

THE MANYIKA AND THE
PORTUGUESE 1575 - 1863.

by

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A B S T R A C T

The causes of the diminished volume of Portuguese-African trade in the interior of the kingdoms of Manyika, Butua and Makaranga at the beginning of the 16th century are to be sought in Portuguese commercial methods. The Portuguese were not adequately prepared to compete with the Arab traders whom they found there.

They learned from the Arabs, but very slowly. However, Arab trading methods and institutions provided a basis for Portuguese mercantile activities in Manyika in the following centuries.

The Portuguese started at a disadvantage because the Manyika used subtle methods to resist Portuguese penetration into the interior. However the Portuguese achieved their aim, for during the 17th Century they established themselves firmly at various points within the kingdom of Manyika. The situation changed considerably during the 18th Century.

The Manyika successfully defied both Changamire who claimed suzerainty over the kingdom of Manyika, and the Portuguese who wanted to trade anywhere they liked within the kingdom. Ultimately, Manyika compelled the Portuguese to concentrate their trading activities north of the Zambezi. Other factors, of course, such as the resistance of Barwe, and the profitable nature of the ivory trade also accounted for this shift in trade.

During the 18th Century the feira of Masekesa (trading post) became a very important place. Manyika princes fought over it and this made it easier for the Portuguese to intervene in Manyika political activities. Portuguese intervention came to an end when the Landins appeared in Manyika in the late 1820's and early 1830's. The Landins were interested mainly in raiding cattle at the feiras. But the

devastating blows which destroyed the feiras were dealt by the Barwists and Quitevans who, like the Manyika, resented Portuguese aggression on their soil.

The Landin attacks, Portuguese administrative inefficiency, confusion of weights and currency and clandestine commercial competition rendered Portuguese trade at the feira of Masekesa unprofitable.

The Landin attacks compelled the Portuguese to re-examine their administrative machinery, and to make belated attempts to reform it. They failed. The Landins drove them out of the feira in 1835. In spite of their expulsion, the Portuguese maintained trade links with the Manyika at an unofficial level. The period 1835-1854 was taken up by the question of the re-establishment of the feira at Masekesa.

In the wake of Landin invasions followed another wave of 'intruders' - the Amatshangana of Manukuse. Unlike the Landins, the Amatshangana exercised some sovereignty over the kingdom of Manyika.

The relations between the Amatshangana and the Manyika were cordial. Some Amatshangana settled in Manyika and identified themselves with the local inhabitants. Portuguese political eclipse partially came to an end in 1854 when both Chikanga, King of Manyika, and the Governor of Rios de Sena agreed to have a capitão-mor re-established at the feira of Masekesa. This arrangement failed to work because the basic defects of the institution of capitão-mor had not been considered. Many of the men appointed lived far away and often did not know the language etc.

The appointment of Manuel Antonio de Souza in 1863 as capitão-mor of the feiras of Quiteve and Manyika ushered in a new era of Portuguese reassertion of their former authority at the feira of Masekesa.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

For a very long time a study of the history of South East Central Africa was confined to the European activities in this region. Very little was known about the political and economic activities of the native societies which inhabited the area earlier. This thesis is but one of the several attempts that are currently being made to describe in detail the political and social structures of these African societies.

I am deeply indebted to my tutor Dr. J.R. Gray to whom I owe a growing interest in the subject of African pre-history, especially that of South East Central Africa. His generous support and encouragement in the course of my research have been inspiring.

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My thanks also go to the Association of Commonwealth Universities whose scholarship for three years enabled me to carry out this research in both England and Portugal.

ABBREVIATIONS.

A.C.U.	Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino partenao-official
A.H.U.	Arquivo Historico Ultramarino.
Ajuda	Biblioteca Publica, da
A.P.O.	Arquivo Portuguez Oriental
Bol. F. U. P.	Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa.
B.N.L.	Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa
Bol. S. G. L.	Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa
Bol. Soc. Estud Moc.	Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Mocambique.
B. Mus. Add. MSS.	British Museum Additional Manuscripts.
Cod	Codice
Cxa	Caixa
G. G.	Governor General
J. A. H.	Journal of African History
J. R. G. S.	Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
Moc.	Moçambique
Occ. Pap.	Occasional papers, Rhodes Livingstone Museum.
PRSA	Proceedings of the Rhodesia Scientific Association.
PRO	Public Record Office
RSEA	Records of South East Africa
S. A. Arch. Bulletin	South African Archaeological Bulletin
S. A. A. A. Sci.	South African Association for the Advancement of Science.
T. T.	Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo
Trans. R. S. A.	Transactions of the Rhodesia Scientific Association.
U. S. P. G.	United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts,

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I N T R O D U C T I O N .

The proper name of what the Portuguese, and later the English, called Manica was Manyika; but, either due to a corruption of Chimanyika or to an attempt at stylistic elegance, the Kingdom came to be known as Manica, a name by which it is known to date.

The Kingdom of Manyika could be delineated in the following manner during its first three and a half centuries of contact with the Portuguese. It was bounded to the North by Maungwe, to the East by Quiteve and Barwe, to the South by Quiteve and Vumba and to the West by the Odzi River. The land extended obliquely from the East to the North, and, measured in walking days, which was the fashion among the Portuguese travellers of the 16th to the 18th Centuries, it was four days in width. The country was traversed by plenty of perennial streams. The main rivers, the Mutari, Nyamukwarara, Budzi, Revue, and Ruenya, descended from a series of metamorphic rocks, consisting of quartzites and schists, which are crossed over by numerous veins of auriferous quartz. A description, even a short one, of the river system can be significant when it is realised that panning for gold constituted an important aspect of the Manyika economy during the late 19th Century, as well as during the period under review.

Manyika's outside contact with foreigners did not begin with the Portuguese. The accounts of the Arab writers of the 10th and 11th Centuries, which deal with the export of gold and ivory from Sofala, clearly demonstrate the existence of commerce between traders from the area of the Manyika Kingdom and elsewhere in the interior with the Swahili traders at the Coast. The paucity of sources on the organisation of this early trade leaves us with little but the information provided by early Portuguese observers at Sofala

and, in particular, Antonio Fernandes during his journeys into the interior of Manyika, Makaranga and Butua between 1514 and 1515.

From these sources it would appear that the Swahili traders conducted their commercial activities in the auriferous areas of present-day Penhalonga, the Revue and Pungwe Rivers, and in the vicinity of Masekesa. They operated bazaars (markets), which provided a means of trading, using gold as a medium of exchange. Thus the Portuguese retained a system to which the local population had grown accustomed.

The Kingdom of Manyika was famous with the Portuguese in South-East Africa for its gold mines and it was partly to obtain possession of the gold mines of Manyika that Francisco Barreto was sent from Lisbon in 1569. It was because of its allegedly inexhaustible gold potential and convenient position as an outlet to the sea that the English and the Portuguese fought over it in 1890. Of crucial importance was, and still is, the port of Beira as a trading outlet. To the Portuguese, the Kingdom of Manyika was of strategic value as a springboard from which they mounted, or hoped to mount, expeditions into the interior.

A study of the history of the Manyika Kingdom is no less important from an African point of view. The important Kingdom of Manyika represented a very sophisticated, though embryonic, prototype of African resistance to foreign penetration. It was able to establish a modus vivendi with the Portuguese in matters of trade without losing its independence. Trade opportunities were controlled by the Chikangas and their princes or Councillors.

Manyika polity emerges clearly during the 18th and 19th Centuries¹.

But it would seem that the main institutions of King, Newanji, Semukadzi

1. See letter from the capitão-mor of Manica, Fortunato Ciriano da Silva, to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 5/10/1830. Maco ll. A.H.U. See Chapter V supra. For 18th Century examples see following footnotes.

and binga² were similar to those which the Portuguese found in existence when they arrived in Manyika in the early 16th Century.

The King was the supreme ruler of the Kingdom. In his duties the King was assisted by a newanji who in the case of a death, assumed the reins of government as a caretaker King. Next to the newanji was a semukadzi, the King's celibate sister, who lived within the royal court and was an intermediary of Nyamandoto, the Manyika ancestral spirit, through whom the Manyika people collectively communicated with Mwari, the creator of Mankind. She was an effective means by which the King exercised control over his people, since it was she who predicted and provided answers to national disasters such as famine, epidemic diseases and wars.

The King had other means of governing his Kingdom. He had specialist spirit medium like Sahumani, the custodian of the Kings' survival spirits, which existed in the nude³, or the rain-maker who, during a drought period, led King and councillors to Mbire⁴, the ancestral home of the Manyika, to offer sacrifices to Muti usine zita (nameless tree)⁵.

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2. The terms Newanji and binga are fairly scattered throughout the 18th Century as shown in, subsequent Chapters. See: anon. Descrição Corográfica do reino da Manica, seus costumes e Leis. Cxa,17, Moc. A.H.U. In this account the terminology used for the spirit medium is Nyabeze. also see: Galvão da Silva, Manuel. 'Diário das Viagens, feitas pelas terras de Manica' in Carvalho Dias, Luiz Fernando de. Fontes para a História, Geografia e Comercio de Moçambique. (See XVIII) Lisbon, 1954, p.329.
3. Shropshire Denis. 'The Story of Sahumani' in Man. Nos.6-7, 1939, p.6.
Shropshire Denis. 'The Mifanidzo of the Mutasa Dynasty.' Man.No.4,5. 1930, pp.4-5.
4. David Mutasa. Personal communication.
5. Ibid. This tree was situated in the present day Marandellas district and could be seen from a long distance. See Possett, F.W.T. 'The Tree in the Religious Ritual of the Bantu of Southern Rhodesia' in Man. Nos.109-110. August,1939, p.126.

The King was also assisted by his sons and daughters⁶ in administering the Kingdom. His sons and daughters, together with their husbands, became special ministers who worked in conjunction with the King's three councils⁷, namely the council of Makorokota, which was comprised of influentially important men who lived in distant parts of the Kingdom and the council of Makotsi, alternatively known as Machinda (princes of royal blood). These two councils, together with the King, decided matters of high policy. A third council consisted of six ministers. Their function was to make pronouncements on matters connected with royal funerals and successions to the throne.

It is the methods which the Manyika Kings and their councillors adopted to circumscribe the trading activities of the Portuguese which constitute the main theme of this investigation. I shall be concerned also to answer particular questions which are fundamental to an understanding of the history of the region which once constituted the Mwene-Mutapa confederacy. Did all the gold which passed through the port of Sofala come, as the Portuguese chroniclers of the early 16th Century

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6. Machiwenyika J. 'The History of the Manyika People and Their Customs.' MS. 14/1/1.Sby.
 'Manyika Headwomen' in NADA No.17.1940 pp.3-5
 Compare the Teves (Quiteves). See Rita-Ferreira, Antonio. 'A Grupamento e Caracterizaçãõ Ethnica dos Indigenas de Mocambique.' Lisbon 1958. p.46.
 Also, João dos Santos, 'Ethiopia Oriental' Book 1, Ch.1. in Theal, G.M. R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. Cape Town. 1964, p.192.
7. David Mutasa. Personal Communication. The dynastic titles of the Ministers were Semukadzi, King's celibate sister, Sakupwanya, the first-born of the King, who was traditionally addressed as baba (father), Muponda, a representative of the original owners of the land, who were ousted by the Nyamubvambire dynasty. This was done in order to placate and solicit for cooperation of Muponda's ancestral spirits, Mukoyi, literally means a trusted man. He married a muzvari (princess) and both lived in Jenya, one of the regions of Manyika, given to them by the King. He represented all the Nehandans (sons-in-law of the King) at the royal court. Samushonga, (mushonga - medicine) a doctor for the royal family, Samusewe (musewe - arrow), minister of defence, and the sixth one was (curu, who was concerned with selection of a new King. Curu also acted as a court drummer. An account of Manyika Kingship is found in Herbert Chitepo's Soko Risina Musoro. Oxford, 1958. (Available at SOAS).

claimed, from the Kingdom of Manyika? How was gold trade organised between the Manyika and the Portuguese traders? Was it the civil wars which made the trade, in particular the gold trade, less remunerative than the Portuguese expected? What was the role of the feiras and of the vashambadzi, and how were they adapted to the African way of life?

The orthodox view of the Ngoni, as the Huns who devastated the Kingdom of the former empire of Mwene Mutapa, has been revised in the light of new evidence. Other factors have been isolated as being primarily, but not solely, responsible for a decline of Portuguese influence during the first half of the 19th Century.

In the following account, Shona terminology has been introduced where appropriate, instead of the Portuguese imitation. But certain Portuguese words like feira or capitão-mor have been left in the original, because an English equivalent does not bring out the concept clearly. I have retained the use of the terms emperor and King, because the Portuguese distinguish in their documents emperador and rei, and there are no clearly distinguishing terms in Shona, both being denoted by Mwene Mutapa and Changamire on the one hand and the Chikangas on the other. Indeed the power and influence of the Mwene Mutapas and Changamires appear to have been impressive, not only to the Portuguese. Dionizio de Melo e Castro, Antonio Pinto de Miranda and the author of the 'Descrição Corográfica...' all bear testimony to the hegemony of Mwene Mutapa and Changamire. The term King has been retained to denote feudatories of Changamire and Mwene Mutapa. The Portuguese administrators were consistent in their use of the term rei for Manyika potentates during this period and emperador for Mwene Mutapas, but as far as the Changamires were concerned, it would seem that the Portuguese discriminated between emperador and rei. A Changamire was an emperador, sometimes even poderoso, only when the Portuguese either dreaded his might

or asked him a favour, such as they did when they implored him to intervene in Manyika-Portuguese trade disputes during the late 18th Century.

I have neither attempted to trace the origin of the Manyika, nor have I speculated on the antiquity of the Kingdom of Manyika and the ethnic origin of the people. These facts, interesting as they are, fall outside the scope of this investigation. Furthermore, this field is better investigated in the oral tradition which persists. I have preferred to attempt a reconstruction of Manyika trading and political relations with the Portuguese from documentary evidence.

C H A P T E R I

EARLY PORTUGUESE CONTACTS WITH THE
KINGDOM OF MANYIKA 1506 - 1575.

There are three main points to note about early Manyika-Portuguese contacts. First, the civil wars among the kingdoms of Madanda, Quiteve, Manyika, Butua and the lands actually controlled by the Emperor Monomotapa became a scapegoat for Portuguese commercial ineptitude and lack of diplomacy in dealing with the potentates of this region in general and, in particular, the successive rulers of the Kingdom of Manyika for a greater part of the 16th Century. Gaspar Correia, who was himself in Sofala at one time, saw the Portuguese in this region behave as sovereigns, haughty and defiant of the Emperor, Monomotapa.

His comment was that they 'treated the people of the land worse than captives' and whenever the Emperor, or any of the Kings for that matter, complained to the Captain-General of Sofala about the behaviour of Portuguese traders, the Captain-General put forward 'many excuses explaining his inability to deal with them.'¹

This was the main cause of hostility between Inhamunda, King of Madanda and the Portuguese. It is possible that Inhamunda's actions, which restricted trade from the Kingdom of Manyika and its neighbours to Sofala, were directed mainly against the Portuguese offenders. It is again quite possible that the wars between him, on the one hand, and Monomotapa and Chikanga on the other, were a result of a complete misunderstanding of Inhamunda's motives.

The second point to note is that the Portuguese advance inland as far as the Kingdom of Manyika was not a preconceived scheme. It was an

1. Correia Gaspar. Lendas da India. Tomo I. Lisbon 1858, p.573.

outcome of three decades of frustration at Sofala. Thirdly, this disappointment led to two important developments; a crystallisation of the institution of Mushambadzi (hawker), known to the Portuguese as mussambazes, on which Portuguese trade for four centuries or more depended, and, secondly, a gradual Portuguese control of the Swahili trading posts - bazaars.

The civil wars, which the Portuguese found being waged in this region when they arrived in 1506, were limited and conventionalised affairs which did very little to alter, let alone destroy, the pattern of Manyika politics, agriculture, gold industry or trade. Gold mining and trade in general had been carried on under similar conditions in the past and were certainly carried on under worse circumstances at one point during the 18th Century². Soares, in his letter of 30th June, 1513 to the King of Portugal, reported that the Captain of Sofala lived in peace with nearly all the neighbouring Kings; the land could not be safer than it was³. We also learn from Almada's letter of 1516 that the relations between the Portuguese community and Inhamunda, on whom the diminished flow of gold to Sofala was blamed, were cordial⁴. This, therefore, means that the restricted nature of the gold trade was caused by factors other than the civil wars.

2. See Chapter III - supra.

3. Letter from Pero Vaz Soares, factor at Sofala, to the King, 30.6.1513 ANTT CC.1 18-27 in Documentos sobre os Portugueses em Moçambique e na Africa Central 1497-1840 Vol.III Doc.No.465 p.385. National Archives of Rhodesia, Lisbon 1962.

Theal G.M. Records of South East Africa Vol.I.p.75.

Lobato A. A Expansao Portuguesa em Mocambique de 1498 a 1530 Livro III. Aspectos e Problemas da Vida Económica, de 1505 a 1530 published by the Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos. Lisbon 1960. p.112.

4. Letter from João Vaz de Almada to the King. Sofala 26/6/1516 TT-CC 1-2-64. Cited in Lobato, A. A Expansão Portuguesa em Mocambique de 1498-1530 Livro II. Política da Capitania de Sofala e Moçambique de 1508 a 1530. Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1954. p.49.
Tracey Hugh. Antonio Fernandes. Descobridor do Monomotapa 1514-1515 (Portuguese translation and notes by Caetano Montez) Lourenço Marques. 1940, p.36.

Very little, other than that they were civil wars, is known about the causes, course and outcome of these wars before the beginning of the 16th Century; even then, in most cases, it is a matter of inspired guess on the part of a researcher. The arrival of the Portuguese further complicated an element which the Swahili had already introduced into these wars. Traders from the interior, notably from the lands which were effectively controlled by the Emperor, Monomotapa and the Kingdom of Manyika, had to pass through the Kingdom of Madanda in order to sell their merchandise to the Portuguese at a Portuguese factory in Sofala. The number involved in all this was probably not large. The Emperor, Monomotapa and Chikanga, the King of Manyika were joined together by fate in mutual interest to promote and expand the Portuguese market for the gold production of their lands.

It would appear that Inhamunda on the other hand wanted to control this trade between the Portuguese and Monomotapa lands and the Kingdom of Manyika which, he felt, could only result in augmenting the striking capacity of his enemies. The Portuguese adventurers and ship-deserters exploited this and hired their services to Inhamunda as advisers and mercenaries⁵.

Several battles, whose details and dates are unknown are mentioned in the Portuguese records as having taken place between Inhamunda on the one hand and Chikanga and Monomotapa on the other. Inhamunda, so it is related, was victorious, probably with the help of the Portuguese mercenaries, in one

5. Letter from João da Silveira to the King, Moçambique, 14/2/1517 TT CC 1-21-35. This letter is summarised on pp.145-7 of Lobato, A. A Expansao Portuguesa em Moçambique de 1498 a 1530 Vol.II. op.cit. Also see pp.81-84.

of the wars against the Monomotapa-Chikanga combination. This was probably a war which broke out in 1518-1519 and whose consequences were exaggerated by a factor of Sofala, Francisco de Brito⁶.

In his letter to the King, Cristovao hardly mentioned any wars. On the contrary, he referred to ambassadors he had sent to the neighbouring lands, those of Inhamunda not excluded, and as far as 'Ynhambre' (Mbire) 'where merchants go and come'⁷. Evidently they went to the lands of the Emperor Monomotapa. Traders could travel 300 to 400 leagues inland 'with greater safety than from Alhandra to Alverca'; the trade routes were open and Inhamunda, the Monster King of Francisco de Brito, was described as tame. He, however, expressed apprehension about the duration of the peace, especially as the people at the factory were wont to break it 'more than is necessary.'

The evidence given by Soares, Almada and Tavora, people who had lived in Sofala much longer than Francisco de Brito, tends to suggest that the impact of the civil wars, in particular those between the period 1518 and 1519, has been exaggerated by historians like Axelson⁸ and Lobato⁹.

In spite of that, the skirmishes which broke out between 1518 and 1519 are episodes which best illustrate the politics of the time. King Inhamunda instituted an economic blockade, the details of which were sent to the King of Portugal in 1519 by Francisco de Brito at Sofala. The effectiveness of this economic blockade, according to Axelson, is revealed by the fact that the factor, de Brito, was able to sell only a small

6. Letter from Francisco de Brito, factor at Sofala, to the King. 8.8.1519 in R.S.E.A. Vol.1. Cape Town, 1964, pp.103-107.
Also see Documentos Sobre... Vol.VI.(1519-1537) op.cit. ANTT CCl 25-7 Doc.No.2 pp.11-19. Also see Lobato A. A Expansão...Vol.III,pp.321-322
7. Letter from Cristovão de Tavora to the King 1518-19. ANTT Cartas dos Vice-reis No.143 in Documentos Sobre... op.cit. Vol.VI. (1519-1537) 1969 p.3.
8. Axelson E. South East Africa 1498-1530 Longmans 1940 pp.150, see also p.154.
9. Lobato, A. A Expansão...vol. II Lisbon. 1954 pp 82-83; 91.
Lobato, A. A Expansão...vol. III, 1960 pp 120-121, 383-4.

quantity of the merchandise and none at all of a ship that was unloaded on the bank of the Pungwe river, not far from the Kingdom of Manyika¹⁰.

The merchants from the Kingdom of Manyika, Butua and the lands which were effectively controlled by Monomotapa, could get to Sofala only through well-known routes. Deviations often resulted in robbery and sometimes death at the hands of pickets which Inhamunda had set up in the thickets. It would seem that King Inhamunda was not opposed to trade between Manyika traders and the Portuguese through his land as long as he was able to control its volume. Notwithstanding, Manyika traders occasionally found their way to Sofala. It is not possible to get an accurate idea of the volume of trade at this time, mainly because the key sources, the diaries of the factor and store-keeper, have not been located in the Lisbon archives and probably do not exist. There is, however, some statistical data¹¹, probably not very accurate, but significant insofar as it indicates an existence of 'an important market whose movement is to a large extent still unknown in its entirety but can be conjectured by partial references and episodes which took place.'¹²

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10. The various items of the cargo of this ship are listed on page 150, footnote one of Axelson's well-known South East Africa 1488-1530 (Longmans 1940) as britangis, 19,000 pieces (costing in Cambay 66 reis each, worth in Sofala 2½ miticals, with the mitical worth 467 reis); macaceres, 808 pieces (costing 111 reis and worth 2 miticals); dimity, 198 pieces (costing 151 reis and worth 4 miticals); trados, 795 pieces (151 reis and worth 4 miticals); sabones, 424 pieces (39 reis worth 1 mitical); tin, 2644 lbs. (900 reis the faracola, worth 30 miticals); red beads, 457 lbs. (840 reis the faracola); 28,225 tangas of silver (each worth 60 reis). The fact that this cargo was unloaded on the banks of the Pungwe river suggests that it was intended for the gold mining and trading centres of the Kingdom of Manyika mentioned in this chapter. *Infra.*
 11. Letter from Francisco de Brito to the King. Sofala 8/8/1519. In R.S.E.A. Vol.I. *op.cit.* pp.103-107.
 12. A great deal of statistical data and tables has been collected from the documents and letters in the Torre do Tombo (Lisbon) and published by Lobato in his A Expansão..... Vol.III. (1960) Lisbon.

The struggle between the Emperor, Monomotapa, and Chikanga on the one hand, and Inhamunda on the other, seems to have reached its climax between 1525¹³ and 1527¹⁴, when Monomotapa warned the Portuguese against supporting Inhamunda, whom he still regarded as his rebel provincial governor¹⁵.

The civil wars between Monomotapa and Torwa (1494-1512)¹⁶ and between Monomotapa and Chikanga on the one hand, and Inhamunda on the other, although by no means a significant factor, very partially explain the diminished flow of gold from Manyika and the interior in general to the Portuguese factory at Sofala. This, as will be noted later, forced the Portuguese to change their tactics in trade.

The other factors, more important and responsible for the shortage of gold, were the limited business acumen of the Portuguese, Swahili clandestine commercial activities in the interior and along the Zambezi from their base at the island of Angoche¹⁷, lack of proper preparation, the

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13. Lobato A. A Expansão..... Vol.III. 1960. passim
14. Letter from D.Lopo de Almeida to the King. Sofala. 27/8/1527. TT-CC-1-37-57 cited on p.80 and quoted on pp.83-84 of Lobato A. A Expansão..... Vol.II. Lisbon,1954. Also see Lobato A. A Expansão..... Vol.III, Lisbon,1960. Footnote 260, p.383.
Guerreiro Alcantara. 'Quadros da Historia de Moçambique, VIII, Moçambique dos Ultimos anos de Manuel a Morte de João III, 1515-1558' in Moçambique Documentario Trimestral No.62. 1950. pp.163-75.
Letter from D.Lopo de Almeida to the King. Sofala. 27/8/1527 ANTT-CC I 37-57.
Documentos sobre..... Vol.VI. (1519-1537) Doc.No.23. p.277.
15. Ibid. This was implicit in his threat to march his soldiers down to Sofala to take possession of the factory if support to Inhamunda was continued.
16. Von Sicard H. 'Tentative Chronological Tables' NADA 1946, p.31.
17. Letter from Pero Vaz Soares, factor at Sofala, to the King. 30/6/1513.
ANTT-CC-I-18-27 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.III Lisbon,1964. Doc.No.76 p 465

proverbial corruption of Portuguese officialdom at the time¹⁸, administrative inefficiency and errors of judgement¹⁹, as well as Portuguese inability to adapt themselves socially in the new circumstances²⁰.

The Portuguese did not bother to study the nature of their consumer market, neither did they have the expertise and necessary capital outlay²¹. What was worse, they 'failed to appreciate' the fact that the gold trade, and not agriculture, was the backbone of the Swahili economy of the South East African Coast²². It took the Portuguese six years to confront their enemy militarily and nearly twenty-five years to establish their supremacy over the Swahili traders. These traders, who, since their military defeat in 1512²³, had been trading largely as middle-men between the Portuguese supply market and the African consumer market, employed every manner of trickery, and in some cases direct attack, to out manoeuvre the Portuguese in the interior²⁴.

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18. For examples see Letter from Cristovão de Tavora, Captain and Governor of Sofala, to the King. Moçambique 20/7/1518. Documentos Sobre..... Vol.V, Lisbon,1966,p.557. ANTT-CC-I, 22-85 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.V. , Lisbon,1966,Doc.No.73 p.57.
19. Letter from Alfonso de Albuquerque to the King, Feb.1507. ANTT-CC-I, 6-8. PATO (R.A.B.) Cartas de Alfonso de Albuquerque Tomo I, parte I, Doc. No.37 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.II. Lisbon,1963, p.127.
20. See Summers R. 'Notes on the economic bases of S.Rhodesian Iron Age Cultures' in The History of the Central African Peoples. Papers presented at the 17th Conference of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute for Social Research. Lusaka, 1963. p.5.
21. See list of maintenance payments for the month of Feb.1506 which gives an idea of the nature of the personnel at the Sofala fortress. ANTT-CC-II, 10-30 Doc.No.55 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.I. Lisbon,1962, p.445. Most of these people were degradados and not traders See Documentos Sobre.... Vol.III., Lisbon,1964. pp.81,121,149,159,173,195,Vol.V.,Lisbon,1966. pp.215 and 335.
22. Axelson E. South East Africa, 1488-1530 Longmans 1940, p.162.
23. See statement by Pero Sobrinho and Diogo Homem, clerks of the factory at Sofala, 15/3/1512, regarding the defeat and death of Maulide, then King of the Swahili community at Sofala. ANTT-CC-11,31-38, Doc.No.37 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.III, Lisbon 1964. p.237-248
24. Anon. 'Description of the situation, customs and produce of Africa (c1518)' Doc.No.48 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.V. Lisbon,1966,p.357-358
Lobato A., A Expansão..... Vol.III. p.103
Lobato A., A Expansão..... Vol.II. p.19

It was a sense of desperation which compelled the Portuguese to send a degradado, Antonio Fernandes, to explore the possibilities of increased trade with African Kings and the sources of gold²⁵. He was the first Portuguese to report the gold-mining activities at Penhalonga, the Mutari, the Revue valleys and the Manyika side of the bank of the Pungwe river. He also reported that this trade was dominated by the Swahili who held fairs every Monday at certain points. We do not know whether or not he had an audience with the King of Manyika; neither do we know how much of his goods - muskets, cloth and beads - he sold or gave as presents. However, this reconnaissance tour, as it were, paid dividends because the Portuguese knew where to go and obtain gold when they established themselves at Sena and Tete. The dates of these two trading stations are controversial and conjectural. It is not unreasonable to accept G.McCall Theal's view that both Sena and Tete came under effective Portuguese influence in 1530 and 1531 respectively²⁶. The 1530's, as will be demonstrated later²⁷, saw a marked shift in Portuguese trading activities from the South, at Sofala, to the North along the Zambezi. It is also recorded that, when Francisco Barreto and his expedition tried to conquer the mines of Monomotapa in 1569, they found 'two fortresses or factories' on the Zambezi river, with people living there²⁸. It was this 'discovery'

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25. Tracey H., Antonio Fernandes, Descobridor do Monomotapa. Lourenco Marques 1940, pp.20-30.
 Also see Gaspar Veloso's Report in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.III. p.181-189.
 Godlonton, W.A., 'The Journeys of Antonio Fernandes' in P.R.S.A. Vol.XL.1945.
 Scholfield J.F., 'The Journeys of Antonio Fernandes', Transactions of R.S.A., Vol.XLII, 1949.
 Quiggin A.H., 'Trade Routes, Trade and Currency in East Africa', in Occ.Pap. Rhodes Livingstone Museum No.5. 1949, p.16.
26. Theal G.M., The Portuguese in South Africa, Cape Town, 1896, Footnote 1, p.133.
27. See this chapter, Supra.
28. Rivara J.H. da Cunha. Arquivo Português Oriental, Doc.No.34, 28/1/1588. Nova Goa 1857. p.124.
 'Records of the Orders carried with them by the captains of the fortress of Mozambique and Sofala. To the Governor-General, Manuel de Souza Continho from the King, Jan.1588.'
 Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. IV, 30.

which aroused the interest of the King of Portugal a decade later²⁹. He wanted to know whether these 'fortresses or factories' could be maintained or not. It is most likely that the fortresses referred to were Sena and Tete, both of which were later declared to be very important in the defence system of Rios de Cuama³⁰. Barreto's victory possibly enhanced the prestige, and tightened the control, of the Portuguese over Sena and Tete.

The main role of these two trading posts during the first half of the 16th Century must have been to control the Zambezi trade route, which had long since the second decade of the 16th Century, become a main loophole through which Swahili traders smuggled merchandise into the interior³¹. The control by the Portuguese of these two points on the Zambezi consummated Swahili dependence on, and their commercial alliance to act as agents, of, the Portuguese traders at Sofala. This alliance laid down a basis on which most Portuguese trade, in alliance with the Swahili, was done in the interior for centuries. It also formally institutionalised the role of the Mushambadzi. It must be pointed out, however, that Africans had been acting as middle-men long before the advent of the Portuguese in this region.

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29. Rivara J.H.da Cunha. Arquivo Português Oriental, Nova Goa 1857, p.124. *fasc.3º*
 30. Rivara J.H.da Cunha. Arquivo Português Oriental, *op.cit.* p.927. *fasc.3º*
 31. See summary of the letters of Antonio de Saldanha, Captain of Sofala and Moçambique to the King. Doc.No.3 in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.III, 1964, pp.13-15.
 Lobato A., Colonização Senhorial da Zambézia E Outros Estudos. Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1962, p.74.
 Tracey H., 'Vias Comercias Arabes de Sofala no Monomotapa antes do estabelecimento dos Portugueses' in Moçambique. Documentario Trimestral 26, 1941, Lourenco Marques. pp.33-35. This article confirms that this was not a new route of the Swahili traders.
 Axelson E., South East Africa 1488-1530. Longmans, 1940, pp.121,125.
 Lobato A., A Expansão..... Vol.III. Lisbon 1960, p.22
 Lobato A., A Expansão..... Vol.II. Lisbon 1954. pp.53,101,117,120, 129,134,139,157.

It would seem that shortly after they had defeated the Swahili in 1512, the Portuguese relied on the Swahili traders to take their merchandise to the market places which had grown up near and around the gold mining centres during the halcyon days of Swahili commercial hegemony. This Portuguese-Swahili commercial alliance was beginning to crack by the end of the first quarter of the 16th Century. This is clearly shown by D.Lopo de Almeida's letter of August 27th, 1527 to the King, in which he pointed out that, although Inhamunda had made an exception to his economic blockade of Sofala by allowing the Swahili traders resident there to trade, the King should not expect much improvement in revenue because the Swahili were 'so long drawn in their affairs that the greater part of those who traded at the factory' during the tenure of one captain's office (normally three years) would not come back until that of another³². In fact the Swahili were, at this time, suspected of inciting Inhamunda in particular, and other African potentates in general, against the Portuguese.

The Swahili traders relied on Manyika middle-men, as well as those from Makaranga, Butua and Barwe, to take whatever had remained unsold in the bazaars, as the market places were then called, to remote villages for sale. This practice gradually gave way to the credit system on which much of the trade was done during and after the 17th Century. The Swahili died out as middle-men and their place was taken by Manyika middle-men. This probably took place during the first half of the 17th Century because it is at this time, and shortly afterwards, that Portuguese travellers and traders speak highly about the fidelity of an African mushambadzi.

The crystallisation of the institution of mushambadzi, and the establishment of Tete and Sena in the north, greatly reduced the role of Sofala as an operating base during the first three or so decades of the

32. Letter from D.Lopo de Almeida to the King. Sofala 27.8.1527. ANTT-CC I, 37-57. Documentos Sobre..... Vol.VI. (1969) pp.277-279.

16th Century. This decline in importance was so rapid that in 1640³³ a Viceroy of India, Don Filipe Mascarenhas, suggested to the King of Portugal that the Portuguese fortifications at Sofala should be dismantled altogether. The King rejected this plan because he felt that the fortress was still useful insofar as it inspired awe and respect for the Portuguese from the neighbouring or even distant African rulers³⁴. Besides, it was his duty to protect a remnant Portuguese community of Christians and traders alike³⁵.

Traders who were settled in Sena either went to Manyika and Barwe themselves or sent their agents. In this way the Portuguese, in absent-mindedness as it were, penetrated the Kingdom of Manyika, notably the gold-producing centres, and eventually supplanted their Swahili predecessors. There is no evidence in the literature of this period as to how the bazaars were organised. But it would seem that both Sena and Tete had capitão-mors as soon as they were established. These capitão-mors distributed merchandise, at a price, to the residents who then took it to Manyika and the neighbouring kingdoms to exchange it for gold. This form of trade was not strange to the Portuguese because it was operated in much the same way as Portuguese feiras in Portugal. We do not know at this stage the amount of protection and the privileges the traders might have received from the King of Manyika. It is probable that all who went to these feiras were under the protection of a territorial prince.

33. Letter from the King to the Viceroy 25.11.1640. Bol.F.U.P. Vol.IV. 1959. pp.317-318.

34. Ibid

For Fortresses and Garrisons as a source of respect see Newitt M.D.D., The Zambezi Prazos..... (Ph.D.Thesis, London 1967) p.176.

35. Letter from the King to the Viceroy, Bol. F.U.P., op cit. pp.317-318.

It is more than likely that the King occasionally sent for gifts. The various princes probably did the same and demanded passage money from individual caravans of merchants who passed through their lands.

It would seem that by the middle of the 16th Century and certainly by the second half of the Century, the Portuguese traders, settled mainly at Sena, had effectively penetrated the gold-mining regions visited by Fernandes in 1514-1515 at Penhalonga and around the Mutari and Revue Valleys. A mining area, which was surrounded by an amphitheatre of mountains 30 leagues in circumference, possibly at Penhalonga, was commonly known as Matuca³⁶. Gold prospecting was done by experts who recognised gold-bearing reef by the dryness and poor herbage of the area where it was found³⁷. It is not known when these mines were operated but, according to an investigation which was conducted in 1573³⁸, among some of the Portuguese traders, who claimed to know the Kingdom of Manyika well, the most important mines during this period were Venguo Shibide, Arouva, Carangua, Quicina, Macarara (on the Mukwarara River), Shipondo (probably Machinpanda, near Umtali), Botare (on the Mutari River), Shevide, Droa (probably Dora - a branch of the Odzi River), Macequece and the Revue valley. The majority of these place-names cannot be traced today. The mines were possibly called after brooks which have now disappeared.

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36. de Barros João., 'Extractos da Asia dos Feitos que os Portugueses Fizeram na Conquista e Descobrimto das Terras e Mares do Oriente' in Theal, G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.VI.p.266. The word Matuca appears "as the only city in the interior" on a map of the early 16th Century. This points to the existence of the region as a mining centre to Swahili trade during the 13th and 14th Centuries. Caetano Montez thinks that the word is associated with the Vatonga who worked in the Matuca mines. This may well be, for there is no Cimanyika derivative for it. For the map and discussion of the word see Tracey H. Antonio Fernandes, Desobridor do Monomotapa. L.M.1940. pp.58-59.
37. de Barros João., 'Extractos da Asia.....' Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.VI. p.266.
38. Guerreiro Alcantara, 'Inquerito em Moçambique no Ano de 1573' in Studia No.6. Lisbon 1960. pp.7-17.

The fact that food supplies had to be imported from the neighbouring Kingdoms of Quiteve and Barwe³⁹ suggests that the gold-mining industry had attracted large numbers of people. In fact some of the miners were outsiders - the Vatonga who lived between the Budzi and Save rivers⁴⁰.

It is evident that by the third quarter of the 16th Century the Portuguese foothold in the Kingdom of Manyika, as well as in the lands effectively controlled by the Emperor Monomotapa⁴¹, was more than tenuous. The anecdotes, contained in a contemporary document of this period, show that the King of Manyika and his vassal princes had been sufficiently alarmed by the uncontrolled movements of foreign traders.

The Inquerito of 1573⁴² clearly shows that the relations between the King of Manyika and the Portuguese were strained. It is not uncommon to come across such references as "the King of Manica and his vassals are thieves; they robbed and killed Portuguese Christians who had been in the said Manica safely" and as a further warning to the Portuguese merchants, the Inquerito raised a scare that the Manyika would always rob "the cloth of whoever went there." In one instance Chikanga is reported to have ordered the death of one Rui Vaz, a store-keeper, probably from Goa, "who fled with two or three arrows". In another instance he ordered the 'robbery' of a 'Moorish' cafila to Sofala where the Swahili were taking their merchandise to the Portuguese, when a fugitive Indian sought shelter in it. The King ordered a general

39. Supra.

40. This region has been identified by Caetano Montez, see Hugh Tracey. Antonio Fernandes op.cit. p.48.
Also see Alberto Manuel Simoes, 'Tongas do Sul' in Bol.Soc.Estud.Moc. IM ano XXV. No.92, 1955, pp.165-66.

41 Machado Carlos Roma, 'Resumo dos Principais Territorios, locais, ilhas, regioes descobertos, conquistados ou occupados, visitados, ou sob a influencia dos Portugueses na Africa, Asia, America e Oceania.' In Bol.S.G.L. serie 52, Nos. 1 and 2, 1934. p.31.

42. Guerreiro Alcántara, 'Inquerito..... de ano 1573' Studia No.6. Lisbon, 1960. pp.14(8), 17(11).

arrest of all Christians in his land, and confiscation of 'the cloth' which they had refused to give him. This was followed by a general 'molestation' of the Portuguese community in general⁴³.

It is evident from the above-mentioned episodes that the Portuguese and Goanese traders, to whom the word Christian must have applied, had denied the King of Manyika his due levies on their commercial transactions in his lands. It is not clear whether the Swahili traders, who were still in Manyika, had any hand in this. It should be remembered that this is almost the time when the Swahili traders are supposed to have instigated Monomotapa to kill the first Portuguese missionary, Father Goncalo da Silveira. The frequent use of the word Christian and the lack of incidents between Chikanga and the Islamized Swahili traders would suggest a trial of strength between Christianity and Islam, and a triumph of the latter.

It would, however, seem that all the King of Manyika wanted was that the traders should conform to Manyika law and customs. He did not want to drive them away. The business man in him prevented this. He could have expelled most, if not all, the Portuguese traders, had this been his desire. His military strength was perhaps at its highest during the 16th Century. He could afford anything up to 2,000 soldiers whenever he fought outside his territory, but 3,000 or more whenever he fought an enemy within his borders⁴⁴. However, it was the mountainous nature of the country which made it difficult for any of his neighbours to conquer Chikanga, including the Emperor Monomotapa⁴⁵. A certain Mpango or Sampango, generally described as both his friend and vassal, used to help Chikanga with 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers

43. Guerreiro Alcántara, 'Inquerito.....' in Studia 6, pp.12-17, 1960.

45. Monclaros. 'Relacao da Viagem.....' R.S.E.A. III, p.227.

44. Guerreiro Alcantara, 'Inquerito..... de ano 1573' Studia No.6. Lisbon, 1960, pp.14(8),17(11).

or more. He could bring more than 70,000 men into the field⁴⁶. Manyika soldiers used bows and arrows, assegai and adzes. However, guns were not entirely unknown. Inhamunda of Madanda, Chikanga's neighbour and enemy, is known to have asked the Portuguese for two bombards on two occasions earlier in the century⁴⁷. Perhaps a belief that guns were a cowardly method of fighting weighed against their use. Even with his traditional armoury, Chikanga was a sufficiently potent military factor to reckon with, but he did not use his military superiority to expel Portuguese and Goanese traders who apparently disregarded his orders. They had only themselves to blame for expanding a chapter of complaints, about civil wars, which was started by Alcacova in 1506⁴⁸.

The weak position of the Portuguese traders improved considerably between 1572 and 1575, due to a development of new circumstances. The Portuguese were not slow to exploit a confusion which resulted from Chikanga's death⁴⁹ and its coincidence with the advent of Homem's expedition at this time.

46. Monclaros 'Relação da Viagem.....' R.S.E.A.III, p.227.

47. Lobato A., A Expansão..... Vol.II. pp.64, 52-53

48. Letter from Diogo de Alcaçova to the King. 20.11.1506 Cochin. ANTT-CC I, pp.5-18. Gavetas XX, pp.4-5. PATO(R.A.B.) Cartas de Alfonso de Albuguerque Tomo II Doc.no.in Documentos Sobre..... Vol.1. Lisbon 1962, p.389-399

Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. Vol.I. pp.62-68.

Freeman-Grenville G.S.P. The East African Coast. Clarendon Press. 1962, pp.120-124.

49. Von Sicard H., 'Tentative Chronological Tables' in NADA, 1946, p.32.

C H A P T E R II.

THE ERA OF PORTUGUESE AGGRESSION 1575 - 1695.

The encomiums and justifications of João dos Santos,¹ an adulator of the court, of Francisco Barreto's expedition of 1569-1575 have become a standard history of what happened between these two dates in Manyika and her neighbours. The substance of the Portuguese official version of the events of 1575 is that Chikanga was pleased to see an invader in his country; he gave him provisions and a present as a sign of friendship². Much is made about a state of war which allegedly existed between the Kingdom of Manyika and that of Quiteve³. The reason advanced for this is that the King of Quiteve did not want his enemy, Chikanga, to prosper by means of trade carried on through his land with the Portuguese. This would render him a danger to Quiteve.

To take the first point. The 'reception' which was accorded to Fernandes Homem is deliberately drawn out of proportion in order to justify a blatant aggression of a small principality whose only misfortune was that it was opulent. What is more important, João dos Santos and his contemporary chroniclers gloss over the fact that this 'reception' was possibly dictated by internal political developments. It is easily forgotten

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1. Santos João dos., 'Ethiopia Oriental' in Theal G.M., Records of South East Africa, Vol.VII. Cape Town, 1964 pp.282, 217-220. Monclaros. Relação da Viagem in R.S.E.A. Vol.III. Cape Town 1964, p.227.
 2. Ibid
Diogo do Couto, Decade IX R.S.E.A. Vol.VI.p.387. Carta de Vasco Fernandes Homen p.a. Luis da Silva em lhe da conta de tudo o sucedido na Empreza de Monomotapa. 15.2.1576. MS 51-VIII-40 fls.212-214 (Biblioteca da Ajuda) Miscelanea Ultramar 1517-1701.
Salt Henry, Voyage to Abyssinia and Travels into the Interior of that Country, Executed under the Orders of the British Government, in the years 1809 and 1810; in which are included an Account of the Portuguese Settlements on the East Coast of Africa visited in the Course of the Voyage. ... London 1814. p.61. Theal G.M., The Portuguese in South Africa Cape Town, 1896, p.151.
 3. Santos João dos., 'Ethiopia Oriental' in R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. Cape Town, 1964. p.217.
Diogo do Couto 'Decade IX' Ch.XXIV in R.S.E.A. Vol.VI. Cape Town, 1964, p.387.
Theal G.M. The Portuguese in South Africa, op.cit. p.151.

that the Manyika were otherwise opposed to this expedition. It could not locate the rich gold mines⁴ largely because it lacked co-operation and sympathy from the Manyika at large. The question of trade through Quiteve is not valid. The Manyika did not have to depend on the port of Sofala for their external trade because the Zambezi trade route had already become popular by the 1530's⁵. If Quiteve had believed that trade with the Portuguese would make Chikanga his enemy rich and powerful, should not this have been all the more reason why he himself would have welcomed Fernandes Homem and his expedition and shown him the famous mines of Bandire? Dos Santos' explanations are most unconvincing to say the least. In any case there is no evidence to show that Manyika-Quiteve relations were always strained. On the contrary, the fact that Quiteve's Zimbabwe was close to the Manyika border⁶ would suggest that the relations were probably cordial although occasional clashes could not be ruled out in an age when boundaries were in a state of flux and alliances easily changed. Quitevan opposition to Portuguese advance was not motivated by hatred for the Kingdom of Manyika. It was dictated by Quitevan interests, the desire to preserve the Kingdom intact. The King's fears were confirmed during the 17th Century when Portuguese prazo-holders took advantage of Quitevan political disunity to carve out land for themselves⁷. Quitevan opposition to Portuguese commercial activities was maintained during the 17th⁸, 18th⁹ and 19th Centuries. Quiteve became a haven for anti-Portuguese elements from Manyika in 1890¹⁰. What

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4. *Carta de Vasco Fernandes Homem* --- in Axelson, E. *S. E. Africa 1488-1530*, 1940. Longmans pp 268-274.
5. See Chapter I. *Infra*.
6. *R.S.E.A.* Vol. VI... p. 389.
Also see Map of Southern Africa by John Senex (fl. 1690-1740) dated 1720.
7. For a discussion of prazos in this region see the pioneering and lucid work of Newitt M.D.D., *The Zambezi Prazos in the 18th Century*, (Ph.D. Thesis, London).
8. Antonio Gomes. 'Viagem que fez.....' *Studia* 3 Lisbon 1959, p. 193.
9. Andrade A.A., *Relações de Moçambique Setecentista*. Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon 1955. p. 155.
The Quiteves attacked the feira of Bandire in 1774 and burnt the houses of the Portuguese feirantes, See Baptista R.J. Caminho de Ferro da Beira..... 1891, p. 14.
10. Rezende's Diary in Revista de Manica e Sofala, Series I-II, 1905.

happened in 1575 was a real manifestation of Quitevan national policy. There were exceptions here and there throughout Quiteve's contact with the Portuguese when, more due to internal political divisions or military weakness than desire, concessions were made and friendship feigned.

The attitude of both Manyika and Quiteve rulers towards Fernandes Homem's expedition was influenced more by politics than trade. It has been suggested that an unknown Chikanga died between 1572 and 1575¹¹. If this is so it may explain why Fernandes Homem's expedition received little opposition from Manyika. It is known that the deaths of most Chikangas were followed by an uneasy period of disputes, intrigue and quite often civil wars¹². It is very likely that there were more than two factions at this time and that each of them decided to look for help, one from the Portuguese and the other from the King of Quiteve who was already up in arms against the Portuguese. The fact that the King of Manyika is described as 'half a moor and half a wizard'¹³ suggests that possibly a delegation, which took provisions to Fernandes Homem and conducted negotiations with him, was most probably headed by one of the Swahili traders.

Secondly, a war, the only one recorded, which broke out between the Kingdom of Manyika and Quiteve, at this time, may also be explained in terms of Manyika rival factions. It was in the interest of Quiteve to

11. Vonsicard H., 'Tentative Chronological Tables' NADA, 1946, p.32.

12. See Chapters IV and V. Supra.

13. Lobato A., 'Viagem a Abyssinia com a Descriçãõ do Interior dos Países, Executada 1809-1810, Parte II' in Moçambique. Documentario Trimestral No.38 19 44 p.95.

Salt H., Voyage to Abyssinia..... op.cit. London, 1809-1810. p.61.

support one of them, opposed to the Portuguese, against the Portuguese and their puppet Manyika faction. The fact that the Portuguese did not get much help in locating the rich mines soon after their arrival in the Kingdom of Manyika would seem to suggest that the anti-Portuguese faction, which probably had a majority of supporters, triumphed. The faction which was led by a Swahili must have offended Manyika national sentiment by its external connections.

In the final analysis, both Chikanga and Quiteve were militarily defeated and they suffered the fate of the vanquished. Two separate 'treaties' were imposed on each of them¹⁴ whereby Chikanga was required to allow the Portuguese traders or their agents to trade freely in his Kingdom. The Captain of Sofala would make him an annual present of 200 rolls of cotton. The 'treaty' seems to have been in the nature of a gentleman's agreement. My search for it, or references leading to it, in the Lisbon archives was in vain. Nor does it seem that anybody knows anything about its existence besides Joao dos Santos. However, a similar 'treaty' was signed by the King of Quiteve in the same year, 1575.

The searches¹⁵ which were subsequently carried out were held not to justify state participation in the venture, although the mines were said to be better than those of New Spain and Peru. There are several possible reasons for the failure of Francisco Homem's expedition to locate worthwhile mines in a Kingdom where 'every palm of land' was described as goldiferous fifty years later¹⁶. We also know from the witnesses who were interviewed in

14. R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. pp.218,219-220.

15. Carta de Vasco Fernandes Homem, MS.51 VIII 40 fls.212-214. Also see Appendix V in Axelson, South East Africa, 1488-1530. Longmans 1940,pp.268-274.

Diogo do Couto 'Decade IX' R.S.E.A.Vol.VI. p.389.

Santos João. 'Ethiopia Oriental' R.S.E.A. Vol.VII, p.218.

16. See Report by Cristovão de Brito de Vasconcellos 20.8.1633, Doc.Aulso No.9. Caixa 1, Moc. A.H.U. Axelson E., 'Portuguese Settlements in the Interior of South East Africa in the Seventeenth Century' in Congresso Internacional de Historia Dos Descobrimentos. Actas Vol.V. II parte 1961, p.11.

1573¹⁷ that there were a number of profit-yielding mines and that despite the restrictions placed on the gold mine industry by the King of Manyika, the gold trade was lucrative.

The first reason for the lack of success of Homem's expedition was possibly Manyika's reluctance to reveal where the rich mines were situated. Judging from a list of mines which was obtained from some of the traders in 1573, the Portuguese traders knew where some of the rich mines were located. There was much gold in Manyika, even though Homem believed otherwise, but the Portuguese traders feigned ignorance in order to discourage state interference with their lucrative trade. There was another reason after 1580¹⁸. It has been pointed out that as a result of the occupation of Portugal by Spain in 1580, the Portuguese in India 'felt no obligation in filling the coffers of a Spanish King..... heinous offences were condoned..... trials indefinitely postponed..... gross misappropriation of money went unpunished.....'¹⁹.

This also explains the failure of a settlement scheme of 1634²⁰, whereby the Kingdom of Manyika was to be militarily conquered, made a seat of the governor of Rios de Sena and a base from which to mount expeditions to the neighbouring Kingdoms of Makaranga and Butua, 'the mother of gold.' About three or four Sena prazo holders, with 7,000 to 8,000 'slaves' to

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17. Alcántara Guerreiro. 'Inquérito em Moçambique no ano de 1573' Studia No.6. 1960. pp.12-17. Note a similar situation in 1633. See 'Petition presented by Don Andres de Vides e Albarado' in 1633 in Memoria e Documentos..... 1890. Lisbon. pp.142-147.
18. The Voyage of Francois Pyrand of Laval to the East Indies, the Moluccas and Brazil. Translated into English from the Third French Edition and edited with notes by Albert Gray and H.C.P.Bell. Vol.II. Part I. Hakluyt Society (1887-90) London, pxxviii.
19. Ibid.
20. Axelson E., 'Portuguese Settlement.....' op.cit. Actas V 1961,p.11. Axelson E., Portuguese in South East Africa 1600-1700. Johannesburg, 1964, pp.97-114. Bol.F.U.P. p.285 (1958) Vol.III Livro das Monções, No.17. El Rei a capitão de Moçambique. Report by Cristovao de Brito de Vasconcellos 20.8.1633, Doc. 9. Cza I.Moc. A.H.U.

work in the mines, were supposed to initiate the scheme. Other prazo holders in Rios de Sena were to be persuaded in time. The scheme failed because it met strong opposition from the capitalists, the miners, essayers and a new Viceroy of India. A judge, who had been sent there to carry out a judiciary inquiry, was murdered by the prazo holders. This attitude was not a new development. It is traceable as far back as 1575.

The vested interests of the estate holders of Rios de Sena, their hatred for Spain and Manyika unwillingness to expose their rich mines to foreign exploitation lie behind the failure of the two schemes, of 1575 and 1634, which have much in common.

Manifestly the period 1575-1629 was a high watermark of Portuguese aggression and exploitation of the Kingdom of Manyika. These twin evils, aggression and exploitation, expressed themselves in two forms: in a growth of the feiras (markets) in several regions of Manyika, and secondly, in a lucrative trade which was being carried on in the interior.

Most of this trade, as pointed out earlier, was carried on at the feira, whose status as an institution must have been greatly enhanced by the 'treaty' of 1575. There is still little information as to how the feiras were organised before the second half of the 17th Century. But a few features have been identified by archaeologists²¹ with regard to their structure, e.g. extensive areas were enclosed by low walls, the walls were made of timber palisades, a few residential huts made of pale and mud, they were situated at a distance from one another, they were near gold mining areas: some were jointly administered by the government of Rios de Sena and others were privately owned. It is known that in some cases the Portuguese adapted ancient ruins for their own purpose²². The common features suggest that the feiras fulfilled a similar function.

21. Garlake P.S., 'Excavations of the site of Dambara^{re} (Rhodesia)' in Proceedings and Transactions of the Rhod.Sci.Assoc. Vol.54. Part I. 1969 p.49.

22. Pires de Carvalho. 'Velha Macequece' Mocambique No.47. 1946, pp.7-17.

Archaeological excavations done by Freire Andrade, Director of the Mines in Moçambique in 1900, brought to light what the feira of Masekesa, the most important one in Manyika, looked like in its completed form.

These archaeological discoveries are corroborated by 17th and 18th Century literature relating to the feira.

The feira of Masekesa was situated between the rivers Muza and Chimeza, on the left bank of the Muza River²³. Its entrance was built on a steep bank of the river; the circumference was 120 metres and it was flanked by two rectangular bastions which also flanked the two lateral sides and there was a similar bastion built on the front side. The walls, probably $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3²⁴ metres high and 90 centimetres thick, were built with stone and granite taken from the locality. The stones and granite were cemented with mortar made from sand and clay. Two drawplates with loopholes opened inside, one 50cm. from the ground while the other, 1.30cm. high, allowed the use of fire arms. In each of these drawplates, the loopholes were 1.80cm. apart. In the two flanks of the bastions were loopholes for the use of small cannons.

The arrangements for artillery and cannons, which appear from archaeological and literary descriptions, were most likely a later development, because it was still being felt in 1633 that it was not necessary to introduce artillery. Rochairas (small guns) and falcoes (ancient artillery cannons) were recommended as defence precautions at this stage²⁵. The King had

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23. This roughly falls within Bordalo's approximation of $18^{\circ} 50'$ longitude South and $44^{\circ} 20'$ longitude East. See Bordalo, Francisco Maria. Ensaio Sobre Estatística da Possessões Portuguezas na Africa Occidental, Oriental na China e na Oceana. Vol.IV. Lisbon, 1859, p.231.
24. For comparison of measurements see Pedro Barreto de Rezende. 'Extractos do Livro Chamado Do Estado da India' in R.S.E.A. Vol.II. Cape Town, 1964. pp.411-412. B.M. MS. Sloane 194. Anon 'Descrição Corográfica.....' Cxa.17 Moc.A.H.U.
25. Report by Cristovão de Brito de Vasconcellos to Conde Viceroy. Cxa.I. Moçambique A.H.U. 20.8.1633.

written several letters, both to the Viceroy of India and the Captain of Mocambique, about the need to fortify Rios de Cuama²⁶. He had a fear that the Dutch, who were aware of the proverbially rich gold mines of Monomotapa, might order a full-scale invasion of Rios de Cuama, either from Sofala or Quelimane or both, which led him to issue repeated orders to the Viceroy to anticipate such an invasion. The feiras of Makaranga, Bueva (Butua?) and Manyika were to be fortified. The problem of Portuguese defence in Rios de Cuama must be studied under the background of Portuguese-Dutch rivalry during this century in the Indian Archipelago²⁷. This will not be dealt with here.

It is not known when the fortress at the feira of Manyika was built. It was probably started shortly after the King of Portugal had made enquiries in 1585-88²⁸ and the structures were likewise gradually added, especially in the 1590's as defence against the Hungwe-Dzimba who invaded the Kingdom of Manyika at this time²⁹. Evidence for this is very scanty. It may be sought in the very origin of the Zimba themselves. The nomenclature Zimba was used indiscriminately by both the Africans and the

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26. Bol.F.U.P. Vol.III. 1958 Lisbon (C.E.H.U.) p.285. 125 $\frac{31}{174}$ s/d Carta de El Rei para o Vice-rei. Feb.1633.
Bol.F.U.P. Vol.III. 1958. p.264. Livro das Monções No 17 80 $\frac{19}{5}$ Carta de El Rei para o Vice-rei. 27 Feb.1633.
Bol.F.U.P. Vol.III. 1958. p.278. Livro das Monções No 17 $\frac{26}{5}$ Carta de El Rei para o Vice-rei. Feb.1633.
Bol.F.U.P. Vol.III. 1958. pp.285-6. Livro das Monções $\frac{32}{125}$ s/d Carta de El Rei para o Capitão de Moçambique. Feb.1633. $\frac{3}{5}$
27. Boxer C.R., 'Portuguese and Dutch Colonial Rivalry 1641-1661' in Studia No.2, 1958. pp.7-42.
28. Rivara J.H. da Cunha, Arquivo Português Oriental 1857 Nova Goa. Doc. No.34. 28.1.1588, p.124. 'Records of the orders carried with them by the captains of the Fortresses of Moçambique and Sofala'. R.S.E.A. IV, 30.
29. Von Sicard H., 'Tentative Chronological Dates' NADA, 1946, p.34.

Portuguese to describe any 'bellicose' group of peoples³⁰; therefore, the suggested invasion of the kingdom of Manyika need not necessarily be directly related to the historical Zimbabwes who allegedly snowballed and rampaged along the East African coast³¹. The Zimbabwes have been identified with the people of a Malawi King, Lundu, otherwise known as Tondo, Rundo, who established his hegemony over the Kingdom of Bororo with the sword³². The suggested invasion of the Manyika Kingdom by Rundo in the 1590's, though a remote possibility, was not altogether improbable. The activities of Rundo in the region of Rios de Cuama alarmed the Portuguese in 1598³³. Dom Pedro de Souza, then captain of Sofala, sustained a serious defeat, in which he lost both men and artillery, in an attempt to drive Rundo out of Rios de Cuama in the same year³⁴. It is also possible that this invasion might refer to fugitives from what later became the Bororo Empire. Contact between the Empire of Bororo and the Manyika Kingdom is known to have existed since the 1550's to the 1660's when a lucrative trade in machira was conducted between these two places³⁵. There is no evidence as to when exactly this trade began or how long it lasted. It is possible that Rundo's conflicts with the

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30. Alpers E.A., 'The Role of the Yao in the Development of Trade in East Central Africa 1698-1850' (Ph.D.Thesis, London), 1966, p.36.
31. Ibid.
32. See Tradition collected by E. de C. Lupi. Angoche - Breve Memoria sobre uma das capitancias-mores do Distrito de Moçambique. Lisbon, 1907. pp.116, 119-123, 162-9, cited on p.34 Alpers E.A., 'The Role of the Yao in the development of trade.....' op.cit. Also see pp.33-36 loc.cit. Alpers E.A., 'The Mutapa and Malawi Systems' in Ranger T.O., (ed.). Aspects of Central African History, London, 1968. pp.21-22. Alpers dates the appearance of the Zimbabwes on the map of S.E.Africa to 1560, ('The Role of the Yao trade.....' p.30) but actually the activities of the Zimbabwes in the region of Rios de Cuama dates back a decade or so earlier. The conflict with the Portuguese began in 1550 when a capitão-mor of Sena, Andre Santiago, intervened in Malawi internal politics. See Rita-Ferreira A., 'Os Azimbas' Monográfica etnográfica in Bol.Soc.Estud. de Moçambique, 24 (84) 1954, p.53. For an authoritative account of the Zimbabwes, see dos Santos, João. 'Ethiopia Oriental' R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. pp.291-299. For Zimba activities in Rios de Cuama in general see Couto, Diogo do. Decada XI Chaps.XV. pp.76-79, XVI, pp.80-83, XVII, pp.83-86.
33. Rivara J.H. da Cunha, Arquivo Português Oriental Doc. No.364, 20.11.1598. p.918. fasc.3º
34. Ibid.
Couto Diogo do., Decada XI da Asia, Lisbon pp.135-40.
35. Monclaros. 'Relação da Viagem q Fizerão os pes da Companhia de Jesus..... no ano de 1569 in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.III. pp.234-35.
Gomes A., 'Viagem que fez.....' (1648) Studia 3. 1959, p.296.
Barreto Manuel, (1667) 'Informação.....' R.S.E.A. Vol.III. p.475.

Portuguese in Rios de Cuama were to some extent motivated by his desire to capture, control and expand the Manyika market for his machira. In his report in 1667, Manuel Barreto refers to the fact that Rundo deliberately raised the price of machira which were sold to the Portuguese.

The Portuguese were obviously not interested in defending the Kingdom of Manyika but their own trade. The problem of defence became more urgent because Chikanga had rebelled against the Emperor, Chunzo Monomotapa in 1599³⁶. It is possible that this rebellion was linked with the civil war which had broken out between Chunzo Monomotapa and Gatsi Rusere, which later involved other feudatories of Monomotapa. It seems that Chikanga was defeated and continued to pay tribute. The real reasons for the cause of the rebellion on the part of Chikanga are not mentioned but it is very likely that the Manyika in general never forgave the Monomotapa for not coming to their aid when they most needed succour in 1575. They used to pay regular tribute to the Monomotapas as their overlords. Another likely cause of irritation was the fact that Monomotapa signed a 'treaty' with the Portuguese, the implications of which affected Manyika interests and the interests of the other vassals who rose in rebellion in 1597³⁷.

The almost uncontrolled movements of the Portuguese traders, the official protection accorded to them and their feiras, especially that of

36. Von Sicard H., 'Tentative Chronological Dates' NADA, 1946, p.34.

37. Botelho J.J.T., Historia Militar e Política dos Portugueses em Moçambique da Descoberta a 1833 Coimbra 1933, p.275.

Botelho de Souza Alfred. Subsidios para a Historia Militar Marítima. Vol.I. (1585-1605) Lisbon, 1930, p.26.

Braganca Pereira A.B.de., Arquivo Port. Oriental Tomo IV, Vol.II. 1937, Nova edição. pp.26-28.

'Report made by the Governor-General, Diogo da Cunha de Castelbranco, by the command of the Viceroy, that His Majesty be informed of the progress of the Conquest of the silver mines in the state of Cuama' in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A., Vol.IV. p.155. For the results of this war see treaty of capitulation by Gatsi Rusere. Doc.No.16 in Memorias e Documentos..... 1890. Lisbon. pp.69-70.

Masekesa which was partly maintained at official expense, must have been blamed on the Emperor, Monomotapa.

As for the Hungwe-Dzimba invasion, it does not seem to have had any impact, whatever its origin was. It does not feature in Manyika tradition, which such an event would.

The slow development of the fortress at the feira must be seen in the larger background of the defence arrangements of the Estado da India. Mozambique, where defence was even more urgently vital, was not garrisoned until 1583³⁸ and was still not complete in 1607³⁹ when the Dutch attacked it. The soldiery was not properly constituted. Its units, quarters and rations were not organised on a permanent basis in the State of India by the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th Centuries⁴⁰.

The position was slightly different in Manyika⁴¹ and other kingdoms where the Portuguese had settlements. The garrisons and Churches were already in existence by the end of the 16th Century as part of the feira life.

38. Montez Caetano. 'Fortificações de Moçambique' in Moçambique No.31,1942. p.45

39. For the details of the Dutch attack and Portuguese defence see Durao A., 'Cercos de Moçambique', Lisbon,1937. This is a 1633 edition which was republished with a preface by Edgar Prestage and notes by C.R. Boxer.

40. Botelho de Souza A., 'Subsidios para a Historia.....' op.cit. p.19.
 Pyrard F., The Vogage of François Pyrard of Laval 1601 a 1611 To the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil. Translated into English from the 3rd French edition and edited with notes by Albert Gray and H.C.P. Bell. Vol.II. Part 1, Hakluyt Society 1887-90 pp.123-131
 Rivara J.H. da Cunha., 'Viagem de Francois Pyrard..... as Indias Orientaes 1601 a 1611' Tomo II. Nova Goa 1858-62, Ch.8. pp.101-114.
 Van Linschoten J.H., 'His Voyage to Goa and Observations of the East Indies' in Purchas His Pilgrimes. London 1625. Ch.VIII p.1754.
 Boxer C.R., The Portuguese Sea-borne Empire 1415-1825 London,1969 p.297.
 Ficalho Conde de. Garcia da Orta E — O Seu Tempo, Lisbon, 1886. p.169.

41. The feira of Masekesa probably had a garrison by the last quarter of the 16th Century. See Chapter I infra.

There was no mention of a Church in connection with Mocambique in an important document of 1582⁴² which gives information about the different posts, their functions, the honour and importance attached to them, and the various classes of people suitable to occupy them in Sofala and Mocambique. But a list of twelve Churches, among which was that of the feira of Manyika, appears at the end of the 16th Century⁴³. A correspondence between the King of Portugal and his Viceroy in India concerning payment of Dominican friars in Rios de Cuama would seem to suggest that Churches were in existence during the last quarter of the 16th Century⁴⁴. It was probably in this Century that garrisons at the feiras came into existence. Certainly the feira of Manyika was a fully developed institution by the first half of the 17th Century. Antonio Colaco is mentioned as capitão-mor of this feira in 1634⁴⁵. He accompanied a small team of gold prospectors to the top of a mountain range where the miners carried out several experiments. The fact that there was a capitão-mor suggests the existence of a garrison. There is no extant contemporary account about the size of this garrison, whose actual strength must have varied from time to time, but theoretically it was ten soldiers. The capitão-mor of the feira of Manyika, like the capitão-mors of the feiras in Makaranga during the 17th Century, was paid from government revenue⁴⁶. It is not known when this system of paying him and other capitão-mors began, neither do we know how much they were paid. But this system was stopped when the Count of Linhares became Governor of India

42. 'Relação das plantas, e descrições de todas as Fortalezas, cidades e povoações que os Portuguezes tem no estado da India Oriental' A Manuscript published by A. Botelho da Costa Viega in Studia 6, 1960. pp. 11-16. Alcántara Guerreiro J. de., 'A accção Missionaria e a sua organização canónica em Moçambique no período filipino (1581-1640)' in Congresso Internacional de Historia dos Descobrimentos Actas Vol. V. II parte 1961 pp. 179-193.

43. Ibid. p. 183

44. 'Records of the orders carried with them by the captains of the Fortresses of Moçambique and Sofala' in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol. IV. p. 90. See page 72 loc. cit. concerning the fact that there was already a Church at the feira of Massapa by 1608.

45. Report by Brito Vasconcellos to the King. 20.8.1633 Cxa. 1 Moc. A.H.U.

46. Rezende Pedro Barreto de., 'Extratos do Livro chamado do Estado da India' in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol. II p. 404, 410

(1629-1635). His argument was that since the region of Rios de Cuama was leased to a captain of Mocambique "he ought to pay the salaries to the captain of Sena,....., Sofala and the other ports of the Rivers." The post of capitão-mor was generally given to one of the wealthy moradores of Sena for a period of three years⁴⁷. His privileges included taxation, control of prices, preference of buying and selling⁴⁸. He exercised administrative and judicial powers. He resolved conflicts which arose between any of the moradores and any Manyika trader, prince or the King himself. Other duties involved the granting of licences, handling of orders within the jurisdiction of his captaincy, protection of cafilas, the raising of soldiers and distribution of presents to the King and his princes⁴⁹. The post of capitão-mor was very much sought after because of these privileges, quite often costing many presents, not only to those who proposed the names of the candidates for the post, but also to those who were nominated⁵⁰.

Evidently the prosperity of Portuguese commerce at the feira, the harmony or lack of it between the Portuguese who lived and traded at the feira must have depended on the capitão-mor's tact and sense of duty. The functions and powers of a capitão-mor, as will be noted later, were greatly modified by such factors as the nature of the King with whom he had to deal, the state of the country, for example civil wars, and his success in most cases depended on the amount of co-operation he received from the moradores in contributing presents for the King or princes.

47. 'Documentos Referentes a Soberania Portuguesa na Manhica e Quiteve' in Arquivo das Colonias. Vol.III. Coimbra 1918, p.99.

48. Ibid. Also see Codice 1460. Moc. A.H.U.
Newitt M.D.D., 'The Zambezi Frazos in the 18th Century' (Ph.D.Thesis 1967)
London, p.114.

Braganca Pereira A.B.de., Arquivo Português Oriental Nova edição. Tomo IV. Vol.II.1600-1699 (1937) p.22. Extracts from the book entitled 'Of the State of India' in R.S.E.A. Vol.II. p.416.

49. Coutinho João de Azevedo Manuel Antonio de Souza. Um capitão-mor da Zambezia. Peão Imperio No.2. Lisbon 1936, p.6.

50. Ibid.

As noted earlier, a capitão-mor at the feira of Manyika was not necessarily a military man. He was an ordinary civilian with great influence among the Sena residents.

The garrison at the feira of Manyika consisted of a detachment of ten to twelve soldiers from Sena⁵¹. This seems to have been the officially stipulated figure when the garrison was first constituted. To start with the soldiers did not live at the feira all the time as they did in the subsequent centuries. They came from Sena in April, stayed until the end of May when they returned⁵². This was the peak of the gold mining season, first, because it was after the harvest⁵³, and secondly, the rains were sufficiently moderate to render both alluvial and reef gold mining lucrative. Evidently the fortress was from the start not an effective means of defence and the feira existed largely because the king of Manyika also benefitted from it by way of presents in return for the favours he granted to the moradores.

In his excavations at Dambarare, Garlake did not find indications of prolonged residence. This seems to have been the case at the feira of Manyika in the 1630's where only about twenty-five residents lived at any one time, including Portuguese and African Christian couples⁵⁴. The fortress had neither

51. Colonel T.P. Cardoso Casado Giraldes MS.648 Azu/Serie, Esboso de Alguns Artigos Relativos a Capitania de Moçambique MS.No.17, Fls.18. (Academia Das Sciencias, Lisboa).

Castro Dinizio de Mello E., 'Noticia do Imperio Marave e dos Rios de Sena. 20.1.1763, in Carvalho Dias, L.F. Fontes Para a Historia.....' in Anais Vol.IX To MO.1 Lisbon,1954, p.130.

52. Botelho Sebastiao Xavier. Memoria Sobre os Dominios Portugueses na Africa Oriental. Lisbon,1935. p.295.

53. The perennial nature of most of the rivers in Manyika made alluvial gold collecting an all-year-round activity, whereas in the neighbouring regions alluvial gold digging was largely confined to the three months of August, September and October, known to the Portuguese as 'do crimo.' I suggest that this was a corruption of a Shona expression nguva yokurima - the ploughing season. See 'Report on the State and Conquest of the Rivers to the Viceroy, João Nunhes da Cunha' by Barreto in R.S.E.A.Vol.III. pp.489-90.

54. Rezende. 'Do Estado da India.' R.S.E.A. Vol.II. p.412.

artillery nor any other form of defence except guns which individual traders possessed⁵⁵. The captain of Moçambique supplied them with gun powder and bullets. It is not clear whether or not the gun powder and bullets were given free as part of the Captain's obligation to defend Rios de Cuama. This situation changed as will be seen later, when some attempts were made, with varying success, to have an armazem and a permanently resident garrison.

There were other minor feiras such as that of Matuca, whose fortress was built by one Joao da Costa⁵⁶. The feira had no capitão-mor. This is an example of a proprietary feira. Its busy nature is shown by the fact that it was never without a passer-by. The fact that feiras had developed to this extent was an indication of how Portuguese aggression had successfully advanced.

A third important feira was that of Vumba which had ten or twelve Portuguese and African Christians in 1631⁵⁷. Apparently the Village settlement extended into Quitevan land. There was a Church but, unlike the other two, there was no priest. There were many small villages subject to the King of Quiteve. This feira served both as a meeting place and trading post for merchants to and from Quiteve. Unlike the feiras of Chipangura and Matuca, there was no fort at the feira of Vumba, an indication that the Portuguese believed that they had nothing to fear⁵⁸.

55. Bragança Pereira A.B. de. Arquivo Port. Oriental Nova edição. Tomo IV. *pt 1*. Vol.II. 1600-1699. 1937, p.22.

Also see B.Mus. Sloane, MS.194.

56. Ibid.

R.S.E.A. Vol.II. p.412.

57. From an anonymous 'Ethiopia Oriental 28.6.1631' in R.S.E.A. Vol.II. p.436; II pp.412, 439; Vol.III.p.486.

Bragança Pereira A.B. de., Arquivo Português Oriental Nova edição. Tomo IV. *pt 1*. Vol.II. 1600-1699. 1937. p.23.

Also see Sloane MS.194 B.Mus.

It is incorrect to say, as R.N.Hall does in his Prehistoric Rhodesia (p.433 London,1909) that the feira of Vumba was not established until 1667, as the above references prior to 1667 show.

58. Bragança Pereira A.B. de., Arq. Port.Oriental, op.cit.p.23. 'Ethiopia Oriental' in R.S.E.A. Vol.II, p.439.

The second point which shows that Portuguese aggression was at its height from the last quarter of the 16th Century to the end of the 17th Century is the extensive and interlocking network of Portuguese trade between the feiras in Makaranga, Butua and Manyika. Manyika-Butua trade connections were first suggested by Joao dos Santos at the end of the 16th Century, when he saw a blanket in Sofala which had been bought by a merchant in Manyika⁵⁹. The merchant was told that it had come from Butua via Angola from Lisbon. In his report to the King of Portugal in 1633⁶⁰, Cristovão de Brito Vasconcellos referred to merchants from the feiras of Makaranga and Butua, and that the Butuans spoke of their land as stretching as far as the sea of Angola.

A Vicar at the feira of Manyika, Fr. Gaspar Macedo actually spoke to some of the Butuans at the feira and they told him exactly the same story⁶¹. Evidently the Butuans must have confused Angola with some other place. But Manyika-Butua trade links were maintained and developed.

Archaeological excavations at the feiras of Luanze^{and} Dambarare by Peter Garlake⁶², at Masekesa by Freire Andrade⁶³ and at the Khami ruins by Robinson⁶⁴ indicate that the Indian red beads were preferred in all

59. R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. p.274.

60. Report from Brito Vasconcellos to the King 20.8.1633 Cxa.1 Moc.A.H.U.

61. Report by Fr. Gaspar Macedo Vicar of Riód de Manica (Livro das Monções No.41. 2 parte, fls.13 Arquivo da India) in Memoria e Documentos..... Lisbon 1890 pp.141-151.

62. Garlake P.S. 'Excavations of the 17th Century Portuguese Site of Dambarare' in Proceedings and Trans. R.S.A. Vol.54 Part 1, 1969. pp.23-60.

Garlake P.S. 'Seventeenth Century Portuguese Earthworks in Rhodesia' in S.Arch.Bull. Vol.XXI, No.84 (Part IV) 1967. pp.157-170.

63. Pires de Carvalho. 'Velha Macequece' Moçambique No.46 1946, pp.5-64.

64. Robinson K.R. Khami Ruins, Cambridge University Press 1959, pp.144-145.

Also see Laidler P.W. 'Beads in Africa - South of the Zambezi' pp.35-40 in Proceedings and Trans.R.S.A. Vol.35. Part 1, 1937.

Conto Diogo do. 'Extracts from Asia' in R.S.E.A. Vol.IV. pp.367-368.

There are samples of agate beads in Caixa 3. Moc. A.H.U. For source and method of manufacturing them in India see Arkell A.J., 'Cambay and the Bead Trade' in Antiquity Vol.X. 1936, pp.296-298.

the kingdoms of Rios de Sena. The popularity of the yellow, green and blue beads varied from region to region. Imported ceramics from China, Persia and Europe in that order have been unearthed at every one of the above mentioned feiras.

The preference enjoyed by the Indian red beads, alternatively known as Cambay beads, was determined by a set of beliefs prevalent among the Manyika and their neighbours in Butua, Quiteve and Makaranga.

It was believed that the Portuguese plucked these beads from trees⁶⁵. The black had been left in the trees for such a long time that they petrified and turned black, the green had been plucked before they were ripe, the yellow had been plucked just before they ripened, the red, which struck the happy medium, were plucked in time before the sun burnt them very much and before they had turned black. These anecdotes were bandied about by the Portuguese at the time to explain the general popularity of the red beads. It may well be that the Africans at the time preferred a bright colour and red met their taste. Cloth was another important item of trade, especially the bright coloured cloths. These were measured by arm lengths.

The most important mining centre during the 17th Century in the Kingdom of Manyika was still Matuca, which was then estimated to be 30 leagues⁶⁶ in circumference, as compared with 50 leagues⁶⁷ in the previous century. The difference of 20 leagues could be either a genuine error of calculation or it may mean that some of the mines had been exhausted and

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65. Gomes Antonio. 'Viagem que fez.....' Studia 3. 1959, p.196.
A relevant English summary of this important travelogue is contained on pp.5-8 of Boxer C.R. An African Eldorado: Monomotapa and Moçambique 1498-1752 Central African Historical Association. Local Series. Pam.No.2.
66. Macedo, Gaspar. Report in Memorias e Documentos..... Lisbon, 1890, pp.148-151.
67. See Chapter I. infra.

people gathered together at the most profitable ones, or that these leagues constituted the forbidden mines of the region of Mbeza. This is most likely. As many as 200 Manyika used to go to a certain place to mine gold and stay there until it was the ploughing season. It would seem that about 10-12 gold mines were in operation in Matuca.

There was sufficient gold from these mines to justify an increase in the quantity of bars of cloth⁶⁸. There was still plenty of room for an expansion of the gold industry, especially what Macedo called the "90 extensive virgin mountain ranges" which all contained "large quantities of gold."

This gold trade was dominated by the Indians, about whom the Portuguese complained. The Portuguese blamed the Indians for a practice, which had then developed, of adulterating gold with silver⁶⁹. There were 50⁷⁰ resident Indian and Portuguese traders in Manyika in the 1630's. The majority of these were Indians from Goa.

The Manyika mining activities were also extended to crystals and iron. They used the crystals to make weights⁷¹ and iron⁷² to make small hoes which

68. A bar or fumba de fato (cloth) or fazenda de lei (monopolized merchandise) - See Boleo O. 'O regimento.....' Studia 3. 1955.p.95) consisted of 98 pieces of ordinary cloth from India assorted as 4 pieces of zuarite and 4 pieces of capotins. These 98 pieces corresponded theoretically to 400 panos (clothes - 352 x 66cm) and each piece of cloth - pano, chuambo or braca (arm-length) was equivalent to a portion of cotton cloth whose length was equal to two outstretched arms. In practice a bar of fazenda de lei consisted of 291 panos and rarely 400 panos and its assortment was very arbitrary. This often resulted in scandals because the functionaries were paid in cloth and willy-nilly they did some trade even though this was against the law.

See footnote 1. pp.49-50 of Filipe Gastao de Almeida de Eca. Gamitto (1806-1866). Noticias Biográficas Acerca do Grande Explorador com Subsídios Ineditos para a Historia de Moçambique. Lisobon 1950. Pissurlencar, Panduranga, S.S. Regimentos das Fortalezas da India. Bastora. Goa.1950, pp.206-208.

69. Gomes Antonio. 'Viagem que fez.....' Studia 3. 1959, pp.239-240.

70. Macedo Gaspar, report in Memorias e Documentos..... op.cit:pp.148-151.

71. Macedo Gaspar, report in Memorias e Documentos..... op.cit.pp.148-151.

72. Bragança Pereira A.B. de. Arquivo Português Oriental, Tomo 4. Part I, 1937. Bastora, P.22.

served as a currency.

The attitude of Chikanga to all this hustle and bustle of trade was one of caution. He maintained that only he had the right to decide which mines were to be operated. A Manyika who struck a mine had to report to the King and failure to do so often resulted in a confiscation of his property, family or death⁷³.

The Mbeza region, south of Penhalonga described as twenty leagues in circumference and 'famed for gold more abundant than can be obtained anywhere in the whole world because of its pure gold which was found in nuggets of one arratel or two arreteis'⁷⁴, was a preserve of the King. The Portuguese and Indians were not allowed to live there and the ostensible reason for this was that the King did not want to be embarrassed by requests to open gold mines. The King probably needed the gold for himself. Despite the prohibition order, much gold was traded. There is a case of one Joao da Rocha, a merchant in Manyika, who took to Sena a piece of gold weighing nine or ten ounces⁷⁵.

The restrictions put on the Portuguese and Indian trade by Chikanga manifested his resentment of this new situation whereby foreign traders and travellers penetrated deep into his kingdom. This was basically the cause of his rebellion against both the Portuguese and Monomotapa in 1629-32. It would seem that the Chikangas did not miss any opportunity to break away from or discomfit

73. Gomes Antonio., 'Viagem que fez.....' Studia 3. 1959. p.195.

74. 1 arratel was equivalent to 1lb. (16 ounces).

75. Macedo G., Report in Memorias e Documentos..... op.cit. pp.148-151.

Monomotapa whenever an occasion arose. A civil war broke out between an uncle, Mavura, and his cousin, Kapranzine Monomotapa⁷⁶. The former was pro-Portuguese but the latter resented Portuguese interference in Monomotapa's affairs. The Portuguese extorted promises from Mavura, after which they made a common cause with him against Kapranzine. These promises involved a treaty of vassalage and a cession of the silver and gold mines⁷⁷.

Chikanga fought on the losing side of Kapranzine. Both he and Kapranzine carried on sporadic attacks on the Portuguese until 1632 when Diogo de Souza de Menezes attacked and killed him⁷⁸. The Portuguese immediately raised his brother to the throne of the kingdom of Manyika, converted him to Christianity and imposed a 'treaty' upon him. The treaty required him first, to pay three pastas⁷⁹ of Botongas⁸⁰, worth 150 Xerafins⁸¹, secondly, to visit

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76. Botelho J.J.T., Historia Militar..... a 1833, Lisbon, 1934, pp.295-304. Axelson E., 'Portuguese Settlements in the Interior of S.E.Africa in the Seventeenth Century.' in Congresso Internacional de Historia dos Descobrimentos Actas V. 1961, p.8. Axelson E., Portuguese in South East Africa 1600-1700, Johannesburg, 1964. pp.69-77.
77. For the provisions and implications of this treaty see 'Livro das monções' No.13, 13 fls. Ordens Regias No.2 fls.5 cited, in Bragança Pereira A.B. de Arquivo Port.Oriental Nova edição Tomo V. Vol.II, Parte II, pp.99-101. 'Treslado das capitulações que fixeram os Portugueses com el Rey do Manamotapa' 28.6.1629, Tete, João Coelho in Memorias e Documentos..... Lisbon, 1890, pp.71-72. Pissurlencar Panduranga S.S., Assentos do conselho do Estado da India Vol.I. (1618-1633) 1953, Bastora. Doc.No.127, pp.396-400. Conselho de 9 Janeiro de 1632 sobre conquista de Monomotapa. Ibid. Doc.No.25. 31.4.1631. pp.542-44. Sobre o Contracto que se fez com D. Numo Alz Pereira para conquistar Manamotapa e ordenar S.Mage. que não tenha effeito o tal contrato. See original in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.III, Cape Town, 1964, pp.277-280, 367-370. No trace has been made of the famous and legendary silver mines of Chikova.' Old abandoned workings' on a galena bearing vein rich in silver' have been located. Probably these were the mines referred to. See Spence C.F. Moçambique. East African Province of Portugal, London, 1963, p.69. About efforts to locate these see Bol.F.U. P.Vol.II, 1956, Lisbon. (C.E.H.U.) p.501. Livro das Moncoes No 17 152 15 Carta 181 13.11.1630 Goa.
- Antonio Bocarro, 'Decade 13 da Historia da India' Doc.No.18. pp.76-78 in Memorias e Documentos.....1890 Lisbon Ibid. Docs.No.53, pp.138-141, No.55 pp.151-153, No.57, pp.155-157, Guerreiro C.J. de Alcantara and J.de Oliveira 'as minas de prata da Chicova em relatorio de século XVII' in Moçambique. Documentario Trimestral No.39, Lourenco Marques, 1944, pp.7-91.
78. Letter from Diogo de Souza de Menezes to the King 17.2.1635. in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. Vol.LV, p.278. (Barreto) R.S.E.A. Vol.II. p.411. Bragança Pereira A.B. de. Arq. Português Oriental Tomo IV. op.cit. p.22 pt1.

the Captain of Moçambique at the beginning of his office, thirdly, to recognise Monomotapa and to pay him regular tribute, fourthly, to disclose the mines in his kingdom and to keep the trade routes open and secure. The last clause of the treaty clearly indicates the grievance of the Portuguese traders. In return Chikanga would be given a cloth out of every bale brought into the feira. In fact he paid for everything he received from the Portuguese. As a Portuguese official pointed out at the time, this was far less than what his predecessor used to get, but the Portuguese conveniently remarked that he was contented. He had to appear to be contented since he owed the throne to them.

This treaty further advanced Portuguese aggression as shown by large numbers of Africans, about 300-500⁸² whom the Portuguese used to send out carrying packages on their backs up country, and the way in which both Indians and Portuguese used to recover their debts. This figure, which is given by Gomes, of course, relates to Manyika as well as to her neighbours.

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79. Gold which the Portuguese obtained from Rios de Cuama was cut into weights known as pastas (thin plates). Each pasta was worth 100 miticals. Chikanga was required to pay 300 miticals.
80. This type of gold is difficult to identify but possibly it referred to alluvial gold. See Costa Lobo A.de S.S. Memorias de Um Soldado, 1585-98 Lisbon, 1872. Compiled from Portuguese MS in B.Mus. by Francisco Rodrigues da Silveira B.M., Add MSS, 25419.
81. Bragança Pereira A.B, de., Arq. Português Oriental Nova edição Tomo IV. p.22. A Xerafin was an Indian coin worth 3 testoons. A testoon was worth 6 pence in 1553. See Nunes, Antonio. 'Extracts from the Book of Weights, Measures and Coins' in Theal G.M., R.S.E.A. VI, 453. For the history of currency in Portuguese India see Rivara, Cunha L.J.H., Arq. Port. Oriental Nova Goa 1857. (Fasc.) 2^o Livro das Privilegios da cidade Goa Doc.No.54, pp.174-187.
82. Gomes A. 'Viagem que Fez.....' Studia 3 1959 p.192.

The credit system operated in this way; that an African would get merchandise from an Indian or Portuguese on credit and offered himself, his property and family as a security. In case of default, a Portuguese creditor sent 20-30 men to confiscate his debtor's property and family⁸³. This led to a neglect of agriculture as Manyika vashambadzi were busy trading and the debtors fled away from their pieces of land to new ones. The King of Quiteve expressed the feelings of many neighbouring kings when he implored his people to concentrate on agriculture, which he considered was a source of wealth and security.

The Portuguese policy of aggression was not limited to the Kingdom of Manyika only. The defeat of Barwe by Antonio Lobo in 1659⁸⁴, the attempted conquest of Butua in 1644⁸⁵, the conquest of Quiteve in 1644⁸⁶ and the resuscitation of the feira of Dambarare between 1675 and 1684⁸⁷ are cases in point of further Portuguese incursions at the end of the 17th Century. This policy received a set-back in and after 1684, when Dombo Changamire initiated and continued his military attacks on Portuguese sources of wealth - the feiras.

83. Ibid.

Macedo Gaspar. Report in Memoria e Documentos..... pp.141-151.

84. Manuel Barreto. 'Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama 11.12.1667.' R.S.E.A. Vol.III. p.488.

85. Boxer C.R., Sisnando Dias Bayão: Conquistador da 'Mae de Ouro'. la Congresso da Historia da Expansão Portuguesa No Mundo, 4a Seccão, Lisbon,1958. For a contrary view that Bayao never went to Butua, see Von Sicard's polemical correspondence to Professor da Silver Rego 'A Propósito de Sisnando Dias Baião, March 2nd 1965' published in Studia No.16,Nov.1965. pp.179-186.

Bayao's conquest of Butua is still an unsettled question. For a recent excursion into the controversy see Newitt M.D.D., 'The Zambezi Prazos in the Eighteen Century,' (Ph.D.Thesis, London,1967,p.159). He dismisses Von Sicard's argument as 'inadequate'but maintains a non-committal position.

86. Acto de Vassallagem do Rei de Quiteve de 23.10.1644 in Memorias e Documentos... Lisbon,1890, p.122.

87. Garlake P.S., 'Excavations of the Seventeenth Century Portuguese Site of Dambarare' in Proced & Trans. R.S.A. Vol.54, Part 1, 1969, pp.23-60. Garlake P.S., 'The value of Imported Ceramics in the Dating and Interpretation of the Rhodesian Iron Age' J.A.H. XI. 1968, pp.13-33.

The increase in the number of feiras and their further development give us an idea of how comfortable the Portuguese were in Manyika in the third quarter of the 17th Century.

The number of feiras had not increased. Chipangura was still the most important feira during the second half of the 17th Century⁸⁸. It would seem that it was the only one with a capitão-mor⁸⁹. The feira of Matuca had declined in importance possibly because merchants found it more convenient to patronise one place. Also this gave them a sense of security even though there was not much fellow-feeling amongst them.

There was a sizeable community of traders at the feira of Masekesa during the 17th Century. In 1696 Fr. Antonio Conceicao, in his 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama'⁹⁰, had this much to say about the life of the moradores; that they were scattered about in the suburbs and were absolutely incapable of collective defence, their morals were despicable and that they were obstinate. Feira society then was very individualised. It has been said that they preferred this type of life because it made it easy for them to play fraudulent tricks on one another, as for example, a morador could secretly have trade dealings with a middle man or servant belonging to another morador. The annual production of gold and ivory at the feira was estimated at 100 pastas in the 1690's, worth 100 xerafins in India, compared with its annual production of 400 pastas in the past. The difference does not necessarily reflect a decline of trade due to Changamire's wars, but rather a profound change in the method

88. Manuel Barreto. 'Informação,....' R.S.E.A. Vol.III. p.486.

89. Ibid.

90. Conceição Antonio, 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama'
Rivara J.H. da Cunha. O Chronista de Tissugry Nova Goa, 1867-69.
pp.107-111.

of trade. There were fewer people then going to the feira because the vashambadzi, as Gomes observed in 1648, went out to remote villages in large numbers. There is also evidence of this in Conceicao's 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama.' Traders occasionally went from the feira of Masekesa to Dambarare, a distance which took them seven days. This was probably between 1675 and 1684⁹¹.

It was Dombo Changamire who helped to stem the tide of Portuguese aggression in the kingdom of Manyika when he began his military campaigns (1684) which culminated in his famous attack of the feira of Masekesa in 1695. The Portuguese aggressive thrust which effectively began in 1575 had at last come to a halt. Thenceforth the Portuguese were on the defensive.

Although the Manyika did not conduct a military defence against the expedition of 1575, due to a succession of civil wars, and promised to open their mines to the Portuguese and Indian traders, yet they deliberately maintained studied silence about the location of the mines; they did not allow the Portuguese to build feiras without opposition. On the contrary, they maintained a subtle warfare, which if not always successful, at least deserves to be applauded. They hid the location of the mines, sometimes retired in defeat, but the moment the Portuguese relaxed, the Manyika redoubled their tactics of prohibition, restrictions and, if they judged it politic, broke out into open resistance again. It was this policy of resistance, little appreciated in 1575, which saved the kingdom of Manyika from being overwhelmed and parcelled out into

91. Bragança Pereira A.B,de. Arquivo Português Oriental Nova Edicao. Tomo IV. Vol.II. Parte II. 1938. p.38.
 Botelho J.J.T., Historia Militar..... Vol.I. p.251.
 Garlake P.S., 'Excavations of the seventeenth Site of Dambarare' in Proceedings and Trans. R.S.A. Vol.54,1969 pp.23-60.
 Garlake P.S., 'The Value of Imported Ceramics.....' J.A.H.X.Vol.I. 1968, pp.13-33.

prazos for the land-hungry Portuguese gentry. The situation, which was created by the circumstances of 1695, profoundly altered the course of Manyika history for nearly two centuries before another aggression, a more fatal one of 1890, was launched.

C H A P T E R I I I

A PERIOD OF DEFIANT CHIKANGAS 1695 - 1795.

PART 1 - Chikanga-Changamire Relations.

In the period 1695-1795, the Chikangas do not seem to have been worried by the Changamires. This is a mere hypothesis as the sources are silent on the exact nature of the relationship. A careful study of the available evidence would seem to show that Changamire's suzerainty over the Kingdom of Manyika was merely nominal and that his name was invoked mainly as a bogey during succession crises. Changamire was quite contented with an occasional tribute, which in fact came from those Portuguese wishing to trade in Manyika.

Manyika-Butua relations are datable as far back as the 1630's¹. References to the wars of Changamire before 1695 seem to suggest that the nearest Changamire ever got to Manyika was the Kingdom of Maungwe, when he waged his famous battle of 1684². The 1695 war, however, is a landmark in Chikanga-Changamire relations. The causes of this war of 1695 are difficult to discern. A late 18th Century account claims that it stemmed from the fact that the Portuguese had violated an old but venerated practice whereby the Portuguese who lived at Chipangura, alternatively known as the feira of Masekesa in Manyika, used to send an annual tribute to Changamire³. The nature and

1. See Chapter II infra.
2. Proposta que fizeram os moradores dos Rios de Cuama a Senhor V.Rey, 16.6.1698. Written by Frei de Assuncao in his 'Breve de algumas noticias da Custodio de Almeida e Souza, do estado dos Rios de Senna e Sofala.' MS.51-IX-3. Bibliotec_a da Ajuda, Lisbon, Conceição, Antonio. 'Tratados dos Rios de Cuama' in Rivara, J.H. da Cunha. O Chronista de Tisuary. Vol.II,1867 (No.17 May) Nova Goa, pp.105,110.
3. Anon. 'Descrição Corográfica.....' (1787-1794) Caixa 17. Moc. A.H.U.

origin of this tribute are not stated, neither do they lend themselves to conjecture. The Portuguese are supposed to have stopped sending this tribute for several years. The capitão-mor, either for political reasons or because he considered the payment of this tribute unfair, had decided to abolish it without advance warning to Changamire. Consequently Changamire resented what he considered a slighting of his authority, and sent his son to remind the capitão-mor about this tribute. The capitão-mor, instead of treating Changamire's son as befitted a royal prince, had him flogged. Changamire did not react to this. Instead he sent yet another envoy, probably another son, with the same mission. The embassy was no more successful than the first. The capitão-mor did not only ignore this delegation, but ordered the ears of Changamire's son to be cut off. When this was related to Changamire, he immediately decided to attack the Portuguese. It may well be that the economic consequences of the non-payment of this tribute had also begun to make themselves felt by this time.

Even if this story is true, the causes of this war, like those of most wars, cannot be explained by a single factor. From the information available ⁱⁿ Rios de Cuama at that time, the war was caused by Portuguese 'insolence' especially of 'those who were strong and owned African slaves'⁴. They 'committed such excesses that the Kings and princes, scandalised, lent themselves to disorder.....' These 'Kings and princes' had previously warned the Portuguese authorities that they would lose their privileges unless they governed themselves properly in Rios de Cuama. The Portuguese activities at

4. See letter from the Viceroy of India to the King, 16.10.1694 in Capello and Ivens. Travaux des Portugais au Monomotapa. Lisobon, 1889, p.44.

the feira and the court of Monomotapa rendered the 'invasion' of the feira of Masekesa by Changamire inevitable. The Portuguese had been playing the game of King-making since the first half of the 17th Century. As in the past, they intervened in the succession politics of the Mutapa dominion in the 1690's⁵. They supported Prince Gende, known to the Portuguese as Dom Pedro, who had been deposed by his uncle Nyacunimbiri. It would seem that the Portuguese gave him asylum in the Kingdom of Manyika because he was in Manyika when Changamire attacked the feiras of Dambarare and Angwa in 1693⁶. It was then that he and his brother Chambo left Manyika for Tete with an army of 4-500 soldiers⁷, some of whom were most probably recruited from the Kingdom of Manyika. He was then trying, to forge a military alliance with the Portuguese in a bid to regain his throne. Changamire's reading of the situation was very correct. What was urgently needed at this time was to attack and scatter the Portuguese who lived at the feiras of Masekesa and Sena, the then two most important trading posts after the 'destruction' of the feiras of Makaranga in 1693. This might be the motive why Changamire attacked Sena soon after his offensive against Manyika in 1695. He realised, as Conceicao points out, that the Portuguese could not last for two years in Rios de Sena if their main source of the gold trade was cut off. The feira more than anything else symbolised Portuguese economic power and the garrison at the feira, a military challenge to Changamire. Changamire wanted to see both destroyed. The Kingdom of Manyika was valued by the Portuguese, inter-alia, as a base from which to mount aggressive expeditions to Butua and neighbouring Makaranga⁸.

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5. Capello and Ivens. *Travaux des Portugais au Monomotapa*. Op cit. pp.39-41. Conceição Antonio, 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama' Rivara J.H. da Cunha, *O Chronista*..... Vol.II,1867, p.107. Also see Newit M.D.D., *The Zambezi Prazos in the 18th Century*. (Ph.D. Thesis, Senate House, London), p.173.
6. Capello and Ivens. *Travaux*..... Op.cit. pp.39-41
7. Ibid.
8. See Chapter II.

Besides these theoretical considerations, there were more immediate and practical reasons. It is possible that Changamire was aware of the Portuguese military preparations which were taking place in Rios de Cuama at this time. Changamire is known to have possessed an efficient secret service system. Besides, Changamire, like most capable military strategists, which he was, probably possessed a very highly developed intuitive insight. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that he did not pay attention to Nyacunimbiri's request for military help at this time, but held him off with promises and concentrated on his next move to attack the feira of Masekesa⁹. It was a timely move, because a newly appointed governor and Captain-General of Mocambique, Dom Estavao Jose da Gama, son of the Marquis of Niza and commander of the naval forces in India, had brought help with him from India in 1695¹⁰. A Castellao of Mozambique had also sent to Rios de Sena, a barge and a galleon, loaded with clothes, powder-shot and a 'voluntary gift' from the inhabitants of Mocambique, in addition to a company of 40 soldiers, two or three artillery pieces and the necessary ammunitions. All this had given a new morale and strength to the moradores of Sena.

Unfortunately for the Portuguese, Dom Estavao Jose de Gama died in 1695, and while the Portuguese were busily occupied reorganising the expedition and also making arrangements for an appointment of Jose da Fonseca Continho as a new governor and commander-in-Chief of Rios de Cuama, Dombo-Changamire decided to attack the feira at Masekesa at the beginning of July, 1695¹¹.

9. Capello and Ivens. *Travaux*..... op.cit.p.41.

10. Ibid.

Rivara J.H. da Cunha, O Chronista de Tessuary, Vol.II. No.15. March 27th, 1868, Goa. pp.49-50.

11. Capello and Ivens *Travaux*..... op.cit. p.42.

Conceição Antonio, 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama'

Rivara J.H. da Cunha, O Chronista de Tessuary, op.cit. p.110.

It is related that Changamire used almost the same military strategy as in 1684 in the battle of Maungwe in which sorcery, Fabian tactics, trickery, for example the lighting of a huge fire, were involved, to defeat the Portuguese at the feira of Masekesa¹².

Changamire used Manyika as his base for further military operations against Sena. He passed through the Kingdom of Barwe without the least hindrance. Sena was saved by the inhabitants of Zomba, who ambushed and defeated a greater number of Changamire's army and drove numerous survivors back to Manyika¹³.

The reasons for this defeat, like the causes of this war, are a matter of speculation. Portuguese military defence was weak, largely because it was not co-ordinated. The Portuguese lived scattered about at the feira of Masekesa, and elsewhere in Manyika. Even those who lived in a fairly organised community, like the one Conceição describes at Masekesa at the end of the 17th Century, must have found it difficult to form a united front because of their personal differences.

However, the writer of the Descrição Corográfica..... states that the Portuguese defended the feira of Masekesa valiantly, even though 'a greater part of them was taken prisoner.' The prisoners were taken to Changamire's court, where they were very well cared for¹⁴. They were given pieces of land for their dwelling and were allowed to marry any Rozvi woman they fancied, even if she had a family of her own. A death penalty was given

12. Ibid.

13. Anon. 'Descrição Corográfica'..... Caixa 17, Moc.A.H.U.

14. Ibid.

to any one who tried to attack the women or daughters of the Portuguese 'prisoners'. It was a duty of these daughters to serve the King and his consort in the royal palace. It is difficult to say where legend ends and history begins in this report. But if what has been said above is reliable, then Changamire's motives for giving such a privileged treatment to his Portuguese prisoners of war cannot be easily guessed. It is tempting to conclude that he probably derived pleasure from being served by 'white' women. Most likely they were part of his harem establishment. Later Changamires were notorious for keeping large numbers of courtesans¹⁵. The men were kept, perhaps to ensure continuity of the 'white' race at his court.

Changamire's subsequent dealings with the Portuguese would seem to suggest another reason why he kept the prisoners whom he had captured during his campaigns in Manyika in 1695. He possibly regarded them as hostages to be pawned in his diplomatic intercourse with the Portuguese authorities in Rios de Cuama. For instance the 'Descrição Corográfica' cites much later the case of Antonio Cardim Foraes, captain-general of Rios de Sena from 1726 to 1730, who tried to secure a release of these prisoners in vain¹⁶. He sent a big present to Changamire but all he got from this diplomatic exercise were two vases full of gold, not the Portuguese prisoners taken from Manyika in 1695.

15. Accressentamento, to. 'Memória sôbre a adoção do território Bandire' 1.6.1831. Maco 21, Moc. A.H.U.

16. 'Descrição Corográfica'.....

and 'destroyed' were used by contemporary and later writers to describe vocabulary of this account, like 'raid', 'attacked', 'sacked', 'razed' and 'destroyed' were used by contemporary and later writers to describe events which took place at the feira of Masekesa in 1695¹⁷. None of these descriptions would seem to convey a correct impression of the impact of this war on Manyika society and economy.

According to the 'Descrição Corográfica,' only "a miraculous image" in the Church escaped the destruction of the invasion of Changamire. This implies wanton destruction of property. Conceicao describes the impact of Dombo-Changamire's wars at the feira of Dambarare in Makaranga, as involving destruction of Church furniture and disinterment of burials. The destruction of property either at the feira of Masekesa or at the feiras in Makaranga has been drawn out of proportion by commentators. Peter Garlake's excavations at Dambarare in 1969¹⁸ and Andrade de Freire's work on the ruins of the feira of Masekesa¹⁹ showed no signs of demolition which such an upheaval would involve. One cannot but suspect that some officials who naturally had to justify their defeat at the hands of Changamire, influenced some of the accounts about these wars. Of course, the consequences of Changamire's attack on the feira of Masekesa in July 1695 should not be underrated. The immediate outcome of this war was that Changamire made himself lord of the Kingdom of Manyika and appointed a Chikanga of his own liking²⁰. This is the Portuguese version of the story but a knowledge of Manyika politics of the time would

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17. Conceição, Antonio. 'Tratados dos Rios de Cuama' Rivara J.H. da Cunha, O Chronista..... Vol.II.1867, Nova Goa, p.110. Assunção. 'Breve de algumas notícias..... MS.51-IX-3 Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon. Capello and Ivens. Travaux..... op.cit.p.42. Galvão. 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Anais (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo.pp.232-332.
18. Garlake P.S., 'Excavations of the Seventeenth Century Portuguese site of Dambarare, Rhodesia' in Proceedings and Trans. R.S.A. Vol.54, Part 1, 1969. pp.23-60.
19. Carvalho Pires, 'Velha Macequece' in Moçambique Documentário Trimestral No.46. 1946, pp. 5-64.
20. Manuel Galvão da Silva, 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Anais (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo I. op.cit. p.327.

suggest that probably Manyika princes fought for the throne, and a prince who fought on Changamire's side during the 1693-4 war was approved by him as King after he had been duly elected by the people in accordance with Manyika traditional politics. The arrangements, in terms of tribute between Chikanga and Changamire, are unknown at this stage, except that Chikanga was ordered "to govern the Kingdom of Manyika and watch over its revoluçõens." The economic consequences of this war are evident. The Portuguese were deprived of their main trading post then, and according to a contemporary account "not a grain of gold reached the Feira de Manica"²¹ Many of the traders fled away from the Kingdom and those who remained were heavily in debt. The Manyika people, according to Portuguese sources, were so militarily weak that they could not effectively resist the enemy. This interpretation of events is open to doubt. I do not think that it mattered much to the Manyika whether the Portuguese or Changamire controlled the Feira de Manica. If later 18th Century history is anything to go by, the Manyika took different positions on an occasion like this. These positions were largely determined by the aspirants to the throne. It is, therefore, suggested that the Portuguese wrongly interpreted Manyika attitude in terms of their own military weakness.

That Manyika trade was not as 'miserable' as the Portuguese suggest, but rather that it was shifted to Quiteve, perhaps on a reduced scale, is shown by the fact that Manyika traders still went to trade in the environs

21. Conceição A., 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama' in O Chronista de Tisuary, Vol.II, 1867, Nova Goa, pp.110-141.

of the Portuguese garrison in Quiteve²². They traded in amber and gold. There is an account of the gold trade at the mines of the lands of Inhatona, which was eleven days' journey from the garrison. The gold from these mines was easily melted. The policy of the King of Quiteve was the only fly in the ointment. It is related that a certain Quitevan African discovered a mine, but the King immediately ordered this individual to be killed. This did not stop the exploitation of the mine. The King, therefore, prohibited further exploitation of the mine. He regulated trade in his kingdom in such a way that a merchant was charged five for every eighty betangis he brought in. The other commodities were not taxed. Manyika merchants clandestinely exchanged their gold for fazendas. They were so successful that they began to undermine Portuguese activities in the area. As a counter-attack it was suggested that all fazendas must be registered. There was yet another mine eight days' journey from the above-mentioned gold mine. The exploitation of this mine was controlled and directed by the King himself. Concessions were available on payment of presents of fazendas as well as five out of every eighty betangis.

22. Pedro Coelho de Carvalho. 'Papel da Notícia que deu da Fortaleza de Sofala.' MS 51-IX-3 3.8.1698, 46v-47v. Ajuda.
For details of the results of the wars of Changamire in general see Jerônimo de Sá's representation on behalf of the emperor, Monomotapa to Thomás da Roza, Freire concerning a restoration of the feiras of Ongue (Angwa) and Masapa. 6.6.1737. Senna. Avulso de Moc. 47-8 fls. Caixa 3 Moc. A.H.U.

See Thomás's reply, Ibid 1.3.1738.

'Reposta dada pelo Reverendissimo Administrador Episcopal de Mossambique e Rios, o Mestre Fr. Manoel de Santo Thomás, da Sagrada Ordem dos Pregadores, as Diligências, que S. Magestade, que Deos Guarde, Manda se Fação Nestes Rios de Senna pera se Inquirir a Verdade das Matérias Contheadas das nos capítulos abaxo.' See Livro das Monções No.89, fls.506 in Academia Real da Historica Portuguesa printed in O Chronista..... op.cit. Vol.IV. (1869) p.62. He gives what one might call the permanent results of the war. After the destruction of Makaranga, the ancient custom of coronation, whereby a successor of a Prince took an oath before ascending the throne, was no longer observed as early as 1723, because there were princes in rebellion, almost all of whom were aspiring to ascend the throne and restore imperial power. He who had more power and cloth, infallibly became King. This became the pattern of Mutapa politics probably from 1710 (Codice 1325 Moc. A.H.U.) when Changamire dealt a final blow to the Emperor's capital.

It was, and still is, an exaggeration to talk of the Feira de Manica having been razed to the ground, because, as early as 1698, there were still references to a "fortress of timber which has a church inside it."²³ Also a large quantity of gold was being taken, although more could have been mined were it not that the moradores lived in fear of Changamire and did not feel secure enough to improve their lot or combat the enemy. All this goes to show that, contrary to generalisations about the feira trade having been brought to a stand-still, trade movements in Quiteve suggest that because of the fear of Changamire in the feiras of Dambarare etc., Manyika traders turned their attention to Quiteve. This was one of the results of the wars of Changamire in the Kingdom of Manyika.

Another consequence for Manyika, Butua and Makaranga, of the wars of Changamire in the 1690's was that trade was restricted until the Portuguese concluded peace with him in 1730²⁴. The intervening period was marked by vigorous diplomatic initiatives from the Portuguese to discuss the peace terms and have them duly signed, but when this failed the Portuguese tried to unite as many African potentates as they could against Changamire²⁵. Changamire did not openly refuse to conclude peace with the Portuguese as such, but kept them half-hoping. This is evident from the correspondence of this period from the authorities in Rios de Sena to the Viceroy in Goa²⁶. It speaks of peace having been concluded with Changamire all the time, but later refers to the fact that Changamire was not interested in peace but wanted presents in the form of clothes for himself and for his princes.

23. Pedro Coelho de Carvalho. Papel da Noticia..... op.cit.

24. 'Livro de Regimentos e Instrucções' No.11 fl.104 v. Bragança Pereira, de A.B. Arq. Port Oriental Tomo IV. Vol.II. pp.172, 169.

Op.cit.

25. Livro de Regimentos e Instrucções No.11 fl.104 v in Bragança Pereira, A.B. de Arq. Port Oriental Tomo IV, 1938, Vol.II. p.170.

26. Ibid. pp 169-170

It is only in 1730 that the correspondence from Rios de Sena refers to the fact that Changamire "our former enemy is without strength"²⁷.

The memory of Changamire's wars was remembered for many years after the event of 1695. A halo of invincibility surrounded Changamire's name. Conceicao, writing directly after the heat of the battle, says that soldiers, who were considered brave in the neighbouring states, trembled at the very mention of Changamire's name soon after the events of 1693-5, and more often than not went to a battlefield conquered before the fight began²⁸.

However, Changamire's control over Manyika seems to have been effective shortly after the war of 1695. There are indications that, for at least a decade or more after the 'destruction' of the feira of Masekesa, Changamire exercised some authority over Chikanga²⁹. Efforts were made to reestablish the feiras and Changamire eventually granted the Portuguese the same piece of land they had before the war of 1695³⁰. The condition for this was payment of a brinzo or tribute which was to be annually paid from a salary of the capitão-mor and was to be shared between Chikanga, the princes of Manyika and Changamire. This brinzo was to be paid in clothing, glass and beads. The capitão-mor had a bond written out in the presence of Chikanga and his councillors so that they would not demand more the following year³¹. Despite this precaution by the capitão-mor other issues often cropped up in connection with the brinzo. Chikanga and

27. Livro de Regimentos e Instruções, No.11 fl.104v in Bragança Pereira, A.B. de. A.P.O. Tomo IV, 1938, Vol.II, p.172.

28. Conceição Antonio. 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama' in Rivara, J.H. da Cunha. O Chronista, Vol.II, 1867, p.106.

29. Letter to Antonio Cardim Troes, Lieutenant-general of Moçambique, from the Count dom Luis de Menezes, Goa 21.1.1719.

Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. Vol.V. p.50

30. Galvão. 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Anais (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo I. op.cit. p.327.

31. Galvão. 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Anais (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo I. p.327.

his councillors did observe the contract. They used to express doubts, either about the quality or length or both, of the material³².

Changamire used to send his envoys ostensibly to collect this and other presents but in fact to gain knowledge of the country "to be better able to invade it" any time he wanted³³. It was because of this that Dom Luis de Menezes suggested that a reestablishment of one feira in Manyika would be sufficient, because a reopening of several feiras would mean several envoys from Changamire to study the country. In any case reestablishment of the feira of Masekesa had an advantage, it being near Sena where most traders lived³⁴. Apart from these stray references, which suggest at best a tenuous control over Manyika, there is nothing else to go by until the 1780's. There are several reasons to suggest that Changamire's control over the Kingdom of Manyika was tenuous. Chikanga practised an independent and different commercial policy from that of Changamire. The Emperor, Changamire, dealt with the moradores of Zumbo very severely, allowing only their vashambadzi into the interior of Butua³⁵ whereas trade at the Feira de Manica was done not only through the institution of mushambadzi, but also by resident feirantes.

From 1780 to 1796 information about Changamire's relations with Chikanga becomes reasonably coherent. Changamire used the Kingdom of Manyika as a pawn in his relations with the Portuguese, but there is not a single instance

32. Ibid.

33. Letter from Dom Luis de Menezes to Antonio Troes, 21.1.1719 in Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. Vol.V. p.50

34. Ibid.

35. Instrução que O Ill^{mo} e Ex^{mo} Sr. Governador e Capitão Mor, General Balthazar Manuel Pereira do Lago, Deo a Quem Lhe Suceder neste Governo. 20.8.1768. Codice 1325 Moc. A.H.U..

Andrade A.A. Relações de Moçambique Setecentista Agencia Geral do Ultramar. Lisbon, 1955, pp.317-338.

'Descrição da Capitania de Monsambique, Suas Povoações e Produções.'

Andrade A.A. 'Relações.....' p.402.

of him taking measures against Chikanga on behalf of the Portuguese despite the fact that the lands of the two potentates were separated from each other by the lands of Cisanga in 1778³⁶. The Portuguese too found it convenient to deal with Changamire secretly concerning trade in Manyika without first consulting Chikanga³⁷. An example of this is found in Changamire-Portuguese relations in the 1780's. The Portuguese wanted to rebuild their fortress, which had been accidentally gutted by fire in 1780³⁸, in order to defend themselves against a supposedly hostile Chikanga³⁹. But in order to forestall the opposition of the Manyika princes and the populace at large, they needed a show of force. This was easily available from Changamire on a quid pro quo basis⁴⁰. Accordingly a large army, headed by Changamire's general, possibly General Gumi⁴¹, was ordered to accompany the Portuguese to the Kingdom of

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36. De Montauray João Baptista. Moçambique, Ilhas Querimbas, Rios de Sena, Villa de Tete, Villa de Zumbo, Manica, Villa de Luabo, Inhambane, C.1778 Ajuda 52-X-2. Doc.No.7 in Andrade A.A. Relações.....p.365
 Botelho X.S. Memória Estatística Sobre os Domínios Portuguezes na Africa Oriental, Lisbon, 1835. pp.144-153.
 da Silva, João Julião. A Cressentamento, Bandire 1.6.1831 Maço 21. Moc.A.H.U. For the size of Changamire's empire during the 17th Century, see some vague notions, albeit unrealistic, of the empire's extent based on maps by Linschot and Pigafeta in a contemporary account by Dapper O. Africa. Amsterdam, 1670, p.600.
37. 'Descrição corográfica.....' caixa 17 Moc. A.H.U.
38. Letter from Joze Francisco de Fonseca to Antonio Manuel de Mello e Castro, 21.9.1781. Cxa.17 Moc.A.H.U. A house of the clerk of the Feira de Manica Joze Manuel Pimenta caught fire and the adjacent buildings including the fortress; the Church was burnt as well as the records and four people. Another house was built 60 paces away from the fortress to avoid a similar accident.
39. 'Descrição Corográfica.....' op.cit.
40. Ibid.
41. General Gumi is mentioned in 1803 as Changamire's ambassador. Changamire's confidence in him is shown by the fact that General Gumi could negotiate treaties on behalf of Changamire. See Letter to the Governor Herônimo Pereira from Manoel Francisco de Rosário, concerning the terms of the Adjudante sent through his ambassador to be ratified by Emperor Changamire. Vila muciriva 19.1.1803 Cxa.42. Moc. A.H.U. Gumi means ten; this was probably a praise name meaning that he could fight ten people at a time and this might account for his rise to generalship.

Manyika and to see to it that there was no hostility or military conflict between the Portuguese and Chikanga. The superb diplomacy of the army's leader and the strict discipline of his army on this occasion did not pass without a compliment from contemporary Portuguese commentators⁴².

The fact that Changamire regarded the Kingdom of Manyika as expendable was demonstrated in his subsequent actions. He requested the Portuguese to build him a fortress similar to the one they had built for Monomotapa several years ago and in return for this service he would give them all the Kingdom of Manyika and the adjacent lands thereof. In addition to this he guaranteed them freedom and security of trade in Manyika but significantly enough, nothing was mentioned about Butua.

It has been implied that Changamire had a garrison of his own in the 17th Century (1670)⁴³. A second mention of the garrison appears in a 1780 document in which the Portuguese categorically stated the conditions on which they would grant him the garrison he had requested⁴⁴. Joao Almeida, a commandant of the Feira de Manica, was carefully instructed to head a mission⁴⁵ to Changamire to acknowledge his request for a garrison, sentiments of friendship and to determine the type of help he needed for his protection⁴⁶. It was hoped that this mission would pave the way for lucrative Portuguese trade, harmony and peace in the feiras and bares of Butua and Dambarare. This trade included ivory trade too.

42. 'Descrição Corográfica.....' op.cit.

43. Ogiby, J.. Africa. 1670. op.cit. p.601. This is not mentioned in the German version. (Personal communication with Dr.J.R.Gray).

44. Relação que dá João Almeida, Commandante da Feira da Manica, do que se pode conseguir do Rey Xangamire, e prezidio annual que baixo se declara e as prozicções que se lhe devem ponderar para d'elle conseguir o mencionado a baixo 11.3.1780 Cxa.16 Moc.A.H.U.

45. Ibid. The expenses of this ambassadorial mission amounted to - a) 26 bares of assorted cloths for Changamire and his provinces, the regulos on the way and the expenses of the ambassador himself. b) 200 macos of assorted beads. All this was without a saguete from the Governor, which was a normal practice on such high-powered missions to princes of the lands. A chair and a low stool normally accompanied this saguete.

46. 'Descrição Corográfica.....' op.cit.

Another condition was that Changamire should allow the old feiras he had destroyed to be opened and restore the same privileges, particularly of erecting fortresses near/feiras for defence purposes as before in the neighbouring lands as well as in the Kingdoms which had been, or were still, subordinate to him.

A third condition was specifically connected with Chikanga who used to dominate the feira of Masekesa every year, "commit barbarities" against the Portuguese, expose the Portuguese to milandos and left the merchants and their vashambadzi unprotected from the molestations of the princes⁴⁷. The Portuguese used to pay Chikanga a tribute of 800 panos for his own use, the use of his garrison, as well as for paying tribute to Changamire⁴⁸. Changamire's secretary, Tumbare, and his envoys went to collect it, but if this were not produced or if there were complaints about commerce for some time or years, Changamire would, in theory at any rate, bring Chikanga to reason at his own expense⁴⁹. He would leave for Manyika together with his soldiers. It is said that both the soldiers and Changamire were of such a temperament, that they could not endure scorn from any quarter without getting their revenge and complete satisfaction. But Changamire, in fact, always behaved in such a way that Chikanga had no cause for revenge or complete satisfaction. It is not stated how much Chikanga paid to Changamire from his 800 panos and a cutonia⁵⁰ which he received from the capitão-mor and his merchants. The Secretary, Tumbare, apparently played an important role in arranging for the collection of tribute.

47. Ibid.

48. Galvao, Diario das Viagens..... in Anais (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo I. op.cit. p.327.

49. 'Descrição Corográfica.....' Cxa.17 Moc. A.H.U.

50. Galvão, 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Anais, (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo I. A cutonia was a fustion, worth 20 cruzados.

According to Robinson, Tumbare was one of the principal servants of the Rozvi empire⁵¹. It appears that Tumbare was the name of a particular individual, which later acquired a dynastic connotation for a family whence tribute collectors were appointed. The role of the Tumbare dynasty requires further investigation. In times of succession crisis, caused by a sudden death of a Rozvi mambo or long drawn out negotiations among the aspirants to the throne, a member of the Tumbare family became regent⁵². His repulse of Zwangendaba (1833) originated a Rozvi praise-song "Dai asi Tumbare hwana hwaitve moto"⁵³ (But for Tumbare nothing would have been good). It would, therefore, be logical to assume that if anybody were sent to confirm individual Chikangas on Manyika throne, it was Tumbare, probably accompanied by General Gumi. I must, however, point out that the only connection I have detected so far, is that Tumbare appears in a document purported to relate Manyika past and culture⁵⁴.

Changamire does not seem to have received tribute in the form of grain, cattle or pottery from the Kingdom of Manyika as he probably did from

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51. Robinson K.R. 'History of the Bikita District' in NADA No.34,1935, p.75
 Nenguwo S. 'Oral work among the Rozvi. A few notes'. The History of the Central African Peoples. Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 17th Conference Proceedings. Lusaka 1963. Group III. p.11.
 Howman E.G. 'The Traditional History of the Makaranga (Wa Rozvi) in Report of the 16th Annual Meeting of the S.A.A.A. Sc. Capetown,1919. pp.381-393. According to this account, Tumbare became unpopular and the Rozvi people burnt him alive. This was undoubtedly as a result of his work as chancellor of the exchequer in the Rozvi empire.
52. Nenguwo S. 'Oral work among the Rozvi.' In the History of the Central African Peoples, op.cit. pp.1-11.
53. Ibid.
54. 'Descrição Corográfica.....' op.cit.

other supposedly subjugated principalities⁵⁵. The decorated type of pottery, which has been found at Dhlo-Dhlo and has also been identified at Van Nærkek near Umtali⁵⁶, might be a case of cultural similarity. The only known tribute, therefore, Changamire received from the Kingdom of Manyika was some of the 800 panos paid to Chikanga by the Portuguese. This aptly justifies the title of this discussion, 'Chikanga-Changamire relations' because the commonalty of Manyika people as such was not involved. The Manyika were not taxed for this purpose. Besides, this provides further evidence of the tenuous nature of Changamire's control over the Kingdom of Manyika during the 18th Century.

From time to time Chikanga demanded beads, drinks and sundry items, besides the annual tribute⁵⁷. In spite of all this, quite often he blocked trade routes into the interior without consulting Changamire, inspiring a fear which was tantamount to that of Changamire in his lands. The Portuguese, therefore, requested Changamire to punish Chikanga, to allow them to build a fortress and to allow the Feira de Manica to be governed by a Portuguese or a Prince of Changamire who would defend Portuguese milandos, punish any 'thefts' which Chikanga used to condone⁵⁸.

A fourth condition of this proposed treaty was that this treaty of friendship should be so firm and 'perpetual' that no regulos or King would molest the Portuguese and get away with it; that should this happen Changamire would immediately send military help to the Portuguese and vice-versa. Changamire was assured that the Portuguese had prompt military aid. All that

55. (Miss) N.Sutherland-Harris thinks that Changamire probably received such tribute. See 'Trade and Politics in the Changamire/Rozvi Kingdoms of the late 17th Century and 18th Century' Seminar paper. M.A.Area Studies 1967. pp.3-4.

56. (Miss)N.Sutherland-Harris, Seminar Paper, op.cit. pp,3-4.

57. Letter from Joze Trindade e Almeida to the Governor of Rios de Senna 8.10.1794, Cxa.30. Moc.A.H.U.

58. Relação que dá João Almeida..... 11.3.1780. Cxa.16, Moc. A.H.U. op.cit.

was required was to convince them that Changamire was a 'brother'. The last, though not least, condition was that this treaty should be ratified by an heir to the throne.

The proposed treaty of 1780 between Changamire and the Portuguese is a typical example of how the Portuguese tried to manipulate diplomacy in order to gain commercial privileges in Manyika and Butua by isolating Chikanga. The merchants' memorials concerning trade in Manyika and Changamire's inability to rectify the situation, provide another example of the nominal nature of Changamire's suzerainty over Manyika. At the same time the memorials show consistency in their effort to build up Changamire at the expense of Chikanga. These memorials were occasioned by disorder at the Feira de Manica caused by the death of Chikanga⁵⁹.

In 1795 the commandant of the Feira de Manica reported to the governor of Rios de Sena the dissatisfaction and deliberations of the merchants who had sent envoys to Changamire to seek protection, improvement of trade and suppression of Chikanga's insults⁶⁰. The envoys had delayed, but the cause of the delay was unknown. The desperate nature of the situation is revealed by the commandants' references to 'intolerable insults' which were estimated to have caused a loss of 'a hundred per cent' to a considerable amount of good fazendas and beads which had been introduced, but due to chaos and anarchy at the Feira de Manica, the stock was immediately exhausted without any profit⁶¹.

59. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrão to the Governor of Rios de Senna. 18.7.1795. Cxa.31. Moc.A.H.U.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

Hence, the capitao-mor's repeated pleas for more fazendas and a remedy for the situation.

A real cause of this confusion was the death of Chikanga and, as long as there was no successor who could stop "the continuous clamours which necessarily follow the division of forces in a Kingdom"⁶², the situation would remain unaltered.

Manyika pretenders to the throne in the late 18th Century, trapped in their own dreams of kings, sent delegations to call Changamire to perform investiture ceremonies. This analysis of the situation is an echo of a memorial drawn up by the merchants on 5.7.1795⁶³. It was during this decade that Changamire's name was constantly invoked by Inharugue, to catapult himself into the throne of the Kingdom of Manyika.

The situation was vividly dramatised in 1796, when a new King called Inharugue ascended the throne of the Kingdom of Manyika. His elder brothers rightly contested the Kingship, but in vain. King Inharugue sent envoys to call Changamire to confirm the investiture ceremony and, when the Portuguese complained about disturbances at the Feira de Manica, Inharugue, King elect of Manyika, pleaded inability to deal with these complaints until Changamire had confirmed him as King⁶⁴. Unfortunately Changamire had been

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62. Letter from the Governor, João de Sá Brito to the Commandant of the Feira de Manica. Moc.26.11.1795. Cxa.31 Moc.A.H.U.
63. The Merchants' Advice to the Governor. Manica 5.7.1795. Cxa.31, Moc.A.H.U. signed by - Manoel da Silva Gonçales, Custódio de Araujo Bragança, João Felix de Carvalho, Manoel Ribeiro dos Santos, Joaquim de Moraes Rega Lisboa, José da Trindade e Almeida, Antonio Caetano Vaz, José dos Santos e Matos, José Gomes Monteiro, Antonio José da Costa e Almeida, Pedro Antonio de Araujo. Incidentally this list gives us the names of the important traders at the Feira de Manica in the 1790's.
64. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrão, Commandant of the Feira de Manica, to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 3.3.1796. Cxa.17 Moc.A.H.U.

delayed by winter. It would appear that Changamire's name was used mainly as a bogey in order to scare his rivals to the throne. Subsequent events do not suggest that either Changamire himself or his envoys ever went to Manyika even to witness the ceremony, let alone confirm it. In fact, this is the first recorded occasion that a Manyika King ever invoked the name of Changamire to obviate obstacles to the throne. Posselt's generalised statement "that the Bafozwi Mambo appointed all tributary chiefs irrespective of the tribe"⁶⁵ does not stand analysis. Inharugue was the only recorded instance of a Manyika King during the 18th Century taking recourse to the bogey of an invincible Changamire. Inharugue's dependence on the Portuguese suggests that it was not his own idea, but an idea of the capitão-mor and his merchants, that he should summon Changamire to confirm his investiture ceremony as King of Manyika. There are three reasons to encourage this line of speculation. First, as I have already pointed out, it was Portuguese policy during the second half of the 18th Century to over-play Changamire's suzerainty over Manyika. There is further evidence in 1795 and 1796 of collaboration, initiated by the Portuguese, between Changamire and the Portuguese. The commandant of the Feira de Manica, D. Diogo de Souza, recommended very strongly in 1795 that an annual saguete, credited to the Royal Treasury, should be paid directly to Changamire, so that he might not disregard Portuguese requests which had been made in the various memorials regarding trade and commerce⁶⁶. In fact, as early as 1780 a suggestion had been made that Changamire should be given a bigger saguete than Chikanga⁶⁷.

65. Posselt F.W.T. Fact and Fiction - A short survey of the natives of S.R. Bulawayo. (1935) p.10.

66. Letter from Diogo de Souza to João de Souza e Brito 16.5.1795, Cxa.31 Moc. A.H.U.

67. 'Descrição Corográfica.....' op.cit.

In 1796 Changamire's envoys were expected at the Villa of Tete, possibly on a goodwill mission. It is also known that the Portuguese described the Changamires of the 18th Century as "susceptible to Portuguese sentiments"⁶⁸. All the evidence available seems to support this assertion, that the Portuguese were trying very hard to build up Changamire as Emperor, at any rate as far as their dealings with him about the Kingdom of Manyika during the 1780's were concerned. The real reason for his evasive policy about Manyika will be clear when Butuan internal politics of the 18th Century are known. Changamire received memorial after memorial from Portuguese merchants at the Feira de Manica⁶⁹ but there is no evidence that he did anything about this situation. The only recorded occasion that Changamire ever intervened, tactfully and effectively, was in the building of the fortress as noted above⁷⁰. The Portuguese had to wait for an answer for a very long time and sometimes envoys were delayed at his court for as long a period as ten months⁷¹.

A second reason to suggest that Inharugue's policy vis-a-vis Changamire was formulated by the Portuguese is that the Portuguese merchants believed that there would be order and safety if a new King were introduced and that this new King would rectify "the past as well as future evils" at the Feira de Manica⁷².

Thirdly, the capitão-mor of the Feira de Manica, Francisco Henrique Ferrao, withheld binzo⁷³ from Inharugue pending his confirmation by Changamire as King of Manyika. It seems, therefore, that, in return for Portuguese

68. Ibid.

69. Advice of the merchants to the Governor of Rios de Sena..... op.cit. 5.7.1795.

70. See this chapter, supra.

71. Advice of the merchants.....op.cit. 5.7.1795.

72. Ibid.

73. Binzo was tribute paid in cloth, beads and liquors. The commander-in-chief, when paying, had a bond written out in the presence of many Manyika so that they could not demand more the following year. Even then, arguments about length and quality of the cloths cropped up. See Galvão. 'Diário das Viagens.....' In Carvalho Dias. 'Fontes para a História.....' Anais X. Tomo I. Lisbon, 1954, p.327.

military help and cloths, Inharugue practised Portuguese policy towards Changamire. He even sent a massango with a dogado and an ox as a sign of friendship. The dogado⁷⁴ was a *gift* to the Governor to say that he should send a capitão-mor with another person to make binzo to Changamire for purposes of electing a new Manyika King⁷⁵.

Chikanga-Changamire relations can be reviewed strictly from a trading point of view. The policy dealt with so far covered Inharugue's tenure of Kingship in 1795-6. His rival successors, Inhagope and Inhamutota (1796-1818), did not invoke the name of Changamire and even Inharugue himself during his later tenure of office as King(1818-1822) never invoked Changamire's name in his struggle for Kingship. It would appear that the tenuous and nominal suzerainty Changamire exercised over Manyika came to an end with the expulsion of Inharugue some time in 1796⁷⁶.

It would appear that trade links were not affected drastically by these political upheavals. The earliest indication of an existence of trade between the Kingdoms of Manyika and Butua occurs in the first half of the 17th Century⁷⁷. By the late 18th Century African merchants from Butua went to sell ostrich eggs at Manyika. These eggs were probably exchanged for the copper which the merchants got from Duma⁷⁸, presumably the location of the present day Mkonde copper mines. The absence of copper and eggs in a list of commodities exchanged at the Feira de Manica in a document of 1762⁷⁹ might

74. A dogado is a certain amount of gold. 1 dogado = 6 oitavas. The origin of the word in Manyika. See Jason Machiwenyika. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People'. MS. 14.1.1 S by.

75. Letter from Jozé de Trindade e Almeida to Custódio Jozé da Lacerda. 3.8.1795. Cxa.30. Moc.A.H.U.

76. See discussion in Chapter II. Infra.

77. Report by Cristovao de Brito de Vasconcellos 20.8.1632. Doc.9, Avulso. Cxa.1. Moc.A.H.U.

78. Manuel Galvão da Silva. 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Anais (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo I. op.cit. p.328.

79. 'Memórias da Costa d'Africa Oriental e Algumas Reflexões Uteis para Estabelecer Melhor, e Fazer mais Florente o seu commercio.' (Anon). Sena 21.5.1762 Fundo Geral 826 B.N.L.

See Andrade A.A. 'Relações de Moçambique.....' op.cit. p.192. Also Anais (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo I. op.cit. p.222.

suggest that trade in these two articles was a later 18th Century development.

A 19th Century document⁸⁰ refers to well-known routes, estimating distances, from Cisanga, a dependency of Changamire to Manyika. There were primarily two routes; one started from Zamve through Cironga, Dirire, up to the Feira de Manica, and another route started from Inhazo through Nhamanga, Dovedove up to Manyika⁸¹. The fact that these routes were well-known by 1831 surely suggests an earlier origin than the 19th Century, possibly the 18th Century, if not earlier.

There is another piece of evidence to suggest trade links between the Kingdom of Manyika and that of Butua. Changamire used to get guns^{and} fine calaim from Sena⁸² and possibly these commodities passed through the Feira de Manica. The 'Accressentamento' refers to a mushambadzi who had been to Changamire twice and paid all the cloth he had. It is conceivable that this was one of the mussambazes who traded at the Feira de Manica, the nerve centre of Sena trade. A servant of one Barloza also claimed to have met a mushambadzi who had accompanied another one to the lands of Changamire⁸³, possibly not Butua, for the lands then stretched as far as Cisanga.

A third piece of evidence is that of Galvao, in 1790, who categorically stated that the copper he saw at the Feira de Manica came from Duma, a six days' journey away from the Feira⁸⁴. This proves, not only the existence of trade between these two Kingdoms, but also that this trade is traceable back to the 18th Century. The eggs are cited in 1780⁸⁵ and copper in 1790⁸⁶.

80. 'Viagem a Manica' in Memória sobre a adoção do Territorio Bandire as Epocas do seu abandono' No.5. 5.8.1831. Maco.21. Moc. A.H.U.

81. Ibid.

82. Accressentamento. Bandire. 1.6.1831. Maco 21. Moc.A.H.U.

83. Ibid.

84. Galvao da Silva M. 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Anais Vol.IX. (1954) Tomo.I. op.cit. p.328.

85. 'Descrição Corográfica.....' op.cit.

86. Galvão da Silva M. 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Anais Vol.X. Tomo I. Lisbon, 1954, p.328.

The entire discussion has shown fairly clearly that one Manyika King, for a very short period indeed, and even then perhaps at the instigation of the Portuguese, deliberately manipulated the impact of the 1693-4 War and the Imperial title of Changamire to scare away his rival pretenders to the throne of Manyika. The discussion has also shown that the Portuguese, without much advantage, encouraged this line of action in order to promote their commercial interests. Changamire was quite happy to have his name thus used, firstly, because this appealed to his ego, in that it tended to perpetuate the myth of empire, power and glory, and secondly, this was good economics anyway. The Portuguese sent several ambassadorial missions to Changamire bearing presents⁸⁷, and in each case he encouraged Portuguese hopes for a redress of their grievances by delaying tactics. Changamire believed in the Aristotelian doctrine that "method conquers more than power." He seems to have based all his diplomacy with the Portuguese on this, whether it was in a battle-field or in ordinary day-to-day dealings. This enabled him to negotiate with the Portuguese on matters concerning the Kingdom of Manyika, from a position of strength. There is no instance during the 18th Century when he acted on the complaints memorialised to him by the Portuguese concerning Chikanga's supposedly hostile commercial policy, or even sent his envoy to Manyika to perform an investiture ceremony.

Changamire's administrative machinery over the Kingdom of Manyika is conspicuous by its absence in the documents and oral tradition alike. It

87. Letter from Manuel Francisco de Rozário to the Governor, Heronimo Pereira, Villa Muciriva 19.1.1803 Cxa.42. Moc. A.H.U. Rellação que da João Almeida, Commandante da Feira de Manica, do que se pode conseguir do Rey Xangamire. op.cit. 11.3.1780, Cxa.16. Moc.A.H.U.

is doubtful whether Changamire himself was in a position to coerce any of his so-called vassals to do anything they did not want. He was himself a privileged, but, all the same, tribute-bearer to Monomotapa during the 18th Century⁸⁸. It is questionable whether such a Changamire was in a position to control Manyika effectively.

88. Pinto de Miranda A. 'Memória sôbre a Costa de Africa (C. de 1766)' Torre do Tombo do reino. Maco 604. in Andrade A.A. Relações..... op.cit. p.307
Pinto de Miranda A. 'Memória sôbre.....' op.cit. also printed in Anais (1954) Vol.IX. Tomo I. op.cit. p.113.

C H A P T E R I I I

A PERIOD OF DEFIANT CHIKANGAS 1695 - 1795.

PART 2 - Manyika-Portuguese Relations.

The Portuguese attributed the decline of trade during this period to Chikanga's alleged hostile attitude and the so-called 'robberies', 'thefts' and 'milandos' practised by the Manyika princes. It was on these mistaken premises that the Portuguese concentrated, on appealing to Changamire to restrain Chikanga about what they regarded as his excesses. They did not bother to examine the weaknesses of their own institutions, e.g. that of mushambadzi, garrison and capitão-mor: (see appendix) to understand Manyika customs in the realm of trade, to investigate the means by which they could recover their lost feiras and prestige, the way in which they could win the friendship of the Chikangas and their princes. It is true that they did send envoys and gifts to Changamire in an effort to bribe him to bring pressure to bear on the Chikangas. This was not a new thing. The situation had changed after the wars of 1695 and the new circumstances required new approaches, a new type of diplomacy altogether and a brutal introspection. The failure to do that resulted in the Portuguese making one blunder after another, which the Chikangas did not allow to go unpunished.

The Chikangas wanted the Portuguese to live and trade in their Kingdom, but under their control. The ignorance of the Portuguese of Manyika political and social institutions always stood in the way of cordial relations. For example, society was more lenient towards certain actions which in normal times were tantamount to 'robberies' and 'disorder', during a period of mourning than at other times. Violation of Manyika sacred customs resulted in milandos and an ultimate ban, albeit temporary, of trade. It was the duty of Chikanga, indeed, as of any other sovereign, to vindicate Manyika law. If

one were to indict the Chikangas of the 18th Century, it would be for excessive lenience to Portuguese moradores. This, of course, was tempered by enlightened self-interest. There are several cases to illustrate this point¹.

Portuguese defence and security were almost always in a state of chaos and anarchy, during the second half of the 18th Century (as shown by the appendix). Information on Portuguese defence is available from 1750 when Francisco de Mello e Castro referred to the existence of a fortress which was constructed for the security of the feirantes². There were in it six pieces of artillery, one of iron, four of bronze and a stone thrower of the same metal with the necessary ammunition. There was a capitão-mor, with twelve soldiers. There was a Church of the Dominican Friars, richly ornamented. Both the capitão-mor and the vicar received the same pay as an ordinary soldier. This pay was taken by the Captain-general of Moçambique, either from the salary of the company of Sena, or from the salary of the garrison of Zimbabwe at Monomotapa's court. This situation, which was far from being satisfactory, deteriorated within two years, when Francisco de Mello e Castro became the first Governor-General of an independent Moçambique in 1752³. Francisco de Mello e Castro, as shown elsewhere⁴, did not think that it was good economics to maintain a garrison at the feira of Masekesa. It was for this reason that he did not bother to improve the military state of the feira. There were in 1752 a capitão-mor, Manuel Cabral de Abreu, four mulatto soldiers, an ensign,

1. See Chapter IV, supra.

2. Castro Francisco de Mello e. 'Rios de Sena: sua descripção, desde a Barra de Quelimane ate ao Zumbo' in Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino Parte nao official Serie II, 1867, Lisobon. p.108.

3. Lobato A. 'Aditadura do Primeiro Governador Geral em 1753' in Bol.Soc.Estud. Moçambique Ano XXIX No.125, 1960, Section E. pp.1-17. See Lobato A. Evolução Administrativa - Lisbon, 1957, pp.283-4. B.Mus.Add.MSS.20909. Letter of appointment 3.9.1749.

4. See this chapter supra.

two sergeants, a drummer and four artillery men in the Manyika garrison⁵. The captain had one cannon, ten or twelve guns, all in a bad state of repair; ammunition was restricted to a barrel containing one arroba of powder-shot. This sad state of the Manyika garrison was entirely due to the apathy of Francisco de Mello e Castro. Abreu reveals that the capitão-mors of Sena embezzled some of the funds which were intended to improve the fortress⁶. This was not confined to the Manyika garrison only. Dinizio de Mello e Castro cites a 1763 example⁷. The Company of Sena was supposed to comprise 40 soldiers, 10 of whom were to go to the Manyika garrison. The salary of each soldier was 9 corjas. It is said that the capitão-mor of Sena made certain that there were always less than 10 soldiers at the Manyika garrison and of the remaining 30, who should have been effectively employed at Sena, he had only 13 soldiers. The General pocketed the salaries of the remaining soldiers both at Manyika and Sena itself. It was during this period of 'extraordinary administrative confusion' that a precedent which had grave implications for the future development of the institution of capitão-mor took place. Francisco Manoel do Rosário, of the order of

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5. Letter of Recommendation from the Governor of Rios de Sena to the Viceroy of India ll.4.1752. Cxa.3 Moc.A.H.U. Codice 1332, No.50, Moc.A.H.U. Anon 'Memorias.....' Fundo Geral No.826, B.N.L. Also in Andrade A.A. Relações de Moçambique Setecentista. Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1955. pp.192, 539. Manuel Cabral de Abreu was a man of considerable experience as a soldier, sergeant, adjutant of expeditionary orders, adjutant of the fortress of Manyika, Cabo major of the garrison of Zimbabwe. He served in Manyika for 14 years and led Portuguese expeditions to Barwe and Quiteve. He is remembered by the Portuguese for both his military as well as his religious service. He built two churches, one in Barwe and another in Manyika. He was rewarded by the Viceroy of India for his services by giving his daughter the prazos of Vengo and Mussambe in Barwe. Also see 'Relação dos moradores Portuguezes que assistem em Moçambique e seus districtos' in Carvalho Dias, L.F. Fontes para a Historia..... in Anais Vol.IX. Tomo I. Lisbon 1954, p.166. Abreu is described as a married man with ability and prudence besides money and considerable landed property. The reason why he was considered poor was probably that he had few slaves - a measure of opulence in those days.
 6. Anon. 'Memorias.....' Andrade A.A. Relações..... p.192.
 7. Castro Dinizio de Mello e. 'Noticia do Imperio Marave e dos Rios de Sena' 20.1.1763. In Carvalho Dias L.F. Fontes Para A Historia..... in Anais Vol.IX. Tomo I. Lisbon, 1954, p.130.

Predicant Friars, was capitão-mor of the feira in 1752, and Manoel Cabral de Abreu was captain of the infantry of that garrison⁸. These two men quarrelled because the latter wanted the post of capitão-mor. The details of this episode are fragmentary and difficult to piece together, but it would seem that the quarrel was settled by the Governor-General of Mocambique, who, for reasons that are not stated, gave an undertaking which bound him and his successors to appoint Manoel Cabral de Abreu capitão mor of the feira at a stipulated salary of five bars of cloth. Abreu became capitão-mor the same year⁹. This precedent became an established practice and the post of the capitão-mor was in future occupied by men "without qualities of good behaviour, nor good administrative ability for public service....." men who were given to extravagance and "lacking a sense of honour by which the Vassals of His Majesty would have been encouraged"¹⁰. This became so much of a scandal that "men of capability and ability" did not wish "to take the office of capitão-mor of the said Manica"¹¹. It is only fair to point out that the appointment of capitão-mors was also arbitrary in the other feiras in Makaranga and at Zumbo. The nearest we have by way of pre-requisites was that a capitão-mor had to be "an intelligent and zealous Portuguese" without ambition¹². These subjectively abstract requirements were formulated in 1723, when a practice of nominating

8. Codice 1332, No.50, Moc. A.H.U.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. See Livro de Regimentos e Instruções No.11. fl.104 V.. A Regimento for Agostinho de Barroes Henriques Pato, Lieutenant General of Moçambique and Rios de Sena, 16.1.1723 in Pereira Bragança, A.B. de. Arquivo Português Oriental Tomo IV, Vol.II, Parte II, Nova edição, 1938. Bastora. pp.171-172.

three or four individuals for a single post of capitão-mor was stopped. This had very often in the past led to sanguinary battles among the contestants. These conflicts inevitably resulted in loss of cloth, gold and ivory which were being bartered. The 1723 regimento also put an end to a practice of nominating more than one captain for a military expedition¹³. The later history of Portuguese administration at the feiras in this region shows that in both these limited respects, the regimento succeeded.

As far as the Manyika garrison was concerned, its general wretched state did not improve as shown by the maps in the appendix and by references to it in 1763¹⁴, 1768¹⁵, 1778¹⁶ and 1788¹⁷. Manuel Galvão da Silva's observations at the feira of Masekesa in 1790 were no more encouraging¹⁸. The entire garrison consisted of 15 patricios under a Portuguese capitão-mor, and an ensign. This fortress, which never failed to feature as an annual expense

13. Ibid.

14. The personnel of the feira comprised 4 people, viz. a capitão-mor, an ensign, an adjutant and a vicar. Their salary was 9 corjas each. (The salary of the vicar was also stated by João Pereira da Silva Barba in 1763 as 140,000 reis per annum. Regista da Provisao passada a Rev. Pad Frei Antonio do Rosario (of the Parish of Manyika) 23.3.1763. Codice 1325. Moc.A.H.U.). A corjar consisted of 20 panos and each pano was equivalent to one braca (outstretched arms). Officially each corjar was worth 3 maticals and two tangas of gold. This was equivalent to 9,600 reis. This was an annual salary of a soldier, without uniform, a soldier's jacket or food. The 9 corjas were assorted as capotims, ardiãns, chuambo, (from Imbaceira) cutunias, (described as raw) sameters, (cured) Cathavenis, Dotins. The officers of the troops earned the same as the soldiers, an exception being that of an ensign, who earned three more corjas for performing an extra duty of hoisting the flag. See Soldo de um ano que tem soldados nos Rios de Senna. Cxa.14. (1770-1774) Avul.Moc.200-2 fls. A.H.U. Castro Dinizio de Mello E. 'Noticia.....' Dias, Carvalho L.F. 'Fontes.....' p.129. Also see original MS.384. Azul serie. (Academy of Science, Lisbon)

15. Instrução que o Ill^{mo} Ex^{mo} Sr. Governador e Capitão General Balthazar Manuel Pereira do Lago Deo a Quem Lhe suceder neste temp 20.8.1768. Codice 1325. Moc.163 v - 175 v. A.H.U.

16. Montaury João Baptista de. 'Moçambique, Ilhas Querimbas, Rios de Sena Villa de Zumbo, Manica, Villa de Luabo' (C1778) in Andrade A.A. Relações..... pp.364-5. There were no troops both at Zumbo and Manyika, except for the slaves whom the moradores kept armed, in case of necessity. These were a source of disorder as private individuals were tempted to engage in a terrible war against the moradores.

17. Anon. 'Descrição da Capitania de Moçambique, suas povocoas e producoes' (1788). In Andrade A.A. Relações..... Lisbon, 1955, p.398.

18. da Silva Manuel Galvao. 'Diário das Viagens feitas pelas terras de Manica' 8/1788 in Carvalho Dias L.F. Fontes para a Historia..... pp.323-332. Also see original MS 1013. Azul Serie. 6fls. (Academy of Science, Lisbon).

for its repair and which had no inner or outer fortifications to make it worthy of the name, was a square construction of stone and clay, with straw-covered walls which partly crumbled away during winter, so that they continually needed rebuilding. There was not a single ordinance, no embrasure, not even a loop-hole from which to fire an arquebus. Barely in one corner did it have a mast on which to fly a flag. The only use this fortification had, if any, was that it provided an enclosure for a little church, likewise built of stone, clay and thatched with straw. The size of the fortress was estimated by the capitão mor of the Feira de Manica¹⁹ as 200 feet long and 148 feet wide, measured from east to west, and the size of the church was 36 feet long and 18 feet wide, measured from east to west. At the door was a small house made of poles and thatched with grass, probably for the clerk, and two small huts where the soldiers lived. On the sides were three orange trees, and one lemon tree. There are scattered references throughout the 18th Century concerning the wretched state²⁰ of repair of the fortress and the need to repair it²¹. It is abundantly clear that Chikanga could have expelled the Portuguese, bag and baggage, from the Feira of Masekesa any time he wanted. The fact that they lived there in relative peace, albeit full of complaints, argues for Chikanga's reasonable treatment of foreigners as well as his cosmopolitan

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19. Letter from José da Trindade e Almeida to the Governor Rios de Sena 8.10.1794. Cxa.30, Moc.A.H.U.
 20. See Report of the soldiers who garrison the fortress of S.Caetano of the Feira of Manica by Francisco Henrique Ferrão, provisional commandant 30.12.1795 Cxa.30. A.H.U. The ammunition of the fortress consisted of 13 fire-arms with their bayonets, 200 bullets, 1 arroba of gunpowder (1 arroba = 32lbs.) and 50 flints.
 21. Letter from the capitão mor of Manica, Francisco Henrique Ferrão, to the Governor of Rios de Sena (undated) Cxa.36. Moc.A.H.U. See also letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena. No.1931 4.12.1799. Cxa.36, A.H.U. The capitão mor reported the crumbling away of the fortress, emphasized the need for more soldiers. The expenses which the moradores were prepared to pay were estimated at 4 bares of cloth.

outlook. This spirit prevailed in the neighbouring regions, where soldiers were quite often described as 'lawless mulattos' or 'canarins'²². In 1766 a company of sipaes had to be brought from Goa to Tette due to the lack of reliable soldiers²³, and yet the Portuguese continued to trade in these regions. Even the so-called Monomotapa guard was largely an imaginary creature before the reforms of 1771²⁴. Even after these reforms the situation did not improve significantly²⁵.

A study of the problems of the Feira of Masekesa brings out clearly the strains and stresses of Manyika-Portuguese relations during the 18th Century. This is so because most of the trade negotiations, conclusion of treaties and occasional fighting took place there. All this rendered the Feira of Masekesa a very important rendezvous for Manyika and Portuguese diplomats. As I pointed out in my discussion of Chikanga-Changamire relations, Changamire allowed the Portuguese to reopen their old Feira of Masekesa. The reestablishment of this feira was regarded as the most important post 1693 war problem to be tackled. The Viceroy of India in Goa set about to look for an influential person who might persuade Chikanga to allow the old feira to be

22. Andrade A.A. Relações..... op.cit. p.364.
23. Ibid.
24. Regimento and Instructions for the captains of the garrison of the Zimbabwe, drawn by Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago. Codice 1332. No.50. Moc.A.H.U. Tette 19.4.1771.
25. Letter from Alves Pereira to the Governor of Rios de Sena. 6.5.1780. Tete. Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U. This letter lists down the company of the Sipaes, the armament of the company, the armament for the company at Monomotapa's Zimbabwe, artillery etc. Also see Andrade Jeronimo José Nogueira de. 'Do Estado em que ficavão os negocios da Capitania de Mossambique.....' (1790) in Arquivo das Colonias Vol.I. Lisbon, 1917. pp.95-6.

re-opened. Manuel Goncalves Guiao, who at that time was "the only resident who has the power and intelligence for this and similar expeditions," was recommended by the Viceroy of India, despite Guiao's "insolent and arrogant attitude to him"²⁶. Luis de Menezes, Viceroy of India, sanctioned ten bares of cloth for the initial expenses of re-opening the Feira at Masekesa²⁷. The first attempt to re-open the feira was made in 1719 by Captain Joao de Tavora de Sampayo²⁸ with a garrison of twenty Portuguese soldiers and some local Africans²⁹. Besides negotiating for a re-establishment of the Feira, Guiao successfully persuaded Makombe, King of Barwe, to allow traders to pass through his lands to the feira of Masekesa³⁰. This scheme does not seem to have succeeded, because in 1720 Luis de Menezes thanked Joao de Tavora Sampayo again "for the zeal with which he attempted the re-establishment of the feira" and he trusted that "with a second journey, this very profitable matter will finally be settled"³¹. A mention of one Heronimo de Faria Peixoto as capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa in 1721³² would seem to suggest that Sampayo's second attempt succeeded. Faria Peixoto is described as a man who had lived in Manyika for thirty years, but was at one time a morador of Sena. He owned property in Manyika, 'land and villages,' probably in Maungwe where he had business connections with his father-in-law, Thome Lopes, who used to tell him

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26. The 'disorders' and scandalous conduct of Guiao are referred to in a letter from the King to Luis de Menezes 25.8.1719 in Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. Vol.V. p.69. For further conduct of Guiao see Letter from Luis de Menezes to Antonio Cardim Troes, Lieutenant General of Moçambique and the rivers (Goa 20.1.1720) regretting the appointment of Manuel Goncalves Guiao to a government post, in R.S.E.A. Vol.V.....op.cit. p.93.
27. Letter from Count Dom Luis de Menezes, Viceroy of India, to Antonio Cardim Troes, Lieutenant General of Moçambique 21.1.1719. In R.S.E.A. Vol.V. op.cit. p.5.
28. Letter from Count Menezes to Factor of Sena, José de Mello Leite 21.1.1719. in R.S.E.A. Vol.V. op.cit. p.54.
Parecer of Conde da Ericéira sobre of Comercio de Mocambique, Lisboa 4.11.1730. Avul. de Moc. Cxa.3. A.H.U.
29. Ibid.
30. Letter from Dom Luis de Menezes to Manuel Goncalves Guiao 26.1.1719, referring to his 11 letters all of which were dated 20.6.1718) in R.S.E.A. Vol.V. p.54.
31. Letter to João de Tavora de Sampayo from Luis de Menezes 20.1.1720 Goa in R.S.E.A. Vol.V. p.95.
32. Carta do Secretario da Academia Real da Historia Portugueza, 17.3.1721 in Rivara, J.H. da Cunha, 'O Chronista de Tissuary (No.40, April), Vol.IV, 1869, p.43.

stories of the often-told legendary Ophir and Solomon, in connection with the empire of Monomotapa in semi-historical times.

The history of the feira between 1719 and 1771 is a matter of conjecture.

There was an attempt to regulate the salary of the capitão-mor of Manyika in 1753³³. This came about as a result of a quarrel between the then capitão-mor of the feira, Fr. Manoel do Rozario and Manuel Cabral de Abreu, captain of the infantry. Probably to spite his enemy, Cabral de Abreu asked for the post of capitão mor and told the Governor of the Rios, Manuel Lopes Ferreira, not to worry about his salary. However, when an amount of five bars of cloth was assigned to him as his salary, he refused to accept it but remained in his post and paid the soldiers from his pocket³⁴. This episode had two permanent results in the history of the administration of the Masekesa feira. First, the amount of five bares, albeit rejected, became the standard salary of the capitão-mor of the Masekesa feira³⁵ and secondly this set a precedent, whereby a capitão-mor served with men lacking in "manners, character and respect"³⁶. These men, who were not carefully chosen, were least concerned about good economy and commerce, neither did they hesitate to loot the royal treasury whenever an opportunity presented itself.

33. Regimento and Instructions for the captains of the garrison of the Zimbabwe, drawn up by Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago. Codice 1332 No.50. Moc. A.H.U. Tette 19.4.1771.

34. Ibid.

In the letter of recommendation, cited in footnote 5, infra - Manuel Cabral de Abreu was reported as being 'very poor' because he had spent much fazenda in the service of the Government.

35. Instructions to the capitão-mor of Manica drawn up by Balthazar Pereira do Lago. Codice 1332 No.50 Moc.A.H.U. 28.2.1771.

This was again mentioned as customary by a factor, Joze Joaquim Correia de Semos Sarmiento in his letter No.3288 to the Governor. 21.6.1820, Cxa.65. Moc.A.H.U..

36. Instructions to the captains of the Zimbabwe..... op.cit. Codice 1332 No.50. Moc.A.H.U. 19.1.1771.

The rights, duties and qualities of a capitão-mor were not clearly defined until 1771³⁷. Capitão-mor, José Antonio Bravo, (1756)³⁸ is a case in point. He was a degradado married to a Chinese courtesan of well-connected parentage in Goa. He administered the feira of Masekesa as if it were his personal property and the result was that two soldiers of that garrison defected to Manyika princes. Most of the moradores deserted the feira to Sena. He was later accused of insolence and theft. This was but one of the many cases.

It is important to note that the feira of Masekesa had no formal status until 1771 when its capitão-mor was paid from the royal treasury, and an attempt was made to raise it to the status of a villa³⁹. But even before this the importance attached to the feira at Masekesa is shown by the fact that its capitão-mor was supposed to earn the same salary as that of the capitão of the Zimbabwe⁴⁰.

The fact that the capitão-mors had no fixed regular salary to enable them to live according to the style of their commission very often obliged them to trade legitimately or otherwise, and attempts by the Chikangas to control them generally resulted in clashes. This was the case in 1750 with

37. Ibid.

38. A report signed by David Marques Pereira 10.6.1756 Cxa,5. Moc.A.H.U.

39. Instructions to the capitão-mor of Manica 28.2.1771 op.cit. Codice 1332, No.50, Moc. A.H.U.

40. The captain of the Zimbabwe earned 5 bares of cloth then. Codice 1332, No.50. Moc.A.H.U. 19.1.1771. The two posts of the garrisons at the Zimbabwe of Monomotapa and the feira of Masekesa were considered very important. See Newitt M.D.D. citing Mauriz Thomans's Reise und Lebensbeschreibung Ch.7, on p.176 of his thesis 'The Zambezi Prazos in the 18th Century' (Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1967). Letter from Curvetta S. Antonio e Almeida Santos to the General of Rios de Sena, David Marques Pereira 15.11.1755. Cod.1310. Moc. A.H.U.

Joze Bravo⁴¹, mention of whom has been made in the preceding discussion. He discovered a bar known as 'Bar do Bungo', but before he could exploit it effectively Chikanga ordered the bar to be closed and all the Manyika who were employed at this bar to be punished⁴². Secondly, the fact that the garrison was generally without proper soldiers to defend the feira or support Portuguese demands or complaints left Chikanga with plenty of room to manoeuvre things as he liked. Hence Portuguese complaints that "the regulo of Manica robs everybody who passes by his lands"⁴³.

The capitão-mor found himself in a dilemma. The King lost what little confidence and respect he might have had for him, and the moradores whose commercial interests were harmed did likewise. This was best illustrated by the death of an influential woman, Dona Ines, who was respected by the moradores as well as the regulos in 1758⁴⁴. This turned 'all the regulos and Monomotapa restless.'

An earlier example of the extent to which personal qualities influenced the fortunes of the feira is that of Manuel Gonçaves Guiao who negotiated, and where this was not possible, fought for trading opportunities, during the first half of the 18th Century. Chikanga's policy was one of restricting trade and movement within his land. For nearly seventeen years he

41. Soares Augusto Estanislao Xavier, Descrição da villa de Sofala. Margao? 1857, p.50 footnote (a).

42. Ibid. The same source mentions that the King buried his son in that mine. This is the only instance I have come across of a Manyika prince being buried in a mine. It might very well be that the death of this prince coincided with the closing of the mine and the King decided to save labour of digging a grave, or alternatively there might be some ritual connected with it. The chances are that it was a mere coincidence.

43. Letter from the Governor of Moçambique, Manuel David Moraes Pereira to Thome Joaquim da Costa, Moc. 9.8.1758. Avulso 82-2 fls. Cxa.6. Moc. A.H.U.

44. Ibid. For a very short biographical sketch of Dona Ines Gracias Cardoso see Lobato A. Evolução Administrativa e Economica de Moçambique (1752-1762) la parte. Fundamentos da Criação do Governo-Geral em 1753. Agencia Geral do Ultramar. Lisboa (1957) p.49. footnote 25.
Newitt M.D.D. The Zambezi Prazos in the Eighteenth Century. (Ph.D.Thesis, London, 1967) pp.130, 132.

did not want the Portuguese to trade in his land⁴⁵ and those who defied his orders had their merchandise confiscated, neither did he allow Portuguese traders to pass to other Kingdoms through his lands. Manuel Goncalves Guiao spent as much as 100 miticals⁴⁶ on saguates to bribe Manyika Manamucates and provincial governors in the Kingdom to join him in a war against Chikanga. The date of this war is unknown, but it took place between 1720 and 1751⁴⁷. Chikanga sued for peace and promised freedom of passage to all Portuguese traders as in the past. Opinion was divided at the policy making level of the Portuguese administration. The Tenente General of the Rivers, for reasons which Guiao calls 'frivolous' decided against reoccupying the feira effectively, but Guiao dashed in and, at his own expense, 'built' a fortress to defend the newly won trading opportunities⁴⁸.

It is in this light that one should view an offer of ten lands made to Francisco de Mello e Castro by Barbe, apparently a 'regulo of Manica'⁴⁹. It may very well be that he was one of the manamucates bribed by Guiao during the war against Chikanga.

Francisco de Mello e Castro suspected an ulterior motive behind this offer and gave an evasive answer to the emissaries who had brought the message containing the offer. He, therefore, recommended that the Governor-General of Moçambique should reject the offer for a number of reasons. First, the

45. Memorial do que tenho obrado nestes Rios no servicio de S.Magestade, que Deus Guarde. Anon. Cxa. Av.3 A.H.U. 7.12.1751. Detailed discussion about the author of this document is found in the English translation of Newitt M.D.D. 'The Zambezi Prazos in the 18th Century.' (Ph.D.Thesis, London, 1967) This document was probably a reply to a 'Parecer do Desembargador, Duarte Salter de Mendonca em que se propoe a autonomia administração da Conquista' Av.Cxa.4. 7/12/1751.

Lobato A. Evolução..... op.cit. p.125.

46. 'Memorial do que..... 7.12.1751' Cxa.3. A.H.U.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Letter from Francisco de Mello de Castro to David Marques Pereira 15.11.1755 Codice 1310, Moc. A.H.U. Cópia da Carta em Oct.1755 pellos Patamares ao Gn. al de Sena, David Marques Pereira. Oct. 1755. Codice 1310 Moc.A.H.U.

fortifications in the interior were exposed to danger and help could not be speedily sent except with an army⁵⁰. Secondly, the fortress of the feira at Masekesa had earned notoriety for being badly garrisoned, badly constructed out of bad timber, and, in his opinion, these ten lands would be in great danger of attack, probably from Chikanga. It had been brought to his notice that the so-called fortress existed only in name; neither, so those who were acquainted with the situation pointed out, was there a good site for establishing a new fortress.

A third reason⁵¹, which sounded more plausible than the two already mentioned, was that the fortress would have been of use if it were constructed near the bares where the Portuguese traders and Manyika miners met, because here it would enforce respect. But this was hardly necessary because Portuguese interests were maintained by cloth, as was the case in Butua, Mano and the remote interior where Portuguese subjects mined for gold without the protection of fortresses. He wondered whether it was, "necessary to conquer the lands if we have all the commerce in our hands and if what we pay for transit to the African is insignificant⁵²". Francisco de Mello e Castro criticised bitterly a plan of military conquest which had been proposed by a Viceroy of India, Conde da Ericeira. It was with utter reluctance that he proceeded with the re-occupation of the feira of Masekesa. Francisco de Mello e Castro was not alone in this line of thinking. Martinho de Mello e Castro and Diogo de

50. Ibid

51. Ibid

52. Lobato A. Aspectos de Moçambique no Antigo Regime Colonial.
Lisbon, 1953, p.23.

Mendonca Corte Real were more or less of the same opinion. They believed that it was not necessary to conquer the interior because possession of the coast secured the commerce of the interior. However, as soon as it seemed that the Dutch at the Cape would advance into the interior toward Manyika, Butua and Makaranga a defence of the interior and re-occupation of Lourenço Marques was instantly ordered in 1752⁵³.

There is no doubt that the reasons advanced by Francisco de Mello e Castro and those of like mind were valid. But it was also true that the merchandise which the traders introduced into the feira of Masekesa depended for their security on the defence of that commerce against interlopers. An identification of the regulo of Manyika, whom Francisco de Mello e Castro called Barbe, is fraught with many difficulties⁵⁴. Firstly, this name does not appear anywhere again in connection with the Kingdom of Manyika during the 18th Century. The name Barbe, however, appears a century later in connection with his subject called Doga, who had rebelled against him and fled to a prazo called Inhacaroro in Barwe. But the same Doga is later referred to as 'Baruist.' A possible explanation here is that perhaps Barbe was a pseudonym of some Manyika prince who was in charge of one of the Manyika districts, which shared the same boundary with the Kingdom of Barwe and that Doga was a 'Baruist'⁵⁵ immigrant who later decided to seekwork on the Inhacaroro prazo.

53. Lobato A. Aspecto de Moçambique no Antigo Regime Colonial. Lisobon, 1953 p.23.

For the question of Dutch ambitions to reach the lands of Monomotapa and Manyika from Rios de Cuama, see Montez Caetano. Descobrimento e Fundação de Lourenço Marques. 1500-1800 Lourenço Marques 1948. p.78.

54. Correspondencia oficial do Governador de Quelimane 1844-1852. Letter to Francisco Henrique Ferrao 4.10.1845. Codice 1468, No.71, Moc.A.H.U.

55. Codice 1468. No.73, Moc. A.H.U.

The case of the ten lands shows how well Francisco de Mello e Castro understood and appreciated the interests of his fellow Portuguese. His acceptance of this offer was bound to offend Chikanga and prejudice Portuguese commerce. It is true that the garrison was in a 'miserable state', but should not this have been the reason why he ought to have set about to improve the situation? It should have been clear to him that without an up-to-date garrison to protect the Portuguese name, the day would not be far off when Africans would not consent that the capitão-mor and his wretched garrison should reside there⁵⁶, and also it should have been evident to him that absence of both would have sounded a death knell to Portuguese commerce in the Kingdom of Manyika. It is possible that commerce had been declining since the beginning of the 18th Century, as estimates made in 1762 proved⁵⁷. Gold production in Manyika was estimated at 100 pastas⁵⁸ a year, compared to Butua whose production varied between 300 to 400 pastas⁵⁹ a year in the same period. Fifty or sixty pastas of the total gold production in Manyika passed through Quelimane and Sena⁶⁰. This was easily recognizable because of its quality. There was, however, no difference in the quality of ivory, whose sale increased or decreased in proportion to that of gold. The gold and ivory

56. Codice 1310. Moc.A.H.U. 15.11.1755, op.cit.

57. Capitão e Juiz da Manica 13.6.1762, Avulso 106-2fls. Cxa.9. Moc.A.H.U.

58. Ibid.

59. Letter from Marco Antonio de Azevedo Continho de Montauray to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque. Sena 15.6.1762. Cod.1321. Moc.A.H.U. Memórias e Documentos..... 1890 Lisbon. p.185. There is a short extract relevant to the figures cited in the text on p.39 of Cod.1321. Moc.A.H.U. See Doc.No.22 p.593. Andrade A.A. Relações..... op.cit.

60. Memorias da Costa d'Africa Oriental e Alguns Reflexoes Uteis para Estabelecer Melhor, e Fazer Mais Florente o seu Comercio. 21.5.1762. fls. 55 in Andrade A.A. Relacoes..... op.cit. p.193. Also in Dias L.F. de Carvalho. Fontes para a Historia, Geografia e Comercio de Moçambique (see XVIII) Anais Vol.IX. Tomo 1. 1954. Lisboa. p.222 Fundo Geral No.826. B.N.L. Noticias dos Dominios Portuguezes Actuals na Costa de Africa Oriental tiradas por Ordem de S.Mad.^{de} Fidels.^a nos annos de 1762 e 1758. These were copied in the secretariat of 'Estado dos Negocios da Marinha' in 1765. This copy of 1765 is undated. The original copy which was sent from Moçambique is in the T.T. (Ministerio do reino, Maco 604). This anonymous memorial has been assigned by Lobato to desembargador Morais Pereira.

were exchanged for drugs and wax⁶¹. Iron, copper, calaim and crystal were marketed on a small scale.

Various individuals discovered bares in Rios de Sena as early as 1720⁶² and certainly by the end of the first half of the 18th Century several bares were in existence⁶³. For example, north of the Zambezi were the bares of Mixonga, owned by a native of Goa, Raphael de Bragança, the bares of Pemba and Ambara discovered by Fr. Pedro Trindade and Mano, João Pereira Velho, that of Beve by Vitoria Francisca, that of Cassunca by Manoel Roiz Leitao⁶⁴.

In his report of July 1762⁶⁵ Marco Antonio de Azevedo Continho de Montaury states that there were 23 bars in the entire "Portuguese Conquest"⁶⁶ of Rios de Sena and North of the Zambezi. These had been once very rich in gold from which their individual discoverers made fortunes. This shift in Portuguese trade from the South to the North resulted in increased trade between Butua on the one hand and Zumbo and Tete on the other, where a sizeable

61. Ibid.

62. Rivara J.H. da Cunha. O Chronista de Tissuary Vol.IV. p.45. 1869 Nova Goa.

63. Boxer C.R. 'A Dominican Account of Zambezia in 1744' Bol.Soc.Estud. Moçambique Ano XXIX. No.125. 1960. Section, E. p.11.

64. 'Memórias da Costa.....' Andrade A.A. Relacoes..... p.281.

65. Montaury Marco Antonio de Azevedo Continho de. 'Bares.' Sena 15.6.1762. Doc.No.22.

Andrade A.A. Relações..... p.593

66. The actual term used is 'Conquista.' The Portuguese connotation of this term during the 18th Century is best rendered as "an area over which the Portuguese had effective jurisdiction." Newitt M.D.D. An Account of a Journey made Overland from Quelimane to Angoche in 1752 by Francisco Raymundo Moraes Pereira. General African Historical Association, Salisbury, 1965 p.35. For the significance of other terms - dominios, colonia, cafraria - see Andrade A.A. "um Caso tipico da Filosofia Politica da Historia Portuguesa" in Studia No.9. 1962. For further information about bars see, Boxer C.R. 'A Dominican Account of Zambezia in 1744' in Bol.Soc.Estud.Moc. ano XXIX No.125, Seccao E. 1960. For the nature of trade and Portuguese relations with the local potentantes in Mocambique and Goa - Biker I.F. Judice. Collecção de Tratados de pazes queo estadoda India Portuguêza fez com os Reis e Senhores com que teve relações nao Partes da Asia e Africa Oriental desde o principio da conquista ate ao fim do seculo XVIII. ('Instrução de el Rey D. Joao V dada ao Marques de Castello Novo' Lisboa 25.3.1744) Vol.VI. 1885 pp.243-62. Rivara J.H. da Cunha. O Chronista de Tissuary. Vol.II, Nova Goa 1867. pp.156-160, 184-90.

Castello Novo's correspondence with the King and Viceroy of India, dated 10.8.1744 is also found in Arquivo das Colonias Vol.III, Lisbon, 1918.

pp.225-40. For mining methods etc. see Lobato A. Evolução..... Vol.I. 1957. pp.44-5, 56, 133-34, 138-40.

number of people who owned bars in the Maravi Kingdom lived. Butua's gold output, probably in 1726 and 1751, when Changamire's relations with the Portuguese are stated to be cordial⁶⁷, was reckoned as stated earlier to be between 300 and 400 pastas⁶⁸ and her market could absorb as much as fifty bars of fazendas, 2 - 3,000 macos of beads⁶⁹. The contrast in the output of gold between the bars in Manyika and the bars in Butua and cis-Zambezi may possibly be accounted for by the difference in extent, of the three places.

The sources of information on the gold output of the Manyika bars differ to a lesser or greater degree. For instance, Montaury, writing in 1762, states that very little gold was obtained from Manyika bars⁷⁰. Miranda writes about infinite gold from the bars of Manyika which produced in one year 70,000 cruzados' worth of gold⁷¹. But subsequently he refers to the territory on which the bars were situated as belonging to a King of Barwe. This clearly refers to the Pungwe river, which separates the two Kingdoms, and most probably where Fernandes saw the Manyika collecting alluvial gold in 1514-1515⁷². "Also in Manyika" Miranda goes on "there are numerous crystals which are shaped like topazes." The author of the 'Descrição Corográfica.....' clearly states that the Manyika bars produced "excellent gold in nuggets,

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67. Nicola Sutherland-Harris. "Trade and Politics in the Changamire/Rozvi Kingdom of the late 17th and 18th Centuries" Seminar Paper, M.A. Area Studies Centre. S.O.A.S.1967, p.8. For collaboration between Changamire and Portuguese see Lobato A. Evolução Administrativa..... 1752-1763. Agencia Geral do Ultramar. 1957. pp.253,139.
68. Montaury Marco Antonio de Azevedo Continho de. Bares 15.6.1762. Doc.No.22 in Andrade A.A. Relações..... p.593.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
Memorias e Documentos..... 1890 Lisbon, p.187.
71. Miranda Antonio Pinto de. Memórias sobre a Costa de Africa. (C1766) in Andrade A.A. Relações..... Lisbon,1954. p.280.
72. See Chapter I. Infra.

folhetas which weighed four pounds"⁷³. It would seem, therefore, that, despite the organisational differences, the bars in Manyika produced gold comparable to their counterparts in Rios de Sena etc. The small amount of gold cited by Montauray might be due to internal political developments of which there is no record during the 1760's. It would appear, from Dinizio de Mello e Castro's description of the bars in Manyika, that the territory on which the feira was situated was being disputed by the King of Quiteve at this time. He refers to the bars of "Manica within the jurisdiction of the King of Quiteve"⁷⁴. It is unmistakably clear from his description, that the area where these bars were found, was the Revue Valley, and that the feira referred to was that of Masekesa, the only one known to possess a fortress at this time. There was a fortress, with a capitão-mor, officials, and soldiers. The motive for maintaining these, according to Dinizio, was to enable the moradores of Sena to trade with the Quitevans. The King of Quiteve did not allow the Portuguese to mine gold in the bars around this area. His subjects, however, could buy cloths and beads from the moradores of Sena. Even in this trade, the King and his princes are accused of causing 'infinite damage,' 'robbery' and violence to Portuguese merchandise, a good deal of which was spent on trying to buy safety. He concludes by urging the King ^{of Portugal} to improve the fortress, its garrison and personnel in order to take advantage of the 'abundant and excellent gold' which came from the bars of Manyika. Quitevan

73. Anon. Descrição Corográfica..... Cxa.17.MOC.A.H.U.

Lobato A. Evolução..... 1957. Vol.I. p.68.

Francisco de Mello e Castro referred to these blue stones, topazes, emeralds, etc. in 1750, but commented that neither he nor any Portuguese had seen them. They belonged to the realm of legend and tradition.

Descrição dos Rios de Sena. Annaes..... Pt. nao official Serie II. 1867. p.100.

Lobato A. Colonização Senhorial da Zambézia e Outros Estudos. Junta de Investigações do Ultramar Lisbon, 1962, p.135.

74. Castro Dinizio de Mello e. 'Noticia do Imperio Marave e dos Rios de Sena' in Carvalho Dias, Fontes para a Historia..... pp.123-4.

policy during this period was decidedly anti-Portuguese⁷⁵. This occasionally contributed to some extent to the small production of gold especially from the bars which bordered on Quitevan territory.

However, the differences in the rights to acquire and operate bars in the lands of Maravi and in Manyika, gave the former added popularity. The bars which were situated in the North of the Zambezi were discovered and operated by individuals who considered them their own property. They had for their labour a large number of slaves who lived there as an organised community under a capitão-mor, a garrison and a priest. The slaves, the majority of whom were negresses, were required to produce a stipulated amount for their master per day⁷⁶.

The situation was different in Manyika. The bars were operated by the Manyika themselves. Chikanga, as we have seen in the case of the capitão-mor, Bravo, in 1756⁷⁷, did not allow the Portuguese to own and exploit bars in his Kingdom. The best-known bars in Manyika, the bars of Chisco, Xima, Gatoza, Musa and Ximiza, were found on the banks of the Mutare, Revue and Nyamucuarara rivers⁷⁸. The conservatism of the Manyika in trade

75. Xavier, Inacio Caetano. 'Noticias.....' in Andrad A.A. Relações..... p.155.

76. 'Memórias.....' in Carvalho Dias L.F. Fontes para a Historia..... p.229. Also see Andrade A.A. Relações..... Lisbon, 1955, pp.196-204.

77. See this chapter - infra.

78. Descrição Corográfica..... Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U. For a complete survey of the well-known bars in Rios de Sena see Galvão's Report in 1786 to Martinho de Mello e Castro, 3.12.1781. Cxa.23, Moc.A.H.U. Lobator A. Evolução..... 1957 Lisbon. pp.243-247, 46-8. Memórias e Documentos..... 1890 Lisbon. Doc.No.76. pp.221, 159-176. de Andrade Jeronymo José Nogueira "Excerpto 'Descrição em que ficavam os Negocios de Mossambique..... anno de 1790'" in Memórias e Documentos..... Lisbon, 1890. p.163. Recommendations by Balthazar Manuel Pereira do Lago to his successor 12.8.1766 in Memorias e Documentos..... Lisbon, 1890, p.196. Also see 'Map of the known mines in the district of Sena' by the capitão-mor of Manyika, Izidoro Pereira Correa 30.7.1857. Sena in A.C.U. parte nao official Serie II, 1859-1867.

matters is shown by the fact that the 'ancients' were supposed to have carried on their alluvial gold-mining in the above-mentioned rivers⁷⁹.

There are two most important reasons why trade shifted to the North; first, the increasing importance of the ivory trade in the North during the first half of the 18th Century, and secondly, the power of Barwe, especially after Gunguro Makombe had acceded to the throne in 1768. The trade in ivory between Mozambique and Goa was more profitable during the period 1749-1770⁸⁰ than in gold. The bars became less and less lucrative; in fact some of them closed down. Montaury gives Mano as the last bar to be closed in 1758 due to a severe drought⁸¹. This was certainly not the last, because bars were observed by Gamitto in 1830⁸².

The popularity of the ivory trade explains, in part, diminished trade activities in Manyika since she herself produced very little ivory. There are several factors why the ivory trade did not make a significant shift to Manyika's neighbours in the West. The hostility between Changamire and the Portuguese, as manifested by his famous raid of 1,000 pastas (worth 800,000 cruzados) of gold belonging to the Portuguese in 1756-7⁸³ the succession wars in his Kingdom in 1766 and Mahia threats in 1769⁸⁴ rendered

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79. Kuss M.H. 'Comunicação sobre a continuação Geologia de uma parte da Zambezia' in Bol.S.G.L. Seria 6^a No.3. Lisbon 1886, pp.178-194.
Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika people' 14.1.1. Salisbury. Paup A.E. The Geology of the Umtali Gold Belt. Geological Survey, 32, 1937, p.81.
80. Alpers E.A. 'The role of the Yao trade.....' (Ph.D.Thesis, London, 1966), p.108. The Yao alone used to take 400-500 bars of ivory to Mozambique annually. According to Francisco de Mello e Castro the gold trade in 1750, at its best, produced only 15% profit, and at its worst did not even yield, 1,000 xerafins in India, which was the value of 1 pasta in Rios de Sena. This did not happen in the case of ivory, because 1 bar (worth 20 faracolas), the equivalent of 22 arrobas, 16 arrateis, cost 100 maticals per bar, which was worth in Indian currency 600 xerafins. This was sold in Mozambique for 1,000 cruzados which in Indian currency was worth 1,333 xerafins, 1 tanga, 40 reis.
e Castro Francisco de Mello. 'Rios de Sena' Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino parte nao official serie II, 1867, p.108.
81. Memórias e Documentos..... 1890 Lisbon, p.187.
82. Gamitto A.C.P. (trans. Ian Cunnison) King Kazembe and the Marave, Cheva, Bisa, Bemba, Lunda, and other peoples of Southern Africa, being the diary of the Portuguese expedition to that Potentate in the years 1831 and 1832 Junta Investigacoes do Ultramar, Vol.I. No.42. Lisbon, 1960, pp.41-42.

the Butuan ivory market uncertain. The trade routes through the lands of Makaranga were in the throes of a civil war in the 1760's, the Munhaes and the princes demanded passage money as they liked⁸⁵. These factors, to a large extent, account for the shift in Portuguese trading activities from the Kingdoms of Manyika, Butua and Makaranga to the North of the Zambezi.

The power of Barwe is another factor which explains the 'decline' of trade in Manyika during the 18th Century.

There are two aspects to this problem, which must be discussed in order to bring out the impact of events in Barwe on Manyika-Portuguese relations. The decline of Portuguese trading activities in the Kingdom of Manyika during this century can be partially explained, first, by a recovery and a re-assertion of its sovereignty by the Kingdom of Barwe, and secondly, by Portuguese military weakness to suppress effectively Barwe's irredentist tendencies. The Kingdom of Barwe had compromised her independence during the 17th Century. Consequently, Portuguese moradores acquired land. Attempts by the Makombes to reverse this situation during the 18th Century severely restricted Portuguese commercial activities in Barwe, and quite often led to conflicts about the freedom of passage to the Kingdom of Manyika. The

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83. Xavier Caetano Ignacio. 'Relação do Estado presente de Moçambique, Sena, Sofala, Inhambane e todo o continente da Africa Oriental' 1758 in Carvalho Dias, L.F. Fontes para a Historia..... p.198.
84. Sutherland-Harris N. 'Trade and the Rozwi Mambo' in (eds). Gray J.R. and Birmingham D. Pre-Colonial African Trade. Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900. O.U.P. 1970. p.257. Compare her argument on p.259. Also there were disorders at the feira of Zumbo. 'Copy of a letter of the capitao-mor of Zumbo, Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos to the Governor and Captain-general of Mossambique 10.3.1767' in Memorias e Documentos..... Lisbon 1890, p.197,
85. Castro Dionizio de Mello e. 'Noticia do Imperio Marave e dos Rios de Sena' in Fontes para a Historia..... (20.1.1763) pp.131-133.

Makombes are described as hostile in the 18th Century Portuguese documents. Anecdotes about encounters between the Vashambadzi and their Portuguese masters were related to Ignacio Caetano Xavier in 1758⁸⁶. Lions and monkeys further rendered the passage to the feira of Masekesa unsafe.

As far as the first aspect of this problem is concerned the attitude and foreign policy of Gunguro Makombe toward the Portuguese between 1767 and 1770, best illustrate how events in the Kingdom of Barwe seriously affected Portuguese trade with the Kingdom of Manyika. The conflict between the Portuguese and Gunguro Makombe came to a head in 1768⁸⁷ when the latter tried to retrieve by force lands in the Sungue region, which had fallen into Portuguese hands, probably during the previous century. Gunguro entered Sungue with his people and set Portugueses houses on fire, especially those belonging to prominent moradores like Antonio Joze Pereira Salema, José Carlos Coelho de Campos⁸⁸. He blocked the passage to the feira of Masekesa and encouraged his subjects to carry on reprisals on Portuguese merchants who tried to take their merchandise secretly to Manyika.

Investigations, which the commandant of the villa of Sena, Jose Caetano da Mota, ordered to be made in 1768⁸⁹ in order to establish Gunguro

86. Xavier, Inacio Caetano. 'Noticias dos dominios Portuguzes na Costa de Africa Oriental' in Andrade A.A. Relações de Mocambique Setecentista. Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon 1955, p.175. There is an English translation of this account by Newitt M.D.D. 'Ignacio Caetano's account of Portuguese East Africa' in The History of the Central African Peoples. Proceedings of the 17th Conference. Lusaka. 1963. p.15.
87. 'Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Inacio de Melo Alvim, to the captain General of Mocambique 3.10.1768' in (ed) Caetano Montez. Inventario do Fundo do Seculo XVIII. Lourenço Marques 1955. pp.208-210. 'Letter from Alvim to Captain-General No.743 1.2.1769'. Inventario..... op.cit. p.113.
88. 'Letter from Alvim to Captain-General 3.10.1768'. Inventario.....pp.208-210. The Sungue territory separated the Kingdom of Barwe from both Sena and Tete and adjoined them along the interior stretches of Tambara, Tipui and Macangano.
89. Ibid. 'Letter from Alvim to Captain General 28.10.1768' Inventario.....pp.222-225.

Makombe's real motives for his attack on, and expulsion of the Portuguese from the region of Sungue, suggest three reasons why Makombe did this; first, that Makombe entered Sungue because he wanted to throw out the Quitevans and some of the Barwe princes, who had occupied this region soon after the death of Mutuconha, the previous King of Barwe, secondly, that Makombe wanted to drive out Changara, a muzinda (deputy) of Chicova, who had allegedly entered Sungue without the former's permission, thirdly, that Makombe wanted to 'consolidate his government'⁹⁰. The first two reasons seem to have been the occasion and not the motive for the war. Gunguro Makombe's desire was to reassert himself as King of Barwe. His ambition to circumscribe Portuguese freedom of movement in his Kingdom revealed itself in several ways. A typical example is that of Miguel José Pereira Gaio in 1768 whose Vashambadzi were destined for the feira of Masekesa and thence to Quiteve⁹¹. These Vashambadzi were prevented from passing through Barwe and had their merchandise confiscated by the orders of Gunguro Makombe. The fact that Makombe had tightened up his control over the Portuguese traders in his Kingdom is further demonstrated by an incident which took place in the same year. Gaio's mussambas grandes (great vashambadzi), Zempere, his Sachicunda (slave-driver), and Zango were forced to pay a saguante when Makombe heard that they were staying at the house of one of his subjects, Inhabata. The saguante consisted of one mutore of cloth, two flasks, one of gun-powder and the other of pepper, and three of nipa.

The respect which a Portuguese delegation showed to Makombe in observing a Barwe procedure for audience with the King, must be viewed as a measure of success of Gunguro Makombe's chauvinistic foreign policy. The mission sought audience with Makombe through Mungari, a muzinda,ⁱⁿ charge of the lands of Cavenga in Barwe⁹². This was the normal way of doing it. The

90. Ibid.

91. 'Requerimento de Miguel José Pereira Gaio, Sena 25.2.1769' in Caetano Montez, Inventario.....pp.213-

92. Ibid.

incidents which have been cited above show that Gunguro Makombe's attack on Sungue was influenced more by his desire to retrieve the image of Barwe as an independent sovereign Kingdom than the presence in Sungue of either Changara or the Quitevans. In fact Gunguro Makombe's line of argument with the Portuguese mission in 1768 seems to confirm this interpretation of Makombe's actions in Sungue in 1768⁹³. Gunguro Makombe contended that he occupied Sungue because the lands which the Portuguese moradores possessed there had been given to them by Mutuconha Makombe, the previous King of Barwe, who came to the throne of the Kingdom with the help of the Portuguese, notably one Bernardo Xavier. Gunguro Makombe maintained that Mutuconha was not a legitimate King and that, consequently, his actions were not valid. Gunguro Makombe did not want to take action at the time, until the death of Mutuconha, because he realised that Mutuconha and his supporters, including Zinheme, Cuvava, some princes of Barwe and the Portuguese moradores in Sungue, would plunge the Kingdom into a civil war. Two developments prompted him to take action in 1768 - the death of Mutuconha and a rupture between the forces of Zinheme and Cuvava.

Gunguro Makombe's patriotic foreign policy, which resulted in several armed conflicts with the Portuguese, made it difficult for Portuguese merchants to trade freely with the Kingdom of Manyika. Portuguese military weakness, as revealed by lack of soldiers, ammunition, artillery of the necessary calibre 3 or 4, small cannons, grape-shots, bullets, artillery men, flints, gunpowder, musket bullets as well as administrative inefficiency at the villa of Sena further weakened the Portuguese position at a time when Gunguro's exemplary resistance to the Portuguese was being widely imitated by his subjects⁹⁴. For instance one 'Mussito,' otherwise known as Marcoa, who

93. 'Letter from Alvim to Captain General 28.10.1768. Caetano Montez. Inventario..... pp.225 -

94. 'Letter dated 23.1.1770 from Inacio de Alvim to the captain general No.760. Caetano Montez, Inventario..... pp.71-72.

lived in Sungue, near Sena, in the lands occupied by Anonio José da Salema, conducted guerrilla warfare from "the woods and thick forests" which served as a strong fortress, "for a party of African rebels and the African 'slaves' who had fled away from their Portuguese master." They concerted their efforts and rendered the passage to the interior of Barwe and Manyika unsafe by making 'intolerable thefts,...causing cruel deaths,' and carrying out reprisals on Portuguese merchants in transit⁹⁵. The Governor on the 23rd January, 1770, referred to 'Mussito' as 'a powerful African' to whom many Africans appealed for a redress of ^{their}grievances, 'as though he was their King.' It was the independent operations of people like 'Musito' which added to the power of Barwe during the 18th Century.

It must not be assumed, however, that the Portuguese were entirely finished as a force to reckon with in Barwe internal politics. They defeated Gunguro Makombe militarily in 1768, but did not drive the advantage of their victory too far, mainly because they realised their overall military weakness. They merely demanded that the lands which belonged to Antonio Jose Pereira Salema and José Carlos Coelho de Campos should be restored, the passage to Manyika should be open, that the vashambadzi, whom Gunguro Makombe held captive, should be freed, that Gunguro should prohibit milandos and confiscation of Portuguese merchandise and lastly, but not least, that Makombe should deal severely with any offenders against Portuguese merchants or alternatively send them to the Portuguese authorities⁹⁶.

Luckily for Barwe, the Portuguese were not in a position to press hard for their demands because of administrative disorders at the villa of Sena. Inacio Caetano Alvim, Governor of Rios de Sena, had to rush from his capital, Tete, to the villa of Sena in July, 1769, in order to intervene among the feuding moradores⁹⁷.

95. Ibid.

96. 'Letter from Alvim to captain General 3.10.1768'. Caetano Montez, Inventario. p.210. *Inacio de Mello e*

97. 'Letter from Alvim to captain General No.731. 16.7.1769', Sena. Caetano Montez, Inventario...pp.140-2.

The impact of Gunguro Makombe's attitude towards the Portuguese has clearly shown how events in the Kingdom of Barwe, whether arising from civil wars or from conflicts between the Portuguese and the Barwists, reduced the volume of trade between Sena and Manyika during the 18th Century, as shown by incidents which have been cited in the years 1758, 1768-1770 and 1794⁹⁸.

It would be wrong to imagine that there was absolutely no trading activities in ivory South of the Zambezi in the mid 18th Century. Ivory trade did exist in Makaranga and Butua in spite of the political turmoils which were taking place at this time. In his observations of 'Kaffir land' Mauriz Thomans points out that Monomotapa's palace "is always surrounded by a decorative fence of elephant teeth"⁹⁹. The name Manyanga (horns) for Changamire's court at Dhlo-Dhlo suggests trade in ivory¹⁰⁰. The manner in which these potentates acquired these tusks is not clearly stated. Both Changamire and Monomotapa probably sent out their own hunters to kill elephants, or women to collect tusks, which elephants lost in their fights or due to old age. In addition to that, some of the tusks were very likely obtained through a custom whereby a tusk that first touched the ground whenever an elephant fell from a shot, was given to the owner of the land, Be that as it may. The superiority of the ivory trade during this period of the gold trade is shown by the fact that 'almost every year three large Portuguese ships' left Mozambique laden with them. The loading usually took place on the 30th June for the ships which departed from Mozambique on the 18th and 30th of August¹⁰¹.

98. See section II of this chapter.

For later examples of the importance of Barwe in Mayika-Portuguese trade see Chapters IV, (1822) and V, (1833).

99. Thomans Mauriz, Reise und Lebensbeshreibung. Augsburg 1877, Chapter 9, p.100.

100. Changamire's Throne, erected at the centre of his royal court and on which he used to sit when giving audience or presiding over trials, was ornamented with ivory. The importance attached to ivory by the Changamires is illustrated by a story, that one of the Changamires; conceived the idea of catching and taming wild elephants. But of course the scheme failed. See Posselt, F.W.T. Fact and Fiction. 1935, Bulaways, pp.141,153. Also see Memorias e Documentos..... 1890, Lisbon, p.169.

101. Thomans Mauriz. Reise und Lebensbeshreibung, Augsburg, 1877, p.106.

The impact of this shift in trade to the North seems to have had its greatest effect on the Manyika gold trade during the 1750's. Quite a considerable amount of trade, which used to be done at the feira of Masekesa through the Kingdoms of Barwe and Quiteve, was then centred at Sungue, a land which shared borders with all the abovementioned Kingdoms¹⁰². This trade was so remunerative that Francisco de Mello e Castro was led to suggest in his description of Rios de Sena to the Viceroy of India, in 1750, that the fortress at the feira of Masekesa, in Manyika, should be removed from there to Sungue for the security of the merchants. The trading post at Sungue was, apparently, rigidly organised. Nobody was allowed to trade by himself or through another person outside the feira on pain of a death penalty¹⁰³. It is not clearly stated whether an 'authority' who lived there was a capitão-mor or not, but there was a priest to administer sacrament and Mass.

It would seem that the desperate state of the feira of Masekesa did not last very long. The trade fortunes varied drastically from time to time. We learn from an account of a capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa, in the 'Memórias.....' that only a few years prior to the year of 1762 there used to be a flourishing trade at the feira¹⁰⁴. African traders from distant lands brought ivory, gold, wax, pearls, honey, crystal rock, probably from Maungwe, cotton, skins of different animals, cattle, which were largely exchanged for cloth, liquors, arms, powder-shot and beads which the moradores of Sena and Queliman sent through their vashambadzi. These articles

102. Castro Francisco de Mello e. 'Rios de Sena' Annaes Conselho Ultramarino. Pt. nao oficial 1867, p.115.

103. Ibid.

There is a more detailed description of the Portuguese community in Sungue, in 1767, Fr.Placido Atilando, (Religioso Dominicano) was in charge of a beautiful chapel. It was well cared for, although the curate of the parish had no stipulated salary. See 'Descrição Geral.....1767' in Memorias e Documentos....1890 p.208.

104. Anon. 'Memorias...1762' in Andrade A.A. Relacoes....p. 193. Also in Dias Carvalho L.F. Fontes para a Historia....p.222

were given to Vashambadzi on credit. The capitão-mor and his soldiers obtained much profit out of this trade, but due to injustices and extortions practised by him, together with the soldiers and their vashambadzi, on African traders from the interior, commerce declined as the latter gradually left the feira and by 1762 trade at the feira of Masekesa had reached its nadir.

In the last quarter of the 18th Century the situation had changed. There is ample evidence of trade activities at the feira of Masekesa, of merchants going from the feira to Quiteve, despite Portuguese complaints about the decline of trade. The nature of trade commodities had also changed.

The author of the 'Descrição Corográfica.....' and Manuel Galvao da Silva's travelogue concur on this. Trade was mostly carried out in such commodities of Indian origin as white glass beads, and a small quantity of blue beads, fine Indian pewter, machira, which were woven in Rios de Sena, white and coloured cotton cloths, which constituted the principal item of the East African coastal trade¹⁰⁵. Nevertheless, the zuartes and especially the dotins, which are broader lengths of cloth, sixteen metres long, had a greater sale throughout the territory of Manyika. Of almost the same popularity were the precato, sadem acanga, short cured savagagin, the cured being worn only by the royal persons and the nobility, the cured sameter being used for sacrificial ceremonies which were performed in order to appease the vadzimu¹⁰⁶. There were many types of cloth on the market of Rios de Sena, some of which, as described by Mauriz Thomans, were "coarse and bad, not fine, and of a black or dark blue

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105. Da Silva Manuel Galvão. 'Diário das Viagens.....' 1790.
Dias Carvalho L.F. Fontes para a Historia..... pp.323-324.
106. Anon. Descrição Corográfica.....Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U.
Lobato A. Evolução.....I p.69.
Lobato A. Senhorial da Zambezia. p.136.

colour"¹⁰⁷. But the Manyika, according to Galvão's information in 1790, who were used to having plentiful supplies of cloth, could judge better its quality and were able to obtain it 'in a thousand different designs and so have first pick.' The situation was different in some distant lands which were governed by Makombe of Barwe, 'where all sorts of cloths are to be found, boosted to twice the value they have in Feira.....¹⁰⁸'. In exchange for these articles, the Portuguese received gold, ivory, mattocks which were well-tempered and held in higher esteem than the ones which the Yaos went to sell at Mozambique. Copper came from Duma which was calculated to be six days' journey from the feira of Masekesa¹⁰⁹. The fact that arms and powder-shot were openly sold shortly before 1762¹¹⁰ at the feira of Masekesa in violation of a ban of 1719¹¹¹ shows that the control of the feira trade had gone out of the hands of the authorities at Sena, but the absence of these two commodities in the items listed in the Descripção Corográfica and Galvão's account suggests a greater and more effective control on the administration of the feira by the Portuguese authorities at the end of the 18th Century.

of

The method/trade, however, did not change very much. The articles were still being given to the vashambadzi/^{who}signed bonds, giving as their security themselves, the property they possessed and that which they would acquire, which very often amounted to very little or nothing¹¹².

107. Thomans Mauriz. Reise und Lebensbeshreibung. op.cit. pp.102-3.

108. Da Silva Manuel Galvão. 'Diário das Viagens.....'
Dias Carvalho L.F. Fontes para a Historia..... pp.328-30.

109. Ibid.

110. See this chapter infra.

111. Letter from Dom Luis de Menezes, Viceroy of India, to the factor of Sena, Jozé de Mello Leito 21.1.1719 Goa in Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. vol.V. p.54.

112. Castro Francisco de Mello e. 'Rios de Sena' (1750) Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino. Pt. nao official serie II 1867, p.108.

Further evidence about trade activities at the feira of Masekesa, is discernible in the complaints of the Quitevans about the introduction of a large quantity of cheap cloth in their land by merchants resident or trading at the feira of Masekesa¹¹³. The Quitevans wanted the two bans, which were passed on 12th April, 1751 and 17th August, 1758, enforced and the transgressors to be exemplarily punished. In 1780-1, Antonio Manuel de Melo e Castro, Governor of Rios, acted promptly and issued a ban to the effect that no moradores from Sena or the feira of Masekesa should trade their cloth in Quiteve, either by themselves or through their vashambadzi¹¹⁴. Quiteve was to remain exclusively reserved for the local business community in Sofala, and that even the port of Sofala was not to be used by the moradores or the merchants from the feira of Masekesa. This ban was put in public places at the feira of Masekesa. But it would seem that this ban was not effective because there were complaints about the trade routes being closed between Manyika and Quiteve during the civil wars in 1795¹¹⁵.

A similar ban was passed in the same year to deal with the unauthorised 'commissarios volantes' who secretly came to the feira of Masekesa from Sena and its environs¹¹⁶. A noticeable decline in trading activities at the feira prompted the Governor of Rios de Sena, Antonio de Mello e Castro to issue an order banning "Commissarios volantes" from staying at, or passing to and from, the feira of Masekesa under pain of imprisonment for six months and confiscation of merchandise, either on its way to or from the Manyika feira. A half of the confiscated

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113. Order issued by José de Vasconcellos de Almeida, 5.9.1780. Cxa.16. Moc. A.H.U. This was a general problem in Rios de Sena. See Letter from Francisco de Mello e Castro to the Viceroy of India, 20.11.1752 in Memórias..... E documentos...1890, Lisob. pp.241-2. Only six different kinds of commodities, known as fato de Lei, were permitted; e.g. (1) missing a (beads) (2) thick beads from Belgate, (3) calain, (4) powder shot, white clothes, raw and black, (known as chuabos or betangil, amandabas capotins and zuartes) (5) chanderes (6) tucurins from Belegate and Cambaia. Lobato A. Evolução..... Vol.1. 1957, pp.257,251.
114. Order to all Portuguese settlements in Rios de Sena dated 16.1.1781 signed by Antonio Manoel de Mello e Castro.
115. Questao da posse daterra e minas de Quiteve Pasta 6, (1842-3) Moc.A.H.U. This document contains information for the years 1808 and 1795.
116. Ban dated 22.3.1780 and signed by Antonio Manoel de Souza, Sena. Also see letter of acknowledgement by a clerk of the feira of Manyika, Joao da Cruz, dated 13.5.1780.

merchandise was to be used to defray the expenses of administration of the feira and the other half for defraying the expenses of the Church. If anyone were caught for a second time, the merchandise would be confiscated as stated above and the individual concerned would be imprisoned for a year or more. Eventually that particular "commissario volante" would lose his rights to sell goods on credit. The bans remained paper intentions, largely because there were no means of enforcement. The Portuguese were busily occupied with more urgent problems of defence and survival on the East African coast. The defence of Mombasa from 1698-1730 is a case in point¹¹⁷.

This, therefore, meant that quite a number of issues affecting Manyika-Portuguese relations had not been solved even by the second half of the 18th Century. Factors such as military weakness, lack of proper personnel at the feira, the rise of powerful individuals such as Guiao, who assumed the running of the feira into their own hands and made alliances with disgruntled provincial governors against Chikanga, desertion of soldiers from the feira to join the regulos and the Portuguese policy of by-passing Chikanga to deal with his vassals, as if they were independent potentates in their own right, brought home to Chikanga the need to control Portuguese movement, commerce, and jurisdiction over the Manyika who lived at the feira, and, eventually, to define the nature of relations between the capitão-mor and Chikanga himself. He did not expel them, a thing he could have done easily, and the fact that the Portuguese continued to trade in his lands, indicated that, by and large

117. Boxer C.R. and Azevedo, Carlos de. Fort Jesus and The Portuguese in Mombasa, 1593-1729. London, 1960, pp.59-86.

Manyika commerce was remunerative. The outcries about injustice, etc., observable in official correspondence, were probably intended to conceal the real profitable nature of Manyika trade in order to discourage demands for remittances to Moçambique or Sena. It may very well be that these complaints were made to impress the higher authorities about the enormity of the problem the capitão-mor and his subordinates were about to tackle or had already tackled.

A step to ameliorate this situation at an administrative level was taken by the Governor of Rios de Sena in 1771, when he drew up a regimento providing for sweeping reforms of the abuses which had crept into the trade of Rios de Sena as a whole¹¹⁸. There are two aspects to this regimento. The first section was intended to improve the trade situation in Manyika. A second one, appearing under the same Codice number was intended to (a) regulate trade between the feira of Zumbo and the lands of Monomotapa and (b) regulate trade between the feiras of Manyika and Zumbo. There is sufficient evidence of inter-feira trade between the feira in Manyika and the one in Zumbo¹¹⁹. This regimento was significant in several ways. It provided a chance for the trading post of Manyika and several others to be raised to a status of villa,¹²⁰ provided a basis for later regimentos; it offers a basis for comparison of

118. Codice 1332, No.50, Moc.A.H.U.

118. Ibid.

120. A villa is a borough or town. It is generally assumed that nearly all the important trading posts in Mozambique and Rios de Sena were elevated to this category on 9.5.1761. A royal charter, addressed to the then captain-general of Mozambique, Cabisto Rangel Pereira de Sa, known as 'Carta de Calisto Raugel' is the basis of this error. Calisto Raugel Pereira de Sa died before he received this charter. However, this did raise the fortress of Mozambique into a villa. As far as the other places were concerned, the text read: "in the ports and villages of Quelimane, Sena, Tette, Zumbo and Manica, Sofalla, Inhambane and the islands, the same jurisdiction is granted to erect these places into villas, provided they have the necessary pre-requisites." Evidently the discretion to erect any of these places into a villa was left to the respective regional governors. The date, 9.5.1761, applies to Mozambique only; the others are different. For example, the date for Zumbo is 27.5.1763, (according to Mario Costa) for Sofala is 20.5.1763 (A.X. Soares, Descrição da Villa de Sofalla. 1857, p.21) The trading post of Manica was never raised to the category of a villa until 1946, when the village of Macequece was called 'vila de Manica,' administered by a local Junta.

De Eca F.G. de Almeida. Historia das Guerras no Zambeza, Vol.I. Agencia Geral do Ultramar 1953, pp.383-384. For an analysis of the 'Instrucoes' for Calixto Raugel Pereira de Sa, dated 7.5.1761, see Andrade A.A. 'Um caso típico da Filosofia Política da Historia Portuguesa' in Studia 9, 1962, pp. 7-27.

salaries of different officers of the various garrisons and once again the capitão-mors of the feira of Masekesa were officially paid from the royal revenue¹²¹.

His salary was fixed at five bars¹²² of cloth (i.e. 2,000 cloths) 800 of which he paid to Chikanga, to be shared between him and Changamire. The salary of the various officers at the feira was not stated then, but, from a report by Diogo de Souza in 1780, this has been established¹²³. Besides, this regimento attempted to regulate the conduct of the capitão-mor, as many of the ills at the feira were directly attributed to a choice of capitães-mor. He was not allowed^{to} indulge in any other form of commerce besides that of the five bars of his salary. Violation of any of the clauses of the regimento was supposed to be punished in accordance with the seriousness of his offences. He was expected to execute the regimento to the letter. The capitão-mor's attitude towards African residents or itinerant merchants at the feira was not supposed to be influenced by hopes of economic benefit but rather by considerations of justice. The regimento's demands on the behaviour of the capitão-mor were quite exacting. His conduct was supposed to be exemplary towards the Africans whom he was supposed to 'civilize.' The capitão-mor was enjoined not to punish them arbitrarily, but whenever it was necessary to punish any of them, the names of the offenders, together with a list of

121. Codice 1332, No.50, Moc.A.H.U.

122. 1 bar of cloth = 400 pieces of corjas, 5 bars = 2,000 panos of 8 'hands' in length and a covado (26" in width). Each hand (2 x 22 cm.) was 44cm. and a covado was 66cm. The captain, therefore, received 2,000 panos of the above specified measurements. Cf. 400 panos he received in 1765. See 'Relacao do Pagamento da Capitania de Sena e mais Prezidios da sua Jurisdicção principiado em abril, 1765.' Cxa.11.Moc.A.H.U. For the basis of my calculations, see Boleo O. 'O Regimento para o novo Comercio de Moçambique de 1693' in Studia Revista Semestral No.3.(1959) Lisbon, p.9. Lobato A. Evolução..... op.cit. p.45.

123. Diogo de Souza, Capitão Geral. General pay for the captaincy and subordinated posts. Cxa.3.Av.Moc. A.H.U.cited in Lobato A. Evolução..... op.cit. p.67. Capitão-mor - 2,000, Captain of the Garrison - 300, Ensign - 240, Quartermaster - 188, 2 Commanders - 184, Drummer - 180, 10 soldiers - 180.

their offences were to be sent to the Governor of Rios de Sena. The conciliatory tone of the regimento clearly illustrated a lesson the Portuguese had learned hitherto, that 'without friendship and faithful dealing',¹²⁴ with the Kings of the lands, trade would be in danger and that the best way to achieve harmony was to follow the 'most legal and the most politic method.' Portuguese official policy towards potentates in S.E.Africa, as expressed in the regimento, was, thus, one of submission, probably because they believed that 'as long as the world exists, so will the Monomotapa emperors',¹²⁵. The grandeur of the Monomotapa empire was still very much alive in their minds. This is evident from the instructions which were given to the capitão-mor. The capitão-mor was instructed among other things 'to pay the greatest respect, attention, submission' to the emperor, because he was 'the legitimate sovereign whom he would serve' and was not to take into account -

...the incidental difference of colour, because all these are legitimate Kings, who are allowed by God or the power of the Conqueror or by the voice of the same God in declamation of the people.¹²⁶

Further evidence to support the fact that the regimento was one of submission, is to be seen in the instructions that -

...since the capitão-mor, as well as the garrison, are in the service of the Emperor, they are not under anybody's subordination or inspection save that of the Emperor...

124. Codice 1332, No. 50. 19.1.1771, Moc.A.H.U. op.cit.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

and "for his three months' leave" the capitão-mor "must not apply to anyone but the emperor." In addition to these instructions, arrangements were made for a "triennial tribute" to the Emperor. This consisted of velvet umbrellas, a large arm-chair, a small stool, a jar made of any metal¹²⁷.

The capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa was supposed to enter the feira with similar ceremonies and customary salutes, and to pay Chikanga the greatest submission. All capitão-mors of Manyika were supposed to declare to Chikanga that they were at the feira of Manyika to serve the "very High, the Most Powerful Sovereign, the Most Faithful King of Portugal"¹²⁸. These high-sounding epithets did nothing to cow Chikanga. He governed his Kingdom as he saw fit and took no notice of them, as will be seen later in the century. The capitão-mors were enjoined not to move with their garrison without express permission of the Kings in order to avoid suspicion. They were required to perform certain duties, which smacked of espionage. The capitão-mors were to take the greatest care to be aware of all events, movements, deliberations of the Kings, their allies and enemies and immediately communicate the information to the Governor of Rios de Sena. It was a duty of a capitão-mor to order the soldiers of the garrison to take arms every morning but only for trooping the colours as he deemed it fit, to inspect them for cleanliness, enforce discipline, arm them properly, teach them good manners and to encourage them to pray. In short the troops had to be "the best regulated and orderly in the world!" (Baltasar Pereira do Lago forgot to mention that they were, perhaps, the most irregularly paid).

127. Ibid.

These gifts signified high status, especially the 'sombreiro'(umbrella). This word was used by the Portuguese in India to designate an umbrella made from expensive material, ornamented, possessing a large shade fixed on to a thick long stick. This was held by an Indian of low caste, known as 'boi' or 'coolie'. This umbrella was a sign of nobility and was used during festivals and such occasions as weddings, baptisms or funerals for children. The Portuguese and other Europeans who considered themselves of a high social standing used similar umbrellas. See Pissurencar S.S. Panduranga. Regimentos das Fortalezas da India. Bastora Goa 1951, p.123, F. note.3.

128. Codice 1335, No.50, op.cit.

The regimento, for the first time, laid down the qualities of capitão-mors. The capitão-mors in future, were to be persons with a sense of duty, a concept of honour, not only towards the sovereign, but also towards their subjects, a quick perception, so that they could anticipate events and take precautionary measures in the interests of the state.

This reform act, to a large extent, turned out to be one of those 'repeated initiatives' from Sena or Tette which were repeatedly frustrated by the venality and incompetence of the authorities on the spot.

The high idealism manifest throughout this regimento was out of tune with the realities of the situation in the interior. The ideal gentleman of the regimento would not make a practical capitão-mor. What was needed was a real sertanejo who had multiple contacts with the Kings and the Princes of the interior.

This discussion of Manyika-Portuguese relations at the feira of Masekesa would be incomplete without a close examination of the methods used by the Chikangas during the 18th Century, to control Portuguese commercial activities in their Kingdom. They used a number of methods:-

(a) each trader or mushambadzi was expected to give the capitão-mor a piece of a sameter which the latter passed on to a territorial prince. This arrangement proved inadequate in practice. Princes, provincial governors, the Chikangas themselves and their bingas demanded more and more cloth and a refusal to comply with the requests often ended up in milandos. A milando (murandu) as the Portuguese understood it at the time is best described in Galvão's words:¹²⁹

129. da Silva Manuel Galvao. 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Dias Carvalho L.F. Fontes para a Historia..... pp.323-332. For a further discussion of milandos see Botelho, S. Xavier. Memória Estatística Sobre os Dominios Portugueses na Africa Oriental. Lisbon, 1935, pp.224-8. Gamitto defined a milando as a 'debt', an obligation contracted and not fulfilled; an offence, a theft, a homicide or any complaint or anything to argue and defend. See Gamitto A.C.P. (Trans. Ian Cunnison) King Kazembe..... Vol. I. Lisbon, 1960, Junta Investigações do Ultramar. No.42. pp.99.

Whatever crime is laid to a person's charge, or whatever lawsuit is brought against him, is called a milando, the judging of the case is called tongar and the penalty inflicted on one who loses the case is called chibinga. The Portuguese are harried by these milandos, as the slightest thing serves as a pretext for the Africans to trouble us and rob us. It would be a miracle for anyone to enter the Africans' territory and get out again without going through some milando, as this is a trick they employ for their thieving. Among some of the ridiculous milandos I witnessed, - some of which I must conceal for the sake of decency - was one I saw brought against an African who was a cook to the commander-in-chief, and for which he paid a chibinga of several pieces of cloth. This cook, who had already been there before, was a sworn friend of a Maniqueiro (Manyika) who came to visit him one day, bringing with him one of his daughters. When the cook saw her, he asked if the child was his daughter, saying how much she resembled a daughter of his own who died. This was enough to make the Maniqueiro say: 'This very girl is your daughter, and I was the sorcerer who killed her. And as she has come to life again, take care of her and give her food and clothing.' The cook was eventually condemned for having compared a living person with a dead one. So I heard told by the Negro Princess of Feira by whom the milando was tried in the house of the commander-in-chief.¹³⁰.

Milandos were common practice in Rios de Sena. This case reveals what an enormous gap of misunderstanding existed between the Manyika and the Portuguese. It was small things like the story of the above-mentioned cook, which more often than not exacerbated relations seriously.

Travellers often sparked off milandos from the Chikangas, who suspected the latter's motives. This was the case with Manuel Galvao da Silva in 1790. Galvao tried to hide his identity as a naturalist, but Chikanga somehow learned about his intentions to study the country and its fauna.

130. Galvao. 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Carvalho Dias Fontes para a Historia.... 1954, pp.323-332.

Galvao was immediately accused of spying in -

...his territory in order to stir up a war against him and cast a spell on, the mines to make gold disappear by means of a stone hammer - a tool not used in those parts, and which Chikanga had never seen or heard of in all his life. ¹³¹

Chikanga threatened that he would have a drum of war beaten at the feira and order his bingas and soldiers to discipline the Portuguese and hurl Galvão beyond the frontiers of the Manyika Kingdom, unless Galvão paid him a hundred large pieces of cloth, which were worth four gold pieces according to the current price at the feira. In his historical account of the feira, Cirne estimated that almost a third of the goods which the feirantes used to bring into the feira were spent in this way ¹³². This was the situation up to 1795-6, when Manyika-Portuguese relations took a different turn altogether.

(b) A second method by which the Chikangas controlled events at the feira of Masekesa was to appoint one of the princes to reside within the vicinity of the feira and to report regularly the events thereof. Examples of Manaca in 1790 ¹³³, the Princes Mossaza in 1795 and 1810 ¹³⁴ and Mutema in 1822 ¹³⁵, who were reported "dominating the feira" show that this was a standard practice. In some cases Chikanga put one of his wives in charge of the feira. This was the case in 1790. Chikanga's wife who styled herself princess' of that area was in charge of the feira. The fact

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131. da Silva Manuel Galvão. 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Dias L.F. de Carvalho. Fontes para a Historia, Geografia e Comercio de Moçambique. op.cit. in Anais Vol.IX. Tomo I, op.cit. pp.323-332.
de Andrade, Jeronimo José Nogueira. 'Do Estado em que ficava os negocios da Capitania de Mossambique nos fins de Novembro do anno de 1789 com alguns observacoes sobre a causa da decadencia do comercio dos Estabelecimentos Portugueses na Costa Oriental da Africa' in Arquivo das Colonias Vol.1. Coimbra 1917, pp.92-93.
132. Codice 1468 No.76, Moc.A.H.U. op.cit.
133. Galvão. 'Diário das Viagens.....' in Fontes Para a Historia..... 1954, Lisbon, p.329.
134. Letter to Constantino Pereira from Diogo Rodrigues. Cxa.57, Moc.A.H.U. 17.7.1810. Also Treaty between Inhacompunza and the Portuguese. 29.12.1795. Cxa.31 Moc.A.H.U.
135. Cxa.71, 3.10.1822. A petition signed by Ricardo da Costa Soares, provisional commandant and capitão-mor of the feira, Lourenço Manuel de Almeida, Joze Joaquim Mascarenhas, Cypriano Xavier de Sa, Andre Manuel Fernandes.

that this woman styled herself 'princess' and not 'queen' leads one to suspect whether this was not one of Chikanga's daughters. The King's wives, according to traditional Manyika practice, were never set over districts to rule, but it was, and still is, common practice to give princes and princesses some land to govern. The woman whom Galvão saw at the feira in 1790 was most likely Chikanga's daughter.

Be that as it may, she received as her due a piece of sameter, which was small to start with but grew in size in time. Every one entering the feira de Manica had to pay this. A similar practice prevailed in Quiteve at the feira of Bandire, where an inhamasango (head of the village) decided milandos and empofias which arose in his mining region¹³⁶. Chikanga's method of delegating authority to his sons and daughters to supervise the administration of the feira were later copied, perfected and practised by the greatest and most well-known prazo holder in the Zambezi during the 19th Century, Manuel Antonio de Souza¹³⁷.

(c) A third method was cultural. Chikanga used to keep the feirantes under his eye by demanding that, if they did not want the feira to be closed, they should attend the King's marriage, funeral and coronation ceremonies¹³⁸. They were, like his sons and provincial governors scattered throughout the Kingdom, expected to bring presents on such occasions to give to the King's bingas, inhamais (pages) and other court officials. Quite often these

136. Baptista J. Renato. Caminho de Ferro da Beira a Manica, Excursões e estudos efectuados em 1891, sob a direcção do capitão de engenharia. Lisboa Imprensa Nacional (1892) p.14.

137. Excerpto do 'Relatorio de uma Viagem as terras do Changamire'. in Memória e Documentos acerca dos Direitos de Portugal aos territorios de Machona, E Nyassa 1890, Lisboa Imprensa Nacional p.513. Continho Joao Azevedo. Relatorio official da Campanha do Barve em 1902. Lisboa, 1904, pp.16-17.

138. Descripção Corográfica do Reino da Minica, seus Custumes e Leis. Anon. Cxa.17, Moc.A.H.U. Excerpts of this appear in Lobato A. Evolucao..... op.cit. pp.61-70. Lobato A. Colonização Senhorial da Zambezia. Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Lisboa 1962, pp.127-137.

methods of controlling Portuguese trade and movement were resented by the capitão-mor and other feirantes as insults.

(d) An effort to challenge Chikanga's decisions rightly or wrongly raised the question of jurisdiction over Manyika subjects who lived within the territorial jurisdiction of the feira de Manica. This again gave rise to milandos. Manyika Kings and princes refused 'that any Manyika' should be imprisoned without their express orders to that effect. The capitão-mor, however, could imprison some Manyika within the feira, who had offended or violated the laws of the feira, provided a payment of eight pieces of cloth was made to a Prince, in whose land the offender lived¹³⁹. Prince Mutangatua's decision in 1780 is a case in point¹⁴⁰. When a certain Portuguese was accusing another of plotting to shoot him with an arrow, it was agreed that some Manyika, presumably one who formed part of this gossip, should be forced to give evidence. Prince Mutangatua refused, giving as his reason that no authorities could imprison a person in his land without first paying the 'customary eight pieces of cloth.'

A milando case which best illustrates the problem of jurisdiction was one made against Lionardo da Silveira Monteiro, otherwise known by his African name Samba, who owned much land including the prazo of Gorongoza¹⁴¹. He committed a milando against a Manyika, and a son of Chikanga, whose name

139. Letter from João de Almeida to Manoel de Mello e Castro 3.3.1781. Cxa.18. Moc. A.H.U.

140. Ibid.

141. Letter from Luis Felix to the Governor 26.7.1794 Cxa.31, Moc.A.H.U. Letter from the Governor to Custodio de Almeida Braganca, capitão-mor of the feira of Manica, 26.7.1794 Cxa.31.Moc.A.H.U. Encl.28.7.1794. Ibid.

was Mweza, threatened to confiscate the fazenda of the capitão-mor and to stop all trade at the feira of Masekesa. This episode is worth relating in detail because of the light it throws on the complicated way in which a milando was processed, including duration and the number of people involved. It is related that a Manyika, who lived in the lands of Mweza, Chikanga's son, wanted to 'steal' a woman and take her 'violently'. A certain Monteiro was around when this happened. He 'punched' this Manyika several times. It is not clear whether this was an act of sympathy for the woman, or that they fought over her. This reads like one of those complex Portuguese promiscuous sexual relations which led to a closure of the feira of Bandire, when one of the moradores committed adultery with one of the Queens¹⁴², or the case of Jozé Gomes Monteiro¹⁴³, a sargento-mor of the villa of Sena, who was banished to the feira de Manica for a similar reason.

Be that as it may, a milando was made against the captain of the infantry, who promised that within four months Monteiro would be brought before Chikanga for trial. At the end of four months, King Chikanga sent regulo Marazua to remind the captain of the infantry that the period of time that they had agreed on had expired. In the meantime, Marazua captured two cows belonging to a mushambadzi of a Swahili trader at the feira of Masekesa and sent one to Chikanga. Chikanga demanded that both the cows and Monteiro should be delivered to him. Fearing the consequences, the inhabitants of the feira discussed the problem seriously and agreed that since they had no alternative the capitão-mor should meet Chikanga's

142. Baptista J. Renato. Caminho de Ferro da Beira.....1891. op.cit. p.14.
 Botelho S. Xavier. Memória Estatística..... op.cit.p.163

143 'Diário da Viagem de Moçambique para os Rios de Sena, Feita pelo Governador dos mesmos Rios' in Documentos para a Historia das Colonias Portuguezes. Lisboa. Imprensa Nacional 1889. Estudos Colonias Vol.III. p.19.

demands in two days' time for the sake of the feirantes and the vashambadzi¹⁴⁴.

The arrangement, which never worked, concerning the settlement of the milandos, was that the capitao-mor would decide all milando cases brought against the Portuguese or Manyika who lived within Portuguese jurisdiction at the feira, and Chikanga would decide all milando cases which were brought against the Manyika¹⁴⁵. But the decisions reached by the capitao-mor were of no avail, because the Manyika could always appeal to Chikanga "who passes judgement as he sees fit and by right of having the stronger hand!"¹⁴⁶.

It should not be assumed precipitately that Chikanga settled milando cases in favour of his subjects, regardless of justice. There is an example to illustrate Chikanga's high notion of justice. A Manyika, who worked for Joaquim de Moraes, had a milando against another who worked for Antonio José da Costa e Almeida¹⁴⁷. This African, who might have been either a Barwist or a Manyika, made a request to both the regulos on the trade route, Chikanga and Makombe, that they should confiscate the cloth of the Muzungos on their way to Manyika. It is related that both Kings refused to do this after the case had been investigated by the manamucates. Hence it would be an act of partisanship to cast a slur on Chikanga's idea of justice.

144. Letter from Luis Felix to the Governor, 26.7.1794, Cxa.31. Moc.A.H.U. Encl.28.8.1794.

145. da Silva, 'Diario das Viagens.....' in Dias, Carvelho, Fontes para a Historia....., 1954, p.330

146. Ibid.

147. Letter from Fernandes do Rozário to the Governor, 19.8.1795. Cxa.31. Moc.A.H.U.

Some of these milandos were engineered by Portuguese traders in their attempts to outshine one another commercially. This is suggested, for instance, by the case of Antonio Jose da Costa e Almeida. The capitão-mor ordered Almeida's African servant to be imprisoned for some offence at the feira¹⁴⁸ but Almeida immediately protested, set his slave free in defiance of the capitão-mor's orders and hurled an avalanche of insults at the captain and obstructed him from executing his duties. Almeida took the law into his own hands and, together with all his slaves, the 'prisoner' not excluded, challenged Moraes to come out of his house. A fierce battle of words took place and the scene was dragged on to the house of an adjudante, who ordered that Almeida should be fined. This demonstrates two aspects of the Manyika-Portuguese contact. First the Portuguese accepted the institution of milando and some of them tried to manipulate it to further their own commercial interests. Secondly, this unveils before us the type of personal concern which a master had for his mushambadzi. This will be even more evident as we go further into this period.

The problem of milandos lingered on up to the end of the 19th Century, when an attempt was made by the Portuguese Government to codify them¹⁴⁹. Ignorance of Manyika customs, and a resentment of the capitão-mor and his moradores at the feira of Masekesa to Chikanga's attempts to regulate Portuguese commerce in his Kingdom and Portuguese jurisdiction over his subjects at the feira, brought about milandos and the concomitant complaints

148. Ibid

149. Revista de Manica e Sofala. Publicação Mensal. Ilustrada. ed. José da Graça Santos. Lisboa, 1904. Vols. I-VI.

about Chikanga's allegedly hostile commercial policy.

There is another aspect of Manyika-Portuguese contact to be discussed before I discuss the changed situation in 1796 and after. This relates to the commercial policy of a Chikanga, who styled himself Goiera III, during the 1780's and early 1790's. It is impossible to determine his reign accurately, but it would seem that he was King from the 1780's to 1795.

The depth of Portuguese resentment to Goiera III's methods of controlling Portuguese trade and movement in his Kingdom was shown by the fact that there was not a single morador¹⁵⁰, except one merchant, at the feira of Manica¹⁵¹. The capitão-mor was so in name. Goiera III was, perhaps, one of the few extremely shrewd Kings that ever ruled the Kingdom of Manyika. He was so abstemious that, although he was the owner of the mines in Manyika, he did not indulge in extravagant royal pageantry, neither did he value Portuguese cruzados¹⁵². If he wanted a capitão-mor to send him a gift, he sent him first a dogado, and when he wanted to display great kindness, he used to send the capitão-mor two cows. He valued cows more than gold and if this type of gift were not reciprocated 'ten times' he conveyed his dissatisfaction and blamed the capitão-mor as a method of asking for more presents. He taxed his people only when he needed corn, but even then, very moderately¹⁵³. This is well-known statecraft, whereby Kings and princes

150. Mappa dos Moradores dos Rios de Sena. Villa Capital Tette, 3.6.1782. Cxa.19. Moc.A.H.U. Drawn by Antonio Manoel de Mello e Castro.

151. The 'Descrição Corográfica.....' puts the number of merchants at 3 or 4. Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U. This is clearly demonstrated by Map S., in the Appendix.

152. 'Descrição Corográfica.....' op.cit.

153. Ibid.

exact tribute from the villages according to the wealth of the village in cattle, goats and agricultural produce. It is some form of redistributive taxation. The philosophy behind this is that the villagers cannot be pressed too hard because they can flee to the other Kingdom where they will strengthen the forces of the enemy.

Goiera's subjects were reasonably comfortable and contented during the last quarter of the 18th Century¹⁵⁴. Vices such as 'ambition,' 'avarice,' 'thievish propensities,' which the author of the 'Descripcao' ignorantly attributed to African monarchs in general, were noticeably absent in Goiera III¹⁵⁵. His laws, which were firm and just, earned him unquestionable obedience from his subjects. The tranquility which reigned in his Kingdom, and the generally high standard of living enjoyed by his subjects, accounted for a large population, both indigenous and foreign, in his Kingdom.

The tradition of controlling the foreigners' activities was extended to the mines, especially those of precious stones and gold. The author of the 'Descripcao Corografica.....' thought that the reason for this was that African traditional doctors had advised the King that the mining of gold on a great scale would end the King's life¹⁵⁶. This seems to me to be a metaphorical way of warning the King that, if he allowed foreigners to dig for gold on a large scale, their rivalries would incite civil wars, which would engulf his kingdom and consequently destroy it. As a result of this, any Manyika who discovered a mine was supposed to report to the King. Failure to do this or divulgence of the information to Portuguese traders resulted in confiscation of the property, wife and children of the individual concerned¹⁵⁷. It was a common practice of any Manyika who found

154. Ibid

155. Ibid

156. Ibid

157. Ibid

a piece of gold to wrap it in a piece of white cloth and to ask a traditional doctor or 'magician' to put it on the grave of his vadzimu, who were responsible for the general fertility of the land and prosperity of the clan. Again we see the same fear shaping the King's policy towards his subjects with regard to gold mining and owning of mines. If individuals were allowed the right to own or operate mines, they would in time acquire power derived from trade and the King would not be able to maintain his rights over the land against the ordinary village headmen. Some of these headmen, with their lineages, would amass a great number of 'voluntary' or mercenary armies and challenge the King's authority. One would like to think that this was the basic objection to individuals operating gold mines outside the King's control.

Chikanga's ban on gold exploitation was not as rigid as the author of the Descripçãõ..... pointed out. There is an example of a silver mine which was discovered in 1780 in Chitenga¹⁵⁸. The silver mine referred to closed, mainly because there was very little silver and secondly, because Manyika miners sold the silver at the same price as gold, irrespective of its intrinsic value. Portuguese traders resented this and the Africans closed the mines in that area on their own, and not because of Chikanga's orders.

The Manyika Kings needed no magician to convince them about the evils of the 'open door policy'. They had seen the empire of Quiteve disappear as a result of the merchants who promoted civil wars among the Quitevan princes.

Another reason, which shows that the ban on mining was not rigid, but was made perhaps to be invoked as and when the situation justified it, is the great number of bares which existed in Manyika

during the 18th Century.

In conclusion, it must be said that the Portuguese refusal to accept the Chikanga's methods of controlling trade activities in their Kingdom, the Chikangas' assertion of their sovereignty over Manyika subjects who lived within the feira precincts, contributed significantly to the misunderstanding between the Manyika and the Portuguese communities.

The Chikangas' methods of controlling Portuguese itinerant trade were judiciously moderate. The author of the 'Descripcao Corografica.....' went so far as to characterize Chikanga III as an exception among African monarchs of his time. Manyika-Portuguese relations, for a greater part of the 18th Century were determined largely by the Chikangas' policies of moderation and Portuguese inclination to self-pity. The Portuguese attitude did not pay adequate attention to both diplomatic niceties with African Kings and their own institutional organisation. The African potentates in most cases demanded no more than an ordinary piece of cloth.

Francisco de Mello e Castro observed that the profit which the Portuguese merchants made after all the payments and presents had been made to African Kings was quite considerable and more than amply compensated for whatever inconvenience they might have undergone en route to the feiras. It was easy to satisfy the demands of African Kings. The Portuguese of the 18th Century, as an able historian of this period has observed, 'were not looked upon with inveterate hostility'¹⁵⁹. And the fact that they remained in Manyika and Rios de Sena in general despite complaints, is proof

159. Newitt M.D.D. (Trans.) 'Xavier's Account of the East Coast of Africa' in 'The History of Central African Peoples.' Proceedings of the 17th conference, Lusaka, 1963, p.15.

positive that they had made their peace with the land. Numerous incidents have demonstrated how ignorantly defiant the Portuguese were to Manyika rulers.

A careful study of this period has also revealed the administrative inadequacies at the feira of Masekesa and other feiras in Makaranga. In the majority of cases the garrisons consisted of no more than the officials; the arms and ammunitions were incapacitated by climate through carelessness; powdershot and bullets were perpetually in short supply¹⁶⁰; subordinates could by-pass the capitão-mor and communicate with the governor¹⁶¹; a proper procedure of appointing an officer quite often gave way to subversions¹⁶² and the soldiers at the feira were generally reported as 'a riotous, mischievous, dangerous gang.' They went without salary for two or more years¹⁶³. A military readiness of this type was not calculated to command respect from the Chikangas, much less resist them if the latter thought of expelling the Portuguese. The Portuguese, therefore, traded in the Kingdom of Manyika, indeed in other Kingdoms such as Makaranga, Quiteve and Barwe, because the Kings of these regions wanted them to do so. The incidents which took place between the Portuguese and the Manyika Kings occurred because the Portuguese did not bother to study, observe and respect Manyika customs; neither were they able to adapt themselves nor choose their trade technique, nor cope with the situation created by their own diplomatic and organisational ineptitude.

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160. 'Letter from Francisco de Mello e Castro to the King, 20.11.1753' in Memorias e Documentos..... 1890 Lisbon, p.171. Also see appendix for the late 18th Century situation.
161. Representation of Captain Manuel Martins to the Governor. Manica 2/1796. Cxa.18. Moc.A.H.U. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrão to the Governor of Rios de Sena 2/1796. Cxa 18. Moc. A.H.U.
162. Ibid.
163. Letter from the Commandant of the feira of Manyika to the capitão-mor. No.5. 24.12.1804. Cxa.46. Moc.A.H.U. See Letter No.6 written by a clerk, Manuel Martins Palma, 24.8.1804, Cxa.46. Moc.A.H.U. Letter No. 7, dated 24.8.1804. Letter No.9 dated 11.3.1805.

C H A P T E R IV.MANYIKA-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS 1795-1822.The Era of the Civil Wars and Increased Portuguese Intervention.

This is a period of increased Portuguese intervention in Manyika politics. It consists of five distinct phases, including the reign of Inhacompunza, who was styled provisional King, July 1795 to March 1796; the reign of Inharugue, 1796-1807; the reign of Inhagope, 1808-1813; the reign of Inhamutota, 1813-1818 and Inharugue's second reign, 1818-1822.

This period, as the short lengths of the reigns would imply, was characterized by succession wars and these wars made it possible for the Portuguese to intervene in Manyika political developments. In the first phase the succession wars were between Inharugue and Inhacompunza. Inhacompunza established himself as provisional King with Portuguese support. In the second phase, the struggle was between Inharugue on the one hand and Inhagope and Inhamutota on the other. These two princes relied on Portuguese military support too. But a rupture developed between the Inhagope-Inhamutota alliance with the Portuguese, when the latter tried to play a double game by supporting both sides. Inhagope and Inhamutota made the Portuguese trade under very restrictive conditions. The Inhagope-Inhamutota alliance came to an end when the latter, who was regarded by the former as a junior partner, tried to exercise effective control of the feira of Masekesa and the surrounding region. Inhamutota was expelled by Inhagope. Inhamutota came back in 1813 and regained control of the feira with the help of the Quitevans. He had to fight both Inharugue and Inhagope separately. Inharugue emerged supreme in this tripartite struggle for the Kingship of Manyika. He reigned in Manyika for the second time, from 1818 probably to 1838.

The policies of these Kings, except that of Inhacompuza, shared one thing in common, and that was an attempt to exercise their sovereignty effectively over the Portuguese, who traded in Manyika. But in every case each one of them had to modify his policies to suit the realities of the succession wars. They all received Portuguese military support. This was the course of events from 1795 to 1822.

The frequent changes of Kings brought about a new situation, and the dynamics of this new situation were very closely linked with trade and control of the feira. For Manyika princes, he who controlled the capital also controlled trade and the entire economy, tribute, presents, favours, honour and glory. This meant war as each one of the princes tried to assume the reins of power. The Portuguese found themselves caught up and exposed to the forces of Manyika politics. The new situation also underscored the very important nature of the feira, which ultimately determined, in the period from 1818 to 1838, the succession among the Manyika princes. None of them could gain control of the situation without Portuguese support and Portuguese support was determined solely by their motives to run the feira trade unfettered. Various traders supported different princes in the new situation, the vashambadzi acquired a new importance as people who knew not only the country well but also the customs and politics of their own people. They were part of the social milieu. They could give advice to their masters, and manoeuvre politics to promote their own trade. This newly-increased importance of the vashambadzi was also derived from the fact that they took fazendas to their princes, sons and brothers, who governed the lands where they obtained gold. They used to give a prince and his newanji (deputy) a piece of cloth for any news the latter gave them. This custom is mentioned in a 19th Century document as an old one and certainly

seems to have been widely practised in the confused and terrible succession wars of the late 18th Century. This then was the nature of the new circumstances created by the frequent changes of Kings between 1795 and 1822. The politics of this period will be reviewed under the policies of the individual Kings.

1. THE REIGN OF KING INHACOMPUNZA:

Inhacompunza's policy toward the Portuguese is a striking contrast to that of his predecessors in the mid 18th Century, who dictated the terms under which the Portuguese could trade. Inhacompunza wanted to impress the Portuguese that, with him as King, the era of the millenium would dawn in Manyika. His policy, which was deliberately designed to earn him a quick diplomatic recognition and military support in order to discomfort his rivals, succeeded in its main objectives.

Custódio Manuel Lopes, commandant of Manyika, reported the death of Chikanga on 11th July, 1795¹. A succession struggle immediately developed between Inharugue and his elder brothers, in particular Inhacompunza. There is ample evidence in a report of 31st Marca to suggest that the first phase of the succession struggle between Inhacompunza and Inharugue, whom the Manyika regarded as a legitimate heir to the throne, continued for at least another eight months². It is in this context of rivalry that the policy of

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1. Letter from Custódio Manuel Lopes to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 11.7.1795. Cxa.30. Moc.A.H.U. In most cases a commandant was a professional officer, whereas a capitão-mor was very often a civilian and a trader at the same time.
 2. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrão to the Governor of Rios de Sena. Manica, 31.3.1796. Cxa.32.Moc.A.H.U.

Inhacompunza must be viewed. He declared himself King and sent a delegation, headed by a macango³, with presents to the capitão-mor. The presents included a dogado⁴ for the Governor of Rios de Sena and an ox which was to be slaughtered and the meat distributed among the Portuguese residents at the feira as a sign of peace, which Inhacompunza and his party pledged⁵. The macango asked the capitão-mor to pay binzo to Changamire in order to facilitate the 'election' of a new King. It is doubtful whether the delegation gained anything more than goodwill because the capitão-mor, whose name has not been identified, was already very ill⁶ and soon died⁷.

The Portuguese did not respond immediately because they were preoccupied with administrative internal reforms. The first phase of their reform scheme was initiated at the beginning of 1795⁸ when Chikanga was still alive. The Portuguese had come to realise that the decline of trade at the feira was not entirely due to Chikanga's restrictions, but also to two other factors; the credit system and the institution of mushambadzi. The vashambadzi introduced a multiplicity of cheap cloths at the feira. This resulted in a devaluation of prices.

This state of affairs compelled the Governor of Rios de Sena to issue a ban to the effect that the merchants must declare the quality and quantity of their fazendas at the feira, the merchandise coming from or going to the feira of Masekesa, the names of senders and recipients. In

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3. A macango represented the departed spirit. (Masango - lit. bushes).
 4. Xavier Botelho in his Memória Estatística..... p.189 says that a dogado was equivalent to 6 oitavas of gold, i.e. 4 maticals.
 5. Letter from Lopes to the Governor of Manica, 9.5.1796. Cxa.31, Moc.A.H.U.
 6. Letter from Lopes to the Governor, 9.5.1796. Cxa.31. Moc.A.H.U.
 7. Letter from Custodio José da Lacerda, provisional commandant, to the Governor of Rios de Sena. 17.8.1795. Cxa.30. Moc.A.H.U.
 8. Letter from João de Souza de Brito to Diogo de Souza 28.2.1795. Cxa.33. Moc.A.H.U.

order to enforce this ban, the governor of Rios de Sena instructed the commandant of the villa of Sena to prohibit merchants to pass or send their vashambadzi with trade commodities to the feira of Masekesa without licence.

The reaction of the moradores to this ban was quite sharp. They protested and pointed out that the majority of them at the feira did not own vashambadzi; even the few merchants who owned vashambadzi generally counted on them to return. The feirantes attributed the decline of trade to the activities of the vashambadzi from Sena, whom they scornfully referred to as 'legitimate transgressors of commerce, who were scattered throughout the interior'. The impact of this ban as a reform edict was a limited one because none of the feirantes knew the places the vashambadzi frequented, the prices for which they sold their merchandise and the people with whom they dealt. The African vashambadzi, as the feirantes correctly pointed out, could not be expected to obey the ban which operated at the feira of Masekesa, issued by a governor whose existence they probably had never heard about.

The Portuguese realised that internal administrative reforms, which were not accompanied by an improvement in Manyika-Portuguese relations, would be futile. Also a realisation that Chikanga, who was then very old and decrepit, would soon die, influenced the Portuguese at the feira to draw up far-reaching proposals in 1795⁹. These proposals were intended to achieve three objectives; to form a basis of Manyika-Portuguese relations

9. The merchants' memorandum, 5.7.1795. Signed by the following: Manoel da Silva Gonçalves, Custodio de Araujo Braganca, Felizardo Joaquim Tales de Moraes Bragança, João Felix de Carvalho, Joaquim de Moraes Rega Lisboa, Manoel Ribeiro dos Santos, José da Trindade e Almeida, Antonio Caetano Vaz, José Gomes Monteiro, Antonio Jozé da Costa e Almeida, Pedro Antonio de Araujo.

with Chikanga's heir and successor; to bring pressure to bear on Changamire to intervene in Manyika-Portuguese trading conflicts, and should both aims fail, to avoid the disaster of the civil wars which they predicted would follow Chikanga's death.

The merchants, therefore, unanimously agreed that, in order to extort concessions from Chikanga, they should abandon the feira of Masekesa and revive that of Aruangua, and, that to make this feira of Aruangua prosperous, they should compel Manyika traders to go there by prohibiting vashambadzi to take commodities into the interior. This action, they believed, would humiliate Chikanga and render him more flexible in his dealings with the Portuguese. Changamire too, so the logic went, would realise that the change of the feira of Masekesa to Aruangua was due to his indifference to the merchants' requests. A fear that Chikanga, who was aware that the Portuguese merchants had sent envoys to Changamire, would make reprisals, made the Portuguese more determined to move to Aruangua. This was the mood of the Portuguese when Chikanga died in July, 1795 and Inhacompunza assumed the ship of state.

The Portuguese did not have to put much pressure on the provisional King, Inhacompunza, because, as pointed out earlier, he needed Portuguese diplomatic, as well as military support¹⁰. He, therefore, established contact with the Portuguese without delay. Inhacompunza's policy towards the Portuguese was very accommodating, as his reactions to Portuguese diplomatic offensive will demonstrate.

10. See beginning of this chapter.

The Portuguese acted aggressively in order to take advantage of the disturbed political situation in Manyika during the eight months that Inhacompunza was provisional King. The governor of Rios de Sena appointed Francisco Henrique Ferrão capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa¹¹. He had instructions to deliver to whoever was King of Manyika after the death of Chikanga. Ferrao was instructed to go to Aruangua and report his presence to the bingas and manamucates through the wives of the late Chikanga or any suitable intermediary. His message from the Governor was that there should be an increase of commercial activities in Manyika. The governor ordered him not to take sides with any of the pretenders to the Manyika throne. Instead, he was to follow the nature of the disputes and study the parties involved in the succession struggle. This policy of neutrality was a child of practical experience, which had shown that it was easy to recognise an established ruler or retreat from the feira whenever it was expedient to do so. Ferrão was instructed to accomplish all the above-mentioned diplomatic niceties before the winter came, because of a housing shortage at Aruangua. He finally arrived at Aruangua on 30th December, 1795. The newly-appointed provisional capitão-mor communicated with Inhacompunza through a junior macango and manamucate who had come directly from Inhacompunza's court. The manamucate assured him that the disorders, which used to take place at the feira during the reign of the late Chikanga, had come to an end. He attributed these disorders to the fact that the late King was very old and, therefore, ineffective as a ruler; the princes disobeyed him, neither did they report to him the milando cases

11. Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena to the commandant of the feira of Manica, Francisco Henrique Ferrão, 26.11.1795. Cxa.31.Moc.A.H.U.

which used to take place in the remote regions of his Kingdom. Inhacompunza promised protection to the muzungos who traded or intended to trade in his lands.

Francisco Henrique Ferrão occupied the feira of Masekesa as capitão-mor amidst great ceremonial fanfare. He called all the feirantes and warned them against creating disorders and difficulties. The manamucates and the macango, together with several highly-ranked councillors, turned up, bringing with them a dogado which the provisional King, Inhacompunza, had sent, as well as two tusks of ivory and a cow, which the Nebinga and the mucaranga of the late King had sent to the capitão-mor. The presents were delivered by a macango who afterwards carefully explained that this was a social visit but he did not forget to ask for cloths which he saw there. The capitão-mor enumerated the complaints of the merchants and publicly delivered the Governor's message concerning freedom of trade in the interior, at the feira and at the bares. It was also stated that the capitão-mor should settle all milando cases; he would again decide what was useful for the safety of the feira. If these conditions were not fulfilled, the capitão-mor threatened that the Portuguese would abandon the feira of Masekesa and warned Inhacompunza that if all the Portuguese merchants departed from the feira there would be no trade in Manyika. He further pointed out that a new feira would be established at Aruangua. These threats proved effective. This is evident from the fact that one of Inhacompunza's princes, Mossaza, who was then in charge of the feira region in 1795, took his samuranda to Inhacompunza's binga to be tried, probably for resisting Portuguese incursions into his territory. Mossaza left his sister in charge of his zimbabwe, and the surrounding area, during his absence to Inhacompunza's court¹².

12. Cópia do termo da embaixada que deu Masango, Manamucate do Rey interino, Incompunza, sobre que se faz o commandante Francisco Henrique Ferrão por Ordcm do Ill^{mo}. Sr. Governador dos Rios de Sena. Manica, 29.12.1795. Cxa. 31.Moc.A.H.U. Signed by the following: Diogo Rodrigues, Francisco Henrique

The provisional King Inhacompunza signed and ratified the above-stated terms¹³. He produced a cow on behalf of the vazimos as a signature to the agreement. Ferrão pressed his advantage further and demanded a copper bracelet instead of a cow so that his successors would see it long after the treaty had been concluded. The ambit of this treaty was extended to cover the problems of passage through Barwe. As in Manyika, there was a succession question to be settled after the death of Gange, the late King of Barwe. The Portuguese exploited this situation to secure freedom of passage to the feira of Masekesa, which they had newly reoccupied. It was not enough to re-establish the feira. A trade route from Sena had to be guaranteed before Ferrão's diplomatic victory over Inhacompunza could bear fruit. An opportunity to do so was provided by Sazua, King-elect of Barwe, who, following an old practice established by his predecessors, had invited the Portuguese to confirm his coronation¹⁴. The Portuguese, who had been bitterly complaining about the supposedly predatory activities of Bondo, King Makombe's brother-in-law, seized this opportunity and made a series of demands, centred round the security of passage to the feira of Masekesa. The Governor of Rios de Sena sent specific instructions to the commandant of the villa of Sena, Custódio de Araujo Bragança, to take to Sazua, King-elect of Barwe. The Portuguese envoys were instructed not to convey the Aguada Manga (water of confirmation) until (a) a

12.(contd.)

Ferrão, Fr.Vincent de Sá, Jozé Banino e Silva, Francisco da Silva Bragança, Francisco Antonio de Menezes, Daniel de Souza Salvador Fernandes, Luis Felix, Jozé Gomes Monteiro, Domingos Caetano do Rosario, Caetano Correa, Manuel Baptista.

13. Ibid.

14. Cópia do termo do Rey de Barwe, 2.2.1795, Cxa.31. Moc.A.H.U. Signed by Diogo Villosos, an interpreter, Daniel Xavier de Remédios, ambassador, Joaquim da Costa. Signature of new Makombe was represented by a manila of copper.

'good passage' and traffic of merchants to and from Manyika was guaranteed; (b) Bondo, Nebira and Inhabere, who were allegedly responsible for the thefts committed on Portuguese merchants en route to Masekesa, had their villages destroyed; (c) Sazua was not to ask for any annual binzo from the capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa, neither would he expect any presents from the merchants of Manyika. The binzo and presents would be paid from the royal treasury.

Thus the Portuguese had their lucky star in the ascendancy in having two Kings, one in Barwe and another in Manyika, who were forced by internal political circumstances to adopt policies of appeasement in 1795. Inhacomunza's reign came to an end in March 1796. His reign was dull. It lacked the lustre which characterised the reigns of his predecessors and those who came after him. He granted the Portuguese every privilege, which the late Chikanga had denied them. This encouraged the Portuguese, as the subsequent account will show, to intervene more and more in Manyika local politics.

2. INHARUGUE'S REIGN:

The nature of the struggle between Inhacomunza and Inharugue is not known, except that the latter faced considerable opposition when he came to the throne in March, 1796, and for quite some time after that he remained insecure -

...because all his brothers, who are aspirants to the throne, go about causing disorder in the land, some seeking to kill him and others to wage war against him; nevertheless, nothing is certain.

As for the feira, it was 'without safety'.¹⁵ Inharugue's foreign policy aimed

15. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrão to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 9.6.1796. Cxa.33. Moc.A.H.U.

to keep the Portuguese out of Manyika politics as much as possible. He sought to exclude the Portuguese by asking Manyika princes to make alliances with him. It was only after this had failed that he asked for help from the Portuguese. Occasionally he invoked the name of Changamire, as suggested above in a previous context, mainly as a bogey¹⁶. It is possible moreover, that he might have wanted the Portuguese to realise that he did not have to depend on their support to secure himself on the throne. He wanted the Portuguese to believe that in case of extreme necessity he could rely on help from the emperor Changamire. This is a mere conjecture, but if this were the case then why did he not invoke the name of Changamire during his second term as King? This flexibility in Inharugue's foreign policy can be explained by the fact that he felt threatened. The Manyika who menaced the feira were not those who lived within it. The seriousness of this danger is shown by the fact that the Manyika had stopped working in the mines and the movement of people from one region to another was very much restricted. Indeed, to judge from Ferrão's report in 1796, there was no movement at all because the regulos were in a turbulent mood. Trade at the feira, as well as in the interior, had come to a standstill.

The diminished volume of trade at the feira was also due to a confusion of prices. For example, a trader by the name of Francisco Antonio de Menezes revealed to the capitão-mor that he knew of some feirantes who used to sell a piece of dotin or zuarde for three maticals, and others, two dogados for the same piece of cloth. The scale and extent of this clandestine trade is not known but it would be reasonable to assume that it was considerable.

16. See Chapter III infra.

The critical nature of the situation in which Inharugue found himself was emphasized by Francisco Henrique Ferrão when he said -

....as for the new King, he has sent some to say that he is ready to fulfil all that is discussed with him according to the instructions of Your Excellence, but because of the terror he could not carry it out since it was still unsafe,in truth he has shown his good faith, ordered the regulos that they should pay their debts to the merchants. Already he has sent some one to demand binzo but I have not yet paid him because the supply of cloths is exhausted...¹⁷.

Ferrao estimated that two bars in addition to his salary would meet Inharugue's demands. Between 21st September and 9th October, 1796, Inharugue fought two Manyika princes, Mazarica and Manaca, who are described in the document as 'conspirators' against their legitimate King¹⁸. He was only able to keep them at bay but he wanted to throw both of them out of his land and destroy their villages. In order to achieve this end he ordered two regulos, Mutungatua Chirombe, Marase and an inhamai (page) from his court to approach another prince, Musaza. These three together formed the King's delegation to the Portuguese commandant at the feira of Masekesa, to deliver Inharugue's call for military help. The muzungos, with their armed slaves, were to march together with the above-mentioned princes against the princes Mazarica and Manaca. Inharugue sought the help of two other princes whose names are not mentioned, but are described by the provisional capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa as 'thieves' about whom the Portuguese merchants continually complained. These two princes had occupied the region between

17. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrão to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 9.6.1796. Cxa 33. Moc.A.H.U.

18. Letter from Ferrao to the Governor, 21.9.1796. Cxa.33 Moc.A.H.U.

Barwe and Manyika, the region, as mentioned before, through which Portuguese traders passed to the feira of Masekesa. The two princes refused to join Inharugue in his campaign against Mazarica and Manaca, whereupon he tried to force them to join the battle on his side by threatening that if they continued to refuse to offer him help he would be compelled to destroy them with military aid from the Kingdom of Maungwe and one of the regions, Saruchera, in the Kingdom of Manyika. He put the responsibility for whatever damage resulted from this war squarely on their shoulders. Inharugue was able to concentrate on the war, largely because his relations with King Makoni of Maungwe were cordial¹⁹. The feirantes gathered together to discuss the advantages of sending Inharugue the military help which he had requested. They decided to throw in their lot with Inharugue. An ensign and a commandant of the feira, together with other officials, including Ignacio Francisco Pinto, capitão-mor of the terras da coroa at the villa of Quelimane, Domingos Caetano do Rozário, Luis Felix de Sá, an adjutant of the auxilliary army, marched at dawn at the head of a large army of armed 'slaves' to join the King's army in the lands of Prince Mutungatua Chirombe. The merchants of the villa of Sena, who would undoubtedly have benefitted from Inharugue's victory, 'supplied ammunitions, gun powder and armament'²⁰. The two princes, whose names are not mentioned, and who, it would seem were loath to see the country plunged into civil wars, were probably finally cudgelled to join the expedition against their will and much to the detriment of the Kingdom of Manyika. It would seem that the expedition accomplished its purpose and

19. Abraham D.P. 'The Principality of Maungwe' in NADA No.28. 1951, p.67

20. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrão to the Governor, 21.9.1796.

burnt the villages of Manaca and Marazica as well as the villages of those who had joined the 'rebels'. Ferrão maliciously commented that he was "happy that the two princes were destroyed by a method that they had known well"²¹. It seems that the civil wars continued for some years. In 1798, twenty-one soldiers were reported to have been sent to reinforce the garrison of the feira of Masekesa, because Chikanga incessantly asked for help "as a friend and ally of the state"²². It was also hoped that more soldiers would be available from Moçambique, especially because news had arrived of peace between France and Portugal²³.

Another report further indicates that the wars continued after 1798. The capitão-mor of the feira of Manyika, who was still Francisco Henrique Ferrão, reported at the end of 1801 that he was not yet able to send back the eleven soldiers who had come from Sena because King Chikanga had told him that some Manyika intended to attack him again²⁴. A year later Chikanga sent envoys to Sena to ask for help²⁵. According to an earlier letter in 1801, the wars in Manyika seem to have been a conflict between several parties in which two Kings, Makoni of Maungwe and Svosve of Mbire, were involved²⁶. In the following years the King of Manyika is mentioned only occasionally. Probably attempts were made to hurry to his assistance in one or two expeditions from Sena, but it is not certain whether any of these expeditions arrived in Manyika at all. In a document,

21. Ibid.

22. Letter from Francisco José de Lacerda e Almeida to Francisco Guedes de Carvalho Menezes da Costa, 30.6.1798. Cxa.35. Moc.A.H.U.

23. Ibid.

24. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrão to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 12.12.1801. Cxa.37. Moc.A.H.U.

25. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrão to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 9.12.1802. Cxa.39. Moc.A.H.U.

26. Letter from Ferrão to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 15.9.1801, Manica. Cxa.37. Moc.A.H.U.

the bottom end of which is badly damaged, Antonio da Costa Almeida was appointed commandant of the wars to help Chikanga, "our ally and friend of the state, against others, also powerful, who seek to exclude him from the throne"²⁷. This document refers to two other expeditions, one sent by the Governor of Rios de Sena, Filipe de Carvalho, in 1803 and again in 1807 by Governor Antonio Noberto de Barboza Villas Boas Truão, who ordered much money to be "spent on arming the slaves, buying firearms and fazenda for the safety of Manyika." It is unnecessary to point out that these Portuguese actions represented a marked change from the policy of neutrality so piously propounded in 1795. Portuguese efforts to prop up Inharugue as King of Manyika in 1807 did not succeed. He was ousted by Inhagope. It is very easy to conclude, on the basis of the war accounts, that the diminished volume of trade during Inharugue's reign was solely due to the succession wars, that all the Portuguese had to do was to support Inharugue militarily and extort trade concessions afterwards.

An incident which took place between Dr. Francisco Joze de Lacerda e Almeida and the colonel of Manica, Jerônimo Pereira, in 1797²⁸ strongly suggests that the problem of confusion of prices was a continuing one and also that the relations between Sena and the feira administration in Manyika were strained. Highlighting the nature of this twin problem, Almeida wrote -

.....the colonel of Manica, Jerônimo Pereira, who passes for the most respectable man at Sena, proved himself a knave, not only by taking exorbitant prices for this cloth but also by supplying this primary necessity in cafre travel of so wretched a quality that it is well nigh useless..... I resolved to punish the knavery of Jeronymo Pereira by directing the factor of Sena to take from his warehouse the best cloth, to be repaid in kind from Moçambique. I also warned him that he himself should be at the expenses of sending back his vile stuffs to Tete.

27. Cxa.55. Moc.A.H.U. 1811.

28. Burton R. Trans. Lacerda's Journey to the Lands of Cazembe in 1798. London 1873. p.56. A report which Lacerda made about Jerônimo Pereira's behaviour was lost, together with two other papers, a map and a second diary.

In another context Lacerda calls the colonel of the militia of Manyika, mad. The above-cited indictment of the Colonel of the Manyika militia must be viewed cautiously. Lacerda wrote this when he was annoyed because his journey to Muata Cazembe had been delayed by the Governor-General of Moçambique²⁹. The documents about the state of relations between Sena and Manyika feira are scanty but it has been suggested that Jerônimo Pereira was also an enemy of Lacerda. Pereira had been aspiring to be a governor of Rios de Sena when Lacerda was appointed. He was again disappointed when the latter was charged with responsibility to lead an expedition to Cazembe. Both posts had economic advantages. The governorship of Rios de Sena would enable him to monopolise the trade of the captaincy and its dependents. However, the Governor-General of Moçambique eventually appointed Jeronymo Pereira to succeed Lacerda as Governor of Rios de Sena in 1797³⁰.

Another instance which vividly illustrates the strained relations between Sena and the Manyika feira is the attitude of the Sena officials. They regarded Manyika as a dumping ground for degradados. This was the case when José Gomes Monteiro, a sergeant of the militia of Sena, was punished for insubordination and his amorous escapades³¹. His love affair with a wife of one of the local potentates caused great bitterness and threatened the peace and security of the fortress of Sena. He was accordingly sent to the feira of Masekesa in Manyika. Monteiro, against the Governor's express orders,

29. Alberto Manuel Simões. 'Dr.Lacerda e Almeida. A sua Biografia e para a Historia da sua Viagem ao Cazembe' in Moçambique. Documentário Trimestral, No.63. 1950. pp.89-123. Also see September 1926 publication of Bol.da Gencia Geral das Colonias, No.15.

30. Alberto Manuel Simões. 'Dr.Lacerda.....' In Moçambique, 63.1950,op.cit.

31. 'Documentos para a Historia das Colônias Portuguezas. Diário da Viagem de Moçambique para os Rios de Senna Feito pelo Governador dos Mesmos Rios, Dr.Francisco Jozé de Lacerda e Almeida' 30.10.1797. in Estudos Colônias. Vol.III.1889. Imprensa Nacional. Lisbon.pp.19-20. Jozé Gomes Monteiro once held the post of capitao-mor of Manica in 1795 and also played a leading role in the negotiations of the treaty of 1795 with Makombe of Barwe. Merchants' memorandum, 5.7.1795. Cxa.31.Moc.A.H.U. Treaty between Makombe and Portuguese, 29.12.1795. Cxa.31 Moc.A.H.U.

secretly left the feira to meet his mistress when he knew that her husband had gone to Moçambique. Finally, when this was known, the Governor ordered the capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa, who had been there for three years, to arrest Monteiro and send him back to Sena. But the capitão-mor ignored the order. On his arrival at Sena, Lacerda was told everything by Monteiro's wife and a priest. In the end Monteiro was sent to Zumbo and not to Manyika, as this would antagonise Makombe, King of Barwe, through whose lands the merchants had to pass.

A third instance which proves that Sena was out of step with the administration in the interior is an instance connected with one Joao Manuel, who had won Makombe to his side by presents³².

The authorities at Sena had to spend money on presents to buy the friendship and goodwill of Makombe in order to secure a free passage to Manyika.

These three episodes sufficiently demonstrate that the relations between Sena and the administration at the feira of Masekesa were far from satisfactory. The latent antagonism which expressed itself in several ways in 1797 must have influenced the attitude of the feirantes towards a ban which the Governor of Rios de Sena issued concerning the prevailing prices and credit system³³. This was an attempt to rectify the confusion of prices and introduction of cheap quality cloths at the feira. The feirantes protested against the ban on economic grounds. The ban raised technical problems. For example, the commodities had already been given on credit at

32. 'Documentos para a Historia das Colônias Portuguezas. Diário da Viagem.....' in Estudos Colônias. Vol.III, 1889, pp.19-20.

33. Petition to the Governor of Rios de Sena, signed by Joze da Lacerda and several merchants 3.8.1795 Cxa.30. Moc.A.H.U.

the current prices when the ban was issued. Some Manyika vashambadzi refused to pay for them at the altered price which would give them less profit, others did not even return to their creditors when they heard about the ban and its insistence on registration of the fazenda and operation of the old prices at the feira. They started business with the Portuguese on the prazos. This was indeed a strong case for continuing the credit system.

The ban was not carried out because it was soon realised that the feirantes lost more than they gained by it. For example, it would have abolished the only method of trading to which the feirantes were accustomed - the credit system; it would have ruined the merchants of Sena who depended on Manyika trade and lastly, there was no machinery to enforce the ban. It is clear then, that the diminished volume of trade which Ferrão ascribed to the 'turbulent regulos'³⁴ and the wars that followed should be examined in the wider context of feira administration and its relations with Sena. The maladministration of the feira was past reform as abortive attempts to improve the situation in 1796 have shown.

As far as Inharugue's foreign policy was concerned, it is significant to note that, despite the military support he received from the Portuguese, he tried to restrict their activities. This is clearly demonstrated by his relations with Francisco Henrique Ferrão, capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa in 1796³⁵. Whenever Ferrao wanted to punish defaulting Manyika vashambadzi he

34. See the early part of the Chapter

35. Letter from Francisco Henrique Ferrao to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 7.10.1796. Cxa.33, Moc.A.H.U.

was required to appeal to Inharugue first. This arrangement involved a lot of expenses for the cost of apprehending the defaulters. Also, wherever this took place, the revenue of the owners of the vashambadzi was greatly prejudiced. It was not easy for Francisco Henrique Ferrão to punish Manyika vashambadzi despite the fact that very often Inharugue depended on Portuguese support.

Francisco Henrique Ferrão's complaints, although undoubtedly biased, help to illustrate the intricate nature of Manyika-Portuguese relations during Inharugue's reign. In 1796, Francisco Henrique Ferrão requested Inharugue's bingas to arrest some Manyika debtors. The King and his bingas first agreed to do this, but after some time gave an order that the debtors should not be arrested. The capitão-mor and the creditors agreed to bury the hatchet. A few days after that, the King sent word to the capitão-mor to say that in future he should not commission him to recover the merchants' debts from the Manyika who had defaulted. It was a matter between the debtor and the creditor and he did not want to have to summon his council to settle such matters, trivial no doubt, for a King. This episode led Francisco Henrique Ferrão to conclude rather hastily that not much credence could be put on Inharugue's word, because he said one thing "this hour and another the next"³⁶. This, he alleged, was typical of Inharugue's predecessors who, when they were given cloths, said one thing, only to deny it when the stock of cloths had been exhausted. In other words his unfortunate experience was that "nos cafres não há palavra senão em quanto dura a conveniência." This is, however, a typical case of a capitão-mor making up excuses for not communicating to the Governor what Inharugue had said. Ferrão unabashedly says that he did not

36. Ibid.

tell the Governor everything that the King had said, because then there would be two contradictory statements in one day³⁷. It was such misunderstandings that often led to complaints by the Portuguese, and to severe measures by Chikanga.

There are several examples to show that the capitão-mors, particularly Francisco Henrique Ferrão, were equally guilty of double dealings in which they did not scruple to tell lies. A milando case of 1805³⁸ demonstrates two points; the arrogant attitude of Manoel Martins, Ferrão's successor as capitão-mor, to the envoys of the King Inharugue and the administrative confusion that prevailed at the feira of Masekesa.

Capitão-mor, Manoel Martins, delayed for a month at the feira of Aruangua on his way to Sena. One day regulo Baza, accompanied by an inhamai and many bingas, entered the feira and began to pemberar (dance) on the verandah, whereupon capitão-mor, Manoel Martins, summoned all the feirantes to listen to the reasons for this milando demonstration. The inhamai, in measured tones, answered that the delegation had been sent by the King, Chikanga, to say that Baza had been expelled, presumably from the feira vicinity. The reason for his expulsion was that the capitão-mor had reported to Chikanga that Baza had confiscated six mutores which were the binzo for Chikanga. Baza and the inhamai asked the capitão-mor before all the feirantes as to when he had confiscated the cloths. The capitão-mor denied that he had sent such a message to the King, Chikanga. In other words, King Inharugue was telling a lie. He committed another milando by

37. Ibid.

38. Letter to the Governor of Rios de Sena, signed by Manoel Francisco do Rozário, Pedro Paulo, Antonio Benedito Gracias, Joaquim Pires. Aruangua, 18.5.1805. Cxa.45. Moc.A.H.U

implying that the King had told an untruth, and the inhamai ordered Baza to pemberar again. The capitão-mor was accused of trying to bring bad blood between Chikanga and his governor. The envoys demanded a cow, but the capitão-mor insolently told them that they could eat cow dung. This brought more protestations. The inhamai and his bingas were finally persuaded to put up for the night and a piece of capotin cloth was given to them. They refused and insisted on having a cow for meat. Pedro Antonio de Araujo was sent to fetch a cow from the captain's danga (kraal). This was the end of the milando. One could quote other such cases, but this sufficiently demonstrates how ignorant the Portuguese were of Manyika customs. They treated the King's envoys cavalierly and openly declared Inharugue a liar. Inharugue, unlike his predecessor, played real politics with the Portuguese. He tried, under very trying circumstances, to uphold his sovereignty. But the realist in him occasionally compelled him to seek Portuguese help. In the next reign, Inharugue's policy of circumscribing Portuguese commercial activities was further developed.

3. THE REIGN OF INHAGOPE: HIS STRUGGLE WITH INHARUGUE AND LATER WITH INHAMUTOTA (1807-1813).

Portuguese intervention further increased during the first few years of Inhagope's reign. But this was soon checked. In their struggle for the crown, Inharugue was supported by the Portuguese, but Inhagope was supported by the Quitevans. Inhagope, supported by the princes, Inhamutota and Mossaza, occupied the feira of Masekesa and the surrounding region, while Inharugue was holding the binga (royal court) and contiguous areas. Inharugue made desperate efforts to dislodge his rivals from the feira, but failed. Inhagope did not himself live at the feira. He lived in Doe, that is N. West of Manyika. He put Inhamutota in charge of the feira. The latter, in turn,

put prince Mossaza in charge of the feira. This was intended to be a mere administrative arrangement. The overall authority lay with Inhagope. But, as we shall see, this created problems.

As in the case of Inharugue and Inhacompunza, the actual circumstances under which Inhagope assumed power are unknown. In his letter of January, 1808 to the Governor of Rios de Sena, Pedro Antonio de Araujo informed the Governor that, on his arrival in Manyika, he had audience with Inhagope, "who took possession of the palace with the help of the Quitevans last year. On the 26th of last month" Araujo continues, "the King, Inhagope, invaded Inharugue's palace, but was repulsed"³⁹. Apparently some of the Manyika, plus his Quitevan supporters, were responsible for this attack. It is not clearly stated as to when Inhagope actually dethroned Inharugue, but it was possibly between January, 1808 and 30th October, 1809 because there is a report dated 30th October, 1809 which mentions an 'expelled' and a 'present' King. The former was possibly Inharugue and the latter, Inhagope. The expelled King was reported to be in binga, that is the royal court. Evidently the term expelled is used in relation to the control of the feira, which was under Inhagope's control, "in the region of the Bungis, the people who, in this Kingdom, dispose of the greatest forces"⁴⁰. The records of this period are silent about the activities of Inharugue, who was then living at the 'binga' (royal court) 'the legitimate place where the Kings lived', and Inhagope, who lived in Doe⁴¹. The fact that Inharugue was able to keep Inhagope and his supporters away from the palace strongly suggests that he must have been fairly

39. Letter from Pedro Antonio de Araujo to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 7.1.1808. Cxa.50.Moc.A.H.U. At that time the capitão-mor had asked for 20 soldiers but could not get them because Truao had been defeated by Monomotapa, at Chicova in October, 1807.

40. Cxa.51. 30.11.1809.

41. Doe is a name of a hill, which according to a map in Baptista, J. Renato, Caminho de Ferro de Beira.....is situated about 35 Kilometres N.W, of Masekesa.

popular with the majority of the Manyika people who helped him regain control of the feira of Masekesa eight years later. The Portuguese referred to Inhagope as King, but in fact it would seem that Inharugue was still the recognised King of Manyika, despite his loss of control of the feira to Inhagope-Inhamutota alliance.

Portuguese policy during this period was ambivalent. The capitão-mor, Pedro de Araujo, supported both parties, Manyika seems to have been divided into two main parties during this armed conflict. The word 'expulso' is to be regarded as a polemic exaggeration. Neither party, it seems, was so powerful as to expel the other. This may explain why the capitão-mor decided to take a chance and intrigue with both parties. His successor, Diogo Luis Rodrigues, was fined 100 panos by Inhagope in return for 'continuity of commerce'⁴². The relations between Inhagope and the Portuguese were strained in 1810 because it is said that he and prince Inhamutota 'plotted' against the Portuguese in that year⁴³. Inhamutota accused the capitão-mor of giving aid to Inharugue. He claimed that he received the information from his samuzinda (adjutant), prince Mossaza, who was then in charge of the feira. The details of this case need not detain us but the fact is that even when it was realised that the capitão-mor had no choice under the circumstances he was still asked to pay $4\frac{1}{2}$ gonos⁴⁴ of pure gold on the pretext that this was his credential, as provisional capitão-mor, to King Inhagope. Prince Inhamutota vaguely assured the capitão-mor about 'facilities' which he would extend to the feirantes and the vashambadzi⁴⁵. It is interesting to note that although

42. Letter from Diogo Luis Rodrigues to Constantino Pereira de Azevedo, 17.7.1810.

43. Ibid.

44. $4\frac{1}{2}$ gonos = 2,250 reis (1 gono = 500 reis, i.e. $\frac{1}{4}$ of an oitava).

45. Letter from Diogo Luis Rodrigues to Constantino Pereira de Azevedo, 17.7.1810. Cxa.58. Moc.A.H.U.

Inhagope was theoretically in possession of the feira region, effective control had passed into the hands of Inhamutota and prince Mossaza. The pretensions of Inhamutota eventually led to a quarrel between him and Inhagope. This is mentioned by the capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa, Rodrigues, in his letter to the Governor of Rios de Sena. It would seem that Inhamutota was expelled from the feira region, and probably from Manyika, between 1810 and 1813. He made an attempt to recapture the feira, but was repulsed by King Inhagope and fled to ^{the}lands of Tanga⁴⁶ in Barwe. There were rumours that he wanted to settle in Barwe. According to a report, which unfortunately is partially illegible, the situation developed relatively slowly. First of all the Portuguese tried to assist King Inhagope, but Inhamutota was probably supported by the Quitevans⁴⁷. It was reported that a massacre took place in the land of Chavave. The King, having received news of this, sent his princes and bingas to ask for military help from the Portuguese. The capitão-mor sent a lieutenant of the militia, Francisco Roiz, and his companion, Francisco Royne Tavor, at the head of a contingent of 56 soldiers to co-operate with King Inhagope's army. An encounter took place between the Portuguese contingent and a 'manga' (group), of the enemy in which four of the enemy were killed and several were wounded⁴⁸. Typically of war reports, we are not told the number of casualties on the Portuguese side.

However, the army of Inhagope and the Portuguese jointly scored a partial success and returned to their respective domiciles. Then some

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46. Letter from José Luis Rodrigues to Constantino Pedro de Azevedo, Bumba 15.11.1813. Cxa.57. Moc.A.H.U.
 47. The King of Manyika is probably Inhagope, although there is no name mentioned.
 48. Letter from José Luis Rodrigues to Constantino Pedro de Azevedo, Bumba 15.11.1813. Cxa.57. Moc.A.H.U.

princes started negotiating with the enemy, according to the soldiers' report. The capitão-mor, therefore, decided to send back the contingent to the feira to forestall any intrigues and maintain the King in power. The King's princes and his bingas supposedly importuned the capitão-mor for military support and at the same time advised him to retreat to Vumba without delay. An order was issued by the capitão-mor to the effect that every inhabitant must leave for Vumba at once. The supply of gunpowder left did not allow any further delay. It is reported that, in the confusion and haste that followed, the inhabitants left behind their cloths, household utensils, jewels and ornaments. They advanced towards Vumba destroying everything before them, "continuing their war of depopulation of the Kingdom" of Chikanga⁴⁹.

As in all wars, the significance of this war in material terms is difficult to assess accurately. The property and lives of people lost will probably never be known, but the estimate of Portuguese losses, given by the capitão-mor was 100 pastas⁵⁰ excluding what was spent on trying to make alliances with 'other Kings' either for direct help or in order to gain their neutrality. The capitão-mor himself spent 30 pastas⁵¹ from his own pocket. In another report⁵², it was estimated that the war cost more than 1,000 cruzados and as much as 230 panos. It is in the same document that Portuguese policy to warring Manyika princes was clearly stated. The capitão-mor was to be neutral and recognise and sustain the victorious party.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. As feitas que auido na terra da Manica. This is a report to the Governor-General of Moçambique, Rios de Sena and Sofala, Contantino Pereira de Azevedo, from Marcos Caetano de Abrio e Menezes, 10.11.1813. Cxa. 57 Moc. A.H.U.

Another result of the war was that the feira was changed to Vumba, where the capitão-mor spent some cloths on saguates to the King and princes of the Kingdom. The feira of Manyika was reported extinct and the entire Kingdom was declared unsafe.

It is significant that Portuguese nostalgic attachment to the feira of Masekesa, where they had conducted their business for more than a century, manifested itself in such utterances as 'the feira of Manica is very important..... we ought to preserve it'. Comparison was made with the mines of America and the feira was declared the best in the captaincy of Rios de Sena⁵³.

4. THE REIGN OF INHAMUTOTA:

After the Portuguese had withdrawn to Vumba in 1813, Inhamutota tried to get in touch with them from the feira, which was then under his control as the following report shows:

After our removal to this place, Prince Nhamutota sent me two ambassadors with a matical as soon as he had arrived at the feira. They requested me to return to the feira or, at least, to send some people to guard the houses; Nhamutota made war only on the King, his relatives, which had nothing to do with the muzungos. I answered that I could not discuss the problem without having talked to the King of Bumba, because I was staying in his territory.⁵⁴

Two princes, probably supporters of Inhamutota and "others who are of the party"⁵⁵ waged war against the Portuguese in Vumba. Capitão Trexaunt intervened and brought about a settlement concerning several issues of trade,

53. Ibid.

54. Letter from Joze Luis Rodrigues to Constantino Pereira de Azevedo, Bumba, 15.11.1813. Cxa.57. Moc.A.H.U.

55. The other party probably means princes who defected from Inhagope to Inhamutota.

and a milando, which Prince Chiconde, a grandee of Prince Inhamutota, had made against the Portuguese⁵⁶. Apart from the fact that Inhamutota feared a return of the capitão-mor, Pedro Xavier Velasco, who, at the time Inhamutota occupied the feira, was already on his way to Sena⁵⁷.

Inhamutota asked the Portuguese authorities at Sena to attend his coronation and bring with them "agua de manga"⁵⁸. Two moradores, Colonel of the militia, lieutenant Francisco, an ensign, Barboza, and the "late" captain of the militia, José de Souza," who recommended that as many people, and probably soldiers, as possible should attend, were nominated to attend the coronation ceremony⁵⁹. The documents are silent about Inhamutota's reign and how he eventually lost control of the feira to Inharugue. It is possible that the five years of Inhamutota's reign were taken up by negotiations with the Portuguese. As noted earlier, Inhamutota himself initiated the dialogue about the feira as soon as he came to power in 1813. In 1818, negotiations between the authorities at Sena and Inhamutota about the feira were abandoned.

Here again we notice that, whenever there were no wars, Manyika Kings put into effect their policy of controlling trade as well as the movements of the Portuguese. We are not told what issues were involved here but it appears that the Portuguese were given conditions on which they could return to the feira. It also appears that they conducted secret negotiations with Inharugue, who was at his binga.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid. In 1816, Velasco tried to go to Manyika again. It is not certain whether or not he was successful. The soldiers, however, who had escorted him, returned to Sena on 20.9.1816 without any results. Cxa.60. Moc. A.H.U. 23.9.1816.

58. Water of confirmation. For the origin and significance of this practice see Gamitto, A.C.P. 'Successão e Acclamação dos Reis do Barwe, Memória sobre um sistema para as colônias Portuguesas' in Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, parte não oficial, Serie 1.Lisbon 1867. There is an English translation of this in Vonsicard, H.NADA. No.31.1954.

59. As Feitas que a vido na terra da Manica. Report from Marcos Caetano de Abrão e Menezes to the G.G. of Moçambique and Rios de Sena, Constantino Pereira de Azevedo, 10.12.1813. Cxa.57. A.H.U.

On the 18th July, 1818, a Portuguese expeditionary force set out for Manyika accompanied by the manamucates of Barwe and Bundo's son⁶⁰. Bundo was a regulo of Manyika, who should not be confused with Bundo of Barwe. The expedition advanced very slowly and was still at Sungue⁶¹, near the Manyika-Barwe border, on 22.10.1818. There are no specified reasons for this delay but the political situation in Manyika seems to be the reason for it. There exists a letter, dated 18.10.1818, that is three months after the departure of the expedition, in which the commandant at the villa of Sena, Ferrão, informed the Governor that:

...the King of Manica, Inharugue, sent his ambassadors to this villa to let me know that he took control of all the parts of his Kingdom and that he had expelled his rival, Inhamutota or Bundalo.

Inharugue also sent a present of 3 dogados, that is 2 ounces and 2 oitavas of pure gold⁶², and wanted in exchange for this, cloths and sundry items⁶³.

It seems to me very probable that Inhamutota or Bundalo is to be identified with Bundo, whose 'son' accompanied the expedition in July, 1818. They seem, at first, to have negotiated with the wrong party. This could also be the cause of the delay.

In November, 1818, the feira was set up, not at Masekesa but at Aruangua, and by 1819 the Portuguese were on good terms with Inharugue, King

60. Cxa. 61. Sena 26. 1818. Moc.A.H.U.

61. Ibid. This place is probably the Muzinda Sungue or Prazo Gorongoza.

62. See Lobato, A. Evolução..... op.cit. p.65.

63. Cxa.61. Sena, 18.10.1818.

of Manyika⁶⁴. The same Inharugue, who was mentioned in 1796, who was expelled in 1807 by Inhagope and who had to fight his several rivals until 1818, is very probably the same Chikanga who was mentioned in 1801 and 1802 without further names.

5. SECOND REIGN OF INHARUGUE:

It is interesting to note that this Inharugue, in about 1822, is called 'Mutaca' for the first time. Mutasa is a dynastic title by which the Kings of Manyika were and are known. Still in 1822 Inharugue had to fight against Bundo⁶⁵, his nephew, a claimant to the throne of Manyika, who up to then was doing all he could to see that he came to the throne. Nevertheless, due to lack of help and especially that of cloths, he had not been able to get help from any of the neighbouring regulos. The result was that he was very desperate. He began attacking traders who were on their way to the feira and seized whatever he could lay his hands on, provided it belonged to the Portuguese, and burnt villages. This is understandable. The Portuguese, according to his logic were the real enemies of the Kingdom and Inharugue was nothing short of a traitor.

Bundo's activities were not entirely in vain. Trade at the feira became unprofitable as a result of his activities. He limited his attacks to the feira, the seat of Portuguese economic power - power which they used in the game of King-making. It was reported that commerce elsewhere was normal, mainly because Bundo had no supporters with whom to co-ordinate his activities. It would appear that the Manyika people were tired of wars and

64. Cxa. 64. 21.10.1819.

65. Letter to the Governor of Rios de Sena from Thomas Francisco Trexaunt, 10.8.1822. Manica, Cxa.65. Moc. A.H.U. Cxa.71. Aruangua, 19.3.1822. On the war reports see a letter Ibid. dated 2.2.1822 and on the famine, Ibid. 4.10.1831.

were longing for peace. However, Bundo did obtain some support from some Barwists. The net result of the wars and predatory activities of the various frustrated princes was a great famine which occurred towards the end of 1822⁶⁶.

Until the year 1833, there are no further reports on dynastic conflicts. In 1831, 'Rei Mutaca' is mentioned but there were also complaints that some of the princes did not obey the King⁶⁷. It is not certain whether or not this disobedience signified further conflicts. According to a report⁶⁸, this King died before October, 1838. The policies of Inhargue and the Portuguese deserve a careful examination during the conflicts. The dynastic wars which took place between 1796-1818 and the sporadic fights which took place after that determined the foreign policy of Inharugue and the Portuguese alike.

Inharugue paid great attention to the Portuguese⁶⁹. He permitted them to exploit the mines, a thing they could not do during the 18th Century, encouraged his subjects to trade at the feira and "up to now (1822) it does not appear that there are any complaints." There is a striking contrast with the situation during the 18th Century. The merchants complained a lot, but the Manyika needed no encouragement from the King to trade at the feira as was the case in 1820. The only complaint the capitão-mor had was about "the continuous requests for cloths for the muzimo" (midzimu). But Inharugue

66. Ibid.

67. Maco 23. Manica 4.10.1831.

68. Cod.1473. f.250v.

69. Instructions to the commandant from the capitão-mor, circa 1822. This document must be dated to about 1822, because it refers to Prince Mutema as the one in charge of the feira. From other documents, we know that he was there in 1822. Otherwise the document exists in a wrong place, Maco 14, Moc.A.H.U., and the date is torn off. The document contains a lot of useful information.

carefully explained the necessity of doing this. Visitors had to offer cloths to Manyika midzimu to ensure that all the mines would produce a lot of gold⁷⁰. The midzimu were and are responsible for the nation's prosperity and tranquility, and for the fertility of the land. The demands for cloth were so incessant that the capitão-mor eventually, but erroneously, concluded that: "Africans are persuaded that the whites always have cloths, that their supply never ends and because of this they ask"⁷¹. In spite of all this, the capitão-mor was quite happy with Inharugue and reported that he had not received a single complaint from either the African or 'Moorish' traders or their vashambadzi since he arrived at the feira. For the prosperity of Portuguese commerce in Manyika, he recommended that Inharugue should be maintained in power⁷², first, because he regarded the 'Portuguese as his brothers' since they gave him help and secondly, he regarded the Manyika princes, his kinsmen, as enemies because they waged war against him⁷³. From 1796 to 1820 the Portuguese referred to Inharugue as a friend of the state, as an ally on two occasions, and once as a brother. It would perhaps be too much to describe him as a proto-Chombe of the 18th and early 19th Centuries, but his sycophantic propensities towards the Portuguese can not be explained purely in terms of his military weakness and the support he expected from them. I think he was lacking in patriotism. He was a clever King, but not a wise one. However, later events prove that he learned from his mistakes and made some half-hearted efforts to revive the traditional spirit of resistance to foreign encroachments.

70. Letter from Francisco Trexaunt to the Governor, 27.3.1820. Cxa.65.
Moc.A.H.U.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

Portuguese policy between 1813-1822 was pragmatic. The Portuguese had learned from bitter experience of the danger of flirting with one prince this moment and another the next.

They avoided any dealings with Bundo during the reign of Inharugue⁷⁴. Bundo, probably at the end of 1822, was a spent force, dejected and a fugitive, together with his father-in-law, his sons and various other princes in the Kingdom of Quiteve⁷⁵. The Portuguese had learned that any cloth spent on Bundo would be used to finance wars to destroy the feira as had happened in the past; they had also learned that the King of Manyika had spies throughout his Kingdom, who would report any dealings between the Portuguese and any of his enemies. Their policy of supporting different princes from time to time was expensive, especially when it is realised that the benefit they got from one prince was the same as that from the other. It was these considerations which helped formulate Portuguese policy towards Inharugue. The authorities at Sena took great care to instruct their commandant in 1820 to observe a policy of 'neutrality' between the warring parties because "they are kinsmen"⁷⁶. He was also instructed to observe the customary diplomatic etiquette, by announcing his arrival and establishing a dialogue between him and an inhamai, a massango with his council, one or two princes and the King's binga, whether it be the ordinary binga or one of the Chicundas (princes). This commandant was also to pay attention to the Kingdom of Barwe and Prince Mutema, who was then in charge of the feira. The instruction ran as follows:

74. Instructions from Sena to the Commandant at the feira 1822, Cxa. 65, Moc. A.H.U.

75. Ibid.

..... you ought to see Prince Mutema who lives in that feira, and ask him for a piece of munco (white gold extracted from a mine of white quartz - see Galvao) which is worth a piece of zuarite and he ought to give you a cow from Machona. The piece of Munco comes from the muzimo of the feira, Inhabinga..⁷⁷.

The King's ambassadorial mission was expected to bring from the King a small gift, a gesture which the commandant was expected to reciprocate. However, on an occasion like this, one Prince Mabota, described as "a poor wretch," generally turned up and, in all likelihood brought nothing, but it was essential to give him a piece of cloth, because the Portuguese got timber and bamboo from his land⁷⁸. It was highly recommended that he should enquire of the King's health and he was to maintain the lie that he came from Goa. The belief of most Kings in this region, if Portuguese sources are to be trusted, was that the Governor lived in Goa and only the officials lived at Sena or the feira. Inharugue was to be told that the capitão-mor would not return to the feira unless the wars between him and Bundo came to an end. Even then, Inharugue was to write to the Governor to ask for the capitão-mor to return, and the Governor would stipulate the conditions to be fulfilled before the capitão-mor returned.

In the 1820's trade at the feira of Masekesa was particularly profitable to the vashambadzi, but not for capitães-mor. The capitães-mor were, as it were, sandwiched among rival princes who needed cloths to finance their wars⁷⁹. The King's ambassadorial missions to the feira were generally big and frequent. Inevitably the capitães-mors' expenses became considerable.

77. Ibid

78. Ibid.

79. As feitas que avido na terra da Manica.....
op.cit.

Inharugue's policy between 3.10.1822 and 30.11.1822 was one of self-assertion. He was still dependent on Portuguese support, no doubt because the Portuguese, even at this stage, still referred to him as 'our ally', but his attempt to take possession of the feira underlines a feeling of recovery of confidence and independent action. He sent his inhamai, Musipa Chemucence as a masango, Prince Conzuma as his personal representative and Prince Mutema of the feira, to tell the commandant and the Portuguese businessmen that the the King had taken over the feira of Manyika⁸⁰. The reason for this resistance is not clear. The chances are that this was done in order to win over support from his rival, Bundo. Inharugue had no doubt in his mind that his policy of dependence on the Portuguese was anathema to most Manyika. He was probably, all along, looking for a chance to escape from it and the lull of the early twenties deceived him. But it was significant that for the first time since 1818, Inharugue felt confident enough to remind the Portuguese, despite protestations of 'brotherhood', that it was he who determined where the Portuguese could trade in his land. This independent policy was short-lived.

The threats of a war by Prince Bundo, sometime in 1822, account for the somersault that took place in Inharugue's foreign policy. It is possible that the Portuguese, who had come to regard the threats of war by Bundo as Damocles' sword hanging over the head of Inharugue, manufactured rumours in order to restrain him from further independent action.

However, after what was termed 'protracted negotiations' between the bingas and the Portuguese, Inharugue reassured them that they could go and

80. Terms of Possession 3.10.1822, Aruangua, signed by; Antonio de Araujo Bragança, Lourenço Manuel de Almeida, who acted as a clerk, CXA.71. Moc. A.H.U.

settle at the feira of Masekesa. It seems that towards the end of these 'protracted negotiations'⁸¹, Inharugue's inhamai and the bingas were imploring the Portuguese to go and settle at the feira, probably to forestall its invasion by Bundo, and when they were reminded about the destruction of the houses and property which took place in 1813, they responded that it was Bundo and not Inharugue who did so. As far as Inharugue was concerned, it was up to them to make up their minds whether or not they wanted to return to Masekesa. He was quite prepared even to donate an alternative site in his land.

The preceding discussion has shown that the feira of Masekesa was a very important institution from the last decade of the 18th Century onwards. Rival princes fought for control of the feira in order to get Portuguese support which was considered essential to maintain oneself in power. Princes were appointed to control and limit Portuguese commercial activities at the feira. This was undoubtedly prompted by elements of patriotism and jealousy about their sovereignty.

The discussion has also shown that Portuguese policy of neutrality often gave way to that of expediency. The niceties of legitimacy were thrown overboard.

Thirdly, the discussion has demonstrated that Inharugue depended on Portuguese support for his safety on the throne, and also that, whenever he felt secure, he tried to resist Portuguese pressure for greater freedom at the feira, and that only threats of war or an actual act of war from his rival, Bundo, forced him to fall back on the Portuguese for military support.

81. Letter to the Governor, signed by Lourenço Manoel de Almeida, Ricardo da Costa Soares, provisional capitão-mor and commandant, José Joaquim da Silva, Felix Mascarenhas, Cypriano Xavier de Sá, André Manoel Fernandes, 20.11.1822. Cxa.71. Moc.A.H.U.

C H A P T E R V.

MANYIKA-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS 1822-1835.

A marked shift in Manyika foreign policy can be discerned during the second quarter of the 19th Century. In contradistinction to the practices of the Chikangas of the late 18th Century and early 19th Century, the Chikangas became more and more assertive between 1822 and 1835. Bondo, who had been largely responsible for the instability of Manyika foreign policy, became less and less important as a factor in Manyika-Portuguese relations. There is only one case of appeal to the Portuguese for military help, and that was when the feira of Masekesa was attacked by the Ngoni in 1833. Nothing seems to have materialised. This is a pointer to the fact that the Chikangas were aware that the Ngoni had no quarrel with them. They were seeking Portuguese wealth in the form of cattle at the feira. The Ngoni impact has often been accused of a destruction of Portuguese interests in Manyika. This picture must be radically altered by the experience of the previous decade. The Ngoni attacks in the 1830's were directed against the feira of Masekesa and the feira of Aruangwa and not against the Manyika people, nor even the Portuguese as such. Very few people were killed. Both Manyika and Portuguese within the feira, and the records covering this period, give no evidence of a single eye-witness account to the effect that young Manyika men and women were taken away by the Ngoni between the period 1822-1835. There is, however, one instance pertaining to Quiteve, and this will be dealt with later.

Besides this, a careful survey of the records reveals that the 'destruction' of the two feiras in Manyika was a gradual process which probably began in 1829 and continued up to 1835, when a new set of circumstances was created. The ultimate fall of the feiras cannot be attributed solely to the Ngoni invasions; other factors were equally at work and, in terms of chronological sequence, they deserve first mention.

Administrative anarchy, which noticeably undermined the Portuguese defence system and trade at the feira during the first decade of the 19th Century, had made confusion worse confounded by the 1830's. A ban¹, intended to correct the situation at the feira, reveals a lack of control by the capitão-mor over the merchants and consequently his inability to rise to the occasion. The feirantes dealt directly with the various princes, 'saguating' them with presents, independent of the capitão-mor. Such articles as calças (trousers), jackets and bonnets, which only the capitão-mor was allowed to give to Kings or princes as presents, were given by the individual merchants living within the feira without the knowledge of the capitão-mor. The increasing tendency of this practice aroused legitimate fears that sooner or later the feirantes would vie with ^{one} another in giving presents to the local princes². The net result of all this would be jealousy and consequent internecine wars among the princes themselves. This would ultimately lead to an 'invasion' of the feira of Masekesa. As a result of these fears a ban was imposed by the Governor of Rios de Sena, José Francisco Alves Barboza, to the effect that, however much it was profitable to individual feirantes to establish independent relations with the princes of the feira and their neighbours, in future this practice would not be allowed. The commandant of the feira was instructed to exercise great vigilance and to act promptly whenever news of a violation of this ban reached him. He was to confine the culprit within the feira precincts and, if he continued to violate the ban, he would be expelled from the feira altogether. This ban was, of course, indirectly imposed upon the Manyika princes. The feirantes at Masekesa, as

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1. Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, José Francisco Alves Barboza to Antonio de Araujo Bragança, commandant of the garrison of the feira of Manyika, 11.5.1824. Cxa.73. Moc.A.H.U.
 2. Ibid.

at Aruangua, were forbidden to receive presents from Manyika Kings or princes³.

Another administrative abuse to be corrected was that of weights. Ricardo da Costa Soares, who succeeded Antonio de Araujo Bragança as capitão-mor⁴, reported that one could rely on the system of weights up to four gonos⁵, but beyond that the weights were confused. According to an old instruction, which he found in the archives of the feira, Francisco Henrique Ferrão had been instructed during the 18th Century to see that the proper weights were used. A piece of zuarte then cost five maticals, but this had been altered to cost a dogado⁶. He reported the feira to be safe. In fact, for the first time the King himself is reported to have visited the feira with his bingas⁷. Soares's complaint was the usual one of too many frequent visits by the bingas, who had to be given fazendas each time they came⁸. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that very few pieces of cloths had been sent to him as his salary.

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3. Letter from Ricardo da Costa Soares, captain of the infantry and provisional commandant of the garrison of the Feira de Aruangua, to the Governor of Rios de Sena, José Francisco Alves Barboza, 3.8.1824. Cxa.74, Moc.A.H.U.
 4. Antonio de Araujo Bragança died on 15.8.1824. See Letter from Ricardo da Costa Soares to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 25.8.1824. Cxa.74. Moc.A.H.U.
 5. Letter from Ricardo Soares da Costa to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 1.10.1824. Cxa.74. Moc.A.H.U. A gono was a small weight of gold, which corresponded to one quarter of an oitava. It was worth 500 reis at the end of the 18th Century. See 'Descrição Corográfica.....' Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U.
 6. 1 dogado = 4 maticals, i.e. 6 oitavas of pure gold. See Xavier Botelho, Memória Estatística.....p.189. Lobato A. Evolução..... Lisbon,1957. p.65.
 7. Ibid.
 8. An example of the expenses incurred in connection with Mutasa and his Bingas can be found in a letter from Ricardo da Costa Soares to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 25.8.1824. Cxa.74. Moc.A.H.U. 111 cloths were paid to the King and Bingas, 6 cloths were paid in order to secure freedom of passage.. 10 cloths were paid to a Manyika who accompanied the Binga. 9 cloths were paid to princes Mutema and Mabota. Also see Letter dated 20.9.1824, this being an account of expenses incurred in connection with the payment of the soldiers and at the same time a request for more fazenda. See Letter dated 26.10.1824, reporting peaceful and friendly relations with the King of Barwe. See Letter dated 25.8.1824, relating that immediately after the death of Araujo Bragança, capitão-mor of the feira de Manica, Soares sent Prince Mutema, who is described as Mutasa's cabo, and was in charge of the feira, together with his envoys and a Portuguese soldier to report the Captain's death to Chikanga. The expense for this was 1 zuarte. Similar expenses were incurred in connection with Bondo, also described as

Starvation added another dimension to the problem. Reports about starvation form a lively topic in the correspondence between the officers at the feiras and the Governor of Rios de Sena. According to a report which the Governor of Rios de Sena wrote in 1829, the general decline of the villas, that of 'Manica' not excepted, was due to a famine which had been raging for six years. This had resulted in wars in the Kingdoms of Barwe and Quiteve and the slaves of the moradores in these places, rather than starve to death, abandoned their masters and devastated large areas near the margins of the Zambezi and in the vicinity of Sofala⁹.

Footnote 8 Continued....

Mokombe's Grande Cabo: This was largely intended to secure freedom of passage to the feira. 25.8.1824, Cxa.74. Moc.A.H.U. For other expenses made to Ricardo as capitão-mor of the Feira de Manica. See Santana, Francisco. Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Vol.I. (Macos 1-10) Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, Lisbon 1967, pp.489,513.

2,294 cloths for the military uniform of the garrison of the feira, from 1.8.1825 to July 1826. These figures must be read with caution because sometimes they remained on paper only. For ~~later~~ example see Letter from Antonio da Silva Baptista, factor of Sena. Also see Santana F. Documentação. op.cit. Vol.I. Lisbon,1964, p.313. 128, 5.9.1827. It would appear that even the practice of paying soldiers who did not exist was still in practice, though in a modified form, See letter from Antonio da Silva Baptista to Francisco Henrique Ferrao.

Santana F. Documentação..... Vol.I. Lisbon, 1964. 45/26/11/1828. p.689.

9. Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne, to Conde de Basto, Minister and Secretary of State and marine and overseas affairs, 7.12.1829. Maco 20. Moc.A.H.U.
 - Letter from Cirne to Conde de Basto, 23.10.1829. Maco 20. Moc.A.H.U.
 - Letter from Antonio da Silva Baptista to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 3.8.1829. Maco 20. Moc.A.H.U.
 - Letter from Severico José de Abranches to the factor of Sena, 18.11.1829, Maco 20. Moc.A.H.U.
- See summaries of these letters in Stantana F. Documentação..... Vol.I. Lisbon,1964. 38/1 and 38/2. p.772.

Manuel Joaquim Mendes ^{de Vasconcellos} e Cirne's observations were supported by Izidoro Manuel de Carrezedo, who dated the famine to 1827¹⁰. The results of this famine, according to him, were not visible until 1832, when trade routes to the feiras of Zumbo and 'Manica', dependents of Tete and Sena respectively, could not be traversed "due to continuous attacks, and robberies, which the princes and regulos made on the Portuguese merchants." The interior of Barwe and Quiteve, where the merchants used to go, had been reduced to a state of anarchy. King Tica of Quiteve died in 1830 and the Queens and rival pretenders to the throne found themselves in a succession crisis¹¹.

In Barwe, the King had also died and Prince Inhamaguada had succeeded him as King, but not without a trial of arms and confusion¹² and a consequent, if only temporary, halt to normal commercial activities. The feira of Masekesa had been isolated from Sena for two years. The Kingdom of Barwe had been without a King for four years and during this interregnum, the Barwists had nobody to obey. Rival princes supported by their parties fought for the throne. It was this which rendered the passage to Manyika unsafe. The Portuguese at Sena were not in a position to remedy the situation¹³.

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10. Letter from Izidoro Manuel de Carrazedo to Francisco Simoens Margioch, Minister and Secretary of State and Overseas affairs. Queliman 13.9.1835. Cod.1477. Moc.A.H.U.
 11. Letter from Francisco Roiz Nunes to Paulo Jozé Miguel de Brito, Governor General of Moçambique. Sofala, 4.8.1830. Maco 12. Moc.A.H.U.
Letter from Nunes to Brito, 14.12.1830. No.1156. Maco 21. Moc.A.H.U.
Letter from Nunes to Brito, 7.12.1830.
 12. Letter from Fortunato da Silva to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena 10.6.1830. in Santana F. Documentação..... Vol.II. Lisbon,1967. p.346.
 13. Copy of a letter from Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Conde de Basto, 23.10.1829 in Santana F. Documentação.....Vol.I. Lisbon. p.1082.

There were eleven filhos da terra instead of the required sixty Portuguese soldiers, the rest having fled away with their food supplied¹⁴.

Vasconcellos e Cirne's immediate task as the new Governor of Rios de Sena in 1830 was to restore contact between Sena and the feira of Masekesa. He, therefore, organised auxiliary troops of armed Africans and a detachment of fifty soldiers, a senior official and two officials of lower rank from Tete to go and reinforce the Sena detachment¹⁵. This expedition included forces from private individuals, presumably of the moradores, who had commercial interests in the Kingdom of Manyika. The commandant of the expedition was given instructions to open the trade route between Manyika and Sena either by persuading the African princes and regulos who commanded the passage to the feira or by force. Instructions were also sent to the effect that the commandant should look for fazenda to supply the garrison of the feira of Masekesa. Traders who wanted to send their fazenda for trading purposes were encouraged to do so¹⁶. That the task of the expedition was a difficult one is shown by the fact that an expedition which left Sena at the beginning of April was not able to accomplish its mission until the end of June. It would seem that the results of the expedition were fairly satisfactory. Vashambadzi were reported going to the feira with fazendas in the same year¹⁷.

14. Letter from Cirne to Conde de Basto, 24/6/3/1830. in Santana F. op.cit. pp.165-166.

15. Letter from Vasconcellos e Cirne to Conde de Basto 28.6.1830 Maco.14. Moc.A.H.U.

A copy of this letter is also found in Maco 20 Moc.A.H.U. Also see Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne. Memória sôbre a Província de Mocambique Documentos para a Historia das Colônias Portuguezas, Ministério dos Negócios da Marinha e Ultramar. Lisboa Imprensa Nacional (1890). Santana F. Documentação..... ii, pp.165-166, 24/6/3/1830.

16. Letter from Cirne to Conde de Basto, 28.6.1830. Maco 20, Moc.A.H.U.

17. Ibid.

It was clear to Vasconcellos e Cirne that if the way to the feira was to remain open it would be necessary to have a firm undertaking from the King of Barwe to that effect. Hence he sent a high-powered mission to participate in the investiture ceremony of King Inhamaguada. Accordingly a treaty was concluded providing for opening of the way to all the vassals of the Portuguese King, to transport their goods to Manyika and the interior in general and guarantees that not even the slightest hostility would be shown to any passer-by. Henceforth no milando case could lead to reprisals or blocking of the passage; payment of madontos (passage presents) by the merchants was stopped and Portuguese-protected persons were assured of continued and extended hospitality from Barwe princes. There is every likelihood that the well-documented famine of the mid-1820's and early 1830's is the one echoed in Manyika tradition¹⁸. The details of the story, which were undoubtedly influenced by a reading of the story in the Bible¹⁹, point to the fact that this famine was due to lack of rain and that this was so severe that even when the rains came, seeds were not easily available. The effects of this long famine seem to have been exaggerated from the archives and as remembered from tradition, because there is evidence that trade was still being carried on. The seeds, which the Manyika used when the rains came, were obtained from vashambadzi, who apparently had come from a long distance²⁰. This is evidence that some form of trade was still continuing.

18. Machiwenyika Jason. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People'. MS 14/1/1 Sby.

19. Genesis 42, 1-6.

20. These seeds are listed as: Cow Peas, Peanuts and Groundnuts.

In his attempt to locate the origin of the general decadence into which all the villas without exception had fallen, Vasconcellos e Cirne vehemently attacked what he called administrative corruption and inefficiency in general. His targets were the Canarins²¹, in particular Francisco Henrique Ferrão, who was nominated provisional Governor of Rios de Sena by the Governor General of Moçambique, Sebastião Xavier Botelho, 'a monopolist', through bribery²². This provisional Governor cared more for his business than the interests of Portuguese merchants in the various villas.

His vashambadzi defied the authority of the capitão-mor at the feira of Aruangua do sul (of the South)²³ and refused to pay the customary

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21. For a detailed discussion of the Canarins see Boxer C.R. Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 1415-1825. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p.73. There is a controversy about the precise meaning and origin of this word. A 'Canarin' is described by H. Michaels, (A New Dictionary of the Portuguese and English Languages. London 1893) as a peasant in the neighbourhood of Goa. This is nearer the truth, because strictly speaking a Canarin is an inhabitant of Canara and not of Goa as is generally assumed. At first the word was also applied indiscriminately to Hindus, especially if they were not Brahmins. (Pyrard II, p.32, 2nd ed). Afterwards the word was applied exclusively to native Christians of Goa. As Cunha Rivara (Viagem de Francisco Pyrard II, p.32) correctly points out, the word should have no derogative connotation. However, its derogative nature, linguists point out, arises from the fact that it is derived from 'Canaddi,' which means in the Maratha language, coarse, unpolished or savage. See Pissurlencar Panduranga SS. Regimentos das Fortalezas da India. Bastora-Goa. 1951, p.39.
 22. Joaquim Manoel Vasconcellos e Cirne. Memória sobre..... Lisbon, 1890, pp.20-22. Letter from Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Conde de Basto 28.6.1830. Maco 20 Moc.A.H.U. See Maco 14 for a copy of the same letter.
 23. The Use of the term 'South' is significant, although it will not be repeated in this discussion. It differentiates this feira from another one by the same name, North of the Zambezi - the feira of 'Aruangua do Norde' established in the ^{late} 1820's. The reasons for change from the feira of Zumbo were similar. The Portuguese were being driven North by King Cazembe. See letter from Manoel Correa Monteiro, commandant of the feira, to the Governor and Captain-General of Moçambique, Sebastião Xavier Botelho, 20th October, 1828. Maco 3, Moc.A.H.U. Letter No.29 from José Manoel Correia Monteiro to the Governor of Rios de Sena, Francisco Henrique Ferrão, 15.6.1828. Aruangua Maco 3, Moc.A.H.U. Letter No.32 from Monteiro to Ferrão, Letter No.36 from Monteiro to Ferrão, both dated 15.6.1828, Maco 3, Moc.A.H.U. Letter No.60 from the Governor and Captain of Rios de Sena, Manoel Joaquim de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the Governor and Captain-General of Moçambique, Paulo José Miguel de Brito, 23.2.1831 Quelimane. Maco 25. Moc.A.H.U. Also see the well-known 'Relatorio acerca da feira do Aruangua do Norde' Docn.No.179 in Memória e Documentos..... 1890 Lisbon. pp.344-354. There is an extract of this report in Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, Parte não oficial Serie II 1859-67 Lisbon, pp.203-208.

piece of zuarte, on the pretext that they worked according to the orders of their master²⁴. Francisco Henrique Ferrão obviously indulged in 'intrigue', 'perfidy' and 'chicanery'. It was not always possible, but the authorities expected that a man in his position should have seen to it that his vashambadzi behaved in an exemplary manner. Vasconcellos e Cirne reviled Botelho for his pro-Canarin policy²⁵, for a licence racket which existed among the moradores. The general unrest caused by famine, the succession wars and lack of protection on the part of the moradores since 1820 led to desertion of Sena, on which the Manyika feira administration was dependent for its defence and supply of fazendas by the moradores. The number of rich and influential moradores who either died, went away or mortgaged their property has been estimated at thirty.

The greatest single factor in the misfortunes of the Portuguese in the 1820's and 1830's was military weakness, which characterised nearly all the 'companies' of Rios de Sena²⁶. This state of affairs tempted the Chikangas to enter the feira premises and to demand tribute from the commandant²⁷ as well

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24. Letter from Manoel Joachim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne, Governor of the Captaincy of Quelimane and Rios de Sena to Paulo José Miguel de Brito, Governor and Captain-General of the State. 26.8.1831. Cod.1468, No.27. Moc. A.H.U.
25. Letter from Cirne to Conde de Basto 28.6.1830. Maco 20, Moc.A.H.U.
26. See General Map of the five companies which garrisoned Rios de Sena in 1827. (Santana F. Documentação 13/30/12/1827, p.316). Some of these were not complete. The total strength was then 301. These five companies were of the infantry of the line of Sena, Tete and Zumbo (the company which, in remote times, served as a guard at the Zimbabwe of Monomotapa) and some incomplete companies of Zumbo and Manica. These two were supposed to have 20-30 pracas each, and the other three, 50-60 pracas each. For a short but depressing historical account of the military of Rios de Sena. See Cirne, Memória Sobre..... op.cit.p.23.
See Letter from João Antonio Rioz Ferreira to the King of Portugal, 31.1.1832, emphasising the the importance of Cirne's letter and urging prompt attention. Mac 20. Moc.A.H.U.
27. Letter from Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Paulo Miguel de Brito, 26.8.1831. Cod.1468, No.70. Moc.A.H.U.

as from the feirantes in general. It must be stated, however, that this did not significantly interfere with commerce. Factors beyond the Chikangas' control were responsible for the 'decline' in trade. Starvation had made a change in the nature of articles of trade inevitable. The Portuguese businessmen bought grain from wherever they could get it and exchanged it for gold during winter²⁸. It appears that gold-mining was then limited to the winter season²⁹. The scarcity of rain perhaps explains this new development in the mining industry. In the past, fazendas worth more than 600,000 cruzados were sent to the feira of Masekesa in the form of missanga, panos etc. but according to Cirne this was no longer the case due to lack of population and security. Cirne's observations were incorrect in this respect. The cases of the Canarins and the racket in licences, both of which have already been cited, suggest that a fairly lucrative business was being conducted at the feira of Masekesa and probably in the interior even though the feira had been officially changed to Aruangua. This was not altogether a new site. Manoel Galvão da Silva described this site in 1790 as showing "signs of having formerly been better defended." There were still then in existence "two pounder-guns, mounted on fork-rests, one of these mortar-guns having a separate chamber." This point was roughly a day's march distant from the vicinity of Masekesa. The grandees of Quiteve and Barwe continued to make attacks on this new feira³⁰.

28. Letter from Manuel Joaquim Mendes e Cirne to Conde de Basto, 28.6.1831.

29. Ibid.

30. Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Fortunato Ciriano da Silva, commandant and capitao-mor of Manica, 25.8.1830. Santana F. Documentação..... Vol.I. Lisbon, 1964. p.1082. 6/1 letter sent on 7.12.1829 by Cirne to Conde de Basto. 6/2 letter sent on 23.10.1829 by Francisco Henrique Ferrão to Mancel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne. These two documents describe the situation in Rios de Sena, in particular the military strength of the various villas. Also see Cod.1468, No.76 Moc.A,H.U. op.cit.

Their attacks were so effective that they have been described in the records as 'depopulating,' 'assaulting' and 'robbing' the feira³¹. The precariousness of the new site of Aruangua as a feira was demonstrated by the fact that there were very few people there, including one or two officials and three or four Africans³². The 'defunct' feira of Masekesa was still popular with the business community. The traders, merchants and vashambadzi from Sena passed by the feira of Aruangua and did not bother to give the saguete which they were obliged to produce, of one piece of sameter³³. This was supposed to be done by every merchant or mushambadzi who entered the feira³⁴. This was meant for a prince of the feira, Mutema. In order to keep the feira open, the capitão-mor gave the King some of his own fazendas, but the infringements at Aruangua continued, and, as the traffic to Masekesa gathered momentum, the feira of Aruangua paled ^{into} insignificance as a commercial post. The Quitevaus were not only directly responsible for the ruin of the site of Aruangua as a trading post but, indirectly, they also enhanced the popularity and value of the old feira of Masekesa. A brief survey of Quiteve-Portuguese relations at this feira will best illustrate this point. The Quitevan attacks on the feira were, so the Portuguese claimed, motivated by envy and rivalry³⁵. The King of Quiteve demanded large quantities of fazenda from the traders who passed by on their way to Masekesa.

His argument was that the Portuguese had re-established the feira of Aruangua on his land and a capitão-mor with troops. Quite often the prince

31. Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Maco 20. Moc.A.H.U. See Santana F. Documentação..... 14/10/6/1830. Vol.II. Lisbon,1967, p.346.

32. Cod.1468. Moc.A.H.U.

33. Letter from Fortunato to Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, 10.6.1830 in Santana F. Documentação..... Vol.II Lisbon 1967,p.346.

Letter from Cirne to Ciriano, op.cit. Cod.1468. No.76. Moc:A.H.U.

34. Letter from Fortunato Ciriaco to Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, 10.6.1830. In Santana F. Documentação..... Vol.II. p.346.

35. Codice 1468 No.76. Moc. A.H.U.

of Quiteve would notify the capitão-mor that he would go and attack him. He demanded what the Portuguese described as exorbitant amounts of fazendas, and any delay in paying this usually evoked the wrath of the King. The capitão-mor's stock became exhausted. He fell back on the Portuguese mercantile community at Masekesa to satisfy Quitevan demands. His appeal in 1831 for a joint action went unheeded³⁶. The change of the feira of Aruangua was not entirely due to Quitevan attacks. The local princes, as well as the neighbouring princes, also made incessant demands on the limited resources of the capitão-mor³⁷. The inhabitants of the feira were "dying of hunger and had been reduced to the last degree of misery"³⁸. The businessmen who conducted their trade very much like absentee landlords had to rush down to Aruangua to see their houses which were reported in danger of being 'robbed' by their captives³⁹.

The attitude of the local potentates and the Quitevans was probably influenced by the hopeless defence arrangements of the feira. It had no munitions, armament or such weapons to deter the enemy. It was entirely without any means of defence⁴⁰. The commandant could not even have sufficient soldiers to escort a company of porters to fetch soldos and ammunition from Sena⁴¹. Some of the supplies took twenty-nine days to arrive at the feira

36. Codice 1468 No.76. Moc.A.H.U.

37. Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the Factor of the Royal Treasury of the villa of Sena, José Diniz, 25.8.1830. Letter from the commandant of Aruangua to the Governor of the Captaincy, 17.11.1830. Maco 20.Moc.A.H.U. Santana F. Documentação..... 7/17/11/1830 Vol.II. pp.343-344. Codice 1468 No.76. Moc.A.H.U.

38. Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the Factor of Sena 25.8.1830, Cod. 1468. Moc. A.H.U.

39. Letter from the commandant of the feira of Aruangua to the Governor of the Captaincy, Maco 14, Moc.A.H.U. Also Santana F. Documentação..... 19/16/12/1830, II, 349.

40. Letter from Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the factor of the villa of Sena, 25/8/1830, Cod.1468. Moc.A.H.U.

41. Ibid.

from Sena. The reason for this delay was not explained, but the Governor of Rios de Sena, in the same letter, instructed the commandant of the feira to tighten up things and punish any dereliction of duty exemplarily⁴². The maps which were produced for the Governor's perusal reveal lack of population at the feira and that the few Portuguese who were in Manyika, were scattered about⁴³.

It must be pointed out, however, that the situation at Masekesa was somewhat brighter than the one which has just been described at Aruangua. The feira was reported quiet, safe, peopled and without starvation⁴⁴. The general feeling at official level at Aruangua was that the feira of Masekesa, which had been changed between 1810 and 1816 "in order to humiliate the King of Manyika," should be abandoned indefinitely. This is evident from the commandant's letter of 10/6/1830⁴⁵ in which he proposed to the Governor of Rios de Sena, that he should pass an order to the effect that all traders should leave Masekesa to settle at Aruangua, and that if they all did that, then they would be better able to defend the feira against the Quitevans and that after a while these traders would like the feira at Aruangua as much as they liked the feira of Manyika. Security, lucrative trade and respectability would crown their efforts. Discussions between Vasconcellos e Cirne and a big council of the moradores and traders of Sena, held sometime in November, 1830 concerning the commandant's memorandum, yielded negative results⁴⁶. It

42. Letter from Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the Commandant of the villa of Sena, 25.8.1830. Codice 1468. Moc.A.H.U.

43. Ibid. Also see Appendix.

44. Letter from Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the factor of the villa of Sena, 25.8.1830. Codice 1468, Moc.A.H.U.

45. Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 10.6.1830 Maco 20 in Santana F. Documentação..... Vol.II. Lisbon,1967, p.346. Letter from Manuel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Paulo Joze Miguel de Brito G.G. of Moçambique, 26.8.1831. Cod.1468, No.76. Moc.A.H.U.

46. Letter from Cirne to the commandant of the garrison of Manica, 25.8.1830. Cod.1468, Moc. A.H.U.

was decided that "for the convenience of the Royal Treasury, the general interests of commerce of this captaincy and the referred to businessmen who inhabit and are scattered throughout Macequece" it would be better to change the feira from Aruangua back to Masekesa until the feira of Aruangua was useful commercially. In this way all would be better able to defend it. "for the individual good of that feira and the general utility of the colony"⁴⁷.

It is evident from the preceding account that starvation, administrative inefficiency and the attacks which the Quitevans made on the feira of Aruangua had seriously weakened the feira before the Ngoni attacked it in 1833. The element of administrative inefficiency operates throughout this period as we shall note later. Two reasons- envy and rivalry, have been given for Quitevan attacks on the feira of Aruangua in the 1830's. But were these attacks solely due to reasons of traditional hostility, envy and rivalry? An answer to the root cause of this is to be sought in Quitevan internal politics. It appears that two princes died in 1830; Prince Maveneça, who apparently was in charge of the region of Bandire, known as High Quiteve, and Prince Boi⁴⁸. Queen Nengomanha also died in the same year.

As pointed out, only the first two Queens of the Kings in this region of Rios de Sena counted during a succession crisis⁴⁹. As far as Quiteve was concerned, the choice of the Queens could not be defied with

47. *Ibid.*

48. Letter from Francisco Miguel Roiz Nunes to Paulo José Miguel de Brito, Sofala 4.8.1830. Maco 12. A.H.U.

49. In Manyika the first two Queens out of Chikanga's 64 wives, during the last quarter of the 18th Century, were known as Nhalinga and Nemanhica. These names were clearly derived from binga (royal court) and Manyika. Their ceremonial function is difficult to identify. See Descrição Corográfica..... Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U. Dr. Liesegang suggests that the custom of having four Queens is 'possibly due to Islamic influence.' He is incorrect in his figure of four to start with; because the Chikangas had one or two Queens at a time. This applied to most Kings in this region, as Marquez de Castello-Novo correctly observed. Biker I.F. Collecção de Tratados..... Vol.VI, 1885. pp.243-62. For the tradition in Quiteve see João dos Santos, 'Ethiopia Oriental' in R.S.E.A. Vol.VII. pp.193,378,381. Cape Town 1964. João Julião da Silva. Resposta das Questões sobre os Cafres (Maco).O.4.Moc.A.H.U.) edited by G.Liesegang. Junta de Investigações do Ultramar. Estudos de Antropologia Cultural No.2. Lisbon 1966, p.20.

impunity. The remaining Queen, Nemaunga, sent a hoe to Prince Nimara Cubacundua to deliver to a Portuguese adjutante as a symbol of the delivery of the territory of Bandire⁵⁰. This did not materialise, first because of Ngoni hostilities and secondly due to the fact that one of the pretenders to the throne, Caringa, invited Ngoni 'warriors' to make his ascent to the throne short, certain and effective. This in part explains the aggressiveness of the Quitevan foreign policy. This was the oft-practised tactic of deviating a nation's mind from acute and embarrassing domestic problems by indulging in adventures abroad. The other possible and most likely explanation is that the Ngoni exploited their assistance to Prince Caringa during his succession crisis and influenced him to mount an offensive attack on the feira of Aruangua. As I shall show subsequently, it was Ngoni policy to attack mainly the feiras of Masekesa and Aruangua in the Kingdom of Manyika. It does seem that Quitevan foreign policy, as well as internal policies, were formulated in such a way that they accorded with Ngoni interests between 1830 and 1833⁵¹.

50. Ibid. dated 4.10.1830.

For the history of this feira see Questão da posse da terra e minas de Quiteve. Pasta 6 (1842-3) Moc.A.H.U. Also the following:

Botelho, Sebastião José Xavier. Memória Estatística sobre os domínios Portuguezes na Africa Oriental, Lisbon, 1835, pp.163-164.

Boralo Francisco Maria. Provincia de Moçambique (Ensaio sobre a estatística da possessões Portuguezes no Ultramar, IIa Serie, Livro IV) 1859, Lisbon, p.231. Memória sobre a adoção do Território Bandire às épocas do seu abandono. 5.8.1831, Maco 21. A.H.U. This gives a detailed account of the episode which led to the closure of the feira.

Baptista J. Renato. Caminho de ferro da Beira a Manica. Excursões e estudos effectuados em 1891 sob a direcção do Capitão de engenharia. Lisboa. Imprensa Nacional 1892. pp.14-15.

Santana F. Documentação..... Vol.II. op.cit. pp. 110, 166, 214, 216, 218, 243, 384, 949.

51. Cópia do Termo do Empréstino que esta Feitoria da Fazenda fez de 600 panos ao Príncipe de Quiteve, Maromo, eleito aclaimado Rey de Quiteve pa as despesas de sua Coroação. 8.12.1831. Pasta 17 Moc.A.H.U.

In a confused situation such as existed in Quiteve in 1830, it is important to examine the party which attacked the feira and its motives. A third motive for these attacks was to obtain cloth and such property as could be used to pay the soldiers to fight in the civil wars of succession. This seems to have been the case in 1831. The attackers were led by two princes, Musito and Dambangera⁵².

The population of the feira of Aruangua then consisted of an ensign of inferior rank and four soldiers⁵³. The Quitevans took advantage of this hopeless defence situation to 'rob' and 'exterminate' the establishment. The Governor of Sofala sent Portuguese envoys to Queen Gomana, who was then reported to be the sovereign of Quiteve, to seek protection. The capitão-mor left the post of Aruangua to join the vashambadzi and businessmen who had gone to settle at the old feira of Masekesa⁵⁴. The Governor of Rios de Sena acquiesced in this, but positively instructed the capitão-mor to fulfil, as a matter of obligation, the instructions which were in that feira, to the effect that capitães-mor were to conduct themselves as circumstances dictated⁵⁵. The capitão-mor was to address himself to the "interests of the royal treasury, the promotion of commerce, by means of prudence and respect reflected from the Portuguese nation". He was instructed to look for "circumstantial information" about the actual state of the feira, commerce and whether or not the manner of dealing with the King of Manyika was still advantageous. He was again to study the behaviour of the businessmen, the

52. Letter from Joaquim Mendes e Cirne to the Governor of Sofala, 11.6.1831. Cod.1468. Moc.A.H.U.

53. Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Fortunato Ciriano da Silva, Commandant and capitão-mor of Manyika, 11.6.1831. Cod.1468. Moc.A.H.U.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

vashambadzi, and the state of the garrison and armament⁵⁶.

The only problem at Masekesa affecting Manyika-Portuguese relations was that of the Mambos (rulers), who were encouraged by Portuguese military weakness to demand more and more cloths and occasionally threatened the very existence of the feira⁵⁷. The Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena sanctioned an advance of six months' soldos in order to satisfy the demands of the King and his Princes, but there were no porters to fetch this from Sena. The authorities at Sena had to rely on an ensign from Manyika, who happened to be there at that time, despite the fact that he was a reputed drunkard and debauchee. In fact he was on probation and the commandant at Sena had been instructed to keep an eye on him and to send him to Quelimane immediately if he committed another offence, and from there he would be sent to Moçambique. The short-age of fazendas to saguata the Mambos was generally due to administrative delays at Sena and scarcity of reliable personnel to escort porters to fetch it. On this particular occasion it was due to a combination of factors such as lack of fazendas to pay the porters. This problem always cropped up when fazendas belonging to the royal treasury had to be transported, otherwise it was not a serious problem for the individual merchants.

There was another problem connected with that of portage, and this was the question of the trade route. The change, between 1810 and 1816, of the feira from Masekesa to Aruangua had resulted in an increasing use of the Gorongoza trade route. Apparently traders encountered the same old difficulties of payment of madontos. The inhacuavas of the prazo Gorongoza seized some mutores of cloth as madontos. The Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena,

56. Ibid.

57. Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the Commandant of the villa of Sena, José Diniz Alfonso, 14.10.1831. Quartel do Governo em Prazo Boror. Codice 1468. Moc.A.H.U.

therefore, instructed the capitão-mor to seize the inhacuamas' families and imprison them or 'castigate them rigorously'. It is interesting to note here the comparative severity with which the potentates in the prazos were sometimes dealt with when they tried to assert their authority as traditional sovereigns.

Portuguese administrative inefficiency, rather than external threats from either the Mambos in Manyika or without, was at the root of their misfortunes. The old problem of trading without licences, cases of insubordination and pilfering of arms intended for the defence of the feira were not uncommon features in the 1830's. For example, there was a case of Miguel Homem, a trader, whose behaviour was described as 'rebellious, 'criminal', 'infamous,' 'insulting' and 'insubordinate',⁵⁸ when he appeared at the feira of Masekesa with a large quantity of fazendas. In all fairness to Miguel Homem, he had obtained a licence from the commandant of the villa of Sena, But, of course, this was outside the established procedure⁵⁹. Cases of thefts of the soldiers' pay by senior officers and insubordination by the military were also reported in 1830⁶⁰. A lieutenant of the militia, Francisco de Almeida, was dismissed from the office of capitão-mor due to incompetency, and the feira was without a capitão-mor for some time. There was not any suitable person for such a post among the officers of the militia. As a deterrent to further relaxation of discipline, Manoel Joaquim Mendes a Cirne, Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, ordered Fortunato Ciriano da Silva,

58. Letter from Cirne to Ciriano, capitão-mor of Manyika, 11.7.1830. Cod. 1468. Moc.^A.H.U.
 Ibid. dated 11.6.1831.

59. Letter from Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to the commandant of the villa of Sena. Cod.1468. A.H.U. 9.1.1830.

60. Letter from Cirne to the commandant of the feira of Manyika. 9.1.1831. Cod.1468. Moc.^A.H.U.

a new capitão-mor, to discipline a commandant of the garrison for stealing the arms⁶¹. These were probably sold to Manyika princes. This is, however, mere speculation. The commandant was to pay for the arms or else have his property equivalent to the cost of the stolen goods confiscated. If the property, for some reason or other, could not be seized, then the man was to be sent to Sena with proofs of the robbery and "of his criminal behaviour" regarding misappropriation of the soldiers' salaries. All this was to be done publicly so that others could learn from this case.

The situation was further complicated by internal developments. There was another attack on the feira of Aruangua in 1831, but probably this was not anything different from the previous ones⁶². The robbery of 'a mine' which was "committed by thieves who left nothing in the house except a box carrying a ban on payment of madontos and some images", was probably connected with Chikanga's son who had rebelled against his father⁶³. He stationed himself with his party somewhere on the trade route and whenever he received news that traders or vashambadzi would pass by he came out and demanded cloth, probably to enable him to pay for the soldiers to sustain his rebellion. In one instance he seized 'a piece of mutore worth ten pieces of cloth' from an

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61. Letter from Cirne to capitão-mor of Manyika, Fortunato Ciriaco, 11.6.1831. Cod.1468. Moc.A.H.U. Dr. Newitt in his 'Zambezi Praços in the 18th Century' (Ph.D. Thesis, 1967, p.176. Senate, London) seems to imply that the garrisons were places where chiefs got arms. This was probably the case in other garrisons, but as far as that of Manyika is concerned, I have not come across such cases in the 18th Century. This is the first recorded case of arms being stolen.
62. Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva to the Governor of the Captaincy, 14.12.1831. Maco 23. Moc.A.H.U.
63. Letter from Ciriano da Silva to the Governor, 9.3.1831 also signed by - José Andrade de Lorna, Clerk; Manoel Francisco de Almeida, provisional Lieutenant; Luiz (?) Augusto Cezar, an ensign; João Manoel Fernando; Martins da Conceição; Domingos Madeira; João Vaz; Cruz Francisco Cravone; Cruz Manoel Sacrava; Cruz Caetano da Lima; J. da Silva Baptista; Felix Masarenhas. Macequece, 14.3.1831. Maco 23. A.H.U.

ensign of the garrison of Manyika on his way there from Sena. It would appear that equal demands for cloth were made by other sons of Chikanga. The capitão-mor described the shortage of fazendas as 'desperate'⁶⁴.

The actual state of affairs regarding Manyika-Portuguese relations at the feira of Masekesa was vividly described by Fortunato Ciriano da Silva, a new capitão-mor of this feira. It will be recalled that he was required, in 1830, to establish himself at Masekesa, to live with the businessmen, moradores and vashambadzi under his control, to collect information relating to the actual state of affairs at the feira and its commerce, to find out the most advantageous way of dealing with the King of the land, the manner in which the businessmen and vashambadzi behave themselves⁶⁵. As usual, his first concern was about an extreme shortage of fazendas to make presents to Chikanga, who arrogantly left the capitão-mor in no doubt that he was not satisfied⁶⁶. The vashambadzi too had nothing better to offer to Chikanga⁶⁷ and naturally the King felt himself under no obligation to honour past treaties concerning commerce and trade. The príncipe, presumably of the feira, would order his envoys to present the capitão-mor with a cow of inferior quality at the feira and demand three times as much besides what was spent on cloth for wearing, and if the Portuguese did not pay for it to his satisfaction, they were threatened with immediate expulsion from his land⁶⁸. As for commerce, it had greatly diminished because mining was 'done on a very small scale.' He gave as a reason for this that the Manyika tended to

64. Ibid.

65. Letter from Cirne to Fortunato, 11.6.1831. Cod.1468, Moc.A.H.U.

66. Letter from the capitão-mor of Manyika, Fortunato Ciriaço da Silva to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne, 5/10/1831. Maco.11. A.H.U.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

agriculture because they feared the injustices of the princes who, whenever they heard that a mine had been struck, issued a decree obliging the miner to deliver the piece of gold. In most cases the mine did not even recover the cost of production. The capitão-mor's representations in this respect were of no avail⁶⁹. The King curtly told him that it was the duty of the King, together with his sons, to preserve the Kingdom. Da Silva's analysis of the complicating factor in Manyika-Portuguese relations was that of the King's sons, who deputed for him as independent potentates in remote parts of the Kingdom during the King's lifetime. They demanded tribute. They too paid tribute to their father in the same manner the Portuguese paid tribute to them⁷⁰. Under normal circumstances, if the capitão-mor or any of the feirantes differed with any of his loyal sons, he automatically incurred the displeasure of the King himself⁷¹. However, this was not always the case, because there are cases during the 18th Century to show that the King sometimes took a stand against his own sons if he believed that they were wrong⁷². Da Silva's line of argument is not convincing. To explain the small flow of gold to the feira in terms of the Chikangas' erstwhile policy towards mining and also to attribute it to lack of harmony between Chikanga and his sons on the one hand and the Portuguese on the other, and also to the federal structure of Manyika polity, is to beg the question. These factors had been in existence for over three centuries of Portuguese contact with the Chikangas. The real reason, it would seem to me, is to be found in the capitão-mor's subsequent remark.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. See Chapter VI.

"They say" he reported, "that unless I give them cloths to put on they will give gold to whoever gives them cloths"⁷³. It does seem that the problem was not one of gold being mined on a reduced scale but rather one of insufficient supply on the Portuguese side to meet Manyika demands. The capitão-mor further referred to these demands as importunate. This shortage of cloth, which was chronic, was probably rendered acute by the exigencies of the Ngoni invasion of Quiteve and its neighbourhood in 1830-31.

It is related that Chikanga demonstrated his dissatisfaction with his presents of cloth from the capitão-mor by confiscating a small cow, which the capitão-mor had sent to be exchanged for provisions⁷⁴. Chikanga complained that his neighbours received from the same capitão-mor better pieces of cloth, such as paninhos, chittas and lenços,⁷⁵ and that because the capitão-mor did not send the quantity of cloth he had asked for, the muzungos should not bring cloth from outside into any of the regions of his Kingdom for trading purposes⁷⁶. Any form of communication between the capitão-mor and the princes was forbidden. Chikanga demanded seven mutores of cloth.

73. Letter from Ciriano to the Governor 5.10.1831. Maco 11. A.H.U.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva, commandant of the Feira da Manica 4.10.1831. Cxa.74 Moc.A.H.U. also signed by the businessmen who gave the capitão-mor Credit:- Miguel de Menezes;
 Franziao Jacinto da Silva Baptista;
 Manoel Francisco de Almeida;
 Antonio Joaquim de Andrade;
 Miguel Fernando;
 Felix Mascarenhas;
 João Manoel Fernandes.

These were positive royal orders, to be obeyed unconditionally, and until Chikanga's demands had been fully met, no trade could take place in any part of his Kingdom.

The businessmen at the feira, therefore, decided to loan the capitão-mor cloths to the amount of six months' soldos⁷⁷ but emphasized in their memorial to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena that this loan should be repaid as soon as possible. The businessmen did the same thing with the cloths demanded by Makombe, King of Barwe.

Manyika-Portuguese relations were no better either at the feira of Aruangua. Mucipa, an inhamai (page) of the King, was involved in a milando case with the capitão-mor when he went there⁷⁸. Apparently Mucipa had been sent by Chikanga to demand cloths.

The food situation was critical at the feira. The feirantes incurred considerable expenses in buying food which was going at very high prices. It was this policy of self-assertion practised by the Chikangas in the 1830's which compelled the capitão-mor to review Manyika-Portuguese relations and to bring forth concrete suggestions as to how they could be improved. His suggestion to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena was

77. These soldos came the following year. See Letter from Severino d'Almeida, provisional commandant of the garrison of Manyika, to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, 28.9.1832. They were described by the commandant in the above correspondence as 'a ridiculous assortment..... damaged and gnawed.' The gun powder which was supposed to be an arroba was in a very bad condition and 83 cartridges for the musketeers, including three Mautes which were damaged. The total of the damaged ones was 834, i.e. 166 short of the 1,000 declared in the report. Enclosed together with this report was another one, signed by a sergeant-major, which contained a list of madontos (passage) expenses for Prince Sazua of Barwe. These were incurred in crossing Prazo da Coroa, Gorongoza, Tamarara and Inhaquava prazos. The expenses in this connection were characterised as 'horrible' and included cloth which was damaged as well as portorage.

78. Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 6/10/1831. ~~M2623~~ Moc.A.H.U.

that he, as well as all the feirantes, should retire from the feira until a new basis for lucrative commercial activities had been created. This could be done by concluding new treaties, providing for a stipulated amount of fazendas to be always paid. The practice hitherto had been that, each time the capitão-mor and his feirantes signed an agreement with the King or any of his princes, they spent an unspecified amount of fazendas and this led them into debt⁷⁹.

However, these suggestions do not seem to have been accepted. Mutasa's ambassadors were reported at the feira demanding more cloths because the King was not satisfied with the mutores which had been sent to him. The capitão-mor had nothing to give them because the soldos had not arrived. He needed about two hundred and two panos to defray the feira expenses and to ensure continuity of commerce⁸⁰. A general inventory of the garrison of the feira of Masekesa produced by the capitão-mor in 1832 revealed a great shortage of arms. There was not even a storehouse. The poverty of the feira from an administrative point of view is portrayed by an inventory which was taken in 1832⁸¹. This proves that the princes were not entirely to blame for the chaos which reigned at the feira. The garrison was noted for relaxation of discipline, lack of respect from the neighbouring

79. Letter from Fortunato Ciriano da Silva to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 5.10.1831. Maco 11. Moc.A.H.U.

80. Letter from Fortunato Ciriaço da Silva, capitão-mor and commandant of the Feira de Manica, 5.9.1832. Maco 26. Moc.A.H.U. To the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena.

81. Ibid.

A copy of the inventory of the archives of Feira de Manica - 2 books which served as registers and from which some folios are missing.

1 bundle of 14 official letters from Governors Cirne, Barboza and Ferrão, and Instructions from the gov't of Moçambique, and articles of a treaty with Chikanga, 4 Letters from the commandant of the villa de Sena.

2 official letters from the Juiz and the alderman of Sena. 8 terms per-
taining to the Church.

1 gilded silver cup without a stand.

1. 1 gilded silver paten

2. 1 prayer book

3. 1 Roman Ritual

4. ½ Eagle-Stone.

5. 1 botta and a square board laid upon the chalice.

6. 6 Exercise books.

7. A minute book.

signed by Jozé Maria da Roza and Agular, Lieutenant and Commandant of the garrison, 3.9.1832. Maco 26. Moc. A.H.U.

potentates and princes⁸². A report, which was submitted together with the general map of the feira, showed that there was no improvement in the state of commerce. The internal situation was probably partially responsible for this and may also explain the constant demands for cloth on the part of Chikanga.

This report is worth citing in extenso because it throws much light on the way trade was conducted as well as on the internal situation.

There is no increase in commerce because of the violence which the King and princes practice continually; they are a caravan of twenty and all want tribute because there is not a part of this land in which there is no prince, and all are in such a position that they could do some favour to the muzungos as well as to the mussambazes, especially Prince Mucucuzi, who is in the land of Chavave, who commands all the routes from Aruangua into the interior, and this prince has conspired against his father Chikanga; when a muzungo arrives there he brings one or two old cows, a title of visiting, and he takes any portion of cloth he wishes, and for that matter, the better part of it. He seizes cloths belonging to the muzungos from the mussambazes. He got nothing the previous year because he had broken all the articles of the treaty. 83.

Apparently Chikanga complained about Portuguese dealings with his rebellious son. He, therefore, decided to send frequent delegations which were 'always more than ten or twelve people'⁸⁴, and each one of them expected clothes to put on. The princes who governed lands contiguous to the feira made similar demands.

The capitão-mor certainly exaggerated the picture of the stresses in Manyika-Portuguese relations as well as the plight of the feirantes. He had

82. Letter from Severino de Almeida, provisional commandant, to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 12.9.1832, Maco 26 Moc.A.H.U.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

suggested to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena that the feirantes should move from Masekesa to Aruangua, but the feirantes decided to remain at Masekesa⁸⁵. The internal political situation certainly made trade less lucrative, but not any more than it had done on other occasions in the past. Chikanga's actions in the 1830's were calculated to recover royal prestige which had been lost during the wars of the previous decade. He looked upon the Portuguese at the feira as his protegées and any violation of his laws or interference, implicit or overt, in his domestic affairs which might result in lawlessness was not calculated to go unpunished.

This was the state of the feira and the nature of Manyika-Portuguese relations when news reached the capitão-mor, sometime in 1832, that the 'Mabzites' (Ngoni)⁸⁶ had arrived there and that the feirantes could do nothing. The landings⁸⁷ are first mentioned in a report of 22.6.1832⁸⁸ on two occasions, firstly when they attacked the feira and the moradores fled away to other lands. This event was described by the capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa, F.Ciriano da Silva, in the following manner:

...two years ago a nation called Mabuzites came and invaded this Kingdom, robbed some cattle and retired; now they returned in three divisions and besieged the whole of Manica. The whole population retired into the mountains where we too decided to retreat in order to see what they would do. On the 31st of last month they invaded the feira, and when they saw that they did not find anything, they retreated and attacked Mutasa. (King of Manyika). But they were not successful as he had built a wall, distrusting this nation. There they made a speech saying that they would return in the time after the grass fires⁸⁹.

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85. Letter from Severino de Almeida to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 28.9.1832. Maco 26. Moc.^A.H.U.
 86. For an interpretation of the word Ngoni, see Ch.VII.
 87. See Chapter VII supra.
 88. Letter from Severino d' Almeida to the Governor of Rios de Sena, 22.6.1832. Maco 26. Moc. A.H.U.
 89. Ibid.

The leader of this Ngoni group is not mentioned but most likely this was Nxaba⁹⁰.

A second mention of the Ngoni appears in a report of 11.8.1832, when they attacked the feira, but did not do much harm. They attacked a prince of the feira Champanze in the morning and the Prince immediately sent an inhamai and two bingas with an axe, an arrow and a cow as his emblem, asking for fire-arms and soldiers from the capitão-mor. It would seem that the capitão-mor was not in a position to conclude an agreement with the Prince. The highest military officer who was then at the feira was a lieutenant, and such officers were not considered competent to do this. As a matter of fact, there was very little by way of military, due to lack of soldos. Ciriano da Silva accordingly communicated his inability to offer help to the prince and returned his emblems. He found it difficult to decide what to do because there were no instructions in the archives of the feira, neither did his predecessor leave any instructions. He too had left for Manyika with very few instructions. The King and his princes continued to ask for cloth on the pretext that they wanted to quieten Changamire or the Landins in order to secure their wives and children⁹¹. The King insisted that these dues should be paid by the vashambadzi "from the north" whom he described as 'thieves', as well as the businessmen who also came to the feira from the north⁹². It is not stated whether Changamire, who was in even greater

90. Liesegang G. 'Ngoni Migrations between Delagoa Bay and the Zambezi' in African Historical Studies, 2, 1970, p.317 ff.

91. Ibid. dated 28.9.1832. Maco 26. Moc.A.H.U. Letter from Almeida to G.G. of

92. Ibid.

/Rios de Sena.

danger⁹³ at this time, had sent emissaries to ask for cloth. It may well be that he did this in an effort to pool the resources of what he probably still considered a part of his empire. However, there is no evidence to suggest that he received anything from Chikanga on this occasion.

The capitão-mor, advised the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena to satisfy Prince Champanze's demands or else the traders would have their merchandise confiscated "because the King says that he is the lord of the land....." in spite of a ban of 9.12.1771, which was passed when Jose Francisco was capitão-mor. This ban described any payment to a prince of the feira as 'robbery'.

This first reported instance of an attack on the feira, which was followed by others of a similar nature, is significant in three ways. First, it suggests that the arrangement which was made in the 18th Century of sending Changamire binzo through the Chikangas was theoretically still operative although no mention of it, indeed even of Changamire, was made since 1795.

Secondly, the incident throws light on what some historians have unhesitatingly called 'raids' - a term which implies predatory activities resulting in chaos and anarchy. It appears that the prince of the feira was

93. After his defeat by Manikuse in 1830, Nxaba fled to Changamire's lands. (see Ch.VIII). Letter from Francisco Miguel Roiz Nunes to José Miguel de Brito G.G. of Moçambique, Sofala, 4.10.1830. Maco.12.Moc.A.H.U. Cópia do Termo do empréstino que esta Feitoria da Fazenda fez de 600 panos ao Príncipe Maromo eleito aclamado Rey de Quiteve pa. ás despesas de Sua coroação 8.12.1831. pasta 7 Moc.A.H.U. Omer-Cooper J.D. The Zulu Aftermath. A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa. Longmans 1966. p.65 Changamire was reported old and senile (Acresentamento 1.6.1831. Maco 21. Moc.A.H.U.) with probably very excessive drinking habits, caught up in the skirts of his courtesans and wives instead of organising intelligently the vast resources and manpower of his empire to combat what was perhaps a few hundred Landins with limited resources. Posterity has not forgiven him for this cowardice at a time when valour was most needed. Apparently his ammunition consisted of four pieces of artillery and two old cannons. 'Trade and the Rozvi Mambo' by N.S.Harris, in Gray and Birmingham (ed) Precolonial African Trade.... op.cit. p.259. footnote 7.

aware that what the Landins wanted was some kind of tribute or protection money. Hence his attempts to buy off the Landins from his land. Thirdly, the Landins directed their attacks on the feira and even then they confined their activities to looting property. They did not attack the Kingdom of Manyika at large but rather the feira. They did the same thing with the feira at Zumbo in 1832, Lourenço Marques and Inhambane⁹⁴.

The report, though based on first-hand knowledge, is silent on the question of young boys and girls being forcibly taken away. We shall see this pattern of attacks directed against property at the feira, and nothing else, repeated in the subsequent years.

The attacks of the Landins on the feiras of Manyika were aggravated by a new development in Barwe - Portuguese relations. A treaty, which was signed at the feira of Masekesa on 9th April, 1833 between the capitão-mor, Severino de Almeida, and Chimombo, Makombe's Ambassador, shows that the rift was about non-payment of madontos⁹⁵. The previous capitão-mor allowed the

94. Letter from Augusto César Rodrigues Sarmento, provisional Governor General of Moçambique. (Paulo Jozé Miguel de Brito died on 28.1.1832) to the Minister and Secretary of State, of the Marine and Overseas Affairs, 17.9.1880 in Arquivo das Colónias, Vol.III, Lisbon 19 , p.55. This was reproduced from some documents in the archives of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. For Lourenço Marques, see Lobato A. Quatro Estudos e Uma Evocação para a História de Lourenço Marques. Junta de Investigações do Ultramar. Lisboa, 1961. p.162.
Admiralty I.D. 1189. A Manual of Portuguese East Africa, London, 1970, p.363.
95. Copy of the Terms. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U. 9.4.1833, signed by: Severino de Almeida, Jozé Maria da Roza Aguiar, Lieutenant Luis Frederico Augusto César, João Manoel Fernandes, an ensign, Antonio Joaquim de Andrade Signature of Francisco Carbone. Quarters of the commandant of the feira de Manica. Ibid. dated 11.4.1833. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U.
Copy of the Terms. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U. Expenses incurred with the princes who dwelt on the trade route from Aruangua to Vunduze - Barwe to Gorongoza boundary. 3 dotins, 28 ardins, 5 Tucurins, 1 sameter, 9 talles, 12 capotins, 1 macose of missanga (beads). The total amount was 583 clothes de lei besides missanga and cabaya bought for 6 maticals 3 lopas bought for 11 maticals, 3 garras bought for 12 maticals, 1 pie of lemos, bought for 6 maticals, 4 pains of calain bought for 4 maticals, 1 bottle of brandy bought for 12 maticals, 1 garrafa of gunpowder bought for ½ matical, 1 gun bought 4 maticals. Signed by: Severino d' Almeida, provisional commandant of the feira, Luis Frederico August César, Francisco Carbone, Manoel Ricardo, Jozé Pereira Ramos, 1st sergeant, 26.9.1833. Maco 30 Moc.A.H.U.
Letter from d' Almeida to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, 30.9.1833. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U. Ibid. dated 20.7.1833. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U.

vashambadzi to pass by to the feira of Masekesa without paying anything to Makombe, and what was worse, each time he was reminded about this he raised the King's hopes by telling him that a new capitão-mor, reportedly at Gorongoza on his way to Masekesa, would clear all the arrears. The capitão-mor was reminded twice but on a third occasion Makombe ordered a sanzo (lit. branch of a tree) to be put on the passage leading to Masekesa. The deliberations of an extraordinary council meeting of the feirantes, which the capitão-mor summoned, resulted in a treaty with Makombe providing for freedom of passage to the feira. It would seem that Bondo, alternatively described as a slave leader or son-in-law of Makombe, had resumed his activities of intercepting Portuguese commerce between the Kingdom of Barwe and the feira of Masekesa. It is perhaps a measure of his importance that the treaty was finally concluded in a land controlled by Bondo⁹⁶.

A second reported attack on the feira of Masekesa took place between the beginning of the negotiations with Makombe and the conclusion of the treaty already referred to. This probably explains why the Portuguese accepted a treaty seemingly disadvantageous to them. A body of Landins, estimated at between two hundred and three hundred, arrived at the feira at

95 Continued... Letter from Mariano da Cunha to Severino d' Almeida, Tete, 22.5.1833. Cod. 1469. No.82. Moc.A.H.U.
 Letter from Mariano da Cunha to the commandant of the villa of Sena, Tete, 22.5.1833. Cod. 1469. No.83, Moc.A.H.U.
 There was no fazenda even in the factory of the villa of Sena from which the capitão-mor could buy freedom of passage to the feira. The moradores, Conselmo Henrique Ferrão, Antonio José d'Almeida, José Alves Barboza loaned the factor soldos equivalent to six months' pay. This is a very important correspondence for Barwe-Portuguese relations in 1833.

96. Copy of the Terms, Maco 30. Moc. A.H.U. 26.9.1833.

night and set fire to the houses⁹⁷. Some people were burnt to death and others were 'robbed' of all that they had. The prince in charge of the feira was desperate. The feira of Masekesa was on the verge of ruin. The capitão-mor and other feirantes, who are described in the report as 'victims', asked for strong, effective military measures to be taken as a precaution against Landin attacks. Alternatively they asked the Governor to help evacuate them to a safe place, possibly Aruangua, where they would remain for as long as the Landins continued to threaten the feira of Masekesa.

It is not surprising that the Landins had such an easy time at the feira. An episode, that took place, best illustrates this point. There were two soldiers and two officers, a sergeant and a lieutenant at the feira. Even these two officers were at loggerheads⁹⁸. A tussle developed as to who was to make out the papers of the garrison. Normally this was done by a lieutenant, but he refused and argued that it was the duty of the sergeant. This lieutenant even defied the orders of the capitão-mor, because being of the first line, he resented the status of the capitão-mor, a man whose category was that of segunda linha. The capitão-mor, therefore, had no choice but to dispense with the lieutenant's services of trooping the colours. This man, who was in charge of the garrison, was 'an official without shame, neither has he fear; in short he was a refined drunkard, all his desire was to go to the villa to drink'. It is related that almost every feirante was aware of this sergeant's excessive drinking habits. When an alarm was raised with

97. Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Mariano da Cunha, to the Commandant of the villa of Sena, 13.7.1833, Cod.1440. No.107. Moc. A.H.U.

98. Letter to the Governor of the captaincy of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Antonio Mariano da Cunha, from Severino d' Almeida, provisional capitão-mor and commandant of the Feira de Manica, 9.5.1833. Maco 30. Moc.^A.H.U.

news of the landins approaching the feira, he was sleeping, drunk, at the door of Felix Mascarenhas. This was the man who was charged with the custody of ammunitions and armaments, indeed of the entire defence of the feira of Masekesa on the eve of a second landin attack on the feira. The capitão-mor, therefore, appealed to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena because he did not want to be 'responsible for two well-known drunkards who were insubordinate.' Apparently the ensign shared the vices of his superior⁹⁹. The military situation at the feira was also discussed in a report of 8.12.1833¹⁰⁰. Twelve European soldiers were sent to the feira; some from the villa of Sena and others from Moçambique¹⁰¹. Even this reinforcement was of no avail, because there were no armaments, no magazines, nor even a prison in which to lock up offending officers. The soldiers of this detachment remained in their houses and if it should happen that some fled away, no one knew, as once happened when four or five soldiers of the garrison fled away one morning. The commandant of the villa of Sena was alerted so that he could catch these soldiers and send them back to the feira to earn their soldos which had just arrived, in order that they might pay for the cows of the prince which they had eaten on credit. The result of this desertion was that it was soon followed by another. All these soldiers were armed when it was learnt that the landins were in the neighbourhood of the feira and they had fled away with their armament during the landin attack¹⁰². The disadvantages of having 'European' soldiers were subsequently regretted by the capitão-mor. European soldiers did not know the language and

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid. dated 8.12.1933 Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

customs of the land. They could, therefore, only be effectively employed within the premises of the feira. They inadvertently violated the customs of the land whenever they went out and accordingly incurred milandos which greatly risked their fazendas.

The Manyika did not "recognise this hardship because they say all the muzungos are brothers." The capitão-mor recommended that it should be a matter of policy that every soldier who left the villa of Sena for the feira of Masekesa should first be initiated into the customs of the land. He further recommended that the two soldiers, filhos da terra, who were with the garrison at the feira, should be retained because of their knowledge of the language and practices of the Kingdom. They would be employed particularly in diplomatic missions to the King or his princes, as well as to the neighbouring kingdoms¹⁰³. This could not be done by European soldiers without serious repercussions.

The second attack on the feira of Aruangua was reported on 9.5.1833. The Landins came through Quiteve, down to the site of the river Zindue which commanded the passage to Manyika, and destroyed the feira¹⁰⁴. These attacks were reinforced by those of Chibindinga, commonly known as Bondo, who was then living in the land of Mussambe in Barwe. He crossed the Zindue in order to attack the vashambadzi on their way to the feira of Aruangua, with the intention to come down to the feira of Aruangua and join the King of Quiteve in attacking the feira.

The immediate result of these attacks on both the feiras of Masekesa and Aruangua was that the pet scheme of removing the feira of Masekesa to Aruangua was abandoned. It is probable that there was collaboration between

103. Ibid.

104. Letter from Severino the Governor, 9.5.1833. Maco.30. Moc.A.H.U.

the Landins and Barwists in attacking the feira. Some Landins had settled in Barwe, where they lived for nearly five years¹⁰⁵. Be that as it may, these attacks rendered the Aruangua site equally unsafe. The moradores of both feiras then toyed with another idea. They suggested the site of Sungo¹⁰⁶ in Gorongoza. The moradores and businessmen of the villa of Sena deliberated the issue at a meeting convoked by the commandant on the orders of the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena. They immediately came to the conclusion that the feira should not be removed to Sungo, rather, more capable soldiers should be sent to Masekesa to improve the military situation¹⁰⁷. The feira of Masekesa was, therefore, not removed. However, both feiras were threatened by an imminent famine and Landin attacks; business was almost nil; the troops of the garrison were skeletal; the officers were confirmed drunkards and too irresponsible to discharge their military duties¹⁰⁸.

The closing of the way to the feira of Masekesa, Bondo's hostile activities and the Landins' attacks on the feira of Aruangua, the attacks on the same feira by the Quitevans and the cool relations subsisting between Chikanga and the Portuguese, compelled the Portuguese community at the feira to buy food supplies from the Kingdom of Vumba. The businessmen used to send the King of Vumba a saguete whenever they sent their agents to his Kingdom. Later, this practice produced the same problems of madontos. In the year 1833,

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105. Liesegang G.J. Beiträge zur Geschte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni in südlichen Moçambique. 1820-1895. p.49.
106. Letter from Cirne to the capitão-mor of Manyika, 10.11.1833. Cod.1440. No.7. Moc.A.H.U.
107. Letter from Severino to the Governor, 10.11.1833. Cod.1440. No.195, Moc.A.H.U.
108. Letter from Severino to the Governor, 8.12.1833. Maco 30. Moc. A.H.U. A letter written the following year refers to much indignation about the behaviour of a lieutenant of the company, lack of respect and obedience. This lieutenant was to be held incommunicado for two months; if this did not achieve the required effect, he would be sent to Tete and from there to Zumbo, where he would be punished according to local customs. This was probably an African or a Canarin from Zumbo.

the King of Vumba closed the ways leading into his Kingdom. His complaint was that the capitão-mor did not give him binzo. The capitão-mor was at his wits' end as to what to do with twenty-four soldiers who continually made representations because they had no salary or food, and he had no more cloths to loan them as he used to do in the past ¹⁰⁹.

A similar demand for saguates was made in 1834 ¹¹⁰.

The Landin-Barwe-Quiteve attacks on the feiras had another very significant result. Lack of resources on the part of the authorities at Quelimane and Sena forced them to relax the ban of 1824, which sought to tighten the administration of the feira ¹¹¹. The businessmen at the feira were complimented for having by-passed this ban and dealt directly with Chikanga without prior permission of the authorities at Sena or Quelimane. Chikanga demanded cloths as usual and the businessmen got together and subscribed sufficient fazenda for his saguata. This should normally have come from the capitão-mor, that is to say from the royal treasure ¹¹². They altered prices which had been operating for years to suit the changed circumstances. It would seem that very little procedure was being followed. Apparently individual businessmen dealt with the King and his princes directly; the system of weights was not observed, clandestine trade was the order of the day. This suited Chikanga and his princes. The fact that quite a number of officers were in debt to the Manyika shows that this form of trade was more

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109. Letter from Severino to the Governor, 30.9.1833. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U.
 110. Letter from Marino da Cunha, Governor of Rios de Sena, to Severino d' Almeida. Macequece, 8.3.1834. Cod.1440. No.195. Moc.A.H.U.
 111. See p.3. infra.
 112. Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Mariano da Cunha, to Severino d' Almeida, 8.3.1834. Cod.1440 No.195.

advantageous to the Manyika than the feirantes¹¹³.

The capitão-mor was also complimented by the Governor for his discretion for not enforcing the provisions of the ban of 1824 and other previous regimentos rigidly. A rigid enforcement of these would have brought about a clash between the Chikangas and the Portuguese, and ultimately the closure of the feira. In order to improve the situation at the feira, the Governor positively instructed the capitão-mor not to allow the vashambadzi to bring cattle into the feira, since these were the motive for the Landins entering the feira¹¹⁴. But, of course, once they were in the feira, they helped themselves to whatever was of interest to them. Only cattle which the King or his princes or any of the neighbouring potentates gave as courtesy presents were allowed to stay in the feira. Hence, the Landin attacks brought about a change in the nature of trade commodities.

The discretionary powers of the capitão-mor were further increased by the Governor's letter of 24.3.1834, as a result of these Landin attacks. Furthermore, the capitão-mor was instructed to handle firmly soldiers who tried to desert the garrison "because they are traitors to the State"; to maintain peace with the Kings, businessmen and the moradores of the feira¹¹⁵. In the case of an unexpected and sudden attack, the capitão-mor was to act promptly "for the good of the Royal Treasury" and convoke a council of resident businessmen and moradores to deliberate on a joint action. In short, thanks to the Landin invasions, the regimentos and bans of the 18th Century

113. Letter from Severino to the Governor, 20.6.1833. Cod.1440. No.195. Moc.A.H.U.

114. Letter from Severino d' Almeida to the Governor, 20.6.1833. Maco 30. A.H.U.

115. Letter from Antonio Mariano da Cunha to Severino commandant of the feira of Masekesa, 25.3.1834, Cod.1440.No.222. Moc.A.H.U.

and early 19th Century were to be interpreted rather liberally.

It would be misleading, however, to exaggerate the impact of the Landin invasions during this period. The Governor, in spite of his abject military state, did not give up control of the feira, as these very wide discretionary powers might suggest. The capitão-mor was not to allow any businessman to trade at the feira without a licence, and the commandants of the villas of Sena and Quelimane were not to issue forged licences, as the ex-commandant of Sena, Caetano da Costa Matozo had done¹¹⁶. In future great care would be taken to ensure that the capitão-mor would be a man of honesty and understanding, "who has the means to circumvent the obstacles from the respective Kingdoms"¹¹⁷.

The belated attempts at reform did not save the Portuguese from a disastrous defeat the following year. The feira of Masekesa was again threatened by the Landins, otherwise known as Vatuas, in 1835¹¹⁸. The Governor of Quelimane took measures to reinforce the defence of the feira. He ordered some citizens of Quelimane to march with their military equipment to Sena. As a precaution, the armazens in the three villas of Sena, Tete and Manyika were well provided with armament. A detailed plan for three divisions was drawn up, "to march, attack and defeat the enemy"; and this plan was given to a colonel and commandant of the first division. The plan provided for a march on 24.11.1835, armament, munitions and guides; rigid instructions to

116. Ibid. He was sent to Moçambique to be tried for this.

117. Letter from Antonio da Cunha, Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, to the Governors of the City of Moçambique, clarifying what the provisional commandant of the feira of Manyika, Severino d' Almeida, had written about the situation in the interior, 29.3.1834. Cod.1440 No.13, Moc.A.H.U.

118. Instructions to the commandants of the divisions, 23.11.1835. Cod.1473. Moc. A.H.U.

the effect that a misunderstanding among the slaves of one division against another must be avoided as this would render the enterprise futile. The march was to be undertaken in the mornings to avoid tiring the soldiers, this being a hot summer season; tents were to be pitched to accommodate armament and ammunitions in case it rained. The Landins had retired to their lands either in Quiteve or Barwe immediately after they had attacked the feiras in 1833. Some of them lived in the vicinity of the Kingdom of Jindwi. Apparently the slaves or vashambadzi of Francisco Henrique Ferrão were willing to serve as guides in locating the Landins.

With regard to tactics, the first division was to occupy a central place as soon as they were near the Landin stronghold, the second division and the third would flank the sides of the first division in such a manner that, when the attack began, the divisions would form a semi-circle in order to catch the enemy in a cross-firing. But, of course, they were to ensure that they would not hurt one another. They were to manoeuvre according to the nature of the terrain¹¹⁹. The commandants of these divisions were enjoined to maintain harmony among the officers, military forces and the slaves "because it is neither the occasion nor the place to remember past differences." Each commandant would be held individually responsible for any violation of the above-mentioned provisions. The march was calculated to take two or three days and such emotive phrases as "defence of the mother land", Portuguese duty to the continent and all the captaincy which has been lost for a long time" were evoked in order to galvanise the soldiers into action. Lastly, the instructions exhorted the commandant who was already -

119. Ibid.

....aware that the fulfilment of these instructions is the first duty of military men, obedience is a motto, doubt is a mistake, delay is a transgression and opposition to the same instructions is a capital crime.¹²⁰.

The circumstances, that is the course of the battle, the number of soldiers involved, are not available in the records, but the feira was attacked in 1835¹²¹ and the Portuguese were driven out of the feiras of Aruangua and Masekesa. The reasons for this defeat must be sought in the maladministration of the feiras as well as in the strained relations between the Manyika and the Portuguese.

I have argued in the preceding discussion that the history of the administration of the feira shows that it is not only the invasion of the Landins which led to Portuguese disaster in Manyika, but also cases of insubordination on the part of the soldiers who were there, lack of capable capitães-mors,¹²² poor communication and co-ordination between the authorities at the feiras and those who were at Sena¹²³, and also a condition of lawlessness which seems to have started round about 1827 and to have developed rapidly after 1830¹²⁴. The Barwists and the Quitevans had rocked the feira of Aruangua before the Ngoni invasions.

It is also possible that the internal discontent which seems to have existed by 1832-33 might have been more important in weakening the resistance of the feira than is generally assumed. It was a policy of the Chikangas to pursue a policy of self-reliance. There is not a single instance of appeal to the Portuguese to intervene in Manyika internal politics. There

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

Omer-Cooper J.D. The Zulu Aftermath. op.cit. p.58.

Botelho J.J.T. História Militar e Política dos Portugueses em Moçambique de 1833 aos nossos Dias. Lisboa, Centro Tip.Colonial (1936) p.154.

122. See this chapter infra.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

is one case of a prince of the feira and not Chikanga himself who appealed to the Portuguese for military help when the Ngoni attacked the feira in 1832. The Chikangas made no secret of their discontent about the tribute and other courtesy gifts which they received. The internal political situation as we have seen on two occasions, in 1830 and 1832, stepped up the demands for saguates. This situation was further complicated by similar demands from the Kingdoms of Vumba and Barwe. The Portuguese could exist at the feiras in Manyika only through the good-will of the Chikangas. They had been given land which was absolutely necessary for their houses and a fortress. They were divorced from the land and consequently the traditional economic order of subsistence agriculture. Only the Manyika and their neighbours could supply this need. The dissatisfaction of the Chikangas expressed itself in another way. They did not make common cause with the Portuguese at the feira against the Ngoni, Barwists or Quitevans. It would not be surprising if some of these princes joined the foreign enemy, considering the threats often hurled at the feirantes to throw them out of the land. When all this evidence is noted, it does not seem that the Ngoni were the deus ex machina who brought the existence of the feiras to a sudden end.

Three other points of departure from orthodox historiography remain to be elaborated. First, the destruction of the feira, as has been shown above, was a long drawn out process. The Ngoni attacks were initiated from 1832, and the feira collapsed in 1835. In all, five attacks were made between these two dates, an average roughly of two attacks a year. Secondly, the attacks were directed at the feiras. This is corroborated by the captain's report of 1834, that what the Landins wanted at the feira were cattle.

Thirdly, the Ngoni attacks have always been assessed from the debit side. It is forgotten that there was, or there could be, a credit side to this historical episode. These invasions led to a great liberalization of the regimentos, to a greater participation by the moradores in policy-making, as was shown by their refusal to change the feira to Sungo in Gorongosa in 1834. In short, the Landin attacks, in a limited sense, democratised Portuguese administration at the villas as well as the feiras of Manyika and Zumbo.

C H A P T E R VI.

PART 1 - MANYIKA-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS
1835 - 1863

"The old Kingdom of Manyika was devastated and the Portuguese abandoned their trading posts there for about fifty years," writes Omer-Cooper in his *The Zulu Aftermath*¹. The above characterisation, which derives from neither documentary nor oral evidence, should not be taken seriously because all the available evidence goes to show that the relations between the Portuguese and the Manyika were not completely broken off after the Portuguese had been expelled by the Ngoni from the feiras of Masekesa and Aruangua in 1835. Nor was the Kingdom devastated in any permanent sense. Only the post of capitão-mor was abandoned, but even then, only for a period of *nineteen* years, (1835-1854). Trade continued, albeit in an extenuated form, between Sena and Manyika. Subsequent events also show that the relations assumed a more commercial character, due to an increasingly important role played by the moradores of Sena in the determination of policy. It was the moradores who were largely responsible for the re-establishment of the feira of Masekesa. Two developments in the politics of Rios de Sena probably explain the reasons for the moradores' greater participation at an administrative level. First, the Portuguese authorities paid more and more attention to the activities of Bonga at Massangano and its neighbourhood during the second half of the 19th Century.

Secondly, Sena itself, on which the administration of the feira of Masekesa depended, and the neighbouring prazos were threatened by the Ngoni more often than the Kingdom of Manyika. The expenses for the expeditions

1. Omer-Cooper J.D. *The Zulu Aftermath. A Nineteenth Century Revolution.* Bantu Africa. Ibadan Series.(ed) Dike K.O. Longmans (1966) p.58.

against Bonga, the expenses incurred in defending the villa of Sena and other Portuguese settlements could only be met with the willing co-operation of the moradores. A greater participation by the moradores in the running of affairs, not only in Manyika but also in the entire region of Rios de Sena, was the price which the authorities at Sena had to pay.

The idea of re-establishing a feira at Sungo in the Gorongosa region to replace the feira of Masekesa was mooted again in 1837 by Antonio Joaquim de Andrade, together with other influential citizens who knew Sena and other districts well². The parecer which they drew up suggested that the feira of Masekesa should be built near the margin of the river Vunduzi, the river which served Quiteve, Sofala and Barwe. An estimate of ten bares of cloth was considered sufficient to meet the initial expenses.

There is further evidence to the effect that contact still existed with the interior. The Portuguese were involved in the succession politics of the Kingdom of Barwe in 1844³. A high-powered mission headed by Thomas Francisco Trexaunt, "One of the first and oldest moradores of Rios de Sena," whose opinion had to be "consulted in matters of such gravity," was sent to Barwe. Trexaunt had performed similar services in 1830. Apparently the trade route into the interior could still be used. There was no news about the threats of Landin invasions. The Governor-General of Moçambique attributed

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2. Letter from the secretariat of the Government of Moçambique, signed by João Antonio Lobao, Major Secretary General, to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, João da Costa Xavier, 28.5.1838. Cod.1477. No.5. Moc. A.H.U.
 3. Letter from Fernando Carlos da Costa, Governor of Rios de Sena, to Galdeno Faustino de Souza, lieutenant-colonel and provisional commandant of the Villa of Sena, 9.5.1844. Cod. 1452. Moc.A.H.U.
Ibid. Letter No.32 regarding the expenses incurred in connection with the envoys of King Chipatata of Barwe. Also see Letter No.29 from a naturalist from the villa of Tete, Doutor Guilherme Peters dated 29.6.1844.

the lack of vigorous commercial activities in the province to 'apathy'⁴. There is more than a hint in the Governor's letter of 1844 that some form of trade and diplomatic contact existed between the themoradores of Sena and Chikanga, King of Manyika. In March, 1845, people from Manyika were expected in Sena. The purpose of their mission, according to a Portuguese account, was to ask for a capitão-mor and a Portuguese flag⁵. They never arrived, due perhaps to internal disturbances.

In October, 1845, the Governor of Rios de Sena instructed the commandant of the villa of Sena to find out whether the businessmen or their vashambadzi, and the inhabitants of the prazos da Coroa, who went to Manyika to trade, encountered any difficulties on the way; further, he was to find out when the Manyika started going to Sena to buy articles 'of absolute necessity' and whether there was any opposition from the Manyika princes⁶. This was a new initiative in response to the abolition of the feira. The commandant accordingly sent emissaries to Chikanga to make proposals about the re-establishment of the feira of Masekesa⁷. It would seem that the primary concern of the Portuguese authorities at Quelimane and Sena during these years was the re-establishment of the feiras of Masekesa and Zumbo⁸.

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4. Letter No.4 from Fernando Carlos da Costa to Anselmo Henrique Ferrão, military commandant of the villa of Sena, 5.1.1844. Quelimane. Cod.1480. Moc.A.H.U. Letter from Joaquim Pinto de Magalhaes, G.G. to the Minister and Secretary of State and of Overseas Affairs, No.1800. 5.2.1844. Pasta 7 Moc.A.H.U.
 5. Cod.1480 Moc.A.H.U. No.24, 25.
 6. Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Galdeno Faustino de Souza, to the commandant of the villa of Sena, 4.10.1845. Cod.1480. No.72. Moc. A.H.U. Letter from the Governor to the commandant dated 5.10.1845. Cod. 1480. No.75. Moc.A.H.U.
 7. Instructions for the provisional Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Major of the Portuguese Army, Antonio Alves de Azevedo Campos, from the Governor-General of Moçambique, Rodrigo Luciano d'Abreu de Lima, 2.6.1846. Cod.1477. (p.127-9), Moc.A.H.U.
 8. Ibid.

This attempt to re-establish the feira of Masekesa in 1845 was frustrated as I have just mentioned by external political developments. These developments were closely linked with events in the neighbouring Kingdoms of Makoni, Vumba and Jindwi. The relations between the Kingdoms of Maungwe and Manyika were affected by an internecine succession war which took place in Maungwe in 1845⁹. Mukunyadze murdered his brother Zendera, King of Maungwe, and usurped the Kingship and ruled with the support of his younger brother, Mukwengere, for nearly five years. A rival claimant to the throne, Nyamanhindi, was living in exile in Manyika¹⁰. He made a bid for the throne with the support of Mudemberwa, the King of Manyika, who immediately sent his brother, Matida, at the head of an army to invade the Kingdom of Maungwe and secure the throne of Maungwe for Nyamanhindi. The army achieved its objective amidst terrible incendiaries and carnage¹¹. The situation was aggravated by the hostility which existed between the Kingdom of Manyika and her two Southern neighbours, the Kingdoms of Jindwi and Vumba. It would seem that this hostility had been existing long before the event of 1845. It is related that, as soon as the Kings of Manyika had gone out to fight the Maungwe, they organised a joint expedition to invade the Kingdom of Manyika. The joint expedition invaded Manyika, killed Mudemberwa, whose only means of defence at this juncture was probably a small guard, and looted the place. Matida, who had been delayed by investiture ceremonies in Maungwe, rushed back to drive the enemy out of the Kingdom. The Jindwis and Vumbas, apparently, put up no resistance, as

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9. Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika people'. MS. 14.1.1. Sby.
Abraham D.P. 'The Principality of Maungwe. Its History and Traditions' NADA. 28, 1951, p.69.
10. Ibid, p.74.
11. Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People' op.cit.
Abraham D.P. The Principality of Maungwe. op.cit. p.69.

often happens in oral tradition. Matida did not pursue the enemy further beyond the frontiers of his Kingdom. This is probably indicative of his relative military weakness.

However, Matida ascended the throne of Manyika on a wave of popularity and Manyika-Maungwe relations remained cordial until 1865, when Vumbi brought about another succession crisis¹². The course and causes of these feuds are merely outlined. One would probably be correct to interpret Manyika-Maungwe conflict in the context of their traditional rivalry. This rivalry in part involved the larger issues of trade and commerce vis-a-vis the Portuguese and the 'Moors' during the 16th and 17th Centuries. The Kingdom of Maungwe was a stronghold of the Moors¹³ while the Kingdom of Manyika was not only a stronghold, but a springboard of Portuguese commercial activities inland, including the Kingdom of Maungwe itself. The affluence of Manyika Kings, an outcome of the Kingdom's contact with the market-orientated long-distance trade, incited the jealousy of her neighbours. The attitude of the King of Vumba towards the capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa, Portuguese businessmen and vashambadzi, in general tends to support this view. He emulated the Chikangas and the Makombes in demanding saguates during the 1830's and, in fact, employed the tactics of Makombe by blocking the passage to the feira of Masekesa, pending payment of saguates by the traders¹⁴.

This war between the Kingdoms of Manyika and Maungwe was significant in two ways. It seems that only the region of Nyamhuka, whose people were noted

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12. Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People' op.cit.
 13. Report on State and Conquest of the Rivers of Cuam to the Viceroy of India, João Nunes da Cunha, by Manuel Barreto, 11.12.1667, in Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. Vol.III.p.487.
 14. See Chapter 4, *infra*.

for their military prowess, was called upon to render military service to the central authority by intervening in Maungwe succession politics. This projected the personality and underscored the importance of this region as against other Manyika regions. It was the army from Nyamhuka which finally destroyed the resistance of the Maungwes and drove out the Jindwis and the Vumbas. As a rule, the Chikangas dealt with the region cautiously¹⁵.

Secondly, it was as a result of this war that an alliance was made between the two kingdoms¹⁶. This meant that the Kingdom of Manyika could then concentrate on solving other problems such as the re-establishment of the feira and the new element, the Ngoni, which was affecting their society.

There is a hint to the effect that the negotiations about the re-establishment of the feira failed, not only because of the external situation, but also due to internal political developments. The evidence for this is scanty and controversial. A certain Doga, apparently, a subject of Barbe, is said to have rebelled against him and, in 1845, asked the Portuguese to allow him to live in the prazo of Inhacaroro¹⁷. Barbe had been described in 1755 by de Mello e Castro as a King of Manyika who offered him ten lands¹⁸. This was probably another name for the Bundo dynasty. It is probably that Bundo had once again renewed his predatory activities. Bundo's activities do not seem to have had any impact on Manyika politics at the time.

15. Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People' op.cit.

16. Ibid. Abraham D.P. The Principality of Maungwe. op.cit. p.69.

17. Letter from the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Manoel d' Abreu Madeira, to Anselmo Henrique Ferrão, commandant of the villa of Sena, 4.10.1485, Cod.1480. No.71. Moc.A.H.u.

18. See Chapter III.

Matida's reign was a relatively peaceful one after all the Maungwe, who had been living there as exiles, had returned to their homeland. It appears that the periods of famine which had been a regular feature of these regions for several years had come to an end¹⁹. An incident, which best illustrates the fact that trade links were not completely broken off with the interior, took place in 1854²⁰. The King of Manyika, as well as the King of Barwe and Maungwe, seized some ivory from Portuguese traders. Makombe's grievance was that one Antonio Maria de Sa e Magalhaes, commandant of the villa of Sena,²¹ had not paid in full for the ivory which he had taken. Apparently the authorities at Sena did nothing to restore the ivory. The Governor of Quelimane sent emissaries to Chikanga, King of Manyika, and Makoni, King of Maungwe, to find out the motive of these reprisals. Emissaries were also sent to Mamane, King of Quiteve, who was described as an ally of the state, to request him to use the influence and prestige which he enjoyed among his neighbours to intervene. The Portuguese were not certain of Chikanga's reaction. This was unnecessary, as 30 envoys were reported at Sena from both Quiteve and Manyika to ask for a capitão-mor. These envoys

19. Abraham D.P. The Principality of Maungwe. op.cit. p.70.

20. Letter from Anselmo Henrique Ferrão to the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, 28.1.1854. in Annaes do Conselho do Ultramarino parte nao official la Serie. (1867) Lisboa. pp.241-242.

21. Antonio Maria de Sa e Magalhaes was dismissed from his office because of insubordination and embezzlement of public funds. He is described in the documents as obnoxious and prejudicial to the province, and he was once imprisoned. When he was an alcidor at Inhambane, he fraternized with the soldiers, ate from the same plate as they did and incited them to rebel against central authority. Several soldiers deserted to join African chiefs. See officios do Governador Joaquim Pinto de Magalhães (1853) Moc. Governo Geral, No.172. 2^a via. 9.6.1853. pasta 12 Moc. A.H.U.

were given shelter as a sign of friendship and the message from the authorities at Sena was well received²². These envoys were maintained at great expense because there was a shortage of food supplies at Sena.

The ivory was restored. King Chikanga gave as a reason for having seized it, that this was intended to remind the Portuguese about 'ancient relations of friendship and commerce,' which existed between them. This was the only effective means he could employ to bring about a dialogue which subsequently took place. Chikanga appointed his son at the head of a delegation of porters, who carried the ivory to Sena, and highly-ranked councillors, who were carefully chosen to accompany them in order to impress the commandant of the villa of Sena about the urgent need to appoint a capitão-mor, and to re-establish the feira of Masekesa. The Portuguese were assured of the old guarantees and privileges of commerce. The prince and his delegation had been instructed not to leave without a capitão-mor²³.

The Governor of Quelimane gave a fantastic explanation as to why Chikanga sent such a delegation.

The natural state of the Negro is war, robbery; and might is right; it is recognised that the establishment of the Portuguese among them is an element of stability and peace, advantageous and satisfactory commerce, and it is for this reason that they come to the Whites.

Recent research into the trade pattern of East and Central African societies has shown the 'harmful effects' which trade could sometimes have on previously flourishing kingdoms. (See Gray and Birmingham).

It is not worthwhile entering into an argument with a Eurocentric-minded, dead Governor, who knew next to nothing about the dynamics of Manyika

22. Letter from the Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Jerónimo Romeiro to the Governor General of Moçambique, Joaquin de Santa Anna Garcias de Miranda, 28.1.1854. In Annaes do Conselho do Ultramarino 1^a Serie parte não oficial. Lisbon 1867, pp.241-2.

23. Ibid.

society. All the available evidence shows that the initiative came from the moradores of Sena. The views of the same Governor, which I shall quote, prove that the re-establishment of the feira was regarded by the Portuguese moradores and authorities as vitally important and a matter of great urgency. The view that the initiative to re-establish the feira came from Chikanga is evidently distorted. There was no doubt that the Chikangas greatly valued trade with the Portuguese, but all the evidence that I have cited hitherto goes to show that trade was going on as usual²⁴. The Chikangas probably benefitted more from direct contact with the merchants, whom they could play one against another and eventually get them to compete in giving presents in the hope of obtaining better trading privileges. The Chikangas could not have yearned for a capitão-mor who would operate under very rigid instructions.

It is not possible to determine how often attempts were made to re-establish the feira of Masekesa, but it was the ardent desire of the government of Mocambique in general to have it operating once again. Marquez de Aracaty de Souza Memoria, Governor General of Moçambique, wanted to re-establish the feira but he died before he could do so. A council, which governed Moçambique in the interim period, gave the question a great deal of thought and sanctioned nearly 60 fumbas of fazendas exclusively for the expenses of re-establishing the feira. The result was disappointing. Another attempt was definitely made in 1853²⁵. 'Perhaps the arrival of new circumstances did not permit that business'²⁶ wrote Anselmo in 1854. This could only refer to either internal political developments, about which there is no hint, or to threats of Ngoni attacks²⁷.

24. Letter from Joaquin Pinto do Magalhães to the Secretary and Minister of State and Overseas Affairs, 31.8.1851. The entire province was reported quiet, despite lack of officers, soldiers and armament. The exception being that of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, where news about commerce was discouraging. Pasta 12. Moc.A.H.U. Letter No.183.

25. Letter from Jerônimo Romeiro to the Governor General of Moçambique, 28.1.1854. in Annaes. op.cit.

26. Ibid.

27. See Part 3 of this chapter, Supra.

The re-establishment of the Portuguese in the Kingdoms of Manyika and Quiteve was regarded as a necessity. The Governor hoped that perhaps this could be done during his lifetime and that "we shall see a new California and Australia as a result of the mines which we could possess there."²⁸ The colonos, soldiers and scientists were ready to go into the interior, and all they needed from the government of Moçambique was permission. This is conclusive proof that the initiative came from the moradores of Sena, who in turn influenced the government to give these attempts an official blessing.

Another event which lends support to the view that the moradores were behind all these moves to re-open the feira is the fact that envoys from both Quiteve and Manyika were at Sena at the same time. I suspect that the moradores of Sena engineered this 'coincidence' in order to impress the authorities at Sena about the need to act urgently. The Quitevans were well-known for their hostility towards Portuguese commercial activities in their Kingdom. It is unlikely that they would have taken the initiative to re-open a feira which they had closed down on their own.

The Manyika case is further clarified by the preamble to Pereira's letter of nomination to the post of capitão-mor. "The King of Manyika agreed to the solicitations of some moradores of the villa of Sena, entertained and welcomed with great demonstrations of pleasure, satisfaction, an envoy who had been sent there."

However, the commandant of Sena communicated to the princes of Manyika and Quiteve (sometime before 1st April) that a colonel of the militia, Izidoro Pereira, had been nominated capitão-mor. The princes were reported satisfied with the choice. Pereira was expected to go to Manyika in August

28. Letter from Jerônimo Romeiro to the Governor-General of Moçambique, 1.3.1854. Annaes... op cit. pp.241-2.

of the same year. The request of the ambassadors of Manyika, and the appointment of Pereira, were perhaps not quite co-incidental, for the latter had made a request for the prazo Gorongosa²⁹. He suggested establishing a fortified feira there, which was to be protected by 80 armed men³⁰. As far as one can see, Pereira did not get this prazo, which was given to his successor ten years later. A patent letter of nomination shows that Pereira was appointed capitão-mor of Manyika and Quiteve "because he possesses numerous armed slaves, enjoys great prestige among the neighbouring regulos and among the citizens."³¹ He was to enjoy the honours, liberties and exemptions which directly derived from that office. His immediate task was to make a report to the government of Moçambique as to how the Portuguese could re-establish themselves "securely in such distant places." Detailed instructions³² were sent to him to the effect that every merchant who intended going to trade in Manyika or Quiteve had to subject himself to Pereira's orders; to fly a Portuguese flag with all customary formalities; he was to maintain neutrality in the disputes of the Chikangas with their princes, and in those of neighbouring Kings; he was to allow only those persons who were resident in Sena to trade either personally, or through their vashambadzi, in the Kingdoms of Manyika and Quiteve; he was not to allow too much liberty, as experience had shown that this tended to destroy commerce in general; he was to employ great wisdom in maintaining friendship and harmony with the regulos and, for

29. Petition of Izidoro Correa Pereira. See enclosure, dated 21.3.1853. Letter from Governor-General of Moçambique. 171 1^a Via. 27.6.1853. Pasta 12 (1852-3) Moc.A.H.U.

30. Ibid.

31. Patent letter of Nomination. Cod.1465. No.506. Moc. A.H.U. 9.3.1854. signed Joaquim Pinto de Magalhães. Approved in Lisbon on 23.3.1857.

32. Instructions to the capitão-mor of Manica, 14.10.1854. Codice 1451, No.130. Moc.A.H.U.

as long as the military force was still too small to protect the three villas effectively, he was not to deploy them in long distances. He was to concentrate on the ivory trade because, as in the previous case, experience had shown that the ivory trade was not so strongly affected as the gold trade by political upheavals³³. The advantages of the ivory trade were obvious³⁴. It did not require possession of a particular site to the same extent as did mining, and therefore there was no need to build a long-term defence system such as a mining community would require. Ivory trade had another advantage over gold trade. It was less subjected to central control of the Chikangas, because only 'a flexible and semi-nomadic association was required, and not a territorially determined fief.'

It was possibly these advantages which induced the moradores of Sena to send their vashambadzi to buy ivory from a place of more than one month's march beyond the feira of Manyika. The expulsion of the Portuguese from the feira of Masekesa brought about a change in the political fortunes of the Portuguese. This affected the pattern of long-distance trade and probably inter-regional trade too. The emergence of new groups, Mzilikazi and Manukuse, must have confronted experienced Manyika gold traders with strong commercial rivals. Competition between the Ndebele and Shangani in matters of trade was observed by Erskine during his journeys from 1873-4. Mzila was 'jealous and adverse to any trade communication' passing to Mzilikazi. His aim was to 'keep the gold produce of Manica to himself'³⁵.

33. Ibid.

34. Gray R. and Birmingham D. 'Some Economic and Political Consequences of Trade in Central and Eastern Africa in the Pre-Colonial Period' in Pre-Colonial African Trade. Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900 (ed) R.Gray and D.Birmingham, Oxford University Press, (1970) p.17.

35. St.Vincent Erskine. 'Third and Fourth Journeys in Gaza or Southern Mocambique, 1873-1874' in R.G.S. No.48, 1878, London, pp.32-40.

The new groups had two advantages over the Manyika gold traders. They were the best hunters and lived in an area where elephants abounded³⁶. The disadvantages attached to this trade were that Mzilikazi was 'a hard merchant to deal with.'³⁷ He was the only one with whom barter could be effected; every tusk of ivory was his and no one dared dispose of one. He demanded a high price for this ivory for two reasons. First, he knew that no one could under-sell him in his extensive dominions and secondly, he supposed that ivory must be precious considering the distance which people travelled to buy it.

Another difficulty was that the Matebele chiefs demanded extravagant tolls and taxed the merchants severely 'for the slightest service obtained, before they are able to purchase a single pound of ivory.' Thirdly, Mzilikazi instituted game laws so that only his own people could hunt elephants. A fourth disadvantage was that of horse-sickness, which commenced as early as September. A combination of these disadvantages gave little inducement to hunters and traders to take advantage of this ivory trade.

Three questions remain to be answered in connection with the ivory trade, which gathered momentum soon after the collapse of the gold trade economy at the feiras. Would it be that the so-called raids, which were carried into Manyika by the Ngoni, were also hunting expeditions? Would it also be that the Ngoni, who lived in Manyika, were invited by Manyika princes and traders to sustain the ivory trade after the collapse of the economic structure, which rested on the gold trade? These questions

35. St.Vincent Erskine. 'Third and Fourth Journeys in Gaza or Southern Mozambique, 1873-1874' in R.G.S. No.48. 1878. London, pp.32-40.

36. The Matebele Journals of Robert Moffat, 1829-1860 ed. J.P.R.Wallis. Vol.II. London, 1945. p.235.

Sunderland-Harris N. 'Trade and the Rozvi Mambo' in Gray and Birmingham (ed) Pre-Colonial African Trade op.cit. pp.252-253.

37. The Matebele Journals of Robert Moffat, 1829-1860 Vol.II. op.cit. p.272

will remain unanswered until more is known about the nature of Ngoni ivory trade.

The third question is, how do we know that the place to which the moradores of Sena and of the feira of Manyika sent their vashambadzi was Butua?

The first evidence is that the 'Abutua' of the 18th Century was also a month's march from the Kingdom of Manyika³⁸. The place is described as beyond the feira. The vashambadzi would have no need to pass through the feira of Manyika from Sena, if this trade had been conducted north of Manyika. The distance cited in 1780 and in 1854 is exactly the same, and the evidence cited in Chapter III in connection with Manyika-Butua trade strongly suggest the place to be present - day Matebeleland.

Secondly, Izidoro Pereira sent a party of traders sometime before 1860 to buy ivory from Mzilikazi³⁹.

Thirdly, the articles of trade found at Mzilikazi's court by Robert Moffat in 1854 are definitely of Portuguese origin and possibly got there from the feira of Masekesa soon after it had been officially re-established in 1854. Some could have come from Zumbo. He saw "blue prints and white linen stored in Mzilikazi's waggon"⁴⁰, and much of the blue linen, which was extremely strong and coarse, "appeared to be from Goa, Surat, etc." Robert Moffat was told by "a good-natured, unsuspecting soul" that these

38. 'Descrição Corográfica do Reino de Manica, seus costumes e Leis.' Cxa.17. Moc.A.H.U. (Anon).

39. Documentos Referentes à Soberania Portuguesa na Manica e Quiteve. Arquivo das Colonias Vol.II. Coimbra. Imprensa Nacional, 1918, p.99
Cod.1461. Moc.A.H.U.

40. The Matebele Journals of Robert Moffat, 1829-1860. Vol.II.op.cit.
p.80.

cloths were obtained from the 'Mashona who purchased them from tribes beyond or east of them.' Besides cloth Robert Moffat saw muskets which were said to have been purchased from Englishmen on the Zambezi. These were 'old English Tower musket' stocks which resembled the ones he had seen in the possession of the Hottentots⁴¹. These muskets were probably sold to Mzilikazi by hunters from the Boer Republic. It is also very likely that some of these, and perhaps the ones which he did not see, came from Portuguese sources. It would appear that the use of fire-arms was rapidly increasing between 1836 and 1848 in Rios de Sena. A ban on the use of fire-arms without licence was passed on 1.7.1848 by the Governor of Rios de Sena, Antonio Alves de Almeida⁴². Subsequent bans of 1854, 1861-64 and 1867⁴³ testify to an increasing demand for guns to hunt elephants. The capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa, Izidoro Pereira, acquired a licence for 150 guns in 1848 and 200 guns in 1854 for his elephant hunters and defence of his prazo and luane (country estate). Most experienced businessmen, both Manyika and Portuguese, adjusted their entre-preneurial skill to meet the demands of altered circumstances.

There is also evidence that ivory trade was carried on between Manukuse and the Portuguese, probably from the feira, long before it was officially re-established. In 1842, Manukuse sent envoys to the Portuguese in Quiteve to the effect that they should send merchants to trade in his Kingdom⁴⁴. He sent them a sample of the trade commodity he wanted and this

41. Ibid. pp 79-80

42. Register of Arms. Cod.1461. Moc.A.H.U.

43. Ibid.

44. Correspondências de Governadores. Cópia dos Termos Processos Accorridos com o Potentado Manicusse e os do Quiteve, Segundo Termo, 22.6.1842. Pasta 7. Moçambique (1842-1845) Moc.A.H.U.

was black missinga and coral falso. It would not be unreasonable to conjecture an interlocking pattern of trade, which spread its tentacles from Sena via Quiteve to Gazaland and from Sena via the feira of Manyika to Matebeleland. It is possible that Inhambane also served Gazaland. The preceding description of the ivory trade which partially replaced the gold trade lies behind instructions given to Isidoro Pereira in 1854 to concentrate on the ivory trade. He was also instructed to maintain a full garrison, to keep arms and ammunitions in good condition, to enter into a book all the expenses and the presents which he received from African chiefs⁴⁵,

These instructions show that the Portuguese had learned that the secret of success in the interior was harmony with the Kings and good administration of the feira. This regimento has idealism and yet is also more realistic and practical than its predecessor of 1771⁴⁶, which was slightly modified by the instructions of the 1830's.

The Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Joaquim de Azevedo Alpoem, put his finger on the problem when he told Pereira that 'the instructions, which the ancient governors of this district gave to the capitães-mor of the feira of Masekesa and Quiteve are today not in harmony with the liberty of commerce.'

Pereira's immediate problem as capitão-mor was to obtain fazendas for saguates to the Kings of Quiteve and Manyika. The amount of saguates which had at first been moderate had grown large by a practice which was started in the 1830's of sending saguates to several princes, including that of the feira. He estimated that these expenses could comfortably be met if the

45. Instructions to the capitão-mor of Manica, 14.10.1854. Codice. 1451. No.130. Moc.A.H.U.

46. See Chapter III. infra.

salary of the capitao-mor was raised from 2,000 cloths, as stipulated in the regimento of 1771, to 5,000 cloths annually. It does not seem that this was done. Rather, he was asked to meet these expenses from his own sources and submit a claim through the normal procedure. Pereira had the intention after his appointment to advance to Manyika in August, of 1854. This was not done. We learn, however, that before 29th November of that year, he had a skirmish with the Ngoni in the prazo of Souza. (West of Sena). The Ngoni, whom he defeated, had allegedly tried to penetrate the Kingdom of Barwe by aggression. They were beaten off and some of them crossed the Zambezi to the north.

Even in 1855, Izidoro Pereira did not have the possibility of advancing towards Manyika -

..because there have been altercations between the pretenders to the throne in that Kingdom; one was deposed by the Landins and another put in his place; and it is said that the people are not even satisfied with this one and expect to find a real heir who will succeed and take office within a short time; then the march of the capitão-mor can begin in greater safety.⁴⁷

The phrase 'was deposed by the Landins' suggests that the Landins had considerable control over Manyika succession politics. This is not borne out by tradition as I shall show later. Pereira presumably lost interest in the founding of a base in Manyika, but still sent messengers, probably in 1860 or 1861, to buy ivory⁴⁸. The trade of Sena with the interior as pointed out earlier consisted largely of ivory. Ferrão's son used to frequent Manyika every May⁴⁹. However, the fact that the journey used to take

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47. Letter from Governor of Quelimane and Rios de Sena, Joaquim d'Azevedo Alpoim, to the G.G. of Moçambique, Vasco Guedes de Carvalho e Menezes, Cod.1463. Moc.A.H.U.
48. 'Documentos Referentes....' op.cit. in Arquivo das Colonias. Vol.II. Coimbra, 1918. pp 91-8 Cod.1461. Moc.A.H.U.
49. The Zambezi Journal of James Steward, 1862-1863. (with a section from his correspondence) ed. J.P.R. Wallis. London, 1952, pp.150-1

Ferrão six weeks⁵⁰ instead of ten days⁵¹, makes one suspect that Ferrão's son went to the same area as the vashambadzi of the moradores, that is 'a month's journey beyond the feira', or alternatively spent the rest of this time trading in Manyika.

I have argued in this discussion that Manyika-Portuguese contact was not completely broken off after 1835. The pattern of trade changed, necessarily, because the feira which used to act as a rendezvous and clearing house was no longer functioning. Consequently, the gold trade, which could only flourish under the feira system, also dwindled and gave way to ivory trade. I have again argued that the re-establishment of the feira was largely due to the initiative of the moradores of Sena, who in effect possessed the material resources and the personnel for such an enterprise. Admittedly the Chikangas responded readily, largely, I suppose, because they anticipated great benefits to be derived from direct contact with the moradores. These hopes do not seem to have been fulfilled. It must have proved difficult for the Chikangas to control the movement of the Portuguese traders who went about searching for ivory beyond the frontiers of Manyika. Certainly, it was much easier to demand saguete from an organised community at the feira, with a capitão-mor who could be held responsible for an infringement of Manyika laws and customs or any delays or shortages in the payment of tribute. The internal succession crisis hinted at earlier might also have influenced Chikanga to react favourably to Portuguese overtures to re-establish the feira, not because Portuguese presence would be an element of stability, but rather a source of supply for the

50. The reason given is that the road 'is hilly and difficult.' The machila could not be used.

51. Conceição A. 'Tratado dos Rios de Cuama' in Rivara J.H. da Cunha. O Chronista de Tisuary. Vol.II (No.13,Jan.) 1867. Nova Goa. p.45.

cloths which he needed to quell the rebellion.

The moradores too must have been disappointed by the ivory trade. They probably incurred large transport charges. This should explain their eagerness to have the feira re-established.

Lastly I suspect that some amount of gold trade, besides ivory, was carried on at the feira or within its vicinity. Old habits die hard. It is inconceivable that the vashambadzi would have given up trading there because of the Landin attacks or the absence of a capitão-mor. This was not a new thing at all. They traded at the feira of Manyika in the 1830's under very similar circumstances and quite often without a capitão-mor.

CHAPTER VI.PART 2 - MANYIKA-AMATSHANGANA RELATIONS1835 - 1863

I have argued in the previous discussion that the Landin invasions of the feiras can be dated with certainty to 1830. There are indications, however, that one or two attacks might have been made earlier. It will be argued in this discussion that the name Landin is applied to the first Ngoni intruders, that is, the groups of Ngwana, Nxaba and Zwangendaba, and the name Vatua was applied specifically to the Manukuse intruders. These names are not interchangeable, although the general tendency is to use them indiscriminately.

Secondly, the view put forward in the previous discussion, that Manyika-Ngoni relations were cordial, will be further developed, with concrete examples. Thirdly, it will be shown that the results of this contact had far-reaching consequences for the future ^{development} of Anglo-Portuguese relations in S.E.Africa.

A meaningful study of Manyika-Ngoni relations must include a general survey of the activities of these groups in the neighbouring regions of Manyika, in particular Quiteve and Cisanga, where they were based for some time.

The homeland of the Ngwanas was probably the valley of what is now Swaziland¹. Nxaba, whose land of birth was more to the South, fled to Swaziland and when both he and Ngwana were threatened by Chaka's army they left the country together, but soon separated. Ngwana stayed for more than two years in the Venda country². Again he fled from there to the territory

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1. Liesegang C.J. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni im Südlichen Mocambique, 1820-1895. P 48
 2. Ibid. P 48

of Changamire where he crops up in oral tradition as 'Mucheheyani'³. He died there and one of his brothers, Magadlela, became Regent. This group seems to have remained there for several years in the territory lying to the north of the Rozvi. He probably conducted the attacks which were made on the feira of Masekesa in the early 1830's. Eventually they were beaten by Zwangendaba, who had followed them there, and they fled to the east where Nxaba was.

Nxaba had moved north and probably crossed the Sabi River in 1826 to settle in Cisanga⁴, one of the territories under the influence of Changamire⁵. He spent almost one year wandering about in the neighbouring lands, demanding taxes especially in the form of cattle. These were obtained from long distances. From there he compelled the colonos of these lands to obey him. He is alleged to have 'robbed', killed men and women, including children, in order to strike terror into the population at large⁶. In this way he

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- of Mucheheyani* (*Beiträge zur Geschichte*)
3. Liesegang got this identification from D.P. Abraham (p.49, footnote, 119) but Nenguwo, S. identified him as Muchechenyana. I prefer the latter. See 'Oral Work Among the Rozvi. A few Notes' in The History of the Central African Peoples. Papers presented at the 17th Conference of the Rhodes Livingstone Institute for research, Lusaka (1963) p.7.
 4. Cópia do Termo do Empréstimo que esta Feitoria da Fazenda N.R. fez de 600 panos ao Principe de Quiteve Maromo eleito aclaimado Rey de Quiteve p^a as despesas de sua Coroação, 8.12.1831. Pasta 7. Moc. A.H.U.
 5. Bótelho Sebastião Xavier. Memória Estatística Sôbre os Domínios Portuguezes na Africa Oriental. (1835). Lisboa. pp.167-172. Liesegang. p.30.
 6. The Invasion of the Vatuas from the coast of Natal, doc. dated 8.12.1831, Pasta 7, Moc. A.H.U. Cópia do Termo do Empréstimo que esta feitoria da fazenda Nossa Real fez de 600 panos ao principe do Quiteve Maromo eleito aclaimado Rey de Quiteve p^a as despesas de sua Coroação, signed by: Sebastião Jozé Rodrigues de Nascimento
Francisco Miguel Rodrigues Nunes
Scipio de Andrade, feitor da Fazenda.
João Felix Antonio Goncalves, Abdula Grekar.

achieved his goal, because everyone who heard about him trembled and fled away. He reached Cisanga without much opposition. He killed the King of Cisanga and committed the same cruelties as he did in the Sabi region, including robberies, seizing of cattle. It is related that from there "he ordered his people to rob and destroy all the neighbouring Kingdoms such as that of Chicanga, 'Xangamire', up to the interior"⁷.

From there Nxaba went to Quiteve, where he invited every prince with his family to his quarters. It is related that he killed every one of them except two grandees, who were wedded to his opinion.

Apparently Murivane, a kinsman of the mentioned princes, who aspired for Kingship, engineered this tragedy in order to assume power⁸. After some time Murivane attacked the two princes referred to above.

An arrangement was made whereby Murivane and others paid tribute to Nxaba as King. He himself went to live in High Quiteve, that is in Bandire, and left behind some of his followers.

When Manukuse, King of the Gaza, heard that Nxaba had established himself in Cisanga he marched there in person in the year 1830, with a great army of Vatuas. He is alleged to have committed the same 'robberies' and hostilities as Nxaba did in the transit lands⁹. He defeated Nxaba. Nxaba retired to the lands of Changamire with an army and Manukuse established himself in Cisanga where he ordered "every African of that land to be disciplined

7. Ibid.

8. In 1830 the Landins supported a rival party, Caringa. See letter from the Governor of Sofala, Miguel Roiz Nunes, to the Governor General of Moçambique, José Miguel de Brito, 4.10.1830. Maco 12. Moc.A.H.U. The main purpose for the Landins going into Quiteve, according to this letter, was to 'seek the mines of copper and trees which produce missanga'.

9. The Invasion of the Vatuas from the Coast of Natal, 8.12.1831. Pasta 7. Moc.A.H.U.

and armed with assegais and shields and taught them to fight according to Vatua tactics. Afterwards he ordered these people who had been trained, together with some of his Vatuas, to attack the villa of Sofala in 1836¹⁰.

Probably Nxaba, in alliance with Magadlela, leader of the Ngwana group, had previously attacked Zwangendaba and beaten him. Zwangendaba, who clearly had the intention to settle permanently in the territory South of the Zambezi, decided to cross the Zambezi after his defeat, an event which took place during an eclipse of the sun in 1835¹¹.

It would appear that in 1840 Nxaba and his supporters were destroyed on the upper Zambezi¹². According to tradition, Magadlela fought on Nxaba's side against Manukuse but did not accompany Nxaba on his way to the Upper Zambezi, rather he remained in Barwe, probably for four or five years, before he crossed the Zambezi in 1839¹³.

10. Ibid.

11. Most writers are agreed on the year 1835, but differ on the dates. Barnes J.A., Politics in a changing Society. A political History of the Ft. Jameson Ngoni. London. Oxford University Press. (1954) gives the date as 20.11.1835 p.3. Cf. Poole. Crossing of the Zambezi. p.290. He gives the date as 19.11.1835. Barnes thinks that this calculation was based on a misrepresentation of the astronomical, as distinct from a civil date. Young agrees with Barnes. Cf. Nautical Almanac 1835. 2nd ed. p.470. See Gray R. Annular Eclipse Maps in J.A.H., Vol.IX. 1, 1968. pp.147-157. citing G.Lancaster's 'Tentative Chronology of the Ngoni; genealogy of their chiefs and notes' in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute XVII (1937) 78, Dr.Gray gives the date as 20.11.1835. Caetano Montez and d'Orvellas dispute the above date. They give 1825. See Montez C. 'As Invasoes dos Mangunis e dos Machanganas'. Mogambique, Documentario Trimestral. 1937. Ayres d'Orvellas. Racas e Linguas Indigenas em Moçambique. Memoria apresentada ao Congresso Colonial Nacional. III Imprensa Nacional 1905. p.36.

12. G.J. Beitrage zur Geschichtedes Reiches der Gaza Nguni im Sudlichen Moçambique 1820-1895, op.cit. p.49.

13. Ibid.

These groups which allegedly specialised in raiding their neighbours' cattle are often indiscriminately referred to as Landins. This confusion may be solved by raising two questions: Who were these Landins? What was the nature of their relationship with other African potentates with whom they came into contact, particularly in Manyika?

Answers to these questions should help differentiate the Landins proper and the Vatuas.

Sebastião Xavier Botelho defined the Landins as the people who invaded and usurped power from the Thongas 'of all the lands along the coast.' These were easily identifiable by their robustness and propensity to 'kill' and 'rob'¹⁴. The invasion of the Landins started in Lourenço Marques to the North through Inhambane.

This clearly refers to the Ngoni groups of Nxaba, Ngwana and Zwangendaba which followed the above-described route. No mention of the word Vatuas is made at this stage until the emergence of Manukuse; a clear indication that, although the two names were later confused, they, in effect, referred to two different entities of intruders. The former is quite often referred to as Mabvites or Mapxittes in the Portuguese records¹⁵. This name was later

14. Botelho S. Xavier. *Memória Estatística op.cit.* pp.132, 174-5, 176. Also see Smith A. 'Delagoa Bay and the Trade of South Eastern Africa' in Gray and Birmingham *Precolonial Trade...* 1970. pp.267-9.
15. Letter from the captain of the militia to the Provisional Governor of Rios de Sena and Quelimane, 22.6.1832. Maco 27. Moc.A.H.U. Letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena, Mariano da Cunha, to the Governor General of Moçambique, 10.11.1833. Codice 1440, No.7. Moc.A.H.U. The same Governor uses the term Landin in his letter to the commandant of the villa of Sena, Tete 13.7.1833. Cod.440. No.107 Moc.A.H.U. The Portuguese used these terms inter-changeably, 'Mapzites ou Landins'. See letter from the Governor of Rios de Sena to the Governor General of Moçambique, 8.12.1833. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U. Letter to Mariano da Cunha from Severino d'Almeida, Commandant of the feira of Macequece, 20.7.1833. Maco 30. Moc.A.H.U. He uses 'Mapxites ou Landins.'

applied by the Shona to the people of Manukuse and later of Mzilikazi. It is now used in a derogatory sense.

A considerable amount of controversy rages round the origin of the word Vatua for the people of Manukuse, who should otherwise be known as Amatshangana¹⁶.

The nature of the Landins' relationship with the Chikangas has been dealt with in the previous discussion and only that of the Amatshangana remains to be dealt with. As in the case of the Landins, the raids which were allegedly committed by the Vatuas were not as destructive as they have been painted. They were probably an occasional affair which took place as an economic necessity or when tribute was not forthcoming or some problem to be urgently solved had arisen.

It does not seem that Manyika-Amatshangana relations were as clearly defined as was the case in the neighbouring Kingdom of Quiteve. There is a tradition that Manukuse sent his emissaries to capture cattle in Manyika but, because the cattle kraals had been removed to the mountain tops during the invasion of Zwangendaba, they then returned empty-handed to Manukuse, who had established his palace at Madhlakazi in Musapa¹⁷.

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16. It is clear from the discussion that the feiras were attacked by people who invaded Lourenco, Inhambane and entered the Sofala region. These were referred to as mapxites or Landins and the word Vatua does not appear until 1835. It was used to designate Manukuse's group. According to Dornellas it was derived from Mutua-ba-tua, a Zulu or the Zulu in Ronga. Batua was a designation for a Bushman. Thus, the invasion came from a region which these inhabited, and the invaders had in their language a cracking noise which characterised it. Perhaps these were the reasons why the name was given to them. D'Ormellas p.36. For another view see Caetano Montez. 'As Invasões dos Mangunis e dos Machanganas' in Moçambique, Documentario Trimestral (10) 25-55, 1937.
17. Tsamba Ye China. 'Rusape' Reader No.2 Masoko e Va Mambo Ve Kare Ve Nyika i no ne Ngano Shoma. S.P.C.K. Sby. Lovedale Press, 1949, p.59.

Manukuse devised a plan whereby he sent 'an army of occupation' to demand taxes from the Manyika people from time to time. Another tradition is even more specific about the nature of this relationship. Some Vatuas lived at the King's Court, others lived scattered about in the various regions of Manyika, Jenya, Zindi, Samanga, Nyamhuka, Karombe and Murahwa¹⁸. They married the local Manyika girls and sometimes even daughters of highly-placed councillors and princes¹⁹. Both traditions are silent as to the exact nature of the tribute paid to Manukuse and the manner in which it was paid. In 1891 there was a suggestion that 'Manica, ever since the date of its conquest, has always had a Vatuva Governor, whose name was Magurguana, in the time of Manicusse and of Mzila'.²⁰ Historial facts and Vatuva practice of vassalage do not support this statement²¹. Tradition records Magigwana as 'Ngungunyana's Commander-in-Chief of the Armies'²². Magigwana was not a resident Vatuva governor at the Court of Chikanga. He features much later in Gaza politics.

The system of vassalage as it was practised in Quiteve with Murivane in 1830 and in 1842 with the regulo of Ampara, was that these two paid tribute to an army which was sent there from time to time. This was done quite often. An example of this may illustrate this system of tribute as it was operated by Manukuse²³.

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18. Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People.' MS 14/1/1 Sby.
 19. Ibid.
 20. Letter from Senhor du Bocage to Sir G. Petre, Foreign Office, Lisbon, 3.7.1891. P.R.O. CP6086. Enclosure in No. 234, p. 250.
 21. For the process, much later in the Century, see P.R.O. Confidential Print, 5970. 1888-9. Letter from Vice-Consul Drummond to the Marquis of Salisbury. L.M. 17.11.1888.
 22. 'The History of the Amatshangana as told by Ingwagazi and Mazikwabo to Wilson Mhlanga'. in NADA No. 25. 1948. p. 73.
 23. Correspondências de Governadores. Cópia dos Termos Processos accorridos com o Potentado Manicusse. 20.6.1842. Signed by Cipriano Baptista, Monteiro etc.

On 20.6.1842 Manukuse sent a delegation to the Portuguese authorities at the fortress of Sofala to announce that all the lands to the south of the villa had been conquered and that he intended to advance into the interior, northwards and westwards. Manukuse demanded four hundred pieces of cloth and that the regulo of Ampara should pay tribute. Compliance with these demands would be rewarded by friendly relations. Two businessmen were sent to give Manukuse presents and to make sure that the trade route was open from Quiteve up to Sofala²⁴. The businessmen in Quiteve subscribed pieces of cloth for this purpose. Two days later, Macate, commander-in-chief of the forces of Muzila, Manukuse's son, occupied the lands of Mambone after committing a terrible carnage, and demanded that all the regulos should obey him. The use of the word obey possibly implied tribute. Whether it was in Manyika, Quiteve or Sofala, it would appear that this was the nature of tribute, an extension of the protection racket of their pastoral southern origin. This protection racket was in the case of Manyika paid in the form of cattle, sheep, goats, skins of genetta felina nzudzi and other animals. Manukuse, therefore, does not seem to have had a resident at any of the chiefs' courts. He certainly charged the chief of the army staff or his subordinates at the head of small parties, with the duty of collecting tribute and conducting negotiations on his behalf. Such was the duty of Maputumana, his chief of staff, between 1842 and 1845²⁵. A look at the manner in which Manukuse obtained tribute from Sena and the neighbourhood will confirm the above-mentioned conclusion. According to reports of eye-witnesses, there were not more than 40 Landins in Chupanga in 1844 who used to receive cloth from the administrator of the prazo, and had,

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

at the beginning of October at the latest, retired to the vicinity of Sofala 'on account of the coming winter'²⁶. They had also been present in the vicinity of the mouth of the Zambezi and had requested cloth as gifts to their King. These requests were resented by the Governor of Rios de Sena, who made an attempt to stop payment of tribute to the Landins, who claimed "that they have been sent to fetch cloth to clothe their King, Manukuse, who lives on the other side of Inhambane." In December, 1846, and again in 1850 he promulgated orders forbidding payment of tribute. In a report of 1858, we learn something about the amount of tribute paid to the Landins. Richard Thornton saw as much as \$400 (£80) being paid to the Portuguese administration by a prazo holder of Chupanga and about \$500 to the Landins. It would be misleading, however, to read all these figures purely as tribute, because it would seem that the Landins earned some of their money by settling disputes among the villagers or by coercing, at the request of a prazo holder, reluctant colonos to go to work²⁷.

Tradition records two waves of tax-collecting expeditions into Manyika, one during King Matida's reign (1845-1865) and another during King Bvumbi's reign. (1865-1870)²⁸. This tradition should not be taken too literally. It probably refers to two memorable episodes rather than tribute collecting expeditions. However, Selous, in a retrospective account, implies that the Vatuva incursions were concentrated on the countries of 'Mtoko, Mangwende, Makoni, Svosve and Makwirimba'.²⁹ The Kingdom of Manyika was left out of the list. This probably refers to Mzilikazi and his people. In any case it seems that once settled in Manyika, the Amatshangana identified themselves with the local

26. Liesegang (1967) p.69.

27. Ibid.

28. Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People.' MS.14/1/1 Sby,

Masoko E. Manyika Nedzimwe Nzvimbo. Kwa Tsambe Series No.5 London. The Sheldon Press 1952. pp 16 and 19. Samuel Mhlanga, Tsamba Ye Cina, 'Rusape' Reader, Series No.2 Masoko e Vamambo Ve Nyika i no ne Ngano Shoma. The Lovedale Press (1949) pp.57-60.

29. Colquhoun, A.R. Matabeleland: The War and our Position in South Africa, London, The Leanhall Press Ltd., p.21. Also see Selous F.C. Travel and Adventure in South East Africa, London, 1891, p.345.

people. Arrangements for collecting tribute must have followed the pattern which the Vatua practised in the neighbouring regions, that is small parties were occasionally sent to the chief to collect it and in some cases cattle or goats might have been paid in gratitude for their expertise or mercenary services.

Tradition records an episode which took place when the Amatshangana were suspected of trying to stage a coup d' état³⁰. The details of this event, on which two traditions are agreed, have an authentic ring; a woman communicated to Mutasa's councillors what her husband used to say to her under the influence of liquor, about the Amatshangana's plan to destroy all Manyika male population and leave women only; how the King ordered a general brewing of beer in most villages of his regions; the giving of a sign for a general massacre of the Amatshangana present at these beer drinking parties. Only two are said to have escaped extinction. On a second occasion it would appear that a fixed sum of 100 head of cattle annually was stipulated³¹. This was not much when the size of the Manyika Kingdom is taken into account and when it is considered that the wealth of an African King, generally speaking, was reckoned in cattle.

It is evident from the preceding account that Manyika-Vatua relations were on the whole as cordial as any between sovereign and vassal, despite the fact that this relationship was vaguely defined.

The imprecise nature of Vatua suzerainty over Manyika gave rise to the Anglo-Portuguese imbroglio of the last quarter of the 19th Century. Vatua

30. Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People.' op.cit.

31. Mhlanga S. Tsamba ye Cina. op.cit. p.60.

suzerainty over Manyika was contested by the British and this in turn involved questions of boundary demarcation, particularly of the auriferous region of Manyika. This was later settled on the battlefield on the very grounds of the 'Feira de Manica.'

The economic consequences of Manyika-Vatua contact must be evaluated from the point of view of Manyika trade relations with Sena. It was from Sena that the opulent moradores sent their vashambadzi to the interior of Manyika. It was Sena that bore the brunt of the defence of the feira of Masekesa. The collapse of Sena economically directly affected the market-orientated trade of the Kingdom of Manyika. An attempt which was made to locate the root causes of the decline of Sena revealed that the attacks of the Landins and Vatuas were some of the causes but by no means the only ones. The defence situation was described by Stewart in 1862 in this way:

..in the N.E. corner of the town stands the fortress. This is a mud creation forming an oblong square of about 180 yds. by 120 or 130 yds. The walls are from 12' to 14' high. At the four angles are four bastions with embrasures for five guns; that is to say, where the embrasures can be seen. The fort, however, is in a state of ruin, though some effort is being made to repair it;.... on one bastion were three old rusty guns and on another, two.³²

The fortress had forty soldiers, probably all Africans. It is not surprising therefore, that the Vatuas felt encouraged to demand more and more cloths to the tune of 'thousands of reis.'

How far was the ordinary Manyika influenced culturally by the Vatuas? This is not easy to assess since there are no records about this. Nevertheless the Vatuas, at a later stage, seem to have recruited soldiers from the local population. It is not reported whether or not these recruits ever returned

32. The Zambezi Journal of James Stewart (ed. Wallis J.P.R.) op.cit. p.150.

home after assimilating the culture of the Vatuas. I have not had evidence to this effect, but I strongly suspect that these recruits served as porters, vashambadzi or hunters to promote the ivory trade between Manukuse and the Portuguese moradores at the feira of Masekesa and elsewhere.

Tradition, as well as written records, suggest, as I have shown in this discussion, that Manyika-Amatshangana relations were cordial. The picture drawn by Livingstone, which has been generally believed and applied to all lands where the Vatuas were found, of 'a scene of great desolation' with 'nothing to be seen but human skeletons or putrid bodies of the slain'³³, is misleading and mischievously unhistorical.

33. Letter from D. Livingstone to Tweeder, 2.11.1861. MS.7792 National Archives of Scotland. (Communicated to me by J.M. Chirenje).

CHAPTER VI.

PART 3 - THE END OF THE VATUA INCURSIONS
AND REASSERTIONS OF PORTUGUESE AUTHORITY
IN THE HINTERLAND OF MANYIKA

The rise of Manuel Antonio de Souza as capitão-mor of the feiras of Masekesa and Quiteve was an inevitable development of a trend which had started between 1836 and 1854, whereby public affairs were decided by eminent citizens among the moradores of the villa of Sena. This was so, as has been shown in the previous discussion, because of the influence they had derived from their wealth and power. Attempts, as we have noted, to alter the situation in 1854 remained, by and large, paper intentions. The new capitão-mor, Izidoro Pereira, did not even know the feira of Masekesa, even though it was his direct responsibility. Portuguese authority at the feira dwindled to almost vanishing point during the period 1836-1863. Manuel Antonio de Souza was appointed to restore Portuguese influence and trade at the feira of Masekesa and the interior in general. But, before he could settle down to tackle the problems of the feira, he had to contend with the Vatuas.

The task of putting an end to the Vatuva incursions and the duty of reasserting Portuguese authority at the feira of Masekesa was left to this Goan, Manuel Antonio de Souza, who succeeded in opposing fearlessly the 'warriors' from the South¹. This, among his other military exploits, contributed to his prestige and reputation as a man of 'indubitable courage', extraordinary ambition and, above all, as a distinguished politician-diplomat, who studied fruitfully the erstwhile African political scene. An

1. Coutinho Azevedo J. Relatório do Barwe, Lisboa (1902) p.6.

analysis of the circumstances leading to his rise as capitão-mor of the feiras of Masekesa and Quiteve is essential if we are to appreciate the truths and half-truths which have been said about him². The decadence of the institution of capitão-mor and consequently of the feira, and his knowledge of the interior, coincidentally contributed to his rise as capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa.

It is difficult to assess how much he knew of African politics, but there can be no doubt that he had a fairly reasonable contact with the African traders of Manyika before he was appointed capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa. He arrived in Moçambique in 1853 to inherit a legacy, which his uncle, Felix Mascarenhas, had left in Moçambique, and his property in Manyika³. He first settled at Sena, but later, after marrying his uncle's daughter, Maria Anastásia Mascarenhas, went to settle near the banks of the Pungwe River (Aruangua), where he constructed an aringa⁴ and devoted himself to commerce and elephant hunting. His activities in hunting and in the ivory

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2. He was born on 10.11.1835 at Mapuca in Bardez. He went to a seminary of Rachol in Salute, where he lived up to the age of 16 years. His tendencies were otherwise. From youth he exhibited his inclination for arms and hunting. These tendencies revealed themselves in his active and adventurous spirit. He felt the blood of his ancestors boiling in him. The tranquility of his birthplace did not suit his temperament and he took advantage of a legacy left by his uncle in Moçambique and Manyika to look for adventures and opportunities for a vast field of action. See Tenente Barinhas. Manuel Antonio de Souza Capitão-mor de Manica e Quiteve. (1835-1892) Região Militar de Moçambique e Escola de Aplicação Militar, Notícia Historia, 1962. Homenagem a M.de Souza pelo 1º Centenário do seu Nascimento in Manuel Antonio de Souza, Herói de Massangano. Lourenço Marques. 1936. p.17.
 3. Felix Mascarenhas was an important businessman in Manyika. His signature appears frequently in the petitions of the 1790's. See Chapter III.
 4. For definition, Newitt M.D.D. and Garlake P.S. 'The Aringa' at Massangano' in J.A.H. VIII, 1, 1967, p.133. footnote 1.

trade⁵ took him to Manyika, Quiteve and Barwe where he is known to have hired women and, probably, children to collect alluvial gold on the banks of the Ruenya River⁶, and controlled strategic routes to the regions of Inhangone, Mussongue and Parigara, which produced wax. It seems that he got involved in the local politics of these Kingdoms and probably extorted obedience from some of the parties.

In 1853 the Governor of Quelimane asked for help from Manuel Antonio de Souza in order to pacify his area⁷. Souza immediately sent auxiliaries. This was the beginning of his era of cooperation, which he gave to the authorities of Moçambique until his death. His ability to give military succour to the Governor soon after his arrival suggests that Souza, inter-alia, inherited a large number of armed 'slaves' from his uncle.

The Vatuas used to cross the Pungwe on their way to the hinterland of Sena⁸ and Manuel Antonio de Souza, with his aringa on the bank of the Pungwe⁹, was strategically placed to observe and to gain a clear knowledge of their activities¹⁰. In this way he knew, as no Portuguese did, the intrigues of the interior, the customs and psychology of the people¹¹ and he

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5. Documentos Referentes à Soberania Portuguesa na Manica e Quiteve in: Arquivo das Colónias, Vol.II, 1918. Coimbra, Imprensa Nacional. pp. 99-102.
 6. Manuel Antonio de Souza, Herói de Massangano, op.cit. p.17.
 7. Barinhas Manuel Antonio de Souza. op.cit., (the pages of this booklet are not numbered).
 8. Liesegang G.J. Beiträge Zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni im Südlichen Mocambique. op.cit. 1820-1895, 1967 pp.68,198. (footnote 199)
 9. Barinhas Manuel Antonio de Souza. op.cit.
 10. Manuel Antonio de Souza, Herói de Massangano. op.cit. p.17.
 11. Ibid.

utilised intelligently the prestige which he had acquired to befriend African Chiefs¹². His later dealings in Barwe politics, involved his marriage with the King's daughter and also his role in a conspiracy which overthrew Makombe.

The second factor which contributed to his rise to the post of capitão-mor is connected with institutional changes in the post of capitão-mor. It has been stated elsewhere that, during the second half of the 19th Century, the capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa and Quiteve never went to Manyika in person¹³. Instead he sent his agents to trade on his behalf. His example was immediately followed by the moradores of Sena, who began to send large quantities of fazendas to the interior. Their vashambadzi were escorted by armed slaves under their command or that of an employee¹⁴. This seems to have been the standard practice in the Portuguese villas of Quelimane, Tete and Zumbo¹⁵. The capitães-mor and sargentos-mor maintained a certain authority, largely because of the prestige which derived from the amount of force they could muster. As a rule a capitão-mor limited himself to arming the sipaes, whom he called together in times of danger¹⁶.

There was another development which changed the character of the institution of capitão-mor. For centuries, the capitães-mor and sargentos-mor were the only authorities charged with the important responsibility of keeping

12. Ibid.

13. Documentos Referentes.... in Arquivo das Colíncias, Vol.II. op.cit. pp.99-102.

14. Ibid.

15. Manuel Antonio de Souza, Herói de Massangano. op.cit. p.16.

16. Ibid.

the Portuguese flag flying in the interior and along the East Coast of Africa¹⁷. Their appointment was not governed by a rigidly defined formula. Very often these were officials of what was known as segunda linha¹⁸, who grappled under great difficulties -

...with little success, frequently without energy, hampered usually by illness, lack of means to restore order, difficult communications, lack of soldiers worthy of the name, lack of incentive, lack of necessary preparations or protection and almost always ignorant of the language and dialects¹⁹ of the local people with whom they had to deal¹⁹.

The functions of capitães-mor were, at the beginning of the institution, exercised by suitable persons from an accepted social class and with the necessary qualifications, such as military qualities and a knowledge of the interior, or being a 'white businessman.'²⁰ They performed various functions²¹. Their power and prestige enabled them to give orders to Africans who lived within their areas of jurisdiction, to the sipaes, regular and extra-ordinary, and to mobilise the manpower of the region in which they lived. They exercised 'despotic powers and real authority', during the 19th Century. With such forces at their disposal, they were able to utilize them for good or for bad²². This was possible, especially when they worked under minimum superintendence. Their authority, when civil, was limited exclusively to business with the indigenous population and could be advantageously used only when the

17. Countinho João Azevedo de, Manuel Antonio de Souza. Um Capitão-mor da Zambezia. Pelo Imperio No.20. Lisboa (1936) p.5.

18. The post or title of Segunda Linha (second line) was generally honorific. It was given to ex-soldiers or people who had performed meritorious service, other than military service, to the State.

19. Countinho João Azevedo de, Manuel Antonio de Souza, op.cit. p.5.

20. Ibid. p.6.

21. See Chapter II, *infra*.

22. Countinho (1936) p.6.

persons invested with such power had 'conscience and prestige'. Some capitães-mor used it to advantage, others to disadvantage, especially after the beginning of the 19th century. Gradually this old generation was replaced by a new one, very often of mesticos, who did not maintain the traditions of their families, neither did they care much about the decorum appropriate to their status²³.

João Azevedo Countinho's view about the degeneration of this institution of capitão-mor is that 'permanent contact with the inhacuanas' and colonos turned (cafrealizam-se) these mesticos into Africans and consequently this led to a loss of all notion of dignity, to a practice of the 'hideous secret rituals of mysterious indigenous societies'²⁴. Countinho writes as if a notion of dignity were a prerogative of the Portuguese and to be African, a total negation of dignity and honour. He forgets that it was the Africans who manned Portuguese garrisons²⁵ and that it was the Africans who fought most of the Portuguese wars in this region²⁶. Countinho's thesis cannot be accepted, because a study of the history of the prazo system shows that it was these mesticos who, in spite of their ritual ceremonies and superstitious 'abuses', retrieved Portuguese fortunes in Rios de Sena and north of the Zambezi²⁷. In fact, Portuguese failure in Rios de Sena was

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23. Ibid. Letter No.339 from Pinto Basto to the Governor of the Territory of Manica, 8.12.1889, Cópia Reservada de Documentos oficiais Trocados entre companhia de Moçambique e o Governo...1900 Lisbon. 1901. pp.130-1.
24. Countinho (1936) p.6.
25. Sena was a typical example. There were 40 soldiers in 1861-2, all of whom were probably Africans. See the Zambezi Journal of James Steward (ed.J.P. R.Wallis) op.cit. p.151.
26. For the role played by Africans in these wars, see João Azevedo de Countinho. Relatorio do Barwe. Lisbon,1902. Botelho J.J.T. História Militar da Descoberta a 1833. 1934. Botelho J.J.T. História Militar da Descoberta aos Nossos Dias. Castilho A. Relatorio da Guerra da Zambesia em 1888. Lisbon,1891. Eça D. História das Guerras no Zambeze. (1953) Vol.I and II.
27. See discussion by Allen Isaac. 'The Prazos da Coroa 1752-1830. A Functional Analysis of the Political System' Studia No.26. 1969. p.168. The Bongas, Pereiras, Matequenha (Mariano Vaz dos Anjos) and Manuel Antonio de Souza, the most successful 19th Century prazo holders, 'underwent an extensive culture change.' Newitt M.D.D. The Zambezi Prazos in the 18th Century. (Ph.D Thesis, London 1967)

precisely due to their inability to relax this over-bearing sense of imagined superiority and personal dignity²⁸. The secret of success, which they never grasped, lay in acceptance of these African rites, ceremonies and superstitions. Some kind of Luso-tropicology, and not racial fanaticism, was all that the situation demanded²⁹.

Another factor, which, according to Countinho, undermined the institution of capitão-mor and, therefore, contributed to the rise of Souza, was that the capitães-mor, during the 19th Century, thought of themselves as miniature Kings and behaved despotically towards people under them. In some families the office and functions of the capitão-mor became hereditary³⁰. Quite often they were interested in amassing wealth and abused the resources and prestige attached to their post, employed Africans without paying them to hunt elephants and to trade in gold dust, pastas maticais, penas in distant places and to build caravans. Others were employed as porters³¹.

The fact that the capitães-mor served in the remote interior or far away from supervisory authority meant that the latter was powerless to take any effective, corrective measure. These were the circumstances which led to an appointment of Manuel Antonio de Souza. He possessed in abundant measure two of the three qualities of capitão-mor - military and knowledge of the interior. He certainly was not a 'negociante branco', neither was he

28. For a penetrating analysis of Portuguese attitude toward the indigenous population in Moçambique in general see Boxer C.R. Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415-1815. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965, pp.41-45.

29. For a concept of Luso-tropicology see: Freyre, G. Portuguese Integration in the Tropics. Lisbon, 1961.

30. Countinho pp.6-7

31. Ibid.

a 'filho da terra'. A capitão-mor normally was a rich resident of Sena. The legacy which Manuel Antonio de Souza inherited from his uncle rendered him an eminently suitable candidate for the post.

After the death of Izidoro Correia Pereira in 1863³², Souza was nominated capitão-mor of the feiras of Masekesa and Quiteve by the Governor-General of Moçambique, José Tavares de Almeida. He was instructed to take positive steps to rectify the abuses which had crept into the institution of capitão-mor, to restore commerce in the interior, particularly that of gold and ivory trade³³ in order to rectify a situation in which the capitão-mor, (Pereira was a notable example) functioned very much like an absentee landlord³³. Souza was instructed to reside for a part of every year in Manyika and Quiteve, to build a house there, to build a fortress and to see to it that it was properly garrisoned³⁵.

The size of the garrison was increased from the official figure of 12 to 20 or 30 soldiers with one officer. This was to be complemented by the usual paraphernalia of sovereignty - the flag. The relationship between the capitão-mor and Mutasa was clearly defined as of old, that is, whatever went on between the King and the capitão-mor had to be ultimately sanctioned by the authorities at Sena.

The Portuguese repeated one of their pious utterances concerning the prosperity of their commerce and their dependence on the goodwill of Mutasa. Hence, Manuel Antonio de Souza was instructed to promote peace in

32. Codice 1461. Moc.A.H.U.

33. 'Documentos Referentes...' in Arquivo das Colonias. Vol.II. Coimbra 1918 pp.99-102.

34. See Section 1 of this Chapter.

35. 'Documentos Referentes...' Vol.II in Arquivo das Colonias. op.cit. pp.99-102.

the interior with the Kings and princes. He could retaliate an attack only in cases of extreme necessity. Even so, he had to exhaust all conciliatory means before resorting to arms³⁶.

The presence of the Amatshangana in the neighbourhood of Sofala dictated a closer coordination of the defence of the villas. To this effect Souza was intructed to keep in close contact with the governor of Sofala, to see that harmony existed between them, to give him all the moral and material support he needed. This was to be done with any other villa or Portuguese establishment³⁷. Special care was also taken to cultivate friendship with Mzila. Both parties had recently signed a treaty whereby

..the said chief will impose on all his subordinates the utmost respect and esteem towards all muzungos (Portuguese) in transit throughout his dominions; and whenever there may be a breach of this rigorous duty, he, Mzila, shall immediately order the culprit to be severely punished. As an example, the privileges of this clause (2) are extended to all the negroes from the dominions of the Crown, who may visit Mzila's territories in public or in private service, whether by order³⁸ of the government or of any inhabitant of that country.

The respect and esteem 'imposed' by Article 2 applied in specific terms to Inhambane, Sofala, Bazaruto, Manyika, Sena, Tete and to the Portuguese 'brethren' at Lourenço Marques³⁹.

Manuel Antonio de Souza was, accordingly, instructed not to antagonise the forces of Mzila. Every effort was to be made to make him

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. P.R.O, Confidential Print. Inclosure in No.99. Gaza-Sofala and Manica Treaty with Mzila. Dec.2nd.1861. 'Territorio de Gaza, Sofala e Manica' Documento No.4 in Termos de Vassallagem nos Territórios de Machona, Zambezia e Nyassa, 1858 a 1889. Lisboa. Imprensa Nacional. 1890. p.12. 'Condições de Vassallagem do regulo Muzilla 'territorio de Gaza''. Doc.No.92. in Memoria e Documentos Acerca dos Direitos de Portugal aos Territórios de Machona e Nyassa, 1890. Lisboa. Imprensa Nacional p.247. Botelho J.J.T. Historia e Militar..... aos Dias. Lisbon,1936. p.80

understand that the Governor, the moradores of Lourenço Marques, Inhambane, Sofala, Sena, Tete and Quelimane were all subjects of His Majesty, the King of Portugal, and that he could not be in peace with some and in war with others, because,

..all are brothers and sons of the same King and for that reason it is necessary that he should maintain peace with all and that he should make peace with all dependent subject regulos, unless Mzila wishes that everybody should make war on him, which will undoubtedly take place if he does not respect all the Muzungos from whatever land ⁴⁰.

Apparently, Isidoro Correia Pereira, the previous capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa, did not succeed in officially re-establishing the feira. The treaty I have cited refers to Portuguese residents in various settlements as being brothers. The fact that none is mentioned in connection with Manyika probably implies that there was, at this time, no Portuguese resident at the feira of Masekesa.

However, when the newly-appointed capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa and Quiteve was in Quelimane for his investiture ceremony, the Landins, estimated at 3,000, attacked his aringa on the bank of the Pungwe and looted his property to the tune of 36,000 reis ⁴¹. Some of his servants fled and others died in these attacks. He returned from Quelimane with merchandise valued at 15,000 reis to start trade again and to recapture his authority and popularity among the Portuguese ⁴². He defeated them and occupied the principal points, and also reconstructed the old aringa. He

39. P.R.O. Confidential Print. Inclosure in No.99. op.cit.

40. 'Documentos Referentes....' in Arquivo Das Colónias Vol.II. Coimbra 1918, pp.102-99

41. Barinhas Manuel Antonio de Souza. op.cit.

42. Ibid.

could not hold his own very long because the Governor of Quelimane delayed in sending him the fire-arms he had promised. He retreated first to Chemba, and finally established himself at Gorongoza⁴³ where he organised his sipaes. In these moves, Manuel Antonio de Souza showed good military sense by occupying Gorongoza - a natural barrier against the Amatshangana incursions into Barwe, Massangano and Tete. He combated the 'Vatuas' and the Landins on a number of occasions. It is on account of this that he acquired great prestige among the Portuguese community, because it was then free from the attacks of its so called implacable enemy⁴⁴. His fame as a warrior spread out into the interior as a great chief. It is not the purpose of this discussion to give an account and assessment of Souza's life, but this much can be said, that his defeat of the Amatshangana should not necessarily mark him out as a military genius. They were a tired nation, which started and sustained this march into the neighbouring territories long before Souza was born.

43. Prazo Gorongoza was named after Mt.Gorongoza, whose altitude is more than 6,000 ft. (Andrada P. Commissao 1882, unpublished MS) and situated about 100 miles South west of Sena. (Robin Series No.4. The Zambezi Papers of Richard Thornton ed.E.C.Tabler,1963 Vol.II.p.279). It was bounded in the South east by the lands of Barwe through which one had to pass on the right side in order to get to Manica from Sena. The River Vunduzi, an affluent of the Aruangwa, separates Gorongoza from Barwe and from Manyika. It was in this angle, formed by the Pungwe and the Vunduzi Rivers, that many problems of passage arose. The Prazo of Gorongoza was often attacked by the King of Barwe.

For the strategic importance of Mt.Gorongoza in the subsequent history of this region see: Countinho Joao de Azevedo. Memorias de um Velho Soldado Marinheiro e Soldado de Africa. Lisbon,1941. pp.551-554.

Manuel Antonio de Souza repelled these attacks and installed four cannons and 30 men to guard the place which was in any case naturally impregnable. See: 'Expedicao a Manica' Villa Gouveia, 9.2.1885 in Das Colonias Portuguesas, Lisboa, ano 35, No.51, pp.48-49.

44. Manuel Antonio de Souza, Heroi de Massangano. op.cit. p.17.

Souza did not transfer the old feira from Masekesa to Gorongoza as his predecessor, Pereira, wanted to do⁴⁵. It would seem that he re-established it in the same place, but, like his predecessor, he does not seem to have frequented the feira. The remnants of the building which Paiva de Andrade saw when he visited the place in 1882⁴⁶ suggest that a number of moradores went to settle at the feira of Masekesa. It was more or less 50 metres long, with four small bulwarks at the sides. Some of the houses were still intact. They were made of stone and mud. The stones, which were generally big and well placed, remained in their places and the mud had been washed away by the rains. It seems, therefore, that Souza re-established the feira with a few modifications.

Souza's rise to power as capitão-mor of the feiras of Masekesa and Quiteve was significant in that it restored the old contact, which had been lost, between the Manyika Kings and the capitão-mor. Manyika-Portuguese relations henceforth centred round the personality and activities of Manuel Antonio de Souza.

Soon after his return from Quelimane, he sent Mutasa presents of cloths, beads, copper or brass wire in exchange for gold and ivory. These presents were immediately followed by some guns of various descriptions. Mutasa reciprocated these gestures of friendship by sending his sons with gold and ivory to Souza⁴⁷. It is not clear from Machiwenyika's account

45. See Section 1 of this Chapter *infra*.

46. Andrade P. *Comunicação e Proposta do Socio e Parecer da comissão Africana da S.G.L. 1882* (an unpublished MS of 14pp).

47. Machiwenyika J. 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People'. *op.cit.*

whether this exchange of gifts was a business transaction or courtesy gifts of the old type, which I have mentioned in several places. The fact that Mutasa's son was at the head of this delegation lends a diplomatic character to the mission and these articles were most likely in the nature of gifts.

Manuel Antonio de Souza's rise to power as capitão-mor of the feira of Masekesa and Quiteve also marked the beginning of effective checks to Amatshangana incursions into the hinterland of Sena and probably Manyika.

I have argued in the foregoing sections of this discussion firstly, that Vatuva attacks and the expulsion of the Portuguese from the feiras of Manyika in 1835 did not destroy completely the commercial contacts between Sena and Manyika; that there was no period of Vatuva domination of the Kingdom of Manyika in the sense of a defined relationship between vassal and sovereign. The political impact of the Vatuva presence in Manyika was not very great. The 'deposition' of a Manyika King, which was alluded to in 1854, must be looked at in terms of possible shifting short-term alliances between the various Vatuva residents and partisan Manyika groups, very much like the Portuguese^{did} in the 18th Century and later in the 19th Century. There is no evidence that Manukuse, or any of his sons, ever approved or rejected an investiture of a Manyika King, as he did in Quiteve. It is possible that the Vatuvas, who lived in Manyika, might have attended audiences and ceremonies on invitation but they remained essentially aloof. Neither do we get from tradition, nor a reading of the literature of the period, an impression that the King and the Vatuvas in general interested themselves in succession politics of the Kingdom. It is possible that some individual Vatuvas might have intrigued with a rebel prince of Mutasa or any of his councillors, but intrigue does not seem to have been used as a consciously-calculated policy for

gaining political ends.

Lastly, I have argued that the influence of the moradores of Sena increased as the Vatuas stepped up their offensive against the Villa of Sena and its hinterland. The authorities needed money, ammunitions, manpower and ideas. They were nearly all agreed on one thing; a re-establishment of the feira of Masekesa, but did not have the material resources to execute this scheme. The result was that they turned to the moradores of Sena for help, and the latter capitalised on Sena's impotence to rise to the occasion. The logic of such a situation was the rise of one of the moradores to a position of prominence. It was a timely availability in 1863 of both such a man and the conditions, described earlier in this account, which made a real difference to the course of Manyika history in particular and the entire region of Rios de Sena in general. Manuel Antonio de Souza's rise to an eminent position in 1863 had important results for Manyika and the Portuguese community. To start with his multiple alliances with Africans became an effective means of disseminating and consolidating Portuguese influence in the interior. His treaty with Muzila in 1863 is a typical example. Succinctly put, the Portuguese authorities depended on Souza to maintain their authority at the feira of Masekesa. He revived the role of the capitão-mor, studied Manyika customs, advised the Portuguese authorities, for example Paiva de Andrade in the 1680's, and extended Portuguese influence into the neighbouring Kingdoms, for example Maungwe, Mtoko and Mangwende. But where this could not be done amicably and peacefully, he used force on Mutasa in 1890, which led to his short imprisonment, war and ultimately partition of the Kingdom of Manyika between the English and the Portuguese.

C H A P T E R VII.

EPILOGUE

Certain issues have emerged from the previous discussions.

First, it has been argued that Portuguese commercial unreadiness, rather than civil wars among the Kingdoms of Makaranga, Manyika, Madanda and Quiteve, was responsible for the small volume of trade during the first half of the 16th Century; and that the period 1575-1695^{was}, characterised by Portuguese aggression, not only in the Kingdom of Manyika, but also in the neighbouring Kingdoms in the West and East. It was during this period that the institution of the Feira developed fully. The feiras were used by the Portuguese as jumping-off points for further incursions into the interior. However, the feiras performed other functions both then and in the subsequent centuries. They acted as clearing centres for trade commodities, both Manyika and Portuguese. The feiras not only contributed to the improvement of economic and juridicial relations among the Portuguese and Africans in Rios de Sena, but also constituted an important addition to the social and cultural aspects of life. In an era when almost every community in the empire of Monomotapa lived attached to the land, the normal gregarious instinct, inherent in men, ought to have found in these meeting points a unique opportunity to expand itself. It was in these feiras that news of what happened elsewhere was diffused among traders from Butua, Makaranga, Barwe and Quiteve. It was again at these feiras that merchants from outside these Kingdoms recounted the marvellous and terrifying stories of their adventures. A mushambadzi (middleman) became a vehicle of legends and ideas which he collected in his perambulations and disseminated in the

regions which he frequented. The feiras, by bringing together people who, though they lived near one another in geographical terms, were politically and culturally alienated, fostered a spirit of solidarity, recognised common interests and, to some extent, promoted a sentiment which transcended tribal and local loyalties.

The pattern of the feiras varied considerably, very often due to the absence or presence of the vashambadzi and merchants, but occasionally the variation was due to wars and/or bad relations subsisting between a territorial prince and a Portuguese capitão-mor and his fellow residents. The smooth functioning and the pattern of the feiras depended on the nature of the relations between the King of Manyika, his princes and traders on the one hand, and the Portuguese community on the other, throughout the period of Portuguese-Manyika contact. In the 18th Century, the feiras began to lose their importance as vantage-points of 'conquest.' Nearly all the other feiras disappeared except those of Masekesa and Zumbo, whose administration was reformed during the second half of the century. This time, however, the Portuguese were unable to dominate the African Kings, and were even unable to repeat successfully their King-making exploits of the previous Century. In fact, they were themselves hardpressed to survive and to make the feiras pay. The question then is: why did this change in Portuguese commercial activities take place at a time when the North of the Zambezi was being subjected to the same sort of 'conquest' and 'anarchy' that the South bank had experienced in the 17th Century? The answer to this may not be the power of Changamire as is normally maintained, but, first, the lucrative nature of the ivory trade North of the Zambezi; secondly, the discovery of, and scramble for, the bares by the Portuguese; thirdly, the power of Barwe. The reports of

Francisco de Melo e Castro, Governor of Rios de Sena from 1745 to 1750, and the results of recent research into Maravi history show conclusively that the ivory trade north of the Zambezi had become very important during the 18th Century. In order to draw conclusions, on the third aspect of the problem, the power of Barwe, one must ask; what happened to Barwe during the 17th Century? As yet very little is known of Barwe-Portuguese relations during the 17th Century, but the scanty evidence available suggests two things; first, that the Kingdom of Barwe came under Portuguese control and influence, probably after its 'conquest' in 1659. In the 18th and 19th Centuries, Barwe regained independence, although retaining close ties with the Portuguese. The relations between the Portuguese and Manyika were, to some extent, dependent on what was happening in Barwe. In the year 1769, the Portuguese conquered part of Barwe for a short time, but were forced to give it up. In the 19th Century, the Portuguese fomented discord between two rival claimants to the Macombeship. The change in the fortunes of the feiras may be partly explained by Portuguese dependence on the Kings of Barwe to allow passage through their lands to the feiras of Masekesa, Makaranga etc. I have also argued that this shift in Portuguese trading activities in Manyika and her neighbouring Kingdoms was relative. A considerable amount of gold was obtained from the bares of Manyika during the 18th Century. De Pereira's 'Noticias' and Galvao's 'Diario das Viagens...' are eloquent testimonies. Portuguese lamentations about a 'decline' in trade due to the hostility of the Chikangas and Makombes occur occasionally in the first half of the 18th Century and become increasingly commonplace during and after the second half of the 18th Century. The administrators did this for the tactical reason of dramatising their difficulties, real and imaginary, in order to elicit appreciation and admiration for their work.

I have also maintained that the political and economic control which the Chikangas exercised was limited to certain mines; the Portuguese minas de graos e palhetas. These mines produced the best type of gold. In this connection it has also been noted that the Portuguese were not allowed to own or operate bares in Manyika, as they did North of the Zambezi.

The impact of Portuguese trade on Manyika economy remained one of subsistence, though market-orientated, with each household responsible for the supply of the group's needs. Three Manyika units of currency, the dokodo (dogado), gono and hoe, were constantly used, but equated to the Arab-Portuguese mitical, pasta and cruzado. Internal trade was not a specialised occupation, although there was a tendency on the part of traders to neglect agriculture in favour of trade. It has also been argued that the role of the mushambadzi became increasingly important during and after the civil wars of the last quarter of the 18th and the first quarter of the 19th Centuries.

I have also tried to show that the basic conflict between the Portuguese and the Manyika throughout this period, 1575-1863, was founded on Portuguese ignorance and consequent violation of Manyika social customs and political traditions. It was, for example, this lack of understanding which led them to solicit in vain for Changamire's intervention in Manyika affairs. Neither did the Portuguese realise the true policy of Changamire, for the latter did not want to antagonise the Chikangas. The efforts of the successive Chikangas to determine and restrict the sphere of Portuguese commercial activities in Manyika often led to conflict. The Chikangas suffered from two obvious limitations in their attempts to achieve complete

control over the gold-mining industry. They valued Portuguese trade as an important source of royal income, without which it would have been difficult to pay the men who fought for them in times of war. This meant, therefore, that there was a limit beyond which they would not impose punishments, sanctions and restraints upon the Portuguese community, if only to keep trade alive. Secondly, in spite of their vigilance, gold found its way to the Portuguese traders through individual Manyika vashambadzi, traders, etc., who were scattered about in the Kingdom and about whose operations little or nothing was known by the Chikangas.

I have further maintained that the Ngoni attacks during the first half of the 19th Century were neither directed against the Manyika nor the Portuguese per se. Initially the Ngoni wanted the cattle which were being sold at the feira of Masekesa, but once the attacks had started, it was not easy for them to confine their actions solely to cattle raiding. The Ngoni responsibility for the destruction of the feira of Masekesa has been exaggerated by historians. The collapse of the feiras of Masekesa and Aruangua can only be properly explained in terms of Portuguese relations with the Kingdoms of Barwe and Quiteve. It was the Barwists and Quitevans who dealt crushing blows to Portuguese trade at the feiras of Masekesa and Aruangua in the late 1820's.

It has also been shown that the relations between the Manyika and the Portuguese persisted after the expulsion of the latter. This period, 1835-1863, of administrative breakdown of the feira of Masekesa, which resulted in non-official contacts between the two communities, witnessed a greater participation by the moradores in the affairs of Rios de Sena. It was this trend which culminated in the rise of a 'strong man', Manuel Antonio de Souza, in 1863. His emergence, however, did not constitute a complete

break with the past. He did not introduce social and institutional innovations. He utilised the old structure of capitão-mor, mushambadzi and feira. There were, at this time, only two feiras South of the Zambezi, those of Masekesa and Quiteve. The latter existed only in name. The feira of Masekesa was, therefore, the only important Portuguese foothold worth speaking about in the interior. There are a number of reasons why it escaped the fate of extinction suffered by the other feiras. The destruction of the feiras of Makaranga in the previous century by Changamire Dombo; his successors' controversial policy of 'exclusion'; the proximity of the feira of Masekesa to the outlet to the Indian Ocean; and, most important of all, the successive Chikangas' policies of encouraging trade between their subjects and the Portuguese gave the feira of Masekesa a unique and lasting vigour. The Portuguese used it again with very limited success in the late 19th Century as they had done in the 17th Century, as a jumping off point to conquer the interior and the neighbouring Kingdoms West and East of Manyika.

A P P E N D I X.

The following tables are intended to give an example of the military strength, population etc. of the Portuguese community in Rios de Sena in general but in particular at the feira of Masekesa in the kingdom of Manyika. I would have liked to give an example of this type for each of the periods I dealt with in the Chapters but such tables are not available. As the Tables show, the problem of military weakness and lack of permanent Portuguese residents at the feiras was not peculiar to the feira of Masekesa. It also applied to the entire Portuguese administration in the Rivers of Sena.

- Table 1 (P249) Table showing the settlers in Rios de Sena. See Manyika especially.
- Table 2 (P250) Portrays the military situation in terms of personnel, arms and ammunition.
- Table 3 (P251) Clearly brings out the problem of lack of personnel to run the trading posts efficiently. Attention is drawn to the feira of Masekesa in June, 1782.
- Table 4 (P252) General picture of the Portuguese military preparedness at the feira of Aruangwa in the Kingdom of Manyika, (1824) in theory.
- Table 5 (P253) Shows the actual state. Note that there were only two registered soldiers who lived in their own houses and not in barracks.
- Table 6 (P254) Garrison of the feira of Masekesa in 1803.

MAP OF THE MORADORES OF RIOS DE SENNA.

DIVISIONS	TE TE						SE NA						ZUMBO						MAMICA						QUELI MANE					
	Portuguese from Portugal	Portuguese from India	Portuguese born in the land	Natives of Goa	Natives of the land	Portuguese from Portugal	Portuguese from India	Portuguese born in the land	Natives of Goa	Natives of the land	Portuguese from Portugal	Portuguese from India	Portuguese born in the land	Natives of Goa	Natives of the land	Portuguese from Portugal	Portuguese from India	Portuguese born in the land	Natives of Goa	Natives of the land	Portuguese from Portugal	Portuguese from India	Portuguese born in the land	Natives of Goa	Natives of the land	Portuguese from Portugal	Portuguese from India	Portuguese born in the land	Natives of Goa	Natives of the land
Married men	10	2	6	4	4	8	2	3	12	8	"	"	"	5	"	1	"	"	"	"	7	2	4	5	1	7	2	4	5	1
Single men	"	"	6	12	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Widowers	5	"	1	"	"	3	"	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Widows	"	"	6	"	"	"	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Sons	9	"	12	4	"	5	2	2	6	10	"	"	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	5	"	2	3	1	13	3	9	18	10
Daughters	"	"	3	2	"	"	1	"	3	"	"	"	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	1	1	3	1	3	1	1	3	1	11
TOTAL	24	2	33	26	4	17	5	7	21	19	"	"	"	7	"	1	"	"	"	"	13	3	9	18	10	21	9	18	10	219
Soldiers	6	1	"	3	"	6	"	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	5	2	"	"	"	5	2	"	1	25
Merchants	4	"	2	6	"	4	"	2	3	1	"	"	"	5	"	1	"	"	"	"	1	"	1	1	1	1	1	2	30	
Farmers	8	1	9	5	2	"	2	2	4	4	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	3	2	1	"	"	"	44	
Clerks	"	"	1	2	"	"	"	"	1	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	4
Surgeons	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	1
Block letters	"	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	2
MUSICIANS	"	"	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	4
Aficates(?)	"	"	"	2	"	"	"	"	1	2	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	7
carpenters	"	"	"	"	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	2
carpenters	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	2
Blacksmiths	"	"	"	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	1
Without Offices	9	"	21	7	2	5	3	3	9	10	"	"	"	2	"	"	"	"	"	"	7	1	5	8	5	7	1	5	8	77
TOTAL	24	2	3	26	4	17	5	7	21	19	"	"	"	7	"	1	"	"	"	"	13	3	9	18	10	21	9	18	10	219

TITLES

TOTAL

FROM ANTONIO DE MELLO E CASTRO TO MAR TINHO DE MELLO E CASTRO. 3.6. 1782. Title, Capital of Rios de Senna.

MAP OF THE AUXILIARIES, MILITIA AND VARIOUS POSITS AND PEOPLE EMPLOYED IN RIOS DE SENA.

DIVISIONS	TATE			SENA			ZUMBO			MANICA			QUELIMA			TOTAL	OBSERVATIONS	
	Ineffective State	Complete State	Appointments in one year	Ineffective State	Complete State	Appointments in one year	Ineffective State	Complete State	Appointments in one year	Ineffective State	Complete State	Appointments in one year	Ineffective State	Complete State	Appointments in one year			
Rank																		
+	Captain of Rios de Sena	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	The Max CX indicates that the post must be maintained. The Colonel of the army of the villa of Sena earns 180 panos. He has the duty to maintain the fortress of the Villa and to pay the soldiers. The cottage which accommodated the two companies of soldiers were 11 in number.
	Colonel of the army	1	1	0	1	180	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	
	Lieutenant Colonel	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	
+	Commandants of Villages	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	
+	Commandants of towns	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Captains-Major of War	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
	Captains-Major of Barracks	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	
	Captains-Major of Crown Lands	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	
	Tax Collectors	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Masters of Campaigns	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
+	Lieutenant Colonels	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	
+	Serjeants-Major	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	
+	Adjutants	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	
+	Captains	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	
+	Lieutenants	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
+	Ensigns	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
+	Serjeants	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	
+	Corporals	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
+	Drummers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
+	Soldiers	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	
	Captains-Major	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Serjeants-Major	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Captains	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Ensigns	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Corporals	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
+	Factors and constables-Majors	1	1	0	1	480	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
+	Clerks of factories	1	1	0	1	180	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
+	Clerk of the Emperor (Monomatspa)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
+	Interpreter of the Emperor	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
+	Interpreter of the state	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	TOTAL	24	24	940	18	0	18840	4	4	0	0	2	180	450	45	1280	93	

PREPARED BY
ANTONIO DE MELLO E CASTRO.
Tete. 3.6.1782

GENERAL MAP OF THE COMPANY OF SOLDIERS WHO GUARD THE FEIRA OF ARUANWA.

QUARTERS OF THE FEIRA OF ARUANWA
 1. 7. 1824.
 (Caxa da Moc A-HA. Lisbon)

The lieutenant together with four soldiers went to send where 16 others had been sent to collect clothes for the garrison.

OBSERVATIONS

Officers of the Infantry	MAP OF THE ARMAMENT BELONGING TO THE COMPANY.										Artillery						
	Ready in action	Belonging to the guard	In use	Registered	Unregistered	In barracks	In their houses/kuts	Prisoners.	In effective state	Missing		In complete state	New prisoners	In transit	In Royal service	Deserters.	Dead
Captain	1																
Lieutenant		1															
Ensign																	
1st Sergeant																	
2nd sergeant																	
Corporals.	2	1	1														
Drummers	1	1															
Soldiers	22	4	20	2				1	50	2	60						
TOTAL	30	6	21	8				1	61	10	75						

Small hammers	24
Wad-hooks	23
Leather cover for guns.	22
Cannons.	2
Small guns	2
Carriage belts	40
Shoulder belts	40
Cartridges	40
Carriages	40
Cartridge boxes	40
Arrows	30
Bandoleers	40
Bayonets	40
Ramrods	40
Arms.	40
ARMAMENT	
slings	1
Catana's - small daggers.	1
Ramrods	2
coupling rods	2
gun-carriages belonging to the company	2
PERSONNEL OF THE COMPANY.	2

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MAP OF THE GARRISON OF THE FEIRA OF MASEKESA

PREPARED BY THE PROVISIONAL CAPTAIN, DIOGO LUIS RODRIGUES
(CAIXA G. MOC. A. H. U. LISBON)

16th JULY 1803		Captain	Ensign	Serjeant Quarter- Master	Corporal	Drummer
C O M M A N D	GUARD READY FOR SERVICE	1		1	1	1
	REGISTERED LICENCES				1	
	DITTO					
	FULL SOLDIERS					
	PRISONERS					
	IN EFFECTIVE STATE	1		1	1	1
	MISSING					
	IN COMPLETE STATE	1	1	1	1	1
A R M A M E N T	Arms in good condition with ram rods					
	Arms in good condition					
	Baquetas and four cases					
	Ram rods					
	Gun slings					
	Cartridge boxes					
	Leather cover for gun locks					
	Small Hammers					
	Wad-hooks/cleaning rods					

4 Arrobas of gun-powder

2 Arrobas of minium (red lead oxide) bullets and one arrabal

220 Fire-arms

600 Cartridges

100 Cartridges at the Feira of Aruangua

G L O S S A R Y .

Ardian	A blue cloth
Arratel (p-eis)	a pound i.e. 16 ozs.
Arroba	A measure of 32lbs.
Bar	Mining camp, a measure of weight of 16 arrobas i.e. about 518 lbs.
Betangil, bretangil	A cotton cloth , usually blue, red or black,
Binga	Manyika Royal Court.
Cafila	Caravan
Calaim	Very fine Indian tin.
Capitao-mor	Administrative authority of a territory.
Capotin	A blue cloth.
Chuambo	A fathom of cotton cloth
Colono	A farmer especially one settled on land belonging to someone else.
Corja	20 pieces, e.g. of cloth; i.e. half of a bar.
Cruzado	Portuguese coin, originally of gold worth 400 reis in 1517, and worth half a crown in 1710.
Danga	Cattle kraal
degradado	A transported criminal
Dogado	From Cimanyika dokodo (gold) a traditional Manyika unit of weight.
Dotin	An uncoloured cotton cloth
Estado da India	State of India, a name applied to the Portuguese possessions East of Cape of Good Hope; of which Mocambique formed a part until 1752.
Faracola	Weight of about 18 Portuguese Pounds.
Fazenda	Merchandise
Fazenda de lei	Monopoly goods
Feira	Market
Feirante	Merchants resident at a feira
Filhos da terra	Sons of the land.

Fumba	A large load of cloth worth 456 panos
Inhacuaa	Chieflet
Inhamai	Page
Luane	Country Estate
Machila	Palaquin, or travelling hammock
Machira	Indigenous coarse cotton cloth
Madontos	Payment made to secure passage.
Makorokota	Councillors
Mambo	High Ranking ruler
Manamucate	Ambassador
Milando	Law-suit, complaint
Moradores	Settlers
Mukaranga	Junior wife
Mussambaze/Mushambadzi	Middle man or hawker
Mussito	Stronghold of escaped slaves. The word was sometimes applied to the leader of the 'rebels'
Mitical, matical, mithqal	A weight of gold equivalent to about 155 oz. worth at the beginning of the 17th Century, $1\frac{1}{2}$ Xerafin.
Mutore	It is equivalent to a third of fumba, i.e. 152 panos.
Muzimo	This word is derived from a Shona word mudzimu - departed spirit
Mozungos	Europeans, Portuguese
Muzvare	Princess
Mukaranga	Title by which a second wife of Chikanga was known
Muzinda	Deputy
Negociante Volante	Wandering merchant especially an unlicensed one
Nehanda	Son in law of a chief
Oitava	One eighth of an ounce
Parecer	A recommendation
Pasta	About $16\frac{1}{2}$ ozs: a sheet of gold weighing 100 maticals

Pataca	This was a Brazillian silver coin worth 320 reis also Spanish silver coin worth 800-900 reis.
Patricio	Anyone of mixed racial origin.
Pemberar	To dance about as a demonstration of joy or anger.
Poderoso	Powerful, influential
Prazo	Landed estate in Zambezia.
Reis	A small Portuguese coin of low value which was abolished in the 16th Century, but its multiples were retained to use as money of account.
Regimento	A Royal or Vice regal set of instructions
Regulo	Chief
Sachikunda	Leader of slaves.
Saguete	Courtesy gift.
Sameter	A rough and ordinary white cloth used as a sign of mourning.
Segunda linha	Honorific title bestowed on eminent citizens.
Soldo	Basic pay.
Tanga	Gold measure of twelve grains, equivalent to 600 reals.
Tocurin	A cloth like Botiam but inferior.
Velorio	Large porcelain beads
Xaile	A red. cloth
Xerafim	An Indo-European coin, originally gold and later of silver, with a face value of 300 reis, but which varied greatly in weight and consequently in value.
Zuarte	A blue cotton cloth
Zimbabwe	Head kraal of a King.

Addendum of a glossary of Portuguese/Shona words.

- Aringa - a stockade made of wooden stakes, it surrounds a whole settlement, often of a great many huts and families but sometimes only of one.
- Bazaar - Markets.
- Botonga (of gold) alluvial gold.
- Binzo (sometimes spelt brinzo). - tribute to a king.
- Cabaya - a sort of Chinese silk; a Turkish tunic.
- Cabo - soldier.
- Chibinga penalty imposed on one who loses a case..
- Chittas - (Sometimes spelt chitas) - printed calico.
- Chuambo - a fathom (Portuguese braca) of cotton cloth, the value of a fathom of cloth or 500 weak reals; 20 strings of beads; a fortified capital.
- Dimity - *Cotton cloth made in India.*
- Emperador - emperor.
- Empofias - fines.
- Feira de Manica Market of Manyika (this referred to the market of Masekesa).
- Garrafa - bottle.
- Gondos - thick but short cotton cloth made in Sofala.
- Gono - small weight of gold (handful) worth 500 reals.
- Inhamasango - head of a Village.
- Inhabinga - Manyika ancestral spirit which ^{was} responsible among other things for the welfare of the traders at the feira.
- Lencos - linen; handkerchiefs.
- Loucas - table plates.
- Macango - an envoy who represented Manyika ancestral spirits. Not the same as Manyika spirit medium.
- Macos - bundles of letters.
- Manga - a group of fighting men.
- Missinga - beads.

Mussambas grandes - great middle-men.

Muzungos - European, Portuguese.

Nhabinga and Nemanhica were titles by which the first two wives of the Chickangas were known during the 18th century.

Negociante branco - white business man.

Nipa - Sap taken from wild palms and distilled into larger quantities of a dring; it has the same effect as very strong brandy.

Nzudzi - fairies.

Paninhos - pieces of linen (as used in this context Chikanga probably referred ^{to} cambric linen.)

Penna - quill.

Pracas - the merchants of a town.

Principe - prince, the eldest son of a prince.

Rei - king.

Riosde cuama - Rivers of the Zambezi.

Sabone(s) - soap.

Samuranda - follower.

Sertanejo - inlander.

Sipaes - native soldiers.

Talher - spoon, knife, fork cover (for each person at a table).

Testoon - equivalence of 2½ pence (6d) in 1553.

Trado - a large auger, wimble or piecer.

PRIMARY SOURCESI. Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino Caixas - Boxes.

This is a series of 77 boxes which cover this period 1600 - 1826, generally there are documents for one or two years in one box.

Soon after the Caixas come the Macos (bundles) these contain documents dating from 1824 to 1834.

Codices - (ancient copies of books with manuscript notes)

Only a few of these codices which were transferred from Moçambique are available in the A.H.U.

Pastas - (Portfolio of a Minister)

This is a series of correspondence of the governors - general and other officials of Moçambique from 1834 to 1881.

I found this series very discouraging for my purpose.

(a) Caixas:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 23, 30, 31,
32, 33, 36, 37, 42, 45, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60, 64, 65, 71, 73, 77.

(b) Maços:

2, 3, 11, 12, 14, 15, 23, 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, D.O.4.

(c) Codices:

1325; 1310; 1468; (Nos.28, 32, 71, 76), 1317; 1307; 1321; 1473; 1324;
1440; (Nos.7, 220,222, 195, 13,) 1469; (Nos.82,83) 1477; (Nos. 14,24,) 1451;
(Nos.16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 103, 212, 218, 123, 308, 249, 191, 163, 250, 251, 226, 227, 234,) 1450; 1452; 1480, 1313; 1413; (No.316) 1500;
1465; (No.506) 1463; (Nos. 388, 434, 453) 1460; (No.169) 1459; (No.265), 1462; 1332; (No.50).

(d) Pasta 6

Questão da posse da terra e minas de Quiteve 1842-43.

Pasta 7

Cópia dos termos dos processos ocorridos com o potentado Manicusse, e com os de Quiteve (184-45)

Pasta 12(1852-53)

Letters of Joaquim Pinto de Magalhães, Governor-General of Moçambique.

2. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon.

Treslado da certidão dos ensayos que fizeram das minas de ouro do Reino de Manica. (Written by Thome de Barros Paueles de Palvora), Documentos Remetidos da India 35, Fol.227-8, 3.2.1635.

3. Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon.

MS IX - 3, 3.8.1696, 46r - 47r.

- (i) Pedro Caelho de Carvalho. Papel da Notica que deu fortaleza de Sofala
- (ii) Proposta que fizeram os moradores dos Rios de Cuama ao Senhor v. Rey, 16.6.1698.
- (iii) Resumo breve de algumas notícias que da Custodio de Almeida e Souza do Estado dos Rios de Sena e Sofala, 16.6.1698, 39r - 42r.
- (iv) Papel que deu Antonio Pereira para o Senhor Rey, 12.8.1698. Lista dos homens de poder que ha moradores nos Rios. 48r - 49r.
- (v) Breve informação dos Rios de Cuama que da o padre Frey Phelipe de Assunção por andar nas ditas terras catorze anos, e estado e modas das feiras e ter larga noticia destas e costumes della.
- (vi) MS. 52 - X - 2³
José Francisco Alvares Barboza analyse estatistica, Topographica, e Politica da Captania de Rios de Senna, addressed to the Cortes Gerals e Extraordinarias e constituites da Nacão Portugueza.

4. Academia Das Ciencias, Lisbon.

- (i) Estatistica da Captania de Rios de Senna do Anno 1806. MS. Serie Azul 1788. Tete 1807, 37 fls.
- (ii) Memórias sôbre os Rios de Sena 1810, MS série Azul 648 No.16.
- (iii) Esboco de alguns Artigos relativos a Capitania de Moçambique, MS serie Azul 648 No.17, fls.
- (iv) Estatística da Capitania dos Rios de Sena feita o anno de 1810 MS 1788 Serie Azul No.20. fls.58.
- (v) Memória acerca do Estado decadente do Capitania de Mocambique no comeco do século XIX, by Dionisio de Lemos Pinto. (Estado das relações começias da Capitania de Moçambique alt o cha 21.8.de 1829 dada pelo Juíz de fora D.I. de Lemos Pinto em sua.

5. Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa.

Fundo Geral 826,
Codice, 29.

6. British Museum.

British Museum additional Manuscripts.

20902

- (i) Relação das naõs e armadas da India com os successos dellas que as se puderam saber para noticia e Instrucao dos curiozos, e amantes da Historia da India. This is arranged as -
- (a) according to the commanders of the expeditions from Vasco da Gama 1497 to Luis de Mendonca, Furtado in 1653;
- (b) List of Viceroys from 1505 to 1640. This manuscript is part of a series of 40 manuscripts, BM. Add.Mss 20861 - 20900 containing copies of laws, royal decrees letters, patents etc. relating to the Portuguese settlements in the Estado da India (1518-1714) entitled 'Collecãõ authentica de todas as Leys, Regimentos, Alvaras e mais ordens que se expediram para a India desde estabelecimento destas conquistas, ordenada por provizãõ de 28 de Marco de 1754.'

20906

- (ii) Livro das cartas que escreveu o conde de Ericeyra Dom Luis de Menezes, no tempo, foi Vice-Rey e capitão Geral da India, sôbre negocios mais importantes daquello estado 1717-20' (together with the letters which he wrote to the Kings and regulos of the Orient or their Generals and Ministers, also portarias and letters written to the Secretary of State, dezembargador Joao Rodrigues Machado by the order of the King of Portugal).

25419

- (iii) Reformacao da militia e Governo do Estado da India oriental Dirigida a Serenissima Infanta Margarita Lugar Tenente Delrey Catholico Nosso Senhor. By Francisco Roiz Silveira, 296 fls.
- (iv) 197 (Sloane MS) - 426 fls.

Bocarro, Antonio do Estado da India, coloured plans of Mocambique (p.96) Goa (p.248), Cartographical description of Rios de Cuama (p.83-84) and boundaries of Sofala (p.81).

The second part of this MS on that State of India contains plans of all the fortresses between the Cape of Good Hope and Chaul, with a description of them all and of the whole East Coast, the Kingdoms upon which they border, and any relevant information thereunto with the revenue and expenses of each in detail. For a printed text or references of this MS see A.B.de Braganca Pereira Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e producoes do Estado da India Oriental por Bocarro, 3 parts. Bastora - Goa, 1937-40 A.P.O. Nova edicao Tomo IV Historia Administerativa Vol.II, 1600-1699.

. Theal G.M. R.S.E.A. Vol.II, Cape Town, 1898, pp.378-420

F.F. dela Figaniere, Catálogo dos Manuscritos Portuguezes existentes no Museo Britanico 1853, p.162.

7. Instituto Superior, de Ciências Sociais Política Ultramarina

Technical University of Lisbon.

Joze Marcia Teixeira de Cruz, Presenca Portuguesa no Nyassa 1796-1834. This is an M.A. documentary dissertation - in two parts A and B. the B part is a systematic collection of documents relating to Portuguese trade and other activities north of Zambezi.

8. Methodist Missionary Society

I found one large bundle consisting mainly of correspondence between the Rev. Isaac Shimmin and Bishop Marshall Hartley, this bundle contains useful historical accounts of Manyika's contact with the outside world.

9. National Archives of Rhodesia.

Manuscript 14/1/1 (Shona) 14.1.2. (English)

M_achiwenyika Jason, 'The History and Customs of the Manyika People' this MS (132 'chapters') is a result of oral tradition collected in the 1930's and covers a much larger geographical area than that dealt with in this thesis. It must be used cautiously because very little or nothing is known about the manner in which the data was collected and collated.

10. P.R.O.

CO. 879/35, CO.879/42, CO.879/93, Co.417/14.

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11. Senate House Library, London.

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12. Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa:

MS 1 Pasta A - 19 (Sofala)
Vizinhos 1755 - 1884 34 fls.

Catalogo dos Governadores distritais desde 1755 em que a Província de Moçambique ficou desmembrada dos Estados d'India a esta parte 1884 com as notas dos acontecimentos que na administração de cada um tiveram lugar.

13. The Archives of the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel:
London.

The material in this archive deals mainly with the situation in the 1890's, Occasionally one comes across useful retrospective historical information relating to Manyika and Masbongaland in general, particularly the 1896-7 upheaval, the files which were being reorganised when I consulted them were classified under the letter D and E. The D series were annual reports and the E Series were sundry letters of correspondence.

Important MS.

E27718, 1907, Yearly report from the S.P.G. in Foreign Parts, Reports of the years, 1900 in Vol.I. and 1902 in Vol.II.

The Rev.W.H. Robin's diary, 'Through Gorongoza and the Land of Barwe' E.1900 Vol.I.. It throws a good deal of light on trade and attitude of the people vis-a-vis the Portuguese.

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Most of the Bishops' correspondence was published in either of the Missions periodical publications:

The Mashonaland Quarterly or The Mission Field.

G.W.H. Knights Bruce's voluminous correspondence is largely found in the 'Journals of Mashonaland' edited by L.K.B.

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de Andrade, J.Nogueira

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Documentos sobre os Portugueses em Moçambique e na Africa Central, 1497-1840. This series is edited under the auspices of the Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos in Lisbon and the National Archives of Rhodesia, the six volumes hitherto published cover the period 1497-1537. For the plan, division of responsibilities and other technical details of this project see Studia No.9, 1962, Lisbon, pp.402-3

Vol.I	1497 - 1506	1962
Vol.II	1507 - 1510	1963
Vol.III	1511 - 1514	1964
Vol. IV	1515 - 1516	1965
Vol. V	1516 - 1518	1966
Vol. VI	1519 - 1537	1969

All these volumes are bilingual (English and Portuguese)

Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa, Lisbon. 1954. In progress, this series, which contains summaries of material from the microfilms which were made in the various archives, those of Goa and Moçambique not excluded, is well indexed. This is produced under the directorship of Professor Antonio da Silver Rego at the Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos. I found Vols.1 - 3 useful for my work.

Cópia de Documentos officaes Trocados entre a Companhia de Moçambique e o Governo de sua Magestade. Lisbon, 1891. There are 8 volumes of this series, (21.2.1888 - Dec.1897), although, these documents cover a much later period than that dealt with in this thesis, they contain some backward looking accounts about Manyika - Portuguese relations.

Documentos Relativos a Concessões de Minas em Moçambique, published by the Minister of Marine and

Overseas Affairs, Lisbon, 1891. Documents No.25, p.90; 37, p.149; 38, p.153; 39, p.154; 68, p.233; 91, pp.274-5.

This source, to my knowledge has not been exploited to any great extent. It adequately compensates for several documents, now missing but cited by Eric Axelson in his Partition of Africa, 1875-1891. Johannesburg, 1967.

Termos de Vassallagem nos Territórios de Machona e Nyassa, 1858a 1889, Lisobon, 1890.

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Arquivo Portugues Oriental, The documents which constitute this series, mainly with the administrative and commercial problems of the 16th and 17th Century Estado da India. This series of documents can be analysed in the following manner-

- a) Documents published by Cunha Rivara in Arquivo Portugues - Oriental (A.P.O.)
Fascículo 1.2a edicao Nova Goa, Imprensa Nacional 1877, Period 1595-1609
- b) A.P.O. Fascículo 1b 1857,
Contains letters from the Kings of Portugal to the Viceroy in Goa.
- c) A.P.O. Fascículo 3^o 2^a Parte Nova Goa, 1861, (Period 1568-1600). This contains letters, instructions and alvaras from the Kings of Portugal to the viceroys and governors of India during the 16th Century. These documents were extracted from the archives of the entire government of the State of India. This fascimile of the Arq. Port. Orient., contains what is generally known as Livros das Moncoes (the books of the monsoons) consists of original letters and papers exchanged between the Kings' governments in Lisbon and the Estado da India, which included Mocambique until 1752. The name derives from the fact that it was only during the monsoons that the despatches and receipt of letters were done. No documents are available before 1584 except two, one of 1568 and the other 1583. The documents covering the first sixty years of Portuguese activities in the Estado da India are missing. It is related that they were sent to Lisbon in 1774. In spite of a decree which was later passed to the effect that they should be returned to Goa, it does not seem that this was done. This information which was gleaned from an Alphabetical Chronological Index (1568-1811) written by Diogo Vieira Tovar Albuquerque, Chief Secretary of State, was confirmed by another Secretary of State in 1841, Claudio Lagrange Monteiro de Barbuda.
- d) A.P.O. 1862, This contains documents on religious problems relating to Goa. It has little information on Mocambique although the bishopric of Mocambique was subordinated to that of Goa. (This subordination probably began on 12.2.1562, but was severed on 21.1.1612, and resumed in 1643. Lima, Durval Pires de Oriente E Africa desde a restauração a Pombal. Agencia Geral das Colonias, 1946, p.207).

- e) A.P.O. Fascículo 5^o (1865)
This is divided into three parts. The first part contains:
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 - ii) Registos de casa dos contos.
 - iii) Livro do pay dos Christaos.
- The second (1865) and third (1866) Parts contain sundry documents of the 16th Century.
- f) A.P.O. Fascículo 6^o contains documents of the 16th century with two supplements, one of the 16th century dealing with religious problems, and another 'Supplemento Segundo' of the XVIIIth century. It contains little that is revelant to Moçambique.

Rivara, J.H. da Cunha

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- a) Tratados dos Rios de Cuama feito por Fr. António da Conceição, administrador da Christandada de Moçambique e Rios 1696, pp.39 etc.63 etc.84 etc.,105 etc.
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Companhia do comercio, No.8 June, 1867. pp.123-131 No.19, July, 1867, pp.147-155.
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
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AN ENLARGED MAP OF THE KINGDOM OF
MANYIKA
(1575 - 1863)


SOURCES:

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1890 Anglo-Portuguese
Boundary



THE KINGDOM OF MANYIKA AND THE NEIGHBOURING REGIONS. SHADED AREA REPRESENTS EXTENSION OF THE KINGDOM.



SCALE: 10cms = 100 km

