

THE BRITISH CONQUEST AND ADMINISTRATION
OF ORISSA, 1803-1819

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of London
by
Bhabani Charan Ray

School of Oriental and
African Studies, December 1956.

ProQuest Number: 11010366

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 11010366

Published by ProQuest LLC (2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

ABSTRACT

In this thesis an attempt is made to analyse the British conquest and administration of Orissa. Chronologically the subject covers the period between 1803 and 1819. Geographically the subject relates to that Maratha Orissa which was brought under British rule after its conquest.

This work is divided into ten chapters. Chapter I deals with the British attempt to secure Orissa through diplomacy. Chapter II describes the British plan of attack and final occupation of Orissa. Chapter III outlines the British tackling of the rebellion of the Raja of Khurda. Chapter IV recounts the British policy towards some tributary states exempted from the general regulations. Chapter V narrates the British religious policy with special reference to the management of the temple of Jagannath and the collection of the pilgrim tax. Chapter VI concerns economic policy. It is subdivided into four sections. Section I shows the introduction of Cornwallis's system of revenue administration. Section II concerns the currency problem. Section III narrates the introduction of salt monopoly. Section IV concerns the administration of the embankments. Chapter VII explains the introduction of the Bengal judicial system. Chapter VIII describes the rebellion of 1817. Chapter IX analyses the reforms which were

subsequently adopted. In Chapter X an attempt is made to bring these themes together.

In a particular country changes in the Government usually involve problems of adaptation, because old ideas are set aside to make room for the new ones. If a regulation is enforced suddenly or abruptly, there is the possibility of a popular reaction against it. This is shown in Chapters VI, VII and VIII. How far popular reactions helped to determine the policy of the Government is shown in Chapter IX.

The work is mostly based on original official sources. Some private papers are also used.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I	INTRODUCTION	1
II	CONQUEST	9
III	REBELLION OF THE RAJA OF KHURDA	47
IV	TRIBUTARY STATES	68
V	RELIGIOUS POLICY	83
VI	ECONOMIC POLICY	122
	(i) Revenue system	125
	(ii) Currency Problem	162
	(iii) Salt Monopoly	176
	(iv) Embankments	193
VII	JUDICIAL SYSTEM	200
VIII	REBELLION OF 1817	219
IX	REMEDIES	243
X	CONCLUSION	262
	GLOSSARY	276
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	288
	MAPS	
	(i) A map of Orissa showing the movement of British troops at the time of conquest.	
	(ii) A map of Orissa showing the Mughalbandi, Tributary states and salt manufacturing area. (Back cover).	

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

At the end of Maratha rule, the boundaries of Orissa were to the east the sea; to the west the Maratha province of Chhatisgarh; to the south the Chilka lake and the Ganjam district; and to the north the district of Midnapur and the province of Birbhum.⁽¹⁾ As J. Richardson, the British commissioner of Cuttack, remarked, "The natural Barriers which form the Frontier of Orissa are the Ocean on one side, with a difficult and scarcely accessible coast, and a wild and a hilly forest on the other, which opposes such a desert to the passage of an Army as would make its progress extremely precarious. This province is, therefore, capable of easy defence."⁽²⁾

We have no means of ascertaining the population of the country at this period, except for an estimate of about 1,450,000 made by Richardson in 1815.⁽³⁾ This figure is highly conjectural. The area the province covered was about 11,930 square miles.⁽⁴⁾ It seems that more than

(1) 19 January 1804, G.Harcourt and J.Melville, Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804, No.41; Add. MSS. 13604, p.94 (same letter as above).

(2) 20 December 1804, J. Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815, No.29.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Census of India, 1872, Vol.VI, Bengal Part II, pp.2, 4.

one third of Orissa was covered with jungles in which wild beasts like lions, tigers, leopards, hogs, elephants, deer and jackals lived in plenty.⁽¹⁾ These wild beasts not only preyed upon travellers but also sometimes damaged crops and might even force the inhabitants of a village to desert it. When G. Harcourt, the Commander of a British force, entered Orissa for its occupation, he wrote "we suffer dreadfully from the tigers, two or three men carried off every night, and these animals are so bold, they come into the centre of the encampment for their prey and the poor victims are found half devoured, close on the confines of the camp..... To this calamity there is no redress, we shout and howl all night as if the devil was among us but it is of no avail".⁽²⁾

Under Maratha rule, the country was divided into two parts, one of which was called the Mughalbandi and the other the Garjat. The former, being in general a plain and fertile land, possessed a numerous population. The latter, being almost entirely a barren tract and a wild expanse of rock, forest and jungle, was thinly populated and generally

(1) Enclosed, 26 October 1803. E. Roughsedge, Lt. Adjt. of Ramgarh battalion to Captain F. Marsden, Commanding a detachment at Hussainbad, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 12 April 1804, No.13.

(2) 27 September 1803, Harcourt to M. Shawe, Private Secretary to Wellesley, Add. MSS. 13609, p.95.

did not produce much more grain than sufficed for the maintenance of its inhabitants. The Mughalbandi was actually in the possession of the Government as a royal domain or land held direct from the Government without any intermediary. The Garjat was held by tributary chieftains who paid a stipulated revenue to the Government and stood between it and the tenants of the soil. (1)

British relations with Orissa prior to its conquest may be divided into two periods. From 1633 to 1757 their efforts were concentrated upon the improvement of trade in the province. But from 1757 to 1803 there was a growing desire for the possession of Orissa. This might be called a period of diplomacy.

Orissa, being situated in the Bay of Bengal, enjoyed an export trade in grains and manufactured articles. In 1633 the East India Company secured permission from the Nawab Muhammad Zaman and established the first British factory in Bengal at Harishpur, the modern Jagatsinhapur, and a second at Balasore. (2)

(1) 19 January 1804, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Add. MSS. 13604, p.94; (same letter as above) Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.41.

(2) C.R.Wilson, English Chiefs at Balasore, pp.1-3.

During Muslim rule the British trade in Orissa flourished, especially the export of cloth, without much interference from the ruling powers. But the Maratha invasion of Orissa from 1742 to 1751 brought considerable confusion to the country and adversely affected trade conditions.⁽¹⁾ Moreover, after the establishment of a British factory at Hugly the importance of the British factories in Orissa gradually declined.

In 1751 a treaty was made between Aliwardi Khan and Raghuji Bhonsla, by which the former agreed to pay a Chauth of twelve lakhs of rupees on condition that "the Marathas would not set their foot within his dominion". In consequence of this treaty the Marathas became de facto rulers of Orissa although the appointment of its governor required the approval of both parties. The Nawab still claimed it to be a part of his province and was not prepared to forego his nominal authority by acknowledging the Maratha supremacy there. When Mir Jafar was the Nawab of Bengal his position was once embarrassed because of the junction of the French and Sujauddaulah for an attack on his kingdom. At this time, Mirza Saleh was acting as governor of Orissa with the approval of both the parties, but was more subservient to the cause of the Nawab backed by

(1) (not dated) 1805, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Add. MSS. 13611, p.61; J.Long, Selections from unpublished records. Nos.72 and 110; Early European travellers in Nagpur territories, pp.52-3.

the British. Jamuji, Raghuji's son, therefore appointed Sir Bhatt Sathe to be governor of Orissa without consulting the Nawab. (1)

John Bristow, the British Resident at Cuttack, thought that if the Marathas gained complete power over the country it would ultimately be detrimental to British interests. So he encouraged Mirza Saleh to oppose Sir Bhatt Sathe; he also sought the help of Mir Jafar to defend the cause of Mirza Saleh against the Marathas. But Mir Jafar did not accept the British suggestion; moreover, Mirza Saleh who first opposed Sir Bhatt Sathe subsequently left Orissa in favour of him. Thus the British plan failed and Orissa passed into the complete possession of the Marathas. (2)

When Mir Qasim had succeeded Mir Jafar as Nawab of Bengal the British approved of his refusal to pay chauth to the Marathas. (3) So the Marathas raided Burdwan and Midnapur, which had already been granted by the Nawab to the British. (4) The British themselves were not prepared to fight on their own. But they desired the expulsion of the Marathas from Orissa and

(1) Siyar, (trans.), Vol. II, pp. 112-3; Orme MSS. India Vol. 18, pp. 504, 506

(1) Siyar, (trans.), Vol. II, pp. 112-3; Orme MSS. India Vol. 18, pp. 504, 506, 505.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Bengal Secret Consultations 16 January 1762.

(4) J. Long, Selections from unpublished records; No. 570.

and drive them out. They urged this point several times on the Nawab. They themselves were also ready to assist him with their own forces. ⁽¹⁾ But the Nawab did not come forward; moreover he was not prepared to bear the expenses of the ⁽²⁾ campaign.

A new stage of diplomacy began in 1765, when the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa was granted to the British. ⁽³⁾ The Orissa of this Grant corresponded to the district of Midnapur. If the British could secure the Orissa under Maratha rule it would provide a juncture with the Northern Sarkars which they had acquired six years previously. ⁽⁴⁾ Clive, as Governor of Bengal, was not in favour of using force to secure it. He believed that by paying a stipulated sum to Januji, in lieu of the chauth demanded for Bengal, Bihar

(1) Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 16 January 1762; Bengal Secret Consultations 11 March 1761.

(2) Bengal Secret Consultations 18 February 1762; Bengal Secret Consultations 12 March 1762.

(3) The Grant was made on 17 August 1765. The Orissa of this Grant corresponded to the district of Midnapur (vide G.W. Forrest ed., Selections from State Papers...Warren Hastings, Vol.I p.2. footnote), which was included in Bengal during the time of Murshid Quli Khan. The name of Orissa found its place in the Diwani because Bengal, Bihar and Orissa had formed one administrative unity for a long time under the Mughal emperor and he was not prepared to admit the overthrow of his sovereign authority over any part of Orissa even though the country was now ruled by the Marathas.

(4) Bengal Secret Consultations 16 January 1767.

and Orissa, the possession of Orissa could be secured. The same policy was vigorously followed by his successor, Verelst. Januji was quite willing for such a proposal. But there was a basic difference in the two positions. The British viewpoint in purchasing Orissa was that it should be ceded without any condition, while Januji's motive was to include the sale of Orissa in a defensive alliance with the British so that he could get British help in case of an attack from an enemy - particularly the Peshwa. But, unwilling to incur the illwill of the Peshwa, the British wanted to evade complying with that clause of the proposed treaty. When Januji detected this intention, he refused to sign the treaty. ⁽¹⁾

Under Warren Hastings British preoccupations elsewhere in India led to a change of tactics with regard to Orissa. The British conflict with Hyder necessitated the march of an army from Bengal to the Carnatic through Orissa. The Raja of Nagpur, who was all the while demanding chauth from the British, found an opportunity to put some obstacles in the way of the British plan for moving the army. So he sent Chimnaji at the head of 30 to 40 thousand horse to Orissa, and directed him to invade Bengal from there. ⁽²⁾ Hastings therefore paid

(1) Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vol.II, No.1393; Vol.III No.203.

(2) G.W.Forrest (ed.), Selections from State Papers....Warren Hastings, Vol.II, p.200.

thirteen lakhs of rupees to Chimmaji; a loan of another twelve lakhs was also advanced to him. Thus the Maratha force left Orissa.⁽¹⁾

This incident made the British feel more strongly the need to possess the country. Consequently a further stage of diplomacy began when Cornwallis became Governor General in 1786. This time the chief centre of diplomacy was Poona. That was so, because Cornwallis thought that the Raja of Nagpur was entirely dependent on the Poona Government; therefore the object could be achieved through the help of the Poona Court.

When the Peshwa desired the acquisition of Salsette from the British Charles Malet, the Resident at Poona, at the direction of Cornwallis suggested that the British might agree to this if the Raja of Nagpur could be persuaded to cede Orissa to them in lieu of Garh Mandal, which could be ceded by the Peshwa to the Raja.⁽²⁾

Several other proposals of a similar nature were very cautiously and cleverly made before the Poona Court for the same purpose.⁽³⁾ But owing to the inability of the Poona Court to influence the Raja of Nagpur these plans could not succeed.⁽⁴⁾

(1) Bengal Secret and Military Consultations 29 March 1781.

(2) Bengal Political Consultations 9 January 1789.

(3) Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 3 April 1789;
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 21 January 1789;
Bengal Political Consultations 21 January 1789.

(4) Bengal Political Consultations 9 January 1789.

CHAPTER II

(CONQUEST)

Sir John Shore, Cornwallis's successor, did nothing to acquire Orissa. But Wellesley soon revived the old policy of entering into negotiations with the Raja of Nagpur to that end. On 16 April 1800, Colonel Kirkpatrick, secretary to the Government, wrote to Colebrooke, the Resident at Nagpur, that the Company desired the acquisition of Cuttack "for an equivalent in money or otherwise" and asked him to influence the Court of Nagpur to that effect.⁽¹⁾

At the same time a proposal was brought before the Raja of Nagpur for the establishment of a British subsidiary force in his territories. The Resident was told that the Governor General "would readily accept a security for the payment of the subsidy of the troops, and even prefer to any other arrangement an assignment of such part of the province of Cuttack as should be adequate to the purpose, and should place under the management of the Company such a tract of the territory as should establish the continuity

(1) 16 April 1800, Government to Colebrooke, Y. M. Kale, (ed.), Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. V, p.48.

of their dominions from Bengal to Northern Circars".⁽¹⁾
 But this negotiation proved a failure, partly because of the Raja of Nagpur's apprehension of losing his independence by maintaining a British force, and partly because of his resentment at the British alliance with the Nizam of Hyderabad, a country which had so long been subject to Maratha plunder.⁽²⁾ It now appeared to the Governor-General that nothing short of a war would give him an opportunity to fulfil his cherished desire.

On 27 June 1803, the Governor-General wrote to Arthur Wellesley, "From the Raja of Berar I wish to acquire the whole province of Cuttack so as to unite the Northern Circars by a continued line of sea coast with Bengal. This cession including Balasore &c. to be made either absolutely or upon payment of a moderate rent or as a security for a subsidiary force to be introduced into the dominions of the Raja of Berar." He further instructed Arthur Wellesley that in the event of a war with the Raja of Berar this object could be easily achieved; he should not make peace with the Raja unless Orissa was secured.⁽³⁾

(1) Ibid.

(2) T. E. Colebrooks, Life and Essays of H.T.Colebrooke, Vol.I, pp.118-22.

(3) Bengal....papers relative to the Maratha war in 1803, p.165.

It may be remembered that on 31 December 1802, the treaty of Bassein was signed by the Peshwa and the British, as a consequence of which the Peshwa was obliged to accept a subsidiary alliance. This was a cause for resentment amongst the Maratha chiefs, particularly Sindhia and Raghuji. Having collected an army at Ujjain, Sindhia crossed the Narmada; Raghuji approached Sindhia's camp at Chikhli, and on 4 June there was a juncture of the confederate forces, but they avoided any open rupture with the British.⁽¹⁾

On 18 July Arthur Wellesley demanded that Raghuji and Daulat Rao Sindhia should immediately retire from the Nizam's frontier near Ajanti. On 1 August, the Governor General in Council reported to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors that he had made arrangements for the occupation of Cuttack,⁽²⁾ explaining that "By the reduction of Cuttack in Orissa, an effectual blow would be struck against the Raja of Berar's resources; the only maritime territory of the Marathas, on the eastern side of the peninsula of India, would be secured from all intercourse with the French, a valuable addition would be made to our revenue and a strong barrier added to the frontier of Bengal against

(1) Ibid. p.181.

(2) 1 August 1803, Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, M. Martin, (ed.), The despatches, minutes and correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley, Vol.III, pp.225-6.

predatory incursions; the intercourse between Bengal and the territories of Fort St. George would also be protected from interruption".⁽¹⁾

War was declared against the Maratha confederates on 3 August. Colonel Campbell, of His Majesty's 74th regiment, commanding the northern division of the army of Fort St. George, had already been directed to prepare for an invasion of Cuttack.

On 21 August he was told to invade, because it was thought that during the absence of the Raja of Berar from the centre of his dominions, the seizure of a place as celebrated as Jagannath would produce an early impression on the minds of the confederate chieftains.⁽²⁾ W. Thorn rightly remarked, "the occupation of the maritime district of Cuttack formed a principal part of the general plan of attack against the confederates".⁽³⁾

- (1) Bengal....papers relative to the Maratha war in 1803, p.235.
- (2) 21 August 1803, Clive, Governor of Madras to Campbell, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 29 Dec. 1803, No.161
- (3) W. Thorn, Memoir of the War in India, p.253. Sir William Thorn was born in 1781; joined the 29th Light Dragoons in India 1799; served in the Maratha War under Lord Lake 1803; at Laswari 1 November 1803; in the capture of Mauritius 1810 and of Java 1811 and Palembang in Sumatra 1812; returned to England 1814; one of his other works is "Memoir of the Conquest of Java"; C.E.Buckland, Dictionary of Indian Biography, p.423.

The plan of invasion consisted in the movement and joint operation of forces from four different directions - from Ganjam, Kedigree, Jaleswar and Midnapur.

First the main force under Campbell consisting of about 1,500 native troops assembled at Ganjam. In addition, a detachment of two companies of His Majesty's 22nd regiment with artillery was detached from Bengal by sea. The British were so sure of success that they appointed John Melville civil commissioner for the settlement of the revenue at Cuttack. Captain Blunt, an engineer who had some local knowledge of the country, accompanied them.⁽¹⁾

In view of the military equipment and arrangements directed against Cuttack, there was no fear of any successful resistance on the part of the Marathas, but the Governor General wanted a peaceable surrender of the province. From the character of the Maratha administration, it appeared probable that the Maratha officers might be induced to surrender the province in return for pensions or donations of money from the British Government. Letters were therefore addressed by the Governor General to Bungaji Pandit, under whose management lay ten-sixteenths of the province, and

(1) 3 August 1803, Government to Melville, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.1; Add. MSS. 13608, pp.2-4 (same letter as above-).

Harbansa Ray, who managed the rest of the country; ⁽¹⁾ both Campbell and Melville were authorised to open negotiations with them. Considering that a considerable portion of the province of Cuttack was occupied by chieftains, many of whom acknowledged no superior authority or were merely tributary to the Maratha State, they were instructed to negotiate engagements on similar terms with such chieftains as possessed the means of embarrassing the progress of the British force. ⁽²⁾

Campbell and Melville were instructed that they "should employ every possible precaution to preserve the respect due to the temple of Jagannath and to the religious prejudices of the Brahmins and pilgrims". ⁽³⁾ To persuade the Brahmans at Puri that they could have confidence in placing the temple under the British administration, a letter was obtained from Jagannath of Trivenī, the oldest and the most eminent of the Pandits in Bengal to Rama Chand and other Brahmans residing at Jagannath which recommended that "they need not be afraid to form connection with the British Government, which is distinguished for peculiar benevolence to its subjects".

-
- (1) 3 September 1803, Government to Melville and Campbell. Add.MSS. 13608 pp.13-4; 7 September 1803, Government to Bungaji Pandit and Harbansa Ray, Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.) Letters Sent 1803, Nos.123 and 124.
- (2) 3 September 1803, Government to Melville and Campbell, Bengal Secret and political consultations 1 March 1804 No.11.
- (3) 9 September 1803, Government to Melville and Harcourt, Add.MSS. 13608, p.13.

This letter was transmitted to Campbell to deliver to them at a suitable time. (1)

On 30 August, news having been received that Maratha reinforcements from Nagpur were expected, another detachment consisting of 500 Bengal native volunteers, commanded by Captain Dick, which had first been intended for the occupation of the port of Balasore, was sent with some additional battering guns to reinforce the main body of troops at Ganjam. (2)

The reason why the main force was despatched from Ganjam was to enable it to reach Cuttack quickly, take the fort of Barabati, the chief Maratha stronghold, and then to send a detachment to secure the Barmul pass, which was called "the Key or the western gate of Orissa", because it occupied a strategically defensible position through which the Marathas entered Orissa. It appeared that several advantages would be derived from the occupation of that important pass. First it would probably attract the attention of the Government of Berar and induce them to detach a force towards the pass in order to keep the British

-
- (1) Enclosed, 3 September 1803, Government to Melville and Campbell, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.12A; Abstract of the contents of the letter from Jagannath of Triveni to priests at Jagannath, Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.), Letters Received 1803, No.180
 (2) 31 August 1803, Government to Campbell, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.51; 30 August 1803, Government to Harcourt, Add.MSS.13608, p.11.

troops in check. This would diminish their means of opposition to any attack which might be directed by the British from Allahabad and Hyderabad. Secondly, it would establish the security of the province of Cuttack by closing it against predatory Maratha attacks from that quarter. Thirdly, it would enable the British to complete their arrangements for an invasion of Berar from the side of Cuttack and transport troops and equipment without difficulty to the western extremity of the pass. (1)

After collecting provisions, Campbell marched from Ganjam. But high fever endangered his life. He was therefore carried back to Ganjam, and Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt of His Majesty's 12th regiment proceeded to Prayagi. There he took command of the troops on 11 September. (2) At this place he heard from a Brahman that "the Brahmins at the holy place consulted and applied to Jagannath to inform them what power was now to have this temple under his protection and that he had given a decided answer that the British Government was in future to be his guardian". (3)

(1) Add.MSS.13608, pp.151,155-6. (a memorandum sent to Harcourt, no date or author).

(2) 1 November 1804, Governor General in Council to the Court of Directors, Bengal Military Letters Received, 11 August 1803, 24 January 1805 Vol.I, pp.538-9; 11 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.55.

(3) 11 September 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.13.

He utilised this as a divine message worth communicating in his letters to numerous chiefs and Zamindars, in order to encourage them to submit to the British authority.⁽¹⁾ Although no treaty had yet been made with the Marathas, Sayid Rahimut-ullah, a munshi, acting on Melville's instruction, circulated a report amongst the people of Cuttack that the Maratha chief had delivered up the country to the British in writing.⁽²⁾

On the other hand, the Maratha Government at Cuttack offered to all the tributary Rajas to relinquish a whole year's revenue if they would assist in preventing the British from obtaining the possession of the province. But there was no response.⁽³⁾ The Marathas also made other defence arrangements. The Maratha chief at Balasore was appointed to the command of forces stationed at Guzur ghat, Narasingpur, Ramachandrapur, Khathipur in Mayurbhanj and Phulwar pass, which in all consisted of more than 1,000 matchlockmen, 100 horse and a number of paiks.⁽⁴⁾ It appears that he was in charge of guarding the northern frontier of Orissa from

(1) 19 September 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.14.

(2) Enclosed 24 September 1803, Lieutenant Col. Archibold Ferguson, commanding a detachment on the bank of the Suvarnakha, to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.191.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Add. MSS. 13609, pp.43-5 (a report from Bhagaban Naik, Kotwal of the Company's factory at Balasore, without date).

British attack. One detachment consisting of 3,000 cavalry and infantry under the command of Balaji Kunar crossed the Mahanadi and took post on the north bank. He occasionally circulated a report that he would invade Bengal. Another detachment was placed in the fort of Barabati in Cuttack. A third under the command of Dharam Rai Pandit was posted at Biplipur (Pipli) to oppose the British army from the south. 3,000 Maratha troops were also reported to have left Cuttack with the intention of disputing the passage of Harcourt at Manikpatna. (1)

When Harcourt reached Mithakua on 13 September the reported strength of the Marathas marching towards Manikpatna rose to 5,000 infantry. But when Harcourt fired a volley with blank cartridges, the Maratha force intending to oppose his passage fled away. The British force took possession of Manikpatna on 14 September. (2) Fateh Muhammad, the Maratha officer commanding the southwest frontier of Cuttack, agreed to the proposed terms offered by Harcourt. (3) He sent his brother to the British camp. His brother accompanied the British force for some distance and helped them considerably by his local knowledge. (4)

-
- (1) Enclosure, 24 September 1803, Ferguson to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.191.
 (2) 13 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.56.
 (3) 17 September 1804, Harcourt to M. Shawe, Private Secretary to Wellesley, Add.MSS. 13609, p.68.
 (4) 19 September 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.14.

By the time the British force reached Narasingpatna on 17 September, they faced some difficulty in transporting adequate stores and provisions by land. It had been thought that they might be carried by water to Cuttack. But now it was found that the boats had to be unloaded owing to the shallowness of the water. In view of these obstacles the idea of transporting anything further by water was abandoned.⁽¹⁾ Moreover, four-fifths of the road through which the detachment would have to pass belonged to the Raja of Khurda. What was apprehended most was that the Raja might be in secret alliance with the Maratha Government.⁽²⁾ Therefore, Harcourt discussed the matter with Melville. Melville suggested that the Raja should be requested to afford every assistance to the British to expedite the advance of the stores, baggage and artillery and send 3,000 fighting men to co-operate with them to expel the Marathas, for which he should be paid one lakh of rupees. This proposal was accepted by Harcourt. Accordingly, a letter was written to the Raja to that effect. As a result the Raja helped the British.⁽³⁾

(1) 3 October 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.17.

(2) 5 November 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.28.

(3) 3 October 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.17; 13 November 1803, Commissioners to Raja of Khurda, Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.), Letters Received 1803, No. 238.

From Narasingpatna, Harcourt moved to Puri, passing through highly cultivated country. He took possession of the city on 18 September. A very conciliatory attitude was shown to the people here. A guard of Hindus was stationed in the temple of Jagannath. Measures were taken to give the Brahmans and the chief officers of the temple confidence in the British administration. (1)

Then Lieutenant Ogilvie, commanding a detachment of 2nd battalion of the 17th regiment Madras native infantry, was directed to take post at Manikpatna because it commanded the passage of a river and was the chief means of entrance into the province to the southwards; it was also important as commanding a convenient landing place. He was instructed to protect that part of the country from Maratha predatory raids and to forward with proper escorts such stores and treasures as might be sent from Ganjam for the troops under Harcourt. (2)

A force was placed under the command of Major Fletcher, who was ordered to remain at Jagannath. He was directed to post sentries on the road to Cuttack as a precautionary measure against the Marathas. He was to keep a watch on what was (3)

(1) 18 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.59.

(2) 21 September 1803, Harcourt to Ogilvie, Add.MSS.13609,p.80.

(3) Robert Fletcher, Captain, 17th regiment Madras Native Infantry.

passing to the southwards of the Pagoda. ⁽¹⁾

Some stores which Harcourt found it impracticable to carry with him were left at Jagannath. Then he proceeded in the direction of Ahmadpur, crossing the rising nalas and rivers with great difficulty. ⁽²⁾ The Marathas attempted to harass the British force on the way, but after a few skirmishes here and there they were driven off by the advanced guard under Captain Hutchinson of the 20th Bengal regiment. The Marathas lost twenty men. On the British side only three were wounded. The bad weather and the inundated state of the country, together with the attack of the Maratha foraging party, delayed the passage of the heavy guns and baggage for five days before Harcourt reached Birapurnsottampur. ⁽³⁾ In view of these difficulties a force was detached under Hutchinson to occupy a position near Mukundapur. As soon as he left the camp, he was confronted with serious opposition from the Maratha forces, both horse and infantry, on his flank. The charge of the Marathas was so vigorous that Hutchinson could save his

-
- (1) 20 September 1803, Harcourt to Fletcher, Add. MSS. 13609, pp. 84-5.
 (2) 19 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No. 60.
 (3) 4 October 1805, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609 p. 100; 27 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No. 62.

position only by a heavy discharge of grape shot from six pounders. This dispersed the Marathas. On the British side 21 were wounded and two killed. ⁽¹⁾

The next resistance to the British force was offered by the Marathas on 4 October, when the advance guard under Colonel Clayton ⁽²⁾ was marching to Mukundapur. But well-directed fire from the British guns forced the Marathas to retreat towards Balakati. In this skirmish the British loss was one pioneer wounded. ⁽³⁾

From Balakati the Marathas took shelter in the fort of Barabati, situated on the north of the island, like Cuttack, and commanding to the northward the Mahanadi and the ferry. ⁽⁴⁾

Soon after his arrival at Cuttack, Harcourt took possession of the fort of Lalbag, which was on the south side of the 'island' and covered the town which lay between it and the fort of Barabati. This fort also commanded occasionally the ferry and always the ford over the Kathjuri river which "bounds the Island to the south-ward as the Mahanuddy does to the northward". Then he pitched camp 1,000 yards in

(1) 24 October 1803, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.80.

(2) Thomas William Clayton, Lieutenant Colonel, 18th Bengal Native Infantry.

(3) 24 October 1803, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.80.

(4) 29 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609, p.162.

front of the south face of Barabati from which the Marathas were very weakly firing at his camp.⁽¹⁾

Harcourt in consultation with Melville was prepared to take the fort by negotiation by paying the garrison up to half a lakh of rupees. But he received no response from the Marathas. So arrangements were made to beseige the fort. All the boats on the Mahanadi were assembled and an officer was placed over them with instructions to prevent the Marathas from throwing supplies to the garrison.⁽²⁾ A spot was fixed at a distance of 500 yards from the outer gate of the fort. A battery was completed on 13 October and a twelve pounder, two howitzers and two six pounders were placed in it. After a heavy fire the Maratha guns were silenced at 11 o'clock in the forenoon, and most of the defences on the south face of the fort were taken off. Clayton had to pass over a narrow bridge with one six pounder and a party of artillery men. He ultimately succeeded in blowing up the wicket only after being exposed for forty minutes to a heavy and ill-directed fire of musketry from the Marathas inside the fort. No sooner was this work complete than a storming

(1) 29 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13609,pp.162-3.

(2) 11 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. 13609, p.102;
13 October 1803, Melville to Harcourt, Add.MSS.13609,p.123

party entered singly with much boldness into the fort proceeding in two different directions although it had to face desparate resistance from the hands of the enemy in the defence of the inner gates. The Marathas fled, leaving three elephants and 120 guns of different calibres behind in the fort. (1) While some of them were making efforts to escape they were drowned in the ditch. (2)

Meanwhile Harcourt carried on negotiations with Shiva Prasad, a Hindu chief at the head of a corps of infantry, who were considered by the Marathas as amongst their best troops; he was ultimately successful in detaching him from the Marathas, and utilised his services in taking possession of the fort of Sarangagarh. (3)

Secondly it was decided to send a detachment to Balasore from Calcutta by sea. The object of sending this force was, first, to induce a Maratha force to be detached in that direction, which would facilitate the progress of the army under Harcourt to Cuttack, and, secondly, to open communications between Jaleswar and Balasore and between Balasore and Cuttack, which would co-ordinate the actions of the British

-
- (1) 15 October 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.70; 27 October 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804, No.90.
- (2) 15 October 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.70.
- (3) 27 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.62.

forces against the Marathas on both the north and the south of Balasore. For this purpose Captain Morgan, of the 15th Bengal Native Infantry, was appointed to the command of a force consisting of five companies of volunteers, 500 men, one artillery officer, thirteen artillery men with guns, lashkars and artificers, and one assistant surgeon.⁽¹⁾ The Governor General had been informed that a considerable number of Pathan adventurers from the British possessions were employed in the military service of the Maratha Government at Cuttack. He wanted to induce them to desert.⁽²⁾ With this in view, a Muhammadan subahdar belonging to the bodyguard of the Governor General was ordered to act under the orders of Captain Grant, who accompanied Morgan.⁽³⁾ Morgan was instructed to use force should he fail to obtain possession of Balasore by amicable means. He was ordered to be cautious not to interrupt such pilgrims passing to and from Jagannath. Considering the difficult navigation of the Balasore river

-
- (1) 6 September 1803, Government to Morgan, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.209; 4 September 1803, Government to Morgan, Add.MSS. 13608, p.96.
- (2) 6 September 1803, Government to Morgan, Add.MSS.13608, p.105.
- (3) 6 September 1803, ~~1803~~ Government to Morgan, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.209; 7 September 1803, Government to Morgan, Add.MSS.13608, pp.109-10.

Mathew Wright, an experienced pilot, was ordered to attend him. (1)

Morgan with the fleet⁽²⁾ of transports left Kedegree on 14 September and reached the Nilgiri hills in the afternoon of the 17th at a distance of about sixteen miles from the bar of the river at Balasore. Because of adverse winds, he could not reach this place as early as he had expected.⁽³⁾

- (1) 4 September 1803, Government to Morgan, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.208; same letter as above, Add.MSS.13608, pp.97, 101.

The original idea for sending a force by sea to Balasore was explained by Harcourt to the Governor General in Council and accepted on 19 August 1803. This expedition was considered to be most secret. During the preparations for it the letters from John Shore, Secretary, Marine Board, to Harcourt were sent without mentioning the name of the place; only a long line was drawn in the letters in place of Balasore. In one of his letters Harcourt wrote to the military secretary to the Governor General "if you will be kind enough to call me at the Government House this morning /25 August/ we will settle the whole business; you will, of course, not mention anything which will tend to the discovery of the destination of this little expedition (Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 27 October 1803 No.59).

- (2) It consisted of Alexander, George, Charles, Fairlie, Lizard, Anne and two long boats (Letter 4 October, Shore to E.Lowes, Commander of Company's Cruiser Teighmouth, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 27 October 1803.)
- (3) 20 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.218; 22 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.219.

The bar at the entrance of the river had ordinarily only two feet of water at low tide and ten feet at high tide, and was considered unsafe for larger vessels without the assistance of the local pilots who had some knowledge of the depth of the water.⁽¹⁾ So Wright, on the morning of the 18th, went out to explore the bar and wished to obtain a native pilot if possible. He came as near as Balramghari house, where there was a Maratha post of infantry. The Marathas suspected the identities of the party headed by Wright and they fired into their boat but without causing any injury. The party thus managed to return to their place of anchorage. Later on, with the help of Pike, the Pilot from the George, Wright was successful in finding a channel for the transports. Leaving the two large vessels, Alexander and Anne, at anchor, other transports moved on the 19th. They all crossed the bar at a favourable flood tide, except one of them, the Lizard, which was deeply laden. Two of the six pounders and a number of the detachment from her were taken off and placed in one of the long boats. Then the party entered the Balasore river and anchored nearly opposite the Balramghari House on the 20th.⁽²⁾

(1) 19 August 1803, Shore to Marcourt, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 27 October 1803 No.59.

(2) 20 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.218; 22 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.219.

Some of the inhabitants of the villages near the entrance of the river approached the vessels; they supplied native pilots. The fleet proceeded up the river but, owing to the darkness of the night and a very heavy fall of rain, they were forced to anchor for that day. ⁽¹⁾

The next day (21st morning) it was reported that a party of Marathas who had been posted at the ghats between the river and Jaleswar were making rapid marches either to defend the town of Balasore or to destroy it. At this Morgan and Grant left the transports behind. They took with them two six pounders and as many fighting men as a few boats could hold, and went up the river for two hours till they reached a clear spot of ground, where they were informed that it was only four miles by land to Balasore. Here Morgan consulted Grant. Both agreed that the enemy should be attacked without waiting for the guns. Accordingly with nearly 300 rank and file they landed from the boats. Then after crossing over paddy fields inundated from one to three feet in water they halted at the town of Balasore. ⁽²⁾

(1) 20 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.218.

(2) 22 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.219; same letter as above, Calcutta Gazette, Thursday 3 November 1803, pp.260-1 (I.O.C., Vol. year 1803).

Meanwhile the Marathas had put Moro Pandit, the faujdar of Balasore, into confinement in the Maratha fort outside the town because he had been attempting to go over to the British in consequence of their intrigues with him. Now, in order to resist the attack of the enemy, they advanced on a place where the ground was elevated and commanding. The inner space contained several spacious buildings well-adapted to the accommodation of troops, perfectly dry and sufficiently large to receive from 400 to 500 men.⁽¹⁾ This continuous long defile stretching from the entrance of the town up to the neighbourhood of the factory house was cleverly lined by the Maratha cavalry and infantry in order to oppose the march of the British into the town and the factory house.⁽²⁾

A British advance party was ordered to move on the Marathas. But they opened fire on it. So a flanking party was detached to assist the British advance, in consequence of which, well-directed fire poured on the Marathas from both the parties, which drove them from their first position; ten

(1) 23 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.220.

(2) 22 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.219.

to twelve of them fell to the ground. Finding the British detachment moving forward the Marathas as a desperate last attempt poured fire on it from the entrances of the lanes, from the tops of the houses and from behind the walls and heights. Yet the detachment continued to proceed on its way and returned a spirited fire at intervals. Then it took possession of the factory house. Soon parties were posted in all directions outside it to ward off the Marathas. The Marathas sniped at the British for some time; they then moved towards the south. Grant tried to seduce a party of Pathan horse from the Maratha detachment but without success. (1)

After the Maratha departure a part of the outside of the town called the Maratha fort was brought under the British possession. It was found that the Marathas had left there three old unserviceable guns on decayed carriages, one that appeared to be a six pounder, a small quantity of grain of different kinds and two chests with papers relating to the administration. (2)

Soon after occupying the town of Balasore, Morgan sent a detachment against a party of Marathas; but they

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

evaded it. On 26 September, there was a rumour that a party of Marathas, hiding in some part of Balasore, were determined to burn and plunder the town; further, it was learnt that a large body of Marathas had been encamped at the village of Ramnath eight miles from Balasore.⁽¹⁾ In order to reassure public opinion Lieutenant Tanner,⁽²⁾ at the head of a small detachment, was ordered to proceed to that village. Before he reached the place the weather had cleared up; so a large body of Marathas who had been encamped there had left on the 26th and marched to a small fort called Deoghur in a jungle about seven miles from Bamanaghati. So Tanner with his men returned to Balasore.⁽³⁾

Meanwhile, the dak to the south of Balasore, was not able to pass Suranga. So to open communications between Balasore and Cuttack, two companies, under the command of Captain Slye⁽⁴⁾ were sent in that direction.⁽⁵⁾ Slye reached Haetierpur. He left it on 29 September; he encamped at

(1) 27 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.224.

(2) Henry Tanner, Captain, 24th Bengal Native Infantry.

(3) 17 September 1803, Tanner to Morgan, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.225.

(4) Charles Slye, Captain, 28th Bengal Native Infantry.

(5) 28 September 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.226.

Begunia the next day, where he was informed that the Marathas had left the town and were encamped about two miles to the south. He marched on and gave the Marathas, consisting of 500 foot, a surprise attack on 1 October. After a short resistance the Marathas abandoned their position. Fifteen or twenty of them were killed or wounded. Five were taken prisoner.⁽¹⁾

By the time he reached Damnagar, he received news that between 2,000 and 3,000 Marathas had assembled at Suranga. The country there was covered with jungles and had a road generally no more than a narrow defile. With a small detachment he was not prepared to risk a fight. He wrote to Morgan for reinforcements;⁽²⁾ in response to his letter, Ensign Scot, at the command of a company passing through Begunia, joined him;⁽³⁾ the combined force now took possession of Suranga; the Marathas left it and fled towards Bhadrakh.⁽⁴⁾

At Suranga one of the sepoy's belonging to the British detachment informed Slye that Maratha forces to the number

(1) 30 September 1803, Slye to Morgan, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.230.

(2) Ibid.

(3) 2 October 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.228.

(4) 3 October 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.231.

of 2,000 horse and foot were collected at a place called Jahajpur about fourteen coss towards the south and situated on the bank of a large nala which was there fordable. Slye desired some verification of this news. So he sent Chait Sing and Baker Sing, two sepoy of his detachment, in the disguise of fakirs to Jahajpur. ⁽¹⁾ They returned with the news that the forces amounted to 500 well-mounted horse and 600 irregular foot. They also added that they heard from the Maratha camp that a force consisting of 10,000 men under Raghunath Bakhshi was on its way from Nagpur and within a few days' march from Cuttack. The Raja of Athgarh was proposing to send soldiers to assist the Marathas; some zamindars and rich people were in league with them to oppose the British. ⁽²⁾ But at the news of the advance of the British force under Harcourt from the south, the Marathas at Jahajpur and on the north of the river Mahanadi fell back towards the river in the direction of the fort of Barabati. So Slye had no further encounter with the Marathas. ⁽³⁾

Thirdly an attack was planned from Midnapur; so a force was ordered to be ready at Jaleswar under the command of

-
- (1) 6 October 1803, Slye to Ferguson, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.198.
- (2) 9 October 1803, Slye to Ferguson, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.202.
- (3) 9 October 1803, Ferguson to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.199.

Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson.⁽¹⁾ Soon he was joined by a detachment from the Governor General's body guard, with guns, tumbrils, ammunition, draught, carriage, cattle and so on.⁽²⁾ He was instructed to have correspondence with the commanding officer at Cuttack, not to interrupt the pilgrims going to the temple of Jagannath, and to be very conciliatory to the inhabitants of Orissa when he passed the Maratha frontier. The object of sending this detachment was, first, to drive out the Marathas from the immediate frontier of Bengal and the country between Balasore and Jaleswar, and secondly, to remove all obstacles on the way from Jaleswar to Cuttack and to reinforce the main force under Harcourt.⁽³⁾

As soon as Ferguson received the intelligence of Morgan's possession of the town of Balasore, he moved in that direction to reach the place "within the shortest period of time". But owing to rain and bad weather his progress was hampered.⁽⁴⁾ In consequence of the attack of the force under Morgan at Balasore the Marathas stationed at the ghats

(1) Archibald Ferguson, Colonel, 24th Bengal Native Infantry.

(2) 17 September 1803, Ferguson to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.177.

(3) 5 September 1803, Government to Ferguson, Add.MSS.13608, pp.87, 90-2.

(4) 28 September 1803, Ferguson to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.195.

between Jaleswar and Balasore had fled.⁽¹⁾ So Ferguson, without receiving any opposition from the Marathas, arrived at Balasore. He left it on 10 October on his way to Cuttack. By the time he reached Suranga, he received the news of the fall of Barabati. His detachment finally reached Cuttack without opposition.⁽²⁾

Fourthly a plan was made for an immediate occupation of the Maratha territory on the north east of the Suvarnarekha which chiefly consisted of Pataspur, Shahbandar, Kamarda, Bhograi, Raji-chand and Kirchand because they were long desired by the British for a natural boundary between Bengal and Orissa. Therefore Colonel Fenwick⁽³⁾ commanding at Midnapur was directed to take measures for that purpose.⁽⁴⁾

It was apprehended that the Marathas with the help of the powerful zamindars on the border might make incursions into the Company's territory. Therefore Fenwick was instructed to encourage the zamindars on the frontier to oppose such an attack; similar instructions were also given to T. H. Ernst, the acting magistrate at Midnapur.⁽⁵⁾ Sumitra

-
- (1) 26 September 1803, Grant to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.258.
 (2) 7 December 1803, Morgan to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.149.
 (3) John Fenwick, Colonel, 5th Bengal Native Infantry.
 (4) 16 July 1803, Government to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 29 December 1803 No.18c; 5 September 1803, Government to Fenwick, Add.MSS.13608, pp.82-3.
 (5) 8 September 1803, Ernst to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 12 November 1803 No.118; 17 Sept. 1803, Govt.to Ernst, Bengal Secret & Pol. Cons. 12 Nov.1803 No.19.

Dei, the Rani of Mayurbhanj, had lands both in the Maratha and in the Company's territories. As a Company's tenant she was in arrears to the extent of Rs.1,600 owing to losses she had sustained from inundations during the last two years. Now the payment of these arrears was suspended by the order of the Governor General. (1) Similar friendly intercourse was maintained with Jagannath Dhall of Dholbhum and other zamindars. (2) Ernst, by a proclamation, offered the protection of the Company to such of the zamindars as might choose to become its subjects. (3) Accordingly most of the zamindars in the Maratha territories either sought this protection or showed a more submissive attitude. But Ramanand Bhuyan of Jamoconda, who had for some years created disturbances in Company's land, remained adamant. Raghunath Paikara Bhuyan, another zamindar of Kirchand, who on many previous occasions had plundered the British territory, was also not ready to listen to the British proclamation. Rather he preferred to be secure in his fort, which was said by Ernst to be "the strongest on the southern frontier". (4)

-
- (1) 16 July 1803, Government to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 29 December 1803, No.18c.
 (2) 17 September 1803, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 12 November 1803 No.120; 8 September 1803, Ernst to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 12 November 1803 No.118.
 (3) 17 September 1803, Government to Ernst, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 12 Nov. 1803 No.119; 28 September 1803, Government to Ernst, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 12 November 1803 No.123.
 (4) 8 September 1803 Ernst to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 12 November 1803 No.118.

On 23 September 1803, by order of Fenwick, Captain Lamb of the 5th regiment, at the head of a detachment proceeded to the parganas Pataspur, Kamarda, Shahbandar and Bhograi, to establish the police daroghas and tahsildars appointed by Ernst.⁽¹⁾ Being frightened at the approach of the British force, Ramanand Bhuyan surrendered to Lamb, who made him prisoner and sent him to Midnapur. His forts were destroyed.⁽²⁾

Another detachment under Lieutenant Cooper was sent against Raghunath Paikara. All that belonged to him on both sides of the Suvarnarékha was soon occupied. The bamboo fences surrounding the forts were burnt. The mud forts were at once delivered up. But Raghunath Paikara managed to retire with a few attendants into the thickest part of the jungle.⁽³⁾

The whole of the Maratha territories on the north-east of the Suvarnarékha was soon brought under British rule.

Thus the total number of troops employed for the conquest of Orissa amounted to 4,916 men. Out of this

- (1) 24 September 1803, Fenwick to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 144.
- (2) 4 November 1803, Ernst to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 29 December 1803, No. 41; 17 November 1803, Government to Ernst, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 29 December 1803, No. 42.
- (3) Ibid.

number some 3,041 constituted the main force which marched from Ganjam and 500 men under Dick reinforced the main force later; 52 including 21 artillery men formed a party under Morgan to occupy Balasore; 854 were ready at Jaleswar with a view to move whenever it would be necessary; 1,300 were stationed at Midnapur in order to render assistance to troops at Balasore and Jaleswar. (1)

In consequence of the attack and march of the British troops from different sides, whatever Marathas were found in the country fled away in fear. After the fall of the fort of Barabati, a party of the Marathas under Balaji Kunar, consisting of 200 horse and 300 foot, retreated towards Barmul pass. (2) Major Forbes, at the head of a detachment, was sent to chase them, (3) but they evaded him. He occupied the Barmul pass, and the entrance of the Marathas to Cuttack was closed. Now a commanding position was available to him to watch the behaviour of the hill Rajas in the vicinity. As this station was unhealthy it was arranged that the garrison of 500 men would be relieved from Cuttack every fortnight. (4)

-
- (1) Bengal ... papers relative to the Maratha war in 1803, p.244.
- (2) Enclosed, 24 March 1804, M.S. Elphinstone, Resident at Nagpur to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 21 June 1804, No. 53.
- (3) 18 October 1803, Harcourt to Forbes, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804, No. 87.
- (4) 21 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS.13609, p.137.

After securing possession of the country, the British stationed troops near the passes and at different strategic places to maintain order and prevent Maratha raids from any direction. First, a force consisting of 1,000 men exclusive of the Europeans was stationed on the 'island' of Cuttack of which 300 formed the garrison for Lalbag, to be relieved weekly from the principal strength in Barabati. Secondly, the post established at Manikpatna was reinforced. Thirdly, it was arranged to maintain a regular force at Jagannath. Fourthly, a force of 300 men with a field six-pounder was placed at Pipli. Fifthly, the post established at Suranga was abolished; a force of 300 or 400 men was stationed at Jajpur and Bhadrakh. Sixthly, a post nearly of the same strength was established at Balasore. Seventhly, a strong detachment was stationed at Kendrapara, which commanded the most material points towards the sea, in order to check the Raja of Kujang and some subordinate chiefs in that part of the country.⁽¹⁾

After completing these security measures, Harcourt

(1) 3 December 1803, Morgan to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 244; 7 December 1803, Morgan to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1803, No. 249; 29 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS.13609, pp. 162-70.

posted the 9th Madras Native Infantry in the fort of Barabati. This consisted of about 450 men. Shiva Prasad's irregular corps gave him 100 more. To it he wished to add 400 or 500 Europeans, 140 troopers with gallopers, four six-pounders and two howitzers. With a force thus formed, he planned to proceed direct to Sonpur. From that place he wished to march along the Sambalpur route to secure the possession of Rattanpur and the valuable district of Chhatisgarh, because he thought their acquisition would afford security to the whole of the possessions of the British Government from Banares to Ganjam. In fact this was not done because peace was established shortly afterwards.⁽¹⁾

On 30 November 1803, Jaswant Rao Ramachandar, an ambassador of the Raja of Berar met Arthur Wellesley at a conference at Deogan for the conclusion of peace. In course of discussions on various points, Arthur Wellesley said that he would require the province of Cuttack to be connected by a convenient frontier with the Company's other territories. The Vakil made no objection, except to point out that "Jagannath was his Raja's own pagoda, he was desirous to retain it, that his honour was involved

(1) 1 December 1803, Harcourt ~~oto~~Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609, pp. 217-8.

in this point." Arthur Wellesley replied that the whole province of Cuttack was absolutely necessary, that the Company had long been desirous to obtain this province in order that there might not be any break in communications between Calcutta and Madras, and to take only half of it, or to allow the Raja to take only half of it, would entirely defeat that great object.⁽¹⁾ The Vakil was now convinced on this point. The treaties were prepared during the night of 16 November 1803. They were signed on 17th by both Arthur Wellesley and Jaswant Rao Ramachandar. The British occupations of Orissa was confirmed.⁽²⁾

(1) Home Miscellaneous, Vol. 623, pp.86, 103.

(2) Ibid, p.111; proclamation 9 January 1804, Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.), Letters Sent, 1804, No.1.

Appendix to Chapter II

(1)

Christmas Day,
25th December 1803.

- 1st. On this auspicious Morn, to Britons sacred
 More than the Feast of Hassan was to Tancred,
 Soon as the sun arose, his gentle beams displayed
 Cuttack's fair Provence saw and own'd his aid,
 Cold chilling dews forsook our Lines; the Barrabatty
 Confessed the sun alone had made it happy.
- 2nd. So we from Britain's Isles much fairer far removed
 From families and homes, the son's Great Power has prov'd,
 Who shelters us from Cold, Protects us from the scorching
heat,
 Climetical Diseases treading down, To him this day is
dedicate.
- 3rd. No more Grim Death shall overwhelm this Land
 Conquered by Christians. They shall always stand.
 Pale Pestilence shall fly from every Tent
 Farwel /farewell/ to sad disease and meagre discontent.

4th. O'er Gentle seas which laves the Banks of Ganges,
Shall blow a wholesome Breeze
Whistling thro' the shady Trees,
From the Extent of utmost Lands it Ranges
To cleanse and purify Mankind
And leave no more disease behind.

5th. Thus spake Great Britain's Genii with loud voice,
Let Harcourt still in Health and Wealth rejoice,
Tho' years renew'd his Fame still be increased,
And happiness Eternal Crown him at the last.

Signed John Symes,
Pte. M.E. Regt.

Camp near Fort Barrabatty
Add. MSS. 13609, p.336.

(2)

On the 4th of September we marched from Ganjam
But we soon lost our road and turn'd back again.

This march proved fatal that very same day
Through the sun's scorching heat
Which on us did beat

Till several of the army fell dead by the way.

We then came to Pihgy and staid a little space
Till our Baggage and followers came all into place
Then we bent our way to Jaggernaut, that city of fame,
Our Road was o'er the sandy beach scarce one we touched the
plain.

This City of Great Eminence we Beheld with some disgust,
For Reasons truly scriptural, and consequently just.
It seemed that Heaven and Earth did war as soon as we came
there,

For our Camp became a swamp and we felt it most severe.
When we left Jaggernaut most wretched was our March,
the Mharrattas gall'd our Picquet to prevent our approach.
We encamped near Ahmedpore, while the rain poured down,
And most of our Men lay on the wet ground.

The 13th Employed in needful preparation,
the 14th Assaulted and took this great station.

Three Pieces of Ordnance was all we did play,
From 6 in the morning till Eleven the same day.
The assault then was warm. Britons led the Way
That before 12 o'clock Cuttack was our Prey
And the Ensign of Britain on their Flagstaff did play.

And now to Co^{ll} Harcourt, the Brave and the wise,
and likewise to His Staff, all happiness be theirs,
May Health, Wealth and Honours fill up every day,
And years yet unnumbered - Long free from Decay.

signed J. Symes,
Private, M.E. Regiment.

Add. MSS.13609, p.337.

(3)

Hail Gentle Muse, let me invoke thy lay,
To sing the praises of the present day.
To give to truth and honor each their due
Amongst the Multitude that each may View.
Himself as in a natural glass
Things past and present to possess.
To bear in mind each worthy Deed
Evils encounter'd and o'ercome with speed.
To fire Each British youth and present evil
That none may yield to Scindiah or the Devil.

Add. MSS. 13609, p. 337.

CHAPTER III

REBELLION OF THE RAJA OF
KHURDA

The rebellion of the Raja of Khurda, which occurred soon after the British conquest of Orissa, had its origins in the Maratha period. During the administration of Shiv Bhatt Sathe, Narayan Deva the Zamindar of Khemidy and a descendant of the royal family of Orissa had claimed the throne of Khurda and had invaded the country. The Raja of Khurda in his distress sought the help of the Marathas, which was granted on condition of a payment of one lakh of rupees. The Raja of Khemidy was driven out of Khurda, but the Raja of Khurda was unable to pay the money bargained for. He was forced to surrender to the Marathas four mahals including Lembai, Rahang and Purusottam Chhattar in which the temple of Jagannath is situated (i.e. the country between the Daya, the Chilka lake and the sea), together with the tribute of fourteen khandaits of the hills subject to his control.⁽¹⁾ The Raja was so

(1) A.B.Mahanty (ed.), Madalapanji, p.79; Bengal Political Consultations 4 December 1759.

angry at being deprived of the management of the temple of Jagannath, a privilege which he had long enjoyed, that he once tried to obtain 500 Telingas and provisions from the chief of Ganjam and together with his own force to invade Puri. It was only on a representation from Raja Ram Pandit, the Maratha Governor of Orissa, to the Governor General of Bengal, that the chief of Ganjam was dissuaded from helping the Raja's design. Consequently this project was a failure. (1)

During the march of the British troops under Harcourt to occupy Orissa, negotiations were carried on with the Raja of Khurda to detach him from the Maratha interest. One lakh of rupees was offered to the Raja provided he would withdraw from the Marathas, afford a clear passage and provide men and supplies for the British troops. (2) The Raja's wakil agreed to this proposal but strongly represented that the restoration of the four mahals should be treated as an essential condition for the fulfilment of the agreement. But Harcourt did not accept this. (3) Yet

(1) C.P.C. Vol. V, No.1224.

(2) 1 October 1804, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805 No.1; 10 October 1806, R.T.Turner, Acting Magistrate of Midnapur to Government, Board's Collections, Vol.318, 7224, p.2.

(3) 21 September 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.15.

the Raja did not give up the hope that his representation might be considered at some future date.

The Raja gave the British some assistance and was willing to the extent of his means to afford men and supplies against the Marathas. But in consequence of the early reduction of the fort of Barabati, there arose no necessity for the British to demand any further help from him according to the terms stipulated. By this time Rs.50,000 out of the promised lakh had been paid to him. (1)

During the Raja's minority Jayi Rajaguru was administering the country. Acting on behalf of the Raja he proceeded to Cuttack in March 1804, attended by 2,000 armed men. He had an audience with Harcourt when he submitted a petition requesting the restoration of the four mahals and urging payment of the balance of the stipulated amount. He further desired the reduction of the annual peshkash to the British which had already been reduced to ten per cent. In regard to the money demanded, the British agreed to pay a further Rs.20,000; the rest it was promised, would be paid at some future date. Regarding the second claim Harcourt observed

(1) 1 October 1804, Harcourt and Melville to Government,
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805
No.1.

that "not a span of land could be given up". He also rejected the request for a further reduction in the peshkash. ⁽¹⁾

Rajaguru returned from Cuttack and said, according to the Raja's subsequent account, "I at first warned you from forming an alliance with the Commander of the Company's Troops and from affording him a safe passage". ⁽²⁾ He further added that Harcourt was not only unwilling to give up the mahals but also had intentions of taking from the Raja whatever hereditary country remained in his possession. ⁽³⁾

(1) Ibid.; 10 October 1806, Turner to Government, Board's Collections Vol.318, 7244, p.4.

(2) Such statements from Rajaguru appear quite credible; Harcourt in many of his letters to the Government has put the blame on Rajaguru for hostilities between the Raja and the British Government. In one of them he said, "It appears the Raja himself is not inimical to us but his Dewan is extremely so and he controls everybody and everything at Khurda". (vide 23 October, ¹⁸⁰⁴ Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. 13610, p.102; also vide 12 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Board of Revenue Proceedings February 1809, No.1.). The subsequent events confirm our belief. Rajaguru was hanged for abetting rebellion (vide Madalapanji, p.82). Again the Raja was in imprisonment; he filed a petition pleading his innocence and holding the Rajaguru responsible for the rebellion. Consequently he was released (vide Board's Collections Vol.318, 7244, p.31; no date nil).

(3) 10 October 1806, Turner to Government, Board's Collections Vol.318, 7244, p.4.

The Raja was chagrined at the news of Harcourt's attitude. He therefore assumed a hostile attitude towards the British Government. That Government had prepared agreements defining in liberal terms its relations with the tributary Rajas. These agreements were readily accepted and signed by all except the Raja of Khurda. The Raja made delays on various pretexts. Consequently the commissioners at Cuttack sent one of their principal native officers to explain to the Raja the nature of the terms proposed. He was also instructed to warn him of the impropriety of his conduct and of the danger of its continuance. ⁽¹⁾

The Raja appeared to be submissive but nevertheless delayed signing the agreement for a space of nine weeks. At this the commissioners at Cuttack ordered their messenger "to quit the Khurda Durbar within eight and forty hours after the receipt of their orders in the event of the Raja continuing to withhold his signature and the acceptance of the terms proposed". Thereupon the Raja accepted the agreement and affixed his seal to it but while delivering it he observed (according to a report from the commissioner of Cuttack) arrogantly and impertinently that "he made peace with the English". ⁽²⁾

(1) 1 October 1804, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805 No.1

(2) Ibid.

Moreover with a view to seizing the four mahals from the British, he sought the help of the Raja of Berar and accordingly carried on a correspondence with him. Some letters referring to this intrigue were intercepted by British officers. In one of them Antaji Naik (an officer of the Nagpur Government stationed at Raipur) wrote to Raghuji Bhonsla, "I have come from Ryepur to Khurda and seen the Raja, he desires me to hire 1,000 horse and foot of which he says he will defray the expense and write to your highness requesting you to give Raghunath Boxy a dress of horse and send him thither with some troops and some guns. The Raja and I have found out the lucky hour, we have circulated a report that Raghunath Boxy marched from Nagpur which has inclined the Mulkee Zemindars (tributary Rajas) to join."⁽¹⁾ The existence of an intrigue was confirmed by the zamindar of Raigarh and by Elphinstone the Resident at Nagpur. However the Raja of Khurda could not get any help.⁽²⁾

Further, the Raja increased his establishment of troops and appointed some Maratha sardars. He also improved the

- (1) 20 November 1804, Elphinstone to Harcourt and Melville, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805
Nos.12, 13.
- (2) 19 September 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. 13610, p.64;
6 October 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610 p.82;
1 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.114.
7 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.126.

internal defence of the country by repairing roads and stationing troops at Dompara and Banpur; 200 guards stationed at the gate of Khurda were reinforced by an additional 300 guards and two pieces of canon. The Raja often went to the hills in search of a place of security to which he could resort in time of need. (1)

Again, the Raja induced the other tributary chiefs to unite in common cause with him against the British. Sambhu Bharati, an influential gosain (religious mendicant), who was disaffected with the new British revenue system was engaged by the Raja for this purpose. (2) Accordingly the Raja of Kujang and Kanika readily accepted such invitation. The latter was in fact more hostile to the British than the former. (3)

In the month of March 1804 the British had made engagements with the Raja of Kanika for the purchase of all the salt made in his territories and he agreed to construct

- (1) 21 October 1804, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations ~~29 November 1804~~ No. 4 April 1805 Nos. 20-2; 13 November 1804, Government to Elphinstone, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 29 November 1804 No. 164; 10 October 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.91; 7 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, pp.125, 127.
- (2) 6 October 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, pp.80-1.
- (3) 7 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, pp.129-30.

golas at convenient places. A gumashta had therefore been appointed to take charge of the golas; he was also supplied with some money for the purchase of salt. But now the Raja suddenly seized all the workmen employed in constructing golas and plundered the money from the gumashta. In July 1804 when the attendance of the Raja was required at the Cuttack town he defied the order, though other tributaries presented themselves with readiness. When he fell into arrears with a considerable part of his revenue, chaprasis were sent to him with commissioners badges to demand payment but they were turned out of his territory. He collected a large body of armed men who were placed under the control of a Maratha sardar who was a well-known enemy to the British Government. (1)

Lastly the Raja of Khurda withdrew his wakil from Cuttack and thus, in the opinion of the British, set a bad example before the other tributaries. (2)

Such hostile proceedings were detected by Harcourt soon after the fall of the fort of Barabati. He attempted to

(1) 20 November 1804, Elphinstone to Harcourt and Melville, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805 Nos.12-3.

(2) 7 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, pp.131-2.

bring the Raja to his senses by conciliatory measures but without success. He observed "Our moderation has been construed into weakness, our silence into ignorance and our endeavours to conciliate into apprehension and fear".⁽¹⁾ He was afraid that the Raja of Khurda's example might be followed by other tributary chiefs. "Everything tends, I think, to increase the necessity of making an example of that fellow the Raja of Khurda".⁽²⁾ Again, he wrote "I do think the Raja of Khurda must be exterminated. It is my intention to demand the immediate dismissal of his troops and destruction of his barriers; that he should give up his correspondence with any persons dissatisfied with the British Government."⁽³⁾

But Wellesley was not prepared to consent readily to this proposal. Indeed his schemes for the extension of British authority in India had already been opposed by the Court of Directors. Again, when in June 1804 war was declared against Holkar the Court of Directors condemned

(1) 6 October 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.81.

(2) 3 October 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. 13610, p.74.

(3) 1 October 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, pp.66-7.

Wellesley's policy more vehemently than before.⁽¹⁾ Thus criticism from home perhaps dissuaded Wellesley from pursuing any further military measures. M. Shawe, private secretary to Wellesley, wrote to Harcourt, "Lord Wellesley desires me to inform you that he has had quite enough of war and is very unwilling to engage in fresh operation of a military nature".⁽²⁾

Another reason for Wellesley's unwillingness to use force against the Raja of Khurda at that moment was that the war with the Maratha confederates was not yet over. He had received information that Holkar's agents were attempting to excite an alarm amongst the petty chieftains dependent on the British Government by spreading the idea that it was the secret aim of the British to deprive them of their powers and to reduce them gradually to the condition of the zamindars subject to the Company. Wellesley feared that any operations against the Raja of Khurda at that moment might give an air of probability to these rumours.⁽³⁾

Wellesley therefore told Harcourt to try to bring the Raja to his senses without using force. He added that if

(1) C. H. Philips, East India Company, pp.140-1

(2) 7 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.139.

(3) 11 November 1804, Government to Harcourt, Add.MSS.13608, pp.142-3.

force had to be used it would be best to wait until Holkar had been defeated. (1)

Accordingly as a precautionary measure against the unity of the tributary chiefs behind the cause of the Raja of Khurda, Harcourt imprisoned Sambhu Bharati, who carried messages on behalf of the Raja of Khurda from one tributary state to another. (2)

Secondly he wanted to demand the removal from office of Rajaguru, who was at the root of the Raja's hostility against the British, and to explain to the Raja the various points concerning which the British felt suspicious of him. For this purpose, Captain Blunt was selected and empowered to adjust differences. (3)

A messenger was sent in advance to request the Raja to receive Blunt. The Raja agreed and behaved with every appearance of submission. But on the following day Rajaguru informed the messenger that the Raja had changed his mind and that Blunt could not come to Khurda. As the messenger insisted on the necessity of compliance, after a long

(1) Ibid.

(2) 6 October 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.81.

(3) 23 October 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.102; 9 November 1804, Harcourt to Elphinstone, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 2 Mgy 1805 No.445; 10 October 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.90.

discussion Rajaguru yielded to the extent of saying that he would explain the matter to the Raja and obtain a letter from him. Thus the messenger was detained for fourteen days, at the end of which he was told that should he attempt to stay any longer at Khurda it might be dangerous for him. (1) He therefore left Khurda for Cuttack, but on the confines of the Raja's territory he found that several harkaras going to Khurda with letters urging the Raja to receive Blunt had been detained by the Raja's guards. One of their letters had been seized and opened. They could procure supplies only with great difficulty. (2) From here the messenger made an attempt to induce the Raja by letter to acquiesce in the British demand. But as this proved of no avail, he returned to Cuttack. (3)

Thus negotiations were broken off. By this time the war between the British and the Maratha confederates was over and Harcourt had already made preparations to curb the power of the Raja. Before he took any action the Raja had already imposed restraints on communications into his territory by placing a guard on the banks of the river

(1) 9 November 1804, Harcourt to Elphinstone, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 2 May 1805 No.445; 7 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, pp.127-8.

(2) 7 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.128.

(3) 9 November 1804, Harcourt to Elphinstone, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 2 May 1805 No.445.

Mahanadi, who attempted to seize all property coming down to Cuttack, declaring that "the Raja's orders were that nothing was to pass belonging to English sirdars at this place."⁽¹⁾

The Raja also sent a party of about 250 cavalry and about 900 Barkandazes, who entered the disputed mahals and plundered them.⁽²⁾ They also disarmed a small detachment in the service of the Company. After that they posted themselves in and near the village of Delang.⁽³⁾

Captain Hickland⁽⁴⁾ who was posted at Pipli soon marched with a party of 120 sepoy and a six pounder at two o'clock in the morning of 22 November 1804 and reached Delang at 5 o'clock. Soon he made a sudden attack and routed the Raja's force. In the attack which was made on the garh near the village, the Raja's force lost upward of 100, while the loss on the side of the British consisted of one lashkar killed, together with one hawaldar, one drummer and six sepoy wounded.^(4^a)

(1) 16 November 1804, Harcourt to Elphinstone, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 2 May 1805 No.446; 5 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.120.

(2) 19 November 1804, Hickland to Harcourt, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805 No.27.

(3) 10 October 1806, Turner to Government, Board's Collections Vol.318, 7244, p.5.; 16 November 1804, Harcourt to Elphinstone, Add.MSS.13610, p.150.

(4) John Hickland, Captain, 5th Bengal Native Infantry.

(4a) 29 November 1804, Hickland to Harcourt, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805 No.27; 20 November 1804, Hickland to Harcourt, Add.MSS. 13610, pp.156-7.

While Hickland was returning to Pipli about 50 horse kept on hovering on his flank on the way, wounded two British sepoy and one of the Europeans. Then they set fire to some villages nearby. In consequence of the firing of Hickland's flanking parties three of the Raja's men were killed. As he was occasionally harassed by the Raja's men, Hickland took post at Pautpur and was ultimately successful in scaring them away. (1)

A force under Harcourt now moved from Cuttack, on which the Raja's soldiers who were plundering in the Mughalbandi retreated and took shelter in the fort of Khurda. (2)

After reaching the fort of Khurda Harcourt reconnoitred the thick bamboo jungles and hedge surrounding the fort within 500 yards of the gate. He sent a detachment under Captain Storey in the direction of Gangapara, the way towards which was reported to have been blockaded by bamboos. When Storey was about 500 yards from the blockade, two sentries posted there gave the alarm. When the British detachment came nearer, the sentries opened fire and then gave way.

- (1) Encl., 20 November 1804, Harcourt to Captain Armstrong, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805, No.27.
- (2) 21 November 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p.154; 7 December 1804, Harcourt to Armstrong, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805, No.32.

After securing possession of the blockade, a strong party was sent to get intelligence of Hickland but they were not able to reach him; the detachment then returned to Khurda.⁽¹⁾

In response to a proclamation issued by Harcourt stating that whoever promoted the British interests would be suitably rewarded, Shaikh Wyoze Muhammad, a native of Cuttack, offered his services with a contingent. He was placed in the charge of a piece of artillery and was directed to reduce the fort of Banpur, which he did. He also captured four of the Raja's brothers and one son.⁽²⁾

Meanwhile a twelve pounder battery and two flanking batteries, one of two howitzers and the other of four six pounders were constructed against the walls of the fort. They were completed on 4 December 1804 and opened fire at daybreak on the following day. At ten o'clock in the morning a practicable breach was made near the principal entrance of the outer fort. Major Fletcher was directed to assault the place with about 120 men of a Madras European regiment and with two flank companies of 2nd

(1) 2 December 1804, Storey to Harcourt, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805 No. 31.

(2) Encl., 21 October 1815, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 31 October 1815 No. 18.

battalion 7th Bengal native infantry together with a six pounder and a proportion of artillery men and gun laskars. (1)

The main party was covered on its right by two flank companies of the 19th Madras native infantry under Hickland and one from the 9th Madras native infantry. These covering parties were told to assist the party under the command of Fletcher. When the outer fort had been carried the inner fort was plainly visible. Soon Fletcher was provided with a ladder, with which he succeeded in climbing the wall, followed by his party. (2)

When the British troops were busy entering the outer work, the Raja escaped, together with the diwan and the other principal sardars. (3) He then made for the jungle from where he sent a vakil with a request for an audience with Harcourt. But the vakil was made a prisoner. Then the Raja sent his diwan for the same purpose but he was also made a prisoner. After this he sent a servant of the Company. When he returned from Harcourt and was encouraging the Raja, a small detachment seized the Raja in the jungle

(1) 7 December 1804, Harcourt to Armstrong, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 4 April 1805, No. 32.

(2) Ibid.

(3) 5 December 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13610, p. 174.

30 miles from Khurda on the night of 3 January 1805, and sent him a prisoner to Cuttack. (1)

After settling affairs at Khurda Harcourt sent a detachment to Nayagarh to capture Antaji and Kannoji, who were chiefly implicated in the intrigue between the Raja of Khurda and the Raja of Nagpur. (2) Then he proceeded directly towards Gope, from which he intended to go up the sea coast by Golra, Marichpur, Harishpur and Bishenpur, Kujang and Kanika in order to deal with those who sympathised with the rebellion and to establish order in those parts of the country. (3)

The Rajas of Marichpur and Bishenpur had promised to join hands with the Raja of Khurda against the British; the former in particular drove away many British raiyats from the frontier villages; he also went to the extent of sending parties to raise contributions in some of the Mughalbandi villages and neglected the orders of the commissioners that he should pay tribute. On the arrival

(1) 10 October 1806, Turner to Government, Board's Collections, Vol. 318, 7244, p.6; 4 January 1805, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805 No. 40.

(2) Ibid.

(3) 13 January 1805, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 2 May 1805, No. 448.

of Harcourt's army in the neighbourhood of their territories they soon submitted. (1)

The Raja of Kujang looked to the Raja of Khurda as his immediate superior. He had therefore made some preparations together with the Raja of Kanika, but the fall of the Raja of Khurda deterred him. When Harcourt's detachment reached his territory in the middle of February 1805 he did not provide them with the grain which they required. As soon as Harcourt crossed the river Mahamadi, he took to flight. His elder brother was thereupon seated on the throne on the following conditions:

First, "that all arrangements made in the Moghulbundi territories with regard to the salt manufactured therein should be considered as extending over Kujang territories as far as they might be deemed applicable thereto by the British Government. Secondly the Raja should account to the British Government or authorities at Cuttack for all property found from the wrecks of the vessels on the sea coast of his territory." Thirdly, he should obey all orders he might receive from the British Government in the capacity of a chief of a 'tributary estate'. Lastly, the family of the Raja who took to flight should be taken

(1) 29 January 1805, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 2 May 1805 No. 448.

care of and provided with a suitable maintenance. (1)

The Raja of Kanika, who was a very active supporter of the Raja of Khurda, had already shown a hostile attitude to the British at the time of the rebellion. Although a British detachment was stationed near his territory, perhaps with a view to frighten him, he drove away the raiyats and other inhabitants from the British frontier, and prevented them from collecting their crops. He imposed considerable restrictions on the passage of vessels up the river, and threatened to put the crews to death. He assembled parties on the frontier of the Mughalbandi for the purpose of invading it. A party of Barkandazes was actually crossing the Kanika river to enter the Mughalbandi, when the arrival of a British vessel in the river prevented it. When a British officer went on duty to a port in the Raja's country he was surrounded by an armed force. When the inhabitants of the villages offered him trifling supplies they were carried off and put in confinement. Therefore Harcourt had sent a detachment towards Kendrapara village in the Mughalbandi to prevent any predatory incursions from the Raja of Kanika.

(1) 17 February 1805, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Constultations 2 May 1805 No. 450.

By the time the detachment reached Kendrapara the Raja of Kanika had heard of the British success at Khurda. He therefore abandoned his attempts to seize a British vessel, and disbanded several hundred of his armed peons.⁽¹⁾ In view of the Raja's misconduct Harcourt imprisoned him and sent him to Balasore. From there he was later removed to the fort of Midnapur. His country was entrusted to the charge of the judge and magistrate of Cuttack.⁽²⁾

The Raja of Kanika was subsequently released from confinement and restored to his estate on paying the same annual tribute as before. But this principle was not applied in the case of the Raja of Khurda when he was freed from imprisonment. When the question of restoring him to Khurda arose, the Raja was not permitted to pay the same tribute as before. He was asked to engage for his estate at a higher assessment. The commissioners at Cuttack desired to make an example of him and believed that such a measure would subdue the rebellious spirit of the tributary Rajas. Harcourt wrote to the Government, "I conceive that such manifestation of our justice and moderation coupled

-
- (1) 22 December 1804, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultation, 4 April 1805 No. 36; 30 December 1804, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805, No. 39.
- (2) 16 May 1805, Government to Harcourt, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 16 May 1805, No. 405.

with the example that has been made of the rebellious Raja of Khurda will effectually prevent the occurrence of those difficulties we have already experienced."⁽¹⁾

But the policy which was calculated to prevent trouble from the tributary chiefs ultimately led to a rebellion, twelve years later, from that part of the country which changed hands from the Raja of Khurda to the British.

(1) 24 December 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.13610, p. 193.

CHAPTER IV

TRIBUTARY STATES.

During the Maratha rule that part of Orissa which was known as Garjat was held by a number of tributary chieftains. They managed their own territories, maintained their own forces and paid a quit rent to the Maratha Government either in money or in kind.⁽¹⁾

If the tributary chiefs committed any offence or acted contrary to the interests of the Maratha Government they were punished. Maratha troops marched into their territories to apprehend criminals and occasionally dethroned a chief himself. The chiefs of Khurda, Athgarh, Ali and Darpan had each been imprisoned, and the first died in the fort of Barabati. Thus, though the tributary chiefs generally enjoyed freedom in the internal administration of their territories, the Maratha Government interfered if it thought fit.⁽²⁾

-
- (1) 19 January 1804, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804, No. 42.
- (2) 17 October 1815, E. Impey, Superintendent of tributary mahals to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations (Lower Provinces) 14 November 1815, No. 41.

When the British took possession of Orissa they found 30 hill chiefs. The territories of some of them constituted the Garjat. The territories of others were scattered over the Mughalbandi. The most powerful of them, the chief of Khurda, rebelled against the British Government and consequently his estate was annexed to the Mughalbandi. The territories of the remaining 29 were generally called "Tributary Mahals." In accordance with the practice of the Maratha Government, the British entered into engagements for fixed jama with these tributary chiefs. It was considered that such a liberal policy was likely to bind them to the British Government. In these engagements there was no provision for the protection of the agricultural community against oppression from the chiefs. But this did not prevent the British Government from exercising an active control in such matters if it wished. The sum total annually derived by the British Government from these 29 Mahals amounted to sicca Rs. 118,687. The surplus thought to be enjoyed by the proprietors was estimated at approximately Rs. 523,250. (1)

(1) 17 July 1818, Governor General in Council to Court of Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1818-19 Vol. IX, pp. 106-9; 20 December 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815 No. 29.

Thirteen out of the twenty-nine mahals were subjected to the British regulations and the remaining sixteen were exempted from them. While the former were absorbed in the Mughalbandi, the latter with some later additions emerged as the real tributary states of Orissa. (1)

This group of sixteen states covered a hilly tract, having the districts of Singhbhum and Midnapur on the north, the Mughalbandi on the east, the district of Ganjam in the Madras presidency in the south and the states of Athmalik, Baud, Bamra, Radhakol, Sonpur and Patna on the west. In many parts of this tract there were hill tribes. The southern part was inhabited by a large number of Kandha, the middle by Savaras and the northern by Kols and Santhals. The greater portion of this tract was unfit for cultivation and the small portion cultivated produced a scanty subsistence. The majority of the inhabitants turned

(1) The sixteen states were Mayurbhanj, Nilgiri, Angul, Athgarh, Dhenkanal, Banki, Daspalla, Nayagarh, Narasingpur, Ranpur, Talcher, Tigiria, Hindol, Sukinda, Keonjhar and Khandpara:
Bengal *Civil* Judicial Consultations B.P.
5 September 1805 No. 32 (Regulation XII 1805).

to employments like the manufacture of iron, charcoal, boat building and felling timber.⁽¹⁾

At the time of the conquest of Crissa, the hilly nature of this tract and "the uncivilised manners of the Zemindars" and of the other inhabitants prompted the British to adopt a policy towards them that was quite different from their policy elsewhere. While the British regulations were extended to other mahals, the chiefs of the sixteen states, in accordance with special agreements made with them, enjoyed full freedom in the internal administration of their territories. Their only obligation was to pay a stipulated tribute to the British Government punctually. The provisions of the agreements show that these chiefs were treated as subordinate allies: on the one hand, they were required to acknowledge the supreme authority of the British, on the other hand they were pledged to prevent the passage of enemies of the British through their territories and to help the British in punishing and reducing to obedience any offenders in their neighbourhood. It was administrative expediency that regulated the British relationship with

(1) 20 December 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815 No. 29.

these sixteen states. It did not arise out of any rights asserted by the chiefs. The British Government reserved the power of interfering in these states if it was found necessary. (1) Their tribute was treated as ordinary revenue by the British. If they delayed payment they were fined as a penalty. If they could not pay at all their lands were sold up. Thus, as in the case of the zamindars of the Mughalbandi, as well as in that of the chiefs of the tributary mahals not exempted from British regulations, the common mode of enforcing the collection of tribute from these sixteen states was to put the lands up for sale. For example, on one occasion six of them were advertised for sale for the recovery of arrears. As suitable bidders were not found, the collector purchased them on account of the Government. But subsequently they were restored to the Rajas on the discharge of the arrears due from them. (2)

-
- (1) Encl., 1 October 1804, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 4 April 1805 Nos. 3, 4.
- (2) 29 February 1820, A. Stirling, Secretary to the Commissioner of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820, No. 25; 26 October 1818, Ker to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 November 1818 No. 52; 29 September 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 November 1818 No. 53.

Formerly the method of collection was defective in that there was no exertion on the part of the Government to press the collection of tribute from the chiefs. There were therefore arrears outstanding in every year. In 1818 when Ker was the commissioner of Cuttack a better arrangement was made for securing the punctual payment of the tribute from the sixteen states. A rule was established that each Raja should send in the amount of each kist on the day of its being due with a despatch (chalan) to the collector's office and address a petition (arzi) at the same time of their having done so. If this petition were not given, orders (parwanas) would be despatched calling for payment and peons would be sent from the commissioner's office after a certain interval. This system proved a success. Stirling, writing on behalf of Ker, stated that "punctual collection of the tribute due from the sixteen Gurjats exempt from regulations was very happily and successfully effected by Mr. Ker during 1226 Umlæ/1818/19/ without its being found necessary to advertise any one of them for sale."(1)

(1) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No. 25.

True to the agreement made with the tributary chiefs, the British Government avoided interfering in the internal administration of these sixteen states.⁽¹⁾ They thought that those chiefs would be "the conservators of the Public Peace and the distributors of Justice." But in 1814 it was reported that some of them were indulging in serious crimes. The chief of Dhenkanal was said to have killed one person and tortured others. Similarly the chief of Mayurbhanj was said to have killed someone. The Government directed the magistrate of Cuttack to take cognizance of these cases. Enquiries were conducted. Owing to the want of evidence, however, these chiefs were acquitted of the charge of murder. But the chief of Dhenkanal was convicted of other charges. The Government also came to suspect that the chiefs had been party to the alleged crimes.⁽²⁾

Therefore the Government decided to appoint an officer to supervise the conduct of the chiefs of the sixteen states so as to prevent the commission of crimes

-
- (1) Encl., 1 August 1812, I.W. Sage, Magistrate of Cuttack to ~~the~~ Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 22 August 1812 No. 26; 22 August 1812, Government to Sage, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 22 August 1812 No. 27.
- (2) 18 October 1814, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations L.P. 18 October 1814 No. 43.

and outrages. This officer was designated the "Superintendent of the Tributary Mahals." Impey, the magistrate of Cuttack, was the first to hold this office. He was appointed in 1814. The power enjoyed by the superintendent was of a political nature; it was not closely defined. It was thought that the superintendent, "being unfettered by any precise rules, might serve as a useful check on their conduct." The whole idea underlying this arrangement was to secure the interests of the people by interfering as little as possible in their chiefs' internal administration. (1)

An attempt was made to see if the police in these states could be improved. Impey was directed to obtain accurate information regarding the states and the character and disposition of their chiefs. When his enquiries began some of the chiefs apprehended that police thanas would be established in their states and objected to the enquiries on the ground that it was not consistent with the agreements made with them by the first commissioners. It was only when the Governor General in Council made clear that "It was not in contemplation to establish police

(1) Board's Collections Vol. 404, 11899, pp. 1, 2, 33-4.
(no date).

thanas on the part of the Government" in the tributary states that the chiefs' suspicions were allayed.⁽¹⁾

In fact the enquiries showed that on the one hand the application of the Bengal regulations to these states would be "very inexpedient". First it was thought that the daroghas at such a distance "amongst a people so ill-informed" and "so little acquainted with the nature" of British laws and methods would harass and oppress the people. Secondly even if the regulations were extended they would be productive of much expense but as the tribute of the states was fixed, there was no means to recover the expense. On the other hand, enquiries convinced the Government that if the tributary chiefs were left entirely uncontrolled, that would increase the amount of crime in the states.⁽²⁾

Therefore the British Government took a middle course. As a result, in 1816 these states were brought under the ordinary jurisdiction of the criminal courts in so far as serious crimes were concerned. The chiefs were left in control of the police but their exercise of

(1) 14 December 1815, Government to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations, L₂P. 14 November 1815 No. 43.

(2) 20 December 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815 No. 29.

this control was now made subject to the supervision of the superintendent. They received sanads from the superintendent under the authority of the Governor General. They were to send all persons charged with murder, robbery or heinous crime within 24 hours of arrest to the nearest police darogha or military detachment. They had to transmit monthly reports to the superintendent of all occurrences relative to the police of their states, especially all heinous offences. (1)

The enforcement of the police regulations in the tributary states does not appear to have been very successful. The orders of the Government for the submission of monthly reports of crimes to the superintendent were not properly carried out. Ker thought the reports "were made up ... in the Cuttack bazar without reference to the actual state of things." Therefore he discontinued the practice of submitting such reports. But he specifically asked the chiefs to report to him the occurrence of any crimes of magnitude and to send in the accused with the necessary information and evidence so that proper steps might be taken against them. In other words the chiefs

(1) Encl., 20 October 1815, M.H. Turnbull, Register, Nizammat Adalat to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 10 May 1816 No. 2.

were deprived of jurisdiction over serious crimes. From 1816 to 1819 only two cases were brought before the superintendent. In one case a charge of murder was preferred by a merchant against two khandaits in Mayurbhanj. The charge could not be properly established; the defendants were acquitted. In another case of a similar nature the prisoners were released from want of proof. But there was no definite procedure for trying criminal cases from the tributary states. This, in Ker's opinion, to some extent made it difficult to prove the guilt of the defendants.⁽¹⁾

Similarly, the civil jurisdiction of the British courts was not extended to the tributary states until 1816. In some of the states succession disputes had resulted in murder. For example, after the death of Tarwar Singh, the chief of Angul, his younger brother Jai Singh succeeded him. He was in possession of the state for three months when it was alleged that Prithwi Singh, his half-brother, murdered him and his three children in 1809/10 (1217 Amali) and retained possession of the kingdom. Lokanath Singh, a son of Tarwar Singh, claimed the succession. He appealed to the British Government. An enquiry was made. The Government was convinced that the crime was committed

(1) 29 February 1820, A. Stirling, Secretary to Commissioners of Cuttack, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25.

by Prithwi Singh. But as a matter of expediency the Government did not inflict any severe punishment on him because it was apprehended that in view of his power and influence over the people any such punishment would provoke disturbances. (1)

After this incident, a regulation was passed to control the decision of claims relating to succession to the sixteen states. All claims to the succession to any of these states were to be decided in the first instance by the superintendent. He was to be generally guided by the established laws and usages of the states. An appeal could be made from the superintendent's decision to the Sadar Diwani Adalat provided that the petition of appeal was preferred within three months after the original decree had been passed. (2)

The policy of the British Government in determining

-
- (1) Encl., 23 July 1814, Richardson and W.C. Ward, Commissioners appointed to investigate into disputed claim to succession to Augul, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations LpP. 16 August 1814 No. 31;
16 August 1814, Government to Richardson and Ward, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P.
16 August 1814 No. 33.
- (2) Encl., 10 May 1816, Government to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations, 10 May 1816 No. 16.

the relation of the Mughalbandi with the Garjat was one of avoiding any complication or confusion and of acting as far as practicable within the limits of the agreement.

On two occasions, when some of the inhabitants of the Mughalbandi applied for the recovery of debts from the hill chiefs, the superintendent dismissed the applications on the ground that the regulations relative ^{to} suits for the recovery of debts did not extend to the Garjat chiefs and that he had consequently no jurisdiction over them in such matters. (1)

When two Mughalbandi estates were purchased privately by two hill chiefs, the Government objected on the ground that the lands taken under their control would be liable to the British regulations and consequently would involve the purchasers in inconvenience and embarrassment. To quote the opinion of Ker, "as the Hill Chiefs are exempt from the operation of the Regulations in their proper capacity of tributaries, we are entitled to demand from them in return for this and other high privileges which they enjoy that they confine themselves to their Hills and abstain from intruding on an order of things of which they form no part." (2)

(1) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No. 25.

(2) Ibid.

In the matter of trade between the Mughalbandi and the Garjat, at first during Impey's superintendence many of the tributary chiefs were imposing vexatious duties on merchants and grain dealers trading with or through the Garjat. When Ker was superintendent he considered that this was injurious and that the chiefs had no right to do so. Therefore he prohibited the chiefs from imposing duties on trade. (1)

If we examine how far the chiefs were eager to keep themselves within the limits of their agreements, it seems that the chief of Nayagarh for many years afforded shelter and support to several of the most active leaders in the rebellion of 1817. He also failed to help in the capture of rebel leaders whose haunts lay beyond his own frontier. (2)

The country of the chief of Mayurbhanj suffered for sometime from the depredations of a tribe of Kandhs or Kols. But when the chiefs was called on, he did not make any adequate exertions to restore law and order. (3)

Sometimes inhabitants of the Mughalbandi charged with crimes absconded to Keonjhar and remained safe from

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

pursuit. Orders from the superintendent's office calling on the chief to apprehend them were often evaded and the regulation for bringing the offenders to task did not often produce the desired effect.⁽¹⁾

In short, in the management of the tributary states exempted from the regulations, the British strictly enforced the punctual payment of tribute from their chiefs. They were also anxious to enforce the observance of the engagements made by the chiefs with their first commissioners. They reserved the right to interfere in the internal administration of the tributary states, and they did interfere when some chiefs committed heinous crimes. They tried to persuade the chiefs to improve their administration, but they thought it expedient to abstain as far as possible from interference lest it might create discontent against the British rule.

(1) Ibid.

CHAPTER V

RELIGIOUS POLICY

In the eighteenth century the British religious policy in India, it has been said, was based not only on toleration but also on protection. Especially in the southern and western parts of India the British were firm supporters of Hindu religious institutions. The basic idea behind the policy was that whatever the native government would have done they were bound to do.⁽¹⁾ By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British patronage of Hindu religious institutions was being criticised by numerous bodies of zealots in Britain, especially the Evangelicals. They pleaded that practices like the burning of widows and self-immolation under the wheels of the car of Jagannath were evils inherent in the Hindu religion which could only be removed by western education and a knowledge of Christianity. Some members of the Clapham Sect, notably Wilberforce, Grant, Henry Thornton and Parry, took an active part in this movement. Some spoke in Parliament. Parry and Grant tried as Directors

(1) J. W. Kaye, Christianity in India, pp.391-2.

to influence the Court into withdrawing official patronage from Hindu religious institutions.⁽¹⁾ But when the news of the Vellore mutiny reached London the opponents of the Clapham Sect vigorously attacked the idea of preaching Christianity in India. It was represented that the preaching of Christianity was one of the causes of the mutiny.⁽²⁾ Public opinion supported them. Consequently the home Government was not inclined to make any changes in the religious policy of the Indian Government which might create misgivings in the minds of the people that the British wanted to convert them to Christianity. In short, in the first two decades of the nineteenth century there was no significant change in the religious policy of the Indian Government.⁽³⁾

This policy applied equally to Orissa as to the rest of India. Like that of the Marathas, the British religious policy in Orissa took special consideration of the religious feelings of the people in general and of the Brahmans at Jagannath in particular. When the British army under the

(1) C. H. Philips, East India Company, pp.158-60;
E.N.Howse, Saints in Politics, pp.73-82.

(2) Parliamentary Papers, H.C.1812-1813 Vol.VIII, pp.517-26.

(3) C. H. Philips, East India Company, pp.161, 190-1;
E. M. Howse, Saints in Politics, pp.87-94.

command of Harcourt marched from Ganjam for the conquest of Orissa, he was warned by the Government not to offend the Brahmans in any manner and was instructed, "On your arrival at Jaggernaut you will employ every possible precaution to preserve the respect due to the Pagoda and to the religious prejudices of the Brahmans and pilgrims. You will furnish the Brahmans with such guards as shall afford perfect security to their persons, rites and ceremonies and to the sanctity of the religious edifices and you will strictly enjoin those under your command to observe your orders on this important subject, with the utmost degree of accuracy and vigilance." The same consistent policy was followed, when the British had taken possession of Orissa. (1)

The temple of Jagannath was looked upon as a prominent Hindu institution, having a great political influence behind it. After the conquest of Orissa Harcourt with reference to the temple remarked that "in a political light its value is incalculable." (2) In 1813 Kishen Chunder Singh, the proprietor of the pargana of Rahang, claimed title to certain lands in the immediate vicinity of Jagannath which he had purchased at a public sale. The Brahmans contested this,

(1) 8 August 1803, Wellesley to Campbell, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.46.

(2) (no date) 1805, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Add.MSS. 13611, p.62

and affrays ensued in which a Brahman lost his life. Richardson after due enquiry recommended that the lands should be free of assessment as being attached to the temple of Jagannath and as being appropriated for the residence of the priests. He further added that "any infringement of the just rights of the Brahmins will be productive of most injurious effects in the political point of view for, I conceive that on the security of those rights, depends the respectability of the priests". The Government approved of this proposal.⁽¹⁾

The British policy towards the priests and Brahmans received a due response from them. In July 1804, when Harcourt with his party visited the car festival at Jagannath, he was received by the pilgrims and priests "with shouts and clapping of hands". They appeared so grateful that Harcourt was astonished. He was of opinion that the gratitude they expressed for the protection afforded them, and the confidence they felt that it would be continued, were "powerful reasons to believe them sincere". He further stated that "in every instance they have manifested the strongest feeling of respect and attention to all of us."⁽²⁾

(1) 15 April 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 May 1813 No.25; 1 May 1813, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 May 1813 No.26.

(2) 10 July 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS. 13610, pp.9-10.

In the same month compliments were presented to Wellesley in a message on a long slip of paper overlaid with gold leaf with the signatures of priests, abbots, recluses, vaishnavas and Brahmans of Puri. (1)

The pensions enjoyed by the Brahmans under the Maratha Government for the support of religious institutions and the maintenance of religious ceremonies were continued under British rule. (2) Similar privileges were also extended to the muslims. For example, in 1805 in conformity with usage, the kazi of Cuttack was given a khilat consisting of two shawls, four turbans and 400 kahans of kauris or 100 rupees in cash for the celebration of the Id. (3)

In short, the keynote of British religious policy was to support the natives in the "undisturbed exercise of their religious rites and ceremonies, and to preserve their places of worship inviolate". (4) In this connection the British were faced with two important problems - first the management of the temple of Jagannath and secondly the collection of the pilgrim tax from the pilgrims who went there.

(1) S. N. Sen and U. Mishra (eds), Sanskrit Documents, pp.9-10.

(2) 14 December 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 December 1813 No.17; 24 December 1813, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 December 1813, No.19; 14 October 1806, R.Ker, the Judge of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 23 October 1806 No.20 (vide also No.21, enclosed).

(3) 10 January 1806, G.Webb, Collector of Cuttack to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 30 Jan.1806, No.33.

(4) 1 July 1814, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 July 1814 No.24.

Formerly the Raja of Khurda, as the superintendent of the temple of Jagannath, had supervised its internal administration. After his removal from this office during the rule of Shiv Bhatt Sathé, the temple was brought under the direct administration of the Marathas. A purcha who was also the Amil of the Purusottam Chhattar, acted as the controlling authority. Owing to the want of vigilance of the Maratha Government, discipline gradually relaxed. The situation deteriorated still further after the British conquest because the absence of any controlling authority allowed the servants of the temple to do whatever they pleased. (1)

For example, regularity was so much neglected that the ceremony which should have been performed before daylight was now sometimes postponed to an advanced hour of the day; consequently many of the daily ceremonies were altogether set aside. Secondly, it was forbidden to use any present made to Jagannath. But such was the impiety and disorder throughout the whole department of the temple, that even the

(1) 10 June 1805, C.Groeme, Collector of Xila Jagannath, to Thomas Fortesque, Secretary to Commissioners of Cuttack, Add.MSS,13611, pp.23-31; (same letter as above) Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.25.

principal servants took horses and other things given in the name of the diety, and misappropriated them for their own use. Thirdly, it had been a practice that if any person knowingly touched any articles intended for Jagannath he was severely punished. But now no attention was paid to this. Fourthly, it was the duty of the Dewal Purcha to occasionally attend to the ingredients of which the Bhog was made, to weigh the different articles and to taste the whole, when dressed, but this was totally neglected; half the articles were embezzled either by the cooks or the persons supplying them. Fifthly, it was contrary to the established custom to sell Mahaprasad at any other place except the twenty second step of the east gate of the temple. But Mahaprasad was in fact indiscriminately sold in every part of the temple.⁽¹⁾

The problem now before the British Government was whether to leave the temple in that condition or to exercise some control over it; to have left the temple unreformed might have allowed a further deterioration in its management. That was why the first commissioners of Cuttack decided to intervene. Paying due regard to the precedents left by

(1) Ibid.

the Marathas, and in consultation with many Brahmans and priests of the temple, they allowed Shewaji Pandit to continue temporarily in the office of Dewal Purcha. He was also directed to control the receipts and disbursements of the temple as before. But they also authorised the collector of the southern division, who had his head-quarters at Puri, to intervene in the management of the temple if he thought it necessary for the good of the institution.⁽¹⁾

In 1805 the commissioners submitted a proposal to the Government recommending some legislation for the management of the temple of Jagannath. In short, they suggested that the Government should appoint a Committee of Pandits to superintend the affairs of the temple while the real control over receipts, disbursements and discipline was to be vested in the collector of the pilgrim tax. G. Udney, one of the members of the Governor-General's Council, was influenced by Evangelical ideas and had given some encouragement to missionaries in Bengal.⁽²⁾ He now suggested that the proposed regulations "would operate to sanction and tend to perpetuate a system of gross idolatry which the Government is neither bound nor does it seem becoming in it to do". He pleaded

(1) 12 November 1803, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.32; 8 April 1808, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 April 1808 No.19.

(2) J.W.Kaye, Christianity in India, p.212.

that the whole economy should be left exclusively to the management of the officers of the temple. But in spite of his objections the proposals were enacted by the Governor General in Council as Regulation IV, 1806.⁽¹⁾

During that period Parry was the chairman and Grant was the deputy chairman. Both of them took a different view of the whole regulation. They recommended to the Board of Control that the Government should be prevented "from interfering in matters which it cannot be proper or competent for that Government to regulate. For a Government which is not Hindoo to elect the priests who are to superintend the affairs of a Hindoo temple, or to exercise control over its Ministers and Officers or to take the management of its funds would seem to us to be a direct invasion of some of the most revered of the Hindoo Institutions; and for a Government professing Christianity to do these things would be to act incompatibly with its own principles".⁽²⁾ The Court also recommended that the Government should not contribute anything from its revenues for the management of the temple because that would mean patronising "idolatrous" institutions.⁽³⁾

(1) Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 April 1806 No.8A (Regulation); Parliamentary Papers H.C.1812-13 Vol.VIII, p.557.

(2) Draft No.33 (18 January 1809) Bengal Draft Despatches Vol.21, pp.80-2.

(3) Parliamentary Papers, H.C. 1812-13, Vol.VIII, p.335.

Robert Dundas, the president of the Board of Control, thought that political sovereignty gave the Company the obligation to preserve the public institutions of the country. He approved the regulation with the following remarks on the draft submitted by the Court. He stated that "it is undoubtedly desirable to avoid as much as possible the exercise of any control over the management and concerns of the temple, as our interference in such matters cannot but be, at all times, disagreeable to the feelings and the prejudices of the Hindoos, and may occasionally furnish ground of jealousy and misrepresentations in regard to our views and intentions respecting their religion."⁽¹⁾

When this was intimated to the Court, Parry and Grant were shocked at the attitude of the Board of Control. In 1809 they wrote a long letter representing their case to the Board of Control. They reiterated their sentiments with further explanations. One of the chief points on which they argued was that the Government had no right to interfere in any circumstances; interference in such religious institutions would give "real cause of offence to the Hindoos" or would

(1) Board's note on Court's Draft, 18 January 1809, Draft No.33, Bengal Draft Despatches Vol.21, pp.80-1.

"furnish ground of misrepresentation in regard to our views and intentions concerning their religion".⁽¹⁾

Dundas upheld his former decision. But he amplified it with further remarks. He stated "the Company have virtually contracted an obligation, before they draw a single rupee of revenue from the country, to support and maintain on a proper footing and upon proper regulations, these establishments which have immemorially been laid in reverence and deemed sacred by their native subjects. As long as the East India Company were permitted to retain political power and authority over the British territories in India, their directors will be held responsible for their adherence to those maxims of Government on which the preservation of the national character for good faith, justice and moderation must in these countries mainly depend,"⁽²⁾ That was why he did not concur in the denial of the competency of Government as "the denial appeared" to him "to have been based as much on the principles of the Christian religion as upon regard to the prejudices of the Hindoos". He further added that he was not prepared to concur in the views of the Court of Directors that the principle of disbursing out of the public treasury

(1) 24 February 1809, Court to Board, Letters to Board Vol.III, pp.317-8.

(2) Bone Miscellaneous Vol.59, pp.474-6.

anything towards the support of religious institutions was objectionable when he considered that "the revenues by which that treasury is supplied, are wholly derived from persons of those religious persuasions". But he stressed the propriety and expediency on every account of "avoiding all unnecessary control or interference" on the part of the Government in regard to the management of the temple. (1)

This policy was intimated to the Government of India through the Court of Directors. (2)

As a result, the Government now modified Regulation IV, 1806, by inserting a provision that the Committee of Pandits should be elected by persons attached to the temple instead of being appointed by the Government. They were to have general control over the temple and its priests. (3)

Meanwhile it had been noticed that even the interference of the collector of the pilgrim tax in the purchase of food for offerings to the idol and of sundry articles for ceremonial

(1) 4 March 1809, Board to Court, Letters from Board, Vol.III pp.137-43; Home Miscellaneous Vol.59, pp.479-80.

(2) Home Miscellaneous Vol.59, p.479.

(3) Parliamentary Papers, H.C. 1812-13, Vol.VIII, p.531.

purposes had not resulted in any economy of expenditure. Again, on subsequent consideration it was found that the management of the temple by an elected body was contrary to precedent. The Government therefore concluded that if the internal administration were left to a hereditary priest, it would result in economy, ensure effective control over the temple and prevent dissatisfaction among the great body of the people at any neglect or irregularity in the administration of its affairs. ⁽¹⁾

The Raja of Khurda was found to be a fit person for this purpose on account of his caste and of the control which he and his ancestors had exercised on the temple. That was one of the reasons why he was released from imprisonment in the fort of Midnapur. ⁽²⁾ In 1809, therefore, the Committee of Pandits was replaced by the Raja of Khurda. He and his heirs were to hold the situation as long as they continued to conduct themselves with integrity, diligence

(1) 9 October, 1806, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 9 October 1806 No.27.

(2) Board's Collections Vol.318, 7244, p.31 (no date); 20 April 1807, Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.) 1807 Letters Received No.151.

(1)
and propriety.

It was apprehended that if the Raja were given the power of appointing or dismissing purchas, he might abuse it. The three purchas were therefore appointed direct by the Government. The Raja was authorised to punish persons subject to his control for neglect or misconduct by imposing fines not exceeding one month's salary or by removing the offender from his office. (2)

It was a decided policy of the Government not to interfere in the internal administration of the temple. For example, in about 1812 Mahadev Mekap, master of the wardrobe to the idol of Jagannath died. As a matter of course he was succeeded by his son Dhundi Mekap. But as he complained that it was difficult for him to perform the duties of his position without assistants, the Raja of Khurda appointed three deputies under him. The Raja took from the store room such articles as were required, gave them into the charge

(1) 17 February 1809, C. Buller, Commissioner of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Board of Revenue Consultations February 1809 No.22; (no date) September 1808, Buller to Fauquier, Bengal Board of Revenue Consultations September 1808 No.7; 17 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 March 1809 No.32; 17 March 1809, Government to Buller, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 March 1809 No.33.

(2) Ibid.

of the deputies, shut the store-room and returned the keys to Dhundi Mekap. But when in September 1813 the inventory was taken, it was found that some articles were missing. The collector of the pilgrim tax made enquiries and suspected that when the deputies had been appointed and the storeroom was opened by the Raja, the property was taken. The Raja pleaded his innocence.⁽¹⁾

This matter was brought before the Government. The Government held that the collector of the pilgrim tax had no right to interfere in such a matter as this, which, according to the arrangements made in 1809, fell within the power of the Raja of Khurda as the superintendent of the temple. ⁽²⁾

Even if the Raja sometimes misused his power, the Government was not prepared to take any drastic measures against him. When Richardson came as a commissioner to Cuttack, he proposed the removal of the Raja from his office. His proposal was based on two reasons. First, he was of opinion that since the Raja of Khurda became superintendent there were fewer first-class pilgrims, because the Raja

(1) 25 January 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 12 February 1814, No.36.

(2) 11 February 1814, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 12 February 1814 No.37.

generally showed an "offensive, contemptuous and disrespectful" behaviour towards them. In support of this view he stated that, during a short period of one or two years he had received such complaints from persons like the Raja of Khemidy, the Raja of Khandpara and the Rani of Sambalpur. (1)

His second reason related to the political ambitions of the Raja. He learnt that the Raja was inculcating a belief that he would, one day, through the power and influence of Jagannath, be restored to his former authority as a ruling power of Cuttack. This he thought was likely to create some difficulty in the peaceful administration of Orissa. On this point his words were in a sense prophetic as two years after a rebellion broke out to place the Raja on the throne of Orissa. (2) But Richardson's proposal contained no satisfactory alternative suggestions as to how the management of the temple would be conducted in the absence of the Raja. That was why the Governor-General in Council rejected it. It was remarked that "the active interference of an European officer in affairs of this nature was by all means to be avoided on every account, less /sic/

(1) 8 January 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.29.

(2) Ibid.

offence should be given to the people in some very tender point by mistakes into which an European might be easily led in matters so very foreign to him, and lest the British Government and its officers should be held forth in the light of direct promoters of an odious superstition".

"Were that superstition less obnoxious it would still be a natural conclusion that the care of religious worship is mostly fitly entrusted to persons of the same religious persuasion and that Government shun the occasion of being mixt in affairs with which it has no concern and by any erroneous management of which most serious differences might be excited very gratuitously among its native subjects"⁽¹⁾.

All that the Government decided to do was to give a warning to the Raja to conduct himself properly in his duties as the superintendent of the temple of Jagannath.⁽²⁾

The main sources of the income of the temple were lands. Under the Maratha rule some lands were under the purcha of Satais Hazari Mahal. He made collections from them. There was another type of lands which were also appropriated for Jagannath, being denominated "Koth Khanja". These were

(1) 1 July 1814, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 July 1814 No.24.

(2) Ibid.

under the charge of the Mathdharis; they were assigned to them to defray the established expenses of the temple. ⁽¹⁾

But owing to the slackness of the Maratha Government, the amount of the annual demands from the above two types of lands were not properly collected. The major portion of whatever was collected was misappropriated by the persons entrusted with the management. ⁽²⁾ The British Government took pains to remove the causes of disorder. Many of the lands under a fixed assessment were brought on the jama of the district; the amount was paid by the Government. The old practice of collecting this revenue from the landholders through the servants of the temple, who received a deduction in the revenue on this account, was abolished. The average annual collections from lands assigned to pay for the expenses of the temple from 1810/11 to 1815/16 were Rs.17,744. ⁽³⁾

(1) 10 June 1805, Groome to Commissioners of Cuttack, Add.MSS.13611, pp.18, 86, 90-4.

(2) Ibid. p.18.

(3) 8 January 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.29; 13 December 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.23; Enclo., 13 December 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.26; Enclo., 12 January 1815, Board of Revenue to Richardson Bengal Revenue Consultations 11 March 1815 No.52; Enclo., 3 December 1816, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 21 February 1817 No.39.

Another important source of income for the temple was the tax paid on the sale of Mahaprasad. During the Maratha rule this collection was affected because, first, the articles of the food required for the Bhog were not purchased in proper season; secondly, articles were bought in the town at an exorbitant rate; thirdly, the purchaser did not keep proper accounts. (1)

The collector of the pilgrim tax claimed that in consequence of the vigilance of the British Government and the control of the internal administration in the hands of the Raja of Khurda, this source of income increased. The average annual income from the sale of holy food from 1810/11 to 1815/16 was Rs.5,795. (2)

A sort of religious tax under the head of sayar under the Maratha Government was abolished; collections on account

- (1) 10 June 1805, Groome to Commissioners of Cuttack, Add.MSS. 13611, p.19; 19 December 1807, Webb to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 29 January 1808 No.30.
- (2) Encl^o, 13 December 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.23; Encl^o, 13 December 1813, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.26; Encl^o, 12 January 1815, Board of Revenue to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 11 March 1815 No.52; Encl^o, 3 December 1816, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 21 February 1817 No.39.

of Dhuja and Pindika were retained. But the amount under this head was not considerable.⁽¹⁾

For the first few years the British Government followed the Maratha system of making up the difference between the receipts and expenditure of the temple. This showed a deficit every year. In order to improve the system, on the basis of the expenditure of past years the whole annual expenses of the temple were computed to be Rs.56,000. In spite of the improvement in the established endowments of the institution and in the other sources of income, the amount was not found sufficient for the support of the temple on the existing scale. It was therefore decided to grant in addition to the proceeds from established sources, an allowance at the rate of twenty per cent upon the net receipts arising from the pilgrim tax.⁽²⁾

Under the Maratha rule a tax was collected from the pilgrims resorting to the temple of Jagannath. The pilgrims paying the tax were divided into two classes, one called

-
- (1) 19 December 1807, Webb to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 29 January 1808 No.30; 27 January 1809, F.Fauquier, Collector of Cuttack, to C.Buller, Commissioner of Cuttack, Bengal Board of Revenue Consultations, February 1809 No.2.
- (2) 18 March 1808, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 April 1808 No.17.

Laljatris; the other called Bhurangas. It seems that the classification was made on the basis of wealth, social distinction and pedigree. The upper classes constituted the Laljatris. The middle classes constituted the Bhurangas. The Maratha Government exempted the poorest people, known as Kangals, from paying any tax.⁽¹⁾

The tax was collected at ghats or stations established for that purpose in different parts of the country. The two important ghats leading to the town and temple of Jagannath were the Atharanala ghat and the Lokanath ghat. They were on the high road that passed through the province from the north to the south. While the latter was close to the town, the former was within a distance of one mile from it. Officers and guards were appointed where the tax was collected. Collection from the pilgrims coming from the northward began at a place called Khunta on the border of Mayurbhanj and continued up to Atharanala. At all stations between Khunta and Atharanala parties of pilgrims paying tax were granted passes, specifying the number of pilgrims, the date and the amount paid by each of them. The same principle was adopted in case of pilgrims coming from the

(1) 10 June 1805, Groeme to Commissioners of Cuttack Add.MSS. 13611, pp.14-15, 65-66.

south and from the west, passing through the Jobra ghat to Atharanala. (1)

Generally the people coming from the rich and fertile Gangetic plain and the surrounding areas were considered richer than the people of the south, who were thought to be coming from a country of less fertility. The Maratha Government therefore charged a higher rate on people coming from the north than on those coming from the south. According to information collected by Harcourt at the time of the conquest, the collections made by the Marathas at the ghats were estimated at from two and a half lakhs to five lakhs of rupees. (2)

The pilgrims were made over to the pandas for two reasons, first to prevent unnecessary delays at the ghats and secondly to prevent people of low caste from going into the temple. Besides the taxes collected at the ghats, every pilgrim who came from the west and went round the 'Sinhasan' or the throne of Jagannath had to pay a fee of four pans and twelve and a half gandas (kauris), if he

(1) Ibid.

(2) 26 September 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.16.

In Orme the fees collected by the Marathas are stated to be three lakhs. There is no date in the report, but it appears to have been submitted to Government in 1776. (vide Orme MSS. India, Vol.18, p.5120).

belonged to the lower class. This amount passed into the accounts of the Government.⁽¹⁾ Soon after the British had taken possession of Puri, the collection of duties from the pilgrims was suspended because Harcourt desired to know the policy of the Government. Two courses were open to them. They could have continued the existing system established by the Marathas. Alternatively, they could have made a declaration that the Government had nothing to do with the revenue derived from the pilgrim tax. At first Wellesley was more inclined towards the latter policy than towards the former, not because of any Evangelical principles but because he thought that it would be an act of humanity to relieve the pilgrims from paying an "oppressive tax" that had been imposed by the Marathas.⁽²⁾ But this could not be effected because the Brahmans repeatedly requested Harcourt to collect the pilgrim tax. This was not without reason. During the Maratha rule the income from the endowments of the temple was always inadequate to meet its heavy expenses. Every year the Maratha Government granted a considerable sum of money for the repairs of the temple, for the maintenance of the

(1) 10 June 1805, Groome to Commissioners of Cuttack, Add.MSS. 13611, p.16.

(2) 1 November 1803, Government to Commissioners of Cuttack, Add.MSS. 13608, p.35; J.W.Kaye, Christianity in India, p. 383.

establishment and for the principal jatras of Jagannath.
This grant came from the pilgrim tax. (1)

The British considered that to deny the Brahmans the privileges they enjoyed under the Marathas would be inexpedient. If the tax were continued it would afford the best possible guarantee for the protection of their religion. It would convince them that the expenses of the temple would be regularly defrayed by the Government. Moreover, the Government thought that the collection of the tax would relieve it from a heavy expense which it otherwise would have faced if it desired to support the temple. The Maratha system of collection was therefore continued for about two years. In 1805 the commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack submitted a draft regulation to the Government for the collection of the pilgrim tax. This was mainly based on Maratha practice but with certain changes which were to provide better facilities for the pilgrims. (2)

This issue was linked with that of the management of the temple. It raised controversies at Government level. The Governor General in Council decided in favour of collecting

-
- (1) 26 September 1813, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804, No.16; J.W.Kaye, Christianity in India, pp.383-5.
- (2) 1 November 1803, Government to Commissioners of Cuttack, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.26

the tax, but when the matter was referred to the Court of Directors, the Court led by Grant and Parry objected to it. The Court held that whatever might be the example of the preceding Government, the British ought not to tax Hindu pilgrims because it would be contrary to Christian principles.⁽¹⁾ They sent this draft to the Board of Control for approval. Dundas remarked that because the tax was established by the previous Governments there was no substantial objection to the continuance of those duties under proper rules for their collection. He stated, "The Board are not aware of any reason why a Government administered by Christians may not derive a revenue applicable to ordinary purposes from a tax on persons performing superstitious rites or pilgrimages in a case in which these practices are not introduced or tolerated for the sake of the tax, but have been found among the ancient usages of the country, and must be permitted to continue, in a case therefore in which the operation of the tax in regard to such practices.....must be to diminish rather than to increase their frequency".⁽²⁾

When this was intimated to the Court of Directors, they expanded their argument by stating that "when the imposer

(1) Draft No.33 (18 January 1809), Bengal Draft Despatches Vol. 21, pp.82-3.

(2) 18 January 1809, Board to Court, Letters from Board Vol.III, pp.74-5.

believed, as the Hindoo Government did, that the privilege was a real and solid good, it was on his principles allowable for him to put a price upon it, but when the Government know the supposed privilege to be a delusion the Court must question the propriety of its continuing the practice, though it may be ancient, that reason not having been deemed by our Government, in other instances, sufficient to sanction customs repugnant to the principles of justice".⁽¹⁾

Dundas maintained his own decision. He remarked that the arguments brought forward by the Court were not based on sound reasoning. This final decision of the Board of Control was intimated to the Government through the Court of Directors. Consequently the collection of the pilgrim tax under the Regulation of 1806 was confirmed.⁽²⁾

Collection was entrusted to an officer called the collector of the pilgrim tax. The general superintendence of the collections and the control of the officials employed in the performance of the duty was vested in the Board of Revenue at Fort William. At the time of conquest the commissioners reported to the Government that the annual

(1) 24 January 1809, Court to Board, Letters to Board, Vol.III, pp.319-20.

(2) 4 March 1809, Board to Court, Letters from Board Vol.III, pp.140-1.

collection from the pilgrims might amount to between two to three lakhs of rupees.⁽¹⁾ At first, the collector of the tax was therefore a covenanted servant and an ex officio assistant to the magistrate of Cuttack. But when the regulation was enforced and the collections were made they fell far short of expectations. The average annual collection from 1805/6 to 1807/8 was only Rs.76,891. So in consequence of a report by Buller in 1808 to that effect, the post was opened to uncovenanted servants.⁽²⁾

The collector of the pilgrim tax had to superintend the ghat daroghas, to keep the accounts of the number of pilgrims and of the amount paid by them at the different places where certificates were sold. He enjoyed the power to exempt pilgrims from paying the tax. He reserved sufficient funds under his charge to make payment of the authorised expenses of the temple. Then he sent the surplus amount to Cuttack. This was regarded as Government revenue.⁽³⁾

-
- (1) 23 October 1803, Melville to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804 No.24.
- (2) 17 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Board of Revenue Proceedings February 1809 No.22.
- (3) 8 April 1808, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 April 1808 No.19; 17 March 1809, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 March 1809 No.32; 13 July 1810, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 July 1810 No.21.

A pilgrim paying the established fees received a pass from the darogha which was to be lodged by the pilgrim or the panda at the sadar kachh~~ari~~ and there exchanged for another bearing the signature of the collector of the pilgrim tax. The latter pass specified the date on which it was granted, the time it was to be in force, the nature of the person taking it out and the name of the panda under whose guidance the pilgrim performed his devotions.⁽¹⁾

A muharrir appointed by the Government at the temple gate was to check the date on which the pass was first presented and marked on the back of it the date when it expired. It was the duty of the panda to return all these passes to the office of the collector of pilgrim tax, receiving in return from him khalas chitthi or release. If the panda failed to return the pass he might be fined.⁽²⁾

For the convenience of the pilgrims coming from different parts of India, depots for issuing Rawanas were opened at several places in the company's provinces, like Dacca, Bihar, Benares, Murshidabad and Madras. This helped the pilgrim to pay the tax near his place of residence. By the production of his Rawana at the ghat the pilgrim passed into

(1) 7 March 1808, Webb to Beard of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 April 1808 No.18.

(2) Ibid.

the town to the collector's kachahri without any difficulty. (1)

For the protection of the pilgrims from undue exactions on the part of the pandas and pariharis of the temple, a table of the rate of fees was fixed at the temple of Jagannath, and in places adjacent to it. The officers attached to the temple were accordingly strictly prohibited from making any demands for money exclusive of the tax and fees specified. These restrictions did not preclude them from receiving gifts voluntarily made. (2)

The collection of tax from the same pilgrim at different ghats, as practised by the Marathas, was abolished because it was considered unnecessary and unjust; according to the regulation, collections were only made at two places. These were Atharanala and Lokanath. (3)

The classification of pilgrims during the British period underwent changes from time to time: this was with a view to increase the collections and add to the advantages of the pilgrims. In fact the collections did not increase to the

(1) 18 March 1808, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 April 1808 No.17; 7 March 1808, Webb to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 April 1808 No.18.

(2) Board's Collections Vol.223, 4892, p.125 (Regulation IV, 1806).

(3) Ibid.

extent expected, although in many respects the pilgrims enjoyed better advantages than before. According to the Regulation of 1806 the pilgrims paying the tax were in conformity with Maratha precedent divided into two classes. One class of pilgrims as before were called the Laljattris; they paid ten rupees each at Atharanala and six rupees at Lokanath; the other class called Bhurangas paid two rupees each at both the (1) ghats.

When the regulation was enforced some defects were noticed. There was no provision in the regulation to allow the Laljattris to purchase a lower class ticket if they desired. If they were not willing to pay at the rate fixed for a Laljatri, they were either turned back or were detained under examination until they paid it. This led to complaints and dissatisfaction amongst the pilgrims. Again it was found that the total number of Laljattris was very small in comparison with that of the other class. So the Government decided to change the classification of pilgrims and to regulate the tax so as to attract more people by charging less than before. It was thought that the additional number would in that case (2) compensate for the loss of the higher tax upon the Laljattris.

(1) *ibid.*

(2) *Ibid*; 27 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 March 1809 No.32.

Thus by the Regulation of 1809 the pilgrims from whom the tax was to be levied were divided into three classes instead of two, as prescribed by the Regulation of 1806. The Laljattris were included in class I, paying the same amount as before. A new class was now introduced. It was called class II. The pilgrims of this class were called Nimlals. They had to pay five rupees coming from the north and passing Atharanala and three rupees coming from the south and passing Lokanath. The ~~Bhur~~Bhurangas came under class II, paying the same as before. Any pilgrim was permitted to take any pass for any class at his own option. (1)

According to the Regulation of 1806, a pilgrim had to visit the temple on the date marked on his pass. As the pilgrims were not usually given the chance to go to the temple more than once, it often happened that many crowded at the same time at the temple gate. As a result, there was a big rush and many pilgrims could not get through the gate. In order to avoid this difficulty the Regulation of 1809 prescribed a certain number of days to different classes of

(1) 27 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 March 1809 No.32; 15 August 1808, Fauquier to Buller, Bengal Board of Revenue Consultations 28 September 1808 No.1.

pilgrims for access to the temple, allowing access to the pilgrims of class I for more days than class II and to class II for more than class III. For example, pilgrims of class I were allowed free access to the temple for fifteen days, while the pilgrims of class II were only allowed access for four days.⁽¹⁾

According to the Regulation of 1806, many pilgrims in conformity with former usage were exempted from paying the tax, but they were not classified. By the Regulation of 1809 such pilgrims were divided into three categories and added to the three classes of pilgrims paying the tax. Thus persons called Mangals, or pilgrims in actual state of poverty, were allocated to class IV. They were admitted without payment and had access to the temple for one day. Under class V came Bairagis, Sanyasis and people carrying the water of the Ganges to the temple of Jagannath or to any other temple in Puri, together with Brahmacharis, Mahants, Gosains and Nagas. They did not pay anything and they had free access to the temple. Class VI consisted of persons whose residence

(1) 27 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
Proceedings 17 March 1809 No.32.

was between Baitarani Nala and the Ganjam river or Rusikulya Nala. These people were exempted from taxation both according to the Hindu scriptures and to immemorial usage as this tract of land was regarded as holy. They were called Desis. ⁽¹⁾

The Regulation of 1809 provided no satisfactory safeguard against the congestion of the pilgrims at the ghats, particularly at the time of the main festivals of Jagannath. ⁽²⁾ According to Trower, ^{writing as} collector of Cuttack, this was the more so because the ghat daroghas and peons might detain pilgrims under the pretext of examination in order illegally to exact money from them. Even respectable persons with their families underwent strict examination and the curtains (pardas) of the Dolis were lifted up to see that they did not conceal anyone within. Such practices were not detected by the Government until 1813. ⁽³⁾

In June 1813 the Rath jatra or car festival was celebrated. The pilgrims of all descriptions, most of whom seemed to be Desis and Kangals together with a large number of Bhurangas, were crowding in the vicinity of the Atharanala ghat to enter

(1) Ibid; 29 January 1810, S.Rusby; to Buller, Bengal Board of Revenue Consultations January 1810 No.27.

(2) Ibid.

(3) 16 August 1813, Trower to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.30.

the town. On 30 June their number exceeded one lakh. As a result, the examination of the pilgrims became difficult, and the collection of the tax was for some time impeded. When the gates were opened the crowds trampled on each other in their eagerness to prostrate themselves before the idol. They were not restrained even by the cries and groans of the sufferers; one fell after another and 36 persons were crushed to death. (1)

It was during this time that Richardson, the commissioner of Cuttack, was there. He was influenced by Evangelical ideas, and was interested in the preaching of missionaries who were attacking some practices in the worship of Jagannath, particularly that of self-immolation under the wheel of the car. (2) He was also convinced that the pilgrim tax was to a certain extent a state sanction to idolatry. Now he thought it an opportune moment to bring a proposal before the Government for its abolition. His suggestions were founded on three considerations - first, the casualties which arose in admitting pilgrims to the temple, secondly the benefit which would arise by the enhancement of the British reputation for liberality and tolerance, and thirdly

(1) Ibid.

(2) Periodical accounts of the Baptist Missionary Society Vol. IV, p.448.

the incompatibility of a tax of that nature with the principles of the Christian religion. (1)

But the Government objected to his proposal for several reasons. In particular they held that the argument regarding toleration was not of any weight as the system existed under the Maratha Government. Moreover, the British Government had freed it from vexatious and oppressive exactions. Further they thought the present system promoted the convenience of the pilgrims under the supervision of the local officers. In the absence of this control they would have been subject to the exactions of the pandas. It was also decided that casualties could be prevented in future by proper precautions. (2)

As a result, enquiries were made. The Regulation of 1809 was modified by a Regulation of 1813. It was found that the number of the Kangals and the Desis particularly at the principal festivals was great. It was thought that if a duty was levied on them it might reduce congestion. The Desis who had formerly been exempted from duty were now required to pay, like the other pilgrims at the principal jattras (the Dol, the Asin and the Rath) unless they arrived there three days before the commencement of the festival. The Kangals who had

(1) 5 February 1814, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.36.

(2) Ibid.

previously been exempted from tax were now required to pay a sum less than two rupees. (1)

According to the Regulation of 1809, the servants of the pilgrims were obliged to quit the town before their masters, as they were given very limited time to stay. They therefore preferred to accompany their masters merely at the time of the festivals. On the one hand, this added to congestion. On the other hand, it added to the inconvenience of the pilgrims. Now the Government thought that if the servants were allowed a longer period to stay it might induce the pilgrims to come earlier. Moreover, it would be advantageous to the pilgrims. So by the Regulation of 1813 the pilgrims were permitted to retain their servants as long as they stayed there on payment of fees for them. The rate of fees for a servant varied according to the class of pilgrim to which he belonged. To achieve the same object the pilgrims were also allowed to live in the town for a longer period than before on payment of an additional amount. (2)

From an account of the number and description of pilgrims annually resorting to the temple of Jagannath between 1805/6

(1) Regulation 1813; Encl., 8 January 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.32; 1 July 1814, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 July 1814 No.24.

(2) Ibid.

and 1813/14, it appears that the average number amounted to 90,273 out of which 75,712 passed through the Atharanala ghat and 14,561 through the Lokanath ghat. Of this total (90,273), 64,069 were exempted from the pilgrim tax, in other words more than two thirds. Of the rest the average number of Laljattris (class I pilgrims) was 2,185 and Bhurangas (class III pilgrims) 23,565. This latter class always formed the largest number of pilgrims. The Nimplals (class II pilgrims) from 1809/10 to 1813/14 always formed the smallest number, averaging only 79 per year at both ghats. (1)

Laljattris passing through Atharanala averaged 1,814, and those through Lokanath 370. The Bhurangas passing through Atharanala averaged 21,346, and through Lokanath 2,219. The Nimplals from 1809 to 1813/14 passing through Atharanala averaged 28 and through Lokanath 51. From the above figures it may be seen that on the whole the number of pilgrims coming from the north was larger than those coming from the south. (2)

The number of pilgrims invariably increased particularly during the Rath jatra and Asin jatra. The average collection during the above two jatras very often exceeded more than

(1) 13 May 1818, W.Ewer, Commissioner of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818, No.15.

(2) Ibid.

half of the collection of the whole year. The average collection from April 1806 to July 1811 was Rs.404,129; but the average collection from the Rath and Asin jatras alone was Rs.213,225. The number of pilgrims became very great if the year was an auspicious one. In 1806/7 the number of the pilgrims was as great as 113,266. This year the collection from the Rath and Asin jatras was ^{the} very large amount of Rs.65,370. (1)

The total collections from the pilgrims from January 1806 to the end of April 1813 amounted to Rs.530,650. The various expenses, including the establishment of amlas, during the same period was Rs.528,140. This leaves a net surplus revenue to the Government of Rs.2,510. In short, the surplus revenue during this period was inconsiderable. (2)

When the Charter Act of 1813 came before Parliament, Babington, Stephen, Thornton, Wilberforce and others of the Clapham Sect strove hard to promote Christianity in India.

(1) Ibid; 15 August 1808, Fauquier to Buller, Bengal Board of Revenue Consultations 28 September 1808 No.1; Enclo, 17 August 1811, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 3 September 1811 No.24.

(2) 8 January 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.29; 16 August 1813, Trower to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.30.

As a result, provision was made for an Episcopal establishment in India. Wilberforce said, "I am persuaded - that we have laid the foundation stone of the greatest edifice that ever was raised in Asia."⁽¹⁾ It seems that this victory of the Clapham Sect had some effect on the Court of Directors and on the Government of India. In 1814 the Court of Directors declared that the pilgrim tax should be used only for the interest of the temple rather than as a source of revenue to the state.⁽²⁾ Accordingly, the Governor-General in Council decided that the surplus revenue was to be spent in the first instance upon the repair of the temple. Secondly it would be applied to the completion and repair of the Jagannath Road that was to be extended from Calcutta to Jagannath. Thirdly, should any cash still remain it was to be spent for any useful work connected with the temple of Jagannath.⁽³⁾

In short, as successors to the Marathas, the British considered it an obligation to protect the religion of the natives. Under the British the people enjoyed the undisturbed

(1) E. M. Howse, Saints in Politics, p.94

(2) 28 October 1814, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Revenue Letters to Bengal 1813-15, Vol.III,p.191.

(3) Resolution of Governor General, no date, Board's Collections Vol.505, 12129, pp.4-5.

exercise of their religious rites and ceremonies; their places of worship were inviolate. The British patronised the temple of Jagannath; they set its management in order, made the collection of the pilgrim tax more systematic and provided better facilities for the pilgrims than before.

CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC POLICY

The conquest brought the British face to face with serious economic problems. To the British, the Maratha economic measures appeared to be unsystematic and complicated. They therefore tried to introduce new ideas and methods in tackling economic problems. But because of their ignorance of the details of local institutions and of the Maratha economic system, these new ideas and methods could not be established smoothly and quickly. The attempt to do so had unexpected consequences. Indeed, the British economic policy ultimately led to some popular dissatisfaction - especially in connection with the introduction of the zamindari system, with the currency system, with the salt monopoly and with the management of embankments.

The British set aside the old Maratha revenue system. They introduced a zamindari tenure such as existed in Bengal. But they miscalculated the Maratha jama and thus started from a wrong basis. As the jama was enhanced there were heavy arrears. To facilitate collection, the sale law was rigorously enforced. Consequently many old zamindars were

overthrown. Their places were occupied by zamindars from Bengal. In their turn the raiyats could not pay the enhanced jama demanded by the zamindars. Many of them were put into jail. Only when nothing could be recovered from them were they set free. Thus both zamindars and raiyats were discontented.

During the Maratha rule the kauri was the principal currency, the medium of calculation and also of exchange. There were also some silver coins of different sorts in circulation. For the sake of convenience the British collected the revenue in sicca rupees. But this resulted in diminishing the demand for kauris. The country was over-assessed and a great amount of silver was sent out to the Calcutta treasury. Silver therefore became scarce. The value of the kauri depreciated. This affected the people more particularly in the mufassal.

During the Maratha rule there was nothing like a salt monopoly. The British introduced this. The price of salt was raised higher than before. Again the British committed an error in estimating the supply of salt to the Mughalbandi. Consequently there was a popular clamour for more salt at a lower price.

During the Maratha rule the zamindars were entrusted with the money for repairing embankments. The British abolished that system because they thought that management by a committee would be more efficient than by the zamindars. The British officers fully relied upon the bund daroghas, owing to the want of their own local knowledge. But the bund daroghas misappropriated the money advanced to them for repairing the embankments. Some of them became zamindars themselves. But many embankments were neglected, floods destroyed crops and this also aroused popular dissatisfaction.

SECTION I
REVENUE SYSTEM

The old Hindu revenue system had undergone various modifications by the time the Marathas secured Orissa. The Marathas, in turn, made some changes in the Mughal revenue system. As in other parts of the Nagpur territories, the Marathas appointed Amils for the collection of revenue. Terminology, for example the use of mamlatdar for the collector of the revenue, such as was commonly applied in Maharashtra, was not used here. But in fact the function of the Amil was similar to that of the mamlatdar. The Mughalbandi was divided into 150 parganas and was placed under the management of 32 Amils. Each pargana was generally divided into two, three, four or more allotments.⁽¹⁾

The old hereditary revenue officers commonly termed Talukdars were placed under the Amils. They were in charge of talukas or subdivisions. They collected revenue from the Mukaddams.⁽²⁾

The Mukaddams of the Mughal period were the headmen of the villages. They were allowed to retain their situations

(1) 15 October 1821, A. Stirling, Secretary to the Commissioner of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 August 1822 No.5.

(2) Ibid.

as before. Their functions were similar to those of the patels in Maharashtra. They collected the revenue from the cultivators.⁽¹⁾

In return for the service they rendered to the state, the Amils and the Talukdars were given Nankar lands. They were also allowed certain perquisites and deductions as expenses of collection. Similar privileges were also enjoyed by the Mukaddams.⁽²⁾

If any taluka were brought under the khas management of the Maratha Government owing to the default of a Talukdar, the Amil would be told to engage directly with the Mukaddams to collect revenue. This generally appeared convenient to the Maratha Government. Therefore under the rule of Raja Ram Pandit many Talukdars were set aside, and the Amils collected the revenue from the Mukaddams. Such was the Maratha system until the British conquered Orissa.⁽³⁾

The gross estimate of the revenue under the Marathas was at times as much as sicca Rs.1,388,880.⁽⁴⁾ But the net receipts always fell far short of this sum, because of the expenses of collection, allowances to proprietors and remissions on account of natural calamities. Over and above these

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) about Arcot Rs.1,500,000.

deductions large balances were always outstanding. The Maratha gross jamabandi included various allowances in money or land to the revenue officers, together with other expenses of collection and authorised deductions; the expenses were such that generally there remained a surplus of about four lakhs to be annually dispatched to the court of Nagpur. (1)

Soon after the British conquest in 1803, two joint commissioners were appointed to place the general administration of the country on a satisfactory footing; these commissioners were entrusted with the settlement and collection of the revenue. Under them were two collectors, one for each of the two divisions, known as the Northern and Southern divisions, into which Orissa was divided. The appointment of these commissioners was terminated in 1805; the country was then placed in the charge of only one collector. He continued in his duties of collection and settlement of land revenue except on two occasions when his powers were temporarily superseded by two commissioners on deputation from the Bengal Government. (2)

(1) Ibid.

(2) 2 August 1805, Harcourt, Commissioner of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805, No.30. (vide also Nos.31a, 32.).

On 15 November 1804 a proclamation was made regarding the settlement of the province which was embodied in Regulation XII, in 1805. The plan was to have a settlement for one year (for 1804/5 or 1212 Amali) and then for three years. Then another settlement was to be made for four years. Then a further settlement for a period of three years was to be concluded. It was announced that at the close of these eleven years a permanent settlement would be concluded on such terms as the Government considered both fair and equitable. It appears that the object behind this plan was that these settlements at short intervals would enable the revenue officers to gain an accurate knowledge of the resources of the country, so that the Government would not be the loser nor the people be too heavily taxed before a permanent settlement could be effected. ⁽¹⁾

In the first settlement of the province made by the collectors in 1804/5 (1212 Amali) all the individuals whose names were found in the Maratha accounts supplied by Gopal Pandit and Narayan Rao Mahashay, two Maratha record keepers, (in other words, zamindars, Talukdars and some Mukaddams and sarbarahkars or village accountants) were allowed to enter ⁽²⁾ into engagements direct for the revenue of their respective

(1) Ibid.

(2) These engagements were drawn out in Persian.

mahals. From the time of the triennial settlement for 1805/6, 1806/7 and 1807/8 (1213, 1214 and 1215 Amali) all these persons were recognised as actual proprietors of the soil (in Persian Malikan-i-zamin) under the provisions of Regulation XII, 1805. The titles of Talukdar and Mukaddam were replaced by the more general term of zamindar, which was invariably applied to the individuals with whom the collectors made settlements direct. ⁽¹⁾

The zamindars were responsible for collecting the revenue from the raiyats in their own estates and submitting it to the treasury of the collector in the appointed kists or instalments. ⁽²⁾ If a zamindar could not pay his revenue in time he would be required to pay some interest as a fine for the delay. ⁽³⁾

-
- (1) 15 October 1821, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 August 1822 No.5.
- (2) 30 June 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 14 July 1809 No.33; 18 April 1809, Fauquier to Commissioner of Cuttack, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 May 1809 No.32; 24 April 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 May 1809 No.32; 30 November 1810, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 21 December 1810 No.7.
- (3) 3 July 1805, R. Ker, Collector of Northern division of Cuttack to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 10 August 1805 No.20; 16 December 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 23 December 1814 No.17.

The estate for which the person considered by the Government to be the original proprietor refused to engage was either offered for sale to a suitable farmer or was brought under the khas management of the Government.⁽¹⁾ But the original proprietor received a malikana at the rate of ten per cent on the Government jama of the estate.⁽²⁾ The revenues of the estates under khas management were collected by tahsildars appointed under the order of the collector of the district.⁽³⁾

In the first assessment of the land revenue by Ker and Groeme for 1804/5 (1212 Amali) the jama was settled at sicca Rs.1,180,870. The principle which they appear to have followed in assessing the revenue was to take the same amount as the Marathas had done on an average of past years and after deducting certain abwabs.⁽⁴⁾

The jama rose to Rs.1,239,397 in 1805/6 in the triennial settlement made by G. Webb as collector of Cuttack. Much of

- (1) 8 March 1816, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 March 1816 No.22.
- (2) 7 August 1813, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 7 August 1813 No.28.
- (3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.
- (4) Ibid.

this augmentation was due to the fact that kauris were converted into rupees at the rate of four kahans to the rupee, in pursuance of the provisions of Regulation XII, 1805, in place of four kahans and two pans as in the preceding year by the order of the commissioners. ⁽¹⁾

Regulation IX, 1805, prescribed the formation of a settlement of four years. But Minto deviated from the policy of Wellesley. He enacted a new regulation, Regulation X, 1807. This provided that the jama assessed in the last year of the settlement was to be fixed permanently, subject to the approval of the Court of Directors. Consequently on the expiration of the triennial settlement the question of effecting a permanent settlement arose. The collector of Cuttack submitted a report on the triennial settlement to the Board of Revenue. ⁽²⁾ Charles Buller, a member of the Board of Revenue, strongly supported the establishment of a permanent settlement in conformity with the declaration made by Regulation X, 1807. But the rest of the members vehemently objected to this. Their reason was that the information

(1) Ibid.

(2) 26 July 1808, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 August 1808 No.4; 6 January 1809, Fauquier to Buller, Bengal Revenue Consultations 27 January 1809 No.36.

submitted by the collector was very inadequate. They remarked that the limits of the district were scarcely known; moreover, the number of zamindars, the several descriptions of tenure, the general state of cultivation, the produce of the district, the quantity of waste land capable of cultivation, of lands liable to revenue and of unassessed lands were 'certainly' not known. They suggested that a member of the Board of Revenue should be deputed to make local enquiries and collect information before a permanent settlement was effected in Orissa.⁽¹⁾ The Government observed the report of the collector with regret. It decided that further provision should be made for the superintendence of the collector. Accordingly some modifications were made in the rules contained in Regulation X, 1807.⁽²⁾ Buller was now nominated by the Government to superintend a triennial settlement.⁽³⁾ Meanwhile, as a temporary measure, the collector was asked to hold a settlement for one year only.⁽⁴⁾

(1) 26 July 1808, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 August 1808 No.4.

(2) 2 September 1808, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 2 September 1808 No.35.

(3) Governor General's minute, Bengal Revenue Consultations 2 September 1808 No.36.

(4) 9 September 1808, Government to Commissioner of Cuttack, Bengal Revenue Consultations 9 September 1808 No.11.

In consequence of the settlement for 1808/9 (1216 Amali) (1) the jama, including resumed jagirs, amounted to Rs.1,242,980.

Buller then completed a triennial settlement. Under it the jama for 1809/10 (1217 Amali) was Rs.1,364,700. The system of farming estates was hitherto confined to the mahals which were the property of the Government. But from Buller's settlement it was made a more general practice. (2)

The triennial settlement expired in 1811/12 (1219 Amali). After this period petitions from some zamindars asking permission to relinquish the management of their estates on the plea of over-assessment were submitted to the revenue authorities. (3)

Even this settlement did not provide all the information needed. The Government therefore felt that further superintendence was necessary. (4) The Board proposed the name of J. Richardson, one of their members to superintend the

(1) 26 November 1818, W.Trower, Collector of Cuttack to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) 31 December 1812, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 2 January 1813 No.41.

pending settlement.⁽¹⁾ This was approved by the Government.⁽²⁾
 It was therefore announced that a further settlement of two
 years should be made.⁽³⁾ Richardson reached Cuttack to super-
 intend the settlement, at the end of March 1813.⁽⁴⁾

It may be remembered that the principles adopted for settlement in the Western Provinces were the same as those for Orissa. The Government made pledges with the zamindars of the Western Provinces that a permanent settlement would be concluded. Commissioners were appointed to give effect to the declaration. An enquiry was made. In 1808 the Commissioners strongly remarked that the Western Provinces did not resemble Bengal; the information so far collected regarding revenue matters was highly disappointing and insufficient to effect a permanent settlement.⁽⁵⁾

-
- (1) 15 December 1812, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 December 1812 No.25.
- (2) 19 December 1812, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 December 1812 No.26.
- (3) 5 October 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 October 1813 No.22; 27 February 1813, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 27 February 1813 No.21.
- (4) 26 November 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22.
- (5) J.W.Kaye, Administration of the East India Company, pp.236-9.

When a proposal for a permanent settlement in Orissa was brought before the Court of Directors, it disapproved of it for the same reasons as had applied to the Western Provinces. The Court's policy was that a permanent settlement was not expedient without proper "knowledge of the resources of the country, of the rights of individuals and of the tenures of property".⁽¹⁾ As the time of settlement approached difficulties were experienced in inducing the zamindars to agree to an increased jama. However, by holding out hopes of a permanent settlement, Richardson managed to complete his settlement by October 1814. The jama of the district was Rs.1,469,501.⁽²⁾

The Court's disapproval of a permanent settlement necessitated a modification of the previous plan. Accordingly in May 1815 a regulation was passed directing the continuation of the existing settlement for one year after 1815/16 (1223 Amali), affording the zamindars an option of relinquishing the management of their estates if they were dissatisfied

-
- (1) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, ~~1820~~ Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol.V, p.315.
- (2) 21 October 1814, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 21 October 1814 No.37; 26 November 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 1819, No.22.

with the terms on which they held them. Under this option 53 estates bearing a jama of Rs.32,773 were thrown up, because as stated by Trower, a subsequent collector of Cuttack, "doubts began to arise in the minds of the zamindars as to the permanent settlement and the disappointment was proportioned to the hopes that have been previously excited". As a necessary consequence of this more estates now passed under the khas management of the Government. All the khas mahal, together now formed nearly one fourth of the Mughalbandi and bore a jama of about Rs.300,000. In 1815/16 (1223 Amali) the jama of the whole district was Rs.1,515,526⁽¹⁾ and rose still higher in 1816/17 (1224 Amali) to the amount of Rs.1,520,409⁽²⁾.

In short, there was a constant increase in the assessment, and a considerably higher jama than that of the Marathas. The Maratha gross jama was in fact inclusive of all allowances in money or land, expenses of collection and every authorised deduction. But the British jama excluded the ten per cent allowed to the zamindars and the expenses of collection. After deducting those expenses and abwabs we find that the Maratha jama of 1802/3 (1210 Amali) was Rs.1,080,770. Their collections

(1) 26 November, 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22.

(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

for 1801/2 (1209 Amali) had been Rs.1,073,848. The average of two years was Rs.1,077,312, and the average of the twelve years from 1790/1 (1198 Amali) to 1801/2 (1209 Amali) was Rs.1,015,049. But the jama of 1816/17 (1224 Amali) exclusive of Khurda was Rs.1,382,409. This shows an excess of Rs.301,639 over the Maratha jama of 1802/3 (1210 Amali), of Rs.366,501 over the average of the twelve years of the Maratha Government and of Rs.201,539 over the British jama of 1804/5⁽¹⁾.

It may be argued that some deductions should be made from the above amount as several lands before held at quit rent had been brought by the British under regular assessment; at the same time it should be remembered that many portions of land held rentfree under the British had been included in the Maratha rent roll. The sayar duties and a variety of small taxes called Bazi Rakam, amounting altogether to a lakh of sicca rupees, together with the collections at the Balasore custom house averaging Rs.30,000 per annum, have been rejected from this account in considering the Maratha assessment. The

(1) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol. V, pp.342, 350.

Maratha sayar duties which comprehended collections at markets, ferries and bazars on every species of merchandise, operated as a general tax on consumers. They were not collected by the British. But the consequences of the salt monopoly should be set off against whatever remission was allowed by the British Government on account of sayar because the operation of the salt monopoly took in effect from five to six lakhs more than hitherto from the whole community in the shape of a tax on the consumption of salt. (1)

The main difficulty was that the basis of calculating the jama was mistaken. Moreover, such surveys and investigations as were carried out were exceedingly limited. (2)

Again lands previously free of tax were now brought under assessment. During the rule of the Hindu Kings Orissa was divided into a number of mahals, the holders of which were military chiefs known as Rajas, Mahanayaks or Khandaits. They claimed to be Kshatriyas and enjoyed hereditary jagirs. Every estate or hereditary jagir possessed its principal garh or fortress of brick, stone or mud, the residence of the

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

(2) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol.V, pp.345-48.

chief, besides smaller garhs sometimes dispersed over the interior. By the terms of his tenure, every chief was liable to hold some office in the Court of the Raja of Orissa. ⁽¹⁾

These military chiefs collected a tax known as chaupani from among the people living in their mahals to cover the expenses of maintaining law and order. They also held as rentfree certain portions of lands called Biswali. ⁽²⁾

Every garh occupied by a military chief had a band of paiks or native militia. Ewer and Stirling thought that the paiks were devoted to their immediate head and were ever ready to follow his command. The paiks received some remuneration for their duties as soldiers. In some cases they held land free of assessment, in others they were assessed at a Tanki or light quit rent. ⁽³⁾

Under muslim rule the old military chiefs were allowed to enjoy their jagirs as under former rulers. The Marathas generally did not interfere with them, though troops were occasionally sent to chastise or collect revenue from troublesome chiefs. ⁽⁴⁾

- (1) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25; 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.
 (2) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25.
 (3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations, 17 July 1818 No.15; 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25.
 (4) Ibid.

The British revenue authorities generally did not follow the old Maratha policy of permitting the military chiefs, with their paiks under them, to enjoy their service lands. Insofar as the Maratha precedent was followed, it was restricted only to a very few with fixed rent. The British held that as the services of the military chiefs were no longer required by the state, therefore their service lands should be liable to regular assessment. The chaupani tax previously collected by many Rajas and khandaits from the people of their estates was prohibited. The Biswali lands in the Mughalbandi were brought under assessment. The holders of small kilas like Golra, Rupasa, Jonye, Rorang and Kohla were required to pay a regular assessment and their paiks, whose military services were no longer required, were similarly made to pay a regular assessment. On the same principle, after the annexation of Khurda to the Mughalbandi, the paiks there whose number was formerly 10,000 were assessed at the same rate as the raiyats. The Dalbeheras and Dalais who were in charge of them were similarly treated. The British Government did not pay any compensation to those who had thus been deprived of their privileges. (1)

(1) Ibid.

Again, the amounts assessed on several estates were not adjusted on equal principles. For example, the assessment fell more heavily on Khurda than on other estates. After the imprisonment of the Raja on account of his rebellion, Khurda was annexed to the Mughalbandi. It was placed under the management of Major Fletcher, an army officer from Madras. His Hastobud papers show that it was a populous and in many respects a well cultivated country as late as 1804. The regular assessments made from the raiyats prior to that date were, he thought, light - seldom, in his opinion, exceeding a sum equivalent to five annas per bigha.⁽¹⁾

In a Hastobud which Fletcher made for the whole estate by taking into consideration the land in cultivation, the nature and value of the produce and the size of the population, the assessment was fixed at Rs.106,000, or on an average about seven and a half annas per bigha. But as the following table will show, the assessment was as high as Rs.138,274 by 1815/16 (1223 Anali).

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

Table showing the jama of Khurda
from 1804/5 (1212 Amali) to
1815/16 (1223 Amali)

(1)

Y e a r	Jama in rupees
1804/5 (1212 Amali)	106,000
1805/6 (1213 Amali)	107,841
1806/7 (1214 Amali)	116,474
1807/8 (1215 Amali)	104,474
1808/9 (1216 Amali)	104,474
1809/10 (1217 Amali) . . .	119,001
1810/11 (1218 Amali) . . .	118,334
1811/12 (1219 Amali) . . .	115,818
1812/13 (1220 Amali) . . .	114,915
1813/14 (1221 Amali) . . .	114,915
1814/15 (1222 Amali) . . .	119,555
1815/16 (1223 Amali) . . .	138,274

The increase in the jama of Khurda was a regular complaint of the Raja's. When he was released from imprisonment in 1807, an option was given to him to engage

(1) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No.38.

for Khurda at a permanent settlement of Rs.94,374 - which, according to the commissioner of Cuttack, was calculated to leave him a profit far exceeding ten per cent on the sadar jama. As the Raja declined such a proposal, Khurda was farmed to suitable bidders at a jama of Rs.118,000.⁽¹⁾ The demand of the Government was limited to Rs.95,000. The difference between the sadar jama and the amount payable by the farmers was assigned to the Raja; it was estimated to afford him an annual provision of Rs.23,000.⁽²⁾

The Raja said that he would engage if the sadar jama of Khurda were reduced to Rs.30,000. If we examine the Raja's point of view we shall see that the amount of tribute he paid to the Maratha Government was stated by Impey to have been Rs.15,000 nominally, whereas the net payment was only Rs.10,000; the rest was deducted annually in lieu of khilat and other presents. Moreover, it seems that this light payment was often withheld till enforced by the military power.⁽³⁾

-
- (1) 27 October 1808, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 28 October 1808 No.14; 2 February 1809, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 28 October 1808 No.14.
- (2) Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P., 28 April 1818 No.39 (Resolution 24 October 1817).
- (3) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol.V., pp.374-5.

According to Fletcher's assessment the jama of Khurda was fixed at Rs.106,000, at seven and a half annas per bigha. Fletcher thought that prior to 1803, the whole assessment on Khurda was about five annas per bigha, which would produce Rs.70,666. Out of this amount the tribute paid to the Maratha Government was Rs.15,000. The remainder, which was retained in the country for the expenses of the Rājā's own establishment and those of the feudatory jagirdars, Dalbeheras, Dalais and paiks, was Rs.55,666.⁽¹⁾

The system of short settlements and the manner in which the jama was increased was a source of embarrassment to the zamindars. It may be supposed that the main reason why they insisted on a permanent settlement was that it would stop that increase of the Government's demand which was called by Trower a fallacious "system of anticipation".⁽²⁾ But a permanent settlement if executed then would probably not have solved the problem at all, not only because the assessment was calculated on a mistaken basis, but also because the revenue authorities had as yet no adequate knowledge of the land tenures in the district. As the Court of Directors

(1) Ibid.

(2) 26 November 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22.

rightly observed, "if there be any condition of a country to which a permanent settlement is more inapplicable than another, Cuttack was in that condition, if there ever was⁽¹⁾ a case that required its postponement, this was that case".

The collection of revenue from the zamindars was strictly enforced. Prior to the British conquest, in the event of sudden inundation, excessive rain, drought or other calamities, tahsildars were sent to make enquiries as to the extent of loss sustained by the raiyats, and agreeable to the accounts which they submitted some remission was usually allowed to the zamindars. Cuttack, a land of many rivers, was subject to occasional inundation. Trower later wrote that "this district suffered severely from inundation; the rain had been heavier than had been experienced for many years and the crops of 1217 (1809/10) were greatly injured. I am informed many petitions written and verbal were presented to the commissioner praying for suspension and remission but the commissioner declined making enquiries on the plea of his having concluded a permanent settlement of the district."⁽²⁾

(1) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol.V, p.324.

(2) 26 November 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22.

This "invariable refusal" to grant any remission on account of natural calamities was noticed by the Court of Directors "as one of the most unfavourable points of comparison between our revenue system and that of our predecessors". Of course there was provision for remissions in the British revenue system. In the words of the Court of Directors, "the discretion entrusted to the collectors by our Regulations of suspending demands and reporting cases of failure or injury of crops for the consideration of the Board of Revenue might have been expected to have been exercised by the collector".⁽¹⁾

Another instance of the strict enforcement of the full Government demand occurred during the building of the new Jagannath Road. Ewer stated that much of the lands on which the road was being constructed had been in actual cultivation before. They were acquired without regard to the hardship which this caused. No compensation or remission was granted to the proprietors.⁽²⁾ When this matter was brought before the vice president in Council, he regretted that the civil authorities should have thwarted the rights of individuals

(1) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol.V, pp.404-5.

(2) 26 March 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 April 1818 No.45.

and have acted contrary to the government's instructions.⁽¹⁾
 On this the Court of Directors commented that the "claims of remission" which should have been attended to "were entirely disregarded".⁽²⁾

The over-assessment led generally to heavy arrears of unpaid revenue at the end of each year.⁽³⁾ The following table will show the arrears standing against the public revenue from 1805/6 (1213 Amali) to 1815/16 (1223 Amali).

-
- (1) 24 April 1818, Government to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 April 1818 No.47.
- (2) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol.V, pp.409-11.
- (3) Resolution, Bengal Revenue Consultations 14 November 1812 No.23; 16 December 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 23 December 1814 No.17; 6 September 1815, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 6 September 1815 No.34.

Table showing arrears of revenue in Orissa
from 1805/6 (1213 Amali) to 1815/16 (1223 Amali)

Year	Recorded jama in S. Rupees	Total collection in the year	Arrears at the close of the year
1805/6 (1213 Amali)	1,239,397	1,165,714	73,683
1806/7 (1214 Amali)	1,239,397	1,117,463	121,934
1807/8 (1215 Amali)	1,240,137	1,157,168	82,969
1808/9 (1216 Amali)	1,242,980	1,177,243	65,737
1809/10 (1217 Amali)	1,364,700	1,165,807	198,893
1810/11 (1218 Amali)	1,408,535	1,218,673	189,862
1811/12 (1219 Amali)	1,453,827	1,168,391	285,436
1812/13 (1220 Amali)	1,454,900	1,027,094	427,806
1813/14 (1221 Amali)	1,469,501	1,042,063	427,438
1814/15 (1222 Amali)	1,484,098	1,109,526	374,572
1815/16 (1223 Amali)	1,515,526	988,106	527,420

(1)

(1) 26 November 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22. From 1809/10 these figures include Khurda.

When the zamindars could not pay their revenue from the resources of their estates and fell into arrears, they might borrow from the mahajans. The mahajans found that when estates changed hands the money they lent could not always be recovered. To cover this risk they applied to the court to be allowed a higher rate of interest than was normally recognised. They obtained permission to charge from 25 to 36 per cent with compound monthly interest where the land was made over in mortgage as security for the payment of the debt.⁽¹⁾ In 1819 Trower remarked that zamindars "borrowed the funds from the Mahajans and the debts then incurred have been yearly increasing, by interest and fresh loans till between the dues of government and the demands of Bankers, a state of Bankruptcy has ensued. To satisfy the demands of the latter, a portion of each year's Revenue has been appropriated to them, and a consequent increase of arrears to the former have has been going on."⁽²⁾

-
- (1) 5 October 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 October 1813, No.22; 3 May 1817, E. Watson, fourth judge of the court of circuit (deputed by Government for enquiries into the causes of the rebellion of 1817) to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 23 May 1817 No. 2.
- (2) 26 November 1818, Trower to Stirling, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 1819 No.22.

Various revenue authorities held different views regarding the cause of the unpaid balances in Orissa.

Webb early in 1806 attributed it to the temper of the people who were not habituated to the revenue system of the British Government and still pursued the methods of procrastination which they had learnt under the Marathas. In 1807/8 when a number of estates were sold for arrears Webb was still convinced that it was caused not by any deficiency of resources but by the disposition of the people to avoid payment. In 1809 Fauquier wrote that the produce of the district was equal to the last three years' assessment but that the majority of the landed interest were in great distress on account of the pressure of heavy loans which they had been compelled to take up at an enormous rate of interest by oppression and calamity of season.⁽¹⁾ In 1810 the Board of Revenue explained "The balances are no doubt ... ascribable to what we call a want of good faith on the part of the landholders. - That is, they expended the rents as fast as they could collect them, and left them entirely destitute of the means of fulfilling their engagements

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818, No.15.

with government."⁽¹⁾ In 1815 Warde as an explanation for numerous heavy arrears stated that it was not want of means which compelled the zamindars to be thus backward but sheer indifference on their part.⁽²⁾ In 1814 Richardson wrote "heavy arrears annually occur in this district by the landholders being in the habit of withholding the payment of their Kists till they are threatened with the sale of their Estates, on which they generally liquidate the demands against them."⁽³⁾ Trower was of opinion that not only was Orissa fairly and moderately assessed but that it could bear a large increase.⁽⁴⁾

These revenue authorities thus thought that over-assessment could not have been a cause for the heavy outstanding arrears that occurred every year. Such remarks must all the more have confirmed the belief of the Government that the only rightful policy for realising the revenue

-
- (1) 18 September 1810, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 October 1810, No. 15.
 - (2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818, No. 15.
 - (3) 30 March 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 9 April 1817, No. 14.
 - (4) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations, 17 July 1818, No. 15.

from zamindars who fell into arrears was to put their lands to sale.⁽¹⁾ Though this mode of procedure was in some respects new, yet it was not an unusual thing in Orissa because under the Maratha Government the estates of defaulting zamindars were either sequestered or transferred temporarily to others without any adequate provision for the excluded proprietors or any return to them of the surplus proceeds after the liquidation of the public demand. The peculiarity of the new mode of sale was that estates below the jama of Rs.5,000 were sold at Cuttack collectorate while estates above that jama were sold at the office of secretary to the Board of Revenue in Calcutta. The idea underlying this arrangement was that the Oriyas were in want of capital and were unwilling for speculation while Bengalis had abundant capital, were heavy speculators and so were likely to bid the highest prices.⁽²⁾

-
- (1) 23 February 1810, Buller to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 2 March 1810, No. 18; 7 June 1811, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 25 June 1811, No. 22; 1 May 1813, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 14 May 1813, No.35; 28 April 1807, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 7 May 1807 No. 13.
- (2) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No. 38; 3 May 1817, Watson to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 23 May 1817 No.2.

When estates were put up for sale, the proprietors must have faced two difficulties in retaining them if they had had means to do so. First, in many cases the amlas in their influential positions either in the court or in revenue offices manipulated matters so as to deprive the zamindars of their estates in their own interests. For example, by section XXVI Regulation 1793 the publication of the notice of the sale of an estate was to be displayed in the zila court for a term not less than one month before the sale. When an enquiry was made it was found that this procedure was not generally adhered to.⁽¹⁾ Secondly the zamindars of Orissa, because of the long distance, neither found it convenient to be present at the presidency at the time of the auction sale, nor could they have their agents there. Naturally, many estates fell into the hands of Bengali speculators without their proprietors' knowledge. Some of these perhaps might have been retained by the original proprietors.⁽²⁾

In 1806, 1807 and 1808 estates paying a jama of Rs. 152,019 were sold for Rs. 72,448 - less than one half of the amount of the annual jama. Trower remarked "a vast

(1) 3 May 1817, Watson to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P., 23 May 1817 No.2.

(2) Ibid; 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No.38.

proportion of landed proprietors were deprived of their estates without receiving a fair equivalent; many of those with large families were reduced to a state of beggary, gaining a miserable pittance for a cultivation of a few bighas of land in the same estates of which they had been recently proprietors."⁽¹⁾ In 1809, 1810, 1811 and 1812 estates paying a jama of Rs. 205,580 were sold for Rs. 248,009, or at an advance of twenty per cent on the sadar jama; in 1813, 1814, 1815 and 1816 estates paying a jama of Rs. 74,124 were sold for Rs. 103,957 or for forty per cent more than the sadar jama.⁽²⁾

The sale of estates at higher rates was chiefly due to the increased number of Bengalis in the district, who competed to buy them. This gave a fictitious appearance to the resources of the country and misled the Government because a great portion of the revenue of every year was paid not from annual produce but from imported capital. This removed the limits which the resources of the country would have set to the increase of the assessment.⁽³⁾

(1) 26 November 1818, Trower to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 13 May 1819, No.22.

(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations, 17 July 1818 No.15. /ns,

(3) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol. V, pp. 457-8.

The private transfer of property was also common between 1803 and 1817. Transfer of property by private contract amounted to Rs. 1,070,397. In one day a certain police darogha sold mahals with a jama of Rs. 50,000 which he had himself purchased for Rs. 21,000, and this was only a small portion of the landed property of the district that passed from his hands. (1)

Many adventurers made a practice of speculation in estates. Mussumuddin, the diwan of the collector of Cuttack, purchased in one year estates paying a jama of Rs. 53,000 for a sum of Rs. 23,000 and later on disposed of them to other speculators. (2)

Within a period of ten years (from 1806 to 1816) the number of estates sold by public auction amounted to 1,011 - an average of 101 yearly. Of these 350 were purchased by foreigners, the jama of whose purchases amounted to Rs. 442,804. The principal estates passed into the hands of foreigners while 235 estates were purchased by persons holding official situations either in their own names or indirectly through their relations. (3)

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
17 July 1818 No.15.

(2) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No.38.

(3) Ibid.

Out of 2,340 Oriya proprietors whose names were registered in the first settlement for the payment of the revenue of Cuttack only 1,449 remained at the end of 1816. In the Mughalbandi which had an annual revenue of Rs. 1,393,000 the original proprietors were only left with lands worth Rs. 30,000. (1)

Thus the zamindars who were pressed hard by over-assessment probably transferred some of their burden to the raiyats living in their estates. The raiyats were pressed to pay more than they used to do. They therefore avoided payment, and numerous applications were made to the court for the confinement of defaulters for arrears. Even imprisonment helped neither the zamindars nor the collectors to realise the arrears. It happened that on many occasions the collector was compelled to move the Government that the defaulters in confinement should be released because there was no hope of recovering arrears. (2) Fauquier wrote "the continuance of their confinement will only be productive of an expense to the government without affording a prospect of receiving the balances and therefore ... the defaulters

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

(2) 12 April 1808, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 6 May 1808 No. 16.

may with propriety be released from confinement."⁽¹⁾

Similar appeals were made by other collectors from time to time and were granted by the Government.⁽²⁾ The confinement and subsequent release of defaulters led Watson to remark "what end was proposed to be answered by this measure? It could not be Revenue - a Gaol is not the place to look to for that - no, it was to prevent the escape of the people who were flying in crowds out of the Country."⁽³⁾

The fate of the raiyats in the Khasmahals was more distressing than in zamindari estates because the pressure of over-assessment was heavier in the khasmahals. Khurda

- (1) 24 March 1809, Fauquier to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 7 April 1809 No. 32 (vide also No. 36).
- (2) 21 September 1811; Waring to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 15 October 1811 No. 22; Resolution, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 April 1811 No. 19; 14 January 1812, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 21 January 1812 No. 22; 9 January 1813, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 9 January 1813 No. 34; 29 March 1811, Buller, to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 April 1811, ^{No. 18, 16 April 1811,} Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 April 1811 No. 19.
- (3) 3 May 1817, Watson to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 17 July 1818 No. 15.

in particular was much affected. Because many raiyats could not pay the enhanced revenue, they left the country for the neighbouring Garjat where the people lived in the conditions prevailing before the British conquest. Ewer wrote "at least 5,000 to 6,000 houses of ryots were deserted." "The miserable remnant" lived in desperate conditions "after disposing of their little all, their clothes, furniture, bullocks, cooking utensils and sometimes their wives and children."⁽¹⁾

Stirling, secretary to the commissioner of Cuttack, who examined voluminous records of both Mughal and Maratha rule and submitted a minute on the subject, stated that the resident raiyats were less thought of now than formerly by the ruling power. In his opinion, during the Mughal and Maratha rule one of the special duties of the zamindar was to keep the raiyat "happy, contented and prosperous." If he failed to execute this trust reposed in him he could be severely punished by the ruling authority. But there was no such provision in Cornwallis's system. Its underlying principle assumed that, "it was the clearest interest of the landholder in the long run to treat his tenants well." The Diwani Adalat was of course open to

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

those who could seek redress for their grievances. But the expense, delay and vexation of a regular suit was a deterrent factor against a poor raiyat's securing justice.⁽¹⁾

The new notion of proprietary right led the zamindars generally to appropriate the whole produce of the jungle, furnishing the firewood and grass and so on. Thus the raiyats lost their customary share in these gifts of nature.⁽²⁾

Whoever bought an estate at an auction enjoyed uncontrolled liberty to manage it according to his own interest. This led to the practice of farming out villages for one or two years to the undertenants who bid highest. No preference was given to the mukaddam or sarbarahkar connected with the village community. Thus the raiyats were exposed to the evils of a farming system.⁽³⁾

In zamindari estates the new zamindars from Bengal appointed their own gumashtas for the collection of the revenue. In the khasmahal, the tahasildars often appointed their own accountants. Consequently the old system of maintaining accounts fell into disuse. The internal economy of village subordination was much altered.⁽⁴⁾ Stirling

(1) 15 October 1821, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 August 1822 No.5.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818, No.15.

wrote "It is my decided opinion that the operation of British laws has been, generally speaking, in Cuttack fatal to the rights and privileges of a numerous class of middle tenantry or heads of villages standing between the talookdar or chief of a number of villages and ryots. Nor is the possession of muquddums the only point in which the constitution of village communities has been changed or broken up by the new landed proprietors. They have dispensed with the services of the hereditary village accountant to a great extent, substituting in his stead a gomastah of their own or one of their brethren in whom the ryots can of course have little confidence."⁽¹⁾ The same officer further observed that "from the circumstances of their being liable to annual settlements and from the ignorance and helplessness of the undertenants" the khasmahals were exposed to suffer from "the prevalent disposition to excessive demand."⁽²⁾

In short the British revenue policy proved satisfactory neither to the zamindars nor to the raiyats nor to the persons in between them. The raiyats complained of the zamindars and the zamindars of the revenue authorities.

(1) 15 October 1821, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 August 1822 No.5.

(2) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25.

The old military chiefs deplored the loss of their old privileges and some of the very few who held their estates at a fixed rent could not retain them either because of the pressure of assessment or because of the intrigues of the amlas. In 1817 when Jagabandhu, who had been fraudulently dispossessed from his own zamindari, excited a rebellion, the people thus discontented joined hands with him against the British authority.

SECTION II
CURRENCY PROBLEM

During the Maratha Government and in earlier times⁽¹⁾ also kauris were the chief medium of exchange in Orissa. They were mainly imported from the Maldiva islands.⁽²⁾ The assessment of the country was always calculated and chiefly collected in kauris. Those who preferred paying in specie were permitted to do so. The system followed in this respect is given below.

Agents of the great mahajanas at Cuttack and Balasore were to be found throughout the interior. They received the amount of the jama from the raiyats, the Mukaddams or the zamindars in kauris. They deposited it at the sadar stations to account of the mahajans. From these places it was received by the Amils in payment of revenue

-
- (1) Kauris were used in monetary transactions from an early time in Orissa. They were the chief currency in the country. On one occasion Narasingh Deva, the Raja of Orissa (1622-1646 A.D.), granted 91,538 kahans of kauris for whitewashing the temple of Jagannath (Madalapanji, p.67). From the dairies of Streynsham master it appears that merchants used kauris for their business. (The dairies of Streynsham master, Vol.II, pp.45, 48.).
- (2) C.R.Wilson, Early annals of the English in Bengal Vol.II, Part I, No.1014, Vol.III, Nos.1523, 1668; Indian Historical Records Commission Vol.XIX, Dec.1942, pp.86-89.

and transmitted by them to the subahdar or faujdar at Balasore. A discount or an allowance was deducted by mufassal merchants to set against the cost and trouble of transporting the kauris. They were collected at stated periods in immense heaps. Then they were put into circulation for the payment of the large army and the establishment of the Maratha Government.⁽¹⁾

A study of the value of kauris in relation to silver during the first fourteen years of the British rule in Orissa shows that kauris almost maintained the Government rate of exchange of four kahans and two pans to the rupee in the market until 1807/8 (the end of 1215 Amali) and then fell as low as seven kahans per rupee in the bazar of Cuttack in 1811/12 (1219 Amali).⁽²⁾

Why did the kauri currency maintain its value in relation to the silver up to 1807/8 (the end of 1215 Amali)? At the time of the British conquest of Orissa kauris were scarce in relation to the demand for them. This is evident from two letters of Harcourt. In one, he informed Morgan in 1804, "It would be advisable that

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

(2) 28 July 1817, Sherer, Accountant General, to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No.42.

the scarcity of cowries in the Town and District of Cuttack should be made known to the Pilgrims whilst passing Midnapur that they might there provide themselves with cowries and small coin."⁽¹⁾ In another he wrote to M. Shawe, private secretary to the Governor General, "We are very much distressed for want of small coin or cowries. I know not how the troops can be paid by their respective officers or how they can procure the small articles of daily consumption from the bazar. You cannot conceive what inconvenience arises in consequence of this deficiency."⁽²⁾ The deficiency in the usual stock of kauris operated in raising their value in relation to silver. Moreover, between 1804/5 and 1806/7 there was an influx of silver into Cuttack because the amount collected at Jagannath particularly in 1806/7 was at the high rate of Rs.117,000, while it usually varied between Rs.38,400 and 70,410 in other years.⁽³⁾ Again a large quantity of rice was exported from Orissa until 1808/9, which attracted some specie into the country in return. This diminished the value of silver to a great extent.⁽⁴⁾

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations, 17 July 1818 No.15.

(2) 9 August 1804, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.MSS.No.13610, p.33.

(3) 8 January 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.29; 16 August 1813, Trower to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 Feb.1814, No.30.

(4) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July, 1818 No.15.

In spite of their deficiency kauris appear to have been in sufficient quantity to answer the purpose of a circulating medium in the interior. It is also to be remembered that no fresh extraordinary importation of kauris from the Maldives made up the deficiency. In 1808 Fauquier, collector of Cuttack, remarked that "no large quantity was either to be bought or sold in the Bazar and it appears at present the fact that no more are generally in circulation than required as change for silver and for all the petty dealings and transactions in the interior where alone they can be said to be current."⁽¹⁾

By Regulation XII, 1805, zamindars were given the option of paying their revenue in kauris at the rate of four kahans per rupee. But the zamindars generally were not much interested in the payment of revenue in kauris, for the bazar rate for kauris remained nearly the same until 1807/8 (the end of 1215 Amali). The raiyats did not lose much in buying silver for kauris. The zamindar found it neither profitable nor convenient to carry kauris from the interior to Cuttack for the payment of revenue when he would not be granted any remission from the Government, unlike the

(1) 1 December 1812, Trower to W. Egerton, Accountant General, Bengal Revenue Consultations 23 January 1813, No.36.

Maratha practice.⁽¹⁾

The wide variation in the rate of exchange between silver and kauris was felt from 1808. It appears that this altered relation came about for two reasons. First, the British after giving due notice stopped receiving kauris in payment of Government revenue from 1808 for reasons of convenience. Consequently there arose a diminished demand for the quantity in circulation, resulting in a depreciation in their value.⁽²⁾ Secondly, there was a scarcity of silver compared with the demand for payment of rents to the landholders. This may be attributed to two reasons. One was a gradual diminution in the importation of specie. The other was the increasing exportation of specie compared with the previous period.

Formerly a profitable trade was carried on with the territories subject to Madras. Merchants exported grain. In return they received different sorts of coins commonly known as Arcot rupees. The British recognised only six of them to be valid. Their value was fixed at the rate of

(1) Ibid.

(2) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No.38.

107½ Arcot rupees per 100 Calcutta sicca rupees. (1) When the Government decided that the revenue would be collected only in sicca rupees, the merchants exporting grain to Madras suffered both inconvenience and loss. As a result, a considerable decrease took place in the export of grain to Madras from small ports like Golra, Harishpur, Bishampur and Manikpatna. This grand channel through which specie flowed into Orissa gradually narrowed. (2)

Formerly a lucrative commerce was carried on in salt from Orissa to Bengal and more particularly to the Raja of Berar's dominion. But with the British conquest and the introduction of a salt monopoly this commerce was closed to Nagpur except for some smuggling carried on with the countries to the west of the Chilka lake. (3)

Another principal channel through which specie entered Orissa was the annual influx of pilgrims from various parts

(1) 5 February 1811, Egerton to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 6 March 1811 No.33; 6 March 1811, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 6 March 1811 No.33.

(2) 21 September 1810, R.Milford, Collector to Buller, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 October 1810 No.19.

(3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

of India. But it was later found that the annual amount of collections during the period was not as much as had been expected.⁽¹⁾

On the other hand, we see that no great influx of kauris took place under the British Government as would have materially increased the whole quantity in circulation. The quantity annually imported to Balasore, the chief resort of Maldivian vessels, never exceeded the value of four or five thousand rupees. That amount was too small to produce any effect in the general market and hardly sufficient to maintain supplies in this or neighbouring countries.⁽²⁾

The British levied a higher assessment than the Marathas had done, excepting the abolition of a few trifling duties, and at the same time they established a heavy tax on salt which gradually extended to the whole of the district. Offices and emoluments were taken from the people of the district; the expenditure on account of the local Government was much below that of the Maratha establishments. Therefore silver began to be annually sent out of the country. During the Maratha period the annual amount which was sent to Nagpur, usually did not exceed four lakhs. That was almost invariably

- (1) 8 January 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 February 1814 No.29; 16 August 1813, Trower to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 5 Feb.1814, No.30.
- (2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations July 1818 No.15.

remitted by bill of exchange. But the average amount annually remitted by the British collector alone to Calcutta was equivalent to upwards of Rs.(sicca) 75,000 from the year of acquisition; moreover, in 1814/15 (1222 Amali) and 1815/16 (1223 Amali) the amount rose to about Rs.1,000,000.⁽¹⁾

One may question how so many lakhs could be collected from Cuttack in silver. It produced occasional complaints from the people. On one occasion E. S. Waring, when he was collector of Cuttack, forwarded some complaints from zamindars. He wrote, "They complain of the heavy loss they sustain at the high rate at which they receive rupees from the ryots and the low rate they pay them into the Company's treasury".⁽²⁾ In reply W. Egerton, the accountant general, remarked that if it were a real depreciation they would require seven kahans of kauris for each rupee when disposing of their produce instead of four. This "would enable them to exchange their cowries for rupees and pay their rents without sustaining any loss".⁽³⁾ On another occasion the fall in the value of kauris drew the attention of Fauquier. But he attributed this to the tactics

(1) Ibid.; 5 February 1811, Egerton to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 6 March 1811 No.33.

(2) 24 December 1811, Waring to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 21 January 1812 No.21.

(3) 28 July 1817, Sherer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No.42.

adopted by the mahajans. In the words of Ewer, "the question of the cowrie currency escaped altogether the notice of the commissioners, Messrs. Buller and Richardson, or was not thought by those gentlemen worthy of any consideration".⁽¹⁾ It appears that this matter did not receive adequate attention from the Government. Perhaps looking to the prevalence of the sicca over the Arcot rupees, it was natural for the Government to take the view that the silver currency was sufficient in Cuttack.⁽²⁾

The six kinds of Arcot rupees receivable by the Government were known as rupees of sorts.⁽³⁾ From 1806 to 1810 the quantity of Rs.1,600,000 of sorts paid into the treasury was remitted to Calcutta. The proportion of Arcots in circulation does not appear to have been replaced by siccas. The amount of Arcot rupees sent out of this district from the collector's office was about Rs.270,000.⁽⁴⁾ Further, it

-
- (1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.
- (2) Ibid; 21 September 1810, Milford to Buller, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 October 1810.
- (3) 30 June 1806, Webb to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 31 July 1806 No.30; 13 November 1811, Egerton to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 November 1811 No.17.
- (4) 21 September 1810, Milford to Buller, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 October 1810 No.19; 4 Sept. 1811, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Rev. Cons.;^{17 September 1811, No.23} 13 May 1818 Ewer to Govt. Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

may be added that from the time Regulation XII, 1805 declared sicca the currency in which all bonds were to be specified and thereby the Government attached preference to it all became anxious to procure siccas in place of Arcots. ⁽¹⁾

In consequence of the fall in the value of kauris there was a rise in the kauri price of commodities, particularly throughout the mufassal. Kauri prices in Cuttack bazar rose 50 per cent between 1807/8 and 1816/17. In the interior they went still higher. ⁽²⁾

But the quantity of kauris was not sufficient to enable the raiyats to purchase rupees even at the rate of five kahans and twelve pans, which was the lowest market rate in the period between 1808/9 and 1816/17. Price lists of rice in various years during Maratha rule show that with only one or two exceptions the cost of rice retained some relation to the value of rupees in kauris, and was always cheapest in those years when the rupee could be exchanged for the greatest number of kauris. Comparative statements

(1) 21 September 1810, Milford to Buller, Bengal Revenue Consultations 16 October 1810 No.19; 4 September 1811, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations; 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

of the cost of grain in the pargana of Lembai from 1797/8 (1205 Amali) to 1807/8 (1215 Amali) and from 1808/9 (1216 Amali) to 1817/18 (1224 Amali) show that the kauri price of rice in the latter period was twenty per cent above that of the former. (1)

The Government rate of exchange was fixed at four kahans and two pans to the rupee. But the market rate of exchange varied usually from six to seven kahans and sometimes as much as eight kahans. The Government rate, in other words, did not fluctuate with the market rate. This state of affairs made the mahajans demand from the zamindars a high rate in exchanging silver for kauris. The accountant general stated that if the zamindars needed money to pay the Government revenue this was readily granted, provided the mahajans were allowed to make their own terms, which were exorbitant; for example, in advancing ten rupees to a zamindar, the mahajans would enter kauris; but they would not receive back the rupee at the Government rate of exchange of four kahans and two pans. (2)

Originally the zamindar's rent was fixed in kauris at the rate of four kahans per rupee. He now pursued the same

(1) Ibid.

(2) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817, No.38; 28 July 1817, Sherer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations, 24 October 1817 No.42.

course as that of the mahajan; because if he accepted the revenue in kauris at the former rate he incurred loss; so he required a further increase in kauris per rupee proportioned (1) to the Government demand from him.

Thus the ultimate burden fell upon the raiyat. To this difficult situation was added the unfeeling attitude in general and the Bengali zamindars of the zamindars/in particular, which was described by Ewer in the following manner -

"Were the zamindar in general disposed to be lenient, merciful and considerate towards his Ryots, I have no doubt but that the produce of many estates is such, as /sic/ that by dividing his Mofussil assessment in cowries by $4\frac{1}{2}$, say, or /sic/ instead of four kahawans, he might still receive from his Ryots sufficient to pay the public demand and the authorised profits besides". He further added, "Had the original proprietors, natives of the different estates born and bred up among the Ryots, forming a part of one large family as it were, retained possession of their lands, this might frequently have been arranged in a manner conducive to the interest of both parties but under the unfeeling and rapacious management of strangers, speculators and adventurers, who have

(1) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No.38.

now acquired the possession of so large a portion of the lands in this district, no spontaneous remedy of this great evil to the bulk of the people is to be expected by a temporary sacrifice on their parts /sic/ of the profit which they are entitled to wring from the Ryots arising from any consideration of the ease, the happiness and prosperity of the under tenants." (1)

In short, kauris were the principal currency in Orissa during the Maratha rule. They were the medium of calculation and of exchange. The British desired to replace them by sicca rupees. They therefore collected the revenue in silver rather than in kauris. This resulted in a diminishing demand for kauris. The British enhanced the jama of the district. At the same time they sent a great amount of silver to the Calcutta treasury. Consequently silver was scarce; the value of kauris depreciated. Prices of things rose high in kauris. The Government rate of exchange was four kahans and two pans to the rupee. But the market rate of exchange was about seven kahans to the rupee. Thus the raiyats suffered a loss from the exchange of kauris for

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

silver. This state of affairs brought hardship to the people more particularly to the raiyats in the mufassal. Probably this discontent was one of the reasons why the people joined in the rebellion of 1817.

SECTION III
SALT MONOPOLY

During the Maratha rule in Orissa salt was manufactured in plenty in the Aurangs on the shores from the Chilka lake on the south to the Maratha enclosures east of the river Suvarnarekha on the north. It was the usual practice in the country for the Beparis or merchants to advance money to the Malangis for the manufacture of salt in the Aurangs. When the salt was ready the Beparis purchased it; after paying duty to the Government, they either sold it in the province or exported it to Bengal, Berar, Sambalpur and other places.⁽¹⁾

The profits of the Beparis and the extensiveness of the salt trade may be understood from the following instance. Sambhu Bharati was a mahajan of Cuttack who had kothis (salt golas) in different parts of the Khurda Raja's territory. He stood security for the payment of the Raja's peshcash to the Maratha Government throughout

(1) Calendar of Persian Correspondence Vol. IX, No. 605.

the Maratha period on condition of being permitted to carry on his commerce duty free. (1)

The amount of salt exported to Berar was three lakh maunds per annum. (2) The whole amount of salt exported to Bengal is not known. The Company was in the habit of importing salt from Orissa at the average rate of 68,269 maunds per annum during a period of ten years prior to its conquest; that was at the cost of sicca Rs. 55-1-8 per hundred maunds. (3) From a statement made by Raja Ram Pandit, the Maratha governor of Orissa, it appears that the income of the Maratha Government from the salt sold in Bengal amounted to two lakhs of rupees per annum. (4) After the introduction of the British monopoly of the manufacture of salt in Bengal every attempt was made to prevent the smuggling of Maratha salt into Bengal. When this failed, in 1790 Forster was sent to the court of Nagpur in order to secure the exclusive right of purchasing

-
- (1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.
- (2) Encl., 4 May 1804, Government to Melville and Harcourt, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805 No. 26; (no date) August 1805, Melville and Harcourt to Government, Add. MSS. 13611, p.57.
- (3) 9 December 1817, Board of Trade to Government, Bengal Salt and Opium Consultations 26 December 1817 No.3.
- (4) C.P.C. Vol. VI, No. 1242.

salt in Orissa, but the Raja of Nagpur declined the proposal on the plea that it would ruin the Beparis there. (1)

The amount of salt exported from the Aurangs in the Chilka lake is not known. During the Maratha period the duty of the Maratha Government upon salt exported from these Aurangs alone into the western region amounted to Rs. 4,500. (2)

During the Maratha rule, salt was sold at four and a half maunds per Arcot rupee at the place of manufacture. The Beparis who purchased salt at the place of manufacture at the rate of from three and a half to four annas per maund or less than one kahan of kauris might have sold them to the consumers at one and a half kahans allowing 50 per cent for profit besides their expenses. But it is said that a sayar duty was collected on the transit of salt which consequently enhanced the price to nearly three kahans per maund in the interior. From a statement collected from the Nirkhi (3) of the bazar of Cuttack under the Maratha rule it was found that in 1799/1800, 1800/1801

(1) C.P.C. IX, No. 605.

(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

(3) An officer who records the prices of articles.

and 1801/1802 (1207, 1208, and 1209 ~~Arli~~) salt averaged 22 seers Katki⁽¹⁾ or 28 seers Balasore or Calcutta⁽²⁾ weight for a chaupani rupee, an imaginary coin equivalent to two kahans and four pans kauris. Consequently the rate per Calcutta maund was between three and three and a half kahans under the four last years of the Maratha Government. Ewer wrote that under Maratha rule the average sale price of salt was from two and a half to three kahans per maund particularly in the mufassal. J. Melville, when commissioner for the affairs of Cuttack said that the price of salt under the Maratha Government seldom exceeded five annas per maund.⁽³⁾

In Bengal, the administration of the salt revenue had undergone various changes in the early days of British rule. During the time of Warren Hastings several civil officers were appointed Salt Agents of the Company. They advanced money to the Malangis who manufactured salt at their direction. The Agents stored the salt and sold it to the wholesale dealers at a price fixed by the Government. The difference between the price which was paid to the

(1) Katki seer weighs 105 tolas.

(2) Calcutta seer weighs 82 tolas.

(3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

Malangis and the wholesale price paid by the salt merchants constituted the revenue of the Company. Cornwallis introduced a system of auction sales instead of selling at a fixed price. Thus the Government had a monopoly both over the manufacture and over the sale of salt. Regulations were made to prevent smuggling and the illicit manufacture of salt. (1)

When Orissa was conquered the Maratha territories on the east of the Suvarnarekha with the salt Aurangs which produced a good amount of salt were annexed to Hijli. Early in 1804 the Governor General in Council made a declaration that the Government reserved to itself the exclusive privilege of manufacturing salt in Orissa. The same system as had been introduced in Bengal was gradually introduced all over Orissa. (2)

After the British conquest, under the collector of the Northern division there was an officer in charge of customs and salt at Balasore. After the introduction of the salt regulations in Orissa in 1804, the officer in charge of salt and customs at Balasore was made the Salt Agent of Orissa.

(1) S.C. Aggarwal, Salt Industry in India, pp.231-2;
N.K. Sinha (ed.), Midnapur Salt Papers, p.5.

(2) Encl., 4 May 1804, Government to Melville and Harcourt,
Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805
No. 26.

He was responsible to the Board of Trade, salt and opium department at Fort William. The duties he had to perform comprised the management of the manufacture of salt, the management of the sales for local consumption and the export of the surplus to Sulkia, and also the prevention of smuggling. (1)

According to the regulations formed for the conduct of the salt department in Orissa, the export of salt by sea was strictly prohibited; any salt attempted to be smuggled was to be confiscated together with the boat on which it might be laden. The export of salt by land to Midnapur or any other district was subject to the control of the Bengal Government. (2)

Any one wishing to buy salt for consumption or resale was to approach the gumashtas in charge of the golas. The gumashta when the money was paid was to grant a char chitthi (a delivery order) which was to be shown to any jamadar or peon in the various chaukis established in the jurisdiction under salt regulation. If the salt was required for sale or consumption in any part of the province beyond the

(1) 4 May 1804, Government to Melville and Harcourt, Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805 No. 23 (vide also No. 26.)

(2) Encl., 4 May 1804, Government to Melville and Harcourt, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805 No. 26.

chaukis, the merchant after giving a char chitthi to the jamadar or the peon of the chauki through which the salt might pass, received in exchange a pass which enabled him to take salt to whatever part of the province he thought fit. (1)

Any merchant who was desirous of purchasing salt for export from Orissa had to apply to the Salt Agent, who issued two Rawanas, of which one was to be delivered at either of the chaukis established near the salt gola and the other was to be delivered to the darogha stationed at either the Baumani or the Barmul pass or other passes controlled by the Government daroghas. (2)

When the salt department was placed under the control of the commissioners the salt Aurangs or manufacturing tracts spread in an unbroken line along the shore of the Bay of Bengal from the Suvarnarekha river, the north boundary of Orissa, to the Debi river, the south boundary of central Orissa, and skirted the Chilka lake, on the east and south east. The British divided all the salt Aurangs into three divisions. Balasore, or the north Cuttack division, extended from the Suvarnarekha on the north to the Dhamra on the south along the western shore of the Bay of Bengal for a distance

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

of some 80 miles, and comprised eight Aurangs.⁽¹⁾ The central division occupied the central portion of Orissa, extending along the coast for about 70 miles from the Dhamra to the Debi which separated it from the southern division. It comprised seven Aurangs.⁽²⁾ The southern division occupied the southern portion of Orissa, extending along the coast for about 90 miles from the Debi on the north to the southwest extremity of the Chilka lake. It comprised seven Aurangs.⁽³⁾

Each Aurang was divided into subdivisions called Bhowris, comprising a convenient number of chattis, which consisted of chulhas or boiling houses. Each Aurang had an establishment of one darogha, two or three muharrirs, some overseers of chattis, a few chaprasis and so on.⁽⁴⁾

The salt manufactured in the Aurangs was of two descriptions viz. pungah or boiled salt and karkach or solar evaporation salt. The latter was properly called abrah

- (1) Rattai, Sartha, Chanova, Dusmolung, Panch-molung, Ankura, Churamun and Dhamra.
- (2) Mundamolung, Sathbhaya, Northern Kanpur, Southern Kanpur, Bankud, Southern Dholya and Harishpur.
- (3) North Astrang, Bhusandpur, Haridas, Parikud, South Astrang, Malid, Gurbai and Southpara; Parliamentary Papers 1856 H.C. Vol. 26, part III, Bengal, (Report ... upon salt in British India) pp.490-493.
- (4) Ibid.

being a superior article to ordinary karkach. (1)

The British cleared the jungle when necessary and excavated communications with the sea which from long neglect had been gradually filled. Thus they brought a number of chatti lands into a productive state. (2)

(1) Ibid., p.493. The system of pungah manufacture in most of the Aurangs in Orissa was similar to that of Bengal agencies. The manufacture of karkach in the Chilka lake was facilitated by local circumstances. "The salt is produced on the tracts of the Chilka lake, left dry in February and March, on its southern margin where the water is at all times shallow, and where from the vicinity of the sea and the influence of the tides, the brine appears stronger than in other quarters. The process is extremely simple; the brine is confined for a few days in a large pan or field enclosed or prepared by the molunghees, whence after partial evaporation, it is admitted into smaller pans 6 or 8 feet square to the depth of two or three inches; it is let in at night, and by the following afternoon, a thick crust of salt is formed on the bottom of the pan which is then raked up and stored in heaps." (Ibid. pp.493-494).

(2) 29 October 1812, C. Becher, Salt Agent of Cuttack, to Board of Trade, Bengal Salt and Opium Consultations 25 November 1812 No. 15.

The introduction of manufacture under the exclusive management of Government officers was gradual. It was first introduced in 1804, in the northern division. It was subsequently extended to the central division. In 1812 the Salt Agent and the Board of Trade recommended to the Government of Bengal the extension of the salt monopoly to the Aurangs in the southern division on the ground that if the management cost one lakh of rupees, it would bring in upwards of five lakhs to the revenue. This was approved. Thus by 1814 the monopoly of manufacture was extended to the whole of Orissa. (1)

At the time of the British conquest the manufacture of salt was in the hands of the Rajas and zamindars whose estates bordered on the coast. It was considered equitable that they should continue to have an interest in the manufacture. J. King, the Salt Agent, was accordingly authorised to enter into agreements with them. In return for receiving one and a half annas per maund on all salt manufactured in their estates, they made over to the Government their salt and fuel lands and divested themselves

(1) 2 September 1805, Harcourt and Melville to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805 No.27; 11 February 1813, Government to Board of Trade, Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 February 1813 No. 42; Bengal Salt and Opium Consultations 25 October 1814 No. 8 (Regulation of 1814); 10 January 1855 E.A. Samuels, Commissioner of Cuttack to Board of Revenue, Report on the administration of the Salt Department of the Revenue of Bengal (1852-53) pp.41-2.

of all right to interfere with the Malangis. In 1811
 King recommended that the Rajas and zamindars should
 receive a certain quantity of salt under the designation
 of khoraki or diet allowances for the use of themselves
 and their families. That was also granted by the Government. (1)

The price paid to the Malangis for manufacturing salt
 varied at different times. At the time of the British
 conquest the usual rate allowed by the zamindars was four
 annas a maund or 25 rupees per 100 maunds. The British
 Government considered that this price was responsible for
 "unlimited smuggling", and at the recommendation of King
 the price was consequently raised to Rs. 35 per 100 maunds. (2)

The net profit of the Government from salt in 1804,
 from an account of the collector of Balasore amounted to
 Rs. 43,435. In the following year the net profit increased
 to Rs. 104,894. (3) King, who succeeded Brown as Salt Agent
 of Orissa, fixed the price of salt in 1806 at two rupees
 per maund in all the northern Aurangs perhaps to show a
 further profit to the Government. When British conquered

-
- (1) Parliamentary papers 1856, H.C. Vol. 26, part III,
 Bengal (Report ... upon salt in British India) pp.484-5.
- (2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue
 Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.
- (3) 2 September 1805, Harcourt and Melville to Government,
 Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805
 No. 27; (no date) August 1805, Harcourt and Melville
 to Government, Add. MSS. 13611, pp.58-59.

Orissa the sale price of salt in the central Aurangs of Kanika and Kujang was one and a half rupees. When the salt monopoly was extended over them the price of salt was raised to two rupees. From the time of the British conquest to 1814 the price of salt in the southern Aurangs was still low; a rupee purchased 32 seers. But when the salt monopoly was extended in 1814 to the whole of the district, the price of salt in these Aurangs was also fixed at two rupees per maund.⁽¹⁾

In 1813, when the Government rate of salt in the central Aurangs was equalised with that in the northern Aurangs the retail price of salt supplied from the Aurangs/in Kanika and Kujang was increased by nearly 50 per cent. But the price rose still higher in the country in general. Ewer wrote, "From all the enquiries I have made relative to the price of salt in the southern part of the district, the cost of that essential article of consumption rose suddenly and instantaneously from 5 to 6 times its former rate on the passing of the Regulations of 1814."⁽²⁾ In 1818 E. Impey, as magistrate of Cuttack, reported "its

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15; Bengal Draft Despatches (1806/7) Vol. 19, para 5, p.426.

(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

inhabitants of Khurda procured the necessary article of life at the low rate of about 32 seers per rupee. Since then its price has risen exorbitantly, and the difficulty of procuring it has become great."⁽¹⁾

The average retail price of salt in Orissa rose to three rupees and four annas (or upwards of 24 Kahans of kauris⁽²⁾). Trower thought that the reasons for the rise of the price of salt to such an extent were that the Government sold it at a higher rate than the rate prior to the conquest; the merchants who purchased salt at the Government price retailed it at an exorbitant increase. The chauki daroghas levied a duty on the passage of salt through their respective chaukis.⁽³⁾

Although the rise in the price of salt was generally felt all over the country it was felt less in the towns than in the interior because in consequence of the rise in urban wages labourers by earning more could somehow adapt themselves to such a rate. But in the interior of the country where the raiyats were poor and had no other means

-
- (1) 2 May 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 23 May 1818 No.1.
- (2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.
- (3) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No. 38.

of income except cultivation, it was very difficult for a raiyat to purchase the salt necessary for his consumption during the whole year. (1)

In assessing the total amount of salt manufactured we notice that according to C. Becher, the Salt Agent of Orissa the number of Malansis employed in 1815/16 (1223 Amali) was 16,847; the quantity of salt which one man could manufacture in a favourable season was about 50 maunds; the total manufactured in a year averaged 842,350 maunds. The yearly average of salt exported to Sulkia was 459,392; about 33,800 maunds were purchased at Government stores. Since the extension of the Regulation generally the sale of salt in the Mughalbandi did not average more than 113,000 maunds a year. (2)

This amount does not seem to have been sufficient for the consumption of the inhabitants of the Mughalbandi. Ewer conducted an enquiry on this point. He estimated that the total population of the Mughalbandi was 1,200,000. In his opinion one 'nul' of salt was required for two days for a

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.

(2) 6 November 1817, Becher to Board of Trade, Bengal Salt and Opium Consultations 26 December 1817 No. 4; 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

person in Orissa; there were fourteen 'nuls' in a Calcutta seer; about thirteen seers were necessary for a year or rather more than half a chhatak for a day. The same view was also held by Becher. On the basis of these calculations Ewer concluded that while the whole consumption of the Mughalbandi required an annual supply of three and a half lakh of maunds, it was supplied with only 113,000 maunds which was sufficient to a population of only 396,000 souls.⁽¹⁾

In addition to the calculations of Ewer there is other evidence to indicate that the population of the Mughalbandi had an inadequate supply. There is the experience of Trower, for example, on 23 May 1817 he wrote, "during my tour of the district it was with the greatest difficulty I could procure sufficient salt for the daily consumption of my camp."⁽²⁾

How had this happened? When the salt monopoly was enforced, there was no means for estimating the supply of salt for Orissa. Yet the Board of Trade presumed that 50,000 maunds of salt had perhaps been required for internal consumption during the Maratha rule. This according to its own words afterwards was based on "a very erroneous calculation."⁽³⁾

-
- (1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.
- (2) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No. 38.
- (3) 9 December 1817, Board of Trade to Government, Bengal Salt and Opium Consultations 26 December 1817 No. 3.

But in the opinion which Ewer expressed in 1818 people could only afford one fourth instead of a half chhatak per day. He thought that a large number went unsupplied from Government stores. This was to some extent supplied by smuggling, notwithstanding checks established to restrain it and the activities of chauki daroghas and chaprasis who had the credit of "being by no means idle in preventing others from benefiting by illicit traffic in salt."⁽¹⁾

Vast quantities of salt were smuggled by the salt amlas; some was supplied to a class of dealers in Orissa; the salt so sold was disposed of at a rate very nearly or quite as high as that procured regularly from Government stores.⁽²⁾

In regard to the complaints of the people, Trower reported, "Whatever the real causes may be or where the fault may be, I confess myself quite unable to decide, but certain it is that the cry for salt is generally throughout the district, not only is the high price complained of, a price which is said to preclude the lower classes of the people from purchasing it, but the difficulty of procuring it even by those who can afford to pay for it."⁽³⁾ Impey stated, "thus deprived or curtailed

-
- (1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.
- (2) 6 November 1817, Becher to Board of Trade, Bengal Salt and Opium Consultations 26 December 1817 No.4; 13 May 1818 Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No.15.
- (3) 13 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No.38.

in the use of an article of life essential to their comfort the Inhabitants of Khurda experience in a greater degree than almost any others in the District, the operation of this salt monopoly."⁽¹⁾ Ewer after due enquiry remarked, "I certainly believe the salt monopoly to be a real and unexaggerated grievance to the inhabitants of a large part of the District and that the introduction of it with its consequences has materially curtailed the already scanty comfort and circumscribed enjoyments of the Oorlah Ryot." He further added, "it must be admitted that the advantages thus far derived by the Government by the extension of salt monopoly but poorly compensates for the privation and discontent occasioned by that measure to their subject in Cuttack."⁽²⁾ This discontent of the people may indeed have been one of the causes of the rebellion in 1817.

(1) 2 May 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 23 May 1817 No.1.

(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

SECTION IV
EMBANKMENTS.

Orissa, a land of many rivers, was subject to occasional inundation. This made the upkeep of the embankments a chief consideration of the Government in all ages. The enormity of the problem can be easily understood from the following statement of Trower: "The bunds in this district extend if taken in each direction upwards of 150 miles.⁽¹⁾"

During the Maratha rule, the management of the embankments was placed under the zamindars who were either supplied with money by the Government or granted some deductions from their revenue on that account. When the British took over the administration of the country the same system was continued till 1806. By Regulation VI, 1806, the general charge of the embankments was entrusted to a committee known as the Committee of Embankments, consisting of public officers nominated by the Government. Generally it consisted of three members. The senior civil servant of the Company at Cuttack

(1) 18 January 1813, Embankment Committee to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 February 1813 No. 36.

acted as the president; the register of the zila court was the secretary. (1)

The whole district was divided into two divisions known as the northern and southern divisions, each under a superintendent for the management of embankments. The superintendents were appointed by the Government. When the management was not found satisfactory, a surveyor of embankments was appointed in 1813. (2)

It was the duty of the committee to furnish to the Government an annual estimate of the expense of repairing the embankments. It was also to look to the general administration of the embankments. Its members were individually and collectively responsible for bringing abuses to light. Under the superintendents were a number of bund darogas appointed by the committee. It was their duty to be careful that the sum advanced for the repair of the bunds was properly expended and that the work was solid and substantial. The surveyor was to survey and report upon the works when finished previous to the accounts being submitted to the

(1) 31 December 1812, Trower to Embankment Committee, Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 February 1813 No. 37; 18 January 1813, Embankment Committee to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 February 1813 No. 38.

(2) Ibid.

Government by the committee.⁽¹⁾ The average annual estimate of repairs including establishment charges, the cost of the surveyor and that of the two superintendents for 1811, 1812 and 1813 was Rs. 40,514.⁽²⁾

The measures taken by the Government generally brought some improvement in many embankments. One of the embankments which drew the special attention of the Government was that at the Kathjuri. Its repair was indispensable for the preservation of the town of Cuttack and Cantonment. It appears that during the Maratha Government the ruined parts of this embankment were to some extent strengthened with piles and earth annually.⁽³⁾ But by the time the British conquered Cuttack the condition of the embankment was precarious. In 1805 G. Steel, who was in charge of bunds in the southern division of Cuttack remarked "The Bund running from the Banks of the Mohanuddy, to the Banks of the Kutjoory is completely broken, and in many places no traces are to be found of the original Bund."⁽⁴⁾

-
- (1) 20 April 1814, Embankment Committee to R. Becher, Superintendent of the embankments, northern division, Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 July 1814 No. 53.
- (2) On 20 December 1814; Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815 No. 29.
- (3) Encl., 20 January 1806, Melville to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 23 January 1806 No. 48.
- (4) Encl., 1 October 1805, Board of Revenue to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 October 1805 No. 36.

He stated "that the Bunds round the Town of Cuttack are in such a state as to require an entire and thorough repair." His recommendations were carried out. In consequence of repairs from time to time the embankment became both stronger and higher than before. In 1814 Richardson stated "The large and solid embankments which now exist at the station of Cuttack itself and which for the greatest part are faced with cut stones ... are essential to the preservation of the town of Cuttack and contonments which would undoubtedly be annually innundated and overflown in many parts, were it not for the embankments."⁽¹⁾

Generally however the conditions of the embankments did not improve as much as had been expected. That was chiefly because at many places repairs were neglected or not taken up in time, with the result that river water broke the bunds, washing away cultivated lands and causing damage to crops.⁽²⁾ In 1813 Sage⁽³⁾ wrote "During my late survey

(1) 20 December 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815 No. 29.

(2) 26 July 1813, Embankment Committee to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 7 August 1813 No. 29; Encl., 18 January 1813, Embankment Committee to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 February 1813, No. 38; 17 September 1814, F. Sackville, Superintendent of Jagannath Road to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 7 October 1814 No. 15.

(3) I.W. Sage, President of the Embankment Committee.

of the Bunds to the northwards of Cuttack I found but few in good repair although immense sums have annually been expended." He further added, "Many of the Bunds do not exceed three feet in height and have not, to all appearance, received any repair for a length of time while others are hardly perceptible owing to their being covered with impregnable jungle."(1)

Investigating the reasons for this neglect Sage wrote, "In two places where I expected to find bunds not a vestige remained and I am thoroughly convinced the public money has been grossly misappropriated."(2) He also added, "that the expenses have and under the present system must increase is to be attributed solely to the practice of advancing money to the daroghas who instead of appropriating it for the purpose, intended, exert their utmost to lay up a fortune for themselves, making zemindars furnish coolies, who are, it is feared, never paid."(3) Trower stated "In more than one instance it has been reported that those officers [bund daroghas] have forced the villagers to work and afterwards refused to pay them. The salary of each Darogah amounts

-
- (1) Encl., 17 February 1813, Embankment Committee to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 27 February 1813 No.25.
- (2) Ibid.
- (3) 18 January 1813, Embankment Committee to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 February 1813 No. 36.

to 16 rupees per mensem and they are employed only six months of the year, most of them keep their palanquins and ... servants and one of them in particular who had the charge of Rahang division has become a zemindar of some consequence in the district and I believe it is pretty well known that he purchased his lands with the money advanced to him for the repairs of bunds."⁽¹⁾

H.C. Sandy, the surveyor of the embankments said that the daroghas "have profited by receipts of public money from the Committee in superintending of embankments." In support of his opinion he stated that on his arrival at Cuttack the daroghas sought his approval for a deduction of sixteen per cent from the advance made to them. When they were asked to explain their reasons they replied as if it was a normal practice under the superintendent.⁽²⁾ Richardson wrote "these men (bund daroghas) have long been in the same place, held the same situations and practised every sort of fraud, as there is every reason to believe and it may be reasonably supposed have from habit, brotherhood and communion of interest reduced their mode of fraud to a system, which it would be

(1) 31 December 1812, Trower to Sage, Bengal Revenue Consultations 20 February 1813 No. 37.

(2) 14 February 1814, Embankment Committee to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 26 March 1814 No. 33.

difficult to
/discover or trace."(1)

Though the corruption of the bund daroghas was brought to light, they were not dispensed with because it was considered that their dismissal would involve greater difficulty in the management of the bunds than their presence. However from 1814 they were no longer given advances for the repair of bunds. An attempt was made to check their works in a more careful way. Yet there is little evidence of improvement. It continued so up to 1817. (2)

-
- (1) 20 December 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815 No. 29.
- (2) Encl., 10 May 1814, Embankment Committee to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 8 July 1814 No. 53; 20 December 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 18 March 1815 No. 29; 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No. 25.

CHAPTER VII
JUDICIAL SYSTEM

During Maratha rule the Amil was empowered to investigate and try both civil and criminal cases. Minor cases were decided by the zamindar in his revenue jurisdiction or when referred to him by the Amil. The popular mode of disposing of cases was to refer them to arbitration, Harcourt, the commissioner of Cuttack observed "Even in felonies as in civil disputes all was arranged by compromise." The arbitration court or Panchayat generally consisted of five or more members chosen by the parties themselves or by the officer to whom the matter was referred. More serious cases were brought before the subahdar of Cuttack.⁽¹⁾

There was no distinction between civil and criminal cases. Proceedings were simple. Ewer, the acting judge and magistrate of Cuttack wrote "all proceedings were summary, no written deposition taken and no form of trial

(1) 27 February 1818, Ewer, Acting Judge of Cuttack to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 37; 22 March 1805, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13610, p.223.

observed. Even an Ooria could understand how to seek redress where nothing but clamour was necessary to make his complaint heard without a prospect of incurring a loss either of time and money." He thought that under the Maratha Government "Heinous offences were exceedingly rare."⁽¹⁾

Generally the time-old customs were followed in determining the nature of the punishment. A person committing a petty offence like stealing firewood was often punished with a small fine.⁽²⁾ For serious offences the offender was generally imprisoned or mutilated.⁽³⁾ In default of human evidence the Panchayat sometimes resorted to trial by ordeal like holding a red-hot iron or putting a hand in boiling ghee.⁽⁴⁾

The Amil was responsible to the Government for maintaining law and order in his revenue jurisdiction. The zamindars or other revenue officers exercised police powers under the Amil. The Khandaits were responsible for maintaining law and order under the zamindars. One of their

-
- (1) 27 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 37.
- (2) Resolutions of Government, no date, Bengal Revenue Consultations January-April 1791 pp. 626-7.
- (3) C.P.C. Vol. V, No. 1977.
- (4) Resolutions of Government, no date, Bengal Revenue Consultations January-April 1791, pp. 626-7.

chief duties was to seize offenders and produce them before the zamindar. Under the khandait were a number of chaukidars.(1)

On 14 October 1803 the British conquest of Orissa was complete and Orissa was placed under the commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack. The commissioners did not interfere with the old system except that they took into their hands from the Amil the power of superintending the police and hearing criminal cases. The control of the police was vested in the magistrate. There were two magistrates, one in the northern and the other in the southern division of Cuttack under the commissioners.(2)

On 5 September 1805 a regulation was passed declaring that all former and future regulations established in Bengal and Bihar should have effect in Cuttack.(3)
In other words, from 1805 Orissa was brought under the system of administration established by Cornwallis in Bengal.

-
- (1) 15 October 1821, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 1 August 1822 No. 5.
- (2) Encl., 4 May 1804, Government to Commissioners for Affairs of Cuttack, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 5 September 1805 No. 24; 27 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 37.
- (3) 27 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 37.

It was designated the district of Cuttack. It was then placed in charge of only one magistrate and was brought under the court of circuit for the division of Calcutta for criminal justice.(1)

The magistrate had limited powers of fine and imprisonment. He had to apprehend all disturbers of the peace and persons charged before him with crimes and misdemeanours. It was his duty to ascertain from the prisoners committed or held to bail, the evidence they might offer in their defence and to cause the attendance of witnesses before the court of circuit. He was required to submit to the court of circuit calendars of those apprehended, of those discharged, and of those tried and of those convicted. The court of circuit was supposed to hold its sessions twice a year, and its procedure was also complex.(2)

The Maratha judicial system had been simple; there was no codified law; the procedure was not fixed. There was no professional lawyer; the provisions of law written or unwritten were not always clear and definite. The British judicial system was more organised; the procedure

(1) W. Blunt and H. Shakespear, Regulations for the administration of police and criminal justice in the provinces of Bengal Bihar and Orissa, p.54.

(2) Ibid., pp. 1, 15, 54.

was fixed; the law was codified. Mutilation was replaced by imprisonment, which the British considered to be more humane. The sudden introduction of so new a system was somewhat bewildering to the people. At first the settled code of procedure was considered as an unnecessary innovation.

According to many British officers, heinous offences were rare in Cuttack. Harcourt observed "I must say however this in favour of the natives of Cuttack that they are in general very peaceably inclined."⁽¹⁾ The reports from the judges of the circuit court for a series of years contained statements to the effect that dacoity was unknown and that other heinous crimes were of rare occurrence; the district was in a quiet and peaceable state.⁽²⁾ Ewer stated that the people of Cuttack "required little of the penal."⁽³⁾

It is only at the end of the first decade of the British rule that there were some violent affrays attended with wounding and loss of lives. But that was due to the hopelessness of civil redress because all who had claims to property

- (1) 22 March 1805, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13610, p.225.
- (2) 20 April 1811, W.E. Rees, officiating Judge of Midnapur (he held sessions for Cuttack) to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 14 May 1811, No. 32; 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol. V, p. 513-6.
- (3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

invariably attempted to obtain possession of it by force.⁽¹⁾

Ewer thought that because there was a smaller number of heinous crimes in Cuttack than in any other of the Company's provinces, therefore the administration of criminal justice was neglected. The sessions were to be held twice in a year. But in actual practice they were held only once. Later on the judges of circuit "for their personal convenience" applied to the Government to hold them once in a year. That was granted by the Government. On the one hand this infrequency of the session courts failed "to familiarise the natives to an institution they were so little likely to understand."⁽²⁾ Because of their ignorance of the proceedings of the criminal courts people were entirely left in the hands of the vakils and amlas who exploited them.⁽³⁾ On the other hand the hearings of the courts were delayed, as a result, sometimes innocent prisoners were unnecessarily detained. The witnesses also suffered from hardship and expense.⁽⁴⁾

-
- (1) 11 January 1822, Governor General in Council to Court of Directors, Judicial Letters from Bengal 1820-22, Vol. VII, p.442; 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol. V, p.516.
- (2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818, No. 15.
- (3) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol. V, pp.519-20.
- (4) 28 September 1816, Watson to Nizamat Adalat, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 7 February 1817, No.37.

The magistrate was empowered to appoint police daroghas. If they were found guilty of misconduct, they were removable only by the order of the Government.(1)

It was also provided that according to the established usages within their respective estates, the principal zamindars and other landholders were to be constituted police officers within their respective possessions; the inferior zamindars or talukdars were to act as subordinate officers of police subject to them. The zamindars were to be subject to the authority of the police daroghas who were in turn subject to the orders of the magistrate. But these provisions were never carried out. In 1806 police thanas were established in Cuttack excluding the sixteen tributary states exempted from the general regulations.(2)

The police administration shows that generally the daroghas were corrupt. R. Ker was the magistrate of Cuttack from 1805 to 1807. As long as he was in this office occasional measures were taken to check corruptions.(3) But owing to the want of vigilance on the part of his successors it seems that corruption

- (1) W. Blunt and H. Shakespear, Regulations for the administration of police and criminal justice in the provinces of Bengal Bihar and Orissa, p.58.
- (2) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25.
- (3) 6 January 1807, Ker to Nizamat Adalat, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 22 January 1807 No.43.

prevailed to a very great extent. In 1817 Trower reported "I believe I am the first and only Officer of the Government that has hitherto visited the interior of the district, I have travelled through the greatest part of it, conversed with all classes of the people from the highest to the lowest and certainly the complaint against the police ... exceeded anything I could have supposed." He further added "the oppression exercised by the police is by no means of late date. I have always considered, and expressed it publicly as well as privately, that the district of Cuttack was, in this respect, the most unfortunate in the Company's provinces."⁽¹⁾ Ewer wrote "in the place of the mild and parental authority of the Raja of Khurda was now substituted that of the judge and collector ... and the unfeeling and oppressive sway of a ... police Darogha."⁽²⁾

The corruption affected both the higher and lower classes of the people. G. Martindell, the military commissioner of Cuttack wrote "the difficulties under which the landholders are said to labour are so much to be ascribed ... to the enormous exactions and extortions of the Native

(1) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations, 24 October 1817 No.38.

(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations, 17 July 1818 No.15.

officers of the District, both Judicial, Police and Revenue."⁽¹⁾
 Richardson mentioned "excesses and oppressions committed by the police Darogahs, the Tehseeldars' Omla and parties of sepoy and ca by continual seizure of Begars, taking firewood, pots, milk, eggs and ca and ca and ca all of which acts are strictly prohibited by the regulations of the government" and reiterated the emphatic words of Trower that the system "proved ruinous to this once flourishing country Khurda by consequent desertion of a great portion of the cultivators."⁽²⁾

Consequently the daroghas grew rich. Trower wrote "We all know what the salary of a police Darogah is, and we know generally speaking from what class of natives they are selected and it is therefore impossible ... to account for the sudden rise of these people to riches and consequence, unless by giving credit to their unwarrantable exactions."⁽³⁾

Here is an example of police oppression. Mirza Mehdi was the police darogha at Puri. A large number of people complained against his exactions before the magistrate. They also declared that if they could not be relieved from this

-
- (1) Encl., 3 March 1818, Martindell to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 April 1818, No.44.
 (2) 3 January 1814, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations, 5 February 1814 No. 37.
 (3) 23 May 1817, Trower to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No.38.

tyranny by the local authorities they would proceed in a body to Calcutta to petition the Council.⁽¹⁾ So the darogha was immediately removed by the order of the magistrate, and transferred to Khurda where he was later said to have "carried on a merciless system of exaction."⁽²⁾

(1) 29 August 1812, Government to the Magistrate of Cuttack, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 29 August 1812 No. 27.

(2) "The collections on account of the Darogah in the village of Trumoo in Khoorda were as follows:-

1st Salamee 2as /2 annas/; 2nd on account of village collections 8 as; 3rd numbering the houses 3 as; 4th boundary assessment 4 as; 5th assessment for supplies 6 as; 6th assessment for Bhangu Bindars 1 anna 2 pice; 7th coolie assessment 2 as; 8th assessment on Darogah's loss in purchasing grain 3 as; 9th for honey, wax and etc., 1 anna; 11th for Khuokhur in hot weather 1 anna 2 pice; 12th fowls and kids 2½ as; 13th for each soonthal 12 as; 14th if any body fell into well his house was plundered and 6 annas were taken from each house in the village; 15th for any person dying from the bite of a snake the same as last; 16th for a burglary 3 rupees from the master of the house: when any body whom the Darogah did not like ... he was fined 2 rupees."

13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

While Oriya was generally spoken in the district of Cuttack, the regulations were only translated into the Persian and Bengali languages which were understood by few. Ewer wrote, "Not a single Regulation has ever been translated into the great vernacular language of the province and the means elsewhere adopted of imparting some knowledge of laws by which they are governed by distributing copies at every thana and mufassal catchery have here either never been resorted to, or if followed, would of course have been nugatory from the contents being locked up in languages wholly unknown to the bulk of the people."⁽¹⁾

At the time of the British conquest, a complete body of Oriya native officers were available. Many of them were Amils each with a large number of tahsildars under them. As their method of business was widely different from that about to be introduced in the district, it was considered impracticable to retain their services. Owing to their ignorance of the rules and practices of the British courts and other Government offices, Oriyas were appointed in none but the lowest positions. The idea of selecting some of the Oriyas first to fill the secondary posts and then after training to rise to more important offices was

(1) Ibid.

completely overlooked.(1)

The exclusion of the natives of Orissa from all offices of trust and responsibility in the courts, in the police and in the revenue and salt departments led to serious consequences. It created a wide gulf between the British Government and the natives of Orissa. Ewer thought that the Oriyas felt that the British showed special favour to the amlas from other provinces.(2)

It appears that the judges of Cuttack perceived little difference between the natives of Orissa and those of Bengal. They did their duties according to law "without enquiring or caring whether those who came before them were aware or not of the measures necessary to be adopted in the conduct of a suit." This left the people entirely in the hands of the vakils who "plundered" them under the plea of money being required for the court expenses and thus "the propriety of these demands could not be disputed by those who knew nothing of the nature and amount of fees and cost." This practice was so common in the court that once the Government felt the necessity of dismissing one Muhammad Feiz, a Government pleader, from his office because he was deeply involved in this questionable means of acquiring money.(3)

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

(3) 22 January 1814, Government to the Acting Judge of Cuttack, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 22 January 1814 No. 21.

The amlas too took full advantage of their situations. They made fortunes either by exacting money from the parties in a suit or by using the influences of their authorities. One Salim Ali came to Balasore at the time of the British conquest in the capacity of a munshi to Morgan, who became acting collector of the northern division of Cuttack. Morgan conferred on Salim Ali a high situation in the salt department. But in the following year he was removed by Ker, Morgan's successor and prosecuted for embezzling money, smuggling salt and selling an appointment. It seems the prosecution was conducted in a careless manner; nothing was proved. When King was appointed Salt Agent, he wrote in 1807 that he "was strongly impressed with an idea of the enormity of Salim Ali's guilt and of the necessity of making a public example of him in order to deter others from similar practices." By the time Impey took charge of the district as the judge and magistrate of Cuttack, Salim Ali was known as an extensive purchaser of land in the name of his nephew, Buzul Hussain and as a merchant; he also had acted as a defendant in criminal cases of various descriptions.(1)

In 1814 he was appointed to the office of fawjdari sarishtadar. When he held that office charges of corruption

(1) 7 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No.1.

were brought against him. In one of them the magistrate punished the accuser and in others committed the accusers and witnesses to the court of circuit which acquitted them for want of proof.⁽¹⁾

Impey later on felt the pernicious consequences of retaining such a person in office whose landed property and responsible position were utilised to exercise an undue influence over the minds of the natives.⁽²⁾ He recommended his dismissal. By the time Salim Ali was dismissed, the annual sadar jama of the lands he had acquired in his nephew's name was Rs. 26,164.⁽³⁾

Another example which may be given here concerns the family of Saheb Zeman, a darogha of Cuttack consisting of his brothers Ali Zeman, a faujdari sarishtadar and Kiden Ali, darogha of Pipli, their nephew Nukram Hussain, a faujdari sarishtadar and Tufil Ali, a faujdari muharrir. Soon after the British conquest Saheb Zeman came here in search of a livelihood. He held the office of a darogha at several thanas for about nine years. Ali Zeman was a

(1) Ibid.

(2) 9 April 1818, Rees to Magistrate of Cuttack, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No. 2.

(3) 7 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No. 1.

record keeper in the court for some time. In 1810 he was appointed a faujdari sarishtadar. In 1812 he held that situation in both the civil and criminal courts. He continued so till Impey took charge of the office of judge and magistrate of Cuttack. On Salim Ali's resignation Ali Zeman was appointed to succeed him, but before he could take charge he was dismissed from Government service for corrupt practices committed when he had been a sarishtadar in the Twenty Four Parganas. He was succeeded by his nephew Mukram Hussain who had been darogha at the thanas of Mutro and Soro. These brothers utilised the influences of their offices to acquire wealth. This is evident from their own statements at an enquiry made by Ewer. Sahebo Zeman petitioned "my younger brother Ulley Zeman resided with me during the time he was Dewanny and Foujdarry Sheristadar and as we found that our salaries were not sufficient to maintain us, we took advantage of the confidence inspired by our high offices and connected ourselves with the Mahajans of the Town. They lent us money to a very large extent and we commenced trading in various articles such as cloth, horses, elephants etc; we also bought and sold several Estates. At one time we sent an investment, the value of 15,000 Rupees towards the Deccan, part of which was plundered by the Raja of Goomsur.

I cannot produce all the papers connected with our concerns, but beg leave to submit a number of redeemed bonds to the number of 43,144 Rupees which will shew that the above statement is correct." Other members of the family became considerable landholders connected in interest with the two chiefs.(1)

The corruption of the amlas made them rich at the sacrifice of many zamindars who were ruined by selling their lands. But when complaints were made against their oppression, they were almost always dismissed because of the nature of the proof required in the court. Ewer thought that this left an impression that the amlas, more particularly the Bengali amlas, were under the protection of the court and that those who brought charges were more likely to be punished than vindicated. Consequently there was a general loss of confidence in the justice of British laws and in the impartiality of the British courts.(2)

For example, Salim Ali was appointed by the Government to the salt department. In consequence of charges of

-
- (1) Encl., 19 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No. 6; 7 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No. 1.
- (2) 7 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No.1.

corruption against him he was dismissed. A decision on a charge against him, for extortion in the name of a judge of the circuit was pending. Yet he was reappointed to his former situation.(1)

Again the appointment of Ali Zeman by the same magistrate who had caused his dismissal is another instance which may be cited here. When Ali Zeman was dismissed a second time he was succeeded by one of his nephews namely Mukim Hussain.(2) It appeared to Ewer that such things might "have excited a belief that though criminality might deprive one member of his office, yet it could not operate to diminish the power and emolument of the family in general." Again a muharrir who had been dismissed by Impey for incapacity was made afterwards a darogha, on account of his experience and ability; another person who had been convicted by the court of circuit was appointed as acting naib nazir.(3)

In considering the popular opinion of the courts Ewer wrote that the people of Orissa "for some years looked on

-
- (1) 9 April 1818, Rees to Webb, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No. 2; 3 October 1816, Magistrate of Cuttack to Court of Circuit, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No. 4.
- (2) Encl., 19 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No. 6.
- (3) 7 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 3 March 1818 No.1.

the Regulations not as a source of redress for the injured and of punishment for the oppression but as a means of introducing into Cuttack a herd of needy rapacious strangers and enabling them to make rapid and large fortunes and acquire possession of a greater portion of the district."

He further added "the above opinion is founded on a knowledge of the sentiment of the people in general acquired by unreserved communication with all ranks during my late tour through the district. On every occasion of referring a complaint to the court I received the answer that nothing but expense was to be gained by following my direction."⁽¹⁾

In short, in the words of the Court of Directors, "the access to civil justice was tedious and difficult to all classes of the Native Population, ... the Native Omlah were corrupt and extortionate to a degree ... the administration of Criminal Justice was also attended with vexations and difficulties to Prosecutors and Witnesses, and with hardship to innocent prisoners;" "the judicial system in Cuttack was by no means adapted either to promote the efficient administration of justice among the people of that province in their material dealings with each other or to protect them from frauds and exactions of the Amlah, which the Regulations

(1) Ibid.

themselves had introduced and that it thus acted not only to the withholding of the right, but to the fruitful production of the wrong."(1)

(1) 19 July 1820, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Judicial Letters to Bengal 1820 Vol. V, pp.522-4.

CHAPTER VIII

REBELLION OF 1817.

The Orissa rebellion of 1817 had its origin in wrongs towards an individual of rank and consequence, who exercised powerful influence over those sections of the people, "reduced by long suffering and oppression to a condition of extreme and desperate wretchedness."⁽¹⁾

Jagabandu Bidyadhar Mahapatra Bhramarabar Ray, popularly known as Jagabandu, inherited the office of Bakhshi, the Military Commander of the Raja of Khurda. He was next to the Raja, both in rank and in authority, because of his influence over the military of the country. He was regarded by the Garjat Rajas and the people of the Mughalbandi as second to the representative of the ancient royal family of Orissa. He had matrimonial alliances with the Raja of Shergarh on the Ghumsar frontier and the Raja of Baramba in Orissa.

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations
17 July 1818 No. 15.

For many generations, his family possessed an estate known as Kila Rorang, which had been acquired by purchase and was held at a quit rent. It was in the possession of the family of Jagabandhu at the time of British conquest. So the settlement of Rorang was made with him by Harcourt at the end of 1803. In 1804/5 a settlement was also concluded with him. In the following year he entered into engagements in G. Webb's triennial settlement.⁽¹⁾

A rich Bengali named Kishen Chunder Singh was the diwan in the office of the collector, C. Groeme. His relation and dependent, Chunder Prasad Singh was the collector's sarishtadar. When Webb became collector, Kishen Chunder Singh resigned but Chunder Prasad Singh continued to hold his office until 1811, when he was dismissed on a charge of dishonesty (and speculation). His brother named Gaur Hari Singh was a tahsildar at Puri from 1804/5 at least until 1809/10. He was entrusted with the collection of revenue from some khasmahals and zamindari estates. It appears that at Puri a scheme for dispossessing Jagabandhu from Rorang was prepared by Gaur Hari Singh, in communication with Kishen Chunder Singh,

(1) Ibid.

who had settled at Cuttack.⁽¹⁾

Several large and valuable parganas in the southern division of Cuttack, including the sacred town of Purusottam (Puri) had been taken from the Raja of Khurda, and placed under the direct management of the Maratha Government. As these parganas were not claimed by any proprietors, after the British conquest the commissioners at Cuttack considered them to be "awkward incumbrances." It was decided to get rid of them by sale. The amlas were probably themselves the first advocates of this measure with the intention of taking advantage of the situation. Rorang was no longer held at a peshkash. It was a valuable estate; it was very lightly assessed. It adjoined the pargana of Rahang in the vicinity of Puri. The object of Kishen Chundar Singh was to take this with other parganas such as Purusottam and Rahang to add to the intended zamindari.⁽²⁾

In the second year of Webb's triennial settlement, Chunder Prasad Singh 'insidiously' pointed out to Jagabandhu the expediency of paying his revenue into the hands of the tahsildar at Puri, instead of into the collector's treasury. By doing so, Jagabandhu fell into a snare. It was easy for the tahsildar to represent in his accounts the

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

collection of Rorang as belonging to the pargana of Rahang.⁽¹⁾

In 1807 a proposal was submitted to the Board of Revenue by the collector of Cuttack for the farming of the parganas Serain, Chabishkud and Rahang, which were for the first time in the English correspondence termed Rahang Ogrey. It appears that the jama of Rorang was added to that of Rahang and was advertised for sale for the recovery of arrears of revenue as with others.⁽²⁾ But no list of the mauzas and mahals was detailed in the Ishtihar-nama or public notice. Lukni Narayan "a creature of Chunder Prasad Singh" took the farm of these parganas in 1807/8 (1215 Amali). Another instrument of Chunder Prasad Singh purchased it in 1808/9 (1216 Amali). In the following year, when the parganas of Rahang Ogrey were put to sale, they were purchased by Kishen Chunder Singh at a high price. The new estate was designated the zamindari of Purusottam Chhattar.⁽³⁾

Jagabandhu's engagements for the triennial settlement were still unexpired in 1807/8 (1215 Amali), and in the following year. Perhaps that is why he was not interfered with during this period, lest the truth might be exposed and the scheme frustrated. It appears that the revenue

(1) Ibid.

(2) 2 April 1814, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 2 April 1814 No. 32.

(3) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

paid by Jagabandhu into the tahsildar's treasury in 1807/8 (1215 Amali) was misappropriated.(1)

As soon as Rorang passed into the hands of Kishen Chunder Singh, his servants attempted to take possession of it; Jagabandhu violently resisted; a riot took place; petitions were submitted to C. Buller, the commissioner of Cuttack. R. Milford, the collector of the district, was directed to submit a report on the matter. But owing to the artifice of Chunder Prasad Singh, the sarishtadar, the truth was concealed. Such was the effect of the opposition of Jagabandhu that the new purchaser was for a long time unable to obtain complete possession.(2)

It appears that Kishen Chunder Singh meanwhile thought it expedient to pacify Jagabandhu for some time by paying his malikana. Jagabandhu let Rorang in farm for the three years of Buller's settlement to Dip Chand, the record keeper of the Diwani court. But with the connivance of Kishen Chunder Singh, Dip Chand destroyed the old patta and took a new one from the former.(3)

In 1813, when Kishen Chunder Singh felt that the plot was matured, he came forward to enter into engagements for Rorang, as a part of his purchase. Jagabandhu found that

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

now he was on the point of being wholly ousted. He therefore presented a petition to Richardson, the then commissioner of Cuttack, in which he stated that he paid the revenues of 1806/7 (1214 Amali) and 1807/8 (1215 Amali) into the hands of Gaur Hri Singh, the tahsildar; in 1808/9 (1215 Amali), during his absence from home, his agents, who had been instructed to deposit the money with the farmers, paid it to the Raja of Khurda and obtained a receipt from him. In the same year, his estate was included in the farm of Rahang.⁽¹⁾ This petition was investigated. It was proved beyond question that the annexation of Rorang was fraudulent. An order was passed for the separation of the two estates.⁽²⁾ But on behalf of Kishen Chundar Singh it was pointed out by a representation in the court that the original right of Jagabandhu to Rorang was questionable. Consequently an order was issued by the Government forbidding any engagements to be taken from him, until he should have established a title to the lands in the regular course of law or at least have satisfied the revenue authorities that he had a strong presumptive right to the property.⁽³⁾

Ewer wrote: "When the final orders of Government were

(1) Ibid.

(2) 14 January¹⁸¹⁴, Richardson to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 29 January 1814 No. 35.

(3) 28 May 1814, Government to Richardson, Bengal Revenue Consultations 28 May 1814 No. 20.

were known on this subject, the complaints of Jagabandhu were loud and vehement. His language is said to have been almost threatening." "He became in fact a beggar and for nearly two years derived his maintenance from voluntary contributions made by the people of Khurda for his support. His time was chiefly spent in wandering over the scenes of his former consequence and authority. Even in his fallen condition he continued to cling to those insignia of state to which his rank and titles as a principal servant of the Raja of Khurda entitled him and although a beggar, was constantly attended by a ragged tribe of followers bearing staves, morchuls, punkas etc." He added that when a darogha who found Jagabandhu in this condition advised him to institute a suit for the recovery of his estate "he ever testified an invincible repugnance, pleading his want of means, the degradation of suing as a pauper and the uncertainty and inutility of any reference to the court by an Oriya when a rich Bengalee was to be his defendant."⁽¹⁾

The popular griveances, which Jagabandhu exploited to avenge his own injuries, were explained by him in the following manner in reply to a question put by the Raja of Khurda.

"The Inhabitants of Khgorda have sustained in the Mofussul

(1) 13 Mgy 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 Jly 1818 No. 15.

a variety of injuries and oppressions from the Bengallees who are in office under the English Government, and who consider and declare themselves to be our Masters while no redress is to be obtained at the Suddur (meaning probably Cuttack) by the poor and oppressed from the Gentlemen in power in consequence of this influence of those Bengallees, and the favour shown to them, as an instance of which a seer of salt which used to be sold for 1 Pun of cowries cannot at present be procured for 12 Puns - moreover where one Rupee was once taken, on account of revenue ten are now exacted and after all there are after [sic ? often] demands and balances. By the injustice of the judges the oppression of the wicked Thanadars, and the tyranny of the officers of the Salt Mehals, the people are altogether overwhelmed and being unable to leave their loved native lands, are grown desperate and careless of life. They have accordingly with the intention to avenge their injuries appointed me Jugbundhoo Bhomebur their leader."(1)

When Jagabandhu was trying to incite a rebellion, the alarm of an invasion of Orissa by the Pindaris was at its height in the month of January and February 1817. A leading sarbarahkar of Khurda who was at enmity with Jagabandhu reported

(1) Encl., 15 July 1817, C.A. Molony, Persian Secretary to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 24 October 1817 No. 49 (A letter of 26 April 1817 from the Raja of Khurda to Government)

to the darogha of Khurda that a messenger had arrived from the Pindari camp. Jagabandhu seemed to be conspiring with him to incite disturbances in the country. The darogha without delay attempted to seize Jagabandhu. He tried for some days to do so. Jagabandhu was apprehensive for his personal safety and took the earliest chance of executing his scheme.⁽¹⁾

His plan was, first, to remove the British administration from Khurda. He intended then to proceed to Puri to place the Raja of Khurda at the head of his rebellion, for two main reasons. First, the very name of the Raja would give strength to his cause. Secondly, in the event of his restoration, the rebels would easily receive assistance from the Garjat chiefs, who still revered the representative of their ancient sovereign. Letters of invitation to various important persons of the district were issued by the rebels in the name of the Raja of Khurda and chiefly written on Talapatras or palm leaves. It appears that such invitations had some effect in the minds of many persons like the Raja of Kujang and the Raja of Kanika.⁽²⁾

The rebellion started in the last week of March 1817 when a body of Kandh chohars to the number of 400 from Ghumsar territory entered Khurda, joined by Dalbeheras and paiks and

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

(2) Ibid; 29 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations^{C.P.} 12 August 1817 No. 23.

headed by Jagabandhu. They looted treasuries from the tahsildar's kachahris at Banpur and Khurda. They carried off one of the Barkandazes and killed another; a servant of the darogha of Khurda was slain; another person was wounded when the Kachahri was burnt.⁽¹⁾ On 30 March 1817 Impey reported to the Government "I have had communication with several persons who were present when the Police Tannah, Moonsiff's cutchery, and Tehsildar's cutchery at Khoorda were burnt and plundered; they all agree in stating that no Houses were destroyed, no property plundered and no one Individual touched, excepting those connected with the Government."⁽²⁾

Impey marched from Cuttack with a detachment of 64 sepoy's under the command of Lieutenant Travis of the 18th Bengal native infantry. He reached Gangpur pass, on his way to Khurda, which was surrounded on both its sides by the insurgents in large numbers. Here he learnt that Lieutenant Prideaux, who was at the head of a force at Khurda, was no longer there. By this time, the sepoy's had been much harassed by exposure to the sun. Moreover they were running short of provisions. It was apprehended that, should the party be forced to return after going through the pass, it might suffer

-
- (1) 29 March 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial consultations L.P. 11 April 1817 No. 1.
- (2) 30 March 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 11 April 1817 No. 3.

great loss, even if it were not routed. So Lieutenant Travis was ordered to return to Cuttack. The British force reached Cuttack on 4 April 1817, after being occasionally attacked by the insurgents on the way.⁽¹⁾

Meanwhile, the rebellion spread. A body of paiks entered the village of Rathipur within five coss of the pargana of Lembai and murdered Charan Patnaik.⁽²⁾ On 7 April 1817, 300 paiks with arms of various descriptions were joined by Raj-ballava Chhottaray, the Khandait of Garh Padmapur. They surrounded a village known as Hariharpur, to which the tahsildar of Kothdesh sent an agent with a peon for the collection of revenue. The paiks beat them, took away their clothes and destroyed the revenue papers. They also searched the tahsildar. They plundered ten or twelve houses. They searched the bund darogha, looted his house and seized his uncle. Rebellion spread to the vicinity of Puri. The purchasers of the estates of Balrampur and Budhakera were violently dispossessed by the former proprietors.⁽³⁾

Now the insurgents attempted to execute the second part of their plan, to occupy Puri. On 12 April 1817 about 200

-
- (1) 5 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 11 April 1817 No. 13.
- (2) 30 March 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 11 April 1817 No. 4.
- (3) 10 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 11.

chohars assembled at Sukal village, at the south of Puri. In the same evening another body of chohars, amounting to 2,000, arrived at Lokanath ghat at Puri. The kachahri at Lokanath ghat was set on fire at 9 o'clock at night. Several other houses were set on fire in the town including the house of the police darogha. About 150 persons, variously armed, marched to the judge's bungalow by the sea shore, while a party of insurgents consisting of about 3 or 4,000 stood at a distance from that bungalow. There was an exchange of smart firing for two hours between the troops stationed for the protection of the judge's bungalow and the insurgents. By the time the insurgents came near the sepoys, the latter rushed forward, charged them and dispersed them in every direction.(1)

A large body of insurgents including some Kandhs from Ghumsar and many paiks of the district, amounting to between 5,000 and 10,000 and headed by Jagabandhu, entered Puri on 14 April 1817. The people of Puri joined hands with the insurgents.(2) The insurgents had an action near Jagannath in which an European and some sepoys were killed. The situation there became so serious that Captain Wallington who was there

(1) 15 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 15.

(2) Ibid.

with about 180 troops, could not stay any longer. He and his detachment, J. King and R. Becher, two salt officers, S. Rusby, the collector of the pilgrim tax, together with some public treasure, retreated from Puri to Cuttack.⁽¹⁾ Some pandas in collaboration with the insurgents pillaged the treasure left behind in the tax treasury, taking away about Rs. 3,900. They also burnt the bungalows.⁽²⁾ The retreat of the British detachment made the insurgents master of the place for some time. They attempted to make the Raja of Khurda, now living at Puri, the acknowledged leader of the rebellion. But it appears that the Raja was not willing to take any active part in it, because of his fear of the punishment which might be inflicted over him in case of failure. The town of Puri was strongly barricaded; various defences were thrown up in its vicinity and on the roads leading to it.⁽³⁾

More than 500 paiks under the leadership of two khandaits, who were followers of Jagabandhu, marched from Khurda to Kila Rupasa. They instigated insurrections in both Gope and Kujang. The khandaits of this part of the country assembled their respective paiks under the encouragement of the former

-
- (1) 16 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 Nos. 17 & 18.
- (2) 19 September 1817, Government to Board of Revenue, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 September 1817 No. 15.
- (3) 15 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 15; 16 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 Nos. 17 & 18.

zamindars of Marichpur, Harishpur and Golra; they extended their depredations into the villages situated within the thanas, Asureswar and Paharajpur; they also plundered several zamindars.(1)

A body of Malangis who joined hands with the insurgents seized a darogha and an amla of the Rennah salt gola. They plundered them and carried them off. They seized the salt darogha of Bankud and Astrang. They plundered the kachahri of the zamindar of Purroah. Other persons who were seized and plundered were the amlas of the zamindar who had purchased kila Rupasa and the amlas of the zamindar of Talapadda.(2)

In the meantime there was a rumour of the intended attack of the insurgents on Cuttack. The situation appeared so alarming that Colonel J.O. Halloran, commanding officer at Cuttack, thought it expedient to remove the collector's treasury to the Mahanadi and the Salt Agent's to the Kathjuri, for the sake of safety.(3)

Meanwhile Captain P. Le Fevre, at the head of a troop, searched for Jagabandhu in Khurda. But he could not find any trace of him. He marched to Bajapur, then through Tirpini

- (1) 29 May 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 28.
- (2) 22 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 22.
- (3) 1 May 1817, J.O. Halloran, Lt. Col. Commanding at Cuttack to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 25.

to Kanas and to Nagun-nala. At 9 o'clock in the morning of 17 April, he reached the village of Dobunder where the insurgents to the number of 1,000 occupied a strong position on the bund. But on the opening of fire by the British force, they fled away in confusion. When Le Fevre reached Puri, he soon drove away the insurgents there. Then he kept an eye on the Raja of Khurda.⁽¹⁾

Meanwhile the Government had been informed of the outbreak of the rebellion and immediately directed an advance of five companies of native infantry from Midnapur to Cuttack. It also appointed Major General G. Martindell⁽²⁾ to be the military commissioner of Cuttack for the suppression of the rebellion.⁽³⁾

The functions of the ordinary courts of law were suspended. Martial law was enforced, first at Khurda and Puri and then at Gope. Special care was taken to prevent the spirit of insurrection from spreading to the Garjat states in the vicinity of Khurda. Rewards were offered to all who helped

- (1) 19 April 1817, Le Fevre to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 21.
- (2) He was born about 1756; Cadet in "the select picket" corps 1772; Ensign in the Bengal N.I. 1776; in the Maratha war of 1804-5; commanded the troops in Bundelkund in 1809, 1812; captured the fort of Kalingir 1812; Major General 1813; commanded a division in the Nepal war 1814-15; K.C.B. 1815; held a command in Pindari war 1818 (Buckland, Dictionary of Indian Biography p. 277; V.C.P. Hodson, List of the officers of the Bengal Army vol. III, p. 245).
- (3) 8 April 1817, Government to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 11 April 1817 No. 12.

to capture the insurgents.(1)

Martindell took his post at Khurda, the chief centre of the rebellion. He employed his forces in destroying stockades and in dispersing insurgents wherever they assembled in parties. As a result, he was able to control the situation within a short period. From this place he directed the movements of other troops to places where insurrection spread.(2)

Major Hamilton, in command of the second battalion, the 18th Bengal native infantry, was ordered to secure and convey to Cuttack the person of the Raja of Khurda and such members of the Raja's family as he might think proper. A party of insurgents under Dharamu Harichandan who were collected in the neighbourhood of Sarangagarh, about three and a half coss south of Cuttack, dispersed at the sight of the British force.(3) On the arrival of Major Hamilton at Puri, the persons of the Raja of Khurda and his son were secured. They were sent to Cuttack under the custody of a force commanded by Le Fevre. A party of insurgents amounting to 2,500 collected at Pipli

-
- (1) 26 April 1817, Government to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 2 May 1817 No. 5; 19 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 20.
- (2) 2 June 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 29; Secretary's (W.B. Bayley's) report regarding Cuttack, 10 August 1817, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 16 September 1817 No. 76.
- (3) 29 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 23.

to rescue the Raja. But they did not dare to attack the big force under Le Fevre. They attacked a comparatively small force under the command of Captain Armstrong at Pipli, who successfully dispersed them by killing 19 and wounding between 80 and 100.⁽¹⁾ It was stated that a body of insurgents had set fire to the thana at Nimapara. J. Pearson⁽²⁾ was directed to march with 80 firelocks to apprehend the insurgents. But he could find no trace of them.⁽³⁾

In consequence of the movement of troops to various parts of the country it appears that towards the end of May 1817 the insurrection was almost put down in Khurda, Puri and Pipli. But the situation in Kujang and its neighbourhood could not be brought under control because the rainy season did not permit the march of troops in that direction. Taking this opportunity a body of 200 paiks attacked the thana of Patamundai and wounded four of the Barkandazes. Another body of paiks belonging to the Raja of Kujang rushed into the kachahri of one Ramprasad who had the duty of transporting salt from Kujang to the chawki. They plundered it. They seized

-
- (1) 19 May 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August, 1817 No. 26.
- (2) James Pearson, Major, 65th Bengal Native Infantry.
- (3) 1 June 1817, J. Pearson to Captain, R.C. Faithful, Major of Brigade, Khurda, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 32.

all the amlas and carried them to Paradip. Eight Barkandazes who came to the assistance of the amlas were similarly seized and carried away. Consequently the salt business of that part of the country was stopped. These paiks also destroyed the thana of Tirun.(1)

When the rainy season was over, a detachment under the command of Captain Kennet(2) marched to Gope. Then he moved towards Kujang. On the approach of the British force the paiks and khandaits fled.(3)

Several persons who had taken an active part in the insurrections in various parts of the country, either in dispossessing the purchasers of estates or in attacking police thanas or in other ways, were apprehended. But Jagabandhu, the principal leader of the rebellion, together with some of his followers fled into the jungle and evaded capture. However the season for carrying on active military operations

- (1) Encl., 29 May 1817, Ramprasad, a salt darogha to Salt Agent, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 30.
- (2) Charles Robert Kennet, Lieutenant Colonel, 68th Bengal Native Infantry.
- (3) 14 June, 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 31A; 26 July 1817, G.W. Barnes, commanding at Gope to Faithful, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 44.

was over by July 1817. (1)

Thus the rebellion to some extent subsided for a time. It broke out afresh in Khurda and its vicinity early in April 1818. This time the disturbances lost the character of open opposition to the troops of the Government. But a great amount of robbery, burhing and massacre somewhat depopulated Khurda, prevented the collection of revenue and spread dismay and disorder into the neighbouring parganas. The state of the police was unsettled from the beginning of April until about the end of the rains of 1818. The paiks of Pipli and Gope thanas again showed a very unruly spirit. Many dacoities were committed within their limits by parties of armed men. In view of this situation W.L. Melville and William Forrester were vested with the powers of joint magistrate and posted at Puri and Khurda respectively to bring order into the thanas of Puri, Gope, Harishpur, Tirun, Pipli and Khurda. In the tract of country within the jurisdiction of the former officer, things relapsed to a state of perfect quiet by the close of the rains in 1818. (2)

(1) 10 April 1818, Stirling to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 42; 19 August 1817, Resolution, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 16 September 1817 No. 77; 12 June 1817, Martindell to Impey, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 32B.

(2) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No. 25.

In Khurda matters began to assume a somewhat favourable aspect only towards the beginning of November 1818, in consequence of measures taken by the joint magistrate and the Brigadier commanding the troops at Cuttack. Yet the situation was not free from anxiety there. (1)

Many of the leaders of the rebellion had not yet been apprehended. According to official proclamations they were not entitled to any pardon. Ker however thought that the disturbances were kept alive in a great measure by unnecessarily continuing in force the proclamations exempting from benefit of amnesties several principal Delbeheras and servants of the Raja of Khurda. Many of those who were in despair of pardon and lacked the means of subsistence continued to arouse unrest. He thought that several leaders who had disbanded their gangs were likely to throw themselves at the mercy of the Government if they were encouraged to do so. Secondly, the natural difficulties of the country rendered their seizure almost hopeless. (2)

In view of these considerations Ker recommended, in April 1819, the issue of one general proclamation of pardon throughout the district, for all offences connected with the disturbances which had been committed between 1 April 1817 and 1 March 1819. Accordingly the Government granted a full

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

and free pardon. It declared a general amnesty throughout the Mughalbandi for all offences connected with the disturbances, inviting the people to return to their families and usual occupations with the fullest confidence. This amnesty was not extended to the persons actually in confinement. Jagabandhu and some principal leaders were also excluded from general pardon.

This proclamation produced two effects. First, it closed forever the opportunity for individuals to gratify private animosities by making accusations of complicity in the insurrection. Secondly it gave confidence to the rebels to return to their homes.⁽¹⁾

The Court of Directors suggested that martial law should be administered with as much forbearance as circumstances might admit of, so that the affection of the people might not be alienated from the Government.⁽²⁾ Martindell transmitted to the Government the names of 268 prisoners, the greater part of whom were confined on general charges of rebellion or plunder without any specification of the date when or the place where the offence was committed.⁽³⁾ He took so liberal a view of affairs that he commuted all sentences of death.

(1) Ibid.

(2) 29 July 1818, Court of Directors to Governor General in Council, Revenue Letters to Bengal 1818-21, Vol.VI, p.16.

(3) 18 March 1818, Ewer, Acting Magistrate to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 31 March 1818 No.10.

When this matter was brought before the advocate general, he remarked "the humanity in the chief and military commissioner of the district has led him to commute all sentences by which death was to be inflicted, so that if these proceedings be irregular, the consequences are not irreparable."⁽¹⁾ The Government did consider the proceedings taken under martial law to have been illegal. It was decided that the accused should be brought before the ordinary criminal courts.⁽²⁾ The Governor General in Council instructed the magistrate of Cuttack, "that individuals charged with minor offences should not be brought to trial or subjected to punishment and the Government will be disposed to receive into their favourable consideration any suggestions which you may wish to offer for the pardon of more serious offenders either on ground of policy or of any circumstances in favour of such offenders."⁽³⁾ Although the matter was taken up by the ordinary courts, in the light of the above instructions, yet Gopal Chhottaray and four of his followers were executed and more than 70 inhabitants of Khurda or its immediate vicinity were either imprisoned or transported for life⁽⁴⁾

-
- (1) 27 April 1818, R. Spankie, Advocate General to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 31.
- (2) 28 April 1818, Government to Nizamāt Adalat, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 32.
- (3) 31 March 1818, Government to Magistrate of Cuttack, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 31 March 1818 No. 11.
- (4) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No. 25.

The rebellion, in short, was conducted by the head of the military of the old Government of Orissa, actively backed by almost all the paiks, Delbeheras and Dalais of the Mughalbandi. Secondly the other class of active rebels who joined hands with them were the dispossessed proprietors of many estates; for example, the ancient proprietors of Harishpur, Marichpur, Golra, Balrampur, Budhakera and Rupas, which had passed into the hands of the new purchasers.⁽¹⁾ Thirdly, the political authority of the Raja of Khurda, who remained discontented, added to the unity and strength of the rebels, although there is no proof that the Raja took any active part in the rebellion. Fourthly, the encouragement of some hill Rajas and the very active part played by the paiks belonging to the Raja of Kujang made the situation still worse. Lastly, there was the general support of the people either because of their fear of the rebels or because of their miseries or difficulties arising from some defects in the British administration.⁽²⁾

The significance of the rebellion of 1817 lies in the fact that until the outbreak, the British Government failed to detect many legitimate grievances. It was only when the rebellion had

(1) Secretary's (W.B. Bayley's) report regarding Cuttack, 19 August 1817, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations 16 September 1817 No. 76.

(2) 19 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 20; 29 April 1817, Impey to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 12 August 1817 No. 23.

had broken out under the leadership of Jagabandhu, "a man whose name has acquired and will long remain such an unfortunate celebrity in the district," that the Government tried to find out what was wrong with the administration. (1)

(1) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

CHAPTER IX

REMEDIES

Soon after the outbreak of the rebellion of 1817, the Government directed Impey to make enquiry into the causes of the disturbances. Not content with Impey's report, the Government sent Watson to make further investigations. The reports of these officers suggested different causes. One of them was the unfitness of the existing laws to the character of the people and to local circumstances. Then there were grievances arising from the misconduct of individual officials. There were also complaints of the intrigues of individuals possessing local influence. (1)

For a more detailed account the Government appointed a commission of two members - G. Martindell, the Military Commander of Cuttack, and Walter Ewer, whose efforts had already been successful in reforming the police and suppressing disorders in Mymensing, Rajshahi and Midnapur. The commission was directed to make enquiries regarding those evils which were stated to have existed in various departments of the Government.

(1) 4 July 1817, Governor General in Council to Court of Directors, Board's Collections Vol. 582, 14178, pp.19-23; 26 April 1817, Government to Watson, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 2 May 1817 No. 2; Resolution, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 16 September 1817 No.77.

The attention of Martindell was chiefly limited to matters connected with security against external enemies and the final suppression of the insurrection. As the civil commissioner, Ewer was specifically directed to enquire into the general state of the country and more particularly of those parts of it in which disturbances prevailed. He was also ordered to direct his attention to the redress of grievances, the detection of abuses, the punishment of offenders and the maintenance of public order. He was also appointed acting judge and magistrate of Cuttack in succession to Impey. (1)

Martindell left Orissa when the rising had subsided. After due enquiry into the causes of the disturbances Ewer submitted a report to the Government. This report is a landmark in the history of Orissa because it opened the eyes of the Government to the negligence of the local officers, explained the whole situation in an able manner and thus prepared the way for reforms. It suggested a radical change in both the economic and the judicial policy of the Government, on the ground that it had not hitherto paid enough attention to the character of the people, the resources of the country and the historical legacy left by the former Government. (2)

(1) Resolution, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 16 September 1817 No. 77; Resolution, Bengal Public Consultations 28 October 1817 No. 13.

(2) 13 May 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 17 July 1818 No. 15.

In his report, Ewer suggested some remedies for the defects of the revenue system. He first recommended a limitation of the revenue demand for a number of years. He thought it necessary to secure the landholders generally against an increase of the public demand and to give them confidence to introduce improvements of which they could enjoy the benefit, so that the Government might eventually expect an increase in the revenue. Secondly, in view of the acknowledged uncertainty of all former settlements and in view of many complaints of actual overassessment, he suggested that a readjustment of the existing settlement should be undertaken as speedily as possible on the principle of correcting errors and equalising the distribution of the whole demand rather than with a view to any material increase. (1)

He therefore recommended that the existing settlement should be extended to 1820/1821 (the end of 1228 Amali). He asserted that it was only after an accurate enquiry into the resources and capabilities of the district that a settlement for nine or eleven years could be made. At the same time he warned that all promise of, or even allusion to, a permanent settlement should be cautiously abstained from in any future regulations until the time when the Court of Directors decided to confer that "important advantage" on Orissa. (2)

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

He discussed the question of restoring the khandaits and paiks to their former condition and also the reinstatement of the Raja of Khurda. The former, he thought, would be a source of trouble. If a vigorous police were established to punish their petty aggressions, the khandaits would lose their power; the paiks would mingle with the bulk of the agricultural population and give up their peculiar habits. He also thought that to restore the Raja might bring further political trouble. But he suggested liberal treatment for him. (1)

As we have seen, there had been popular complaints that the supply of salt had been too small and the price too high. Ewer recommended an adequate supply of salt. He took into consideration the circumstances of the inhabitants of different parts of Orissa and the rates at which salt used to be sold. He therefore suggested that the sale price should be restored to two and a half rupees in the central Aurangs of Kanika and Kuja-ng and that one rupee per maund should be the rate at all places of manufacture south of the river Debi. (2)

We have already noticed the hardship of the raiyats owing to the fall in the value of kauris. As a remedy Ewer suggested that the experiment should be tried for the next two or three years of receiving a portion of the revenue in kauris; he remarked "I cannot conceive that any serious evils would result

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

from the adoption of the measure."⁽¹⁾

Ewer also suggested some judicial reforms. We have seen that the judge did not seem to inspire much popular confidence. Ewer recommended that in selecting a person for that office disposition should be as much attended to as ability. In order to win the confidence of the people, the judge should pass the cold season of every year in visiting every quarter of his district attended by as many officers as necessary who should be Oriyas. These Oriyas should encourage the people to submit petitions. The judge in his enquiries should prove himself anxious to ascertain their real condition and redress their grievances.⁽²⁾

We have also seen that Oriyas were not employed in any office of trust and responsibility, and that this gave rise to some discontent. Ewer suggested that Oriyas if possible should hold every Government post in Orissa. He remarked "although it may be difficult to procure immediately persons properly qualified to fill up the higher situations, yet by supplying every vacancy the Oorias in time will acquire all the requisite knowledge."⁽³⁾

In view of Ewer's report the Government decided to change the nature of the administration in Orissa. In order to carry

(1) Ibid.

(2) 27 February 1818, Ewer to Government, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 37.

(3) Ibid.

out active measures of reform, R. Her, the second Judge of the Court of Sadar Diwani Adalat, "a civil servant of high rank, great weight of character and extensive experience both in the Judicial and Territorial Departments", was nominated, in April 1818, Commissioner of Cuttack. He was vested with a general control over the civil administration of the district. (1)

In the superintendence of the land revenue and customs and in the control of the salt department within the local limits of Cuttack, the Commissioner was authorised to assume the functions of the Board of Revenue and of the Board of Trade. He was also authorised to discharge the duties hitherto entrusted to the Committee of Embankments in Cuttack and to assume the immediate superintendence of the tributary states. (2)

The Commissioner was also vested with the powers and functions hitherto exercised by the provincial Court of Appeal and circuit for the division of Calcutta. His decisions and orders in all suits coming under his cognizance was to be final. (3)

(1) Regulation V, 1818, 28 April, Government to Her, Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations L.P. 28 April 1818 No. 44.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

The concentration of such extensive power into the hands of a single authority necessitated the passing of a special regulation - Regulation V of 1818 - and thereby the exercise of the functions of the Boards and other authorities mentioned above was suspended. These functions the civil commissioner was authorised to exercise. It was also decided that further special powers might be thereafter delegated to the commissioner, if after taking charge of his office, he found them necessary to the success of his mission. (1)

The placing of the administration of Orissa under a commissioner with special powers brought radical changes both in economic and judicial affairs.

During Ker's rule an attempt was made to set the revenue system in order. The arrears for 1815/16 (1223 Amali) and for 1816/17 (1224 Amali) together with previous years were Rs.660,617. By the time Ker reached Cuttack the arrears for 1817/18 (1225 Amali) were Rs.1,263,953 on a jama of Rs.1,541,953 at the time when the last instalment was due. Thus the total arrears stood at Rs.1,924,570. Ker announced a general sale of estates because at that

(1) Ibid.

moment it was considered difficult to find out any other way for the collection of arrears. "The melancholy spectacle was exhibited of a sale of 44 estates paying a jumma of Rs.50,304"; still a balance of Rs.872,822 remained due for that year besides heavy balances for former years. (1)

Ker thought that if some of the arrears were relinquished, it would enable the zamindars to discharge the dues of the Government with punctuality. Moreover, in his opinion, it was preferable to make this sacrifice rather than to have recourse to measures involving an almost entire transfer of the landed property of the country. Accordingly at Ker's recommendation the Government authorised the collector to write off various sums. The largest portion of the arrears relinquished was either nominal or was due from persons who possessed no means whatsoever to discharge the debt. The arrears thus relinquished amounted to Rs.581,944. (2)

Ker died at Cuttack before he submitted the final report. Stirling, the secretary to the commissioner, wrote on his

(1) 29 February 1820; Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25; 30 March 1821, Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors; Revenue Letters from Bengal 1820-21 Vol.X, p.194.

(2) 30 March 1821, Governor General in Council to the Court of Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1820-21 Vol.X, pp.197-8.

behalf. He stated that in Ker's opinion "the annulment of the process of confining defaulting zamindars was one of the few material defects which he conceived to exist in the Bengal Code," but to this he attributed "the sweeping sales of the landed property" in Orissa. As a remedy against this defect some extension of the collector's power of coercion appeared to him indispensable. He stressed the issue of Dastaks to remind them in time. A draft of a regulation to that effect was submitted to the Government in August 1818, and was promulgated with some alterations in November as Regulation X, 1818. ⁽¹⁾

(1) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25.

This regulation stated that every proprietor or farmer of land was to pay the instalment at the appointed time without delay. If he fell into arrears the collector~~s~~ either issued a Dastak by a peon or sent a written notice requiring payment within a given period. If the arrears were not discharged within the time stated, the peons brought the defaulter or his surity to collector's kachahri. If the arrears were not paid the defaulter was kept under the charge of peons for fifteen days. If security was not given and the arrears were not paid by the end of fifteen days he was sent to jail on the order of the collector. The collector was also authorised to attach the estate of a defaulting proprietor or farmer of land without personal arrest.

(vide Regulation X, 1818).

The above measures had an immediate effect in stimulating the zamindars to pay the amount demanded from them out of their immediate resources and in enabling them to raise money in the market when relieved from the burden of old balances. (1)

Consequently the revenue of 1818/19 (1226 Amali) could be collected within the Amali year with a balance of only about Rs.40,000. This result was attained with a very limited recourse to the measure of a public sale. Only thirteen mahals were sold up leaving a jama of Rs.8,468. The year 1819/20 (1227 Amali) showed a still better result. The revenue of that year was realised with the exception of a balance of Rs.39,000. This result was attained without any public sales except in the case of four estates bearing an aggregate jama of Rs.1,091. (2)

In referring to the improvement in collection under the new system the Governor General in Council stated "the above improvement is in a considerable measure to be ascribed to the operation of Regulation X 1818...still more however is doubtless to be ascribed to the immediate supervision of the commissioner

-
- (1) 29 February 1820 , Stirling to the Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1920 No.25.
- (2) 30 March 1921, Governor General in Council to Court of Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1820-21 Vol.X, p.200; 29 February 1920, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1920 No.25.

and to the personal character of the officers to whom the revenue administration has for some time past been confided and by whom the more extensive powers vested in them by the above law appear to have been exercised with great tenderness and discretion".⁽¹⁾

We have already discussed over-assessment as one main reason for the heavy arrears outstanding. The relinquishment of some arrears now gave a temporary relief to the landholders. But it was apprehended that unless the jamas of some over-assessed estates were not reduced, heavy balances of a similar nature would be repeated. So settlements were made with many estates at a reduced jama. For example, the following table will show the reduction of the jama of some estates.⁽²⁾

Name of the estate	Jama of the year 1817/18 (1225 Amali) in rupees	Jama of the year 1819/20 (1227 Amali) in rupees
Mhurda	114,274	52,409
Delang-Lembai ..	38,251	29,627
Rahang-Chabishud and Sarain ...	66,175	48,804
Cordais	109,408	95,087
Rorang	5,268	4,000

(1) 30 March 1820, Governor General in Council to Court of Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1820-21 Vol. X., p.201.

(2) Ibid.

As a natural consequence of these settlements the jama of Orissa was reduced. The following table shows how the jama of Orissa continued to be reduced both in 1818/19 (1226 Amali) and in 1819/20 (1227 Amali).⁽¹⁾

Year	Jama in rupees
1817/18 (1225 Amali) ...	1,541,969
1818/19 (1226 Amali) ...	1,540,953
1819/20 (1227 Amali) ...	1,408,082

Excluding the tributary states the settlement of 1819/20 exhibited an aggregate of 2,362 mahals assessed with a jama of Rs.1,299,124.⁽²⁾

We have seen that the British revenue policy, prior to the rebellion, dispossessed about two thirds of the original Oriya proprietors. They were replaced by outsiders. The rebellion showed that they had no power to check disorder; rather were many of them dispossessed by the old proprietors backed by the raiyats. Now the Government decided against alienating further the sympathy of the old landed aristocracy. The new policy was to secure the tranquility and prosperity of the country by "attaching the leading men to our Government and leaving to all classes the enjoyment of their lands on terms

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid.

of moderation".⁽¹⁾

In accordance with this policy settlements were made with many of the original proprietors; in some cases the Government purchased the estates of defaulters and restored them to the original proprietors. Hereafter the Government began to deprecate the extended use of the system of khas management on the ground that it tended to dissolve the connection between the agricultural community and their natural leaders.⁽²⁾

Also, the khandaits were now confirmed in their personal rights. In other words, they were permitted to retain some jagir lands. But the ordinary paiks were not afforded any peculiar privileges, first, because the attempt to find out the individuals among them who formerly enjoyed the jagir lands was unsuccessful as they were generally confounded with the raiyats; secondly it was considered that the maintenance of such a 'mischievous' class might disturb the peace of the country.⁽³⁾

Forbearance was shown to the Raja of Khurda. He received a fixed stipend of Rs 2,400 per annum as zamindar of Khurda, without any reference to the reductions made in the jama of that estate. Soon after the death of Mukunda Deva, an advance of Rs.10,000 was made to his son to ~~meet~~^{meet} the expenses of the funeral

(1) Ibid., pp.242, 254

(2) Ibid., p.210.

(3) Ibid., p.241.

ceremony. This amount was later on declared to be a free gift of the Government. At the same time he was released from any further demands on account of the balances due from his father which amounted to Rs.7,685. (1)

Popular complaints about salt received the attention of the Government. The Government first supplied more salt and on easier terms than before. The following table shows that for the three years 1814/15, 1815/16 and 1816/17, the quantity of salt annually sold by the Agent averaged 149,442 maunds. In 1818/19 and 1819/20 the annual quantity sold averaged 235,460 maunds. (2)

<u>year</u>	<u>maunds</u>	<u>year</u>	<u>maunds</u>
1814/15 ..	149,539	1818/19..	216,416
1815/16 ..	166,008	1819/20..	254,505
1816/17 ..	132,779		

Secondly, the price of salt was reduced. In 1819 the price of salt in the town of Cuttack was two rupees and eight annas per maund - more than 30 per cent below the average of preceding years. The Governor General in Council remarked "by this means, a considerable increase of revenue has been obtained

(1) Ibid.. p.212.

(2) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25; 30 March 1820, Governor General in Council to Court of Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1820-21 Vol. X, p.221.

and the comforts of the people appear to have been essentially promoted". He further added "the facility and regularity with which the article has been procurable will have further proved a source of essential convenience".⁽¹⁾

The Government now took notice of the popular inconvenience which had arisen from the disturbed relation of kauris and silver. It felt that receiving kauris as revenue would have afforded a partial and unequal relief to those affected. But in view of the immediate inconvenience and ultimate embarrassment to all commercial dealings, such an idea was abandoned. However the revenue demand had already been much reduced. The demand for silver was therefore less felt than before. Consequently the complaints were no longer heard.⁽²⁾

Before the rebellion, the condition of the embankments had been unsatisfactory. They were considered "to be almost universally in a very decayed and precarious state". Her judges it expedient to place the superintendents of the bunds on a more respectable footing than hitherto and to give them effectual control over the bund darogas. Considering the importance of the embankments he represented to the Government that "an ill-judged restriction of the estimates must be productive of most extensive mischief" in Orissa. The official

(1) Ibid.

(2) 20 March 1821, Governor General in Council to the Court of Directors, Revenue Letters from Bengal 1820/21 Vol. K, pp. 249-50.

sanction he secured for the disbursement of the bund department was for an amount as high as Rs.74,000, exclusive of the cost of establishment. (1)

Several new bunds were built with a view to the improvement and extension of cultivation. The system was generally to construct 'Dobundhees' (double bunds) at some distance in cases where the old embankments were much decayed or washed away and from their position close to the rivers were exposed to further constant dilapidation. The 'Dobundhees' were generally solidly formed and promised to stand for years without requiring any but the most trifling repairs. Stirling later wrote that Ker's measures "secured the due and fair expenditure of the greater portion of his heavy amount and the advantages likely to be felt from it have been very generally and gratefully acknowledged by the landlords". (2)

Reforms were also made in the police and judicial system as in economic policy. Ker recommended the suspension of the chaukidari regulation in Cuttack, chiefly on the ground that the tax was oppressive and that the number of burglaries committed in the town of Cuttack was always inconsiderable. In his words, "the greater portion of the inhabitants of the town of Cuttack are certainly poor and the tax no doubt bears heavily upon them

(1) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No.25.

(2) Ibid.

and is a real grievance. It is vain to tell the people that the object of the regulation is to ensure their safety and promote their happiness. They cannot comprehend how their happiness is to be promoted by taxation nor can they be convinced of the necessity of an establishment to ensure their safety from dangers which they do not fear and which do not and never did exist to an extent to create alarm." Accordingly the Government suspended the operation of Regulation XXII, 1816, on 28 August 1818.⁽¹⁾

When Ker reached Cuttack the state of the police was 'disorganised', consequent upon the disturbances of 1817, in the southern part of the Mughalbandi, particularly in the smaller kilas and in the thanas of Pipli, Gope, Tirun and Hariharpur. For the efficient control of the police, W.L. Melville, an active and considerate officer, was appointed joint magistrate and deputy collector in those areas. As a result, these thanas were no longer troubled by the paiks or any other plunderers.⁽²⁾

Complaints against the corruption of the police gradually died out in consequence of the vigilance and regular tours of the magistrate and commissioner.⁽³⁾

(1) Ibid.

(2) 11 January 1822, Governor General in Council to Court of Directors, Judicial Letters from Bengal 1820-22 Vol. VII, pp.441-2.

(3) Ibid, p.444.

The vexations and hardships of prosecutors, witnesses and prisoners were obviated to a great extent, first, because the session courts were held more frequently than before; secondly because 'superior' regularity was maintained in trying cases within the competency of the magistrate.(1)

The civil branch of judicial administration was improved to a great extent. Many of the amlas indulging in corruption were dismissed and punished. Stirling thought in 1820 that a healthy atmosphere prevailed under the watchful eye of the judge.(2)

Moreover as a result of judicial decisions passed since 1818 in cases of disputes about land many of the former landholders were restored. Amongst these were the Khandaits of Harishpur and Bishenpur who held lands at a fixed jama. Similar privileges were awarded to many of the proprietors of smaller kilas subject to variable assessment. Moreover, a Khandait Raja who had been dispossessed was reinstated in the enjoyment of his hereditary right by an award of the zila court.(3)

There had been many affrays arising from disputes respecting the right of succession to estates or other contested

(1) Ibid. p.445

(2) 29 February 1820, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Consultations 19 May 1820 No. 25.

(3) 11 January 1822, Stirling to Government, Bengal Revenue Governor General in Council to Court of Directors, Judicial Letters from Bengal 1820-22 Vol. VII, pp.456-7.

claims of land prior to the arrival of Ewer to enquire into the causes of the rebellion. These contested claims drew the ready attention of the Government; they were settled by either summary or regular courts.(1)

The Government adopted the policy of appointing Oriyas to all posts for which they were qualified.(2)

In fact within so short a period very appreciable reforms could be effected in the judicial administration. This may be summarised in the words of the Governor General in Council. He stated that "the state of police throughout the district has greatly improved, that civil justice is administered with efficiency and the confidence of the people in our judicial administration has been restored." This success was due to the change in policy and to greater vigilance on the part of the officials. In the words of the Governor General in Council, "these benefits appear" "to be mainly ascribable to the establishment of the special commission and to the exertion of the individuals who have so ably and zealously conducted the administration of the province."(3)

(1) Ibid. p.443.

(2) Ibid. p.462-3

(3) Ibid. pp.466-7.

CHAPTER X)
CONCLUSION

The period from 1803 to 1819 was a period of rapid transition in the history of Orissa. Political changes were followed by administrative changes. Prior to this period, the British had attempted for nearly four decades to secure Orissa through diplomacy, because they wished to complete the line of communication between the territories under the Bengal and Madras Governments. They apprehended that the possession of Cuttack by the Raja of Nagpur would enable him to interrupt communications between Calcutta and Madras; that would facilitate the invasion of Bengal and the Northern Sarkars; that also would help the French or other European powers to land in that country. But British diplomacy failed to persuade the Raja to cede Orissa. When Wellesley became Governor General he thought that force would have to be used. Thus in 1803 the conquest of Orissa formed an important part of the war against the Maratha confederates.

Wellesley desired a peaceable surrender of the country so that people's minds would not be disturbed by the panic of the war. But the Marathas did not agree to this proposal. However, the British forces that went to occupy

Cuttack received opposition from the Marathas only at a few places. In particular, Maratha resistance was bolder at Balasore and Barabati than elsewhere. The Maratha force at Cuttack was weak; the Raja of Nagpur was busy fighting the British elsewhere and was unable to reinforce it. Thus the Marathas were completely overwhelmed by the British well-planned attack and superior military skill. They were defeated and fled to Nagpur through the Barmul pass. The British won an easy victory. This was due not only to their superior plan of attack but also to their diplomacy in alienating the sympathy of the tributary Rajas from the Maratha Government by offering them hopes of liberal treatment. To this should be added the proclamations and promises made by the British, which envisaged a better Government in the interests of all.

The conquest was followed by a rebellion. The British policy of conciliation and liberal treatment was looked upon with great satisfaction by the tributary chiefs. The Raja of Khurda went to the extent of taking it to be a weakness. At the time of conquest the British asked the Raja for some help for which he was paid. During Maratha rule four parganas had been taken from him and added to the Mughalbandi. Now he thought it a suitable

time to bargain with the British for the restoration of those parganas. But the British, who claimed the sovereign authority over the country, were not willing to cede territories to a subordinate chief. The Raja rebelled. He was helped by some other tributary chiefs because of his influence over them. The British sent troops against them and put down the rebellion. The Raja of Khurda and the Raja of Kanika were imprisoned. Their territories were brought under the administration of the British. When they were afterwards released, the Raja of Kanika was restored to his own state by paying a tribute as before. But the British did not give the Raja of Khurda that privilege because as the leader of the rebellion he seemed to them to deserve more punishment than anybody else. Because he was asked to pay a regular jama to the Government if he wanted the restoration of Khurda, he declined. Here one can remark that if Khurda had been restored to the Raja in return for payment of the original tribute, there might not have been another Jagabandhu to excite rebellion in 1817.

At the time of conquest and soon after it the British entered into agreements with the hill chiefs. Sixteen of them were exempted from the general regulations. This policy was based on both political expediency and the precedent

left by the Marathas. These chiefs were treated as subordinate allies. They enjoyed freedom in the internal administration of their territories. But the British reserved the right to interfere if they thought it necessary. When charges of murder and other crimes against some of the tributary chiefs were brought before the British Government, enquiries were made: if guilt was proved, punishment was inflicted. When murders were committed in some states in connection with the succession to the throne, the British, in order to avoid violence, passed a regulation to control the decision of claims relating to succession to the sixteen states. All this shows that the British Government pressed upon the Rajas not to indulge in crimes and to improve their methods of Government for the benefit of the people. But at the same time the Government was cautious to abstain as far as possible from all gratuitous and unnecessary interference with the Rajas which might move them to create discontent against the British authority.

Again British religious policy in Orissa during the period under review seems to have been as acceptable to the people as that of the Marathas had been. Indeed, the British were more anxious than their predecessors to reform the management of the temple of Jagannath, to make the

collection of the pilgrim tax more systematic and to provide more facilities for the pilgrims than before. Of course a similar policy was followed in the collection of the pilgrim tax at other places like Gaya and Allahabad and in the management of many Hindu religious institutions in other parts of India. But the temple of Jagannath was a particularly celebrated religious institution in India to which a large number of pilgrims from different areas resorted every year. It therefore drew the special attention of the British.

Under British patronage the temple of Jagannath prospered. Soon it became an eyesore to people influenced by Evangelical ideas or missionary zeal. They vigorously attacked the policy of the Government as encouraging idolatry. On the one hand they pleaded that the Government should not patronise any idolatrous institutions. On the other hand they expected an active help from the Government for the spread of Christianity. The Court of Directors under Evangelical influence opposed the patronage of native religious institutions. But the Board of Control held that the British Government had obligations to support them as the successor of the native Government. Political expediency demanded that the Government should not actively encourage the preaching of Christianity because it might

result in popular resentment.

On the other hand unlike their policy towards the tributary states and towards religion, the new administrative system introduced by the British encountered some difficulties. From 1803 to 1805 Orissa was placed under the administration of two commissioners. These first commissioners were not fettered by any regulations. They enjoyed wide powers. They could easily adjust matters to suit local needs while paying due respect to the practice and precedent of the Marathas. This period may be called a period of observation. But it was inadequate. If it could have been extended for a few years more it would probably have done much good.

From 1805 to 1817 Orissa entered into a different type of administration. Cornwallis's judicial, revenue and salt regulations were introduced. But it appears that they were somewhat hastily enforced without adequate investigation into the usages of the country. It seems that in enforcing them the British made no difference between Bengal, a country which had already adjusted itself to British regulations after a good deal of experiment, and Orissa, a country which was until very recently ruled by a quite different set of rules and practices under the Marathas.

The Bengal Government objected to any criticisms issued

by the home authorities against Cornwallis's system. Moreover, particularly for Orissa, the criticisms came too late.

The period between 1803 and 1819 was as important for the rest of India as it was for Orissa. The two Maratha wars were important among wars which were made by the British against the native states. The Maratha war that took place in 1817 considerably extended British hold on India. In fact it established the British authority on a firm footing.

Equally important with the expansion of the British power in India was the question of administration. The period under review saw two kinds of efforts which corresponded to two schools of administrative thought. One was represented by Cornwallis and his supporters. The other was represented by Munro and later on by Malcolm and Elphinstone.

The school of thought deriving from Cornwallis's ideas tended to ignore local institutions, old usages and traditions. It emphasised the introduction of western institutions and methods in their place. This approach seemed to its critics to be hasty, sudden and even reckless.

The second school respected the ancient institutions of India. It believed that they were valuable for the

foundation of British rule. It avoided innovations. It tried to give more scope to individual discretion to avoid a rigid separation of powers, to give more power to Indian officials, to make use of institutions like the Panchayat, a Raiyatwari settlement and so on. The whole approach was slow but appeared steady and sure.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century criticism against the Cornwallis system of revenue administration had been steadily accumulating. The home authorities gradually became interested in the Raiyatwari system, which had attracted the attention of Lord William Bentinck during his administration in Madras and of which Munro was a great advocate. From 1812 the home authorities, particularly the Board of Control were averse to the principle of a permanent settlement. The Raiyatwari system based on annual settlements with the cultivators was considered more consistent both with individual rights and with the Government's interests. In 1813 the Court of Directors instructed the Bengal Government to introduce such arrangements where practicable. But the Bengal Government objected. It argued that in the territories under the Bengal Presidency, which had not been placed under the permanent Zamindari settlement lands were jointly occupied and cultivated by numerous owners. The community of tenure was imperfectly

understood. If engagements were made with the individual, the right and privileges of landed proprietors would be overturned. A separate arrangement with the cultivators would tend to dissolve the village communities. Again if it was enforced numerous subordinate collectors and assessors would be appointed. It would be impossible to check or discover their exactions from the people.

The Bengal Government adhered to its own principle of permanency. It held that the previous promises and regulations and the expectation of the people demanded that a permanent settlement should be effected after an interval.

Criticism was also levelled at the judicial and police system established under Cornwallis. In this respect, the Munro system advocating a more extensive use of native agency appealed to the home authorities. So they considered the Cornwallis system an unwise departure from the established usages of the country. They expected that great benefit would be derived from giving fresh vitality to the native institutions of the country. They, in 1813, issued instructions to the Indian Government for the immediate adoption of these measures. They suggested the employment of village headmen and Panchayats in the adjudication of suits.

The instructions of the home Government were soon implemented in Madras. But as in the case of the Raiyatwari system the Bengal Government objected to it. They argued that the presidency was divided into an immense number of villages. They had no reliance on the integrity of the village headmen. ⁹⁸ ~~Its~~ judicial powers were vested in so many individuals it would be impracticable to exercise any adequate superintendence. They further added that the village institutions had been destroyed where permanent settlement had been made. The agents of the zamindars had taken the place of the headmen. If they were given power, they would act in the interest of the zamindars. Thus the raiyats would be subject to oppression. Moreover, very little was known of the existing local institutions in the provinces not under a permanent settlement. Under such circumstances they thought that it was neither expedient nor just to recognise any set of individuals as public functionaries. The Bengal Government therefore suspended compliance with the orders from home.

Thus the instructions from home had no effect on the Bengal Government. In Orissa, in particular, the Cornwallis system of administration continued after 1813 just as it had before. In economic and judicial matters the

framework of the Maratha system was set aside and the established institutions to which people had been accustomed were neglected.

Owing to the want of proper investigation into the land tenure system and the resources of the country, there was over-assessment. Every year heavy arrears were outstanding. As a measure against this the sale law was rigorously enforced. As a result the original Oriya zamindars were displaced by persons from Bengal who had enough capital to pay the Government revenue. Yet the arrears began to increase year by year. The ultimate burden of over-assessment fell upon the cultivator.

The monopoly of the manufacture and sale of salt that was enforced in Bengal was extended to Orissa. Here also the supply of salt, particularly to the Mughalbandi, was based on erroneous principles, perhaps because the British misunderstood the Maratha system. The supply was therefore inadequate, and the price was greater than it had been under Maratha rule.

Under Maratha rule kauris were regarded as the chief currency in which revenues were paid. Under the British, silver was the only currency in which revenues were collected. The major portion of whatever was collected was sent to the Bengal treasury. In addition, the country was ~~over-~~

over-assessed. All this went to increase the value of silver. This together with other reasons disturbed the ratio between silver and kauris. Consequently the prices of commodities in kauris rose high.

There was some evidence of popular dissatisfaction with these changes.

Under the Maratha Government the people were accustomed more to usage and custom than to a system of regulations. Now many regulations were enforced within a short period. This may have led to popular confusion. Moreover the regulations were not translated into Oriya. Even those which were understood through interpreters must have seemed new and foreign. Moreover all responsible offices held by Indians were entrusted to persons from Bengal. During this period the British officers appointed for the administration of Orissa relied upon these amlas. The latter seem to have taken advantage of the Oriyas' ignorance of the regulations. There was evidence of corruption in the revenue department, in the salt department, in the courts of justice and in the management of the embankments. When an influential person like Jagabandhu fell a victim to conspiracy of the amlas to deprive him of his estate, it was easy for him to exploit the situation to incite a rebellion.

The rebellion is a turning point in the history of Orissa. From 1817 to 1819 it enters into a new phase. This might be called a period of active vigilance on the part of the Government. When adequate enquiries were made some real popular grievances were brought before the Bengal Government. The Cornwallis system of regulations as administered in Orissa was found unsuitable. A special regulation was passed in 1818. It vested vast power, similar to that conferred on the first commissioners of Orissa, in one officer called the commissioner of Cuttack. The years 1818 and 1819 in particular saw considerable changes in the nature of the administration. Many estates which had passed into the hands of outsiders were restored to the original holders. This helped in the reinstatement of the old landed aristocracy. Many persons who had enjoyed jagirs under Maratha rule were restored to their former privileges. The jama of the country was considerably reduced. This reduction of the jama ultimately helped in restoring the disturbed ratio of silver and kauris. More salt was now supplied than before. The price of salt was lowered so that the people could get it cheaply. More money was spent in the repair of embankments than before, and adequate measures were taken to remove corruption from the management of the embankments.

Amlas found guilty of corruption were punished. More attention was paid to popular complaints. Justice could be obtained more quickly in civil suits either by summary or regular courts. A greater frequency in the circuit courts lessened the difficulties of witnesses and prosecutors in criminal cases. A regular tour by the magistrate and collector into different parts of Orissa removed corruption in the police. Vigilance and direct contact with the complaints of the people gave scope to improve the efficiency of the administration.

Again it seems that the Orissa rebellion of 1817 had a bearing on the contest between the Cornwallis and Munro systems. It constituted a signal defeat for the Cornwallis system and thereby opened the way for the universal acceptance of the Munro system. It is perhaps significant that after the conquest of Maharashtra in 1818, a system of administration more in accordance with Munro's ideas was encouraged there. Again, the Bengal Government which had so stubbornly objected, some years earlier to those instructions from home for the establishment of a Raiyatwari system, took steps to introduce a Raiyatwari system into Assam after its conquest in 1826.

Glossary

- Abra - a superior description of Kurkuch salt.
- Abwab - miscellaneous cesses levied by the zamindar or public officers.
- Adalat - court of justice.
- Amali - an era current in Orissa.
- Amla - a native officer of a judicial or revenue court.
- Arzi - petition.
- Aurang - a manufacturing district, a division of an Agency.
- Bakhshi - commander in chief.
- Banya - a trader, a money changer.
- Barkandaz - a matchlockman, but commonly applied to a native armed with a sword and shield who acts as door keeper, watchman, guard or escort.
- Bazar - market.
- Bazi - several, miscellaneous.
- Begar - a forced labourer.
- Bepari - a trader, a dealer, merchant.
- Bhog - offering.
- Bhowri - a house for boiling salt.
- Bigha - a measure of land varying in extent in different parts of India. In Cuttack the bigha is generally considered to be an English acre.

- Biswali - a type of land assigned to the military chiefs.
- Cada, Kada - one fourth of a ganda, the number one; a piece of Kauri.
- Chakla - a large division of a country comprehending a number of parganas.
- Chaprasi - a messenger or courier wearing a badge, most usually a public servant.
- Char Chitthi - a delivery order.
- Chatti or Chattee - a name given to a collection of Chulhas.
- Chauki - station of police or of custom, a guard, a watch or the post where they are placed.
- Chaukidar - a watchman.
- Chaupani - a tax formerly levied by the military chiefs in Cuttack to cover the expense of maintaining police commuted for money payment.
- Chauth - an assessment equal to one-fourth of the original standard assessment or generally to one fourth of the actual Government collections demanded by the Marathas from the Muhammadan or Hindu princes as the price of forbearing to ravage their countries.
- Chhatak - one sixteenth part of a seer measure, either of weight or capacity.
- Chitthi, chit - a letter, a note.
- Chohar - a tribe of mountaineers in the hills of Orissa.
- Chulha - a fire place.
- Coss - (vide) Kos.

- Dadni - advance
- Dak - post
- Dal - a general term for pulses
- Dalai - a subordinate officer in command of paiks.
- Dalbehera - headman among paiks; an officer in command of paiks.
- Darbar - a court, a royal court, an audience.
- Darogha - the head of a police. It is also applied to a native officer in other departments.
- Dastak - it applies more generally to a summons, a writ, a warrant; specially to a process served on a revenue defaulter to compel him to pay any balance that may be due.
- Desi - belonging to, born in a country, a native of a country.
- Dewal purcha - a head priest of Jagannath.
- Dhuja - the quantity and the value of cloth presented for the purpose of being displayed on the wheel at the top of the temple of Jagannath on which the Government received from the person presenting it its full value as a fee under the head Dhuja.
- Diwan - a minister, a revenue minister.
- Diwani Adalat - civil court.
- Do - two
- Dobundhee - having double bunds
- Do-fas^{ki} - yielding two crops in a year (land)
- Doli - a sort of sedan in which women are carried.

- Fakir - a poor or indigent person; the most general application is a Muhammadan religious mendicant who wanders about the country and subsists on alms.
- Faujdar - an officer enjoying both civil and military power over one division of a country; the chief of a body of troops; an officer in charge of the police and jurisdiction in all criminal matters.
- Faujdari - criminal as opposed to civil.
- Ganda - a money of account, equivalent in reckoning to four kauris or the twentieth part of one anna; twenty gandas make one pan; to count by gandas is to count by four; the value of ganda implies four.
- Ghat - a place where customs are commonly levied, a station.
- Ghee or ghi - clarified butter.
- Gola - a granary, a storeroom, a place in which grain or salt is kept for a season.
- Gosain,
Goswami - a religious mendicant.
- Gumashta - an agent, a representative, e.g. an officer employed by the Zamindars to collect their rents.
- Harkara - a messenger, a courier, an emissary.
- Hastobud,
Hustobood - an examination of the assets or resources of a country; a comparative account showing the present and past produce of an estate.

- Hat - a market, one held only on certain days in a week, a fair.
- Hawaldar
(corruptly
Havildar) - a native officer of the Indian army subordinate to a subahdar.
- Ikrar - agreement, assent, ratification.
- Ishtihar-nama - a written notice or proclamation.
- Jagir - a tenure common under native Government in which the public revenues of a given tract of land were made over to a servant of the state together with powers requisite to enable him to collect and appropriate such revenue, and administer the general Government of the district.
- Jagirdar - the holder of a jagir, the holder of any assignment of revenue.
- Jama - the total amount of rent or revenue.
- Jamabandi - settlement of the amount of revenue assessed upon an estate, village or district.
- Jamadar - an officer of police, customs or excise, second to the darogha.
- Jama-mufassal - the gross revenue to be collected in all the villages of a zamindari as rated in the accounts and to be paid after deducting charges to the zamindar.
- Jama-sadar - the revenue assessment settled with the Government direct by the proprietor in opposition to the jama-mufassal.
- Jatra - a religious festival.
- Jatri - a pilgrim.

Kabutiya
(corruptly
subooleat)

- a written agreement, especially one signifying assent, as a counter part of revenue lease or the document in which a payer of revenue, whether to the government, the Zamindar or the farmer expresses his consent to pay the amount assessed upon his land.

Kachahri
(corruptly
Cutchery)

- a court, an office.

Kahan

- a measure of value equal to sixteen panas of Kauri shells or 1,280 Kauris.

Kandh

- a class of mountaineers or wild tribes.

Kangal

- poor, miserable, bankrupt.

Kanungo

- a revenue officer; generally applied to village and district officer who recorded all circumstances within their sphere which concerned landed property and realization of revenue etc.

Karkach,
Kurkuch

- salt obtained by solar evaporation.

Katki seer

- the seer in common use in Cuttack and Puri. It weighs 105 tolas or sicca rupees.

Kauri
(corruptly
cowry)

- a small shell used as a coin. In account four Kauris are equal to one ganda and 80 Kauris to one pan.

Khalas

- release, freedom.

Khalas Chitthi

- letter of release.

Khalisa,
Khalsa

- lands or villages held immediately of government and of which the state is the manager or holder.

- Khandait - a name of a class of military landholders residing in the hills in Kilas or fortified dwellings and holding their lands at a quit rent on condition of acting as a feudal militia.
- Kharch, Khurch - expense, disbursement.
- Khas - as a revenue term it is applied to the management of estates and the collection of the revenue by the officers of the Government, without any intermediate person between them and the cultivators.
- Khas - mahal - district held in the management of the Government.
- Khilat - a dress of honour.
- Khoraki - diet allowance.
- Khud-Kasht - cultivating one's own field.
- Kila - a fort, a fortress, a castle.
- Kiraya - hire, fare, the money or the rate at which anything may be hired or rented.
- Kist - instalment.
- Kistbandi - settlement of the revenue by instalments.
- Kol - a class of wild tribe inhabiting forests and mountainous tracts.
- Kos, coss - a measure of distance varying in different parts of India from one to two miles, but most usually about the latter.
- Kothi - a store room.
- Kotwal - a chief officer of police for a city or town.

- Krori, or)
 Karori, also)
 Crori) - The possessor or collector of a Kror or ten millions of any given kind of money, a collector of revenue, a tax gatherer.
- Lakhiraj - - revenue free (land).
- Lashkar - a gun carrier, a tentpitcher, a bearer.
- Mahajan - a banker, a money changer, a creditor.
- Mahal - a province or district, in the language of regulations a mahal is called an estate and is defined any parcel or parcels of land which may be separately assessed with the public revenue.
- Mahalla - a division of a town, a quarter, a ward.
- Mahaprasad - holy food.
- Malangi - a manufacturer of salt.
- Malikana - relating to the proprietor as his right or due applied to an allowance assigned to a zamindar who from some cause as failure in paying the revenue or declining to accede to the rate at which his lands are assessed is set aside from the management of the estate, the per centage was 10 per cent on the net amount realised by the Government.
- Mamlatdar - the head revenue and police native officer of a district.
- Mashal (corruptly
 morchul) - torch
- Math - monastery.
- Mathdhari - abbot.

- Mauza - a village or a group of villages; a parcel or parcels of lands having a separate name in the revenue records and known limits.
- Mufassal - the country, the provinces or the stations in the country as opposed to the Sadar or principal station or town.
- Muharrir - a clerk, a writer, a scribe.
- Mukaddam - a chief applied specially to the headman of a village - under the Marathas usually charged with the realization of the revenue and its payment to the collector.
- Mulki - relating to a kingdom or country provincial, native.
- Munshi - a secretary, a writer; a term applied by Europeans usually to interpreters of Persian or Hindustani.
- Munsif - a judge.
- Naib - a deputy, a representative.
- Nal, Nul - a hollow bamboo, a measure of grain or salt.
- Nala - a rivulet, a watercourse.
- Nankar - an assignment of a portion of land or revenue of an estate made to the zamindar or any revenue officer as his subsistence allowance.
- Nawab - a viceroy or governor of a province.
- Nazir - an officer who sees to the service of the writs and the execution of orders.
- Nerick, Nirkh - price, rate, rate of revenue payments.
- Nirkhi - an officer who fixes or records the prices of articles.

- Nizamat Adalat - supreme court of criminal justice.
- Ogrey - etcetera; and the like; and so on.
- Pagoda - a Hindu temple.
- Pahikasht - non-resident cultivators or tenants at will.
- Paik - the paiks constituted a local militia holding the lands of the military chiefs or Rajas by tenure of military service.
- Pan, Pun, Pana - a sum of eighty kauri shells equal to twenty gandas and of which sixteen are equal to a Kahan.
- Panda - a priest of Jagannath.
- Pandit - a learned Brahman.
- Pankha, Punkha - fan.
- Parda - a veil, a screen.
- Pargana - a district, a tract of country comprising many villages.
- Parihari - a servant of Jagannath, who conducts the ^{pilgrims through} the doors and presents them to Jagannath.
- Parwana - an order, a written command.
- Patel - the headman of a village.
- Patta - a document given by the collector to the zamindar or by some other receiver of revenue to the cultivator or under-tenant specifying the conditions on which the lands are held and the value or the proportion of the produce to be paid to the authority or person from whom the lands are held.

- Peon - a piadda, a footman, a messenger.
- Peshkash - a tribute, a quit rent.
- Pindika - voluntary presents made at the throne of Jagannath in cash, bullion and jewels.
- Pitralli - land enjoyed through ancestors.
- Pungah salt - salt produced by boiling the brine.
- Purcha - a head priest of Jagannath.
- Raiyat - a cultivator, a peasant, a farmer.
- Raiyatwar - according to or with raiyats applied to revenue settlement.
- Rakam, Rukum - an item of an account.
- Rawana - a passport, a pass.
- Sadar, Sadr - usually means the chief seat of Government, the presidency as opposed to the provinces or mufassal.
- Sadar jama - the sum total of revenue payable to the government direct exclusive of the charges of collection.
- Salami - a complementary present, a present to a superior especially upon being introduced to him.
- Sanad - a grant, a charter, a document conveying an individual titles, privileges, offices.
- Sarbarahkar - title given to the village accountant.
- Sardar - a chief, a headman, a commander.

- Sarkar - the Government or administration, a division of a country.
- Sarishtadar - a registrar, a record keeper applied specially to head native officer of a court of justice, or collector's office.
- Savara, Sabar - a class of hill tribe.
- Sayar, Sair. - This term denotes all other sources of revenue accruing to the Government in addition to land tax from a variety of imposts as customs, transit duties, licences fees, house tax, market tax, etc.
- Subahdar - the governor of a province, a viceroy under the Mughal Government, a native officer in the Company's army holding a rank equivalent to that of captain under the European officers.
- Tahsildar - a native officer collecting the revenue from the cultivators.
- Tahsildari - the office or duty of tahsildar.
- Taluk - a division of a province.
- Talukdar - the holder of a taluk, a collector of revenue from the cultivators.
- Tanki - a quit-rent.
- Thana - a police station
- Thanadar - an officer in charge of a thana.
- Thani - a permanent (cultivator)
a stationary (cultivator).
- Tour chitthi - a pass, a permit.
- Vakil - an agent, an attorney.
- Zila - a district, a division.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Manuscript Records

A. At the India Office.

The items relating to Orissa in the following series:

Bengal Board of Revenue proceedings 1803-1817.

Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations 1803-1822.

Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations 1803-1822.

Bengal Political Consultations 1789-1818.

Bengal Revenue Consultations 1803-1822.

Bengal Salt and Opium Consultations 1803-1822.

Bengal Secret and Military Consultations 1760-1790.

Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.),

Letters Received 1803-18,

Letters Sent 1803-18.

Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1788-1805.

Boards Collections Vols. 223, 315, 318, 494, 505, 582,
583, 584, 585, 586, 587.

Draft Despatches submitted by the Court to the Board
of Control, 1803-1814.

Home Miscellaneous 59, 511, 603-4, 623.

Judicial Despatches to Bengal 1804-1820.

Judicial Letters from Bengal 1803-1822.

Letters from the Court 1788-1821.

Letters to the Court 1801-1822.

Military Despatches to Bengal 1803-1808.

Military Letters from Bengal 1803-1808.

Orme MSS. India Vol. 18.

Revenue Despatches to Bengal 1804-1822.

Revenue Letters from Bengal 1803-1821.

B. At the British Museum.

Add. MSS.

Wellesley papers. 13604, 13608, 13609, 13610, 13611.

2. Printed.A. English.I. Reports, letters, memoirs and some
select works.

- Aggarwal, S.C. The Salt Industry in India, Simla 1937.
- Aitchison, C.W. A Collection of treaties, engagements and sunnuds relating to India and neighbouring countries. 7 Vols. Calcutta, 1876.
- Arbuthnot, J. Sir Thomas Munro - Selections from his minutes and other official writings. 2 Vols. London, 1881.
- Ascoli, F.D. Early Revenue History of Bengal and the Fifth Report 1812 Oxford, 1917.
- Aspinall, A. Cornwallis in Bengal. Manchester, 1931.
- Auber, P. Rise and progress of the British power in India. 2 Vols. London, 1837.
- Baden-Powell, B.H. The Land system of British India. 3 Vols. Oxford, 1892.
- Banerjee, R.D. History of Orissa (from earliest time to the British period). 2 Vols. Calcutta, 1930.
- Bengal and Madras papers. 3 Vols. Imperial Records Department, Calcutta, 1928.
- Blunt, W. and
Shakespear, H. (Compilers) An Abstract of the Regulations enacted for the administration of the police and criminal justice in the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Calcutta, 1824.
- An Abstract of the Regulations enacted for the Assessment and Realization of the Land Revenues in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from the year 1793-1824. Calcutta, 1826.
- An abstract of the Regulations enacted for the administration of civil justice in the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from the year 1793 to the end of 1824. Calcutta, 1826.

- Buchanan, C. Christian Researches in Asia. London, 1819.
- Buckland, C.E. Dictionary of India Biography. London, 1906.
- Calendar of Persian Correspondence. 9 Vols.
Records Department, New Delhi, 1901-1953.
- Campbell, L.D. A Vindication of the Justice and Policy of
the late wars in India. London, 1806.
- Carey, S.P. William Carey. London, 1934.
- Saulfield, J. Observations on our Indian administration.
London, 1832.
- Census of India. Vol. VIA, Bengal Part II. Calcutta, 1902.
- Chand, R.P. (ed.). Selections from official letters and
records relating to the History of Mayurbhanj.
Vol. I, Baripada, 1942.
- Chaudhuri, S.B. Civil Disturbances during the British rule
in India. Calcutta, 1955.
- Choksey, R.D. The Aftermath. Bombay, 1950.
- A History of British diplomacy at the court
of the Peshwas. Poona, 1951.
- Clarke, R. (ed.) Digest of Bengal Regulations, 1793-1854.
2 Vols. London, 1855.
- Colebrooke, T.E. Life and Essays of H.T. Colebrooke. Vol. I,
London, 1873.
- Dalton, E.T. Descriptive ethnology of Bengal.
Calcutta, 1872.
- Dodwell, H.H. (ed.) The Cambridge History of India.
Vol. V, Cambridge, 1926.
Vol. VI, Cambridge, 1932.

- Doss, Ramchunder (compiler) A General Register of the Hon'ble East India Company's civil servants of Bengal Establishment from 1790 to 1842. Calcutta, 1844.
- Drummond, J.G. Panchayats in India. Oxford, 1937.
- Duff, J.G. A History of the Marathas, 3 vols, Calcutta 1912.
- Dutt, R.C. Economic History of India, London, 1950.
- Dutt, R.C. and others. Land Problems in India. Madras, 1903.
- Early European Travellers in the Nagpur Territory. Nagpur, 1930.
- East India Register. 1803-1819.
- Einzig, P. Primitive money. London, 1949.
- Elphinstone, M. Report on the territories conquered from the Paishwa. Bombay, 1838.
- Forrest, G. The Life of Lord Clive, 2 Vols. London, 1918.
- Forrest, G.W. (ed.) Selections from the state papers of the governors-general of India.
Warren Hastings. 2 Vols. London, 1910.
- Selections from the state papers of the governors-general of India.
Cornwallis. 2 Vols. London,
- Official writings of Mountstuart Elphinstone. London, 1884.
- Furber, H. Henry Dundas. London, 1931.
- Galloway, A. Government of India. London, 1832.
- Gleig, G.R. The Life of Sir Thomas Munro. 3 Vols. London, 1830.
- Grant, C. Observations on the state of society among Asiatic subjects of Great Britain. London, 1813.

- Gune, V.J. The Judicial System of the Marathas. Poona, 1953.
- Harington, J.H. An analysis of the laws and regulations in Bengal. London, 1821.
- An elementary analysis of the laws and regulations in Bengal. 3 Vols. Calcutta, 1805-1817.
- Hodson, V.C.P. List of officers of the Bengal Army. 3 Vols. London, 1927-46.
- Hunter, W.W. History of Orissa, 2 Vols. London, 1872.
- Indian Empire. London, 1882.
- A History of British India. 2 Vols. London, 1899.
- Land system in Bengal. Vol. I, London, 1894.
- Hutton, W.H. The Marquess Wellesley-K.G. Oxford, 1893.
- Imperial Gazetteer of India. Vol. XIX, Oxford, 1908.
- Ingham, K. Reformers in India. Cambridge, 1956.
- Joshi, V.V. Clash of three empires. Allahabad, 1941.
- Kale, Y.H. (ed.) Poona Residency Correspondence. Vol. V, 1781-1828. Bombay, 1938.
- Kaye, J.W. The administration of the East India Company. London, 1859.
- Christianity in India. London, 1859.
- The life and correspondence of Henry St. George Tucker. London, 1854.
- The life and correspondence of Sir J. Malcolm. 2 Vols. London, 1856.
- The life and correspondence of Charles Lord Metcalfe. 2 Vols. London, 1854.
- Selections from the papers of Lord Metcalfe. 2 Vols. London, 1854.

- Khan, G.H. Siyar-al-mutakherin (trans. Mustafa Hajji).
4 Vols. Calcutta, 1902-3.
- Landerdale, (Earl
of). Inquiry into the practical merits of the
system for the government of India.
London, 1809.
- Laurie, W.F.B. Orissa, the Garden of Superstition and
Idolatry. London, 1850.
- Long, J. Selections from unpublished records of
government. Calcutta, 1869.
- Maddox, S.L. Final report on the survey and settlement of
Orissa. Calcutta, 1900.
- Malcolm, J. Political History of India. London, 1811.
- Marath war in 1803: Bengal, Fort St. George and Bombay papers
presented to the House of Commons.
London, 1803-4.
- Marchioness of
Bute. The private journal of the Marquess of
Hastings. 2 Vols. London, 1858.
- Marshman, J.C. The life and times of Carey, Marshman and
Ward, (history of Serampore Mission.)
2 Vols. London, 1859.
- Martin, M. The Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence
of Marquis Wellesley during his adminis-
tration in India. 5 Vols. London, 1836-40.
- Mehta, H.S. Lord Hastings and the Indian States,
1813-1823. Bombay, 1930.
- Hill, J. and
Wilson, H.H. The History of British India. 9 Vols.
London, 1840-48.
- Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the
affairs of the East India Company.
Vol. III, Revenue, Vol. IV, Judicial.
London, 1832-33.

- Notes relative to the Late Transactions in the Maratha empire or Maratha war 1803. London, 1804.
- Overton, J.H. The Evangelical revival in the eighteenth century. London, 1898.
- Owen, J.S. A Selection from the Despatches, Treaties and other papers of Marquis Wellesley. Oxford, 1877.
- Parliamentary papers. House of Commons, 1812-13. Vol. 8, Paper 224.
- Parliamentary papers House of Commons 1812-13. Vol. 9, paper 264.
- Parliamentary papers House of Commons 1812-13. Vol. 10, paper 331.
- Pearce, R.R. Memoirs and Correspondence of Richard Marquess Wellesley. 3 Vols. London, 1846.
- Prinsep, H.T. Transactions in India, 1813-23. London, 1825.
- A narrative of the political and military transactions of British India, 1813-1818. London, 1820.
- Ray, R.R. Exposition of the practical operation of Judicial and revenue system of India. London, 1832.
- Ray, S.C. The Permanent settlement in Bengal. Calcutta, 1915.
- Report on the Administration of the Salt Department of the Revenue of Bengal for the year 1853-54. Calcutta, 1855.
- Report of the commissioners appointed to enquire into and report upon the manufacture and sale of and tax upon salt in British India. London, 1856.
- Richard, J. Reports on the territories of the Raja of Nagpur. Nagpur, 1901.
- India. 4 Vols. London.

- Richards, R. India. 2 Vols. London, 1829.
- Risley, H.H. Tribes and Castes of Bengal. 2 Vols.
- Roberts, P.E. India under Wellesley. London, 1929.
History of British India under the Company and the Crown. London, 1938.
- Ross, C. (ed.) Correspondence of Charles, First Marquess Cornwallis. 3 Vols. London, 1859.
- Salim, G.H. Riyaz-us Salatin (a history of Bengal), translated by Manlavi Abdus Salam. Calcutta, 1902.
- Sardesai, G.S. (ed.) Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. II Poona affairs. Bombay, 1936.
New History of the Marathas. 3 Vols. Bombay, 1846-48.
- Sastri, K.N.V. The Munro System of British Statesmanship in India. Mysore, 1939.
- Selection of papers from the records at the East India House. 4 Vols. London, 1820-1826.
- Selection from the Records of Bengal government. Calcutta, 1851.
- Sen, S.N. Administrative system of the Marathas. Calcutta, 1923.
- Sen, S.N. and U. Mishra (eds.) Sanskrit Documents. Allahabad, 1951.
- Seton-Karr, W.S. Selections from Calcutta Gazettes. 5 Vols. Calcutta, 1864-69.
- Shore, F.H. Notes on Indian affairs. 2 Vols. London, 1836.
- Sinha, N.K. India House Correspondence. Vol. V. Delhi, 1949.
- Stirling, A. An account (geographical, statistical and historical) of Orissa proper or Cuttack. Calcutta, 1904.

- Sutherland, J. Sketches of the relations between the British government in India and the different native states. Calcutta, 1837.
- Teignmouth, Lord. Memoir of Lord Teignmouth. 2 Vols. London, 1843.
- Temple, R.C. (ed.) The Dairies of Streynsham Master. 2 Vols. London, 1911.
- Thompson, E. and Garrett, G.T. Rise and fulfilment of British rule in India. London, 1934.
- Thornton, E. History of British Empire in India. 6 Vols. London, 1841-45.
- Thorn, W. Memoir of the War in India. London, 1818.
- Tone, W.H. Illustrations of some institutions of the Maratha people. Calcutta, 1818.
- Toynbee, G. A Sketch of the History of Orissa. Calcutta, 1873.
- Tupper, C.L. Our Indian protectorate. London, 1893.
- Warner, W.L. The protected princes of India. London, 1894.
- Wellington's Campaign in India. Calcutta, 1908.
- Wheeler, J.T. Early Records of British India. Calcutta, 1878.
- Wills, C.W. British relations with the Nagpur State. Nagpur, 1926.
- Wilson, C.R. English chiefs at Balasore in the Bay of Bengal. 3 Vols. Calcutta, 1895.
- The Early Annals of the English in Bengal. 3 Vols. Calcutta, 1895.
- Wilson, H.H. A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue terms. London, 1855.

II. Periodicals

Asiatic researches. Vol. XV, Serampore, 1825.

Calcutta Gazette. 1803.

Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol. XIX, December 1942,
New Delhi, 1943.

Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
Vol. LII, part I, Calcutta, 1883.
Vols. LXVII, Calcutta, 1898.

Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. III, London, 1952.

Journal of Indian History. Vol. VIII, part III, December 1929,
Madras.

Periodical Accounts of the Baptist Missionary Society. Vol. IV,
Bristol, 1817.

B. Oriya

Mahanty, A.B. (ed.) Madalapanji. Cuttack, 1940.