

BRITISH POLICY in WEST AFRICA, the MALAY PENINSULA and the SOUTH PACIFIC
during the COLONIAL SECRETARYSHIPS of LORD KIMBERLEY and LORD CARNARVON,
1870 to 1876.

by

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Abstract.

Three experiments in Britain's tropical empire were begun in 1874. The forts on the Gold Coast were added to the island of Lagos to form a crown colony which was given legislative power in the Gold Coast Protectorate, the first Residents were appointed in the Malay States and the Fiji Islands were annexed. As it has been suggested that these developments formed part of a new forward colonial policy inaugurated by Disraeli, and since the three experiments were sometimes mentioned together, an examination of the background of the changes and a consideration of their place in the history of British policy may be useful.

Local events in each area reached a crisis during Gladstone's first ministry at a time when changes in personnel gave the Colonial Office a different bias. The separatist Sir Frederic Rogers gave way as Permanent Under-secretary in 1871 to Robert Herbert, a former Premier of Queensland; Lord Kimberley, a conscientious Colonial Secretary, who gave close attention to the local crises, took office in 1870, and Edward Knatchbull-Hugessen, who became Parliamentary Under-secretary in 1871, showed himself to be an eager expansionist. Between 1870 and 1873 they conducted a careful reappraisal of Britain's role in the three tropical regions, and between February and August 1873 Kimberley decided to intervene in the Gold Coast against Ashanti invaders, he suggested the appointment of Residents in Malaya, and he urged Gladstone to annex Fiji.

As the Liberal Government fell in February 1874 before future policy had been determined, the final decisions fell to Lord Carnarvon, Disraeli's Colonial Secretary. He decided to follow Kimberley's policy in each case, but he announced strictly limited aims. Instead of initiating a period of colonial expansion he saw himself conducting three experiments in the administration of tropical dependencies.

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The Pacific sections were read by Dr. I.M.Cumpston of Birkbeck College, who lent me an unpublished manuscript by her father; the West African sections were read by Mr. D.Jones of the School of Oriental and African Studies; I discussed the question of the cession of the Dutch Gold Coast to Britain with Dr. D.Cooms of the University of Ghana, who lent me his unpublished manuscript on the subject. The whole thesis was read in draft by Mr. R.I.Conhaim of the University of California, who made valuable criticism, by Professor D.G.E.Hall of the School of Oriental and African Studies, who gave me encouragement throughout; and by Dr. C.D.Cowan who first suggested the subject for research.

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Introduction.

Three experiments were launched in 1874, which were significant in the history of the British empire in the tropics. In West Africa the tiny settlement of Lagos was added to the forts on the Gold Coast to form a new crown colony, which was given legislative power in the vague Gold Coast Protectorate. In the Malay States the first Residents were appointed. The annexation of Fiji gave Britain her first possession in the South Pacific outside the Australasian colonies.¹ In the press, in Parliament and in the private letters of Cabinet Ministers these experiments were often mentioned together, and the purpose of the present thesis is to enquire whether they formed part of a comprehensive new departure in British policy.

Gladstone's first ministry resigned in February 1874, and in the General Election which followed Disraeli triumphed. But although the experiments were inaugurated by Lord Carnarvon, his Secretary of State for Colonies, they did not, as has been suggested,² form a part of a new policy of colonial expansion. Carnarvon said it was "impossible to appropriate every territory and every island", and he pleaded for "some breathing time before we are required to act on a large scale...."³ The experiments were really the result of a re-appraisal of Britain's role in the three areas conducted by the Colonial Office under Lord Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary in Gladstone's Government from July 1870 until February 1874. The peculiar internal circumstances of the three areas had raised the general question of British intervention, and while Kimberley was reluctant to move and wanted to prevent the extension of British responsibilities, Edward

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1. Except Pitcairn, settled by the Bounty mutineers in 1790, whose decedents were moved to Norfolk Island in 1856.
 2. E.G. C.E.Carrington, The British Overseas (1950) p.534: "when the forward policy was fairly launched by Disraeli in 1874...."
 3. To a New Guinea deputation. The Times, 3.v.1875 reporting a meeting of 29.iv.1875.

Knatchbull-Hugessen, the Parliamentary Under-secretary for Colonial Affairs from January 1871 to February 1874, who was an avowed 'imperialist' within the Liberal camp, urged him to intervene, and insisted that withdrawal would be politically dangerous. Thus between February and July 1873 Kimberley decided to attempt firmer administration on the Gold Coast and to intervene with force against Ashanti, he adopted the proposal for the appointment of Residents in Malaya, and he urged Gladstone to annex Fiji. The experiments launched by the Conservative Government were really decisions to pursue policies which had been worked out by their Liberal predecessors. They were the culmination of a period of tentative innovation rather than the beginning of a forward movement.

Although the experiments were not part of a comprehensive scheme of expansion, and Carnarvon insisted that each case had been judged on its merits, the decisions of 1873 and 1874 represent major landmarks in the development of the Gold Coast, in the assumption of British control in Malaya and in the Pacific islands. If this was not generally realised at the time, there were a few who began to ask where such experiments might end. Lord Blachford, who as Sir Frederic Rogers, the Permanent Under-secretary of the Colonial Office, 1860 to 1871, had tried to ward off the assumption of new responsibilities in the tropics, displayed a prophetic awareness, when he wrote in 1875: "we have Suez with Egypt in the distance - Perak with Siam in the distance - Fiji with Oceania in the distance, and Ashanti with Central Africa in the distance".¹

Looking at the three experiments together he realised that they were all part of the same problem. This thesis will attempt to define that problem and will examine the backgrounds to the three experiments. And as each area has

1. Blachford to Taylor 9.xii.1875. Quoted in G.E. Marindin, Lord Blachford's Letters (1896) p.365.

recently received separate detailed treatment from historians,¹ some justification of the present approach is necessary. C.D.Cowan in his at present unpublished Origins of British Political Control in Malaya 1867-1878 (1956) traced the growth from scratch, as it were, of Colonial Office thinking on Malaya after the Straits Settlements were transferred from India Office supervision in 1867. He revealed the role played by Kimberley, a much trusted lieutenant of Gladstone's, who still awaits a biographer,² and he noticed how the mention of Germany seemed to play a crucial part in the Malayan decision. He realised that Kimberley appeared to be doing similar things in West Africa and the South Pacific, but in specialist work on Malaya there was neither time nor space to investigate them. The present study follows Dr. Cowan's suggestion of taking the three areas together and seeing if any connecting links join Kimberley's policies.

What are the links? Firstly, there is the co-incidental one of time. Roughly between the 1850's and the 1870's the very diverse social and political institutions of the Gold Coast, the Malay States and Fiji seemed to reach a

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1. West Africa: J.D.Hargreaves, "The French occupation of the Mellacourie, 1865-67" Sierra Leone Studies, No.9 (Dec.1957) p.3 & "The First Phase of the Partition of West Africa", read to the Anglo-American Historian's Conference, London 1957. F.Wolfson, British Relations with the Gold Coast 1843-1880 (PhD.thesis London 1950). K.O.Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885, (1956). S.O.Biobaku, The Egba and their Neighbours 1842-1872 (1957). C.J. Gertzal, Imperial Policy towards the British Settlements in West Africa, 1860-1875 (B.Litt. thesis Oxford 1953).

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2. The fullest account is in the Introduction by E.Drus to Kimberley's "Journal of Events during the Gladstone Ministry. 1868-1874", Camden Miscellany, vol. XXI, Royal Historical Society, 1958.

a stage which made certain people demand British intervention. Diverse though they were, the three areas had certain superficial features in common, which were more apparent to contemporary Englishmen than they are to-day. The power of local authority was weakened by rivalries, immigration, economic penetration, or European interference. Englishmen, authorised or not, had intervened to mitigate disorders. Domestic slavery, or customs which were stigmatised as slavery, existed, and could still rouse the moral ardour of the House of Commons. Thus, by coincidence, Kimberley faced similar situations, and in the summer of 1873, he made similar decisions, for each area.

Secondly, there is the link provided by Downing Street. Decisions were made by the same men in the Cabinet or the Colonial Office, and policy had to fit the common factors of foreign policy or the scrutiny of the Treasury. Although Carnarvon said that each case was judged on its merits, it was inevitable that officials handling papers from different areas sometimes on the same day, would see the similarities of their problems. Rogers liked to find precedents from the entire empire when considering a new policy, Knatchbull-Hugessen referred to Fiji in his arguments on Lagos, Gladstone hoped the Ashanti war would warn people off Fiji, Carnarvon announced the annexation of Fiji in the same letter in which he sought Disraeli's permission to go ahead with the abolition of slavery on the Gold Coast, Derby thought the Fiji, Malayan and Gold Coast policies would offset the possible loss of the Gambia, and Fiji cropped up in the discussions about consular jurisdiction in the Niger Delta and relations with the Orange Free State.

Thirdly, there is a link though local officials. Two Royal Engineer officers, in particular, play a considerable part in the discussion. Sir Harry Ord¹ and Sir Andrew Clarke, the first two colonial governors of the Straits Settlements (1867-1875) had both been previously to the Gold Coast and had played a part in

1. His name was Harry St. George Ord, not Orde (as some authors have called him) nor Sir Henry, as in The Cambridge History of the British Empire, III, p.46.

the making of policy there. In Singapore they had a crucial role in the assumption of British control in the Malay States. (Sir) John Pope-Hennessy, who was Governor-in-Chief of the West African Settlements at the outbreak of the Ashanti war in 1872, had formerly governed Labuan. A minor official, Sir William Hackett began as Queens Advocate in the Gold Coast in 1861, and later acted as Lieut-Governor. In 1869 he went as Recorder to Penang, and later acted as Chief Justice of the Straits; in 1875 he became the Chief Justice of Fiji. (Sir) John Glover R.N. had two separate roles: at Lagos between 1861 and 1870 as governor, and as a commander in the Ashanti war 1873-74.

Fourthly, there is the often baseless, but nevertheless important link of public opinion. Parliamentary debates produced many cross references between West Africa, the Straits and Fiji. The Missionary Societies, Anti-Slave and Aborigines Protection societies, with their wide experience of treating the world as their oyster, several times sent deputations to the Colonial Secretary to discuss a cluster of problems ranging from West Africa to New Guinea, from Zanzibar to the South Seas. Colonial newspapers delighted in giving the Colonial Office a consistency which it never had. Thus the decision to send the Ashanti Expedition in 1873 gave Singapore newspapers a hope that a strong policy might be attempted in the Malay States.¹ Australian newspapers also suggested that recalcitrant Fijians or Papuans might be treated like the Ashantis, and a Governor of Victoria made great play of a literary similarity when he compared the New Guinea question in 1874 with the 'old Guinea' troubles of 1872.

Finally, historians have also noticed the apparent links. Carrington says Kimberley "initiated forward moves in West Africa, Malaya and Fiji which his Tory successor completed".² Knaplund, after a very superficial glance at the three areas, said "Britain took control of new lands and added to her burdens. The

1. Cowan, Origins, p.225, fn.9.

2. Carrington, British Overseas, p.534.

onward march of empire could not be halted".¹ H.L.Hall spends most of his chapter on "Native Policy"² dealing with West Africa and Fiji. And following Disraeli's accusation in the 1874 election, the text-books suggest that an Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1871 provided for the transfer to Britain of the Dutch Gold Coast forts in return for Britain's renunciation of her objections to Dutch expansion in Sumatra.³ This link had some substance, but the 'treaty' was in fact three separate treaties, with quite different origins, which were submitted to the Dutch States-General together to facilitate their passage. As it was "the Sumatra Treaty was the gilding to induce the Dutch to swallow the Gold Coast pill", but the States-General, at first, "took the pill and rejected the gilding".⁴ Link, pill and gilding require further examination.

The links, however, were scarcely noticed by contemporaries. A few, like Kimberley, Rogers and Carnarvon, realised that the process of expansion, once begun, would be difficult to check, but some sense of proportion may be gained by noticing the only occasion where the author has found the Gold Coast, Malaya and Fiji mentioned together is State Papers, though not in private papers. This was the case of the Malay Chieftains' swords. After the Perak war of 1875 the governor of the Straits Settlements suggested that loyal Malay chiefs might receive an inscribed silver-handled sword from the Queen, on the pattern of swords presented in West Africa after the Ashanti war of 1873-74. The swords were duly inscribed, when it was discovered that the loyalty of the chiefs was less deserving of reward. Carnarvon was rather annoyed, but since the Fijian chiefs had just suppressed a cannibal rising, he said, "I suppose we cannot utilise the swords in Fiji".⁵

1. P.Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy, (1927) p.137.

2. H.L.Hall, The Colonial Office (1937) pp.190-220.

3. R.C.K.Ensor, England 1870-1914, (1936) p.27. D.G.E.Hall, A History of South-East Asia (1955) pp.474-5.

4. Memo. by (Sir) Percy Anderson of the F.O., printed 28.1.1874. Copy in CO/273/77.

5. Min. by Carnarvon 25.xi.1877 on Anson to Carnarvon 29.ix.1877. CO/273/91.

The links, then, are often coincidental and tenuous. But a case can be made for the value of this, as it were, 'horizontal' approach to the history, over a short period, of the three areas. No new method of research or interpretation has been made, but the close emphasis placed on the timing of decisions in London has yielded helpful results. By carefully noting the dates of arrival and registration of despatches, of the dates of minutes and annotations, and in some cases of the dates of interviews with men-on-the-spot, the author has been able to make up, in some measure, for the somewhat informal system of filing used by the Colonial Office. A few examples will illustrate this. When Fiji was still foreign territory and therefore the responsibility of the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office began a Fiji file in 1860. but most of the Fiji correspondence is buried in the files for New South Wales, Victoria, New Zealand and the other Australian colonies, while some is hidden among the African business in the ubiquitous 'Slave Trade' series. After 1866 the West African Settlements were unified under one Governor at Freetown through whom correspondence was supposed to pass. Fortunately, separate files were maintained in the Colonial Office, but since discussions were liable to overlap, it is necessary to examine all the files to get a complete picture. For example, much of the discussion over the exchange of the Gambia to France is in the Sierra Leone files, a suggestion relating to Dutch Elmina on the Gold Coast is found only in the Gambia file, and as the West African coast was momentarily viewed as a whole in 1874-76 the vital documents might be anywhere in the Foreign or Colonial Office files. Similarly, matters relating to the Malay States were scattered about the single Straits Settlements file until 1888.¹ Thus, it is only when notice is paid to the dates when papers from, say, both Kedah and Kelantan were received, and it is

1. In 1888 reports from Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan were filed separately, and in 1897, after the creation of the Federated Malay States, a separate "Native States" correspondence was opened.

realised that they are considered on the same day and regarded as the same problem, that it is possible to trace the growth of a general trend of policy towards the Malay States.¹

There is nothing new in the present method, but concentration on it has been fruitful. Moreover, it has enabled the author to uncover evidence which the specialist, covering a longer period, in one area might miss. The Fiji specialist looking for the basis of the British attitude towards what were called "native states" would be unlikely to look at the African correspondence. The Gold Coast specialist might overlook memoirs relating to Penang, where a conversation recorded there throws light on Gold Coast events. Malayan experts have assumed that India provided the analogies to the Malay States, whereas the Colonial Office brought an entirely new bias to policy. Thus, while this thesis is essentially an exercise in interpretation rather than a charting of virgin soil, it is based on the original documents, and some new material has, in fact, been used for the first time.²

However, in the author's opinion, the greatest value of examining the three separate, but related, parts of the larger problem, is that an attempt can be made to get behind that phrase in the despatches which hides a multitude of sins: "the opinion of Her Majesty's Government". Both in the nineteenth century and to-day the process of policy making in London has been severely criticised. Recently a Nigerian historian, writing of the British Government's difficulty in pursuing "a consistent and well-conceived Colonial policy" in West Africa in the 1840's, lays the blame on the "out-dated, clumsy machinery of government in Britain which made swift consistent action so difficult".³ Cardwell complained

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1. This is not a criticism of the C.O., which doubtless had good reasons for its methods, but a statement of the researcher's difficulties.
 2. The Brabourne Diaries; Commodore Goodenough's Private Journal; and Andrew Clarke's Report to the War Office on West Africa, 1864.
 3. Dike, Trade & Politics, p.86.

about the same thing during the controversy over sending the Ashanti expedition in 1873, when he grumbled to Gladstone about "our form of government, which seldom very clearly defined responsibilities...."¹ Here, then, is an appropriate starting point. An examination must be made of the Colonial Office and of the forces which moulded its policies.

1. Cardwell to Gladstone 19.ix.1873. Gladstone Papers 44120/135.

Chapter 1.THE COLONIAL OFFICE IN 1870 - THE 'COLONIAL QUESTION' AND THE FRONTIER PROBLEM.

About the year 1870 the Colonial Office was forced to pay more attention to West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific. By 1876, it was clear that the new responsibilities it had acquired in those areas would provide increasing business for many years. But it would be wrong to assume that the policies which comprised this change were made in the Colonial Office. However able the Secretary of State might have been, and however expert was his permanent staff, the forces which moulded British policy came as much from the outside of the office as from within. The Colonial Office was only the focal point where ideas from many sources were reconciled; at one extreme stood the officers who faced the mundane tasks of administration in the tropics, at the other there was public opinion, vague, unpredictable, and usually in reality the opinion of the few enthusiasts who were interested. In this chapter the springs of British policy will be examined.

Who, then, was responsible for policy making regarding West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific in the 1870's ? Obviously in an examination of this kind the careers, personalities and prejudices of the political and permanent heads of the Colonial Office will be of interest. But before discussing the Colonial Office of 1870, a word is necessary about five other important sources of influence on policy : (1) The Prime Minister, Cabinet and the Queen, (2) other government departments, (3) Parliament, (4) Pressure groups and individuals, and (5) Colonial governors, officials and special commissioners.

Theoretically, the Cabinet was the final authority for decisions and accountable to Parliament for them. Gladstone's carefully preserved Cabinet notes prove that the Gold Coast and Fiji (but not apparently Malaya) were

frequently discussed in the Cabinet. Gladstone often intervened to demand information of Kimberley when affairs in the three areas looked dangerous politically, or became expensive. Records of Disraeli's Cabinets were not found, but in Derby's 'Bill of Fare' for the autumn of 1874 Fiji and the Gold Coast were the only colonial subjects included,¹ and it is known that the Cabinet prepared itself for a dangerous Gold Coast debate in July 1874. As a result of this debate either Disraeli or the Cabinet persuaded Carnarvon to abolish domestic slavery on the Gold Coast. The Queen had a large correspondence with her Ministers, and demanded to be 'in the know', especially during military operations. She was particularly fussy about instructions to Governors and Commanders, and sent messages to the troops after battles.

Yet really, since these were essentially fringe problems, the Prime Minister, Cabinet and Queen played a small part in the three experiments. The biggest decision with which this thesis is concerned was the Ashanti expedition. Yet the decision to send it, made in July 1873, and the appointment of Wolseley to lead it, made in ^{August} ~~September~~, were largely taken behind Gladstone's back without Cabinet discussion. It was not until a month later that the Prime Minister attempted to assert any authority in the matter.² He was extremely hazy about all three areas, and admitted this to Kimberley. He told Commodore Goodenough he was never quite certain which was which of Tahiti and Hawaii.³ Fiji, however, was Gladstone's bete noire. He had first opposed its annexation in 1859 and he continued to do so until his friend Sir Arthur Gordon accepted the governorship. He avoided annexation in 1873 by sending the Goodenough-Layard Commission to report on the demand for it, which was his only successful

1. Derby to Disraeli 13.x.1874. Private. Disraeli Papers, XII.

2. See below pp. 115-125.

3. Goodenough's Journal, I, 18.vi.1873.

postponement of a decision in the three areas. Similarly, Disraeli, with the exception of slavery on the Gold Coast, took little interest in the three cases and matters were completely left in Carnarvon's hands. The Queen's political interventions were without influence and Kimberley was rather cynical about Her Majesty, but her interference in matters of patronage received more attention.¹

Other government departments had an interesting role to play and they were probably responsible for most of the charges levied against the cumbersome nature of the policy making process. Inter-departmental wrangles caused most of the delays. Other sources of trouble were problems where departmental responsibilities were ill-defined, as in the South Pacific. The Treasury and the War Office were the departments which tended to frustrate the Colonial Office, while the Foreign Office sometimes tried to initiate policies in which the Colonial Office was the laggard.

The Foreign Office took a 'progressive' view of policy in these areas. With such basic assumptions as British interests and trade, the mission to suppress slavery, and the exigencies of European diplomacy in mind, one gets the impression that the Foreign Office - even before the period of great rivalry in the 1880's - was intent on carving out 'spheres of influence', to divide up the world among 'civilized' powers to facilitate international affairs, to avoid friction, provided an 'open door' for trade was maintained. The Colonial Office, which had to face the problems of administration, often took a more cautious view. Thus it was the Foreign Office which urged the occupation of Lagos in 1861 against the wishes of the Colonial Secretary.

In two cases of attempted spheres of influence the Foreign Office had a wide

1. After Gladstone's ministers were sworn in at Windsor in 1868, Kimberley wrote in his Journal (p. 1) "What a preposterous relic of medieval Royalty this kneeling & hand-kissing is!". Another comment on the Queen's foibles was, "How Childish!". On the matter of patronage, see correspondence with Gen. Biddulph over Capt. Speedy in the Kimberley Papers.

conception which the Colonial Office in one case lamely followed, and in the other actually frustrated. These concerned the partition of South-east Asia and West Africa.

In the former case the Foreign Office considered in the early 1860's that the policy of objecting to Dutch expansion in Sumatra was fruitless, and that Dutch sway in the island might well have advantages if it were accompanied by the suppression of piracy and commercial concessions. But when in 1866 the Foreign Office approached the Colonial Office the latter was found to be too busy with its new dependency, the Straits Settlements which was about to be transferred from India. Only when Governor Ord took a personal interest in the matter did the Colonial Office offer any help.¹ Similarly, in the case of the Siamese tributary States, the Colonial Office had to learn something from the Foreign Office. The latter department encouraged the Siamese hold over its tributaries to the north and south because international matters could then be conveniently handled through Bangkok. But in 1868 Governor Ord at Singapore demanded direct access to the Siamese tributaries in the Malay Peninsula, and he had to be reminded by the British representative at Bangkok that special treatment for Britain in the southern tributaries might lead to special treatment for the French in the Laos States to the north. So a compromise was worked out between the two departments.²

In the case of West Africa the French government suggested, in 1866, that the isolated and comparatively worthless British settlement of The Gambia should be exchanged for the equally useless French posts east of Sierra Leone. The Foreign Office welcomed a scheme, which might have resulted, later in the century, in a neat partition of the West African interior. But Kimberley, very shaken by a deputation in his first week at the Colonial Office, refused reluctantly,

1. See below pp. 152-159.

2. See below pp. 138-144, 147-150.

but firmly, to allow the Gambia exchange to take place. The same thing happened in 1876, when it was the Colonial Office which dropped the matter which the Foreign Office was keen to complete.

Over the South Pacific the Foreign Office seemed unaccountably slack. In October 1871, in the hope of avoiding annexation, the Cabinet decided to accord de facto recognition to a new government in Fiji, but for some reason the Foreign Office never told the British Consul of this decision. Perhaps it was Granville's fault. Kimberley, who admired Granville's political gifts, did not approve of his "slipshod way of doing business... His great fault is that he lives from hand to mouth, and trusts too much to the chapter of accidents. He seems never to give himself the trouble to reason any matter out completely, and he is singularly ignorant of the details of questions he has to deal with. This laziness makes him, an indifferent departmental Minister".¹ Rogers, incidentally, thought it made him an ideal Minister.²

The Colonial Office suspected that laziness also had something to do with the War Office's attitude to Colonial policy. Problems of imperial defence loomed large in discussions of colonial policy in this period. But it did not concern the three areas under review - although Singapore's strategic value was realised, and Fiji's was claimed. In 1861 the Select Committee on Imperial defence had largely turned into a discussion of the relationship of the imperial government to the self-governing colonies.³ The period 1868-73 was important in this context as the period of the withdrawal of the imperial garrisons.⁴ Yet the War Office could be a bane to the Colonial Office where troops had to

1. Kimberley's Journal, p. 31.

2. Rogers to Miss Rogers 20.xii.1868. Marindin, Letters, p. 275.

3. C.W.de Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848 - 72, (1929) pp. 211-212.

4. P.Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy, (1927) pp. 125-30.

be paid for out of crown colony revenues, or when reinforcements were not forthcoming in an emergency.

A battle royal took place in 1868-72 over the number of English troops to be stationed in the Straits. When the question resolved itself into one about sentries the Horse Guards appeared in very poor light. War Office establishments appeared to require 1,074 men to man thirty-one sentry posts, and 150 English artillerymen would require 150 Indian troops, who in turn would have to become 300 if they were also to guard themselves! After a conference to resolve the question of Singapore's defences Rogers decided that the War Office's "single idea was, what sentries were necessary, and how many men were necessary to give these sentries five nights in bed out of six".¹ Finally, the War Office agreed to allow English troops to ^{do} sentry duty provided they travelled in omnibuses! Rogers came to the conclusion that

"the British army is not so comprised as to be available for the necessities of tropical dependencies. A body of British troops cannot be used without a body of coloured troops to attend upon them and the British army contains no coloured troops (with the unavailable exception of the Ceylon Rifles) who can be stationed in the East... the WO and HG do not seem² adapted to the exigencies of an Empire having tropical possessions".

The detachment of Royal Engineers sent to Fiji was more of a liability than an asset, as it required the colonial revenue to pay for equipment which it would take away with it. In 1876 the commander of the detachment refused to move against a cannibal tribe until reinforcements arrived from India or the Cape, so Sir Arthur Gordon ran his "little war" with Fijian forces under their chiefs, supervised by his A.D.C. and Private Secretary.³ Similarly in 1873 Kimberley found the War Office reluctant to send reinforcements to the Gold Coast in the early stages of the Ashanti invasion.

1. Rogers to Lady Rogers 9.viii.1868. Marindin, Letters, p. 274.

2. Min. by Rogers 17.xi.1870 on Ord to Kimberley 6.ix.1870. CO/273/30.

3. Gordon to Carnarvon 18.xi.1876. A.H.Gordon, Fiji : Records of Private and Public Life, 1875-80, II, p. 224.

Matters improved, however, during Gladstone's ministry, when Cardwell and officers like Wolseley left the War Office in a more eager frame of mind. The younger officers rushed to volunteer for the Ashanti campaign, and both it and the Perak campaign of 1875 were waged with forces (both roughly a Brigade in strength) far in excess of requirements. De Kiewiet has suggested that the eagerness of the post-Cardwell generation "is not unrelated to the more vigorous departures of British policy".¹

The Admiralty's attitude to the tropics was similar to the War Office's. Service in West Africa was especially unpopular, and while the Admiralty was glad to borrow colonial steamers for service in the Niger,² it was reluctant to provide ships for the colonial authorities in the Gambia.³ There were frequent wrangles between the West African governors and naval officers. In 1860 the Commodore refused a Foreign Office request to escort traders up the Niger,⁴ and Sir Arthur Kennedy complained that with a government comprising over a thousand miles of coast he was surely entitled to better cooperation from the Squadron than he received. Rogers agreed he was "very much left in the lurch by the Admiralty".⁵

The influence of the Treasury is difficult to plot precisely. More comprehensive study is required since the Treasury's explicit role in the three areas was small; but its general influence was great. As de Kiewiet says "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Treasury and the exigencies of the British budget have made as much colonial history as the Colonial Office itself".⁶ The

1. C.W.de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, (1937) p. 47.

2. Ad. to CO. 23.ii.1871. CO/267/313.

3. Ad. to CO. 5.ix.1872. CO/87/103.

4. Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 174.

5. Min. by Rogers on Kennedy to Granville 4.vii.1870. CO/267/306.

6. de Kiewiet, op. cit. pp. 8-9.

The colonies had to pay for themselves; grants in aid were exceptional, and this rigidity was sometimes a source of frustration, not only to the man on the spot, but also to the Colonial Office. An under secretary once said,

"the real source of the darkness and confusion which pervade all these African finances has been the arbitrary way in which, with no reason assigned, the Treasury has for some years overruled by its sheer will every successive attempt from this office to look the affairs in the face and make some reasonable settlement".

It is argued that Treasury Control was but an extension of Parliament's control over the nation's expenditure.² Following this view, and noting that on the surface relations between the two departments seemed cordial enough, one could state that the Treasury merely exercised a wise discretion over public expenditure. Yet there was more to it. Sir John Wood points to the crux of the problem when he says that the Treasury in Gladstone's era was interested in "regularity and prudent administration" rather than "policy".³ The Foreign and Colonial Offices (which after all were not major spending departments⁴ like the Admiralty and War

1. Min. by Elliot 20.xii.1864 on Pine to Cardwell 13.xi.1864. CO/96/65.

2. J.Wood, 'Treasury Control', Political Quarterly, Oct-Dec 1954, xxv, 4, p 370-81.

3. Ibid p. 377.

4. Statement of Expenditure, 1870-71. Accounts and Papers, 1871, XXXVII, pp. 44-48.

Services

Army	£ 14,085,400
Navy	9,767,171
Abyssinia Exped. of 1868	300,000
Credit: war in Europe	2,000,000
	<u>26,152,571</u>

Foreign Office

Office	77,814
Embassies	73,970
Diplomatic service	294,919
Consular service	275,520
Slave Trade	5,747
	<u>727,970</u>

Colonial Office

Office	34,933
Grants in aid	71,624
Orange R.Terr. & St. Helena	6,019
Emigration	14,545
Coolie emigration	1,260
Treasury chest.	18,393
	<u>146,774</u>

Office) were interested in questions of policy which often had a world-wide scope, while the Treasury was interested in scrutinizing the details of expenditure. Thus to the former an argument over the cost of an additional clerk in a consulate was infuriating, when to the latter it was all in a day's work. The Colonial Office could certainly not be accused of extravagance. When new colonies like the Straits Settlements (1867) and Fiji (1874) came under its view financial considerations were the major preoccupation of the officials in Downing Street, and when Gordon was reluctant to reduce expenditure in Fiji Carnarvon said he "must be told in the plainest - though of course in very civil - terms that he must carry out the proposed reductions".¹ Lowe, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, once wrote to Kimberley : "I am always most anxious to meet your wishes because I believe you are really anxious for economy".²

Yet the Treasury was regarded as the bogey of Whitehall, and was universally unpopular among civil servants. Possibly its permanent^{an} staff were to blame; Herbert claimed that the Lords of the Treasury never saw a Colonial Office letter,³ and the Treasury clerks often received higher salaries than the rest of the civil service and were said to constitute "the worst dressed and most high-spirited department of State."⁴ The commonest complaint was of the discourteous tone of Treasury letters.⁵ "What a preremptory letter from one office to another" was a typical comment by the head of a Colonial Office department.⁶ One of the Treasury's most bitter critics was Knatchbull-Hugessen - himself a former Junior Lord.⁷ He lambasted the "petty parsimonious spirit", the "blundering stupidity"

1. Min. by Carnarvon on Gordon to Carnarvon 14.i.1877. CO/83/13.

2. Lowe to Kimberley 30.x.1872. Kimberley Papers, PC/A/13.

3. Hall, Colonial Office, p.269.

4. Wood, op. cit. p. 375.

5. W.A.Baillie Hamilton, 'Fourty-four years at the Colonial Office', Nineteenth Century (1909), pp. 610-12.

6. Min. by Barrow on Treas. to CO. 31.i.1871. CO/267/313.

7. See below p²⁸. He had little Treasury work; his duties were those of Assistant Whip.

and "miserable pettyfogging proceedings" of his former office.¹ When Governor Keate died a few weeks after arriving in West Africa Kimberley suggested that his widow might be repaid the £175 stamp duty paid on his commission, but the Treasury regretted that there were no funds for such repayments. Knatchbull-Hugessen said "It is this niggardly, parsimonious treatment of public servants - not always accompanied by the courtesy of language which might soften the weight of the blow which discredits the department which controls the finances of this country".² Kimberley usually gave way in such small matters, but he disliked "their silly petulancy".³

Only two cases of Treasury discourtesy and parsimony, with which one could find fault, appear in this account. Both concern the South Pacific - the area over which the government departments appeared to find most scope for disclaiming responsibilities. Firstly, it was largely Treasury delays which caused an attempt to provide the British Consul in Fiji with magisterial powers between 1866 and 1869 to be dropped. One letter from the Foreign Office dated 6 November 1866 was not answered by the Treasury until 25 January 1868.⁴ When the attempt was revived in 1871 the Foreign Office was driven to the shift of getting Treasury approval for a gaoler and constable to assist the Consul, and waiting until the scheme had started before letting the Treasury know that Clerks would also be required.⁵ The second, more serious, case occurred over the South Sea Island labour traffic. In 1862 a Bill to empower Colonial Governors to sub-poena witnesses from outside the colonies was dropped because the Treasury objected to the expense. After blatant cases of kidnapping and growing public anger the Colonial Office re-opened the matter of legislation. The Treasury now tried to get the Australasian colonies to pay for

1. Hall, Colonial Office, pp. 33-35.

2. Min. by K-Hugessen 18.vi.1873 on Treas. to CO. 12.vi.1873. CO/323/314.

3. Min. by Kimberley 1.ii.1871 on Treas. to CO. 31.i.1871. CO/267/313.

4. FO/58/124 pp. 69 & 91.

5. See below p. 245-246

the costs of prosecutions in their courts, which caused Rogers to exclaim : "This seems to me governing an Empire in the spirit of a subordinate department of the Inland Revenue office".¹ This time Kimberley took the matter to the Cabinet and the Treasury decision was reversed.

In fairness to the Treasury it should be said that the impetus for economy came from Parliament. In 1874 Gladstone still tried to resist the annexation of Fiji as he saw 'disagreeable and distorted phantoms stalking' across the House of Commons, 'new votes in the Estimates'.² But one can sympathise with Carnarvon's lament, when a matter seemed settled and the Treasury reopened it on the grounds of expense, that "at a time when every moment of my available leisure is engrossed by a severe pressure of the most important business I should be obliged to carry on a controversy with the Treasury on a matter of the smallest detail".³

Although it was behind the Treasury's contribution, Parliament exercised its own influence on policy. By questions, requests for the presentation of correspondence, or by moving resolutions or motions of censure, the members of both Houses could embarrass the Colonial Office. In a few cases they directly influenced policy in this way, and parliamentary interest in the colonies generally increased in this period. Fiji in particular provided some lively debates. Here ~~again~~ Bodelsen's distinction between the maintenance of empire and colonial expansion must be remembered,⁴ for while much of the renewed interest in colonies in the 1870's concerned the former, parliamentarians often made no distinction. Gladstone, for instance, disliked the new interest in the old colonies as much as he abhorred the idea of new responsibilities in the tropics. Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote in 1871 :

"I made a speech which I supposed was successful - as it was much cheered. Gladstone, however, is not fond of speeches in favour of our Colonial Empire, and remarked that I had spoken 'an excellent bit of Bunkum'. Not

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1. Min. by Rogers 2.i.1871 on Treas. to CO. 30.xii.1870. CO/201/560.
 2. 3rd Series Hansard, vol. ccxxi, col. 1287.
 3. Hall, Colonial Office, p. 36.
 4. C.A. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism (1924) pp. 7-8.

very encouraging ! Of late years there has been a cry, by no means just, that 'the liberals would like to give up the Colonies', which cry I set myself to disprove wherever and whenever I can... But if sentiments of loyalty to the Colonial Connection are termed 'Bunkum' by the Liberal Prime Minister the task will be difficult".

Here again the question was one concerning the old colonies, but Knatchbull-Hugessen had a part in the making of policy for the three tropical areas, and his speech in the Fiji debate in 1872, which should have defended the government's policy, was hailed by the opposition as a concession of their point. Gladstone himself had to state the government's case.

The period when colonial debates emptied the House was drawing to a close. The three areas under discussion provided some dangerous political weapons in the late 1860's and early 1870's. Palmerston (over the Gold Coast in 1864), Gladstone (over Fiji in 1872 and 1873) and Disraeli (over the Gold Coast in 1874) required all their debating skill to overcome the hostility of the House, and the vote on Fiji in 1873 went against the government. In certain cases parliamentary agitation was responsible for immediate decisions. The day after the Fiji debate of 1872 the Colonial Office urged a new Fiji policy on the Foreign Office.² Lord Stanley of Alderley's motion of censure in the House of Lords on the Malay States policy in May 1874 forced Carnarvon to make some decision.³ The Commons debate on slavery in July 1874 was responsible for the decision to abolish domestic slavery in the Colony and Protectorate, and fear of a hostile parliament was one of the reasons for dropping the Cambia exchange with France in 1876.⁴

Parliament, therefore, played an important role in the experiments of 1874, in a few cases almost a vital one. But the influence of Parliament was really the work of a group of enthusiasts. In the House of Lords it was the Duke of Manchester, Lord Stanley of Alderley, the third Earl Grey, the Marquis of Normanby

1. Brabourne Diary, vol. IV 1870-73, p. 558.

2. See below p. 167.

3. See below p. 322-323.

and the Earl of Belmore. In the House of Commons the leading zealots were men like Sir Charles Adderley, Arthur Kinnaird, Admiral Wingfield, Admiral Erskine, Baillie Cochrane, Robert McFie, Robert Torrens, Evelyn Ashley, Adolphus Young and Robert Fowler. By far the most successful of them, in terms of nuisance value, was Alderman (later Sir William) McArthur, Liberal member for Lambeth.

The son of a Methodist parson from Donegal, McArthur became a successful woollen draper in Londonderry, and transferred his headquarters to London in the 1850's, when business with his brother's firm in Sydney increased. He was a leading Wesleyan and a member of the Aborigines Protection Society. His brother Alexander was prominent in Australian Methodism and politics and it was his marriage to the daughter of W.B.Boyce, president of the Australian Methodist Conference and later General Secretary of the Methodist Missionary Society in London, which brought William McArthur into missionary circles.¹ This persistent Alderman caused a West Africa debate in 1871 and he embarrassed the Colonial Office and the government twice in 1873. In February he called for the publication of Gold Coast correspondence and asked what instructions had been sent to a new Administrator - before the Colonial Office had even written them. On this occasion Knatchbull-Hugessen managed to persuade him to postpone his motion for a fortnight.² In June the Cabinet decided to send the Goodenough-Layard Commission to Fiji in order to avert another McArthur motion, but this time he refused to give way even to Kimberley's entreaty.³ He was the prime mover in the Commons agitation on Fiji, where the Methodist missionaries were prominent. In fact when McArthur, a Liberal, moved the motion in 1874 supporting the Disraeli government's action in Fiji, Gladstone viciously attacked the Alderman's "sadly deluded philanthropy" and the constitutional singularity of his motion.

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1. T.McCullagh, Sir William McArthur, KCMG, A Biography, (1898) pp. 66-67.
 2. Min. by K-Hugessen 18.ii.1873 on Question received 14.ii.1873. CO/96/104.
 3. Kimberley to Gladstone 11 & 12.vi.1873. Private. Gladstone Papers, Add.Mss. 44225/49 & 53.

The clue, then, to Parliament's influence lies in the efforts of the zealots. In addition to these, sometimes in alliance with them, were other individuals and pressure groups. Through Parliament, through deputations and through publicity or simply by letters, they sometimes played an important part. Each parliamentary enthusiast usually had expert advice. McArthur spoke for the Wesleyans, Kinnaird for the Scottish Presbyterians, Stanley of Alderley for the Straits Settlements Association and for Sir Benson Maxwell, former Chief Justice in Singapore. Adderley, one suspects, was the spokesman for (Sir) John Pope-Hennessy, a former Tory M.P., who was Governor-in-Chief in West Africa 1872-73.¹

The pressure groups represented two main groups of interests, economic and humanitarian, but any one interest would usually deploy the arguments of the other. Thus, the agitation for the annexation of Fiji waged by the Fiji Committee, the Anti-Slave and Aboriginies Protection Societies, and the Wesleyans, although fairly attributable to humanitarian motives, was also backed by commercial, strategic and even chauvinistic arguments. The Straits Settlements Association, founded in 1868 really to foster the financial and commercial interests in Singapore, announced itself as a constitutionalist body to defend the independence of the Supreme Court and to fight prejudicial legislation. Because it was found to be politically inconvenient to fit the question of the exchange of the Gambia to France in the 1875 parliamentary session, another pressure group, the Gambia Committee, was able to mobilise opposition so that the proposal was never put to the new parliament. This committee was the usual mixture of missionary, humanitarian, merchant and 'Imperialist' elements.² Motives were doubtless mixed; 'Commerce, Christianity and Civilization' was the battle cry of a whole host of

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1. When Adderley asked the CO. to lay before parliament P-Hennessy's proposal for uniting Labuan and the Straits Settlements, the head of the eastern department wondered how Adderley knew about it. "Mr. Hennessy told him" wrote Herbert on Question received 16.ii.1872. CO/144/39. See other evidence below p.
 2. Royal Colonial Institute to FO. 12.i.1876. FO/27/2227.

specialised interests and there is probably truth in de Kiewiet's version of an old jibe at the humanitarians : "they say Christ; they mean Christ, but they also mean cotton".¹

How effective were the pressure groups in influencing policy ? What did the Colonial Office think about them ? Beside McArthur's comparative success can be placed the cool reception often given to economic interests. A leading Gold Coast firm wanted the government to leave the coast in 1874 but as they were accused of selling arms to the Ashantis they were discredited. Some of the Gambia merchants who fought the proposed cession with France were regarded by the Colonial Office as a watchdog.² The Straits Settlements Association, however, so persistently attacked Governor Ord that after two years the Permanent Under-secretary of the Colonial Office decided that the "time has arrived when the Association may be relieved of the supervision of the Col: Office",³ and in 1872 he wanted to "rebel against the tyranny" of the endless flood of letters from the Editor of the West African Herald.⁴ The New Guinea Association of 1875, in spite of 'a varnish of piety' was regarded as little "better than a filibustering expedition".⁵

Established societies were usually well known in the Colonial Office and were treated accordingly. The Missionary Societies met with patience and respect, but the Anti-Slavery Society was known to pass on a good number of baseless charges. The reception given to financial interests varied from the great respect shown to Mr. Seymour Clarke, Chairman of the Great Northern Railway, who represented tin and telegraph interests in South-east Asia,⁶ to Herbert's comment on a proposal about land purchases in Papua - "Scoundrels".⁷ On the whole the Colonial Office attitude

1. de Kiewiet, Colonial Policy, p. 243.

2. Min. by Kimberley 26.v.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 21.v.1872. CO/87/102.

3. See below p. 163

4. Min. by Herbert 30.v.1872 on Fitzgerald to Kimberley 25.v.1872. CO/147/26.

5. Carnarvon to Cairns 30.x.1875. Private (copy). Carnarvon Papers PRO.30/6/6 p. 32.

6. See below p. 203

7. See below p. 373

at this time to commercial ventures in undeveloped tropical lands was : go at your own risk; do not expect the protection of British officials !

Two cases where non-parliamentary activity by pressure groups played a noticeable role in the formation of policy may be cited. In one, the Kidnapping Act of 1872, it was attended by great publicity; in the other, the decision to intervene in the Malay States in 1873, it was very much behind the scenes. Firstly, in December 1871 the news of Bishop Patteson's murder in the South Seas opened the gates to floods of publicity about kidnapping, and as the news came after a particularly frustrating year of departmental responsibility-dodging, perhaps it is not simply coincidence that in less than a month after the news the Cabinet had decided to meet the kidnapping problem with imperial legislation. In the second case, one might almost say that the Colonial Office was blackmailed into intervening in Malaya. Between 1868 and 1873 Seymour Clarke in London, and W.H.M. Read in Singapore and London, bombarded the Colonial Office with proposals relating to tin concessions in Selangor and a telegraph extension from Burma to Australia via the Malay archipelago. On the whole Clarke's prominence in the City ensured that they had a patient hearing, but the Colonial Office was always non-committal. What Clarke wanted was a statement which would assure the City that investments in the Malay States would be secure; better still would have been British intervention to keep order. Early in July 1873 Kimberley (quite independently of Clarke's interests) had made up his mind that the civil war in Perak called for some intervention. He was still uncertain what form it should take, when, from the blue as it were, Clarke produced, on 15 July, a letter from Singapore hinting that the ruler of Selangor might request a German protectorate. It is most unlikely that this was anything more than a threat cooked-up in Singapore, probably by Clarke's brother-in-law, Read; but it had its desired effect. Kimberley now viewed the matter with great urgency. British paramountcy in the Peninsula seemed threatened, and after a careful study of past relations with the Malay States

during July and August 1873 Kimberley produced his famous suggestion of the Residents.¹ This is sufficient proof that the letters from cranks, committees and commercial houses, filed always last in the Colonial Office papers, deserve the careful attention of the resercher who seeks the springs of British policy.

A final word is necessary on the role in policy making of the local officials-governors, minor officers and special commissioners. Their influence in this period can scarcely be overestimated. Final decisions, of course, always lay with the home government, its authority based on Parliament. Governors could always be censured and even recalled, but once in office the Governor in fact exercised the widest discretion. The most notorious case of a governor at cross-purposes with the Secretary of State was over Sir William Jervois's policy in Perak in 1875. He launched his scheme before reporting to Carnarvon, and when things went wrong he ordered a Brigade into action before fully explaining himself to London. And this was at a time when the telegraph was open to Singapore - although it is true that it broke down at a crucial moment. He was severely censured and most of his policy was reversed, but his spirited defence amounted almost to a personal insult to Carnarvon. Yet after all this he was not recalled nor was his promotion jeopardised.

Almost all the governors in West Africa and the Straits had an important influence on policy between 1870 and 1874. Their usual technique was to exceed their instructions and report a fait accompli, which was usually approved. Sir Andrew Clarke's Pangkor Engagement in Perak was the most outstanding case. Similarly, Commodore Goodenough, sent out to Fiji to investigate the demands for annexation, fulfilled his job by accepting the preliminary cession of the islands - the news of which reached London two months before the Report supporting it. Captain Strahan, Governor of the new Gold Coast Colony in 1874, when asked to

1. See below p. 202-206.

report on the possibility of abolishing slavery, replied with a proposal, which, in anticipation of approval, he had already begun to implement. Even a minor officer could have a far reaching influence. The 'Resident idea' for Malaya received its greatest advocacy from a temporary Lieut-Governor of Penang, who was borrowed from Ceylon while others were on leave, and who turned up in London during the period when Kimberley changed his mind about intervention. In Fiji British naval officers intervened to keep the peace in 1873 to the extent that they were described as a 'virtual protectorate'.

Colonial governors who were ex-M.P.'s presented another problem. The suspicion of Pope-Hennessy's collusion with Adderley has been mentioned, and wherever he went this mercurial Irishman was the champion of the underdog; in Labuan it was the Chinese, in West Africa the Africans, in Barbados the negroes, in Hong Kong the Chinese again and in Mauritius the French. Sir James Fergusson, another ex-Tory M.P. and a former Under-secretary in the India Office, missed active political life as Governor of New Zealand, 1873-75,¹ and he infuriated the Colonial Office by his encouragement of (Sir) Julius Vogel's plans for expansion in the Pacific. Sir Arthur Gordon had been private secretary to his father Aberdeen when he was Prime Minister, was an M.P. 1854-57 and private secretary to Gladstone in the Ionian Islands. His colonial governorships satisfied an ambition for greatness rather than strictly material ends,² thus in Fiji, 1875-80, he demanded immense freedom of action, which Carnarvon on the whole gave him. At the same time he was a regular correspondent of Gladstone, who had opposed Carnarvon's decision to annex the islands.

Thus, although the influence of certain governors became a little too over-powering, one is tempted to say that on the whole the Colonial Office spent as

1. Goodenough's Journal, I, 28.ix.1873.

2. In 1876 he said he would not be tempted out of England again except to 1. An Indian Presidency, 2. Ceylon, 3. the Gov-Generalship of Canada, or 4. the suggested Gov-Generalship of the W. Indies. Gordon to Carnarvon 8.xi.1876. Private. PRO.30/6/39 p. 100.

much time convincing themselves of the wisdom of a particular governor's policy and defending it, as it did in thinking ahead and instructing the governors what to do.

Many diverse forces, then, focussed on the department which provides the main material for this thesis. From 1798 to 1876 the empire was administered from precarious premises, now demolished, which closed the St. James's Park end of Downing Street. Number Fourteen was the address, but there were encroachments into available spare rooms in Downing Street.¹ The entire establishment in 1870 consisted of sixty-seven including messengers, and the burden of administering the far-flung Victorian empire was borne by the Secretary of State, two Under-secretaries, one Assistant Under-secretary, the Legal Adviser and about a dozen departmental clerks.² Office hours were noon to 5.30 pm.³ A member of the staff who joined just before the period of this discussion recorded his disappointment :

"I had pictured the Colonial Office to myself as a dignified abode of mystery, excitement, and la haute politique, where I should be entrusted with weighty secrets, and where in plain English, I should be able to 'fancy myself' as an active participator in some of the most important and delicate affairs of State. Instead of this, I found myself in a sleepy humdrum office, where important work was no doubt done, but simply because it had got to be done; where there seemed no enthusiasm, no esprit de corps, and no encouragement for individual exertion. And, what to my foolish imagination seemed worst of all, I very soon began to realise that the Colonial Office did not occupy the position in the eyes of the world that even I was able to feel it ought to have... The colonies were simply a bore. They were there somehow, and they had got to be maintained, but at as little expense and with as little trouble as possible. They might now and then provide a subject for abstract discussion, and might even come in useful occasionally for political purposes; but they were not recognised as constituting an important factor⁴ in the life of the nation, and they just had to take their chance".

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1. Hall, Colonial Office, p. 48. W.A. Baillie Hamilton, 'Forty-four years at the Colonial Office', pp. 599-602.
 2. J. Bramston, 'The Colonial Office from Within', Empire Review, April 1901, p. 283. In 1870 the Legal Adviser became a second Assistant Under-secretary and in 1874 a third was added.
 3. Baillie Hamilton, op. cit. p. 601.
 4. Ibid. pp. 603-4.

It is quite true that politically colonial affairs had tended to become fringe matters which only occasionally reached the headlines, as in the case of the Ashanti War in 1873. The Permanent Under-secretary once said of a governor who was worried about reports of parliamentary debates in which he was criticised, that the governor had forgotten "no one reads that part of the proceedings because it relates to a colony".¹ But Baillie Hamilton said that 1870's were the 'beginning of a new era', and he dates this from Herbert's appointment as Permanent Under-secretary in 1871.² The present writer would suggest that other leading personalities had as large a role; therefore a word is indicated on the personalities in the Colonial Office in the early 1870's.

As Secretary of State for Colonies from July 1870 to February 1878 Kimberley and Carnarvon both held comparatively long tenures of an office notorious for its birds of passage.³ In 1855 alone there had been four changes. Both were among the really great public men of their day; they were both, for instance, to turn down the Viceroyalty, and they were both Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. Kimberley is now emerging from undeserved, but understandable, obscurity,⁴ while Carnarvon has received his due from de Kiewiet and is well-known by Hardinge's biography.⁵ But

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1. Min. by Herbert 31.i.1878 on Gordon to Carnarvon 30.xi.1877. CO/83/14.
 2. Baillie Hamilton, op. cit. p. 604.
 3. The only other long tenures in 75 years were Henry Dundas (1795-1801) Lord Bathurst(1812-27) Stanley, fourteenth Earl of Derby (1841-45) the third Earl Grey(1846-52) and the Duke of Newcastle(1859-64).
 4. E.Drus's edition of his Journal. Camden Miscellany Vol.XXI (1958) and her 'The Colonial Office and the annexation of Fiji'. Trans. of the R.Hist. Soc. 4th. ser. XXXII (1950) pp. 98-110. C.D.Cowan, The Origins of British Political Control in Malaya, 1867 to 1878, (PhD thesis London 1956). E.Thio, British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, 1880-1909 (PhD thesis London 1956). B.Hamilton, Barbados and the Confederation Question, 1871-1885, (1956). A.Ross, New Zealand asperations in the Pacific, (PhD thesis Cambridge 1949). The Brabourne Journal, see bibliography.
 5. C.W.de Kiewiet, Imperial Factor in South Africa (1937). A.H.Hardinge, The Fourth Earl of Carnarvon (1925).

neither of them belonged to the normal run of aristocratic party men. Carnarvon resigned twice, in 1867 and 1878, over disagreement with Disraeli's policy, and Kimberley was a believer in "that tacit understanding between the leaders on both sides which has much more to do with the smooth working of our complex political system than the superficial observers, who only see the outside of public affairs, imagine".¹ Carnarvon believed that colonial affairs should be above party conflict² and nothing will be found to distinguish between Kimberley's and Carnarvon's policies in the three areas. They had the confidence of their respective Prime Ministers in this period. Gladstone and Kimberley appear especially close; their letters display a deep trust and Kimberley was nearly always able to get his way. Gladstone might rush in and demand what was happening, but his understanding of the problems of the three areas was imperfect - and he admitted it. Carnarvon had been estranged from Disraeli over the Reform Act (the cause of his resignation in 1867) but in 1874 Disraeli seemed to tumble over himself in flattering Carnarvon and placed complete trust in him over policy in the three areas. These problems, said the Prime Minister, "will only give you fresh opportunities for distinguishing yourself".³ By 1876 Disraeli had begun to change his mind and wrote, "while all the Government are attacked in the metropolitan papers for their blundering etc little Carnarvon, who feeds the Radical press, is always spared, and really he is the only one who has made mistakes, and committed a series of blunders".⁴ Two years later he regretted the South African policy when each day brought "a new blunder of Twitters".⁵

Both Kimberley and Carnarvon were experienced in office, and each had had some

1. Kimberley's Journal p. 1.

2. After W.E.Forster's famous address in Edinburgh on 'Our Colonial Empire', on 5.xi.1875, Carnarvon wrote : "it gives me the sort of assurance that the time has come when colonial policy may be very greatly, at least, taken out of the category of party questions.". Carnarvon to Forster 3.xii.1875. PRO.30/6/43 p.314.

3. Disraeli to Carnarvon 12.iv.1874, Private. PRO.30/6/11 p.8.

4. Disraeli to Lady Bradford 26.iv.1876 quoted in Buckle, Life of Disraeli, V, p.475.

5. Disraeli to Lady Bradford 27.ix.1878, Ibid. VI, p. 420.

previous experience of West African, South-east Asian and Fiji problems. But as Kimberley saw them from a Foreign Office viewpoint and Carnarvon from the Colonial Office, the former was more sensitive (though not always farseeing) in diplomatic matters, while the latter was more aware of moral responsibilities. Neither were particularly good public speakers. Kimberley's performances in the Lords were dull; he despised oratory, although he admired those who could sway the "cold critical audience" of the upper House.¹ Carnarvon's speeches have an attractive modesty of style and one writer claimed that "As a debater he is exceedingly ready, quick and courteous. He possesses, too, the power... of summing up the general results of a discussion with equal cogency and completeness".² Nevertheless, he was often rather vague on the details of his subject.³ Kimberley apparently never entertained visitors from the empire,⁴ while Carnarvon was particularly good both at hospitality and receiving deputations.⁵ Kimberley could pen an incisive despatch; Carnarvon's tended to be rather rambling and informal in contrast. Gordon, although a Liberal, liked the latter, and wrote "never having been a Governor yourself, you are perhaps hardly aware how much pleasure you can give by a few civil words".⁶

Kimberley was forty-four when he went to the Colonial Office on 6 July 1870.

A diplomatic career had been widened by a few years as Under-secretary in the

1. M.E.Grant-Duff, Notes from a Diary 1886-1888, I, pp. 130-1.

2. T.H.S.Escott, Pillars of the Empire, (1879), p. 22.

3. See 3 Hansard, ccvii, col. 383, when he talks about a non-existent 'Resident' at Kumasi; and where he tells a deputation that the new High Commissioner in the Western Pacific would be "commander of these tribes", The Times, 3.v.1876.

4. Escott, Pillars, p. 173.

5. Ibid. p. 22.

6. Gordon to Carnarvon 28.viii.1876, Private. PRO.30/6/39 p. 96.

India Office and two years as Lord-Lieutenant.¹ He entered Gladstone's first Cabinet, a 'new man', as Lord Privy Seal, where Knatchbull-Hugessen said he was "a very good, hardworking man in an idle place".² He was subsequently in all Gladstone's Cabinets and fulfilled his life-time's ambition³ when he became Foreign Secretary in Rosebery's government in 1894. Although a great talker,⁴ he was a poor public speaker,⁵ and this combined with his "being entirely destitute of vanity"⁶ kept him from becoming a popular figure. A journalist called him "a statesman of a peculiarly solid and trustworthy type"⁷, and he was regarded as "a most powerful member in every Cabinet in which he sat".⁸

As an administrator Kimberley was outstanding. The few comments which survive from contemporaries who knew him in office are well supported by his handling of the three questions under review. Goodenough found him "well up in his subject"⁹, and Wolseley regarded him as a 'strong' Colonial Secretary.¹⁰ Dufferin thought he was "one of the ablest" of public men¹¹, and Kilbracken, his private secretary in

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1. John Wodehouse, third Baron Wodehouse, first Earl of Kimberley. B. 7.i.1826; Eton 1838; took a first in classics at Oxford in 1847; first spoke in the Lords 1850. Under-secretary in the Foreign Office Dec. 1852 until 1856. British Envoy at St. Petersburg 1856-58. Under-secretary in the Foreign Office 1859-61; resigned when Russell became a peer. In December 1863 he went as special envoy to Denmark in the Schleswig-Holstein Question. In April 1864 he became Under-secretary in the India Office, and in November he became Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, where he remained until June 1866. In Gladstone's first ministry he was Lord Privy Seal, and Colonial Secretary from July 1870. In the second ministry he was Colonial Secretary and went to the India Office in December 1882, where he returned in the third and fourth ministries. He was Foreign Secretary March 1894 - June 1895, and was also for two periods leader of the House of Lords. The most complete account is the Introduction by E.Drus to his Journal, op. cit. pp. vii-xii.
 2. Brabourne Diary vol. III 1867-69, p. 448.
 3. Ibid. p. 544.
 4. G.Wolseley, A Soldier's Life, II, p. 271. A.Godley, Reminiscences of Lord Kilbracken (1931) p. 158..
 5. E.Drus, op. cit. p. viii.
 6. Dufferin's view quoted in A.Lyall, Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, I, 23.
 7. Escott, Pillars, p. 174.
 8. Godley, loc. cit.
 9. Goodenough's Journal, I, 10.vi.1873.
 10. Wolseley, A Soldier's Life, II, p. 271.
 11. Lyall, Dufferin, I, pp. 23-4.

the India Office, rated him a good second best, after Gladstone of officials he had known.¹ In Knatchbull-Hugessen's 'order of talent' of the Liberal Cabinet he placed Kimberley fourth after Gladstone, Lowe and Granville; and beside Chichester Fortescue, who some expected to be Colonial Secretary instead,² Bruce said Kimberley was like "a whale to a sprat". Early in 1871 Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote : "as things look now, Kimberley stands a good chance of being one day Prime Minister."³ But when he told Kimberley this the latter said he would be satisfied with the Foreign Office.

There was, however, a rather cynical side to Kimberley's personality.⁴ Sir Arthur Gordon, who disliked him, once said Kimberley was "the sort of man to not do a thing, all the more because he is asked to do it".⁵ But Gordon was quite wrong in his belief that Kimberley "never cared to give his full attention to Colonial matters".⁶ Kilbracken's remembrance of shrewd, businesslike application to official work, and courageous self-confidence once his mind was made up, will be evident in this thesis. Nearly all the important documents from the three areas were seen by Kimberley and he often drafted the important despatches. His grasp of detail is well illustrated by his brilliant summaries of issues where he was only consulted at a late hour.⁷ He was particularly strict if documents were delayed in reaching him.⁸ The present writer is led to the view that Kimberley's

1. Godley, Reminiscences, p. 157.

2. O.W.Hewett, Strawberry Fair, A Biography of Lady Waldegrave, 1821-1879 (1956) pp. 210-13.

3. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 526.

4. A good example on Sir Arthur Kennedy's report on peace achieved in the rivers north of Sierra Leone : "The millenium has commenced at Sierra Leone. In time it may perhaps extend to civilized nations, but it seems rather far off in Europe and America". Min, 16.iv.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 23.iii.1871. CO/267/310.

5. Gordon, Fiji Records, IV p. 316.

6. Gordon to Selbourne 28.viii.1874 quoted in J.K.Chapman, The Career of Arthur Hamilton Gordon, to 1875, (PhD thesis London 1954). p. 446.

7. See his letters to Gladstone on the Siak Treaty and the Malay States policy, below pp. 94 & 206-207.

8. See Min. 5.ix.1873 on Harley to Kimberley 31.iii.1873 . CO/87/104.

conscientious application to business, and his sensitivity to diplomatic implications, played a major part in the working out of the three experiments. By September 1873, however, after his decisions in the three areas, he was extremely weary of office.¹

Carnarvon who took over on 21 February 1874 had served his official apprenticeship in the Colonial Office.² There as Under-secretary at the age of twenty-six he had made his mark as a "very able, clear-headed, cool and remarkably good and quick writer".³ Lord Stanley was impressed and wanted to take him to the India Board, but he stayed at the Colonial Office, and when Bulwer Lytton was ill, and Merivale, the Permanent Under-secretary, was away, Carnarvon virtually ran the Office.⁴ In this way he met the three problems he had to decide on in 1874: the question of the annexation of Fiji, the problem of administration on the Gold Coast and expansionism in South-East Asia. At this early stage he formed the opinion that one of the political chiefs in the Office should see "all that is done", which practice he tried to carry out in 1874.

His private secretary recalled that at 10 am. he would find Carnarvon "at a large table with a mass of correspondence he had already read".⁵ He was apparently slow to give his confidence, but once it was given, he proved a warm friend.⁶ He seems to have been more ambitious than Kimberley, and Rogers felt he had "a wish

1. Kimberley to Gladstone 22.ix.1873. Gladstone Papers, 44225/105.

2. Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert. B. 24.vi.1831. Visited Turkey as a child; went to Eton 1844 and Christ Church, Oxford 1849, where he took a first. In 1852 he toured the Middle-east; in 1854 he made his first speech in the Lords; in 1856, at the conclusion of the war, he toured the Crimean battlefields. Under-sec. at the Colonial Office Feb. 1858-Jan.1859. High Steward of Oxford University, 1859. Travelled in the Mediterranean in 1860. Colonial Sec. June 1866 till he resigned over the Reform Bill in March 1867; and also from Feb.1874 until he resigned in Jan. 1878 over Disraeli's eastern policy. Lord-Lieut. of Ireland, 1885-6. Visited the Cape and Australia 1887-8 and declined Rhodes's offer of the Chairmanship of the British South Africa Co. Died 1890.

3. Merivale's view quoted in Hardinge, I, p.113.

4. Ibid. p. 130.

5. Sir Herbert Jekyll quoted in Hardinge, III, p.317.

6. Rogers's view, Marindin, Letters, p.263. Jekyll's view, Hardinge, III, p.321.

to shine before the public and to distinguish himself in the ordinary sense of the word. His failing was rather too much self-consciousness, and a disposition to be caught in showy schemes".¹ One suspects too that he was more headstrong than Kimberley. Jekyll said he was 'inflexible' once his mind was made up (his resignations testify to that) and that "chicanery and subterfuge were hateful to him".² He would not have been able to handle Gladstone as well as Kimberley did, and he was also a lesser light in the Cabinet.³ That Carnarvon was a "hard worker" and "never spared himself"⁴ is evident from the large private, semi-official, correspondence he encouraged with governors, and from his careful memoranda and summaries of deputations, reports, speeches and even quite secondary reading. Thus, Carnarvon's diligence certainly played an important part in policy making.

Of the Parliamentary Under-secretaries only one was of any consequence. William Monsell (later Lord Emsley) was quite insignificant from 1868 to 1870; Rogers had no confidence in his ability to represent the Colonial Office in the Commons.⁵ James Lowther, under-secretary in 1874, was more distinguished as a sportsman.⁶ His greatest contribution in the Colonial Office was the repetition of Herbert's minutes in rather more artless and rumbustious (and more readable) form. It is unlikely that he was much help to Carnarvon, whose moral responsibilities for indigenous peoples must have fitted into his idea of "negrophilist claptrap".⁷ His contrast to Carnarvon is well illustrated by his description of Gordon's system of administration in Fiji - possibly the most creative of the three experiments - as "the administration of the pretentious Prig who represents HM in that Colony".⁸

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1. Marindin, Letters, p. 263.
 2. Jekyll in Hardinge, III, p. 321.
 3. Selbourne to Gordon 6.ix.1874, Gordon, Fiji Records, I, p.3.
 4. Jekyll in Hardinge, III, p.319.
 5. Marindin, Letters, p. 278.
 6. R.Lucas (in DNB, Supp. II, vol. 2, p.483) says by 1888 Lowther was "a rare survival of old toryism".
 7. Min. by Lowther 26.iii.1877 on FO. to CO. 10.iii.1877. CO/83/15.
 8. Min. by Lowther 1.ii.1878 on Gordon to Carnarvon 30.xi.1877. CO/83/14.

Knatchbull-Hugessen (1870-1874) was altogether different. His long, argumentative, closely written minutes - at first done in pencil and then inked over - often covered pages of foolscap, and have attracted the attention of historians. His position in Gladstone's government, and his contribution to policy is of great interest. "The daily life of an MP and subordinate member of Gladstone's Government, 1868 to 74 was no sinecure" he said.¹

Knatchbull-Hugessen was a parliamentary wag, as those who suffered his puns on the Colonial Office files had cause to know. When Vanity Fair produced his hilarious cartoon in 1870 he was called "a promising apprentice... an adept in the genial and jovial intercourse which does so much to hold parties together".² He published several volumes of fairy tales while serving in Gladstone's government, which apparently did not advance the apprentice's prospects of promotion.³ He wrote for a time (1866 to 1868) for The Owl, a rather daring gossip sheet, which, although it was "good natured and never vulgar",⁴ probably also did not help his reputation. Gladstone said he was "a good fellow, a clever fellow, a very good speaker, but he... has never earned a reputation as a hard worker".⁵ Carnarvon complained of "egotistical vanity".⁶

By 1870 he was a disappointed political careerist and he went to the Colonial Office in January 1871 with "a painful feeling upon my mind that I had not been

1. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 481.
2. Vanity Fair, 11.vi.1870 p. 331.
3. Brabourne Diary, VI 1880-81, p. 927. "I have been told that he [Gladstone] considers my writing Fairy tales for children as 'frivolous', but, if so, it shows a marvellous want of knowledge of human nature on his part: these books never interrupted work... They have often been written as a kind of relaxation to a brain hard-worked with Public and other serious business".
4. Ibid. II 1866-69, p. 353.
5. Gladstone to Granville 24.x.1873 (copy) Gladstone Papers 44545/3.
6. Carnarvon to Northcote 20.iii.1877 (copy) Pro.30/6/7 p. 192.

well treated".¹ As a friend of Palmerston he had obtained his first office as a Junior Lord of the Treasury in 1859.² But the duties were only those of assistant Whip in the Commons, so every few years Knatchbull-Hugessen threatened to resign. Although Gladstone gave him some responsibilities in the Treasury in 1865, and Russell gave him the Under-secretaryship at the Home Office in 1866, where he returned in 1868, he felt very aggrieved that many others were promoted over his head. His diary contains many discussions of his disappointed prospects. Bright's resignation from the Board of Trade in December 1870 excited his hopes again, and he told Gladstone that it was time he was given the responsibility for a department in the Commons. But the Colonial Under-secretaryship was accepted grudgingly as it was not coupled with a Privy Councillorship,³ and he wrote in his diary "one reason for my acceptance being my friendship for, and good opinion of, Kimberley, with whom I think I am sure to do well".⁴ Later he wrote: "During the whole of my tenure of office under Kimberley, no two men could get on better".⁵ Kimberley is strangely silent about Knatchbull-Hugessen, but their relationship seems to have been cordial enough. When, however, Knatchbull-Hugessen, dropped from Gladstone's second ministry and given a peerage in 1880, then attacked the government which elevated him in his first session, Kimberley was very annoyed.⁶ The first Lord Brabourne later became a Conservative as a result of Gladstone's South African and Egyptian policies.

Beside Kimberley and Carnarvon, Knatchbull-Hugessen was an ordinary politician and was altogether of lesser stature. Yet he had had plenty of experience as a junior minister, and he was a Director of the South Eastern Railway in the

1. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 516.

2. Ibid. I 1857-65, p. 46.

3. Correspondence in Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, pp. 506-16 and Gladstone Papers 44111/24-46.

4. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 519.

5. Ibid. p. 583.

6. Ibid. VI 1880-81, p. 948.

expansive days of Edward Watkin. Although he showed no evidence of colonial interests before 1871, he represented the Colonial Office well in the Commons.¹ Inside the office Kimberley seemed to disregard Knatchbull-Hugessen's lengthy advice; in fact in the crucial summer of 1873 he had practically ceased to give it. Yet one thing stands out. Knatchbull-Hugessen stated, more clearly and persistently (almost passionately) than any one else the British dilemma in West Africa, the Malay Peninsula and the South Pacific. Briefly his thesis was this: Britain was involved, one way or another, in these places. She had not pursued a consistent policy in the past, still worse, she had never made it clear to Africans, Malays or Fijians what her real intentions were. Complete withdrawal, or the assumption of further responsibilities coupled with a consistent policy, were the only alternatives for the future. But instead of solution there was stalemate, "since the Policy of HM Gov^t would not allow for extension & Public Opinion certainly would not permit its abandonment".² Knatchbull-Hugessen's point was this: "It is idle for us to halt between two opinions".³ Time and again between 1871 and 1873 this theme appeared on the minute papers relating to the three areas, sometimes at great length, sometimes with glacial brevity. Without acknowledging it Kimberley really came to hold Knatchbull-Hugessen's view. In 1873 he admitted that in West Africa, for example, "we have fallen between two stools".⁴ Thus the persistence of Knatchbull-Hugessen has a part to play in the new attitude of the Colonial Office.

It is difficult to generalise about the role of the permanent staff. As they often appear as defenders of governors who have incurred the displeasure of the Secretary of State,⁵ their independent influence on policy may be questioned. The

1. S.Childrens, Life and Correspondence of H.C.E.Childrens, (1901) I, pp. 211-2.

2. Min. by K-Hugessen 12.i.1873 on Goldsworthy to Kimberley 4.i.1873. CO/147/29.

3. Min. 6.viii.1872 on Simpson to Pope-Hennessy 15.vi.1872. CO/87/102.

4. Min. by Kimberley 23.ix.1873 on Cooper to Administrator-i-C. 29.vii.1873.CO/87/10

5. See their attitude to Clarke's and Jervois's plans in Malaya, below pp. 322-343.

general attitude and prejudices of the Permanent Under-secretary, however, were probably important. The nineteenth century Colonial Office, in its Permanent Under-secretaries, was served by some of the greatest civil servants of the day. From 1836 to 1892 the post was held by only four men - Sir James Stephen (1836-47), Herman Merivale (1847-59), Sir Frederic Rogers (1859-71) and (Sir) Robert Herbert (1871-92). Almost as influential in the period before the 1870's were Sir Henry Taylor and (Sir) Frederick Elliot. The period covered by this thesis was that of the transfer from Rogers to Herbert, and as Baillie Hamilton went so far as to date the new era from this event, a word must be devoted to each.

Rogers was by training a lawyer and a scholar. After Eton and Oxford and a call to the Bar in 1831, he became a Fellow of Oriel in 1840. He was a Liberal and a High Churchman, being a close friend of both Gladstone¹ and Newman.² In his early years he was for a while a leader writer on the Times, and in 1844, at the age of thirty-three, he received his first official appointment from Gladstone as Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. He joined the Colonial Office in 1859 and when he retired in 1871 some claimed "he probably had no equal among civil servants".³ Kilbracken said he was "a man of extra-ordinary intellectual power, possessing an immense knowledge of a great variety of subjects; a delightful companion, and, with all this, modest and humble to a fault".⁴ This modesty was not so evident in his official work. Knatchbull-Hugessen said "He scarcely ever wrote a despatch... without administering a snub to some unhappy Colony",⁵ and in 1869 George Higinbotham, a former Chief Justice of Victoria, proposed, in a celebrated speech, that the Government of Victoria should by-pass the Colonial Office and communicate direct with the British government. Australians imagined, he said,

1. J. Morley, Gladstone, I, pp. 54, 59 & 307.

2. A. Godley, Reminiscences, p. 74.

3. Ibid. loc. cit.

4. Ibid.

5. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 669.

that they were self-governing, but really they were governed "by a person named Rogers. He is the Chief Clerk in the Colonial Office".¹ Rogers's lengthy, scarcely legible, minutes show the cold analysis of a legal mind, and even when he had nothing to suggest he still took a few pages of foolscap to say so.

Yet Rogers only plays a part in the three experiments by his absence. He was a colonial separatist, convinced that the great colonies of settlement were destined for independence. The only "moral difficulty" in this for him was the question of "the protection of coloured races, who are always exterminated by the Anglo-Saxons in temperate climates, and yet are incapable of receiving more than an illusory share in the Government".² This was the very problem which occurred in the areas under discussion and to meet them Rogers had no ready-made philosophy. It is evident, however, from his comments before retirement that while he preferred places near British colonies to fall under Britain rather than to others, he generally opposed further responsibilities in the tropics. Several years after Carnarvon had inaugurated the three experiments Rogers wrote, "I still look with a certain distrust on our accessions of responsibility in West Africa, Fiji, and the Straits...."³ The major trend of Rogers's period was the development of responsible government in the colonies of settlement. He was unprepared for the new tropical empire which is the subject of the present thesis; this would have increased his "moral difficulties".

Robert Herbert's experience was quite different and made him more adaptable in face of new problems. He was at Eton and Oxford with Carnarvon his cousin, and after a brilliant Oxford career, where he took a first in classics and gained an All Souls fellowship, he became Gladstone's secretary in 1855. In 1858 he went to Queensland with his friend John Bramston where they were respectively Colonial

1. E.E.Morris, A Memoir of George Higinbotham, (1895), p. 183.

2. Autobiographical fragment written about 1885. Marindin, Letters, p. 295.

3. Ibid. p. 380. Blatchford to Taylor 28.v.1877. It is difficult to agree with Knaplund (Gladstone's Imperial Policy p. 134) that Rogers like K-Hugessen "lent a willing ear to requests for new annexations".

Secretary and Private Secretary to the governor. With the grant of responsible government in 1860 Herbert sat in the Legislative Council and he was the first Prime Minister. Returning home in 1867 he spent two years at the Board of Trade and joined the Colonial Office in 1870 as Assistant Under-secretary. He succeeded Rogers in 1871.

As he was the first Permanent Under-secretary with experience of the empire east of Suez, Knatchbull-Hugessen said that with regard to the colonies of settlement Herbert did "as much good as his predecessor did harm".¹ His experience also made him more flexible than Rogers on questions of expansion in the tropics. He cannot simply be dubbed an expansionist, but particularly in the case of New Guinea his first hand knowledge of Queensland made him eager for annexation. He fully accepted the experiments of 1874 elsewhere; after Sir Andrew Clarke's attempted settlements in Perak and Selangor he wrote, "We are now obliged to interfere frequently on the [Malayan] Coast...."², and after the Ashanti War was over he was "not at all sure that the annexation of the whole [Gold Coast] Protectorate" might not be necessary.³ He was also a keen supporter of the West African mail subsidy.⁴ This colonial experience and interest combined with flexibility of outlook, imperturbable resolution, and great personal charm made Herbert an important force within the Office. One contemporary called him "the ideal colleague" to whom "the hill Difficulty does not exist";⁵ another wrote,

"officially he does not know the meaning of the words hurry or discomposure. Tidings of colonial revolution might arrive without causing him visible excitement and would simply suggest themselves as incidents - all coming in a days work - each to be dealt with in its proper turn".

His contribution to the discussion under review was large, especially in South

1. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 670.

2. Min. by Herbert 2.v.1874 on Clarke to Kimberley 24.ii.1874. CO/273/75.

3. Min. by Herbert 17.iv.1874 on Fitzgerald to Carnarvon 13.iv.1874. CO/96/114.

4. See long minute, 23.x.1872 on Treas. to CO. 22.x.1872. CO/267/318.

5. M.E.Grant-Duff, Notes from a Diary 1873-1881, II, p. 337.

6. Escott, Pillars, p. 121.

Pacific matters. In this his flexibility played an important part in the search for a means to stabilize the British frontiers.

Apart from the Under-secretaries the only other influential members of the Colonial Office staff were the principal clerks of the geographical departments, the so called Heads of Departments. They, and a few others, were sometimes influential in specific cases where their specialised researches produced well founded conclusions. The internal organisation of the office underwent a significant change at this time,¹ but the individuals most worthy of note were Charles Cox (Eastern department), William Dealtry (Australian)², Sir George Barrow (African till he retired in 1872), and two rising young clerks in the African department, Augustus Hemming and Edward Fairfield. Two examples of researches which probably weighed heavily with Carnarvon were Fairfield's Gold Coast memoranda of 1874,³ and the New Guinea Memorandum of 1875⁴ by William Malcolm, the recently appointed third Assistant Under-secretary. It was only in 1872 that minute writing was not restricted to the senior level of the office.⁵ Hemming recalled that in the heyday of Rogers and Taylor "the idea of a youngster fresh from a public school or university, or even a Board school, presuming to spoil

1. With the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the India Office in 1867, and the Federation of Canada at the same time, it was possible to regroup the four geographic depts. (West Indies, North American, Mediterranean & African and Australian & Eastern) as follows:- West Indies, North American & Australia, African and Mediterranean, and Eastern. When Taylor, who had long handled West Indian business retired in 1872, Herbert organised the office into two depts. only (apart from a big 'General' dept. for financial, legal, parliamentary business etc.) :- West Indian & Eastern, and North American, Australian, African & Mediterranean. In 1874 the work was again split into three:- West Indian & Eastern, North American & Australian, and African & Mediterranean. In 1879 under Hicks-Beach it was split into four again:- Eastern, West Indian, North American & Australian, and African & Mediterranean. The most important trends of the period were (1) the emergence of the separate Eastern dept., (2) the decline in the size of the West Indian dept., and (3) the increase in the African work.

2. He was very good at clipping Australian newspapers.

3. See below p. 299-301.

4. See below p. 382.

5. Hall, Colonial Office, p. 19.

official paper and waste official time by the expression of his crude and undigested 'views' and 'suggestions'" was anathema.¹

In short, "the stagnant waters of the Colonial Office began to be stirred up by an occasional breath of life" in the early 1870's, not simply by Herbert's advent, but by a combination of Kimberley's conscientiousness, Knatchbull-Hugessen's persistence, Carnarvon's diligence, Herbert's flexibility, the detailed researches of up-and-coming clerks like Fairfield, as well as the urgency of certain crises on the frontiers of empire.

The policy making process has now been surveyed, and the basic political, departmental and personal influences which will be observed at work in the discussion have been introduced. A final word is now necessary about five general characteristics of the period which may add a further perspective.

First, the universal method of policy making by 'inquiry and report' requires notice. The favourite, and obvious, technique of delay or of satisfying a sincere lack of knowledge, was to commission a governor or a special commissioner to inquire and report. This is why, in the three areas, the governors and commissioners have such importance. Their importance was heightened by the almost as universal habit of exceeding or prejudging instructions. In the three important cases of officers commissioned to report in 1873, Wolseley in the Gold Coast, Clarke in Malaya, and Goodenough in Fiji, these officers did exactly this.

Secondly, because of the remoteness of the areas, and because Downing Street depended largely for its information on governors' despatches, the selectiveness of a governor's information (or even a delay in the mails) caused a heightened sense of crisis. Events in the Malay States in particular were kept from the Colonial Office by Ord, Clarke and Jervois. When a bundle of news arrived from an area at

1. A.W.L.Hemming, 'The Colonial Office and the Crown Colonies', Empire Review, vol. XI, No. 66, July 1906, p. 503.

infrequent intervals it gave a sense of crisis which someone, say in Singapore, would not feel. Similarly, officials nearer the scene of troubles were prone to panic. Australian politicians liked to draw the attention of Whitehall to 'anarchy' or 'imminent foreign intervention' in Fiji. And most of the military interventions of the period, in Selangor (1871), the Gold Coast and Ashanti (1873-74) and Perak (1875) were in much greater force than sober military appreciation might have indicated. The exception was Gordon's 'Little War' in Fiji, where he deliberately avoided the appearance of "a war between whites and natives".¹

Thirdly, the Colonial Office can be caught in pursuit of red herrings. In 1871 and 1872, for instance, when the situation on the west coast of Malaya was really becoming anarchic, the Colonial Office staff expended a lot of nervous energy over Governor Ord's relations with the Maharaja of Johore, the one ruler with whom Britain had fairly satisfactory relations in Malaya. The governor erred; but on the side of too great a cordiality.² Similarly, the problems in West Africa were formidable, yet relations with Liberia, and much fun at its expense,³ seem to have taken an unwarrantable amount of the Colonial Office's permanship.

Fourthly, an attitude of racial self-confidence was very evident in this period. The political units of the three areas were, to contemporaries, "native States", usually 'uncivilized' and 'barbarous' States. The Colonial Office usually drew the line at 'native', and Herbert was to rebuke Sir Julian Pauncefote, the Assistant Under-secretary, for his 'planter' attitude to the West Indian negroes.⁴ But Cabinet members would have serious discussions on what to do with "these Coast niggers",⁵ and Wolseley regarded the West Africans as "so many monkeys".⁶ The favourite word for

1. Memo. Jan. 1877 quoted in A.H.Gordon, Story of a Little War, (1877) p. xiv.

2. See below p. 191-194.

3. E.g. "Liberia is a helpless & hopeless place". Min. by K-Hugessen 13.v.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 14.iv.1871. CO/267/310.

4. B.Hamilton, Barbados and the Confederation Question, 1871-1885 (1956) p. 20.

5. Halifax to Kimberley 21.xii.1873. Kimberley Papers, A/52.

6. Wolseley to his wife 27.ix.1873, G.Arthur, The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, p. 10.

Malays was 'children'; Fijians were 'cannibals'. Even Sir Arthur Gordon, whose policy towards the Fijians was remarkably benevolent, told the settlers : "My sympathy for the coloured races is strong; but my sympathy for my own race is stronger".¹ His remark that the Maharaja of Johore was "the first native I have ever seen who does not look ridiculous in European costume"² is particularly revealing. The typical view gaining ground among local officials was stated by Thomas Braddell: "the innate superiority of the ordinary Englishman in his sense of honour and justice, is sufficient to dominate the inferior character of the Malay".³ Even in the matter of justice the attitude crept in. Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote: "of course all men are equal before the law - or nearly all - but it is a mistake to suppose that you can treat Chinese as if they were English... I am all for whipping".⁴ On the question of juries in Sierra Leone Kimberley wrote, "A jury of Englishmen is a tolerable institution - a jury of Irishmen often intolerable - a jury of blacks I should say always intolerable".⁵

Finally, the Colonial Office attitude to Germany requires comment. A change seemed to take place for a while after the Franco-Prussian War. In the years before and immediately after the foundation of the German Empire, Bismarck deliberately discouraged schemes for colonial expansion. "I will have no colonies", he said in 1871.⁶ But this did not prevent German residents abroad, traders, missionaries and naval leaders from producing schemes. Thus Bismarck refused an offer of Fiji in 1869, and ordered the Consul in Samoa to cultivate good relations with the Americans there. But in spite of the official German attitude, British traders, missionaries, and local officials became increasingly suspicious of German intentions. When the warship Hertha reached Singapore in February 1870 with

1. Gordon, Fiji Records, I, p. 183.

2. Ibid. p. 104.

3. CO/809/1 p. 246.

4. Min. by K-Hugessen on despatch received 10.vi.1872. CO/273/57.

5. Min. by Kimberley 19.xi.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 19.x.1871. CO/267/312.

6. M.E.Townshend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism (1921) p. 18.

instructions from the Crown Prince of Prussia to survey Blair harbour, in the mouth of the Endau River, the northern boundary of Johore, it spurred Sir Harry Ord to renew his demands for British intervention in the Malay States.¹ The Hertha was supposed to be en route for Samoa where Theodore Weber was planning a German colony,² but the outbreak of war with France in July 1870 caused the ship's recall. After the war German warships were soon on the scene again in the Pacific to "look after German interests".³ The Nymphe called at Melbourne in December 1871, at Fiji in March 1872, and took Weber (who was Consul in Samoa and Manager for Godeffroy) to Pago Pago harbour in Samoa only to find that a U.S. officer had signed a treaty gaining exclusive rights in the harbour just over a week before.⁴ Thus rumours began to fly again, and in 1873 an L.M.S. missionary claimed that Germany had designs on New Guinea where two German missionaries had started work in 1855.⁵

In face of all the rumours and scares the Colonial Office was unperturbed, but about the summer of 1872 Knatchbull-Rugessen began to get anxious about Germany in the Pacific, and Herbert took the same view under Carnarvon, even after specific denials were made in Berlin. Rogers had not been in the least worried about Germany. In 1867 he said a German colony in New Guinea would be "a very good thing for the Australians".⁶ In 1870 he thought that if Fiji could be reduced into "Berlin order it would be useful",⁷ and his attitude to the rumour that a North German harbour was sought in Malaya was- "let her by all means".⁸ At this stage Herbert thought that the entry of the North German Confederation into the Pacific would help to keep the balance of naval power there,⁹ but by 1875 he was advocating a policy of quietly

1. Ord to Kimberley 3.ix.1870. CO/273/39.

2. S.Masterman, Origins of International Rivalry in Samoa 1845-1884 (1934) p. 67.

3. Consul March to FO. 27.iii.1872. FO/58/131 p. 94.

4. G.H.Ryden, The Foreign Policy of the United States in relation to Samoa (1933)

5. Townshend, op. cit. p. 35 pp. 62-71.

6. Min. by Rogers 3.viii.1867 on Young to Buckingham 31.v.1867. CO/201/542.

7. Rogers to Hammond 4.ii.1870. FO/58/119 p.206.

8. Min. by Rogers 20.vii.1870 on FO. to CO. 14.vii.1870. CO/273/42.

9. Memo. by Herbert 10.v.1870. CO/201/562.

acquiring 'paramountcy' in the Pacific to the exclusion of the U.S.A., Germany and France.¹ It is difficult to see when Knatchbull-Hugessen's aggressive attitude began. In January 1871, when he heard a rumour that Germany might acquire Liberia, where her merchants had been established since 1849,² he thought the acquisition "would probably be a general benefit".³ But in July 1872 he spoke of the dangers to Australia of a German Fiji.⁴ Kimberley's attitude is also difficult to assess. In 1872, in face of the Samoa rumours, he was content to let Germany have "this questionable luxury",⁵ but the suggestion of a German protectorate in Selangor in 1873 prompted him to urgent action where he felt Britain's position as 'paramount power' in the Malay Peninsula was challenged.⁶

It is impossible to generalize from these isolated comments, and after the annexation of Fiji, and official German denial of ambitions in Samoa and New Guinea Carnarvon was satisfied. What is certain is that privately many Germans were planning colonies, and that publicly some British traders and missionaries, and many Australians, were worried. The extent to which these suggestions and rumours were ventilated is vividly illustrated by a conversation in 1874 between Thakombau, the self-styled 'King of Fiji', and Commodore Goodenough's messengers only five days before the chiefs decided to cede the islands to Britain:

"King Is it true that the German man of war is at Melbourne. [Marshall] Moore, [Interpreter] Probably. King Is she larger than Pearl [Goodenough's flagship] Moore Don't know. King Have the French many ships of war. [Lieut.] Olive [RM] At least 20. King I thought they were all destroyed in the war... Have the Germans many ships. Olive Yes pretty well. King Why are they building so many? Olive Cannot say, perhaps they are looking out for fresh colonies. King They had better go to Tonga and annex the Tongan Islands. How Germany is growing. It was only a small place a short time ago... How many ships-of-war has England? Olive About 200. King with loud ejaculation Good! Good! How is it that England is so great and strong. Olive Because she is rich and wise and good. King True! True!"

1. See below p. 391.

2. Townshend, *op. cit.* p. 37.

3. Min. 27.i.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 28.xii.1870. CO/267/307.

4. Min. 22.vii.1872 on FO. to CO. 22.vii.1872. CO/201/571.

5. Min. by Kimberley 12.iv.1872 on W.H.Weld (extract) 25.xii.1871. CO/201/572.

6. Kimberley to Gladstone 10.ix.1873. Private. Gladstone Papers 44225/103.

7. Goodenough's Journal, III, 14.iii.1874.

A picture has been attempted of the Colonial Office and the forces which influenced its policies. Before watching these forces at work in formulating policy in the three areas, it is necessary to ask - What were its major problems? And it is important to emphasise that the 'Colonial Question' as it was spoken of in the early 1870's had nothing to do with the problems discussed in this thesis. It was, briefly, the problem of the relationship of England to her self-governing colonies; the theme which has been examined by Bodelsen.¹ Most of the colonies of settlement had been given responsible government. Canadian Federation went further, and many saw it as a logical step towards complete independence.² Others recoiled from this eventuality, and out of the debate the Imperial Federation movement grew. Part of the discussion revolved around the widely held, but not particularly accurate, view that Gladstone and the Liberals wanted to get rid of the colonies.³ Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech was probably designed to associate the Conservatives with the opposite trend, which, however, they were not really responsible for creating. But this question lies outside the scope of this thesis.

The view to be advanced here is that the three experiments of 1873-74 were part of another problem, which was in many ways as big as the usual 'colonial question' of the same period. In terms of military interventions, economic development, administrative systems, even moral considerations, the modern history of the Gold Coast and Nigeria, Malaya and the British possessions in the South Pacific have raised problems quite as big as the unsolved riddle of the relations with Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. This other problem of the 1870's was essentially a 'frontier' one - a frontier which was already familiar in somewhat similar form from experience in India, New Zealand and South Africa. "Both in India and South Africa it was frontier disturbance which led the British Government

1. Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism. (1924).

2. A.Mills, 'Our Colonial Policy', Contemporary Review, June 1869, p. 238.

3. Gladstone's views are discussed by Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy.

to make the attempt to check the disturbance, and thus by an inevitable process to control new areas".¹ In these areas, as well as in West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific, the frontier of British political influence, missionary activity, trading and even administrative assistance, stretched beyond the frontier of sovereignty. In trying to stabilize and make safe the narrower frontier the three experiments discussed here were born.

The 'frontier' theme has its dangers. The frontier discussed here is not the frontier of American historiography; it is not the receding area of free land and the westward march of settlement, which in 1893 could "explain American development" for Turner.² The abundance of free land for settlement combined with the insignificant Amerindian population has little relation to the areas of the three experiments; although it is interesting to note that Gladstone's studies, in the 1840's, of American and colonial history and problems led him to a view similar to Turner's notion of the frontier as a democratizing environment.³ Nor is de Kiewiet's application of Turner to South Africa quite relevant. He explains why himself—"The Indians of North America were hunters before they were cultivators; the Bantu races were above all else graziers and cultivators. They wanted the land in which the farmers settled".⁴ Thus the South African frontier included a more important African element than Turner's frontier involved Indians, while of the three areas under discussion only Fiji had the white settler problem. Nor, again, is the Indian frontier a correct parallel. "What I call a frontier," wrote Sir Alfred Lyall in 1891, "is the utmost political boundary projected as one might say beyond the administrative boundary".⁵ Lyall's frontier bears the closest comparison with the areas of the three experiments, but he was thinking more in terms of military

1. de Kiewiet, Colonial Policy, p. 154.

2. F.J.Turner, 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History', Report of the American Historical Association for 1893, p. 199.

3. Knaplund, Gladstone and Imperial Policy, p. 60-61.

4. de Kiewiet, op. cit. p. 113-114.

5. A.Lyall, 'Frontiers and Protectorates', Nineteenth Century, clxxiv, August 1891, p. 31.

protection along a frontier stretching from the Trucial Coast to British Burma.

The frontier of this thesis was a vague zone, adjacent (or merely nearby in the case of the Pacific Islands) to areas of British territory. Within the zone British missionary activities or trade or treaty relations or military intervention or protection or administration had developed. By 1873 events within this zone in the three areas had developed to an extent that the security of the British settlements close by was said to be threatened. In West Africa the dangers arose from British interference in the rivalries of the African States, in Malaya it was piracy and civil war, in the South Pacific it was rumoured European intervention. Thus, the decision which faced the Colonial Office in 1873 in these areas was similar to the one which had to be faced in South Africa and India. The frontier needed stabilizing, and the alternatives presented were: further annexations or complete withdrawal. The argument to be maintained here is that, except in the case of Fiji, neither suggestion was followed. Instead a vague, middle-of-the-way notion of 'paramountcy' was conceived.

This frontier problem is one which was more evident in the 1880's and after in the familiar period of the international scramble. By then leading statesmen were aware of the problem, whereas few were in the early 1870's. As has been emphasised, writers on the 'colonial question' concerned themselves with relations with the colonies of settlement. Certain writers, however, did show an awareness of the frontier which forms the subject of this thesis. Three are worth noting.

Charles Dilke's Greater Britain (1868) was mainly concerned with the English-speaking world, and concentrated on proving his race theory that "the dearer ones, are on the whole likely, to destroy the cheaper peoples".¹ But Dilke spared a word for what he called 'dependencies'.

1. C. Dilke, Greater Britain (1868) II, p. 405.

"Whether, indeed, dependencies pay or do not pay their actual cost their retention stands on a wholly different footing than that of colonies. Were we to leave Australia or the Cape, we should continue to be the chief customers of these countries: were we to leave India or Ceylon, they would have no customers at all; for falling into anarchy they would cease at once to export their goods to us and to consume our manufactures... Our dependencies still form a nursery of statesmen and of warriors, and that we should irresistibly fall into natural sluggishness of thought, were it not for the world-wide interests given us by the necessity of governing and educating the inhabitants of so vast an empire as our own... The possession of India offers to ourselves that element of vastness of dominion which, in this age, is needed to secure width of thought and nobility of purpose; but to the English race our possession of India, of the coasts of Africa, and of the ports of China offer the possibility of planting free institutions among the dark skinned races of the world".¹

In the year after Dilke's publication Arthur Mills, in an article devoted mainly to the usual 'colonial problem', showed himself to be aware of the problems in West Africa and elsewhere. But he made it clear that he considered that "the administrative blunders we may have committed in our attempts to govern coloured races, however serious may have been their consequences, stand apart from the category of problems presented by the everyday phases of our colonial policy".² This basic distinction made Mills criticised the attempt of the third Earl Grey to transplant English institutions in the Gold Coast, which had recently received publicity in the 1865 Select Committee on West Africa.³ He lambasted the idea of England playing Lady Bountiful to aboriginal races, "a petting and patronising policy"; and he characterised treaty making in frontier zones as "a mere diplomatic pastime carried on between the Queen's representatives and a set of tattooed and feathered Chieftains".

Thirdly, in 1870, Herman Merivale produced his famous essay defining the usual 'colonial question', in which he expressed the growing feeling of the time that 'something ought to be done'. He, too, showed that, like Dilke and Mills, he was aware of the other problem. He mentioned the refusal to annex Fiji in 1861,

1. Ibid. pp. 394-406.

2. A.Mills, 'Our Colonial Policy', Contemporary Review, June 1869, p. 232.

3. Discussed below p. 62-64.

and he noted the special problems of New Zealand and South Africa. He recalled that the government of India "holds dependencies in the Malay Peninsula",¹ and he ended the essay with a very coherent view of the frontier zone in Asia.

"I will finish with a few hasty glances at another great field of national development - almost an empire, in all but in name - with which our connection seems as yet in its infancy. By actual possession here and there; by quasi-territorial dominion, under treaties, in other places; by great superiority of general commerce and the carrying trade everywhere, we have acquired an immense political influence in all that division of the world which lies between India and Japan...."²

Merivale¹ saw clearly a type of frontier zone such as this thesis will examine in West Africa, the Malay Peninsula and the South Pacific. Merivale also noted, what has been discussed above, that there were conflicts of departmental responsibility in London. He suggested a single resident 'Minister' or 'Governor General' should co-ordinate British policy in the zone. It would be fair to say that Merivale's was the most mature realisation of this sort of frontier problem in the early 1870's, although he did not isolate the particular areas discussed here. One of the first people to realise in a general way what was happening on the frontier in the tropics was probably Rogers, who several times after 1874 referred in one breath to the expanding frontier in West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific.

The theme, then, is defined, and the participants have been introduced. It is now necessary to examine in detail the course of events in each area and to trace the development of British policy. The background of each local problem has been treated separately, and it has often been necessary to turn back roughly to the 1850's to present a clear picture. British policy in each area will be dealt with in separate chapters up to the decision to intervene in 1873. The actual interventions will be treated in one chapter. Here, only the inauguration of the new policy

1. H. Merivale, 'The Colonial Question', Fortnightly Review, new ser. vol. 7, 1870, p. 175.

2. Ibid. loc. cit.

will be discussed; its development lies outside the scope of this thesis. Thus, Sir Arthur Gordon's remarkable government in Fiji, the Resident System in Malaya, the development of the District Commissioners in the Gold Coast, the expansion of the Lagos protectorate and the work of the Western Pacific High Commission will be discussed only in so far as their origins are found in the policies of 1874.

Chapter 2.THE BRITISH WEST AFRICAN SETTLEMENTS AND THE FATE OF THE 1865 POLICY,1865 to 1873.The 1865 policy.


In 1865 a parliamentary Select Committee considered the diverse and scattered British interests in West Africa and attempted to provide a unified policy for them. The committee was requested by Sir Charles Adderley after Palmerston's government had been bitterly criticised for its action during the Ashanti invasion of the Gold Coast Protectorate in 1863. At the same time Capt. (later Lieut-General Sir Andrew) Clarke, R.E., wrote a strong criticism of Britain's position in West Africa, which the War Office passed to Cardwell, the Colonial Secretary, who considered sending Clarke back to gather material for the Select Committee.¹ Cardwell sent instead another Engineer officer, Col. (later Major-General Sir Harry) Ord, the Governor of Bermuda, who had first visited the Gold Coast in 1850, and since 1855 had been the Colonial Office's 'expert' on the area.

Thus the Colonial Office had two conflicting reports before it as it faced Adderley's committee; Clarke wanted a reduction of responsibilities, but the optimistic Ord was reluctant to give anything up. The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss how these two conflicting opinions were reconciled in the 1865 committee's report, and how this policy was soon rejected by the Colonial Office.

Along the two thousand mile West African coast, which had a history of European intercourse dating from the fifteenth century, Great Britain possessed, in 1865, four tiny scattered settlements, and what has been called an 'informal dependency' in the Niger Delta.² In 1866 the traveller took fourteen days from

1. Lord de Grey to Clarke, quoted in R.H.Vetch, Life of Lieut-General Sir Andrew Clarke (1905) p. 83.

2. Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 204.



THE WEST COAST OF AFRICA IN 1873

Liverpool to reach The Gambia, the nearest settlement to England. Here the town of Bathurst had been settled on an island at the mouth of the river in 1816.¹ Sierra Leone, the colony with the longest continuous existence, had been founded in 1787 by philanthropists as a settlement for freed slaves, and during the middle of the nineteenth century it was considered the hub of the British settlements. On the Gold Coast a series of coastal forts had been taken over by the Crown in 1843.² Furthest east was the island of Lagos and its outposts, ceded to the Crown in 1861.³ British sovereignty was confined to these minute coastal possessions whose trade was by no means great.⁴

While the Colonial Office⁵ administered these settlements, the decline of the trans-atlantic slave trade had in no way diminished the Foreign Office's interest in West Africa. Since the abolition Act of 1807 and the formation of the Squadron in 1810, the Foreign Office had vigorously clamped down on the slave trade emanating chiefly from the delta region. But Lander's discovery of the mouth of the Niger in 1830 converted the river into "an arm of the Atlantic Ocean".⁶ It thus became the

1. McCarthy's Island, 150 miles up-river, was purchased in 1820.
2. Ord found five forts occupied in 1864- Dixcove, Cape Coast Castle, Anomabu, Winneba and Fort James, Accra.
3. Palma, to the east, and Badagry, to the west, were annexed in 1863.

4.

		1860	1861	1862	1863	1864	1865.
<u>Gambia</u>	Imp.	£73,138	109,581	99,825	172,965	135,777	128,808.
	Exp.	109,137	136,837	154,443	141,673	143,157	138,693.
<u>S.Leone</u>	Imp.	172,726	168,070	144,269	209,106	190,441	368,545.
	Exp.	304,394	213,204	268,814	295,833	201,808	237,240.
<u>G.Coast</u>	Imp.	112,454	162,970	145,160	76,955	no Blue Books.	
	Exp.	110,457	145,819	102,086	53,764		
<u>Lagos</u>	Imp.	no figures			171,138	120,796	114,284
	Exp.				158,341	166,903	175,636

Value of trade 1860-65 from Fairfield's Memo 21.1.1874 in Confidential Print, African 40, CO/806/3 p. 4. Ord's report of 1865, quoting the 1863 figures gave a very misleading picture because of the Ashanti war.

5. The Senegal & The Gambia were governed between 1766 & 1783 as the Colony of Senegambia, on the American model, but after the Treaty of Versailles the Gambia was entrusted to the Committee of Merchants. See E.C.Martin, The British West African Settlements, 1750-1821 (1927), pp. 57-102.
6. Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 18.

most fruitful centre for 'legitimate trading', and the foundation in 1849 of the consulate of the Bights of Benin and Biafra gave the Foreign Office a political stake in West Africa no less important than the vague Gold Coast Protectorate. A Nigerian historian has written: "in the half-century following 1830 Britain established and maintained an 'informal' or commercial empire over the Delta states... But British reluctance to annex the Delta formally was no evidence of her unwillingness to control the area politically".¹

No effort was made to define the respective spheres of Colonial and Foreign Offices and at Lagos where they overlapped Rogers expected confusion.² But a tacit arrangement emerged. The Foreign Office looked after relations with the Niger States and in 1871 they rejected an offer of the Governor-in-Chief of the settlements to mediate in the Oil Rivers war.³ The Colonial Office was left solely responsible for relations with the States adjacent to the settlements and treaties were not usually sent to the Foreign Office.⁴

The bitter dilemma of British policy in West Africa was clearly stated in Clarke's report to the War Office.⁵ While the Colonial Office governed expensively defended establishments,⁶ the greatest trade was with the Niger Delta, where, before the rise of JaJa of Opobo in 1870, it was estimated at £1 million a year.⁷ Clarke wanted drastic economies in the settlements as he did not believe that other European Powers would touch them or that the Africans were likely to attack them. The latter, he said, were more interested in their own wars and one State was not worth defending as against another.

1. Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 203.

2. Min. by Rogers 8.ix.1863 on FO. to CO. 5.ix.1863. CO/147/5. Cf. C.B. Adderley, A Review of 'The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration' by Earl Grey, 1853, and of subsequent colonial history (1869) p. 213.

3. FO. to CO. 11.xi.1871 (draft) FO/84/1347.

4. Meade to Enfield 5.i.1872. FO/84/1360.

5. Printed June 1864. WO/33/13/1387.

6. Ord's rough figures for expenditure of the settlements:- Civil - £12,000, Military - £130,000, Naval - £157,000.

7. Memo. by Charles Livingstone 8.xii.1871. FO/84/1343.

The frontier problem in West Africa arose from the gradual extension of British influence. Relations with African States which began with treaties of commerce and friendship had come to assume, said Clarke, the "form and title of a territorial protectorate" which involved "the extension of quasi-British authority and jurisdiction over countless tribes still affecting to retain their independence". The Africans were given a false sense of security, yet there was no adequate administration. The worst aspect of this for Clarke was the fact that "No obligation or responsibility is acknowledged on the part of the natives to England: while she assumes on the other hand, the serious one of identifying herself with their quarrels, and in reality frequently has to guard them against the results of their own inter-tribal feuds".¹ Outside Sierra Leone, he said, trading factories alone were needed:

"Lawful commerce will best be promoted by confining the operation of English influence and interference to that exercised by a Consul or mercantile agent, and not by endeavouring to force by military power and the machinery of a colonial government, our institutions and laws upon a people to whom they are neither suited nor applicable".²

He thought the British West African settlements were a "costly and profitless experiment".

Ord disagreed and his report was much more optimistic. "So far", he said, "as the suppression of the slave trade and the encouragement of commerce are concerned, it may be said that the settlements attain the principal objects for which they are maintained".³ He re-iterated the familiar argument that British settlements were more effective than the Navy in suppressing the slave trade, and he claimed that there had been some real achievements: the abolition of human sacrifice, the mitigation of oppressive elements in African law, and a gradual improvement in the lot of domestic slaves. He disagreed with Clarke's contention that factories alone were needed; this system proved inadequate at Lagos between 1851 and 1861. As for

1. Clarke report p. 43.

2. *Ibid.* p. 77.

3. Ord's report, Accounts and Papers, 1865, XXXVII, p. 314.

the argument that the greatest trade was outside the settlements, in the Oil Rivers, he begged the question by saying that the palm oil producing areas being near navigable rivers made trade easier than elsewhere in West Africa.¹ Instead of Clarke's system of consulates Ord supported the idea of a grouping or federation under Sierra Leone, where there would be a Governor-in-Chief who would treat the Gambia, Gold Coast and Lagos as he might a group of lesser West Indian islands.

Both Ord and Clarke were questioned by the Adderley committee, which began its hearings on 9 March 1865 and considered its report on 22 June. Both their opinions were in fact accepted; like Clarke the committee severely criticised the various extensions of territory which had taken place and it advised retrenchment, but the general conclusions followed Ord. The committee was unable to recommend withdrawal immediately from any of the settlements,² but in the interests of economy and unity of policy it was decided that the settlements would have a single Governor-in-Chief.

Future policy, however, was largely contained in Cardwell, the Colonial Secretary's, amendments to the final report. Its core is contained in the following often-quoted words (of which Cardwell's additions are in brackets):

"that all further extensions of territory or assumption of government, or new treaties offering any protection to native tribes, would be inexpedient; and that the object of our policy should be [to encourage in the natives the exercise of those qualities which may render it possible for us more and more to transfer to them the administration of all the Governments with a view to our ultimate withdrawal from all, except, probably, Sierra Leone".]

Yet, even in the next paragraph the committee, prompted again by Cardwell, allowed a measure of local discretion, which, in a short time, would be used significantly both at Lagos and the Gold Coast. "

["This policy of non-extension admits of no exception as regards new settlements, but cannot amount to an absolute prohibition of measures which in peculiar cases, may be necessary for the more efficient and ³ economical administration of the settlements we already possess".]

1. Ibid. p. 317.

2. The only settlement actually abandoned was Bulama Island, which was awarded by arbitrators appointed by the President of the U.S.A., to Portugal in 1870.

3. Reports from Committees, 1865, V, p.3.

This compromise policy¹ of Adderley's and Cardwell's guided Gladstone's government in 1868. Until his retirement in December 1868 (Sir) Frederick Elliot² constantly reminded his political chiefs of the 1865 committee's policy, and among his last official acts were the preparation of memoranda which were used to brief Granville on the application of this policy to the Gold Coast.³ Both at the Colonial Office, 1868-70, and the Foreign Office, 1870-73, Granville resolutely tried to apply the policy. Both Kimberley and Knatchbull-Hugessen studied the 1865 report and they tried to apply its recommendations to the settlements, but they found they could not. Granville was a little more successful in applying it in the Niger Delta, but even here he permitted the British Consul to mediate in the Bonny-Opobo War and he granted the Consul extra-territorial jurisdiction in 1872.

The failure of the 1865 policy has prompted Dike to say that "within a decade of the adoption of these resolutions by Parliament the logic of facts drove the British Government towards a vigorous policy of economic and political expansion not only on the coast, but in the West African interior".⁴ This generalisation based on Nigerian experience, cannot be accepted for West Africa as a whole, as there is little evidence of this 'vigorous policy' in the hinterland in the early 1870's. Even in the Delta Granville was determined to maintain the status quo and he refused to intervene in the struggle for power and the palm oil trade between Bonny and Opobo in 1871,⁵ a struggle which cut British trade with the Delta by half.⁶ When British traders attempted to bypass the Delta middlemen

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1. For a preliminary discussion of the political division among members of the committee, see J.D.Hargreaves, Review of Dike's Trade and Politics in Sierra Leone Studies, No. 6, Jan. 1856, p. 127.
 2. Assistant Under-secretary from May 1849 to December 1868, who had the general supervision of the African dept. K.C.M.C., 1869.
 3. See his minute 2.xii.1868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 7.xi.1868. CO/96/77.
 4. Dike, op. cit. p. 181.
 5. Granville to Livingstone 25.i.1871 (draft). FO/84/1343.
 6. Min. by Wylde 8.ii.1873 on Livingstone to Granville 7.i.1873. FO/84/1377.

States and to 'tap' the oil trade themselves, the Foreign Office in the early 1870's insisted on retaining the former mode of trade through the middlemen brokers "according to the established custom of the oil rivers".¹

However, it is certainly true that by 1873-4 the idea of withdrawal from West Africa was all but abandoned. In the Colonial Office Knatchbull-Fugessen and African experts like Fairfield and Hemming maintained there was a duty to remain, in lengthy arguments which will be analysed in ^{a later} this chapter. In the Foreign Office, William Wylde,² who consistently urged an aggressive policy, is worth quoting. When the Colonial Office told merchants in 1872 that if they traded outside the British settlements on the Gold Coast they did so at their own risk, he wrote,

"We have a valuable and increasing trade on the African coast. In some of the Rivers there are British manufactured goods to the value of between £200,000 and £300,000 and to give out publicly that we are not prepared to protect those goods and the British traders would I humbly submit be a great error. We have spent some millions of money in the suppression of the Slave Trade, and as a consequence of that suppression legitimate trade has sprung up not only at places which used formerly to be the greatest slave marts, but at innumerable other parts of the Afrn Coast where vessels a few years since never dreamt of touching.

But this trade exists and has been developed only on the understanding on the part of the natives that we are prepared as we have hitherto done to protect it, and to exact reparation where outrages are committed on British subjects and their property. We keep a Consul on the Coast and a Squadron also for the protection of British interests, and if they are not to afford a general protection to British subjects of what use are they?"³

When the Treasury questioned the value of sending presents to encourage the Emir of Nupe to protect traders in the Niger in 1873, Wylde defended them with the words,

"We have been at some expense in opening up the Niger Trade, and it would be a pity now to run the risk of undoing all that we have done on the West Coast of Africa, by refusing to send the King a few Presents.

We have probably done more within the last 20 years to open up Africa

1. Derby to Hartley 21.v.1874 (draft). FO/84/1401.
2. William Henry Wylde became a supernumerary clerk in the FO. in 1839. He went with his father, Col. Wylde, on a mission to Spain and Portugal, 1846-7, and became an assistant clerk in the office in 1859. In 1865 was on the Slave Trade Instructions Commission and was appointed head of the Commercial and Consular dept. of the FO. This was often called the 'SlaveDept.' and dealt with the African and Polynesian business. In 1872 he conducted an inquiry into consular establishments. Retired 1880.
3. Min. by Wylde 8.v.1872 on CO. to FO. 2.v.1872. FO/84/1360.

to European traders than had been achieved in the century previous, and it would be bad policy now for the sake of a few pounds to risk the closing of one of the principal high ways into the interior of Africa".¹

He also supported armed intervention against Brass in 1876 when Niger traders had been attacked.

"Some years ago the Traders on the Afrn Coast were given to understand that if they chose to establish themselves up the Rivers where the natives were hostile they must do so on their own responsibility and that they must take the consequences and not expect to be protected by our Cruisers. But where there is money to make our merchants will be certain to intrude themselves, and it is all very well to say that they will not be protected, but the fact is that if they establish a lucrative trade Public Opinion in this Country practically compels us to protect them, and a great outcry takes place if our Traders are attacked and murdered or their goods pillaged and no redress is obtained... We can hardly therefore allow these Brass Pirates₂ to put a stop to the navigation of a great River like the Niger...."

Thus, in both Foreign and Colonial Offices ambitious voices were heard.

As yet they were not those of the decisive policy makers; both Granville and Kimberley were reluctant to move in West Africa. But in spite of their reluctance and the Treasury's parsimony, Gladstone's government was unable to stabilize the frontier in West Africa. The frontier of 'influence' and 'protection', and in the Gold Coast 'jurisdiction', had already passed beyond the frontier of British sovereignty and the 1865 policy did not check this trend.

The Gold Coast Protectorate before 1865.

The type of frontier problem which Kimberley was to face is vividly illustrated by the case of the Gold Coast. No aspect of the frontier in West Africa was vaguer than the zone of responsibility here, and no problem baffled the 1865 committee so much. The Ashanti invasion of 1863 was the main reason for the committee, but after all their discussions its members decided that the Protectorate was "not defined by treaty, but only implied....", and that the limits of British territory (i.e. the forts) were "wholly indefinite and uncertain".³ This settlement had the smallest

1. Min. by Wylde 28.iii.1873 on CO. to FO. 22.iii.1873. FO/84/1382.

2. Min. by Wylde 12.viii.1876 on W.A.McKellar to Derby 27.vi.1876. FO/84/1455.

3. Reports from Committees, 1865, V, p. 10.

trade of all, but its influence stretched the farthest. A digression is therefore necessary to discover the origins of this system before discussing the 1865 view of it, because it was a protectorate ignored by the international lawyers, but as Miss Wolfson says it was "a new departure in Colonial policy".¹

The British trading settlements on the Gold Coast became involved in African politics because of Ashanti expansion. By the late eighteenth century the inland Ashanti nation had grown into a powerful empire which increasingly dominated the States around the coastal forts. After Ashanti defeated Fante in 1806 the British, Dutch and Danish merchants recognized Ashanti suzerainty over the coastal peoples, and even their right of rent for the ground on which the forts were built. Ashanti expansion was partly economic since they sought an outlet to the sea, and as the British had no influence in Africa, and merely wanted to trade, there was no basic hostility to Ashanti. The Asantehene, the 'King of Ashanti', said in 1806, "I took the English for my friends, because I saw their object was trade only, and they did not care for the people".²

But the merchants could not stand by as in 1806 while their African neighbours were ravaged; hence the terms of Bowdich's Treaty (1817) which provided for peace between Ashanti and "all nations of Africa residing under the protection of the Company's Forts".³ Although Ord, in 1865, thought this was the foundation of the Protectorate, the British merchants more likely simply undertook the exercise of influence over the tribes immediately adjacent to their forts so as to keep the peace with Ashanti.⁴ For a short time there was a British Resident at Kumasi, and when the Crown took over the British forts in 1821 a peaceful policy was intended towards adjacent African states. But the inevitable frictions, fed by the aggressive policy of the local officials, led to more fighting which culminated in the decisive

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1. F. Wolfson, British Relations with the Gold Coast 1843-1880 (PhD thesis London (1950) p. 4.
 2. W.E.F. Ward, A History of the Gold Coast (1948) p. 148.
 3. J.J. Crooks, Records Relating to the Gold Coast from 1750 to 1874 (1923) p. 119.
 4. Memo. by E. Fairfield, 24.iii.1874, Confidential Print, Gold Coast 49. CO/806/11p.3

defeat of Ashanti at Dodowa in 1826 by a coalition of British, Danes and most of the coastal states. After this the British government tried to abandon the coast, removing the garrison in 1828, but the merchants managed to prevent a withdrawal.

The real foundation of the Protectorate was laid by George Maclean, who headed the government under a committee of merchants from 1829 to 1843.¹ By his 1831 Treaty, signed with Ashanti, Fante and ten other chiefs, Ashanti gave up her suzerainty over the coastal peoples and the claim for rent for the British forts. Henceforth the ground on which the forts stood was regarded as British territory. The Asantehene renounced his rights to tribute from his former subjects states on the coast; these in turn undertook not to molest Ashanti traders.² Thus a sort of British paramountcy, personified by Maclean, was recognised, which apparently implied that the Fante would be aided against Ashanti. British sovereignty was confined to the few coastal forts, which were interspersed between those of the Netherlands and Denmark.

Under Maclean's remarkable personal influence the Protectorate took shape. A man of great courage with a high sense of moral rectitude, he came to exercise a wide jurisdiction in the Gold Coast states.³ In spite of adverse criticisms and talk of scandal,⁴ Forster's Select Committee in 1842 endorsed his "useful though irregular

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1. The government of the forts was vested in a London committee of three merchants and Parliament granted £4000 annually. Maclean was appointed Lieut. in the Royal African Corps in 1826 and went to the G.C. in Oct. 1827 as secretary to Lieut-Gov. Lumley. Under the merchant government his official position was President of the Council at Cape Coast, but he styled himself 'Governor of His Britannick Majesties Settlements on the G.C.'
 2. Text in Crooks, Records, pp. 262-4.
 3. A contemporary account of Maclean is B. Cruikshank, Eighteen Years of the Gold Coast of Africa (1853), I, pp. 170-5. Similar work had been begun by John Jackson, a merchant who headed the govt. temporarily before Maclean arrived. See J.D. Fage, 'The Administration of George Maclean on the Gold Coast 1830-44', Trans. of the G.C. and Togoland Hist. Soc. vol. I, (1952-55) p. 112.
 4. Maclean married L.E. Landor, the poetess, who died suddenly at Cape Coast. Cruikshank, I, pp. 223-231 discusses the controversy surrounding this.

Jurisdiction" among the African coastal states.¹ However, since this influence and jurisdiction were extra-legal, steps were taken to regularize it. Firstly, at home the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts and the Gold Coast Order in Council were intended, ostensibly, to provide for jurisdiction over British subjects outside British territory, provided the local sovereign agreed.² But it is suggested that it was also intended to regularise, for Downing Street's satisfaction, the activities of the Crown official who would inherit Maclean's jurisdiction over Africans.³ Secondly, on the coast itself, the forts were put under Crown government again and were attached administratively to Sierra Leone, and Maclean continued to exercise his African jurisdiction, now as a Crown official styled 'Judicial Assessor and Assistant to the Native Sovereigns and Chiefs of the Country adjacent to the Gold Coast'. His rule was legalised, from an African point of view, by the famous Bond of 1844 under the terms of which he continued the task of "moulding the customs of the country to the general principles of British law".⁴

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1. Reports from Committees, 1842, XI, p.4. One definition of Maclean's protectorate runs: "a sort of irregular civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Coast tribes by their tacit consent and acquiescence gradually grew up, extending in course of time over a much larger area than the local limits of the merchant government in London". J.M.Sarbah, 'Maclean and the Gold Coast Judicial Assessors', Journal of the Africa Society, vol. 9, No. xxxvi (July 1910) p. 349.
 2. See paper on Civil & Judicial Constitution of the British West African settlements. A & P, 1854-55, XXXVII, pp. 375-466.
 - (a) 6 Vict. c.13. An act to enable HM to provide for the Government of Her settlements on the Coast of Africa and in the Falkland Islands.
 - (b) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 94. An act to remove doubts as to the exercise of Power and jurisdiction by HM within divers countries and places out of HM's dominion and to render the same more effectual.
 - (c) Order in Council, 3.ix.1844, appointing Cape Coast Castle a place for trials under (b).
 3. G.E.Metcalf, 'After Maclean', Trans of G.C. & T.Hist. Soc. I, p. 183. Similarly, Page, op. cit. p. 110 suggests that although the Committee of Merchants were instructed in 1828 only to administer law to residents of the British territory, it was accepted that there might be 'influence' over nearby tribes.
 4. Text of Bond in Crooks, Records, p. 296. But see metcalfe, op. cit. p. 184 for the result of the new government in which executive and judicial powers were separated, thus weakening maclean's hand. For a discussion of the legal aspect see A.N.Allott, 'Native Tribunals in the Gold Coast 1844-1929', Journal of African Law, vol. I, No. 3 (1957) pp. 163-168.

Although the Colonial Office was suspicious of the new protectorate, the third Earl Grey, Colonial Secretary 1846-52, made a bold attempt to develop it and attempted a remarkable experiment in African administration.¹ In 1850 the Gold Coast forts were made a separate government and two years later a 'Legislative Assembly' produced the so-called Poll Tax Ordinance to provide a revenue based on a poll tax of one shilling. Grey, who was one of the few politicians of the period to give serious thought to the administration of indigenous peoples in British territories, hailed the Assembly, which consisted of the Governor, his Council and most of the Fante chiefs, as a 'rude negro Parliament'. He wanted "to train the inhabitants of this part of Africa in the arts of civilization, until they grow into a nation capable of protecting themselves and managing their own affairs".²

But the Poll Tax was not well received,³ and in 1855 Palmerston sent Major Harry Ord to investigate.⁴ This was Ord's second visit to the Coast and he produced a modest programme of development for the Gold Coast. Reporting in May 1856⁵ he proposed the retention of Grey's experiment with some modifications and

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1. Earl Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration (1853), II, p. 284.
 2. Ibid. p. 287.
 3. Wolfson, Relations, p. 40-41.
 4. Harry St. George Ord. B. 1819; commissioned in R.E. 1837; served at Chatham, Woolwich and Ireland; in the West Indies 1840-45; and at home 1845-54, ending up as Adjutant of the R.E. Depot at Chatham. Visited West Africa and Ascension Is. Dec. 1849 - Sept. 1850 inspecting military and naval works. During the Crimean War he was Brigade-Major of the British force under Brig-Gen. Harry Jones, which took part in the Baltic campaign of 1854. At the siege of Bomarsund Ord volunteered for regimental duties in addition to staff work and he gained a Brevet Majority and a mention in despatches. Although he returned to regimental duty, he spent most of the rest of his life in Colonial service. In 1855-56 he reported on the Gold Coast; in 1856 he went to The Hague to negotiate over the Gold Coast; in 1857 he went to Paris and The Hague for the same purpose. He was Lieut-Gov. of Dominica 1857-58 and was then seconded to the Colonial Service. Governor of Bermuda 1861-67 (during which time he visited West Africa before the 1865 committee); Governor of the Straits Settlements 1867-73, and Governor of Western Australia 1877-79. For his early career see WO/25/3913/111 and London Gazette, 1.ix.1854 p. 2699.
 5. Ord to Labouchere 15.v.1856. CO/96/40.

suggested applying the Poll Tax revenue to public works and technical education, with the chiefs empowered to criticise expenditure. He wanted to win the confidence of the Africans by tolerating domestic slavery and by recognising the African merchants as a middle class. He also insisted that increased revenue from import duties was impossible unless similar arrangements were made by the Dutch whose forts, interspersed between the British ones, were customs free.

Ord, then, did not advise the Colonial Office to end the Protectorate. The problem of maintaining the influence gained by Maclean, without annexing more territory or the continuance of the £4000 annual grant, remained. But as Palmerston believed that settlements, by encouraging commerce, were the best means of ending the slave trade,¹ no attempt was made to abolish the Protectorate. To tackle the revenue problem Ord made the first of his unsuccessful negotiations with the Dutch.²

The difficulties of administration on the Coast were soon high-lighted by the horror-struck reports of Sir Benjamin Pine about domestic slavery. Within the forts, which were British territory, this was not permitted, but in the Protectorate States it was an essential part of the social system. Particularly horrified by the practice of 'pawning' children, Pine wrote, in 1857, a harsh indictment of Maclean's system.³ But the Colonial Office was undismayed and Pine soon changed his mind. "This is not the time for England to abandon any hold she has on the coast of Africa" said the Colonial Secretary.⁴ Yet, although after Ord's report, the government decided to maintain the forts, no positive policy was produced for the Protectorate. Lord Stanley was told in 1858 that it was "one of the most serious problems now

1. See his draft of Ord's instructions 31.x.1855. CO/96/37.

2. See below p. 86.

3. Pine to Labouchere 10.x.1857. CO/96/41.

4. Ibid. Min. by Labouchere 23.xii.1857. See Metcalfe (op. cit. pp. 188-189) for the dilemma behind these brave words. "In Justice, and now in taxation, they assumed two of the basic functions of government; in both spheres they had passed beyond the stage of mere advice. But they were still not prepared to rule or to accept fully and frankly the final responsibilities of police and defence...."

pending",¹ but, fearful of adding new burdens to the home taxpayer, he too made no decision.²

Carnarvon was the first politician after Grey to give serious thought to the Gold Coast. As parliamentary Under-secretary in 1858 he urged a definite policy and supplied the raison d'etre for it. England had a moral responsibility, he said, to spread Christianity and civilization "thus repairing the actions and policies of former times".³ There was no question of acquiring sovereignty, but he thought withdrawal from the forts would be immoral as Britain held the balance of power between Ashanti and the coastal States.

"We have established ourselves in that country and have undoubtedly effected it for good, also probably for evil. So we are hardly at liberty then to throw down the principle of good and evil to them to make their choice...⁴ because we find the task... is a more severe one than we expected."

Bulwer Lytton accepted this, but money and a good governor were still wanting. As Parliament obviously would not produce the former, the second, unsuccessful, effort was made to get the Dutch either to sell their forts or to levy equal duties, and as for a governor, Ord, then the Lieut-Governor of Dominica, was suggested. He knew the area and seemed convinced that the Protectorate could be administered successfully. One imagines that Ord would have cherished the job, and although in 1861 he became Governor of Bermuda, he was still used in Gold Coast matters. In 1860 he went to The Hague again to discuss the equalisation of customs duties, but for a second time the talks failed.

So even after Ord's 1856 plan, and Carnarvon's admission of moral responsibility in 1858, no decision was taken on the Protectorate. A novel scheme of administration had been born of the merchants' intervention against Ashanti and developed by Maclean Grey, Palmerston and Ord had made contributions, but in the 1860's the future of the

1. Min. by Merivale 5.iii.1858 on FO. to CO. 1.iii.1858. CO/96/44.

2. Ibid. Min. by Stanley 7.iii.1858.

3. Ibid. Memo. on the Gold Coast by Carnarvon 11.xi.1858.

4. Ibid.

experiment still hung in the balance. Not until the fierce light of parliamentary disapproval was directed on the Gold Coast was the Colonial Office forced into making some decision. The cause of this was the Ashanti invasion of 1863.

British intervention in Gold Coast politics had been caused by Ashanti expansion; Maclean's Protectorate was the result of Ashanti recognition of the independence of the coast States in the 1831 Treaty. Maclean in his lifetime commanded the respect which caused Ashanti and the coast States to settle their troubles through him. But the very ambiguity of the British position in the Protectorate caused constant frictions in subsequent years. On occasions the Ashantis took the law into their own hands and entered Assin to recover their subjects. Because of these tensions, the Protectorate States were in constant dread of the Ashantis and came to regard the British as their protectors. The two chief causes of friction were interference with Ashanti traders by States like Akim and Assin which were in a position of middle-men; and the sheltering of runaways from Ashanti in the Protectorate or the British forts. Both these motives lay behind the Ashanti invasion of Assin and Akim in March 1863.¹

Governor Richard Pine believed that the dread of the Ashantis should be decisively removed by an expedition to Kumasi. The Colonial Office refused to sanction this, and an ineffectual military effort in the Protectorate adversely affected British prestige. When, in December 1863, the Colonial Office finally

1. In 1862 two fugitives - a slave boy, and an old man called Janin (who had found a gold nugget and not handed it over to the Asantehene according to law) - took refuge at Cape Coast Castle. Ashanti demanded their surrender and Pine, believing the Asantehene would kill them, refused. Ward argues (History p. 206) that if the Asantehene swore to spare the runaways, he would keep his word.

The invasion began in March 1863, and after months of inconclusive manoeuvring by the local garrison Pine advocated his march to Kumasi. Permission was finally granted in Dec. 1863 and over 600 men of the West India Regt. came as reinforcements. But losses from disease were so great that the attack was called off.

See Ward pp. 205-213. W.W.Claridge, A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti (1915) 503-529. F.Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty-Ashanti (1921) 91-97. Wolfson, Relations, 63-67. A.B.Ellis, History of the Gold Coast of West Africa (1893) 224-235.

agreed to Pine's expedition a regular battalion it sent out arrived too late, and a local force which waited on the Pra never entered Ashanti territory. So many men died of disease the expedition was forced to retire.

Palmerston's government was bitterly attacked in Parliament. Sir John Pakington raised the matter in the Commons on 20 May 1864 and a few days later Cardwell, the Colonial Secretary, cancelled further operations.¹ The Government narrowly missed a defeat on 17 June on a motion of censure brought by Vice-Admiral Sir John Hay, whose brother had perished on the Coast. Although Palmerston ended the debate in characteristic vein - "if England takes under protection tribes of men... the honour of the country may... require... some steps... to make that protection not an empty word but a reality"² - the House was not charmed and his gallant words were belied by his government's subsequent policy. For the whole fiasco had two results. Firstly, the government solved the Ashanti embarrassment by deciding in 1864 never again to intervene to assist the Protectorate States against Ashanti. Secondly, Adderley's 1865 committee enunciated a policy of reduction of responsibilities in the Protectorate.

Ashanti relations had long been a source of friction. Thus after the motion of censure Cardwell told the Governor that in the event of another Ashanti invasion the coastal States would have to defend themselves, as British troops would not be used in the deadly climate. British efforts were to be confined to urging the chiefs to unite in their own defence, and to advising and arming them.³ This policy was consistently followed by the British government, if not by the local officials, for nine years.

Adderley's committee then made the first serious attempt to define the Protectorate. The Colonial Office rather shaken by the events of 1863-4 and having

1. Cardwell to Administrator 23.v.1864 A & P, 1864, XLI, p. 157.

2. 3 Hansard clxxv, col. 2017.

3. Cardwell to Pine 23.vi.1864. A & P, 1873, XLIX, p. 864-5.

already adopted a policy of non-intervention against Ashanti, maintained before the committee that there was no legal obligation to protect the coastal States. They were not, said Elliot,

"bound by any treaty or record; whether they were morally bound, or what should be the extent of any obligation of the kind is a difficult question ... the case seems the same as that of a relation with a minor European power which shows great deference to the wishes of England; and which England may be proportionately inclined to help".¹

The most important witness for the Gold Coast was Ord, whose interrogation by Lord Alfred Churchill and Lord Stanley produced the core of the British position.

Ord maintained that there was no legal obligation to protect the coast States but there was a moral one. The only possible legal ground was the Poll Tax Ordinance for if the Africans paid taxes they might be entitled to more protection than was written into the 1831 Treaty. But, as he had written in his report, they were not paying the tax, thus "fortunately the conduct of the natives has relieved us from all embarrassment". This disposed of, there remained only the 1831 Treaty itself, of which Ord had written:

"The closer the matter is investigated the more probable does it appear that Mr. Maclean contemplated using influence which the term 'British protection' would necessarily give him both over the natives and the Ashantees, to preserve the former as far as his means allowed him, from the aggressions or oppressions of the latter".²

Stanley wanted to know whether Britain could stand aloof if Ashanti overran the Protectorate but left the British territory untouched and announced no quarrel with the British. Ord said such an eventuality was unlikely since the coast States had gained their independence through British intervention and the Ashantis regarded Britain and the coast States as 'identified'. But if it did happen Ord did not think they would be morally justified in standing aside.

Most of the other witnesses supported the Protectorate in one way or another.

1. Reports from Committees, 1865, V, pp. 25-6.

2. A & P, 1865, XXXVII, p. 306.

Sir Benjamin Pine pointed out that ever changing governors failed to apply a consistent policy, while the powers of the chiefs were undermined. He believed in African self-government and advocated,

"accustoming the people to manage their own affairs so that within a given time, it might be half a century, and it might be a century, we should be free to a great extent, and they might manage their own affairs... I should begin by... making them drain their towns."

As has been mentioned, the committee, prompted largely by Cardwell, optimistically advised a combination of Ord's and Pine's ideas - non-extension of territory, non-interference, retrenchment, training for self-government. Unable to get rid of the Protectorate, it established that there was no obligation to protect it.

Cardwell's 1864 Ashanti policy, and the Adderley committee's 1865 Protectorate policy prevailed in London until 1873 when Knatchbull-Hugessen questioned it, and Kimberley, in a new set of circumstances, found himself forced to intervene in another Ashanti war. Meanwhile the 'escape clause' of the report was soon used to extend British territory. In 1867, Ord's negotiations with the Dutch finally bore fruit and both nations agreed to partition the coast-line at the Sweet River. From that moment things never went right for the Dutch in West Africa, and in 1872 they finally gave up their settlements to Britain. This in turn exacerbated Britain's troubles with Ashanti, who since the eighteenth century had possessed the rent 'Notes' for the Dutch fort of Elmina and who were longstanding allies of the Dutch. In 1873 the 1865 policy was abandoned; in the following year Ashanti was invaded and the

1. Reports from Committees, 1865, V, p. 148. Wylde, for the Foreign Office, said the influence acquired on the Gold Coast was a valuable deterrent to the slave trade. The Rev. Schrenck, of the Basle Mission, said if the British quit he would look to the French for protection. Henry Barnes, a Fante merchant, said "we would rather the English did not go away". The only really critical voices were the R.N. men, who disliked service on the coast, and Capt. (Sir) Andrew Clarke (see below p. 121.) who said "with such a poverty-stricken machinery you cannot expect to obtain any effectual results".

For a contemporary African view of the self-government clause see J.A.B.Horton, West African Countries and Peoples (1868). "This is indeed a grand conception, which if developed if fact, will immortalize the name of Britain...." p. 69. He suggested creating two African States - the Kingdom of Fante and the Republic of Accra.

Protectorate was "annexed administratively" to a new Gold Coast Colony.¹

The problem of the British frontier in West Africa is vividly illustrated by this account of the Gold Coast Protectorate; the frontier of influence went far beyond the frontier of sovereignty. The same problem faced Kimberley, in differing degrees, as he considered all the West African settlements. But in three cases where he might have applied the 1865 policy he rejected it. Firstly, when he took office in July 1870, negotiations were well advanced for the cession of the Gambia to France, which he stopped. Secondly, although he rejected proposals for the actual expansion of Lagos in 1871, he decided, after a serious discussion of Britain's role at Lagos in 1872 and 1873, that withdrawal as recommended in 1865 would be impossible. Thirdly, early in 1873 he decided that Britain would remain on the Gold Coast, would forget the 1865 resolution about self government, and he was considering a new policy of governing through the chiefs as agents of British policy at the very moment when the Ashanti invasion was announced. This caused him finally to throw aside the 1865 policy and to recommend intervention. In September 1873 he wrote:

"when we tried to get rid of [the Gambia] with what a clamour we were met. One good thing may come out of the Ashantee War that some definite policy must be agreed upon by Parliament as regards these African Settlements. The report of 1865 is neither₂ one thing or the other: and as usual we have fallen between two stools".

It is necessary now to examine the backgrounds of the Gambia, Lagos and Gold Coast discussions and to examine the role played by Knatchbull-Hugessen first, and then by Kimberley and others, in the rejection of the policy of 1865.

The Gambia 1865-1873.

Discussion of the Gambia question will be brief as it was a might-have-been.

1. See below p. 291-301.


2. Min. by Kimberley 23.ix.1873 on Cooper to Administrator-1-C. 29.vii.1873. CO/87/105

The British settlement was an inconvenience to French development in Senegal and in 1863 and 1864 the Ministry of Marine and Colonies in Paris contemplated acquiring it.¹ Governor Faidherbe suggested to Napoleon III in July 1863 that the posts on the Ivory Coast and at the Gaboon should be offered to Britain in return for the Gambia. Late in 1865, no doubt encouraged by the report of the 1865 committee, the French Ambassador canvassed Clarendon in London,² and in March 1866 the French proposed formally an exchange of their posts at Grand Bassam, Assini and Dabou for the Gambia.³ In 1863 they had already abandoned their short-lived 'protectorate' at Porto Novo, near Lagos. The Colonial Office merely referred the offer to the Governor-in-Chief. In 1867 the French revised their offer and suggested that the Gaboon might be a better exchange for the Gambia. They pressed for an answer in May 1868 and as Adderley was then Parliamentary Under-secretary in the Colonial Office he insisted that here was a chance to implement the 1865 policy, but Buckingham decided against it.⁴

The plan was revived again in 1869 under Gladstone's government and since Granville as Colonial Secretary was determined, at first, to apply the 1865 policy, and Sir Arthur Kennedy, the Governor, wanted to get rid of the Gambia, the moment was ripe for negotiations. But no one wanted Grand Bassam, Assini and Dabou. A possible way out was suggested by Rogers. The Colonial Office was by then becoming convinced that Elmina, the chief Dutch fort on the Gold Coast, would have to be acquired,⁵ but although the Dutch government was willing the King was opposed. Why not let the Dutch have the French posts, which were west of Elmina, said Rogers, then Britain could have Elmina. Granville liked this idea, but Kennedy opposed it as he was

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1. The genesis of the idea in France is discussed by R.Catala, 'La Question de l' exchange de la Gambie Britannique contre les comptoirs francais du Gold de Guine de 1866 & 1876', Revue d'histoire des Colonies (1948) t.xxxv, pp. 114-118.
 2. Ibid. p. 121. See Hemming Memo. 8.x.1874 on Grant to Carnarvon 6.x.1874. CO/267/32
 3. Memo. by Hemming 20.ii.1875 on Kortright to Carnarvon 6.xi.1875. CO/87/107.
 4. Mins. by Adderley (11th) and Buckingham 13.v.1868 on FO. to CO. 5.v.1868. CO/87/90.
 5. Granville to Clarendon 16.x.1869. Private (copy). Granville Papers PRO.30/29/55p.61

SIERRA LEONE and the northern rivers



10 0 10 20 30 40 50
miles

more concerned over French activity north of Sierra Leone.

The trade of the Mellacourie and Fouricaria Rivers, some 60 miles north of Freetown, had largely been built up by Sierra Leone merchants but as trade expanded in the 1860's French merchants took an increasing share, and in December 1864 some Bordeaux merchants asked the French government to protect French commerce from the extension of British customs and port dues. While the 1865 committee sat in London war broke out over the succession to the Moriah chiefdom, north of the Mellacourie, and commissioners from Sierra Leone who tried to make peace suggested placing British customs officers or a Resident Agent on the Mellacourie. The Colonial Office refused, and this gave French officers the chance, without authority from home, to take the law into their own hands. Pinet-Laprade, the new Governor of Senegal, was determined to see the French established in the Mellacourie, and between 1865 and 1867 he made treaties with both sides in the Moriah succession dispute by which French 'protectorate and suzerainty' were established. A blockhouse manned by 25 soldiers was built on the south bank of the Mellacourie at Benty and French anchorage dues were collected.¹

Kennedy suggested in 1869 that the French should give up this new position in return for the Gambia. He proposed in fact, a partition of the West African coast at the line of the River Dembia, which would thus permit British influence in the territory between Sierra Leone and the Iles de Los, and would remove British claims north of this.² Granville and Clarendon agreed and in February 1870 the proposal was put to the French,³ who were naturally prepared to accept it as a basis for negotiations. As early as 1866 they had decided in Paris that the Gambia was more important than the Mellacourie.⁴

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1. J.D.Hargreaves, 'The French occupation of the Mellacourie 1865-67', Sierra Leone Studies, (Dec. 1957), No. 9, pp. 31- 15. Catala, op. cit. pp. 116-7.
 2. Kennedy to Granville 29.iv.1869. A & P, 1870, L, p. 543.
 3. Ibid. p. 550. Clarendon to Lyons 11.ii.1870.
 4. Hargreaves, op. cit. p. 15.

In January 1870, however, the first of a series of objections, which ultimately wrecked the scheme, reached Downing Street. While the government thought the exchange would soon be settled, and the Governor of Senegal visited Kennedy at Bathurst, opposition in England suddenly mounted. The merchant houses,¹ the Manchester and Bristol Chambers of Commerce, and petitioners from the Gambia bombarded the Colonial Office with letters. There was a question in the Commons on 10 June, and Gladstone, caught off his guard, had to admit that a colony could not be ceded without Parliament's consent.²

This meant that Kimberley took office in the midst of the controversy and he faced a difficult decision during his first days at the Colonial Office. On 14 July 1870, only a week after seeing his first Gambia file, he received a deputation of Gambia merchants and agreed to consider their estimates of expected financial losses if the cession took place.³ Next day there were debates in both Houses and although Granville made a good case for the cession in the Lords, the Commons took the opportunity to criticise the government's colonial policy generally.⁴ Luckily for Kimberley there were two excuses for hedging. The Law Officers decided an Act would be necessary for the transfer and there was no time to fit the bill into the session.⁵ Negotiations were suspended on the out-break of the Franco-Prussian War and Kimberley never allowed them to be resumed under him.

Clearly the agitation he faced during his first days of office made a deep impression. Therefore he decided at once that while negotiations might be resumed

1. Brown & Quin, Forster & Smith, and Thomas Chown.

2. 3 Hansard, cci, col. 1842.

3. There appears to be no record of this interview, but the date is certain from Edmund Wodehouse to Meade 13.vii.1870 (copy in Granville Papers PRO.30/29/55 p. 178) and from Monsell's statement in the Commons. Hints of what passed can only be gleaned from minutes by Kimberley (on 17.vii.1870 on Brown to Kimberley 12.vii.1870 and 4.viii.1870 on Chown to Kimberley 30.vii.1870. CO/87/98^a) and from Monsell's speech, 3 Hansard, cciii, col. 366.

4. Ibid. cols. 339, 351-67.

5. Min. by Kimberley 16.vii.1870 on LO. to CO. 13.vii.1870. CO/87/98^a.

after the war, Britain would reserve her right to consider objections, and before the next French overtures were made he had decided to stay on the Gambia. He made the decision in March 1871 when the question of abandoning McCarthy's Island, which had been recommended by the 1865 committee, was raised;¹ and when in May 1871 he learnt of the renewal of the Marabout-Soninki War he even decided to retain the island.² When the French broached the question of the cession again in August 1871 Kimberley regretted that,

"it should be necessary to break off a negotiation, which had been conducted in a most friendly spirit between the two governments... but that so much opposition has been manifested in the Gambia settlement to the proposed cession, that I have come to the conclusion that, it would not be desirable to proceed any further with the negotiations".³

The French tried again in May 1873, but they met with the same polite refusal from Kimberley.⁴

As early as 1870, then, Kimberley decided that the 1865 policy would not do for the Gambia. In the following years he considered how best he could provide for the security of the settlement. There was a wrangle with the Admiralty over the use of gunboats in the river, and in the middle of 1872 Knatchbull-Hugessen urged a more forceful policy on the Gambia. Traders, he said, should either be told they would get no protection, or force should be paraded regularly; "It is idle for us to halt between two opinions".⁵ This was a theme repeated often by Knatchbull-Hugessen about West Africa, and it was an opinion Kimberley also came to hold.

Although the Gambia exchange question was revived in 1874 after the Ashanti War,

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1. Min. by Kimberley 2.iii.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 9.ii.1871. CO/87/99.
 2. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 10.v.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 11.iv.1871. See J.M. Gray, History of the Gambia (1940) pp. 388-394, 416-430, 444-455 for details of the long drawn out struggle between the Muslim Marabouts and the pagan Soninki chiefs of the Gambia. The first outbreak was in 1852. Successive peace treaties were patched up by the governors, but the basic rivalry was not removed. In 1872 trouble flared up near McCarthy's Island. In 1873 the Soninkis were driven from their towns in British Combo, on the peninsula south of Bathurst, and there was fear that the war would be carried into the British settlement.
 3. Min. by Kimberley 20.viii.1870 on FO. to CO. 14.viii.1871. CO/87/101.
 4. Min. by Kimberley 31.v.1873 on FO. to CO. 23.v.1873. CO/87/106.
 5. Min. by K-Hugessen 6.viii.1872 on Simpson to P-Hennessy 15.vi.1872. CO/87/102.

when Disraeli's government wanted to add Grand Bassam and Assini to the Gold Coast as part of the policy of achieving 'paramountcy' in the area for fiscal reasons, opposition again flared up, and the matter was dropped in 1876.¹

The Lagos Settlement to 1873.

At Lagos the 1865 policy was steadily ignored by Commander Glover R.N. Originally an anti-slave station, the minute British colony at Lagos had inevitably become involved in the politics of the adjacent Yoruba country,² and by 1871 Kimberley was confronted with proposals from Glover, the Administrator, for annexations on the mainland. Although he had supported the annexation of Lagos when he was at the Foreign Office in 1861,³ Kimberley rejected Glover's proposals. But by 1873 he had definitely decided that withdrawal was out of the question. The arguments in London over Lagos clearly exposed the inadequacy of the 1865 policy, which Knatchbull-Hugessen, in particular, wanted reversed. It is now necessary to trace the stages of this argument.



British influence both at Lagos and in the Niger Delta dated from Palmerston's Foreign Secretaryship. Realising that the gunboat rule of the Squadron was not adequate to suppress the slave trade, he appointed the first resident officer in the area. The choice was significant. For just as Maclean had developed the Gold Coast Protectorate without authority from home, so John Beecroft, the Consul for the Bights in 1849, "succeeded in making British rule familiar to the native states under his consular jurisdiction... in time Africans came to look upon the British Consul as de facto Governor of the Bights of Benin and Biafra".⁴ While Beecroft was the

1. See below p. 307-312

2. For the origin of the rivalry between the Yoruba towns of Ibadan and Abeokuta see S. Johnson, History of the Yorubas (1921) p.200-293, and S.O. Biobaku, The Egba and their Neighbours, 1842-1872 (1957) p chapters 1 & 2.

3. Memo. by Wodehouse 22.i.1861. FO/84/1141.

4. Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 128. The Consulate was at Fernando Po until 1872 when it was moved to Old Calabar.



LAGOS AND COMMANDER GLOVER'S ROUTES INTO YORUBALAND

official representative in vast consular area from Dahomey to the Cameroons, British influence of a different kind emanated from the Egba town of Abeokuta, where missionaries were established after 1842.¹ These missionaries, who were particularly fearful of attacks from Dahomey, combined with Beecroft to establish British influence at Lagos in 1852. In December 1851, King Kosoko of Lagos, who had refused to make a slave trade treaty, fired on a British ship flying a flag of truce, therefore Lagos was attacked, Kosoko exiled, and a treaty was made with the restored king, Akitoye.² But co-operation between the missionaries at Abeokuta and the Consul at Lagos was not always cordial, and after the consular district was split in 1853, the Consul for the Right of Benin stationed at Lagos, tended to allow the immediate interests of the port to dominate his policy. As the Egba historian Biobaku writes:

"The Consul (as well as the traders) favoured the diffusion of British influence throughout the area and was inclined to take trade necessities as his guide. The missionaries, on the other hand, would have no truck with notorious slaving chiefs and tended to look upon Abeokuta₃ as the centre from which civilizing influence should radiate".

Thus relations between the two centres of British influence, Lagos and Abeokuta, were strained. Meanwhile, the coastal States became involved in the Ijaye War (1860-65) during which a section at Ibadan tried to organise an alliance

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1. The Rev. Thomas Birch Freeman (born in England son of an African father and an English mother) a Wesleyan missionary on the Gold Coast, visited Abeokuta on 11 December 1842. He was convinced that Shodeke, the remarkable personality who led the Egba, was a liberal ruler and he saw Abeokuta as a centre from which civilization might be spread to the region. Shortly after, Henry Townshend, a C.M.S. teacher from Sierra Leone arrived (4 Jan. 1843) after some freed Yorubas from Sierra Leone who had immigrated to Abeokuta had requested an Anglican missionary. Biobaku, The Egba, pp. 27-8.
 2. Akitoye had admitted British traders to Lagos in 1845 and agreed to abolish the slave trade. After being deposed by Kosoko, leader of the slaving interest, he fled to Abeokuta. In 1848 Townshend, the Anglican teacher, took a petition from Abeokuta to England professing hatred of the slave trade, of which Lagos was said to be the centre, and requesting protection of trade on the lagoon. Palmerston interviewed Townshend and the C.M.S., who requested a British Agent at Abeokuta and a gunboat on the lagoon. In Jan. 1851 Beecroft visited Abeokuta and agreed to restore Akitoye as King of Lagos. Ibid p. 43.
 3. Ibid. p. 51.

with Kosoko and Dahomey to purge British influence from Yorubaland.¹ This placed Abeokuta in a perilous position and the Egba turned to Lagos for help. But the Consul had no power; "We have all the responsibilities of possession without the power which would enable us fully to carry out our views," wrote Brand who wanted to annex the whole area.² Another suggestion was the appointment of African Agents on the mainland supported by a force of consular guards. Consul H. Foote placed resident Vice-consuls at Lagos and Badagry and he bombarded Porto Novo when the King obstructed the palm oil trade.

Finally, in view of the difficulties of the Lagos consulate the Foreign Office decided to annex the island in 1861.³ But although the first governor had strict instructions not to interfere with the mainland, he found that to make Lagos economically viable he was led into a policy of expansion. To provide revenue for the colony he brought Palma and Badagry within its customs boundary as historic appendages of Lagos. When the Egba invaded the Ijebu country to pay off a score against the town of Makun, where Ibadan obtained arms during the Ijaye War, Governor Freeman decided the Egba were the obstacles to peace in Yorubaland. Thus hostility to Abeokuta became the basis of the policy of the Lagos government.

The most persistent exponent of this policy was Commander Glover,⁴ who acted as

1. *Ibid.* pp. 64-78.

2. W.H.Scotter, International Rivalry in the Bights of Benin and Biafra, 1815-85, (PhD thesis London 1933) p. 88.

3. Newcastle, the Colonial Secretary, was opposed, but the Foreign Office prevailed, and the cession took place on 6 August 1861.

4. Later Capt. Sir John Glover. B. 1829, son of a clergyman, who, as an officer had fought against Ashanti in the Dodowa campaign in 1826. Joined the navy aged 12; survey work in the Levant 1841-50; stationed at the Cape 1850; China Station and promoted Lieut. in 1851. Took part in land operations during the Burma War 1852-53, and was in the Baltic campaign during the Crimean War 1854-5. Surveyor to Baikie's Niger Expedition, 1857-61 and surveyed the Lagos lagoon and part of the Niger; he also made the overland journey from Raba to Lagos and back via Ibadan and Abeokuta. In 1863 he was O.A.G. at Lagos when Freeman was ill. Promoted Comdr. in 1864 and returned to Lagos as Colonial Secretary, where he became Lieut-Governor when Freeman finally left. In 1866 he returned to Lagos for a second tour as Administrator under the centralised West African Settlements.

For his expedition up the Volta in 1870 see below pp. 102-103, and for his part in the Ashanti War, 1873-4 below pp. 116-130, 295-297.

governor between May and November 1863, and was appointed Governor in 1864. With certain intervals Glover ruled Lagos until 1872. He was a forceful personality, an efficient administrator and above all was well acquainted with the Nigerian region. He had worked with Baikie to open up the interior of the Niger country and was particularly interested in the overland route from Lagos to the Lokoja station which would bypass the rival city States of the Delta. At Lagos he saw himself as the arbiter of Yorubaland.

The details of his policy at Lagos are difficult to unravel and the Colonial Office did not understand them, but it was based on a bias towards Ibadan; opposition to Abeokuta, which resulted in an attempt to achieve trade routes to Ibadan, Oyo and ultimately the Niger, which could not be obstructed by the States in the immediate vicinity of Lagos.¹

He declared a British protectorate over Pokra, Ado and Okeodan on the mainland based on 'flimsy mandates from the people',² and he placed a Resident Agent at Okeodan. He proposed that the Egba and Ibadans should evacuate their armed camps at Makun and Ipara respectively, and that Ikorodu and Ijebu should renew an alliance so that, through them, he could open a safe road to Ibadan (no. 3). He attempted to come to terms with the Egba, and on a visit to their camp at Makun he suggested a British Agent for Abeokuta. When Ikorodu raided Makun he left the Egba to retaliate, and shortly after the roads to Lagos were reopened. But when the Egba discovered arms were again passing to Ibadan they closed them again, thus annoying Glover who resumed the policy of hostility to Abeokuta.³ On 29 March 1865 Glover sent an

1. Described in Glover to Kimberley 7.xi.1872. CO/147/26. See map opposite p. 73.

2. Biobaku, The Egba, p. 74.

3. Ibid. p. 75. Glover's personal feelings about the Egba are still obscure. Pope-Hennessy said Bishop Crowther once told him that Glover had a 'personal hatred of the Egba due to some personal slight'. (P-Hennessy to Kimberley 15.ix.1872 CO/147/24). Glover claimed he had a narrow escape with his life in Abeokuta in 1858; others said he 'lost his luggage' there. Ibid. Min. by Hales 15.ix.1872, and Lady E.Glover and Sir Richard Temple, Life of Sir John Hawley Glover (1897) pp. 80-81.

ultimatum to the Egba to raise their siege of Ikorodu, and when they refused, he landed troops who put the Egba to flight.¹ Shortly after this Ord visited Lagos to prepare his report for the 1865 committee, and on the whole he endorsed Glover's policy.²

At the end of 1865 Glover went home on leave. But he returned as Administrator under the unified West African government in November 1866 and immediately resumed his shadow boxing with the Egba. While he was in England an internal crisis at Abeokuta had enabled some of the 'Saro', the educated freed Yoruba immigrants from Sierra Leone, to form the Egba United Board of Management.³ In June 1867 they placed a customs house on the River Ogun, so Glover retaliated by moving troops into Ebute Metta. This was followed by the expulsion of the missionaries from Abeokuta, but the Colonial Office ordered Glover not to interfere.

Glover always denied that he had an expansionist policy, but in the years of great uncertainty from 1868 to 1871 he was certainly ambitious for the success of Lagos. The trouble on the hinterland was caused partly by internal dissension at Abeokuta and partly by the rivalry of the Egba and Ibadans over trade routes to Lagos. This in turn effected the trade of Lagos about which high hopes were entertained. Kennedy believed that the campaign of Sir Samuel Baker in the Upper Nile would divert trade from the Sudan to Lagos;⁴ Kimberley's first taste of Glover,

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1. Biobaku, The Egba, p. 75: "Undoubtedly, Glover manoevered the Egba into the position where he could take the step of armed intervention which he had premeditated as the best means of ending the interior war".
 2. A & P, 1865, XXXVII, pp. 308-312. Ord noticed Glover's Ibadan bias and realised his policy might harm the Egba. Ord said a decision was necessary over the area of beach between Lagos and Palma since territory without a 'recognised protector' was unknown there. As for Glover's so-called protectorate over Pokra, Ado and Okeodan, Ord said it was "a protection which is not, however, understood by either party to involve the responsibilities which have been supposed to apply to it in the Gold Coast".

The 1865 committee's conclusion on Lagos was that "an indefinite territory, including all these places, is understood to be more or less under British Government, bounded only on the left of the Ogun by the lagoon, and on the right without any frontier". The Committee suggested a British Commandant at Lagos until an African government could be restored; then a Consul would suffice. (Reports from Committees, 1865, V, 11 & 15). Ord and Glover were lifelong friends, and they were together at Homburgh when Ord died in 1884.

3. Biobaku, op. cit. p. 79

4. Kennedy to Kimberley 4.x.1870. CO/147/18.

who was on leave at the end of 1870, came in the shape of a proposal of a mission to the Emir of Nupe with a view to trying to divert the Nile traffic to the Niger. Kimberley's reply was a distinct enunciation of the 1865 policy.¹

When he returned to Lagos in 1871 Glover found war likely on the mainland. In his absence anti-British elements had met at Igbessa, so Glover recalled Lagos people from this town and posted Hausas on the frontier. The Colonial Office approved his action.² Glover was uncertain of the real trouble, but he was sure that Ibadan and Abeokuta were about to go to war,³ as ^{he} believed the Yorubas of Oyo and Ibadan wanted to break the Egba position of monopolising middlemen of the trade to Lagos by opening a road to the lagoon via Ijebu Ode (no. 4). As Lagos would benefit by such a route Glover requested instructions in case he was asked to mediate.⁴

In July 1871 he tried to settle the rivalries of Yorubaland by a conference. Because of their geographical position the Egba were able to close most of the routes to Lagos from Oyo and Ibadan. Of seven possible routes only two were open (nos. 2 and 2a), and these ran through Abeokuta. Glover's policy was to achieve alternative routes to break the Egba monopoly, especially one in the east via Makun and Ilesha (no. 5).⁵ Kimberley thought this was a wise policy, but as the roads were still closed in October 1871, Glover became convinced that war was inevitable and began to garrison his frontiers. Since Porto Novo was a last slave market where the Egba could exchange slaves he decided that this town would be the key to the war.⁶ His suggestion of the annexation of Porto Novo reached the Colonial Office in December 1871, but Kennedy, the Governor in Chief, did not support it.

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1. Glover to Kimberley 21.xii.1870 and Kimberley to Kennedy 5.i.1871. CO/147/10.
 2. Glover to Kennedy 18.iii.1871. CO/147/20.
 3. Ibid. Glover to Kennedy 20.iii.1871. Biobaku, The Egba, p. 87 says it was really a matter of a possible civil war at Abeokuta following a constitutional crisis.
 4. Glover to Kennedy 25.iii.1871. CO/147/20.
 5. Maps and plans in PRO. MR.389 (1).
 6. Glover to Kennedy 18.v.1871. CO/147/21.

The Colonial Office was divided on the Porto Novo question. Herbert felt Glover might be right. Knatchbull-Hugessen said he was probably right from the Lagos viewpoint, but wondered: "would not the general confidence in us be diminished and might not the consequence be our implication in native wars and embarrassments from which our whole policy has been to keep ourselves clear".¹ Although he gave due weight to Glover's views for pacifying Yorubaland, Knatchbull-Hugessen thought there had been stronger reasons for annexing Fiji, which had been refused in 1862. Kimberley was adamant: "I am altogether against Captain Glover's proposal. On similar grounds of philanthropy we might be called upon to annex Dahomey, Ashantee, Abbeokuta - for anything I see (except the difficulty of the enterprise) the greater part of Africa".² Kimberley reminded Glover in January 1872 that he was not to annex Porto Novo; in fact after reading the Lagos estimates in the following month he thought of removing Glover.³

After his annexation plan was rejected Glover proceeded to blockade Porto Novo by placing the steamer Eyo Honesty on the lagoon. Replying to Kimberley's warning, he suggested, as an alternative, the appointment of a British Resident there. Until British influence was established at Porto Novo, he insisted that the roads to the interior would be unsafe; that a war with the Egba and Ijebu was the only other alternative. When this view reached London in March 1872, Herbert supported the idea of a Resident at Porto Novo, provided the steamer was withdrawn,⁴ and Knatchbull-Hugessen agreed; although he realised that this would mean reversing their policy. Before a decision was made the question was referred to (Sir) John Pope-Hennessy, the

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1. Ibid. Mins by Herbert (6th) and K-Hugeseen 9.xii.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 15.xi.1871.
 2. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 11.xii.1871. On a suggestion of acquiring territory in the Cameroons, Kimberley wrote, "I am not prepared to extend British sovereignty in W.Africa".
 3. Min. by Kimberley 8.ii.1871 on Glover to Kimberley 17.x.1871. CO/147/23. In Glover's favour one should remember that he was very short of officials.
 4. Min. by Herbert 5.iii.1871 on Glover to Kennedy 3.ii.1872. CO/147/23.

new temporary Governor-in-Chief, but Kimberley's attitude was still quite firm:

"It is necessary to be very cautious in extending our 'influence'. Africa is a large continent, and our extension may be limitless, if we are to provide for the peace of the interior, and occupy the coast wherever 'influence' is wanted to prevent disorder... there is an infinite field for further 'development' East of Lagos. The Brass, Calabar, & Bonny rivers are far from being in perfect order and Oko Jumbo v Jah Jah [at Bonny] is a litigation which Capt. Glover would no doubt think it right to terminate preremptorily".¹

The Colonial Office decided to curb Glover's expansionism and Pope-Hennessy warned him accordingly. But in April 1872, just as a serious attempt to implement the 1865 policy seemed likely, Knatchbull-Hugessen expressed serious misgivings:

"I cannot but feel that after all we have done on the W.African Coast, there is an inconsistency and something akin to withdrawal from former policy, if we permit the increase of human sacrifice and murders in the immediate vicinity of a British colony without an effort to prevent the same".²

If British policy was only to retain small settlements then Glover was possibly too energetic, but a clear statement of policy should be made to the Egba.³

In February 1872 Samuel Crowther, Bishop of the Niger, a Yoruba educated at Sierra Leone, passed through Abeokuta and represented the Egba viewpoint to the Colonial Office. The Egba claimed that Lagos was becoming a refuge for their slaves, that Glover rigidly enforced an arms embargo which had been applied because of the war in the Oil Rivers, and that he stationed troops on the mainland at Ebute Metta.⁴ Thus by April 1872 both Governor Pope-Hennessy, who was now at the Gold Coast, and the Colonial Office, were exasperated with Glover. In spite of all their insistence on a passive policy he kept the steamer at Porto Novo, he sent (Sir) Roger Goldsworthy, the acting Collector of Customs and a man with Indian experience, on a road opening mission to Oyo and Ibadan; he intended to lead an expedition to open this route at Ode, and he sent J.O.Payne, the Sheriff of Lagos, on a similar mission

1. Ibid.Min. by Kimberley 5.iii.1872 on draft for P-Hennessy 9.iii.1872.

2. Ibid.Min. by K-Hugessen 3.iv.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 5.iii.1872.

3. Ibid.Min. by K-Hugessen 4.iv.1872 on Glover to Kendall 17.ii.1872.

4. Crowther to Kimberley 6.ii.1872 and C.M.S. to Kimberley 30.iii.1872. CO/147/25.

to Ijebu Ode. In May 1872 Kimberley was about to take "very decided steps" with Glover,¹ but the latter was finally restrained by the Lagos merchants and Pope-Hennessy.

The merchants opposed Glover's ordinance to empower him to close the roads and prohibit trade to and from Lagos, and Pope-Hennessy disallowed it.² The Governor found trade at Lagos virtually at a standstill when he arrived on 24 April 1872; Glover was at odds with the English merchants, but he was supported by many of the inhabitants. Lagos itself presented a very favourable contrast to Freetown and Cape Coast, and Pope-Hennessy had to pay tribute to Glover's internal administration. But he decided that the stoppage of the Yoruba trade was the result of Glover's Egba policy.³ The Colonial Office attitude to Glover at this time was summarised by Herbert: Glover had "done well in his home administration, but... pursued too 'spirited' and interfering a policy in Foreign Affairs".

His new superior, Pope-Hennessy, was one of the most controversial colonial governors in the later years of the nineteenth century. As an Irish Tory M.P. he was well known in the House of Commons 1859-66, and he had only missed office in Derby's government because he lost his seat.⁴ Disraeli suggested him as Governor of the Straits Settlements but the job went to Sir Harry Ord. Between 1867 and 1869 he administered the government at Labuan. Wherever he went he quarrelled with subordinates; at Labuan he suspended his father-in-law (the future Sir Hugh Low, Resident in Perak) from office.⁵ His personality has prompted one historian to suppose that the Colonial Office "developed a tradition of giving any particularly sticky or static colony a dose of this warm hearted, vigorous and cantankerous Governor".⁶ These qualities were to be important in West Africa, for both at Lagos

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1. Min. by Kimberley 15.v.1872 on P-Hennessy to Glover 16.iv.1872 (copy). CO/147/23.
 2. Ibid. P-Hennessy to Kimberley 18.iv.1872.
 3. Ibid. P-Hennessy to Kimberley 27.iv.1872.
 4. Memo. by Salisbury in Carnarvon Papers. PRO. 30/6/10.
 5. A.H.A. Anson, About Myself and Others (1920) p. 313.
 6. B. Hamilton, Barbados and the Confederation Question (1956) p. 46.

and the Gold Coast Hennessy had serious personal differences.

At Lagos on the strength of a few days experience he completely reversed Glover's Egba policy and Glover came home.¹ The blockade was withdrawn from Porto Novo and Pope-Hennessy assured the Egba that he did not intend to interfere with them. He had to go to the Gold Coast suddenly on 30 April because of a murder at Elmina,² but he returned to Lagos as soon as he could and early in June he received a reply from Abeokuta, which contained accusations against Glover. To this Pope-Hennessy simply re-iterated his statement that Britain did not wish to interfere. This caused the Colonial Office to have its first serious doubts about Pope-Hennessy. They felt the accusations against Glover should not have been left unanswered, and that Glover also deserved a hearing. Kimberley said Pope-Hennessy "has made a great mistake in disavowing his predecessor in writing to the Egbas. This will give an impression of weakness and dissension on the part of the British authorities which cannot fail to do harm".³ But the Governor continued to disavow Glover. Assured of the 'cordial sincerity' of the shifty King Docemo, he announced his complete confidence in the Lagos people's loyalty, so by the end of July 1872 the Colonial Office feared there was something wrong. As ever, Knatchbull-Hugessen was the first to sense trouble. "It is too much as if he had been quite ready to sacrifice Captain Glover to his own desire to acquire popularity and influence with the native tribes and their 'friends' in Lagos. It may turn out that he has been made a fool of by these people after all".⁴ In August 1872 Kimberley agreed; "Mr.

1. Barrow of the Africa dept. wrote, 11 July 1872, that Glover told him, "having been made to feel I was not wanted - indeed I could not remain - I asked for leave of absence". In Nov. 1872 Glover gave his version of what P-Hennessy had said to him: "Capt. Glover, I want neither to hear nor read anything, I know all, and have heard all. Merchants, missionaries and natives have both written and spoken, and I must tell you, you know nothing of the country the place or people. It is not the slave question. It is you and your aggressive policy". Glover to Kimberley, London, 7.xi.1872. CO/147/26. For Pope-Hennessy's version see his despatch dated 30.xii.1872. CO/147/24.

2. See below p. 97.

3. Min. by Kimberley 14.vii.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 15.vi.1872. CO/147/23.

4. Min. by K-Hugessen 25.vii.1872 on Glover to Kimberley 18.vii.1872. CO/147/26.

Hennessy has I fear been bamboozled, and it will be fortunate if we escape serious trouble".¹ Pope-Hennessy's Egba policy might be right, but Kimberley disliked his methods.

There was much unpleasantness in the aftermath of Glover's dismissal and the reversal of his policy, especially when the new policy did not work. Therefore, while further evidence of Glover's 'intermeddling' came to light and the result of Pope-Hennessy's policy was awaited with growing doubt, a serious review of British aims took place in London. At the end of 1872 and early in 1873 serious thought was given to Britain's role at Lagos and this co-incided with a similar re-appraisal of the British position in the Gold Coast Protectorate.²

Herbert said they would never get to the bottom of the Glover-Hennessy controversy and he thought that

"the moral appears to be that our administrators should distinctly understand that they are not sent to the coast to 'open roads' and create trade, but, pursuing an impartial and non-interferent policy, simply to maintain order and good government within those settlements for which this country is responsible. If trade flourishes... well and good; if not, we cannot have gentlemen of limited capacity and experience pressing what they or their interested advisers suppose to be a spirited and intelligent policy away in the interior. If, for the sake of the English merchants we are not allowed to retire from the coast, at least, let us stick to the coast proper and to our own boundaries on it".

Knatchbull-Hugessen heartily disagreed with this and said that a lot of good could be done by "timely and judicious missions", but Kimberley took the same attitude to the Yoruba country as the Foreign Office took to the Niger Delta; he said they should recognise the middlemen position of the States adjacent to Lagos as a 'custom of the whole country' and should not interfere. He wanted friendly relations with all African States: "when we endeavour to feel our way to direct intercourse with tribes further in the interior we should do so with much caution and not attempt to force such intercourse by coercive measures".⁴

1. Min. by Kimberley 6.viii.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 24.vi.1872. CO/147/23.

2. See below p. 108-110.

3. Min. by Herbert 3.viii.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 25.vi.1872. CO/147/23.

4. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 6.viii.1872.

By October 1872 winds were blowing in the other direction. As Manchester merchants complained about Pope-Hennessy's policy and called for the return of Glover, Knatchbull-Hugessen aired some of his anxieties to Kimberley.

"Our presence on the West Coast of Africa must be supposed to indicate our wish to extend Trade, Civilization and Christianity: these objects, however, cannot be effected by remaining with our hands folded and shrinking from any combat with native habits, ignorance and prejudices. Every now and then an administrator feels this so strongly that he acts with greater vigour than a total non-interference with Native Policy would sanction - then he is called 'ambitious' and accused of acting beyond his instructions. This is what I imagine Captain Glover to have done. On the other hand Mr. Hennessy has gone out, very proud of his supposed talent for 'managing' natives, and quite ready to¹ believe that he knows how to do so better than anyone who had preceded him".

Kimberley, while now agreeing that there was a lot to be said for Glover, was still not to be moved. "I am I confess less combative than Mr. Hugessen, and I am not prepared for a crusade in W. Africa on behalf of trade, civilization and christianity"²

Knatchbull-Hugessen was not deterred by this and maintained that Glover would probably turn out to have been right. Even Kimberley wavered in November 1872 when a respected missionary, David Hinderer who had spent 21 years in the Yoruba country, expressed views very similar to Glover's.³ Kimberley now said,

"Captain Glover was, I never doubted, quite right in his main views, but he went too fast. Our position at Lagos is a very difficult one. We want of course free access to the interior but we cannot undertake the task of controlling all the powerful coast tribes, and if we succeed in getting them under our control, we shall immediately come into⁴ collision with the tribes beyond, and so on until we come to Timbuctoo".

Glover, defending his policy, seems to have had a remarkable grasp of Yoruba history, so Kimberley still further diluted his objections, and suggested that Glover simply "wanted to play one party off against the other to promote the interests of Lagos".⁵

1. Min. by K-Hugessen 10.x.1872 on Leigh-Clare to Kimberley 3.x.1872. CO/147/25.

2. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 12.x.1872.

3. Hinderer was the first C.M.S. missionary to penetrate to Ibadan. (Anna Hinderer, Seventeen Years Yorubaland (1873) pp. 20-1). As the Hinderers were cut off at Ibadan in the Ijaye War, their account has an Ibadan rather than Egba bias. Glover made three attempts to relieve them during the war and Mrs. Hinderer counts Glover as a friend. (p. 279)

4. Min. by Kimberley 16.xi.1872 on Hinderer to Kimberley 1.xi.1872. CO/147/26.

5. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 24.xi.1872 on Glover to Kimberley 7.xi.1872.

Kimberley had all but come round to Glover's policy by December 1872. The roads, expected open in October, remained closed and a new Administrator suggested a 'quiet blockade' to coerce the Egba. Pope-Hennessy was unwilling to propose this, but Holland, the Legal Adviser in the Colonial Office, suggested sending a warship, which Glover had suggested in May.¹ When Goldsworthy furnished further defence of Glover's policy Knatchbull-Hugessen predicted that one day Lagos would have either to be extended or abandoned. As things were there was a stalemate, "since the Policy of HM Govt. would not allow for extension & Public Opinion would certainly not permit its abandonment".²

At the beginning of 1873 the Colonial Office forgot the personal quarrel and had a more general discussion over the instructions for R.W.Keate, the new Governor-in-Chief. Glover's policy was finally recognised as a logical one, but one which antagonised the middleman States near Lagos. Pope-Hennessy had followed the official policy but had done it badly. "The root of the difficulties must lie deeper", wrote the Head of the Africa department, "it existed from the first and what puzzled Mr. Freeman and Captain Glover, has puzzled Mr. Hennessy and Mr. Fowler".³

Once again it was Knatchbull-Hugessen who questioned the whole basis of Britain's position, and although the argument was occasioned by the Lagos question he was speaking for the West African Settlements as a whole. The Gold Coast in particular was obviously in his mind. It was not a matter of mistakes by individual governors, he said, so much as "the inherent viciousness of the whole system under which we find ourselves administering the governments on that coast". To leave boundaries undefined, jurisdiction uncertain, and administrators uninstructed, was to ask for trouble. "Natives", he said, "are to be governed either by fear of the dominant race, or by a conviction that it is to their own interests that

1. Mins. on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 28.xi.1872. CO/147/24.

2. Min. by K-Hugessen 12.i.1873 on Goldsworthy to Kimberley 4.i.1873. CO/147/29.

3. Min. by Hales 22.ii.1873 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 30.xii.1872. CO/147/24.

the desired form of government should exist. Either alternative was - and probably still is - open to us in the case of the West African tribes. But neither has been fully or fairly tried".¹ The Africans were now hostile, and Knatchbull-Hugessen laid the blame squarely on the 1865 committee. He criticised the "half and half policy of Great Britain - occupying territory as if she were ashamed of it... coaxing one day and threatening the next". Above all, he said, public opinion would not stand a withdrawal.

What was the object of Lagos, he asked. If it was still to put down slavery and spread Christianity, he believed that the best thing for Lagos, and for all West Africa, "would be that the whole sea-board should be under British control. The Egbas, Jebus and others should then have power and influence brought to bear on them which would oblige them for their own sakes to open up roads into the interior". He supported the annexation of Porto Novo and the occupation of all the seaboard to Leckie. If this was against the government's policy, he was sure they would come to it one day. As an interim policy he proposed defining the boundaries of British territory, where slavery could not exist, and he proposed of form of Indirect Rule elsewhere. He suggested ruling the 'Protected territory' through African rulers and paying stipends to the rulers of Abeokuta and Ijebu Ode to keep the roads open.²

Knatchbull-Hugessen's blend of frank long-term appreciation and practical compromise was not without effect on Kimberley, who finally decided to maintain the status quo at Lagos. Withdrawal was out of the question, he said, and Lagos would be defended if necessary. He proposed that British sovereignty would be maintained at Lagos, Badagry, Palma and Leckie, and that the rest of the territory would only

1. Ibid. Min. by K-Hugessen 23.ii.1873. This very long minute would make an excellent political speech. Compare it with the similar long minute (18.ii.1873) on the Gold Coast Protectorate (below p.108-9). February 1873 seems to have been the crucial month for the development of K-Hugessen's criticism of a passive policy. On 24 Feb. the telegram indicating that Fiji was 'offered' was received. (See his minute 24.ii.1873 on Robinson to Kimberley 20.ii.1873 (Tg) CO/201/573).

2. Lagos minute of 23.ii.1873.

be 'protected' because of the existence of domestic slavery. The boundary of this protectorate would have to be defined and the new governor was instructed to inquire and report.¹ Thus a passive policy prevailed at Lagos, but the 1865 policy had been rejected. In 1873 the Colonial Office was diverted to more pressing problems on the Gold Coast. The roads to and from Lagos and the interior re-opened in May 1873, but when Carnarvon took over in 1874 he found the position still precarious, and his laconic Under-secretary wondered "whether the game is worth the candle".² Although the idea of annexing Porto Novo was revived in 1874 there was no real attempt to try out the Glover policy, and the future of Lagos was, for a time, bound up with the Gold Coast.

Anglo-Dutch Relations on the Gold Coast 1865 to 1872.

On the Gold Coast the escape clause of the 1865 resolutions was utilised in the Anglo-Dutch exchange treaty of 1867 which virtually partitioned the coast line at the Sweet River. The Dutch took the forts and protectorate to the west, and Britain assumed control to the east. This was not a sudden reversal of policy; it was the end of a decade of negotiations, which underlined the main administrative problem of the Protectorate. The Anglo-Dutch partition was designed to meet the revenue problem.

It had lain behind Grey's Poll Tax in 1852 and when this proved inadequate, Ord pointed, in 1856, to the customs free Dutch forts interspersed between the British ones. He thought the Dutch might sell their forts, as the Danes had done in 1850, or they should impose import duties mutually with the British. The government had agreed to this and between July 1856 and May 1857 Ord visited The Hague and Paris in the first fruitless attempt at agreement over duties.

The second attempt (1859-61) followed Carnarvon's 1858 memorandum. Moral

1. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 25.ii.1873 and draft for Keate 5.iv.1873.

2. Min. by Lowther 10.iv.1874 on Berkerly to Carnarvon 14.iii.1874. CO/147/30.

obligations apart, Carnarvon wanted to avoid clashes with foreign powers over "our vague and anomalous jurisdiction" behind the forts,¹ but the second series of talks floundered on the question of 'interior delimitation'. The Dutch wanted Britain to renounce the Protectorate over Western Wassaw, to the north-east of Elmina, which stood between the Dutch and their Ashanti allies. Ord supported them, but although Carnarvon was tempted, he felt bound in good faith to the Wassaws not to leave them to the Dutch without their own consent. Thus Britain broke off negotiations in 1861.²

Successful negotiations opened on Dutch initiative after the Ashanti War of 1863-1864. With their settlements now costing over £10,000 a year, there were suggestions afoot in Holland in 1864 for disposing of them altogether.³ In 1865 Fransen van Putte, the Liberal Colonial Minister, was anxious to reach agreement with Britain over Sumatra, where relations were strained because of conflicting views of the ambiguous treaty of 1824. As the Dutch expanded in the island by treaties with the local rulers, British merchants in the Straits Settlements complained that the Dutch tariff damaged their trade, and the usual policy of the British government was to object to the Dutch treaties. By 1865 there were signs of a change. Whitehall was not so sure that Straits trade really was adversely effected by Dutch activity in Sumatra. The Dutch Liberals held out the promise of abolishing differential tariffs in return for British acquiescence at Dutch supremacy in Sumatra.⁴ In October 1865 van der Putte said he was disposed to throw the Dutch Gold Coast settlements into such a bargain.⁵

Here is the origin of the famous 'link' which lies behind the assertion that in 1872 Britain and the Netherlands made a bargain whereby Britain acquired Elmina in return for giving the Dutch a free hand in Sumatra.⁶ Although this is a stage ahead

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1. Min. by Carnarvon 16.ix.1858 on Gov. Bird to Sec. of State. 2.viii.1858. CO/96/43.
 2. It was Kimberley who suggested dropping the matter. Wodehouse to CO. 18.viii.1860 FO/97/250.
 3. "What must the Netherlands do with her settlements on the coast of Guinea?". Trans. of pamphlet in FO/37/466. African Aid Soc. to CO. 6.vi.1864. in CO/96/66.
 4. Discussed below p. 152-157.
 5. Milbanke to Russell 31.x.1865. FO/37/450.
 6. First raised by Sir James Elphinstone 13.ii.1872. 3 Hansard ccix, col. 328.

of the 1868 partition, a word on the question is necessary here. The real 'link' originated in the battle for ratification in the Netherlands of three separate agreements made in 1870 - the Sumatra treaty, a treaty allowing the Dutch planters in Surinam to recruit labour in India, and the treaty by which the Dutch gave up their Gold Coast forts. The Dutch asked that the three treaties might go before the States-General together so that the various concessions would balance each other; permission to recruit in India to balance the concessions to British merchants in Sumatra; the recognition of Dutch supremacy in Sumatra and the labour agreement to balance the loss of the Gold Coast settlements. Granville still further strengthened the link by insisting that all three treaties should 'stand or fall together'.

But even before this the two matters had been un-officially linked by van der Putte and Sir Charles Adderley. They were both anxious to reach agreement over Sumatra and were both willing to use the Gold Coast, which they wanted to quit, as a bargaining counter. Thus the Foreign Office assertion of 1874 that during the entire course of the negotiations over the Sumatra treaty "no allusion was made to the relations of the two countries in the West Coast of Africa",¹ is not strictly true. Paradoxically, it was the Sumatra treaty which failed when first presented to the States-General because it involved granting commercial concession to British merchants. Yet essentially they were separate agreements designed to remove long standing sources of difficulty. And while the Foreign Office had been prepared to discuss a Sumatra agreement as early as 1866, the Gold Coast cession it was supposed to palliate only came in 1870 after Dutch conservative opinion was affected by the disastrous results of the 1868 partition.

To return to the partition: Baron Bentinck, the Minister in London, announced

1. FO. Print of 28.i.1874 of Memo by H.Percy Anderson, 5.i.1874. p. 10.

the Dutch readiness to partition the coast on 12 January 1867.¹ British scruples over western Wassaw were forgotten; tempted to abandon them in 1860, Carnarvon, now Colonial Secretary, consulted Ord again and accepted his view.² "When we have given up our territorial possessions, we have no call I think to reserve our most shadowy... convention which has been inaccurately termed a Protectorate with certain barbarous tribes of the Interior- we do not transfer them to the Dutch", he told the Foreign Secretary. The Foreign Office suggested Ord as a negotiator, and as he was already designated Governor of the Straits Settlements they said he "might incidentally have opportunity of sounding the Dutch about the Sumatra question".³

Now there were no complications; these came only after the partition. Elliot, Ord and Col. Nagtglas drew up the Convention which was signed on 5 March 1867. It provided for joint tariff policies and for a boundary running north of the Sweet River.⁴ Governor Blackall and Governor Boers effected the exchange of forts in January 1868.⁵ So just as Ord went to Singapore as the first colonial governor his policy of 'tidying up' the Gold Coast bore fruit. At the same time Herbert T. Ussher, the Administrator, optimistically reported progress in the Protectorate. Adderley, now the Parliamentary Under-secretary and a consistent advocate of leaving the Gold Coast either to the French or the Dutch,⁶ said this was flying in the face of the 1865 recommendations. So ~~to~~ 1865 policy was invoked as a reminder to Ussher and as a salve to consciences in Downing Street.

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1. FO to CO. 12.i.1867. CO/96/75.
 2. Carnarvon to Stanley 17th and 31.i.1867. FO/37/466. Carnarvon said his views on Wassaw were based on Ord's.
 3. Min. by Anderson 17.i.1867 on CO. to FO. 17.i.1867. FO/37/466.
 4. Text in FO. to CO. 5.ii.1867. CO/96/75.
 5. Blackall to Buckingham 6th and 28.i.1868. CO/96/76. Britain gave up Beyin, Dixcove, Sekondi & Kommendah and the protectorate over W. Wassaw and Denkyera and Appollonia. She received from the Dutch Mori, Kormantine, Apam and Dutch Accra.
 6. Mins. by Adderley 4.iii.1868 on Ord to Rogers 21.ix.1867. Private. CO/273/17, and 15.v.1868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 16.iv.1868. CO/96/76.

The 1868 partition had two results. Firstly, the Dutch had to use force to take some of their new possessions. Secondly, the Fante and their neighbours felt betrayed by Britain, and, led by a Council of Chiefs at Mankessim, they formed a defensive alliance against Ashanti and joined in the resistance to the Dutch and the Elmina Africans.

The major forts were transferred peaceably and Blackall, who was about to relinquish his post, returned to Freetown satisfied of the 'perfect tranquility' of the ceded areas.¹ Trouble started a few days later after the Kommendahs refused to accept the Dutch, and the town had been bombarded from the sea.² When Sir Arthur Kennedy, the new Governor-in-Chief, arrived the Fante chiefs at Mankessim, joined by chiefs from Wassaw, Denkyera and Kommendah, were all determined to resist the Dutch. A force of Wassaws and Denkyeras assembled near Kommendah and Ussher warned Governor Boers that as Britain had only exercised a protectorate over Wassaw it would be unwise to assert sovereignty. He did not want to assist the Dutch in their troubles in case the Fante attacked the British forts. A Dutch detachment at Kommendah was attacked on 24 February. Elmina itself was surrounded by a large Fante army,³ and some of the educated Africans were urging the Fante to throw off their British allegiance.

In this serious crisis the Colonial Office stuck to the policy of non-intervention, prompted in particular by Adderley, who wanted to get rid of the settlements.⁴ But the officials on the coast feared another Ashanti invasion or even intervention by the French, and Ussher was determined to discredit the

1. Blackall to Buckingham 28.i.1868. CO/96/76.

2. Ibid. Ussher to Blackall 6.ii.1868. Ward, History, p. 231 comments on the exchange: "never was there a greater political mistake" as the Africans were not consulted. Claridge (I, pp. 560-62) called the partition "a monumental piece of folly and injustice" as for the Wassaws and Denkyeras it "involved the practical surrender of these tribes to Ashanti".

3. Ussher to Blackall 6.iii.1868. CO/96/76.

4. Ibid. Mins by Adderley 18th and Buckingham 20.iv.1868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 30.iii.1868.

Fante Council ,who, he said, were interpreting too literally the 1865 self-government resolution. He believed Britain would either have to buy out the Dutch completely or to forgoe exercising any influence in the interior.¹ Thus Ussher made the first British suggestion of acquiring the Dutch settlements since Ord's 1856 report and at the same time the Wesleyan missionaries came to the same conclusion; "the Dutch are a great nuisance. If they could only be got rid of we should have lasting peace".² Four years later this suggestion was acted on but in 1868 Adderley said it was absurd. Ussher's immediate policy was for an alliance between the Fante and the Elminas. But even though they withdrew their forces from Elmina the Fante refused such a treaty. They had good cause for, since the eighteenth century, when Ashanti captured the 'Note' by which the Dutch agreed to pay rent for Elmina, the Elmina Africans had maintained a close connection with Ashanti, and so were hated by the Fante.³ The enmity was deep rooted and a valid reason for hesitancy by the Fante, who also believed the Elminas had recently requested help from Ashanti against them.⁴ But Ussher lost his patience; he gave the Fante until 12 July to accept the alliance, and when he was rebuffed, he severed all relations with them and said that if the Ashantis invaded - and they were reported in Wassaw and Denkyera - the Fante would get no British help.⁵

In London Adderley alone took much notice of the crisis. He urged Buckingham to face it: "Ussher seems to me too figity and to have too much idea of building up our 'prestige'". Adderley wanted to hold the forts alone and let the Africans fight it out.⁶ During August and September 1868 he continually called for a

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1. Kennedy to Buckingham 16.iv.1868. CO/96/76. file.
 2. Taylor to Boyce 7.xii.1868. Methodist Miss. Soc. Gold Coast Incoming 1868-71
 3. Ward, History, p. 155.
 4. Taylor to Boyce 5.vi.1868. Meth. Miss. Soc. Gold Coast Incoming 1868-71 file.
 5. Ussher to Kennedy 17.vii.1868. CO/96/76.
 6. Ibid. Min. by Adderley 17.viii.1868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 28.vii.1868.

consistent policy; and he still harboured the plan of giving up the Gold Coast in order to get concessions in Sumatra.¹ He persuaded Buckingham to send Kennedy to investigate the Gold Coast.² But at the end of 1868 a crucial hiatus took place among the Gold Coast policy makers. In November Kennedy visited the Fante and took an entirely different view of them to Ussher, who went on furlough leaving W.H.Simpson as acting Administrator. In the middle of all this Gladstone came to power in England and Granville followed Buckingham at the Colonial Office.

In West Africa the new Governor-in-Chief reversed Ussher's Fante policy. It was futile to coerce them, he said, impressed by their "general bearing, intelligence, and comparative civilization". He was not impressed by Gov. Boers or by the Elmina chiefs who were only a small, and to him, "wholly barbarous and uneducated" tribe. So Kennedy left Simpson to pursue a conciliatory policy towards the Fante.³ In London Sir George Barrow, Head of the African department, accepted Ussher's view that there would be no peace until the Dutch left, but Elliot felt it was dishonourable to have persuaded the Dutch to partition and then let the Protectorate peoples make this an excuse for attacking the Dutch. As the conservatives were about to leave office Buckingham left the decision to his successor.

Granville at first took the same view as Adderley. He approved of the policy of non-interference and he was shocked to find that £36,000 was being spent each year if only to "raise the moral tone of the natives who are gradually becoming less under our influence".⁴ He saw no reason for remaining there and the local officials were warned that their posts were liable to abolition.⁵ Granville, it

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1. Min. by Adderley 26.ix.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 3.viii.1868. CO/273/ 21.
 2. Min. by Adderley 4.ix.1868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 13.viii.1868. CO/96/77.
 3. Kennedy to Buckingham 7.xi.1868 (and confidential same date) CO/96/77.
 4. Ibid. Min. by Granville 12.xii.1868.
 5. Min. by Granville 24.xii.1868 on Treas. to CO. 15.xii.1868. CO/96/78.

appears, felt none of the moral responsibilities which troubled Carnarvon, and he resolutely tried to apply the 1865 policy. Even when Kennedy came round to Ussher's view that there would be no escape from the problem until the Dutch left, Granville refused to consider taking Elmina.¹

He soon changed his mind. In February 1869 Vice-Admiral Edward Harris, the British Minister at The Hague, hinted that the Dutch might be glad to sell Elmina,² and an unofficial offer was made before the beginning of October.³ Meanwhile, the Colonial Office became interested in getting rid of the Dutch. Monsell said on 1 March, "if we remain at the Gold Coast we ought to have Elmina"⁴ Next month Rogers had his bright idea. Kennedy who was worried about French activity in the rivers north of Sierra Leone, had revived the Gambia exchange plan.⁵ "How would the Dutch like to take [the Ivory Coast posts]... from the French & let us have Elmina", scribbled Rogers in the margin of a minute,⁶ and Granville, finally convinced that Britain would have to secure Elmina if she remained on the coast, thought Rogers's plan might help the Dutch to overcome their King's opposition.⁷

This opposition prevented negotiations for the first half of 1870, and although Granville tried to make a move in April, Clarendon urged caution. When the Dutch King was approached for the third time in June 1870 he agreed, as Dutch honour had been restored by reprisals at Kommendah. However, it is possible that the conditions suggested by van Limburg, the Foreign Minister,

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1. Granville to Kennedy 9.ii.1869 (draft). CO/96/79.
 2. Harris to Clarendon 19.ii.1869 in FO. to CO. 23.ii.1869. CO/96/82.
 3. Clarendon to Granville 5.x.1869. PRO. 30/29/55 p. 38. Cf. E.S.de Klerck, History of the Netherlands East Indies, II, p. 338.
 4. Min. by Monsell 1.iii.1869 on FO. to CO. 23.ii.1869. CO/96/82.
 5. See above p. 68.
 6. Margin of Barrow, 2.iv.1869 on Kennedy to Granville 13.iii.1869. CO/87/91.
 7. Granville advised this in spite of Barrow's opposition. See note by Granville after Barrow, 21.iv.1869 on Kennedy to Granville 13.iii.1869. CO/87/91.

had swayed him. The cession was to be gratuitous but Britain would pay for fixtures at Elmina. More significant was the condition that the cession treaty would go to the States-General along with the Sumatra and Surinam treaties recently completed. The Dutch had wanted these two treaties to go before the States-General together so the privileges granted to the Surinam planters would offset the admission of British traders on an equal footing in Sumatra.¹ Now the Gold Coast matter was to be added. Here is the official 'link' between the treaties; Granville accepted it, in fact he inverted it and said they would all "stand or fall together".

However, forgetting that Britain was, in a way, doing the Netherlands a favour in taking Elmina, Limburg tried to re-open the Sumatra and Surinam matters. He thought the Surinam planters should be able to recruit labour on more favourable terms, and suggested ^{instead} of the Sumatra agreement a treaty re-defining the respective spheres of the two nations in South-east Asia. Granville, now Foreign Secretary, flatly refused; in fact he said he would rather defer the Gold Coast matter than prejudice the Sumatra agreement. But the Dutch were anxious that the Gold Coast treaty would be presented with the other two, so it was agreed that all three would stand or fall together.²

As Gladstone said he was ignorant of the matter Kimberley, now at the Colonial Office, drew up a precis for him, making sure, on Granville's advice, to leave it "as little open for Lowe to cavil at as possible".³ He assured Gladstone "It is by no means a case of extending our responsibilities, to which I would be most averse, but of relieving us of a serious embarrassment in the only way",⁴ and the Prime Minister said he would stop "a good cluster of

1. Discussed below p. 152-153.

2. FO. to CO. 3.x.1870. CO/96/86.

3. Granville to Rogers. Private, attached to Gladstone to Granville 11.x.1870 (copy) in Kimberley Papers 8b.

4. Kimberley to Gladstone 14.x.1870. Gladstone Papers 44224/88.

agreements". Kimberley warned Lowe that an Ashanti War would cause the Treasury to "bleed freely", and the Chancellor agreed to the payment of £24,000 for stores, although he disliked the increase of territory. Kennedy was told to prepare the Africans for the cession.

Then three things happened which were to hold up the Elmina cession for over a year. The Dutch government resigned, Ussher published the proposed cession prematurely in Elmina giving the impression it was a 'sale and purchase', and the Asantehene laid claim to Elmina. Meanwhile Kennedy urgently warned the Colonial Office of the presence in Elmina of Akjampong, uncle of the Asantehene, and a hundred Ashanti warriors.¹ The purpose of this force was not yet realised but Kennedy insisted that it would have to leave before the transfer took place. Thus hope of early agreement faded in January 1871 because Elmina was unsettled, the new Dutch government had to consider it, and a battle was brewing over the ratification of the three treaties in the States-General.

The Colonial Office was tortured all the while by fears of another Ashanti war. The Dutch categorically denied the Ashanti claim to Elmina, and Col. Nagtglas, the Governor, was told to get rid of Akjampong and the Ashantis. Kennedy was told to offer the Asantehene the same payment the Dutch paid as rent, as a stipend,² which Knatchbull-Hugessen called "a good cheap investment" provided the Asantehene understood its payment depended on good behaviour. But when Nagtglas was slow to remove Akjampong, Knatchbull-Hugessen said "do not let us drift into an Ashanti war. Better abandon the idea of taking the Forts".³ A fortnight later he wondered whether a show of force might not be the cheapest course in the long run,⁴ and Kimberley decided to reserve the right of freedom

1. See below p. 103.

2. CO. to Kennedy 2.i.1871. CO/96/87.

3. Min. by K-Hugessen 7.iii.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 9.ii.1871. Ibid.

4. Min. by K-Hugessen 20.iii.1871 on FO. to CO. 18.iii.1871. CO/96/90.

of action over occupying the forts in case Ashanti attacked.¹

Opposition to the Gold Coast cession treaty, which was signed on 25 February 1871, mounted in the Netherlands as the States-General was called upon to ratify it. Yet when it came before the Second Chamber on 7 July 1871 it passed, while the Sumatra treaty failed.² Diehards of the Dutch Indian interest opposed the extension of equal trading rights to British subjects in Sumatra. Rumour had it that the Dutch had been pressed to sell Elmina and that the cession was a prelude to other colonial retreats. Thus, the Dutch took the Gold Coast 'pill' and rejected the Sumatran 'gilding' and the real gilding, the Surinam treaty, which was designed to sugar the Sumatran pill was not even risked. The Sumatra treaty was slightly re-drafted and was submitted in the 1872 session.

There was further opposition to the Gold Coast treaty in the First Chamber. During a three day debate which opened on 15 January 1872 a mulatto from Elmina named Graves, who had brought a petition to the King, was seated in the gallery by the opposition. The British annexation of the South African diamond fields in October 1871 was criticised. But the Surinam planters were anxious to get their labourers from India so the Gold Coast treaty was accepted. So was a more concisely worded Sumatra treaty, and on 24 January 1872 Admiral Harris reported that the King had signed all three treaties, which were ratified on 17 February.

On the Gold Coast it only remained to transfer the forts. The task fell to Pope-Hennessy who was, apparently, well regarded by the Dutch.³ He was only a

1. CO. to FO. 23.iii.1871. But in a private letter to Harris, 25.iii.1871 (copy in Kimberley Papers A/27h) he said, "Pray make our Dutch friends understand that we have no intention of leaving them to the mercy of savages, though this is very different from an engagement (which we cannot give) to protect their settlements against an attack".

2. See below p. 159.

3. "He stood well in the eyes of the Dutch in Borneo". Kimberley to Granville 23.i.1872. PRO.30/29/55 p. 251.

temporary Governor-in-Chief, but his six-month tour became extended to nearly a year, and this enabled both Kimberley and Knatchbull-Hugessen to exonerate themselves from blame for the troubles which followed the cession, by making Pope-Hennessy their private scapegoat.¹ He was instructed emphatically that the object of the Elmina cession was "not the acquisition or the extension of British power, but the maintainance of tranquility on the Coast". The Dutch blunders in the 1868 exchange were to be avoided.² He landed at Elmina on 4 April 1872 and two days later received Admiral de Ruyter's baton - symbol of Dutch sovereignty for 235 years. In May the Colonial Office heard the news with satisfaction.

Their pleasure was premature for the cession had two results; one involved the unfortunate dismissal of Ussher; the other concerned relations with Ashanti. On 22 April, after Pope-Hennessy had gone to Lagos to deal with Glover, a Dutch officer, Lieut. Joost, was murdered in Elmina. First thought to have been an attack on G.E. Eminsang, a mulatto who was appointed Civil Commandant, it later turned out there was a personal grudge against Joost.³ Pope-Hennessy hastened back from Lagos to discover that Ussher had been slow to act after the murder, and having just got rid of Glover at Lagos, he took the opportunity to remove Ussher from the Gold Coast. He was sent home on 'sick leave'. Knatchbull-Hugessen thought it best for West Africa that they went, saying "Mr. Hennessy has gone out as a new broom to sweep clean places which have become foul, and the old brooms and old housemaids... will be better away".⁴ But there were serious doubts in the Colonial Office about Pope-Hennessy and Herbert thought that they

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1. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, pp. 630-32. Kimberley's Journal p. 42.
 2. Min. by Kimberley 29.i.1872 on FO. to CO. 29.i.1872 and draft for Pope-Hennessy 12.ii.1872. CO/96/95.
 3. Ussher to Kimberley 27.iv.1872 CO/96/92. K-Hugessen was right when he said "I hope and believe that this has nothing to do with the transfer of territory". Min, 27.v.1872 on Ad. to CO. 25.v.1872. CO/96/95.
 4. Min. by K-Hugessen 6.vi.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 6.v.1872. CO/96/93.

would have to restrain him "or he will become confirmed in the opinion which I suggest he unconsciously holds, that every officer who differs from him is to be suspended. We had too much of that at Labuan".¹

If the Ussher affair had been the only result of the Elmina cession all might have been well. But the Fante were afraid of the Ashantis, the allies of the Elminas, and arming together they caused trouble in the Protectorate. What was not known in London (until 1873) was that in December 1871 the King of Elmina sent his brother to Ashanti to report that Britain was about to take Elmina, and the Ashanti chiefs, convinced that Elmina was theirs, demanded war. The Asantehene, Kofi Kari Kari, told the Elmina envoy that he would come down in January to remove the English flag; the Elminas were to be patient until then.² This attack did not materialise, but relations with Ashanti had long been strained. Considerable efforts were made throughout 1872 to forestall an Ashanti attack, but they failed because peace had never really been made after the 1863 invasion, and from Ashanti's point of view the indignity suffered in 1862 had not been redressed. It is therefore necessary to trace the development of relations with Ashanti.

Relations with the African States on the Gold Coast.

Elmina's fate was decided by a European agreement. But although the local government at Cape Coast Castle had been anxious to get rid of the Dutch, its major problems were really relations with Ashanti and with the States in the

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1. Min. by Herbert 11.vi.1872 on Pope-Hennessy to Kimberley 18.v.1872. CO/96/93. Cf. Barrow to Hales 21.ii.1873. Private. with Pope-Hennessy to Kimberley 30. xii.1872, CO/147/24. "It is well known... that one of the 'Pope's' failures is to endeavour to establish infallibility & at the same time to obtain supremacy - hence his liability to anathemize all around him".
 2. Lawson to Harley 14.iv.1873. CO/96/98. F.A.Ramseyer & J.Keuhne, Four Years in Ashantee (1875) p. 205.

Volta region of the Protectorate. Ussher's great fear had been that the aftermath of the 1868 partition would cause another Ashanti invasion. However since Ashanti was active in the Volta region before the 1867 convention,¹ poor relations with Ashanti need tracing further back. Maclean, in laying the foundations of the Protectorate, made peace with Ashanti one of the keystones of his policy.² But Ashanti, on the one hand, found it difficult to accept the independence of former subjects in Assin, Akim and Denkyera, and the protectorate States, on the other hand, tried to maintain their position of middlemen and provoked Ashanti by molesting their traders. The Asantehene Kwaku Dua was a peaceable man,³ but his reign (1838-67) was full of wars.

After Governor Pine had refused to give up the fugitives in 1862 Kwaku Dua and his chiefs believed that Pine had broken an agreement made by Maclean to return runaways;⁴ hence the Ashanti invasion of March 1863 and the events which followed and caused the 1865 committee. What was not known in London was that the Ashanti chiefs were only dissuaded from invading the Protectorate again in 1864 by Kwaku Dua's influence.⁵ When a Dutch Sergeant visited Kumasi in February 1865 the Asantehene was still waiting for the fugitives; talk of war was still in the air.⁶ Col. Conran, the Administrator, tried reconciliation in September 1865, but he thought the war had been over cruelty meted out to Ashanti traders. He ignored the difference with Pine over the fugitives. But Conran did his best to re-open trade with Ashanti, and he thought the danger was past by October 1865.⁷

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1. Conran to Blackall 3.xii.1866. CO/96/72. Accra traders reported that Ashanti was sending 3000 men to join the Akwamus who who about to assist the Awunas in operations west of the Volta. 2. See above p.56.
 3. Claridge, op. cit. I, p. 512: "He was the most pacific man who ever sat on the Ashanti stool". Cf. F.C.Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty-Ashanti, (1921) pp.85-99.
 4. This is not in the 1831 treaty unless under the phrase "terms and conditions of peace already agreed to". Evidence of such an agreement is discussed by Claridge, I, p. 505-508, Fuller, op. cit. pp. 91-95, Ellis, History, p. 225.
 5. Ward, History, p. 213, Fuller, p. 97.
 6. Pine to Cardwell 8.iii.1865. CO/96/67.
 7. Conran to Cardwell 8.ix and 9.x.1865. CO/96/68.

But the Ashantis had merely given up the direct approach. Taking advantage of local wars in the Volta region they continued to harass the Protectorate.

British authority in the Volta region was practically non-existent. After the Danish purchase of 1850 the Protectorate extended theoretically beyond the river. The Accra merchants were the only people interested in this area. But when in the early 1860's the Volta States changed from slaving to legitimate commerce fierce warlike competition grew between the States at the river's mouth who tried to maintain their position as middlemen. On the west bank the Adas and their allies the Accras faced the Awunas of the eastern shore who were allied with the Akwamus further north.¹ Ord reported in 1865 that the eastern protectorate was much less effective than the rest and Cardwell forbade interference there.²

In 1866, however, the local government decided to intervene in the Volta. In February Conran sent troops to Accra and Ada, in October he visited the Awuna chiefs and in December he passed a report that 3000 Ashantis had crossed the Volta to join the Awunas and their allies the Akwamus.³ Carnarvon, who had succeeded Cardwell, forbade interference,⁴ but in March 1867 Ussher sent 25 soldiers to Ada to remove the impression "that HMG intended to remain perfectly passive under any circumstances but those of a direct attack upon the Forts".⁵ The impression was, of course, a correct view of British policy. Ussher was taking a line contrary to the 1865 policy.

At this stage, in April 1867, Kwaku Dua died. He was said to have been planning a new invasion of the Protectorate to avenge the disgrace of 1862 and

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1. Accra Confederacy to Fante Confederacy 21.ix.1869 (copy) enclosed in Solomon to Boyce 22.xi.1869. Meth. Miss. Soc. Gold Coast Incoming 1868-71 file. Cf. Wolfson, Relations, pp. 120-127.
 2. Reports from Committees, V, 1865, p. 67.
 3. Blackall to Carnarvon 26.xii.1866. CO/96/72.
 4. Ibid. CO. to Blackall 22.ii.1867 (draft).
 5. Ussher to Blackall 9.iii.1867. CO/96/74.

the campaign was only delayed by a struggle for the succession in Kumasi.¹ In July he was succeeded by Kofi Kari Kari, who is said to have sworn on his enstoolment, "My business shall be war".² Yet in the late months of 1867 there was an air of optimism on the Gold Coast. Ussher sent as Commissioner to the Volta the veteran Wesleyan missionary, Thomas Birch Freeman who made a treaty with the Akwamus. He wanted to appoint Freeman as Magistrate in the area, where his experience and prestige might have had a salutary influence,³ but Buckingham, prompted as ever by Adderley, refused.⁴ Prince Ansa, an English educated and stipended Ashanti who lived at Cape Coast, visited Kumasi and reported that although the events of 1862 still rankled Kofi Kari Kari was prepared to let bygones be bygones.

In 1868 Ussher's optimism passed when the Ashantis continued to harass the Protectorate. In May they invaded Denkyera, by August they were in Wassaw, and in spite of all Ussher's efforts in the Volta region and a visit there by Sir Arthur Kennedy in November 1868, the Ashantis still remain in the vicinity.⁵ Although Kennedy thought that an Ashanti attack was unlikely, Ussher's locum tenens W.H.Simpson visited Akwamu in March 1869 and found Krobo 'swarming' with Ashantis and was himself held virtually a prisoner for a few days.

Simpson determined to stop Ashanti. Once back at Accra he reported a four pronged attack against Denkyera, Akim, Fante and Elmina, and Krepi. His policy

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1. Claridge, I, p. 555. Ramseyer & Kuehne, op. cit. p. 202, say that they were told by a chief that Kwaku Dua died of grief because of the slight in 1862 from Pine. In Ussher to Blackall 15.v.1867 CO/96/74 the Administrator said Boers warned him that Kwaku Dua was about to attack Cape Coast, Elmina and Accra.
 2. Ramseyer & Kuehne, loc. cit.
 3. The story was told that when crossing the river to make a treaty with Awuna he was fired on; then he was recognised - "It's Freeman" - and he was able to make the treaty. A.Birtwhistle, Thomas Birch Freeman, West African Pioneer, (1950) p. 101.
 4. CO. to Blackall 23.xi.1867. CO/96/74 (draft).
 5. Wolfson, Relations, p. 139 calls Kennedy's trip a 'pioneer venture'. He took Glover from Lagos with him and reported enthusiastically on the prospects for building a Palm Oil and Cotton trade. Kennedy to Buckingham 14.xii.1868. CO/96/77.

was to assist Ashanti's enemies in the Volta area, to urge the Asantehene to call off the attacks, and to assert the British Protectorate both on the Volta and the former Dutch lands to the west. When this plan reached London in May 1869 Granville was Colonial Secretary and a serious discussion took place. Rogers could not see why Ashanti should be stopped; she appeared only to be trying to gain a route to the sea. Monsell regretted that in the dangerous situation there was anyone more than a Consul on the coast. Granville, who decided to censure Simpson,¹ was nearer to the truth than he knew when he wrote, "we are drifting into war";² there had virtually been a state of war since 1863.

Downing Street stuck to the policy of non-interference, while the Ashanti army commanded by Adu Boffo, although checked, continued to alarm the Protectorate by its raids in the Volta region. Two members of the Basle Mission at Anun were captured,³ in August 1869 Adu Boffo received re-inforcements, and the Ashantis were also reported in Appollonia in the western protectorate. By January 1870 Akjampong and his force had reached Elmina.⁴ Thus when Kimberley came to the Colonial Office in 1870 on the eve of the Dutch treaty over Elmina the Protectorate was encircled by Ashanti activity: Adu Boffo in the Volta area, Akjampong in Elmina, and some forces in the former Dutch protectorate of Wassaw and Denkyera.

Kimberley did his best to maintain the policy of non-intervention. When

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1. Min. by Rogers, Monsell and Granville on Kennedy to Granville 14.iv.1869. CO/96/79.
 2. Min. by Granville 23.vii.1869 on Kennedy to Granville 1.vi.1869. CO/96/80.
 3. Claridge, I, p. 577 states that Adu Boffo was ordered not to enter the Protectorate. Wolfson, Relations, pp. 141-2, says Ashanti had the same motive as the Europeans - to break the middlemen of the Volta; that Adu Boffo had orders to gain Krepi and a route to the sea via Awuna.
 4. Kennedy to Granville 24.i.1870 CO/96/84. At Cape Coast it was thought that the Elminas had requested Ashanti help. Rumours were afoot that the Dutch had asked the Ashanti for help, that Akjampong came to assist the Dutch against the Fante. The Dutch admitted they had sent a mission to Ashanti but said it concerned trade. Barrow was very suspicious, Min. 24.iii.1870 on FO. to CO. 23.iii.1870. CO/96/86.

Ussher and Glover ascended to Volta in June 1870 to scotch Ashanti activity by bombarding Doffo and Volo, Kimberley disapproved of such a "wholesale massacre".¹ When Ussher wanted a Steamer for permanent service on the Volta, Kimberley said "I am most reluctant to assume any fresh responsibilities whatever on the African Coast".² Even when the Asantehene laid claim to Elmina, and Kennedy insisted that Akjampong was the advance guard of an Ashanti army to resist the cession, Kimberley remained cautious. Knatchbull-Hugessen wanted to pay a stipend to keep Kofi Kari Kari happy, as he believed that "if he is not 'squared'" there would be trouble, but Kimberley thought it useless to make appeals to "the Ashantee savage";³ he did not know what to do.

Matters seemed to improve in January 1871. Kofi Kari Kari repeated his determination to let bygones be bygones,⁴ and as the Elmina agreement reached its conclusion British policy was directed to appeasing Ashanti. Yet it was about this time that Knatchbull-Hugessen began to dissent from Kimberley's cautious line. When a British gunboat destroyed, in May 1871, the house of Geraldo, a former slave dealer, who lurked in the background of the Ada-Awuna troubles, Kimberley disapproved, but Knatchbull-Hugessen said, "if we claim to exercise a Protectorate upon this coast... it is absolutely indispensable that we should preserve our moral hold upon the native tribes".⁵

In the last months of 1871 and throughout 1872 great efforts were made to keep the peace with Ashanti. Protracted negotiations took place over the question

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1. Min. by Kimberley 27.vii.1870 on Kennedy to Kimberley 4.vii.1870. CO/96/85.
 2. Min. by Kimberley 2.xii.1870 on Kennedy to Kimberley 2.xi.1870. CO/96/85.
 3. Mins. by K-Hugessen and Kimberley 11.ii.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 25.i.1871. CO/96/87.
 4. Ibid. Asantehene to Ussher 31.i.1871.
 5. Min. by K-Hugessen 7.vii.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 2.vi.1871. CO/96/88. Hugessen made frank and somewhat cynical comment on this 'moral hold' when Kennedy suggested stipending the chiefs as the best way to secure peace. "It is a question of moderate (continual) bribery or greater expenditure on military force and loss to the colony, or more (periodical) breaking out of the native chiefs. I think bribery is preferable - and cheaper". On Kennedy to Kimberley 8.xi.1871. CO/96/89.

of the exchange of the captured German missionaries and prisoners from the Protectorate States. An envoy from Cape Coast, J.E.Crawford, met Kofi Kari Kari in August and Downing Street was delighted to receive from the Dutch a letter purporting to be from the Asantehene in which he no longer claimed Elmina as tribute.¹ Kennedy thought that good relations might be assured by the appointment of a Resident Agent at Kumasi, but Kimberley feared his life might be endangered and an insult to national pride would require a punitive expedition. In 1873, however, Kimberley revived the idea of a Resident.

In spite of all the optimism relations with Ashanti did not improve. The Asantehene's renunciation of Elmina is now thought to have been a forgery by H.Plange, the Dutch envoy.² Kofi Kari Kari prevaricated over the release of the missionaries because Adu Boffo, who captured them, demanded £1000 before giving them up. Akjampong was arrested in Elmina and banished to Assin, but as he did not go back to Ashanti an expedition was sent to capture him and he was 'escorted' through to Protectorate. The Fante feared that an Ashanti invasion would follow the cession of Elmina and events proved them right. The Colonial Office remained hopeful - and out of touch with the situation. While the chiefs at Kumasi grew more and more restless in 1872 attention in London was diverted from the Ashanti problem by developments within the Protectorate.

So far this account has revealed that the British attitude to the Gold Coast was governed by European considerations. A rather legalistic interpretation of the Protectorate, a revenue problem unsolved because of the doctrine that the colonies should be self-supporting, attempts to solve it by agreements with the Dutch, attempts to buy-off Ashanti - these had little to do with African

1. 'Certificate of Apology' in Salmon to Kennedy 19.x.1871. CO/96/89.

2. Discussed by Ward p. 242 and Claridge I, pp. 608-9.

aspirations. Yet the 1865 committee had recommended the encouragement of the qualities of self-government. How was this resolution sustained in practice? Between 1865 and 1872 there were three attempts by Africans on the Gold Coast to implement the resolution. In 1865 King Aggeri of Cape Coast tried to get the chiefs to support his contention that British authority rested on African consent. In 1867 a Fante Council of Chiefs took measures of self-defence against Ashanti and resisted the 1868 partition, and in 1872 a Fante Confederation Constitution was promulgated. Neither movement produced permanent institutions, but the agitation which followed in the House of Commons might have resulted in a significant change of policy by Kimberley in 1873, had not the long presaged Ashanti invasion taken place.

John Aggeri was enstooled the first Christian King of Cape Coast on 13 February 1865. Standing beside a Wesleyan missionary he exhorted the Fante to become Christians and he told Conran that he was at the administrator's disposal at all times.¹ But in April 1865 he insisted on the equality of his court with the Judicial Assessor's Court and great restlessness followed in the Gold Coast. Messengers were sent to all the protectorate chiefs and when Joseph Martin, who had been questioned by the 1865 committee, returned, the 'self-government' clause in the report was hailed as a victory for Aggeri. Finally in 1866 Aggeri claimed that the local government could pass no laws without Africans' consent,² and the Colonial Office viewed the matter seriously. "If we are to choose between loss of our influence and asserting our sovereignty over the town of Cape Coast, I should do the latter", wrote W.E. Forster, and Cardwell said Aggeri must be told that he misinterpreted the 1865 resolutions, that "in return for protection we expect deference to our authority".³ The affair subsided in December 1866 when

1. Conran to Pine 8.iii.1865. CO/96/67.

2. Blackall to Sec. of State 19.iv.1866. CO/96/71.

3. Ibid. Mins. by Forster (20th) and Cardwell 21.v.1866.

Aggerly was banished to Bulama.

Some of Aggerly's followers were involved in the next African movement. On the eve of the Anglo-Dutch partition agreement in 1867, Ussher suggested a new policy for the Protectorate. British authority, he said, should be asserted to help "in consolidating this large assemblage of native tribes into a confederation" based on self-defence against invaders.¹ The Anglo-Dutch partition fulfilled Ussher's dream remarkably soon for in February 1868 he reported that a Council of Chiefs had been gathered at Mankessim for some time taking measures of self-defence against the Ashantis, and assisting the Kommendahs, Denkyeras and Wassaws against the Dutch. It was this movement which waged the Elmina war, already mentioned. Africans had not been consulted over the partition and because of their fear of the Ashantis they organised swiftly to combat it. In January 1868 Ussher warned the Fante against 'treasonable practices' against the British, but Buckingham urged conciliation. Adderley, somewhat perversely, was delighted by these events: "fortunately it seems that the Fantees are playing us false, so that we are absolved from all obligation" to defend them.² Ussher severed relations with the Fante on 18 July 1868.

As so frequently happened policy on the coast changed sharply with personalities. When Kennedy visited the Fante in November 1868 he was impressed by them and Ussher's successor, Simpson, determined to meet them. He visited Mankessim in May 1869 and claimed that, by humouring the talk of independence, he supplanted the influence of the educated Africans by that of the local government. It is more likely that the Fante Council suspended their operations when they learnt that the Dutch were leaving Elmina.

News of the third movement, the 'New Fanti Confederacy', was sprung on the

1. Ussher to Yonge 5.xii.1867. CO/96/74.

2. Min. by Adderley 18.iv.1868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 30.iii.1868. CO/96/76.

Colonial Office in January 1872. A comprehensive written constitution of forty-seven articles was drawn up at a meeting at Mankessim on 16 October 1871. Under it the first 'National Assembly' met on 18 November, and it appointed the first King-Presidents, a Ministry, and nominated Fitzgerald, the Editor of the West African Herald, as the agent in London. A poll tax was attempted in the Mankessim area. It was a movement dominated by the educated Africans and Fitzgerald's and Horton's influence were seen behind it.¹

Salmon, the Administrator, appears to have panicked. "This is a dangerous conspiracy", he reported, and he promptly arrested the leaders - later releasing them on bail.² The Colonial Office did not agree; Holland, the Legal Adviser, said the confederation had done nothing illegal and Kimberley said Salmon had made a great blunder, but "I would disavow him in as gentle a manner as is consistent with disavowal".³ The government did not want to stamp on legitimate schemes, but as protecting power they would like to be consulted.⁴ There was a great fluster in the West African Herald over the arrests, but by February 1872 Simpson reported that on the coast things were subsiding. The chiefs, he said, had affirmed their loyalty to the government and disavowed the 'characterless mulattoes'.

But in the House of Commons the Fante Confederation remained alive. McArthur urged, in July 1872, the recognition of the confederation.⁵ Meanwhile Pope-Hennessy was at work in the Cape Coast archives. Just as he followed his removal of Glover with research at Lagos to back up his views, so at Cape Coast he delved

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1. Horton's letters to the Colonial Office, which were read with interest and respect there, were published by Horton in 1870 under the title Letters on the Political Condition of the Gold Coast.
 2. Salmon to Kennedy 4.xii.1871. CO/96/89.
 3. Ibid. Mins. by Holland (6th) K-Hugessen (9th) and Kimberley 11.i.1872 on Kennedy to Kimberley 16.xii.1871.
 4. Ibid. Kimberley to Kennedy 16.i.1872 (draft).
 5. 3 Hansard ccxiii, col. 36.

around for justifications of his removal of Ussher. Encountering the Fante problem he told the Colonial Office in July 1872 that he was gathering information about the confederation.¹ This research was more fruitful than his muck-raking on Glover and Ussher, and in October he sent home some far reaching proposals for administration on the Gold Coast. He had told the Fante that legitimate schemes would be encouraged, but that the government wanted to be consulted first. He had also told them he "entirely approved of some parts of their scheme", and he told the Colonial Office that the only alternative to the Confederation was a "firm extension of Her Majesty's Authority".² Kimberley seemingly disregarded this view. He had no faith in Pope-Hennessy now; the despatch is extensively annotated by Kimberley, and on the proposal for extension he wrote: "This is contrary to the policy of HM Government".³

Yet there is a possibility that Pope-Hennessy forced the Colonial Office to change its policy.⁴ McArthur asked for the correspondence with Pope-Hennessy on 17 February 1873 and he enquired what instructions had been sent to Col. Harley the new administrator. This caught the Colonial Office unawares. Herbert wanted to withhold the papers, but Kimberley insisted on publication. Knatchbull-Hugessen, however, persuaded McArthur to postpone his question for a fortnight, which gave them a chance to consider Harley's instructions as they had not been written.

Knatchbull-Hugessen now boldly stated his views. He severely criticised "the absurd system of 'protectorate'", by which the government never knew how much authority it had and lacked the power to enforce it. The talk of self-

1. P-Hennessy to Kimberley 6.vii.1872. CO/96/93.

2. P-Hennessy to Kimberley 29.x.1872. CO/96/94.

3. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley.

4. The tory Pope-Hennessy was probably behind Adderley's efforts in the Commons. (Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, pp. 631, 637-8). It is just possible also that Hennessy's despatch of 9 Oct. was written deliberately knowing that its policy was contrary to the official view - thus subtly advocating the confederations' point of view which fitted, theoretically, the 1865 policy.

government in 1865 had made matters worse. As in the Lagos case Knatchbull-Hugessen blamed the 1865 report for the present troubles.

"In the present tone and temper of the British mind no abandonment of territory would, in my view, be permitted by Parliament, or sanctioned by Public Opinion... but... there is a long step between that indignation and a readiness to put its hand into its pocket to pay for the enlargement ... of territory from which the advantage material to Great Britain may be considered remote".

He proposed that the British position on the Gold Coast should be "more accurately defined and more certainly established", and at last Kimberley agreed with him. Knatchbull-Hugessen saw the same two alternatives for the Gold Coast as he had for Lagos - withdrawal to the forts, or extension of territory and the creation of Crown Colony administration. Here Kimberley parted company. Whatever they did, said Knatchbull-Hugessen, they should completely disregard the educated Africans; having undertaken responsibilities Britain could not "in justice to her own character evade them, nor can the will stand still to watch the progress of events".²

On the whole Kimberley agreed with this advice and said, "For all practical purposes therefore we may dismiss the question of retiring from the Gold Coast".³ In a short sentence Kimberley finally condemned the 1865 policy. On the Gambia, at Lagos and now in a third case Kimberley decided to remain in West Africa and provide the best government he could. Rejecting the Fante Confederation he decided to try governing the Gold Coast through the chiefs. "We must keep within the line of a Protectorate, defining by agreement with the chiefs what are to be the powers and obligations of the Protecting Power, and what on the other hand are to be the obligations of the natives towards us".⁴ With this in mind he

1. Min. by K-Hugessen on McArthur's Question 18.ii.1873. CO/96/104.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley (after 20th) and draft for Harley. These can probably be regarded as Kimberley's Gold Coast policy had not the Ashanti war intervened.

4. Ibid.

drafted Harley's instructions, outlining a sort of 'Indirect Rule' scheme. But they were never sent. In the middle of the deliberations came the news of the Ashanti invasion.

The decision to intervene against Ashanti in 1873.

News of the invasion reached London on 19 February 1873.¹ The Ashanti army had crossed the Pra on 22 January, but Harley was so surprised, when he was told, that he had sent an officer to confirm it. The Ashantis made a familiar three pronged attack - in the west through Denkyera, in the east through Akim, and the main force going down the Cape Coast road. It was estimated that 12,000 men crossed the Pra to make up the main attack under the command of Amankwa Tia. A prisoner related that the Asantehene had announced that he would 'take Elmina which was his, and the Assins who were his subjects'. Full reports reached Downing Street on 26 February.

Pope-Hennessy tried to blame Harley, but the accusation was disregarded as the Governor's judgment was no longer trusted in these matters.² Kimberley would express no opinion without further information, but Knatchbull-Hugessen straightaway said "the Ashanti must now receive a severe lesson, the more severe and effectual it is, the better chance of arresting future inroads".³ The War Office was alerted. When Lauderdale asked in the Lords on 7 March if it was true Ashanti had declared war on England, Kimberley related the facts as he knew them and said the reasons for the invasion were not yet known.⁴

On 10 March Pope-Hennessy's appreciation arrived: that this was not an Ashanti invasion. Similarly R.W.Keate, the new Governor-in-Chief, decided not

1. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 598.

2. By the same mail (received 26.ii.1873) P-Hennessy reported that trouble in the Gambia had subsided, but Kimberley noted on the Gambia file, 26.ii.1873, "I am sorry to say I altogether distrust Mr. Hennessy's judgment on these matters". CO/87/104.

3. Mins. 26th and 27.ii.1873 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 8 & 10.ii.1873. CO/06/96.

4. 3 Hansard ccxiv, col. 1515.

to send re-inforcements from Sierra Leone as it did not appear that the Ashantis were going to attack the British.¹ Keate's policy was that laid down by Cardwell in 1864; British efforts would be confined to holding the forts "thus to make it clear to the natives around that they must depend upon their own exertion if they are not to be entirely destroyed by the Ashantees."² But by the time this news reached London, on 19 March, it was realised in the Colonial Office that the matter was very serious. Herbert suggested sending officers to rouse the Fante and Kimberley agreed. He also arranged for supplies of rice, and agreed to consult Goschen, at the Admiralty, about naval support. All agreed that Pope-Hennessy had been wrong, and Knatchbull-Hugessen said, "Mr. Hennessy fancied he had pleased everybody & done wonders & being disappointed & deceived was too eager to fix the blame on Col. Harley. The Ashantee should now be severely dealt with - the first cost will be the last".³

To make matters worse Governor Keate died at the height of the crisis a few days after arriving on the Gold Coast. Harley took his place but stayed at Cape Coast.⁴ On 10 March the Ashantis defeated a large Fante force at Fante Nyankumasi and two days later Harley arrested the King of Elmina who supported Ashanti.⁵ A hundred re-inforcements arrived from Sierra Leone on 20 March and Harley sent 50 armed Hausa police to Dunkwa as he thought it undesirable to create an impression among the Fante that they would get no support whatever happened.⁶ But Downing

1. Keate to Harley 18.ii.1873 (copy) CO/96/96.

2. Ibid. Keate to Kimberley 1.iii.1873.

3. Ibid. Min. by K-Hugessen 21.iii.1873.

4. Harley to Kimberley 19.iii.1873. CO/96/97.

5. Ibid. Harley to Kimberley 15.iii.1873. The following explanation is in O'Reilly to Harley 26.iii.1873. Because of the Asantehene's long-standing alliance with Elmina, there were said to be two parties in Elmina - the King's (anti-British) and the mulattoes' (pro British). Rumour had it that the King had asked the Asantehene to assist him against his rivals. (Lawson to Harley 14.iv.1873.)

6. Ibid. Harley to Kimberley 21.iii.1873.

Street stuck to the policy of non-intervention. When questions were asked in the Commons on 25 April by Sir John Hay and McArthur, Knatchbull-Hugessen repeated Cardwell's 1864 policy; the government would use the chiefs to defend the Protectorate. British steps were so far confined to sending 100 troops from Sierra Leone, the use of 50 Hausas at the front, Harley's efforts to rouse the Fante, the arrest of the King of Elmina, and the sending of two warships to the scene.¹

At the same time Pope-Hennessy began to mobilise his Tory friends. During the first week in May Adderley got in two questions in the Commons,² but when he tried to re-iterate the 1865 policy on 9 May, Knatchbull-Hugessen reminded him that the attempt to get rid of the Gambia to France had met with an outcry.³ Thus during May 1873 publicity in England mounted, and if Kimberley as usual did not like to take too decisive a line - he disliked the deportation of the King of Elmina - Knatchbull-Hugessen believed it was "essential to show the native kings and chiefs that we will deal with a strong hand with treachery and disloyalty".⁴ At all events it began to look as if somebody would have to act".

Re-inforcements were decided upon. A despatch from Harley received on 9 May showed that the Ashantis were in greater strength than had been thought. They were also reported to be in Appollonia in the western districts, and it seemed likely that all the former Dutch protectorate would rise against the British if the Ashantis appeared successful. Harley had also received a letter from

1. 3 Hansard ccxv, col. 970. The Times, 26.iv.1873.

2. There was a large polemical correspondence over the Harley-Hennessy trouble, as there had been over the Glover affair. A good example in Harley to Kimberley 31.iii.1873 caused K-Hugessen to write, "these letters disclose a state of anarchy on the Gold Coast among the officials". CO/96/97.

In May K-Hugessen prepared to announce some of P-Hennessy's mistakes if Adderley pressed his questions too deeply. He also suspected that P-Hennessy was behind an anti-Harley letter in The Times, 27.ii.1873.

3. The Times, 13.v.1873.

4. Mins. by Kimberley and K-Hugessen 4th and 5.v.1873 on Harley to Kimberley 2.iv.1873. CO/96/97.

the Asantehene saying that the Elmina cession was the cause of the war. The Fante sustained another defeat at the battle of Dunkwa on 14 April after earlier putting up a stout resistance for a time. Harley ordered a general retreat.¹ After this news a War Office conference was held in London on 10 May which was attended by Kimberley, Cardwell, Goschen and also Herbert and Sir Andrew Clarke. They decided to embark 100 Royal Marines immediately, and to transfer four companies of the West India Regiment from Barbados.²

A change in basic policy was not intended by this. But the situation at Cape Coast, and the demands from officers on the spot for a more forceful policy, were clearly making some new decision necessary. On 19 May the War Office learnt that the Commander at Cape Coast thought it would be impossible just to defend the forts because of the refugee swollen towns around. He wanted some ruling about Cardwell's 1864 instructions. Although the Ashanti camp was known to be in a wretched state though lack of food and the spread of small-pox, the Ashanti army numbered 40,000.³ The day after this news Kimberley noted in his Journal that, "the Ashanti war begins to look troublesome".⁴ He told Gladstone that questions would have to be discussed by the Cabinet.⁵ On 22 May a proposal arrived at the Colonial Office from Lieut-Col. Ruvignes, who had been Civil Commandant at Anomabu in 1863, suggesting an invasion of Ashanti by the Volta route. Here was another request for a change in the policy of non-intervention, this time from London. Knatchbull-Hugessen said they should not entertain the idea "unless we make up our mind to alter that policy and the nature of our protectorate".⁶ Surprisingly enough he opposed such an expedition. So did

1. Ibid. Harley to Kimberley 12 & 14.iv.1873.

2. Minutes of conference WO/32/826 file 076/219. Instructions for the Marine commander, Col. Festing in 076/235. Kimberley told to WO. (12.v.1873) that no time could be lost as he was anxious to send back the Hausas to Lagos, where the situation was still unsettled.

3. Capt. Brett to WO. 21.iv.1873. Ibid. file 076/233.

4. Kimberley's Journal p. 38.

5. Kimberley to Gladstone 21.v.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/38, and Cabinet Minute 24.v.1873 44641/124.

6. Min. by K-Hugessen 27.v.1873 on WO. to CO. 22.v.1873. CO/96/107.

Kimberley, who said of Ruvignes's fear of French ambitions,

"it is absurd to talk of French aggrandisement in that quarter when we have just extended our influence over the whole coast from Lagos westward nearly to Assinee with the single exception of Porto Novo. If we weaken ourselves we cannot adopt a better course than to spend a few millions in conquering Ashanti and establishing a West African Empire. It is to be hoped that no Govt. will be mad enough to embark on so extravagant an enterprise".

There was to be no change of policy. The commander at Cape Coast was told that the 1864 instructions would stand.²

In June the news was confirmed that the Ashanti effort appeared to be spent. Leaving Dunkwa the invading army moved west into Denkyera.³ Harley tried to rally the Fante, suspecting the Ashantis would make a final effort before retiring, and by the end of May the latter had moved from their position threatening Cape Coast, to Jukwa the capital of Denkyera, fifteen miles from Elmina.⁴ From London things were beginning to look quiet. Possibly the Ashanti would soon go home. But the calm was delusive, for two mail ships had been lost and a shock was in store.

It arrived on 10 July in the shape of news of a British bombardment of Elmina, and a rout of the Fante before Jukwa.⁵ "An end to all peace and quiet for the unlucky Colonial Office", wrote Kimberley.⁶ An Ashanti force had advanced upon Elmina on 13 June while Col. Festing, commanding the Marine re-inforcements, was bombarding a section of the town after the hostile 'King's party' had refused to surrender their arms. A battle raged throughout the day, Festing calling for all the Hausa, naval and military help he could get, and he only

1. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 28.v.1873.

2. WO. to OC. Cape Coast 29.v.1873 (draft) WO/32/826 file 076/237.

3. Harley to Kimberley 17.v.1873 CO/96/99.

4. Ibid. Harley to Kimberley 29.v.1873.

5. The Times, 10.vii.1873 p. 10, a correspondent's report dated Freetown 29.v.1873.

6. Kimberley's Journal p. 39.

managed to drive the Ashantis three miles before dusk when they retired.¹ Kimberley was alarmed by the news and at a meeting at the War Office on 15 July he pressed the military authorities, who he said were "very unwilling to move", to send 200 more Marines who were standing by, and to alert a wing of an Infantry Battalion.² The Marines sailed in Simoon on the 16th while the Colonial Office studied its belated despatches about the Fante defeat at Jukwa on 5 June. The Ashantis were reported at Efutu, twelve miles from Elmina, and there was "alarm and panic" at Cape Coast.³

It was in the two weeks following this news that Cardwell, the chief author of the 1864-65 policies, and Kimberley, who had realised their limitations, changed their minds about non-intervention, and decided to send the much publicised Ashanti expedition. The main stages of this crucial change of policy stand out clearly. Who was ultimately responsible for this decision is still obscure.

On 26 July after reading of Harley's difficulties in rousing the Fante, Kimberley thought something would have to be done to repair the disorganisation among the Fante. Harley was to be told that £40,000 would be asked from Parliament to aid the Fante. He must tell the chiefs that "while HMG expect them to do their best to defend themselves, they will on their part give them cordial and active support in order to put an end to this disastrous war".⁴ The same day Kimberley sought Cardwell's advice. He thought that the two of them with Goschen should discuss what to say to Harley on the military situation by the 30th's mail.

Kimberley was not certain what course to take:

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1. The Marine re-inforcements from England made Elmina their base. But they found that the section of the town occupied by the 'King's party' supported Ashanti. The Legislative Council decided on 12 June to make this group give up its arms, and the operation was planned for first light on 13 June. When no arms were forthcoming at the appointed hour, Festing gave another half-hour and then bombarded the town. At this moment the Ashantis appeared. Festing to WO. 18.vi.1873. WO/32/826 file 076/320.
 2. Kimberley's Journal p. 40. 3 Hansard cxxvii, cols. 308, 267-8.
 3. Harley to Kimberley 10.vi.1873. CO/96/99.
 4. Min. by Kimberley 26.vii.1873 on Harley to Kimberley 30.vi.1873. CO/96/100.

"The question seems to be: can any active measures be taken against the Ashanti during the rainy season? if so, within what limits, and of what nature?"

Of course if the Ashanti attack our forts, the course is simple, to repel them, but if they do not attack what then? We cannot leave them quietly in occupation of the Protectorate. Public opinion would not allow us to do so, if we ourselves desired it: and all the trade of our settlements is practically destroyed by the presence of the invading force, so that if things are left in their present position the settlements will be merely a heavy burden upon the Imperial Treasury. Are we to contemplate an attack on Coomassie, and could we assemble a force sufficient enough for the purpose".

Kimberley asked to see Cardwell on Monday 28 July. After this conversation he called for all the papers on Ashanti affairs since 1864. He also wanted the details of Glover's Volta expeditions, and he asked the Foreign Office to get from The Hague particulars as to the navigability of the Pra.² Hales produced the Colonial Office material immediately, but when the despatch was sent to Harley on 30 July, Kimberley had not yet made any decision. He really intended to stir Harley up, he told Cardwell, it committed "no one to the Pra or any other particular line of action".³

The same day Captain Glover R.N.⁴ offered his services to the Colonial Office. Herbert was inclined to accept but Kimberley feared that after the Yoruba country roads trouble they could not use Glover again in West Africa; he thought Glover wrote a "vainglorious letter". Nevertheless Kimberley saw Glover on 4 August and commissioned him to lead a flank expedition against Ashanti up the River Volta.⁵ Kimberley gives the clue to what happened in a note to Knatchbull-Hugessen on the 4th:

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1. Kimberley to Cardwell 26.vii.1873. Cardwell Papers, PRO.30/48/5/33.
 2. Mins. by Herbert and Kimberley 28.vii.1873 on Harley to Kimberley 30.vi.1873 CO/96/100.
 3. Kimberley to Cardwell 30.vii.1873. PRO.30/48/5/33.
 4. See above p.74. (p. 4.
 5. Kimberley said of Glover (Min. 1.viii.1873 on Glover to Kimberley 30.vii.1873 CO/96/109) "he is one of those exceptional boasters who have proved that boasting and solid qualities sometimes go together". Earlier in the year Glover had tried for the job of Governor-in-Chief. (Glover to Kimberley 15.iv.1873 CO/267/325.

"We mean to employ Glover to lead an expedition of natives and Hausas against Ashantee up the Volta. I see him today at 3. We cannot mention this in the House, as it would be dangerous to disclose prematurely our military plans....¹The plan was mentioned in the Cabinet on Saturday and approved".

The Cabinet, then, had on 2 August decided on Glover's expedition. Gladstone also noted that a frontal assault on the Ashantis might have to be considered later.²

But the plans for the frontal assault were actually made without consulting the Prime Minister. At a meeting at the War Office on August 13 the forty year old Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Gold Coast.³ Kimberley reported his work to the Prime Minister afterwards.

"Whatever we do must be done quickly, and if possible in such a manner as to deter the Ashantees from attacks upon our settlements for a long time to come".⁴

Glover was to be allowed to spend £15,000 on his Volta expedition; the final decision about a possible attack on Kumasi would depend on Wolseley's appreciation when he arrived at Cape Coast. "It is very provoking", said Kimberley, "to have to spend such large sums of money on these savages, but we cannot leave the matter as it is". Gladstone admitted that he was a bad judge of Ashanti policy, but as Rogers before him, he did not see why the Ashantis need always be enemies.⁵ To him there was little consolation in the war, but he hoped that

"The miserable war will not be without some compensation, if it slackens the precipitate zeal of MacArthur and Co. for the annexation of Fiji, or

1. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, pp. 634-5.

2. Cabinet Minute 2.viii.1873 Gladstone Papers 44641/189. Wolfson *op. cit.* p. 287 says Parliament's consent was obtained on the 2nd. This can hardly be so, as it is contradicted by Kimberley's note to K-Hugessen on the 4th. On the motion for the adjournment on the 4th Sir Patrick O'Brien tried to get a debate on the Ashanti war but Gladstone declined to 'use his influence' to get one. ³ Hansard ccxvii, p. 1526.

3. G.Wolseley, *A Soldiers Life*, II, p. 267.

4. Kimberley to Gladstone 13.viii.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/79.

5. Gladstone to Kimberley 14.viii.1873 Kimberley Papers A/52.

if it abates the₁ disposition of John Bull to put his head hereafter into a noose".

Very soon Gladstone was full of doubts and queries about the new policy. And well he might have been since the main decision appears to have been taken behind his back. It is not easy to point to the responsibility for this, but it seems to lie with Kimberley, Cardwell or Wolseley himself.

It was the news of the Elmina-Jukwa battles (received 10 July) which really stirred the responsible authorities in London. It was after his conversation with Cardwell on 28 July that Kimberley reviewed the Ashanti papers and asked for information about Glover's exploits in the Volta. It is fairly certain that Cardwell told Kimberley about some of the considerations which had taken place in the Admiralty and War Office. A few days after the Elmina-Jukwa news Goschen had called Glover to the Admiralty to discuss the possibility of getting stores to Prasu. A few days later, according to Glover's account, he was sent for by Cardwell to repeat what he had said. Thus on 29 July, at a meeting in the War Office, Glover suggested raising a force in the Accra and Volta region to attack the Ashantis in the flank and rear and to threaten Kumasi from western Akim. Sir Andrew Clarke² supported the Glover plan, suggesting operations far up the Volta. He advised that Glover should be given a free hand to deal with the whole situation.³ The day after this interview Glover offered his services to the Colonial Office, no doubt on Cardwell's and Clarke's advice. Somewhat surprisingly Gladstone approved the plan on 2 August and the Glover offer was accepted the same day.⁴ Gladstone later said the Glover plan was a good one.⁵

1. Ibid. Gladstone to Kimberley 21.viii.1873.

2. Clarke had been grateful to Glover in 1864, when by making sure that he got to sea during a bout of fever, Glover probably saved Clarke's life. Vetch, Life of Clarke, p. 82 and E. Glover, Life of Glover pp. 118-120 disagree as to whether this took place at Lagos or Cape Coast.

3. E. Glover, Life of Glover pp. 149-152 based on an autobiographical fragment now in the library of the Royal Commonwealth Society.

4. Herbert to Glover 2.viii.1873. Letter Book in Glover Papers.

5. Gladstone to Kimberley 14.viii.1873. Kimberley Papers A/52.

Yet from the start Glover's was a flank operation.¹ The important appointment was Wolseley's, which paved the way for the march to Kumasi in 1874. Sometime, probably at the end of July, Wolseley drew up a memorandum outlining a plan of campaign against Ashanti.² He proposed that he should assume the government of the Gold Coast, and should take out a staff of officers who would raise an African force which would attempt to drive the Ashanti beyond the Pra. He also indicated that he would probably need two battalions of English troops, who could be rushed to the Pra along a road with staging posts.³ Cardwell evidently favoured this plan by the hero of the Red River Expedition in Canada,⁴ who was also his ally in the battle against purchase. He sent the plan to Kimberley before the Cabinet of 2 August, saying Wolseley was "now ready to capture Coomassie".⁵ Thus Cardwell's support of the Wolseley plan makes him a fair candidate for shouldering the responsibility for the attack on Kumasi, although he was quick to deny this to Gladstone: "you will observe that I have said nothing about any expedition to Coomassie, or anywhere else".⁶ If Cardwell wanted a forceful policy on the Gold Coast he was not strictly honest with

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1. In his instructions (Kimberley to Glover 14.viii.1873. Gold Coast Print 35, p. 148) Glover was appointed "Special commissioner to the Native Chiefs of the Eastern District". He was to raise an African force there and create a diversion in the flank and rear of the Ashanti army in the Protectorate and to force them to retreat.
 2. This memo. has not been found and the date is unknown. Wolseley's biographers say, "As soon as difficulties arose on the Gold Coast, Sir Garnet prepared for Mr. Cardwell a memo. on the situation". (F.Maurice & G.Arthur, The Life of Lord Wolseley, pp. 61-62). Wolseley himself said, "Mr. Cardwell had in confidence already informed me that he would like me to go there should it be determined to undertake active operations against the invading Ashanti... I submitted privately to Mr. Cardwell a rough outline of a military scheme...." (A Soldier's Life, II, p. 262.)
 3. Ibid. pp. 262-3. This plan was carried out.
 4. R.Willock, 'Green Jackets on the Red River', Military Affairs, XXII, 1958, No.1 p. 26. For a contemporary account by an officer. Blackwood's Magazine, Dec. 1870 p. 704, Jan. 1871 p. 48 and Feb. 1871 p. 164.
 5. Cardwell to Kimberley 1.viii.1873 (copy) Cardwell Papers, PRO.30/48/5/33.
 6. Cardwell to Gladstone 3.ix.1873. Gladstone Papers 44120/119.

Gladstone about it.

Nor can Kimberley be exonerated from bearing a big share of the responsibility. As a conscientious Colonial Secretary he had not been prepared to let matters slip on the Gold Coast. He had already rejected the 1865 policy by deciding to remain at the Gambia, Lagos and the Gold Coast. Early in 1873 he was contemplating stronger administration in the latter. If his word in his Journal is to be trusted, he had to persuade unwilling authorities to send the reinforcements on 15 July and he also called for part of a British battalion to be alerted, so he was prepared to use English troops. Afterwards he said he never doubted for a moment that they would have to use them,¹ and he told Gladstone that the burning of Kumasi was as justifiable as killing an enemy in battle.² When he wrote to Cardwell before the decision on Glover he mentioned the possibility of an attack on Kumasi. Thus the Wolseley-Cardwell plan found a ready supporter in Kimberley. Wolseley records that at one of the meetings subsequent to his appointment, Kimberley answered "in a somewhat sharp tone of voice" questions by Goschen. Kimberley became so nettled at the cross examination by some of his colleagues that finally, says Wolseley, he banged his fist on the table saying "either this expedition comes off or I cease to be Colonial Minister".³ And in some ways Kimberley's change of mind was greater than Cardwell's; the latter appears as the advocate of the ambitious Wolseley project, which itself was part of the new spirit stirring among the younger officers who were quick to volunteer for the expedition, but Kimberley accepted the plan only after first entertaining a milder alternative proposed by Sir

1. Kimberley's Journal p. 42.

2. Kimberley to Gladstone 2.v.1874. Gladstone Papers 44225/150.

3. Wolseley, Soldier's Life, II, p. 268. Wolseley did not mention Goschen, but said "a minister"... "but I fancied that the question reflected Naval sentiment at the Admiralty".

Andrew Clarke.¹

In his Journal Kimberley says he first offered the new Gold Coast command to Clarke,² who was Director of Works at the Admiralty, but who had accepted the governorship of the Straits Settlements on 30 May 1873 in succession to Sir Harry Ord.³ Clarke's 1864 report on West Africa was favoured in the War Office,⁴ and he was called into the various conferences during 1873. Like Wolseley he drew up a plan of campaign and an itinerary to Kumasi.⁵ He opposed the employment of English troops and asked for a free hand to make a settlement with Kofi Kari Kari. His precise plans are unknown, but he told Col. Anson at Penang a year later that he had "stipulated that the country should be handed back to the native government after the war was over".⁶ After Wolseley's appointment Clarke suggested than an autographed letter from the Queen to the Asantehene and the Protectorate chiefs

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1. Sir Andrew Clarke (1824-1902) was then Director of Works at the Admiralty, but was called into the Gold Coast discussions because of his experience. B. 1824, educated King's, Canterbury and the RMA Woolwich, commissioned R.E. 1844, and served Chatham, Woolwich and Ireland before going to Van Dieman's Land in 1846. For a short time he built roads during the New Zealand war in 1848; from 1849-53 he was ADC and Pr. Sec. to the Lieut-Gov. of Van Dieman's Land. In 1858 he became Surveyor-General of Victoria with a seat on the Legislative Council. He helped draft the constitution when Victoria received responsible government, and he was elected to the new Assembly by S.Melbourne. A member of the Cabinet and an advocate of universal suffrage in the 1857-58 session, he was invited to form a government but decided to return to military duty in England. He was at the Gold Coast during the 1863-4 war and he acted as a staff officer for Gov. Pine, and even acted as Chief Justice. His report seems to have a wider scope than a strictly military mission would suggest. His admiralty post began in 1864. See below Chap. 5 for his career in Malaya.
 2. Kimberley's Journal p. 42. The Duke of Cambridge also favoured Clarke. HRE to Cardwell 19.viii.1873. Cardwell Papers PRO.30/48/4/17.
 3. Clarke to Kimberley 30.v.1873. Kimberley Papers A/69.
 4. Vetch, Life of Clarke, p. 82.
 5. Information from Vetch p. 115. Like Wolseley's Memo. Clarke's cannot be found. However there is in the Glover Papers a memo. on Singapore Government note paper signed by Clarke 11.viii.1873, initialled by Cardwell "written by Sir A.Clarke at my request". Here Clarke says if an attack upon Kumasi is decided upon regular troops would be needed, but he is convinced that sufficient forces could be raised in the Protectorate.
 6. A.E.H.Anson, About Myself and Others (1921) p. 324.

would be much better than an expedition to Kumasi.¹ One suspects that Gladstone would have preferred Clarke's scheme, and three years later, after Sir Arthur Gordon's successful "little war" against the Fiji mountaineers, one M.P. suggested that some such limited effort (which Clarke obviously preferred) should have been used against the Ashantis.² Kimberley evidently favoured this at one stage, but in 1864 Clarke had favoured withdrawal from the coast, and as Wolseley said, "peace loving as Lord Kimberley undoubtedly was, he took no such church-warden's view of our Imperial responsibilities".³ So Kimberley definitely accepted the forceful Wolseley plan and he had the onerous task of persuading Gladstone, a task he did not shirk. On the whole he handled the Prime Minister shrewdly and got his way, as he did over the Malay States and Fiji at the same time.

One person who seems 'out' of the crucial Gold Coast decision was Knatchbull-Hugessen, the very man who had so often urged an aggressive policy. Parliament was prorogued on 5 August 1873 and he was probably busy with last minute parliamentary duties. He was also going through one of his periodic bouts of dissatisfaction over the prospects of Gladstone's government and his own career. Kimberley wrote to him on 10 August, "I trust you are not serious in talking of making your bow. You would not I am sure turn your 'backside'... to Coffee Calicalli".⁴

Yet if Kimberley and Cardwell were firm in their support for Wolseley, the Cabinet, which had not yet fully been drawn into the matter, were not unanimous, and Gladstone was by no means happy when he discovered the scale of the preparations. Thus although the decision to undertake active operations was made between 26 July and 2 August, the final decision was not made until 7 November, when Wolseley's request for English troops was sanctioned.

1. Clarke to Kimberley 19.viii.1873. Kimberley Papers. A/69.

2. G. Shaw Lefevre to Gordon 1.ii.1877. Gordon, Fiji Records, III, p. 117.

3. Wolseley, Soldier's Life, II, p. 271.

4. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, pp. 639.

Now it seems fairly clear that from Wolseley's point of view an English expedition to Kumasi was part of the plan from the start. Both Kimberley and Cardwell realised this, although probably both of them hoped that a peace might be achieved without one.¹ The plan as presented to Gladstone was that Wolseley would use the forces already available and those he could recruit in West Africa to strike a blow at Ashanti if possible, and request a British expedition only should it prove necessary. But Kimberley, much franker than Cardwell, told Gladstone they should prepare for such an expedition by Wolseley. "It is a hateful affair, but I feel sure, that the only safe policy is to deal with it quickly and thoroughly".²

A minor wrangle took place early in September over Wolseley's instructions. On the peace terms with Ashanti and the question of human sacrifices Gladstone pointed out that "they are not crimes under the moral law as recognised in Africa", but the Queen telegraphed that they must say that if the Asantehene continued such sacrifices she would regard him "with horror".³ Kimberley steered his way through these verbal niceties by adding an innocuous phrase about ending 'atrocities'. Wolseley was to warn the Asantehene that an expedition was in preparation in case he did not leave the Protectorate. The object politically was to get a new treaty with Ashanti - perhaps based on the 1831 Treaty. Kimberley also suggested that a Resident or Consul might be appointed to Kumasi;⁴ these instructions were dated 10 September 1873, the day on which Kimberley sent Gladstone Clarke's instructions for the Straits Settlements in which Residents in the Malay States were suggested.

Cardwell also had trouble with Gladstone over Wolseley's instructions as the Prime Minister thought the General was given too wide a discretion. But Cardwell

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1. See Kimberley to Goschen 12.ix.1873, in A.D.Elliot, Life of Goschen, p. 122.
 2. Kimberley to Gladstone 18.viii.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/79.
 3. Gladstone to Kimberley 4.ix.1873 Kimberley Papers A/52. Kimberley to Ponsonby 9.ix.1873 (copy) Ibid. A/46. Kimberley to Gladstone 9.ix.1873. 44225/99.
 4. Kimberley to Wolseley 10.ix.1873 (draft). C0/96/108.

insisted that the question of a British expedition would be a Cabinet decision. Beyond that limitation Wolseley should have the widest latitude to deal any blow at Ashanti with what he found at Cape Coast.¹ While all this was going on, Goschen, faced with the need of providing a hospital ship, confessed to "very great qualms" and a feeling "so uncomfortable about the expedition and now so doubtful as to its necessity".² Cardwell, the main author of the 1864-5 policies replied:

"you cannot be more opposed to an ambitious policy on the Gold Coast than I am... but could Kimberley have a state of things in existence, under which his revenue is destroyed by a Barbarian invader and the people whom he assumes to govern, are butchered or enslaved? Is he to eat humble pie and withdraw?"

So the first wave of opposition was overcome. Wolseley sailed from Liverpool on 12 September. Gladstone thought Kimberley had "judged wisely" about the instructions - although he was soon "aghast" at the expense.⁴

Indeed the preparations, as Cardwell told Kimberley, were "assuming large proportions".⁵ So Gladstone, who had also taken over the Treasury on 1 August, was full of enquiries; he discovered that a hospital ship was being prepared, and that equipment for 15 miles of railway was being sent to Cape Coast. He began to suspect that an expedition to Kumasi was preparing - which, of course, was true. Cardwell tried to ease his mind:

"We have not (as Northcote argues) involved the country in a war without calling Parliament. We are in a war forced upon us... and existing long before Parliament broke up. I believe the steps we have taken have averted a storm of indignation, which would have burst forth if these ill-tidings had arrived and no such steps had already been taken. As regards the tramway:.. I do not regard it as pledging us to an expedition into the Ashanti territory".⁶

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1. Cardwell to Kimberley 3.ix.1873 Kimberley Papers A/52. Cardwell to Gladstone 3.ix.1873 Gladstone Papers 44120/119. Gladstone to Cardwell 5.ix.1873 (copy) Ibid. 123. Military instructions: Cardwell to Wolseley 8.ix.1873 (draft) WO/32/826 file 076/594.
 2. Goschen to Kimberley 8.ix.1873 Kimberley Papers A/52. Goschen to Cardwell 10.ix.1873 Cardwell Papers PRO. 30/48/5/27 p. 115.
 3. Ibid. Cardwell to Goschen (copy) 12.ix.1873. p. 113.
 4. Kimberley's Journal p. 42.
 5. Cardwell to Kimberley 18.ix.1873. Kimberley Papers A/52.
 6. Cardwell to Gladstone 20.ix. 1873. Gladstone Papers 44120/140.

But Kimberley and Cardwell sensed that the atmosphere at Cabinet level was getting rather 'hot' for them, and at a meeting at the War Office on 22 September, which finally decided on the hospital ship and the railway (a meeting which Gladstone had been invited to attend), they agreed that the circle of responsibility would have to be enlarged to include the Cabinet generally.¹

The Cabinet finally discussed the matter on 4 October. In a meeting which lasted from 12 to 5 pm Bright, sitting in his first Cabinet as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, was one of those who opposed the Kimberley-Cardwell policy. His diary recorded: "Ashantee policy to be pacific: no invasion of Ashantee, & no assault on Coomassie".² This sounds more like Bright's wishful thinking, but certainly as a result of this Cabinet a despatch was sent to Wolseley on 6 October, drafted in the main by Gladstone, which represented the first real attempt by the Prime Minister to assert any authority in the Ashanti war.³ Wolseley was warned against conducting desultory operations; he was told that the government would be most reluctant to sanction an English expedition. They would be satisfied with an honourable peace, or, failing that an effective chastisement of the Ashanti forces. Apart from this the main object now was to drive the Ashantis from the Protectorate.

Gladstone's intervention was a month too late. Wolseley arrived at Cape Coast on October 2,⁴ and a mere week elapsed before he asked for 1500 English troops.⁵ A sober military appreciation of the situation on his arrival might have told the General that he would be cheated out of the cherished march to Kumasi. The Ashantis were definitely about to retreat and there had been no further alarms like the Elmina battle in June, which had really caused Cardwell

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1. Cardwell to Gladstone 22.ix.1873. Gladstone Papers 44120/144.
 2. P. Bright, Edition of The Diary of John Bright, p. 357.
 3. Gladstone's rough drafts in Cabinet Minutes 3 & 4.x.1873, Gladstone Papers 44641/193-6. Kimberley's draft (based on Gladstone) in CO/96/108.
 4. Wolseley to Kimberley 6.x.1873. Confidential Print, Gold Coast 36 n. 267.

and Kimberley to consider sending Wolseley. There had been considerable suffering among the Ashanti invaders since May; they had no faith in their commander Amankwa Tia, and they had settled down at Efutu and Mampon, until early October when they began to fall back. But if the immediate threat to Elmina and Cape Coast was removed, British authority throughout most of the Gold Coast had collapsed under the impact of the invasion. Nearly all the former Dutch Protectorate west of Elmina was seething with discontent, and as the Ashanti forces under Akjampong and Adu Boffo advanced in June and July 1873 many of the chiefs joined the invaders. The British were reduced practically to holding Secondi, Dixcove and Axim with frequent Naval assistance. King Blay of Appollonia was the only African ruler in the western Gold Coast who could be relied upon.¹

When Commodore Commerall, commander of the Squadron, tried to reconnoitre the mouth of the Pra on 14 August, preparatory to a drive up the river to cut the Ashantis in two, his party was attacked by the Shama people, and Col. Harley decided to blockade the whole coast from Cape Coast to the Assini River. One of the Kings of Secondi was deported; several towns were bombarded from the sea. In the eastern part of the Protectorate Glover found, when he arrived in September, that the Awunas were threatening Ada, and that the whole problem of the east side of the Volta remained unsolved. Harley had wanted to try negotiating with the Awunas and the Akwamus in January 1873, but Pope-Hennessy had forbidden him, so the situation had deteriorated for over half a year. To

1. Kimberley wrote "King Blay is a really good fellow. He seems to be worth all the rest put together". Min, 29.x.1873 on Harley to Kimberley 29.ix.1873. CO/96/102.

make matters worse Harley's relations with the military and naval officers were far from cordial.¹ The Protectorate was in a bad state then, but the real danger from Ashanti was past.

Two days after his arrival Wolseley met the Cape Coast chiefs and offered £10 to any chief who would field 1000 men and £10 a month while they were under arms. These levies would be provided with arms and food and each man would be paid 3d a day. British officers would be appointed to the various chiefs, and recruiting officers were also sent to the Gambia, Lagos and Sierra Leone.² Yet in only a week after his landing, before he could have made any systematic effort to train and assess the Fante forces, he told Kimberley he would need the English troops. In his memoirs he said he never thought he would finish the war without them; in fact, it is fairly clear that he had made up his mind beforehand that the Africans would be useless. From Sierra Leone he wrote to his wife that "The Africans are like so many monkeys; they are a lazy good-for-nothing race".³ Before he even heard the replies of the Cape Coast chiefs to his proposals he told his wife he would see "these wretched kings and chiefs" but that he would have to ask for English troops.⁴ He was confirmed in this belief by the first operations on 14 October - some punitive attacks on hostile villages around Elmina where a survey party had been attacked. But his official application to the War Office for the English regiments was dated the

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1. Commerell's wounding at Shama removed Harley's greatest enemy among the local officers, but his poor personal relations came to a head early in September when he disagreed with Col. Festing over military measures against the Ashantis. Harley thought that an invasion of Ashanti was now feasible and he also urged Festing to attack the Ashanti camp at Mampon. Festing however refused to move at a conference on 11 Sept. as Wolseley's appointment was known, and Wolseley late upheld Festing.
 2. Wolseley to Kimberley 5.x.1873, Gold Coast 36 p. 209. Wolseley to WO. 7.x.1873 WO/32/826 file 076/1235.
 3. Wolseley to Lady Wolseley 27.ix.1873. G.Arthur, The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley, p. 10.
 4. Ibid. loc. cit. In A Soldier's Life, II, p. 276 he wrote: "The term 'slave' jars upon the ear, and yet the more one sees the negro at Cape Coast the more one realises that he was intended to be the white man's servant".

day before this. It is safe to judge that Wolseley decided to have a British expedition from the start; that he did not consider any other alternative when he got to Cape Coast.

The request reached London on 17 November. Already the Cabinet had authorised Cardwell to ship stores for 1500 men,¹ and on the 17th it sanctioned the despatch of three English battalions, which sailed on the 19th to 21st. Gladstone re-iterated his desire that Wolseley should make peace if possible, and strike a blow as far short of the Pra or Kumasi as possible.² When the Cabinet considered, on 21 November, the instructions they should give Wolseley on the use of the English troops Bright tried to prevent any invasion of Ashanti, but he failed and contemplated resigning.³ Gladstone warned the General that if Ashanti was completely crushed he might reach Kumasi and find no one there to negotiate⁴ - this happened. The Queen, with a sure instinct in these matters, hoped that Gladstone was not fettering Wolseley's movements.⁵

This caution was really the last interference the Liberal government made in Wolseley's Kumasi campaign, which culminated in his entry of the Ashanti capital on 4 February 1874. Since this news did not reach London until after Gladstone's fall, it was the Glover expedition which caused the most misgivings in the government in the last months of 1873. As Glover prepared to attack the Awuna in an effort to protect his flank by clearing the lower reaches of the Volta before turning on Ashanti, Kimberley demanded the reason for this extra war.⁶

1. Cabinet minute dated Nov. 1873. Gladstone Papers 44641/209.

2. Ibid. Minute 17.xi.1873, 44641/218. Gladstone to Kimberley 19.xi.1873. Kimberley Papers A/8b.

3. P. Bright, The Diary of John Bright, p. 358.

4. Cabinet Minute 21.xi.1873. 44641/223.

5. Ponsonby to Kimberley 23.xi.1873. Kimberley Papers A/40.

6. Min. by Kimberley on Wolseley to Kimberley 13.xi.1873. CO/96/103. Kimberley to Wolseley 23.xii.1873. (draft).

When Glover began paying £5 a man for Hausa slaves to build up his African force, Gladstone stopped it.¹ Wolseley, in fact, complained that his own efforts at recruiting in western Akim were jeopardized by Glover's little war, although Glover had distinctly told his lieutenant Capt. Sartorius not to interfere with Capt. Butler in western Akim. Kimberley began to wonder if the whole Glover expedition had not been a mistake.²


One thing Kimberley was certain of - "how utterly without authority we are in the 'Protectorate' and that we are defending little more than a shadow".³ Nor is there any indication that he had any constructive idea of what to do about the Gold Coast after the war. He opposed Wolseley's plan for an Anglo-French-Portuguese arms embargo; "Suppose after the war we retire from the coast? The whole measure will be nugatory".⁴ He realised that great reforms were needed, yet he doubted if the settlements could ever be governed satisfactorily. In such a mood he once told Wolseley that he would not bother him "on this futile subject".⁵ Possibly it was poetic justice that the hardworking, but now quite weary, Kimberley should remain in office until the eve of victory, but the younger, more imaginative, Carnarvon should have to deal with the peace treaty and the settlement of the Protectorate.

Perhaps it was poetic justice too that on 15 January 1874, the day Wolseley's main campaign in Ashanti territory began, Sir Andrew Clarke began the Pangkor conference, which laid the foundations of the 'Resident system' of government

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1. Mins. on Wolseley to Kimberley 13.xi.1873. CO/96/103. Kimberley to Gladstone 15.xii.1873 Gladstone Papers 44225/129. Gladstone to Kimberley 16.xii.1873 Kimberley Papers A/52.
 2. Min. by Kimberley 25.xii.1873 on Wolseley to Cardwell 2.xi.1873. CO/96/107. Herbert said however: "The truth is that Capt. Glover has succeeded in a business with which he is familiar and the officers who had no African experience have naturally been less successful". Glover had earned a high reputation at the Colonial Office for his training of the first Hausa police at Lagos.
 3. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 25.xii.1873.
 4. Kimberley to Granville 17.xii.1873. Granville Papers PRO.30/29/55/33
 5. Kimberley to Wolseley 9.i.1874 (copy). Kimberley Papers A/22.

in the Malay States. As already noted, Clarke might well have been wearing Wolseley's boots on the humid banks of the Pra, but his solution to the Ashanti problem had been rejected. He went to Singapore to be faced with the problem of the civil wars in the Malay States. There, he was told in London (quite rightly), "matters were much more critical and the situation more difficult than on the African coast".¹

1. Vetch, Life of Clarke, p. 115.



THE MALAY STATES and THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS

Chapter 3.SIR HARRY ORD AND THE MALAY STATES, 1867-73.The Straits Settlements and the Malay States before 1867.

It took Sir Andrew Clarke less than four months to decide on his policy for the Malay States. He appointed the first Residents in Perak and Selangor, and although they were intended as advisers to the Sultans, over the years these officers came to control the government of the States. As a result of the change of policy which produced Clarke's plan the British government ceased to think in terms of small outposts and trading centres which were guardians of the trade route through the Straits of Malacca to China, but to regard itself as the 'paramount power' in the Malay Peninsula. The origin of this new departure is the subject of the present chapter.

Unlike the West African settlements the colony of the Straits Settlements was a comparatively new Colonial Office responsibility. First developed as an outpost of India, it had been transferred only in 1867. The settlements consisted of the island of Penang, ceded by the Sultan of Kedah in 1786; Province Wellesley on the mainland opposite, which was added in 1800; the island port of Singapore, Stamford Raffles's creation of 1819; and the old colony of Malacca on the mainland, ceded by the Dutch in 1824. While Raffles had envisaged British dominance and commercial supremacy over the entire area, the Government of India, had, traditionally, tried to keep aloof from the internal affairs of the Malay States.

The Colonial Office inherited this policy of non-intervention within the Peninsula. It thought in terms of isolated strategic and commercial settlements situated on the road to China. When the trusted West African negotiator, Sir

Harry Ord, was sworn in as the first Colonial Governor on 13 April 1867 he had instructions simply to install the normal crown colony administration in Singapore. The chief interest of the new master in London at first was the revenue of the new colony, since the Treasury had been very reluctant to let the imperial government take over from India. Therefore, although those who had agitated for Downing Street rule had hoped that more attention would now be turned to the Malay States, they had to wait seven years before anything was done. In his draft of Ord's instruction Rogers deleted the heading "Political Relations"¹, because in 1867 the Colonial Office gave little thought to the question of relations with the Malay Peninsula. They regarded their new responsibility in the Straits Settlements purely as an administrative matter, similar perhaps to the West Indies.

They were wrong, and they were very soon to realise their mistake. Already throughout the whole area a complex web of political relationships existed. British sovereignty was confined to Penang, Malacca and Singapore, but British influence embraced the whole Peninsula. Stated in broadest terms, the Malay States had been saved from dominance by Siam from the north, and the Dutch from the south, only by British intervention. In 1860 Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, the Governor, claimed that, with the exception of "one or two petty Independent states, the possession of the Malay Peninsula is divided between the British and the Siamese".² When Ord arrived in 1867 the influence of Siam was confined to the so-called tributaries in the north, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, and the independence of the most important west coast States, Perak and Selangor,

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1. Draft instructions for Ord 6.ii.1867. CO/273/16. The bias of official emphasis can be judged from the fact that it was a Treasury letter which occasioned this draft.
 2. W.G.Maxwell & W.S.Gibson, Treaties and Engagements affecting the Malay States and Borneo (1924) p.1. See also Cavenagh's despatch to the Govt. of India, 19.vii.1861. A & P, 1863, XLIII, p. 306.

had been guaranteed by intervention and treaties.¹ In the east and south of the Peninsula, the States of Pahang and Johore were by-products of Anglo-Dutch rivalry for the lands of the former Johore Empire.² Johore itself was virtually a British creation. A more recent threat by Siam to Pahang had led to intervention by Governor Cavenagh in 1862.³ The Dutch had undertaken never to form establishments or to make treaties in the Peninsula by the London Treaty of 1824, and relations over Sumatra, the southern shore of the Straits of Malacca, were governed by the same agreement.⁴

The most recent writer on the subject has suggested that the East India

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1. Perak treaties, Maxwell & Gibson pp. 20-26; Selangor treaties pp. 30-35. The best account of early relations between the British settlements and the Malay States is L.A.Mills, 'British Malaya, 1824-1867', Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 1. Pt. 2. (1925) pp. 128-69.
 2. During the period of intense Anglo-Dutch rivalry stirred up by Raffles in this area after the Napoleonic Wars, the Sultan of Johore (present Johore, Pahang, Singapore and Riouw-Lingga archipelago) was living at Lingga, a puppet of the ruler of Riouw. The dominions on the Malay Peninsula were ruled by great officers who became virtually independent, the Temenggong of Johore and the Bendahara of Pahang. Raffles's method of securing Singapore; the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824; and the Pahang civil war 1857-63, all served to give permanence to this arrangement and to 'partition' the old Johore empire. (See Mills, British Malaya, pp. 19-81; W.Linehan, 'A History of Pahang', JMBRAS, XIV, May 1936 pp. 56-67; Cowan, Origins, pp. 8-9; R.O.Winstedt, 'A History of Johore', JMBRAS, X, Pt. III Dec 1932, p. 98; and for the British treaties with Johore, Maxwell & Gibson pp. 115-132.)
 3. The Pahang civil war really included two conflicts: a fight for the succession in Pahang following Bendahara 'Ali's death in 1857, between his sons Tun Mutahir and Wan Ahmad; and a final attempt by a successor of the 'Riouw half' of the Johore empire to recover a mainland province. The latter was Mahmud (deposed Sultan of Lingga) who joined Wan Ahmad. Siam saw opportunities of extending her influence and backed Mahmud, Wan Ahmad and their ally the Sultan of Trengganu. Mutahir was supported by the Temenggong of Johore. In 1862 Mahmud went to Siam and married the sister of the King and returned to Trengganu (Wan Ahmad's base) with Siamese troops. Wan Ahmad's third invasion was successful and in 1863 he became the ruler of Pahang, and he tried to cultivate good relations with the British. (Contemporary accounts in A & P, 1863, XLIII, pp. 303-387 and O.Cavenagh, Reminiscences of an Indian Officer (1884) pp. 303-307. See also Linehan, Pahang, pp. 66-89; Winstedt, Johore, pp. 94-96; M.C.ff. Sheppard, 'A short history of Trengganu', JMBRAS, XXII, Pt. 3 June 1949, pp. 31-34; Mills, British Malaya, pp. 165-166; Cowan, Origins, pp. 18-21.
 4. See below p. 152.

Company could be regarded as paramount power in the Peninsula:

"Out of the five states south of Kedah (counting the Negri Sembilan as one) there were thus by 1862 two whom the East India Company were pledged to protect, and three over whose external relations they had a right of control... On a strict legalistic interpretation Johore and Perak would no doubt have been regarded¹ by later nineteenth and twentieth century opinion as protectorates".

But the treaties in no way implied intervention in the internal affairs of the States. Here British policy was strictly one of non-intervention. However, by the middle of the century the Straits press had suggested acquisition by Britain, and it had attacked what was called "a course of utter neglect" towards the Malay States.² Cavenagh's exceptional intervention in 1862 came after prompting from Singapore merchants because the events in Trengganu and Pahang were hampering trade on the east coast.³ Thus, in Singapore at least, it was thought that the Malay States should not be left to themselves, and it was argued that trade with the Peninsula could be increased, that great riches lay ready for the picking. Therefore although British sovereignty did not stretch beyond the small settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore, already the frontier of trade and political influence had moved beyond.

Because of the peculiar internal conditions of the Malay States this wider frontier was to cause a rethinking of the traditional policy of non-intervention. It is evident that there was a gradual appreciation of the problem in London during the first six years of colonial office administration in Singapore. It was realised in Whitehall that the Straits Settlements were not simply a normal colonial responsibility like, say, the West Indies, but they presented the problem of a frontier bordering on politically unstable States, potentially rich in resources, which was not unlike the contemporary frontiers in West Africa and the South Pacific.

1. Cowan, Origins, pp. 21-23.

2. The first suggestion of annexation was made in 1844. See C.B. Buckley, An anecdotal history of Old Times in Singapore (1902) II, pp. 421-2, 575, 584.

3. Paterson, Simons, Co. to the SS. Govt. 23.x.1862, and Singapore Chamber of Commerce to Cavenagh 31.x.1862, A & P, 1863, XLIII, pp. 330-332.

Ord's proposed Malay States policy, 1867-71.

Sir Harry Ord was well installed in Singapore before the Colonial Office seriously considered the problems raised by the Malay States. But on 8 June 1867, among a bundle of papers which the India Office rather belatedly turned from its cupboards, Charles Cox, the head of the Eastern department, found a few which were "interesting and instructive as regards our relations & difficulties with Native Chiefs".¹ The rulers of Johore and Pahang disagreed over their boundaries, and the ruler of Larut, a province in Perak, and the Sultans of Kedah and Kelantan were in various ways restricting trade. A report was also included on Sumatra's east coast States, which formed the southern shore of the Straits of Malacca.

None of these matters were regarded as urgent. "Nothing further to be done" was the favourite comment. Ord was simply asked in July 1867 to report on two matters: the Johore-Pahang dispute, and the effect of the Sultan of Kelantan's monopolies on trade.² Only in one respect were the India Office papers regarded as useful; they indicated the Government of India's policy in a specific case. Negotiations had been attempted from time to time with the ruler of Larut, who levied irksome duties on the tin exports. In 1866 Cavenagh had expressed a fear to the Government of India that there was a tendency in Penang "to push British interference with the Native States further than is either necessary or desirable".³ Generally, the Governor said, he interfered in two cases only: where a British subject was murdered in Larut, or where there was murder or piracy on the high seas. Cox quoted this in a precis for the Duke of Buckingham, the Colonial Secretary, to show,

1. Mins. 1.vii.1867 on IO. to CO. 6.vi.1867 containing papers relating to the SS, Malaya and Sumatra.

2. Ibid. CO. to Ord 19 & 20.vii.1867 (draft).

3. Cavenagh to the Govt. of India 15.ii.1866 (copy) in IO. to CO. 6.vi.1867. Ibid.

"what may be taken I conclude as the standing instructions under which the Governor of the Straits Settlements would act in any future case where his interference was asked for agst a Native Chief¹- and I should say that these instructions are sound ones".

The Sumatra paper touched a wider question, for the Foreign Office was about to consider a new policy. The long standing attitude of opposition to Dutch expansion in Sumatra was being re-examined; in 1866 and 1867, however, both the India and Colonial Offices were too busy with the transfer of the Straits Settlements, so serious thinking about Sumatra policy was confined to the Foreign Office. In September 1867 Lord Stanley decided it was inevitable that the Dutch would gradually rule the whole island, and that British protests would not stop them. Therefore he asked the Colonial Office "whether it would not be advisable to abandon the practically useless right to protest against inevitable territorial acquisitions" if in return trade in Sumatra on equal footing with the Dutch could be achieved.² Here again the Colonial Office did not regard the matter as urgent and they refused to give an opinion until the new governor at Singapore had reported.³ They were less concerned with diplomacy than with the revenue of the Straits Settlements. In 1867 the Malay States on either side of the strategically vital Straits of Malacca did not arouse any anxiety in Downing Street.

Early in 1868 this complacency was shaken. Governor Ord was asked to report on a few matters concerning the Malay States, but since he had governed only colonies with representative institutions he was unused to the crown colony routine of detailed reports. He was a regular officer, who, although he had missed the active service which might have come his way, had also been spared

1. Min. by Cox l.vii.1867 on Larut papers, Ibid.

2. FO. to CO. 17.ix.1867 CO/273/14.

3. Discussed below p. 156. Rogers warned Adderley that Sumatra was sure to crop up again, on IO. to CO. 28.ii.1867. CO/273/15.

the dull routine to be found at home. He was above all things a willing volunteer, who fully exploited any chance for exceptional service. Normal postings on the home establishment had been enlivened by his trips to West Africa, Paris and The Hague. Unexceptional posts as a Colonial Governor in Bermuda and the West Indies were relieved by the Inquiry in West Africa and the 1865 committee. At the age of forty-seven Ord was well accustomed to negotiations and responsibilities. A man of considerable, if rather narrow, experience, a professional soldier, military engineer, and 'expert' on Anglo-Dutch arrangements in West Africa, he also had a high opinion of his ability with 'native chiefs'. So he promptly began negotiating with the Malay rulers. He tried to teach the Sultan of Kelantan the virtues of free trade, and to tidy the colony's boundary with the State of Kedah.

Both Kedah and Kelantan were 'tributaries' of Siam. Definition of their precise status is difficult, but all the Malay States north of Perak and Pahang were regarded as within Siam's sphere until the boundary settlement of 1909. The Burney Treaty of 1826 is exceedingly vague as to the relationship with Kelantan and Trengganu,¹ but the northern states sent tribute to Siam. While Kedah and Kelantan were definitely under considerable influence and their foreign affairs were conducted by the Siamese, Trengganu resisted Siamese influence in this period and Governor Cavenagh had supported this.

Ord's negotiations with the rulers of Kedah and Kelantan introduced the Colonial Office to the question of relations with the Malay States. A bare hint of the Kedah negotiations was received on 27 January 1868,² but the full reports were not received until 12 February. Apart from the details of the negotiations, which will be discussed later, Ord's action opened an important

1. Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties, p. 80.

2. Min. by Cox on Ord to Buckingham 18.xii.1867. CO/273/13.

question of principle, which was to occupy the Colonial Office for five years: "namely our mode of dealing with the Native States - a point on which Sir H.O. has had no instructions".¹ Buckingham, the Colonial Secretary, was adamant, and said, "Col. Ord is to Govern the settlements not to diplomatise, which may be left to the Foreign Office".² But Rogers realised that a much wider problem had been raised concerning the whole sphere of the authority of the governor of the Straits Settlements in South-east Asia.³ Ord, characteristically, had his own ideas. Under the old regime relations with the Malay States and the Dutch had been subject to the approval of the Government of India, and Straits residents had often pressed for wider powers for the Governor. Ord supported their view and warned the Colonial Office that any diminution of his authority would lower his prestige and encourage piracy.⁴ The Colonial Office therefore considered this question of principle before the details of the Kedah and Kelantan.

Pleased to have a concrete case not an abstract question Rogers considered relations with the Malay States in the broadest context by surveying the division of responsibility on the entire imperial frontier. This was something that had not been possible under the Government of India, therefore his long minute is an important stage in the realisation of the Malayan frontier problem. He wrote:

"in some places the FO has no machinery thro' which it can act, no channels thro' wh it can desire information - & no interest in the questions wh arise - which on the contrary the CO has all these advantages for the transaction of business. Such is the case in the countries adjoining Natal & the Cape. Consequently the CO deals absolutely without any intervention on the part of the FO, with Kaffirs and Zulus.

In China the contrary state of things exists & the contrary mode of proceeding is inferred. We are continually impressing on Sir R. Macdonell

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1. Ibid. Min. by Cox 17.ii.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 31.xii.1867.
 2. Min. by Buckingham 17.ii.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 3.i.1868. CO/273/17.
 3. Rogers first saw the Kelantan despatch (3.i.1868) on 19 February and the reply to Ord was dated 22nd. But on the 19th Rogers had added a further note that the Kedah despatch (31.xii.1867) which he saw the same day was part of the same problem.
 4. Ord to Buckingham 31.xii.1867. CO/273/13.

[Gov. of Hong Kong] that he is only to communicate with the Chinese Govt. thro' the diplomatic authorities.

On the West Coast of Africa I shd think the CO wd be left to take its own way absolutely, but for the fact that the FO has an interest in the Slave Trade question & consequent Treaties with Native "Kings" - Here I believe it is not unusual to invest a consular authority in the Govr or administrator who in that capacity takes orders from the FO. [eg. Glover at Lagos.] ... I am inclined to say that this double responsibility of the Govr to authorities whose bias is not always the same is not, except in very easy times, a very safe or satisfactory method, if it can be avoided.

In Honduras the Govr I think would be expected to deal under instructions from the CO with the neighbouring Indians with little or no interference from the FO so long as the question was merely a matter of Indians, but all matters wh could be matters of discussion with Mexico as sovereign of the Indians - wd go to the FO.

Now as to the Straits...."

Here Rogers defined three spheres; suggesting (1) that the governor should deal, under the Colonial Office, with the Malay States "not subject to any influence than our own", (2) that he should be able to deal directly with the Siamese tributaries, under Foreign Office approval, and (3) that relations with the Dutch would, as usual, be handled by the Foreign Office, with Colonial Office advice.¹ In March 1868 the two departments worked out a policy on these lines for the Straits of Malacca area. The Colonial Office agreed with Ord that the governor was the official best placed for gaining information in the Malay Peninsula, and that prestige was important, but the governor's activities might conflict with British policy towards Siam or the Netherlands, and that a local colonial interest might embarrass the home government. Stanley, the Foreign Secretary, found it all "rather an irritating and troublesome question". Rogers's Foreign Office counterpart, the painstaking Edmund Hammond,² said "let the Colonial Office adopt their own rules".³

In this rather casual way Ord's ideas were accepted in London and embodied in his belated instructions on the Malay States. Agreeing in principle with

1. Min. by Rogers 19.ii.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 31.xii.1867. CO/273/13.

2. See M.A. Anderson, Edmund Hammond, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1854 to 1873, (PhD thesis London 1956).

3. Notes by Stanley and Hammond with CO. to FO. 17.iii.1868. FO/37/487.

the Kedah negotiations Buckingham told Ord that in negotiating he had exceeded his powers and his methods were criticised. As to the frontier question - relations with the Dutch would be as in similar regions like British Guiana and the Gold Coast. The important part of the instructions concerned the Malay States not subject to Siam:

"with regard to the native powers you will possess a larger authority. But you will remember that the relations of the settlements with those powers are matters which may at any time become of serious importance... Although therefore circumstances may not unfrequently arise in which you may be called upon to act absolutely on your own judgement, yet it is generally undesirable that you should enter into formal negotiations with native princes... except¹ in pursuance of an object or a policy approved by HM's government".

Unfortunately Downing Street could not close the matter with a neat instruction and throughout 1868 the problem of relations with the Malay States kept reappearing in the despatches from Singapore. Ord's negotiations with Siam over Kedah and Kelantan produced complications and commercial interests in the Straits added variations on the same theme. Before the end of 1868 Buckingham would be forced to admit - if only in confidence to the department - that British intervention might be necessary in Malaya, and the Colonial Office would find itself defending its newly won preserve from the Foreign Office.

Before discussing this, however, a brief word is necessary about the Kedah and Kelantan negotiations. Relations with Kedah were poor because the Sultan levied duties on cattle imported into Penang for food, and he took advantage of his irregular boundary with Province Wellesley to provide gambling houses which were forbidden in the colony. The India Office passed on reports of previous negotiations but Cox had said "nothing appears to be done".² Evidently Ord reopened negotiations on his own initiative, and his efforts to get a new boundary treaty gave the Colonial Office its first cause for alarm over his

1. Buckingham to Ord 22.iv.1868 (draft). CO/273/23.

2. Min. by Cox 1.vii. 1867 on IO. to CO. 6.vi.1867. CO/273/15.

methods. Not only was he dilatory in reporting home, but he lost his temper on two occasions and suspended negotiations. When the treaty was finally signed in Singapore on 21 March 1868 the verdict was: "a very questionable proceeding", and that Ord had been "successful in carrying out his object and intentions tho' he has not obtained that success in a regular manner".¹

He began the negotiations in August 1867 when Tan Kim Ching, the Siamese Consul at Penang,² took the Sultan of Kedah to Singapore, where a memorandum was agreed upon as the basis for a treaty. It provided for the straightening of the Kedah-Province Wellesley boundary by an acre for acre exchange of land, for a fixed scale of duties to be levied by the Sultan, and both parties agreed to clear a belt of country either side the boundary and they would not licence gambling houses within two miles of it. Ord said he would travel to Penang to sign the new treaty on 30 December 1867. But when the draft in Malay was presented there the Sultan refused to sign. Being an actual draft treaty it differed from the August memorandum and the Sultan said he would sign nothing without the express approval of Bangkok. Ord had a fit of temper, severed relations with the Sultan, and withdrew the pension which had been paid to him since the cession of Penang.

Only after this failure did Ord report home, and he transferred his negotiations to Bangkok, writing on 10 January 1868 to the British Consul. The Siamese government appointed Phya Thep Worachin, and Tan Kim Ching as commissioners with full powers of negotiation on behalf of Kedah, and Ord met them at Penang on 13 February 1868. The commissioners agreed to Ord's terms

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1. Min. by Cox 5.v.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 26.iii.1868, with treaty and maps. CO/273/17.
 2. Tan Kim Ching (1829-92) was given this title by the King of Siam. He was a Straits Chinese with wide interests in the East. He had rice mills in Saigon; influence among the Chinese in the Siamese tributaries of Kelantan and Patani; his Singapore house was known as 'Siam House'. Song Ong Siang, 100 Years of the Chinese in Singapore (1923) pp. 92-3, 115, 156.

and asked for twenty-four hours to fetch the Sultan. Then, as they were about to visit Junk Ceylon, they suggested they might visit the Sultan en route and bring him to Singapore in about three weeks. This request for further delay caused another outburst of temper by Ord, who now broke off negotiations with the Siamese and withdrew the offer of an acre for acre exchange of territory.

In spite of this the Siamese commissioners brought the Sultan to Singapore in March 1868. Ord withdrew his threat and the new treaty was signed on 1 March. Perhaps a little lecture on British policy towards Siam from Harry Alabaster, acting Consul in Bangkok, had modified Ord's views. The governor had already formed his ideas about his relations with the Malay States but he had not yet received his instructions; Alabaster reminded him that British policy was to buttress Siam's hold over her tributaries. If Kedah was to be treated as independent, what of the other tributaries. Dealing with them through Bangkok was convenient, but although direct relations with the Malay tributaries were feasible, relations with the Laos States, where the French were interested, would not be so easy.¹ In March, therefore, Ord completed the Kedah matter through the Siamese.

The same is true of the Kelantan affair. Ord was asked by the Colonial Office to investigate the report that the Sultan monopolised the sale of cotton twist and yarn in his country and farmed exclusive rights of trading in certain commodities. But after consulting the Singapore Chamber of Commerce Ord straightway urged on the Sultan the adoption of free trade. When the latter pleaded his weakness in resources and need of revenue, Ord decided to get satisfaction from Siam. Thus the commissioners who visited Singapore in March 1868 assured Ord that the Raja of Kelantan would comply with his wishes and make an apology.²

1. The Siamese side of the case and copies of the Alabaster-Ord correspondence are in Alabaster to Stanley 18.iii.1868. FO/69/46.
2. Ord to Buckingham 23.iii.1868. CO/273/17.

The details of both these negotiations were not important. Their significance lies in the fact that both were settled through Siam, that quarrels over the Kedah treaty took place in Whitehall, and that Kedah and Kelantan first raised the question of relations with the States on the frontier in the Straits. Rogers's minute of 19 February 1868 represents the first stage in Colonial Office thinking on the British frontier in Malaya.

The second stage was caused by British companies which were trying to enter tin mining in the Peninsula. Within two days during May 1868 requests for interference in the Malay States came from different quarters. The most comprehensive was from W.H.M. Read,¹ a leading Singapore merchant who brought an introduction from Ord. He was in London making arrangements for a number of commercial ventures in South-east Asia, notably the projected Selangor Tin Company and some telegraph extensions. His London collaborator was his brother-in-law, Seymour Clarke, the highly successful General Manager of the Great Northern Railway, who was something of an expert on telegraph systems.² While Clarke pestered the Foreign Office about a telegraph line through Siam, Read perplexed the Colonial Office with a forthright indictment of the policy on non-intervention in Malaya. That policy, he wrote,

"if it can be called a policy, has been to allow matters to follow their own course. The consequence is, that at the moment the rich and fertile countries of the Malay Peninsula are as little known as they were at the time of the first settlement of Singapore... I do not apprehend that any political complications are likely to follow from the formation of new treaties with the rulers of the independent native states, but on the contrary, I am led to believe that they will gladly avail themselves of any opportunity which would enable them to derive revenues... and such good counsel and advice as would enable them to govern their subjects upon more enlightened principles than at present prevail".³

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1. William Henry McLeod Read had been in Singapore since 1841. He was Consul-General for the Netherlands, a friend of the King of Siam, and he had the ear of the Straits authorities at some crucial moments. He was a promoter of telegraphs in Siam, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies; he was also interested in Gold Mining in Siam and planting in Borneo. He assisted in quelling the Singapore riots of 1854 and 1863, and he was later the Municipal President.
 2. See below p. 163.
 3. Read to Buckingham 9.v.1868 with a Memo. on the Malay States. CO/273/24.

Although rather embarrassed by Read, the Colonial Office was agreed on one thing: "Sir H. Ord does not require any stirring up in negotiating with the Native Chiefs". They feared that Read's views would make him more inclined "to meddle with native policy & that is an evil to be avoided". Adderley, the Parliamentary Under-secretary, knew about the problems of the expanding frontier from his experience as Chairman of the 1865 committee, where he also had had an opportunity to assess Ord. He said "the danger of friendly motives to Natives is that they always take them to mean more than they do & Ord is too ready that way".¹

Rogers decided to scotch Read's notions. Pulling his favourite iron from the fire - the local contributions for defence - he said that if the Straits merchants cared to pay for their own defence it might be very politic to

"undertake the duty of saying in such of these states who should govern & how he should govern. But to endeavour to dictate with effectual physical force as the backbone of dictation,² I think is to involve oneself in quarters of which we cannot see the end".

He said the government should not approve

"any policy which is dictatorial in its character, and which has for its object either territorial extension wh they look upon as an absolute disadvantage, or political³ influence, which as they believe will follow as a matter of course...."

When Read's letter went to Singapore, therefore, Ord was reminded that British policy in regard to the internal affairs of the Peninsula was one of non-intervention.⁴

At the same time as the Colonial Office was considering Read's letter another reached them, from the London agent of Paterson, Simons Company who had worked tin mines at Kuantan in Pahang.⁵ Some of the company's property had been

1. Ibid. Min. by Cox (12th) Adderley (13th), and Buckingham 15.v.1868.

2. Ibid. Min. by Rogers (undated) 3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. Buckingham to Ord 20.v.1868 (draft).

5. Peterson, Simons to Buckingham 8.v.1968. CO/273/24. Paterson's concession of 1862 is printed in A & P, 1863, XLIII, pp. 331-2.

confiscated by one of Wan Ahmad's followers in 1863, and the new Bendahara had not restored it. Assistance had been sought from the governor and from the Government of India without success. Now the Colonial Office was asked to intervene.

Rogers was beginning to sense the seriousness of the question and wrote, "A false step may cause a good deal of mischief".¹ He suggested that the Colonial Office should completely disassociate itself from commercial ventures in the Malay States. Thus the answer to the mining company closely followed that given to Read, and also to similar projects in West Africa and New Guinea. Merchants venturing into semi-barbarous lands did so at their own risk; the government would not intervene to enforce their contracts "when the disturbed state of the country, and the disputes of rival claimants to power cause embarrassment and loss".² The phrase quoted is significant as it represents a slight qualification of Rogers's view. It was added by Buckingham on 4 June 1868 because he thought "there may be cases in which it might be proper to take strong measures".³ He did not specify which cases, but his admission represents a further stage in the appreciation of the real problem in Malaya. And on the same day at least one possible case for intervention was cited in a reply to Ord on his Kelantan despatches. These had reached London at the time when any idea that Ord might 'diplomatised' was anathema, so he had been cautioned. But as the Siamese

1. Min. by Rogers 25.v.1868 on P & S Coy. to CO. 8.v.1868. CO/273/24.
2. CO. to P & S Coy. 8.vi.1868 (draft). Ibid. The same attitude was shown over West Africa: "persons who trade at remote places must understand that they are to settle their own quarrels and that they are not to expect the intervention of British forces". (Min. by Elliot 11.vii.1866 on Blackall to Carnarvon 20.vi.1866. CO/96/71.) Cf. the reply to the N.Guinea Coy. of Sydney: "any persons who embark in it [the N.Guinea expedition] must not look for aid and protection from the national forces, nor for the confirmation of HM government of their titles to any acquisitions of land which they may make from the natives". (Buckingham to Young 14.ix.1867 (draft). CO/201/542).
3. CO/273/24. Buckingham first saw the papers on 26 May, but on 4 June he corrected the draft and added this 'escape clause' for the benefit of the office.

commissioners satisfactorily completed the Kelantan negotiations in March 1868, so Ord took the opportunity, in replying to his caution over Kelantan, to raise the whole Malay States problem again. His despatch, which arrived exactly a week after Read's letter, was couched in such similar terms that Rogers, remarking that all these letters were about "extension of our influence", suspected some concerted move.¹ Possibly Ord and Read had discussed their line of approach before the latter left Singapore.

Ord now offered for the first time a comprehensive policy for the Malay States. Firstly, in the case of the Siamese tributaries he did not know what Siam's authority really was but the Siamese commission completed the Kelantan and Kedah business without so much as a reference to the rulers concerned. Following Alabaster's view Ord thought that "the subjugation of these native states of the Peninsula to Powers greater or more civilised than themselves is an advantage to themselves and to all who have relations with them". Secondly, in the southern part of the Peninsula Ord considered that outside Johore the situation in the Malay States was dangerous. "Nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the condition of the Native States that are not dependent upon any superior power, in most of them there is, as a rule, neither order, peace, nor regular government". This insecurity discouraged the exploitation of their immense resources, for although tin mining flourished in a few places, the 'squeezing points' of the minor Malay rulers were ruinous to enterprise. Only with Perak were the relations of the colony satisfactory; they were not defined, but the Sultan usually sent an officer to settle disputes with the colony. In Selangor and the other States there was no such arrangement; thus said Ord "I feel that it would be greatly to the advantage of the settlements if our influence could thus be extended over the Peninsula and I shall not fail to avail myself of any

1. Min. by Rogers 20.v.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 8.iv.1868. CO/273/18.

opening that may present itself for do doing".¹

Ord then had decided on his duty in the Malay States, but Rogers did not like it. "Settlers and merchants are always ready to call for operations of which they are to reap the profit and government to bear the cost... And Governor's are only too apt to fall in with a policy which gives interest and importance to their proceedings".² Nor did Edmund Hammond, in the Foreign Office, like Ord's efforts. Only a few days before Rogers's remark he wrote, apparently quite independently, "I hope Governor Ord will not be too active with the petty states".³ For a third time Ord was reminded that "the true policy of the Government of the Straits Settlements is not to attempt to interfere, but to keep entirely clear of any disorders which may occur in the neighbouring native states which do not directly effect or threaten the peace of the settlements themselves".⁴ The ground for local discretion was limited to this single eventuality.

When Rogers went on his summer holidays in 1868 he could feel confident that the Colonial Office had made it clear that its policy in the Malay States was one of non-interference. But a slight advance had been made; some of the States had been under careful review, and Buckingham had admitted, to his department, that interference might be necessary. Thus Ord had been authorised to interfere if the safety of the colony was threatened. Further advances were about to follow. In the latter part of 1868 the Colonial Office would be found jealously guarding its new sphere from the Foreign Office, and it would learn that in spite of all the warnings Ord was widening his personal sphere of influence to include, not only the Peninsula, but also the territory to north and south. In August 1868 he was entertained by the King of Siam and met the

1. Ibid. Ord to Buckingham 8.iv.1868.

2. Ibid. Min. by Rogers 20.v.1868.

3. Min. by Hammond 16.v.1868 on CO. to FO. 15.v.1868. FO/69/47

4. CO. to Ord 4.vi.1868 (draft). CO/273/18.

Malay Sultans on the east coast. In November he visited his Dutch counterpart at Batavia.

The concluding phases of the Kedah Treaty give an instructive glimpse into metropolitan attitudes and of departmental rivalries in Whitehall. It was assumed in Singapore that the treaty of 21 March 1868 was in force. Not so in London. Adderley, who was something of an expert on West Africa by now, was thoroughly confused about "all these Rajas" in Malaya.¹ But if the Colonial Office did not like Ord negotiating, even less did they like the Foreign Office poaching in the area and taking the kudos.

The two departments misunderstood each other from the start. When the Colonial Office passed on Ord's despatch with his draft Kedah treaty and his general question as to his responsibilities on the frontier in Malaya, the Foreign Office, like the Colonial Office, had considered the question of principle first. The Kedah treaty could wait; Stanley could see no objections and Hammond sent it to the Law Officers. Then, on 25 May, Ord's treaty arrived as a fait accompli taking the Foreign Office completely by surprise. "The matter and the questions involved in it are in such a state of muddle that I hardly know what to advise", wrote Hammond.² To make matters worse Rogers was soon away from the Colonial Office, so that in the summer of 1868 confusion reigned.

Adderley did his best, but grumbled that "no object seems simpler" - only the process complicated".³

He agreed that the governor ought to be able to negotiate in cases like Kedah. It was really a question of the division of responsibility; Rogers had drawn up the rules, the Foreign Office had agreed, now the first case had come up, and the departments were at loggerheads. They were all agreed that in the

1. Min. by Adderley 26.vi.1868 on FO. to CO. 17.vi.1868. CO/273/23.

2. Min. by Hammond 31.v.1868 on CO. to FO. 25.v.1868. FO/69/47.

3. Min. by Adderley 24.x.1868 on FO. to CO. 17.vii.1868. CO/273/23.

Malay States the governor ought to have some responsibilities, but the Siamese tributaries still bothered the Colonial Office.¹

It would all depend on the circumstances, said Rogers carefully, when he returned from vacation to shed light on the matter.

"I am inclined to think that when the tributary can settle a question without any communication between our authorities & the Siamese authorities, the Governor shd negotiate, but that if it is necessary that the Siamese authorities should intervene visibly, it is better the whole matter should₂ pass through the hands of the Consul... and the King of Siam".

In this case the Foreign Office won; the treaty was completed by the Consul, after consultation with Ord, and it was signed in Bangkok on 6 March 1869.³

However the affair provided a warning for the Colonial Office. Thus when Granville took over in December 1868, Rogers, briefing him as to the Malay States, said "experience seems to show the necessity of maintaining a very clear line indeed between the junction of the officers of the Colonial Office and those of the FO. Else they will certainly quarrel & probably draw us in".⁴

Granville, who was Colonial Secretary December 1868 to July 1870, had to restrain Ord on only one occasion. But energetic Sir Harry was well in his stride in South-east Asia. In August 1868 an eclipse of the sun, which was to be observed by a French scientific expedition, was made the occasion for a State entertainment for the governor by the King of Siam. At Whae Whan, near Patani, on the south-east coast of Siam, King Mongkut dined Sir Harry and Lady Ord and Mr and Mrs Alabaster in the royal quarters. Ord in turn entertained the King. Siamese court customs were apparently disregarded as a compliment to

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1. Buckingham without Rogers was not sure what was going on. Mr. Berne, the FO. treaty writer, was consulted on holiday but could not help. The matter was held over until Rogers was back in London.
 2. Min. by Rogers 22.x.1868 on FO. to CO. 17.vii.1868. CO/273/23.
 3. Knox to Clarendon 19.v.1869. FO/69/48. Text in Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties, pp. 82-85. It closely resembled Ord's 1868 treaty.
 4. Min. by Rogers 21.i.1869 on FO. to CO. 8.i.1869. CO/273/34.

to the visitors and Ord believed he was treated to honours "rarely if ever accorded to a European". He said that "the King's visit to me had no parallel in history",¹ and he thought that the Whae Whan meeting was of great significance in Anglo-Siamese relations. Certainly, the first documents perused by Granville after he took office were reports of a controversy between Alabaster and the Siamese government in which Ord was asked to mediate.²

The Whae Whan meeting was probably more significant than Ord realised. In 1867 the French had persuaded Siam to renounce her suzerainty over Cambodia, and King Mongkut was still intensely suspicious of the French. After one of their gunboats had selected Whae Whan as a suitable site for viewing the eclipse, Alabaster had to oblige by sending a British gunboat to allay Siamese fears. The French application to build an observatory caused dismay as it was feared that the French, once established, might not leave.³ Finally, Mongkut made the eclipse viewing an international affair. He wanted some 'high British official' to attend so Alabaster suggested Ord. During the festivities the French were "complaining and dissatisfied, and said the Siamese were so suspicious of them", but for everyone else the whole time was spent "as a picnic".⁴ European and American ladies came from Bangkok in Siam's finest gunboat; many uninvited came too. Mongkut personally fired a seven-gun salute for the British Acting Consul, stop watch in hand, and he posed for photographs with Ord's party. The whole was a triumph for Siamese hospitality and for Ord's self-esteem.


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1. Ord to Buckingham 27.viii.1868 CO/273/21. Booklet and photos. received 16.xi.1868 in CO/273/22.
 2. Alabaster to Stanley 10.ix & 17.x.1868. FO/69/46. By this time Ord's stock in the FO. had fallen very low. Hammond wrote (2.xii.1868) "if Governor Ord is not preremptorily prohibited from meddling in Siamese matters, we shall have never ending difficulties."
 3. Alabaster to Stanley 13.vi.1868. CO/69/46.
 4. Ibid. Report in Alabaster to Stanley 24.viii.1868. The acting-consul's report is much more exuberant than Ord's, and included a water colour of the scene by himself for Stanley. Hammond drily commented: "a very curious account".

But Ord's August journey was not confined to these pleasing informalities. The voyage back to Singapore was interrupted first to visit the Sultan of Trengganu, who made friendly compliments to the Straits government. Ord then took the Maharaja of Johore to Pahang and mediated in the boundary dispute with Bendahara Wan Ahmad.¹ By the end of 1868 Sir Harry Ord seemed to be bent on establishing a sort of personal paramountcy in the Malay Peninsula. The Colonial Office had to remind him that such long absences from the colony should have received prior approval from them.²

Ord next turned his attention to Sumatra, where Anglo-Dutch relations were governed by the 1824 treaty. Here Ord had a personal interest based on his long negotiations with the Dutch over the Gold Coast; in fact he may even have discussed the matter with the Dutch while completing the 1867 partition agreement.³ In 1824 Britain permanently evacuated her Sumatran settlements and undertook not to make treaties with Sumatran rulers, and the Dutch agreed, in Notes exchanged at the same time, to respect the independence of Atjeh, the northernmost State in the island. Both nations agreed to admit each others' subjects to trade with their respective possessions and would not charge more than double the duty chargeable on their own subjects. They also agreed not to make treaties with the local rulers which expressly excluded the trade of each others' subjects.⁴ The territorial clauses of this treaty were clear, but the commercial articles caused constant friction.

Disagreements over the treaty arose for three reasons. Firstly, as the

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1. The boundary arranged in 1862, when Mutahir was Bendahara of Pahang, was the Endau River, but the islands off its mouth went to Johore. Wan Ahmad rejected this agreement, but in 1867 Sultan Omar of Trengganu persuaded him to accept Ord's mediation. Ord persuaded Abu-Bakar of Johore to return the islands to Pahang, which were north of the mouth of the Endau. Linehan, Pahang, p. 91. Cowan, Origins, pp. 48 & 75. Ord to Buckingham 20.1. 1869. CO/273/26.
 2. CO. to Ord 4.xii.1868 (draft). CO/273/22.
 3. See above p. 81.
 4. Text in Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties, pp. 8-12.



Dutch pushed their influence northwards towards the borders of Atjeh by treaties with the Sumatran rulers they brought these areas within the sphere of the Dutch tariff.¹ Secondly, these treaties provided for Dutch paramountcy in States where, in some cases, Britain had made treaties previous to the 1824 treaty, as in Siak, Deli, Langkat and Serdang.² The Dutch maintained that these were abrogated in 1824, but the British government insisted that the latter treaty was not retrospective. Thirdly, the territory between Atjeh and Siak was disputed by the local rulers. The Dutch treaty with Siak of 1 February 1858 recognised this area as part of Siak, and in 1865 they sent an expedition to Asahan when this was disputed. The British government regarded the Dutch treaties as 'annexations'.

It would be wrong to assume the Dutch were effectively occupying Sumatra. But by the 1860's treaties had been made with most of the States south of Atjeh and the Siak treaty of 1858 provided that Siak and its dependencies "forms a part of Netherlands India and consequently is placed under the supremacy of the Netherlands".³ Moreover the local rulers agreed not to make treaties, or permit foreigners to excavate, own land or reside without the consent of the Dutch Resident at Riouw. In 1859 an Assistant-Resident was stationed at Siak, Controllers were appointed at Deli, Panai and Bila in 1864, and after the Asahan expedition of 1865 an official was placed there.⁴

The usual British policy was to object to Dutch expansion in Sumatra on the grounds that the tariff was injurious to British commerce, and that the treaties embodying it were contrary to the 1824 treaty. Although, from time to time

1. Eg. Djambi Treaty 15.xii.1834 in FO. Confid. Print dated Sept. 1867 pp. 21-24 copy in CO/273/14.

2. Memo. by Sanderson, 1.ii.1869. FO/37/488.

3. FO. Confid. Memo. relating to the Proceedings of the Netherlands Authorities in the Eastern Archipelago 1824-62. by A.S.Green. p. 37. Copy in CO/273/9.

4. Memo. by Gov-Gen. of Netherlands India, M.Mijer, June 1869. FO print of Ord's mission to Batavia pp. 12-17. FO/37/488.

the Dutch made concessions, withdrew their forces, told the local rulers to make exceptions in favour of British subjects and reduced the tariffs, the Straits merchants frequently complained.

In 1865 a change was evident both in London and The Hague. Fransen van Putte, the Liberal Colonial Minister, was anxious to re-define the 1824 treaty as it referred to Sumatra and Borneo and he was prepared to remove differential tariffs in Netherlands India and give up the Dutch Gold Coast settlements to get this.¹ It was suggested at the same time that Straits trade with Sumatra was really increasing, and that complaints from Singapore were caused by jealousy of the success of the German merchants there.² Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, was prepared to encourage the Dutch to adopt a liberal trade policy by allowing Dutch supremacy in Sumatra, and Herman Merivale, from the India Office said "to get free trade in exchange for this acknowledgment would be an excellent bargain".³ In March 1866 Clarendon authorised the British representative at The Hague to open informal discussions over Sumatra, but the to exclude Borneo.⁴

No progress was made because of changes of government in both countries. The new Dutch Conservative Colonial Minister, Mijer, was not favourable. Lord Stanley, the Conservative Colonial Secretary, was not helped by the India and Colonial Offices which were too busy with the transfer of the Straits Settlements.⁵ Pending negotiations the Foreign Office decided to make formal

1. Milbanke to Layard 16.viii.1865. Private. & Milbanke to Russell 31.ix.1865. FO/37/450.

2. Ibid. Capt. Ricketts (HM Consul, Sarawak) to Layard 22.viii.1865.

3. Ibid. Merivale to Hammond 10.xi.1865. Private.

4. Ibid. Clarendon to Milbanke 30.iii.1866. Neither the CO, nor the Admiralty were disposed to commit themselves on the subject of Borneo.

5. Ibid. Min. on CO. to FO. 13.ii.1867, "the former consider that they have done with the Straits Settlements, and the latter that they are not yet in a position to deal with questions relating to them".

protest against recent Dutch treaties with the States between Siak and Atjeh.¹ Meanwhile the Colonial Office did not regard the matter as urgent and simply asked the governor for information along with other matters.

Sir Harry Ord, however, reminded Whitehall that he was "not altogether without experience" in relations with the Dutch, and he suggested that he might conduct negotiations on the spot.² This was refused, but when Stanley decided in September 1867 to abandon "the practically useless right of protesting against inevitable territorial acquisitions" if equal trading facilities were granted in Sumatra to British subjects, he agreed that Ord's opinion on the draft treaty should be asked.³ Ord's reputation still stood high in the Foreign Office, who were not yet antagonised by his Siamese negotiations. His views on the new Sumatra treaty were sent to the Foreign Office in March 1868. Agreeing with the idea of the treaty he pointed out the difficulties likely to be encountered and suggested that Britain should offer a more attractive quid pro quo.⁴ Privately he suggested to Rogers that he should be allowed to tackle the Governor-General of Netherlands India; he had been eleven years on and off involved in the Gold Coast negotiations and he would like "a chance of trying my hand here".⁵

Ord found an ally in Vice-Admiral Edward Harris, the British Minister at The Hague, where discussions were resumed in June 1868 on the return of the Dutch Liberals to power. Stanley's draft treaty, known as the Siak Treaty, referred to the territory between the River Djambi and Cape Temiang, but de Waal

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1. Dutch treaties with Bila, Panei, Serdang and Deli in FO. Confid Print Dec. 1866. Copy in CO/273/15. Stanley to Ward 16.ii.1867. FO/37/450.
 2. Ord to Buckingham 13.iv.1868. CO/273/10.
 3. Ibid. FO. to CO. 15.x.1867.
 4. Ord to Buckingham 16.i.1868. Confidential. in CO. to FO. 25.iii.1868. FO/37/487.
 5. Ord to Rogers 21.ix.1868. Private. CO/273/17.

the Colonial Minister asked "why not all Sumatra?".¹ This raised the question of Atjeh, with which Raffles had made a treaty in 1819, which should have been changed after 1824 but nothing had been done. The Dutch had agreed in the 1824 Note to respect the independence of Atjeh, but de Waal said that certain Achinese chiefs now sought Dutch protection. Stanley was prepared to 'deal liberally' over Atjeh, but the Colonial Office advised that this be left out of the original proposal. Harris, however, suggested that Ord should visit Batavia, and Ord revived the idea of allowing the Dutch to have Atjeh. He reiterated his view that the Dutch were asked to make a large commercial concession to British subjects and would require something more material in return than a conviction of the "abstract propriety" of the matter. He suggested that Atjeh should be left to the Dutch, just as he proposed abandoning the former protectorate over Wassaw on the Gold Coast. Northern Sumatra was, he said, in a state which encouraged piracy, and the Sultan of Atjeh had "the usual vices of the Malay Rajahs".² The Colonial Office now agreed with Ord; they were more anxious in getting the commercial concessions and Adderley several times suggested offering the British Gold Coast forts to get this. The Foreign Office were more cautious, regarding the Atjeh question as a 'nice one', but they concluded that Raffles's 1819/^{treaty} was a dead letter, that Dutch control over Sumatra had distinct advantages, so Clarendon (although recently returned to office and not really clear about Ord's mission) said "if Sir H. Ord is to negotiate with the Dutch Governor I suppose he must make the most" of Atjeh.³ Ord was not, in fact, permitted to negotiate, but he was allowed to make it known that the British government would 'deal liberally' over Atjeh;⁴ his real mission was to sound opinion in Batavia and create a favourable feeling towards

1. Harris to Stanley 24.vii.186 copy in CO/273/22.

2. Ord to Buckingham 9.xii.1868. Ibid.

3. Min. by Clarendon on Sanderson Memo. 1.ii.1869. FO/37/488.

4. FO. to CO. 23.ii.1869. CO/273/34.

the treaty. Mijer, the Governor General, was known to be an opponent, the States-General was evenly divided, and the Dutch King had not yet been told.¹

Ord reached Batavia on 14 June 1869 and returned to Singapore a month later. He found great opposition in Java to any concessions, and he felt that Mijer himself was most reluctant. The policy of the Liberals at The Hague towards Netherlands India was regarded as uncertain, but the local officials wanted no change which would give advantages to British traders. Mijer gave Ord his own ideas for a future treaty. Stanley's final draft was designed to cover all areas in Sumatra which the Dutch had acquired since 1824 and might acquire in the future.² Mijer suggested it should apply only to Siak, so reducing the area where British traders would be admitted on an equal footing.³ Ord urged the British government to accept Mijer's version, and if there was still opposition at The Hague to adopt a tough line with the Dutch to demand redress for violations of the 1824 treaty, or take to matter to arbitration.⁴ The latter idea was rejected, but Whitehall was surprised that Ord had not exceeded his instructions and produced some rash committment; instead he seemed to have "conducted his negotiations quietly and with distinction".⁵ His particular contribution was the inclusion of Atjeh in the final agreement and his sympathetic understanding of the difficulties of the Dutch Liberals, but after this the Colonial Office deliberately kept Ord out of the matter and an attempt at intervention he made in 1871 was resisted.⁶

The new treaty was not completed until 1872, partly because of the precarious political position of the Dutch government, and partly because of the 'links'

1. Harris to Clarendon 26.iii.1869. FO/37/488.

2. Copy in FO. to CO. 17.ix.1867. CO/273/14.

3. FO. print of Ord's Mission pp. 6 & 34. Copy in FO/37/488.

4. Ord to Granville 22.vi. & 10.vii.1869. CO/273/30.

5. Ibid. Min. by Cox 23.viii.1869.

6. Min. by Cox 14.ix.1871 on Ord to Meade 14.ix.1871. CO/273/53.

with the other agreements.

Firstly, at the end of 1869 the Dutch asked if the agreements negotiated separately to allow Dutch planters in Surinam to recruit labour in India could be presented in the States-General at the same time to offset the concessions to Britain embodied in the Siak Treaty.¹ Granville agreed, but in September 1870 he insisted that both treaties should 'stand or fall together'. Secondly, the British government first agreed to attach a note to the treaty withdrawing opposition to future Dutch occupation in Atjeh, and later the treaty was expanded to include the whole of Sumatra.² Thirdly, in June 1870 the 'link' was forged by van Limburg, the Foreign Minister, with the Gold Coast treaty, which has already been discussed,³ and Granville, rejecting an attempt by the Dutch to reopen the Sumatra treaty and re-define the Anglo-Dutch spheres in South-east Asia, agreed that all three should 'stand or fall together'. Kimberley told Gladstone that the Sumatra Treaty, signed 8 September 1870, was "dependent on the conclusion" of the Gold Coast one,⁴ The latter was not signed until 25 February 1871 and this is what kept all the treaties from the States-General until the 1871 session. In July 1871 the Gold Coast treaty was accepted and the Sumatra one was not, but the latter, re-submitted in slightly revised form in January 1872, was finally accepted and was ratified on 17 February 1872.⁵

Thus during his mission to Java in 1869 Ord kept within his instructions and he made a useful contribution to the treaty which was completed three years later. In the Malay Peninsula he tried to take one other step forward. Concerned over the problem of piracy off the coast of Perak he revived the

1. Harris to Clarendon 17.xii.1869 & 28.i.1870. FO/37/488.

2. Ibid. Clarendon to Harris 10.iii.1870. Confid. (draft).

3. See above p. 43-46.

4. Kimberley to Gladstone 14.x.1870. Gladstone Papers 44224/88.

5. Text of Sumatra treaty, signed 2.xi.1871, Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties, pp. 17-18.

British claim to the Dindings, but the Colonial Office restrained him. In 1826 the Sultan of Perak had offered to cede a coastal area known as "the Pulo Dinding and the Islands of Pangkor".¹ This area was not defined, and it was never occupied as the East India Company did not ratify the treaty. Some negotiations were in progress when Ord arrived but they were discontinued, but in 1869 Ord tried to re-open the matter. In England, Lord Stanley of Alderley, a traveller in the East and a former Straits resident, read of the new move in the Straits newspapers, and he demanded explanations from the Colonial Office. Ord insisted that he never intended to occupy new territory without authority, and Granville had this one occasion to remind Ord of the usual policy: "I should not be disposed to approve of any proceeding which would extend the responsibility of HM Government in the neighbourhood of the Straits Settlements".²

In 1870 the Malay States caused little anxiety in Whitehall. Ord's attention was diverted by more pressing problems in the colony, and Kimberley took office in July 1870 with little apparent knowledge of, or interest for, the Malay States. For instance, when some photographs of Malays arrived for Professor Huxley, the Minister who was to alter the course of Malayan history, found them "a hideous series",³ and when a rumour was circulated by the Dutch that the Maharaja of Johore was about to lease the island of Tiomang to Prussia, Kimberley said, "the first step is to ascertain distinctly where the Maharaja and his islands are".⁴

In March 1871 Ord, sick with malaria, left for his first leave in England. Having covered in five years the whole range of British policy towards the Malay States, he had achieved only a part of his policy. His general notions

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1. Perak treaty No. 1, 1826. Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties, p. 23.
 2. Granville to Ord 10.ix.1869 (draft). CO/273/30. For a fuller discussion of the whole Dindings controversy see Cowan, Origins, pp. 67-69.
 3. Kimberley 14.i.1871 on Ord to Kimberley 21.xi.1870. CO/273/41.
 4. Kimberley 21.vii.1870 on FO. to CO. 7.vii.1870. CO/273/42.

of responsibility were accepted, and within each of Rogers's three spheres, Ord had made some useful contributions. In the case of Siam and its tributaries, he had urged the value of preserving Siamese power and had concluded agreements over Kelantan and Kedah. His visit to Mongkut had furthered good relations with Siam itself. In the case of the independent Malay States he had carried his point that the Governor should have wider authority, and with this freedom he had successfully mediated in the Pahang-Johore dispute and made a friendly visit to the Sultan of Trengganu. He found relations with Perak more or less satisfactory. In the third case, where relations were with the Dutch, his Gold Coast experience had given him a special interest. Agreeing that the Sumatran States could be conceded to the Dutch, he carried the important point that Atjeh should not be excepted. In all these matters one can say that Ord was a success.

But he had also envisaged further British intervention within the Peninsula, and this had been flatly rejected in London. Ord was convinced that the policy of non-intervention in Malaya needed revision. The Colonial Office would allow intervention only if the security of the colony was threatened, and although the germ of a revolution in policy lay in this proviso, Sir Harry Ord was not to be the executor. He accepted his position as Downing Street's catspaw and told his Council "my hands are tied".¹

While on leave in England he tried to press his views, but although he made some headway on administrative details, he failed to carry his concept of a Malayan policy. Ord's impact on the Colonial Office, however, cannot be viewed apart from the more general opinions held there about his administration in the Straits. Officials would regard Ord's ideas in their light of their confidence in the Governor. It is therefore time to take stock of Ord's position in Singapore - the fulcrum whence he sought to influence wider spheres.

1. Legislative Council minutes, 20.x.1869 received in CO. 7.ii.1870. CO/273/43.

Ord's government of the Colony, 1867 to 1871.

The first Colonial Office administration of the Straits Settlements had been a stormy one. On the one hand, Straits residents who had longed to be rid of the superintendence of the Government of India, now found Downing Street a more vigilant master;¹ on the other hand, the Colonial Office realised that Ord, for all his experience, was unacquainted with the system in Crown Colonies. Expenditure on new steamers and Government House drew criticism from both sides. At the transfer ceremonies in Singapore, Ord offended local society by his brusque manner.² Sir Benson Maxwell, the Chief Justice, clashed with him from the start. For several years even the layout of his Estimates and Blue Books was unacceptable to London.

Thus Ord's limitations were realised. In January 1868 Rogers remarked that service in Bermuda and the West Indies, where there were representative institutions, ill fitted anyone for the detailed reporting required from Crown Colonies. When Ord, with the best of intentions, suggested in the Legislative Council that new revenue was needed and that import duties were not ruled out he sent shivers of fright around Singapore, the City and Whitehall. "I cannot help thinking that the relations between Sir H.O. and this office are becoming unsatisfactory",³ said Rogers, who prepared a tart lecture for the governor.⁴

Eventually Ord produced Blue Books in the correct form, but some typical expressions of his personality left a bad impression. Demands for an A.D.C. caused irritation, although he got his way. Letters about his future career, and claims to what amounted to special consideration, made Rogers think him "most unduly pertinacious".⁵ But when criticism came from outside, Downing

1. Straits Times, 20.iii.1869.

2. C.B. Buckley, Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore, II, p. 786.

3. Min. by Rogers 16.i.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 7.xii.1867. CO/273/13.

4. CO. to Ord 31.vii.1868. Confid. (draft). CO/273/18.

5. Min. by Rogers on Ord to Granville 25.i.1869. CO/273/26.

Street supported the governor. In Singapore Ord became very unpopular, but evidence suggests that in his early days he had a good deal of support.

Opposition first centred in London.

When the framework of Colonial rule in the Straits Settlements was embodied in the first ordinances which Ord presented in the Legislative Council in April 1869, old Singapore residents were alarmed that the cherished independence of the Supreme Court seemed threatened. One result of this was the foundation in London in January 1868 of the Straits Settlements Association "to guard against any legislation that might prejudicially effect the interests of the Straits Settlements".¹ This society took the initiative in the attack on Ord. Month by month it badgered the Colonial Office, and it secured two interviews with Granville and at least one with Kimberley. But after two years of controversy Ord emerged victorious,² and his reports became so satisfactory that it was said that his 1868 Blue Book "might be read as Sir H Ord's general reply to the Straits Association."³ In 1870 the association's influence slumped after Herbert wrote in January: "the time has arrived when the Association may be relieved of the supervision of the Col: Office".⁴

Yet at the very moment when the Colonial Office felt that Ord was holding his own, opposition came to a head in Singapore. Public meetings were held against him, and when he went on leave newspapers hoped he would never return. Sir Benson Maxwell, his perennial rival, was said to command the unofficials in

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1. Wm. Napier (Sec.) to Granville 7.ii.1868. CO/273/24.
 2. Granville, sensitive to political pressure, was fairly indulgent to the Assoc'n, and its letters were often the only Straits documents he endorsed. He received a deputation on 4 May 1869, but since a reply by Ord to his attackers was received on 1 May, Granville conceded nothing. In December 1868 a 'Singapore Merchant' wrote three vicious letters to The Star, which soon appeared as a pamphlet, The Straits Settlements, or How to Govern a Colony. Ord's reply was contained in a series of reasoned annotations to this, in Ord to Granville 29.iii.1869. CO/273/31.
 3. Min. by Sandford 30.x.1869 on Ord to Granville 27.ix.1869. CO/273/30.
 4. Ibid. Min. by Herbert on SS Assoc. to Granville 31.i.1870.

in the Council, W.H.M. Read resigned his position as a Magistrate for a year after a row with Ord, and Rogers found himself "suspecting the truth to be that Sir H.O. is irritating".¹ Politically, this meant that people were reluctant to serve on the Legislative Council. Possibly pressure was put on people to refuse to serve as unofficials to embarrass Ord, which made Cox feel that he was "hardly meeting with fair play".²

Ord overcame his political troubles with some courage. While the Straits Association in London hedged when Granville suggested adding a Chinese member to the Council, Ord welcomed the idea, and he went further, and decided that two more Europeans could also be appointed. The Colonial Office feared that he might only get a majority by using his casting vote, but Ord said he was "quite prepared to take the risk".³ At the outset on the 1870 session Cox was "curious to see how Sir H. Ord will get through this session. If wise - well?".⁴ And this suspicion that he might pull it off was fulfilled. When the new steamer Pluto proved inadequate for local needs Ord decided to settle the question of government transport, which had vexed him from the start, for himself. He got the Executive Council to vote \$7000 to alter Pluto,⁵ and they also agreed to spend \$15,000 building a new steamer after selling two old ones. Herbert was furious. "It really is a great impertinence in him to sign these despatches altogether", and he suspended the matter by telegram. But Knatchbull-Hugessen was not so sure that Ord would not make out a good case: "Note Ord had his Council unanimously behind him now - last year he needed to use his casting vote".⁶ While he was at home in 1871 Ord managed to persuade Kimberley over

1. Min. by Rogers 23.iii.1870 on files ref. Maxwell & Read received 21.iii.1870. CO/273/36.

2. Min. by Cox 1.vi.1869 on Ord to Granville 26.iv.1869. CO/273/29.

3. Ord to Granville 9.ix.1869. CO/273/31.

4. Min. by Cox 11.vii.70 on Ord to Granville 24.v.1870. CO/273/38.

5. F. Swettenham, Footprints in Malaya (1942) pp. 13-15 recalls Pluto's limitations

6. Mins Herbert (22nd) and K-Hugessen 23.iii.1871 on Ord to Kimberley 14.ii.1871. CO/273/45. Herbert was annoyed because he arranged to purchase Pluto second hand - a bargain which proved very doubtful.

the steamers.

Ord may have mastered his troubles with the Council, just as he got the better of the Straits Association, but he also had trouble with his subordinate officials, especially those immediately below him, the Lieut-Governors of Malacca and Penang. Herbert's was probably a fair summary of the impasse Ord reached in his personal dealings:

"I am rather inclined to think that Governor Ord's unfortunate temper and disposition to act harshly and imperiously towards those who do not humbly obey his will has led a party of officials to combine in giving him trouble and putting him in the wrong. Any symptom of this should be repressed - but one cannot help feeling¹ that if he is uncomfortable he made the bed on which he lies".

Only in the light of this judgement on his character can the reception of Ord's proposals and actions as to the Malay States be seen.

Nevertheless, this view must not be allowed to obscure the real achievements of Ord's first tour at Singapore. In spite of all the criticism, he produced a revenue to cover expenditure in years of trade depression, and the estimates for 1871 showed a surplus of \$71,192.² Government House was completed. As a professional engineer Ord was a highly suitable person to introduce Crown Colony rule in Singapore, and he introduced much resented, but essential, ordinances to provide more sanitary conditions in the growing urban centre. (Sir) Frank Swettenham, who was only twenty when he arrived as a Cadet, saw much of Ord while travelling as his Malay interpreter, and he remembered him as "A big and very masterful Governor, of great ability and strong character". He paid tribute also to Ord's financial ability, and said "Sir Harry and Lady Ord were exceedingly kind to me from the first".³ Ord's opponents were usually from the European mercantile community, never a class much trusted by aristocratic

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1. Min. by Herbert 22.viii.1870 on papers concerning troubles with Shaw in Malacca received 13.viii.1870. Ord also had trouble with Cairns in Malacca and Anson in Penang. See A.E.H. Anson, About Myself and Others, pp. 29^a-4.
 2. Ord to Kimberley 19.ix.1870. CO/273/41.
 3. Swettenham, Footprints, pp. 16-17.

ministers like Granville, Kimberley and Carnarvon. On the eve of Ord's departure even Herbert thought the governor should have his due: "We have had to find fault with him about administrative details, but he should have credit for conciliating and keeping in good order the Asiatic population".¹

Whatever the Colonial Office thought about Ord they were very soon completely disenchanted with his locum tenens, Col. Anson, the Lieut-Governor of Penang. Only three months after Ord's departure from Singapore Herbert complained of "too much eagerness in the Colony to amend his proceedings now that his back is turned".² Knatchbull-Hugessen noticed how "Mr. Anson is very busy & inclined to put a great many irons in the fire at the same time".³ Kimberley insisted that "a very strong check is required on the foolish tendencies of acting Governors to fussy meddling in the policy of their superiors".⁴

Yet Anson's meddling was really a continuation of Ord's own policy. After seeing the Malay States, Ord had recommended what he felt, as the man on the spot, the circumstances demanded, but he was restrained by the policy of non-intervention. Anson, now standing in Ord's shoes, came to the same conclusions as Ord. He saw a critical deterioration of order and trade on the west coast. To appreciate his position it is necessary to turn aside and consider the Malay States at the time of Ord's leave in England in 1871.

The Malay States in the 1870's.

Only in Johore and Kedah was there anything like effective government.⁵ Kedah, along with Kelantan, has already been noted as under the suzerainty of Siam, and

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1. Min. by Herbert 12.iv.1871 on Ord to Kimberley 3.iii.1871. CO/273/45.
 2. Min. by Herbert 6.vi.1871 on Anson to Kimberley 25.iv.1871. CO/273/46.
 3. Min. by K-Hugessen 1.vii.1871 on Anson's speech to Legis. Council. Received 28.vi.1871. CO/273/47.
 4. Min. by Kimberley 6.vi.1871. on Anson to Kimberley 3.vi.1871. CO/273/47.
 5. Report of the 'Committee on Native States' in Anson to Kimberley 25.iv.1871. CO/273/47.

Ord had established good relations with Siam.¹ Johore had been ruled since 1862 by Abu-Bakar, who styled himself Maharaja and was in close touch with Ord. His family owed its position to British influence² and his home was in Singapore. In 1866 he had visited Europe and he has been called, somewhat doubtfully, the one Malay ruler the British could trust and the "father of modern Johore".³

In the East of the Peninsula, Trengganu was ruled peaceably by the remarkable Sultan Omar, who had centralised the administration on the Sultanate.⁴ After the excitements of the early 1860's Trengganu could be said to be outside the main stream of Malay politics as seen from Singapore. Pahang was war-sick and somewhat de-populated after Wan Ahmad's three invasions;⁵ even at the end of the century Pahang was still something of a backwater in Malaya.⁶

The regions that would worry Col. Anson lay on the west coast between the British settlements of Penang and Malacca, in the States of Perak and Selangor and Sungei Ujong, more precisely, they lay around the rivers which flowed through the tin bearing areas and issued into the Straits of Malacca. On these rivers the leading Malay Rajas based their revenues in the form of tolls; along the same rivers a growing traffic in tin was transported.

The west coast States were afflicted by two problems which became interwoven. Firstly, Chinese tin miners, backed by capital in Penang and Malacca, and attracted by the possibility of great wealth, brought to Malaya clan rivalries

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1. While Ord was on leave King Chulalongkorn visited Singapore. Anson, About Myself and Others, pp. 299-301.
 2. See agreement between Sultan and Tumengong of Johore, 1855. Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties, pp. 127-129.
 3. See Winstedt, 'History of Johore' JMBRAS, X, Pt. III (Dec 1932) pp. 100-120. In England Abu-Bakar was created a Knight of the Star of India - the first Malay ruler to be so honoured. His special position in Singapore did not prevent him causing anxiety to the Straits government on a number of occasions. W.H. Read was a frequent critic. For some of Abu-Bakar's economic interests, see Cowan, Origins, pp. 44-48.
 4. M.C. ff Sheppard, 'A Short History of Trengganu', JMBRAS, Pt III (1949). 34-35.
 5. See above p. 134.
 6. H. Clifford, East Coast Etchings (1896) p. 11.

which erupted into open warfare.¹ Secondly, the decay of Malayan royal institutions gave rise to dynastic rivalries, jealousies, and civil wars among the Malays. Since the Malay Rajas usually depended upon revenues from river tolls,² and the yields from these increased when the rivers were used by the tin traffic, rivalry for territorial jurisdiction over the mouths of the rivers was rife. Two sorts of rivalry existed therefore, (1) among the Chinese societies in the mines, and (2) among the petty Malay rulers. When Malay Raja allied himself with Chinese Headman, the result was the type of confused warfare which halted trade and even threatened the security of the British settlements.

In Perak the rivalry of opposing candidates for the Sultanate lay behind the tension among the Malays. Only two months after Ord's departure Sultan Ali died on 25 May 1871,³ and the irregular election of Bendahara Ismail to succeed

1. See V. Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (1948) pp. 155-173, and Mills, British Malaya, pp. 203-208 for the Chinese Secret Societies. These societies had their origin in China and membership was usually based on regional or clan divisions in China. Originally 'benevolent associations', some had taken on a criminal character. In the Malay States they usually provided the only organisation among the mining communities. By the 1850's two groups had emerged at Penang:


(a) The Ghee Hin, and the Ho Seng, which corresponded with the Triad Society of China, and was largely composed of Cantonese. Locally these were known as the 'Four Districts', 'See Kwan'.

(b) The Hai San and Toh Peh Kong, which had been formed in Penang, and consisted mainly of Hakkas. These were known as 'five District', 'Go Kwan'. In the Penang riots of 1867 these two parties were involved in a regular war for ten days. (Anson's account, Myself & Others, pp. 278-283.)

The division and rivalry of the Ghee Hin and the Hai San were projected into the Malay States. Little was known about the societies in the Colony until Gustav Schlegel's, Thian Ti Hwui, published in Batavia in English in 1866, and based on records seized by the Police. It was used, according to Purcell, by Anson's committee of inquiry into the Penang Riots, whose report was published in 1868.

2. See R.J. Wilkinson's chapters in R.O. Winstedt, 'A History of Perak', JMRRAS, XII (1934) pp. 134-158 for the Perak Constitution and for some account of the various officers of State, and what they were, in theory, entitled to in the way of revenue. Mills, British Malaya, pp. 170-173 says the Malay States at this time were committing political 'hara-kiri' among themselves.

3. Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, p. 93 gives the date as 26 May. Cowan, Origins, p. 98 gives 25 May, following the Irving Report, 24.vii.1872. CO/809/1 p. 152.



OUTLINE SKETCH OF PERAK

him, left the Perak Rajas in rival groups. As the authority of the Sultanate of Perak had been declining for twenty years the normal constitutional processes were becoming upset.¹ The decline began in the late 1850's when Sultan 'Abdu'llah Muhammad Shah (reigned 1851-1857) and his sons were so unpopular and weak that the chiefs were in open rebellion.² By the time of the death of Sultan Ja'afar (reigned 1857-1865) the Perak royal house had so declined that the new Sultan, Ali, reigned until 1871 in impotence at Sayong,³ while an ageing Bendahara, Ismail, who was not a member of the royal house, lived in isolation up the Kinta River.⁴ In 1871 the dominating characters of Perak were neither the Sultannor the Bendahara, but the Raja Muda 'Abdu'llah and the so-called Mantri of Larut. The highly intelligent, but unpopular, Raja Yusuf, son of Sultan 'Abdu'llah Muhammad Shah, remained a persistent claimant for the Sultanate.⁵

These rivals faced each other in 1871,⁶ and as their names will recur again and again in the background to British intervention their antecedents are worth discussing. The Sultan and Raja Yusuf may, for the moment, be dismissed quickly. The former had been Raja Muda to Sultan Ja'afar and became Sultan in 1865. A weak ruler, he had no real authority in Perak. Yusuf was several times passed by in the succession, apparently because he was disliked because of his harshness.⁷

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1. The best account of this period of Perak's history is the Introduction to C.D.Cowan, 'Sir Frank Swettenham's Perak Journals, 1874-76', JMBRAS, XXIV, Pt. 4 (Dec. 1951) pp. 12-20. The Constitution of Perak is discussed at length by Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, pp. 134-158. Usually the heir presumptive, or Raja Muda, was accepted by the minor rulers in an election as the new Sultan. The Bendahara or 'Prime Minister', if of the royal house, then often succeeded as Raja Muda, and a new Bendahara was elected.
 2. Winstedt, Perak, pp. 75-76. J.M.Gullick, 'Capt. Speedy of Larut', JMBRAS, XXVI, Pt. 3 (Nov. 1953) pp. 24-25.
 3. Ibid. p. 25.
 4. Cowan, Origins, p. 62.
 5. Cowan, Swettenham's Perak Journals, p.16.
 6. Gullick, Speedy, p. 24 speaks of two parties among the Perak Malays - the up-river(Ulu) chiefs centred around Kuala Kangsa on the Upper Perak, and the down-river (Hilir) chiefs living nearer the mouth at Bandar Bahru and Durian Sabatang.
 7. In 1874 Swettenham was told by the Laksamana, "By rights Yusuf ought to be Sultan of Perak, but he is so severe the chiefs cannot bear his harshness". Cowan, Swettenham's Perak Journals, p. 56.

but he persisted in claiming he was the rightful Sultan, and in 1874 Swettenham found him "by far the most royal looking man I have seen in Perak".¹ Bendahara Ismail was not of the royal house; the date of his election to office is uncertain, but is said to have been about 1851.² By 1871 he was old and living apart, wisely caring after his tin mines at Kinta and he continued to do so even after he was elected Sultan in succession to Ali.³ The Raja Muda 'Abdu'llah was the son of Sultan Ja'afar and was made Raja Muda in 1865, probably because Bendahara's Ismail's non-royal descent prevented the normal succession being followed.⁴ By 1871 'Abdu'llah was at odds with the Sultan, and he antagonised the Mantri of Larut by trying to collect taxes there, which he claimed were a perquisite of the Raja Muda's office.⁵

This quarrel introduces the most significant factor in Perak politics in this period. For while the Malay Sultans of Perak had declined a parvenu family had achieved an almost independent domain in the province of Larut, where it owed its position to wealth from taxes on tin mined by the Chinese in Larut. These were said to number 40,000 in 1871, and to be exporting tin worth one million dollars a year.⁶


Forty years earlier Larut had been a marshy tract on the periphery of Perak affairs, under the nominal jurisdiction of a minor Malay ruler.⁷ But about 1840 this ruler employed a relative, Long Ja'far, the Mantri's father, to collect

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1. Ibid. p. 54. In February 1869 Yusuf had presented his case to the Straits government and Col. Macpherson, the Colonial Secretary, regretted at the time that it was not possible for Britain to govern Perak "through a nominee". Wilkinson, 'Notes on Perak History', Papers on Malay Subjects, v.4, (1908) p. 99.
 2. Date discussed in Cowan, Swettenham's Journals, p. 13. Ismail's origins are discussed by Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, p. 140.
 3. See below p. 114
 4. 'Abdu'llah's background discussed in Gullick, Speedy, p. 25. 5. Ibid. p. 26
 6. F. McNair, Perak and the Malays: Sarong and Kris (1878), p. 351.
 7. Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, p. 78 calls Larut a 'no man's land' and describes the authority, such as it did exist, of the one interested Malay ruler, the Panglima Bukit Gantang, or Keeper of the pass between Larut and the Perak R.

the taxes in the area.¹ When he first went to Larut, it is said there were only three Chinese living there, but seeing the possibilities for tin mining he encouraged the Chinese to work there, and he gradually gained for himself nearly independent jurisdiction. After he died in 1857 his son Ngah Ibrahim, then in his twenties, managed to gain even greater powers than his father.² Yet if Ngah Ibrahim gained 'titular and official' authority³ over Larut, he did not attempt to govern. The Chinese miners at Klian Pauh (later Taiping) and Kamunting were largely left to themselves and such organisation as there was was provided by the secret societies. Others have described the origins of these societies which in 1862 first brought disorder to Larut. It is sufficient to mention here that in 1862 the Hai San miners at Klian Pauh drove the Ghee Hins of Kamunting from Larut, assisted, it should be noted, by Ngah Ibrahim.

This was the first of a continuing series of disorders which troubled Perak and Penang, where the Chinese had their headquarters, for fifteen years. But while it illustrates vividly the precariousness of Ngah Ibrahim's wealth, the affairs of 1862 also assisted him indirectly in getting greater powers. For by paying large sums to meet claims against the titular Sultan Ja'far (who could not pay),⁴ it appears that Ngah Ibrahim was given further freedom in Larut and was made one of the four great chiefs of Perak. Henceforth he was known as

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1. Gullick, Speedy, p.18-19. Long Ja'far's origins are discussed by Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, p.78. His brother had married the daughter of the Panglima Bukit Gantang.
 2. The grants of jurisdiction over the Larut to Long Ja'far and Ngah Ibrahim are best presented by Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, pp.78-79, where he says of Long Ja'far: "Beginning as a mere representative of the Sultan he bought from his master one after another the various sources of revenue in the province". Translations made by Swettenham in 1873 of the documents said to be the grants, are quoted by Wilkinson, Papers on Malay Subjects, op. cit. pp. 102-5.
 3. Wilkinson's careful phrase.
 4. The dispossessed Ghee Hin members made claims against the titular authority in Perak, Sultan Ja'far. Gov. Cavenagh blockaded the Larut River to enforce the payment of \$17,447. It is said that the arrangement whereby Ngah Ibrahim settled this debt was negotiated by the Laksamana, Mohamed Amin, who Gullick (Speedy p.25) calls the ablest Malay financier in Perak. (See also Cowan, Origins, p. 60. McNair, op. cit. p.351. Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, p.81. and Cavenagh, Reminiscences, pp. 323-324.).



THE RIVERS OF SELANGOR

the Mantri of Larut.¹ Whether he received a freehold or simply a sort of fief is undecided, but certainly in the late 1860's he was the de facto ruler of Larut. His revenue from the tin trade was said to amount to \$200,000 a year: he had a small police force of forty men, and forts on the Larut river commanding the seaward and landward entrances of the Larut tin mining area.²

In Selangor a civil war, which had begun before Ord went to the East, was reaching a more crucial phase when the Governor went on leave. The Sultan of Selangor had actually requested Ord's assistance in July 1870, but this was refused because the real nature of the Selangor civil war did not emerge until after his return. Selangor's problems differed from Perak's, but the same elements - Chinese mining clans, and rival Rajas - played their part.³

In his long reign from 1826 to 1857 Sultan Muhammad had allowed the kingdom to split into what were virtually principalities centering round the five main rivers - the Bernam, Selangor, Klang, Langat and Lukut.⁴ The most powerful of these territorial rulers by the time of Muhammad's death in 1857 was Raja Juma'at of Lukut, who, like the Mantri on Larut, built his wealth and power by a wise cultivation of tin mining by Chinese, whom he first introduced into Selangor in the 1840's. He was soon copied by Raja Abdul-Samad, ruler of the Selangor River, who opened up the Kanching Hills mines, on the upper Selangor River about 1844, and by Raja Abdullah of Klang, who opened the Ampang mines on the upper Klang in the late 1850's.⁵

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1. Referred to hereafter as The Mantri. A discussion of the new title in Cullick, Speedy, p.22, and a careful discussion of the meaning of the new grants, and a copy of the document, in Wilkinson, in Winstedt, Perak, p. 81.
 2. Ibid. p.82. The forts were at Matang, near the mouth of the Larut River, and at Kota, commanding the land route over the pass from the Perak River.
 3. See Cowan, Origins, pp. 84-5 for discussion of the differences between the situations in Perak and Selangor.
 4. Wilkinson, 'History of the Peninsula Malays', Papers on Malay Subjects (1923) vol. 7 p. 142, speaks of "five petty states".
 5. S.M.Middlebrook, 'Yap Ah Loy', JMBRAS, XXIV, Pt. 2, (1951) pp. 17-20.

It was rivalry for the possession of these rivers rather than for the Sultanate which caused the Selangor civil war. The years between 1860 and 1867 have been described as those particularly disastrous in Selangor's history.¹ As Swettenham says, Selangor became "the war playground of a number of Malay Rajas, whose pastime was fighting and intriguing to gain control of the rich districts in Selangor where Chinese, and a few others, were mining tin".² The most ambitious and persistent of these warring Malays was Raja Mahdi, who in 1866 managed to commandeer the lower Klang district.³ At first the Sultan Abdul-Samad did not demur to this coup: he told Raja Ismail, the heir to the dispossessed ruler of Klang, that as they were both young men they should fight it out. But when Raja Mahdi stopped paying his \$500 a month into the Royal Revenue, the Sultan's equanimity passed, and he refused Raja Mahdi the hand of his daughter Arfar.⁴

Sultan Abdul-Samad gave his daughter instead to the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din, brother of the Sultan of Kedah, who henceforth for about ten years was to be one

1. Wilkinson, History of the Peninsula Malays, p. 144. Abdul-Samad, nephew and son-in-law of Muhammad, had become Sultan of Selangor in 1859. As ruler of the Selangor River district he had been active in opening up the Kanching Hills mines, but as Sultan he lived in indolence, neutrality and semi-retirement at Langat. Middlebrook (p.24) states the view that his election was a mistake. Possibly a worse event was the death in 1864 of Raja Juma'at, for under his sons Raja Bot and Raja Yahja Lukut went into a rapid decline.
2. Swettenham, Footprints, p. 20.
3. Raja Mahdi was the grandson of Sultan Muhammad, and the son of Raja Sulaiman, who originally ruled Klang before he was displaced in 1853, when the Sultan gave the region to Abdullah, who opened the Ampang mines. Raja Mahdi had been living in Klang as a trader in the early 1860's, receiving an allowance from Abdullah. The coup took place when Abdullah was embarrassed by his Malay subjects.
4. In Abdullah's time, Abdul-Samad had arranged for the Klang revenues to be collected on a commission basis by the Singapore tycoons W.H.M.Read and Tan Kim Ching. (Winstedt, Selangor, p. 19). This possibly made Mahdi's defaulting more obvious to the Sultan and it also involved awkward demands for compensation from the British merchants. In May 1867 Gov. Cavenagh refused to intervene in the dispute between Raja Mahdi and Raja Ismail. Ibid. p. 30.

of the leading figures in Selangor politics.¹ And not only did Mahdi loose a wife, for in little over a year he lost Klang to Raja Ismail, who with 'Zia'u'd-din's help attacked the area, and captured Klang by March 1870.² However before many months had passed the persistent Mahdi had found a new prize, for in July 1870 he drove Raja Muda Musa from the mouth of the Selangor River.³

The motive for each of these skirmishes was the rivalry of the Rajas for control of the river mouths which would yield an income from duties on tin exports. The mining areas, as already mentioned, lay nearer the headwaters of the rivers. There, rivalries of a different kind were brewing. The miners around Kuala Lumpur, on the Klang, were Hai San members, while the Kah Yeng Chew clan of the rival mines nearby were Ghee Hins.⁴ Thus potential enmities, like those in Perak, existed in Selangor. Worse still when the Chinese Headman, Liu Ngim Kong, died in 1868 having appointed Yap Ah Loy as his successor, disappointed relatives of Liu descended on Kuala Lumpur. Led it seems by Chong Chong, a former employer of Yap Ah Loy, they constituted a threat to the peace among the miners of the area. Nothing happened in February 1869, however, when Chong Chong first

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1. The Tengku is said to have been educated among Europeans, and Abdul-Samad, who had no territory to offer him after he married Arfar, asked him what he wanted to do. When the latter stated a preference for administrative work the Sultan made him a sort of governor of Langat, which would enable him to collect revenue as an income. More vaguely the Sultan said he would "give up the country with its districts to our son... to govern and develop for Us and Our sons". (Written authority dated 26.vi.1868). Whatever was intended by this the Malays came to style him as Tengku Wakil and the British authorities regarded him as 'Viceroy'. Thomas Braddell's Report on Selangor, 18.ii.1874. CO/809/1 p. 216.
 2. Cowan, Origins, p.93 & Wilkinson, Hist. of Pen. Malays, p.145. Ismail received financial backing in Malacca and he captured most of the Klang forts in August 1869, but Raja Mahdi remained at Kuala Klang. 'Zia'u'd-din had to go to Kedah in 1868 when his mother died, but he returned to Klang in Oct. 1869, and Middlebrook (p.43) suggests that a previous arrangement had been made about recruiting a Kedah force for the Klang operation. This seems unlikely if Wilkinson's account of the Tengku's attempted mediation between Mahdi and Ismail is correct. Wilkinson, Peninsula Malays, p. 145.
 3. Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy, p. 47.
 4. The town of Kuala Lumpur grew in the late 1850's at the confluence of the Klang and Gombok Rivers. Liu Ngim Kong took charge in 1861 and he was soon elected Headman, or Capitan China. In 1862 he called upon a more remarkable Chinese, Yap Ah Loy, to be his agent, and this man, who achieved great wealth and power, succeeded to the Capitancy in 1868.

arrived, but he soon became the leader of the Kah Yeng Chews who were planning to attack Yap Ah Loy.¹

It was this situation - the inflammable rivalries of the miners - which caused the Chinese and Malay quarrels of Selangor to coalesce. During the seige of Klang Yap Ah Loy did not commit himself,² but sometime before November 1869 he went to Langat to see Sultan Abdul-Samad. There he met the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din and he came away, it is believed, "a nominal associate" of his party.³ When, therefore, in September and October of 1870 Kuala Lumpur was attacked by Chong Chong and Sayid Mashhor (a former ally of the Tengku),⁴ Yap Ah Loy looked to the Tengku for help. And when Sayid Mashhor and Chong Chong failed in their attack, they fell back, it seems, on the Raja Mahdi's positions on the Selangor River.⁵

The situation thus created represents the position of the Selangor war on the eve of Ord's departure for England: the Tengku at Klang, Yap Ah Loy at Kuala Lumpur, and the dispossessed Raja Ismail on the one side, were ranged against Raja Mahdi at the mouth of the Selangor and Sayid Mashhor and Chong Chong, who were planning another attack on Kuala Lumpur.

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1. Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy, pp.32-34.
 2. Ibid. p. 34.
 3. Ibid. pp.44-45. Yap Ah Loy's first formal recognition as Capitan China had been from Raja Mahdi, and this must have been desirable to them both for purely business reasons. Ah Loy wanted a favourable ruler controlling his export outlet, and Raja Mahdi wanted a prospering, secure miner whose exports would provide him with a revenue. See Cowan, Origins, pp.92-94 for consideration of the date of Yap Ah Loy's trip to Langat, and also for a more foresighted trip to the Sultan by Liu Ngim Kong (before Yap Ah Loy knew he would be next Capitan). It is suggested that the impending demise of Mahdi's reputation at Langat was realised by the Headman.
 4. Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy, pp. 52-53 for the best account of this remarkable Borneo warrior. 'Zia'u'd-din employed him to garrison the mouth of the Selangor River, where Raja Muda Musa was the weakest link in his chain, but after the murder of one of Sayid's brothers at Langat (possibly by one of the Sultan's sons), the warrior deserted the Tengku.
 5. Wilkinson (Peninsula Malays p. 146) who neglects the up-river sector of the war, says Mahdi went to Selangor immediately after his defeat at Klang, and that Sayid Mashhor went to Selangor directly after he defected from the Tengku. Middlebrook p.48 & Cowan, Origins, p.97 say they when Sayid Mashhor left the Tengku he joined Chong Chong in the attack on Kuala Lumpur, and they joined Raja Mahdi after their defeat.

On the southern border of Selangor in Sungei Ujong, a leading State of the Negri Sembilan, a similar struggle was repeated on the Linggi River. The river had long been a focal point during wartime and it was the chief highway to the tin mines at Rasa, where the Chinese began work about 1828.¹ In the forty years before 1870 illegal tax-gathering constantly interrupted trade on the Linggi, and the problem was complicated because at its mouth the river was the boundary of Malacca and Selangor, and the land immediately north of the river's fork, between the Rembau River and the Linggi proper was disputed between Sungei Ujong and Rembau. Further upstream the authority of the Dato'Klana, or territorial ruler of Sungei Ujong, was challenged by the Dato'Bandar whose wealth from his revenues gave him the position of a virtually independent ruler.² In 1849 the ruler of the Negri Sembilan had imposed a settlement whereby the Linggi revenues were divided between them, and they were recognised as politically equal.³ But the enmity continued. Dato'Bandar Tunggal (1849-74) successfully asserted his equality and regarded himself as independent ruler of the middle Linggi. The Dato'Klana tended to support the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din of Selangor and he cultivated good relations with the British, while the Dato'Bandar, a better fighter, harboured Raja Mahdi of Selangor and opposed British attempts to clear the Linggi.⁴

It should be emphasised that this sketch of the Malay States in the early 1870's came from the reports made in 1874 and from works of modern scholarship. Most of the information was not available to Col. Anson in Singapore, still less was it known in London. Ord had made hints to the Colonial Office, but failed to

1. G.M.Gullick, 'Sungei Ujong', JMBRAS, XXII, Pt.2 (1949) pp.18-19 and Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, p. 101.

2. R.J.Wilkinson, 'Sungei Ujong', JSBRAS, No. 83 (1921) p. 129.

3. Gullick, op. cit. p. 19.

4. See below p. 325 for map.

excite them. In the light of Ord's failure, official annoyance with Anson is understandable. But by the end of 1871 Anson had gone further in the Malay States than Ord had ever done; he made an armed landing in Selangor, he intervened in the Selangor civil war and he obtained Kimberley's approval. His action sparked a controversy in the English press, and even caused Gladstone to raise his eyes from the Irish church and the English public houses.

Anson's administration and the Selangor Incident, 1871.

Anson's opening moves in Singapore were tactless. By attempting pettyfoggish changes in the Malay States policy he created a hostile feeling in Downing Street. Therefore the Colonial Office reacted unfavourably to the honest attempt he made to face real problems. Firstly in April 1871 he suggested commuting the Sultan of Kedah's pension for an outright payment. Ord, who was consulted in England, agreed this might be useful, but he was not so worried about the pensions as Anson. Kedah's was one of eleven, costing \$20,000 a year all told, which gave the governor the means, said Ord, of exercising "a wholesome control over the Native Princes".¹ Kimberley decided to discuss the whole matter with Ord and told Anson "not to moot any questions as to changes in our relations with the native states without express instructions from home".² Secondly, in May 1871, Anson suggested that since British traders were increasingly interested in the Peninsula, the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Straits courts should be extended to the Malay States. Ord again said this would be useful, but needed great care, so Kimberley said it could wait until Ord got back. When, therefore in June 1871 Anson announced the finding of a committee he had appointed to review Malay States policy, a hostile reception, partly on personal grounds, was

1. Ord to Kimberley 14.vi.1871. CO/273/55.

2. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 22.vi.1871.

to be expected. "This is only one of the many instances to show that Col. A. is somewhat over zealous, as if to cast the absent Governor in the shade".¹

Anson must have known that at least Perak was unsettled, when he went to Singapore. Then after the death of Sultan Ali in May 1871, and the election of Bendahara Ismail instead of Raja Muda 'Abdu'llah to the Sultanate, matters in Perak rapidly came to a head.² Anson knew that there had been a lot of coming and going between Perak and Province Wellesley; he knew too that Penang merchants had outstanding grievances against the Achinese, across the Malacca Strait. In Singapore he found papers from Malacca referring to a case of robbery in Rembau in the Malacca hinterland which were endorsed by Ord "Left for Col. Anson".³ But as something of a novice in Singapore, instead of acting hastily off his own bat, Anson appointed a committee to consider what should be done as to the Malay States in general.⁴ Arthur Birch, the acting Lieut-Governor of Penang, Commander Robins, the senior naval officer, and Major. Fred McNair, the Colonial Engineer, were instructed to consider relations with the States not subject to, or having representatives from, any other Power. They reported in May 1871 and apart from McNair their judgement was probably impartial. Birch had recently come from the West Indies department of the Colonial Office to act for Anson in Penang, and the naval commanders were always being posted in and out. Moreover later events suggest that a number of their observations were valid ones. Relations with Johore, and to a lesser extent with Kedah, were found to be satisfactory as disputes were usually settled. It was with Atjeh, in north Sumatra, and with the West coast States, especially Perak, that problems arose.

1. Min. by K-Hugessen 11.viii.1871 on Anson to Kimberley 3.vi.1871. CO/273/47.

2. See above p. 168-174.

3. Anson did not report this until October after the C.O. had demanded explanations. Anson to Kimberley 19.x.1871. CO/273/50.

4. Anson's rather negative personality may be gathered from his memoirs - mostly social gossip, as its title suggests. Sir A.E.H. Anson, About Myself and Others (1920).

The Straits officials were appallingly ignorant about the States,¹ so the committee made three proposals. A commission should visit Atjeh and Perak to settle outstanding matters and make arrangements for future relations. European officers should be appointed, on the application of the Sultans, to reside in the Malay States.² Paid by the Sultans they would advise them, act as the channel of communication with the Straits government, and foster trade. Johore, they said, had virtually adopted this system. They also proposed a new treaty with Perak to exchange Pangkor and the Dindings for some land adjoining Province Wellesley.

Anson himself offered more modest proposals when he sent the report to London. Agreeing on the commission to visit Perak and Atjeh, he did not advise the appointment of resident officers. Nor did he press the idea of the exchange of the Dindings because he knew that the whole claim to this territory, based as it was on a treaty which had not been ratified, had been shelved. He simply recommended that a "political agent" should visit the Malay States frequently - by no means an outrageous idea in view of Ord's itinerations. But, no doubt because of Anson's previous efforts, the Colonial Office was impatient with him. "I do not find the slightest pressing need for moving", wrote Cox.³ As to policy in the Peninsula generally Cox agreed that increased commerce would mean

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1. Cf. Swettenham, Footprints, p.25. "There did not exist a book of reference which supplied any information whatever in regard to the Malay States".
 2. Cowan, Origins, p. 107, says this idea came from McNair, who was familiar with the Indian Residents at the Courts of the Princes. McNair was a graduate of the Royal School of Mines and was an R.A.cadet in 1845. He served with his Battery in India until 1850 and was in the Straits and Labuan, 1853-57. He was Adjutant of the R.A. in the Straits, and in 1857 was made Pr. Sec. to the governor. Later he was Executive Engineer and Superintendent on Convicts. He returned to Europe in 1865 and was promoted Major in the Madras Artillery, but in 1867 he was appointed Chief Engineer in the Straits, where he was responsible for the building of military works. Thus his Indian experience was not great. He figured prominently in the beginning of British intervention in Malaya 1874-76.
 3. Min. by Cox on Anson to Kimberley 3.vi.1871. CO/273/47.

increased influence, but since Kimberley and Ord had discussed the question¹ the matter was dropped.

Ord later claimed that he had tried hard in London to convince Kimberley that policy needed changing if, as he said, "We hoped to hold our own in peace on the Peninsula".² When he got home in April 1871 he put his ideas to Knatchbull-Hugessen and Herbert, who told him to submit them to Kimberley. In an interview Ord told the latter that he was more hampered in his dealings with the Malay States than the governors under the Indian regime, and this had caused a decline in British influence. He had tried to exert influence and he believed the Malays recognised the value of British intervention, but the idea was growing in Malaya that the British government did not care. Ord attributed the deterioration of affairs on the West coast to this notion.

Kimberley recognised the force of Ord's arguments, and approved his attempts at personal relations with the Malay rulers. Beyond that Kimberley was adamant, and he "expressed in the most decided terms his objections to extending in any way the Governor's authority to deal with native affairs". He "would not approve of any measure entertaining addition of territory, nor any step likely to bring us into collision with the natives", save only in the case of self defence.³ When precisely this interview took place is not known. However if Ord remembered rightly, Kimberley conceded nothing.⁴ The same was true for the Anson committee's

1. Kimberley saw Ord 8.viii.1871. Kimberley's Desk Diary. Kimberley Papers.

2. Ord to Carnarvon 18.xi.1874. CO/273/78.

3. Ibid.

4. Ord's account of this interview was written after his successor's actions were made public in 1874, Ord claiming that he had tried to do the same thing but had been forbidden. Kimberley's Desk Diary noted interviews with Ord on 21 April, 24 May, 7 July, 8 August and 12 December 1871 and 23 January 1872. No doubt Ord spoke to Herbert and K-Hugessen and Kimberley as soon as he got home. Possibly he was again consulted on the Anson committee, and final words were no doubt exchanged in Jan. 1872. Whatever the case Ord does not indicate what meeting it was in his letter. There are no records in the C.O. files of any report to Kimberley on the Malay States submitted by Ord while he was on leave.

proposals. Anson was simply referred to previous instructions on not interfering.¹

In judging the 'Native States Committee' simply in the light of the usual policy, and their confidence in Anson, instead of on the findings of the committee itself, the Colonial Office neglected a realistic warning. For even before they received the report, events took place in Selangor, which cost British lives, and one could say, vindicated the committee. Moreover, the news of these events was received in Downing Street on 21 August, five days before the reply to Anson's report was sent. The committee had warned that 'revolution' was daily expected in Perak. Anson, looking far ahead, saw Pangkor as the 'key' to Perak, whence some day civilization would spread into the interior. What actually happened was an act of piracy by some Chinese from Penang, who took refuge in Selangor; but the repercussions of this incident might have warned the Colonial Office of mounting danger on the West coast of Malaya.

The 'Selangor Incident' began with an act of piracy by some Chinese. Its importance lies in the British intervention which followed, and the publicity it received in England. Intervention began in the pursuit of pirates, which was unexceptionable. It ended, more dubiously, in the Colonial Secretary of the Straits coercing the Sultan of Selangor, and almost certainly promising British help to the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din.

Late in July 1871 the crew of a Penang Junk were murdered by Chinese and the Junk was taken to the Selangor River.² The owner reported the matter to Anson on 25 July and a search was immediately begun.³ Within three days the searchers were surprised to find the Junk near Kuala Selangor and they received permission from the Raja Muda Musa, nominal ruler of the Selangor mouth, to recover the

1. Kimberley to Anson 26.viii.1871 (draft). CO/273/47.

2. Account in Penang Argus, 1.vii.1871.

3. Details of the affair in the public despatches are printed in A & P, 1872, LXX, pp. 661-713. There are certain discrepancies between this and the Mss. records which begin Anson to Kimberley 14.vii.1871. CO/273/48.

cargo, which was found in some Chinese shops close by.¹ Musa, however, was no longer really in control of the Selangor River, having been ousted by Raja Mahdi a year before, and when Mr. Cox, the Police Commissioner from Malacca, tried to chase one of the Chinese pirates, an angry crowd surrounded the British party.² Therefore they withdrew to the Pluto and took the Junk in tow. As they left the Selangor River some stray shots were fired on them from the Raja Mahdi's stockades.³ The search had been a success; but it had obviously been a bad case of piracy, six pirates were still thought to be at large, and shots had been fired on the colonial steamer.

Anson could have turned the matter over right away to the Sultan or 'Zia'u'd-din because in the 1825 treaty the Sultan of Selangor had promised not to harbour pirates,⁴ but Anson took immediate action. He authorised a search for the rest of the pirates and HMS Rinaldo arrived at Selangor on 3 July for the purpose. There ensued an incident which remains obscure. A landing party under Lieut. Maude R.N. met a Raja, almost certainly Mahdi, who refused to go to the

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1. A & P, 1872 cited above. Comdr. Bradberry to Lieut-Gov. of Penang 1.vii.1871. The Junk was found at Ilam and was immediately boarded by Police Inspector Barnum, who took six Chinese prisoner. Bradberry and Police-Commissioner Cox landed and found the cargo in some shops. Three more prisoners were taken. In Winstedt, Selangor, p. 24 is a different account of this by Raja Mahdi.
 2. Wilkinson, Peninsula Malays, p. 148 says Raja Musa had returned to the Selangor River early in 1871 and remained the 'titular authority', but had no real control. Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy, p. 47 suggests that Musa had no special liking for the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din and may have even abetted Raja Mahdi during the Klang episode.
 3. A & P, 1872 cited pp. 668-671. Cox to Anson 30.vii.1871. For a critical treatment of these arrests, see Cowan, Origins, p. 110.
 4. Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties, p. 33 see articles IV and V.

Pluto, and a skirmish took place in which a sailor was killed.¹ The upshot was that on 4 July Rinaldo shelled the Selangor forts and next day a landing was made by over four hundred troops from Penang when the remains of the Raja Mahdi's forts were destroyed.²

In theory the affair was still within the realms of piracy and self-defence, but in effect Anson had intervened in the Selangor civil war. The significant event was the political settlement that followed. Acting on the advice of Charles Irving, the Auditor-General, Anson decided that Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din was the key to a settled Selangor. The Tengku, said Irving, had "what might be called European ideas about his government, and I am inclined to think that, if circumstances gave him the chief command in Selangor, he would prove a good ruler and a good neighbour to the Colony".³ Accordingly Anson sent James W.W. Birch, the Colonial Secretary, to make a settlement with the Sultan of Selangor, and HMS Teazer was sent to Selangor to keep Raja Mahdi away.⁴

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1. The facts as reported by the participants are in Capt. Robinson to Anson 6.vii. 1871, A & P, 1872, LXX, pp. 673-676. On the morning of 3 July Rinaldo rendezvoused with Pluto. Robinson says that on landing Maude asked for Mahmud but met Raja Mahdi, who he tried to take to Pluto. The latter resisted, a sailor was shot and Maude wounded. Winstedt, Selangor, p. 24 says: "Maude met a Raja understood to be Mahdi or Mahmud, who shook hands with the Lieutenant, but refused to embark in the boat. Maude insisted. The Raja's followers opened fire...." Winstedt quotes Mahdi's version: "While I was searching for the Chinese pirates to send to Penang, the English came and arrested Sayid Mashhor and tried to arrest Raja Mahmud and me, seizing me by the sleeve". In a later defence of his action (A & P, 1872 cited pp. 702-704) Anson said he did not know Raja Mahdi had fortified the mouth of the Selangor River. If this is true he had not read the memo. prepared by Irving very carefully. This was favourable to 'Zia'u'd-din, and by implication hostile to Mahdi. If the officers knew the sense of Irving's Memo. they would have been prejudiced against Raja Mahdi. The despatches do not contain the fact (recorded in Wilkinson's, Peninsula Malays p. 147) that Allan Skinner, Anson's 'Political Agent' during the operation, had been defied by Sayid Mashhor before a stockade on the opposite bank. Skinner the senior cadet in the Straits service was a very young man.
 2. Account of landing, by 400 men with artillery, in Lieut-Col. Shortland to Capt. Robinson 7.vii. 1871. A & P, 1872, cited pp. 671-673.
 3. Ibid. p. 679. Memo. on Selangor disturbances by C.J. Irving.
 4. Birch's account in A & P, 1872 cited pp. 686-689, and a separate report was made by Irving pp. 690-694.

Birch arrived at the Sultan's palace at Langkat on 21 July after visiting 'Zia'u'd-din's forts en route. His ostensible purpose was to deliver a letter from Anson requesting the Sultan's aid in tracing the pirates, who, it was said, had been aided by Mahdi and Mahmud; and the suggestion was included that the Sultan should appoint a governor to administer his country.¹

The Sultan wanted time to consult his chiefs. Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din was already in theory such a governor, but Abdul-Samad knew that the 'Kedah interloper' was unpopular. Yet Birch gave the Sultan only twenty-four hours to make up his mind. Next morning the Colonial Secretary put what had passed in writing, reminding the Sultan that the British urgently requested him to

"appoint one man whom the English government can trust to act as our friend's Vakeel, and conduct the affairs of the whole country between Malacca and Perak, and we promised to assist our friend's Vakeel in² case any of our friend's subjects ventured to dispute his authority".

At 3 pm the Sultan replied that Mahdi and Mahmud would be outlawed and that Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din's authority of 1868 would be confirmed, with the proviso that Raja Bot of Lukut and his brothers should also be associated with the government. But Birch already knew that Raja Bot was 'Zia'u'd-din's enemy; accordingly British troops were landed again and Birch insisted that the proviso be removed. The Sultan gave in and the Tengku received again that vague authority "to govern and open up the country so as to bring it into proper order for Us and Our sons."³ Birch then accepted a gift of tusks for the Queen, the Sultan's flag was saluted and by 25 July the mission was back in Singapore.

Just a month had passed since the piracy: an intervention such as Ord had never attempted was completed; with British troops in the offing what Birch optimistically thought was a better form of government had been forced on the Sultan of Selangor. Birch's precise promises to the Tengku are not recorded, but

1. Ibid. p. 689.

2. Ibid. p. 689.

3. Ibid. p. 690.

all the authorities agree that Birch was 'impressed' by the Tengku, and it is suggested that the Colonial Secretary "left him with the full support of the British government".¹

The Selangor Incident was not discussed in London until August 1871 because Anson did not use the London telegraph as he might have done. His first reports reached the Colonial Office on 21 August, where they caused no excitement at first, although they later gave the Prime Minister some anxious moments. Herbert and Kimberley were a bit anxious that the vulnerable steamer Pluto had been endangered but they suspended judgement. When Birch's report arrived on 4 September Kimberley thought the settlement quite satisfactory and Anson was simply told that he should have applied to the Sultan for redress before taking action. Kimberley hoped Birch did not pledge support for the Tengku,² but for the benefit of the Office he wrote, like Buckingham in 1868, a significant saving-clause: "I use the word pledge because it might become adviseable to give him our support but it is very different from promising it".³ Kimberley saw the papers on 10 September. The reply to Anson, however, was not sent until the 26th.

The Colonial Office was quite happy, but the affair had caused flutterings elsewhere. On 13 September a letter in The Times by Sir Benson Maxwell attracted the Prime Minister's attention. Anson's efforts were called an "act of war". What power, asked Maxwell, had a colonial governor to arrest offenders in a foreign country and to punish the subjects of that land who obstructed him? Even if Anson did have the power to make war, was there any necessity in this case? Did Anson approach the Sultan first? These questions were posed by the former Chief Justice, whose interpretation ran:

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1. Wilkinson, Peninsula Malays, p. 149 pictures the Tengku sitting "through the interviews with impassivity, showing neither pleasure nor disappointment at the turn affairs were taking". Cowan, Origins, p. 116 says the affair "is remarkable in the first instance for the great irresponsibility of the men on the spot".
 2. Kimberley to Anson 26.ix.1871 (draft). CO/273/48.
 3. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 10.ix.1871.

"it would seem that because some inferior officers of Selangor interfered to prevent the extradition of a suspected criminal and the restoration of some stolen property, a Colonial Governor commissioned two vessels to invade the Malay territory and to punish those officers, without even calling upon their sovereign to punish them, although that sovereign was at peace with us... and because the men engaged in carrying out this unlawful order were resisted and fired upon, his towns and forts were on subsequent days destroyed, a number of his subjects were killed, and he was himself compelled, but threats of further hostilities to appoint to the administration of some province an officer nominated by the English Governor...."

It was neither glorious nor necessary, said Maxwell, it should "raise a blush of shame and indignation on every English face".

Maxwell's tirade reached the right quarters. Gladstone remembered Raja Brooke's suppression of the Dyak pirates.¹ His secretary made a few enquiries and on 19 September Kimberley sent Gladstone the Selangor papers, holding up the reply to Anson until the Prime Minister had seen them. Kimberley said that Maxwell was ignorant of many of the facts. The Times had carried a scanty letter on 5 September which Commander Robinson had inserted in the Straits Times in July to allay the fears of the relatives of his men. Maxwell had evidently seen this and other newspapers. "The Malay pirates are desperate men, and the murders committed on this occasion were most atrocious", said Kimberley melodramatically, and not very accurately.² He was uneasy about the employment of the Pluto, but otherwise he intended to approve Anson's action. Gladstone was satisfied with Kimberley's judgement, but he admitted that Maxwell's letter made him uneasy. He wondered, with quick perception, whether "on principle as well as from want of sufficient force" the governor should not have applied to the Sultan first, and Kimberley altered the despatch to Anson accordingly. He cautioned the local government "not to be too hasty as they are apt to be in resorting to force against native states".³ Clearly Birch's intervention was not really regarded

1. Gladstone to Kimberley 21.ix.1871. Kimberley Papers A/8b.

2. Kimberley to Gladstone 19.ix.1871. Gladstone Papers 44224/203.

3. Ibid. Kimberley to Gladstone 25.ix.1871.

in London as exceptional. The whole affair was treated as one of piracy.¹

Sir Harry Ord was shooting grouse while the Colonial Office was studying the reports on the Selangor Incident. He was still weak from malaria, and when he applied for four months extension of leave in October, the Colonial Office had so quickly forgotten the lesson of the Selangor Incident that "Mr. MacDonald could see "no reason why Sir H. Ord's presence at the Straits is urgently required".² His leave was extended until January 1872. Then Anson applied for leave and Mr. Meade thought it well that the acting governor should disappear when Ord returned. Kimberley agreed and admitted that "I cannot say that Col. Anson's administration of the colony has impressed me favourably".³

Anson's departure left a vacancy at Penang because Arthur Birch was wanted back in the West Indies department in London. James Birch, the tireless Colonial Secretary, volunteered to go to Penang, but Ord would need him in Singapore, therefore a temporary Lieut-Governor was wanted. The choice proved of the utmost importance. Kimberley's secretary produced (Sir) George W.R. Campbell, the Inspector-General of Police in Ceylon, a man with ten years previous experience in India.⁴ Campbell was to play an important part in Malayan history in his short stay. If the Colonial Office brought to Malaya experience of frontier problems in other areas, Campbell took to Penang experience of the administration in some of the Indian States. Moreover, he interpreted his duties

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1. Like Gladstone The Times also remembered Sarawak, but it told its readers not to expect "an unhesitating verdict", as lack of evidence prevented this. The evidence waited until Jan. 1872 when the papers were published for Parliament but were not debated.
 2. Min. by Macdonald 3.x.1871 on Ord to Kimberley 2.x.1871. CO/273/55.
 3. Min. by Kimberley 4.i.1872 on Anson to Kimberley 20.xii.1871. CO/273/51.
 4. G.W.R. Campbell was b. 1853; Ensign in the Bute & Argyll Rifles in 1855; went to India in 1856, where he was appointed Assis-Supt. in the revenue survey. During the Mutiny he was Adjutant of the Ahmedabad Koli Corps and he was Assis-Supt. of Police and Assis-Magistrate. In Dec. 1859 he was appointed Supt. of Police and Commandant of the Rutrahgerry Rangers. Promoted in 1863 he was sent to re-organise the Canara Police. Transferred in 1866 to the Belgau Police; and he was selected to re-organise the Police in Ceylon. He then transferred to the Colonial Service. Qualified in three Indian languages.

towards the Malay States too widely and made frequent suggestions as to new policy towards them. More important still he impressed Kimberley by his ability and appears to have been consulted by the Minister during the most crucial turning point in the Malay policy. In fact Kimberley's first admission that some intervention seemed necessary in Perak was made after reading one of Campbell's reports. Campbell arrived at Penang on 23 March 1872, the same day on which Sir Harry Ord returned to the Straits; Anson left on the 30th.

Ord and the West Coast States of the Peninsula, 1872 to 1873.

Ord returned to harness with enthusiasm and within a week he reported a scheme for re-organising the Straits Police. But although he had tricky problems to cope with inside the settlements during his second tour, the outstanding one was the state of the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula. Whether through ignorance of, or simply through lack of interest in the Malay States, the Colonial Office had not seen the dangers which the Selangor Incident revealed. Ord was partly responsible for this, for the normal relations between the colony and the States were almost entirely kept from London's scrutiny. Only when explanations were demanded, or when Ord got into hot water, had matters been referred home. Sometimes hints slipped out; Arthur Birch when he left the colony was thanked by Penang residents for the "visits you have paid to the neighbouring Native States and for friendly correspondence you have opened with their Rulers, by which an attempt has been made to bring to bear the legitimate influence of the British Government". "Of which, however, we know nothing", wrote Cox.¹ As had been the case for years, everyday correspondence with the Peninsula had not been seen in London.

During Ord's second tour in Singapore these relations involved him in more

1. Min. by Cox on Ord to Kimberley 11.iv.1872 received 13.v.1872. CO/273/57.

and more difficulty. In 1872 and 1873 the Colonial Office was drawn in deeper at every step. Yet because he had been unable to carry his main ideas in London, Ord was always hampered by the policy of non-intervention, which he was now bound to apply. He tried to pick up the threads laid down by Anson, but failed to make much improvement. "I was always alive to the fact that a more preremptory course of action would have been more successful"¹ he wrote later, but he had been prohibited from doing what he thought right. In 1872, for the first time in his career, the appearance on the scene of energetic, optimistic, practical, Sir Harry, did not reduce things to order and reason. All he could do was convince the Colonial Office that something had to be done. Unfortunately for Ord he did this by his own mistakes rather than by force of argument. For some reason he could scarcely put a foot right with the Colonial Office in the crucial twelve months from July 1872 to July 1873, and he finally returned to England under something of a cloud.

Mounting exasperation both in Downing Street and at Government House erupted in 1872 over relations with Johore. In many respects the policy attempted by Ord was one of the most delicate and well meaning of his administration. Johore was the closest State to Singapore in every respect, and Ord rightly believed he should have a special relationship with Maharaja Abu-Bakar. But opinion in Singapore was not united on the question of relations with the Malay States, and when in 1872 Raja Mahdi turned up in Singapore, then took refuge on the West coast of Johore, where he was said to be planning a return to Selangor, Ord was placed in a difficult position.²

1. Ord to Carnarvon 18.xi.1874. CO/273/78.

2. For Mahdi's movements since the Rinaldo attack see Wilkinson, Peninsula Malays, pp.151-3 & Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy, p.110,fn.20. Mahdi went to Benkalis in Sumatra to raise forces. 'Zia'u'd-din asked the Dutch to stop him, but he slipped away. Wilkinson says he went to Singapore to claim redress against the Dutch, and this led to a cleavage among the officials. Braddell (no lover of 'Zia'u'd-din) and the Maharaja of Johore were said to favour Mahdi. Among the merchants, J.G.Davidson supported Tengku 'Zua'u'd-din, and W.H.M.Read was a constant critic of Abu-Bakar.

He attempted a risky policy. Charles Irving, the Auditor-General, insisted Mahdi was a danger; Thomas Braddell, the Attorney-General, said there was very little evidence against him. Confronted with this conflicting advice, Ord leaned towards Braddell. By allowing Raja Mahdi to stay in Johore Ord hoped that terms could be arranged between the Raja and the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din.¹ He tried to persuade the Raja to accept a pension of \$350 a month, if he undertook never to return to Selangor, but the adventurous fugitive refused and he soon made trouble again.²

This came to light in London when a newspaper accused the Maharaja of Johore of sheltering Raja Mahdi with Ord's collusion. Kimberley demanded an explanation,³ and Ord, unwisely, showed this letter to the Maharaja. Hurt to think that Kimberley believed he was assisting the Raja, Abu-Bakar explained that it was customary to offer hospitality to fugitives and that anyway the Raja was watched by spies. The article, he said, was a "tissue of falsehoods".⁴ Ord on his part was equally annoyed with Kimberley, regretting that he "should have dreamed it possible that I could have taken the part which the article attributed to me".⁵ Privately he wrote to Herbert, "I might have been credited with a little more common sense".⁶

Quite frustrated now by the policy of non-intervention and the increasing

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1. Ord to Kimberley 24.x.1872. CO/273/60.
 2. In June or July 1872 Raja Mahdi slipped out of Johore and made his way via the Linggi River in Sungei Ujong to Selangor, where he joined Sayid Mashhor, who was preparing a fourth campaign against Kuala Lumpur. See Middlebrook (pp. 64-65) for a comparison of the characters of Raja Mahdi and Sayid Mashhor.
 3. The occasion of Kimberley's demand clearly illustrates the way Ord kept London in the dark. Abu-Bakar requested some rifles for his police and Ord sent to request home on 10.vii.1872 (CO/273/58). Before asking the War Office to supply them, Kimberley (having seen about Raja Mahdi in the London & China Telegraph, 26.viii.1872) asked for an explanation, on 2.ix.1872. This was not answered by Ord until 24.x.1872 and was received in London on 25 Nov. Thus, the newspaper had anticipated the governor by two months.
 4. Abu-Bakar to Ord 15.x.1872 in Ord to Kimberley 24.x.1872. CO/273/60.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ord to Herbert 24.x.1872. Private. CO/273/60.

disorder on the West Coast. Ord tried to shake the Colonial Office's complacency by writing: "murder, plundering, and burning are the order of the day & the bad ones are beginning to believe that popular cry 'nothing will induce the government to intervene'".¹ But Herbert said they could not trust Ord to intervene wisely. He had made two mistakes over Johore; firstly, to encourage Abu-Bakar to let Mahdi stay, secondly, to inform him of Kimberley's fears. The Colonial Office staff were unanimous in their condemnation of Ord. "Guilty of great indiscretion", said Meade; Herbert said that "Sir H.O. hardly understands the rudiments of his duty as a Governor"; "Most indiscreet", wrote Kimberley, and Ord was censured.²

Abu-Bakar was mollified and Ord reprimanded, but the same thing happened the next year. This time the Maharaja asked Ord for a loan of \$45,000 to pay his debts, and he reaffirmed a promise to govern Johore according to British wishes. Ord agreed to the loan after consulting the Executive Council and he reported the matter to London afterwards. Another storm followed. "There is often more objection to the form in which Sir H. Ord does a thing than the thing itself", said MacDonald;³ London should have been consulted, but presumably Abu-Bakar could not be disappointed. Cox was opposed to such loans generally and he thought Ord's action was most objectionable. Kimberley decided to do what they did in the previous case. "A very severe censure is deserved", but the loan would not be refused as this would lower the governor's prestige.⁴

Yet Johore, surely, was not really a problem. Ord's tactlessness merely deflected the Colonial Office's attention from the very real troubles on the West Coast to which Ord had rather desperately referred. In London it had been

1. Ibid.

2. Mins. on Ord to Kimberley 24.x.1872. CO/273/60. The censure was drafted by Kimberley and dated 24.xii.1872.

3. Min. by MacDonald 10.v.1873 on Ord to Kimberley 24.iv.1873. CO/273/66.

4. Ibid. Mins. on Ord to Kimberley 24.iv.1873, and draft of censure dated 24.vi.1873.

imagined that all was not well after Birch's mission to Langat in 1871, but this was far from true. A note from the Admiralty on 6 November 1872 warned the Colonial Office that Raja Mahdi was back in Selangor. In December two long reports from Ord brought the situation fully into Downing Street's view.¹ While the civil servants had been losing their tempers with Ord over Johore, matters in Perak and Selangor had been coming to a head.

On his return to Singapore in 1872 Ord had immediately tried to do something, within his limited powers, to settle affairs on the West Coast. In April Charles Irving was sent on a mission in the Peninsula. First he went to Selangor where he found 'Zia'u'd-din in control of the mouths of the Klang and Selangor Rivers, but he reported the 'rebel rajah' to be in command of the headwaters.² The Tengku was not interfering with trade, but was trying to stop supplies reaching his enemies.³

In Perak Irving was ordered to discover who was the rightful Sultan. If Anson had not really known what was happening in Perak, Ord was determined to find out, and in April 1872 Irving produced the best picture to date. He met Raja Muda 'Abdu'llah in the Mantri's presence on 25 April and the former presented his claim to the Sultanate. The Mantri (but only after 'Abdu'llah left) said Ismail had been rightly elected. Thus Ord learnt of this fundamental controversy, now nearly a year old, and he sent Irving back to try to persuade 'Abdu'llah and

1. Ord to Kimberley 6 & 11.xi.1872. CO/273/61.

2. Ibid. 6.xi.1872.

3. Although Irving's report was the most up-to-date account of the Peninsula troubles, it was less sound on Selangor than it was for Perak. After Birch's Mission to Selangor, July 1871, 'Zia'u'd-din took certain measures to improve the government. Estimates of revenue & expenditure were made; a steamship was acquired, and European officers were put in command of garrisons at Kuala Lumpur and Kuala Selangor. But as Middlebrook (pp. 63-64) points out, the Tengku's position was still precarious. His allies failed entirely to deal with the threat of Sayid Mashhor from Kuala Kuba in Upper Selangor, and in December 1871 the Tengku was forced to look to Wan Ahmad of Pahang for help. Ibid. pp. 65-67.

Ismail to meet in the presence of a British officer and settle their differences.

Nothing came of this.¹

Meanwhile the effects of the disturbances upon trade produced complaints from the Straits merchants. Some Malacca traders claimed that the colonial government was not living up to its promise to support the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din, and said that unless it did there would be "great sacrifice of human life and British property".² In answer to this Birch, who had made the promise, had to re-affirm the policy of non-intervention. But W.H.M.Read replied that already much harm had been done by Ord's equivocation when Raja Mahdi was in Johore. He said that while the Singapore Chamber of Commerce

"would deprecate any recourse to coercive measures, it would argue upon the government the absolute necessity of adopting some straightforward and well defined policy in dealing with the rulers of the various States of the Malay Peninsula, for the purpose of promoting and protecting commercial relations... as there is every reason to believe that they would readily accept the impartial views and friendly feelings of the British authorities".³

Ord must have agreed with all this, but he knew the idea was not acceptable in London. At the end of October 1872, however, he made an attempt at intervention himself. He achieved nothing, but he was at least able to produce a comprehensive idea of the problem on the West Coast for his superiors.

1. 'Abdu'llah was styling himself Sultan by April 1872, and Gullick (Speedy, pp.27-28) says he was planning to oust the Mantri from Larut. Cowan, (Origins, p.127, fn. 90) quoting from 'Perak and Larut Disturbances', Raffles Museum, Singapore, shows the sort of worry which existed among British officials before the Irving Mission. Irving wrote on 13 April (before his mission or at Penang on the way?) an impression he had gathered from Arthur Birch: "Larut is virtually an independent state. Its present position is interesting because it is a specimen of what is likely to become a common state of things along the coast ... If ever the Chinese choose to combine and turn out the Malays altogether I cannot see what is to prevent them".

See Ord to Kimberley 6.xi.1872. CO/273/61, for a belated and none too detailed despatch describing the Irving Mission. The full Memo. by Irving dated 24.vii.1872 was not sent to London until 1874. (Confid. Print, Eastern 11. CO/809/1 p. 148.)

2. Malacca traders to Singapore Chamber of Commerce 27.vii.1872 in Ord to Kimberley 6.xi.1872. CO/273/61.

3. W.H.M.Read to Col. Sec. SS. 17.ix.1872. Ibid.

In a general account of the 'State of the Country' Ord reported that Perak, Selangor, and now Sungai Ujong, were unsettled. In Perak the Chinese from Penang were deeply involved in the Larut War; supplies for the factions fighting over the mines were procured there and hundreds of wounded were returning. On top of this it was thought that Raja Muda 'Abdu'llah was about to attack Sultan Ismail. In Selangor Ord discovered that Raja Mahdi was undoing anything Birch's mission might have accomplished, and when he visited Langat on 1 November with an escort of British troops, the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din's position seemed so hopeless that Ord suggested he 'throw in the towel'.¹ But the Tengku was determined to hold on and the governor assisted him in getting the help of Wan Ahmad of Pahang.²

Finally, the war looked like spreading from Selangor into Sungai Ujong, as Raja Mahdi had returned to Selangor by way of the Linggi and Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din therefore wanted to secure this exposed southern flank. To this end he had made an agreement in 1870 with the ruler of Rembau defining the boundary of Selangor and Rembau at Sempang so he could build a fort to command the Linggi there.³ After the return of Raja Mahdi the Tengku tried to get the ruler of Rembau to revive his claim to the territory on the right bank of the Linggi, but the chiefs of Sungai Ujong prepared to resist. The Dato'Klana's nephew, who was acting for him, ordered arms in Europe to fight Rembau, therefore when Ord was asked to intervene in September 1872 he decided to do so.⁴ He went to Sempang

1. Winstedt, Selangor, p. 29.

2. The Tengku first approached Wan Ahmad in December 1871, but the latter would not assist without Ord's permission. In April 1872 the Tengku went to Singapore to discuss the alliance. (Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy, p.76) Sometime between May and August 1872 Ord went to Pekan to make arrangements with the Bendahara. (Cowan, Origins, p.136.) The first Pahang expedition crossed into Selangor in August 1872, but failed to relieve Kuala Lumpur, which fell late in August 1872. (Linehan, Pahang, p.96)

3. R.O.Winstedt, 'History of the Negri Sembilan', JMBRAS, XII, Pt. 3 (Oct. 1934) p. 69. Report on the State of the Country in Ord to Kimberley 6.xi.1872. CO/273/61.

4. Memo. by Thomas Braddell, CO/809/6 p.52.

but the ruler of Rembau failed to arrive to present his case, and Ord persuaded Temgku 'Zia'u'd-din to drop the matter on the condition that the Dato'Klana of Sungei Ujong promised not to help the Tengku's enemies.¹

In Sungei Ujong, then, Ord prevented a new sore from festering, but four major ailments remained uncured: (1) the war among the Chinese in Larut, (2) the question of the Perak succession, (3) the Selangor civil war, and (4) the interruption of trade.² Yet somehow Ord tried to persuade the Colonial Office that he had everything in hand. He hoped, he said, that Kimberley would feel

"I have neither been so ignorant nor so unmindful, as has been alleged, of the bearing which the internal condition of these states has upon certain interests of the settlements, and that notwithstanding the little actual power I am³ able to exercise I have done what I can to protect those interests".

But the report had quite the reverse effect; Kimberley wrote, "a tangled web which I fear Sir H.Ord is not the man to unravel".⁴

A week after he wrote this a report arrived on what was happening in Larut. It concerned an expedition by George Campbell, which in some ways had important consequences. The Mantri of Larut went to Penang on 16 October 1872 to complain that the warring Chinese in Larut were being re-inforced from Penang. On the evening before this Capt. Speedy, the Police Superintendent, had found some arms in a Junk, which had left cleared for Perak, so Campbell decided to see what was happening for himself. He set off with Speedy intending to "bring thoroughly home to the persons who had sent the Junks already mentioned, the grave offence of which they had been guilty and prevent turbulence by the presence of a British man-of-war at Larut".⁵ Eight miles up the river they found a blockade, which

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1. Ord's State of the Country report. Cowan, Origins, pp. 137-139.
 2. There was speculation at this time among investors in England as to whether the Larut troubles were connected with the fluctuations in the tin trade. See Mining Journal, 14.viii.1869 p. 592; 27.iv.1872 p. 394; 15.vi.1872 p. 554; 29.xi.1873 p. 1312; 31.i.1874 p. 117, and 21.xi.1874 p. 1281.
 3. Ord's State of the Country report.
 4. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 22.xii.1872.
 5. Ord to Kimberley 11.xi.1872. CO/273/61.

included one of the Penang Junks. On board they found two Chinese who said they were about to be decapitated. Speedy released them, while Campbell sent a telegram to Singapore indicating that an impasse had been reached in Larut. Two thousand people, it was said, had recently been killed in one day.

Campbell's expedition was insignificant and did nothing to solve matters, but it is important because its aftermath in Singapore and London brought forth suggestions for a radical change of policy. The first reaction in Singapore was to ensure an administrative 'cover-up'. Ord wanted to know why the Junk had been allowed to leave Penang in the first place, but Campbell, the man on the spot, was more interested in thinking about the bigger problem of achieving peace in Perak. He reported in October that the Hai San miners who had been expelled from Larut in February 1872 had recovered their mines again, and that the turn-coat Mantri seemed finally committed to their side. Campbell insisted on advocating a change in the British policy. Like the Anson Committee, Campbell, no doubt drawing on his Indian experience, said: "I would again press the suggestion for the appointment of a Resident or Political Officer for certain of the Malay States". Apparently a leading Chinese had told him, "when the British flag is seen over Perak or Larut, every Chinaman will go down on his knees and bless God".¹

These tidings reached Downing Street in the first week in January 1873.

MacDonald thought Campbell's expedition had been undignified and he agreed with

1. *Ibid.* Campbell to Col. Sec. SS. 24.x.1872. Here Campbell refers to a similar suggestion made on 6.ix.1872. This may be the letter, quoted undated in Wilkinson, 'Notes on Perak History,' Papers on Malay Subjects, vol 4, (1908) pp. 99-100, which clearly shows Campbell's source for this all-important idea: "I speak with diffidence being so new to this portion of the East, but I think it worth consideration whether the appointment under the British government of a British Resident or Political Agent for certain of the Malay States would not, as in India, have a markedly beneficial effect. Such a Resident or Political Agent would need to be an officer of some position and standing and a man of good judgement & good personal manner, and he should of course have a thorough knowledge of the Malay language... In India, in many a native ruled state, it is marvellous what work a single well-selected British officer has effected...."

Ord that the Junk should have been stopped in the first place, but Knatchbull-Hugessen said,

"the presence of an English man of war might have a salutary effect... if my memory is correct, the annexation to British Rule of the country in which the disturbances took place, and which its inhabitants are said to desire, would be most beneficial to Penang, and contribute to the tranquility & prosperity of the settlements in no slight degree₁- this idea however, is to be discouraged I suppose, just now...."

His supposition proved correct. Kimberley could not agree "that further extension of British territory is the proper remedy for these evils. If we are to annex all the territory in Asia where there is misgovernment we must end in dividing Asia with Russia".² He said Campbell was wrong in letting the Junk leave Penang, and that stringent measures were needed to prevent a recurrence.

Thus Campbell's suggestion about Residents, like that of the Anson Committee, and Knatchbull-Hugessen's ideas about annexation, fell on deaf ears in January 1873. Yet in only eight months Kimberley was to change his mind and give Ord's successor, Sir Andrew Clarke, the scope which enabled him to fulfill Campbell's hopes. Therefore it is necessary to assess the factors which would appear to have caused Kimberley's crucial volte-face in the summer of 1873. From the evidence available three things seemed to have weighed heaviest on his mind; (1) international rivalry appeared to hover over the Straits, (2) the situation on the West Coast, especially in Perak, deteriorated, and (3) the pressure from English economic interests was skillfully and persistently kept up.

The decision to intervene, 1873.

In February 1873 Granville passed to Kimberley a Dutch rumour that Italy and the U.S.A. had ideas of making treaties with Atjeh. That this was a surprise for

1. Min. by K-Hugessen 6.i.1873 on Ord to Kimberley 11.xi.1872. CO/273/61.
2. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 8.i.1873.

the Colonial Office can be judged by a minute Herbert began but then crossed out: "It is hardly to be supposed that the US would intervene in the affairs of Achin".¹ But after the incident of the American colony in Borneo in 1865,² and the Italian plans for a penal colony in 1870,³ the possibility could not be ignored, and a month of enquiries followed. Arthur Birch, now back in the Office, wrote what he knew of the Sultan of Atjeh; Washington and Rome issued denials; finally Kimberley saw the Dutch minister in London on 11 March 1873.⁴ The Dutch were about to attack Atjeh and the Sultan had appealed to the three hundred years old friendship between the two countries to secure British assistance. But in view of the agreement of 1872 Kimberley assured the Dutch Minister that Britain would not interfere in Atjeh and would be friendly to the Dutch.⁵

At the end of March 1873 the Dutch began their long war with Atjeh. They requested Britain, on 13 April, to forbid the export of arms from the Straits to Sumatra, and on the same evening Granville and Kimberley decided that although this would not be done, they would be friendly to the Dutch and if necessary would seize arms as contraband. The Dutch were told that no specific proclamation would be made,⁶ but unfortunately for ministerial scruples Ord issued an arms embargo without orders from home. Unfortunately for the Dutch their first offensive in Atjeh failed.

No sooner was the Atjeh scare over than the Colonial Office heard about the confusion in Larut. In December 1872 the Chee Hin Chinese had made a successful invasion, the Mantri's Matang stronghold was captured, and an attempt at mediation had failed.⁷ Though the Hai San still retained a few mines, the Chee Hin were

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1. Min. by Herbert on FO. to CO. 6.iii.1873. CO/273/73.
 2. K.G.Tregonning, 'American Activity in N.Borneo, 1865-1881', Pacific Hist. Rev. (Nov 1954) p. 365.
 3. FO. to CO. 16.ix.1872. CO/144/39.
 4. Memo. by Kimberley 11.iii.1873 on FO. to CO. 6.iii.1873. CO/273/73. Memo. by C.Vivian 25.ii.1873. FO/37/534.
 5. Byland to Kimberley 4.iv.1873 and reply (copy) 5.iv.1873. Kimberley Papers, A/27
 6. Min. by Granville on Byland to Granville 3.iv.1873. FO/37/534 and Min. by Kimberley on FO. to CO. 3.iv.1873. CO/273/73.
 7. Gullick, Speedy, p. 30.

blockading the Larut River. Thus early in 1873 Larut was virtually abandoned to the Chinese who waged a regular war,¹ while Malay authority in the area was almost non-existent. Even the Mantri and 'Abdu'llah made a temporary rapprochement from February to April 1873.² Ord prohibited the export of arms to the territory between the Krian and Perak rivers on 21 February and he sent HMS Hornet to enforce the blockade. This only served to cut off the Chinese factions from their supplies and it drove them to piracy.

Details like this of course did not reach London, but in April 1873 the Admiralty (again first with the news) reported the reason for the presence of HMS Hornet at Penang.³ In June the Colonial Office had a discussion over the legal difficulties of defining piracy.⁴ Finally, on 7 July, Kimberley admitted that something would have to be done. He had just read George Campbell's report, dated 28 June, on the Larut war.

"It is possible", the Lieut-Governor had written, that friendly intervention on our part would end the condition of things described and it is more than probable that a resident political officer, a carefully chosen discreet man with a good knowledge of the people and their language would prevent its recurrence. Most of the native ruled states in and around India have such officers and the value of their influence is unquestionable... I have found all the Malay potentates⁵ most amenable to reason, most courteous and most anxious to please".

Kimberley thought it "an excellent report",⁶ and at the same time he had a conversation with Campbell, who was at home on leave.⁷ Evidently Campbell

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1. Cowan, Origins, p. 143.
 2. Gullick, (Speedy, p. 31) says that the Mantri had so often played the Vicar of Bray with the Chinese that he went into virtual exile. Wilkinson (Winstedt, Perak, p.85) says in February he moved to Krian, where he lived on a boat to facilitate a quick getaway, and he quotes a document (p.86) dated 14.viii.1873, in which 'Abdu'llah confirmed the Mantri's rights over Larut in return for recognition as Sultan. 'Abdu'llah then appointed Raja Yusuf to be his Raja Muda, but he soon fell out with the Mantri again.
 3. Ad. to CO. 29.iv.1873. CO/273/72.
 4. The Fair Malacca case, which is discussed by Cowan, Origins, pp. 147-149.
 5. Campbell's report on Penang for the annual Blue Book, 28.vi.1873. CO/273/74.
 6. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 7.vii.1873.
 7. Min. by Kimberley 8.vii.1873 on Ad. to CO. 27.vi.1873. CO/273/72. This is where Kimberley mentions the conversation with Campbell on the other topic.

impressed Kimberley and possibly it was he who convinced the Secretary of State that something would have to be done about the Malay States. For Kimberley noted on the same day that Sir Andrew Clarke, the new governor, would have to look into the Larut problem.

"I think we must endeavour to put a stop to these disturbances. It is evident that Penang is a base of operations for these contentious Chinese. The difficulty is how to do anything, without direct interference with Perak which is very undesirable".

Kimberley, then, went as far as admitting that he should try to stop the disturbance in Perak, but he still clung to the policy of non-intervention. As yet, he was undecided what action he should take. In the case of the Ashanti War he had clung to the policy of non-intervention since February and he had not yet changed his mind. But in the Malayan matter another factor came into play at the end of July and moved him still further. This time it was the English economic interests in Selangor.

A few English companies, inevitably attracted by the success of Chinese mining, were attempting to enter Malaya in the early 1870's. In the 1850's some Americans had worked a mine at Ricko in Selangor, but they gave up because of the political insecurity.² Early in the 1860's Paterson, Simons and Company operated in Pahang for a time through Chinese agents. Henry Velge of Malacca promoted the Sungai Ujong Tin Company.³ Two persistent Englishmen with an interest in Selangor were James Guthrie Davidson and the ubiquitous W.H.M. Read. Davidson was a leading Singapore lawyer who had some knowledge of the Peninsula, and who was a financial backer of the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din and Yap Ah Loy.⁴ Read's wide connections in South-east Asia have already been noted and like Davidson his investments gave him a stake in the Tengku's success. In 1866 he had

1. Min. by Kimberley 7.vii.1873' cited above.

2. Swettenham's Report on Selangor 8.iv.1875. CO/809/5 p. 138.

3. Braddell's Memo. on Sungai Ujong, in Clarke to Carnarvon 29.xii.1874. Ibid. p. 56.

4. Swettenham, Footprints, p. 20; Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy, p. 84; P.B. Maxwell, Our Malay Conquests (1878) p. 36.

attempted to collect the Klang revenues on a commission basis for the Sultan, but the civil war had upset the scheme.¹ Read and Davidson came together in the projected Selangor Tin Mining Company, which Read had been pushing in London in 1868, but the company was still unincorporated in 1873.²

Their chief ally in London was Seymour Clarke, who was married to Read's sister. He was a very successful railwayman, who probably became concerned with Malaya, through Read, as a telegraph expert. His was a strange background to influence Malayan history, but he was obviously a significant man in the city: a leading railwayman in the golden age of English railroading, a telegraph expert who must have had useful contacts with the cable manufacturers, he was also known and respected by the politicians.³ As leading London director of the Selangor Tin Company he was destined to influence British policy in unexpected fashion.

In 1873 the promoters of the company were still anxious to inform prospective investors in the City and Singapore that operations in Selangor would be safe. On 25 June 1873 Davidson's London solicitors asked the Colonial Office if it would sanction the Company employing its own troops. Even Knatchbull-Hugessen disapproved of this. On 18 July however Seymour Clarke produced an entirely new series of possibilities. A letter from the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din dated 3 June⁴ sought protection from a European Power. Apparently the Tengku wanted the

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1. Winstedt, Selangor, p.20.
 2. The company was finally registered, 6.vii.1874 under the name of Malayan Peninsula (East India) Tin Mining Co. Ltd. A & P, 1875, LXXI, p. 500.
 3. Seymour Clarke was Brunel's chief clerk during the building of the G.W.R. As Traffic Supt. of the London division, while in his early twenties, he had demonstrated early telegraphy equipment for the Duke of Wellington, and had organised the first Royal Train. When the G.N.R. began operating into Kings Cross in 1851 he became its General Manager, and he helped build the company into one of the great industrial concerns of the land. He is said to have had influence with Gladstone, who arbitrated in railway pooling agreements. He resigned from the Great Northern in July 1870 because of illness. (See E.T.MacDermot, History of the G.W.R., pp. 57, 230, 661 & 677. C.H.Grindly, History of the G.N.R. 1854-95, pp.153, 245, and G.N.R. Minute Books 1/36 (B.T.C.Archives) pp. 148, 236.)
 4. By this time the Tengku's fortunes in Selangor were more promising. Yap Ah Loy having re-captured Kuala Lumpur in March 1873. Middlebrook, p. 81.

promoters of the company to find out "if the English or any other Government, would interfere in any disturbances that might arise in the territory of Selangor"¹ - a vague, and not unusual request. But Clarke added that a Singapore resident, probably his brother-in-law Read, had recently expressed the view that "the independent sovereigns of the smaller states of the Malayan Peninsula would put themselves under the Protectorate of some European Power, and Germany was mentioned as most likely to be approached failing England".²

Germany had already been mentioned in connection with Malaya a few years before and this had occasioned no alarm. In July 1870 Rogers had said "if Prussia likes to have an island then I should say let her by all means, the government will not be prepared to oppose such a cession unless it will injure British interests".³ A later rumour about a German harbour at the mouth of the Endau River in East Johore had come to nothing. But in the two years following the Franco-Prussian War, with the balance of power in Europe radically altered, some English statesmen were watching Germany carefully. If the juniors in the Colonial Office passed Seymour Clarke's warning without comment, Kimberley was alarmed. "The possibility of a German protectorate seems small", wrote MacDonald.⁴ Cox agreed, but as he valued prestige he wrote "with a judicious Governor we might almost imperceptibly have a considerable influence on the various Native Chiefs".⁵ Herbert suggested the governor might consider confidentially "if it might be safe and advantageous to extend our influence to some parts of the Malay territories beyond our settlements".⁶ Knatchbull-Hugessen said this would

1. Enclosed in Seymour Clarke to Herbert 18.vii.1873. CO/273/74.

2. Ibid.

3. Min. by Rogers 20.vii.1870 on FO. to CO. 14.vii.1870. CO/273/42. Cf. Min. 3.viii.1867: "I believe a German colony in New Guinea wd be a very good thing for the Australians. Why shd it hurt them?", on Young to Kimberley 31.v.1867. CO/201/542.

4. Min. by MacDonald 19.vii.1873 on Clarke to Herbert 18.vii.1873. CO/273/74.

5. Ibid. Min. by Cox 20.vii.1873.

6. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 21.vii.1873.

be easy, but this time he thought it better to please his chief by echoing the usual policy:

"I do not understand that to be the policy of HM Govt, but rather to keep ourselves to ourselves as much as we can & to avoid those complications which may follow extension of 'influence', which entails as a rule extensions of responsibility".¹

He can hardly have believed in this; one senses in the words 'keep ourselves to ourselves' a contempt for such a viewpoint. Over Fiji he had condemned "the surpassing love of Economy" and "dread of incurring responsibilities". Later he said "Serve us right if Germany annexes Fiji",² and when Fiji was, as he thought, offered to Britain in April 1873 he said public opinion would not stand a rejection.

Certainly Kimberley saw Clarke's letter in entirely new light: "It would be impossible for us to consent to any European Power assuming the Protectorate of any State in the Malay Peninsula". Writing this on 22 July he decided to consult Granville and Argyll, the Secretary of State for India.³ His first thought was that Sir Andrew Clarke, the new Governor, could make new treaties in which the rulers of the Malay States would agree not to cede territory to other Powers without British consent. Meanwhile he studied what the existing treaties implied. MacDonald made a summary of the existing treaties on 23 July, and Kimberley was full of questions, but on 31 July he made an interim decision.

Seymour Clarke was to be told that all correspondence would have to go through the Governor.⁴ With this breathing space gained Kimberley ordered a thorough study of the Malayan treaties. Meanwhile in the first few days of August he was busy deciding on the Ashanti expedition on the Gold Coast.⁵ Before deciding on Malaya he gave the department a fortnight to prepare a comprehensive

1. Ibid. Min. by K-Hugessen 22.vii.1873.

2. See below p.211.

3. Min. by Kimberley on Clarke to Kimberley 18.vii.1873. CO/273/74.

4. Ibid. Kimberley to Seymour Clarke 5.viii.1873 (draft).

5. See above p. 116-118.

memorandum on relations with the Malay States under the Indian regime and after, "so complete as to be intelligible without reference books or papers".¹ MacDonald did this, but Kimberley still called for the files on the 1869 treaty with Kedah. He studied the memorandum carefully and it is adorned with his pencilled comments. When he replied to Seymour Clarke on 5 August, with a repetition of the non-intervention policy, he told the department that the whole question was to be dealt with in connection with Sir Andrew Clarke's instructions as to the Malay States.

The following pattern emerges then: the Larut and Perak troubles had made Kimberley decide, early in July, that Governor Clarke would have to look into the Peninsula problem. The possibility of European rivalry added further urgency to this inquiry. The next step forward came at the end of August when Kimberley decided on Clarke's instructions. Another petition from Chinese traders had just reached London with the comment by Ord that the whole West Coast of Malaya from Province Wellesley to Malacca was in a state of anarchy. On 28 August Cox noted that "Lord K. is about to consider how far it may be desirable for the British government... to interfere actively in an effort to stop the dissensions in the Malay States".² Kimberley wrote his famous draft of Sir Andrew Clarke's instructions on 31 August 1873.³

On 10 September, having just settled Wolseley's Gold Coast instructions, Kimberley sent Clarke's Malayan instructions to the Prime Minister with this rather apt summary of the situation:

"It is the old story of misgovernment of Asiatic States. This might go on without serious consequences except the stoppage of trade were it not that European and Chinese capitalists stimulated by the great riches in tin mines... are suggesting to the Native Princes that they should seek the aid of Europeans... We are the paramount power in the Peninsula up

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1. Min. by Herbert 10.viii.1873 on Clarke to Kimberley 18.vii.1873. CO/273/74.
 2. Min. by Cox on Ord to Kimberley 10.vii.1873. CO/273/67.
 3. Ibid. Kimberley's draft 31.viii.1873.

to the limit of the States tributary to Siam, and looking to the vicinity of India & our whole position in the East I apprehend that it would be a serious matter if any¹ other European power were to obtain a footing on the Peninsula".

Thus far had Kimberley's conversion, perhaps simply knowledge, advanced since July. Clarke's instructions did not pledge the government to anything; they simply implied that "some attempt is to be made to produce a better state of things".² They were despatched on 20 September, after Clarke had set sail. In 1867 Ord's instructions had concerned the Colony alone; in 1873 Clarke was told that an important part of his duties was the conduct of relations with the Malay States. In 1867 Buckingham had said that diplomacy could be left to the Foreign Office, but in 1873 Kimberley decided "we are the paramount power in the Peninsula".

Ord's last days at Singapore.

While the Colonial Office had given up hope that Ord could accomplish anything, by July 1873 the Governor himself had 'thrown in the towel'. Selangor had ceased to trouble him,³ but Perak's problems were unsolved and Ord did not think that his government would be able to solve them. In his final months in Singapore Ord simply met emergencies as best he could.

The Chinese faction in Larut, cut off from supplies in Penang by the R.N. blockade, began to prey upon shipping near the coast. At the same time the struggle for power among the Malays of Perak approached its last phase, and the two conflicts were mixed as the Mantri finally committed himself to the Hai San Chinese. Therefore 'Abdu'llah, once again at odds with the Mantri who was also Ismail's chief supporter, is said to have offered the Ghee Hin half their

1. Kimberley to Gladstone 10.ix.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/103. 2. Ibid.
 3. After the relief of Kuala Lumpur in March 1873 Raja Mahdi and Sayid Mashhor were confined to upper Selangor, where the Pahang troops finished off the fighting. In November 1873 'Zia'u'd-din recovered Kuala Selangor and the Pahang troops withdrew. Linehan, Pahang, pp. 95-100.

expenses if they were victorious in Larut.¹ In planning an offensive to recover Larut himself the Mantri persuaded Captain Speedy, who resigned as Police Superintendent, to raise a sepoy force in India, and the latter left Penang on 27 July.² Now an Englishman, a former Straits official, was involved in the Perak war. Although the important policy decisions were already being made in London, the men on the spot made a last effort at settling Perak. In doing this they virtually committed the government to the Mantri's side.

Col. Anson made an effort to reconcile the Mantri, 'Abdu'llah and the Chinese Headmen at a meeting in Penang on 10 August, but he failed.³ Therefore, as he feared the war might spread into Penang where the secret societies had their headquarters, he decided to take the Mantri's side and he sent an urgent telegram to Singapore.⁴ This brought Sir Harry Ord on a last visit to the scene of trouble. When he arrived at Penang on 25 August, 'Abdu'llah was invited to a conference but he pleaded illness, so Ord, no doubt persuaded by Anson, decided to recognise the Mantri as the independent ruler of Larut. The arms embargo was lifted from exports to his supporters and Ord organised the R.N. strength in the area into a flotilla of small boats to police the Larut shore and suppress the growing piracy.⁵

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1. Cowan, Origins, p. 144. Gullick, Speedy, p. 33 says 'Abdu'llah spent 16,000 on the Chee Hins.
 2. Agreement with the Mantri discussed by Gullick, Speedy, p. 32.
 3. The proclamation by Anson in Wilkinson (Winstedt, Perak) p. 87. Attending this meeting were the Mantri, 'Abdu'llah, Ho Ghi Shi (Chee Hin Headman) and Chang Ah Kwi (Hai San Headman), Capt. Grant (HMS Midge) and Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din of Selangor. 'Abdu'llah seems to have been the only one to make a serious effort to get peace, and he sailed in Midge taking the proclamation to Larut. But on 14 Aug. Grant reported that the Chee Hin refused to lay down their arms.
 4. Wilkinson (Winstedt, Perak) p. 88. 'Abdu'llah was furious with Anson for this and immediately 'deposed' the Mantri and went off the Singapore to raise money from Kim Ching. 'Gullick, Speedy, p. 37.
 5. Wilkinson, Peninsula Malays, p.112; Cowan, Origins, p.154; Gullick, Speedy, p.34. Ord invited 'Abdu'llah to meet him on 2 Sept., the Mantri was recognised on the 3rd., and the arms embargo lifted on the 9th. The genuineness of 'Abdu'llah's illness is not known, but he did offer to send a representative. Ord refused this, and this may possibly be simply a typical example of his highhandedness.

Anson's fears for Penang looked like being fulfilled on 16 September when the Mantri's town house was blown up, so the Royal Marines were alerted. On the same day one of HMS Midge's boats was fired on from a Ghee Hin stockade at Selinsing.¹ These sailors had a thankless task in policing the river, and Swettenham, who had three weeks with them, has described the sweltering days and rain drenched nights, when over half the ship's companies went sick. Almost invariably when sighted, the pirates could pull away into mangrove enclosed waters in their narrow craft manned by twenty or more men pulling on double banked oars, before the Bluejackets could pull their cutters close.² Thus after the attack on Midge's men the government in Singapore authorised the Navy to take its revenge.

Two stockades were destroyed by HMS Thalia on 20 September, and three large Junks, fifty guns and many pirates were captured. The Colonial Office heard about this from the Pall Mall Gazette on the evening of 26 September, and when the official reports arrived MacDonald wrote: "we are getting somewhat actively mixed up in Perak politics",³ but this no longer caused heart searchings in Downing Street. Herbert could not see what else could have been done⁴ and Kimberley approved the attack.⁵ Until Sir Andrew Clarke had reported the Colonial Office was content to let the men on the spot have a free hand on the troubled frontier in Malaya, so they did not object either to other independent actions by Ord. These concerned Speedy's sepoy's and the Dutch campaign in Atjeh.

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1. Wilkinson (Winstedt, Perak) p.89. The gig was fired on from the shore and from the water and as the Malay steersman lost the rudder at the crucial moment she ran aground and two officers were seriously wounded. Ord to Kimberley 17.ix.1873 (Tg). CO/273/69.
 2. Swettenham, Footprints, pp. 28-30.
 3. Min. by MacDonald on Ord to Kimberley 5.ix.1873. CO/273/69.
 4. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 11.x.1873.
 5. Ibid. The qualified nature of Kimberley's change to a more active policy in Malaya and his now realistic attitude can be seen from his reply to the suggestion, made by Herbert on the 11th that the Malay rulers should employ British manned gunboats for police work. "Englishmen commanding Malay gunboats would soon acquire a preponderating power in the Malay States", said Kimberley.

The Mantri made his deal with Speedy before he was recognised by Ord. The latter asked Kimberley what attitude he should take to Speedy's action, and Herbert insisted that the Mantri had as much right to employ Englishmen as the Khedive of Egypt. Kimberley did not want to interfere with the Mantri's affairs but he was not so sure about the troops from India, so the matter was passed to the India Office. They could only say that Speedy and a hundred men had been prevented from embarking for a time. But after reference to Singapore, where Ord had not objected, they had left¹ and Speedy's force sailed up the Larut River on 29 September.² The Colonial Office were annoyed that Ord had not waited for the instructions which he had asked for, but it was too late to do anything. Ord's action, however, was consistent with his support for the Mantri. The Colonial Office only hoped that he had not committed himself to support Speedy. Actually Speedy's force was unable to recapture Larut completely for the Mantri,³ but Speedy's presence was to be useful to the new governor.

When Ord forbade arms exports to Atjeh without orders from home Kimberley again approved, although the governor was reminded that he should have referred the matter home first. Sir Harry made his last farewells to the Legislative Council in Singapore on 31 October 1873, where he took a final tilt at the policy of non-intervention. The verdict in London was - "with a little more discretion Sir H.O. might have left Singapore a popular governor".⁴ He left Penang on 2 November, and Sir Andrew Clarke's administration began on the 3rd.

Clarke's instructions, in contrast to Ord's in 1867, emphasised the matter

1. India Office to CO. 14.x.1873. CO/273/72.
2. Gullick, Speedy, p. 34.
3. For Speedy's progress see Cowan, Origins, p.157. Major McNair was not impressed by Speedy's force, but he said that 'moral support' was given to it by the local government. (McNair, Perak and the Malays, p. 353-4). When Anson visited Larut in December 1873 he found the Mantri more interested in opening the mines, his source of revenue, than clearing out his enemies.
4. Min. by Meade 2.i.1874 on Ord to Kimberley 1.xi.1873. CO/273/71.

of relations with the Malay States. Because of the growing anarchy and the decline in trade it was now thought "necessary to consider seriously whether any steps can be taken to improve their condition".¹ The British government had no desire to interfere in the affairs of the Peninsula, but, wrote Kimberley in words often quoted,

"I have to request that you will carefully ascertain as far as you are able the actual condition of affairs in each state and ... report... any steps which can properly be taken by the Colonial Government to promote the restoration of peace and order and to secure protection to trade and commerce with the native territories. I would wish you especially to consider whether it would be advisable to appoint a British officer to reside in any of the Malay States. Such an appointment would₂ only be made with the full consent of the native Government...."

Kimberley admitted that something would have to be done in Malaya. He put forward tentatively the suggestion of Residents, which had been mooted by the Anson Committee and strongly advocated by George Campbell. He told Gladstone that the government committed itself to nothing; Clarke was to inquire and report.

But the Colonial Office had not bargained on their man. Later in life Clarke described his own feelings about his instructions:

"My instructions were simple. The Colonial Office was thoroughly dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the Peninsula. I was to make it the subject of a careful enquiry, and report my views as soon as possible. I fear that in some quarters there lurks a belief in the efficacy of reports... It was necessary to act in the first place and report afterwards... The Principles upon which I acted were simple. Personal influence has always a greater effect on natives of the type of the Perak chiefs, and this influence I endeavoured to apply... In place of anarchy and irregular revenues I held out the prospects of peace and plenty. I found them in cotton: I told them that, if they would trust me, I would clothe them in silk... and since, I have often wondered how many of our useless, expensive, and demoralising small wars might have been avoided by similar modes of procedure... and I imagine that the secret of Imperial as of commercial success lies in knowing where to adventure".³

1. Kimberley to Clarke 20.ix.1873. (draft). CO/273/67.

2. Ibid.

3. A. Clarke, 'The Straits Settlements', British Empire Series, vol. I, pp. 45-450-455.

Sir Andrew Clarke's adventure began on the Island of Pangkor on 14 January 1874, when he started to use his 'influence' with the Perak chiefs.

On the same day in West Africa Wolseley stood poised for his invasion of Ashanti, and in the South Pacific, similar proceedings to Clarke's were in progress in the Fiji Islands. Goodenough and Layard were beginning their formal enquiries into the question of annexing Fiji, where, as in Malaya, the situation was urgent. In fact on, the day that Clarke began the Pangkor Conference one of the Fiji Commissioners wrote home this private impression: "for God's sake let there be no delay after our report is sent in, or I shall not be able to restrain these folk, they will one side of the other draw blood".¹

1. Layard to Wylde 14.i.1874. Private, FO/58/139 p.30.

Chapter 4.THE DEBATE OVER FIJI AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1855-1874.

Sir Andrew Clarke, who went to Malaya to inquire and report following Kimberley's change of mind in July 1873, nearly went to Fiji on a similar mission, after a Cabinet decision in June of that year.¹ Since 1855 there had been repeated proposals that Britain should annex the Fiji Islands or make them a protectorate. They were resisted until February 1873 when Kimberley urged Gladstone to accept. Even then a decision was avoided, for Kimberley, knowing Gladstone's reluctance, provided yet another opportunity for delay. The Cabinet agreed, on 7 June 1873, to send E.L.Layard, the new Consul for Fiji, and Commodore J.C.Goodenough, the new commander of the Australasian Squadron, to inquire and report on the question of annexing Fiji.

Their recommendations were probably a foregone conclusion,² but their action was not expected. In the case of Malaya, Clarke was given the idea of appointing Residents by a Secretary of State who was nevertheless taken aback by the fait accompli at Pangkor. Similarly, if the wording of Goodenough's instructions left little doubt as to Kimberley's predilections, authority for the preliminary cession of the islands, which took place on 20 March 1874, cannot be found in them. Lord Tenterden, the Assistant Under-secretary in the Foreign Office, wrote: "I thought Layard and Goodenough were to inquire and report, not to invite a plebiscite for annexation".³


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1. Kimberley to Gladstone 30.iv.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/29. Here Kimberley first moots the idea of a commission and says Clarke would be excellent man if the Admiralty could spare him. Sir Arthur Gordon, then the Governor of Mauritius, also volunteered to go to Fiji.
 2. K-Hugessen believed that the Commission 'paved the way' for annexation and, unless Gladstone had overruled them later, he felt the Liberal Govt. would have annexed the islands. Brabourne Diary, V 1874-79, p. 732.
 3. Min. by Tenterden 10.iii.1874 on Commissioners' published correspondence with the Fiji Govt., 12.i.1874. FO/58/139 p.33.

The cession of Fiji, which was accepted by Disraeli's ministry in the same way as it accepted Pangkor, and Wolseley's Treaty of Fomana with Ashanti, ended the Fiji debate. But it was only the beginning of another. This concerned the problem of the British frontier in the South Pacific. Just as in West Africa and Malaya the frontier of British commerce, investment, settlement, crime, political influence or administrative assistance had moved beyond the British settlements, so in the case of the islands of the South Pacific, it had moved beyond Australia and New Zealand. Moreover, like the slave trade in West Africa, the labour traffic in the Pacific caused the humanitarians in Britain to make a clamour, which, politically, was a potent factor behind the Fiji decision. Therefore this chapter on the background to the annexation of Fiji will involve three closely interrelated themes - the British reaction to governmental changes in Fiji after 1855; the attempt to regulate the labour traffic; and the awakening, in a quiet rather academic sense of expansionism in the Pacific. "The waste places of the earth were being filled up", said Lord Carnarvon in 1874, "... and there were few outlying properties left".¹ The debate on these themes in London followed a pattern which coincided remarkably with the debates over West Africa and Malaya.

Early requests for the annexation of Fiji, 1855-1863.

In the middle of the nineteenth century Fiji, in the South Pacific, began to follow the pattern of Hawaii, in the North. Traders, missionaries and then settlers from the British colonies and from the U.S.A. introduced new notions of government into the Polynesian kingdoms. The Hawaiian (Sandwich) Islands were the most important group in the Pacific outside Australasia: first a port of call for whalers and traders between Nootka Sound and China, they received a United

1. To a deputation of the Fiji Committee, 4.vii.1874. CO/83/5.



SKETCH showing the relative positions of certain PACIFIC ISLANDS

States Consul in 1820, the same year the American missionaries came. American influence predominated throughout most of the nineteenth century and in 1843 Britain and France renounced all intention of acquiring Hawaii. But whatever the ambitions of American settlers, traders, politicians or the Navy Department, with Congress reluctant to assume oversea responsibilities, Hawaii was left a sort of international no-man's-land. Englishmen, Frenchmen and Americans took office under the Hawaiian Kingdom which was able to maintain a precarious independence until the end of the century.

Although English missionaries had been active in the Pacific since the eighteenth century, the government declined on the whole to exercise forceful political influence. The L.M.S. ship Duff took the first missionaries via the Horn in 1797 to Tahiti and the Marqueses, and the society gradually expanded westwards to Samoa, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia and the Solomons. The Wesleyans worked eastwards from New Zealand, entering Tonga in 1826 and Fiji in 1835. The Presbyterians went to the New Hebrides in 1848, and Bishop Selwyn founded the Anglican Melanesian Mission in the same year. Yet after securing New Zealand in 1842 the British government refused numerous requests for protection or annexation - from Tahiti (1838), Hawaii (1843), Tonga, Tahiti and Tutuila (1844) Samoa (1857) and Tonga (1859).

French interest in the Pacific provided a notable contrast. While the Protestant missionaries, traders and settlers from the U.S.A. and the British colonies carved out their strictly private empires protected only intermittently by naval intervention, the French government worked hand in glove with the Roman Catholic missionaries to create French influence in areas where French settlement and trade were negligible. The Mission d'Océanie was founded in 1829 and by 1835 the Pacific was divided into two apostolic vicariates. Beginning tentatively at Hawaii in 1827 the French Catholic missions expanded to Eastern Polynesia: to the Gambier Islands (1834), Tahiti (1836) and the Marqueses (1838). In the South


Pacific, after an attempt in Tonga, they created stations at Wallis and Futuna islands, near Samoa, in 1837, and they centred their mission here in New Zealand. Moreover, the annexation of the Marqueses and the creation of the Tahiti Protectorate in 1842, and the occupation of New Caledonia in 1853 were deliberate acts, a part of the French policy of securing bases in the Pacific.

The Hamburg firm of Godeffroy did not establish its Agency in Samoa, which was the basis of the German interest, until 1857.¹

Thus by the middle of the nineteenth century, when the frontier of British interest moved beyond the Australian colonies, Britain, France and the United States had firm stakes in the Pacific. In the South, Britain had secured New Zealand, the finest prize in the ocean; in the North the U.S.A. was assured that the other two would not make Hawaii into a Pacific Bermuda, and her citizens were quietly consolidating their hold on the economic life of the kingdom. France was the leading power in the Eastern Pacific from her base at Papeete, and in securing New Caledonia, the nearest large island to Australia (apart from New Guinea), she had demonstrated also that the islands of the South Pacific in the region of the British colonies, were not automatically a British preserve. In Fiji British influence predominated in religion, trade and settlement. A measure of this influence can be seen in the words of Thakombau: "The Americans are all bluster, and the French are all grimace and very polite, but the English are the most honest".²

The Fiji Islands are a group of over two hundred islands about 1000 miles north of New Zealand. Viti Levu, the largest island has an area of 4010.70 square

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1. The best general accounts of the growth of European expansion in the Pacific are, J.I. Brookes, International Rivalry in the Pacific Islands, 1800-1875, (1941) and J.M. Ward, British Policy in the South Pacific, 1786 to 1893 (1948). G.H. Scholefield, The Pacific, its past and future, (1919), although rather out of date, has a lot of very useful material.
 2. Goodenough's Journal, II, 24.ii.1873.



THE FIJI ISLANDS

miles and lies at latitude 18° South and longitude 178° East. The first European to visit them was Tasman in 1643, and after Cook (1774) and Bligh (1789), a number of explorers, traders and a mission ship called in the late eighteenth century. The first chart was published by Aaron Arrowsmith in 1818. More systematic surveys were made by D'Urville in 1838, Commander Wilkes of the U.S. Exploring Expedition in 1840, and by Captain (later Admiral Sir Mangles) Denham, R.N., in 1855-56.¹

In the early years of the nineteenth century trading ships from India, Australia and New England sought sandalwood and bech-de-mer for the markets of China, Manila and Batavia,² and from the early trading ships and from shipwrecks came the beachcombers - "deserters, marooned sailors, derelict scourings of the ports of the old world"³ - who gave to the Fijians their first taste of western civilization in the shape of new diseases, alcohol and firearms.

If European interest in Fiji began with explorers and traders, European influence was first exerted by the Wesleyan missionaries. Actually the first Christians in Fiji were two L.M.S. teachers from Tonga, who landed at Lakemba⁴ in 1830,⁵ but at end of 1834 the Wesleyans decided to enter the Fijian islands. William Cross and David Cargill, the first missionaries, reached Lakemba in October of 1835 and four years later Fiji was a separate mission district.⁶ A doctor soon arrived and a Fijian Bible was produced. In spite of their initial horror at cannibalism, slow conversions and disillusionment when Christian fought Heathen in the battles for power among the chiefs, the Wesleyans were destined to play a significant part in Fijian history. By 1860, with sixteen missionaries

1. For voyages of discovery see C.C.Henderson, Fiji and the Fijians 1835-56 (1931) pp. 16-25 & R.A.Derrick, A History of Fiji (1946) vol. I, pp. 28-36.

2. Derrick, History, p. 39.

3. Ibid. p.37.

4. Phonetic spelling will be used for Fijian names. Fijian b is pronounced mb, c - th, d - nd, g - ng, q - ng.

5. Henderson, op. cit. pp. 42-43.

6. G.G.Findlay & W.W.Holdsworth, The History of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (1921), vol. III, pp. 371-380.

in the field aided by over 200 local preachers, they claimed 9,715 church members and 60,000 churchgoers.¹ When Sir Arthur Gordon arrived as Governor in 1875 he found the head of the mission was one of the most important men in the islands controlling an organisation which Gordon likened to the Jesuits.²

Missionary influence was not confined to religious teaching. They provided the interpreters for political meetings between the chiefs and the visiting naval officers, and James Calvert, who headed the Ovalau circuit from 1861 to 1866, worked to bring about the cession of the islands to Britain. Calvert's activities, moreover, were not confined to the chiefly level, for the Methodist leaders in England and Australia were urged to exert pressure by their colleagues in the mission field. The missionaries visited Australia for the annual Methodist Conference, and in New South Wales the local Methodists, who controlled the Fiji Mission after 1855, were influential politically. At one time there were seven Methodists in the Colonial Assembly,³ and one of them, Alexander MacArthur moved a resolution in 1859 urging the annexation of the islands. In London the leading agitators for annexation were briefed by the Methodists; Admiral J.E. Erskine MP., who had visited the Fiji Islands, corresponded with Calvert. Above all Alderman William MacArthur MP., brother of the Sydney politician, was a leading Methodist. It was he who led the agitation in the House of Commons and he earned the sobriquet of "the patron saint of the Fiji Islander".⁴

Fijian, to the early nineteenth century mind, stood for cannibal. Henderson wrote that if a great chief visited Mbau and human joints were not available "women and children fishing on the reefs would be stalked and taken, dressed and cooked to furnish him with appetizing dishes".⁵ Yet early traders were often

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1. Rev. W. Wilson to Dr. Hoole, May 1860. Methodist Missionary Society Archives, Various Fiji Papers, 1858-60 file.
 2. Gordon, Fiji Records, I, p. 164.
 3. Notebook 13, Calvert Papers, Method. Miss. Soc. Archives.
 4. Sir Wilfred Lawson in the Commons, 4.viii.1874. 3 Hansard, ccxxi, col. 1296.
 5. Henderson, op. cit. p.55.

hospitably received. Until the late eighteenth century there were no large political units in the Fiji Islands,¹ and when the early discoverers arrived, the chief 'kingdoms' were Rewa, Verata and Mbau (on Viti Levu), Thakaudrove, Mathuata and Mbua (on Vanua Levu) and Lakemba in the Lau Islands. Derrick says that "during the first half of the century, native affairs in that part of Fiji were dominated by a struggle for supremacy in which [Rewa, Mbau and Verata] engaged. The border lands between Rewa and Mbau became the cockpit of Fiji".² By almost continual warfare the chiefs of Mbau raised their power so that by the 1850's Thakombau was styling himself Tui Viti, 'King of all Fiji'. The decisive point in his fortunes was the battle of Kamba in 1855, a year which in many ways may be seen as the great watershed in Fijian history.

But Thakombau's victory over his rivals at Kamba frustrated his ambition to be in reality a 'King of all Fiji'. The victory was only possible with the help of the Christian King George Tubou of Tonga, whose relative Ma'afu, the 'Bismarck of the Pacific', had been established in the Lau group since 1848. From the time of Kamba until he became a British official in 1874, Ma'afu and the Tongans of Lau played an important part in Fijian history.³ By 1855 he had acquired all the northern Lau group and he eventually united eastern and northern Fiji into a confederacy to rival the power of Thakombau.

In 1855 also the debate over Fiji in London, which ended in the annexation of 1874, really began, for two comprehensive proposals for British policy in the South Pacific were received. Firstly, Charles St. Julian, a law reporter who was also Consul-General for Hawaii in Sydney, suggested that Samoa and Fiji should be taken under "protective supremacy" on the analogy of Earl Grey's Gold Coast

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1. Derrick, History, says the largest kingdoms, Verata and Thakaudrove "were at most a few miles of coast with perhaps a conquered island or two".
 2. Ibid. p. 54.
 3. Early Tongan contacts are discussed by Derrick pp. 118-128.

Protectorate.¹ Secondly, Mr. G. Oliver of Bradford suggested the annexation of Fiji and other islands.² Although their advice was not followed, it was not rejected out of hand; only after careful consideration was it rejected and the Treasury did sanction the appointment of two new Consuls in the Pacific, one of which went to Fiji where the United States had had a Consular Agent since 1846.³ It was in July 1855 also that James Calvert, the Wesleyan leader at Ovalau, engineered the first of Thakombau's fruitless requests for British protection, "lest the French and Popery should gain these islands".⁴

Again, it was in 1855 that Commander Boutwell of the U.S.S. John Adams made Thakombau admit liability for 45,000 dollars worth of damages due to American citizens. Most writers, from Sir Arthur Gordon onwards, have accepted Consul March's memorandum of 1873⁵ and date the American claims from an incident in 1849 when the U.S. Agent, John Brown Williams, set fire to his house while firing a Fourth of July salute. He claimed that some Fijians looted his property, and he subsequently added interest to his original figure. Thus the American claims

1. P. 2 of Memo. dated 31.vii.1854 in FO/58/82 p.306.
2. Oliver suggested, in a letter to Clarendon dated 26.xii.1854 which has not been found, that Britain should annex New Guinea, the Celebes, Fiji, Tonga and the New Hebrides. This was sent to Capt. Fremantle, Senior Naval Officer in Australia, who reported that a protectorate over Fiji could be gained with little trouble. Oliver's suggestion was known to Calvert in July 1855 who was under the impression that the British government favoured it. Circumstances seemed ripe for gaining Fiji, but no action was in fact taken. However, in 1883, Augustus Gregory, the Australian explorer, said he had received confidential instructions in 1855 to annex New Guinea, should the Crimean war continue. (Information from J.H.I. Cumpston, Augustus Gregory and the Inland Sea, unpublished manuscript, used by courtesy of the late author's daughter, Dr. I.M. Cumpston, pp. 41-43). See also Calvert to Gen. Sec. 24.vii.1855. Meth. Miss. Soc, Fiji Incoming 1855 file, and Memo. on the Oliver proposal dated 5.i.1855. FO/58/82 p. 308.
3. Brookes, International Rivalry, pp. 230-231.
4. The chief of Levuka, in rebellion against Thakombau, had treated for help from the Roman Catholic missionaries. Calvert to Gen. Sec. 13.viii.1855. Meth. Miss. Soc. Incoming Fiji 1855 file.
5. Memo. by E. March, London 14.v.1873. FO/58/135 p. 179. Calvert's version of the figures are in G.S. Rowe, Fiji and the Fijians, by T. Williams and J. Calvert (1858) p. 574.

have always been severely criticised.¹ However, the documents published by the State Department make it clear that although Williams's claims were certainly excessive they were in fact only the last of a list which included legitimate losses suffered by Americans dating from 1844.²

Williams, as chief creditor, was a persistent claimant and the State Department ordered an investigation; but it was Boutwell's actions, rather than the claims, which were most discreditable. The commander was "a Papist and a Southerner".³ He ignored a more senior officer who warned him not to accept Williams's figures, and he threatened Thakombau with deportation to the United States if he did not admit liability for outrages which were not really his responsibility.⁴ This action was disavowed by the American government after the Civil War, but Boutwell's high-handedness in 1855 set off a long chain of reactions.

In the long run Calvert's persistent advocacy of Thakombau's case reached President Grant's ears in 1868 and eventually there was a reconsideration of the case, but this was not before an Australian company had inveigled 200,000 acres from Thakombau in return for the payment of the debt.⁵ In the short run, Thakombau's debt caused the premature cession of the islands to Britain. For when Commander Sinclair of the U.S. Corvette Vandalia arrived in October 1858 to collect the money, Thakombau was threatened again and now promised to pay \$45,000

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1. Gordon, Fiji Records, I, p. 495; Brookes, International Rivalry, p.233; Legge, Britain in Fiji, p. 28; and Henderson, History of Government in Fiji, II, p.66.
 2. Details of all the claims were presented to Comdr. Petigru of the U.S.S. Falmouth in Feb. 1851, to Comdr. Macgruder of the U.S.S. St. Mary's in July 1851, and were sent to Washington, 1.1.1854. They are published in Treaties and other International Acts of the United States of America, ed. by H. Miller. Dept. of State publications (1942) vol. VII (1855-58) pp. 286-293.
 3. Rev. J. Waterhouse to Gen. Sec. 13.xi.1855. Meth. Miss. Soc. Fiji Incoming 1856 file.
 4. Comdr. (later Rear-Admiral) T. Bailey, U.S.S. St. Mary's, arrived while Boutwell was at work and reminded him, as a junior officer, to obey his instructions. See letter in Miller, Treaties, pp. 297-298; cf. Meth. Miss. Soc Fiji Incoming 1856 file.
 5. See below p. 236-237.

in a year.¹ Having no means of paying he turned to the newly appointed British Consul, William Thomas Pritchard, who had arrived on 10 September 1858.² On his advice Thakombau ceded the islands to Britain on the condition that the United States debts would be paid. Drawn up by Pritchard, and signed at Levuka on 12 October, only four days after the promise to Sinclair, the cession document recognised Thakombau as Tui Viti "having full and exclusive sovereignty and domain in and over the islands". It also provided that the British Crown would receive 200,000 acres of land.³ Pritchard set off for England with this on 3 November; the Colonial Office heard via Australia in January 1859, and Pritchard reported in February to Lord Malmesbury at the Foreign Office, who approved his action in bringing the document personally and gave him work in the office.⁴

Should the government accept Fiji? Carnarvon, the youthful Parliamentary Under-secretary in the Colonial Office, was in two minds; "It is painful to refuse but there must be a limit somewhere to our protecting and governing duties especially when we gain nothing by the acquisition".⁵ Yet it was selfish, he said, to refuse to protect "unfortunate islanders who are terrified by the licence of French sailors and the annexation ideas of the US. Government".⁶ Bulwer Lytton, the Colonial Secretary, put the decision off until the controversy over Disraeli's 'fancy franchise' reform bill was over.

There was widely deployed support for accepting the cession. In Sydney Alexander MacArthur caused the New South Wales Assembly to vote an address to the Crown in support,⁷ and Captain Towns, a wealthy merchant, offered to pay the

1. Miller, Treaties, p. 303.

2. W.T.Pritchard, Polynesian Reminiscences (1866), p. 209.

3. Copy of text in B.Seemann, Viti: an account of a government mission to the Vitian or Fijian Islands, 1860-61 (1862) pp. 124-1281

4. Pritchard, op. cit. p. 221.

5. Brookes, International Rivalry, p. 244

6. Ibid. p. 245.

7. McCullagh, MacArthur, p. 147.

American debts. The Admiralty hydrographer, Captain John Washington, favoured the cession with his often-quoted warning that between Vancouver and Sydney Britain had "not an island nor a rock in the 7000 miles of ocean".¹ The Manchester Cotton Supply Association reported favourably on the standard of Fijian cotton, and the Rev. William Arthur, general secretary of the Wesleyan Missionary Society, fearing that the French might create another Tahiti, publicised the matter in a pamphlet, "What is Fiji?". Lord Derby, the Prime Minister, listened to what some of the supporters of annexation had to say, but before any decision he was defeated over the reform bill.

Thus Palmerston's second government was formed in June 1859, and Russell and Newcastle took over the Foreign and Colonial Offices. The American payments were due in October 1859, so Russell sent Pritchard back to Fiji in July with a verbal instruction to tell the chiefs that the cession was being considered. Reaching the islands on 1 November the Consul was immediately faced with the problem of rivalry between Thakombau and Ma'afu. Thakombau had already been in difficulty with the Mbau chiefs when Pritchard left in 1858; a year later the Consul found that the abler Ma'afu had prevailed on Vanua Levu and had allies on Viti Levu on either side of Thakombau, at Mbengga, in the south, and Rakiraki to the north-east. Both sides appealed to Pritchard. Thakombau wanted help; Ma'afu asserted that he himself would soon be master and that the Consul must recognise him.²

Pritchard's instructions were vague and as the cession offer was still unanswered, he faced an embarrassing choice. Deciding to preserve the status quo at the time of the cession he determined to maintain Thakombau and check Ma'afu and the Tongans. Without announcing this he called the first conference of the

1. Quoted in Seemann, Viti, p. 421.

2. Pritchard, Reminiscences, p. 225-232.

leading Fijian chiefs, which began at the Consulate at Levuka on 14 December 1859, with HMS Elk standing by. Here Pritchard, with the concurrence of the United States Consul, got signatures on a remarkable group of documents. "I secured the controlling power of the group in my own hands", he later wrote.¹ Ma'afu was persuaded to renounce his pretensions, the 1858 cession was "ratified and renewed" by twenty chiefs including Thakombau, and finally the Consul was granted "full unreserved entire and supreme authority to govern Fiji and to make what laws he pleased".²

Pritchard probably regarded these powers as an interim system of control pending a decision as the question of the cession. But before Palmerston's government made up its mind the Colonial Office sent a commissioner to investigate. The officer chosen was Col. W.T.Smythe, R.A.³ Finding no ship for Fiji in Sydney he went to New Zealand, and he finally reached Fiji on 5 July 1860 after having to spend at least a month in New Zealand during the first Taranaki War (March 1860 to March 1861), an outbreak which followed a land dispute between Maori chiefs and the government.⁴ In Sydney Governor Denison warned Smythe of New Zealand's experience of settlers' problems with the local inhabitants, and this lesson was not lost on the Colonial Office where the Maori War was seen to "illustrate the difficulty of carrying out the Fiji project".⁵

It was soon quite evident that Smythe would advise against the cession as he discovered that Thakombau did not have authority to make it.⁶ He sent a

1. Ibid. p. 234.

2. Derrick, History, pp.143-4; Seemann, Viti, pp.128-9. Copy of treaty giving him jurisdiction over British subjects, 15.xii.1859 in FO/58/124 p.65. The treaty vesting full powers in him, 16.xii.1859 in Smythe to Newcastle 9.xi.1860. CO/83/1.

3. Derrick (p.144) says Smythe was appointed at the end of 1859, but the FO. was not officially told until CO. to FO. 31.vii.1860 (draft). CO/83/1.

4. J.Hight, 'The Maori Wars, 1843-72', Camb.Hist.Brit.EMP. VII, Pt.2, pp.133-136

5. Min. by Sandford 19.vi.1860 on Smythe to CO. 14.iv.1860. CO/83/1. Legge, Britain in Fiji, p. 34 says that these fears of another New Zealand "were decisive" in leading the CO. to accept Smythe's advice against annexation.

6. Smythe to Newcastle 9.viii.1860. CO/83/1.

a provisional adverse recommendation in November 1860,¹ but the full report did not reach the Colonial Office until 17 August 1861. As his conclusion was already announced, Smythe aimed in the report to dismiss the reasons which were given in favour of annexation. Thus he said (1) that steamers from Sydney to Panama would have to make a more dangerous journey and go 359 miles out of their way if they went via Fiji, (2) that although cotton grew well, the land question would have to be settled, and production would be low because the Fijians would not work, and (3) that Fiji was not necessary for the maintainance of British power in the Pacific. That depended on the ships of the Australasian Station. Fiji would be a costly addition, and he thought that instead of being annexed it ought to be allowed to develop gradually under western influence like the Kingdom of Hawaii. All he suggested was that the British Consul should be given magisterial powers over British subjects and that the Consulate should be moved from Levuka to Suva.²

Agreeing with Smythe the Colonial Office advised, on 7 September 1861, that the cession should be rejected.³ So far as the Colonial Office was concerned this disposed of Fiji until 1870, and their attitude in the early 1860's is illustrated by Rogers's statement that "the present juncture is certainly not one in which it would be convenient to become responsible for the Government of more warlike savages than we already have on our hands".⁴ Thus offers of Samoa in 1862 and

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1. Smythe to Newcastle 9.xi.1860. CO/83/1.
 2. Report in A & P, 1862, XXXVI, pp.734-742. Smythe's qualifications and his conduct of the enquiry are severely criticised by Derrick, History, pp.146-7. In 1873 Smythe changed his mind over Fiji and K-Hugessen wrote: "The fact is that his report on 1861 was all wrong in many of its most essential particulars" (Min. 1.iv.1873 on FO. to CO. 26.iii.1873. CO/83/3). This did not prevent Kimberley, who got to know Smythe in Ireland, from suggesting sending him as the Commissioner in 1873. (Kimberley to Gladstone 30.iv.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/29).
 3. CO. to FO. 7.ix.1861 (draft). CO/83/1. Russell, the Foreign Sec. agreed. Ten years later Kinnaird told the Commons that when he had tried to persuade Palmerston to annex Fiji the P.M. had looked at the map and recited all the depths of the harbours in Fiji, but Gladstone replied that Newcastle was the only member of the Cabinet who favoured annexation. ³ Hansard, cccxi, col.213-7.
 4. Min. by Rogers 19.vi.1860 on Denison to Newcastle 10.iv.1860. CO/83/1.

Raratonga in 1866 were also rejected.

The Foreign Office, however, had a continuing responsibility in Fiji. To begin with Smythe advised the removal of Pritchard; there were rumours about his past, accusations of financial irregularity, and above all the evidence that Pritchard had interfered in Fijian politics and achieved a position of great power. He was an able man, said Smythe, but needed supervision.¹ Pritchard had indeed worked indefatigably to develop and civilize Fiji. By advertising in the Australian papers for settlers, he claimed that he attracted between ten and twenty new arrivals a week.² His rules governing land purchases were recognised to the extent that by 1863 the Consular Seal on a deed was accepted as legally binding. He persuaded the settlers and the chiefs to support a 'Mercantile Court of Fiji' consisting of the British and United States Consuls and other assessors.³ British ships were required to register and he issued 'sailing letters' as the condition of giving them protection. In April 1862 he visited King George Tubou of Tonga after the Wesleyans and the U.S. Consul had warned him that Ma'afu's ambitions might lead to a Tongan invasion of Fiji. And although Smythe had a poor impression of Pritchard, Dr. Seemann, the botanist, and Commodore Seymour, the Senior naval Officer, - both of whom witnessed Pritchard's relations with the Fijians - paid tribute to him.⁴

Faced with these conflicting reports Russell ordered the Governor of New South Wales to investigate, and a commission of three arrived at Levuka in June 1862 for this purpose. Evidence of stealing by Pritchard was found unsatisfactory, but his financial affairs "led to very justifiable suspicion".⁵ Therefore the

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1. Ibid. Smythe to Newcastle 9.xi.1860.
 2. Pritchard, Reminiscences, p.235.
 3. Cf. the Courts of Equity in the Niger Delta, see ^{above} p.396
 4. Seymour's view in AD. to CO. 22.xi.1861. CO/83/1. Derrick, History, p.146. Seemann's Viti (1862) was in some respects a contradiction of Smythe, and Seemann also published and edited Pritchard's Reminiscences in 1866.
 5. Commission's report in FO/58/108 p.535. Pritchard does not mention the commission in his Reminiscences. He blames the missionaries, who he said, at first told him that Thakombau was Tui Viti, then later said he had no power to cede to islands. (p.218). After the formal refusal of the cession, Pritchard says he ceased to exercise the powers he had gained.

Consul was suspended and he left Fiji in 1863. The British government's refusal of the cession was announced in the islands in July 1862.

Undoubtedly Pritchard was an able and energetic man, who, probably with the best of motives, exceeded his vague instructions. He was obviously ambitious and in financial matters, if not dishonest, certainly incompetent: yet Henderson's criticisms seem somewhat violent,¹ and both Derrick and Legge have concentrated on his achievements.² He is important for this discussion because his five year tenure of the Consulate raised most of the problems which were to worry Whitehall for a decade or more. Who was the lawful authority in Fiji? Who would prevail in the struggle for power between Thakombau and Ma'afu? How were the British settlers in the islands to be governed? What was Fiji's commercial and strategic value? The same ship which delivered the formal British refusal was handed a paper by Robert S. Swanston, one of the ablest of the settlers, on the commercial potential of the islands. Very impressed by the economic possibilities and racial harmony of the group this writer said all that was needed was magisterial power for the British Consul, so that the settlers could be controlled. Smythe had also recommended this, and in the Foreign Office the Hon. H.C. Vivian agreed. Fiji would present all sorts of difficulties but he thought there would be no harm if the new consul tried to get jurisdiction over British subjects.³ Thus from 1862 to 1869 British policy towards Fiji involved an attempt to give the consul magisterial powers over British subjects. The attempt failed.

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1. Henderson (History of Government in Fiji, II, pp.61-102) completely accepts Smythe's view and has not a word of criticism of the commissioner. He considered Pritchard an autocratic, dangerous megalomaniac who "would be a King in Fiji".
 2. Derrick, (History, pp.154-5) says that but for Smythe Pritchard would be regarded as the "Stamford Raffles of the South-western Pacific", and Legge, (Britain in Fiji, p.38 & 106) says "it is impossible not to admire his tactical skill in controlling the native affairs of Fiji, or to admit the justice of his pride in his achievement".
 3. Min. by Vivian 11.iii.1863 on CO. to FO. 5.iii.1863, with Swanston's paper dated 24.vii.1862. FO/58/124.

The development of Fiji and the attempt at Consular Jurisdiction, 1863-70.

Ten years after the Smythe Report consular jurisdiction in Fiji was provided by Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts. Yet the order was never published or carried into effect.¹ A decade of drafting and re-drafting in Whitehall ended in failure; a failure which cannot be explained simply by the changes which were taking place in the islands. Here is a clear example of the muddle and indifference by which the departments of state in London could obstruct the formulation of policy when it concerned such a peripheral area as the South Pacific.²

Only rarely did Fiji come before the Cabinet. In theory the islands came within the ken of the Foreign Office, who appointed the Consul, but the Foreign Office rarely moved in these waters without consulting the Law Officers. The Colonial Office could not remain aloof, however much it tried,³ because Australian colonists were interested in Fiji, the R.N.Squadron was based in the colonies, and most of the plans for consular jurisdiction envisaged appeals to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Most of the delays in the Fiji discussions were caused by the Treasury, which once took over a year to answer a letter and which was responsible for the dropping of plans for consular jurisdiction in 1869. Again, when the growth of the South Sea labour traffic attracted publicity to dusty corners of Whitehall there was no clear cut line of responsibility. Most of the ships involved came from colonial ports, but much of the information could only be gathered by the consul. Any measures for regulation depended on Treasury sanction of the expense and Admiralty enforcement. In these circumstances, Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Treasury,

1. FO. to CO. 19.ix.1871 (draft). FO/58/122 p.107.

2. When he was working in the FO. Pritchard found a parcel in a corner addressed to him at Levuka with some forms. It had been there for 16 months.

Reminiscences, p.225.

3. Kimberley often wrote minutes like this: "I wish to discourage the notion that the Colonial Office has anything to do with the Fiji islands". Min. on Belmore to Kimberley 25.i.1871. CO/201/563.

Admiralty and Law Officers between them managed to prevaricate for ten years over providing facilities which were already being taken for granted elsewhere.¹ Herbert was conscious of the muddle when he wrote that "A vast quantity of the Polynesian business has been done twice over".²

Admittedly Fiji was a unique case. Normally consular jurisdiction was based not only on the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts³ but on treaties with the ruling sovereigns. Pritchard had forgotten the latter, so his successor, Henry M. Jones VC., was asked by the Foreign Office in September 1863 if there was any authority in Fiji with whom a treaty could be made.⁴ Jones replied that there had "never been any law and order in Fiji", but he said that in 1860 Congress had granted the United States Consuls in lands without 'civilized government' the same powers as had been obtained by treaty in China, Japan and Siam.⁵ A year later Jones reported that he had persuaded the Fijian chiefs to form a confederation. Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, was encouraged by the American act, so on 6 November 1866 the Treasury was consulted about an Order in Council to apply the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts to "certain islands in the Pacific".⁶

The Treasury did not reply until 25 January 1868,⁷ when Mr. Reilly, their drafter, produced a scheme similar to those operating in China, Japan and Siam. It provided for the registration of British subjects in Fiji, civil and criminal jurisdiction by the Consul similar to that exercised by an English county court, the Consul to be able to award penalties up to six months imprisonment or a fine of £50. Prisoners, serious cases and appeals were to go to New South Wales.⁸

1. See below p.393-396.

2. Min. by Herbert 30.vi.1871 on Belmore to Kimberley 8.iv.1871. CO/201/563.

3. See below p.57.

4. Min. by Vivian 11.iii.1863 on CO. to FO. 5.iii.1863 & FO. to Jones 14.ix.1863 (draft). FO/58/124 pp.30-31.

5. Jones to FO. 6.x.1866. Ibid. p.35-& 43.

6. FO. to Tres. 6.xi.1866 (draft). Ibid. p. 69.

7. The delay was caused by a misunderstanding between the Treas. and Mr. Reilly.

8. Booklet in Treas. to FO. 25.i.1868. FO/58/124 p.91.

Another delay followed as the Law Officers considered that an Act would be necessary to make the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts apply to Fiji; in January 1869 Reilly drafted the required Bill.

These delays were caused by the legal conclusion that in Fiji jurisdiction could not be based on sufferance and that there was no regular government with which a treaty could be made. Reilly's Bill was designed to overcome this bar, and it was only after the matter had progressed thus far that the Lords of the Treasury realised the true nature of the Fiji anomaly and took fright. As the Bill involved giving the Crown jurisdiction in a case not experienced before, they felt that British subjects might force the Crown to exercise powers in a territory which was not British and which another Power might acquire. Therefore the Treasury deluged cold water on the whole scheme by re-iterating a familiar doctrine:

"If a jurisdiction is created it may be presumed to Courts must be established to administer it. These cannot exist without a Government to protect them nor a Government without taxes - nor taxes without some sort of police; and all these things being created under British law they must... in the too probable case of default, be supported from Imperial resources".

The Treasury suggested instead that Fiji should be placed under the jurisdiction of one of the Australian colonies.¹ They did not realise, said Vivian, that consular jurisdiction usually paid for itself out of fees.

The Colonial Office was not pleased by the Treasury's alternative. Granville, the Colonial Secretary, would not allow Fijian crimes to be punishable in Australia without colonial consent, as this would be "pro tanto a revival of transportation".² He suggested a voluntary scheme of law enforcement in Fiji among the settlers, or some joint arrangement with the United States. But the latter had found that their 1860 Act of Congress was ineffective, and as the

1. Treas. to FO. 2.i.1869. FO/58/124 p.223.
2. CO. to FO. 26.ii.1869. FO/58/116 p.123.

British Law Officers were unable to recommend any satisfactory way of applying the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts to Fiji, Clarendon dropped the Bill in May 1869.¹ The Foreign Office decided to rely on the "prudence and discretion" of the new Consul, Edward March. Thus eight years after Smythe's suggestion the attempt to get consular jurisdiction was dropped, until Granville revived it in 1871.

While Whitehall dabbled with Fiji in this leisurely fashion in the 1860's, events in the islands conspired to draw more urgent attention to them. The abortive cession of 1858, Pritchard's advertisements in the colonial press, and the high cotton prices induced by the Civil War in the U.S.A. increased the white population to three hundred and fifty by 1865,² and the value of trade grew steadily.³ But the problem of government still remained. At its core lay the rivalries of the Fijian chiefs, especially Thakombau and Ma'afu. From 1862 to 1874 three approaches were made to the problem of government in Fiji. Firstly, British Consuls⁴ did their best to encourage the Fijian chiefs to create a unified government, and to protect them from unscrupulous settlers. Secondly, individual settlers, or mere adventurers, became the secretaries of the leading chiefs, and later tried to create constitutional regimes with themselves as ministers. Thirdly, white settlers formed 'mutual protection societies' which planned to take the law into their own hands in the event of a complete crisis. The third solution was the least constructive and its recurrent manifestations

1. FO. to CO. 20.v.1869 (draft). FO/58/124 p.274.

2. They will be called 'white' settlers as they included Europeans, Americans and Colonials. In 1865: 230 Brit, 70 Am, 30 Germ & Scand, & 20 others. (Jones to FO. 24.xi.1865. FO/58/124 p.49.)

3. Value of exports, from Consul's reports :-

<u>1862</u>	<u>1863</u>	<u>1864</u>	<u>1865</u>	<u>1866</u>	<u>1867</u>	<u>1868</u>	<u>1869</u>	<u>1870</u>
£13,030	13,085	19,764	24,225	30,970	39,960	45,167	57,020	98,735.

Imports, occasionally estimated by the Consul:-

<u>1865</u>	<u>1866</u>	<u>1867</u>	<u>1870</u>
£20,000	25,000	29,000	71,000

4. Capt. Henry Michael Jones VC July 1863-July 1867; John Bates Thurston (acting) July 1867-November 1869; Edward March November 1869-January 1873.

embarrassed the Consuls. In 1871 for instance some British subjects formed an armed Klu Klux Klan.¹ The second solution represented Fiji's short-lived attempt to emulate Hawaii; in many ways a constructive solution, its breakdown in 1873-4 was the immediate cause of British intervention. The efforts of the consuls were usually ineffective, but they were important because they identified the British government with the cause of protecting the Fijians from the settlers, a cause taken up by the colonial government after 1874.

Consul H.M. Jones VC arrived in 1864 with instructions to look into the question of consular jurisdiction. Finding no recognised and unified authority in Fiji with which to make a treaty he tried to create one, by calling a meeting of the leading chiefs on 8 May 1865 when the 'Confederation' was launched. The seven leading chiefs of Mbau, Rewa, Lakemba, Mbua, Thakaudrove, Mathuata and Nanduri agreed to constitute an annual assembly of chiefs which would legislate for all Fiji. Local autonomy would remain, each chief would levy his own taxes, but wars would have to receive the sanction of the assembly, and a stipend would have to be found for the annually elected President. A national flag was adopted: Thakombau was elected the first President and the next assembly was arranged for 1 May 1866.²

The Confederation was short-lived. To Jones the Fijian idea of sovereignty was "simply an unlimited privilege of plundering".³ Disputes over the delimitation of the chiefs' territories and suspicion of Thakombau were rife, and early in 1867 Mbua, Lakemba and Thakaudrove seceded from the Confederation. When Jones left Fiji in July 1867 he had to report that Ma'afu now led the seceding states which formed a federation of north-eastern Fiji.⁴ But Thakombau was not to be outdone. Encouraged by some white settlers he styled himself King of Mbau and

1. Govt. of Fiji to Gov. of N.S.W. 3.1.1872 in CO. to FO. 2.iv.1872. FO/58/1330. 160.

2. Jones to FO. 24.xi.1865. FO/58/124 p.49.

3. ibid. p.80. Jones to FO. 18.vii.1867.

4. Also called the 'Lau Confederation' or the 'Eastern Confederation'. Derrick, History p.161 says Ma'afu did not push himself forward until 2 years later.

its dominions, and Samuel St. John (from California) his secretary, drew up a constitution based on Hawaii's. At a ludicrous ceremony on 2 May 1867 the 'Mbau Constitution' was launched.¹ This was just as ineffective as Jones's confederation, and Fiji was left divided into two rival camps, Thakambau in Mbau and Ma'afu at Lau. Each had their white advisers, or 'Ministers', and Thakombau's domain compared unfavourably with Ma'afu's.

At this stage (Sir) John Thurston entered Fijian political life. He had landed a year before after a shipwreck and he was soon the close friend of Captain Jones², who, when he left for England in 1867, appointed the newcomer as acting Consul. Thurston, who was the acting Consul until 1869, was destined to stand beside Sir Arthur Gordon as one of the great makers of modern Fiji. After entering the merchant navy as a boy he had served five years in Indian and Pacific waters before attempting sheep farming in Australia. On a final voyage to the South Seas before starting a new ranch he was shipwrecked at Rotuma and after landing at Levuka in the mission ship John Wesley, he devoted the rest of his life to Fiji. With little formal education he was a man of great versatility and instead of becoming just another planter he mastered the Fijian language and the land tenure system, and he was also an expert on ships and botany. The Foreign Office refused to make him the permanent Consul in 1869, but he shepherded Thakombau's government through the storms of 1873-4 as Chief Secretary, and although this stage of his career is still most controversial,³ it is fair to say that he was indispensable to the first colonial administration in 1874. His career culminated in 1888 in his appointment as Governor of Fiji and High

1. Derrick, History, pp. 163-4. In 1873 St. John supported annexation by Britain, Goodenough's Journal, II, 6.xii.1873.

2. They discovered they had both been on the same ship to India. A.B. Brewster, King of the Cannibal Islands (1937) p. 241.

3. See below p. 345-357.

Commissioner for the Western Pacific.¹

Thurston had no illusions about Thakombau's pretensions. Nevertheless he continued Jones's policy of encouraging the growth of a single Fijian authority. He found the Fijians well disposed to the settlers on the whole and he sought to preserve this harmony. Two incidents in 1867 illustrate the trend of Thurston's policy; in one he urged Thakombau to fulfill his responsibilities; in the other he tried to save him from being exploited by Australians.

Firstly, on 21 July 1867 the Rev. Thomas Baker was murdered by a mountain tribe in the interior of Viti Levu. Although settlers paid taxes to Thakombau for his protection as King of Mbau, he tried to disclaim all responsibility for the Viti Levu 'mountaineers'. Thurston pressed him to assert his authority: he urged him to punish the murderers and Captain Hope of HMS Brisk refused to do it. Although Thurston succeeded in getting several Fijian expeditions organised for this purpose, they were not effective.

In the second case, Thurston's efforts to save Thakombau from the Polynesia Company of Melbourne, were more successful. The American debt was still unpaid in June 1867, when Capt. Stanley of the U.S.S. Tuscarora reminded Thakombau of them and made the now usual threats. This time the American representative secured an 'Indenture' by which Thakombau promised to pay the value of the balance due, amounting to \$43,565.19, in four yearly instalments of island produce beginning 1 May 1868. On top of this the islands of Moturiki, Batiki and Nairai were 'mortgaged' as security.² It was obvious that Thakombau would not be able to pay again, and early in 1868 the American Commercial Agent suggested that the three islands should be advertised in the Australian newspapers, but when Seward, the

1. For his early career see J. Millington, The Career of Sir John Thurston, Governor of Fiji 1888-97, (MA. thesis London 1947) pp. 22-26. For a slighter and rather different account see Derrick, History, p.160, fn.14 and the Introduction to "Journal de Bord D'une Tournée de Recrutement aux Nouvelles-Hébrides en 1871, sur la Goélette 'Strathnever'", by J.B. Thurston. Journal de la Société des Océanistes, XIII, No.13 (Dec.1957) p. 69.

2. Miller, Treaties, pp. 304-305.

Secretary of State, sent the matter to the Senate, no action was taken.¹

A way out was suggested for Thakombau by a group of Melbourne businessmen. A company had been formed (probably through the efforts of the American Consuls in Melbourne and Fiji)² to pay Thakombau's debts plus a stipend of £1,000 a year, in return for 200,000 acres of land with the right of making laws and establishing courts, and a commercial and banking monopoly in the islands. Thakombau signed a charter in these terms on 22 June 1868 after a champagne breakfast aboard the Albion at Levuka.³ Thurston immediately protested. He told the Polynesia Company that it was negotiating as if it were a foreign State and he issued an injunction staying the actions of the British directors while he called on Commodore Lambert, the Senior Naval Officer, to investigate. He told Lambert that Thakombau did not own any of the 200,000 acres at Suva Bay, Mbengga and Viti Levu Bay, and Lambert approved the Consul's action. Thakombau therefore disowned the charter, but he promptly signed another on 23 July, and by a gentlemen's agreement the company also agreed to supply him with a gunboat. Eventually⁴ the

1. Miller, Treaties, pp. 311-312.

2. The Gov. of Victoria believed that Gen. Latham, US. Consul, Melbourne, was one of the promoters, but he is not in the list of investors given in fn.3. But Dr. Isaac M. Brower, US. Consul, Fiji, did sign the company's charter. Arriving in Fiji about 1858, he had been appointed Vice-Consular Agent by J.B. Williams on the day the latter died, 10 June 1860, and he retained the post until 1876. He was a planter with considerable estates and experimented in wool growing. (Miller p.304; Derrick, History, pp.178-9; Thurston to Fo. 27.v.1868, Thurston to Lambert l.vi.1868 (copy), FO/58/113 pp. 116 & 120; CO. to FO. 18.viii.1869, FO/58/116 p.243).

3. Charter signed by Brower, John Lavington Evans & W.H.O'H. Brewer. Their 'associates' were Frederick Cook (financial agent) Andrew Lyall (merchant) J.S. Butters (Mayor of Melbourne) W.C. Smith (banker, Ballerat) & T. Davey (Mayor of Ballerat). Miller, p.313.

4. Ibid. pp.314, 318-323. By the time the final payment was paid, l.ix.1870, the U.S. Govt. had decided to re-examine Williams's claim, first admitted by Boutwell in 1855. One of the Rev. Calvert's letters had reached Pres. Grant in May 1868 and the State Dept. suggested an impartial inquiry. A Court of Inquiry was held in October 1869 by Comdr. Truxton, who allowed all the claims except the late Consul Williams's. While Boutwell had allowed \$19,365, he was only entitled to \$7,199.67. Truxton did not think the Polynesia Company should be released from their obligation to pay, but he suggested that the excess of Williams's claim should be refunded to Thakombau. This was not done, but as Thakombau did not own the 200,000 acres the money was all refunded by the Colonial Govt. in Fiji to the Company, who gave up the land.

company paid off the U.S. debt, and the company's first settlers arrived at Suva Bay in 1870.¹ Thurston continued to oppose the company, and although it continued its activities, he probably prevented it from becoming a miniature East India Company in Fiji.

In 1869 there was an attempt to revive the 1867 Mbau Constitution, when W.H.Drew (Thakombau's new secretary) produced, in March 1869, a blue-print for a consitutional monarchy known as the 'Amended Mbau Constitution'. But although Drew tried to enlist help in New Zealand,² his government was no more successful than St. Johns's. Edward March, who replaced Thurston as British Consul in 1869, said the government was quite ineffective, and that all disputes were usually referred to the British and American Consuls.³

In fact the period from 1869 to 1871, when a determined effort was made to form a workable constitutional government in Fiji, were years of great uncertainty for the islands. White settlement increased rapidly; 1870 saw the 'Great Fiji Rush' when there were over 1,000 fresh arrivals bringing the total to nearly 4,000.⁴ The value of cotton exports reached £92,700,⁵ and suggestions, rumours, resolutions and some concrete proposals for annexation by one of the Powers were rife. Consul March's position was difficult. He was instructed to remain neutral in Fijian disputes and to rely on his tact and judgement to smooth matters where British subjects were involved, but in a tumbledown Consulate on the beach

1. An account by one of them in Brewster, *op. cit.* p.52.

2. Bowen to Granville 14.iii.1870. CO/209/216.

3. Derrick, *History*, p. 189.

4. Growth of the white population from the Consul's reports:-

<u>1867</u>	<u>1868</u>	<u>1869</u>	<u>1870</u>	<u>1871</u>
366	600-650	est.1000	2000	3,900.

5. Value of cotton exports from the Consul's reports:-

<u>1862</u>	<u>1863</u>	<u>1864</u>	<u>1865</u>	<u>1866</u>	<u>1867</u>	<u>1868</u>	<u>1869</u>	<u>1870</u>
£ 360	900	3,000	6,000	19,000	34,004	30,975	45,000	92,700.

6. FO. to March 19.iii.1869 (draft). FO/58/115 p.163.

at Levuka, a place steadily taking on the character of a rowdy American frontier town, his 'tact and judgement' were hard pressed and he became alienated from the British settlers.

"I am in the midst of low adventurers, absconders from the Colonies, and a class of men who are in a chronic state of excitement caused by continual indulgence in alcoholic drink. I am at the mercy of any ruffian who chooses to walk into the office...."

he wrote in despair.¹ Thus by 1870 the Fiji files in London grew large and urgent again.

Annexation projects, 1870-1871.

Kimberley's attention was drawn to Fiji in his ^{first} weeks at the Colonial Office in July 1870 because proposals for annexation were mooted in Australia. While the pace of change in the islands quickened at the end of the 1860's, and the Foreign Office struggled with the Treasury over consular jurisdiction, strange rumours and suggestions reached London. By the middle of 1870 the officials in the Colonial Office were doing a good deal of thinking about the future of Fiji.

Some fruitless projects were canvassed. In December 1869 the Melbourne Age wanted the colony of Victoria to prevent the annexation of Fiji by a foreign Power by emulating the East India Company and governing Fiji through a Resident.² A group of Germans in Fiji applied for annexation by the North German Confederation but Bismarck refused in October 1869 although he agreed to appoint a Consul and send a gunboat.³ A public meeting in Levuka on 14 June 1869 discussed the question of protection from the United States or a European Power. The conclusion reached was that since Britain refused to annex, her protection should be sought for a period of ten to twenty years to enable the islands to develop a type of government like Hawaii's.⁴ A group of seventy Americans, nevertheless, signed a

1. March to T.V. Lister 2.vii.1870. Private. FO/58/118 p.306.

2. The Age, 11.xii.1869, cutting in Canterbury to Granville 2.i.1870. CO/309/93.

3. Copy of Bismarck's letter dated 16.x.1869 in March's Report on Fiji, 27.iii.1870 FO/58/118 pp. 181-196.

4. Memorial in March to Clarendon 31.iii.1870. Ibid. p. 219.

petition to the United States Government, but the American Consul refused to send it to Washington,¹ and the State Department denied that it had any desire to interfere in Fiji.² A rumour was passed that Napoleon III had made a treaty recognising Thakombau's government, but it transpired that a convention, supposed to have been signed 8 July 1858, had provided freedom for the Roman Catholics, and the French had merely recognised Thakombau as 'King of Mbau'.³ In March 1870 the British Consul sent home memorials from Thakombau, Ma'afu and the British residents purporting to pray for British protection.⁴ This was never answered by the Foreign Office and in 1874 letters were found in the Consulate which indicated that this was not a bone fide request.⁵ But it certainly appeared in 1870 that some Power might take Fiji; when Admiral J.E. Erskine, MP., visited the Foreign Office early in 1870 he was surprised to find Clarendon and his staff "so well up and deeply interested in the islands".⁶

The Colonial Office was not alarmed by the prospect of a foreign Power in Fiji. Sooner than see Britain become responsible for the islands, Granville was prepared to risk the possibility of annexation by the United States.⁷ Herbert wondered if "it might save the credit of England and be of general advantage, if any diplomatic communications could result in the establishment of a friendly European Government over these islands".⁸ He wrote a long memorandum in May 1870 on the activities in London of Lavington Evans (one of the directors of the Polynesia Company) who had been to see the Agent-General for Queensland. Evans

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1. March to Clarendon 31.iii.1870. FO/58/118 p.175. Copy of the American petition acknowledged by US. Consul, 31.viii.1869 enclosed in Sutton to Granville 8.xi.1869. CO/309/71.
 2. FO. to CO. 16.iii.1870. CO/201/561.
 3. March's Report, FO/58/118 pp.181-219.
 4. March to Clarendon 31.iii.1870. Ibid. p.215.
 5. Goodenough's Journal, III, 12.i.1874.
 6. Rev. Calvert to Rev. Hoole 17.iii.1870. Meth. Miss. Soc. Home letters 1867-1870 file.
 7. Rogers to Hammond 4.ii.1870. FO/58/119 p. 206.
 8. Min. by Herbert 11.vi.1870 on Dr. L. Fison to W. Fison 27.viii.1869 (copy) in CO/201/562.

claimed he had authority from the Fijian settlers to secure British or German aid.

"I do not of course at all regret", wrote Herbert, "the decision of this Government to have nothing to do with a country which is too likely to be involved very shortly in native difficulties. But it is by no means unimportant to England that it should pass into the hands of a power likely to contribute to the maintainance of a fair balance of naval power in the Pacific. France, Holland, Russian and America have their fleets in or handy to the area surrounding Australia, and as Prussia has now a somewhat considerable steam fleet, I venture to suggest that it is well worth while for this Government to make some exertion with the view of causing the Fijis to be constituted a North German Colony... If North Germany will not come forward, then possibly Belgium might do it. About ten years ago a Belgian Commission... visited Australia and the neighbouring countries with a view to reporting on the practicability of founding a Belgian Colony in these Seas...

It is really very necessary that some Government (which should not be the French or American) should be established in these islands".¹

Receiving this with his first brief on Fiji Kimberley discovered that the Colonial Office had no fears of Foreign Power near Australia. Rogers said that "if Prussia would adopt the task of reducing these savages into Berlin Order it would be a useful and very curious to look at".² He seemed to welcome Germany into the colonial field; he thought a German colony in New Guinea would be a good thing, and in July 1870 said he would be happy to let the Germans have a base in Malaya.³

These ideas of an international approach to the Fiji problem were very much within the realms of abstract discussion. More concrete business reached London in July 1870 in the shape of a definite proposal that Victoria should annex Fiji. The Governor of Victoria indicated that the Australian Inter-Colonial Conference would pass a resolution urging the creation of a British protectorate in Fiji,⁴ and the Governor of New South Wales endorsed this resolution.⁵ Kimberley

1. Ibid. Memo. by Herbert 10.v.1870.

2. Ibid. Min. by Rogers.

3. Mins. by Rogers 3.viii.1867 on Young to Buckingham 31.v.1867. CO/201/542 and 20.vii.1870 on FO. to CO. 14.vii.1870. CO/273/42.

4. Canterbury to Granville 20.v.1870. Confidential. CO/309/93.

5. Belmore to Granville 13.vii.1870. CO/201/558.

agreed to consider the matter, but he warned his staff that "feeling here is strongly against extension of territory".¹ But in August 1870 the Prime Minister of Victoria pressed for some decision, and the Agent-General for the Colony, G.F. Verdon, worked behind the scenes in London, so Kimberley was forced to study the matter seriously.

Rogers set out the possible alternatives in a revealing minute :

"The only point explicitly raised is the keeping out of foreign powers. Sir J. McCulloch [the Victorian Premier] says nothing of the proposal that Australia should take charge. But we must evidently look forward.

Without any dog in the manger feeling I should have thought it desirable to occupy these islands from Australia with British prepossessions rather than from the US. with American prepossessions. In fact the course of events is forcing us in this direction.

The course of events points to the establishment in Fiji ultimately of a community of European origin - dominant in spite of inferiority of numbers - not perhaps by virtue of inequality of law, but inherent superiority. This problem is to bring about this naturally, peaceably, as speedily as may be (speed however not being a main point) and without involving this country in expense or responsibility or quarrels with other powers.

1. I assume that there is a predominant & growing feeling in favour of connection with Gt. Britain rather than with any other power among the white settlers. But of course any civilized power may easily buy a quarrel with some native chief, and obtain some cession from him on which to found a claim to sovereignty. This has to be prevented, and it seems to me that we ought to take steps to prevent it.

2. The settlers should be furnished with some sort of law for settling disputes & exercising criminal jurisdiction among themselves & if it practically extended to natives so much the better. With^t this they will not remain at peace or content.

3. They should remain under the obligation of settling their own affairs at their own risk and cost with the natives. If this is not so, they will be arrogant & quarrelous believing that whatever they do they will be pulled through.

These being as it seems to me the conditions of the problem, I throw out the following suggestions -

1. Agreement with other powers not to obtain sovereignty or assume protectorate except at the desire of the white population.

2. Treaty with the native chiefs (1) binding them not to accept sovereignty of any other civilized power & (2) giving HM jurisdiction over all cases in wh. one of her own subjects is concerned (as in Turkey and China) with power to entertain questions betⁿ natives if submitted voluntarily or by proper native authority to their jurisdiction.

3. Annexation, with Constitution of Crown Colony.

4. Annexation, with arrangement that Gov^r of Victoria shall till otherwise

1. Ibid. Verdon spoke to Rogers at this stage. But Dealtry shows that Verdon's idea was for a joint protectorate by the Australian colonies, which might be a stage towards federation. Min. by Dealtry 13.x.1870 on Canterbury to CO. 12.viii.1870. CO/309/94.

determined by HM be ex-officio Gov^r of the Islands with the power to appoint Lieut. Gov^r who is to take orders from the Gov^r of Viet^r. The cost of the gov^t being defrayed by Victoria, and the Gov being guided in his instructions to the Islands, by the advice of his responsible ministry.

5. A protectorate is sometimes proposed. I do not quite know what this means. I suppose it is an intimation to the world that nobody then must assume sovereignty over these islands or make war on them, but that if they have any grievance against them they must apply to us, and that we will either compel the islanders to make compensation or take up their quarrel, and that we will interfere in their private affairs as much as we from time to time may think adviseable.

I do not myself very much like this kind of thing.

6. Leaving things to take their course till the whites are sure enough to be recognised as an independent republic ignoring more or less the natives.

I am disposed to No. 2 at once & ultimately No. 3, the danger of wh. (No.3) is that a knot of speculators get hold of the Local Gov^t and obtain a support wh. for the moment gives an impulse to their₁ speculation, at the cost of war, destruction of natives, & public expense".

Miss Drus says that Rogers really had nothing to suggest.² Yet his long minute is a classic summary of the complex of attitudes which the Colonial Office brought to the discussion, and his personal preference was prophetic of what actually followed. Granville shortly was to attempt to revive consular jurisdiction and Fiji was eventually made a Crown Colony.

Kimberley considered Roger's summary on 22 October 1870. It is clear that he came to the Colonial Office harbouring no desires for expansion; he greeted the news of New Zealand's annexation of the Bounty Islands with characteristic cynicism ("a valuable acquisition!"³), and in December 1870 he reminded the department that Fiji was "not under the Colonial Office".⁴ Yet it must be conceded that he gave considerable thought to Fiji, and he probably did this because he wanted to do his duty by the Australian colonies. In this way he may have been more indulgent than his colleagues in the government. Before he he went to the Colonial Office he wrote:

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1. Min. by Rogers 19.x.1870 on Canterbury to Granville 12.viii.1870. CO/309/94.
 2. E.Drus, "The Colonial Office and the Annexation of Fiji", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th. ser., XXXII(1950) p.95.
 3. Min. by Kimberley on Bowen to Kimberley 21.viii.1870. CO/209/217.
 4. Min. by Kimberley 7.xii.1870 on Belmore to Kimberley 29.ix.1870. CO/201/559.

"Whatever may be said in favour of the independence of the Australasian colonies it would be a great calamity that they should separate in anger from us. Nor can it be denied that their loss would give a shock to our influence and reputation. It is difficult to see in what way their connection with us can be permanently maintained. But it will be a gain for both us¹ and them, if we can keep up the connection till they become stronger".

This attitude may be one of the factors behind Kimberley's sympathetic consideration of several schemes for Fijian government in the following three years, which culminated in a forthright recommendation of annexation in 1873. The proposals from the Inter-Colonial Conference and from Victoria, then, were not to be dismissed lightly. Kimberley's reply was considered by Granville and Gladstone², and the Queen only agreed with his conclusion after expressing fears about American annexation.³

In his reply to the Victorian proposal, sent on 16 March 1871, Kimberley said he would not alter the 1862 decision not to annex. The new Zealand wars had made the government afraid that Fiji might have to be occupied by force, and as Rogers's minute showed, the idea of protectorate was too vague. Instead of annexation or protectorate, said Kimberley,

"Her Majesty's Government are however ready to give such aid as may be in their power through the Consul for the maintainance of order until the European community can establish a regular Government, and they are considering measures with a view to increase the authority of the Consul over British subjects by conferring upon ^{him}magisterial powers".⁴

After sending this, as the Foreign Office was looking into consular jurisdiction again, Kimberley warned his department off the subject; he wished "to discourage the notion that the Colonial Office has anything to do with the Fiji Islands".⁵

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1. Kimberley's Journal, May 1870, p. 13.
 2. Kimberley to Gladstone 8.iii.1871 (copy) and Gladstone to Kimberley 10.iii.1871, Kimberley Papers, A/43 & A/8b.
 3. *Ibid.* A/40. Ponsonby to Kimberley 12 & 14.iii.1871.
 4. Kimberley to Canterbury 16.iii.1871 (draft). CO/309/94.
 5. Note by Kimberley with CO. to FO. 14.iv.1871 (draft). CO/201/563. Cf. Min. 20.vii.1871 on Treas. to CO. 11.vii.1871. CO/201/567: "The Fijis are not a colony & until they are, the responsibility for dealing with them does not rest with the Colonial Office". Yet in 1859 the permanent officials of the CO. had insisted that the CO. should decide the issue. See Drus, *op. cit.* p. 87.

The renewed attempt to achieve consular jurisdiction came from Granville. The Colonial Office was informed of this on 1 February 1871, and this time an Order in Council actually received the Royal Assent, but was never published. What is not clear is whether Kimberley pressed Granville into action on the lines of Herbert's and Rogers's ideas, or whether Granville decided independently on the basis of Consul March's reports, and that the knowledge that Granville was taking this action enabled Kimberley to answer Victoria as he did. A new draft Order in Council to apply the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts to Fiji was prepared in February 1871, and this time it was the Colonial Office which made trouble. Rogers and Holland, throwing back an opinion held by Granville when he was Colonial Secretary, said the Australian colonies would have to be consulted.¹ But Hammond, the permanent Under-secretary in the Foreign Office thought matters were so urgent in Fiji that he wanted to send a warship,² so to avoid the delay of an exchange with the Australian colonies the words were added 'provided that New South Wales agrees'.

The Colonial Office hurdle lightly side-stepped, the Foreign Office turned to face the Treasury, and here W.H.Wylde showed a sly touch. The consul in his magisterial capacity would need clerks, a prison and a gaoler, and the Treasury had asked for an estimate of the cost.³ Experience in Turkey showed that the registration fees of 5/- per Briton produced a small surplus in big towns and a deficit in small ones. Wylde suggested a gentle tactic with Their Lordships:

"Let us get the Order in Council issued and a Gaoler & Constable appointed in the first instance, and let the Consul himself represent the responsibility of carrying on the Duties that would devolve upon him without further assistance. The assistance must follow and when once the machinery is started the Treasury cannot refuse to sanction the necessary expenditure.⁴ Whereas if we frighten them now we shall come to a deadlock at once".

Thus the Treasury were simply told that the system would be the same as in

1. Holland to Vivian 5.iv.1871. FO/58/124 p. 314.

2. Min. by Hammond 21.iv.1871 on CO. to FO. 14.iv.1871. FO/58/121 p.66.

3. Treas. to FO. 6.v.1871. FO/58/124 p. 321.

4. Ibid. Min. by Wylde.

Turkey and China, and they made no reply. Their memories were jogged in July, but they did not answer because Kimberley was looking into a new proposal for annexation by an Australian colony.¹ In spite of the Treasury's desire for postponement, the Order received the Royal assent in September 1871; but to little purpose because Granville decided not to authorise Consul March to assume magisterial powers.² After ten years Col. Smythe's suggestion had been fulfilled on paper, but it was never used. Events in the islands had produced a new situation, and a new Fiji Government was to receive de facto recognition.

De facto recognition for the Fiji Government, 1871.

While the Foreign Office was completing the final stages of the consular jurisdiction muddle in 1871, Kimberley was toying again with the idea of annexation by an Australian colony. This was the Treasury's excuse for delay. The new proposals came, not from Victoria, which according to Viscount Canterbury, was not really interested in Fiji, but from New South Wales, where Lord Belmore was deluged with Fiji projects in April 1871. A deputation headed by Dr John Dunmore Lang delivered recommendations on the 25th from a public meeting in Sydney.³ Next day a Mr. Leefe from Fiji informed the Governor that the settlers

1. See below p. 246-248.

2. What happened is still rather obscure. The draft Order was sent to the Pres. of the Council on 24 Aug. 1871 (FO/58/122 p.42). On the 26th. the Treasury suggested postponing the matter as Kimberley was considering a new policy in view of the new situation in Fiji. (Ibid. p. 44). But on 19 Sept. the FO. told the CO. that the Order had received the Royal Assent, though March would not be authorised to act. (FO. to CO. 19.ix.1871. CO/201/567). When the Niger Delta Order in Council was planned in 1872 (see below pp. 345-6) Wylde said that the Fiji Order went to the Council, then the Treasury intervened and stopped it on the ground of expense. (Min. by Wylde 26.iv.1872 on CO. to FO. 25.iv.1872. FO/84/1360).

3. Lang called for the annexation of Fiji in Sept. 1870 in a petition to the Legis. Council. Although long prominent in the political and religious life of N.S.W., he commanded little respect in Whitehall. Rogers called him a "tiresome old demagogue", and Kimberley said "His last book which I have read is excessively Tiresome". In July 1870 Lang published The Coming Event, Or Freedom and Independence for the Seven United Provinces of Australia in which he gave as one of the main reasons for separation, the "absolute necessity for the erection of a Sovereign and Independent Power in the Pacific, in view of the actual state of things in the Fiji Islands".

needed protection, and on the 27th. Charles St. Julian, the Hawaiian representative suggested a Hawaiian protectorate over Fiji. For a second time, then, the Fiji problem was thrust into Kimberley's lap by an Australian colony.

Now there were new elements in the argument. Fiji was seen as part of the wider problem of the Pacific labour traffic, which will be discussed later. The Sydney Morning Herald compared the Fiji problem with the frontier in South Africa; they were both problems "which present the spectacle of an English population without law".¹ Herbert began to expect serious calamities in Fiji.

"No doubt", said Knatchbull-Hugessen, "unless 'Protection' is given -ie. a settled form of Government established. Probably our annexation of the Fiji Islands would effect this in the most satisfactory way to those concerned in the trade of the Islands, many of whom are British subjects. Then, however, comes the question whether we are under a moral obligation to protect English traders all over the world by annexing the countries with which they establish trade. It is a question partly of moral obligation & partly of policy. I believe we have decided not to annex & if nobody else does & things are allowed to drift, there will probably be some 'serious calamities' before any government is established in the islands".²

The Sydney proposals reached London in July 1871. A Hawaiian protectorate would be 'a perfect farce' said Kimberley, but he did not see why New South Wales should not acquire the sovereignty of Fiji.³ This would be a convenient way for Britain to avoid taking the responsibility, so although he had refused the earlier request from Victoria, Kimberley allowed the idea of annexation by an Australian colony to be revived, with important consequences.

He put the proposition to Granville and Gladstone and told them it was supported by Lowe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and a former settler in Sydney, and by Charles Cooper, the Agent-General for New South Wales.⁴ Kimberley knew

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1. Cutting dated 15.ii.1871 in Belmore to Kimberley 22.ii.1871. CO/201/563.
 2. Min. by K-Hugessen 31.v.1871 on Belmore to Kimberley 22.iii.1871. Ibid.
 3. Min. by Kimberley 20.vii.1871 on Belmore to Kimberley 28.iv.1871. Ibid.
 4. Kimberley to Granville 26.vii.1871 (copy). Gladstone Papers 44224/193.

Charles Cooper worked to bring the first railway to N.S.W. in 1850. He declined to form the first ministry under responsible government in 1856, but he was Prime Minister of N.S.W. five times between 1856 and 1870, when he came to London as Agent-General.

too that Julius Vogel, the New Zealand politician, who he had seen recently in London, was also interested in Fiji.¹ Granville feared that the Australians would ill-treat the Fijians and he wanted the matter discussed in the Cabinet.

But as Kimberley told Gladstone

"we have not hesitated to place ^{all} the Indians in British N.America under the Canadian Government, and, if responsible government is established at the Cape, & the troops are withdrawn from the frontier, the native tribes in that country will be left to the control of the local authorities. Of course it may be answered that these are not conclusive reasons for assuming new responsibilities; but what is the alternative? If we could leave the British settlers in the Fijis entirely to themselves, the case would be different but no one I believe proposes total abstinence from all interference. On the contrary we are about to give our Consul magisterial powers, which will involve us in responsibility & expense without attaining the end of providing a settled Government".²

If New South Wales would be willing to annex the islands, Kimberley could see "no better solution to the problem".³ The Cabinet agreed,⁴ and Kimberley drafted a despatch to Belmore on 29 July indicating that if the Colony was prepared to undertake the responsibility of governing Fiji the Government would not object.⁵ Yet this all important paragraph was deleted from the despatch which actually went on 10 August. This was because an entirely different complexion had been put on the picture by a coup d'etat in Fiji.

A small group of settlers at Levuka had proclaimed a constitutional monarchy

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1. Vogel was then Post Master-Gen. of NZ. and had come to London in April 1871 to make arrangements for the ill-fated mail steamer line between Auckland and San Francisco (see below p. 282). He met Kimberley on 27 March. (Mins. by Dealtry & Herbert on GPO. to CO. 27.iii.1871. CO/209/225). Herbert later wrote: "If NSW hangs back New Zealand will perhaps be glad to undertake the Fijis. Mr Vogel seemed to think so". (Min. 18.vii.1871 on Belmore to Kimberley 28.iv.1871. CO/201/563.)
 2. Kimberley to Gladstone 26.vii.1871. Gladstone Papers 44224/187.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Cabinet Minutes, 29.vii.1871. Gladstone Papers, 44639/85.
 5. Kimberley to Belmore 10.viii.1871 (draft crossed out) after Belmore to Kimberley 28.iv.1871. CO/201/563.

on 5 June 1871, and it was this 'Fiji Government' which, under various forms, ruled until 1874. Thakombau was made King, and Ma'afu's support was won by leaving him as Governor of Lau and making him Viceroy with a salary of £800. The Cabinet consisted of five Europeans and Thakombau's brother and son. Sydney Charles Burt became Premier,¹ and George Austin Woods the Minister of Interior Affairs.² A new Constitution, which included plenty of high sounding phrases from the Declaration of Independence, was passed on 18 August by a Fijian Legislative Assembly.³ Hawaii was acknowledged as the model for this attempt at constitutional government, and although a few chiefs stood aloof, the Hawaiian Consul in Sydney, Charles St. Julian, visited Fiji in the summer of 1871, and told Governor Belmore of New South Wales that he thought the new constitution would work.⁴ Several Australian newspapers were favourable to the new regime, and the U.S.A. recognised it.⁵ Edward March, the British Consul, opposed it and he soon became one of the chief enemies of the Fiji Government, which by the end of 1871 was taken over by Woods, who dominated it until 1872 and who became one of the most controversial characters of these years.⁶

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1. Burt, an auctioneer in Sydney, went to Fiji as an absconding debtor, but Henderson (Hist. of Govt. in Fiji, II, p.199) says he was an able man who went to Fiji to retrieve his fortunes and pay his creditors.
 2. Fiji Govt. Gazette 5.vi.1871 in CO. to FO. 1.vii.1871. FO/58/121 p.156.
 3. Printed Copy in FO/58/122 p. 81.
 4. Belmore to Kimberley 6.x.1871. Confidential. (copy) FO/58/122 p.111.
 5. Brookes, International Rivalry, p.373.
 6. Woods came from a Naval family, but after creditable service he was only Lieut. when he retired aged 40. He then did marine survey work in the colonies; Brewster (p.149-150) says Victoria, Scholefield (p.87) says N.Zealand; probably both. Brewster says he was known in the Navy as 'Magnificent George' and that Thakombau was so impressed he made him a member of the Mbau Royal House. Woods told Goodenough (Journal, II, 28.xii.1873) that while he was at Auckland he heard that the Germans had designs on Fiji and he made up his mind to save to the islands for Britain. A short while after this at Sydney an agent from Fiji offered him £1,000 to survey the Nanuku passage in Fiji, but when he arrived on 9 April 1871 he found that the authorities could not pay him. He was about to return to Sydney when Thakombau asked him to assist in the government, because the whites said Woods was 'unconnected with Fiji'.

The news of the June coup upset Kimberley's plan for annexation by New South Wales because it raised the wider question of recognition for the Fiji Government. When Granville heard of the event on 1 July 1871¹ he sought the Law Officers' advice, and as the latter saw no reason for refusing recognition Granville inclined to agree.² But the Colonial Office thought otherwise. Herbert even wanted the Foreign Office to suppress the Law Officers' report lest its publication in Australia become an embarrassment if Fiji were later annexed; he stood by the New South Wales plan. So did Knatchbull-Hugessen, who said "It is most inadvisable that the future of Fiji should be complicated by indiscreet recognition of the authority of native chiefs who have not an admitted authority to any extent".³

Thus, responsibility for Fiji became more obscure than ever; Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Treasury, Law Officers, New South Wales - now the new Fiji Government! Kimberley did not know where to turn.

"This is rather a puzzling matter, but I do not think the Colonial Office should take the responsibility of deciding it. If the Fijis are annexed... it will devolve on the Col: Off: to deal with them, but at present they are foreign, and to be dealt with by the Foreign Office".⁴

It was an awkward dilemma because there was no document to justify expectations that New South Wales would accept the bait; Kimberley had simply been told privately by Cooper, the Agent-General, that it was possible. This hesitancy made Knatchbull-Hugessen impatient: "Our ancestors would have accepted the cession of the islands & laid the foundations of a thriving European Colony. We prefer the drifting system...."⁵ But, as ever, Kimberley would not be rushed. He took two months to clear his mind; in October he recommended the recognition

1. CO. to FO. 1.vii.1871. FO/58/121 p.156.

2. FO. to CO. 31.vii.1871 (with the LO's report) CO/201/567.

3. Mins. by Herbert 5th and K-Hugessen 6.viii.1871. Ibid.

4. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 7.viii.1871.

5. Min. by K-Hugessen 7.ix.1871 on Canterbury to Kimberley 14.vii.1871. CO/309/100

of the Fiji ministry as the de facto authority, and he probably did this against the advice of his department.

The most likely cause of his volte face was an extraordinary statement from Sir James Martin, the Premier of New South Wales.¹ Kimberley had only got as far as drafting his New South Wales plan, when Martin, in Sydney, informed the Governor that any such plan would be impossible. The whole outburst was caused by Kimberley's reply to Victoria of 16 March 1871 conveying the Cabinet decision not to annex and looking to the establishment of a stable government in Fiji.² There was no precedent, said Martin, for such an invitation to settlers to form a government. New South Wales would never annex Fiji, for by doing so she would open up a new field of colonisation for the benefit of Europeans rather than Colonials. It was an imperial question, said Martin, Britain should annex Fiji.

The statement was full of contradictions. Herbert had no difficulty in answering it sentence by sentence, and Cooper, the Agent-General who was Martin's predecessor as Premier, believed Martin's views were personal.³ Herbert did not want to recognise the Fiji Government. Although he realised that consular jurisdiction by Order in Council alone was now impossible, he still pressed for the New South Wales plan. It would prevent a foreign or independent government in Fiji, and he thought the imperial government might "afford the same facilities as in the not dissimilar case of the territory of Basutoland, which on the application of the legislature of the Cape of Good Hope has very recently been

1. N.S.W. Cabinet decision of 8.viii.1871 in Belmore to Kimberley 9.viii,1871 CO/201/564.

2. See above p.244.

3. Min. by Herbert 21.x.1871 on despatch cited in fn.1.

annexed by that Colony".¹

Kimberley therefore did not completely abandon the New South Wales plan, but he did not adopt the Law Officers' proposal for outright recognition. He preferred a characteristically vague and waiting policy, with the New South Wales plan left open, and the Fiji Government recognised as the de facto authority. This was no clear policy to please a Knatchbull-Hugessen, but in an uncertain situation it did not commit the government to any particular course, and Legge's recent criticisms are unjust.² After reading Herbert's views on 22 October, Kimberley took the matter to the Cabinet.³ He told Granville of his idea on the 25th. As Cooper, the Agent-General, pleaded that the New South Wales plan should be kept open,⁴ and the Victorian Government clamoured for directions as to its relations with the new Fiji Government,⁵ the moment seemed ripe for announcing Kimberley's policy.

The Cabinet approved it on 27 October⁶ and passed his draft despatch on the 31 31st.⁷ Therefore all the Australian governors were informed by circular dated

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1. Ibid. An Act annexing Basutoland to the Cape had been passed by the Cape Parlt. in June 1871, but the previous history of this should have warned Herbert of the risks inherent in the N.S.W. plan for Fiji. The significance in the history of British policy of the decision to annex Basutoland, which was made (largely on Adderley's advice) by the Derby ministry in Dec. 1867, is discussed by de Kiewiet (Colonial Policy & the S.African Republics, pp.222-224). "The projected annexation was not simply an attempt to solve a peculiarly troublesome frontier difficulty... it was not that the British Government, properly speaking, would annex Basutoland. It had given one of its colonies permission to undertake the annexation with all its attendant burdens". This indeed had been the intention; the CO. left the way open for the Cape or Natal to annex Basutoland. But in 1868 Gov. Wodehouse annexed Basutoland to the Crown. Thus the CO. - not a colonial government - became responsible for protecting the Basuto from the Boers, which was a cause of political embarrassment for Gladstone's govt. in 1869. The same thing was to be repeated over the Diamond Fields in 1871. (See below p.264.).
 2. Kimberley's careful, middle-of-the-road, and still open policy described here surely does not deserve Legge's stricture of being a 'precipitate' decision taken after 'lack of serious consideration'. (p.122).
 3. Min. by Kimberley 22.x.1871 on Belmore to Kimberley 9.viii.1871. CO/201/564.
 4. Kimberley to Granville 25.x.1871 (copy). Kimberley Papers A/43.
 5. Canterbury to Kimberley 1.viii.1871. CO/309/100.
 6. Cabinet Minute 27.x.1871. Gladstone Papers 44639/111.
 7. Kimberley wrote: "for the Cabinet Tues" [the 31st.] Min. 29.x.1871 on Canterbury to Kimberley 1.viii.1871. CO/309/100.

3 November 1871 that they should treat the Fiji ministry as the government de facto. New South Wales was informed that the way was open still for the colony to annex Fiji.¹ Although Kimberley had tried to keep the Fiji issue out of the Colonial Office, he ended up by recommending the government's policy on two occasions. This was in complete contrast to the situation four years later when the Colonial Office wanted to organise the Western Pacific High Commission itself, but the Foreign Office kept the initiative.²

Kidnapping and the Pacific Labour Traffic, 1860-1872.

The Government now had a Fiji policy, but as it rested on the rather slender chances of the new Fiji Government being a success, it proved little more than an postponement of decision. And between December 1871 and June 1872 there was a new clamour for decision, as the Fiji question became ^{linked} with the much wider question of kidnapping in the Pacific. In June 1872 the Pacific Islanders Protection Act was passed to regulate the traffic of Pacific islanders in British ships. But having recognised the Fiji Government, Britain could not interfere with the traffic within the Fiji Islands. Therefore mainly on account of the labour traffic, fresh proposals for annexation were made in 1872.

On 20 September 1871 Bishop Patteson of Melanesia, a man much admired by Gladstone, was clubbed to death at Nukapu, Santa Cruz Islands, in an act of retaliation following a visit by kidnappers.³ The news reached London in December 1871. For a decade the Pacific labour traffic had been filling volumes with painstaking case-studies and lengthy memoranda,⁴ but regulation of the traffic in British ships had been held up since 1862 by the Treasury, just as they had prevented consular jurisdiction in Fiji. The Queensland Government made

1. Kimberley to Belmore 3.xi.1871. (draft seen by the Cabinet). CO/201/564.

2. See below p.384-392.

3. Eye witness account in Ad. to CO. 14.vi.1872. CO/309/107.

4. Correspondence with individuals, consuls, governors and departments is gathered together in FO/58/ vols. 125-129.

regulations in 1868 governing the introduction of Polynesians on the plantations in the colony, and the Colonial Office carefully watched this system at work. Notorious kidnapping cases received mounting publicity, till by 1872 the flood of indignation made action imperative. Patteson's murder in 1871 did for Polynesia what Livingstone's death was to do for Central Africa in 1873.¹

Organised indentured immigrant schemes, Indian coolie emigration, and even the importation of Pacific Island 'kanakas' were familiar features in colonial history; the introduction of Polynesians and Indians into Fiji was also an essential part of Gordon's policy in Fiji after 1875. 'Blackbirding' in the Pacific received its great impulse because of a sharp rise in demand for labour in the early 1860's as guano from Peru's off-shore islands became a valued fertilizer in the development of scientific farming and as the cotton shortage induced by the American Civil War caused optimistic planting in Queensland and Fiji. For the collection of guano and the cultivation of cotton, Pacific islanders were acquired by fair means or foul and transported to Peru, Queensland and Fiji.

From all accounts the Peruvian traffic was the most notorious. From 1860 until 1863, when British and French pressure caused the Peruvian Government to prohibit the traffic, many outrageous incidents were reported. In most cases the islanders were willing to migrate for temporary work, and a scheme operated by Capt. Henry English of Fanning Island probably represented labour recruiting at its best.² The Peruvians went to Easter Island, the Gambier and Line Islands, and were even reported as far west as Samoa.³ In the Union group islanders were

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1. See R.Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (1953) p.34.
 2. English recruited for one or two years from Penryn, Reison, Humfries and Danger Islands. He got the chiefs to agree to his scheme, regular wages were paid, a Polynesian missionary accompanied the islanders, and they were sent home at the end of the contract. English was a staunch opponent of the Peruvians. Capt. Richards (HMS Hecate) to C.inC.Pacific 8.v.1863 (copy). FO/58/98 p.217. Consul Synge (Honolulu) to FO. 22.vii.1863. Ibid. p. 212.
 3. Consul Williams (Samoa) to FO. 16.v.1863. FO/58/99 p.307; T.Dunbabin, Slavers in the South Seas, (1935) p. 251.

said to have been driven from chapel at the point of the bayonet,¹ Easter Island lost a third of its male population², while at Callao the kidnapper received from two to three hundred dollars per islander. A British naval officer called the Peruvian traffic "as revolting a description of slave dealing as ever was practised on the West Coast of Africa".³ The British Government could only tell its consuls to be watchful and put pressure on the Peruvian Government.

But already by 1861-1862 Whitehall was looking into British law as it related to kidnapping by British subjects in the Pacific, for in 1859 the Sydney ship Two Brothers kidnapped four islanders at Samoa. The Attorney-General of New South Wales suggested proceedings in the Supreme Court but there was no power to subpoena witnesses from outside the colony, so the matter was referred to London, where the Law Officers could offer no solution. In 1862 a Bill was drafted to empower governors to subpoena witnesses, but the Bill was dropped because the Treasury refused to sanction the cost of prosecutions.⁴

The traffic to Queensland began in 1862. The same Capt. Robert Towns, who had offered to pay Thakombau's debt in 1859, started a 2,000 acre cotton plantation near Brisbane, and between 1862 and 1867 he imported 382 New Hebrideans on one to three year contracts, all of whom were sent back.⁵ The importation of islanders into Fiji began about 1864 and by the end of 1869 there were 1,649 recorded immigrants in the group.⁶ The British Government was constantly reminded of this growing traffic, by the French Government, which accused Britons of kidnapping, by the Scottish Presbyterians in the New Hebrides, who claimed that

1. Williams to FO. 16.vi.1863. FO/58/99 p. 307.

2. Dunbabin, op. cit. p. 225.

3. Capt. Richards to Syngé May 1863 (copy), FO/58/98 p. 217.

4. For this case and a careful analysis of the legal position and the disputes with the Treasury see O.W.Parnaby, "Aspects of British Policy in the Pacific: the 1872 Pacific Islanders Protection Act", Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand, vol. 8, No. 29 (1957) pp. 54-65.

5. Memo. by Buckley FO/58/125 pp. 97-112.

6. Ibid.

abductions caused retaliations on missionaries and traders, and by the Anti-Slave and Aborigines Protection Societies, who kept up a stream of letters.

A regular and much abused system of recruiting in British ships for the plantations in Fiji and Queensland grew up drawing mainly from the New Hebrides, Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands, and despite Queensland's 1868 regulations it became evident that British law did nothing to discourage kidnapping. But a solution to this was deferred because of the departmental rivalries in London, and because there was no clear cut line of responsibility. The attempt which the Treasury frustrated in 1862 seems to have been a Colonial Office initiative.¹ But many of the complaints went to the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office referred alleged cases of kidnapping to that department, which made careful investigations of each case. Generally kidnapping was put into the 'slave trade' category, on which the Foreign Office had a wealth of experience.

The matter became urgent in 1869 after the Latona,² Young Australia³ and

1. Parnaby, op. cit. pp. 56-57.
2. The Rev. James McNair, a Scottish Presbyterian missionary at Anetium, New Hebrides, reported that Capt. Smith of the Latona kidnapped nine men from Erromanga in October 1868. He claimed that after saving Smith's life he secured a promise from the latter to release the islanders, which he failed to keep. (FO/58/126 pp. 90, 137, 139-148, 234). The complaints from Anetium went to John Kay, the foreign mission secretary of the Presbyterian Reform Church, who sent them to Arthur Kinnaird, the M.P. for Perth, who sent them to the Foreign Office. (Parnaby, op. cit. p. 59).
3. Capt. Hovell and a Polynesian crewman of the Young Australia were tried for murder in Sydney, but the counsel for the defence, Sir James Martin, the Attorney-General, secured a remission of sentence on the technical point that the Rotuman witness produced by Thurston, Consul in Fiji, had sworn on a translation of the New Testament and not on the whole Bible. (Parnaby, p.61).

The Young Australia with one to two hundred islanders for Fiji on board had reached Api, New Hebrides in October 1868. Three islanders were captured there, but in the hold they caused trouble. Finding bows they fired at any one in sight, so they were shot and thrown overboard. After the ship had left Fiji Thurston heard of the story from one of the islanders and he notified the authorities in Sydney, where Capt. Hovell and some of the crew were arrested. Levinger, the supercargo, was found at Melbourne. (See memo. on the case by William Owen, 31.vii.1869. FO/58/126 pp. 217-224).

Hovell was thought to be Ross Lewin, the most notorious of the kidnapers between Fiji and Australia. Formerly a seaman in the R.N., he had served in China in the 1840's. While he was a sandal-wood trader with a station on the island of Tanna, New Hebrides, he had undertaken to obtain Capt. Towns's first Queensland labourers in 1862. After this contract expired he advertised as a regular blackbirder in 1867. (Dunbabin, pp. 164-167).

Daphne¹ cases became public. The details of these cases are complex; they were exhaustively dissected in London, and have recently received critical treatment by a historian.² Their importance lay in the publicity they received, and the failure of the authorities to sustain cases against the perpetrators. The Latona accusation was not supported,³ but transmitted as it was by Gladstone's friend Kinnaird, it caused the Colonial Office to resurrect the 1862 Bill.⁴ There was great opposition in Sydney to the Daphne prosecution. In the Vice-Admiralty Court the Chief Justice dismissed the charge of slaving brought by Comdr. Palmer R.N., who was made to pay costs. The Commodore told the Admiralty that the prosecution had been a mistake, and at first they agreed. However, as the Foreign Office had approved Thurston's action in the case, and Kinnaird raised the question in Parliament, Palmer had to be vindicated; his costs were refunded and he was promoted Captain.⁵ The result of all this was that by 1870 the existing law was clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent kidnapping.

Therefore in April 1870 the Colonial Office re-opened the question of imperial legislation with the Treasury. There was no intention to abolish labour recruiting. The Queensland system seemed to show that the trade could be regulated, and Bishop Patteson himself had said "I do not advocate the suppression but of the regulation of this traffic".⁶ Regulation was prevented by the

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1. The Daphne arrived at Levuka in April 1869 with 100 naked Tanna men on board. When Thurston and Palmer examined her they found her clearance was for Brisbane to Tanna and back, and its Queensland import licence was signed in favour of Ross Lewin. Pritchard, the supercargo, was a partner of Lewin's. Comdr. Palmer said the ship was rigged out like a West African slaver, and he attempted to prosecute it in Sydney. See memo. by Vivian 10.ix.1869. FO/58/126 p. 349; Dunbabin, pp. 193-205; G. Palmer, Kidnapping in the South Seas (1871) pp. 104-108.
 2. Parnaby article cited.
 3. FO. to Kinnaird 4.viii.1869 (copy). FO/58/126 p. 243.
 4. Parnaby, op. cit. p. 59.
 5. 3 Hansard, cc, cols. 1427; Palmer, op. cit. pp. 104-151.
 6. Patteson to Gov. Bowen (N.Z.) 4.vii.1870 in Bowen to Kimberley 24.vii.1870. CO/209/217.

Treasury's refusal to sanction the cost of prosecutions, so Kimberley decided to resurrect the 1862 Bill. Reminded after eight years, Their Lordships presumed that there was no urgency in the matter, and suggested a solution might be found in the extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.¹ Holland insisted that prosecutions should be an imperial charge so Kimberley pressed the Treasury to agree, but he met with refusal.²

Kimberley had to tell the Foreign Office in December 1870 that the Treasury decision made action impossible.³ Millions had been spent on the suppression of the African slave trade, and H.C. Rothery, the Treasury adviser on the slave trade, admitted that kidnapping in the Pacific was "slave trading in the largest sense of the term,"⁴ but imperial funds were still not available for prosecutions. In an outstanding case of kidnapping in Samoa by a British registered ship commanded by one of the most notorious Pacific freebooters, the chivalrous 'Bully' Hayes,⁵ the Treasury tried to pass the responsibility for the cost of prosecution to the Australian colonies.⁶ This attitude infuriated Rogers:

"This is the kind of letter which makes me think that England is ceasing to desire the rank of a first class power and had better abandon it. Here

1. Treas. to CO. 6.ix.1870. CO/201/560.
2. Ibid. Treas. to CO. 8.xii.1870.
3. Vivian wrote: "The Treasury have taken the same line with the Col. Off. as with us". on CO. to FO. 29.xii.1870. FO/84/1330.
4. Report by Rothery 15.x.1870 in FO. to CO. 7.xii.1870. CO/201/560.
5. William Henry Hayes was the greatest and most dashing of the Pacific pirates of this period. From Cleveland, Ohio, he was described as tall, powerful, pleasant, open-faced, and well-dressed. He did not drink, but late in life he took to shooting people when in a temper; he liked poodles and had many wives. Between 1858 and 1876 he appeared in most of the main ports of the Pacific, Australasia and South-east Asia, and he was a continual embarrassment to the Foreign Office who feared he might be a British subject. He was killed in 1876 by the cook on his ship. (See Dunbabin, op. cit. pp. 223-234 and H.S. Cooper, Coral Lands (1880), II, pp. 59-65.)
In Dec. 1869 Chief Mauga of Pango Pango, Samoa, seized Hayes and handed him to Williams, the British Consul. But there was no jail to keep him until a British warship arrived and on 1 April he slipped away. Williams to FO. 3.x.1870. FO/58/118 p. 454.
6. Treas. to CO. 30.xii.1870. CO/201/560. Although Holland did not like this idea, Kimberley's first thought was "might not we ask the Australian colonies?"

is a great duty attaching to her if it attaches to anybody as the great maritime power of the world and as the centre from which these obnoxious proceedings directly or indirectly proceed, and the Treasury refuse to aid in putting down all these abuses for fear of risking a few hundred thousand pounds.

This seems to me governing an Empire in¹ the spirit of a subordinate department of the Inland Revenue office".

Monsell appealed to Kimberley to get the Cabinet to reverse the decision and from Wymondham on 14 January 1871 Kimberley ordered a case to be drawn up.

On the same day Knatchbull-Hugessen was 'installed as Under-Secretary',² and shortly he, a former Junior Lord, joined the denunciations of the Treasury. In a typically aggressive minute on 27 March 1871 he presumed the Treasury decision was not final

"The matter must have been fully considered by the Cabinet, and the whole Government, and not the Treasury alone, will have to bear the responsibility of having refused to defray from Imperial funds any portion of the expenses incurred in bringing to punishment persons guilty of an offence peculiarly repugnant to the public opinion of this country".³

Miss Brookes claims that the Cabinet had decided to meet the matter with imperial legislation, but record of a Cabinet discussion at this stage has not been found.⁴ Evidently the Treasury was still making trouble because when the Australian governors were sent a draft Bill on 20 April 1871 making kidnapping a felony, at the Foreign Office's express request the Australian colonies were asked if they would bear the cost of prosecutions. At the same time the British consuls were warned that the Treasury would not defray the costs of any prosecutions they brought.

Knatchbull-Hugessen was distressed by the Treasury's apparently successful retention of the initiative, and he continued to complain. When the Board of Trade joined the regrets of the Treasury decision he was all for telling Their

1. Min. by Rogers 2.i.1871 on Treas. to CO. 31.xii.1870. CO/201/560.

2. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 519.

3. Min. by K-Hugessen 27.iii.1871 on FO. to CO. 25.iii.1871. CO/201/567.

4. Brookes, International Rivalry, p. 369. Kimberley merely noted that Granville agreed to the circulars for Australia & did not mention the Cabinet.

Lordships what "everybody outside their office" thought of them.¹ As the discussions developed Kimberley again appeared as the Government's redeemer. The Treasury wanted to foist the responsibility on to the colonies, but the Law Officers decided in October 1871 that imperial legislation alone would ^{not} stop the growth of a slave trade in the Pacific. The Australian colonies concerned (except one) agreed to pay the costs of cases in their own courts; New Zealand volunteered too; so the Foreign Office passed the matter to the Colonial Office to complete. But they would have none of it, and the Bill was sent back for the Foreign Office to deal with. It looked as if the familiar game would continue; but as with Fiji, so now with the labour traffic regulations, the job fell to Kimberley. Came the news of Petteson's death in December 1871, and Herbert told his chief that the other departments were looking to the Colonial Office for direction.² Armed with a memorandum prepared by Herbert Kimberley told Gladstone that he was considering the matter with Granville.³

"The real difficulty is Fiji", said Kimberley.⁴ It was "not only convenient but necessary for England to look upon the two questions as one", wrote Herbert,⁵ who had a coherent plan. Regulations were already in operation designed to prevent abuses in the labour traffic to Queensland; the Fiji Government should be encouraged to adopt the Queensland rules as the condition for formal recognition by Britain. It was true that the Treasury were still obstinate, but the Australasian colonies had agreed to pay most of the costs of prosecutions. All the imperial government now had to do, said Herbert, was to pass an Act, agree

1. Min. by K-Hugessen on Bd. of T. to CO. 27.vii.1871. CO/201/565.

2. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 12.xii.1871.

3. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 14.xii.1871. They had a conversation on the 13th, and Herbert's memo. is dated 15th.

4. Kimberley to Granville 16.xii.1871 (with Herbert's memo.) PRO.30/29/55 p. 247.

5. Herbert's memo. 15.xii.1871. FO/58/122 p. 230.

6. NSW and NZ would pay for cases in their courts; Qd would pay where islanders were on their way to that colony; Tas. and W.Aust. said they were not involved, and Victoria did not reply.

to pay a few costs, instruct the Admiralty to enforce the Act, and then invite the Fiji Government to do the same.

So it was that Kimberley once more did the work which he maintained belonged to Granville's department. He presented the draft of the Pacific Islanders Protection Bill to the Cabinet on 22 January 1872¹ and the Treasury finally had to agree to re-imburse naval officers for expenses incurred seizing offenders. By March 1872 the Colonial Office had taken the matter over completely, and Granville agreed that Knatchbull-Hugessen should shepherd the Bill in the Commons.²

After Patteson's murder and the publicity over the Young Australia and Daphne cases the only political danger to the Bill came from the advocates of complete abolition. Petitions in support of regulation rained in from many quarters,³ public meetings were held in Australia, and the colonial newspapers freely offered Kimberley advice. Most poignant of all was Patteson's own appeal for imperial legislation, published a year after his death: "The African Slave Trade was put down as a thing evil in itself, a disgrace to humanity, and a practical repudiation of Christianity. People did not stop to enquire further".⁴ Kimberley received a deputation from the Aborigines Protection Society of 8 February 1872, questions were asked in Parliament, and it was learnt that the U.S. Government also

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1. Cabinet minute 22.i.1872. Gladstone Papers 44640/6. The East African Slave Trade was also discussed. Gladstone's note reads: "Feejee Island Slave Trade, Bill & Memo to be presented by Kimberley".
 2. Kimberley to K-Hugessen 26.vi.1872 (copy) Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p.588. Min. by Kimberley on McArthur Qn. received 6.iii.1872. CO/201/571.
 3. From the Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the Mayor of Leeds, the people of Falmouth, the Australian Methodist Conference, the Glasgow & Edinburgh Synods of the United Presb. Church of Scotland, the Edinburgh Ladies Emancipation Society, and from Anthony Trollope. The latter was in Australia, and in his Australia and Zew Zealand (1873) there is a long defence of the Queensland traffic (I, pp.132-148), but he admits there is kidnapping in the Fiji traffic. Cf. Trollope to Kimberley 12.xii.1871. Kimberley Papers A/27^t.
 4. Memo. by Patteson 11.i.1871. A & P, 1872, XLIII, p. 830.

had a Bill before Congress. The agitation reached its fulfillment on 27 June 1872 when Kimberley sent the Pacific Island Protection Act to the Australasian governors. The imperial and colonial governments then began to apply regulations which had first been mooted a decade before.

After producing their Act, however, Gladstone's ministers were not allowed to sit back and simply wait for it to produce results, for others besides Kimberley and Herbert had realised that the unsolved Fiji question was inextricably mixed up in the kidnapping problem. It was logical that suggestions for annexation should be revived. The Melbourne Age in criticising the Bill had demanded the hoisting ^{of} the British flag in a number of the Pacific Islands, and had asserted that under "titled statesmen of the Carnarvon, Buckingham and Kimberley stamp" the Colonial Office was incompetent.¹ That much maligned department did not have to wait long for the inevitable; on 6 March 1872 McArthur gave notice of a motion proposing the establishment of a protectorate in Fiji.

This time there was a definite split in the political leadership of the Colonial Office. Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote on 13 June, "we have done all we can do by legislation, at home and in the Colonies to suppress the traffic... Even then Fiji will be an obstacle and stumbling block in our way... Fiji is drifting on and on".² Kimberley was prepared to agree that now the Act was passed they should give the Foreign Office some direction as to Fiji; in spite of the decision over de facto recognition made over seven months before it transpired that Granville had not yet instructed the Consul to do this!³

Most embarrassing of all for the Government was the fact that as the McArthur debate approached, it was obvious to Kimberley that Knatchbull-Hugessen, his

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1. Cutting dated 4.xi.1871 in Canterbury to Kimberley 23.xi.1871. CO/309/101.
 2. Min. by K-Hugessen 13.vi.1872. on Ad. to CO. 10.vi.1872. CO/201/571.
 3. Min. by Herbert on Administrator, NSW. to Kimberley 19.iv.1872. CO/201/560. Brookes, International Rivalry, p. 375 says March heard of the 1871 decision second-hand from a naval officer in June 1872.

spokesman in the Commons, favoured annexation. Similarly, Lord Enfield, the Parliamentary Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, wanted a British protectorate.¹

Three days before the debate Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote,

"The truth is that from the surpassing love of Economy which rules English statesmen now-a-days, and from the dread of incurring responsibilities which (fortunately for our English colonies today) our forefathers did not entertain, we have, wisely or unwisely, let slip the opportunity of acquiring a new colony - or group of Colonies - which would probably have cost less than we imagined... this matter will₂ perhaps be judged with greater accuracy some twenty years hence".

Kimberley was unmoved; he reminded his junior of the 1871 policy of refusing annexation, of leaving the door open for the New South Wales plan, and of according de facto recognition to the Fiji Government. Now in June 1872 he simply told Granville to do what had been decided in November 1871.

The Fiji debate in the House of Commons took place on 25 June 1872 - the day after Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech. McArthur, in fact, endorsed the new emphasis which the Conservative leader had given to the colonial empire. Fiji, he said, was the 'key to Polynesia', and in the interest of the eternal trinity of the humanitarians - Christianity, Commerce and Liberty - he called for a protectorate like that on the Gold Coast.³ Admiral Erskine⁴, seconding, referred to the third Earl Grey's views on the Gold Coast Protectorate published in 1853, Sir Charles Wingfield reminded the House that the French in Tahiti clothed what amounted to absolute rule under the veil of a 'protectorate', and Mr. Eastwick mentioned the recent "annexation" of Samoa by the United States.

The last point, strictly inaccurate, though it was, could not have been lost on Knatchbull-Hugessen. For that very day, before the debate, Mr. Dealtry, the

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1. Memo. by Enfield 27.iii.1872. FO/58/120.
 2. Min. by K-Hugessen 22.vi.1872 on Administrator, NSW to Kimberley 19.iv.1872 CO/201/569.
 3. See above p. 53-64.
 4. 3 Hansard, ccxii, cols. 192-219. Admiral Erskine had been in touch with the Wesleyans in 1870. He had also visited the Fiji Islands in 1849, where he had met Calvert and Thakombau. He had impressed the latter with the fire-power of a British warship, and he had greatly approved, himself, of the work of the Wesleyans. See J.E.Erskine, Journal of a Cruise in the islands of the Pacific (1853) pp. 165-279.

head of the Australasian department, had shown him reports from Washington and Samoa that on 17 February 1872 a Samoan chief had ceded the harbour of Pago Pago, on the island of Tutuila, to Commander Meade of the U.S.S. Narrangansett. Furthermore, a Washington newspaper had reported that less than two weeks later a German warship had arrived for the same purpose, and its Captain, when told of Meade's Treaty, had gasped "It cannot be so".

The basis for these reports will be discussed later.¹ But the possibility of German or American intervention in Samoa had long been dreaded by New Zealanders, who had tried to forstall it. In February 1872, for instance, the Colonial Office had considered an application by the New Zealand Government to assume a protectorate over Samoa.² As with the Australian proposals for Fiji this had been carefully considered in London, and although Kimberley told New Zealand that she had quite enough trouble on her hands with the Maoris, in his private minutes to the Office he did not close the door to New Zealand's aspiration. Just as the Fiji question was left open for New South Wales or Victoria to act, so with Samoa Kimberley wrote "we might wish to change our minds hereafter (perhaps in the form of allowing New Zealand to annex some of these islands in the name of the British Crown)".³

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1. See below pp. 282-283. The Pago Pago treaty was not ratified; and the German action was from Theodore Weber, The Consul, and was not official.
 3. Memo. by the PM. 24.xi.1871 in Bowen to Kimberley 24.xi.1871. CO/209/223.
 3. Min. by Kimberley 22.ii.1872 on FO. to CO. 16.ii.1872. CO/209/228. S.Masterman, The Origins of International Rivalry in Samoa (1934) pp. 92-93, neglects this evidence of Kimberley's wider (private) view, and claims the CO. did not consider the matter seriously. But Kimberley crossed out Herbert's draft reply to N.Z. giving good reasons for non-intervention in Samoa, because he thought that if they changed their minds in the future it would be embarrassing to have such good reasons against action on record.

Kimberley's attitude was consistent with the N.S.W. plan for Fiji, and also with his frontier policy in South Africa. The latter policy sprang from Adderley's policy for Basutoland in 1867, mentioned above p. 252. In May 1871 Kimberley insisted that if the diamond fields (Griqualand West) were annexed, the Cape would have to be responsible for them. But Gov. Barkly repeated the process of the former case, and in Oct. 1871 he annexed Griqualand West to the Crown, and the Cape refused to take it. See de Kiewiet, British Policy & the South African Republics, pp. 291-301.

In February 1872 the Colonial Office had also received suspicious reports of German activity from Viscount Canterbury, the Governor of Victoria. Giving his opinions about the recognition of the Fiji Government, he said he was worried lest some other Power, especially Germany, should assume a protectorate over Fiji. Colour was lent to his concern before he even sealed his despatch on 31 December 1871 when the German warship Nymphe arrived at Melbourne bound for the South Seas.¹ Knatchbull-Hugessen knew about this when he read of the Pago Pago treaty. He had supported the refusal to let New Zealand take Samoa as this was consistent with the Fiji policy, but on the day of the Fiji debate, after reading the news from Washington, he wrote: "The Americans are alive to the advantage to a naval power of having an advance post in the Pacific. They could hardly object after this, to our annexing Fiji, did our policy tend that way".² After this, Knatchbull-Hugessen's strange speech in the debate is more understandable.

It was a skillful speech in many ways. He could not "let down the regiment,"³ but by now he felt very strongly about colonial matters and obviously disagreed with the Government's policy. Therefore sitting high on the fence, he dropped a few thoughts about colonial policy. African analogies, he said, were inadmissible; in the case of the territory adjoining the Cape, the Government did not annex because it thought that in the interests of "civilization, of the British diggers, and of the native tribes, and of South Africa itself" that the Cape should govern them. On the Gold Coast, the Elmina cession accomplished in 1872 had been designed to remove the source of friction caused by the presence on the Coast

1. Canterbury to Kimberley 30.xii.1871. CO/309/101.

2. Min. by K-Hugessen 25.vi.1872 on FO. to CO. 22.vi.1872. CO/309/107.

3. A favourite phrase. See Brabourne Diary, VI 1880-81, p. 909.

of two Powers. So having begged the question,¹ Knatchbull-Hugessen turned to Fiji to sum up the arguments for and against annexation. There was British settlement and investment in Fiji, the islands would provide a base for commerce and for the Pacific fleet; but the inhabitants had not expressed a wish for annexation, and it might be costly, as the Maori wars had cost £20 million. As for a protectorate, he had "never been able to find out exactly what a protectorate meant",² As to colonial policy generally, he wished to make his position clear: he would not support a policy which made it a rule that whenever annexation would benefit a place Britain should annex it, but he did not undervalue colonies. In fact he believed that if anyone laid down a doctrine of non-extension that person would "sound the first note in their country's retrogression in the scale of nations".³ For all these words his real feelings about Fiji were not lost on the House; in fact a member immediately claimed that he had conceded the point at issue. It was therefore left to Gladstone to state the Government's view.

The Prime Minister scored points from McArthur, and he deplored the idea of a protectorate - "It might be anything or nothing; it was the most shadowy of all relations". He agreed that annexation might be beneficial to Fiji, yet in New Zealand the Maori population had declined by about 80,000 in just over thirty years.

1. What he said about S. Africa and Elmina was all quite correct, but these were not the analogies appealed to by previous speakers. They had referred to the Gold Coast Protectorate, where British officials had more or less administered justice over a wide (if vague) area since 1831. (see above pp. 53-64)

In the light of Earl Grey's book alone, quoted by Erskine (The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration, 1853) a very plausible case might have been possible. In point of fact, however, the Gold Coast Protectorate had grave limitations, about with the Colonial Office had been increasingly made aware in the 1860's. But K-Hugessen did not deal with this - no doubt wisely - as this would have supported the case he disagreed with. As a piece of evasion, then, his speech was masterly, but it was not relevant to the points that had been made.

2. 3 Hansard ccxii, col. 209.

3. Ibid. col. 211. K-Hugessen took the opportunity to aim a few shafts at the Crystal Palace speech. On the idea that there was a party which supported colonial separation he said it "only existed in the fertile brains of imaginative statesmen who, in order to create a new political programme for their own party, found it necessary to misinterpret the policy of their opponents".

Above all the Government had no real evidence that the Fijians wanted some form of control. Gladstone said his policy was:

"so far as it is able to lay down an abstract and general rule with regard to annexation, he was prepared to say that HMG would not annex any territory, great or small, without the well understood and expressed wish of the people to be annexed, freely and generously expressed, and authenticated by the best means the case would afford".¹

Fiji did not meet his conditions, and the House agreed by a majority of 68.²

Gladstone's statement was consistent with Kimberley's 1870 policy; the door was not closed, but decision was postponed. The Government was taking one thing at a time, and they were awaiting the results of the Kidnapping Act.³

The decision to sent the Goodenough-Layard Commission, 1873.

The day after the Fiji debate of 1872 the Colonial Office told the Foreign Office that it was time Consul March had some instructions. Herbert's idea was recommended: that the Consul should not oppose the Fiji Government, but should make his recognition conditional upon Fiji's adopting regulations for the labour traffic.⁴

Actually, March's relations with the Fiji Government had become more and more strained, and the Fijian Premier had even complained to Granville.⁵ Throughout 1871 the Consul had continued to send unfavourable reports. On the one hand British subjects swore allegiance to the new government and considered themselves beyond British law;⁶ on the other, settlers outside the Levuka area found Thakombau's rule insufficient for their protection and they formed 'guerilla bands' to defend themselves.⁷ By October 1871 the opposition in Fiji had formed a 'Constitutional

1. Ibid. col. 217.

2. Ayes 84. Noes 135.

3. Kimberley & Granville in Lords, 24.vi.1872. 3 Hansard, ccxii, col. 81.

4. CO. to FO. 26.vi.1872. FO/58/133 p. 278.

5. Burt to Granville 10.vii.1871. FO/58/121 p. 190.

6. March to FO. 27.viii.1871. FO/58/120 p. 179.

7. Ibid. March to FO. 11.x.1871. p. 201.

Party' to secure the release of a man arrested by the Government.¹ By the end of the year March was getting desperate as British subjects driven from their lands by resentful Fijians demanded protection, and the Consul himself was ordered at the point of a pistol off the labour ship Peri, owned by Woods, who was now the Prime Minister. "I shall be compelled through sheer despair to quit Fiji", he wrote in December 1871.²

All was not right with March's attitude to the Fiji Government, but as Wylde reminded his Foreign Office colleagues,^a the Consul was still without instructions.³ Early in 1872 Lord Tenterden reminded Hammond that they had done nothing about the "sort of burlesque constitutional government" in Fiji,⁴ but the permanent Under-secretary was quite out of touch with the situation and the whole question was postponed until the Kidnapping Act was finished.

In Fiji, meanwhile, the Woods Government met growing opposition in 1872. With salaries and expenditure running to £20,000, the Government proposed raising a revenue of £23,000. A loan of £5,000 was procured from one of the ministers, and £5 debenture notes were issued redeemable in two years at 10% interest. But a group of settlers calling themselves the 'British Subjects Mutual Protection Association' informed March that they would pay no taxes, and they were particularly indignant when the Government created a Fijian Army. Tension was clearly mounting; some of the settlers left, trade declined,⁵ and the Government was temporarily prevented from arresting a planter who murdered a Fijian chief by an armed 'Klu Klux Klan' of settlers.⁶ In an effort to improve matters Woods, the Premier, visited Sydney early in 1872 to raise funds and to persuade the Government of the colony to instruct British subjects in Fiji to obey the local

1. Ibid. March to FO. 30.x.1871. p. 226.

2. Ibid. March to FO. 14.xii.1871. p. 251.

3. Mins. 28.x.1871 FO/58/122 p.189 and 30.xii.1871. FO/58/120 p.284.

4. Min. by Tenterden 3.i.1872. FO/58/120.

5. March to FO. 26.i.1872 FO/58/131 p. 34 and 20.iii.1872, p. 82.

6. Woods to Administrator N.S.W. 3.iv.1872 (copy) in FO/58/131 p. 110.

laws. A serious crisis was only avoided because John Thurston, the former Consul, and Robert Swanston, Ma'afu's adviser in Lau, were persuaded (in Woods's absence) to join the Government.¹

Thurston had been absent from Fiji during the coup d'etat in 1871 and his assumption of office in the spring of 1872 gave a temporary boost to the Government's prestige, although, as Professor Henderson has said, it was to seriously reduce his own. Yet, whatever criticisms can be made of Thurston for his activities between 1872 and 1874, and no final assessment can be made here, there is much evidence to support Robinson's opinion that he was "an honest able man, sincerely desirous of promoting and protecting the interests of King Cakobau and his people",² or Gordon's view that he "steadily opposed the wishes of the majority of the whites to exploiter the natives".³ As Consul in 1869 he had tried to get the Foreign Office to clarify the law about British labour ships.⁴ Now as Foreign Minister he wrote to Knatchbull-Hugessen saying that the Fiji Government was preparing legislation based on the Kidnapping Act of 1872.⁵ Thus he was able temporarily to alleviate London's fears, so that at the end of 1872 the British Government was lured into a false sense of security which made it think that de facto recognition and the Kidnapping Act had solved the Fiji problem.

In actual fact Gladstone's House of Commons statement of June 1872 succeeded

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1. The date when Thurston joined the Govt. is uncertain. Brewster (p.241) says 19 June 1872; Henderson, (Govt. in Fiji, II) says March on p.242 and May on p.282; Derrick, (History, p.214) says May. Woods told Goodenough (Journal, II, 28.xii.1873) what happened when he got back to find Thurston a Minister. He said Thurston insisted that two members of the Cabinet be dropped and that Swanston & Clarkson be elected instead. But when Woods asked Thurston whether he wanted him to resign too, the latter said not.
 2. Robinson to Kimberley 27.i.1873, copy in FO/58/139 p. 152.
 3. Gordon, Fiji Records, I, p. 163. Cf. Legge, Britain in Fiji, pp.97-99.
 4. O.W.Parnaby, "The Regulation of Indentured Labour to Fiji 1864-1888", Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 65, No.1, (march 1956) p. 58.
 5. Thurston to K-Hugessen 11.ix.1872. CO/83/2.

in suppressing Fiji as a political issue only until February 1873. Meanwhile Kimberley reverted to his efforts of keeping Fijian business out of the Colonial Office.¹ The Admiralty instructed the Squadron in its job of suppressing kidnapping.² Granville decided to remove March from the Consulate and appoint someone, who coming fresh, could carry out the policy of de facto recognition, and who might assist the Fiji Government in suppressing kidnapping.³

Neither the progress of the Fiji Government, nor the operation of the Kidnapping Act gave cause for satisfaction. By November 1872 Kimberley thought they might have to abolish the traffic in British ships altogether. The American attempts at regulation failed, Congress dropped its Bill, and Hamilton Fish, the Secretary of State, showed himself to be more interested in restricting the migration of Chinese, and cast aspersions on British activities in South-East Asia.⁴ There was a growing suspicion that the Fiji Government could not be trusted on the matter of labour regulation. In fact, although the issue did not become public again in England until February 1873, in the intervening months Knatchbull-Hugessen and Kimberley kept up a running debate behind the scenes.

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1. Min. by Kimberley 11.ix.1872 on FO. to CO. 4.ix.1872. CO/83/2.
 2. Holland drafted the instructions, in CO. to Ad. 9.vii.1872. CO/201/570. The Australians then claimed they were denuded of naval defences, but Kimberley said it was reasonable to use the Squadron for suppression in peacetime.

The establishment of the Australasian Squadron in 1872 was 4 corvettes (Clio, Cossack, Blanche, Dido), a sloop (Rosario) and a paddle steamer (Basilisk). The Commodore deployed all his strength cruising in the islands, and HMS Barrosa from the China Station covered the western area. A new schooner Ethel was purchased and sent to Fijian waters, and others were ordered to be built. (Ad. to CO. 30.x.1872. CO/83/2).

3. Holland also drafted the Consul's instructions, suggesting that recognition should be conditional on the Fiji Government's adopting regulations like the 1868 Queensland act. This was the day after the Commons debate, and Kimberley made sure Gladstone saw the draft. (Holland to Hammond 26.vi.1872 with a note by Gladstone. FO/58/133 p. 278-283.)

March had consistently opposed the Fiji Govt., thus his position under the new policy was invidious. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Law Officers would not let British subjects shelter behind Fijian citizenship. (Circular to Australian Governors, 14.viii.1872. CO/201/571).

Percy Anderson, of the FO slave department, suggested sending H.A.Churchill to Fiji. He had retired in Feb. 1872 from being Consul-General in Zanzibar, a position with certain parallels to the Fiji situation. (Note in FO/58/132 p.67)

4. FO. to CO. 21.xi.1872. CO/83/2.

This debate had two levels: one was the still rather academic one on the possibility of international rivalry in the Pacific, the other was on the urgent question of the status of Fiji. On the first, Knatchbull-Hugessen was worried about the intentions of Germany and the U.S.A. The German warship Nymphe had been sent out in answer to Bismarck's 1869 promise, and it made the Governor of Victoria suspicious. Although the German Captain told Julius Vogel, now the Prime Minister on New Zealand, that Germany had no designs on Samoa or Fiji,¹ on reading of the ship's arrival in Fiji Knatchbull-Hugessen suddenly wrote: "Serve us right if Germany annexes Fiji". Kimberley, as ever, was non-committal in face of such frankness. Why?, he asked. "Because we should have a foreign Power in a position in the Pacific whence great annoyance might be inflicted upon our Australian colonies, which position we might have occupied ourselves if we had so inclined". "The Monro Doctrine of the Pacific", mused Kimberley,² who was not prepared to invent such a doctrine himself. In New Zealand Vogel was also worried about American and German ambitions and also about a possible great Polynesian confederacy of Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. But Kimberley remained aloof. "I don't see how we are to interfere unless we are to lay down and enforce the doctrine that no European or American Power is to interfere in any part of the South Pacific but ourselves".³ Even so he was not pleased by the exclusiveness of Meade's Pago Pago treaty.⁴ The prize for detached academic discussion, however, must go to Herbert's view of the United States:

"Probably they hope to be master of the Pacific presently but both Canada and Australia may be ahead of them a hundred years hence. In the meantime the old dog England and her colonial puppies of course growl when any of the manglers which she cannot₅ make use of is approached. I see the US. contemplate a station in Borneo".

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1. Vogel Memo. 9.vi.1872 in Bowen to Kimberley 26.vi.1872. CO/209/225.
 2. Mins. 23rd, 24th and 25.vii.1872. on FO. to FCO. 22.vii.1872. CO/201/571.
 3. Min. by Kimberley 4.ix.1872 on Vogel Memo. cited above.
 4. Min. by Kimberley 22.ix.1872 and CO. to FO. 27.ix.1872 (draft) CO/209/228.
 5. Min. by Herbert 29.x.1872 on Canterbury to Kimberley 7.ix.1872. CO/309/105.
For the Americans in Borneo see K.G. Tregonning, "American activity in N. Borneo, 1865-1881", Pac. Hist. Rev. (Nov. 1954) xxiii, No. 4, p. 357.

Even Knatchbull-Hugessen was not too combative about American activities.

Obviously the Alabama affair made him cynical, as he said the U.S.A. "knows that in the event of her clashing with British interests, the only result will probably be an amicable arbitration upon terms not unfavourable to herself".¹

On Fiji, however, Knatchbull-Hugessen was emphatic. In August 1872 he warned Kimberley that Gladstone's hints in the Commons debate would probably encourage McArthur to get another annexation debate in the 1873 session. In October Herbert wanted to give formal recognition to the Fiji Government as it had passed labour regulations based on the British Act.² Kimberley agreed to this, but the Foreign Office was waiting until the new Consul was appointed.³ Meanwhile they wanted Thurston to stop writing to Knatchbull-Hugessen and to use the 'proper channels'. To the latter this was a policy of barren stonewalling; they might 'postpone' and 'put by', he said, but McArthur had already given notice of a motion calling on the Government to find out if the Fijians wanted annexation, and they should prepare to meet this. But Kimberley 'put by' again. Discretion was still the better part of imperial valour.

Final warning that the problem would soon have to be faced was given in February 1873. On 7 February McArthur tabled his motion,⁴ on the 18th he began to stir the waters of the House by asking if the (unanswered) 1870 memorial from Fiji asking for protection had been received,⁵ finally, on the 24th, a telegram arrived from Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor of New South Wales, informing the Government that a letter from Thurston was on the way, in Thakombau's name, asking

1. Ibid. Min. by K-Hugessen 30.x.1872.

2. "Could we pretend that a third class Governor with the usual expensive staff of incompetent colonial officials would have done as well as Mr. Thurston's administration". Min. by Herbert 14.x.1872 on Thurston to K-Hugessen 24.vi.1872 CO/83/2.

3. Kimberley to Granville 15.x.1872. PRO.30/29/55 p.281 and FO. to CO. 21.x.1872. CO/83/2.

4. Question received 7.ii.1873. Ibid.

5. 3 Hansard, ccxiv, col. 597. See above p.240. The FO. did not send the CO. a copy of the 1870 memorial until 6.iii.1873!

the British Government if it would entertain an offer of the Fiji Islands.¹ The time for a decision in London drew near.

In this way the respite gained by Gladstone's 1872 ^{speech} expired in February 1873. The Government would have to make up its mind before Thurston's letter arrived, and before McArthur's motion was debated, so Kimberley immediately consulted the Prime Minister. Moreover, Knatchbull-Hugessen's persistent pressure had not been lost on his seemingly inert chief. Probably Kimberley's non-committal replies in 1872 hid a growing agreement with his uncompromising subordinate, for Kimberley now advised annexation.

As soon as the Robinson telegram arrived on 24 February, Knatchbull-Hugessen, taking it to be an outright offer, warned that if annexation was refused a hostile motion would probably be carried in the Commons. Herbert still opposed annexation, preferring the New South Wales plan on the grounds of economy.² But Kimberley straightway urged Gladstone to accept Fiji, so they could cut away the root of the kidnapping problem.³ Gladstone was non-committal. He agreed that Fiji was a formidable question⁴ and he discussed it with Kimberley and Granville, probably on 25 or 26 February, when they decided not to answer Thurston's telegram, but to await the letter.⁵ Gladstone did not hide his prejudices: "I can give no promise to be party to any arrangement for adding Fiji and all that lies beyond it to the care of this overdone and overburdened Government and Empire".⁶ The Cabinet might

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1. Robinson to Kimberley (tg) 20.ii.1873. CO/201/573. Derrick, History, p.222 says the letter was prompted by the news of McArthur's motion, which was rec'd in Fiji on 14.xii.1872. Henderson, Govt. in Fiji, II, pp 344-347, is sure the telegram was sent in the expectation that the offer would be rejected; that it was part of a plot by Thurston and Woods to confound the opposition and create a despotic regime.
 2. Min. by Herbert 24.ii.1873 on the telegram.
 3. Kimberley to Gladstone 24.ii.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/10.
 4. Gladstone to Kimberley 25.ii.1873. Kimberley Papers A/8c.
 5. Ibid. A/43. Note by Kimberley 27.ii.1873.
 6. Ibid. A/8c. Gladstone to Kimberley 26.ii.1873.

still prove a difficult hurdle, then, but at least the political leadership of the Colonial Office had made up its mind.

Discussion in the Office turned to practical matters. When it was learnt in March 1873 that Robinson was assisting Thurston by sending the Commodore to Fiji, Knatchbull-Hugessen said they would have to make the islands into a Crown Colony, but Kimberley thought it might be difficult to attune freedom loving Australian settlers to this.¹ Herbert was still averse, and when Thurston's letter arrived on 22 April he questioned its representative character. But Knatchbull-Hugessen always had a weighty argument: "I do not think we ought to reject the offer, nor that a rejection would be sustained by the House of Commons or by Public Opinion in this Country".² In the Foreign Office Wylde feared that if they took Fiji, the United States might annex Hawaii. Actually the U.S. Minister Resident in Honolulu supported annexation and President Grant's administration was favourable, and it was in 1871 that American officers inspected Pearl Bay as a possible base,³ but Kimberley's cousin, Major James Wodehouse, the British Consul-General in Hawaii, did not believe this.⁴ Lord Enfield was not put off by the possibility, and he again advised Granville to annex Fiji.⁵

It looked as if a decision could be delayed no longer. Thurston's letter had to be answered; McArthur's motion was scheduled for 13 May. Kimberley was in favour of annexation, but he knew Gladstone's aversion, therefore he provided the Prime Minister with yet another excuse for delay. Let a commissioner be sent to Fiji - possibly General Smythe who had gone in 1860, or Sir Andrew Clarke, who had been so useful over the Gold Coast.⁶ Gladstone admitted that he was

1. Mins. on Robinson to Kimberley 27.ii.1873. CO/201/573.

2. Min. by K-Hugessen 24.iv.1873 on Robinson to Kimberley 20.iii.1873. Ibid. Thurston's letter addressed to Granville, dated 31.i.1873, referred to McArthur's motion and asked if HMG would entertain an offer from Fiji if "its King and people, once more, and now through the king's responsible advisers, express a desire to place themselves under HM's rule".

3. G.H.Ryden, The Foreign Policy of the U.S. in Relation to Samoa (1933) pp. 42-43.

4. Wodehouse to Granville 30.viii.1872. FO/58/132 p. 111.

5. Mins. 30.iv.1873 & 1.v.1873. FO/58/139 pp. 295-6.

6. Kimberley to Gladstone 30.iv.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/29.

neither acquainted with the facts about Fiji, nor did he want to move. But he had sensed the political importance of the issue, and was "much exercised in mind about Fiji".¹ He knew some of his colleagues and "the world without" wanted to go further than he did.

Throughout May 1873 Gladstone and the Cabinet were given all the Fiji papers. From these Gladstone read of Kimberley's meeting with the Aborigines Protection Society, which came to support McArthur on 12 May. To them Fiji was a slave trade problem to which they brought a rich experience in agitation. Sir Bartle Frere had gone to Zanzibar in 1872 to get a slave trade treaty,² why, they asked, was not someone sent to Fiji where the islanders were about to suffer the same fate as the Maoris. Kimberley was unusually expansive. Yes, they were considering action; yes, the lesson of New Zealand was in mind; and there was another problem, he said; the same reasons given for the annexation of Fiji could well apply to the whole of Polynesia - where would the process end?³ Kimberley's evasive policies and his non-committal replies to Knatchbull-Hugessen's unreserved declarations had disguised, then, a mind increasingly aware of expanding horizons. Kimberley was indeed uncertain what to do; but he cannot be accused of ignoring the problem of the expanding frontier.

Memoranda prepared for the Cabinet by Consul March,⁴ now back in London, supported the familiar argument that if Britain did not annex, some other Power would. He claimed that the islands would be easier to govern than New Zealand as

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1. Gladstone to Kimberley 8.v.1873. Kimberley Papers A/8c.
 2. In the late 1860's the Lay Secretary of the Church Missionary Soc. had watched the East African Slave trade, and in 1869 the C.M.S. called for a select committee which met in 1871. In 1872 Frere was appointed Special Commissioner to the Sultan of Zanzibar to get a treaty abolishing the slave trade by sea. See Oliver, Missionary Factor in East Africa, p. 18-19.
 3. Details in Australia & N.Zealand Gazette, 17.v.1873. CO/83/4. Among the 29 signatories were Kinnaird, the Duke of Manchester, Wingfield, Ad. Erskine, McArthur, Wm. Fowler MP, McFie and A.W.Young MP.
 4. March's Memos: The State of Fiji when he left, 7.v.1873 (FO/58/135 p. 123); The U.S. claims, 14.v.1873 (p.176) Annexation of Fiji, 19.v.1873 (p.184).

revenue would produce £12,000, civil establishments would cost only £7,000, and military needs could be met by four Companies of Marines and two warships from the Squadron. The Cabinet had all this information before the meeting of 24 May, but the subject was never discussed. Gladstone and Granville exchanged notes, but it was 'Too late for Fiji'.¹ Gladstone hung back until the very last and he even asked Kimberley to consider an idea of March's² that the fiction of a united Fiji should be abandoned, that the rival chiefs should be left to govern their people, and that the British Consul should simply have jurisdiction over British subjects.³ But Kimberley refused to go back.

The decision was finally taken in the Cabinet on 7 June 1873 when Kimberley's proposal of a commission was accepted.⁴ For Gladstone this was really another postponement of decision, but one suspects that for Kimberley the result was a forgone conclusion; he had handled both the Fiji question and Gladstone skillfully. On 10 June Gladstone spoke to Commodore Goodenough, the new commodore of the Squadron, who recorded this impression of the interview:

"The real question therefore is at once removed to recognition or annexation & Mr. Gladstone even more than Lord Kimberley said that I must report what wd. be most conducive to law & order and the best interests of the people black and white who inhabited, or are to inhabit, these islands.

Mr Gladstone spoke seriously of the great disadvantage attending the acquisition of new colonies, the great difficulties of governing a country at the other end of the world...."⁵

Three days after this McArthur had to be faced in the House of Commons. Kimberley tried to persuade him to cancel his motion in view of the Cabinet's decision, but the persistent Alderman politely refused, and Kimberley urged Gladstone to explain the new policy to the House.⁶ On 13 June 1873 McArthur rose to recite

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1. Cabinet Minute 24.v.1873. Gladstone Papers 44641/126.
 2. Memo. of 7.v.1873.
 3. Gladstone to Kimberley 29.v.1873. Kimberley Papers A/8c.
 4. Cabinet Min. 44641/128. Goodenough heard that 'Fiji was on' next day. Goodenough's Journal, 8.vi.1873.
 5. Ibid. I, 10.vi.1873.
 6. Kimberley to Gladstone 11 & 12.vi.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/49 & 53.

the well known arguments for annexation. It had been unworthy, he said, to expect New South Wales to take Fiji, de facto recognition had been a dangerous precedent, and it had been discourteous not to reply to the 1870 memorial. Referring to Gladstone's 1872 statement, he hoped now to show a well authenticated desire for annexation, and with liberal quotations from the Fiji Times, Thurston's letters, Captain Palmer's book, and the kidnapping cases - and the pertinent fact that a quarter of a million pounds had been spent in five years in suppressing the East African coastal slave trade - he came to his final appeal. It was not only a matter of the national interest; it concerned the cause of "liberty, civilization, and Christianity" throughout the Pacific, and he appealed to Gladstone, a former Colonial Secretary, to accept the sovereignty of, or a protectorate over, the Fiji Islands.¹

Gladstone replied frankly, and he scored debating points as usual. Annexation was becoming a favourite topic with the House, he said; it might be the 'chill of age' but he confessed that accessions of territory did not excite him, and since trade with Fiji was small he did not think the commercial argument was a good one. The philanthropic argument was important, but if McArthur's figures for Fijian church-going were correct, the islands had the highest proportion of devout believers in Christendom. Gladstone's chief defence was the expense incurred in the Maori Wars; he refused to commit the same errors in Fiji.² He wanted more information, therefore a commission would inquire and report. This was all the Government would do at the moment, and it did not convince the humanitarians who carried McArthur's motion by a majority of 36.³

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1. 3 Hansard, ccxvi, cols. 934-941. Printed as a booklet, The annexation of Fiji and the Pacific Slave Trade (May 1874) by the Aborigines Protection Society.
 2. For the importance to Gladstone's view of the controversy with N.Z. over the costs of the Maori wars and the withdrawal of the imperial troops, See E.A. Benians, "Colonial Self-government, 1852-70", Camb. Hist. of Brit. Emp. II, p. 701, where he asserts that "out of the New Zealand question sprang the new imperialist movement."
 3. Ayes 86. Noes 50. 3 Hansard, ccxvi, cols. 943-9 for Gladstone's speech.

What had really happened was that Kimberley had provided Gladstone with another excuse for postponing a decision on Fiji, and as the Liberal Government fell before the Goodenough-Layard report arrived, it was never called upon to decide. But Kimberley had clearly travelled past his master on Fiji,¹ as he would shortly do also on the Malay States and Ashanti. He had advised annexation as early as February 1873. Immediately after the 7 June Cabinet he presented Gladstone with four alternatives: consular jurisdiction, formal recognition of the Fiji Government, protectorate, or annexation.² These formed the basis of Goodenough's instructions, but as Gladstone read them he was reminded of war, expense and trouble with the local people elsewhere: "I hope nothing will be done which will lead us to responsibility inner-wards - as in New Zealand and in Abyssinia".³

In spite of this warning Goodenough's instructions, although based on the four alternatives, really eliminated three of them, leaving a fair impression of Kimberley's preference.⁴ Firstly, consular jurisdiction would be difficult to justify unless the local government was really incapable, and no arrangement would be satisfactory unless the labour traffic was regulated. Secondly, if the local government was to ^{be} recognised de jure it would have to be certain that it was fully recognised locally, and it would be unsatisfactory unless its labour laws were effective as Queensland's. Britain would also require most favoured nation treatment for her merchants. Thirdly, the objections to a protectorate were "obvious" as this would involve "undefined responsibilities" with limited power


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1. After Carnarvon announced the annexation in 1874 Kimberley wrote: "As I expected the government have taken possession of Fiji... I think it would have been difficult to avoid taking Fiji". (to Gladstone 4.xi.1874. Gladstone Papers 44225/154). K-Hugessen wrote in 1874: "it is tolerably certain that we would have annexed the islands". Brabourne Diary, p.733.
 2. Kimberley to Gladstone 10.vi.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/54.
 3. Gladstone to Kimberley 27.vii.1873. Kimberley Papers A/8c. The expressions of Gladstone's great reluctance throughout the discussion may be considered beside Legge's assertion that "nowhere does he indicate an irrevocable opposition to annexation should it prove to only satisfactory solution". Brit. in Fiji, p. 136.
 4. Draft after FO. to CO. 5.viii.1873. CO/83/4.

of discharging them. Finally, the fourth alternative was annexation.¹ Here Kimberley offered no comment. But a series of practical questions had to be answered: was the cession desired, what form of government would be suitable, how would the Fijians be represented, what would be the state of the revenues and expenses, what was the land system. Final phrases denying any British desire for annexation were really face-savers to satisfy Gladstone, if the instructions were published. Edgar L. Layard, the new Consul, was told by the Foreign Office to accord de facto recognition to the Fiji Government, to avoid controversy, and to encourage (with Royal Navy support if necessary) the suppression of kidnapping.²

New Zealand's Samoan schemes, 1871 to 1874.

Although Kimberley had reduced the Fiji case to fairly clear cut proportions and had made up his mind about it, on the wider question of the frontier in the South Pacific his ideas were negative. He certainly recognised the problem; both he and Gladstone told Goodenough that "taking Fiji might result in our annexing all Polynesia",³ he asked the Aborigines Protection Society in May 1873 where the process of annexation would end,⁴ and he deferred considering a request for annexation from Rotuma until after the Fiji decision.⁵ In 1874 after Fiji was annexed he told Gladstone, "we shall have further pressure for annexation in the Pacific",⁶ referring here to a matter which concerned him during his last days at the Colonial Office - the re-kindling of Australian interest in New Guinea. After Moresby's explorations on the South-east coast of New Guinea in 1873, Herbert,

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1. In the Commons debate on the Conservative policy, 4.viii.1874, K-Hugessen said that Kimberley's instructions had eliminated three alternatives; "There remained, then, only annexation, unless we were prepared to abandon altogether any interference". 3 Hansard, ccxxi, col. 1293.
 2. Granville to Layard 29.ix.1873 (draft seen and altered by Kimberley) FO/58/135, p. 53.
 3. Goodenough's Journal, I, 10.vi.1873.
 4. See above p. 276.
 5. Min. by Kimberley 23.ii.1873 on Ad. to CO. 19.ii.1873 CO/201/575.
 6. Kimberley to Gladstone 4.ix.1874. Gladstone Papers 44225/154.



THE PRINCIPAL ISLANDS OF THE SAMOAN GROUP

a former Premier of Queensland, consistently advocated some form of annexation to keep out other powers.¹ But Kimberley took no decision on New Guinea, which, along with Fiji, Rotuma and Samoa, was one of the subjects which were left for Carnarvon in 1874.

The most serious aspect of the South Pacific frontier problem beside Fiji was New Zealand's designs on Samoa. In fact restraint of Julius Vogel, the New Zealand Prime Minister, was one of the last acts of the Gladstone Government in 1874.

The Samoan (Navigator) Islands lie about Latitude 14° South and Longitude 171° East, roughly 600 miles north-east of Fiji. From the arrival of John Williams, the L.M.S. missionary, in 1830 until the 1850's British influence predominated; a Consul was appointed in 1845, and Williams's son, John C. Williams, acted as the U.S. Consul from 1839.² British missionary influence continued, but trade in Samoa gradually became dominated by the Hamburg firm of J.C. Godeffroy, which established its copra trade Agency at Apia in 1857.³

In 1864 Theodore Weber became Godeffroy's Agent, as well as Consul for Hamburg and the North German Confederation, and while building up a remarkably efficient and widespread commercial empire in the Pacific, it seems that he began purchasing land in the late 1860's for planting a German colony in Samoa. The senior partner of Godeffroy's in Hamburg had been a friend of Bismarck's and official support was said to be forthcoming. The warship Hertha was on its way to Samoa, when, after it had called at Singapore in 1870, it was recalled because of the Franco-Prussian War.⁴ German warships returned to the Pacific after the war, but Bismarck held back from colonial ventures and ordered Weber to cultivate

1. Discussed below pp. 370-383.

2. Masterman, International Rivalry in Samoa, pp. 59, 29-44, 56.

3. Townshend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, pp. 40-41.

4. Ibid. p. 67. H.S. Cooper, Coral Lands, II, pp. 55-58.

good relations with the Americans in Samoa.¹

The United States interest came from three sources. Firstly, Henry Pierce, the Minister Resident in Hawaii, advocated the acquisition of bases in the Pacific-Hawaii in the North, and Samoa (strategically placed on the routes to the isthmus of Panama) in the South.² Secondly, the New York shipping magnate, W.H.Webb,³ wanted a coaling station for his trans-Pacific steamer line, and thirdly, some Californian land speculators invested in Samoa. When Webb failed to get a subsidy for his steamers from the U.S. Government, Julius Vogel arranged for the New Zealand Government to subsidize the service, and in May 1871 the first mail steamer of the new line reached Auckland from San Francisco.⁴ Because of his interest in a coaling station in the South Pacific, Webb sent Captain Wakeman to report on Samoa. The latter visited the islands in July 1871 and reported, in often-quoted words, that Pago Pago was the "most perfectly land-locked harbour in the Pacific". He also warned his employer of Weber's plans,⁵ and Webb sent this report both to the State Department and to Vogel.

Thus, early in 1872, three different streams of national aspirations (albeit aspirations fostered in the main by individuals rather than by governments) converged on Samoa. In November 1871 the New Zealand Government proposed that Samoa be placed under New Zealand, following the precedent of the protectorate adjoining the Cape, in order to forestall the U.S.A. and Germany. Kimberley

1. Townshend, op. cit. p. 56.

2. Ryden, U.S. policy in Samoa, p. 49. The author suggests that the U.S. Navy Dept. was seriously concerned about Pacific bases in the early 1870's, but that Congress was opposed.

3. Ibid. p. 45. William H.Webb had been building ships since the 1850's, and built warships for the Union during the Civil War. Interested in the Pacific guano business and isthmian transit routes; President of the N.American Shipping Co.

4. Vogel signed the agreement in New York 7.iii.1871. Named the "U.S., N.Z., & Australia Mail Steamship Line", it provided a 28 day interval service between Auckland and San Francisco. N.Z. paid £50,000 for 13 complete services, plus free mail transit. (Bowen to Kimberley 20.iv.1871. CO/209/221.) It failed, 1873.

5. Ryden, op. cit. pp. 50-52.

refused, but early in 1872 New Zealand sent William Seed to report on Samoa.¹ For the United States, Commander Meade (unauthorised by Washington) negotiated a treaty with Chief Mauga securing exclusive rights to Pago Pago harbour as a Naval Base and coaling station.² Two weeks after this Weber arrived on the scene in the warship Nymphe, which was visiting the South Seas, and he protested about the Meade treaty.³ All these aspirations came to nought; the Senate sat on Meade's treaty, Downing Street refused Vogel's scheme, and Weber received no support from Bismarck.

The American interests, however, appeared to contemporaries to be more persistent, for soon after Meade's treaty, James Stewart of the Central Polynesia Land and Commercial Company of San Francisco bought 300,000 acres of land in Samoa for cotton growing.⁴ Stewart was entrusted with a petition for the U.S. Government requesting annexation, and although President Grant refused,⁵ in March 1873 he appointed the notorious Colonel Steinberger as Special Commissioner of the United States President to Samoa. After visiting the islands Steinberger returned to the U.S.A. in December 1873 to tell Grant that Samoa wanted American protection. His subsequent activities, and shortlived regime in Samoa as Prime Minister, his deportation in a British warship and disavowal by the American Government have been described elsewhere.⁶ His importance for the London argument lies in the

1. William Seed, inspector of Customs, was sent to Samoa, N.Caledonia and Fiji ostensibly to report on prospects for N.Z. trade. (Vogel Memo. 23.xii.1871 in Bowen to Kimberley 5.i.1872. CO/209/226.)

2. Ryden, op. cit. pp. 55-62, makes a careful reconstruction of Meade's orders. Webb had sent Wakeman's report to Sec. of State Fish, who received at the same time a report of Weber's activities from the U.S. Consul. Fish was generally sympathetic to Webb. Three ships of the Pacific Squadron were cruising in the Pacific in 1870-71 to protect American commerce. Meade's orders from the Navy Dept. were obscure, but Pierce, the Min-Resident at Honolulu, provided the interpretation on which Meade's action in Samoa was based: "In my view of the future domination of the U.States in the North and South Pacific Ocean, it is very important that the Navigator islands should be under American control - ruling through the native authorities".

3. Ibid. p.70. Cf. Sunday Morning Chronicle, Washington 2.vi.1872 clipping in FO. to CO. 22.vi.1872. CO/309/107. This was the news K-Hugessen read before the Fiji debate. See above p. 264.

4. FO. to CO. 21.ii.1873. CO/209/231.

5. Masterman pp. 114-115 & Ryden pp. 83-84.

6. Ryden, pp. 85-147.

excitement his mission caused in New Zealand.

As Steinberger approached Samoa, Sir James Fergusen, the Governor of New Zealand, informed Kimberley that Vogel, the Prime Minister, again called on the imperial government to forstall the U.S.A. and Germany in Samoa.¹ Both Fergusen and Vogel told Goodenough of their schemes for Samoa and Fiji.² In the Colonial Office, Holland thought that in view of the New South Wales plan for Fiji, this New Zealand plan for Samoa was reasonable. But Herbert pointed out that Samoa was rather further from New Zealand than Fiji was from Sydney, and that there were no British settlers in Samoa. "Mr. Vogel is everything just now", he said, "and this is one of his wild schemes".³ Kimberley (only a few months after the long Fiji battle) completely rejected Vogel's plan.

"I am entirely opposed to the annexation of these islands or meddling in their affairs. It might be judicious to obtain a treaty granting equal advantages to British subjects trading with the Navigator Islands, but the present moment seems unfavourable for such rash actions as might lead to a controversy with the United States. Considering the number of the points in the world which we have annexed, we cannot object to other maritime powers seeking stations of their own. If we multiply our stations too much we really weaken ourselves by multiplying the points open to attack beyond our power to defend".⁴

Knatchbull-Hugessen agreed; he preferred Fiji to Samoa, but he pointed out that a flat refusal was hardly consistent with the New South Wales plan for Fiji.⁵ Nevertheless, the refusal went to telegraph on October 14, 1873.

The New Zealanders were not deterred, and two far reaching plans reached the Colonial Office on 22 December 1873, both supported by Governor Fergusen. Firstly Vogel insisted that a decision on Fiji in isolation was inadequate; a policy for all Polynesia was wanted. If there was to be expansion, it should be comprehensive, not a last minute international scramble. Either there should be a joint protectorate with Germany, the U.S.A., France and Holland, or Britain

1. Fergusen to Kimberley 1.viii.1873. CO/209/230.

2. Goodenough's Journal, I, 29.ix.1873.

3. Min. by Herbert 3.x.1873 on Fergusen to Kimberley 1.viii.1873. CO/209/230.

4. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 5.x.1873.

5. Ibid. Min. by K-Hugessen 10.x.1873.

should take everything. If this was done, then Vogel pleaded that "local efforts to maintain peaceful relations with uncivilized races are far more successful than those directed by a distant power".¹ To this the Governor (who had just heard that New South Wales was demanding the annexation of Fiji) added the pertinent fact that a clash between the Fiji Government and the settlers was only being prevented by the presence ("anomalous interference") of British warships. Fergusson drew the imperial government's attention to Tonga and Samoa, as well as Fiji, and he suggested government by Residents as in the Indian States, or making the islands provinces of New Zealand.² Herbert said Vogel's ideas were 'foolish' and 'impudent', and Kimberley agreed.³ The second suggestion, from Mr. Coleman Phillip, an English lawyer who had been involved in the founding of the Bank of Fiji, was for a sort of East India Company to secure dominion over the South Pacific. Herbert thought that this idea was more useful, but Kimberley did not like the look of it.⁴ In January 1874 both ideas were put to the Cabinet.

Kimberley sent the New Zealand schemes to Gladstone on 24 January 1874, commenting that they were "most extravagant",⁵ but on the day before the Cabinet considered them, much fuller plans for a chartered company arrived. Governor Fergusson still supported Vogel, who had obviously adopted the Phillip scheme. A South Pacific Trading Company would be guaranteed by the New Zealand Government. "The ultimate object which I have in view is the establishment of the Polynesian islands as one Dominion, like Canada, to be a British dependency".⁶ Herbert was furious; Vogel, he said, was "the most audacious adventurer that perhaps has ever held power in a British Colony", and he regretted that the Governor supported him.⁷

1. Vogel Memo. 17.x.1873 in Fergusson to Kimberley 22.x.1873. CO/209/230.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Mins. 24 & 28. xii.1873.

4. Mins. 22 & 23. xii.1873 on Fergusson to Kimberley 23.x.1873. CO/209/230.

5. Kimberley to Gladstone 24.i.1874. Gladstone Papers 44225/138.

6. Vogel Memo. 23.xi.1873 in Fergusson to Kimberley 24.xi.1873. CO/209/230.

7. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 26.i.1874.

But Fergusson did not like being a governor; as an ex-Tory MP. and Under-secretary in the India Office he missed parliamentary life,¹ and doubtless the visionary Prime Minister added interest to his exile.²

The Cabinet considered the replies they would give to New Zealand on 27 January 1874.³ But the results of their discussion are not truly represented in the short negative reply which went on 10 February. In view of the political situation in England (a week later the Government resigned) the Pacific Trading Company scheme was left for the next Government, as was Fiji.

The unsent draft certainly declined to extend British power in the Pacific, but Vogel's claim that local efforts in relations with aboriginal peoples were more successful than metropolitan efforts was conceded. The Government was "quite ready to consider any plan which may be formed in New Zealand for the purpose of directing such local efforts to the establishment of closer relations with the uncivilized races of Polynesia beyond the limits of the colony".⁴ Moreover, this sober approach to the frontier problem was not Kimberley's, it came from none other than Gladstone. He found Vogel's memorandum "extremely crude", but the idea about local expertise was "one piece of sound doctrine". "And singular to say", went on the Prime Minister, "the memorandum seems to partake of the nature of a retraction as to New Zealand of the contemptuous answer received from (I think) New South Wales to our observation that they might if they pleased frame for consideration a plan for annexing or governing Fiji".⁵ Thus the Prime Minister who so objected to imperial involvements, fully supported Vogel's views about 'local efforts', and he was prepared to consider plans. This has prompted one historian to surmise that had Gladstone not fallen from power Vogel's Pacific

1. Goodenough's Journal, I, 28.ix.1873.

2. See A. Ross, New Zealand aspirations in the Pacific, (PhD. thesis Cambridge 1949) pp. 400-402 for criticism of historians who accept Herbert's view of Vogel.

3. Cabinet Minute 27.i.1874. Gladstone Papers 44641/255.

4. Kimberley's addition to second draft after Fergusson to Kimberley 22.x.1873. CO/209/230.

5. Gladstone to Kimberley 24.i.1874. Quoted in Ross, op. cit. p. 159, fn. 72.

plans might possibly have been successful,¹ just as Kimberley and Knatchbull-Hugessen both surmised that they would have annexed Fiji. It may even be that Kimberley, having won the lengthy Fiji battle, gave-up on the wider problem of the Pacific frontier just as Gladstone became aware of it, in the same way that Knatchbull-Hugessen had seemed to capitulate over Ashanti and Fiji just as Kimberley took a decided stand. Pioneers or fanatical protagonists frequently give up the cause; but often after inspiring others to go much further than they would.

Yet this still-born policy of Gladstone's for the South Pacific was really quite consistent with imperial policy elsewhere.² Possibly Gladstone saw in Vogel's scheme a way of avoiding in the Pacific an 'Imperial Factor' which proved so costly in South Africa. But it was too late, and this frontier problem was only another unsettled matter left for Carnarvon to face in February 1874. The three themes which have been woven together in this chapter - Fiji, kidnapping and expansion - had given increasing trouble to Gladstone's Government. In each case a policy was all but formed: the way was paved for the annexation of Fiji, the results of the 1872 Kidnapping Act were being watched, expansion by Britain was denied, but the door was not closed to local action. The Liberal Ministry had moved away from the non-interventionist notions of the 1860's. The target of Crystal Palace had really disappeared. But the final decisions had not been taken; these were left for Disraeli's Government.

1. Ibid. loc. cit.

2. One of London's few consistent policies seems to have been that annexations ought to be made by the 'colonial imperialists' who wished expansion on the imperial government. Eg. the Cape - Griqualand West; Natal - Basutoland; NSW. - New Guinea and Fiji. Thus, in this context, 'N.Z. - Polynesia' seemed quite logical. Ross, p. 159, treats Vogel's expansionist ambitions and the trading company scheme separately, and so misses the full force of the Gladstone letter he quotes. But both matters reached London together (Dec. 22) and they both went to the Cabinet. Gladstone (as noted above) was prepared to listen to plans for 'local efforts', and possibly the Trading Company would have fitted this. Herbert was favourable at first and Gladstone showed no hostility. When the details of the Company scheme arrived, in time for the Cabinet, but after Gladstone and Kimberley's exchange of views, Gladstone simply noted: "the proposal is more enlarged - a joint stock company". Gladstone Papers, 44641/255.

Chapter 5.THE NEW EXPERIMENTS IN THE GOLD COAST, MALAYA AND FIJI,
AND CARNARVON'S PREVENTION OF FURTHER EXPANSION, 1874-76.

Lord Carnarvon became Colonial Secretary in Disraeli's Government on 21 February 1874, and within a matter of days he was faced with the frontier problems for which Kimberley had mooted new policies, but had not made final decisions. He discovered that in Fiji Commodore Goodenough was obviously biased towards annexation, therefore on 23 February he cautioned the Commissioner by telegram. He learnt of Vogel's Pacific dreams and of the activities of President Grant's agent in Samoa on 25 February. Next day the telegram announcing Wolseley's entry into Kumasi arrived; and also on the 26th Seymour Clarke, having heard of the Pangkor Engagement, tried to get a word of approval from Carnarvon for the Selangor Tin Company. Therefore after only a week in office Carnarvon was well aware of the delicate decisions which faced him concerning the frontier in West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific.

Although five years younger than Kimberley, Carnarvon had had much more experience in colonial affairs. As Parliamentary Under-secretary in the Colonial Office in Derby's 1858 Government, and Secretary of State from June 1866 to March 1867, he was already acquainted with the three regions over which he was called to decide. His 1858 memorandum had been a land-mark in the Gold Coast policy. He had sympathised, on similar moral grounds, with the request for annexation by Fiji in 1859. He had been prepared to accept Sarawak from Raja Brooke, and he had contemplated a South-east Asian empire to be called the 'Borneo Settlements' and based on Singapore, as a link between India and Australia.¹ He had been aware of the controversy with the Treasury over the transfer of the Straits Settlements

1. In 1858, according to Memo. by A.S.Green, 22.ix.1874. FO/58/145 p. 268.

from India to the Colonial Office; a matter completed by his successor Buckingham in 1867. He was familiar with the Office, familiar with the problems under discussion, and now his way was made smoother since Robert Herbert, the Permanent Under-secretary, was a relative and had also been Carnarvon's school friend at Eton and his Oxford contemporary.

Carnarvon appeared to have completed his policies for the three areas by October 1874 and gained the plaudits of party and the press. But his attention was not given equally to each case, and none of the three were so large as the South African problem. The Gold Coast policy was treated with urgency, received much study, and with keen co-operation from the governor was virtually completed by October. The Commission's report from Fiji did not arrive until 10 June 1874 and as the islands were annexed - without a Cabinet discussion - before the autumn, Disraeli's surprised pleasure is understandable. But in the Pacific Carnarvon would not move beyond Fiji. Treating the new annexation as an experiment in the administration of a Pacific island, he met further problems with the Western Pacific High Commission, and instrument which fell short of assuming sovereignty and providing government. Malaya received scant attention from Carnarvon in 1874. Sir Andrew Clarke's reports on the Pangkor conference were not treated urgently, and when the policy of placing Residents to advise certain Malay rulers was approved in September 1874, Carnarvon made it clear that he regarded the new departure as another experiment. In Perak the experiment failed initially, and one suspects that it was only after the murder of the Resident in 1875 that Carnarvon gave serious thought to the Malay Peninsula.

Carnarvon's solutions in the Gold Coast, Malaya and Fiji were those which Kimberley had already considered. There is no evidence that Carnarvon took office with notions of imperial expansion in mind; his imperialism took the shape of a belief in co-operation between the self-governing colonies and his tenet that

colonial affairs was the "greatest of all political questions"¹ was hardly different from Kimberley's confession to Gladstone that he took a more sanguine view of "the power and influence of this country than you do".²

Yet one senses that Carnarvon was more imaginative than Kimberley, that in 1874 he handled problems and personalities with more finesse. Perhaps this impression is gained simply because Kimberley's period was one for the realisation of the frontier problem and the investigation of possible courses of action. Carnarvon took office after the immediate crises had been met, and with the spadework done, he was not worn out by its details and could look ahead. How he did this, and with what effect, must now be examined.

The Gold Coast Protectorate after the Ashanti War.

Assuming office five days before the arrival of the news of Wolseley's entry of Kumasi,³ Carnarvon first of all decided he could do nothing but accept the Ashanti War. Disraeli and the Cabinet wanted to make political capital out of it, and Carnarvon indeed produced privately an impressive list of mistakes by the Gladstone Government, which, he thought, had "run the expedition too fine in time and men".⁴ But Carnarvon warned Disraeli against an attempt to discredit the Liberals.

"There is no question in my mind", he wrote to Disraeli, "that the Ashanti have been for a considerable time preparing to invade us and that it has been an invasion of the British territory quite as much as of the protectorate. I should... prefer to accept the fact of the war and, unless we are attacked (which is most unlikely) treat it as a transaction for which we are not responsible, but which... we are determined to make the best of".⁵

Of the conduct of the military expedition Carnarvon found "more to praise than to blame", and Wolseley basked in glory, even Glover got a knighthood. Militarily,

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1. Carnarvon to K-Hugessen 18.viii.1874 (copy), Carnarvon Papers. PRO.30/6/44, p. 145.
 2. Kimberley to Gladstone 26.xi.1873. Gladstone Papers, 44225/10.
 3. Wolseley to Kimberley 5.ii.1874 (tg) rec'd 26.ii.1874. CO/806/4 p. 14.
 4. Undated memorandum. PRO.30/6/85.
 5. Carnarvon to Disraeli 6.iii.1874 (copy). PRO.30/6/11 p. 3.

it had appeared neat, effective and a fitting exercise for Cardwell's re-organised War Office.

Wolseley had been determined to get his march to Kumasi, and although the invasion of Ashanti had not been the "child's play" he expected, and he did not dictate a new treaty to the Asantehene in his own capital, everything went pretty much according to the plan which Wolseley had first made in London about July 1873. The only hitch in his plans was the failure of the African levies; but although his official despatches continually described them as "utterly useless" in tones of hurt disappointment, it has already been argued that Wolseley did not expect anything better.¹ In many ways the campaign was a model. It was short, since all the British troops had to be away by March at the latest because of the rains. In this way the scandalous loss of life, attributed to the climate, as in 1864 was avoided. Administrative arrangements worked smoothly for once, and the senior Medical Officer (who Cardwell greatly praised) could find no defect in the War Office's support.² A field telegraph worked admirably from the front.

At forty Wolseley was the oldest officer in the campaign and his staff, drawn for the first time from the Staff College, was composed of some young men of brilliant promise. One rushed home from Canada, uninvited, in order not to miss the fray.³ Foremost among them was Colley - "the ablest officer then in our army"⁴ - who raced back from the Carpathians and resigned a Professorship at the Staff College,⁵ in order to accompany Wolseley as transport organiser. Redvers Buller was in charge of Intelligence; Lieut. Frederick Maurice, the commander's private secretary, received his first experience of fire. By proving that English troops could fight in tropical Africa they laid the bogey of 1864, and military

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1. See above p. 127-8. Wolseley failed to recruit sufficient carriers for his Brit. force so one whole Battalion (the 23rd) was not committed and re-embarked.
 2. Cardwell to Northcote, quoted in R. Biddulph, Lord Cardwell at the War Office, (1904) p. 234.
 3. W.F. (later Lt-Gen. Sir Wm.) Butler, Akim-Foo: the History of a Failure, pp. 3-5.
 4. Wolseley, Soldier's Life, II, p. 276.
 5. T.H.S. Escott, Pillars of the Empire, p. 47.

historians might regard the campaign as a training exercise for an important section of the British military leadership of the late nineteenth century.

Before the British troops arrived on 10 December 1873 all Wolseley could do was restore British prestige in the Protectorate, making the best use of the African forces he could raise, and to press forward the preparations for the reception of the British troops. The Ashanti army began to fall back from Mampon when Wolseley arrived himself at the beginning of October 1873, so he posted a detachment of Hausas under Col. Festing to harass their rear. When the Ashantis hastily crossed the Pra on 29 November, Wolseley's first object was achieved; had a peace treaty been made then, Gladstone would have been satisfied. But Wolseley received no answer to his terms. Letters addressed to the Asantehene on 14 October offering a peace treaty on the condition that the Ashantis left the Protectorate by 12 November, handed over prisoners, including the German missionaries, and paid compensation, were not answered until Wolseley was actually in Ashanti territory. So Wolseley pressed on with his preparations. As the Ashantis retreated Col. Festing pursued, and a road was pushed northwards so the British troops would be able to make haste to the Pra. The African levies were organised into irregular units under British officers - "Wood's Regt.",¹ "Russell's Regt.",² and "Rait's Artillery" - and they were gradually committed to help Festing at the head of the road to the Pra.

All was ready for the invasion of Ashanti at the end of 1873. The British troops were to be kept at sea until 1 January 1874; they would then march along the prepared road, sleeping overnight in prepared camps, so they would be fresh to cross the Pra on 15 January. Wolseley had no intention of crushing the Ashanti

1. Commander was later Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood VC.

2. Commander later Lieut-General Sir Baker Russell.

nation, which he probably came to regard more highly than his Fante allies.¹

A few battles in the Adansi Hills, he thought, would bring the Asantehene suing for peace.² The plan involved four lines of advance to cross on 15 January: the main force to follow the Prasu-Kumasi road; Captain Glover to operate in the East towards Juaben, and between them Captain Butler to lead a force of Western Akims. In the West, Captain Dalrymple was to move along the 'Wassaw Path' with a force of Wassaws, Tchufuls and Kommendahs.³

On the eve of the attack, just as Wolseley reached the front in late December 1873, letters from the Asantehene addressed to Harley claimed that Ashanti had no quarrell with the British, that they demanded only the allegiance of Assin and Denkyera.⁴ With Lord Gifford's scouts already 13 miles inside Ashanti territory North of the Pra, Wolseley warned the Asantehene that the invasion was under way. The terms for peace were now more specific: the release of prisoners, an indemnity of 50,000 oz. of gold dust, and a new treaty to be signed by Wolseley in Kumasi.⁵ The Asantehene was prepared to accept this and he replied by sending the missionary Johannes Kuehne with a message begging Wolseley to stop, and saying that Amankw Tia had not been authorised to attack the British forts. But Wolseley demanded all the European and African prisoners from the Protectorate,⁶ and he pressed his advance to Fomana, the Adansi capital. Here he received another letter from Kumasi; the remaining missionaries were released (Kofi Kari Kari himself paying Adu Bofo his £1000), and Amankwa Tia was ordered to pay the indemnity - now would Wolseley stop ?

But the General would not be cheated out of Kumasi. He told the Asantehene that he intended to enter the city, it was up to Kofi Kari Kari whether he arrived

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1. Wolseley to Biddulph 26.x.1873. Private. Extract in Kimberley Papers. A/22.
 2. Ibid. Wolseley to Cardwell 11.xii.1873. Private (copy).
 3. Chief of Staff to Glover 31.xii.1873. CO/806/2 p. 97.
 4. Kofi Kari Kari to Harley 25 & 26.xi.1873. Ibid. pp. 98-99.
 5. Wolseley to Kofi Kari Kari 2.i.1874. Ibid. pp. 103-4.
 6. Kofi to Wolseley 9.i.1874 & Wolseley to Kofi 13.i.1874. CO/806/4 pp. 6-7.

as friend or conquerer. If all the Protectorate prisoners were delivered, half the indemnity paid, and hostages, including the heir to the Asantehene, the Queen Mother, and the heirs to the four leading Ashanti kings sent, Wolseley would go to Kumasi with an escort of 500 men to sign the treaty. Ward says these were impossible conditions;¹ thus the Ashanti decided to stand and fight at Amoaful. Receiving no satisfaction after a halt of four days at Fomana, Wolseley sent an ultimatum to Kofi Kari Kari on 29 January 1874. On the same day the battle began.

The Battle of Amoaful dashed Wolseley's illusion of 'child's play'. It took the Black Watch four hours to take the town and the Ashantis kept up fire from the flanks all the time. But by hard fighting Wolseley reached the River Oda on 3 February. Here messengers from Kumasi confirmed that the Asantehene accepted the General's terms. Nothing, however, would now keep Wolseley from Kumasi; he was in no mood to trust the Asantehene, and he was anxious about getting back to the coast before the rains began in earnest. He informed Kofi Kari Kari that he would wait on the Oda that night for the hostages (and, incidentally, to build a bridge). After a stormy night, which drenched his troops, Wolseley waited for two hours of daylight on 4 February, and then resumed the attack. At 9 am. the Rifles took Odahsu, where they were held up for hours; finally the Black Watch, bagpipes playing, burst through the resistance and rushed to Kumasi. At six pm. on 4 February the weary troops paraded in the Ashanti capital and cheered the Queen. Wolseley had achieved his ambition.

He had not fulfilled his mission. The Asantehene had fled and did not answer a summons to sign a treaty; like Napoleon at Moscow, Wolseley waited for negotiators who did not materialise, while Ashanti messengers were caught sneaking arms, while Fante allies began looting, and while reports arrived that the rivers on the route back were rising. On the evening of the 5th he decided to destroy

1. Ward, History of the Gold Coast, p. 273.

Kumasi and quit. The Palace was blown up next day, the town was fired, and the withdrawal began covered by the Black Watch. And only just in time, for the bridge over the Oda collapsed before the last British troops had crossed and they had to undress and wade.

The march to Kumasi had its desired effect. Close on Wolseley's heels Glover's party passed through Kumasi from the North-east on 12 February, and the Asantehene decided to accept the General's terms. Ashanti envoys overtook the main British column at Fomana on 13 February, with the first instalment of the indemnity. Wolseley sent off his draft treaty (which took its name from the spot) and made haste to the coast. By 23 February the last British units had embarked for home.

Butler's and Dalrymple's supporting attacks were less successful; the former failed to persuade any of his small force to enter Ashanti territory, and Butler's Akims fled before Amoaful, but both diversions drew off some Ashanti forces. Captain Glover, in spite of Wolseley's contention that he was a failure and innumerable difficulties, was fairly successful. It will be remembered that Glover found that the Eastern districts of the Protectorate would not help him against Ashanti until he had suppressed the Awuna and their allies the Akwamu, who had assisted Ashanti in 1869 and were now threatening Ada again. Therefore Glover prepared to attack Awuna early in December 1873. Planning to cross the Volta from Mlefi and destroy the Awuna towns North of the lagoon, he then intended to send Lieut. Goldsworthy, a former Indian officer who had been Glover's right hand man at Lagos, southwards to the sea, while he would move North himself against Akwamu, and then collect his Akwapim, Krobo and Eastern Akim allies for the attack on Ashanti.

However, just as Glover was about to begin his campaign Wolseley ordered him to be on the Pra on 15 January. Protesting that with the Awuna and Akwamu

unsubdued his flank was unsafe, Glover pleaded that given only two days of successful operations across the Volta he could have a force, flush with victory, on the Pra by 1 February. But Wolseley insisted that Glover (even with only a small force) would have to be on the Pra by 15 January, to threaten Juaben, second town of the Ashanti Confederacy.¹ One senses that after all Glover's efforts and promises of a large force, Wolseley was rather pleased that Glover seemed to have failed.² If this may be true, Glover surprised him, for his protest came only after he had accepted Wolseley's order in good part and had submitted his plans to cross the Pra on time, and push forward to Juaben, twenty miles North-east of Kumasi.³ In fact to make sure that Glover would not steal his glory Wolseley ordered him not to move West of Juaben without further orders.⁴

So Glover dropped his Awuna war after shelling some villages on 23 December, and concentrated on moving to the Pra. Running the gauntlet part of the way up the Volta in canoes, he went via Odumasi (2 January) Akropong (6 January), to cross the Pra on 15 January as ordered, although he had only 700 Hausas out of his promised force of 16,000. By the end of January he was half way to Juaben when he was held up at the River Anum. Here he awaited Wolseley's orders which never arrived, so he pressed on. Captain Sartorius crossed the Anum on 2 February and Glover, now joined by his re-inforcements from Akim, Akwapim and Krobo, reached the deserted town of Juaben. Sending Sartorius ahead to catch Wolseley's column, Glover pushed on through smouldering Kumasi on 12 February. Next day Sartorius met Wolseley at Fomana, and Glover followed the General down the road to the coast. Augustus Hemming, of the Colonial Office, was right when he wrote, "Capt. Glover seems to have got on wonderfully well, considering the difficulties he has

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1. Wolseley to Edmund Wodehouse 31.xii.1873. Private (copy). Gladstone Papers, 44225/142.
 2. See Wolseley to Kimberley 1.i.1874. CO/806/2 p. 92.
 3. Glover replied to the orders on 14 Dec. His 'protest' was dated 28 Dec., and was probably his excuse for the small force he now realised would reach the Pra.
 4. Chief of Staff to Glover 31.xii.1873. CO/806/2 p. 97.

had to contend with".¹

The new treaty was signed by the Administrator at Cape Coast Castle on 14 March, after Wolseley had left; known as the Treaty of Fomana it replaced the 1831 Treaty as the basis of British relations with Ashanti. The Asantehene agreed to the indemnity of 50,000 oz. of Gold, and he withdrew some of his forces who still lingered in the Western Protectorate. He renounced all allegiance from Denkyera, Assin and Akim, and (this was new) from Adansi. He also renounced any claim to Elmina or to payments by the British for the forts. Both sides pledged themselves to keep trade routes open and Ashanti undertook to keep the Prasu-Kumasi road in good order. In accordance with Queen Victoria's wish the Asantehene said he would try to stop human sacrifices, but this would be difficult for the Ashanti ruler to keep. Otherwise, apart from the final securing of Elmina and the removal of doubts about Denkyera, Assin and Akim, the only new departure was the inclusion of Adansi, which had requested to join the Protectorate.² Here was a precedent for the secession of Ashanti States and the break-up of the Kingdom. Wolseley had deliberately hastened from the scene to avoid such political complications which might have detracted from his success. It was no part of British policy to destroy Ashanti. What was wanted, as Gladstone had seen clearly, was peaceful relations.

Although Carnarvon decided not to make political capital out of the war, he was uncertain what to do about the Gold Coast Protectorate. He warned the Cabinet to be cautious in attacking the Liberals over the war as they would themselves face tricky questions as to future policy on the Gold Coast.³ In fact Carnarvon faced precisely the same dilemma as Kimberley had just before the Ashanti invasion in 1873. Should they leave the Gold Coast (a solution which Kimberley had rejected

1. Min. by Hemming 7.iii.1874 on Wolseley to Kimberley P.ii.1874. CO/96/111.

2. Text in Crooks, Records, pp. 521-3.

3. Carnarvon to Disraeli 6.iii.1874. PRO.30/6/11 p. 3.

early in 1873) or remaining, should they strengthen the basis of British rule? In March 1874 a careful study was made in the Colonial Office. The dilemma was clearly stated in April when Mr. Fitzgerald, Editor of the West African Herald, suggested a bold, if rather vague, programme of public works, health improvement and education.

"It is difficult to see how any half measures with regard to the Government of the Protectorate can be made to suffice", wrote Herbert, "Unless we directly govern up to the Prah, we can have no guarantee against wars and disturbances. I am not at all sure that the annexation of the whole Protectorate (which I look upon with horror) is not the only cheap and safe alternative to retirement from the coast except perhaps one or two naval depots".

"Complete annexation or total abandonment are I fear the only alternatives", agreed Lowther, "The former is too ghastly to contemplate, the latter too charming of execution. All these tentative half measures such as Protectorates etc may do for a time & I suppose something of the kind will have to be attempted until the vulgar prejudice which is now a days dignified by the name of 'Public Opinion' veers round to a common sense and unsentimental view of the question".

"A very evil choice to have to make", said Carnarvon,¹ who sketched the alternatives for himself in rather more imaginative terms.

1. Abandonment of the Coast.
Consular Govt on Coast & resid^t at Coomassie.
2. Transference to a Company.
Tho' formerly done, time passed for this. Practical difficulties in creating a monopoly. Abuses wd. grow up & Govt wd. be held responsible.
3. Fanti or other Confedⁿ.
such as Ld. Grey proposed - impracticable.
4. Direct Govt - Anglo-Indian plan - resid^t at Coomassie. Coomassie burnt.
It wd. increase probable obligations & connections.
5. Actual annexⁿ & Govt. of territory".²

As he weighed these alternatives he received plenty of advice. He discussed whether experience in Burma would be helpful with Sir Arthur Phayre and Col. Yule.³ Col. Harley, the former Administrator on the Gold Coast, said enough

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1. Mins. by Herbert (17th), Lowther (20th) & Carnarvon 21.iv.1874 on Fitzgerald to Carnarvon 13.iv.1874. CO/96/114.
 2. Undated memo. PRO.30/6/85. A note was added "See 4. form suggested in Fiji".
 3. Memo. on the meeting, undated in PRO.30/6/85.

sacrifice had been made on behalf of the Fante; they should be taught reliance in thorough fashion by the abolition of domestic slavery on the coast.¹ Bright pleaded for a complete withdrawal, Gladstone for friendship with Ashanti,² and Earl Grey, the former Colonial Secretary, proposed a 'real' protectorate like the system when the Ionian Islands were under British protection. British territory on the Gold Coast would still have to be limited to the forts, he said, because of domestic slavery. Outside of them the aim should be to create African States, possibly building on the old Fante Confederation idea. Britain would protect these States, and govern them through a High Commissioner who would exercise authority on behalf of the States.³

Gradually it emerged that the small body of opinion interested in West Africa would not support a withdrawal from the coast. In the House of Commons Mr. Hanbury said on 27 April,

"we ought simply to act the part of policeman there, and let things take their natural course, giving the people an opportunity of learning the arts of peace, and educating them, so that the superior members of their race might administer side by side with us".⁴

In a long debate on 4 May 1874 Arthur Mills said Britain could not honourably leave the coast. Knatchbull-Hugessen defended Kimberley's policy, but pleaded that such colonial matters should be beyond party strife⁵ - a sentiment which Carnarvon would heartily endorse. Disraeli told the House, quite truthfully, that the Government were considering the matter very carefully.

Such public or private expressions of opinion reminded Carnarvon that an obligation was felt by many people towards the Gold Coast. This may have helped him to decide on remaining, but it merely left him asking the same question which had troubled Kimberley in 1873: what should become of the Protectorate? Here the

1. Harley to Carnarvon 11.iii.1874. CO/806/7 p. 34.

2. Daily News clipping, 14.iii.1874 in Carnarvon Papers, PRO.30/6/50 pp. 82-4.

3. The Times 14.iii.1874. See Grey's idea embodied in a draft of a treaty in Grey to Carnarvon 13.v.1874. PRO.30/6/44 p.30.

4. 3 Hansard, cccvix, col. 1212.

5. Ibid. cccviii, cols. 1592-1604.

influence of his permanent officials in the Colonial Office must have weighed heavily. The House of Commons did not become restive until April 1874, but early in March most penetrating researches into the whole basis of British relations with, and jurisdiction on, the Gold Coast were conducted by Augustus Hemming and Edward Fairfield in the Colonial Office. Certain conclusions emerged from their study which almost certainly were the major influence behind Carnarvon's policy.

Firstly, the 1865 resolutions (already rejected by Kimberley) were finally condemned. Like Knatchbull-Hugessen a year before Hemming called them "vague and inconclusive", proclaiming as they did that Britain could not yet withdraw, but fettering the hands of the local government in providing effective rule.¹

Secondly, a clear obligation to protect the coast States against Ashanti emerged, and Cardwell's military policy of 1864 stood condemned alongside the 1865 resolutions. It was realised that no such obligation was written into the 1831 treaty, but apparently there was justification for the coastal African's belief that the British intended to protect them. Maclean had undermined the influence of African authority - the Kings and Chiefs - rendering the coast States less organised to defend themselves. Comparatively secure in Maclean's lifetime since Ashanti respected him, they were told after the 1863 invasion that they would receive no help but ammunition and advice. Thus the policy followed since Cardwell's time had left the States free to provoke Ashanti but implied that no help would be given them if the latter retaliated; whereas Maclean had not permitted unjust wars, but he had aided the coast States when there were attacked. Fairfield insisted that the 1873-74 war did not relieve Britain of the duty of protection:

"The duty arises from the fact that our presence renders the protectorate tribes less able to defend themselves, whilst our peculiar policy has² exposed them to the undying hatred of their most powerful enemies".

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1. Memo: Gold Coast, Enquiry of 1865, by A.W.L.Hemming, March 1874. Confid. Print, Gold Coast No. 50. CO/806/12 p. 16.
 2. Memo: The Origin and Extent of the British obligation towards the Native Tribes on the Gold Coast, by E.Fairfield, 24.iii.1874. G.C.No. 49. CO/806/11. p. 18.

Thirdly, the scheme of West African administrative federation adopted in 1866 was found defective. Ord's advocacy of the idea had been based on his West Indian experience where there was nothing like the vague jurisdiction of the Protectorate. In placing the Gold Coast under a Governor-in-Chief four-and-a-half days away in Freetown, the Government had been blind to the hazard caused by the Protectorate. This made the Gold Coast potentially the most dangerous West African settlement. Much depended on the man on the spot, yet he was not the real authority; the recent war, the Harley-Hennessy trouble, well illustrated the point.¹

Fourthly, the biggest single bar to better government on the Gold Coast was the existence of domestic slavery. If British rule was to be effective, full sovereignty would have to stretch beyond the forts. Successive governments had shrunk from this, not solely because of reluctance to take territory, but because slavery was illegal in a British possession. Yet a close examination of the legal position showed that slavery was very much condoned by British officials on the Gold Coast. Domestic slavery was fully recognised in the Protectorate and dealt with by the Judicial Assessor, an officer of the Crown, although in proven cases of cruelty he had a humanitarian influence. So deeply rooted, however, was domestic slavery, comparatively mild though it was - slaves for instance could own property - that Fairfield suggested it could not be suddenly abolished; anyway, many slaves would not want emancipation. He suggested instead regulations designed to end slavery gradually. Importation of foreign slaves into the Protectorate should be forbidden, slaves should be able to purchase their freedom; pawning of relatives for debt should be stopped, and all children might be declared free. Then said Fairfield, "if the slave population did not emancipate itself under these rules in three generations we should not be at

1. Hemming memo. CO/806/12 pp. 9-10.

fault".¹

Probably influenced most by Fairfield, Carnarvon announced the outlines of his policy to the House of Lords on 12 May 1874. There would be no withdrawal from the Gold Coast, he said. Although no written obligations demanded British presence there, there were, in Carnarvon's view, certainly moral ones. Re-iterating the same views he had propounded as a young Under-secretary in 1858, he said:

"A great nation like ours must be sometimes prepared to discharge disagreeable duties; she must consent to bear the burdens which are inseparable from her greatness... It is certainly not a desire of selfish interests or the ambition of larger empire which bids us remain on the West Coast of Africa; it is simply and solely a sense of obligations to be redeemed and of duties to be performed".²

In the interest of better government he announced five changes. (1) The Gold Coast forts and Lagos were to be united into a single Crown Colony on the model of the Straits Settlements, (2) Better officials would be sought, including a strong governor; tropical pensions would be paid. (3) Either Elmina or Accra would be made the new capital, and possibly a hill station, to provide a West African Simla, would be built. (4) An armed Hausa police force would guard the roads and prevent the Fante from molesting Ashanti traders. (5) Domestic slavery would greatly concern the local government, but Carnarvon promised no sudden emancipation.

Here then was no dramatic reversal of policy. Carnarvon proposed to retain the Protectorate very much as it had existed before the war and to attempt to advance civilization there more by influence than by edict. Nevertheless certain distinct additions were made in 1874 to this modest programme, which profoundly influenced the future of the Gold Coast, and gave the Conservatives in England

1. Memo: Domestic Slavery, the Jurisdiction of the Judicial Assessor and the Legal Character and limitation of British Power upon the Gold Coast, by Fairfield, 19.iii.1874. CO/806/9 p.22.

2. 3 Hansard, ccxix, cols. 157-168.

cause for self-congratulation at the end of year. Embodied in secret instructions to the governor on 20 and 21 August, they have caused more than one historian to say that Britain "annexed" the Protectorate.¹

Firstly, although no new territory was annexed, the Legislative Council of the new Gold Coast Colony (i.e. Lagos and the Gold Coast forts) was empowered to legislate for the Protectorate.² The Queen was proclaimed the sole authority in the Gold Coast. The local government, enlarged to the full crown colony administration, instead of confining itself to judicial and police functions as before, would comprehend civil jurisdiction, health, education, roads, economic development and the regulation of social life. It would be more correct to say therefore that the Protectorate was 'annexed administratively' to the Colony.

Secondly, domestic slavery was formally abolished. Although Carnarvon told Parliament in May that emancipation was impossible, the House of Commons was not satisfied and Northcote predicted a "field day"³ in the House on 29 June, when the Hon. Evelyn Ashley, Liberal member for Poole and son of Lord Shaftesbury the factory reformer, moved a resolution calling for a firm announcement by the government that they would stop slavery on the Gold Coast. The Cabinet met to prepare itself for the test on 27 June, and it required all Disraeli's skill in the debate to prevent a vote. Ashley pointed to the hypocrisy of the Government's position, and claimed that the Protectorate was not annexed simply because they were shirking the slavery problem. If the Russians at Khiva and the British at Zanzibar put pressure on the local rulers to abolish slavery, how could Britain tolerate it on the Gold Coast? Goschen, the former Liberal First Lord, said they should rebut the charges of foreigners who said that Britain only abolished slavery where it suited her interest. The Prime Minister only persuaded Ashley

1. Ward, History, pp. 257-260. J.D.Fage, An Introduction to the History of West Africa (1955) p. 140.

2. Order in Council, 6.viii.1874. Copy in CO/806/19 p.6.

3. Northcote to Carnarvon 27.vi.1874. PRO.30/6/7 p. 23.

to withdraw his resolution by assuring the House that he for his part hoped that slavery would soon be abolished.¹

Disraeli was true to his word. It cannot be directly proved from the records that he made Carnarvon act in the matter, but on 21 August Governor Strahan was told that since the Fante had done little to save themselves in the Ashanti war the Queen was "entitled to require of them a greater degree of deference and conformity to the known desires of herself and her people than formerly".² Carnarvon suggested that the Governor should request the kings and chiefs to cease importing slaves, draw up rules governing the relations of masters and slaves, emancipate the badly treated doncos, i.e. foreign slaves, at once on compensation, and sometime soon to declare all children to be free. Once again Carnarvon's approach was tentative; he ordered the governor to inquire and report. Privately he told him to keep it secret, and he hoped that compensation could be avoided as the revenue would be needed for development.³

But Carnarvon had not bargained on his man. It was Governor George Strahan⁴ who urged abrupt measures against domestic slavery, so providing the Conservatives with an unexpected political windfall, and causing a significant change in African society on the Gold Coast. Strahan took only nine days to answer Carnarvon's despatch; he recommended the immediate prohibition of all slave dealing, the declaration of freedom for all imported slaves and children, and the non-recognition in the Courts of any rights over personal liberty.⁵ In short Strahan proposed the

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1. 3 Hansard, ccxx, cols. 607-641.
 2. Carnarvon to Strahan 21.viii.1874. Secret. CO/806/19 p.8.
 3. Carnarvon to Strahan 3.ix.1874. Private & Confid. (copy). PRO.30/6/24 p. 12.
 4. Captain George C. Strahan joined the R.A. in 1857. He was A.D.C. to Gladstone when he was High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands, 1859, and in Feb. of that year he became A.D.C. to Sir Henry Storks, Gladstone's successor, who became Gov. of Malta in 1864. Strahan went to Malta with him and became Chief Sec. of Malta 1868-69. He was Colonial Sec, Bahamas, 1869 and Acting-Gov. 1871-73. Administrator of Lagos 1873 until appointed Governor of the new Gold Coast Colony, June 1874. Gov. of the Windward Islands 1876.
 5. Strahan to Carnarvon 19.ix.1874. Secret. C.C. No. 60. CO/806/23.

ending by Royal Proclamation of slavery as a legal status on the Gold Coast. Downing Street was taken by surprise, Fairfield being enthusiastic, but Herbert cautious. Yet it was not a hasty proposal. Already since 25 June, when he arrived on the Gold Coast, Strahan had faced the slavery question. When African chiefs appealed to him to recover runaways he made it quite clear that slavery was repugnant to the British Government, that he never wished to hear the word slave mentioned. The local officials had supported him in this, so in part the governor had already been preparing the Gold Coast African for emancipation. Before the Ashanti Kingdom disintegrated and removed the threat to the Protectorate and while British prestige, gained in the war, lasted, Strahan urged that complete abolition was both necessary and possible. As Harley had said, the coastal Africans were already sufficiently compensated by being rescued from Ashanti slavery. Strahan was quite aware of the dangers in so sweeping a change to the African social system; poverty might afflict elderly slaves taken from the support of their masters, enforcement might become necessary, and probably the idlest slaves would demand freedom first and then might form marauding bands. On the other hand it was expected that many slaves would elect to stay with their masters and emancipation would thus be gradual. In fact, if Carnarvon approved, the governor had already called the chiefs to meet him, on 16 October 1874 from the west and on 5 November from the east. To Captain Strahan it was a gamble worth taking.¹

Carnarvon agreed that the stakes were worth playing for. Receiving Strahan's despatch on 15 October he lost no time in making up his mind and two days later, in the same letter in which he announced the annexation of Fiji, he sought Disraeli's permission to take military precautions on the Gold Coast in case

1. Strahan to Carnarvon 20.ix.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/24 p. 15.

trouble attended the announcement of abolition.¹ Disraeli had complete confidence in Carnarvon at this stage, and Carnarvon had a remarkable trust in Captain Strahan. Leaving the final decisions to the governor, he only urged him not to risk a failure which would dash Britain's newly won prestige. If the conferences with the chiefs succeeded, the governor was authorised to proclaim the immediate prohibition of slave dealing. The timing of the actual abolition ordinance was left to Strahan's discretion. Naval support was promised and a wing of the West India Regiment was retained at the Gold Coast; re-inforcements were held at Sierra Leone.² Having passed the real responsibility to Strahan, the Government proceeded to congratulate itself on the risks it had incurred. "It is a masterly, indeed admirable performance", wrote Disraeli, "your conduct of your office cannot be too highly praised".³

Strahan's conferences with the chiefs were successful and the Proclamations were issued without incident. Therefore, although the mild programme announced in May was no panacea, the gamble of October was regarded in England as a great success. One newspaper claimed that such statesmanship had not been seen in the Colonial Office since Earl Grey, that Carnarvon's colonial policy was "spirited and splendid".⁴ This was less than justice to Captain Strahan, whose boldness gave Disraeli's cautious government the credit of the major reform on the Gold Coast. Although the governor's action did not end domestic slavery, which still existed in 1915, when Claridge wrote, it tended to end the internal slave trade and caused domestic slaves to be better treated.⁵

The changes of 1874 - the formal abolition of slavery and the inclusion of

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1. Carnarvon to Disraeli 17.x.1874. (copy) Carnarvon Papers, PRO.30/6/11 p. 26.
 2. Ibid. Carnarvon to Strahan 22.x.1874. Private (copy) PRO.30/6/24 p. 16.
 3. Disraeli to Carnarvon 26.x.1874. Hardinge, Life of Carnarvon, II, p.79.
 4. Northern Echo, 6.i.1875, clipping in PRO.30/6/47 p. 174.
 5. Claridge, Gold Coast and Ashanti, II, 183-4.

the Protectorate in the sphere of the Gold Coast Colony's laws - did not really amount to the 'annexation' of the Protectorate, for the assumption of British sovereignty did not take place until 1901, when Ashanti was also annexed. But though sovereignty was not taken in 1874, the Crown was made the sole authority and thus for many purposes Colony and Protectorate were treated as one, and the general impression was gained that Britain had 'taken over' in the Protectorate. A missionary wrote: "The Gold Coast is now a Colony and not a Protectorate and already the more decisive measures of British rule are making themselves felt".¹ The way was paved for the eventual inclusion of the Protectorate within the British dominions, and the Colonial Office admitted, "we are now, particularly in the Gold Coast, committed to a policy of development and improvement, a policy of real and earnest efforts to raise the natives of our settlements from the slough of ignorance and barbarism... The agents of this policy must be among other things, roads and schools...."²

In practice this fine sounding policy was slow to be implemented, and in part this was because of the British Government's reluctance to go beyond the modest changes of 1874. Need for revenue, however, in the new Gold Coast-Lagos colony (and also in Sierra Leone) caused the local officials to try the policy of 'custom house imperialism', and for this reason the Gambia Exchange was revived between 1874 and 1876. But Carnarvon was reluctant to face parliamentary opposition and the matter was dropped.

French eagerness to obtain the Gambia had in no way slackened and on 11 April 1874 the French Ambassador approached Lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary, who told him the matter would be considered.³ The Foreign Office was quite willing

1. Rev. Penrose to Gen.Secs. 26.iv.1875. Meth. Miss. Soc. Gold Coast Incoming 1875-76 file.

2. Min. by Hemming 14.x.1875 on Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Carnarvon 13.x.1875. CO/87/108.

3. FO. to CO. 27.iv.1874. CO/87/107.

to let the matter proceed, but they decided the Colonial Office should decide as it would "depend entirely" on the future policy on the Gold Coast;¹ thus a delay occurred while Carnarvon made up his mind what to do about the Protectorate. In this way the West Coast of Africa was, momentarily after the Ashanti war, looked at as a whole.

By the end of 1874 the Colonial Office had decided that the Gambia exchange would enable them to solve many of their outstanding problems. The Sierra Leone Government was still worried about the French post at Benty on the Mellacourie and wanted to extend the sphere of the colonial customs for revenue purposes. The Gold Coast Government wanted to stop trade, especially in arms, getting to Ashanti from Grand Bassam and Assini, and it decided also that the territory between Lagos and the Gold Coast should be brought under British influence. Glover's plans for annexing Porto Novo were revived; Fairfield said it would enable Lagos to control the Egba trade and Herbert said it was a "tempting policy".² Carnarvon therefore told Derby that if the exchange was revived and the French gave up their claims South of the River Dembia³ in return for the Gambia there would be no bar to a modest expansion of Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast for fiscal purposes.⁴ Derby agreed, and although he knew the loss of the Gambia would be unpopular he said "after Fiji & the Gold Coast we are not likely to be reproached with a policy of colonial surrender".⁵

On 5 March 1875 the Colonial Office made the definite proposal that the French should give up claims between the Rio Pongo and the River Benin,⁶ and this was accepted by the Cabinet on 17 April.⁷ Derby informed the French Ambassador

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1. Memo. by Wylde 20.iv.1874. FO/27/2226.
 2. Mins. by Fairfield & Herbert 25.viii.1874 on Banners to Carnarvon 20.viii.1874 CO/147/30.
 3. See above pp. 65-70 and maps on pp. 46 & 67.
 4. Carnarvon to Derby 12.xii.1874. (copy). PRO.30/6/8 p. 61.
 5. Ibid. p. 64. Derby to Carnarvon 16.xii.1874.
 6. CO. to FO. 5.iii.1875. FO/27/2226. Carnarvon to Disraeli 13.iv.1875. Disraeli Papers, XII.
 7. Min. by Herbert 21.iv.1875 on FO. to CO. 11.iii.1875. CO/87/108.

on 30 April 1875 (a year after the matter had been raised) that the British Government was now prepared to negotiate; but the Foreign Office did not want to appear too eager.¹ In May Wylde thought that the British sphere should be extended to include the Niger Delta; "though HM Govt. have no intention of occupying any portion of the banks of that river" they did not want them to come under the French.² The proposal which was put to the French Government on 23 July 1875 was for Britain to give up claims North of the Rio Pongo, and for France to surrender claims between the Pongo and the Gaboon.³ The French Ambassador told Carnarvon on 27 July that his Government had agreed, and that as the French Assembly was about to rise the matter was published in France.⁴ But Disraeli did not want to risk opposition in Parliament and, against Carnarvon's advice, the matter was postponed until the next session of Parliament.⁵

This delay enabled the oppositon in both countries to mobilise. From August 1875 to February 1876 the Colonial Office was given evidence of growing opposition, from the Gambia merchants, the missionaries, and the Royal Colonial Institute.⁶ On 2 February 1876 Carnarvon saw the newly formed Gambia Committee, and he also learnt that French officers had been seen at Porto Novo and that it was rumoured that the King of Porto Novo wished for the French protectorate to be revived.

The Colonial Office staff was eager to exclude the French from the regions South of the Pongo as part of the Gold Coast policy. The Ashanti war had brought embarrassing publicity and public surprise that so little had been done to develop

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1. Min. by Tenterden 29.iv.1875 & FO. to Gavard 30.iv.1875.(draft). FO/27/2226.
 2. FO. to CO. 15.v.1875. CO/87/108.
 3. FO. to Fr. Ambass. 23.viii.1875 (draft). FO/27/2226. The Rio Pongo rather than the Dembia was suggested by Sir Arthur Kennedy, who said it would be more in keeping with the divisions of the African communities.
 4. Carnarvon to Disraeli 28.vii.1875. (copy). PRO.30/6/11. p. 81.
 5. Carnarvon to Disraeli 5.viii.1875. Disraeli Papers, XII: "I was anxious if it had been practicable to settle it".
 6. Manchester Chamber of Commerce to CO. 13.x.1875. CO/87/108. R.Colonial Institute to FO. 12.i.1876. FO/27/2227. Gambia missionaries to Gen. Secs. 29.i.1876. Meth. Miss. Soc. Gambia Incoming 1868-76 file.

the West African settlements. Now, said Hemming, an attempt would be made at development, and the opposition of a few Gambia merchants should not be allowed to prevent it.¹ Armed with Hemming's memorandum Carnarvon announced the proposal to the House of Lords on 17 February 1876, when he said the exchange would involve Britain's gaining exclusive rights in the mouth of the Niger.²

When he made this speech he was not aware that on 11 February 1876 the French Ambassador had handed a 'note verbale' asking for certain clarifications of the British proposal. While the British proposal had envisaged the area North of the Rio Pongo being left to "l'influence francaise", the area to the South would be reserved for "l'action de l'Angleterre". This was probably a translation error, but the French said they were prepared to give up their posts and claims between the Pongo and the Gaboon and would recognise British jurisdiction and influence; however if it was intended that large new areas would shortly be taken under British 'control', further explanations would be required.³ Derby thought the British proposal was unambiguous and for some reason the Note was not sent to the Colonial Office. So Carnarvon's speech disturbed certain French circles, and shortly after a letter reached the Colonial Office in which a Marseilles merchant, referring to the speech, said France would never give up her claims at Wyda, Cotonou and Porto Novo. It was only after receiving this that the Colonial Office inquired if the French had changed their view, and the Foreign Office forwarded the 'note verbale'.⁴

"A wonderful mess", was the Colonial Office verdict;⁵ they were greatly annoyed with the Foreign Office, who they suggested should find out if the French had

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1. Min. by Hemming 14.x.1875 on Manchester Chamber of Commerce letter cited.
 2. 3 Hansard, ccvii, cols. 375-384.
 3. French Note, . 11.ii.1876. FO/27/227
 4. Marseilles merchant to J.F.Hutton, Manchester 21.ii.1876 in CO. to FO. 29.ii. 1876. FO/27/227.
 5. Min. by Meade 2.iii.1876 on FO. to CO. 1.iii.1876. CO/87/109.

changed their views forthwith. The result was a French Note on 8 March 1876. The French Government still agreed to the exchange but sought assurances to allay the fears of the Marseilles merchants, who feared that French trade would be excluded if Britain took over the entire coast.¹ This cannot be read as a rejection of the British proposal, but Fairfield's first reaction was: "This is the end of the matter".² Meade was most reluctant to end the negotiations and believed that the French would still agree, but Herbert said they would have to make it clear that the Gold Coast Government wished to gain the territory between the Gold Coast and Lagos. Carnarvon stood firm on this and insisted that they could not go to Parliament to cede the Gambia for anything less.³

After two years dilatoriness and a last minute muddle the Gambia exchange question was allowed to lapse again, and the best chance of adopting the policy of expanding the Gold Coast customs was lost. Disraeli blamed Carnarvon.⁴ Derby said "the Col. Off. was in a hurry to begin this negotiation, and in a hurry to break it off".⁵ Carnarvon believed the fault lay with the Foreign Office for not sending him the 11 February note; it was, he said, "solely an error of the FO... Had this paper been forwarded to the CO. none of the present differences could have arisen".⁶ It would be more correct to say that the Gambia pressure groups and rumour mongers successfully frightened the Colonial Office into not going to Parliament without a considerable bargain for the Gambia.

Thus a passive policy prevailed for a time in West Africa. One of the Gold Coast missionaries began to "wonder at the undecided policy of the Government in

1. Text enclosed in FO. to CO. 10.iii.1876. CO/87/109.

2. Ibid. Min. by Fairfield 10.iii.1876, but crossed out.

3. CO. to FO. 15.iii.1876. FO/27/2227.

4. Disraeli to Lady Bradford 26.iv.1876. Buckle, Disraeli, V, p. 475.

5. Min. by Derby on Memo. by C.B.Robertson 21.iv.1876. CO/27/2227.

6. Min. by Carnarvon 14.v.1876 on FO. to CO. 8.v.1876. CO/87/109, which goes on, "But this cannot & ought not to be stated".

not taking all the Coast",¹ but it was political failure at home which hampered the Colonial Office and the local government, which, in spite of subsequent attempts to revive the exchange, would never gain the coastline between the Gold Coast and Lagos.

The appointment of the first Residents in the Malay States, 1874-75.

Though the news of Wolseley's entry into Kumasi did not reach London until after Kimberley left office, a report of Clarke's Pangkor conference, where a start was made in settling the dissensions of the Malay States, arrived on 24 January,² the day on which Gladstone announced the dissolution of Parliament. Although Clarke had begun to apply the policy of resident advisers which had been suggested by Kimberley, the final approval had to await the new government. Kimberley telegraphed that no permanent Residents could be appointed until the matter had been considered in London.³ As the full details of Clarke's policy in Malaya did not arrive until the end of March 1874, the Colonial Office did not consider Malaya until after their major researches into the Gold Coast settlement. Although the aftermath of the Ashanti war was treated with some urgency, Malay affairs received somewhat leisurely treatment in 1874.

In part this was because of Sir Andrew Clarke's methods. Sent out to inquire and report, he was not a man to await approval before he acted. "My own experience of the use of Reports does not tend to a high appreciation of their practical value", he once wrote.⁴ "To take responsibility, to act first and always to act, to write about it afterwards", was his philosophy and these methods were sometimes

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1. Rev. Milum to Gen. Secs. Lagos, 18.iv.1876. Meth. Miss. Soc, Incoming Gold Coast 1875-76 file.
 2. Clarke to Kimberley 23.i.1874 (Tg). CO/273/75.
 3. Ibid. Kimberley to Clarke 24.i.1874. (draft tg).
 4. A. Clarke, "The Straits Settlements", British Empire Series, I, p. 450.

a shock to civil servants.¹ Fully conscious that his report, which did not reach London until 30 March 1874 represented a fait accompli far in excess of his instructions, he was confident in his policy. Possibly since his Gold Coast solution had been rejected in favour of those of a brilliant commander fourteen years his junior, Clarke wished to shine in Malaya. "I feel I have done a good stroke", he had written to his friend Hugh Childers, First Lord of the Admiralty from 1868 to 1872, "in short, all the people here say that nothing has been done so complete and equal to it since Raffles's time".²

After his arrival at Singapore on 3 November 1873, with Kimberley's authority to investigate and report on suitable forms of intervention, Clarke had very soon realised the urgency of his problem, especially in Perak. Although the Mantri's forces and the R.N. flotilla had had some limited success in the Larut River, the marauders grew bolder off the Perak coast. In the first two weeks of November 1873 junks were attacked almost daily off the Dindings, and even off the South coast of Penang. On 22 November, Anson, the Liaut-Governor, posted a Sergeant and 15 Police at the Dindings, but by 13 December the situation was so critical that Anson warned Singapore by telegram.³ That evening, when W.H.M. Read dined at Government House, the governor discussed Perak with this guest.

Clarke had had a month to consider the problem and his method of intervention, and he had discussed it with Abu-Bakar, the Maharaja of Johore.⁴ Now Read had some advice to offer. Read's own financial interests had been more with Selangor, where in 1866 he had attempted to collect the Klang revenues on a commission basis with Tan Kim Ching,⁵ and currently he was involved in the Selangor Tin venture. But in October 1873 Raja Muda 'Abdu'llah of Perak, whose fortunes were

1. Sir G.S. Clarke in Vetch, Life of Clarke, pp. vii & xii.

2. Ibid. p. 154.

3. A. Skinner, 'Precis on Perak Affairs', 10.1.1874. CO/809/1 p. 147.

4. Cowan, Origins, p. 225.

5. Winstedt, Selangor, p. 19.

then at their lowest ebb, had visited Singapore and sought Kim Ching's and Read's help. Read had advised 'Abdu'llah to await the new governor. Kim Ching, finding the Raja Muda a rather expensive and scandalous quest, sent him away - but not before receiving a promise that if he succeeded in getting 'Abdu'llah appointed Sultan he would be granted the revenue farm of Larut for ten years.¹ If Read was in partnership with Kim Ching, as he had been in the past, in this venture, it would have given him a significant interest in 'Abdu'llah's case.

Read now asked Governor Clarke if he intended to act quickly in Perak. "I am ready at a moment's notice if I can get the key to the door", Clarke is said to have replied; "Give me a fortnight", returned Read, "and I will get it for you".² Read then promptly (according to his own account - others say it was Kim Ching) drafted a letter from 'Abdu'llah to the governor asking Clarke to act as 'umpire' in the succession dispute, requesting the protection of the British flag, and for the appointment of an officer to 'assist and advise' in the government of Perak. A copy of the letter, signed by 'Abdu'llah, reached Singapore on 9 January 1874.³

But Clarke had not waited for Read's key. Piracy did not subside in December and the Police at the Dindings said it was getting worse. On 2 January 1874 a Police Sergeant was fired upon in Province Wellesley, near the Perak border. Events seemed to show that of the four problems in Perak - the succession, the Mantri's position in Larut, the Chinese war in Larut, and piracy on the coast - the fourth was the most urgent. But to remove the motive for it the Chinese war in Larut would have to stop, therefore Clarke sent W.A.Pickering, the Chinese Interpreter, and an important member of the Straits Government, to try to make

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1. Enquiry as to the Complicity of Chiefs in the Perak Outrages, 'Precis of Evidence' by C.B.Plunket, l.xii.1876. p. 3. A copy enclosed, along with the Mss. evidence, in Jervois to Carnarvon 14.xii.1876. CO/273/86.
 2. W.H.M.Read, Play & Politics. Reminiscences of Malaya. By an Old Resident (1901) p. 25.
 3. Ibid. pp. 25-26. Precis of Evidence, (p.3) ascribes this to Kim Ching.

terms with the Chinese Headmen.¹ Arriving at Penang on 3 January 1874 he met the Ghee Hin leaders next day and found them eager for peace; they agreed to arbitration by the governor, and only requested that Capt. Speedy's attacks on behalf of the Mantri should be stopped and that provisions be sent to their 2000 men in Larut.²

Clarke now had his key and he acted quickly. On 7 January, in a telegram to Anson, he ordered a conference at the Island of Pangkor for 14 January. He sent Swettenham to Speedy and the Mantri to get a cease-fire, and Major McNair and Capt. Dunlop were sent to Perak to see that the pirates surrendered their boats at Pangkor, to gather information about the Perak succession problem and the Mantri's position, and to take the Malay chiefs to Pangkor. 'Abdu'llah's letter inspired by Read arrived on 9 January,³ and two days later Clarke left for Pangkor with Thomas Braddell, and Allan Skinner.⁴ Negotiations began on 15 January and five days later agreements were reached with both Chinese and Malays.

So while Wolseley slowly invaded Ashanti, Clarke made quick work in Perak. The Chinese settlement was straightforward and satisfactory. Pickering won the confidence of the Ghee Hin Headmen who were heartily sick of their war. Bringing them to Pangkor on 13 January, he also brought some Hai San leaders who, recently victorious, were more uncertain about the proceedings. Nevertheless on 15 January, after the Ghee Hins had surrendered their boats, both factions made peace. They had no confidence in the Malay rulers, and they even hoped that Britain would take the country over completely. By agreements signed on 20 January both sides would disarm, destroy their stockades and allow a free return to the mines, where

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1. William Alexander Pickering lived in Formosa, 1863-70, where he helped the U.S. Government in negotiations with the inhabitants in the South of the Island. Appointed Chinese Interpreter to the Straits Government in 1871.
 2. Pickering to Governor 8.i.1874. CO/809/1 p. 176.
 3. See Cowan, (Origins, p. 230 fn. 22) who discusses differences between Read's version and the text signed by 'Abdu'llah.
 4. Inspector of Schools in the Straits Government.

a British commission would supervise the settlement of claims. The headmen agreed to allow a British Resident to regulate water supplies for the mines, and the Sultan of Perak's officers to govern in Larut. Finally, the Headmen pledged surety of \$50,000 to keep the peace.¹ Dunlop, Swettenham and Pickering were sent as commissioners to Larut immediately, and Capt. Speedy, the Mantri's private commander, was appointed provisionally as Assistant-Resident in Larut. The agreement worked satisfactorily, for after two months hesitation the Chinese flocked back to Larut. A few Hai Sans who tried to make trouble in July 1874 were deported by the Mantri; by the beginning of 1875 Larut's wartime population of 4,000 had risen to 33,000, and the towns of Taiping and Kamunting had thriving populations of 4,000 and 5,000 respectively.² The eagerness of the Chinese probably had more to do with this than Speedy's efforts, but the Pangkor settlement in Larut was a success. The Chinese view of the new regime is aptly summed up in the words which an English traveller heard a few years later: "Empress good-coolie get money; Keep it".³

The settlement in Perak proper was more doubtful and caused a disaster. When he went to Pangkor Clarke was still confused over the rivalry of Raja Muda 'Abdu'llah and Sultan Ismail and the status of the Mantri in Larut. Allan Skinner did his best to find out, but was not able to do much better at unravelling the details of Ismail's election to the Sultanate in 1871 than Irving had done in 1872. Irving's report, only the gist of which ever reached London until 1874, was favourable to 'Abdu'llah and gave a bad impression of Ismail, who Irving had not met. On the other hand both George Campbell and Col. Anson at Penang had been biased towards the Mantri, Ismail's chief supporter, and unfavourable to 'Abdu'llah, and it was this trend which had culminated in the

1. CO/809/1 pp. 105-6.

2. Speedy's first annual report in Clarke to Carnarvon 6.iv.1875. CO/809/5 p.97.

3. I.L.Bird, Golden Chersonese (1883) p. 255.

recognition of the Mantri by Sir Harry Ord in August 1873.¹ The impression Clarke had gained by January 1874, evident in his instructions to Dunlop and McNair, was that 'Abdu'llah was de jure Sultan and that Ismail reigned de facto. He had heard that the former was an opium addict and was unpopular with the chiefs because of his support for the Ghee Hin Chinese, and that the latter had powerful support in the Mantri, the Laksamana, and the up-river chiefs. McNair and Dunlop could not sort the matter out and merely reported that the Mantri had assumed an independent position.² Clarke had already realised he might have to confirm this. It looks, then, as if Clarke went to Pangkor hoping to confirm Ismail as Sultan and regularise the Mantri's position in Larut. None of the investigators - Irving, Skinner, McNair or Dunlop - seemed to have noticed Raja Yusuf or the fact that 'Abdu'llah had appointed him his Raja Muda.³

The Pangkor conference completely reversed Clarke's view. He was surprised to find 'Abdu'llah "a man of considerable intelligence",⁴ and all the chiefs present, except the Mantri, seemd to favour him, whereas the Mantri made a poor showing. The latter was reluctant to disarm his Hai San allies, even after the Ghee Hins had surrendered their boats, and he was suspected of harbouring ambitions to become Sultan himself. He denied this, but he received short shrift from Clarke, who blamed his vacillations for the Larut troubles. 'Abdu'llah on the other hand was conciliatory to the Mantri; he agreed to confirm his authority in Larut if he received in return a written recognition as Sultan. He requested a British officer to assist in the government of Larut, as he had already requested one for Perak. One by one the chiefs present said they would support 'Abdu'llah as Sultan; only the Mantri hedged. It was probably he who complained to Anson

1. Cowan, (Origins, p.234, fn.30) contends that Clarke was aware of this, but disagreed with the action.

2. Report 14.i.1874. CO/809/1 p.99.

3. See above pp.201-202.

4. Clarke to Kimberley 26.i.1874. CO/273/75.

soon after and to Birch and Swettenham in April 1874, when he said that with 'Abdu'llah facing him, and Yusuf and Ismail far off, there had been little real choice at Pangkor.¹ Clarke certainly gained the impression that he could regard Ismail's election in 1871 as a temporary expedient.²

The Pangkor Engagement, signed 20 January 1874 recognised Raja Muda 'Abdu'llah as Sultan of Perak and Ismail was allowed to retain the title of 'Sultan-Muda' and a pension; Ismail's nominations to the great offices of Perak were confirmed, as were the Mantri's powers in Larut. For the future government of Perak the idea of resident advisers, which had been mooted since the Anson Committee in 1871, was finally to be tried. A British Resident's advice would be asked and acted upon in all matters except Malay religion and custom; an Assistant-Resident (Speedy) would advise the Mantri in Larut. The salaries of these officers would be a first charge of the Perak revenues, a civil list would provide allowances for the Sultan, Bendahara and Mantri, and the revenues would be collected and regulated by the Resident. Finally, to help in the suppression of piracy two contentious territorial matters were settled by a stroke of the pen. The Dindings controversy³ was ended with the cession to the Crown of the mainland area of creeks, and the South bank of the Krian River was also annexed for the same reason.⁴ Thus two small areas where pirates took refuge were made British territory, and the first British Resident in Malaya was formally accepted.

After less than three weeks Clarke turned to Selangor. The urgency of the piracy problem lay at the back of the Pangkor conference; in the same way piracy in Selangor made intervention urgent again and provided the excuse for it, for piracy had grown to an extent which threatened the security of Malacca's trade.

1. Cowan, Swettenham's Perak Journals, p. 62.

2. Braddell's account dated 28.i.1874. CO/809/1 pp. 191-8.

3. See above p. 160.

4. Text in CO/809/1 pp. 103-4.

Pirates, apparently from the Jugra River, attacked the Cape Rachado lighthouse in January 1874. There had also been a notorious case of piracy in the Jugra in November 1873. Only one from the crew and passengers of a junk had escaped with his life, but he was able to identify nine of the perpetrators in Malacca, who were imprisoned. This gave Clarke his key to Selangor. Determined to suppress piracy he arranged to meet Admiral Shadwell, of the China Station, on 6 February.

Clarke's plan was to make a show of force before Sultan Abdul-Samad of Selangor, to deliver the Jugra pirates for punishment, and then make the Sultan suppress piracy under the 1826 Treaty. He left Singapore with McNair and Braddell on 6 February; while warships blockaded the mouths of the Jugra and the Klang, and J.C. Davidson brought his friend the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din along behind, Clarke set out for Langat with the formidable support of four men-of-war. These he left out of sight while he breakfasted under the muzzles of the Sultan's main fort on 8 February. Several invitations failed to bring out the Sultan whose sons, Braddell claimed, feared the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din was about to be made Sultan¹; more probably the force behind had not gone unobserved. Finally Braddell landed quietly, sauntered round the town, slipped the Sultan's sentries, and, finding the Sultan, persuaded him to go on board.² Next day the governor's entourage landed and conferred with Abdul-Samad in the Palace. After making sure that the Sultan bore no ill-will towards 'Zia'u'd-din the governor sent for the Tengku. It was Clarke's first sight of him, and the governor seems to have been impressed with the effect of the dramatic little encounter on the Sultan, who greeted him cheerfully, and then proceeded to explain the Tengku's position in Selangor.

Clarke now felt he had the measure of the Selangor chiefs. Sultan Abdul-Samad.

1. Braddell's Selangor report, 18.ii.1874. CO/809/1 p. 214.

2. Clarke to Childers 11.ii.1874, quoted in Vetch, Life of Clarke, pp. 157-8.

although an opium smoker, appeared quite able to manage affairs but he was lazy and never interfered if he was left to enjoy himself. "A rather careless heathen philosopher", Braddell called him, but one careful enough to hoard \$100,000's worth of tin. Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din impressed Clarke's party; "a very good fellow.. I was much taken with him", wrote the A.D.C.¹ Between these two stood the Sultan's sons who lived at Langat; Raja Yacob, "a lawless, cruel chief", who was suspected of being implicated in the Jugra piracy; Raja Kahar, who Braddell said was even worse, but who had "a certain air of bonhomie", and the Raja Musa, a religious man, acquainted with Singapore life, who seemed out of place at Langat, and whom Braddell noted as possible material for the succession. Clarke was not put off by the Sultan's sons, and on 10 February he got down to business.

The Jugra pirates had murdered some British subjects so the Sultan was requested to try them. He agreed and appointed 'Zia'u'd-din for the task. Clarke also told the Sultan he must put a stop to piracy and that the British Government would assist with warships. Thus Abdul-Samad could no longer brush off the piracies with "Oh! those are the affairs of the boys"; when he told his sons to listen to Clarke's words the governor was heard in silence. The Sultan had little option but to accept the offer. Three men-of-war were left blockading the Jugra, another was posted at Langat until the trial was over; the Sultan was also informed of his son Yacob's suspected complicity.

After a conference quite as swift as Pangkor,² Clarke left Selangor on 12 February. Davidson and McNair remained to ensure that the pirates got a fair trial. Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din pronounced them guilty on 15 February and execution followed next day. The Jugra stockades were destroyed and \$5,000 compensation was asked. Finally to underline the new regime the Tengku toured Southern Selangor with British warships.³

1. Vetch, Life of Clarke, p. 160.

2. But with no document to show.

3. McNair & Davidson to Col. Sec. SS. 21.ii.1874. CO/809/1 p. 222.

There is no record of an equivalent to the Pangkor Engagement from the Langat conference, but probably when the Sultan re-affirmed the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din's position he agreed to a British officer as adviser. By May it was already known that the Tengku's friend J.G.Davidson was to be the Resident.¹ Later Swettenham was appointed Assistant-Resident with the particular duty of remaining with the Sultan at Langat. The execution of the Jugra pirates made a deep impression as the news spread around the rivers of Selangor.² Therefore after less than three months in Singapore Clarke had, in two swift visits, laid the foundations of the so-called 'Resident system', and had made the first steps towards the achievement of peace and order in the West of the Malay Peninsula.

His reports reached London on 30 March 1874. He had admitted, when he sent the outline of the Pangkor Engagement, that he had exceeded his instructions, but his action had received a cautious approval from the Colonial Office.³ With the detailed descriptions of the Pangkor and Langat conferences he enclosed the opinions of the Straits officials. Only one of them disagreed about the Residents; Irving preferred an itinerant official. Braddell thought "the innate superiority of the ordinary Englishman in his sense of honour and justice, is sufficient to dominate the inferior character of the Malay",⁴ although he was shortly to learn that these qualities were not enough. James Birch, the Colonial Secretary who had intervened in 1871, saw the issues in black and white: "complete annexation" or "Protectorate, with a British Resident" were the only alternatives and he supported the latter.⁵

The matter was not treated urgently in the Colonial Office and Carnarvon only

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1. Although Clarke did not report this home until the end of the year, it was known in London in May. Stanley of Alderley to Carnarvon 10.v.1874. PRO.30/6/21.
 2. Birch's Journal of visit to the Peninsula 31.iii.1874. CO/809/1 p. 265.
 3. Mins. Cox (3rd) Herbert (5th) and Carnarvon 6.iii.1874 on Clarke to Kimberley 26.i.1874. CO/273/75.
 4. CO/809/1 p. 246.
 5. Ibid. p. 247.

stated an opinion after a motion of censure had been attempted in the House of Lords. The head of the Eastern Department, Charles Cox, who usually endorsed documents on the day of receipt, took a week to study the material before offering comment. He was impressed by Clarke's achievement, although he foresaw, prophetically, the dangers involved.

"It appears to me", he wrote on 6 April 1874, "that Sir A.C. deserves the greatest credit for having brought all these disturbing elements to agree to the proposed arrangement. I do not see why it is not to work well. At the same time we must not keep out of sight that from some unforeseen cause we may possibly be called upon to take steps to prevent some attempted violation of the Agreement, or to enforce an adherence to some of its provisions. I do not think it is likely so long as the Residents shall act₁ judiciously avoiding as much as possible interference in minor matters".

Herbert was equally pleased, and more optimistic:

"I do not think we shall be dangerously compromised in any way. We are now obliged to interfere frequently on the Coast to prevent piracy & as English enterprise makes its way into the interior we shall almost certainly have to follow it to redress outrages on Englishmen unless we adopt Sir A Clarke's preventative policy which₂ may be expected to give the best prospect of avoiding complications".

But not everybody was so pleased. On 19 May Lord Stanley of Alderley, a former resident in the Straits, attempted to censure the Government in the House of Lords.³ He did not think that Clarke had been long enough in the East to understand what he was doing. It was all a plot, he said, of the Singapore Government to enter into "equivocal and entangling engagements". It would lead to invasion and conquest of the whole Peninsula, possibly another campaign like the Ashanti war. The Residents had powers, he said (very truly), which would make them the virtual rulers of the States; moreover the very title 'Resident' was in Netherlands India akin to that of governor, and in British India it was associated with annexation. Later events were to prove Lord Stanley right, but he did not commend his case to the House either by his inaudibility, or by

1. Min. by Cox 6.iv.1874 on Clarke to Kimberley 24.ii.1874. CO/273/75.

2. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 2.v.1874.

3. 3 Hansard, ccxix, cols. 467-473.


producing an array of skeletons from the cupboard. He criticised the transfer of the Straits from India to the Colonial Office in 1867, Ord's building of Government House in 1870, the Selangor Incident of 1871, and he repeated some accusations made in 1873 that Ord had accepted valuable presents from Malay rulers.¹ Carnarvon defended British intervention and the use of Residents; Kimberley deplored Stanley's sudden complaints about events which had happened years before, and he pointed out that they could hardly ignore between thirty and forty cases of murder by pirates. Two days later both Carnarvon and Kimberley rose to defend Sir Harry Ord.²

Stanley failed to get his way, but he probably forced Carnarvon to make some preliminary decision as to the Malay States. On the day after the attempted motion of censure the Secretary of State ordered a general approval of the Pangkor and Langat conferences.³ A despatch was sent on 29 May, but in a private letter he cautioned Clarke:

"Peace and order, the revival of trade and the suppression of piracy must conduce the English interests: and I am certainly not disposed to quarrel with an extension of English influence rightly and fairly developed... we are entering upon new ground with relations of a somewhat delicate nature. This history of the Indian 'Residents' is too recent and marked not to serve to throw light upon similar appointments in the Peninsula... we become through them much more closely connected than heretofore with things and persons and political combinations that may easily lead us further than we now intend to go. This new phase therefore of colonial policy needs very careful watching - and I think more by those on the spot, where there is far greater power⁴ of immediate control, than by the Secretary of State in London".

Although Clarke had exceeded his instructions, he was now, along with a caution, given a wide local discretion. Carnarvon realised a major change of course had been made, but he made it clear that it should be treated as an experiment.

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1. It was thought in the CO. that Sir Benson Maxwell, former Chief Justice in Singapore and a great opponent of Ord's, was behind Lord Stanley.
 2. 3 Hansard, cccix, cols. 597-600.
 3. Min. by Carnarvon 20.v.1874 on Clarke to Carnarvon 24.ii.1874. CO/273/75.
 4. Carnarvon to Clarke 27.v.1874. Private, (copy). PRO.30/6/40 p.2.



While the Colonial Office trod thus cautiously, Clarke turned his attention to the territory between Selangor and Malacca where trouble centred on the Linggi River. The Linggi had not attracted quite as much attention as the Perak and Selangor rivers in previous years, but the same elements for trouble - Chinese miners and rival Malay rulers - were present. Ord had encountered both the rivalry of the Dato'Klana and Dato'Bandar of Sungei Ujong after the latter had harboured Raja Mahdi on his way back to Selangor in 1872, and the rivalry of the Dato'Klana and the ruler of Rembau for the territory between the Rembau and the Linggi above the fork. On his visit to Sungei Ujong Ord had probably prevented the Selangor war from spreading.¹

On 3 December 1872 the Dato'Klana had died and he was succeeded by his nephew, who had been acting for him, Syid 'Abdu'r-Rahman, a chief of Sumatran descent who was unpopular in Sungei Ujong.² But he was better known to the British officials as he had often lived in Malacca, and in March 1873 when he was elected Dato'Klana he was apparently 'recognised' by the Straits Government.³ Dato'Bandar Tunggal appears to have regarded Dato'Klana 'Abdu'r-Rahman with particular resentment, and as traffic on the Linggi was still interrupted by these internal troubles in Sungei Ujong in 1874, Clarke determined to clear the river.

An agreement on the Linggi was signed on 21 April 1874 when the Dato'Klana of Sungei Ujong and the Dato'Muda of Linggi⁴ visited Singapore. The new Dato'Klana bound himself to govern on principles of justice and equality, to protect the Linggi river traffic, to give up offenders who escaped from the Colony. The agreement also provided that "the Station, District or Settlement of Sempang as far as Permatang Passir shall be placed under the control, order, and direction

1. See above p. 196-197.

2. Gullick, Sungei Ujong, p. 34.

3. Clarke to Carnarvon 15.xii.1874. PRO.30/6/40 p.21. This was probably by the Lieut-Gov. of Malacca, not by Ord. See Braddell Memo p. 29.

4. Ruler of the Bugis settlers from Riouw who left Rembau in the eighteenth century and received land near Bukit Tiga. Wilkinson, 'Sungei Ujong', JSBRAS, No. 83 (1921) p. 139.

of the British Government".¹ In return for these obligations by the Dato'Klana and surety for \$50,000 the "moral and material guarantee and protection of the British Government" was granted to maintain the independence and security of Sungei Ujong.²

Clarke's actual plans for the Linggi are obscure as the April agreement looks much more like a mere paper pledge than the Pangkor Engagement or the Langat conference; one critic said it was "like a bond gone mad".³ Possibly it was designed to sweeten the Dato'Klana before a crucial conference of all parties concerned in the Linggi rivalries. The ruler of Rembau, or Dato'Perba, who had recently been contending for power with a rival, had built a stockade on the river at Bukit Tiga. He had also asked the Straits Government for recognition, so Clarke saw an opportunity for getting rid of the stockade. The Dato'Bandar was again threatening the Dato'Klana, so Clarke decided to follow the latter back to the Linggi and hold a conference to pacify the river. Captain Shaw R.N., the Lieut-Governor of Malacca, held preliminary conversations in Malacca at the end of April. He got the Dato'Klana of Sungei Ujong and the Dato'Perba of Rembau to agree to a conference with Clarke at the mouth of the Linggi on 2 May 1874. In the meantime the Dato'Perba promised to destroy the Bukit Tiga stockade.⁴ About the same time Shaw saw Dato'Bandar Tunggal, who promised not to interfere with the Dato'Klana's new responsibilities on the Linggi.⁵

Clarke arrived to unlock his third door to the Malay States on 2 May, attended by Braddell and Shaw and the usual force of warships. But this time the key did not turn smoothly. The Dato'Perba of Rembau neither destroyed his stockade nor came to the conference. As he pleaded sickness, a new venue, at Sempang, was

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1. Winstedt, "The Negri Sembilan", *JMBRAS*, XII, Pt. 3, (1934) p. 71.
 2. *Ibid. loc. cit.* Cf. Vetch, *Life of Clarke*, p. 165. Clarke alluded vaguely to this meeting in a private letter dated 23.iv.1874. PRO.30/6/40 p.1.
 3. P.B.Maxwell, *Our Malay Conquests (1878)*, p. 38.
 4. Clarke to Carnarvon 8.v.1874. CO/809/1 p. 257.
 5. Clarke to Carnarvon 15.xii.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/40 p. 21.

offered for 5 May; but still he refused. Therefore, as the Dato'Klana, who had accepted responsibility for the safety of the river, pleaded his inability to deal with the stockades, Clarke decided to give him active support. The British party destroyed the stockades at Bukit Tiga and left the Dato'Klana to build police posts on the river in this area. This had the desirable effect and a few weeks later the Dato'Perba of Rembau went to Singapore to make his peace with the governor.¹ The Dato'Klana was thus left in charge of the Linggi River with the moral support of the Straits Government.

That Clarke had failed to secure a third 'Pangkor' did not escape Carnarvon. But when the Linggi report was received in the Colonial Office in July 1874 it was approved and the lack of a concrete agreement caused no anxiety. "In the present state of the country", wrote Carnarvon, "perhaps we may for a while at least dispense with the engagements wh. A.C: failed to secure".² After this for the remainder of 1874 there was little news from the Malay States. Clarke said nothing about whom he was appointing as Residents, apart from Speedy in Iarut. But as Disraeli had placed complete confidence in Carnarvon in the Gold Coast and Fiji matters, which had attracted much more publicity in England, Carnarvon had no reason to hold back with the new Malay States policy. On 10 August 1874 he sent the telegram authorising Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor of New South Wales, to annex Fiji.³ On 21 August he instructed Governor Strahan, of the new Gold Coast Colony, to inquire and report on a scheme for abolishing domestic slavery in the Protectorate. So one imagines that when Robert Meade, the Assistant Under-secretary, suggested on 29 August that they might write to Clarke on the general situation in the Malay States, Carnarvon was quite ready to give approval for the new policy in what he must have regarded as the least urgent of the three

1. Clarke to Carnarvon 29.vi.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/40 p. 3.

2. Min. by Carnarvon 20.vii.1874 on Clarke to Carnarvon 8.v.1874. CO/273/75.

3. See below p. 364.

cases.¹ Accordingly authority for the provisional appointment of Residents in Perak and Selangor was sent on 4 September 1874.²

After this the Colonial Office had little to say on the subject. Clarke was told not to overwork himself,³ and as he was appointed a member of the Viceroy of India's Council early in 1875, final decisions as to the choice of Residents, and the investigation of Malay debt-slavery, were left to his successor, Sir William Jervois. However, while attention in London was diverted to more pressing problems, events did not stand still in Malaya. Difficulties were encountered in Perak and armed intervention became necessary in Sungei Ujong.

When James W.W. Birch and Frank Swettenham visited Perak in April 1874 they discovered how ignorant they were about the succession conflict in Perak, and how superficial had been the Pangkor Engagement. Birch had already applied for the post of Resident in Perak, but he was not appointed until November 1874. Ismail, Yusuf and the 'up-river' chiefs had been absent from the Pangkor conference but even those who had attended were already dissatisfied at its results. One of the chiefs - probably the Mantri or the Laksamana - had told Col. Anson shortly after the conference that he did not really know what the governor intended.⁴ The Laksamana and others held meetings in which they averred that the British intended to take the whole of Perak, as they had the Dindings. In February 'Abdu'llah asked Mr. Dukes, a Penang lawyer, if the Dindings clause of the Pangkor Engagement could be rescinded, and the Mantri is said to have paid 12,000 to another lawyer, Mr. B.C. Woods, to take the matter to Parliament and get the Pangkor Engagement cancelled.⁵

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1. Mins. by Meade 29th, & Carnarvon 30.viii.1874 on Clarke to Carnarvon 27.vi.1874 CO/273/76.
 2. Carnarvon to Clarke 4.ix.1874. CO/809/1 p. 266.
 3. Swettenham, Footprints, p. 47: "Sir Andrew's whole time was devoted to Malay affairs".
 4. Anson, About Myself and Others, p. 322.
 5. Precis of Evidence p. 4.

Birch's April journey, through Larut, over the pass the Kuala Kangsa and down the Perak river, gave him a foretaste of troubles ahead. The whole question of Yusuf was discovered, and Swettenham, puzzled that Irving and Skinner had ignored him, was impressed by his intelligently expressed claims. More ominous was the general impression abroad that Clarke had "appointed" 'Abdu'llah as Sultan, for Clarke maintained that the chiefs had freely elected him.¹ Ismail still retained the Regalia and treated Birch discourteously. When Swettenham went back in June to persuade Ismail and Yusuf to meet Clarke at Penang the former Sultan refused.² In fact in October 1874 Ismail, Yusuf and the Mantri met Mr. Woods to arrange for a deputation to visit England.³ Therefore by the time Birch became Resident in November the Perak rulers had already determined to undermine the Pangkor Engagement, and although 'Abdu'llah had been warned by Braddell not to farm the Perak revenues with the ^{out} governor's consent, he had already farmed the Customs to a Chinese for 26,000.

Birch faced a formidable, if not impossible task, but he tackled it with his customary zeal and haste. The Chinese was told that the Customs farm could not be recognised. After visiting 'Abdu'llah, Ismail and the Mantri he published the Pangkor Engagement by proclamation. So far as Birch was concerned the Malay customs of Perak were a hinderance to his plans and could be disregarded; after establishing his Residency at Banda Bahru early in 1875 he went ahead with plans to unify the revenues and the local courts. Impatient with the chiefs, he treated Sultan 'Abdu'llah with contempt. In fact there is evidence that Sir Andrew Clarke was not altogether pleased with Birch's methods. He told Anson: "I am very much annoyed with Birch, and the head-over-heels way in which he does things: he and I will come to sorrow yet, if he does not mind. He has made a regular mull of the

1. Cowan, Swettenham's Perak Journals, pp. 57-62.

2. Ibid. pp. 74-92.

3. Clarke to Carnarvon 4.xi.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/40 p. 13.

[tax] farms & does not seem to have impressed either the Sultan or the ex-Sultan very favourably".¹

Yet Birch was being frustrated by both sides of the Malay struggle; Ismail would not surrender the Regalia, and 'Abdu'llah wrote secretly to him urging him not to do so. When Birch wrote his first report he realised that for all his police stations and plans for administration the basic troubles of Perak were far from solved.² With Ismail outside the Pangkor settlement, and 'Abdu'llah now regretting its implications, the chances of turning Perak proper into as prospering an area as Larut were remote. Governor Jervois arrived in Singapore to find active opposition to the British intervention in Perak.

Clarke's settlement on the Linggi was also short-lived, because just as he had failed to grasp the real situation in Perak, so in Sungei Ujong he had committed himself to a weak and unpopular Dato'Klana without understanding the twenty year old de facto relationship of the two rulers in the State.³ In spite of his assurance to Shaw in April 1874 the Dato'Bandar continued to oppose the Dato' Klana's authority, and the problem came to light again in July 1874 when Raja Mahdi and Raja Mahmud again disturbed the peace of Selangor. Clarke immediately supported the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din, and Raja Mahdi shortly gave himself up in Singapore. Raja Mahmud, however, escaped to join the Dato'Bandar of Sungei Ujong, who began once more to threaten the Dato'Klana. When the latter requested a British Resident and wished to fly a British flag over his house at Ampangan "so as to be under the protection of the Great Governor",⁴ the Dato'Bandar threatened his life.

War once more seeming imminent between the two rivals in Sungei Ujong, and with the Chinese miners at Rasa likely to take sides as they had done in Perak,

1. Anson, op. cit. p. 323. 2. Birch to Col. Sec. SS. 2.iv 1875. CO/809/5 p.125

3. See above p.178.

4. Dato'Klana to Shaw 24.ix.1874. CO/809/5 p. 64.

Clarke sent Pickering on 4 October 1874 to mediate in the Malay dispute and to keep the Chinese out of it. Pickering got a written assurance from the Dato' Bandar that he would not attack the Dato'Klana but the tension was obvious. Still confused over the relationships of the Sungai Ujong chiefs Clarke sent Swettenham to discover what he could from Sultan Abdul-Samad of Selangor; and then to visit the Dato'Bandar. Thus, at this late hour, the governor discovered that the Dato'Bandar had a share in the revenues of Sungai Ujong and he claimed that he should always be consulted by the Dato'Klana.¹ Clarke sent Pickering back on 30 October to get the Dato'Bandar to sign the 21 April Linggi Agreement, and to invite him to Singapore. Now the Dato'Bandar refused point-blank; claiming that he was independent, he shut himself up in his stockades at Kapayang where he felt safe from the interfering British. That he was thoroughly hostile now was gathered by Swettenham, who was greeted with the words, "What! another European! You travel about my country as if it were your own".²

When the Dato'Klana decided to force the issue his effort was such a miserable failure that Clarke was forced to intervene with British troops. The Dato'Klana with a force of 400 captured the forts at Rasa and Rahang on 16 November, but at Kapayang next day the Dato'Bandar stood firm. Most of the Dato'Klana's force ran away; Pickering had to rescue him. While the Dato'Bandar recovered Rasa and Rahang Pickering wrote desperately for help: "The Tunku Klana is a cur, but we don't like to leave him... we are surrounded here...."³ A small detachment of troops left Malacca immediately, Clarke went to Lukut as soon as he heard the news, and there Capt. Tatham R.A. landed a force of 180 marines, sailors, police and English infantry from Singapore. Pickering recovered Rasa with the Malacca detachment on 23 November. After reconnaissance parties were fired on from

1. See above p. 178.

Clarke to Carnarvon 29.xii.1874. CO/809/5 p. 32.

2. Vetch, Life of Clarke, p. 167.

3. Ibid. p. 168.

Kapayang on the 28th, surrender terms were offered, and when the time limit expired the forts were taken (they were deserted) and destroyed on 30 November.

Thus Clarke finally had to force the door of Sungei Ujong.¹ He left Capt. Dunlop, of the Singapore Police, to arrange a settlement, and went himself to make sure that Sultan Abdul-Samad of Selangor would not shelter Raja Mahmud and Dato'Bandar Tunggal as they fled before the British troops. With Swettenham there to keep him to his word the Sultan refused to harbour the fugitives, who gave themselves up in December. Most of the British expedition retired from Sungei Ujong early in December 1874, and having lost only one blue-jacket it had survived well in the Malayan interior, which made Clarke rather pleased with his little foray.² Capt. Tatham was appointed Resident in Sungei Ujong with a detachment of 50 men to help keep order. Pickering disarmed the Chinese miners, ten to eleven thousand of whom were found in the Rasa area, and he persuaded them to sign an agreement according to which leases, royalties, water supplies for the mines, and trading boat licences would be regulated by the Resident. Mining resumed by the middle of December 1874 and traffic flowed down the Linggi once again. So Clarke made good his failure of May, even if the intervention had been slightly more impromptu than Pangkor and Langat. The news caused no excitement in London; Meade only commented perversely that he wished the Dato'Bandar Tunggal were in the Dato'Klana's position - "he really seems to be made of good stuff".³

By the time Sir William Jervois arrived in Singapore on 8 May 1875 attention had turned again to Perak, where events were coming to a head. Moreover, because of a request from the Straits Settlements Association in London Clarke stayed behind for a few days to discuss urgent problems with his successor. He did not leave until 26 May, and Anson believed this meeting was a blunder, as he claimed

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1. He could probably have opened it peaceably, as on 30 Oct. a messenger reached Singapore from the Dato'Bandar with powers to negotiate.
 2. Clarke to Carnarvon 15.xii.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/40 p. 21.
 3. Min. by Meade 11.ii.1875 on Clarke to Carnarvon 29.xii.1874. CO/273/76.

there was professional jealousy between the two R.E. officers.¹ Certainly Jervois was the senior officer, and he disagreed significantly with Clarke over future policy. Their discussions no doubt ranged widely over the question of Residents, because Jervois had been instructed by Carnarvon to inquire and report on the whole situation so that final decisions could be made on the appointments.² His attention was also drawn (but not until after Clarke left Singapore) to Malay debt-slavery, which had figured in Speedy's report on Larut. Carnarvon had made a successful gamble in starting to abolish domestic slavery in the Gold Coast; it was logical that he should desire "the abatement of a practice so cruel and impolitic"³ in Malaya. Jervois was authorised to correspond with the Sultans to test their feelings on the possibility of ending debt-slavery.

Inevitably Clarke and Jervois must have been most concerned with Perak. Clarke had recently waited 36 hours at Pangkor to see Sultan 'Abdu'llah, who had not turned up. When Jervois arrived at Singapore a deputation from 'Abdu'llah was present in the city complaining about Birch,⁴ but they received no sympathy from either Clarke or Jervois. Not long after Jervois arrived a letter came from Birch, dated 13 May, indicating that 'Abdu'llah was set upon breaking the Pangkor Engagement. Birch called the Sultan a "vain little idiot" who was quite unfit to rule; the Resident believed most of the people in Perak would support Ismail.

Thus, from the start of his governorship, it was obvious to Jervois that all was not well with the Pangkor settlement or with the Resident experiment in Perak. As soon as Clarke left, Jervois reported to Carnarvon "there is not that 'holy calm' reigning in the Peninsula which the Pangkor treaty is generally supposed

1. Anson (About Myself, p. 323) said they had both held the post of Insp-Gen. of Fortifications at the War Office. Anson was quite wrong here. Clarke had been Director of Works at the Admiralty 1864-73 and was not Insp-Gen. of Forts. until 1882-86. Jervois had been Assist. (later Deputy) Insp-Gen. of Forts. at the W.O., 1856-75.

2. Carnarvon to Jervois 8.iv.1875. CO/809/5 p. 89.

3. Ibid. 25.v.1875. p. 119.

4. Precis of Evidence p. 12.

to have inaugurated".¹ And if Clarke had supported 'Abdu'llah, but was not very satisfied with Birch, it is probable that even before Clarke left, Jervois decided to support Birch and to reconsider the question of Ismail. Here was the ground for disagreement between the two generals. When Clarke said farewell to Anson at Penang he said, "Jervois has plunged into the native states head-over-heels".²

The new governor outlined his plans for Perak privately to Carnarvon on 10 July 1875. 'Abdu'llah, he said, was useless, the Rajas still levied their own taxes on the river, the Straits Government had already advanced about £15,000 to Perak, and debt-slavery and Malay-Chinese rivalry further darkened the picture.

"It appears to me that the Residential System, which implies advice as distinguished from control, is not calculated to meet the requirements either present or future of the case. The Sultan and Rajahs... are our obstacle to any just and enlightened system of government... we should, as opportunity offers, take possession of those States... This may be done without shedding blood, without opposition from the people,³ except Sultans and Rajahs who profit by the present state of things".

Jervois proposed pensioning off the troublesome Rajas and ruling Perak indirectly through men, presumably like the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din of Selangor, "who would virtually become British officers and would be associated with the British official element only so far as necessary to supplement the native element". Time seemed ripe for this in Perak; revenue would be adequate, it would benefit the State, and the cause of humanity and freedom.⁴

One suspects that Carnarvon was forced to do his first serious thinking about the Malay Peninsula when he received this.⁵ In 1874, while he had treated the Fiji and Gold Coast matters urgently and worked hard to conclude his policy, he had left the Malay States to the permanent staff and had tended to treat the

1. Jervois to Carnarvon 29.v.1875. Private. PRO.30/6/40 p.22

2. Anson, op. cit. p. 324.

3. Jervois to Carnarvon 10.vii.1875. Private. PRO.30/6/40 p. 28.

4. Ibid.

5. On 1 Sept. 1875 he called for a map of the Peninsula and for tabulated memoranda giving details of each state. CO/273/80.

Peninsula and the Residents as a matter for leisurely experiment. Now Jervois suggested something much more akin to the outright Fiji annexation or the legislative control of the Gold Coast Protectorate. In fact one could almost say that, without realising it, Jervois seemed to appeal to the Gold Coast and Fiji cases. The existence of slavery in the former and 'undefined serfdom' in the latter had moved Carnarvon to take up a position of moral responsibility in both cases. He had thought that the time was ripe on the Gold Coast to extend some British control and to undermine slavery. Therefore he realised the logic of Jervois's policy for Perak. But new action in the area was distasteful to him because of his preoccupations elsewhere. Admitting to Lord Salisbury, then at the India Office, on 3 September 1875 that he did not feel very favourable to the idea of converting influence and protection to direct sovereignty, he said:

"The time must come for this and probably soon: but it may cost money, and is likely to need military reinforcements, and my hands are extraordinarily full of very heavy work now. Moreover I shall probably be obliged to annex Zululand... and I am beset on all sides with applications to take N.Guinea. I therefore much desire to keep the existing system in the Malay₁ Peninsula for a time at all events: and I think that it can be done".

Salisbury agreed, because annexations in Malaya might alarm other Eastern States, and complicate relations with Burma, Siam and China. Worse still it might "raise to a fever heat the war passions of the Anglo-Indians". It might be possible in a year's time".²

Yet only a week later, on 13 September 1875, Carnarvon realised that Jervois was already embarking on the new policy. In July the governor had visited the East Coast of the Peninsula and tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Bendahara of Pahang to accept a Resident.³ He also announced that he expected Yusuf and Ismail would shortly ask the British Government to take over Perak. "Everything

1. Carnarvon to Salisbury 3.ix.1875. Private. PRO.30/6/10 p. 20.

2. Ibid. p. 21. Salisbury to Carnarvon 5.ix.1875.

3. Jervois to Carnarvon 7.viii.1875. Confid. CO/809/6 p.9. Rec'd in CO. 13 Sept.

seems tending to render it inevitable that Perak must become part of the British Dominions - and that, without costing a penny or firing a shot".¹ Writing from Balmoral the same day Carnarvon, while agreeing with Jervois that his policy might become necessary, warned him that in view of the situation in Burma and China, and the fact the public opinion had only just realised the novelty of the new Residents, the new policy was not to be attempted.² The warning was too late. The first information to reach London after the report of Jervois's September visit to Perak was the dramatic telegram of 4 November 1875 announcing the murder of James Birch, the Resident.

Jervois had decided, probably in April 1875 while Clarke was still in Singapore that the best solution was "to declare Perak British territory, and govern it accordingly". But since this would mean British law and British citizenship for the Malays, he now decided on the cheaper and simpler system of governing the country by British officers in the name of the Sultan. Instead of advising, as envisaged by Clarke at Pangkor, the Resident would deliberately control the State. The new officer would be styled 'Queen's Commissioner', and a Malay Council should give the Malay rulers an interest and a part in the Government.³ In the first two weeks of September Jervois had toured Perak with a large party of officials to persuade the rulers to accept his plan, but although Raja Yusuf agreed, Ismail and 'Abdu'llah would not answer.

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1. Jervois to Carnarvon 7.viii.1875. Private. PRO.30/6/40 p. 30.
 2. Carnarvon to Jervois 13.ix.1875. Private (copy) Ibid. p. 29. Cowan, Origins, p. 291, suggests that Carnarvon received the 10 July letter at Balmoral and replied to it immediately. But he was not so fast as this. The 10 July letter probably caused his request for the CO. staff to produce details, and his reference to Salisbury. And as Jervois seemed only to throw it out as a suggestion Carnarvon did not bother to answer it right away; in fact, as has been argued, he saw the logic of it. It was the 7 August letter (which doubtless came with the despatches of the same date, which were received in 13 Sept.) which alarmed Carnarvon. He suddenly realised that Jervois was going ahead with the plan; hence the urgent letter from Balmoral.
 3. Jervois to Carnarvon 16.x.1875. CO/809/6 p. 33-4.

In view of events in Perak, of which Jervois was not aware, this was not surprising. A movement was afoot in Perak to get rid of Birch and oust the British. Although Jervois was not aware of the plot, his party sensed the unrest. "There seems to be only one opinion among the Malays of any sense, and that is that very little would lead to a quarrel now", wrote Swettenham.¹ But no one realised that Sultan 'Abdu'llah was so incensed with Birch that he planned to unite with Ismail to remove him. Birch had threatened 'Abdu'llah with deposition in June 1875 if he continued to frustrate the new revenue system,² and the Sultan's debt-slaves, usually women, were continually taking refuge in the Residency. On 21 July 1875 'Abdu'llah had called a meeting at Durian Sabatang, at which all the Perak chiefs except Yusuf were represented. They discussed the failure of their deputation to Singapore, and they were told that Ismail was prepared to join a plot to get rid of Birch. Maharaja Lela of Passir Salak volunteered to kill the Resident. For a few days beginning 24 August 'Abdu'llah held a seance in which, professing to be possessed of spirits, he predicted Birch's death within a month. On the very day that Jervois was at Blanja in September, the Mantri was secretly informing Ismail of the preparations.³ Birch heard several rumours of the plan but disregarded them, and the governor returned to Singapore.

Ismail refused to accept the Jervois plan. He wanted nothing to do with the Pangkor Engagement, and said the former relations between Perak and the East India Company had been adequate. 'Abdu'llah was given fifteen days to consult his advisers, but Birch thought he would never agree and he asked the governor for troops and a gunboat. Raja Yusuf and Raja Idris accepted the plan and received the first instalments of their pensions, but 'Abdu'llah held out. Jervois ordered Birch to make a final effort to persuade him on 30 September 1875. The Resident

1. Cowan, Swettenham's Journals, p. 96.

2. Precis of Evidence, p. 12.

3. All the information about the plot depends on the evidence taken afterwards, and therefore it is all second-hand.

was given two drafts; one was for 'Abdu'llah to sign indicating his agreement with the plan, the other was an offer of the Sultanate to Yusuf should the first fail. Birch did not have to use the threat because next day Raja Idris brought 'Abdu'llah's acceptance. But Birch was not finished with the Sultan; he tried to get 'Abdu'llah's signature on proclamations appointing British officers as Judges in Perak and giving them power to collect and administer the revenues. 'Abdu'llah hesitated, and only gave in after being threatened with the second letter. On 3 October the signed copies of the proclamations were delivered, and Swettenham took them to Singapore for printing. He returned on 26 October with the printed notices, and also a proclamation by the governor dated 15 October 1875.

Birch immediately posted the notices at Banda Bahru with great ceremony, and on 28 October he sent Swettenham up river with copies, while he went down river himself. On the same day 'Abdu'llah held a meeting at Durian Sabatang at which it was agreed that Lela should kill Birch at Passir Salak. The Resident was warned next day, but he went on confidently saying, "if one Mr. Birch is killed, ten Mr. Birches will take his place".¹ On the 31st the Sultan sent Lela a kris as the authority for the act. Birch reached Passir Salak on the evening of 1 November, and he was murdered while bathing shortly after 8 am. next morning. Lieut. Abbott, his companion, who had gone shooting across the river managed to get back to the Residency at Banda Bahru. Swettenham, returning from up the Perak river two days later noted great excitement at Blanja on the 4th. He was told what had happened, and, refusing to land, he slipped down the river covered by the mists to reach the Residency on the 5th.² There the survivors were joined by Capt. Innes with 60 British regulars from Penang. The force tried to take Passir Salak on 7 November but they were stopped by one of Lela's stockades a few miles from the Residency and Innes was killed. At this point the governor

1. *Precis of Evidence*, p. 25.

2. Swettenham, *Footprints*, pp. 57-60.

appeared on the scene. There was some unrest in Selangor at the same time, and more trouble in the States adjoining Malacca. Therefore fearing a general rising in the Malay Peninsula Jervois decided to occupy Perak by force.

Birch's murder wrecked the Jervois plan, and nearly wrecked its author's career. The day after he signed the proclamation, which Birch and Swettenham were posting, along with their notices of administrative changes, Jervois had written a long account of his new policy for Carnarvon.¹ Shortly after he completed this, Carnarvon's urgent letter from Balmoral arrived; but the governor thought it was too late to go back. So he defended his action in a private letter, saying that if the advice of the Resident was really followed he would have, practically, to become the ruler of the State. If the advice was not followed there were two alternatives: withdrawal or movement forward, but if they retired it would leave the causes which led up to intervention to operate once again. Alternatively steps could be taken to enforce the Resident's advice; this was the basis of the Jervois plan.²

When Carnarvon heard of Birch's murder on 4 November 1875, this explanation was still in the post. He was ignorant both of the plan and its defence, let alone the cause of the murder. So when he received a demand for 1,000 troops with artillery from India, three companies of regulars from Hong Kong, in addition to the English Battalion stationed in the Straits, he was naturally shocked at the scale of Jervois's military action. A week after the news of the murder he was still ignorant of its cause; a series of urgent telegrams produced no explanation from Jervois who had gone to Perak. There was still no answer on 12 November when he explained his military requirements. Already he had 750 infantry and 80 artillery from the Straits garrison in the field. Major-General

1. Jervois to Carnarvon 16.x.1875. CO/809/6 p. 28.

2. Jervois to Carnarvon 18.x.1875. Private PRO.30/6/40 p. 32.

Francis Colborne, the Commander-in-Chief, Hong Kong and the Straits, was bringing 300 regulars from Hong Kong; Jervois also requested 2 Battalions and a mountain battery from India. He planned to march one party through Larut, over the pass to Kuala Kangsa and down the Perak River; the second force would drive up river from the Residency. Still ignorant of the political background Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, said, "A more unsatisfactory explanation of a war I never read", and he was reluctant to let the 2 Battalions leave India; "Perak can, if need be, be recaptured: a panic in India might be irreparable".¹ The final blow came when the cable between Madras and Penang broke down. Carnarvon still had no explanation from Jervois; now telegrams would have to go by steamer from Ceylon or Rangoon.

It was not until 22 November, nearly three weeks after the murder, that Jervois's despatches, written before the event, arrived. Carnarvon took the matter immediately to the Cabinet, who read that Jervois had heard that some of the Perak chiefs wanted the British to govern Perak, so he had gone ahead with his plan. Carnarvon seized on this as "The cause of the war".² Next day telegraphic communication was opened with Singapore via Siberia, and a telegram dated the 18th (via Ceylon) brought the governor's long awaited explanations. He said his policy was universally approved in the Straits and he demanded now a show of force. On 24 November the Government learnt of a successful assault by Capt. Dunlop at Passir Salak and of the recovery of Birch's belongings. They also learnt that although 'Abdu'llah had expressed his loyalty, some of his advisers were implicated, and the Jervois feared a general rising. Moreover, he suggested annexing all the territory between the Perak and Krian rivers and holding it by force.³

1. Two letters Salisbury to Carnarvon 13.xi.1875 & Nov.1875. PRO.30/6/10 pp.30-31.

2. Note on Jervois to Carnarvon 18.x.1875. PRO.30/6/40 p. 32.

3. Jervois to Carnarvon (tg) 18.xi.1875. CO/809/6 p. 64.

The Cabinet must have been furious. Gathorne Hardy, the Secretary of State for War, said Jervois's conduct "has been outrageous. I question whether you will not have to recall him".¹ Carnarvon consulted Disraeli the same day, and sent a telegram of censure. British troops, he said, were not to be used for either annexation or the maintenance of Residents. If the Residents were not acceptable on the original basis as advisers, they might have to be withdrawn. "Neither annexation nor government of the country by British officers in the name of the Sultan can be allowed".² Jervois, however, persisted in sending telegrams defending his policy, so on 10 December 1875 a very severe despatch of censure condemned his "grave errors of policy and action".³ It is true that all the governor's military requirements were granted, but Carnarvon held him accountable for his actions, and warned him that the decisions on the settlement would be made at home.

An occupation, rather than a campaign, is the best description of the Perak expedition of 1875. 'Abdu'llah and the Laksamana professed loyalty, but Iela fled to join Ismail at Blanja. Militarily therefore Jervois's object was to pursue the fugitives and occupy upper Perak. To this end an excessive force was used, which failed in its first object and hated the second.⁴ Maj-General Colborne left Bandar Bahru on 8 December with 300 men from Hong Kong assisted by naval units. They reached Blanja by water on 13 December, to find that Ismail had fled to Kinta. This meant a difficult overland march and when Kinta was reached after a few skirmishes on the 17th, Ismail was still uncaptured. Brigadier-General John Ross led the Indian force, consisting of the Buffs, the 1st Gurkhas, a mountain battery, a company of Bengal Sappers, and some signallers.

1. Hardy to Carnarvon 25.xi.1875. Private. PRO.30/6/12.

2. Carnarvon to Jervois (tg) 25.xi.1875. CO/809/6 p. 74.

3. Ibid. Carnarvon to Jervois 10.xii.1875.

4. See account of Brig. Ross's attitude in "Needs Explaining" in J.C.Scott, Cursed Luck. Ross, who had served in Afghanistan, hated the jungle, and said "they had all been sent out on policemen's work; that it was an insult to the service" p. 184.

They set off up the Larut River on 29 November, crossed over to Kuala Kangsa, whence a belated party was sent to join Colborne at Blanja. On 4 January 1876 they disarmed the trouble nest of Kota Lama, where the Brigade Major was killed. A third force landed from Pangkor to subdue the Perak coast if necessary. But the final pursuit of Lela and Ismail was carried out by police and irregulars, with the co-operation of other Malay Sultans and the Siamese Government.

Ismail surrendered with the Regalia to the Raja of Kedah in March 1876. Lela was captured by the agents of the Maharaja of Johore in July. Shortly afterwards 'Abdu'llah's part in the conspiracy was discovered. After much soul searching in the legal department of the Colonial Office¹ Lela and the immediate murderers of Birch were hanged; 'Abdu'llah was deported to the Seychelles and Ismail lived in exile in Johore, where he died in 1889.

Carnarvon was quite satisfied by the conduct of the military operations, which cost under £100,000 and were eventually paid for out of the Perak revenues.² Inevitably the expedition invited comparisons with Wolseley's campaign against Ashanti in 1874. But Jervois insisted that there was no analogy with the march to Kumasi or the earlier expedition by Napier in Abyssinia. In Perak the emphasis was on occupation to prevent a recurrence of trouble; the former cases had been designed to strike a blow and retire.³ General Colborne went further, and considered that his task had been much harder than Wolseley's.⁴ And while Wolseley and Glover had been covered in glory, Colborne's appointment had been disliked by Carnarvon from the start,⁵ and Brig. Ross was reprimanded for hanging a Malay.⁶

1. See memo. by Malcolm 26.x.1876 after Jervois to Carnarvon 4.iv.1876. CO/273/83.

2. Carnarvon to Jervois 1.ii.1876. CO/809/6 p. 279.

3. E.Sadka, "The Journal of Sir Hugh Low, Perak, 1877", JMBRAS, XXVII, Pt. 4, (1954) p. 31.

4. Jervois to Carnarvon (tg) 28.xii.1875. CO/809/6 p. 123.

5. Anson, About Myself, p. 332.

6. Carnarvon to Stanley 12.xi.1875. Private. PRO.30/6/17 p. 142.

7. Cowan, Swettenham's Perak Journals, p. 127, fn. 121.

The political settlement of Perak after the war was a complete reversal for Jervois. He adhered consistently to his policy to the end, however, and when he received Carnarvon's harsh despatch of censure, he claimed that it was unjust, that his plan had been the logical outcome of the Resident policy which Carnarvon had approved.¹ In February 1876 he pressed Carnarvon to announce the Government's new policy. He continued to condemn any idea of a British withdrawal from Perak or a return to government by advice. In a full reply to Carnarvon's censure he obstinately stuck to his position and informed Carnarvon that he had misunderstood both the situation in Perak and the very policy he had approved.² Carnarvon was justifiably furious to receive a despatch which amounted almost to an attack on his honesty. "I am afraid I must characterise this despatch as one of the least satisfactory that I have ever received since I have been connected with the office. It unquestionably has the merit of cleverness; but it is unscrupulous in argument, unbecoming in tone, and very disingenuous in character".³ The document in the Colonial Office file is peppered with indignant comments.

Yet Carnarvon was, on his own part, being obstinate. He seemed more concerned to establish that Jervois had started to annex Perak, rather than to face the real limitations of government by advice. The Permanent staff of the Colonial Office were noticeably more indulgent to Jervois, since they were not personally insulted. Meade in particular was prepared to see Jervois's viewpoint. The censure had been outspoken, so a very deferential reply was hardly to be expected from the governor. Moreover, Sir Andrew Clarke had sent only seven despatches on Perak between Pangkor and Jervois's arrival; this had led them all to believe that government by advice was working well. Pangkor had been based on the assumption that advice would be readily sought; the Colonial Office had been quite ignorant

1. Jervois to Carnarvon (tg) 15.i.1876. CO/809/6 p. 188.

2. Jervois to Carnarvon 10.ii.1876. CO/273/83.

3. Ibid. Min. by Carnarvon 22.iii.1876. See Cowan, Origins, pp. 301-304 for a careful discussion of the Carnarvon-Jervois controversy.

of the forces at work in Perak to combat this. "I think it not improbable", wrote Meade, "that annexation may be the ultimate result, but I see no reason why it should take place for some time to come".¹ Herbert partly excused Jervois as an army officer not used to Colonial work. Jervois was told to take no action. After this the Malay policy once again received more leisurely treatment.

Carnarvon finally sent his decision on 1 June 1876. Annexation was forbidden; troops were not to be used to impose Residents on an unwilling population. Carnarvon did not consider that the Residents had been given a fair trial. The name of 'Resident' would remain, and they would confine themselves to advice. However, Jervois's Malay Council was acceptable and could be tried. "It should be our policy to find and train some Chief or Chiefs of sufficient capacity and enlightenment to appreciate the advantages of a civilized government and to render some effective assistance in the government of the country", was the rather vague conclusion Carnarvon came to.² The choice of a new Sultan of Perak was left to Jervois.

The governor now bowed before his superiors. When he reported his actions in accordance with Carnarvon's instructions on 19 August 1876 he brought "a laggard controversy to a graceful end".³ Carnarvon forgave him, and Jervois admitted that he had "stepped beyond proper bounds".⁴

Jervois was undoubtedly rash and wrong to persist in his policy after Carnarvon's warning and he was insubordinate in his persistence. But Carnarvon was not without blame. There is no evidence that he gave to Malay affairs the same urgent detailed study - the reading and summarizing of memoranda and books, the carefully recorded interviews with individuals and deputations - which he gave to Fiji and the Gold Coast. He was quite ignorant, as were most of the Straits

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1. Min. by Meade 21.iii.1876 on Jervois to Carnarvon 10.ii.1876. CO/273/83.
 2. Carnarvon to Jervois 1.vi.1876. Confid. Print Esatern 17a. p.112. CO/807/7.
 3. Min. by Roebuck 28.ix.1876 on Jervois to Carnarvon 19.viii.1876. CO/273/84.
 4. Carnarvon to Jervois 17.ix.1876 & Jervois to Carnarvon 30.xi.1876. Private. PRO.30/6/40 p. 31 & 33.

officials until 1874-76, of the real forces at work in Perak. He refused to recognise that in Perak there was no 'Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din or Maharaja Abu-Bakar to rely on. Thus a Resident had either to govern or be superfluous. On the other hand the Jervois plan was in accord with both Kimberley's and Carnarvon's basic policy of finding a way of achieving order on the frontier by some method which fell short of the extension of British sovereignty. Fiji was only annexed after ten years of investigation into the possibility of consular jurisdiction or government by one of the Australasian colonies. The Gold Coast Protectorate was deliberately excluded from the territorial dominions of the Crown and Ashanti was neither annexed nor provided with a Resident. There were really no insuperable obstacles to annexation and occupation in these frontier regions at this time except for the basic and legitimate reluctance of Whitehall. Jervois's policy was consistent with the Colonial Office's in that he recoiled from annexation and his system of indirect rule had some affinity to Carnarvon's system of dealing with the Gold Coast Protectorate. The 'Queen's Commissioners' might have ended up as rather grandly titled District Commissioners. However, Birch was an unfortunate instrument, 'Abdu'llah an insincere participant, and Jervois an unscrupulous advocate of the plan. But the system of government by the advice of the Residents as it was eventually to be evolved by men such as Sir Hugh Low, which lies beyond the scope of this present discussion,¹ bore many marks of affinity to the Jervois plan.

The annexation of Fiji, 1874.

News from Fiji had been scanty and discouraging in 1873 while the British Government was making up its mind about sending the Goodenough-Layard Commission Edward March, the troublesome British Consul, left suddenly because of illness

1. See Introduction to Low's Journal by E.Sadka.

on 23 January 1873, so for nearly a year, in the crucial before before Commodore Goodenough's arrival, there was only a temporary British representative in Fiji. Yet the most significant thing which Goodenough found at the end of the year was that British intervention alone had kept the peace in 1873. After the confidential request from Thurston to Governor Robinson in December 1872¹ a warship from Australia had been maintained continually at Fiji² and intervention by naval officers amounted, said Goodenough, to a "virtual Protectorate".³

In two incidents the presence of the Royal Navy had prevented fighting. The first took place in March 1873 when members of the British Subjects Mutual Protection Society decided they would take revenge themselves on Viti Levu mountain tribes who murdered the Burns family in the Mba River region. Here a clash with government troops was only avoided by the presence, at Thurston's request, of Capt. Chapman of HMS Dido, who took the ringleaders to Levuka under arrest, whence they were deported to Australia.⁴ The Captain's actions embarrassed both the Foreign and Colonial Offices in London, but Gladstone later told Goodenough that he had no doubt that Chapman was right.⁵ Thurston had turned to the British commander because British policy had not made his position in the Fiji Government easy. Kimberly had announced de facto recognition, but Granville had not told the Consul to do this, and the Law Officers had decided that Fijian citizenship did not put British subjects outside British law. It was Kimberley's circular announcing this⁶ which had prompted Thurston's request to the Governor of New South Wales for a ship, and at the same time he had told Robinson that Britain should be consistent; either she should concede that Fiji was an independent

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1. Thurston to Robinson 20.xii.1872 in Robinson to Kimberley 27.i.1873. CO/201/573
 2. Ad. to CO. 18.iii.1873. CO/83/3. HMS Dido was already at Levuka in Jan. 1873 indicating that Robinson complied with Thurston's request immediately.
 3. Goodenough & Layard to Kimberley 13.ii.1874. Confid. CO/808/2 p. 60.
 4. Chapman to Stirling 29.iii.1873 in Ad. to CO. 14.vi.1873. CO/83/3.
 5. Mins. on Ad. to CO. 14.vi.1873. Ibid. and Ad. to FO. 14.iv.1873. FO/58/140 p.39 and Goodenough's Journal, I, 10.vi.1873.
 6. Circular to Australasian governors 14.viii.1872 (copy) in FO/58/140.

State, or she should annex it.¹ He probably felt inhibited by Kimberley's circular at the time of the Mba rebellion, but decided he must maintain the government's authority. Capt. Chapman was the only way out, and Thurston promised him that if the ringleaders were removed the case against them would be dropped.² Undoubtedly Thurston and Chapman between them prevented a serious incident.

But this could not save the Fiji Government. By July 1873 it was clear that the 1871 Constitution had broken down. The Legislative Assembly outvoted the Government on its financial policy in May 1873, but although the Ministers offered to resign Thakombau dissolved the Assembly and kept his ministers.³ He told Commodore Stirling in July "I retain the ministers because I believe that under their guidance Fiji will prosper".⁴ Tension intensified when the Government announced that a new Assembly would be elected by all Fijians, and the settler opposition decided to fight the Fijian franchise. Therefore the election was postponed, and Thurston drew up a new constitution. Matters were so uncertain that the Commodore left HMS Blanche (Capt. Simpson) at Levuka, and appointed its paymaster, Lieut. Nettleton, as acting Consul.

The second incident took place in September 1873, and again it was the presence of a British ship which kept the peace. Revenue authorised by the Assembly expired at the end of August, but the Government continued to levy taxes. A demonstration against this was made by a German merchant, Hedeman, who, encouraged by G. Hennings the German Consul, forcibly withdrew goods from the bonded warehouse without paying duty. When the Government tried to arrest the perpetrator, a clerk named Schule, Hennings appealed to Nettleton, who turned to Capt. Simpson. At first the Captain warned all British subjects, government or opposition, not to use arms, but

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1. Thurston to Robinson 20.xii.1872 in Robinson to Kimberley 27.i.1873. CO/201/573.
 2. Thurston to Chapman 19.iii.1873 in Ad. to CO. 14.vi.1873. CO/83/3.
 3. Derrick, History, pp. 229-230.
 4. Stirling to Ad. 13.viii.1873. This first reached to CO. via FO. to CO.10.xi. 1873. CO/83/4; the Ad. did not send it on until 4.xii.1873. CO/83/3.

Thurston satisfied him of the justice of the Government's case, and he got Simpson to sign a proclamation warning British subjects not to resist the Fiji Government. The height of the crisis came on 3 September 1873 as the Fijian army concentrated its reserves at Thakombau's house, and the Germans fortified themselves in Hedeman's store. The Government was determined to arrest Schule. Simpson held aloof saying it concerned the Germans not the British, but Lieut. Nettleton, the acting British Consul, took the law into his own hands and Simpson later admitted that he prevented bloodshed. In naval uniform he entered Hedeman's store, where the defenders were drunk, and he arrested the clerk. Simpson was infuriated, but he took the prisoner on board the Blanche, and although he refused Thurston's request for Royal Marines to patrol Levuka that night, launches were held ready for action. The crisis passed and Thurston skillfully gained Simpson's support, by placing his resignation as Chief Secretary in the Captain's hands, to be accepted if written charges were made against him. As none were made, Simpson published on 8 September 1873 his support for lawful arrests by the Government, and he handed over the prisoner Schule to the Government.¹ Thus Thurston prevented Simpson from gaining the initiative while successfully using the Royal Navy to keep the peace. Perhaps Simpson had a restraining influence on Thurston;² Brower, the American Consul believed he prevented bloodshed in Fiji.³

The affair of the Germans caused a panic in New South Wales, which was just

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1. Derrick's account of the Hedeman affair (History pp. 223-4) is based upon Nettleton to Granville 8.ix.1873 & 26.ix.1873. FO/58/135 pp. 253 & 288. The CO. heard via Robinson to Kimberley 6.x.1873. CO/201/574, with a clipping from the Fiji Times. K-Hugessen wrote on this (26.xi.1873) "not much like peaceful annexation - probably they will have killed each other before we settle upon this policy, in wh. case there will be no one left to annex". A much fuller account, including Simpson's correspondence with Thurston was received in London in 1874. Simpson to Stirling (extracts) 29.xii.1873. CO/808/2 p.47-58.
 2. Derrick, History, p. 234. Goodenough to Goschen 2.xii.1873. Private (copy) PRO.30/6/44 p. 4.
 3. Goodenough's Journal, II, 25.xi.1873.

what the German Consul wanted.¹ The Government called on the Governor to telegraph Kimberley that Fiji was bordering on anarchy and to request immediate annexation as foreign intervention would be a calamity.² The last point really had little relevance at this time, and Herbert remarked, in London, that since British subjects were involved on both sides of the 'anarchy' intervention would be difficult. But he admitted that "it would no doubt be awkward if both Fiji and the Navigators [Samoa] passed into ownership which could prevent our steamers coaling".³ For Kimberley, who, as argued above, had already made up his mind in favour of annexation, the Hedeman affair was further evidence to support his view. He admitted to the still reluctant Gladstone: "I take a more sanguine view I confess of the power and energy of this country than you do".⁴ But Gladstone's Government had postponed all action until Goodenough and Layard had reported; they took no further decision on Fiji, which, like the Gold Coast and the Malay States, was left to Carnarvon.

In the Fiji Islands themselves government rested more and more on Thurston's shoulders. A measure of Thakombau's dependence on him was evident during one of the meetings with the commission when on matters of money or land the king said, "It is all understood by Mr. Thurston".⁵ When he heard about the appointment of the commission in September 1873 he regretted that it was not really an answer to the letter of 31 January, but he promised to assist the commissioners.⁶ But he had sent the letter at a time of particular difficulty. After his successes

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1. The alarm in N.S.W. was deliberately created by G.Hennings, the German Consul in Fiji, who informed Simpson, after the latter had announced his support for Thurston, that he was sending a fast vessel to Sydney to report that two Englishmen had armed 1,000 Fijians. (Hennings to Simpson 6.x.1873. CO/808/2 p. 58). The Fiji Times article which had alarmed Sydney has the same date, 6.x.1873.
 2. Robinson to Kimberley(tg) 15.xi.1873. CO/201/574.
 3. Min. by Herbert 15.xi.1873 on telegram.
 4. Kimberley to Gladstone 26.xi.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/10.
 5. Goodenough & Layard to Kimberley 19.iii.1874. CO/808/2 p. 75.
 6. Thurston to Robinson 25.ix.1873 in Robinson to Kimberley 22.xi.1873. CO/201/574

in the Mba and Hedeman affairs, with the Assembly dismissed, and after winning Simpson's docile support, Thurston was in a stronger position, and it is suggested that he imagined himself as a despotic ruler.¹ Certainly at the end of September 1873 a new constitution was circulated secretly among the chiefs, which provided for an Assembly of nominated Chiefs with a minority of elected Europeans, a Cabinet of three, and a Privy Council consisting of the Cabinet, the Government and a chief from each province. Through this Thurston would be able to check the settlers. For some reason he sent a copy to Simpson, who persuaded him to hold it over until the commission arrived,² and it took Goodenough only a few days to make up his mind to stop it.³

This brief account of events in Fiji in 1873 shows quite clearly that when Goodenough arrived at the end of the year things had greatly changed since the letter of January and Kimberley's instructions to the commission.

Commodore Goodenough reached Levuka on 17 November 1873. Although his Journal provides a detailed picture of his five months in the islands, it is difficult to gain a reliable account since so much evidence is heresay, and both Thurston and Thakombau made contradictory statements at different times. The one certain thing is that even before Layard arrived Goodenough very quickly decided in favour of annexation.

He was so shocked at what he found that he felt bound to interfere. Prisoners taken by the Government in its Mba campaign were about to be hired out to planters so Goodenough warned British subjects that he would regard such hiring as acts of slavery under British law.⁴ He found that while the Government was alienated from the settlers, Thurston and Thakombau did not seem enthusiastic for annexation, and

1. Henderson, History of Govt. in Fiji, II, p. 347.

2. Derrick, History, p. 237. The proposed constitution was published in the Sydney Morning Herald, 4.xi.1873, copy in FO/58/153 p. 319.

3. See his resolution in Goodenough's Journal, II, 22.xi.1873.

4. Notice by Goodenough 10.xii.1873. CO/808/2 p. 40.

were intent on pressing forward with the constitution. Apparently the letter of 31 January 1873 had really meant: "Do you require or intend to annex us, because your interference is a hindrance to us and if your intentions were decided we could get on".¹ Thurston was 'rather a puzzle' to the Commodore, but he was "full of the most extravagant ideas about his own position and... one of the greatest bores" he had ever met.² Goodenough was determined to prevent the new constitution and after a long argument with Thurston on 26 November he asked the Chief Secretary what would happen when the R.N. left Fiji. Thurston said he was confident in his government's strength to enforce order, but Goodenough warned him that if English subjects used a Fijian force to co-erce other settlers he would take them to court in Sydney.³ On 12 December Thurston "came some way down the tree" and assured Goodenough that he was a supporter of annexation.⁴ The Commodore had already become one himself, since about two weeks after his arrival he told Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that he could "see no way out of the muddle but annexation".⁵

From the outset, therefore, Goodenough decided on annexation and his activities in Fiji were designed to achieve this. Such action formed no part of his instructions, but it was fully in keeping with his character. Professor Ward severely criticises the commission claiming that both members were unqualified for their task.⁶ This requires some revision. Miss Drus suggests that Layard, the Consul, was probably chosen carefully as he had experience both in New Zealand and South Africa.⁷ He was also an experienced lawyer, but Goodenough noted "I see

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1. Goodenough to Goschen 18.xi.1873. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/44 p.2. Henderson, (Hist. of Govt. in Fiji, II,p.347) developes on this view of Goodenough's and suggests the Jan. letter was part of a plot by Thurston to achieve despotic power, that the letter was sent in the belief that it would be refused. This view, however, neglects that in January 1873 the Government's prestige was low.
 2. Goodenough to Goschen 2.xii.1873. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/44 p. 4.
 3. Goodenough's Journal, II, 26.xi.1873.
 4. Ibid. 12.xii.1873.
 5. Goodenough to Goschen 2.xii.1873. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/44 p. 4.
 6. J.M.Ward, British Policy in the South Pacific, pp. 249-50.
 7. E.Drus, "Colonial Office and Annexation of Fiji", op. cit. p. 103, fn. 11.

that I shall have to tell Layard what to do in everything".¹ However he seemed to respect 'old Layard' as he genially called him. In the case of Goodenough Ward's strictures are unjustified. Kimberley had first thought of appointing special commissioners and suggested General Smythe or Sir Andrew Clarke; Sir Arthur Gordon, then Governor of Mauritius, also offered to go. But this seemed too ostentatious, and as Goodenough was appointed Senior Naval Officer of the Australian station in April 1873 he was an ideal person. A son of the Dean of Wells, he had been seen at prayer just before the assault on Canton in 1857, so he was a man who would appeal to McArthur and Gladstone; a Captain who taught teetotalism to his crew, he would not easily be swayed by the gin-sodden residents of Levuka, who were those most opposed to the Fiji Government; a mission to the United States during the Civil War, and an appointment as naval attache visiting the major European powers in 1871-73, had given him experience of a semi-diplomatic nature.² In fact for a naval officer Goodenough was a man of singularly wide cultural interests, being well read in works on social problems and accomplished at languages. His library on HMS Pearl contained four hundred volumes,³ and his reading list while in the South Pacific was formidable.⁴

Ward also accused Goodenough of "lack of political astuteness", yet the Commodore's appreciation of Ma'afu's position in the Lau group indicates that he had a sense of the political realities of the islands,⁵ and someone who saw him at

1. Goodenough's Journal, III, 4.i.1874.
2. For details of his early career see Mrs. V.G. Goodenough's, Memoir & Journal of Commodore Goodenough (1876). This is excellent for his career and gathers interesting comments from his contemporaries. However, all the political matters are omitted, and it necessary to go for them to the 6 volume Mss. Journal (some of which is printed in the Confidential Prints in the PRO.) See also A. Stanley, In Memoriam, James Graham Goodenough, A Sermon, 16.i.1876. The preacher accompanied HMS Pearl to Fiji.
3. Gordon, Fiji Records, I, p. 116.
4. He records finishing books by Macaulay, Trollope, Livingstone, Buckle, Darwin, Gladstone, Carlyle, Froude and Voltaire.
5. Commission's Report, CO/808/3 p. 15.

work in Fiji said the Chiefs had "implicit trust in the Commodore".¹ Moreover, before leaving London he visited the missionary headquarters, which must have commended him to McArthur, who, if he did not meet the Commodore personally, must have influenced him indirectly through the Wesleyan Missionary Society. And the Rev. Langham, head of the Wesleyans in Fiji, who, as a believer in Fiji for the Fijians was by no means an annexationist, wrote of Goodenough and Layard:

"Unquestionably they are the men for the work...."² The most noticeable trait in Goodenough's character was his self-discipline and inflexible devotion to duty. Capt. Moresby admired his "fine scientific and sailor-like qualities, his promptitude, his iron nerve",³ and if some of his men might have irreverently called him 'holy Joe', an Australian acquaintance remarked on his "resolution and fixedness of purpose". It is only in the light of such views of his character that Goodenough's actions in Fiji be judged. Just before writing his report he admitted that he had seen annexation as "a positive duty".⁴

Having decided, then, that annexation was the only solution to Fiji's problems the Commodore went about achieving it with his usual resolution. He told Goschen that if a crisis occurred he would hoist the British flag beside Fiji's "as a Protectorate for a time"⁵, and he would make the Government submit all its acts to the foreign consuls. He told Thakombau and Thurston on 22 December 1873 that when Layard arrived they would call a public meeting to find out if the chiefs and people desired annexation".⁶ Reluctantly agreeing to such a meeting Thakombau now said he wished to keep the islands; the letter of January 1873 "was an invitation to come and talk about it". Thurston was probably nearer the truth when he said "You must know, Commodore Goodenough, that this question was put at

1. Mrs. Goodenough, Memoir, p. 117.

2. Langham to McArthur 13.ii.1873 (copy) in Chesson to Carnarvon 8.v.1874. CO/83/5.

3. J.Moresby, New Guinea and Polynesia (1876) p. 278.

4. Mrs. Goodenough, Memoir, p. 117.

5. Goodenough to Goschen 2.xii.1873. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/44 p.4.

6. 1st. Progress Report 13.ii.1874. CO/808/2 p. 60.

a time of great difficulty".¹

Layard did not arrive until 1 January 1874, so this gave Goodenough six weeks to tour the islands and talk to the settlers. He found them so opposed to the Government that he reported privately, "I have consequently had the disagreeable task of keeping the contending sides asunder in this quarrelsome... little place which is full of idle penniless people on the one hand and rather highhanded government men on the other".² He decided that annexation by either New South Wales or New Zealand would be objectionable and thought that Fiji should be made a Crown Colony under a politico-military officer with North-West Frontier experience.³ Layard agreed with the Commodore when he arrived and privately he urged annexation in a letter to Wylde:

"for God's sake let there be no delay after our report is sent it, or I shall not be able to restrain these folk, and they will one side or the other draw blood. If it is 'nay', nothing can stop a fight".⁴

The commission began its self-appointed task of securing annexation in January 1874 by publishing their intentions. They announced, in language which Goodenough admitted "looks babyish"⁵, that they were "two chiefs" come to enquire whether the Fijians wanted annexation, that their object was the peace and welfare of Fiji. But their intentions were unmistakeable:

"It is no new thing for England to govern Islands like Fiji. She owns and governs in several parts of the world a great number of similar Islands to Fiji, and it will be very easy for her to govern Fiji, and preserve its peace, and promote the welfare and prosperity of its people.

But England will never take Fiji by force or stealth if the king and chiefs do not wish to give it...

But there is one matter to be considered by the king and chiefs of Fiji, they must know that the number of Foreigners in Fiji will greatly increase from year to year, as well as their property, and their residence in Fiji will cause, or create, great intricacies, and for these reasons

1. Goodenough to Ad. 14.i.1874. copy in FO/58/142 p. 371.

2. Goodenough to Milne 27.xii.1873. Private (extract). PRO.30/6/44 p.11.

3. Abstract of letters to Goschen in Hunt to Carnarvon 22.v.1874. Ibid. p.20.

4. Layard to Wylde 14.i.1874. Private. FO/58/139 p.30.

5. Goodenough's Journal, III, 14.i.1874.

the king and chiefs must think and study well over the matter, whether they will be able to conduct their¹ government in the future, under more difficult circumstances, or not".

Like Clarke in Malaya, Goodenough had been sent to inquire and report, but like Clarke at Pengkor, and during the same week, he had decided to solve the problem and report afterwards. He tried, in fact, to persuade the chiefs to accept annexation.

This was not easy. The commission's first Progress Report (13 February 1874) indicated that after their meeting with Thurston, Ma'afu and Thakombau on 26 January they thought a request for annexation might follow soon. But Goodenough would not agree to the salaries and position demanded by Thakombau and the chiefs, and the second Progress Report (19 March 1874) announced the rejection of annexation. The crucial meetings, when the Fijian chiefs gathered to consider whether to accept annexation, took place in the early days of March 1874. Once again the evidence is confused and contradictory, but the Rev. F. Langham told Goodenough on 1 March that he suspected that Thurston and the Government were scheming against annexation.² Apparently on the 2nd Thurston told four leading chiefs, "openly I have said that I am in favour of annexation, but you know that I am not and that I can keep the government going".³ Goodenough was told that on the 3rd the Ministers spoke against annexation and that Thakombau lost his temper with them⁴ and said "I will send for the Commodore tomorrow morning, and give the country to Britain".⁵ The commissioners attended on the 5th, and when the chiefs

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1. Correspondence between Commission and Chiefs, published by Thurston 12.i.1874. FO/58/139 p.33. This is the letter on which Ward seems to have based his criticisms. In the FO. Tenterden wrote, 10.iii.1874: "I thought that Layard and Goodenough were to inquire and report not invite a plebiscite for annexation" Herbert said the same in the CO. and Lowther said they would have to bear this strong bias in mind when they saw the report.
 2. Goodenough's Journal, III, 1.iii.1874.
 3. Statement by Langham, Journal, IV, 29.ix.1874.
 4. Statement by Moore, Journal, III, 3.iii.1874.
 5. Statement by Swanston, Journal, III, 11.iii.1874.

wanted to know their position in a British colony, Layard explained the system in Ceylon. Ma'afu advocated annexation and Thakombau seemed disposed to accept, but that night some of the chiefs, and possibly Thurston and Woods, caused him to change his mind. On 6 March annexation was formally rejected, the Government resigned, and Thurston was asked to assume the government himself.¹ Thurston's actions are not easy to explain. Professor Henderson believed that he was motivated by vanity and personal ambition to be the despotic ruler of Fiji. But Sir Arthur Gordon's judgement on Thurston should not be despised,² and it should be pointed out that Goodenough certainly appeared to be forcing the pace with Thakombau, while he placed the interests of the settlers very high. In his first argument with Thurston the Commodore said the British Government "had a paramount duty to perform to English residents, that was the *raison d'etre* of being here at all".³ Yet it hard to avoid the conclusion that for some reason Thurston did not want annexation at this stage, and had deceived the commissioners. He had a week of acrimonious correspondence with Layard while Goodenough went off to assist a steamer aground at Kandavu. When the Commodore returned he told Swanston on 11 March that he had "tried to believe in Thurston's straightforwardness but have not been able to do so, I am convinced of the contrary now from all that he has done".⁴ The Commodore, therefore, decided to defeat Thurston: "we forbid Mr Thurston accepting office. Should he persist we then remove him for a while to his plantation... It is the only way".⁵ He began secret negotiation with Thakombau

1. 2nd Progress Report 19.iii.1874, with memo. on meeting (based on the Journal) CO/808/2 pp. 74-78.

2. See above p.269.

3. Goodenough's Journal, II, 26.xi.1873.

4. Journal, III, 11.iii.1874.

5. Ibid. 12.iii.1874. Cf. Henderson, (Hist. of Govt. in Fiji, II, p.478) : "The truth would appear to be that, at this stage of his career, he [Thurston] was not the kind of man who should have been entrusted with supreme power. The moral qualities of his nature were too liable to be overborne by vanity and vindictiveness, and also by anxiety for his own advancement and aggrandisement".

through Lieut. Oliver R.M. and Marshall Moore, and on 14 March 1874 he heard that Thakombau was willing to ask the chiefs to reconsider the matter.¹ He met Thakombau on the 17th and next day, after a tense meeting with Thurston, accepted "the disclaimer of bad intention" which the latter made.² He shortly heard (although he did not believe it) that Thurston was trying to get the chiefs to withdraw their refusal of annexation. But Thurston was true to his word, and Goodenough wrote, "That liar is a good deal cleverer than I am, having the native chiefs at his back".³

Thus Goodenough's patience and persistence were rewarded. On 20 March 1874 the commission accepted provisionally the cession of Fiji to Great Britain. Important conditions were attached, which would be unacceptable in London, for Thakombau offered "the Government of the Islands, but not the soil or the Fijian people", but the commission had taken a big unauthorised step and they accepted.⁴ Goodenough was sure he had done right and wrote, "now I must work heart and soul to get the Govt. to take the islands or all will be worse than before, a great deal worse".⁵

The new situation in Fiji at the end of 1873 and Goodenough's early bias in favour of annexation was obvious to Carnarvon all along. Although he was genuinely interested in the colonial empire, he was by no means pleased with the Commodore's efforts. After seeing his private letters to Coschen, he consulted Derby at the Foreign Office⁶ and telegraphed to the Governor of New South Wales to warn Goodenough that hoisting the flag as a protectorate would complicate matters, and

1. Journal, II, 14.iii.1874.

2. Ibid. 18.iii.1874.

3. Ibid. 19.iii.1874.

4. Goodenough & Layard to Carnarvon 20.iii.1874. CO/83/5.

5. Journal, III, 21.iii.1874.

6. Carnarvon to Derby 23.ii.1874. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/8 p. 10.

that no steps should be taken until the home Government considered the matter.¹ Miss Drus suggests that Goodenough may have received this before the 20 March session and ignored it, but this is most unlikely.² Carnarvon told a deputation of the Aboriginies Protection Society, who saw him on 6 March 1874 to give their views on the Gold Coast and Fiji policies, that he was awaiting the Commission's report, but he made the significant statement that annexation for Fiji would not necessarily solve the labour traffic in the South Seas.³ Thus at this early stage, even before he had decided about Fiji, he had realised the problem which he would later meet with the Western Pacific High Commission.

The first Progress Report indicating that the commissioners favoured a crown colony in Fiji reached the Colonial Office on 7 April 1874, and caused Holland to say that they were not dealing with the instructions.⁴ But even greater shocks were in store, for next day, on 8 April, the telegram arrived announcing the preliminary session of 20 March 1874.⁵ The matter was immediately prepared for the Cabinet and Carnarvon warned Disraeli that the time approached for a decision on Fiji.⁶

The picture began to look as it had in Gladstone's day: Colonial Secretary telling Prime Minister the matter was urgent, commissioner's report being made the excuse for delay; then on 14 April the redoubtable McArthur calling attention in the Commons to newspaper reports of the 20 March session. Carnarvon hedged when he reported to the Lords on 20 April by saying that he had no official confirmation and that the commissioners appeared to have disobeyed their orders.

He agreed, as had Gladstone and Kimberley before, that New Zealand experience

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1. Carnarvon to Robinson (tg) 23.ii.1874 (copy) FO/58/142 p. 323.
 2. Drus, *op. cit.* p. 105, fn. 4. The letter from the Gov. of N.S.W. with the substance of the telegram is pasted in the Journal, III, at 6.iv.1874. Goodenough told Carnarvon it arrived after the session (Private 18.iv.1874, PRO.30/6/44 p. 18) and judging by his character it is unlikely he lied to the Sec. of State, specially when the Gov. of N.S.W. knew all about it.
 3. The Times, 7.iii.1874, clipping in CO/83/5.
 4. Ibid. Goodenough & Layard to Carnarvon 13.ii.1874, and minutes.
 5. Ad. to FO. 8.iv.1874. with telegram. FO/58/1444 p. 448.
 6. Carnarvon to Disraeli 11.iv.1874. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/11 p. 9.

would be born in mind.¹

The Goodenough-Layard report did not arrive until 10 June 1874 and Carnarvon revealed no opinions until then. But in the Colonial Office there was hostility to the preliminary cession. When they heard that the debts of the Fiji Government amounted to £87,145. 9. 2.², one member of the Office thought the whole affair was an intrigue by Thurston who was holding out for better terms. Holland was especially hostile, and when Herbert read the terms of the cession he saw Britain left with "apparently little more than the high privilege of governing at the cost of this country".³ Still silent in May, Carnarvon agreed it was a "difficult question", but he insisted on awaiting the report.⁴ On 18 May Robinson telegraphed to say that the Government of New South Wales demanded annexation.⁵ By the end of May 1874 the question became so urgent in London, with conflicting opinions being pressed from all sides, that Carnarvon wrote to Goodenough saying the Progress Reports and the 20 March cession made him await the full report with "increased anxiety".⁶

When it arrived, the Report was accompanied by a private letter. Aside from the usual arguments on the commercial possibilities of Fiji, its position for trans-Pacific steamer lines, its strategic position for suppressing kidnapping, Goodenough said that the lawlessness of the British settlers pointed to annexation. If Consuls like Jones had had magisterial powers years before a well-ordered white community might have grown up, but now it was too late.⁷ The actual report was a somewhat unsystematic document, but bearing in mind the commissioners' aim (their own version of it) it dealt with most of the problems which a new crown

1. 3 Hansard, ccxvii, cols. 544-5 & 809-810.

2. Financial Report by Thos. Horton (Manager of Fiji Bank) & Carl Sahl (German Consul-Gen in Sydney) 16.iii.1874. CO/808/1 p.9.

3. Min. by Herbert on Goodenough & Layard to Carnarvon 20.iii.1874. CO/83/5.

4. Ibid. Min. by Carnarvon 6.v.1874.

5. Robinson to Carnarvon (tg) 18.v.1874. CO/808/2 p. 103.

6. Carnarvon to Goodenough & Layard 22.v.1874. Ibid. pp. 103-4.

7. Goodenough to Carnarvon 18.iv.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/44 p. 17.

colony administration would have to meet, although Goodenough later expressed his dissatisfaction with it.¹ A short history of the recent government was not hostile to Thurston; indeed it said that when he came to power in 1872 he had the confidence of everybody. Where the commissioners quarrelled with Thurston was on the realities of politics in Fiji. Thurston, they said, believed in a theoretical unity in the islands with Thakombau governing through his ministers in the interests of the Fijians. The commissioners, while sympathetic to the theory, found that in practice the Fijians did not appreciate the ministers' efforts. They summarised recent history in Fiji as follows:

"A native chief has been raised to supreme power, by the white population. In working a constitution under him the latter have found themselves, as a matter of fact the disposers of the interests of the natives. A Ministry which at first rested on the support of the whites, has, by raising an armed force, felt it possible to make itself independent of them, and has sought to govern the country on the theory of preserving native interests and treating whites as aliens. In the course² of two years they have spent about £124,000 and are £87,000 in debt".

If Fiji were not annexed, the report went on, the Consul would have to receive magisterial powers and R.N. vessels would have to be employed to purge the labour traffic of abuses, but this would amount to a protectorate and a "Protectorate of an undefined and inconvenient character".³ Since there was an almost unanimous demand for annexation Fiji should be made a crown colony on the Ceylon or Singapore model. Here was a clearly stated conclusion; the rest of the report concerned all the various problems - financial, administrative - which would have to be solved. In the same mail as the Report came despatches from the nearby British colonies; Premier Parkes of New South Wales supported annexation because of Fiji's commercial and strategic position and from a vague fear of foreign intervention,⁴ and Governor Fergusson of New Zealand reminded Carnarvon that the

1. Re-reading it 15 Sept. 1874 he wrote: "It is too staccato & does not sufficiently show my own opinion for my own justification". Journal, IV, 15.ix.1874.

2. Goodenough & Layard Report, 13.iv.1874. CO/808/3 p.4.

3. *Ibid.* p.6.

4. Robinson to Carnarvon 10.iv.1874. CO/201/577.

Fiji Banking and Commercial Company, which had lent money to the Fiji Government, was a New Zealand concern.¹

As Carnarvon did not announce the Conservative Government's policy until he spoke to the House of Lords on 17 July 1874, and since he kept silent in public until then, it is impossible to discover when he really made up his mind over Fiji. He was perturbed by Goodenough's activities but he seemed to put off a decision until after the Report arrived. Yet he told a strong deputation from the "Fiji Committee" and the Aborigines Protection Society which he saw on 4 July 1874² that the whole question of annexations was being considered as the "waste places of the earth were being filled up", but he had no comprehensive policy of annexations; each case would be judged on its merits.³

His undated memoranda indicate that it was after this deputation that Carnarvon⁴ seriously formulated his policy. On 6 July he told Disraeli's secretary that a Cabinet decision was urgent,⁵ and on the 9th he sent Derby, Salisbury and Disraeli the draft of a telegram for Governor Robinson of New South Wales instructing him to visit Fiji, tell the inhabitants that the preliminary cession with its conditions could not be accepted, and to find out if an unconditional cession was possible. The telegram was not actually sent until 10 August, but clearly it was early in July that Carnarvon made up his mind to accept Fiji if it was offered without conditions. Interviewing people acquainted with the islands, and reading up on the subject⁶ for the past months, he had satisfied

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1. Fergusson to Carnarvon 13.iv.1874. CO/808/2 p. 184.
 2. Including McArthur, and his brother Alexander; others MP's, Dixon, Young, Salt, Jenkins, Kinnaid, Corry; some colonial representatives; and Rev. W.B. Boyce Gen. Secretary of the Wesleyan Missionary Society.
 3. The Times. 4.vii.1874.
 4. In the Carnarvon Papers, (PRO.30/6/51), some jottings about the discussion with the deputation, possibly made during the meeting, serve roughly to date these notes, which were obviously also used in drafting his speech in the Lords.
 5. Carnarvon to Corry 6.vii.1874. Disraeli Papers, XII.
 6. He summarised Goodenough's letters to the Admiralty, and Layard's to the FO. He interviewed naval men like Stirling, Goodenough's predecessor, and he read books like Seemann's Viti and Britton's Fiji in 1870 - a collection of articles from the Sydney Morning Herald. He also made his own summary of the Report.

himself that there were good reasons for annexation:

- "1. Convenient depot from wh. to exercise police supervision.
2. English settlers - English capital - English crime - wanted an English Government... chaos in prospect.
3. Kidnapping.
4. A convenient stepping stone.
5. Objection by Australians to foreign neighbours.
6. Desire of Aust and NZ for them to become British.
7. H. of C.
8. Probably ultimately paying - like other group of islands like Bahamas etc etc wh. do just pay even with their Assemblies. But if governed as Crown Colony it may pay better.
9. Tolerably healthy.
10. Although it does not: whole₁ kidnapping area it does form centre of it - and where employed".

He also scribbled - "But not a question of money. Mission of England. A spirit of adventure fill up waste places of earth".² Moreover he was assured of the general assistance of New South Wales, and New Zealand specifically offered to govern Fiji.³ Carnarvon possibly thought the annexation of Fiji could be made into an act of imperial co-operation.

The decision was made public when Carnarvon presented the Commission's Report in the House of Lords on 17 July 1874. He announced that the Government could not decline the offer of cession; that a Crown Colony "of rather a severe type" was the only system of government that could be entertained. His speech was delivered with a curious modesty and its theme was reminiscent of his speech on the Gold Coast policy.

"I am loathe to use words which seem too strong for the occasion and therefore I hardly like to say that England has a mission to extend her policy of colonization in this part of the world, but at all events it does seem to me that there is an indirect duty which lies upon us, as far as we can, to take under our protection a place into which English capital has overflowed, in which English settlers are resident, in which, it must be added, English lawlessness is going on, and in which the establishment of English institutions has been unsuccessfully attempted...." ⁴

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1. Memoranda PRO.30/6/51 p. 23 (back) & 24.
 2. Ibid. back of p.22.
 3. Robinson to Carnarvon 14.v.1874. PRO.30/6/25 p.59. Fergusson to Carnarvon 13.iv.1874. CO/209/232. Herbert at first wrote on the latter (11.vi.1874), "Yes, New Zealand might be able to govern Fiji better and more cheaply than this country could".
 4. 3 Hansard, ccxxi, col. 185.

Here was a touch of the grandeur of "that greatest of all political questions - the unity and maintainance of the Empire",¹ yet Carnarvon insisted that the case had been judged solely on its merits and should not be linked with his Gold Coast speech on 12 May. Kimberley made a non-committal speech for the Liberals, but could hardly have objected to a policy which was virtually his own. Granville was not so enthusiastic, fearing "a leap into the dark at a very long distance".²

McArthur was listening to Carnarvon's statement and he returned to the Commons chamber greatly excited. On 4 August 1874 he moved the House to support the decision to send Robinson to Fiji and so doing he gave Gladstone the opportunity to make a final onslaught at annexation. The Goodenough-Layard Report, he said, was one of the most chaotic public documents he had ever seen - even if his understanding of it was not particularly thorough. It spoke of the Fijian as being in a relation of "undefined serfdom" to the chiefs; what was this but another name for slavery? The question of Thakombau's debts, which, as everyone had now forgotten, was at the bottom of the Fiji involvement, might bring the country to the threshold of another Alabama crisis with the U.S.A. "I see disagreeable and distorted phantoms stalking across the stage of this House. I see new Votes in the Estimates - new Votes for future wars in Fiji - new Votes for future engagements - a reproduction in aggravated form of all we have had to lament in New Zealand".³ McArthur, his motions, his pamphlet, and his "sadly deluded philanthropy" did not escape his party leader's scorn. Knatchbull-Hugessen reminded the House of Kimberley's four alternatives, and said that since three had failed annexation alone remained. The Gold Coast policy was alluded to by many of the speakers and one pointed to the apparent paradox that in the ^{case of the} Gold Coast it was pleaded that they could not retreat from commitments on the coast; here

1. Carnarvon to K-Hugessen 18.viii.1874. (copy). PRO.30/6/44 p.145.

2. 3 Hansard, ccxxi, col. 197.

3. Ibid. col. 1287.

there was no commitment, but the House was asked to enter one. One member wanted to leave the "Methodists and cannibals" to settle matters between themselves.

Disraeli noted the tone of the debate and no doubt remembered his difficult moments over the Gold Coast policy. The Cabinet was pre-occupied with internal ructions over the Public Worship Bill and Disraeli was not happy at the idea of the imperial Treasury guaranteeing the initial expenses of Crown Colony government in Fiji. Thus first a Cabinet meeting, then the whole question was "indefinitely postponed". Carnarvon protested on 7 August 1874 and complained that "after all, the matter resolved itself into one of confidence in the judgment of the Minister who is responsible",¹ so Disraeli told him he would leave Fiji "entirely in your hands".²

As soon as he received this assurance from the Prime Minister Carnarvon sent the telegram which had been drafted in July before the Lords debate. Disraeli was out of humour at this time after the tiring Parliamentary session and the Cabinet troubles, and he was out of town. As with other matters he placed complete trust at this stage in Carnarvon. Nevertheless he must have been rather startled with Carnarvon's speed with Fiji. The telegram was sent to Robinson as soon as Disraeli's letter was received, and by the time the Prime Minister was back in London for the autumn Cabinets Fiji was annexed.

Sir Hercules Robinson reached Fiji on 23 September. He found there was still some opposition to the cession, but he evidently made an excellent impression on the chiefs; where Goodenough had been diffident and kept offering help and asking Thakombau if he had any questions, Sir Hercules was masterly and 'chief-like'.³ He had a frank discussion with Thakombau on board HMS Dido on 25

1. Carnarvon to Disraeli 7.viii.1874. Disraeli Papers, XII.

2. Disraeli to Carnarvon 8.viii.1874, quoted in Hardinge, Life of Carnarvon, II, p.74.

3. See account of overheard conversation in David Wilkinson to Hutchins 22.x.1874 (copy) in PRO.30/6/25 p. 75.

September, who said "If matters remain as they are Fiji will become like a piece of driftwood in the sea and be picked up by the first passer by".¹ The King consulted his council, and on 28 September offered the islands unconditionally to the governor. The Deed of Cession was signed on 30 September 1874, Fiji was proclaimed a Crown Colony on 10 October, and Thakombau symbolized the passing of the old regime in Fiji by presenting his favourite war club to Queen Victoria.

Carnarvon was able to report the successful annexation of Fiji to Disraeli in the same letter as he requested permission to go ahead with the abolition of slavery on the Gold Coast.² Disraeli was impressed; "He seems very busy annexing provinces to the Empire"... "Carnarvon seems to be distinguishing himself"³ Kimberley and Knatchbull-Hugessen both seemed pleased; it was as if their own prophecies had been fulfilled,⁴ and even Gladstone promised to stop making trouble when he learnt that his friend Sir Arthur Gordon had accepted the governorship, as he drew a "strong distinction between the policy of annexation and the execution of that policy when determined on".⁵ Carnarvon was delighted with Robinson's successful visit to Fiji - "It is like a dream".⁶

Carnarvon refuses Rotuma, Samoa and New Guinea.

After deciding on the annexation of Fiji, Carnarvon turned to settle the other outstanding questions concerning the South Pacific. Rotuma islanders had asked for annexation,⁷ New Zealand still coveted Samoa, Australians were looking

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1. Robinson to Carnarvon 3.x.1874. CO/83/5.
 2. Carnarvon to Disraeli 6.x. PRO.30/6/11 p. 26.
 3. To Lady Bradford 18.x.1874 & Lady Chesterfield 20.x.1874. Zetland, The Letters of Disraeli to Lady Bradford and Lady Chesterfield, I, pp.
 4. Kimberley to Gladstone 4.xi.1874. Gladstone Papers 44225/154. Brabourne Diary pp. 732-733.
 5. Gordon to Carnarvon 1.xi.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/39.
 6. Carnarvon to Disraeli 27.x.1874. Disraeli Papers XII.
 7. A request from the Wesleyan Rev. John Osborne (5.viii.1872) that the chiefs feared the French and wished Britain to take possession was in Ad. to CO. 19.ii.1873 (CO/201/575). Kimberley put off the decision until after Fiji was settled, and later said they should consider it along with the Thurston letter of Jan. 1873, but this was not done. Herbert reminded Carnarvon in Oct. 1874.

anxiously at New Guinea, Vogel continued to press for the Chartered Company, but although after the Goodenough-Layard Report Carnarvon had seemed anxious to complete the annexation of Fiji, he opposed further annexations in the Pacific. "For the present at least I think we may leave Rotuma beyond the limits of the Empire", he wrote, "the day may come when it and possibly other islands may be included but this is hardly yet".¹ Indeed, if Rotuma was included in the Fiji Islands he thought it might alarm people as a 'new annexation'. Future expansion in the Pacific, then, was not ruled out, but for the present Carnarvon regarded Fiji as a trial case of administration of a Pacific island.

A few days after the Rotuma decision Herbert suggested that Carnarvon should answer all schemes of the Vogel type by saying:

"the establishment of a separate Colonial Government in Fiji will afford HMG increased facilities for considering requirements of this country & British subjects in the Pacific, and for the present you are not prepared to decide for or against any particular schemes for the development of British influence among the islands".²

Yet if Herbert personally disliked Vogel and agreed in principle that a halt should be called for a time to annexation in the Pacific while experience was gained in Fiji, he was still interested in Samoa and New Guinea and the idea of the Chartered Company. He said the New Guinea question might be solved by such a company, and if Vogel's desire for New Zealand's control over Samoa was not seriously entertained in London, it is evident that the American interest in Samoa gradually convinced Herbert that there must be some value in the group. Therefore neither the Trading Company scheme nor Samoa were rejected out of hand in 1874. It was not until August when, after sending Robinson to Thakombau, Carnarvon decided that Fiji would be enough for the time being.

The fall of Gladstone's Government had caused Vogel's scheme for the South

1. Min. by Carnarvon 1.xi.1874 on FO. to CO. 21.iii.1873. CO/83/3.

2. Min. by Herbert 7.xi.1874 on Fergusson to Carnarvon 24.vi.1874. CO/209/232.

Pacific chartered company to be dropped in mid-stream. Gladstone's own slightly favourable reception of the idea was not intimated to the New Zealanders, so Vogel's plan was yet another of the problems confronting Carnarvon in his first days of office. He was given the papers concerning both Samoa and the Trading Company on 25 February 1874, when he also read of Col. Steinberger's first visit to Samoa and the fact that he returned to the U.S.A. with a petition from the foreign residents requesting an American protectorate. But Goodenough, who had called at Samoa on his way to Fiji,¹ had played-down the Steinberger visit and the idea of an American protectorate; he believed the Americans were only interested in Pago Pago harbour.² Herbert also thought it unlikely that the Americans would assume a protectorate, but if they created a precedent for responsibilities so far from home, he had the impression that Samoa was a better bargain than Fiji. And "as it is not likely that we shall take possession in any form of the Navigators Islands, we may be well satisfied to see the Americans there".³

Herbert's attitude to the proposed chartered company is difficult to define. When he showed Carnarvon the unsent draft of 6 February which embodied Gladstone's and Kimberley's views, he said he thought Vogel was advocating "a very speculative and audacious policy".⁴ Yet on other occasions he was attracted to the idea of the company. Carnarvon trod very cautiously: "Visionary - dangerous - open to speculation & corruption etc", he noted.⁵ The despatch with Gladstone's views said the Government was prepared to consider a chartered company and agreed that if it was approved it would be based in Australasia.⁶ Carnarvon sent a much more guarded despatch. He objected to the intended monopoly, to the obvious

1. Goodenough's Journal, I, 6 to 8.xi.1873.

2. Goodenough to Admiralty 14.xi.1873 in Ad. to CO. 20.ii.1874. CO/83/5.

3. Min. by Herbert 25.ii.1874 on FO. to CO. 21.ii.1874. CO/209/233.

4. Memo. by Herbert 25.ii.1874 on Fergusson to Kimberley 24.xi.1873. CO/209/230.

5. Memo. 26.ii.1874. Carnarvon Papers. PRO.30/6/51 p.3.

6. Draft by Herbert 6.ii.1874 on Fergusson to Kimberley 24.xi.1873. CO/209/230.

political ambitions of the company to build great dominions like India and Canada.¹ These objections were included in the reply to Vogel's memorandum of 23 November 1873, which was finally sent on 5 March 1874. Gladstone's invitation to send further details remained; Carnarvon said the British Government could not resist the creation of new settlements "within a reasonable distance of the Australasian colonies", but since foreign powers were involved in the commerce of the islands too, great caution was needed. Herbert's hand can surely be detected in the final paragraph: "I need not inquire how far the term neighbouring is applicable to such distances as the interval between the islands and New Zealand or Australia."² Vogel's scheme, then, was not rejected, but he received no encouragement to rash action. Carnarvon probably handled Vogel with more finesse than Kimberley did. Both Samoa and the Trading Company were quietly put off once again until after the Fiji decision.

Yet Samoa still seemed to hold some fascination for the Colonial Office. When they read a copy of Steinberger's report to President Grant in June 1874, Herbert wrote, "I believe there is no doubt that this is a better group of Islands than Fiji".³ In fact, when it became evident that Congress would not accept the petition for American protection he wondered "whether we should not (if a Colonial Government is established in Fiji) acquire the harbour". Lowther suggested they should make the Fiji decision an opportunity for considering a general policy for the South Pacific.⁴ The nearest approach to a general policy for the area, however, was in fact Vogel's plan for a chartered company, and in August 1874 Carnarvon decided that he had too much trouble on his hands in Fiji and that Vogel's company would only complicate matters at this stage. Carnarvon's general policy was embodied in the Western Pacific High Commission which fell short of Vogel's dreams, but did gain the latter's approval.

1. Ibid. Min. by Carnarvon 26.ii.1874. 2. Ibid. Draft by Herbert 5.iii.1874.
 3. Min. by Herbert 12.vi.1874 on FO. to CO. 2.vi.1874. CO/209/233.
 4. Mins. by Herbert & Lowther 22.vi.1874. on FO. to CO. 19.vi.1874. Ibid.

Vogel did not slacken in his advocacy of the company and possibly he alarmed the Colonial Office. When in May 1874 details arrived of a Bill embodying his scheme before the New Zealand Parliament, Herbert wrote, "Mr. Vogel's unscrupulousness and Sir J. Fergusson's pliability threaten us with a more awkward difficulty than we have in Fiji".¹ Vogel had been quite frank. He looked to a mighty federated empire with irresistible world-wide naval power, and he saw New Zealand as the natural metropolis of Polynesia. Since Great Britain would not move towards this (even though force of circumstance might force her to take Fiji) Vogel considered what New Zealand might do. "It seems to me", he wrote on 5 February 1874, "that New Zealand may earn for reluctant Great Britain - without committing her to responsibilities she fears - a grand island Dominion".² To this end the New Zealand Government made an agreement with Frederick Whitaker, a New Zealand financier who was also Chairman of the Fiji Banking & Commercial Company, to form a joint stock company, with capital of £1 million and headquarters in Auckland, to carry on business of merchants, shipowners, planters, producers, manufacturers, brokers, agents, insurers, bankers, and money lenders in the Pacific Islands, New Zealand and Great Britain. The political motive was not mentioned in the Bill before the colonial Parliament, but as Herbert did not fail to realise Vogel saw New Zealand in a "metropolitan position in the Pacific".³ The same motive was obviously behind the creation of the Fiji Bank, and the New Zealand offer to administer Fiji on the argument that she was better fitted by proximity, racial experience and financial involvement.⁴

Vogel's frankness and persistence did not commend him to Whitehall. Lowther said his scheme should be promptly 'snuffed out',⁵ and Herbert thought New

1. Min. by Herbert 17.v.1874 on Fergusson to Kimberley 12.iii.1874. CO/209/232.

2. Vogel Memo. 5.ii.1874 in Fergusson to Kimberley 11.ii.1874. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 17.v.1874.

4. See above p.362.

5. Min. by Lowther 18.v.1874. on Fergusson to Kimberley 11.iii.1874 cited.

Zealand's answer to the despatch of 5 March was 'impertinent'.¹ In it the charge of monopoly was answered by the remark that other colonies were at liberty to subsidize similar companies. British enterprise in the Pacific, it went on, could not be repressed; Britain should not check New Zealand because it was more enterprising than the jealous Australian colonies. By the time Carnarvon read this Robinson had already been sent to Fiji. The Colonial Secretary decided that the problems of administration there were going to be too big to be complicated by the new set of problems which the Trading Company would create.² Therefore he wrote privately to the Marquis of Normanby, Fergusson's successor as Governor of New Zealand, telling him not to encourage Vogel, that Fiji was now an additional reason for not going ahead with the chartered company.³ At the end of 1874 Samoa was also taken from New Zealand's hands and negotiations were transferred to Berlin.⁴

While the New Zealanders were looking far and wide over the South Pacific with particularly long glances at Samoa, the Australians were showing renewed excitement about New Guinea and also began to cast their eyes on the Pacific Islands. Therefore after annexing Fiji, and quieting the New Zealanders over Samoa and the company, Carnarvon had to formulate a policy in the even more tricky case of New Guinea.

The Dutch claimed West New Guinea up to the line of Meridian 141°, but the South-eastern end of the island had been surveyed by the Royal Navy. The

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1. Min. by Herbert 11.vii.1874 on Fergusson to Carnarvon 8.v.1874. Secret. CO/209/232. From the tone of the despatch Herbert suspected it was Vogel's work.
 2. Ibid. Min. by Carnarvon 28.viii.1874 & Carnarvon to Fergusson 4.ix.1874. (draft)
 3. Carnarvon to Normanby 20.viii.1874. Private & Confid. (copy). PRO.30.6/25 p. 30.
 4. A Vogel memo. 22.vi.1874 re-iterating New Zealand's ambitions to beat the Americans to Samoa and expressing fears of Germany was given the reply that Fiji was to be a trial case in the Pacific. (Fergusson to Carnarvon 24.vi.1874 & Carnarvon to Fergusson 11.xi.1874 (draft). CO/209/233). In Dec. 1874 von Bulow gave assurances that Germany was not officially interested in Samoa. Ibid. FO. to CO. 18.xii.1874.

Admiralty had begun its survey's in Torres Strait in 1842 when this route was used increasingly by ships plying between New South Wales and India and China. Between 1845 and 1850 Captain's Blackwood of HMS Fly, Yule of HMS Bramble and Owen Stanley of HMS Rattlesnake had charted parts of the coast of South-east New Guinea.¹ In 1846 Yule of the Bramble ran up the Union Jack, taking formal possession (in the vague, informal, R.N. way) of the South-east coast of the island.² As shipping through the Straits increased and pearl fisheries developed the Queensland Government founded a settlement at Somerset, near Cape York, in 1864 with Imperial and Colonial financial help. The post was founded to police Torres Strait and assist ships in distress, although some optimists thought it would become another Singapore.³

Before Disraeli's 1874 government there had been four abortive schemes to colonise East New Guinea. The first began in the spring of 1867, when, after a public lecture in Sydney, a New Guinea Company began to organise a 'Pioneer Expedition' to trade with the Papuans, explore the island and to pave the way for land purchases and settlement. The company urged the imperial government to confirm Yule's informal annexation and it asked for imperial grants to pay for some scientists and teachers in New Guinea. No material support was forthcoming from Henry Parkes, the Premier of New South Wales, who passed the matter to the home government with a vague blessing.⁴

In the Colonial Office Rogers deplored the stated aim of the company to drag the imperial government into more colonization. With Australia crying out for labour he thought it insane to throw lives and money into new tropical territory. Frederick Elliot threw the whole weight of his Colonial Office

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1. Memo. by Capt. Frederick Evans, Admiralty Hydrographer, 2.vii.1875. CO/808/11 p. 3.
 2. Extract from Bramble's log, 16.iv.1846 in Capt. Richards to Dealtry 13.viii.1867. CO/201/542.
 3. Foresby, New Guinea, p.11.
 4. Gov. Young to Buckingham 31.v.1867 & 22.vi.1867. CO/201/542.

experience against the scheme:

"For the last 27 years it has fallen to my lot, in one capacity or another, to see every important question about new colonies or acquisition of Native Lands, and... this Department has always steadily resisted the monstrous doctrine that private persons can buy vast tracts of country from helpless¹ Natives for a bottle or two of rum and a few coats and trousers".

Rogers for no immediately apparent reason thought a German colony in New Guinea would be a good idea.² Sir Charles Adderley agreed that help should no be given to the Sydney venture, but he said they should not give an opinion on the general question; "who shall say that New Guinea shall not be settled, or that the Australian English should not settle it?"³ Buckingham agreed with Elliot and told the Australians what he also told those connected with similar projects in West Africa and Malaya: he was not concerned with travellers and explorers, but he could sanction no settlement, settlers should expect no protection and that they ^{would} get no confirmation of land titles.⁴

The second New Guinea scheme took shape in March 1869 when J.A.Campbell formed a Trading Company to settle the interior of the island. He urged Sir Henry Keppel, commander of the China Station, to annex New Guinea. The Admiral supported the idea, suggesting to the Admiralty that Chinese immigrants could be taken from Hong Kong, but the Foreign Office refused.⁵

The third attempt was the ill-fated Maria expedition which was wrecked off the Great Barrier Reef in February 1872. Seventy young men of Sydney formed the New Guinea Prospecting Association at the end of 1871. Being ignorant of ships, let alone exploration and settlement, their efforts ended in disaster.⁶


The fourth period of interest came in 1873-4 after Captain Moresby's

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1. Ibid. Min. by Elliot 13.viii.1867 on Young to Buckingham 22.vi.1867.
 2. Ibid. Min. by Rogers 3.viii.1867 on Young to Buckingham 31.v.1867.
 3. Ibid. Min. by Adderley 13.iii.1867 on desp. of 22 June cited.
 4. Ibid. Buckingham to Young 14.ix.1867 (draft).
 5. FO. memo. on N.G. in FO. to CO. 26.vi.1875. CO/808/10 pp. 27-28.
 6. Belmore to Kimberley 29.xii.1871. CO/201/565. Cf. D.C.Gordon, The Australasia Frontier in New Guinea, 1870-1895 (1951) pp. 83-87.


discoveries, and the foundation of the first missionary settlements. In January 1873 the Rev. William Wyatt Gill, of the L.M.S., reported to the Colonial Treasurer of New South Wales that the first South Sea Island teachers had been located on the South-east of New Guinea in November 1872.¹ This missionary hoped, privately, that Great Britain would forestall the Germans, who were already interested in the area. German missionaries had begun work in 1855, but Codeffroy did not build its depot in New Britain until 1875.² Gill believed that one day Australia would take New Guinea, but that the time was not yet ripe.³ Another writer, named Rendall, reminded Kimberley in September 1873 of Moresby's acquisitions; he had apparently asked Palmerston at an earlier period to annex both Fiji and New Guinea, now he called on the Liberals to deny the criticisms in the Crystal Palace speech.⁴ A few days after he received this Kimberley was confronted with the plans of Col. James Scott of Melbourne, who wanted to know what the Government would do with the territory annexed by Moresby. Would they confirm the purchase of 10,000 acres from the Papuans, and the privilege of selecting 10,000 acres to be paid for to the British Government at a price to be fixed in consideration of the risks he would incur? Herbert's only comment was, "Scoundrels". Kimberley thought they had better find out what Moresby had taken.⁵

It is important to be clear that Moresby's discoveries were actually quite modest, but as his official report did not reach the Colonial Office until April 1874 exaggerated reports were allowed to circulate in Australia and England. Moresby was ordered to Torres Strait to check kidnapping in September 1872. He

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1. R. Lovett, The History of the London Missionary Society (1899), I, p. 442.
 2. Townshend, Origins of German Colonialism, p. 41.
 3. Rev. Gill to G.A. Lloyd 28.i.1873 in Robinson to Carnarvon. Confid. 7.ix.1874. CO/808/10 p. 16.
 4. Rendall to Kimberley 17.ix.1873. CO/201/576.
 5. Bowen to Kimberley 12.viii.1873. CO/309/110 & Scott to Carnarvon 26.vi.1874. CO/808/15 p. 26.



AUSTRALIA, NEW GUINEA AND THE ISLANDS



SKETCH OF MORESBY'S DISCOVERIES BASED ON HIS 1874 CHART

reached Somerset in January 1873 and finding no kidnapping to check he decided to go exploring in New Guinea, about which rumours had been flying in Sydney before he left. There was talk of Russian or Italian intervention and an expedition was said to be planning in San Francisco.¹ The boundary of the Australian Station fell short of New Guinea by 15 miles, but Moresby claimed later he had permission to visit New Guinea. The Eastern limit of his cruise was fixed at Meridian 148° but he had authority to pass this should it be necessary. Moresby decided to act on his own initiative. Reaching the Usborne River in February 1873 he chartered Port Moresby, which he named after his father,² and in April he discovered that certain land formerly thought to be part of the mainland constituted a series of islands. These he charted and took possession of and he called the seaway between the China Strait, which he thought would make a shorter route to China.³ Back at Sydney in July 1873 he was reprimanded by Commodore Stirling, who apparently "cared nothing at all for hydrography".⁴ This was all quite clearly understood in 1874, but in September 1873 all the Colonial Office gathered was that in a private letter to the Admiralty hydrographer Moresby had spoken of 'good harbours', 'fertile land', 'friendly natives' and 'gold'.⁶ The Standard reported on 1 October 1873 that Moresby had annexed all his discoveries.

In the autumn of 1873 the Colonial Office only had the vaguest of pictures of Moresby's exploits. Holland saw that it was obvious he had not annexed the whole island and he doubted whether they should recognise what he had. Herbert on the other hand as a former Premier of Queensland was alive to New Guinea's

1. Moresby, New Guinea, p. 168.

2. Moresby, Two Admirals (1909) p. 264.

3. Moresby, New Guinea, pp. 142-230.

4. Stirling to Admiralty 13.x.1873 (copy). CO/201/578 rec'd in CO. 20.iv.1874.

5. Goodenough's Journal, I, 13.x.1873. Goodenough was more sympathetic to Moresby, who he thought was 'tactless'; but he allowed Moresby to explore the North-east coast of New Guinea on his way home in 1874.

6. Ad. to CO. 15.ix.1873. CO/201/575.

importance to Australia. He was the one person in the Colonial Office who consistently advocated getting the South-east coast before anyone else, and between 1873 and 1875 he produced ingenious scheme after ingenious scheme to this end. He said Moresby had done right, "otherwise, another power might have stepped in and taken the part most valuable & nearest to Australia, leaving us the part which we are less likely to require, the western end of the main island"¹. But nothing was done in 1873; although Kimberley supported annexation in the case of Fiji, on the whole he deplored annexations in the Pacific. When he tried to reconcile Gladstone about the annexation of Fiji in 1874, he admitted that "the worst is we shall have pressure for further annexations in the Pacific", and he cited the Australian clamour for New Guinea.²

The New Guinea question was placed squarely before Carnarvon in March 1874 by Francis Labilliere, an Australian lawyer living in London. He had had some discussions on New Guinea with men like Yule of the Bramble in the summer of 1873, and judging by the phrases used in his letter to Carnarvon he probably knew the contents of Moresby's letters to the Admiralty. Realising that the Gladstone Government would probably rebuff him he had waited. Now in 1874 he wrote to Disraeli and Carnarvon placing New Guinea in the context of Britain's frontier in the tropics:

"good or bad, we cannot help having to do with [the Papuans]..for they must henceforth effect British interests much more than the Ashantees and the Fijians".

He said the Papuans should not be left to their own fate after what had happened in Fiji. Annexation by Britain was their best hope and this would also be best for imperial and colonial interests as New Guinea was a potential menace to Australia. Even if the Government wished to adhere to the policy of non-extension

1. Min. by Herbert 15.x.1873 on Ad. to CO. 14.x.1873. CO/309/111.

2. Kimberley to Gladstone 4.xi.1874. Gladstone Papers 44225/154.

Labilliere claimed that New Guinea was a good case for making an exception. "Our most prosperous Colonies never exhibited to first explorers such evidence of richness as New Guinea has displayed."¹

This was the strongest case for New Guinea yet made, and by this time the Admiralty had received Moresby's official report. Dealtry was able to borrow a copy for the Colonial Office. Herbert made Carnarvon quite clear as to his attitude:

"This is a much more important question to the Australian Colonies & to the Empire than that of the annexation of Fiji. The great wealth and extent of New Guinea and its close proximity to Australia render the question of its ownership a somewhat pressing one. I do not think there is any hope of our being able to keep clear of interference with New Guinea. The brutalities of our traders must demand our frequent presence whenever they commence operations on its coasts. I do not at all anticipate that the occupation of New Guinea if judiciously entered upon need be very costly. If a settlement (which might in the first instance be a penal establishment for Australia) were made on the south eastern & healthy part of the coast, & our ships employed to control & regulate trading operations, we should probably spend much less than by letting matters drift until we have to interfere, & probably fight, on a larger scale".²

How like Knatchbull-Hugessen this minute reads! Herbert suggested that they should sound the opinions of the Australasian governors and Carnarvon agreed.³

The replies were discouraging. The colonial governments vaguely endorsed British expansion, but offered no help; to New Zealanders New Guinea was of secondary importance beside Polynesia,⁴ South Australia had no suggestions, Western Australia was generally favourable but its governor did not think any Australian colony would take on the administration,⁵ and Governor Bowen of Victoria said the climate was not suitable for white settlement. Australians were interested in land, but Bowen agreed with Derby that Britain had 'black subjects enough'. As the Dutch claimed West New Guinea he was reminded of the

1. Labilliere to Carnarvon 26.iii.1874. CO/808/10 pp. 1-3. He said that he also sent a copy to Disraeli.

2. Minute. by Herbert 3.iv.1874. CO/234/34.

3. Circular to Australasian Governors 17.iv.1874. CO/808/10 p.4.

4. Fergusson to Carnarvon 2.vii.1874. CO/209/232.

5. CO/808/10 p.6.

Gold Coast troubles. Dutch settlements in New Guinea might one day be a thorn in the side ^{like} Elimina. Then the Dutch would have to be induced to give them up, so that 'New Guinea' would be as bad as 'old Guinea', and the Papuans would be more formidable than the Ashantis.¹

The most important answer came from New South Wales. Henry Parkes, the Premier, expressed the typical Australian view of expansion. Enclosing the Rev. Gill's 1873 letter with the German warning², he said there was no country with such attractions as New Guinea, and that if it was colonized by foreigners it would be an embarrassment to Australia. Sir Hercules Robinson (writing just before he set off for Fiji) agreed that the annexation of New Guinea would be popular, that Australia would benefit without having any expense, but he poured scorn on the whole idea. Within 10 degrees of the equator New Guinea would never be a home of white settlement; there was not even a white missionary. At best it could become a Java or a Ceylon. He saw little likelihood of foreign occupation, as any Power wanting naval bases would find more convenient islands, and Britain could not stop this. "It is scarcely to be anticipated that Great Britain will annex every available spot in the South Pacific".³ In London Herbert took up the cudgels again on behalf of the New Guinea proposal. Searching hard for a way out he disagreed heartily with Robinson,

"Perhaps Mr. Vogel's Polynesia Company might be developed into one in which all the Australasian colonies should unite for Colonization in Oceana generally... Sir H. Robinson does not sufficiently appreciate the evil that will probably result from some European power claiming and annexing all non-Dutch New Guinea. This is one of the dilemmas of Empire. The outcry will be loud when a Foreign Flag is hoisted 80 miles from Queensland. To hoist that of England need not be costly".⁴

By the time Queensland replied to Carnarvon's inquiry in 1875 the New

1. Ibid. p. 10. Bowen to Carnarvon 1.ix.1874.

2. See above p. 373.

3. Robinson to Carnarvon 7.ix.1874, Confid. with Parkes Memo. 27.vii.1874. CO/201/577.

4. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 4.xi.1874.

Guinea fever was also mounting in England. Queenslanders had little real interest in New Guinea, but they were generally favourable to annexation. It was felt that if Britain held back Germany, Italy, France, perhaps even Russia or the U.S.A., might go ahead. By the time this view reached London even the eager Herbert was getting exasperated by the Australian attitude.

"The prevailing idea of Australian statesmen appears to be that their country must perish if any Foreign Power hoists its flag within a week's steaming power of the shores of the great island continent; and that it is the duty of the British taxpayer to defray all the charges of the premature occupation of a country unsuited for white labourers. While the Australian taxpayer, who is much better able to pay, reaps the commercial profit of the enterprise. But we are steadily drifting on this further annexation".¹

Herbert was at a loss what to suggest. Clearly he wanted to keep the foreigners off the South-east coast of New Guinea, but he did not want another administration like Fiji to pay for.

Three days after Herbert wrote Carnarvon met a deputation from the Royal Colonial Institute. Agreeing with many of their views, he reminded them what had already been undertaken in the Gold Coast and Fiji and he pleaded for "some breathing time".² His coolness was supported by the Admiralty hydrographer's report, which was the fullest of all the Government papers on New Guinea. After researches into the Dutch and French explorations it rejected Moresby's quick route to China and the idea of docile Papuans. Herbert suggested another way out. The securing of the coastline in the narrowest part of Torres Strait was the most urgent matter. He suggested that the navy should make a careful survey of the coast opposite Cape York, "as it would seem desirable to secure the best situation in that part, without prejudice to the question whether or not more extended annexations should take place".³ The idea was put to the Foreign Office on 6 August 1875, where Derby took the same attitude as Herbert. He had written

1. Min. by Herbert 26.iv.1875 on Gov. Cairns to Carnarvon 22.ii.1875. CO/234/35.

2. The Times, 3.v.1875. p.6.

3. Min. by Herbert 11.vii.1875, CO/201/580 on Memo. in Ad. to CO. 9.vii.1875 CO/808/11 p. 1-6.

in July, "I don't like the notion of letting foreigners come so near to us. We shall want New Guinea some day ourselves".¹

Thus in 1875 the New Guinea question grew formidable, with expeditions being planned in London, Sydney and Melbourne. In Sydney the veteran colonist, William Macleay, organised a fruitless expedition. Col. Scott in Melbourne announced that he had already written to Bismarck and next would try Marshal MacMahon or the Russian Emperor. In England a quasi-military expeditionary force was organised by the New Guinea Colonization Association. On top of all this Premier Roberston of New South Wales began to play the part of an Australian Vogel. A deputation led by the inevitable Dr. Lang² had called on him on 19 May 1875 to support the Macleay expedition. Robertson had other ideas. Referring back to the Australian answer to Kimberley's New South Wales plan for Fiji, he said that like Fiji, New Guinea was an imperial question. He had not expected Fiji to be annexed, let alone be provided with a Sir Arthur Gordon, but now that the British Government had taken the plunge it could easily expand the duties of the Governor of Fiji and make him Governor-General for all Polynesia. The imperial government, he said, "having launched into the thing might as well deal with the whole of Polynesia".³ And these were not simply the effusions of a colonial politician to quieten a strong delegation; they were intended for the Secretary of State. In a minute of 31 May 1875 Robertson wrote:

"My colleagues and myself venture respectfully to offer our opinion that on many grounds it would be desirable in the highest interests of civilization that Great Britain should, with as little delay as possible, take possession not only of the magnificent island of New Guinea, but of the islands of New Britain, New Ireland, and the chain of islands to the north-east and east of New Guinea from Bougainville of the Solomon Group, the group of the New Hebrides, including Espiritu Santo, Mallicolo and Sandwich, with smaller adjacent islands, and the Marshall, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, to all of which the traffic from

1. Derby to Carnarvon 19.vii.1875. Private. Carnarvon Papers. PRO.30/6/8 p. 71.
 2. See above p. 246.
 3. Account of delegation in Sydney Morning Herald, 20.iv.1875.

the port of Sydney extends.

It appears to us that a more extended domain over these waters on the part of the British Empire would be not only consistent with the maritime supremacy of England but would conduce much to the tranquility and peace of the Australian colonies... The question is wholly an Imperial one and it seems to us to regard it in any other light would neither conduce¹ to the satisfaction of the colonies, nor to the dignity of the Empire".

This was probably more than even Herbert bargained for, but throughout the summer of 1875 he kept reminding Carnarvon that a decision would have to be made about 'hoisting the British flag'.

In October 1875, when Col. Scott's threats arrived, Herbert thought it just possible that the man might interest a foreign Power. He therefore proposed an announcement of British 'paramountcy'. He suggested that a public despatch should be sent to Australia putting on record that

"the labours & explorations of British officers & men of science as well as other British subjects constitute a priority of claim which no unfriendly power could ignore; and that while the positive annexation of New Guinea to England... must be a question for very serious consideration... HMG can have no hesitation in saying that they could not recognize any pretension on² the part of any other Power to assume the sovereignty of the island".

Carnarvon said he would consult the Cabinet.

A few days after this on 10 October 1875, and presumably before Carnarvon had done anything about it, the plans of the New Guinea Colonization Association arrived. An expeditionary force under military discipline was envisaged, its members to be recruited under the Volunteer Act as the 'New Guinea Volunteers'. Some of its officers were to be made J.P.'s under the Fiji Government. The association presented itself as a humanitarian venture, and claimed that the Macleay expedition from Sydney (which actually failed) might lead to colonization like that in Fiji. The venture had influential support - the Duke of Manchester, Stanley of Alderley, McArthur, Kinnaird, James Young MP. and Col. Torren MP. - it

1. Memo. in Robinson to Carnarvon 3.vi.1875. CO/808/15 p.50.

2. Min. by Herbert 3.x.1875 on Scott to Carnarvon 9.vii.1875. CO/309/113.

claimed too that both the East India Company and Hudson's Bay Company had started on land less fertile than New Guinea.

The Colonial Office was ^{not} taken in by what William Malcolm, the new third Assistant under-secretary, called "a varnish of piety on the prospectus", which did not conceal the real object which was "simply land jobbing speculation".¹ It turned out that Lieut. Robert Armit R.N., the commander of the proposed expedition had been dismissed his ship for insubordination, and the Admiralty had received subsequent complaints about dishonoured bills.² Malcolm made the first serious study in the Colonial Office of the New Guinea question. His conclusions were decisive: (1) as a place for colonization New Guinea was valueless, (2) the commerce of Torres Strait was already securely protected by the Somerset Settlement, (3) Moresby's route to China was unproven, and (4) there was no reason to suppose that any foreign Power contemplated annexing New Guinea. The association, therefore, received no encouragement from Carnarvon, and it was further discredited when it was known to have been approached by people who wanted guns run into the Philippines.³ Carnarvon decided it was a "filibustering expedition"; he told a Cabinet colleague that "at present I am prepared to resist the cry for annexation & to get over the difficulties by other means".⁴

His 'other means' was the Western Pacific High Commission, which will be discussed shortly. It probably fell short of what Herbert wanted, for one of his many ideas was that Vogel's proposed Trading Company might be made into a scheme for inter-colonial government in the Pacific Islands. But Vogel's reply to this suggestion in November 1875 was unenthusiastic. True, the ever ingenious New Zealander drew up a paper plan, but he admitted that New Zealand was

1. Min. by Malcolm 25.x.1875 on N.G.Assoc. to Carnarvon 9.x.1875. CO/201/580.

2. Ad. to Co. 5.xi.1875. Ibid.

3. Carnarvon to N.G. Assoc. 30.x.1875. CO/808/15 p.85.

4. Carnarvon to Cairns 30.x.1875. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/6 p. 32.

interested least of all in New Guinea, and he did not think an inter-colonial conference on the subject would be any use.¹ Carnarvon's answer to the English venture had already been given to the Colonization Association. His answer to the Australian colonies went to New South Wales on 8 December 1875.

In many ways it was more skillful than Kimberley's despatch on Fiji.² Carnarvon said (and in the main the colonial press accepted) what Kimberley had wanted to say over Fiji, and also to the settlers in Natal and the Cape over Basutoland and the diamond fields: 'It is in your interest - you pay'. "It is simply impossible either for me to admit", Carnarvon told the Australians, "or to persuade the English people that the Australian Colonies have no special interest in the annexation of New Guinea and that the responsibility of the measure rests exclusively with the Imperial Government". The only ground he could see for hasty action was foreign annexation, but the U.S.A. did not look like wavering from her traditional policy, and Germany had said she wanted no colonies. It was unlikely that any other power would take New Guinea without reference to Britain.³

So Carnarvon successfully resisted New Guinea, as he had Rotuma and Samoa, but Herbert was not at all satisfied. When there was a French scare in 1876 he said they should not postpone annexation of the shore facing Cape York. Yet even Herbert had to admit "I feel at a loss for any really constructive suggestion". He realised the paradox of his position; "if we delay annexation, the very serious risk is run of an almost immediate collision with Australia. If we are too hasty in annexing, we stimulate a rush of people to an almost uninhabitable country, and saddle this Government with very heavy expense".⁴ But Carnarvon's decision stood for a few years. The annexation of New Guinea had to wait until Queensland took the law into its own hands in 1883, and Bismarck entered the

1. Vogel to Herbert 18.x.1875. CO/209/234.

2. See above p. 252-3.

3. Carnarvon to Robinson 8.xii.1875. CO/808/15 pp. 93-4.

4. Min. by Herbert 24.vii.1876 on FO. to CO. 21.vii.1875. CO/201/582.

lists in 1884.¹

The origin of the Western Pacific High Commission.

Although Carnarvon successfully resisted the cry of further annexations in the Pacific, he did not ignore the need for some form of extended jurisdiction in the area. He realised that the annexation of Fiji would tend to increase the interest of British subjects in the region and it might encourage the labour traffic. Even before the annexation of Fiji he began to study methods of meeting this problem, therefore a final word is necessary about his "other means".

The Kidnapping Act of 1872 did not immediately purge the labour traffic of its abuses. Kidnapping by British subjects became a felony, the transport of islanders in British ships and their importation into the colonies were regulated.² But an important branch of the trade, the importation of islanders into Fiji, and their movement from island to island within Fiji where British planters hired them, was largely untouched. It is true that Consul March developed his own informal system of licences, and the Fiji Government under Thurston attempted to copy the British Act, but Whitehall was not certain whether the Fiji Government was to be relied upon in this. This was one of the arguments for annexation: Fiji as a focus for the traffic, yet beyond British jurisdiction, was a weakening factor in the 1872 Act.

But outside Fiji the Act also had limitations. One of the worst kidnapping cases, the Carl massacre, only received publicity in England after the Act, and as the leading perpetrators escaped the death penalty for technical reasons

1. See M.G.Jacobs, 'Bismarck and the annexation of New Guinea', Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand, vol. 5, No.17 (Nov. 1951) p. 14.

2. See above p.162.

the whole case appeared to detract from the usefulness of the Act.¹ Therefore, early in 1873 the L.M.S. "startled, horrified and humiliated" by the evidence, suggested that the Royal Navy be given wider powers. Nothing was done in 1873 as Kimberley wished to test the 1872 Act, and if Fiji was annexed he knew they whole situation would change.

Thus regulation of the labour traffic was yet another of the problems which carried over into Carnarvon's period. In his first week at the Colonial Office a kidnapping case achieved some publicity so on 26 February 1874 Carnarvon warned Herbert that he would like to talk the matter over.² Throughout 1874 it is evident that both the Foreign and Colonial Offices realised they would have to formulate some policy to cover the actions of British subjects in the South Pacific, and Carnarvon thought that measures would be necessary even if Fiji was not annexed.³ He told a large deputation from the Aborigines Protection Society, which came to discuss the Gold Coast and Fiji on 6 March 1874 that he

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1. The Carl's owner, James Patrick Murray, a former Medical Officer of health of Sandhurst, Victoria, escaped punishment by furnishing evidence for the Crown. The master and mate were sentenced to death, but this was commuted to life imprisonment as they had been taking Murray's orders. The Carl had sailed from Sydney early in 1871 and reached Fiji in June. There, apparently, Murray decided to go 'blackbirding'. From the N.Hebrides they went to the Solomons collecting groups of islanders, but some warlike men from Bougainville did not mix with the others in the hold. Fights began among the islanders and there were attempts to fire the ship. No one spoke the Bougainvillers language, all efforts to calm the human cargo failed, so Murray panicked and about 20 Sept. 1871 the "Carl Massacre" took place. The crew sat firing into the hold until the islanders were subdued; about 70 were killed and their bodies thrown into the sea; 20 wounded but still living were also thrown overboard. Murray is said to have sung 'Marching through Georgia' during the firing. The Carl's hold was then whitewashed and HMS Rosario found nothing amiss when she boarded the ship on 17 Nov. Murray's agent in Fiji for the hiring of the labourers was none other than G.A.Woods, Thakombau's minister. Nothing was suspected until Consul March found some unwilling islanders aboard, one with a gunshot wound. As a result a Court of Inquiry was held on HMS Cossack on 22 May 1872 and Murray's story came out.

(See account of Court of Inquiry in March to Granville 27.v.1872. Sessional Papers House of Lords, XV, p. 227; account of the trial in Sydney Morning Herald, 2.xii.1872 clipping in CO/201/570; statement in the Commons by K-Hugessen, The Times, 26.ii.1873; and Dunbabin, Slavers in the S.Seas, pp. 210-218).

2. Min. 26.ii.1874 on Daily Telegraph clipping of 24.ii.1874 in CO/309/112.
3. Carnarvon to Derby 27.vii.1874 (copy). PRO.30/6/8 p. 38.

did not think the annexation of Fiji would solve the kidnapping question.¹ At a conversation on 9 April 1874 Sir William Stawell suggested that an officer should travel on every labour ship to guard the welfare of the islanders.² Sometime before June 1874 Carnarvon made a note that when the Goodenough-Layard Report arrived some new arrangements might have to be made.³

The Goodenough-Layard Report, received on 10 June 1874, not only confirmed this impression, but it advocated a definite plan. Paragraph 38 might be seen as the origin of the Western Pacific High Commission.

"We think that the commission of the Governor of Fiji should give him authority over the persons and acts of British subjects in the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands, or the islands of the Pacific south of the equator and west of meridian of 168° West longitude (except New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands, which are under the French flag). This would be very satisfactory to Englishmen living in these islands, who would then be able to refer their disputes to the courts of Fiji, and would be able to register vessels and take out licences to carry labourers in a regular way, whereas they are now doing so either by stealth or through the fiction of a French flag and registers obtained from New Caledonia... The formation of a centre of law and order could not fail to have a good influence in this part of the S.Seas, where⁴ the number of adventurers in various pursuits is yearly increasing".

After this Carnarvon suggested that Wylde of the Foreign Office might draw up an Order in Council along these lines,⁵ but Wylde postponed consideration of the deployment of consular resources in the South Pacific until after Carnarvon made up his mind on Fiji.⁶ When this was decided and annexation accomplished in October 1874 a new Pacific Islanders Protection Bill was prepared to extend the 1872 Act to Fiji. But, as Goodenough frequently insisted, this would not be enough since British ships were evading the law by flying French colours.⁷

Gradually the idea grew that there should be an official with authority over

1. See above p.358.

2. Memo. PRO.30/6/51 p.4.

3. Ibid. p. 14 undated.

4. CO/808/3 p.10

5. Carnarvon to Derby 27.viii.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/8 p. 38.

6. Memo. by Wylde 27.vii.1874. FO/58/145 p. 174.

7. Ad. to CO. 28.xii.1874. CO/83/5.

British subjects throughout the islands of the South Pacific. A correspondent in the Sydney Morning Herald suggested in September 1874 that a Consular Officer should cruise among the islands, and there was talk in London of appointing Layard to do something like this when he left Fiji.¹

The suggestion that the Governor of Fiji should be made Consul for the adjacent areas, on the analogy of North Borneo, - the suggestion which was acted upon after three years of departmental wrangling - was first made by Herbert on 6 November 1874.² On the same day Sir Arthur Gordon had talked with Herbert in the Colonial Office.³ Gordon was not offered the governorship of Fiji until 27 November 1874, but he had been in correspondence with Carnarvon as early as 23 October⁴ and his name had been used in connection with Fiji as early as June.⁵ There was no mention of consular authority in these letters, but Gordon later claimed that he certainly expected wider authority when he accepted. He said that when his appointment was first discussed it was suggested that the Governor of Fiji should have some relations with the "wild tribes in his vicinity but beyond his jurisdiction", as did the governors at the Cape, the Gold Coast and the Straits Settlements.⁶ There is no evidence that Gordon made the suggestion about the Consul, but Herbert's note on the same day as Gordon's visit may be more than a coincidence.⁷ The idea was put to the Foreign Office on 11 November 1874, and although Wylde did not like it, Derby showed an open mind and was prepared to listen to "any proposal on this matter".⁸

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1. CO. to FO. 11.xi.1874. FO/58/145 p. 336 & Mins. by Wylde 2.i.1875 and Derby 7.i.1875.
 2. Mins. by Herbert 6.xi.1874 on Robinson to Carnarvon(tg) 4.xi.1874. CO/83/5.
 3. Gordon, Fiji Records, I, p.16.
 4. Carnarvon to Gordon 23.x.1874. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/39 p.48.
 5. Herbert to Gordon 5.vi.1874 quoted in J.K.Chapman, The Career of Arthur Hamilton Gordon, 1st Lord Stanmore to 1875 (PhD. thesis London 1954) p.440
 6. Gordon to Carnarvon 17.ii.1875 Private. PRO.30/6/39 p.69.
 7. Bourke, the Parliamentary Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, said on 26 Feb. 1875 that he had heard the Cabinet had appointed Gordon Consul-General, but Derby denied it. Mins. 26 & 27.ii.1875. on CO. to FO. 12.i.1875. FO/58/148.
 8. Min. by Derby 7.i.1875 on CO. to FO. 11.xi.1875. FO/58/145 p. 412.

Here, then, was the basis of the Western Pacific High Commission but it was not achieved until after a lengthy battle between the two departments. The Colonial Office a definite proposal on 12 January 1875. Anxious to ensure that there would be no "conflict of principle or practice" in the South Pacific, they suggested that the Governor of Fiji should be Consul-General for at least Samoa, Tonga and the New Hebrides.¹ Wylde did not like the idea and Tenterden wanted to postpone the discussion.² But a plan was worked out by Herbert, Wylde and Bourke at two conferences before 5 March 1875. The plan was that Gordon would be 'High Commissioner' with authority and jurisdiction in cases concerning British subjects, but where foreign nationals were concerned (i.e. Europeans and Americans) he would refer cases to the British Consul in New Caledonia.³ The Foreign Office embodied their views in a letter on 11 March, but instead of the title High Commissioner they wanted to call the Governor 'Special Commissioner'.⁴

This agreement of March 1875 represents a victory for the Foreign Office viewpoint. However much they regretted the 'double allegiance' they would not let Gordon have full consular authority, and Herbert although he disliked this, said they would have to agree. He noted, prophetically, however, that

"As a consequence I can only anticipate a great increase of labour for both Departments, resulting in comparative failure to protect the Islanders".

He feared that British prestige would be weakened, but he promised that the Colonial Office would endeavour "to prevent as far as possible the failure of that undertaking in which the annexation of Fiji has been the first step".⁵ One point he stood firm on was the title 'High Commissioner', and Carnarvon told

1. CO. to FO. 12.i.1875. CO/808/12 p.8.

2. Mins. by Wylde 14.i.1875 & Tenterden 9.ii.1875. FO/58/148 pp. 109 & 114.

3. Note by Herbert 5.iii.1875 on draft O. in C. CO/83/8 & Min. by Bourke, 6.iii.1875. FO/58/148.

4. FO. to CO. 11.iii.1875. CO/808/12 p. 26.

5. Min. by Herbert 14.iii.1875 CO/83/8 on FO. to CO. 11.iii.1875 CO/808/12 p.26.

the Foreign Office he regretted the division of responsibility, but he agreed to an Order in Council in their terms.¹

Having achieved their victory over the authority of the Consul at New Caledonia, the Foreign Office climbed down. What they really feared was that the High Commission would appear to other Powers to be the first step towards more annexations in the Pacific. Tenterden said foreign States would be justified in this view, "but the Colonial Office will not intend annexation & the F.O. will for some years be able to repudiate the idea".² As the High Commission would save the Foreign Office the need for providing consuls outside New Caledonia they decided to "leave the Col^l Office to carry out their own policy in their own way".³

This wrangle over the High Commission seems to have been a strictly private affair between the two departments; Carnarvon did not take the new Pacific Islanders Protection Bill to the Cabinet.⁴ In fact when the new Bill was first presented to Parliament on 16 March 1875 there was no mention of the High Commission. Carnarvon did not come out into the open until 29 April 1875, when he had to satisfy the deputation who wanted him to annex New Guinea.⁵ He agreed with their views about kidnapping but warned them it would be "impossible to appropriate every territory and every island". Instead, he said a clause would be inserted in the new Pacific Islanders Protection Bill to make the Governor of Fiji into a High Commissioner with consular authority in the area, and he would be "commander of these tribes".⁶ Since the Admiralty assured him that technically the north and south-east shores of new Guinea were washed by the Pacific Ocean, he was able to include these much debated regions within the

1. CO. to FO. 22.iii.1875. CO/808/12 p.33

2. Min. by Lister, FO/58/148 p.168.

3. Ibid. p. 165. Min. by Wylde 24.iii.1875.

4. Carnarvon to Cairns (Lord Chancellor). 9.iii.1875. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/6 p. 7.

5. See above p. 319.

6. The Times, 3.v.1875. Carnarvon's meaning for this unusual phrase is not clear.

High Commissioner's jurisdiction.¹

The High Commission policy did not please the Treasury, which had been the main cause of Britain's slackness about kidnapping for over ten years. W.H.Smith, the Parliamentary Under-secretary of the Treasury, wrote privately to Carnarvon on 1 May 1875 asking him to put off the insertion of the new clause into the bill "as it does not recommend itself to us".² But Carnarvon was insistent:

"The suppression of kidnapping and the protection of English subjects from kidnapping is really as much a part of national policy as the suppression of the slave trade and the notion that we were lukewarm on such a question would be much more damaging than the few hundred pounds spent on the establishment of a Consular Court in the Pacific".³

Therefore when the new Pacific Islanders Protection Act became law on 4 August 1875 Fiji was included in the Australasian colonies and a new Clause Six provided the basis for the High Commission. The Crown was empowered to "exercise power and jurisdiction over Her subjects within any island and places in the Pacific Ocean not being within HM dominions, nor within the jurisdiction of any civilized power, in the same and as ample a manner as if such power and jurisdiction had been acquired by the cession or conquest of territory". By Order in Council the High Commissioner could be vested with consular authority and jurisdiction in his own courts.⁴ The order was not passed until 1877.⁵

Sovereignty would not be acquired in the area of the High Commission, and the Act did not derogate from the rights of the Pacific islanders, but Sir Julius Vogel, who was in London (and who dined with Carnarvon on the night before the New Guinea deputation),⁶ realised what Carnarvon had done. The High Commission, he said, was "an admirable compromise between that taking possession

1. Min. by Herbert 28.iv.1875 CO/201/580 on Ad. to CO. 24.iv.1875. CO/808/10 p.20.

2. Smith to Carnarvon 1.v.1875. Private. PRO.30/6/17 p. 17.

3. Ibid. p. 15 Carnarvon to Smith 2.v.1875.

4. 38 & 39 Vict. cap. 51.

5. See below p. 396.

6. Carnarvon Memo. 28.iv.1875. PRO.30/6/47. This record says they talked about telegraphs.

of the other islands which I have advocated and that leaving them to grow into lawless communities which on all sides has been admitted an evil".¹ Like the new administration in the Gold Coast Protectorate and the Residents in the Malay States it was an experiment in providing order and jurisdiction without assuming sovereignty. And Vogel knew what would happen. Just as Herbert had at one time suggested that the alternatives on the Gold Coast were withdrawal or complete annexation, as Jervois had seen that a Resident in Malaya could only control or be an ornament, so Vogel saw the Western Pacific High Commission as "the means to tentatively and gradually establish British sway in Polynesia without undertaking at the commencement responsibilities which might frighten those who look with dread upon an enlargement of her colonial possessions".² Vogel, of course, could not resist sending along a few ideas to hasten this process, but Herbert as usual resisted them. Even so, he appreciated the logic of Vogel's views.

If the Colonial Office's attitude of the mid-1870's is fairly represented by the views of the Permanent Under-secretary, that view is remarkably close to Vogel's. Herbert asserted a view of British paramountcy, of the impossibility of recognizing foreign intervention in the area, but he also believed that the time for further annexation had not come. His view of policy in the Pacific reads very like Kimberley's explanation to Gladstone of his view of the Malay Peninsula in September 1873.³

"Further annexation will come at the proper time", wrote Herbert on 5 May 1875, "but to tell the world (Germany, United States, France etc.) that we now contemplate it would be to defeat the object and prevent us from quietly acquiring paramount influence among the islands".⁴

1. Vogel to Carnarvon 4.v.1875. Private. PRO.30/6/47 p.216.

2. Ibid.

3. See above p.206-207.

4. Min. by Herbert 5.v.1875 on Vogel's draft amendments to the Carnarvon clause. PRO.30/6/47 p. 225.

Carnarvon's 'other means' in the South Pacific, then, were thoroughly in keeping with his policy in West Africa and Malaya. What the impatient memorialists and deputations did not realise was that the apparently obstinate Colonial Office often had the 'same ends' in view. The real difference of opinion was usually over timing rather than aim. After the changes of 1874 Carnarvon asked for a breathing space, for a time of consolidation and reappraisal to observe the workings of the modest, but in the long run far reaching, experiments being made in the Gold Coast, Malaya and Fiji.

Conclusion.'PARAMOUNTCY' AND 'EXPERIMENT' ON THE FRONTIER IN THE TROPICS.

From the point of view of the regional historian many subjects have been dropped in mid-air, as it were, in this thesis. The origins of systems of government have been examined but it has been impossible to follow their development. However, it is worthwhile to pause and take stock of the situation about 1876 from the point of view of British policy and to try to answer certain questions. What did the changes in West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific amount to? Why were certain devices tried while others were rejected? Is it true to say that a forward movement had begun? To answer these it is necessary in the first instance to be clear what alternatives faced the Colonial Office. Then the nature of the solutions which were adopted may be discussed.

By 1873 events in the frontier regions, and publicity at home, had posed the general question of withdrawal or advance. Both extremes, however, were rejected. It is true that Fiji was annexed, but in the context of the debate over the South Pacific this was an experiment which fell short of widespread annexations in the islands. Both Kimberley and Carnarvon sought some way for keeping order and stabilizing the frontier which fell short of further assumption of British sovereignty. In their search they considered five alternatives: extra-territorial jurisdiction, Residents, Chartered Companies, Protectorates, and the idea of 'paramount power'. Each requires a brief discussion.

The alternative which was usually considered first was extra-territorial jurisdiction. This was a well tried expedient by 1870. "It is impossible", wrote Sir Henry Jenkyns in 1902, "to submit British subjects to non-Christian law or to trust to the justice of local courts, and therefore either crimes committed by British subjects must be left unpunished or power must be taken for the British

Government to punish them".¹ Thus, as a recent writer puts it, "The discrepancy in the evolution of Western and Eastern legal systems was bridged by means of capitulation treaties".² Since the seventeenth century representatives of the Levant Company received certain judicial rights over British subjects in the Ottoman Empire in this way. However, in practice the Turkish capitulations were difficult to enforce and in the nineteenth century doubts were cast on the legality of these arrangements. As a result the first Foreign Jurisdiction Act (1843) defined the powers acquired by the Crown outside British dominions "by Treaty, Capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means", to be the same as that exercised in Crown Colonies which had been gained by cession or conquest.³ At the same time doubts that had arisen in the 1842 Select Committee on West Africa about the jurisdiction exercised by George Maclean on the Gold Coast were removed (from an English point of view) by the West Africa and Falkland Islands Act (1843) and the Gold Coast Order in Council (1844).⁴

Fiji raised new problems and for ten years after 1861 a method of applying the system to Fiji was half-heartedly attempted. In this period, for diplomatic purposes non-Christian States, or States outside the "International Family" were divided into "Eastern Countries" and "barbarous communities". The former (e.g. the Ottoman Empire, China, Japan and Siam) although non-Christian were undoubtedly sovereign States, therefore extra-territorial jurisdiction was sought by treaty. Of the latter, W.E.Hall wrote in 1894, "It is impossible to regard an island in the South Seas or a kingdom in the interior of Africa as having the necessary marks of a State".⁵ Gladstone disliked such distinctions; announcing the Goodenough-Layard Commission for Fiji in 1873, he pleaded for "the same measure of justice for ourselves and other people".⁶ And a modern lawyer (1926) has

1. H.L.Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas (1902) p.142.

2. G.Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (1951) p. 35.

3. 6 & 7 Vict. c.94. 4. 6 & 7 Vict. c.13. O. in C. 3.ix.1844.

5. W.E.Hall, A Treatise on the Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown (1894) 130

6. 3 Hansard, ccxvi, col. 945.

asserted that "there has been a persistent preponderance of jurisdic opinion in favour of the proposition that lands in the possession of any backward peoples who are politically organised ought not to be regarded as if they belonged to no one".¹ But in the case of Fiji there was no single authority with which to make a treaty and as jurisdiction could not be based on sufferance a Bill was drafted to overcome the difficulty. But the Treasury took fright fearing a gradual increase of responsibility and expense. Although in 1871, after ten years, Granville got the royal assent to Consular Jurisdiction in Fiji, it was never used as circumstances changed.

In the same year suggestions were made for extending the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Straits Settlements courts over British subjects caught in the colonies for offences in the Malay States. The proposal was unexceptionable and was acted on in 1874, but Thomas Braddell the Attorney-General in Singapore, had gone further and wondered if the Colonial Office "might feel inclined to encourage the extension of the powers of legislation by giving to the Legislature of the Colony authority... to legislate for matters beyond the Colony".² The writer must have referred to criminal not political matters but his idea was rejected.³ However, a similar idea was adopted on the Gold Coast in 1874 where the Legislative Council of the Colony could make laws for the Protectorate.

The only cases where the solution of extra-territorial jurisdiction was adopted were in the Niger Delta in 1872 and in Tonga and Samoa in 1879. In the Niger Delta the Foreign Office did not wish to disturb the status quo and considerably limited the powers of intervention of the Consul. The reason for extra-territorial jurisdiction was technical. British traders in the Oil Rivers employed a number of Africans from the British West African Settlements, who, when

1. M.F.Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory (1926) p.20.

2. Report by Braddell 10.iv.1871 in Anson to Kimberley 12.v.1871. CO/273/47.

3. Ibid. Note by Holland, the Legal Adviser.

they were convicted for petty crimes in the Delta 'Courts of Equity', often appealed to the British Courts in the Gold Coast who overruled the Delta Courts. Thus the Foreign Office determined to reconstruct the Delta Courts of Equity, which were converted into Consular Courts by Order in Council of 21 February 1872.¹ In this case jurisdiction which had been exercised by "sufferance" was regularised under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts in the Old Calabar, Bonny, Cameroons, New Calabar, Brass, Opobo. Nun and Benin Rivers.

In Samoa and Tonga exclusive jurisdiction over British subjects was given by treaty in 1878-9 and was exercised by Deputy Commissioners under the Western Pacific High Commission.² Thus, although extra-territorial jurisdiction played a part in British policy in the frontier zones, it did not prove an adequate method of securing order.

The second suggestion was that of Residents. The practice of appointing Residents as political agents to the courts of Indian Princes was well known. The Melbourne Age suggested in 1869 that the Colonial Office should govern Fiji through a Resident,³ and Julius Vogel suggested in 1873 that if Samoa was not made a province of New Zealand, it and other Pacific Islands might be governed by an officer like the "Residents at Native Courts in India".⁴ In West Africa Sir Arthur Kennedy suggested a 'Resident Agent' with somewhat different functions should be sent to Ashanti,⁵ and both Kimberley in 1873⁶ and Carnarvon in 1874⁷ revived the idea. When Commander Glover governed Lagos he suggested, at various times, 'Residents' or 'Agents' at Abeokuta and Porto Novo. In 1872 there was talk of appointing a 'Political Agent' in the Mellacourie River area north of

1. Hertslet's, Treaties, XIII, p. 50.

2. Ibid. XV, p.334 for Samoa and p.396 for Tonga.

3. The Age, 11.xii.1869 cutting in Canterbury to Granville 2.i.1870. CO/309/73.

4. Fergusson to Kimberley 22.x.1873. CO/209/230.

5. Kennedy to Kimberley 16.xii.1871. CO/96/89.

6. Kimberley to Wolseley 10.ix.1873 (draft) CO/96/108.

7. Memo. on the Gold Coast alternatives. PRO.30/6/85.

Sierra Leone,¹ and Professor Blyden wanted an Agent appointed in the interior at Fouta Djalon.² After the Ashanti War in 1874 Carnarvon considered appointing Residents in the Gold Coast Protectorate States, but it was suggested that the "degraded habits" of the kings precluded this, although Capt. Brackenbury suggested that an itinerant officer should visit the kings and hold Durbars.³

In the case of the Malay States the suggestion of Residents was adopted. First mooted in 1871 by the Anson Committee and advocated more persistently by George Campbell, the Ceylon official who acted as Lieut-Governor of Penang from March 1872 to May 1873, this suggestion apparently appealed to Kimberley. The same week in which he decided to intervene in Perak he interviewed Campbell. But when Sir Andrew Clarke went to Singapore in 1873 with Kimberley's famous suggestion of a Resident, it was almost certainly an adviser that was in the Secretary of State's mind, rather than an officer who would control the government of the State. Therefore, although accepted in a single case in 1874, Residents were no panacea to stabilize the frontier.

The third suggestion, and this was completely rejected at this stage, was for Chartered Companies. A large portion of the British empire had been acquired by the seventeenth century companies, and after 1882 vast areas would come under the sway of the modern companies. But Hudson's Bay Company had only recently, in 1869, surrendered its territorial rights, and the government was reluctant to allow new companies. The Selangor Tin Company's request in 1873 to be allowed to use its own troops in Malaya had been quickly refused. Various New Guinea companies had been refused any government help or encouragement after 1867. Carnarvon considered transferring the Gold Coast to a company in 1874, but

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1. Min. by Hemming 28.ix.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 1.ix.1872. CO/267/316 & min. by K-Hugessen 4.iii.1873 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 10.ii.1873. CO/267/320.
 2. E.Blyden, "Report on the Timbo Expedition, 1873" in Harley to Kimberley 22.v.1873. CO/267/320.
 3. Undated Memo. PRO.30/6/85.

he decided there were "Practical difficulties in creating a monopoly. Abuses wd. grow up & Govt. wd. be held responsible".¹

The most coherent plan for a company was Vogel's South Pacific Trading Company and here it was Gladstone, whose government in 1881 chartered the North Borneo Company,² who was faintly interested. But Carnarvon found the scheme "Visionary - dangerous - open to speculation & corruption etc." and he let the matter drop. As yet, therefore, the chartered company was not regarded as a suitable instrument in frontier regions

Most commonly advocated was the fourth suggestion, a Protectorate. This requires some discussion, and the discussion is complicated by the fact that 'protectorate' as understood by modern international lawyers was only defined after the Berlin West Africa conference of 1884-5, when protectorates in West Africa were recognised.³ Before the 1880's such protectorates as existed in these regions were ignored by the international lawyers. Although Twiss in 1861 found the name Protected State inadequate and he distinguished between "Protected Independent States", such as the Ionian Islands under Britain, and "Protected Dependent States", like the Princely States of India,⁴ he made no mention of the much publicised contemporary Gold Coast Protectorate.

Recent writers testify to the vagueness of the term. Just as Carnarvon said in 1874 that questions about annexation should be decided on their merits, so say the international lawyers, one must regard protectorates.⁵ Hall in 1894 said the

1. Undated Memo. PRO.30/6/85.

2. In the period covered by this thesis C.L.Moses, the U.S. Consul in Brunei, "ushered in a preposterous incident, out of which was to emerge the British North Borneo Company". He obtained the cession of a large tract of land and another American received the title of Raja of Ambong and Marudu. K.G. Tregonning, "American activity in N.Borneo 1865-1881", Pacific Hist. Review, XXIII, No. 4 (Nov. 1954) p.357.

3. Gen. Act of the Berlin Conference, 26.ii.1885, A & P, xlvii, pp. 107-117. Art. 34 refers to the notification of new possessions and protectorates.

4. Twiss, The Law of Nations (1861), pp. 26-35

5. E.g. H.Lauterpracht, in 8th edition (1955) of L.Oppenheim, International Law, I, p. 192.

word had "different meanings in different circumstances and in the mouths of different persons".¹ A modern definition is:

"A point arises when a weak State surrenders itself by treaty to the protection of a strong State in such a way that it transfers the management of all its more important international affairs to the protecting State. Through such a treaty an international union is called into existence between the two States, and the relation between them is called protectorate. The protecting State is internationally superior to the protected State; and the latter has with the loss of the management of its more important international affairs lost its full sovereignty, and is henceforth only a half sovereign state. It is, however, a conception which, like suzerainty, lacks exact legal precision, and its real meaning depends very much upon the special case. Generally speaking, protectorate, may, again like suzerainty, be called a kind of international guardianship... Great Britain exercises a protectorate over a number of 'protected States' in Asia, but their international status is not clear. They must be distinguished in any case from the protectorates over African tribes, acquired by treaty with the chiefs of those tribes.² These 'protectorates' possess no international status whatsoever".

The three types of protectorate of the international lawyers, then, might be called (1) the 'real' protectorate of a European or Christian State over another (like the Ionian Islands under Britain), (2) the 'Oriental' protectorate, or "the protectorate of members of the Family of Nations exercises over such non-Christian States as are outside that family",³ and (3) the 'African or South Sea' protectorate where treaties are made not with the head of a sovereign State but with "heads of tribal communities";⁴ this is sometimes called a colonial protectorate and is associated with 'backward territories'.

Believing, apparently, that there were no authorities in late nineteenth century Africa or Polynesia capable of making internationally valid agreements, lawyers like Hall have taken the attitude: "It is little short of ridiculous to apply the principles of European international law with prudish exactness to the savages of the Santa Cruz Islands".⁵ This view is not unchallenged. Gladstone could speak in 1873 of equal justice for all, and Lindley (1926) found it

1. Hall, Treatise, p. 204.

2. Lauterpracht's Oppenheim (1955) I, pp. 192-6.

3. Oppenheim (1905 edition) I, p. 281.

4. Ibid. loc. cit.

5. Hall, Treatise, p. 235.

"difficult to see how, having regard to the universality of the practice of grounding a colonial protectorate upon an agreement with the local authorities, and to the importance attached by the European Powers to these agreements in their relations inter se, the requirement for such an agreement can be regarded otherwise than as a rule of law".¹ On the whole, though, from an international point of view, protectorates were, firstly, not recognised in the three areas in the 1870's; secondly, when they were recognised at a later period, they were seen as "nothing else than steps taken to exclude other Powers from occupying the respective territories. They give, like discovery, an inchoate title, and are preparations and precursors of future occupations".²

However silent international law might have been about protectorates, this did not prevent M.P.'s, officials, naval officers and rulers from using the word freely in the 1860's and 1870's. The term Protectorate was applied on the Gold Coast to an undefined area running inland from the coast for about 50 miles and extending about 300 miles along it, where British extra-territorial jurisdiction and also jurisdiction over Africans was exercised. After the first Residents were appointed in Selangor to advise the rulers of the State, the Attorney-General of the Straits Settlements approved the confirmation of a tin concession which included a phrase saying that the British Government had "assumed a protectorate over the State of Selangor",³ and the head of the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office accepted the idea that Britain was the "protecting power".⁴ Similarly, without providing a definition the agitators for the annexation of Fiji always said that the alternative was a protectorate over the islands, as Thakombau was said to desire this. Here was another variation on the word, for in 1855 Thakombau had said "I do not give the land. I only want them to be here to protect

1. Lindley, The Acquisition of Backward Territory, p. 176.

2. Oppenheim (1905) I, p. 281.

3. Braddell to Agent of the Malay Pen. (E.India) Tin Mining Co. 10.iii.1875 in Clarke to Carnarvon 18.iii.1875. CO/809/5 p. 94.

4. Ibid. Min. by Cox 28.iv.1875. (in CO/273/79).

me",¹ and in 1874, after refusing to cede the islands to Goodenough, he changed his mind and agreed to "cede the country to England... but it must be understood that he was giving only the Government of the country, not his men, or his earth".² Here was the notion of protectorate from one who sought protection. Goodenough produced yet another version when he said the presence of British warships and the intervention of naval officers in disputes constituted a "virtual protectorate". If disorder had broken out when he was in Fiji, Goodenough had planned to hoise the Union Jack "as a Protectorate for a time".³ These illustrations serve to show that in popular parlance, as well as in law, the word had very little precise meaning in the 1870's.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the vagueness was a useful asset. But in the early 1870's protectorate was very unpopular in Whitehall. Discussing its possibility in Fiji Rogers wrote in 1870,

"A protectorate is sometimes proposed. I do not quite know what this means. I suppose it is an intimation to the world that nobody then must assume sovereignty over the islands or make war on them - but if they have a grievance against them they⁴ must apply to us... I do not myself very much like this kind of thing".

In 1871 Knatchbull-Hugessen said a protectorate was "a very absurd as well as a curious state of affairs",⁵ and in the 1872 Fiji debate he said he had "never been able to find out exactly what a protectorate meant".⁶ Gladstone said: "It might be anything or nothing: it was the most shadowy of all relations; it might involve almost all the responsibilities of government".⁷ In 1873 Kimberley made it clear that whatever happened he would not "adopt a Protectorate in Fiji",⁸ and

1. Quoted in Brookes, International Rivalry, pp. 234-235.

2. Goodenough's Journal, 20.iii.1874.

3. Goodenough to Goschen 2.xii.1873. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/44 p.4.

4. Min. by Rogers 19.x.1870 on Canterbury to Granville 12.viii.1870. CO/309/94.

5. Min. by K-Hugessen 17.iv.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 29.iii.1871. CO/267/310.

6. 3 Hansard, ccxii, col. 209.

7. Ibid. col. 215.

8. To a deputation 12.v.1873. Clipping from Australia & New Zealand Gazette, 17.v.1873 in CO/83/4.

in Goodenough's instructions the idea was dismissed quickly - "it would be impossible... undefined responsibilities, with limited powers of discharging them"¹

In the 1870's, then, it was the vagueness of protectorate which made the authorities shun it. Although in the case of the Gold Coast the long standing title of Protectorate was to be retained, Kimberley had determined (before the Ashanti war wrecked the scheme) to define "the power and obligations of the Protecting State... and the obligations of the natives towards us".² While the Gold Coast Protectorate was retained in 1874, and the idea of Britain as the 'protecting power' in Malaya was accepted, protectorate, on the whole, was regarded as an unsatisfactory way of stabilizing the frontier.

The fifth alternative lay in the catch phrase 'paramount power', which was increasingly adopted at this time. This presupposes the existence or creation of a 'sphere of influence' within which such paramountcy is recognised or claimed. It is, said Lindley, "the step preceding the establishment of Colonial Protectorate in the modern process of territorial acquisition".³ This was the most attractive of the alternatives in 1874.

Probably the most famous case of a challenge to British paramountcy was the declaration of the German protectorate over Angra Pequena in 1884. "If there had been any apprehension", wrote Edward Fairfield, "of an annexation of this Coast by a power not concerned in the promotion of South African policy, Great Britain as the paramount power, would have taken possession of it long ago".⁴ This attitude can also be seen in the 1870's. In fact the attractiveness of the notion can be judged from the following definition (1894):

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1. First draft in Confid. Memo. 10.vi.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/45. Final draft in FO. to CO. 5.viii.1873. CO/83/4. Scholefield's assertion (The Pacific, p. 90) that "The Colonial Office itself had expressed a preference for a protectorate", is quite wrong.
 2. Min. by Kimberley on McArthur Qn. rec'd 18.iii.1873. CO/96/104.
 3. Lindley, Acquisition of Backward Territories, p. 207.
 4. Quoted in de. Kiewiet, Imperial Factor in South Africa, p. 314.

"The term 'sphere of influence' is one to which no very definite meaning is as yet attached. Perhaps in its indefiniteness consists its international value. It indicates the regions which geographically are adjacent to, or politically group themselves with, possessions or protectorates, but which have not actually been so reduced into control, that the minimum of the powers which are implied in a protectorate can be exercised with tolerable regularity. It represents an understanding which enables a state to reserve to itself a right of excluding other European powers from territories that are of importance to it politically as affording means of future expansion and preventing civilized neighbours from occupying a dominant military position... the phrase 'sphere of influence' taken by itself rather implies a moral claim than a true right... before long spheres of influence₁ are destined to be merged into some unorganised form of protectorate".

Thus, after Kimberley had decided to intervene in the Malay States, and had been further stirred by the rumoured threat of a German protectorate, he wrote to Gladstone, "we are the paramount power in the Peninsula... it would be a serious matter if any other European power were to obtain a footing in the Peninsula".² Similarly, new annexations other than Fiji were refused in the South Pacific because, as Herbert wrote in 1875, "Further annexation will come at the proper time, but to tell the world (Germany, United States, France etc) that we now contemplate it would be to defeat the object and prevent us from acquiring paramount influence among the islands".³

In West Africa the notion of paramountcy was not so explicitly stated, but it was nevertheless implied. Thus the recognition of spheres of influence to avoid international friction lay behind the Anglo-Dutch partition of the Gold Coast in 1868 and the attempted Anglo-French partition at the Rio Pongo from 1869 to 1876. The Foreign Office regarded Britain as the paramount power in the Niger Delta and they were anxious to keep the French out.⁴ It is important to remember that Kimberley resisted all ideas of expansion into the West African interior,⁵ and Carnarvon rejected the opportunity of annexations on the Gold Coast and in Ashanti

1. Hall, Treatise, pp. 228-9.

2. Kimberley to Gladstone 10.ix.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/103.

3. Min. by Herbert 5.v.1875 on Vogel to Carnarvon 4.v.1875. PRO.30/6/47 p. 216.

4. FO. to CO. 15.v.1875. CO/87/108.

5. E.g. Min. 5.xii.1873 on Blyden to Kimberley 22.x.1873, (CO/267/324) where he deprecates the idea of "taking charge of the western Soudan".

in 1874. But along the coast itself British policy was directed to establishing a form of British paramountcy between the Gold Coast and Lagos mainly for fiscal reasons.

In other parts of West Africa also the idea of spheres of influence seemed to have an appeal for the Colonial Office. The Liberian Government was regarded as a nuisance and Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote in 1871: "the suggested acquisition by Germany wd. be a general benefit".¹ Similarly with the rivers north of Sierra Leone Kimberley wrote in 1872 "we ought not to have a dog-in-the-manger-policy. Either we should take steps to open the trade of these rivers ourselves, or we should let the French do so".² In the 1860's there had been hopes that Britain could withdraw from West Africa completely, but between 1870 and 1874 the dream faded.³ Knatchbull-Hugessen began to express the view:

"England has sown the seeds of civilization and christianity upon these coasts, & whether for the furtherance of these great objects, or for the mere development of the resources of the country evidently teeming with underdeveloped wealth, her continual presence, and action is most desirable in the interests of W.Africa and the world".⁴

The idea gained ground, and events conspired to strengthen it, that Britain was on the West African coast to stay; but not at the expense of clashes with European powers.

Thus in the decade before the 'scramble' of the 1880's a feeling of British paramountcy in certain spheres in West Africa, South-East Asia and the South Pacific was becoming evident. Referring to the treaties in West Africa made between 1868 and 1875 Lindley admitted that "many treaties, especially among the early ones, contain no direct reference to the sovereignty or protectorate of the European contacting Power, although they comprise provisions which imply some

1. Min. 27.i.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 28.xii.1870. CO/267/307.
2. Min. 8.x.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 1.ix.1872. CO/267/316.
3. Min. by Herbert 30.vi.1871 (on Kennedy to Kimberley 5.vi.1871. CO/267/311) :
"This is a dream... which it is useless to indulge in".
4. Min. by K-Hugessen 3.x.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 1.ix.1872. CO/267/316.

kind of paramountcy on the part of that Power".¹ In the Malay Peninsula and the South Pacific an explicit paramountcy was (confidentially) claimed. Thus the vaguest of the five alternatives was accepted. No ready-made institutional framework existed for stabilizing the frontier so the Colonial Office decided to experiment in each area. As Carnarvon said, each case was judged on its merits; yet as has been shown, the experiments were part of a wider whole.

The nature of the changes of 1873-76 therefore emerges. They were experiments in the administration of tropical dependencies. Moreover, they were limited experiments. Carnarvon would not consent to annexations beyond Fiji, he refused to extend the Residents to more than three of the Malay States and he trod very carefully in the Gold Coast. Further generalisation would be rash since the degree of British responsibility varied from Carnarvon's crown colony of "rather a severe type" in Fiji to the very timid policy subsequently followed in the Gold Coast and Lagos. At most it can be said that the policy adopted by the British Government represented the minimum fulfillment of responsibilities unwillingly incurred. This may be best illustrated by a brief summary of subsequent developments.

In West Africa the climatic conditions meant that British administration developed more slowly than elsewhere. In spite of the promise of Strahan's efforts and Disraeli's premature congratulation of Carnarvon, very little was done on the Gold Coast. The limits of neither the Colony nor the Protectorate were defined. Government confined itself to keeping the peace, exercising jurisdiction and building a few roads. An armed constabulary was created and where it was stationed the officer in charge combined his duties with that of Civil Commandant under the title of District Commissioner. At other places there were civilian D.C.'s but they were confined to the coast. Chiefs continued

1. Lindley, Acquisition of Backward Territory, p. 185.

to be magistrates in their own courts, and by the ineffective Native Jurisdiction Ordinances of 1878 and 1883 they were given powers to compel their people to build roads and thus they became petty administrative officials. This was regarded as the cheapest way of getting the job done. The Colonial Office's plans for better administration were not fulfilled. In spite of tropical pensions the highest quality of British administrator was not attracted; the educated Africans were deliberately avoided after the experience of the Fante Confederacy, and the chiefs were in fact given powers which they had not possessed before - all of which hardly augured for success. The conclusion of a recent authority is that,

"Despite the increased resources gained as a result of [the 1874 changes]... the Colonial Office was still reluctant to accept the responsibility for the territory, and the physical and climatic difficulties alone made complete dominion over the Gold Coast unthinkable. The re-organisation after 1873 seemed to augur a period of vigorous and decisive action. But the real exercise of jurisdiction in the Protectorate continued to be halting and tentative".¹

This very limited policy was challenged in the 1880's. Merchant interests criticised the neglect of economic development, Sydney Webb and John Anderson, then two young Colonial Office clerks, questioned the value of an expensive establishment which failed to produce social and economic advance for the African, and in 1880 Governor Usher, the administrator dismissed in 1872 by Pope-Hennessy, wished to extend direct rule by District Commissioners in the interior of the Protectorate. But the Colonial Office refused and it was not until 1901 that the Protectorate was formally annexed to the Colony and its limits defined.²

Similarly a vacillating policy was adopted towards Ashanti. Although Gladstone and Kimberley had not intended to smash the Ashanti kingdom in 1873, Wolseley's campaign had had this effect. In 1874-75 a number of tributaries seceded from Kumasi. The Asantehene, Kofi Kari Kari, was deposed for domestic

1. F. Wolfson, British Relations with the Gold Coast, p. 360.

2. Gold Coast Order in Council, 21.ix.1901. London Gazette, 1.x.1901. p. 6380.

reasons. Both Kimberley and Carnarvon had contemplated appointing a British Resident at Kumasi, but this was not done; and although ineffective efforts were made by Gold Coast officials at mediation between Ashanti and her rebellious tributaries, the Gold Coast Government adopted a policy of neutrality. Thus Osai Mensa, the new Asantehene, began rebuilding the Ashanti Confederacy with the defeat of Juaben in 1875.

The British attitude has been severely criticised.

"The policy of the Gold Coast Government towards Ashanti from 1874 to 1890 was utterly timorous and vacillating, and the fruits of the campaign of 1874 was completely lost in an incredibly short time... The two bases of its policy were a misunderstanding of the position of the Asantehene, and a determination never again to be involved in an Ashanti War... The Government... wanted the Asantehene to be strong enough to keep all Ashanti in order, but to be weak enough not to be a danger to the Colony. Two contradictory aims naturally led to chaos".¹

Although further suggestions of a British Resident at Kumasi were at first resisted, disorder within Ashanti, disputes about fugitives, and the expansion of Germany and France wrought a change in British policy. In 1891 the Governor attempted to send a Resident to Ashanti, and in 1895 Governor W.E. Maxwell arrived with an ultimatum to Ashanti to accept a British Resident. When this was refused the Asantehene was forced to submission by a military expedition, a Resident was appointed, and Asantehene Prempeh was deported. The questionable methods used in this caused fierce resentment, and when in 1900 the governor demanded the surrender of the Golden Stool, revolt broke out in a few days.² The governor narrowly escaped with his life in Kumasi and as a result Ashanti was subjugated and annexed by Britain, while the territory to the north was placed under a Commissioner.³

The final assumption of British control appears less smooth than it was in

1. Ward, History of the Gold Coast, pp. 282-3.

2. Ibid. pp. 301-303.

3. Ashanti Order in Council, 26.ix.1901. London Gazette l.x.1901, p. 6382, & Northern Territories Order, 26.ix.18 Ibid. p.6381.

Malaya, and this was in part due to the fact that, for all Carnarvon's moral scruples in 1874, the government was for a long time extremely reluctant to take new territory, accept new responsibilities or provide effective administration and development.

Expansion was also gradual at Lagos and in the Niger Delta. Various small additions were made to the Lagos Protectorate, and the governor successfully mediated in the disputes of the Yoruba hinterland in 1886, the year when Lagos was again separated from the Gold Coast Colony. But the area was by no means settled and when the Egbas and Ijebus closed the trade routes to Ibadan and Oyo, the situation was reminiscent of Glover's day. Sir Gilbert Carter, the governor from 1890 to 1896, was able to do what Glover had always planned. A British Resident was forced on Ijebu Ode in 1892, in the following year one was appointed at Ibadan, and in 1897 the Yoruba country was attached to Lagos as a Protectorate. Carter said that he had in fact carried out Glover's policy.¹

In the Niger Delta the British Government was content to maintain the status quo after the creation of extra-territorial jurisdiction in 1872. Even after the recognition of a British sphere of interest at the Berlin Conference, and the declaration of the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1885, no effective administration was attempted for several years. Not until the deportation of JaJa in 1887, the setting up of an administration under a Commissioner and Consul-General at Old Calabar in 1891, and the creation of the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893, was effective government begun. This process culminated in the capture of Benin in 1897.

Meanwhile, significant developments took place up the Niger. The Lokoja Consulate of 1866-69 had been short lived, but in 1877 Goldie Taubman (Sir George Goldie) visited the Niger and shortly united the British companies into the United African Company. In 1884, by treaties, he gained control of the Niger and

1. E.Glover, Life of Glover, p. 98.

he bought out the rival French concern. Chartered in 1886 as the Royal Niger Company Goldie's enterprise established administration on the Niger and Benue Rivers, which in 1900 came under the control of the Crown as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria with Lugard as High Commissioner.

Thus three elements united to form modern Nigeria: Lagos and the Yoruba hinterland, the Delta based on the influence of Palmerston's Bights consulate, and the Niger interior opened up by the Royal Niger Company. The Colonial Office took over the Niger Coast Protectorate, which, when certain of the company territory was added in 1900, was termed Southern Nigeria. In 1906 Lagos and its Protectorate were added to form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Lugard became Governor of both Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1912 and two years later was the first Governor-General of the united government of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.¹

In Malaya a system of government by advice to what were theoretically sovereign independent Sultans was attempted, but in time this became a system of firm British control. But when Carnarvon approved Sir Andrew Clarke's policy in 1874 he said the experiment "needs very careful watching",² and although he realised the logic of Jervois's annexation suggestion in 1875, he refused to sanction it. He failed to see that the Resident system had had a sufficient trial, and therefore he said the experiment should go on.

"Whatever may be the ultimate policy which it may be necessary to adopt in the Malay Peninsula it is clearly our object to make the best of existing materials, and with this in view it should be our present policy to find and train up some Chief or Chiefs of sufficient capacity and enlightenment to appreciate the advantages of a civilized government and to render some effectual assistance in the government of the country.

It is in my opinion, undesirable that the British officers should interfere more frequently or to a greater extent than is necessary in the minor details of government. Their special objects should be, the maintenance of peace and law, the initiation of a sound system of taxation, with the consequent development of the resources of the country, and the

1. See A. Burns, A History of Nigeria (1948) chapters XII to XIX.
 2. Carnarvon to Clarke 27.v.1874. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/40 p.2.

supervision of the collection of the revenue, so as to ensure the receipt of funds necessary to carry out the principal engagements of the Government, and to pay for the cost of the British officers¹ and whatever establishments may be necessary to support them".

As Swettenham said this was "surely an impossible task... the Malay States were to be wheeled into line, everything was to be done on the most approved principles, and one white man was to do it, but the means to secure this very desirable end were not mentioned".² Thus men like Sir Hugh Low, the Resident in Perak from 1877 to 1889, virtually reversed the Pangkor Engagement. Instead of the Sultan ruling with the advice of the Resident, the Resident ruled with the advice of the leading Malays and others.³ In the words of a recent writer, "a form of British control grew up in each of the States under British protection which was at variance with the constitutional theory as set out in the Treaties and the Colonial Office policy directives. Direct Government by the Resident was cloaked in the forms of advice, and the Malay Rulers surrendered their actual power into the hands of British officers and administrative officials".⁴

In the 1880's this system was gradually extended after Governor Weld urged expansion, and Herbert in the Colonial Office suggested the consolidation of Britain's position. The responsibility of protecting Johore was formally accepted in 1885 when Maharaja Abu-Bakar, who went to London to get assurances from the Colonial Office that his State would not be annexed, signed a new treaty. Two years later Pahang made a similar treaty, but in 1888 Bendahara Wan-Ahmad was forced to accept the Resident system. The States in the Malacca hinterland were gradually consolidated under British supervision. Firstly, in 1886 Jelebu was linked with Sungei Ujong under one Resident; secondly, in 1889 Tampin, Rembau and the Sri Menanti Confederation became the Negri Sembilan also with a British

1. Carnarvon to Jervois l.vi.1876. Co/809/7. p.112.

2. F.A.Swettenham, British Malaya (1948 edition) pp. 217-218.

3. E.Sadka, 'The Journal of Sir Hugh Low' JMBRAS, XXVII, (1954) p.24.

4. Cowan, Origins of British Political Control, p.298.

Resident; finally, in 1895 both groups joined under the title of Negri Sembilan and asked for a single Resident. In the next-year the administrative union known as the Federated Malay States was launched, in which the rulers of Perak, Selangor, Pahang and the Negri Sembilan agreed to centralize their administrations under a Resident-General at Kuala Lumpur, who was placed under the general supervision of a High Commissioner, the Governor of the Straits Settlements. In this way British control in the South of the Peninsula was consolidated, with Johore retaining her separate status.

In the northern Malay States which were tributary to Siam British control was delayed because of conflicting interests in the Foreign and Colonial Offices. While the Colonial Office, prompted by Singapore, pursued the policy of 'paramountcy' in the Peninsula, the Foreign Office was guided by the policy of maintaining Siam's independence as a buffer State between British Burma and the French in Cambodia. The Anglo-Siamese Convention of 1897 represented a victory for the Foreign Office viewpoint, and committed Britain to strengthen Siam's hold over the Malay tributaries. However, the 1902 Declaration, whereby British 'Advisers' were to be appointed in Kelantan and Trengganu by the Siamese Government who would still receive a portion of the revenues, represents a Colonial Office initiative and a compromise which opened the door for further British encroachment. In 1909, by Treaty with Siam, the northern boundary of British Malaya was finally drawn, and Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu were 'transferred' to Britain and they later accepted British protection by treaty. Paradoxically, Johore, always the closest Malay State to the British, was the last to accept advice and it always retained a difference in name, as the official accepted in 1914 was called General Adviser.¹

Twentieth century Malaya, therefore, consisted of three elements: the colony of the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States, and the unfederated States.

1. See E.Thio, British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, 1880-1909, (PhD. thesis London, 1856).

Annexations on the Peninsula did not follow as Jervois predicted, and real British control was based on the fiction of advice which was coined at Pangkor in 1874.

In the South Pacific, after taking Fiji, Carnarvon refused Rotuma, Samoa and New Guinea. "It is impossible to appropriate every territory and every island... it is only reasonable to ask some breathing time before we are required to act on a large scale, to do something quite as difficult to organise and control as either Fiji or the West Coast of Africa".¹ Although annexed, Fiji was an experiment.

That it also became a landmark in British colonial administration is to the credit not so much of Carnarvon as Sir Arthur Gordon, governor from 1875 to 1880. For all his faults Gordon had a remarkably comprehensive picture of his aims in Fiji, although he demanded an independence akin to that of the Malay Residents. "For God's sake, don't try and govern Fiji in detail from Downing Street...", he wrote to Carnarvon, "I am confident that, if left alone, I can and shall succeed, but you cannot conceive how differently many questions look where one is able to judge them on the spot from what they did in London".² In fact Gordon unwittingly confronted Carnarvon with the latter's own idea - that Fiji was an experiment.

"The line of policy adopted by Great Britain in her treatment of the natives of Fiji is watched with interest and anxiety by the inhabitants of other groups in the South Seas, and on its success or failure will depend to a great extent the sentiments, whether of confident friendship or of fear and distrust, with which the already acknowledged power of the Queen will be regarded throughout the Pacific".³

In Fiji Gordon inaugurated a remarkable experiment in what could be called 'Indirect Rule', not as a cheap expedient, like the Native Jurisdiction Ordinances on the Gold Coast, but as an expensive experiment in the preservation and development of an indigenous society. He thought that development in the interest

1. To New Guinea deputation, 29.iv.1875. The Times, 3.v.1875. p.6.

2. Gordon to Carnarvon 2.vii.1875. Private. PRO.30/6/39 p.78.

3. Gordon to Carnarvon 26.ix.1876. Gordon, Fiji Records, II, p.161.

of the white settlers alone would be simple; development in the interest of Fiji as a whole he realised would be costly, and as he told Carnarvon, "it is the natives who are the people - whose interests we have to consider".¹ Therefore, he had continual conflicts with the Colonial Office over expenditure.

Gordon's attitude was well illustrated in his land, local government and taxation policies. He insisted that the bulk of the land should be retained for the Fijians in spite of legal arguments that the settlers' land titles should be examined in court without reference to questions of ethics and general policy. His successful advocacy ensured that about 80% of the land was retained for the Fijians. Similarly, his local government system was designed to retain the chiefs in authority; chiefs of suitable rank were placed over each province, district and village. District and Provincial councils were created and resolutions from an annual Great Council of Chiefs formed, in some cases, the basis of legislation in the Legislative Council of the colony. Fijian stipendary magistrates were given similar powers over their people as the European counterparts had over the settlers. While these policies were designed to preserve Fijian rights and institutions, the taxation policy fostered the economic potential of the people.² The system was likened to the Dutch Culture System, which Gordon undoubtedly studied. The cash poll tax was abolished; instead the Legislative Council assessed the payments due from the provinces, the Government invited tenders for the purchase of the Fijians' crops at fixed prices, and would also advise which crops were best from the market viewpoint. The Fijians were left to raise enough produce to meet their assessment. Thurston, who one writer claims was the originator of the scheme,³ said the Fijian got the maximum price for his produce in order to pay his minimum tax assessment, and he also kept the surplus.⁴

1. Gordon to Carnarvon 24.xii.1875. Private. PRO.30/6/39 p.86.

2. Gordon, Fiji Records, I, p. 196 & 457. There were rumours before the system started that the Culture System was to be introduced.

3. J.Millington, The Career of Sir John Thurston, p.54.

Gordon's aim was to "seize, if possible, the spirit in which native institutions have been framed, and endeavour so to work them as to develop to the utmost the latent capacities of the people for the management of their own affairs".¹ In a speech in 1876 he told Fijians, "You are not a conquered people, but Great Britain has joined you to her in order that peace might be established in the country, and for the welfare of all alike".² His greatest weakness was finance; apart from an initial grant of £100,000 and some loans, money was not forthcoming from Britain, and rapid increase of his revenue by economic development by Australians and New Zealanders would destroy his policy of gradual development. Therefore, as Gordon wished to prevent the Fijians from becoming the plantation labourers of the settlers, and Polynesian labour from elsewhere was increasingly difficult to recruit, he sought indentured immigrants from India who first arrived in 1879. Gordon was familiar with the system of Indian immigration in Trinidad and Mauritius, and it has been suggested that he went to Fiji with the idea in view from the beginning.³ At all events the Indians became a "human subsidy" for his experiment,⁴ and thus created what may yet prove to be the most serious threat to his aims.⁵ Nevertheless Gordon's achievement in Fiji was a lasting one and may well have been influential elsewhere.⁶ Although the Colonial Office disliked his haughtiness and had the measure of his faults, and Lowther felt once that it was "high time he got a snub",⁷ he had a staunch defender in Herbert; and Carnarvon's verdict on leaving office was: "It has been, to my mind, a great experiment".⁸

1. Gordon, Fiji Records, I, p.198.

2. Ibid. p. 390.

3. I.M.Cumpston, "Sir Arthur Gordon and the Introduction of Indians into the Pacific: The West Indian System in Fiji", Pacific Hist. Rev. XXv (Nov 1956), pp. 375-376.

4. Legge, Britain in Fiji, p. 268.

5. Population, (1956 Report): Fijians - 148,134. Indians:- 169,403.

6. Legge, p. 156. Sir William MacGregor, Gordon's chief medical officer, was later Governor of N.Guinea 1888-98, and Lagos 1899-1904.

7. Min. by Lowther l.ii.1878 on Gordon to Carnarvon 30.xi.1877. CO/83/14.

8. Carnarvon to Gordon 27.viii.1878. Gordon, Fiji Records, p.165.

Beyond Fiji Carnarvon refuse to move. "We cannot in fact undertake annexations in all parts of the world", he said,¹ and Gordon was specifically ordered not to extend British annexation or protectorate.² Carnarvon's answer to problems in this region was the Western Pacific High Commission, which was intended to provide jurisdiction over British subjects only. The men on the spot, however, interpreted this more liberally; Alfred Maudslay, who Gordon sent home in 1877 to hasten the issue of the commission, said the aim was "the extension of British influence in these lands, and the prevention of their annexation by any other power",³ and Gordon claimed that before he left England in 1875 Herbert had said he should quietly secure the annexation of Samoa and Tonga to Fiji.⁴

These aims were frustrated. Germany was not checked in Samoa and New Guinea, nor were the United States in Samoa, and the French were not excluded from the New Hebrides. While Maudslay's plan envisaged Deputy Commissioners at Tonga, Samoa, the New Hebrides and the Solomons with jurisdiction in the islands around, when the Order in Council was issued in 1877 D.C.'s were only appointed at Tonga and Samoa to exercise jurisdiction over British subjects⁵; foreigners and islanders were outside their jurisdiction.

In the long run, however, the Western Pacific High Commission provided a ubiquitous instrument for British supervision in the Pacific. The 1877 Order gave the commission jurisdiction over British subjects in Tonga, Samoa, Rotuma, Eastern New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, the Louisiade Archipelago, and the Union, Phoenix, Gilbert, Ellice, Marshall, Caroline and Solomon Islands.⁶ Although Gordon later said that the High Commission kept order less effectively than

1. Min. by Carnarvon 21.v.1877 on Robinson to Carnarvon (tg) 19.v.1877. CO/83/13.

2. Carnarvon to Gordon 29.ix.1877 (draft) CO/83/15.

3. Maudslay to Gordon 11.xii.1876. Gordon, Fiji Records, II, p.241.

4. Ibid. I, pp. 407-8.

5. A third D.C. was appointed in 1881 to visit N.Britain, N.Ireland and the north coast of Eastern N.Guinea.

6. Order in Council 13.viii.1877. Hertslet's, Treaties, XIV, pp. 871-911.

previously when the Royal Navy did things "in its own way", in 1893 certain jurisdiction over foreigners and islanders was added,¹ and when gradually British political control spread the High Commissioner was available to give general supervision. Extra-territorial jurisdiction treaties were made with Samoa and Tonga in 1878-9; Papua became a Protectorate in 1885 and was annexed in 1888.² A joint Anglo-French naval commission was created in 1887 to supervise the new Hebrides, where a D.C. was appointed in 1902, and the Condominium was inaugurated in 1906. Protectorates were assumed over the Gilbert and Ellice Islands in 1892 and the Solomons in 1893. Finally Tonga signed a Protectorate treaty in 1900, and Vogel's Samoan ambition was realised in 1914. "Samoa was to New Zealand... what New Guinea was to Australia, an irredenta in which the honour of the people was involved, and which they hastened to redeem".³

Over most of these accessions the High Commissioner had a general supervision but since he was also the Governor of Fiji his control was remote and frequent suggestions were made for the separation of the High Commission from Suva.⁴ A writer in 1919 criticised Britain's conglomeration of possessions in the South Pacific:

"the lack of of cohesion or uniformity in the organs of government, or any general policy tending to weld them together. In Fiji we have a Crown Colony with some measure of representative government; in Tonga a quaint protectorate with a British resident; in Cook a dependency of New Zealand with a representative native government and a resident; in Papua a "territory" administered by the Commonwealth of Australia; in the New Hebrides a condominium with a medley of jurisdictions; and over the Western Pacific generally the High Commissioner, who is also Governor of Fiji, holds sway and exercises it chiefly through a number of deputies".⁵

Thus, although Carnarvon's new official eventually supervised an empire far wider

1. Pacific O. in C. 1893, Ibid.XIX, p.570.

2. The Commonwealth of Australia took over the government in 1906.

3. Scholefield, The Pacific, p.178.

4. Apart from the years 1880-82, when Gordon was High Commissioner and Governor of New Zealand, the High Commissioner was always Gov. of Fiji, until 1952 when the posts were separated and the H.Q. of the Commission moved to the Solomons.

5. Scholefield, p.301.

than that envisaged in 1875 and 1877, he never had the authority and initiative which Gordon had anticipated when he sailed from England in 1875.

In view of the conscious limitations of Carnarvon's policies and the gradual nature of the growth of British influence in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Malaya and the South Pacific, it is not possible to say simply that 1874 saw the beginning of the forward movement. It is true that the Pangkor Engagement, the annexation of Fiji and the Ashanti war were major landmarks from the point of view of local history, but in the broader context it has been seen that the British Government was reluctant to move and exercised considerable restraint. The logical outcome of intervention was not unrealised; Kimberley saw that expansion from Lagos might involve wide responsibilities in the West African interior, and he told Gladstone he expected further annexation cries in the Pacific. Carnarvon saw that annexation might follow in Malaya, and after the Ashanti war there were limited attempts to gain territory east and west of the Gold Coast. But Carnarvon definitely wished to draw the line after the Gold Coast-Lagos colony, the Residents in Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong, and the new colony in Fiji. There was a marked lull before expansion was resumed in these areas in the 1880's, when additional factors were involved. Instead of viewing the changes of 1874 as the beginning of the forward movement, it is more useful to see British policy as a reaction to certain individual situations and the pursuit of limited objectives.

The experiments of 1874 were not the work of great and famous empire builders either in Whitehall or on the frontiers. In London, Kimberley was painstaking and conscientious, so he studied the problems and did not try to ignore them, but he was reluctant to move. In each case he went through several

months of great uncertainty before a combination of Knatchbull-Hugessen's persistence, public opinion and the urgency of the issues caused him to make up his mind in favour of action. Even so, although he determined quite firmly on intervention, he was still uncertain what final form it should take. Carnarvon coming when when the ground had been prepared showed considerable imagination and flexibility in 1874 in face of the work of officers who acted first and reported afterwards, but as his problems multiplied and South African affairs came to dominate the Colonial Office, Carnarvon seemed to lose his touch. His handling of Jervois in Malaya and the Gambia Exchange question was less successful than his original launching of the three experiments.

With Whitehall so generally reluctant, with the exception of Knatchbull-Hugessen and Herbert, the main impetus for change came from the men on the spot. A large responsibility for the changes rests upon them, since intervention involved taking sides in local disputes. In West Africa the Fante and the Protectorate peoples were assisted against Ashanti, in Malaya 'Abdu'llah of Perak was upheld against Ismail and Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din of Selangor against Raja Mahdi and his friends, and in Fiji the pretensions of Thakombau were usually favoured rather than Ma'afu's. The historical situation determined this choice in the Gold Coast, but in Malaya it depended very much upon the judgment of Irving and Braddell, the men who tried to unravel the local details, and they did not agree on what they found.

Because such a choice was made British intervention was usually resisted, and the Colonial Office often came to feel that it had "backed the wrong horse". Officers in the Gold Coast continually expressed disgust at the military failing of the Fante, in Malaya Jervois contemplated turning to Ismail as Sultan of Perak in preference to 'Abdu'llah, in Sungei Ujong Danto'Bandar Tunggal was regarded as more valiant than the Dato'Klana to whom the Government was committed,

and in Fiji Ma'afu always excited more admiration than Thakombau. This choice was always very significant for the local history, and must have given a characteristic imprint to the British presence.

From Whitehall's point of view, however, the local choices were less important than the methods of intervention. Thus, this thesis, as well as being an interpretation of the policies of 1870-76, has also involved a study of origins. Firstly, the Colonial Office interest in the three tropical areas intensified. Secondly, important ideas such as the use of Chartered Companies and 'Indirect Rule' were aired. Thirdly, certain international preliminaries to the period of greater rivalry in the 1880's occurred.

The Colonial Office consolidated certain new spheres of responsibility. Although the Foreign Office retained the initiative in the Niger Delta, in relations with Siam, and for a time relations with foreigners in the South Pacific, on the whole the Colonial Office was left with a free hand in the three areas. It decided the Gambia question as the Foreign Office believed that the Gold Coast policy would be the determining factor. It was left with the supervision of the Malay States, except where its activities might conflict with Siamese relations, and Kimberley, who decided to intervene in 1873, retained his interest and even from the India Office he influenced Malayan policy.¹ In the South Pacific the High Commissioner, the Governor of Fiji, was gradually given supervision of various later accretions, and the Judicial Commissioner was always the Chief Justice of Fiji.

The Colonial Office also slightly changed its ground in this period and admitted theoretically that trade should be encouraged, if only to create revenue. Buckingham, Granville, and Kimberley had kept aloof from enterprises like the Selangor Tin Company; the Polynesia Company in Fiji was frustrated by

1. See E.Thio, British Policy in the Malay Peninsula. p.316.

Thurston, and various New Guinea ventures were firmly discouraged. But after the Ashanti war and the appointment of the Malay Residents the idea of economic development in West Africa and Malaya was accepted, and in Fiji this was Gordon's only solution to his financial difficulties.

The ideas about Chartered Companies and 'Indirect Rule' presage the period of greater expansion in the last quarter of the century. Gladstone received Vogel's idea of the South Pacific Company not unfavourably, and Carnarvon evidently had the East India Company in mind when he considered his new policy on the Gold Coast, when he also interviewed some administrators from India and Burma.¹ At the end of the period Goldie's arrival in the Niger was the first step towards the Royal Niger Company. 'Indirect Rule' is a loosely used concept which cannot be analysed here, but a recent writer on Gordon's administration in Fiji writes: "These principles of native administration approximated closely to those subsequently developed by Lord Lugard and Sir Donald Cameron in Nigeria and by Cameron in Tanganyika - the principles of Indirect Rule".² An American writer on Malaya said that there "indirect rule is substantially an offshoot of the fact that the Malay States... have remained protected States".³ Thus direct government by Resident was clothed in the fiction of advice; but noting how Jervois advocated annexation in 1875 but then recoiled and decided to control still indirectly through Queen's Commissioners, Emerson concluded: "In other words indirect rule is a cheap means of transition to annexation".⁴ This compares with the reasons for the Native Jurisdiction Ordinances on the Gold Coast, but is in complete contrast to Gordon's desire in Fiji.

Later international rivalries are foreshadowed in the period 1870-76 in two ways. Firstly, the rivalry of France was encountered in West Africa, in the

1. PRO.30/6/85. "Query a Company? See Act 1870 quoted in Annual Register XXIII confirming all conquests of the E.India Co. in India".

2. Legge, Britain in Fiji, p.165.

3. R.Emerson, Malaysia, p.54.

4. Ibid. p.126, fn. 20.

rivers north of Sierra Leone, and the rivalry of the U.S.A. and Germany was encountered in the Pacific especially in Samoa. There were even rumours of German intervention in West Africa (Liberia) and Malaya. The alarmists were nearly always the men on the spot, such as Sir Arthur Kennedy, W.H.M. Read, or Julius Vogel, and just as ⁱⁿ the crises of the mid-1880's when British policy was determined, in the main, by factors of European diplomacy, so in the early 1870's the British Government was on the whole complacent about foreign rivalry in the tropics.¹ The exception to this was Kimberley's action in Malaya and in future years he referred to the rumoured 'German scare' of 1873.²

Secondly, the extension of extra-territorial jurisdiction, the development of techniques of expansion which fell short of sovereignty but nevertheless implied a vague paramountcy, provided the basis for succession assertion of British spheres of influence at a later date. British paramountcy in Malaya was staunchly defended until the 1909 northern boundary was achieved, Britain's position in the Niger Delta was cherished by the Foreign Office, especially by W.H. Wylde of the Slave Department. It is true that Australians and New Zealanders had a source of grievance over New Guinea and Samoa; but, then, the treatment of the German land claims in Fiji after annexation was one of Bismarck's excuses for pique with Britain.³

The crises which directed Kimberley attention to West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific in 1870 to 1873, and the policies pursued by Carnarvon in 1874 to 1876, while being an important stage in the growth of British control in the tropics, cannot be signalized as the vital stage in this process. The period

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1. See Kimberley's Min. on the French in West Africa 28.v.1873 on W.O. to C.O. 22.v.1873. CO/96/107; & Malcolm's Memo. on N. Guinea 23.x.1875. CO/808/14.
 2. Sept. 1881: "Bismarck used to be the bugbear, and was believed to have an eye on Selangor",
April 1885: "I mention Germany because some years ago the Germans were intriguing in Selangore, now under our protection".
Quoted in E. Thio op.cit. pp. 9 & 316.
 3. A.J.P. Taylor, Germany's First Bid for Colonies (1938) p. 32.

should rather be viewed as one when the Colonial Office began to realise the problem of the British frontier in the tropics and began to weigh the alternatives which it faced. The frontier in the tropics was not a central issue of British policy, although a few crises reached the headlines, and while a vague conviction of British paramountcy was firmly held, it was decided that before further territory could be taken certain experiments were necessary.

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