the assignments out of the produce of Tanjore, "at such Times as may be consistent with the state thereof" — "provided the amount of the whole assignments shall not exceed what we shall think the Tanjore Country may be burthened with". Moreover they had secured the assent of the helpless Raja to this arrangement. The new order seems to have abrogated the compromise, for on 19 March the Nawab, again urging his claims on Tanjore, argued, "The Tanjore Debt I can easily discharge provided I be undisturbed in the management of the revenues of that Country." And on 28 March he repeated his argument that had he not undertaken the two expeditions, he would have been "master of much treasure", that he had contracted heavy debts and had advanced large sums to the inhabitants of Tanjore, and proposing that after discharging the debt which he had contracted on account of Tanjore and deducting his military and other expenses, he should keep the revenue "untouched till an answer is received from Europe". He appealed to Pigot that "You wish to execute the Company's orders forcibly and against my consent; whereas I am willing to wait till an answer is received from them before I give it up ... listen to the request of an old

friend". However, on 25 March the Council had already unanimously agreed that the Nawab was unlikely to give his consent to the rendition of Tanjore and that, the "state of crops in that country not admitting of further delay", Pigot should himself go up to Tanjore. On 30 March Pigot duly set out for the city. He arrived on 8 April. On 12 April the Raja was ceremonially restored to his throne. While at Tanjore Pigot ordered that all grain from the last harvest collected by those who held assignments from the Nawab on the Tanjore revenues should be seized and handed over to the Raja's officials.

If the Nawab had been discomfitted, Tulaji was naturally full of joy and gratitude to the Company for restoring him to his throne, and ready, so he declared, cheerfully to resign the ordering of his affairs into the Governor's hands. To one who had been degraded into a captivity, which as it extended over two and a half years must have borne all the appearance of permanence, a release itself, let alone the retrieval of dignity,

3. The Council was initially unanimous in adopting this decision though subsequently there was dissenion, and a proposal was made that two members should accompany the Governor to Tanjore. This was defeated, but Pigot took with him two members of his own choice - Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 25 Mar.1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.136, p.88.
was a miracle. Under such circumstances, it was expedient rather to look upon the British as deliverers, than to run the risk of attributing the origin of all his troubles to them. Tulaji's main anxiety was to perpetuate their patronage, not to question past behaviour, and to this end he was not only accommodating, but extremely solicitous.

In consequence, the treaty concluded between the Raja and the British was immensely satisfactory to the latter. The safety of the Raja and his family, and the security of the country seemed to necessitate not only a British garrison in the fort of Tanjore, but that the same force should undertake the protection of the whole kingdom. There was the argument that if the fort of Tanjore alone was garrisoned by the British and the country defended by the Raja's troops, there would be constant disputes between them. At the same time, if the garrison at Tanjore was not large enough "to awe the Rajah's forces", it would weaken the Company instead of being a security and additional strength on the Coast, while the whole purpose could be undone by the Raja conveniently removing the seat of his capital. To prevent the dangers and confusion of a double authority arising, and indeed to maintain the safety of the Carnatic which depended upon "a well disciplined force regularly

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paid", it was necessary that "no other force should be permitted to be kept up" in Tanjore. The Raja was duly deprived of the small army he had maintained, and he agreed to keep no soldiers himself, save the guards necessary for his prestige and dignity, the number of which was not to exceed five hundred. Consequently, not only was the fort of Tanjore garrisoned by the British troops, but the whole kingdom virtually came under their control.

Again, quite apart from the regular tribute to Arcot, the Raja was to pay an annual sum of four lakhs of rupees to the British. He was persuaded to arrive at that neat total in order to avoid the cumbersome details of accounts and expenses. Initially, the Council was opposed to this arrangement, since it was not exactly in the spirit of the Directors' instructions; however, in a subsequent meeting at which the Governor was also present, they expressed their approval. There was also a provision in the treaty that the Raja was not to entertain relations with any power, and on all matters, including the matter of differences with neighbouring Poligars, he was to seek and accept British advice. Apart from revealing considerable

2. "as every measure we have taken has been at his [Raja's] request". - Pres.& Coun.-Court of Dirs., 14 May 1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.128, p.478.
prudence, this condition was of no consequence, for without an army and without power, there was no prospect of the Raja ever attempting any independent action likely to endanger British interests.

This so called Restoration of Tulaji in reality marked the establishment of the British power in Tanjore. It also marked the introduction of that system of subsidiary alliance, which was to play so important a role in the growth of the British Empire of India. With all the dignity and respect nominally attached to his position by the treaty, the Raja was nothing but a protected prince. Here was the thin end of the great wedge. The gradual absorption of the Tanjore country into the British dominions was the inevitable outcome. "Had I a thousand tongues", wrote the Raja, "they could not express my gratitude ... the Country of Tanjore is the Company's ...".

This lyrical phrase was soon accomplished fact, the price the Raja had to pay for his Restoration. The Raja, who had been styled the "friend and ally of the Carnatic" in the treaty of 1769 with Haidar, was in this manner reduced to the position of a petty vassal, with no army, little revenue and a plundered people.

2. The Reverend Swartz records that during the Nawab's rule, the difficulties of the people of Tanjore were greater, and consequently there was a large emigration for want of food and work. - Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of the Reverend Swartz - Pearson, Vol. 1, p. 304.
As for the Nawab, the new treaty still recognised him as an independent power, and as the 'Overlord' of Tanjore to whom tribute was due. But not only was his right to tribute once again reduced to the sum specified in the treaty of 1762, but the British had assumed the authority to collect the tribute on his behalf. They had insinuated themselves into the admirable position of being the Nawab's as well as the Raja's protectors and thus complete masters of their mutual relations. The Restoration appeared to re-establish Tulaji in his rights and dignity, in reality it crippled him and destroyed his independence. The Restoration appeared to reassert the Nawab's old claims as 'Overlord', in fact it substituted Madras for Arcot as effective master of Tanjore.
The proclamation of Tulaji as Raja of Tanjore in April 1776, when finally agreed upon, did not bring the question of the Tanjore Raj to a peaceful and settled conclusion. Tulaji had been placed on his throne again, but this did not mean that real authority and full control of his government had thereby been restored to him. As has been seen, he had already been compelled to accept a British garrison in his capital and a reduction in his own forces. Now the degree of his independence in another major field, that of revenue collection and management, was to be decided. This issue was to turn on the question of who should dispose of the crops harvested in the early months of 1776 - a seemingly narrow issue, but one on which the fate of Pigot's administration and the survival of an independent Tanjore came to depend.

The revenue from the spring harvest was claimed by both the Nawab and the Raja. Mohammed Ali's primary concern in acquiring Tanjore had been the attraction of its revenue, and it was inevitable that he should try every artifice to retain all that he could. He therefore argued once again that he had been lawfully in possession of the country, that its acquisition had entailed enormous expense, and that since he had already
assigned the land revenue of Tanjore to his creditors, the proceeds of the harvest of February 1776 were his of right. The Raja's claim to the revenue was put forward with equal conviction. His restoration had been ordered in 1775 and the Madras authorities had hastened to secure its early proclamation mainly, as their own consultations showed, because the collection of the harvest revenues would allow of no further delay. And behind this immediate action lay the Court of Directors' condemnation of the whole two years occupation by the Nawab. If that was unjustified, and the Raja had already suffered the unwarranted loss of two years revenue, then the Raja's claim to the February harvest could scarcely be disputed.

Had the issue been a straightforward one between the Raja and the Nawab, it is probable that the matter would readily have been settled. For the British to have imposed their decision upon the Nawab, even an inequitable and derogatory decision, would have been no novelty. But behind the Nawab stood those to whom he had assigned lands and who expected to secure handsome profits, and behind the Raja stood those who hoped to manœuvre themselves into position of power and profit at his court. During the discussion of this revenue question the Madras authorities divided therefore into two distinct sections, indifferent to the interests of the Company whom they
represented, or even of the two princes with whom they were negotiating, indifferent to any sense of responsibility, of compromise, or of integrity.

To some extent, the onus for the open division between discordant interests at Madras rested with the Directors themselves. Lord Pigot, who was to play the dominant role in the forthcoming drama, was their choice as the man to implement the Raja's restoration. His appropriateness for that role had scarcely been demonstrated in his earlier Indian career, his obstinacy and factionalism were known, and so was his personal financial involvement. The disaster which followed the entrusting of such a task to so inappropriate an arbitrator could have been foreseen, and with little difficulty avoided.

But when the Directors proceeded to order the restoration, much as they stressed the need for haste, they neglected to define the period from which it was to take effect. It was not clear whether Tanjore should be considered independent from the date of their instructions, from the date of the receipt of such orders in Madras, or from that of the Council's proclamation. Considering the knowledge they had of the late transactions, the Nawab's insatiable greed to possess Tanjore, and the irresponsible conduct of their Council, it should have
been more than clear to them that the Tanjore revenue, in the absence of a definite decision from them as to its disposal, would suffer various claims on it. Their mere declaration on that question would certainly have forestalled or nullified the subsequent claims of the Nawab and would have checked effectively the insurgent elements in their Madras administration. Nevertheless they gave no orders on the issue. Their inadequacy is all the more glaring when it is contrasted with the extreme care they had taken to safeguard their own financial interests by issuing specific instructions to Madras to settle all pecuniary issues affecting the Company with the Raja prior to his restoration.

That the Directors' vagueness would prove a fatal blunder was not at once apparent. When Pigot returned from Tanjore, the entire proceedings effected by him there received, after a little hesitation, a vote of approbation¹. All approved the restoration and the acceptance of four lakhs of rupees annually from the Raja to meet the costs of the British garrison. The only note of protest at the meeting of 6 May, was that of Stratton, Jourdan and Palmer against Pigot's arrest of the Nawab's manager and the dubash of Benfield, Kumara, and even on this issue the Governor had a majority behind him². But it

soon became clear that approval was to relate only to the restoration and that on other issues dissent was likely to grow. Only too clearly personal interests were involved. Thus, when Pigot originally proposed that he should visit Tanjore, Sir Robert Fletcher, the Commander of the Madras forces, at once declared that he wished to be the person to effect the restoration of the Raja—and if Pigot is to be believed, Fletcher without the knowledge of the Council had already sent his baggage and one of his secretaries to Tanjore and had borrowed money which he lent to the Raja. When it was agreed that the Governor should undertake the journey for that purpose, Fletcher argued that two members should accompany Pigot to save the actual restoration from serving the "corrupt interests of individuals at the expense of the Publick". Fletcher could not carry a majority in imposing this condition, but his proposal indicates how much importance was attached to any British visit to Tanjore and to the notion of concealed private interests. In the event, Pigot did take two Councillors with him "to convince them and the world" that he had "no sinister view" in going to Tanjore, but both men were of his choice and

3. "... several members of the Board had expressed their wishes to me in private, that they might go to Tanjore". - Pigot's Narrative, 11, Sept.1776 - Papers Relating to Madras, p.2.
not appointed by the Council. Even the reasons for Pigot's choice of Jourdan and Dalrymple to accompany him seem dubious and uncertain; both men later declared that they had not wished to make the journey. Nor did their inclusion in Pigot's party produce the desired effect of stilling the suspicions of the other members of the Council.

The actions of the Council seem to suggest that suspicion of all members' motives was justified. If the Directors had failed to provide instructions about the settlement of revenue questions, there was no good reason why the Council should not have done so. The Nawab had already made it clear that he had made assignments to Europeans on the Tanjore revenue due from the February crops to the amount of fifteen or sixteen lakhs of rupees; and that the holders had cut and received the grain into their keeping. Had the Governor and the Council in reply taken a definite decision regarding the harvest, before proceeding to effect the Restoration, establishing a certain procedure to be followed, any further intervention by the Nawab,

2. Jourdan's inclusion had the disadvantage of breaking the opposition party in Madras during his absence. This "was never forgiven. Whether Mr. Jourdan, who was very intimate with Mr. Benfield, had any views, which were there disappointed, or whether he expected to have been the only person, who went with Lord Pigot, I cannot say. But His Lordship never mentioned a word of his intention of carrying me with him, not even to myself ... nor had I ever expressed any desire to go". Notes by Dalrymple (given in January 1777 on his way to England) - Papers Relating to Madras, p. 30.
or those allied to his interest, could have been prevented. But from the haste they showed to implement the orders on Tulaji's restoration, and the ease with which they postponed a decision on the important aspect of the task, the revenue of Tanjore, it can only be surmised that both the Governor and members of the Council had ulterior motives for their behaviour. The Governor must have realised the difficulties of the revenue question; he perhaps postponed a decision, hoping to settle it in the Raja's favour by hastily effecting the Restoration. The members of the Council, for their part, probably entertained the idea that since the crops had already been harvested and stored with the holders of assignments on the Tanjore revenue before the actual Restoration was effected, it would not be tampered with. It was because the Governor's activities in Tanjore were not confined to the matter of the Raja's enthronement alone, but involved the revenue, that initial acquiescence in his proceedings turned to disagreement.

That the disagreement eventually became violent and total was almost certainly to be attributed to the presence in Madras of Paul Benfield, a civil servant of the Presidency. Even before Pigot's departure for Tanjore, Benfield had informed the

1. Pigot was aware that the Nawab was "being misled by designing men, who flattered him with the ridiculous expectation, that the orders of 1775 would be revoked". - Pigot's Narrative, 11 Sept.1776 - Papers Relating to Madras, p.1.
Governor that he had interests in Tanjore revenues, and indeed his extensive monetary connections with the Nawab and his complex financial arrangements were well known to the Governor. Pigot's immediate reply, given without much concern for general interests it would seem, was a casual assurance that he had no intention of injuring Benfield's rights. Once arrived in Tanjore, however, Pigot proceeded to adopt measures diametrically opposed to such an assurance.

Whether in declaring that the February harvest revenues should be surrendered to the Raja, Pigot was making an honest judgement or fulfilling his side of some corrupt bargain cannot be known. In either case his action was a blow to all whose fortunes were linked with the Nawab. His further action in demanding that the Nawab's manager produce all the revenue accounts for Tanjore, and in then despatching a force to pursue and arrest him within the Carnatic when he left Tanjore to avoid compliance, was certainly challenging. Such a measure as the seizure of the Nawab's official, within the limits of the Nawab's territory and without his sanction or authority, caused great indignation, as could be expected. This furnished the Nawab with an excellent pretext to make a complaint, which he

duly lodged with the Madras Council as well as with the Supreme Government.

As though this were not enough, Pigot also proceeded to a more direct break with Benfield personally, equally understandable, but equally unwise. Kumara, the dubash of Benfield, had been specifically desired by the Governor not to proceed to Tanjore until he himself had completed his journey. But not only had the dubash arrogantly disobeyed Pigot by visiting Tanjore, but he had also taken upon himself the business of informing the Raja secretly that he would like to have the management of the country and would advance him whatever sum he required. Dalrymple later deposed that Kumara had also warned the Raja that Pigot would advise him to place the country under the Company and accept a British garrison in the Fort — this was indeed the proposal Pigot was bringing from the Council, but that he should decline the proposal. The Raja was further assured by Kumara that if he did so he would be supported by at least seven members of the Council. All this was reported by the Raja to Pigot. It should have been clear from Kumara's knowledge of Council proceedings, that in his arrogant behaviour in Tanjore he felt himself supported by some person or persons of authority. Had Pigot investigated Kumara's

behaviour as dubash of Benfield, he might well have exposed those who had instigated his actions and thus strengthened his own hands. Instead, he chose to inflict a public insult on Kumara and hence on his master Benfield without securing any evidence to justify his action, by ordering the corporal punishment of Kumara with the whip, in public.

To this Benfield replied by denouncing Pigot's action in allowing British troops to help the Raja in taking possession of grain already cut and stored by holders of assignments on the Tanjore revenues. This could not have been done without the sanction of the Governor, Benfield declared, and this amounted to a violent seizure of British property by Pigot, who should be made accountable for the act. He also invoked the Council's aid in pressing his personal claims upon the Tanjore revenues, requesting them to "recover his property while ... the President, under their commission, remained in authority" in Tanjore territory.

If the Governor's actions seem questionable, or at least unwise, the claims of Benfield must be dismissed as preposterous. Benfield had come out to Madras in 1764 as architect and engineer, and was employed on the works of the Fort with the rank of a lieutenant, though his name was also in the civil list.

In 1769, he resigned his post to become a contractor for the erection of a rampart for the defence of the Town of Madras. He was dismissed from service in 1770 for factious conduct, but was reinstated; and was again dismissed in 1772 for disobedience. He subsequently contracted for new works at Fort St. George and had been engaged on them till 1776. Under cover of these activities Benfield had also built up a close association with the Nawab; he was in fact the banker to the latter and all the drafts of bills for the payment of the Nawab's kista were sent to, and discharged by him. Apparently, he had indulged in the lucrative business of lending money to the Nawab from the amounts he had made from contracting for the Company - a business which as Lucy Sutherland has put it was both "corrupt and most undesirable". Now, in the Council meeting of 29 May 1776 his claim was solemnly put forward that by virtue of

2. Edmund Burke, in his speech of 28 February 1785, thus surmised the Nawab's debt: "The Nawab, ever in arrears with his dues to the Company, is pressed for payment. He applies for money to a financier like Benfield. Notes of hand are given to him, which are accepted at the Treasury. The Nawab grants the lender a tanka or assignment of the revenue of a specified district and until the revenue comes in, pays two or three percent per month for the accommodation. By the connivance of the Governor as Cashkeeper, the lenders notes are not presented until the revenue payment is made. By this plan the lender receives usurious interest on a capital sum which he never disbursed. It may be asked why the Nawab did not avoid the grant of interest by deferring his payments to the Company until his revenue was realised. The answer is that a large indebtedness favoured his ambitious schemes, since it prompted the Company to aid him in the conquest of fresh territory, like Tanjore, providing additional revenue". Burke's Speeches, Vol. III, p. 126.
3. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics – Sutherland, p. 318 (f.n).
mortgages and assignments of the Tanjore revenues from the
Nawab, there were due to him Rupees 3,69,090 from the district
of Mannargudy, Rs. 20,000 from the district of Pappanaaim and
Rs. 1,20,659 from Pattukkottai, making a grand total of over
half a million rupees. As Marshman observes, "nothing can
more clearly demonstrate the total demoralization of the public
service at the Madras Presidency than the fact that this Paul
Benfield, occupying an inferior post, not worth more than 200
or 300 rupees a month, and keeping the grandest eqippage at
Madras, should not consider it by any means preposterous to
assert" that he had advanced such a large amount on the Tanjore
revenue. But preposterous or not in terms of abstract
justice, the claim was not preposterous in practice when so many
of the most important Company servants were directly or
indirectly involved in Benfield's transactions.

This was to be shown in the successive responses of the
Madras Council to Benfield's appeals. When he first asked the
Council to instruct Pigot at Tanjore to recover his property,
the move in Council to take the matter under consideration was
defered by the majority. Then, after Pigot's return,

   pp.362-364.
3. "... nearly all the most important Company servants were
   involved either in their own names" or in that of "his
   securities". - East India Company in Eighteenth Century
   Politics - Sutherland, p.318 (f.n).
4. Stratton & Coun.-Court of Dir.s., 24 Sept.1776 - Papers
   Relating to Madras, p.65.
Benfield's claims were taken into deliberation. He was asked to produce particulars and vouchers for his various transactions. He was unable to comply with the request, but he maintained that they had been registered in the cutcherry, and that the Nawab himself would vouch for them. Somehow Benfield never managed to produce the records of the cutcherry to substantiate his claims, though the Nawab's acknowledgement, even if not pressed for, can fairly be assumed to have been offered with great eagerness. It might well be argued that the Nawab's acknowledgement that the debts were genuine, and that Benfield really had advanced great sums to him, was irrelevant to the Tanjore question: the contract, however legitimate, was between the Nawab and Benfield and did not involve either the Raja or the Company. However, it appeared that the claims were far from genuine, and that there was disturbing evidence of collusion between the Nawab and Benfield to commit a giant fraud, for on enquiry, Benfield's claims on the people of Tanjore had dwindled to Rs.30,000 and even for this sum there was no corroborating evidence. The Council therefore decided that his claims on Tanjore, having "no connexion with the Government", and being without sufficient explanation and evidence to enable them to form any opinion, could not be taken up by them "in any respect". Similarly they concluded that the assignments of the Nawab were not "Admissible".

In this rejection of Benfield's claim, as in the earlier approval of Pigot's actions in Tanjore, there had been consistent majorities in Council. Ambiguous as the Directors' orders had been, the Madras authorities' interpretation of them had been entirely reasonable, as was their decision that since the restoration, there could be no connection between the Tanjore revenues and the private debts and commitments of the Nawab. It is startling, therefore, that on 3 June, only five days after this verdict on Benfield's claims, Henry Brooke who had voted with the majority on 29 May, should be found moving for a reconsideration of Benfield's case. He explained that Benfield's letter to the Council could be viewed in two different ways; one, that of his demanding and the other of his requesting, the assistance of the Council. Since he was originally of the impression that it was made in the former sense, he had voted against it; but now that he was satisfied that Benfield had only requested the Council to assist him, he moved that the entire claim should be reconsidered. It is utterly ridiculous that the sense in which Benfield submitted his claim should have any bearing upon its validity; and the member's explanation for the change in his attitude is as outrageous as the motion that he moved. Nevertheless, it was decided by a majority to discuss the claim once again.

2. Ibid. p.197.
That there was active collusion between Benfield, supported by the Nawab, and some members of the Council in this reversal of the earlier decision is very clear. Dalrymple later succinctly put it: "Benfield, with whom most of the Madras people are involved ... had influence enough to get this resolution revoked, the Nabob having conciliated some of the members who had hitherto supported His Lordship". Henry Brooke was one of those so worked upon, and George MacKay was another, though this was the man who earlier had proposed "publicly in Council to seize the Nabob's person" in order to overcome his obstinate refusal to accept the Restoration. How they were worked upon is unknown, but it should be noted that Benfield had been joined at this time by another agent of the Nawab, a man known to be on good terms with the Governor-General Warren Hastings, John Macpherson. When Pigot in 1775 had been endeavouring to prevail upon the Nawab to agree to the Raja's restoration, Macpherson had been surreptitiously visiting Mohammed Ali, obviously to champion his interests and so to gain recognition and reward for his former services as the Nawab's agent in England. In January 1776, after the Nawab had been forced to realise that Tanjore was lost to him, the Madras Council was handed by the Nawab himself, a document

entitled "A Short Memorial of Services to His Highness the Nabob of the Carnatic", which set forth the activities of John Macpherson in England during 1767-1769, and his negotiations on behalf of the Nawab. Macpherson had thereupon been summoned before the Council and asked if he were the author. He had declined any definite answer, arguing that the transactions mentioned related to a period anterior to the date when he became a servant of the Company. He had been dismissed from service for conduct prejudicial to the Company's interests, but had continued to stay at Madras hoping to be reinstated in service. Meanwhile he became a close friend and ally of Benfield, and in the creation of a majority against Pigot and for Benfield and the Nawab, Macpherson may be presumed to have played a part.

Governor Pigot tried to stultify the move by Henry Brooke by persuading the Council to stand by its original decision, but he was defeated by a majority of seven to five. George Mackay then moved that the Nawab had the right to the crops sown

3. He secretly confessed to Hastings his authorship of the document, but asked Hastings as a friend to advise when it was opportune to appeal to the Bengal Council against his dismissal. Macpherson-Hastings, 3 Mar. 1776 - Addl. Mss., 29137, pp. 92-94.
4. Both Macpherson and Benfield had been bitter rivals to the Nawab's favour and the former had even made accusations against the latter to Hastings. But from the time of his dismissal they "became and remained fast friends". - East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - Sutherland, p. 318 (f.n. 2).
in 1775 and harvested early in 1776. Advances for cultivation had been made by him and the country itself had been under his authority during the greatest part, if not the whole of the harvest. Moreover, he argued, the Directors' orders had not sanctioned any such seizure of the Nawab's property in Tanjore as would be implied in the handing over of the February harvest to the Raja. Hence, he declared that the Nawab's assignments on the Tanjore revenues were legal and that the Raja should be instructed to respect and restore all the claims of Benfield. The Governor objected to the motion as the Nawab's right was not to be discussed by the Council; but he was again defeated and Mackay's motion was adopted by a majority of seven to five.

Bigot then tried to separate Benfield's claims from the question of the Tanjore revenues by declaring them private and so no concern of the Raja's. But once again the Majority successfully opposed the President and decided that the claims were, "so far as they regard Mr. Benfield, private claims; so far as they regard the Nabob's assignments to Mr. Benfield, public." It was further resolved that the Raja should be recommended to account to Benfield for the Nawab's share of the crops in the districts assigned to him. Legally, much of the

2. Ibid., p.245.
3. Ibid., pp.248-249.
4. Ibid., p.250.
5. Ibid., p.247.
argument was feeble, for Benfield's claims were private and the fact that the debtor was the Nawab could not make them public and so bring them within the Council's jurisdiction. Or, if the Nawab's involvement did make the matter public, it is hard to see why the Raja should deal not with the Nawab but with Benfield, who had appeared so far not as the Nawab's agent but as his creditor.

However, for Governor Pigot the question was not one of legal niceties but of immediate practical politics. He had two constitutional alternatives before him: either to acquiesce in the majority's decision, hoping for a reversal by the Directors at some future date, or to record his dissent and at once appeal to higher authority for support. Neither of these lawful alternatives seems to have appealed to him, probably because of the uncertainty of their success. Since the original orders with which he had come to Madras were due to his endeavours at home, passed indeed by a slender majority of four votes, it is understandable that he was not willing to risk a reference home, or to reveal his failure to command a majority in the Council. He resorted therefore to the more damaging and uncertain method of attempting to crush the opposition.

Since it was evident that the Nawab was personally and deeply involved in the moves of the rebels, the Governor's first

1. 28 Feb. 1775, Court Book, 83, p. 462.
move was to try to isolate and neutralise the Nawab. This he did in two ways, both very unpopular and very provocative, first by laying down that no European should visit the Nawab without the knowledge and sanction of the Council, and secondly by proposing that the Nawab should be removed from Madras to Arcot. The earlier measure he had passed by the exercising of his casting vote, the latter which was designed to strengthen the first, was defeated. Nothing could have indicated more clearly the stress and impatience under which Pigot was working than his determination to move the Nawab from Madras. It had been in his day as Governor that the Nawab had originally adopted Chepeuk for his permanent residence. And it had just now been Pigot who had denounced Mackay's proposal to seize the Nawab as "a breach of national faith to the Nabob, who had come with his family to live under the protection of the English ..." His proposal, therefore, represented a complete about-face in his attitude to Mohammed Ali, and though it was defeated, it understandably gave the aspect of a personal vendetta to the conflict between the two parties.

The next moves in the conflict concerned appointments to be made at Tanjore. Pigot's proposal was that a factory should be

2. Ibid., pp.264-265.
opened at Tanjore; but the Council did not consider the step necessary, and the suggestion was rejected. Fletcher then moved that Colonel James Stuart should be appointed to the garrison at Tanjore. Vellore was in fact the major military post after Madras in the Carnatic, and a "post of Honour, assigned to the officer second-in-command". The reasons for sending Stuart to Tanjore were therefore clearly nothing to do with military strategy since only a small number of troops was required in Tanjore. Stuart was evidently to be posted there with the intention of assisting Benfield in the recovery of his assignments. That such was the motive seems to have been generally realised as the Raja himself expressly stated his desire to the Council that Colonel Harper should be allowed to continue at Tanjore. However, the Council approved of Fletcher's suggestion and Stuart's appointment was carried, despite Pigot's opposition.

Having failed to prevent Stuart's appointment by the Majority, Pigot next sought to counteract their move by sending one of his own men to Tanjore also. As grounds for this he reported that the Raja was apprehensive because of a report that

1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 28 June, 1776 - The motion was left for the Council meeting of 8 July, when it was defeated. - India Papers (y), pp.1-2.
5. Ibid., p.332.
he himself was speedily to return to England. Naturally he had assured the Raja, through his vakil, that there was no truth in the rumour. But he advanced the argument that it was "absolutely necessary to quiet the Rajah's alarms, by sending a person of consequence thither, in whom the Rajah could confide ...". The argument was scarcely convincing, for assuming that the Raja was apprehensive of the probable departure of the Governor, who had taken office only recently, the official denial and an assurance of protection of his interests, would surely have been sufficient. What the Governor's statement did reveal indirectly was his belief that the Raja would be destitute of protectors in his absence and the existence of a personal relationship with him. To add to the suspicion, he proposed that Claud Russell, a member of the Council and a particular friend of his, should be allowed to proceed to Tanjore as the British Resident.

With this move of the Governor, the struggle between the two parties began to reveal itself in its true colours. The appointment of Stuart to the Tanjore garrison had been accepted

2. Charles Floyer drew dark inferences from the nomination of Russell to Tanjore, seeing that he was about to marry Leonora Pigot. He also suggests that Pigot contemplated resignation of his office to his son-in-law, who became second in the Council because of the later suspension of Stratton and Brooke. - Floyer-Palk, 25 Sept. 1776, Palk Mss., Love, p.299.
and if Russell had also been allowed to proceed to Tanjore, neither party would have been able to accomplish its desired objective. And had large personal interests in the revenue question not been involved, it is inconceivable why Pigot should have been so particular about having one of his party at Tanjore; and similarly why the other party should have so objected to Russell's Residency. "The struggle between the President and the majority in the Council now was whether Colonel Stuart, who would manage the business agreeably to the views of the majority, or Mr. Russell, who would manage it agreeably to the views of the President," should go to Tanjore.

Though Russell's appointment was initially accepted, the Majority found it convenient to cancel this by urging the Governor to send him with the Committee of Circuit, to which Russell had been nominated by the Directors, to tour the Ceded Districts. However, as the Directors had specifically mentioned that this mission should be undertaken only after the Tanjore question had been settled, the Governor argued that there was no need yet for the Committee to move, since the business regarding Tanjore was far from settled. The Majority, however, insisted that Stuart should proceed to Tanjore immediately. The Governor therefore refused to sanction the

appointment, though he proposed that if Russell was allowed to go to Tanjore, he would agree to Stuart's appointment.

This was to be the last stage of any order, both in point of form and procedure in the Council. The Majority were determined to check the Governor sending anyone of his choice to Tanjore and were adamant upon sending one of their own. The Governor was equally decided in his wish to prevent Stuart from going to Tanjore alone. Personal motives and passions took the place of considered administration and the natural result was a revolution.

The Majority sought strength in the standing orders of the Company which laid down that "whatever shall be agreed on by the majority shall be esteemed the order by which one to act ..." and which enjoined that the Council's transactions be "ordered and managed as the majority of the Council shall determine, and not otherwise, upon any pretence whatsoever".

The Governor, in order to repel this attack by the Majority, declared that the Council was not competent to act without him. It was his duty to the Company, to his friends in the Council and to the good order and Government of the Presidency to see that the Majority "do not proceed further ... and to declare

as his opinion, that without his name to those orders, they are not the act of Government\(^1\), and men executing such orders may be liable to difficulties ...\(^2\).

Even if the Governor had been willing to rest the matter without achieving his object of sending Russell, the Majority was determined to order Stuart to Tanjore. Since the Governor refused to sign the order for Stuart's instructions, they held that the Secretary should sign them\(^3\). If the Secretary refused, the Majority looked upon themselves "as authorised to order him \([the Secretary]\) to do so"\(^4\). The Governor positively refused the Secretary's right to sign the orders without his sanction; and thereupon two members of the Majority, Brooke and Stratton, wrote a letter to the Secretary directing him to sign the orders. After these two had signed the letter, and before it could be passed to the other members of the Council, the Governor took possession of the letter and declared that he would leave the matter as it was, till a reference was made to the Directors for their decision\(^5\).

It is possible that the Governor had by now realised his precarious position and the extremity to which the matter had proceeded. It is also likely that the affair might have stopped

1. Earl Mansfield, judging the case of the King against Stratton, Brooke, Mackay and Floyer in 1779, expressed his opinion that "the Governor was the integral part of the Council, without whom the Council could not act"; but at the same time, he pointed out that the Governor "had no negative upon a majority of the Council". - *State Trials* - Howell, Vol.XXI, p.1220.


4. Ibid., p.372.

5. Ibid., p.373.
It is also likely that the affair might have stopped there, if he had in fact acted according to his declaration and allowed matters to rest until orders could be received from London. Instead, he immediately proceeded vindictively to charge Brooke and Stratton "of being guilty of an act subversive of the authority of Government ... in the signing orders to the Secretary ...". As a result, he declared that their suspension was necessary, and his motion to that effect was adopted by the exercise of his casting vote. This was indeed clean contrary to his expressed desire for a truce and his unwarranted and imprudent action was the immediate cause for the Majority's retaliatory violence.

The Majority assembled the same evening of 22 August at Benfield's house, where a meeting took place between them, Macpherson, Benfield and the Nawab's two sons. At another meeting at Fletcher's residence the next morning, they decided to take the extraordinary and irregular measure of declaring themselves the "legal representatives of the Honourable Company, under the Presidency". They not only expressed a conviction that all the servants of the Company would so regard them, but they also sent

2. Earl Mansfield explained this act: "Now there is that act, and to be sure it was a most illegal, arbitrary, and violent act, and it certainly was an assuming of the whole government by my lord Pigot; because in order to gain a vote of majority, two members of the Council are ordered out and superceded; if three had been wanted, it would have been the same". - State Trials -Howell Vol.XXI p.1222.
public notices to the effect that they would assume the authority of Government, since the Governor had violated "every law, which ought to bind a servant who has sworn fidelity to the Company". As the final measure, both to establish their authority and to remove that impediment which represented itself in the Governor, they decided that he must of necessity be arrested.\(^1\)

On the same day, Pigot summoned the Council and had the members who had signed the declaration suspended; and ordered that the Commander of the Forces, Fletcher, should be put under arrest and court martialed for his association with the Majority. The Command of the army was offered to Stuart.\(^2\)

Colonel Stuart seems to have occupied a peculiar place in the eyes of both parties. The Majority had been eager to send him to Tanjore, a measure which the Governor had strenuously tried to prevent; and yet, he was now offered the important post of Commander by Pigot himself.\(^3\) Stuart's promotion to the post was inevitable since the Majority themselves had already decided


3. From Stuart's long association with Lauchlin Maclean, and from the latter's position as the agent of the Nawab from 1774, it could be assumed that he would have supported the Majority against Pigot. It is difficult to believe that Pigot was unaware of Stuart's association with Maclean, and it is equally surprising that he should have attempted to enroll Stuart's support in his favour. *Reward is Secondary—Maclean*, pp. 270, 301-307 and 311.
in view of Fletcher's illness, to appoint him to the Command. It is clear that Stuart had shifted from his original identity with the Governor\(^1\), and the latter seems to have been completely unaware of this change with which, to his great inconvenience and mortification, he was soon to become familiar. Despite the fact that Stuart was eager to go to Tanjore, and that he was the Majority's clear choice, the Governor preferred his particular company the following day. He breakfasted with him\(^2\), and after intermittent sittings of the Council during the day, he invited him to supper at his Garden House\(^3\). It was on their way to the Garden House that Stuart managed to execute the most important task, the actual arrest of the Governor.

1. "...Colonel Stuart having found that Lord Pigot's protection would not be so profitable to him as the countenance of the adverse party ...". Dalrymple-Court of Dirs. 17 Jan.1777 - Papers Relating to Madras. p.5

2. Even before joining the Governor, Stuart had sent him a letter stating humbly that as he was "imperfectly informed of the steps which have led to the honour conferred on me yesterday, and not thinking myself entitled to a seat in Council, as matters are at present circumstanced, I hope it will be agreeable to Your Lordship, to allow me this day to peruse the Consultations, or other papers passed in Council, on occasion of these unhappy differences ...". This request was made to enable him to understand the situation before he was "called upon to execute any public act of authority". There is little doubt that Stuart was considering the chances of the success of the task he was to perform that evening, as he had on 23rd itself received his orders from Stratton & Council to arrest the Governor. Stuart-Pigot, 24 Aug.1776-Tanjore Papers. Vol.I p.417

3. Pigot seems to have feared some violence for he "did not think it prudent ... to go out of the garrison" and had stayed for supper at the Fort on 23 August. Trusting Stuart, he braved the visit to his Garden House the next evening. - Pigot's Narrative. 11 Sept.1776 - Papers Relating to Madras p.10
They set out from the Fort after dark, in a chaise driven by the Governor himself. The road lay across the island through a double avenue of banyan trees. When the carriage was midway between two bridges, two officers, Lieutenant Colonel Edington and Captain Lysaught, stepped into the road and signalled the carriage to stop. They had an armed party of sepoys concealed in the shadow of the trees, and as soon as Pigot reined in, Lysaught shouted "you are my prisoner". Then came the revelation of Stuart's real attitude, for he ordered the Governor to get out. Pigot was immediately hustled into a closed carriage belonging to Benfield, and was driven to St. Thomas Mount, where he was delivered into the custody of Major Horne, Commander of the Company's artillery.

There could scarcely be any doubt about Stuart's complicity for after effecting the Governor's arrest, he returned to the Fort where the Majority had already assembled. All slept in the Council Chamber that night. They adopted a motion the next day by which Russell, Stone, Dalrymple and Lathom, the members who had supported Pigot, were suspended. An announcement to the civil and military servants in the form of a proclamation declared

that they had assumed the authority of the Presidency with George Stratton as the Governor\(^1\). Though there was a minor protest, their assumption of authority was generally accepted\(^2\).

Edington presented himself at the Mount on the evening of 27 August with the intention of removing Pigot to a secret place of detention\(^3\). But the Governor steadfastly refused to accompany him, and when Major Horne summoned the garrison, Pigot harangued them to such effect that the troops tacitly avoided exercising any force\(^4\).

An appeal was then made by Russell, also with Pigot at the Mount, to Admiral Hughes then cruising off Madras for protection for Pigot. The Admiral refused to intervene. He had long since made it clear to Palk that he was in favour of the Nawab, declaring in March his view that the Nawab "certainly merits every attention from the English, being in my opinion their most sincere friend in the country". Indeed he maintained that there was no fault to be found in giving up Tanjore to the Nabob”. He was against the Restoration of the Raja; in his opinion,

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2. Among the civil servants, 38 refused to acknowledge the new Government of Stratton. To protest against the removal of Pigot and to disprove that the entire civil service had supported the revolution, they had sent a letter to the new Government with "the only favour we have to request of You Gentlemen" that their letter of protest was sent to the Directors.(29 Aug.1776-Tanjore Papers Vol.I pp.448-449). The military officers had already received their orders from their Commander, Stuart.- George Smith-Palk, 20 Sept.1776-Palk Ms.-Love p.291
3. Pigot was of the opinion that the Majority intended to remove him to Gingee, but the Majority later denied this. There is no doubt, however, that Pigot's removal was contemplated.
4. Pigot's Narrative. 11 Sept.1776-Papers Relating to Madras pp.16-17
everything would have been satisfactory if Tanjore had been left with the Nawab, with only the British garrison in the Fort\(^1\). Holding such views, whether from considerations of public policy or private advantage, the Admiral was unlikely to sympathise with Pigot and his friends. When Stratton and his supporters communicated the news of their coup to Hughes, he had hastened on 27 August to assure them that "finding you in possession of the Government", he would readily join them in all measures tending to the good of the common cause and welfare of the Company\(^2\).

Russell having failed, Pigot himself then appealed to the Admiral, seeking safety in the King's name\(^3\). Hughes did then claim a safe conduct to the ships for the Governor, but when the Majority pointed out that there was no proof of the King having empowered "any of his officers to require the removal of any servants of the Company ...", Hughes accepted their point with a most questionable alacrity, adding that he "should have been disappointed to have been told" that there was any proof of a similar instance\(^5\). The Majority having refused to deliver the

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\(^1\) Hughes-Palk, 22 Mar. 1776 - Palk Mss. - Love p. 273
\(^3\) Pigot-Hughes (n.d) - Homo Misc. Series, Vol. 132, pp. 735-737
person of the Governor to the Admiral\(^1\), did promise that no further attempt would be made to remove Pigot from the Mount\(^2\), and with this assurance Hughes showed himself very ready to be satisfied.

On the broader issue of the legality of the revolution, the Admiral promptly decided that the only line he could adopt was that "of not pretending to determine that of which" he was "not a competent judge ..."\(^3\). This seemingly humble profession of insufficiency is interesting indeed, since earlier he had not only declared himself in support of the Nawab's interests, but had even lamented the orders for the Restoration. It is clear, however, that he did not practice his professed principle, for immediately he offered the assistance of his fleet to the Majority on the grounds that they had the power of carrying on the administration of the Presidency\(^5\). In so doing he may have also been strengthened by the letter which Hastings and his Council had written on 10 September recognising the authority of the Majority, though it is not clear when this letter reached Madras\(^4\).

Soon after assuming authority, the Majority appealed to the Supreme Government at Calcutta for their approval of and support for the change in the Madras administration. It is evident

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2. It is clear that the Majority had intended "as the last resort in case of an attempt to rescue Lord Pigot, his life must answer for it".-Home Misc.Series.Vol.129, p.697
4. This letter was sent in duplicate to Hughes and Pigot.-Tanjore Papers. Vol.II. pp.41-42.
from the correspondence between the individuals within the Councils of Madras and Calcutta, even before the drastic changes that took place at Madras in August, that the Supreme Government's sympathies were with those men who were to form the Majority. As soon as they heard of Pigot's deposition, they promptly acknowledged the Majority as "the legal Administration of the Presidency of Fort St. George", and offered them their assistance in support of their authority. Their declared arguments for such a conduct were that the rights and powers of the Governments in India were "by the Original Constitution of them, vested and established in the Majority of the Council ...".

It has been said that in acknowledging the authority of the Majority, the Bengal Government's decision was "a reasonable one". In the narrowest constitutional terms this may have been so, for the Governor certainly had no right to override a hostile majority. But in any wider view the decision was far from reasonable, while the way in which it had been arrived at must seem suspect in the extreme. There is little doubt that the Governor-General had always shown himself in favour of Mohammed Ali, that he was blindly attached to the Nawab's interests and importance, that he was not favourably disposed towards the restoration of Tulaji, and that his Council was equally against the role Pigot had planned to play at Madras.

1. see below pp. 306-307.
3. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics-Sutherland, p. 319.
since he belonged to the Opposition interests in England and the orders for the Restoration ran counter to their views.

Warren Hastings was well versed in Carnatic affairs, and his association with Mohammed Ali had been long and intimate. He was a member of the Madras Select Committee when the first expedition against Tanjore was decided upon in 1771. He had always favoured the Nawab as a particular ally, and even though he was not in the Madras administration in 1773 when Tanjore was captured and made over to the Nawab, it can be assumed that he was in complete agreement with measures undertaken then; for he was to observe later in 1781 that he could hardly allow Tanjore "the credit of a serious argument. The measures of our first Settlers dignified the Rajah with the Title of King, and by that misnomer, ... he has acquired all the prerogative of Royalty, though the Nabob, his undoubted Sovereign has been without scruple treated as a Dependent." It was unfortunate that Hastings had not understood the part played by Tanjore in the growth of the power that he represented, had not acknowledged that Tanjore was indeed an independent state, and had been so unreasonable in his bias towards Mohammed Ali; and such a bias did not fail to

1. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics—Sutherland, p.319.
2. Regarding this decision, the Committee consisting of Du Pre, Ardley and Hastings was not unanimous. The Court later observed that they were "deprived of the pleasure of knowing which of our servants was of a different opinion from the majority, as no dissent was entered on that occasion".—Court of Dirspres.& Coun, 12 Apr. 1775—Home Misc. Series, Vol. 267, p. 5
provide some indirect support to the Nawab in his fight against Pigot.

If the Governor-General was personally in favour of Mahammed Ali, it was also true that his own interests were somewhat combined with those of the Nawab. Lauchlin Macleane, Hastings' agent in England, was also the agent of the Nawab. He had originally come to India to make a quick fortune, and had obtained the post of Commissary-General of Bengal. "He was quick to see that his best prospects lay at the disorganised Court of the Nawab of Arcot, and had not been there six months in the country before he was employing a period of convalescence in Madras in the most grandiose intrigues with the Nawab ... out of which he clearly hoped to obtain both financial advantages and an early return to England". There is no doubt that Macleane persuaded the Nawab to represent his case in England, and when Macleane soon found it necessary to resign his post with the Bengal Government, he accepted the post of the Nawab's

1. Hastings was urged to take "many broken men" of the speculative disaster of 1769 "under his wing in India so that he could give them the opportunity to restore their shattered fortunes. Lauchlin Macleane was only the most conspicuous of them; of very similar type was John Stewart ...". - East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - Sutherland. p.299


3. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - Sutherland. p.303


5. "Macleane was so closely allied to Hastings and Sullivan that he knew that an energetic 'new broom' like Francis would sweep him away at the first opportunity". It was Francis' arrival that made Macleane resign his post. — Reward is Secondary-Maclean. p.429.
agent in January 1775.

It was unfortunate that Hastings' personal sentiments were shared by his Council, who had always shown themselves equally in favour of Mohammed Ali. Earlier in June 1775, they had supported the Nawab in his quarrel with the then Madras Government regarding his right to nominate Amir ul Umara as the Nawab of Tanjore. To the Nawab's complaint against Pigot's arrest of his manager, they had responded warmly by denouncing the Governor's action as "a violation of the Independent Rights of the Nabob", and had expressed a strong objection to the loss that his interests were to suffer by the restoration of Tulaji. Seven weeks later they had again declared that they would "support the rights of the lawful Nabob ... against all such attempts in future", and that they would "exert with effect, the power vested in them by the Legislature of superintending and controlling the Government of the Presidency of Madras ...". And to Pigot's move in Council to alienate the Nawab from his British supporters and to remove him from Madras to Arcot, they had strongly objected by openly criticising the personal character of the Governor: "Your President's conduct and behaviour to the Nabob manifest symptoms of a strong personal

2. see pp.234-235
indisposition towards him, heightened by a tone of authority unbecoming the Nabob's dignity and independency ..." ¹. Their sentiments, though misguided, were certainly strong, for on the same day they passed 17 resolutions in Council supporting the rights of Mohammed Ali and condemning the actions of Pigot²; and went on to cast a further doubt on Pigot's integrity by questioning whether or not some pressure, similar to that used on the Nawab, had been put on Tulaji by Pigot to make him agree to the terms that had been settled by the Restoration, for the expressions of the Raja, they remarked, "were never voluntarily used by any independent prince, however grateful he might be for the services rendered to him" ³.

Sir Robert Fletcher, one of the chief opponents of Pigot, had himself been in intimate correspondence with Sir John Clavering of the Supreme Council, as well as with Hastings; and the dissensions in the Madras Council had been narrated, doubtless, in a partial light ⁴. Fletcher had originally expected to proceed to Tanjore to effect personally the Restoration of Tulaji, and had put forward the argument that since the treaty to be concluded with the Raja was specifically a military matter, he as Commander of the forces, should have the privilege to conclude the affair.

   22 " " " " pp. 173-175.
   27 June 1776 - " " " p. 261.
   29 " " " " pp. 265-268.
When his proposal was rejected, he had expressed his mortification to Clavering, who had readily sympathised with him. Indeed, Clavering considered it derogatory for the Governor to have superseded the Commander. While the attitude of Clavering seems basically one of support of all military personnel and not strictly against Pigot, it can nonetheless be seen that he had very little sympathy for Pigot or the orders he was to carry out. The flow of private correspondence was conducive neither to an unbiased presentation of the facts, nor to a strict consideration of the general interests, and it denied Pigot the advantages of fair explanation and chances of support from Bengal. It was equally unfortunate that Pigot had "failed to cultivate a good understanding with the Supreme Council, while the members of the Majority corresponded privately with Bengal and ascertained how far they might expect support". Pigot was certainly aware of these unfavourable trends, but apparently had preferred to ignore them due either to over-confidence in his ability, or to the probable notion that the Majority would never resort to violence.

4. Pigot had realised that the Bengal Council were "guided in their deliberations by private complaints and private correspondence; I had such Dependence on their Honor and Justice as to have supposed them incapable of forming decisions without giving me an opportunity of saying something for myself ..." - Pigot-Court of Dirs, 9 Nov.1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.132, p.669.
The Nawab on his part had been laboriously exerting himself to bring about a reversal in the policy of the Directors, and had it not been for the subsequent drastic events in Madras, it is probable that he would have succeeded. In March 1777, the Directors had decided in favour of the Nawab's protests and had actually introduced modifications respecting "the collection and application of the Revenues and the administration of affairs of the Kingdom of Tanjur". This change was mainly due to Maclean, who had successfully persuaded the Ministry to view his master's case in a favourable manner; and it was even believed that there was to be another appointment of a representative of His Majesty's Government at the Court of Mohammed Ali. Even though the Nawab's direct influence in the Parliament is not a fact, it is clear that he not only had influential friends, but that he also had also managed to bring about a modification in the orders for the Restoration. The Ministry was favourable to him, and he was also in correspondence.

1. 5 Mar.1777- Court Book 85. p.634
3. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics-Sutherland, p.315 and 323.
4. "The majority of the Directors led by Harrison are themselves very much disposed to support the orders sent out by Lord Pigot ..., but the Ministry wish rather to favour the Nabob and several of the Directors are willing to do as they are bid however contradictory to the sentiments they had before declared". Vansittart-Hastings, 18 Mar.1777 -Addl.Mss. 29138. p.249
with the British Crown, which had always supported his interests. This sudden rise in the Nawab's position had definite attractions for the prominent personalities of British India. Apart from the private gains to be made in their relations with him, it also became an important object for his friends to support his interests with a view to satisfying the Crown and currying favour with the Ministry. Hastings, whose position in England at this time was not altogether satisfactory, found this an excellent opportunity to strengthen his interests by giving his support to the Nawab.

It was even suspected, though unjustly says Dr. Sutherland, that Hastings was involved with the Majority in bringing about the overthrow of Pigot. His opposition to the restoration of Tulaji, and his resentment at the consequent loss to the

![Image]


In 1771, the Nawab was called upon by George III to perform the investiture on his behalf; and the Nawab bestowed upon Lindsay the Order of the Bath.

2. "For the Crown is so pledged for the support of the Nabob, and the Administration are so enraged at the proceedings of Lord Pigot, which are all attributed to Opposition principles, as being personally offensive to His Majesty, as well as to his Ministers, that any Defeat relative to the Affairs of the Carnatic, either in India or here, would have been felt by the Government as the severest Mortification".- Macleane-Hastings, 12 May 1777 - Addl. Ms. 29138. p. 405

3. "... the protection you have afforded the Nabob has recommended you in the strongest manner to the King and the Ministry particularly Lord North".- Macleane-Hastings, 12 May 1777 - Addl. Ms. 29138. p. 405.

4. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics-Sutherland, pp. 319-320.
Nawab's interests, turned to a positive dislike of Pigot, who must have seemed to many to be the cause for the rendition of Tanjore. There is little doubt that Hastings began to favour those who were opposed to Pigot, and who were equally in favour of Mohammed Ali. Macpherson, who had been dismissed by the Madras Council and who had since associated himself with the Majority, was a very close friend of Hastings; and had always been the main channel of intercourse between him and the Nawab.

It is only reasonable to assume that Macpherson had led his friend to consider his interests, as well as those of the Majority, in a favourable light. Another friend of Hastings, John Stewart, who paid a visit to Madras early in 1776, gave an opinion of Pigot to the Governor-General, which may also have assisted the latter in determining the line of conduct to be adopted. Stewart reported that Pigot, apart from enquiring after Hastings' health as a mere formality, had not expressed a "single sentiment of kindness" towards the Governor-General. Indeed, Pigot had been offered repeated opportunities to evince some interest, but had consistently fended them off by "professing the most perfect indifference ..." A shrewd

1. "if ever I had it in my power to show implicit confidence in the friendship of any man living, it is in writing this letter warm from the candor of my mind to you".  
2. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics—Sutherland, P.319.  
3. see p.305 f.n.1  
anticipation on the part of Pigot might have enabled him to strengthen his position, but unfortunately he had ignored the opportunity. Such an insalubrious atmosphere both at Calcutta and in Madras, which was "nothing but a nest of Hastonians", was to prove most unhealthy for the Governor.

It is clear from the correspondence of the Governor-General with George Stratton that he was in fact in agreement with the Majority. There is no evidence, it is true, to incriminate him in the actual conspiracy, but there is little doubt that he desired the removal of Pigot and encouraged the Majority in their action. It can be accepted that he was not interested in any financial gain for himself, but it is difficult to accept the further argument that he "cannot be accused of favouring the Nawab's creditors". The Governor-General was aware of the fact that the basic disagreement between the Majority and Pigot was the question of the revenues of Tanjore; and that it was claimed on behalf of the Nawab mainly to satisfy the people to whom it had already been assigned. If in fact he was not interested in the question, it would have been appropriate for him to have referred the matter to London without offering his

2. Macpherson had been imploring Hastings even before the Majority's action, to interfere in the affair. Hastings' replies to Macpherson were destroyed by the latter; and Vansittart pointed out to Macpherson that this correspondence "would if known be very liable to misconstruction". Vansittart Hastings, Macpherson, 6 May 1775 (quoted in) The Impeachment of Warren Hastings-Marshall. pp. 8-9.
support to either party. While informing the Governor-General of the Revolution, Fletcher desired him not only to approve the measure, but also to write "fully your sentiments to England upon the whole matter". The Governor-General's immediate reply was to approve and applaud the measure, and also to congratulate the Majority "upon the Facility and success with which it was accomplished". Apart from hastening to inform the new Governor of his approval "as expeditiously as it could have been", he assured him also that the Majority's action would "be ratified at home".

Besides rejoicing at Pigot's deposition, Hastings went a step further to observe that he would be easier in his mind when he heard that "your late President is returned to England. His presence must be productive of some distrust and check the operations of your government". Regarding the protest made by certain civilians against the Majority's assumption of authority, he assured Stratton that it "can do no harm". It had been made "with a strict regard to truth and with great temper" and he would advise them to return to duty; and in the event of their prudent return, the new Governor should take them back.

"In truth", the Governor-General explained, such a deputation was "no unfortunate circumstance" as his own report of what

3. see p.300(f.n.2).
he had seen or heard to London "must cut off every remaining
Hope which they [Pigot's party] may have formed of Aid from
that quarter" 1.

Then the Governor-General, in what provides further
evidence of his intimate association with the Majority, proceeded
to advise Stratton as to the future course of his action. "You
have yet, my friend", he wrote, "a very difficult task to
perform. The whole world will have an eye upon your conduct and
be ready to impute what you have already done to motives of self
interest if the least shadow of a pretext is afforded ... you
must consider your place as a place of honour not of profit, nor
should you suffer an action to escape you that will not bear to
be viewed in the broadest day light". Furthermore, he warned
him that personal integrity would be insufficient "unless you
prevent others from availing themselves of the late change for
their own undue advantage". He therefore specifically desired
Stratton to leave the matter of the Tanjore assignments alone,
without intervention in their actual realisation 2. The advice
shows that Hastings was well aware of the basic issue in the
clash between Pigot and the Majority. It also shows a very clear
perception of the manner in which the whole matter would be
viewed by the Directors for, after advice which covered the
whole affair with grace and justice, there comes a shrewd

judgement of the Court's likely response. He was certain, Hastings said, that a "demand of such magnitude, and involving the property of so many men who have friends and connections at home to assert their right to it, will in the end obtain it; and such a reference, in my opinion, the most likely way to gain the Company's sanction to it". This, in fact, was the real situation of the Company administration and a factor which Pigot had attempted to fight.

From the sentiments that the Governor-General expressed to the Majority, and from the eagerness with which he hastened to confirm their action, it is clear that he desired and indeed rejoiced at Pigot's deposition. And it was Pigot's misfortune that the Supreme Council, notorious for their disagreements on almost every issue, were here unanimous in their support for Stratton and the Majority. They did not evince the slightest concern for the deposed Governor or his supporters - Francis callously remarked of Pigot that "he was caught like a canary bird and there he may whistle". Their official letter of 10 September to Pigot was scarcely less brutal for after declaring that they would have been happy to effect a reconciliation, they added that they feared that the differences had gone too

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3. (quoted in) - East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics- Sutherland. p.319 (f.n.1).
far to admit such a possibility; "and that a want of success, in promoting that desirable end, might have been attended with consequences more fatal, than any which can result from our present decided resolution".

Such public realism was matched by a private frankness and cynicism in the correspondence of Hastings. To Stratton he made clear his belief that private interest was likely to triumph over public morality and justice: "while the principal servants of the Company have such claims in the Country, they will always lean to the side of their interests, when the rights of the Company come in competition with theirs or where theirs may be affected by the public measures which their duty may demand". While the Governor-General's conduct remains questionable, it becomes understandable in the light of Hastings' own dictum that "Men can not always reason fairly when their fortunes are at stake, but will often be influenced by such a concern even without suspecting the bias that leads them on wilfully departing from their integrity". This was true not only of the Governor-General, his Council, and all prominent men of the Madras administration, but of the authorities in England also.

The attitude of the Nawab was openly and understandably in favour of Pigot's deposition: his two sons had openly associated themselves with the Majority and were actually

present at the meetings when the decision was taken to assume the authority of the Presidency. It was later maintained by Captain Randall, the aid-de-camp to Amir ul Umara, that he was instigated by the latter to murder Pigot by poison or otherwise. But the Nawab protested entire innocence of complicity in the affair, and gave his assurance that he knew nothing of the Majority's actions until after the arrest of the Governor. Stratton's evidence would suggest that the story of a murder plot was fabricated, but that the Nawab was innocent of any part in the Majority's plotting is hard to believe. Though he refused the sanction of his name to the measures that had been adopted, it may be surely assumed, as Dalrymple put it, that his gold had the "credit of being the instrument which brought about these events." The day after the Majority's assumption of power, he entered the Fort in great splendour to congratulate them and give "public testimony of his rejoicing." It is also on record that the new Governor assured the Nawab that he would

1. see p.296.
2. Randall -Court of Dirs, 3 May 1777- India Papers (C). pp.1-16.
3. "... and the Nabob says he had no previous knowledge of the revolution, for he was asleep when it happened." - Randall - Court of Dirs, 3 May 1777- India Papers (C). p.16
5. Stratton later observed that he was "sure that the Nabob's son is innocent for he told him so with his own mouth." - Randall - Court of Dirs, 3 May 1777- India Papers (C). p.16.
6. The Nawab wrote to the Directors that "It becomes not me to give my opinion relative their internal disputes ... I have neither right nor wish to interfere in it, therefore I do not meddle with it." - Nawab - Court of Dirs, 25 Sept.1776- Home Misc. Series, Vol. 130, p.608
have no further cause to complain against the servants of the Company, and indeed that it would be his sincere pleasure to evince his esteem and respect for His Highness. There is no doubt that the Nawab encouraged the Majority and was pleased at the fall of Pigot, but in his case at least the hostility was open, of long standing and forthrightly declared.

In England intelligence of the Madras Revolution excited great initial indignation and surprise, but oddly little practical disturbance to the power pattern. The Opposition interests, which had secured Pigot his appointment, embarked upon measures to secure condemnation of the late proceedings at Madras, an ineffective order to recall both parties to the dispute was issued, but the undue dominance in the Company's affairs of party politics in the main helped to minimise the real magnitude of the question. The proceedings of the Home authorities provided a facsimile of the diverse interests that compelled their servants in India to unjust actions, with this difference only that they could act with impunity. Hastings' analysis was quite correct — "the majority of the Madras Council had their friends just as Lord Pigot had his". Where all was "Party", the resolutions taken on the Madras usurpation

2. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics-Sutherland, p. 320
3. "In this country all is party ...".- Palk-Goold, 17 Mar. 1769.-Palk Isse.-Love. p. 97.
"... the extraordinary revolution at Madras ... has kindled a spirit of party strife and contest greater than you can imagine".- John Bourke-Francis, 29 Apr. 1777- (Quoted in) The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics-Sutherland, p. 323.
depended more upon the pull of interests than upon a just consideration of the political and administrative requirements of the Tanjore state.

Before news of the Revolution in Madras arrived, the Court of Directors had already decided to heed the Nawab's protests against the Restoration, and to introduce drastic modifications in their plans for Tanjore \(^1\). Had the Court's deliberations not been rudely interrupted by the Madras news, Pigot would have found himself ordered to implement measures opposed in principle to the Restoration. The violent actions of the Majority thus served to postpone measures which would have been most disastrous for Tanjore. This, however, was almost the only positive outcome of Pigot's overthrow. The Court of Directors' only immediate response, on 18 March 1777, was to seek a speedy conveyance to Madras for Thomas Rumbold\(^2\), Pigot's old rival, and then on 19 March to postpone consideration of what Rumbold's orders should be "to a future day" \(^3\). Nearly a fortnight then elapsed before a preliminary decision was taken by the General Court to recommend the Directors to adopt the most effectual means to restore Pigot to power \(^4\). On 4 April the General Court added the suggestion that five Commissioners be appointed with

1. 5 Mar, 1777- Court Book, 85. p. 634.
2. 18 Mar, 1777- Court Book, 85. p. 650.
4. 31 Mar, 1777- " " " p. 677.
"full powers for the supervision and management" of the affairs of Madras and to inquire into the late disorder. A week later it was further resolved that Pigot and his supporters should be restored to power and the members who had effected the Revolution should be suspended from service for conduct "unjustifiable and of the most dangerous tendency". At the same

time, a vote of censure on Pigot was also adopted as his proceedings appeared "to have been in several instances reprehensible". Since no specific instances were adduced, the censure of Pigot must be seen as a recognition of a faction within the General Court which must be conciliated if Pigot were to be restored.

If the General Court had been dilatory and indecisive, the Ministry showed itself uninterested: as late as 12 April Robinson was complaining that he could not persuade North to think seriously about the Madras question. The fact was that the Ministry did not feel concerned, and held no brief "either for Lord Pigot or for the Majority ..." There was a general idea as King George III noted, that both the parties involved in the Revolution had been "stimulated by motives alone of

1. 4 Apr. 1777 - Court Book, 85. pp. 685-686
2. 11 Apr. 1777 - " " p. 699
3. "... just because the issue was less serious, ministers in their other preoccupations paid little attention to it".- Robinson-Jenkinson, 12 Apr. 1777 - (quoted in) East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics-Sutherland, p. 321
4. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics-Sutherland, p. 320
private interests." Though Pigot's case was actively supported by the Opposition interests, and Admiral Pigot, the Governor's brother, gained some sympathy for him among the Proprietors, there was not such unanimity within the Company as would produce speedy and decisive action in Pigot's favour. When on 9 May 1777 a resolution framed by Robinson, for the recall of both Pigot and his opponents was put to the General Court, in the absence of "a solid combination in the Company against ministerial control; Robinson carried the day by 414 to 317 votes. Failing to effect the desired result in the Court, the Opposition raised the question in the House of Commons. Resolutions, approving the conduct of Pigot and condemning his recall, were moved - it was in the course of these proceedings that Edmund Burke became interested in the question of Tanjore. The proceedings in Parliament achieved little, and though foreshadowing later developments, had no immediate


2. The Court of Directors felt that "Much of the present confusion has arisen from the private engagements of our servants, and their concerns, dealings, and transactions on their own separate with the Princes and Natives of the Country..." - Home Misc. Series. Vol. 269. p. 243.


4. Court Book, 85. p. 711

5. The debate was "of some interest as indicating the development of the future; it showed the willingness of the Rockingham group to take up Indian questions to harass the Government, and it also laid some of the foundations of the great attacks which, with Fox and Burke at their head, they were later to launch against the Government". East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics-Sutherland. p. 323.
political importance. All that emerged was a face-saving
formula under which it was agreed on 10 June that Pigot should
be restored to office, but that after his restoration he should
relinquish his post and return to England. The members of the
Madras Council who had brought about the Revolution, and Benfield
were to be recalled; the military officers who had supported
them were to be court martialled; and Sir Thomas Rumbold was
to succeed Pigot as Governor.

Even this compromise solution was not ultimately applied,
for when on the last day of August 1777, John Whitehill arrived
from England with Despatches to "Lord Pigot, our President and
Governor of Fort St. George", he had to assume the Governorship
himself since Pigot had already died in confinement on 11 May.
Pigot had thus died even before his friends in England could
send copies of the Directors' orders for his restoration.

2. Ibid. p. 253.
5. Though Pigot's last months at Madras were subjected to
much controversy, and his death caused much commotion in
the subsequent inquest, the burial of the ex-Governor
was not given much importance. The interment took place
in the Fort, and was the first intramural burial in
St. Mary's Church. No inscription marked the spot. Nearly
a hundred years later, during the course of excavations
carried out under the chancel in 1874, a vault was found
containing a nameless coffin. This was surmised to be
that of Lord Pigot, and by the order of the then Governor
of Madras, the Duke of Buckingham, a slab was placed
over the vault inscribed simply 'In Memorium'. - see
overland by the hand of William Burke. On his arrival in September, Burke too thus found his mission thwarted by death. The one product, therefore, of Admiral Pigot's efforts on his brother's behalf, was involvement of William Burke with the affairs of the Raja of Tanjore, whose agent he soon became.

To William the appointment, which he was to hold, in England and India for some five years, was one "with the promise of great prosperity" in his affairs. But this connection, by interesting Edmund Burke in the affairs of Tanjore and Warren Hastings' part in them, proved ultimately to have a national significance.

Meanwhile, an inquest had been held at Madras on the death of Pigot. The Grand Jury was summoned by the Coroner, George Ram, who had declared himself against the Majority when they

1. After the loss of his seat in Parliament, William was sorely beset by his creditors. His prospects of finding a lucrative position were gloomy, and in 1777 he became interested in seeking his fortune in India. He had actually undertaken the journey overland to India to ensure the immediate release of Pigot. - Edmund Burke and his Kinsmen, p.79. and East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics-Sutherland, p.327.
5. George Andrew Ram was the Coroner at the time of the Revolution. Soon after, clearly because of his disapproval of the Majority's seizing power, he was appointed to a subordinate settlement, and a new Coroner was appointed in his place. Since Ram had no intention to quit his office, he maintained that "he could not be removed from it by a proof of delinquency". The new Government allowed Ram to stay at Madras, and as a result there were two Coroners at Madras at the time of Pigot's death. It was Ram who summoned the inquest at Pigot's death. - Stratton & Coun.- Court of Dirs, 2 July 1777- Military Letters to England. Vol.XII.
seized power in August 1776, and under his direction a verdict
of wilful murder was brought in against Stratton, the Majority
and the military officers concerned. The verdict was given in
August, nearly three months after Pigot's death; and it was
not published until September after Whitehill had assumed office
as Governor. Stratton and the Majority were committed for
trial at the Quarter Sessions. Advice was sought for from the
Supreme Court at Calcutta, which declared that the inquest
afforded insufficient evidence for the indictment, and therefore
the proceedings were dropped. Stratton and the other members
then left for England where they were prosecuted by the State.
For all their offences, they were fined the comparatively paltry

Vol. 269, pp. 5-6.
The Madras Inquest proceedings were published in England in
1778 under the title of "Original Papers, with authentic
state of the Proofs and Proceedings before the Coroner's
Inquest which was assembled at Madras upon the Death of Lord
Pigot."

2. "the inquest ... adjourned at different times, from the 11th
May until the 7th August ..."-Whitehill-Court of Dirs,

3. "This verdict was kept secret from the 7th August until the
24th September ..."-Whitehill-Court of Dirs, 4 Oct. 1777-

Vol. 269, p. 274.

5. "Impey, Chambers, Le Maistre and Hyde recorded the opinion
that there was no legally appointed Coroner in Madras, and
that, if there had been, the materials of the inquest were
insufficient for an indictment for either murder or manslaugh-

6. Several resolutions were moved by Admiral Pigot in the
House of Commons and consequently proceedings were commenced
in 1779 by the Attorney-General against Stratton, Brooke,
sum of one thousands pounds each ¹.

Stuart remained under suspension and was tried by court martial for arresting Pigot. But he was acquitted on the technical ground that he had effected the arrest outside the limits of Fort St. George, and was therefore beyond the sphere of the Governor's military command ². Not only was he taken back

1. The leniency of the penalty is clear from the fact that when imprisonment was laid down as the alternative to the fines, the money was immediately paid into Court. In a note by Lord Erskine, the leniency is thus explained: "The accusation was weighty, but the judges were bound, by their oaths, to weigh all the circumstances of mitigation, as they appeared, from the facts in evidence, and from the pleadings of the counsel at the bar. They were not to pronounce a severe judgement, because the House of Commons was the prosecutor. Mr. [Edmund] Burke, however, who had taken a very warm and... an honest part in the prosecution, took great offence at the lenient conclusion, and repeatedly animadverted upon it in the the House of Commons".—State Trials—Howell. Vol.XXI. p.1292

2. Sir Hector Munro, who was then the Commander-in-Chief, considered that no military offence had been committed because Lord Pigot as the Governor held the chief military command, the arrest was made outside the Fort. Stuart, it should be noted, was anxious to be tried, and even went as far as to point out the exact spot where the arrest took place, "greatly within the Guns of the Fort". He maintained, quite rightly, that "to suppose that the late Lord Pigot was not then and there Governor and Military Commander in Chief of all the Troops which Government had appointed for the Garrison of this Fortress ..., would infer, in my humble opinion, this very extraordinary position, that the Governor of Fort St. George, when he takes any airing, or walks out beyond the Glacis, either for health or duty, loses his right to give Orders to any part of his own Garrison, not even when he thinks fit to inspect their Barracks. It would infer that the Governor, sitting in the Country house allotted by the Company for him, where I believe the greater part of his time is spent, could not then locally act in a military capacity, as has been universally the practice, as well as, in my idea, the clear right of the Governor ...". (Stuart-Gov.& Coun.16 Mar.1778.Mds.Mil.Cons,Vol.59). It is clear that Stuart based his defence not on the absurd technicality of where the offence was committed, but on the fact that he was acting under orders. Stratton and the Majority, who formed themselves the Government on 23 August 1776, had ordered Stuart on the same day to effect the arrest of Pigot. see p.298.
into service, but was soon promoted to the rank of general. But, during the governorship of Lord Macartney, he was dismissed from the service for insubordination, arrested and deported. This led Amir ul Umara to compose the mot: "Once General Stuart catch one Lord, now one Lord catch General Stuart".

The orders for a local inquiry, given by the Directors, were to prove equally ineffectual. In October 1779, they were informed by the then Madras Government that they had not been successful in obtaining any dependable information regarding the Revolution. The chief culprits had saved themselves with a negligible fine; Stuart and other military officers had been found not guilty, as they had acted under orders; and many others who had taken an active part had managed to re-enter the Company's service. In this manner, a major incident, of an

1. On 17 September 1783, Maj-Gen. Stuart was dismissed from the Company's service by the Madras Government, and Maj-Gen. Burgoyne, the senior officer in His Majesty's service in Madras, was ordered to take command of the King's forces. Stuart thereupon declared that he would continue to give orders to the King's troops and Burgoyne agreed to obey him. Burgoyne also refused to accept the command himself "because I think it militates against my Duty to the King and my obedience as an Officer". Stuart was then arrested, and the next senior officer, Colonel Ross Lang, was promoted to the rank of Lt-General to become the commander of the forces. - Home Misc. Series. Vol. 342. pp. 409-111.


3. "If any of the defendants should be employed again by the Company, it will be from a persuasion that they, in general, look upon what the defendants have done in a venial light, from their motive, intention, and object in doing it. If the Company should entertain that opinion of their conduct, it will be the addition of greater authority than that of the Council at Bengal, and may be the means of removing the strong impression made by their convictions". - The Judge's Remarks- State Trials- Howell. Vol. XXI. p. 1291
extraordinary and revolutionary nature was to pass without leaving any mark either on the administrative machinery of the Presidency, or on the pattern of private interests involved in the Carnatic. The Direction had thus proved to possess "neither policy nor leadership" equal to the demands of the incident.

Before this extraordinary chapter in the history of Madras is closed, a final word is required about the outcome of the revolution for Tanjore. It will be recalled that conflict had come to a head over the question of sending Stuart to Tanjore—an issue which undoubtedly involved private financial interests, though no solid evidence ever emerged from the spate of accusations of sinister motives. It might have been expected, therefore, that with the triumph of the Majority their private interests and those of their ally the Nawab would have been rewarded. In fact, though the Majority had declared that the revenues derived from the Tanjore harvest of 1775-1776 belonged to the Nawab, they did not venture to disturb the Raja in his possession of it. Similarly, though Stuart proceeded to Tanjore after the Revolution to support Benfield's claims, on enquiry he declared that they could not be insisted upon "with any degree of justice." Stratton and the Majority were displeased with Stuart's conduct, but the latter's "representations were so pointed that they desisted from the demand of the money."  

It is ironical that Stuart, whose appointment to Tanjore had been so vehemently opposed by Pigot, should have found Benfield's claims unsupportable. The Majority, however, sent Major Horne to Tanjore to make another application on Benfield's behalf; the Raja positively declined to acknowledge the claims; but an arrangement was arrived at by which he agreed to pay four lakhs of rupees to be kept as a deposit with the Company till the orders of the Directors were known. This entire sum, however, was never realised and though the deferred payments continued to strain the Tanjore revenues, the major claimants of 1776 did not realise an amount which in any way reached their original expectations.

In February 1778 the extraordinary episode of Pigot's governorship and overthrow ended with the arrival of Sir Thomas Rumbold as the new Governor of Madras. By 15 March he felt able to report all quiet in his new charge: the "Divisions which have so long distracted" the Madras settlement and which "reached to all Ranks of people" had disappeared, he wrote, and the Presidency was now restored to unanimity and quiet. The Nawab and his family were now completely exonerated from any involvement in the Revolution; indeed the Governor reported that they "no longer remain under the suspicion of a conduct, which would render them unworthy of the alliance and friendship" of the Company. The faithful ally now seemed all the more noble and worthy, since his ambition to possess Tanjore could no longer challenge their own ambitions. The Raja of Tanjore was likewise praised for his attitude, for to prove his abundant gratitude to his benefactors he had offered the Company further land round Devikkottai. However, the proffered gift had seemed to the Council less suitable, from

"a political as well as commercial point of view" than Nagore and the districts round about it, further north, inland from Negapatanam. The Devikkottai lands would merely yield revenue, those at Nagore would furnish both revenue and "a Residency of our servants and supply an Investment which its situation commands", while the manufacturers of Worriapalayam and the adjacent districts could be brought to Nagore ¹. They had therefore drawn the Raja's attention to these points, and as might have been expected, the Raja had shown himself only too eager to please the Madras Government by altering his offer to suit their wishes ². The Company seemed to have emerged from the most awkward situation created by Tulaji's restoration with positive advantage, in commercial as well as purely political terms. Rumbold confidently reported to the Directors that from Cape Comorin to the Krishna there was "no force of any consequence but your own and that that great tract of country is entirely dependent on you for protection" ³.

For a few months in the spring and summer of 1778 this newly peaceful situation continued. In Madras, with the Council once more restored to unanimity, Rumbold was able to busy himself with repairing his private fortune ⁴. At Arcot all was quiet.

2. Nagore and 277 villages around it were formally made over to the Company by Tulaji on 17 June 1778.-Treaties and Sanads-Aitchison. Vol.X. p.87.
For the corrupt activities of Rumbold, which were clearly established in 1783, see the Report of the Secret Committee, Parliamentary Branch Collection, Vol.II. pp.474-478.
And in Tanjore Tulaji, showing himself sensible to the fall in his fortunes and loss of independence, and leaving all affairs of state to his minister, buried himself "in sloth and attentive only to his pleasures" 1. Then in August 1778 war with France again broke out and British forces marched to the capture of Pondicherry and other French posts, all of which quickly fell.

The conflict with the French was quickly brought to a successful conclusion, and little disturbance was caused in the Carnatic. But it was the occasion for re-opening the question, earlier so damaging to the interests of Tanjore, of the financial and military support due to the Company from its allies in time of war. On 17 October, reporting victory to the Directors, the Madras Council declared that the conduct of the Nawab during the operations against the French was "deserving of applause", but complained that the Raja had quite failed in his duty to provide assistance. Indeed, though his resources ought to have been at least as great as those of the Nawab, the Raja had not even discharged the payments due under his treaty with the Company 2.

These accusations against the Raja were both false and unjust. The charge that the Raja was in default was later

proved to be untrue: in 1780 it was shown that the Raja had faithfully discharged his subsidy down to 1779. Nor were complaints about his war services more reasonable. In 1778, as in 1763 and after Haidar's attack in 1767, demands for troops, supplies and money were made without any basis in the agreed conditions of the Company's treaty with Tanjore, for despite the long history of war in the Carnatic, no attempt had been made at the Restoration to define the help which the Raja might be required to give. The criticism of the Raja's role was the more unjust in that it paid no attention to the sufferings of Tanjore in the preceding years. Even when the country had been rescued from the total occupation of the Nawab, it was only that it might be placed under the partial occupation of the British: the tribute to the Nawab continued undiminished while new charges for the British garrison at Tanjore were fastened on the state. Having reduced the Raja to a renter, much diminished in independence and dignity, the Council had little cause to complain of his lack of zeal. Moreover, by the treaty of restoration his army had been limited to the six hundred men required for his personal service.

To the complaints of Madras, Tulaji responded in a letter of 10 October, by agreeing that he should have played a more active role in the operations against the French, but pleading
that his impoverished condition had made action impossible. He was left with nothing, and was indeed "ashamed" that he had been unable to afford the assistance he had wished, but he had neither troops of his own, nor the means of raising loans¹. He appealed, therefore, to the Court of Directors to advise the Madras Government not to demand more than had been stipulated in the treaty ². These arguments were brushed aside by the Madras authorities, who in a series of letters justified their demands on Tanjore to the Directors. They accepted that there had been a definite fall in the Tanjore revenues since the Restoration, but preferred to attribute this to the mismanagement of the minister. They agreed that it was only with difficulty that the Raja was able to discharge his payments - but maintained that it was unreasonable to employ British arms in the protection of a country which yielded little more than was sufficient "to reimburse the ordinary expenses of that protection" ³. Then, abandoning any higher grounds, Rumbold argued that the Company had incurred heavy expenses, it must replenish the treasury, and that it was more practicable to look to the Raja than to the Nawab. Mohammed Ali had given splendid assistance during the war, but he was already indebted to the Company for enormous amounts and his share of the Carnatic revenues was "swallowed

up by such an immense load of unaccountable private Debts ..." Rumbold declared.

It was his duty as the representative of the Company to look for resources "where they are to be had"; and at so critical a period, he would not be misled "by arguments or deluded by professions, but to be alone guided by actions." Because of the protection Tanjore received from the Company, the Raja's "first and grand object" ought to be to allot a sufficient portion of his revenue for the maintenance of the British troops at Tanjore, and to provide "a Fund for every exigency." The onus for the unfulfilled engagements had been squarely placed upon the minister, and the Governor observed that the proper solution would be the removal of the minister. But, as the Raja seemed attached to him, and as a demand for the minister's dismissal would be an act of interference in the Raja's domestic administration decidedly prohibited by the Directors, the Select Committee decided that they should seek from the Raja security for the performance of his engagements. If they failed to obtain any security, they would then adopt measures to appropriate the Tanjore revenues.

2. The situation certainly was critical — by June 1779 the Madras treasury contained only £291.—Minutes of Evidence. (quoted in) English Relations with Haidar Ali—Sheik Ali. p. 225.
There is little doubt that had not Lord North intervened at home to prevent it, the Madras Government would have proceeded to secure payment from the Raja by themselves interfering in the Tanjore revenue collections. The Raja's appeal to Madras to take account of the impoverishment of his state went unheeded, and his appeal to the Directors was equally ineffective, for in 1780 they endorsed the plans of Madras to compel the Raja to make a contribution to the war expenses. What saved the Raja was his taking a leaf out of the Nawab's book by entrusting his interests to the care of agents in England. From 1777 both William Burke and Captain William Waldegrave were busy in London on the Raja's behalf, exerting themselves to bring about a change favourable to Tanjore, and in 1780 they presented a Memorial from the Raja to Lord North 1.

Their task was not easy, for the hostility towards the Raja's claims shown by the Company was reinforced by Macpherson, who had taken the place of Maclean as spokesman for the Nawab Mohammed Ali. Macpherson's main object was to make the support for Hastings "inseperable from the cause of the Nabob". He had in fact established excellent relations with Laurence Sullivan, the Deputy Chairman of the Court and a very good friend of Hastings 3, and was confident that he would obtain for Mohammed

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1. "Memorial on behalf of the King of Tanjore Presented to Lord North".
2. Maclean made a fast journey to Madras in 1777, and on his return was drowned in the Bay of Biscay in February 1778. Reward is Secondary-Maclean. p.436.
Ali "most of the Revenues and the Sovereignty and the Absolute Reversion of all England will part with ..." 1. Sullivan himself was favourable to the Nawab 2, and introduced measures in the Court in April 1780 by which the Raja was to be compelled to make an assignment of territory towards the deficit in his payments, and a Resident with extensive powers was to be appointed at Tanjore 3. The Raja's agents protested against these measures 4 and achieved some temporary success for the Directors, on 13 May, rejected the measures on the ground that they were unacceptable in their present form 5. But, Sullivan introduced the same measures again in September, in a modified form: if the Raja agreed to make his payments two months in advance, then the demand for an assignment of territory was to be waived; if the Raja refused, he was to be compelled to assign territory, and the Madras authorities were not "to meddle further than to receive the Revenues" collected by the Tanjore officials 6. These proposals were clearly improper and an infringement of the treaty with Tulaji, for though payments had been stipulated there was not a word about the provision of security for their

2. By April 1780, Governmental influence in the Court was very slight so that Sullivan enjoyed virtual control of the Directorate. As a good friend of Hastings, there is little doubt that he shared Hastings' views regarding the Carnatic.-The Founding of the Second British Empire-Harlow. Vol. II. p. 105.
5. Ibid. p. 83 and p. 88.
6. The only source for these proposals is Sullivan's letter to Henry Fletcher, dated 9 October 1780. (quoted in) The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, Vol. IV. p. 304 (f. n. 2).
discharge. Nevertheless, the Directors approved of the proposals on 27 September. The Raja seemed doomed.

However, while the Madras Council and Macpherson were winning their way in the Court of Directors, William Burke had been busy with the Ministry. Macpherson had earlier tried his hand with Lord North in February 1779, and had reported to Hastings that he had received the same response from North as he had from the Duke of Grafton in 1769: "His Lordship professes infinite Regard for me and would do anything for me if I left him in peace." William Burke did better than that. In August, while Sullivan was preparing new proposals in respect of Tanjore, Burke had been handed a letter from Lord North to the Raja, in reply to the latter's memorial. The letter declared that His Majesty "trusts that the East India Company will give all due attention to the safety of Tanjore, and that you [the Raja] would cultivate their friendship. Nothing can give His Majesty more pleasure, than to hear that a perfect harmony subsists" between the Raja and the Company.

Before Sullivan's proposals could be put to the vote and passed by the Directors on 27 September,

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2. Edmund Burke maintained that this was a "thin Court"; but though it was not a full Court, it had 16 Directors present, while the Court which rejected Sullivan's proposals in April had been only 15 strong. The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, Vol. IV, p. 304.

3. "By mere force I have obtained a Paragraph from the Company to their Government at Madras ordering the utmost friendship upon their Part in all that regards the Nabob and every support that can be given in his affairs."-Macpherson-Hastings, 10 Feb. 1779-Addl. Mss. 29143. p. 53.


William Burke had left England for Tanjore with this letter in his pocket, "in full confidence, that if His Employer did not get satisfaction for all He had been already robbed of, that a step would be effectually put to future robberies". When the Directors then proceeded to pass Sullivan's proposals, Edmund Burke could point out to Jenkinson, Secretary at War, that if the Directors were not prevented from sending their orders "a Shocking Scene will be seen, the most dishonourable to our Nation: A Gentleman arriving with a letter from the first minister of England to the King of Tanjour acknowledging the Letter by which He puts himself under His Majesty's Protection; and another, very probably on the same day, with an arbitrary Order to seize upon his revenue". He made the same point to the Earl of Hillsborough and Viscount Stormont, the two Secretaries of State, stressing how unwarranted the Directors' plan was, showing as it did "a very extraordinary and dangerous design, leading to a general waste and Robbery" of Tanjore. Stormont wrote to the Court of Directors on the very day, 3 October, that Burke approached him, pressing that the measure should be postponed, at least until the arrival in London of Lord North, who had "repeatedly objected to the above measures". By 15 October,

2. Ibid. pp. 304-305.
Edmund Burke could write, "I was obliged to bestir myself, and it pleased God that this wicked business is stopped for the present." Under pressure from the Ministry, the Court of Directors reviewed their policy towards Tanjore. One outcome was the discovery during a further check of the Tanjore accounts that the Raja was not in such arrears as Madras had claimed. The Madras Council had declared, most unjustly, that the Raja was in arrears in his payments for 1776, 1777 and 1778, the Court declared that the balance due from Tanjore could "not be ascertained to a later period than 1778". Indeed, by 1779 the arrears had been reduced to a very inconsiderable amount, and the Madras authorities had "no just cause of complaint against him concerning money matters ...". In mid-October, therefore, the Court wrote to Madras expressing their dissatisfaction at the contradictory declarations received from there and the absence of any proper statement of accounts. They ordered the Council to keep correct accounts of their transactions with Tanjore — and they ordered that the proposals for a forced levy of contributions should be dropped as "unnecessary and ... unjustifiable". On 19 October, Edmund Burke was able to report to Hillsborough and Stormont that the orders for Madras

were now, he was told, "very different from what he apprehended."

The Raja had been saved from the proposed exactions of the Madras Council, and the Directors sought to prevent mischief in future by establishing closer contact with the Raja through a civil servant who should reside at Tanjore. This would provide for the better management of their affairs with the Raja, as the presence of a Resident would prevent any improper interference by the military officers and regulate the funds granted by the Raja for the services of the Company. The Resident was to maintain a strict account of all the Raja's payments, and was to take care not to carry any improper charge into the Raja's accounts; Stephen Sullivan, son of the Deputy Chairman of the Directors, was appointed the first British Resident at Tanjore. It must be regretted that the expediency of appointing a Resident at Tanjore had not been seen earlier, from the beginning of the British relations with the

3. Ibid. p. 379.

Laurence Sullivan, while proposing measures to compel the Raja to make an assignment of territory, had suggested the appointment of his son as the Resident at Tanjore - a position which he described as honourable "and I am assured very profitable". Edmund Burke considered this appointment as Laurence's project of "delivering over to his Son ... the whole Revenues" of Tanjore (The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, Vol. IV. p. 304). Stephen had been in India since 1778 with the intention of making a quick fortune to save his father, who had lost his fortune in the speculations on the East India Stock in 1769. - The Impeachment of Warren Hastings - Marshall. p. 11 (f.n. 1).
state, or from 1762. It would have permitted a better understanding of the Raja's position, his unswerving dependence upon their protection against the Nawab's ambition, and an appreciation of his close attachment to the Company; such an understanding might have prevented the Madras authorities from embarking upon the hostile expeditions against their ally. The irresponsibility and injustice that the Directors now found in the proceedings of the Madras authorities had not been the only instance in the history of their relations with Tanjore. Earlier examples, more serious and of greater consequence, had been ignored without any attempt to safeguard the interests of Tanjore. This appointment, coming so late, naturally had limited significance and restricted benefits. The Company's major concern was the payments from Tanjore, and the purpose of the Residency was only to supervise and collect those payments. There was little political significance, for the Raja's authority had already been restrained.

Had the brief and successful campaign against the French in the Carnatic ushered in a period of peace, Tanjore under the Ministry's protection might have recovered. Unhappily to the Maratha war in which Bengal and Bombay had been involved since 1776 was now added conflict with Haidar Ali brought on by the folly of the Madras Government. The Maratha war had already strained the Company's finances, the Mysore War brought on
by the capture of Mahe in 1779 in defiance of Haidar's warning, bankr upted Madras. The treasury there was already depleted when war began, and the loss of two thirds of the Carnatic to Haidar's cavalry while merchants fled in panic to an ill-prepared Madras shattered the Company's finances. Throughout 1781 and 1782, with Arcot in Mysorean hands, Haidar Ali plundered the Carnatic and Tanjore, while Sir Eyre Coote sent from Bengal failed "to make the least progress towards driving Hyder out of the nawab's possessions, while the English resources and finances steadily decayed" 1.

In this war Tanjore was doubly a victim for it was devastated by Haidar's armies and then drained by its ally the Company of its remaining resources. Haidar Ali entered the Tanjore country in July 1781 and overran the entire land, while the capture of the capital itself was prevented only by the distress that Haidar's army suffered on the way. For a period of almost six months, Haidar remained the master of the country; the atrocities and injuries inflicted upon Tanjore by his army were enormous and staggering 2, the main Anicut was destroyed and as a result the entire country was deprived of the main source of water from the Kauvery. Haidar Ali then drew off to engage the British forces, but after defeating Colonel Braithwaite on 18 February, his son Tipu returned to plunder Tanjore a second time 3. The result was a drastic fall in the

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yield of crops—that of 1781 being only a seventh of the 1780 output. Owing to the destruction of all the embankments and channels, large areas went out of cultivation, and the harvest of 1782 was worse even than that of 1781. The scarcity of food and shortage of employment drove many people out of the country, and the Reverend Swartz records that "As famine was so great, and of so long continuance, those have been affected by it who seemed beyond its reach. A vigorous and strong man is scarcely to be met with; ... when it is considered that Hyder Ali has carried off so many thousands of people, and that many thousands have died of want, it is not at all surprising to find not only empty houses, but desolated villages." 

1. 1780 - 10,016,101 kalam s (kalam, equal in weight to about 1/4 of an Indian maund).
2. 1781 - 1,578,220
3. 1782 - 1,370,171
4. "A most luxuriant Crop, with which the ground was at that time covered, was instantly swept off and every water dyke and embankment totally destroyed ..." - A View of the English Interests in India - Fullerton, p. 96.
6. In the history of the Christian missionaries in India, Frederick Swartz, the German, occupies an important place. After 11 years in the Tranquebar mission, he founded a mission at Trichinopoly in 1766. In 1769, Swartz visited Tanjore, and was ever after a very close friend of Raja Tulaji and later of his adopted son, Saraboji. In 1778 Swartz made Tanjore his permanent residence. He was sent in 1779 by the Madras Government on a confidential mission to Haidar. From 1787 till his death in Tanjore on 13 February 1798, Swartz was concerned with the question of the succession to the Tanjore throne for his pupil, Saraboji.

It had been clear from the outset that the Madras Government, which had already approached the Raja in 1778 for contributions, lacked the resources to maintain unaided the war against Haidar, and the Bengal Government had contributed largely, sending in four years no less than 265 lakhs of rupees to Madras. But Bengal too was hard pressed and Hastings, faced with the costs of the Bengal Presidency's war effort and the need to support Bombay against the Marathas, could not long sustain the additional burden of Madras. By 1781, Hastings had been driven to such expedients as exacting easy money from Chait Singh and from the Begams of Oudh, acts which later formed the ground for the most serious and wellfounded charges in his impeachment. He was to justify his exaction of money from Chait Singh by arguing that "it is a right inherent in every government to impose such assessments as it judges expedient for the common service and protection of all its subjects; and we are not precluded from it by any agreement subsisting between the Raja and his government." The same line of argument, remeniscent of that put forward by Mohammed Ali as

2. Dodwell maintains that Hastings could have raised a loan to meet the demands of the situation, but he was "unwilling to contract another bonded debt for he had received much credit with the directors for having paid off that which he found existing when he came to India". Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol.IV. p.295.
ground for demands on Tanjore in 1769, Hastings now urged Macartney to apply in Madras. Among the first of Hastings' letters to the new Governor of Madras was one suggesting the exaction of war subsidies from the Raja of Tanjore. He declared that the Raja should be compelled "without hesitation or reserve" to pay a contribution to the Company. He was certain that it was well within the Raja's ability and resources to have fulfilled his engagements, and went on to cast a doubt as to whether the Raja was not in fact deliberately evading his payments with a view to accumulating a secret fund: if indeed he were allowed such an opportunity it would prove detrimental to the Company's interests, for it would afford him the means to oppose them, if he should forget the favours he had received from them. The Raja's plea of inability to meet his payments appeared to the Governor-General as nothing but a flimsy excuse, and he lamented the very lenient treatment that Tanjore had received from Madras. The proper solution, Hastings declared, would be to assume the entire revenues of Tanjore. He was so convinced of the necessity of this procedure that he declared his sentiments as "public, not private", and invited the Governor to avail himself of them "in any manner" he pleased. With this attitude, hostile to the claims of Tanjore

as Hastings had always been, Macartney was in agreement, and he forwarded an extract from the Governor-General's letter in support of his own views to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Company. Macartney, for his part, stressed to the Court in March 1782 that the Raja had "supplied nothing, or next to nothing" during the war with Haidar and that he

1. Hastings' partiality towards Mohammed Ali is further evident from the liberal treatment that he gave the latter in 1781. Amidst the enormous business of his relations with Chait Singh, the Begams and his sentiments regarding Tanjore to obtain money for the Company, he allowed Mohammed Ali to successfully persuade himself and his Council to overstep "the limits of their statutory powers" by appointing at Madras a special agent, Richard Joseph Sullivan, "chosen with singular lack of tact from among the Madras covenanted servants, to watch over the performance" of the Company's treaty with the Nawab (Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, p. 291). Macartney, on his arrival at Madras, disapproved of the role of the agent as well as of the terms of the treaty, and later the Directors revoked the appointment of Sullivan and annulled the treaty (Dirs.-Bengal, 12 July 1782, Parliamentary Branch Collections, Vol. 3, pp. 40-41).

2. As Dodwell has shown, this extract from Hastings' letter reached London just after Sullivan and Hastings' friends had lost control of the Directorate. Sullivan's alliance with the administration, and consequently the administration's support to Hastings, had called down upon him the enmity of the Opposition. With the fall of North in March, and with Sullivan's tenure of office expiring in April, the Opposition found it easy to dominate the Directorate; the new Chairman, Robert Gregory, and Deputy Chairman, Henry Fletcher, attacked Hastings severely for his attitude. They considered his views as "diametrically opposite to those which we entertain respecting the Rights of the Rajah of Tanjore", and as "repugnant to every Idea of Justice and Moderation ". The Directors, at this time, were equally opposed to the policy of Hastings towards Chait Singh, and they had earlier passed a resolution calling for his resignation (Court of Dirs.-Gov.-Gen., & Coun, 28 Aug. 1782 - Parliamentary Branch Collections Vol. 8, p. 42. Also Court Book, 91, p. 127.) Hastings later accused Macartney for having betrayed him to his enemies. Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, p. 290.
should be compelled to contribute to the war expenses.

The Court of Directors scarcely required the promptings of Hastings or Macartney, for the latter's letter to them crossed with one of their own to the Raja in which, while assuring the Raja that it would ever be their study to contribute to the lasting welfare of him, his family and his people, they conveniently assumed that he had given every assistance in his power to Madras during the war with Haider. Similarly, they expressed their hope that on all occasions of danger or invasion of the Carnatic, the Raja would exert himself "in such a manner as the necessity of the case may require." In all this there was no reference to the devastation that Tanjore was known to have suffered at Haider's and Tipu's hands, still less to any possibility of a suspension of the payment of the Tanjore subsidy so as to aid the recovery of the people. Rather in January 1783, when it was known that a year's tribute was due from the Raja, the Court instructed the Madras Council not only to obtain the full amount, but also to secure "an equitable portion" of the expenses of the Mysore War. This time, as

1. It should be noted that if Tanjore was to be pressed for a financial contribution, so was Arcot. In December 1781, Macartney secured from the Nawab an assignment of all the revenues of the Carnatic, the collection of which he so efficiently organised as to secure for the Company over one hundred lakhs of rupees in three years, 1782-1784. See Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, pp. 291-292.


opposed to 1780, there was no intervention by Edmund Burke to prevent the Directors from imposing such a heavy demand upon impoverished Tanjore. It was not that the great statesman had become less interested in Tanjore, but that he had come to take a wider interest in all Indian affairs. The alarming reports that had reached England of the Company's war with the Marathas, of the humiliation that they had suffered at the hands of Haidar, of the French fleet that was operating off the Coromandel Coast, and of the low position of the Company's finances, had caused great concern and the affairs of the Company had come to be discussed by Parliament in detail even during the crisis of the American War. In the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into the affairs of Bengal Edmund Burke played an active part, and his attention was thus increasingly focussed on Bengal and on Hastings and his policy. Moreover, William Burke had by now relinquished his post as the Raja's agent in favour of the more lucrative position of Deputy Paymaster of the Forces in the East, removing the link with Edmund and thus depriving the Raja of two champions.

2. Edmund Burke and his Kinsmen—Wecter. p.118.

This appointment was obtained for William by Edmund Burke. Walpole wrote that this office was "created on purpose for him" (The History of Parliament—Namier, Vol.II. p.157); and Cornwallis later declared that "sending William Burke to India was a most unnecessary job" (Cornwallis Correspondence, Vol.I. p.465).
in London. Under pressure from events in India, unrestrained by critics in London, the Directors were unwilling to consider the proper interests of Tanjore when their own were so threatened.

In India the Raja continued, quite rightly, to put forward the devastations that his country had suffered at the hands of Haidar and Tipu as an excuse against the balance of his payments to the Company. The Governor accepted that the loss to Tanjore was indeed heavy, but explained that the Raja, in the recollection of his own losses had entirely forgotten the still heavier losses that had been sustained by the Company. Macartney preferred to consider the war as a peninsular war, and argued that if from unavoidable necessity Tanjore had been exposed to ravage and enemy occupation, it could not be concluded that she had not been protected. Every action fought in the Carnatic and in Malabar, in his opinion, had been a contribution to the protection of Tanjore. In January 1785, Macartney again took up the difficult task of convincing the Raja of the rightness of the Company's claims. The Governor admitted that the Raja was paying for the Company's protection of his country, and that it might seem that if the Company failed to protect it from damage, then the Raja might claim a deduction in his payments, or even compensation for the loss suffered. But this line of argument, the Governor maintained, "cannot by any means

apply to the present case". In a general war, every part of the Carnatic could not possibly be protected, and the Raja should take relief in the ultimate protection that the Company gave him. The other point put forward by the Raja that the Mysoreans were not his enemies and that the damage to his country only occurred because of his alliance with the British who had declared war against Haider, was considered inconsistent with the nature of his connections with the Company. For the Governor explained that having taken him under their protection, the British considered any hostile attack upon him as an attack upon themselves; in the same manner, when they were attacked, they had a right to expect a return for the protection that he received from them. It is unnecessary, however, to consider further the arguments deployed by Macartney, for as he showed in his letter of 27 July 1785 to the Committee of Secrecy, not justice but need was to decide the issue. The fact that Tanjore had suffered a severe loss was not so important, the Governor maintained, as that for a period of twelve months she had been "totally unmolested by the Enemy". He suggested to the Company that Tanjore ought to contribute her "proper proportion to the general Charge", and that the demand could not be considered as harsh, for the calling for "so considerable a Payment from the exhausted" Tanjore was for the "support of the exhausted Company".

Before these proposals had reached London, however, the Company administration had itself undergone a drastic change due to the successful bid by the British Government to control the affairs of the Company. The news of Haidar's invasion of the Carnatic, the impolitic and dangerous war with the Marathas, and the problems of the British administration in Bengal, had caused an upsurge of concern in England for national interests. The recent events in India had clearly shown how a false step by any one of the Presidencies could expose British interests in India to the danger of extinction; and fear of the probable loss of the thirteen colonies in America had only increased anxiety for India and its preservation under British control. The result was that two Committees were set up by the House of Commons in 1781, one the Select Committee under Edmund Burke appointed on 12 February to examine the judicial administration of Bengal and later with enlarged scope to "consider how the British Possessions in East Indies may be held and governed with the greatest security and advantage to this Country and by what means the happiness of the native inhabitants may be best promoted"; and the other a Secret Committee under Henry Dundas appointed on 2 May to inquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic and "of the present condition of the British Possessions in those parts". In this manner an effective

opening had been made for a review of the Company affairs. With suspicion of the honesty of the Company administration in India already widespread and Dundas, Charles Jenkinson and John Robinson increasingly convinced of its inefficiency, the two Committees were soon ready to make it clear that sweeping reforms were necessary 1.

There is little doubt that Tanjore was in Burke's mind when in February 1781 he proposed to Robinson, who had been exerting himself since 1778 to introduce reforms in the structure of the Company, that a clause should be introduced in the proposed document to protect the princes of India to the effect that "the Governors abroad should in all their transactions with the Country Powers be governed and bound by Instructions from His Majesty" 2. Jenkinson was also in favour of this, while Dundas, in his speech in the House on 9 April, denounced the offensive military operations of the Company with a view to conquest 3. He followed this on 15 April with a resolution condemning "all schemes of Conquest and Enlargement of Dominions" 4. Charles James Fox, in his turn, agreed with these principles, for in his India Bills in 1783 he also advocated that the Presidency Governments should be prevented from conducting external policies affecting British relations with Indian princes in independence of orders from home. Burke's

1. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics—Sutherland, p. 369.
influence was here quite clear, for the bill sought quite specifically to safeguard the interests of Indians and Indian princes. Thus the Company's Governments were to be prohibited from making any acquisition of territory, from entering into any offensive alliance for the purpose of extending their territories, from hiring out their troops to any local power, or from entering into any agreement for the maintenance of their troops in the territories of any Indian prince without the specific permission of the Commissioners in London. These conditions, if they had been accepted, would certainly have been of immense benefit to Tanjore, though it is not clear whether Burke and Fox really planned to rescind the arrangements Madras had contracted with the Raja since his restoration, which were squarely opposed to these conditions. However, as Burke claimed, this measure would have been the "Magna Charta of Hindustan".

If Burke had favoured principles and the check of abuses in the British administration in India, Dundas for very practical reasons showed himself much concerned over the deplorable economic condition of Tanjore and the diminished state of its revenues. On 17 April 1783, he proposed a set of resolutions

3. Dundas was convinced of the deplorable state of the Tanjore revenue largely by the evidence given to the Secret Committee by William Petre, a Company officer who had been in Tanjore for a number of years and who had recently returned to England. According to Petre the Tanjore yield had dropped from 30,000,00 kalahs per year in the days of Tukkoji to 15,000,00 in the present rule of Tulaji. Dundas continued to believe, as it is evident from his later observations regarding Tanjore and the policy he directed from 1784 to 1800, that the Tanjore revenues could be improved with proper
to safeguard the interests of Tanjore. It was clear, he maintained, that "besides what may be imputed to bad Administration, One cause of that Decline has been an Opinion prevailing in the Country, that the Rajah's Government would not be of long continuance, and that another Revolution was approaching" 1. Dundas had a clear knowledge of Tanjore affairs, and to save Tanjore from further decline he proposed that a new regulation should be adopted "in regard to the Revenues and Debts, and to the military Establishment, kept up at the Expence of the King of Tanjore". He favoured the policy adopted by Pigot by recommending that the "indeterminate Rights and Pretensions of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore, with respect to each other, should be ascertained and settled upon a Footing of Justice and Perpetuity, according to the arrangement carried into Execution during the Government of Lord Pigot, that an insuperable Barrier may for the future be fixed between the Hopes and Fears of these two Powers, under the protection of the Company ..." 2. Burke's rhetorical outbursts on the abuses of the Company rule were to receive special notice, and Dundas in his turn recommended that the debts of the Raja (and also of Mohammed Ali) should be ascertained with a view to liquidation and discharge; and the chief object should be "directed to the Discovery and Punishment of Peculation by any of the Company administration and that the state was indeed capable of discharging its dues to Madras and Arcot without much difficulty." - Parliamentary Branch Collections. Vol.12.p.340-342.

1. Parliamentary Branch Collections. Vol.11. p.470
Servants, and above all, to the more entire prevention of it in future.¹

One immediate result of these developments was that the Court of Directors hastened to denounce Hastings' general conduct and decided to "pursue all legal and effectual means for the removal and recall" of the Governor-General.² The Court followed this in August by condemning Hastings' view regarding Tanjore — transmitted to them by Lord Macartney — as "diametrically opposite to those which we entertain respecting the Rights of the Rajah of Tanjore," and as "repugnant to every idea of Justice and Moderation and the agreements subsisting between us and the Rajah ..."³ Tuleji himself was informed of the Company's "unalterable Determination to support and protect him in the Management of his own Territories, according to the Agreement subsisting between the Nabob of Arcot, the Rajah, and the Company, and to guarantee to him and his family the quiet Possession of his Country"; and Madras was instructed to take particular notice of these sentiments of the Court.³

Charles James Fox, in his India Bills of 1783, had also suggested that the debt scandal of Tanjore (and Arcot) should be carefully examined and that a report should be made to the Commissioners. The Raja of Tanjore, along with the other princes of India, should be forbidden to mortgage or pledge his lands.

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or his revenues to any British subject. This was similar to the ruling earlier proposed by Dundas. However, when Fox had fallen and William Pitt with the able assistance of Dundas had drafted his India Bill, the entire question of enquiry into the various claimants on the revenues of Tanjore and Arcot was quietly withdrawn. With a general election facing him in the spring of 1784, Pitt found himself compelled to seek the aid of the 'Arcot creditors' in Parliament; and he was effectually supported in his election campaign by the notorious Paul Benfield, and his attorney Richard Atkinson, himself of "unsavoury reputation as a fraudulent contractor". The price paid for their support was complete recognition of all the claims of the creditors, with the promise of repayment of their loans with interest from the revenues of Tanjore and Arcot. Dundas himself had earlier described these claims as "the debts of corruption", and Burke was just in his accusations that

2. Benfield entered Parliament in 1780, and in October 1781 had managed to return to India where he soon found himself on the worst terms with Lord Macartney. During the Governor-Generalship of Macpherson, he was undisturbed; but Cornwallis ended his Indian career, for he was suspended and ordered home. On his return to England, he re-entered Parliament and was a member till 1802. He died a bankrupt at Paris in April 1810.—The History of Parliament—Namier & Brooke, Vol.II. pp. 81-82.
Pitt and Dundas had themselves made a corrupt bargain in return for services rendered to them. It was this agreement which was later to end in India with the Raja of Tanjore being compelled in 1787 to agree to pay a sum of 60,000 Rs. annually towards the liquidation of debts to individuals.

With the passing of Pitt's India Act in August 1784, governmental control of the Company was established on a permanent basis, and with the appointment of "six Commissioners for the Affairs of India", that control made possible a full review of Company policies in the Carnatic, where the war with Haidar had revealed grave weakness. On the question of the Arcot debts, as has been seen, party politics dictated a policy unfavourable to Tanjore's interests. On the wider political issues, too, the influence of Dundas and the other Commissioners proved no less harmful, for the earlier demand for the renunciation of all schemes of conquest and enlargement of dominions did not preclude further infringements of Tanjorean sovereignty. Thus the new Board of Control proceeded to adopt

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2. The claims of the individuals on the Raja were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Alexander Brody</td>
<td>99,254 (star pagodas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Duncan Baine</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir George Ramsay</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Maclellen</td>
<td>72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Burrows</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Whyte</td>
<td>4,706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1787, it was agreed that the interest on the above claims should be at 12 p.c. per annum, and there was at that time interest already due for four to five years, the total amount was fixed at four lakhs and the Raja agreed to pay an annual sum of 60,000 Rs. towards the interest and the liquidation of the principal sums.
measures subjecting the Raja (and the Nawab) to conditions that would ensure a common front, under the Company's control, whenever the Carnatic might be threatened. The basic, essential means to such an end was the assumption of complete control of the Carnatic by Madras in times of war, and such an arrangement, the Board hoped, would have definite advantages to British possessions in the Carnatic and would "render them collaterally a substantial Barrier of Defence to the other British Possessions in India" ¹.

Accordingly, Madras was instructed to "settle and arrange, by a just and equitable treaty with Tanjore and Arcot, a plan for the future defence and protection of the Carnatic, both in time of peace and war on a solid and lasting foundations". Payment to troops, maintenance of garrisons, repairs and improvements to fortifications, and other services incidental to military establishments, occasioned expenses; to these Tanjore was to contribute. In order to meet these expenses, the Raja was to specify particular districts and revenues as security for the due payment of his contributions. The Raja's payments were to be made to the treasury of Madras "with whom the charge of the defence of the Coast, and of course the power of the sword, must be exclusively entrusted" ². In their

search for funds\textsuperscript{1}, the Directors would not stop at just obtaining security. The exclusive power of the sword and the care of the Coast which they had so unhesitatingly given to Madras, was to be further extended over the internal administration of Tanjore, which they had all along maintained was the exclusive concern of the Raja. In the event of a default in the payments, the Madras Government was now authorised "to enter upon and possess such districts and let the same to renters". During periods of war, and this was the most unreasonable infraction of the independence of Tanjore, the Raja should engage to refrain "from the application of any part of his Revenue ... but apply the whole, save only the ordinary Charges of the Civil Government, to the purposes of the war" \textsuperscript{2}. If the demand for contributions was unfair, the condition concerning periods of war was illegal. Not only the whole aggregate revenue of Tanjore would be under application to the Company during periods of war, but this pre-emption of the revenues was to continue as long after the war as should "be necessary to discharge the burthens contracted by it" \textsuperscript{3}. There was no definition either of the kind of wars, or the kind of enemies which would bring these clauses into force; rather it was

\textsuperscript{1} By March 1784 the Company's debts in India had risen to about £3 million, while the Company at home had to meet demands due between March 1786 to March 1790, calculated at about £6 million. Added to these were the normal servicing of the bonded debt and cash required for the supply of their trade. - The Founding of the Second British Empire-Harlow, Vol.II, p.186.


\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. P.430.
assumed that any war in which the Company was involved, the Raja was to consider as his own. At the same time, the Directors, having quite brazenly assured their servants in Madras that their proposals were in no way intended to deprive the Raja of the substantial authority that was necessary to the collection of revenue in Tanjore, proceeded to lay down that if "a diversion of any part of the Revenues to any other than the specified purposes shall take place, the Company shall be entitled to take upon themselves the collection of the Revenues" 1. The only concession to the Raja was a reduction in the amount demanded for the war expenses; on account of the ravages that Tanjore had suffered, he was to pay four lakhs instead of the original demand for six lakhs of rupees; and even this consideration was only to make it easier "to bring out our proposed arrangement with him" 2.

Though the Directors professed that their proposals were just and advantageous to the Company and Tanjore alike, it can hardly be denied that the proposed arrangement was not only one-sided, but thoroughly unreasonable. Of this the Directors seem to have been uncomfortably aware, for they felt the difficulty of "reconciling in this instance, the justice which we owe ... and the system of Conciliation which we wish to pursue towards all the native powers with whom we are connected,

2. Ibid. p.445.
with the means of realising resources from which we must in part hope to be freed from the embarrassments under which the Company labour ...". However, without giving any consideration to the difficulties of the people of Tanjore which the Raja had explained in great detail, they managed to still their consciences and declare that "the justice and policy and even the necessity of the arrangement" was satisfactorily established. They concluded: "... as the Rajah has been restored to the possession of his Kingdom, and holds it by our power and our justice, he will, without hesitation concur in the measures we have suggested ...".

However, when these plans were put to Tulaji by Davidson, the Resident at Tanjore, the Raja refused to agree to the terms proposed. Since he had been regular in his payments for 1785-1786, he maintained that the Company had no right to ask him to agree to new conditions. The Governor, Sir Archibald Campbell, himself agreed that the Raja had in fact been most regular in his payments, and he reported to the Directors that the Raja had exerted himself during the late alarming scarcity of money at Madras, and had continued to make his payments "with a punctuality that does him infinite honour". It is clear, however, that despite the Raja's objections, a new treaty

1. Board's Drafts of Secret Letters and Despatches to India
2. Davidson- Secret Committee, 10 Jan.1786- Enclosures to Secret Letters from Madras.
would have been imposed had it not been for developments concerning Tulaji’s health. In March 1786, the Resident had warned the authorities that the declining state of Tulaji’s health foretold “the certain prospect of an approaching succession”. Tulaji’s health had been deteriorating steadily and it was evident that he might not have many months to survive his disorders. With a change in the succession, it would certainly be easier to accomplish their proposals, and they chose therefore to postpone negotiations until difficulties within the royal family should enable them to act with more effective harshness against their ally.

There was no doubt that the Raja of Tanjore was in a desperate condition. Debilitated by an incurable disease, overwhelmed with affliction by the premature loss of his legitimate descendants, his son, daughter and grandson, and embarrassed by his powerless position, Tulaji had retired in hopeless despondency to the recesses of his palace from which he never afterwards emerged. The collection of the revenue from the impoverished country was barely adequate to supply his needs. The new minister, Baba, had introduced the oppressive pattack system of revenue collection, partly to replenish the

2. Several villages were united into a Pattackam, and a Pattackdar was placed over it. The appointment of a Pattackdar was with the minister, who distributed the office in return for an adequate consideration. The power of the Pattackdars could be carried to a high degree of oppression without much fear of detection from the state.
treasury and partly to fill his own pocket, which instead of relieving the distress of the people, augmented them to an intolerable degree. The general oppression of the people and neglect of cultivation now appeared to the Madras authorities as constituting a greater injury to British interests than a delay in the payment of the subsidy. If such conditions were allowed to continue, it would be disastrous to the Raja and his people, and the Governor felt that it was absolutely necessary for an immediate and effectual interference in Tanjore affairs. However, when Campbell pressed his view that it was essential that Baba should be removed from office and provided complaints against him, the Raja merely observed that Baba had only acted in obedience to his own commands, and that the miseries of the people of Tanjore should be imputed not to the minister but to those who exacted exorbitant payments from an exhausted and diminished country. Even a request from Macpherson, the Governor-General, to the Raja to dismiss his minister was not successful.

The Madras authorities now realised that the removal of the minister alone would not suffice; a total alteration in the administration of Tanjore was essential. In mid-October 1786 it was for this purpose proposed, therefore, that a committee of Company servants be appointed to act as a "Board

of Inspection" in Tanjore 1. Once again, however, the Raja made it clear that he was determined to prevent any interference by Madras in his internal administration. He was entirely averse to the proposed Committee and maintained that it was not only unnecessary, but would also remove the possibility of his people placing any confidence in their sovereign. It would amount, he argued, to a reflection upon him, and he pressed the point that the creation of such a board would be a breach of the treaty existing between him and the Company. Moreover, since he had faithfully discharged his dues to the Company, the Madras authorities had neither justification nor excuse for interfering in his internal administration 1. Despite the Raja's objections, it is probable that the Board of Inspection would have carried out its mission, for the Raja had neither the power nor resources to prevent the Madras authorities from interfering in his internal affairs. It is difficult to believe that the conditions of the treaty prohibiting interference in the internal administration of Tanjore, which had not prevented Madras from contemplating interference, would have saved the Raja from actual interference. But an effective stop to these proceedings came in the form of Tulaji's death, which occurred on 31 January 1787 2.

Tulaji had no surviving male children and his only brother, Ramaswami, was illegitimate and therefore barred from the succession. It had long been clear therefore that on the death of Tulaji there would be difficulty in filling the Tanjore throne without dispute or conflict. This the Madras authorities had foreseen; as early as September 1786 the Governor had noted that the precarious state of Tulaji's health made it "highly expedient to adopt every precaution to prevent violent commotion" at Tanjore. Any dispute would seriously involve the welfare of the people and the interests of the Company. Without the knowledge of his Council, the Governor had therefore given secret orders to Colonel Stuart at Tanjore to take control of the palace, property and effects of Tulaji on his death, and to prevent any proclamation of a successor until the resolutions of Madras were known. These orders were now put into effect. On Tulaji's death, Stuart took charge of the entire palace, prevented any move in Tanjore to nominate a successor to Tulaji, and made it clear that matters would remain in status quo until advice was received from Madras. This move was subsequently approved of by the Council, and the Directors themselves were

1. Major General Stuart, who had actually effected the arrest of Lord Pigot in 1776, had in Madras a contemporary of the same name. Both officers had served in America, and had served under Sir Eyre Coote in the war with Haidar Ali. The Colonel, who was at this time commanding the garrison at Tanjore, was 10 years junior to the Major General and after serving in the 2nd and 3rd Mysore Wars, became the Commander-in-Chief, Madras, in 1801. - Vestiges of Old Madras-Love, Vol. III, p. 76
satisfied with the precaution taken by the Governor 1.

Tulaji himself, equally prescient of the disasters that would follow the absence of any nomination of a successor on his part, had taken the precaution shortly before his death of adopting Saraboji, a ten year old boy from a collateral branch, as his son and successor, and had appointed his brother Ramaswami, known also as Amar Singh, to act as Regent till Saraboji came of age. He had also taken the precaution to notify Madras, just five days before his death, that his choice was "proper in all respects", and that his wish was that Saraboji should succeed him 2. As a final measure, Tulaji had further entrusted the boy to the guardianship of the Reverend Swartz, on whose character and standing with the British authorities he greatly relied. There is little doubt that Tulaji's decision was entirely in accord with Indian practice and would have been implemented, had Tanjore been a sovereign state such as the Company had Indeed maintained that it was. In the event, however, the proclamation of Saraboji was prevented by Colonel Stuart, and the question of a successor left open to discussion.

This was the cue for a third party, the Nawab of Arcot, to enter the scene. He could claim that the protection given by his British ally to Tanjore was given on his behalf, and that now that Tulaji had died without a direct heir, he as overlord

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of the Carnatic was the person to whom Tanjore should go. The Company here was only his agent, and he therefore pressed on them his claim for the reversion of Tulaji's kingdom with vigour and perseverance, thus anticipating by many years Dalhousie's Doctrine of Lapse. As usual he was willing to promise to give all the revenues of Tanjore to the Company to defray the expenses of their military establishment in the kingdom, and he also offered to provide a reasonable allowance to Tulaji's family if Tanjore were incorporated with Arcot.

While these rival claims were being put forward, Colonel Stuart meanwhile holding Tanjore quiet, the Madras authorities had referred the succession issue to Lord Cornwallis, who had assumed office as Governor-General in October 1786. Cornwallis' pronouncements on the Tanjore succession were made in a minute of 26 February 1787. That minute entirely rejected any claim by Mohammed Ali, as overlord of tributary Tanjore. Cornwallis admitted the Nawab's right to receive tribute from Tanjore, but at the same time stressed that it had been clearly established that the Raja "holds his Kingdom by Inheritance and exercises within it every act of independent Sovereignty". The treaty of 1762 had confirmed the payment of tribute to Arcot, but nonetheless had left the sovereignty of the Raja "unimpaired and undisputed". The Nawab's present offer was tempting indeed, but it was doubtful whether any advantage could be derived from their acquiescing in his claims; and it was even

2. Ibid. pp.563-564.
more doubtful whether Tanjore would improve under his administration. On all these grounds the Nawab's claims were rejected.

The arguments of the Governor-General were certainly correct, but Cornwallis failed to apply them to the Company as he had applied them to the Nawab. If the Nawab had no rights as overlord, what rights and pretensions could the Company have in Tanjore affairs? If the Nawab had no right except that of receiving tribute, how could the Company explain or defend their action in supporting his late invasion of Tanjore? And if the Raja held his kingdom by inheritance and his sovereignty was unimpaired, why did the Company install a garrison at Tanjore at the Raja's expense, why had they contemplated interference in the internal administration before Tulaji's death, and how could they justify their seizure of the palace at his death and their intention to control the succession to Tanjore?

Cornwallis did indirectly acknowledge that his arguments to the Nawab had a bearing upon the British position too. For, having declared that the "question is of less importance to our interests than to our reputation", he went on to argue that though the doctrine of adoption seemed repugnant to British ideas of natural justice and humanity, if it conformed to the laws of the Hindus, then "no argument should weigh with us to alter it." Unhappily he refused himself to have the question put to the test, but arguing that the Bengal Government could

2. Ibid. p.651.
not with any propriety decide the question referred a decision on the matter to the Madras Government. This was both unnecessary and inequitable. Hindu civilisation and culture was not confined to the South alone, and there were in Calcutta many pandits who could have pronounced authoritatively upon the Hindu law of adoption. And certainly to leave the decision to an interested party such as the Madras Government was unlikely to yield either a fair hearing or a just decision.

So in fact it proved. If the Governor-General felt the doctrine of adoption was repugnant, the Madras Governor was ready to reject the doctrine in its entirety. "An unqualified admission of the Doctrine of Adoption", declared the Governor, was "attended with the most serious consequences to the peace of that country and to ... Company's interests in India, for the same reason, which could now give the sovereignty of Tanjore to an innocent boy ... might convey the Kingdom of Tanjore to the Mahratta Empire, in case some future Rajah should adopt the offspring of one of their principal chiefs as his son". In this manner, the Tanjore succession became a "question of political expediency", and thus the adoption itself was to be discussed 1. If the adoption proved irregular or unpopular with the people, Campbell argued, it would then be advisable to confirm the brother of Tulaji on the throne. On the other hand, if it was found regular, then it would be advisable to conform to part of Tulaji's desire by confirming the brother

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as the Regent, but to keep the adoption in a state of suspension by withholding a positive sanction "further than what it may virtually acquire by our protection and support of the boy". Such a move, the Governor explained, would "remove all doubts concerning the justice" of the settlement; the advantages were enormous, for the brother would possess the real power which would remove the injury he had suffered by a nominal exclusion, and at the same time, the adoption could be kept open and would operate as a "perpetual check upon the Regent, and prove the surest pledge in our hands for his future good behaviour and conduct". There is little doubt that had these ingenious arguments for exploiting the situation at Tanjore been accepted, the Governor would have established a dual internal government in Tanjore, playing the adopted son against the Regent until no vestige was left of either of them. However, these plans had been worked out before the attitude of Cornwallis was known. When the Governor-General's minute arrived it was clear that the lead he had given had inadvertently nullified the arguments of Campbell, and that his declaration that the adoption, however repugnant, must be adhered to if good in Hindu law, had saved Tanjore from the total disaster which it must otherwise have suffered at the hands of the Governor. It was no longer possible to proceed without at least examining whether the adoption was regular and whether it was conformable to Hindu law and custom.

In April 1787, Sir Archibald proceeded to Tanjore to settle the question of the succession. There were actually two questions involved, the validity of Saraboji's adoption and the legitimacy of Amar Singh. Basically, one had no relation to the other and an examination of both was not in the strict sense required. If Amar Singh's legitimacy was upheld, the fact could not alter or diminish the right of Tulaji either to adopt an heir or to nominate his successor; on the other hand, if the adoption was found irregular, that would not in any way render Amar Singh's claims stronger were he illegitimate. However, it was found convenient to deal with both issues to arrive at a decision.

On his arrival at Tanjore, the Governor received the "most positive assurances" from the principal Europeans and most of the local merchants, who were intimately connected with the laws and religious principles of the Hindus that the "rights of Ameer Sing were certainly well established". Tulaji had always treated him like a brother, and such a kindly gesture was now construed into an argument to strengthen his claims. It was also found that Amar Singh had never been officially declared illegitimate, and this, the Governor argued, tended to erase the fact that he was indeed illegitimate. Independent of these considerations, the adoption itself, the Governor paradoxically asserted, was an act of injustice to Amar Singh, "whose legal right" to the throne "was unquestionable".  

In order to decide on the validity of the adoption itself, twelve pundits were assembled to give their opinion. Though the Governor declared that the "circumspection observed in procuring the opinions precluded all possibility of collusion on their parts", it was later found in 1797 that there had been collusion indeed, and that their verdict was influenced by every other consideration but the laws of religion. It can be easily seen that an assemblage of that character, chosen from within Tanjore, left little scope for an unbiased verdict.

Amar Singh's claim had a unique advantage: his rise to power either as the Raja if the adoption was found irregular, or as the Regent if the adoption was found regular, was assured; and in that situation, it was understandable that the chosen authorities would naturally favour a decision that would safeguard their welfare and interests.

As a basis for an elaborate exposition of their grounds for rejecting the adoption, the pundits questioned whether Tulaji ever possessed the right to adopt an heir. Having questioned that right - and today no one would doubt that Tulaji had a right to adopt both as a private individual and as a ruler - they also questioned whether Saraboji was an acceptable choice as an heir. They here argued that the boy was over ten years of age at the time of the adoption and that his natural parents were not present at the ceremony - both of which

circumstances invalidated the adoption. Finally the pundits took note of Amar Singh's recent protest against the adoption. In so doing they ignored the fact that there was no evidence either from Tulaji or from the Reverend Swartz, the guardian of Saraboji, that Amar Singh had refused to recognise the adoption at the time of the ceremony or in the short period before Tulaji's death. On the basis of these arguments, "the unanimous declaration of a number of religious men of respectable character pronounced the adoption ... irregular and contrary to the laws". Accepting this verdict, the Governor set aside Saraboji's claims and placed Amar Singh on the Tanjore throne in the name of the East India Company.

The time was now propitious for the imposition upon the Raja of those conditions which the Court of Directors had been proposing since 1784. Amar Singh was too grateful to the Company for his elevation to the gaddi to quibble about terms, and in April 1787 he accepted a new treaty put before him by the Madras Government. In theory this was another voluntary agreement between two independent powers; in practice it subordinated the rights and interests of the Tanjore state to the military needs of the Company in the Carnatic. Accordingly it was laid down that the Raja was initially to pay four lakhs

of rupees annually, as before, towards the cost of the British garrison in Tanjore. But this amount was to remain flexible—and would be raised in proportion to any increase in the annual yield of the Tanjore revenues. Should the revenue rise, then the annual subsidy would also be "increased according to the same scale or standard". It was also decided that the annual subsidy was to be paid in monthly instalments from November to April each year; and any failure in the payments to the amount of 90,000Rs. or above, for a period of one month after the same should become due, would give the Company the right "to enter upon any of the districts" of Tanjore that should "appear to them necessary to discharge the amount of the sum in arrears".

During the period of default, they also had the right to appoint superintendents and receivers to collect and receive the revenue from the renters of the Raja with powers to examine and inspect all receipts and accounts of those lands. Such officers would be withdrawn only when the arrears had been cleared in full.

Furthermore, in the event of war breaking out in the Carnatic, in Tanjore or on the Coast of Coromandel, the British had the right to assume "the direction, order and conduct" of

1. While this condition clearly implied that it was the right of the Resident to know what the year's revenues were, there is no mention, however, of the figure for this standard revenue. There was not a word also about a lessening of the annual subsidy in the event of a decrease in Tanjore's revenues, four lakhs being apparently the absolute minimum.

2. This period of November to April was chosen mainly to cover the entire period of harvest in Tanjore, and also to make it easier for the Raja to fulfill the conditions of his engagement.

the war, and for that purpose to receive four fifths of the revenues of Tanjore towards the war expenses. Tanjore was given pride of place among the Company's allies, and it was decided that the Raja's proportional share of the cost of war should be a fifth of the whole amount of the military expenditure 1. For the effectual security for such payments and to remove every doubt "of any secretion or diversion" of the Tanjore revenues, the Company was to appoint one or more inspectors to verify the public accounts of the Raja; and these conditions would continue even after the cessation of hostilities until Tanjore's complete share of the expenses was realised 2.

This treaty also brought a change in Tanjore's tribute relationship with Arcot. The Raja had been found in arrears in his tribute to the Nawab since 1776, and it was also the case that the Nawab himself was greatly in debt to the Madras Government. It was now conveniently arranged that the Raja should pay the tribute due to the Nawab directly to the Company. The Nawab on his part solemnly assigned over to the Company "the arrears of Peishchoush already due and the annual Peishchoush which shall henceforth become due" in part payment of his debt to them 3. This subtle move of transferring to

2. Ibid. p.108.
3. Ibid. p.114.
Madras Tanjore's tribute due to Arcot had two important results. The first was purely financial in that the Company obtained from the Raja what in fact had been established by them in 1762 as due to the Nawab. The second, a more significant result, was that it deprived the Nawab of the possibility of ever claiming any practical concern in the affairs of Tanjore again. The tribute by 1787 had become the only vestige of his overlordship; now this was made over to the Company, he was left with no occasion whatever for intervention in Tanjore affairs.

There had been little necessity, by way of any breakdown in earlier treaty arrangements between the Company and Tanjore, for any new treaty in 1787. Since the time of Tulaji's restoration, the relationships of 1762 had supposedly been reasserted and Tanjore had paid its annual subsidy to the Company with fair regularity. Moreover, Tanjore had always paid a share of the expenses of any Carnatic war in which the Company had been involved, though there had been no contractual grounds for claiming such aid from her. However, the Madras authorities had for some years been anxious to secure a more direct control over the revenues from which the subsidy was paid, and though barred by the specific orders issued by the Court of Directors in 1776 had wished to interfere in the internal administration of the Raja. This local desire to encroach upon Tanjore's independence was reinforced by the growth of imperialist
attitudes in Calcutta. The result was that the opportunities offered by the succession to Tulaji were exploited to the full, and a treaty was imposed wholly injurious to the interests of Tanjore and advantageous to British interests – especially their financial interests.

So despite Tulaji's expressed wish, the Madras authorities refused to recognise Saraboji, placed Amar Singh on the throne, and imposed prospective financial burdens upon Tanjore which made a mockery of all Cornwallis' words about Tanjorean independence. Only in one manner did Campbell seem to pay some slight regard to Tulaji's expressed wishes, when, having set aside Saraboji's claims, he nevertheless requested Amar Singh to countenance and protect the boy. This apparent concern for a boy whose close relation to the royal house depended solely upon his adoption, which had been declared void, is difficult in strict logic to understand. If the adoption was irregular, there was no good reason why Amar Singh should provide for a person who had been declared a pretender, nor any basis, legal or moral, for the Governor's making such a request to Amar Singh. An explanation must probably be sought in a consciousness that the rejection of Saraboji's claims was likely to be seen as unjust by Indians and a desire to forestall any criticism of harshness in England. It is also probable that the Governor hoped that the continued presence of Saraboji in the political

arena would serve as a check on Amar Singh and thus prove beneficial to British interests. The latter view is the more probable when one recalls Sir Archibald's plans to establish a dual power in Tanjore when he first considered the question of the succession in March 1787. In the event, whatever the motives of the Governor, his request that Amar Singh protect Saraboji had the effect of reopening the settlement he had achieved, for Amar Singh was not disposed to countenance Saraboji and his treatment of the boy eventually brought the whole question of the succession to a reconsideration.
Amar Singh's elevation to the throne and the new treaty signed between him and the Company for the security of his engagements were not to be the answer either to the problem of relationship between them, or of the welfare of the people of Tanjore. Indeed, the degeneration that had set in after Tulaji's restoration in the internal administration of Tanjore continued, and if anything became worse. The inordinate nature of commitments that had been forced upon the new Raja was largely responsible for this aspect of degeneracy and inefficiency in the Tanjore administration, which began to spread misery among the people and economic distress in the country. For the role of kingship everything was wanting in a man of Amar Singh's background, and from the manner of his elevation to the throne, it became essential for him to adopt a dual attitude to his duties. He had at once to seek to safeguard the interests of his country and to ensure his own continuance on the throne — and where these duties conflicted he chose the latter. It appeared to him that as long as he maintained punctual payments of the subsidy to Madras, his position would remain strong. But to maintain such a payment which he could scarcely meet from the

1. "It was the misfortune of Ameer Sing to be raised to the Musnud from a life of perfect seclusion, to be wholly unfit, for the charge he had assumed ..."— Tanjore Commissioner's Proceedings, 31 July 1798—Vol.90.
depleted revenues of Tanjore, he had to resort to the method of raising loans at exorbitant interests. The country itself was given, for the sole purpose of maximising the collection of revenue, to five or six rapacious agents, who demanded high rates from the people and appropriated a major part for themselves. As a result, the treasury soon became empty and Amar Singh found himself unable to meet the payments. Nevertheless, to win supporters of his elevation to the throne, and also to reward the people who had been instrumental in putting him there, he began to alienate much of his lands as inam to his favourites and to learned and religious men. If his basic administration of the country was far from satisfactory, his munificence proved disastrous. The Madras authorities naturally became apprehensive of this steady deterioration and realised that unless Amar Singh was prevented from making generous donations, he would lose all means of fulfilling his engagements to them. They noted that the payments due in March 1788 were not expected to be cleared till April, and that even then a deficit of a third of the total subsidy seemed inevitable. There was also the prospect of irksome delays in future payments. By July 1788 the Governor already felt it necessary to use this initial delay as an excuse for warning the Raja of the dangers of his practices, and of his need to adopt immediate measures for the discharge of the arrears. Unless there was an immediate change in the Tanjore administration, the Madras Government would adopt measures promptly to recover the arrears due to them.

Unfortunately the evil had grown to such proportions that there was no easy or single means to a complete remedy. To safeguard their interests, it was necessary for the British to take steps to obviate the deficiency in the Tanjore revenue and to prevent the recurrence in future of similar embarrassments. The Governor's warning did not have any effect. Amar Singh continued in his ways and made no attempt to change his style of administration. Rather it appeared to Campbell that "the impressions of gratitude on the mind of the Rajah, for his unexpected elevation to the Musnad have been too weak to resist a passion for profusion and extravagance and that the solemn promises which had been made by him ... were forgot almost as soon as the President quitted Tanjore". The situation had indeed deteriorated to such a degree that it seemed no longer practicable "to prescribe a proper remedy and at the same time attend scrupulously to the Rajah's rights and privileges as a Prince". In such circumstances, the safety of Tanjore, the welfare of its people and naturally, the Company's revenues, became primary objects; when once these had been sufficiently provided for, then every attention paid to the Raja would be "just and laudable". It was only from a consideration of "leniency and compassion" to Amar Singh and a hope that some measure short of actual confiscation of his country would be found adequate to the objects that led him, the Governor said, to refrain from recommending the enforcement of the penal clause.

of the treaty.

The Governor therefore proposed on 29 July that a commission be appointed to "enquire, investigate and reform" the Tanjore administration; and to ascertain as well what revenue had been collected since Amar Singh came to power. The Raja should be prevailed upon to agree to a just and reasonable proportion of his revenue being set aside for his expenses, beyond which the revenue should not be alienated for any purpose whatever until the outstanding amount had been paid in full to the Company. To implement this scheme effectively, certain districts of the country should be allotted for the Raja's expenses and should remain under his management. The rest of the country should be made over to the Company by granting some "formal instrument for the purpose of liquidating the arrears due ... and for securing such arrears for the next two or three years".

In the meantime, Amar Singh had himself confessed the errors of his administration that had produced these most baneful consequences and had given his inexperience and the common effects "of a sudden rise to power from a state of adversity" as the major reasons for this. While he would introduce reforms in his administration, he nonetheless did not expect to be able to clear all the arrears straight away. He needed time and requested the Madras Government to accept

three lakhs as immediate payment and to grant permission to make three yearly payments of seventy thousand rupees \(^1\). The Council agreed to this arrangement \(^2\), and the Raja discharged the three lakhs immediately \(^3\).

But though the British seemed agreeable to these delayed payments, they were not prepared to forego the chance of pressing for reform. The Raja had expressed his inability to clear the arrears straight away and had thus breached his agreement and laid himself open to the penal clause of the treaty. The Company was entitled thereby to enter upon the management and collection of the revenues of Tanjore until the arrears were fully recovered. This was the threat held over the Raja's head. But the Madras Council did not wish to put the threat into execution. They wanted punctual payments—but wished such payments to be made by Amar Singh with no apparent pressure from them. Moreover, on a strict evaluation, the arrears owed did not amount to a very considerable sum, and if they resorted to extremes on that count alone, it might be deemed "a measure repugnant to the feeling, regard and avowed patronage" professed for the Raja and his family by the Company \(^4\). Restraint was not without its purely practical merits too, for as the President and Council noted, "An

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Immediate sequestration of the Revenues would be attended with a certain loss of the present balance and a considerable deficiency in the collection of the ensuing year\(^1\). In such state of affairs they preferred to delay executing the threat while any hope of success remained. The real wish of Madras was to see effective reform of the Raja's administration. As the authorities said, if they could establish such a check as would secure the performance of the Raja's promises, it would be much to their advantage "to acquiesce in this arrangement than to adopt measures of greater vigour with respect to the management of the country" \(^2\). Accordingly, they confirmed the plan for the liquidation of the arrears in three yearly instalments.

Unhappily reform did not follow, Amar Singh continued to default in his payments and arrears mounted up. For this the Raja's own profusion and mismanagement may partially have been to blame. But the failure was also quite clearly due to the inability of his country to bear the burdens put upon it. The Raja was so utterly destitute of resources that he was compelled to employ the revenues of one year to discharge the arrears of the preceding year. He attempted in fact to raise loans from the Danes to pay off his debt to the Company, but the idea of his approaching a foreign power was unacceptable.

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2. Ibid.
to Madras 1. Indeed a loan was not the solution: unless his arrears were completely discharged, it was impossible for Amar Singh satisfactorily to conduct the ordinary affairs of his government. As he himself saw, if he were to continue this ruinous policy of "forestalling the coming crop in order to discharge the present balances, his Government would in a short time be ruined and overwhelmed with debt" 2. This was the problem that confronted Tanjore: the stipulated payments were clearly beyond her resources and there was no prospect of the arrears ever diminishing, for Amar Singh lacked the means to make good his promises. Any desperate attempt on his part, as the Reverend Swartz explained to the new Resident Ram, would only have added to the misery of his people as "the inhabitants must pay all the exorbitant interests on these advanced sums" 3.

While matters were in this state, the whole question of the financial and political relations between Tanjore and the Company was thrown into the melting pot by the eruption of a war with Tipu at the very end of 1789. Any war involving the Madras Government would certainly have led to new demands on Tanjore. But the circumstances of this particular conflict ensured that the demands would be both heavy and ruthless. The Madras Government was quite unprepared for war - indeed even

after Tipu's attack on Travancore, named a British ally by the Treaty of Mangalore, the Governor Holland sought to show war was unnecessary and to be avoided\(^1\). Such a government was soon in straits for money and ready to turn to Tanjore for relief. But more important, the supreme Government under Cornwallis saw the war with Tipu as part of a much wider conflict with the French, with whom Tipu had made a secret understanding; Cornwallis' experience, it has been said, "had accustomed his mind to world-wide maps". Consciousness of the greatness of the issues involved, and anger at bungling in Madras where "Orders had been disobeyed, preparations not made, and allies betrayed", led to the Governor-General charging himself "with the responsibility of an irregular measure, to taking temporary direction" of the civil and military affairs of Madras \(^2\). The same considerations led Cornwallis to brush impatiently aside any treaty rights of Tanjore which seemed likely to hamper the prosecution of so vital a conflict.

The new Governor of Madras, General Medows, had decided that the demand for war contributions from Tanjore should commence from April \(^3\). Even on the first receipt of information

\begin{enumerate}
\item It seems probable that Hollond was already warned of what was about to happen, and had taken a bribe from Tipu; he certainly delayed preparations ...". -The Cambridge History of the British Empire. Vol.IV. p.335.
\item For the many failures on the part of Hollond to inform the other Settlements of Tipu's attack on Travancore, see Cornwallis' Minute of 2 April 1790.-Correspondence of Cornwallis-Vol.II. pp.10-12.
\end{enumerate}
about the hostilities with Tipu, Amar Singh had readily agreed to abide by the conditions of the treaty concerning periods of war, and had agreed to pay the Company four fifths of his revenues by July 1791. However, though the amount to be paid had been specified in the treaty, and though the Raja showed himself co-operative, still Madras seemed greatly concerned with the actual realisation of the amount; there was a report from the Resident that no banker would accept Amar Singh’s bills, and there was also the disturbing fact that his payments were already in arrears. In such circumstances, it was feared that unless the arrears were cleared and the punctual payment of the war contributions was secured, the consequences to British interests would be highly detrimental. The supreme Government was yet more concerned. They declared in May 1790 that at a time when the Company’s resources were so much strained, and when pecuniary supplies were so indispensably necessary for ensuring the success of the war, it would “even be criminal” on the part of Madras to fail in requiring from the Raja the full execution of the conditions of the treaty. Cornwallis went on therefore to suggest that this full execution could best be secured by arranging for the Company to take over the complete management of the Tanjore administration for the duration of the war. This

3. Ibid. p.LXXI.
suggestion unfortunately ignored the fact that the assumption of the revenue administration was only enforceable under the treaty in case of default in the Raja's payments, and then only while arrears remained undischarged. However, by June 1790 the circumstances of the Company appeared quite desperate to the Governor-General and he was not prepared to accept the treaty in its strict terms; rather he declared his "unqualified opinion" that to assume the management of Tanjore would be the course "affording the only means by which the resources to be claimed from it can be realised and the fidelity and attachment of the Poligars and tributaries secured".

The Governor-General's suggestion was promptly put into practice. Ram and Tullofield were appointed Commissioners to negotiate with Amar Singh. They were to request him to make a voluntary assignment of the country; failing which, Amar Singh should be asked to invest the Commissioners with powers to see the collection of his revenues; and if this was also not agreeable, as the last gesture of co-operation, he should be invited to direct all his revenue officers to work under the Commissioners' authority. There was no question of Amar Singh refusing all these conditions, for if he failed to agree, the Commissioners were authorised to assume the Tanjore administration by proclamation.

It is clear that the proposals put to Amar Singh were arbitrary, that the choice given to him was very limited, and

that the course adopted was contrary to the treaty signed with him in 1787. He had either to accept one of the conditions offered by the Commissioners, or helplessly observe them assume the authority of his Government; there was no room given to him to question the Company's right to resort to the penal clause of the treaty. This was all the more unjust since there was grave doubt about the arrears on whose existence the Company's right to invoke the penal clause depended. The Raja maintained that the arrears were no more than a nominal Rs.27,000 as against the Rs.363,433 claimed by the Madras Council. Even the Resident himself confessed that there was "no clear and explicit accounts of Mr. Hollond's with the Rajah", and that it was impossible to determine whether Amar Singh had actually paid the subsidy up to the end of 1789. As for the war contributions,


2. There is little doubt that John Hollond, Governor of Madras from February 1789 to February 1790 when he suddenly relinquished his post, without informing Lord Cornwallis, and his brother Edward, a member of the Madras Council and for a few days acting Governor after John's departure, were both corrupt. Edward was sent to England under arrest but both brothers escaped any enquiry and went to America where they spent the rest of their lives. It is quite probable that in his transactions with Amar Singh, John Hollond had been corrupt, whence the discrepancy in the accounts. But, unfortunately, nothing was made of this, and Amar Singh was still left to pay the amount of arrears the accounts showed.-see Cornwallis' Minute of 2 April 1790, and letter of 30 December 1790-Correspondence of Cornwallis. Vol. II. p. 10 & 63.

Amar Singh protested that they would not fall due until July 1791, and he appealed to the Commissioners to await a further reference to Madras. But his appeal produced very little effect, for the Governor-General had already declared to the Directors that he had "felt no reluctance" in proposing the coercive measures, and that there was no circumstance "either in the public or private character" of Amar Singh which gave him "the least claim to forbearance from the Company in exacting the performance of his public engagements." The fact remained that Amar Singh would not agree to any of the proposals, and consequently the Commissioners assumed the administration of Tanjore on 15 September 1790 by "proclamation on the part of the Honourable Company.

Apparently, while agreeing to the new conditions immediately after ascending the throne, Amar Singh had not fully realised

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2. Lord Cornwallis had ordered a similar arrangement with Mohammed Ali, but his personal disapproval of Amar Singh on the strength of the Arcot interests is clear from what he wrote regarding the Nawab: "... but I cannot help viewing the old Nabob of Arcot in a very different light, and it was therefore, I must acknowledge, with great concern that I gave my sanction to a measure which I knew would occasion pain and mortification to a Prince so far advanced in years, and whose interests have long been so closely connected with those of the British nation ...", Cornwallis-Court of Dirs. 10 Aug.1790-Correspondence of Cornwallis. Vol.II. p.496


their implications. He had recognised the Company's right to appoint tahsildars, but had not envisaged any assumption by the Company of the management of his country. He now protested that he was "actuated by no conviction of the Company's right to seize" his territories, and appealed to Madras against the Commissioners' proceedings as "improper and unjust". But his protests were to have no effect, for he possessed neither the power to arrest the Commissioners' proceedings, nor the influence to bring about an amendment in the policy of the authorities. The Council, with scant respect for Amar Singh's protestations, decided to reply to him at a later date; the Commissioners remained in the management of Tanjore.

It is notable that Amar Singh's statement regarding his arrears due to the Company was not given any consideration, nor was any effort made by Madras either to repudiate his allegation, or to produce a proper statement of accounts. Yet if the arrears were only Rs.27,000 as stated by Amar Singh, it would not have been easy to justify the action that was adopted by the Madras Government, though Amar Singh's past unpunctuality in his payments might still have been used against him. It was - and perhaps is - unnecessary to consider the technical grounds for the Company's action in Tanjore. The Governor-General was determined to safeguard the Company even if legality and Tanjore suffered. The Court of Directors were

in complete agreement with the Supreme Government, for they held that it would have been "unwise, impolitic, dangerous and perhaps fatal to the interests of all concerned" if the measures had not been adopted. They considered it as "unreasonable to expect, as it is impossible such an expectation can be fulfilled, that the deficiency of subsidy on the part of the ... Rajah should be made good by supplies from Bengal, already very much exhausted by drains of various kinds during a long series of successive years". The opportunity was very welcome and the time propitious to adopt direct methods of securing the payments from Tanjore. It was the duty of their representatives in India, claimed the Directors, "from time to time, whenever the necessity shall be as obvious as the present, to recur to such measures as will ensure the Company the complete benefit" of its treaties. On the basis that what was good for the Company was good for everyone concerned, the taking over of the Tanjore administration was supported as a wise and proper action.

In May 1792, soon after the cessation of hostilities between the British and Tipu, Amar Singh, presumably with the hope that the management of Tanjore would be handed back to him, complained to the Governor-General about the terms of the treaty of 1787 by which he had been required to pay the Company

2. Ibid. p.558.
4. The Treaty of Seringapatam was concluded on 18 March, 1792.
four lakhs of rupees as subsidy, and another three lakhs on account of his tribute to Arcot. There was ample justification in this complaint as the contributions were quite beyond Tanjore's resources. This much could no longer be denied by the Madras authorities. During the two years of their management, when they made the collection through dubashes of their own appointing, they had experienced for themselves the difficulties which they had belittled when complained of by the Raja. In 1791 the subsidies to Arcot and Madras were almost two thirds of the total collection, and even in a good year such as 1792 were about a half. The dubashes, moreover, being temporary collectors, had hastened to enrich themselves, so that the Company administration without securing greater returns to the Madras Government had added to the general distress of the people of Tanjore.

The extent of this distress and the justness of the Raja's claims was to some degree recognised by the Madras Government,

2. This information about the Tanjore revenues was supplied to the Madras Council by the Board of Revenue: 1791 - total collection, Rs.9,20,113 - less expenses Rs.1,664,401, 1792 - Rs.10,05,563 - Rs.1,404,640. The average net revenue was Rs.8,09,391.04; of this, taking a lakh of rupees and a fifth of the revenue for the Raja, the remainder of Rs.4,95,513 was just about the sum Tanjore could afford to pay as subsidy.- Home Misc.Series, Vol.637, pp.186-188.
for in August 1792 a new treaty was offered to Amar Singh\(^1\). This proposed to reduce the annual subsidy from four to three and a half lakhs of rupees, while the payments to Arcot and the Raja's creditors would be reduced to Rs.50,000 and Rs.60,000 respectively\(^2\). The Raja would be supplied with the service of British troops for the collection of his revenues, though he would have to defray their expenses. To provide that security for his payments previously lacking, however, he would be required to pledge certain districts\(^3\). The Company would then have the right to assume the management of the districts if payments fell more than fifteen days behindhand, while in the event of protracted delay the Company might take over the districts permanently in full proprietary. As further protection, the Raja would not be allowed to grant any bills against his revenues. Finally, the new treaty specified the way in which the war contributions should be provided for. A clause, based on

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1. The new proposals were mainly due to the recommendations of Cornwallis before leaving Madras after his victorious campaign against Tipu that a new arrangement might be formed with Amar Singh to secure effectively the future payments of the subsidy, similar to the one the Company had formed with Mohammed Ali.—Governor's Minute, 28 Aug. 1792—Home Misc. Series. Vol.637. p.185.

2. It was also proposed that Rs.11,000 for the support of Sarabogi, and Rs.3000 for the support of the widows of Tulaji should be paid directly to the Company by July of every year.

3. The estimated annual revenue of the pledged districts were:

- Mannargudi — Rs. 2,45,198.
- Trivady — " 1,49,609.
- Mayavaram — " 1,64,668.
experience gained since 1790, provided that during periods of war Tanjore should come under British administration, one fifth of the total revenue collection being given to the Raja for his expenses 1.

This clause might seem to do no more than regulate and perpetuate a practice which had existed in 1790. But it really indicated that yet another large and important step had been taken in the reduction of Tanjore's status. It provided the Company with a right to manage Tanjore, never previously even hinted at in any treaty. For the first time, soram populo, the Company proposed to assume that "overlordship" hitherto claimed by the Nawab and guaranteed to him by the Company. By the Restoration the Raja had been reduced effectively to management of Tanjore's internal administration, of which the major task was the collection of the revenues; this clause cut into this area of his authority also. He was to be no more than a part-time ruler - a king only in times of peace, and a pensioner of the East India Company in times of war, when Tanjore would pass entirely under British control.

Amar Singh was in no position to ward off the calamitous conditions of the new treaty. His interest was now to continue at peace, but if the British chose to pursue hostilities with any power in India, he could neither influence that choice nor disassociate himself from it. While he would be informed of the

Company's plans for peace and war in recognition of his status as an ally, he had none of an ally's share in policy decisions. By this treaty he was for all practical purposes reduced from the position of an independent prince to that of a zamindar, an agent of the Company. This was the reductio ad absurdum of the theory of Tanjore's independence. It might be pretended that the treaty was a voluntary agreement between two sovereign states designed for their mutual benefit, but in fact Amar Singh had no power to object to, alter or reject the terms of the agreement. His protests were brushed aside by the Governor-General as "of insufficient weight to induce a departure from any one of its treaty's several stipulations". Supporting the decision of Madras, the Governor-General declared that the treaty was effective from July 1792.

The war with Tipu had terminated in March 1792, but the management of Tanjore, assumed by the Company in September 1790 on the grounds of arrears in the subsidy, was not restored to the Raja because the new treaty was under consideration. When

1. There is little doubt that Amar Singh had no choice but to accept the terms, for the country was completely under British control, the accusations against his treatment of Saraboji were on the increase, and the continuing deficit in the payments of his subsidy made the British so overpowering that the Governor, while offering the new terms in August 1792, proposed that they should take effect from July 1792. -Home Misc.Series. Vol.634. p.379.

2. Amar Singh protested against the clause concerning periods of war, and more particularly against the annual allowance granted to Saraboji; he wrote in vain to the Governor-General in October and to the Court of Directors in April 1793. -Home Misc.Series. Vol.285(a). pp.649-661.

the treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in December 1792, the Tanjore administration was still retained by the Company - and remained in the Company's hands until July 1793 - this time because the Madras Government was investigating accusations against Amar Singh of maltreatment of Saraboji and of the widows of Tulaji 1.

To understand these accusations, it is necessary to consider the relations between Amar Singh and Saraboji from the time in 1787 when the latter's adoption was declared void and Amar Singh was placed on the throne. It was understandably Amar Singh's particular concern that Saraboji should be completely excluded from any future consideration where the succession to the Tanjore throne was concerned. Towards this end, he strove to destroy Saraboji's standing and prestige by making his position in Tanjore miserable and humiliating. The treaty of 1787, which provided that the boy should be granted an allowance, limited the Raja's pursuit of this end, but he used the fact that no precise rules had been laid down about method of payment and place of residence to harass Saraboji with uncertain and often meagre allowances 2. Saraboji complained of this treatment early in 1789, but though the facts were well known at Madras, the Governor chose to do no more than desire Amar Singh to give the boy better treatment 3.

Amar Singh became increasingly hostile to Saraboji and to the widows of Tulaji. He preferred strange and fantastic charges against them. The death of his son-in-law was ascribed by him to the machinations of the widows; they had compassed this wicked design, he declared, with the help of a magician. He caused a public proclamation to be read accusing them of instigating a pujari to attempt the same atrocious crime against his own life. Consequently, their life and that of Saraboji was reduced to a very deplorable state, and it was obvious that Amar Singh desired the complete removal of Saraboji since the boy's presence offered the only obstacle to his continued possession of the throne.

Early in 1791 Saraboji and the widows of Tulaji again complained of their distress to Madras. On this occasion the Governor, while once more requesting to show every indulgence to the domestic comforts of the prince and his family, himself allowed a sum of twenty-five thousand rupees a year to Saraboji, to be appropriated from the Tanjore revenues now being managed by the Company, and arranged that this should be conveyed directly to the prince by the Reverend Swartz. As could be expected, Amar Singh expressed great surprise at this decision.

1. A priest responsible for performing animal sacrifices for the people.
2. "His Saraboji's life was in the utmost danger".—Memors of the Life and Correspondence of the Reverend Swarts—Pearson, Vol. II. p. 251.
and declared that the amount was too liberal. Swartz, however, was of the opinion that Saraboji should leave the palace and establish a separate residence in Tanjore. There was no improvement in Amar Singh's disposition towards Saraboji, and by 1792 the latter had been so hard driven that he implored Swartz to approach the Madras authorities to enable his release from Amar Singh. Swartz promptly contacted Madras, and consequently Saraboji was invited to come and stay at Madras with his mother. From the time of his arrival there on 10 January 1793, Swartz began to champion openly the cause of Saraboji.

Even before Saraboji's arrival at Madras, various complaints had reached Madras and Calcutta, and had formed a major reason for the Governor-General's order to defer restoring the Tanjore administration to Amar Singh in December 1792. The Governor-General had no favourable opinion of Amar Singh, and in order to make him take his duties seriously and "as a measure of restraint upon his conduct", it was thought advisable to pronounce Saraboji heir presumptive to the Tanjore throne. Swartz, as guardian to Saraboji, was not content with this. He

had already pointed out that Saraboji's adoption was legal. Now he urged that this issue should be considered more carefully. For Amar Singh, only 43 years old, was about to take two wives, so that a mere revision to the Tanjore throne seemed an increasingly empty promise to his protégé. The entire conduct of Amar Singh and the continued championing of Saraboji's cause by the Reverend Swartz had created great doubts with the Supreme Government of the just rights of Amar Singh to the Tanjore throne. But, since the decision reached in 1787 had been for years accepted as proper in every respect, it was necessary to proceed "with great circumspection and delicacy" in impeaching the right that had been given to Amar Singh. The Bengal Government, therefore, recommended that Saraboji be proclaimed the heir, and that they would meanwhile proceed upon a second reference to pundits in Bengal to ascertain the rights of Saraboji under the procedure of adoption.

When Madras pronounced Saraboji as the heir presumptive, Amar Singh countered by declaring that the adoption itself was invalid, and that Tulaji had lost his faculties at the time of contracting it. Amar Singh was certainly within his rights to protest against the nomination of Saraboji as his successor.

for he did no more than stress what had already been accepted and acknowledged in the treaty of 1787. However understandable the Bengal wish to re-examine the rights of Saraboji, any reopening of the case was contrary to the treaty which had declared his adoption irregular, while to proclaim him heir apparent before his position had even been reviewed was even more outrageous. To make Saraboji the heir was to undo the decision of 1787, before his claim, which rested entirely on the adoption, had been in any way validated. Nevertheless, the Bengal Government, without explaining the justness of their move, ordered the new title to be conferred. Amar Singh, powerless to oppose the order, had to accept the decision.

The Court of Directors, on learning that the Governor-General had set about a second examination of Saraboji's rights, felt "a degree of concern" that a question should have arisen "tending to impeach the equity of that decision" arrived at by Sir Archibald Campbell in 1787. A further inspection of the proceedings had convinced them that Sir Archibald, before placing Amar Singh on the throne, had taken every necessary step to ascertain his rights. The part played by Lord Cornwallis in 1787 in accepting that decision also seemed "highly proper". But in order to rest the question on an unimpeachable foundation, they were now compelled to resort to an enquiry into the adoption itself; and examine if it was indeed contracted in consonance with the Hindu Laws. The

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question had now become a matter of great importance and they recommended every possible degree of attention and consideration in the discussion of it.

It would appear that a sudden emergence of evidence in support of Saraboji's claims was the reason for this change in the British attitude. But though their anxiety was equivalent to such a significant trend, the change was mainly due to the sudden revelation of the true aspects of the relations between Amar Singh and Saraboji. The extraordinary patience of Saraboji in enduring his distress, the equally extraordinary hatred shown him by Amar Singh, and above all the unswerving support given by the Reverend Swartz to Saraboji's legitimate rights, contributed in a great measure to the feeling that his case had not been justly decided in 1787. Even then, if Amar Singh's antagonism towards Saraboji had been less severe, and had Saraboji been allowed to stay at Tanjore, it is probable that the recent developments would not have resulted; for the actual release of Saraboji from Tanjore and his setting up his residence at Madras seem to have been the deciding factors in promoting a re-examination of his rights.

The realisation, however, that the validity of the whole question depended upon the legality of the adoption is a peculiar point. Matters had not changed since 1787 in any manner as to require a re-examination. The situation was the same as when Sir Archibald, with the complete approval of the Governor-General, had preferred to examine the Hindu Laws by confining it to the

verdict of the pundits at Tanjore. It was now felt that the question should be referred to the pundits at Calcutta, and the Directors, on a minute consideration of all the evidence, would themselves settle the question of the succession.

Meanwhile Amar Singh, to whom the management of Tanjore had been restored in July 1793, found himself pressed by the Governor of Madras, Lord Hobart, into agreeing to a new treaty. At the death of Mohammed Ali in October 1795, Sir John Shore, the Governor-General, had authorised the Governor to submit to Omdat ul Umara a proposition (already made to Mohammed Ali by Cornwallis) by which the entire revenues of the Carnatic would be assigned over to the Company. This proposal, it was stated, was made mainly to avoid the inconvenience and evils arising from the separation of the collection of the revenues from the responsibility for the defence of the territories. Hobart chose to extend to Tanjore the proposal made to Arcot and to secure the transfer to the Company's administration of the three districts earmarked by the treaty of 1792 as the source of the Raja's payments to the Company. At this time Amar Singh was quite regular and punctual in his payments so that to justify his action, Hobart had to make play with the prospective danger to British interests which might be expected from the evil influence of the Raja's minister, Shiva Rao, who had adopted

2. Nawab Mohammed Ali died on 13 October 1795, aged 75, and was succeeded by his eldest son Omdat ul Umara.
various oppressive methods to increase the resources of Tanjore. There is little doubt that Shiva Rao was unpopular and that Amar Singh was absolutely devoted to his minister, and it was probably true that the systems adopted by the minister were prejudicial to the real interests of Tanjore and the Company. It was nevertheless only with difficulty that Amar Singh was persuaded to sign, on 23 January 1796, a new treaty making over to the Company the districts pledged in 1792, whose revenues estimated at Rs.56,000 would cover Tanjore's subsidy to the Company, tribute to Areat and service of the 'Tanjore Debts'. If there was any surplus after meeting these charges, in the amount collected, this would be paid to the Raja, while if there was a shortfall the Raja would have to make it good. The agreement seemed very satisfactorily to serve British interests. But Hobart had not been authorised by the Governor-General to promote any such agreement with Tanjore, and letters from the Raja to the Governor and the Supreme Government soon made it clear that

2. The expected yield of the districts were:-
   Mannargudy - 2,45,198 Rs.
   Tiruvady - 1,49,609 "
   Mayavaram - 1,64,668 "
the new treaty had been imposed by the use or threat of force. Though the Resident Macleod maintained that Amar Singh had voluntarily agreed to the new treaty, there is little doubt that he had been forced to give it his sanction. British troops having been repeatedly called out to intimidate the reluctant Raja. Shore was quite clear that serious and unwarranted injury had been done to Tanjore. He declared to Charles Grant that the Raja had been "dragooned into the treaty", that the misconduct of Shiva Rao had been made a pretence for compelling the Raja's signature, and that the Governor had "expected to gain great credit; if he could accomplish it; and that being accomplished, he concluded the means would not be scrutinised". The Governor-General was not opposed to the results achieved: had they been achieved without "a Violation of Justice and Good Faith", he would have rejoiced at them; but he was not tempted by the value of the prize to ignore the means by which it was obtained. Lord Hobart might have obtained the complete approbation of a Wellesley, but Sir John Shore who believed that "honesty is, in

1. In his letter of 20 January, the Raja had complained to Hobart that Macleod's treatment of him and his frequent calling out the soldiers had made him a very frightened man. The Resident himself wrote on 3 February that "the prevalent idea in Tanjore was that Shivarow was to be seized - and I certainly would have seized him if I could have done so without carrying an armed force within the palace walls ...". Macleod-Hobart, 3 Feb.1796 -Ft.William Cons, 29 Apr,1796 -Beng. Pol.Cons. Vol.5.
all situations, the best policy\textsuperscript{4}, viewed the conduct of the Governor as impeachable\textsuperscript{2}, and declared that the Raja's regular payments had precluded all pretext for British interference in Tanjore affairs. Consequently, the new treaty was annulled\textsuperscript{3}, the districts were handed back to the Raja, and the treaty of 1792 was brought back into effect \textsuperscript{4}.

Meanwhile the investigation into Saraboji's rights which had been set on foot by the Governor-General in February 1793 were now approaching their denouement. A set of questions to be put to the pundits of Calcutta and Benares had been prepared on 15 February 1793\textsuperscript{5}, and later in May had been amended and translated into Sanskrit by Sir William Jones \textsuperscript{6}. The pundits of Calcutta and Benares to whom these questions\textsuperscript{7} had been referred for their opinion, gave their verdict in favour of Saraboji, maintaining that the adoption contracted by Tulaji was legal and acceptable under Hindu Law; and this was received by the Supreme Government in April 1795 \textsuperscript{8}. This declaration was accepted by the Governor-General and Council. But acceptance required a further enquiry,

2. "If Mr. Hastings had done what Lord Hobart has, it would have formed an article in his Impeachment". Shore-Dundas, 5 July 1796 - An Indian Governor-Generalship - Furber. p.104.
7. These questions concerned mainly two points - whether Saraboji, the only son of his natural parents was eligible for adoption, and whether the fact that he was more than ten years old at the time of the ceremony nullified the adoption.
this time into the circumstances surrounding the giving of the contrary, and hitherto received verdict against Saraboji in 1787. Apart from the Tanjore pundits, two other persons had been intimately concerned in that decision—Macleod, the Resident, and the Reverend Swartz. Both had been present on that occasion. Both were in a position to throw further light on the question. The Governor-General now asked them both to reveal every detail they knew which related to the succession of 1787.

The statements which the two men made showed how regrettable it was that the enquiry into the adoption, and especially into the religious validity of Saraboji’s claims, had been so hurried and perfunctory in 1787. A show of courtesy to the boy had been proffered by Sir Archibald Campbell, but neither the Supreme Government nor the Home authorities had bothered to verify the acceptability of the opinions expressed at Tanjore, or to reconsider the matter as further evidence became available. Now it appeared that Macleod, the Resident at that period, had withheld information which, if disclosed, might have prevented the inequitable decision. Soon after the enthronement of Amar Singh, the Resident had become acquainted with the opinions of various people who considered that the “supposed defects in the adoption of Serfoge were of no validity” 2. He became familiar with quotations from the Shaster regarding the legality of the

adoption; and was also aware that most of the pundits chosen to decide the merits of the case were unequal to the demands made of them. In fact, the Resident had become firmly convinced of the legality of the adoption and "that conviction was strengthened by the circumstances of His Excellency [Amar Singh] bestowing lands upon some of the pundits who gave their opinions in his favour" 1.

The Reverend Swartz also produced details which cast new light on the decision of 1787, and which had he been bolder and franker might have altered the issue. Unfortunately he had preferred to remain quiet, "... the whole business was done so quickly - I was silent - for which I blame myself" 2. Now nearly a decade later he spoke up "to ease my mind, and if possible to benefit my unfortunate pupil". According to Swartz, he had been present at the time of Tulaji's death, though not at the time of the adoption. Tulaji had informed him of the adoption and had requested him to be Saraboji's guardian. While declining the responsibility himself, Swartz had recommended Amar Singh instead. But Tulaji was clearly against the idea since he had "doubts concerning him [Amar Singh]". However, as it was essential that a guardian be appointed, the missionary strongly recommended that Tulaji accept his nomination 2. Thus, but for Swartz's persuasion, Amar Singh might never have attained the position of

guardian which gave him both the status and ambition to bid for the succession itself. Equally, had Swartz agreed to remain even the nominal guardian of the boy, the latter's cause would doubtless have received greater attention from the Governor in 1787.

Swartz may have been to blame for overriding Tuleji's distrust of Amar Singh as guardian, but he had no part in the decision on the adoption. He had considered that his ignorance of the Hindu Laws prevented him from participating in the discussions and so he had remained aloof. He had been surprised that the pundits did not offer any proof from the Shaster to substantiate the justice of their findings, but then they had not been asked to produce any. Later, however, various incidents caused doubt to grow. By his office as guardian, Amar Singh had secured mastery of the administration and the treasury - the hopes and fears of all men naturally turned thereafter upon him. The pundits openly admitted to Swartz that in those circumstances it was most unreasonable to expect a just opinion from them. Swartz noted that "two of them who formerly had no office are taken into the Rajah's services, others have fields which they would immediately lose if they confessed. One of them is here who declared that hope and fear had influenced him".

1. Though Swartz was "a master of the principal languages spoken in the South of India, and well versed in Tamul literature, he had not found it necessary to study the Sanscrit, which accounts for his want of acquaintance with the Shasters". - Memoir of the Life and Correspondence of the Reverend Swartz-Pearson, Vol.II.p.309.

after the event might not indicate bribery before it. However, another incident suggested that there had been corruption, and that this had touched even the most senior Company officials. When Amar Singh was once pressed by the Resident to clear his arrears, he threatened that "if they press too much, I will reveal all and raise a stench over all England - for they all have got money from me except Mr. Swartz". Those present at the time were Mr. de Souza, a Portuguese gentleman, Campbell's dubash, Swartz and the Resident. This was in fact an accusation of a serious nature and if it had been proved, would have exposed the Chief Executive of the Presidency, Governor Campbell, to the charge of having conspired against Saraboji to bring in a proclamation in favour of Amar Singh. While leaving it a matter to the Supreme Government to secure confirmation of this accusation from the persons concerned, Swartz confirmed it himself in "the most awful and solemn manner".

There seems no doubt whatever that Swartz was telling the truth. It might well be asked why did he not reveal these circumstances in 1787? Was it perhaps that he had of late found Amar Singh opposed to his missionary activities whereas originally he had expected him to be ready to favour mission work? It is true that by his recommendation to Tulaji that he should appoint Amar Singh as the guardian, he had in fact strengthened the latter's position. And he had stated that the new Raja "will not

hinder the progress of the Christian religion, but, at least externally, further it”¹. But there is no evidence whatever of Amar Singh hindering the activities of the missionary, or of Swartz himself complaining of any hostility or change of attitude. Swartz had been deeply disappointed with the administration of the Courts of Justice at Tanjore, and had frequently complained to Amar Singh and the Madras Government that some improvement was most desirable. But Amar Singh’s neglect of this alone could not have provoked Swartz into seeking a re-examination of the adoption. He had come to know of translations of the Hindu Laws, published in Bengal, and these revealed to him that the Tanjore pundits “had acted a base part”². There is little doubt that it was this realisation which made him seek redress for his unfortunate pupil, and considering his mission in India, his reluctance to involve himself in anything remotely political³, and indeed the implicit trust and respect⁴ he commanded from Tulaji, Amar Singh and the people of Tanjore, it can be safely assumed that Swartz was the only person not guilty of partisanship in the whole question. Yet though from his account the Resident and the dubash of Governor Campbell had conspired to

³ Swartz’s refusal to be the guardian himself was chiefly related to the political implications involved, the government of the country during the boy’s minority. —Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of the Reverend Swartz—Pearson. Vol. II. p.101
⁴ In his minute of 30 December 1796, Shore stated that he had never heard Swartz’s name mentioned without respect.—Ft. William Cons, 30 Dec. 1796—Beng. Pol. Cons. Vol. 14; Range 116.
misrepresent the succession issue in return for bribes from Amar Singh, very probably with Campbell's complicity, there followed no move to enquire into the truth of Swartz's accusations. On the contrary, the Governor and Council at Fort St. George cheerfully wrote that though it was impossible "to disunite the name of Sir Archibald Campbell from the subject", they felt it a duty to his memory "to declare our conviction that his decisions were formed from the best and most upright intentions, and if he erred, it was an error arising from misinformation, but that the motives which actuated that decision on his part were pure and disinterested" 1. Macleod, the Resident, though he had himself confessed to the suppression of facts, was accorded a similar acquittal. The Madras Government indicated disapproval to Macleod: "it was a question with you whether you were not bound in your capacity of Resident to disclose to Government all you know or believe respecting Amar Singh's title" 2. The Governor also recorded that there were parts of the Resident's conduct "which he could not entirely approve, but which he has not animadverted upon officially" 3. But there, without further explanation, the matter was allowed to rest. When Macleod was removed from his post in 1798, his failures or his misdeeds in connection with the adoption dispute

proved no part of the charges against him. The Supreme
Government, too, was ready to whitewash the Madras officials.
The Governor-General took the trouble to require a second
confirmation of the authenticity of his remarks from the Reverend
Swartz, but when the latter furnished the possibly inconvenient
confirmation of the charges of corruption and injustice, no
further enquiry followed. All those who had joined with Amar
Singh in conspiracy were thus allowed to escape unharmed and
persumably in the enjoyment of any illicit gains.

The report of the Calcutta and Benares pundits, the revela-
tions of Macleod and Swartz, and the comments of the Madras and
Calcutta Governments were now forwarded to the Directors, together
with a declaration from an assembly of pundits at Tanjore. These
now declared that the adoption of Saraboji had been absolutely
legal and valid. In 1787 it had been asserted that Saraboji was
not eligible for adoption because he was more than ten years of
age at the time of the ceremony, now it was recorded that even
if he had been older, this would not have invalidated the adoption.
It had been customary among the Marathas at Tanjore to adopt
boys above ten years of age, in fact even up to the age of
twenty-two years and such adoptions were quite regular "provided
they were males of the same tribe". With all these documents
before them, the Secret Committee in London proceeded to pronounce

1. Macleod was removed from his position only due to various
complaints of his having interfered with the internal adminis-
tration and affairs of Tanjore.
a decision on the question, with appreciable haste; for within less than three weeks of acknowledging the last batch of information - the verdict of the Tanjore pundits - which completed the documents, the Secret Committee had endorsed the decision of the Directors on the question. They agreed that it was impossible "to entertain a doubt that Serfozee has been unduly deprived of his rightful inheritance through the injustice of the present possessor of the Throne of Tanjore, carried into effect under the authority of our Government"; but such a conclusion was not based entirely on the many relevant documents produced by the Madras Government, and probably casts a reflection on the policy of Cornwallis in allowing the question to be decided in Tanjore in 1787. Clearly the Secret Committee had not much faith in the revelations of the Reverend Swartz, Macleod or the second verdict obtained in Tanjore, for they remarked that "if the material upon which a just decision of the Question depends, rested on a few partial or equivocal documents, we should feel it impossible to disturb the possession which has been held in consequence of the determination given by Sir Archibald Campbell in 1787; but when the whole evidence is collectively considered, & a great part of which consists of the information

received from Bengal, through the medium of Persons who cannot possibly have any interest in the Question", they could not but decide in favour of Saraboji.

What were the Secret Committee and the Board of Control, in whose work the British prime minister, William Pitt, actively participated, to do about those who had misled them, and, since the real merits of the case now stood revealed and they knew of "no principle on which the British Government can co-operate in longer supporting the Usurpation", what were they to do with Amar Singh? The Secret Committee were clearly aware that the Madras Government had been involved in the wrong done in 1787, for they roundly declared that "We by our Representatives are, in a great degree, the authors of this injustice". They were very conscious, too, that the usurper had already enjoyed the Tanjore throne for a decade, with the public approval and support of the Company, so that any sudden change must create a certain embarrassment. While inaction was totally unacceptable, any immediate, unprepared removal of Amar Singh must leave them liable to the charge of "wantonly or capriciously interfering in the succession and Internal Concerns of the Native Powers with whom we are connected and thereby subjecting the national Character to jealousy and reproach". Such jealousy and reproach would the more

2. The above letter was submitted to the Board on 25 October, and was approved the same day by Pitt and Dundas.
4. Doubtless, Indian observers had already made this charge in 1787, for the Madras Government's actions in that year are admirably summed up in the Committee's letter.
certainly be incurred if after a decade of injustice they were once again "to carry into effect any forfeiture in our own favour". Only one way out of this double difficulty offered itself - to cast the entire blame for the whole episode upon Amar Singh - and this the Committee without a qualm chose to do. They therefore added to their declaration that the Company, through its representatives, had been the cause of the injustice, the rider that "it was produced by our interference, obtained through the misrepresentations and corruption of the person who is now reaping the benefits of it". They then proceeded to the welcome conclusion that the Committee had been merely "the innocent instruments" by which injustice had been committed, so that a second interference with the succession would doubtless appear "in the fair light of honorably repairing that injury".

The arguments of the Board might seem somewhat devious and their allocation of blame rather uneven, but governments are notoriously unwilling to admit error and it could be argued that at least the error was being corrected. Saraboji so long denied his right was at last to be installed as ruler of Tanjore.

The Board, however, was unwilling to see value only its own reward. They added therefore the directive that the Madras Government should "take care that the interests ascertained to us in the Revenues of Tanjore, be better guarded than they have been by

any former Treaties" 1. Safeguarding and furthering the interests of the Company thus came to be joined to the question of the elevation of Saraboji to his throne - and once so joined British rather than Tanjorean interests took priority. To secure the subsidy from Tanjore on a more solid basis was most desirable, and a complete reorganisation of the internal administration of Tanjore to suit the above end seemed to the Board essential. This could be accomplished along with the elevation of Saraboji to the Tanjore throne. The Secret Committee, therefore, proposed that a Commission of three Company servants should be sent to Tanjore to ascertain the conditions and state of the country, and then make Saraboji agree to "such conditions and limitations in the management of the Country as may ensure a just administration", and to "secure us effectually in the regular and permanent payment of that Contribution to which we are entitled" 1. This was an inexcusable encroachment upon the natural rights of an independent, friendly state. It was also an injustice to Saraboji thus reduced to the position of a pensioner, a position scarcely less grievous than his original exclusion from the throne, for the Committee laid down that the report of the proposed Commission, and its acceptance, must precede the elevation of Saraboji to the Tanjore throne 1.

The Home authorities' high sounding sentiments about repairing the injustice done to Saraboji thus became the cloak for a further encroachment upon the independence of Tanjore. The

slowness with which they acted upon the pronouncement that Saraboji's claims were legitimate served this purpose very well. For though the pronouncement had been made while John Shore was Governor-General, action thereon was left in abeyance till the arrival in India of his successor, Lord Mornington late the following year. If Saraboji's hope was a little longer deferred, his uncertainty and anxiety excited, so much the better. Meanwhile Dundas conferred with Wellesley and agreed that the time was ripe for an expansion of British territories in India. Long before Wellesley reached Madras early in 1798, therefore, the fate of Tanjore had been sealed.

The new Governor-General found some practical difficulty, however, in setting up the Commission which had been ordered by the Secret Committee. Amar Singh was still the Raja of Tanjore and while his authority was acknowledged, the Commission would only be embarrassed in their enquiries. Their access to the revenue accounts of Tanjore, which was necessary to the success of their enquiry, could not be obtained without Amar Singh's consent. Such consent was unlikely to be given, yet to attempt to act without the Raja's consent would have been most difficult, while knowledge of the Secret Committee's orders would have left

1. "A Decision ... with References from Fort St. George on the subject of Tanjore, [is] in suspense for the arrival of his Lordship". Shore - Dundas, 13 Sept. 1797 - An Indian Governor-Generalship-Furber. p.128.
2. Henceforth the more usual later title of the Governor-General will be used.
3. The East India Company - Philipps. p.103.
Amar Singh without any interest for the welfare of the country or in fulfilling the stipulations of the treaty of 1792 with regard to the payment to the Company. Moreover to authorise the Commission to act independently of Amar Singh, while Amar Singh was still ruling, would be a violation of the treaty of 1792 patent to all the other Indian powers. Again, the Commission, even if not opposed, would take at least a year to investigate and report, while Wellesley was sure that "it could never have been in the contemplation of the Government at home" to postpone to so distant a time the restoration of Saraboji.

To obviate these difficulties it was finally decided that the first move should be the deposition of Amar Singh and elevation of Saraboji. But this "solemn adjudication of the musnud to Serfojee", this righting of an acknowledged wrong inflicted by the Company's own servants, this belated reparation was not to be without conditions. For Saraboji was to be asked, as a pre-condition of his elevation, to agree to the appointment of a Commission of Company servants. He was to be required to allow the Commission access to all public accounts and records of his country and to cause the attendance of all persons whom the Commission would like to see. The Commission would proceed as though Saraboji's accession, and any changes which he might wish to make, had not occurred, while Saraboji for his part would be bound to accept any new arrangements resulting from the Commission's enquiry and proposals. Such proposals would of

course be for "the better management of his country, particularly for the due administration of justice and also for securing the Company the more regular discharge of their existing and future demands on Tanjore".

Concern for better management of Tanjore revenues and due administration of justice had not, however, prevented the Board from sending instructions through the Secret Committee that Amar Singh should after deposition receive a substantial pension. After all his duplicity, and misrepresentations, after unjustly enjoying the throne for eleven years, most probably in collusion with corrupted Company officials, Amar Singh was allowed by the Governor-General both a place of residence at Madhyarjunam in Tanjore and twenty five thousand rupees a year from the Tanjore revenues. Similarly, though the appointment of a Commission had been called for because of the lasting disorder and near bankruptcy to which Amar Singh and his minister had brought Tanjore, the Company refused to consider a reduction in their demands upon Tanjore, even in the form of a temporary moratorium. Rather Tanjore had to continue payments to the Company, and to enable her to save herself as well as "our interests", Wellesley directed that Saraboji should consent to "transfer the entire charge of the whole of the country of Tanjore" to the Madras Government for a period of one or two years after his accession.

There is no doubt that the Governor-General desired the accomplishment of this last aspect, but it must be said in his
favour that a certain amount of diffidence was felt on this point. He did not think it proper to direct the Madras Government to make any clear cut proposition to Saraboji to this effect; for it was of the greatest importance that no ground should be afforded for suspicion that "the change in the succession, has been dictated by a desire to extend our influence in the Country, or by any other motives than those of a strict regard to justice". Wellesley, however, evidently did not wish to carry this regard for justice to the long dispossessed and much wronged prince too far, for he was quite ready to cheat even if unwillingly publicly to bully him. He therefore suggested to the Madras Government that they should try to coax Saraboji into inviting the Company to assume the temporary management of his country. After all, Saraboji was still very young and if he was made to feel sensible of his inexperience and even inability to enter immediately upon the management of the administration, he might express a desire for the British to help him. In that case, the Governor-General authorised the Madras Government to undertake the responsibility.

The Governor-General did lay down that if Saraboji desired to manage Tanjore himself, then every indulgence should be given to him by the Madras Government. But the liberality of that sentiment was marred by his addition of the condition that "he shall pay due attention to the recommendation of the Commission". While offering no opinion on the subject of what further security from the Raja might be demanded by that Commission, Wellesley

nevertheless cautioned Madras that this subject should form "one of the early objects of the Commission" and to Governor Harris he displayed a suggestive anxiety to know the names of the members of the Commission, "on whose report", he observed, "much will depend". If Saraboji did not commit political suicide, Wellesley clearly expected the Commission to encompass the destruction of Tanjore. Once Saraboji could be brought to abide by the Commission's findings, the way was open to the annexation of the entire kingdom to the British dominions.

The Commission was not required, however, for as Wellesley hoped, Saraboji proved open to suggestion. It was understandable that after all the troubles and humiliation he had suffered in the past decade, Saraboji should not have desired to query the conditions attached to his elevation. Ascending the throne itself after such long a delay was a great achievement to him, and he seems to have accepted the appointment of the Commission without any question. Of this the Governor-General seems to have been very confident, for remarkably enough he had not given any directive in his long letter to Madras for any alternative action in the event of Saraboji's refusal to accept the proffered conditions. It is regrettable that the young prince was not equal to the occasion, for had he refused to accept them he would have

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3. It was unfortunate that the Rev. Swartz, who had laboured so long for the recognition of his pupil's claims, had earlier died in Tanjore on 13 February, 1798.
posed a considerable problem to Wellesley. Continuation of patronage to Amar Singh was out of the question and an immediate annexation of Tanjore would not have been a step likely to meet with the Directors' approval. Quite possibly the Governor-General would have been compelled to render justice without conditions and in this manner Saraboji might have saved his country and his position as a real ruler. But, as it was, he agreed to the conditions and the deposition of Amar Singh and Saraboji's elevation to the throne took place in June 1798.

Soon after Saraboji's installation, the Resident, Torin, set about securing a plea for British aid from him. The task was difficult indeed for in theory there still existed the vestiges of the rule that "no interference could take place, but what was formally and explicitly specified" by the Raja himself, and there was also the Governor-General's expressed wish that any application for British aid should be publicly seem to come from Saraboji from "a full conviction of the benefit to be derived from it". Torin at first doubted success, and it was "with the utmost diffidence" that he proceeded to restore Saraboji to the throne and simultaneously to "open to him a conviction of his inability to govern the Country". After long discussions in which there is little doubt that Torin used every type of persuasion, Saraboji was brought to express a desire that the Company should

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assume management of his country for one or at the furthest two years. At the same time, he also sought assurances from the Governor-General that the management of the country would revert to him at the end of that period.

So far the restoration of Saraboji had gone smoothly and a useful point had been gained in the campaign to secure British control of the administration of Tanjore. Wellesley was able to write to the Directors in November 1798 reporting that "it was a great satisfaction ... that this signal act of justice took place without occasioning any disturbance at Tanjore." Saraboji had been placed on the throne, Amar Singh had been sent to Madhyarjunum with an annual allowance, and the country had come under British management. It remained only to ensure the perpetuation of British control. Wellesley had been careful not to reply to Saraboji's plea that any British administration of his kingdom should be only temporary. In January 1799 the Commission in its report laid down that British administration ought to be permanent. They argued that the entire system of administration under Amar Singh had been such as gradually to remove every respect for the central authority.

4. Since Amar Singh died childless in 1802, there was no question of any extension of the pension awarded to him.
it had become "indispensably necessary to establish a regular and permanent system for the better administration of the revenues" of the country. Wellesley gratefully seized upon the Commission's findings, and, declaring that the treaty of 1792 did not seem adequate to the situation, proposed to embody the propositions of the Commission in a new treaty with Saraboji, by which he should hand over the administration of Tanjore in perpetuity to the Company. Saraboji was thus required to pay the penalty for the maladministration of Amar Singh, the man whom the Madras authorities had so long maintained upon a usurped throne. The Company for their part were to be rewarded for their interference and even invasions, for the collapse of the Tanjore administration which they had helped to bring about was now to be the reason for awarding them the kingdom.

Since Saraboji had already committed himself to abide by the recommendations of the Commission, his assent to the proposed treaty was now a mere formality. On 25 October 1799, a treaty was accordingly signed by which Tanjore became a part of the Madras Presidency, and the Company agreed to pay the Raja a fixed allowance of one lakh of rupees with a fifth of the net revenues of Tanjore after all administrative expenses had been met. Saraboji still retained jurisdiction over the city of Tanjore.

2. The legitimate ruler was thus awarded just four times as much as the deposed usurper Amar Singh.
He was allowed to garrison the Tanjore Fort in any manner he chose, but in the event of war or any other emergency, the Company held the right to occupy it. On all occasions, in Tanjore as well as in British territories, the Raja was to be treated "with all the attention, respect and honour which is due him to the friend and ally of the British Nation". Saraboji received the treaty ratified by the Governor-General on 30 December 1799, and on the same day delivered over the management of Tanjore to the Company.

It is difficult to be critical of Saraboji for having resigned the management of Tanjore to the Company. He had already been driven to such pathetic depths of despair that when he was eventually awarded the long delayed recognition, he was too much overcome by his sense of gratitude to see the dangers in the apparently friendly gestures of the Governor-General. Administrative disorders were almost beyond his control and with no army and little revenue authority, there was nothing that he could have done to prevent the advance of his protectors' interests. At his accession his personal position itself was pitiable, for with all the glittering titles of his station and with the style of 'friend of the British Nation', he was not even able to afford to get married. He had to account for his daily expenses to the Resident, and his meagre resources were just enough to discharge

his monthly instalments to the Company. He was, as Torin reported, "much perplexed between the necessity of performing his nuptials on very limited means, or of remaining in a situation, which according to the Customs of his Country and in the general opinion of his people, is disreputable even to a common person of his age, where the family is not prevented by absolute poverty" 1. The only possible remedy was to withhold a month's instalment, but in February 1799 the Governor-General was not prepared to allow even this consideration to his ally, as the money from Tanjore was absolutely essential for the expenses of the Company's forces then about to be launched against Mysore 2. Wellesley's reply to the Resident at Tanjore merely expressed the hope that Saraboji would by then have "reconciled himself to the inconveniences which must naturally be expected" 3. With the Governor-General at Madras personally directing splendid armies in their harrying and destruction of Tipu Sultan in May 1799, Saraboji took the hint and reconciled himself to his bachelor state. The fact that Wellesley remained at Madras with great armies at his disposal until September 1799, busy partitioning out Mysore, doubtless helped Saraboji further to reconcile himself to the loss of power embodied in the treaty of 25 October. He might also take such comfort as he thought fit from the flattery and praise showered upon him when

2. The British army of the Carnatic was believed to be "the most amply and liberally supplied ... which ever took the field of India". Cambridge History of India. Vol.V. p.341
he resigned the burden of administering his country to the British. Thus Lord Clive, Governor of Madras, wrote to express admiration for his "penetration and candour in seeing the inveterate abuse which had been introduced into the Government of Tanjore, as well as your magnanimity in determining to apply the only effectual remedy ...". It may have been some consolation to know that the Governor intended to take up his new task of administering Tanjore with "scrupulous attention to the sacred trust you have reposed in the honourable Company to evince to the world that by a noble self denial ... [you]... have fixed the prosperity of your country and the happiness of your people in the most permanent foundations".

This last note, of concern for the people of Tanjore, had also been struck by the Governor-General in his minutes to the Court of Directors of 31 May 1798, explaining why he wished to establish a permanent revenue and judicial system for Tanjore over which the Raja should have no control. He had there vehemently stressed that annexation was necessary to secure the welfare of the people. In the face of the maladministration which had occurred under Amar Singh, he could not shut his eyes, Wellesley declared, "to the diminution which our weight in the scale of the Country Powers has suffered, and is likely to suffer still more, if the means for checking the progress of the evil be much longer neglected". It is notable, however, that the

remedy applied to the evil was of questionable appropriateness. It was true that Tanjore was in need of efficient and fair administration, but her near-bankruptcy and disordered government was in a great measure due to the enormous subsidy demanded of her. There was never any mention in the Governor-General's correspondence of relieving her of this burden, which would have been the most practical mode of expressing concern for her people, rather his main concern was to safeguard the extraction of the subsidy. It was as the best means to securing this end that annexation was decided upon. Wellesley expressed his pleasure that Tanjore would "at length become a scene of order and affluence, an honour to the Government of the Company and of the Rajah, and an increasing source of profit to both". The Governor of Madras put it more plainly and honestly when he declared that the treaty had "at length relieved that valuable province from the effects of a native administration", and expressed his satisfaction "in this interesting progress to the improvement of the territories under the Presidency".

CONCLUSION.

From the days of its founder, Chola Karikala, down to the advent of the British in the Carnatic, Tanjore had been a Hindu principality, little influenced by Muslim or Christian contacts and preserving the ancient Tamil culture and civilisation. The last era of this continuous Hindu dominion was that of the Marathas, whose rule lasted a hundred and twenty-five years. Moreover, except for a period of hundred and fifty years when it was a subordinate province under Vijayanagar, Tanjore had always maintained its sovereignty, and even in the days of Maratha hegemony, when subordination to Poona might reasonably have been anticipated, Tanjore had preserved its absolute independence. Yet, in the course of fifty years relations with the British, this political unit gradually lost both its power and independence, and was finally absorbed into the British dominions.

The British first interfered in Tanjore affairs when invited to do so by one claimant in a disputed succession to the throne,

1. The history of Hindu Tanjore falls into three periods — the Chola, the Nayak and the Maratha. The commencement of the Chola dynasty was more or less coeval with the Aryan civilisation of the South, and is traceable to a date anterior to the second century B.C. It lasted until the early part of the sixteenth century A.D., and during the period of at least seventeen centuries over which it thus extended, the extent of its dominion varied considerably. After a considerable rise in the ninth and tenth centuries, it began to decline in the twelfth, and in the early sixteenth century, it became a province of Vijayanagar by conquest. After the fall of Vijayanagar, it became independent under their Viceroys ruling under the title of Nayaks, and remained in their hands until the power was wrested from them by the Maratha Venkoji.
and they finally annexed the kingdom in the course of settling another disputed succession. It was not discord within the royal family, however, which fatally exposed Tanjore to European penetration, for the original intervention yielded no lasting fruit. Rather it was the Mughul Emperors' claim to tribute in recognition of their ultimate suzerainty over South India which led to the absorption of the kingdom into the East India Company's territories. This is the more strange since both the British and the French Commissioners, drafting the terms of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, agreed that any specific inclusion of Tanjore in the clauses of that treaty was unnecessary because the Raja was an independent sovereign, whose kingdom was not comprehended within the limits of the Mughul Empire 1. Their view of the practical status of Tanjore was at that time undoubtedly correct; nevertheless, the payments which the Raja made in recognition of Mughul power were to have the most far reaching effects and they may be seen as the immediate occasion for the downfall of his kingdom.

The Nawab, when the Mughuls conquered the Deccan, was merely a deputy governor of the Subahdar, and as the Raja disdainfully declared in 1777, the Rajas had "governed Tanjore before the ancestors of the Nabob were heard of" 2. Nevertheless, the upstart Nawat Arab family of the Nawab were able to establish themselves as hereditary rulers of the whole Carnatic, and to

1. An Account of the War in India-Owen. p.153
throw off any effective subordination to the Subahdar and the Emperor. Furthermore, they succeeded in directing to themselves the imperial claim on Tanjore. The Mughul demand on Tanjore had been made by the victorious imperial commander Zulfiqar Khan when he drove the Maratha king Raja Ram from the Carnatic. Thereafter, however, the Imperial Court had no further concern in the affair, and instead of some distant and possibly ineffective demand made from Delhi, a claim for tribute was asserted by the local Mughul officer, the Nawab.

The payment to the Nawab need not automatically have reduced Tanjore to subordination, destroying its claim to sovereignty. The British, for example, had acquired Devikkottai from the Raja under the condition of making an annual payment to Tanjore, but this in no way impaired their independent authority. Moreover, the tribute from Tanjore was not regularly paid, since the Nawab's claim was not supported by Imperial sanction but only by his own local power. What was fatal therefore to Tanjore was the backing to the Nawab's rather tenuous claim given by the Madras authorities. Had the Nawab been compelled to rely upon

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1. The very Reverend Hutton has said that "the Nawab of Arcot was in truth no independent prince. He was merely an officer of the Subahdar of the Deccan of whom he had been rendered independent, ignorantly or generously, by the English. A political error had been committed in ever treating him as independent; and political errors, however generously originated, are often as dangerous as intentional crimes". Nowhere was the truth of this comment to be more painfully brought home than in Tanjore. Cambridge History of India, Vol.V. p.362
his own force and authority, or had he avoided becoming indebted to the Company, it is doubtful whether the demand for tribute from Tanjore could long have been enforced. As it was however, the Nawab's claim served as an excellent excuse for the Company to exact as much as was possible from Tanjore. As Edmund Burke has put it, "The Nabob, without military, without federal capacity, is extinguished as a potentate; but then he is carefully kept alive as an independent and sovereign power, for the purpose of rapine and extortion".

The justness of Burke's view is made clear by any study of the double interpretation which the British were careful to attach to the Raja's status: for while emphasising the subordination of Tanjore to Arcot, they nevertheless maintained that Tanjore was indeed an independent power. Tanjore's assistance during the Carnatic Wars was solicited on the grounds that the Raja was a sovereign power. The first treaty between the Raja and the Nawab was negotiated by Pigot on the grounds that Tanjore was an independent power. The restoration of Tulaji was ordered by the Court of Directors on the grounds that the Nawab had no more claims on Tanjore than the annual tribute — a point which was again reiterated by Lord Cornwallis while rejecting the Nawab's claims to Tanjore during the Succession question of 1787. All the treaties that the British concluded with Tanjore were between two powers, each recognising

the other's sovereignty. This recognition enabled the Company to prevent Tanjore falling a prize to Mohammed Ali or to the Marathas. But their recognition of the Nawab's claim to tribute also enabled them indirectly to extract much needed money from Tanjore, and they were also able to use the threat from Arcot as the means of driving the Raja of Tanjore to accept claims to direct payments in aid of the Company's war effort. By espousing two interpretations of the Raja's status, even though these were logically incompatible, the Company was able to act upon whichever interpretation suited their interests at any particular juncture.

If the first direct intervention of the British Parliament in the affairs of the Company was injudiciously planned, the manner of its execution proved disastrous to Tanjore. The Treaty of Paris, however beneficial in establishing a temporary halt to the conflicts of two European nations founding an empire, by its eleventh article introduced a most

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1. After the extinction of the Tanjore Raj in 1856, Kamakshi Bai, the senior Rani, took the case to the Privy Council. Lord Kingsdown, who delivered the judgment, declared emphatically that the Raja was "an independent sovereign of territories undoubtedly minute and bound by treaties to a powerful neighbour, which left him practically but little power of free action; but he did not hold his territory, such as it was, as a fief of the ... East India Company ...". (quoted in) Empire in India—Bell. p.56.
dangerous new concept into the politics of India, and one extremely damaging to Tanjore. Moreover, the appointment of a plenipotentiary of George III at the Court of Arcot proved to be a major cause for the subsequent violent policy of Madras against Tanjore, leading to the capture of Tanjore for the Nawab. Though this aggression was disclaimed in London and a restoration of the Raja ordered, there was never any question of the Company's compensating Tanjore for the losses caused by the two invasions and by the three years of alien rule under the Nawab. Instead, when Tulaji was eventually restored, it was upon condition that he should maintain a British garrison at Tanjore and that he should formally accept the Company's right to demand war subsidies whenever the Company was engaged in hostilities in India. The imposition of such conditions upon a ruler admittedly wronged and now to be restored to his former

1. The interpretation of this article led to the possibility, as Wilks has pointed out, that the "two European Nations had assumed themselves the right of conferring the official appointments, and interior arrangements of the Mugul Empire". And more tragic, as Mill has pointed out, was the result of the significance of this treaty to Salabat Jang, who "was acknowledged as lawful Subahdar of the Deccan, after he had been nearly two years deposed, and another reigning in his stead. This instrument, indeed, which recognised Salabat Jang as a great sovereign, was the immediate cause of his death; for Nizam Ali, who had been withheld by dread of the restoration of the French power in India, no sooner received intelligence of the Treaty of Paris, by which the French resigned the Carnatic, and appeared to abandon the contest, then he felt himself delivered from all restraint, and ordered his brother to be murdered in September 1763".-

Historical Sketches of the South of India—Wilks. Vol.II. p.2
History of British India—Mill. Vol.III. p.316
rights and dignities as an independent ruler was but a cruel mockery of justice. Indeed that injustice was matched only by the impudence with which Company officials expressed their concern for maladministration by the Raja's officials and consequent hardship to the inhabitants of the country while they were imposing the demand for a subsidy which exhausted the Tanjore treasury. In the wars with Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan Tanjore was left exposed to their ravages, but this led to no abatement of the demands of the protective power for payments of war contributions. Both subsidy and war contributions were aptly described by Edmund Burke as "a large grant, from a small kingdom not obtained by our arms; robbed, not protected by our power; a grant for which no equivalent was ever given, or pretended to be given" 1.

It is clear that the treaties of 1787, 1792 and 17992 were contracted only to safeguard the payments due from Tanjore, and the assumption of the management of the country during periods of war, which enabled the Company to obtain four fifths of the Tanjore revenues, was intended purely to realise as much as was

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2. The treaty of 1799 was later in 1855 adjudged by the Court of Directors as purely a personal one with Saraboji, although the treaty of 1792 was "between the contracting parties, their heirs and successors". They also held that the accession of Raja Shivaji, son of Saraboji, in 1833 was "an act of grace and favour on the part of the British Government and in no degree a matter of right on the part of the Rajah himself". This argument was to pave the way for an easy extinction of the Tanjore Raj in 1856. - Empire in India-Bell. p.57.
possible from that kingdom. The arrival at that amount was arbitrary, their right to impose such a settlement questionable, and the realisation of the amount was quite contrary to their professed concern for the Raja and his people. Pitt's indictment of Warren Hastings' demand upon the Raja of Benares as "utterly disproportionate and shamefully exorbitant" would have equally well applied to the demands made upon the Raja of Tanjore by both Cornwallis and Shore. Both these Governors-General have something of a reputation as moderate men, perhaps by contrast with the more extreme acquisitive imperialism displayed by Wellesley. But their dealings with Tanjore in 1787 and 1796 and with Oudh in 1787 and 1798 alike show a most resolute determination to ignore the conditions of earlier treaties and all consideration for the luckless inhabitants in order to secure money out of the two states. The motion that Burke carried through in the House of Commons was very true of the Company's relations with Tanjore: The Company was "found totally corrupted and totally perverted from the purpose of the institution, whether political

2. See the treaty with Asaf ud daula of Oudh concluded in April 1787 by Cornwallis: "... with respect to the troops stationed at Futty Ghur, which had been withdrawn, as stipulated in the Treaty of Chunar, I advise that they shall not be recalled, but continued" At a cost of fifty lakhs of rupees a year. Treaties, Engagements and Sanads-Aitchison. Vol.I. pp.105-111. See also Shore's treaty with Saadat Ali Khan of 21 February 1798 which, ignoring the promise in the 1787 treaty that "no further demand shall be made", adds nineteen lakhs of rupees to the annual subsidy from Oudh, plus eleven lakhs for the repair of the Company's forts and twelve lakhs for installing their ally on his ancestral throne. Aitchison. Vol.I. pp.118-122.
or commercial", and that "the powers of war and peace given by
the Charters had been abused ... and all the treaties of peace
they have made have only given cause to so many breaches of
public faith; countries once the most flourishing are reduced
to a state of indigence, decay and depopulation ... to the
infinite dishonour of our national character" 1.

Yet since the reality of power in Tanjore had been with
the Company since 1776, the Raja ought perhaps to have been
grateful to Cornwallis and Shore for permitting Tanjore to retain
a quasi independence, however impoverished. Shore had at least
restored Saraboji; his successor Wellesley dethroned him.
P.E. Roberts has argued that "Had Cornwallis not resigned in 1797,
we can well imagine that no great upheaval would have taken place
that Tippu would have been permitted to make his peace; and that
the status quo ante, with some adjustments and modifications,
would have been continued" 2. This seems unlikely however, for
even before Wellesley had left England, Dundas had agreed with
him that "the time was ripe for an expansion of British India" 3.
The activities of the new Governor-General in the following
years bear ample proof of his tireless efforts to satisfy the
enormous appetite of Dundas for expansion 4. In 1797 the

1. (quoted in) The Inwardness of British Annexations in India-
Srinivasachari. p.11.
2. India under Wellesley—Roberts. p.29.
4. "If you will have a little patience, the death of the Nizam will
probably enable me to gratify your voracious appetite for land
and fortresses. Seringapatam ought, I think, to stay your stom-
ach a while; not to mention Tanjore and the Poligar countries.
Perhaps I may be able to give you a supper of Oudh and the
Carnatic, if you should still be hungry"—Wellesley—Dundas,
absolute possessions of the Company in South India extended to Madras with some adjoining villages\(^1\) and scattered settlements and districts\(^2\), but by 1802, Tipu had been destroyed leaving a truncated Mysore in the hands of a powerless Raja, the French influence at Hyderabad had been removed, the Company had taken over the administration of Tanjore, Surat and the Carnatic, new alliances with Oudh and Poona had been concluded, and the whole of India south of Goa and Krishna excepting for Mysore, Cochin and Travancore, had come under direct British rule. The French threat, quite probably, was most welcome to Wellesley\(^3\) as the excuse for accomplishing the grand object of increasing British possessions. He had himself stated that the situation in India was "extremely critical, but in my opinion, by no means alarming"\(^4\); and yet proceeded to follow schemes of conquest which were in no way justified by his own reading of the situation.

As for Tanjore and the restoration of Saraboji, Wellesley

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1. These were San Thome, Poonamalli, Tiruvendipuram, Chinglepet, Covelong, Manimangalam, Shriharikkottai, Tripassore, peddappollam, Perumbakkam, Salivakkam and Conjeevaram.

2. A conspectus of the Company's acquisitions were;— Cuddalore was acquired in 1682, Fort St. David in 1690, Fort of Tellicherry in 1683, Devikottai was obtained from the Raja of Tanjore in 1749, and Masulipatam was taken from the French in 1759. The Ceded districts were taken in 1767, and the Dutch settlements of Sadras, Pulicat and Negapatam were annexed in 1781. Nagore was ceded by the Raja of Tanjore in 1778, and the districts of Malabar, Salem and Dindigul were acquired from Tipu in 1792.

3. "In the state of mind by which the Governor-General, and Englishmen of his intellectual and moral caste, were at that time distinguished, the very existence of a Frenchman was a cause of alarm". — History of British India—Mill. Vol. VI. p. 58

felt that "some modifications in the manner" of executing the instructions from London were necessary. Typically, the modifications he proposed took the form of a pension to Saraboji and the annexation of his entire kingdom. It is said that Wellesley felt "a burning indignation at the wrongs and miseries inflicted by incompetent native governments on their helpless subjects and a determination to wage a relentless war against the forces of anarchy and misrule." Tanjore's finances were certainly in a deplorable condition, but however noble and humane the Governor-General was in his intentions, he had obviously failed to analyse the basic cause that had led to the decline in Tanjore revenues. The enormous burden of the annual subsidy to the Company was the major cause that had almost bankrupted Tanjore, and the Governor-General, without the smallest attempt to relieve the country of this commitment, had preferred to let this detrimental arrangement outweigh any consideration for the Raja's interests. Even assuming

2. History of British India - Roberts, p.250
3. Again there is a direct parallel to Wellesley's treatment of Oudh, where indignation at maladministration went hand in hand with the taking of nearly two thirds of the Oudh revenues, and then of nearly two thirds of its territory.
that Amar Singh's rule had resulted in a general oppression of the people and deterioration in the Tanjore revenues, it was certainly unfair that Saraboji, who was in no way responsible for them, should have been called upon to pay the penalty. Had he been raised to the throne in 1787, the damage inflicted upon the country by the usurper would have been avoided. But, regrettably, no such liberal understanding was afforded to Saraboji; instead he was denied the justice which the Company professed to be rendering him. He was the legitimate successor to Tulaji, but while at last granting him recognition, Wellesley relieved him of his right to govern. This was not "accomplished without some blunders and political crimes. To disguise them and to maintain that the British administrators were always swayed by impeccable motives ... is to produce an unreal and impossible picture".

It is not very clear why it was necessary, when the Company possessed such power over Tanjore, to proceed to the absorption of the state. Since 1776 the Rajas had not had any

1. The Commissioners' report declared that the "Tanjore mirasdars, during the days of the Maratha Rajas generally and more especially during the days of Ameer Singh, enjoyed undue advantages and were on the whole a favoured people". They also found the notion, which had prevailed before, of the emigration of people during Amar Singh's rule "to be purely visionary"; on the contrary, "owing to the too easy Government of Ameer Singh and the rigorous proceedings exercised for some years past in the neighbouring districts of the Nabob ... a very considerable number of inhabitants of the inferior classes have of late taken refuge in the Tanjour country ...". Report of the Commissioners, 31 Jan. 1799- Tanjore Commissioners' Proceedings. Vol. 90.

independent foreign relations, nor had they been allowed any forces of their own, other than those required for household show. Furthermore, they lacked the support of the people because they were aliens, and the support of the Maratha nation because they were isolated. In Tanjore, at least, Wellesley could scarcely demonstrate any threat from the French. As for the subsidy, which was the Company's main concern, this was taken care of by the Raja's agreement to the sending of a Commission composed of Company servants to enquire into the real state of the country and find out the means to an efficient and just administration. There was no reason to suppose that whatever the Commission's recommendations, the Governor-General could not have compelled Saraboji to implement them. Once every precaution had been taken to improve the general welfare of the people, with definite sources earmarked for the prompt payment of the subsidy and with enlarged powers for the Resident to watch over the interests of the Company, matters could have been settled satisfactorily. Such an indirect rule, which in fact had been evolving since 1776.

1. To mark the victory of his allies over Napoleon, Saraboji built the tower Manors in Saluvanayakan Pattanam in 1816.

2. It seems probable that Dundas was very impressed with the picture made out by Petre about the natural wealth and resources of Tanjore. While giving evidence before the Committee of Secrecy in 1782, Petre had explained that Tanjore "not many years ago was one of the most flourishing, best cultivated and most populous countries in Hindustan". For the rapid decline between 1768 and 1782, he had pointed out the general mismanagement as one of the major reasons. The annual yield of 32,050,000 kalamas under the rule of Pratap Singh had gone down to 15,000,000 kalamas per year by 1778. Dundas obviously believed that the inability of Tanjore to meet the subsidy payments was only due to mismanagement, and for that Tanjore had never realised what a heavy the payments were to.
would have been safe, satisfactory and an honourable arrangement for a loyal and close ally, whose help had been invaluable in the establishment of British power in India.

That such an arrangement could be acceptable and workable was demonstrated in Wellesley's decision to elevate the Wodeyars to the Mysore throne in 1799. By the treaty of Seringapatam with Krishnaraja Wodeyar he contrived to circumvent the disadvantages of Mysore remaining an independent state. The two special characteristics of the treaty - that the subsidy paid for the Company's forces could be augmented at the will of the Governor-General in Council in time of war, and that the Governor-General was empowered in times of difficulty or danger to take over the whole internal administration of the country - were such as to enable the Governor-General to "command the whole resources of Mysore, to improve its cultivation, to extend its commerce, and to secure the welfare of its inhabitants". It is true that this arrangement was dictated by particular political needs, being in fact a "species of screen put up to hide at once from Indian and European eyes, the extent of aggrandisement which the British territory had received". Nevertheless, the system worked and the state of Mysore was even able to survive a period of direct administration by the Company. Since the Company already held the right to take over the entire administration of Tanjore during periods of war, it was doubtless

not beyond the Governor-General to have secured from Saraboji consent to the other conditions imposed on Mysore. The new arrangement with Mysore was based on the inconveniences experienced in the Company's relations with Tanjore. It also noted that the moment was propitious, for as Wellesley put it, it was "more candid and liberal, as well as a more wise policy, to apprise the Rajah [of Mysore] distinctly, at the moment of his accession, of the exact nature of his dependence on the Company ...". The same solution to past inconveniences and the same opportunity to redefine British relations with a ruler hopefully waiting to be restored offered also in Tanjore. Yet, while a family unconnected with the Company was gratuitously installed in Mysore, the Tanjore Rajas to whom much was owed, even if only by way of reparation, were bundled off the stage.

1. "... recollecting the inconveniences and embarrassments which have arisen to all parties concerned under the double governments and conflicting authorities unfortunately established in Oude, the Carnatic and Tanjore, I resolve to reserve to the Company the most extensive and indisputable powers of interference in the affairs of Mysore ..."). Wellesley - Court of Dirks, 3 Aug. 1799 - Despatches of Wellesley - Martin, Vol. II, p. 98

2. Ibid.

3. The question whether to rule India directly or indirectly was of course an old issue. Thus from Clive to Vereist the aim had been to leave to the Nawabs of Bengal the duty of a subahdar, while the Company's function as Diwan was entrusted to Indian officials such as Mohammed Resa Khan. Hastings broke with that tradition, but Francis added his theoretical arguments to the practice of Vereist, and as Guha has shown, was ready, once the suzerainty of the English crown had been established, to strengthen the Nawabs of Bengal as the instruments of an indirect British rule. With this plan of 1776 went a steadfast opposition by Francis to any extension of British possessions in India. That opposition was shared by many in England, as Vincent Harlow has shown, and as the repeated Company and Parliamentary prohibitions of schemes of conquest and extension of dominions demonstrate. Wellesley's action in Tanjore, as in the Carnatic, at Surat or in Oudh were thus contrary to a powerful tradition in India and to the(cont.p.144)
The installation of Saraboji as ruler of Tanjore but subject to such conditions of indirect British control as were imposed on the Raja of Mysore would not of course have satisfied the many promises of friendship and protection that had been given to the Tanjore Rajas by the Company. But it would have been honourable and, by securing much needed reforms, it might even have provided the conditions for a real measure of independence. What is obvious, however, is that the taking over of the whole administration by the Company was entirely counter to the terms of the treaties which the Company had entered into with Tanjore, and was contrary to the faith that the Rajas had been encouraged to place in their ally. Since this thesis will not be concerned with the history of Tanjore after 1800, it is not proposed to enter into the rather speculative argument that Wellesley's action saved the people from the maladministration of an absolute ruler. But it is appropriate to note here the expressed determination of the Home authorities. The Court of Directors condemned in 1805 the policy which Wellesley had followed, largely at the instigation of Charles Grant, who believed that "the wider the British dominion in India spreads, the more vulnerable it becomes" recalled the Governor-General. No reversal of Wellesley's measures followed however, and the Tanjore Rajas therefore remained mere pensioners, until 1856 when on the death of Raja Shivaji without a male heir, Dalhousie abolished the Tanjore Raj under the Doctrine of Lapse.

1. A Rule of Property for Bengal-Guha. p.145
2. The Founding of the Second British Empire-Harlow. Vol. II.

1. Francis, commenting on the replacement of an Indian by European administration in Bengal, wrote, "From the extraordinary decline of the Revenue, since we took the direct management of it into our own hands, it seems probable that white Collectors are not much honester than black ones." - A Rule of Property for Bengal-Guha. p.155.
verdict of Roberts: "If territories were sometimes questionably acquired, they were honestly and capably administered"; but that on this ground alone "it is certainly prudent to rest Lord Wellesley's case, though to do so is frankly to abandon the outposts of a technical and legal defence" 1.

Roberts' comments are those of a committed partisan struggling to be fair. The more recent study by Alexandrowicz, writing when the links with India are ended, achieves more detachment in "exploration of principles of the law of nations which applied to European-East Indian relations". Alexandrowicz examines the development of European attitudes from their original Christian rejection of any dealings with heathen powers, through the tacit allowance of commercial arrangements with them, to the grudging acceptance of infidel alliances against other infidel states. He shows that European penetration into Asia caused a revision of these attitudes to the point where Grotius for example could accept Asian states as sovereign, equal members of the community of nations - states which have long had "their own Kings, their own government, their own laws and their own legal systems" 2. He traces the history of capitulations, the degree to which these derogated from sovereignty and their ultimate debasement into a system of unequal treaties. Finally he notes the return of the European powers to the point where they deny

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to Asiatic states any rights deriving from natural law or any part in the law of nations. The morality of superior force has replaced the morality of superior religion as justification for the denial of equality. In such an analysis the annexation of Tanjore may be used, with the overthrow of Chait Singh and the dismemberment of Oudh, to mark the moment when for the British in India that new attitude has triumphed.

What that attitude meant to one Indian state, the loyal, accommodating, but powerless kingdom of Tanjore, it has been the purpose of this study to explore in detail, stage by stage. It was once pretended that empire in India was created in a fit of absence of mind, the history of relations with Tanjore shows instead a very clear and conscious calculation of interest. Just how conscious the process was may be judged from this quotation from a contemporary observer of the Indian scene: it was the case of "the Europeans first getting a foot there as merchants; imperceptibly endeavour to extend their powers; are no longer satisfied with the advantage of trade, and begin gradually to oppose their own private interests to the interests of those princes who have admitted them into their dominions. In a little time they find means to involve them in a war; sometimes they give them assistance, in order that they may afterwards make them pay for it; and sometimes they incite one prince against another or endeavour to create confusion in their political relations, in a word, they never rest till they get possession of the land which is the object of their ambition".

1. A Voyage to the East Indies- Bartolomew. pp.49-50
RAJAS OF TANJORE (1738 - 1833).

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# GOVERNORS OF MADRAS (1748 - 1803)

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