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Race and processes of racialisation in British international development discourse, 1997-2017

Maya Goodfellow

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Department of Development Studies

School of Oriental and African Studies

University of London

Abstract

This thesis analyses the role race and processes of racialisation play in British development discourse about India between 1997 and 2017. Using Stuart Hall's conceptualisation of race, paired with critical race scholarship, decolonial theory, postcolonial theory and Gramscian notions of hegemony, it offers original empirical findings by examining and comparing three key areas: a) government discourse on development; b) development professionals' views of their work and c) British newspaper reporting on development in India. The processes of racialisation present in each, and how they interact with colonial tropes, gender and class are evaluated qualitatively and comparatively. They are also compared with domestic discourses already established as racialised, that is discourses on race and asylum and immigration.

I demonstrate continuities across these different realms, and identify significant similarities between the arguments of 'pro' and 'anti' development proponents in British politics. It is by looking at these multiple strands of discourse, articulated at times by different actors, that I suggest racialised development discourse is hegemonic.

This thesis offers an original contribution in examining how shifting forms of racialisation operate in development discourse and by arguing that dominant development discourse is key to maintaining and is also maintained by representations of Britishness that are synonymous with whiteness. In addition, it not only demonstrates how race is central to ideas of development but also how this can be masked through competing forms of racialisation of the 'to-be-developed' and seemingly 'positive' forms of racialisation of people in India.

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Glossary

ACIQ	The Advisory Committee on International Questions
BNP	British National Party
BWI	Bretton Woods Institutions
DfID	The Department for International Development
EMB	Empire Marketing Board
FCO	The Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GAD	Gender and Development
GNI	Gross National Income
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
MPs	Members of Parliament
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
ODA	The Overseas Development Administration
ODM	Ministry of Overseas Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OWC	One World Conservatism
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UN	The United Nations
USDAW	Union of Shop and Distributive and Allied Workers
VSO	Voluntary Service Overseas
WAD	Women and Development
WID	Women in Development
WTO	The World Trade Organisation

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Introduction

Deepening our understanding of racialised development discourse

To account for racism is to offer a different account of the world. – Sara Ahmed, 2012: 3.

The release of the British-directed blockbuster *Slumdog Millionaire* in 2009 was a global event. The film, which tells the story of Jamal Malik's journey out of a Mumbai slum, was met with critical acclaim (Chin, 2009; The Times of India, 2009) and won one hundred and nineteen awards. Indeed, its viewership was so big it surpassed the number of people who visited India that year (Sengupta, 2010: 613). The country's then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said *Slumdog's* success had "done India proud" (The Telegraph, 2009a).

This international fanfare mostly overshadowed incisive critics who lamented the film's racial stereotypes (Amlani, 2009: 9; Sawhney, 2009; Varma, 2009; Banaji, 2010; Sengupta, 2010: 6-7; Mudambi, 2013: 285-287). The *bildungsroman* takes viewers on a two-hour whirlwind tour of a world populated by incompetent, cold-hearted or corrupt Indian characters. The only caring adults the film's protagonist, and thus the viewer, encounters are three white 'Western' tourists (Sengupta, 2010: 604-605). Amid all the hype, it seemed many failed to duly consider one of the worrying take-home messages of *Slumdog*: poverty and underdevelopment are the result of Indian otherness. This thesis looks closely at the message underlying *Slumdog* in order to examine whether it manifests itself more broadly in British society.¹ In particular, it will explore how race and processes of racialisation are present in British discourse when the subject of discussion is development.

I. Why this research matters: finding race in development

Though the study of race and racialisation is very much alive in universities across the world, it is largely and surprisingly absent in one field of academic exploration that

¹ Britain refers to England, Scotland and Wales and the United Kingdom (UK) to England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. However as these terms are used interchangeably in popular discourse, I have chosen to use 'Britain' throughout this thesis for coherence.

brings together people of different races on a regular basis: Development Studies. This is puzzling because the continuities between colonialism and development² have been noted by many scholars (among others, Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Biccum, 2010; Dogra, 2012), from dependency theorists (Frank, 1967) and post-development scholars (Esteva, 1992; Escobar, 1995) to post-modernists (Duffield and Hewitt: 2009). Yet missing from this work is if – and if so, then *how* – one of the central tenets in justifying colonialism (McClintock, 1995) persists in development discourse and practice: where is race? This is arguably an understudied question in development, which seems counterintuitive. Since it was first established in 1989, the Journal of International Development has only published 11 articles that include the words ‘race’ and ‘racism’. It may well be that scholars take these terms for granted, but if so, they could unintentionally be precluding debate in a key aspect of the historical legacy of colonialism. This thesis, then, will explore the ways development discourse is related to race. The central question of this thesis can be stated as: *What does it mean to say development discourse is racialised?*

There is a relatively small but rich amount of scholarship on this subject. Scholars have established that race and processes of racialisation are central to development discourse at both the macro level of government discourse (Noxolo, 2004; Kothari, 2006a; Wilson, 2012) and at the micro level of international non-government organisations (INGOs) (White, 2002; Goudge, 2003; Kothari, 2006b; Heron, 2007; Loftsdótti, 2014; Rivas, 2018). They have placed race at the centre of their research on development. However, what is missing from existing analysis is an examination of the hegemonic nature of racialised development discourse and an explanation of what this looks like. Hegemony in this sense is understood as the production common sense, in the Gramscian (Gramsci, 1971) understanding of that term, by political and civil society. This means ideas that benefit the ruling class are made to seem natural or ordinary among the majority of the population through processes practiced by the state and civil society. But these very ideas are conflicting and unsteady and this common sense must be consistently reproduced (Cox, 1983; Hall, 1986). As will be explained further in the Methodology, hegemony is significant for our understanding of race as the way it understands power as contested, shifting and

² ‘Development’ will refer primarily to international development activity carried out by British organisations abroad.

operating in a multi-dimensional way, allows us to consider the way race is established through a web of meaning that is not rigid but is rather shifting.

There is no unified, systematic analysis of the racialised nature of development discourse across different areas – most work either focusses on the context of government or the context of INGOs. This matters because government and civil society (of which the media – mostly at a national level – and INGOs and private development organisations – predominantly at an international level – are a key part) are significant in the creation and maintenance of dominant discourses. Without close study into, and evidence of, the way race manifests itself in government discourse, in newspaper representations and among development practitioners, the pervasiveness of racialisation in development discourse cannot be established, making it difficult to understand the way hegemonic development discourse, at least in Britain, is constituted by race. In addition to this, without systematic analysis it is not possible to make sense of the shifting forms of racialisation within discourse, how these sit alongside one another and the impression they give collectively. Furthermore, there has not been this kind of focussed analysis in the field of contemporary government discourse. Not prevalent in discussion is how racialised development discourse relates to discourse about and policy on race in the domestic sphere. Looking at this will hopefully allow us to further understand how race structures and systematises social, political and economic relations in Britain. In particular, I will examine how shifting notions of whiteness shape both discourse about Britain as a nation and the power dynamics of those who work in development. Whiteness with regards to development is an understudied area, particularly in work focused on the British context. To fill this empirical gap in existing work, the main analytical chapters of this thesis are devoted to analysing the ways development discourse is racialised in three areas: government, development professionals and the media.

This thesis will argue that race is constitutive of dominant British development discourse and if it is put at the forefront of analysis we can see how in this particular national context – and specifically in the domain of national politics, media and development organisations – development discourse helps maintain an idea of Britain as synonymous with whiteness, which we can make sense of when understood through the white subject position. Indeed, alongside other forms of racialisation,

manifestations of whiteness will be tracked throughout different strands of analysis in order to assess how it shapes and is central to development discourse. This thesis will examine how the ways it is present might have continuities and differences both within and across these sites of discourse. It will also show how in Britain ‘pro’- and ‘anti’-development arguments in popular politics, often treated as polar opposites, share a racialised discursive basis. In addition to this it will demonstrate how racialisation is shifting, specifically with regards to a country such as India, which is growing economically but also has high levels of poverty.

This thesis is aware that there is no one unified notion of development. It will, therefore, attempt to reject ideas of development that reproduces the idea of ‘the West’ vs. ‘the rest’. It recognises that people and organisations in the global North do not always impose racial categories or particular economic structures upon the global South and realising neither the global North or the global South are homogeneous categories (Fanon, 1961; Rahnema, 1997; Connell and Dados, 2014). However, this thesis seeks to examine power in Britain – looking at government, development professionals and the media – and thus it will look at how development discourse is articulated and how this very discourse might perpetuate this ‘West’ vs. ‘the rest’ framing. In addition, with regards to INGOs, I recognise people from the global South take part in development and that there is South-South aid (Quadir, 2013). I am thus seeking to avoid a depiction of aid that engenders recipients as passive beneficiaries; rather I explore the locus of power within the sector, particularly with regards to British development organisations, while being aware this is not the sole way aid relationships are shaped. This thesis unfortunately does not have the scope to explore in detail the intricacies of power relations that challenge these dichotomies but it will try not to perpetuate this dichotomous framing, not least through realising that processes of racialisation can be co-produced by people from the global South and the global North. Instead, what it seeks to understand is the hegemonic nature of racialised development discourse in Britain. Having established the overarching purpose of this thesis, the final part of the introduction will now explain its structure.

II. The structure of this thesis

Chapter One will give an overview of two of strands of literature particularly relevant

to this thesis, before laying out the theoretical framework and methodology. Firstly, it will give a brief overview of work that demonstrates the relationship between colonialism and development. This will draw on development scholars, post-development scholars and postcolonial theorists who show the continuities development has with colonialism. In much of this work race is not prevalent in analysis, thus the second section of the literature review will examine the work that does bring race into analysis. This strand itself can be divided into two distinct lines of inquiry: one that looks at development discourse broadly and the other, at development organisations or development professionals. Once the key literature has been established, I will draw predominantly on the work of Stuart Hall (1980; 1981; 1986; 1988; 1996; 1997a; 1997b; 1999; 2000; 2003; 2006a; 2006b; 2011; 2018), as well as that of other critical race theorists, to define terms such as race, racialisation, whiteness; these will be explained in order to further establish the theoretical framework that forms the basis of this thesis. I will then also draw on Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971; Cox, 1983) to establish what is meant by hegemony. Following this, Chapter Two will consist of an outline of the methodologies used in each subsequent chapter of this thesis. It will do this after looking to Hall and others (Doty, 1996; van Dijk, 1998), in order to explain what is meant by discourse, outlining the tools from discourse analysis that will be used in later chapters.

Chapter Three dissects New Labour, Coalition and Conservative discourse, using both the material found in *Developments*, a magazine published by the Department for International Development (DfID) between 1998 and 2010, and government speeches and policy documents as the basis for this analysis. It begins with a brief overview of the history of Britain's development policies and rhetoric, largely through the prism of how different governments have approached development. It will draw on existing work to trace how development has traditionally been understood as an area of policy and discourse that the Labour Party were far more concerned with than the Conservative Party. Once this historical context has been explored, it demonstrates that there has been a convergence with regards to development between the main political parties. It will look at current scholarship on this subject to show how New Labour, the Coalition and the Conservatives engaged with development in similar ways; it will briefly outline the dominant thinking in development practice and how each government, in line with dominant development practice, maintained a neoliberal

programme of development.

Once this has been established, the chapter conducts a focussed discourse analysis of the ways development is represented generally and then more specifically in relation to India. It looks at representations of Britain and of people who ‘do’ development work, as well as of the to-be-developed.³ The analysis will be broken down into subsections in order to establish the different forms of racialisation that exist alongside one another and to show how these depictions exist across discourse under New Labour, the Coalition and the Conservative governments. It will also briefly explore how some of the racialised forms of representation found in ‘pro’ development government discourse can be traced in the language used by ‘anti’ development politicians, not least in the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Though they have never been in government their influence on British political discourse has been important and UKIP will be briefly referred to in order to establish the similarities between ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ development proponents in British politics.

Chapter Four is an investigation into how the implied relationship between race and development determines the ways development practitioners – that is people who work in development in different categories, whether in INGOs, in private development organisations, as civil servants in DfID or as freelance consultants – understand the context in which they work, in this case, India. It does this from material gathered through semi-structured interviews conducted with people who work in development. It also examines how they understand their work more generally, how they perceive dynamics within the organisations they have worked or continue to work in and how processes of racialisation interact with the material in pay differentials and power.

Chapter Five is an examination of how race manifests in everyday media reporting and helps make racialised discourses of development appear common sense, in the Gramscian understanding of that term (Hall, 1986: 20). It examines how Britain and Britons are constructed in newspaper reporting on Indian development and poverty and looks at how India, Indian poverty and key moments in recent history that are related to India are represented across Britain’s main national newspapers. It also examines how these

³ I will refer to the subjects of development work as the to-be-developed to highlight how they are considered in dominant discourse as ‘behind’ modernity and progress.

representations compare to the forms of racialisation found in previous chapters.

Chapter Six looks at government domestic discourse on race and immigration. This is not a focussed, thick discourse analysis as has been conducted for previous chapters but rather draws on existing work that makes clear how these discourses are racialised (Back et al, 2002a; Back et al, 2002b; Hall, 2000; Gilroy 2004; 2012; Mayblin, 2017). The purpose of comparing these discourses with development discourse is to show how despite the impression government might give – of being concerned with reducing global poverty and believing that people around the world are equals – the racialised development discourse in reality shares clear similarities with racialised domestic discourse on race relations and immigration.

The final chapter will reflect on the analysis outlined across the three main discourse chapters, as well as the previous chapter on immigration and race discourses. It argues that there are key similarities across these different chapters, which shows not only that development discourse is racialised but that we can make sense of the hegemonic nature of this racialisation, as well as its shifting nature, by examining and comparing different strands of discourse with one another. In particular, it argues that notions of whiteness are central to some of the dominant tropes in British development discourse. It also argues that these processes of racialisation share clear similarities with domestic discourses that we already know to be racialised from existing work but that might often be considered as separate from development. Such understandings of development discourse are integral not only in order to make sense of this discourse itself but also to consider how Britain thinks of itself as a country. Ultimately this shows that even in development discourse, which in the popular domain is thought to be concerned with equality, racialisation is at the heart of its logic.

Chapter One

Where is race in development and what is race? Literature review and theoretical framework

In this chapter, I give an overview of the literature and theoretical frameworks that are relevant to this thesis. To begin with I look at two key strands of literature. The first is work on relationships between development and colonialism, in particular produced by post-development scholars and postcolonial theorists. This broadly points to and explains the continuities between development and colonialism on a number of layers, from epistemological to practical similarities. I briefly consider this well-established body of literature, as it forms the backdrop for the way development is understood in this thesis, that is, as a practical, discursive and intellectual field that shares continuities with the colonial project. However, largely this work does not significantly engage with race.

Thus, the second strand of literature is made up of a cadre of academics who have examined how race and racism play a role in development. This work itself can be divided into two strands: one that looks at development generally and one that looks at development organisations. I will review this work as it shines a light on the discursive and material continuities and differences between colonialism and development along the lines of race in a number of different domains. Exploring such arguments is essential to help situate the contribution of this thesis. In particular, I argue that though current work offers a valuable basis on which to build the arguments I make about development and race, it fails to offer an account of how racialised development discourse is hegemonic, in particular how whiteness operates in different domains. Thus it does not uncover the shifting forms of racialisation that exist in this discourse, nor does it examine some of the key continuities between political parties in Britain, between development discourse and domestic discourse and policy in relation to race and immigration and between different fields such as the discourse of government, development professionals and media. Therefore, once I have analysed the existing work on race and development – and briefly development and discourses of the nation, which are relevant for my work – I will further explain the contribution this thesis is making to existing literature.

Once I have outlined the existing terrain with regard to the literature, I will explain how I conceptualise race, defining key terms: race, racism, racialisation, whiteness and hegemony. This will be followed by an explanation of how discourse is understood in this thesis and the specific tools I will use in later chapters to analyse development discourse.

I. Epistemological and practical continuities between colonialism and development

Colonialism and development cannot be clearly distinguished from one another (Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Sylvester, 1999; Kapoor, 2008; Omar, 2012; Wilson, 2012). Yet development agencies and development practitioners have largely remained silent on the subject of colonialism; with an “avowedly forward-looking approach”, they make no reference to Empire as if it is entirely relegated to the past (Crush, 1995: 9; Sylvester, 1999: 717). Indeed, the link between colonialism and development was obscured in popular discourse; a good example of this is US President Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural address (Truman, 1949), which is often assumed to signal the dividing line between colonialism and development and the acceptance by key statespeople in countries like India that the birth of the development era was a rupture from colonialism (see Nehru cited in Bhagavan, 2013: 91; Nehru cited in Kumar and Prasad, 2003: 30; Palit, 1972). In addition to this, colonialism’s “vituperative” language, which was used to explain racial hierarchies and justify British rule, has seemingly been replaced with neutral language about development, progress and community-led change (Shrestha, 1995: 273-4; see also Wallerstein, 1997: 101). Yet as April Biccum has noted the idea of development as positive occurs through what Homi Bhabha would recognise as a shift in discourse from the seat of power. He argued that hegemonic structures of power are sustained and maintained with shifts in vocabulary (1994: 242, cited in Biccum, 2010: 148) and words are used to efface oppressive power structures. Thus, as a significant amount of scholarship has argued, despite these linguistic shifts that might obscure continuities between the two, development, in its contemporary form, found its beginnings in colonialism.

Indeed, postdevelopment, postcolonial, decolonial and antidevelopment theorists

(Kapoor, 1999; Bose, 1997; Escobar, 1995; Nederveen Pieterse and Parekh, 1995; Nandy 1992: 295-308) have shown that international development is rooted in a Eurocentric model of linear progress, which finds its roots in colonialism. As Priya Kapoor noted (1999: 253), Rostow's economic growth theory (1959) went so far as to create five phases of growth where "traditional society" is temporary and unstable while modernity is the universal ideal – this set "goals for a particular set of universal conditions for underdevelopment" and so "development theory attempts to be a master discourse so that it can account for all progress" (Kapoor, 1999: 253). Thus modernity was ostensibly achieved through a very particular, linear notion of progress, which originated in Europe (Wallerstein, 1997: 96-7).⁴

Postcolonial scholarship demonstrates how this continues to shape development, particularly as development relies on the constructed divide between 'us', the developers, as the symbols of progress and 'them', the to-be-developed, as innately incapable of achieving 'development' alone (Lamers, 2005; see also Stoler and Cooper, 1997: 35). Indeed, in their landmark study, *Doctrines of Development*, Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton (1996) delved into 19th Century work to show that the origins of contemporary development principles, such as trusteeship, are identifiable in this time. There are a number of different scholars who have traced different practical similarities between colonialism and development, including how

⁴ Ideas of modernity were and are arguably central to this. Modernity, which generally tends to refer to the "social, cultural, political and economic changes that took place in Western Europe from the mid-sixteenth century onwards", "developed out of colonial encounters" (Bhambra, 2007: 2-77) and it was "constituted in a dialectical relation with a non-European alterity that is its ultimate content" (Dussell, 1995: 65). Yet this was and is erased. Through modernity, "Europe affirms itself as the 'center' of a World History that it inaugurates: the 'periphery' that surrounds this center is consequently part of its self-definition. The occlusion of this periphery [...] leads the major contemporary thinkers of the 'center' into a Eurocentric fallacy in their understanding of modernity" (1995: 65). The belief in European modernity is possible because of the erasure, or at least side-lining, of all other forms of progress and knowledge beyond Europe. Europe continues to be constructed as a "cultural-geographic sphere" from which events of world historical importance have developed endogenously (Bhambra, 2007: 5) and it is understood as "the genealogical foundation of 'the West'" (Sabaratnam, 2017: 20).

Shibusawa outlines that Jürgen Habermas saw the "project of modernity" as emerging from Enlightenment thinkers' attempts to develop objective scientific methods of inquiry, discern universal foundations in law and morality; and to foster "autonomous art." This was centred on efforts to organise social relations around 'rational' modes of thought, which would free people from myth and superstition (2013: 35). There are multiple ways 'modernity' can be defined and conceptualised (Chakrabarty, 2002; 2009) but this thesis agrees with Bhambra's critique, namely, that what unites scholars across many theoretical divides (Eisenstadt, 2002; Wagner, 2010) is conceptualising it as embodying a distinction between "social formations of 'the West' and 'traditional' or 'pre-modern' societies" (Bhambra, 2007: 3; Ascione and Chambers, 2016). For discussion of the pitfalls of some postcolonial work on modernity see Bhambra, 2007: 15-33.

the basis for modern development thinking was evident during colonialism (see also Dwivedi and Nef, 1982; Friedmann, 1992; Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Hailey, 1999; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Cooke, 2003; Kothari, 2005; Ludden, 2005; Wolfensohn, 2005; Anghie, 2007; Wilson, 2012). Through this wealth of scholarship we can see that development owes an “unacknowledged debt” to colonial rule (Cooke, 2003:47).

In summary, existing work from postdevelopment and postcolonial scholars, as well as those interested in the genealogies between development and colonialism, leads to a convincing conclusion that development shares ~~many~~ epistemological, practical and discursive similarities with colonialism. This is important for this thesis, as it gives weight to any connections drawn between racialised colonial discourse and race in contemporary development discourse.

However, although there are a sizeable number of academics that have unearthed the continuities and discontinuities between colonialism and development, when doing so few acknowledge the subject of race (White, 2002: 407) or explore processes of racialisation in development. This is not a fundamental flaw produced by postcolonial approaches but related to how postcolonial and other theories are utilised in existing work. For instance, though postdevelopment scholars like Escobar (1995) trace the Eurocentric nature of development, race is not prevalent in analysis. This is puzzling, as while it manifested itself unevenly and “was dependent upon time and place” (Mosse, 1985: x), race played a vital role in the Empire, gaining particular traction after the 1857 Indian uprising (Kothari, 2006b; Herbert, 2008). In fact there is a tendency in post-development scholars to romanticise societies ‘pre’ development – which has been rejected by Escobar (1995) – which insists that “truth and meaning reside with ‘the primitive’ and not with ‘the advanced’”. This does not go “beyond modern relations of domination but threatens to reinscribe them with their most violent form” (Manzo, 1995: 238). This risks reinforcing processes of racialisation whereby there is an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ that are innately different from one another. One of the fundamental oversights in some work (Escobar, 1995) on the epistemological continuities between colonialism and development is that there is no engagement with how notions of European modernity and attendant ideas of progress being endogenous to Europe are related to ideas of racial superiority. Modernity is also reliant upon an

inferior ‘other’; on a stark division between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ subjects (Shilliam, 2010), where the ‘rise of the West’ is seen as a worldly phenomenon of human progress and as a point of reference for the rest of world in its development.

Biccum (2010), in particular, is one of the key scholars I engage with throughout this thesis. The majority of her analysis centred on the DfID’s magazine, *Developments*, which I use as the primary subject of analysis in Chapter Three. From the material she analysed, she argued the civilising mission is repackaged in *Developments* and development discourse is reliant on teleological notions of progress, while treating poverty among the to-be-development as natural. In addition, she demonstrated how British development discourse shared similarities with the *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Lugard, 1922: 618), which justified indirect colonial rule by pointing out how Britain benefits economically, while the colonised are taught civility. Biccum finds this same dual purpose in government development discourse, which argues Britain would benefit from economic stability and safety, while impoverished peoples’ lives would be improved (see for example Blair, 1999: 22). This thesis finds similar evidence for this and thus agrees with these arguments.

However, Biccum’s analysis of *Developments*, which was published before the magazine was discontinued, resulted in her identifying:

[T]wo key figures, one that equates lack of development with a lack of humanity, a poverty-as-degeneracy [...] and the other that emerges as a new humanism around the figure of the ‘global citizen’ meant to be the object of development education as a new marketing agenda for development under neo-liberal terms (2010: 21).

My analysis will disrupt the idea that there are only these two binary categories of representation in *Developments*. Biccum did not systematically engage with critical race theory and this has resulted in her overlooking how the construction of the to-be-developed and the developer is relational and shifting. I argue that race is an essential analytical lens to use to look at material found in *Developments* and show how racialisation is relational and shifting in development discourse, in particular I will look at shifting forms of whiteness and how that is central to representations and conceptualisations of development. Therefore, although the categories Biccum outlined do carry saliency, they only provide a partial picture of the way power is imagined, justified and played out in *Developments*. Biccum’s work is somewhat

demonstrative of problems of the failure to engage with race when attempting to make sense of both the historical genealogies of contemporary development practice and its current processes. Race is integral to ordering and making sense of the world, if it is not used as an analytical lens through which to make sense of development, we fail to understand some of the subtle power dynamics and forms of racialisation that are constitutive of development.

II. Current work on race, racism and development

Given the centrality of race to British colonialism, and the relationship between colonialism and development, a small body of scholars have connected the dots between the two areas of research outlined above and argued that race is present in development discourse and practice (White, 2002; Goudge, 2003; Noxolo, 2004; Heron, 2007; Kothari, 2006a; 2006b; Wilson, 2012; Loftsdótti, 2014; Rivas, 2018). They have made a break with those scholars who tend to not (explicitly) consider race as relevant to development work. Academics have either dismissed race as an “outdated category” that doesn’t have analytical significance (Nederveen Pieterse, 2004: 1102); argued that the racial aspects of colonialism are “routinely rejected” in development (Duffield and Hewitt, 2009:10); or failed to engage (at all or in any extensive way) with the role race plays in development (Escobar, 1995; Biccum, 2010). Current research into the role of race and racism in development finds these approaches wanting and explores discursive and material manifestations of race and racism in development. These approaches themselves can be divided into two camps: one looks at racialisation in development discourse broadly, the other looks specifically at race among development professionals. Though they at times overlap, I will now look at these two existing strands of work.

i. Analysis of development and development discourse

Firstly, I will consider three key scholars’ work on race and racism in development, which look at the subject broadly, in terms of development discourse. They are Uma Kothari (2006b), Kalpana Wilson (2011; 2012) and Patricia Noxolo (2004); their work is essential for this thesis. They have all broadly agreed that racial categories essential

to colonialism were repackaged through development. As Noxolo explained:

[A]fter the Second World War, these ideas of racial evolution through the adoption of first-world institutions formed the cornerstone of the international development discourses put forward by the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly in the group of ideas known as modernisation theory, and elaborated most famously in W. W. Rostow's *The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth* (2004: 209).

The basis for this thinking was that the global North was more developed and thus more capable than those in poverty. Noxolo showed how these ideas were present in early New Labour discourse on development. Looking at New Labour's 1997 white paper on development, she argued that the language and ideas used in this government document should be understood through imperial and racist frameworks. The white paper shows how international development policy helped maintain power differentials, which were "underpinned not only financially [...] but also discursively by post-imperialist and neo-imperialist structures of power that draw their moral force (their impression of rightness, of inevitability) from racialised assumptions" (Noxolo, 2004: 206). In particular, she analysed how in the white paper:

[T]hird-world countries appear as static in their poverty, and third-world governments appear incapable of the kind of independent action that might lead to their own development. First-world intervention is seen as the only means of development for those whose status as 'developing' never seems to end" and how "any change deemed positive is to be brought about by the first world" (2004: 210).

By drawing on these racialised constructions, Noxolo pointed out, that politicians like Tony Blair were able to cast Britain as heroically rescuing people who are in poverty in the 'developing' world (2004: 216). Noxolo's analysis is crucial for some of the arguments in this thesis. However, though a compelling snapshot of New Labour discourse, Noxolo's work does not further explore the nuance and shifting forms of racialisation that might be present in government discourse.

Kothari's (2006b) and Wilson's (2012) works, in particular the latter, arguably extended this analysis. They both argue that a legacy of colonialism is racial divides in development discourse and that this does not always mean there are explicit references to race, instead processes of racialisation might take the form of constructions of "cultural difference" (Kothari, 2006b: 15; Kothari 2006a; Wilson, 2012). As Kothari explains, development is mistakenly understood as ahistorical and as existing in "non-racialized places and outside of racialized histories" (2006a: 9). Both Kothari and Wilson looked to the work of transnational feminist Chandra Mohanty (1986) and

Gayatri Spivak (1988), who have critiqued development discourse for the way it repackages racialised and gendered colonial tropes of ‘Third World’ women as victims. To highlight this point, Wilson examined three different advertisement campaigns including one by the Nike Foundation. She argued this campaign appropriates feminist rhetoric about empowerment and to suggest that girls in the developing world can escape poverty by becoming entrepreneurs. This ahistorical argument in the advertisement suggests poverty is natural to the global South and is produced by cultural factors rather than connected to global power imbalances. The representations of women in the global South produced by these institutions “operate in the same way as images of ‘contented and productive’ women workers in colonial enterprises used in British advertising in the late 19th and early 20th centuries” (Wilson, 2012: 43-68). Women and girls in poverty are turned into racial stereotypes and advertisers suggest employment will help solve inequality. In reality, they are taken into an exploitative economic regime under the guise of progress and empowerment. Wilson and Kothari made the connection between development, colonialism and racism and suggest that racialised representations play a part in development discourse (Kothari, 2006a). This is important to note as this idea of material processes being related to racialised development discourses will appear in my own analysis with reference to the way neoliberalism can be racialised.

More specifically, using postcolonial theory and Foucauldian notions of power, Wilson (2012) offered a fuller account of the role race plays in development discourse than most existing work, which tends to have come in the form of book chapters or journal articles. Taking a global view, she analysed the relationship between race and capital in a wide variety of development organisations and initiatives and the social, political and economic change they are concerned with (Wilson, 2012: 2). She unpacked how “ideas of race and development have been, and remain, inextricably intertwined with each other”. She argued when understood in relation to “global processes of capital accumulation and imperialism”, we can see that development is “implicated in the production of material and embodied differences which are both legitimized by and come to be explained through ideas of racial hierarchy in multiple guises” (Wilson, 2012: 243). In order to make this argument, Wilson convincingly suggested that to understand the relationship between race and development, we

should not just understand development as encompassing institutions like DfID or INGOs but also the “whole complex of unequal material relationships and processes which structure engagement between the global South and [the] global North” (2012: 4). This means that Wilson’s work is organised around themes – such as population control policies or the treatment of HIV/AIDs in sub-Saharan Africa – as opposed to looking at discourse produced by specific parts of society. This meant that she did not offer a systematic analysis of contemporary government discourse nor did she speak to development professionals. Indeed, although she examined *The Observer’s* coverage of local resistance of Vedanta’s mining plan in the Niyamgiri hills – in which she argued those engaging in resistance were racialised as exotic and ‘other’ – absent from this existing work is any attempt to track representations of development in the media within the Gramscian framework of power. Wilson’s work provides a valuable intellectual contribution that forms the basis for this thesis; some of her arguments are echoed in later chapters but they are also extended at certain points. Therefore, in this way I add to her work as she does not lay out the hegemonic nature of racialised development discourse. Neither does she assiduously explore how development relates to whiteness; whiteness is mentioned a number of times in her work but the different ways it operates are never fully explored (see for instance Wilson, 2012: 75). Without such analysis we cannot understand what it means to say that hegemonic development discourse is racialised and how it might be part of everyday, common sense understanding of development.

In addition to this, the majority of work to date on race and development does not offer a comparative analysis of how racialised government development discourse relates to domestic discourse. This, then, treats development as a separate, isolated field. Yet we know from the work of Gallagher (2011) and Harrison (2013) that foreign policy discourse generally, and development discourses specifically, are connected to representations of the state. For example, Gallagher argued that New Labour “harnessed a broader British imagination of Africa” by attempting to “do good” on this continent, in order to assert the “moral strength of the British state” (2011: vii). Similarly, Harrison examined the multitude of ways ‘Africa’ has been “represented within British modernity” and specifically through development, which he argued served to construct “British self-perception and even self-esteem”. Discourse that is about ‘Africa’, then, helps communicate ideas of British virtue

(2013: 1-2). These works do not seek to explicitly explore and establish the connection between international relations and development, and domestic discourse and policy. Neither is their primary concern race. This means that the racialised notions of the nation and the forms of racialisation within development discourse are not explored to a significant degree. Instead, they make important connections between how discourse about ‘Africa’ informs discursive constructions of Britain. They provide key ground on which to begin to show that development policy and discourse do not only consist of representations of the ‘other’ but also of the ‘developer’ and they do not exist separately from domestic policy and discourse on race. In fact, such connections are recognised by Wilson to a degree. She argued for a historicisation of development beyond, as well as including, the “narrative fissure between colonialism and development” (2012: 213) but she engages little with recent history or extensively with British domestic policy and discourse.⁶ Without situating development discourse in the broader context of domestic discourse there is a risk of making the forms of racialisation in development seem exceptional, as opposed to closely linked to a system of racialisation that organises society.

ii. Development professionals: Micro-level analysis

As well as work that conducts a macro analysis of development discourse, a portion of the scholarship is on race and development dynamics within development organisations. There is an increasing body of work that examines aid workers’ lives and work that reflects on the power differentials within aid (Eyben 2006; Mosse, 2011). Four of the key works within this broader body of scholarship focussed on race and development professionals (White, 2002; Goudge, 2003; Kothari, 2006a; Heron, 2007; Loftsdóttir, 2014; Rivas, 2018). White (2002) and Kothari (2006a) focussed generally on how power-relations are racialised at the micro-level of development work. White did not conduct interviews with people in development and Kothari drew from one discussion, but both predominantly also used their personal experiences as evidence. The latter, a woman of colour, argued that the distinction between who gives assistance and “who must be grateful for it” is racialised. She made this argument by explaining that from her own encounters she noticed “‘local counterparts’ have been visibly

⁶ Wilson’s most significant engagement with DfID consists of a chapter examining the department’s attempt to involve diasporic groups in development, see 2012: 206-242.

disappointed when they realized that their expatriate consultant was not white” (2006a: 14). This, she said, establishes the whiteness of who is considered an expert, arguing:

Even when the knowledge and experiences of ‘local’ people are valued, in participatory exercises, for example, some form of development intervention is nearly always considered necessary, through external funding and in the provision of ‘facilitators’ or ‘moderators’. These racialized assumptions have contributed to a failure to recognize the diverse world of ideologies and aspirations and the ability of ‘recipients’ of aid to manage resources on their own, as well as a tendency to ignore non-western conceptions of, for example, ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ or, indeed, ‘development’ (2006a: 16).

Therefore, Kothari’s work suggested epistemology in development practice is racialised. White (2002), a white woman, came to a similar conclusion. Through three dimensions of development – material outcomes, techniques of transformation and modes of knowing – she argued that while working in development she found “my whiteness opened me doors, jumped me queues, filled me plates and invited me to speak” (2002: 408). She also noted how the power afforded to ‘international’, white development workers appeared to legitimise them making explicitly racist statements (White, 2002). In addition to these two accounts, Goudge (2003) examined the role race played in Nicaraguan development work and similarly found that there were assumptions made about white, British superiority in development work, where they were assumed to be the most capable of providing development. Therefore, in each of these works what was uncovered was the way people who are racialised as white are afforded power in development spaces by virtue of them being white.

Similarly to Kothari’s work (2006a), Rivas (2018) looks at the experiences of people of colour, as opposed to white people, in development. She looks specifically at women of colour and their experiences. She notes that a significant amount of scholarship on development professionals focusses on people racialised as white and thus reinforces stereotypes of the darkness of the developing world and the whiteness of the aid industry (2018: 169). From interviews, she argues women of colour in development she spoke to found it difficult to address race and racism in development organisations because an assumption among white staff was that they could not be racist as they work with people of colour on a daily basis and the work they do is good. In many ways, findings in Chapter Four complement Rivas’s (2018).

Similar arguments were apparent in the work of Loftsdóttir (2014) and Heron (2007), who interviewed development professionals in the Icelandic and Canadian contexts respectively. Loftsdóttir focuses on development and whiteness (2014), interviewing 30 Icelanders, men and women, who are classified as white and who work in development. He then analyses the development paradigm in Iceland through the prism of race and power (2009; 2012; 2014) and comes to the conclusion that in development “white privilege can be safely exercised without having to be reflected on critically” (2014: 467). This echoes Kothari’s (2006a) Goudge’s (2003) and White’s (2002) work by suggesting that people racialised as white are taken to be superior in development spaces. Using post-structural and critical race theory, Heron (2007) looked at a similar phenomenon in Canada by examining the experiences of Canadian white middle class women working in development on the African continent. She argued that “doing development help[s] to form subjectivities contingent on ideas of goodness and Othering, against a backdrop of a North/South binary, in which Canada is constructed as a nation that is good. All of the existing works appear to agree that there is a stratified process of racialisation, whereby white skin is privileged above all others, and ‘Western’ ideas above the so-called ‘native’ or ‘indigenous’.⁷ Therefore from this existing work we can see that there is a racialisation of epistemology, where ‘local’ knowledge is assumed inferior to ‘Western’ thinking and there is also a literal privilege of people racialised as white.

This existing work provides a valuable base on which to build my own. Indeed, I will use the arguments made in some of this work to analyse interviews with development professionals. Yet there is an arguable gap within existing analysis. Aside from Kothari (2006a) and Rivas (2018), existing work that hones in on development professionals focusses on people racialised as white. Meanwhile, the work that does not look primarily at the experiences of people racialised as ‘not white’. Both are valuable and important areas of study, but without comparing the views and experiences of people racialised as white and people who are not, we fail to understand the shifting nature of processes of racialisation in development and in relation to modes of knowledge. Over 10 years ago, Kothari noted: “the UK development industry is now more multiracial

⁷ Karthik Navayan Battula argues international aid agencies in India maintain caste hierarchies within their own organisations (2015: 222). There is still a great deal of work to do on this but it is beyond the scope of this thesis.

and multistranded, and this factor, together with processes of globalization may be reducing the significance of the geographical centrality of western knowledge, whiteness continues to be a signifier of status and expertise” (2006a: 16). Yet beyond her article and Rivas’s book chapter, an understudied area of research is an exploration of the multiracial nature of development practice and what this means with regard to processes of racialisation. Given that whiteness is not static (as will be explored later in this chapter): (how) do the ideas of whiteness, power and knowledge take shape within an increasingly multiracial workforce? This thesis will explore this question not yet covered in existing scholarship.

iii. My contribution

My research will build on this existing work to explore how hegemonic development is racialised. It will do so by analysing processes of racialisation in government discourse, compare this with how race and development are understood by development professionals and how their experiences might be related to racialisation, and look at how both compare with media representations of development. Thus, I will draw on existing work analysing relationships between race and development (White, 2002; Noxolo, 2004; Kothari 2005; 2006a; 2006b; Wilson, 2012; Rivas, 2018), postcolonial feminist scholarship (Dogra, 2012; Biccum 2010; McEwan, 2001; Midgely, 1998), as well as the theoretical tools laid out in the next section. This thesis will attempt to build on this work to show how racialised representations of development are systematically incorporated into information relayed to Britons about development in general and Indian development in particular and it will also look at how people who work in the field of development understand race in relation to what they do. Existing work looks at how race and development are linked; this thesis will not only examine this link but it will explore how race organises and systematises representations in development and how this is related to a broader process of systematisation in Britain. In particular, it will explore how whiteness manifests in each of the sites of discourse examined and how this compares across these sites.

This thesis offers three original empirical contributions. Firstly, by assiduously analysing government discourse, it will show the shifting forms of racialisation found in development discourse under New Labour, the Coalition and the Conservative governments. This will allow us to establish the continuities between these different

governments and show how this discourse is hegemonic in the political sphere. To strengthen this argument about the hegemonic nature of racialised political discourse, it will show how these racialised constructions of development are also present in anti-development rhetoric. Secondly, it will intertwine different strands of focus that have not yet been compared, looking at government discourse, compared against development professionals' thoughts on race and development and the racialised nature of media coverage of development. In fact, there is a dearth of work on regular newspaper coverage of development. Bringing these three strands of analysis together will provide a more comprehensive picture of the hegemonic nature of race in development discourse within Britain, giving a sense of the depth and extent of racialisation as the ruling apparatus of modern society. Thirdly, it will examine the continuities between government discourse on development and domestic discourse on immigration and race, showing how the two are not at odds with one another as might be assumed in the popular domain but are in fact complementary. Furthermore, this will bring whiteness, which has not yet been systematically tracked and made sense of in development discourse generally and British development discourse specifically, into the frame. It will examine how race operates at a micro-level in complex ways but also at a macro-level, in order to explore the shifting nature of racialisation. Therefore, using Gramscian notions of power I will try to identify a hegemonic picture of racialised development discourse, which has not yet been done. I will thus draw connections across these three strands of study showing that not only are the to-be-developed racialised as 'other', but that representations of the donor state – in this instance Britain – are emblematic of and sustained by whiteness.

III. Theoretical framework

To explore what it means to say contemporary development discourse is racialised, I will look at critical race theory and in particular the work of Stuart Hall, whose thinking forms much of the framework for this thesis. This will be interspersed with work from postcolonial studies, decolonial theory and cultural studies. This thesis will draw on already established colonial tropes to examine how development generally and Indian development and underdevelopment specifically are racialised in the three areas of study. The next section will consist of an explanation of the theories used to make

sense of race, racialisation and whiteness, before explaining how hegemony is conceptualised and what is meant by discourse analysis in this thesis. It should be noted that the concept of whiteness is central to this thesis but prior to exploring exactly what is meant by whiteness, I will first locate the specific understanding of race used in this work, which is an essential basis for my conceptualisation of whiteness.

i. What is race?

I will be working under the constructivist theorisation of race, where it is understood as an artificial category that has no deterministic biological basis (Hesse, 2007). Thus, as Sabaratnam explains, this is a “sociological understanding of race, which is counterposed with a biological one” and that:

emphasises the ways in which social, political and economic relations are structured through and by ideas of assumed and mythologised forms of human ancestry, irrespective of any biological foundation. These ideas are not transhistorical but emerge alongside projects of European colonisation around the world (2018: 6).

The construction of race and racism was the ideological basis for colonialism and was popularised in British society in this time.⁸ Race in this thesis will be understood as a “sociogeny” that defines patterns of behaviour and modes of being (Fanon, 1952). Or put another way, I will understand race as what Alana Lentin calls a “technology of power”, that is a “schema for managing populations” (2015: 28). Racial groups are not absolute but instead “relational and situational [...] engendered by historical processes of differentiation” (Shohat and Stam, 2004: 19). And race is dynamic in terms of time and place: it is not a static concept. Indeed, as Ambalavaner Sivanandan explained “racism never stands still. It changes shape, size, contours, purpose, function, with changes in the economy, the social structure, the system and, above all, the challenges and resistances to that system” (2002: 1).

Much like Gloria Wekker (2016: 22), I take cues from Stuart Hall and use the term race throughout this thesis to mean race or racialisation but also as a combination of race and ethnicity. Hall defined race as follows:

⁸ For further discussion see: Biddiss, 1970; Said, 1978; Stocking, 1987; Adas, 1989; Stoler, 1989; Pickering, 1991; Midgley, 1992; Howe, 1993; Young, 1994; Bates, 1995; Cohn, 1995; 1996; McClintock, 1995; 1997; Grewal, 1996; Kutzer, 2000; Benton, 2002; Fredrickson, 2003; Arnold, 2005; Chakravarty, 2005; Pal-Lapinski, 2005; Isaac, 2006, Mignolo, 2007a; 2007b; Siddiq, 2008; Solomos and Back, 2009; Wagner, 2010; Mamdani, 2012; Malik, 2010; 2013; Mignolo, 2011; Mizutani, 2011.

[it] claims to ground the social and cultural differences which legitimate racialized exclusion and biological differences i.e. in Nature. This naturalizing effect appears to make racial difference a fixed, scientific ‘fact’, unresponsive to change or reformist social engineering [...] the problem is that the genetic level is not immediately visible. Hence, in this type of discourse, genetic differences (supposed to be hidden in the gene structure) are ‘materialized’ and can be ‘read off’ in easily recognizable visible signifiers such as skin colour, physical characteristics of hard, features (e.g.) the Jewish hooked nose), body-type etc., enabling them to function as closure mechanisms in everyday situations (2000: 222).

Meanwhile, ethnicity “generates a discourse where difference is grounded in cultural and religious features” (Hall, 2000: 223). The two are often positioned against one another but as Hall explained “biological racism and cultural differentialism [...] constitute not two different systems, but racism’s two registers [...] it seems therefore more appropriate to speak, not of ‘racism’ vs. ‘cultural difference’, but of racism’s ‘two logics’” (2000: 224). How we might conceptualise the way discussion of ‘culture’ can be part of racialised discourses will be further unpacked below with reference to Martin Barker’s (1981) understanding of ‘new racism’.

While changing form, race and racism are also structural: they are institutionally embedded, in the sense that they are developed, sustained and perpetuated by social institutions. Hall argued that to understand race in this way we must look beyond two prevailing paradigms, economic determinism and sociological pluralism. The first model for understanding race takes “economic relations and structures to have an overwhelmingly determining effect on the social structure of such formations” and thereby erroneously assumes that social divisions can be “explained principally with reference to economic structures and processes”. The second explanatory field shows that race cannot be “reduced to the economic level of determination” but is a social formation that changes at certain historical junctures. Yet this approach makes the mistake of understanding racial structures as existing outside economic relations (Hall, 1980: 306-308). To bridge the divide between these two paradigms, Hall charted a means by which race can be understood as both structural and subject to historically specific social divisions. He took a threefold approach, borrowing from elements of Marx’s method:

1. The materialist premise: the analysis of political and ideological structures must be grounded in their material conditions of existence.
2. The historical premise: “that the specific forms of these relations cannot be

deduced, *a priori*, from this level [the material level] and must be made historically specific” by supplying the elements that can explain their differences.

3. Third: ‘structured in dominance’. Race and racism become significant ideological tools through power relations. Building on Antonio Gramsci, Hall explains, dominant ideas that benefit the ruling elite – such as institutional racism – are not imposed on society from above but win consent from citizens. This is a process that constantly reworks itself (Hall, 1980: 322-323; Mouffe, 1979).

Thus, race is a constructed category that comes into being through both economic and material factors and through social dynamics that are historically contingent. Ultimately, racism is part of the ruling elites’ ideology and gets consent from, as well as being reproduced by, wider society.

To further understand how race operates in society, we must first look through a Gramscian lens at how power operates. Coming from a Marxist perspective, like Hall, Gramsci challenged economism as simplistic and defined leadership, or as he called it hegemony, as:

The ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production (1971: 12).

What Gramsci meant by this is that the ruling group maintains control through “the creation and perpetuation of legitimating symbols” that make up the dominant culture. This is a fractious, incomplete process often prone to conflict (Lears, 1985: 569) but through these means the elite gain consent for their ideas from society. To achieve this, two semi-autonomous spheres: political society (government, courts, police) and civil society (the latter being “the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’”, namely comprised of schools, churches, political parties) work together in complex and at times conflictual ways to convince subordinate groups to support the “existing social order” (Gramsci, 1971: 12; Bates, 1975). As will be explained in the Methodology, popular culture – in particular the media – plays an important role in creating this order

in contemporary Britain, just as notions of the racialised colonised ‘other’ were disseminated throughout society at the beginning of the 20th Century in the form of advertising (McClintock, 1997). Yet for the moment, it is simply important to establish that hegemony, which will be further defined later, is a constantly changing process whereby the dominant group secure approval for their ideas from the population.

As Hall has demonstrated, Gramsci’s conceptualisation of hegemony can be used to study race. At certain times and in certain places racialised subjectivities are embedded into discursive processes and institutions and this can shape how goods are distributed. Take the media, representations we see in newspapers accumulate meaning and create what Hall called the dominant regimes of representation (1997a); at different historical and social stages they sustain certain racial norms and prejudices. For example, in recent years, sections of the media have suggested sexual abuse carried out against girls – often presented as exclusively white girls – is a crime associated almost exclusively with South-Asian men, usually of Pakistani heritage; their “culture” is presented as the causal factor in child sex abuse. This is an extreme example of what Martin Barker called the ‘new racism’ (1981) and Etienne Balibar has called neo-racism (1991), where though it remains a marker of racial difference, biological racism on the basis of skin colour and phenotype is largely abandoned for a cultural racism, which sees certain people as not belonging in – and in this case damaging – the nation because of their ‘alien’ culture constructed as innate to them. Barker argued ‘new racism’ is:

It is a theory of human nature. Human nature is such that it is natural to form a bounded community, a nation, aware of its differences from other nations [...] It is in our biology, our instincts, to defend our way of life, traditions and customs against outsiders – not because they are inferior, but because they are part of different cultures (1981: 21; 23).

Despite the fact that there is no correlation between race, culture and sexual abuse, it is an idea – although a contested one – propped up by politicians, including former Home Secretary Jack Straw, because, we can assume, it is politically convenient for them to do so or perhaps they believe it themselves. Through discursive constructions for some in the society, this form of racialisation begins to appear as common sense (Cockbain, 2013). In this thesis what this means is that “cultural racism builds on biological racism a further discourse, which evokes cultural differences from an alleged British, ‘civilised’ norm to vilify, marginalise or demand cultural assimilation from groups who also suffer from biological racism” (Meer and Modood, 2012: 39). Race is

produced institutionally and is embedded in a popular discourse that makes particular forms of racial prejudice appear to be common sense at certain times, this process helps to create and justify racialised hierarchies. Thus, in line with Hall (1997b) this thesis will understand race as a system of classification, which itself is produced by racialisation (Sabaratnam, 2018).

ii. Maintaining the racial hierarchy: How do we make sense of racialisation?

To elucidate these ideas, I will define racialisation and then racism. The changing ways race is constructed in different temporal and geographical contexts is defined as racialisation. It is the process by which race is “injected” into social relations through institutions and popular culture (Garner, 2016: 5) and turned into a determining, meaning-laden term. In accordance with the requirements of the dominant group at a specific time, the ‘otherness’ racialisation creates is assembled on the basis of skin colour, physical description and/or cultural difference tied to a social hierarchy (Murji and Solomos, 2005). It creates and reproduces the racial categories necessary to create and sustain racial hierarchies; it is thus the process by which “supposed ancestral groups” of individuals or groups are identified and then this identification is invested “with political meaning” (Sabaratnam, 2018: 7). For instance, during the 1950s and 1960s increasing numbers of people from the colonies and former colonies came to settle in Britain, which they had the legal right to do as citizens. Although there were also specific forms of racialisation attached to each group, the media also homogenised Indian people with people emigrating to Britain from the Caribbean or other countries in Asia; under the broad term ‘immigrants’ they were constructed as a threat to society (Hartmann, Husband and Clark, 1974: 56-90) and some used this as a justification for refusing housing or work to people of colour. The ruling elite benefitted from this both economically and politically; they exploited people labelled as ‘immigrants’ for economic gain and demonised them to gain power (Croft and Dean, 2014). In this sense, racialisation is used to justify racial discrimination or oppression (Sabaratnam, 2018).

Racialisation is not always based on fear or overt negativity: in contemporary Britain, it

is not uncommon for Britons of Indian descent, whose votes and economic contributions are at times embraced by politicians, to be celebrated for being 'hardworking'. Ahead of Narendra Modi's visit to Britain in November 2015, one newspaper columnist lauded British Indians as naturally "industrious" high-achievers (Kirkup, 2015: 13), which arguably assumes a certain ancestral nature to this work ethic. 'Negative' and 'positive' overarching stereotypes were assembled through the process of racialisation, they can exist alongside one another in the same time and place and persist for a long time but they are not fixed. As the suffix 'sation' in the word 'racialisation' suggests, this is an ongoing process where the constructions of race as an explanatory tool change over time.

Avtar Brah has expanded on Hall's model for understanding race; eloquently showing that the process of racialisation is contingent upon other socially constructed categories (1996: 213). Social categories overlap; one set of social relations cannot be privileged above another nor can they be yoked together as one (McClintock, 1997). For instance, when a group of people is racialised, women may be constructed differently from men (hooks, 1982; Haraway, 1989; Ware, 1992). To explain this, Brah gave the example of "Asian women's positionality in post-war Britain", arguing that their "gender has been the site of colonial debates about 'culture' and 'tradition'" (1996: 12). In this process of racialisation, Asian women were seen as a homogeneous mass in Britain, and were often – and in many ways continue to be, particularly if they are Muslims (Dwyer, 1999; Falah and Nagel, 2005; Pai, 2016) – constructed as trapped in an oppressive culture, populated with aggressive men, and in need of saving. This understanding of social identities, which we might term intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991), means classifications such as gender, class, sexuality and disability should be taken into account when discussing race. Consequently, racialisation is not a process that occurs in isolation, it intersects with other social categories affecting people differently.

Racialisation is not a binary process where racial groups are always constructed as a homogeneous mass or solely divided along social lines such as gender or class. In a process termed differential racialisation, "racialised power is configured into hierarchies, not simply between the dominant and subordinate categories of people but also among them" (Brah, 1996: 3). A prime example of this occurred during

colonialism, where Indian people might have been privileged over people from the African continent. There is an ever-changing hierarchy of racism. In addition to this, as they appear to become common sense (as Gramsci would understand it), race formations entrenched in society may be perpetuated by people who are themselves oppressed by racism. This can even manifest itself as intra-group racialisation e.g. caste and India (Omvedt, 2006; Dirks, 2011). Racialisation, whether differential or not, is not a straightforward process; Gramsci highlighted the conflict that can occur between a “person’s conscious thoughts and the implicit values embedded in his actions”, in rare instances resulting in counterhegemony (Lears, 1985: 569). This is because we all have multiple subjectivities and cannot solely be defined by one social category; the numerous aspects of our “selves” can contradict one another as well as the dominant ideology that we might perpetuate (Mouffe, 1993). Nevertheless, though these contradictions exist, at different times and in accordance with the prevailing ideology, racial groups are racialised differently, and can take part in this racialisation themselves. Amid these different layers of racialisation what is most important for this thesis is that we can understand race as a system of classification made possible by racialisation (Hall, 1997b).

iii. Racism

How does the term ‘racism’ fit into our understanding of race? Steve Garner defines it thus: “racism can be thought of as the engine that produces unequal outcomes of all kinds, while racialisation is the ideological fuel that keeps the engine going” (2016: 4). Racialisation turns race into a significant label and racism is the impact of this process on the ‘other’ in terms of material and social inequalities (Alcoff, 2001). Alternatively, as Gramsci would see it, after winning the consent of broader society, racialisation makes racism the norm and this “support[s] and define[s] the existing distribution of goods” (Lears, 1985: 569). Depending on the shape of racialisation in a particular moment and location, racism affects different genders, racial groups and classes differently. We might use W.E.B Du Bois’s (1935) work to further understand this. In *Black Reconstruction* Du Bois (1935) explained how capitalism relied on and produced racial difference along economic and social lines in order to maintain a system of exploitation. He called this the wages of whiteness, which as he explained functioned on two levels. There was the material wage; black and brown people are paid less than their white counterparts. And the psychological wage; certain white

people, as part of the working class, may have been paid a low wage but received “public deference [...] because they were white. They were admitted freely, with all classes of white people, to public functions [and] public parks” (Du Bois, 1935: 700). That is the material and immaterial parts of white racial power that manifest through societal structures and norms.

But what is also important in this equation is Du Bois’ evolving understanding of the colour line, which he argued was central to capitalist development. He understood it initially as “the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea” to make sense of racial discrimination. But after visiting a Warsaw ghetto in 1949 and the treatment of Jewish people in Poland he recognised the colour line was:

not even solely a matter of color and physical and racial characteristics [...] No, the race problem in which I was interested cut across lines of color and physique and belief and status and was a matter of cultural patterns, perverted teaching and human hate and prejudice, which reached all sorts of people and caused endless evil to all men (Du Bois, 1952: 46).

Thus racism should not be understood through a narrow, essentialist definition that merely understands it as colour-coded prejudice or as solely distinguished by phenotype; to do so is to ignore the modalities of race, racialisation and racism. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s work on race and capital explains, “racism is the state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death, in distinct yet densely interconnection political geographies” (2002: 261). What is important here to note, Melamed argues is that Gilmore “identifies a dialectic in which forms of humanity are separated (made “distinct”) so that they may be “interconnected” in terms that feed capital”, this process, which Gilmore calls “partition” is, in the words of Melamed “the base algorithm for capitalism” (2015: 78). Thus we can see how racial divides are intimately connected in such a way that they are reliant on one another and capitalism is reliant on their positioning in relation to one another.

Racism, then, is both part of a complex process of exploitation and exclusion and “inhabits spaces of deep ambivalence, admiration, envy and desire” (Brah, 1996: 15). As Du Bois’s work on the colour line suggested, race is not consistently maintained in

binary terms: superior whiteness vs. inferior blackness. Those in power demonise, fear and pity the ‘other’ and may also exoticise and lust after difference. For instance, in colonial India, British men often saw the colonised women in India as both helpless and sexually alluring. As Homi Bhabha explained, drawing on Frantz Fanon’s (1961) work on the Manichean Delirium, these contradictions speak to a split within the colonial oppressor whose identity is intrinsically connected to the construction of the ‘other’. He wrote:

[The colonizer is] tethered to, not confronted by, his dark reflection, the shadow of colonized man, that splits his presence, distorts his outline, breaches his boundaries, repeats his action at a distance, disturbs and divides the very time of his being (1952: xiv).

This tension – where those in power have a contradictory relationship with the “other” that reveals instability at the core of their own identity (Stoler, 1995; 2010) – continues to persist where racial categories are used as markers of difference. Therefore, racialisation and racism can speak to both an anxiety over and desire for ‘otherness’ that itself can reveal the instability of racial identities.

iv. Understanding whiteness

Whiteness is central to this thesis and thus this section will explain how it is conceptualised in relation to existing literature and how postcolonial and decolonial theory, both of which are deployed at points throughout this thesis, relate to this literature. It is important to consider whiteness because as Coco Fusco reminded us, “racial identities are not only Black, Latino, Asian, Native American and so on; they are also white. To ignore white ethnicity is to redouble its hegemony by naturalizing it” (1988: 91).

Critical whiteness studies is a varied and broad field, but there is a general agreement that whiteness is culturally and politically constructed, shifting and relational; the movement of Irish people from “non white” to “white” demonstrates its fluidity (Roediger, 1999). As with all racial categories there is “an inherent definitional slipperiness and instability” to whiteness; it is not a “credible biological property. But it is a social construction with real effects that has become a powerful organizing principle around the world” (Rasmussen, Klinenberg, Nexica and Wray, 2001: 8).

Indeed, we can see “there are no white people as such only a (changing) set of idealized norms, practices, and investments that constitute a white racialized ideal” (Hunter, Swan and Grimes, 2010: 410). These are manifest in a variety of ways, some of which be explored throughout this section, as well as more broadly in this thesis.

However, to begin to make sense of this, we can draw on Richard Dyer’s seminal work *White* (1997), which considered some of the key ways whiteness manifests. Importantly, given its constructed nature, as with other racial categories, skin colour is one marker used to denote whiteness, but it is not the only one. That is because whiteness is politically and culturally made and not restricted to *a priori* racial definitions (Hall, 1988). Thus, we can understand whiteness as a constructed subject position and image of the self that is not biologically grounded. Dyer showed what this can mean by analysing how white people claim to speak for the commonality of humanity – essentially what this means is that whites are seen as the purest expression of human race itself (Dyer, 1997: 22). But Dyer demonstrated that this is not just about biological or physical difference but what he called “‘spirit’”:

get up and go, aspiration, awareness of the highest reaches of intellectual comprehension and aesthetic refinement. Above all, the white spirit could both master and transcend the white body, while the non-white soul as a prey to the promptings and fallibilities of the body (1997: 23).

These ideas, Dyer explained, are central to whiteness in a way that transcends white peoples’ bodies. Through these supposed ideals people possess, the impression is created – perhaps most easily identifiable in imperialism – that “white people lead humanity forward because of their temperamental qualities of leadership: will power, far-sightedness, energy” (Dyer, 1997: 31). As we will see throughout this thesis, these are qualities that can be performed and seemingly identified in people who might not be considered as phenotypically white.

Though we can track and identify these characteristics, one of the key ways the racial hierarchy functions is through the establishment and invisibilisation of whiteness (Du Bois, 1917; Fanon, 1952; Baldwin, 1962; Dyer, 1997). Critical whiteness theorists establish that the invisibilisation of whiteness is part of how it functions and this can make it difficult to detect and pin down. Existing scholars explore how whiteness

works in differential ways, is produced and reproduced in different contexts and differently even within the same context, shaping both global power dynamics and interpersonal interactions (Essed, 1991; Dyer, 1997; Wekker, 2016). Therefore, it is necessary to attempt to analyse some of the different ways it shapes discourse, power relations and our understanding of the world. In order to do so, in this thesis whiteness is understood as part of a hegemonic system of racial classification that operates at both a macro and micro level (Essed, 1991), the latter in particular focussed on the everyday manifestations of whiteness. Although it should be noted that the different levels whiteness operates on are often connected to one another.

Firstly, we will consider whiteness at the macro level. One of the ways we can understand whiteness in the contemporary moment is considering how it “is linked to imperial and colonial expansion, simultaneous with the making of (white dominant) nation states” (Frankenberg, 1997: 8, see also Hall 2000; Goldberg 2006; López, 2005: 10). Indeed, whiteness was and continues to be central to the understanding of what constitutes a ‘modern’, ‘developed’ state or set of states. This thinking becomes apparent when we consider the way ‘the West’ is conceptualised; “the signification of the modern and the European as well as the racially coded nature of global divisions of labour suggest that racialization is not an anachronistic but a contemporary project” (Bonnett, 2002: 350). As Winant pointed out, this has been challenged “since World War II, and particularly since the 1960s” but the relationship between whiteness and supremacy has not been dislodged (2000: 99). Whiteness is essential to the demarcation between the “civilised” over the “uncivilised” world in popular British discourse; whiteness is “produced in dialectic with racialized Others who need intervention to become civil and modern” (Jiwani, 2006: 5). Therefore, when thinking about development discourse, it is important to consider how this might continue to be the case and how ‘the West’ and Britain are still reified as sites of supposed civilisation and progress. Whiteness consists of a myth of a civilised global North helping an uncivilized global South is sustained in spite of a reality where Western capitalism was built on racial exploitation (Andrews, 2016: 439). As Gramsci (1971) would say, on this basis people assume leadership and thus adopt a pedagogical relation to the rest of the world (also see Pagano, 2017: 64).

Related to this is how whiteness can function at a micro level. One of the central ideas in critical whiteness studies is that whiteness must be exposed as a “tacitly privileged subject position” (López, 2005: 14). People interpellated as white receive relative material, social and political advantages in comparison to people who are not. In addition to this, people classified as white are – implicitly or explicitly – seen to be more advanced and capable than people of colour and are thus rewarded accordingly (Leonardo, 2004: 137). This is because, as discussed above, whiteness gains meaning from particular socio-historical parameters; during colonialism white identity was constructed and made to represent the ideal notion of civilization, modernity and progress in order to legitimate rapacious imperial projects (Hage, 1998: 58). As Sabaratnam explains: “the idea of the ‘West’ as a civilisation emerged as a somewhat fluid construct which nonetheless allowed many people racialised as ‘white’ to identify with each other in a variety of racialised settings around the world” (2018: 8).

How this operates at a micro level – in terms of interpersonal engagements – is complicated and shifting, not least because as noted earlier, “whiteness is not reducible to white skin, or even to ‘something’ we can have or be” (Ahmed, 2007: 159). During colonialism, “the whiteness that distinguished the colonizer from the colonized was a social construction that was not concerned simply with skin colour, but with what that signified in terms of disposition, culture and habits” (Anderson, 2013: 36). As Stoler explained the focal dispositions for maintaining whiteness were created in the bourgeois family and consisted of restraint, civility, self-discipline and self-control – these were needed to be a pure European (1995: 149-164). Thus “pigmentation was not sufficient to distinguish the properly white”; instead “self-mastery” required “self-ownership or property in the person”. This meant the borders of whiteness were fraught and unstable, they were “(im)permeable for working-class women” and “while Empire and colonialism whitened the urban poor in Britain, there was the ever present danger that they might revert to type because of their genetic and cultural inadequacies” (Anderson, 2013: 36). This notion of whiteness as connected to higher ideals, self-mastery and control has persisted. In Britain for instance, this means poor white people can be implicitly treated as not quite white through the depiction of them as lazy “benefit scroungers” or by associating them with criminality and low culture (Shilliam, 2018).

Furthermore, whiteness can be in operation in communities of colour. For instance, as López explained, there can be bourgeoisie communities such as “Cuban Americans, Indian Brahmins, Afro-Jamaican bourgeoisie” who invest “in whiteness to some degree or other as an indispensable component of their own upward mobility within their respective societies” (2001: 17). For example, racialisation can be bound up with language, dress code, education, diet or architecture. We can understand this from Fanon’s work, demonstrating the continuing power of whiteness, he explains how a former slave wants to “make himself recognized”, particularly through conflict with his former master in order to achieve psychological and ontological freedom from colonial power (1952: 217). This is done by performing certain modes of whiteness, conforming to what is seen as ‘modern’ and capable.

However, even these groups López mentioned, if compared against people racialised as white in predominantly white communities, would be seen as lesser and not white. In comparison to less privileged groups within the nation state they inhabit whiteness to maintain their superiority. Thus, as with colonialism, people of colour can perform whiteness but they will never quite be white. By the same token, those who might have been considered as having white skin but were depicted as ‘other’, such as the Irish in 1800s America, have still tended to retain privileges of whiteness that people of colour have not comparatively had. Though they may have been racialised as ‘other’, they were not prevented “from voting on the grounds that they were not white” or “hauled [...] into court for marrying white persons” (Foner, 2010: 5). Thus “whiteness is graduated, with internal boundaries between the more and less white”, although we can and should recognise that “those who are ‘white’, however degraded, are nearly always salvageable in contrast and relation to those who are not”. The importance here is to recognise the “motility and contingency of racial categories” (Anderson, 2013: 37).

This shows how whiteness operates among people who may not be considered as phenotypically as white but also the limits of this. As Fanon notes: “the educated Negro suddenly discovers that he is rejected by a civilization which he has none the less assimilated” (1952: 93). This is also manifest in Bhabha’s work, which considers the coloniser’s attempt to impose particular ways of being onto the colonized. In Bhabha’s definition, mimicry is articulated as “the desire for [...] the subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite [...] almost the same but not white”

(Bhabha, 1984: 86–89). Thus some of those people who might not be seen as phenotypically white can perform whiteness but will still be considered as somewhat ‘other’ in relation to those interpellated as phenotypically white.

As with all hegemonies, there is an anxiety over the meaning of white identity and how to protect it. Yet arguably to protect itself, it at once sets up a constant distance from the ‘other’, while also making itself seem invisible and/or natural (Frankenberg, 1993). Or as Richard Dyer explained “whites must be seen to be white, yet whiteness consists in invisible properties, and whiteness as power is maintained by being unseen”; “[o]ther people are raced, we are just people” (1997: 45). As noted at the beginning of this section, Dyer explained that this gives people interpellated as white the image of being the representative of all humanity, not just one race (1997: 10), this in turn reinforces the idea of whiteness as the pinnacle of humanity and modernity. Thinking about development discourse, as we will see, this invisibilisation is partly achieved through the idea established earlier; whereby the European notions of progress that underlie discourse and practice, and which are inextricably linked with whiteness, are constructed as universal. However, as Sara Ahmed outlined, this invisibility is dependent upon one’s viewpoint: “whiteness is only invisible for those who inhabit it, or those who get so used to its inhabitation that they learn not to see it, even when they are not it” (2004: 1).

These understandings of the different, overlapping ways whiteness operates at the macro and micro level – and the relationships we might draw between the two – will be key for making sense of how whiteness manifests in the different strands of analysis used in this thesis. Thinking about how whiteness is rooted at the macro level of the national and international and how it operates at the micro level of the development organisation will be a theme that runs throughout this thesis.

Furthermore, we might see how postcolonial and decolonial theory – both of which are concerned with the impact of colonialism on the contemporary world – might provide a basis for understanding whiteness. As López explained, aside from theorists such as Bhabha, whose work I have drawn on in this section, “postcolonial studies has generally shied away from explicit discussions of race”. Though López sought to remedy this, he argued it might stem from “the poststructuralist sensibility of much postcolonial

writing, with its accompanying aversion to any seemingly oppositional logic and affinity for linguistic and literary, as opposed to sociological, critique” or it could be that “the undertheorization of colonial whiteness may be the product of a simple conflation; that is, whiteness in this context may be so closely associated with colonial domination that no further distinction seems necessary or desirable” (López, 2005: 4).

Though generally not centering whiteness, some postcolonial work is useful for considering the enduring nature colonialism and particular ways of understanding the world formed during Empire continue to shape the contemporary. Postcolonial theory reveals how dichotomous thinking between the colonised and the coloniser continues to shape who and what is seen as modern and progressed, and what is seen as backwards. Race can be inserted into this analysis. As discussed earlier, postdevelopment scholars have analysed the Eurocentricity of development, and how notions of progress are wrongly assumed to be endogenous to ‘the West’ (Escobar, 1995) but this is possible through processes of racialisation, which we must understand as historically rooted. Thus, though ideas of modernity and progress also go beyond skin colour, we can see white skin was symbolic of the “modern man” (Dyer, 1997; Bonnett, 2002) and that this idea was created to draw distinctions between ‘civilised’ colonisers and the ‘uncivilised’ colonised after the conquest of the Americas.

Decolonial scholars are also concerned with the relationship between colonialism and contemporary operation of power and their specific theorisation of this relationship is useful to understand whiteness. Indeed decolonial scholars might make sense of the ‘civilised’/‘uncivilised’ through the colonality/modernity dichotomy. Many scholars – Quijano (2000), Mignolo (2002) and Grosfoguel (2002) among them – consider that ideas of ‘modernity’, in terms of how it is historically and epistemologically constructed, is bound up with colonality, which is concerned with the centering of ‘the West’ in the development of the capitalist world and ongoing modes of power that were produced during Empire. Colonality is reliant on the racialised hierarchy of humanity “which enables forms of conquest, appropriation, violence and domination” (Sabaratnam, 2017: 155). In this equation, whiteness, which might be understood as corresponding to modernity, remains central to maintaining European dominance.

Decolonial theory is also concerned with the erasure of alternative forms of knowledge, privileging European epistemology that might be linked to whiteness, through the construction of white Europeans as holding knowledge for progress and civility. It is by privileging of the English language and European epistemology that such ideas of racialised superiority are maintained (Thiong'o, 1986). These are ideas that will be deployed at times throughout this thesis, however, as decolonial theory has a different cosmological basis to this thesis – focusing on coloniality and not race, per se – this theoretical framework will be drawn up but not centred when understanding whiteness.

Methodologically, Ware and Back noted there is a risk with looking at whiteness, where one assumes a moral high ground and those examined are “consigned to the backwoods of bad-sense whiteness” (2002: 8). This thesis attempts to avoid this by looking at the structural nature of race. In addition to this, bringing whiteness into analysis risks centring groups that are already centred. But for the purposes of this study, to ignore whiteness would be a significant oversight. I follow from Nakayama and Krizek (1995), and Lorde (1984) respectively who argued that identifying whiteness reveals its centrality – looking at it as a racialised positioning challenges its supremacy and reveals how it operates as a “mythical norm” (Lorde, 1984: 116). It allows for the possibility of destabilising the logic of race as a category. In fact, in mainstream development discourse attention is often explicitly focussed on the ‘other’. As well as examining different forms of racialisation used in representations of people in India, this thesis will look at how whiteness is constructed in development discourse to unveil the often hidden racial category that sustains it and is in some way sustained by development.

v. Tools to understand race, racialisation and whiteness

Therefore, as has been discussed in the previous pages, throughout this thesis race, racism, racialisation and whiteness will be understood as social and economic constructions that are rooted in the hegemonic project through government, civil society and discursive formations. These are not steady categories. Yet in certain historical moments and contexts, people or groups of people are categorised along race lines – in combination with other categories – for the social and material benefit of those in power. This thesis will thus contribute to a body of critical race theory that

recognizes “race [...] is the centrepiece of a hierarchy system that produces difference” (Hall, 2017: 33).

However, taking cues from Sabaratnam (2018), I will now lay out the tools used in this thesis to analyse development discourse. They are rooted in the conceptualisation of race and racialisation outlined above and aim to provide a clear explanation of the semantic context I am focussing on. In this, I propose that there are a number of different, overlapping epistemologies that allow us to make sense of how development is racialised. They include: ignorance, innocence, goodness, rationality and immanence. Much of this draws on critical race scholarship on whiteness but as I will explain in the conclusion to this section, it can also be used as a way in to understand racialised representations of the to-be-developed and broader constructions of the ‘other’.

Firstly, let us consider the epistemology of ignorance, which Sabaratnam (2018) uses to make sense of whiteness. Ignorance as conceptualised by Mills (1997) is one of the key means through which racialised forms of development can be understood. Ignorance can be made sense of as the necessary lack of knowledge about the historical and current forms of racial domination, which make this domination possible (Mills, 1997: 19). There is quite simply a lack of understanding among white people of the racist world in which they live and benefit from (Sullivan and Tuana, 2007: 2). This is reliant on thought that excludes Europe’s histories of supremacism, as well as the present, and exceptionalises its position as a symbol of progress.

This is useful for making sense of development discourse because, as we will see, there is a consistent decontextualisation of poverty among the to-be-developed and a rewriting and romanticisation of British colonial history. These are key tropes in development discourse that rely on ignorance not only to construct the developer as a symbol of progress but also the to-be-developed as inherently backwards. Thus, as discussed in relation to postdevelopment, postcolonial and decolonial scholars’ work (Dussel, 1995; Chakrabarty, 2002; 2009; Eisenstadt, 2002; Bhabra, 2007; Wagner, 2010; Shibusawa, 2013; Sabaratnam, 2017), ignorance in relation to development also means excluding the non-European world – the cultural and intellectual production

that occurred outside of Europe and the forms of wealth and resource extraction and manual labour Europe relied on in from its colonies – when discussing notions of European modernity and development (Bhambra, 2007). This ignorance is then fundamental to sustaining the dominant ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ narrative that we will engage with in development discourse. This will also allow us to think about how this dichotomy is not rigid but rather look at the ways processes of racialisation are fluid and relational.

Sabaratnam shows that working with the epistemology of ignorance is the construction of innocence. Gloria Wekker’s theorisation of white innocence (2016) can be understood as the process through which racism is treated as a product of individual bad behaviour and where active forms of racism are understood to have been largely dealt with. It is through both ignorance and innocence that racism is treated as if it is not structural. There is a disavowal of the institutional nature of racism and the historical backdrop of Empire that produces and justifies supremacist narratives. Innocence erases the systemic nature of racism and thus if current racial inequalities are not a product of historical racism and contemporary institutional racism then racial hierarchies are assumed to be natural. This is illuminating for development discourse as it will allow us to consider how in government, development professionals’ and media narratives, poverty is often constructed as inherent to the ‘developing’ world or as a fact of life, isolated from broader historical, social, political and economic processes.

As this thesis looks to Sabaratnam’s work on whiteness (2018), it uses the notion of immanence to make sense of how whiteness but also processes of racialisation operate. Sabaratnam argues, “epistemologies of ignorance and innocence also require some kind of alternative narrative about *how* and *why* white-racialised people arose to their present position of pre-eminence”. Using Gurminder Bhambra’s work (2007) on Eurocentricity, Sabaratnam devises an epistemology she calls ‘immanence’. Under this understanding of whiteness, the notions of modernity explored earlier in this chapter are understood as:

[I]mmanent or endogenous to the ‘West’. In this discursive formation, the West is an auto-generative entity whose own genius and social conditions drove a rapid but autonomous form of modernisation, meaning it surpassed historical competitors in achieving the advances in political, economic, social, technological and cultural spheres (Sabaratnam, 2018: 13).

This is necessary to help understand development discourse as it is based on the notion of 'the West', or more often in our case Britain, as having the answers to development, which is a product of immanence. It is thought Britain naturally developed itself and now must provide a path for others to develop, as they are inherently incapable.

However, for the purposes of development discourse there are two other manifestations of whiteness found in this thesis, which are not covered by Sabaratnam's framework. Though they are reliant on immanence to function, and in many ways constitutive of this immanence, and they are closely related to ideas of innocence and ignorance, they are not the same as the existing categories and in development discourse are essential to understanding the multitude of ways whiteness operates, they are the notions of goodness and rationality.

Goodness is used in this thesis to make sense of how whiteness is intrinsically tied to notions of being or doing good. We can make sense of this to some degree through Richard Dyer's work. He explained:

Power in contemporary society habitually passes itself off as embodied in the normal as opposed to the superior (cf. Marcuse 1964). This is common to all forms of power, but it works in a peculiarly seductive way with whiteness, because of the way it seems rooted, in common-sense thought, in things other than ethnic difference [...] Thus it is said [...] that there are inevitable associations of white with light and therefore safety, and black with dark and therefore danger, and that this explains racism (whereas one might well argue about the safety of the cover of darkness, and the danger of exposure to the light); again, and with more justice, people point to the Judaeo-Christian use of white and black to symbolize good and evil, as carried still in such expressions as "a black mark," "white magic," "to blacken the character" and so on (2002: 127).

Goodness is structured around the representation of white as positive and black, and in many cases brown, as bad and impure. This form of representation transfers subtly across the justifications for global power and ordering: 'the West' and/or Britain have the best intentions for the entire world and their motivations are pure. This arguably is related to colonial narratives that represent colonised people as barbaric and the coloniser as benevolently bringing progress and religion to backwards parts of the world; this was one of the bedrocks of colonial supremacist thinking. Goodness is then useful to think about how development is discursively constructed in the British context; the ways that not only is there a 'developer' and a to-be-developed but that the

stability of these categories and the justifications behind them are reliant on whiteness being considered synonymous with goodness.

Existing alongside this is the idea of rationality as a symbol for whiteness and progress. In this, I draw on the previous theoretical tools, in particular ignorance, to argue that European progress is grounded in a particular notion of what is classed as universal epistemology, yet rationality should still be understood as its own category that makes up and is made by ideas of whiteness. One key strand of this is that rationality and within this hard-headedness – that is, the idea of rational self-interest – is inherent to European thought. Or put another way:

(A) dominant impulse of whiteness took shape around the notion of rationality of the European Enlightenment, with its privilege construction of a transcendental white, male, rational subject who operated at the recesses of power while at the same time giving every indication that he escaped the confines of time and space [...] reason is this historical configuration is whitened and human nature itself is grounded upon this reasoning capacity. Lost in the defining process is the socially constructed nature of reason itself, not to mention its emergence as a signifier of whiteness (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1998: 5).

Thus whiteness represents “orderliness, rationality, and self-control and nonwhiteness indicating chaos, irrationality, violence and the breakdown of self-regulation” (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1998: 5). This will help make sense of development discourse when it is talked about as if it is motivated by goodness but also hard-headed rationality. As will be unpacked in this thesis, embedded within this is the idea of self-reflexivity; where whiteness is affirmed by an ability to be aware of the damages caused by whiteness, even if not explicitly articulated as such. This self-reflexivity then reinforces ideas of white rationality and white goodness. Whiteness is thus constituted by notions of goodness and rationality and thus through the epistemology of immanence we can see that discourses of modernity and progress continue to be a justification for supremacist notions of progress.

Though Sabaratnam uses them primarily to consider whiteness, these forms of epistemology are not only illuminating in this respect; they also allow us to consider how the to-be-developed and the ‘developing’ world are racialised. As Karen Brodtkin wrote, “white always contains a positive spin in explicit or implicit contrast to a negative one attached to a nonwhite other” (Brodtkin, 2001: 147). Homi Bhabha’s concept of ambivalence (1984; 1994) is useful to make sense of this further. Bhabha

analysed how identities are relational and how the figure of the active coloniser is placed against a barbaric colonised person, these constructions are in a hierarchy and give meaning to one another. Bhabha explained that these categories either had to be articulated at the same time or that when one was uttered there was a tacit allusion to the existence of the other. But they also must rhetorically be kept at a distance from one another – for example European rationality and colonised irrationality were treated as fixed, atavistic, without origin and thus distinct categories. Therefore, we can consider throughout this thesis epistemologies of immanence construct the to-be-developed as poor, corrupt or simply incapable as the opposite of the good, rational ‘West’.

However, the division between the developer and the to-be-developed is not necessarily static. Using these epistemologies, we will see that notions of whiteness and other forms of racialisation can be shifting and relational and intersect with class and gender. This is not to say, though, that there are not still overarching dominant tropes related to whiteness, which are more easily occupied by people who are thought to have white pigmentation, but rather that as laid out in earlier pages, race and processes of racialisation are not reducible to skin colour, this can be one marker of many for race. As Brodtkin wrote about whiteness:

work that foregrounds enduring tropes or themes is open to criticism for not attending to the ways that whiteness, defined in relation to a panoply of nonwhiteness, is synchronously diverse and historically fluid [...] likewise, analyses that foreground diversity and fluidity are fair game to criticism that they erase historically persistent meanings and contents of whiteness (2001: 148).

By using the epistemologies outlined above, this thesis will attempt to both show the fluidity of whiteness and other forms of racialisation, in terms of who they are applied to and used to represent at different times, while also analysing the overarching tropes that remain to some extent consistent. Indeed, in this way it will use and extend these epistemologies in a novel way, considering how they operate and both the macro and micro level and what this might mean for our understanding of whiteness in the context of development discourse.

vi. Hegemony

As should be clear by now, I will utilise a Gramscian approach to power, which is centred on the notion of hegemony. At its most basic level, this means understanding

hegemony as “political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the ruling class” (Bates, 1975: 352). Power is thus not primarily exercised through coercion but consent; “to the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases. Hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behaviour in most people most of the time” (Cox, 1983: 164). Creating this consent helps maintain the ruling ideology by making it appear common sense.

Looking to Hall’s work on Gramscian notions of hegemony, we can see that creating and maintaining this consent is not a one-dimensional process. Hall argued,

we must take note of the multi-dimensional, multi-arena character of hegemony. It cannot be constructed or sustained on one front of struggle alone [...] it represents a degree of mastery over a whole series of different “positions” at once. Mastery is not simply imposed or dominative in character. Effectively, it results from winging a substantial degree of popular consent. It thus represents the installation of a profound measure of social and moral authority, not simply over its immediate supporters but across social as a whole. It is this “authority,” and the range and the diversity of sites on which “leadership” is exercised, which makes possible the “propagation,” for a time, of an intellectual, moral, political and economic collective will throughout society (Hall, 1986: 15).

This demonstrates that hegemony is reproduced on multiple planes and that it is consistently being re-engineered; it is not static. Indeed, “hegemony must be constructed, it represents a contested and won on many different sites, as the structures of the modern state and society complexity and the points of social antagonism proliferate” (Hall, 1988: 168).

The creation and maintenance of hegemony is a conflictual process. In order for this hegemony to be maintained, “different, often contradictory elements can be woven into and integrated within different ideological discourses” (Hall, 1986: 27). What this process achieves is a form of common sense that is “not rigid and immobile but is continually transforming itself” (Gramsci cited in Hall, 1986: 21). Nevertheless, this means when the ruling classes’ ideas, values and ways of organising society become hegemonic, they also become commonsense. That is, they may be reproduced in other sections of society.

To more specifically understand what Hall means by the “multi-dimensional

character” of hegemony, this thesis considers how a Gramscian reading allows us to expand the conception of hegemony and how we understand power and authority (Hall, 1988: 168). In a classic Gramscian reading, hegemony is maintained through the state and civil society. As Cox explains, if we use a Gramscian lens we must understand that “the hegemony of a dominant class [...] bridged the conventional categories of state and civil society, categories which retained a certain analytical usefulness but ceased to correspond to separable entities in reality” (Cox, 1983: 164). This therefore transforms “the limited definition of the state, characteristic of some versions of Marxism, as essentially reducible to the coercive instrument of the ruling class,” by emphasising both the “educative and formative” role of a state that is not simply coercive and “the complexity of the formation of modern civil society” (Hall, 1986: 18). Hegemony is thus concerned with the different constellations of power that maintain a commonsense, which itself must be consistently reengineered.

Gramscian conceptualisations of hegemony, in particular as deployed by Hall, are useful for the purposes of this thesis because it allows us to understand the different domains in which, as well as the different ways, race is constructed and given meaning. As Hall explains:

Gramsci’s subtle use of the state/civil society distinction – even when it fluctuates in his own work – is an extremely flexible theoretical tool, and may lead analysts to pay much more serious attention to those institutions and processes in so-called “civil society” in racially structured social formations than they have been encouraged to do in the past [...] in any Gramscian-inflected analysis, they would cease to be relegated to a superficial place in the analysis (1986: 26).

Therefore, we must consider how different parts of society talk about development to determine the different ways it is racialised. Thus I will look at how racialisation is maintained and rearticulated in political society and civil society through everyday discursive formations (Gramsci, 1971; Spivak, 1990). In addition to this, as hegemony is not steady or ever complete, I will use Bhabha’s (1994) theorisation of indeterminate and conflicting colonial discourse to further inform my understanding of race as an unstable and historically contingent category. Thus understanding hegemony in this way we can move away from a rigid understanding of race to recognise and make sense of the ways it is shifting, as well as understand how it operates in different spheres. The aim of using Gramscian notions of power, therefore, is to attempt to make sense of hegemonic forms of racialised discourse.

I take cues from Hall, who made it clear Gramsci should not be used “like an Old Testament prophet who, at the correct moment, will offer us the consoling and appropriate quotation”, particularly given the specific context within which he was writing. Rather we might “‘think’ our problems in a Gramscian way” (1988: 161). Thus in my reading, civil society is more expansively conceptualised than in Gramsci’s, as it includes development organisations and the media, the explanations for why will be further unpacked in the Methodology.

Chapter Two

Methodology

In this chapter, I will outline my methodology. I will explain how discourse is being conceptualised in this thesis, the different sets of discourse analysed and why I have decided to hone in on British development discourse about India. Following this I will explain the method of data collection conducted for each chapter, examining why I chose government, development professionals' and media discourse to analyse and the methodology I have used for each unit of analysis. This will include an explanation of why I made particular methodological choices, including a consideration of the chosen time period and the specific sources consulted, and how these decisions impacted on the research findings.

I. Discourse analysis

This thesis seeks to delineate the discursive practices and linguistic features that are responsible for drawing a specific representation of the social actors. As Hall outlined, “it is through its discursive operations that race gives meaning to the world, makes a certain kind of sense of the world, constructs an order of intelligibility, organizes human practices within categories, and thus comes to acquire real effects” (2017: 81). Thus a discursive analysis is particularly important for considering how ideas of whiteness and superiority are maintained through development. Discourse, then, refers “not simply to speech or written communication, but broadly to the sets of signifying practices through which people know and understand the world. Through the circulation of ideas, people determine what they accept to be true and valid, or reject as false and illegitimate” (Shibusawa, 2013: 32). Though this thesis is primarily an analysis of speech and writing, discourse is not limited to these two realms and it also includes non-linguistic actions.

Discourse is “primarily about the production of meaning” (Eriksson Baaz, 2005: 11) and it also plays a part in organising social practices. Discourse analysis shows that “every social configuration is meaningful” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987: 82) and that

meaning is not constructed simply through one discursive medium, but as Hall notes “several [...] working together” (2006a: 165). Thus, this thesis will explore different discursive terrains in order to understand how they work together to produce meaning.

It does so recognising that:

[L]anguage is not merely contemplative or justificatory, it is performative. An analysis of political discourse helps us elucidate not only the systems of thought through which authorities have posed and specified the problems for government, but also the systems of action through which they have sought to give effect to government (Miller and Rose, 1992: 177).

In addition, the discursive production of meaning is historically, socially and institutionally specific. Discourses are partial, they temporarily close meaning and reduce and exclude other possible meanings (Eriksson Baaz, 2005: 11) but they also draw on “elements in other discourses, binding them into its own network of meaning” (Hall, 2006a: 166).

Teun A. van Dijk’s work on the relationship between discourse analysis and analysing racism shows how discourse analysis is helpful for looking at racialisation at a macro and micro level. He explained that “discourse analysis allows us to make explicit the inferences about social cognitions of majority group members about minorities from the properties of their text and talk” and that a detailed study of “political discourse reveals underlying sociopolitical and in particular ethnic attitudes of politicians, and the strategies of agenda setting and the manufacture of the ethnic consensus” (1993: 94).

In addition to this, I will draw on cultural theory to think about government and media representations and also discursive constructions among development professionals. In particular, I use Stuart Hall’s work (1980) as he studied relationships between racial prejudices, hegemony and the media and he focussed on the insidious normalisation of racist stereotypes. Hall wrote about a “grammar of race” which exists in the popular domain. He differentiated between “overt racism”, self-evident instances of racism; and “inferential racism”, “where the apparently naturalized representations of events and situations relating to race, whether ‘factual’ or ‘fictional’ [...] have racist premises and propositions inscribed in them as a set of unquestioned assumptions” (1981: 83). By looking at representation in this way, I will be able to effectively analyse the work

race does in development and how racialised conceptions of development are formulated; circumventing overt racism, its anticipated constructions of development obfuscate the racialised landscape they are situated in and help produce (Hall, 1981).

In order to make sense of these forms of racialisation I will use particular tools of discourse analysis. I look to the work of Roxanne Doty, who conducted an early study of development discourse (1996). Drawing from her work I use the notion of naturalisation, a process that “occurs through presupposition, which creates background knowledge that is taken to be true. This background knowledge entails an implicit theorization of how the world works and also an elaboration of the nature of its inhabitants” (Doty, 1996: 10). This has the effect in development discourse of treating particular subjects and objects, namely the developer and the developed, as naturally occupying the position that they do. With naturalisation is categorisation, which is “[t]he construction of classificatory schemes often serves to naturalize by placing human beings into the categories in which they ‘naturally’ belong. Hierarchies are often established upon the presumed essential character of various kinds of human beings” (Doty, 1996: 10). Thus we can see how there is a hierarchy created between those who are supposedly able or who have developed and those who supposedly are not and have not. Indeed, I will see how the ‘developer’ and the ‘developed’ are positioned against one another through these forms of naturalisation and categorisation and how these may, at times, be shifting in line with shifting forms of racialisation. I understand discourse as a set of subject positions and using these tools will attempt to analyse the propositions found in development discourse and then explore how they are racialised.

Using these tools, I examine three different sources: government discourse, largely in the form of the magazine, *Developments*, interviews with development professionals and newspaper coverage of development in India. It is important to note that the discourse found in each strand differs in key ways, which will be explored later in this chapter, but all three are related to what might be broadly defined as British discourse about India. This work has a comparative component, it offers some space for comparing between different strands of research and I am also able to make reference to existing work that looks at how countries on the African continent feature in development discourse, as well as how general government development discourse is

racialised. India is one of the objects in the discourse, and a site where development professionals practice their work. Therefore, using the tools of discourse analysis, the chosen case study of British development discourse will be used to show how development is constituted by racialised representations (Wendt, 1998: 104). Before considering the chosen time frame and why I have focussed on the chosen forms of discourse analysed, I will briefly explain why I focussed on India as one of the main objects in this discourse.

II. Why India?

Over a 250-year span, India was the proverbial “jewel in the Crown” of the British Empire; it was Britain’s “largest and most important colony” (Cohn, 1996: 3). India was often a focal point in the colonial mindset, shaping the way colonialists broadly understood the “other”; almost every “British political thinker of note wrote on the empire and most of them wrote on the British Empire in India” (Mehta, 1999: 4). Even so, to some, India might seem like an odd choice for a case study because in the New Labour years, examined extensively in this thesis, government and popular discourse focussed a great deal on the African continent (or ‘Africa’ as it is regularly called). From Blair’s infamous conference speech when he proclaimed, “Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world” (2001) to the Make Poverty History campaign that centred on images of countries and people on this particular continent (Harrison, 2013), the administration dedicated a significant proportion of its time and money to ‘Africa’. So much so that just before stepping down as Prime Minister, Blair acknowledged “Africa has been at the top of my foreign policy for the last ten 10 years” (2007). This has led many scholars examining Britain’s development policy to hone in on the country’s relationship with this continent (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001; Porteous, 2005; Williams, 2005; Ware, 2006; Cammack, 2006; Gallagher, 2011; Harrison, 2013). Yet, India should not be, and has not always been, overlooked (Wilson, 2012).

The lengthy and complicated colonial relationship between Britain and India is not the only reason this case study has been chosen; the connection between the two countries continues to be complex. Until 2015 India was one of the largest beneficiaries of British overseas development assistance. Despite initially eschewing British support in

the years directly after decolonisation, between 1960-1970 it was the biggest British aid recipient and until 2015 it received one of the main chunks of Britain's aid budget (Rowlatt, 2015). In more recent times, Britain "has consistently been one of the largest bilateral donors to India" (Straw and Glennie, 2013: 5). After 1998, India "received more British aid than any other country" and was one of 22 British priority countries in its aid programmes (Bunting, 2011). Under New Labour, India was the single biggest recipient of British aid; DfID spent £1 billion on India between 2003 and 2008. After 2003, when India restricted the number of donors it would accept aid to five [countries], one of the five was Britain and Britain's share of aid increased (Straw and Glennie, 2013: 5). Many of DfID's 'flagship' poverty reduction programmes have been in India and the department's former incarnation, the ODA, funded seven major projects in the country since 1983 (Amis, 2001: 102). Aside from aid, Britain's contribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) to India rose in relative and in absolute terms during the New Labour years. In 2001, Britain contributed just £135 million of FDI to India. By 2010, this had risen to £1.8 billion, which made up 7.7 per cent of all British FDI outflows (Straw and Glennie, 2013).

India is also an important case study because in 2012 the Conservative Government announced that after 2015 bilateral aid to India would end and the focus would be on encouraging private investment projects in the country. At this time and the year leading up to this decision, India featured heavily in British media coverage of aid, development and poverty and many outlets claimed India, because it has its own space programme, was rich enough and did not need British aid (Bennett, 2013).

Yet, despite this debate, there is still concern over poverty and inequality in India that arguably remains racialised. *Slumdog* is still referenced by tabloids in relation to inequality in India (English, 2016) and there remains regular reporting on poverty levels. There exists an uncomfortable tension of conflicting forms of racialisation in Britain that is important to explore: between India as a growing power and as a country with high levels of inequality that it cannot deal with alone. For all these reasons, India is a compelling case through which to explore the role race plays in development discourse.

III. Why the chosen timeframe?

The discourse I am concerned with is focussed on a specific historical juncture (Denscombe, 2010), the time frame 1997-2017. There are three key reasons the given time frame was chosen for the research conducted. Firstly, 1997 is when DfID was established and launched a “mass marketing campaign”, the kind of which had not been seen since the Empire Marketing Board (EMB), which was a 1920s poster campaign to persuade people in Britain to buy goods from the Empire (Biccum, 2010: 41). 1997 was when development was highlighted as a key issue in British politics and 2017 brings us as close to the present day as possible. In addition to this, focussing on discourse up until 2017 encompasses within it recent debates about Britain’s aid budget, including the decision to end aid to India, which was made in 2015

Secondly, and relatedly, the theoretical framework chosen for this thesis – that is a Hallian understanding of race based on Gramscian notions of power and common sense – led me to consider it necessary to attempt to establish the deep common sense operations of whiteness in development discourse. As will be discussed, this helped decide the sites of discourse examined, in an attempt to examine this hegemonic picture, but also shaped the decision to examine this particular historical juncture at which development was accepted as central to government policy. That is, as will become apparent in the establishment of the historical context in the following chapter, 1997 onwards marks a time when the two main parties of government reach a relative consensus on the subject of development and seem to establish what Gramsci might call a common sense position. This, therefore, also allows us to consider how notions of whiteness might also be common sense across this time period.

The sites of discourse chosen – the rationale for which will be explored in the next section – also helped to decide the time frame. As I focussed on government discourse, 1997, the establishment of DfID was chosen as an important starting point. This helped me to rule out looking back further into the past, as government was not as concerned with development and Overseas Development Assistance was managed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Yet as *Developments* was discontinued when a new government came to power, I was also interested in considering if and how government discourse might change with different governments, this encouraged

me to extend the time frame beyond 2010, when this change occurred. Deciding to end the time frame at 2017 was shaped by two considerations. Firstly it brought me up-to-date, as it was the point at which this research began. Secondly, it also encompassed the period in which debates about the aid budget were significant in British politics, notably on 13th June 2016 a debate on aid took place in the UK House of Commons following a *Daily Mail* petition on the subject.

IV. Chosen methods of data collection

This research is predominantly qualitative in nature. This includes secondary research, namely consulting work that examines colonial tropes in both colonial and development discourse and work that examines development critically, some of which has been referenced in the introduction (McClintock, 1997; Shohat and Stam, 2004; Biccum, 2002, 2010; Dogra, 2012). Chapter Six of this thesis, the last chapter prior to the Conclusions, is derived from secondary material. The primary research carried out falls into the following categories:

- 1) Archival research: consulting “data that existed before the time of study [...] that is not] generated as part of the study” (Jackson, 2011: 105). This includes governmental outputs, including ministerial speeches, newspaper content, and development practitioners’ public writing, where available.
- 2) Semi-structured interviews: this is a method of interviewing where the initial questions are designed and prompts and probes will be invented during the interview (Wengraf, 2001: 159).

These are the methods of data collection that were used for analysis in chapters Three, Four and Five. In a moment, I will explore now how data were collected for each chapter.

When using a Gramscian framework of power, paired with Hall’s conceptualisation of race, it is difficult to decide which sites of discourse to focus on; many different sites can be considered as forming a hegemonic picture of development. Some of the reasons for choosing the sites of discourse I focussed on will be explored in the following pages. As this thesis relies on Gramscian understanding of hegemony, it recognises power does not flow in a unidirectional way but is a “strategic alliance

between different sectors” (Hall, 1980: 26) at different, interconnected level. Therefore, this will be a multilayered analysis of government, media and civil society. For instance, the media and the government are not closed systems; they interact with one another, with people and other sectors of society. I will probe how these three key sectors at the national and global level compare with one another. From this it will be possible to begin to establish how dominant development discourse is racialised (Patnaik, 1988).

This thesis is based on a multi-method discourse analysis, and therefore for each strand of research, certain methodological choices were made that informed and shaped the scope of the study. These decisions and why they were made will be explored in the following sections.

i. Government discourse

Development is often thought of as operating outside politics, as Ferguson demonstrated, it is conceived of as an “anti-politics machine” (1990). Yet, the contrary is true; development is inherently political. It is used for political purposes by governments who are donor states (Yasutomo, 1989), and as this thesis will show, projecting power in the realm of development allows a government to give a particular image of itself both domestically and on the global stage.

The political realm is not confined to government but understanding government discourse is important for making sense of the hegemonic nature of racialised constructions of development. Gramsci (1971) understood hegemony as a product of both political society and civil society, though the latter is also considered an important point of challenge to this hegemony. Gramsci argued the state, which he saw as synonymous with political society, has to “request consent” and it is also conceived of “as an ‘educator’”, inasmuch as it tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilization” (1971: 215). Thus, in order to understand how development discourse is racialised and the hegemonic nature of this process, we must understand how the New Labour and subsequent governments, who for this thesis are key representatives of the government, attempt to convince the populous of the importance of development work and how they present that work in the process.

To examine government discourses in the given time frame (1997-2017), this thesis will examine the time from when New Labour came to power and look at their time in government (1997-2010), and then look at the Coalition Government (2010-2015) and the Conservative Government (2015-2017). It is important to note, before exploring how primary research has been carried out, that analysis of government and development will be preceded by an overview of the history of how Britain's political parties have interacted with and spoken about development, in order to contextualise analysis. This research was conducted by consulting relevant primary material (often in the form of party manifestos) and secondary material on the subject.

The British government and DfID are not homogeneous entities. They change over time with different political parties in charge at particular times and within them are people who are critical of the dominant discourse. Chapter Three is not concerned with trying to uncover the multitudinous forms of racialisation that might have occurred or occur within DfID, instead, it is interested in the different, dominant ways the government department and key government figures represented development to the public.

Between 1998 and 2010, DfID produced a quarterly magazine named *Developments*. *Developments* was “the most easily accessible mouthpiece of DfID” and was the first step in New Labour's attempt to market development to British people (Biccum, 2010: 20). There has been little comprehensive engagement with *Developments*, aside from Biccum's work (2012), which used material from the magazine to trace continuities between colonial and development discourse. In total there were 49 issues of *Developments*, plus one special issue produced specifically for local government, and the magazine was produced between 1998 and 2010.⁹ As April Biccum (2010) explained *Developments* largely mirrors discourse and policy found in New Labour white papers on the subject, and contains within it speeches and interviews with key ministers, including Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. But it brings in another layer to be considered: the magazine was part of an attempt to ‘sell’ DfID and its work, though this magazine was largely focused on civil society and those who work within development. It was explicitly one of the public faces of DfID and thus

⁹ Issue 12 was not analysed as part of these data as there was not a copy of it in the British Library or any other facility that could be accessed for this research.

contains in it how DfID represented development to the public. I dealt with this material by going through each magazine and putting relevant materials into categories created during data collection. These data were then re-codified, compared with one another to ensure that categories were sufficient and covered all of the data found. I conducted a similar exercise for all of the images and front pages of *Developments*, which I counted and codified along categories relevant to those found in government written text.

As *Developments* was discontinued when the Coalition Government came to power, I examined government documents and speeches to examine the period between 2010 and 2017, which includes the Coalition (2010-2015) and Conservative governments (2015-2017). The Coalition's decision to end *Developments* and the lack of white papers on development mean both governments dedicated far fewer words to the subject than New Labour. Indeed, not only is the time span shorter but it appears as though the Governments' decision to implement austerity meant there were increasing questions about why they had not cut aid spending and so they reduced the explicit engagement with or publicity of DfID's work, although not abolishing it altogether as there was a continued push to persuade the public of the need for development. Yet, analysis of each of the governments' discourse will be interspersed with one another as there was not a huge rhetorical shift on development between the periods 1997-2010 and 2010-2017. Thus relevant material was compared with data in existing coded categories in order to see if any new categories needed to be created.

ii. Interviews with development professionals

Studying development professionals' reflections on development and of the structures of their organisations will complement the other strands of research in this thesis as development professionals are part of a hegemonic geo-culture that can both "legitimate and challenge the discourse and practice of global governance" (Amoore and Langley, 2004: 89). I am concerned with how development professionals understand race because they are key players in global civil society. I analysed the *Guardian's Secret Aid worker* column and interviewed development professionals to explore how they perceive their work and the organisations they work in. This has

been compared with my findings in other areas of analysis and to some extent will hopefully mean avoiding privileging the text over the context by looking at them alongside one another. The interviews show how constructions of development and race compare with development professionals understanding of the subject.

As most development practitioners have thus far stayed relatively silent on whether race and processes of racialisation is relevant in their work – with a few notable exceptions (White, 2002; Goudge, 2003; Noxolo, 2004; Kothari, 2006a; 2006b; Herron, 2007; Wilson, 2012; Loftsdótti, 2014; Rivas, 2018) – I explore if racialised ideas about Indian development found in the government domain can be compared with development professionals’ understanding of the subject. Development professionals are important to consider as they play an important role in sustaining and determining norms in this field and also interact with popular conceptions of development. I am concerned with how development practitioners explained and projected their understanding of development and how their organisations operated; I do not attempt to uncover ‘truthful’ positions but subjective ones that will be compared with wider representations. The purpose was to get an “insight into the mind-set [or rather the mind-set they present] of the actor/s who have played a role in shaping the society in which we live” (Richards, 1996: 200). Chapter Four, and this thesis more broadly, then, are *not* explorations of how race might shape development practice, nor is Chapter Four an in-depth analysis of observed power relationships between people who work in development. Rather it is concerned with how development professionals see their own work, organisations and relationships between people working within these organisations. Thus ‘fieldwork’ has not been carried out in India and research has not taken the shape of an ethnographic study, though these are surely valuable areas of research, which could be carried out in future.

In this thesis, the term ‘development professional’ refers to people who work in a range of different organisations: INGOs, private development firms and DfID, and people – including academics – who worked as freelance consultants on projects. I did not limit my study to one specific group within this range of development professionals because it is possible to say there is an overlap between INGO, private consultancies, government and consultants, particularly given that government subcontract work to companies and organisations and the important role INGOs play

in the development of policy (European Commission: 2001, 14). In fact, the range of interviewees takes into account that development work is not a unified body (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 181); it encompasses a wide array of organisations. And as Terje Tvedt showed, development organisations have become increasingly similar, there has been “an integration process between states and organizations all over the world” and organizations “more or less share the same rhetoric and have become accountable to donor states or international institutions” (1998: 213).

To begin my analysis, I examined the *Guardian's Secret Aid Worker* column. This column is part of *The Guardian's* Global Development Professionals Network, where people who work in development are able to write anonymously about their personal experiences of and perspectives on their work. It is printed on the basis of rolling submissions and so is irregular. These texts are used as a way of analysing development practitioners' thoughts on race and are compared with information found in interviews. I collected the *Secret Aid Worker* data online, beginning with Tuesday 15th September 2015, when the first column was written, until 13th November 2017, when the last column was published within the window of my data collection. In total 72 articles were examined. Not all of these looked at or explicitly referenced India. However, each was examined and sections deemed to contain racialised language, descriptions or ideas and any parts with significant references to race were collated. Once all these data were collected, they were then codified into relevant categories; this codifying process was done twice in order to ensure the relevant categories had been created.

Interviews were best lent to purposive sampling, which is based on selecting the individuals as a sample of a population according to the purposes of the research. This method is primarily used when the sample is relatively small (Paler-Calmorin and Calmorin, 2007: 104), as it is in this instance. This kind of sampling may be prone to bias, and I was aware of this when deciding which participants to interview and attempted to offset this through snowballing. Through snowballing I received names of other potential contacts from initial interviewees, allowing me to conduct further interviews. Yet not all interviewees were reached from the same first initial person, I approached a number of different people and used snowballing from all participants in order to gain as wide a possible reach.

Sampling meant I spoke to a subset of the research population (in this case development professionals) that provides “the link between the study population and its generalization to the wider population” (Bloor and Wood, 2006: 153). I interviewed 21 people to form the basis of one chapter in this thesis. In terms of the number of people interviewed, as Sarah Baker and Rosalind Edwards have argued asking, “how many interviews is enough?” may be practically unfeasible. Yet they proceeded to ask fourteen “expert voices” and decided the answer is: “it depends” (2014: 6). Perhaps the most helpful response was from Howard Becker who argued, “when you do stop, the interviews and observations you have and what you want to say coincide, your data supporting your conclusions and your conclusions not going beyond what your data can support” (2014: 15). I have attempted to ensure that this is the case in this thesis.

I chose semi-structured interviews as they provide “unique flexibility” and give the space to address the “specific dimensions” of my research question while also “leaving space for study participants to offer new meanings to the topic of study” (Galletta and Cross, 2013:1-2). General discussion was structured around what participants thought about India, their view(s) of development and their work, their lifestyle when living in the country or other professionals’ lifestyles, and their relationships with their colleagues. Once all interviews were conducted, I transcribed them and coded relevant responses in already created categories, which were formed from preliminary hearing of participants’ answers. I then created new categories where necessary. I went through these categories in order to ensure they were all accurate.

I conducted semi-structured interviews with development professionals. Participants’ names and their place of work will remain anonymous, unless agreed otherwise with the interviewee in question. This also included a range of people, of different genders, ages and ‘races’. The nationalities of people interviewed span from those born in Britain, other European countries and India but all worked on or in India at some point in their careers, even if only briefly, and the vast majority have done work on or in India between 1997 and 2017. Two participants fall outside of this timeframe, having worked in and lived in India prior to 1997 but continuing their work in development beyond this date with some ongoing engagement in India.

When conducting initial interviews it became increasingly apparent that given the transient nature of development work, it was not necessarily desirable to adhere to criteria that would have, for instance, only engaged with people born in Britain. I talked to both people born in Europe and in India because at times racial ideas of development can be co-produced and replicated as well as challenged by people of colour (Ahmed, 2007). For instance, people of Indian origin and people of colour more generally might notice different forms of racialisation that white people do not; their lived experience of an institutionally racist society may lead to different reflections.

Furthermore, the varied nature of my interviewees along racial, national and gender lines both reflects the fluid nature of development work – with people moving from one country to the next in the space of years (or even months, if they live in the country they are working on at all) – and captures an array of different viewpoints. Engaging with this breadth of voices has enabled me to begin to illuminate how race manifests itself in different places for different people and how it interacts with nationality, showing its very particular presence at a micro- and macro-level in development work while also revealing how its socially-constructed, shifting nature operates within development.

Yet, there are limitations to the claims that can be made in this regard. This inquiry is confined to people who consider themselves white – both British and European – and people who classed themselves as Asian or specifically of Indian descent. I did not interview any black development workers about their experiences, which might be different given anti-black politics in India and globally. In addition to this, given the number of interviews conducted with people of Asian and Indian descent, the conclusions drawn from these interviews could be further deepened and explored with additional research.

I am aware of my own positionality. As a British citizen, I was aware I may well have been considered an ‘insider’ as with an understanding of the way British society operates there is a possibility I may share characteristics with some of the British people I interviewed. But I was also aware of the potential ‘outsider’ status, when interviewing people who were not British. However, as the focus of my research is

development organisations, and having never worked in the sector, I was aware some might have also considered me an ‘outsider’, that is someone who does not understand the culture of the organisation or the sector in terms of implementing the practical components of development (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009: 55). As someone who is ‘mixed race’ – with one white British parent and one parent of Indian origin – I was considered by some interviewees as an ‘insider’ in terms of knowledge about India. More than one participant enquired about my background, and in particular where in India my family is from, which may have helped them feel more comfortable or potentially on guard or judged.

I understood these interviews as ‘elite’ interview. “Elite” in this instance means individuals “who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society” and are likely to have influence on development outcomes (Richards, 1996: 199). The advantage to this form of interview is development practitioners can hold information or insights not available in development documents. However, it brings with it problems. Given the nature of my subject matter, some interviewees sometimes seemed on guard. This is not something that was widely encountered, though in some instances respondents preferred not to answer questions about race. Though interviews were ‘elite’, I spoke to people at different levels within an organisation; this will be taken into account in the relevant chapter and forms part of analysis. I was also aware of the power dynamics that may be at work during the interviews. Interviewees who see themselves as experts may have wanted to control the interview, influencing the format and the information available. To mitigate this, I was well prepared, with thorough and detailed knowledge of the subject, the organisation and the interviewee.

iii. Newspaper discourse

The study of popular representations can offer a unique insight into how development is understood in the public domain. It is an area of study almost entirely untouched by development scholars and not necessarily considered “seriously or legitimate knowledge about development” (Lewis, Rodgers and Woolcock: 2013). I will join a number of academics that have challenged this notion, and argued for incorporating the study of popular representations into the social sciences (Coser, 1972; Nussbaum, 1997; Lewis, Rodgers and Woolcock: 2013), by analysing newspaper representations

of development.

The reason for choosing newspaper representations is twofold. Firstly, media representations play a key role in constructing the dominant view of development. According to the Gramscian understanding of the media, it is used as a tool by the ruling elite to “perpetuate their power, wealth, and status [by popularizing] their own philosophy culture and morality” (Boggs, 1976: 39). The national media explains to broader society much of what goes on in the rest of civil society in a certain country – as well as in the state – therefore it is both part of civil society’s framework and a key actor within it (Shaw, 1996). This means, as Hall might see it, that the media are “agents of ideological practice” (see Davis, 2004: 67). Although the media is also a site of contestation, it is effective in gaining consent for institutional racism as it is “central to what ultimately comes to represent our social realities” (Brooks and Hébert, 2006: 297). The racist constructions of a particular group created and/or sustained in the media accrue meaning over time and are connected to political and economic structures, in which unequal systems are implicitly legitimised. I am not exploring how or arguing that media solely creates or shapes public perception, indeed this is another line of necessary study altogether. Rather I am analysing whether newspaper representations of development are racialised, probing the role it plays in how we understand development and comparing it with the other strands of analysis.

Secondly, looking at media reporting might help unearth what is not said, what might be excluded and what might be “routinely suppressed” in formal development discourse or it might echo this discourse in interesting ways (Darby, 1997: 8; Harriss, 2011: 24; Lempert, 2014: 390-391). Reporting may make sense of the messy relationships concealed by the term ‘development’ by revealing the power dynamic between the subject and the object. Lillie Chouliaraki’s (2006) work on the spectatorship of suffering revealed the asymmetry between who suffers and who watches the suffering, known as the subject-to-object relationship where those in power gaze upon the powerless. This replicates global power imbalances between the global North and the global South and obscures the potential for empathy by making the people who are suffering into a spectacle. The imbalance is not confined to suffering; it is my contention it is also present in racialised understandings of development.

Consequently, this thesis will actively focus on the way British newspaper reporting presents India and Indians, as opposed to drawing on the voices of the oppressed, unless present in the newspapers consulted.

In addition to this, following from Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, I understand the British media through the lens of the propaganda model (1995), where there are biases in the media and where even though the state does not have monopolistic control over the media, it still largely serves dominant elites. The model shows how in a profit-driven market there are restraints and elite interests that influence news. Although there are contestations and challenges to the dominant hegemony within the media, newspaper discourses are integral to maintaining the way societal and global relations are ordered (Goldberg, 1993: 9). This should perhaps come as no surprise given that popular historical works – whether fiction or media – are taken as primary expressions of human truth (Foucault, 1984).

Media outlets are not neutral and have significant power in representing race, gender and class; they do not just represent what is already there but rather transmit representations. Meaning is given through the act of representation (Hall, 1981) and thus dominant meanings are embedded in media. We might, then, call the media a meaning-making apparatus. Analytically, then we can see the media is important for understanding the hegemonic nature of racialised representations of development as it is one means through which dominant understandings of the world are established. Indeed, in terms of race and racism, the idea that popular representation is a key function of dominance has also been established by feminist, cultural and postcolonial theorists (hooks, 1992; Razack, 1998), who recognise that the abundance of negative imagery of the ‘other’ works to reinforce a system of racial inequality. As bell hooks notes:

From slavery on, white supremacists have recognized that control over images is central to the maintenance of any system of racial domination and it is through analyzing these images and the way we talk about these images that we can rise to the challenge to speak that which has not been spoken (1992: 4).

The media that circulate in society are essential to maintaining racialised hierarchies. Yet with regards to development and newspapers, how representations might be racialised in reporting is not yet known. Consequently, newspaper representations of

development provide information about how development and race can be compared with development professionals' and government discourses to establish processes of racialisation across all three.

The discursive study of media representations of Indian development focusses on newspaper articles. I ruled out advertising campaigns, artwork or any other form of representation due to time constraints. I looked at coverage of Indian development in all of Britain's national newspapers, including their Sunday editions: *The Guardian* and *The Observer*, *The Independent* and *The Independent on Sunday*, *The Times* and *the Sunday Times*, *The Telegraph* and *the Sunday Telegraph*, *The Daily Express* and *The Sunday Express*, *The Sun* and *The Sun on Sunday*, *The Daily Mail* and *The Mail on Sunday* and the *Financial Times*.

To show how racialised representations are embedded in the public domain, I used LexisNexis to study textual representations of development in India. I did so by examining key terms between the dates 1st May 1997 to 31st December 2017, which included Slumdog Millionaire; India and poverty; Narendra Modi and Britain.¹⁰ These terms were chosen as they were related to key moments in Britain's and India's recent history and some are also related to development. My choice of evidence was restricted to the period between 1997 and 2017, thus making a suitable comparison with literature from DfID.

Each relevant article produced through these searches was read through and coded. I chose to use a grounded approach as it was thought this would broaden analysis. This, and all other coding in this thesis, is to some extent subjective. As McQuail explained, "there is no objective or neutral way of deciding which categories should be used" (1977: 2). As with other strands of analysis that required coding in this thesis, articles that had been coded at the beginning of data collection for this chapter were then looked at again to ensure all coding-measures had been included.

V. The relationships between each site of discourse

One of the comparative elements of this study is that it looks at the way forms of

¹⁰ These terms were: 'slumdog millionaire', 'India poverty', 'Prince William India', 'Tony Blair India', 'Gordon Brown India', 'David Cameron India', 'Theresa May India', 'India aid', 'Narendra Modi Britain' and 'Modi London'.

racialisation in each strand of research examined in this thesis compare with one another. However each line of inquiry – government, development professionals’, media and discourse on immigration and asylum and race – cannot be directly compared with one another because they are not equivalent. That is, examining external facing government discourse on development, which at times is intended to ‘sell’ development to the British public, is evidently different in nature from the discourse articulated during interviews with development professionals.

Government discourse and newspaper coverage are public facing, they are intended for a public audience in a way that development professional interviews are not. Although development professionals interviewed were aware of how the content would be used – for a thesis that would eventually be in the public domain – the discourse was less explicitly focussed on explaining development to the general public. There is an evident difference between this data and the data collected for the other two sites of discourse in that interviewees amount to discourse produced by reflexive individuals, not explicitly intended for a mass public audience to ‘sell’ or explain development. These views intersubjectively expressed through interviews are a different form of discourse from government or media discourse.

In addition to this, government discourse and newspaper discourse differ from one another, as well as from development professional discourse, in that government was almost exclusively aimed at ‘selling’ development to Britons. Meanwhile, newspaper discourse cannot be regarded as an attempt always and only of selling development to readers, though reporting might be shaped by editorial lines – some of which might be ‘pro’ development, the aim is not necessarily to give a positive account of development or even directly explain Britain’s development efforts. Reporting might also be focussed on particular events or cases that are related to development.

In addition to this, though government discourse might be understood as public facing, this is largely in the form of political speeches, in the case of *Developments* it was largely aimed at communicating DfID’s efforts to civil society and in particular development professionals. This demonstrates an important link between government discourse and development professionals. Similarly, newspaper discourse is not entirely separated from the other two sites of discourse. While like government

discourse, media discourse is public facing, it also contains government speeches and includes reporting on policy decisions. Likewise, politicians make speeches knowing that one way they may be communicated to the public is through the media. In addition to this, media is connected to development professionals as they also consume and may be influenced by media reporting on poverty and ‘underdevelopment’. We might understand the relationship between the three in the following diagram:




Figure 1: Mapping different sites of discourse

These similarities and differences are important and mean that direct comparisons will not be made across these different sites of discourse, but rather continuities and disjunctures will be traced through them. These different sources produce different kinds of speech but the strong claim to draw continuities and differences comes from the Gramscian theoretical framework used in this thesis, which allows us to conceive of power and commonsense being exercised and produced in a number of different spheres and in different ways. If processes of racialisation and in particular whiteness are found in these different areas it shows the profound embeddedness of this discourse and the deep common sense of whiteness. Together these sites make a map

of a racialised development discourse, exactly how will be explained in the conclusion of this thesis.

VI. Scope of the study and potential limitations

In addition to the potential limitations of the time frame outlined above, perhaps one of the most significant areas that require further study is the role of caste in development work in India. Indeed, when talking about race in relation to India and more generally the Indian diaspora, caste and caste discrimination plays a hugely significant role in social and discursive norms; caste discrimination is a form of racism (Dirks, 2001; Dhanda, 2015). However, within British government discourse on development, the first strand of research conducted, this was not mentioned on more than a small number of occasions. Therefore, a decision was made early on in the study to limit the analysis to look at British understanding of India and how this was racialised, meaning discussion of caste was not sought out among development professionals and in the media. This decision was not made on the basis that analysis of caste politics are not important and significant, indeed it is recognised that they are integral to understanding race within India and that discussion of caste might also play a role in British discourse. However, given that caste did not present itself regularly in government discourse and that the scope of the study was also significant in its multilayered approach and 20 year time period of examination, the decision was made to limit the study by excluding caste. Still, this is certainly an important and valuable area for future study.

With regards to the time frame chosen, there are evident limitations to choosing this period. Examining data within the time frame 1997 to 2017 does not allow consideration for the shifting forms of whiteness that may have been in operation in development discourse in previous years, nor how the two main parties of government might have wielded such discourses or created and reproduced discourses differently from one another prior to a relative consensus being reached on development. In addition to this, the time frame of twenty years also made it more difficult to focus more specifically on each strand of discourse, assuming a relative coherence across this time frame. However, given that it is possible to discern a dominant discourse on and practice of development in this time period, at least from a British perspective –

and which will be established in each subsequent chapter of this thesis – this was not considered a significant enough limitation to invalidate the scope of the study.

In addition to this, there are some limitations to the material chosen for this study. Firstly, with government coverage of development, I do not engage with how the main opposition parties talk about development. This decision was made by using the Gramscian framework to help me to narrow down what I should look at; government is perhaps the most obvious site of where common sense might be produced. Opposition parties and politicians may also be engaged with this, or they may offer an alternative discourse; they may attempt to create a counter common sense. This might be particularly true with the Labour Party since it elected a new leader, Jeremy Corbyn and certainly might warrant further study. Yet for the purposes of this thesis, narrowing the focus allowed me to closely track discourse in detail and also look at one clear site of power where hegemony is produced.

There were also limitations when interviewing development professionals. I decided not to limit my data collection to people born in Britain, but rather to talk to those who had worked for a British organisation. However this meant given the way interviewees were found that a relatively small number of interviewees from India were interviewed, future work might expand on this to deepen and further the findings found in this thesis. Finally, in newspaper data collection, I chose key phrases and events to look at coverage of. This meant that a systematic analysis of all newspaper coverage in the given time frame was not conducted, thus limiting the extent of the data collection. In addition to this, only particular words and events were chosen, which were somewhat subjective. However, I made these decisions in order to be able to collect the data in the given time I had but, with the theoretical frame used, did so in a way to attempt to demonstrate the commonsense forms of representation that exist within this coverage. Though these limitations are significant, given the clear methodology and theory I am using, I believe they have not undermined the outcomes of this research.

Conclusions

In conclusion, this thesis attempts to contribute to the existing literature by analysing

the hegemonic nature of racialised development discourse; it aims to do so by establishing the tropes identifiable in three distinct strands of development discourse and exploring how these are racialised and then comparing across these three areas. It will show how shifting forms of racialisation are apparent in development discourse and how these interact with gender and class. In addition, this thesis will compare development discourse with discourses widely understood as racialised in an attempt to demonstrate how development discourse forms part of a wider conceptualisation of society that is racialised. To begin, the next chapter will explore tropes and their propositional content in government discourse and show how they are produced through race and processes of racialisation.

Chapter Three

Analysing government development discourse

I think we can do more to make sure the public understand what development is about and to take pride in the UK's role in it — Douglas Alexander (cited in DfID 2007: 33)

Douglas Alexander's is an apposite quote on which to begin thinking about government development discourse. He demonstrates the importance government can place on communicating what development is to the public and indicates that their messages are tailored for people in Britain. Yet what Alexander's words also suggest is that governments' conceptualisation of development is not only about representing the to-be-developed but also establishing how Britain is seen and how it sees itself. This prompts the question: what does it look like when government attempts to ensure the public "understand" development; how is "the UK's role" conveyed in this discourse and how might this be related to race? As explored in Chapter One, the importance of development to national self-image has been extensively examined by scholars to date (Gallagher, 2011; Harrison, 2013) but race is not prevalent in their analyses.

In addition to this, in existing work examining race and development there is arguably little assiduous exploration of how government development discourse represents Britain and the to-be-developed, how these representations interact with one another and how they are racialised. Nor is there any work on whether there are continuities across recent British governments' representations of development. In particular, there is a dearth of work looking at the role whiteness plays in government discourse about development.

Thus given the weight governments can give to development discourse, there is a surprising lack of understanding of how race manifests and shapes the ways successive politicians in power talked about development. Or put another way: while we know race plays a role in development discourse (Wilson, 2012), we do not know the differing and overlapping forms of racialisation that might occur in government discourse or how processes of racialisation might have been hegemonic. This chapter seeks to fill this lacuna.

To this end, it will focus on the roles race and processes of racialisation played in the discourse of New Labour, the Coalition and Conservative governments, as well as looking briefly at ‘anti’ development proponents such as UKIP. It will do so by first establishing overlapping tropes and their propositional content in this discourse. As outlined in the Methodology (see page 62), these were found by examining issues of *Developments* and by looking at government speeches on development, the latter data were the entirety of the focus for the Coalition and Conservative governments given that the magazine was discontinued in 2010. From this, relevant data were coded and then recoded in order to clearly lay out each of the tropes covered in this chapter. I also examined and codified all of the images in each issue of *Developments* and each of the front pages, examining all of the words used on the front pages as well and from this I codified these images and text.

This chapter will look at each trope individually to allow us to make sense of the propositional content of government discourse, which includes different representations of Britain as morally good, active and rational, the to-be-developed as naturally impoverished, women in the ‘developing’ world as both in need of saving and potential agents of development and India as a place of chaos and incapability. This incapability can also fall along class lines. Focussing on each of these tropes and using the tools of discourse analysis outlined in Chapter One (see page 46), I will conduct an examination of government discourse to establish how each of them manifest; how they convey meaning about both the developer, usually Britain, and the to-be-developed or ‘developing’ countries.

Once these tropes have been established, I will unpack how they are reliant on manifestations of race and processes of racialisation for their meaning, again using analytical tools outlined in Chapter One (see page 46) and Gramscian notions of hegemony. From this I will uncover how these tropes might be seen to interact with one another to create shifting and relational forms of racialisation in this discourse. The conclusion to this chapter will establish how these findings contribute to existing work on race and development discourse. However, before beginning to explain the discourse analysis conducted for this chapter, I will briefly explore the history of Labour and Conservative approaches to development in order to establish how in

recent years there has been a convergence between the two main party's approaches. This establishes the context within which governments were operating and creating, and lays the ground for us to draw comparisons between different governments from 1997 onwards. Ultimately, this chapter will argue that representations of Britain, the to-be-developed and developing countries are hegemonic in government development discourse and show how there are varying forms of racialisation that make up this hegemonic picture, all of which are produced by processes of racialisation that centre around notions of whiteness.

i. British government and development: Convergence between the two main parties

The Labour Party has historically given greater support to development (Bose and Burnell, 1991; Clwyd, 1992; Gallagher 2011: 8; Ireton, 2013). Until Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron ring-fenced the aid budget in 2010, Labour's main parliamentary rivals had "tended not to prioritise international aid" when in government (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012: 130). Thinking historically, we can see the difference between the two parties on this subject by looking at their manifestos. International aid did not make an appearance in manifestos prior to 1964 because much of the public-facing international discourse focussed on colonialism and Britain's connections with Commonwealth countries. In the 1960s and 70s development received "limited attention" but this grew through the 1980s and 1990s, becoming increasingly salient in the 2000s. Analysis shows that Labour paid far greater attention to development than the Conservatives (Conservative Party 1970; 1974; Labour Party, 1970; 1974; Vickers, 2011: 22; Chaney, 2012: 255; Ireton, 2013: 4). In addition, neither Margaret Thatcher nor John Major put forward a white paper on development, indicating they did not consider it a priority. Instead, it was under Labour governments that the three of the most significant white papers were issued (1965, 1975 and 1997). New Labour's 1997 white paper was the first since 1975, suggesting the lack of attention the Conservatives, who had been in office from 1979 to 1997, paid to development in comparison to Labour.

Furthermore, under Margaret Thatcher there were significant cuts to the bilateral aid budget. Perhaps most significantly, Thatcher downgraded the ability and power of the

Labour-created Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM), which came into being under Harold Wilson's first term in office (1964-1970). The ODM "represented the first British attempt to develop a cohesive overseas aid policy in a postcolonial context" (Riley, 2017: 54).¹¹ Yet between 1970 and 1979 the ODM was brought into the Foreign Office by Conservative governments and renamed the Overseas Development Administration (ODA). This was an institutional downgrading that affected the power and prestige of development; at this time, the junior minister for the ODA was accountable to the Foreign Office and the reduction of the bureaucratic clout of development made it more difficult to maintain spending and protect the sector's institutional interests (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012: 131). The difference between the ways the two parties treated development, then, appeared to be embodied by its structural place in government. However, once David Cameron became Conservative party leader, it is possible to trace a convergence between the two parties on development. In order to make sense of this, first, let us look at New Labour's approach.

When they came into power in 1997, New Labour raised the stature of development, giving it its own government department, DfID. This was a marked change. While there had previously at times been government ministers for overseas development, under Blair a separate government department with its own cabinet-level Secretary of State was created, giving development a seat at the highest level of government. They also dedicated a section of their 1997 manifesto to development, they claimed the country had a "clear moral responsibility to help combat global poverty" and committed to the UN's aid spending target (Labour Party, 1997; Young, 2000; Webster, 2008: 14). This came after 17 years of Conservative government, during which the aid budget was reduced to 0.2 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) and the Conservatives regularly used aid to buy political support in their effort to outmanoeuvre the Soviet Union, instead of supporting developmental or human rights aims (Cumming, 2001). In addition, aid had often been connected to "promoting British trade, a practice that had become publicly discredited after the Pergau Dam scandal, and was ended by New Labour" (Gallagher, 2011: 9; Lankester, 2013). Blair's

¹¹For further discussion of Labour's internationalism and their approach to development and imperialism, see Padmore, 1944; Howe, 1993; Nwaubani, 1993; Paul, 1997; Douglas, 2004; Sylvest, 2004; Thorpe 2008; Vickers, 2011; Virdee, 2014; Riley, 2017.

government untied aid, increased the aid budget by 40% and widened its policy remit beyond aid distribution to actively include developing countries in international trade negotiations, debt sustainability, examining the impact of the global environment on poor people and encouraging free and fair elections (Vereker, 2002: 135). Though reality did not always match up to this rhetoric (see Mokoro, 2005; Webster, 2008), these moves were understood through the party's commitment to development and certain New Labour figures, namely Gordon Brown, Tony Blair and Claire Short, were seen as personally invested in development (Bower, 2004: 206; Rentoul, 2013: 444). Therefore, while New Labour refashioned itself as a modern break from much of Labour's past thinking, not least by adding a prefix to its name and shedding its long – albeit unsteady – relationship to the working classes (Gallagher, 2011; Seymour, 2016), the government maintained the party's historical commitment to development and extended it by creating DfID.

When New Labour lost its majority in the 2010 general election, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition came into power and in many ways maintained governmental commitment to development. There had already been a growing consensus on development under New Labour (see Gallagher, 2011: 85-87) and this continued from 2010 onwards. Led by David Cameron as Prime Minister and Nick Clegg as Deputy Prime Minister, the Coalition Government largely continued with New Labour's development programme and trajectory. Despite his party having previously reduced the functions of the ODA and rarely prioritised international aid, Cameron made clear his commitment to keeping DfID as an independent government department – although in 2015 the International Development Committee “solicited views on whether or not DfID should be re-absorbed into the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]” (Lightfoot, Mawdsley and Szent-Ivanyi, 2017: 518) – and increased its budget (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012). In the face of opposition from some of his backbenchers, Cameron ring-fenced the development budget, amid cuts to other government departments, and enshrined in law the UN's 45-year-old aid spending target, committing the government to spend 0.7% of GNI on aid every year (Anderson, 2015) – fulfilling a pledge the Conservative made in a Green Paper, *One World Conservatism* (OWC) (Hall-Matthews, 2011: 511). In fact, after 2012 development spending went from £8.766 billion (0.56 per cent of GNI) to £12.240 billion (0.72 per cent of GNI) in 2015 (Lunn and Booth, 2016). This increase in the

budget meant Britain became “the first G8 country to hit the international aid target of 0.7 percent of GNI” (Crines and Heppell, 2017: 5). When Theresa May became Prime Minister in 2016 following Cameron’s resignation, Priti Patel, widely regarded as an aid sceptic, became Secretary of State for International Development. In spite of the worry that Patel would abolish DfID and replace it with a trade body (Manji and Cullen, 2016: 1), DfID and the ring-fenced budget stayed in place.

There was thus an important change in the contemporary Conservative approach to development under Cameron in comparison to previous Conservative governments; the leadership maintained aid spending and did not attempt to dismantle DfID, talking of it in favourable terms. In addition to this, the Conservatives had already committed to development spending in OWC prior to forming the Coalition (Mawdsley, 2017: 225). The Conservatives’ positive embrace of development and commitment to maintaining aid spending in the austerity era was a significant break from their past; indicating a degree of consensus between Britain’s two main parties of government: development and aid were integral parts of government programme regardless of which party was in power (Mawdsley, 2011: 506).

However, the Coalition and the May-led governments did not, and have not, taken an identical approach to Labour on development, particularly in relation to the specific operations of DfID. In 2009, the Conservatives’ Green Paper promised to adopt a “hard headed”, value-for-money agenda, that would supposedly rebalance stronger national interests with “doing good” in the world (Conservative Party, 2009; Mawdsley, 2015: 347). The Conservatives attacked Labour’s record on development as “soft-hearted” and claimed they focussed on inputs instead of outputs. The Conservatives promised to focus on policies that were morally imperative and that benefitted Britain, while arguing for rigorous testing on value for money, helping to release entrepreneurialism, engaging British voters and coordinating conflict resolution (Conservatives, 2009; Hall-Matthews, 2011: 511; Mawdsley, 2011: 506). In line with this last point, the government did increase aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Hall-Matthews, 2011: 512). According to Lightfoot, Mawdsley and Szent-Ivanyi, the difference between New Labour and the Conservatives manifested in the shape of four trends:

[T]he focus on fragile states; the growing emphasis on economic growth (rather than

poverty reduction per se), with particular prominence for private sector-led development; the routing of a higher share of aid through ministries other than DFID; and the exit from or transition within many former recipient countries (2017: 518).

What was also different to their approach is that the Conservatives had created a different economic context to Labour; in part because of the austerity programme they implemented, there was ever-growing pressure to reduce the foreign aid spending (Mawdsley 2015: 348). In a climate where aid was increasingly being criticised by domestic actors, notably UKIP, development policy was realigned toward an “explicit and expanded focus on UK economic and geopolitical interests” (Lightfoot, Mawdsley and Szent-Ivanyi, 2017: 517). In addition to this, alongside these shifts in focus and, under significant media pressure, the Conservatives ended bilateral aid to India at the end of 2015.

Nevertheless, despite these tangible differences there were significant similarities between the Coalition’s, the May government’s, and New Labour’s approaches to aid. If examined through an economic lens, all were somewhat in line with the dominant understanding of development globally, which since the 1980s had taken the shape of a neoliberal notion of development (for the history of this Deshpande and Sarkar, 1995; Chang 2002; 2014; Stiglitz, 2005; Hickel, 2014; 2015), and has continued to be pursued despite its failures (Roy 2010; Pollin, 2015; Hickel 2017).¹² New Labour, the Coalition and the Conservatives continued to see neoliberal policies as an essential part of their development agenda, emblematised, for instance, by their continued implementation of microfinance loans (see Soper, 1995; Blair, 1997; DfID, 1997: 25; 31; Fairclough, 2000: viii; Finlayson, 2003: 67; Watson and Hay, 2003: 292; DfID, 2008: 36; Mitchell 2010; Moses, 2010: 28). Consequently, not only did the Coalition and Conservative governments converge with New Labour on development, for all the noticeable and noteworthy differences, there were some similarities between New Labour’s and their Conservative predecessors’ development agendas. One of these was, as Slater and Bell (2002: 342) argued that they maintained the country’s

¹² I use the term neoliberalism because despite its problems it is useful to explain economic processes in relation to development (Hall, 2011: 10). A form of capitalism, at least in the USA, UK, East and Southeast Asia (see Gray, 1995; Eagleton-Pierce, 2015 103; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005: 3; 1; 2; Miller and Rose, 1992: 199), in development, neoliberalism might be understood through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that include “restrictive macroeconomic policy”, cuts to subsidies and price controls “liberalization of international trade and investment, privatization and deregulation (Chang, 2002: 1).

commitments to economic liberalism and embraced free markets. This echoed with much of their domestic policy agenda, which was focussed on a variant on neoliberal economics (Hall, 2003; Needham, 2003). New Labour justified its development programme by stressing their moral duty to eradicate poverty (DfID, 1997: 16) but under this rhetoric was an economic model that had been proven to be ineffective (Hickel, 2014; Pollin, 2015: 166). Therefore, we can see from these histories that from the mid-to-late 2000s at least, there was a convergence with regards to development policy between the main parties when in government, making it even more plausible to draw parallels between the discourses of each, which I will now do in the following section by examining tropes identified in government discourse.

II. Government discourse analysis

i. Britain as the developer

One of the recurring tropes found in government discourse is the representation of Britain as the developer that has the solutions to poverty. For instance, in country profiles throughout *Developments*, which were overviews of particular countries DfID worked in, Britain is imagined as the active agent. This is emblematised by the country profile of Sierra Leone:

Sierra Leone has amazing mineral wealth, yet 70% of its population lives in poverty and it is also ranked as one of the world's poorest countries [...] The UK government's priorities in Sierra Leone are security and stability, governance, and economic growth (DfID, 2010a: 13).

The subject of the sentence is the British government and it is the grammatical agent in this quote, Sierra Leone, in the former sentence, is passive. Britain is thus imagined as actively implementing measures to deal with poverty. The predicate demonstrates Britain has “priorities” and that they are actively attempting to deal with poverty. The nature of Britain’s plans are also accentuated by the list of three different concerns: “security and stability, governance, and economic growth”. Grouping these three examples together may give the impression that the government’s plans are not insubstantial but consist of a variety of measures; this thus underscores to the reader the proactive nature of the government.

This is an idea that appeared elsewhere in *Developments*, when discussing

development projects in India. One article noted an internally created project in slums in Calcutta had improved “urban planning and governance” and helped “create access for the poor to services like water, sanitation and health”. But it added “DFID has been a key player in the scheme, committing more than £100 million for improvement in roads, drainage, sanitation and water supply” (Wroe and Doney, 2007: 8). Though unlike in the previous quote, there is evidence of people internally within the country actively engaging in development work, DfID is still placed as central to this. It is described as a “key player” and its financial commitment plus the positive outcome of this is stated. In addition to this, when Secretary of State for International Development, Conservative, Priti Patel argued, “Britain can lead through much of the work that we do” and said British “leadership is so valuable, so vital and so important” (Patel, 2017: 13; 2). This places Britain as the active agent, helping people all around the world as a leader bringing them hope they would not otherwise have. Their supposed indispensability in this capacity is particularly accentuated with a tautological list of three words: British leadership is “valuable”, “vital” and “important”. Each of these representations, then, position Britain as *the* or an important actor in development and thus as an agent of change.

The role of Britain as the active developer is not only conveyed through descriptions of DfID doing development, it is also achieved through comparison with the ‘developing’ world, where it is imagined the former has naturally progressed. This was emblematised in an article and image in Issue 45 of *Developments* that suggested Britain had progressed where others had not. Firstly, a picture was spread across two full pages, which showed a mocked up panorama where people are washing their clothes, defecating and bathing in the Thames. Images are communicative acts; we can understand them in line with the saying “a picture says a thousand words” (Rancièrè, 2008: 33). Therefore, we can explore what this image might be communicating. The camera is at the same height as the people who are standing on the banks of the Thames and this height makes these people the focus of the frame, the backdrop is the river and the London skyline and the ground is such a dark brown colour that it appears nearly black. On one page there are several different people; one man who is white with his back to the camera who appears to be urinating into the river, another in the background of the picture is a man who is black standing next to the river airing out what looks to be a bed sheet. In the foreground is a woman who is white sitting on

a bucket with her back to the camera, holding a baby who is white with blond hair; the baby's face is also not visible. Also in frame in the foreground are two women, one, who is white, carrying a washing basket, the other, who is black, carrying a shopping bag.

On the other side of the page, in the same image, there are far more people in the frame. A lot of the people on this side of the picture are blurry outlines in the background, many of them are hunched over as if cleaning and some can be seen hanging up their washing. Amid this, it is also possible to see a dog in the background. Discernible in the foreground is a white man whose bottom half is wrapped in a towel, the viewer sees him side on and he appears to have just come out of the river. And particularly pertinent, at the front of the frame is a white woman looking down, her whole face turned toward the camera, she is sitting on an upside-down bucket and just in frame is the top of a yellow rubber glove. She is dressed in what might be described as smart-casual clothes – a green t-shirt, a pink skirt, tights and wellington boots. Behind her to the right but occupying less of the frame is another white woman who is also sitting on an upside down bucket folding a piece of material laid out on the floor, which is on top of another sheet so it is not touching the ground, the camera has captured her side on.

This image is jarring, it shows people in London, predominantly but not exclusively white people, cleaning, washing and relieving themselves in the Thames. The number of people in the image seems to suggest this is a normal place for people to carry out their day-to-day activities. This is accentuated by the presence of the baby who one might be worried would be at risk in an unhygienic setting. The normality of this is also suggested through the people in the image who are wearing clothes that look relatively well kept and certainly not inexpensive. This image then seems to convey a sense of the absurdity through shock, as it is clear this kind of scene would never take place in Britain and in doing so positions Britain as the natural developer; it is seen as the country that has been able to develop and would thus not have scenes such as this, which may be described as somewhat humiliating and emblematic of uncleanness.

The notion that Britain is a country that has naturally progressed is also discernible from words that accompany the image. The article says:

Does the scene seem a little implausible? Apparently affluent citizens of wealthy London taking their laundry down to the banks of the Thames. Squatting on the muddy shoreline to do their washing-up; taking a bath and relieving themselves; all in the same shared water source. It's striking simply because it's an everyday scene from cities all over the developing world starkly transposed onto a city where this kind of poverty was long ago made history (DfID: 2009a, 4-5).

The picture does not only suggest that this scene is jarring; the language used in the article highlights this, arguing this scene is "implausible". The pairing of this description and the image appears to demonstrate how farcical it is that this kind of scene would happen in London. This is further accentuated by the visceral descriptions of people "relieving themselves", "squatting" to do their "washing up" and washing themselves, all in the same water. But this juxtaposed against the idea that this is an "everyday scene" in places "all over the developing world". Together the image and the text convey a sense that people in London have developed past these kinds of uncleanliness. Yet the reason for this is decontextualised. Readers are told poverty of "this kind" was "long ago made history" in the 'developed' world. These kinds of scenes are relegated to the distant past but it is not explained how; instead the article suggests that the 'developing' world is behind Britain, which is positioned as simply having developed. As is often the case there, is no context or explanation given for why London has 'progressed' in this way. Therefore the notion that Britain has naturally progressed is naturalised and treated as it is a fact.

The previous image and text analysed suggests that at times in government discourse it is laid out as if development occurred endogenously within Britain, where little historical context is given for development. This is further accentuated in other government representations and is achieved by focussing on representations of Britain's history of development. Underdevelopment is treated as part of the past in Britain but it is not explained how this came to be. For instance, in an interview in *Developments* with then Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn, he explained British development as such:

Economic development is going to be the main thing which will make a difference to people's lives. If you doubt that for a second, ask yourselves the question, "How was Britain's society changed from what we were 400 years ago to what we are today?" Four hundred years ago: enormous poverty, low life expectancy, very few people in school, terrible ill health. Peoples' lives have been transformed. Lots of things happened, but principally it's been a process of development in the economic department, and other countries want the same opportunity (cited in Wroe and Doney, 2004c: 28-29).

Benn begins by centring the importance of “economic development”, placing it at the beginning of the sentence and then stating it is “the main thing” that will “make a difference to people’s lives”. This use of syntax with the word choice “main” accentuates that it is economic development that will change peoples’ lives. He then further justifies this response by drawing on British history as evidence. He uses hypophora; asking a question and immediately giving an answer. This heightens the reader’s interest by prompting them to think about what has happened in Britain during the past four hundred years and then allows Benn to give an answer. In response to his own question he uses tricolon to list all of the forms of ‘underdevelopment’ that existed in Britain “four hundred years ago”. This listing device appears to give his response depth and weight by outlining a number of different negative realities of Britain’s past. The picture he is able to paint of this past is constructed as particularly negative through the use of the adjective “enormous” prior to “poverty”, the adverb “very” in relation to people in school, and the adjective “terrible” before “ill health”. Each of these words is used to highlight the severity of how ‘undeveloped’ Britain was in the past. The list is then positioned against the present where peoples’ “lives have been transformed”. This short sentence is declared as a statement with little explanation of how things have changed but the word “transformation” is able to suggest it is completely different from this past. However, the political, social and historical processes necessary for this transformation to happen are bundled into “lots of things” which are secondary to “development in the economic department”.

Taken together these rhetorical devices allow Benn to establish himself as an authority who has the weight of history behind his argument. This creates space for him to rush through the explanation of what has happened with little space given to these other “things” that occurred. This makes it more persuasive when he says he knows what needs to be done, by drawing on the fact that Britain has ‘progressed’. Therefore, development in Britain is treated as an endogenous product, albeit centred around economic development and thus much like representations of poverty this naturalises this representation as if it is a statement of fact, while also depicting Benn as an authority on the subject. In this way, in Benn’s words there is a naturalisation of the idea that Britons are the agents of change. The discursive trope that naturalises development in Britain as if it is produced endogenously is reliant on and reproduces a

form of classification (Morrison, 1992: 67); Britain is depicted as naturally occupying the category of the ‘developer’. Therefore with little information or specificity to backup this form of classification, it is assumed as accurate within the text.

We can to an extent see this reflected in the imagery on the pages of *Developments*. Of the 1,958 images in the magazine,¹³ I classified 242 (12 per cent of all images analysed) as of westerners and a significant number of these were of politicians or celebrities engaging in development work. Choosing one of the issues at random that had five or more pictures of westerners (there were 27 issues that met this criteria) I found that in issue 28, of the 10 pictures in the magazine, 50 per cent were of Benn in a country in the African continent, teaching children. These ten pictures themselves made up 28 per cent of all of the 36 pictures in this issue of the magazine. Indeed, one image shows him writing his own name on the white board and teaching children in a classroom. This explicitly conveys his role as helping to educate children and arguably symbolises how development efforts do this at a macro level. The other images are of Tony Blair, Jeffrey Sachs, Bono and Bob Geldof, either of their headshots, of them on panels or meeting people. Bono and Geldof were heavily involved in Live 8, a series of benefit concerts for development, and Sachs is an economist who has done work on how to end poverty. Their images convey a sense of western actors, particularly wealthy and/or powerful western actors, providing answers to development. Indeed, if we look at the word cloud on the next page we see these themes recurring.

¹³ By the time image data was collected Issue 47 was not traceable within the British Library or at any other facility. Therefore, this is not included in analysis.

experts, and are able to stay “cool” in the “world’s most troubled hotspot”. These descriptions are placed next to one another, which accentuates this contrast. The juxtaposition of the chaos of the environment with the calmness of the people from the UK, paired with the erasure of people who live in ‘developing’ countries, means the ‘developers’ are imagined as sensible people who can keep their wits about them and who bring knowledge to an area of chaos. This is particularly strengthened by the suggestion that there is a “pool” of workers lined up to do this work – it is not only a few exceptional individuals but if there are a number of people to choose from, making up the pool, these are the kinds of people Britain produces regularly. This representation feeds a narrative in which Britain is the orderly agent who is naturally positioned to engage in development. This demonstrates that one of the hegemonic tropes in government development discourse remains that at both a macro and micro level Britain is active and has the solutions to poverty.

The positioning of active Britons engaging in development is a trope also apparent in UKIP’s discourse on development. Although UKIP were not and have not been part of government and thus fall outside of the scope of analysing government discourse, their 2015 manifesto, which had a two-page section about ‘Overseas Aid’, did reveal some similarities with government discourse. One full page of the manifesto presented an image of Nathan Gill MEP, a white UKIP politician, with his arms around an unnamed black woman. They are centred to the right of the image but occupying the majority of the page and they are in the foreground so the camera is focussed on them. The woman’s head blocks out the bottom of the ‘O’ and ‘V’ of the words “overseas aid”, which are in white block capital letters and set against a brown background that is the ground wherever they are. Gill is looking at the camera and smiling, the woman is looking just off camera but is also smiling; they are both wearing smart casual clothing. In the background of the image, but to the right of it, almost off camera, the viewer can see two young black children, one of who is looking in the direction of Gill and the woman. The casual style of their clothes and their pose, with his arm around her as if he knows her, conveys an image of him as ‘at home’ ‘doing’ development, this suggests a naturalness to the role he is occupying. The people centred in this discourse are not people in poverty but the people who are helping. There is an evident racial dynamic in this image; the white UKIP spokesperson is able to look directly at the character with agency and purpose, his arms around a black woman who is looking

away but smiling. Accompanying this image and underneath the words “overseas development” is a quote from Gill, which reads, “Ultimately, UKIP wants to help lift people out of poverty through trade, not aid. In the meantime we’ll continue to support the poorest people on earth through programmes that prioritise clean water and sanitation, vaccinations and disaster relief” (cited in UKIP, 2015: 68). The active agent is an imagined UKIP government that would “help lift people out of poverty”. Consequently, although UKIP did want to reduce the aid budget significantly and downgrade DfID, they still drew on images of Britons as agents, indicating how this trope is hegemonic in political discourse.

Therefore, one dominant trope I have found in government discourse represents the developer, whether that is Britain as a country or British development workers, as *the* or central active agents in the development process. Through processes of naturalisation, classification and decontextualisation they are depicted as if it is simply a fact that their history is one of progress and that they thus have the answers to development. As we will see in the following pages, the representation of Britain as naturally able to provide development to the to-be-developed is not just achieved through positioning the country or representatives of the country as active; it is also established through constructing positive qualities as supposedly innate to the country, namely tropes of goodness and rationality.

ii. ‘Good’ Britons

This centring of Britons as the people who have agency coincides with a conceptualisation of British people as inherently good. Britain and British people are repeatedly represented in government discourse as engaging in development because it is morally right. It is possible to consider that all donor discourses have this element of exceptionalism, given the structure of the aid economy is one of donor countries ‘giving’ to recipient (Kapoor, 2008). But as we will see later in this chapter how this operates in British government discourse contributes to a broader racialised discourse on development and thus it is important to establish the propositional content of the goodness trope.

One of the forms of goodness represented in *Developments* is of Britons as exceptional. In an article covering the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat the scene is portrayed through the eyes of British civil servants who work in development. DfID employee Mary McCollum wrote on the visit to Bhuj, Gujarat: “As we arrived in the DfID camp, the exhausted UK Search and Rescue team – saucer-eyed from lack of sleep – were making their final arrangements before setting off on the 10-hour drive to Ahmadabad to catch a flight home” (McCollum, 2001: 19-20). The “we” is referencing British development workers; they are the subjects of the article. Their exhaustion is explicitly mentioned but also accentuated through a description of them as “saucer-eyed from lack of sleep”, which seems to suggest that they have been working hard in Gujarat. Here the subject is the UK team, *their* fatigue matters.

The significant focus of this article is the rescue effort; people in India are not really present. Yet the text should be read in conjunction with the accompanying picture. There are no images of Indian people apart from those with their mouths covered and a picture of what we can presume is an aid worker or civil servant standing in the rubble. This picture is like a still from a film; in the foreground of the image is a silhouette of a man looking down toward the ground so that his face is not visible. The image is dark and is in black and white because of this it is not possible to make out his facial features. He is in the centre of the image so the reader’s eyes are drawn to him, but the camera angle allows them to also see the whole landscape behind him. He is standing against a backdrop of smoke and buildings that have been destroyed, we can assume by the earthquake. By centring him in this way, as a solitary figure against a backdrop that symbolises danger and risk, this picture gives the impression that what the aid workers are doing is heroic in nature – in fact, it almost looks as if he has emerged from the rubble. Meanwhile, Indian people are absent altogether. Depicting development workers as heroes was also done more explicitly in a portrayal of Tony Blair as part of the Make Poverty History campaign. “Oxfam published a postcard (for supporters to send to Downing Street) with a cartoon of Tony Blair caricatured as a superhero” (Harrison, 2013: 162). The campaign centred the heroic nature of the Prime Minister, which stood in stark contrast to a faceless mass of people in the global South. What *Developments* does in this instance, then, is show that in ‘difficult’ environments and in disaster situations, Britons have agency *and* heroism. This can be understood as forming part of the national image: Britons are exceptional and willing to sacrifice

themselves for others.

In government discourse the notion of goodness is more regularly presented at the macro level of the nation, of Britain as good and importantly of this goodness as both reflective of British identity domestically and projected internationally on the global stage. British goodness is constructed through development discourse. When he was Secretary of State for International Development, Douglas Alexander epitomised this thinking, stating:

I'd like to see DFID become as self-defining to the people of the UK as the BBC, I'd like to see DFID become an essential part of who we are as British people and how we present ourselves to the world – an institution we are proud of because of the good it achieves (cited in DfID 2007: 33).

In this way, Alexander showed he wanted DfID to become a beloved national institution and the reasoning for this is because of the good it does; this goodness is at once seen as intrinsic to British identity and also constructed as important because it is possible for others in the world to discern it too.

Similarly, one overriding messages in Coalition and Conservative rhetoric on development included politicians repeatedly focussed on Britain's moral commitment to development (Glennie, 2011: 508). For instance, in Cameron's 2015 Conservative Party conference speech, he praised parliament's legislation on 0.7 per cent, which meant that the government target was to spend this percentage of the country Gross National Income (GNI) on development aid each year:

This party made a promise and kept a promise – to spend 0.7 per cent of our national income on aid.

Other countries also made that promise. But they didn't keep it.

I say to them: if Britain can keep her promises, so should you (2015: 136-138).

Cameron repeats the word "promise" using the literary device anaphora; in some variation, he repeats the words "made a promise and kept a promise", which he begins the first sentence with. Repeating this phrasing helps emphasise not just the word "promise" but the message that it is important to keep a promise and Britain is able to do so. This highlights that the Conservatives both made and kept a promise but separated them from other countries that made promises about aid spending but did not keep them. The Conservatives quickly become elided with the country as a whole, suggesting the two and their attendant values with regards to promises are not different

from one another. The phrase “so should you” acts as a piece of advice to other countries, the implication of Cameron’s words being that if a promise is made, it should be kept and so other countries should follow Britain’s lead. This categorises Britain as a country that keeps its promises and situates Britain’s goodness as a symbol of its superiority (Noxolo, 2011: 32). In another 2013 speech, Cameron argued that British aid spending “says something about our standing in the world and our sense of duty in helping others” (cited in *The Telegraph*, 2013), thus accentuating at once British duty, a word infused with a notion of morality, and how development symbolises Britain’s status. Cameron uses development to bolster Britain’s superiority and thus exceptionalism on the global stage by drawing on and contributing to the goodness trope; arguing it is a country committed to keeping its promises and importantly it does this when other ‘developed’ countries do not.

Britain and Britons are constructed as a “good” and morally righteous through discourse about development (this is also identified in Gallagher, 2011). This is evident from politicians’ discourse across governments; where British goodness is imagined as identifiable through their engagement with development. In 2006 Brown addressed Christian Aid after the Gleneagles Make Poverty History rally, saying “[w]e are today seeing Britain at its best, united for one great cause” (in Gorringer and Rosie, 2006:16). Similarly, during the 2017 snap general election campaign, former Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn struck this same tone when he tweeted at the prospect of May scrapping the commitment to aid spending: “Britain’s commitment to help the world’s poorest people says a lot about the kind of country we are. Keep the 0.7%” (Benn, 2017). Corresponding with this, in a defence of British aid spending, Cameron said: “We are the kind of people who believe in doing what is right [...] It says something about this country [...] it says something about the kind of people we are. And that makes me proud to be British” (cited in *The Telegraph*, 2013). Finally, in one speech Priti Patel uses the word “hope” 11 times and argues: “UK aid is an amazing brand, and it is a badge of hope across the world, and it is one that we are proud of” (2017: 18). These are all centred on accentuating British goodness.

Brown’s argument is that when Britain advocates for development it is “at its best” and stresses the importance of morality in the arguments for development; Britain is good when it cares about development. Similarly, though he does not explicitly state

development spending proves Britain's moral nature, Benn alludes to this with the phrase it "says a lot about the kind of country we are". This repeated the phrasing used by Cameron about the "kind of people" Britons are and again emphasises this point to the reader/listener; these two phrases are used to suggest an innateness to Britain doing the right thing – *all* British people are constructed as inherently moral. This is demonstrated by the discursive tool collectivisation: the "we" in this formulation is seen to represent everyone in the country and "we" do what is right. Thus each of the politicians suggests aid spending is a symbol of Britain's goodness. Benn intimates this by saying it is "commitment" to helping "the world's poorest people" that communicates positive messages about Britain; commitment implies a dedication and the notion of helping the poor is centred as a symbol of goodness. Indeed, Patel's use of the word hope also stresses this notion of British goodness and like Cameron highlights the country can be proud of their development efforts. With the goodness trope Patel mirrors language used by not just by Cameron but also by New Labour, where innate British goodness and thus superiority is evident from its development project. Therefore, in government discourse there are two messages conveyed by suggesting that development work is good. One is that Britons are inherently good because they do development, and they do development because they are inherently good. We might then understand this trope as hegemonic because politicians across the political spectrum reproduce it.

Finally, through discourse on Empire politicians were able to construct Britain as a country that has always been and continues to be good – a discourse that appears to legitimatise politicians' arguments that Britain is best placed in the world to engage with development. When visiting former British colony Tanzania, with the intention of highlighting issues of poverty on the African continent, Gordon Brown told *The Daily Mail* Britain should "celebrate much of our past rather than apologise for it" and talk about "British values that are enduring, because they stand for some of the greatest ideas in history: tolerance, liberty, civic duty, that grew in Britain and influenced the rest of the world" (cited in Brogan, 2005: 10-12). Similarly, Blair in a speech to ambassadors argued that Britain's "history is a strength" as long as "we lose any lingering traces of imperial arrogance and recognise countries will only work with us as equals". He added: "that said, working with us is what many want and probably more than any other former colonial power, our empire left much affection as well as

deep problems to be overcome". In this formulation he also said relations were transformed with "DfID helping to give us a relationship of equality, trust and partnership (2003:1; 21-22).

In addition to this, on a visit to the site of the Amritsar massacre, Cameron was asked whether he would apologise for the British colonialists' actions and he responded:

I don't think the right thing is to reach back into history and to seek out things you can apologise for.

I think the right thing is to acknowledge what happened, to recall what happened, to show respect and understanding for what happened

That is why the words I used are right: to pay respect to those who lost their lives, to remember what happened, to learn the lessons, to reflect on the fact that those who were responsible were rightly criticised at the time, to learn from the bad and to cherish the good [...].

I think there is an enormous amount to be proud of in what the British empire did and was responsible for. But of course there were bad events as well as good events. The bad events we should learn from and the good events we should celebrate.

In terms of our relationship with India is our past a help or a handicap? I would say, net-net, it is a help, because of the shared history, culture, and the things we share and the contributions that Indians talk about that we have made (cited in Watt, 2013b: 4-6; 10-11).

What each of these responses demonstrates is how these British politicians used the imperial past and relationships in order to establish Britain as an ultimately good country and suggest that because of this past the country is well equipped to engage in development work.

Each of these engagements with Empire in relation to development is used to ultimately symbolise British goodness. For Brown "tolerance" and "liberty" are imagined as instinctive British traits and by wielding them to argue Britain influenced the world with them, he is constructing a history where the British Empire had a positive impact on the rest of the world. This history is imagined as continuing to influence the present in a positive way, highlighted through the adjective "enduring"; these positive "values" have existed for a long time and continue to do so. From this it is possible to read a suggestion that they are central to Britishness. Similarly while at one moment, Blair urges Britain to lose its "imperial arrogance", in the next he uses this past to show that it equips the country to engage in international development, in particular using the argument that Empire "left much affection" for the former coloniser. This is an idea that may at times be reinforced by people from within

formerly colonised countries like India (for instance see Lalvani, 2017) but the discursive function is important here. By already having established that Britain should lose its arrogance, Blair has implicitly acknowledged what Brown did not; that there were ‘problems’ with Empire. This might be understood as what a Gramscian analysis calls co-optation; “a strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition”. This means potentially counter-hegemonic ideas are absorbed into the hegemonic doctrine and made consistent with them (Cox: 1983: 166-167; 173). The fleeting recognition that Empire for instance had bad elements within it subsumes critiques into its own analysis, allowing the depiction of Britain as a good power to largely continue as is. Therefore, this admittance arguably makes it easier for him to make statements about how colonialism has equipped Britain with the skills to engage with development and highlight British goodness through the reference to “affection” still felt for the country.

As with Blair, Cameron argues it is important to “acknowledge” what happened but in doing so refuses to apologise for Amritsar. It is noteworthy that he concludes this point by saying he wants to “learn from the bad and to cherish the good”. Even at the site of the Amritsar massacre, Cameron mentions that there was “good” in Empire. “Bad events” and “good events” seem to be positioned against one another as if they carry equal weight, and we might be able to see that while Cameron does not want to apologise for the “bad events” like Amritsar he does want to “celebrate” the “good events”. This comes after he says there is an “enormous amount to be proud of” – by using this description that highlights there is a lot Britain should be proud of, he seems to suggest in this speech that there is more “good” than “bad”. Thus while “good” and “bad” might come together, suggesting they are given equal weight and that Empire was a ‘mixed bag’, they also come with the accentuation of how much there is to be proud of and that the “good” should be celebrated. This suggests the good, to some extent, outweighed the bad. From this, Cameron, like Blair, highlights how the imperial past is helpful for the present. Using hypophora he responds to his own question about whether the past is a “help” or a “hindrance” in Britain’s relationship with India. Yet in this response he does not engage with the ways it might be a hindrance. Having downplayed the “bad” earlier and ignoring it in his response to his own question, Cameron is able to say the colonisation of India – which is never directly referred to but is intimated through “our past” – “helps”, in particular because

people in India still talk of British contributions to the country. By situating this point about contributions in the argument that Britain's past with India is "a help", Cameron appears to suggest Britain's contributions were positive. Thus in a manner akin to Blair, Cameron appears to intimate in this speech not only that Empire was largely "good" but that this past continues to have positive impacts on the present. Brown, Blair and Cameron all invoke a particular version of Empire to highlight British benevolence and, it appears, in an attempt to cast colonial history as positive. This rhetoric about Empire buttresses the idea that Britain is a benign, positive power, all of which it is suggested is beneficial for Britain's development agenda.

Therefore, from this subsection we have seen that one of the dominant tropes in British government development discourse is that Britain or Britons are good. It is argued in development that this is why they as a country or as people engage in development work and at the same time that their development work proves their goodness. In this way, British sense of self and notions of Britain as a moral country are established through development rhetoric; 'doing' development is a symbol that Britain is inherently good. This also communicates that Britain or British people are exceptional; they have the natural capacity to be selfless and are also morally superior to other 'developed' countries. Yet, this is not the only justification or explanation for development, existing alongside this trope of goodness is another in which Britain 'does' development because it is rational.

iii. 'Rational' Britons

Therefore, the explanation behind why Britain does and should engage in development extends beyond the goodness argument and relies on the idea of rationality, although as we will see the two are not always separable. One of the tropes I identified in government discourse is that it is logical and necessary for Britain in particular to engage in development work. This was apparent in New Labour's first white paper on development:

Decisions taken in London, New York or Tokyo can have a profound effect on the lives of millions far away. We travel to distant places and trade with people of whom our grandparents knew little. We are mutually dependent. If our grandchildren are to have a safe future, we must improve opportunities for all the children of the world (DfID, 1997: 10).

The relationship between the ‘developed’ cities mentioned and unnamed places in the ‘developing’ world is established through this first sentence. They might be spatially separated as they are “far away” but they are grammatically close to another and it is stated that the decisions in the former has a “profound effect” on the latter. The syntactical arrangement and the language used show the closeness of the two: one impacts the other in a meaningful way. One of the justifications for development in the white paper then is based on this idea of interconnectedness. Once it has been established that decisions in London, for instance, impact others, this logic is turned around: the two worlds are “mutually dependent”. Therefore, this interconnectedness flows both ways. It is then suggested that it is logical to ‘do’ development in order to protect people in Britain. The possessive pronoun “our” has the impact of making the reader think about their own grandchildren, whose safety it is then argued is dependent on the opportunities available to other children in the world. This is a form of implicature, it is not explicitly stated but we can deduce that children elsewhere in the world will pose a threat to “our” grandchildren in the future if Britain does not develop them. These statements are written as if they are fact, thus naturalising them but also treating engagement with development work as a rational response to this threat. This is not separable from the notion that Britain has the solutions to development. London, along with Tokyo and New York, has the power to develop the rest of the world: they are the active agents. Therefore, the trope of Britain being rational is grounded in the trope of Britain as having the answers to development. These two tropes, we could argue, are interconnected: history demonstrates Britain possesses the knowledge and techniques to help the ‘developing’ world progress, and as well as being good to do, it is rational too.

The idea that it is rational to engage in development work because the ‘developing’ world poses a threat to Britain is a theme that was repeatedly reproduced in government discourse. In a wide-ranging speech on foreign affairs, known as the Chicago Speech, Blair argued:

The threat is not change. The world and many countries in it need to change. It is change through disorder, because then the consequences of change cannot be managed.

[...] But a new order presumes a new consensus. It presumes a shared agenda and a global partnership to do it.

Here's where Britain's place lies. We can only play a part in helping this - to suggest more would be grandiose and absurd - but it is an important part. Our very strengths, our history equip us to play a role as a unifier around a consensus for achieving both our goals and those of the wider world (2003: 5-7).

“Change” is repeated four times in the space of three sentences and is used to suggest change needs to happen, but this is also accompanied by a warning that there is danger in change not being “managed”, which will produce “disorder”. He therefore asserts that “change” is necessary but also dangerous if not done in the way he is suggesting. The threat of “disorder” then emanates from the places in the world that need to change: ‘their’ instability might impact ‘us’ but there is no discussion of if ‘we’ impact ‘them’ in negative ways. This was echoed by successive people in the position of Secretary to State for International Development. Valerie Amos argued, “[w]e have a world in which people are increasingly concerned about issues to do with safety and security [...] Good development is a moral issue, but it’s about self-interest too” (cited in Wroe and Doney, 2003: 24). Hilary Benn argued for development by stating, “[t]he honest truth is if we don’t do this, we won’t have a safe and secure world in which to live’ (cited in Wroe and Doney, 2004c: 31). Finally, Conservative Justine Greening justified development work by arguing that instability can end “up on our own doorstep” (2015: 11). Each of these people stresses the safety of Britain and why development is important for this, with Amos explicitly articulating development is about self-interest. Thus this was one of the ways development was imagined as beneficial to Britain; it would stop chaos entering into the country. By drawing on rhetoric similar to Blair’s we can see that Greening, Benn and Amos are each highlighting the ‘developing’ world as unsafe and potentially hazardous for Britain. Therefore, in government discourse, one of the justifications for development is that it is necessary for British safety and is therefore logical.

The rationality trope extends beyond constructing the ‘developing’ world as a (potential) threat that should be managed. It also includes imagining Britain as having the right skills to combat this threat. After having established change is necessary but must be managed, Blair argued Britain has a role to play in this. But he also said Britain has “only a part” to play in this and argues it would be “absurd” to state otherwise. Blair is showing a degree of self-reflexivity: he appears to be showing some humility in terms of world affairs by not overstating Britain’s role. However, this is

short-lived and appears to clear space for him to say Britain's role would still be "an important" one; having stated he realises Britain's role is to only "play a part" it is easier for him to argue Britain's place is actually important. Indeed, this is then followed up with the argument that Britain is well positioned – because of its history – to act as a "unifier". Blair does not expand on what this history is but as he expresses this as a positive statement, it is possible to argue that it relies on a decontextualised understanding of British development that overlooks the realities of Empire. Blair is able to present British development as rational in two ways: firstly, as already discussed, as a necessary intervention in a world where change might lead to disorder. This is a theme that we encountered earlier in this chapter; in the discussion of the UK stabilisation unit in Afghanistan (see page 91), it was the British developers that were represented as bringing "cool heads" to a chaotic environment. Thus similarly to Blair's language there was an implication that Britons are rational and it is this level-headedness that allows them to engage in development effectively. Secondly, in Blair's speech we can see him suggesting Britain's involvement is a common-sense approach, as the country is naturally well positioned to play a part in helping form a "new consensus". In contrast to the notion that development is the right thing to do, here Britain is constructed as a sensible global actor that can deal with chaos. Therefore, the justification for development in government discourse is not only that Britain is good but that it is at once in the country's interests to engage in development because of the threat of change in the 'developing' world, and that this is also a logical decision because Britain is the right actor to fulfil this role. This naturalises Britain's place as the developer, while also categorising the country as such.

The rationality trope was also explicitly articulated in Conservative development discourse. Greening opened a 2015 speech by stating: "The UK's international development policy is not only the right thing to do but also the smart thing to do for Britain's national interest" (2015: 2). In this speech she repeated the word "smart" six times, in this context this adjective indicates that it is shrewd for Britain to engage in development. For instance, she said: "I want to argue today that our approach can be – and is – both right and smart at the same time" and added "it's a false choice to say we should either do the right thing OR the smart thing [...] what benefits them, also benefits us" (2015: 5; 6). Using collocation, "right" and "smart" are repeatedly spoken about together, which demonstrates that development can both be morally good and

rational. The meeting of the two – development being both good and rational – was also reflected in Greening’s further justifications for development. “[W]hat benefits them, also benefits us” is a form of parallelism, persuading the reader that development work is mutually beneficial: we can read from this that it is good because it benefits ‘them’ and it is rational because it benefits ‘us’. This is compounded by Greening’s argument that it is important people have jobs to: “lift themselves out of poverty and aid dependency, while at the same time growing the markets and trading partners for Britain of the future” (2015: 12). We can deduce that the good outcome is enabling people “lift themselves” out of poverty, the rational is growing markets and trading partners, both of which benefit Britain.

In the examples given, Greening is using parataxis: the two clauses are put side by side and so they at least appear to have equal weight. As this speech was published online we can see how the text was structured and that this argument about poverty and markets is set separately from the rest of the text as a bullet point, thus more clearly treating the two points as equal with one another and also stressing their importance structuring the text in such a way that makes this a separate point on its own. Indeed, this sentiment was also reflected in *Developments*, as we have seen earlier, Valerie Amos declared development was both “moral” and in Britain’s “self interest” (cited in Wroe and Doney, 2003: 24) and in another article in the magazine series it was noted “it is in our own interests, as well as our moral duty, to help create conditions where people can help themselves” (Wells, 1998: 5). In government discourse development Britain can be depicted as both rational, considering how development benefits Britain, and good, with regards to how it impacts the to-be-developed. In this instance, the two are tied together.

In addition to this, we can also see the relationship between the goodness and rationality in the Priti Patel speech referenced earlier (see page 96). However unlike Greening, this idea of rationality stems from the notion that development is good for Britain’s global image. As we have already seen, Patel argues for development with the reasoning “UK aid is an amazing brand, and it is a badge of hope across the world, and it is one that we are proud of” (2017: 18). She also notes that development is “helping Britain stand tall in the world, saving lives, changing lives” (Patel, 2017: 2). As well as symbolising British goodness, there is a suggestion that it is important that

others see this goodness and in this way we might see that it is seen as a rational thing to do. Patel mentions that the UK is standing “tall” and this paints an image of the country standing in such a way that it can be seen. It is from high that they spread this goodness but one other possible reading of this word choice is it suggests they are at the pinnacle of progress, higher than or at least equal to other countries that are not directly referenced. This reading is more convincing when we also consider it in conjunction with her use of the phrase “UK aid is an amazing brand”. The word choice of “brand” here is important, on one level it could mean that it symbolises positivity; the “brand” is known and reliable for providing hope. But this use of advertising language of “brand” can also be understood as tied to Britain ‘selling’ itself through its development programme. Analytically this appears to be a conscious effort to project the country’s power and ideas of goodness on the world stage, and in doing so highlighting its uniqueness in being good. In a way, this reflects Cameron’s desire to position Britain against other ‘developed’ countries as the only one meeting its target on aid spending. The idea of ‘doing good’ and projecting Britain’s goodness was presented as closely aligned with national interests in a “win-win” project (Mawdsley, 2017: 224) and in this instance we can see that British rationality is suggested through using development to symbolise the country’s standing in the world.

Furthermore, the hegemonic nature of this trope is also identifiable from the fact that ‘anti’-development political party UKIP, who as mentioned have not been in government, also used it, though in a less direct way. In their manifesto the party argued for reducing aid spending down to 0.2 per cent GNI, which they said would bring it “in line with that of the United States, which has a very similar level of deficit and overall debt as a percentage of GNI to the UK”. While conducting this comparative analysis with other countries, they also said they would not allow spending to fall below “£4 billion per annum, more than given by Spain and Italy combined” (UKIP, 2015: 69). UKIP did advocate for reducing the development budget and the prestige and power of the department – these are no small shifts from the consensus that had emerged among the main parties. Yet in line with their opponents, they framed their proposals by focussing on the importance of British spending exceeding that of other European countries, although “in line” with the USA. The argument was Britain would still be doing “more” than some other countries. In this sense though it is not explicitly articulated, similarly to Patel’s reasoning there is a

sense that it is rational for Britain to continue with the development project and continue to spend more than and in line with certain other countries in order to maintain British stature on the global stage. Thus although UKIP policy and rhetoric remained comparatively hostile to overseas aid, it is possible to see this as reiterating to ‘pro’-development trope of Britain’s development programme and related to a supposedly rational approach.

Therefore, whether benefitting British stability, considered sensible because Britons are rational and thus capable of ‘doing’ development or used as a sign of British global standing, development is imagined in government discourse as pragmatic. As Biccum identified (2010), this shares some continuities with the logic of the Dual Mandate (Lugard, 1922), where indirect colonial rule was justified on the basis that Britain would benefit economically, while the colonised would be taught civility; Britain engages in development not only because it is morally good but also because it makes sense to do so.

iv. Poverty is ‘natural’

Throughout government development discourse, there is a divide between the ‘developed’ and the ‘developing’/‘underdeveloped’ world, which is achieved through a suggestion that poverty in the latter is natural or a product of a certain country’s or peoples’ way of life. If we look again at the country profile examined earlier, we can see how this works: Sierra Leone is described as having “amazing mineral wealth, yet 70% of its population lives in poverty and it is also ranked as one of the world’s poorest countries (DfID, 2010a: 13). As established, Britain is considered the active agent, yet Sierra Leone, the subject in this sentence, is passive. The name of the country is followed by a predicate that consists of three statements next to one another: Sierra Leone has “amazing mineral wealth”, its population “lives in poverty” and it is “ranked one of the world’s poorest countries”. The former is separated from the latter two statements with the conjunction “yet”. These syntactical devices create a form of implicature; it is suggested, particularly with the word “yet”, but not formally expressed that Sierra Leone has the appropriate natural resources to be a rich country. This is further implied by the use of the word “amazing”; this adjective seems to suggest that the country’s mineral wealth is not just significant but out of the ordinary.

This extraordinariness is then juxtaposed against the statements that demonstrate how extreme poverty is in the country. In this way, there is a suggestion that life in Sierra Leone is stagnant; there is possibility for change with the “amazing mineral wealth” but this has not come to fruition. This is somewhat emblematic of a thread running through development discourse, where descriptions of poverty in the global South represent life in these countries as static (Noxolo, 2004: 210). With these statements and the way they are ordered, it is possible for the reader to deduce that Sierra Leone has the natural resources needed to develop, but that there is a missing piece internally, among the people, that means it is still in dire poverty. There is thus a reading of this description where we can see poverty is depicted as the result of faults within the country and among Sierra Leoneans. Therefore, the to-be-developed are constructed as inert, unable to use the natural resources at their disposal and, as we have seen, positioned against an active British government. It is suggested that Sierra Leone has not progressed because of problems inherent to the country, while as the previous examination of this quote showed, British government is constructed as having the solutions to poverty. Taken together, this adds up to a form of naturalisation; they both operate as a statement of fact and are given no further explanation (Doty, 1996: 10). Therefore, one possible reading of this country profile is that people within Sierra Leone are categorised unable to deal with poverty independently and that the solutions must come from Britain.

One of the ways the country profile appears to present poverty as an endogenous failing is through the decontextualisation of the social, political and economic world in which global poverty exists. This is a recurring theme in *Developments*. While regional factors, such as the Liberian civil war, should be taken into account to understand poverty and instability in Sierra Leone, there is no mention of the geopolitical and economic forces at work alongside internal politics (Keen, 2003: 75; 87; Hickel, 2014: 1364). Without reference to the historical and geopolitical context, and with this suggestion that thanks to its abundance of minerals, Sierra Leone possesses the resources needed to develop, the logical conclusion the reader is left to arrive at is that poverty is internally produced by Sierra Leoneans.

This is a logic repeated in other *Developments* articles and by government ministers. One article lays out the things needed for development such as basic medical care and

infrastructure before stating, “Because of their poverty, developing countries look to the developed world for help with this” (Lowcock, 2001: 10), another states “globalisation also underlines why we cannot ignore countries which are ‘stuck’ because it is often in just such places some of the world’s most acute problems emerge” (DfID: 2010c, 9) and Patel as Secretary of State for International Development argues Britain would “ensure that we enable the poorest countries in the world to industrialise faster, to create jobs, to look at how Britain can lead through much of the work that we do” (Patel, 2017). These representations of the developing world imagine it as stagnant and unable to progress without outside help. In this way poverty is assumed to be the natural product of the country and/or something that simply happens. For instance, the first two processes that are conveyed by Patel as necessary for development are not put in context. If industrialisation is too slow, it is not explained why and if there are too few jobs there is no reasoning as to why. Instead, the adjective “faster” followed by the argument that jobs need to be created suggests that things are moving too slow in other parts of the world. From the term “new jobs” the reader can deduce there are either no jobs or only “old” ones, thus further creating a picture of a ‘developing’ world that is stagnant. There is no broader context presented for the reader to consider, poverty is naturally produced internally and the only way to deal with it is to get outside assistance from countries like Britain, which are represented as the developer.

Therefore, there is a narrative in *Developments* that locates the to-be-developed in a binary with the developed, where the former is incapable of independently progressing (at least by ‘Western’ standards). This is further emblematised in an article entitled ‘Living the Life’, which saw then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for International Development Gillian Merron spend 24 hours “immersed in the daily life of a remote village in northern Nigeria”. This description sets the tone for the rest of the article by conveying the notion that what she has written about this “remote village” will be somewhat accurate given that she was “immersed” in the day-to-day there. These adjectives communicate that she will have had an ‘authentic’ experience and will have seen what life is ‘really’ like in this faraway place, thus it is possible to read this as communicating to the reader that what Merron says will be reliable. Once this has been established, excerpts from the diary Merron kept were displayed as part of the article. One of the extracts read as follows:

One of the men who had come to welcome me asked, “would the leaders in your country allow people to live as we do?” My answer was no – not any more, because people in the UK would not allow it. And because there is a contract between UK taxpayers and the state, based on payment, expectation, and delivery (Merron: 2008: 10).

By saying “people in the UK would never allow” a situation whereby people live as those in this village in Nigeria do, the diary appears to propose Nigerian politicians are able to leave people to live in poverty as if ‘they’ simply are unconcerned about this. This, Merron says, would not be thinkable in Britain. Much like the country profile on Sierra Leone, without analysis or mention of the context – including the numerous other factors that contribute to poverty in Nigeria, such as extractive industries (Duze, 2008) – a possible subtext is that inequality is a product of the natural tendencies or neglect of Nigerian leaders.

In addition, the quote represents people in Nigeria as passive. Aside from the man who asks this question, “people” in Nigeria have no agency in this description. Rather it is people in Britain that are the grammatical agents – even though in this instance not acting for or on behalf of the to-be-developed, beyond perhaps setting an example for people in this village in northern Nigeria – they actively demand a particular relationship with the state. In this description there is a list of three ideas in relation to Britain, this time it is the “taxpayers” and the “state” that have a contract based on “payment, expectation, and delivery”. As with the description of the British government’s priorities in Sierra Leone, grouping these three solidifies the idea that UK citizens are actively engaged with their government and thus play a role in ensuring they receive a particular way of life. The idea that people in Britain “would not allow it” is positioned against people in Nigeria, who are implicitly constructed as passive, with the suggestion that this is the reason they have an inferior state-society relation. In this description and the Sierra Leonean country profile it is possible to identify a trope in government development discourse where “the tendency has been to describe the characteristics of the poor rather than discuss underlying structures of inequality and exclusion” (Kothari, 2006a: 19). These discursive processes of naturalisation seem to construct the to-be-developed and ‘developing’ countries as inherently incapable and Britain as the opposite, the broader social, historical and political context is not taken into account and these representations are assumed to be factual.

Finally, there is a notion of poverty as natural through a construction of the environment. Generally, there was a depiction of life in developing countries as dirty; one article relayed a rule for understanding “a capital city in a developing country”: there is “dust, dirt, overcrowded slums, beggars and street children” (Pieterse, 2000: 11). This is the sum total of how one identifies that they are in a developing country’s capital city; ostensibly all are the same and all are dirty and dusty. In addition to this, in an article examined earlier in this chapter (see page 91), Afghanistan is described in similar terms, as a “hot” place that requires “cool” heads of British developers. Similarly, in an article entitled ‘Africanistan’, *Developments* editors described the changing nature of the country in relation to its environment:

In the hot, dry, dusty terrain of Afghanistan, history used to take forever, but today it is in fast-forward. After long years of conflict followed by tyrannical Taliban rule, the country is now marching at the double towards elections this autumn (Wroe and Doney, 2004b: 3).

The title merges together the words ‘Africa’ and ‘Afghanistan’: this supposed portmanteau treats these parts of the ‘developing’ world as if they are the same. The adjectives used to describe the country – “hot”, “dry” and “dusty” – highlight the supposed natural difficulty of the place. This description highlights the stagnant nature of the environment and surroundings. This is compounded by the conceptualisation of time; history used to “take forever”, in this way mirroring the stagnant environment. Now it “is in fastforward”, although this is not explicitly stated it is implied that this changed with ‘Western’ involvement. Indeed, as is widely known and would likely be part of the reader’s knowledge, it was the US-led coalition that was responsible for the overthrow of the Taliban. The languid nature conjured up by a stifflingly hot country is done away with as outside involvement has helped them to move quickly and ultimately progress. Therefore, in the description of Afghanistan what is imagined is an innate backwardness and sloth-like movement to progress, embodied in environmental descriptions subtly reinforces that Afghans are now only achieving progress because of outside help. Therefore, we can see there is a notion in development discourse that the ‘developing’ world is naturally poor, the broader social, historical and economic contexts within which these countries operate are erased, and there appears to be the suggestion that they are unable to develop themselves.

v. Women and girls as (potential) economic contributors

As established thus far, representations of development in government discourse construct Britain as the natural developer – both because of their goodness and rationality – and the to-be-developed as in need of help. However, there is also a gendered argument made in government discourse with regard to why development matters and how it should be done. If we look again at the word cloud (see page 91), we can see that women appear in significantly large writing and children and girls are in font slightly smaller than this. Thus we know women, girls and children are relevant in coverage but the question remains as to how. Firstly, one of the ways gender plays a role in government discourse is through the idea that women and girls are integral to development as economic actors.

A recurrent theme through *Developments* was that for poverty to be eradicated girls must be educated and women must be able to work so they can become entrepreneurs. In an article, “Uneducated girls spell ‘disaster’”, an unnamed author argued:

Failing to send girls to school is costing the world’s poorest countries billions of pounds a year, according to a new report from Plan International. No education means girls are confined to dangerous, unskilled work – neglecting their earning potential and slowing a country’s recovery from the current financial crisis (DfID, 2009b: 6).

This piece utilises the logic of Women In Development (WID), namely the belief that society as it is will be improved by better involving women and girls, by suggesting girls should be involved in existing development efforts and that their productive capacity should be increased (see Boserup, 1970; Kabeer, 1994; Porter, 1999 for an explanation of how gender has been theorised and utilised in relation to development). This is not explicitly stated but it is foreground in the text because it ties together girls’ education and economic growth. Both sentences in this quote begin by stating girls should be educated and conclude with the reasoning that if they are not it is economically costly.

The piece is thus arguing it is necessary for girls to learn in order to save government money and for the girls to maximise their earning power. The importance of breaking down gender barriers then is predicated on neoliberal economics, rather than a good in its own right. For example, without education women and girls are described as being

“confined to dangerous, unskilled work – neglecting their earning potential”. The verb “confined” creates an idea where girls are trapped by their work. The adjectives “dangerous” and “unskilled” relate to what is at cost, both their lives and their future. Using parataxis – where no conjunction is used to connect two phrases or clauses – their “earning potential” is then introduced as a clause in the same sentence. As there is no conjunction it is left for the reader to deduce that the only way to release girls from dangerous work is to unleash their ability to earn significant amounts of money. Similarly, another *Developments* article explicitly states “More girls in schools leads to greater economic growth and less poverty” (DfID, 2009h: 17). This focus on the economic potential of women and girls is not concerned with their empowerment from patriarchal structures but through the prism of the liberal tradition it is ‘empowerment’ within the existing structure (Wilson, 2012). Therefore, in government discourse girls’ education is centred as important because of how they will contribute to the country’s economic growth.

The argument that girls’ education is good for economic growth is repeated elsewhere in *Developments*. In an editorial, Martin Wroe and Malcolm Doney noted “study after study recognises there is no tool more effective in development than the education of girls. Improving access of girls to schooling increases economic activity, cuts mortality rates, improves nutrition and prevents the spread of AIDs/HIV” (Wroe and Doney, 2004a: 3). As with the previous example, increasing economic activity is centred as a key reason to educate girls. Here they use persuasive techniques in order to suggest this; the repetition of “study after study” communicates that supposedly much evidence shows educating girls is important for development. Though this evidence is not cited or referenced, the authority of a “study” is arguably intended to give weight to their statement. This is further highlighted in the list of what might be considered ‘moral’ arguments for educating girls, such as cutting mortality rates and improving nutrition. With these representations there is an undercurrent that it is simply the right or good thing to do. However, included in this list, at the very beginning, is the argument that it increases economic activity. The authors did not state that educating girls might lead to economic emancipation or independence but rather described this change in the abstract sense that it increased economic activity. By including this in the same sentence as the others it appears to suggest that an economically productive girl or woman is as important as finding ways to ensure that the same girl or woman

has a longer life expectancy. What we see from these representations is an attempt to portray girls' education as essential to development because it will create economic growth.

This kind of language was not only used in relation to girls' education. The discursive trope of girls *and* women as being essential to development was also apparent in Conservative constructions of development. In one speech Justine Greening argued: "women and girls are at the heart of everything we do" (Greening, 2015). Like New Labour's discourse, this explicitly demonstrated that women and girls were considered central to development efforts. Yet the grammatical agent is "we", either government, Britain or both, if Greening is treating them as synonymous with one another, whereas the women and girls are positioned as passively at the heart of development; not 'doing' development but present in it nonetheless. She then explained why this was the case, stating that the government believes "investing in women and girls is one of our best buys. For example, every £1 spent on family planning can save governments up to £4 on healthcare spending, housing, water and other public services" (Greening, 2015). As with "we" in the previous statement, "our" could refer to either the government or the country as a whole, this slippage may well be intentional, blurring the government's actions with the country's, the former supposed to represent the latter. This sentence objectifies "women and girls" by equating them to pounds, development work that focuses on women and girls is treated as if it is a commodity; they are a "best buy". This is compounded by the way Greening explains the actual economic returns when investing in family planning. Here the women and girls, even as dehumanised figures, disappear. Using the technique of impersonalisation, they are symbolised instead by family planning, this is a form of essentialism where they are reduced down to bodies that produce children. In this way her justification chimes with the pragmatism trope: government invests in women and girls because it is economically sensible or profitable. Yet it also draws on a process of dehumanisation. In government discourse women and girls are consistently placed as integral to help development – this is used as a justification for educating girls and focussing on women as part of development projects – and this appears to be because of their sex; because they are women and girls. It is this 'quality' that government depicts as eliciting an economic return. There is thus essentialism at the heart of this representation; women and girls are treated as little other than their bodies and from

this basis the argument is made that they are good value for money.

Indeed, there is one final representation of women that arguably forms part of this proposition but that does not explicitly articulate the importance of developing women. One contributor to the magazine described their time in India by writing about women in ‘Gujerat’ [sic] picking cotton:

[C]olour has been bleached out of this dry landscape, but the women themselves look like moving jewels. One wears a sari in pink, turquoise and yellow, another drapes her head with a scarf of scarlet and purple, the third wears a brilliant green overdress embroidered in gold [...] This hot, dusty field is the start of a supply chain that ends with a customer choosing which T-shirt, jeans or underwear to buy among the myriad styles, labels and price available (Tickle, 2006: 34).

There are vivid descriptions of the clothes the women are wearing; the image of the “brilliant” colours, the gold embroidery and the idea that they are “moving jewels”; these women are to be consumed by the British audience. The women in colourful clothing are separated from the dry landscape; they are at once gendered figures to be consumed by the audience and also as producers of goods to be bought; this corresponds with the tropes examined so far. Women are workers, who are economically productive, and this economic production is ushered into existence through consumers. This description arguably suggests that though the environment around them is stagnant, these women are productive because of their economic roles. In fact, this description of the landscape as “hot”, “dusty”, “dry”, echoes that of Afghanistan (see page 110). The repetition of these descriptions for two different countries – India and Afghanistan – in different issues of the magazine and written by different authors, suggests a similarity in how the ‘developing’ world is seen. Therefore, what we have seen in this proposition is that the education and economic empowerment of women and girls is represented as important for development work because of the economic gain they will provide; they are centred as key potential agents of development but in the process essentialised as little more than their sex and imagined as workers that will produce economic growth.

vi. Women in need of saving

Another gendered trope in government discourse is the representations of the societies and ‘traditions’ from which women must be emancipated. That is, women in the ‘developing’ world are depicted as in need of saving from the countries they live in,

the ‘traditions’ they are supposedly trapped in or the men around them. The front page of Issue 13 of *Developments* is a good example of this. It shows one young woman wearing a headscarf, which is pushed back from her face, showing the top of her head and hair. She is in the foreground of the picture, the focus is on her and she is turned toward the camera, looking directly into the lens and thus at the views. The viewer and thus the photographer appear to be at the back of a classroom, where this girl is sitting. In the background is a classroom full of other young women wearing the headscarf, turned away from the camera. They are not in focus, only the girl is. She does not appear alarmed by the person photographing her and by extension the gaze of the viewer but rather has a slight smile on her face. We can interpret this image as depicting the girl who is facing the camera as either enlightened thanks to development or asking to be helped through the medium of development. Meanwhile the others in the class with their headscarves on, facing away from the camera and not in focus have not been emancipated or will not be without the help of Britain.

This picture is used again in Issue 22 on two occasions, though unlike in the earlier issue, it is not on the front page it is given a significant amount of space on one of the pages and is also a thumbnail on the contents page. We can read individual images such as this by pulling out meaning and interpreting what they represent, this makes use of what Stuart Hall (1997) called dominant regimes of representations. At different historical and social stages, images and depictions accumulate meaning over time and sustain certain racial norms and prejudices. Utilising Hall’s technique, we can see the image is intelligible by looking at the War on Terror discourse, which was unfolding at this time. Images of veiled Muslim women were used to justify imperial wars. ‘The West’ was imagined as a “beacon of civilization” and these women, key political figures such as George Bush (President 2001-2009) and Laura Bush and Tony Blair and Cherie Blair argued, needed to be liberated from backwards culture by ‘Western’ powers (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Stabile and Kumar, 2005: 766; Shepherd, 2006; Wilson, 2012: 51). Oppression of women in Afghanistan had long been ignored by Britain and the USA; this was part of a ploy to sell war in Afghanistan to people in each country and obscured the material benefits both stood to gain from the war (Stabile and Kumar, 2005). Therefore, this image can be interpreted as fitting into this broader repertoire; readers looking at this picture will likely have known this broader regime of representation and thus made similar deductions about the girl looking at the camera

being 'saved' from an oppressive religion through development (Manchanda, 2001).

The notion that girls or children more generally need to be or are being saved through development is accentuated through images of children being educated throughout the magazine. Of the 1,958 images examined in the magazines, 320 (16 per cent of the total images analysed) are of children and these can broadly be divided into children looking happy and being educated and children looking sad or ill. To gauge how regularly images of children being educated were used, of the issues that contained five or more pictures of children (that was 32 issues in total) I chose one at random and looking more closely at the images. I looked at Issue 22, which contained 10 pictures of children, amounting to 29 per cent of all images. The front page showed children sitting in a row on the floor, looking side on at the camera that is at their height. They are not smiling but one holds a piece of material and looks to be learning. Nine of the images in this issue, that is 90 per cent of all images of children, show them learning with the help of development. In this way, it is suggested that children are being saved from ignorance by development.

The idea of being trapped in tradition, culture or religion and needing to be saved from this also translates into representation of womens' experiences. Editor of the *Developments*, Martin Wroe, described young Afghan women who "are finding a voice through film and television with the help of an enterprising media project [...] Gulmaki [one of the women he meets] is not a typical Afghan woman, deferential and respectful in the presence of men" (Wroe, 2004: 14-15). The assumption that a "typical" Afghan woman is "deferential" and "respectful" ignores ground-up women's resistance to oppression in Afghanistan (Stabile and Kumar, 2005) and it buttresses a stereotype of Afghan women as subservient to men. The idea that these women have found a voice suggests that prior to this project they would be voiceless. To gain their voice, it is possible to discern that collaboration with Britain is necessary as the media project Wroe references is in partnership with Britain. Therefore, women are the active agents who are "finding" their voice but this action is also helped into existence through a project Britain is involved in; their action dependent upon development. We might understand this as a variation of the idea that 'Third World Women' need to be saved by people from the global North (Mohanty, 1984). In this representation women do have some agency but there remains the stereotype of women typically being

submissive and in order to be saved, they must be helped by Britain. At times this was also explicitly articulated; speaking about a woman seeking justice in Malawi, one *Developments* article explained: “just as things looked very bleak, a new DFID-backed initiative came to the rescue. The local Primary Justice Forum, introduced by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), paid the fine, saving Georgina from prison” (DfID, 2009f: 17). This used the very language of “saving” a woman from practices within the country. While it may be true that DfID’s work did help this woman, using this language reinforces a broader image of women in the ‘developing’ world as helpless and in need of saving. Therefore DfID’s approach to gender presented an image of ‘developing’ countries as places where women and girls as reliant on development assistance to be emancipated.

Contributing to this notion of women and girls in ‘developing’ countries as trapped and in need of liberation is the collocation of “women” and “children” in *Developments*. Former *Developments* editor Clare Shaw, in an editorial focussed on sustainability, wrote:

All sectors of society in every country in the world – women, children, NGOs, local authorities, national governments, business and industry, trade unions, academics, farmers, food producers – have a part to play in making sustainable development a reality. But we have to each play a part as individuals, through our day-to-day actions, and as consumers (2002: 3).

Shaw lists a variety of people who are able to help but all are represented by their work or organisational structure. Though women can also occupy any of these positions, it is only ‘women and children’ who are explicitly referenced as unconnected to a practical role they may play in development. Even the “we” the text refers to, meaning the writer and the reader, are symbolised as consumers. This means everyone else in this text is active; they have a purpose, a clearly defined role. As we have seen thus far, this seems to reduce women down to their sex; this is why they are important for development. However, there is also a process of infantilisation. Using collation – the regular occurrence of certain words next to or close to one another – women and children or women and girls are throughout *Developments* grouped together (e.g. McLeod, 2000: 28-9 and Malik, 2008: 9). If we look at all of the images in *Developments*, for instance, we see of the 1,958 examined, pictures of women and children in some variation comprise 128 pictures (7 per cent of all pictures), whereas pictures of men and children only amount to 18 (0.9 per cent of all pictures). This has

the impact of treating women as if they are like children, as it is a trope that surfaced in the War on Terror discourse. Feminist scholar Laura Shepherd has argued ‘women and children’ “infantilizes [women] [...] denying them both adulthood and agency, affording them only pity and a certain voyeuristic attraction” (2006: 21). Therefore, when women are grouped with children or girls in government discourse we are seeing another variant of the Orientalist idea that women and girls in the global South need to be protected by ‘the West’, women have no agency and they are not seen as adults, thus they need help to be developed or emancipated (Enloe, 1992: 96). Women and children and women and girls are thus packaged together rhetorically; although there is also the representation of women and girls as integral to development, albeit achieved at times by dehumanising them, this exists alongside a trope that strips them of agency (Wilson, 2012).

In addition to this, the erasure of men and boys in the Shaw quote, and in the government focus that prioritises economic development through women and girls, suggests in certain countries they have less of a role to play in development at the everyday micro-level. Although there were images of men ‘doing’ development in *Developments* and though the professions mentioned in Shaw’s list will include men, they are not referenced by their gender in a ‘positive’ way as women and girls are. Rather, they were at times depicted as a homogeneous group that is ‘bad’. For example, in Issue 13 an article called ‘Votes for Women’, which looked at the number of women in politics in Pakistan, men were presented in a homogeneous way:

“Islam restricts women from intermingling with men. Women should stay at home and shouldn’t be politicking,” said Maulvi Allah Bakhsh, the mosque leader.

But Fatima is lucky that her husband, a retired army man, fully supports her political endeavours. Undeterred by opposition from the forces backing the status quo, this 39-year-old mother of six is ready to raise issues as diverse as high rates of female illiteracy, poor maternal health facilities and lack of clean water (Rizvi and Nusrat, 2001: 23-4).

Fatima is described in relation to her children, namely as a “mother of six” and the issues listed that she is supposedly most concerned by are traditionally considered ‘women’s issues’, in this way she is stereotyped through a very particular gender role as a mother and carer. Meanwhile, Maulvi Allah Bakhsh, the mosque leader, may well not be without influence over peoples’ and specifically male opinion, yet he is the only

man who is given the space to speak in this quote.¹⁵ This therefore centres the reader's focus on his words and his argument that Islam dictates women should be confined to the home. By centring his words, this representation might have the effect of reducing down a diversity of Muslim men down to the views of this one Imam. Although Fatima's husband is mentioned, and it is noted that he supports her, he is not given the space to speak in the way the Imam is nor is he named. He is therefore less prominent in the description and less memorable for the reader. The widespread nature of these patriarchal views is emphasised by the idea that Fatima is "lucky" her husband supports her career. This implies most men do subscribe to patriarchal views, there are few who do not and this is why Fatima is as lucky. Although in *Developments*, Fatima has agency to fight against oppression, this is predicated on the idea that many men in Pakistan are innately 'bad', or at least intensely patriarchal. Missing from analysis is the structural forms of oppression individual men and women then play a part in; it becomes an idea in which many men are 'bad' and women are 'good'. Government discourse does not grapple with the social construction of masculinity, and how this manifests itself specifically in certain parts of Pakistan or is linked to patriarchy. Therefore, it appears to treat patriarchal values as natural to Pakistani men. These fixations on the inherent problem with Pakistani men see them as unhelpful in development or as stymieing progress. This tells the reader regressive gender norms are inherent to underdeveloped countries in the global South and uses gender to buttress the idea that the global North must show others countries how to develop.

Consequently, as well as representing women and girls as potential workers who can be made economically productive through education and development, government discourse constructs women and girls as in need of saving from the 'developing' countries they are from. This is achieved through the coupling together of women and girls and women and children, suggesting women are equivalent to girls and thus infantilising them and taking away their agency. But it is also suggested through the depiction at times of men oppressing women.

vii. Representations of India

As well as examining representations of development more broadly, it is vital to

¹⁵ There is extreme gender violence and evident patriarchal structures (Isran and Isran, 2012), which women organise against (Critelli and Willett, 2012).

burrow down in one case study to see the specific ways one particular place is represented. This is because processes of representation and in particular racialisation are not steady; racialisation is historically as well as geographically contingent (Brah, 1991); different groups of people are racialised in comparison to one another at different times. This is not to say that there are not overlaps and similarities between places and times. Yet instead of only looking at an overview of representations of race in development discourse, as others have done, here we will focus on India to make sense of how particular tropes present themselves when this country is being discussed. Looking at India will allow us to explore complexities that may not be seen within a broader view. India has a growing economy and is a country that is in some ways ‘developing’ but continues to have high rates of poverty, this allows us to examine if and potentially how this manifests in government discourse. In fact, this divide was intimated in an issue of *Developments* focussed primarily on India. Furthermore, focussing on the more specific forms of representation in India will lay the ground for further case-specific analysis in subsequent chapters, which will enable us to compare and contrast forms of racialisation in *Developments* with those in British newspapers and those found among development professionals

a. India as incapable

By examining representations of India in *Developments*, I identified a number of tropes not found by looking at how development generally is represented in government discourse. Yet there was one that fitted into a trope already found in this chapter: the depiction of poverty as an innate product of a particular country. Much like general representations of development, poverty is decontextualised and progress is broadly treated as a product of ‘Western’ influence. In a country profile on India, the following description was given:

India is the world’s largest democracy. But despite strong economic growth, some 828 million Indians live in poverty. Between 2002 and 2007 the UK provided more than £1bn in aid to India, and from 2008 to 2011 will invest another £825m, including £500m on health and education. DFID’s main focus is on malnutrition, child and maternal deaths, education, and water and sanitation (Das, 2009: 36).

This text uses numbers to illustrate its point. Juxtaposed against India’s democratic credentials and “strong economic growth” are the 828 million people in poverty, India’s economic growth is quantified but the number of people living in poverty is making the levels of impoverishment easier to make sense of. At the same time this

means people in India and the Indian government are noticeably absent; the only means through which they are represented is through this negative, passive statistic. In line with the description of Sierra Leone earlier in this chapter, neither India's colonial history, the contemporary extractive processes that occur, often carried out by multinational companies nor resistance to this (Padel and Das, 2010) are mentioned in the brief description of the Indian economy. This naturalises poverty in India, depoliticising and dehistoricising existing inequality and treating it solely as a product on the nation-state (Jones, 2006: 10).

The notion of India as incapable is achieved by positioning it as passively existing in relation to a British agent of change. Here we can see how representations of Britain as active naturalises the notion of India as incapable. The focus is on DfID's involvement and this is clearly quantified not just for the year preceding the article but between 2002 and 2007. This gives the sense that Britain has an ongoing financial commitment and plan for India. Their dedication is symbolised by the statements of how much money they give to the country, while there is no mention of financial or practice assistance anyone in India might be giving to people in poverty. Therefore, after it has been stated that people in India live in poverty, there is a list of the financial and practical help the UK and DfID are providing in the country. The final list of DfID's 'focus' is an example of a tetracolon, which gives the impression that Britain has a well-thought-out, balanced plan that it is being enacted. While Indian economic growth and poverty are given one sentence, two long sentences with more than one clause are used to explain the work DfID is doing. The construction of this paragraph therefore suggests that no one in India is acting against poverty. Instead, the grammatical agents are the UK and DfID; it is the UK that has "provided more than £1bn in aid" and will continue to "invest" and by using a list of all of areas of development DfID are focussed on there is a sense they are active and 'doing' development world. This may seem unsurprising given *Developments* was a magazine produced by DfID with the aim of publicising their achievements. Yet what is omitted tells us as much as what is mentioned; alongside this explanation of DfID's work is the suggestion that people in India are incapable of looking after themselves and one another. Consequently, through the decontextualised description of Indian poverty not only is DfID 'selling' its own work, while failing to mention significant causal factors in poverty, it also implicitly naturalising the idea that India and Indians are incapable

of dealing with poverty alone and thus categorising India as in need of help and Britain as the agent of change.

The notion of incapability is repeated in *Developments*. Throughout the magazine's coverage there was a dual narrative: one of Indian underdevelopment and poverty and secondly of recognition that there has been significant economic growth in India. Both points are apparent in the country profile: "despite strong economic growth, some 828 million Indians live in poverty" (Das, 2009: 36). Yet as the country profile seemed to suggest, India is still reliant on Britain. Articles that discussed the success of India's economy often contained in them caveats that informed the reader that growth was predicated on 'Western' involvement:

It's because of China and India's progress – largely on the back of increased trade with rich Western markets – enabling poor producers to sell to many more wealth consumers than they'd find at home. In other words, it has been the custom of western shoppers and businesses, that has helped millions of Chinese and Indians out of poverty. This is not something we should take direct credit for (they did the hard work – we just bought stuff we wanted) but surely it is worth celebrating (Boulton, 2008: 5).

China's and India's "progress" is stated as the initial fact and indeed they both have growing economies. Yet immediately this progress is attributed to trade with "rich Western markets". This establishes an image where the West, which possesses wealth, is helping the 'developing' world. In addition to this, the grammatical agents are not China and India, progress has somewhat passively happened to them, but people in 'the West', represented through impersonalisation as "Western markets" and "western shoppers and businesses" are taken to represent 'the West'. The way this sentence is structured positions 'the West' as helping "millions of Chinese and Indians out of poverty". The use of "Chinese" and "Indians" in this way is arguably a form of collectivisation; these words represent people who had been in significant poverty in these countries and in this way they and the countries as a whole are homogenised.

It might seem this creation of 'the West' as active and China and India as passive is offset by the rejection that "we" – which in this case of collectivisation might mean either 'the West' or Britain – shouldn't take credit for development, yet this comes after it has been established that it is 'the West' that has been active in reducing poverty. In addition to this, the supposed positive qualification – that "they" did the hard work – is in parentheses, this cuts it off from the rest of the text and suggests it is

perhaps a less important aside. The seeming unimportance of this additional piece of this information in parentheses is buttressed by the suggestion that regardless it is “worth celebrating”. As Stuart Hall explained, “adding positive images to the largely negative repertoire of the dominant regime of representation increases the diversity of ways in which ‘being black’ is represented, but does not necessarily displace the negative” (1997: 274). Thus this brief positive suggestion that people in these two countries have worked hard is situated in a broader terrain of the ‘developing’ world being represented as passive. Therefore, even when the focus is on countries that are economically growing there remains the discursive tool that depicts Britain as the active agent. We can see that representations of the to-be-developed or the developing world are not always necessarily wholly negative but that the negative representation is still dominant, in this instance the depiction of India as needing help to development.

The binary between Indians and Britons was reiterated in the conceptualisation of Empire and India. As outlined earlier in this chapter, the Empire was very rarely explicitly mentioned in *Developments* and when it was it tended to be treated as insignificant to understanding contemporary global politics. The few times it was acknowledged, it was talked about as though it had entirely come to an end or as if in some ways it benefitted the colonies. In ‘India: how’s it growing?’ it is possible to interpret from the words they used that the authors of the piece, editors Martin Wroe and Malcolm Doney, wanted to put India in its place:

If the speed of Global India’s progress is breathtaking, the progress of the poor is more dogged. The rise of global India is measured in ‘lakhs’ (hundreds of thousands) or rupees. The struggle of the poor are counted in hundreds. As the country celebrated sixty years of independence from Britain this summer and Delhi’s Red Fort echoed to the sound of cannon, India’s flag flying free where the British Union Jack was lowered forever in 1947, it cannot afford to be too triumphalistic (2007: 13).

The first three sentences consist of comparisons between India as a growing economy and ongoing poverty. The first constructs a distinction between the speed of economic growth, where the adjective “breathtaking” symbolises that it is moving at a particularly fast pace and may be out of control. Meanwhile the “progress of the poor” is depicted as “dogged”; this is an animalistic term that dehumanises while also suggesting progress is more difficult and thus we can deduce slower. To give weight to this, the authors continue to demonstrate the difference, relying on equating progress in terms of economic symbols. Similarly to the country profile, there is a

decontextualised “struggle of the poor”, in which poverty is merely described in comparison with economic progress of the country. This again is part of the naturalisation of the idea that people in India simply are in poverty as there is no focus on the wider social, historical, political or economic contexts. Although this follows the binary of developed, active Britain vs. underdeveloped, passive India, this is achieved through a slightly different portrayal of underdevelopment. There is an active India that is economically growing and rising. This country is not passive as a whole and there are also attempts to be active among the poor but this is a “struggle” or “dogged”; poor Indians attempting to achieve change alone is too difficult.

Taken together this form of representation of an ‘active’ India paired with the decontextualisation of poverty suggests there remain problems internal to India, which is why poverty continues. Yet previously ‘Western’ involvement as necessary to Indian economic growth was conveyed through evidence of the work DfID was doing. In this segment it is the *lack* of ‘Western’ involvement that seems to be a problem. Wroe and Doney focus on independence as a supposed release from British rule; they describe the flag “flying free” as a symbol of the end of colonialism but this is to suggest independence has not produced progress for the poor. Accompanying this is the word “triumphalistic”, which suggests perhaps Indians are overconfident or that there is a long way to go so people should not become complacent. It is true that inequality levels were high in India (Ghosh and Pal, 2007) and we should understand different, arguably stigmatising attitudes towards poverty (Dasandi, 2015). Yet, although it is not explicitly stated it is a possible subtext that decolonisation and the lack of direct British presence that accompanied colonialism has allowed poverty to grow. This is achieved through the suggestion that it was believed decolonisation would result in progress for India. Yet as this has not happened there is a suggestion that Britain was not the cause of problems in the country but rather that Indians are incapable of looking after themselves.

However, the focus on incapability does not merely fortify the division between India and ‘the West’, the picture is more complex than this binary allows: class played a role in *Developments*’ depiction of India, where in one article richer Indians were constructed as capable and poorer Indians as incapable. Discussing inequality in the country, an international development consultant in India explained: “There is India on

two feet, on four legs, on two wheels, on four wheels [...] and then there's the jet set" (cited in Wroe and Doney, 2007: 5). This communicates that there are different layers of advancement in India, from people flying around the world, to those who represent lack of progress by merely walking around. The class divides these references are substantial and in this same article the reader was told:

A go-getting 26-year-old brand manager in a dynamic IT company in Noida, near Delhi, takes a more Darwinian view. There are two Indias [sic], she says: 'There are those that are ready to do something, and those that don't want to do anything (cited Wroe and Doney, 2007: 5).

This established again a decontextualised version of Indian poverty whereby people simply choose what kind of life they want to live and some people do not have the nous or inclination to earn money and lift themselves out of poverty. The vast majority of the representations of India in *Developments* focussed on the country as a whole, with the undercurrent that it needed help from Britain to progress. But even when this was the message there were also moments where Indian agency was recognised; as shown previously, this showed 'rich' India as progressing quickly and the poor as attempting to progress but unable to do so at a significant pace. Here there is the division not solely between Britain and India but between rich India and poor India or people who "do something" and people who do not want to.

The implication of the quote, paired with the differentiation between India that is technologically progressed and that which is not, suggests that poverty in India is conceptualised as an individual failing of people who are in poverty. This is not entirely divorced from the previous representation where poor people in India struggled and 'global' India was rapidly growing. However, in this article poor Indians are more explicitly constructed as less capable, previously their poverty was decontextualised and though it might have been interpreted as an endogenous failing, in this representation there is an explicit notion of the poor being blamed for their own poverty. Poor people are both not attempting to progress in this representation and rated below the people above described as "jet setters". This creates a spatial and technology hierarchy based on how people move around; the poorest with their feet on the ground, the richest in the air, and this sits alongside a representation of people in poverty as unwilling to act. Someone interviewed for *Developments* articulates this but it is not questioned or probed by the interviewer or elsewhere in the text. Therefore,

this distinction between rich Indians as capable and poor Indians as incapable exists is unchallenged in the magazine.

Hence, through examining discourse about India in *Developments* we can identify a theme found generally in development discourse: that India and most Indians are incapable of developing independently. It is noteworthy that a country that is economically growing is still depicted in a similar manner to countries that are not. India is imagined as a place that is prospering but where this prosperity is deeply related to British or ‘Western’ involvement and where development may in fact be stymied when Britain is not heavily involved. In addition to this, although this is not a recurring trope, what was also apparent in *Developments* was the distinction between poor Indians as incapable and richer Indians as capable. In this one article, rich Indians momentarily came to occupy a similar position to the developer, Britain, in other representations of the country; they had the inherent abilities to progress while poor Indians did not. This demonstrates how the internal dynamics of class relations may surface in representations of the ‘developing’ world.

b. India as chaotic

Though there is a division between rich India and poor India, there remains a notion that India is incapable of development and this is achieved through imagining the country as inherently chaotic. This can be discerned from how the environment was described in *Developments*. For instance, in the proposition outlined earlier, we saw a description of India where economic growth was described with the adjective “breathtaking” (Wroe and Doney, 2007: 13). This not only symbolises that growth is particularly fast but that it also might be out of control. Similarly, in an issue focussed on India, the country was described as “booming” on four occasions, as “accelerating fast” and as a place where there was a “boom” occurring in cities (Wroe and Doney, 2007: 3; 5; 6; 4). These descriptions were part of a broader explanation that while the country is economically growing; the poor are being left behind. Thus we can read these descriptions as suggesting that there is an element of chaos in this growth; it is dominating and could prove to be uncontrollable.

We might begin to see that Indian economic development is imagined as chaotic and

thus potentially threatening. Looking at a school in Chennai, which is partnered with Warden Park Secondary School in Haywards Heath, Sussex, the writer explained:

It's 9am at Little Flower Convent School for the deaf in Chennai, India, and already a simmering 33 degrees Celsius. Away from the surging city streets, morning prayers in the shadow courtyard follow a solemn flag-raising ceremony. Then to the beat of a Tamil drum, 500 girls march off to lessons (DfID, 2009c: 8).

The heat of the environment is communicated through description that it is a “simmering 33 degree Celsius” but there is a stark contrast between the city streets, which are “surging”, and the tranquillity of the school, where order is instilled through drumbeat. Indeed, these two descriptions are placed side-by-side, which highlights the stark contrast between the two. This indicates nuance; in India there are different worlds, one that is chaotic like other developing countries and one that is calm and ordered. The reading of “breathtaking” earlier (see page 123) is arguably more convincing when placed in relation to this description of the school in Chennai.

In addition to this, in another *Developments* article, the following description of a school was given: “it is a hot summer morning in Ganeria village primary school in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh [...] As the clock strikes 11am bedlam breaks out” (DfID, 2009g: 14). The reference to “bedlam” could be seen as related to the fact that this describes a primary school and a chaotic environment made up of many children, but there can also be a double meaning, where India and Indian children in particular are thought to produce “bedlam”. Indeed, the description “breaks out” also suggests there is an inherent nature to it; this kind of bedlam is embedded in India. Reading this text as conjuring up images of India as chaotic is convincing when put in relation to the other two examined here. The three examples seem to suggest India as a country that has some degree of development, where children go to school and the economy is growing, but this is chaotic and unwieldy.

The notion of India as a place of chaos is reinforced by the idea that rules are not followed within the country. In one piece in *Developments* India as a chaotic environment is invoked through references to corruption:

While many countries disappoint the international community with the cronyism, autocracy or internal conspiracies, India continues to win plaudits for having stayed largely true to the spirit of democracy [...] but beneath the surface, Indian democracy conceals a raw mix of corruption, primitive patterns of loyalty, sycophancy and populism (Agrawal, 2007: 15).

India is set among many other countries that have “cronyism” and “internal conspiracies” and thus it is established that corruption is not a problem exclusive to India. However, there is a distinction between the “international community” and the “many countries” that are disappointing because of their internal corruption. “International community” may be taken as a form of collectivisation, representing the progressed, developed world, and the demarcation between the unnamed countries and this community suggesting “cronyism” or “conspiracies” are the product of internal failings, entirely disconnected from countries beyond national borders. Here chaos is emblematised by the successive descriptions of India as a place of corruption; the four next to one another – referencing corruption, loyalty, sycophancy and populism – gives the impression that there is a significant volume of suspect activity in India.

Furthermore, as the description continues, corruption in India is described as hidden – emblematised by the description of it existing “beneath the surface” and thus not in clear view – behind “democracy”. This description suggests that there is a dual nature to Indian society and that although India has reached a certain level of progress in terms of ‘democracy’, underneath it is still dangerously ‘native’. This may be interpreted from the mention of corruption; it is portrayed as part of a “mix” of “primitive patterns of loyalty, sycophancy and populism”. The choice of syntax with the adjective “primitive” suggests that there is an innateness to these forms of extreme dishonesty in India, whereby Indian people are thought to naturally behave in the ways described. This seems to be accentuated by the use of the adjective “raw” at the beginning of this list of ‘problems’ in India. The adjective might be taken to depict corruption as the natural unrefined state of India and Indians. In this way, though there are rare moments when rich Indians are constructed as ‘developed’ and through the discourse of corruption and primitivism, Indian society is imagined as inherently flawed and not under control: it is a place of chaos.

Representations of the environment and of India as inherently chaotic imply issues such as poverty are produced endogenously and that growth is not under control; the latter suggesting outside help may be needed. While there are representations of India as an economically growing power and of rich Indians as capable of progress, there are also these representations of India as fundamentally incapable. Therefore, when

situated in this broader context a plausible interpretation is that even if India progresses to a degree, it can never deal with poverty independently because of its inherent failures.

III. How discourse is racialised

The European has only been able to become a man through creating slaves and monsters. — Jean-Paul Sartre, in Fanon, 1961.

This is the West's new image of itself: a sexy, politically active generation whose preferred means of spreading the word are magazine spreads with celebrities pictured in the foreground, forlorn Africans in the back [...] Africans are props in the West's fantasy of itself. — Uzodinma Iweala, 2007:6.

The final section of this chapter will explore how the representations and tropes outlined in the previous pages are related to race and are a product of processes of racialisation, in particular how they are related to whiteness. As explored in the literature review, one of the critiques of development in post-development and post-colonial literature is that echoing colonialism (Dirks, 1992; Escobar, 1995), there is a clear demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This has been established clearly in the tropes outlined above and it is also an established trend (Lamers, 2005). We know these divisions find their roots in a colonial logic: as Dirks (1992) argued, colonialism was a cultural project that created and reproduced dichotomies between ‘them’ and ‘us’ to sustain colonial control. Yet what is often overlooked is how racial, as well as gender and class, boundaries were essential to creating and maintaining British colonial authority and legitimacy (Mohanty, 1986) and how race, alongside these other categories, continues to structure our world. Using Hall, who deploys a Gramscian conceptualisation of hegemony, I understand race as “one of the principle forms of human classification, which have all of these negative and positive attributes kind of built into it” this functions as a “common sense code in our society”. Race is not rigid but is shifting and these classifications:

are used in order to divide populations into different ethnic or racial groups and to ascribe characteristics to these different groupings and to assume a kind of normal behavior or conduct about them [...] there is a kind of essentializing of race and a whole range of, diverse range of characteristics ultimately fixed or held in place because people have been categorized in a certain way, racially (Hall, 1997b: 3).

This is an apt description of not only how race functions but how it is given political

meaning through racialisation; identifying particular groups through supposed ancestral connections. By failing to engage with the importance of race in this dichotomy, much existing work does not explore the distinctions between the developed and to-be-developed, which regularly appear in government discourse and are reliant upon racialisation for salience.

Therefore, in this section I will explain how the tropes identified in this chapter interact with one another to construct a picture in which Britain is a force of progress but that this is reliant on whiteness, which can be made sense of through the epistemologies immanence, ignorance, goodness and rationality. Here, whiteness is understood following Hall's logic, that it is a politically- and socially-constructed category that is not solely reducible to static, biologically bounded racial categories (1988: 443). Though each of the propositions were analysed separately, their propositional content overlaps and they find meaning from one another. Representations of Britons also find meaning when positioned against the to-be-developed who are classified as inherently backwards, corrupt and incapable of development (this binary is referenced by Wilson, 2012: 136 broadly in relation to the 'good governance' agenda). In particular, the Indian case demonstrates how even when a 'developing' country is capable of economically growing, it can still be represented as incapable of independently aiding people in poverty. These representations are not only achieved through presenting Britain as active and the 'developing' world as passive but constructing the qualities supposedly needed for development – goodness and rationality – as inherent to Britain. Therefore, by using race as a tool through which to make sense of these tropes we can see the different ways these distinctions are drawn between the developer and the to-be-developed.

However, this section will also attempt to show that other forms of representation and racialisation that exist alongside this dichotomy. Race interacts with class and gender in representations of the 'developed' world to create distinctions within these countries, between who is wealthy and who is not, and who is capable of doing development and who is not. From this we might begin to understand how racialisation, in line with Gramscian understanding of hegemony as unsteady and as being produced in multiple ways, can be shifting and contradictory in government discourse, a theme not yet explored by existing work (Wilson, 2012). This will be

established by showing how there are competing representations of India as a place of corruption while also depicting rich Indians as more developed than poor, and positioning women in the ‘developing’ world as more likely to be agents of development than men, albeit with the help of ‘the West’. Ultimately, these shifting binaries are constructed as natural or common sense. In order to explore these themes, this section will first examine how agency is racialised with regard to the divide between Britain and the to-be-developed but also in relation to class and gender within ‘developing’ countries. It will then analyse how qualities depicted as inherent to Britain and ‘developing’ countries are formed by race and processes of racialisation and can undermine or challenge the ways agency is racialised.

i. Agency as racialised

Firstly, let us consider how race operates in constructions of Britain as the developer and poorer countries as the to-be-developed. We have seen in government discourse about development, Britain – and at times ‘the West’ – are depicted as having the solutions to global poverty. By consistently positioning Britain as the active agent in development discourse, it is imagined that without their help the ‘developing’ world will be unable to progress. This finds its logic in a teleological understanding of development, that early developers can show the path to later ones. This is achieved by conceptualising Britain as a country that was historically able to develop independently. This ultimately excludes the history of the ‘developing’ world, obscuring the ideas, wealth and resources that were produced in these countries and were used by Europe to progress (Dussel, 1995; Bhambra, 2007; Shibusawa, 2013). The idea that there is a ‘universal’ understanding of development possessed by Britain, a country that has already naturally achieved this development, independently flows from the supposed ‘common sense’ understanding of development that centres Europe or Britain as the ‘developed’ world. In line with modernisation theory there is a “standard notion of a linear movement from a traditional past to a modernized future” and this is done where “[t]raditional, or pre-modern, societies” are “put forward as objects of comparison with societies already deemed to be modern” (Bhambra, 2007: 57). Thus, the ‘developing’ world is imagined in development discourse as *naturally* poor. Poverty and inequality were decontextualised in *Developments*; this is emblematic of a process whereby failures of development have been attributed to the

to-be-developed (Wilson, 2012: 145) rather than the economic policy of the developers. This was represented in a particularly distinct way with regard to India; recognising that the country was one of economic growth, poverty was still decontextualised and thus India was depicted as incapable of progress without the help of Britain and/or ‘the West’. However, this exists alongside recognition that there was economic development, thus the representation of India does not necessarily rely on the country being underdeveloped as a whole but there is the notion that even when there is economic growth, the country is not capable of ensuring there is a reduction in poverty.

This notion of the developed world as one of progress and the underdeveloped as unable to change without external help relies on a Eurocentric version of history and this analysis echoes the work of many postdevelopment scholars (Escobar, 1995: 8). For instance, as Hanne Løngreen’s (2001) work on the development gaze argues, the developing world is constructed – through images and text – as ‘pre-modern’ and separate from British ways of living. Yet, what Løngreen’s work is not concerned with is how this distinction is reliant on race. As Patricia Noxolo argues, “the post-colonial underpinnings of British governmental relationships mean that race continues to form the base for its discourse of development” (2004: 208); it is only possible to establish these tropes as natural through manifestations of race and processes of racialisation that are historically rooted.

The representations of Britain as developed do not only rely on a Eurocentric history that erases and/or marginalises the agency and histories of non-Europeans but also the erasure of the racial dominance that was intrinsic to these processes. That is, these depictions of the ‘developed’ vs. the to-be-developed are produced through ignorance of the supremacist idea used to justify colonialism and that was essential for Britain to depict itself as the pinnacle of progress and development. Implicit in this alternative telling, white people – and in particular the “white spirit” – are representative of all of humanity and thus have the knowledge and abilities to progress (Dyer, 1997). Therefore, the representations of Britain as endogenously developing erase historical and contemporary processes of accumulation and “the violence of racism in its material forms” (Sabaratnam, 2018: 9). This can be understood as part of the dominant discourse, where this erasure is part of the processes of winning consent for this

hegemonic understanding of development. This erasure is integral for the distinction between the active and capable developer and the opposite to-be-developed, without it Britain could not be positioned as a benevolent developer because of its history and it would not become common sense. This was explicitly articulated in references to Empire, which was invoked as a positive sign of Britain's capability to help the 'developing' world develop. Within this is a peculiar engagement with history: the colonised were once "people without history" (Wolf, 1982), now the colonisers are trying to fashion themselves in a similar way, or rather people with a very particular history. This is significant because this view of history helps to conceal the racialised past and also the connections between the racialised past and present; whiteness and its invisibilisation continues to be central to the separation between the 'civilised' and the 'uncivilised' (Jiwani, 2006: 5). In popular discourse the history of racial hierarchies and the supremacist notion of Britain and its standing in the world is obscured by an romanticised vision of Empire, which is cast as beneficial for Britain's contemporary relationships with the rest of the world.

We can understand this through the epistemology of ignorance. With particular reference to Brown's comments on Empire, Pitcher argued that this historical revisionism goes beyond Paul Gilroy's conceptualisation of postcolonial melancholia – which is the inability to mourn the loss of Empire because of guilt or shame (2004) – as it "sets out the ground for the development of a new world role that has its direct progenitor in the civilizing mission of British imperialism" (2009: 57). This is in an effort to recapture Britain's diminished place in the world, preserve an imperial vision of the nation that at once obscures the realities of but also relies on the racial hierarchy to justify Britain's ongoing leadership in global politics and progress. Therefore, the history of British development forms the backdrop for contemporary justifications for development, but it also depicts a historical and thus contemporary reality where race is not significant. If racial domination was not relevant in Britain's development past, it is more difficult to argue that it is relevant in the present. Or put another way, it is easier to ignore race as a relevant factor in structuring global relations (Mills, 1997). When history is used to erase contemporary forms of racial domination it is far easier to win consent or make common sense the notion that British knowledge of development needs to be exported because of the supposed natural economic and intellectual dominance of Britain, these arguments are not seen as rooted in racial

superiority. Yet they are reliant on whiteness to operate, precisely the idea that there are an idealised set of norms and practices inherent to Britain is a product of the “white racialised ideal” (Hunter, Swan and Grimes, 2010: 410) discussed in the theoretical section of this thesis. In this way, whiteness remains essential to demarcating the ‘civilised’ from the ‘uncivilised’; the latter need the expertise and idealised ways of being possessed by the former to help them progress (Jiwani, 2006: 5). Therefore, ignorance of Britain’s racial domination is used to justify its development efforts and also create a contemporary image of development where race is not relevant.

As hegemony is multi-dimensional, as well as ignorance, which obscures the colonial and racial past, in government discourse, we can use epistemologies of immanence to make sense of these representations: through the distinction between Britain as *naturally* having agency and the developing world as *naturally* needing British help to develop. Drawing on a history that erases racial domination, government discourse is able to suggest Britain developed thanks to internal superiority and this is what should be exported around the world. This relies on a process of racialisation; the suggestion that Britain historically possessed the capability of developing independently gives justification to a narrative where it was British exceptionalism that produced modernity and progress – these ideas both embody and gain salience and meaning from whiteness. Therefore, ignorance and immanence are necessary to sustain these constructions of the ‘developed’ and to-be-developed. They work together to create an image of Britain as “a separate and special historical subject” where modernity and progress were generated internally (Sabaratnam, 2018: 9) and it is through this idea that it is possible to depict Britain as providing the keys to development. Yet to make sense of how this operates in terms of race and racialisation, we must look at how it is related to representations of the to-be-developed or ‘developing’ countries.

The racialised construction of the ‘developed’ is also reliant on a specific understanding of the to-be-developed. Bhabha’s concept of ambivalence (1984; 1994) explored in Chapter One (see page 50) is relevant to make sense of how the latter is racialised. The two terms, active Britain and incapable ‘other’, are placed opposite one another. Crucially, these identities are relational and had to at once be kept close to and at a distance from one another; during colonialism European rationality only made sense when defined against irrational colonised people or countries but there was the

consistent rearticulation that because irrationality was inherent to colonised people they could never quite become as civilised as the coloniser (Said, 1978). Considering this colonial history, the decontextualisation of poverty in the ‘developing’ world bears some echoes of colonial rationale. Firstly, colonised countries were represented as poor because they were backwards, the racial hierarchy justified these distinctions: the colonised were incapable because of their race. Secondly, when colonialism was coming to an end, European countries argued anti-colonial movements were responding to poor living standards, not economic, political or racial domination. This meant poverty in the colonies was represented as a product of individual failings and radical decolonisation was implicitly dismissed as unnecessary (Hodge, 2007). Contemporary representations of the to-be-developed as incapable are thus a continuation of this colonial form of racialisation and the erasure of wider historical, social and political processes that were used during decolonisation. When poverty is treated as a product of the country in which they live this draws on the racial inferiority of the ‘other’. In particular, this incapability trope is apparent in representations of India; this is a country that is able to economically grow but it is inherently incapable of dealing with poverty. Consequently, these representations of Britain and the to-be-developed make common sense “racialised hierarchies” (Sabaratnam, 2018: 9) because they rely on the logic of racial superiority that determines Britain as exceptional and the developing world as inferior.

However, there is not just a depiction of Britain as the developer and poor countries as the underdeveloped. Using a Gramscian understanding of hegemony, we can see racialised constructions of development discourse are being consistently engineered in different ways. Thus by looking at the Indian case study I have also found there are discernible dichotomies within the representations of India along the lines of class, which shows how race does not operate in isolation and is shifting in its nature. Consider how in one representation (see page 125), poor people in India are represented as incapable, their poverty a product of their own failings in comparison to those in India who are not in poverty, who are assumed to be successful and ‘developed’. This is demonstrable by what Brah describes as “racialised power [...] configured into hierarchies”, these hierarchies are not only in operation between “dominant” and “subordinate” categories, that is between Britain and India, but also “among them” (Brah, 1996: 3).

To make further sense of this we might consider the relationship between race and class, which has been clearly articulated by Karen Brodtkin (2000) and chimes with Du Bois's work on the subject (1935). Brodtkin looked at the way Jewish migrants in the USA have in the past 150 years gone "from white to off-white and back to white". Brodtkin explained how "job degradation and racial darkening were linked processes": the labour Jews performed at the time of being classified as racially off-white was defined as "menial and unskilled" (1998: 240; 241), whereas they moved to more socially elevated roles when defined as white. This is a two-way process, Brodtkin explained:

Race making in turn facilitated the degradation of work itself, its organization as "unskilled," intensely driven, mass-production work. Race making is class making, just as much as class making is race making. They are two views of the same thing (2000: 245).

If we can understand race and class making as mutually constitutive processes, then in the article in *Developments* it is possible to make sense of the Indian people in poverty as being depicted as naturally less capable than their richer counterparts. The epistemology of immanence in this one representation, then, is used in a similar way to how it is in the dichotomy of the British developer vs. the to-be-developed; incapability is imagined as inherent to poor Indians and agency constructed as inherent to rich India. Though there are not a great deal of representations of poor people in India in comparison to rich, we can see from this representation that class appears to play a role in how race operates in development discourse and how processes of racialisation are shifting. This indicates that processes of racialisation do not operate alone but interact with other forms of constructed identity.

Furthermore, we can make sense of shifting forms of racialisation in government discourse by examining how race intersects with gender to produce the gendered representations outlined earlier in this chapter. As established, government discourse about gender reinforces the 'developing' world as having a lack of agency but also positions 'developing' women as uniquely able to provide some form of development. Yet as gender is racially bifurcated (Brodtkin, 2000: 246), these gendered representations are racialised. Government at once expresses that girls and women need to be helped to escape off so-called 'traditional' society, including oppressive

men, and embrace modernity, and also advocates for them to succeed through neoliberal notions of development, which includes constructing women and girls as racialised subjects who will provide development.

When women are represented as trapped by ‘traditional’ society, government development discourse draws on an existing trope, whereby ‘real’ liberation has only been achieved in ‘the West’ and women in the ‘developing’ world need the help of ‘the West’ or Britain to escape patriarchy (Brody, 1996:154; see also Higgenbotham, 1992). As Biccum noted, in conventional development discourse – as is the case in other discourses such as nationalism, religion or ethnicity – women are border markers of civility: “the emancipation of (white) Western women within the liberal democratic nation state has become the market of civility and supremacy of metropolitan states” (2010: 21; 135). States that do not live up to the many markers that decide whether women are emancipated are considered uncivilised. However, Biccum (2010) failed to explicitly focus on how this takes shape through the process of racialisation. Women in the ‘developing’ world are infantilised, while men are imagined as oppressive. Antoinette Burton’s work (1998) showed that Indian women are often depicted in dominant discourses as helpless victims of uncivilised practices and Lata Mani (1990) explained how during colonial rule these same women were depicted as weak to highlight the legitimacy of and moral necessity of Empire, even though the very presence of the colonialists set into motion a movement for ‘reform’ by the colonised of their own society, for instance on issues like ‘sati’. In government discourse the consistent running together of womenandgirls and womenandchildren draws on these ideas to suggest women are inherently incapable. This is also reinforced by the erasure of men when the womenandgirls trope is used and through the consistent focus on women as the people who will achieve development. As we saw, at times when men are presented they are depicted as negative stereotypes (see page 118), which represent ‘traditional’, oppressive society. In this way, what Barker called the ‘new racism’ (1981) is in operation; here cultural differentialism constitutes a form of racialisation as ‘tradition’ is treated as inherent product of difference (Hall, 2000: 224).

We might understand this through ideas of ignorance and immanence (Sabaratnam, 2018), that is the erasure of alternative histories and realities and also the notion that oppression and submission are inherent to ‘developing’ men and women. This mirrors

some of the trends in the War on Terror discourse where men in Afghanistan were racialised as barbarians and women as victims (Shepherd, 2006). This has a long historical precedent, as Leila Ahmed (1992) shows, in the 1880s one central reason justifying the British occupation of Egypt was the superior Christian race needed to liberate Muslim women from Muslim men. Therefore the representation of women as infantilised paired with fleeting references to men as oppressors reproduces a variant of Mohanty's "average third world woman" (1984: 56) by infantilising women in the global South as helpless victims, in the similar vein as the way women and children in the global South are visualised as desperate and powerless images to be gazed upon by 'Western' eyes in "poverty porn" (Plewes and Stuart, 2006).

However, in government discourse while women and girls are depicted as trapped and without agency, there is also an argument that they can become emancipated through neoliberal economic development. Government discourse suggests the way to stop being the average Third World Woman trapped by tradition is to pursue economic development; it is only through these representations that women appear to have any hope or agency. Yet this is not centred on economic emancipation for women, the representation of women as the solution to development rests on the idea that through work they will be able to achieve autonomy and economically grow their country. This is a form of the 'smart economics' where it is thought it makes sense to invest in women and girls because they will expand the global economy and participate fully in the neoliberal market place. Thus while women are represented as trapped by 'tradition', there is an underlying argument in government discourse that women should reject "'traditional' social norms to embrace" the market (Hickel, 2014: 1356). Using gender in this way, government discourse echoed the post-Washington Consensus that obscured the failings of neoliberal economics, particularly with regard to women (Cornwall, Harrison and Whitehead, 2007; Milward, Mukhopadhyay and Wong, 2015: 78), by pinning underdevelopment on internal failings within the country, not least through the good governance agenda. Indeed, the image of women working in the fields (see page 114) gives legitimacy to this particular form of economic development advocated for by Britain. This arguably echoes the same way advertising of Empire lent authority to the project during colonialism. Looking at British tea ads, Ramamurthy explained that images of women tea pickers were seen as "alluring and sensual" and through their "apparent contentment and productivity

within an ordered environment symbolically affirmed the need for empire” (2003: 126). Therefore, this kind of positive representation of a productive Empire is echoed in this description of development and this contributes to a broader notion of women as economic contributors.

Yet, Wilson found gender is incorporated into development work and underpins and extends “unequal gendered structures and relations” as it assumed “women will always work harder, and be more productive, than their male counterparts; further, they will use additional income more productively than men would” (Wilson, 2012: 49). This is underpinned by the idea that women and girls specifically are important for economic development and the essentialism being used to suggest that because of their sex they will be the most effective people to bring about economic growth (see Kabeer, 2003; Chant, 2012; Wilson, 2012 for discussion of how mainstream approaches to gender have had negative material impacts). Indeed, the erasure of men specifically as agents of development – men are of course seen as developers in different job roles but never referred to specifically as important because they are men – attests to this. This is “deeply racialised” as it assumes women in the global south to be “hyper-industrious, altruistic, entrepreneurial female subjects” (Wilson, 2015: 803; 807). This demonstrates the specific neoliberal character of government development agenda but also how this is made up with processes of racialisation.

To further make sense of this, Wilson Gilmore’s definition of racism might also be useful here. As discussed in Chapter One, she analyses it as “the state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death” (2015: 78). In government development discourse, to-be-developed women are depicted as a homogeneous group that is able to work relentlessly, in this way they are stripped of their humanity. As Wilson Gilmore’s definition suggests, this has material consequences: Sylvia’s Chant’s 2008 work used women’s first hand experiences to show the damage this gender discourse causes; women say they feel they are expected to work, provide and look after the household, duties that do not fall to men. In government development discourse this is arguably symbolised by representing women and girls through how much economic return they will deliver; they cease to be people but are simply economic units. Therefore, racialised notions of gender are used throughout government discourse and may be arguably used to try and

win consent for the notion that women and girls are either victims trapped by oppressive ‘traditional’ society or have the potential to be individual agents of survival within a neoliberal idea of development (Wilson, 2012: 49) but both tropes are reliant upon racialisation.

ii. ‘Natural’ qualities: the developers and the to-be-developed

As well as constructing Britain as the centre of progress, which thus has the answers to global inequality, government discourse also depicts Britain as good while being rational; two strands of representation also flow from the social production of whiteness. These exist alongside constructions of the developing world as inherently ‘corrupt’ and naturally chaotic, which cannot be entirely separated from the depiction of the developing world as incapable because, as we will see, they are both rooted in the epistemology of immanence.

To begin to make sense of how development discourse establishes particular representations of Britain, we can look at Graham Harrison’s work. He has shown when examining British non-government organisations (NGO) campaign literature on ‘Africa’ that often discussions about other countries also create or strengthen thinking of what it means to be British, conspicuously the “moral nature of Britishness” (2013: 1). A number of scholars complement Harrison’s work: drawing on Derrida’s argument around gift giving, Ilan Kapoor showed that the process of giving aid and development assistance signifies on the one hand a demand that the receiver is indebted to the giving nation (through aid conditionality) and on the other construct a positive vision of a unified nation (2008: 76-78). This latter point is supported by Biccum (2010: 64) and Chandler (2007, although this is with regard to foreign policy), and Gallagher (2011) made a similar argument with regard to the African continent. Gallagher argued, “the idea of Africa and Britain’s help for Africa has worked as a way to create the sense of an ideal society in Britain, and most particularly to affirm the ‘good state’” (2011: 4). Gallagher explained specifically in relation to the domestic context why this might have been embraced by New Labour (see 2011: 125-144).

We can identify these trends throughout development discourse. In government discourse, development (re)affirms the country as intrinsically good – engaging in

development work shows Britain is good, while there is also a suggestion Britain does development work because it is inherently good – and showcases Britain’s positive role on the global stage and its moral superiority in relation to other countries. Therefore in government rhetoric, Britain’s development budget is used to establish and affirm the country as a moral, progressive nation. However, one of the key elements in this relationship between development and imagining the nation, which is arguably not the primary unit of analysis for many scholars, is race. From Harrison (2013) to Biccum (2010), scholars looking at Britain’s relationship with development have not tended to explore in detail how the justifications for and reasoning behind development from the British perspective are tied to whiteness.

The trope in government discourse that Britain is a good nation, that it stays true to its moral obligations unlike other ‘developed’ countries but also that it is motivated by compassion, is also related to whiteness. This is not uncovered by the existing epistemological framework identified by Sabaratnam, yet it is essential to understanding how whiteness operates in development discourse. Dyer’s work on whiteness, outlined in Chapter One, might allow us to begin to make sense of this. He argues whiteness though often rendered invisible is associated with goodness and a strong moral code; the common-sense thinking as Dyer (1998) points out is that white represents ‘good’ and black, and I would argue in many cases brown, ‘bad’. This we can see was shaped by colonial discourse whereby colonialists were depicted as being motivated by the desire to help others to progress and in this way their racial superiority reaffirmed. For example, examining the role of pity in development discourse, Chouliaraki argued that the idea of acting on behalf of vulnerable others was “born out of the moral universalism of the Enlightenment” and was assumed emblematic of “the dominant moral order of modernity” (2012: 2). These ideas have thus, to an extent, been made common sense. This is identifiable in discourse not specifically focussed on Empire, the propositional content of the goodness trope stressed innate British goodness. This chimes with how the discourse of goodness, was used during the time of Empire to symbolise the country’s racial superiority (Ala’i, 2000). In this way, we might understand the historical and contemporary notions of goodness as rooted in immanence: an intrinsic part of what Britain is.

Therefore, the goodness of development is a continuation of the depiction of whiteness

as concerned with moral order. Though it might also be related to rationality, this can be understood as bound up with whiteness as being related to the supposed practice of self-mastery, where goodness is at once inherent and practiced or acted upon. Self control in this sense would allow the route to that goodness; both self-mastery and goodness might be seen as representative of and produced by what Dyer calls the white spirit, as discussed in Chapter One (Dyer, 1997). The operation of goodness, which is bound up with whiteness, occurs at a macro level; selling development to the public through an idealised version of what lies at the core of the nation, and how they are superior to other countries, and at micro level, the people doing development are active moral, good human beings. Thus while Harrison argued that the sense of duty to the to-be-developed “offered a palliative to the sense of national loss ushered in by decolonisation” (2013: 51), my analysis suggests that the repeated suggestion that Britain ‘does’ development because it is good and is good because it ‘does’ development should specifically be seen to be reliant on and reproducing whiteness. This is achieved through notions of ‘moral force’; the power and conscience to give aid form racialised ideas about who is able and willing to help and who is not (Noxolo, 2004: 206). Thus, government discourse has constructed and sustained an image of the British nation as the hallmark of morality, and this is dependent on the logics of whiteness.

Furthermore, as indicated operating alongside and with the goodness trope is another produced by processes of racialisation: that Britain is acting rationally in its own self-interest.¹⁶ It is repeatedly stated in government discourse that Britain is engaged in development because it was right to do, as explored in the analysis of goodness above, and because it was the sensible course of action. In this way, it is imagined development is good for Britain. As Biccum has argued (2010) this is arguably a continuation of the Dual Mandate: development is depicted as beneficial for progressing the to-be-developed as well as being economically advantageous for Britain. Thus, taking into account that this is historically rooted, the conceptualisation of development being in Britain’s self-interest makes up the notion of whiteness by drawing on the imperial distinction between the coloniser and colonised along the lines of rationality vs. irrationality; rationality is part of Dyer’s “white spirit”, that is

¹⁶ For discussion on the relationship between goodness, self-interest and the state see Gallagher, 2011: 27-39.

believed to embody the highest reaches of intellectual comprehension (Dyer, 1997: 23).

In addition to this, the representation of poverty and inequality being endogenous to ‘developing’ countries is related to the discourse on rationality. It is assumed chaos born of poverty is endogenously produced in ‘developing countries’ and that these places and the people that occupy them pose significant danger to Britain. Indeed, we see this from the way corruption is imagined as contributing to chaos in India but is produced by *primitive* ways of being, as if it is inherent to India. The racialised notion of the ‘developing’ world being a place of instability is reinforced by a depiction of the environment as stifling and chaotic. ‘Developing’ countries are described as places of disorder and intense heat and British developers are imagined as people who bring order or at least calmness to these places. This draws on colonial notions that the fundamentally chaotic environment of colonised countries caused inherent deficiencies, while the order of the colonies produced the opposite. Theo Goldberg’s work sheds further light on how depictions of the environment are linked to race:

Racism is taken historically as (or in terms of) identifying people geomorphically by their supposed phenotypes in terms of their imputed or implied geographic origins and the cultural characteristics considered to be associated with those geographic identifications, those landscapes and their associated characteristics [...] race figures the nation even as it transcends it; and in transcending race gives the nation its transcendental character, its larger, ultimately globally extentionalist imperative (2009: 7).

Applying Goldberg’s analysis of race to descriptions of the environment in government discourse specifically, we can see that the environment is taken to be associated with innate characteristics of the people ‘native’ to the area. That again affirms that even if India is growing economically, it is not capable of managing development itself. In fact, these representations might be understood as a version of ‘tropicality’; the discourse that represents the colonised world or in contemporary iterations the global South as the global North’s environmental ‘other’ (Arnold, 2005: 37). And in this conceptualisation Britain is a place of rationality and a country like India one of chaos. This mirrors imperialist and aristocratic anxiety of ‘threatening’ or ‘revolting natives’ or ‘peasants’ and reiterates the tacit recognition that the colonial powers are reliant on the colonised for wealth and stability (Noxolo, 2004) and this feeds into a fundamental contradiction in development that gives authority to the

people ‘doing’ development. Namely, a belief that ‘natives’ will ‘catch up’ with the developed world while also suggesting this might never be possible because of ‘their’ innate failings or at the very least that it will only be possible with the help of good Britons.

Therefore from the constructions of different respective qualities as ‘natural’ to Britain and ‘developing’ countries such as India we can see that these centre around manifestations of race and processes of racialisation that are historically rooted. Becoming what we might understand as a Gramscian conceptualisation of common sense (Hall, 1986: 20), Britain and British people are depicted as good and innocent, both the reason why they do and proven by their development work. This flows from the white subject position; Britain is depicted as acting with the best interest of the to-be-developed in mind and as possessing an exceptional amount of empathy. The other side of this seeming emotional response is rationality, where Britons engage in development because it is logical to do so and benefits them. This can be sense of through a white subject positioning where reason and logic are central to the functioning of a developed human being and country. In contrast, the epistemology of immanence can make sense of India as chaotic: even though the country is able to grow economically it has inherent deficiencies that stop this from happening. It is depicted as standing in contrast to Britain where it does not have the natural capacities to develop.

Conclusions

Consequently, this chapter has attempted to establish key tropes in government development discourse and analyse how they are the product of race and shifting forms of racialisation, which interact with class and gender. One plausible interpretation is development discourse relies on racialised representations of the to-be-developed as helpless. I have argued that throughout government discourse there are representations of the to-be-developed as lacking agency or reliant on Britain to gain agency, this is achieved through racialisation as it is suggested that poverty is produced endogenously due to individual failings within a country (Wilson, 2012: 76; 136). This echoes existing work. In particular, it agrees with Wilson (2012) that gendered representations are infused with processes of racialisation that represent women as in need of saving, as workers who will provide economic returns and as female bodies that can be

controlled. Through these representations women are constructed as helpless, stripped of agency beyond that as an individual worker and dehumanised.

However, I have also added to this work by conducting a focussed analysis of government development discourse, which has allowed me to establish that the racialised tropes identified are hegemonic – some being reiterated by ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ development proponents alike – and that in line with a Gramscian understanding, this hegemony does not contain one form of representation but rather is made up of multi-layered, competing and complementary forms of racialisation. I have explored how depictions of Britain as developer is a product of and reliant on whiteness, which can be understood through epistemologies of immanence and ignorance, but also the imperial thinking that whiteness was constituted by both goodness and rationality. These forms of representation operate at the macro level of discourse about the state and at the micro level of individual Britons doing development. When these representations are analysed in conjunction with representations of the to-be-developed we can see more clearly how both figures are placed in a racial hierarchy that is historically rooted. For instance, the construction of India might be regarded as slightly different from normative constructions of the to-be-developed. It is a country that is growing economically and therefore it is depicted as capable of doing progress at one level. Yet this representation also includes in it the normative understanding of poverty and development in government discourse, as it is ultimately depicted as incapable of dealing with poverty. Here the epistemology of immanence establishes that poverty is a product of inherent internal flaws and thus regardless of how much it progresses, it will continue to need the assistance of Britain.

Therefore I have argued that government development discourse does not always allow us to see richer Indians as equivalent Britons. The racial element of capitalism shows with particular clarity that race is relational and temporally contingent – affluent Indians are higher in the hierarchy than those in poverty meaning they fit into neither category; they are not in poverty but are at times seen as degenerate. Class, in capitalist terms, is divided into racial groups; the bifurcation of class and race forms the basis for the justification of development; even societies that are economically progressing in the global South cannot be trusted to manage themselves. Looking at the Indian context alongside Du Bois’s (1935) and Brodwin’s (2000) analyses we can see how the

relationship between race and global capitalism is mutually constituting: poor Indians can be racialised as below richer Indians but given the racism embedded in global capitalism, richer Indians can never be seen as good as their British counterparts.

These shifting forms of racialisation have not been examined in existing analyses. Yet if we are to make sense of race and processes of racialisation as historically rooted, the unsteady nature of these forms of racialisation is important. Hegemony is not steady but is shifting and contested and indeed, as Stoler and Cooper (1997) explained, Empire was not one static process and the social identities constructed through establishment of racial and spatial difference were not stable. Thus there was an ongoing threat derived from the unsteadiness of difference and the potential collapse of racial purity. The hegemonic vision and the power of the coloniser were in danger of being challenged and must have been consistently rearticulated. Consequently, the operation of coeval statements as part of a hegemonic system – including the anxiety they embody; that the hegemony may be questioned or challenged – is key to understand how constructions of development in government rhetoric are racialised.

Indeed, although she does not explicitly engage with race throughout her work, Biccum argues that in *Developments* there is a trope that “equates lack of development with a lack of humanity, a poverty-as-degeneracy” and another that “emerges as a new humanism around the figure of the ‘global citizen’ meant to be the object of development education” (2010: 21). Yet, she does not engage with how Britain is equated with whiteness nor how there are distinctions between the poor and the rich within developing countries, which make this binary more complicated. Although the two categories Biccum establishes can be identified in *Developments*, a close reading of the Indian case reveals that there are different layers of representation that cannot be explained by these two categories. Poor Indians are constructed as incapable and thus degenerate. However the rest of Indian society is not constructed as fitting into the ‘global citizen’ category because they are racialised as corrupt and uncaring.

Yet, given the multi-layered, shifting nature of race in development discourse this poses the question: how different is this from discourse among development professionals? The next chapter will explore how professionals’ discourse is racialised and whether this shares similarities with development.

Chapter Four

Race and development professionals

Race and processes of racialisation in development are not only evident in government discourse; we must consider how they might manifest in development organisations. One of the reasons for examining development professionals is that in the popular domain in Britain, many might consider it outlandish if people from ‘developing’ countries offered the British government advice on how to reduce increasing levels of child poverty in Britain. Mari Marcel-Thekaekara’s explanation of her experience is testament to this. In a *Guardian* article she explained that in 1994 she and her husband came from Tamil Nadu as part of a North/South exchange to visit inner-city housing estates and bring with them ideas about social change in India. Another aim was to challenge the notion of the global South solely needing help from the global North and never the other way round. She did not give any more information beyond this but explained that they spent time in Matson, Gloucestershire as part of her husband’s involvement in an “Oxfam programme” and it was here that they experienced problems:

[W]e did run into massive criticism, both hostile and racist, from the local press. "Can Oxfam spot the difference?" ran one press clipping showing a skeletal, starving African child juxtaposed with a bunch of healthy British kids (Marcel-Thekaekara, 1999: 6).

She noted that there was no visible upset in the communities they visited but the anger from the newspapers appeared to stem from an expectation that developed countries will always have the answer to problems of poverty; that they are superior to the developing or underdeveloped. This suggests when thinking about the role of development professionals in Britain, there may be an implicit hierarchy that determines who has the knowledge to ‘do’ development. But the question for us in this chapter is: does this relate to race? And, if so, as development organisations can be multiracial (Kothari, 2006a: 16), how does this operate when increasingly it is not only white Europeans who might be considered as ‘experts’?

Therefore, this chapter explores development professionals’ personal experiences of working in the sector, how they understand their roles and their work. It asks whether their conceptualisations of development and of India are racialised and if participants

have considered the relationship between race and development, as well as how race operates at the micro level within development organisations. Racialisation in this thesis is a process whereby racial categories, which are tied to the supposed ancestral backgrounds of individuals or groups, are consistently produced and reproduced and give meaning to a racial hierarchy (Sabaratnam, 2018). This is key to analysis because INGO workers' understanding of development, and whether this is racialised, will help to establish the way racialisation manifests in development organisations and how racialised discourses are reproduced, not just at structural levels but also how they are mediated through individual subjectivities. Using Gramscian notions of hegemony – when power is understood as the ruling ideology winning consent and making itself seem common sense in a multi-dimensional but conflictual way – it will look at the conflicting or differing forms of racialisation that operate within development organisation and how certain forms of racialisation might appear common sense to some. This will allow us to explore the differences and similarities between racialisation in government discourse and professionals' discourse and give a picture of the varying forms of racialisation across the state/civil society divide.

As outlined in the Methodology (see page 64) this study draws on 21 interviews with development professionals who have worked in India and on data collected from 69 Secret Aid Worker columns from the *Guardian* newspaper, I intersperse content found in each strand of analysis. These data were codified and recodified in line with recurring themes. The analysis of both participants' responses and *Guardian* aid worker columns will be divided thematically. In line with the rest of the thesis, this chapter examines how development professionals understand their relationships and work, and how they articulated this to me during interviews because what is of interest throughout this thesis is how development work is presented – by government, the media but also by people who work in the field.

Racialisation manifests itself in different ways because “the process of racialisation [...] is never finished, it evolves and changes and is therefore unpredictable” (Jones et al., 2017: 157). To make sense of the evolving forms of racialisation among development professionals, including the shifting nature of who performs and occupies whiteness, this chapter draws out two different, overlapping strands of analysis, which themselves contain varied forms of racialisation. Firstly, it will begin by looking at the

ways India and development are perceived. This first section can itself be divided into two different, overlapping parts. Initially, I will explore how assumed epistemological supremacy of the European – as rational, universal and the key to progress – intersects with how longstanding colonial tropes of people in India are used to mould how development professionals see India and Indians. This can be identified in negative forms of representation about India – where Indian people are not seen to conform to European epistemological frameworks – and ‘positive’ representation – where Indian people are deemed to be somewhat developed where they are seen to have ‘learnt’ European knowledge systems. Secondly, the assumed supremacy of this constructed European epistemology is understood as being rooted in how development professionals see one another or how they believe they are seen or treated. People from Europe and the USA, or those who have studied at institutions therein, are perceived to be the most qualified to speak in development spaces, at least according to participants, and may be deemed as ‘international’ workers in relation to ‘local’ workers. We will see that there is a material impact to these categories, which, according to professionals, manifests itself in pay differentials. Once these tropes have been established, I will then explore how they are related to and sustained by race and processes of racialisation. In particular, I will examine how assessments of India are made in relation to how Anglicised the country is and how through the epistemology of immanence, the category ‘international’ is imbued with notions of whiteness. I will argue that it is on this basis that people of colour can occupy this category.

The second part of this chapter will probe the ways white people are privileged in development organisations. Examining professionals’ feelings about their work relationships and perceived power dynamics, it will look at the way people perceive race as operating within organisations, regardless of the knowledge one possesses. I will argue that through interviews it is possible to show that there is still a privileging of white men and women ahead of people of colour. This can cut through the ‘international’ and ‘local’ divide, and show how racialisation is a shifting, contradictory process where differing forms within development can run alongside one another.

This chapter is thus comparative in a number of ways. I will compare the findings in this chapter against studies of development workers that have come before it. In

addition to this, I will compare how forms of racialisation manifest from INGO workers own discourse and the processes of racialisation in government discourse – both forms will then be compared against media representations of development in the chapter following this one. However, prior to exploring the racialisation of India and knowledge systems, and then the micro-level forms of racial discrimination that participants say manifest in development organisations, I will first briefly explore existing work on development professionals.

I. Understanding development professionals

Development professionals play a key role in not just implementing development projects but sustaining and determining development norms. As Parpart explains development professionals are “essential to the development enterprise” because there is an assumption that “development problems can be reduced to technical i.e. ‘solvable’, problems which involve the transfer of Western technical expertise to the developing world” (1995: 225). Thus development professionals can be key players in maintaining the hegemony of an international development project (although not everyone agrees with this, see Mosse, 2005). But how should we understand development professionals in relation to the hegemony of dominant development ideas and how should we understand the “technical” expertise Parpart mentions? Both questions can be answered by looking at development professionals’ specific role or roles.

As established in the introduction to this thesis, development work in Britain was born out of the colonial project (Kothari, 2005: 432-33). Yet, as Uma Kothari (2005) has explored there was not a neat, linear move from British colonialism to development, particularly given that the two were and are not unified projects but were and are contested and shifting. While many colonialists spent a significant amount of time in a particular region (although there is no need to romanticise this) with a shift toward neoliberalism after decolonisation, there was a move toward focussing on development professionals’ technical expertise. Essentially, supposed regional knowledge was supplanted with technical skills, which were described as universally applicable (Kothari, 2005). In this shift, some with situated knowledge became ‘universal’, for instance Malcolm Darling ex-colonial officer in the Punjab, northern India/Pakistan,

became a UN expert. This is what Kothari called the “professionalisation of development” (2005). Similarly, Stirrat described the focus on ‘universal’ technical skills as part of “the culture of consultancy”, premised on “modernist principles of objectivity and rationality”. Stirrat argued that this understanding of the universal flows from the assumption that the world is knowable “in positivist, empiricist terms” and quantifiable data are used as evidence of knowledge and thus the authority to control (2000: 37; 36). As we know from the introduction and previous chapters, the embeddedness of rational, positivist thinking in development stems from European enlightenment. As we will see later, this chapter further suggests that we will see the qualifications required to be an ‘international’ development professional are racialised.

Despite their differences, technical assistance – much like colonial officers’ work – relies on a power imbalance. The very idea of development presupposes that there are ‘developed’ countries and ‘developing’ or ‘un(der)developed’ countries, and that in order for the latter to follow the route of the former, they need assistance. That is because as the above Stirrat quote implies, development is conceptualised as following a simply linear progression towards ‘Western’ definitions of modernity, an idea that has “provided the rationale for the development business which has continued to expand since its inception in the 1940s” (Parpart, 1995: 222). The view of development as a linear, ‘Western’ process relies on a binary construction of the un(der)developed as incapable and the developed as representatives of progressive modernity. What we make of this division matters for how we understand development professionals’ role. Existing work shows how professionals are constructed as *the* actors able to bring about progress (Ferguson, 1990; Escobar, 1992; Crush, 1995). Indeed, as post-development scholars have noted, the idea of development professionals transferring “technical expertise” to developing countries assumes they have universal knowledge that qualifies them to solve any problems (Escobar, 1997: 91). This is founded on ideas about the “professional”, “expert” and “expertise” (Kothari, 2005: 427) and these categories are defined against supposed amateurs in developing countries.

Yet, the idea of the ‘expert’, often called ‘international’ by participants, is applied differently to different people: it is not static. This might be understood through hegemony, which we know is a conflictual process (Hall, 1986: 27). We will explore

this in detail later; for the moment it is important to note these categorisations help to decide who has authority. The supposed need for technical expertise – where development knowledge is not primarily founded on an in-depth understanding of a specific geographic context but is located in supposedly transferable technical know-how – is recognised globally. This notion of expertise was popularised from the 1870s onwards. In the contemporary period, under the guise of technical expertise neoliberal policies are implemented globally as the route to “development” (Kothari, 2005). This is further reinforced by the implication that ‘local’ people aren’t familiar with international development techniques, which in turn are developed in ‘the West’ and constantly renewed (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 109). This means that despite the focus on participatory development, empowerment and inclusion, there is an evident power relation between development professionals and the to-be-developed; the former is always in control of participatory research (for instance see Løngreen: 2001: 227). There is thus a naturalisation of the category of ‘international’ being superior to all others. Consequently, “experts are also able to confirm the legitimacy of their role and intervention by claiming to possess the latest and more advanced expertise” (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 97) all the while implicitly defining themselves against the inexpert people who fall outside this category.

Therefore, we can establish continuities between colonial understanding of progress and the dominant notions of development that are conceptualised in development organisation. As Parpart explained “the presumption of Western technical and moral superiority never flagged” and civilisation remained rooted in the assumption that Western technical knowledge was the pinnacle of human achievement” (1995: 224). Consequently, much mainstream development conducted by countries, or organisations from countries, like Britain continues to operate on a logic where the un(der)developed world is in need of saving by ‘Western’ rationality, science and knowledge (Mudimbe 1988), and development processes are embedded in ideas of people from ‘the West’ transferring their expertise to the global South (Nindi, 1990; Escobar, 1992). This is not purely top down, there is significant innovation from local groups and INGOs (Sharma, 2008) and there are academics that have been reflexive about the power imbalances involved in development (Chambers, 2006; Mosse, 2011). Nevertheless it remains a dominant mode of thinking in international development organisations. There is a line of academic inquiry that questions power relations in

development work (Porter, 1999; Rahnema, 1997; Elabor-Idemudia, 2002; Simpson, 2004; Eriksson Baaz, 2005) and the perceived goodness of development (Fassin, 2011: 35-6). Situated in this body of critical literature, there are academics who have examined development professionals' viewpoints and work specifically through the prism of race, which were explored extensively in the literature review (White, 2002; Goudge, 2003; Kothari, 2006a; 2006b; Heron, 2007; Loftsdóttir, 2014 Rivas, 2018). This chapter intends to complement and build on this scholarship and thus the next section will begin to unpack some of the tropes found in development professionals' discourse.

II. Conceptualising India, knowledge and whiteness

To begin with, we will explore development professionals' thoughts on India. When asked about India as a place to live and conduct development work, interviewees provided two broad, overlapping responses relevant to this study. One of which saw India in a negative light and Indian poverty, in part, as a product of flaws within the country. And the other offered a seemingly more positive view, which depicted India as a place of progress because of its Anglicisation. Firstly, we will consider the negative representations.

i. India as corrupt

One trope that came up infrequently but offered a key insight was corruption. When asked about the obstacles to what respondents perceive to be good development, Interviewee E, a white woman originally from South Africa, pinpointed corruption as a problem specific to India:

I don't know how much of this is my prejudice and racial stereotype but something about corruption [...] On one level, look how many people have been lifted out of poverty in India. Actually it's amazing and most of that is *nothing* to do with the development industry *at all*.

She went on to explain, "there is this sort of thing that India is quite corrupt country" though she said she did not know "how fair" it was to make such a comment. While recognising people had been lifted out of poverty in India – and noting this was not a result of international development work – and that her views might be related to "prejudice and racial stereotype[s]" interviewee E came back to the idea that India is

inherently more corrupt than other countries.

Corruption is a problem in India (Gould, 2016), but what is also important here is the response to E's comment. Interviewee E asked that her interview be conducted in front of her 'junior' Indian colleague (Interviewee F), ostensibly to ensure the former did not skirt around or sugar coat issues. She left when her colleague was interviewed, and Interviewee F engaged with the topic of corruption mentioned by Interviewee E:

Corruption is definitely there, I will not deny that. But also when you look at what international organisations [...] do when they come to India to get hold of government officials to enter into the government functionary, they also do some kind of corruption. It's not only the local organisations.

While Interviewee F did not directly reference what had been said in the previous interview, she engaged with the assumptions that Indians are more prone to corruption than people from other countries by saying that corruption is "definitely" present in India. However, she also highlighted that corruption is not confined to the Indian side of development by offering a direct comparison between corruption in India and international organisations that engaged in "some kind of corruption". This suggested she considered Interviewee E's comments a misrepresentation of the country; by pinning growing inequality specifically on people internal to India, she eclipsed the reality where corruption in different forms is present in development and not qualities inherent to people within India. This amounts to categorising corruption as endemic to India and thus in need of help from international staff that have overcome such problems is found in government discourse. Although no identities are stable or cohesive, as Interviewee F's responses suggests, stereotypes such, as 'Indians are corrupt' can operate as a form of implicature. They appear to be implicitly positioned against the underlying idea of development: 'internationals' are capable of tasks or reducing inequality in a way Indians are not and they also have compassion and more importantly, a moral probity people in India lack.

Furthermore, Interviewee E's comments are noteworthy because they can be compared to one *Guardian* Secret Aid Worker column that says: "I cannot emphasise how often we forget and unconsciously blame poor people rather than circumstances for their poverty" (Secret Aid Worker, 2017a: 4). However, according to E, this equation at least with regard to India is altered; it is not the poor blamed for their situation but

Indian corruption. This practice of stereotyping people in India in this way, according to Stuart Hall “reduces people to a few, simple, essential characteristics” and exaggerates and simplifies how a person or group is seen and understood. This stereotype of Indian people suggests development and progress cannot be achieved if simply left to people within the country: it functions as a negative against an invisible good and moral white British middle class because as Hall explained stereotyping maintains the social order, in particular “gross inequalities of power” (1997: 257, 258). In this instance these words are not explicitly used but the *implication* is that Indians are more corrupt and thus worse than other people.

Indeed, another interviewee came across this thinking when she worked in development. Interviewee G, a British woman of colour, recounted the homogenisation that occurred when she worked for a British development organisation:

My colleagues who I respected greatly would [...] use language that I felt deeply uncomfortable [with] [...] just generalising and homogenising: “oh yes we can’t do this because Indians are known to be corrupt” and [...] where I would catch their eye there was this moment of “oh, whoops did I say something offensive, is she going to be offended?”. And I interpret that moment as one where there was an awareness that this is not appropriate but nothing ever changed.

Similar to Interviewee E’s assertion, Interviewee G found there was an assumption that India was a place of corruption. This was achieved through a process of homogenisation: where “Indians” were referred to as corrupt. She thought that this amounted to a form of homogenisation and that it was something that her colleagues would be aware of when they caught her eye; here from Interviewee G’s perception there is a suggestion that the presence of a person of colour made her colleagues consider how what they might be saying was racialised. Interviewee G perceived a form of homogenisation that can lead to dehumanisation.

The representation of India as a place of inherent corruption appears to be naturalised or common sense in these accounts from certain development professionals. This in turn appears to underpin the notion that development is necessary; that ‘Western’ powers and habits are superior to the mass of corrupt, incompetent Indians. We might understand this through Løngreen’s “development gaze”, referenced in Chapter Three. Taking cues from John Urry’s “tourist gaze” (2001), she argued the “development gaze” is a particular way of looking at development work where the development

worker is continually having “encounters between different cultures and different phases in social and economic development” but this is understood as a “meeting of the (post) modern and the pre-modern point of view” (2011: 226). Interviewee E’s assumption that India is inherently more corrupt than other places in the world and the homogenisation of Indians that Interviewee G described, allows this backwardness to be projected. Thus among some development professionals’ own explanations of India or their experiences of working in development it was possible to identify tropes that categorised Indians as backwards and in need of development assistance.

ii. ‘Positive’ representations: India as Anglicised

However, when asked to give their thoughts on arriving, working and living in India, participants who were not born or had not grown up in the country also outlined a positive vision of the country – particularly in relation to other places they had worked. Similarly to government rhetoric in Chapter Three, several participants mentioned high levels of inequality in India, yet some also focussed on their positive, personal connections to the country. However, this was intimately connected to the colonial relationship between India and Britain. Interviewee U, a white Briton, explained, “I’d always liked um India uh or liked the idea of India” and Interviewee N, a white Briton, said that while he hadn’t been to India before working there, he was happy to move to the country: “I think you know like many Brits growing up, India is somehow part of the story um you know and everybody would always say it is a fantastically fascinating country um to live and work in”. But he also added, “you know you live in India but you never really understand”. In these responses India is both Britain’s past and Britain’s ‘other’ – one argues they liked the *idea* of India and the other stated India was not only part of Britain’s “story”, presumably meaning as part of the Empire, but also “fantastically fascinating”. The point here is not that both Interviewee N and Interviewee U had a fond impression of India but that they have a familiar “idea” of the country; mirroring Orientalist thinking, they were intrigued to live there because of its familiarity and their fascination with it. As Said explained in his seminal work *Orientalism*, during colonialism “[t]he Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences” (1978: 1). Seeing the Orient specifically as a place of memory and experience resonates with professionals’ contemporary

understanding of India. Interviewee U had a preconceived idea that India will be a good place to live and Interviewee N's view of India as "part of the [British] story" was an encapsulation of a familiarity that is crucially born of the history of colonialism.

British and European participants' familiarity and comfort with India manifested through references to language. It appeared that one of the reasons interviewees were positive about India was that people in the country spoke English and thus it was easier for them to move around and work. Interviewee A, a white European who had previously been living in Vietnam prior to moving to India, explained why he thought Delhi was a good place to live:

[It is] easy place to live and adjust to [...] I mean language barriers were difficult in Vietnam, not so difficult in India um so yeah like I felt a lot more at home it's much more cosmopolitan, there were like art galleries and just like cosmopolitan life.

Interviewee A made a positive distinction between Delhi and Hanoi but in order to do so he mentioned language. This paired with the idea that it was "much more cosmopolitan" than Vietnam allows us to see that what he appears to have meant was it was easy for him to live there because of similarities to his home in Europe. Thus he also felt at home because more people spoke English. Interviewee A was not alone. Another white, European-born participant referred to English when discussing his view of India. Interviewee R said:

India is of course a much easier place to work than many because so many of the people you work with speak English and so you know it's a really easy and so many of them I mean all of our chums had been at St Stephens and they all [...] knew English literature better than we did.

For R the ease of working in India and the participant's views of the country are shaped by the number of people who speak English. Indeed, he stated that it was easier to work there because of the language. Although he also said that it was "easy" because the Indian people he interacted with knew English literature. In addition to these two interviewees, Interviewee E also mentioned English. When discussing attempts to get work translated from Hindi to English, she said:

We've really struggled with translation and transcription of our projects in India and that's been really interesting to me [...] I don't know why has that been such an issue? [...] I assumed so many people would speak English, there'd be this huge work force, we'd be really able to get stuff done really quickly [laughs] and we just didn't.

Unlike the previous two interviewees mentioned, E did not seem impressed with the level of English spoken in India. In fact when it was stated they “struggled with translation and transcription” there was a tone of disappointment in her voice. This was affirmed by her stating she “assumed” a lot of people would speak English, which meant they would be able to do the work she wanted, but too few did. This was disappointing for E because, she said, it meant the work was not done to the standard she wished. The disappointment that people in India did not speak English at the level expected and the belief that the workforce is slow are tied together in this moment; perceived incompetence stems, in part, from lack of English. Like interviewees A and R above, the grasp of English is important for how India is perceived, while E had assumed more people would speak English than they did. Therefore we can see from all three that the view of India and Indian peoples’ worth can be understood through knowledge of English.

As mentioned, Interviewee R’s positive reflection on India is not confined to the English language; it is tied to a broader supposed Anglicisation of the people he worked with. He mentioned the Anglophone nature of Indians’ education when referencing St Stephens, a college of the University of Delhi. The Cambridge Mission to Delhi was established in 1854 by upper class missionaries affiliated to Cambridge University (St Stephens, nd: 1). But this alone is not necessarily noteworthy, the participant explained *where* they were educated is relevant as “they knew English literature but they didn’t know any Indian literature” and that “they knew [...] English literature better than we did”. This was mentioned in the same thought as India being an easy place to live; familiarity comes from a common knowledge base constructed around knowledge of English literature. And knowledge of literature is intimately tied to the colonial project. As Gauri Viswanathan explained, in colonial India “British colonial administrators, provoked by missionaries on the one hand and fears of native insubordination on the other, discovered an ally in English literature to support them in maintaining control of the natives under the guise of a liberal education” (1987: 17). Therefore, arguably the positivity with which Interviewee R saw Indians who have a good grasp of English literature stemmed from this idea of control and familiarity; it indicates the sustenance of British hegemony and suggests in development Indian people are measured by how well they know the English language and subject areas linked to England.

iii. ‘International’ and ‘local’: the privileging of European epistemology

The focus on Indian knowledge of English literature and knowledge of the English language is emblematic of what we might understand as the dominance of European epistemologies, which persists in development. The hierarchy of knowledge is part of what Quijano (2000) calls the global coloniality of power (also see Mignolo, 2002; 2007b) and does not solely present itself as micro-level professionals’ views of India; the way professionals discuss development suggests it continues to manifest through the privileging of ‘international’ knowledge. This label includes people who are seen to have the ‘right’ ‘technical expertise’, positioning ‘them’ against ‘local’ staff who are treated as ‘Other’ and not in possession of the ‘right’, ‘universal’ knowledge. The valorisation of European epistemology is integral to understanding development discourse among professionals and reveals how “development knowledge emanating from certain Western ideological constructs and practices denigrates indigenous knowledge, expertise and lived experiences” (Elabor-Idemudia, 2002: 227). Yet looking at the dominance of European epistemologies and the categorisation of the ‘international’ as articulated indirectly by professionals uncovers a finding not present in other studies of development and race: people of Indian origin and people born in India can be ‘international’.

The connection between Indian workers’ English skills and whether they are seen as advanced and capable by development professionals can be connected to a much broader idea that people from ‘developed’ countries are better equipped to ‘do’ development work. This is evidenced in Secret Aid Worker; one contributor, who works in their home country – an unnamed place in the global South – explains:

People from my country hold westerners up on a pedestal, assuming they are more disciplined and hardworking. My experience suggests otherwise; we should not assume someone’s professionalism based on his or her nationality.

[...] How incompetent must they think my country people are that they have to fly an “international expert” 7,000 miles just to conduct a day of training on being more eco-friendly in daily life? (Secret Aid Worker, 2017c: 5-6).

This quote distinguishes between ‘westerners’, who are elevated on a pedestal, and ‘local consultants’. What is explained here is that someone coming from the West will automatically be considered an expert when this is not always the case. There is a

perception from this ‘local’ actor that people within the country are assumed to be incompetent in comparison to someone from ‘the West’. This demonstrates the insistence that someone deemed ‘international’ has better knowledge and skills than anyone seen as ‘local’. Yet this also begs the question: who can be classed as ‘international’? This research suggests the ‘international’ label is shifting but that it is not always or only straightforwardly connected to skin colour or nationality. As we will see, we might understand this through hegemony; the multidimensional way that power operates in order to create certain ideas as common sense and where racialised ideas are not sustained on one front (Hall, 1986: 15).

Participants reiterated the assumption, articulated in *The Guardian* piece above, that an ‘international expert’ is innately more competent than a ‘local’ member of staff. This divide between local and international, Interviewee G said, is justified through how knowledge is seen:

It’s that the international knows how to write reports for an international audience and it’s not really an international audience [...] it’s Brits writing report for Brits and yet somehow Brits get to capture the mantle of being international.

We can see in this moment, ‘international’ stands for ‘British’. Though she is of Indian origin, Interviewee G outlined how she believes as a British person is afforded a level of responsibility and trust a person in the global South is not:

I was British and therefore suitably foreign [...] and therefore could be trusted in a way that local couldn’t be [...] the role was written into the contract and it came with a lovely stipend [...] I got maybe it was something like \$30 a day for not really doing anything [...] it cut to the heart of [...] who can be trusted who cannot be trusted? In the divisions between the local and the international, I was classified as international and therefore got paid or got the stipend that my colleagues didn’t.

She restates that again her Britishness meant that she was “suitably foreign” and in this context her ‘foreignness’ was positive as it meant she could be trusted. One of her jobs in a country in the global South had been to monitor payroll, despite not having a finance background. She thought that she was deemed trustworthier simply by virtue of being British, and that she then benefitted materially from this assumption. This brings us back to corruption found earlier in the chapter; that Interviewee G believed she was seen as trusted, particularly in comparison to local staff, suggests the latter are assumed to be innately dishonest or at least have more of a capacity to be dishonest than British staff. This homogenises ‘local’ staff as unscrupulous ‘others’ set against a

trustworthy ‘international’ staff member. We will see later that Interviewee G believed she was treated as less competent than her white colleagues but when put in relation with ‘local’ staff she argues was still seen as more incorruptible than people from country in which she was working. For the moment, we can see from professionals’ explanations that within development some participants perceive there to be an understanding of knowledge where the ‘international’ is tied with universal technical assistance and the ‘local’ assumed to be less valuable. And one of the keys to achieving this ‘international’ label according to Interviewee G is to have a passport from the global North.

Interviewee G was not the only participant who said there were these distinctions in terms of epistemologies or assumptions of competence that ‘international’ staff benefit from or perform. Interviewee H, was born and had worked in India, she described the imbalance when young people from the global North came to intern at the organisation she worked for and within India:

They thought because they had studied and they were coming from the West they had all the solutions. [...] It was very fascinating to see that lot of people who are coming from the West and [who] want to try their ideas thought that they had the most brilliant idea without even realising that it might not work [...] if you’re not basing it in the context or on the local knowledge.

Interviewee H states that people who came from ‘the West’ assumed that their knowledge was enough to fit specific local contexts. In this instance we see this from the viewpoint of someone from within the country: they view from the ‘West’ as assuming they have all the knowledge needed. As she states there was little consideration for the context but rather a belief among people from ‘the West’ that their ideas would be “brilliant”. What these two points have in common is that within the parameters of British organisations, at least, people from the global North assume they and/or are assumed to have superior knowledge or skills to the people from the countries they are working in. Interviewee H, who worked for an Indian organisation, challenged this but Interviewee G believed it was encouraged and perpetuated in the organisation she talked of. Therefore, the categorisation of the ‘international’ and the power that comes with this through naturalisation is understood, at least in part, through nationality: if one is from the global North, you are much more likely to be classed as ‘international’.

As development can be about implementing supposed ‘universal’ ideas, some ‘international’ development workers work in a country they have no knowledge of and in some cases to which they have rarely been. This was implied by Interviewee H’s comments about the lack of contextual knowledge some people from ‘the West’ had. Of those interviewed, eleven did not come from India or have origins in South Asia – and at least five had not been to India prior to working there and admitted they had no prior knowledge of the country. Interviewee E – a white woman born in South Africa – was leading a project in India with junior members of staff but she admitted:

When I was in South Africa I felt people would come and didn’t understand what’s happening. And then when I went to seminars here, on South Africa, I always felt like they hadn’t quite got it [...] And now I give seminars on India, where I know almost nothing about India [laughs and looks at colleague] [...]. I was really ill all the way through it [the project] so I wasn’t allowed to travel. So I have done a project on India, where I’m going to write on India where only [...] a month ago, I was allowed to travel to India for work. So I’ve become exactly [laughs] the person that I never wanted to be and now I stand up and I talk about India.

There was what might be construed an awkward moment in this interview, when Interviewee E laughed and looked at her Indian colleague. This seemed to signify a self-awareness that she believes she is perhaps not qualified to “give seminars on India” considering that she knows “almost nothing about India”. This interviewee was a white woman from South Africa, who was now living and working in the UK. This participant felt they were not necessarily qualified to speak about India but did so because in development she believed this is the norm. In fact, this was established through her comparison between her experiences as a South African and when working on India: as a South African she felt non-South Africans did not quite ‘get it’ when speaking about the country. Though she has these experiences and knowledge, which she feels unsettled by, she replicates this in her own work. Thus, she demonstrates self-awareness but proceeds to still engage in the work.

This kind of admission was not uncommon amongst participants; Interviewee Q reached a very senior position in a development organisation heading up projects in India. The interview reached over the halfway point before he had to explain he had never lived in India:

I’ve never lived in India, I should say, I’ve never, ever lived in India. Every night I’ve been in India, I’ve been in a hotel [...] I’d go out for a couple of days or something I might be out for a week, at the longest. I’ve never been on official business in India for more than a week in my life. It’s more likely two or three days. So I know the airport

pretty well [laughs].

Interviewee Q both repeats and uses tautology to make the point that he has never (ever) lived in India, this highlights that his relationship with the country is somewhat transitory. He also suggests this by stating that he has only ever stayed in a hotel while in India, never staying longer than a week. Therefore, not only has he never lived in the country, he has also never stayed in for a long period of time. He suggests, with a joke, that he knows the airport – therefore is more familiar with the process of arriving into and leaving the country – than he is with India as a country.

Similarly, Interviewee O, a white European who heads up a whole department on the region, rarely goes to India:

Q: How many times have you been to India or how often do you go?

A: [...] It's about ten times I would say now over four years typically I would go two to three times maximum per year.

There is a rigidity to his engagement with India, he has a specific number of times he tends to go and this means he can calculate the number of times in total he has been. This does not suggest a deep engagement with the country. During the course of the interview, O admitted that he had been happy to move to India or southeast Asia but this was not required of him, despite the fact he oversaw projects there. He also explained this was not his region of expertise. However, it should be noted that neither Interviewee Q nor O, unlike Interviewee E, expressed any discomfort with this situation; they rather described it in a matter-of-fact manner. In addition to this, at least four of the people interviewed ended up in India by accident; one said it was 'a fluke' they ended up there purely because they knew someone who asked if they would be interested in a job with them. The disconnect between people in powerful positions and knowledge of context within which they are working is reiterated in Secret Aid worker, one person writes: "[m]y NGO's board does not consist of one national from the country we operate in. Some of them have never travelled to this country, the rest almost never visit and one of them is my CEO's mate" (Secret Aid Worker, 2016a: 8-9). This author recognises there is not one person 'local' to the country on the board but also that a number of the board members have had no experience in the country in question and that of those who do is limited. This particular piece of evidence further suggests it is not uncommon for people from the global North to be involved in and do

work about countries they are unfamiliar with or have no knowledge of or be given control over projects in these countries. Thus, in this formulation, the people who occupy the ‘international’ do not need to know the local and the national to work in a country; as participants described it, India became for these interviewees an abstract location for the implementation of abstract development principles devised elsewhere.

What is crucial in this equation is not simply nationality or analysing the nature of someone’s engagement with a particular country but the fusing of power with nationality and what this means for doing development work in particular places. This comes down to the supposed epistemological supremacy of ‘international’ workers. Interviewee P who was born, grew up in and is based in India and had been working in development for decades described the phenomenon of ‘international’ staff working in contexts they’re unfamiliar with in unfavourable terms: “development interventions are conceived and then implemented they show both arrogance and what I would call technocratic fundamentalisms”. Therefore, if they have technical expertise – defined as such within a Eurocentric framework, which is assumed to be superior and provide the answers for the world’s problems – and are a national from a ‘developed country’ like Britain, professionals are seen as more capable than Indians and importantly able to apply their knowledge anywhere in the world. Or as another Secret Development Worker puts it: “so often we do jobs in Africa that we would never be allowed to do in our home countries. Simply because we are white, we are western, and we know what is best” (Secret Aid Worker, 2016d: 2). Yet, as we have heard from professionals, nationality is thought to provide a pass for people of Indian origin from the global North to occupy the category of the ‘international’, too.

Therefore, people who are from Britain, the USA, Europe or Australia – places that might be classed as ‘the West’ – are not the only ones who are able to enter into the category of ‘international’ in development work. Discussions with participants revealed that simply being based in development offices in these respective parts of the world could earn one this title. Interviewee C retold experiences comparable to those outlined above:

Within think tanks in the global North there is this perception that their knowledge is in some ways superior [...] than in the global South. [...] When I was working at [name of think tank] I didn’t feel like my knowledge was less or my contribution was less but when we worked with partners in developing countries, there was that unequal power

relation [...] where I think the understanding was that we'd be partners but we sort of often ended up treating them more like sixers [...] I think that's true across various think tanks where I have friends as well [...] I do think that often these relationships are built on the expectation of partnership and that there is this sort of unequal relation.

Interviewee C was born and grew up in India but through her explanation we can see that working for a think tank based in London, she believes, afforded her a level of respect and power she would not have had if working for an Indian-based INGO. In fact, she says that she saw these unequal power relations between people in London and “partners in developing countries”. As she pointed out, one of the key differences deciding this ‘international’ and ‘local’ line can be literal; whether a professional from the global South is based in an office in the USA, Britain or Europe or if they are based in the country they are working on. She went on to say that if she had been working in an organisation in India and partnering with the prominent British development organisation she would have “been in a subordinate position compared to colleagues”. Crucially, amongst participants, this distinction was only felt by people born in India – not for people from Europe, the USA or Britain even those that were of colour – where being classed as ‘international’ was possible if working in an office based in ‘the West’, but that if the same person were to work within India, for instance, they might be classed as a ‘local’ or less than those working in the office in ‘the West’.

Yet, the category ‘international’ in development is not only based on whether development professionals are living in or from the global North; for those from India, it appeared to be connected to the forms of knowledge they are seen to possess, which is determined through where they were educated. Interviewee F, a woman from India who works in India with international and domestic organisations (and had some dealings with DfID) explained that there was a difference in how people were treated depending on where they went to university:

Within the organisation [...] if there was someone who has studied from the [UK] or any other institute abroad, there was a difference in how they were treated [...] even though they had [...] much less experience of the grassroots they were [...] given more weighted [sic] than [...] the others.

Although the category ‘international’ is not referenced, Interviewee F recounted an assumption she came across, where if a development worker has studied in Britain then they will be seen to have the capability and knowledge superior to people educated in other institutions, even though, as Interviewee F pointed out they might

not have much knowledge of the local context. Interviewee F explicitly stated there was a difference in how people “were treated” depending on the educational institute they went to and where in the world this was. She argues that this counted more than experience or “grassroots” knowledge. Therefore, Interviewee F suggests a “Western” education affords people to be treated better and more knowledgeable than others working in development.

In addition to this, it appears that some ‘local’ staff might be aware they have to conform to an ‘international’ system that is predicated on ‘Western’ superiority and ‘technical expertise’. Interviewee F explained that there was an awareness and even internalisation among Indian staff of the power imbalance at the heart of this ‘international’/ ‘local’ divide:

Indians do have a mentality of feeling inferior to [...] people who come from the West. [...] If you can’t speak English you’re not considered as intelligent, it’s that’s the [...] mentality there is. I think that kind of [...] impacts the behaviour and attitude as well.

Interviewee F says that there is still a feeling among some people that they are inferior to people from ‘the West’, this suggests that the narrative of the ‘international’ might also be reproduced by some people in the ‘developing’ countries or at least in India. This is arguably, then, the production of a common sense, hegemonic idea. Again the subject of English resurfaces, which emblematises this point further, this awareness of internalisation of feeling lesser than people from ‘the West’, particularly if one does not speak the language might be considered reflective of what Wa Thiong’o calls the “colonization of the mind” (1986). What this suggests is there is an acceptance and a reproduction of the idea that people from ‘the West’ are superior to people in India within the country itself. Through emulating the knowledge systems privileged by ‘the West’ and through accepting development premised on technical expertise, some ‘local’ staff members help maintain the hegemony of the ‘international’.

However this does not mean all or even a majority of ‘local’ Indian staff have this point of view. Some see that British staff they work with assume they are superior to Indians but they reject this. Interviewee M, an Indian woman working in India said: “I know some conversations among Indians that they, the Western and the whites, think they are superior to or have superior brains and are superior in some sense to the Asians and Indians [...] it is there but not very prominent”. There is thus an awareness

that “Western” people and “the whites”, the two from this formulation we see are not necessarily synonymous to one another, think they are superior, in terms of intellect, to Indian people and Asian people. This is, as Interviewee M, explains not explicitly stated but it exists. These ideas were rejected by M altogether and this, she said, was also rejected by many of the other people she knows who work in the sector. This demonstrates that while some in India may accept and perpetuate the hegemony of ‘Western’ thinking in development, all do not readily accept it and many actively challenge and reject it (we also saw this with Interviewee H earlier). We may see this as a challenge to what might be considered hegemonic thinking. Thus the ‘Western’ people display this idea of their superiority but it is by no means necessarily internalised or accepted.

Nevertheless, it was evident from interviewees that participants perceived there to be or articulated that there was an overarching divide between ‘international’ and ‘local’ staff. The qualifications to be considered ‘international’ are varied and are relational but whether it comes down to nationality, geographic positioning or education, there is a persistent idea that people from ‘the West’ and institutions in ‘the West’ have knowledge that is both universal and superior. Among development professionals interviewed it was widely accepted that within organisations there was a clear division between ‘international’ and ‘local’ staff, with the former being seen as superior to the latter. For people born in India their ‘international’ credentials are achieved through either working in the global North or having been educated in Britain or the USA. It is highly likely that educational credentials are related to class and caste as it is more likely wealthier people in India would have the opportunity to be educated in universities in the USA or in Britain, for instance, places where fees are high and there are a limited number of scholarships. But more research would need to be done to establish this. Regardless, these categories of ‘international’ and ‘local’ are shifting and relational and not only tied to skin colour.

iv. ‘International’ and ‘local’: material inequality

‘Do expat colleagues deserve these privileges more than I do?’ – Secret Aid Worker, 2016d: 8

Finally, before exploring how the tropes established in the first section of this chapter are racialised, I will consider how from interviewees it is possible to argue that the deep power imbalances embodied in the privileging of what we might call a European or ‘Western’ epistemological system have a material impact on development professionals’ lives according to the professionals themselves. Perhaps nowhere is the material inequality between ‘international’ and ‘local’ staff more apparent than when we look at pay disparities. Although differences in pay vary from organisation to organisation, as well as over time (and are therefore not documented here), every participant in this study and two separate *Guardian* Secret Aid Worker columns recognised international staff are paid more than local staff. One *Guardian* contributor notes:

“You must earn a lot of money as they are paying you in dollars.”

“Woah, that’s really cool working with expats.”

These are two typical responses I get every time I explain to friends and family that I work in international development, on projects in our country [...]

But they are wrong. Working with expats is okay, I guess, but it’s not all it’s hyped up to be. I am from a country in south-east Asia where, to put it bluntly, we value expats – especially those with hazel eyes and blonde hair – more than we value ourselves (Secret Aid Worker, 2017c: 1-4).

When this development professional talks of how “expats” are valued, this can have a double meaning: firstly, it might be a reference to salary differences, particularly given that they discuss how an incorrect assumption among their friends and family is that local INGO workers get paid a lot of money when the reality is they get paid less than international counterparts. And secondly, how they are appreciated as development professionals within the organisation they work. Their input and work is seen as less important than that of international workers. The specific mention of people with “hazel eyes and blonde hair” as valued more highly – in both senses – than people from south Asia encompasses an assumption that white people hold the most authority and earn the most money, a point we will come back to later in the chapter. But for the moment, what this reflection appears to suggest is the two points we can draw out from this quote are undeniably related: worth of ‘international’ staff economically is intimately connected to their knowledge and expertise being seen as superior.

This was not an isolated finding; there is a significant amount of evidence from the data examined that ‘local’ staff are paid less than ‘international’. Another *Guardian* column explicitly makes this point:

On average, a local employee receives a third of that [paid to an international member of staff] [...]

On the other hand, expatriate staff receive between \$3,000 and \$8,000 a month. This is not uncommon in the international NGO (INGO) world. In fact, in a particularly renowned UN programme, the highest paid local employee receives less than the international intern (Secret Aid Worker, 2016d: 3-4).

Although we do not have access to the data that looks at pay differential across different organisations, it is suggested here that local employees on average receive a third of what an international staff member gets paid. They then illustrate this with the average salaries for international staff. Indeed, this is not hard evidence, as it is relayed through a column, anonymously written, yet regardless of the specifics this does chime with interviewees who as we will see in a moment are also aware of pay differentials.

This person goes on to explain people can be paid differently even though they may be doing the exact same jobs. They explain why this is the case:

The discrepancies in compensation and benefits reflect the difference in value assigned not only to needs, but to the capabilities of local versus expat staff. Foreign “experts” are assumed to know more about how to improve local lives than the locals themselves. This means that the highest positions in INGOs are almost all held by foreigners from the country in which the INGO is headquartered (Secret Aid Worker, 2016d: 10-11).

The explanation for the significant pay differences between ‘international’ and ‘local’, according to this development professional hinges on the idea that people from abroad are classed as experts automatically and that they therefore have the best knowledge. There is not necessarily a rigid hierarchy that functions in every single moment of day-to-day interactions in development organisations, some existing work suggests ‘local’ staff have a distinct authority in non-hierarchical INGOs (Taylor, 2001: 53). However, from existing analysis of interviewees it is possible to see there are recurring power differences between the ‘local’ and the ‘international’ and the issue of pay reiterates and makes unambiguous the connection between remuneration and knowledge: international staff are paid more because it is assumed they have the most knowledge, and as established, what is meant by knowledge is contained within a very specific parameter.

This is a theme not only contained to Secret Aid Worker articles. Although a number of participants in this study argued that there were moves to ensure ‘local’ staff were in

more senior positions, many said that there were salary differential between international and local staff. Interviewee G described their experiences:

The local always got maybe a fourth of what the international got paid even if their expertise was far superior and it was always justified using that same [...] language of “Ah but the international brings in international expertise”.

Again the connection between knowledge and pay is highlighted by arguing that regardless of expertise, the local may be receiving a ‘fourth’ of what the international was. As with the Secret Aid Worker column, the specifics of the pay differences are not of interest here but what is, is the perception that pay levels are connected to whether your knowledge is deemed ‘international’ or ‘local’ and this though questioned is largely naturalised.

The severity of the material impact is clear from one participant. Interviewee F showed how this can have material impact on the people receiving less pay. An Indian-based ‘local’ development worker who worked with British organisations, outlined how the pay disparities impacted her:

If you look at their salaries, their perks [...] their lifestyle it’s completely different from [ours], we mainly get 40,000 rupees paid per month no benefits, no health insurance nothing [...]. End of the month we have no money in the bank, we don’t know what to eat.

[pause] I think lots of their money goes in to their admin costs, their salaries, so there has been always a dynamic [...] can always see funder has been here [puts hand up high as if demonstrating scale] and you are here [put hand much lower].

She began by saying it was not only the salaries that were different but the “perks”, that is health insurance or any other benefits. In fact the “perks” were mentioned in passing by Interviewees M, N and J, all white British professionals who briefly noted that they lived particularly lavish lifestyles paid for by their employers. They were provided with housing, chauffeurs and private schools for their children, all paid for by the development organisations for which they worked. For Interviewee F being denied these “perks” came with being paid less, which itself results in her saying she had no money at all and at times could not even pay for food. When stating the impact this had on her she continued to make the comparison between herself and international staff. She added:

I used to only get 10,000 rupees per month and living with that money per month was a *huge* challenge in Mumbai. So end of the month you won’t believe I used to have no money for even bus ticket. I used to walk like five kilometres from my home to train

station [...] I had to change two trains and then I used to reach centre [...] and from there I used to walk and nobody knows about it [...]. So I have seen that kind of poverty [...] and I used to get scared of getting sick because I used to have no money, no benefit, no health insurance.

Therefore, Interviewee F seems to imply even though she did all the groundwork, she still was paid a small amount considering the living costs in Mumbai. She documented how the low level of pay shaped her life; having to walk great lengths to get to work because she couldn't afford transport and living a precarious existence without insurance or benefits. Not only are pay level and assumption of knowledge connected, they have a clear material impact. It is possible to see how the low level of pay is tied to how Interviewee F was perceived as less valuable than international staff: this meant that she was paid a salary upon which she could not survive. But this is also bound up with class: of all the participants interviewed F had not come from a wealthy family and had received a scholarship to go to university in Thailand, she was not wealthy and had not made it into the 'international' category. This account shows 'local' staff are paid less than their 'international' counterparts and that this has a material impact on peoples' lives.

The divisions between staff are not limited to pay differences but also how staff are treated. Interviewee T, a British man of colour of Indian origin, recalled that when the organisation he worked at was downsizing in 2003, they decided to outsource the drivers, all of whom were local staff. Asked what impact this had on rights and pay, he explained:

I couldn't tell you how the terms and conditions changed but they did move from being [organisation name] staff to being on contract and it was difficult a process because [...] [They] had all the built up pensions and they relied on jobs and had families to support and it was very difficult for them. If I recall [...] the organisation who won the contract was asked to offer jobs first to the ex [organization name] drivers. I'm not sure in terms of pay [...] what the difference [was].

Although T could not recall the specifics of the contract changes, that he remembered this occurring suggests the decision to outsource caused difficulties for the people it affected. This is not to assume that international staff are always handed ideal conditions but that there appears to be a disposability of the way local staff are treated. This highlights how at a micro level, the development industry which professes to empower people in the global South can be disempowering for people who work

within development organisations. It is difficult to determine the reason for this. It could be that the privileging of international knowledge is intimately connected with the privileging of international lives, yet it could also or instead be that this administrative decision has a negative impact. Regardless, the impact of this decision demonstrates a clear distinction between the ‘local’ and ‘international’, intentional or not. Indeed, in this way, ‘local’ staff might be deemed as less worthy than their British counterparts. This is a trope identified by Fassin:

The lives of ‘expatriates’ are valued more than those of “nationals” in matters of wages, social protection, freedom to associate, recognition—to the point where the belligerents themselves, when attacking humanitarian mission sites, always differentiate between the two, demanding ransoms for Western hostages and simply killing local workers (2011: 50).

We see this same dynamic occurring in much more subtle way in the development sphere, as F’s experiences and T’s retelling remind us, for those development workers classed as ‘local’ there is a risk they will be treated as simply less important than their ‘international’ counterparts and that this will materially impact their lives.

So far, this chapter has examined British and European development professionals’ accounts of India and developed two strands of argument. One is professionals’ negative perceptions of Indians as corrupt and incapable, this stems from processes of homogenisation and age-old stereotypes. The other, is ‘positive’ perceptions of India(ns) as familiar and capable, this positivity is incumbent upon and tied up with perceived Anglicisation of India. This is not entirely dissimilar from the negative perception, which stems from an ‘othering’ judged and shaped by the perceived lack of Anglicisation in India. As a result we can see there is already among some of the European, white development professionals interviewed a subtle perception that British modes of education and knowledge as signs of superiority. Relatedly, it has charted the ways people working in development in India are divided between the ‘international’ and ‘local’, which is connected to modes of knowing and material inequalities among professionals. From this analysis, we are able to see that the label ‘international’ is not exclusively given to people who have white skin pigmentation; rather it is also connected to whether someone was educated in Britain, Europe or the USA. However, what has not been explored is how these findings relate to processes of racialisation. This will now be established before moving on to the second part of this chapter.

v. The shifting nature of whiteness: racialisation of existing tropes

So far we are able to identify a number of different tropes from interviews with development professionals, they are namely: India as positive because of its Anglicisation, the privileging of European epistemology and the material outcomes of this and India as corrupt. I argue in this section that when we look at hegemony through a Gramscian lens we can see each of these are produced by overlapping processes of racialisation, in particular I will draw on the epistemologies of immanence and ignorance in order to make sense of how these operate and specifically in development organisations that have a multiracial composition, how they are related to whiteness. Indeed, it is worth reiterating that in line with Hall I understand whiteness not as an essentialised identity with a pure essence but as a subject position and image of the self, as he writes about the category ‘black’ it is “a category constructed politically and culturally, which can not be confined to a set of transcultural or transcendental fixed racial categories” (1988: 443). With this in mind, I will begin by looking at the colonial roots of how the English language is referred to by interviews and Anglicisation more broadly, and look at how this intersects with constructing corruption as immanent to India(ns), to show how we can make sense from interviews of how whiteness, but also potentially class, operate in development organisations. Then I will explore the shifting forms of racialisation of the ‘international’ and ‘local’ categories to establish that ‘international’ can be accessed through whiteness and that this brings with it material benefits, which themselves are produced by the intersection of capital and race.

Firstly, let us consider how the ‘positive’ forms of representation rely on the idea that India is Anglicised. This is best highlighted through the thinking that development professionals’ are impressed with people in India when they are able to speak English, which can be understood as a functioning of whiteness when we look at it with the epistemology of ignorance – namely, the dearth of engagement or knowledge of historical and current forms of racial domination that can be central to whiteness as a subject position (Mills, 1997: 19). There is a lack of engagement with the colonial history and English by professionals who make this point. Yet imperial history has played a role in creating the underpinnings for the propositional content identified in this chapter thus far. To understand this propositional content, we need to look to

colonial history. According to postcolonialists Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin:

One of the main features of imperial oppression is control over language. The imperial education system installs a 'standard' version of the metropolitan language as the norm, and marginalizes all "variants" as impurities [...] Language becomes the medium through which a hierarchical structure of power is perpetuated, and the medium through which conceptions of 'truth', 'order' and 'reality' become established (1989: 7).

In India, English was also used to elevate an "elite"; people who could speak English well (as defined by the colonisers) were treated as the go between for the colonisers and the rest of the Indian population. English is now not imposed upon populations through colonial government and it can and has been co-opted. Salman Rushdie argued English "grows from many roots; and those whom it once colonized are carving out large territories within the language for themselves" (1982: 10). Yet there is recognition that to succeed globally one must have knowledge of English and as López observed in response to Rushdie's argument "non-English Englishnesses" are always measured in comparison to "English Englishness" from which they emerged (2001: 78). Thus English continues to create a hierarchy and this is evidenced by participants' judgement of Indians through their language skills; for them this notion of the English as equating to positivity or the elite appears to be a common sense idea, in terms of Gramscian thinking.

In addition to this, one's grasp of the English language is tied to a performance of whiteness. This can be made further sense of through Frantz Fanon's work on the subject of language and race. Writing about the French language in the 1950s he argued:

To speak means to be in a position to use certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization. Since the situation is not one-way only, the statement of it should reflect the fact [...] the Negro of the Antilles will be proportionately whiter – that is, he will come closer to being a real human being – in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language...mastery of language affords remarkable power (1952: 17-18).

Fanon was not reifying the ability to use the coloniser's language but recognising that to do so was to continue to perpetuate a system whereby the coloniser was seen as superior and more advanced. In particular this was connected to a process of whitening, where the colonised was able to gain a sense of humanity – largely confined to white Europeans – through mastery of language. In this way, this might be seen as part of what Dyer calls the "white spirit", where we might understand English

as symbolizing the “highest reaches of intellectual comprehension” (Dyer, 1997: 23). Although European racism and imperialism were heterogeneous and affected different groups of people in different ways at different times (Eriksson Baaz, 2005: 64), the belief in becoming ‘whiter’ and more human was common in colonial societies and is important throughout this chapter with respect to modes of knowledge and understanding. This persists, “the ideology of racial markedness [...] has a corollary an ideology of linguistic markedness” (Bucholtz, 2001: 87). English continues to be a mark of social distinction in India; one academic commented it is the “language of power, command and upward mobility” (Parameswaran, 1997).¹⁷ This does not mean that a person of colour’s whiteness is not contested but rather that they are able to perform a form of acceptability through the English language. This is confirmed by Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffins, they argued that the colonised “signify by the very fact of writing in the language of the dominant culture that they have temporarily or permanently entered a specific and privileged class endowed with the language, education and leisure necessary to produce such works” (1986: 5). Thus, for the colonised, using the coloniser’s language “open doors which were still barred to him fifty years ago” (Fanon, 1952: 38). From participants’ responses we can see that for them, they begin to see Indians who can speak English well as more capable and of the country being easy to live in and what the historically rooted understanding of racialised demonstrates is that the ‘positive’ representations of India and/or Indians is produced by whiteness.

Existing alongside this for “Anglicised” Indians are orientalist ideas of exoticism and mysticism resurfacing. For the British development worker, India may be unknowable, as Interviewee N said, “you know you live in India but you never really understand”, as well as being a place of intrigue because of Britain’s past involvement with the country. Accompanying the idea of India as fascinating and exciting is that it is mystery; Indians are at once exotic and familiar and, therefore, neither wholly one nor the other. Thus we can bring together the intrigue that some white British or European interviewees say they have about India because of the colonial history with these representations of Anglicised Indians. In this way we might see that “well-educated”

¹⁷ Hindutva nationalists have challenged the dominance of English and it has been noted Prime Minister Narendra Modi conducts international meetings in Hindi (Samanta, 2014). But speaking English remains to be seen as a sign of class and cultural superiority (Parameswaran, 1997).

Indians can help explain the country to development professionals; this can be understood as Roman's white fantasy, that is the white desire to "know the racialised other" (1997: 275). This brings us back to Heron's findings with regard to the African continent and corruption and otherness; the to-be-developed or the developing country can never be seen as "just like us" because "if too many of "them" are "just like us," "they" are not in need of "development" by "us," so why are "we" "there"?". Instead, development is a question of ""them" being known by "us," and being assessed by and understood through "our" standard" (2007: 89; 34), even if "they" can never quite reach it. Indeed, this otherness is also communicated through the depiction of people in India or the entire country as corrupt. This can be made sense of through the epistemology of immanence as these suggestions echo the belief held by the post-imperial British government, which was an overhang from Empire, "that people from the Indian subcontinent were untrustworthy" (Smith and Marmo, 2014: 175). It is assumed corruption is inherent to India and to Indian people, who are talked about as if they are a homogenous mass. What is particularly revealing for our purposes is the implicit positioning of corrupt India against uncorrupted Britain/ 'the West'. This was indicated by Interviewee E pointing out that it was not only people in India who were corrupt. As Stephens explained, "once the language of "more than," "less than," "better than," "worse than" comes into play, the relationship between knowledge and power becomes more explicit. This can and has been interpreted as yet another form of racism" (1989: 122). Though this language was not explicitly used, these comparisons were made and from this we can see, as in Chapter Three, how the epistemology of immanence functions to racialise India(ns) as inherently corrupt and Britons as the opposite, and for some participants how this has become common sense.

The contrasting but overlapping tropes discussed so far can be made sense of through Homi Bhabha concept of "mimicry"; colonial subjects were taught to mimic the colonisers to become Anglicised, but crucially as we will see as this chapter unfolds, there always remained a distance in this mimicry, they could be Anglicized but never English (1984: 128). For some development professionals interviewed, in the way they explained India, it appeared that the job of Anglicised Indians was to mediate and make knowable Indian society – a society that is fundamentally different and problematic. Interviewee E, however, implied she failed to find people who could speak English well enough to fulfil this role. Thus if we bring together numerous

development professionals' testimonies we can see Indians who speak English, are aware of European systems of knowledge and have been educated in elite institutions are whitened to an extent but they exist in a country that cannot itself be understood without mediation from an Anglicised elite, as it remains "other" and a place of inherent difference. This maintains a difference between people who are phenotypically white and those who are not, the latter are 'from' this 'othered' context and thus a sense of distance is maintained between the two. This might be understood as revealing an anxiety at the bounds of whiteness (Stoler, 1995; 2010), which will be further discussed and made sense of in the next section of this chapter.

These conceptualisations of Indians who speak English and know European epistemologies also relate to who is depicted as 'international' and who is classed as 'local' in development organisations. In most work on development and race, these divides appear to be mapped on to skin colour, or at the very least the label of 'international' is reserved for people thought to be white. We will see in the next section that from the interviews conducted we can conclude in some ways this is the case. However, entry into the 'international' category is not decided solely through skin pigmentation: people of Indian origin from the global North can be seen through the prism of whiteness. This allows people who are classed as 'not white' to become whitened through either their nationality, when compared to people from the global South, or if a professional was born in India and they have been educated in an institution in the global North. Thus, we can see as we did in the previous chapter, that racialisation does not only operate among different racial groups – when these are defined phenotypically – but also among them (Brah, 1996: 3), where in this formulation the 'superior' is able to perform whiteness.

The transfer of knowledge from North to South is not simply imposed upon populations in the global South as this superiority can be accepted, as well as challenged, by many in the South (Parpart, 1995: 222; 226). This we might understand through the Gramscian notion of power, that is, the dominant ideology is not coercively imposing ideas on others but it is produced through consent (Hall, 1986). Yet, the justification for the necessity of this transfer is dependent upon the erasure of knowledge from the global South and the universalisation of knowledge from the global North; therefore we can look again to the epistemology of ignorance. This bears

the mark of colonialism; the violence of which was not confined to the physical or material realm but also seeps into the epistemic. Edward Said's concept of "positional superiority" is useful here; thinkers set the Orient against the Occident in a multitude of equations, all of which resulted in the latter being seen as superior. As Smith explained this went beyond "the field of study referred to by Said as 'Orientalism' but other disciplines of knowledge and 'regimes of truth'" (1999: 59). Colonisers maintained, and justified their violent dominance over colonised populations by claiming to have superior knowledge of the world, including technical and scientific knowledge as well as the creation, collection and mediation of mediating knowledge about the colonised. Understanding what classified as knowledge was essential to maintaining this superiority; through colonialism "the Western came to 'see', to 'name' and to 'know' indigenous communities" (Smith, 1999: 60) and these ways of knowing were deeply racialised. At the same time, social Darwinism was used to argue that colonised people were unable to look after themselves; this was derived from the European understanding that Indian, Chinese and African scientific and technological advancement lagged behind their own as European "modes of thought and social organization" were thought to correspond "much more closely to the underlying realities of the universe than did those of any other people or society, past or present" (Adas: 1989: 7).

A key part of the process of racialising the colonised as backwards and 'other' was ensuring that knowledge outside of Europe was cast as inferior and illogical, and that it was largely erased. The erasure of the history of non-European knowledge and lessening in importance of different knowledge systems and forms of production has persisted since formal decolonisation. According to decolonial scholars, the idea of modernity, for instance, is naturalised "as a universal global process" (Mignolo, 2007b). As Grosfoguel explained "a myth about a Truthful universal knowledge [...] conceals who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks" (2007:213). By constructing itself as 'universal', the 'Western' epistemic system conceals the erasure of subalternised forms of knowledge and the attendant racism implicit in this. This can also be understood in relation to the epistemology of immanence; the idea that there is an endogenous, autogenerative nature of European or British 'progress'. As with colonialism, 'the West' is inherently the place of progress

and thus ideas. In development this manifests itself specifically in the privileging of so-called ‘international’ technical expertise, which is taken to be universal, whereas ‘local’ forms of knowledge are inferior (Kothari, 2005). Although there are those that advocate for ‘local’ and ‘indigenous’ knowledge to be assimilated into ‘international expertise’ but while continuing to reify this division (Agrawal, 1995; Elabor-Idemudia, 2002: 227). Though some interviewees questioned this flow, for the vast majority of participants the division between the ‘international’ and ‘local’ was normalised; it was deeply embedded into institutional practice and embedded in seemingly harmless oppositional categories. However, rather than see only ‘Westerners’ as expert researchers, as the above explanation does, we can see that people from India can also be considered experts if they are seen to possess this universal knowledge, which is in some ways thus hegemonic, and this is tied to occupying whiteness.

Race is integral to the epistemological erasure and the construction of epistemological supremacy. During colonialism, the hierarchy of knowledge was connected to the superiority of white Europeans above all other ‘races’; placement in the racial hierarchy was, in part, connected to which peoples had been thought to have previous civilisations (McClintock, 1995: 135; Arnold, 2005: 37). As Frankenberg explains:

Like the word “race” and like “racial names” (whiteness, blackness, and so on), the words “culture,” “nation,” and “people(s)” continue to be organized by hierarchical ranking systems dating back to the very beginning of the western European colonial project. In the colonial context, the naming of “cultures” and “peoples” was very much linked to naming and marking out a host of Others as beings deemed lesser than the “national” Selves who sought to dominate them (2001: 74-75).

Therefore, we might see this ranking as shaping how we understand epistemology. Here the idea of immanence resurfaces; it was thought Europe was able to progress because it had knowledge inherent within its boundaries that helped it do so and this was explained through supremacist thinking – white people had superior intellect and this manifests in the notion of ‘universal’ application of European epistemologies in development. Thus, it is possible to see from interviews that people who are from Britain or who have been educated in institutions in ‘the West’ are considered to have this superior knowledge and are thus whitened in this way. People of colour from the global North may automatically be whitened comparatively to people from the global South and people of colour from the global South must learn the British/European/‘international’ way of thinking in order to be seen as superior and

they, according to participants, must be based in Britain or have been educated in the global North. This also brings us back to the assumption that people who cannot speak English are less capable.

To further make sense of this we might consider López's explanation of whiteness. Drawing on the distinction drawn between the "West" and the "East," where being "Western" in this context has less to do with where one sits on the map and more to do with how one relates to a colonial history in which "Western-ness" is bound up with both colonial dominance and whiteness (2005: 17). He wrote:

whiteness remains behind in the new postcolonial state, in the form of both actual white subjects (former colonizers turned citizens) and the cultural and ideological apparatuses that continue to reflect the values of the colonial regime – a national language or religion, educational system, government infrastructure, and so on (2005: 13).

Thus as has been made clear, whiteness is a privileged subject position (López, 2005: 14; also see Du Bois, 1935). This also means, as outlined in the introduction to this thesis, that bourgeois communities populated by people of colour can be invested in whiteness as a way to achieve mobility. These people claim "superiority by virtue of their relative whiteness and establishing economic and cultural hegemony over other less-privileged groups on racial grounds" (López, 2005: 17). In development, then, we might see people of colour from formerly colonised countries such as India being able to occupy the 'international' category because of their ability to perform whiteness. Yet, given that this is tied to accessing and possessing European epistemologies, it is likely that this has a class and caste element to it: thus it is arguable that access to whiteness is easier if you are materially privileged, though further work needs to be conducted on this. Therefore, whiteness is often achieved, or so at least it appears from interviews, through having been educated at universities deemed sophisticated enough to qualify as 'international', which stems from the Eurocentric notions of epistemology which are themselves innately tied to whiteness.

We might understand this through Hall's usage of hegemony as it "represents a degree of mastery over a whole series of different "positions" at once" (Hall, 1986: 15). Here, then, we can see different forms of racialisation operating alongside one another but where each of them maintains the dominant hegemony that the 'international' is equated with whiteness, which itself is at once clearly grounded in notions of

superiority, while also shifting in terms of who it is applied to.

As we have seen, this distinction between the ‘international’ and the ‘local’, which is produced by ideas of whiteness, has material effects. Similarly to Hall (1986) using Gramscian notions of hegemony to unite the economic and the social, we can see the two are related here; socially constructed differences result in material difference. The impacts are themselves related to race; the pay disparities explained in interviewees appears to demonstrate how development organisations are embedded in and reproduce the relationship between race and capitalism. Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s definition of racism as anti-relational, disrupting collectivism to maintain neoliberal capitalism, is helpful here. If racism is “the state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death, in distinct yet densely interconnection political geographies” (2002: 261) then we can see different forms of humanity are separated from one another (Melamed, 2015: 78). This is at play within development organisations that subscribe to the categorisation of ‘local’ and ‘international’ staff, and the attendant pay scales applied to this. There is a racialised division between staff but these categories are connected to one another, not just because as Bhabha (1994) would note both categories are reliant on one another for meaning but also because they are connected in the realm of development to keep the enterprise going. The values attached to them decide how they relate to one another; being of higher value means you will be ranked above someone of lower value and this will manifest in the material. Looking at development professionals’ experiences allows us to see the impact of racial capitalism on peoples’ lives and how this operates *within* development organisations. Therefore although being seen as white is not the only pass to being classed as ‘international’, there is a racialised distinction operating in development that separates but ties together ‘local’ and ‘international’ and in the process working to justify pay differentials.

From development professionals’ own perspectives we can see epistemologies of immanence and ignorance at play in how professionals from Europe, in particular white professionals, see India. It is both seen as a place of inherent corruption but also of positivity in that Indians who are able to occupy or relate to whiteness through language and knowledge are seen in a good light. This maintains a hegemonic image of India as a place of backwardness, unless whiteness is performed. In addition to this

we have uncovered how becoming an ‘international’ member of staff is not confined to white people yet being able to fit into the category ‘international’ – whether because of their education, nationality or knowledge of the dominant epistemology – is implicitly tied to whiteness and means one will receive monetary and societal benefits not available to those in the ‘local’ category. But crucially, it has found that the whiteness implicit in the ‘international’ category can be applied to people of colour from the global North, as well as certain members of the global South who are deemed to have the ‘right’ knowledge, expertise and/or educational background. This we can argue is achieved through the hegemonic notion that ‘Western’ knowledge is superior. However, as we are about to see, these are not the only forms of racialisation that manifests in development at a micro-level: race also works in a biologically defined way and this cuts across ‘international’ and ‘local’ divides in order to privilege white people.

III. The enduring power of white development

In *Secret Aid Worker*, the significance of being seen to have white skin pigmentation appears on a number of occasions. We have already seen one Secret Aid worker from the global South argue, “we value expats – especially those with hazel eyes and blonde hair – more than we value ourselves” (*Secret Aid Worker*, 2017c: 4). Similarly, another contributor writes:

Formalised colonialism is over. But now we have to make sure we aren’t implementing an even more insidious, neo-colonial system that gives white, rich people around the world the power to make decisions for countries that are not their own (*Secret Aid Worker*, 2016b: 7-8; 14).

This *Secret Aid Worker* contribution suggests a racial hierarchy that places people with white skin pigmentation at the top operates next to and across the racialised divide between the ‘international’ and the ‘local’. Interviews with development professionals uncovered a factor not found through examining government development discourse: the microforms of racialisation that manifest in development processes. Or, in other words, there is a privileging of white people in development. Despite the fact that there is a racialised differentiation between ‘international’ and ‘local’ staff, it is also true that the terms “expert”, “expatriate” and “consultant” are not race-neutral in a biological sense (Kothari, 2006a: 15); they first and foremost imply

white people.

When asked directly whether race played a role in development, nearly all participants answered that it did and an overwhelming number noted the number of white people occupying senior positions and/or the lack of racial diversity in development organisations they were working in or had worked. From participants' responses, the issue of the privileging white people within development organisations can be broken down into four, overlapping categories: the privileging of white people in development, the assumption that people of colour are less capable than their white counterparts (which be divided into experiences of people working in organisations that are situated in the global North and global South, respectively), pigeon holing and goodness.

Firstly, it was possible from interviews to identify that white people dominated development. Focussing specifically on private development organisations, Interviewee D, who is of colour, explained, "over here in the private sector I do not think it's diverse at all I mean they're making efforts to get more women but I think it's still white women and older white men. That's the reality". This was not just mentioned by people who work for private development organisations, Interviewee U, a white participant who did not work in a private organisation, argued that while organisations were making strides toward greater "diversity" the organisation they worked in remained "quite a white department" and pointed out "there's not a whole heap of, um, uh, sort of black members of staff". Along the same lines, Interviewee G, a British woman of colour of Indian origin, said while working for a British non-governmental development organisation she was aware she was "the only person of colour in an office of about 80 people". She went on to say:

I was the only person of colour that was a consultant on the projects I worked on and where there were others [...] they might have been of south Asian origin, there were no black consultants. Not one.

Much like U, G specifically noted both the lack of people of colour in the organisation and that there were no black consultants.¹⁸ While she did not work in DfID she did say from her experiences of working with the government organisation she noticed divides within it:

¹⁸ More works needs to be done with regards to this but it is beyond the scope of this study.

DfID was deeply divided between so-called international and national staff. *Deeply divided*. All the drivers of course would be locals um administrative staff are local, decision makers are all British all predominantly white British and they're the ones that come for three years and then they get moved on.

Therefore, this suggests that in the British government's development organisation, white people occupied more senior positions than people of colour or 'locals'. This is only one person's observation yet what is important is it chimes with others' general analysis of British development organisations as predominantly white. This suggests that while there is fluidity in terms of who might be defined as 'international' there is still a predominance of white people in development and as we will continue to see, they are seen to be more likely to be in positions of power or are thought to have more authority.

Indeed, in this vein, Interviewee B, a white woman who had worked for a British-based INGO, noted that though power is given to country offices (the offices based in countries in which the INGO is working), there are still occasions when white people still dominate:

It's a really decentralised way of working and I think [the organisation] does that because they don't want to appear like they're doing all this 'you have to do what the white man in the UK says'. But last week for example there was an induction [...] for senior level staff at country programmes [...] I felt so uncomfortable all of a sudden with the fact that it was all white people from the UK office speaking to a room of coloured people [sic], like people from Bangladesh, people from Uganda, people from Burkina Fasa [sic], people from Zambia, from India. Like people from all over our country programmes and I was just like starkly aware of [...] how *white* the people talking to our country programme staff was [sic].

What Interviewee B was recounting here was that she perceived there to be a racialised power dynamic in this meeting, which is at odds with how the organisation sees itself working. While it attempts to give power to country offices, when people from country offices and white people from the central office, which is based in London, are in the same room, the latter are dominant. She expressed that she was uncomfortable because of the dominance of white people in the central office but also that they were the only people who were given space to speak. Therefore, although we know racialisation in general and in development in particular is not always straightforwardly tied to skin pigmentation but can be tied to categorisation – i.e. where 'international' is related to 'Western' credentials – there remains, according to participants, a privileging of people with white skin pigmentation. What this means is that participants either

observed there were few people of colour working in organisations or white people occupied senior positions. Therefore, although there may be people of colour – both from the global North and global South – working in development organisations (whether private, non-profit or government), senior positions in development organisations can remain, according to these participants, overwhelmingly white.¹⁹

i. Being white, being capable

As the second point in the above paragraph implies, interviewees suggested the ongoing domination of white people is not a mere coincidence, it is connected to broader power structures, whereby people of colour are generally seen as less capable than their white counterparts (Solomos and Wrench, 1993). Expertise still remains connected to a hierarchy where skin colour does matter. On more than one occasion agency and power of staff of colour – including those from the global North – was raised. In Secret Aid worker, for instance, one anonymous respondent, who is a woman of colour, outlines her experiences:

I have struggled to prove myself as a woman of colour in development. Being undermined and undervalued, even when consistently producing quality work, means I am often in a state of constant anxiety at work. Even less qualified and newly hired men are provided with more assumed respect from the get-go. As women, and especially as women of colour, we have to work twice as hard to be thought of as half as good.

During my time in this sector, I have had younger, male (usually white) volunteers questioning my authority, because they weren't able to accept my seniority. Despite having several years of experience on my just graduated colleague, we are treated equally by my manager, rendering my years of hard work and expertise in-country irrelevant (Secret Aid Worker, 2017b: 8-9).

She explains how she had to prove herself but particularly notes that even if she works harder she is not considered as good as male colleagues, even if they are less qualified. This demonstrates that within the development organisation she worked she believed she was assumed not to be as qualified because she was a woman of colour. This is evidenced by the ongoing questioning of her authority and the way her knowledge was not considered pertinent, while due to their gender and race, white men were more likely to be heard.

¹⁹ Two participants noted in terms of diversity there are efforts to get more *white women* involved in development. This kind of gendered hierarchy has colonial precedent (see Ware, 1992: xviii; and hooks, 2000 and Smith and Marmo, 2014: 79-80) and suggests further specific research should be done in this regard.

Participants interviewed for this study also mentioned the power imbalance between people of colour and white staff seen in Secret Aid Worker accounts. For instance, Interviewee U explicitly stated that who is able to represent the body they work for is linked to race:

There's a whole racial dynamic [...] when you're working in development in a lot of the countries we're working in, just in terms of who's seen as empowered, and who's seen as able to represent the UK [...] but also our local staff sometimes feel that people don't take them seriously enough as a representative of the organisation.

In this instance, a senior white member of staff is recognising that people of colour, regardless of whether they are from the country, aren't seen as those most suitable to "represent the UK" in this particular development organisation.

This is not an isolated recognition among participants. Interviewee G personally experienced a variation of this. As a British woman of colour, she said she saw the interaction between race and gender affecting her authority:

Every single one of my white male colleagues who are around the same age as me – they would always be employed in development because they look like experts because that's what people, national ministries and so on, felt like they were buying. And for me it was always a harder sell in everyday ways; getting my reports accepted by the client [...] Why are they getting employed onto contracts when I could do that? But I'm not even given a look in and it comes down to my name. It comes on my CV [...] and which is awful and so people see straight away and it's 'oh no, well you can't be the expert'.

According to this participant, there is an assumption that a woman of colour will not be seen as an expert; this was palpable in her everyday work and undermined her power within development spaces as her reports were a "harder sell" amongst clients.

In addition to this, Interviewee D, a woman of Indian origin recognised that although she experienced a certain privilege being Indian and middle class, this privilege was context dependent. Within the internal sphere of the development organisation for instance, she felt her nationality and race worked against her:

I think there were times in my career where I felt that my word was not given the same weight as my supervisor or colleague who was white and British [...] I don't know if that was because he was white or British or that he was so much more senior than me and he had the technical expertise [...]. I assume it's a combination of both.

What this shows is she felt her colleague's experience was compounded by his gender

and race and that she felt the concoction of the three together meant his views and thoughts were greatly privileged above hers. This echoes Kothari's findings (2002, 2005) that in the professionalisation of development there is a reinscription of the racial and gender hierarchy that shaped colonial power relations. All of these examples demonstrate how people of colour, and in the majority of evidence specifically women of colour, were or felt sidelined in development organisations because of their race and gender; they often believed it was white men who were seen as the experts and thus in possession of the best knowledge to 'do' development.

What we have witnessed in this subsection is a range of similar feelings and incidents where women of colour – regardless of where in the world they are from or if they are considered 'international' or not – have felt inferior to or overlooked in favour of their white counterparts, particularly white men. This reflects Richard Dyer's precise explanation that being white is "a passport to privilege" (1997: 44), being a white man can experience another layer of gender privilege on top of this but white women still maintain a degree of power above women of colour. We might understand this as reliant on epistemologies of ignorance and immanence: white subject positions protect racialised privilege (Sabaratnam, 2018: 10) through ignoring historical processes of racial domination and centring the supposed autogenerative capacity of people racialised as white. Through this, white people can benefit from "racial hierarchies, ontologies and economies" (Sullivan and Tuana, 2007: 2). The space of 'international' staff members in development might also be considered to be hierarchised; from participants' comments it is possible to see that being white means you are still considered most superior.

Thus much like wealthy Indian elites in Chapter Three, people of colour in development organisations who might be classed as 'international' are still ranked hierarchically as inferior to their white counterparts. Again, even among those people of colour who are either from the global North or from the global South and able to conform to and perform accordingly to the dominant epistemology, participants suggested they would not be assumed to be *the* expert in comparison to a white person. This is arguably representative of the anxieties around whiteness; the need to patrol the border of the socially-constructed subject position of whiteness and reinforce that superiority is ultimately reserved for certain people who are phenotypically white;

those who possess the “white spirit” (Dyer, 1997: 23). These findings resonate with other work on development professionals and race (White, 2002; Kothari, 2006a; 2006b; Rivas, 2018) but in this instance fit into a puzzle where the term ‘international’ is not exclusively white. This means the terms “expatriate” and “development professionals” also still refer to an ideal white, middle class figure (Leonard, 2010: 6), thus people of colour who are seen to navigate, embody, perform whiteness can be included in the ‘international’ but might also be erased from view or seen as lesser than white people. This we might see as a hegemonic position rearticulating itself by representing different, at times conflicting positions at once (Hall, 1986), as it must be “won on many different sites” (Hall, 1998: 168). According to participants, within the walls of development institutions this is divided along the lines of white vs. people of colour; people of colour from the global North and global South might be seen as ‘international’ staff but they are also not always necessarily seen as equal to their white counterparts. It is possible to suggest these racialised hierarchies only function within the development organisations – there are scholars such as Sen or Reetika Khera who have been incredibly influential in terms of theory and practice – thus this may be emblematic of how these knowledge hierarchies function at the micro-level of interactions within offices or in the profession.

ii. Problems with pigeonholing

Yet while some participants of colour said their race meant they were seen as less of an expert, at times it might have shaped *how* they were classified as an expert. For certain participants of colour – and again in particular women – there was an ongoing worry that they would be pigeonholed in their work. This was because there was an assumption that they would only know about the country or region from which they were from or which they were presumed to be from. Interviewee D, a woman from India who was educated in the USA, expressed the anxiety she felt working in a private British-based development company:

One of the things I’ve been worried about to a certain extent in my career is the fact that because you belong to a certain group you tend to be pigeon holed into certain projects [...]. And I think the assumption is that because you’re from there you’re more likely to succeed, which is true given that I speak the language in India, given that I blend in more, it is more likely that I’ll have less of a hard time than someone who sticks out. I get it. But I think that what I’ve struggled with [...] this notion of race in the British development context is this like oh [...] because you belong to a certain ethnic group

you should be put on to [certain] projects.

E's worries show because of her Indian background there is a risk she will be expected to focus on India; this is in contrast to white European development professionals discussed earlier who are able to work in a given context without being familiar with it at all. Though she has 'international' credentials, there is a risk her race will mean she does not qualify to have the 'universal' technical expertise her colleagues do. Not all participants use the term 'pigeonholed' but even those, like E, who were largely positive about development work, thought their gender and race limited what they could achieve in the profession.

Interviewee G revealed the relational nature of how she was perceived. She previously talked about how she was seen as trustworthier than people in the global South and concurrently noted she was heard less than her white, male counterparts. But in addition to this, she said that because she was of Indian descent, when she did a PhD her supervisor expected her to focus her research on India, when she had chosen to look at South Africa. This, she said, made no sense to her: "at that point I'd been to India twice in my life [...] and so I didn't have a connection with India but it was still I had to explain why I wasn't doing research on India". The assumption that she must do work on India, she noted, was an ongoing assumption when working in development and she said it stems from the homogenisation of people of colour depending on which racial group they are thought to be part of. This latter point was also reflected in Interviewee C's explanation of her experiences. Although she did not think race played a role in how she was treated at work, she recalled: "my team there were two or three of us who were South Asians and sometimes – often people – including people within our team – would confuse us for each other even though, I don't know, I don't think we look similar". That people from South Asia can be confused with one another in development spaces reflects a possible broader homogenisation of people from South Asia, where in British society 'they' are often assumed to look the same. But it is also connected to the assumption that people who might be perceived to be from India, for instance, will naturally do work on India. This form of racialisation produces a limitation; homogenising people because they come from the same part of the world while also assuming that 'their' knowledge is limited to where they are from. Meanwhile, people who are phenotypically white are taken to represent and understand

all of humanity (Dyer, 1997). Therefore, through examining development professionals' perceptions of their work and their experiences, there is an ongoing idea within development organisations that white people will know best and as discovered in the Anglicisation of Indians, it is plausible to argue that people of colour might be expected to make knowable the 'other' world they come from.

iii. Goodness of development professionals: the link to white identity

It was not only the participants of colour who spoke about race being an issue in development work. Throughout the course of this research, when discussing my thesis in social settings I encountered numerous people – of different races – who had worked in development at some point in their lives who explicitly stated that racial disparities were apparent in development. Numerous white participants affirmed that race played a role in development but many distanced themselves and their organisations from being implicated in this. Some of these participants came to the conclusion that things are getting better – organisations are improving their 'diversity' or overcoming racism – or development professionals themselves are not racist. Interviewee J, a white participant, noted race is an issue in development, and even suggested that development itself is racist, but went on to argue that a British INGO in which he was employed by for a lengthy amount of time had worked "through the racist thing". This assumed that while racism is an issue in development this particular INGO has managed to separate itself from the rest of the industry. This also manifested in another way for Interviewee U who when discussing the lifestyle in India and the expectation to have a lot of staff said: "Some people got into that, some people quite like having lots of staff around. I hate it [...] I didn't. Though I had someone come three times a week to do a bit of cleaning for a couple of hours". This does not explicitly mention race but there is a hidden idea in this comment that Interviewee U recognised power imbalances in development – manifest through the use of cleaners – but that he did not really partake in it; he was different from the rest of British development professionals. In both examples there is a self-reflexivity, not entirely different from the kind witnessed in government development discourse, but this is centred on a desire to distance themselves from what they perceive to be racialised or problematic dynamics in development. This reflects an ongoing finding among many white development professionals that issues such as racial disparities and

privileging of whiteness might exist in development but they are personally not implicated in it.

These respondents see themselves, their work, their organisation or the country within which they are working as separate from the overall way race shapes and is embedded in development work. Heron called this the “myth of alternative development”. In her study she found participants were able to pinpoint failings of development, ineffective projects and the “proliferation of highly paid Northern professionals who have no real commitment to development” but all saw their work as different from this (2007: 103). This applies to the role of race in development; most participants recognised race plays a role but did not see their own work or themselves as perpetuating racial stereotypes or divides. Interviewee J went so far as to say a whole organisation has extricated itself from perpetuating any of the racial dynamics found in development. This mirrors studies outside of development; in a working study of white student teachers, McIntyre found:

When being a member of the white race requires that the participant reflect on the history of white racism and the consequences of racism for people of color and for their own individual and collective white psyche, they separate themselves from ‘those whites’ and stress their individuality (1997: 95).

This entails recognition that there is racism and white privilege but these white people refuse to see themselves as implicated in this (see also Rivas, 2018: 172). Therefore, there is still a notion of innocence where the industry as perpetuating racial stereotypes or as functioning on a racist basis but this is not everyone and these particular individuals exist outside of this.

To establish this difference – of themselves or their organisations – relies on a belief that development is not only necessary but remains ultimately good. They are “acting for the good”, that is, for vulnerable people (Fassin, 2011: 37). The theme of an inherent goodness and morality in development work surfaces time and again. Among participants there was a recurring theme that good people go into development work. When asked about their motivations for going into development, participants gave the following reasons: coming from a “socially-aware family” (Interviewee A), having a “strong sense of social justice” (Interviewee U), “to make the world a better place” (Interviewee R) and seeing their work as “meaningful” work (Interviewee A).

Interviewee B outlined how they were motivated by a strong sense of morality:

I've always had [a] really strong sense of injustice and when I feel like there's some sort of injustice going on I've always felt motivated to respond to that [...] as a little kid I think presented this desire and need for wanting to make the world a more just place [...] and wanting to fight for people that might not necessarily have the means or access to fight for themselves.

By using language such as “social justice” and “making the world better”, Interviewee B focussed on their own positive motivations and goodness, therefore implying that development work must lead to social justice. In line with this, Interviewee A stated, quite simply, there are a lot of “good people” doing development, while Interviewee U said development was necessary because “it’s not right for the UK to sit by and watch other [...] people in other countries not having life chances because of their poverty”, saying “I do believe we have some role in sort of helping to redistribute that”. There is work looking at this intersection between goodness and development professionals (Fassin, 2011) and Cowen and Shenton’s (1996) work traced development back to its missionary origins. It also fits into Feldman and Ticktin’s analysis of appeals to humanity, where people “claim to govern or intervene on behalf of a universal humanity”, which in turn justifies the need for governing technologies (2010: 6). In development, this has the effect of justifying practices even if they are fundamentally flawed. A Secret Aid Worker contributor goes so far as to describe development workers as “part of The A-Team” (Secret Aid Worker, 2016c: 9-11). In particular, this imagining of development workers as part of a special team fighting injustice reflects Harrison’s (2013) findings in Chapter Three when Oxfam depicted Tony Blair as a superhero.

Yet, seeing people who work in development as good also helps development professionals form their subjectivities, and this is tied to whiteness. As Ananya Roy explained development discourses help to define citizens in the global North, as well as the West’s place in the world; this creates subjectivities that can be acted on (Escobar, 1995; Roy, 2010: 12; Loftsdóttir, 2014). What this means is that the goodness discourse implicitly tells us that people and governments in the global North that ‘do’ development are not only agents of change but are morally grounded. Development work is “axiomatically assumed to be altruistic” (Heron, 2007: 2) and development workers are implicitly, if not explicitly, positioned against an underdeveloped ‘other’ who have less moral fibre or less capacity to do anything for

themselves. We can compare the assertions that development professionals want to ‘do’ good through their work with the racialisation of Indians earlier in this chapter as corrupt. Though not all participants racialised Indians in this way, we can see there is an implicit suggestion that their work elevates them above those ‘local’ Indians. This is not to romanticise those ‘locals’ but to recognise this distinction is achieved by constructing ‘international’ development professionals – and in particular those who are seen as having white skin – as rational, unitary persons who were central to Kant’s and Rousseau’s modernity project, which Heron refers to in her work (2007: 124). Though this may at times be applied to professionals classed as ‘international’, it is particularly applied to white development professionals who are seen as superior to their counterparts. Development professionals who perform whiteness and white professionals in particular are agents of modernity; they have the morals to ‘do’ development and this is supposedly apparent when compared with Indians. A moral subject is thus created through development discourse (Feldman and Ticktin, 2010; Fassin, 2011: 37), and I agree with Heron that this is anchored in whiteness. However, I have found that in certain instances this might also encompass people of colour. This, then, takes us back to the argument set out in Chapter Three, that there is an innate goodness in British people, demonstrated by their support for development, only in this instance it can also extend to certain Indian people who might be seen as connected to whiteness. The similarity between the two suggests there is a hegemonic nature to this trope across these different institutions or sites of power.

Goodness not only sustains the conceptualisation of ‘Western’ actors as universal and helpful but also obscures the racialisation at the heart of development. The positioning of development professionals against Indians strengthens ideas of whiteness and as development tied to a white ideal. The notion of goodness allows participants to suggest that even if development is flawed, many people working in it are *mainly* motivated by goodness and therefore are not intending to, or do not, perpetuate racism (see also Rivas, 2018). Though there may be some people conducting ‘bad’ development practices, the majority of development workers are assumed to have a moral commitment to doing good that elevates them above criticism (Fassin, 2011: 37). This also enabled certain participants in this study to distance themselves from the inherent racialisation of development while also enabling them to downplay instances of racialisation as innocent.

In particular, Interviewee A, a white man from Europe, did this during the course of the discussion:

I remember once doing [laughs] a fashion show [...] when I was like really young in like traditional African clothing [...] but, um, yeah to raise money [...] Like in hindsight a lot of the stuff [...] I'd sort of frown upon now but like it was the '90s [...] Like there is good hearted [sic], they meant well.

Alongside those participants who rejected the idea that they or their organisations perpetuate or rely on racialised notions of development, this was a clear moment when race played a part in development but is dismissed as innocent. Interviewee A began this comment with laughter that might be construed as somewhat nervous and then proceeded to note that he now might be uncomfortable with white Europeans dressing up in “traditional African clothing”, this demonstrates a self-reflexivity also apparent when Interviewee E admitted that her views on corruption might be shaped by prejudice or racism. But while Interviewee E proceeded with her comments, A wanted to also create a justification for what he now considers to be something he would “frown upon”. It is possible to understand this from the white subject position that reproduces white innocence (Wekker, 2016); acts of racism are accidental or exceptional, meaning they are committed by ‘bad apples’ or by people who know no better. Thus while it would be an overstatement to say that this fashion show demonstrates these people are racist, the justification operates on the same logic.

Conclusions

Sometimes organisations or governments want to see an international face but I find in India that's a lot less because they have some absolutely brilliant people throughout the organisation or [...] in the country [...]. For very specific things they may ask [...] there is a symbolic component, they have a workshop or a meeting and we have this international guest so one of the roles you fill is upgrading a bit the status of the event because there's somebody from outside. – Interviewee O

From the interviews conducted it is possible to argue that race and racialisation mould the development profession. This chapter has shown how in line with Gramscian notions of hegemony, racialisation operates at different levels and in different ways within development organisations. Consider the above quote taken from Interviewee O's transcript: we know from this chapter that the term “international face” can mean

multiple things.

Firstly, we have seen that this might apply to anyone from the global North and/or people from the global South who fit into the hegemonic European development epistemology system embodied in the idea technical expertise. People of colour from the global South in particular might be defined as ‘international’ but this process of possessing the ‘right’ knowledge is a performance of whiteness; this knowledge system stems from hegemonic ideas of European and white superiority and the erasure of other forms of knowledge. This rests upon the racialisation of the to-be-developed corrupt or only positive when Anglicised, as we saw in constructions of India. This may well be connected to class – the ability to gain the necessary education to be classed as ‘international’, for instance, is likely to be related to material wealth. Indeed, this racialised divide between the ‘international’ and the ‘local’ has a material outcome, with the latter being paid less than the former and appears to be a function of the intersection between race and capitalism (Du Bois, 1935; Brodtkin, 1998), where racialisation in development discourse shapes and is shaped by peoples’ position in capital relations. This reflects racialised tropes uncovered in Chapter Three, in particular the epistemology of immanence which is used to construct India as inherently corrupt and the epistemology of ignorance, which is used to construct Britain as the place of progress and in this chapter which is used to establish European epistemology as superior. Both are therefore the basis on which whiteness is constructed and this similarity begins to demonstrate the hegemonic nature of these representations.

The relationship between the ‘international’ and whiteness and the racialised material outcomes of this are novel findings not uncovered by existing work. Though used in this thesis, Kalpana Wilson’s book (2012) did not include interviews or directly engage with development professionals. Instead we know from her study that INGO public-facing discourse is racialised along some of the lines identified in Chapter Three. The work on development and professionals is largely concentrated in journal articles and book chapters by a handful of scholars (Kothari, 2006a; 2006b; White, 2002; Loftsdóttir, 2014 Rivas, 2018) and two books (Goudge, 2003; Heron, 2007), explored in detail in the literature review. I have built on this work by talking to people of Indian origin or descent, as well as white Europeans/British people. Including

participants of Indian descent has deepened analysis by helping to explain how people in the particular context of development work are seen as ‘international’ from the global South and how people born in India or who have Indian heritage possess a level of relative power that fits into the racialised hierarchy of development. If we understand hegemony as contested and shifting, in line with this I have thus attempted to unveil the messy relationships between nationality, race and class to show there are concurrent forms of racialisation that can co-exist, and contradict one another. Looking at these intersections, I have attempted to inject the aforementioned original line of argument into the current analysis of race and development professionals.

However, the term “international face” might also mean someone classified as having white skin pigmentation. According to participants, and in line with existing analysis, power and knowledge within development organisations remains significantly concentrated in the hands of white people. Therefore though people of colour from the global North may have a degree of power in development due to their nationality, we see white people in development organisations that continue to be seen as the ultimate representatives of the nation. Thus flanking the unsteady nature of who is ‘international’ and who is ‘local’ are forms of racial discrimination at the micro level that belie the idea that anyone can be classed as ‘international’; in accordance with White’s (2002) and Kothari’s (2006a and 2006b) experiences, there still exists a hierarchy, akin to that found in colonial discourse (albeit far more subtle), in which expertise remains connected to people categories as having white skin. This arguably demonstrates the shifting and multi-dimensional nature of hegemony.

The power of this white identity is maintained and protected within the realm of development through the idea of goodness. As with self-reflexivity found in government discourse in Chapter Three, white development professionals tend to recognise development is racialised but exempt themselves from this equation by using ideas of white innocence and the morality of development. This reflects what Flax called “innocent knowledge”:

[T]he discovery of some sort of truth that can tell us how to act in the world in ways that benefit or are for the (at least ultimate) good of all. Those whose actions are grounded in or informed by such truth will have their innocence guaranteed. They can only do good, not harm, to others. They act as the servant of something higher and outside (or more than) themselves, their own desires, and the effects of their particularly histories or social locations (1992: 447).

Innocent knowledge ignores and shields how power relations mould systems of knowledge. I agree with Heron (2007) that development work is an expression of innocent knowledge. But this can operate in two ways, one in which innocence is guaranteed due to ideas of truth, the other which relies on ignorance. The epistemology of ignorance “is part of a white supremacist state in which the human race is racially divided into full persons and subpersons. Even though – or, more accurately, precisely because – they tend not to understand the racist world in which they live, white people are able to fully benefit from its racial hierarchies, ontologies and economies” (Sullivan and Tuana, 2007: 2). Therefore, the supposed moral grounding of development work gives white people an even stronger claim to innocence; they achieve personhood through their work and can hide behind it – if they say or do something racist, they did not mean to because they are ultimately good people who work for the to-be-developed, and this helps them to understand themselves and the work they do.

Therefore a notion of development professionals’ inherent goodness cloaks the problems identified in development. Indeed, Rivas pinpoints these problems (2018); one woman she interviewed in Pakistan said it was “ironic” that in development organisations aimed at helping people and respecting their rights, people: “give in to all of their racist and sexist ideas all at once and for some reason think it is okay in this space as if being here and being an expat or expert gives them some impunity” (cited in Rivas, 2018: 172). Thus while development professionals “are ready to concede some of its [developments] failures [...] they take strong objection to all attempts to ‘throw the baby out with the bath water’” (Rahnema, 1997: 381). This arguably stems from the assumed goodness of, and moral motivations for, development. This is tied to white innocence: supposed positive intentions outweigh racialisation in development. The irony is the innocence of these intentions are themselves a product of racialisation; professionals are elided with white goodness and set in opposition against the to-be-developed or ‘local’ workers who are ‘othered’ as backward. This obscures that racialisation of development – seen as a flaw in the system – is inherent to the functioning of the development system. We could understand this as ideas that challenge the hegemonic nature of whiteness and processes of racialisation in development being, for some people, integrated into the dominant discourse.

Therefore, we can see there is a privileging of people who are white at the heart of development but that a concurrent form of racialisation can sit alongside this where people of colour are afforded a degree of power if they can perform whiteness. These differing forms of racialisation demonstrate that there is a hierarchy of 'races' but in line with Fanon that this is not simply a case of white vs. black, there is an unease and liminality in development organisations that demonstrates race is not stable but a set of anxieties; for instance, where 'international' people of colour might have a 'lack' of authority in relation to white people and an abundance of power or material wealth in relation to 'local' 'others'. This chapter has attempted to unveil exactly how this can take shape within development organisations. Comparing this with government discourse we can see that India is presented as a place of corruption. Similarly, at the micro level, people of colour may become 'international' but this is not secure – as it is for white people – and according to their own observations and feelings, they are, in this conceptualisation of knowledge and development, inferior to some degree. How exactly this compares or contrasts to representations of development in the media remains to be seen and will be considered in the next chapter.

Chapter Five

India, development and race in the media

On the 13th June 2016, a debate on aid took place in the UK House of Commons as Members of Parliament (MPs) discussed a topic that had become a matter of public debate in the preceding six years (Henson and Lindstrom, 2013): should the UK spend 0.7 per cent of its GNI on international aid each year? Alongside the debate in the chamber, MPs Steve Double and Stephen Twigg worked with the House of Commons' Digital Outreach Team to ask people on Twitter about foreign aid spending; they had around 3,000 responses in the space of an hour (parliament.uk, 2016). An online petition that gathered over 23,000 signatures triggered the parliamentary debate and this social media conversation. The petition was launched by national tabloid newspaper *The Mail on Sunday* (Provost, 2016: 1; Walters and Carlin, 2016), which had been leading the vanguard against the 0.7 per cent commitment. This particular instance highlights how the campaign to reduce or abolish 0.7 per cent spending led by this one newspaper forced parliamentary debate on development (Cawley, 2015), and shows the close connection between media, in its varying forms, and government. But it leaves us with the question: how does the media more broadly represent development and how does this relate to other areas of discourse?

DfID and development organisations have recognised the importance of the role media plays in shaping public understanding of development and the to-be-developed: there has been some work on the relationship between public understanding of development and media portrayals (VSO, 2002). In government discourse it is suggested media alone conveys simplistic understandings of development and gives an overarching picture of “doom and gloom” that has a negative impact on support for development (Darnton, 2009:4). In *Developments* one unnamed author argues that perhaps because of the way “the western media portrays the developing world” the British public are sometimes given “the impression that the poor are here to stay, and nothing really changes” (DfID, 2006: 4). This suggests there may be a popular conceptualisation of media as driving one-dimensional stereotypes of development, yet what has not been explored is how this may complement representations found in other forms of

discourse, not least in government discourse.²⁰

Given these relationships, this chapter will examine how Indian development and poverty is represented in British print media, exploring what continuities and differences this has with both government discourse and the forms of racialisation found among development professionals. This will allow us to gain a fuller picture of newspaper representations and their relationship to race and make sense of the hegemonic nature of racialised representations of development. To do this, I have examined coverage of Indian development in Britain's daily national newspapers: *The Daily Express*, *The Daily Mail*, *The Daily Mirror*, *The Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *The Telegraph*, *The Times* and *The Sun* and any of their Sunday siblings. This covered the period from 1st May 1997 to 31st December 2017 and included an examination of 1,320 articles. I chose key terms²¹ to search in LexisNexis in this time frame and coded and recoded data accordingly, as laid out in the Methodology. This chapter presents the analysis from this research and instead of using all the key words I have examined to form categories of analyses, I have devised four, overlapping categories that encapsulate forms of representation in contemporary media reporting on India, development and poverty. This is because each set of key terms explored did not necessarily yield a great deal of coverage on their own and because there were clear themes that cut across them, these make up the discursive tropes that are laid out in this chapter. Within these categories, and as with previous chapters, race intersects with gender and class to create differing forms of racialisation.

Drawing on Gramscian understanding of hegemony and the analytical tools laid out in the Methodology, this chapter will show how in media coverage of Indian poverty, Britons who engage in development work or with people in India are presented as good, and in line with government discourse this goodness is reliant upon constructions of whiteness for its meaning. Alongside this form of racialisation, I have found a tension in media coverage: between seeing India, as a growing power and as a

²⁰ Given the methodological premise of this study, exploring the relationship between media representation and public opinion is beyond its scope. See Henson and Lindstrom, 2013.

²¹ Although some of these searches produced the same article more than once, a breakdown of the number of articles for each is as follows: 'slumdog millionaire', 1,000; 'India poverty', 83; 'Prince William India', 52; 'Tony Blair India', 5; 'Gordon Brown India', 2; 'David Cameron India', 58; 'Theresa May India', 7; 'India aid', 101; 'Narendra Modi Britain', 5 and 'Modi London', 7. Only in those deemed relevant for this were examined study.

threat and seeing India as chaotic and unchanging. In the former, India is depicted as a power that may surpass Britain, but that must be kept in check; in the latter, through constructions of Indians as chaotic and unchanging ‘others’, poverty is imagined as inherent to India and thus Indians are seen as in need of help from Britain and Britons. In order to further explain this analysis, this chapter is divided into two sections, the first examining the tropes found in newspaper discourse and their propositional content and the second will analyse how these tropes are racialised. As will become clear throughout this chapter, these representations can be understood as part of the same discursive ensemble found in the government section of this thesis and among development professionals, all of which are reliant upon race and processes of racialisation. For coherence, I will briefly outline existing work on media and development and the contents of this chapter before presenting my analysis.

I. Looking at the media

In Britain, elite opinion is divided on development and this is mirrored in newspapers. There are those that are explicitly anti-development, such as right-wing leaning newspapers, *The Daily Mail* and *The Express*, and there are papers that do not take a consistent, overt position on development in their reporting but certainly do not propagate an anti-development agenda, such as the left-wing leaning newspapers, *The Guardian* and *The Daily Mirror*. Despite these divides, we will find there are similarities in the racialisation of poverty in India in development coverage. Therefore, this chapter will specifically look at the role media plays in creating and/or sustaining racialised depictions of development in relation to the other strands of this study. I am not therefore arguing that it alone presents simplistic or racialised images of the to-be-developed. Instead, I am both looking at it in comparison to government and professionals’ discourse, as well as in isolation. This will allow me to examine how racialised constructions are embedded in day-to-day reporting, which is different from some existing work that looks at specified targeted advertisements by INGOs for fundraising (see Dogra, 2012), in order to think about the way representations of development are normalised in everyday reporting and how these compare with the other two strands of study.

As outlined in the Methodology the media was chosen as an area of study because in

the Gramscian understanding of hegemony we can understand it as a domain in which the ruling elite perpetuate their own notions of society, and in this way it might further unveil the nature of the dominant discourse on development (Boggs, 1976: 39). Existing work also suggests that looking at the media might reveal parts of discourse not so directly discussed in government discourse or it might reproduce this discourse in different ways (Darby, 1997: 8; Harriss, 2011: 24; Lempert, 2014: 390-391). Additionally, the media is important because, using Hall's work (1998), this thesis takes the stance that media outlets are not neutral and have significant power in representing race, gender and class; they do not represent what is already there but rather transmit representations. In fact, media plays an important function in helping to making certain meanings dominant through reiteration and attributing meaning to them (hooks, 1992; Razack, 1998). While as mentioned before, there is work analysing how INGOs fundraise through newspaper advertisements (Dogra, 2012) and work that looks at the relationship between Western spectators and people who suffer in 'developing' countries on television screens (Chouliaraki, 2006), there is little work looking specifically at how international development is regularly represented in newspapers in Britain. The scholarship that does exist tends to look at coverage of international development in relation to either public opinion or other issues such as climate change (Doulton and Brown, 2009; Franks, 2013; Cawley, 2015). For instance, Cawley conducts a comparative study between Ireland, Britain and the United States, finding that in each country print media "positioned the macro resourcing of aid primarily as an inward concern" (2015: 533). This, like the other work in this area, is a valuable site of study but it focusses specifically on reporting about aid spending. Instead, as is relevant for this study, this chapter however will focus in on everyday reporting and attempt to analyse how this plays a role in maintaining hegemonic racialised development discourse.

II. Media Analysis

i. Goodness of Britons

One of the tropes that presented itself in representations of Indian poverty and development in the media was the enduring goodness and kindness of Britons. To begin we can see that certain actors articulate the notion of Britons as good in coverage of Indian poverty and development. In an article about British aid, the Chief Executive

Officer of Save the Children, Justin Forsyth is quoted as saying:

As a nation the British are instinctively generous [...] There is a group of people that doesn't like aid but there's a much bigger group that feels very supportive. It's deep in the DNA and psyche of the British people: Comic Relief, Live Aid, Make Poverty History and Jubilee 2000 show that (cited in Valley 2012: 4).

This quotation appeared in a search for “poverty” and “India” together in LexisNexis and is a direct articulation of how Britons can be imagined in relation to development. Forsyth states Britain is “instinctively generous” and that this is “deep in the DNA and psyche of the British people”. Using the adjectives “instinctively” and “deep” his language highlights the inherent, biological nature of British generosity, suggesting that it is a quality inherent in people in Britain. This quote was reported in *The Guardian* with no question or context and it is therefore stated as if it is a fact that British people are inherently good – it is in their DNA. This is enhanced by the way Forsyth situates this in the debate about aid in Britain; he notes there is “a group of people that doesn’t like aid” but this is portrayed as only a small group, which is outweighed by “a much bigger group”. By placing them side by side, Forsyth is comparing them with one another and his word choices – describing the supportive group as “much bigger” and those that do not like aid as simply a “group” – stresses that more people like aid than do not. The ground for this statement has already been laid by suggesting British people are “instinctively generous” and this thinking is then reiterated with the reference to DNA. Therefore, echoing government development discourse, it is stated that ultimately most Britons are supportive of development because of their inherent morals, which in this instance are articulated as if they are part of their biological make up. These descriptions are stated as fact, thus normalising this representation and allowing Britons to be categorised as good.

Yet British goodness was not often articulated so explicitly; chiming with this categorisation of Britons as good, but more subtly conveyed, are depictions of slum tours in India. There were ten references to slum tours in India in the coverage I examined and these tended to centre Britons in a positive way. For instance, one *Daily Mail* article about poverty in India, which had the subtitle “slumdog saviour”, recounted:

Hundreds of Britons were touched by the plight of Indian youngsters when the hit movie *Slumdog Millionaire* came out. Greenforce has come up with one of the most colourful — and useful — ways to offer help assisting in a Delhi or Daipur orphanage

(Roe, 2011: 25-6).

The work “saviour” functions as a sign of goodness; though it is ambiguous as it could mean the tours themselves, it is possible to interpret that this word is referring to the Britons who are visiting the slums and they are in this way depicted as saving people in poverty. “Saviour” also has evident religious connotations, which imply a certain morality to actions. Indeed, interpreting the use of “saviour” in this way is reinforced by the description of “hundreds of Britons” who were “touched” by the depiction of the slums in *Slumdog*, which prompted them to find a way to help the orphanage. By describing Britons as emotionally impacted by seeing poverty in India, the moral response of Britons is centred with the implication that they were motivated to act because they felt morally compelled to do so. Therefore, in this representation people from Britain that go to volunteer in India are portrayed as having consciences that they then act upon in an effort to do good and thus Britons are categorised as fundamentally good.

This representation and categorisation manifested again in depictions of slum tours, which tended to centre the caring nature of Britons. Another account of slum tours explained:

That's where concerned westerners get the opportunity to visit a glorious city of contradictions and see the real slumdogs of India. They witness the horrific conditions, the dreadful poverty and the heart-warming optimism of these wonderful little boys and girls making the most of the cards life has dealt them (Amlani, 2009: 1).

There are two forms of significant representation at play in these quotes, one of the “concerned westerners” who, aside from children, are the only subjects that are depicted as having emotion or that are referenced in any detail. Adults in India are entirely absent from this representation; this omission is particularly stark given that “westerners” are centred in this way. The westerners’ concern seems to sit in contrast with the “horrific conditions” and “dreadful poverty” that makes up India, this gives even more weight to the goodness implied by their concern, as it sits in stark contrast with the negative Indian surroundings symbolised and accentuated by the adjectives “horrific” and “dreadful”. Thus, similarly to the previous quote above, this represents “westerners” as agents who are compelled to help people in “horrific” conditions. The second form of representation connected to this is the representation of the children. Playing on ideas of innocence, the children are described as “wonderful” and as with

the reference to “concerned westerners” starkly highlights the omission of Indian adults. This suggests these “wonderful children”, whose vulnerability is implied with the word “little”, only have the “concerned westerners” to help them. Indeed, this is also highlighted by the phrase “cards life has dealt *them* [my emphasis]”, which may encourage readers in Britain to feel gratitude for the cards life has dealt *us* but also deduce that “concerned westerners” are comparatively privileged and are using this privilege to help others. The representation also seems to imply with this description that poverty is an unlucky reality, although it is not the focal point of the description. Therefore, like government discourse, development and underdevelopment are seen as simply occurring without any broader historical, social or political context at play.

In addition to this, the entire description is given a weight of authenticity as it begins by stating these westerners will see the “real slumdogs”. This at once ties the description to the film, suggesting there is a degree of honesty in the film’s representation of poverty, and also distances it by stating this is reality, not simply fiction, and in the process the goodness of the westerners becomes even more real: they are not simply entering into a film, they are volunteering to help real people in poverty. Therefore these reports centre the intrinsic care of people from ‘the West’, while using Indian people – and children in particular – as a backdrop through which to create this image. This continues to represent a naturalised notion of British morality, which means they are categorised as good.

Furthermore, as well as establishing the goodness of Britons by accentuating their compassion and action, accounts of slum tours often seemed to claim that the action of Britons are ultimately good and not intrusive. This is done with the portrayal of Britons as reflexive. One reporter who went on a slum tour explained:

I ask James whether he thinks it's a good idea for white Westerners to come here, and he displays a healthy ambivalence. "It's definitely a double-edged sword. I'm very uncomfortable about being here, but I know that the money is going to the people who need it, which wouldn't be the case if I was visiting something else in the city (Welsh, 2009: 12).

James, one of the people on the tour, is asked about his views and recognises the intrusive nature of these tours, but this quandary is supposedly somewhat resolved by, or at least treated as less important than, the idea that it is better than not going: there is financial aid going to the people in the slum. In this way, he echoes the logic among

development professionals; inherent goodness of development work is more important than the power dynamics that might be reproduced through it. This recognition of the potential problems of slum tours is achieved by centring James's feelings; *he* is uncomfortable. This is done rather than exploring what the negatives may be or speaking to people who live in the slum. Focussing on James' feelings arguably makes it easier for him to declare it is positive to go on a slum tour: he has recognised the problems, weighed these up and come to a logical conclusion. What is also noteworthy is that James, a fellow 'Westerner' is asked about his feelings; there is no engagement in this piece with people who live in the slum, who are effectively denied a voice. Instead his discomfort is centred but what is also focussed on is that he is adamant that the financial contribution outweighs any negatives. This is arguably a form of implicature; the reporting does not state James is good. But it is possible for the reader to deduce this as he is described as having "healthy ambivalence" and thus represented as having considered whether he should go on the tour and then given space to justify why he did go on it. Therefore this piece effectively centres a Western voice that concludes that the tour is worth doing because of the financial goodness it brings, and silences the people who are being viewed through the tour. In this way, British goodness is affirmed: Britons are taking part in these tours knowing the potential problems but ultimately wanting to help.

The neutralisation of a critique by mobilising the logic of British goodness is also in how slum tours are represented by those that run them:

My immediate reaction to this was that it felt voyeuristic, and I refused to run them. Then I heard of an NGO in Mumbai offering what it claimed were "responsible tours" through the Dharavi slums – the biggest slums in the world. I decided to check them out. The five-hour tour proved to be one of the most fascinating experiences I have ever had in India. My guide, Ramesh, led me expertly through both the commercial and residential districts, introducing me to many locals that clearly knew and respected him. Not for a minute did I feel like a voyeur. There was a strict no-photographic policy, and all the fees paid – which were not insubstantial – went to a foundation that helped finance local community centres and education (Bealby, 2010: 6-7).

As with the previous quote, there is a noticeable absence of voices from people who live in the slum, there are references made to Ramesh, who is the guide, but exactly who he is, is not explained and he is not given a voice either. The only locals that are present in the text are the people who the author perceived as knowing and respecting his guide. This seems to give weight to the idea that he is not a "voyeur"; there are

good relations between the guide and the locals, he believes, and thus if the tours were intrusive this would likely not be the case. In addition to this, his goodness also appears to be affirmed by the fact that he paid fees. He achieves this in two ways. Firstly, by noting as an aside that they “were not insubstantial”, he does not state the amount that he gave or directly that it was a substantial amount but rather implies that it was with this phrasing. It remains mysterious leaving the reader to deduce that it was a significant amount. Secondly, he gives evidence of what this money will be spent on: this allowed him to establish that not only did he give money but that there was a tangible, imaginable outcome of this. The author’s goodness is also affirmed in the text by his refusal at the beginning to run tours, stating himself that it would be “voyeuristic”, beginning in this way establishes his reflexivity and suggests that if he were content with how the tours were organised then they must not be voyeuristic. But even though the writer did not feel like a voyeur, it does not mean he was not one. By integrating what might be understood as contradictory ideas into the dominant narrative, the author is able to escape this label through calls to innocence: the underlying idea that he was trying to do good and was cautious.

The idea of good Britons is not only created through accounts of slum tours but also by focussing on the efforts of particular individual Britons. This is apparent in the case of Leah Pattinson, a woman who volunteered in India and contracted leprosy. This particular news item was in *The Express* (Milne, 20002), *The Daily Mail* (Pendlebury and Cooper, 2001; Moore, 2004), *The Daily Mirror* (Mulchrone, 2000) and was referenced in *The Guardian* when Pattinson was invited to a lunch with Queen Elizabeth II (Scott, 2004). *The Daily Mail* called her “A Very Modern Angel” (Moore, 2004), *The Guardian*, *The Daily Express*, *The Daily Mirror* referred to her as “The Angel of Nagpur”. While in an earlier *Daily Mail* article entitled “The English Rose among the lepers” the paper explained:

ON HER 25th birthday Leah Pattison telephoned her parents from a public booth in a sweltering, dust-choked, nighttime street in the Indian city of Nagpur.

[...] The tears began to flow and she sobbed: 'I'm afraid I've got leprosy.' [...].

Leah Pattison is known as the Angel of Nagpur in the fetid slum which has become her home.

The first white woman to venture here, she lives like and among the locals, with few possessions, no phone or water on tap, sleeping on the roof of an overcrowded apartment.

Her days are spent in close contact with people at whose image many, perhaps even you reading this article, would recoil.

Often she alone offers them hope. In these days, when individual charity or heroism is

dulled by hyperbole, Leah Pattison's is a truly exceptional story (Pendlebury and Cooper, 2001: 1-6).

A number of different devices are at work in this description. Firstly, newspapers that covered this story focussed on her supposed nickname, the Angel of Nagpur. This instantly suggests her goodness is otherworldly and that she is in some way pure and exceptional. Secondly, there is the contrast between Pattinson and her surroundings and/or the people around her. Using her nickname, the “Angel of Nagpur”, the journalists in *The Daily Mail* establish her difference and we might say superiority in relation to the slum. She is an “Angel” living in a slum that is described as “fetid”. This adjective conjures up strong imagery of a place that is unpleasant and dirty, while Angel symbolises evident purity and cleanliness. This contrast is also established by the description of her living situation, she is a “white woman” living “like and among locals”; her identity is given specific contours along the lines of race and gender, and she is given a voice, meanwhile the locals are a homogeneous mass that simply form the backdrop for descriptions of Pattinson. In addition to this the headline of *The Daily Mail* article positions her as an “English rose among lepers”, which arguably represents cleanliness and purity, among a faceless mass of people simply described as lepers, thus they are reduced down to an illness.

These contrasts appear to operate in such a way that highlights her innocence but also her superiority. As with the description “Angel”, the portrayal of her spending time with people the reader might “recoil” from not only separates her from the people she is surrounded by, but by positioning her as an active agent helping them – her goodness is highlighted; she does work others do not. This point coincides with the second form of representation identifiable in this quote: she is positioned as brave and it is through this that her goodness is also established. The verb “venture” appears to stress the risk involved in going to this part of India and doing this work. Her uniqueness in going to this part of India and to this slum and doing this work is portrayed through the final sentence; she is the only person offering people in the slum hope, her story is exceptional and this is constructed by recognising there are hyperbolic accounts of heroism in the world but this is not one of them. Thus her goodness is established by the risk she is taking and that she is the only person doing this work. In this description she is the only active agent; without her it is implied there

would be no hope and in this way people in the slum are erased or denied agency.

In the same *Daily Mail* article, these themes are continued; Pattinson's goodness is highlighted and this is done by focussing on her agency:

HER father Derek is staying in Nagpur with Leah, now 29. It is the first time he has visited (he brought out with him tooth floss, fruitcake and Marks & Spencer underwear for Leah) and Mr Pattison says he is 'gobsmacked' by what he has found: 'He cannot believe the work she is doing and the way she drives herself.' At the moment Leah has under her care 150 women, who are either being treated medically or set up in cottage industries such as sowing or stall-holding (Pendlebury and Cooper, 2001: 30).

This description focuses on her agency in two ways. Firstly, it depicts her as committed to her work, as her father's description suggests her work appears unbelievable and she is driving herself. This seems to imply that she is again the active agent doing work that many others would not engage in and it is this that leaves her father shocked. Secondly, it describes the work she does; her responsibility is outlined by the fact that she has one hundred and fifty women she looks after, this again positions her as the active agent, these women are receiving treatment – from whom exactly, we are not told – and they are all under her care. All of this highlights Pattinson's goodness: she is the ultimate carer, willing to even risk her own health and safety to help others.

We also see the goodness of Britons represented in reporting on *Slumdog* generally and in particular in relation to director Danny Boyle and the child actors in the film. In the data collected there were 67 reports that included the names of the child actors, Rubina Ali and Azharuddin Ismail, who were cast in the film and had been living in Delhi slums (a selection include Johnston, 2009; McCartney, 2009; Pearson, 2009; Roche, 2009; Sturcke et al., 2009; The Telegraph, 2009b). One idea in reportage of the film was that the casting of the two children could be understood as an act of goodness. This is encapsulated in a piece in *The Daily Express*, which explained:

This time last year life looked bleak for *Slumdog Millionaire* stars Rubina Ali and Azharuddin Ismail.

The angelic-looking children - who shot to fame in the hit 2008 film *Slumdog Millionaire* - lived in one of Mumbai's dirtiest slums, surrounded by rubbish and with no prospect of a decent education.

Now, though, both are enrolled full-time in school and living in far better conditions (Roche, 2009: 1-3).

In this explanation of events, the writer stressed the children's "angelic" looks. This

suggests they are innocent and pure, and contrasts against the dirtiness of Mumbai. Much like in the film itself – where white characters are the only kind adults to feature onscreen – the underlying idea here is that these children would have been corrupted by their surroundings had they not been enrolled in a school. This is established between the “then” and “now”; prior to being in the film had no hope, now their lives are vastly improved. The issue here is not that they were helped to get an education that might otherwise not have been available to them but that it is implied that there would have been no hope for them whatsoever without the aid of the film. This draws on representations found earlier where Indian adults are absent and only ‘western’ actors are present.

A similar sentiment was repeated in *The Sun*’s Letters section:

SLUMDOG Millionaire director Danny Boyle [...] is brilliant for dashing to Mumbai to make sure his child stars are rehoused after their shacks were bulldozed. It's great to know that, even though the film is finished, he values humanity and the youngsters who contributed to its success (*The Sun Letters*, 2009: 1).

In this equation, Boyle is featured and he is described as having dashed to India. The adjective “dashing” suggests that he responded quickly and thus the reader can interpret him as not only active but also driven by morals. What is not mentioned are people in India, their absence in the text is telling. The subtext being that people in India do not value humanity in the way Boyle does. In both instances lurking underneath the explanations are the humanity and goodness of Boyle and the film in a place that seemingly has little humanity and in which the children would be helpless.

Yet, there was also judgement of Boyle’s treatment of the children, when it seems he did not live up to this construction of British goodness. It was reported that Boyle had not paid the child actors a significant amount of money for appearing in the film. A *Daily Mail* journalist commented on this:

By far the best things in *Slumdog Millionaire* were the beautiful child actors, recruited from the Mumbai slums, who had an unfakeable joy and resilience, even as fate dealt them yet another cruel blow. Now it emerges that Rubina and Azhar, who played the leads early in the film, were paid £500 and £1,700 respectively for a year’s work. They were found places in a local school and get £20 a month for books and food. But they still live in dire poverty in a makeshift camp along a railway line (Pearson, 2009: 1-3).

The child actors are, like in the previous quote when they were called “angelic”,

depicted as innocent; they are described as the best thing about the film and as “beautiful.” While the description of the children remains similar, unlike in the previous article, Boyle is criticised for failing to provide for the children. As well as showing that not all media coverage was positive, this shines a light on the relationship between race and class. Just as with the ‘local’ staff that were paid less than their ‘international’ counterparts in development organisations in Chapter Four, here the ‘local’ children, who unlike the Indian actors who starred in the film are directly from poverty, are paid a relatively small amount of money. But this coverage does not make the connection between this incident and broader systemic exploitation. Readers are left to believe this form of exploitation is an isolated incident and thus implicitly supports the form of representation throughout government and the media that poverty is inherent to India, as opposed to being related to global inequality and forms of exploitation both internally and externally to the country. Yet existing alongside this is a representation of Britons not living up to the role of being good.

However, even this problematic economic dynamic between Boyle and the child actors, picked up on by newspapers is, in places, defended. The notion of goodness resurfaces once again. In a *Daily Telegraph* article, defence was built on stereotypes found in the film:

As the Oscar buzz around *Slumdog Millionaire* mounted, there was growing indignation in the Western press over the comparatively paltry level of reward for its child actors. I have some sympathy with the film-makers over this. They had reportedly made efforts to secure the children's future with a basic trust fund, a regular education, and another lump sum upon finishing school at 18. Perhaps they could have done more, but it is unwise to shower a slum-dwelling child with large sums of hard cash up front, rendering them the prey of every local crook and ambitious member of their extended family (McCartney, 2009: 4-5).

The key aspect in this quotation is that it would be “unwise to shower a slum-dwelling child with large sums of hard cash up front” because they would be “prey of every local crook and ambitious member of their extended family”. There are two stereotypes at work in this quote. Firstly, the ideas that local “crook[s]” are everywhere, waiting to exploit the innocence of a “slum-dwelling child”. And secondly, connected to this, is the idea that the only other adults who populate this world are family members who are only concerned with stealing innocent children’s money. The reference to the “extended family” paints a picture of innocent children surrounded by huge families who are all untrustworthy. At its core, the defence of the

director is rooted in the idea Indians cannot be trusted with money, this thus not only reinforces Boyle's goodness – he knows not to give to these children – but chimes with the idea of rationality found in government discourse; Boyle is demonstrating rational thinking by not giving the money to the children at this stage as it would simply be taken off them by the untrustworthy adults around them. This reporting reproduces the very idea established in the film: children are used as conduits for funds from abroad and the way they are depicted to show the inherent corruption of people in India. These representations are treated as if they are fact and thus categorises Britons as 'good' and Indians as 'bad'. Ultimately this representation also serves to reinforce or at least protect the goodness of Britons: Boyle is sensible and maintains his morality by not giving the children access to this money immediately.

Consequently, goodness of Britons is also established through exploring the lack of goodness among Indian people. The 'badness' or passive nature of Indians, the latter we saw in the previous quote, is not explicitly mentioned but is necessary, as Bhabha (1994) has shown, to establish the goodness of Britons. There is one account that demonstrates this particularly well. In reporting of *Slumdog Millionaire* there was focus on Indian anger at the use of the language in the film. This came into particular stark view in *The Daily Mail* in an article entitled, "Don't call us 'dog': Indian 'slum dwellers' riot over *Slumdog Millionaire* film":

Tateshwar Vishwakarma, a social activist said: 'Referring to people living in slums as dogs is a violation of human rights.'

'We will burn Danny Boyle (the film's director) effigies in 56 slums here' [...]

Simon Beaufoy, the screenwriter, said last week: 'I just made up the word. I liked the idea. I didn't mean to offend anyone' (Daily Mail, 2009: 4-5, 9).

The anger of the people in India is implicitly contrasted against Beaufoy's good intentions. Beaufoy's claim that he did not mean to cause offense might be construed as a way of suggesting the people who are angry about this description are overreacting; they plan to burn effigies of Boyle over a supposed mistake or accident. In addition to this, the people described in India are seen as unruly, they are described as engaged in a "riot", which has negative connotations undermines the substance of the protest. By saying offense was not meant to be caused, Beaufoy is able to cloak himself as blameless and in this way maintain his goodness. Indeed, this notion of Briton's goodness as conveyed through their reasonable nature was also communicated through a review of the film where it was described as creating an "even-handed"

portrayal of India (Gritten, 2009: 6-7). The British-made film was thus imagined as fair, and this fairness denoting goodness. Therefore, there is an arguable distinction that categorises Britons as ‘good’ and Indians as ‘bad’ in this description, which continues to affirm the positivity of Britons and represent their actions as pure.

The expression of British goodness also manifest in arguments against aid. India has often been mentioned in the debate about aid (Dalrymple, 2010: 3) and it has been used as an example of why Britain should reduce its development spending. An editorial in *The Sun* is a prime example of the arguments made about why Britain should stop giving aid to India:

BRITAIN can no longer justify sending aid to India.
This superpower in the making is treating us like mugs.
We have a good claim to be the most generous people in the world when it comes to humanitarian causes. [...]
The endemic theft and corruption that ensures only a fraction of the aid sent to India benefits the poor.
The fact that the world's 10th richest nation, whose economy will outstrip ours inside a decade, leaves millions to starve as its millionaires and billionaires bask in luxury.
The fact that India can afford a £2billion space programme.
The fact its economy is growing at ten per cent a year while ours stands still.
The fact it is rich enough to be the world's biggest arms importer and operate the fourth largest air force.[...]
No wonder the Indians laugh at us. They have the money and resources now to solve their own terrible problems (The Sun, 2012a).

Within this argument against giving aid to India are many of the tropes in this chapter, albeit in slightly different forms. In particular there is a construction of Britons as good and as being taken advantage of by wealthy Indians who are depicted as greedy and untrustworthy; the country is one of “corruption” and “endemic theft” so the money does not go to “the poor”. It describes India as a “superpower in the making” that is treating Britain “like mugs”. This corresponds with the anxiety of India as a rising power, overtaking Britain, which we will see later in this chapter. Yet this is still tempered by the idea that Britain is more moral than India and arguably other parts of the world; they can claim to be “the most generous people in the world”. This centres British people as “generous” but importantly as with government discourse it is comparative with other countries. Whereas India is negatively stereotyped: they may be growing economically but it is a country that “leaves millions to starve as its millionaires and billionaires bask in luxury” in comparison to British goodness. Similarly to government discourse, India is depicted as a place of corruption and theft;

this is accentuated with the word “endemic”, which can mean widespread or native to a certain place and thus suggests a certain innateness. British goodness is highlighted through this description of India as they are imagined as being taken advantage of by people who are not ‘good’. India is constructed as ‘bad’. Much like the constructions of the child actors’ extended family from *Slumdog*, Indians are depicted as villainous; they “laugh” at Britons and should be left alone to solve “their own terrible problems”. Importantly for our purposes, however, this badness accentuates British goodness: Britain is imagined as an innocent power that because of its excessive goodness is being taken advantage of. This final example further indicates the hegemonic nature of the goodness proposition, as it occurs in both ‘anti’ and neutral or pro reporting of development.

Therefore the categorisation of Britain as intrinsically fair subtly manifests and is naturalised in media coverage of development: in descriptions of Britons as good; of slum tours, in sympathetic portrayals of director Danny Boyle vis-à-vis the child actors in *Slumdog* and in depictions of ‘ordinary’ Britons as doing crucial development work. What binds these slightly different forms of representation is that they make the same claim about Britons, which is that they are good. This goodness is represented as both proven by development work and causes Britain to engage in development.

ii. India as chaotic

Representations of India and Britain in newspapers are not confined to showcasing the supposed goodness of Britons, there are also depictions in the media of Indian poverty and success: there is a recurring comparison between the two Indias – one of poverty and one of riches. Woven into both of these are representations of India as a place of chaos, and as we will see later in this chapter of India as unchanging, and thus incapable, and of India as a threat. “Two Indias” is a phrase used by former Save the Children chief executive, Justin Forsyth, who we encountered earlier in this chapter. This is used in mainstream development discourse to draw attention to the dualistic nature of Indian development, the country as growing economy and a place of poverty. In one *Sun* article India is described as “often defined by images of street children and grinding poverty” but also as a place that is “a booming economic powerhouse and increasing in numbers of young Asian Brits are moving there [...] to seek their

fortune” (The Sun, 2012b: 1-3). These two ways of describing India in one article establishes a distinction between significant levels of poverty and lavish wealth. India is a place of “grinding poverty”, where children live and/or work on the street but also a “booming economic powerhouse”. The two adjectives used here “grinding” vs. “booming” demonstrates the extremes of these two representations. Thus often when there is mention of India’s growing economy there is recognition of the extreme poverty that continues to exist in the country. One report explains, “the ‘India shining’ image co-exists with massive poverty. India is home to a third of the world's people living on less than \$1.25 a day - more than all the poor in sub-Saharan Africa” (Tran, 2013: 5). Similarly, people in India talk of ‘India vs. ‘Bharat’, implying one nation with two names: India a place of wealth and power, Bharat of poverty (see Kaur, 2016 for further discussion). But how it is used in newspaper representations is important for this thesis.

One of the ways we can make sense of these representations is that existing alongside newspaper portrayals of Britons as good and the mostly implicit references to Indians as ‘bad’ there is the portrayal of India as a place of chaos. Forsyth was an advisor to both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (Watt, 2013a: 5-6) and this phrase he used encapsulates the idea that India is at once a country of extreme poverty and growing wealth. While this distinction is widely used in India by Indians, the material from newspapers shows a particularly ‘British’ rendering of it. We can begin to make sense of this by considering representations of India as chaotic. A good example of a subtle depiction of India’s growth and its poverty as resting on a fundamental idea of Indian chaos can be found in one piece of coverage of Gordon Brown’s 2007 trip to the country. India is portrayed as “a country consumed by its own success”, where:

newspapers trumpet soaring share prices, speak of the soft superpower of Bollywood and report gloatingly about companies gobbling up western rivals. The Times of India, the country's biggest-selling English-language newspaper, has adopted a new slogan: India Poised, Our Time is Now (Ramesh, 2007: 1).

An almost unstoppable, chaotic description of India is conveyed, suggested by the description of numerous voices speaking at the same time as there is rapid economic change; newspapers “trumpet” and reports gloat while share prices soar and companies take over western rivals. Adjectives such as “gobbling” and “soaring” give the sense that there is a rapidity to this action, while “trumpet” indicates there is a particular

level of sound involved in these pronouncements. This layered description creates an image of a country that is made up of noise and constant action and does so in such a way that it gives the impression that it is difficult to keep track of it all as it is occurring at the same time. This chaos is also invoked in descriptions of the contrast between poverty and affluence: “what strikes most people when they arrive is the seemingly organised chaos. Cattle roam the capital's poshest avenues and ragged children beg alongside foreign-made cars and glitzy malls” (Ramesh, 2007: 1-3). This is not necessarily a negative description, in fact the term “organised chaos” suggests that it might be somewhat positive; it is chaos that has some logic to it. However, there is a potentially negative element to this, where the chaos is made up of posh avenues and glitzy malls while “ragged children beg”. As with descriptions of good Indians, children are used to emblematised poverty and this conveys a particular innocence and vulnerability: some of the most powerless in Indian society are not looked after and have to beg, we assume in order to survive. Thus there is an underlying implication that in this chaotic society there is a negative side, where children struggle to exist in the chaos of a growing economy.

The description of India that coincided with Brown's visit to the country is not the only description that directly conveys this sense of chaos: Adiga, who is seen as part of the newer Indian postcolonial writers, explained India as a place of “chaos” and “unpredictability” (2009:1), as if unpredictability is not a possibility in every country around the world. Yet while this depiction is also not explicitly negative, other representations of Indian chaos are evidently so: chaos becomes a symbol of ‘otherness’. For example, in a travel column, one journalist for *The Daily Mail* described Indian people as an uncontrollable throng:

When you first arrive there and a beggar approaches, you feel compassion and hand over some cash. Instantly, you are surrounded by 40 or 50 more beggars, all pushing and shouting and demanding the same treatment.

The ones with hands grab at your clothing, the ones without hands prod you with their stumps and the ones without stumps bump against you with their chests

So you start out as a caring, sympathetic visitor and end up as a hardened, street-wise tough. You hate your transition – but you have no choice (Morris, 2010: 4-6).

Often the active grammatical agents in the discourses examined are Britons. However, in this description it is a faceless mass of “beggars” who are active, yet their agency is negative. They push, shout, demand and grab, these descriptions present an aggressive

crowd that is harassing people visiting the country. This has the impact of turning a visitor from “caring” to “hardened”. This description creates a chaotic image of the country, which is overwhelming and where agency is used for negative purposes. This also has a negative impact on people who come into the country; from this it is imagined as if there is an innate negativity to the country produced by this chaos of poverty where people cannot remain sympathetic or caring in India. It is described that someone will arrive and feels compassion but after encountering crowds of “beggars”, this same person will become “hardened”. It is the chaos of the poor that has produced this change and this juxtaposition that categorises Britons who are passively being impacted and “beggars” who are presented as an unruly mass is treated as a fact; this image is thus naturalised.

The construction of this chaos is also created by dehumanising people in India: the only people who are described are unnamed “beggars” and the way in which they are suddenly described to multiply suggests India is an uncontrollable place that produces “hardened” individuals. This is achieved by describing how one “beggar approaches” and then suddenly how someone visiting the country is “surrounded”. There is dehumanisation present in this description because the people are imagined almost as if they are otherworldly; they simply appear and are given no specific characteristics other than some of them, who are described as having “stumps”. They are thus human beings reduced down to one part of their body. The suggestion that a visitor will be ‘prodded’ by more than one person who has a “stump”, instead of a hand, also conjures up images of the chaotic nature of a country that means people regularly lose their limbs. This dehumanisation echoes another travel column that also depicts India as chaotic. Writing in *The Sun*, the author describes the India/Pakistan border, from the Indian side: “And every night at around 5pm thousands of Indians and Pakistanis descend on the border for a Changing of the Guardstyle ceremony, but without the formality. This is India after all” (The Sun, 2013: 19). A “ceremony” is usually considered to be orderly but it is established that people in India do not follow this normal protocol. Their movement is juxtaposed against the word “ceremony”: they “descend”, this evokes animalistic imagery, notably “without the formality”. In line with other descriptions, this appears to represent Indian people as a group of dehumanised bodies. The number of people and the way they are described as arriving together as a mass means there is no “formality” to the “ceremony” as might be

expected from such an event. But as the description notes, this is not a surprise as this is emblematic of what India is like. From this the reader can deduce India is a place of chaos where the 'normal' convention for a formal event is absent. Therefore, these descriptions evoke a disorder that represents India as a place of chaos, and through images of significant numbers of disorderly Indian people, we see suggestions that this has a negative impact on the people who visit the country.

The depiction of India as chaotic symbolises the country's and the peoples' 'otherness' and this is identifiable in representations of Indian people in poverty *and* wealthy Indians. Firstly, in a depiction of a slum in India, the scene is described as chaotic where again the number of people is one of the focal points of description:

And above all, the teeming slum – its residents are either welcoming or indifferent to visitors because, as Chris Way says “Indians are used to having lots of people” – feels safe. It would be interesting to see whether anybody would dare organise similar tours of the poorer parts of suburban Paris or London.

[...] Even for casual tourists, it is not easy to leave the slum behind. Take as many showers as you want when you return to your hotel – the smell of Dharavi will linger on your shoes (Mallet, 2009: 14-15).

The slum is not simply described as full of people but it is “teeming”. The adjective “teeming”, as with previous descriptions, reproduces animalistic, dehumanising imagery, particularly as it is a word often used to describe an abundance of wildlife. Similarly in a *Daily Telegraph* interview with Anthony Dod Mantle, *Slumdog's* cinematographer, comparing the film with a subsequent film he made where “it involved shooting animals in the wilderness”, he says it reminded him “of working with children in the streets of Mumbai for *Slumdog Millionaire* – except the kids in Mumbai run a lot faster” (Waters, 2009:2). This comparison between children and “animals in the wilderness” encapsulates how looking at the slum, in this case children in particular, can involve gazing upon a dehumanised 'other' in their 'natural habitat'. The comparison, which focuses on how fast children in Mumbai run, gives an impression that India is as chaotic as the natural world, where the social order in human society is absent.

In addition to this, the description that Indians are “used to having lots of people” around depicts a form of dehumanisation where it is assumed “they” will not mind lots of tourists entering their homes or the space in which they live. Much like the

description of the ‘beggars’ there is a notion that people in India are used to this kind of chaos, it is only ‘Westerners’ who are not. There is thus a caricature of all Indian people as living in the slum as happy to have visitors there or unconcerned because of the number of people living in the country. The notion of India as a crowded country is also described by one account in *The Sun*, where readers are told “nothing, absolutely nothing, prepares you for India in the flesh. It's pandemonium. From the minute you step off the plane it's an assault on your senses and a feast for the eyes. The whole country is awash with colour and people – a LOT of people” (The Sun, 2013: 3-6). Again we see India from the viewpoint of a visitor, who is at odds with the chaotic environment, they declare that “nothing” can prepare you for India, which is “pandemonium”. In addition to this, although not the focus of the image, Indian people are presented as a homogeneous mass; the only description of them is with the reference to there being a lot of colour and a lot of people, this is highlighted by the capitalisation of ‘lot’. Therefore, in newspaper representations of Indian poverty there are images of the country as chaotic, which are produced through dehumanised, animalistic descriptions of the numbers of people.

However, as noted, although this did not occur frequently in newspaper representations, I found descriptions of India as chaotic also exist in representations of the ‘developed’ or wealthy parts of the country. One particular example of this is a depiction in *The Times* that make India and Indians seen disorganised:

On William and Kate’s trip to India such was the couple's popularity that Sir Dominic Asquith, the British High Commissioner, had to warn the assembled stars and business moguls [...] not to crowd them. “I'm told you're a rowdy bunch!” he said. “We need to make sure they enjoy the experience as they want to meet you all. I say that in the hope you will be very kind to us and stay in your groups around the tables instead of coming, quite understandably, and besieging them. We will bring them to you” (Low, 2016: 11).

The description of wealthy Indians, including famous people and businesspeople, as having a propensity to crowd the Royal Family echoes the description of the slum as “teeming” and of tourists to India being crowded by “beggars” (see page 218). This is emblematised by the word “besieging”, these wealthy Indians have to be kept in order by Britons otherwise they will overrun William and Kate. In this way the rich in India cannot be separated from the poor and there is an assumption that not only the environment is chaotic but also the people are inherently so too. Therefore, as this and the other examples demonstrate there is an identifiable trope in media reporting that

categorises India as having a chaotic environment, in particular where people of Indian origin are unable to control themselves and behave in what is construed as a reasonable manner, and this environment can also have negative impacts on Britons.

iii. India as unchanging

However, India is not only represented as a place of chaos, it is also depicted as a place of stagnancy, where very little changes. In fact, the two tropes can meet in the same representation, which can involve continuing to depict it as chaotic but also naturally stagnant. This can be understood as hegemony in action; having mastery of different positions at once (Hall, 1986: 15). For instance, one *Financial Times* journalist wrote about Delhi:

I might have begun the week thinking India was becoming more like the rest of the world but I left its capital realising that for all its recent progress, it was still ruled with a bewildering mix of arbitrariness and apathy. As Jan Morris wrote in the 1970s, “You think you can change the system? Try it, try it, and when the elaborations of Delhi have caught up with you [...] when it dawns upon you gradually that it has been done more or less this way, come conqueror, come liberation, since the early Middle Ages, you will probably agree that [...] India is always as it is!”(Jacob, 2009: 10).

The idea that India is different from the rest of the world is telling when paired with the concept that India has been the same throughout history. In many ways these discourses converge with tropes used by Hindu fundamentalists who stress India’s supposed uniqueness and why it must be preserved (Khan, Svensson, Jogdand and Liu, 2017). But in British newspaper representations, this is situated in a broader regime of representation where India is at once chaotic and at the same time unchanging. In this representation the chaos is implied through the description of India as a “bewildering mix of arbitrariness and apathy”, India is confusing and it is a mix of these two negative ways of being. Yet this also relies on a depiction of India as in stasis, which is implied with the use of the Morris quote from the 1970s. That this quote is still applicable to India suggests that the country has not changed since then. But the quote itself also asserts that India has been the same since the Middle Ages, accentuated by the statement “India is always as it is”. This is juxtaposed against an earlier presumption that it seemed “India was becoming more like the rest of the world” yet the author is left believing this is not the case: thus India remains a place of negativity of “arbitrariness” and “apathy”, as it has always been, and it shows no sign of

changing. This notion of a lack of progress emblematises an idea that while India is economically growing it is in many ways still in stasis.

The idea of stasis is also articulated in an article that demonstrates the dual portrayal of India as a place of thriving wealth and “development” and a place of extreme poverty. This contradiction is treated as natural to the country and in the process it is imagined as unchanging: “India has always been a land where extremes of wealth and poverty have existed side-by-side. The days of bejewelled maharajas and their famine-stricken peasants may have passed, but the ancient inequalities persist” (Foster, 2008: 1-2). As with the previous quote there is an underlying idea that some things in India have changed, in this instance it is with the recognition that there are no maharajas or peasants in the way there were once. However, the fundamental divide in the country is treated as having always existed. By situating this separation between the rich and the poor in Indian history and specifically treating it as “ancient” draws on the idea that it is natural to Indian society, as in government and development professionals’ portrayals there is an endogeneity suggested in the description of poverty. Therefore the representation of India as in stasis also gives the impression that poverty is solely a product of internal dynamics.

We also see this conceptualisation of stasis when the topic of Empire emerges in newspaper coverage. In a *Daily Telegraph* article Britain is still seen as more capable and advanced than its former colony and this incapability is symbolised through its stasis:

“Foreign visitors have so many misconceptions about Calcutta!” says my guide, with a light laugh. “But it is the scientific and cultural heart of India” [...]
I smile politely. [...] I've noticed some of the little malls, too, and my hotel is unarguably very luxurious [...]
But, as for bodies, there are bodies in the streets all over Calcutta. The 40,000 poor gaunt ghosts who live on the pavements, or under flyovers or on traffic islands, certainly look like corpses at night, lying on the ground, wrapped head-to-toe in grimy lengths of cotton. All seem to work: some by pulling a rickshaw, barefoot. The streets teem with enterprise and activity. Even so, it's not just the poverty of this decrepit city that is inescapable. The dirt is almost ubiquitous, too.
The British handed back India in 1947 and much of Calcutta appears not to have been cleaned since (Pielou, 2011: 1-4).

In this piece of reporting, the idea that Calcutta – which was the jewel within the jewel that was India during Empire (Chattopadhyay, 2005: 282) – has not improved in terms

of cleanliness since decolonisation implies that India did not improve upon the colonial powers leaving; this mirrors a similar idea laid out in government discourse. This is an idea reiterated by Indian businessperson Kartar Lalvani, in a report of his company in *The Daily Mail* we're told that he says, "it's now almost 70 years since the British left India and the poverty is almost as bad as it's ever been" (cited in Preston, 2016: 7-12). In the above quote this lack of progress is suggested by the contrast between the guide's words and the observations of the *Telegraph* writer, this portrays a country where there is economic and technological development, but where poverty and filth are abundant. As with earlier articles focussed on slums, we see again a place, this time "the streets", described with the verb "teem", portraying a country that is chaotic and this chaos is also made up of 400,000 poor people who are described as barely alive. Dirt and poverty are described as if they are everywhere and this is represented as if it is a product of stasis. Therefore, we can see that the way India is unchanging in this particular description is with regard to its poverty, echoing government discourse on development, this suggests poverty is ingrained in India and not connected to geopolitics or factors outside the nation state.

Finally, this representation of stasis also takes on a slightly different form when it is conveyed through representations of gender relations in India. In this particular instance explained below, time is not referenced but problems of gender inequality are presented as endogenous to India and a product of unchanging traditions. The *Daily Mail* article in question focussed on female infanticide in India:

It is difficult for those of white British origins, who come from a culture where the safe arrival of a healthy baby girl is a cause for celebration, to understand the deep-rooted commitment of British Indian families to what has become known as 'son preference'. You have to travel to India itself to even try to understand it. [...]
[There is] an almost visceral need for male progeny that not only transcends class, caste and religion, but which has spread across oceans to every Indian community in the world (Desai, 2010: 12-14; 16).

As noted the unchanging nature of India is not established through references to time but rather by conveying the notion that female infanticide is the product of unchanging and negative norms, in this way there is an underlying notion that this is a product of Indianness. There is a distinction made on the basis of the colour of skin: people of "white British origin" cannot fathom this practice and as with the references to India as a chaotic country (see page 218), it is argued you must go to India to "even try to

understand it” because it is unfathomable. This highlights a distinction between white people and all people of colour in Britain because it is only people with “white British *origins*” [my emphasis] who come from a “culture” that would find this impossible to understand. This is compounded by a comparison with “most western standards” where this would be considered “horrific”, contrasted against “Indian emigrant communities throughout the world” where “the brutal practice makes sound economic sense” (Desai, 2010: 24). The word “origin” in this conceptualisation highlights the supposed ancestral nature of this difference, as does the way these practices are described as travelling; it is implied that it is the product of an innate cultural difference. This is compounded by the description of it as an “almost visceral need”; the adjective “visceral” seems to portray infanticide as a problem produced by Indianness, by ancestry, instead of seeing it as a very particular manifestation of worldwide male violence and a product of specific socio-historic developments.

The unchanging nature of India in respect to female infanticide is highlighted by the stereotyping of women in India as largely helpless and unable to fight back:

The problem is that educated, emancipated Indian women are the exception, while more traditional women, the sort who sit sobbing over the arrival of an unwanted girl, are the rule. They pass on to the next generation what they have learned from bitter experience: that they are subservient to men; their usually loveless marriages will be arranged for them; and the size of their dowry matters more than their education (Desai, 2010: 30).

Women in this representation are depicted as in stasis. By describing educated, emancipated women as “the exception”, as well as tying “traditional women” to infanticide, it is imagined that there is an endogeneity to this norm; it is the product of Indian tradition that is passed on through “generations”. This eclipses the forms of dissent that occur in India and which find their roots in medieval times (Dube Bhatnagar, Dube and Dube, 2005: ix) and instead suggests almost all women in India continue to fulfil a stereotype where they are subservient to men and in which they practice and subscribe to female infanticide. In this way, there is an assumed stasis to this where it is ongoing and reproduced, little changes, because of problems inherent to Indian society; produced through ancestry.

Therefore, we can see from the representations of India as static, which can sit alongside and work with representations of it as chaotic, there is an ongoing notion that poverty and gendered issues such as female infanticide are a product of ancestral

lineage. Stasis thus constructs an image of India as stuck in the past because its problems are produced endogenously and it is incapable of moving forward in a positive way because of its own internal failings.

iv. Anxiety about Indian growth

However, India is not only imagined as unchanging or chaotic. As a growing economic power, it can also be constructed as a potential threat to Britain. In fact, in one *Daily Telegraph* article I found Irvine Welsh expressing an anxiety related to the construction of hardworking poor Indians as a challenge to ‘Western’ dominance: “Perhaps, deep down, Westerners trickle in to Mumbai's slums because we want to understand how their remarkable people, who have nothing, will replace us at the top of the global pile” (Welsh, 2009: 29). In this moment it is suggested that the fixation of poor Indian people emblematised in films such as *Slumdog* stems from a colonial-form of anxiety of ‘Western’ power being destabilised and crucially in this conceptualisation, Indians are not chaotic or in stasis but “remarkable”. Not all representations of India as a threat centre on this idea of people in India being exceptional, as we will see in this subsection.

When Indian economic success is covered in newspapers, there is, at times, a sense of anxiety that a former colony is rapidly developing power. When British political leaders visit India the idea of the country as intimidating exists. One *Sun* report of then Prime Minister Gordon Brown visiting India reflected this:

MILLIONS will have to learn new skills to stay in work in the next decade as jobs haemorrhage to China and India, Gordon Brown forecast last night.
The PM-in-waiting warned nearly six million unskilled jobs will disappear by 2020 to Asia (Pascoe-Watson, 2007: 1-4).

“Millions” is repeated twice in this representation of global relations and is paired with the word “haemorrhage”, together these descriptions highlight the significant changes that could occur as two growing economic powers, India and China, take jobs away from Britain. In this way, there is a fear articulated by Gordon Brown that these countries and their economies will threaten Britain’s future. While there may be some truth in this, it is telling for our purposes that similar kinds of anxiety were apparent in reports of David Cameron’s 2010 trip to the country. It was said in a *Telegraph* article that his challenge was “to claim a piece of India’s extraordinary growth story for

Britain and, with it, some hope of finding a way out of the UK's economic doldrums" but warned he would not "be landing in the third-world India of the Oscar-winning Slumdog Millionaire but in the world's second-fastest growing economy, soon to be the fastest" (Nelson, 2010: 1-2). India's "extraordinary growth" stands in contrast with the UK, which is described as in the "economic doldrums". This contrast highlights an anxiety that there is such a stark economic difference between the two countries and this is arguably why it is described that Cameron must "claim a piece" of Indian growth for Britain, in a way attempting to level the playing field. Unlike Brown's visit to the country, Cameron's trip occurred after the Western financial crash and therefore the anxiety may have been more immediate as the imbalance between the countries may have been further on show.

In particular fear of a former colonised country becoming more powerful than Britain was articulated in an *Observer* article:

Cameron is right to identify India as a key market, but the benefits must flow two ways. It will be interesting to see who emerges as the dominant partner in this special relationship: the enfeebled old colonial master, or the newly self-confident former colony (Sunderland, 2010: 14).

In this description the anxiety is heightened; imagery of a former colony overtaking a country that it had once been colonised by is riven with the idea of Britain as a diminished power "enfeebled" in comparison to India. By drawing on colonial history, this description underscores the anxiety of India's growing economic power as related to the two country's histories: there is a worry that Britain has lost the status it once had and will no longer be "dominant" in what appears to be presented as an inherently asymmetrical relationship.

Furthermore, the articulation of India as a threat is conveyed through the sense that India still needs to be guided, which echoes representations in government discourse. When David Cameron went to visit India, there was an uncritical report in *The Guardian* about how Save the Children demanded he have "a 'difficult conversation'" with the Indian government about poverty (Watt, 2013a: 1). The implication in this reporting is Britain is the moral arbiter, more concerned with issues of poverty than a reluctant Indian government. This, then, chimes with constructions of Britain as good and dovetails with representations in government discourse of India needing help from

Britain to progress.

A report in *The Times* struck a similar cord but in this instance the guidance is constructed as essential for the world. Writing about climate change:

The West cannot stop India and China from industrialising. It can, however, take every intelligent step to ensure that those countries and their people develop as cleanly as possible. That is practical politics, good economics, environmentally sound and morally right (The Times, 2006: 8).

In this instance, the focus is on climate change and not poverty but the thinking here is similar – ‘Western’ powers have the moral compass needed to reach the right solutions. There is the notion that India and China industrialising is a threat, which is indicated by the argument that they must be helped to progress, otherwise it might be done in such a way that is not “environmentally sound” or “morally right”. Once again, the keys to development are presented as intrinsic to Britons and ultimately not within reach of Indians without the help of Britain and crucially this argument appears to gain coherence from the implication that Indian development would be environmentally and morally threatening if done independently.

v. The poor as content

The final trope found in newspaper representations did not occur regularly but on a handful of occasions was present in different representations of the country: there is a ‘positive’ form of representation that reifies poverty. The poor in India are treated as “resilient” and depicted in certain instances as harder workers than the rest of society (Richardson, 2009: 9; Welsh, 2009: 7-8), and as we saw in the Irvine Welsh quote, one of the reasons there is anxiety over Indian growth is because of the “remarkable people” in Mumbai slums who “have nothing” and “will replace us at the top of the global pile” (Welsh, 2009: 29). In these moments, the poor are defined by supposed character traits such as being hard working or more vaguely described as being remarkable, they are reified and their poverty becomes a background issue.

A prime example of this was in television coverage; Channel 4 aired *Slumming It* in 2010, where presenter Kevin McCloud lived in an Indian slum for a fortnight. In a critique of an episode in *The Guardian*, columnist Aditya Chakraborty recounted how McCloud said: “There's only one word to describe this place – and it's intense [...]”

People are living in really horrible conditions, producing amazing things and at the same time they seem to be happy (cited in Chakraborty, 2009: 6). This could be seen as not entirely dissimilar from Gandhi's concept of *daridra narayan* (a phrase originally attributed to Swami Vivekananda) – where the poor are respected – it amounts to dedicating one's service to those in poverty as this is seen to equate to service to God. Yet this description is embedded in broader media representations of India as inherently impoverished and that doesn't give people the chance to speak for themselves. Chakraborty wryly attacked this, writing "cheers for that, Kevin" (2009: 6). This shows there are critiques of this reporting but nonetheless it reveals there are representations of the poor in India as content with their lot. Indeed, from articles analysed earlier we find similar themes. In the *Daily Mail*, it is described that "by far the best things" in *Slumdog* are the child actors recruited from the slums, the reader is told they had "unfakeable joy and resilience, even as fate dealt them yet another cruel blow" (Pearson, 2009: 1-3), while an article on slum tours described "wonderful little boys and girls" as witnessing "horrific conditions" and "dreadful poverty" but that they still had "heart-warming optimism" (Amlani, 2009: 1). In both instances children are focussed on with an element of positivity: children in poverty are resilient and they are optimistic, the latter description still centres on how the visitors to the slum feel – their hearts are warmed by this optimism. However, as with McCloud's description, these people in poverty are not given space to speak for themselves: resilience and optimism are mapped onto them by the writers.

This positive representation is not confined to media reporting. Though it rarely occurred in government discourse one particular piece in *Developments* showed there were elements of this in coverage of the to-be-developed. In an article about youth volunteers, a young woman who volunteered in Himachal Pradesh was asked to describe her experience working in a school in the area. She noted that the poverty was "shocking" but that she came to enjoy her time teaching and living in India. She recounted of her experience: "We spend our money on material things we don't even need. Whereas in India they've got nothing and yet they're so happy. It's made me look at life in a different way" (cited in Northup, 2009: 29). Indian people are represented as happy, despite being poor, thus showing that although they are materially disadvantaged, this does not impact on their happiness. None of the people this young woman met in India are quoted and thus as with newspaper representations,

their happiness appears to be a product of the author's perception. Therefore, this notion of Indian people in poverty as happy is constructed by authors in a way that involves dehumanisation.

III. How newspaper discourse is racialised

The final section of this chapter will examine and compare the different tropes and their propositional content to establish how manifestations of race and processes of racialisation produce them. This thesis uses Hall's understanding of race (1997), namely seeing it as a form of classification that categorises people and assumes they will behave in a particular way based on inherited characteristics. Racialisation, as we have seen, makes apparent how this is not only connected to biological proprieties, such as phenotype, but rather assumptions are related to a belief that behaviour and ways of being are produced by ancestry; for instance, through the notion of 'new racism' we know representations of or arguments related to cultural difference can also be a form of racialisation (Barker, 1981; Hall, 2006b; Meer and Modood, 2012; Sabaratnam, 2018). Racialisation can be identified in this chapter through the epistemology of immanence and notions of goodness and corruption. We will see how these processes share similarities with those identified in previous chapters, in particular the conceptualisation of British people as good and India as chaotic. In order to make sense of the racialised forms of representation in newspaper discourse, I have divided this section into two parts: one exploring British goodness as racialised and the other looking at representations of India, as well as the relationship between these forms of representation of those of Britain or Britons. Using Gramscian notions of hegemony we can see that there are multiple, shifting forms of racialisation that amount to dominant racialised development discourse.

i. Goodness as racialised

Firstly, one of the evident tropes in newspaper reporting of development is the representation of Britons as inherently good. In contrast to government discourse on development – which engaged with how Britain as a nation, in the abstract sense, is good – there was more focus on individuals Britons goodness, whether people visiting slum tours or engaging in development work. As with before, this is not covered in Sabaratnam's epistemologies but is central to development discourse. It might be a

product of the function of different discourses: government discourse, in particular political speeches are used to communicate messages to the country as a whole about the nation and its place in the world; media has a similar function but also focuses on events considered newsworthy and in such a way that captivates the readers' attention. It is for this reason that there might be more focus on the individual. This to some extent chimes with professionals' representation of themselves as doing good, in particular the white development professionals who distanced themselves from racialised development practices. Nevertheless, in newspaper discourse the conceptualisation of Britain or British people as good is achieved through a variety of representations, which we can argue this helps establish the hegemonic nature of this trope, some of which demonstrate considerable similarities with government discourse and professionals discourse and which like these discourses are racialised.

The most evident articulation of British goodness echoes government discourse and is highlighted through Forsyth's explanation of goodness as embedded in British DNA. This clearly articulates how goodness is reliant on the epistemology of immanence; conjuring up this biological imagination of why people in Britain are the way they are. This particular subject position produces the notion that Britain's commitment to development is the product of an ancestral biology that determines Britons as good. This shares similarities with government discourse, in particular politicians that stressed development was part of who British people were. This idea of innateness is emblematic of racialisation; goodness is constructed as something that is part of British people by virtue of them being British. As with government discourse, we can make sense of this representation through the notion of whiteness. We can draw on Dyer's understanding of whiteness, also used in Chapter Three, to make sense of whiteness as encoded into notions of goodness and having a strong moral code, in this way, it might be representative of Dyer's "white spirit" (1997: 23), while whereas negative traits can be racialised as 'other', as we will see later in this section. This stems from the colonial conceptualisation of morality, where it was tied to innate racial superiority and for it to be deployed in the contemporary moment it is reliant on the epistemology of ignorance that erases this history. Thus, Forsyth's comments when situated in this broader context do not just suggest goodness as a biological part of British identity but rely on whiteness for meaning. Goodness here is a product of an essentialising of a whole group of different people, they are fixed by being categorised

as British and thus ‘good’ (Hall, 1997b), and this can therefore be understood as a product of racialisation.

In other newspaper representations it is individuals who are centred and though reliant on similar processes of racialisation, this manifests in a different way. For instance, director Danny Boyle is cast in the position as a positive actor who aids the children who star in his film. This echoes a colonial trope of the white saviour who saves innocent colonised people – in this instance, children – from the corrupt influence of India. This is perhaps best emblematised by Rudyard Kipling’s conceptualisation of the “White Man’s Burden” (1899), where it was imagined it was the responsibility of colonialists, as a ‘superior’ race to civilise the colonised: this was seen as both necessary and a natural task given the former’s assumed superiority. In the contemporary moment this has been updated and termed the White Saviour Industrial Complex, which refers to the inclination of wealthy white people to help the poor with little expert knowledge of how to do so or discussion with those they are helping (Cole, 2012). In relation to ideas of immanence, it is assumed there is an inherent goodness and superiority in the people who do the helping that means they are naturally and thus understandably going to help. We can thus see representations of Boyle as good and helping these children, particularly protecting them from Indian adults around them, through these ideas of whiteness.

Reading representations of Boyle as emblematic of how whiteness operates in relation to goodness is more persuasive when we consider the references to children throughout some of these representations. Children are depicted as at once abandoned in India and also being saved by Britons, and this is particularly the case in representations of Boyle. As Nandita Dogra explains in her analysis of INGO fundraising advertisements in Britain, children are used in numerous ways. One of them is that they can be used to project notions of innocence but also “symbolic helplessness and dependence” (2012: 39). Similarly, Ramamurthy explored how private corporations and charities have long used pictures of children to demonstrate that other countries are lagging behind in their economic development and need help. In this framing, children are both “enchanting” and presented as “helpless creatures dependent on the bounty provided by corporate conglomerates” (2003: 186). Children, then, could be taken to represent the country as a whole, infantilised and in need of help from outside power and it is good Britons

who are in a position to do this. This is buttressed by Ashis Nandy's work that links development and childhood, though as a psychologist he was using a double meaning of development intentionally (1983: 15). His work shows there is a notion whereby intervention is necessary because "the Third World" is being represented "as a child in need of adult guidance"; this is "the infantilisation of the Third World" (cited in Escobar, 1995: 30). This process of infantilisation is racialised because it is produced through immanence; it suggests India is inherently incapable and in need of help from Britain. In addition to this, we might understand these representations through Hall's theorisation of inferential racism. Hall differentiated between "overt racism", self-evident instances of racism; and "inferential racism", "where the apparently naturalized representations of events and situations relating to race, whether 'factual' or 'fictional' [...] have racist premises and propositions inscribed in them as a set of unquestioned assumptions" (1981: 83). In this particular articulation, we might see inferential racialisation in operation, where the naturalised representations of Britons and Indians amounts to a categorisation of Boyle as active and good and Indians as absent. People in India are incapable of or unwilling to look after children, while Britons are and this relies on already embedded logics of the former being inherently uncaring and the latter the opposite. Given the ways goodness operates across the three different strands studied, this appears to amount to a hegemonic trope.

In this conceptualisation of British goodness is a representation of British people as innocent. Firstly, Beaufoy in newspaper representations is able to distance himself from the negative responses to *Slumdog* by claiming it wasn't his intent; in the coverage his actions are reported as unintentional while Indians are imagined as an unruly crowd (a theme we will unpack further in a moment). This representation of Beaufoy can be made sense of through the epistemology of innocence, which drawing on Wekker's work (2016) we can understand as a racialised subject positioning that in this instance highlights the inadvertent nature of racist statements. Using Wekker's (2016) and Tuck and Yang's (2012) work, Sabaratnam explains that innocence is at the core of "white subject-positioning through the profession of good faith" it has the role of separating and protecting "white-racialised populations from both histories of colonial and imperial domination and contemporary practices of racialised discrimination" (Sabaratnam; 2018: 12; Wekker 2016: 16-18). This does not explicitly apply to Beaufoy in that the film is not making explicitly racist statements but some of

the same logic is in operation; by claiming innocence, he is able to say that the title of the film was not intended to cause offence. This highlights the *inadvertent* nature of the offence that was caused, this is drawn from the white subject positioning Wekker identifies and it also means that his goodness remains intact.

Secondly, we see a similar form of innocence at play in representations of slums, although in this instance it is also achieved through self-reflexivity. We might understand the slum tours as what Patricia Williams called “racial voyeurism”: the intrusive staring of white people into the lives of poor people of colour. The example she gave was of tours in New York that take tourists to black churches to “see the show” (Williams, 1997: 17; 22). She recounted one instance in which hundreds of tourists came, took pictures of African Americans praying and then abruptly left for lunch [...] She said this represented a colonial trope of watching “exotics” (Williams, 1997: 22-25). Although the experiences are not directly the same, we can see the notion of ‘Western’ tourists going to slums in India to tour the slums and look upon the lives of people in India as a form of racial voyeurism. The voyeuristic nature of this is even recognised by people on the tours. But the ability to reject or at least sideline this notion of voyeurism is produced by processes of racialisation. James, in particular (see page 206), is depicted as being able to weigh up whether it is morally right to go on the tour and to argue that the amount of money he gives outweighs any discomfort he might have draws on similar racialised trope to Beaufoy, despite the evident differences: though James does not make claims to innocence, there is still the notion that the intent is good and thus this makes the actions good too. This echoes the innocent knowledge found among development professionals, and suggests this representation is hegemonic, because this is not about making racist statements or being involved with activities perceived as racist but rather as we saw with professionals in Chapter Four, it is rooted in the idea that there is a truth that shapes how to act in the world for the good of all, and people who act on this basis are able to rise above their own wants and the impact of history of specific socio-economic dynamics (Flax, 1992: 447). This is arguably another aspect of the white subject positioning and might be seen to be part of the white racialised ideal (Hunter, Swan and Grimes, 2010: 410) as it draws on the sense of rationality found in government discourse: the idea that slums tours may be an imperfect way to do this but it is better to give money and help than not at all. This is buttressed by innocent knowledge:

James is able to rise above the specifics of the situation and position himself as doing good for others.

The goodness of these actions is also achieved by representations of poor people in India as happy, this racialises them in a covert way. Poor people in India are at moments, including during representations of slum tours, represented as content and used to having lots of people around them. The reification of happiness is a form of 'othering'. Nederveen Pieterse explained how this operates: poverty is romanticised so that material deprivation equates to social and or emotional wealth (2000). There is thus an instance in which material conditions are less relevant "by suggesting that people 'do not mind' being poor, or that happiness is a greater wealth than material conditions, a system of inequality becomes justified" (Simpson, 2004: 688). This has the impact of sidelining material relationships and therefore "diverts criticism of capitalism and Euro-centric ideology and provides an alibi for the inequality, exploitation, and oppression in their modern guises" (Mohan, 2001: 159). It is possible to see that this is linked to the other processes of dehumanisation; as we have witnessed, one of the common themes in government and professional discourse is the idea that 'they' are 'other'. By this logic it is possible to see how a form of representation that depicts poverty as happy is reliant on a denial of humanity. To further understand this we might consider how content poor Indians are represented as potentially good workers at times; as industrious and making the most of things. In this way we might compare this with representations of women in government discourse; they are portrayed as potentially hyperindustrious, ignoring the inequality and poverty that has accompanied efforts involved in getting women involved in development. This bears similarities with the positive racialisation of Indians in poverty as overlooking material realities: both revolve around depicting poor Indians as without depth beyond their role as workers or happy slum dwellers. In this way, they are stripped of dynamic attributes and painted as one-dimensional stereotypes. This representation of poor Indians as happy also affirms British goodness on the slum tours: Indian people are represented as undaunted and remaining happy as 'Westerners' come into their homes because they are used to this kind of intrusion.

ii. Inherent qualities related to development

To understand how racialisation is one of the mechanisms that establishes the contrast between Britain and India, we can look at these representations of good Britons in conjunction with how India is represented as stagnant. India is represented as a place of backwardness, despite its economic successes and this is constructed by focussing on India as having remained somewhat static and from this Indian poverty is constructed as immanent, just as British goodness is imagined likewise. India is depicted as not having progressed in terms of dealing with poverty and as with government discourse it is implied this is a product of endogenous problems, in particular ancestral lineage and the product of an innate character flaw. We can best understand this as a product of racialisation when we examine coverage of infanticide, which is constructed as a product of Indianness. Female infanticide, the practice of aborting an unborn girl, is a significant problem in India (see Jha et al., 2011). The racialisation comes from the *way* female infanticide is recognised and reported on. We might understand female infanticide as “part of a larger continuum of violence on women and with the worldwide phenomenon of the devaluation of women” (2005: ix), as scholars Rashmi Dube Bhatnagar, Reena Dube and Renu Dube have said (2005), thus it could be construed as a particularity of Indian patriarchy in line with Kandiyoti’s work on culturally specific forms of patriarchy (1988). However in reporting, it is treated as a distinct practice passed down from generation to generation and using Stuart Hall’s understanding of cultural differentialism as one of racism’s two registers (2000: 224), as explored in Chapter One, we can see that it appears to rely on the notion that it is a product of ancestral lineage, which as we know represents the heart of the racialisation process. In particular this echoes findings in government discourse, where it is the helplessness of Indian women; their inherent inability to resist patriarchy that produces this ongoing lineage. This is not just an infantilisation or stripping away of agency for the sake of it but this representation gets its meaning and legitimacy from racialisation; from suggesting generations of Indian women are incapable of resisting patriarchy and thus allowing this practice to be passed down the ancestral line.

This stands in contrast to how Pattinson is represented, which appears to echo colonial constructions of goodness and gender. Using Mindry’s work (2001) we might

understand representations of Pattinson as an iteration of an imagined feminine “global family, where a picture is painted of “women who (simply because they are women) are concerned about others, of women who need to care for all the members of the “global family””. She explains there is “a politics of feminine virtue at work [...] that constitutes women in ways that are disturbingly similar to Victorian colonial discourses about the caring, selfless mother and that constitutes women along the familiar themes of domesticity and benevolence” (Mindry, 2001: 1189; see also McClintock, 1995). Therefore, echoing colonial tropes, we might see Pattinson as both gendered and racialised as caring but also unlike the Indian women in representations of infanticide, as capable. This representation is racialised because it rearticulates and thus reproduces the colonial idea of British women as caring but in this case adds the notion of capability. Britain and British people are represented as good and their actions pure; as Forsyth’s quote demonstrated, moral values are assumed to be something innate to people born in Britain and when a gendered lens is used, we can see this stands in stark contrast to representations of people in India.

In this sense, we can see that the idea of violence against women is constructed as innate to Indian culture, it is a form of the ‘new racism’ Barker (1981), relying on a form of racism where culture is a differential marker: for Indians their culture is seen as relevant in explaining sexual violence. This is buttressed by Hall’s regimes of representation; where different depictions of particular groups gain meaning and begin to sustain racial prejudices. We might understand this as forming part of a wider, hegemonic web in British newspaper reporting where men of Asian origin are assumed to be *naturally* sexually predatory and misogynistic (Cockbain, 2013). Supposed culture of Asian men is used as a differential marker and cultural determiner to explain the behaviour of these men (Barker, 1981). In newspaper representations of infanticide, this figure of the misogynistic man is present in the frame but in addition to this there is the incapable, weak woman, similar to representations of women as incapable in government discourse. While in line with discourse on race in Britain, the way Britons conduct themselves is imagined as reflective of a cohesive, positive way of life and that is the reason why female infanticide is not widespread. Thus, the coverage of female infanticide in India is embedded in these broader, what we might call hegemonic, racialised tropes of violence against women being a product of ancestral lineage in which Indian patriarchy is not situated on a universalised spectrum

of violence against women but treated as the product of being Indian.

Alongside representations of India as static are conceptualisations of the country as a place of chaos. These conflicting forms of representation might be understood through the lens of hegemony as it operating at different points at the same time. Unlike government discourse this focuses less on descriptions of the temperature and natural environment and more on the people. Indian people are dehumanised as faceless masses that overwhelm Britons; whether tourists or the royal family. The epistemology of immanence is useful here to make sense of this as this chaos is articulated through images of ‘Westerners’ being impacted by the Indian environment, and in particular people asking for money on the street. This notion of the environment and people in India making people from ‘the West’ less caring suggests an element of innateness. In fact, this echoes colonial discourses where certain colonialists claimed when they engaged in corrupt or exploitative behaviour in the colonies, this was a result of the environment. It was claimed the place created this negativity (Padideh, 2000). This innateness is also apparent when we consider how class operates; it is not only poor Indians that are a threat to Britain. Though Indian “stars and business moguls” have a significant degree of cultural capital and power due to their economic success, when placed in relation to the British High Commissioner and two members of the British royal family they are racialised in a manner akin to poor Indian people in media coverage analysed earlier. The notion that they are unable to control themselves as an unruly crowd is used as a marker of their behaviour and to explain why the British must keep them in line. This is reminiscent of coverage in *Developments*, where wealthy Indian people are racialised as lesser in relation to wealthy British counterparts. Such distinctions were apparent under the Empire, elites for instance represented as superior to others deemed lower class (Cannadine, 2002). Thus, as with government discourse there is an evident intersection between class and race, while poor Indians will often be the focus of dehumanisation and racialisation, when compared with white Britons, rich Indians may be subject to these same forms of racialisation. As with representation of India as static, representations of India as chaotic appear to suggest that without external help India will continue to be a place of chaos as it appears to be conveyed that this is how Indians organise themselves naturally. Racialising rich Indians in this way allows there to be a distance maintained between white Britons and these Indians, protecting but also showing anxieties over

the borders of whiteness (Bhabha, 1952: xiv).

Though not stated as related to whiteness, this anxiety is explicitly articulated in media discourse in a way it is not in government or professional discourse. This manifests as a fear that Britain, a former coloniser, will be overtaken by the country it once colonised and also as a notion that India must be kept in check; its progress managed by Britain. This latter representation in particular reflects the depiction in government discourse of Britain as necessarily guiding economically growing countries that are incapable of progressing alone. Yet, despite these differences – of the fear of India and the idea that India is a threat if not helped to develop – we can understand these representations through Bhabha’s work; he explains due to the dependency and closeness in signification of the coloniser and colonised, they occasionally met. This produces an anxiety, a moment when the socially-constructed nature of both categories risked becoming apparent but they were kept separate through the consistent rearticulation of racialised representations (Bhabha, 1994). This anxiety can be further understood by looking at Nederveen Pieterse’s work, he argued “there are two main varieties of stereotypes: “outcasts” and “competitors” (1995: 234). The former are excluded from all that matters, whereas the latter are “menacing: they threaten to step out of the circle of otherness and to interfere with the lifelines of identity”. Essentially, they compete in different ways with the creators of the stereotypes. Nederveen Pieterse pointed out when a group moves from “outcasts” to “competitors”, there is an attendant increase in stereotyping. I argue this should be understood as racialised stereotyping. Going back to the notion of endogeneity – both found in ideas of stasis and chaos – we can see India is believed to be threatening because its growth means British superiority is waning and because it is thought it should not be trusted because of internal failings to progress. Thus, the threat of Indian growth is explained as if it is an innate product of Indianness and thus produced by ideas of lineage. Much like representations of wealthy Indians as uncontrollable, it is imagined that because of their nature and way of being, Indians and India as a country that is economically growing is threatening to Britain.

Conclusions

This chapter has shown the varying forms of racialisation present in newspaper

reporting on India. In line with how we might understand hegemony as operating as being made up of a web of meaning, it has demonstrated that in certain coverage of Indian development, the country and Indian people are at once racialised as a threat, a dehumanised mass and incapable of progressing without help. Within this, there was also a glimpse of a class element similar to that found in both government and development professionals' discourse; where rich Indians were presented as lesser than their white counterparts and their behaviour explained as produced through an inability to control themselves. In the former two chapters the distancing of richer Indians, who in professionals' discourse knew English, was achieved first in government discourse by depicting India as inherently corrupt and secondly in professional discourse through the privileging of white people within organisations, though in Chapter Four class seemed to have played a role in enabling Indian people to perform whiteness. In addition to this, there was a trace of poorer Indians being dehumanised as content in their poverty, which helped to reinforce the notion of Britons as good, even when engaging in activities like slum tours that might be considered exploitative.

Indeed, there exists in newspaper representations a presentation of Britain and British people as necessary to helping India progress and benevolent for doing so. This is achieved through depicting Britons as inherently good, with an element of rationality, themes also found in representations of government discourse and professionals' discourse. Yet one theme that appeared in *Developments* and media discourse but was not apparent in professionals' discourse is the idea of the poor as content. In *Developments* and media discourse this occurred rarely, the few instances of this were referred to in this chapter, but it at once represents people in poverty through a one-dimensional stereotype, where their material reality seems to be relatively unimportant. Their humanity is thus reduced down to simply being happy individuals, content with their lot. This also has the impact of reinforcing British goodness; whatever different forms development takes – whether it comes in the shape of what might be seen as intrusive slum tours – Britons are still doing the right thing and they are not harming poor Indian people, as evidenced by their happiness.

In addition to these forms of racialisation, there exists a similar trope in anti-development coverage, which is pursued only by right-leaning papers such as *The Daily Mail*, *The Sun* and *The Express*. But much like the connection between 'pro'-

and ‘anti’-development politicians in Chapter Three, this is reliant on similar forms of racialisation that can be present in general development coverage. This arguably demonstrates the significant connection between media reporting on Indian development and processes of racialisation. It must be recognised that the vast majority of this is covered in either tabloid newspapers or those that might be situated on the right of the political spectrum. Yet this is not absent from reporting of newspapers that might be deemed left leaning, though the forms of racialisation tend to be less overt. While not every single piece of reporting on development and poverty in India is racialised, the spread of racial tropes across the papers shows the pervasive, hegemonic nature of racialisation, operating in different ways at the same time.

Perhaps most important for our purposes is the forms of racialisation found in media representations of Indian development and poverty in India, which are *not* a significant departure from government and development professionals’ discourse, as government analysis suggests. In fact, they are reliant on the same tropes and this has an important meaning for our understanding of the work race does in the representation of development in Britain. As with government discourse and elements of professionals’ discourse, Britain is racialised as good and India as incapable but also at times a threat. This suggests a hegemonic racialised development discourse, which will be further explained in the conclusion to this thesis. Yet now that shifting forms of racialisation have been established in development discourse, it remains to be seen how this compares with domestic discourses, which existing scholarship already shows to be racialised and whether they share any similarities or differences.

Chapter Six

Parallel discourses: race and immigration and asylum

In 2002, at a European Union (EU) summit Tony Blair made an explicit connection between development and asylum policy. With Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, Blair attempted “to harden trade policy and suspend foreign aid to developing countries that refuse to take back refugees whose applications for asylum have been rejected” (Krieger, 2004: 297). Though this proposal was rejected, this demonstrates the explicit relationship between New Labour’s aid rhetoric and asylum: aid was seen at times as a potential tool to keep asylum seekers out of the country. This is a clear example of how development rhetoric and policy do not operate in a vacuum but interact with domestic politics to create a hegemonic construction and utilisation of race. Yet existing work on development and race tends to look at development discourse in relative isolation and thus we fail to understand how development might interact with or share similar roots with other forms of discourse in Britain, particularly those like asylum discourse that we already know to be racialised. This chapter is thus concerned not only with these explicit moments of connection, as outlined in Blair’s plan, but rather the more subtle similarities between development discourse and those domestic discourses that existing work has already demonstrated is related to race.

Therefore, this chapter attempts to compare dominant tropes found in development discourse across government, media and development professionals with domestic discourse on race and migration. The reason for doing this is because like Julia Gallagher I take a constructivist approach, seeing “ideas, actions and motivations” as rooted “within wider society” (2011: 2). Thus examining rhetoric focussed on the domestic terrain, we might find illuminating connections between development discourse and other areas of discourse. Ferguson showed in *The Anti-Politics Machine* (1990) that development is often treated as separate from politics. I will argue that not only is it political, even though politicians attempt to cloak it in a supposedly neutral moral discourse (Noxolo, 2004), but that development discourse shares similarities with domestic discourses that scholars have shown to reinforce, rely on and produce processes of racialisation (Back et al, 2002a; Back et al, 2002b; Hall, 2000; Gilroy

2004; 2012; Mayblin, 2017) and that might otherwise be considered particularly distinct from development discourse. I will argue these discourses exist in parallel with government development discourse, which as we have seen, plays a role in sustaining a notion of the to-be-developed as a threat and inherently flawed and Britain as a good and rational country, which has an important role to play in guiding others' progress – both for 'their' benefit and the benefit of Britons – all of which are products of racialisation. Therefore, we will see how discourse on race and asylum and immigration also rely on and reproduce tropes that racialise the nation as synonymous with whiteness and at particular moments treat asylum seekers, migrants and people of colour born in Britain who do not conform to ideas of whiteness as a threat.

This chapter will not take the shape of a detailed discourse analysis found in other chapters, instead through secondary research, it draws on the rich vein of critical scholarship that demonstrates how discourses of race and asylum and immigration are racialised. In addition to this, this chapter does not follow the same logics as the previous chapters, which were defined by speakers – government, development professionals and media – instead this chapter focuses more broadly on race, and immigration and asylum discourses in Britain. One of the reasons for choosing these specific areas of discourse, which are not always separable from one another, is that we know from existing work that they are racialised. In addition to this, these discourses include explicit engagement with the 'other', specifically when the 'other' is not from Britain or is perceived to not be from Britain, which is also the focus of development discourse. By comparing these discourses, this chapter will attempt to further demonstrate the hegemonic nature of racialised discourse in Britain and make clear how development fits into this and in particular how it compares with discourses that we know to be racialised. Taking cues from Hall, this chapter will attempt to show how race is "not a subcategory" but organises and systematises society (cited in Grossberg, 2001: 101). Thus, the questions addressed in this chapter are how are these discourses, according to secondary research, racialised and how do they compare with government on development discourse?

This chapter will begin by exploring government approach to 'race relations' within Britain. It will firstly specifically look at New Labour's response to the 2001 disturbances in the north of England and then politicians' engagement with the term

multiculturalism. I will show how this domestic discourse on race centres on an idea of cultural and moral difference where it is thought that people of colour born in Britain do not automatically belong to this country and where their difference is demarcated through the new racism (Barker, 1981). The reason for sequencing this section by first looking closely at New Labour discourse is that this provides a good example of the discourse that followed, as prominent politicians in the two subsequent governments did not break with the ideas articulated by New Labour politicians in response to the disturbances. From this I will draw on existing work that shows the way people of colour are, at times, depicted as not belonging to Britain, while politicians position ‘them’ against white people who do (Hall, 2000: 222). I will also look at how these discourses interacted with the War on Terror, which specifically marked out Muslims or people thought to be Muslims as the ‘other’. The second part of this chapter will then examine the government’s approach to asylum and immigration, both in terms of rhetoric and policy. I will look to scholarship on asylum and migration to outline successive governments’ asylum and immigration policies that have made it more difficult for people seeking asylum and migrating to Britain to come to and stay in the country. It will specifically draw on Lucy Mayblin’s work (2017) to argue that restrictive asylum policy and stigmatising rhetoric became the norm from the 1980s onward because people seeking asylum increasingly came from the global South and were understood through racialised notions of humanity that find their roots in colonialism. I will finally conclude the chapter by further establishing how these discourses on race and asylum and immigration share similarities with discourse on development.

I. Government race relations

i. New Labour and the 2001 ‘riots’

Set against a history of racialised migration policies, which since the 1960s had actively tried to stop migrants of colour from coming to Britain (Solomos, 1989), and ‘race relations’ policies that marked out people of colour as ‘other’, New Labour initially provided hope that they would focus on racial inequality. This promise was symbolised by the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, which New Labour’s first Home Secretary, Jack Straw, set up to investigate the murder of teenager Stephen Lawrence, following years of his family campaigning for justice – although Straw did this after

intense pressure from campaigners, including Lawrence's family and in particular his mother, Doreen. The Inquiry concluded with the Macpherson Report, which said the way the London Metropolitan Police handled Lawrence's murder "was marred by a combination of professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officials" (1999: 365). This was the first recognition of institutional racism in an official report and at the time Hall argued that despite its problems, it represented "a real advance" (1999: 194) because it recognised institutional racism as a problem in Britain and in the police. Alongside commissioning this necessary investigation, New Labour introduced an amendment to the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which included 'outlawing' racial discrimination in public authorities, and in those functions of public authorities run by the private sector. Although this included an immigration exemption, where it was possible to discriminate on the grounds of nationality or ethnic or national origin for the implementation of immigration, asylum and nationality law (Dummett, 2001: 4). After a significant electoral victory in 1997 New Labour was well-positioned to bring in radical reforms to change the nature of the British economy, which had been gradually turned into a neoliberal structure under Margaret Thatcher, and begin grappling with racial inequality exacerbated by previous governments. Pieces of action like the Macpherson Report and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 suggested this might happen. However, as a body of literature on New Labour and race shows (Back et al, 2002a; Schuster and Solomos, 2004), New Labour did not bring in fundamental change on race.

Alongside New Labour's initially positive rhetoric and policies on race ran a strain of politics that accommodated white nationalism. This was identifiable in New Labour's response to the Runnymede Report *The Future of Multiethnic Britain* (Gilroy, 2004: xi). In its opening pages the report warned: "England, Scotland and Wales are at a turning point in their history. They could become narrow and inward-looking, with rifts between themselves and among their regions and communities, or they could develop as a community of citizens and communities" (Runnymede Trust, 2000: xxiii). The report said that one of the problems that might lead to this rift was "the unstated assumption remains that Britishness and whiteness go together"; they advocated for this notion to be challenged (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 23). Publicly, Labour chose to reject these warnings. In response to right-wing papers attacking the report, Jack Straw

argued there was a lack of patriotism on the left, which let modern British identity be seen as “narrow, exclusionary and conservative” (Travis, 2000:1). In doing so Straw refused to engage with the notion that there might be a racial element in the conceptualisation of who constituted the nation and overlooked the report’s argument that Britishness and whiteness remain connected (Back et al., 2002a). This highlights the party’s unwillingness to engage with how “constructs identified as “people(s),” “nations,” “cultures,” and “races” became complexly interwoven”, and how these concepts often “bleed into one another in racist terms”. Just as “American” is often taken to mean “white”, the same is true for “British” (Frankenberg, 2001: 74). The government’s response to the Runnymede report cut straight to the core of what scholars called New Labour’s “white heart”. While they supposedly embraced “cultural diversity and inclusion” – although this in itself was not unproblematic – scholars argued they also turned away from engaging with how national identity might still be tied to whiteness (Back et al., 2002a: 453; Kundnani, 2007).

We can make further sense of New Labour’s attempt to balance between a racially inclusive form of nationalism and a British identity exclusively tied to white identity when we look at the unrest in 2001. Their response to this showed, just as Straw’s reaction to the Runnymede report signalled, that they would not robustly challenge white nationalistic narratives but would rather reinforce what we might understand as the new racism or cultural racism (Barker, 1981). Civic unrest erupted across English northern post-industrial towns between April and June. After years of economic and social disenfranchisement, young Asian people clashed with the authorities in an expression of unhappiness and anger that Amin (2003) has divided into three broad reasons. One was that they were not being heard; officials had engaged predominantly with so-called community leaders, taking them as representatives of the entire community and not engaging with other peoples’ concerns (Amin, 2003). Secondly, the people who took part in these clashes had witnessed years of their elders being subjected to racial discrimination, which in line with Du Bois’ argument (1935), had negative economic and psychological impacts on their lives. Thirdly, they were angry the authorities had failed to take action against racist gangs attacking Asian people. Indeed, the violence began when police were responding to “white racists going on a rampage through the Asian area of Goldwick in Oldham”. Instead of dealing with the white nationalists, they donned riot gear and arrested some of the people who were the

targets of racist attacks as well as some of the attackers. This reaction meant they “lost any claim to be defending ‘the rule of law’” (Kundnani, 2001: 16) as they criminalised the people under attack.

New Labour’s response to the violence, in some ways, mirrored the way the police responded: they treated Asian people, who are not a homogeneous mass, as alien to the body politic. Asian ‘culture’ was treated as a causal factor for violence. Blunkett stated in 2002: “We have norms of respectability [...] and those who come into our home – for that is what it is – should accept those norms just as we would have to do if we went elsewhere” (cited in Younge, 2005). Reacting to the disturbances in this way cast the minority communities as ‘visitors’, as the implication was the ‘we’ was the white community. This should be understood through Barker’s ‘new racism’ (1981); Asian youths who engaged in resistance were imagined as culturally incompatible with people in Britain and thus the cause of violence. This was contradictory to a reality that as Paul Gilroy argued has generally been one in Britain of relatively harmonious racial mixing, though this does not ignore the racism embedded in this society (Gilroy, 2004). Yet, this is a form of cultural racism that attempts to present “an imaginary definition of the nation as a unified cultural community. It constructs and defends an image of national culture, homogeneous in its whiteness yet precarious and perpetually vulnerable to attack from enemies within and without” (Gilroy, 1987: 87). In this way, the Asian young people were marked out as culturally different and threatening to Britain.

The discussion of ‘our home’ drew a parameter around who could express ownership over or belonging in Britain; the people coming into this home were the Asian people involved in the disturbances, they, therefore, had a far less definite claim to Britain; they were the outsiders. We might understand this through Charles Mills’ Racial Contract (1997), where in European societies the conceptualisation of individual rights is racially exclusive. Asian people were told “their right to be British” was “no longer unqualified” and had “to be demonstrated” (Pilkington, 2008: 3.3). This discourse symbolised a belief in a relationship between whiteness and national culture, one that minorities needed to fit into. It was assumed white people born in Britain conformed to and reproduced this culture, which was emblematised through the notion of respectability, but people of colour could pose a threat to it with their cultural

obscurity. This demonstrated how nationalism and race are intimately interwoven together and are often mediated through culture (Gilroy, 2004). This also chimes with Kristen Phillips work, which explained that people of a 'different race' might be permitted to enter the nation state but are monitored, categorised and put in a social hierarchy (2009). Therefore, we can see that New Labour made it clear that Asian people did not necessarily belong to and were not of the nation, at least not in the way white people did and were; the former's citizenship was not permanent but contingent.

The racialised discourse that treated Asian people as at best guests or at worst intruders in Britain was achieved by ignoring the economic terrain that had led to divisions between communities: namely, the wages of whiteness (Du Bois, 1935). Drawing on the government-commissioned Cattle Report (2001) into the incidents, Blunkett recognised poverty was an issue. Yet, just as the report did, Blunkett and the government's policies minimised material inequality, racism and social deprivation experienced by minorities (Schuster and Solomos, 2004: 282) to cultural divides. Blunkett placed the onus on people of colour, arguing that to achieve harmonious community relations, "people should have the wherewithal, such as the ability to speak English" (2001: 6) and introduced a plan the following year to make migrants take a citizenship pledge (Tempest, 2002). Explaining divisions between white and brown as a product of 'culture' and linguistic otherness and focussing on migrant loyalty to a mythical idea of the nation, even though many of the people involved were born in Britain, eclipsed the intersection between economic and racial inequality, which was apparent in Asian peoples' lack of access to decent jobs and council housing.

As Ash Amin showed, "the history of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities' in Lancashire and Yorkshire was tied to the textile industry. Asian and white workers were used as cheap labour post-World War II, but after the mid-1960s the number of job opportunities shrank because of "new technologies and the closure of mills unable to compete with cheaper textiles from the developing countries". Unemployment in the Asian community rose as people of Asian origin were excluded "from the few public service jobs that were kept mainly for whites". Instead people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent were forced into insecure, low-paid work, such as working as taxi drivers or running take away shops. Over twenty-five years these towns "faced severe economic hardship and uncertainty, with more than one generation living with

permanent unemployment (around 50% among young Asians in Oldham)". Due to racial stereotypes and thus racism in the job market, Asian people were treated as if they weren't as (trust)worthy as their white counterparts. The competition for jobs "fuelled resentment" (Amin, 2003: 461) between different white and Asian groups and "each community was forced to turn inwards on to itself" (Kundnani, 2001: 106). This shows how capitalist relations are racially codified (Brodin, 1998: 250) and how according to Du Bois' wages of whiteness (1935), the exploitative economic system were precariously maintained by ensuring poor white people benefitted both economically (albeit marginally) and psychologically, receiving slightly better jobs. The focus on culture and language, then, effaced the mutually constituting role race played in oppressing Asian people and also fermenting anger – some of the same stereotypes of Asian people as incapable and untrustworthy, which locked them out of decent jobs, was used to explain social unrest.

The disregard of material circumstances is what Bonilla-Silva (2006) called the minimisation of racism, which is a subset of colour-blind racism, and played a significant role in New Labour's image of the nation. Axiomatically, the minimisation of racism ignores the role racism plays in shaping job opportunities or access to education and only recognises extreme forms of physical racial violence (Bonilla-Silva, 2006: 29). This underpinned the thinking behind new racism that minority ethnic groups' natural 'cultural' difference caused unrest in society. Blunkett and others used "benign particularism" to establish that racial inequalities were not a causal factor in violence, instead focussing on an "essentialised conception of ethnic and racial difference as the primary basis of social division" (Rhodes, 2009: 4.6). The conclusion was people of Asian origin were different to white Britons and within this Asian culture was seen as lesser than white culture because it was to blame for violence. Minorities, then, were treated as a threat to the nation. Ultimately, New Labour's discourse around the 2001 disturbances upheld the very ideas discussed in the Runnymede report refuted by Straw: that Britishness is synonymous with a whiteness that embodies civility.

ii. Government discourse on belonging

The themes of a racially codified 'them' and 'us' found in New Labour's response to

the 2001 disturbances can also be found in subsequent governments' discourse, as well as later in the New Labour term. For instance, New Labour continued in this vein following the 2001 disturbances by advocating for policies and using rhetoric that fortified whiteness in Britain (Pilkington, 2008: 8.1). In 2005 Tony Blair, who had previously referred to Britain as "a proud and independent-minded island race" (2000: 24), gave a speech on immigration and race against the white cliffs of Dover to a handpicked all-white audience (MacAskill, 2005: 3). At a time when the far right group, the British National Party (BNP), was gaining traction (Schuster and Solomos, 2004: 280), the arguable symbolism, whether intentional or not, was striking: New Labour would protect the integrity of the white nation, which was separate from people of colour and migrants.

From September 2001 onwards, the broader context for this discourse on race was the War on Terror. This meant people "perceived as outsiders" were seen as a threat to the nation, specifically in the form of the terrorist, and could themselves be at risk of experiencing hostility and violence. To make further sense of this, Hall explained that it was Muslims who were specifically targeted, explaining "since the moral panic about the politicization of Islam, 9/11 and the 'war on terror', Islamophobia is everywhere close to the surface, and young Muslim men and women are particularly vulnerable" (2006b: 46). Indeed, following 9/11 and then also the 7/7 bombings, Muslims or people thought to be Muslims were marked out as the 'other' and there was a focus in political and media discourse on the "assumed relationship between religion and issues of terrorism", which were deemed "specifically pertinent in their respective coverage of Islam and Muslims" (2012: 48). There were attempts to mark Muslims as culturally specific 'others' that posed a threat to Britain and more generally to the supposed British way of life. Between 2000 and 2008 there was a significant rise in media coverage of British Muslims and 36 per cent of stories about this group were about terrorism, while 22 per cent were about the religion and cultural difference between Islam and Britain or the West (Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008). Drawing on Goldberg (2006), Meer and Modood explain how this operates as a form of racialisation. They argue:

non-Christian religious minorities in Europe can undergo processes of racialisation, where the 'otherness' or 'groupness' that is appealed to is connected to a cultural and racial otherness, which relates to European peoples' historical and contemporary perceptions of those people that they perceive to be non European (2012: 39).

They also show how this draws on a long history of Muslims being perceived and treated as a racialised other in Europe. Therefore, in this way, particularly in the context of the War on Terror and the 7/7 bombings in London, Muslims were racialised as a threat to the nation.

We can see this form of racialisation at work in Blair's language, although this also extends to people of colour more broadly. Indeed, Blair's wariness of understanding the nation as racially diverse was evident in his 2006 speech on multiculturalism and 'extremism':

We should begin by celebrating something. When we won the Olympic Bid to host the 2012 Games, we presented a compelling, modern vision of Britain: a country at ease with different races, religions and cultures [...] We like our diversity. But how do we react when that 'difference' leads to separation and alienation from the values that define what we hold in common? For the first time in a generation there is an unease, an anxiety, even at points a resentment that our very openness, our willingness to welcome difference, our pride in being home to many cultures, is being used against us; abused, indeed, in order to harm us (2006: 1-8).

Firstly, we can consider how this relates to people of colour generally. Blair lists a number of positive qualities that he suggests are inherent to people in Britain. Margaret Wetherell analysed the speech and explained: "According to Blair if Britain is anti-racist and committed to equality and social justice, this situation has arisen not through struggle but from national character" (2008: 307). But crucially, as Wetherell explained, this is referring to white Britons. The "we" Blair speaks of appears to be white people who are at ease "with different races, religions and cultures". People of colour, "were the subject of exhortation – theirs is the duty to integrate" (2008: 307). Although not explicitly explained by Wetherell, in this equation the ostensible progress, positivity and forward-looking nature of British society comes from white Britons', people of colour born in Britain do not possess these same values and therefore are not necessarily naturally British (Bhabha, 1994); people of colour in this moment were not *of* Britain. This also can also be interpreted as indirectly focussed on Muslims. Discussions about multiculturalism at times had an explicitly Islamophobic tone (BBC, 2006a; BBC, 2006b) and as explained the discourse on multiculturalism was occurring in and produced by the war on terror, and this speech was given one year after the 7/7 bombings. There is a notion that Muslims in particular have a 'culture' that can be at odds with British 'culture'. In this way, Muslims particularly

and people of colour generally are racialised as a group that is a threat to Britain. The message to them is “assimilate or die” (Hall, 2011: 272).

The Coalition also addressed questions of race and belonging in such a way that white identity, and how it was considered synonymous with British national identity, was reified. In 2011 David Cameron gave a speech on ‘multiculturalism’ that used similar racial demarcations to those Blair employed to describe the nation:

Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream [...] We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values.

So, when a white person holds objectionable views, racist views for instance, we rightly condemn them. But when equally unacceptable views or practices come from someone who isn’t white, we’ve been too cautious frankly - frankly, even fearful - to stand up to them (2011: 8-9).

While criticising what he vaguely calls ‘state multiculturalism’ he talks of a “we” that has supposedly encouraged people to live apart from one another but also apart from the “mainstream”. “We” could mean successive governments or politicians, but it arguably also has the meaning of white people. Cameron argues “we’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values” – we” and “our” are elided as the same group and the people who hold particular values are the same as this “we”. Who he is referring to becomes clear in the next paragraph: he positions “white people” against “someone who isn’t white”. It is possible to see, then, that this “we” is a reference to white people because the “other communities” are anyone who “isn’t white”. Cameron then depicts white people as doing the right thing – as being good – by criticising people who express racist views. Yet they are too afraid to do the same thing to a person of colour.

In line with thinking about the racial distinctions in this speech, Paul Gilroy argued:

His repetition of the word ‘frankly’ is revealing and the peculiar discursive currency acquired by the term ‘values’, which was sharply distinguished from mere ‘views’ and ‘practices’ in his dismal scenario, is decisive. That invocation of ‘values’ creates a hierarchy of cultures to displace all the horizontal presumptions of a simpler, social plurality [...] the presence of race in his statesmanlike account of multiculturalism’s doom should be understood as a symptom of the persistence of racism after its official disavowal (2012: 385; 388).

From Gilroy’s analysis we can see that not only does “we” refer to white people in

Britain and the implicit “them” to people of colour, but that there is also an important value judgement involved in this distinction. Gilroy explained that Cameron has not just positioned ‘white’ against ‘non-white’ but the former sits at the top of the hierarchy of cultures.

To further unpack this idea, Gilroy analysed a “chain of raciology meanings” in Cameron’s speech. This, importantly for our purposes, included the idea that: “[w]e British are rightly and strongly against racism when it is articulated by ‘whites’ (Whiteness is not seen as the result of any social process but is understood instead as a simple, natural descriptor.)” and “[t]he troublesome non-whites who dwell among us are incorrigible and that condition must be urgently transformed by a robust ‘muscular’ liberalism that supercedes the passive varieties of tolerance associated with traditional conservatism” (2012: 388). As this explanation demonstrates, there is a division in Cameron’s speech between “whites” who are against racism and “non-whites” who pose a potential threat to the UK. Gilroy argued:

The sign of whiteness provides Cameron with a double marker. It racialises a victorious outcome in the civilisational swirl of contending values on which national security depends. It specifies in racial terms the fear that comes with the prospect of being victimised by accusations of racism that may now not only be unfair but also be difficult or even impossible to refute (2012: 389).

Therefore in line with Blair’s speech, Cameron constructs white people as synonymous with the nation; ‘they’ need to be protected from “non-whites” who represent degraded and problematic forms of civilisation. Buttressing the thinking behind this very divide, white goodness and innocence is highlighted; white people are imagined as always challenging racism and also living in fear, as Gilroy noted, of being unfairly called racist.

The racialisation of minorities as a threat to British security and stability under these successive governments demonstrated how, in the words of decolonial scholar Ramón Grosfoguel, “‘racial’ colonial ideologies have not been eradicated from metropolitan centers which remain in grave need of sociocultural decolonization” (2002: 204). Under the successive governments analysed Britain was “ethnically defined” as white and people of colour had their citizenship questioned in a way that white Britons did not (Rhodes, 2009: 3.13). In this way, there was an articulation of people of colour as potentially not belonging to the nation, they were outsiders and thus even if born in

Britain, at times elided with migrants. The imagined nation (Anderson, 1991), then, continued to be racialised. Yet, this was not solely related to skin colour but focussed on cultural and linguistic differences, particularly if we think about the idea of British culture and values and how people of colour and Muslims in particular were treated as outsiders to this. Thus as Hall explains of notions of civilisational superiority and post-Imperial Britain:

To the degraded repertoires of race and colour were added other dimensions of racialized otherness more to do with cultural differences – historical, religious, linguistic, enshrined in custom, dress, familial practices and values, and so on – in the racialized system which came to be known as ‘the new racism’. Since then, racialization of difference has increasingly drawn on these two repertoires, biogenetic and culture (Hall, 2006b: 47).

This is how we can understand the way race and notions of belonging manifested in Britain: in particular moments, people of colour and at times specifically Muslims, were racialised as outsiders.

II. Government approach to asylum and immigration

One of the areas of government policy and rhetoric that overlaps with race is immigration and asylum. Indeed, as we have seen, people of colour born in Britain have at times been referred to as if they are migrants who have moved to Britain from elsewhere. Yet the question remains how people coming into the country are treated and how they are racialised. Bell and Slater have argued the question of asylum and immigration is interesting to consider; noting the introduction of strict asylum legislation was “symptomatic [...] of a paradox at the heart of New Labour’s approach to globalization” (2002: 356). According to their work, New Labour’s belief in globalisation – which at its most basic definition might be considered as seeing the world as increasingly interconnected and indeed this is how New Labour often used it – was contradicted by its restrictive domestic policy towards asylum seekers. For instance, while Blair, Short and Brown were arguing that borders were becoming more blurred and claiming interdependence was the norm (even if the reality was one in which they believed Britain had more power and agency than the to-be-developed), they were also implementing regressive asylum policies at home (Solomos and Schuster, 2004; Webber, 2012). There was an arguable tension between their discourses: they articulated that the world was interconnected and it was possible to

improve the world for everyone in development discourse while also denying that people from different parts of the world were equal to one another, some were positioned as a threat to Britain. Therefore, this construction of difference, as we will see in this section, was racialised. Before we draw on work that demonstrated how this was racialised, I will use existing scholarship to give a brief overview of the restrictive policies that were implemented.

i. Restrictive immigration and asylum policy

Through three pieces of legislation in 1999, 2002 and 2004, New Labour introduced policies that excluded “asylum seekers from mainstream social security provision” and made it so that some people were unable to access any provision at all (Bloch and Schuster, 2005: 1). The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act introduced a body “to administer a cashless voucher system”. By refusing to give money to people seeking asylum, instead marking them out with vouchers, they stigmatised asylum seekers as ‘other’. This was also accompanied by a move to effectively criminalise the process of seeking asylum (Back et al., 2002b: 451). In the 2002 white paper *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain*, Home Secretary David Blunkett stated a “robust” asylum system would “expose the nonsense of the claim that people coming through the Channel Tunnel, or crossing in container lorries, constitute an invasion when it patently demonstrates how difficult people are finding it to reach this country” (Home Office, 2002: 1). This was New Labour’s Home Secretary arguing that the government effectively kept asylum seekers out of the country.

Solomos and Schuster (2004) have documented how New Labour’s restrictive measures shared similarities with their Conservative predecessors who attempted to make it more difficult for people to come into the country as asylum seekers. In addition to this, the Coalition’s and Conservatives’ policies on asylum and immigration bore significant similarities to New Labour’s. The two governments, the Coalition and the Conservatives, differ from one another very little with regard to immigration and asylum, in particular because the Conservatives, who then governed independently – albeit relying on the Democratic Unionist Party for votes from June 2017 onwards – were the dominant partner in the Coalition Government. As we have seen in the previous chapter, neither of these governments broke with New Labour’s

commitment to development and both continued to reason that with an interconnected world it was beneficial for Britain to engage in development. Yet, at the same time they attempted to curb this supposed interconnectivity by implementing regressive asylum and immigration policy through the Immigration Act 2014 and the Immigration Act 2016. With regard to asylum, the Coalition and then the Conservatives kept much of New Labour's legislation in place and further attempted to restrict entry into Britain and decrease the number of migrants and asylum seekers in the country. For instance, the 2016 Act extended "deport first, appeal later" to all migrants: prior to this it applied solely to people who had been convicted of a crime but did not have the right to reside in Britain or people the Secretary of State thought it "conducive to the public good" to deport (Immigration Act 1971). What this extension meant in practice was people whose asylum claims had been rejected could be deported to their home country prior to their appeal being processed – unless it was believed deportation would cause "serious, irreversible harm" (Home Office, 2016: 1-2). There was not a significant amount of legislation introduced on asylum but in 2015, when she was Home Secretary, Theresa May outlined a "tough new plan for asylum" to make it more difficult for people to have their claims processed in the UK, meaning they would instead be processed in nearby countries (cited in Travis, 2015: 2).

In addition to this, the Coalition and Conservative governments intensified regressive immigration measures. Towards the end of New Labour's term in office they had introduced stricter immigration measures; in 2006 they extended the amount of time 'non-skilled' European migrants had to be in the country before they could apply for residency, moving it from four to five years and in March of that same year they announced that hospitals had to show they couldn't hire a junior doctor from Britain or the EU before they could even consider a candidate from a non-EU country (Anderson, 2013: 106). These changes had the impact of making it more difficult for people to stay in the country and earn a living. However, under the subsequent two governments, immigration measures became more of a government focus and were significantly tightened. In the 2010 election, the Conservatives pledged to reduce 'net migration' from the "hundreds of thousands" to the "tens of thousands" (Vargas-Silva and McNeil, 2017 2). When they came into government they maintained this pledge and implemented measures that included limiting the number of visas available to "skilled workers" who had job offers, introducing a minimum income requirement for citizens

to bring partners from non-EU countries to join them in the UK and closing down the visa scheme that meant ‘highly skilled workers’ could not come to the country without a job offer. Through the 2014 and 2016 acts they also introduced a package of policies they called the ‘hostile environment’. These policies meant that if you did not have the right documentation to prove you were in the country legally, you would not be able to access healthcare, housing or employment. In this way, the government made it more difficult for people to access basic services if they could not provide documentation proving they were in the country legally. Therefore, looking at these restrictive policies introduced by New Labour, the Coalition and the Conservative governments, we can see that they were aimed at keeping people out of the country or making it more difficult for them to stay in Britain. Yet in order to understand how this was racialised, we must consider the rhetoric, reasoning and historical and social context that these policies were introduced in.

ii. Racialising migrants and refugees

New Labour’s, the Coalition’s and the Conservative’s policies were justified by a discourse in which asylum seekers and for the latter two governments in particular, migrants, were depicted as enemies of the nation. We can make sense of how this is racialised by looking at the discourse people in government used and existing work on this. In 2001 when he was Home Secretary Jack Straw said that regardless of their international obligations “there is a limit on the number of [asylum] applicants, however genuine, that you can take” (cited in Cracknell, 2001: 3). When he was in the same post David Blunkett echoed Margaret Thatcher’s language on immigration when he said asylum seekers were “swamping” schools and when met with criticism, refused to retract his comments (cited in BBC, 2002). The party also ran a by-election campaign in 2004 that attacked their opponents with the slogan “Labour is on your side – the Lib Dems are on the side of failed asylum seekers” (cited in White, 2009). There were evident similarities between New Labour’s stigmatising language and language used under the Coalition government. For example, when he was Prime Minister David Cameron called people trying to seek refuge in Britain a “swarm” (cited in BBC, 2015). He also referred to people in the Calais refugee camp as a “bunch of migrants” (cited in Mason and Perraudin, 2016: 1). Each of these governments treated people seeking asylum, refugees and migrants (albeit respective

governments dealt with these groups in different ways) as if they were a threat to the nation by constructing asylum seekers and migrants as a homogeneous mass that threatened to overwhelm the country and who could not be trusted: they were depicted as out for what they could get and even portrayed as fabricating asylum claims to get into the country. This language stripped people of their humanity and was used to legitimate regressive policies that materially disenfranchised people seeking safety in Britain. Indeed, Solomos and Schuster argued this was part of a “never-ending sequence of ‘blame the victim’ justifications for increasingly harsh and unfair efforts to control UK borders” (2004: 296).

To make sense of how this discourse on migration, asylum and refuge is racialised, it can be understood in a broader historical context. As Solomos and Schuster explain there has been a link between immigration and race in political culture in Britain at least since 1945. Looking at the history of immigration legislation and race relations legislation they say one of the key ideas of race relations in Britain has been:

to promote better community relations by stopping new immigration. This approach was based on the idea that the fewer immigrants, particularly ones that were visibly different in some manner, there were, the easier it would be to integrate them into the ‘British way of life’ and its social as well as cultural values (2004:268).

This argument persisted under New Labour with regard to asylum seekers and under the Coalition and Conservative governments with regard to immigrants and asylum seekers. This means “the logic that underpins current legislation on migration and on race relations in Britain assumes that good race relations depend on ever more strict immigration controls” (Solomos and Schuster, 2004: 284). Part of the reason that people were marked as a threat was because they were imagined as inherently different from people born in Britain. This was established through racialisation, that is, the implicit assumption that through ancestry and where people are born, they inherit particular values (Appiah, 2016). Indeed, this is a popular argument encapsulated by Slavoj Žižek who stated of people coming into Europe “we have to be clear they are in our culture. Certain ethical limits [...] are non-negotiable. We should be more assertive toward our values [...] Europe means something noble – human rights, welfare state, social programs of the poor. All of this is embodied in the enlightenment of the European legacy” (Žižek, 2016). Thus, through notions of racialised difference, immigrants and people seeking asylum were treated and spoken about as if they were a

threat to Britain, people with different and seemingly lesser values (Back et al., 2002b; de Genova, 2018).

To further make sense of how this racialisation operated, we can look at Lucy Mayblin's (2017) work on asylum. She has challenged and deepened conventional analysis of European governments' restrictive asylum policies by demonstrating how they are connected to colonial history. She critiques the conventional narrative in migration studies that explains why restrictive asylum policies were introduced from the 1980s onwards. The argument tends to be that there was a huge increase in numbers of people seeking asylum and the people coming to Europe were different from before – they had different rationales for fleeing their home and came from a more diverse range of countries than before. It has also been argued asylum seekers became harder to distinguish from economic migrants, in part because the rise of cheap air travel made it easier for people to move and thus meant more would do so even if they did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. Thus, drawing on Chimni's (1998) work, Mayblin argues that prior to the 1980s, asylum seekers were thought to be European – generally white men fleeing Communism. In fact, as she points out, until the 1967 protocol was introduced, the 1951 Refugee Convention prevented non-European people from being considered refugees. Mayblin argues one of the problems with the traditional analysis that attempts to explain why regressive policies were introduced from the 1980s onwards is that there is a long history of non-European people seeking asylum, for instance during the Indian partition (Mayblin, 2017: 20-34). These facts are often neglected because the destination for the majority of these people wasn't Europe but that does not mean refugees were ever predominantly European.

Mayblin offers another analysis of why these restrictive asylum policies were introduced: non-European asylum seekers, who began to come to Europe in increasing numbers just prior to these policies being introduced, were racialised as 'other' (Mayblin, 2017: 20-34). But Mayblin argues this racialisation must be understood as historically embedded:

[T]he process whereby asylum seekers came to be marked as different in line with a narrative of unwanted, alien 'others' from the 'underdeveloped' non-modern world; is one which is very specifically informed by histories of race science but endures today because of continued logics of coloniality – the legacies of the justificatory discourses of

colonialism. Thus it is not the fact that they are marked as different as a consequence of their difference, but that the colonial discourses marked them as such and that rationales of inequality and civilisation incommensurability remain (2017: 37).

It is through this understanding of a historically embedded form of racialisation that we can make sense of the government policy and rhetoric that stigmatised, punished and impoverished asylum seekers. This contradicted the message that poverty eradication was a priority for these governments or that the world was becoming more interconnected. While New Labour, the Coalition and the Conservative governments advertised Britain's position as a global leader to reduce poverty and help others, they were trying to protect "the social integrity of the nation-state" from racialised outsiders (Back et al., 2002b: 450).

Conclusions

In conclusion, we can see that race and immigration and asylum discourses were racialised in the period examined in this thesis. Policy and rhetoric on race and on asylum and immigration, at times has constructed people of colour as a threat to the stability of the nation and this was achieved through processes of racialisation. With regard to discourses focussed on race relations, this is done through what we might call 'new racism' (Barker, 1981; Hall, 2006b: 47). Through discourse focussed on values, culture and language, it was imagined people of colour – and at times with a specific focus on Muslims – were culturally threatening. People of colour marked out as culturally threatening were racialised as being at odds with positive British culture, the latter is embodied by the supposed responses to racism or moral norms thought synonymous with Britishness. With regard to asylum and immigration, drawing on colonial discourse and systems of racial categorisation, we can see asylum seekers and migrants are racialised as less than human and similarly possessing values at odds with Britain, and thus threatening to the country.

The theoretical and empirical observations made in this chapter can help us understand the connection between development discourse and domestic discourses on race, immigration and Empire, which allow us to see them as parallel discourses. This arguably can be understood through Gramscian notions of hegemony (Hall, 1986); different areas of discourse are operating to create and sustain racialised

representations of the nation, at times in unsteady ways. Both race and immigration and asylum discourses are, like development discourse, rooted in the racialised notion of Britain, where Britain possesses good values; in development discourse it is imagined that people in ‘developing’ countries were regarded as bringing instability to global affairs and danger to Britain’s doorstep. In development discourse this is produced by racialisation of the to-be-developed which legitimates the representation of Britain as a good and rational nation and thus well equipped to do development work.

In government discourse representations of people in poverty were reliant on stereotypes that constructed them as inherently lesser than those in Britain and that portrayed the ‘developing’ world as a potential threat to Britain. These are sentiments also produced in asylum and immigration discourse, which as stated, implies that people already in or coming into the country are a threat to the stability of Britain. The forms of discourse relied on racialised constructions of the ‘other’ – whether of the to-be-developed or people trying to get to or stay in Britain – that implicitly drew on and rearticulated the racial hierarchy in order to give these representations seeming stability and meaning. Under the epistemology of immanence, these representations in particular centred on the notion that ‘they’ were fundamentally different from people in Britain and were a threat to the country in some form or another. In development discourse this functioned as a way to legitimise policy and aid spending, in asylum and immigration it operated as a way to dehumanise asylum seekers and migrants and thus arguably gave legitimacy to restrictive policies.

Similar to the logic of Blair’s 2002 plans, in an article arguing for aid spending a year after he stepped down as Prime Minister, Cameron wrote: “if we don’t tackle poverty abroad, the results are visited upon us at home” and noted “mass migration” as one of the “results” that comes to Britain. He added: “If we don’t play our part in ensuring that everyone has an education and hope of a decent life, then the waves of migration we have seen in recent years will be nothing, compared with in decades to come” (2017: 2; 3). This was a vein of thinking similarly identified by Gallagher under New Labour in relation to their policies on the African continent (2011: 82). Therefore both Cameron and Blair attempted to make a connection between development and immigration and asylum. While Blair wanted to use aid punitively, Cameron proposed

it was a way to ensure fewer people wanted to come to Britain. However, his description of migration was dehumanising – the language of “mass migration” and “waves of migration” erases the individual people who move and uses language that implies there are too many people coming through, for instance, invoking natural imagery to suggest the country will be overrun with people from abroad. In this instance, they are “people” when they are in their country of origin, people who deserve an “education” and a “decent life” but they are threatening migrants when they leave. Therefore we can see both similarities and differences between these statements and development discourse. In the latter the humanity of the to-be-developed are consistently denied when they are spoken about in their country of origin. For Cameron they are people in their country of origin but dehumanised as migrants when they are in Britain. Despite this difference both rely on a depiction of the ‘other’ as a dehumanised mass and a threat to Britain. We can understand this through hegemonic notions of power where different positions are articulated at the same time but perpetuate the same forms of racialisation.

Therefore, if we look closely at the rhetoric with regard to race and asylum and immigration, we can see it is not fundamentally different from that which makes up development discourse. We might then see this picture is not as straightforward as Bell and Slater’s (2002) analysis suggested; they argue that restrictive asylum policies and discriminatory discourses were at odds with development discourse that argued the world was increasingly interconnected. Yet we see there is congruence in the way the nation is constructed in discourse about race relations, asylum and immigration and about development – both were reliant on the racialisation of the ‘other’ and displayed a relationship between whiteness and British identity. The government’s development rhetoric and policy did not contradict its race and asylum and immigration policy and rhetoric but rather existed in parallel to it, the two complementing one another to an extent.

The reason this is important is that these sets of discourses were articulated to a domestic audience at the same time. They are, as we have seen, not necessarily separate in terms of the racialised tropes they draw upon and we might see how they reinforce one another. Consequently, we can see there are parallel discourses in Britain; when development discourse is examined through race it is possible to make

sense, from existing work on race and asylum and migration discourses, that it shares discursive similarities with domestic discourses. This allows us to understand further the hegemonic nature of this discourse and how it operates as part of a broader system. Thus we can begin to further see, as mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, how “the whole social formation [...] is racialised” (cited in Grossberg, 2001: 101).

Conclusions

Another world is not only possible, she is on her way. On a quiet day, I can hear her breathing. — Arundhati Roy (2003)

The main purpose of this thesis has been to attempt to make sense of the different ways race and processes of racialisation shape development discourse and understand how they might share similarities with domestic discourses in Britain that we know are shaped by and reinforce ideas of race. In order to achieve this, I have attempted to answer the question set out in the Introduction: ‘What does it mean to say development discourse is racialised?’. This question has been addressed by using Gramscian notions of hegemony, critical race, decolonial and postcolonial theory, and primarily the work of Stuart Hall, to uncover and analyse the multiple forms of racialisation that appear in government, development professionals’ and media discourses. I have compared them with one another, while also comparing them with domestic discourses on race and asylum and immigration. Here, I will restate the contribution this thesis makes to the existing body of literature and explain the hegemonic forms of racialisation found in British development discourse, showing that across government and civil society, I have found remarkably similar, albeit shifting, processes of racialisation.

We know from existing work that race and processes of racialisation are central to development both discursively at a macro level and at the micro level – that is, within development organisations (White, 2002; Goudge, 2003; Kothari, 2006b; Heron, 2007; Loftsdótti, 2014; Rivas, 2018). Yet, while some of this work looks at the British context (Wilson, 2012; Noxolo, 2004), what we do not know is how different forms of racialisation manifest specifically in different strands of discourse, how these strands compare with one another and how this relates to domestic discourses. Ultimately, when I embarked upon this thesis, it was not clear what it meant to say that racialised development discourse is hegemonic. Nor was it apparent that if and if so, how, different, seemingly different forms of racialisation in this discourse might exist alongside one another. This latter question is particularly pertinent when thinking about a case like India, a country that is economically growing but continues to have high levels of poverty.

Therefore, as explained in Chapter One, this is an original empirical project because

existing work has not tracked government, media or development professionals' representations of development and compared forms of racialisation in each respective area. This thesis has also honed in on representations of India and people in India in the discourses of the aforementioned strands of study. Finally, an understudied area of research is examining how the relationship between race and development compares with forms of racialisation identified with the areas of discourse we already know are racialised from existing work, such as race and asylum and immigration discourses. Using Gramscian notions of hegemony, looking at one case and drawing on three strands of analysis – government, media and development professionals – and offering a comparison of these three strands as well as with domestic discourse, this thesis has provided a fuller picture of the types of racialisation that occur in development, and how they interact with gender and class. It has thus established how the dominant discourse of development utilises, reinforces and creates differing forms of racialisation. This matters because we know development occupies an important place within British popular discourse. A substantial amount of time and money was put into 'selling' the idea of development to the British people, particularly under New Labour, and there have been ongoing attempts to argue against development, which has placed this subject central to public debate.

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Firstly and perhaps most significantly, this thesis has shown how government and media development discourse in Britain perpetuate and rely on constructions of Britishness that are produced through whiteness. One of the ways this is achieved is through the epistemology of immanence, this primarily references the notion that development occurred within Britain thanks to innate qualities of the British people. This was in part reliant on historical erasure, which was particularly explicit in government discourse, and produced through what we might understand as the epistemology of ignorance. In particular, the supposed successes of Empire were invoked to establish that Britain has the qualities to engage in development. This is used to suggest that Britain has always naturally occupied the place of being the more developed nation in comparison to parts of the formerly colonised world, and that British development was achieved independently. This draws on racialised supremacist narratives in order to suggest there is an inherent, ancestral quality that produced

Britain as the developer.

The representation of Britain as a developer is produced through processes of racialisation, in particular through the idea of Britain as a good power, found in government and media discourse specifically, and Britain as a rational nation. This is intimately related to a white subject position (Sabaratnam, 2018; Dyer 2002; Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1998). Stemming from ideas of whiteness and central to the construction of Britain as a developer is the thinking that Britain is at once a morally good power but one that possesses the logic to do what is best for the country and for the world. Indeed, we can see how professionals' discourse, though different from the other two strands, can rely on the notion of developers as doing good, necessary work even if development itself is flawed. This demonstrates how the three strands have a shared conceptualisation of Britain as good and rational, although they may manifest in different ways. For example, there is a greater emphasis on Britain as a 'good' nation in government and media discourse, perhaps because of the public facing nature of this discourse and the way they are concerned with the 'macro'. However, we still find elements of goodness in professional discourse through the notions of 'innocence, explored in further detail in a moment, which reflect the micro found in government and media; that is, how people working in development are represented clearly as doing good.

In addition to this, rationality is present in different ways in the sites of discourse examined. In government discourse it is the 'right thing' for Britain to engage in development because this will benefit the country and Britons are presented as rational; in media discourse it is largely just that Britons are rational and the same is true of professionals' discourse. Much of this relies on notions of immanence; Britain and Britons have the tools to do development and this comes from ideas of whiteness about who is seen as being able to practice self mastery. Therefore, there is a significant overlap between Britain and Britons being seen as the capable actors in 'doing' development and possessing the 'right' epistemological and practical tools, and it being rational for Britain and Britons to do development.

These notions of goodness and rationality, central to development discourse and intimately related with whiteness, are not covered by Sabaratanam's epistemologies

but have been found as essential to understanding whiteness in the material studied. Indeed, the specificity of the notion of self-mastery, which might be seen as intimately connected to immanence, is not synonymous with it but is rather a particular and important way that whiteness operates. The differing ways goodness and rationality are articulated and the different extents to which they are we can understand as a hegemonic web of representation, where similar and differing positions are articulated across different institutions.

Yet to further understand goodness and rationality, there is one other similarity across the discourses that presents itself in different ways and that is not accounted for in Sabaratnam's epistemologies: the idea of self-reflexivity. In government discourse politicians at moments recognise the 'limits' of Britain's power and some of its history of Empire, in professional discourse it is through the recognition that race plays a role in development and in media it is through discussion of 'slum tours' where the problematic nature of the tours is recognised. But in each instance, this reflexivity is then used to affirm racialised discourse. In the latter two this can be understood through 'innocent knowledge' (Flax, 1992), where goodness is centred, and in government discourse it is also ideas of goodness – that Britain and its history is ultimately more 'good' than bad' – as well as ignorance. Yet though epistemologies previously explored are present in this self-reflexivity, it nonetheless forms an important part of whiteness. The overarching discourse of whiteness that centres white goodness and power is strengthened by self-reflexive recognition, which implicitly engages with some of the corrosive problems of whiteness and its dominance.

What operates in contrast to this self-reflexivity, as well as with it (for instance in government discourse the erasure of colonial narratives), is ignorance of racism historically and in the contemporary moment as a tool of power through oppression. As Andrews has argued, one of the key elements of whiteness "is to minimize the importance of racism in society. There has been a post-racial turn in how problems are understood, and a key element to this is to argue that other factors are more important than racism" (2016: 449). This is particularly true in development discourse. Race is not regularly engaged with in academic work on development and this research shows that when it is engaged with in professional discourse, it is through a formulation of white innocence (Wekker, 2012). It is thought the goodness of the work being done is

more pressing than considering race and racial inequalities. It seems to be suggested throughout these discourses that because goodness is exemplified through development, Britain and development cannot be racist because it does good. Therefore, British discourse on development is at once, even if only briefly, self-reflexive of the damaging nature of whiteness while also erasing that damaging nature through ignorance and goodness.

It is particularly important to understand how racialisation operates through development because in the popular domain such discourses are assumed to be innocent and therefore less likely to be imagined as reinforcing a racial hierarchy. We have seen representations of this in each of the strands of development discourse studied; politicians, professionals and newspaper reporting have constructed Britons as inherently good, which, as established in the introduction, draws on colonial forms of racialisation that construct Britain as the benevolent, inherently superior nation. This whiteness was also evident in ideas of rationality, particularly found in government discourse but with echoes in newspaper discourse

One of the particularly novel findings in this thesis with regard to whiteness and processes of racialisation is the similarity between the discourse of ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ development politicians. Tracking development discourse from 1997 through to 2017 revealed that both sides of this debate in the public domain share a belief in Britain as a good nation that needs to help the ‘other’ through development, yet the ‘pro’-development voices advocate for a continuation of this while the ‘anti’ voices warn that this generosity has been taken advantage of. The same is true in media discourses. This demonstrates how these politicians find similar grounding in their arguments and thus how central to development whiteness is and, in turn, how useful development is to notions of a Britishness that is synonymous with whiteness. Therefore, we can see similarities not just across different strands of representation but throughout all of government discourse, the continuity between the New Labour, Coalition and Conservative governments and ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ development politicians reveals the hegemonic nature of this discourse.

Secondly, forms of racialisation also involve depictions of the to-be-developed and ‘developing’ countries more broadly. Just as Britain is constructed as the natural

developer, poverty in ‘developing’ countries tends to be decontextualised; it is implied that it is a product of failings internal to the country. This is particularly prominent within government and media discourse where through representations of the environment, which is primarily used in government discourse, and representations of Indians as a homogenous mass, stuck in a static environment the country is represented as incapable of developing. However, in a slightly different way, this is also present in professionals’ discourse where it is assumed non Anglicised Indians are less capable of engaging in development. Thus though professionals spent less time describing the environment and the people in a crudely homogenised way, as the other explicitly public facing sites of discourse did, there was still a notion of Indians as less capable. Both whiteness and this form of racialisation, therefore, share a root in the epistemology of immanence: it is assumed internal failings produced by ancestry and ways of being are causing progress and poverty in each respective place. We see similar ideas in discourses on race and asylum and immigration, in particular through new racism (Barker, 1981) or what might be called cultural racism, and also through colonial discourses on humanity, people who are not white or not British can be racialised as a threat to the nation. This process of racialisation is reliant upon an explicit or implicit representation of Britain as a good nation with good values and culture, whereas migrants, asylum seekers and people of colour are thought to be internally flawed; their behaviour produced by ancestry. There is a particularly evident relationship between government discourse and discourse on immigration and race, where ‘developing’ countries and migrants and people of colour are both represented as threat to the nation.

This idea of the threat is not found in professional discourse but is evident in media discourse, where the threat instead manifests in anxiety about India ‘overtaking’ Britain. Indeed, we might see this in discourses on immigration and race; using Bhabha’s work we could consider that this manifests in the racialisation of the other as a threat, which buttresses the idea that there is an important difference between Britons and immigrants and white Britons and particular people of colour. By drawing a relationship between domestic discourse on race and asylum and immigration discourses and seemingly neutral development discourse, it shows how some of the hegemonic forms of racialisation that exist in British society and which structure relations are ones that can construct people of colour as a threat to a British nation

synonymous with whiteness and thus goodness. The hegemonic nature of this is identifiable not only in the comparison between these realms of discourse but also through the fact that these forms of representation are apparent in the very discourse and policy area that professes to care about others around the world.

Thirdly, this thesis has shown how development discourse in Britain operates on competing and complimentary forms of racialisation, as we might expect with hegemonic discourses. There are multiple strands of racialisation including representations of people in poverty as helpless, women as neoliberal automatons, Indian elites as inherently corrupt, uncaring or uncontrollable and India as a place where poverty is inherent to the country or as a place where growth cannot be trusted without British help to harness it. These ideas are conveyed to varying degrees in each respective strand of discourse; in professionals' discourse it is articulated through the notion of corruption but also that white people are still superior to Indians and people of colour within development organisations. In government and media discourse, notions of corruption are present but contained within the ideas of India as chaotic and a country that is not to be trusted with growth. This latter point is particularly explicit in media discourse.

Though these discourses do manifest in different ways, one commonality is how Ruth Wilson Gilmore's definition of racism can apply to all three sites of discourse at particular moments. In government discourse, women are stripped of their humanity and imagined as economic contributors; among the media poor people are racialised as simply 'happy' with their lot and in professionals, 'local' workers experience material inequality when compared with their 'international' counterparts. Thus, though the production and exploitation of group vulnerabilities are produced in different ways and to slightly different ends, they are connected, as Wilson Gilmore suggests (2002: 261).

Thus, from these different forms of racialisation it is possible to see that while this is a thesis primarily about race, we cannot talk about race either in the singular or in isolation. This thesis found that in development discourse, class is linked to racialisation. Poor people in India may be racialised as lesser than their richer Indian counterparts because their poverty is assumed to be natural to their way of being. In addition to this, I have demonstrated the relationship between race and capital through

conversations with development professionals. This is a particularly novel area of work with regard to race and British development discourse. I have shown how as well as competing forms of racialisation existing in development discourses, processes of racialisation operate in development organisations with nationality and education.

Indeed, we have seen how at the micro-level British nationality can allow people of Indian origin to pass into the ‘international’ category usually reserved for white people, and how education at a US or British university can do the same for people born in India. Therefore, it is not just a question of nationality that helps to denaturalise the very idea of race as related to phenotype. This is important not just for our understanding of how development professionals perceive race in their workplaces but also for material outcomes. Pay disparities in development are well known but how these relate to processes of racialisation are key to understanding the relationship between discourse and the material outcomes. Importantly, this is related to government and media discourse in that Britons are assumed to have the knowledge to engage in development regardless of the country to-be-developed; as discussed earlier in this chapter, this is reliant on epistemologies of ignorance and of immanence in order to suggest Britain has developed independently and thus has the answers to development. Thus, we can see whiteness is essential to create the notion of Britain as inherently the developer, something that can be, to some degree, learnt by others with the right education.

Therefore, while the idea of Britain as a nation continues to be constructed as synonymous with whiteness there were different processes occurring at the micro-level of development professionals. Processes of racialisation are shifting and relational, meaning the disconnect between skin colour and racialisation is not permanent. This shows how phenotype is one demarcation of race that continues to matter and how seemingly contradictory or fundamentally different processes of racialisation can sit alongside one another. Indeed, from existing findings it appears that class is relevant to this analysis; people from India of a higher class are able to perform whiteness, even though they are still across each site of discourse, seen and depicted at times as still not being white.

Finally, it is not just that there is a negative to-be-developed/‘developing’ world vs. a

positive developer, Britain. Even when there are ‘positive’ representations of the ‘developing’ world, which might not seem to be racialised – such as India as a growing economy, there are still forms of racialisation present within these representations, such as the depiction of Indians as corrupt or the country as chaotic, as previously discussed. This means that there are forms of racialisation present alongside others; people of colour in development organisations might be racialised as occupying whiteness at times but they might also be considered inferior to their white colleague. The shifting nature of racialisation and also the seemingly positive representations, for instance that India is a country growing economically, works to hide the very racialisation it perpetuates by making it seem as if development discourse is complementary. This potentially demonstrates how beyond development discourse, race is difficult to pin down. However, ultimately, we can see there are moments where racialisation means the extra humanising of some people, such as Britons as heroic developers and the non humanising others, such as Indians who are corrupt or seen as needing to be controlled by their white counterparts, which as we have seen can cut across class lines. Thus, it is possible to argue that in development discourse, a country like India might be seen as progressing economically, but through a racialised understanding of the country, there is still a notion that no matter how much it progresses, it will never and can never be equal to Britain. This echoes Baaz’s summary of colonial discourses on civilisation, where “Western civilization was presented as the universal terminus of evolution, which the colonized should repeat, copy and internalize. At the same time, continued colonial domination was dependent on the opposite idea, namely that the colonized should remain different” (Baaz, 2005: 45; see also Fanon, 1952; Mayblin, 2018). Ultimately what these forms of racialisation suggest is that race is central to how development is conceptualised.

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However, this project undoubtedly has limitations. It has not shown how race and processes of racialisation affect or are embedded within development practice within India or in other development contexts. This is certainly an area for further study. In particular, continuing to use a blend of critical race, decolonial and postcolonial theory, an ethnographic account of relationship in INGO in India would help to clarify and deepen the analysis outlined in Chapter Four. This thesis has hopefully provided a strong base on which this research can be conducted. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter One, one of the significant areas for further research would be an exploration

of how caste in India intersects with race and material inequality in development work. Caste was almost entirely absent from representations of India in British development discourse but during the course of this research there was an indication from one participant who worked in development that higher caste Indians are more likely to occupy senior positions in development organisations. Given the significant role caste plays in shaping Indian society an analysis of how it manifests in development organisations but also in development work is certainly an important, necessary area of further study.

The analysis advanced by this thesis need not mean future work is confined to the realm of development. Given the forms of racialisation found in relation to British discourse on development, analysis of how race manifests in other realms of government policy – such as contemporary migration discourse or policy – is a potential further area of study. Though this has been worked on in the past, as indicated by the work referenced in this thesis, there is a contemporary debate that has not been extensively analysed. This, paired with a Marxian understanding of material inequality, could help us to understand how whiteness manifests in a nation that is and always has been multiracial. Such a project might be vital to helping to form anti-racist resistance to state policy or contribute to existing work on reimagining the nation as a multiracial entity, particularly in relation to how the UK understands itself if it leaves the European Union, and how contemporary discourses on migration are related to shifting forms of racialisation. Complementing this analysis, further work could be done on the way the global elite is racialised and how these processes of racialisation operate in tangent with material inequalities beyond development work.

Yet, for the moment, I hope this thesis contributes to the important body of literature on race and development and that it can be used to help challenge and question the way British politicians use development discourse to talk about the country on the global stage and how this discourse remains intimately connected to notions of Britain's national identity as synonymous with whiteness.

While writing this thesis I have been interested in the two different reactions to my work. Among some development scholars I have encountered in Britain, there has been a distinct disinterest when I have explained my research topic to them, as if race

is relatively unimportant to development work in the academy and outside of it. Among development professionals – those I have encountered outside of interviews – people I have talked to have displayed a fascination in my thesis and often a candid admission that they believe race plays a significant role in their work, with some noting that their organisations perpetuate different forms of racialisation. I hope that for both academics and professionals this thesis continues, or brings light to, a conversation already begun by others and prompts recognition, at the least, that race and processes of racialisation are central to development discourses in Britain.

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