

Sir John Jordan and the Affairs of China, 1906 - 1916,
with Special Reference to the 1911 Revolution and Yüan
Shih-k'ai.

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Abstract

Apart from several journalistic articles there is no major work on Sir John Jordan who was the British minister to Peking from 1906 to 1920. This can probably be explained by the fifty years' rule which had until recently prevented the opening to the public of Foreign Office materials pertaining to the later years of Jordan's service. This thesis is a study of his work as British minister in Peking between 1906 and 1916. However, as the title indicates, not every aspect of Jordan's ministry nor every major event in China in these ten years is dealt with in the thesis. The emphasis is on those which have a direct bearing on his rôle in the 1911 revolution and his relationship with Yüan Shih-k'ai. This also accounts for choosing 1916, when Yüan died, as the closing year of the study.

Jordan's ministry between 1906 and 1916 is worthy of study in that it throws light on a vital period of Chinese internal history which was crammed with dramatic changes. Institutionally, China changed from being a dynasty to a republic and then almost to a dynasty again; militarily, she suffered from three civil wars; and politically, she was to reap from these ten years decades of internal chaos and strife which was only brought to a temporary end with the institution of the communist régime in the middle of the century. Jordan, as the British representative, as a senior diplomat with great knowledge of China and as a friend of Yüan Shih-k'ai, played an important part in these events. The primary purpose of the thesis is to identify and assess his rôle.

It is also hoped that the thesis will throw light on British policy towards China and, to a lesser extent, Japan during these years. In this respect, it is important to bear in mind that it was during this period that Britain's predominance in China, and the Far East, was for the first time being seriously challenged.

Finally, Jordan himself is an interesting person to study. His activities during these ten years serve as a case study of the place of personal influence in policy-making in the peculiar political and international setting of the time.

Contents


Abstract

Contents

Photograph of Sir John Jordan

List of Abbreviations

	Page
Introduction	8
Chapter One - Chinese Politics 1906 - 1911	13
Chapter Two - Policy of Neutrality in the 1911 Revolution...	84
Chapter Three - Mediation	129
Chapter Four - Yüan Shih-k'ai's Rise to the Presidency	162
Chapter Five - The Reorganisation Loan	204
Chapter Six - Yüan Shih-k'ai's Autocracy	258
Chapter Seven - The Monarchical Movement	285
Conclusion	339
Glossary - List of British Officials Whose Names Appear More Than Three Times in the Thesis.	
Bibliography	



HIS EXCELLENCY SIR JOHN N. JORDAN, K.C.M.G.
(British Minister at Peking)

This photograph is taken from A. Wright,
Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other
Treaty Ports of China
(London etc., 1908)

Abbreviations

- CCL Pao Tsun-p'eng etc., (ed.), Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'ung, Taipei, 1960 -
- CCS ts'ung-k'an Shen Yün-lung (ed.), Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-k'an, Taipei, 1966.
- CH ts'ung k'an Wu Hsiang-hsiang, (ed.), Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shih ts'ung-k'an, Taipei, 1960 -
- Ch. Conf. Print Foreign Office Confidential Print, China. (F.O. 405).
- Ch. Corres. Foreign Office General Correspondence, Political, China, before 1906 (F.O. 17), after 1906 (F.O. 371).
- Ch. Emb. Arch. Foreign Office Embassy and Consular Archives, China. (F.O. 228) or (F.O. 671) or (F.O. 233). The reference number will be inserted when a volume is mentioned for the first time.
- Cheng-ch'ih shih Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-ch'ih shih, Shanghai, 1948.
- China Consortiums F. V. Field, American Participation in the China Consortiums, Chicago, 1931.
- HHKM Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh-hui, Hsin-hai ko-ming, Shanghai, 1957
- Japan Corres. Foreign Office General Correspondence, Political, Japan, after 1906 (F.O. 371).
- KMWH Lo Chia-lun (ed.), Ko-ming wen-hsien, Taipei, 1953 -
- Liang, nien-p'u Ts'en Hsüeh-lü, San-shui Liang Yen-sun Hsien-sheng nien-p'u, in CHS ts'ung-shu.
- NGB Nihon Gaimusho, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho [Documents on Japan's diplomacy].

NCH The North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette.

PRCCC Papers prepared for the Research Conference on Contemporary China, with exclusive reference to the 1911 Revolution, New Hampshire, Aug., 1965.

Recent Events J.O.P. Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China, London, 1912.

Shih-hua T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang chün-fa t'ung-ch'ih shih-chih shih-hua, Peking, 1957 - 1961.

Shih-kao Tsou Lu, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang shih-kao, Commercial Press, 1941.

Tsui-chin san-shih-nien Li Chien-nung, Tsui-chin san-shih-nien Chung-kuo cheng-ch'ih shih, Shanghai, 1930.

Introduction

Sir John Newell Jordan¹ was born at Balloo, Ireland, on 5 September 1852. It was alleged that he owed his sense of justice and conscientiousness to both his Irish origin and strict Presbyterian upbringing. His career of forty-four years was exclusively made in the Far East, his highest position being British minister in Peking, 1906-20. Five and a half years after he retired from China he died in London on 14 September 1925.

Jordan's Career

Unlike many, Jordan entered the China Consular Service as a student interpreter in 1876 with an excellent university degree². His academic aptitude accounted much for the success he made of the Chinese language and the concise and interesting way with which he wrote official despatches.

Between 1881 and 1886 Jordan was pro-consul at Canton, acting consul at Kiungchou and Amoy respectively. These were the only years which Jordan spent in southern China where the anti-dynastic revolutionary movement gradually gathered strength. The period was valuable to Jordan in giving him first-hand experience of the sentiment of the southern Chinese, something which became particularly useful during the crisis of the 1911 revolution.

In 1886 Jordan was transferred to Peking where he at first discharged the duties of accountant to the legation. He soon proved his mettle and was promoted to assistant Chinese secretary in 1887,

1. The biography of Jordan given here is based on D.H. Hosie, "Jordan, Sir John Newell"; Dictionary of National Biography, supp. 1922-30, (Oxford Univ. Press 1937) pp. 461-3; Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1920

and full Chinese secretary in 1891. His service as Chinese secretary especially won the high approval¹ of O'Connor, then British minister in Peking³. The ten years, until 1895, in the legation were beneficial in two ways. In the course of the period it was inevitable that Jordan should become familiar with Chinese politics at the highest level. It also meant complete mastery over the Chinese language on Jordan's part⁴.

In 1896 Jordan went to Korea as the consul-general at Seoul. He became chargé d'affaires in 1898 and minister resident in 1901. He left in late 1905 shortly before the legation was withdrawn on Japan establishing a protectorate over Korea. Despite his feeling that between 1896 and 1906 he was "only a distant observer of events in China"⁵, Jordan's Korean days had an indelible effect on his later service in China. He was frequently apprehensive that China would follow the tragic steps of Korea. References to Korea were made most frequently during World War I when China's sovereignty was severely threatened by Japan.⁶

p.408; and the obituary notes in The Times, 15 Sept. and NCH, 19 Sept. 1925, except where stated otherwise.

2. He obtained a first class B.A. honours degree in Classics in 1873 at Queen's College, Belfast.
3. N.R. O'Connor to Sanderson, 4 Feb. 1895, in which O'Connor describes Jordan as "our excellent Chinese secy."; also O'Connor to Marquis of Salisbury, 10 Oct. 1895, Ch. Corres., (F.O.17), vols. 1246 and 1245 respectively.
4. For a brief description of the duties of the first secretary, see L. Marchant, Anglo-Chinese Relations in the Provinces of the West River and the Yangtze River Basins 1889 - 1900 (London M.A. thesis, 1965) p.64. The duties included daily visits to the Wai-wu Pu and being the language expert of the legation.
5. Jordan, "Some Chinese I have known", Nineteenth Century, vol. 88 (Dec. 1920) p.947.

From 1906 to 1920 Jordan was again back in Peking, this time as the British representative there. There is no direct evidence in the Foreign Office on the background to Jordan's appointment. It appears that Dr. G. E. Morrison, The Times correspondent in Peking and respected by the Foreign Office, was instrumental in bringing about the decision in highly recommending the choice to Lansdowne, the foreign secretary of state, W. G. Tyrrell and Louis Mallet, in charge of the China Department. The decision was made in early October 1905 when Morrison was in London⁷. The first ten years of the ministry is the period to be studied in this thesis. As a preliminary to this study, it is desirable to examine briefly Jordan's relations with the London Foreign Office; his relations with British officials in China; his relations with Chinese leaders; and his relations with other foreign ministers in Peking.

There is no doubt that the Foreign Office trusted Jordan. After all, he started from the lowest rung of the consular ladder and had spent thirty years in the Far East, twenty of them in China, when he was appointed as minister⁸. The Foreign Office was headed by Sir Edward Grey during the entire period concerned, and Grey was extremely appreciative of Jordan. Writing to Jordan after the 1911 revolution B. F. Alston, a clerk in the office, said: "I found him, though it was nothing new to me, most enthusiastic about and full of admiration for you - and all you have done".⁹ Three months later, shortly before

6. For example, Jordan to Langley, private, 24 Nov. 1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12.

7. 22 Jul., 29 Sept., 2 Oct., 1905, Morrison Papers, vol. 65.

8. Because of Jordan's experience E. H. Parker writes in "The Fight for the Republic in China", Asiatic Review, vol. 15 (1919) p. 12 that Jordan was "probably the 'safest' minister we have ever had in China".

9. Alston to Jordan, private, 4 Aug., 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 2.

Jordan's leave, Alston wrote again: "If you only realised the way the S. of S. always refers to you, as do all those in authority, you would understand how we here cannot conceive the idea of Peking without you there to represent us"¹⁰. It was only in 1916, under the extraordinary circumstances created by Japanese supremacy in the Far East during the War, that Jordan's anti-Japanese attitude caused some change in his relations with the Foreign Office.

Through the long years of official contact since Jordan's Korean days, a close friendship developed between him and F.A. Campbell, permanent under-secretary of state and the head of the China Department until the end of 1911. W. Langley, Campbell's successor until 1918, had a marked respect for Jordan who was an "old hand", as it were, especially during the early years of his headship of the department.

Looking at Jordan's relationship with the Foreign Office one is also bound to ask how much freedom of action Jordan was given and how much initiative he possessed. It is evident from the Foreign Office archives that Grey, though heavily burdened with European affairs, paid considerable attention to Far Eastern matters and exerted a strong influence on questions concerning China, especially those involving Japan. Jordan on the other hand did not appear to have had great confidence in his own influence on the Foreign Office. Sir Valentine Chirol once wrote to W.G. Tyrrell, private secretary to Grey: "I am obliged you gave poor Jordan a K.C.B. for he wanted 'bucking up' badly. The trouble with him is that he is far too diffident and timid and if I may venture to say so stands in far too great awe of F.O! He is always saying

10. Alston to Jordan, private 1 Nov. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 2.

he thinks he ought to do this, that, and the other, but I don't know whether F.O. would approve"¹¹. Jordan's obituary in The Times is full of praise of him but it also says: "Perhaps the one reproach that could be made to Jordan was his extreme diffidence in advising his own government" (15 September 1925). However, these comments were not invariably true. On a number of important occasions, as will be seen, Jordan did exert his initiative and because he was famous for being careful his suggestions were seriously considered.

Throughout his career as minister, Jordan maintained excellent relations with the consular service. But he was insistent on the consular staff being at all times in close contact with the legation. Consular officials had no excuse to be ignorant of their standing. Jordan told Campbell: "I am a little anxious about the future of the Chancellery with Robertson and Garnett both going home so soon. The work there is at all times heavy and I am afraid I make it especially so by insisting that the consulates, of which there are thirty odd, should be kept fully informed of all that concerns them"¹². Jordan also insisted on the consuls making full reports on all matters pertaining to their posts. For instance, in 1908, Tebbit, the consul at Newchwang, was reprimanded for failing to observe fully Japanese activities in his area¹³. In 1911 Jamieson, consul-general at Canton and an official of repute, was chided for want of detailed reports on the revolutionary movement in the province¹⁴.

11. Chirol to Tyrrell, private, 29 Jun. 1909, Grey Papers, (F.O. 800). vol. 106. Sir V. Chirol was the foreign editor of The Times from 1899. He was considered an expert on Far Eastern affairs and certainly had the ear of the Foreign Office.

12. Jordan to Campbell, private, 28 Nov. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.

13. Jordan to R.T. Tebbit, private, 6 May, 1908, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.

14. Jordan to Jamieson, private, 18 Jun. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

Largely because of the political situation which dominated the decade Jordan had a closer contact with the consular officials at Shanghai, Hankow, Canton, Nanking and Yunnanfu. It is interesting to note the influence these officials had on Jordan in crises like the 1911 revolution and the monarchical movement of 1915-16.¹⁵

As far as other British officials in China were concerned, Jordan enjoyed throughout the period helpful cooperation from Admiral Winsloe of the China Station. It was still the gun-boat age in which the presence of warships was regarded by foreigners in China as the strongest guarantee for safety. Cooperation between Jordan and the commander-in-chief of British troops at Tientsin was notable during the 1911 revolution and, to a lesser extent, the allied occupation of Tsingtao in 1914.

Jordan's relations with the Chinese authorities can be divided into two periods: before and after the 1911 revolution. During the last five years of the Ch'ing dynasty Jordan was familiar with many of the important Chinese officials. Prince Ch'ing, Na-t'ung, Yüan Shih-k'ai, Wang Ta-hsieh, Wu T'ing-fang and others often took Jordan into their confidence with varying degrees of sincerity. Jordan's familiarity with high Chinese official circles increased in the period after the 1911 revolution which was characterised by the autocracy of Yüan Shih-k'ai.

In both periods it was significant that Jordan was conversant with the Chinese language¹⁶. Of the Ch'ing officials mentioned above only Wang Ta-hsieh and Wu T'ing-fang¹⁷ knew English, but they were not

15. See Chapters 2-4, and 7.

16. Jordan's mastery of Chinese is of repute, O'Conor to Marquis of Salisbury, 10 Oct. 1895, Ch. Corres., (F.O.17), vol.1245. Tang Shao-i says that he spoke "first-class Mandarin", NCH, 19 Sept.1925. Not all British ministers to Peking knew Chinese; for example, the language was foreign to O'Conor.

the most important representatives of the group. Yüan Shih-k'ai knew no English, besides a few personal names, but he often asked for private interviews with Jordan. When he could not see Jordan personally about important matters it was Yüan's habit to send his eldest son, K'o-ting, his henchman, Liang Shih-i, or his private secretary, Admiral Ts'ai T'ing-kan, to Jordan. All of them spoke only Chinese. After he had become the president of China, Yüan sometimes made use of his advisers, notably the Australian, G.E. Morrison and Sir Richard Dane, in communicating with Jordan. Towards the end of the period Wellington Koo¹⁸, who was to attain international fame in the Paris Conference of 1911 and who spoke English well, was also sent to Jordan.

From February 1911, Jordan was the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking. It was the first time that a British minister assumed this position of seniority there in relation to his diplomatic colleagues. Although some people sneered at the limited capacity of the Diplomatic
19
Body, Jordan attached considerable significance to his doyenship. It usually entailed an extra burden of duties for whosoever assumed it, yet an astute manipulation of its prerogatives often caused matters to be directed in a manner highly beneficial to the nation the doyen represented. Thus Jordan wrote to Tyrrell soon after he became senior minister: "it [the doyenship] is certainly a post which no one

17. Wang at one time was minister to London. Wu was for many years minister to Washington and he obtained a Ph.D degree from the University of Pennsylvania.

18. Wellington Koo was a councillor of the Wai-chiao Pu when he was frequently sent to Jordan by Yüan. He had his Ph.D. degree from the University of Columbia.

19. See for example, D. Vare, first secretary, and for many times charge d'affaires of the Italian legation 1912-18, Laughing Diplomat, (London 1938), pp. 126-7 quoting a poem written by

would willingly accept [because of the extra work]. But there are many important questions, such as the Whangpoo Conservancy, etc., which touch our interests very closely and which do not always go as we could wish when directed by another Legation"²⁰. That Jordan was the senior foreign minister during the 1911 revolution accounted partly for the shape of what it commonly called the policy of neutrality adopted by the powers.

Looking at the ten years here studied from the stand-point of periodisation, they can be clearly divided into three periods. The first period was from September 1906 to October 1911, when the revolution broke out, in which Jordan made his assessment of the various elements prominent in Chinese politics. This period was significant in that it largely determined Jordan's reasoning and actions during the two following ones. The second period was from October 1911 to August 1914, when World War I commenced. Those were the revolutionary years in which Jordan's influence on Chinese affairs reached its zenith. The reason for Jordan's influence then was Yüan Shih-k'ai's acquisition of supreme power after the revolution. The third period was from August 1914 to June 1916, when Yüan Shih-k'ai died. For Jordan it was a period of utter frustration because Japan's ascendancy during the War meant a corresponding decline in Britain's prestige in China and consequently a decline in his influence. Moreover, Japan's anti-Yüan policy was in direct conflict with his own

J.O.P. Bland in 1906 "In dejection to the Diplomatic Body at Peking", and entitled "A Lullaby".

20. Jordan to Tyrrell, private, Feb. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7, Marchant, Anglo-Chinese Relations in the Provinces of the West River and the Yangtze Basins, 1889-1900, p. 66 throws light on this point indirectly in describing how Hankow was raised to the rank of a consulate-general in 1899.

pro-Yüan attitude. The death of Yüan, which Jordan regarded as a direct outcome of Japanese conspiracy, crowned the frustration of those years.

Jordan and British Railway interests in China

The assessment made by Jordan of the different elements of Chinese politics during the years before the revolution was determined almost entirely by his concept of Britain's rôle and position in China. During those years Jordan had to deal with many aspects of British interests in China, such as opium, the West River piracy, the Whangpoo Conservancy, British mining rights and the like. But it was in railway matters that his attitudes can be seen most clearly.

Although it had been popularly believed amongst British merchants in China that the country was a great potential market, yet until the beginning of the twentieth century China's foreign trade remained comparatively small. After the international scramble for concessions in 1898 railway interests in China became the chief attraction to British investors. It is estimated that besides the Exchange Adjustment Loan of 1905, the Currency Loan of 1911, and a number of provincial loans, all loans contracted by China from British capitalists in 1898-1911 were for railways²¹. In 1898 the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank associated with Jardine, Matheson and Company ~~to~~ formed the British and Chinese Corporation²² to handle railway concessions in China. The new syndicate was closely identified with the leadership

21. Chung-Sien Chen, British Loans to China 1860-1913, (London Ph.D. Thesis), p.84; see also A.P. Winston, "Chinese Finance under the Republic", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.30. (Aug. 1916), p. 739; and H. Feis, Europe: The World's Banker 1870-1914, (New York, 1930), p. 452 which explains the zeal to invest in China.

22. For details about the British and Chinese Corporation until 1913 see Chung-Sien Chen, British Loans to China, 1860-1913, pp. 171-7;

of the China Association - the spokesman for British China merchants - and was used by the Foreign Office as an instrument to implement its policy of limited liability in the Yangtze. The Foreign Office supported the corporation in obtaining concessions but there was no question of state finance or management; the concessions obtained were the private business of the corporation.

Running counter to the increased British railway interests in China, the rights recovery movement, a product of the birth of national spirit amongst educated Chinese, was also gathering strength in this period. Sir Ernest Satow, the minister before Jordan, was impressed by the new spirit. Before he left China he submitted a memorandum advising the Foreign Office to abandon the old policy of extorting railway concessions from China and, if possible, to refrain from materialising the concessions which the British and Chinese Corporation obtained in 1898²³. It is difficult to define Grey's reaction to Satow's advice. Although he stated in his instruction to Jordan as his own opinion that the policy of extorting concessions was no longer justified, Grey counteracted the statement later in the despatch by saying that a departure from the policy might be mistaken for weakness²⁴. Perhaps because of his long absence, Jordan refrained himself from positively objecting to Grey's vague instructions with which he did not at all agree. Between 1906 and 1911 Jordan devoted

also M. Collis, Wayfoong, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, (London, 1965), p.118.

23. Satow to Grey, no.177, v. conf., 2 Jun. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol.35.

24. Grey to Jordan, no.298, 31 Aug.,1906, Ch. Corres., vol.35.

himself vigorously to helping the British and Chinese Corporation to put in effect the preliminary agreements which it had made with the Chinese government on the concessions obtained in 1898. To him, railways in China were a "positive obsession"²⁵. At moments of utter despair he might sigh that "Sir E. Grey's policy of embarking on no further[railway] enterprises . . . is the only sound one"²⁶, but he never really meant it.

Apart from the firmly established Russian sphere in North Manchuria, the Japanese sphere in South Manchuria, the German sphere in Shantung, and the French sphere in South-west China, railway interests in China from 1909 became increasingly internationalised. The Hukuang Railway Loan Agreement was made in the spring of 1911 between the Chinese government and the quadruple consortium of British, American, French, and German bankers. The consortium was enlarged in 1912 by including Japan and Russia. Jordan was against any semblance of cooperation with other countries not only on railway development but in all industrial and commercial matters in China. He objected in the summer of 1908 to the Anglo-French loan to the Chinese government to redeem the Peking-Hankow railway from a nominal Belgian concern. Later, when the cooperation was extended to the Hukuang Railway Loan, Jordan condemned the French share as "a millstone round our necks"²⁷. When negotiations were going on simultaneously with the Chinese government on the Soochou-Hangchou railway, a purely British concern, and

25. Jordan to Campbell, private, 6 Aug. 1908, Jordan Papers, vol. 4.

26. Jordan to Campbell, private, 26 Dec. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 5. On this particular occasion Jordan and the Corporation were encountering extreme difficulties over the Soochou-Hangchou-Ningpo railway.

27. Jordan to Campbell, private, 11 Jun. 1908, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.

the Tientsin-Pukou Railway, an Anglo-German concern, Jordan insisted that the former must take precedence over the latter²⁸.

If cooperation with just one country was disagreeable to Jordan, wholesale internationalisation in the form of the consortium was even more repugnant. While understanding the political significance of the consortium, Jordan attacked it for being "unnatural", "cumbersome and heterogeneous" and, above all, for precluding British concessionaires from bidding freely for Chinese industrial loans²⁹.

It was a great relief to Jordan, as well as the Foreign Office, when at the end of 1913 industrial loans were separated from political ones which remained under the regulations of the consortium agreement. X

It was natural that Jordan should have been especially concerned about Britain's railway rights in the Yangtze region. Despite the Anglo-Chinese agreement of February 1898, on the non-alienation of the Yangtze region it had never been a British sphere, strictly speaking, in the sense that, for instance, Shantung was a German sphere. There were times when Jordan expressed regret that the Yangtze region had not been subjected to stronger British state control³⁰. In this ten year period of Jordan's career the first encroachment on the British railway interests in the Yangtze area was in 1909 when the Germans succeeded in including themselves in the Hukuang Railways Loan. This was a blow ^{to} on Jordan who found it the harder because both the British

28. Jordan to Grey, no. 238, 16 May 1907. Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

29. Jordan to Langley, private, 22 Oct. & 8 Dec. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

30. For example, Jordan to Langley, private, 13 Jul. 1912; 29 Dec. 1913, Jordan Papers, vol. 8; Langley Papers (F.O. 800) vol. 31.

bank and the Foreign Office were resigned to the situation because of political considerations in Europe³¹. The acid test was in the months preceding World War I when Japan forced her entry into the Yangtze region. In his resistance against Japan Jordan had the support of Sir Edward Grey³².

Jordan's personal qualities

A study of how Jordan was thought of by people who were familiar with him throws light on his personality. His two most outstanding qualities were conscientiousness and righteousness.

At the end of January 1910 Jordan had "a complete breakdown owing to over-work and a conscientious devotion to duty"³³. On his arrival in Peking in the summer of 1913 as chargé d'affaires, Alston found him "almost too tired to talk"³⁴. Three years later Jordan was again on the point of collapse, this time partly because of the additional strain caused by the death of his best friend Yüan Shih-k'ai³⁵. All this, however, partly reflects his inability to delegate less demanding tasks to others for greater efficiency.

There were many incidents showing the sense of justice that was in Jordan. One example here suffices to illustrate the point. When Jordan fell ill in early 1910 MaxMuller, first secretary of the legation, took charge. After several weeks Jordan discovered accidentally that MaxMuller had not been paid the salary of a chargé d'affaires.

He was "awefully upset" and telegraphed at once to have the matter

31. Jordan to Campbell, private, 12 Aug 1909; Jordan Papers, vol. 6 in which Jordan attacked J.O.P. Bland whom he considered as largely responsible for creating a situation in which the Germans could make a successful claim. Also F.O. memorandum to M. Cambon, 15 Feb. 1909; and Addis to F.O., 23 Jan. 1909; Ch. Corres., vol. 622.

32. This aspect is dealt with at greater length in chapter 7.

33. MaxMuller to Campbell, private, 31 Jan. 1910, Alston Papers, (F.O. 800) vol. 245.

corrected³⁶. Jordan's sense of justice accounted a great deal for the respect that his subordinates had for him. Just one year after he became minister, A. Robertson, second secretary of the legation, wrote a private letter to M.W. Lampson of the Foreign Office which was full of praise of Jordan and ended: "I hope it is fully realised at home what a splendid Minister we have here. He is worth the whole of the rest of his colleagues put together and is universally liked and respected. It is a genuine pleasure to work under him"³⁷. Leech, another secretary of the legation, wrote: "His power, personality, and tact, coupled with his instinctive sense of justice, enable him to conquer without offending the vanquished. I have never met such a wonderful character during the 20 years I have been in the service."³⁸ MaxMuller told Alston that it was impossible not to be "able to work well and cordially with a chief like Sir John"³⁹.

Within a short time Jordan gained the confidence of the British mercantile community in China. At a China Association dinner in October 1907 Alston heard "nothing but praise" of Jordan.⁴⁰ There were rumours that Jordan would not be returning to China when he left for leave in 1910; the English residents were so concerned that MaxMuller had to make repeated assurances⁴¹.

34. Alston to Langley, private, 2 Jun. 1913, Alston Papers, vol. 247.

35. Alston to E. Drummond, private, 16 Aug. 1916, Grey Papers, (F.O. 800), vol. 44.

36. MaxMuller to Campbell, private, 10 Mar. 1910, Alston Papers, vol. 245.

37. Robertson to Lampson, private, 15 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 233.

38. Leech to Campbell, private, 2 Apr. 1908, Alston Papers, vol. 244.

39. MaxMuller to Alston, private, 12 Nov. 1912, Alston Papers, vol. 245.

40. Alston's minute on Robertson to Lampson, private, 15 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 233. As a matter of fact Jordan was held in high esteem by the association throughout his service, China Association, Annual Reports 1910-1915, p.60, supp. pp. 10,14; Annual Reports 1920-1921 pp. 17-18.

The complimentary views above may be balanced somewhat by the opinions of a Chinese official, Chang Ch'ien, and an Italian diplomat, Daniele Vare. Both Chang and Vare are chosen because of their neutral background. Important Chinese belonging either to Yüan Shih-k'ai's or Sun Yat-sen's faction were bound to be prejudiced in their opinions of Jordan. But, Chang Ch'ien had a loose attachment to both groups. As for Vare, his neutrality was derived simply from the fact that Italy cherished relatively less political and financial ambitions in China. Chang said that Jordan gave him the impression of being proud and condescending⁴². Perhaps Chang's statement can be understood better in the light of Vare's observation made before the War: "I do not profess to know what passed in Sir John's mind, but it seemed to me that his world consisted of the British Empire and China, with Russia and Japan in the background (sometimes inconveniently near) and a lot of other powers fussing round and interfering in matters which did not really concern them and which they imperfectly understood. Germans and French he looked upon as tiresome, and Americans as spoilt children. Swedes, Spaniards and Portuguese were merely Banderlog"⁴³. Vare also said that Jordan "had a personality that was worthy of study, though he was not what you would call a superior man; only an admirable public servant"⁴⁴.

41. MaxMuller to Alston, private, 10 May 1910, Alston Papers, vol. 245

42. Chang I-tsu, Chang Chi-chih chuan-chi, fu nien-p'u, nien-piao, [Biography of Chang Ch'ien followed by his chronological biography], (Taipei, 1965), p. 256.

43. Vare, Laughing Diplomat, p.119

44. Ibid.

Chapter One

Chinese Politics 1906-1911

To Jordan there were three main elements in Chinese politics between 1906 and 1911. There was the weakness of the Manchu government; the new spirit manifested in many of the provinces; and above all, the power of Yüan Shih-k'ai, whether in or out of office, which represented the middle way between the government's conservatism and the province's radicalism.

The Manchu government

The prestige of the Manchu dynasty was at its lowest ebb in the period. Famines, drought, and other national disasters were freely attributed to the belief that the mandate of the Manchu was at an end. Anti-dynastic outbreaks occurred with increasing frequency.

These years were no better in terms of government. In 1906 China was under the nominal reign of Kuang-hsü with the empress dowager, Tzū-hsi, actually controlling the reins of government. But even the once dominating empress was fast losing her grip on the country. The constitutional reform policy which was officially adopted, explained most simply, was itself an acknowledgement of weakness by the government.

The death of the aged empress dowager had been long expected before it took place on 15 November 1908. It was preceded by the death of Kuang-hsü a day earlier. Uneasiness was particularly wide-

spread amongst Chinese officials¹ who feared that the disappearance of the empress dowager might let loose the anti-Chinese sentiment of the Manchu. The apprehension was shared by interested foreigners who watched the situation eagerly. For example, for one week after the deaths took place the Japanese minister in Peking sent hourly reports to Tokyo in case of emergency.²

Jordan was further worried that the death of Tz'ü-hsi, leaving Kuang-hsü in power, might endanger the position of Yüan Shih-k'ai. Yüan was then concurrently a president of the Wai-wu Pu and a member of the Grand Council. It was well known that Kuang-hsü hated Yüan for betraying him in the Hundred Days' Reform of 1898. Thus Jordan found that the "simultaneous deaths of both Monarchs" offered "a fortunate solution of the difficulty."³

For a short while Jordan was optimistic. The period immediately after the deaths was unexpectedly peaceful. There was the usual sense of hopeful anticipation associated with a new beginning although the regency was the third minority since 1860.

¹ See for example, Jordan to Campbell, private, 12 Dec. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 5, in which Jordan says: "Wang, [Ta-hsieh] the late Minister in London, Wu Ting-fang, who is going as Minister to Washington, and others whom I need not mention, tell me that they are glad to be out of the country, not knowing what may happen when the Empress Dowager dies".

² C. MacDonald, ambassador at Tokyo, to Grey, tel. 81, conf., 19 Nov. 1908, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 183.

³ Jordan to Grey, no. 14, conf., 6 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190; also Jordan to Campbell, private, 26 Nov. 1908, Jordan Papers in which Jordan is extremely outspoken about this relief.

⁴ The prince regent, Prince Chun, headed a mission of apology to Germany after the Boxer fiasco, see Jordan to Grey, no. 521, 21 Nov. 1908, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 183; also Jordan to Grey, no. 257, 15 Jul. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 191.

The chief "compensating advantage" of the new regency, according to Jordan, was : "For the first time in history the supreme direction of Chinese affairs will be in the hands of a man who has seen something of foreign countries, who has come freely into contact with the outer world."⁴

Disillusionment set in two months later when Yüan Shih-k'ai was summarily shorn of all office in early 1909. To Jordan no Chinese official excelled over Yüan. Take for example Jordan's criticism of the Grand Council, the body which practically did the work of the central government, just before Yüan Shih-k'ai became a member of it. Of the two Manchu members, Prince Ch'ing was old and in feeble health and the other was a useless cypher. Of the two Chinese members Lin Shao-nien was a "dark horse" and Chu Hung-chi, who dominated the council and had the trust of the empress dowager, was "a narrow-minded pedant".⁵ The Grand Council immediately after Yüan's dismissal was no better. On the Manchu side, Prince Ch'ing remained in office, Shih Hsu was inexperienced, and Na-t'ung also suffered from bad health. The Chinese, Chang Chih-tung and

⁵ Jordan to Campbell, private, 21 Mar. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 4.

⁶ Jordan to Grey, no. 119, conf., 16 Mar. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 636.

⁷ Jordan to Campbell, private, 15 May 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

⁸ Actually Jordan rather overlooked the modern aspect of Chang. He advocated modernisation based on western knowledge rather than institutions, see Chang Chih-tung, Ch'üan-hsüeh p'ien [Exhortation to study], (Shanghai, 1898); A. J. Brown, New Forces in Old China (London etc. 1904), pp. 189-90. Chang was a reformer of Chinese education, F. L. H. Pott, The Emergency in China (Indian edition, 1914), p.129;

Lu Ch'uan-lin, were aged and too conservative.⁶ When a cabinet was for the first time instituted in May 1911 in the place of the Grand Council Jordan regarded it as a "new stable with the old horses".⁷

The regency was further weakened, in terms of personnel, by the death of Chang Chih-tung in early October 1909. To Jordan Chang had all along been overshadowed by Yüan Shih-k'ai. Chang was Yüan's rival and represented the old school of Chinese officials.⁸ It was after Yüan's dismissal that Jordan realised better that for some years Chang and Yüan had been the two pillars which bolstered up the dynasty.⁹ Perhaps what impressed Jordan most was that Chang "served his country with singular disinterestedness for nearly fifty years and died in comparative poverty"¹⁰ - a rare virtue in Chinese officialdom. Jordan was also disappointed with the dismissal of Tuan-fang, whom Jordan regarded as the ablest of the Manchu officials, on trivial grounds shortly before Chang Chih-tung's death.¹¹

The prince regent was responsible for yet another danger. Shortly after the inauguration of the regency there was a marked revival of Manchu ascendancy in all departments of government. He made no attempt to give effect to the decrees promising the fusion of the two races and abolition of Manchu privileges. Instead he

on a smaller scale than Yüan, Chang was a reformer of the army, see R. L. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), pp. 60-71. It is, however, true that he was less of a zealous reformer than Yüan during the last years of the dynasty, see Shen Yün-lung (ed.), Hsien-tai cheng-chih jen-wu shu-p'ing [Collected articles on leading figures of Modern China] in CCS t'sung-k'an, vol. 1, pp. 65-6.

⁹M. E. Cameron puts forward a similar view - Chang was the only prop of the tottering dynasty after the deaths of Tz'ü-hsi and Kuang-hsü, see "Public Career of Chang Chih-tung 1837-1909" in Pacific Historical Review, vol. 7 (1938), p.208.

trusted his two younger brothers, whose ability was doubtful, with heavy responsibilities in the forces. He also exposed himself exclusively to the influences of his cousin, Duke Tsai-tse, and his kinsman, T'ieh-liang, who was Yüan Shih-k'ai's avowed enemy. Jordan was aware of the fact that the four Manchus were nicknamed the "Inner Grand Council".¹² Towards the end, the ascendancy of the Manchus in Peking was accentuated by the formation of the hand-picked Manchu Imperial Guards. The danger was two-fold: Manchus on the whole were less skilful in matters of government, and the stability of the Ch'ing dynasty had hitherto been dependent on a harmonised relation between the Manchu and Chinese elite.

Such was Jordan's general conception of the government to which he was accredited during the first five years. Yet, to him, the real characteristic of the Manchu government of those years was not so much its increasing weakness in general as its weakness in face of the increasing autonomy of the provinces in particular. What was important was Jordan's realisation that the weakness of the central government was harmful to foreign interests in China. 1906-1911 were five years of unpleasant experience in which Jordan witnessed how the most important British railway interests in the Yangtze area suffered from the central government's weakness. The railways in

¹⁰ Jordan to Campbell, private, 21 Jan. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 5. Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 195.

¹¹ Annual report, ibid.

¹² Jordan to Grey, no. 119, conf., 16 Mar. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 636; E. J. Dillion, "Foreign Affairs" section, Contemporary Review, vol. 100 (Dec. 1911), p. 878 in which Manchu favouritism was named as the "cardinal error" of the regent, also L. F. Lawton and

question were the Soochou-Hangchou-Ningpo Railway and the Hukuang Railways. Negotiation for a loan to build the latter followed immediately that for the former, and together they covered the entire five years' span.

In the general scramble for concessions of 1898 the British and Chinese Corporation Limited obtained the right to build the Shanghai-Nanking and the Soochou-Hangchou-Ningpo Railway lines in the lower Yangtze district. On July 9 1903 the Final Shanghai-Nanking Railway Loan Agreement was signed with important consequences. The Chinese regarded the agreement as having the most disadvantages. The objectionable features of the agreement included heavy commission, the purchase of the native -built Shanghai-Woosung line as a branch of the Shanghai-Nanking line, the great power of the British chief engineer, and the predominant British control over the construction and management of the line.¹³ The harsh terms stimulated indigenous effort at railway development, particularly in the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang.

H. Hobden, "The Fall of Yuan Shih-kai", Fortnightly Review, vol. 87 (1 Mar. 1910), p. 432.

¹³For terms of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway Loan Agreement see MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 1, pp. 387-409. For comments see Chang Kia-ngau, China's Struggle for Railroad Development (New York, 1943), p.30.

¹⁴See Sheng to Mr. Brenan of the corporation, 24 May 1903 in Satow to Grey, no. 120, 17 Mar. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 22.

¹⁵British and Chinese Corporation to F.O., 9 Jan. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 22.

Between 1898 and 1903 the British and Chinese Corporation showed no active interest in the Soochū-Ningpo acquisition and the Chinese wondered whether the concession would be enforced. The terms of the preliminary agreement of this line were more or less parallel to that of the Shanghai-Nanking line, and it was expected that the final agreement of the two lines would be identical. On 24 May 1903 Sheng Hsüan-huai, director-general of the Imperial Railway administration, notified the corporation that if surveys and estimates were not made within six months of his writing the preliminary agreement would be considered abrogated.¹⁴ On receiving no answer to his letter Sheng explicitly encouraged the Chekiang gentry to proceed with their railway plans. The Chekiang Railway Company, formally established in 1905 with imperial sanction, formulated a provincial railway scheme centring at Hangchou, thus clashing directly with the British concession.

At the end of 1905 the British and Chinese Corporation was informed by Sheng that he had received imperial instruction to cancel the preliminary agreement with the corporation.¹⁵ The imperial order was given, at the instigation of Sheng, in self-defence against the petition of the provincial gentry. For the first eight months of 1906, until Jordan reached Peking in September, negotiations between the corporation, the British legation, and the Chinese government

¹⁶ Acting consul Smith, Hangchou, to Satow in Satow to Landsdowne, no. 429, 11 Dec. 1905; Satow to Grey, tel. 10, 13 Jan. 1906; British and Chinese Corporation to F.O., 22 Feb. and 1 Mar. 1906; Ch. Corres., vol. 22.

were at a standstill. On the one hand, the Chekiang gentry, encouraged by Sheng, the imperial decree and the new governor, strengthened their agitation against the 1898 preliminary agreement and actually began surveys for construction by the end of February.¹⁶ On the other hand, the Wai-wu Pu, represented by Prince Ch'ing and T'ang Shao-i who were willing to continue negotiations on the basis of the preliminary agreement, was between the grips of the British and the provincials whose opposition the government was not able to suppress.¹⁷ In the middle of the year Prince Ch'ing attempted to postpone the question by suggesting it be shelved until the Canton-Kowloon Railway Loan Agreement, being negotiated with the same corporation, was settled.¹⁸

When Jordan reached Peking on 10 September the controversy reached its peak. Carnegie, chargé d'affaires awaiting Jordan's arrival, informed the Foreign Office the same day that not only had the government not resumed negotiations but an imperial rescript of late August had authorised two new railway companies to build a line from Soochou to Hangchou to Ningpo.¹⁹ In the next half year negotiations remained stagnant while Jordan constantly received news of the railway progress made by the Chekiang gentry. On 26 October the Chekiang Provincial Railway Company held its first shareholders' meeting in which it was stated that the company had about 6,000 shareholders and the amount paid up was between 4,210,000 and 4,219,000 dollars.²⁰ The meeting was soon followed, in mid-November, by a formal

¹⁷ Satow to Grey, no. 119, 17 Mar. 1906; Satow to Grey, no. 163, 10 Apr. 1906, Ch. Corres. vol. 22.

¹⁸ Carnegie to Grey, tel. 123, 11 Jun. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 22.

opening of work on a railway which was attended by important provincial authorities.²¹ By the end of March, 1907 the ambition of the provincial gentry had considerably increased; the Kiangsu and Chekiang railway administrations avowed their intention to build the Soochou-Kashing and Kashing-Hangchou sections respectively.²²

The progress made by the provinces did not signify slackness on the part of Jordan. On the contrary, he plunged into the question with vigour, bombarding the Wai-wu Pu with protests against provincial construction. However, Jordan could not do much while the Canton-Kowloon Railway Loan Agreement remained unratified. But the half year of stagnation was a period of profitable observation. The most obvious observation was that provincial autonomy, asserted by the moneyed gentry, was a real problem against the increasing weakness of the central government. Moreover, Jordan was convinced that provincial enterprise, however vigorous it might first appear, would end in failure. Native railway building was yet a wasteful procedure. In early February, 1907 Jordan reported the existence of corruption in the Chekiang Company which squeezed contributions from the populace which

¹⁹ Carnegie to Grey, tel. 166, 10 Sept. 1906. The new rescript was again made at the memorialisation of Sheng. See also Carnegie to Grey, no. 358, conf., 23 Aug. 1906; and no. 375, 9 Sept. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 22.

²⁰ Summary of events in Hangchou in November in Jordan to Grey, no. 507, 29 Nov. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 217.

²¹ Jordan to Grey, no. 526, 12 Dec. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

²² Jordan to Grey, no. 150, 28 Mar. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

was eager for the railway to be built.²³ Morrison confirmed Jordan's observation of the waste incurred by provincial construction after a visit to the Kiangsu province.²⁴

Jordan resolved on insisting on the validity of the 1898 preliminary agreement, despite Sheng's argument to the contrary, and on maintaining an "attitude of firm and patient pressure".²⁵ After many representations in which Jordan emphasised the importance he and the British government attached to the line, moves were made by the Chinese government at the end of May to renew negotiations with the corporation. The Chinese government of course also realised the impossibility of abrogating the preliminary agreement unilaterally. Negotiations would begin pending the arrival of Wang Ta-hsieh, the late minister to London and a member of the Chekiang gentry. On arriving in Peking two months later Wang attempted to further procrastinate by proposing that negotiations be shelved awaiting the conclusion of the Anglo-German Tientsin-Pukou Railway Agreement which Jordan relegated to second importance to the Soochou-Ningpo line.

²³ Monthly summary of events in Hangchou in Jordan to Grey, no. 74, 6 Feb. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 217.

²⁴ Jordan to Grey, no. 150, 28 Mar. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

²⁵ Jordan to Grey, tel. 181, 4 Oct. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 22.

²⁶ Memorandum to Hillier in Jordan to Grey, no. 370, 7 Aug. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

²⁷ Jordan to Grey, no. 370, 7 Aug. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220. It is asserted that Jordan was solely responsible for moderating the corporation's terms in Chen, British Loans to China 1860-1913, p.114.

Negotiations eventually began in early August. In the second meeting Hillier, representing the corporation, was given three alternatives. The first two amounted to a virtual nullification of the preliminary agreement but the third was:

"That the Corporation should furnish a loan for the construction of the whole line by China herself, the loan being secured by Chinese Government revenues other than those of the railway, but repayable out of the surplus earnings of the line."²⁶

In short, a compromise was offered in which the corporation, though giving the loan, was divorced from the power of construction and control. The decision was with Jordan. He authorised Hillier to accept the compromise, realising its expediency in face of the provincial attitude.²⁷ But he refused the Chinese request that since sufficient native capital had been accumulated the loan could be used for another project.²⁸ An imperial edict was accordingly issued charging the governors of Kiangsu and Chekiang to persuade the gentry to desist from their obstinacy. The edict, largely due to Yüan Shih-k'ai's influence, was described by Jordan as "an interesting example ...of how an Imperial Decree can be cancelled when necessary, by the issue of an Edict indirectly annulling its conditions".²⁹

Despite the compromise, negotiations were again checkmated during the last quarter of 1907 by a severe recrudescence of provincial opposition. Embittered by the compromise, the provinces decided to defy both the government and the British. Angry telegrams were heaped on both central and local authorities. Tuan-fang, the

²⁸ Jordan to Grey, no. 405, 20 Aug. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

²⁹ Jordan to Grey, no. 513, 30 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

viceroy of Nanking, received a belligerent letter from the provincial railway companies.³⁰ Jordan was fully aware of the mass meetings in the provinces, denouncing the British loan as an "'alienation of the people's rights'", and threatening anti-British boycotts.³¹ The Chinese press, especially in Shanghai, threatened anti-dynastic risings and assassinations.³² Jordan also knew that Wang Ta-hsieh was warned by his provincials that if he allowed the agreement to be signed his ancestral tomb would be desecrated.³³

The central government was highly embarrassed and dared not conclude the agreement with the corporation. Sheng^{was} called to Peking and instructed to act as an intermediary between the provinces and the government. Adopting a softer attitude, the government invited provincial representatives to Peking to discuss matters.³⁴ In the capital, the representatives demonstrated the most unrelenting determination to block any compromise settlement.

For text of the edict see Chang Ching-lu (ed.), Tung-hua hsü-lu. [Documents on the Kuang-hsü reign, continued], (Shanghai, 1909), ch. 210, p.5.

³⁰ E-tu Zu Sun, "The Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Loan of 1908", Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 3 (Feb. 1951), p. 143.

³¹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 194, 12 Nov. 1907; Jordan to Grey, no. 513, 30 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

³² Enclosure in Jordan to Grey, no. 513, 30 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

³³ Jordan to Grey, no. 513, 30 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220. For contemporary records of the agitation see for example Cheng-lun [Political discussion] (Shanghai), vol. 1, no. 2 (Nov. 1907), pp.117-8.

³⁴ Jordan to Grey, no. 553, 26 Nov., and Jordan to Grey, no. 594, 24 Dec. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 409.

Jordan was infuriated by the behaviour of the provinces and the helplessness of the central government in face of it. He wrote emphatically at the end of November:

"The central government is now between the Devil and the deep sea The provincials are bombarding the Wai Wu Pu with furious telegrams threatening open rebellion if they yield, while we go down once a week and tell them that they have no claim to be considered a government if they cannot bring the provincials into line. There has never before been such a distinct test case between Peking and the provinces, and the result, whatever way it goes, must have far-reaching effects."³⁵

Despite Jordan's disapproval of the provinces he had to further compromise because of them. He gave up insistence on the precedence of the Soochou-Ningpo line over the Tientsin-Pukou line when the Chinese government argued that the relatively lenient terms of the latter when published would soften the provincials because they were to be identical with those of the compromise on the Soochou-Ningpo line.³⁶

Provincial vehemence began to subside at the beginning of 1908. The release of the Tientsin-Pukou Railway Agreement had a tranquilising effect. Furthermore, the central government conceded that the loan would not be borne by the provinces but by the Board of Posts and Communications. The final agreement was signed on 6 March, 1908. It was an obvious decline from the Shanghai-Nanking

³⁵ Jordan to Campbell, private, 28 Nov. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 5. The view that the issue was a test case was shared by other competent observers, for example, Osaka Mainichi Sinbun, 12 Dec. 1907, translated in Wai-chiao Pao, vol. 4, no. 2 (7 Mar. 1908), p. 17(b).

³⁶ Jordan to Grey, tel. 179, 16 Oct., tel. 190, 9 Nov., tel. 213, 9 Dec. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

Railway Loan Agreement in terms of British advantage. Unlike the Shanghai-Nanking Railway the Shanghai-Ningpo line³⁷ could not be mortgaged or controlled by British creditors in the case of default because it was secured not on its own surplus earnings but those of the Imperial Railways of North China. There would be no British auditor as stipulated in the preliminary agreement. On the administrative side, the British chief engineer was to be selected by the Board of Posts and was to function under Chinese authorities.³⁸ The emphasis was that the line was a Chinese property though nominally³⁹ built with a British loan. Jordan said that such reduced privileges were "the best we can obtain under the circumstances".⁴⁰

There was not a long respite after the Shanghai-Ningpo Railway Loan Agreement was signed before negotiations began for constructing the Hankow [Hupei]-Canton [Kuangtung] Railway, or the Hukuang Railway, to be brief. Later, negotiations were extended over the Hankow-Szechuan line and together with the Hankow-Canton line they were called the Hukaung Railways.

The concession to build the 710 miles long Hankow-Canton line was initially obtained by the American Chinese Development Company in April 1898. On 6 September, 1905 the Chinese government redeemed the line from the Americans for £6,750,000.⁴¹ The

³⁷ It was arranged at the last stage that the railway would start from Shanghai instead of Soochou.

³⁸ For a comparison of the two railway agreements see Z-tu Zen Sun, Chinese Railways and British Interests (New York, 1954), pp. 68-71.

³⁹ The railway was built without resort to the British loan funds.

⁴⁰ Jordan to Grey, tel. 37, 10 Feb. 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 409.

Hongkong Government gave a loan of £1,110,000 to help the redemption. In return for the redemption loan Chang Chih-tung, viceroy of Hupei and Hunan, sent a private letter to Fraser, then the consul-general at Hankow, giving priority to British nationals in railway development in the two provinces.⁴²

During the following three years construction of the line was undertaken by the Hu provinces and Kuangtung. Despite the establishment of the Szechuan-Hankow and Canton-Hankow Railroad Companies the three years were a period of stagnation with only a measure of success in Kuangtung.⁴³ Chang Chih-tung realised the necessity for a foreign loan if the line was to be built and revenue obtained from it quickly. Nine months after

⁴¹ For details of the role of the American company until the redemption in 1905 see W. R. Briasted, "The United States and the American Chinese Development Company", Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 11, (Feb. 1952), pp. 149- 59. For Chang's reason of redemption see Yoshihiro Hatano, "The Background of the Railway Nationalisation Policy in the Late Ch'ing Period", pp. 12-13, P R C C C

⁴² In view of the connection of the Hankow-Canton line with the Canton-Kowloon line the Hongkong Government was eager to keep the former free from the control of the other powers.

⁴³ Jordan to Grey, no. 576, 23 Dec. 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 622, Hatano, "The Background of the Railway Nationalisation Policy in the Late Ch'ing Period", p. 25. Chang, China's Struggle for Railroad Development, pp. 39-40; Tseng K'un-hua, Chung-kuo t'ieh-lu shih [History of Chinese Railways] (Peking 1924), p.110, and Hsü T'ung-hsin, Chang Wen-hsiang-kung nien-p'u [Chronology of Chang Chih-tung], (Shanghai, 1946), p.213.

being promoted as a grand councillor, Chang was appointed as director-general of the Hankow-Canton Railway in July 1908. Recalling the private agreement of 1905 Chang applied in October, through Fraser, for the help of British finance for the Hupei section of the Canton-Hankow line. Jordan was overjoyed by Chang's offer and instructed Fraser to accept it.⁴⁴

The importance of the Canton-Hankow line in terms of British interests was obvious. When it was completed it would be part of the railway system which connected Peking with Canton and Canton with the British colony of Hongkong. The line would be invaluable to promoting British interests in the Yangtze and the West River regions. But to Jordan's disappointment the loan ended up as an international enterprise in which Britain, France, Germany and America shared the loan equally. The history of the Hukuang Railways loan had two distinct phases: international rivalry, and provincial opposition. The second phase is more important here because it is a continuation, from the Shanghai-Ningpo Railway, of the central theme of provincial separation.

In the beginning Jordan was pleased with Chang Chih-tung's intention to obtain a purely British loan. In February 1909 negotiations between the British and Chinese Corporation and the Chinese broke down because J. O. P. Bland, representative of the corporation, insisted on the terms of the Canton-Kowloon Railway as affording more adequate supervision by the lending party, but

⁴⁴ Jordan to Grey, no. 457, conf., 14 Oct. 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 422.

Chang Chih-tung would not concede anything more than the Tientsin-Pukow terms. At first Jordan agreed with Bland⁴⁵, but he soon changed his attitude when the Germans offered the Tientsin-Pukow terms to Chang. Despite Jordan's objection, the London Foreign Office and the bank agreed to sign an arrangement on 14 May, 1909 whereby the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Banque de l'Indo Chine which had hitherto been operating under the British bank in the matter, and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank obtained equal shares of the loan.⁴⁶ It was in the allotment of engineering rights that Jordan found some comfort. The British group received the Hankow-Canton line exclusively to itself. The German group was given the Szechuan-Hankow line up to Ichang, thus the entire Hukuang Railway system was brought into question. The American insistence on participation in the loan delayed matters for another year and on 23 May, 1910, a quadruple agreement was signed accepting American participation and raising the total figure of the loan to £6,000,000.⁴⁷ On the whole, Jordan was not deeply involved in the period of international controversy in relation to American inclusion because he was taken seriously ill in early 1910 and soon afterwards left China until the end of the year.

⁴⁵ Jordan to Grey, tel. 33, 23 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 622.

⁴⁶ For terms see memorandum of terms of agreement come to at meeting of 14 May in Addis to Grey, 17 May 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 624, For Jordan's displeasure see Jordan to Campbell, private, 4 Mar. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.

⁴⁷ For text of the agreement see MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 1, pp. 886-7.

After the inclusion of German interests Jordan became reconciled to the internationalisation of the Hukuang Loan and thought that "it matters not so much who builds the railways as that they should be built quickly in the interests of trade".⁴⁸ Thus he was disappointed with the delay caused by the American action. However he knew that opposition from the provinces which became immediately noticeable after Chang Chih-tung's death in October, 1909 was far more menacing. Opposition existed in Kuangtung even before Chang's death. When the news of a foreign loan for the Hankow-Canton line was first heard of in 1908 the president of the Hankow-Canton Railway Company told Fox, acting consul-general at Canton, that the company already had sufficient funds to complete the Kuangtung section of the line.⁴⁹ Jordan notices that agitation intensified in Kuangtung when Chang Chih-tung was appointed as director-general of the Hankow-Canton Railway. Chang had to convince the provinces of the government's concern for their interest.⁵⁰ Opposition from Hupei and Hunan then was not as strong as Kuangtung partly because progress in the provinces was far behind that in Kuangtung, but mostly because Chang Chih-tung, even after his transfer to the capital, retained a strong influence in these provinces.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Jordan to Campbell, private, 11 Oct. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 6.

⁴⁹ Fox to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 303, 7 July 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 422.

⁵⁰ See translation of Chang's proclamation in Jordan to Grey, no. 455, 14 Oct. 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 422. The declaration was made in August, see Wang Shu-tung, Chang Wen-hsiang-kung chüan-chi [The complete work of Chang Chih-tung], (Peiping, 1928), "Telegraphic Correspondence", ch. 80, pp. 3-6.

With Chang's death the provinces got out of hand. Jordan was informed that the Hupei Railways United Association forced contributions from the farming and business classes in Hupei. The vernacular press in the two Hu provinces quoted freely from the British press, notably The Times, which placed political significance on the loan negotiations, to prove that the powers had ulterior motives in competing to build the railways. The provinces were, ^{acting with} the cognisance, if not support, of the local authorities.⁵² Consular reports from Szechuan also indicated provincial zeal for railway building with native resources.⁵³ Provincial pressure was so adamant that shortly before Jordan left China in early 1910 the Hupei gentry was granted the right to issue stocks by an imperial edict for constructing the Hupei sections of both the Canton-Hankow and Szechuan-Hankow lines. Jordan protested to the Wai-wu Pu with his French and German colleagues.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Jordan to Grey, no. 377, 13 Oct., no. 423, 16 Nov. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 626. After Chang's death, direction of railway affairs was placed in the Board of Posts and Communication under Hsü Shih-ch'ang.

⁵² Jordan to Grey, no. 468, 16 Dec., no. 478, 22 Dec. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 851. See also memorial of governor of Hunan, Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan, 23 Nov. 1909. Ta-Ch'ing li-chao shih-lu [Records of the reigns of Ch'ing Dynasty], compiled by the Department of State of Manchukuo (Tokyo, 1937), Hsüan-t'ung, ch. 24, pp. 7-8. Later, Jui-Cheng, acting viceroy of Liang-Hu, also supported the gentry. MaxMuller to Grey, no. 165, 25 May 1910, Ch. Corres., vol. 851.

⁵³ For example, H. A. Little to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 6, 5 Jan. 1910, Ch. Corres., vol. 851; also North China Daily News, 23 Dec. 1909.

⁵⁴ Jordan to Grey, no. 51, 15 Feb. 1910, Ch. Corres., vol. 851.

The absence of Jordan was characterised in China by frequent anti-foreign outbursts, particularly in the provinces affected by the Hukuang loan. There was open expulsion of foreigners in Hangchou, tension in Nanking, and general clamouring against foreign encroachment in the whole of Szechuan.⁵⁵ The most serious outbreak was at Changsha in late spring when all foreign property, except the Yale Mission Hospital, was destroyed.⁵⁶

When Jordan returned to China the three provinces remained hostile and the loan unsigned. The loan was not to be signed until he had passed through what he called "never ... a more strenuous six months"⁵⁷ in which he gave the Wai-wu Pu and the Board of Communications "no peace".⁵⁸ A brighter prospect appeared for the resumption of negotiations when Sheng Hsüan-huai was appointed as president of the Board of Communications in the middle of January. Sheng had formulated the policy of nationalisation of trunk lines and commercialisation of branch lines. He entered into active negotiation with the banks between February and May with the mind to carry out his new policy⁵⁹. During the period provincial agitation continued.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ For information on the unrest see Ch. Emb. Arch. (F.O. 228), vols. 2618-9; (F.O. 233) vol. 133.

⁵⁶ For a first hand account of the outbreak see M. Hewlett, then British consul at Changsha, Forty Years in China (London, 1943), pp. 59-68; also Ch. Emb. Arch. (F.O. 228) vol. 2617. The immediate reasons for the riot appeared to be the rise of price in rice and the discontent of the stone guilds, but the question of railway had already created a volcanic situation.

⁵⁷ Jordan to Campbell, private, 24 May 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

⁵⁸ Jordan to Campbell, private, 16 Mar. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

The four months were essentially a period of readjustment and compromise. The Chinese government feared the provinces on the one hand and used them to extract better terms from the banks on the other hand. The banks and the governments, already taxed by the problem of provincial opposition, was eager to conclude the loan especially at the later stage when they heard rumours of the formation of a rival international consortium.⁶¹

Jordan was extremely impatient.

After the consortium made the concession whereby the Chingmenchou-Han_yang branch was excluded from the agreement⁶² a new hitch occurred in mid April. The question involved the British particularly and Jordan played an important rôle in it.

⁵⁹ Sheng was in Japan where he inspected Japanese industry and banking between September and November, 1908. It is possible that he based his policy of railway nationalisation on the Japanese model which was put into practice about two years before he visited Japan, A. Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialisation, Sheng Hsüan-huai and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass. 1958), pp.79, 81-2. For Japanese railway nationalisation see Japan's Railroad Ministry, Nihon tetsudōshi [History of Japan's railways] (Tokyo, 1922), pp. 797-830.

⁶⁰ At the end of January just before the negotiation resumed, for example, a riot broke out against the British in the British concession of Hankow. The alleged cause was the death of a Chinese coolie. But as Jordan pointed out the cause was long embedded, Jordan to Grey, no. 43, 30 Jan. 1911, Ch. Conf. Print, vol.2064.

⁶¹ According to Jordan the rumours had a considerable effect on the banks' representatives and his colleagues. The chief spirit of the new combination appeared to be the Russo-Asiatic Bank, Jordan to Grey, no. 122, 17 Mar. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080.

⁶² The exclusion affected the American and German shares most. Jordan was not unhappy to see the Germans "obliged to forego some of their ill-gotten gain after all", Jordan to Campbell, private, 16 Mar. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

In a meeting between the bankers and Sheng Hsüan-huai on 12 April Sheng announced that in face of the increasing agitation in the provinces he could not accept any agreement without further concessions from the groups. Sheng proposed that half of the loan funds should be deposited with the Ta-Ch'ing Government Bank and the Chiao-t'ung Bank because he could not accept control of loan funds by foreign banks at a damaging rate of interest. Hillier at first urged the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to assent to the proposal. Jordan too immediately telegraphed the Foreign Office advising immediate sanction.⁶³ The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, as the chief issuing bank, was not happy with the arrangement which cut down its control of loan funds. However, Addis relented partly because of Jordan's attitude.⁶⁴ Jordan expanded his views later and convinced the Foreign Office that although the "arrangement is not an ideal one ... such a favourable opportunity for a settlement is very unlikely to recur", and that "it is no time for mincing matters by considering the interests of any particular institution when the larger interests of British trade in China and of a British colony are at stake."⁶⁵

Things took a new turn when Hillier, after being told by Sheng Hsüan-huai of the precarious state in the provinces, wanted to ask the bank to revoke its consent. He was afraid that the bank

⁶³Hillier to Addis in Addis to F.O., 13 Apr., Jordan to Grey, tel. 99, 13 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080.

⁶⁴Grey to Jordan, tel. 70, 19 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080.

⁶⁵Jordan to Grey, tel. 102, 20 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080 on which Campbell minutes: "I dare say Sir J. Jordan is right"; Jordan to Campbell, private, 22 Apr. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

would stand to lose if a grave situation arose after large deposits passed into the Chinese native banks. Hillier told Jordan that the bank offices of Shanghai and Hongkong were apprehensive of the effect on the bank, as the chief exchange bank, caused by disorganisation of the exchange market as a result of large transfers. Jordan pointed out that if the bank had just made several provincial loans over which it had no effective control, it should be able to agree to the new arrangement; and if the other groups had given up the Chingmenchou-Hanyang branch line the British group should be able to make the sacrifice.⁶⁶ During the rest of April the quarrel was on the portion of the loan to be deposited with the Chinese banks. In assenting to the principle of deposit in the first place Addis had specified the proportion as one-quarter; but the Chinese insisted on one-half. Jordan again urged the Foreign Office to accede and even Hillier regarded the question of secondary importance after the principle had been yielded.⁶⁷

Events went on smoothly afterwards between the banks and the Chinese government. But provincial disavowal remained strong. To facilitate the signature of the Final Hukuang Railways Loan Agreement Sheng Hsüan-huai urged the throne to issue an edict, dated 9 May, transferring all main railway lines to the Board of Communications. Although Jordan would have liked the branch lines to be

⁶⁶ Jordan to Grey, tel. 103, 21 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080.

⁶⁷ Jordan to Grey, tel. 105, 25 Apr; Hillier to Addis in Addis to F.O., 25 Apr. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1080.

nationalised as well, the nationalisation of the trunk lines undoubtedly represented significantly to him a measure of government success over the provinces. Writing to Campbell Jordan said; "The Government here at last determined to take their courage in both hands and to deal firmly with the provinces."⁶⁸ The Hukuang Railways Loan Agreement⁶⁹ was signed on 20 May with other minor modifications. Britain retained sole engineering rights over the Canton-Hankow line after a fierce international struggle. Jordan could hardly conceal his pleasure and looked forward to the near future when Peking would be directly connected with Hongkong by rail.⁷⁰

To Jordan the choice between the provinces and the central government was obvious. The provincial gentry were anti-foreign in the financial field. In both cases of railway loan negotiations concessions had to be made because of provincial agitation. In the case of the Shanghai-Ningpo Railway it is arguable that even had there been no provincial uproar the simultaneous existence of the Tientsin-Pukou Railway loan negotiations made it inevitable for the British to soften their terms. But, whether the concessions would have been as drastic, had it not been for the provinces, is another question.

On the other hand Jordan generally found the Chinese government, represented by officials such as Prince Ch'ing, Na-T'ung,

⁶⁸ Jordan to Campbell, private, 15 May 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

⁶⁹ Terms of agreement are available in MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 1, pp. 866-899.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Jordan to Campbell, ^{private,} /24 May 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

Yüan Shih-k'ai, Wang Ta-hsieh, T'ang Shao-i, and Liang Tun-yen, willing to fulfill its foreign obligations,⁷¹ Even Sheng Hsüan-huai, who posed as the greatest difficulty in the Shanghai-Ningpo case, and in Jordan's opinion was anti-British and an enemy of Yüan Shih-k'ai,⁷² adopted a new conciliatory attitude towards foreign concessionaires in the Hukuang Railways loan negotiations.

Although Jordan became relatively optimistic about the Manchu government after it had signed the Hukuang Railways Loan Agreement and the Currency Reform Loan a month earlier, he continued to be conscious of its weakness in dealing with the provinces. For five months the provinces agitated against the government's decision to nationalise the trunk lines. The summit of agitation was reached when serious revolts broke out in late August in Szechuan under the leadership of P'u Tien-chün, a member of the gentry, who issued the famous "Ch'uan-jen tzu-pao sheng-chiao shuo" (A discussion on the Szechuanese self-preservation).⁷³ Despite the professed determination of the government to suppress the outbreak it remained unabated when the Hankow revolution broke out in October the same year.⁷⁴

The New Spirit: revolutionary and constitutional

After having been to Korea Jordan found the China to which he returned much different from that which he had left ten years before.

⁷¹ See, for example, Jordan to Grey, no. 334, 7 Jul. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 230.

⁷² Jordan to Grey, no. 594, 24 Dec. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 409.

⁷³ For details of the Szechuan revolt see H. Hedtke, "The Genesis of the Revolution in Szechuan", P R C C C.; also Tai Chih-li (ed.), Ssu-ch'uan pao-lu yün-tung shih-liao. [Documents on the Szechuan railroad revolt], (Peking, 1959).

⁷⁴ Jordan to Admiral Winsloe, private, 15 Sept. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

Of course no great changes were noticeable among the general mass of the people, but many could be found in the influential groups in Peking such as the court nobles, the officials, the intellectuals and the wealthy people. These changes were often reflected in the social life of the capital. Jordan was at first surprised to meet at dinner princes and other dignitaries who had abandoned their former secluded mode of life. Women of rich, respectable families were seen on the streets in carriages or even riding astride. While he regarded these changes in social life as wonderful Jordan could not help wondering "if things are not going too fast, and if a big reaction may not set in before real reform is effected". He was also astounded at the number of officials and intellectuals who "had studied abroad, spoke several foreign languages, and were quite equal to the foreigner on his own ground".⁷⁵

Before long Jordan realised that changes were not confined to the capital. The outlook of the articulate sector of the empire generally, represented by the intellectuals, the newspapermen, the merchants, and the moneyed-gentry of the provinces, had undergone a radical change. In short, the articulate China had awakened. She was awakened to her weakness; more important still, she was awakened to the advantages taken out of her weakness by foreign powers. As the annual report of the British legation in Peking for 1907⁷⁶ puts it: "China for the Chinese" is not a mere temporary craze, but a settled conviction which has sunk deep into the minds of the people, and will

⁷⁵ Jordan to Campbell, private, 29 Nov. 1906; 8 Aug. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 4; Jordan, "Some Chinese I have Known", Nineteenth Century, vol. 88 (Dec. 1920), p. 947.

⁷⁶ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1907, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 178.

have to be reckoned with in all dealings with this Empire in the future". Closely associated with this birth of national feeling, though not unmarred by other more materialist considerations, was the "recovery of sovereign rights movement" which grew in intensity as the years drew towards the 1911 revolution.⁷⁷

The new spirit was reflected in several characteristics of the time. Jordan's attention was particularly drawn to two of them; the Chinese press,^{and} the boycotts. The former was frequently used to the severe detriment of both the dynasty and foreign interests in China, and the latter, although they almost always finished up in disgracing the central government, were primarily aimed against foreign goods.

The annual report of the legation for 1906, the first year of Jordan's return to China, has a fairly large section on the Chinese press. Broadly speaking, it was of two types; that^{which} circulated in the interior and that in the treaty ports. As a result of severe press censorship the first type of paper was published merely as official gazettes. But the second type in the ports became increasingly anti-dynastic and anti-foreign in tone. The much repeated slogans were "China's rights and interests", "dignity of the state", "recovery of concessions", "independence" and "self-government". Press censorship did not affect these papers which owed their unmolested existence to the extra-territorial privileges of the foreigners in the foreign settlements. The report further points out that the brains behind

⁷⁷ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.

these papers were mostly returned students from Japan.⁷⁸ The report for 1910 reports a great increase in the number of papers and those in the Yangtze valley in particular contributed to the feeling of unrest by propagating warnings against the partition of China by the powers.⁷⁹ Closely associated with the Chinese press as an anti-foreign tactic were the posting of placards and distribution of handbills containing similar slogans.⁸⁰

The first boycott by China was against American goods in 1905, in protest against the American immigration ban on Chinese. Despite the attempt of high officials like Viceroy Yüan Shih-k'ai of Chihli to stamp out the boycott and the protest of the American minister, the anti-American boycott lasted for several months with the support of merchants and newspapermen, especially those in Canton and Shanghai. Jordan must have heard of this unprecedented event in Korea. Its significance was not missed by the French and Russian papers in China which denounced the boycott from the start and warned that it would eventually effect all foreign interests alike.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1906, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 171.

⁷⁹ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.

⁸⁰ See, for example, Jordan to Grey, no. 53, 16 Feb. 1910, enclosing an intelligence report by Seeds, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 199; for a newspaper cutting on a placard posted in Szechuan urging national preparedness against foreigners, see Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 233), vol. 133; see also L. Giles, "The Awakening of China: A street placard from Hunan", Nineteenth Century, vol. 60. (Oct. 1906) pp. 521-32.

⁸¹ For details of the boycott see Akira Iriye, "Public Opinion in Late Ch'ing China", pp. 8-16, P R C C C, T. F. Millard, The New Far East (London, 1906), pp. 244-55; and C. F. Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts, (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 29-39. M. Field, "The Chinese Boycott of 1905", in Papers on China (Harvard Univ.) vol. 11, (1907), pp. 63-98.

In 1908 Jordan himself witnessed another boycott in China, this time against Japan, after the Tatsu Maru incident. Early in the year Tatsu Maru, a Japanese freighter, was searched and detained by the Chinese government for having on board arms for the revolutionaries. Merchants at Canton in particular boycotted Japanese goods on learning Japan's humiliating demands on the Wai-wu Pu for an apology, punishment of responsible officials, reparation for damage done to the ship, and payment for the arms which were to be confiscated by the Chinese government.⁸²

Jordan was to some extent involved in both the negotiation and the boycott. Both the Chinese and Japanese governments asked for his good offices in arranging a settlement. Although the Admiralty agreed readily to arbitrate between the two governments Jordan felt that active intervention on the part of Britain might expose her to "the charge of holding the Canton Government responsible for the acts of pirates, while at the same time encouraging the importation of arms for their use".⁸³ Grey was also reluctant to interfere.⁸⁴ Soon after the boycott started MacDonald, on being requested by the Japanese government, telegraphed Grey to ask if the consul-general at Canton could be instructed to approach the Chinese authorities with a view to allaying the boycott.⁸⁵ The Foreign Office naturally referred the

⁸²For the course of the incident see Iriye, "Public Opinion in Late Ch'ing China", pp. 16-22; and Feng Tzū-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, [Materials on pre-1911 revolutionary history], (Commercial Press, 1946-7), vol. 4, pp. 188-94.

⁸³Admiralty to F.O., 7 Mar. and confidential clause of Jordan to Grey, tel. 47, 25 Feb. 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 425.

⁸⁴Grey's minutes on Admiralty to F.O., ibid.

⁸⁵MacDonald to Grey, tel. 34, 30 Apr. 1908, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 182.

matter to Jordan who was fully aware that the boycott could equally be directed against British goods. He therefore instructed the consul-general to approach the viceroy informally on the matter but no concrete diplomatic moves should be made "to the detriment of our trade".⁸⁶ Jordan's apprehension should be set against Count Hayashi's comment on the boycott: "The day will come when China will rise against England. As that power has the greatest interests in China it stands to reason that she will suffer the heaviest losses of any of the powers".⁸⁷

"The day" came towards the end of the same year. On 29 November a Chinese passenger died on board the British river-steamer "Fatshan". The native press and a local political organisation, Tzū-ch'ih Hui, asserted that the death was caused by a Portuguese member of the crew. On the first two days of December the acting British consul-general held an inquiry which gave the verdict that the man died of natural causes. Anti-British agitation was immediately whipped up against the verdict. The viceroy succeeded in bringing about a fortnight's lull on the protest of the acting consul-general. However, a boycott against the "Fatshan" was staged at the beginning of 1909 when the second inquiry produced the same result.⁸⁸

Another anti-British boycott occurred a few months later in the Yantze area centred at Kiukiang. The cause was the alleged ill-treatment of a Chinese coolie, who died afterwards, by the superintendent of police in the British concession at Kiukiang. At

⁸⁶ Jordan to Grey, tel. 90, 2 May 1908, China Corres., vol. 425.

⁸⁷ A. M. Pooley, (trans.), The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi (London, 1915), p.303.

the end of April the superintendent was accused of murder but found not guilty in an inquiry held by the British consul and an officer deputed by the local taotai. The matter dragged on for several months with repeated inquiries while the population in Kiukiang was protesting violently against the verdict. The question had to be taken up by the Wai-wu Pu and the British legation.

On 17 August Jordan was telegraphically informed of a boycott by Kiukiang against all British shipping from carrying goods destined for the port. The boycott hit hardest at Messrs. Jardine, Matheson and Company and Messrs. Butterfield and Swire Company. It soon had the support of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai and British shipping in the Yangtze generally was affected.⁸⁹ It is important to note that while making representations to the Wai-wu Pu repeatedly in strong terms, Jordan did his best to pacify local feeling by instructing the municipal council to transfer the superintendent concerned and withdrawing the consul at Kiukiang.⁹⁰ The boycott gradually died down towards the close of the year.

During the two incidents Jordan was extremely conscious of the fact that the largest British firms in China were "singularly sensitive to the least dislocation of their trade".⁹¹ On the other hand, the Chinese became increasingly ready to threaten, if not actually stage, anti-British boycotts. For example, at the end of

⁸⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 1, 2 Jan. 1909; no. 4, 4 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 613.

⁸⁹ Details are available in Jordan to Grey, no. 336, 16 Sept., 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 191.

⁹⁰ Jordan to Grey, no. 373, 12 Oct. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 191.

1909 and beginning of 1910 such threats were propagated by the native press over the question of the Lanchou mine.⁹²

Leaving aside the various facets of the new spirit mentioned above Jordan was aware of two persistent expressions of the same spirit in the form of two movements running through the years 1906-1911. They were the revolutionary movement and the consitutional movement.

In 1905 Sun Yat-sen founded the Chung-kuo T'ung-meng Hui in Tokyo. Between 1906 and 1911 there was a series of attempts directly or indirectly associated with the society, aiming ultimately at unseat^{ing} the Manchu government.

In December 1906 anti-dynastic risings, representing the first endeavour of the T'ung-meng Hui, broke out at Liuyang and its adjacent prefectures on the border of Hunan and Kiangsi. Jordan reported a rapid suppression and expressed not the slightest anxiety.⁹³ But the risings made an impact especially on the authorities in the Wuhan area. In the following months there was a purge in the New Army at Nanking, and a close search for secret societies in the central Yangtze area. The consul-general at Shanghai reported this state of official nervousness to Jordan together with the translation of Chang Chih-tung's observation on the revolutionary societies in the provinces bordering upon the Yangtze. Jordan considered Chang's views

⁹¹ Jordan to Alston, private, 7 Jan. 1910, Jordan Papers, vol. 6.

⁹² Jordan to Campbell, private, 11 Nov. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 6.

⁹³ Jordan to Grey, tel. 242, 12 Dec.; tel. 244, 15 Dec. 1906, Ch. Corres. vol. 38. For Chinese accounts of the risings see Li, Cheng-chih shih, vol. 1, pp. 269-70; Wen Kung-chih, Chung-hua min-kuo ko-ming shih [History of the Chinese Republic until the Northern Expedition], (Shanghai, 1927), vol. 1, p. 25.

as "improbable" and would not have reported to the Foreign Office had it not been that similar "alarmist rumours" reached him through Sir Robert Hart. Sir Robert told Jordan that Yüan Shih-k'ai had his troops ready to go to the Yangtze region at a moment's notice.⁹⁴

Thus for a time the Yangtze area was closed to the infiltration of the T'ung-meng-Hui. Moreover, after the suppression of the Liuyang revolts the Ch'ing government discovered that the revolutionary headquarters and leaders were in Tokyo. Japan was asked to deport Sun Yat-sen, Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei and others who afterwards established a new headquarters at Hanoi, Annam. Thus for the next few years most of the revolutionary outbreaks took place in south and south-west China. At the end of May and beginning of June 1907 the T'ung meng Hui directed risings at Swatow and Huichou respectively in Kuangtung. The consul-general at Canton telegraphed Jordan of the disturbance on 30 May. Several days later Jordan learned from the British admiral that at least at Swatow the rebels had been dispersed. Despite the anxiety of the Chinese government Jordan did not attach much significance to the risings. It was only about two months earlier that the military attaché of the legation reported after a tour in the Yangtze that the revolutionary elements were yet incapable of causing serious trouble.⁹⁵ Jordan was further

⁹⁴ Jordan to Grey, no. 9, v. conf., 7 Jan. 1907, enclosing a despatch from the consul-general at Shanghai, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 173. The state of official nervousness was confirmed in Li, Cheng-chih shih, vol. 1, pp. 270-1.

⁹⁵ Confidential memorandum of the military attaché in Jordan to Grey, no. 211, 2 May 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 220.

convinced of the insignificance of the revolts in that for more than a week the consuls at Swatow and Amoy had not taken the trouble to report on the disturbance. On being asked by Jordan the two consuls said that newspaper accounts on the matter were grossly exaggerated.⁹⁶

After the failure at Swatow and Huichou, the T'ung-meng Hui revolutionaries staged another uprising in Kuangtung at Lienchou and Chinchou. Jordan did not think the incident was serious except that he was considerably annoyed at the destruction of British mission property at Lienchoufu during the disturbances preceding the revolt.⁹⁷

On 6 July 1907 the Manchu governor of Anhui, En Ming, was assassinated by a revolutionary Hsü Hsi-lin who acted independently of the T'ung-meng Hui, but is much revered in the T'ung-meng Hui literature. The assassination was followed by an abortive uprising in Anking, the provincial capital, in which the woman revolutionary Ch'iu Chin was involved. Hsü and Ch'iu and a few others were caught, severely tortured and executed.⁹⁸ Jordan noticed that the assassination caused a great panic among the Grand Council and high officials

⁹⁶ Jordan to Grey, tel. 100, 7 Jun; tel. 101, 8 Jun. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 231. For details of the two risings see Feng, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 5, pp. 99-116. Lo Chia-lun, Kuo-fu nien-p'u ch'u-kao. [Draft chronological biography of Sun Yat-sen], (Taipei 1959), vol. 1, pp. 177-82; also The Times, 30 May, 1-3 Jun. 1907.

⁹⁷ Jordan to Grey, no. 304, 25 Jan. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 229. For details of the disturbances see Wen, Chung-hua min-kuo ko-ming shih, pp. 26-7. Feng Tzu-yu, Chung-kuo ko-ming yün-tung erh-shih-liu-nien tsu-chih shih, [Organisation of the Chinese revolutionary movement], (Shanghai, 1948), pp. 146-7.

⁹⁸ For details of the entire Anking incident and its aftermath see Lo Chia-lun (ed.), K M W H, vol. 1, pp. 96-132; see also Kuo-fu nien-p'u Ch'u-kao, vol. 1, pp. 182-6; and Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih-nien

in the provinces, Chang Chih-tung was also said to have been threatened with assassination and Tuan-fang in Nanking was highly apprehensive. The Chinese press in Chekiang and Shanghai protested against the execution of Hsü and Ch'iu. However, Jordan himself did not seem to have been much worried by the incident.⁹⁹ There were other minor revolts in the next three years in which Jordan was almost entirely uninterested.¹⁰⁰

The rising at Canton in April 1911 represented the most serious and well-laid attempt of the T'ung-meng Hui in its history before the Double Ten revolution of the same year.¹⁰¹ On 10 April Jordan learned that the tartar-general at Canton had been assassinated two days before by a member of the revolutionary party. Jamieson, the consul-general described the assassination as "merely the act of an isolated individual".¹⁰² Twenty days later Canton witnessed a violet uprising. But Jordan had no report from Canton and he only

wen-hsien pien-tsuan wei-yüan-hui, Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih-nien wen-hsien, [Collection of materials on the origin of the Chinese Republic on its 50th anniversary], (Taipei, 1964), vol. 13, pp. 167-89.

⁹⁹ Jordan to Grey, no. 332, 10 Jul; Ch. Corres., vol. 231; no. 392 20 Aug. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 217.

¹⁰⁰ These attempts were: Chen-nan-kuan (1907); Ch'in-lien, Ho-k'ou, and Anking (1908); Canton (1910). See Lo, Kuo-fu nien-p'u chu'u-kao, vol. 1, pp. 193-234; Li, Tsui-chin san-shih-nien, pp. 154-8.

¹⁰¹ Details of the events are available in Tsou Lu, Kuang-chou san-yüeh erh-shih-chiu ko-ming shih [The rising of March, 1911 in Kuangchou], (Taipei, 1953), pp. 1-77; Hsü Shih-shen, Kuo-fu ko-ming yüan-ch 'i hsiang-chu [Detailed commentary on texts selected to illustrate the revolutionary career of Sun Yat-sen] (Taipei, 1954), pp. 155-68.

¹⁰² Jordan to Grey, no. 151, 11 Apr. 1911, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 204.

enquired into the matter when Grey asked him for information to answer parliamentary questions. Jordan answered on 3 May, one week after the revolt started, that Canton had calmed down and that accounts of the uprising had been exaggerated.¹⁰³

Thus Jordan was aware of the increasing strength of the revolutionary movement, but it was not sufficiently strong to seriously trouble him. This attitude of Jordan remained unchanged throughout the pre-revolutionary years. At the beginning of 1907 he said:

"There is undoubtedly a feeling of unrest and a good deal of noisy agitation going on in many parts of the Empire, but, so far as I can judge, there is no indication of any concerted anti-dynastic movement with which the Government is likely to find it difficult to cope".¹⁰⁴

In the annual report for 1910 it is stated that the revolutionary societies "fortunately lack adequate organisation".¹⁰⁵

Since the movement was straightforwardly anti-dynastic and often anti-foreign, Jordan was naturally not sympathetic with it. At the beginning of 1907 two Chinese, Chang Pao-ching and Huang Yi, were arrested in the Shanghai settlement for being implicated in the bombing of the Constitution Investigation Commission in 1905. He instructed the consul-general at Shanghai that the political suspects should not be handed over merely because the viceroy demanded it but that a prima facie case should be established and that he should

¹⁰³ Jordan to Grey, tel. 111, 3 May 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1090.

¹⁰⁴ Jordan to Grey, no. 9, v. conf., 7 Jan. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 223.

¹⁰⁵ Jordan to Grey, annual report, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.

consult the British judge of the Supreme Court, Sir Havilland de Saumarez. To the judge, however, Jordan telegraphed: "I consider it important, from a political point of view, that we should be very careful to prevent the impression becoming current that revolutionaries can take refuge in Shanghai in view of the many rumours of seditious activities in the central provinces".¹⁰⁶ In the diplomatic meeting Jordan strongly objected to the Italian chargé d'affaires' proposal that the Mixed Court should not only hold a preliminary trial but properly try the case itself.¹⁰⁷ After the Chaochou-Huichou outbreak Jordan cooperated with the Wai-wu Pu in asking the Hongkong government to deport the instigators, notable among them Teng Tzū-yü.¹⁰⁸ In early 1908, again on being requested by the Wai-wu Pu, Jordan telegraphed the governor of Singapore to deport Sun Yat-sen. Sir John Anderson, however, did not comply but warned Sun against instigating any act inimical to the Chinese government while staying in the colony.¹⁰⁹

The constitutional movement, as opposed to the revolutionary one, attracted much of Jordan's attention. There are different ways of looking at it. In terms of content, the movement had two

¹⁰⁶ Jordan to consul-general and Sir Havilland in Jordan to Grey, tel. 5, 11 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 213.

¹⁰⁷ Jordan to Grey, no. 85, 18 Feb. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 213.

¹⁰⁸ Jordan to Grey, no. 309, 25 Jun., tel. 100, 7 Jun. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 229.

¹⁰⁹ Jordan to Grey, no. 88, 20 Feb. 1908, Ch. Corres., vol. 421.

aspects: administrative and political reform. Thinking on a completely different level one is confronted with the conflicting aims of the Ch'ing government and the constitutionalists, mostly upper-class gentry, in supporting the movement.¹¹⁰

Leadership of what is broadly known as the constitutional and reform movement passed to and fro between the government and the constitutionalists between 1898 and 1910. By 1905, after the Russo-Japanese War, the government and the constitutionalists became more open in their struggle to lead the constitutional movement in their own ways. The aspect of administrative reform of the movement became increasingly overshadowed by its political significance.

However, the aspect of administrative reform was still prominent during the first years of Jordan's return. At the end of 1906 Jordan reported that most of the decrees passed to anticipate a constitutional government dealt with such matters as the re-organization of the metropolitan and provincial administrations, the promotion of education, the suppression of opium and the control of railways, telegraphs, and postal administration.¹¹¹ In the middle of 1907 a new series of decrees was issued on provincial administrative and judicial reform.¹¹² In the last quarter of the same year it was further

¹¹⁰ A lucid distinction between the two aspects of the movement and an explanation as to why the Ch'ing government decided to promote the movement to the political level are given in J. H. Fincher, "Perspectives on Chinese Experiments with Representative Institutions, 1907-1916", pp. 6-17, P R C C C

¹¹¹ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 231; tel. 207, 7 Nov., tel. 211, 10 Nov., no. 476, 14 Nov. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 31. Details of the reforms intended by these decrees are seen in Chang Chih-pen, Hsien-fa lun [Constitutional Law], (Shanghai, 1946), p. 143.

¹¹² Jordan to Grey, no. 336, 11 Jul. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 224.

decreed that the Manchu garrisons were to be disbanded and that the Manchu were to be treated on a par with the Chinese. The equalisation of the two races appeared to Jordan as "one of the few practical steps taken towards reform".¹¹³ Moreover, the codification of the laws and the improvement of the fiscal system was also decreed.¹¹⁴ It can certainly be said that Jordan was well inclined towards these attempts at the betterment of China provided they were not so drastic as to bring about the collapse of the social^{and} administrative order. In the promotion of education, for instance, Jordan was not averse to replacing the traditional examination system with a modern one. But he was apprehensive of the outcome of the change because of the great rôle played by returned students from Japan. He lamented the "pity that something cannot be done to direct a larger portion of the student class to England."¹¹⁵

¹¹³Jordan to Grey, no. 474, 3 Oct. 1907; no. 501, 17 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 224.

¹¹⁴Jordan to Grey, No. 501, 17 Oct. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 224.

¹¹⁵Jordan to Grey, no. 28. 19 Jan. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 223.

Jordan had a completely different attitude towards the political manifestation of the constitutional movement. In September 1906 the throne decreed the desirability of a constitutional government on the recommendation of the mission which left China in late 1905 to study the constitutions of countries abroad. By August 1907 the Commission to Investigate Modern Governments (Kao-cha Cheng-ch'ih Kuan) had been reorganised into the Constitutional Government Commission (Hsien-cheng pien-ch'a Kuan), a more powerful and permanent agency charged with supervising reform. In September 1907 a national assembly (Tzū-cheng Yüan) and in October, provincial assemblies (Tzū-i Chü) and various local assemblies were promised. The entire process culminated in August 1908 in the promulgation of a programme designed to complete constitutional reform in nine years, at the close of which the real parliament would have been convened.¹¹⁶

Jordan's attitude towards the nine years' plan was one of scepticism. He realised that Japan was chosen as the model in political reform. However, he pointed out clearly that China, being much less experienced politically, should have a longer period of preparation than nine years.

¹¹⁶ For text of the edict of 27 August 1908 which decreed the nine years' plan see Liu Chen-k'ai, Chung-kuo hsien-cheng shih-hua [History of the Chinese constitution], (Taipei, 1960), pp. 29-31.

"Evidently the Court and Government must reason that what was possible for Japan is equally possible for them, but it should, I think, be clear to them that the march of events in Japan can furnish no safe criterion for a programme of radical measures in a continent such as China is, and that in any case there is no sufficient number of qualified leaders and experts available to bring the scheme into effective execution all over the Empire in the time allotted."¹¹⁷

Again it is pointed out in the annual report for 1910 that democratic institutions were not compatible with oriental life and ideas and that western education had affected only a small minority while the masses were "abysmally ignorant and credulous".¹¹⁸

Aside from the general feeling of scepticism based on his assessment of the political ability of the Chinese, Jordan was specifically apprehensive that the programme would further strengthen the separatist tendency of the provinces. There is no doubt that the Ch'ing government, under external threat and internal pressure, recognised that political reform was indispensable and sought to direct it in a way that would bring concentration of power in the central government. Thus at the end of 1907 Yüan Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung, the most powerful governors-general, were promoted out of their provinces.¹¹⁹ However, as Y. C. Wang puts it in retrospect:

¹¹⁷ Jordan to Grey, no. 408, 14 Sept. 1908, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 183.

¹¹⁸ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.

¹¹⁹ The government's motive of concentrating power in its hands is almost unanimously put forward in works on the movement. See, for example, Y. C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West 1892-1949 (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 254-6; Fincher, "Perspectives in Chinese Experiments with Representative Institutions, 1907-1916", pp. 10-11; and Li, Tsui-chin san-shih-nien, p. 115.

"Actually, a wide discrepancy developed between intention and practice".¹²⁰ Jordan anticipated such discrepancy from the start. About three months after the national assembly and provincial assemblies were promised Jordan told Sir Arthur Moore that the Chinese government had raised "a Frankenstein by their propagation of constitutional theories".¹²¹ He told the Wai-wu Pu that "troublesome as Foreign Representatives are, they are nothing to what is in store for them when they will have to face a Parliamentary opposition composed of rabid members from Canton and the South!"¹²²

It was scheduled that the provincial councils should be formed before the national assembly. Jordan foresaw the damaging effect inherent in the councils upon the authority of the central government. To him the institution of the councils, dominated by the gentry¹²³ and deliberative in function only in name, upset the traditional balance of local power between the government authorities and the gentry class. His apprehension was based on something more concrete than his observation of the rift between the provinces and the government in railway matters in particular. The self-government society (Tzū-ch'ih Hui) in Canton must have appeared to Jordan as the predecessor of the provincial assembly. The acting consul-general at Canton reported in early 1909 that the society was a political

¹²⁰ Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, pp. 255-6.

¹²¹ Jordan to A. W. Moore, private, 16 Dec. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.

¹²² Jordan to Campbell, private, 10 Dec. 1908, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.

¹²³ Jordan to Grey, no. 474, 20 Dec. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 199, enclosing a report by Campbell on the origin, governing rules, composition, franchise and powers of the assemblies. The rules governing election meant that only the gentry could become members.

manifestation of the reform movement in the city. It played a leading rôle in the anti-Japanese agitation and boycott in 1908 in protest against the Tatsu Maru incident. It also instigated the anti-British boycott against the "Fatshan". The society controlled the press and was amply financed by local influential people as well as Cantonese residing in the British colonies. Above all, it had made itself a power to be reckoned with by the Cantonese government and local foreign authorities. At the same time, Canton did little towards implementing the administrative reform which Jordan approved of.¹²⁴

The assemblies of most provinces eventually met in mid-October 1909. As was to be expected, Jordan paid serious attention to the occasion. Consular officers in all provinces were instructed to furnish the legation with information on the assemblies. Apprehension was especially entertained about the assemblies at Changsha, Hankow, and Canton which declared their steadfast intention to protect provincial interests from foreign exploitation. The Hukuang Railway loan was the foremost question which was affected by this attitude of the assemblies. In all, the government officials were either not powerful enough to stamp down the gentry's opposition or were openly sympathetic with the assemblies.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Fox to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 83, 19 Feb. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 634.

¹²⁵ Jordan to Grey, no. 409, 10 Nov. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 191; Jordan to Grey, no. 423, 16 Nov. 441, 30 Nov. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 626; and Jordan to Grey, no. 474, 20 Dec. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 199. See also N C H, 16 Oct., 11 Dec. 1909; 18 Feb. 1910.

But the first sitting of the assemblies was already much less stormy than what was to follow. In spite of his illness and leave in 1910 Jordan knew of the three petitions (26 January, 22 June, 3 October) instigated by the Association of Provincial Councils made up of members representing sixteen provincial assemblies to institute a permanent parliament in one year instead of nine years as originally decreed.¹²⁶ Jordan naturally disapproved of these activities and the government exhausted all means to delay decision on this matter. When the second session of the provincial assemblies began in late 1910, open rupture with the government became the dominant feature. The Kuangsi assembly resigned en masse because of a difference of opinion with the local authority over the question of opium suppression. The Chekiang assembly suspended its sitting because of the refusal of the governor to memorialise the throne for the reinstatement of T'ang Shou ch'ien, a prominent member of the gentry at the head of the Chekiang railway, who had been dismissed by an imperial decree. The assemblies of Hunan and Shensi pledged support for the Chekiang one. In Kuangtung the assembly insisted on a voice in the government of the province and demanded that the provincial budget should be submitted to it. In short, the annual report for the year comments: "The most prominent feature of the autumn session, 1910, of the various provincial assemblies has been the number of occasions on which recourse had been made to the

¹²⁶ For details of the petitions and the effort made by the assemblies to gain mass support see Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, pp. 256-61; Chang P'eng Yüan, "Constitutionalists and the Chinese Revolution of 1911", pp. 17-23, P R C C C; also MaxMuller to Grey, 237, 22 Jul., tel. 176, 27 Oct. 1910, Ch. Corres., vol. 858.

expedient of voluntary suspension of sittings by way of protest against various actions of the high provincial authorities..."¹²⁷

The national assembly or senate was formally inaugurated on 3 October, 1910, anticipating the parliament proper. It is certain that the national assembly represented to Jordan less of a threat to the power of the central government than the provincial assemblies. Jordan might even have hoped that the national assembly would exercise a moderating influence on the provincial assemblies since its duties included intervention in the disputes between the various provincial assemblies and between the assemblies and the provincial authorities.¹²⁸

The senate was a disappointment immediately after its inauguration which was simultaneous with the third petition by provincial leaders for the immediate establishment of a parliament. The petition was also submitted to the senate for discussion. Towards the end of the month the senate decided unanimously to support the petition. It threatened to resign if it was rejected.¹²⁹ On 4 November the prince regent yielded and made a compromise whereby parliament would be convoked in 1913 instead of 1917. The compromise disappointed both the petitioners and Jordan. The former felt that the concession fell short of their demand and the latter, in London, told Campbell that "the Regent could certainly have squashed the demand... if he had taken strong measures at the outset".¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201. For similar details see Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, p. 261.

¹²⁸ For details see translation of the first instalment of regulations for the senate in Jordan to Grey, no. 337, 22 Jul. 1908, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 183, and Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.

¹²⁹ MaxMuller to Grey, tel. 176, 27 Oct. 1910, Ch. Corres., vol. 858.

When Jordan returned to Peking the senate was still in session. He went to several sittings and soon discovered the reason for the "independent attitude"¹³¹ of the senate. The fact was that the "provincial members of the Senate are carrying all before them, and, so far, there has practically been no opposition on the part of the representatives of the Government".¹³² It was because though nominally half the members of the senate were nominated by the government, most of them were officials of the lower ranks and were more inclined to the views of the provincial members.

Although Jordan was impressed by the seriousness of most of the senators¹³³ he found it difficult to accept their encouraging gestures towards the provincial assemblies in defying the authorities and attacking the central government itself. For example, on the resignation of the Kuangsi assembly the senate telegraphed the governor forbidding him to interfere with the action of the assembly whilst at the same time he was told to abandon the strike. The most serious attack on the central movement took the form of public censure on the Grand Council. The grand councillors were attacked for having encroached upon the legislative over minor economic and educational measures in Hunan, Yunnan, and Kuangsi.

¹³⁰ Campbell's minute on MaxMuller to Grey, tel. 181, 5 Nov. 1910, Ch. Corres., vol. 858.

¹³¹ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.

¹³² Jordan to Campbell, private, 6 Dec. 1910, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

¹³³ Jordan to Alston, private, 15 Dec. 1910; Jordan to Grey, private, 11 Jan. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

In a meeting on 9 November the senate moved to demand explanation from the grand councillors in person. The Grand Council retaliated by a wholesale resignation - an unprecedented event in Chinese history. On 18 December the regent refused to accept the resignation and asserted the council's supremacy over the senate. During the crisis Prince Ch'ing and Na-t'ung, both of them grand councillors, often complained to Jordan of "the extravagant pretensions of these inexperienced representatives of the people".¹³⁴

Yüan Shih-k'ai

There is no way of accurately dating the beginning of the interesting and significant friendship between Jordan and Yüan Shih-k'ai. The most common assertion is that it began when Yüan and Jordan were both serving in Korea.¹³⁵ However, available evidence does not confirm this statement. First, Jordan's service in Korea basically did not coincide with that of Yüan Shih-k'ai. Jordan took up his first position in Korea in October, 1896 and remained there until the end of 1905.¹³⁶ Yüan went to Korea in late 1882 and left in August, 1894 soon after war started between China and Japan.¹³⁷ Thus there was more than

¹³⁴ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201; Jordan to Grey, no. 458, conf., 20 Dec. 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 204, see also H H K M, vol. 4, pp. 69-71.

¹³⁵ For example, Hosie, "Sir Jordan, John", Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-30, supp., p. 462. Speaking on Jordan on hearing of his death T'ang Shao-i also says that Jordan and Yüan became friends in Korea, N C H, 19 Sept. 1925; Wu Hsiang-hsiang, "Hai-wai hsin-chien Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shih shih-liao", [New Materials abroad on Modern Chinese history], in CH tsung-k'an, vol. 1, p.62.

¹³⁶ Sir Walter Hillier, consul-general at Seoul, applied somewhat unexpectedly in early July 1896 for retirement because of a serious eye disease which threatened him with blindness, MacDonalld to Marquis of Salisbury, no. 50, 23 Jul. 1896, Ch. Corres., (F.O.17) vol. 1282. At

two years' interval between their two periods of service.

Secondly, Jordan had not once mentioned in all his writing that he knew Yüan in Korea. The most likely occasion for him to have done so, had it been the case, was when he wrote to Campbell shortly after Yüan's death. He said: "During his [Yüan's] early life in Korea he formed friendship with a number of Englishmen - Baker, Hillier, McLeavy Brown and others...",¹³⁸ but not himself. Again, neither did he assert that he knew Yüan in Korea when he wrote the article "Some Chinese I have known" after his retirement.¹³⁹

Thus Jordan might have first come across Yüan either in the two years' interval mentioned above or after his return to China as the British minister there. Of these two possibilities the former was the more likely. Yüan did not come straight back to China after having left Korea in August, 1894. He was commissioned to stay in Manchuria to facilitate the transportation of reinforcements to the Chinese forces fighting in Korea. He reached China in the beginning of 1895. After her defeat by Japan China endeavoured to strengthen herself by building up a modern national army. The responsibility fell on Yüan who took up command

the same time MacDonald recommended Jordan to fill the vacancy, MacDonald to Marquis of Salisbury, no. 51, 23 Jul., ibid. The Foreign Office appointed Jordan on 5 September, F.O. to MacDonald, draft tel., 5 Sept. 1896, Ch. Corres. (F.O.17) vol. 1281. Jordan took up duties from Hillier on 26 Oct., Jordan to Marquis of Salisbury, no. 38, 26 Oct. 1896, Ch. Corres., (F.O. 17) vol. 1284. Thus presumably Jordan left China at the end of Sept. By then Yüan would have been back to China for about one year and nine months.

¹³⁷J.Ch'en, Yüan Shih-k'ai (London, 1961), pp. 20, 44.

¹³⁸Jordan to Langley, private, 13 Jun. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15. By Hillier Jordan means Sir Walter Hillier who was consul-general at Seoul before him. MacLeavy Brown had been in Korea for some time before Jordan and was appointed by the Korean government as the adviser to Customs at the end of 1895.

¹³⁹The article is available in Nineteenth Century, vol.88 (Dec.1920).

over the selected force of 4,000 to 5,000 men at HsiaoChan, seventy miles from Tientsin, in December 1895.¹⁴⁰ Despite the absence of definite evidence pointing to Jordan's acquaintance with Yüan during Yüan's early days at HsiaoChan it can fairly be assumed that this was the case as the army grew in repute. It was of course the origin of the Pei-yang Army [Army of the North Seas] which owed its allegiance to Yüan and eventually became^{the} military backing in his later bid for ascendancy. When in Korea Jordan followed Yüan's military career in HsiaoChan, and later in Shantung and Chilhi, closely.¹⁴¹

On the other hand, it is evident that Jordan and Yüan were already acquaintances, if not friends, soon after Jordan's return to China in 1906. For in the report on a visit to Yüan in Tientsin where he occupied the post of viceroy of Chihli Jordan made no mention that it was the first meeting.¹⁴²

It seems as though Jordan had already been impressed by Yüan before he left China in 1896, and one is given the impression that in Korea he had singled out Yüan from the handful of the then prominent

¹⁴⁰Ch'en, Yüan Shih-k'ai, pp. 44-5.

¹⁴¹Jordan, "Some Chinese I have known", p. 954. Other accounts of Yüan at HsiaoChan are: Shen Tsu-hsien and Wu K'ai-sheng, Jung-an ti-tz'ü chi [Early life of Yüan Shih-k'ai] in CHS ts'ung-shu, pp. 73-85. Ch'en, Yüan Shih-k'ai, pp. 46-62; C. Beresford, Break up of China (London 1899), pp. 271-3; Powell, The Rise of China's Military Power, 1895-1912, pp. 71-89.

¹⁴²Jordan to Grey, no. 535, conf., 21 Dec. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 221.

¹⁴³After going through about a dozen books written by missionaries in China the impression is that they were almost unanimously admirers of Yüan. For example, G. S. Eddy, The students of Asia (London, 1916), pp. 113-4; J. C. Keyte, The Passing of the Dragon (London, 1913), pp. 1-2; A. J. Brown, New Forces in Old China, p. 345; and Rev. G. F. Fitch,

Chinese officials and followed his career with meticulous attention. In early December 1899 Yüan was appointed governor of Shantung in the place of Yu Hsien. Yüan's salutary suppression of the fanatical Boxers, and protection of foreigners in the province won the praise of the foreign community in China, especially the missionaries.¹⁴³ In fact this was the first significant impact that Yüan made on the foreigners, something that was to have fruitful effect in his later career. Even away in Seoul Jordan was aware of the happening.¹⁴⁴

In the middle of November 1901 Yüan was promoted as the viceroy of Chihli and concurrently the commissioner for trade of North China. In later days Yüan often told Jordan that he regarded "his tenure of the Viceroyship of Chihli as the most fruitful period of his career".¹⁴⁵ Yüan's vice-royalty, especially the latter half, coincided with the constitutional reform movement. Yüan Shih-k'ai is known as a leader of the progressive movement. However he was not genuinely sympathetic with the political aspect of the movement, and his participation was more or less confined to the aspect of social reform. One of his close associates points out that Yüan committed himself insofar that he was able to keep his name in the foreground in the peculiar atmosphere of the day.¹⁴⁶

From Jordan's point of view there was no harm in Tientsin being the

"Progress of Moral Reform in China during 1907", The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal, vol. 39, no. 1 (Jan. 1908), p.9.

¹⁴⁴Jordan, "Some Chinese I have Known", p. 954; missionaries repeatedly told Jordan about the incident, for example, W. McClure to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 24, conf., 16 Jan. 1909, Ch.Conf.Print, vol. 190. Other accounts of the event are Ch'en, Yüan Shih-k'ai, pp.63-75; Brown, New Forces in Old China, pp. 91, 196, 267, 341.

¹⁴⁵Jordan, "Some Chinese I have Known", p. 955.

¹⁴⁶Shen Yün-lung, "Chang I-lin yü Yüan Shih-k'ai", in Hsien-tai Cheng-ch'ih jen-wu shu-p'ing, vol. 2, pp. 275-6.

model municipality characterised by such blessings of modernisation as broad streets, improved municipal arrangements, an efficient police organisation, electric trams, sanitation and electric lighting. Jordan was particularly impressed by Yüan's zeal in suppressing the smoking and growing of opium, and encouraging education, especially the technical aspects of it.¹⁴⁷ In short Jordan regarded Chihli as "a model on which the reform of the country should be based"¹⁴⁸ and he trusted the essentially conservative Yüan with his progressive policies which were only within the framework of stability essential to British interests.

It appears that the friendship between Jordan and Yüan matured most rapidly during the one and a half years when Yüan was in charge of the Wai-wu Pu before his dismissal in early 1909. Yüan's promotion to the capital was as much good news to Jordan as it was repugnant to Yüan.¹⁴⁹ In retrospect Jordan remarked that Yüan and Na-t'ung, the fairly capable Manchu counterpart of Yüan in the Wai-wu Pu, taken together "were probably the strongest combination the Chinese Foreign Office has ever produced".¹⁵⁰ Two months after Yüan became president of the Wai-wu Pu the Foreign Office in London prepared a memorandum on the standing grievances against the Chinese to be given

¹⁴⁷ Jordan, "Some Chinese I have Known", p. 955; Jordan to Grey, no. 535, conf., 21 Dec. 1906, Ch. Corres., vol. 221. For a general account of Yüan's work at Tientsin see Lawton and Hobden, "The Fall of Yuan Shih-kai", pp. 423-4; also G. S. Eddy, The Students of Asia, pp. 62-3.

¹⁴⁸ Jordan to Grey, no. 14, conf., 6 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.

¹⁴⁹ The promotion was a Manchu plan to strip Yüan of his provincial strength, Jordan to Grey, no. 146, conf., 6 Jan. 1909, ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Jordan, "Some Chinese I have Known", p. 956.

to the new Chinese minister to London.¹⁵¹ Foremost amongst the grievances was the Soochou-Ningpo railway. It was settled in early 1908. Jordan could not forget how he was asked by Yüan to write a strong protesting letter concerning the railway to Yüan himself so that the latter could have the ground to advise the Chinese government on a speedy settlement.¹⁵² Another grievance listed in the memorandum was the Chinese delay in currency reform promised in the Commercial Treaty of 1902. Yüan tried to remedy this in late 1908 when he instructed T'ang Shao-i to discuss the question with the British Foreign Office on his way home from his mission of thanks to the United States for using her share of the Boxer indemnity to educate Chinese youth. Other questions to be discussed included Customs succession on the retirement of Sir Robert Hart, Sino-Japanese negotiations in Manchuria, and British supervision of the building of the Chinese navy. But these plans turned out to be abortive when Yüan was dismissed from office.¹⁵³ Throughout the one and a half years Jordan was impressed by Yüan's strong hands over the provinces in forcing them into line with the government's policy in relation to foreign concessions. He attributed the unexpected peace after the deaths of the empress dowager and Kuang-hsü to the presence of Yüan in the capital.¹⁵⁴ But after the

¹⁵¹Memorandum, 19 Nov., in Grey to Jordan, no. 472, 20 Nov. 1907, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 175.

¹⁵²Jordan to Grey, no. 579, conf., 11 Dec. 1907, Ch. Corres., vol. 409.

¹⁵³Jordan to Grey, tel. 13, conf., 8 Jan., Jordan to Grey, no. 14, conf. 16 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.

¹⁵⁴Jordan to Grey, no. 521, 21 Nov. 1908, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 183.

removal of Yüan the Wai-wu Pu "relapsed into its former state of incapacity", and was "unable to settle any question in which provincial interests are specially yor ^{largel} yconcerned." [sic.] ¹⁵⁵

The edict of 2 January, 1909 which dismissed Yüan Shih-k'ai from all offices was a surprise to Jordan. He thought that ^{the} simultaneous deaths of the express dowager and Kuang-hsü had removed the chance of the latter taking vengeance on Yüan for the 1898 coup. Moreover, Yüan was given the responsibility of organising the imperial funerals, a lucrative task, and on 19 December made senior guardian of the infant emperor. On 24 December Jordan wrote: "There is a fairly general impression that he [Yüan] is degenerating both mentally and physically and the multitude of his wives may account for this."¹⁵⁶ Hence there was not the least apprehension of a serious political change.

The next morning after his dismissal Yüan took the first train for Tientsin. However he was soon assured of his personal safety and returned to Peking the same afternoon. Two days later he left Peking for his home province, Honan. At Changteh, the important railway juncture in the north of Honan Yüan built himself a retreat which he named the "Garden for Cultivating Longevity".¹⁵⁷ where he watched the events that were to lead to the great revolution in 1911.

¹⁵⁵ Alston's Memorandum, based on Jordan's reports, respecting the Wai-wu Pu, 31 Jan. 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 196.

¹⁵⁶ Jordan to Campbell, private, 24 Dec. 1908, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.

¹⁵⁷ Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 99.

The removal of Yüan caused a fairly considerable storm in the foreign legations, particularly in the British one.¹⁵⁸ It was a blow on Jordan and he was completely disillusioned about the regency. Besides its long term ill-effects on British interests Yüan's removal created immediate dangers. Jordan was apprehensive of a disruption of the administration if Yüan's dismissal was to be followed by a wholesale removal of his protégés in the government services. That many men owed their positions to Yüan did not escape Jordan. Foremost in his mind were Hsü Shih-ch'ang and T'ang Shao-i who, with the strong support of Yüan, were determined to checkmate Japanese expansion in Manchuria.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the dismissal represented not only "the self-willed or vindictive character of the Prince Regent" but "the reactionary tendencies of the Manchu party."¹⁶⁰ The drastic impeachment of the most prominent Chinese official was keenly felt by the Chinese as an act of Manchu suppression. The schism between the Chinese and Manchu was widened.¹⁶¹

The American and German ministers called on Jordan to talk over the situation that very afternoon. They considered that the incident should not be passed unnoticed by the foreign representatives.

¹⁵⁸ According to the representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank in Peking the dismissal caused the greatest commotion in the British legation, Wu Hsiang-hsiang, "San-Han Fu-sang so-chien Yüan Shih-k'ai kuan-hsi shih-liao", [Materials relating to Yüan Shih-k'ai in Korea and Japan], in CH ts'ung-k'an, vol. 4, pp. 446-7.

¹⁵⁹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 3, 2 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.

¹⁶⁰ Jordan to Grey, no. 14, 6 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.

¹⁶¹ It is recorded that Chang Chih-tung feared that he would soon be treated by the Manchu court as it had treated Yüan, Shen, "T'an Yüan Shih-k'ai", [On Yüan Shih-k'ai], in Hsien-tai cheng-chih jen-wu

Jordan agreed with Count Rex and Rockhill that the foreign ministers should simultaneously approach the regent and each deliver a message from his government "strongly representing ... that China's foreign relations would suffer severely by the dismissal of a statesman who was universally considered the guarantee of his country's political stability."¹⁶²

The next day an informal diplomatic meeting was held in the American legation. It was decided that the diplomatic representatives should ask from their respective governments authority to make representations against the dismissal directly to the regent rather than through the Wai-wu Pu. In fact a text was drafted by the French minister. Jordan urged the Foreign Office for immediate authorisation and pointed out, on his own initiative, that the representation had to be made before Yüan's departure from Peking, to be effective,¹⁶³ This suggestion implied that Jordan hoped for the reinstatement of Yüan as a result of the representation. The Foreign Office gave its permission but Campbell remarked: "I rather doubt whether it can be said that it is no interference, but we do interfere occasionally in the internal affairs of China and can hardly avoid it."¹⁶⁴

shu-p'ing, vol. 1, p.67.

¹⁶² Jordan to Grey, tel. 3, 2 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.

¹⁶³ Jordan to Grey, tel. 5, 3 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 612.

¹⁶⁴ Campbell's minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 5, 3 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 612.

However, on 9 January Jordan reported the failure of the Diplomatic Corps at concerted action. There was a marked divergence of opinion as to what form the representation should take or the manner in which it should be given. Jordan was annoyed at the "marked indifference" of the Japanese minister, Ijuin, who opposed the mention of Yüan's name so that the representation would not assume a personal complexion. He indirectly deprecated the action by saying that the representation would only be received by China as an interference in her domestic politics.¹⁶⁵ Japan further argued that since Yüan's personal safety was guaranteed there was no more ground for interference.¹⁶⁶

In order to understand Jordan's views on the Japanese attitude it is necessary to know something about the Sino-Japanese and Anglo-Japanese relationship with regard to Manchuria. Ever since her victory over Russia in 1905 Japan had been expanding her influence in South Manchuria to the detriment of Chinese sovereignty. Almost immediately after Hsü Shih-ch'ang and T'ang Shao-i became the viceroy of Manchuria and the governor of Fengtien respectively in early 1907 there was a marked tightening of Chinese policy in Manchuria. Since Hsü and T'ang were Yüan's important henchmen it was believed that the anti-Japanese policy was adopted at Yüan's instigation. It has also to be borne in mind that for several months before Yüan's dismissal

¹⁶⁵ Jordan to Grey, tel. 17, 9 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.

¹⁶⁶ MacDonald to Grey, tel. 3, 10 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vo. 190.

negotiations had been going on between China and Japan on such Manchurian questions as telegraph, lumbering in the Yalu basin, and the construction of the Changchun-Kirin Railway. British merchants in China had become extremely anti-Japanese because of Japanese commercial immorality in South Manchuria, especially the piracy of British trade marks. Jordan too became dissatisfied with Japan and was pleased with Yüan's forward policy in Manchuria.

Thus it was commonly believed and openly suggested by some Chinese and foreigners, for example Morrison amongst the latter, that the Japanese were elated by Yüan's ill fate and expected the removal of T'ang Shao-i whose attitude in Manchuria was particularly obnoxious. The development was taken by the Japanese as being inducive to a successful conclusion to the Manchurian negotiations.¹⁶⁷ In his official correspondence Jordan in effect endorsed the opinion by citing the view without giving any refutation.¹⁶⁸ Privately to Campbell he wrote: "There is only one opinion of the Japanese attitude in Peking and that is that they were perfectly satisfied with the recent turn of events and thought the removal of Yuan and Tong would facilitate their Manchurian negotiations. That appears to me a perfectly natural view for them to take, but unfortunately it does not coincide with what I conceive to be best for British interests."¹⁶⁹ Moreover, Jordan observed a close relation between the Japanese legation and T'ieh-liang whom he regarded as the chief instrument of

¹⁶⁷ Jordan to Campbell, private, 21 Jan. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.

¹⁶⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 20, 11 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.

¹⁶⁹ Jordan to Campbell, private, 19 Jan. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.

Yüan's overthrow. Some Chinese, especially Liang Tun-yen who filled Yüan's vacancy in the Wai-wu Pu, held firmly that the Japanese were actively involved in bringing about Yüan's fall by virtue of their influence over the Manchu faction. Officially Jordan hesitated "to give credence to such a statement", but he never denounced the idea as vehemently as the British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Claude MacDonald.¹⁷⁰ The concerted action of all the powers was not to take place. The Russian government, because of the concern of its exclusive claims in North Manchuria and the Russo-Japanese secret pact of March 1907, instructed the Russian minister to abstain from action. France, the ally of Russia in Europe and tied to Japan by the 1907 Franco-Japanese treaty, was evasive in response. Germany's instruction to her minister was that he was to abstain unless unanimity was achieved.¹⁷¹

Despite the discouraging attitude of the powers Jordan and Rockhill still maintained the expediency of seriously drawing the attention of the Chinese government to the matter. They agreed to request authorisation from their governments to make separate representations to the Wai-wu Pu, using the French draft formula of 3 January as the basis.¹⁷² On 11 January Jordan received his authorisation, and so did Rockhill. The latter did so only after the American State Department had ascertained the London Foreign Office's support of Jordan. In fact Grey said: "I was originally doubtful about the wisdom of this representation but suppressed my doubt owing to my confidence in Sir J. Jordan's knowledge of the Chinese and his judgement as to its

¹⁷⁰ Jordan to Grey, tel. 20, 11 Jan., MacDonald to Grey, tel. 5, 14 Jan., no. 11, conf., 23 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.

¹⁷¹ Jordan to Grey, no. 24, conf., 16 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.

¹⁷² Jordan to Grey, *ibid.*

probable effect."¹⁷³ Thus Jordan played the most important rôle in the Anglo-American action, the Americans following the British lead because "as American interests are not large they do not desire to act separately or take any leading part in such action."¹⁷⁴

Jordan and Rockhill prepared a short statement and wrote a letter to Prince Ch'ing for an interview. At the interview the two ministers repeated verbally the written statement. Jordan further stressed that any violent change of the Chinese government would be a matter of deep concern to the British because of the magnitude of their commercial interests and the large part they played in the development of the country. They were assured by Prince Ch'ing that the removal of Yüan was on personal grounds and that it did not denote a change in policy either in internal reforms or foreign relations.¹⁷⁵ Jordan had to be content with the assurance as the regent was determined that Yüan must go.

Although the Anglo-American action did not result in the reinstatement of Yüan it clearly reflects Jordan's attitude towards Yüan Shih-k'ai. It is appropriate to describe the next three years, until Yüan was recalled at the outbreak of the 1911 revolution, as the "eclipse"¹⁷⁶ and not the absence of Yüan's influence. Indeed, Changteh was in easy rail access to officials at the capital. Yüan's son, K'o-ting, and henchman, Feng Kuo-chang, Yang Shih-chi, Hsü Shih-ch'ang and Chao Ping-chün, occupied important posts in the army, the police, the ministry of communication and other departments.¹⁷⁷ Also, Yüan had

¹⁷³ Grey's minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 26, 15 Jan. 1909, vol. 612.

¹⁷⁴ Bryce, British ambassador in Washington to Grey, tel. 8, 10 Jan. 1909, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 190.

supporters in the powerful Prince Ch'ing and the Manchu official Na-ī'ung. Moreover, the three years were characterised by repeated rumours of Yüan's recall. Soon after Yüan's dismissal became known, the Chinese minister at London and Sir John MacLeavy Brown, councillor of the Chinese legation, expressed as their views that Yüan's retirement was of a temporary character.¹⁷⁶ Jordan likewise shared the general expectation of Yüan's return to official pre-eminence. The feeling was particularly marked from late 1910 onwards. In September, 1910 daily conferences were held amongst government members with the recall of Yüan as the chief subject of discussion. No result came out because of the alleged opposition of the empress dowager, Kuang-hsü's wife. Towards the outbreak of the revolution rumours again became rampant when Prince Ch'ing resigned from the premiership and recommended Yüan to take his place. However, his resignation was rejected by the throne.¹⁷⁹

Thus, Chinese politics between 1906 and 1911 opened up three possibilities. First, the central government might succeed in concentrating power in its hands. However, this possibility was slight despite various vigorous attempts of the government at imposing its will on the provinces towards the close of the period. Moreover, from Jordan's point of view, although he was sure of the government's sincerity in upholding her obligations towards foreign countries, it seemed that a

¹⁷⁵ Jordan, to Grey, tel. 26, 15 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres., vol. 612.

¹⁷⁶ Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 101.

¹⁷⁷ Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 110.

¹⁷⁸ Alston's minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 26, 15 Jan. 1909, Ch. Corres. vol. 612 ; The Times, 11 Oct. 1909.

revival of the power of the government might not be an ideal situation after the dismissal of Yüan Shih-k'ai because of the extreme conservative character of the officials remaining in power. He would have liked to see more reform achieved in China along social and administrative lines.¹⁸⁰

Secondly, there was the greater possibility of the provinces getting the upper hand. The provinces were the places where the revolutionary and constitutional spirit had been bred. There was no question of Jordan ever becoming sympathetic with the revolutionary movement. But he approved of the administrative reform provided by the programme of the constitutional movement, despite being highly apprehensive of its political manifestations. Therefore the importance of "a leader capable of controlling it [the constitutional movement] and guiding it along the path of moderation and safety"¹⁸¹ was something he felt strongly.

Thirdly, it was possible that Yüan Shih-k'ai would re-enter public life. To Jordan this of course represented the ideal outcome of the situation. It would remove the shortcomings of an over-conservative government and provide the much needed leader for the constitutional movement.

¹⁷⁹ For example, Jordan to Grey, no. 458. conf., 20 Dec. 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 204; The Times, 6 Sept., 8 Sept. 1910; 29 and 30 Sept. 1911, Jordan to Campbell, private, 11 Nov. 1909, Jordan Papers; vol. 6 in which K'o-ting told Jordan that he expected his father to return to office within a year.

¹⁸⁰ Jordan to Grey, no. 458, conf., 20 Dec. 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 204.

¹⁸¹ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1910, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 201.

Chapter Two

Policy of Neutrality in the 1911 Revolution

It has been established in the previous chapter that Jordan was not sympathetic with the revolutionary movement. But when the revolution broke out in October, 1911, Jordan immediately adopted the so-called policy of strict neutrality. That is to say, theoretically, no help was to be rendered either to what had hitherto been the legitimate government or its opponent. The reasons for Jordan's attitude are not difficult to see.

British Interests and Behaviour of the Revolutionaries Towards Foreigners

Where the revolution first broke out, and later centred, was significant. It is a common theory that there were three "centres of gravity"¹ during the revolution, beginning with the outbreak in October 1911 and ending with Yüan Shih-k'ai's election as the provisional president of the first Chinese republic in March 1912. These "centres" were the Wuhan cities of Wuchang, Hankow, and HanYang, where the revolution first began and which remained the field of military activities until negotiations began in early December; Peking, the stronghold of Manchu imperialism; and Shanghai, where peace conferences between the revolutionaries and the Manchu government took place and where the republican feeling became especially unrelenting. Of these places Jordan had to worry least about Peking in terms of British interests. It was a completely different matter with the other two. The Wuhan cities occupied the central position of the Yangtse region

¹P. H. Kent, The Passing of the Manchu, (London, 1912), p. 122.

where British interests were heavily entrenched. Hankow had the largest British concession and it was the most important railway centre in central China.² Although the city was retrieved by government troops at the end of October it remained within the firing range of the revolutionary cities of Hanyang and Wuchang until the end of November. The longstanding importance of Shanghai especially for British commercial interests was well-known.

Moreover, the revolution was not confined to these "centres" only. Within less than one and a half months after the first outbreak Ichang, Changsha, Hsianfu, Kiukiang, Taiyuanfu, Tengyueh, Yunnanfu, Mengtze, Hangchou, Ningpo, Wenchou, Chinkiang, Kueichow, Wuhu, Anking, Canton, Swatow, Chaochoufu, Foochou, Changchoufu, Amoy, Chefoo, Nanking, and Chungking were taken over by the revolutionaries. These revolutionary cities fell broadly into two categories: treaty ports where British merchants aggregated; and towns in the interior where many British missionaries ^{were} stationed.

The China Station under Admiral Winsloe was responsible for the protection of British nationals and interests at the treaty ports. Soon after the Admiral arrived at the Wuhan area he was made senior admiral of the international squadron patrolling the Yangtze. The British concession in Hankow could not accommodate all the missionaries who were collected from outside the settlement. Women

² Radiating from Hankow were: Hankow-Canton Railway, unfinished; Hankow-Peking Railway; Hankow-Szechuan Railway, unfinished; and Hankow-Shanghai Railway.

as well as children had to sleep on board gun boats during the early days of the turmoil.³ Moreover, the China squadron had only 29 vessels, among them ten shallow draught gunboats, one despatch vessel and seven destroyers, more or less antiquated. With these Admiral Winsloe had to provide security for British interests and residents along the Yangtze and Canton rivers as well as the whole sea coast.⁴ Besides the frequent complaints of inadequate protection made by British residents at some ports⁵ Jordan was made keenly aware of the inadequacy of the British naval strength in China by yet another matter. In Jordan's opinion it was impolitic to employ British military force to supplement the naval man power because he was afraid that the presence of foreign troops in the concessions might convey the impression of outside interference to the revolutionaries. Thus the settlements at Hankow and Shanghai were guarded by bluejackets and volunteers. However, Admiral Winsloe found it increasingly difficult to provide the necessary naval manpower and repeatedly asked Jordan for his consent to the landing of troops to relieve the fatigued naval men at Shanghai and even Hankow where most of the naval resources concentrated.⁶

³ Jordan to Grey, tel. 219, 11 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

⁴ The Times, 24 Nov. 1911, gives the names and description of all British vessels in China during the revolution.

⁵ For serious complaints of British residents at Hankow see Goffe to Jordan, no. 113, 24 Nov. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 288) vol. 1802; the residents of Ichang complained directly to Grey, their telegram of 2 Jan., and Grey to Jordan, tel., 2 Jan. 1912, British Parliamentary Papers, LXXIII, p. 388; also NCH, 25 Nov. 1911.

⁶ For example, Winsloe to Admiralty to Admiralty to F.O., 3 Nov., also Jordan to Grey, tel. 261, 3 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

An equally serious problem was the protection of foreign missionaries who were scattered throughout the interior. The question should not be looked at from an exclusively British point of view. If anti-foreign atrocities were to take place all foreign missionaries would be indiscriminately involved. Thus the instruction Jordan received was to protect British lives and those of other foreigners whenever necessary. In retrospect, Jordan recalled his anxiety: "Risings in China have hitherto not infrequently been attended by anti-foreign feeling when, indeed, they have not been entirely anti-foreign in character, and at the outbreak of the revolution ... there was considerable anxiety regarding the safety of missionaries and other residents in the interior."⁷ There were in China at the time about 40 ~~Greek~~ Orthodox missionaries, 1450 Roman Catholic priests and 5150 protestant missionaries.⁸ The last two groups together possessed stations and out-stations in every prefecture in China.⁹ Most British missionaries belonged to the protestant church and together they represented more than twenty English missions. Of these the China Inland Mission was the biggest and had out-stations in extremely remote villages in the outlying provinces of Kansu, Sinkiang, and Yunnan.¹⁰

⁷ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1911, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 229.

⁸ K. S. Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China, (London 1929), pp. 566, 539, 606, which give sufficient information to produce the conjectured figures in the text; statistics in the China Year Book and China Mission Year Book, 1912, do not give the exact figures required.

⁹ Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China, pp. 537, 571.

¹⁰ China Inland Mission, annual report for 1911 entitled China and the Gospel, (London etc., 1912) pp. 121-37.

Jordan was certainly concerned for British colonial interests. Of the British colonial possessions in South East Asia, Hongkong had the earliest connection with the revolutionary movement. A few months after establishing the Chung-hsing Hui headquarters at San Francisco Sun Yat-sen founded a branch of the society in Hongkong at the beginning of 1895 which was heavily involved in the revolutionary attempt to seize Canton in September 1895. With the establishment of the T'ung-meng Hui in 1905 a new T'ung-meng Hui branch was founded in Hongkong under the leadership of Fung Tzu-yu. Henceforth the Hongkong branch played an important rôle in the various T'ung-meng Hui revolutionary attempts that took place before 1911. Such important revolutionaries as Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei had intimate connections with the Hongkong branch. In 1905 too a Singapore T'ung-meng Hui was established by Sun. It soon flourished and its membership was enlarged especially by means of literary propaganda. Revolutionary cells were also founded in the Straits Settlement, Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Malacca, and British Sarawak.¹¹ The close connection between the Chinese population of the British colonies and revolutionary activities did not escape Jordan. Indeed, immediately after the revolution began important Chinese newspapers in

¹¹ For details of the revolutionary movement in British colonies see, for example, Ts'ao Ya-po, Wu-chang ko-ming chen-shih, [True account of the Wuchang uprising], (Shanghai, 1930), pp. 260-70 in which Ts'ao suggests that the people in the British colonies, as opposed to the Dutch, contributed much more money to the cause; Li P'o-sheng, etc. (ed.), Hua-ch'iao chi tsung-chi, [Record of overseas Chinese], (Taipei, 1965), pp. 459-62; and Feng, Ko-ming i-shih, vol.5, pp.206-40.

Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, for example the Nam Kew Pao¹² (Straits Chinese Post) and the Cue Sing Mail¹³ respectively, took the revolutionary and republican stand. Even the Nan-yang Tsung-hui Hsin-pao¹⁴ (Union Times), another popular Chinese paper in Singapore but directed by an Englishman A. P. Goodwin, desisted from its usual pro-Manchu line soon after the revolution broke out. In Hongkong the revolutionary success in Kwangtung was zealously celebrated. On his way back to China from America Sun Yat-sen was received with enthusiasm in Singapore¹⁵. When he expressed his views in early December on the Japanese attempt to bolster up the Manchu dynasty Jordan wrote: "If we join the Japanese in bolstering up the dynasty, we are bound to incur much unpopularity in the South which is red-hot republican and may possibly have some trouble in Hongkong and Singapore where the Chinese population is intensely anti-Manchu."¹⁶

On the other hand, the revolutionaries on the whole adopted a friendly attitude towards foreigners. The outbreak at Wuhan was characterised by civil treatment of the foreign concessions. Soon after the outbreak Jordan reported that the revolutionary commander-in-chief made a proclamation against injury to foreigners or concessions under

¹²For example, 14 Oct., 16 Oct., and 21 Oct. 1911.

¹³The paper appears to be a T'ung-meng Hui organ in Kuala Lumpur.

¹⁴The Paper is in fact an organ of the constitutionalists. Its attitude remained anti-revolutionary until November.

¹⁵Nan-yang Tsung-hui Hsin-pao, 8 Nov., 14 Nov., 1911; and J. Cantlie and C. S. Jones, Sun Yat-sen and the Making of China (London, 1912) p.137.

¹⁶Jordan to Campbell, private, 4 Dec. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

pain of death. In Wuchang, where a military government of the revolutionaries was set up, missionaries and foreign staff members of schools were guarded out of the city to safer quarters by the revolutionary troops. The property of the churches was also protected. Besides, there was the explicit promise of the leader of the Wuchang military government, Li Yüan-hung, that foreigners would not be molested on the condition that they refrained from helping the Manchu government.¹⁷

Protection of foreigners by the revolutionaries was reinforced by every revolutionary success. In many places the cry was: "Protect the foreigner, protect the Christian". In Nanking, Taiyuanfu, Kingchou and Yachou missionaries were even able to afford protection and shelter to non-christian Chinese and Manchus.¹⁸ Before negotiations took place between the government and the revolutionaries in early December Jordan needed only to worry for the safety of the foreigners at Taiyanfu and Hsianfu, the respective capitals of Shansi and Shensi, about whom the legations had for a long time received no news. When news eventually came through apprehension for the Taiyuanfu foreigners was proved to be ill-founded. Hsianfu, however, "was the greatest stain attaching to the revolutionary cause" because eight Swedish subjects, six of them children, were killed in a mob violence. When Jordan received the news he sanctioned the formation of a rescue expedition, mostly manned by British men, under J. C. Keyte, which brought the

¹⁷ Jordan to Grey, tel. 220, 12 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093; also HHKM, vol. 5, p. 175-6.

¹⁸ Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China, pp. 543, 608.

remaining missionaries in Shensi out to safety. Keyte attributed the cause of this singular act of anti-foreign violence to a split of leadership in Shensi between the more educated sector of the revolutionaries and the Ko-lao Hui (Society of the Elder Brethren) which encouraged anti-foreign terrorism although it was within the revolutionary camp.¹⁹

The moderate behaviour of the revolutionaries towards foreigners was unexpected and it was natural that Jordan avoided doing anything to change it. Jordan's attitude towards the revolutionaries as expressed in the policy of neutrality can perhaps be explained in the light of W. Levi's statement on the revolutionaries' policy towards the foreigners: "The lines separating the various political groups became nebulous. The attitudes on foreign policy which had up to this time [the revolution] been the generally distinguishing mark of these groups [notably the government and the disaffected provinces] melt altogether. There was no longer certainty as to where anyone stood. Expediency began to rule, [my italics] and foreigners became objects of political manouvres. Nobody in China wanted to expose herself to the accusation of having surrendered to foreign powers, yet everybody was vying for foreign sympathy in the knowledge that sooner or later he would need foreign help."²⁰

¹⁹ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1911, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 229. For a first hand account of the incident and the expedition see J. C. Keyte, The Passing of the Dragon, (London, 1913); see also E. F. Borst-Smith, Caught in the Chinese Revolution, (London, 1912) which is a second hand account of the Shensi episode dedicated to Keyte.

²⁰ W. Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy, (Minneapolis, 1953) p. 122.

Neutrality in Action - Indemnity Postponement, Loans and Informal
Cash Advances.

The Manchu government approached its demise in a state of increasing indebtedness.²¹ According to the budget for 1911 prepared by the Ministry of Finance at the end of 1910 China would have^{had} to face a deficit of about 78,000,000 taels, or £10,000,000 without the revolution.²² The outbreak at Wuhan heralded the danger of a lapse of financial contribution to the government from the disaffected areas. The anticipation of the government of this danger was later fully borne out. In places which were affected by the revolution the machinery of taxation broke down partly because of administrative confusion but mostly because the revolutionaries abolished most of the taxes to gain the support of the people. Then of course there was the prospect of extra military and naval expenditure. Less than a fortnight after the outbreak Jordan observed that "the Ministry of Finance have already recommended the suspension of payments other than those required for war purposes and for the service of foreign loans." By the end of October many of the boards were left without responsible officials both because of the general panic caused by repeated rumours of a possible feud between the Han and Manchu communities and the fact that officials' salaries in most cases were long overdue.²³

²¹ For a good account of the degeneration and decentralisation of government finance during the late Ch'ing period see P'eng Yü-hsin, "Chi'ng -mo chung-yang yü ko-sheng ts'ai-cheng", [Central and provincial finances in the late Ch'ing period] in CCL, collection 2, vol. 5, pp. 3-46.

²² MaxMuller to Grey, tel. 177, 28 Oct. 1910, Ch. Corres., vol. 858.

²³ Jordan to Grey, no. 409, 23 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

A week after the revolution broke out Jordan, as the doyen, received from the Chinese government the first suggestion of financial assistance in a request for postponing the payment of the Boxer indemnity. The Wai-wu Pu informed him that it would soon present him with a memorandum, to be passed to the other ministers, applying for the postponement. If the ministers approved, a formal application would then be made to the powers. Jordan made no comment when reporting on the matter.²⁴ The Foreign Office made a calculation of the unpaid amount of the British share of the indemnity while waiting for the official application. F. A. Campbell reacted favourably and recalled America's remission in 1909 of part of the indemnity which China owed her.²⁵

The same day the Board of Posts and Communications applied to the four-powers consortium, through its agents in Peking, for a loan of 500,000 taels. There are two reasons for considering the question of this loan and that of indemnity suspension together: first, because the requests were made simultaneously; secondly, because Jordan had an identical view on both. To clarify the discussion that follows a table is drawn, showing the four ministers, the four bank representatives in Peking, and the European banking groups concerned.

²⁴ Jordan to Grey, tel. 229, 18 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

²⁵ The total amount of the British share of the indemnity was £7,593,081-15s.-0d., of which £148,022-18s.0d., was paid, leaving still unpaid the sum of £7,444,958-16s.2d. The remaining sum was being paid in monthly instalments of £28,000, see Langley's minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 229, 18 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

Powers	Britain	France	Germany	America
Ministers	Jordan	Picot (Chargé d'affaires)	Haxthausen	Calhoun
Bank Representatives	Hillier	Casenave	Cordes	Straight
Banks	Hongkong and Shanghai Bank	Banque de l'Indochine	Deutsche- Asiatische Bank	J.P. Morgan & Comp- any

When the revolution broke out Hillier, the agent of the British bank, was in London. The German agent, Cordes, was also absent from Peking. Thus the initiative of the consortium agency in Peking was with the American, Straight, and Frenchman, Casenave. These two men, Straight in particular, favoured financial aid to bolster up the Manchu dynasty especially after Yüan Shih-k'ai was recalled on 14 October. Casenave recalled: "Willard Straight and I believed that... we have nothing to gain from the revolution. For some months the negotiations that we had to carry on had been placed in the hands of relatively capable mandarins like Tsai Tao and Sheng Kung-pao.... We were firmly convinced that the country was not ripe for a republic which would lead only to anarchy; and we believed that under these conditions if the Manchus would decide to entrust the government to a good prime minister, their maintenance was still the best solution possible."²⁶

²⁶H. Croly, Willard Straight, (New York, etc., 1925), pp. 417-8.

At the same time the American, French and German ministers were in favour of assisting the Chinese government. Jordan, however, did not share his colleagues' view. He wired London urging caution since any financial assistance would mean continued support to the Manchu government.²⁷ Moreover, Jordan feared that China would be incapable of repayment. The day before the outbreak he observed that "China will wake up some fine morning and find herself unable to meet her obligation and international control will be the result."²⁸ Li Yüan-hung's unilateral warning that the revolutionary government would not recognise any loan contracted between the powers and the Manchu government after the revolution began must have had an effect on Jordan.²⁹ It was simply bad policy to lend without much hope of being repaid.

In the China Department of the Foreign Office opinions were not unanimous. The relative advantages of conceding a new loan and postponing the indemnity payment were examined. MaxMuller preferred making a loan which could legally be regarded as an independent undertaking of the British bank to the alternative of postponing the indemnity payment, involving the direct sanction of the government. Campbell thought that for Britain's immediate interests and convenience the dynasty should be preserved but at the same time he did not relish the idea of supporting an effete and corrupt government. He too, like Jordan, feared that China

²⁷Jordan to Grey, tel. 230, 18 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

²⁸Jordan to Campbell, private, 9 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

²⁹Jordan to Grey, tel. 222, 13 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

would not be able to repay her debts.³⁰

On October 19 the Board of Posts and Communications raised its request to 2,000,000 taels. At the same time the Ministry of Finance applied to the consortium for 10,000,000 taels. A change was then discernable in Jordan's attitude; in place of his previous downright rejection he was ambiguous: "While it is no doubt desirable to render every assistance to the Chinese government in its present difficulties, it is equally certain that unconditional compliance with all these requests for money must in the end entail some form of international control."³¹ The Foreign Office was puzzled. MaxMuller found it "rather difficult to gather from this telegram whether Sir J. Jordan is in favour of the loan or not, though from his previous telegram he appeared to be opposed to it."³² The Hongkong office of the British bank telegraphed the London office that it was imperative for the banks to refuse all clean loans unless they were made under "the aegis" of the governments. The London office, being torn between the attitude of the agents in Peking who favoured the advancement of loans and that of the Hongkong office which did not, asked the Foreign Office for guidance in the matter.³³ Because of the ambiguous attitude of Jordan the Foreign Office could not decide on an answer. But it seemed to have

³⁰ MaxMuller's and Campbell's minutes on Jordan to Grey, tel. 230, 18 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

³¹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 231, 19 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

³² MaxMuller's minute on *ibid.*

³³ Townsend to Campbell, enclosing the telegram from Hongkong, 19 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

been more inclined towards refusal than agreement. Campbell said: "Yes, Sir J. Jordan does not like to express himself very strongly, but I think - more from the previous tel No. 230 than from this - that he does not approve of compliance." Grey perhaps under the same impression, considered it wise for the powers to be financially neutral.³⁴

The other three lending powers reacted differently. The American State Department was wary and showed reluctance to accede to the Chinese requests. However, it was prepared to consider the matter as purely "a legitimate business" to be dealt with by the bank groups "acting in concert, and without any obligation on the part of their Governments to express an opinion, at any rate for the present."³⁵ The French government considered that since the Chinese asked for larger sums the matter required more consideration.³⁶ But the German government saw no objection to advancing 12,000,000 taels to the Chinese government by the four groups.³⁷ On the whole, the attitude of the three powers was not favourable to making the loans. Though Willard Straight favoured assistance to the Manchus, the customary practice of the American group was inaction except when it was given the explicit support of the State Department. The French reply was not really an answer.

Meanwhile, the question of indemnity postponement existed on a par with that of loans. On 20 October the Wai-wu Pu formally proposed

³⁴ Campbell's and Grey's minutes on Jordan to Grey, tel. 231, 19 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

³⁵ J. Bryce to Grey, tel. 150, 20 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

³⁶ F. Bertie to Grey, tel. 176, 20 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

³⁷ Lord Granville to Grey, tel. 91, 21 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

to postpone payment of the instalment of principal ^{and} interest due on 1 January, 1912, and the instalment of interest due on 1 July, 1912.³⁸

So far Jordan had remained silent on the subject.

It appears that between 19 and 23 October Jordan's attitude had undergone a major change. On 23 October the Foreign Office received a telegram from Jordan which was both a volte face in his attitude towards loans and a first comment on the indemnity postponement. To put it simply, Jordan advised that financial assistance be given to the Manchu government. The imperial cause was losing ground and in spite of all its faults "the government is probably no worse than any administration which is likely to be substituted for it." Moreover, Jordan considered the fact that the revolution originated directly from the Hukuang Railway Loan Agreement constituted "a moral claim" to the support of the powers without which the Manchu government could not survive.

But a significant qualification was attached to Jordan's proposal: "such guarantees as are usual in the case of States who find themselves unable to meet their obligations should, I think, be insisted upon before we give it any such assistance, either in the way of further loans or in the shape of a postponement of indemnity payments." The safeguards that were suggested included the establishment of an audit department under the Ministry of Finance which was to be composed of foreign staff, and the employment of foreign staff members of the Customs as supervisors and assistants in the principal spending departments in the provinces as well as in Peking, these to be subject to the audit department.

³⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 232, 20 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

It is not too strong to say that an element of blackmail could be found in Jordan's suggestion. In return for financial assistance, he advised that the Chinese government be asked to put an immediate stop to her obstruction of river conservancy measures, and to enforce effectively Article IX of the Mackay Treaty which provided for the development of China's mineral wealth. However, the "first and foremost" condition was that a reformed government should be placed in Peking with capable men at its head including Yüan Shih-k'ai. In short, Jordan's attitude towards financial help to the Manchu government changed from objection to ambiguity and finally to conditional accession.³⁹

In view of Jordan's sudden change of attitude, the Foreign Office telegraphed the other three governments as to the desirability of acceding to the Chinese requests. The telegrams, however, revealed the Foreign Office's doubts about the practicability of Jordan's suggestion. Instead of urging the other powers to join in making the loans and permitting a suspension of the indemnity payment, the Foreign Office listed the dangers of taking such measures and suggested that if eventually they were to be adopted it should be done on the conditions set forth by Jordan.⁴⁰ ~~Even~~ Jordan himself did not seem to have really made up his mind. Writing to Campbell the very day^h sent the telegram supporting financial assistance to the Manchus he said: "I cannot see

³⁹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 235, 23 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

⁴⁰ F. O. telegrams to British ambassadors at Paris, 275 ; Berlin, 210; Washington, 259; and repeated to Peking, 136; 23 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

there is much difference between a state and an individual and no one in private life would lend money to a person who was at the end of his resources and not competent to look after his affairs."⁴¹

Jordan's colleagues in Peking disagreed with the conditions he set down and were willing to give help without them.⁴² The other three governments were not sympathetic either. While Jordan treated the two questions of loans and indemnity postponement together, the three governments preferred to deal with them separately. The American government read Jordan's suggestions as a scheme for the eventual control of China's finances and considered it premature.⁴³ The French minister for foreign affairs feared that the position of the Manchu government might be further compromised if it accepted Jordan's conditions which were "too rigorous."⁴⁴ Even the German government desired prudence in putting forward the conditions. Matters were relatively simplified when on 25 October the Chinese government cancelled its request for the suspension of indemnity payments; although by then the American, German and Japanese governments were ready to comply. The French were hesitant but not likely to act independently.⁴⁵ By then the British Office too had

⁴¹ Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

⁴² Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

⁴³ Bryce to Grey, tel. 152, 24 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093; tel. 154, 29 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

⁴⁴ Carnegie, in-charge, to Grey, tel. 179, 26 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

⁴⁵ Jordan to Grey, tel. 242, 25 Oct., Bryce to Grey, tel. 152, 24 Oct., Yamaza to Campbell, 25 Oct., and Carnegie to Grey, tel. 179, 26 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

a more favourable reaction to indemnity suspension than to making new loans. In fact, China was allowed to let her indemnity payments lapse during the whole revolutionary upheaval.⁴⁶

Thus by 25 October the powers' financial policy towards China remained as neutral as it had been ever since the revolution broke out half a month before. Jordan's proposal of conditional aid, more than anything else, reinforced rather than weakened the policy of non-assistance to the Manchu government. This view is justified by what happened on 24 October. That day the Peking office of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank telegraphed the London office urging that loans be made to the Chinese government or Britain and the British bank would have to be responsible for all the consequences of refusal since all the bank agents and legations of the other three powers in Peking favoured assistance.⁴⁷

Jordan immediately warned the Foreign Office against following the suggestion without insisting on his conditions being accepted. He harshly criticised the French chargé d'affaires who was particularly keen on lending to the Chinese government without imposing stringent conditions.⁴⁸

Without the consent of the governments the consortium would not lend to the Chinese government. The desperate Prince Ch'un, the regent, had to resort to a rival Anglo-Belgian-French group which was represented by a Frenchman, Baron Cottu. This group was apparently acting under the

⁴⁶Jordan to Grey, tel. 107, 27 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.

⁴⁷Telegram from bank representatives in Townsend to Campbell, 25 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

⁴⁸Jordan to Grey, tel. 241, 24 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

auspices of the Russian government which was eager to frustrate the quadruple consortium and thereby limit American influence in China.⁴⁹ The French government, partly because of the obvious financial advantages and partly because of its need for Russian support in the Morocco Crisis, was tempted to sanction this Cottu loan of 150,000,000 francs which was to be issued in two halves.⁵⁰ Suspecting it as a Russian gesture to eliminate her influence from north China America naturally reacted most strongly to the independent loan. Both the American government and group declared that it would have^a bad effect on American interests in connection with the Currency Loan which was promised to the Chinese government in the spring of 1910 by the consortium.⁵¹ The other groups, particularly the German one, were annoyed at the prospect of their privileged position being undermined by the new loan.⁵²

In compliance with the American request for joint action the London Foreign Office instructed Jordan to consult his American colleague and to make joint representations to the Wai-wu Pu. Jordan personally opposed the loan mostly because it represented a departure from the policy of neutrality which he had by then again become resigned to. He persuaded the French chargé d'affaires from supporting the loan

⁴⁹For the anti-Japanese and anti-Russian designs of the consortium, at least from Straight's point of view, see Croly, Willard Straight, chapter 7.

⁵⁰See conditions of loan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 253, 31 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

⁵¹American ambassador in London to Grey, 3 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

⁵²MaxMuller's special minute on loans and indemnity postponement, 6 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

and, according to himself, managed to win the argument.⁵³ That his advice was heeded by the French chargé d'affaires might be true for when the loan was abandoned by the French government Sir. F. Bertie, British ambassador to Paris, was told that Jordan had helped in bringing about the outcome.⁵⁴ However, the more important reasons for the abortion of the loan appeared to have been the inability of Cottu to issue the loan within the agreed time limit; the pressure applied on the French government by the American, British and, to a lesser extent, German governments; and above all the Russian abandonment of the rival loan in face of the groups' agreement to giving up temporarily their efforts on the Currency loan.⁵⁵

Besides playing a part in bringing about the abortion of the Cottu Loan Jordan frustrated yet other suggestions of financial aid to the Chinese government. On 1 November Townsend, manager of the British bank acting in Addis' absence, wrote to the Foreign Office of the desirability of reminding the Chinese government of its right to claim from the consortium half of the Hukuang Loan funds to be deposited with the native banks. Both Townsend and Hillier urged that the policy was a sound one in that the money would enable the Chinese government

⁵³ Jordan to Grey, tel. 260, 3 Nov., and tel. 265, 6 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

⁵⁴ Bertie to Grey, tel. 182, 7 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

⁵⁵ J. G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912, (Berkeley, 1935), p. 251.

to stabilise the situation for the general benefit of commerce; and since it was not a new loan there would be no danger of non-recognition as threatened by Li Yüan-hung in the case of a revolutionary victory.⁵⁶

Jordan objected to this suggestion and the Foreign Office declined the British group's proposal in these words which Jordan used on the Cottu Loan:

"the powers are likely to be in a position to exercise a far more salutary and abiding influence if, instead of lending money to prolong civil war, they reserve it for use under suitable guarantees whatever administration may eventually emerge...."⁵⁷

The next day Townsend urged the British Foreign Office to agree to a new Chinese request for 5,000,000 taels to stabilise the Shanghai money market. To strengthen his argument Townsend mentioned especially the expected arrival of Yüan Shih-k'ai to Peking.⁵⁸ Again the bank's recommendation was declined. On 3 November Townsend repeated the request which was supported this time by similar requests from the American, French and German bank representatives in Peking. They all urged that the loan, besides steadying the money market, would forestall the Cottu Loan which was still a threat. Moreover, Yüan Shih-k'ai, who was just vested with full power, needed money for reorganisation purposes. Besides, the loan would be safe because it was approved by the

⁵⁶Townsend to Campbell, 1 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

⁵⁷Jordan to Grey, tel. 260, 3 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

⁵⁸Townsend to Campbell, 2 Nov. 1911, enclosing a telegram from Peking, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

Tzū-cheng Yüan, the senate, which was having its second session in Peking.⁵⁹ Once more Jordan's words were used in the Foreign Office's rejection. Jordan's views had to be repeatedly cited because they carried weight when dealing with people who could either claim themselves as men on the spot or conversant with the situation in China. It was formally decided in the interbank conference of 8 November that the consortium would remain neutral.⁶⁰

November saw the rapid spread of revolutionary success. But the situation had also improved on the government side. Hankow and Hanyang were recovered on 29 October and 27 November respectively. The situation in the north generally had become much more stable since Yüan Shih-k'ai's arrival at Peking in mid November. Shantung, which had previously declared its secession from the dynasty, abandoned its independence. A tendency towards negotiations emerged on both sides when the revolutionaries lost Hanyang. The government loss of Nanking at the beginning of December made it seem that the score was drawing equal. It was at about this time that Jordan made a fresh appraisal of the policy of financial neutrality which he had so far adopted.

On December 5 the London Foreign Office received a letter from Addis enclosing a telegram the Peking office of the British bank sent three days before which warned the London office of the danger of the Cottu Loan

⁵⁹Townsend to Campbell, 3 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

⁶⁰See minutes of the inter-bank conference in Addis to Campbell, 11 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.

being received. . In fact a supplementary agreement for 238,000,000 francs had been contracted. But in Peking Cottu's representative expressed grave doubts as to his ability to meet the obligations of the agreements and hinted that the consortium might take over the business. The Peking office further reported that Yüan Shih-k'ai was annoyed with the groups in blocking the Cottu Loan while not willing to help themselves. The telegram ended with the view that "the moment has arrived when governments should be asked to reconsider their neutral policy and support constitutional government, thereby enabling groups to render financial assistance." But the Foreign Office responded unfavourably. Campbell considered that the situation in China was not sufficiently settled and that Britain could not sanction the business after having intervened herself against the Cottu Loan.⁶¹

Meanwhile, a truce was already arranged between the Manchu government and the revolutionaries. Preparations were underway for negotiations to take place in Shanghai and on 6 December the prince regent abdicated. Later the same day Jordan sent a telegram to the Foreign Office which represented a second volte face in his attitude towards the policy of financial neutrality during the revolution. He advocated that advances be made to Yüan Shih-k'ai who was in desperate need of funds to sustain his government for the impending peace negotiations at Shanghai. Jordan found the situation serious because Yüan Shih-k'ai, who had hitherto been respectful towards foreign rights, was reduced to

⁶¹ Addis to Campbell, enclosing telegram from Peking, 4 Dec. 1911, and Campbell's minute on it, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

ordering Aglen, the British inspector-general of Customs, to surrender the funds kept for pension purposes. Aglen refused and threatened to resign. The bank agents in Peking proposed to make an advance of 30,000,000 taels on the government that unless Yüan was given money he would not be able to control the situation and disorder would ruin the prospect of a settlement. Jordan could no longer "withhold sanction to the groups giving temporary accommodation" to the government represented by Yüan. But the second volte face, like the first, was conditional. Jordan said:

"I would propose, however, in order to obviate a possible boycott, that Yuan Shih-kai should be informed that, until the necessity of an advance in the interest of the negotiations had been explained to the revolutionaries and their acquiescence in it secured, the money would not be handed to him."⁶²

The other legations in Peking on the whole were favourable towards lending to Yüan.⁶³

Under the circumstances the Foreign Office found Jordan's suggestion "the best means out of the difficulty".⁶⁴ It put forward the proposal to the other powers; it was done with some embarrassment because of its attitude towards the Cottu Loan a short while before. In the telegrams to the governments, including that to Japan although she was not a member of the consortium, the acquiescence of the revolutionaries was significantly stressed.

⁶² Jordan to Grey, tel. 327, 6 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

⁶³ Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 261.

⁶⁴ F. O. Lindley's minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 337, 6 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

There were two separate questions: should the advance be made; and, if it should, should it be made with or without the agreement of the revolutionaries. On 9 December the Foreign Office learned that the French government was prepared to sanction the loan, but no mention was made about the acquiescence of the revolutionaries as a sine qua non. It was only nine days later that the French government expressed the desirability of having the agreement of the revolutionaries who it thought could not be too obstructive if all the powers acted together.⁶⁵

The German government was even eager to have the advance pushed through; besides agreeing to make the advance it did not consider the acquiescence of the revolutionaries a sine qua non.⁶⁶

The Japanese Minister for foreign affairs at first thought that financial help to Yüan Shih-k'ai from the powers would exasperate the revolutionaries and go far to wreck the negotiations. On 19 December the Japanese government eventually agreed to advance small sums of money to enable Yüan to continue with the administration in Peking, but not to be used for military purposes.⁶⁷

The American State Department was at first disinclined to abandon the policy of neutrality. But on 12 December it withdrew its objection to American nationals giving small loans "especially if loans are of broadly international character."⁶⁸

⁶⁵Bertie to Grey, tel. 205, 9 Dec., tel. 214, 18 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

⁶⁶E. Goschen to Grey. tel. 113, 9 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

⁶⁷MacDonald to Grey, tel. 60, 19 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

⁶⁸Bryce to Grey, tel. 162, 10 Dec., tel. 164, 12 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

The historian J. G. Reid would have thought the above paragraphs crude descriptions of the international dealings of the question. Writing on the subject he pays much attention to the anti-American sentiment of the Japanese and Russian governments; the anti-Japanese and anti-Russian feelings of the Americans in relation to north China; the Russian pressure on France to withdraw from the essentially anti-Russian quadruple consortium; and the British desire of avoiding friction with any party, especially Russia and Japan.

All these diplomatic cross attempts entangled international relations in China and made cooperation a difficult matter.⁶⁹ Nevertheless the fact is that agreement was reached at one point between the powers that some form of financial assistance would be given to Yüan Shih-k'ai.

However, Jordan's proposal of financial aid to Yüan was abortive, mainly because the revolutionaries withheld their acquiescence, but also because Jordan himself vacillated. It was natural for the revolutionaries not to agree to any action beneficial to their enemy. Wu T'ing-fang, the revolutionary minister for foreign affairs, vociferously protested against any loans to Yüan. He declared that all loans to the government would be regarded as actions "deliberately directed against the rights the people are fighting for and have almost won".⁷⁰ Although the powers were not unanimous in insisting on the

⁶⁹ Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, pp. 261-6

⁷⁰ The Times, 11 Dec. 1911.

agreement of the revolutionaries as an absolute condition, Grey's insistence on this determined the outcome. In any case, news came from Jordan on 16 December that at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps it was decided that there would be no chance of getting the acquiescence of the revolutionaries.⁷¹

Between 6 December, when Jordan proposed financial accommodation for Yüan, and 16 December, when it was found that there was no hope of getting the agreement of the revolutionaries, it was easy for the people around Jordan to sense his vacillation. Initially he had made the proposal to help Yüan Shih-k'ai to tide over the negotiations. But he was not unaware of the risk involved to British interests: "The choice, briefly put, is between chaos and boycott."⁷² In a letter to the secretary of state of the United States urging assent to the loan for Yüan in order to prevent anarchy in north China, Calhoun, the American minister pointed out: "The British minister, who at first directed his nationals to resume loan negotiations, has since seemed to vacillate and I am uncertain as to his policy."⁷³ Reid asserts specifically that "on December 11 the British Minister

⁷¹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 348, 16 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

⁷² Jordan to Campbell, private, 10 Dec. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

⁷³ Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 265.

again was vacillating."⁷⁴ That day Jordan received from the consul-general at Shanghai the information about Wu T'ing-fang's protest. Wu also notified the Shanghai office of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank that all loans to the Manchu government would be denounced. The consul-general, Fraser, became nervous and feared that "if native newspapers ventilate matter, there may be local complications." Jordan immediately instructed Fraser to inform the revolutionary leaders at Shanghai that advances were to be made not with the intention of prolonging civil war but of preserving the status quo in the north for the impending peace negotiations.⁷⁵ The Shanghai branch of the British bank became highly uneasy and objected to all advances.⁷⁶ The nervousness of Fraser and the Shanghai bank together with his own fear of revolutionary boycotts forced Jordan back to the policy of financial neutrality, not to mention the international complications involved. Jordan's change of mind was disapproved of by all the bank agents in Peking and the other three legations.⁷⁷ Willard Straight regarded Jordan as having a "wobbling" character,⁷⁸ and the German minister criticised him as a man who "did not possess great determination."⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 265.

⁷⁵ Fraser to Jordan and Jordan to Fraser in Jordan to Grey, tel. 337, 11 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

⁷⁶ Addis to Campbell, enclosing telegram from Shanghai, 12 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

⁷⁷ Jordan to Grey, tel. 348, 16 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

⁷⁸ Croly, Willard Straight, P. 429.

⁷⁹ Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, p. 261.

Neutrality in Action - Customs Collection and Deposit

The policy of neutrality was also applied to the question of customs. Jordan was unquestionably more involved in it than his other colleagues, because of his position as doyen and the British nationality of the inspector-general of the Customs, Aglen.

The Chinese Maritime Customs was an internationally-staffed institution of the Chinese government which had customs depots at the ports and throughout the provinces. Despite its apparent international character the Customs, ever since its first establishment in 1854, was in effect predominantly controlled by Britain. W. T. Wade and H. N. Lay were the dominating voices in the service before Sir Robert Hart became chief commissioner in November 1863. During the next fifty years, that is until the death of Hart in 1911, British control over the Customs strengthened appreciably through Hart's strong personal influence. During the "scramble for concessions" in 1898 Sir Claude Macdonald, then British minister in Peking, had the Chinese Wai-wu Pu confirm that the inspector-general of the Customs would always be British as long as Britain had the largest share of China's foreign trade. It is a fact that until the 1930's the British formed the majority of the top-ranking personnel of the Customs.⁸⁰

Until the revolution broke out the Customs was only responsible for customs collection. Each depot was headed by a foreign commissioner and a Chinese superintendent. The revenue

⁸⁰For a lucid account of British predominance in the Customs see T'ung Meng-cheng, Kuan-shui lun, [Discussion on the Customs], (Commercial Press, 1933), pp. 212-21; see also S. F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs, (Belfast, 1950), appendix on "Personnel of China's Customs Service, 1875, 1895, 1905, 1915", pp. 897-904.

collected was paid into Chinese government banks at each locality. It was afterwards paid out by the Chinese superintendent for specified purposes, such as payments of indemnity, foreign loan services, or current expenses of the area. But never did the Customs have the prerogative either to directly deposit or discharge the collected funds. Its responsibility did not go beyond verifying and filling the bank receipts in proof of payment of duties.⁸¹

In terms of foreign interests the customs revenues were important in that they had been pledged as security for the Anglo-French loans of 1858 and 1860, the Kansu Military Loan of 1867, the loans for payment of the Sino-Japanese War indemnity, and finally the massive Boxer indemnity.⁸² During the revolution, after a province declared its independence its customs depots were open to the interference of the revolutionaries. Sorely pressed for funds the revolutionary leaders of the provinces naturally wanted to have access to the customs revenues. In order to prevent default of the debts secured by the Customs the powers were anxious to keep the service intact. Fortunately for them the Chinese superintendents of most depots of the provinces that had been taken over by the revolutionaries left their posts which were left to be solely responsible to the foreign commissioners.

⁸¹ Jordan to Grey, no. 458, 23 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097; S. F. Wright (ed.), Kuan-shui chi-shih, [Collection of documents on the Chinese Maritime Customs, 1912,-1934], (Inspectorate-general of Customs, 1936), p.1.

⁸² T'ung; Kuan-shui lun, p. 226.

Although at no two ports were the conditions affecting the Customs the same,⁸³ a precedent of neutrality with regard to customs funds was established jointly by Jordan and Aglen. The direct cause of the precedent was that the revolutionaries at Changsha and Hankow were the first to interfere with the customs. Both the foreign commissioners were British. At Changsha the revolutionary authorities notified the commissioner at the end of October that he might continue to function under their auspices. The implication of the notification was obviously that the revenues collected were to go to the revolutionaries. Jordan, after consulting the Customs inspector-general, sent a telegram to the consul at Changsha instructing him to cooperate with the customs commissioner to induce the revolutionaries to allow the customs revenues be held in deposit for the time being either by the inspector-general or the Consular Body at Shanghai. In arguing with the revolutionary government the consul was to point out that the revenues were "really the property of foreign bondholders and that its appropriation by rebels may lead to serious complication with foreign powers."⁸⁴ At Hankow, the revolutionaries appointed their own Chinese superintendent to the customs depot after the imperial authorities had fled from the city. A similar arrangement was made with the revolutionaries in Hankow as in Changsha.⁸⁵ For these places as well as those which

⁸³ See circular no. 4, 14 Mar. 1912, in Inspectorate-general of Customs, The Maritime Customs (Shanghai 1938), vol. 3, p. 62.

⁸⁴ Jordan to Grey, tel. 244, 26 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

⁸⁵ Jordan to Grey, no. 458, 23 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

were later taken over by the revolutionaries the arrangement was for the revenues to be deposited with the Hongkōng and Shanghai Bank at Shanghai in the account of the inspector-general. Thus Jordan was much responsible for the neutrality measure in relation to customs funds whereby both the revolutionaries and the imperial government were debarred from access to the money. Moreover, this policy of neutrality in relation to customs funds directly opened the period in which the Customs gained the right of depositing and allocating customs revenues. Not only were the revenues in the revolutionary areas held in deposit with the Hongkōng and Shanghai Bank but a similar arrangement was made for that from the government provinces.⁸⁶

Soon afterwards difficulties arose over the question of allocation of deposit rights amongst the powers and the foreign banks. Jordan was at first content to use the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank alone for deposit purposes. However, the representatives of the other powers objected to the arrangement because of the exclusive British character of the bank. Some ministers suggested that the already existing Boxer Indemnity Commission of Bankers should be utilised instead. Jordan saw no objection to the new proposal and consulted Aglen on it. Aglen, however, disagreed on the ground that the Customs was not pledged against the Boxer indemnity alone and that there was a fixed order of priority by which the debts involved were to be redeemed. He accordingly suggested that a special commission composed of the banks which were involved in such loans and indemnities be

⁸⁶Wright, Kuan-shui chi-shih, p. 7.

established for keeping the funds. Moreover, the commission was to pay out of the funds the current expenses of the Customs service, to pay as far as possible all maturing loan services, and to appoint banks to deposit specific sums for specified purposes.⁸⁷ Jordan, as the doyen, referred the matter to the banks in Shanghai which on 23 November drew up six articles concerning the task that was entrusted to them.⁸⁸ The Diplomatic Corps approved of them and each minister asked for the concurrence of his government. A concensus of approval was achieved on 3 January 1912. Immediately afterwards Jordan, again as the doyen, presented the Wai-wu Pu with eight articles proposing the establishment of a new commission in Shanghai composed of all banks which were connected with the debts China incurred before the Boxer rebellion, and those connected with the Boxer indemnity. In short, by these eight articles which the Chinese government agreed to on 21 January 1912 the inspector-general of the Customs became responsible for the collection of customs revenues and their remittance to the Shanghai commission; the allocation of the funds to the specified banks in Shanghai; and the payment of loan services. Hence, in the Chinese view China had lost control over the use and deposit of the customs revenues which were only restored during the 1930's.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Jordan to Grey, no. 458, 23 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

⁸⁸ Jordan to Grey, 5 Dec. 1911, British Parliamentary Papers, LXXIII, pp. 373-4, they became the first six of the eight articles mentioned below.

⁸⁹ Wright, Kuan-shui chi-shih, pp. 10-1.

Neutrality in Action - Railways

During the period of fighting in the revolution four railways connected with British capital were involved. They were the Peking-Mukden and Shanghai-Nanking Railways which were mortgaged to the British and Chinese Corporation in return for the loans with which they were constructed; the Peking-Hankow Railway which was redeemed by the Chinese government from a Franco-Belgian concern with an Anglo-French loan; and the Tientsin-Pukou Railway which was only partly finished with an Anglo-German loan.

Both the Peking-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow Railways do not figure prominently in the present discussion. Each of them was a joint enterprise concerning which Britain could not make a decision independently. In any case, nothing could be done about the Peking-Hankow Railway which had been used by the government since the beginning of the revolution as the quickest means of sending troops and reinforcements to Wuhan. The revolutionaries in Hupei, on the other hand, destroyed part of the railway near Hankow to obstruct the movement of the government troops which were on their way south. Problems over the Tientsin-Pukou Railway arose when the revolutionaries, having newly captured Nanking on 2 December, stated that they would destroy the railroad if Chang Hsün, the ultra-conservative general of the Manchu government then 100 miles to the north of Nanking, attempted to retake the city. In both cases Jordan did his best to ensure continuous service on a purely commercial basis and prevent the earnings of the lines from being interfered with.⁹⁰

⁹⁰For what Jordan did about the Peking-Hankow Railway see, for example, Jordan to Goffe, tel. 12, 17 Jan., tel. 16, 23 Jan., tel. 20, 27 Jan.,

Jordan played an important rôle in neutralising the Shanghai-Nanking and the Peking-Mukden Railways. Shanghai fell to the revolutionaries on 3 November. That day Fraser telegraphed Jordan that about 40 revolutionaries entered the Shanghai station of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway in the afternoon, and the line was in danger of being interfered with. Moreover, he was apprehensive about the safety of the International Settlement because it was near to the Shanghai station. He had, therefore, followed the suggestion of the British general-manager of the railway and ordered the station to be guarded by volunteers.⁹¹ Jordan completely approved of Fraser's action and pointed out that the railway, though a property of the government, was nevertheless built with British capital and mortgaged to British bondholders whose interest would be affected by a decrease in the earnings of the railway. He further explained that the line should continue to run as a purely commercial undertaking and should not be used for the conveyance of troops or munitions by either side. Although the Foreign Office doubted the legality of Jordan's decision it approved of it because it was clearly to Britain's interest.⁹²

But the revolutionaries would not accept foreign occupation of the Shanghai station. Negotiations took place between the revolutionaries and Fraser with the result that on 4 November the

tel. 20, 27 Jan., 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228) vol. 1841; Jordan to Grey, no. 89, 20 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315. As for the Tientsin-Pukou Railway see, for example, Jordan to Fraser, tel. 141, 15 Dec. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 671) vol. 336.

⁹¹ Fraser to Jordan, tel. 91, 3 Nov. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228) vol. 1806.

⁹² Jordan to Grey, tel. 262, 4 Nov. 1911, and Campbell's minute on it, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

volunteers were replaced by properly uniformed ^{revolutionary} soldiers. In fact Fraser was under pressure from the foreign community which objected strongly to the volunteers occupying the railway station because it was eager to gain the good will of the revolutionaries. In agreeing to the withdrawal of the volunteers, Jordan, however, continued to insist that the railway should not be used for military purposes.⁹³ The Manchu government appeared to be particularly satisfied with Jordan's arrangement because, although it too was prevented from using the railway for carrying troops and munitions, it was more important that the revolutionaries could not use the railway to take Nanking.⁹⁴

However, on 12 November Fraser suggested that it was necessary for Jordan to reconsider his neutral measure because the revolutionaries had gained indisputed possession of the territory through which the entire railway ran. In fact some of the more aggressive revolutionaries had become restive about the restriction that Jordan had placed on them in using the railway. To avoid a collision with the Shanghai revolutionary government Jordan agreed that as long as the revolutionaries held indisputed possession of the territory concerned they would be allowed to use the railway for military transport which, nevertheless, would be treated on a purely commercial basis. Jordan told Fraser that for the benefit of the shareholders a special account had been opened at the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank into which the earnings of

⁹³ Fraser to Jordan, tel. 102, 7 Nov. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1086.
Jordan to Grey, tel. 262, 4 Nov. 1914, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

⁹⁴ The satisfaction of the Manchu government is suggested in Tamura Kosaku, Saikin Shina gaikoshi, [A history of Chinese diplomacy since the 1911 revolution] (Tokyo, 1938), vol. 1, p. 64.

the railway were being paid. It was also decided that for the safety of the International Settlement neutrality of the railway would be maintained within ten miles outside the settlement. Thus entraining was only allowed from Naziang, a point ten miles from Shanghai. Two days later even this restriction was removed because the British master-general complained that Naziang was unsuitable for entraining on a large scale.⁹⁵

The Peking-Mukden Railway was neutralised under completely different circumstances. Between the end of October and the arrival of Yüan Shih-k'ai in the middle of November, Peking was panic-stricken. The recruitment of more than 2,000 Manchu police by the government gave colour to the rumour that there would be a general massacre of the Han Chinese in the capital. Just as this fear subsided rumours of an anti-Manchu massacre gained ground. The tension increased when large numbers of people left Peking for refuge elsewhere.

The situation deteriorated when on 29 October news reached Peking of the mutiny of the 20th Division under General Chang Shao-tseng at Luanchou, about 100 miles north of Tientsin on the Peking-Mukden Railway. Soon afterwards General Wu Lu-chen of the 6th Division defected at Shih-chia-chuang, south-west of Peking, from where he threatened to march on the capital.⁹⁶ These extraordinary happenings threatened worse confusion in Peking and because of them Jordan felt the necessity

⁹⁵ Jordan to Grey, no. 438, 15 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

⁹⁶ The two mutinies will be discussed in fuller detail in the next chapter.

of maintaining access to the sea from the capital. To achieve this purpose the Peking-Mukden Railway must be preserved.

On 4 November the British general-officer in command at Tientsin, Cooper, informed Jordan that the British chief engineer of the Peking-Mukden Railway was daily expecting order from the viceroy of Chihli to cut the line so as to forestall an advance of the 20th Division on to Peking. At the same time there was the danger of the line being destroyed by the mutinous troops after their march on the capital, in order to prevent the government from getting reinforcements from Mukden, the place of origin of Manchu power.

Jordan at once made representations to the Wai-wu Pu on the strength of Article IX of the Final Boxer Protocol of 7 September, 1901, which gave the powers the right to occupy certain points to keep open communication between Peking and the sea, especially in times of emergency. At the sametime Jordan instructed the consul-general at Tientsin to make similar representations to the viceroy. The Chinese director of the railway was also warned by his British colleague against all interference with the running of the line.

Jordan then put forward a scheme of guarding the railway by foreign troops first to the ministers of France and Japan because they were the only powers, apart from Britain, who had troops at Tientsin for the purpose. However, he took the precaution of having the ministers of Germany, America, Russia, and Italy notified. His suggestion was readily approved by all the governments.⁹⁷ The question, however, was complicated

⁹⁷ Jordan to Grey, no. 434, 13 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

by Japan's proposal to guard alone the part of the railway to the north of Shanhaikuan.⁹⁸ Jordan alleviated the embarrassment and apprehension of the Foreign Office by asserting that until the Gulf of Chihli froze the situation only justified the guarding of the railway from Peking to Tientsin, and that the area beyond Shanhaikuan had not been affected by the revolution.⁹⁹ He stressed, above all, the precautionary nature of his scheme which would not entail foreign occupation of the line but merely served "to keep the railway running without interference from either party."¹⁰⁰

By 7 November a plan for guarding the railway between Peking and Tientsin was drawn up by the generals of the foreign troops at Tientsin, under the leadership of General Cooper. Britain was to be responsible for guarding the line from Peking to six kilometres south of Wanchuang (71 kilometres); Japan from five kilometres north of Langfang to five kilometres south of Changchuang (35 kilometres); and France from six kilometres north of Yangtsun to Tientsin east (35 kilometres). Later, through Jordan's influence, America was asked to cooperate when the scheme was extended from Tientsin to Shanhaikuan in face of the approaching winter when the Gulf of Chihli would be frozen.¹⁰¹ However, the actual scheme was not put into action until early January 1912, when the Shanghai peace

⁹⁸ Yamaza's, Japanese chargé d'affaires in London, memorandum to F.O., 6 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094. The Japanese based their demand on the precedent created by Russia during the Boxer incident when she was given the exclusive ^{right} to guard the railway beyond Shanhaikuan, see also MacDonald to Grey, tab. 43, 9 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

⁹⁹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 273, 11 Nov. 1911 and Campbell's minute on it, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094. However, Grey agreed that in the case of the scheme being extended beyond Shanhaikuan Japan would ^{be} grant ^{her} request.

¹⁰⁰ Jordan to General Cooper, private, 10 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

¹⁰¹ Jordan to Grey, no. 434, 13 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

negotiations broke down and there were disturbances caused by the revolutionaries at Luanzhou and Chinwangtao.¹⁰²

The guarding of the Peking-Mukden Railway, although primarily for the evacuation of foreigners in an eventuality in Peking, was nevertheless a measure of neutrality in that it prevented both the Manchu government and the revolutionaries from destroying the railway.

Neutrality in Action - Inconsistencies

The abandonment of the neutralisation scheme with regard to the Shanghai-Nanking Railway was not the only instance of inconsistency in Jordan's policy of neutrality during the 1911 revolution. On the one hand Jordan did not recognise the revolutionaries as belligerent. Immediately after the revolution broke out Jordan instructed Goffe, acting consul-general at Hankow, that "beyond what is absolutely indispensable for the security of British life and property, you should not hold any communication with the rebel commander."¹⁰³ A fortnight later Jordan agreed with his colleagues in a diplomatic meeting that the Diplomatic Body would not object to the Consular Body at Hankow entering into relations with the revolutionary government there if this was found to be necessary to safeguard the tranquility of the concessions; but the question of recognising the revolutionaries should not be discussed.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Jordan to Grey, tel. 4 Jan., no. 30, 16 Jan., no. 78, 15 Feb. 1912, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 208.

¹⁰³ Jordan to Goffe in Jordan to Grey, tel. 222, 13 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

¹⁰⁴ Jordan to Grey, no. 428, 8 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

On the other hand, Jordan's treatment of the questions of contraband and the right of search of the revolutionaries did not agree with his professed neutral attitude which, however, did not recognise the revolutionaries as belligerents. On 22 October the senior consul at Hankow telegraphed Jordan, as the doyen, that Li Yüan-hung had given the Consular Body a list of goods which the Wuchang revolutionary government would consider as contraband. The list was a long one including such items as telegraph apparatus, materials for railway construction, food and drink, bedding, horses, foddors, carts and clothes for soldiers and sailors. These goods, when discovered, would be confiscated together with the ships carrying them. Despite the fact that the revolutionaries had not been recognised as belligerents and therefore had no right whatsoever to impose contraband on foreign shipping, Jordan urged his colleagues, in the diplomatic meeting of 28 October, to acquiesce to the demand of the revolutionaries. He stated that under the circumstances he doubted the advisability of insisting on the full enforcement of treaty rights and he himself was prepared "to advise British shipping companies temporarily to abstain from this trade until the situation become clearer!"¹⁰⁵ Jordan's attitude was made known to the British subjects at Hankow. However, a British steamboat was confiscated in November because the revolutionaries suspected that the coal on board was for the imperialists.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Jordan to Grey, no. 428, 8 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

¹⁰⁶ Jordan to Grey, no. 466, 28 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

If confiscation was rare, there were more cases of British ships being fired on by the revolutionaries. After the outbreak of the revolution the revolutionaries who had taken possession of the Yangtze ports fired on any ships, including those under foreign flags,¹⁰⁷ which passed the river by night; nor were ships belonging to the British companies spared. For example, two ships belonging to Messrs. Jardine, Matheson and Company, the "Taising" and "Tung Ting", were fired on from the Kiukiang forts and the two sides of the river near Hankow respectively in November. The two steamers were suspected of carrying provisions for the imperialists on their night cruises. Every case of this kind was brought to Jordan's notice. While agreeing to Goffe making representations to the revolutionary authorities he stressed the impossibility of adhering strictly to full treaty rights in the abnormal situation. He approved of the willingness of the British ship-owners to operate along the Yangtze only during the day.¹⁰⁸

Closely connected with the question of contraband was the right of search by the revolutionaries. On 9 November Goffe reported that the general officer commanding the revolutionary troops at Kiukiang notified him that all vessels had to be searched at the port for munitions of war and supplies destined for the government forces. While saying that "British subjects could not, of course have been directed to obey the order" he approved of Goffe acknowledging the receipt of the notification

¹⁰⁷ For example, a Japanese ship was fired upon because of being suspected of carrying imperial officials, Winsloe to Admiralty in Admiralty to F.Q., 6 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

¹⁰⁸ Jordan to Grey, no. 466, 28 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

without refuting it.¹⁰⁹ By the middle of December Jordan had come to agree that the revolutionaries should be given the right of search outside treaty port limits because to refuse this, he thought, "would result in grave collisions tending to open conflict".¹¹⁰ Thus Jordan's attitude towards the questions of contraband and the right of search of the revolutionaries created an irregular situation in which the revolutionaries were not recognised as, but given the rights of, belligerents.

As early as 26 October the crown advocate at Shanghai, H.C. Wilkinson, presented Jordan with a memorandum on the claim of the revolutionaries to be recognised as belligerents. Wilkinson considered that there were three grounds on which such a claim was based: the revolutionaries were in organised revolt against the Manchu government and had become the defacto rulers of more than half the country; the treatment given the revolutionaries by the Consular Body at Hankow tacitly acknowledged them as belligerents; and, in any case, such recognition would not entail the recognition of their government should the revolutionaries eventually win their cause.¹¹¹ It will be seen in the following chapter that Jordan refused to consider the matter because he was reluctant to further jeopardise the already precarious

¹⁰⁹ Jordan to Grey, no. 466, 28 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

¹¹⁰ Jordan to Grey, tel. 353, 19 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

¹¹¹ Crown advocate to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 428, 8 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

position of the Manchu government. The Foreign Office then agreed with him.¹¹²

A month later even the Foreign Office became embarrassed by the irregular situation. Opinion in the office was not unanimous. F.O. Lindley considered it more convenient to recognise the revolutionaries, but Langley held that time had not yet come to openly affront the Manchu government.¹¹³

On 19 December the crown advocate again took up the question of recognising the revolutionaries. At that time negotiations between the Manchu government and the revolutionaries had just begun and Jordan hoped that by some great fortune the peace conference might decide on the retention of a restricted Manchu monarchy. Therefore he again rejected the crown advocate's suggestion of recognising the revolutionaries. Grey met Jordan half way in sending a telegram to him stating that the revolutionaries would not be recognised as belligerents unless he advised so.¹¹⁴

On 4 January, however, Jordan himself suggested that the question had to be reconsidered, and that the revolutionaries might have to be recognised after all. The main reason for the change appears to be the institution at Nanking on New Year's Day of a united provisional republican

¹¹²Grey to Jordan, tel. 224, 18 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

¹¹³Lindley's and Langley's minutes on Jordan to Grey, no. 466, 28 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

¹¹⁴Grey to Jordan, tel. 227, 20 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

government which put the revolutionaries in a stronger position than they had been before. Moreover, the breakdown of the Shanghai peace conference the next day threatened a renewal of fighting.¹¹⁵ However, no serious fighting was resumed and the revolutionaries were never recognised as belligerents throughout the course of the revolution.

In concluding it is justified to say that Jordan made an important contribution to formulating the mechanism of British neutral policy which was adopted during the Chinese revolution of 1911. It has been seen that in some cases Jordan had no time to consult the Foreign Office before he had to make a decision. It is obvious that in adopting the policy of neutrality Jordan thought primarily of the protection of British life and property.

By the so-called policy of neutrality the Manchu government was denied the support and help which she had hitherto received from Britain. This in itself was a blow to the prestige of the government. The two attempts of Jordan to lend to the government proved to be abortive, and he was mainly responsible for withdrawing from the Manchus the surplus of customs revenues and railway earnings which they had hitherto enjoyed.

Moreover, Jordan's acquiescence to the demands of the revolutionaries in relation to contraband and the right of search was in effect an act of outright partiality which contributed significantly to the morale of the revolutionaries.

¹¹⁵ Jordan to Grey, no. 8, 4 Jan. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

Chapter Three

Mediation

This chapter is not only dealing with Jordan's mediation between the revolutionaries and the imperial government at the end of November and beginning of December, but also the events, apart from the mechanism of the policy of neutrality which Britain adopted, which took place before it. It is hoped that by dealing with these events and the mediation an answer could be found to the question whether Jordan's attitude towards the two contending parties was truly reflected by his policy of neutrality, which in effect was advantageous to the revolutionaries.

A brief account of the political events of the first two months of the revolution until Jordan's mediation will help to make clear the discussion which follows. As soon as the revolution broke out in Wuchang the viceroy of the Hu provinces, Jui-cheng, and the commander of the 8th Division of the provinces, Chang Piao, fled across the Yangtze to Hankow. Almost immediately the Hupei revolutionaries gained control of the three Wuhan cities, and revolutionaries of other provinces also revolted. The Manchu government reacted quickly. Two armies were rushed to Wuhan by Generals Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Ch'i-jui, under the overall command of the German-trained Manchu General Yin-ch'ang; and the British-trained Admiral Sa Chen-ping was ordered to bombard Hankow. Simultaneously, Yüan Shih-k'ai was recalled, and later took over Yin-ch'ang's command. In spite of these efforts of the government the revolution spread, and in north China too part of the Pei-yang Army mutinied as a result of revolutionary sedition. Generally

speaking, the Manchu government was fast losing the country to the revolutionaries, but until the end of November it had not suffered a decisive defeat. At the beginning of December, Yüan Shih-k'ai, representing the Manchu government, succeeded in arranging a cease-fire with the revolutionaries through the mediation of Jordan. Jordan accepted Yüan's invitation to mediate against a Japanese attempt to intervene on the side of the Manchu government. On 6 December the prince regent abdicated, and three days later an armistice of fifteen days, to be followed by a peace conference, was agreed upon.

The outcome of the 1911 revolution is well-known; the Manchu dynasty abdicated and the revolutionaries were apparently triumphant. However, this was by no means a foregone conclusion during the first two months of the revolution. Nearly a fortnight after the first outbreak Jordan told Campbell that in his opinion the dynasty depended much "upon the action of Yuan Shih-k'ai and the loyalty of the Imperial forces"¹. A week later Jordan added another source of hope for the dynasty - the Tzū-cheng Yüan (senate) which "may be able to dictate the conditions on which the provinces will consent to the continuance of the present dynasty"². The three hopes for the dynasty as Jordan saw them are convenient headings for the discussion which follows in that they naturally systematise the events which occurred between the outbreak of the revolution and Jordan's mediation, and reflect Jordan's assessment of the relative strength of the revolutionaries and the government.

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1. Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.
 2. Jordan to Campbell, private, 30 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

The Reinstatement of Yüan Shih-k'ai

When the news of the Wuchang revolution reached Peking, Prince Ch'ing suggested to the frightened court to recall Yüan Shih-k'ai to save the situation. On 14 October, Jordan telegraphed the Foreign Office that Yüan was appointed viceroy of Hukuang with full command over the forces originally in Hupei and joint command over Yin-ch'ang's troops which were leaving for Wuhan. Admiral Sa^{ping} also was to cooperate with him. Jordan thought Yüan's reappointment would probably "ensure loyalty of the northern troops, which was doubtful, and will materially strengthen the hands of the government in dealing with this crisis"³. However, Yüan K'o-ting, Yüan Shih-k'ai's son, told Jordan that his father would not go to Hankow unless he was given full command over Yin-ch'ang's troops⁴.

The recall of Yüan had two somewhat contradictory effects on Jordan. On the one hand, that the prince regent resorted to recalling Yüan reflected the seriousness of the revolutionary threat and the government's inability to cope with it. On the other hand, with Yüan in control it would be more likely for the insurrection to be contained before assuming serious proportions. It was obvious that Jordan was extremely pleased with Yüan's appointment and looked forward to his return to Peking "as a Dictator"⁵.

But Jordan was not alone in welcoming Yüan's recall; the heads of the other legations viewed it with equal optimism, and urged their governments to consent to loans to the Manchu government. Perhaps the

3. Jordan to Grey, tel. 225, 14 Oct. 1911 Ch. Corres., vol.1093

4. Jordan to Grey, tel. 234, conf., 21 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol.1093.

5. Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol.7.

Japanese minister in Peking, Ijuin Hikokichi, serves as a good illustration. Before Yüan Shih-k'ai received an imperial mandate to put down the revolution Ijuin was considerably interested in the scheme of Kawashima Nanima, the famous adventurer whose name is associated with the salient features of Japanese militarism and expansionism, whereby Japan would support a nominal Manchu régime in part of north China and Manchuria which would be subject to exclusive Japanese exploitation and a nationalist régime in south China under Sun Yat-sen. However, after the reinstatement of Yüan, Ijuin became highly pro-Manchu⁶. It has also been seen that the bank agents in Peking too viewed the return favourably.

Jordan did not remain optimistic for long, though his colleagues did. On 29 October 1911, Yüan Shih-k'ai, in his new capacity as the high commissioner, left Honan for the south. The news of his movement undoubtedly raised the morale of the government troops fighting in Wuhan, and Hankow was retaken on the very day. However, the situation in the middle and lower Yangtze Valley had become too far out-of-hand and the imperial success at Hankow did little to brighten the prospect of the Manchu cause in Jordan's eyes. In a letter to Campbell at the end of October Jordan remarked that "the areas affected are so widely apart and the Government is so ill prepared for a protracted struggle that the revolutionary cause seems to me the more hopeful of the two". He was disturbed because a revolutionary success "would mean a long period of confusion and disorder which would be fatal to trade"⁷.

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6. M. B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 134-5; Masaru Ikei, "Japan Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 25, no. 2 (Feb. 1966), p. 216; Ijuin to Uchida, no. 348, 28 Oct. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 377-8.
7. Jordan to Campbell, private, 30 Oct., 3 Nov., 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

Neither did the recall of Yüan remove the financial difficulties of the Manchu government. It has been seen that the Manchu request for financial assistance had repeatedly been rejected by the powers. Even Yüan Shih-k'ai's appeals for funds after his arrival in Peking were rebuffed. On many occasions Yüan personally impressed on Jordan the urgency of his government's financial needs, thinking that if Jordan was convinced the powers might be persuaded to lend. It has been shown that Jordan was of little service to Yüan in this respect.

On the other hand, Jordan knew that Yüan had access to the palace treasure hoarded by the late empress dowager, Tzū-hsi. Soon after he returned to Peking Yüan was given about £400,000 of the palace treasure to defray the current expenses of the government, to buy ammunition for the war ministry, and to pay for troop movements⁸. The existence of a palace hoard was verified by the omniscient Morrison of The Times. It was perhaps true that Yüan's financial difficulties were at their height in December when the revolutionaries and the government were negotiating for a peace conference. It was then that Jordan made the suggestion that a loan should be made to Yüan to tide over the period of negotiations. No loan was made in the end and in the middle of December Jordan was informed that there was enough in the imperial treasury for less than a week. Yüan personally told Jordan that "the pot will cease boiling in a few days". Even then Jordan remarked: "The loan to Yüan Shih-k'ai is a very perplexing question in which one feels literally between the devil and the deep sea. All his people say that he cannot go on without money.... But one cannot be sure that things are quite as bad as they are represented or that the palace hoard is exhausted".⁹

8. Jordan to Grey, no. 444, conf., 16 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

9. Jordan to Campbell, private, 20 Dec. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

Jordan was right. Again, on 2 January, he learned that Yüan had obtained from the palace 8,000 bars of gold equivalent to about 2,000,000 taels of silver, and silver amounting to 3,000,000 taels. Jordan also noticed the existence of the so-called "patriotic bonds" which were forced contributions from officials and members of the imperial family to finance the government through the crisis¹⁰.

This element of conflict in Jordan permeated other aspects regarding the recall of Yüan. While Yüan was still engaged in military operations in the south the court on 1 November dismissed Prince Ch'ing's cabinet from office and appointed Yüan as the new premier pending his return to Peking. Again Jordan's immediate reaction was one of pleasure. He wrote two days later:

"Yüan Shih-k'ai is the man of the hour. He has had his revenge for the treatment he received three years ago. We put our money on the right horse at that time and had the Regent only listened to British and American advice, he might have been spared the deep humiliation he is now suffering".

But with the same breath he said:

"I doubt if Yüan's appointment as Premier will have a final solution".

He envisaged Yüan would have great difficulties in forming a cabinet of capable men and that the new cabinet, when formed, would meet great opposition from the ministers who had been replaced. As it turned out, there was not so much opposition from the outgoing cabinet as resistance against joining the new one. Even T'ang Shao-i, Yüan's henchman, refused to be enlisted, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the veteran constitutionalist, also rejected Yüan's invitation to be included¹¹.

10. Jordan to Grey, no. 15, 5 Jan. 1912; Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

11. Jordan to Campbell, private, 3 Nov., 19 Nov., 1911; Jordan Papers, vol. 7; Li, Cheng-ch'ih shih, vol. 1, p. 254.

On 13 November Yüan reached Peking where he was "accorded an almost royal reception" in which none of the Manchu princes was present. Presumably Jordan was in the crowd which welcomed Yüan¹². Not a few people pinned their hopes on the arrival of Yüan in Peking. It was Prince Ch'ing's "sole hope"¹³. The bank agents in Peking urged that loans could safely be advanced to the Manchu government on the grounds that the situation would certainly improve with Yüan in the capital. Jordan was informed of Yüan's return to Peking well in advance by Yüan K'o-ting¹⁴. Again, a conflict can be discerned in his attitude. On the one hand, the prospect of Yüan's return alone had an unmistakably "reassuring effect"¹⁵ on the panic-stricken Peking. The number of people leaving Peking decreased noticeably during the few previous days. Jordan was not unaffected by what he observed. On the other hand, he was acutely aware of the fact that imperial authority in most provinces had ceased to operate. The day after Yüan's return he wrote to Admiral Winsloe about the event but commented that "with the whole country in the hands of the rebels and no funds at their disposal, I do not see how the government, even with Yüan's help, can manage to struggle on very much longer"¹⁶.

"The action of Yüan Shih-k'ai", on which the fate of the Manchu dynasty much depended, relied in turn upon the attitude of Yüan Shih-k'ai towards the dynasty and the revolutionaries. Most histories written either generally on the period or specifically on Yüan Shih-k'ai cannot detach themselves from a judgement on Yüan's loyalty to the Manchu court. Similarly it is important to understand Jordan's conception of Yüan in this respect.

12. Jordan to Admiral Winsloe, private, 14 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

13. Jordan to Campbell, private, 10 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

14. Jordan to Grey, tel. 258, 2 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

15. Jordan to Grey, tel. 274, 12 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.

In general, before Yüan returned to Peking, Jordan believed that his loyalty to the Manchu dynasty was not in question¹⁷. It was only after Yüan's return that Jordan was able to ascertain Yüan's attitude and impress his own on him. On his arrival Yüan was immediately engrossed in forming his cabinet, the names of which were announced on 16 November. Moreover, he was preoccupied in securing control over all the troops in the vicinity of the capital. But he had not forgotten the powers, nor had he forgotten Jordan. The next day after his arrival Jordan received a call from Yüan K'o-ting, "on his father's behalf", informing him that though it was Yüan Shih-k'ai's desire to save the dynasty, circumstances had made that virtually unfeasible. Jordan was further told that the revolutionary leaders, notably Li Yüan-hung, had offered Yüan the presidency of a Chinese republic if he would defect from the government. Yüan K'o-ting said that his father asked for the advice of Jordan who gave it as his personal opinion that the best solution lay in the retention of the Manchu dynasty as a figure-head, accompanied by such constitutional changes as had been promised by the court to the Tzū-cheng Yüan about a fortnight before. Yüan K'o-ting hastened to assure Jordan that the revolutionaries wanted "his father to be their ruler... and that the republic would only be a transitional stage."¹⁸ Jordan was considerably surprised by Yüan K'o-ting's information. He knew that since the beginning of November Yüan, then still in Hupei, had been trying to come to an understanding with the Hankow revolutionaries. But it appears that it

16. Jordan to Winsloe, private, 14 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

17. For example, Jordan to Grey, no. 397, 16 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094; Jordan to Campbell, 3 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

18. Jordan to Grey, tel. 278, 14 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

had never occurred to Jordan that Yüan might consider more than inducing the revolutionaries to put down their arms and accept a limited Manchu monarchy¹⁹. Jordan decided to clear his mind in an interview with Yüan Shih-k'ai himself which was scheduled for the next day.

The Foreign Office gave immediate instruction concerning the impending interview; Sir Edward Grey telegraphed:

"Conversations with Yuan Shih-k'ai are left entirely to your discretion. We have conceived very friendly feelings and respect for him personally from his previous record. We should wish to see a Government sufficiently strong to deal impartially with foreign countries and to maintain internal order and favourable conditions for the progress of trade established in China as a consequence of the revolution. Such a Government would receive all the diplomatic support which we could give it".²⁰

However, it appears that the telegram did not arrive in time to prepare Jordan for his interview. In any case, Yüan's attitude towards the situation was substantially different from Yüan K'o-ting's description of it the day before. Yüan Shih-k'ai told Jordan that Li Yüan-hung had rejected all his "overtures" which, judging from the context, though not specified, provided for a limited Manchu monarchy. Yüan then stated that although Shanghai had joined Wuchang in demanding for a republic, he would lead the cause of the dynasty which was really the predominating sentiment in the north. Moreover, he thought that by rallying the northern provinces to his cause he might be able to form

19. Jordan to Grey, tel 258, 2 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094. It is an established fact that on 1 November Yüan wrote to Li Yüan-hung, and on 11 November Yüan's representatives, Liu Ch'eng-en and T'sai Ting-kan, reached Wuchang to negotiate with Li. Chinese historians usually use this as evidence to prove Yüan's disloyalty to the Manchus, see Wu Hsiang-hsiang, "Yüan Shih-k'ai mou-ch'ü lin-shih ta-tsung-t'ung chih ching-kuo", [The procedure by which Yüan Shih-k'ai schemed for the provisional presidency], in CH ts'ung-k'an, vol. 1 p. 6; Chü Cheng, Hsin-hai tsa-chi, [Notes on the 1911 revolution], (Taipei, 1956), p. 75; see also Jordan to Campbell, private, 17 Nov. 1911, for Ts'ai Ting-kan's version of the failure of the attempt to negotiate with the revolutionaries, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

20. Grey to Jordan, tel 168, 15 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.

a nucleus of government in the north which would eventually win over the south, either by persuasion or by force. From the tone of the telegram on the interview to the Foreign Office it appears that Jordan was pleased with Yüan's attitude, and he described Yüan K'o-ting's interview as "a feeler".²¹

Certainly after their meeting on 15 November Jordan was under the impression that Yüan was a faithful supporter of the Manchu cause. However, Yüan told Jordan soon afterwards that the situation was "very hopeless" and that he had not realised the extent to which the Manchu government had deteriorated during his three years of absence. Yüan's private secretary, Ts'ai Ting-kan, made similar observations to Jordan and said that many of Yüan's own followers urged him to recognise the hopelessness in upholding the dynasty²². Jordan found Yüan becoming daily more despondent, and at the end of November Yüan talked of resignation²³.

The Imperial Forces

Jordan also held contradictory views about the imperial forces which would, to a great extent, determine the outcome of the revolution. Just before the revolution broke out, the bulk of the imperial forces in North China was at Yung-p'ing, Hopei, where they were drilling for the Grand Autumn Manoeuvres. It was planned that during the manoeuvres the divisions which participated would be divided into two armies, marching towards each other from opposite directions. The army which would march from the east composed chiefly of the Pei-yang divisions under the overall command of General Feng Kuo-chang, aided by General Chang Shao-tseng

21. Jordan to Grey, tel. 281, 15 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.

22. Jordan to Campbell, private, 17 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

23. Jordan to Campbell, private, 27 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

of the 20th Division of Mukden and General Wu Lu-chen of the 6th Division of Paoting. The army which would march from the west was mainly made up of units of the Imperial Guards, commanded by General Shu Ch'ing-o, aided by General T'ien Hsien-chang and General Ha Han-chang. When the revolution broke out the Ch'ing government ordered an immediate postponement of the manoeuvres. Yin-ch'ang, then also at Yung-p'ing, was ordered to leave for Wuhan. His aide-de-camp, Ting Shih-yüan, immediately set about preparing Luanchou, an important junction on the Peking-Mukden Railway, as the camp for entraining purposes. Ting also asked the authority of the Peking-Mukden Railway to arrange with that of the Peking-Hankow Railway for the transport of fifty train-loads of munitions and troops. On 14 October the 4th Division and 1st Battalion entrained; Yin-ch'ang followed two days later. Jordan hoped at the beginning that these troops would be able to contain the Wuchang revolution as a local affair²⁴.

Before long Jordan became sceptical about these troops. Although the request of the military attaché of the British legation to join the imperial army as an observer on the spot was rejected, he remained a good source of information for Jordan on Ch'ing military movements. He told Jordan that he found little enthusiasm along the Peking-Hankow line for the imperial cause²⁵. This observation of the military attaché was

24. The details of Ch'ing military movements depicted here are found in HHKM, vol.6, p. 339; and Wu Hsiang-hsiang, Wan-Ch'ing kung-t'ing yü jen-wu, [The court and leading figures of the late Ch'ing dynasty], (Taipei, 1965), pp 100-1.

25. Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7; Jordan to Grey, no.409, 23 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094; and military attaché's report in Jordan to Grey, no.431, 10 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095. In fact, the military attaché was later given a special permit by the Ch'ing government to go to Hankow himself. He arrived there on 19 October, one day after Morrison.

somewhat confirmed by Ting Shih-yüan in his diary²⁶. Jordan commented 140 rather sharply that "at least 30,000 men have proceeded to the scene of the disturbance and if China's modern army is one-tenth as efficient as our military experts have led us to believe, they should make short work of the mutineers."²⁷ However, the first imperial victory at Hankow was the result of a week's military operation, and it has been alleged that General Feng Kuo-chang was so frustrated by the resistance of the Hankow revolutionaries that when the city was taken by his troops he set fire to it in revenge²⁸.

On the other hand, there were reasons to believe that the imperial troops that were sent to Wuhan were superior to the revolutionary troops there. Despite the obvious signs of unpreparedness, the imperial troops that were sent were part of the properly equipped and trained Pei-yang Army. The common phenomenon amongst the different revolutionary centres, however, was indiscriminate recruitment. The Wuchang military government created a precedent for this. Thus troops belonging to the 8th Division which started the revolution fought side-by-side with inexperienced new recruits from all classes including coolies, loafers, rickshaw men, and shopkeepers. Jordan was given the information which Goffe had learned "on good authority" that there were only about 5,000 trained revolutionary soldiers fighting in Wuhan.²⁹

26. Ting's diary was published by the Dairen library of the South Manchurian Railway Company and has been in rare circulation. It is entitled Mei-leng chang-ching pi-chi, [The diary]. It is, however, substantially quoted in the section dealing with Ch'ing military movements on the outbreak of the revolution in Wu, Wan-Ch'ing kung-t'ing yü jen-wu, pp. 100-1. According to Ting there was no time to prepare enough food and coal to entrain the soldiers from Luanzhou to Hankow, and this caused considerable discontent amongst the soldiers.

27. Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911; Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

28. For example, Chü, Hsin-hai tsa-chi, p. 68.

29. Goffe to Jordan, no. 97, 16 Oct. 1911; Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1802. For details of rapid recruitment at Wuchang, see Lo Kang, Lo pien Kuo-fu

That soon afterwards Jordan became sceptical even of this superiority of the imperial troops in Wuhan is reflected in his reaction to the imperial victory at Hanyang at the end of November. It is important to notice that the recovery of Hanyang by government troops is the most commonly employed evidence to argue that Yüan's military power was strong enough to crush the revolution, which, however, he preserved as a weapon to blackmail the court.³⁰ The British commander-in-chief of the China Station was considerably impressed by the equipment, organisation, and discipline of the imperial troops in the Hanyang campaign which he witnessed on the spot³¹. Later, Jordan was frequently attacked for mediating between the revolutionaries and the government at the time of the Hanyang success, an act which was considered to have forestalled an eventual success of the government at Wuhan which might in turn have brought about the collapse of the revolutionary movement³². Partly to defend himself and partly out of genuine conviction, Jordan commented in retrospect that other than negotiations there could "be no doubt that at the best a long and bloody war would have ensued"³³. In other words, Jordan believed that the revolutionaries in Wuhan had every possibility of holding their own against their imperial enemies.

nien-p'u chiu-miu, [The errors in the chronological biography of Sun Yat-sen edited by Lo Chia-lun], (Taipei, 1962), p. 262; and Hu Ou-kung, a revolutionary leader at Wuchang during the revolution, frankly acknowledges the incompetence of the new recruits in his Hsin-hai ko-ming pei-fang shih-lu, [The 1911 revolution in north China], (Shanghai, 1948), p.61. Also Chung-kuo jen-min cheng-ch'ih hsieh-shang hui-i Hu-pei-sheng wei-yüan-hui, Hsin-hai hui-i lu, [Collections of memoirs on the 1911 revolution], (Wuhan, 1957), vol. 1, pp. 179-80.

30. For example, Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 116-7; E.P. Young, "Yuan Shih-k'ai's Rise to the Presidency, 1911-1912," p. 33, note 14 in PRCCC which gives reference to the remarks of contemporary American diplomatic and consular officials; and Sih-Gung Cheng, Modern China, (Clarendon Press, 1919), pp. 15-6.

31. Admiral Winsloe to Admiralty in Admiralty to F.O., 13 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

Leaving aside the strength of the imperial troops in Wuhan, Jordan found it difficult to make a definite assessment of the imperial troops in north China which would determine Yüan Shih-k'ai's action. Jordan was particularly struck by the unreliability of the Pei-yang army. Three days after the revolution broke out he telegraphed the Foreign Office that the loyalty of the northern troops was "doubtful"³⁴. The British military attaché was convinced that many of the officers on the general staff were in secret communication with the revolutionaries³⁵. Yüan k'o-ting was one amongst those who informed Jordan of the unreliable state of the Pei-yang Army.³⁶

Jordan's apprehension seemed for a time to be justified when on 29 October the 20th Division of Mukden, then at Luanchou because of the postponed Autumn Maneuvres, mutinied and refused to entrain for the front. Immediately afterwards Chang Shao-tseng, the commander, and several of his colleagues presented the court with a petition of 12 articles which, if enforced, would provide a national parliament before the end of the year, a constitution to be drawn up by the parliament, a cabinet responsible to the parliament, and the exclusion of members of the imperial household from all offices of state. In short, they demanded of a highly limited constitutional monarchy. The Manchu government was alarmed by such an event taking place on its doorstep, especially as Luanchou was a strategic point on the Peking-Mukden line, on which

32. The severest criticism came from the Peking correspondent of the New York Herald, a Mr. Ohl, who entertained a personal grudge against Jordan and a general anti-British attitude.

33. Jordan to Grey, tel. 97, 24 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315.

34. Jordan to Grey, tel. 225, 14 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

35. Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

36. Jordan to Grey, tel. 234, 21 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

the Manchus depended both for reinforcements from, and retreat to, Manchuria³⁷. It can, however, be argued that the Luanchou mutiny did not make Jordan feel completely hopeless about the loyalty of the Pei-yang troops. On 2 November, Yüan K'o-ting assured him that the mutinous troops were "acting under Yüan Shih-kai's inspirations".³⁸ The reason for Jordan's acceptance of Yüan K'o-ting's statement can be seen in the next section in relation to the Tzū-cheng Yüan.

However, the disloyalty of part of the Pei-yang Army was undoubtedly reflected in the mutiny of the 6th Division, one of the original divisions of the Pei-yang Army then under the command of Wu Lu-chen, at Shih-chia-chuang. That Jordan was conversant with the situation during the revolution was shown by the fact that as early as 14 October he expressed his knowledge that the 6th Division was "honey-combed with revolutionary ideas"³⁹.

Wu Lu-chen succeeded to the command of the 6th Division only in the winter of 1910 through the influence of his good friend, Liang-pi, a Manchu noble. He was, however, a revolutionary. Yin-ch'ang distrusted him and rejected his request after the outbreak of the revolution to lead his division to the front. After Chang Shao-tseng's actions at Luanchou, Wu attempted to contact Chang and Lan T'ien-wei, the assistant commander of the 20th Division, both his old friends, to start a revolution in the north. The Manchu government heard of the plot and was alarmed. It appointed Wu as the new governor of Shansi, the capital of which had just been taken over by the revolutionaries, to quench the revolution there.

37. For details of the Luanchou mutiny see HHKM, vol. 6, pp. 331-9; for the twelve demands see Li, Cheng-ch'ih shih, pp. 251-2.

38. Jordan to Grey, tel. 259, 2 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

39. Jordan to Campbell, private, 14 Oct. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

The idea of the appointment was to separate Wu, Chang and Lan so that it would be difficult for them to join forces. Wu accepted the appointment but met the Shansi revolutionaries at Niang-tzŭ-kuan where they were persuaded to pretend surrendering to him to allay the Manchus' suspicion. He then stationed his troops at Shih-chia-chuang, awaiting an opportunity in which his division and the 20th Division might meet and march on Peking. At Shih-chia-chuang too, Wu disrupted the transport of munitions to the imperial troops fighting in Wuhan. That the Manchu government was alarmed was natural; apart from the fact that the Peking-Mukden and Peking-Hankow Railways were being endangered, Luanchou, Shih-chia-chuang, and Niang-tzŭ-kuan were within striking distance from Peking. Jordan did not fail to appreciate the gravity of the situation. It was at this point that he arranged for the guarding of the Peking-Mukden Railway by foreign troops to keep the sea accessible to Peking in case of an eventuality there⁴⁰.

Later, however, Jordan must have been considerably relieved that the Luanchou and Shih-chia-chuang crises did not assume the magnitude which they at first threatened to. Chang Shao-tseng's resignation ended the first incident and Wu Lu-chen's assassination the second. Most commentators agree that the net outcome of the disappearance of the influence of Chang and Wu, particularly the latter, was that Yŭan Shih-k'ai became the indisputable power in north China.⁴¹

It has been seen so far that Jordan had been unable to assess the extent to which the Pei-yang Army was unreliable in terms of its subjection to revolutionary infiltration. He seemed to be equally, if not

40. For details of the Shih-chia-chuang mutiny, see HHKM, vol. 6, pp. 329-31, 361-2, 371.

41. For example, HHKM, vol. 6, p. 279; Wen Kung-chih, Tsui-chin san-shih-

more, uncertain of Yüan Shih-k'ai's control over the Pei-yang Army which was an important factor in assessing the reliability of it. Jordan again had contradictory views on the matter. When Yüan was recalled in the middle of October Jordan certainly had high hopes mainly because of his belief in Yüan's influence with the army. The belief was short-lived. The Shih-chia-chuang mutiny in particular made him realise that Yüan's control over the Pei-yang Army was not as absolute as he at first thought it to be:

"although Yuan's prestige with it [the army] was very great, it does not follow that he may be able to control it permanently".⁴²

Knowing China as he did, he must have realised soon afterwards that Yüan's loss of direct administrative control over the Pei-yang divisions between 1907 and 1911 must have attenuated his claim to personal loyalty from the soldiers in spite of the close link that he had maintained with the top-ranking officers during the period. Commenting on this Jordan regretfully wrote:

"The whole arrangement has the defect which has characterised all recent Chinese policies - the one man rule".⁴³

Apart from the Pei-yang Army, the imperial forces included the Imperial Guards and the old-style troops which antedated the New Army.⁴⁴ They were, however, of extremely marginal significance. The Imperial Guards came under Yüan's influence only after his return to Peking, and Jordan noticed that such out-moded forces as the Hsun-fung Tui, Huai Chün, and Wu-wei-so Chün could hardly be depended on in a serious combat.⁴⁵

nien chün-shih shih in CHS ts'ung-shu, vol. 2, p.5; and Li, Cheng-ch'ih shih, vol. 1, p. 313.

42. Jordan to Campbell, 3 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

43. Ibid.

44. The term "New Army", or Hsin Chün, is used to include both the Pei-yang Army and the Nan-yang Army which was in the south.

45. Military attaché's report in Jordan to Grey, no. 492, 4 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

Thus, speaking generally on the imperial forces, Jordan realised that in terms of military prowess in the Wuhan area the revolutionary forces were stronger and more confident, the government troops weaker and less cohesive than is generally supposed. And, in terms of the overall military strength of the Manchu government which depended on Yüan Shih-k'ai, Jordan realised that Yüan was confronted by such unpleasant facts as the revolutionary sedition in, and his loss of absolute control of, the Pei-yang Army.

The Tzŭ-cheng Yüan.

The Tzŭ-cheng Yüan, or national assembly, began its second session in Peking on 22 October, but it only struck Jordan as a possible influence in retaining the Manchu dynasty as a limited monarchy at the end of October and beginning of November in connection with the Luanchou mutiny. Two days before the Luanchou generals made their demands the Tzŭ-cheng Yüan had presented four demands: the abolition of the imperial cabinet, so called because the majority of its members were from the imperial family; an amnesty for political offenders; the participation of the people in drawing up the constitution; and the immediate convocation of parliament. The close similarity between the Luanchou generals and the Tzŭ-cheng Yüan in their demands immediately caused Jordan to suspect that the Luanchou demands were drawn up in consultation with the Tzŭ-cheng Yüan.⁴⁶

Jordan's suspicion was confirmed when on 2 November Yüan K'o-ting told him that the Luanchou demands were made under the inspiration of his father who was also in direct communication with the Tzŭ-cheng Yüan.⁴⁷

46. Jordan to Grey, tel. 256, 30 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

47. Jordan to Grey, tel. 258, 2 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

Having been given the information by Yüan K'o-ting, and being convinced of Yüan's sincerity in upholding a limited Manchu monarchy, Jordan therefore thought of the Luanchou mutiny more as a constitutionalist than revolutionary plot, and his attention was accordingly diverted to the Tzū-cheng Yüan.

The frightened Manchu court immediately conceded Chang's demands, and the Tzū-cheng Yüan was ordered, on 2 November, to draw up a constitution. The next day it produced a constitution of nineteen articles which was practically an endorsement of the Luanchou demands. The regent accepted the constitution and promised to promulgate it at the end of the month in the Imperial Ancestral Temple. To further show its sincerity in accepting constitutional limitations, the Manchu court requested the Tzū-cheng Yüan to pass its decision, which it did on 7 November, to appoint Yüan Shih-k'ai as the new premier.⁴⁸

It has been seen that for the past few years Jordan had been a close observer of the constitutional movement and was fully conversant with the relationship between the Tzū-cheng Yüan and the Tzū-i Chü, the provincial assemblies. As early as the day after the Luanchou demands were made, Jordan hopefully telegraphed the Foreign Office that the Tzū-cheng Yüan might succeed in persuading the provinces, through their assemblies, to accept under adequate guarantees the concessions made by the government⁴⁹. Immediately after the court had accepted the constitution Jordan wrote to Campbell that delegates would be sent out by the Tzū-cheng Yüan to the provinces to gain their acceptance of a constitutional monarchy⁵⁰

48. For details of these sessions in the Tzū-cheng Yüan, see Peking Daily News, 3, 8, 9 Nov. 1911.

49. Jordan to Grey, tel. 256, 30 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1093.

50. Jordan to Campbell, private, 3 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7. It is said that later the assembly was surrounded by a "languid"

On 6 November he reiterated to the Foreign Office his opinion that the hopes of the Manchus "rest upon Yuan and the National Assembly being able to convince the country that it is better to keep the Manchu dynasty in position, shorn of all powers, than to the prospect of probable confusion and disorder."⁵¹

However, the hope raised by the Tzū-cheng Yüan in Jordan that the Manchu dynasty might after all be retained was short-lived. About the middle of November Jordan already observed that the delegates who had been despatched by the Tzū-cheng Yüan to indoctrinate the provincial assemblies with the idea of a limited Manchu monarchy did not have "a very cordial reception" at Hankow, Shanghai, and other strong revolutionary centres⁵². When the prince regent took the oath on 26 November, binding the dynasty to the constitution, Jordan knew that the Tzū-cheng Yüan had already lost its cause.

Before looking at Jordan's mediation between the revolutionaries and the government, several conclusions have to be drawn from what has so far been said in this chapter. First, it is clearly underwritten that Jordan, although adopting the policy of neutrality, still adhered firmly to the ideal which he had held during the pre-revolutionary years, - a figure-head Manchu dynasty with Yüan Shih-k'ai in actual power. He distrusted the revolutionaries and their idea of a Chinese republic. At this point it is interesting to contrast Jordan's consistent attitude to the attitude of Goffe, acting consul-general at Hankow, Fraser, consul-general at Shanghai and Wilkinson, consul at Nanking. In this it is assumed that as British representatives at the ports concerned, they had been supporters of the Manchu government as opposed to the revolutionaries.

atmosphere because the best speakers had been sent to the provinces, Peking Daily News, 14 Nov. 1911.

51. Jordan to Grey, no. 427, 6 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.

Throughout the revolution Goffe was most ingratiating towards Li Yüan-hung, and became extremely friendly with him. In a despatch which dealt with the revolution in retrospect, Goffe said: "The future could be faced with less anxiety if China possessed more men of the stamp of the leader of the revolutionaries at Wuchang"⁵³. It has been seen in connection with the policy of neutrality that Jordan was often affected by Fraser's anxiety to be on good terms with the Shanghai revolutionaries. It will be seen that towards the end of the revolution Wilkinson openly sympathised with Sun Yat-sen, who had by then become the provisional president of the Nanking republican government, as opposed to Yüan Shih-k'ai⁵⁴. Secondly, Jordan had been unable to come to a definite conclusion as to the relative strength of the revolutionaries and the government. This is reflected in the conflicting views which he held towards the reinstatement of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the imperial forces, and the Tzū-cheng Yüan, the three remaining props of the Manchu dynasty during the first two months of the revolution. Thirdly, however, it became increasingly clear towards the end of November that the revolutionary cause was getting the upper hand.

Mediation

The suggestion that Britain should mediate between the revolutionaries and the Manchus was not first made by Jordan. On 26 October Townsend of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, acting in the absence of Addis, and Hillier, the bank's representative in Peking, who was in London at the time, called on the Foreign Office to whom they communicated a telegram

52. Jordan to Grey, tel. 274, 12 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.

53. Goffe to Jordan, no. 17, 20 Feb. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1841.

54. Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 6, 24 Jan. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), vol. 1836.

of the Hongkong Office of the bank suggesting that the powers might offer to mediate for the Chinese. Hillier especially tried to convince Campbell that mediation was particularly suited to the Chinese mentality⁵⁵. The Foreign Office was sceptical and asked for Jordan's opinion. Jordan replied that mediation at that moment was both unlikely to be successful and impracticable. It was not likely to be successful because the Manchus and the revolutionaries were fighting for two directly opposing causes and that there was as yet no organised revolutionary centre or body to deal with. It was impracticable in that it would involve Britain deeply and prematurely and compromise the Manchu cause before it was fully tested⁵⁶.

Fighting between the revolutionary and government forces continued in Wuhan until the end of November. On 25 November, Goffe telegraphed Jordan that stray shells from Hanyang were falling on the British concession in Hankow. The next day Jordan expressed to Yüan Shih-k'ai his anxiety for the safety of the British community at Hankow. Yüan stated that the imperial forces were only acting on the defensive and he was willing to suspend hostilities if an armistice could be arranged on mutually satisfactory terms. Jordan was then asked by Yüan to convey his desire to Li Yüan-hung through the British acting consul-general at Hankow. Jordan made the decision in accepting Yüan's request to him to mediate and instructed Goffe to send a verbal and unofficial message to Li. He took care to explain that his object of mediation was to "avert useless bloodshed and to prevent prolongation of dangerous situation in which the British community has now been placed for some six weeks."⁵⁷

55. Campbell's minute addressed to Grey, 26 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol.1093

56. Jordan to Grey, tel. 249, 29 Oct. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1094.

57. Jordan to Grey, tel. 302, 26 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

On 27 November the imperial troops retook Hanyang. According to Goffe the revolutionaries were demoralised and fled to Wuchang where the situation became untenable. Jordan was further informed that Li Yüan-hung had come to accept a constitutional monarchy. Goffe said that he would try hard to obtain Li's terms for an armistice which would then be sent to Jordan to be communicated to Yüan Shih-k'ai.⁵⁸

The promptness and decision with which Jordan reacted to Yüan's invitation to mediate between the imperial and the revolutionary sides was quite unlike his usual way of lengthy contemplation. The apparently prompt decision was, however, the result of vigilant observation and experienced calculation. The four objections which he listed a month before to Hillier's suggestion of mediation no longer existed.

The first objection was that there was no basis for negotiation in that the revolutionaries asked for a republic and the imperialists, of course, the retention of the dynasty. This objection seemed to have been removed with Li Yüan-hung agreeing to a constitutional monarchy.

The second objection was that there was as yet no central machinery through which the revolutionaries could be dealt with collectively in a negotiation. But, by the end of November there was a clear attempt at cohesion amongst revolutionaries of different provinces. In fact, earlier in the middle of November Goffe reported to Jordan that he had received from Li Yüan-hung a despatch stating that he had been elected by various republican generals as the representative of the republican government with Wuchang as the temporary centre.⁵⁹ When Hanyang fell representatives

58. Goffe to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 307, 27 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

59. Goffe to Jordan, tel. 76, 15 Nov. 1911. Ch. Emb. Arch, vol. 1802.

from the revolutionary provinces were arriving at Wuchang for consultation in forming a united provisional government.⁶⁰

The third objection a month before was that the strength of the Manchu government had not yet been fully tested. Hence premature mediation of a third party tended to compromise the position of the government. By the end of November, however, as it has just been asserted, the inability of the Manchu government to claim a decisive military superiority over the revolutionaries was obvious to Jordan.

The fourth objection to mediation a month before was that it involved Britain. But events had developed to a point at which Jordan realised that Britain had of necessity to become involved. Apart from the severe disruption of trade, the exposure of the Hankow concession to continued warfare, Jordan foresaw the danger of troops, both revolutionary and imperial, degenerating into bandits mostly as a result of the shortage of pay. There was the additional danger that the original bandits in the provinces might take advantage of the chaotic political situation to carry on pillage on an enlarged scale. Under such circumstances, British missionaries still remaining in the interior were likely to be endangered. At about the fall of Hanyang Jordan wrote to Admiral Winsloe urging him to defer his annual visit to Hongkong and remain in the north during the winter which he expected to be filled with general lawlessness, misery and distress in the central provinces.⁶¹

Finally, there was an obvious difference between the situation at the time of Hillier's proposal for mediation and that which prevailed at the end of November. Had Hillier's proposal been approved, the British

60. Goffe to Jordan, tel. 88, 29 Nov. 1911. Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1802.

61. Jordan to Admiral Winsloe in Jordan to Grey, no. 480, 5 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

government would have appeared to have interfered of her own accord. But at the end of November Jordan was accepting an invitation to mediate from Yüan Shih-k'ai, with the tacit agreement of Li Yüan-hung.

On 27 November Goffe telegraphed Jordan the terms which Li proposed for a fifteen day armistice in which each side would keep to the territory they occupied. The terms were: representatives from all the revolutionary provinces to meet and elect plenipotentiaries to negotiate with Yüan's representatives; and the armistice to extend for another fifteen days, if necessary. Jordan transmitted the terms to Yüan who asked Feng Kuo-chang for a detailed account of the disposition of the imperial troops at Wuhan before stating his terms.⁶²

On 1 December Yüan gave his terms which Jordan telegraphed Goffe to transmit to the revolutionaries. They provided for continued possession by both sides of territories which each already occupied; a three-day truce; and prohibition on both sides to obtain reinforcements or increase military strength in general during the truce and subsequent armistice. The wording of the last condition was: "In order that any infringement of the conditions may be obviated, British consul-general to sign armistice agreement as witness". Before consulting the Foreign Office Jordan authorised Goffe to sign the agreement accordingly. Later he explained to Grey: "I trust that the last condition meets with your approval: I had no time to consult you in regard to it"⁶³.

The Foreign Office was not unanimous in reacting to Jordan's initiative. Some fear was felt that the situation could be embarrassing for

62. Goffe to Jordan, tel. 87, 27 Nov. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1802; Jordan to Grey, tel. 308, 28 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

63. Jordan to Grey, tel. 314, 1 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

Britain if either side infringed an armistice agreement witnessed by the British acting consul-general. As it turned out, the British consulate-general at Hankow received numerous complaints of infringement especially from the revolutionaries⁶⁴. The permanent under-secretary, Sir Arthur Nicolson, was doubtful as to the effect of British mediation on the other powers, especially Japan who had just made overtures to London to intervene actively on the side of the Manchus⁶⁵. Campbell, nevertheless warmly seconded Jordan's action for he considered that, in being the witness, Goffe had no obligation to guarantee that the agreement would be kept intact but would only make it less likely for either side to infringe the conditions.⁶⁶ Sir Edward Grey was perhaps the most outspoken in approving Jordan's action. He minuted: "I approve: it is not an occasion when we should be punctilious and Sir J. Jordan acted quite rightly."⁶⁷

On 2 December the imperial troops at Nanking were defeated by the revolutionaries who took over the city. Through Ts'ai T'ing-kan Jordan conveyed to Yüan his desire that no attempt would be made to retake Nanking by force which would "irretrievably compromise the cause of a peaceful settlement"⁶⁸. Through Goffe a truce for three days was at last arranged on 3 December. No terms were made specifically in relation to the truce but the conditions existing were practically those demanded by Yüan Shih-k'ai⁶⁹. On 4 December Jordan, Yüan, and T'ang Shao-i had a meeting in which an arrangement for an armistice was drawn up. Yüan issued the

64. For example, Goffe to Jordan, tel.103, 11 Dec., tel. 111, 15 Dec. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1802.

65. Nicolson's minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 314, 1 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

66. Campbell's minute on *ibid.*

67. Grey's minute on *ibid.*

68. Jordan to Grey, no. 495, 12 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1310.

terms to Feng Kuo-chang while Jordan telegraphed them to Goffe who was instructed to exert his good offices in securing their acceptance by the revolutionaries. The terms stipulated for an extension of the truce and the prohibition of further military movements anywhere including Wuchang and Nanking, and negotiations between the revolutionaries and government in which T'ang Shao-i, to be expected at Wuchang within five days, would represent Yüan Shih-k'ai in discussing the situation with Li Yüan-hung or his representatives⁷⁰. On 6 December a second three day truce was agreed upon which expired on 9 December when a fifteen day armistice was put into force⁷¹.

Jordan's mediation between the revolutionaries and the Manchu court has to be seen in relation to the Japanese proposals for active intervention in favour of the Manchu dynasty. When talking of Japanese response to the Chinese revolution there is a distinction between the policy and attitude of the Japanese government and that of the shishi, or nationalists, notable amongst them was Miyazaki Torazo who was closely connected with Sun Yat-sen⁷². The nationalists, however, represented the unofficial Japanese policy.

Official Japanese policy was shaped by various personalities in the Japanese government who were not unanimous in their attitude towards the Chinese revolution. The Japanese administration which met this Chinese

69. Goffe to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 317, 3 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

70. Jordan to Grey, tel 319, conf., 4 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

71. Jordan to Grey, tel 334, 10 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

72. The intimate relationship between Miyazaki Torazo and Sun Yat-sen until the 1911 revolution can be seen in Miyazaki's reminiscence, Sanjusan-nen no yume, [Thirty-three years' dream], (Tokyo 1926, 1943), which has been translated into the Chinese version of San-shih-san-nien lo-huameng, (Shanghai, 1934); also Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen pp. 49-51, 64-153.

crisis was the Saionji cabinet, the foreign minister of which, Uchida Yasuya, was inexperienced in Chinese affairs⁷³. During the first week of the revolution the Saionji cabinet, under the influence of the army, seemed to have followed the policy of supporting the Manchu government. On 16 October the Japanese government decided to supply the Manchu government with arms and ammunition through private merchants⁷⁴ in compliance with a request made by the Manchus three days earlier through the military attaché of the Japanese legation, Aoki Nobuzumi.⁷⁵

The general staff of the army, on the other hand, advocated supplying troops to the revolutionaries. Saionji and Uchida objected but the home minister, Hara Kei, advised the cabinet to consider the situation carefully, and not just be content with supporting the Manchus, because the influence of the revolutionaries was fast expanding. The cabinet meeting of 24 October decided on a policy of exploiting the situation in China to consolidate Japanese influence in Manchuria on the one hand, and cooperating with the other powers on the other. The second part of the decision was made because the Japanese government wanted to avoid offending both the Manchus and the revolutionaries whilst the situation remained unclear⁷⁶.

The Japanese government policy changed with the emergence of Yüan Shih-k'ai as the premier in the middle of November. It has been seen that this had largely to do with Ijuin, Japan's minister in Peking.

73. Uchida was the former ambassador to the United States. The Chinese revolution broke out whilst he was on his way to Japan from America to take up the post of foreign minister.

74. Ikei, "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", p. 214.

75. Ijuin to Hayashi, no. 261, secret, 13 Oct. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp 134-5

76. Ikei, "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911," pp. 214-5.

Knowing the extent to which the Manchus relied on Yüan Shih-k'ai, Ijuin too became increasingly interested in Yüan with whom he became friendly when he was a consul at Tientsin. Being inexperienced in Chinese affairs, Uchida depended on Ijuin's judgement.

Before Yüan's return to Peking Ijuin had already established a secret tie with Yüan's confidant, Chao Ping-chün⁷⁷. On 16 November Ijuin was instructed by the Gaimusho to ascertain Yüan's intentions but avoid committing Japan definitely. But if Yüan signified his intention to save the situation by relying on Japan, Ijuin should promise some help⁷⁸. After talking with Yüan on 18 November, Ijuin was convinced that Yüan intended to preserve the dynasty. Accordingly he strongly advised his government to adopt a positive policy in support of Yüan and the dynasty⁷⁹.

Based on some fragmentary evidence in the biography of Yamagata Aritomo, the historian Masaru Ikei points out that concurrently there might have been pressure from the Genro on the cabinet to adopt a similar policy⁸⁰. The outcome was an invitation to the British government to intervene in the Chinese situation on behalf of the Manchus.

On 28 November Yamaza Enjiro, Japanese chargé d'affaires in London, was instructed by Uchida to present two memoranda to Sir Edward Grey. The first gave a fair description of the current Chinese situation and pointed out the danger entailed in the prolonged continuance of it.

77. Ijuin to Uchida, nos. 398, 401, 1 Nov. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 54-6.

78. Uchida to Ijuin, no. 299, 17 Nov. 1911, NGB, vols 44-5, pp. 164-6.

79. Ijuin to Uchida, no 548, v. conf. 18 Nov. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 380-

80. Ikei, "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", p. 219.

It also gave an analysis of the relative strength of the Manchus and the revolutionaries and concluded that "the time has come for the powers largely interested in China that they should not maintain any longer an attitude of mere onlookers, but that it is essential for them to take proper measures as soon as possible with a view to safeguarding their interests". Japan desired to know Britain's views and she would not approach the other interested powers before an agreement was reached between them.

The second memorandum, as a natural sequence to the first, embodied the "proper measures" which the Japanese government was contemplating. The Japanese government regarded a republic as most unsuitable for China, but since the Manchus were incapable of regaining power it suggested that Britain, and the other powers, should agree actively to intervene in favour of a constitutional government with nominal Manchu sovereignty⁸¹.

The outstanding feature of these memoranda was that the views expressed in them, except the operative arrangement, were exactly synonymous with those of Jordan. As Lindley of the Foreign Office remarked: "The Japse communication describes accurately the present situation in China as far as we know it; [from Sir John Jordan] and the views of the Japse govt as to the best solution, viz a reformed Manchu monarchy, are identical with those held by Sir John Jordan...."⁸² Grey wanted to obtain confidentially Jordan's opinion on the operative part of the Japanese proposal⁸³.

81. Memoranda communicated by Yamaza in Grey to MacDonald, no. 244, 1 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

82. Lindley's minute on memoranda.

83. Grey to Jordan, tel. 188, conf., 1 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

Two days later Jordan gave his views. At the end of a telegram which was primarily a report on the three day truce arranged through Goffe, Jordan expressed his anxiety that nothing should be done to thwart the arrangements which Yüan was making to negotiate with the revolutionaries' representatives at Wuchang. Campbell grasped Jordan's meaning and remarked: "To wait and see what happens is the policy that appears indicated"⁸⁴.

In the telegram to the Foreign Office which was a direct reply to Grey's question on Japan's proposals, Jordan expressed his views in a more explicit and constructive manner. He stated that he agreed completely with the Japanese that a constitutional monarchy would be the best solution for China. However, he objected to Japan's proposal of active intervention on behalf of the Manchus on three grounds. First, he thought that "the cause of constitutional monarchy will be prejudiced rather than advanced by foreign intervention at present". Secondly, intervention on the part of the powers would create an immediate threat to the security and interests of foreigners in China. Thirdly, by championing an effete Manchu régime the powers were in effect making themselves responsible in future for the observation of the constitution by the Manchu throne. The last point would give rise to the danger of Japan and Russia gaining an undesirable measure of tutelage over the court "in virtue of their military proximity."⁸⁵

In place of the proposed action of Japan Jordan had two suggestions: the prolongation of the armistice into a period long enough for negotiation to take place in which the Chinese themselves would compose

84. Jordan to Grey, tel. 317, 3 Dec. 1911, and Campbell's minute on it, Ch. Corres., vol 1096.

85. Jordan to Grey, tel. 318, 3 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol 1096.

their own differences; and the exertion of pressure by the powers to assist Yüan Shih-k'ai in obtaining the abdication of the prince regent as "an essential preliminary to a settlement". The Foreign Office expected these views from Jordan. A memorandum containing the salient features of his telegram was drawn up and sent to the Japanese on 5 December as an answer to their proposals. In informing him of the communication to Japan Grey assured Jordan that his suggestions were "most helpful". Jordan was to cooperate with the Japanese minister to give Yüan Shih-k'ai such assistance as they deemed advisable to prolong the armistice and secure the abdication of the prince regent⁸⁶.

As early as the middle of November, there were demands for the removal of the regent. T'ang Shao-i told Jordan then that he had suggested the regent's abdication to both Yüan and Prince Ch'ing as a necessary prelude to any negotiation. T'ang further stated that a Chinese imperial guardian for the boy emperor would have to be appointed pending the convocation of a representative assembly at Shanghai to decide on the future form of government. It was also known to Jordan that Yüan readily accepted T'ang's suggestion while Prince Ch'ing, despite his well-known reliance on Yüan, was reluctant⁸⁷. The prince regent himself was most unwilling to abdicate. From then on Yüan worked hard on the removal of the regent. It is certain that Yüan had the support of Jordan in the matter from the beginning. On 27 November Jordan told Campbell that the regent still refused to resign and "Yüan

86. Grey to Jordan, tel. 195, 5 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

87. Jordan to Grey, tel. 287, 19 Nov. 1911, tel 294, 23 Nov. 1911
Ch. Corres., vol. 1095.

said that there was no way of putting sense into his stupid head."⁸⁸ Jordan was convinced by Yüan that by removing the unpopular prince regent "constitutional government might be more palatable to the south".⁸⁹ The regent eventually abdicated on 6 December.

The Japanese government did not answer Britain's reply to her proposals until 9 December, endorsing the British policy of non-intervention. Judging from the virulent attacks on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the Japanese press which favoured its government's policy of intervention⁹⁰, it is obvious that Britain's restraint was largely responsible for the eventual decision of the Japanese government. Jordan was instrumental in deciding on the policy of mediation and non-intervention. The reasons for Jordan's mediation from the viewpoint of British interests are obvious. However, it appears that he also thought that by bringing about negotiations before the government became too weakened to be worthy of any consideration, the retention of the dynasty might still not be an impossible outcome.

88. Jordan to Campbell, private, 27 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

89. Jordan to Grey, tel. 319, conf., 4 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol.1096.

90. Ikei, "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", p. 224, referring to Osaka Mainichi, 18 Jan., and Kokumin Shinbun, 5 Feb. 1912.

Chapter Four

Yüan Shih-k'ai's Rise to the Presidency

The truce which took place on 3 December marked the end of hostilities between the revolutionaries and the Manchu government, although the threat of a renewal of fighting was always present. Immediately after the truce preparations were made for negotiations. During this period of preparation Jordan was primarily concerned with the maintenance of the armistice. In the course of the Shanghai peace conference which began on 18 December an important change occurred in Jordan's attitude. He realised then, as a result of the interaction of several factors, that the Manchu dynasty had to go. His policy became one of obvious support for a republic, conditional upon Yüan Shih-k'ai being the president. Unfortunately the peace conference broke down at the beginning of January, 1912 and the situation developed in such a way as to threaten Yüan Shih-k'ai's position in the revolution. The period between the breakdown of the Shanghai peace conference and the eventual abdication of the Ch'ing dynasty on 12 February, 1912 was a time of uncertainty for Yüan Shih-k'ai. Likewise, it was a time of anxiety for Jordan because of his changed policy of supporting Yüan Shih-k'ai as the president of the Chinese republic.

The Shanghai Peace Conference

On 9 December T'ang Shao-i, Yang Shih-ch'i, T'ang's aide in the conference, and nine other delegates, allegedly representing the northern provinces, left Peking for the conference which was to have taken place in Wuchang. Two days later T'ang's retinue reached Hankow where the revolutionaries, however, demanded that Shanghai be the venue of the

negotiation instead¹. Before leaving Hankow for Shanghai T'ang Shao-i had an interview with Li Yüan-hung in which he urged Li to accompany him to Shanghai; Li, however, expressed his inability to do so. That the conference took place in Shanghai instead of Wuchang and that Li Yüan-hung was not present at the conference had repercussions of considerable importance both in terms of the outcome of the conference and Jordan's attitude to the revolutionaries' demand for a republic in the conference.

Jordan did his best to facilitate negotiations between the two sides. T'ang was received at Hankow by Goffe², and when Shanghai was later preferred as the place of negotiation Fraser was instructed to offer his good offices³. Incidentally, Admiral Winsloe, who was asked by Jordan to defer his annual visit to Hongkong and stay north, chose Shanghai as his base for the winter. His squadron was a forceful reminder to the participants of the conference that they were under foreign observation⁴.

Realising the interest and fast expanding influence of Japan in China, Jordan knew that he could not ignore her in his attempt to facilitate the negotiation. It appears that one of the reasons which made the Japanese government agree to Britain's policy of non-intervention on 9 December was that it suspected duplicity in Yüan's simultaneous requests to Jordan to mediate between the revolutionaries and his government and to Japan for help to preserve the dynasty. Japan appeared to

¹The reason for the change has never been clear. It might have been that revolutionaries of other provinces were not willing to trust the negotiation with Li Yüan-hung whom they feared would compromise their position too much, see Goffe to Jordan, tel. 88, 29 Nov. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol.1802.

²Goffe to Jordan, tel. 104, 11 Dec. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1802.

³Jordan to Grey, no. 502, 17 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1310.

have also viewed Britain's policy with suspicion in that while rejecting her invitation to intervene on behalf of the Ch'ing government, Jordan, with the approval of his government, was actively engaged in bringing the opponents together, in arranging for an armistice, and in helping to prepare for the peace conference.

Ijuin Hikokichi, who was largely responsible for the Japanese memorandum of 28 November, was especially displeased with Jordan's actions. On 6 December Ijuin telegraphed the Gaimusho that in view of the "ambiguous attitude" of the British minister the Japanese government should ask the British government to have Jordan instructed to maintain a close contact with himself⁵. It is interesting to note that two days before Ijuin received a telegram from Uchida stating the necessity of ascertaining again the motives of Yüan Shih-k'ai because of the ambiguity of his policy⁶. Instead of answering this instruction Ijuin criticised Jordan's actions as being not only "ambiguous", but deliberately so. On 8 December Uchida again instructed Ijuin to ascertain the motives of Yüan⁷. The second instruction was only natural, for Uchida was baffled by Yüan's actions of signing a second three day truce on 6 December, appointing T'ang Shao-i to negotiate with the revolutionaries, and securing the abdication of the regent. But it was apparent that Ijuin had more faith in the sincerity of Yüan Shih-k'ai than Jordan.

Jordan was not unaware of Ijuin's suspicions. In an interview on 5 December he explained carefully to Ijuin the impracticability of Japan's

⁴ Admiral Winsloe to Admiralty, 18 Dec. 1911, in Admiralty to F.O., 13 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

⁵ Ijuin to Uchida, no. 640, 6 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, supp., p. 397.

⁶ Uchida to Ijuin, no. 347, 4 Dec. 1911. NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 391-3.

⁷ Uchida to Ijuin, no. 648, 8 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 401-3.

proposal for intervention and his own steps to bring the two parties together. In reporting on the interview immediately afterwards Jordan stated that "we [Ijuin and Jordan] agree that, however slightly the chance of peaceful settlement might be, every opportunity should be given to Chinese of composing their differences themselves before resorting to foreign intervention"⁸. He was soon disillusioned about the acquiescence of Ijuin and had to explain again "our situation throughout to Japanese minister" on 8 December⁹. Ijuin then expressed as his personal opinion that the independent action of Britain was liable to rouse the suspicions of other powers; and he himself had avoided having any contact with Yüan Shih-k'ai since he knew of Jordan's mediation¹⁰. As a result of this interview Jordan suggested that to avoid further misunderstanding the Japanese government should be officially invited to help in assisting the negotiation, but with himself remaining as sole intermediary. He stated that his hands would undoubtedly be strengthened if it could be made known that the other powers agreed with his policy, but "concerted action of more than two or three legations is too unwieldy to be workable". He further stated that concerted action of all the legations should be considered only as a last resort to avert a complete state of anarchy should a deadlock in the negotiation occur¹¹.

The Foreign Office approved of the suggestion as "an excellent move" to allay Japan's suspicions and prove Britain's sincerity to her ally in relation to Chinese politics, while retaining the essential

⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 323, 5 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

⁹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 329, 8 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

¹⁰ Ijuin to Uchida, no. 648, 8 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 403-4.

¹¹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 329, 8 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

initiative in Jordan's hands. The invitation was sent to the Japanese government through MacDonald who keenly supported it¹². MacDonald pointed out that Britain was obliged to invite Japan in the matter on the strength of Article I of the alliance agreement, but he was sure that Japan would accept Jordan as an intermediary because she was fully aware of the "special position he [Jordan] holds with Yuan Shih-k'ai"¹³.

A change of attitude also took place in the Gaimusho. It has been seen that on 9 December it agreed in principle to Britain's policy of non-intervention. Apparently Uchida began to suspect that Ijuin had misjudged the situation by concentrating entirely on Yüan Shih-k'ai¹⁴. This change of attitude of the Japanese foreign ministry was reflected clearly in its reaction to Ijuin's conversation with Yüan Shih-k'ai on 12 December. The day before Jordan suggested to Ijuin that Ijuin might further the cause of negotiation by entering into direct relations with Yüan Shih-k'ai. This suggestion shows that Jordan was ignorant of the transaction that had been going on between Ijuin and Yüan since Yüan's return to Peking. Jordan learned from Yüan Shih-k'ai that Ijuin called on him that very day. In the interview, Jordan was told, Ijuin reminded Yüan of the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and expressed his wish that in future he would be fully informed of all which passed between Yüan and Jordan. Yüan asked Jordan if he would object to his taking Ijuin into his confidence¹⁵. . . . However, it appears that Yüan had not

¹² Grey to MacDonald, tel. 58, 8 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1096.

¹³ MacDonald to Grey, tel. 56, 9 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097, also Uchida to Ijuin, no. 372, 13 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, p. 410.

¹⁴ Uchida decided to try out the alternatives by sending two envoys: Matsui Keishiro to Peking to help Ijuin in supporting the dynasty; and H.W. Denison, legal adviser to the Gaimusho, to Shanghai to talk with the revolutionaries, see Uchida to Ijuin, no. 384, 16 Dec. 1911 NGB, vols. 44-5, p. 415; and Ikei, "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", p. 222.

informed Jordan of the interview of 12 December in which, according to the telegram which Ijuin sent to the Gaimusho that day, Yüan again denounced the idea of a republic in China. Ijuin stated as his personal view that Yüan could depend on the Japanese government in his last attempt to retain the dynasty, and assured Uchida that he would be in as close a contact with Yüan as possible¹⁶. However, Ijuin's advice was obviously received sceptically. In Uchida's reply to Ijuin which was sent on 15 December, it was stated that although Japan agreed with Yüan's preference for a constitutional monarchy in China she found it difficult to offer material aid for the purpose and that she must act in coordination with Britain¹⁷. In fact, earlier that day Uchida had instructed Ijuin and the Japanese consul-general in Shanghai to cooperate with their respective British counterparts in facilitating the negotiations.¹⁸

Attention became focussed on the peace conference in Shanghai. The day before the conference began Jordan instructed Fraser to have Wu T'ing-fang, the commissioner representing the revolutionaries at the peace conference, verbally informed that the Japanese government was in complete unison with the British government, and that he and the Japanese consul-general were acting in concert¹⁹. Yüan Shih-k'ai also spoke to T'ang Shao-i in the same terms.

Before negotiations started the Diplomatic Body at Peking, with Jordan as the head, decided that permission should be obtained from the governments to present identical communications to the commissioners of the peace conference through the Consular Body at Shanghai. The notes

¹⁵Jordan to Grey, tel. 340, 13 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

¹⁶Ijuin to Uchida, no 668, 12 Dec. 1911. v. conf., and urgent, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 405-9.

¹⁷Uchida to Ijuin, no. 380, 15 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 410-2.

¹⁸Uchida to Ijuin, no. 379, 15 Dec. 1911, and Uchida to Ariyoshi, no. 146, v. conf., 15 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 410, 413.

were to emphasise the necessity of reaching an understanding as soon as possible, and were eventually presented on 20 December.

The first meeting of the conference was held on 18 December in the International Settlement at Shanghai. After the usual exchange of credentials, each side accused the other of infringement of the armistice arrangement. The atmosphere became tense already after the first meeting. On the second day of the conference Fraser was visited by T'ang Shao-i who intimated that in the second conference meeting the revolutionaries would demand the acceptance of a republic as a condition for further negotiations. T'ang asked Fraser to see Wu T'ing-fang and reason with him. Fraser did as asked but found Wu most truculent²⁰. In this connection it has to be recalled that before T'ang Shao-i left Wuhan for the Shanghai conference he was given by the Hupei revolutionary government four proposals: the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty; liberal treatment of the imperial family; good treatment of the Manchus generally; and a united China. Jordan learned that Yüan would accept all proposals except the first one!²¹

The second conference meeting on 20 December was significant in that in confirming the communication of T'ang Shao-i to Fraser it marked a turning point in the attitude of Jordan. In the meeting the revolutionaries declared that a republic would be the future form of Chinese government and "no compromise whatever could be discussed". Failing an agreement, the revolutionaries would take "all civilised measures" to

¹⁹ Jordan to Fraser in Jordan to Grey, tel. 350, 17 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

²⁰ Fraser to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 352, 20 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

²¹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 345, 15 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

materialise their ideal. Simultaneously, T'ang Shao-i asked Jordan, through Fraser, to convey to Yüan the observation that a "republic became the only solution". T'ang also sent a separate telegram to Yüan to the same effect²².

Until the revolutionaries' categorical demand for a republic on 20 December, Jordan had been torn between the expediency of enforcing a neutral policy which was basically beneficial to the revolutionaries and his ideal of a limited Manchu monarchy as being most suitable for China. However, circumstances increasingly convinced him that the retention of the Manchu dynasty was impossible and the uncompromising attitude of the revolutionaries on 20 December was the last straw in causing him to discard his ideal. Three factors were involved at this stage in finally convincing Jordan of the inevitability of a republic: the fact that the peace conference was held in Shanghai; his anxiety to prevent the renewal of hostilities; and, above all, what appeared as Yüan Shih-k'ai's acceptance of a republic.

That the conference took place in Shanghai, instead of Wuchang, was significant. It was not surprising that an adamant demand for a republic was made by the revolutionary leaders in Shanghai, such as Wu T'ing-fang, Wen Tsung-yao, and Wang Ch'ung-wei, who, though not being left-wing revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing and Ch'en Ch'i-mei, were sincere believers in republicanism. They were, moreover, different from Li Yüan-hung who was basically neither a revolutionary nor a republican, and had agreed to a constitutional monarchy when the revolutionaries were defeated at Hanyang.

²² Fraser to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 357, 21 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

The fact that the peace conference took place in the International Settlement at Shanghai also meant that Jordan was more subject to the opinions of the British mercantile community there which was extremely anxious to be on good terms with the revolutionaries because of their business. Despite his own silence on the matter it was obvious to outside observers that Jordan was extremely susceptible to the British opinion at Shanghai²³.

It was the revolutionaries' good fortune that Morrison of The Times was at Shanghai during the negotiation. Morrison was a great sympathiser of the revolution. On the outbreak of the uprising he rode up and down the legation street declaring enthusiastically that "the end of the Manchu dynasty was at hand"²⁴. Later, he tried to persuade Yüan Shih-k'ai to give up the cause of the Manchus²⁵. It was natural that Jordan was considerably influenced by the attitude of Morrison who had not only recommended his appointment in 1905, but was largely responsible for the formation of public opinion on Chinese affairs in Britain.

The second factor which accounted for Jordan's support of a republic was his fear of the renewal of hostilities. This fear stemmed mostly from his belief in Yüan's sincerity in insisting on a Manchu constitutional monarchy which would clash with the revolutionaries' demand for a republic. Jordan knew that on knowing the absolute demand of the revolutionaries, Yüan telegraphed T'ang to continue negotiations on the

²³ For British opinion in Shanghai on the revolution and its influence on Jordan, see Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih-nien wen-hsien pien-tsuan wei-yüan-hui, Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih-nien wen hsien, vol. 1 p.380; HHKM, vol. 8, p. 439; and Bland, Recent Events, p. 267.

²⁴ Croly, Willard Straight, p. 412.

²⁵ Report on an interview between Yüan Shih-k'ai and Morrison, in North China Daily News, 9 Dec. 1911.

basis of a limited monarchy until the peace conference reached a decisive crisis²⁶. Did Jordan still believe in Yüan's sincerity as much as he did when Yüan returned to Peking about a month before?

The question is not without ambiguity. First, Jordan knew that since the middle of November Yüan had been repeatedly offered the presidency of the republic by the revolutionaries. The last offer, as far as he knew, was made at the beginning of December²⁷. There must have been enough ambiguity on Yüan's part to have prompted Jordan to write to Campbell at the end of November, in connection with Yüan's threat to resign because of the regent's refusal to abdicate, that Yüan had no "real intention of effacing himself, and in the end he will probably keep to the winning side if he does not fall between the stools in the meantime"²⁸. Secondly, Jordan was informed that the imperial defeat at Nanking on 2 December, almost unanimously considered by historians as an event which rehabilitated the morale of the revolutionaries after their defeat at Hanyang five days before, was brought about by some arrangement between the generals of the two sides. Jordan told the Foreign Office that Tuan Ch'i-jui, the imperial general in charge of the campaign and one of Yüan's henchmen, was instructed by Peking to abandon the city²⁹. Thirdly, there was the strange behaviour of T'ang Shao-i in accepting a republic readily at the Shanghai peace conference. Later, Jordan remarked that T'ang's "doings at Shanghai are

²⁶ Jordan to Grey, tel. 359, 21 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

²⁷ For example, Jordan to Grey, no. 502, 17 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1310. The offer was formally decided on by the representatives of the revolutionary province on 2 December at a meeting at Wuchang, see for example, Wu, "Yüan Shih-k'ai mou-ch'ü lin-shih ta-tsung-t'ung chih ching-kuo", p. 8.

²⁸ Jordan to Campbell, private, 27 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

²⁹ Jordan to Grey, no. 495, 12 Dec. 1911. Ch. Corres., vol. 1310.

a bit of a mystery to everybody and why Yuan ever sent him there if he knew Tong's sentiments is only explicable on the theory that Yuan, in spite of all his protestations, would in the end accept the presidency of a republic"³⁰.

At the same time, however, what has just been cited was insufficient proof for Jordan of Yüan's insincerity in supporting the Manchu dynasty. As far as the revolutionaries' offers of the presidency were concerned Jordan had not learned that Yüan had accepted any of them. In the case of the battle of Nanking Jordan could have easily thought that Yüan might have ordered Tuan Ch'i-jui to abandon the city to appease the revolutionaries in preparation for the peace conference. After all, the abandonment of Nanking which brought an end to serious fighting between the revolutionaries and the Manchu government was only in line with Yüan's proposal for a cease-fire a week before. On the surface, Yüan's appointment of Tang Shao-i as his representative to the Shanghai peace conference was the most suspicious act. But Jordan himself was aware of T'ang's sentiments, and he was present in the special meeting of 4 December which decided on T'ang's appointment. One wonders why he did not raise the question of suitability of the choice at the time, at least privately, to Yüan. Thus, taken as a whole, despite a certain amount of discrepancy, Jordan still regarded Yüan as sincere in his opposition to a republic. And because of this he was seriously apprehensive of a renewal of hostilities.

The third, and perhaps most important reason for Jordan's support of a republic was Yüan Shih-k'ai's acceptance of the revolutionaries' demand. Before elucidating this point it is necessary to recapitulate

³⁰ Jordan to Campbell, private, 4 Jan. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

what has been said so far about Yüan's attitude to the Manchu dynasty. Whether Yüan was loyal or disloyal to the Manchu dynasty is, in my opinion, one of the hopeless cases in history, the truth of which, I doubt, could ever be found. In terms of recent historical works only, Jerome Ch'en's Yuan Shih-k'ai and Wu Hsiang-hsiang's "Yüan Shih-k'ai mou-ch'ü lin-shih ta-tsung-t'ung chih ching-kuo" hold the view that Yüan was guilty of duplicity from the beginning of the revolution; he preserved the dynasty as long as it could be used in bargaining with the revolutionaries for his own position. However, Ernest P. Young's "Yuan Shih-k'ai's Rise to the Presidency, 1911-1912" argues with equal conviction that Yüan was forced to give up the dynasty by forces which were beyond his control. The most important of these forces were what Young terms the "unpleasant military facts" which Yüan faced, which roughly coincide with Jordan's observations on the unreliability of the imperial forces, and the neutrality of the powers. It is not the purpose of this study at all to find an answer to this historical riddle. The important matter is that until the Shanghai conference Jordan believed in Yüan's sincerity in his support of the dynasty and had good reasons for doing so. Moreover, until then Yüan appeared to have taken Jordan into his confidence, consulting him on every major decision.

A change in Yüan's attitude towards Jordan seemed to have taken place soon after 20 December. It has to be recalled that on 17 December, one day before the peace conference began, Ijuin with Jordan's knowledge saw Yüan. Yüan told Jordan afterwards that in the interview he reiterated his preference for a limited monarchy and stated that his aim was to retain the child emperor and to institute a council of regency. When

questioned as to his policy in case of the Shanghai conference failing to come to an agreement, Yüan expressed his readiness to ask for the good offices of "friendly powers." The Japanese minister persued the matter and suggested that should such a failure occur only Japan and Britain would first be approached. Yüan replied significantly that "he would of course have to inform Great Britain in view of assistance he had already received from us [Britain]... [and] that he was willing to inform Japan also if the two governments wished that he should do so." Ijuin then pointed out the objections to approaching a number of powers, and pressed Yüan to leave the question of friendly mediation to Britain and Japan alone. To this Yüan replied "emphatically that if Great Britain and Japan were agreed on the point, he would be quite prepared ... to approach British and Japanese governments alone and to follow advice and decision of the two powers"³¹. Yüan was obviously anxious to emphasise Britain's lead in any Anglo-Japanese action.

Jordan felt that the proposal of Ijuin was "a step slightly in advance of my instructions which only covered negotiation at Shanghai"³². Grey also became uneasy and instructed Jordan that although he did not object to Yüan Shih-k'ai consulting him and Ijuin, he had to be careful not to let Ijuin push him into actions which would be regarded as active intervention or would arouse the hostility of the powers³³. MacDonald in Tokyo also warned both the Japanese vice-minister for foreign affairs and Grey of the dubious effect that would be produced by any such independent Anglo-Japanese action as proposed by Ijuin³⁴. The day the

³¹Jordan to Grey, tel. 351, secret, 17 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

³²Ibid.

³³Grey to Jordan, tel. 223, 18 Dec. 1911. Ch. Corres., vol. 1097.

³⁴MacDonald to Grey, tel. 62, 20 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

revolutionaries declared absolutely for a republic at the Shanghai conference Jordan told Ijuin that the proposal of Anglo-Japanese intervention in the event of the failure of the Shanghai conference was impracticable and liable to arouse the jealousy of the other powers³⁵.

On 20 December, too, Morrison called on the Japanese consul-general Ariyoshi, praised Yüan Shih-k'ai and expressed his belief that a republic with Yüan as president was the only solution to the Chinese situation³⁶. The next day Jordan called on Ijuin who made use of the chance to test Jordan's attitude towards Morrison's opinion. After the interview Ijuin telegraphed Uchida that Jordan "had given him the impression that he personally considered that a republic with Yuan Shih-k'ai as president might be a possible solution of the question, failing a limited monarchy"³⁷. Ijuin, obviously still clinging to the idea of supporting Yüan Shih-k'ai in retaining the dynasty, suggested that the Japanese government should instruct Yamaza to express to the London Foreign Office Japan's objection to the course. On 24 December Yamaza communicated a confidential memorandum to Grey to ascertain if "the opinion expressed by Sir J. Jordan... is shared by the British government."³⁸ Grey asked Jordan if what the Japanese minister spoke of him was true³⁹. Jordan replied: "I am not in favour and never have been in favour of supporting Yuan Shih-k'ai as president of Republic"⁴⁰. Jordan could not have told an untruth here. His statement, taken on the surface, was fully justified. Indeed, if he had not been, and was not in favour of a republic in China, how could he have been in favour of Yüan as the president? At the same time Ijuin

³⁵Ijuin to Uchida, no. 711, 20 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, p. 432.

³⁶Ariyoshi to Uchida, no. 429, 20 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, p.435-6.

³⁷MacDonald to Grey, tel. 64, 26 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098; also Ijuin to Uchida, no. 715, urgent, 22 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp.437-9.

had not made a mistake because of his deficiency in English, though Uchida later tried to explain the misunderstanding in this way⁴¹. Jordan did say in the interview that Britain, with vital interests in central and south China, could not afford to disregard the demands of the revolutionaries. Moreover, he told Ijuin that Morrison's proposal of installing Yüan as the president had already been relayed to the newspapers in England. The incident reflects that Jordan began to realise the inevitability of a republic in China. However, it was Yüan's dubious behaviour which eventually made him deny openly his support for the retention of the monarchy.

On 22 December Yüan Shih-k'ai asked to see Jordan and Ijuin separately about the telegrams which he had been receiving from T'ang Shao-i since 20 December. The most important of these was the one in which T'ang suggested that the question of the form of government should be decided in a representative national assembly. Yüan Shih-k'ai saw Jordan first, stressed his adherence to a constitutional monarchy and asked him if "he could look to foreign intervention for support". Jordan replied that it was a serious task to coerce half of the country and that Britain "wanted a strong and united China, under whatever form of government the Chinese people wished". It was the first time since the revolution broke out when Jordan made no mention of his preference for a constitutional monarchy. Yüan then asserted that the Shanghai republicans were not entitled to represent the view of the masses whose

³⁸Memorandum communicated to F.O., 24 Dec. 1911. Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

³⁹Grey to Jordan, tel. 235, 24 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

⁴⁰Jordan to Grey, tel. 366, 25 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

⁴¹Confidential clause of MacDonald to Grey, tel. 64, 26 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

sentiments were intensely conservative and monarchical. To remedy this Jordan suggested that T'ang Shao-i's proposal of a representative assembly could be adopted. It could not but be obvious to Yüan that Jordan would not object to a republic.⁴²

The interview between Yüan Shih-k'ai and Ijuin took place in the afternoon, Yüan repeated what he had said in the morning to Ijuin who again gave Yüan Shih-k'ai the assurance that the Japanese government favoured a constitutional monarchy in China, and promised to telegraph Yüan's appeal for aid to Tokyo.⁴³

The next day the following words appeared in The Times:

"The present issue is complicated by the openly expressed fears of Yuan Shih-kai that England and Japan, acting in unison, are determined to maintain a monarchical government in China, if necessary by force. Absurd though the story is, it is believed by Yuan Shih-kai and is having a baneful effect that the British Foreign Office might wisely dispel"⁴⁴

Both Jordan and the Foreign Office were baffled. Jordan was warned by T'ang Shao-i from Shanghai that any attempt to intervene on the part of the powers would unite all classes and parties against foreigners⁴⁵. Grey on 24 December instructed Jordan to "strongly deprecate statement by Yuan Shih-kai which is mischievous and... quite untrue."⁴⁶ Jordan then told Yüan, in the words of Morrison, that "Great Britain had done her best to bring the contending factions together, but cared not a damn whether there was a republic or a monarchy."⁴⁷ At the same time, Jordan instructed Fraser to refute statements in the nature of that in The Times

⁴²Jordan to Grey, tel. 360, 22 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

⁴³Ijuin to Uchida, no. 720, 23 Dec. 1911, v. urgent, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 449-52.

⁴⁴The Times, 23 Dec. 1911.

⁴⁵Jordan to Grey, tel. 364, 23 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

which appeared in the press in Shanghai.⁴⁸

Morrison, The Times correspondent then at Shanghai, testified that he got the message from T'ang Shao-i who said that he was given it by telegraph from Yüan Shih-k'ai. Morrison later attempted to explain the misunderstanding to Willard Straight:

"Sir John Jordan, the British Minister, and Ijuin, the Japanese Minister, acted under explicit instruction from their chiefs to cooperate. They both separately so informed Yuan. Ijuin, however, without telling Jordan, advised Yuan that Japan would never recognise a republic and would interfere with force, if necessary, to prevent its establishment. In view of what both Jordan and Ijuin had said about cooperation Yuan took this as meaning that Great Britain agreed with this attitude".⁴⁹

But Yüan could not possibly have misunderstood Jordan's opinion expressed in the interview on the morning of 22 December. There was a deliberate want of faith on Yüan's part. If he had really assumed that Jordan and Ijuin were so closely in unison, why did he always give them separate interviews?

The entire incident strongly supports the theory that at least from 20 December Yüan, regardless of his attitude before, had come to accept the republic and its presidency. This theory has to be seen in the light of two pieces of evidence which Jordan was ignorant of. The first was that simultaneous with the peace conference there was a secret conference in the Wen-ming book-shop in Kansu Road, Shanghai⁵⁰ between the

⁴⁶ Grey to Jordan, tel. 236, 24 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

⁴⁷ Croly, Willard Straight, p. 431.

⁴⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 367, 26 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

⁴⁹ Croly, Willard Straight, p. 431.

⁵⁰ It is a mistake in Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 121 where it is stated that the negotiation took place in Nanking. At that time Huang Hsing was in Shanghai, having left Wuhan after the revolutionary defeat at Han-yang in November, see Li, "Huang K'o-chiang hsien-sheng

representative of Tuan Ch'i-jui, Liao Yü-ch'un, and that of Huang Hsing, Ku Chung-shen. There can be no doubt that this secret meeting had the sanction of Huang Hsing and Yüan Shih-k'ai who was Tuan Ch'i-jui's superior. On 20 December, the very day the revolutionaries demanded a republic in the peace conference, an agreement was reached in this secret conference, consisting of five articles: "1. A republican government will be established as the only government of China; 2. the Imperial House will be treated with generosity and courtesy; 3. he who overthrows the Manchu régime shall be President of the republic; 4. the soldiers of the north and south, including both Hans and Manchus, will be treated with due consideration and they will not be held responsible for the destruction during the revolutionary war; 5. temporary administrative councils will be created in the provinces to maintain peace and order."⁵¹ The agreement explicitly stated that the Manchu dynasty was to be sacrificed, and Jerome Ch'en even suggests that it was the basis of the formal discussion at the peace conference⁵².

The second piece of evidence was that Wang Ching-wei, a noted member of the T'ung-meng Hui and on the delegation of the revolutionaries at the Shanghai conference, had been included by Yüan in the delegation representing the government. It appears that Yüan became anxious for his own position on learning of the impending return of Sun Yat-sen soon after 20 December and asked Wang Ching-wei to do his best in negotiating with the revolutionaries⁵³. It is also alleged that soon after the unilateral declaration of the revolutionaries on 20 December Yüan Shih-k'ai,

nien-p'u kao", pp. 276-7; and HHKM, vol. 8, p.103. The negotiation took place in the Wen-ming book-shop because it belonged to a revolutionary, Yü Fu, who took part in the negotiation.

⁵¹ Translation of terms taken from Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 121.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Hu Ou-kung, Hsin-hai ko-ming pei-fang shih-lu, pp. 103-4, and Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 121. In fact Yüan Shih-k'ai made Wang his sworn son.

urged on by Wang Ching-wei, Yüan K'o-ting, T'ang Shao-i, Yang Shih-ch'i, and Liang Shih-i, sent a telegram to the imperial delegation at Shanghai, agreeing to the abdication of the Manchus. However, he emphasised that it was inappropriate for him to abandon the Manchu cause immediately.⁵⁴

Two reasons for Yüan's treatment of his interview with Jordan on 22 December are therefore not impossible. First, Yüan might have thought of using Jordan's public denial of support of the dynasty to justify his abandonment of its cause to the court which, of course, realised the influence of Britain in China. Secondly, knowing Japan's opposition to the republic, Yüan might also have thought a public denunciation of the dynasty by Britain a forceful frustration of Japan's desire. Whatever the reasons might have been it is true that Yüan forged the threat of Anglo-Japanese intervention on behalf of the dynasty and had it relayed through T'ang Shao-i to Morrison whose pro-revolutionary sentiments were well-known to him.

There is no evidence bearing on Jordan's views on Yüan's dubious action. But the truth is that he remained friendly and in close contact with Yüan. On 24 December Jordan and Ijuin were again asked separately to see Yüan and Prince Ch'ing. In the meeting with Jordan, Yüan produced a draft telegram which he was about to send to T'ang accepting his proposal of a national assembly to decide the future form of government. Jordan approved of the proposal as a "fair one" which would make the revolutionaries morally responsible for continuing the civil war if they rejected it⁵⁵. Ijuin, however, asked Yüan to defer despatch of the telegram

⁵⁴ HHKM, vol. 8, pp. 117-8.

⁵⁵ Jordan to Grey, tel. 365, 24 Dec. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1098.

pending his receipt of instructions from Tokyo about Yüan's request for material aid two days before⁵⁶.

In Japan, mostly because of the insistence of the Genro, the government made a last attempt at maintaining a constitutional monarchy in China⁵⁷. However, Yüan Shih-k'ai, having ascertained Britain's attitude, could openly defy Japan's intention. He sent the telegram, approving the national assembly, to T'ang on 26 December without waiting for Japan as Ijuin requested⁵⁸. An edict approving the assembly appeared on 28 December which J.O.P. Bland described as "the death warrant of the dynasty"⁵⁹.

To Jordan's relief the Japanese government at last reckoned its intervention as a complete failure, and decided to take no further step pending the outcome of the assembly. For a few days after the decree was issued events appeared to Jordan to be developing satisfactorily. On 29 December he learned that the peace conference had decided to extend the armistice to 5 January, before then questions concerning the election and composition of the national assembly would be raised⁶⁰. Meetings on 30 and 31 December were indeed devoted to the consideration of the assembly and 8 January was fixed as the date of the first sitting⁶¹. All of a sudden, however, Yüan Shih-k'ai's attitude changed and T'ang Shao-i was allowed to resign from the post of imperial commissioner at the

⁵⁶Ijuin to Uchida, no. 726, 25 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, p.459.

⁵⁷The Japanese cabinet was unanimously in favour of abandoning demands for a constitutional government on 22 December. The Genro, notably Yamagata Aritomo, however, put pressure on the cabinet on 24 December to have further talks with Britain and Yüan on the line of a constitutional monarchy, see Ikei, "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911", p. 223; and Uchida to Ijuin, no. 405, 24 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 454-5.

⁵⁸In fact, Yüan blamed Ijuin and Japan instead for being forced to abandon the dynasty because Japanese aid was not forthcoming, Ijuin to Uchida, no. 738, 27 Dec. 1911, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 472-7.

⁵⁹Bland, Recent Events, p. 167. It was a "death warrant" of the dynasty because only Kansu, the New Dominions, Manchuria, Shantung, Chihli, and Honan were nominally under imperial rule.

Shanghai conference on 2 January.

Yüan Shih-k'ai negotiations with the Revolutionaries for the Abdication of the Manchus.

According to Jordan, Yüan Shih-k'ai was "unwell and very depressed" on 1 January. He talked of resignation to escape from an intractable situation: in the north he became extremely unpopular because of his concession to the revolutionaries in agreeing to the national assembly; and in the south the peace conference broke down because of the "most uncompromising" attitude of the revolutionaries in insisting on the national assembly sitting in Shanghai where the atmosphere was too republican. Jordan was puzzled by the change because if Yüan had in the first place conceded to the assembly, the outcome of which was a foregone conclusion, the questions of its location and composition were not of first importance. He therefore told Grey: "The whole manner and language of Yuan Shih-kai were so tantalisingly puzzling and so different from what they have been hitherto, that I could not resist enquiring whether any outside influence was being brought to bear."⁶²

It has been generally agreed by Chinese historians that what happened in Nanking between 29 December, 1911 and 1 January, 1912 was the reason why Yüan changed his attitude. Sun Yat-sen arrived in Shanghai on Christmas Day. On 29 December the revolutionaries who had established a united provisional government at Nanking elected Sun as the provisional president.

⁶⁰ Fraser to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 372, 30 Dec. 1911. Ch. Corres., vol. 1310.

⁶¹ For minutes of the meetings see HHKM, vol. 8, pp. 85-95.

⁶² Jordan to Grey, tel. 1, secret, 1 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1310.

On 1 January he was duly inaugurated at Nanking. Despite Sun's assurances the day before his inauguration and in his inauguration speech that he would vacate the presidency immediately on the abdication of the Manchus⁶³, Yüan felt that he had been cheated by the revolutionaries who had repeatedly offered him the presidency and he refused to be pacified by mere promises. Yüan telegraphed T'ang accusing him of having exceeded his authority in the conference sessions of 30 and 31 December, and on 1 January T'ang resigned. Yüan accepted the resignation the next day and informed Wu T'ing-fang that henceforth he would negotiate directly with the revolutionaries by telegraph. Wu objected to the inconvenience and urged Yüan to go personally to Shanghai. Yüan in turn asked Wu to go to Peking and the conference was suspended in the midst of the arguments.

However, it appears that Sun Yat-sen's and Wu T'ing-fang's assurances on 2 and 5 January respectively allayed much of Yüan's suspicion.⁶⁴ Moreover, the difference between Yüan and the revolutionaries was further bridged by such ambiguous characters as T'ang Shao-i, Wang Ching-wei, Liang Shih-i, and Yang Shih-ch'i who engaged themselves actively in pulling strings between the two sides. On the surface negotiations between Yüan Shih-k'ai and the revolutionaries had been discontinued, but in fact secret negotiations were going on. However, they were no longer negotiations between the revolutionaries and the imperial government represented by Yüan Shih-k'ai, but between Yüan, as an individual,

⁶³ Li, Cheng-ch'ih shih, vol. 1, pp. 334-5; Lo, Lo pien Kuo-fu nien-p'u chiu-miu, pp. 282-4; for translation of the oath see H.F. MacNair, Modern Chinese History, (Shanghai, 1927), p. 719.

⁶⁴ Lo, Lo pien Kuo-fu nien-p'u chiu-miu, pp. 285-8.

and the revolutionaries concerning the treatment of the imperial dynasty. The exit of the Manchus became a foregone conclusion, but both Yüan and the revolutionaries wanted to secure the best terms for themselves in preparation for the impending transitional period.

Jordan was not unaware of these secret dealings. In the middle of January the Foreign Office was told that "a Mr Hsiang, who is said to be in confidence of Sun Yat-sen, is known to have paid several visits to the premier, and it is believed that Tong Shao-yi, although no longer the accredited agent of Yuan, still keeps up a secret correspondence with him through Liang Shih-yi, another Cantonese, who is playing a leading part in this strange drama."⁶⁵ Ten days later Jordan wrote of the difficulty he had in following events because there were "two sets of negotiations going on."⁶⁶

Jordan was right in his observations. To ordinary readers of newspapers it would have appeared that a lukewarm attempt was still being made by Yüan and Wu to find a solution to the question of the form of government to be adopted. This was because some of the telegrams which went between Yüan and Wu were released to the press, but they were mere decorative flourishes. The rest of the telegrams were kept secret. It is asserted that the unreleased telegrams from Yüan to Wu T'ing-fang were largely phrased by Liang Shih-i; from Wu to Yüan by Wang Ching-wei; from T'ang Shao-i and Yang Shih-ch'i mostly by Yang himself; and from Yüan to T'ang and Yang by Liang Shih-i and Yüan Chung-shu. The most striking fact was that all these underlings were in close communication

⁶⁵ Jordan to Grey, no. 29, 16 Jan., 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.

⁶⁶ Jordan to Grey, no. 47, 27 Jan., 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.

with each other.⁶⁷ By the end of the first ten days of January an agreement was near. The terms were roughly that the Manchu emperor was to abdicate, the imperial court to be well treated, Sun Yat-sen to resign as soon as the abdication took place, and Yüan Shih-k'ai to be president.

It was therefore no surprise to Jordan when on 11 January Liang Shih-i informed him that "all parties had come to the conclusion that the abdication of the emperor and the retirement of the Court formed an indispensable preliminary to any settlement." Liang expressed as his own opinion that the court would either abdicate in favour of Yüan or authorise him to establish a provisional government. Jordan was asked if Yüan would be recognised in either case. Jordan was sounded on a situation which, if ^{it} materialised, would be at complete variance with the agreement which had supposedly been reached between Yüan and the revolutionaries. Instead of Yüan receiving power from the Nanking provisional government Jordan was asked if he and Britain would recognise a new provisional government in the north, to be exclusively under Yüan's control. Despite the "attitude of reserve" which he claimed to have assumed, Jordan pointed out that "the Powers had shown confidence in Yuan Shih-kai."⁶⁸ Three days later Yüan's secretary, Ts'ai T'ing-kan, told Jordan that the ~~empress~~ dowager, Lung-yü, would soon issue an abdication edict which would place Yüan Shih-k'ai in temporary charge of the government pending the election of a president⁶⁹. However, events were not to develop thus smoothly. It is also interesting to note that

⁶⁷ HHKM, vol. 8, p. 118; and Li, Chen-ch'ih shih, vol. 1, p. 337.

⁶⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 13, conf., 12 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1310.

⁶⁹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 17, 14 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1310.

Yüan Shih-k'ai did not send Liang and Ts'ai to Ijuin⁷⁰.

Yüan Shih-k'ai Falling between Two Stools?

Immediately after Liang's and Ts'ai's communications to Jordan Yüan was put in an extremely critical situation for a fortnight during which his position was uncertain. He was pressed into a tight corner by both the Manchu fanatics and revolutionary die-hards. Jordan, because of his alignment with Yüan, also suffered from the uncertain situation.

When the secret negotiations between Yüan Shih-k'ai and the revolutionaries concerning the abdication of the Manchus reached an advanced stage, Yüan asked Prince Ch'ing to raise the matter at court. On 12 January a secret meeting of the imperial kinsmen was held in which Prince Ch'ing presented the case for abdication. The majority of the young kinsmen refused to consider the question. The meeting was responsible for the origin of what was to be known as the Tsung-she Tang, or imperial clan party, whose members were those imperial kinsmen and Manchu nobles who insisted on the retention of the dynasty. Amongst them were Prince Kung, Prince Su, Prince Ch'un (the ex-regent), Duke Tsai-tse, Liang-pi, T'ieh-liang, and Yü-lang. A few of these imperial clansmen, in particular, Prince Kung, had their antiques and valuable paintings sold to raise funds for a final show-down with the revolutionaries⁷¹. Although Yüan avoided giving a direct answer to the ex-regent who visited him on 13 January to sound him on the topic of abdication, the news of abdication spread and was, Jordan reported, "freely discussed in official circles"⁷².

⁷⁰ Ijuin only learned of Liang's visit to Jordan from Jordan himself, see Ijuin to Uchida, urgent, no. 28, 12 Jan. 1912, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp.543-4. It appears that Ijuin was completely ignorant of Ts'ai's visit.

⁷¹ For these details see Li, Cheng-ch'ih shih, p. 337; HHKM, vol. 8, p.111; and Kao Yin-tsu, Chung-hua min-kuo ta-shih chi, [Chronology of important events of the republican period], (Taipei, 1957), p. 2.

⁷² Jordan to Grey, no. 29, conf., 16 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.

On 16 January Yüan was nearly assassinated on the way home from an audience with the empress dowager from whom he wanted a decisive answer on the question of abdication. The plot was launched by an underground revolutionary organisation in Peking under the leadership of Chang Hsien-pei and Yang Yü-ch'ang who, being in the north, were apparently ignorant of the fact that negotiations were still going on between Yüan and the revolutionaries. They therefore decided to remove Yüan whom they regarded as the sole obstruction to the revolutionary success. Yüan narrowly escaped while some men and horses in his retinue were killed. Jordan called personally to congratulate him on his escape⁷³.

After the incident Yüan never appeared in court again although he continued to urge the court to abdicate. His trusted adherents Wu Wei-te, then minister for foreign affairs, Chao Ping-chün, minister of the interior, and Liang Shih-i were entrusted with the task of persuasion⁷⁴.

The first imperial conference was held in front of the throne the next day after the attempted assassination of Yüan, but no conclusion was reached; Prince Ch'ing and P'u-lun stood for voluntary abdication of the emperor and court, and a Mongolian prince and Prince Kung spoke for the opposition. The rest of the clansmen present were silent.

On 18 January the second imperial conference was summoned in which the difference between the two views became more obvious. It was after this meeting that the Tsung-she Tang decided to act. Early in the morning of 19 January the Tsung-she Tang members issued a strong statement of their views and vowed to take stringent actions to maintain the Manchu dynasty⁷⁵.

⁷³Jordan to Grey, tel. 18, conf., 19 Jan. 1912 Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

⁷⁴Details of the rôle played by Liang, Wu, and Chao at court before the abdication is recorded in biography of Liang, Ts'en, Liang, nien-p'u vol. 1 pp. 105-111.

A new situation developed when in the imperial conference of 19 January Liang Shih-i and Chao Ping-chün, speaking for Yüan Shih-k'ai, suggested that the current problem be decided by the cabinet and that both the Peking and Nanking governments be simultaneously dissolved and replaced by a new integrated government at Tientsin. The same day Jordan saw Yüan and was consulted on the current situation as usual. Yüan disclosed his intention of setting up a government in Tientsin. He assured Jordan that "arrangements had been completed with the southern leaders". The arrangements that had been reached were, of course, nothing to do with the proposed Tientsin government. Jordan was then asked to telegraph the Foreign Office to recognise Yüan's position in the new government. It appears that Jordan was the only foreign minister who was taken into Yüan's confidence in this matter. Jordan informed the Foreign Office and advised firmly that "recognition of Yuan Shih-kai affords only hope of securing anything like a stable Government in China."⁷⁶ Grey, upon Jordan's advice, agreed that Yüan's proposal which was made "in arrangement with southern leaders" should be supported⁷⁷.

Conference on the question of abdication continued to take place in the palace on 20, 21 and 22 January. The empress dowager, whose trust in Yüan Shih-k'ai had much increased after his escape from the assassination, was weak-kneed and wanted to succumb. The Tsung-she Tang members, however, were adamant in their objection. The empress dowager was embarrassed and particularly annoyed with Prince Kung whose attitude was especially

⁷⁵ Li, Cheng-ch'ih shih, vol. 1, pp 338-9.

⁷⁶ Jordan to Grey, tel. 18, conf., 19 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

⁷⁷ Grey to Jordan, tel. 14, 21 Jan., 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

uncompromising. The spirit of the imperial clique appeared to have been bolstered up by Feng Kuo-chang who told Duke Tsai-tse, obviously without Yüan's knowledge, that if he could only have three months' expenses he would be able to quench the revolution. The princes, although unwilling to part with their personal wealth, maintained a militant attitude⁷⁸.

The position became increasingly impossible for Yüan who on 23 January sent Ts'ai T'ing-kan to inform Jordan of his difficulty in dealing with the Tsung-she Tang. Yüan again threatened to resign. Jordan was extremely perturbed by Ts'ai's intimation. He immediately called on Ijuin and stated emphatically that some measures had to be taken to prevent Yüan's resignation which would certainly lead to confusion in the north. On reporting the interview to the Foreign Office Jordan said that Ijuin did not attach serious importance to Ts'ai's statement and was "disinclined to take any action"⁷⁹. The Foreign Office sensed from the remark that Jordan was in favour of some action which would "perhaps take the form of a joint warning from the Powers to the Manchu Princes of the risks which they would run if they depart from the policy hitherto adopted on Yuan Shih-kai's advice."⁸⁰ However, both Grey and Nicolson were cautious and advised adherence to the policy of impartiality. Langley wrote privately and stressed: "At present the watchword here is, as ever, strict non-intervention."⁸¹ The Foreign Office, unlike Jordan, was unwilling to give its support exclusively to Yüan because it felt that it knew "too little of the Chinese forces at

⁷⁸Such details are available in HHKM, vol.112-3; Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p.128; and Aisin Gioro P'u-i, Wo-ti ch'ien pan-sheng, [Autobiography of the last Ch'ing emperor], (Peking, 1964), p. 43.

⁷⁹Jordan to Grey, tel. 21, 23 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

⁸⁰Langley's minute on *ibid.*

⁸¹Langley to Jordan, private, 25 Jan. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 1.

work to be sure of our ground" and the situation was ever-changing and "confused by various unknown factors".⁸²

Relations between Yüan Shih-k'ai and the "reactionary party", Jordan's label for the Tsung-she Tang, continued to deteriorate, and Jordan feared that fighting might break out in that the princes ^{had} succeeded in inducing the indecisive empress dowager to postpone abdication and obliging Yüan Shih-k'ai to retake the original decision of having the question settled by a national convention⁸³. A decree embodying the above decision appeared on 25 January. If Yüan's proposed resignation was repugnant to Jordan, it was welcomed by the Tsung-she Tang which immediately arranged that once Yüan resigned its members would form a new cabinet with T'ieh-liang as the commander of the Manchu troops.

Meanwhile, Yüan was under extreme pressure from the revolutionaries who found his Tientsin scheme both surprising and objectionable. Wilkinson, consul at Nanking, reported to Jordan that on knowing Yüan's plan of a Tientsin government, Sun Yat-sen immediately withdrew his offer of the presidency and instructed Wu T'ing-fang to telegraph Yüan the following conditions: the emperor should abdicate; the emperor was to abstain from the organisation of a provisional amalgamated government; Nanking would be the seat of the new provisional government; and Sun Yat-sen would resign when, and only when, the provisional government was recognised by the powers; finally, Yüan was not to concern himself with the provisional government until after Sun's resignation⁸⁴. Two days later, Sun again telegraphed five points to Yüan through Wu and had them

⁸²Grey's and Nicolson's minutes on Jordan to Grey, tel. 21, 23 Jan., 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

⁸³Jordan to Grey, no. 47, 27 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.

⁸⁴Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 73, 20 Jan. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836; for terms see Li, Cheng-ch'ih shih, vol. 1, 339-40.

published in the press: the abdication of the emperor which Yüan was to officially announce to the foreign ministers; a public declaration by Yüan of his support of republicanism; the resignation of Sun Yat-sen when informed of the abdication by either the Diplomatic Body or the Consular Body at Shanghai; and an oath by Yüan after his election as president to be faithful to the constitution promulgated by the Nanking senate.⁸⁵ The attempt of Sun to detach Yüan from the Manchu government and to put him under the control of Nanking was obvious and fully justified from the revolutionaries' point of view. Wilkinson therefore told Jordan that the "conditions laid down by Dr. Sun Wen...are by no means impossible ones for Yuan Shih-kai to accept, especially if, as is no doubt intended, pressure is brought upon him to do so by the foreign Ministers at Peking."⁸⁶ Jordan, however, disliked Sun's actions. The same day Sun raised his five points Jordan telegraphed the Foreign Office that the situation had changed and there seemed to be "great difficulties in forming an amalgamated Government of the north and south". Jordan was, of course, biased. The revolutionaries were not withholding their approval for an amalgamated government but a government which would be totally irresponsible to them and exclusively under Yüan. Jordan made no effort to conceal his distaste when he saw that while almost all the ministers favoured a temporary government under Yüan Shih-k'ai, it was being "expressly debarred by the uncompromising attitude of Sun and the Nanking leaders."⁸⁷

Yüan Shih-k'ai's position remained most intractable until 26 January when several important events occurred. It looks as though his fortune

⁸⁵ Jordan to Grey, no. 40, conf., 22 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.

⁸⁶ Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 6, 24 Jan. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836.

⁸⁷ Jordan to Grey, tel. 20, 22 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

improved with his being made a marquis of the first order by the empress dowager that day. That same day the Manchu noble Liang-pi, the leader of the Tsung-she Tang, was assassinated by a revolutionary, Peng Chia-chen. The death of Liang-pi was a fatal blow to the Tsung-she Tang and before long it was dispersed: Prince Su fled to Port Arthur; Prince Kung to Tsingtao; and some others to Tientsin⁸⁸. Jordan was undoubtedly relieved although he described the incident as inaugurating a "reign of terrorism"⁸⁹.

The same day as Liang-pi's assassination too, another spectacular event took place. Over forty generals of the Pei-yang Army, led by Tuan Ch'i-jui, memorialised the throne to abdicate. Jordan realised, as has been confirmed by numerous historians since then, that the authors of the memorial "had acted under the inspiration of Yuan Shih-kai". However, instead of accusing Yüan of disloyalty as many do, Jordan followed the above statement with an eulogy, praising Yüan as "the astute politician, whose masterly brain has been directing all the moves in this long drawn-out game of Chinese statecraft".⁹⁰ The memorialisation of the Pei-yang generals was important in that the dynasty was stripped of all military support.

In the final imperial conference on 30 January the decision of abdication was taken by the empress dowager. On 1 February Jordan was informed by Wu Wei-te that Yüan had been formally authorised to negotiate terms with the revolutionaries for the treatment of the court⁹¹. On 12 February three edicts were promulgated. The first one fixed a republic

⁸⁸ P'u-i, Wo-ti ch'ien pan-sheng, p. 45; Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, p.139; and Kao, Chung-hua min-kuo ta-shih chi, p.2; and HHKM, p.115.

⁸⁹ Jordan to Grey, no. 47, 27 Jan. 1912; Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.

⁹⁰ Jordan to Grey, no. 71, 10 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1314; also Tsou, Shih-kao, p. 953; Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 127; and Li, Cheng-ch'ih shih, vol. 1, pp. 341-2.

⁹¹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 30, 1 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

as the form of government and invested Yüan Shih-k'ai with full power to organise a provisional republic with the cooperation of the southern republican party. The second dealt with the terms of the treatment of the imperial family. And the third exhorted the people and officials to serve the new government.

Thus between 26 January and 12 February, when the Manchus abdicated, Yüan had only to deal with the revolutionaries. During this period relations between Yüan and the revolutionaries were extremely tense. Many revolutionaries regarded Yüan's machination as the sole cause of the postponement of the Manchu abdication. Jordan learned from Wilkinson that within the Nanking government there was a strong extremist and military section which favoured the continuance of war not so much against the Manchus, whom it regarded as worthy of no consideration, as Yüan Shih-k'ai whom it suspected of trying to outmanoeuvre the revolutionaries and aspire to imperial honours for himself⁹². Indeed, the cry for a northern expedition amongst the southern revolutionary leaders resounded with increasing ferocity. This militant spirit was fully reflected in the telegrams which were published in the Lin-shih Cheng-fu Kung-pao, an official publication of the Nanking provisional government. For example, the Wuchang military government telegraphed the Nanking government on 26 January that if abdication failed to take place by the expiration of the armistice on 29 January, it would resume fighting⁹³. Other revolutionaries urged the Nanking government that a northern expedition was a necessary prelude to forestalling the cunning devices of Yüan and, thus, a general settlement of the situation⁹⁴.

⁹²Wilkinson to Jordan, no 6, 24 Jan. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836.

⁹³Lin-shih Cheng-fu Kung-pao, 29 Jan. 1912.

⁹⁴Lin-shih Cheng-fu Kung-pao, 31 Jan. 1912

Jordan was aware that 3,500 revolutionaries had already been transported to Shantung and, on 27 January, two days before the armistice expired, fighting resumed on the Tientsin-Pukou Railway. Moreover, there was a circulation of leaflets and pamphlets which urged the necessity of leaving the national problem to the arbitration of force. Thus on 30 January, in spite of the empress dowager's decision to abdicate, Jordan told the Foreign Office that the situation was far from certain⁹⁵. But it also appears that Jordan somehow believed that Yüan would be able eventually to reach an agreement with the revolutionaries whose financial difficulties removed much sharpness from their threat of a general northern expedition⁹⁶.

It has been seen that on 30 January the empress dowager entrusted Yüan with full authority to negotiate with the revolutionaries for the terms and manner of abdication. All negotiations between Yüan and the revolutionaries before that date were, legally speaking, unauthorised. Between 1 and 12 February Yüan's two preoccupations were, according to Jordan, the final settlement of conditions upon which the Manchu court was to retire, and the ensurance of as short an interval as possible between abdication and the establishment of a coalition government. In order to bring about a short interval Yüan proposed that the announcement of abdication, Sun Yat-sen's resignation, Yüan's own election as president, and the inauguration of the amalgamated cabinet should take

⁹⁵ Jordan to Grey, no. 47, 27 Jan., no. 50, 29 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vols. 1312, 1313.

⁹⁶ Jordan to Grey, no. 50, 29 Jan. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313, Jordan learned from Fraser who was told by Wu T'ing-fang that the revolutionaries had no means to pay troops; also Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 11, 3 Feb. 1911, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836, Wilkinson reports that troops in Nanking were paid partly by military notes which were printed by the Nanking government as a result of financial exigencies. For an enlightening account of revolutionary finance in this period, see G. Lanning, Old Forces in New China, (Shanghai, 1912). pp 359-61.

place on the same day. Jordan, of course, understood that Yüan's motive was to consolidate his control over the situation by quick actions, leaving little room for counteraction⁹⁷. Sun Yat-sen realised this point also and insisted that Yüan should allow events to proceed without undue haste and go to Nanking to be elected as president. Sun regarded it as crucial that Yüan should be elected by the Nanking senate, an acknowledgement that the republic to be inaugurated was the fruit of the revolution. Yüan Shih-k'ai wanted precisely to avoid this because he had no desire to derive his authority from the revolutionaries.

The abdication edict of 12 February was a blow on Sun Yat-sen and his close followers, such as Hu Han-min, Ch'en Ch'i-mei, and Ma Chün-wu, who represented the left-wing of the revolutionaries. It was in effect a replica of the Tientsin provisional government scheme which Yüan first proposed about a month before. The new provisional amalgamated government, though not at Tientsin, would be exclusively controlled by Yüan Shih-k'ai whose status was legalised not by the revolutionaries but by the Manchu edict. However, Sun Yat-sen resigned soon after the abdication as he had promised and Yüan Shih-k'ai was elected on 15 February as the new provisional president by the Nanking senate.

However, disagreement between Yüan and Sun Yat-sen continued and was reflected in the question of the capital. Three days before the abdication edict was promulgated Wilkinson told Jordan that the situation had improved, in view of the impending abdication, except for a possible hitch over the location of the republican government⁹⁸. It was because

⁹⁷ Jordan to Grey, no. 71, 10 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1314. This is an important document which portrays not only the events which took place during the 12 days or so before abdication, but is also a summary of Jordan's attitude since his definite abandonment of the monarchical cause on 20 December 1911.

⁹⁸ Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 12, 9 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1836.

Sun Yat-sen insisted that Nanking instead of Peking should be the seat of the government for three ostensible reasons: to remind Yüan that he owed his position to the revolutionaries; to remove him from the base of his military strength; and to detach him from the traditional seat of despotic monarchicism.⁹⁹ Jordan was further told that there was a decided rift within the Nanking government because a strong moderate group objected to the insistence of Sun's extremist section also on three grounds: it would certainly be objected by Yüan Shih-k'ai for personal reasons; it would incur an enormous expense which China could ill afford at that time; and it would certainly mean that all the palaces in Peking would be looted¹⁰⁰. As a result of the influence of the moderate group, the senate on 14 February passed by 20 to 8 votes a resolution making Peking the capital¹⁰¹. The decision, however, was reversed by 19 to 8 votes the next day under threat from Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing¹⁰². Jordan, as expected, was sympathetic towards Yüan who "did not naturally feel inclined to separate himself from his army and trust himself as a private citizen to the tender mercies of the new republic". Moreover, Yüan was needed in the north to preserve order where sentiments were essentially monarchical¹⁰³.

⁹⁹ Chang Ch'i-yün, Tang-shih kai-yao, [Outline of the history of the kuomin-tang and the Chinese revolution in the last sixty years], (Taipei, 1951), pp. 139-40.

¹⁰⁰ Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 12, 9 Feb. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836, the summarised content of which was telegraphed to Jordan. The moderate revolutionaries were mindful of Yüan's feelings because they had decided to give him a free hand to settle the confusion, see, for example, Chung-kuo jen-min cheng-ch'ih hsieh-shang hui-i ch'üan-kuo wei-yüan-hui wen-shih tzü-liao yen-chiu wei-yüan-hui, Hsin-hai ko-ming hui-i lu, [Collection of recollections of the revolution of 1911], (Taipei, 1916), vol. 1, p. 488; for general reasons see Lanning, Old Forces in New China, pp. 338-9.

¹⁰¹ The moderate group included such important revolutionaries as Sung Chiao-jen and Chang Ping-lin, and the representatives from the northern revolutionary provinces. They thought that the change would facilitate Russia's and Japan's encroachment on north China, Wu, "Yüan Shih-k'ai

Largely because of Sun Yat-sen's influence, a delegation, including Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, Wang Ching-wei, and Sung Chiao-jen, was despatched to "welcome" Yüan to Nanking. The event aroused the keen interest of the British Foreign Office. On 19 February the Foreign Office listed its objections to Nanking as the capital in a memorandum which largely based its argument on the Boxer protocol of 7 September 1901. The Foreign Office argued that the allocation of the legations and the provision for open communication between the capital and the sea had the basic assumption that Peking would remain as the capital. Besides, an enormous amount of British capital had been invested in the railway system in north China which was built with Peking as the capital. Moreover, large expenses would have to be incurred if the legations were to be moved to Nanking. In short, the British government was tempted to intervene with the other powers¹⁰⁴.

Jordan, when asked his views by Grey, deprecated intervention as unnecessary because he had just been told by T'ang Shao-i and Liang Shih-i that most political leaders in both north and south favoured Peking which would most likely be retained as the capital of the country. Moreover, Jordan pointed out that it would be most unsuitable for Britain,

mou-ch'ü lin-shih ta-tsung-t'ung chih ching-kuo," p. 12, I Kuo-Kan (ed.), Li fu-tsung-t'ung cheng-shu, [Official Writings of Vice-president Li Yüan-hung], in CHS t'sung-shu, pp. 98-9.

¹⁰²Wilkinson to Jordan, tel. 17, 15 Feb. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836. Huang Hsing threatened the assemblymen with military arrest if they would not rescind the decision. A close associate of Sun threatened suicide on the floor if they would not do the same, Young, "Yuan Shih k'ai's Rise to the Presidency, 1911-12", p. 24.

¹⁰³Jordan to Grey, no. 71, 10 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1314.

¹⁰⁴MaxMuller's minute to Langley, 19 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.

of all the powers, to take the initiative to intervene in the matter. Such an action would not only be resented by the southern extremists but, more significantly, by the British merchants in Shanghai and the southern ports who were plainly in favour of a move of the capital to the south whereby the political centre of the country would be brought into closer relations with its commercial area¹⁰⁵.

The welcoming delegation reached Peking on 25 February. Four days later two regiments of what was known as Yüan Shih-k'ai's most trusted 3rd Division, under the command of one of his most dependable officers, Ts'ao K'un, mutinied in the western section of the city and looted several thousand firms and homes in the heart of the capital. The mutinous troops also staged a siege of the residence which housed the welcoming delegation. During the next few days mutinies occurred in Tientsin and Paoting where troops not only looted but set fire to the cities¹⁰⁶.

Events connected with the choice of the capital moved quickly towards a solution after the mutiny in Peking. Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, as the leader of the welcoming delegation, telegraphed the Nanking government on 2 March urging that Yüan should be allowed to remain in Peking both to restore order and forestall intervention by Japan who was sending troops to the disaffected areas from Manchuria.¹⁰⁷ Four days later the Nanking government agreed to Yüan assuming the presidency in Peking, but he had to telegraph his oath to the Nanking senate which was also

¹⁰⁵ Jordan to Grey, tel. 63, 28 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.

¹⁰⁶ For details of the mutinies see, for example, HHKM, vol. 8, p. 122; Chung-kuo jen-min cheng-ch'ih hsieh-shang hui-i ch'üan-kuo wei-yüan-hui wen-shih tzü-liao yen-chiu wei-yüan-hui, Hsin-hai ko-ming hui-i lu, vol. 1, p. 487; and Pei-ching ping-pien shih-mo chi, in CHS ts'ung-shu.

¹⁰⁷ Uchida to Ijuin, no. 65, 4 Mar. 1912, NGB, vols. 44-5, p. 593.

to confirm the names of the premier and cabinet ministers whom he nominated. The cabinet, however, would have to assume duty in Nanking and then proceed to Peking. Yüan Shih-k'ai was duly sworn in as the second provisional president of the Chinese republic on 10 March, 1912.

Because of the close connection between the Peking mutiny and the settlement of the question of the capital, it has been commonly asserted that the mutiny was instigated by Yüan Shih-k'ai to dramatise to the Nanking government the unstable north where his presence was indispensable¹⁰⁸. However, this theory becomes doubtful when one looks at the mutiny from Jordan's point of view. Jordan was shocked by the mutiny which he could observe clearly because it took place near the legation quarters. On 3 March he convened a meeting of the Diplomatic Body to decide on the rôle of the powers in the crisis. It was decided in the meeting that during the day-time foreign soldiers were not only to patrol the legation quarters, but the city of Peking in general to help to maintain order¹⁰⁹. He knew that it was believed amongst some extremists in Nanking that Yüan inspired the mutiny¹¹⁰; however, it appears that he considered it too impolitic to have been designed by Yüan. In the first place, it was only the day before the mutiny that Yüan's men, T'ang Shao-i and Liang Shih-i, told him that in the Nanking government only a minority insisted on Nanking and in the end Peking would most likely be preferred under pressure from the majority. It seemed unnecessary for Yüan to stage a mutiny which he should have known, with his knowledge of soldiers, to be infectious.

¹⁰⁸ For example, Wen, Chung-hua min-kuo ko-ming shih, vol. 1, pp. 81-2; T'ao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp. 124-5; Chang, Tang-shih kai-yao, pp. 130-1; and KMWH, vol. 3, p. 434.

¹⁰⁹ Ijuin to Uchida, no. 164, 3 Mar. 1912, NGB, vols. 44-5, pp. 588-9.

¹¹⁰ Wilkinson, to Jordan, no. 17, 7 Mar. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1836.

More important still, Jordan considered the mutinies as severely detrimental to Yüan's prestige. He told Grey rather sorrowfully: "There can be no doubt that Yuan Shih-kai's prestige has suffered a severe blow from which it may not recover. His name, recently so honoured as the saviour of his country, is now execrated as the cause of the recent disorder."¹¹¹ Was Yüan likely to have instigated the Peking mutiny, which seemed unnecessary, at the expense of his reputation not only amongst the moderate elements in the south but, more significantly, the foreign powers, whose trust he had always valued, especially under the extraordinary circumstances of the time? Thus Jordan's reaction helps in supporting the theory that Yüan did not instigate the Peking mutiny although it served his political purposes in the question of the capital; a theory which is gaining credence in recent historical research on the incident¹¹².

By way of concluding the chapter, it can be said that Jordan did not abandon the Manchu cause until 20 December 1911, when the revolutionaries declared unilaterally for a republic. However, his final despair of the Manchu dynasty was not of great practical significance in that in order to protect British interests he had already improvised the mechanism of British neutral policy which was beneficial to the revolutionaries. The entire matter had more to do with his idealistic hopes for the future of China for whom, he believed, a republic would be most unsuitable.

Jordan's attention became even more focussed on Yüan Shih-k'ai after 20 December. The republic could only be accepted on condition of Yüan

¹¹¹ Jordan to Grey, no. 104, 3 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315.

¹¹² For example, Wu, "Yüan Shih-k'ai mou-ch'ü lin-shih ta-tsung-t'ung chih ching-kuo", pp. 11-16; and Young, "Yuan Shih-k'ai's Rise to the Presidency, 1911-1912," pp. 27-8.

becoming the president. To him institutions and what is known as the "one man rule" policy were the essential ingredients of Chinese politics. By institutions was meant, of course, the dynasty or monarchy which had hitherto been the established form of government in China. Now that there had to be a drastic change in terms of institutions, the "one man", in this case, Yüan Shih-k'ai, had to be more heavily depended upon to tide over the greatest crisis in Chinese history. In this connection, it is seen that although the Foreign Office too, largely through Jordan's influence, cherished a good opinion of Yüan Shih-k'ai, it had never reached the degree of pinning all its hopes on him. It may be arguable that by reason of its relative detachment, the Foreign Office had a more balanced view than Jordan on the much interwoven issues of Yüan Shih-k'ai, Chinese politics in general, and British interests in China during the latter half of the revolution.

It has been asserted that until the end of December Jordan in general believed in Yüan's sincerity in his support of the dynasty. Yüan's subsequent acceptance of the presidency did not change Jordan's view of his integrity. Indeed, Jordan himself was forced by sheer circumstances to abandon his ideal. Thus Langley was told that "Yuan Shih-kai has played the only part open to him - that of an opportunist prepared to accept the solution which the country wanted, or at all events, the portion of it which is in a position to make known and enforce its wishes at present"¹¹³.

Yüan's attitude towards Jordan is also much reflected in this chapter. He was definitely much more attached to Jordan than Ijuin.

¹¹³ Jordan to Langley, private, 17 Jan. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

After Japan had definitely abandoned her insistence on a constitutional monarchy, Yüan assumed a much more aloof attitude towards Ijuin than before. This, of course, is a direct manifestation of Yüan's belief in Britain's rather than Japan's friendship. But Yüan did not hesitate to make use of Jordan to suit his own political purposes, and Jordan was seen to have suffered in Yüan's game of playing one barbarian against another.

Since negotiations started between the north and south there had been little scope for Jordan's action. Neither Jordan nor Britain, nor any powers, had a decisive influence on the course of events during the months of negotiations leading to Yüan Shih-k'ai's rise to the presidency. The outcome of the revolution was essentially the result of the reshuffling of power balance between the revolutionaries, the Manchus, and Yüan Shih-k'ai. A sidelight is thrown on the fact that by 1911-1912, although foreign influence in her was still considerable, China had reached the transitional stage at which her politics could no longer be lightly interfered ^{with} by the powers. In short, Yüan emerged as the strong man not only over the Manchus and the revolutionaries, but the powers and their representatives, including Jordan, although at the same time he had to ingratiate himself with the foreigners.

Although the dynasty had to go, the revolution undoubtedly yielded a satisfactory outcome from Jordan's vantage point. With Yüan in control British interests would be guaranteed, and the excesses of the revolutionaries restrained. He was certainly justified in saying, soon after his abandonment of the Manchu cause, that the "truth, of course, is that

China is not suited and will not for many years to come be suited, either for constitutional government or a republic, and that it matters little what form of government is adopted, provided she can obtain some capable men to govern the country."¹¹⁴ The most capable man, no doubt, was Yüan Shih-k'ai; and this point stands more prominently against another statement made by Jordan: "It is strange the whole upheaval has not yet thrown up a single new man of any capacity or marked ability above his fellows. Wu [T'ing-fang], Wen [Tsung-yao] and the whole Shanghai lot are not the sort of men to whom one would care to entrust the fortunes of a new regime."¹¹⁵ Sun Yat-sen, above all, was an "armchair politician", "a coward", and "a wild visionary who knows nothing of China".¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴Jordan to Grey, no. 13, 6 Jan. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1311.

¹¹⁵Jordan to Campbell, private, 4 Jan. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

¹¹⁶Jordan to Campbell, private, 27 Nov. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7; Jordan to Grey, tel. 278, 14 Nov. the confidential clause in Jordan to Grey, tel. 289, 20 Nov. 1911, Ch. Corres., vol. 1095; and Jordan to Langley, private, 6 Sept. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

Chapter Five

The Reorganisation Loan

It has been seen that the lack of funds on both sides of the imperialists and the revolutionaries had materially hastened their abandonment of force and adoption of peaceful negotiations. It was, therefore, not surprising that the immediate problem of the newly established republic was finance. The Reorganisation Loan discussed here was the loan of £25,000,000 which China secured from the consortium in 1913 with which she was chiefly to pay off her maturing foreign liabilities and the series of provisional loans which she had been receiving sporadically from the consortium since the republic was established. Jordan's part in the negotiations for the Reorganisation Loan has to be discussed here at length because without the provisional loans, given on the understanding that they would be redeemed by a large reorganisation loan, Yüan's government ^{would have} had little chance to tide over its first year of existence. Moreover, it will be seen in the following chapter that the timely access to the Reorganisation Loan money in the summer of 1913 enabled Yüan Shih-k'ai to crush the Kuo-min Tang opposition against him with ease, thus establishing a mile-stone on his road to autocracy.

Premier T'ang Shao-i did not have exaggerate when, in addressing the Nanking assembly on 29 March, he described China as "the most poverty-stricken country in the world".¹ Once he was in control of the situation, even before the formal inauguration of the republic, Yüan Shih-k'ai knew that he needed external financial help². Unlike

¹Bland, Recent Events, p. 381

²Yüan's attempt to float an internal loan in January ended in failure, Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 147.

before the revolution, foreign loans were no longer being contracted for extraordinary and constructive purposes, but for ordinary, political, and recurring administrative purposes. In applying for help to the quadruple consortium in the middle of February 1912 the Chinese based their request on the need to meet the current administrative expenses and to pay the stipulated pensions to the Manchu court.³

There were immediate military expenses for Yüan to see to. On the one hand money was urgently needed to disband about 500,000 irregular soldiers⁴ mainly as a result of the indiscriminate recruitment of the revolutionaries during the period of fighting. Agitation for money by soldiers awaiting disbandment was strongest at Shanghai and Nanking. Aside from being anxious to prevent the unpaid soldiers from degenerating into brigands or staging mutinies, Yüan Shih-k'ai was naturally eager to rid the revolutionary leaders of their following. On the other hand Yüan needed to maintain and build up his own forces. Unlike Japan, loyalty in China had to^{be} bought. While pushing on the programme of disbandment in the south, Yüan recruited for himself thirty new corps of soldiers on the ground of security after the mutinies in February and March, refusing Huang Hsing's suggestion that he should take over his Nanking soldiers who could not be disbanded because of the

³ Hillier to Addis in Addis to Langley, 17 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.

⁴ Jordan was informed of the figure by Yüan, confidential clause in Jordan to Grey, tel. 88, 19 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315.

lack of funds.⁵

At the same time many outstanding foreign debts were awaiting liquidation.⁶ It has been seen that the payment of the Boxer indemnity fell completely into abeyance during the revolution. A number of maturing provincial loans would have to be redeemed. In some cases Britain, France and Germany had themselves since the beginning of the revolution been paying for China's interest charges on the Chinese loans which they had issued in order to safeguard China's credit in the European money market.⁷ With the re-emergence of a semblance of government in China the powers began to press for payment. The only way out of the difficulty for Yüan was to liquidate old debts by making new ones.

So much for the needs of expenditure. But what were the prospects of income? It would be some time before the provinces would make contributions to the central government. The government would be fortunate if the provinces did not clamour for financial assistance for the disbandment of excessive troops and general rehabilitation purposes. In fact for two years after the revolution Peking was seldom in receipt of anything from the provinces, except from those nearby.

⁵Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 145; Li, "Huang K'o-ch'iang hsien-sheng nien-p'ü", pp. 307-8.

⁶For a list of outstanding liabilities due by the Chinese government at the end of 1911, see The China Year Book, 1912, p. 298.

⁷Willard Straight, "China's Loan Negotiations" in G. H. Blakeslee, (ed.), Recent Developments in China, (New York, 1913), p. 140.

Even the small sums that the government did receive were irregular in nature and often took the form of patriotic pledges⁸. Moreover, in some cases provincial authorities needed whatever money they could grab to maintain a certain amount of military strength and hence political security. Chang Hsün and Huang Hsing were outstanding examples⁹. In any case Yüan Shih-k'ai did not insist on contributions at this early stage to ingratiate himself with the provinces.

Customs surplus had been a source of income to the Manchu government. With the tightening of foreign control over the Customs Service during the revolution and China's deplorable state of indebtedness, surplus would not be reaching the republican government for some time to come. At the same time both the likin excise and especially the salt gabelle were so chaotic and governed by monopolies that they were far beyond the reach of the new government.

It has been seen in relation to the Hukuang Railway Loan negotiations that Jordan disliked the consortium in dealing with China's finances. His dislike of it increased when at the end of June, 1912 Russia and Japan were included in it. It took nearly half a year for the negotiations for the establishment of a sextuple consortium to complete because of Russia's and Japan's insistence on reserving to themselves

⁸ See table showing the budgets of China for 1913-1915 in Chia Te-huai, Min-kuo ts'ai-cheng chien-shih, [Brief history of the finances of the Chinese Republic] (Commercial Press, 1941,) pp. 667-72; Yang Ju-mei, Min-kuo ts'ai cheng lun (Shanghai, 1932) p.12; and H.G.W. Woodhead, The Truth about the Chinese Republic, (London, 1925), pp. 124-5.

⁹ Chang Hsün continued with his recruitment when the general call was for disbandment of troops, Jordan to Grey, no. 198, 29 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1318. Huang Hsing disbanded as far as he could the soldiers who

Mongolia and Manchuria respectively. Between the two Jordan viewed Russia's cooperation with greater apprehension because of Russia's explicit aversion to a strong China which would be a setback to her ambitious activities in Urga.¹⁰ He was further conscious that the Russian and Japanese elements of the consortium would hinder its dealings with the Chinese, bearing in mind the anti-Japanese and anti-Russian sentiments of Yüan Shih-k'ai¹¹. However, Grey insisted on the inclusion of the two powers. Knowing Jordan's feelings Langley wrote after the signature of the sextuple agreement with an apologetic undertone: "we have, I hope, not given away too much upon the question of Manchuria and Mongolia which our other concession really implies though the names do not appear." He further asked Jordan to understand the difficult position which the Foreign Office was in because Russia's entrance had the backing of France.¹²

Apart from his intolerance of the consortium policy there are strong indications that Jordan was uneasy about giving loans to China in her then existing financial state. If China's credit in the European money market before the revolution had been fairly satisfactory it had certainly been impaired during the course of the chaos when she

were hastily recruited during the revolution but retained those who were truly revolutionary in sentiment, Li, "Huang K'o-ch'iang hsien-sheng nien-p'u", pp.316-7.

¹⁰For example, Jordan to Langley, private, 16 Apr. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

¹¹For example, Jordan to Grey, tel. 188, 15 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

¹²Langley to Jordan, private, 21 Jun. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 1.

was actually in default. Jordan expressed this worry readily:

"Lending money to China in her present condition is a mild form of gambling. The lenders trust to her great natural resources and to political pressure or intervention for repayment in the long run. Unless the process of regeneration is more effective than any one would care to predict at present, it is morally certain that the recovery of all this money will be an unpleasant task for our successors."¹³

Knowing his support for Yüan Shih-k'ai one would expect Jordan to have taken the initiative to assist his administration financially. However, it appeared that personal approval to renewing financial help to China was forced from him at the end of February when Japan offered a series of independent loans to the still existing Nanking government. With the stark necessity for funds Sun Yat-sen and the Nanking government approached Japan for various amounts of money pledged separately against the Han Yeh Ping Mines, the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company Limited, and the Shanghai-Ningpo Railway. All these loans were partly paid over despite protests from different quarters.¹⁴ Even the Okura Loan, which had as its security the Shanghai-Ningpo Railway, was half paid over in face of Britain's and more especially Jordan's objection on the ground that it was a direct violation of the 1908 railway agreement. Jordan viewed these small

¹³Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Mar. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

¹⁴Protests from the United States, Britain, and Jordan against the loans as gross violation of neutrality are abundantly available in Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.

advances to the Chinese under the guise of loans to private companies as Japan's ostentatious attempt at "utilising the abnormal situation in the south to acquire predominance in the shipping and industrial interests in Yang-tsze".¹⁵

On 17 February the London Foreign Office was informed that the consortium's agents in Peking had proposed to finance the Chinese provisional government by means of treasury bills in view of Yüan Shih-k'ai's pressing need for funds to establish a coalition government. The bank representatives anticipated that China would negotiate for a large and comprehensive loan for reorganisation purposes. The consortium sought the concurrence of the governments concerned.¹⁶ To Sir Edward Grey's question as to whether "time has come for advancing money to the Provisional Government"¹⁷ Jordan replied:

"Under the circumstances I see no alternative to advancing money to the Provisional Government, in view of the active competition of others."¹⁸

Thus initially it was the fear of uncontrolled competition and Japanese intrusion into the Yangtze that prompted Jordan to approve of the consortium financing China. But this did not rule out his awareness of Yüan Shih-k'ai's financial difficulties. In the same telegram he said that Yüan needed 2,000,000 taels for the Nanking

¹⁵ For Jordan's protest against the Okura Loan see Jordan to Grey, tel. 35, 5 Feb. 1912; for his comment on the loans see Jordan to Grey, tel. 41, 9 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1312.

¹⁶ Addis to Langley, enclosing telegram from Hillier, 17 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.

¹⁷ Grey to Jordan, tel. 36, 21 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.

¹⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 60, 23 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.

government to disband troops and liquidate its outstanding liabilities. Yet the fear of Japan's competition reigned more predominantly in his mind for he pointed out that Japan had promised to furnish Yüan with the money as part of a larger loan to be secured on the China Merchants' fleet. On 28 February the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, on behalf of the consortium, paid the 2,000,000 taels to the Nanking minister of finance.¹⁹

In the annual report on China for 1912 which was drawn up under Jordan's supervision, the history of the Reorganisation Loan negotiations amongst the Chinese government, the consortium, and the powers between 22 February and the end of 1912 is divided into six periods, each possessing its own characteristics. Since the periodisation in the report is in itself a reflection of Jordan's attitude towards the loan and since it can be extended to apply to the entire length of the loan negotiation until its conclusion in April, 1913, it deserves to be adopted in the present analysis.²⁰ In studying Jordan's attitude towards the loan it is also hoped that light will be thrown on the British side of the matter, an aspect which has yet been little studied.²¹

¹⁹The British bank made the advance in view of China's immediate need on behalf of the other groups which had not sufficiently recovered from the policy of neutrality.

²⁰Jordan to Grey, annual report, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320. Words quoted at the beginning of each period are from the report.

²¹Of the works which are consulted for this study of the Reorganisation Loan the following are written from the American point of view: A.G.Coons, The Foreign Public Debt of China, (Phil., 1930), pp.54-61; T.W.Lamont, Henry P. Davison: The Record of a Useful Life, (New York, 1933) pp.160-5; (Davison was the head of the American bank). E.V.Field American Participation in the China Consortiums (Chicago, 1930), hereafter Consortiums, pp.67-97; Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy 1913-17,

Period I (22 February to 15 March): "optimism on the part of the groups, and the commencement of advances."

The 2,000,000 taels of 28 February was of course insufficient to meet China's needs. Nanking was clamouring for more money. On 29 T'ang Shao-i again asked the consortium for 3,000,000 taels for relieving the Peking government for the month of March. Also, 64,000,000 taels would be needed each month for April, May and June, half for Peking and the other half for Nanking. To repay these advances China expected to conclude in June the same year a comprehensive reorganisation loan of £60,000,000, namely £12,000,000 for each of five years, the first instalment to be floated in July. Besides repaying the preliminary advances the loan was to cover all matured provincial loans and arrears of indemnity. The balance of the proceeds was to be used for reorganisation: 80% for productive undertakings and 20% for the army, navy, and education. The loan was to be secured as a second charge on a reorganised salt gabelle.²² On 2 March Yüan Shih-k'ai made an urgent request for 1,015,000 taels, less than half of T'ang's made two days before.²³ Jordan agreed to make the advance partly because the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank was willing to do so and partly ^{because} the

(New York, 1952), pp. 23-55; C. Vevier, The United States and China, 1906-1913, (New Jersey, 1955), pp. 196-213; S. R. Wagel, Finance in China, (Shanghai, 1914), pp. 57-77; and A. M. Overlach, Foreign Financial Control in China, (New York 1919), pp. 239-69.

²²Hillier to Addis in Addis to Langley, 1 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol.1314.

²³Chang, Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao shih, p. 58.

situation was serious for Yüan after the series of mutinies which had broken out in Peking, Paoting, and Tientsin.²⁴

On 9 March the consortium handed over 1,100,000 taels to Peking and stipulated that an option on further monthly provisions and thereorganisation loan must be obtained. The option was given the same day by Yüan Shih-k'ai in his letter to the bank representatives stating:

- "3. That the banks hold a firm option for the provision of the further monthly requirements of the Chinese government for the months of March, April, May, June and possibly July and August, which the four groups have already been requested to finance, against the delivery of additional sterling Treasury Bills or terms to be arranged.
4. That in consideration of the assistance rendered by the groups to China in the present emergency and of their services in supplying her credit on the foreign markets, the Chinese government assures to the groups (provided their terms are equally advantageous with those otherwise obtainable) the firm option of undertaking the comprehensive loan for general reorganisation purposes already proposed to them..."²⁵

The British group, finding the Chinese request for a loan of £60,000,000 of great importance, suggested an inter-bank conference to set down definitely the future policy towards lending to China. In a meeting of the conference on 12 March, the bankers decided to supply Yüan's monthly requirements until August, inclusive, and to meet a further request from Yüan for 2,000,000 taels made on 11 March for

²⁴The advance was also by the British bank on behalf of the others, Addis to Langley, 6 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1314.

²⁵Field, Consortiums, pp. 74-5.

the payment of troops at Wuchang and the protection of the Hupei provincial notes.²⁶ However, this amount of money was not paid over on account of the independent Anglo-Belgian Loan which was to suspend negotiations between China and the consortium for one and a half months. The "optimism", the total lack of expectation that obstructions might arise, with which the banks had thus far dealt with the financial needs can be deduced from the bankers' terms, stipulated in the meeting of 12 March, upon which they would meet the monthly requirements. The terms were: payment was to be made against Chinese treasury bills; China was to receive 95½% for nine months' bills; the groups were to have preference on a loan not exceeding £60,000,000 to be spread over 5 years secured by the salt gabelle; China was to take immediate action to reorganise the gabelle through foreign experts to be recommended by the inspector-general of the Customs. Moreover, China was to give adequate guarantees for proper control of the expenditure of the loan proceeds; and, while the monthly requirements were being made and until all the issues of the treasury bills would have been redeemed and the loan successfully issued, the Chinese government was to "bind themselves and their successors not to negotiate or contract any loan or advance whatsoever except through the medium of the four groups."²⁷

²⁶ Because of the reckless printing of such military notes by the revolutionaries to solve temporarily their financial difficulty, the redemption of these notes was a big problem after the revolution, for example, Wagel, Finance in China, p.76.

²⁷ Field, Consortiums, pp. 75-6.

Little can be said about Jordan in this period. He was extremely, perhaps unusually, silent on the matter. Perhaps, being torn between the feelings of "should not" and "have to" he found it difficult to voice his opinion. But one fact was apparent: he wanted China to employ extensive foreign expert aid in the productive processes. This would be particularly expedient in the reorganisation of the salt gabelle which Jordan thought "should be administered under foreign expert supervision."²⁸ Judging more from his attitude towards railway loans before the revolution and from the next two periods of the Reorganisation Loan negotiations Jordan appeared to have been in favour of strict supervision of both expenditure and security of loan funds. Apart from this inference his attitude during this period was on the whole unsettled. This unsettled state of mind was to be modified with more events taking place which enabled him better to choose a course of the lesser evil. In the annual report it is said that "the optimism which characterised the attitude of four groups during the first period was hardly shared by their governments". Despite the general nature of the statement it can be accepted as the reflection of the uneasiness with which Jordan, as a part of the British government, viewed the matter.

²⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 60, 23 Feb. 1912, in reply to Grey to Jordan tel. 36, 21 Feb. 1912, with regard to conditions put forward in Hillier to Addis, 15 Feb. in Addis to Langley, 17 Feb. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1313.

Period II (15 March to 29 April): "strained relations resulting from Chinese breach of faith".

On 14 March the Peking bank representatives learned that Tang Shao-i had concluded an independent agreement with a Belgian syndicate for a loan of £1,000,000. The loan agreement gave as security the net income and property of the Peking-Kalgan Railway, as well as the general revenue of the government. The interest rate was sealed at 5%. The consortium and the powers broke into loud protests which were echoed by the foreign press both inside and outside China. All advances were instantly suspended. The loan was considered as China's "breach of faith".²⁹

What was Jordan's reaction to the Anglo-Belgian Loan? The crux of the question is whether China had broken her promise. Strictly speaking China could argue that the Anglo-Belgian Loan was not a breach of her contract of 9 March although it ran counter to the policy set down in the consortium meeting of 12 March. Yüan Shih-k'ai's letter gave a firm option to the consortium to advance the monthly requirements and a future reorganisation loan. But with regard to the reorganisation loan the condition was that the terms of the consortium had to be "equally advantageous with those otherwise obtainable." The Anglo-Belgian Loan was obviously too big a sum to be relegated to the status of a monthly advance. As a loan its terms were much more lenient than even the

²⁹ MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 2, pp. 947-50. The British firms that participated in the Anglo-Belgian Loan included the Eastern Bank, Messrs. Sassoons and Company, and Messrs. J. Henry Shroder and Company.

monthly advances given by the consortium, not to mention the big loan which was to be negotiated.³⁰ The most significant advantage of the new loan to the Chinese was that it did not involve any form of foreign control. It can perhaps be contended on behalf of the consortium that the Chinese should have given it some warning.

Jordan protested against the Anglo-Belgian Loan with his three colleagues on 25 March. In making the protest he endorsed the view that China had broken her promise and had helped in creating a precedent of monopoly by the consortium. This was important as he himself later said, though in a different context, that "a precedent is everything in China."³¹ It cannot be denied, however, that Jordan had an additional ground for protest^{ing} in that in taking the Peking-Kalgan Railway as its security the Anglo-Belgian Loan was a violation of both the Sino-British Peking-Kalgan Railway Loan Agreement of 1902, which expressly forbade the railway to be pledged for foreign loans, and the Anglo-French Peking-Kalgan Railway Loan Agreement of 1908.³²

By the end of March Yüan Shih-k'ai became anxious for the deadlock to be removed. A few hours before the ministers presented the joint representation on 25 March Yüan went to Jordan personally and asked him to "extricate him from the 'impasse'".³² The Chinese wanted to renew relations with the consortium as if the Anglo-Belgian Loan were non-existent. The ministers in Peking backed up the

³⁰The legality of the Chinese in signing the loan is clearly and convincingly set out in Chu Hsieh, Chung-kuo ts'ai-cheng wen-t'i, [Problems of Chinese finances 1865-1933], (Shanghai, 1933), pp.133-4.

³¹Jordan to Langley, private, 21 May, 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

³²Jordan to Grey, tel. 98, 4 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1316.

consortium's refusal. Three weeks later Jordan was approached by the minister of finance, Hsiung Hsi-ling to induce the groups to resume negotiations. Jordan gave Hsiung "a frigid reception" and told him to approach all the four ministers.³⁴ A Chinese memorandum was consequently presented to the Diplomatic Body which Jordan regarded as showing "a very inadequate appreciation of the part China must play if she is to have foreign money."³⁵ Moreover, he considered that the loan was "a blessing in disguise" since it made China more conscious than before^{of} her rôle as "a suiter for foreign financial assistance".³⁶

Thus towards the end of the short second period Jordan's attitude became formalised. He realised that consortium monopoly was necessary as opposed to free competition; and supervision of the Chinese expenditure of loan funds was necessary as opposed to free spending. The Belgian loan produced a sizeable impact on Jordan in relation to his insistence on strict supervision, particularly that of expenditure. Official records on the expenditure of the Belgian loan are unavailable. Writings touching on the subject are generally confusing and contradictory. However, it is certain that Jordan objected

³³ Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Mar. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

³⁴ Jordan to Langley, private, 16 Apr. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

³⁵ Jordan to Langley, *ibid*; Jordan to Grey, tel. 103, 18 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.

³⁶ Jordan to Langley, *ibid*.

vigorously to the manner in which the money was spent. He asserted that a great part of the loan, amounting to £1,250,000 (by including a subsequent issue of £250,000), was "frittered away" in political selling and buying. He pointed out that the whole matter was so unaccountable that T'ang Shao-i had never been able to produce a full account of the expenditure to the public although it was demanded that he do so.³⁷ Jordan's observation was not unsupported. According to a renowned contemporary journalist in Peking, Huang Yüan-yung, T'ang brought with him two-thirds of the loan money to Nanking for cabinet-making, disbandment of troops, and general stabilisation in the south. The remaining one-third was totally unaccountable.³⁸ Such leaders of the time as Huang Hsing, Ch'en Ch'i-mei, and even T'ang Shao-i were suspected of having lined their pockets. Jordan seemed to have accepted the accusation against Huang Hsing readily.³⁹

In the middle of April the attitude of the consortium softened after an apology from T'ang Shao-i. It was willing to resume negotiations if China acknowledged formally that the loan was an act of faithlessness on her part.⁴⁰ Compliance to the condition came from China on 27 April and the Anglo-Belgian Loan was officially cancelled on 2 May 1912.⁴¹

³⁷ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1620.

³⁸ Huang Yün-sheng i-chu, Yüan-sheng i-chu, in CHS ts'ung-shu, vol. 1, pp. 131-3.

³⁹ Section on Huang Hsing, Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1620.

⁴⁰ Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to Peking in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 19 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.

⁴¹ The China Year Book, 1913, p. 354.

Negotiations between China and the consortium were resumed on 29 April.⁴²
Period III (29 April to 9 July): "desperate appeals for funds, hesitation of the groups and growing agitation in China against conditions of control."

It has seldom been mentioned in books touching on the Reorganisation Loan that the Belgian loan did produce a softening effect on Addis who was the head of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. In a letter to the Foreign Office in early April he pointed out that international financial tutelage would not be acceptable to republican China. Yuan would suffer a severe loss of prestige if his government accepted a system of strict foreign financial control. He thought that the interests of the shareholders could be safeguarded by a "negative form of control" conveyed by the right of veto on expenditure and the appointment of foreign auditors, accountants and collectors of revenues pledged as security by the Chinese government.⁴³ These proposals were at first not accepted by the other groups and governments and were regarded by the British Foreign Office as "too moderate."⁴⁴

In China, the bank representatives were displeased with Addis' proposal and considered that the supervision of expenditure must be stricter than what Addis suggested. To them foreign control should be strict and applied to the period "deemed to be sufficient for complete work of establishing efficient government", and not just to the loan of £60,000,000. Moreover, foreign advice should be sought not only for

⁴² Jordan to Grey, tel. 108, 29 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.

⁴³ Addis to Langley, 2 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1316.

⁴⁴ MaxMuller's minute on *ibid.*

the collection of those revenues pledged for the loan but on all revenues in general. They went as far as suggesting that £60,000,000 would barely be enough to include the funds needed to reform the salt gabelle into a respectable security for the financial assistance that had been and was to be given to China.⁴⁵

Jordan appeared uncertain. While agreeing to the suggestions of the bank representatives as the best solution to China's insolvency with fruitful results in the long term, he felt too that Addis' fear was ^{not} unjustified. And over and above these arguments was the pressing fact that Yüan was desperate for money. Jordan summed up the situation to Langley saying: "The difficulty is a very real one."⁴⁶

Immediately after the resumption of negotiations the groups received repeated appeals for funds from China. T'ang Shao-i announced that his government would require a larger sum of money than previously specified. The requirements would amount to 35,000,000 taels during the next five weeks and 10,000,000 taels per month between 15 June and 15 October. Jordan's view was that these requirements should be satisfied under conditions of control to be arranged by the group representatives in consultation with the ministers. He asked Hillier and Mayers, representative of the British and Chinese Corporation, to draw up a scheme to control the Chinese expenditure of the provisional advances.⁴⁷ He regarded the control of expenditure as "the crux of the

⁴⁵Hillier to Addis in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 25 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.

⁴⁶Jordan to Langley, private, 4 May, 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

⁴⁷Jordan to Grey, tel. 109, 1 May, 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1317.

whole problem, as upon its successful solution the pacification of the country entirely depends." The scheme that was drawn up was subsequently revised by the other bank representatives. It stipulated that the Chinese minister of finance was to attach to his department an experienced foreign auditor selected by the consortium. His post was to be retained under the direction of a foreign controller-general of foreign debts to be appointed later in connection with the reorganisation loan. His function was to sign all requisitions upon the monthly advances. Expenditure control was dealt with under two headings: the payment and disbandment of troops; and the payment of civil officials' salaries and administrative expenses.

Regarding the first heading the auditor was to sign requisitions on being informed of the number of soldiers to be disbanded and the amount of funds needed by a commission to be formed by the ministry of war with the cooperation of the military attachés of the legations concerned. The commission would detach one or more Chinese and one or more foreign military officers as deputies to each of the important military centres, for example, Nanking, Wuchang and Canton, to witness the procedure of either payment or disbandment. The soldiers to be disbanded would receive an order of pay in return for which they would be disarmed under the observation of the deputies.

As for the salaries of civil officials and administrative expenses, general statements of monthly requirements should be published in advance in the government gazette and detailed pay sheets furnished by the minister of finance for the auditor's approval. Realising the difficulty in directly tracing the application of these

funds, it was stipulated that sheets of payment were also to be distributed amongst consular officers who were to ascertain by private enquiry how far the funds were reaching their destinations.

It was further clearly stipulated that all expenditure for purposes not covered by the above clauses had to have its regulations arranged separately between the minister of finance and the consortium. It was also specified that the scheme applied only to the provisional advances and not to the eventual big loan, hinting that regulations for the latter would assume an even stricter nature.

Jordan approved of the scheme which was then presented to the banks and the governments. In explaining his agreement to the scheme to the Foreign Office Jordan said that it was a "choice of evils" because even knowing that foreign control of expenditure "in the present temper of the country may raise a storm of opposition which will sweep away all semblance of government" it still had to be insisted on in that if China was allowed indiscriminate borrowing and spending she would "work her ruin in a measurable distance of time."⁴⁸ Jordan was not surprised that T'ang Shao-i should categorically reject the scheme when it was presented to him on 3 May. T'ang declared that rather than subscribing to the scheme he would resort to forcing loans from the Chinese themselves. Jordan remarked that "there seems nothing to be done but to

⁴⁸ Jordan to Grey, no. 198, 29 Apr. 1912, enclosing the scheme, Ch. Corres., vol. 1318.

wait till the Chinese come to their senses."⁴⁹

Nine days later the Chinese presented a set of counter proposals for supervising the expenditure of the provisional advances. It suggested that in relation to the disbandment and payment of troops, instead of the military attachés of the legations, the foreign commissioners of the Customs should be employed. They would be assured of all facilities to ensure the effectiveness of the scheme and, jointly with the Chinese military deputies from Peking, would sign all pay sheets. The minister of finance pointed out that the new arrangement would make the scheme less obnoxious to the Chinese in that the commissioners of the Customs were themselves employees of the Chinese government and it could be suggested to the public that their employment was necessary because the Customs revenues were to be used to disband and pay the troops while in fact the money would be released beforehand to the inspector-general of the Customs in Peking from the provisional advances.⁵⁰

The consortium accepted the counter proposal and on 17 May paid over 3,000,000 taels to the Chinese government: 1,500,000 taels for the payment of troops in Peking; and 1,500,000 taels for the redemption of military notes at Shanghai. The total sum of the advances made thus far was 6,100,000 taels. Jordan was fairly satisfied and pronounced that

⁴⁹ Jordan to Langley, private, 4 May 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8; also Hillier to Addis in Hongkong and Bank to F.O., 3 May 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1317. Shanghai

⁵⁰ Hillier to Addis in Addis to F. O., 13 May 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1318.

even the counter proposals guaranteed "a stricter measure of supervision than has ever been exercised over the expenditure of foreign money in the past, but this is justified not only by the anomaly of the political situation, but still more by the fact that the expenditure in this instance is of an entirely unproductive nature."⁵¹

After the advance of 17 May two more advances of 3,000,000 taels each were made on 12 and 18 June respectively. Between 17 May and 18 June two incidents occurred which, though minor in significance, were indicative of Jordan's attitude towards the question of control over the expenditure of the provisional advances. It has been said that the banks had conceded the substitution of the commissioners of the Customs for foreign military attachés in supervising the payment and disbandment of troops. In early June the Chinese attempted to associate the Chinese superintendents of the Customs, who had been deprived of their function during the revolution when the foreign commissioners became directly responsible to the International Bankers' Commission at Shanghai, with the scheme in order to further reduce its objectionable foreign element. The bank representatives acceded to the Chinese proposal. On receipt of the news Jordan objected strongly, because fearing that the accession would make supervision unreal_A of the corrupt nature of the Chinese superintendants. Jordan won the support of the other ministers and together they made the bank representatives rescind their accession to the Chinese.⁵²

⁵¹ Jordan to Grey, no. 231, 18 May 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1319.

⁵² Jordan to Grey, no. 257, 15 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

Soon afterwards Jordan was greatly displeased by an independent action of Hillier which he considered as having the effect of rendering supervision illusory. Without consulting Jordan, Hillier agreed to a document which was intended to be handed to the Chinese minister of finance as an exposition of the bank representatives' interpretation of the duties of the Customs commissioner under the regulations governing the expenditure of the advances. The document stated that the commissioner did not need to supervise all cases of payment and disbandment of troops in his area in person. He was free to delegate one or more members of his Chinese staff to represent him in such operations. A further provision even limited personal investigation of the commissioner to cases in which he was refused facilities for verification or had grave grounds for suggesting that irregularities had taken place. Despite his extreme displeasure Jordan refrained from taking any action because the document had already been approved by the other ministers and he would not like to bear alone the censure of the Chinese.⁵³ He reflected his displeasure about the matter when writing on the advance that was to be paid over on 18 June: " The Chinese have made a peremptory demand for a further advance...and convey a covert hint that there will be trouble if there is any delay in producing the money. I am not altogether surprised at this after the way the Bankers relaxed the provisions for superintending the expenditure of the advances."⁵⁴

⁵³ Jordan to Grey, no. 257, 15 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

⁵⁴ Jordan to MaxMuller, private, 17 Jun. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

On the other hand internal opposition to foreign financial control in connection with the provisional advances was increasing. Since the resumption of negotiations at the end of April Jordan had been making scattered references to the opposition of the provinces which, however, did not become obviously noticeable until May and June. Jordan reported that the Chinese minister of finance had to address a public letter at the end of May to Huang Hsing, Li Yüan-hung, and the southern leaders, defending his acceptance of foreign supervision of expenditure. Tension was increased when the so-called National Subscription Movement (Kuo-min-chüan), which ended in failure, came into vogue especially in the southern provinces with the aim of obviating the necessity of foreign borrowing. In connection with the movement there was a general recrudescence of anti-foreign feeling. Moreover, foreign finance in China was again being used as a weapon to attack the government by its enemies. Jordan described the mounting agitation as bearing "a sinister resemblance to the similar movement against the Hukuang Railway loan, which proved the precursor of the revolution". He also noticed that the agitation had the support of T'ang Shao-i who wanted to use it as a lever to obtain more favourable conditions from the consortium.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Details of the National Subscription Movement, the National Rescue Association, and translation of finance minister's letter in Jordan to Grey, no. 241, 31 May 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1319. Details of anti-foreign feeling especially in Szechuan see Jordan to Grey, no. 248, 6 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1319; Jordan to Grey, no. 254, 12 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320. See also, Wu Yen-yün (ed.), Huang liu-shou shu-tu [Correspondence of Huang's Nanking Period], in CHS ts'ung-shu, pp. 10-5, 20-1, 25-7, and Li, "Huang K'o-ch'iang hsien-sheng nien-p'u", pp. 319-26.
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By the end of June Jordan made a new observation about the supervision of expenditure which had something to do with his later change of attitude. He found that with the central government unable to exercise authority over the provinces, the foreign advisers, auditors, and accountants in Peking as provided by the regulations of supervision could exercise no more than paper control. He observed that in many cases in this period supervision was merely nominal. Jordan began to doubt if supervision of expenditure was really as important as he had first thought it to be.⁵⁶

At the same time the consortium busied itself with the formulation of conditions governing the eventual comprehensive loan and the admission of Russia and Japan. In the inter-bank meeting in London of 14 and 15 May a tentative list of conditions was drawn up without which the consortium would decline to undertake the reorganisation loan. These conditions were not finally decided on until the consortium heads met again in Paris between 18 and 20 June. To be brief Willard Straight's summary of the most important terms is cited below:

- "1. That the government should have the right to satisfy themselves as to purposes for which funds are required.
2. That China should herself create a system of audit in which foreigners should be employed with powers not merely advisory but also executive so as to ensure the effective expenditure of loan funds borrowed for the purposes specified.

⁵⁶For example, the supervision of the disbandment of troops at Nanking was a complete failure, Jordan to Grey, no. 323, 5 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.

3. That the salt taxes to be hypothecated for the service of this loan should be administered either by the existing Maritime Customs organisation or by a separate Chinese service like the Customs, however, under foreign direction, thus safeguarding the proper administration of the security despite the possible continuance or recurrence of unsettled conditions in China.
4. That the groups should take the first series of the loan of £60,000,000 at a fixed price, and be assured an option in the subsequent series at a price to be based on the market quotation of the first issue, thus giving China the benefit of any improvement in her credit.
5. That to protect the quotation of bonds issued and to assure a successful marketing of subsequent series, China should not borrow through other groups until the entire loan of £60,000,000 had been issued.
6. That for a period of five years China should appoint the groups' financial agents to assist the administration in its work of reorganisation."⁵⁷

When these conditions were presented by the bank representatives on 24 June the Chinese rejected them, especially the ones concerning the control of the salt gabelle, foreign auditors and foreign supervision of expenditure. In short the Chinese government objected to the two basic principles of supervision of expenditure and control of security. Grey instructed Jordan to inform the Chinese government with his colleagues that "the six powers cannot approve of any loan being made by their nationals except upon the general lines of the conditions laid down in the groups' telegram of 15th May, to which the provisional assent of His Majesty's Government has been given." However, Grey would not insist on the last provision of a foreign financial agency in China.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Straight, "China's Loan Negotiations", pp. 143-4; for a brief but lucid analysis of the psychology of the consortium bankers while they were drawing up the terms see Field, Consortiums, p. 83. It has to be noted that these conditions are often referred to in the British Foreign Office materials as "the groups' telegram of 15th May."

⁵⁸ Grey to Jordan, tel. 106, 29 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

On 29 June the Chinese minister of finance reduced the amount of the loan from £60,000,000 to £10,000,000 with the hope of having the conditions relaxed. The attitude of the British Foreign Office was to insist on "an assurance of adequate security properly administered and a wise and effective control of the proceeds of any loan, be it for 10 or for 60 millions."⁵⁹ The French government suggested that the best way to soften the Chinese government was to suspend all payments. On 6 July Grey instructed Jordan to associate himself with his French colleague.⁶⁰ On 9 July Jordan and the other five ministers made a joint declaration to China that the powers would not allow the consortium to make further advances without the conditions which were presented to China at the end of June. The minister of finance of China stated in reply that he could not accept the conditions which were so stringent that internal trouble would be the only result. The important matter was that in following the Foreign Office's instruction to make the joint declaration of 9 July, Jordan showed little enthusiasm.⁶¹

Period IV (9 July to 22 September): "a period of a misunderstanding."

The two months after 9 July were almost wholly preoccupied with discussions of the terms of supervision between the banks and the Chinese government; between the banks and their respective governments; and among the banks and governments themselves. During the period Addis,

⁵⁹ MaxMuller's minute on Addis to F.O., 29 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

⁶⁰ Grey to Jordan, tel. 108, 6 Jul. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

⁶¹ Jordan to Grey, tels. 151, 152, 9 Jul. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

speaking for the British bank, again suggested that the consortium should be satisfied with less stringent supervision and control to ensure the successful conclusion of a reorganisation loan. He thought that instead of insisting on a firm option for future loans a preference on equal terms would be sufficient. Also, rather than the hypothecation of the entire salt gabelle a scheme could be evolved whereby the area of the gabelle under reorganisation would increase proportionately with the amount of the loan issued.⁶² However, some groups insisted that terms should not be relaxed while others took the view that even if terms were to be eventually relaxed the Chinese government had to take the first step to renew negotiations. But all agreed that China should contract a loan of at least £20,000,000 and not £10,000,000.⁶³ While the British group adopted a lenient attitude, the British government not only insisted on the conditions of 15 May but, together with the German government, turned down the suggestion of the United States that China should be allowed to borrow elsewhere during the deadlock.⁶⁴

The British Foreign Office's policy continued to be the same until the end of August when the Crisp Loan challenged it about the legality of giving exclusive support to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in loan negotiations with China. The question, though being successfully

⁶² Addis' tel. to groups, 17 Jul. in Addis to F.O. 17 Jul. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

⁶³ The consortium considered that £10 million could hardly cover the sum which China owed it. For list of China's debts see Urbig (head of German group) to Addis in Addis to F.O., 17 Jul. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

⁶⁴ Langley to Jordan, private, 4 Aug. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 1; U.S. ambassador to F.O., 19 Jul. 1912; and MaxMuller's minute on ibid., Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.

repressed by the Foreign Office thus far, had been present from the beginning. It has to be recalled that at the beginning of March the Foreign Office sanctioned the request of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank for exclusive government support until the conclusion of a reorganisation loan with China.⁶⁵ In giving the sanction the Foreign Office had in mind its own convenience and the fact that the bank had made the first advances without proper security.⁶⁶ This action of the Foreign Office roused the antagonism of the other big banking houses in London, notably the Eastern Bank which participated in advancing the Anglo-Belgian loan half a year before.⁶⁷ After 9 July the Chinese government made numerous appeals for funds to sources other than the consortium including such British concerns as the Chartered Bank⁶⁸ and the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company.⁶⁹ In each of these cases the Foreign Office succeeded in staving off the participation of outside British groups.

On 23 August Mr. Birch Crisp called at the Foreign Office and was received by J. D. Gregory who was in charge of Chinese loans. Crisp informed Gregory of the loan which his syndicate had been negotiating with China since 30 May. Gregory explained that it was

⁶⁵ Addis to Langley, 6 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315.

⁶⁶ Langley to Addis, 14 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1315.

⁶⁷ MaxMuller's minute on his interview with the chairman of the Eastern Bank on 7 Mar., 9 Mar. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1314.

⁶⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 153, 10 Jul., tel. 156, conf., 16 Jul. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

⁶⁹ Chinese Engineering and Mining Company to F.O., 29 Aug; Grey to Jordan, tel. 135, 30 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.

the government's policy^{not} to "support a loan concluded without adequate guarantees for the control of the expenditure of the proceeds and without proper security."⁷⁰ However, Crisp was serious about the loan and the Foreign Office was aware that it was encouraged by Morrison who was then in London.⁷¹

The knowledge that Crisp was about to conclude a loan with China and that he had the support of the Lloyd's Bank, the London County and West Bank, and the Capital and Counties Bank caused the Foreign Office to resurvey its loan policy. The Foreign Office felt that increased pressure was coming from the British banks on the one hand while there was a prolonged delay in arriving at a conclusion by the consortium as to the minimum control to be demanded from China. The Foreign Office considered abandoning the consortium policy as a final solution to the dilemma.⁷² On 30 August Grey telegraphed Jordan for his views on a possible withdrawal of the government's exclusive support which had hitherto been given the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, although it was stated that the final abandonment of the consortium would be conditional on a further definite refusal of the Chinese to accept the scheme that was drawn up by the groups. In the event of the consortium being abandoned the British government "would be free to consider, purely on its merits, any application from respectable British groups for support in carrying through any financial operations in China", and it

⁷⁰ Gregory's minute on the interview, 27 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.

⁷¹ Not only was Morrison implicated, MacLeavy Brown, councillor of the Chinese legation in London, acted as witness of the contract, see, for example, Gregory's minute on principles to guide loan, 27 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.

⁷² Gregory's minute on the question of the right of loan negotiation by other groups, 27 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.

would, if necessary, oppose "any loan agreement not fulfilling substantially the same conditions as they have insisted upon in the case of the abortive reorganisation loan as regards proper security and control of expenditure and also repayment of the advances to the six Power consortium."⁷³

Jordan advised against the discontinuance of the consortium which he had by then accepted as an expedient. He did so despite the fact that in the meantime he was finding the consortium policy increasingly disadvantageous to British interests because Britain had never, like Japan, Russia, Germany, or France, converted her railway concessions in China into national concerns. In the middle of July Jordan opposed strenuously the Chinese government's offer of the Northern Railway, a Chinese government property built with British capital, as an alternative security to the salt gabelle.⁷⁴ In reply to Grey's telegram Jordan pointed out that the Chinese government had not yet made a definite rejection of the consortium. As a matter of fact a fresh overture for £20,000,000 had just been made to the consortium providing that the terms would not be such as to impair the administrative authority of the Chinese government or to excite popular opposition. He reiterated that if the consortium was abandoned the result would be ruthless competition resulting in the loss of all semblance of control which in turn would cause worse financial confusion in China. He was convinced that given equal terms the Chinese would prefer the consortium, because of its greater resources, to other groups whose chance of a success lay in "their

⁷³ Grey to Jordan, tel. 134, 30 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1321.

⁷⁴ Jordan to Langley, private, 13 Jul. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

agreeing to relax terms."⁷⁵ It appears that Jordan was unaware that in saying so he was actually pointing out indirectly the necessity of relaxing the terms drawn up by the consortium. Gregory regarded Jordan as "rather begging the question".⁷⁶

On 4 September the Foreign Office was officially informed by the Chinese minister in London that the Chinese government had definitely signed the Crisp Loan Agreement for £10,000,000. On 10 September the Foreign Office warned Crisp that pressure would be put on the Chinese government to abandon the loan. Apparently China was still willing to cancel the Crisp Loan if the consortium relaxed its conditions. However, the groups generally were not prepared to do so.⁷⁷

Despite the Crisp Loan Grey decided to abide with the consortium for the time being. There were two other reasons for the decision besides Jordan's advice. First, the Chinese government was still having talks with the bankers in Peking and negotiations could not be considered as broken down definitely. Secondly, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank put pressure on the Foreign Office not to recede from its pledge of support to the bank pending the issue of a reorganisation loan.⁷⁸ Thus the Foreign Office saw in the speedy conclusion of the

⁷⁵ Jordan to Grey, tel. 175, 3 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

⁷⁶ Gregory's minute in *ibid.*

⁷⁷ Correspondence between groups in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 13 Sept. 1912, vol. 1322.

⁷⁸ Gregory's minute on Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 11 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

loan the only means to free itself from the pressure exerted on it simultaneously by the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the other independent houses. A quick conclusion of the loan could only be achieved by the relaxation of the consortium terms. Gregory came to think that pressure should be put on the British group to coerce its partners into relaxing the terms "all under the threat of withdrawal of our support, if the next negotiations are a failure." Grey approved and telegraphed Jordan of this change of policy on 16 September. He was willing to relax the conditions governing foreign administration of the salt gabelle though not that of the expenditure of loan funds. He also stated that the British group had agreed to the modification suggested, and he believed that the position of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank "who have always hitherto taken the lead in the negotiations, should... be sufficiently strong to enable them to carry the consortium with them if they are supported by His Majesty's Government." But it was also decided that the consortium would not make any move until the Chinese government would be induced to present a statement as to the extent it would agree to foreign control of the salt gabelle.⁷⁹

Simultaneously in China Jordan came to the same conclusion that relaxation of the consortium terms was a necessity. On 13 September Yüan Shih-k'ai privately informed Jordan that he was prepared to cancel the Crisp Loan if the consortium would agree to more reasonable terms. Jordan assured the Foreign Office that the Crisp Loan was "a lever for

⁷⁹Grey to Jordan, tel.148, 16 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

moderating the demands of the groups."⁸⁰ Being thus encouraged Jordan called on Yüan the next day and urged him to cancel the Crisp Loan. Without being given any guarantee of a relaxation of terms Yüan declined. He told Jordan that he must have money immediately, but acceptance of the conditions imposed by the consortium would mean "his own political extinction". He assured Jordan that despite the hostile protest against foreign control over the salt gabelle by the national council and the provinces he was willing to employ foreigners extensively in the gabelle. At the end of the interview Yüan stated categorically that with money he could guarantee order and stability, without it he would resign. Jordan regarded the interview as Yuan's personal appeal to himself to obtain an abatement of the groups' demands. At the end of the telegram in which he reported on the meeting he stated explicitly for the first time that abatement of the consortium terms was the "only feasible solution."⁸¹ His telegram crossed that of the Foreign Office which was to inform him of the same conclusion. On receipt of Jordan's telegram Grey was ready to inform the other five powers of Britain's decision.

Jordan went a step further than the Foreign Office in the relaxation of terms. While the Foreign Office only agreed to lessen the control over the salt gabelle and not expenditure of loan funds Jordan agreed to both. Writing privately to Langley on 21 September he expressed fully his opinion on the loan negotiations which had so far

⁸⁰ Jordan to Grey, tel. 185, 13 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

⁸¹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 188, 15 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

developed. He regarded it a mistake of Britain to have made the joint declaration of 9 July which bound China to terms which she could not accept in their entirety. He reiterated the necessity of retaining the consortium to prevent harmful competition and thought it unnecessary to attach more significance to controlling the expenditure of a loan which was more designed for China to repay her debts than to reorganise the country. Moreover, the past two months proved that supervision over the disbandment of troops had been a complete failure.⁸²

The willingness of Britain to relax conditions was not to produce an immediate effect. On 21 September the Peking bank representatives were presented with a set of counter proposals by the Chinese minister of finance for the resumption of loan negotiations.

They were:

- "a. The reorganisation of the salt gabelle;
- b. The employment of foreigners in the administration;
- c. The deposit of revenue collections in an approved bank;
- d. The counter-signature by a foreigner of requisitions in loan funds;
- e. A joint foreign and Chinese audit;
- f. The employment of foreign experts in industrial enterprises;
- g. A preference on equal terms for further advances."⁸³

Both Jordan and Grey found the counter proposals a suitable basis for the resumption of negotiations.⁸⁴ However, without having consulted Jordan, Hillier joined the other five bank representatives in rejecting the counter proposals and declaring a categorical adhesion to the ministers' joint representation of 9 July.

⁸² Jordan to Langley, private, 21 Sept. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

⁸³ Enclosed in Addis to F.O., 30 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

⁸⁴ Jordan to Grey, tel. 192, 20 Sept. 1912; Grey to Jordan, tel. 154, 21 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

Period V (22 September to 5 November); "readjustment of ideas."

On 24 September, the day after the bank representatives rejected China's counter proposals, the Crisp Syndicate paid China £5,000,000 of its loan. Yüan Shih-k'ai sent word to Jordan that he was forced to accept the money because of the uncompromising attitude of the groups.⁸⁵ The following day Jordan "exhausted every effect to induce President to cancel or suspend London Loan", but failed. Yüan repeated his need for immediate financial assistance and his reasons against the consortium loan terms.⁸⁶ Moreover, Jordan considered that the protest of the consortium against the Crisp Loan rested on no solid basis since it was the consortium who suspended payment after July.⁸⁷ There is no doubt that the firm attitude of Yüan made an impression on Jordan. Two days later the Crisp Loan became an accomplished fact when, in spite of the efforts of the British government to block it, half of it was floated in the London market.

Meanwhile talks were ^{continuing} amongst the groups as to whether the Chinese counter proposals of 21 September should be accepted as the basis for resumption of negotiations. The correspondence between the groups on the question was fast becoming bulky, yet no conclusion could be achieved. The French and the American groups in particular were most insistent on adherence to the conditions of the groups'

⁸⁵ Jordan to Grey, tel. 199, 24 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

⁸⁶ Jordan to Grey, tel. 202, 25 Sept. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

⁸⁷ Jordan to Langley, private, 5 Oct. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

telegram of 15 May.⁸⁸ The other governments too were not yet prepared to relax the conditions.

Jordan became extremely impatient at the speed with which events were moving. On 1 October he again reminded the Foreign Office firmly that no settlement could be possible without relaxation of terms. He further suggested that instead of the consortium principals in Europe drawing hard and fast terms without sufficient regard for the conditions in China, the bank representatives in Peking should be given more freedom to negotiate with China.⁸⁹ An increase in the freedom of action of the bank representatives would naturally mean a simultaneous increase in the freedom of action of the ministers in Peking. Jordan pointed out privately to Langley that the situation then was one of delicacy and difficulty for Yüan Shih-k'ai. Yüan was trying to win votes for his presidential election and was naturally unwilling to antagonise the southern provinces who were against foreign control.⁹⁰ It has to be borne in mind that until then Yüan had still succeeded in maintaining rapprochement, superficial though it might have been, with the revolutionary, later Kuo-min Tang, leaders which culminated in the visits of Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing to Peking in August and September.

⁸⁸ Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 2 Oct. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

⁸⁹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 204, 1 Oct. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

⁹⁰ Jordan to Langley, private, 7 Oct. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

The signature of an agreement between a Belgian firm and the Chinese government for a loan of 250,000,000 francs to build a railway from Lanchou to Haichou on 24 September⁹¹ intensified the impatience of Jordan at the stubbornness of the consortium and the other governments in refusing to relax terms, thus preventing the loan from being pushed through. Jordan, with his usual jealousy for British railway interests in China, was upset that Belgium, because she was outside the consortium, should be free to conclude the railway loan. The British and Chinese Corporation also found the Belgian railway loan most unpleasant. After consulting each other, Jordan and Mayer sent separate telegrams to the Foreign Office and the corporation respectively stating that it was intolerable that the consortium arrangement should continue to fetter the participating powers in purely industrial enterprises and leave the field open for non-consortium interests. They suggested that in future there should be a distinction between financial and industrial loans. The former should continue to be undertaken internationally through the consortium while the powers should be free to compete in the latter.⁹² The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, however, held the view that the continental powers of the consortium regarded industrial loans as much a political instrument as financial ones and would resist any attempt to discriminate between them. The Foreign Office agreed with the bank that the time had not yet come for such a separation to take place.⁹³

⁹¹For text of agreement see MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 2, pp. 976-99.

⁹²Jordan to Grey, tel. 206, 5 Oct.; and Hillier's telegram on Mayer's telegram in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 8 Oct. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

Meanwhile, the other five groups and governments were as undecided as before. The bankers met in Paris on 5 October but failed to come to a unanimous agreement. The Foreign Office in London felt increasingly suffocated by the pressure coming from Jordan and the public whose questions directed at Grey in parliament showed a mounting opposition to the government's monopolistic support of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. The Foreign Office had to make the British group press the other groups to come to a decision.

After the middle of October the groups eventually decided, as Jordan earlier suggested, that the bank representatives in Peking would be given the power to decide, with the six ministers, on what were the absolutely indispensable and practicable conditions to be obtained from China in giving the reorganisation loan. It has to be recognised, however, that the consortium came to the decision not only under the pressure exerted by the British group and government but also with the awareness that China was making overtures for funds in different directions. The success of the Crisp Syndicate to float half of its loan demonstrated the possibility of independent transaction despite the consortium bloc.⁹⁴ In accordance with the inter-bank decision in Europe a conference of the bank representatives in China was held in Shanghai. It was decided on 24 October that in future the representatives would be given "full power"

⁹³ Addis to Hongkong office of bank, 11 Oct. 1912, approved by the F.O., Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

⁹⁴ There were constant rumours of Chinese overtures to different concerns: Jordan to Grey, tel. 215, 19 Oct. 1912, on alleged negotiation between the Chinese minister in London and British Syndicates; and F.O. minute, 23 Oct. 1912, on yet two more Chinese overtures to foreign concerns, Ch. Corres., vol. 1323.

in consultation with their ministers in negotiating with China.⁹⁵

Thus for the time being initiative of the consortium was moved from Europe to Peking. Jordan was of course in favour of relaxation. The American minister, Calhoun, had been uneasy about the stringent terms of the consortium and would cooperate with Jordan.⁹⁶ Jordan claimed himself to have been successful in persuading the Japanese minister to agree to the necessity of leniency. He persuaded the other three ministers on the point and all, except the Russian, were "reasonable."⁹⁷ Thus, it is not surprising that on 5 November negotiations reopened officially between the consortium and the Chinese government on the basis of the Chinese counter proposals of 21 September. But it is also true that the knowledge of the possible inability of the Crisp Syndicate to pay over the second half of the Crisp Loan made the Chinese even more willing to reopen talks with the consortium.

Period VI (5 November 1912 to 26 April 1913): "continuous labour in negotiating and drafting the agreement for the reorganisation loan."

The months between 5 November, the resumption of negotiations, and 26 April, 1913, the conclusion of the Reorganisation Loan Agreement, were taken up with revision of terms between the Chinese government and the consortium. From the end of January, 1913 onwards the period was also characterised by the scramble amongst the governments for the

⁹⁵ Hillier to Addis in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 25 Oct. Ch. Corres., vol. 1323. In the meeting too a first step was taken towards the separation of financial and industrial loans which, however, is no longer relevant to this study.

⁹⁶ Field, Consortiums, p.84.

⁹⁷ Jordan to Langley, private, 4 Nov. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

adviserships provided by the loan agreement.

British attitudes towards the loan negotiation during the fourth and fifth periods had been quite unlike those of other powers of the consortium. Perhaps the difference was not as marked in this last period when loan negotiations in China were tinted by the considerations of alliances in Europe which affected Britain as much as France, Russia, and Germany. Because of the increased political element in the negotiations, Jordan's part in the matter became much overshadowed.

During the last period Jordan wanted a speedy conclusion of the big loan as before. He still maintained that the consortium had to be retained to preclude damaging competition which would result in a complete loss of control over the security and expenditure of loan funds; Yüan Shih-k'ai had to be given immediate financial assistance; and British interests had to be liberated from the consortium arrangement to enjoy freedom of competition in the industrial field. Jordan's desire to restore to British firms the freedom of industrial competition in China had not only strengthened in himself⁹⁸ but had infected the Foreign Office. Grey, in particular shared his zeal and pressed the British group to induce the

⁹⁸This can well be seen in Jordan to Langley, 8 Dec. 1912; "I wish heartily that we were safely rid of all these groups and again free to go in for industrial undertakings. Nothing good has come out of these unnatural combines. During the first three of four years of my tenure of this post we did some really good work of which we have reason to be proud." Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

consortium to make arrangements for the eventual separation of financial and industrial loans pending the complete issue of the big loan and its associate ones.⁹⁹

To Jordan's utter annoyance, negotiations dragged on during the last stage. For the first two months after negotiations reopened the chief obstacle to rapid progress was the Crisp Loan. Jordan held the difficult view that while it was impossible for the consortium to negotiate with the Chinese as though the Crisp Loan did not exist, Britain should not be a party to help or coerce China to break the Crisp contract.¹⁰⁰ In fact, Jordan was resigned to half close his eyes to the existence of the Crisp Loan and allow negotiations to proceed as much as possible. Fortunately the problem never materialised because Crisp found it increasingly difficult to pay the remaining half of his loan to China. On 23 December Crisp agreed to have his loan cancelled on condition that China should pay him a considerable compensation (about £150,000).

The powers themselves raised several obstacles. The French, supported by the Russians, insisted on the inclusion in the expenditure of the loan of the payment of claims due to the governments arising from the revolution. Jordan preferred to make the payment of these claims a

⁹⁹ Grey to Jordan, private, 30 Oct. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 1. The question came to be greatly discussed in the inter-bank conferences of the period, see minutes of meetings in Ch. Corres., vol. 1324-5, 1590 and 1594.

¹⁰⁰ For example, Jordan to Grey, tel. 238, 21 Nov. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1324.

condition precedent to the powers' recognition of the republic.¹⁰¹

In the general discussions of the employment of foreign advisers under the loan terms at the end of 1912, the French and Russian ministers insisted on the provision of satisfactory contracts for the foreigners concerned. Jordan thought it sufficient if the groups approved the appointments.¹⁰² It was only near the end of 1912 that a rough agreement was arrived at amongst the groups and governments on the different points raised including that of the issue price. The fact was clearly that Jordan took a more lenient stand towards almost every question connected with the last stage of the loan negotiation than his colleagues and the consortium and he carried the Foreign Office with him.

A general agreement between the consortium and Chinese government soon followed that between the governments and groups. The amount of the loan was to be £25,000,000 pledged on the salt gabelle. The supervision of expenditure and security was secured by the establishment of a central salt administration, a national debts department, (for all foreign loans) a loan department, (for the reorganisation loan only) and an audit bureau. Despite the fact that foreign element was to be heavy in these departments the terms of supervision had already been relaxed. Taking the salt department as the most outstanding example, instead of insisting that it be exclusively run by foreigners at the top levels the consortium agreed that a Chinese

¹⁰¹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 254, 11 Dec. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1325.

¹⁰² Ibid; and Alston's minute on inter-bank conference of 13, 14 and 16 Dec. which objected to Jordan's leniency, Ch. Corres., vol. 1325.

co-inspector-general would be appointed on a par with the foreign inspector-general.¹⁰³ The banks also agreed that because of China's urgent demand for money provisional advances would be made before the issue of treasury bills of the loan which would take at least two months.¹⁰⁴ That on 27 December Chao Ping-chün, the premier, and Chou Hsüeh-hsi, the minister of finance, presented the outline of the loan agreement to the provisional senate confirmed the idea that the loan could have been concluded soon afterwards had it not been that a new question arose.

The new question was the scramble for adviserships amongst the powers. Early in January the Chinese government notified the six governments that in the near future the latter would be informed of the names, duties, and powers of the foreigners to be employed as advisers. There would probably be three of them; one each for the salt administration, the public debts, and audit departments. The French objected to the Chinese proposal. Jordan was sorely tried by the aggressive attitude of the French minister who asserted that his government desired that China would appoint six advisers, one of each nationality of the consortium. The Russian minister naturally took up the same line. Most of the other powers and their ministers disagreed with the French suggestion. Jordan maintained firmly that the French proposal would entail a foreign commission of control which the Chinese would never accept.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ See article 5 of the Reorganisation Loan Agreement, MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 2, pp. 1009-10.

¹⁰⁴ Huang, Yüan-sheng i-chu, vol. 2, pp. 26-8.

¹⁰⁵ Jordan to Grey, tel. 23, 26 Jan. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1590.

Because of the want of accord among the consortium powers no advances were made to the Chinese by the end of January as promised. The Chinese declared that they would break off negotiations and seek for funds elsewhere. In theory, Jordan thought that the Chinese were justified in borrowing elsewhere because the consortium had failed to make the promised advances. In practice, however, he and the German minister held that their countries' interests would be too severely jeopardised by an abortion of the loan at this stage.¹⁰⁶ Grey agreed and was prepared to instruct Addis to make the advances independently with the Germans if France and Russia continued to obstruct, out of, he suspected, political reasons in Europe and Mongolia.¹⁰⁷ But Jordan was also afraid that this independent Anglo-German action, if effected, would precipitate a rupture of the consortium.¹⁰⁸

For the next one and a half months negotiations revolved round the question of the number of advisers and its allotment amongst the powers. Details of this stage of negotiations are not of direct relevance to the study of Jordan.¹⁰⁹ It suffices to say that Jordan endeavoured to ensure a speedy conclusion of the loan but with little success. Grey had become more susceptible to considerations of European politics in his dealings with China. Rather than asking Germany to join in making advances to China Grey came to insist that she could

¹⁰⁶ Field, Consortiums, p. 90.

¹⁰⁷ Grey to Jordan, tel. 19, 24 Jan. and confidential clause in Grey to Jordan, tel. 25, 1 Feb. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1590.

¹⁰⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 22, 24 Jan. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1590.

¹⁰⁹ Details are available in Field, Consortiums, pp. 89-93.

never be given the post of the inspector-general of the salt administration. It was no surprise that on 2 February the American minister reported: "Everything indicates a readjustment of relations of England, France, and Russia on lines of triple entente."¹¹⁰ On 9 March the Chinese minister of finance sent a letter to the powers censuring them, and not the groups, for delaying the progress of negotiations.¹¹¹

At the same time Grey was much depressed by the stalemate in the negotiations. Just before 17 February when all the governments, except the American, agreed on the French proposal of four advisers Jordan was told by Langley that Grey decided that "if the proposal made by the Legations fails and the other powers then refused to revert to the Chinese proposal he must give up the job as impossible." Langley added: "I should be very sorry if he takes that line and hope that with your advice he will not do so as it seems a thousand pities that the negotiations so nearly brought to a successful conclusion should be wrecked on the distribution of these appointments."¹¹² By the end of February the accord between the governments had again disappeared, this time largely because the Germans objected to Britain having both the Customs and the salt administration. To remove the deadlock Jordan suggested that there should be one British inspector-general of salt at Peking, one German deputy inspector-general at Shanghai, one French and one Russian advisers to the audits department, and one German director of

¹¹⁰Field, Consortiums, p. 93.

¹¹¹Coons, The Foreign Public Debt of China, pp. 59-60.

¹¹²Langley to Jordan, private, 13 Feb. 1913, Jordan Papers, vol. 11.

the national loan bureau. In this way Jordan hoped that the Germans would be appeased and that the Chinese might accept the scheme in that although the number of advisers was increased to five their presence would still be confined to three departments.¹¹³ The Chinese cabinet rejected the proposal about the middle of March because it feared that its acceptance would lead to complications in parliament which was on the eve of being convened.¹¹⁴

The situation was given a new turn after the middle of March. The American Department of State, under the new administration of Woodrow Wilson, refused to renew its request to the American group to further connect itself with the China consortium. The secession of the American group had a demoralising effect on the rest of the consortium groups. It was feared that America would make independent loans to China without insisting on control¹¹⁵ because the new American government considered the consortium terms as "touching very nearly the administrative independence of China" and "might conceivably go to the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial, and even in the political, affairs of that great Oriental State."¹¹⁶ It was also feared that China would be encouraged by the

¹¹³ Jordan to Grey, no.109, conf., draft , 10 Mar.1912, Ch.Emb.Arch, (F.O.228) vol. 2354.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., and Jordan to Grey, tel.68, 13 Mar.1913, Ch.Emb.Arch, vol.2354.

¹¹⁵ It appears that America did later propose to make loans of U.S. \$25,000,000 and \$125,000,000 respectively, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to F.O., 6Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593. Details of the American secession are found in, for example, W. J. Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan, (American secretary of state, 5 Mar. 1913-8 Jun.1913), (Chicago, 1925), pp.361-3; Lamont, Henry P. Davison, pp. 160-5.

¹¹⁶ S.F.Bemis (ed.), The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series, vol. 10, chapter 2, p. 10.

American action to free herself from the consortium.¹¹⁷

A deluge of questions was directed at the British government in parliament, because of the American secession, on its consortium policy. Grey, who had all along been criticised in the matter, was discouraged by the new turn of events and considered abandoning the consortium quite seriously. Jordan immediately assured him that the withdrawal of the American group would not in itself weaken the consortium but it was essential for the five remaining groups to be maintained.¹¹⁸ Jordan's advice certainly had a salutary influence on Grey's decision again to abide with the consortium.¹¹⁹

At the same time the change in the political situation in China forced Yüan to accept financial assistance from the quintuple consortium almost on any terms. Two days after the American group seceded from the consortium Sung Chiao-jen, the founder and actual leader of the Kuo-min Tang, was assassinated in Shanghai. Yüan was accused by the Kuo-min Tang for having instigated the crime, and relationship between the two was fast deteriorating. On 27 March the Chinese minister in London told Grey that a salt expert in India, Sir Richard Dane, was offered the position of foreign inspector-general of the salt administration.¹²⁰ At the end of April the Chinese government voluntarily agreed to appoint five advisers.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ For example, there was the rumour that China asked for a loan of £30,000,000 from Addstein and Reuter, Langley to Jordan, 2 Apr. 1913, Jordan Papers, vol. 11.

¹¹⁸ Jordan to Grey, tel. 74, 21 Mar. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1592.

¹¹⁹ Langley to Jordan, private, 26 Mar. 1913, Jordan Papers, vol. 11.

¹²⁰ Grey to Jordan, tel. 90, conf., 28 Mar., also Jordan to Grey, tel. 78, 29 Mar. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1592.

¹²¹ Jordan to Grey, v. conf., tel. 81, 4 Apr. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593.

A new question arose during the last half month before the eventual conclusion of the loan in late April in which Jordan played a prominent part. On 10 April the representatives in Peking were notified that if the consortium agreed to a reduction of interest from 5½% to 5% the Chinese government would be ready to sign the contract "at once and without reference to New Parliament."¹²² The consortium soon agreed to the reduced interest rate but was doubtful about ignoring the new parliament which had a Kuo-min Tang majority. Grey shared the doubt and telegraphed for Jordan's opinion.¹²³ Jordan stated firmly that whether parliament was consulted or not was a domestic question of China and the loan agreement properly communicated to the legations by the Wai-chiao Pu would satisfy all requirements to make it a binding engagement on the Chinese government and its successors.¹²⁴ Hillier telegraphed Addis at the same time putting forward the same view.¹²⁵ The same day Addis informed Hillier of his agreement to sign the loan contract without the ratification of the Chinese parliament.¹²⁶

On 25 April Sun Yat-sen made a public denunciation of the loan in Shanghai. Jordan asked Grey not to regard the declaration as "too important."¹²⁷ The Reorganisation Loan Agreement was eventually signed on 26 April, after midnight, in the office of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank while until the last minute ^{fear} was entertained that a Kuo-min Tang plot

¹²²Hillier to Addis in Addis to F.O., 10 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593.

¹²³Grey to Jordan, tel. 108, 11 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593.

¹²⁴Jordan to Grey, tel. 92, 14 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593.

¹²⁵Hillier to Addis, 18 Apr. 1913, (F.O.228) Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2355.

¹²⁶Addis to Hillier, 18 Apr. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2355.

¹²⁷Jordan to Grey, tel. 103, 28 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593.

might upset the plan.

In signing the loan agreement Jordan urged that the Chinese parliament, which was opened on 8 April, should be ignored. He was fully aware of the confusion inside the parliament since it was first convened that and thought it was in no suitable state to debate on the loan. On the one hand Britain could not indefinitely be prevented from recovering her "freedom for economic enterprises",¹²⁸ and on the other hand Yüan Shih-k'ai could not be let down on the eve of his struggle with the Kuo-min Tang or "his disappearance from public life would mean political and commercial chaos."¹²⁹ Jordan's reasoning incidentally explained why Yüan would not submit the loan agreement to be approved by the new parliament as at the end of 1912 when he submitted the outline of the agreement to the provisional parliament which in effect had a more substantial Kuo-min Tang majority.¹³⁰ In fact he was assured by some of the Kuo-min Tang members, soon after the loan agreement was signed, that they would not block the agreement if he submitted it to parliament.¹³¹ The question was not whether the loan agreement would be approved or not but when it would be approved, and Yüan needed money immediately in preparing for a show-down with the Kuo-min Tang.

¹²⁸ Jordan to Langley, private, 21 Apr. 1913, Alston Papers, (F.O. 800), vol. 246.

¹²⁹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 103, 28 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1593.

¹³⁰ Numerically the Kuo-min Tang held a majority in both the provisional and the first parliaments. In the new parliament, however, some Kuo-min Tang members held more than one party card and were susceptible to bribes from Yüan Shih-k'ai. The position of the party became more vulnerable when Liang Ch'i-ch'ao organised the Chin-pu Tang by combining the other three most important parties other than the Kuo-min Tang in the provisional parliament, soon after parliament opened, under the auspices of Yüan, see for example, Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 143; Wen,

By way of summary, it is without question true that the Reorganisation Loan negotiations were an international matter in which the rôle of Jordan was often overshadowed. Bearing this point in mind, it is remarkable that Jordan's part in the negotiations is still clearly traceable. Instead of the usual way of looking at the loan negotiations from the American angle, the British side of the matter is emphasised here. This emphasis is justified not only on the subjective basis that this study is on Jordan but also on the objective one that despite the international character of the question Britain remained the corner-stone of the politico-financial edifice which dealt with Chinese finance both because of her residual influence in the Far East and the leading rôle of her bank in the consortium. Regardless of motives, Britain's lead is most clearly reflected in the fact that she, and not America as is usually suggested¹³², was the first consortium power which suggested the relaxation of terms in giving the Reorganisation Loan to China.

Jordan's rôle becomes distinct once the loan negotiations are looked at from the purely British angle. Generally speaking, the rôle of the British bank can be relegated to secondary importance on the grounds that it operated largely in accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office. Thus the views of the Foreign Office and Jordan are the important matter.

Tsui-chin san-shih nien Chung-kuo chün-shih shih, vol. 2, p. 24; Tsou Lu, Hui-ku lu [reminiscences], (Shanghai, 1943), pp. 54, 57; and Li Tsung-huang, Chung-kuo Kuo-min Tang tang-shih, [History of the Kuo-min Tang], (Shanghai 1935), pp. 149-50, 152-3.

¹³¹ For example, Tsou, Shih-kao, vol. 2, pp. 978-9; Li, Cheng-ch'ih shih, vol. 2, pp. 390-1.

¹³² Most of the books which are listed in note 21 have the implication that the American secession from the consortium was the major cause of the relaxation of terms.

Despite Jordan's dislike of the consortium and initial scepticism as to China's ability to repay her debts there was general accord between Jordan and the Foreign Office in relation to loan negotiations until the deadlock of 9 July. This accord was expressed in the upholding of the consortium as the channel of financing China and insistence on strict supervision of both expenditure and security of loan funds. The fact that both the Foreign Office and Jordan professed that in insisting on strict supervision they thought of China's good as well as their own, suggests that the consortium governments were not just exploitative in their motives as is almost unanimously put forward in Chinese writing.¹³³

From 9 July onwards Jordan's influence on the Foreign Office, especially on Grey, in dealing with the negotiation increased. Grey's first reaction towards the Crisp Loan was to consider withdrawing from the consortium. This Jordan firmly discouraged. Soon after this the Foreign Office and Jordan reached simultaneously, though for different reasons, the conclusion that a relaxation of the consortium terms was the only way to the speedy conclusion of a reorganisation loan which in turn was the only way out of the difficult situation for both Britain and China. Once the conclusion was reached, Jordan was far more consistent than Grey in acting on it. Jordan firmly maintained the necessity of maintaining the consortium pending the conclusion of the big loan every time Grey suggested its abandonment under strong pressure at home. It is of course arguable that since Britain had been so much involved in the loan that unless the

¹³³ For example, Ch'ien I-shih, Chin-tai Chung-kuo ching-chi shih, [Economic history of modern China], (Life Press, 1939), pp. 85-7; Chang I-fan etc. (ed.), Ts'ai-cheng chin-jung ta-tzū-tien, [Dictionary of terms used in public finance and currency] (Shanghai, 1937), p.1236.

situation became absolutely impossible Grey would not rescind his support to the consortium. Yet it cannot be denied that Jordan's firm adherence to the consortium principle and his effort in China to facilitate a conclusion of the loan question was a constant moral support to Grey in abiding with the consortium. Grey meant it when he attributed the successful conclusion of the Reorganisation Loan entirely to Jordan's untiring efforts.¹³⁴

That the consortium was preserved was important because it was important for Yüan to receive money from the powers represented in the consortium. It goes without saying that the material aspect of the Reorganisation Loan was important in the spring and summer of 1913. But it can still be argued that Yüan could have obtained money somewhere,^{somehow,} had the consortium failed him. Thus the more important point, as Jordan pointed out, was that "in making the loan we [the powers] are virtually backing him [Yüan] against the rest of the field;"¹³⁵ especially recalling the effect of the powers' neutrality on the Manchus during the revolution less than two years before. The Reorganisation Loan was the token of recognition given by the powers to Yüan of his position in China.

During the course of the negotiation for the Reorganisation Loan Jordan was unique in being closely related with Yüan Shih-k'ai. It has been seen that Yüan had several times personally appealed to Jordan who in turn gave Yüan his personal advice on the loan question, although this did not refute the fact that Jordan viewed the question with other

¹³⁴ Grey to Jordan, tel. 132, 10 May, Ch. Corres., vol. 1594.

¹³⁵ Jordan to Langley, private, 21 Apr. 1913, Alston Papers, vol. 246.

considerations as well as Yüan's position in mind. Writing to Langley about a month before the Crisp Loan Jordan said: "Yuan looks...upon me as a sort of renegade. At our last interview he pictured the six ministers as trying hard to strangle him but said he knew I kept the knot from being tied too tightly."¹³⁶ This point seems to be justified by Jordan's action later in relation to the so-called Austrian Contracts. It was originally arranged that advances would be paid over to the Chinese government in a few days after the signature of the Reorganisation Loan Agreement. Two days after the signature great misgiving was caused amongst the groups when they discovered the Austrian Contracts whereby the Austrian firm, Arnold, Karberg and Company, gave the Chinese marine a total loan of £3,200,000. The contracts were signed on 10 April, the exact date after which the Reorganisation Loan Agreement (Article 17) stipulated that no loan could be concluded by China without consulting the consortium.¹³⁷ Jordan immediately held up the loan for more than a week. However, on being given the discretion to act by the Foreign Office, he changed his mind and authorised Hillier to pay Yüan the advances. This was done just one day before the French minister was informed by his government of a French hitch and was instructed to defer all actions. Jordan congratulated himself for making "a miraculously narrow escape" from "an awful mess". When Jordan was holding up the loan Yüan sent a private message that his last hope was gone. Later when Yüan heard from Jordan that he was to have money after all he said that "old friends were the best."¹³⁸

¹³⁶Jordan to Langley, private, 4 Aug. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

¹³⁷For terms of the contracts see MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 2, pp. 1004-7.

¹³⁸Jordan to Grey, tel. 111, 8 May; tel. 112, 9 May 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1594; and Jordan to Langley, private, 14 May 1913, Alston Papers, vol. 247.

Chapter Six

Yüan Shih-k'ai's Autocracy

Yüan Shih-k'ai's ambitions had clearly been underwritten by the Reorganisation Loan. With access to these funds the path of autocracy was more readily open to him, and in this chapter we must trace the growth of Yüan's power in the years between the so-called second Kuo-min Tang revolution of 1913 and the outbreak of World War I. Since, however, Jordan took little note of the post-1913 aspects of Yüan's power play - most likely because they appeared as natural consequences of his victory rather than inherent crises in their own right - stress must be placed on the dramatic events which led up to the revolution of 1913 and the consequences of them. Two matters particularly held Jordan's attention: the resignation of T'ang Shao-i from the premiership; and the assassination of Sung Chiao-jen.

The Resignation of T'ang Shao-i

T'ang's resignation deserves attention because it is almost unanimously interpreted as Yüan's first blow at a responsible cabinet system which was designed by the provisional parliament at Nanking to curb his ambitions.¹ Immediately after Yüan Shih-k'ai's investiture as the provisional president on 10 March, 1912 the next urgent step towards establishing an amalgamated republican government was the formation of a cabinet. On 13 March Yüan appointed T'ang Shao-i as the first premier of the first Chinese republic, a step which had previously been approved by the Nanking parliament. By the end of March

¹ For example, Li, Tsui-chin san-shih-nien, pp. 257-8; and Chang Hsiao-chien, Chung-kuo chin-tai cheng-ch'ih shih, [Political history of modern China], (Taipei, 1959), p. 103.

T'ang completed the task of cabinet-making. On the surface, the cabinet represented a conciliation between the north and south. T'ang himself had a dual affiliation: as a henchman of Yüan and as a member of the revolutionary party. Lu Cheng-hsiang and Hsiung Hsi-ling, both men of neutral political standing, were recruited respectively as ministers of foreign affairs and finance. The revolutionaries Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, Sung Chiao-jen, Ch'en Ch'i-mei, Wang Ch'ung-wei, and Liu Kuan-hsiung were appointed, respectively, ministers of education, agriculture and forestry, industry and commerce, justice, and the navy. But the important army and interior ministries were given to Tuan Ch'i-jui and Chao Ping-chün who were Yüan's devoted subordinates. Thus, Wilkinson told Jordan that it was unanimously agreed in the Nanking government that "the new cabinet was a triumph for President Yüan"².

Perhaps no one amongst the foreigners knew better than Jordan the relationship between Yüan and T'ang - essentially between master and subordinate. Yüan was the Chinese commissioner for military affairs in Korea when he first met T'ang who was then a customs official. During the next ten years T'ang deputised for Yüan whenever Yüan was absent from Korea. When Yüan was training soldiers at Hsiaochen, T'ang was his secretary. As the governor of Shantung Yüan entrusted T'ang with the handling of diplomatic and commercial affairs. On becoming the viceroy of Chihli, Yüan commissioned T'ang to the customs office at Tientsin to help collect provincial revenues with which to pay off Chihli's share of the Boxer indemnity. After the Russo-Japanese War the viceroy of Chihli was for the first time made responsible for the

²Wilkinson to Jordan, no.21, 1 Apr. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol.1836. For more detailed analysis of the cabinet members and their political affiliation see Ch'en, Yüan Shih-k'ai, p. 141; Ku Chung-hsiu, Chung hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo shih, [History of the establishment of the Chinese Republic] in CHS ts'ung-shu, p. 101.

defence of Manchuria. It was through Yüan's influence that T'ang was appointed the governor of Fengtien in the spring of 1907. Two months after his recall to office in the revolution of 1911 Yüan sent T'ang as his personal representative to negotiate with the revolutionaries at Shanghai.³

Thus, while acknowledging T'ang's capability, Jordan considered that he could not achieve much without Yüan Shih-k'ai's influence behind him.⁴ This is most clearly reflected in his change of attitude towards T'ang's mission to Britain in early 1909 after his visit to the United States, ostensibly to thank her for relinquishing part of her share of the Boxer indemnity⁵. Being the senior vice-president of the Wai-wu Pu Yüan Shih-k'ai had unofficially given the mission the additional task of seeking expert aid from Britain for a number of schemes concerned chiefly with the Chinese navy. Jordan had regarded T'ang's visit to England seriously and had asked Campbell to "secure a good reception" for him⁶. After Yüan's dismissal from office, however, Jordan had told Campbell that T'ang's mission no longer had "any practical importance" because the materialisation of its unauthorised commission "depended entirely on Yüan's presence" in Peking⁷. When

³ According to the description of T'ang given in Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1919, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 229.

⁴ T'ang after all had had seven years of education in America. For Jordan's appreciation of T'ang's relative ability as compared with most Chinese see, for example, Jordan to Langley, private, 7 Feb. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 4.

⁵ Some historians regarded the mission to America as a manifestation of Yüan's pro-American policy and his attempt to oust Japan from Manchuria with American help, see, for example, J.A. Miller "The United States and Chinese Territorial Integrity, 1908", in D.L. Lee etc. (ed), Essays in History and International Relations in Honour of George Hubbard Blakeslee, (Mass., 1949), pp. 243-56.

⁶ Jordan to Campbell, private, 24 Dec., also 17 Sept. 1908, Jordan Papers vol. 5.

⁷ Jordan to Campbell, private, 21 Jan. 1909, Jordan Papers, vol. 5.

at the beginning of 1911 T'ang resigned from the post of acting minister of the Board of Communications, Jordan had regarded his decision as a wise one, for without "Yüan Shih-k'ai, [who was still in enforced retirement] he would have no power"⁸.

Yüan must have felt particularly confident in nominating T'ang as the premier. It was natural for him to assume that the new president/premier relationship would resemble the old master/protégé one. Yüan was, however, quickly disillusioned. T'ang insisted from the beginning on adhering to the provisional constitution which was promulgated by the Nanking senate and announced by Yüan Shih-k'ai on 11 March. Writing to Jordan the consul at Nanking, Wilkinson, commented: "The powers of the President, the Ministry and the Constitution are all very loosely defined in the constitution, and will probably be a source of frequent dispute in the future"⁹. However vague the provisional constitution might have been it was impossible to bypass its chief stipulation - the institution of a responsible cabinet.

From the beginning T'ang was determined that the cabinet, and not Yüan, would exercise executive powers in government administration. He would not allow the president's office to issue any statement without his approval and co-signature. He even edited Yüan's first inaugural speech before it could be published. Yüan retaliated by exhausting every means to inconvenience the cabinet. Chao Ping-Chün

⁸ Jordan to Campbell, private, 19 Jan. 1911, Jordan Papers, vol. 7.

⁹ Wilkinson to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, no. 163, 3 Apr. 1912, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 208, enclosed in it is a copy of the English text of the constitution. For the original text see Ku Tun-jou, Chung-kuo i-hui shih, [History of the Chinese parliament], (Taichung, 1962), pp. 63-8. For an analysis of the shortcomings of the constitution see Huang Kung-chüeh etc., Chung-kuo chih-hsien shih, [History of the constitution in China], (Commercial Press, 1937), vol. 1, pp. 41-4.

never once participated in cabinet meetings, and T'ang was hated in the president's office. Difference of opinion also arose over Huang Hsing's appointment and the treatment of Chang Hsün whose troops were feared by Nanking¹⁰.

It has commonly been held that the eventual break-up of the friendship in June was precipitated by two questions: the Anglo-Belgian Loan of March 1913 and the appointment of a governor-general of Chihli. It has already been seen that the Belgian loan was denounced by the consortium and the powers as a breach of China's faith. Part of the inner history of the loan is still shrouded in mystery. So far there have been two views on the relative part played by Yüan and T'ang in the matter. One view maintains that having given preference to the consortium on 9 March Yüan had every intention of adhering to his promise, the Belgian loan being entirely an independent action of T'ang. It is a fact that Hsiung Hsi-ling, the minister of finance who was close to Yüan, strongly opposed this transaction of T'ang's with an outside group¹¹. Thus Yüan was extremely displeased with T'ang when the consortium suspended all advances on knowing about the new loan. This was certainly the view which Yüan wanted the consortium and the powers to hold. It is, however, contrived, for if Hsiung Hsi-ling had complained about the Belgian loan in advance, it was unlikely that Yüan would have been completely ignorant of the matter; and if he had really objected strongly to the loan he could have warned T'ang off.

¹⁰For such details see Li, Cheng-ch'ih shih, vol. 2, pp. 374-5; Tao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp. 132-3; and a contemporary newspaper account in Cue Sing Mail, 29 Jul. 1912.

¹¹For example, Chuang Chün-chang, Chung-hua min-kuo chien-kuo shih, [History of the establishment of the Chinese Republic] (Taipei, 1957) p. 108.

The more convincing view holds that while agreeing to the preference demanded by the consortium Yüan was fully aware of the stringency of the consortium terms which, if accepted, would be detrimental to his political position. He was not therefore unwilling that T'ang should be successful in pushing through the independent loan which, besides easing his financial embarrassment could be used as a lever to extract better terms from the consortium. Opposition from the groups turned out to be unexpectedly strong and Yüan resorted to denying completely his part in the matter. T'ang, the scape-goat, was thus made to apologise to the legations¹².

Jordan chose to assume that Yüan was innocent. Writing on the impasse created by the Belgian loan he said: "Tong Shao-yi has been at his old tricks again and has got the President and his party into a mess"¹³. It is an open question whether Jordan really did believe in Yüan's innocence or, knowing his financial difficulty and precarious political position, helped him in softening the ire of the consortium by putting the blame entirely on T'ang.

Most historians agree that the dispute over the governor-generalship of Chihli was the immediate cause of T'ang's resignation. In the middle of March the provisional government of Nanking stipulated that governors-general and governors of provinces would henceforth be given the title of tu-tu and were to be elected by the provincial parliaments. Wang Chih-hsiang, a military officer who sided with the revolutionary party, was elected tu-tu by the Chihli parliament. The intention of the

¹²Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 148.

¹³Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Mar. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8. Jordan was obviously alluding to T'ang's support for a republic at the Shanghai peace conference of 1911-2 as one of his "tricks".

revolutionary members of the Chihli parliament was to keep Yüan under the close observation of Wang. T'ang at the time was still organising the cabinet in Nanking where the revolutionaries insisted on the government endorsing the Chihli election. On returning to Peking T'ang obtained a personal guarantee from Yüan for Wang's appointment. Wang was told to go to Peking to be officially appointed. On Wang's arrival the government received a circular telegram from the leaders of five Chihli divisions objecting to his appointment. Because of this Yüan decided to send Wang to Nanking to assist in the disbandment of troops instead. T'ang, eager to adhere to his promise to Nanking and maintain the faith of the government, refused to co-sign Wang's new commission. It was, however, released on 15 June without T'ang's signature. The next day T'ang left for Tientsin, leaving behind a letter of resignation¹⁴.

Jordan attributed the cause of T'ang's resignation mainly to the Belgian loan¹⁵. In fact he hardly mentioned the dispute over Wang. This reflects that much of Jordan's attention at this time was taken up by loans and finance rather than China's internal politics. During the deadlock created by the Belgian loan Jordan already predicted that T'ang Shao-i "will probably not last"¹⁶, anticipating his dismissal rather than resignation. Thus later he described T'ang's resignation as his "bolt to Tientsin"¹⁷. Despite his awareness of the sensation caused amongst the "Southern men" by T'ang's action there is no evidence of Jordan reading it as the first step by Yüan towards destroying the republic.¹⁸

¹⁴For details see T'ao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp. 134-5; and Ts'en, Liang, nien-p'u, vol. 1, p.121. Both assert with certainty that the telegram from the Chihli military leaders was Yüan's idea.

¹⁵Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1912, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 229.

¹⁶Jordan to Langley, private, 16 Apr. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

However, the incident serves to show the difference in Jordan's attitude towards Yüan Shih-k'ai and T'ang Shao-i.

In spite of Jordan's profession that he regarded both Yüan and T'ang as his "old friends" and was sorry to see the split between them¹⁹, Jordan was not in the least disturbed by T'ang's resignation. This reaction of Jordan was in great contrast to his attitude towards the dismissal of Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1909. In reporting the departure of T'ang Jordan commented: "Tong's emotional nature and general unsteadiness of purpose do not fit him to be a political leader." He further regarded T'ang as being presumptuous in tendering the resignation: "As negotiator between the north and south at the Shanghai conference Tong claimed to be the founder of the republic, and was inclined to arrogate to himself a largershare of authority than the President was disposed to yield"²⁰.

Lu Cheng-hsiang, a well-meaning diplomat who could easily be influenced by Yüan, succeeded T'ang Shao-i as premier for less than four months. And when, at the end of September, Chao Ping-chün acceded to the post, the cabinet came to be a truly pliant tool in the hands of Yüan Shih-k'ai.

The Assassination of Sung Chiao-jen.

Until the assassination of Sung Chiao-jen on 20 March, 1913, relations between Yüan Shih-k'ai and the revolutionary party were apparently harmonious. For example, the revolutionaries had protested only mildly against Yüan's unlawful execution of the two revolutionary generals,

¹⁷Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Jun. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

¹⁸Ibid., and Jordan to Grey, no.276, 28 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

¹⁹Jordan to Langley, private, 21 May 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

²⁰Jordan to Grey, no.276, 28 Jun. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1320.

Chang Chen-wu and Fang Wei²¹, and had supported the visits paid to Yüan by Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing in August and September, 1912²². Chinese internal politics during the first year of the republic was characterised by constant cabinet changes on the part of the government and the formation, disintegration, and allying of new political parties. The apparent harmonious relations between Yüan and the revolutionaries stemmed largely from the instability of the government on the one hand and the weakened position of the revolutionary party as it broke apart on the other. The internal split in the revolutionary movement marked by the formation of the Kung-ho Tang (Republican Party) by such prominent revolutionary leaders as Chang Ping-lin, Sun Wu, and Lan T'ien-wei with some former constitutionalists and members of the Manchu bureaucracy under the leadership of Li Yüan-hung. Other revolutionaries such as Ku Chung-hsiu and Wu Ching-lien formed the T'ung-iKung-ho Tang (United Republican Party). The position of the revolutionary party was somewhat retrieved when Sung Chiao-jen organised the Kuo-min Tang in August 1912, using the T'ung-meng Hui as a nucleus²³.

It has already been mentioned that Jordan's preoccupation with the Reorganisation Loan negotiations resulted in his paying scant attention to most of these internal changes. It was the assassination of Sung Chiao-jen and the subsequent uproar which brought his attention back to the

²¹It has been asserted that Yüan executed Chang, a bitter personal enemy of Li Yüan-hung, and Fang, Chang's subordinate, to further secure the loyalty of Li Yüan-hung who was then a popular public figure, Farjanel, Through the Chinese Revolution, p. 231; T'ao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp.138-41. Jordan, however, thought that the government's argument that Chang and Fang were guilty of sedition "can scarcely be disputed", Jordan to Grey, no. 358, 28 Aug. 1912, Ch. Corres., vol. 1322.

²²Details of the meetings amongst Yüan, Sun, Huang, and Li Yüan-hung are available in, for example, Ts'en, Liang, nien-p'u, vol. 1, pp.122-4; and T'ao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp. 147-51.

Chinese political scene.

After founding the Kuo-min Tang, Sung Chiao-jen remained as its actual leader with Sun Yat-sen as nominal chairman²⁴. Sung was a staunch advocate of the responsible cabinet system and local self-government. These two political ideals of the Kuo-min Tang were heresy to Yüan Shih-k'ai²⁵. Sung toured round Hunan, Hupei, Anhwei, and Kiangsu, propagating his political ideals with the aim of winning more Kuo-min Tang seats in the provincial assemblies and the parliament which were to be convened in early 1913. In his speeches Sung did not hesitate to attack Yüan's government.²⁶ Recalling his attitude towards the constitutional movement during the last years of the Manchu dynasty it is to be expected that Jordan disagreed with Sung. He asserted that it was by "a gross display of corruption and intimidation" that the Kuo-min Tang achieved its success in the elections for the provincial assemblies which were completed by the end of January²⁷.

By March, 1913 elections for the national parliament clearly indicated that there would be a Kuo-min Tang majority. It was naturally expected

²³ Good analyses of party formation, affiliation, and their significance are found in T'ao, Shih-hua, vol. 1, pp 142-5; and Yu Jun-t'ang etc., Chung-kuo tang-tai cheng-tang lun, [Political parties in present-day China] (Canton, 1948), pp. 29-31.

²⁴ Sun felt that the Three People's Principles were especially neglected by Sung, Tsou, Shih-kao, vol. 1, pp. 143-5; Chang, Tang-shih kai-yao, vol. 1, pp. 144-5; for a defence of Sung, see Chang Chi, Chang P'u chüan hsien-sheng chüan-chi, [Works of Chang Chi], (Taipei, 1951), vol. 1, pp. 31-2.

²⁵ See political principles of the Kuo-min Tang in Yu Jun-t'ang, Chung-kuo tang-tai cheng-tang lun, p.30.

²⁶ For example in a large party meeting held in Peking on 21 July 1912 Sung declared the government to be useless and expounded on the necessity of a government by the T'ung-meng Hui, S.K. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, (London 1916), p. 73. About half a month before his death, Sung gave a speech in Nanking criticising the government as degenerating and unpopular, Li, "Huang K'o-ch'iang hsien-sheng nien-p'u kao", p. 359.

that Sung would be the new premier as a result of his party's position in the parliament. But on 20 March, just before leaving for Peking to consult Yüan Shih-k'ai on political matters in preparation for the opening of the parliament in early April, Sung Chiao-jen was shot in the back at the North Station in Shanghai. Two days later he died from his wounds²⁸.

Sung's death quickly evolved into a serious political crisis. Soon after the murder the assassin, Wu Shih-ying, and the alleged instigator, Ying Kuei-hsing, were arrested and held in custody by the authorities of the French and the International Settlements respectively. On 28 March, Jordan received from the Wai-chiao Pu a notification requesting him, as the doyen, to remit Wu, Ying, and all the witnesses to the Chinese authorities on the grounds that the crime was committed in Chinese territory. Before consulting the other ministers Jordan tentatively approved Fraser's suggestion that they should insist on the accused being tried by the Mixed Court to ascertain if the crime had truly been committed in the settlements and if so whether a prima facie case could be established²⁹.

Soon afterwards Jordan learned from Fraser that the Municipal Police of the International Settlement had in their possession documentary evidence³⁰ indicating that Ying had instigated the crime under orders

²⁷ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1912, Ch. Conf. Print, vol.229.

²⁸ Details of the assassination are available in Li, "Huang K'o-ch'iang hsien-sheng nien-p'u kao", pp. 359-60.

²⁹ Jordan to Grey, tel. 77, 29 Mar. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1623; Jordan to Fraser, tel. 6, 29 Mar. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), vol. 1875. Later the British authority asserted that claim of jurisdiction over Ying was mainly established on the fact that the arrest was made in the settlement, Fraser to Jordan, tel. 14, 31 Mar. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol.1875.

³⁰ Later in a telegram to Grey, Jordan explained that the evidence consisted

from Hung Shu-tsu, the private secretary of premier Chao-Ping-chün. Jordan was further told that the Kuo-min Tang members were aware of such evidence and that Ying Kuei-hsing had telegraphed Peking urging that Jordan and the French minister should be moved to intervene.

Knowing Jordan's sympathy for Yüan, Fraser, however, said:

"I do not see any advantage in trying to have evidence withheld or holding sitting in camera and I think men and papers must be handed over if there is reasonable evidence of guilt"³¹.

Fraser expanded his view in a despatch written the same day:

"The best thing for every body seems to be to let the counsel on each side... have a free hand; after all, there is no real evidence against Yuan and no direct evidence against Chao, so far as I know, though Ying may implicate them in his despair"³².

Fraser's suggestion reflected his certainty that Jordan would be on the side of Yüan in any internal strife in which he was involved.

Jordan agreed with Fraser's view³³. Evidence of Yüan's implication was too strong to be overlooked. It would be unsound policy to involve Britain in a Chinese political scandal. He was further convinced of Yüan's guilt when he learned that the French consul-general at Shanghai had been asked by the commissioner of foreign affairs of Tientsin to delay the trial proceedings against Wu as long as possible until he had seen all evidence compromising the government. At the same time Colonel Bruce of the Municipal Police was asked to keep Ying in his custody also as long as possible.³⁴

of a special private code sent to Ying by Hung and telegrams in the same code between them. Amongst the telegrams was one from Ying to Hung after the assassination reporting that the "arch criminal had been removed". There was also a letter from Hung to Ying promising a large reward if the "great object" was fulfilled, Jordan to Grey, no. 143, conf., 3 Apr., see also no. 182, 3 May 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1623.

³¹ Fraser to Jordan, tel. 13, conf., 28 Mar. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.

The Mixed Court had its first hearing of the Sung case on 12 April when it reported to the senior consul that a prima facie case could be established against Ying Kuei-hsing. Three days later the Consular Body agreed to the rendition of Ying under a written guarantee from the Chinese authority that the accused would be given a fair trial before a regular court. The rendition took place on 22 April³⁵.

Later developments of the assassination confirmed Jordan that he had acted correctly in not interfering for Yüan showed himself capable of controlling the situation. In spite of the news from Fraser at the beginning of April that the Kuo-min Tang leaders in Shanghai had decided on the political elimination of Yüan by force³⁶ Jordan observed that on 8 April the parliament opened "smoothly and everything is quiet," at least on the surface³⁷. As for the undercurrent of tension Jordan thought that there could only be two ways of removing it: a compromise or a showdown between Yüan and the Kuo-min Tang. In early April Jordan was optimistic about a compromise: "the present struggle between the north and south, like any street brawl, will probably terminate in both sides eventually adjusting their differences in deferance to the counsels of peace makers". Failing a compromise, on

³² Fraser to Jordan, despatch, conf., 28 Mar. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.

³³ Jordan to Fraser, tel. 6, 29 Mar. Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.

³⁴ The Tientsin commissioner was used to dilute the taint of government's implication, Fraser to Jordan, tel. 14, 31 Mar. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.

³⁵ Fraser to Jordan, tel. 14, 31 Mar., tel. 19, 12 Apr., tel. 20, 15 Apr., no. 51, 22 Apr. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.

³⁶ Fraser to Jordan, tel. 15, v. conf., 2 Apr. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.

³⁷ Jordan to Grey, no. 149, 9 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.
See also Huang, Yüan-sheng i-chu, vol. 2, p. 84 on the uneasy peace after Sung's death.

the other hand, Jordan was confident that Yüan would come out of an armed struggle successfully with his troops of about 100,000 strong who were ["]immeasurably superior to any forces which the south can command."³⁸ Yüan's position was further strengthened by the conclusion of the Reorganisation Loan four days after the rendition of Ying Kuei-hsing to the Chinese court.

The Second Revolution

A compromise between the Kuo-min Tang and Yüan Shih-k'ai was not to take place. Events moved fast after the conclusion of the Reorganisation Loan towards what is commonly known as the "second revolution".

On learning of the death of Sung Chiao-jen, Sun Yat-sen hurried back to Shanghai from Japan on 25 March. There he met with other Kuo-min Tang leaders at Huang Hsing's house to consider steps to be taken against Yüan. Sun Yat-sen favoured the immediate use of force to expel Yüan from office. Huang Hsing and Huang Fu deprecated the use of arms on two grounds: first, it did not appear to be right to resort to force when it might be possible to punish Yüan through legal and constitutional means; secondly, the party was simply not ready for an armed clash with Yüan. They realised that the Kuo-min Tang provinces of Hunan, Kuangsi, Anhwei, and Kuangtung had still to grapple with problems of internal order and military discipline. Their argument gained the support of most Kuo-min Tang leaders then at Shanghai and, rather than arming themselves, they set about organising a special court to ensure a fair trial of the Sung case. The special court was, of course, rejected by Yüan's government which insisted that the case be tried by the tu-tu

³⁸ Jordan to Grey, no. 143, conf., 3 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1623.

and the civil commissioner of Kiangsu in a regular court. The Kuo-min Tang continued to adhere to a policy of constitutional opposition even after the conclusion of the Reorganisation Loan and after Yüan's refusal to allow Chao Ping-chün to appear as a witness in the Sung case as decided on by the Shanghai court and as demanded by the Kuo-min Tang. Chao, who had been on "sick leave" for a period after Sung's death, finally resigned on 1 May.³⁹

The Kuo-min Tang, it should be noted, was not even then a united party. Two factions were discernable in the Peking assembly. One stood for a legal solution to the political problem. The other preferred to use force and many of this group left for Shanghai with the intention of initiating hostilities. Many other nominal Kuo-min Tang members succumbed easily to Yüan's bribery and gave up their party membership. The conclusion of the Reorganisation Loan not only enabled Yüan to bribe more Kuo-min Tang members but furnish Liang Ch'i-ch'ao with ample funds to organise the Chin-pu Tang (Progressive Party), an amalgam of the T'ung-i Tang, (United Party), Min-chu Tang (Democratic Party), and Kung-ho Tang, which, with the Kuo-min Tang, were the chief parties in the Peking assembly. The Chin-pu Tang soon became something of a government organ in the new parliament in opposition to the Kuo-min Tang.⁴⁰

³⁹ Details of the dissension, weakness of the Kuo-min Tang in Shanghai and the provinces, the special court, and Chao are found in Shen, "Pu-hsin ti erh-t'zũ ko-ming", pp. 17-20; Li, "Huang K'o-ch'iang hsien sheng nien-p'u kao", pp. 362-3, 365, 369-70; P'an Kung-chan, Ch'en Ch'i-mei, [Biography of Ch'en Ch'i-mei], (Taipei, 1954), pp. 57-8 and Chin Wen-ssu etc. (ed.), Huang Ying-po (Fu) hsien-sheng ku-chiu kan-i lu, Memorial volume for Huang, in CHS ts'ung-shu, pp. 164-5. Chao Ping-chün was poisoned in early spring the next year in his position as tu-tu of Chihli. Almost all chinese historians agree that he was poisoned by Yüan to prevent him from betraying his guilt in Sung's death, but Jordan thought that his death was caused by Kuo-min Tang members, Jordan to Grey, no. 88, 2 Mar. 1914, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 214

⁴⁰ Tsou, then a member of parliament representing Kuangtung, Hui-ku lu pp. 53-4; and Tsou Lu wen-ts'un, [Collections of Tsou], (Peking, 1930), pt. 5, p.10; Yüan-sheng i-chu, vol. 2, p. 101.

On 29 April Yüan asked for a confidential interview with Jordan. After thanking Britain for her rôle in the Reorganisation Loan and commenting on the Sung case, Yüan sounded out Jordan on the political situation. Yüan told Jordan that Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing wanted to reduce him to a figurehead if not eliminate him entirely. He said that he had received reports saying that Kuangtung and Kiangsi were contemplating an independent movement. He then asked Jordan if the powers would be satisfied with the rise of Sun and Huang to power and, if not, would they adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards him if he should find it necessary to use force against the recalcitrant provinces.

Jordan stated in reply that it was well-known that Grey's policy had always been for a strong and united China. Although deprecating the idea of a civil war, he assured Yüan that "the feeling among the foreign representatives at Peking were practically unanimous in favour of his own continuance in office". His personal opinion was that "his retirement would be a great misfortune". He further rid Yüan of his fear of Japan's help to the Kuo-min Tang by assuring Yüan that the Japanese minister shared his view⁴¹. Grey, however, was not as outspoken in supporting Yüan⁴².

Jordan came out of the interview knowing that another civil war was unavoidable. He realised that although the Kuo-min Tang might be trying to avoid an armed collision yet its insistence on Yüan being bound by constitutional regulations was in effect tantamount to insistence on a showdown. This he regarded as the "root cause" of the struggle between

⁴¹Jordan to Grey, tel. 104 v. conf., 29 Apr. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.

⁴²Grey to Jordan, tel. 122, 1 May 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.

Yüan and the Kuo-min Tang.⁴³

The repeated overtures of the Kuo-min Tang during May to remove the tension by constitutional means appeared futile to Jordan. Early in May Jordan learned that Colonel Bruce, who was on intimate terms with the Shanghai Kuo-min Tang leaders, was told by Sun that force would not be used against Yüan⁴⁴. On 6 May Fraser told Jordan that the Kuo-min Tang leaders were perturbed by the movement of government troops into Hupei and reiterated their desire to avoid fighting⁴⁵. In the middle of May the Kuo-min Tang asked the missionary Timothy Richard to enquire whether Jordan would mediate between Yüan and the party. It had decided to agree on the retention of Yüan as president on condition that he would apportion offices equally among the parties, establish an audit of public expenditure, give the Sung case a fair trial, and be controlled by constitutional laws. In return the party would abandon its attack on the government⁴⁶. On 20 May Jordan learned that E.S. Little of Messrs. Brunner, Mond, and Company in Shanghai, who was closely related with the Kuo-min Tang was about to go to Peking to lay before Yüan the Kuo-min Tang's proposal for removing the strain⁴⁷. To these suggestions of mediation, unlike the revolution of 1911, Jordan firmly replied that he feared "no foreigners could hope to do any good by interfering in such a question."⁴⁸

⁴³ Jordan deals with the "root cause" of the second revolution at length in Jordan to Grey, no. 211, 19 May 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.

⁴⁴ Fraser to Jordan, tel. 27, 1 May 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.

⁴⁵ Fraser to Jordan, tel. 29, 6 May 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.

⁴⁶ Fraser to Jordan, tel. 33, 16 May 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875. Fraser however, thought that this application for mediation was a test of the attitude of the powers whom the Kuo-min Tang suspected for having promised Yüan their unqualified support.

⁴⁷ Fraser to Jordan, tel. 34. conf., 20 May 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.

⁴⁸ Jordan to Fraser, tel. 20, 17 May 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1875.

By the end of May both sides were preparing for an armed conflict. The Kuo-min Tang realised that Yüan would not accept their peace offers. Jordan learned that in a dinner given in his honour Baron Kato, who was then visiting China, was asked pointedly by Sun Yat-sen how far the Kuo-min Tang could rely on Japan's support in its coming struggle against the government⁴⁹. By then Huang Hsing had already been stripped of his military rank and denounced by the government. Large bodies of government troops were moving into the Yangtze area. And Yüan publicly rejected Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan's offer of mediation by saying that the question was not the difference between the north and south but the submission of provinces to the central authority.⁵⁰

Before going on leave Jordan, in a farewell interview on 4 June, gave Yüan his blessings on crushing the Kuo-min Tang. In the meeting Yüan assured Jordan that the position of the Kuo-min Tang provinces was far from being formidable and that he had the situation of the Yangtze area firmly under control. To give more security to the government position in the Yangtze he had only to remove the Kuo-min Tang tu-tu of Kiangsi, Li Lieh-chün. He would then turn his attention to Canton. Yüan stated firmly that he was "determined at all costs to secure the unification of the provinces under the central government".

As for the situation in Peking, Yüan was then mainly concerned with his election to the presidency. He was certain that he would be the first president because even the Kuo-min Tang could not decide on an alternative candidate. However, he refused to be a figurehead president whose powers were to be limited by party cabinets and other regulations.

⁴⁹ Jordan to Grey, no. 217, conf., 23 May 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.

⁵⁰ For example, Ch'en Po-ta, Chieh-kuo ta-tao Yüan Shih-k'ai, [Yüan Shih-k'ai, the destroyer of the republic], (Peking, 1954) p. 21, quoting Shih Pao, 24 May 1913.

He would set about to educate members of parliament in the true requirements of the country.

Jordan replied that a strong centralised government was absolutely essential to bring about a unification of China's finances. Instead of deprecating civil war as he did in the interview of 29 April he "hoped that no more force than was necessary would be used to bring the provinces into line". He then expressed appreciation on behalf of the Diplomatic Body of the ability with which Yüan had kept China together in face of overwhelming difficulties during the eighteen months before. He regretted that he could not witness Yüan's inauguration as the president and assured him that Britain would recognise the republic as soon as the president was elected.

Once Jordan's support was gained on the principal point Yüan turned to the practical details. He asked for Jordan's assistance in preventing the import of arms into Canton from Hongkong, the sanction of loans to the provinces, and the using of the Shanghai International Settlement as a shelter by political agitators.

Jordan stated that he had already arranged with the Wai-chiao Pu that the Hongkong government would not issue an export permit of arms unless against a permit issued by the Chinese Ministry of War and after notifying the British legation. By this arrangement one large consignment of arms for Canton had already been held up. He would, however, remind the governor of Hongkong again on the point. As far as provincial loans were concerned, they would certainly not be sanctioned without the approval of the central government. The problem of the Shanghai settlement was more complicated because of the international character

of that port. But the Diplomatic Body under his doyenship had always objected to the use of the settlement as a basis for agitators' activities, and it would certainly continue to do so. Jordan's support for Yüan could not have been more explicit than this⁵¹.

On 9 June, three days after Jordan's departure, Yüan dismissed Li Lieh-chün from his post as tu-tu of Kiangsi. On 14 and 30 June the Kuo-min Tang tu-tus, Hu Han-min and Po Wen-wei were respectively dismissed from Kuangtung and Anhwei. The second revolution began on 12 July with Li Lieh-chün's declaration of independence at Hukou. Huang Hsing took up military command at Nanking on 14 July. Two days later Ch'en Ch'i-mei became independent at Shanghai. With the flight of Huang Hsing from Nanking on 29 July the revolution ended as a quick defeat of the Kuo-min Tang.

Despite Jordan's absence it is essential to view the second revolution in relation to the Reorganisation Loan in which he had played a clear rôle. Out of £21,000,000 realised by the Reorganisation Loan over £10,500,000 was assigned to the payment of matured or maturing liabilities of the Chinese government, £3,000,000 to disbandment of troops, £5,500,000 to "current expenses of administration", and £2,000,000 to reorganisation of the Salt administration⁵². Immediately after the problem over the Austrian Contracts was settled regular advances of loan funds were paid over to the Chinese government. According to the British legation it was impossible to state the exact amount of loan funds that was expended on the second revolution. However, it is estimated that during the summer

⁵¹ Barton's record of the interview in Jordan to Grey, no. 234, 5 Jun. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.

⁵² MacMurray, Treaties, vol. 2, p.1013. Only £21,000,000 was realised because the loan was made at the issue price of 84% and the interest rate of 5%.

and autumn months of 1913 Yüan's government received about £8,000,000 of loan money over which supervision as required by the loan agreement had no effect⁵³. It is obvious that the £8,000,000 was originally earmarked for current administrative expenses and the disbandment of troops. In fact Chou Hsüeh-hsi, the minister of finance who signed the Reorganisation Loan Agreement, resigned and went to Tsing-tao in opposition to Yüan's violation of the loan agreement in using the money which was meant for the disbandment of troops to crush the Kuo-min Tang⁵⁴. It appears that part of the funds assigned to the reorganisation of the salt gabelle was also used by Yüan to ensure his success⁵⁵.

The importance of the Reorganisation Loan is significantly shown in the fact that the loyalty of the Chinese navy was at the last minute bought by Yüan with the loan money. The loyalty of the navy under Admiral Li Ting-sing was vital to the government's position in the Yangtze especially considering that the navy had its base at Shanghai where most of the Kuo-min Tang leaders aggregated. A detailed eye-witness account, by W.F. Tyler, a self-proclaimed "strong partisan of Yüan" who had had an intimate relationship with the Chinese navy during the Sino-Japanese War and was working in the Customs at Shanghai in 1913, describes how an imminent mutiny of the navy was narrowly averted by the admiral's timely access to loan funds:

⁵³ Jordan to Grey, annual report for 1913, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 229.

⁵⁴ Chou Shu-chen, grand-daughter of Chou Hsüeh-hsi, Chou Chih-an hsien sheng pieh-ch'uan, [Biography of Chou Hsüeh-hsi], (Shanghai, 1947), p.81.

⁵⁵ Chiang Ching-i, Chung-kuo yen-cheng wen-t'i, [The salt problem in China] (Shanghai, 1936), pp. 134-5. Here the author asserts that part of the money assigned to the reorganisation of the salt gabelle was illegally used by Yüan to crush the revolution in opposition to his monarchical movement in 1916. This is untrue because the Reorganisation Loan was completely spent by April 1914. If there had been any irregularities

On 17 July, Tyler decided to visit Admiral Li because he was puzzled by the fact that the fleet was still anchored opposite the arsenal when there was definite news that the Kuo-min Tang was about to attack the arsenal. Admiral Li told Tyler that in a meeting on board the day before two captains threatened with their mauser rifles to carry the rest of the crew with them to the side of the Kuo-min Tang. This was serious news to Tyler who feared that the immediate outcome would be a joint attack on the arsenal by the Kuo-min Tang and the navy. Admiral Li then suggested that an immediate supply of about a million taels might save the situation in that the fleet had not been paid for two months and the Kuo-min Tang promised to pay it if it would defect from the government.

After having left Admiral Li, Tyler immediately called on A. G. Stephen, manager of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, about the possibility of using the considerable reserve of Chinese government money which the group banks held against Chinese liabilities. Stephen gave no immediate answer.

On 18 July Tyler was introduced to Admiral Tseng Ju-cheng, a faithful partisan of Yüan Shih-k'ai. Admiral Tseng told Tyler that money must be obtained by noon the next day as he expected the attack on the arsenal to take place the next night. The same day Tyler met Admiral Jerram of the "Newcastle", just arrived in Shanghai, and the British acting consul-general, Fulford. Jerram was encouraging towards Tyler's efforts in saving the navy for the government, but Fulford was cautious. Tyler himself admitted that his intervention was not correct but it was the lesser evil compared with the downfall of Yüan Shih-k'ai.

in this aspect it was most likely to be in connection with the revolution of 1913.

On 19 July Tyler received a cheque of a quarter-of-a-million taels together with the guarantee of further advances on condition that he would administer the funds. A telegram from the chief secretary of the Customs Inspectorate-general, C.A.V. Brown, giving him freedom to act at his discretion, removed all uneasiness that Tyler had about implicating the Customs in internal politics.

Tyler immediately rented a flat as a naval office in which he acted as the treasurer. He told Admirals Li and Tseng to call another meeting of the captains and assure them of pay. The admirals were immediately furnished with funds in return for which they had to provide a summary of expenditure for each vessel. The Kuo-min Tang attack on the arsenal took place on 23 July, the government troops were assisted in their defence of the arsenal by the Chinese men-of-war anchored off Shanghai⁵⁶.

Tyler's account was supplemented by the Foreign Office archives which explained what had taken place in the Shanghai office of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Shanghai consulate-general, the British legation and the consortium which led to the release of the funds administered by Tyler. Having known from Tyler the situation of the navy, Stephen called on Fulford and asked if a British naval man could act as the paymaster-general to guarantee the loyalty of the navy. Fulford deprecated the suggestion and proposed that Stephen should wire Hillier in Peking to see if funds could be drawn from the Reorganisation Loan and if a man of the bank could carry out the scheme privately with the navy⁵⁷. Stephen telegraphed Hillier accordingly and stressed that unless the fleet helped Peking actively the conflagration would be prolonged

⁵⁶W. F. Tyler, Pulling Strings in China, (London, 1929), pp. 230-7.

⁵⁷Fulford to Alston, no. 93, conf., 19 Jul. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 671) vol. 357.

with serious consequences, especially with Nanking having just declared its independence.⁵⁸ Hillier consulted Alston, acting minister in Jordan's absence, who in turn consulted the other four ministers of the consortium powers and together they sanctioned the immediate advance of funds to the Chinese admirals through the banks in Shanghai⁵⁹.

The Reorganisation Loan funds were also used to secure the loyalty of the government troops guarding the Shanghai arsenal under the command of Tseng Ju-cheng and the allegiance of Chang Hsün who, it is alleged, had previously encouraged the governor of Mukden to declare independence in return for a bribe from Japan⁶⁰. The use of the Reorganisation Loan money as bribery can be summed up with the words of Alston's report on the revolution: "It must, in the first place, be conceded that the principal weapon used by the Central Government and its supporters has been bribery. No decisive success in the field was gained by the northern generals nor anything in the nature of a 'lesson' inflicted on the rebel forces. Desultory fighting ... was followed, in almost every case, by protracted negotiations, resulting in the fixing of a definite price at which the leaders were prepared to be 'bought off' and the men to disperse after laying down their arms and receiving a bonus in cash."⁶¹

When Jordan resumed duties in late November Yüan Shih-k'ai had not only crushed the second revolution but had been formally elected president. Four days after the election, on 10 October, Yüan's government was

⁵⁸Text of Stephen's telegram, 17 Jul. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), vol. 2498.

⁵⁹Alston to Fulford, tel. 20 Jul. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2498; and Alston to Grey, tel. 164, 20 Jul. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1624.

⁶⁰Tyler, Pulling Strings in China, pp. 240-1; and Alston to Grey, no. 320, draft, 15 Aug. 1913, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), vol. 2500.

⁶¹Alston to Grey, no. 367, 22 Sept. 1913, Ch. Corres., vol. 1625.

recognised by the powers with the exception of America who had given her recognition half a year before. To prevent the heavily Kuo-min Tang inspired Draft Constitution of the Altar of Heaven (T'ien-t'an hsien-fa ts'ao-an) from passing Yüan Shih-k'ai, on 4 November, rid the parliament of a quorum by simply expelling from it all Kuo-min Tang members. Soon after Jordan's return an advisory body known as the Administrative Council (Cheng-ch'ih Hui-i) was organised for Yüan by the prime minister, Hsiung Hsi-ling, in the place of the disabled parliament. Jordan later made an interesting remark on the organ: "Yuan Shih-k'ai has thrown off the mask and is attempting to govern China very much on the British Crown Colony system. He has an Administrative Council which is a much more pliant instrument of his will than the ordinary Legislative Council is in the hands of a British Colonial Governor"⁶². On 10 January 1914 Yüan dissolved the parliament and less than two months later he ordered the dissolution of all the provincial assemblies and self-governing bodies throughout the country.

Having removed most of the obvious obstacles to power Yüan set about positively to establish his autocracy over China. The Administrative Council, in deference to his wish, appointed a select committee to amend and revise the Nanking Provisional Constitution into what was officially designated as the Constitutional Compact of the Chinese Republic (Chung-hua min-kuo yo-fa), but more aptly Yüan's constitution, promulgated on 1 May 1914. The compact greatly increased the power of the president, thus limiting that of the legislature in proportion. The president was to appoint all cabinet ministers and other officials;

⁶² Jordan to Langley, private, 8 Feb. 1914; Jordan Papers, vol. 12.

to conduct foreign affairs independently and declare war; to draft, together with the new Council of State, and promulgate the constitution; and to issue emergency decrees and financial measures. The Council of State, (Ts'an-cheng Yüan) provided by the compact and composed of members selected on a highly conservative basis, was established in late June in the place of the Administrative Council as an advisory organ to the president. At the end of December the Council of State drew up a revised Law for the Presidential Election which significantly provided that the president was to be in office for ten years, and eligible for re-election. Moreover, he was to nominate three candidates from whom the new president would be elected. Besides taking quasi-constitutional steps to confirm his autocracy, Yüan Shih-k'ai consolidated his military hold over the provinces by appointing as high provincial authorities only those who were committed to his cause⁶³.

Needless to say, Jordan was satisfied with these developments. For the first time since 1906 there was some semblance of a strong central government in China, something which he had been obsessed about. When World War I broke out he had become much more optimistic about the situation in China. This optimism stemmed largely from what he considered as a marked improvement in China's finances as a result of centralisation. Jordan noticed that the central government was receiving an increasing amount of revenue from the provinces⁶⁴. The centralisation of salt

⁶³For details of Yüan's autocratic measures between July 1913 and December 1914, see Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, pp. 48-58; F.W. Houn, Central Government of China 1912-1928, (Wisconsin, 1959), pp. 86-92; Liu, Chung-kuo hsien-cheng shih-hua, pp. 48-51; Ch'ien Tuan-sheng etc., Min-kuo cheng-chih shih, [History of the Administrative system of the republic], (Shanghai, 1946), vol. 1, pp. 66-103.

⁶⁴Jordan to Langley, private, 20 Apr. 1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12.

administration began to show its effect by 1914 when there was a marked increase in the monthly yield of revenue⁶⁵. Salt continued to do well during the early months of the War⁶⁶. Between the Customs and the Salt Jordan knew that China could repay her foreign liabilities with confidence. This accounted for his accommodating attitude towards the talks for a fresh reorganisation loan for China in April 1914⁶⁷. About three months after the War began Jordan was still sanguine about China, although a shadow had already been cast by Japan's action in Shangtung:

"China is going along quietly, keeping her head above water and just managing to pay her way financially. Unless there are some unexpected complications, I see no reason to be apprehensive about the immediate future."⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Jordan to Langley, private, 30 Nov. 1913; 4 May 1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12. Also W.R.S., "The Chinese Salt Administration", in Remer (ed.), Readings in Economics for China, (Shanghai, 1922), p. 289.

⁶⁶ Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Oct., 24 Nov., 1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12.

⁶⁷ Jordan to Langley, private, 6 Apr. 1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12.

⁶⁸ Jordan to Langley, private, 25 Oct. 1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12.

Chapter Seven

The Monarchical Movement

The monarchical movement which was formally inaugurated with the founding of the Chou-an Hui (Society for the planning of peace) in August, 1915 was the most important domestic question in China between August, 1914, the outbreak of World War I, and June, 1916, the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai. It has been current before the War started that Yüan entertained imperialist ambitions. The saying seemed to have been borne out by his increasingly autocratic policies after the 1913 revolution; his worship, in late 1913 and early 1914, of Heaven and Confucius which was a traditional imperial prerogative; and his obvious connivance at the seditious expressions of such advocates of imperialist restoration under the former Ch'ing dynasty as Sung Yu-jen and Jung Nai-hsüan in 1914¹. During the crisis of the 21 demands it was alleged that Yüan had accepted Japan's offer to support him as emperor if he would concede her demands². But it

1. Huang I, Yüan-shih tao-kuo chi in CHS ts'ung-shu p.21; Tao, Shih-hua, vol. 2, pp. 90-4. Jordan also refers to this agitation for Manchu restoration in Jordan to Langley, private, 2 Dec., 1914, Jordan Papers, vol. 12.
2. The allegation has both been supported and repudiated. For support see, for example, Putnam Weale, The Fight, pp. 123-4, 146; Liu Yen, Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih, [History of Foreign relations of China] (Taipei, 1962) p.446; Liu Yen, Ti-kuo chu-i ya-p'o Chung-kuo shih, [China under the oppression of imperialism] (Shanghai, 1927), p.66; and Pai Chiao, Yüan Shih-k'ai yü Chung-hua min-kuo, p.139. For repudiation see, Chang, Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao shih, p.180; and Wang Yün-sheng, Liu-shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo yü Jih-pen, [Documents on Sino-Japanese relations for the past sixty years] (Tientsin, 1932-4), vol. 7, pp. 1-2.

In my opinion it was not likely that Yüan had accepted the bribe; had it been offered at all. Yüan was extremely careful in negotiating with the Japanese. The negotiation lasted four months in which there were over twenty conferences. Yüan released the long censored press to agitate against Japan, see Chow Ts'e-tung,

is a fact that in early 1915 Yüan Shih-kai attempted by bribery to obtain Liang Chi-ch'ao's support for his monarchical scheme³. Active preparations were temporarily abandoned in the following months as negotiations with Japan on the twenty-one demands were under way. Immediately after negotiations drew to a close, Yüan Shih-kai redirected his full attention to the monarchy question. The three months between the signing of the Sino-Japanese convention and the establishment of the Ch'ou-an Hui were characterised by rumours in Peking that a Yüan dynasty was at hand. Feng Kuo-chang went personally to Peking at the end of June to find out the truth from Yüan. To Feng, whose objection to Yüan taking the crown was obvious, Yüan emphatically denied his imperialist intention.⁴ But soon afterwards the governors-general of Shantung, Kiangsi, Shansi, Mukden and Hupei, together with Chang Tso-lin, were called to Peking, ostensibly to report on their posts. There their allegiance to the monarchy was won.⁵ The monarchy was still under cover.

The May Fourth Movement, (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) p.21. The revolutionary Huang Hsing telegraphed from abroad giving Yüan his support, Chün-tu Hsüeh, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, (Stanford, 1961), p. 53. After the Sino-Japanese treaty was signed Yüan expressed to Jordan his pride in successfully rejecting the fifth group of Japan's demands, see Jordan to Langley, private, 10 Jun., 1915, Jordan Papers Vol. 13. It was obvious that Japan's hatred of Yüan increased after the twenty-one demands incident and she determined to oust Yüan from the Chinese scene, Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, p. 194. However, the allegation of Yüan being bribed, true or otherwise, gained currency.

3. Liang refused Yüan his support. Soon after the appearance of the Ch'ou-an Hui Liang publicly denounced the monarchy by releasing an article entitled "I-tsai so-wei Kuo-ti wen-t'i che". [What strangeness, the so-called question of the form of government.] Liang refused to withhold the publication under

The Ch'ou-an Hui was the first step towards publicising the monarchy. Its aim was to study (yen-chiu) the question as to which was the most suitable form of government (kuo-t'i) for China⁶. However, the fact that its manifesto took up the argument of Professor F. J. Goodnow⁷ made the result of the study a foregone conclusion. It was only at this stage that the seriousness of Yüan's monarchical desire began to dawn on Jordan. Until then, Jordan had assumed that Yüan was content with the autocratic powers that he had, which equalled that of any emperor in old China⁸.

The monarchical movement was the first and only important domestic crisis in the regime of Yüan Shih-k'ai during World War I. The power balance in China underwent important changes during the War. Concentrating on her struggle against Germany, Britain withdrew her squadron from the Far East, leaving her established interests mainly to the protection of Japan. Japan inherited the dominant rôle in China which had hitherto been Britain's. She also

a bribe of 20,000 dollars, Liang Chi-ch'ao, Tun-pi chi, [Collected cables, documents, articles etc. in support of the Yunnan declaration of independence against the régime of Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1916] in CCS ts'ung-k'an, pt. 4, p.80, and J.R. Levonson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China, (London, 1965), p.179. For an English translation of Liang's article, see Putnam Weale, The Fight, pp. 142-58.

4. Liang Chi-ch'ao, Yin-ping-shih wen-chi, [Collected works and essays of the Ice-Drinker's Studio] (Shanghai, 1925), Vol.56, p. 14(b); T'ao, Shih-hua, Vol.2, p. 99; and Putnam Weale, The Fight, p.137, Note 1.
5. T'ao Shih-hua, vol.2, pp. 103-4; T'ao, Liu-chün-tzŭ chuan, [Biography of the six gentlemen], (Shanghai, 1948), pp.264-5. An analysis of Chang Tso-lin's intention in supporting Yüan's monarchy is given in Sonoda Ikki, Kaiketsu chō saku-rin. [Biography of Chang Tso-lin] (Tokyo 1923), pp. 88-90, and of Yen Fu in B. Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power, Yen Fu and the West, (Harvard Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 223-8.

saw to it that her new gain would be fully exploited to her advantage. Britain and her allies could do nothing, for Japan's help was badly needed in tracking German cruisers in the China Seas, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, in conveying troops from India and Australia to European fronts and above all, in supplying munitions and war materials especially to Russia. Yüan's monarchical movement synchronised with the most bitter losses of the Allies on the two fronts. Thus Japan's war contribution was most urgently needed and her influence in China increased in proportion to the need of her allies. Hence, a study of Jordan's attitude towards Japan is a prerequisite for understanding his attitude towards the monarchical movement in which Japan played a predominant rôle.

Jordan and Japan

Throughout the second part of his consular and diplomatic service⁹, Jordan had many opportunities to come into contact with Japan. He was the Consul-general at Seoul during the decade between the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars; a period when Russia and Japan rivalled each other for predominance in Korea. Jordan was then clearly pro-Japanese. He found Russian influence over the corrupt Korean court

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6. The society was formally established on 23 August under Yang Tu, Yüan's trusted henchman, and five others who were henceforth known as the "six gentlemen". For manifesto embodying its aim, see Huang, Yüan-Shih tao-kuo chi, p.28. For details of the "six gentlemen" see T'ao, lu-chün-tzu chuan, pp.238-40.
 7. Professor Goodnow had been at one time adviser to Yüan. He was invited to spend his 1915 summer vacation in Peking. In June he presented his famous memorandum advocating monarchy as the most suitable form of government for China. For text, see Pai Chiao, Yüan Shih-K'ai yü chung-hua min-kuo, pp. 162-174. For full original text, see Peking Gazette, 17 Aug. 1915, in Jordan to Grey, no. 214, 25 Aug. 1915, Ch. Corres. Vol. 2338.

extremely distasteful especially during the three or four years before the Russo-Japanese War¹⁰. Japan was Britain's ally and Russia's activities in Manchuria resembled robbery. He was even annoyed with Japan in behaving towards Russia with such moderation that was "interpreted as a sign of weakness"¹¹. Japan stood for progress and Jordan could not understand why the Koreans should prefer a Russian absorption to a Japanese one¹². Immediately after the Russo-Japanese War began Jordan wrote:

"It will be a terrible struggle, the East against the worst part of the West, with the best part of the West's sympathies enlisted on the East's side."¹³

Military operations occurred mainly in Korea until the late spring of 1904 when they were transferred to Manchuria. Jordan's description of Japanese actions in Korea was full of admiration. The Japanese soldiers behaved well, acted with precision and foresight. This was in great contrast to the ignorance and excesses shown by the Russians.¹⁴ During the war Jordan expressed the desire that Japan should soon be rid of military concern and initiate a large-scale reform programme in Korea¹⁵. He was not in the least averse to the possibility of a Japanese protectorate over Korea¹⁶.

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8. Jordan to Langley, private, 8 Feb. 1914; Jordan Papers, vol.12.
 9. Jordan was promoted to the diplomatic service early in 1912.
 10. For example, Jordan to Campbell, private, 11 Jan. 1904; Jordan Papers, vol. 3.
 11. Jordan to Satow, then minister at Peking, private, 16 Dec. 1903, Jordan Papers, Vol. 3.
 12. Jordan to Satow, private, 17 Jan.1904, Jordan Papers, Vol. 3
 13. Jordan to Campbell, private, 9 Feb. 1904; Jordan Papers, vol.3.
 14. For example, Jordan to Campbell, private 15 Feb., 22 Feb., 16 Mar., and 7 Jun., 1904; Jordan Papers, Vol. 3.

Soon after the war Jordan went to Peking. Gradually he discovered that Japan was not as dove-like as he had thought. Before long a fairly intense anti-Japanese sentiment became prevalent amongst the British communities at the treaty ports¹⁷. British merchants, especially those in Shanghai, were outraged by the dishonest commercial dealings of Japan. For the first two years after the war the greatest crime of Japan in commerce appeared to Jordan and the British merchants to be the piracy of British trademarks¹⁸. From 1907 onwards it was apparent that Japan had stepped into Russia's shoes in South Manchuria where she discriminated against goods other than her own. Between the beginning of 1907 and that of 1909 Japan's policy suffered obstruction in Manchuria from Hsü Shih-ch'ang and Tang Shao-i, who were the viceroy of Mukden and the governor of Fengtien respectively, through the influence of Yüan Shih-k'ai. Thus when Yüan was dismissed in early 1909, Jordan sensed Japan's relief as much as his own disappointment¹⁹. Almost simultaneously the United States applied herself vigorously to arresting the Japanisation of Manchuria. Her efforts were personified by Willard Straight, the American consul-general at Mukden, who aspired to the building of the Chingchou-Aigun Railway and the internationalisation of all Manchurian railways.

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15. Jordan to Campbell, private, 15 Feb. and 17 Jun. 1904, Jordan Papers, vol. 3.
 16. Jordan sided with the Japanese in preventing the Korean court from appointing a new minister to London as a first step towards converting Korea into a Japanese protectorate, Jordan to Campbell, private, 23 Nov. and 2 Dec. 1904; Jordan Papers, vol. 3.
 17. Annual reports from British legation, Tokyo, for 1909 and 1910 in Ch. Conf. Print, vols. 195, 201; the Rt. Hon. Earl Stanhope, "Great Britain and Japan in the Far East", Nineteenth Century, Vol. 67 (1910), p. 534; and F. Coleman, The Far East Unveiled, (London etc. 1918), p.12.

On account of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Grey refused America Britain's support in the schemes. Jordan was unhappy about the Anglo-American grudge and commented:

"This is one of the penalties which we have to pay for the political advantages which we reap from our alliance with Japan".²⁰

However, Jordan was still influenced by the good impression of Japan which he had built up during his Korean sojourn. Later, he grew to accept Japan's special position in Manchuria for which she did pay a price, as long as British treaty rights were not impinged²¹.

During the revolution of 1911-1912 sharp differences of opinion arose between the British and Japanese governments and between Jordan and Ijuin. However, the outcome of the revolution was satisfactory to Jordan as Yüan Shih-k'ai re-emerged with full powers²². During the revolution in 1913 both the Japanese nationalists and the Japanese government were engaged in activities against Yüan Shih-k'ai. The event certainly made Jordan more suspicious of Japan. But, his absence from China during the revolution and the ultimate success of Yüan tended to soften resentment.

The first real conflict between Jordan and the Japanese came soon after he returned from his leave to Peking at the end of 1913.

18. Jordan to A. Hosie, private, 20 Nov, 1906, Jordan Papers, vol. 4. and Jordan to Campbell, private, 30 Apr. 1908, Jordan Papers, Vol. 5.

19. Refer Chapter 1, pp. 79-80.

20. Jordan to Grey, no. 2, Conf., 2 Jan. 1911, Ch. Conf. Print, vol. 204.

21. For example, Jordan to Campbell, private 18 Feb, 1909, Jordan Papers, Vol. 5.

22. See Chapter 4.

Jordan himself told the Japanese minister, Yamaza:

"I had been closely associated with the Japanese for over seventeen years in Korea and here, and that this was the first time I had found myself in acute conflict with them"²³.

The struggle can be summed up in two comments of Jordan:

"the Japanese government are determined to make every effort to obtain a firm railway footing in the Yagtzee Valley"²⁴.

and,

"We [Britain] are determined to defend it"²⁵.

Grey and Jordan supported each other in firmly maintaining the Yangtze as a British sphere²⁶. Jordan maintained a most uncompromising attitude in making representations both to the Chinese government and the Japanese legation against Japan's claim to build the Nanchang-Hankow and the Nanking-Hsiangtan lines. Efforts were also made to block Japan's plan of a railway from Fukien to a point on the Canton-Hankow line²⁷. Apart from railways, Jordan complained of the Japanese loans to the Chapei Water Works, the Tung Kuan-shan mines in Anhui, the Hupei Cement Works²⁸, the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company,²⁹ and above all, the Han Yeh Ping Iron Works³⁰ as bearing political purposes³¹. Jordan was further agitated by the founding of the Japanese and Chinese Development Company in March 1914 which had as its directors and advisers, leading Japanese bankers and businessmen whose

23. Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Feb. 1914, Jordan Papers, Vol. 12.

24. Jordan to Grey, no 269, 27 Jul. 1914, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1942.

25. Jordan to Grey, Tel. 31, 19 Feb., 1914 Ch. Corres., Vol. 1941.

26. For example, Jordan to Grey, no 63, conf., 10 Feb 1914, Ch. Corres., vol. 1940; Jordan to Grey, tel. 31, 19 Feb. 1914 in which Jordan urged a definite and firm policy; Grey to Greene, no. 22, 2 Feb., Jordan to Grey, no. 77, 21 Feb., and Grey to Jordan, tel. 32, 25 Feb. 1914, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1941. See also J.O.P. Bland, "The Future of China", Edinburgh Review, Vol. 220, (Oct 1914), p.443.

aim was to lead industrial development in China, especially in the Yangtze³². Most of the Japanese claims on the Yangtze derived from promises given by Sun Yat-sen and Li Lieh-chün in return for Japan's aid during the revolution in 1913. However, Yüan Shih-k'ai played along with Japan because of the financial needs of his government; the Reorganisation Loan having been spent by April 1914. Jordan did not only resent Japan's policy, he also became aloof towards Yüan Shih-k'ai³³. Despite the marked increase of Japanese prestige and influence in China Jordan, until the outbreak of war, was confident that Britain's prestige still surpassed that of Japan³⁴. The Anglo-Japanese strife for the Yangtze was temporarily shelved by the outbreak of World War I, only to emerge again in 1915 when Japan presented the 21 demands.

With the War started, Britain's relations with Japan immediately overshadowed those with China. Grey initially asked Japan to help only in protecting Hongkong and Wei-hai-wei. As far as Britain was concerned, there was no question of Japan declaring war. Japan planned

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27. Materials relating to these railway negotiations are found in abundance in Ch. Corres., Vols. 1941-2; also Kajima Morinosuke, Nihon Gaiko seisaku no shiteki kosatsu, [A historical study of Japan's foreign policy] (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 454-6.
 28. Jordan to Grey, tel. 38, 25 Feb. 1914, Ch. Corres., vol. 1941.
 29. Jordan to Grey, tel. 47, 5 Mar. 1914, Ch. Corres., vol. 1941.
 30. Jordan to Grey, no. 89, 28 Feb. 1914 also no. 96, 7 Mar. 1914, Ch. Corres., vol. 1941.
 31. Such accusations can be found in, for example, Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Feb. 1914; Jordan Papers, Vol. 12; Jordan to Grey, tel. 38, 25 Feb. 1914, Ch. Corres., Vol. 1941.
 32. For details of programme considered by Company see, Greene to Grey, tel. 17, 13 Mar. and no. 79, conf., 19 Mar. 1914, Ch. Corres., vols. 1941, 1942.
 33. Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Feb. 1914; Jordan Papers, Vol. 12.

otherwise. On 7th and 8th August cabinet meetings were held in Japan which decided her entry into the War on Britain's side. By 9th August it seemed to Jordan that Japan gave a much wider interpretation to Grey's request for Japanese help and he feared that a declaration of war by Japan on Germany was imminent. He told Grey categorically that there was no urgent need for Japan's help in China. A declaration of war by Japan would "endanger the stability of the existing regime in China, to say nothing of the inevitable effect it would have upon our future political influence in this country and our prestige in Asia generally"³⁵. At the same time Jordan received a telegram from the governor of Hongkong, Sir F. May, saying that intervention by Japan would involve serious complications as a result of loss of British prestige³⁶.

Later the same day Greene telegraphed Jordan that the French ambassador informed him of an interview in London between Sir A. Nicolson, permanent under-secretary for foreign affairs, and M. Cambon, the French ambassador in England, on joint Anglo-French-Japanese action against Tsingtao³⁷. In fact, no such interview had ever taken place in London³⁸. Acting upon the false information Greene had, on the previous day, advised the Foreign Office to accept the scheme of

34. Jordan to Grey, no. 135, conf., 30 Mar 1914, Ch. Corres., vol. 1942.
35. Jordan to Grey, tel. 146, secret, 9 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016. The Japanese somehow learned of Jordan's attitude and objected to it, see Greene to Grey, tel. 71, 10 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016.
36. May to Jordan, tel. 9 Aug. 1914, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), vol. 2306.
37. Greene to Grey, tel. 67, secret, 8 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016, it was repeated to Jordan in Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), vol. 2306.
38. Grey to Greene, tel. 44, secret, 9 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016.

co-operation for future purposes in China. Unlike Greene, Jordan did not give a gentle advice for joint action but strongly believed that the co-operation of the British navy with Japan in any action against Tsingtao was the only alternative to "a lasting blow" to Britain's prestige in the Far East. Jordan, however, did not reiterate his objection to Japan's entry in^{to} the war. The decision to subordinate Britain's interests in China, not to mention China's own interests, to Britain's interests in Europe was clearly at work³⁹.

On 10 August the British Foreign Office was officially informed of the Japanese cabinet's decision to declare war⁴⁰. Grey gave way the next day though laying down a geographical limitation for Japanese actions⁴¹. On 10 August too, Greene telegraphed Grey concerning Japan's proposed action against Tsingtao. America was not to be invited. The allies would act together and would restore Tsingtao to China after the War. If Britain would not consent, Japan would still proceed on her own⁴².

Jordan immediately expressed the view that a public declaration as to the eventual restoration of Kiaochow was absolutely essential, and that Russia and France would have to be invited in operating against Tsingtao⁴³. At least twice afterwards, before Japan delivered her ultimatum on 15 August, Jordan repeated his insistence on a public statement⁴⁴. Jordan hoped that Japan's actions would be

39. Jordan to Grey, tel. 148, secret and urgent, 9 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016.

40. Japanese memorandum to F.O., 10 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016.

41. Grey to Greene, tel. 47, 11 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016.

42. Greene to Grey, tel. 72, 10 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016.

43. Jordan to Grey, tel. 153, secret, 11 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016

neutralised by Britain participating in them. To his suggestion of inviting the Allies Grey responded positively⁴⁵. Japan, however, had now come to object to French and Russian inclusion⁴⁶.

Jordan's desire to have Britain associated with Japan persisted throughout the history of taking Tsingtao. On 2 September, Japanese troops landed on Lungkou on the northern Shantung coast, about 150 miles outside the leased territory. To attack Tsingtao the troops had to trespass on Chinese territory over which no German right had previously existed. The question of territorial neutrality had been contemplated by both Japan and Britain before the ultimatum was delivered⁴⁷. However, the Chinese declaration on 3 September of a war zone of the adjacent territory of Kiaochou Bay, including Lungkou, Laichou, and Kiaochou was essentially the result of Sino-Japanese diplomacy⁴⁸. The British expeditionary force under General Barnardiston did not take the overland route and landed on 23 September at Lao-shan Wan, a place inside the German leased territory; thus avoiding the violation of neutrality⁴⁹. Jordan knew of the plan at an early stage and despite Britain's avoidance of any breach of Chinese neutrality, he advised that no distinction should be made between Japan and Britain in this respect.⁵⁰

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44. Jordan to Grey, tel. 162, 13 Aug. 1914, in this Jordan remarks that without a public statement "we should be making a false start". Also, Jordan to Grey, tel. 163, 14 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., Vol. 2016.
45. Grey to Jordan, tel 139, 12 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., Vol 2016.
46. Greene to Grey, tel 94, 19 Aug, 1914; Japan Corres., Vol 2017.
47. Greene to Grey, tel 83, 14 Aug. 1914; Japan Corres., Vol 2016.
48. For telegrams between the Chinese and Japanese foreign offices, see Wang, Liu-shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo yü Jih-pen, Vol. 6, pp. 53-8. Some sources state that Jordan did help to persuade the Chinese to concede to a war zone, for example Chao Yün, "Chi Chung-Jih

Jordan did his utmost to smooth relations between Japan and China and to allay Chinese suspicions of Japan in the Tsingtau affair. On 12 August, Yüan sent an emissary to inform Jordan that the Chinese government was inclined to accept a German offer of returning Kiaochou direct to China because China feared that Japan would attack and occupy the place single-handed. Jordan said frankly that China was not likely to be allowed to do so. By then Jordan, of course, had already learned of Japan's decision to enter the war and act against Tsingtao⁵¹. Before the emissary left, Jordan told him to assure Yüan that Chinese interests would be seriously considered and that no apprehension need be entertained on any possible joint Anglo-Japanese action on Kiaochou⁵².

Later, in express defiance of Grey's wish⁵³, Jordan was not associated by the Japanese Chargé d'affaires in communicating to China the terms of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany. Yüan was uneasy about the independent Japanese action. Jordan, as baffled by Japan

Chiao-she", in Chia-yin tsa-chih, (The Tiger Magazine), vol. 1, No. 7 (Jul. 1915), p. 4

49. For details of Anglo-Japanese action against Tsingtao, see Gezay Wood, The Shantung Question, (New York, etc. 1922) pp 48-50; and T.E. La Fargue, China and the World War, (Stanford etc. 1937), pp. 21-6, and Tan T'ien-k'ai, Shan-tung Wen-t'i shih-mo [The Shantung question], (Shanghai, 1935), pp. 31-3.
50. Jordan to Grey, tel. 189, 4 Sept. 1914 Japan Corres., vol 2017.
51. There appears, however, to be another reason for Jordan's objection to direct restoration of Kiaochou by the Germans. The fact that Tsingtao had been used since the War began as the base of German anti-Ally activities was an extreme irritation to Jordan. German influence at Tsingtau would not be eradicated in the case of a direct restoration, see T'ao, Shih-hua, vol. 2, pp. 46-7. T'an T'ien-k'ai in his work suggested that Yüan Shih-k'ai thought of taking back Tsingtao by his own military strength. He is inaccurate in asserting that this plan had the support of Jordan, Shan-tung wan-t'i Shih-mo, p. 31.

as the London Foreign Office, however, assured Yüan that there was "a complete understanding between the two governments"⁵⁴. When Japanese troops were about to land at Lungkou Jordan told Yüan that China's best policy was to have complete confidence in Japan⁵⁵. Japan then launched a military occupation of the Kiao-tsi Railway, running between Kiaochow and Tsinan, when she took over the Wei-hsien terminus of the line at the end of September. The Wai-chiao Pu protested that territory to the west of Wei-hsien was not within the war zone⁵⁶. Chinese public sentiment was also roused by the incident. Japan, on the other hand, was bent on occupation and argued that the railway was the property of the German government. Although Jordan disapproved of the Japanese action he involved himself in running between the Chinese and Japanese in an attempt to find a compromise⁵⁷. The persistent effort of Jordan to bring China and Japan smoothly along can be explained by his desire to avoid the emergence of embarrassing situations in which Britain's weakness would be further revealed.

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52. Jordan to Grey, tel. 156, secret, tel. 158, secret, 12 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., Vol. 2016.
53. Grey to Jordan, tel. 140; and Grey to Greene, tel. 50, 12 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., Vol. 2016.
54. Jordan to Grey, tel. 165, 17 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2016; for explanation of Japanese action, see Greene to Grey, tel. 100, conf, 20 Aug. 1914, Japan Corres., Vol. 2017.
55. Jordan to Grey, tel. 179. 1 Sept. 1914, Japan Corres., vol. 2017.
56. For Chinese protests, see Wunsz King, (ed.) V.K. Wellington Koo's Foreign Policy. Some Selected Documents, (Shanghai, 1931) pp.76-81.
57. For example, Jordan to Grey, tel. 205, 29 Sept. and tel. 208, 30 Sept. 1914, Japan Corres., Vol. 2017.

Following closely the capture of Tsingtau, Japan made the 21 demands on China. The incident is interesting in that it confirmed the characteristics of Jordan's war-time policy in relation to Japan.

Generally speaking, Britain was given even less scope in which to assert her rights as an ally in the new crisis than in the occupation of Tsingtau. The European War at this point was going badly on the Western Front. Japan made it explicit from the beginning that the British Foreign Office would not be welcome to make observations⁵⁸. Despite the fact that she found the Japanese demands highly obnoxious, Britain's policy in the crisis was essentially one of accommodation of Japan's wishes on the principles of expediency and reward⁵⁹.

The beginning of the incident was characterised by Japanese distrust of Jordan. There was no doubt that Kato, fearing Jordan's pro-Chinese attitude might create complications, attempted to conceal the terms of the demands from Jordan for over three weeks, during which time he hoped to make Chinese acceptance a 'fait accompli'⁶⁰. The

58. Greene to Grey, tel. 64, secret, 10 Feb. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2322.

59. In terms of expediency, Alston wrote a memorandum in March laying down officially a policy of effacement in the Far East, the damage of which to be repaired by the result of the War. Alston's confidential memorandum, 14 Mar. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2323. In terms of reward, it has to be remembered that Grey promised Kato in Dec. 1914 that Japan would be entitled, after the War to rewards proportionate to her war efforts, F.O. memorandum, 29 Jan., on Japanese demands communicated by Japanese ambassador, 22 Jan. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2322.

60. According to the usual practice, a document, bearing on China, that was passed between Tokyo and London, would be passed almost simultaneously between the Japanese and British legations in Peking. On urgent matters communication was also made between the Tokyo British embassy and Peking British legation. The Foreign Office in London was given the released version on 22 Jan. Perhaps the terms were too long, or thinking that he would be informed by the Japanese legation anyway, both the London

apprehension of Kato was a direct outcome of his knowledge of Jordan's suspicion of Japan.

As in the case of Tsingtau, Jordan decided that Britain had temporarily to efface herself before Japan. Although Hioki had not "felt justified by his instructions" to furnish Jordan a copy of the demands, he translated orally to Jordan at the end of January the principal points of what has come to be known as the released version of the demands. Commenting on the oral statement, Jordan said that the demands did not seriously affect British interests in China and were a natural outcome of the current political situation⁶¹. On 8 February Jordan saw for the first time the released version of the demands on paper. He telegraphed to Grey his two main concerns. First, that Britain's established interests in China would not be affected; secondly, that the stability of the existing Yüan régime would not be upset⁶². Grey adopted Jordan's views. On 22 February he instructed Greene to inform Japan that Britain, in accordance with Japan's wish, would not comment on the demands. But, Japan was to respect British commercial interests and China's independence and integrity. This in effect was Britain's tacit approval of Japan's action⁶³.

Foreign Office and Greene did not send a copy of the demands to Jordan. It turned out that Hioki refused Jordan a copy also on the grounds that he was instructed not to. The result was that Jordan did not have a copy of any version of the demands until 8 February. Alston was convinced that Kato was deliberate in concealing the terms from Jordan; Alston's minute on Greene to Grey, tel. 78, 22 Feb. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol 2322. Alston's theory might be true because even Jordan himself knew that Kato considered him "very pro-Chinese", Jordan to Langley, private, 2 Oct. 1914. Jordan Papers, vol. 12.

61. Jordan to Grey, tel. 19, 29 Jan. 1915, Ch. Corres. vol. 2322.

62. Jordan to Grey, tel. 27, 8 Feb. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2322.

63. Grey to Greene, tel. 47, 22 Feb. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2322.

After a visit paid by Wellington Koo, then a councillor in the Wai-chiao Pu, on 9 February, Jordan suspected that there were discrepancies between the version of the demands to the Chinese and that to the powers. A week afterwards Jordan still wrote that the Japanese action was inevitable and "weak states must pay the penalty of weakness"⁶⁴. In a memorandum in March the Foreign Office laid down the policy of temporary effacement in China. Because of its trust in Jordan's caution the content of the memorandum was sent to him by post in a private letter which reached him just before the entire incident closed⁶⁵. Jordan replied, with justice:

"Had the above [policy] been sent to me as official instructions months ago, I could not have carried them out more carefully than I have done."⁶⁶

As in the case of Tsingtau, Jordan urged on the Chinese government tolerance with regard to the Japanese demands. This policy of Jordan was particularly marked at the final stage of the Sino-Japanese negotiations. Japan had been considerably irritated by the stubborn resistance of the Chinese during the course of the negotiation. By the end of April China was given a revised version of the demands of which her acceptance was demanded under threat. The Chinese government expressed to Jordan that the revision was unsatisfactory.⁶⁷ Negotiations broke off on 1 May after China had returned what she considered the most that she could accept. China was prepared to accept war if forced. Liang Shih-i was sent to Jordan to ascertain

64. Jordan to Langley, private, 15 Feb, 1915, Jordan Papers, Vol. 13.

65. Alston to Jordan, private, 19 Mar, 1915, Jordan Papers, Vol. 14.

66. Jordan to Alston, private, 6 May 1915, Jordan Papers, Vol. 13.

67. Jordan to Grey, tel. 102, 29 Apr, 1915, Ch. Corres., Vol. 2323.

British policy if Japan declared war on China. Jordan categorically denounced the thought of war:

"I earnestly urged him to weigh the consequences of war against results of compliance with modified demands. The former must mean immediate disaster...while the latter would give China time to await issue of Europe war, which might afford her a last opportunity to set her house in order"⁶⁸

When Japan finally delivered an ultimatum on 7 May, 1915 demanding a categorical reply, with the exception of Group V, Jordan advised the Chinese government to give in with good grace. Anxious to make sure that no loophole was left for Japan to create further troubles Jordan sent an urgent and private message to Yüan on 8 May urging the "necessity of giving an absolutely unconditional acceptance"⁶⁹ On the same day China accepted the revised demands. According to Lu Cheng-hsiang, Jordan's advice had a weighty influence on the cabinet members during the meeting which decided the final outcome⁷⁰.

There was, however, one great change in Jordan during the 21 demands incident. He no longer identified himself and Britain with Japan. He firmly objected to the suggestion of the China Association to the Foreign Office of co-existing with Japan in China by active cooperation.⁷¹ Moreover, while urging tolerance and temperance on China on the one hand, Jordan made it plain to Yüan Shih-k'ai and other cabinet members that his sympathy was with the Chinese on the other⁷².

68. Jordan to Grey, tel. 110, 5 May 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2324.

69. Jordan to Grey, tel. 119, conf., 8 May 1915 Ch. Corres., vol. 2324.

70. Jordan to Grey, tel. 122, 8 May 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2324.

71. Jordan to Alston, tel., private and conf., 25 Mar, 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2323.

72. Wang, Liu-shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo yü Jih-pen, Vol. 6, pp. 310-1 Tao, Shih-hua, vol. 2, p. 61.

There can be no denying that Jordan's resentment of Japan was greatly strengthened by the 21 demands. Especially towards the latter part of the event his private correspondence was strewn with denunciation. On 1 May, for instance, Jordan wrote to Langley that Denison's death had produced a marked deterioration in Japanese diplomacy which was so unlike that before the Russo-Japanese War⁷³. Before the Japanese ultimatum was delivered Jordan remarked that there was "no reasoning with a highwayman well-armed and Japan's action towards China is worse than that of Germany in the case of Belgium"⁷⁴. Yet the confinement of these critical remarks to his private letters only was perhaps not merely accidental. All through the crisis Jordan exercised restraint not to act in any way which would be detrimental to Anglo-Japanese co-operation outside China⁷⁵. In fact, Jordan did so well that Japan, anxious for China to accept her ultimatum, asked for Jordan's good offices in persuading the Chinese⁷⁶. The Foreign Office highly appreciated the way he handled the situation in Peking⁷⁷.

In short, Jordan's resentment against Japan did not reach its breaking point during the crisis over the 21 demands. There were several reasons for this. First, his two primary concerns were met,

73. Jordan to Langley, private, 1 May 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

74. Jordan to Alston, private, 6 May 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

75. For example, Jordan to Langley, private, 15 Feb. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

76. Greene to Grey, tel. 175, 8 May, on which Alston sarcastically minutes: "Contrast Baron Kato's desire for Sir John Jordan's good offices at the eleventh hour, with his mistrust of him at the first!" Ch. Corres., vol. 2324. Also, The Times, 24 May 1915,

at least half-way. Railway concessions in the Yangtze was the greatest concern caused by the demands in terms of British interests. Later, Jordan realised, and thus enlightened the Foreign Office, that consideration of the matter was really purely academic in that capital for construction would not be forthcoming for a long time after the War⁷⁸. In terms of stability of Yüan's régime the demands diverted opposition from Yüan to Japan. Yüan seemed pleased with the eventual outcome and remained friendly towards Britain⁷⁹. Perhaps, underneath this was the belief that war was not going to last long.

Japan against the Monarchy

Jordan began reporting to the Foreign Office on the monarchical movement when the Ch'ou-an Hui published its first manifesto in the middle of August. From the outset Jordan was convinced that the movement had the full support of Yüan. Liang Shih-i, Yüan's financial pillar, was greatly implicated. The Ch'ou-an Hui was subsidized by the president's office. Wellington Koo was sent to Mexico to obtain unfavourable reports on republican institutions⁸⁰.

As can be expected, Jordan agreed to the principle of monarchy in China and Yüan was the obvious choice for the throne. He admitted that the success of the movement might settle "the vexed question of the succession"⁸¹ which was causing considerable apprehension amongst

77. Alston's and Langley's minutes on Jordan to Grey, no. 83, conf., 7 Apr. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2324.

78. Jordan to Grey, tel. 106, conf., 3 May 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2324.

79. Jordan to Langley, private, 10 Jun. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13 see also La Fargue, China and the World War, pp. 76-8.

80. Jordan to Grey, no. 214, 25 Aug. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

81. Jordan to Langley, private, 19 Aug. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

British merchants in China. However, he objected strenuously to the choice of time for the change. For nearly two months after the establishment of the Chou-an Hui Jordan tried his best to stave off the monarchy. He warned the Chinese government of possible opposition in the south and advised postponement until the European War was over.

Yüan Shih-k'ai made what appeared to be the first serious sounding of Jordan's opinion at the beginning of September. On 3 September Liang Shih-i saw Jordan privately. From this and other interviews with Liang it appeared that Jordan's chief worry was that Japan would certainly fish in troubled waters⁸². After the twenty-one demands incident Jordan prophesied that there would be further mischief from Japan as long as war lasted in Europe⁸³. Thus in his first interview with Liang he expressed his fear of Japanese interference and indicated that the question could be more suitably considered after the War. Shortly afterwards a short lull occurred in the movement which Jordan naturally interpreted as the result of his advice⁸⁴. A check on the dates shows that the lull stemmed more likely from a shift of organisational centre from the Ch'ou-an Hui to the Ch'ing-yüan Lien-ho Hui

82. Liang has been condemned as the greatest sinner in the monarchical plot. However, in the more authoritative works it is suggested that Liang objected to the movement in the beginning, see, for example, Huang, Yüan-shih tao-kuo chi, pp. 24-6, and Ts'en, Liang, nien-p'u, vol.1, pp. 267-71. Ts'en in his anxiety to defend his hero implied in p. 280 that Liang was still uninvolved by 19 September. This is rendered doubtful by his interview with Jordan on 3 September, see Jordan to Grey, no. 234, 10 Sept. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338, and Jordan to Langley, private, 7 Sept. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

83. Jordan to Langley, private, 13 May 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

84. Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Sept. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

(Joint association for petition) which was officially established on 19 September under the auspices of Liang Shih-i⁸⁵.

The movement took a new and vigorous turn. Petitions for a monarchy came incessantly to the government from labourers, merchants, educationalists, and woman leaders⁸⁶. On 21 September Liang Shih-i again saw Jordan and tried to convince him that public opinion (min-i) was too strong for Yüan to oppose. Writing to Langley, Jordan said that he told Liang "quite frankly that statement of this kind deceived nobody. Foreigners knew perfectly well that the whole agitation was engineered from Peking". Even granted that China was weak such strong language could not easily be justified. It reveals Jordan's earnestness in discouraging the move. He again stressed the folly of making the change when "international equilibrium, so essential for her [China's] safety" was being upset⁸⁷. The remark was an arrow pointing at Japan.

At the same time Jordan was greatly puzzled by Japan's reaction to the Chinese situation during the first two months of the Ch'ou-an Hui's existence. The movement was strongly supported by Ariga who was the Japanese political advisor to Yüan Shih-k'ai and known to the Chinese as a trusted friend of Japan's prime minister, Okuma Shigenobu⁸⁸.

85. Huang, Yüan-shih tao-kuochi, pp. 31-2, also Liu chen-yü, Hung-hsien chi-shih-shih pen-shih-pu-chu, [poems on the Yüan dynasty] in Shen Yün-lung (ed), Yüan Shih-k'ai shih-liao hui-k'an, (Taipei, 1966), pt. 1, p. 47.

86. A list of the associate organisations of the Ching-Yüan Lien-ho Hui is given in Huang, *ibid.* p. 33; also Chen, Chieh-kuo ta-tao Yüan Shih-k'ai, p. 50.

87. Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Sept. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

88. Liu, Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih, p. 446; and Hu, Ti-kuo chu-i yü

At the beginning of September Okuma was supposed to have made an informal statement, which was widely circulated by both the Chinese and Japanese press, that monarchy was more suitable for China and Yüan was the only qualified person for the throne. He added this was essentially a domestic matter of China and the Japanese government would merely wait and see, providing that developments would not jeopardise Japanese interests⁸⁹. In retrospect, historians read traps in the statement⁹⁰ but Jordan accepted it, if authentic, as Okuma's public profession in favour of the monarchy⁹¹. Besides, eminent Japanese in China appeared to be active advocates of the change. Hioki was then on leave and the Japanese legation was in charge of the Councillor, Obata, who impressed Jordan as regarding the monarchical question as China's own affair. Odagiri, the important unofficial personage who had played an important rôle in Japan's bid for the Yangtze in early 1914, was encouraging the Chinese along the line.⁹²

Chung-kuo cheng-ch'ih, [Imperialism and Chinese politics 1840 - 1924] (Peking, 1961), p. 143. Also Ariga is said to have been responsible for drawing up the rules governing the royal family of the Yüan dynasty, Liu _____, Hung-hsien chi-shih-shih pen-shih-pu-chu, Pt. 1, pp. 37-8, 65-6.

89. For Okuma's statement see enclosure in Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Sept. 1915, Jordan Papers, Vol 13.
90. For example, Kwanha Yim, "Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Japanese", JAS, vol. 24, no. 1, (Nov, 1964) p.64.
91. Jordan to Langley, private, 23 Sept. 1915, Jordan Papers, Vol. 13.
92. Jordan to Langley, private, 20 Oct, 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

A change of attitude took place at the end of September simultaneously in Jordan and Japan. The monarchical movement was then in full momentum. Under the direction of the Cheng-yüan Lien-ho Hui petitions for a monarchy poured into Peking from the provinces. On 6 October the Senate, sitting in its capacity of the Legislative Chamber (Li-fa Yüan), passed a king-making bill which provided elaborate regulations for referring the question to a provincial referendum⁹³. Japan then spoke officially for the first time. She opposed the change to a monarchy. Ambassador Inouye Katsunosuke was instructed on 29 September to sound the opinion of the British Foreign Office on a possible Japanese proposal of joint action to oppose the monarchy⁹⁴. In the interview on 5 October Inouye told Grey that Japan opposed the monarchical movement because she feared that it would cause serious disturbance in the south⁹⁵. The Foreign Office was not as surprised by Japan's action as Jordan later was because Okuma's statement was yet unknown to the office⁹⁶.

On the other hand, Jordan thought that the movement had to be accepted. Instead of joint Anglo-Japanese opposition Jordan advised that "we should accept the inevitable and come to a close understanding with the Japanese Government as to the best course for minimising whatever risks the change may involve".

93. Description of the movement at this stage is found in Jordan to Grey, no. 253, 1 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
94. Yim, "Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Japanese" p.64; Okuma to Inouye, no. 255, 29 Sept. 1915, NGB, vol. 81 (1915), pp. 60-1.
95. Grey to Jordan, tel. 214, 8 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.
96. The letter, Jordan to Langley, 23 Sept. 1915, in which Jordan refers to the statement had not been received by the Foreign Office, see Langley to Jordan, 14 Oct. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 14; also Grey to Jordan, tel. 217, 12 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

Reasons for the volte face were given in the same telegram. Chiefly, the movement had gone so far that outside opposition at this stage would do more harm than good. Jordan was obviously impressed by the success with which Yüan forged popular support for his scheme. Secondly Yüan succeeded in convincing Jordan that there would be no internal trouble. Yüan was particularly successful in this respect in his interview with Jordan on 2 October⁹⁷. Thirdly, earlier Japanese utterances did lead Jordan into thinking that Japan had accepted the change despite his basic apprehension. Jordan's language in writing privately to Langley almost amounted to accusing Japan of deliberate deceit:

"it is a great pity that they [the Japanese] did not make their views known two or three months ago when a decisive word from them would probably have been sufficient to stop movement".⁹⁸

The fact that Jordan was instructed to be in close association with his Japanese colleague clearly implied the reserve with which Whitehall received his change of attitude.⁹⁹

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97. According to the Japanese archives it appears that Jordan was again made use of by Yüan after this particular interview. Apparently Jordan was more than usually convinced by Yüan's argument. This did not escape the astute Yüan. The next day it appeared in the press that Jordan had explicitly supported the monarchy in the interview. Despite the fact that the Wai-chiao Pu corrected the statement afterwards, the desired effect was achieved, see Obata to Kato, no. 550, 8 Oct. 1915, NGB, vol. 81 (1915), pp. 68-72, enclosed are a passage from The Peking Daily News of 7 October which gives a dialogue between Yüan and Jordan and a passage from The Asiatic Daily News, the notorious Yüan-bribed organ, cancelling the statement. Also Li Nai-han, Hsin-hai Ko-ming Yü Yüan Shih-k'ai, [The 1911 Revolution and Yüan Shih-k'ai], (Hongkong, 1948), pp. 119-20.
98. Jordan to Langley, private, 20 Oct. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.
99. Grey to Jordan, tel. 217, 12 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., Vol. 2338.

In the next two-and-half months Japan made firm objection to Yüan's monarchy purely through diplomatic channels. Advice was twice tendered to the Chinese government to halt the change. On both occasions Japan carried her allies with her. It was a period of unprecedented embarrassment for Jordan, especially in terms of his friendship with Yüan Shih-k'ai.

During the first half of October a plan to undertake a demarche to frustrate the Chinese plan was quickly drawn up in a select political circle in Japan. It received the formal approval of the cabinet on 14 October when Ishii, late ambassador to France, took up the post of foreign minister.

Ishii instructed Inouye on 15 October to inform the British government that a joint advice should be given from the Allies and America to China to desist from the monarchical plan¹⁰⁰. Japan's reason was again the fear of the movement resulting in internal disorder which would be prejudicial to British and Japanese interests. To reinforce the argument Ishii sent a second urgent telegram later the same day to Inouye pointing out that important officials like Hsü Shih-ch'ang, Li Yüan-hung, Feng Kuo-chang, Tuan Ch'i-jui, and Chou Hsüeh-hsi were in passive resistance to the change of government¹⁰¹. Three days later Grey was presented with a memorandum embodying the proposal of joint advice and the rationale behind it.

100. Ishii to Inouye, no. 265, urgent, 15 Oct. 1915, NGB, vol. 81 pp. 74-6.

101. Ishii to Inouye, no. 266, urgent, 15 Oct. 1915, NGB, vol. 81 p. 76.

Grey asked Jordan if he had any objection to Britain's acceptance of the proposal¹⁰². As before, Jordan subordinated his opinion to the greater interests of his country. But he did not submit silently. He called on Obata twice, after receiving Grey's telegram, and expressed the view that external interference at that stage would embarrass Yüan Shih-k'ai; thus, more likely to have trouble.¹⁰³ Jordan refuted Japan's other reason for interference by stating that no serious importance should be attached to opposition of the high officials¹⁰⁴ and that consular reports from Shanghai, the Yangtze ports, and Canton showed no apprehension of trouble¹⁰⁵. To Langley he emphatically stated that unless foreign intervention was applied in time it would not be able to forestall the result of provincial elections which were being zealously organised¹⁰⁶. In any advice to be given, Jordan stressed the importance of American participation in addition to that of the Allies. American participation would strengthen the advice by giving it unanimity and by countering the effect of Goodnow's memorandum¹⁰⁷. However, the more serious reason for American participation appeared to be Jordan's bitter awareness

102. Grey to Jordan, tel. 221, 18 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338. Notice that Grey does not ask for Jordan's opinion; the telegram is so worded as to show that acceptance of Japan's proposal is intended.

103. Obata to Ishii, no. 570, 18 Oct; and no. 576, urgent, 20 Oct. 1915, NGB, vol. 81, pp. 81-3.

104. Jordan to Grey, tel. 260, 19 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

105. Jordan to Grey, tel. 262, 21 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

106. Jordan to Langley, private, 20 Oct. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

107. Jordan to Grey, tel. 262, 21 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338; and Jordan to Langley, private, 20 Oct. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

of the inability of the Allies to stand up against Japan. American help was naturally thought of because of her obviously pro-Yüan and anti-Japanese attitude¹⁰⁸.

The Foreign Office understood and sympathised with the reasoning of the British minister. Langley suggested that Britain should bide her time and hope that the problem might solve itself by the declaration of the monarchy as a result of the provincial referendum¹⁰⁹. But Japan was too fast and alert to be out-witted. Two days before informing the American ambassador, Guthrie, of the proposed advice to China, Japan suggested to Britain that it should be given without waiting for the reply from the powers¹¹⁰. Jordan learned of the new move of Japan from Obata on 25 October and objected to it¹¹¹. Grey, however, concurred with Japan and instructed Jordan to consult Obata in giving the advice at once¹¹².

In the afternoon of 28 October Obata led Jordan and the Russian minister in giving the advice to the Wai-chiao Pu¹¹³. The Chinese foreign minister, Lu Cheng-hsiang, replied that the monarchical question was an internal affair resulting from popular sentiment and that it would not give rise to chaos¹¹⁴. The interview was completely

108. For Woodrow Wilson's pro-Yüan attitude see Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy 1913-1917, pp. 139-50.

109. Langley minutes on Jordan to Grey, tel. 262, 21 Oct., 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

110. Japanese memorandum, 24 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

111. Jordan to Grey, tel. 265, 25 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

112. Grey to Jordan, tel. 225, 25 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

113. It was obvious that Japan was solely responsible for the advice, see, for example, the headline of the news in The Times, 1 Nov. 1915.

114. Jordan to Grey, tel. 272, 28 Oct. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

embarrassing and distasteful to Jordan. He firmly declined to be the spokesman of the interview although he was still the doyen. He also regarded his association with Obata as a personal betrayal of Yüan Shih-k'ai "whose memory is a very long one"¹¹⁵. From then onwards Jordan became increasingly critical of Japan's China policy.

China did not answer the powers until 2 November when she reiterated her ability to maintain internal order. Japan regarded the answer as China's rejection of her advice. During the next week pressure was continually applied to the Chinese government¹¹⁶. However, the advice succeeded in slowing down the movement. On 9 November Jordan was informed by the Wai-chiao Pu that the change would not take place that year¹¹⁷. Two days later the ministers of the powers were informed by Lu Cheng-hsiang that the grand ceremony of instituting the monarchy would be delayed¹¹⁸. This did not satisfy Japan who decided to maintain "an attitude of vigilance as to the further development of the situation"¹¹⁹.

In reality Yüan Shih-k'ai had not the slightest intention of slowing down the movement. During the next month provincial voting continued. Yüan's determination was not daunted by Ch'en Ch'i-mei's

115. Jordan to Langley, private, 4 Nov. 1915; Jordan Papers, Vol. 13.

116. Telegrams from the Chinese minister in Tokyo, Lu Tsung-yü, show that warships were being mobilised, a second warning was being prepared and that Lu was being repeatedly threatened by the Gaimusho, Wang, Liu-shih-nien-lai Chung-kuo yü Jih-pen, vol. 7 pp. 14-15.

117. Jordan to Grey, tel. 287, 9 Nov. 1915; Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

118. Jordan to Grey, tel. 294, 11 Nov. 1915; Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

119. Inouye to F.O., 18 Nov. 1915; Ch. Corres., Vol. 2338.

attempted revolution on 5 December at Shanghai. By December voting in the provinces was completed¹²⁰. Delegates from the provinces assembled at Peking and constituted the so-called People's Representatives Convention (Kuo-min ta-hui) which was to finally decide on the question of monarchy. On 11 December the 1993 delegates of the convention voted unanimously on a constitutional monarchy and twice petitioned Yüan to ascend the throne¹²¹. The petition was granted next day, but Yüan was still to function as president until the ceremony inaugurating the dynasty took place. Yüan's action was not expected by Jordan who told the Japanese minister, Hioki, on 2 December that the Chinese were serious about a postponement.

The Japanese would not accept the situation and decided on a second advice which was made on 15 December with Jordan and the ministers of Russia, France, and Italy. Hioki warned China that the powers would assume an attitude of watchfulness and would intervene if trouble arose¹²² from the change. The joint advice was unheeded judging from the happenings during the next few days. Between 19 and 23 December Yüan was busily conferring titles on his friends, high officials in Peking, and tutus of the provinces. Yet it was obvious at the same time that the attitude of the powers was a spoke in Yüan's monarchical wheel. Despite Yüan's eagerness to proceed with the scheme, on 20 December

120. In this Yüan was severely implicated for having forged the result see Huang, Yüan-shih tao-Kuo chi, pp. 90-1; Liang, Tun-pi chi, Pt. 4, pp. 23-43; and a booklet entitled Yüan Shih-k'ai wei-tsao min-i chi-shih, [The peoples' will: an exposure of the political intrigues at Peking against the Republic of China], (1916).

121. For details of the convention, see Huang, Yüan-shih tao-kuo chi, pp. 68-83.

122. For interview with the Waichiao Pu see, Jordan to Grey, tel. 345, 14 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

Hioki and Jordan were told that the formal inauguration of the Hung-hsien reign would not take place until the Chinese New Year which would be in early February 1916.¹²³

On the other hand, there was a change of attitude amongst the powers, except Japan, after Yüan's formal acceptance of the crown. Russia was the first to suggest to Britain that the Allies should recognise Yüan Shih-k'ai when he was formally proclaimed emperor¹²⁴. France followed shortly¹²⁵. At that time the Allies were anxious for China to join the War on their side. They wanted China's help in expelling German nationals from China, and Russia, in particular, was eager for Chinese supply of arms and ammunition. Britain was not less anxious in this respect. She was anxious about German underground activities at Tsingtau and Shanghai which threatened sedition in India. The Allies were also apprehensive of the fact that the Germans and Austrians had been ingratiating themselves with Yüan during the monarchical movement¹²⁶. The London Foreign Office realised that the monarchy was a fait accompli and could not be postponed until after the war¹²⁷. Grey accepted the Allies' view of recognising Yüan Shih-k'ai should he formally assume the throne. On 16 December Jordan was informed of Grey's decision. His opinion was sought before the Foreign Office would finalise its policy in anticipation of a new move on the part of Japan¹²⁸. Encouraged by his

123. Jordan to Grey, tel. 353, 21 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

124. Buchanan to Grey, tel. 1874, 14 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

125. Bertie to Grey, tel. 1032, 21 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

126. Jordan to Grey, tel. 354, 21 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

127. Alston's minute on Buchanan to Grey, tel. 1874, 14 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

128. Grey to Jordan, tel. 293, conf., 16 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

government's change of attitude, Jordan spoke forcibly in favour of immediate recognition for the first time since he had done so two months before. He stressed that since the beginning of October he had been convinced that prolongation of the uncertain situation would produce unrest and eventually dislocate trade¹²⁹. Jordan also became more outspokenly anti-Japanese in his correspondence. He wrote bitterly to Langley that the Allied diplomatic representatives in Peking felt that they were "so many puppets pulled by Japanese strings."¹³⁰

Whether it was because she anticipated an imminent outbreak in south-west China or she felt it diplomatic to humour the Allies slightly at this point, Japan expressed willingness to soften her attitude provided that China remained peaceful¹³¹.

The Hu-kuo Movement (Movement to protect the republic)

Yunnan was the first province which rebelled against Yüan's monarchy. Independence of the central government was declared by the two governors of the province on Christmas Day, 1915. There was one month's interval before the second province, Kueichou, seceded.

In Jordan's opinion the monarchy still had a great chance of success before the independence of Kueichow had it not been for Japan's obstruction. Actually, Jordan had not expected the Yunnan

129. Jordan to Grey, tel. 347, conf., 17 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

130. Jordan to Langley, private, 21 Dec. 1915, Jordan Papers, vol. 13.

131. Grey to Jordan, tel. 299, 18 Dec. 1915; Jordan to Grey, tel. 351, 19 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

revolt to take place. He was too much under the spell of Yüan's guarantee of internal control¹³². Twenty days after the revolt was confirmed Jordan attached little significance to that "ordinary incident" which "marked the beginning of all dynasties in China."¹³³ Hioki was impressed by his optimism that the revolt would be suppressed. Also, he instructed Goffe, consul-general in Yunnanfu who was in close touch with the insurgent government, to discourage the movement¹³⁴.

Jordan had reasons to be hopeful. He learned from Goffe that the Yunnanese, though they had no special affection for Yüan, generally preferred the peaceful inauguration of a monarchy to internal strife¹³⁵. The military movement of the Yunnanese was not impressive. The Yunnanese revolutionary army (Hu-kuo chün) was grouped into three divisions under the respective command of Ts'ai Ao, Li Lieh-chün, and Tang Chi-yao. Ts'ai's First Division was to enter Szechuan and occupy the posts of Suchou, Luchow, and Chungking. Li's Second Division was to operate in Kuangsi, and Tang's Third Division to infiltrate Kweichow¹³⁶. The military Junta in Yunnanfu was short of financial resources. Goffe reported to Jordan that Tang, as military governor of the province, negotiated strenuously with the foreign representatives for access by the Yunnan military government to the monthly subsidy from the salt revenue of the province¹³⁷. But, facing Ts'ai's poorly-

132. Jordan to Grey, tel 358, secret, 24 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

133. Jordan to Langley, private, 14 Jan. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15

134. Jordan to Grey, tel. 361, 15 Dec. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2338.

135. Goffe to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 6, 5 Jan. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2644.

136. Detailed description of the military plan is given in Yü En-yang, Yün-nan shou-i yung-hu kung-ho shih-mo chi, [History of the Yunnan rising of 1916 against Yüan Shih-k'ai] in CCS ts'ung-k'an, pt. 1, pp. 127-9.

equipped army were two divisions and three mixed brigades under General Ch'en Huan of Szechuan. Moreover, Jordan understood that Yüan Shih-k'ai had mobilised several divisions in the north to the aid of Szechuan where the main campaigns were expected to be waged. He considered the military arrangements of the government sufficient to meet the revolt¹³⁸. In fact most historical sources accord with Jordan's assessment of the situation. For example, General Feng Yü-hsiang recalls in his autobiography that although he was in sympathy with Ts'ai Ao, for a long time he could not change sides because he was hemmed in by government troops¹³⁹. Also, Ts'ai's tuberculosis deteriorated in the bitter cold of December and January. Even when Kueichou seceded Jordan thought that the province was too poor to make substantial military and financial contributions to the opposition movement¹⁴⁰.

Japan remained the greatest obstacle in the period. At first, the Yunnan revolt actually accelerated the monarchical movement. Peking became eager to remove all diplomatic difficulties before concentrating on suppressing the internal opposition. The government announced officially that the inauguration of the monarchy would take place on New Year's Day. Russia, France, and especially America were ready to recognise Yüan. Jordan argued with the Foreign Office that it was unreasonable not to recognise Yüan when America and the Central

137. For example, Goffe to Jordan, tel. 66, 27 Dec. 1915, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228), vol. 1952.

138. Jordan to Grey, no. 6, 5 Jan. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2644.

139. Feng Yü-hsiang, Wo ti Sheng-huo [My life], (San-wu tu-shu-she, 1944), pt. 2, pp. 1-21.

140. Jordan to Grey, tel. 49, 30 Jan. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2644.

Powers were ready to do so. The danger of non-recognition by the Allies was two-fold; the rebels would be encouraged; and Yüan would be thrown into Germany's arms. He again attempted to bring Hioki round to his views¹⁴¹. Jordan's attitude was largely responsible for the anti-British spirit of the Japanese press at the time¹⁴². The London Foreign Office was still inclined towards recognition as a solution.

On the other hand, the Yunnan revolt was Japan's pretext to strengthen her opposition to the monarchy. On 12 January Jordan reported to Grey that the Chinese vice-minister for foreign affairs informed Hioki that the inauguration of the monarchy would not, after all, take place in February. Grey was told that the Chinese government was indecisive because of Japan's attitude and a Chinese mission was to go to Japan to gain her favour¹⁴³. Shortly afterwards, Yüan was openly humiliated when the special mission, headed by Chou Tzū-chi was rejected by Tokyo at the last minute.

In Japan, an attempt was made to assassinate Okuma on 12 January in denunciation of his weak China policy. The kokuryukai, the ronin, and the army were determined to capitalise on the Yunnan revolt to oust Yüan from the Chinese scene¹⁴⁴. On 19 January the Japanese cabinet decided not to recognise the monarchy irrespective of her

141. Jordan to Grey, tel, 10, 7 Jan. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2644.

142. Jordan to Langley, private, 14 Jan. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15.

143. Jordan to Grey, tel. 20, 12 Jan. 1916, Ch. Corres., Vol. 2644.

144. Yim, "Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Japanese", p.70.

Allies' inclination. During the interval between Japan's rejection of China's mission and the Japanese cabinet's decision, the Wai-chiao Pu was in constant receipt of telegrams from Lu Tsung-yü, Chinese minister at Tokyo, advising the immediate abandonment of the monarchy because of Japan's attitude. On 21 January Yüan was told by Lu that the Japanese government had decided on taking free action in future (tzü-yü shin-tung) and was inclined towards recognizing the Yunnan military government as a belligerent body¹⁴⁵. That day Jordan was told by Lu Tseng-hsiang that the ceremony of enthronement was postponed. Knowing Japan's state of mind, Jordan commented that the postponement was the "wisest decision in the circumstances"¹⁴⁶. At that time Kweichou was still loyal to the central government. The monarchy was thwarted in the first place by Japan's opposition rather than internal defection.

A month later, on 23 February, Yüan issued a mandate postponing enthronement indefinitely. At the time although Ts'ai Ao's troops were making successes in Szechuan, they did not justify such a retreat on the part of Yüan. In fact Jordan himself was optimistic despite the insurgent successes because the main body of the government reinforcement had not yet arrived at Szechuan. He was certain that Ts'ai would not be able to withstand the overwhelming odds of the northern troops¹⁴⁷. Richard Dane, the inspector-general of the salt administration, was sent to Jordan by Yüan a week after

145. Wang, Liu-shih-nein-lai Chung-kuo yü Jih-pen, vol. 7, pp. 34-7.

146. Jordan to Grey, tel. 37, 21 Jan. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2644.

147. For example, Jordan to Grey, no. 62, 28 Feb. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

the mandate was issued. Yüan feared that the mandate was not effective enough to save his situation and asked if a further mandate should be issued abandoning entirely the monarchical idea. Jordan advised against it. The internal situation did not yet justify a further humiliating gesture. Yüan should wait for a major military victory when he could announce the abandonment gracefully. Dane agreed with Jordan¹⁴⁸.

However, Yüan Shih-kai's military position was vitally altered by Kuangsi's independence which was declared on 15 March. It directly precipitated the disaffection of General Lung Chi-kuang of Canton, who had been the crux of the situation in the south-west and, to a lesser extent, that of General Chen Huan of Szechuan. Lung admitted frankly to Wilton, acting consul-general at Canton, that the defection of Lu Yung-ting, tutu of Kuangsi, was a severe and unexpected blow on him. The event threw his brother, Lung Chin-kuang, who was then on the Yunnan-Kuangsi border with his troops, into a precarious situation¹⁴⁹. Also the safety of his son, Lung Ti-chien was in question¹⁵⁰. Harrassed by the unfavourable change of military balance Yüan decided to renounce all intention of becoming emperor. Before issuing the mandate he again sent Dane to Jordan for advice. This time Jordan expressed it as his personal opinion that the renunciation should be clear cut and unmistakable in order to be effective¹⁵¹. On 23 March the Hung-hsien régime was declared at an end.

148. Jordan to Grey, tel. 80, conf., 1 Mar. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

149. Wilton, acting consul-general in Kuangtung, to Jordan, tel. 29, 16 Mar; and tel. 36, 23 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch. (F.O.228) vol. 2736.

150. Jameison to Jordan, No 60, 3 Apr. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736.

Again, in Jordan's opinion, between 21 January, when Yüan first notified the legations of postponement of the enthronement ceremony, and 15 March, when Kuangsi became independent, Yüan could have quietened down the situation had it not been for Japan. There had been rumours concerning the loyalty of Yüan's old trusted generals, Feng Kuo-chang and Chang Hsün. Japanese officials in China were convinced of Feng's positive anti-Yüan spirit¹⁵². Jordan came to a different conclusion through reading consular reports of the first two months of 1916. Fraser told Jordan that he was told by Major Kah, Feng Kuo-chang's trusted man, that Feng would not fight against Yüan although he was definitely jealous¹⁵³. After visiting Feng, Morrison told Fraser that Feng had openly declared that he would do nothing against his "old friend the president" as long as he was left in power in Nanking¹⁵⁴. According to the intelligence report from the British consulate in Wuhu, Chang Hsün was, at least superficially, maintaining order and behaving loyally in Anhwei.¹⁵⁵

Thus Jordan thought that until the eve of Kuangsi's independence there was no major reason for Yüan to despair over the south-west. In fact the insurgent troops suffered immediate reverses as soon as they came in touch with the main body of the northern troops which

151. Jordan to Grey, tel. private & secret, 20 Mar. 1916, Ch. Correa, vol. 2645.

152. For example, Ariyoshi, Consul-general at Shanghai, to Ishii, no. 134, 11 Nov. and no. 166, 23 Dec. 1915; and Hioki to Ishii, no. 386, conf., 21 Dec. 1915; NGB, vol. 81, pp. 203-4, 234-5, 230-1.

153. Fraser to Jordan, private, 15 Jan. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228) vol. 1966.

154. Fraser to Jordan, private, 26 Jan. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 1966.

155. The report only reached Jordan after Yüan's death, see Intelligence Report for April - June, Porter to Jordan, 17 Jul. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228) Vol. 1985.

arrived at Szechuan at the end of February. Tang Chi-yao feared that the penetration of government troops into Yunnan was imminent and he confided in the British consul-general his intention to flee¹⁵⁶. Jordan told Goffe not to discourage the flight unless it might endanger the safety of British subjects¹⁵⁷. At a point Tang's position was extremely precarious in that the Yunnanese gentry secretly plotted to prevent his flight and then hand him over to Yüan Shih-k'ai¹⁵⁸. A little more than a week after the northern army reached Szechuan Jordan learned that it had recaptured from the insurgents Suifu, Nachi, and Chiangan¹⁵⁹. It was no surprise that he drafted a telegram to Grey on 5 March saying that the "progress of rebellion now appears to be checked"¹⁶⁰. As late as 14 March, the day before Kuangsi's independence, Jordan wrote to Langley in an optimistic mood¹⁶¹. Thus it was natural for him to think that had it not been for Japan's obstinate diplomatic opposition there would have been ample time for Yüan to establish the monarchy as a fait accompli, even granted that Kuangsi became independent at the time it did.

Japan was not only obstructive diplomatically. She was actually assisting the insurgent movement. Jordan had numerous proofs of Japan's complicity. The Yunnanese troops were mostly

156. Goffe to Jordan, tel. 44, v. conf., 29 Feb, 1916; Ch. Emb. Arch., Vol. 2736.

157. Jordan to Goffe, tel 21, v. conf, 2 Mar. 1916; Ch. Emb. Arch., Vol. 2736.

158. Goffe to Jordan, tel. 46, 2 Mar. 1916; Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736.

159. J.L. Smith to Jordan, no. 11, 5 Mar. 1916, and Smith to Jordan, no. 12, 11 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736

equipped with Japanese arms and ammunition¹⁶². Jordan learned from reliable sources, which he did not specify, that Ts'ai Ao was assisted by retired Japanese military officers in his campaign¹⁶³. Japanese officials in different places were in close contact with anti-Yüan elements. For example, T'ang Shao-i and his friends in Shanghai were in constant communication with the Japanese. Jordan, on the other hand, instructed Fraser to have no transaction with Tang¹⁶⁴. Hioki's interference with the administration of the salt money, which had hitherto been directed by Dane, was interpreted by Jordan as a Japanese device to deprive Yüan Shih-k'ai of funds to which he had an indisputable right¹⁶⁵ and to hamper him in his efforts to suppress the rebellion in the south.

Not only were the local Japanese officials implicated, special agents were sent to the different centres to fan the opposition movement. Despite Goffe's good impression of a Major Yamagata, Jordan was convinced that he was sent to help the Yunnanese in obtaining ammunition and other assistance from Japan through Tongking. Goffe pointed out, however, that the new Japanese consul was a proof of Japan's sympathy for Yunnan. Ever since December, General Aoki Nobuzumi

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160. Jordan to Grey, tel. 83, 5 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736.
161. Jordan to Langley, private, 14 Mar. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15.
162. For example, Goffe to Jordan, tel. 50, 4 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736.
163. Postscriptum of Jordan to Grey, no. 67, 8 Mar. 1916, draft, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736.
164. T'ang had repeatedly approached Fraser to ask Jordan to co-operate with his group and the Japanese in securing Yüan's removal, Jordan, to Grey, tel. 87, secret, 8 Mar. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.
165. Jordan to Langley, private, 29 Feb. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15. By the end of March, salt surplus in the group banks was \$19,298,000.

had been in Shanghai, having been transferred from Port Arther, where he was actively engaged in anti-Yüan activities¹⁶⁶. Even the ordinary Japanese residents in China adopted a most unrelentingly anti-Yüan attitude and considered the time as an unprecedented opportunity for Japan¹⁶⁷ to strengthen her position in China.

Jordan could no longer conceal his anti-Japanese feeling. After Yüan had postponed the monarchy at the end of January, he wrote to Langley bitterly that it "marked the parting of ways" between Japan and Britain. He had originally intended China as a commercial asset¹⁶⁸ during the war years. Although the War did cause a decrease in China's foreign trade in 1915¹⁶⁹, the decrease was not colossal and Germany, Britain's strong rival, was ousted from the China market¹⁷⁰.

By the Reorganisation Loan Agreement of 1913 the Chinese government had the right of access to the surplus for general purposes. Because of Japan's objection, the Consortium could not release all the sum requested by Yüan despite the fact that Richard Dane had given his consent, Dane to Addis in Jordan to Langley, 16 Apr. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15; also F. L. Pratt "Four Years of the Chinese Republic", Quarterly Review, vol. 226, (Jul., 1916), p.170. Yüan appealed to Jordan through Liang Shih-i for the sum that was held up, Jordan to Grey, tel. 129, v. conf., 15 Apr. 1915, Ch. Corres., vol. 2655.

166. For details of Aoki, a nationalist expert on China who was extremely anti-Yüan, and his mission at Shanghai, see Yim, "Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Japanese", p.68; and Jordan to Langley, private, 12 Sept. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15, also Jordan to Grey, tel. 87, secret, 8 Mar. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645; and Jordan to Grey, no. 70, conf., draft, 13 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736.
167. Peking Gazette, 8 Feb. 1916, enclosed in Jordan to Grey, no. 50, 17 Feb. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.
168. Jordan to Langley, private, 1 Feb. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15.
169. Particulars of trade at treaty ports in China of 1915 are available from London and China Telegraph (1915), vol. 57.
170. Jordan expresses this idea to Alston, private, 9 Oct. 1914 and to Lord Bryce, private, 23 Feb. 1916, Jordan Papers, vols. 12, 15. Also Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 13, no 10, (1916) p.7.

In 1915 Britain retained her leading financial position in China, with Japan running up¹⁷¹. Trade came to a standstill when civil war was waged on the monarchical question. What concerned the Foreign Office most was perhaps Jordan's sense of guilt. For the first time he could not avoid identifying himself with China's suffering. He had often expressed his preference for the Chinese rather than the Japanese but never had he before found difficulty in submitting his sympathy to the higher cause of British interests in China. Just before Kuangsi declared independence he wrote:

"...for a person who is troubled with a conscience it is not always easy to make one's sense of public duty square with one's private idea of what is right"¹⁷².

The Downfall of Yüan Shih-k'ai

When the monarchy was officially abolished on 25 March only Yunnan, Kweichow and Kuangsi were independent. When Yüan Shih-k'ai died two months later, five more provinces, Kuangtung, Chekiang, Shansi, Szechuan and Hunan, had seceded from the central government. The fight was no longer for a principle, but for the downfall of Yüan. The two characteristics of the period were the want of unity amongst the non-Yüan elements, and Japan's determination to remove Yüan for ever. They reinforced each other in strengthening Jordan's conviction of Japan's guilt in the eventual death of his friend.

The lack of unity amongst the anti-Yüan elements suggested that had Yüan been backed up by the powers the last five provinces were likely to have remained faithful¹⁷³. Of the five provinces Kuangtung and Szechuan were the most important. Lung Chi-kuang was not a sym-

171. This is according to the statement given by Alfred Sze, Chinese minister in London, in his interview with the London and China Telegraph, see paper, 24 Dec. 1915, vol. 57.

172. Jordan to Langley, private, 14 Mar. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15.

thiser of the Hu-kuo movement. It has been seen that his defection was forced on him by circumstances created by the independence of Kuangsi. Furthermore, Lung's hands were forced by the mutiny of the Kwangtung navy¹⁷⁴. The mutiny could have been forestalled by ample cash from Peking as in the revolution of 1913 when Yüan had the financial backing of the powers. Jordan also learned that even after Kwangtung had declared independence and was entering a loose federation with the other three southern provinces, Lung was still distrusted by the governors of Yunnan, Kueichou and Kuangsi who wanted to oust him from Canton¹⁷⁵. As late as one week before Yüan's death Lung gave a strong hint to Jamieson, consul-general at Canton who reported to Jordan, that if Yüan took a strong stand Kwangtung would revert to his side¹⁷⁶.

In Szechuan Ch'en Huan held out longer; the province declared its independence two weeks before Yüan died. It was within Jordan's knowledge that soon after the independence of Kuangsi Ch'en Huan entered into communication with Ts'ai Ao to relieve the situation of Szechuan. Ch'en, however, declared that his negotiations with Ts'ai were done on behalf of the central government and not an independent action of his own.¹⁷⁷ He appeared to have followed a course which

173. For a lucid analysis of the non-Yüan and anti-Yüan elements, see Li Shu, Hsin-hai Ko-ming ch'ien-hou ti Chung-kuo Cheng-ch'ih, [Chinese politics before and after the 1911 revolution] (Peking, 1961), pp. 130-5.

174. Jamieson to Jordan, tel. 42, 6 Apr. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736.

175. Jamieson to Jordan, tel. 51, 19 Apr. and tel. 53, 20 Apr. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736. On the other hand Li Ken-yüan, Northern Expedition Commissioner of the Military Council, points out that Lung's attitude had been hostile and had threatened to murder himself and Liang Chi-ch'ao soon after the council was

avoided humiliating Yüan too much. But as a result of the pressure exerted on him by prominent members of the Szechuan gentry, Ch'en sent a telegram to Yüan on 7 May urging him to retire. The later declaration of independence was largely due to the influence of what is known as the Szechuan party which advocated independence to expel all non-Szechuanese, particularly Yunnanese, troops from the province. To Jordan, the defection of Ch'en came only after a prolonged vacillation between the Szechuan party and the conservative party which stood for loyalty to Yüan¹⁷⁸.

Perhaps the Nanking conference, convened in May by Generals Feng Kuor-chang, Chang Hsün, and Ni Ssu-ch'ung to settle the question of Yuan's presidency, was the clearest manifestation to Jordan of the divided spirit of the non-Yüan elements. A month after the independence of Kuangtung a united military council (Chün-wu Yüan) was established over the four southern independent provinces at Shui-hing (romanisation from Cantonese) in Kuangtung. Tang Chi-yao, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ts'ai Ao and Tsen Ch'un-hsün occupied important posts in the council¹⁷⁹. It insisted on the abolition of Yüan's presidency irrespective of Yüan's

established, Li Ken-yüan, Hsüeh-sheng nien-pu, [Biography of Li Ken-yüan] in CCS ts'ung-k'an, p.70; Liang Chi-ch'ao confesses his distrust of Lung, Tung-pi chi, pt.4, p. 83.

176. Jamieson to Jordan, tel. 63, 30 May 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch. (F.O. 288), vol.2738.
177. Smith, consul in Szechuan, to Jordan, tel. 23, 4 Apr.1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol.2736.
178. Smith to Jordan, no.24, 13 May, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol.2738; for details relating to Ch'en Hsün's position between the two factions see Feng Yü-hsiang, Wo ti sheng-huo, pt.2, p.5.
179. For details of the Chün-wu Yüan, see Jamieson to Jordan, no.76, 9 May, 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol.2738.

repentent measure of instituting a responsible cabinet under Hsü Shih-ch'ang.

Ten days after the establishment of the Chün-wu Yüan Feng Kuo-chang called for a conference at Nanking to be attended by governors of the loyal provinces. As one of the most influential military figures of the time Feng's attitude and movement was closely followed by Jordan through consular reports from Nanking. Consul Giles reported to him that Feng had no "sympathy with the Yunnan rebellion, attributable though it be to the monarchical movement of which he disapproved"¹⁸⁰. As a result Feng adopted a strictly neutral attitude, diverting his energy to preserving order in Kiangsu which meant putting down all Hu-kuo activities in the province. The Nanking conference met between 19 and 23 May with no result despite Feng, Chang, and Ni's ostensible support for the unconditional retention of Yüan. Jordan's interpretation of the conference is the important matter. He regarded it essentially as the product of a rift between the generals in the north and the leaders in the south-west:

"military leaders generally in the north of China, while prepared if necessary to sacrifice Yuan Shih-kai to pressure of public opinion, are not disposed to let political agitators have a large share in future settlement"¹⁸¹

Jordan's observation was correct. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao telegraphed Feng on 12 May insisting on the removal of Yüan¹⁸². The south condemned the conference as being a tool of Feng for his personal ends.

180 Giles to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, No. 62, 28 Feb. 1916, Ch. Corres., Vol. 2645

181 Jordan to Grey, tel. 141, 9 May 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

182 Liang, Tun-pi chi, pt. 3, pp. 26-7.

Feng was bitterly nicknamed as "Yüan Shih-k'ai II" by the native press which recalled Yüan's alleged double dealings during the 1911 revolution¹⁸³. In Kiangsi the conference was despised and ridiculed¹⁸⁴.

Again Jordan thought that had it not been for Japan's insistence on Yüan's complete removal, Yüan might have been successfully able to exploit the dissension in order to retain his presidency. At the end of March the Foreign Office informed Jordan that the Japanese government held that support to Yüan was not conducive to an early settlement of the crisis and she would continue to watch the course of events "with vigilance".¹⁸⁵ Jordan objected to Japan's attitude. He admitted that Yüan had lost much of his prestige, but his total elimination would only result in large-scale confusion. He officially criticised Japan as being unreasonable now that the monarchy was already cancelled. He asked Grey to put forward his views to the Japanese ambassador¹⁸⁶.

Britain was embarrassed by the divergent views of Japan and her minister in Peking. The Foreign Office faced a dilemma which was clearly put by its official, J.D. Gregory:

"We are ill-armed to face a repetition of the 1912-1913 crisis. Then we had the wherewithal at our disposal to finance a strong man, and in an extreme case troops and ships. Now we have neither.... The only money that could be forthcoming would be American money,

183. For example, Giles to Jordan, no.63, 17 May 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2738.

184. Kirke, consul in Kuangsi, to Jordan, no.28, 30 May 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2738.

185. Grey to Jordan, tel. 61, 31 Mar. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

186. Jordan to Grey, tel. 107, 3 Apr. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

but, if we avail ourselves of that for the purpose of pursuing a policy with which the Japanese don't agree, we risk raising one of the great questions of the future viz. our choice between the U.S. and Japan"¹⁸⁷.

The embarrassment of the Foreign Office was aggravated by American support of Yüan Shih-k'ai¹⁸⁸. Grey decided on a last attempt to change Japan's attitude. He asked the Japanese ambassador to find out if the Japanese minister of foreign affairs would agree to a situation which would leave Yüan with only constitutional powers¹⁸⁹. On 8 April Ishii telegraphed the Japanese ambassador that the compromise suggested by Grey was impracticable because the South was adamant on Yüan's removal¹⁹⁰. Britain had to throw Yüan Shih-k'ai overboard. To the Americans who insisted on the status quo in China Grey expressed his inability to take exception to the course adopted by Japan¹⁹¹. The change to a more favourable tone by the Japanese press reflected the change of British policy¹⁹².

During the same period Japan actively assisted the four southern provinces and instigated new troubles elsewhere in the country. Jordan learned that three days after the independence of Kuangsi the Japanese consul-general at Canton spent a whole day trying to induce the two governors of Kuangtung to join Yunnan and Kuangsi without success¹⁹³. He also learned that shortly before Kuangtung eventually seceded the same consul-general secured the help of Lu Yung-t'ing, the disaffected military governor of Kuangsi, in bringing pressure to bear upon

187. Gregory's minute on Jordan to Grey, tel. 107, 3 Apr. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

188. For Woodrow Wilson's support of Yüan Shih-k'ai throughout the monarchical movement see Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913-1917, pp. 146-58.

189. Grey to Greene, no. 97, 5 Apr. 1916; and Grey to Jordan no. 90, 13 Apr. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

Lung Chi-kuang¹⁹⁴.

Japan continued to be the supplier of arms and ammunition to the insurgent provinces¹⁹⁵. The resources of these provinces remained limited even after their amalgamation under the Shiuhing military council. Jordan implied that the council might have collapsed had it not been in receipt of foreign financial assistance¹⁹⁶. He had a strong reason to suspect that the Chün-wu Yüan was under Japanese influence. Jamieson did not report on its establishment until some time after the event took place because of lack of official confirmation. Jordan, however, learned of the change from Hioki before Jamieson's report. On being asked about the delay in giving the information Jamieson explained that Hioki must have learned of the news from the Japanese consul-general at Canton "whose activities in the matter of trying to create a Southern Republic have been great"¹⁹⁷.

Apart from being heavily involved in the south Japan created new embarrassment for Yüan in Shantung. In reporting to Jordan in the second week of May the consul at Tsinanfu stated categorically that Japanese military authorities were giving every possible help to the anti-Yüan elements in Shantung, and that strong pressure was being put on the governor to declare independence.¹⁹⁸ This explained to Jordan why at the Nanking conference ten days later the Shantung representatives

190 Grey to Jordan, tel. 69, 8 Apr. Paraphrase of Ishii's telegram in Grey to Greene no. 106, 11 Apr. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

191 Grey to Spring-Rice, tel. 923, 11 Apr. 1916, repeated to Peking; Grey to Spring-Rice, tel. 926, 12 Apr. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

192 Greene to Grey, no. 176, 20 Apr. 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

193 Secret and confidential clause of Jamieson to Jordan, tel. 34, 19 Mar. 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., Vol 2736.

194 Kirke to Jordan, tel. 11, 3 Apr. 1916; Jamieson to Jordan, no. 17, 3 Apr. 1916, vol. 2736.

raised the strongest objection to the retention of Yüan as president¹⁹⁹.

The thorny question of the treatment of Yüan was solved suddenly and finally by his death on 6 June. This was a shock to Jordan whose immediate reaction was highly emotional:

"As to Yuan Shih-kai, you will not expect a balanced opinion from me at this moment. I had a great personal liking for the man and feel both his loss and the manner of it acutely. The appreciation contained in my official despatch is a very imperfect estimate of the loss we have sustained by his death.... and to his last day he remained a firm friend of Great Britain. He could not speak a word of English, but he could repeat the names of all his English friends and often told me anecdotes of his association with them. Almost the last time I saw him he said that he had been on very friendly terms with Englishmen since his early manhood and that he had learned to trust and like them. Of this he gave innumerable proofs....

I could go on indefinitely reciting acts to the credit of my dead friend - for simply as a friend I shall always remember him.... He fell in an unequal struggle and to me he was greater in his bitter adversity than he had been even at the height of his power"²⁰⁰.

In this letter and his official despatch on Yüan's death Jordan talked about Yüan more in terms of friendship than British interests. Perhaps that was too unreal a time to think concretely of British interests when Japanese influence in China was so overwhelmingly predominant. There was no doubt that Jordan regarded Yüan as a victim of Japan. In emphasising Yüan's trust in Britain Jordan was indirectly

195. For example, Goffe to Jordan, tel. 63, 25 Mar. 1916, via Canton, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2736.

196. Jordan to Grey, no. 122, draft, 10 May 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2738.

197. Jamieson to Jordan, no. 79, 10 May 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2738.

198. Pratt, consul in Shantung, to Jordan in Jordan to Grey, tel. 142, 9 May 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2645.

199. Giles, consul in Nanking, to Jordan, tel. 10, 22 May 1916, Ch. Emb. Arch., vol. 2738. However, it appears that Jordan was not too concerned about Japan being implicated in the separatist movements in

criticising his government for being unjust to Yüan. In fact he had for some time been irritated by Langley's accommodating attitude towards Japan. In reproaching the Foreign Office Jordan also suffered from self-reproach. It was obvious that Yüan drew closer to Paul Reinsch, the American minister, just before his death. One month before the end Yüan approached Reinsch on the probability of his seeking asylum in the United States. To this suggestion Reinsch reacted favourably²⁰¹.

In concluding, Jordan held firmly that Japan was mainly responsible for the collapse of Yüan's monarchy, which in turn led to his tragic death. She pretended to encourage the movement at its beginning and opposed it at its height. On the whole an objective study of the course of events justifies Jordan's view. The rising in Yunnan would, of course, have taken place with or without the dallying of the Japanese government. It was a well-planned plot of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and his Changsha student, Ts'ai Ao. One day after the Ch'ou-an Hui announced its existence Ts'ai visited Liang in his Tientsin home where they decided to unseat Yüan. The conspiracy at Yunnan was properly hatched in October between Liang, Ts'ai and Tai K'an, late civil governor of Kueichou. Yunnan was to be the starting base because Ts'ai was influential amongst the Yunnanese troops. Then the province would be reinforced by the secession of Kueichou and the Liang-Kuang. Later

South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, see Tanaka Giichi Denki Kanko-Kai, Tanaka Giichi denki [Biography of Tanaka Giichi] (Tokyo 1958), vol. 1, pp. 629-30; and Iwanami Koza, Nihon Rekishi, [A Course in Japanese history] (Tokyo, 1963), vol. 19, pp. 73-5.

200. Jordan to Langley, private, 13 Jun. 1916, Jordan Papers, vol. 15.

201. Jordan to Grey, tel. 162, 26 May 1916, conf. Ch. Corres., vol. 2645. also Reinsch, An American Diplomat, p. 192; Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913-1917, p. 157.

events justified Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's boast that the movement followed its original plan closely²⁰². But it is still an open question if T'ang Chi-yao, tutu of Yunnan, supported the Hu-kuo movement wholeheartedly.²⁰³

However, Liang and his colleagues realised the scanty resources of Yunnan and the vital importance of the cooperation of the three neighbouring provinces²⁰⁴. Kueichou did not join Yunnan until well after one month. Yet, more than a week before this happened Yüan had already decided on an indefinite postponement of the monarchy. The decision was thus obviously irrelevant to the military situation in the south. The more convincing view is that the decision was due to Japan's rejection of Yüan's special envoy whose real mission appeared to have been the winning of Japan's favour to the monarchy. The first act of weakness quickly led to the second and the third. Diplomatic frustration not only lowered the morale of the central government, it had a decided adverse effect on the government troops who were hoping that their service would be rewarded with titles and gold in the new dynasty.

Most works on the period state sweepingly that the failure of the monarchical movement was attributable equally to Japan's diplomatic pressure and internal opposition. It is more true to say that Japan

202. Liang, Tun-pi chi, pt. 4, pp. 81-2; and Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China, pp. 181-2.

203. For example, Chin Chao-tzū, Chin-shih Chung-kuoshih, [History of Modern China] (Shanghai, 1947), p. 180. Shen Yün-lung (ed.) T'ang Chi-yao, in CCS ts'ung-k'an pt. 3, pp. 32-4 support the view that T'ang took the leading part in the revolt to counteract views to the opposite effect.

204. Most observers agree on the point, for example, London and China Telegraph, 27 Mar. 1916, in vol. 58; NCH, 8 Jan. 1916.

gave Yüan and his monarchy the first and most important blow. The opponents of Yüan benefited from Japan's obstruction and made full capital out of it in bringing about Yüan's final elimination.

Jordan did not seem to have realised that Japan's influence in China would increase as long as war lasted whether she chose to support Yüan's monarchy or not. Assuming that the Yunnan revolt was an invariable, Yüan's success depended heavily, as in the revolution in 1913, on the support of the powers in terms of hard cash. Yüan had severe difficulties at the later stage in financing the heavy movement of troops from the north to the defected provinces. The manifestedly loyal provinces withheld remittances to the government on the plausible ground that funds were needed for local military purposes. In the end a moratorium suspending payments by the Bank of China and Bank of Communications was resorted to. Had Japan not obstructed the monarchy she would have been the only power in the position of giving substantial aid to Yüan. If it were so, Japan's influence would have increased all the same. It was the War that should be blamed, but Japan was, of course, a more tangible substitute.

By the time Yüan Shih-k'ai died Jordan had become irrevocably anti-Japanese. Henceforth he "saw behind every bush a Japanese"²⁰⁶. He

205. London and China Telegraph, 21 Feb. 1916; 27 Mar; and 29 May, 1916, in vol. 58. For details of the moratorium, see Huang, Yüan-shih tao-kuo chi, pt. 1, pp. 143-5; Ts'en, Liang, nien-p'u, vol. 1, pp. 338-9. It is interesting to see Jordan's reaction to the moratorium. On 12 May the cabinet issued the moratorium ordinance. The Shanghai branch of the Bank of China decided to defy the ordinance to avoid panic in the city. To give the appearance of security, the Shanghai branch asked a British barrister, White Cooper, and a Japanese to be the trustees. Jordan objected because it was "very undesirable that any British subject should be associated in a measure which aims at setting aside a mandate issued by recognised [Yüan's] government of the country". Later on, with the Chinese government's approval, a foreign loan of

had lost that sense of political balance which had, until the incident of the twenty-one demands, enabled him to divorce personal views from national interest. His unconcealed bitterness against Japan proved a constant source of embarrassment to Whitehall and was chiefly responsible for the violent attack on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by the Japanese press until the monarchical movement drew to a close²⁰⁷. The Foreign Office, eager to maintain good relations with her Far Eastern ally, decided to send out Alston in May (arriving in Peking on 4 August) with a view to taking over chief responsibilities from Jordan. It appeared that Jordan was bitter about Alston's presence²⁰⁸. The Japanese ambassador, Inouye got the impression that the Foreign Office would recall Jordan for good.²⁰⁹

However, although for a time the Foreign Office might have felt it more convenient to be without Jordan's presence in China it was unlikely that it would recall him. Grey in particular would be reluctant

\$2,000,000 was made to liquidate the notes of both the Banks of China and Communications in Shanghai, Jordan to Grey, tel. 145, 12 May; tel. 147, 14 May; tel. 150, 17 May; 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2656.

206. Sir E. Teichman, himself a consular official in China, Affairs of China, (London 1938) p.46
207. London and China Telegraph, for example, 20 Mar. 1916, in vol. 58; according to Coleman, The Far East Unveiled, p. 21, the Japanese declared that their anti-British press campaign "was aimed against the English in the Far East rather than against Britain as a power", for more details of Japan's objection to the English in China in particular, see pp. 22-3.
208. Alston to E. Drummond, private, 16 Aug. 1916, Grey Papers, (F.O. 800), vol. 44, Alston was sent as the councillor of the legation in Peking and the original councillor, Macleay, was recalled soon after Alston's arrival.

to take the step. In fact there were rumours of Jordan's retirement soon after Alston's appointment to Peking was made known, but Grey hastened to assure Jordan with what he had apparently told the Chinese minister in London when the latter enquired about the matter:

"I regretted that any statement should have appeared that you were retiring because it was not true. We wished you to stay as long as you could"²¹⁰

Despite Grey's assurance, when Jordan left China in November 1916 it was expected in the Foreign Office that he would not return to the country again. To Alston's disappointment²¹¹ Jordan asked to be sent back the next summer and he returned to Peking in November, 1917.

209. Inouye Kaoru-ko Denki Hensankai, Segai Inouye-ko den, [A biography of Inouye Kaoru], (Tokyo, 1934), vol. 5, pp. 245-6. Here it is said that Inouye was told by Grey himself that Jordan would be recalled. However, Japanese official documents on the monarchical movement in 1916 until Yüan's death do not confirm this finding, see NGB, vol. 84 (1916), pp. 1-187.

210. Grey to Jordan, no. 112, 19 May 1916, Ch. Corres., vol. 2656.

211. The expectation that Jordan would not be going back to China is shown in Alston's letter to Langley in which he resents Jordan's return which makes it necessary for him to make other arrangements because he had expected to succeed as the new minister, Alston to Langley, private, 6 Aug. 1917, Langley Papers, vol. 30. Thus it appears that Jordan was given the choice whether or not to return to China, but it was generally expected that he would choose not to because of the frustration that he had during the first two years of the War. When he asked to return to China in late 1917, the Foreign Office did not object; by then the War was turning to the better for the Allies.

CONCLUSION

Between November, 1917 and March, 1920 Jordan continued to be extremely critical of Japanese activities, especially the Nishihara loans which he regarded as Japan's means of consolidating her influence in north China. At the same time he became increasingly friendly with the Americans, especially the American minister, Reinsch, who, apart from having become Britain's ally in the European War, were known for their suspicion of Japan's designs in China. And over and above his anti-Japanese and pro-American attitude, Jordan became much more concerned about China being able to develop the country herself and for her own good. Because of his consistent concern for China and his identification with China in her suffering at Japan's hands, Jordan was generally thought of as being stronger and more stable in his last two and a half years in China.¹ The details about Jordan during this short period, however, are of little direct relevance to the theme of this thesis.

Between 1906 and 1916 Jordan's policy, whether generally or with special reference to the 1911 revolution and Yüan Shih-k'ai, was essentially conditioned by his concept of Britain's rôle in China. During the years before the War he was primarily concerned with the expansion of Britain's commercial, industrial, and financial foothold in China. Apart from the obvious material considerations in carrying activities to this end, he steadfastly believed that Britain deserved more concessions because she, more than any other country, could achieve more out of what she was given

¹For example R. Gilbert, "Forty-four Years in China", in Far Eastern Review, vol. 16, no. 3, (Mar. 1920), p. 136.

for the general good. The attitude was typical of an age in which the cry of the "Whiteman's burden" was raised, except that Jordan thought more in terms of a British burden in China. The attitude, too, explained partly his aversion to cooperation of any kind with other countries. It was only during his last year in China that he advocated internationalism in dealing with China's finances and railways and in this, apart from a concern for China's interests, there was certainly a desire to retain a British share which would otherwise be devoured by Japan.

That Jordan was in the first place the trustee of British interests explains both his behaviour in the 1911 revolution and his attitude towards Yüan Shih-k'ai. During the 1911 revolution the immediate decision of withdrawing financial aid from the Manchu government was made in order to safeguard British life and property. The two subsequent examples of departure from the policy of financial neutrality were motivated by the desire to stabilise the Shanghai money market which was vital to both China's internal and external trade, and, more significantly, to sustain Yüan Shih-k'ai's ministry as long as possible, since it guaranteed law and order, at least in the north. His mediation between Yüan and the revolutionaries aimed, first, at the restoration of peace, which was essential to British trade. Secondly, it aimed at initiating negotiations, the result of which might still be the retention of the Manchu dynasty as a constitutional government, with the real power in Yüan's hands. This, too, was an outcome which Jordan thought would serve Britain's interests best.

The relationship between Jordan and Yüan was essentially based on mutual interests. From the point of view of British interests, it would have been unnatural if Jordan had rejected the overture of friendship from Yüan Shih-k'ai who was not only the most influential political figure in China from 1906 to 1916, but was outspoken in his reliance on Britain's support. This, however, does not exclude the fact that Jordan was truly friendly and even respectful towards Yüan Shih-k'ai. At the same time, Yüan also made full use of Jordan's support. In this connection, that Jordan was the representative of Britain, the most important power in China until the War, was significant.² It is doubtful if Yüan would have taken the trouble to befriend Jordan if he had represented, for example, Italy. Indeed, when it suited his purpose, his friendship with Jordan did not prevent him from giving away to Japan railway rights in the Yangtze region in 1913 and 1914.

All the same, Jordan's behaviour during the 1911 revolution and his friendship with Yüan Shih-k'ai were not free from a genuine concern for China. Compared with the Foreign Office, and such important consular officials in China as Goffe, Fraser and Wilkinson, Jordan definitely gave more thought to China's interests. The Foreign Office of course had other considerations which it regarded as more important than Britain in China. For instance, during the Reorganisation Loan negotiations in 1912 and 1913 the Foreign Office was chiefly preoccupied

²For instance, Jerome Ch'en implies that Yüan remained pro-British after the 1911 revolution because he was under the illusion that Britain was still the strongest power in the Far East, Yüan Shih-k'ai, p. 254.

with the problem of internal opposition to the consortium. As for Goffe, Fraser, and Wilkinson, they quickly abandoned support for the Manchu government in the 1911 revolution and for Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1916, when they thought British interests made this necessary. Jordan, too, understood the dangers of continued support from the point of view of British interests in each case, and in the end he had to act like Goffe, Fraser and Wilkinson, but he showed much greater reluctance in abandoning what he conceived as best for China.

In this connection Jordan's attitude to the revolutionaries, later the Kuo-min Tang, can also be considered. On the one hand he deserves to be praised for upholding as consistently as circumstances allowed him what or whom he believed to be good for China. On the other hand, he seems to have shown little desire to find out more about those whom he thought obstructive to his ideal China. Even if we accept that Sun Yat-sen was indeed more a visionary than a practical politician,³ Jordan's criticisms of Huang Hsing, as an outstanding example, seem to^{be} unfairly harsh. The harshness is at first sight justified in that during both the 1911 and 1913 revolutions Huang occupied the key military positions in opposing the Manchu government and Yüan Shih-k'ai respectively. However, Jordan was not justified in accepting so readily the accusation made by Yüan's government of Huang's corruption in the disposal of the

³ Sun was considered as an idealistic visionary even by some members of the Kuo-min Tang, for example, Sh_{en}, "Pu-hsin ti erh-t'zū ko-ming", p. 18; Wilkinson to Jordan, no. 12, 9 Feb. 1912, Ch. Emb. Arch., (F.O. 228) vol. 1836 in which Jordan was told that when Sun was the provisional president in 1912 he was considered as an inexperienced statesman by many in the Nanking provisional government.

Belgian loan.⁴ Opposition to what Jordan considered to be politically right in China did not necessarily mean a want of integrity and morality. In fact most people who knew Huang personally had a high opinion of him.⁵ Jordan's criticisms of Ch'en Ch'i-mei were equally, if not more, outspoken.⁶ Assuming, in the extreme case, that both Huang and Ch'en were criminals, it is still true that Yüan Shih-k'ai was equally guilty of criminal acts, the most abominable of which was his ruthless annihilation of his political enemies. The distinction he made between Yüan, Huang and Ch'en in this respect was most unbecoming of him, who was renowned for being just. Does it mean that Jordan too shared the view that what was considered to be just in the western world did not necessarily apply to China, and that morality was relative rather than absolute?

Jordan himself has been unfairly criticised for being timid, muddled, and lacking in determination during the years before the War. Ironically, the sharpest attacks came from Morrison who had strongly recommended Jordan's appointment as minister to Peking. Morrison once wrote that Jordan was "the most industrious quill driver ever known", always "bemuddled" and "immersed in details".⁷ Judging from his

⁴See chapter 5, p.219.

⁵See, for example, Sh'en, "Pu-hsin ti erh-t'zǔ ko-ming"; Li Yün-han, "Huang K'o-ch'iang hsien-sheng nien-p'u k'ao," and Hsüeh, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution; Huang, Yüan-sheng i-chu, vol. 1, p. 246.

⁶In Ch'en's case Jordan's criticisms were more justified because Ch'en did have connection with members of underground societies to further the cause of the revolution, Sh'en, "Pu-hsin ti erh-t'zǔ ko-ming", p.19.

⁷9 Dec. 1909, Morrison Papers, vol. 82 (?)

correspondence Jordan was far from being bemuddled, although it is true that he had the details of matters at his finger tips. It appears that Morrison's change of attitude stemmed more from his disappointment in Jordan's attitude towards China than the mere question of competence. China had been Morrison's main interest throughout his life. Between 1898 and 1912 he was The Times correspondent to Peking. From 1912 to his death in 1920 he was political adviser in the Chinese government. His straightforwardly pro-Chinese attitude was unmistakable. In 1903 Morrison prayed for a Russo-Japanese war which would oust ~~the~~ Russian influence from Manchuria.⁸ During the Russo-Japanese War Morrison and Jordan found a basis of congenial friendship in being anti-Russian and pro-Japanese. Soon after becoming the British minister in China, however, Jordan became a disappointment to Morrison, in that Morrison found Jordan too concerned about Britain's, and not enough about China's interests. After the Russo-Japanese War Morrison's pro-Chinese feeling became synonymous with his antagonism against Japan whom he regarded as the pretender to Russia's position in Manchuria. Jordan's fairly friendly relations with the Japanese in Peking until 1913 must therefore have been annoying to Morrison.

⁸Nish, "Dr. G. E. Morrison and Japan", Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia, vol. 2, no. 1, (Jun. 1963), p. 43; and Nish, "Morrison and the Portsmouth Conference", Journal of Royal Australian-Historical Society, (Mar. 1963), vol. 48, pt. 6, pp.26-7.

⁹One example of such speeches was that given to the China Association at Shanghai, Jordan to Campbell, 12 Dec. 1907, Jordan Papers, vol. 5. Another example was Morrison's farewell speech to England before leaving for Peking to take up the advisership, Pall Mall Gazette, 16 Sept. 1912 in Ch. Corres., vol. 1348, in which Morrison says that it is wrong to think that a republic is not suitable to China; for this, Jordan criticises

On the other hand, Jordan found Morrison unrealistically optimistic about China. Both before and after the 1911 revolution Morrison's speeches on China were so coloured by his enthusiasm that Jordan found them to be incongruous with the real state of the country.⁹ The differences between them came to head in 1912 over the Birch Crisp Loan, which Morrison urged on the Chinese in order to break the monopoly of the consortium. Jordan indignantly described Morrison's share in the matter as "a disservice"¹⁰ both to China and Britain. Nevertheless, relations between the two men appear to have taken a better turn after the outbreak of the 1914 war because Jordan became increasingly anti-Japanese.

The crux of the matter is that until 1914 Jordan and Morrison looked at China from almost directly opposite angles. Morrison's position meant that he could unflinchingly follow his pro-Chinese tendency, especially when he was in the service of the Chinese government. Indeed, he was not unique in his loyalty as an employee of the Chinese government. Sir Robert Hart was another outstanding example.¹¹ By contrast, as the British representative in China Jordan's first duty was to protect Britain's interests. This duty had to be carried out especially in the 1911 revolution through a vicissitude of changes. Since the circumstances changed

Morrison for being "absurdly optimistic", Jordan to Langley, private, 21 Sept. 1912, Jordan Papers, vol. 8.

¹⁰ Grey to Jordan, private, 3 Oct. 1912; Jordan to Grey, private, 23 Nov. 1912, Grey Papers, (F.O. 800), vol. 43.

¹¹ Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs, p. 819.

rapidly, it was natural that Jordan's policy had to be frequently adjusted to the turns of the events if the best interests of Britain were to be maintained. In fact, Jordan was adaptable rather than indecisive. A more indecisive person would have taken much less than the almost ten years that Jordan took to reverse his attitude to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War. A less adaptable person would have taken longer to suggest the policy of internationalisation in accordance with his realisation of Britain's vulnerability in the Far East after the War.¹² It has been suggested that Jordan is to be considered at his strongest during his last two and a half years in China, because he had become consistently anti-Japanese and pro-Chinese. It has to be borne in mind, however, that circumstances then offered him no alternative.

Whether Jordan liked it or not, diplomacy in China during the greater part of the ten years dealt with here was characterised by growing internationalisation, forerunner to the later storm. Thus it is often difficult to assess Jordan's influence in a given situation. It can be asserted with confidence that Jordan's influence was greater than that of his colleagues in Peking at any time before the War, because Britain was still the leading power in China, having much residual influence and still taking a leading position in the bank consortium. Nevertheless, Jordan's influence was weakened by the fact that the period had definitely begun in which diplomacy had to be conducted on a world wide basis. It was no longer an age when what was to be done about China

¹²Unlike Alston, a much more unsteady person, who got extremely anti-Japanese during the short time in which he was in charge for Jordan in 1913.

could be considered strictly within the Chinese context. This explains what appears to be the Foreign Office's loss of confidence in Jordan during the first half of the War. It also suggests that, with or without Jordan as minister, British policy would have followed the same broad lines towards the 1911 revolution and Yüan Shih-k'ai as in fact it did. Jordan's initiatives bore fruit only when they could fit into the overall structure of British diplomacy.

Finally, Jordan's ministry was one of irony. During the 1911 revolution he was forced by circumstances to abandon the ideal of a limited monarchy for a republic which he had hitherto been sceptical about. In 1916 he had to oppose Yüan Shih-k'ai's monarchical movement against his wishes. After the War he advocated international cooperation in China, an aversion to him until before the War. Perhaps, most ironical of all is the fact that until the present day he has been severely criticised by the Chinese for whom he professed to have a true liking.¹³ He has been almost uniformly denounced by the nationalists, followers of Sun Yat-sen, as the arch-supporter of Yüan Shih-k'ai's political crimes, and by the communists as the instrument of Britain's imperialist aggression in China.¹⁴

¹³ Jordan to Alston: "That is the experience of all of us who knew the Chinese individually, they are really a far more likeable people than the Japanese," 7 Jan. 1910, Jordan Papers, vol. 6.

¹⁴ When the news of Jordan's death reached China in 1925 it is said that "not a single Chinese newspaper...contained any appreciation of the services of the late Sir John Jordan to China", NCH, 19 Sept. 1925. An obvious example of attacks from the communists is Shao Hsün-cheng, "Hsin-hai ko-ming wu-shih-nien-chien wai-kuo chin-lieh-che yü Chung-kuo mai-pan-hua chün-fa Kuan-liao shih-li ti kuan-hsi", [the relationship between foreign aggressors and militarist's powers in China.] in Li-shih yen-chiu, [Chinese Historical Journal] , (Peking 1954), no.4, pp. 62-3. An obvious example of attacks from the nationalists is Wu, "Hai-wai hsin-chien Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shih shih-liao", p.62.

Glossary^φ

List of British Officials Whose Names Appear More Than
Three Times in the Thesis

A. In the Foreign Office

- Alston, B. F., Acting senior clerk 1 Apr., 1906 - 30 Jun., 1907.
Senior clerk, 1 Jul., 1907 - 22 Sept. 1911.
Acting-counsellor at Peking, Jan. - Jul., 1912.
Resumed duty at the Foreign Office from 30 Sept.,
1912. Again acting counsellor at Peking, 3 May 1913,
and chargé d'affaires at Peking 6 Jun. - 24 Nov., 1913.
Again acting counsellor at Peking, 17 Jun., 1916 and
chargé d'affaires 16 Nov., 1916 - 8 Oct., 1917.
- Campbell, F.A., Under- secretary of state, 1 Aug., 1902 - 28 Dec., 1911.
- Gregory, J.D., Acted as junior clerk between 7 Oct., 1909 and 30 Sept.,
1913; and assistant clerk from Oct., 1913, with short
periods of service abroad.
- Grey, E., Secretary of State for foreign affairs, Dec. 1905 -
Dec., 1916.
- Langley, W., Senior clerk 1 Oct., 1902 - 30 Jun., 1907. Assistant
under-secretary of state 1 Jul 1907 - 30 Sept., 1918.
- Lindley, F.O. Acted as clerk from 18 Oct., 1911 to 17 Jan., 1912.
- Nicolson, A.R. Under-secretary of state 23 Nov., 1910 - 19 Jun., 1916.
- Tyrrell, W.G. Assistant clerk 14 Apr., 1903 - 6 May 1907. Senior clerk
7 May, 1907 - 30 Sept., 1918. He was also private
secretary to Grey, 7 May, 1907 - 14 Jun., 1915.

^φList compiled from the Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular
Year Book, 1906 - 1920.

B. Consular Staff in China

Fraser, E.D.H., Consul-general at Hankow 1 Jul., 1901 - Jan., 1911.

Consul-general at Shanghai from 20 Jan., 1911.

Fulford, H.E., Consul-general at Mukden 6 Aug., 1906 - Jan., 1911.

Consul-general at Hankow, 20 Jan., 1911 - 30 Sept., 1912,
but was absent during the 1911 revolution. Acting
consul-general at Shanghai 9 Jun., 1913, 8 Feb., 1914.

Giles, B., Acting consul at Changsha, 27 Dec. 1905 - 4 May, 1907.

Acting consul at Tsinan 1908 - 1910. Acting consul at
Nanking 4 Nov., 1914 - 15 Dec., 1915 and from 19 Jan., 1916

Goffe, H., Acting consul-general at Chengtu 11 Apr., 1905 - 13 Jan.,
1907. Transferred to Wuhu Sept., 1908, and to Nanking,

21 Jan., 1909. Acting consul-general at Hankow 1911 - 1912
Consul-general at Yunnanfu from 1 Oct., 1912.

Jamieson, J.W., Consul-general at Canton from 21 Jan., 1909.

Kirke, C.C.A., Acting vice-consul at Hankow in 1911 and 1912. Acting
consul at Chefoo 1912 - 1914, and at Nanking 1914.

Consul at Wuchou and acting consul-general at Canton 1915.

Smith, J.L., Acting consul-general at Chengtu 1914 - 1916.

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1. From Campbell, Langley, Grey and Tyrrell, Dec. 1910 - Dec. 1912.
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3. To F.O., British representatives in China and Japan, and British naval authorities, 1901 - Oct. 1905 as Minister resident and consul-general in Korea.
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5. To General, Oct. 1907 - Jul. 1909.
6. To General, Jul. 1909 - Jan. 1910.
7. To General, Dec. 1910 - Dec. 1911.
8. To F.O., 1912.
9. Registers of correspondence, 1903 - 1906.
10. Registers of correspondence, 1907 - 1908.

11. From Langley, 1913 - 1914.
12. To F.O., 1913 - 1914.
13. To F.O., 1915.
14. From F.O., 1915.
15. To Langley, 1916.
16. To and from F.O., 1917 - 1919.

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22	35	38	213
217	220	221	223
224	229	230	231
233	409	422	425
612	613	622	624
626	634	636	851
858	1080	1093	1094
1095	1096	1097	1098
1310	1311	1312	1313
1314	1315	1316	1317
1318	1319	1320	1321
1322	1323	1324	1325
1348	1590	1591	1592
1593	1620	1623	1624

1625	1940	1941	1942
2322	2323	2324	2338
2644	2645	2655	2656

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(F.O. 228)

1081	1082	1084	1085
1086	1836	1841	1952
1966	1985	2306	2348
2349	2500	2736	2737

2338

(F.O. 671)

336	339	357
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(F.O. 233)

133

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168	171	173	174
175	178	179	182
183	187	190	191
195	196	199	200
201	204	229.	

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(F.O. 17)

1245	1246	1281	1282
1284			

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(F.O. 371)

2016	2017
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(F.O. 800)

244	245	246	247
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82?	65	66
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