

Arslan, Ayse (2019) Industrial workers in the garment industry, house-workers in the family : women's productive and reproductive labour in Izmir, Turkey. PhD thesis. SOAS University of London. <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/30965>

Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners.

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s.

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination.

**Industrial Workers in the Garment Industry, House-
Workers in the Family: Women's Productive and
Reproductive Labour in İzmir, Turkey**

Ayşe Arslan

Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD

2018

Department of Development Studies
School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London

Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis

I have read and understood Regulation 21 of the General and Admissions Regulations for students of the SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

Signed: _____

Date: _____

To my mother Sebahat Arslan,
my sisters in blood – Yasemin, Nilüfer, Leyla –
and my sisters in spirit

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the productive and reproductive work of women garment workers in İzmir, Turkey and the interplays between these two forms of work. It combines E. P. Thompson's Marxist approach to class with a Marxist-feminist approach to women's reproductive labour, mainly elaborated by S. Federici, M. Mies, M. Dalla Costa and S. James. The broad aim of this study is to show that women's work in the labour market and reproductive work in the family cannot be separated from one another and must be analysed as an interrelated social relation. It further discusses the material conditions of garment work, labour regimes, socio-cultural aspects of everyday life, and social relationships on the shop floor, and shows that these are shaped by different forms of social oppression, such as class, gender, migration, age and ethno-cultural identities.

This research is mainly based on an ethnographic extended case study carried out from July 2015 to August 2016 in İzmir, Turkey. This fieldwork consisted of participant observation and in-depth interviews with different actors. By deploying a historical-materialist feminist analysis of the relationships between class and gender across productive and reproductive realms in the fieldwork settings, this study suggests that the material and social conditions of women's productive and reproductive work are inextricably linked, and shape one another. This thesis contributes to the existing literature on the interrelatedness of women's paid and unpaid work across productive and reproductive realms by arguing and illustrating that women's subordination and exploitation in one realm determines and stimulates their subordination and exploitation in the other. More specifically, the informalisation of women's labour in the İzmir garment industry is shown to reproduce the conditions for the appropriation of their unfree unpaid reproductive labour in the family and vice versa.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	3
Table of Figures.....	7
Table of Tables.....	8
List of Acronyms	9
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	10
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION.....	12
CHAPTER 2. A FEMINIST HISTORICAL MATERIALIST TAKE ON GENDER ACROSS THE REALMS OF PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION.....	21
2.1. Historical Materialist Perspective and Class as a Social Relation.....	22
2.2. Marxist-Feminist Theory on Women’s Reproductive Labour.....	28
2.3. Informalisation and Feminisation of Labour in the World.....	37
2.4. The Global Garment Industry	47
2.5. Conclusions.....	53
CHAPTER 3. TURKEY IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE: WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR INFORMALISATION AND REPRODUCTIVE LABOUR.....	57
3.1. Women’s Employment Under the Neoliberal Transition in Turkey.....	58
3.2. Informalisation of Labour during the AKP Era	66
3.3. The Gendered Nature of Labour Informalisation and Women’s Reproductive Labour under Turkey’s Neoliberal Conservative Hegemony.....	71
3.4. Labour and Gender Relations in the Garment Industry in Turkey.....	81
3.5. Conclusions.....	87
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK	91
4.1. Conducting Field Research from the Historical Materialist, Feminist Perspective.....	92
4.2. Geographical Research Area	95
4.3. Participant Observation.....	98

4.4. In-Depth Interviews.....	105
4.5. Positionality and Personal Experiences.....	110
4.6. Research Ethics.....	118
4.7. Conclusions.....	120
CHAPTER 5. ORGANISATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND LABOUR REGIMES IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY	
5.1. Factory-based Production.....	122
5.1.1. The Conditions of Factory Labour.....	127
5.1.2. Labour Control, Work Pressure and Alienation of Labour	135
5.2. Atelier-based Production	140
5.2.1. The Conditions of Atelier Labour	143
5.2.2. Syrian Refugee Workers and Child Workers in Ateliers.....	149
5.3. Home-based Garment Production: The Organisation of Work and Labour Conditions.....	155
5.4. Conclusions.....	160
CHAPTER 6. CLASS BEYOND STRUCTURAL POSITIONS: SOCIO-CULTURAL AND EVERYDAY LIFE, AND GENDER DYNAMICS IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY	
6.1. The Socio-Cultural Atmosphere and Everyday Life on the Shop Floor.....	165
6.2. Workers' Social Profiles and the Life Paths that Lead Them to Be a Garment Worker 170	
6.3. The Gendered Nature of Work and Everyday Life in the Garment Industry	179
6.3.1. Gender Relationships and Sexual Harassment at Work	182
6.3.2. The 'Bad' Image of Women Garment Workers and Women's Control over Other Women	188
6.4. Conclusions.....	195
CHAPTER 7. CLASS AS A COMPLEX SET OF SOCIAL RELATIONS: INTRA-CLASS RELATIONSHIPS IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY.....	
7.1. Workplaces Beyond Commodity Production	200
7.2. Different Ethno-cultural Identities on the Garment Shop Floor	206

7.3. Intra-Class Relationships under the Neoliberal Labour Regime and Patriarchy: Competition or Solidarity?	211
7.4. Conclusions.....	223
CHAPTER 8. DOMESTIC AND CARE WORK – WHOSE WORK? : WOMEN GARMENT WORKERS’ REPRODUCTIVE LABOUR.....	
	227
8.1. Productive and Reproductive Work Together: The Unequal Division of Labour at Home	228
8.2. “Men Have One Job, Women Have a Thousand”: Women’s Opinions and Feelings	237
8.3. The Interplays between Reproductive and Productive Work.....	245
8.4. Mothers, Sisters, Daughters: The Women’s Reserve Army of Reproductive Labour	252
8.5. Realities and Dreams of Women Workers.....	257
8.6. Conclusions.....	263
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION.....	
	267
9.1. Women’s Productive and Reproductive Labour from a Feminist Historical Materialist Perspective	267
9.2. Labour Informality and Women’s Labour in the Garment Industry	271
9.3. Class as an Experience and a Social Relation.....	278
9.4. Subordination and Exploitation beyond the Garment Industry: Unpaid Reproductive Work of Women Garment Workers.....	284
9.5. Limitations of the Thesis and Recommendations for Future Research.....	289
Appendix 1: Interviews with Women Workers.....	291
Appendix 2: Date and Place of Interviews with Women Workers.....	296
Appendix 3: Interviews with Employers.....	297
Appendix 4: Other Interviews.....	298
BIBLIOGRAPHY	299

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Top Ten Exporters of Clothing, 2016 (Export Volumes in US\$ billion)	48
Figure 2: Labour Force Statistics in Turkey by Years	60
Figure 3: Women's Labour Force Participation Rates (%) by Years in Turkey	61
Figure 4: Women's Employment Patterns by Sectors by Years in Turkey	62
Figure 5: Women's Labour Force Participation Rates (%), (>15 years old) OECD Countries in Q1 2017	63
Figure 6: Fertility Rates in Turkey, 2001–2016	75
Figure 7: Map of İzmir	97
Figure 8: Pictures of the Ateliers	144

Table of Tables

Table 1: Employment Status by Gender and Years, Turkey [Per thousand persons, >15 years old, (Percentage shares of total women's/men's employment status)].....	64
Table 2: Strikes Suspended by the AKP Governments in the 2000s.....	69
Table 3: Turkey's Garment Exports by Countries with the Biggest Share in 2015 (\$ billion).....	82
Table 4: Composition of Registered Workforce in the Garment Sector in Turkey in December 2016.....	83
Table 5: Research Questions	94
Table 6: Average Monthly Earnings and the Wage Differentials (as of October 2015).....	158
Table 7: Educational Status of Women	170
Table 8: Migration Status of Women.....	171
Table 9: Reasons for Migration	172
Table 10: Factory and Atelier Women's Social Networks in the Garment Industry	178
Table 11: Sexual Harassment Incidents in the Workplace.....	184
Table 12: Labour Union Statistics in İzmir's Garment Industry at the Time of Fieldwork.....	218
Table 13: Men's Share in Housework in Women Interviewees' Households....	232
Table 14: Circumstances in Which Men Help with Housework in Women Interviewees' Households	232

List of Acronyms

AKP	Justice and Development Party/ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
COC	Codes of Conduct
CSGB	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
EOI	Export-oriented Industrialisation
EU	European Union
FTO	Foreign Trade Association
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
JHSU	Joint Health and Safety Unit
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEA	Private Employment Agency
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party/ Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê
SGK	Social Security Institution
TURKSTAT	Turkish Statistical Institute
UK	United Kingdom
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I completed this thesis with the help and support of many people. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the wonderful people I met during the fieldwork, especially to the women garment workers and my co-workers in the factory and ateliers who devoted their time to me, shared their stories, listened to my story, and opened their homes, tables and hearts to me. Their smiles and sincerity kept me going despite the hardships I faced during the fieldwork.

My sincere thanks go to my supervisor, Dr. Alessandra Mezzadri, for her guidance and enlightening feedback. Her enthusiasm and immense knowledge improved the thesis tremendously. I would also like to thank the rest of my supervisory committee, Dr. Tim Pringle, Prof. Nadjé Al-Ali and Dr. Thomas Marois, and to my examining committee, Dr. Kanchana Ruwanpura and Prof. Özlem Onaran, for their insightful comments and valuable support. I am grateful to everyone who has created and contributed to the wonderful intellectual and social atmosphere at SOAS, especially the students, and all the staff – not just academic, but also all the ‘background’ staff whose work is vital. This enriching and friendly environment was key for me to enjoy the thesis journey. I met amazing friends at SOAS who have accompanied and supported me along the way. My special thanks go to: Bilge, Akif, Sila, Serena, Jo, Joshua, Daniel M., Veli, Francesco, Matteo, Daniel F., Paniz, Nafsika, Ezgi, Nithya and Zoe. I would like to also thank my teachers in the Political Science and Public Administration Department at METU (ODTÜ), who significantly contributed to my intellectual development.

I am grateful to Burcu, who was always on the other end of the phone during my days in London and encouraged me to keep going, and to Neşe who was a true friend and a refuge to me throughout this journey. It was a great relief to know that Beril would be there whenever I needed her. Special thanks to my dear friends Lale, Ferize and Gülen who have always been with me in my good and bad times since we met. A warm thank you is due to Ela (Elzbieta), Elif, and Eylül. A sincere thank you also to Sue for her diligent proofreading of the thesis.

My last and warmest thanks go to my family. There is no way I can thank my mother, Sebahat, enough. She gave so much of herself to raise six children, and still continues. Her contribution to this study is huge also because she hosted and looked after me during my fieldwork, and hosted my interviewees. In this journey, I also came to better understand and appreciate the value of her labour. My sisters Yasemin, Nilüfer and Leyla have always treated me with great love and care. I have always felt very fortunate to be their 'little sister'. I am grateful to have the love of my brother Ferhat. My father, Mizbah, and little brother, Hasan, are not with us anymore, but actually they are.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis applies a feminist historical materialist approach to study labour, gender and social reproduction in the garment industry in İzmir, Turkey. It is mainly concerned with how women's paid productive work in the garment industry and unpaid reproductive work in the family interact with each other. Under capitalism, women have always been a significant source of unprotected, informal paid labour and the primary responsible for reproductive work at home. However, with the onset of the neoliberal era, women's labour force participation and employment started to rise significantly, especially in labour-intensive and export-oriented sectors. At the same time, the burden of unpaid reproductive work on women's shoulders increased due to the increasing privatisation of social reproduction. Today, the interplays between class and gender receive more attention as a result of the growing feminist struggle in the socio-political and academic arenas. Following this line of inquiry, the main objective of this thesis is to explore the ways in which production relations/class experiences and patriarchal processes/norms shape each other in the realms of production and reproduction.

This is of interest for a number of reasons. Firstly, the interplays between capitalism and patriarchal ideologies did not receive due consideration in either mainstream or Marxist studies until the 1970s. Within the Marxist literature, gender has been often treated as secondary or 'additional' to class rather than as co-constitutive (e.g. Mies, 2014 [1986]; Federici, 2014 [2004]; Arruzza, 2016). Instead, this thesis considers gender and patriarchal ideologies as integral to capitalist production and class experiences. Secondly, within the analysis of the relationship between capitalism and patriarchal ideologies, the fundamental role of women's unpaid reproductive labour in the (re)production of capitalism and women's subordination has been mostly disregarded or underestimated (e.g. Mies, 2014 [1986]). Thirdly, and more specifically, the dynamic and close relationship between women's productive and reproductive work has rarely received sufficient attention. Thus, following a limited number of studies (see Kusakabe & Pearson, 2010; Ong, 2010; Carswell & De Neve, 2013; Schling, 2014; Mezzadri, 2016a, 2017), this thesis theoretically and

empirically analyses women's productive and reproductive work in relation to each other.

In order to study women workers' experiences across the productive and reproductive spectrum, this thesis deploys an original theoretical framework, which combines the historical materialist perspective elaborated by E. P. Thompson with Marxist-feminist theory on women's reproductive labour. Following Thompson, this thesis challenges the narrow 'economistic' and deterministic interpretations of class, characteristic of some orthodox Marxist analyses. On the contrary, this analysis sees class as a social relation, which eventuates as individuals *experience* their determinate class situations "within the *ensemble* of the social relations" (Thompson, 1978: 150). Class is a socio-cultural as well as an economic relation, which cannot be defined in isolation (Thompson, 1965: 357). In other words, it is misleading to define class merely in economic terms and to view culture and norms as secondary (Thompson, 1979: 17-18). Based on this particular perspective, this thesis investigates the ways in which workers experience, understand, and feel about their material conditions of work and life. Notably, this perspective allows for an in-depth analysis of diverse structural inequalities, the dynamic relationships between different forms of oppression, and how these are socialised.

Thompsonian insights on class contribute substantially to our understandings of how class is formed and experienced, and its social and cultural traits. However, Thompsonian class analysis fails to address the central role of gender and women's reproductive work in the perpetuation of capitalism and women's subordination. For this reason, and with the aim of overcoming this limitation, the thesis combines Thompson's take on class with Marxist-feminist approaches to social reproduction. Specifically, as there are already a small number of other contributions focusing on garment work (e.g. Mezzadri, 2017), the thesis draws on the useful insights of a number of Marxist-feminist thinkers, such as Silvia Federici, Maria Mies, Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, to account for gender and the exploitation of women in the realm of reproduction. Despite the central role of women's unwaged reproductive labour in the perpetuation of society and capitalist production, it has received

too little attention in academic and political spheres until recently. In fact, the exploitation of women's unpaid reproductive labour has provided the basis upon which capitalist production relations are established (Federici, 2012; Mies, 2014 [1986]; Dalla Costa & James, 1971; Vogel, 2013; Fortunati, 1995)¹. Furthermore, it has been one of the significant sources of women's subordination. With the rise of capitalism, women have been isolated in the home, their reproductive work has been devalued, and their autonomy has shrunk (Folbre, 1991; Federici, 2012; Mies, 2014 [1986]; Dalla Costa & James, 1971). Accordingly, a satisfactory class and feminist analysis requires considering the realm of social reproduction and women's role in it.

In fact, the term 'social reproduction' encompasses a large range of aspects (such as public education, health, housing, pensions, benefits, and leisure facilities), different social actors (including state, capital, individuals, and civil society) and various spaces (such as public sector, market, family and community). At its most fundamental and broadest level, social reproduction is about how people 'live' (Mitchell, Marston & Katz, 2004: 1). However, this thesis discusses social reproduction in the context of women workers' unpaid reproductive work. Throughout the thesis, the term 'reproductive work' refers to women as social actors and to their unpaid reproductive activities, mostly undertaken in the family. Having said that, women's unpaid reproductive work is also analysed in relation to state policies and the capitalist relations of production.

In order to provide the broad context of this study, the thesis also uses the literature on globalisation, and on the informalisation and feminisation of labour, in general and with reference to the global garment industry. The transition to neoliberalism has brought considerable changes to the organisations of production and labour conditions. In the neoliberal era – that is, since the 1970s – the transnationalisation of capitalist production has significantly accelerated, and become more flexible (Castells, 2010). Standard

¹ I use the term 'exploitation' since I argue that women's reproductive work is 'actual work' for capitalism and provides the basis upon which capitalist production relations are built. This point will be further elaborated in Chapter 2.

notions of permanent work have been eliminated, the power of labour has weakened (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005), and labour has become ever more precarious (Standing, 1999a, 2009). The number of women in employment has increased during this period, especially in labour-intensive and/or export-oriented sectors in developing countries (Standing, 1989, 1999b). The garment industry is one of the key sectors in which all these changes have been observed (e.g. Mezzadri, 2008; Ruwanpura, 2011). Thus, this thesis uses the insights from a number of studies, including those mentioned above, on the global transformations of production and labour regimes in general, and in the garment industry in particular.

The central argument of this thesis is that the material and social conditions of women's productive work and reproductive work are inextricably intertwined. The exploitation and subordination of women in one sphere trigger and stimulate their exploitation and subordination in the other. In other words, there is a reciprocal relationship between the sphere of production and the sphere of reproduction. The application of this macro-level argument to the case of women garment workers in the neoliberal age suggests that the informalisation of women's paid labour and the exploitation of their reproductive labour in the family stimulate one another. Women's reproductive obligations trigger the flexibilisation of their paid labour and cause higher exploitation of their labour in both the market and the family.

This research makes original contributions to the existing literature at different levels. First, it offers an original theoretical account as no previous study has combined a Thompsonian class perspective with a Marxist-feminist social reproduction perspective. This theoretical framework allows this study to investigate the complex socio-material processes behind the exploitation and subordination of women across the production and reproduction realms, and to explore the socio-economic, political and cultural implications for women's lives. Moreover, it enables this study to include the voices of research subjects and to give them agency. Second, this thesis contributes to the growing research field of women's reproductive labour by offering new insights into its theorisation. It provides an in-depth analysis of some of the central aspects of

reproductive labour, and examines working-class women's perspectives on it. Moreover, in line with other studies, the thesis also illustrates how reproductive labour subsidises capitalist production, and highlights the significance of what I define as the “women’s reserve army of reproductive labour”.

Third, this study contributes to the existing literature on issues of class, by going beyond the economic analysis of class and elaborating on the interplays between material and social life. It does so by examining the ways in which workers, individually and collectively, experience, think and feel about their class situations, and analysing the co-constitutive relationships between different forms of social oppression (e.g. gender, age, migration, and socio-cultural identities). Fourth, this thesis makes methodological contributions to the existing literature by deploying a multi-method fieldwork, which combines the ethnographic extended-case method (see Burawoy, 1998), composed of ethnography, participant observation and in-depth interviews, with quantitative data, and secondary sources. The novelty of this methodology lies principally in the combined deployment of ethnography and participant observation (employment as fieldwork) as synergetic research techniques, an approach which has been used in only a few previous studies. This allowed this study to explore the class and gender experiences of women garment workers across the production and reproduction realms in the natural flow of their daily life and from their own perspectives. In this sense, this thesis also offers important methodological insights on the key features of participant observation and its potential interplay with in-depth interviews, and on the role and positionality of the researcher in conducting fieldwork.

Finally, this study makes an important contribution to the study of gender and labour in Turkey, and more specifically in İzmir. There is an important growing literature on women’s industrial labour in Turkey (see Ecevit, 1991; Çınar 1994, Eraydin & Erendil 1999; Başlevent & Onaran, 2003, 2004; Sugur & Sugur, 2005; Atılgan, 2007; Toksöz, 2007, 2011; Balaban & Sarıoğlu, 2008; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; Yaman Öztürk, 2010; Beşpınar, 2010; İlkcaracan, 2012; Dedeoğlu, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Toksöz, Rittersberger-Tılıc & Celik, 2012; Kümbetoğlu, User & Akpınar, 2015;

Tartanoğlu, 2017), yet although this contains valuable accounts of women's unpaid reproductive work, there has been no detailed and systematic study of how the industrial and reproductive work of women workers shape each other in Turkey. Furthermore, so far there has been no research on women's employment in İzmir's garment industry. Thus, this study also fills an important gap in the literature in relation to its geographical focus.

This thesis is composed of nine chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework on which this study is based. After examining Thompson's class perspective, it discusses Marxist-feminist theory on women's reproductive work. It then analyses the key features of changing structures of production and labour regimes² in the neoliberal age, how women's reproductive work has been affected by the neoliberal transition, and how the informalisation of women's paid labour and increasing burden of their reproductive work are linked. Finally, it applies the same inquiry to the case of the global garment industry. Overall, this chapter discusses in detail the relationship between class and gender across the realms of production and reproduction on a broad level, and its implications for (women's) labour under neoliberalism in general, and (women's) labour in the garment industry in particular.

Taking a historical materialist perspective requires this study to locate the analysis in its historical and social context. The relations between class and gender, and between women's productive and reproductive work are manufactured in different ways in different societies. Accordingly, Chapter 3 provides a broad historical picture of Turkey in relation to the research areas of this thesis. It examines the socio-economic transformations that have taken place in the country in the neoliberal period, with a specific emphasis on the

² The term 'labour regime' is used in a broad sense in this thesis. As the labour regime in a particular workplace cannot be separated from the broader relations of production, the term implies the analysis of capital-labour relations at global, national and workplace levels, and the interactions between them. In other words, it not only refers to relations in production, but also to relations of production broadly (Mezzadri & Srivastava, 2015: 5). Furthermore, as this thesis will also confirm and illustrate, labour regimes are strongly related to issues of social reproduction (Pun & Smith, 2007; Mezzadri, 2017; Mezzadri & Lulu, 2018). Thus, the term also implies the analysis of the interplays between relations of production and relations of reproduction.

AKP (Justice and Development Party/Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) era, their implications for labour, and for women's productive and reproductive work in general and in the garment industry in particular. It illustrates that during the AKP era, the informalisation of the labour market has gained significant momentum, women have been over-represented in atypical and insecure jobs, the patriarchal gender norms that associate women with unpaid reproductive work have been reinforced by state policies and discourses, and women's reproductive obligations have significantly shaped and restricted their participation in the labour market.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the methodology employed for this thesis. It demonstrates the ways in which the theoretical frame was operationalised in the field, discusses the rationale behind the choice of method, presents the main and sub-research questions of the thesis, introduces the research area, reviews the research techniques, and examines the personal involvement of the researcher in the field and the research ethics criteria deployed during and after the fieldwork. The chapter suggests that the use of a multi-method fieldwork that combines the ethnographic extended-case method with quantitative data and secondary sources allowed the researcher to develop a deep understanding of women workers' experiences and perspectives, the socio-cultural context in which these are situated, and the class and gender relations across the production and reproduction realms.

The empirical narrative begins with Chapter 5. In line with the historical materialist perspective that this study adopts, this chapter looks at the labour regimes and the material conditions of garment work. It comparatively examines the broader structures of garment production, the organisation of work in the workplaces and labour conditions. It analyses the close interaction between these three levels across factory, atelier and home-based production scales of production in İzmir's garment industry in the light of the debates on labour informality. Since labour regimes are central to how workers experience their class location, the intra-class relationships at work and the reproductive work of women, this chapter provides the basis for the next three empirical chapters. It concludes that labour informality is widespread across the whole

industry and is experienced more intensely by the groups who have disadvantaged social positions based on gender, migration, age, and limited mobility. However, labour informality intensifies in relation to job insecurity and violation of legal labour rights through the end of supply chains, whereas it lessens in terms of heavy work pressure and harsh labour control.

In accordance with Thompsonian and feminist class perspectives, Chapter 6 focuses on the everyday class experiences on the shop floor and how they are shaped by patriarchal gender norms. It analyses the general features of the socio-cultural and everyday life in garment workplaces, women workers' social profiles, and the gendered nature of garment work and everyday life on the shop floor in İzmir. It highlights that class feelings and sentiments, and daily life on the shop floor are significantly shaped by the material conditions of work and life, and the strong patriarchal norms present in Turkey.

Chapter 7 furthers the analysis of the ways in which workers, individually and collectively, experience and understand their class situations, and the ways in which economic, political and cultural formations shape these experiences. To that aim, it focuses on the intra-class relationships and intra-gender relationships of women workers and looks at the impacts of ethno-cultural identities, the neoliberal labour regime and patriarchal ideologies on social relations at work. On a broad level, it demonstrates that the intra-class and intra-gender relationships of women are considerably determined by the interplays between labour, ethno-cultural identities and gender.

In line with the main aim of this thesis, Chapter 8 focuses on women's unpaid reproductive work in the family and its relationships with their garment work. It examines the main aspects of women's reproductive labour, women's opinions and feelings about the conditions of their reproductive work, the restricting effects of reproductive work on women's garment work, the ways in which women's unpaid reproductive work subsidises capitalist production, the role of the unpaid reproductive labour of women relatives and friends of working women – what I call the “women's reserve army of reproductive labour” – and women's future expectations and dreams. This chapter concludes

that the conditions of women's garment and reproductive work mutually shape each other. Trying to ensure the wellbeing of their families while working under poor, informal conditions in the garment industry, women face severe exploitation and subordination across both production and reproduction.

Chapter 9 gathers the main conclusions of the thesis and makes recommendations for future work in the field.

CHAPTER 2. A FEMINIST HISTORICAL MATERIALIST TAKE ON GENDER ACROSS THE REALMS OF PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION

This chapter provides the general theoretical framework on which this thesis is based. It discusses in detail the relation between class and gender across the realms of production and reproduction and then moves to analyse how these interplay in the context of the specific labour regime characterising the garment industry. This study combines the historical materialist theory on class with the Marxist-feminist theory on women's reproductive labour. It argues that women's productive and reproductive work should be analysed in relation to each other as an interrelated social relation, and in dialogue with other social relations.

In the first section, I will discuss a Marxian notion of class from the historical materialist perspective elaborated by Thompson. Based on Thompson's class perspective, this thesis challenges the economic deterministic interpretation of Marxism on class and understands class as a socio-cultural as well as an economic relation. However, as Thompson's class analysis is inadequate with regard to the role of patriarchal ideologies and women's reproductive labour in capitalist production relations, in the following section I will examine feminist Marxist theory to account for gender and the realms of reproduction. The insights of a number of key Marxist-feminist thinkers (e.g. Federici, Mies, Dalla Costa & James) will complement Thompson's class understanding. Together, Thompson's class approach and Marxist-feminist insights will enable us to analyse the complex relations between labour and gender, and their social and cultural expressions across the realms of production and reproduction in general, and in the garment industry in particular. After examining the relations of production (i.e. informalisation and feminisation of labour) and reproduction in the age of globalisation, I will trace the effects of labour informality, patriarchal norms and women's reproductive work in production relations in the global garment industry.

2.1. Historical Materialist Perspective and Class as a Social Relation

Class is a contested concept, which has provoked a considerable academic and political debate over its definition and implications. There are different ways to interpret and imagine class. This study is based on the Marxist analysis of class that argues for the interplay between economic relations and social relations at large. According to Marx and Engels, the mode of production does not simply explain the reproduction of the physical existence of individuals: “[r]ather, it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite *mode of life* on their part” (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1846]: 37). They emphasise the centrality of material conditions for grasping human reality by claiming that individuals depend on the material conditions of their production (1998 [1846]: 37). However, the relationship between individuals and their material conditions is not one-sided and ‘vulgarly’ deterministic, but reciprocal: “[t]he production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a twofold relation: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relation” (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1846]: 48-49).

Class is a historical concept, an abstraction based on “real individuals, their activity, and the material conditions of their life” (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1846]: 36-7). From the Marxist perspective, class is defined on the basis of ownership of the means of production and control of labour. In *The Communist Manifesto* (Marx & Engels, 2008 [1848]: 33), the capitalist class is defined as the class who owns the means of social production and employs wage labour, whereas the working class is defined as the class who has no means of production of their own, and has to sell their labour power in order to live.

This definition, however, does not mean that class is purely an economic location, distinct from the political, ideological and cultural spheres. On the contrary, there is an interaction between them. Class, political-ideological forms and social norms shape one another and are in a co-constitutive relation. To be more precise, social relations, such as race, gender and sexuality, are not ‘additional systems’ that just happen to co-exist with and qualify class, but concrete relations comprising a broader sociality, integral to the very existence

and operation of capitalism and class itself (Ferguson, LeBaron, Dimitrakaki & Farris, 2016: 32; see also Fernandes, 1997; Federici, 2014 [2004]; Bannerji, 2005; Mies, 2014 [1986]). Different forms of social oppression may sometimes reinforce and sometimes contradict each other; but they are always interrelated.

To put it differently, there is no homogenous class category whose members have identical and fixed social experiences. Instead, multiple forms of oppression shape the experiences of class members in distinct ways. As Bannerji (2005: 145) writes, we need “a social understanding that conceives social formations as a set of complex, contradictory and inclusive phenomena of social interactions”. This perspective requires us not to treat class as a solely economic category and “the ‘real’ or the fundamental creative force of society” (2005: 147) while treating other social categories [such as gender, caste, age, migration and ethnicity] as ‘secondary’ or ‘additional’ categories. We instead need to treat them as social relations that are mutually constructive of each other.

Accordingly, it is misleading to see the *material* and the *social* as separate entities. There is an interaction between them. Marx did not understand social reality as made up of atomised individuals, as clearly bounded and separate. Rather, he understood the world as a network of complex relations, within which any single element is moulded on the basis of its relation to the others (Sayer, 1987). In his letter to Bloch, Engels (1890) criticises the economic determinist interpretation of Marxism:

According to the materialist conception of history, the *ultimately* determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the *only* determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure — political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas — also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their *form*. (emphasis in original)

We need to take into account the *historical* and *relational* aspects of Marx's conceptualisations while analysing social reality through these concepts. This is why class cannot be understood as a fixed concept without looking at the historical and social context in which it exists and its relations with other components of social relations, such as gender, race and ethnicity. The labour force is socially constituted; the production and reproduction of it call forth a range of geographically and historically specific cultural forms and practices (Katz, 2001: 711).

In this regard, Thompson's approach to class as a process and lived reality of social life enables us to analyse the relations between the mode of production and the *ensemble* of social relations. Thompson (1965: 357) argues that as well as being an economic formation, it is also a social and cultural one which cannot be defined in isolation, but only in terms of relations with other classes over a considerable historical period. He rejects the base/superstructure dichotomy, the separation of the *economic* from the *social* and *historical*. For Thompson (1965: 352), reducing a superstructure to a base is misleading. He understands the *economic*, "not as a 'regionally' separate sphere which is somehow 'material' *as opposed to* 'social', but rather as itself irreducibly *social*" (Wood, 1990: 136). He argues that the mode of production does not show itself only in 'economic' institutions and practices, but also in values, norms and cultural patterns.

And yet, Thompson does not reject the centrality of the mode of production. What he does reject is defining it only in economic terms by treating social norms and culture as secondary and 'less real' (Thompson, 1979: 17-18). For him, the "base" – the process and relations of production – entails, and is embodied in, juridical-political and ideological forms as well as economic ones (Wood, 1990: 136). Following Marx, he argues for the materiality of ideas and values and states that values arise within the same nexus of material life and relations as our ideas (Thompson, 1995 [1978]: 236). However, he is also against the position that ideas, religious beliefs, or works of art may be reduced to the "real" class interests that they express (Thompson, 1965: 352). Although the 'economic movement' has proven to be the 'most elemental and decisive',

social and cultural phenomena do not come after the economic; they are, at their source, involved in the same nexus of relationships (Thompson, 1965: 356).

For Thompson, *experience* is central to understanding classes: “[c]lass eventuates as men and women live their productive relations and as they experience their determinate situations ‘within the *ensemble* of the social relations’, with their inherited culture and expectations” (Thompson, 1978: 150). In this sense, ideas, feelings, expectations and values gain importance for understanding class. He argues that we cannot understand class unless we see it as a *process*, as something “happening in human relationships” (Thompson, 2013 [1963]: 8). Class eventuates as a result of common experience; it is the articulation of some men’s interests as *between* themselves, and as *against* other men whose interests are different from theirs (Thompson, 2013 [1963]: 8-9). In this sense, he tries to improve the explanatory power of classical Marxism by focusing on ‘human relationships’, particularly social relations of exploitation (Blank, 2014: 32).

By emphasising the importance of the values and culture of the working class, Thompson acknowledges its active role. Rather than locating the essence of class simply in ‘structural *positions*’, Thompson locates it in the *relationships*, such as exploitation, conflict, and struggle that shape the processes of class formations (Wood, 1982: 59). His approach can also be read as an opposition to the denial of human agency. For him, individuals are not puppets whose activities and ideas are totally determined by the mode of production. On the contrary, he emphasises the different ways different classes experience the relations of production, and views human subjects as active agents in the transformation of history. Even if the culture of the ruled subjects remains ‘compatible’ with the prevalent system of production and power, subordinate classes experience production relations in their own particular ways that can come into conflict with the ‘common sense of power’, and produce the struggles to transform the modes of production (Wood, 1990: 140).

Thompson's approach to class as 'an experience' and 'a social relation' is critical to analyses of the contemporary working class, which has been fragmented by precariousness. Even if the objective production relations have divided the working class, both in material and class solidarity terms, the *experience* they share – the intensification of exploitation and insecurity – unite them. It is essential to reveal the common and particular experiences of the working class, who are engaged with diverse forms of production, amongst themselves and against the other classes. It is evident that every historical materialist approach should acknowledge objective production relations as the foundation of class relations. However, "the relationship among people occupying similar positions in the relations of production is not given directly by the processes of production and surplus extraction" (Wood, 1982: 61). Therefore, understanding class as a process enables us to understand the logic of production relations in the daily transactions of social life, in the concrete experiences of the working class outside the sphere of production itself. This approach makes it possible to grasp the commonalities and differences of working class experiences, and also makes it possible to find ways of developing the working class struggle.

Thompson's approach provides a deep analysis of the inequalities inherent in capitalist societies and how these are socialised, but fails to address the structural inequalities between men and women and how these shape their experiences. While he focuses on the daily experiences of the working class – and to an extent enables us to analyse the multiple inequalities embodied in everyday experiences – he does not address the question of gender. In fact, Thompson's historical focus was chiefly on men (Corfield, 2011: 7). Similarly, Scott (1988) argues that Thompson's most influential work, *The Making of the English Working Class*, is pre-eminently a story about men. In Thompson's account, "class is, in its origin and its expression, constructed as a masculine identity, even when not all the actors are male" (Scott, 1988: 72).

Where Thompson does mention women and their poor working conditions, these accounts are marginal. Although he acknowledges that not all workers were men, production is represented as a predominantly masculine

activity (Scott, 1988: 78). Moreover, there is an association of women with domesticity even when women's experience is referred to mainly in the context of production relations (Scott, 1988: 73). For instance, in addition to arguing that the abundant opportunities for women's employment in the textile districts gave women the status of independent wage-earners, he states that "the claim that the Industrial Revolution raised the status of women would seem to have little meaning when set beside the record of excessive hours of labour, cramped housing, excessive child-bearing and terrifying rates of child mortality" (Thompson, 2013 [1963]: 452). As such, he associates the problems related to reproductive work, namely housing, childbearing and child mortality, with women. In this way, he reinforces the identification and naturalisation of reproductive work as "women's work".

Even though social reproduction is as significant as production for the operation of capitalism and reciprocally intertwined, it has been overlooked and naturalised by many Marxist thinkers. With their primary focus on exploitation in the workplace, the exploitation of women at home has been ignored. Haider and Mohandesi (2015) argue that Thompson adhered to the notion of a separate, naturalised domestic sphere and thus he passed over the terrain of social reproduction in silence as he saw it as outside of history, as something that had always existed as such. Although Thompson's definition of class as a social and cultural formation enables us to analyse the class experiences of women and to give them agency, he does not elaborate on the role of the patriarchy and the subordination of women in class society.

Thompsonian social history, which demonstrated the possibility of the rescue of the subaltern classes from the "enormous condescension of posterity" (Thompson, 2013 [1963]: 12), has powerfully influenced feminist history "to recover the forgotten sex" (Hall, 1990: 81). Joan Acker finds Thompson's approach to class as a social-historical process to be most compatible with the feminist project (1988: 478). However, Thompson himself does not provide a comprehensive account of the relations between gender and class. Most of all, he does not analyse the role of women's unpaid labour and its importance to the operation of capitalism. As women are central to the

development of capitalism and the class struggle, the history of the working class should also include the history of women. In this sense, Thompson's conceptualisation of class can be quite productively complemented by the Marxist-feminist literature, which focuses on the subordination of women in capitalist societies; the relation between the exploitation of women's unpaid labour and the rise and reproduction of capitalism, and the different living and working conditions experienced by women as class subjects.

2.2. Marxist-Feminist Theory on Women's Reproductive Labour

The role of women in biological and social reproduction has been crucial for all modes of production, including the capitalist mode (Federici, 2014 [2004]). It is clear that gender systems are not peculiar to capitalism, nor did they arise as a consequence of capitalism. However, they have been transformed and re-articulated by capitalism. As Dalla Costa and James (1971) state, even if the oppression of women did not begin with capitalism, their intense exploitation and the possibility of their liberation did. The capitalist owning class historically inherits and benefits from patriarchal social structures (Hennessy & Ingraham, 1997: 11).

The conceptualisation of women's invisible 'reproductive labour' is one of the crucial contributions of feminist theorists. This contribution has focused on the analysis of the relation between the subordination of women and capitalism, and the possibilities for the struggle against both of them. Reproductive labour can be very broadly defined as activities associated with the maintenance and reproduction of peoples' lives on a daily and intergenerational basis (Ferguson et al., 2016). It entails three key components: "biological reproduction of the species", "the reproduction of the labour force", and "the reproduction and provisioning of caring needs" (Bakker, 2007: 541). Social reproductive activity, "comprising both affective and material labor...is indispensable to society. Without it, there could be no culture, no economy, no political organization" (Fraser, 2017: 21). In this sense, women's unpaid reproductive labour ensures the perpetuation of society and the reproduction of the particular type of individual that is necessary for capitalism.

However, beyond the vital role that reproductive labour plays in the reproduction of any society at any time, there is a particular reciprocal relationship between reproductive labour and capitalism. Federici provides a foundational explanation for this relationship. She claims that the circuit of capitalist production began and centred on 'the kitchen', 'bedroom', and 'home', and then moved on to the factory (Federici, 2012: 7-8). In other words, unpaid reproductive labour is central to the development of capitalism. The capitalist organisation of production is based on the exploitation of the unwaged labour of the 'house-worker' and the unequal power relations built upon her wage-less condition (Federici, 2012: 11). The existence of waged work, the accumulation of surplus value, and the functioning of capitalism as such depend on unpaid social reproductive activity (Fraser, 2017: 23). Women's unpaid reproductive labour enables the bourgeoisie to control and decrease the cost of labour which is necessary for (re)production of labour power. Moreover, by "denying housework a wage and transforming it into an act of love, capital has...also disciplined the male worker, by making 'his' woman dependent on his work and his wage" (Federici, 2012: 17). Therefore, women's dependency on men and women's unpaid reproductive labour are warranties for the operation of capitalism.

Mies, similarly, argues that the violent subordination of women has constituted the infrastructure upon which capitalist production relations were established. Without this infrastructure of coerced women's labour, the contractual labour relations of the free proletarians would be impossible (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 170). Capital has made men wage slaves because it has succeeded in allocating social services to women in the family (Dalla Costa & James, 1971). Reproduction of bearers of exploitable labour power is a condition of existence for capital (Vogel, 2013: 157). However, this structural or direct violence against women is not only based on economic objectives. "The economic motives are intrinsically interwoven with political ones, with questions of power and control" (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 170). A sharp division of reproductive labour from wage labour in capitalist societies also constitutes the basis for a

series of powerful ideological structures (Vogel, 2013: 160), and, as such, it is one of the primary sources of women's subordination to men.

We can now argue that the subordination and exploitation of women by both the ruling classes and men from their own class is a precondition for capitalist development. The production of goods and services cannot be separated from the production of life; the two are part of one integrated process (Luxton, 2006: 36). For women, dispossession has entailed the separation from the means of production, but also seclusion in the home, devaluation of reproductive work, and their deployment as either unpaid or cheap labour in the market. In other words, capitalism has developed through multiple processes of exploiting and strengthening patriarchal relations. However, the realm of social reproduction and the role of women in it were long excluded from academic studies and labour politics: for example, housework was not deemed a legitimate subject for intellectual enquiry until the late 1960s (Kynaston, 1996).

When we look at the reasons for the invisibility of women's reproductive labour, we can first say that it is invisible because it is attributed to women's 'natural' capabilities and dispositions. Housework has been imposed on women and "transformed into a natural attribute of [women's] female physique and personality" (Federici, 2012: 16). "Femininity became associated with domesticity, caregiving, physical weakness, and dependence" (Mohandesi & Teitelman, 2017: 44). Second, there are no fixed working hours for houseworkers. Working hours and leisure hours are inseparably interwoven with one another. Third, and most importantly, women's reproductive labour is invisible because it is unpaid. Separating the work of social reproduction from that of economic production, capitalist societies have associated the former with women and remunerated it in "the coin of 'love' and 'virtue'", and the latter with men who are compensated with money (Fraser, 2017: 23). The presumption of familial affection and the love between couples conceals the economic relationship within the familial organisation (Bennholdt-Thomsen, 1981: 21). In this sense, demanding a wage for housework has been one of the ways to make it visible. The *Wages for Housework* Campaign, which was launched in 1972 by a

group of feminists from England, Italy, France and the United States, was the first attempt to force the state to recognise reproductive work as work. For James (1975), the demand for a wage from the state is a demand to be autonomous of men, which opens the possibility of refusing forced labour in factories and in the home itself. This campaign exposed the root cause of women's oppression in capitalist societies and revealed the major mechanisms by which capitalism sustains its power and keeps the working class divided (Federici, 2012: 8).

The relationship between production and social reproduction has changed throughout history in parallel with changing modes of production and it is important to examine this relationship in order to understand women's changing conditions of subordination and exploitation. Federici's seminal study (2014 [2004]) on the transition from servile community to capitalism illustrates women's changing labour relations and experiences. For Federici, the sexual division of labour in the servile community was less pronounced and less discriminating. She argues that although land was usually given to men and transmitted through the male lineage in the medieval servile community, women serfs were less dependent on their male kin, less differentiated from them physically, socially, and psychologically, and were less subservient to men's needs than "free" women would later be in capitalist society (Federici, 2014 [2004]: 24-5). Women not only worked on the land, which was generally given to the family unit, but could sell the products of their labour (Federici, 2014 [2004]: 25). Moreover, women's domestic activities were not devalued and did not involve different social relations from those of men as they later would in a money economy where housework ceased to be seen as 'real work' (Federici, 2014 [2004]: 25). As wage labour and men's participation in the market economy expanded, production for use rather than exchange became identified as a distinctly women's activity and the work performed at home became devalued (Folbre, 1991: 465-6).

Similarly, Dalla Costa and James (1971) discuss the change in the organisation of production, namely the transition of the centre of production from the home and the family in a pre-capitalist patriarchal society to the

factory in a capitalist society. They argue that capital, which separated men from the family and turned them into wage labourers, created a fracture between them and all other wage-less proletarians (Dalla Costa & James, 1971: 10). Women, children and the aged, who do not receive wages and whose financial responsibility is on men's shoulders, lost the relative power that came from the family's dependence on their labour which was regarded as social and necessary (Dalla Costa & James, 1971: 5). With the transition to a capitalist patriarchal society, the nature of social reproduction and the conditions of women have changed substantially. Women have been isolated in the home, and forced³ to carry out work that is considered unskilled and focus on reproduction (Dalla Costa & James, 1971).

Each mode of production is built upon specific organisational forms of production and creates particular forms of social relations. Since under capitalism, reproductive work is excluded from the wage relation that rules the relationship between capital and labour, it has been devalued. Stolcke (1981) argues that as a result of the notion of progress, born in the 19th century, only activities related to material production are regarded as socially valuable. The work and achievement ethos of bourgeois society, which attributes work, production and progress to men, conceals the specificity of women's subordination (Stolcke, 1981: 32). This is why the exploitation of the non-wage labourer is hidden in capitalist societies, and women's labour "appears to be personal service outside of capital" (Dalla Costa & James, 1971: 10). With the rise of the capitalist mode of production, women have been relegated to the nuclear family, becoming more dependent on men, and social reproduction has been made into a private matter, left to women, and undervalued.

The domestication of women, their transformation into housewives who are financially dependent on their husbands, became the model of the gendered division of labour under capitalism which made it possible to control women's reproductive capacities (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 69). In this sense, women's economic, sexual and physical autonomy has shrunk under capitalism. Control

³ The term 'forced' is used herein not in physical or legal senses, but in social and economic senses.

over women's bodies has been exercised through laws on abortion, and government policies on birth rates, rape and sexual harassment. For example, witch-hunts in Europe were one of the most violent waves of male violence against women, aimed at domination and control over women's bodies, and their productive and reproductive work. The aim of witch-hunts was to rob women of their autonomy over economically productive functions and establish masculine hegemony in the economic, political and cultural spheres (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 70); and, as a result, women began to function as machines for the production of labour and the state's control over the women's body was institutionalised (Federici, 2014 [2004]: 184).

The crucial role that women's reproductive labour plays in the perpetuation of capitalism has been often disregarded by Marxist analyses. Many feminist thinkers have criticised the Marxian approach for focusing primarily on production, ignoring the centrality of reproductive labour to capitalism and the exploitation of women in the family (Mies, 2014 [1986]; Federici, 2012; Dalla Costa & James, 1971; James, 1975; Stolcke, 1981; Fortunati, 1995; Bhattacharya, 2017a). Orthodox Marxism has always seen women as psychologically subordinated people who, except where marginally employed outside the home, are outside production and essentially a supplier of a series of use values in the home (Dalla Costa & James, 1971).

Marx acknowledges the importance of reproduction for 'capital': "[t]he maintenance and reproduction of the working class remains a necessary condition for the reproduction of capital" (Marx, 1982 [1867]: 711). He also acknowledges the internal relation between production and reproduction: "[w]hen viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and in the constant flux of its incessant renewal, every social process of production is at the same time a process of reproduction" (Marx, 1982 [1867]: 711). Nevertheless, Marx's analysis of social reproduction is based on the assumption that workers are waged and neglects the great numbers of unpaid workers (house-workers, students, subsistence farmers and so on) and the many forms of labour that are not contracted or paid for in a monetary exchange (Mitchell et al., 2004: 6). The role of the housewife in social reproduction and so in the perpetuation of

capitalism, and its reinforcing effects on women's subordination and exploitation remain unclear in his studies. Similarly, large swathes of historical-materialist analysis have failed to grasp and underline the interdependence between relations of production and reproduction, or to capture the role that gender and sexuality play in the forms and structures of oppression that shape capitalism's social matrix in terms of both material conditions and ideologies (Ferguson et al., 2016: 28-29). The Marxian critique of the 'capital-labour' relationship omitted the home and the domestic sphere where women are responsible for all the work of reproduction of labour power and the working class more generally (Katsarova, 2015).

One main point of the debate arises from the Marxian conceptualisation of productive labour and the presumed division between productive and reproductive work. Marx argues "the only worker who is productive is one who produces surplus-value for the capitalist, or in other words contributes towards the self-valorisation of capital" (Marx, 1982 [1867]: 644). Mies rejects this narrow definition of the concept of the *productivity of labour*, and asserts that,

labour can only be productive in the sense of producing surplus value as long as it can tap, extract, exploit, and appropriate labour which is spent in the *production of life*, or *subsistence production*, which is largely non-wage labour mainly done by women. (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 47)

She asserts that the labour which goes into the production of life is productive labour in the broad sense of producing use values for the satisfaction of human needs. For her, since the production of life is the permanent precondition of all historical forms of productive labour, including capitalist accumulation, it has to be defined as *work* and not as unconscious "natural" activity (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 47).

Hence, looking for class only within the immediate process of production is inadequate and misleading. This limited definition would prevent us from seeing the fact that housewives are a section of the working class, as they (re)produce labour power both physically and socially, which is the foundation of capitalist society. Housework contributes to the accumulation of capital, and it is actually 'work' for capital, reproducing the most important commodity

capital has: the worker's capacity to work and to be exploited (Federici, 2006). Even if the housewife does not think of her labour as producing the commodity 'labour power', she rears human beings and works for the wellbeing of her family members, and so what she creates becomes a commodity (Bennholdt-Thomsen, 1981: 20). Housewives are the unpaid labourers who discipline children (i.e. future workers), and men workers and ensure they work for family survival. Rather than understanding the working class as waged workers, we must understand it as everyone who is dispossessed of the means of production and participates in the totality of reproduction of society (Mies, 2014 [1986]; Denning, 2010; Bhattacharya, 2017b).

Thus, a Marxian analysis of the entire cycle of production is not possible without incorporating reproduction (Fortunati, 1995: 10). The exploitation of the wage labourer depends on the exploitation of the non-wage labourer in capitalist societies. Hence, there is an inherent relationship and interdependency between productive and reproductive work. The rejection of the separation between them shows that women's unpaid domestic work is *work* and an essential necessity for the operation of capitalism. It enables us to see the reality that "more men depend on women's work than do women on a male 'breadwinner'"⁴ (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 160). The working day spent by women house-workers in the home is as necessary as the working day spent by men workers in the factory because it transforms the "means of subsistence into the labor power of the entire working family" (Fortunati, 1995: 92).

The separation between productive and reproductive work can also be articulated as the separation between the public and private spheres, a separation which feminist scholars have rejected analytically and politically. While the public (or economic) world has been associated with the market and men, the private (or moral) world has been associated with the family and women (Folbre & Hartmann, 1988; cited in Folbre, 1991: 467). As a result of

⁴ During the 1970s and 1980s, within the feminist literature, there was an important debate over a "male-breadwinner family model", in which the husband earns a family wage and the wife performs full-time reproductive work. The thesis does not engage in this debate because, as can also be seen from the case study of this thesis, this model became unsustainable for most working class families with decreasing wages and increasing social inequalities during the neoliberal era. See, as examples of the debate, Humphries (1977) and Barrett (1980).

believing in this separation and seeing housework as ‘unproductive work’ or ‘non-work’, Marxists have suggested women should enter paid employment, ‘productive work’, as a way of liberation. For example, according to Engels (1972 [1884]: 137-8), “the first condition for the liberation of the wife is to bring the whole female sex back into public industry”. Other than acknowledging the strenuous features of housework and opposing the subordination of women in the family, Lenin defines housework as unproductive and similarly argues that,

to effect her complete emancipation and make her the equal of the man, it is necessary for the national economy to be socialised and for women to participate in common productive labour. Then women will occupy the same position as men. (Lenin, 1965 [1919]: 43)

Many feminists have rejected this economistic Marxist approach to the liberation of women. Federici asserts that the Left wants to bring women to the factories because they presume that unpaid housewives “are backward with respect to the ‘real working class’ and can catch up only by obtaining a more advanced type of capitalist exploitation, a bigger share of factory work” (Federici, 2012: 29). Because the Left sees the roots of women’s oppression in their exclusion from capitalist relations, the solution, for them, is women’s introduction to these relations. The main problem of this approach is that it ignores the history of patriarchy and many of the other hegemonic and coercive structures that influence women’s engagement in social reproduction (Mitchell et al., 2004: 12). In fact, although women’s exploitation today has its roots in the capitalist mode of production, it is evident that becoming a wage labourer does not dissolve the subordination of women, but transforms it. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 8, Marxists’ strategy for the liberation of women means more work and more exploitation because women are already house-workers. Even if women work outside the home for pay, they are still primarily responsible for most reproductive work in the family. This means that women’s relatively higher economic independence is achieved through a rise in a double burden of domestic and paid work.

Contrary to the idea that women’s subordinate position stems from their being left out of the development process, what should be problematised are

the relations through which women are “integrated” into this process (Elson & Pearson, 1981: 145), and the ways in which they participate in the labour market while continuing to do unpaid reproductive work. Women are in the bottom segments of the occupational hierarchy and subjected to harsh working conditions including lower levels of pay, insecurity of employment, and sexual and verbal abuse, yet they persist in trying to ensure the survival of their families under these conditions. In the following two sections, I will first discuss the changes in labour regimes in the neoliberal period and their effects on women workers, and then the general conditions of production, labour regimes and women’s labour in the global garment industry.

2.3. Informalisation and Feminisation of Labour in the World

In the late 1970s, the crisis based on mass production, the redistributive state, and national development opened a new era in the history of capitalism and led to significant socio-economic transformations. This phase of capitalism, called ‘neo-liberalism’, has been characterised by increasing privatisation and deregulation policies, the elimination of national barriers to the flow of capital, the rise of globalised production networks and the commercialisation of public services. Neoliberalism has evolved to preserve capital(ism) and to weaken the power of labour by virtue of social, economic and political transformations imposed by internal forces as well as external pressures (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005: 3). Although capitalism has always tried to expand endlessly, the world economy only became truly global with the new infrastructure provided by the technologies of the late twentieth century (Castells, 2010: 101). In the new global economy, which uses institutional instruments, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) among others, national barriers to the flow of capital have diminished. Neoliberal globalisation prompted the transnationalisation of production (Mezzadri, 2008: 613). The number of transnational corporations with more sophisticated global production networks has since increased significantly (Paus, 2009: 4); and arguably, with the rise of emerging economies, global trade has become ‘polycentric’ (Horner & Nadvi, 2018).

One of the fundamental outcomes of the neoliberal transformation can be seen in the organisation of production processes and labour relations. Flexibility, which enables capitalists to overcome the unpredictability of production demand, became a basic characteristic of the new production process. Flexible production arose as an answer to overcome the rigidity of the mass production system and to manage unpredictable demands in worldwide diversified markets (Castells, 2010: 166). Increasing flexibility in the production process resulted in increased flexibility in labour relations. Labour market flexibility was suggested as the key to increasing export-oriented production and promoting economic growth (Onaran, 2002).⁵ Labour flexibility can be defined as the ability to reduce or increase employment or wage levels with ease, to increase mobility, to make more flexible use of skills, and to introduce nonconventional work arrangements (Kanawaty, Gladstone, Prokopenko & Rodgers, 1989: 277).

Thus, the 'new' regime has developed in a labour-unfriendly manner (Silver & Arrighi, 2001; see Mezzadri, 2008), and the *labourist model* in closed-economies, where social entitlements were tied to labour performance, and social protection and redistribution were based on the norm of full-time men's labour, became unsustainable (Standing, 2009: 42-44). Companies started to free themselves from the costs of keeping regular workers, and atypical and precarious employment increasingly replaced relatively secure permanent employment. The increasing atypical contractual relationships (such as short-term, part-time, seasonal, and subcontracted work) paved the way for low pay, poor working conditions, less job security, alienation from the working process, and de-unionisation (Standing, 2009).

In the meantime, the process of *informalisation of labour*, which refers to exacerbating job insecurity, poor working conditions and less social protection, has become the central concept to describe changing labour relations (Arnold & Bongiovi, 2013). While informalisation was discussed at the level of the

⁵ In fact, however, the experiences of many developing countries, which were trapped in a vicious cycle of low wages, low accumulation rates, and low employment growth despite increasing their labour market flexibility, contradict this argument (Onaran, 2002: 767-8).

'informal sector' in the 1970s and, as a broader system, termed the 'informal economy' in the 1980s, it has become to be considered as 'an employment strategy' referring to a more generic term by the beginning of the 2000s. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), employees are considered as having informal jobs "if their employment relationship is not subject to standard labour legislation, taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain employment benefits" (ILO, 2002: 124). Similarly, Chen (2007: 2) defines informal employment as "employment without labour and social protection, both inside and outside informal enterprises, including both self-employment in small, unregistered enterprises and wage employment in unprotected jobs".

Therefore, limiting the discussion of labour informalisation to the formal/informal dichotomy would be misleading. In this era, not only has the employment rate in the unregistered sector increased, but the features defining informal employment have expanded to almost every type of employment: the distinction between formal and informal labour has become blurred (Mezzadri, 2008; Chang, 2009). As argued by Bernstein (2007: 4), "the boundaries between the active and reserve armies of labour become ever more fluid, together with a shrinking 'core' of relatively secure wage employment in the former, and a growing component of the latter that is chronically pauperised". Therefore, informalisation should be defined as a *process*, rather than an object (Castells & Portes, 1991; Meagher, 1995).

Indeed, the legal regulations of work relations are important to the labouring classes. However, since both the content and implementation/violation of legal frameworks depend on class power relations, the organised/unorganised class powers are equally significant for grasping the impacts of the informalisation of labour. As Chang (2009: 167) states, the main reason behind informalisation is not the absence of a regulatory framework; rather it is employers' unwillingness and the labour movement's inability to protect workers.

As class is a *social relation* (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1846]; Thompson, 2013 [1963]), informalisation cannot *only* be analysed in terms of the deteriorating material conditions of the working class but must also be analysed in terms of class powers. Globalisation has undermined the conditions in which traditional trade unionism was possible (Sanyal & Bhattacharya, 2009: 35), and resulted in a steady dismantling and withering of existing labour rights (Bhattacharya, 2014: 942). Labour informality has destroyed the organised power of labour via fragmented and dispersed production systems. As workers become more isolated in both the physical (fragmented working process and places) and social (reduced class solidarity) sense, organising around class interests has become much more difficult.

As a result, labour informality not only reduces the cost of labour for capitalists, it is also an effective way of controlling labour. Job insecurity and fear of job loss have weakened the collective power of the working class. Today, workers face the permanent threat of unemployment. Employers take advantage of every opportunity in the 'free market'; they easily retrench workers who complain about unfavourable working conditions or organise against them. In other words, informalisation has become a useful tool for employers to discipline labour and reduce workers' resistance.

It should be noted here that it would be misleading to assume that all workers across the world were enjoying standard permanent employment before the neoliberal period. Full-time, standard employment is an exception in the history of capitalism, which existed for only a minority of workers, even in industrialised countries, during the Fordist phase (Mitropoulos, 2006; Vosko, 2010; Breman & van der Linden, 2014). In this sense, regarding the 'precariat as a new class' (Standing, 2011) would be misleading because what has changed is not labour's position within the production process, but the features of labour itself. Workers are still "classic proletarians: stripped of the means of subsistence and with no option but to sell their labour power in order to survive" (Breman, 2013: 132). In short, flexibility and precariousness have always been intrinsic to capitalist employment relations, but intensified and became widespread in the neoliberal era. From the Thompsonian perspective, it

is crucial to understand how the increasing precariousness under neoliberalism affects the ways in which workers experience and understand their material conditions of work, and the intra-class relationships among themselves.

The state has been a key agent in the process of informalisation of labour and in weakening the power of organised labour. Flexible forms of employment are increasingly becoming legalised and institutionalised via state practices, and workers' living and working conditions are getting poorer via state regulations. For instance, Mezzadri's study (2010) on the Indian garment sector illustrates that the reproduction of informality takes place in the context of a strong capitalist state, actively engaged in supporting the expansion of labour informalisation processes. The Indian state has facilitated and strengthened the process of informalisation of labour through implementing policies favouring the resilience of informal arrangements and aligning with capital's interests against those of labour (Mezzadri, 2010: 502). Similarly, Goger and Ruwanpura (2014) illustrate that the state played an active role in the process of the establishment of a new capitalist mode of production and of proletarianisation in a post-war setting in Sri Lanka.

In line with the neoliberal growth and labour informalisation strategies, the state also directly engages in controlling and disciplining labour. As Hensman (2001: 1073) wrote, governments have attacked labour rights to attract investment and boost exports. For example, the South Korean state has repressed trade union activities to limit worker-management conflict and thereby reduce production costs, which is essential in an export-oriented economy (Seguino, 1997: 110). Although there are many violations of workers' rights worldwide, in most cases states do not take responsibility. All these indicate the main feature of neoliberalism: the systematic use of state power to impose market imperatives (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005: 3; see also Ruwanpura, 2018).

Understanding class as a social relation and arguing for the interplay between the *material* and the *social* requires us to look at the interplay between class experiences and other social relations. Looking at labour informalisation

from this perspective, we see that informal employment entails the supply of labour by more vulnerable groups. In this regard, gender, age, education level, and citizenship status become important determinants. Immigrants, women, young, and uneducated people, who possess less bargaining power in the labour market, are more vulnerable to insecure jobs. Informal labour is not a homogenous category: different social groups experience the new labour regime in different ways.

Gender has been one of the most important elements in the structuring and perpetuation of globalisation and labour informalisation. With the end of the Fordist phase, which was associated with more protected *male* labour, women workers accounted for as many jobs as men. While women have always been a significant source of workers for unprotected, informal jobs, the deteriorating living standards of the working class have resulted in a significant increase in their participation in paid work. Growing poverty caused by the elimination of social welfare policies and the rise of neoliberal policies forced more women to seek paid work: the increasing labour market flexibility and diverse forms of insecurity became a driving force for greater women's labour force participation and employment (Elson & Pearson, 1981; Standing, 1999b).

This new transformation in the labour process was soon termed as the 'feminisation of labour' (Standing, 1989, 1999b), referring to the increasing participation of women in paid employment, as well as the expansion of less secure and poorer working conditions, previously characterised by women's employment, to men's employment. There is a reciprocal relationship between the informalisation and the feminisation of labour. The process of feminisation of labour has emerged in certain contextual developments where international trade has increased significantly; production has been shifted to countries where labour costs have been relatively low; labour rights became increasingly regarded as production costs to be avoided to maintain or improve 'national competitiveness'; protective labour regulations and employment security have been eroded; and, the privatisation of social protection and individualisation of social security have grown (Standing, 1999b: 584).

With the elimination of barriers to the flow of capital and the globalisation of production more women became employed, especially in the labour-intensive and/or export-oriented sectors. The fragmentation of production processes and new areas of export specialisation created an increased demand for low-paid, flexible women's labour (Afshar & Barrientos, 1999: 5). Consequently, the increasing participation of cheap and flexible women's labour in production quickened and, arguably, 'facilitated' the industrialisation process in developing countries. Women's disadvantaged status has been a stimulus to investment, exports and, by extension, economic growth (see Seguino, 2000; Staveren, Elson, Grown & Çağatay, 2007).

Today, women form the majority of informal labour in most developing countries and constitute its poorest and most vulnerable ranks (Horn, 2010). Within informal employment, they tend to be under-represented as informal employers and 'regular' informal waged workers and over-represented as industrial outworkers (Chen, Vanek & Heinz, 2006: 2136). Compared to men workers, women are also over-represented in the bottom and lower-paid segments of the informal economy (Chen, 2007; Brown, McGranahan & Dodman, 2014). Hence, women are particularly vulnerable to both structural and individual discrimination and abuse in terms of working conditions, insecurity of employment, levels of pay and harsh or undignified employment (Pearson, 2007: 735). In addition to being discriminated against in terms of wages and job security, women workers face gender-specific problems in the workplace, such as the lack of maternity-related benefits and childcare facilities, patriarchal pressure and control, and sexual and verbal abuse (Barrientos & Smith, 2006; Hale & Wills, 2005; Smith et al., 2004).

Since women traditionally had lower levels of labour-force participation than men and less experience of formal employment or traditional union organisation, they were often assumed to be more compliant and accepting of the poorer employment conditions linked to flexible employment than men (Barrientos, 2001: 86). Dejardin and Owens' study reports that in times of hardship, women are more prone than men to accept lower paying and insecure jobs (2009: 6). Women are also considered to be a more disciplined, malleable

and easier workforce to manage (Caraway, 2005; Ruwanpura & Hughes, 2016). Wright's (2006) work on Mexico and China reveals how the myth of "disposable women", who are regarded as dexterous, patient, and attentive workers, operates throughout developing countries and serves as a tool for establishing their normative characteristics and behaviours. Similarly, Salzinger (2003) shows how a fantasy of "productive femininity" (i.e. cheap, docile, dexterous femininity) is produced in the daily routines of the shop floor in Mexican industry and frames decisions about the production process, such as hiring and labour control.

However, portraying women workers as docile and passive is misleading and based on essentialist understandings of gender and femininity. Despite patriarchal oppression, women workers' various collective struggles around the world have disproved this myth (see Moghadam, 1999; Salzinger, 2003; Lee, 2005; Pun, 2005, 2007; Chan, 2006; ILO, 2013). It should also be noted that although they are relatively more apparent nowadays, women workers' particular problems have not appeared on the agendas of organised class movements for a long time. Functioning within patriarchal paradigms, trade union leaders have not seen women as equal partners and have not been interested in their particular needs (RoyChowdhury, 2005: 2250).

As I argued in the previous section, women's productive and reproductive work cannot be separated from one another as they are strongly interwoven. Moreover, the forms of social reproductive work are not static but historically variable (Arruzza, 2016: 25). Viewed from this perspective, I argue that the informalisation of women's paid labour and the exploitation of their reproductive labour in the family are internally linked and stimulate one another. Patriarchal gender norms and women's reproductive obligations weaken women workers' bargaining power and cause higher exploitation of their labour, both in the market and in the family. Although more women have moved into paid labour, men are still considered the primary wage earners and women as responsible primarily for housekeeping. 'Being a housewife', the primary role universally associated with women, provides a base for low wages.

Defining women as 'housewives' means their work can be bought far more cheaply than men's labour (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 116).

Besides, as Caraway (2007: 44-45) convincingly argues, the main reason women are concentrated in labour-intensive sectors with high labour turnover instead of capital-intensive sectors is that the latter encourage long tenure and do not want to deal with the costs and organisational 'troubles' associated with maternity leave. Due to being associated with the domestic sphere, short-term employment of women is seen as socially acceptable, as it is assumed that they would return to their domestic 'responsibilities' the rest of the year (Barrientos, 2001: 89). This employment flexibility functions as a way of reducing the risks of the unpredictability of demands. Hence, their reproductive roles and obligations pave the way for women's informal employment.

Given the time and energy that they spend in a paid job, the increase in women's informal employment in the labour markets in parallel with the growth of neoliberalism has diminished their capacity to perform reproductive work, on the one hand, and increased their total workload on the other. Moreover, since the nation state has been drawn into a complex of supranational, regional, and multilateral systems of governance, it has abandoned, reduced, or reconfigured many of its previous responsibilities for social reproduction (Mitchell et al., 2004: 16). As a result, social reproduction has been opened to market rules and its burden on women significantly increased. The neoliberal regime has increasingly privatised and commodified social reproduction (Katz, 2001; Folbre & Nelson, 2000; Arruzza, 2016; Fraser, 2017).

To give capital total control over labour, globalisation "must expropriate workers from any means of subsistence that may enable them to resist a more intense exploitation" (Federici, 2012: 86). This is why, according to Federici, it has to systemically attack the material conditions of social reproduction and the main subjects of social reproductive work, which are largely women in most countries. Hence, globalisation is, in essence, a war against women; its effects are particularly felt by women in the 'Third World', but it weakens the

livelihood and autonomy of working class women in every region of the world (Federici, 2012: 86).

The state has been a main actor in decreasing the autonomy of women, increasing appropriation of their unpaid reproductive labour in the family, flexibilising their labour in the labour market through diminishing social protections, reproducing patriarchal gender norms that associate women with reproductive work and implementing labour deregulation policies. In the globalisation era, the state has disinvested in the reproduction of the workforce by cutting spending on health care, education, infrastructure and basic necessities (Federici, 2012: 108). For example, the US state started to devolve the costs of social reproduction back onto the working class with the rise of neoliberalism (Mohandesi & Teitelman, 2017: 63). In Taiwan, the state encouraged women to continue to provide unpaid labour to the family and larger community, while simultaneously pursuing their factory work via its “Living Rooms as Factories” and “Mothers’ Workshops” programmes (Seguino, 2000: 34), and in South Korea, the state condoned the ‘marriage ban’, which frequently required women to quit their formal sector jobs upon marriage (Seguino, 1997: 109). In the 1980s, the Singaporean state reversed fertility reduction policies to increase the supply of workers in future generations and simultaneously encouraged part-time employment of women (Pyle, 2005). These examples illustrate that the state not only acts in a way to facilitate and reinforce informalisation of labour, but also to ensure the increased appropriation of women’s reproductive labour in the family and their participation in the labour market in accordance with the bourgeoisie’s demands.

Having provided the macro-theoretical frame and discussed the main effects of the neoliberal labour regime on (women’s) (reproductive) labour, I now present a picture of the global garment industry upon which this thesis is centred. The garment industry is one of the biggest export-oriented, labour-intensive industries in which informalisation and feminisation of labour have been witnessed worldwide. In the following pages, after introducing the global garment industry, I trace the effects of the neoliberal labour regime on

(women's) garment labour and discuss the interplays between women's garment and reproductive work.

2.4. The Global Garment Industry

The garment industry is one of the largest and oldest export industries, with supply and demand chains all around the world. Clothing accounted for 3.04% (\$444 billion) of total merchandise exports in 2016 (WTO, 2017). As shown in Figure 1, the biggest garment exporter in 2016 was China, followed by the European Union (EU) (28) countries. The garment industry is one of the most globalised industries in the world, organised in complex commodity chains and production networks (Mezzadri, 2010; Kumar, 2014; RoyChowdhury, 2015). The chains and networks extend from raw material production through yarn spinning, fabric weaving, dyeing and finishing, garment sewing and trimming, to labelling, packaging and delivery (McNamara, 2008: 6).

In the neoliberal era, production units were relocated from the Global North to the Global South due to the lower costs of labour in the South. Although the garment industry was already internationalised before the implementation of neoliberal politics (Mezzadri, 2008), relocation accelerated due to the increasing mobility of capital and competition to reduce production costs. As a result, we have witnessed the emergence of "manufacturers without factories", such as Nike and Adidas, which concentrate on increasing profit through design and marketing while reducing costs and risk through outsourcing (Hale, 2000: 351). The relocation, which started in East Asia in the 1970s, expanded to include Southeast Asia, Latin America, China and South Asia (Mezzadri, 2010: 42). Today, late-industrialised countries account for the majority of global garment exports.




Figure 1: Top Ten Exporters of Clothing, 2016 (Export Volumes in US\$ billion)

Source: *World Trade Statistical Review, WTO 2017: 35*

Being a highly labour-intensive and low technology industry, the garment industry has been the first rung on many countries' ladder to industrialisation (Kabeer & Mahmud, 2004: 133). The governments and entrepreneurs of developing countries have seen the industry as a development lynchpin which opens doors to foreign investment and brings in foreign exchange earnings (Hurley & Miller, 2005: 17). Garment companies in developing countries compete with each other in terms of quality, price and time taken for delivery, having usually been provided with the design and specification of garments by retailers (Fukunishi & Yumagata, 2014: 14). Because it is a relatively low-cost labour-intensive industry, developing countries can offer a comparative advantage, especially through labour costs (Hurley & Miller, 2005: 17). However, many developing countries now face growing competition and downward pressure on prices as almost four decades of restrictions on trade formally ended with the demise of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement quota system⁶ in 2005 (McNamara, 2008: 1).

There is a complex subcontracting chain in the global garment industry, starting with buying companies and ending with home-based workers. Today,

⁶ This international agreement was in effect between 1974-2004 and imposed quotas on the exports of textile and garment products from developing countries.

garments are the global product *par excellence*, “created through a complex organization of production stretching across the world economy” (Mezzadri, 2017: 16). Thus, there is a multiplicity of ways to utilise labour in the garment industry, from large mills employing thousands, to medium-size family-run firms, to small sweatshops, to individual outworkers, who are usually women, toiling in their own homes (Elson, 1994: 189). While power is consolidated at the top of the industry with closer relationships between retailers/marketers and key manufacturers, the bottom of the chain is characterised by increasingly complex and multifarious relationships (Hurley & Miller, 2005: 39). The subcontracting system enables buyers to lower contract prices, pressuring manufacturers to keep labour costs low and thus leaves workers more vulnerable (Esbenshade, 2004: 104). However, although retailers exert almost total control over the pay and conditions of garment workers by forcing manufacturers to accept rock-bottom prices, the subcontracting chain allows them to argue that they are not responsible for working conditions and labour rights violations in the industry (Hoskins, 2014: 78).

The geographical relocation of the industry, increasing competition to reduce labour costs and expansion of subcontracting has intensified the informalisation of the labour market in the garment industry. The garment sector is largely characterised by informal, non-unionised, cheap and short-term employment (Hale, 2000; Wills & Hale, 2005; Mezzadri, 2010; Kumar, 2014; RoyChowdhury, 2015); local manufacturers, locked into fierce competition, accept unprofitable deals and then increase the pressure on their own workforces through forced or unpaid overtime (Hale, 2000: 352).

Often, the minimisation of labour costs is realised by employing socially disadvantaged groups who have less bargaining power in the labour market (RoyChowdhury, 2015). The development of the garment industry worldwide has been achieved through benefiting from structural inequalities (Mezzadri, 2010). As is the case with the working class in general and informalised labour in particular, (women’s) garment labour cannot be treated as a homogenous category, but instead should be considered as a set of intersecting relations of various social forms of oppression. In addition to gender, there are various axes

of differentiation to segment the garment labour force such as ethnicity, age, migration or mobility. Different typologies of garment labour are anchored to other social structures of oppression and subordination (Mezzadri, 2017: 74).

Given a massive subcontracting chain and ongoing pressure to decrease production costs, globalised garment production is characterised by numerous labour violations. Withholding pay, union busting, mass firings and lockouts, and even limiting toilet breaks and forced pregnancy testing of workers are some of the most common violations (Brooks, 2007: xvii). Garment workers face insecurity of employment, which is determined by fashion trends and market fluctuations (Hale, 2000: 353). Moreover, the organisation of workers against poor working conditions is especially difficult in the garment industry due to flexible production and high labour informality. Short-term employment constrains the establishment of solidarity bonds between workers (Kumar, 2014: 800), and prevents them from developing long-term strategic organisations to challenge poor working conditions. Furthermore, given the small amount of capital needed for garment production and the relatively short time needed to complete orders, transnational companies tend to shift manufacturing sites to other countries in the event of widespread local protests, the enforcement of national labour laws, or rising wages (Brooks, 2007: xxiii).

In the history of the development of the garment industry, in parallel with the expansion of the market, the production process was subdivided into a series of increasingly simpler tasks which could be carried out by less and less skilled, and thus cheaper labour, mainly women and girls (Kabeer & Mahmud, 2004: 134). As better technology has de-skilled production, more and more women, mostly young and unmarried, have been employed in the garment industry (Rosen, 2002: 240). Women workers are considered an ideal workforce to be employed in the larger industrial units since they are perceived as less likely to unionise (Mezzadri, 2010: 52). Today, although the garment industry is heavily feminised (RoyChowdhury, 2015; Hensman, 2011; Ruwanpura, 2011; Mezzadri, 2010; Wills & Hale, 2005; Kabeer, 2004; Kabeer & Mahmud, 2004; Kumar, 2014; Rosen 2002), women workers remain largely invisible. Women's contribution to value generation is more likely to be

disguised, especially in the garment areas where women's participation on the shop floor is low (Mezzadri, 2016a). In fact, women play a key role in the non-factory realms of garment production, especially in the petty commodity enterprise where they participate as 'family aids' (Mezzadri, 2016a: 1884).

High-intensity and hyper-exploitative production relations inside the factories that produce clothing for the retail market are maintained through patriarchal gender roles and representations (Brooks, 2007: xviii). The industry creates extensive wealth for those at the top, while many millions of women endure working conditions of low pay, forced overtime and insecure hours (Wills & Hale, 2005: 1). Women workers are subject to low wages, weak collective bargaining opportunities, lack of equal pay for work of equal value, poor or non-existent maternity protection and various forms of violence (ILO, 2014: 12). They face the threat of dismissal when they get pregnant and rarely get their jobs back afterwards (Hensman, 2011: 219). In some cases, their spatial mobility is restricted by their families in order to maintain cultural norms of respectability, which in turn forces them to accept a smaller income rather than a lucrative job that requires them to be mobile (Carswell & De Neve, 2013: 67). The garment sector not only benefits from gender inequalities, it also strengthens them through the gendered division of labour in production. In Bangalore, for example, men are employed as 'highly skilled' tailors, security guards and managers, whereas women are employed as cutters, tailors and helpers, and the latter, that is, any work done by women, are seen as 'unskilled' (Kumar, 2014: 797). Similarly, in Delhi, while men workers complete full garments, women workers are restricted to single assembly-line tasks (Mezzadri, 2016a: 1888).

There is a crucial link between the [gendered] labour processes and social reproduction (Carswell & De Neve, 2013; Lier, 2007; Mezzadri, 2017). Exploitation of women's productive and reproductive labour is much higher and more tightly interwoven for women working in industries with high labour informality, such as the garment industry. It is women's association with reproductive work and familial responsibilities that allows higher exploitation of women in global garment production. The reason why the garment sector is

regarded as one of the most appropriate sectors for women is its flexible production organisation and precarious employment patterns. In this way, women are assumed to carry out paid productive and unpaid reproductive work together in the most efficient way. From the capitalist viewpoint, women's identification with unpaid reproductive work makes them the optimal labour force that can be employed on a short-term basis without social rights.

The flexibility which women need to combine paid work with domestic responsibilities means worse work conditions, i.e. a shift from export to domestic garment work, from factory work to home-based work, from large compliant firms to smaller firms (Carswell & De Neve, 2013: 67). Being associated with the domestic sphere, women work as unpaid workers without any social rights in family-based garment production units and play a crucial role in the survival of petty commodity production (Mezzadri, 2016a: 1881). Women, especially those who are married with small children, prefer home-based work or jobs where they can negotiate working hours so that they can stop work to fulfil reproductive tasks (Carswell & De Neve, 2013: 67). Childcare responsibilities oblige women to stop doing garment jobs when there are no networks of support available (Pearson & Kusakabe, 2012: 116-7). Women are also compelled to retire early in order to spend more time and energy on care for their families, especially in the cases of sudden family illness (Ruwanpura, 2013: 157-158).

Moreover, it is women who are first excluded from paid work in household-based production when work availability is limited during crises and who are expected to revert to reproductive tasks to subsidise the declining family wage (Mezzadri, 2016a: 1891). Thus, and as I will demonstrate in more detail in Chapter 8, women workers' conditions of production and reproduction are internally linked and shape one another.

However, despite the abovementioned strong interrelation between reproductive and productive work and the highly gendered nature of production and labour, the organised working class struggle in the industry seems to be largely indifferent to gender concerns. The tension between gender

and class is obvious in the unionisation of garment workers, the majority of whom are women, while trade union bureaucracy and leaders are mostly men (Anner, 2011). In the United States, for example, although the garment industry has traditionally been a site of women's work and women have been at the forefront of organising and building the union movement, the labour aristocracy has traditionally consisted of white men (Brooks, 2007: 118). Similarly, the trade unions in the Asian garment industry remain patriarchal as men are regarded as more competent in socially valued domains and thus more suited to leadership (Evans, 2017). Unless the discrimination against women is eliminated and gender-based working problems are included in the class struggle, the organised power of the working class is destined to remain weak. To develop a strong class struggle, all obstacles to women's participation in labour unions' decision-making mechanisms and leadership should be eliminated. Labour movements should finally cover women's unpaid reproductive work and gender-based working problems, and challenge unequal power relations between men and women at the workplace and beyond.

2.5. Conclusions

According to Thompson's Marxist historical materialist perspective, upon which this study is based, class is not a fixed concept that can be reduced to fixed locations, but a process embedded in a complex set of social relations (Thompson, 2013 [1963]). In this sense, values, norms, and feelings are important in order to understand the particular ways in which individuals live their productive relations and experience exploitation, conflict, and struggle. From a Thompsonian class perspective, class is as much a socio-cultural formation as it is an economic one. In other words, class is a social as well as a material phenomenon, since these two are not regionally separate entities. Therefore, a satisfactory class analysis can only be developed by looking at the interplays between the economic, political and cultural spheres which allows us to trace the effects of production relations in the daily transactions of social life and the dynamic relationships between different forms of social oppression.

Although Thompson's class approach enables us to account for multiple social inequalities, it does not explain the role of gender and women's

reproductive labour in capitalist relations of production. In this regard, the contribution of Marxist-feminist theory to Marxist class analysis is crucial. Marxist-feminist theorists, such as Federici, Mies, and Dalla Costa and James, allow us to see the importance of women's devalued, unpaid reproductive labour in the (re)production of capitalism and its reinforcing effects on women's exploitation and subordination. With the rise of capitalism, women were relegated to the home and became more dependent on men, and reproductive work became 'women's work' and devalued. Capitalist production relations are built on women's coerced unwaged reproductive labour (Federici, 2012; Mies, 2014 [1986]; Dalla Costa & James, 1971; Fraser, 2017). Unpaid reproductive work ensures the reproduction of societies in general, and labour power in particular, on a daily and intergenerational basis. By doing so, it not only decreases the cost of labour but also ensures the reproduction of the particular type of individual that is necessary for capitalism. Accordingly, housewives (i.e. house-workers) are a part of the working class. Moreover, women continue to be house-workers even if they participate in the labour market and so carry the double burden of paid and unpaid work – a point that many Marxist thinkers failed to take into consideration when suggesting women participate in productive labour as a way of liberation.

When we look at women's participation in labour markets, we see that they have been employed as cheap and vulnerable labour on the lower and so-called less-skilled end of the occupational ladder. Women's current labour conditions have been significantly shaped by the neoliberal transformation. Neoliberalism has developed into a harsh labour-unfriendly regime, which has substantially weakened the power of the working class through structural transformations realised in social, economic and political realms. In the neoliberal era, labour informality has become the main employment strategy to decrease production costs and increase profits. The flexibilisation of production and the precariousness of labour conditions have escalated, resulting in a steady deterioration in the working and living conditions of the working class. Workers are forced to work in poor, unsafe and risky conditions, with less labour protection and job security.

Women represent a substantial part of the massive pool of informal labour that characterises many developing and emerging economies and, increasingly, is expanding to mature economies as well. Women are, in fact, more likely to be represented in informal employment (see Horn, 2010; Chen, 2007). Moreover, with the globalisation of production, more women became employed, especially in labour-intensive and/or export-oriented sectors and factories in developing countries (Standing, 1989, 1999b). Given the unequal power relations between women and men, women are more likely to be discriminated against in terms of working conditions, job insecurity, low wages and undignified employment (Pearson, 2007). In addition, the social construction of women as 'housewives' reproduces their vulnerability across labour markets (Mies, 2014 [1986]; Elson & Pearson, 1981). In other words, women's unpaid reproductive labour becomes a tool for employers to lower labour costs. In particular, in sectors where labour informality and flexibility in production is high, women are regarded as the optimal workforce who can be employed on a short-term basis without social protection.

The garment industry is one of the leading industries with high women labour participation and labour informality. It is characterised by flexible production with massive supply and subcontracting chains, and informal, non-unionised and cheap employment. The hyper-exploitative production relations that characterise the industry are maintained through patriarchal gender norms which assume that women are less likely to unionise and easier to control. Moreover, they are regarded as the optimal temporary workforce due to their reproductive obligations to the family. As a result, the exploitation of women's productive labour in garment production and the exploitation of their reproductive labour in the family reproduce and reinforce each other. Indeed, there is a self-reinforcing relation between the conditions of vulnerability women face across the productive and reproductive spheres because their exploitation and subordination take place across both realms simultaneously.

The theoretical frame developed in this chapter will be operationalised in Chapters 5-8, in which I will analyse the productive and reproductive labour conditions of women garment workers in İzmir and provide evidence for the

arguments that I have developed here. In order to provide a broad and historical picture to contextualise the fieldwork findings, the next chapter presents the socio-economic transformations that have taken place in Turkey in the neoliberal era, and their implications for labour and women's productive and reproductive work in general and for the garment industry in particular.

CHAPTER 3. TURKEY IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE: WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR INFORMALISATION AND REPRODUCTIVE LABOUR

The theoretical frame that I developed in the preceding chapter requires us to look at the complex relationships and synergies between labour and gender, and between women's reproductive and productive work. These relations are manufactured in different ways in different societies: women's subordination in production and in the family varies across geographical areas. This is because, as argued by Kandiyoti (1988; see also Ruwanpura, 2007), patriarchal norms change considerably across different regions; hence, they are also likely to articulate – and co-constitute – class in distinct ways. Based on the theoretical premises of the thesis, this chapter gives a broad and historical picture of Turkey in order to contextualise the fieldwork findings. It provides an overview of the recent socio-economic transformations in relation to women's employment, labour informalisation and women's reproductive labour with a specific emphasis on the AKP era.

I will first look at the main characteristics of women's employment and their subordination in production during the neoliberal era. Based on the data that I gathered from various statistical sources, I will claim that women are over-represented in atypical, insecure jobs, and discriminated against in terms of payment and social rights. In the second section, I will analyse the labour informalisation process and labour conditions in general in order to better grasp the conditions of women's participation in the labour markets. I will argue that informalisation of the labour market has gained considerable momentum, especially over the last 16 years, due to the anti-labour politics of the AKP which extended the legal basis for flexible employment, provided a legal ground for the establishment of private employment agencies, enforced restrictive regulations concerning unionisation and collective bargaining, and implemented repressive, hostile policies against organised labour.

In the third section, I will show the links between informalisation of labour and patriarchal ideologies at a macro level, and between women's paid and unpaid labour. I will argue that patriarchal gender norms that associate

women with unpaid reproductive work provide legitimacy for the informalisation of labour at a broader level. As I will show, women bear the primary responsibility for the reproduction of family members in Turkey and reproductive work is the main obstacle to their participation in the labour market. The neoliberal-conservative politics in the country tries to simultaneously ensure an increased appropriation of women's reproductive labour in the family and their flexible employment in the labour market through reinforcing patriarchal gender norms. In the final section, I will look at the implications of labour and gender relations in the Turkish garment industry, which is marked by high labour informality and relatively high women's employment. I will examine the general characteristics of production, labour conditions and gender dynamics in the sector. I will argue that the main force behind the competitiveness of the Turkish garment industry is the intensive exploitation and subordination of women's labour through patriarchal norms that associate women with the domestic sphere and reproductive work, systematically devaluing their contribution to production. In short, in Turkey, the 'domestication' of women through reproductive responsibilities exceeds the boundaries of the household and shapes the mechanisms for the appropriation of their paid labour in the garment industry.

3.1. Women's Employment Under the Neoliberal Transition in Turkey

When we look at the historical trajectory of women's employment in Turkey, we see that they have always been under-represented in employment and concentrated in low-paying and labour-intensive sectors (see Toksöz, 2011; Makal, 2001; Kazgan, 1982). During the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) period until the 1980s, women's labour force participation in the registered economy was extremely low. Women constituted 17.6% of all registered workers in 1947, 13.1% in 1955, and 11.2% in 1965 (Makal, 2001: 134). ISI provided men with more secure jobs with relatively better working conditions. In that era, men household heads were able to sustain their families alone since wages, and thus purchasing power, were relatively high (Toksöz, 2011: 24). Another main characteristic of women's employment before the

neoliberal era was that it was highly concentrated in the agricultural sector. Women's share of non-agricultural employment stood at 8% in the 1950s and had increased by only 4% in 1980 (İlkkaracan, 2012: 9), and industrial employment of women was concentrated in the tobacco (57% of the total employment in the industry), garment and textile (30% of the total employment in the industry), and food and beverage (25% of the total employment in the industry) sectors in 1970 (Kazgan, 1982: 164).

In to the 1980s, in parallel with the global developments at the time, Turkey took its first steps towards neoliberalism and the transition from ISI to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) policies. In line with the neoliberal transition, anti-labour and pro-capital economic policies were introduced (Boratav, 1990: 225), the export-oriented segments of capital were provided with various types of export incentives (Bekmen, 2014: 53), financial and product markets were deregulated (Aydiner-Avşar & Onaran, 2010: 2045), all sections of the organised labour movement were banned from politics, and the majority of prominent activists were jailed (Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2009: 36).

However, during the 1990s, the state faced an institutional crisis where the economic opening was not integrated with a parallel development in its institutional capacities to undertake efficient regulation (Öniş & Bakır, 2007: 149). Dependency on financial accumulation and uncontrolled financial inflows and outflows triggered economic fragility (Akça, 2014: 23-24), and the economy was marked by huge budget deficits and high inflation rates. The economy could not increase private investment, which could have provided a sustained overall stimulus (Özden & Bekmen, 2015: 90); thus, compared to the 'East Asian miracles' that have been attributed to the combination of a strong state and export-oriented strategy, the Turkish state failed as a promoter of both capital accumulation and international competitiveness (Yalman, 2009: 15).

In the beginning of the 2000s, existing social unrest arising from a series of crises paved the way for the rise of a new political party, the AKP. Since the party came to power in 2002, Turkey has witnessed significant structural transformations in both economic and socio-political terms. The party has

pursued a ‘free economy-strong state’ project (Akça, Bekmen & Özden, 2014: 3), and promoted the interests of large-scale domestic capitalists and international investors (Onaran & Oyvat, 2016: 274). The neoliberal doctrine, which had been the aim of the ruling class since the 1980s, was consolidated owing to the 16-year one-party rule of the AKP. During this era, contrary to the party’s rhetoric built on selective economic statistics, such as high growth and low inflation, the economy has remained fragile due to the high current account deficit, dependency on volatile capital flows, high levels of domestic and external private debt, persistent levels of inequality and poverty, and the inability to create sufficient jobs (Onaran & Oyvat, 2016: 274). Consequently, despite the economic growth sustained since 2000, with the exceptions of 2001 (-5.96%), 2008 (0.84%) and 2009 (-4.7%),⁷ labour participation rates have not increased, and unemployment rates have remained high (see Figure 2).




Figure 2: Labour Force Statistics in Turkey by Years

Source: Author’s compilation based on TURKSTAT database (accessed October 23, 2017)

In the meantime, from the 1980s to the present (2018), there has been no meaningful increase in women’s labour force participation rates (see Figure 3). The abundance of men’s labour supply (Toksöz, 2011: 27), low levels of direct foreign investments during the 1980s and 1990s (Yaman Öztürk, 2010: 33), stagnant employment rates, and low levels of export-oriented production have

⁷ Author’s compilation based on the WB database (accessed June 20, 2018).

been the main reasons for the lack of significant demand for women’s labour in urban areas. Moreover, waning agricultural employment had a significant effect on women’s labour participation: the share of women workers in the agricultural sector dropped from 78.5% in 1990 to 51% in 2004 and to 28.7% in 2016 (see Figure 4), and the rise in industrial employment was too low to balance this out. As can be seen from Figure 4, although the total number of women workers in industry has tripled since the 1990s, its percentage share rise of total women’s employment was much lower – from 7.6% in 1990 to 14.9% in 2016. The strongest feminisation patterns have been witnessed in the service sector rather than the industry. The service sector contributed 75% of the net jobs created in the 1980-2009 period, versus only 22% by manufacturing (İlkkaracan, 2012: 10).




Figure 3: Women’s Labour Force Participation Rates (%) by Years in Turkey
 Source: Author’s compilation based on OECD statistics (accessed on November 3, 2017)




Figure 4: Women's Employment Patterns by Sectors by Years in Turkey
 Source: Author's compilation based on TURKSTAT database (accessed October 23, 2017)

Therefore, unlike the high rates of feminisation of labour in Latin America and South East Asia that could be observed in parallel with the adoption of EOI policies (Beneria, 2003), there was no significant feminisation trend in Turkey. On the contrary, the women's labour force participation rate dropped from 36.1% in 1989 to 32.5% in 2016. Thus, export-orientation does not necessarily and directly result in feminisation of labour, particularly if economic growth is not accompanied by a sustainable and high level of economic activity (Başlevent & Onaran, 2004: 1390). At present, Turkey has the lowest rate of women's employment among OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries at 31.6%, compared with an OECD average of 59.8% (see Figure 5). However, it should be noted here that the national and international statistics underestimate the actual rates of women's labour participation in the Turkish labour markets. As Dedeoğlu (2012) argues, official statistics, showing decreasing women's labour force participation in Turkey, mainly focus on educated women workers and ignore informal women's labour. In fact, as I will show in the following pages, women mostly work as unregistered and temporary workers in Turkey.




Figure 5: Women's Labour Force Participation Rates (%), (>15 years old) OECD Countries in Q1 2017

Source: Author's compilation based on OECD database (accessed November 3, 2017)

When we look at the main characteristic of current women's employment in Turkey, we see that women work in more insecure jobs for lower wages and with less social protection than men. In particular, women who used to be unpaid family workers in rural areas but migrated to urban areas are now employed in the informal sector in metropolitan cities (Başlevent & Onaran, 2004: 1378). In the 2000s, unregistered and precarious employment has become more prevalent among women of low-income households in urban spaces (Buğra & Keyder, 2003; Toksöz, 2007). Rising income inequality and women's unemployment combined with overall deteriorating wage incomes in

the 2000s have forced women in low-income groups to increasingly enter the labour market through informal jobs (Dedeoğlu, 2010: 7-8). The economic activities of low-educated and unqualified women are concentrated on informal work, such as home-based work and care work (Tartanoğlu, 2017: 29).

Women are over-represented in part-time and home-based work and paid less than their men counterparts. According to the OECD gender equality database, in 2017 the share of women's part-time employment in total women's employment was 17.9% compared to only 5.9% for men. Thus, the share of part-time employment among women is more than triple that of men. Moreover, while the number of home-based women workers increased from 220,000 in 2004 to 517,000 in 2013, home-based men workers increased from only 27,000 to 32,000 (Turkish Statistical Institute [TURKSTAT] database).⁸ These figures indicate that women constituted 94.2% of home-based workers in 2013, being 16 times more likely to be a home-based worker than men. Women's subordination in production manifests itself in unequal payments as well: in 2016, the annual average income of women was TL 20,645 (roughly \$5,900 as of December 2016), whereas it was TL 26,438 (roughly \$7,550) for men (TURKSTAT database).⁹ As such, women earn around 78% of men's wages in Turkey.

Table 1: Employment Status by Gender and Years, Turkey [Per thousand persons, >15 years old (Percentage shares of total women's/men's employment status)]

Years	WOMEN				MEN			
	Paid Worker (regular/causal)	Employer	Own Account Worker (self-employed)	Unpaid Family worker	Paid Worker (regular/causal)	Employer	Own Account self-employed Worker	Unpaid Family worker
2004	2,263(44.8%)	49(1%)	490(9.7%)	2,244(44.5%)	8,430(57.8%)	950(6.5%)	4,081(28.8%)	1,123(7.7%)
2006	2,670(50.8%)	69(1.3%)	659(12.5%)	1,859(35.4%)	9,358(61.7%)	1,093(7.2%)	3,895(25.7%)	819(5.4%)
2008	2,975(53.2%)	77(1.4%)	616(11.1%)	1,927(34.4%)	9,962(63.9%)	1,172(7.5%)	3,707(23.8%)	757(4.8%)
2010	3,260(50.7%)	83(1.3%)	822(12.8%)	2,260(35.2%)	10,052(63.9%)	1,120(7.1%)	3,725(23.7%)	823(5.3%)

⁸ Author's own calculation based on TURKSTAT database (accessed November 20, 2017)

⁹ Author's own calculation based on TURKSTAT database (accessed November 23, 2017)

2012	3,967(54.3 %)	93(1.3 %)	788(10.8 %)	2,460(33.6 %)	11,652(66.5 %)	1,145(6.5 %)	3,907(2.4 %)	808(4.6 %)
2014	4,627(60.2 %)	94(1.2 %)	701(9.1 %)	2,266(29.5 %)	12,499(68.6 %)	1,079(6 %)	3,777(2.7 %)	889(4.7 %)
2016	5,276(63.5 %)	112(1.3 %)	734(8.8 %)	2,190(26.4 %)	13,101(69.3 %)	1,127(6 %)	3,801(2.1 %)	864(4.6 %)

Source: Author's compilation based on TURKSTAT database (accessed October 20, 2017)

Regarding the employment status of women, in 2016, 63.5% of employed women were paid workers, 26.4% unpaid family workers (4.6% for men) and 8.8% own account workers, while only 1.3% of women were employers (6% for men) (see Table 1). Thus, women are almost six times less likely to be an employer and five times more likely to be an unpaid family worker than men. Women are also discriminated against in the labour market concerning legal protection and social rights. According to the TURKSTAT database,¹⁰ the unregistered employment rate was 33.8% in total employment, 28.8% in men's employment and 45% in women's employment in 2016. This shows that women workers are more likely to work without employment contracts and social security benefits. Unsurprisingly, unemployment rates are higher for women than for men. According to the OECD gender equality database, Turkey's unemployment rate was 9.2% among men and 12.7% among women in 2015. Given these facts, Turkey ranked 130th of 140 countries in the Global Gender Gap Report 2016 (World Economic Forum, 2016: 346).

All these data indicate that women, who have historically been under-represented in employment, are over-represented in atypical, insecure jobs and discriminated against regarding payment and social rights. State policies since 2002 have played a significant role in the flexibilisation of women's labour; thus, before moving to analyse the relation between the recent process of women's labour informalisation and women's reproductive labour, I will first sketch out the general features of Turkey's labour informalisation process and the working conditions it implies, in order to contextualise and better understand the context in which women's productive and reproductive labour takes place.

¹⁰ Author's own calculation based on TURKSTAT database (accessed November 15, 2017)

3.2. Informalisation of Labour during the AKP Era

Turkey, which has followed orthodox structural adjustment policies since 1980, is usually seen as a successful example in terms of labour market flexibility (Aydiner-Avşar & Onaran, 2010: 204). The AKP has played a crucial role in labour market flexibility in the country. The deregulation of the labour markets has been a continuous aim of the party (Onaran & Oyvat, 2016: 294). Its first significant piece of pro-labour flexibilisation legislation took place in 2003, one year after coming to power. With the new Labour Law No. 4857 enacted by the AKP, subcontracted, temporary, part-time labour was given a legal ground and became prevalent. According to this law, firms employing fewer than 30 workers are allowed to cancel the permanent labour contracts of workers who have been working for less than six months without giving a reason or paying redundancy (article 18). While the previous legislation only allowed firms employing 10 or fewer workers to do so (Labour Law No. 4773, article 13/A), the new law allows a greater number of firms to do so. Given that 6,825,233 (49.5%) of the 13,775,188 workers registered in 2016 were employed in firms with fewer than 30 workers,¹¹ the new law provided extensive labour flexibility to the majority of private enterprises and eliminated job security for almost half of the total workforce. This legislation resulted in serious job insecurity for women, as they are mostly concentrated in small-scale companies (Yaman Öztürk, 2010: 47).

The new law also facilitated the implementation of overtime work for the benefit of employers. While employers had to obtain the approval of the regional directorates of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to ask their workers to work overtime before 2003 (Labour Law No. 1475, article 35), the new law removed this requirement and firms were free to ask their workers directly (article 41). Following these labour market deregulation policies, the part-time employment rate rose from 6.6% in 2002 to 9.6% in 2017.¹² Also, according to a report by the Republican People's Party (CHP), the number of subcontracted workers in the public and private sectors has increased more

¹¹ Author's compilation based on SGK database (accessed March 15, 2018).

¹² Author's compilation based on OECD database (accessed July 29, 2018).

than five-fold, jumping from 387,000 in 2002 to around 2 million in 2017 (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 June 2017).

Another significant legal step towards labour flexibilisation has taken place through the establishment of private employment agencies (PEAs) in Turkey. PEAs are labour contractors whose role in the deregulation of labour markets has been growing globally as they enable employers to manage peaks and troughs in labour demand (Barrientos, 2013: 1061). In contrast to European countries where these agencies have long been established, in Turkey they were legalised by Law No. 4857 for the first time in 2003. In May 2016, Law No. 6715, termed 'the law of labour for rent' and heavily protested by working class organisations, was enacted to authorise PEAs to establish temporary employment relationships.

The authorisation of PEAs opened an important door for employers to lower labour costs. According to this law, PEAs are the legal employers of their workers, and it is they who set the scope of work and labour conditions. They supply workers to a producer (i.e. the 'real' employer) on the basis of a contract for a fee. There is no direct contractual relationship between a worker and a real employer. PEAs also pay the workers' wages and social security benefits – but only for the period that workers are contracted to work. Hence, employers are supplied with suitable and precarious labour without having to cover the costs of permanent employment, such as social security and severance payments or take on the potential 'risks' of labour mobilisation. PEAs make a profit as commercial agents by charging the 'real' employers more than they pay the workers they supply them with. Within this profit-oriented legal framework and practice, it is the workers who lose in terms of job security, payments, health and safety, social security benefits and the right to organise.¹³ According to the Turkish Employment Institution database, there were 437 PEAs in October 2017. Although the number and effectiveness of PEAs in Turkey is still far behind those in the US and Europe, it is likely that their role and authority in the flexibilisation of labour in Turkey will increase over time.

¹³ For a detailed analysis of adverse effects of Law No. 6715 on labour, see Bakır (2017).

As I argued in the previous chapter, class powers are central to the labour informalisation process. The weakening power of organised labour is both a significant result and cause of labour informalisation. Since the 1980s, organised labour has lost political power in Turkey, as in other parts of the world. The institutional changes brought about by neoliberal policies caused severe erosion in labour unions' membership figures, and in their political and ideological influence over society at large (Doğan, 2014: 188-9). Under AKP rule, unionisation levels have remained considerably low. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (CSGB), the rate of unionisation in the private sector was 12.2% in January 2017 (CSGB, 2017). However, this figure underestimates the reality because it only includes registered workers. When the unregistered employment rate is taken into account, which was announced as 35.2% in July 2017 (TURKSTAT, 2017), the actual unionisation rate falls far below the official rate.

One main reason behind the low levels of unionisation in Turkey is legal regulations. Labour unions are subject to legal barriers which limit their authority to conclude collective labour agreements in the workplace. According to Law No. 6356 enacted in 2012, only those labour unions representing at least 1% of the workers engaged in a given branch of activity¹⁴ (Law No. 6552, 2014, article 20) and more than half of the workers employed in the workplace and 40% of the workers in the enterprise to be covered by the collective labour agreement shall be authorised to conclude a collective labour agreement (article 41). In the private sector, the number of registered workers covered by a collective labour agreement (431,181) was only 3.4% of total registered workers and 30.2% of total labour union members (1,429,056) in 2015 (CSGB, n.d; CSGB, 2015a). As such, two-thirds of unionised workers cannot negotiate with employers via the collective bargaining agreement procedure and are left more vulnerable to employers' attacks for being a labour union member. The low numbers of collective labour agreements and low unionisation rates reproduce each other.

¹⁴ According to Labour Law No. 6356, there are 20 branches such as food industry; weaving, garment and leather; bank, finance and insurance; communication and so on.

Despite the weakening of the organised power of labour, a number of effective strikes have been organised in the last decade in Turkey. However, the state has actively engaged in suppressing strikes and workers' protests via legislative power and police brutality against strikers. Since the 1980 military coup, the government has had the right to suspend a strike and, according to article 63 of Law No. 6356, a lawful strike or lock-out that has been called or commenced may be suspended by the Council of Ministers for 60 days if it is deemed prejudicial to public health or national security. Despite this already existing authority, the AKP utilised its extensive power derived from the state of emergency rule to expand the scope of strike suspensions with Emergency Decree Law No. KHK/678 in November 2016. According to article 35 of the decree, a lawful strike or lock-out that has been called or commenced may be suspended if it is prejudicial to urban public transportation services of the metropolitan municipalities, and economic or financial stability in banking services, as well as to public health or national security (*Official Gazette*, 22 November 2016). In practice, this law allows a complete ban on the right to strike and has been effectively used to prevent workers' collective struggles.

Table 2: Strikes Suspended by the AKP Governments in the 2000s

Date of Governmental Decree	Grounds	Industry Involved	Trade Union Involved
1 June 2003	National security	Rubber	Petrol-İş
8 December 2003	National security	Glass	Kristal-İş
14 February 2004	National security& public health	Glass	Kristal-İş
21 March 2004	National security	Rubber	Lastik-İş
1 September 2005	National security	Mining	Maden-İş
27 June 2014	National security & public health	Glass	Kristal-İş
30 January 2015	National security	Metal	Birleşik Metal-İş
18 January 2017	National security	Metal	Birleşik Metal-İş
20 January 2017	National security	Metal	Birleşik Metal-İş
20 March 2017	Economic & financial stability	Banking	BASS
22 May 2017	National security	Glass	Kristal-İş
5 June 2017	Public health	Pharmaceutical	Petrol-İş
26 January 2017	National security	Metal	Birleşik Metal İş/ Türk Metal/ Çelik-İş

Source: Author's compilation based on *Official Gazette* issues published on the dates shown in the left column of the table.

As can be seen from Table 2, 13 major strikes so far have been suspended under AKP rule. Four of these strikes were in the glass industry; four in the metal industry; two in the rubber sector, and one each in the mining, banking and pharmaceutical sectors. Six of the 13 suspensions took place in 2017 under the state of emergency law, which has been in force since July 2016 and which the AKP has been using as an opportunity to implement controversial changes in the political and economic realms. The informalisation of the labour market and support of capital and capitalists have been two of the most important points in their economic and political agenda. In a July 2017 meeting, Erdoğan, the party leader, set out the AKP's anti-labour politics and the ways in which the party deployed emergency rule to this end. The following quotation from Erdoğan speaks for itself:

We are enforcing emergency laws in order for our business world to function more easily. So, let me ask: have you got any problems in the business world? Any delays? When we came into power, there was again a state of emergency enforced in Turkey but all factories were under the threat of strike. Remember those days! But now, by making use of the state of emergency, we immediately intervene in the workplaces under the threat of strike. Because you can't shake our business world. We use the state of emergency for this (*Birgün*, 13 July 2017).

As Erdoğan's speech makes obvious, the AKP attacks the right to strike in order to appeal to domestic and foreign capital, and mobilise the support of the bourgeoisie. The government tries to suppress organised labour through criminalising on-going strikes. Suspensions of strikes are not exceptional cases but a regular strategy, amounting to a systematic violation of workers' right to strike in Turkey (Çelik, 2015). The AKP uses its legislative and executive power to suppress the labour movements. In cases where workers collectively resisted labour informalisation policies, the party has not refrained from resorting to coercive measures and tried to remove dissent through force (Civelekoğlu, 2015: 109). Consequently, these state policies further diminish the organised power of labour, which has already been weakened by the attacks of neoliberalism via job insecurity, low wages, and diminishing social protection. As Erdoğan clearly stated as early as 2008, the AKP has been ruling the country in such a way as to prevent, in their opinion, 'the tail [workers] from wagging the dog' (*Hürriyet*, 23 April 2008).

In short, organised labour has lost significant power, and the informalisation of labour has gained considerable momentum in the last 16 years due to the anti-labour politics of the AKP. However, the deterioration of working conditions and the dominant anti-labour politics cannot be fully understood without also looking at the anti-feminist, conservative politics and policies implemented by the party. In fact, patriarchal ideology has been central to the process of labour informalisation process in Turkey. Flexible forms of employment are represented by the AKP as a way to increase women's employment and promote gender equality. The party reproduces patriarchal gender norms and uses women's disadvantageous position in the labour market to justify the informalisation of labour. In the following section, I will examine the process of labour informalisation in Turkey from a gender perspective. I will illustrate the role of conservative patriarchal politics in shaping labour relations as a whole and its effects on women's (reproductive) labour.

3.3. The Gendered Nature of Labour Informalisation and Women's Reproductive Labour under Turkey's Neoliberal Conservative Hegemony

In Turkey's recent history, state policies aimed at increasing women's employment have always gone hand in hand with an emphasis on the need for labour flexibilisation and the importance of women's traditional gender roles. While there was no public policy regarding women's employment until the 1990s, the first such by the state was included in the 6th Development Plan (1990-94) under the heading of '*Aile, Kadın, Çocuk*' [Family-Woman-Child]. It stated that women's employment should be encouraged in non-agricultural sectors by enhancing education levels and providing vocational training (DPT, 1989: 287). Since 2000 the significance of women's employment started to be emphasised more heavily in official documents. Since then, the state has made two major suggestions for expanding women's employment: promoting flexible forms of employment for women and supporting women's entrepreneurship (Toksöz, 2007: 51).

The state's women's employment policies are internally linked with its gender politics. Through the 2000s, the bodies of women and their reproductive

activities have been one of the main targets of the state's policies. The conservative-patriarchal politics has attempted to control women's bodies in various ways through promoting childbirth, discouraging abortion, interfering with clothes that women wear and the ways women can behave in public spaces, and so on. Traditional gender roles and women's familial obligations have also been reinforced by the AKP. The party's neoliberal conservative hegemony is built on the sanctity of tradition, faith and family values (Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 561).

The family has been a vital metaphor and an operational ground for the AKP's hegemony (Öztañ, 2014: 179), and unsurprisingly, the party/government policies and discourses to strengthen the family predominantly targeted women. According to the party, the family is the natural locus of women (Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 567); and women have been increasingly depicted as 'sacred' mothers, keystones of the family structure and guardians of the moral-cultural order (Acar & Altunok, 2013: 18). At a 2014 conference on "justice for women", Erdoğan said, "[o]ur religion regards motherhood very highly. Feminists don't understand that, they reject motherhood", and continued "you cannot put women and men on an equal footing. It is against nature." (*BBC*, 24 November 2014). Thus, Erdoğan rejects gender equality and justifies his anti-feminist, sexist standpoint by using Islamic discourse and referring to the 'different natures' of women and men.¹⁵ According to him, "[n]o matter how successful a woman is, a woman who denies her motherhood, who gives up on looking after the home is incomplete, is only half, is at risk of losing her uniqueness" (*CNN*, 9 June 2016).

The primary motive behind sanctifying motherhood has been to encourage women towards childbirth. Increasing fertility rates, by increasing appropriation of women's unpaid labour, has been a main aim of the AKP. Erdoğan first mentioned his well-known slogan 'at least three children' in 2008 on International Women's Day. He told women:

¹⁵ Here I do not mean to suggest that all readings and applications of Islam are necessarily patriarchal and anti-feminist. Rather, I claim that the AKP governments have used Islamic discourse in a way to legitimise and reinforce conservative patriarchal gender norms in Turkey.

I am speaking to you as one of your sorrowful brothers, not as a prime minister. We should preserve our young population. The most important thing for the economy is a person. They [read: enemies of the Turkish nation] want to eradicate Turks. What they are doing is this [eradicating Turks]. Have at least three children not to decrease our young population (*Hürriyet*, 7 March 2008).

In another meeting, Erdoğan advised parents not to worry about earning a living with three children and referred to India's and China's growing economies as successful examples of 'high-growth cum high fertility rates' trajectories (*ntvmsnbc*, 10 October 2009). Arguably, by intervening in women's life decisions as the 'father' of Turkish society, Erdoğan also ensures the reproduction of the reserve army of labour necessary for capitalist development.

Since 2008, Erdoğan has repeatedly told women to have at least three children as a national goal. In January 2013, he emphasised the need for a youthful workforce in order to be a strong nation with a strong economy: "one [child] is bankruptcy. It is the bankruptcy of the nation. Two is standing in place. Three will sort of carry us forward. So we need four or five," he told attendees at a wedding (*Hürriyet*, 21 January 2013). It is not only Erdoğan, but also other AKP representatives who address women as mothers and place the duty of having children as well as childcare on women's shoulders. For example, former Prime Minister Davutoğlu stated that "the woman giving birth is actually doing a national duty" (*Birgün*, 3 February 2016). The former Minister of Forestry and Water Affairs Veysel Eroğlu (*Milliyet*, 11 February 2012), the former Minister of Family and Social Policies Fatma Şahin (*Milliyet*, 18 November 2012), the former Minister of Finance Mehmet Şimşek (*İHA*, 8 June 2013), the former President of the Social Security Institution (SGK) Yedigöller Gökcalp İlhan (*Hürriyet*, 21 August 2013), the former Minister of Science, Industry and Technology Fikri Işık (*Milliyet*, 13 December 2014), and the former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım (*Milliyet*, 28 August 2016) are amongst those who have joined the conversation in support of Erdoğan and asked married couples to have at least three children.

Having at least three children is represented as a national duty in order to have a strong national economy. Demographic indicators and reproductive

behaviours are translated into and calculated in terms of their economic profitability and considered desirable or undesirable as a function of their economic value (Kurtulus-Korkman, 2015: 346). Over the course of time, this pronatalist politics has been increasingly backed up with religious and ethnic/racist norms. Having children is represented as a sacred duty and God's command. On the other hand, it has always been ethnic-nationalist because, as Kurtulus-Korkman, (2015: 346) notes, the 'three children advice' is meant for the non-Kurdish regions. Fertility rates are already high (above three children) in the Kurdish majority eastern and southeastern regions of the country, whereas it remains lower (below two children) in Turkish-majority regions. For example, in 2016, the highest fertility rates were observed in Şanlıurfa, Ağrı, Siirt, Şırnak and Muş (with an average of 3.7 children), and the lowest rates in Karabük, Edirne, Kırklareli, Zonguldak and Kütahya (with an average of 1.5 children) (TURKSTAT, 2016a). The nationalist rationale of pro-natal policies was clearly articulated by Erdoğan in 2017:

Indeed motherhood is the biggest grace of God given to women. [It is God's] gift. Rejection of motherhood is the rejection of creation...What does our God, our Prophet tell us? The command is clear: marry and reproduce. Muslims' reproduction is a must. I trust in our women's sensitivity regarding this. The terrorist organisation [read the Kurdistan Workers' Party- PKK¹⁶] in Turkey is so sensitive in regard to this. They have at least 5, 10, 15 children. (*Evensel*, 10 November 2017)

Erdoğan associates high Kurdish fertility rates with the spread of terrorism. For this reason, he exhorts women [read Turkish women] to increase their biological reproduction rates, as a way to fight against 'the national threat'. He also essentialises motherhood as 'God's command', constructing women who reject it as rejecting Islam. Under the Erdoğan government, procreation is framed as a requirement and a sign of patriotism and religious belief.

In the context of this patriarchal ideology articulated with nationalist and religious norms, women are depicted as the primary responsible for childbearing, childcare and with the broader reproduction of society. Women are given a wide variety of reasons to comply with their supposed 'natural' reproductive role: realising economic growth, securing the competitiveness of

¹⁶ PKK is an armed movement, which was formed in the late 1970s and started an armed struggle against the Turkish state in 1984. It identifies itself as fighting for the self-determination and cultural, political and economic rights of Kurds.

the Turkish economy, being a good Muslim, and fighting against national political threats. Notwithstanding the different rhetorical claims, this ideology and the policies it inspires aim to increase the appropriation of women’s reproductive labour in the family. These pronatalist discourses and policies reinforce Silvia Federici’s stress on the embeddedness of capital and the state in projects related to the appropriation of women’s reproductive labour. Focusing on the rise of capitalism and its implications at a societal level for women, she underlines how “the personal became political, and capital and the state were found to have subsumed our lives and reproduction down to the bedroom” (Federici, 2012: 97). However, given that the total fertility rate dropped from 2.4 in 2001 to 2.1 in 2016 and never exceeded 2.2 during the AKP era, it seems that women have turned down this call to be the ‘mothers of the nation’ (see Figure 6).




Figure 6: Fertility Rates in Turkey, 2001–2016

Source: Author’s compilation based on TURKSTAT database (accessed November 20, 2017)

Beyond the party bureaucrats’ rhetoric and attempts to shape public opinion, existing state policies play a critical role in confining women to the home. For example, while mothers are given 16 weeks of paid maternity leave in both the public and private sector, fathers are given only five days paternity leave in the private sector (Law No. 4857, additional article 2) and ten days in the public sector (Law No. 657, article 104). Law No. 1475 entitles women to a severance payment if they voluntarily quit a job within their first year of marriage (article 14). Moreover, the requirement for private companies to provide a day care centre for children up to the age of 6 only takes effect if they

employ more than 150 *women* – not men and women (*Official Gazette* No. 28737, article 13). In order to bypass this obligation most large firms either keep their number of women workers under the limit or simply do not meet this legal obligation in the knowledge that there is very little effective legal enforcement of the requirement (İlkkaracan, 2012: 16).

The AKP has further strengthened the legal regulations that promote the increasing appropriation of women's reproductive labour and the flexibilisation of their paid labour in production. Law No. 6663 enacted in 2016, states that following their maternity leave, women workers are allowed to work part-time for two months for the first child, four months for the second child and six months for the third child (article 6). The unused leave will be transferred to the father *only if the mother dies* during or after giving birth (article 22). The same law also states that one of the parents is allowed to work part-time until the child reaches primary school age at 6 years old (articles 21, 43). During this period, all employment benefits are calculated over part-time working. Even though the law entitles both mothers and fathers to work part-time, this labour right is more likely to be exercised by mothers due to the strong patriarchal structure and customs in Turkey. As a result, this regulation *de facto* reinforces the flexible employment of women; reduces their employment-based benefits, and strengthens employers' reluctance to employ women. The stimulus behind these laws is 'the housewife ideology' that defines women's income as a *supplementary income* to that of the so-called 'breadwinner', namely the husband (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 118).

In line with its aim to encourage women to have large numbers of children and prioritise their reproductive obligations in the family, the AKP's central policies towards women's employment has been to flexibilise their participation in the labour market instead of providing the necessary conditions to increase women's employment in permanent and secure jobs. Flexible employment is seen as a way for women to undertake both productive and reproductive work. Moreover, the party justifies the highly gendered character of the flexibilisation of labour by appealing to women's supposed 'natural' family responsibilities. Hence, patriarchal discourses identifying women with

domestic work provide legitimacy for flexible employment (Yaman Öztürk, 2010: 32).

The 10th Development Plan 2014-2018 (Ministry of Development, 2013) reflects this neoliberal-conservative perspective of the AKP on gender equality and women's employment. According to this plan, the main gender equality objectives were: strengthening women's role in social, cultural and economic life; preserving and developing the status of the institution of the family; and, enhancing social integration. The primary policies to reach these objectives were listed as establishing reconciliation and family counselling mechanisms to decrease the divorce rate, and promoting "secure flexible working" for women to increase women's employment and harmonise family and work life (Ministry of Development, 2013: 40-41). Former Prime Minister Davutoğlu stated that the AKP's aim was to grow women's labour force participation by 1% for every year until 2018 while simultaneously expanding flexible forms of employment (*Bianet*, 28 January 2015).

Following this plan, the government announced its *Programme on Protection of Family and Dynamic Population Structure* in 2015. It defines the family as an institution that holds individuals and society together, and as a necessity for a strong society. However, the programme report noted that communication between family members has weakened, divorce rates have increased, and the institution of the family has lost its power in recent years. Fertility rates have been decreasing, and the elderly population has been growing. To solve these perceived demographic 'problems', the programme suggested strengthening the family and increasing fertility rates through encouraging marriage and offering incentives for working women to have children. In line with this policy, the government enacted Law No. 6637 in March 2015, which regulated incentives for earlier marriages (Turkish citizens, both men and women, who open a 'dowry account' in a bank will receive 20% interest from the state if they marry before the age of 27 [article 14]) and childbirth (all mothers will receive cash payments of TL 300 [roughly \$75 as of December 2017] for the first baby, TL 400 [roughly \$100] for the second and TL 600 [roughly \$150] for the third and subsequent [article 16]). In the words of

the government, this programme aimed at achieving “reconciliation” between women’s family and work life (Ministry of Development, 2013: 41). In reality, it aimed to strengthen the patriarchal family and expand the reserve army of labour by placing the main national and economic duties on women’s shoulders.

Bolstering traditional gender roles and defining motherhood as women’s most important role lead to the naturalisation and devaluation of women’s reproductive work, reinforcing an already unequal division of reproductive labour. When we look at the allocation of time between paid and unpaid work in Turkey, we see that it is mostly women who ensure the reproduction of the family. According to a TURKSTAT (2008: 22) time use survey providing data from 11,815 non-working individuals aged 15 and older, women spend 5.2 hours daily on household and family care compared to their men counterparts’ 0.9 hours. The findings do not show a great difference for employed women and men (4 hours/women, 0.7 hours/men). With regard to the care provided to children aged 0 to 5 years, mothers account for 86% of total providers (TURKSTAT, 2016b). Similarly, wives and mothers constitute the majority of total care providers for elderly and disabled people in need of care (ASPB, 2011). The state policies encourage the ‘familisation’ and feminisation of care for elderly and disabled people instead of improving public service delivery (Özateş, 2015: 82).

As such, women’s unpaid domestic work is the main obstacle to their participation in paid work. In July 2017, 56.3 % of unemployed women aged 15 and over reported familial obligations (i.e. domestic and care work) as the main reason they did not participate in the labour force, but no men reported this as their reason (TURKSTAT database).¹⁷ Women’s employment rate remains lowest among married women aged 25-49 years with children (Toksöz et al., 2014: 117). İlkaracan (2010) shows that the gender participation gap significantly increases in case of marriage and widens as education level decreases: among the urban population aged 20-44 in 2008, the participation gap for women and men with primary education rises from 45% to 82% with marriage; for high-school graduate women and men the gap jumps from 15% to

¹⁷ Author’s own calculation based on TURKSTAT database (accessed November 20, 2017).

70%; for those with university education, although there is almost no gap for single women and men, it increases to 25% for married women and men.

Similarly, Başlevant and Onaran (2003: 53) point out that the number of children has an important negative effect on wives' labour force participation, whereas it has very little effect on husbands' employment. Another study conducted on 5,646 women living in urban areas reports that 52% had quit their jobs because of familial issues, such as marriage, childbearing or childbirth, and also family members' health problems (Eyüboğlu, Özar & Tufan, 1998). Arguably, this suggests that collective reproductive duties – and not only childcare related obligations – are always socialised by women. However, as argued in the previous chapter, women who do not participate in the labour market but carry out reproductive activities in the family are not unproductive individuals. They are productive through their domestic work, the invisibility of which leads to their exclusion from economic and social life and political decision-making processes (Onaran & Oyvat, 2016: 297).

Women's reproductive obligations are also a serious obstacle to their employment in the formal economy. The research conducted by Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits (2008: 111) reports that women who marry or have their first child after the age of 20 have a much higher chance of being employed in the formal economy than those who marry or have their first child at a younger age. Moreover, women's familial responsibilities make their employment undesirable for employers in the formal economy. Employers avoid employing women because long working hours and shift-based work are incompatible with women's reproduction obligations and also because they do not want to bear the costs associated with women's reproductive activities, such as pregnancy, maternity leave and childcare (Toksöz, 2011: 27).

Thus, the ideologies of domesticity and motherhood hinder women's full access to the labour market on equal terms with men (Ecevit, 1991: 75). Employed women continue to do housework and care for children, the sick, and the elderly, mostly without husbands' contributions (Ecevit, 1991: 75): research conducted on women textile workers in Bursa shows that the 'help' of those

women's husbands rarely extends beyond simply being present with the children when women are at work (Sugur & Sugur, 2005: 272).

In short, women are the primary responsible for the reproduction of the family in Turkey, spending almost six times as long on reproductive tasks than men. Their reproductive obligations prevent them from working outside the home in general and working in the formal economy in particular. The AKP's rhetoric and policies reinforce this sexual division of labour and women's secondary status both in the labour market and in the family. It essentialises and strengthens patriarchal norms that associate women with reproductive work, using conservative patriarchal rhetoric and women's disadvantaged position in the labour market to justify labour flexibilisation policies. The AKP is basically trying to kill two birds with one stone by ensuring the increasing appropriation of women's unpaid reproductive labour in the family *and* their participation in the labour market in line with the needs of capital.

However, despite these pressures, many feminist organisations in Turkey strongly object to the neoliberal-conservative politics of the AKP. Women have taken to the streets several times to defend women's rights and freedom against the AKP. *Platform for Women's Labour*, which includes 40 different women's organisations, argues that the government is trying to expand flexible/precarious working to the whole of the working class, beginning with women under the guise of the ideology of motherhood. Opposing state policies, these organisations demand full-time and secure jobs for women and the promotion of the equal division of labour between parents regarding care work (*Bianet*, 9 January 2015).

Having examined the macro context for labour and gender relations across productive and reproductive work, I will now go on to trace the implications of these relations for the Turkish garment industry, the focus of this study. In the following pages, after discussing the general characteristics of the market position and production structures of the industry, I will analyse its labour conditions and gender inequalities.

3.4. Labour and Gender Relations in the Garment Industry in Turkey

The transition from ISI to EOI paved the way for the development of the export-oriented Turkish garment industry. Hence, in many ways, the garment industry is paradigmatic of the changes that have taken place in Turkey with the shift towards the neoliberal agenda. Turkey's manufacturers became integrated into global production chains as sub-contractors in the garment industry (Bekmen, 2014: 53), and Turkey's share of world clothing exports has risen 12-fold in the last three decades, from 0.3% in 1980 to 3.4% in 2016 (WTO, 2013: 130; WTO, 2017: 121). According to the WTO database, Turkey's total garment exports grew from \$131 million in 1980 to \$15,047 million in 2016. Today, Turkey is the seventh biggest garment exporter after China, EU (28), Bangladesh, Vietnam, India, and Hong Kong (see Figure 1).

Turkey is a 'full-package' supplier with vertically integrated textile and garment enterprises (McNamara, 2008: 12). However, with the demise of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement quota system in 2005, Turkey faced fierce competition, especially from China and Bangladesh where labour costs are cheaper (Ministry of Economy, 2016: 4-5). In reaction to this change, the Turkish garment industry shifted from low value added to high value added, high quality and fashionable garments (Ministry of Economy, 2016: 1). Moreover, Turkey offers a logistical advantage over East Asian countries as its proximity to the EU market strengthens its market position. High quality, fashion-oriented brands tend to outsource to countries nearer to home to decrease the lead-time needed for delivery (Gereffi, 1994). As global buyers are increasingly demanding that suppliers produce in small quantities and deliver on short-lead times, Turkey's geographical position, enabling producers to meet just-in-time order schedules, is playing an increasingly significant role. Delivery times in the industry have decreased from three to four months to four to five weeks in recent years (CSGB, 2015b: 76).

The Turkish garment industry is one of the important industries contributing to the gross national product. According to the TURKSTAT

database,¹⁸ the garment industry had the third biggest share of total exports at 10.5% (\$15 billion), exceeded only by the automotive industry (15.8%) and the basic metal industry (12.6%) in 2016. However, instead of producing their own brands, the majority of export-oriented companies produce for global brands (MSIT, 2015: 40). Hence, the Turkish garment industry relies heavily on foreign markets. As Table 3 shows, EU countries are the biggest market for Turkey's garment exports: Turkey exported clothing worth almost \$11 billion of total \$14,855 billion to the EU countries in 2015, 73.7% of Turkey's total clothing exports (Ministry of Economy, 2016: 6).

Table 3: Turkey's Garment Exports by Countries with the Biggest Share in 2015 (\$ billion)

	2015
Germany	2,687
United Kingdom (UK)	2,093
Spain	1,629
France	723
Netherlands	700

Source: Ministry of Economy, Republic of Turkey (2016: 4)

The state provides various subsidies to garment enterprises, such as investment promotions (customs duty exemptions, tax reductions, value added tax return, etc.), export promotions (short-term loan support, training-employment-market research support, etc.), small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) subsidies (loan support and various support programmes) and research and development subsidies (MSIT, 2015: 41-2). In 2014, the government provided TL 1,240,589 (approximately, \$530,000 as of December 2014) in financial assistance to SMEs in the textile and garment industry for vocational education and skilled employee employment (CSGB, 2014: 10).

The garment industry employs a significant proportion of the workforce in Turkey. In 2016, according to the SGK database, 466,829 people were employed in 32,228 registered firms in the garment industry (see Table 4). However, when the high levels of unregistered and atypical employment in the sector are considered, the number of garment workers is estimated to be as high as 1.5 million (MSIT, 2014: 10). The textile and garment industries were

¹⁸ Author's own calculation based on TURKSTAT database (accessed November 25, 2017).

predicted to account for 20% of total employment in 2015 (CSGB, 2015b). When we look at the structure of the sector, we see that micro and small enterprises employing fewer than 50 workers constitute 94.5% of garment companies (SGK database), and the sector is characterised by a widespread network of subcontractors that help reduce fixed costs and provide cheaper labour resources (Dedeoğlu, 2011a: 666).

Table 4: Composition of Registered Workforce in the Garment Sector in Turkey in December 2016

Number of Men Workers	234,588
Number of Women Workers	232,241
Women's Employment Rate (%)	49.7
Number of Workers in Companies Employing 1-9 Persons	76,790
Number of Workers in Companies Employing 10-49 Persons	132,173
Number of Workers in Companies Employing 50-249 Persons	157,586
Number of Workers in Companies Employing 250+ Persons	100,280
Total Number of Registered Workers	466,829

Source: Author's compilation based on SGK database (accessed November 20, 2017)

In terms of the broad features of labour conditions in the garment industry, Turkey does not differ from the general picture discussed in the preceding chapter. It is characterised by informal, non-unionised and cheap employment. In 2016, the daily average income in the garment sector was TL 65.80 (approximately \$17), compared to the overall average of TL 83.73 (approximately \$21.60). Garment workers are the second-lowest paid industrial workers after those in the leather manufacturing industry at TL 63.96 (SGK database). The legal net minimum monthly wage, which was TL 1,404 as of 16 November 2017 (approximately \$363), is more likely to be the ceiling, rather than the bottom line. According to research conducted by the CSGB on 24,540 garment workers and 257 garment companies across Turkey, 79% of workers received the minimum wage, while only 21% received more (CSGB, 2011: 40). The legal net minimum wage is 91% of the hunger level for a family of four and 28% of the poverty level defined by the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (2017). However, according to the Ministry of Development

(2014: 103), one of the main obstacles to the competitiveness of the Turkish garment industry is still “high labour wages”.

The Turkish garment sector is marked by widespread violations of labour rights. It operates mostly from unregistered workplaces where labour legislation is ignored (CCC, 2005: 33). Two-thirds of garment workers, around one million people, are unregistered and deprived of legal protection and social insurance. While unrecorded employment benefits employers by decreasing labour costs and facilitating the hiring and firing of workers, it puts workers in an extremely vulnerable position. The falsification of wage records is another widespread problem: under-reporting of workers’ wages in order to avoid paying full social security costs negatively affects the workers’ pensions and severance payments when they retire or if they are dismissed (FWF, 2015: 1).

Long working hours beyond the legal limits and mandatory overtime are other significant labour violations. According to Law No. 4857, the standard working week is 45 hours (article 63) and overtime cannot exceed 270 hours a year and must be remunerated at one and a half times the normal hourly pay (article 41). However, actual working hours are far beyond these legal limits in the garment sector. According to a report by the CSGB (2011: 12), the working day can last up to 12 hours in the garment industry. Another research project conducted by the CSGB on 82 garment companies and 29,762 workers showed that 14.5% of workers worked more than 270 hours overtime per year, 24.7% were not paid, or underpaid their overtime payments, and 14.5% were forced to do overtime (CSGB, 2015b: 54-5). Although overtime is supposed to be subject to workers’ agreement (Law No. 4857, article 41), mandatory overtime is a norm rather than an exception in the Turkish garment sector. Workers are forced to work for long hours in order to fulfil short-term and changing orders (CSGB, 2011: 12). Moreover, given the low wages, garment workers have to do long hours of overtime to earn sufficient money to survive. Without overtime earnings workers are not able to meet their most basic needs (CCC, 2014: 69).

Low unionisation levels are another significant result of high labour informality in the Turkish garment industry. The unionisation rate among

registered workers in the garment, leather and textile industries was only 9.12% in January 2017 (CSGB, 2017). Moreover, given the barriers and restrictive regulations discussed in the second section, only three of the 16 labour unions in those sectors exceed the 1% threshold and have the right to collective bargaining (see CSGB, 2017). Only 51 garment, leather and textile workplaces (a total of 10,444 workers) concluded collective bargaining agreements in 2015, (CSGB, 2015c: 22), which corresponds to far less than 1% of the total registered workers in those sectors. However, again, when the number of unregistered workers is taken into account, the actual unionisation and collective bargaining rates fall far below the official figures.

Another important characteristic of the Turkish garment industry is its relatively high rates of women's employment. Since the mid-1980s, when it began its winning export performance, the garment industry has been one of the biggest sectors offering women employment (Dedeoğlu, 2011b: 31-32). The competitiveness of the industry in global markets was achieved through a pool of rural-to-urban women migrants (Eraydin & Erendil, 1999: 269). Today, the women's employment rate in the garment industry (49.7%, see Table 4) is much higher than the total women's employment rate (32.5%, see Figure 3). Given widespread unregistered employment in the industry, the real number of women workers is estimated to be much higher than that presented. One of the reasons for relatively higher women's labour participation in the Turkish garment industry is the abundance of small-scale workplaces located in the neighbourhoods where the women workers live (Dedeoğlu, 2000: 166). Additionally, women are regarded as the optimal labour force for these tasks which require manual dexterity, as they are seen as being 'naturally' good at delicate jobs and carrying them out quickly (Ecevit, 1991: 62-63).

Women garment workers are also subjected to discrimination and further exploitation in the industry. Firstly, there is a gendered division of labour in the production process, in which cutting, ironing and dyeing are considered "men's work", while cleaning, helping and basic sewing are seen as "women's work" and are paid at lower rates (CCC, 2014: 67). The most favoured jobs, which require the use of technological, capital-intensive machinery, are assigned

mostly to men workers (Balaban, 2011: 160). Moreover, registered women workers earn less than their men counterparts: according to the SGK database, in 2016 women garment workers earned TL 64.21 per day compared to men's TL 67.34.

Beyond being discriminated against in terms of job positions and pay, women garment workers are subjected to undignified work conditions, including sexual harassment and violence (Kümbetoğlu, User & Akpınar, 2015). They are also deprived of their legal rights regarding pregnancy, maternity, and childcare facilities. According to one CSGB report (2015b: 75), none of the companies inspected which were required to provide a day care centre for the children of workers actually had one. Moreover, 127 pregnant or nursing women workers in five companies were unlawfully forced to work more than the daily legal limit of 7.5 hours per day (CSGB, 2015b: 78). As such, the lack of government checks on adherence to these ineffective regulations and sanctions on gender discrimination at work paves the way for further flexibilisation of women's labour in the industry.

Women's further exploitation and subordination in the industry is strongly linked with their familial reproductive obligations. Due to being identified with domestic space and reproductive work, women are more likely to work as informal labour under insecure conditions in small units and home-based garment production. Women garment workers, especially married ones, prefer workplaces within their neighbourhood so that they can get home swiftly to do the domestic work awaiting them (Eraydin & Erendil, 1999: 268). With regard to small-scale atelier production, wives, mothers, daughters and other close women family members of atelier owners constitute the core of the labour force, providing significant flexibility to their employers in terms of working hours and periods, the pay on offer and division of labour in the production process (Dedeoğlu, 2011a: 669). However, these women, whose roles range from directly contributing to production to cooking for garment workers and cleaning the workplace, are mostly unpaid or underpaid as they are regarded as 'helping' their families (Dedeoğlu, 2010, 2011b). The small-scale family firms engender an overlap between women's workplace and domestic activities,

resulting in easy exploitation of women's unpaid family labour for the sake of families' well being (Dedeoğlu, 2012).

The labour force in home-based garment work is composed exclusively of women. Home-based garment work is regarded as 'women's work' that uneducated and poor women do for '*pazar parası*' (money for daily groceries) (Atılgan, 2007). Home-based garment workers are predominantly married women who either lack their husband's permission to work outside the home, or do not have sufficient childcare assistance or any other employment options (Balaban & Sarıoğlu, 2008: 16). Similarly, Tartanoğlu (2017: 32-33) reports that although women may want to work outside the home in a formal job, having small children who are in need of care obliges them to do home-based garment work. As these women are also expected to fulfil the duties of a full-time housewife in the family, they work under heavy pressure and the double burden of paid and unpaid work (Balaban & Sarıoğlu, 2008: 17).

In the light of the discussions above, it is clear that the Turkish garment industry maintains its powerful market position through benefiting from the patriarchal norms that associate women with the domestic sphere and reproductive tasks, and devalue their contribution to production. Women garment workers shoulder the double burden of paid and unpaid work, in more insecure jobs, with lower wages, without social insurance, and being discriminated against in terms of job positions. In Chapters 5-8, I will further deepen the analysis of class and gender relations in the industry, and examine the internal relations between the realms of production and reproduction in the case of women workers in İzmir's garment sector. I will show how patriarchy shapes the organisation of work, working conditions, and daily life on the shop floor and illustrate how women's reproductive responsibilities determine and limit their productive work in many ways.

3.5. Conclusions

In line with the theoretical stance of this study, this chapter has examined the key features of labour and gender relations across the production and reproduction realms and the interplays between them (in the garment

industry) in Turkey. Understanding class as a social relation and in constant interaction with other social forms of oppression, and arguing for the decisive role of reproductive labour in the perpetuation of capitalism and subordination of women, this chapter has illustrated that women's conditions of productive and reproductive work are strongly interrelated at both the ideological and practical levels in the case of Turkey.

In Turkey, women have always been under-represented in employment, concentrated in low paying/labour-intensive sectors, earned less and worked in more insecure jobs than men. In the neoliberal era, contrary to the global trend of feminisation of labour, there has been no rise in women's employment due to Turkey's abundant supply of male labour, low levels of export-oriented production, stagnant employment rates and high unemployment rates. Since the year 2000, unregistered and precarious employment has become more widespread among women in low-income households, as rising income inequality and low wages have forced them to increasingly enter the labour market through informal jobs (Buğra & Keyder, 2003; Dedeoğlu, 2010).

In parallel with how Standing (1989, 1999b) defines the informalisation and feminisation of labour as closely linked and mutually reinforcing processes, the increasing informalisation of women's labour has gone hand in hand with the informalisation of labour in general in Turkey. Over the last 16 years, the neoliberal hegemony has been consolidated as a result of the AKP's one-party rule. The party has: implemented numerous laws to further the flexibilisation of the labour market; it greatly facilitated the cancellation of labour contracts and the implementation of overtime work; it legitimised precarious (subcontracted/temporary/part-time) employment and the establishment of private employment agencies; it restricted union and collective bargaining rights; and, it repressed organised labour by exploiting its extensive legislative and executive authority.

The informalisation of labour has been strongly linked with the patriarchal ideologies that assign women complete responsibility for reproductive work. The AKP has used traditional gender roles as a means to

legitimise labour informalisation and deregulated the labour market in the name of increasing women's employment and reconciling women's family and work life. However, party policies on women's employment do not aim at eliminating gender discrimination and promoting secure jobs for women at all. Rather, it aims to expand flexible employment and increase the appropriation of women's unpaid reproductive labour. In line with this aim, the AKP has pursued pronatalist and anti-feminist policies, enacted a number of laws that define women on the basis of motherhood, promoted subordination of women in the labour market and in the family, and encouraged a strict gendered division of labour across both realms. In the process, traditional gender roles have been reinforced, women's reproductive behaviour has been translated into a national economic and political issue, and women have been increasingly depicted as sacred mothers who are primarily responsible for biological reproduction and childcare. Hence, the neoliberal-conservative politics of the AKP has simultaneously strengthened patriarchal expectations of women and enhanced the flexibilisation of their work in the labour market.

The Turkish garment industry is one of the biggest industries to benefit from a large supply of cheap and precarious women's labour. The industry, which significantly contributes to the gross national product, is characterised by relatively high women's employment and high labour informality. Women, who constitute at least half of the total garment workforce, are subjected to higher rates of exploitation and discrimination in the industry. They earn less than men. They are excluded from specific jobs, such as cutting, ironing and dyeing. They are deprived of their legal rights regarding pregnancy, maternity leave, and childcare facilities. Indeed, gender discrimination further exacerbates the impact of flexible employment on women. Being associated with and socially constructed as linked to the domestic sphere and reproductive work, women are predominantly employed as informal or unpaid family workers without legal protection and social insurance in small-scale and home-based garment production. Ultimately, the success of the Turkish garment industry is strongly based on its capacity to exploit multiple home, atelier and factory-based gender inequalities.

In the remainder of the thesis, based on the theoretical premises of the study and in light of the broad picture of Turkey's socio-cultural, political and economic context provided here, I will illustrate in detail the features of the labour and gender relations in the garment industry in İzmir. Before doing so, however, in the next chapter, I will discuss the complex and multi-layered methodology deployed for the field-based study in order to outline the foundations on which the research findings and arguments are built.

CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK

This chapter provides an overview of the methodology employed for this research, presenting the ways in which the theoretical frame outlined in the previous chapters was operationalised in the field. As Burawoy (1998: 28) says, “[t]heory and research are inextricable”. Thus, I will begin by discussing the rationale behind my choice of a multi-method fieldwork combining the ethnographic ‘extended-case method’, composed of ethnography, participant observation and in-depth interviews, with quantitative data and secondary sources. I will provide the links between my theoretical frame and the research design, and present the main and sub-research questions of this study. Since this study understands class ‘as a social relation’ (Thompson, 1978), and is conducted from a Marxist-feminist perspective, this multi-method fieldwork strategy was the most appropriate to understand the class and gender experiences of women garment workers in the natural flow of daily life and from the standpoints of the workers. In line with the theoretical frame of the study, this method allowed me to better grasp the interactions between different social relations, and the interplays between the realms of production and reproduction.

In the second section, I will introduce my geographical research area, and discuss in some detail the reasons for selecting it. I will then go on to elaborate on my research techniques, the key features of my experience of participant observation and the in-depth interviews I carried out. As I will show, working alongside workers was a significant research technique in several ways. The in-depth interviews further deepened and opened new windows to my analysis. These two techniques allowed me to collect the life histories of women workers and their views on their lives in their own words. Following this, I will discuss my personal experiences and involvement in the field, focusing on my own positionality, experiences and failures as well as successes. In the last section, I will look at research ethics during and after my fieldwork. Overall, my use of multiple research methods and my participation in the lives of my informants allowed me to develop a deep understanding of the women workers’ own experiences and perspectives, the socio-cultural context

in which these are situated, class and gender relations across production and reproduction realms, and the interaction between them.

4.1. Conducting Field Research from the Historical Materialist, Feminist Perspective

This thesis is predominantly based on an ethnographic extended-case study of women garment workers carried out over 14 months from July 2015 to August 2016 in İzmir. Crucially, in my case, the case study can be defined as ‘extended’ on the basis of the depth and intensity of daily interactions with the workers, during both production and reproduction time, and on the basis of the combination of multiple, complementary techniques of data collection, both qualitative (e.g., interviews) and quantitative (e.g., the review of secondary sources). Drawing from Burawoy (1998), other studies have deployed the extended case study method. In particular, Mezzadri (2014; 2017) has deployed it to study the Indian garment industry across multiple sites and over a prolonged period of time. However, she has not deployed participant observation. In this sense, the approach elaborated here contains important novel elements, as applied to the industry and site in question.

In the field, by combining participant observation and interview techniques, I followed what Burawoy referred to as a ‘reflexive’ approach. As specified by Burawoy (1998: 5), the extended case study method “applies reflexive science to ethnography in the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro’, and present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on pre-existing theory”. In fact, arguably, the principal dimensions of the extended case study method are extending from observer to participant, extending observations over time and space, taking the geographical and historical context of the field into account, and extending theory (Burawoy, 2000: 26-28).

In line with this method, the research questions and findings of this study were derived both deductively and inductively. On the one hand, the process of research and its theorisation was deductive because the initial research questions and presumptions were derived from the theoretical

approach that I employed. On the other hand, however, during the data collection and analysis, I also treated theory inductively to reflect on and further develop it. I immersed myself in the world of my research subjects through working in the same workplaces, spending time together outside the workplace and conducting in-depth interviews with them. Although it was my first and only fieldwork on the subject, spending more than a year in the diverse spaces of the field enabled me to approach the social reality as a process, to share my informants' lives, and to learn their ways, thoughts and feelings. Overall, this method allowed me to better grasp the exploitation and subordination of women in production and in the family. It enabled me "to dig beneath the binaries to discover multiple processes, interests and identities" (Burawoy, 1998: 6), and to see beyond the discursive knowledge and the contradictions within and between the narratives and everyday practices.

Notably, the choice of method is derived from the theoretical framework of this thesis, which combines the historical materialist class perspective elaborated by E. P. Thompson and a feminist-Marxist social reproductive theory to answer the main question of this research: 'How do women's paid productive work and unpaid reproductive work shape and interact with each other in the case of women garment workers in İzmir, Turkey?' As outlined in Chapter 2, this study understands class as a socio-cultural as well as an economic formation, one which is embedded in cultural practices, feelings, and ideas. Further, it argues for the holistic view of women's experiences in the productive and reproductive realms. The ethnographic case study was the most suitable methodological approach, in order to understand the everyday experiences of the women, and the broader context in which these everyday experiences take place (Prasad, 2015: 79).

It should also be noted that the ethnographic inquiry developed here also shares a great deal in common with the research priorities of feminist studies that argue for "face-to-face, hands-on, reciprocal relations between researchers and those being researched" (Harrison, 2007: 24). It seems to be the most suitable approach for a feminist research agenda, as it is "attentive to the concrete realm of everyday life and human agency, and is conducted with

empathy, connectedness, dialogue, and mutual consciousness-raising” (Harrison, 2007: 24). I chose participant observation and in-depth interviews as my research techniques because they allowed me “to focus on women’s experience and to listen and explore the shared meanings between women” (Skeggs, 2001: 429-30), and to give agency to the women, something that “androcentric traditional analyses” have systematically failed to do (Harding, 1987: 4). Thanks to the ethnographic extended-case study, I was able to understand women’s perspectives, include their voices, recognise their agency, and present the socio-cultural, political-economic context within which their experiences and perspectives are situated.

Throughout the fieldwork, I aimed to link my observations and findings with theory and existing literature and to establish a dialogue between the theory and the field. The main and sub-questions of this research were shaped by the theoretical frame, but also moulded by my observations and experiences in the field. While conducting participant observation and in-depth interviews I sought to find answers to the questions listed in Table 5.

Table 5: Research Questions

<i>How do women’s paid productive work and unpaid reproductive work shape and interact with each other in the case of women garment workers in İzmir, Turkey?</i>	
Labour regimes and labour conditions across different scales of garment production in İzmir	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How does the organisation of work differ across different scales of production? • What are the labour conditions in terms of wages, working hours, social security benefits, annual leave, and job security across different scales of production? • In what ways is labour controlled across different scales of production? • To what extent and in what ways is labour informalised across different scales of production? • How do the broader organisation of production and the organisation of work inside the workplaces impact the labour regimes across different scales?
Socio-cultural atmosphere, everyday life and gender dynamics in İzmir’s garment industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the socio-cultural atmosphere in the garment workplaces? • What are the demographic characteristics of women garment workers? • What are women’s reasons for doing paid work and choosing a garment job? • What do garment workers think about their self-image? • How do garment workers feel about their life? • How patriarchal gender norms shape the organisation of production, labour conditions, and everyday life on the shop floor?

<p>Class as a complex set of social relations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What do the workplace and colleagues mean to women garment workers? • How do women workers socialise in the workplace? • What are the ways in which different ethno-cultural identities shape intra-class relationships? • What are the ways in which the competitive capitalist labour regime damages intra-class relationships? • How do patriarchal norms influence intra-gender relationships among women? • What are the main sources and forms of power relations among garment workers? • How do these power relations shape intra-class relationships? • How and under which conditions does solidarity come into play among garment workers?
<p>Women's reproductive work and its relations with garment work</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the reproductive responsibilities of women? • What are the main aspects of reproductive work? • What is the division of labour in women's families regarding housework and care work? • What do women think and feel about their reproductive work and the unequal division of labour at home? • What are the ways in which women's reproductive work shapes and limits their garment work? • What kind of role do women relatives and friends of women garment workers play in terms of reducing restrictive effects of reproductive work on paid work? • What do women do in their spare time, if they have any? • What are the future expectations and dreams of women?

Source: Author's own, based on the checklist deployed for interviews as well as priorities that emerged during periods of participant observation.

I also used multiple sources of secondary data, including newspaper archives, official statistics and reports, and academic and non-governmental organisation (NGO) studies relevant to my research. The quantitative data were predominantly gathered from TURKSTAT, SGK, CSGB, *Official Gazette*, WTO, ILO, and OECD databases. However, the quantitative research method precludes the connection between research and everyday life and portrays social life as if it were static and independent of people's experiences (Bryman, 2012: 179). Being aware of that, I used quantitative data to 'see' the entire picture at a broader level, develop a stronger macro-analysis of my case, and further substantiate my findings from the field by embedding them in the broader contours of the gendered political economy of Turkey and its garment industry.

4.2. Geographical Research Area

There were a number of reasons for selecting İzmir as the geographical site of my research. Firstly, being located on international trade routes and

close to Europe, İzmir is a significant centre of garment production in Turkey. In 2016, it had the second highest share of garment exports at 6.7% (1,132 million dollars), after İstanbul at 72.7%, and before Denizli at 6.5% (Turkish Exporters Assembly database). According to the SGK database, in 2016 there were 2,175 registered garment firms in İzmir and 37,819 registered garment workers.¹⁹ In terms of industrial employment in the city, the garment sector is the second-largest, accounting for 15.39% of employment, only just behind the food industry with 15.6% (İZKA, 2015: 40). Secondly, İzmir is one of the leading cities in terms of women's employment in Turkey. In 2015, the city had the third highest rate of women's employment (30.7%), after Edirne (35%) and Denizli (32.7%), and higher than Kırklareli (30.4%), Ordu (30.4%) and İstanbul (30%) (CSGB, 2015c: 208-210). However, I was unable to find any studies on the garment industry and women's employment in İzmir; thus, I wanted to fill this gap in the literature.

According to my research findings, garment production in İzmir takes place mainly in the Buca, Bornova, Gaziemir, Konak, Karabağlar, Torbalı, and Çiğli districts. Export-oriented garment production mostly takes place in the Buca Aegean Clothing Organised Industrial Zone, the Atatürk Organised Industrial Zone and the Fashion, Textile, Garment Industrialists Zone. These are located in the Buca, Çiğli and Bornova districts respectively. I conducted my research in three different districts – Buca, Karabağlar and Konak – to achieve higher representativeness. The research regarding factory labour was mainly carried out in Buca, atelier labour in Karabağlar and Konak, and home-based labour in Karabağlar and Buca. These choices were informed by my initial mapping of production sites in İzmir, my contacts with local people and my place of residence in the city.

¹⁹ Author's compilation based on SGK database (accessed March 15, 2018).



Figure 7: Map of İzmir

Source: https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dosya:İzmir_districts.png

In fact, in addition to my intention to fill the gap in the literature, I also chose İzmir because I grew up there in a working class neighbourhood in which many garment firms and ateliers were located. Thus, I was familiar with the structure of the city and the social and cultural lives of my informants. As I knew many women garment workers in İzmir, I had preliminary knowledge regarding the sites and the organisation of production. I also thought having friends and relatives in İzmir would help me to meet women workers through safe channels and establish trusting relationships. In the end, I only met a small number of women workers in this way, but the fact that I had lived in İzmir for 18 years, and my family for 40 years, helped me to build trust and relationships with women workers.

Being an insider is often criticised for eroding researchers' objectivity. Prasad (2015: 87) argues that when an ethnographer shares any elements of a culture with the subjects under observation, it may be hard to notice its more taken-for-granted aspects. During fieldwork, I always kept the risks of being an insider in my mind. I tried to avoid these risks by constantly asking myself: what would a foreigner see in this picture? Am I missing the socio-cultural

context because I am too familiar with it? In the end, I believe, my social scientist training allowed me to avoid naturalising and overlooking the significant aspects of the socio-cultural setting and relationships that are situated in it. I turned being an insider into an advantage by developing a rapport with my women informants, immersing myself in their world and gaining deeper insights into their experiences and perspectives.

4.3. Participant Observation

Social reality, especially its subtle forms, such as power, subordination, and exploitation, does not simply stand around and wait for us to take its picture. The researcher needs to comprehend “a fragmented, dispersed, volatile, lived experience” (Burawoy, 2000: 2). Certainly, the most important part of my fieldwork in understanding the complex social reality was the participant observation that took place at one factory, four small-scale ateliers and in the Limontepe and Kuruçeşme neighbourhoods in İzmir. Participant observation helps provide insights into events that otherwise may not be understood (Devereux & Hodinott, 1993: 32). More specifically, fieldwork in the form of employment “provides the researcher with access to informants, experiences, and the possibility of a more corporeal understanding of the environment and forces in which a particular population is immersed” (Whitelaw, 2008: 62). Sharing the hardships and discomforts of working long hours under harsh physical conditions laid a firmer foundation for my relationships with women workers. My direct observations as a worker allowed me to immerse myself in the world of my informants and also to be accepted into their communities.

In participant observation, one needs to learn to remove herself/himself from the setting being observed in order to intellectualise what she/he has seen and heard (Bernard, 2011: 258). Distancing and disembodiment are vital to in-depth participant observation and critical analysis (Prentice, 2008: 60). I was aware of the danger of internalising my informants’ points of view too much over the course of my participant observation and so I constantly reflected on myself and reviewed my observations and findings in order to put things into perspective.

In December 2014, three months into my research, I went to the Buca Aegean Clothing Organised Industrial Zone in İzmir to explore the area. I visited two garment factories to introduce myself as I thought that working in real-life garment production and placing my own labour at the centre of production would help me to better understand the lives of my research subjects and the interrelationships between class experiences and gender norms. When I finished the first year of my research, working on theory, literature and research design, I returned to İzmir for fieldwork in July 2015 and stayed until the end of August 2016.

During my fieldwork, I lived in my parents' house on the outskirts of İzmir, in the Kuruçeşme neighbourhood. There were many factories, ateliers and home-based women garment workers living in our neighbourhood so the location provided me with easy access to my informants and enabled me to observe women garment workers' daily lives. It also gave me the opportunity to talk to the women garment workers while walking along a road, or waiting for a bus. I spent the first month exploring and deciding where to begin.

In August 2015, I decided to work in one of the garment factories in the Buca Aegean Clothing Organised Industrial Zone, which was 10 minutes walk from my house. I applied for my first garment job at the Grey Factory, which I chose randomly. I first talked to the factory's receptionist who welcomes outsiders and told her briefly about my research and desire to work there. The receptionist said I would need to have an interview with the management team and arranged an appointment for me. Two weeks later, I had a one hour interview with two managers. They asked details about my education and work life, my research, the reasons behind my desire to work there and the results that I hoped to achieve. They were both sceptical and meticulous. Two weeks after the interview, I was told that I could work at the factory if I provided an official letter from the university and signed a paper stating that I was going to work there for my research and was willing to work without any payment or insurance, to take all responsibility for anything potentially happening to me in the factory, and to assure confidentiality.

I began work at the Grey Factory on 7th September, 2015. On my first day, the production manager briefly introduced me to the workers in the assembly line department, saying that I was a university student and that I was going to work with them for my research project. I started working in the quality control section composed of around 20 workers and was assigned to fold and package garments on a large table. I was working with a number of women doing the same task who taught me how to do so, and corrected me when necessary. I got better with practice.

Since the assembly line production was taking place on the same floor, I was usually able to observe what was happening in other sections. After two weeks working in the quality control section, I switched to the sewing section, composed of around 50 workers, the majority of whom were women. My work in the sewing section entailed relatively basic tasks requiring minimal instruction and responsibility: piling garments up, carrying pieces and tools between operators, sewing tags on, etc. Although I spent most of my time working on assigned tasks, I had the opportunity to visit all the production sections, including the management, and talk to the workers in those sections in the course of production. This allowed me to understand the whole process of production and observe labour conditions across the whole factory floor.

I spent over ten hours every workday with my co-workers, actively engaging in the production of garments. Women workers asked me to help with their work, such as cutting out pattern pieces, carrying stuff or calculating the number of pieces that they had produced at the end of the day. I was given permission to use the dining and transportation facilities of the factory and so I used the shuttle buses provided by the factory and spent the tea and lunch breaks with my co-workers. I tried to spend time with as many women and groups as possible and participated in their shop-floor conversations about work-related, social or personal matters. However, I purposely had closer relations and spent much more time with two groups, the first composed of around eight women operators and the second of five women quality controllers, since these were the women with whom I was working more closely. This allowed me to connect further, and learn much from them. I also

attended women's social gatherings. As Bernard (2011: 277) states, hanging out with research subjects help researchers to build trust, which in turn prompts ordinary conversations and behaviours in their presence. These meetings were also useful for understanding women's relations with each other outside of the workplace and the causes and forms of tensions and competitions among them.

I finished the first one-month work period on 6th October, 2015. I had initially planned to work for only one month at the factory, but decided that, after a short break, I would work a second month to substantiate my observations further. In the meantime, I conducted interviews with some of my factory co-workers and made a couple of visits to the factory. The break gave me a chance to get some distance and put things into perspective, thinking about what I had achieved and what I needed to do, or not do, in the second one-month work period. When I began work at the factory again at the beginning of December, I saw that the number of workers and the pace of production had increased. I soon learned the reason: the factory had started to work with H&M and the volume of orders had increased. This second period allowed me to develop a closer relationship with my co-workers and better grasp both blatant and subtle forms of exploitation, domination and power relations shaped by class, gender and ethno-cultural dynamics on the shop floor. I finished working at the Grey Factory at the end of December 2015.

After finishing my work at the Grey Factory, I gave myself a couple of days to review my participant observation experience and findings. I wrote a report on the whole process, including my participation in the field. In January 2016, I began to look for a job in a small-scale atelier, having decided to carry out garment atelier work in a different district to achieve higher representativeness. I knew that Karabağlar was another district with a number of working-class neighbourhoods where many small-scale ateliers were located and so I visited the Günaltay neighbourhood of the district with a friend of mine who grew up there. Almost every street was home to more than one atelier. I randomly talked to the people on the streets and entered the ateliers to ask if I could work there.

Although I did not have any connection with any atelier owners or workers in that neighbourhood, it was easy to identify ateliers even if there were no signs on the entrance doors; their windows were covered with dye or paper and loud music blared out of them. Ateliers operating clandestinely usually cover their windows in an attempt to escape identification as such but, ironically, this acts as a clear indication of their presence. When I saw a basement floor with covered windows and heard the noise of machines accompanied by music, I chose to enter. I will refer to this atelier as the Cold Atelier. There were around fifteen workers. I introduced myself as a doctoral researcher and explained my wish to work there as a helper without any claim for remuneration or social benefits. The atelier owner did not even ask my name and agreed to employ me the next day. I had similar experiences in what I named the Dark and Secret Ateliers, which again I chose randomly. None of the atelier owners asked me to provide my identity card or official documents. The main reason behind my easier access to ateliers compared to the factory was the relatively higher level of unrecorded/illegal production activities and higher labour informality in ateliers. Given the illegality of the situation, I had been worried that the atelier owners would be more suspicious of me. However, most of the atelier workers were unregistered and the atelier owners were secure in the knowledge that there were many illegal ateliers operating and rarely any state inspection and enforcement. The atelier owners also welcomed my work because in this way they had an extra worker at zero cost, even if only for a short period of time.

These three ateliers were all within walking distance of each other, and produced knitted outerwear mainly for the domestic market. They were located in the basement or ground floors of residential flats, having 20-40 square meter floor areas. They were small-scale 'sewing ateliers' composed of 8-14 workers. I worked as a helper for two weeks for each atelier, cutting and piling garments, carrying pieces and tools between operators, serving water, tea and food, cleaning up and washing dishes. Due to the small number of women employed and limited scope of production, I was better able to get close to these workers and observe the production process, and the class and gender relations on the

shop floor in a relatively shorter time compared to the factory. Working in different ateliers enabled me to develop a stronger analysis through comparing and contrasting my findings from each site.

After finishing my work in those ateliers, I decided to work in an atelier located in another district, which produced wedding dresses for both the domestic and international markets, an important part of garment production in İzmir. Thanks to an acquaintance working there, I started work as a helper in the White Atelier, which was located in the Konak district, at the beginning of March. There were many other wedding dress manufacturing ateliers within the same area. My co-workers and I used to go to an *işçi lokantası* (workers' restaurant) where many other atelier garment workers also went for lunch. This gave me a chance to observe and talk to other women atelier workers.

I chose a wedding dress-manufacturing atelier also because I had thought that it could provide access to home-based women workers, which is precisely what happened. Home-based production is an integral part of wedding dress-production because embroidering is predominantly outsourced to home-based women workers. While I was working at the White Atelier, there were two 'middle-women' who took the materials and pieces to be embroidered and distributed them to home-based workers, one of which became one of my key informants. As she lived in the Limontepe neighbourhood of the Karabağlar district, I spent around one month in the neighbourhood, mostly in the one-room shop²⁰ of the middle-woman and in women workers' homes. I observed women's work and their relationships with each other and conducted interviews with some of them. During this period, I also visited the Cold, Dark and Secret ateliers to see what (if any) changes had taken place after I left. In the last part of my participant observation, I returned to Buca, my own neighbourhood. As I stated earlier, there were many home-based women garment workers living in our neighbourhood. For approximately one month, I visited a one-room shop belonging to a middle-woman, observed the

²⁰ Some middle-women have one small room, which is located on the ground floor of the building that they live in. Middle-women use these rooms to allocate and collect fabrics and sometimes do embroidery with women.

production and women's relationships with each other, and conducted individual and group interviews.

Throughout my fieldwork, I kept a journal in which I took daily notes reflecting daily events, conversations, my observations and own experiences. The recording of detailed field notes is a key part of participant observation. I spent 2-3 hours every day writing up field notes. One day, in the first weeks of the participant observation, I was too tired to record my notes and decided to do it the day after. However, when I sat at the computer the next day, I realised that I had forgotten most of my observations. After that, I always recorded my notes as soon as possible, usually in the evening of the same day, despite often being exhausted by garment work. I also always carried a small notebook in which I took small notes immediately to remember things better.

I strongly believe that my participant observation process was a uniquely revealing experience that allowed me to better understand women's productive and reproductive work and the relationships between the realms of production and reproduction. Participating in the production helped me gather deeper insights on the organisation of production, labour control strategies, and class and gender relationships across different scales of garment production. It was only by getting to know workers in the context of their daily work lives that I came to appreciate the complex intra-class relationships composed of contradictions, struggles, tensions, solidarity, and competition. The participant observation period allowed me to dig out unacknowledged and/or unexplained reality that lies deep down within the realm of my investigation, and that often goes undetected. Moreover, as I will explain later in this chapter, this process helped me to immerse myself in the life of women workers and learn much more from them thanks to the relationships of intimacy that I developed with my informants throughout the participant observation process. Obviously, this point entails a number of ethical considerations, which I will develop in later sections of this chapter. Altogether, the period of participant observation lasted six months: two in the Grey Factory, two months total in the Cold, Dark, Secret and White ateliers, and two months in the middle women's shops and home-based women workers' homes.

4.4. In-Depth Interviews

Another primary data collection technique of this research is in-depth, semi-structured interviews. I conducted 71 interviews in total. Conducting semi-structured, in-depth interviews helps to avoid creating a hierarchal relationship between the researcher and the interviewee (Oakley, 1981), and allows researchers to understand “the lived experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience” (Seidman 2006: 9). Moreover, through my interviews with the women workers, I was able to gather their life histories, significant experiences in their life in their own words, and their definition and construction of these experiences. As Anderson and Jack (1991: 23) state, in these kinds of interviews, “the focus is on process, on the dynamic unfolding of the subject’s viewpoint”, rather than on gathering information. In other words, it is an interactive process that allows for exploring the complex and conflicting experiences/thoughts/feelings of the informants. These interviews also allowed me to ask about and discuss matters that could not be discussed in public. Overall, semi-structured, in-depth interviews helped me to deepen my analysis of productive and reproductive labour, to further understand the perspectives of my research subjects, to include different actors’ voices, and to obtain additional information.

Of the 71 interviewees, 50 were women garment workers, whom this study focuses on. I used the purposive sampling method to choose women interviewees; a technique that enables the reader to hear many different voices and identify different trends (Wilson, 1993: 181). I included a wide range of variables in an effort to improve the representativeness of the sample (see Appendix 1): scales of production (factory, atelier and home-based), marriage status (married, single, and divorced), number of children (0 to 5), age groups (20 to 50 years old), education (unschooled, primary school graduates, high school graduates, and two-year university graduates), jobs (packaging, quality control, sewing, thread trimming, embroidering, working as a helper and middle-woman) and ethno-cultural backgrounds (Turkish, Kurdish, Sunni and Alevi).

I conducted personal interviews with 43 women, and two group interviews with a total of seven home-based women workers. I conducted the interviews in a friendly and informal mode. Of the 43 personal interviews, 30 were conducted in the interviewees' houses, 10 in my house, and three in cafés (see Appendix 2). In all cases, the interviews were held away from the employers' eyes and ears and in private. One of the group interviews composed of three home-based women took place in one of the women's house, and the other, composed of four home-based women, took place in the middle-woman's small shop. During the group interviews, some other women joined and left the conversation. These group interviews were very helpful for gathering additional data and insights, based on the observation of the interaction of women workers in the groups.

Conducting most of the interviews in women's houses and my own home, in private, developed intimacy between the workers and me, and generated a relaxed atmosphere in which women could share their personal experiences and feelings. Moreover, by visiting their homes, I had an opportunity to see their neighbourhoods and what kind of houses they were living in. Sometimes, I could also observe the division of labour within the household. On the other hand, conducting some interviews in my house further developed intimacy between the women and me. The area and house where I was living were similar to those of my informants and I clearly observed that they felt more relaxed and comfortable after coming to my house. In each interview that took place in houses, we usually prepared food, ate and cleaned up together before proceeding to interviews.

The interviews with women workers lasted from 45 minutes to three hours, with an average of one and a half hours. My co-workers accounted for 28 of the 36 factory and atelier women interviewees. The development of a personal relationship with women workers prior to the interviews was very useful. We had already spent long working hours together and this was a key factor in allowing for more open and intimate conversations about their work in the garment sector and in the family, their life stories, thoughts and feelings. I knew only four of the women before starting fieldwork, through my family and

friend relationships. I had acquaintances in common with seven, but no previous connection with the remaining 39 women.

I did not offer money or presents in exchange for interviews, but I did usually take snacks when I went to women's homes. I conducted interviews at times and places that were convenient to the women: they usually preferred to meet at the end of the workday, as they were too busy with familial responsibilities and reproductive tasks on their days off. I took notes immediately after each interview, including the time and place, information provided before or after the record, how the informant seemed (nervous or relaxed, etc.) at which moments, body language, gestures, tone of voice and if there were interruptions and/or silent moments.

I used a tape recorder during the interviews with the women's permission. Before starting the interviews, I briefly explained my research focus and informed the interviewees of the ethical principles of SOAS's Research Ethics Policy. In each interview, I had a list of questions and topics to cover, but the order and emphasis changed depending on the informant. I was prepared, but did not exercise excessive control over the interviewees so as to allow room for new leads. One of the keys to successful interviewing is "learning how to probe effectively—that is, to stimulate an informant to produce more information" (Bernard, 2011: 161). I asked clarifying questions (such as who, how, when, and why) about my informant's remarks in order to have a deeper understanding of their experiences, views, and feelings. At the end of each interview, I asked the women if they would like to share anything else, and whether I should include, remove, or rephrase any questions or expressions. I tried to put interview questions in a neutral, understandable, clear, short and non-threatening way. However, in the first interviews, I realised that some terms that I was using were unfamiliar to women (for example, 'different ethnic identities' and 'solidarity'). I then clarified and rephrased these terms in a way that made more sense to them.

Some of the women became very emotional during interviews, especially while talking about their inability to spend time with their children, their past

and present poverty conditions, and the (mostly domestic) violence they had previously been subjected to. During those moments, I tried to reassure them, gave them some time to pull themselves together, and then changed the subject by asking different questions. Almost all women interviewees told me that the interview was like a therapy for them and they felt emotionally lighter at the end of the interview. They seemed to feel valued and happy. Indeed, this caused me emotional difficulties that I will explain in the next section.

I also conducted interviews with three other main groups: four factory and four atelier owners; one representative each from five trade unions; and one official each from six garment-related associations. One of the factory owners and the four atelier owners were my employers. I tried to learn their opinions on the garment sector in Turkey and İzmir, labour market and employment strategies, and the organisation and relations of production. I interviewed the chairpersons of the five trade unions²¹ about the local problems of garment workers, and unionisation strategies and obstacles in the sector.

As I stated earlier, as yet there has been no studies on garment production in İzmir. Thus, to delineate the structure of the garment industry in İzmir and understand the perspectives of the sector representatives, I interviewed officials from the Aegean Exporters' Association, Aegean Region Chamber of Industry, Aegean Clothing Manufacturers' Association, İzmir Chamber of Commerce, Turkish Clothing Manufacturers' Association, and the Fashion, Textile, Garment Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association. I also conducted interviews with officials from the İzmir Branch of TURKSTAT and a woman representative from the İzmir Women's Labour Platform. I did not use a tape recorder but took notes while conducting the interviews with these groups as I thought taping might make them feel uncomfortable and alter what they might say because there was no pre-existing trusting relationship between us. I

²¹ İzmir branch of the Trade Union of Textile, Knitting, Clothing and Leather Workers (Teksif); Aegean branch of Öz İplik-İş; İzmir branch of the Weaving, and Textile Workers' Trade Union (Deri-teks); Söke branch of the Textile Workers' Trade Union (Disk Tekstil) and İzmir branch of the Revolutionary Textile Workers' Trade Union (Dev-Tekstil).

expanded these notes and reminders into full notes immediately after the interviews.

I should note that, in comparison to these informant groups, women workers seemed to lack self-confidence and did not see themselves as 'worthy' to be interviewed. For example, one woman aged around 50, who had been working at the Grey Factory for more than 20 years, rejected my interview request, suggesting that I should interview a young woman worker who, she said, "knows and speaks better". Some women asked for the questions in advance to prepare answers. At the beginning of the interviews, most women seemed timid and anxious and their voices sometimes quavered. As soon as I realised this, I reassured the women that there were no right or wrong answers to the questions I was asking and that what *was* important to me was their own experiences, observations and thoughts. After the first few questions, they seemed to speak more comfortably and freely and with less anxiety, and began to provide information beyond the asked questions.

While many women agreed to be interviewed, many others felt they could not participate even though they wanted to. The main reason was the research focus of this study itself: they were low-paid workers working at least 12 hours a day in the garment industry and unpaid workers in the family. In other words, the topic of the research shaped the field of the research. Many women refused to be interviewed, saying that they did not even have time to spend with their families, let alone for interviews. They were working until late in the workplace and also had to work at home, doing domestic and care work, in the remaining time. Another obstacle to women's participation in interviews was oppression from men. Some married women told me that their husbands would not allow them to participate. I suggested going to their homes and conducting interviews there in order to overcome those obstacles; this worked in many cases, but not all.

In-depth interviews allowed me to deepen my research findings. Talking face-to-face in private with women workers led to more open and richer conversations. In this way, I better understood their life, work experiences in

both the production and reproduction realms, and their views and feelings about these. Moreover, through in-depth interviews, I could gather information from different actors representing business and labour, and obtain their own perspectives. This helped me develop a broader picture and a stronger analysis.

I started the analysis of the data gathered from participant observation and in-depth interviews in the early days of the participant observation period and continued until I finished writing this thesis. While I engaged with data mapping throughout the whole period of research, from September 2016 to January 2017, I focused solely on data mapping. I began by listening to all the recorded interviews, and reading all the transcripts and field notes. Then, I constructed a thematic mapping based on the data and the theoretical frame that I had developed. I analysed the notes in my journals and the interview data both manually and by using a qualitative data analysis software program called MAXQDA.²² The use of multiple methods and multiple data sources has strengthened the validity of my findings. Having outlined the methodological approach and the research methods that I used, I will now reflect on my positionality and involvement in the field.

4.5. Positionality and Personal Experiences

Researchers' positionality (e.g. gender, class, age, ethnicity, etc.) and personal experiences in a research field are central to a research process. The inquirer must place herself/himself within the frame of the picture that she/he attempts to paint in order to make the entire research process and results open to scrutiny (Harding, 1987: 9). Introducing the "subjective" element into the analysis does not mean to be less "objective". On the contrary, it increases the objectivity and decreases the "objectivism" that hides this kind of evidence from the public (Harding, 1987: 9).

As Burawoy (2000: 25) says, ethnography is learned through practice and I learned a lot through practicing in the field. It was a great adventure in my academic and personal life: the experiences of refusal/support, enthusiasm/apathy, resentment/gratitude and happiness/depression. I

²² MAXQDA is a software program for qualitative and mixed methods data analysis.

remember very well how I felt the night before my first day at the Grey Factory. I was in the position of being both an insider and an outsider. As Mullings (1999: 340) argues, since positionalities are always dynamic in time and space, “no individual can consistently remain an insider and few ever remain complete outsiders”. I grew up in a working-class family in İzmir, then spent ten years in Ankara for my higher education before moving to London to do my PhD. I was anxious, worried and unsure about my participation in the lives of my research subjects:

I feel anxious and nervous. It is time to face if you are still one of them or not. I feel the contradiction between being too involved and therefore not being able to see what is behind the scenes, and detaching myself but subsequently remaining an outsider/not being accepted by the community. It is said that a researcher who does not know what to look for cannot reach the right answers. Always ask yourself what you are looking for and review your answers (Diary notes, 06.09.2015).

In my first day at the factory, I immediately started packaging garments with the help of other women workers. I was afraid of being seen as an outsider who did not know how to do her job. I was so focused on packaging that I almost forgot that I was there to do research. I even remember that I automatically worked faster when the foreman said: “Hurry up! Orders will not be fulfilled!” I would soon realise that this was an everyday labour control strategy; the forewomen/foremen repeated the same thing many times every day. Then, I looked up from my work-station for a moment. The first thing I realised was that I was working on the ‘wrong’ side of the table. I had my back turned to the other production sections and could only see the people working opposite me. From the next day, I changed my position so that I could see the entire production floor, slowed down my pace and tried to be more rigorous about observing the production process and the shop-floor relationships. On the other hand, as Burawoy (1979: 17) says, no amount of knowledge or consciousness individuals have can alter the lived experience of the relations of production, which “is socially produced as ‘natural’”, and in the midst of shop floor rhythms begins to feel natural.

During my first days at the factory and ateliers, I tried to get to know the setting and the people; I was friendly but did not push women workers into interaction. I refrained from making them feel uncomfortable by asking

questions, especially in the early days when they had almost no idea about me and allowed time to get to know them and for them to get to know me. Moreover, in this waiting period, one soon realises that there is no need to ask all the questions one may have in mind as many of them are answered naturally in the course of participant observation. After spending a few days in the workplaces, the other workers and I began to talk about our daily lives, and feel like friends. My women co-workers taught me the job and opened their lives to me. I witnessed their sufferings and happiness, listened to their private secrets and dreams. I honestly shared my personal story. I was often asked questions regarding my family and personal life and responded openly. I did not act or talk in ways that did not fit my own personality.

Women workers were usually surprised when they learned that I grew up in the Kuruçeşme neighbourhood and my family was still living there: “How did you get out of the neighbourhood and go to university in London?!” they used to ask me. I believe that coming from a similar neighbourhood, culture and class made them feel closer to me. Our family backgrounds and life stories sounded familiar to each other. Almost all the women workers that I got close to in the field told me that I was humble. They found it surprising, though, for a person, who is well educated and studying in London, to be humble. “You do not look like [a person who is studying abroad]”, “You are not arrogant”, “You are like one of us” they told me. I think that their perception of me as humble was one of the most important factors that helped me to lessen barriers and diminish the possibility of being seen as an outsider.

Being a woman researcher was also an advantage in getting closer to women. Women researchers usually stand a better chance than men of being accepted as insiders in women-dominated settings (Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault, 2016: 67). I believe my gender enabled me to develop trust more easily and allowed more open conversations with women. Because of the strong patriarchal structure in Turkey, I believe it would be almost impossible for a man researcher to become friends with women and talk about intimate experiences and feelings in a relatively short period. Moreover, we as women shared similar problems in terms of societal and individual male oppression.

Woman-to-woman interviews also create the possibility of reciprocal identification, since both parties share a subordinated gender identity (Finch, 1999: 170). Although admittedly to different extents, we had both experienced patriarchal oppression and restrictions at home, work or on the streets. Therefore, they were comfortable with sharing their gender-related problems, thoughts and feelings.

As an unmarried, educated woman in her late twenties, I encountered a great deal of consternation from women workers: why was I unmarried and childless?; why was I not working but still a student?; and why was I interested in their world? “When are you going to start working?”, they used to ask me with pity – they were concerned about my non-earning status. They also often asked me when I was going to marry. A woman worker at the Grey Factory even tried to arrange a date with her son but I thanked her and politely refused her offer. She told me to keep it secret from other workers, so I did. There were many things to be kept secret on the shop floor. As I will show in Chapter 6, garment factories and ateliers are full of gossip and rumour. Gossip provided me with a great deal of information regarding class and gender relations on the shop floor.

As Taylor et al. (2016: 57) state, people often do not understand participant observation, even when it is explained to them and my experience validates this claim. The people that I worked with in the factory and ateliers usually did not understand why I was working, especially under those conditions, without pay. Even when I explained that it was for my PhD research, it did not make much sense to them and most of them assumed that I was some kind of apprentice. One day, a woman worker around my age told me: “Even I do not know what a thesis or PhD means. Tell people that you are doing a kind of homework to graduate”. I took her advice and often used this description when they seemed confused. Some women in the field nicknamed me ‘journalist’ and sometimes made fun of me: “Write this down, journalist!” When they told obscene jokes or used foul language, they used to warn me with laughter: “*Aman ha bunları yazma, bizi rezil etme!*” [Do not write this down, do not shame us!]

Women workers usually treated me with familial and protective kindness. I was younger than most of them and so they treated me like a daughter or younger sister and I called most of them *abla* (big sister). As I said before, it was difficult for women to make time for interviews. Those who agreed to be interviewed did so as a favour to me: “*İnşallah işe yarar!*” [God willing, it will work for you!]. They all hoped that I would be rewarded for my effort: “*İnşallah emeklerinin karşılığını alırsın*” [God willing, you will be rewarded for your effort].

One day I could not go to work in the factory because I was sick. Most of the women noticed my absence. They had cut or sewn my clothes when I needed help and I had given them advice about their children’s education. Towards the end of my time there, everyone was excited about the factory’s New Year celebration, which was going to take place at a five-star hotel in the city centre. Everyone was asking each other what they were going to wear and I, too, was a part of these exciting conversations. However, when I asked the production manager if I could attend the event, he seemed reluctant and avoided giving a definite answer. When I told my co-workers, they talked to the forewomen and the production manager to persuade them, without my asking. The production manager eventually allowed me to attend the night thanks to my co-workers’ efforts. These things happened naturally, as time passed and we developed a reciprocal relationship based on mutual support. In the ateliers the women’s approach to me was similar: they shared their food with me, told me to sit down when I looked very tired and warned me against cold/dust/risks in the ateliers. It was almost as if they pitied me. They did not understand why I was working with them instead of doing an office job. One of the most common wishes that the women workers had for me was: “*Allah seni bu sektöre düşürmesin!*” [May God not make you work in this sector!]. According to them, I could perhaps work in the management department but never in production.

My fieldwork was not only composed of trust, solidarity and success; I also faced serious challenges. Although being a woman researcher and coming from a working-class family helped me to develop intimacy and familiarity with the women, it was not easy to break down the barriers in the beginning. Trust is

a hard-gained and fragile emotion, and establishing and maintaining trusting relationships with research subjects is a slow and on-going process. Even if women seemed to like me after spending some time with me, I sometimes felt that they did not entirely trust me. One example of this occurred in my third week at the factory and was illuminating in this respect. At the time, women were speaking more freely in my presence, and sharing much more. During a tea break, I was sitting with a group of women in the garden and felt a part of the group. In the morning of the same day, I had had an interview with the owner of the factory. When one of the women asked where I was in the morning, I told her that I was interviewing the employer. All the group members had heard what I said. After an hour of conversation, one of the women who had been criticising the employer during the break called me over to her sewing machine desk and asked what I had talked about with the employer. I briefly told her that we talked about the sector. She seemed worried: "You know, I said negative things about him, but I have to work here. I have only a few years left before my retirement. Please do not tell him what you hear from me!" she said. I felt bad that I seemed unable to reassure her enough that I would never share her thoughts with anyone, although I kept my promise to her, and to all the women workers. However, it seemed to me that the women workers increasingly trusted me and shared their intimate stories and criticisms of the employers/management with me.

My experiences taught me that there is always a power asymmetry between researchers and their informants. Although I tried to reduce the effects of this asymmetry, explaining my reasons for working/spending time with them in the factory, ateliers and their homes, it was impossible to eliminate the power relations separating me from my research subjects. I had more freedom and flexibility on the shop floor and less work pressure and control. I was working with them to do research and would soon leave the job. I was temporary in the world that they had to live in. I was from a similar culture, wearing similar clothes, and living in a similar neighbourhood, yet I was studying in London and working to become an academic. They knew that. In one of my first days at the factory, when a woman worker learned that I was

studying in London, she said: “Yeah, I see now why you are speaking freely”. The implication was that I was overly self-confident in communicating with people and expressing my opinions. I experienced another similar example at the New Year celebration event mentioned above. There were more than one fork, spoon and knife on the dinner tables provided by the hotel. The women that I was sitting with were confused: they turned to me and said, “You have been to Paris.²³ You must know. How should we use these?”

As I will show in Chapter 6, the issue of power was complex in the garment workplaces, especially in the factory. Women workers formed and acted in groups in the factory and there were tensions between some of them. As Johnson (1975) wrote, it is common for participant observers to find themselves in the middle of a power struggle over their presence. I tried to approach all groups and women workers in the same way and develop a rapport with all of them. However, it was strange for them to see me getting along with all of the women in the factory. Some tried to manipulate to make me tell them what women from other groups had said or done. In such cases, I tried to make both sides understand that I was not hostile to their position but would not take a side or give information to or about the other side. Towards the end of my time in the factory, all women seemed to accept and appreciate my position.

Another significant challenge that I faced in the field was related to harsh working conditions in the sector. The bodily experiences of a fieldworker are a significant part of the research process and the emergent knowledge (Okely, 2007). My bodily experiences were a significant source of my understanding and analysis. In all the workplaces I worked, the working environment was noisy and dusty without fresh air. It was, in fact, the first time in my life that I understood the great importance of nostril hair! The ateliers were also cold and deprived of sunlight and I was working on my feet for at least 10 hours a day. My body and its limitations were integral to my research on the shop floors where I worked as a garment worker. Some days I felt exhausted and drained of

²³ They mixed up London with Paris. In fact, it did not matter for them which city it was; the important thing was that I had been abroad.

enthusiasm. The following quote is from my fourth workday at the Grey Factory:

I am too tired. I feel sleepy, my legs hurt. I cannot concentrate on what is going on around me. My physical weakness is winning over my passion and curiosity. In fact, I was excited and happy before going to bed yesterday. I guess this is how capitalism succeeds. It drains excitement and passion from workers (Diary notes, 10.09.2015).

I also had psychological challenges during the fieldwork as I witnessed and heard the difficult life stories of my co-workers. The world that we study is not external and separate from us. Ethnographic research as a mode of data collection involves “the development of close connections with subjects and situations being studied” (Prasad, 1997; cited in Prasad, 2015: 75). The more I became a part of the women’s lives and witnessed their sufferings, the more depressed I felt. Their lives were full of class and gender injuries, poverty and deprivation. Moreover, I often felt offended by the owner of the Dark Atelier. It was the only workplace in which I worked almost non-stop. Once, when the employer saw me leaning against the wall, she ‘warned’ me saying “Are you gonna do that job?!” Another day, while she and her woman friend around my age were sitting in the kitchen, which was quite small, she ‘asked’ [read told me] me to make coffee for them.

Emotionally, the most difficult aspect of the fieldwork was working with child workers in the ateliers. Those children should have been going to school, playing games on the streets, sleeping and eating well. They were physically and emotionally harmed in the ateliers, as they were working more than ten hours a day on their feet, doing physically heavy work, and subjected to maltreatment. I felt helpless and guilty because I could not change anything in their lives, although I sometimes tried. The more involved I got with my research subjects in their daily lives, the more I felt that they were becoming a part of my life. This also caused me to feel disappointed, even sometimes angry, when my women co-workers, those whom I thought of as my ‘friends’, did not show any interest in participating in interviews without giving any reason. At those moments, I reminded myself that it was not fair or reasonable to expect all the women to be interested in my research and to sacrifice their already scarce free time on my behalf.

Moreover, as I stated earlier, most people did not understand my interest in their world and were sceptical of my motives. Even though I always made my identity and purpose clear from the beginning, some people from different informant groups (usually before getting to know me) thought of me as a kind of spy. Factory workers thought I was a spy for the management/employer, employers for the government, and trade unionists for the government or owners of the factories that they were trying to organise in. A man worker at the Grey Factory even asked me if I was a spy for the British government. Some of these conjectures were rumours that I heard from other people, some were expressed openly to me by the people who thought so. Besides, as Burgess (1991) claims, even if the gatekeeper may give you access to the site, others may resent your presence. I later heard that the forewomen/foremen in the Grey Factory were initially uncomfortable with my presence as they did not understand what I was going to do in the factory and were afraid that I was going to intervene in their jobs. However, they seemed to accept my presence as time passed.

As I wrote in the beginning, the fieldwork was a great adventure, during which I learned a lot about research and life. I gained deeper insights and knowledge regarding my field research and made many friends. On the other hand, no window on workers' lives can fully reveal the weight of the hardship of an entire life of toil. I left the field at the end of August 2016, having spent over a year sharing my life with garment workers.

4.6. Research Ethics

This research, including the fieldwork and writing-up stages, was conducted in line with the UK's Data Protection Act and the ethical requirements of SOAS' Research Ethics Policy. As a basic ethical principle, I always made my identity and purpose clear to the research subjects. However, I did explain my research topic in general terms with different highlights. On the one hand, I usually presented myself to business owners and the sector representatives as being interested in garment production in İzmir, the role of women workers in its success and women workers' life experiences. On the other hand, I told women workers that I was researching the ways in which

they combine garment jobs with domestic and care work, and how these two affect each other. I never lied.

I conducted interviews at times convenient to the informants. All personal interviews were undertaken in private in order to prevent any situation that could bring damage to my research subjects. I paid special attention not to conduct interviews in the presence of employers, outsiders or other family members since it “may inhibit informants, embarrassing them into evasion or silence” (Devereux & Hoddinott, 1993: 32). I did not speak or act in the workplaces in a way that could harm workers. For the same reason, I did not cross the borders determined by the managers and employers.

Speaking Turkish, I did not need an assistant in the field and I undertook all of the interviews myself. I sought verbal consent from all interview subjects. Before starting the interviews, I briefly explained the research focus, assured the interviewees of anonymity and confidentiality, and that they could call a halt to the interview whenever they wanted. I always sought consent from the interviewees to use an encrypted voice recorder. I transcribed audio records and wrote up my notes regularly on my personal computer which was password protected. I did not reveal informants’ names, even in my notebooks. I changed their names and coded the interviews, using a reference, which would remind me of the interview but not make sense to anyone else. Hence, all the names, including workplaces, workers, and employers presented in this thesis are fictitious to maintain anonymity. The research results were not written in a way that identifies any research subject. In the rest of the thesis, I use codes to refer to the fieldwork interviews. For both workers and employers, the code denotes: age/gender/scale of production. For gender, ‘W’ refers to ‘Woman’, ‘M’ refers to ‘Man’. For scale of production, ‘FW’ refers to ‘Factory-Worker’, ‘AW’ refers to ‘Atelier-Worker’, ‘HW’ refers to ‘Home-based Worker’, ‘FO’ refers to ‘Factory Owner’, and ‘AO’ refers to ‘Atelier Owner’.

Lastly, in light of my ethical duty to the women garment workers, I endeavoured to remain loyal to their stories, to include their voice as much as

possible, and to offer a credible account of their work in the realm of production and in the family.

4.7. Conclusions

This chapter has outlined the methodological approach of this study and the development and implementation of the field research. This study mainly rests on the ethnographic data gathered in the field by keeping a field journal, noting observations through participant observation, attending social gatherings of the women and conducting in-depth interviews. The multi-method fieldwork, combining the ethnographic extended case study with secondary and quantitative data, was the most appropriate methodological approach to operationalise my theoretical frame, which emphasises the importance of the interplays between the economic, political and cultural spheres, and between the realms of production and reproduction, and their effects on daily transactions of social life.

Employment as fieldwork provided me with a valuable opportunity to better understand the labour regime, social interactions on the shop floor, and the internal relations between the realms of production and reproduction. Participating in production and the daily lives of women workers, and experiencing the emotional, mental and physical conditions alongside them were very useful for building rapport and trust with my informants and immersing myself in their world.

In-depth interviews provided me with a deeper understanding vis-à-vis my research questions by allowing more open and richer conversations with various actors in the field. Through these interviews, I was able to draw a broader picture and develop a stronger analysis. My field experience as a garment worker and my use of multiple methods allowed me to achieve a deep understanding of the organisation and characteristics of garment production. I developed a strong understanding of the class culture of workers, their intra-class relationships, the ways in which these relationships are shaped on the shop floor, and the ways in which women's productive and reproductive work are linked to and shape one another.

Overall, the field research was a uniquely informative experience that deepened my knowledge of class and gender relations across the productive and reproductive realms. In line with the theoretical standpoint of the study, it allowed me to better understand the strong interactions between different sets of social relations and the ways in which women workers experience and understand the conditions of their work and life. Field data will be analysed in the following chapters. The next chapter will first look at the labour regimes and labour conditions across factory, atelier and home-based garment production.

CHAPTER 5. ORGANISATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND LABOUR REGIMES IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY

Starting with this chapter, I will analyse my field findings in the light of the theoretical frame that I developed. This chapter will provide the analysis of the broader structures of production, the organisations of work and labour regimes across different scales of production in İzmir's garment industry in the light of the debates on labour informality. As discussed in Chapters 2-3, labour informality is characterised by job insecurity, poor working conditions, and less labour protection. It is not only a way of reducing the cost of labour but also a way of controlling labour. However, labour informality as an employment strategy is not a one-size-fits-all model but has various composite features. Thus, in this chapter, I will comparatively examine the organisations of work and their effects on the patterns of labour informality across the factory, atelier and home-based scales, respectively. Since the organisation of work has significant impacts on labour regimes and labour conditions, I will start each section by explaining how the production takes place in different production scales. After that, I will discuss labour conditions and show the patterns of labour informality. As well as looking at material labour conditions, such as pay, social benefits, working hours and so on, I will also discuss work pressure and labour control mechanisms, which are significant parts of labour informality. As I will argue, labour informality is widespread across the whole industry. However, whilst labour informality in terms of job insecurity and violation of legal labour rights intensifies towards the end of the supply chains, it lessens regarding heavy work pressure and harsh labour control. Since the organisation of production and labour regimes are part and parcel of the class culture and class relations, this chapter will provide the basis for the following chapters.

5.1. Factory-based Production

As I stated in Chapter 4, I worked at the Grey Factory for two months and interviewed 20 women working in the factory. The factory was established and started to produce in 1992: its production was mainly concentrated on knitted women's outerwear. Since its establishment, it had only produced for the international market; garments produced in the factory were mainly destined

for European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, and Finland. The annual turnover of the firm was around €21 million in 2014. Approximately 3.5 million pieces were produced each year. The factory employed around 200 workers. About two-thirds of the workers consisted of blue-collar workers in the assembly line department. Most of the rest were white-collar workers doing office jobs. The factory did not have its own brand but worked for big name clothing brands, including H&M, Esprit, Topshop, Marks & Spencer, and Tom Tailor, producing designs provided by the buyers. Nonetheless, the production manager told me that they had started to offer their own designs to buyers in the last few years. By producing their own designs, he thought, the factory would gain more credibility and become more competitive in the market.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, flexible production is characterised by a massive increase in subcontracting. The export-oriented garment industry is characterised by disintegrated buyer-driven global commodity chains (Gereffi, 1994). Employers react to changes in demands with lower costs achieved by reducing the regular factory workforce and using subcontractors (Hale, 2000: 352). Grey was run in line with the rule of flexible production and subcontracted most of the production to smaller firms. Moreover, cutting was totally outsourced to a subcontracted firm, which operated inside the factory and employed around ten workers. Subcontracted production accounted for 85% of the factory's total production. The number of subcontracted firms varied between 10 and 20, depending on the number of orders. The factory supplied designs and raw materials to the subcontracted firms. While some subcontracted firms carried out the whole production process themselves, from cutting to packaging, others were only responsible for specific tasks. Grey factory workers monitored the production process and also undertook quality control in the subcontracted firms.

When I asked why he chose to produce 15% of the total production in the factory instead of outsourcing all the production, the owner of Grey said: "The production here in the factory improves the quality. [In this way] you keep yourself updated with the new technological developments in the sector.

Moreover, some customers want production to be done specifically in the factory” (Semih, 49/M/FO).²⁴ As well as increasing the quality and meeting some customers’ demands, the assembly line department in the factory acted like a pressure relief valve. When subcontracted firms were not able to meet targets, production was transferred to the factory. In other words, in the Grey Factory case, it was no longer the subcontracted firms providing flexibility to the factory, but the factory to subcontracted firms.

One day I went to one of Grey’s big subcontracted firms, ‘Ada’, located in Çiğli, Atatürk Organised Industrial Zone. Alongside Grey, Ada was producing for other two large garment firms. However, the chain of subcontracting did not end with this firm. Ada was outsourcing to two subcontracted firms each consisting of eight/nine workers, working inside its building. I was also told that Ada subcontracted to other smaller firms during periods of high production demand. Thus, the buyer contracts to Grey, Grey subcontracts to Ada, and Ada subcontracts to firms smaller than itself. As such, this represents one example of the complex subcontracting chain in the export-oriented garment industry.

The organisation of production inside the factory begins with taking orders from buyers and working on a model. Based on buyers’ instructions, samples are made in the factory’s sample production unit. There were around ten workers in this section. Sewing machine operators in this unit are expected to be skilled at using various sewing machines. An operator in this unit is responsible for each operation of sewing and sews a whole garment sample herself/himself. This is why these workers are better paid than their counterparts in the assembly line department. Until buyers approve the sample, all corrections are done in this section. Around 20 customer representatives were employed by the factory, who served as a bridge between the buyers and the sample production unit.

Once a buyer has approved the sample, it is sent to the assembly line department. The first phase of production in this unit is cutting the material

²⁴ As explained in the previous chapter, this particular code equates to a 49-year-old, man, factory owner.

from the patterns. After that, it is sent to the sewing section, which is the backbone of production. The sewing section operated on an assembly line, which workers called 'the belt'. There were two belts, each consisting of around 25 workers and producing different garments. There was one forewoman/foreman (the 'belt leader') for each belt and one head forewoman in charge of the whole section. These forewomen/foremen consulted with the production manager to decide how to set up the belt for each new model. Belt leaders are the highest paid workers in this department. They decide the required tasks and the order of processing, allocate tasks to workers and monitor the sewing process.

The location of sewing machines changes according to the tasks needed for each model. Pieces of fabrics are processed by operators consecutively, and exit the line as a finished garment. Unlike small-scale production, operators always do the same task for each garment. For example, if an operator sews a pocket, she/he always sews a pocket on the assembly line, the rationale being to extract more surplus value from workers through intensifying the expenditure of labour on the assembly line. On the other hand, doing repetitive tasks deskills workers; operators cannot develop different sewing skills if they work in the same factory for a long time. Consequently, they stand less chance of finding a better job in the labour market.

Sewing machine operators are the heart of garment production. They are classified as 'first' 'second' or 'third' class, and their wages are determined according to the number of machines they can use and how competently and quickly they use each of them. During one of my interviews with the production manager, he gave me the list showing workers' performance numbering and salaries. In general, operators' wages ranged between TL 50-200 above (5-20% of) the net monthly minimum wage, which was TL 1000.50 as of 1 October, 2015. There were also three quality control supervisors who checked the quality of the sewing operation. The average monthly wage of these workers was higher than that of operators but, as they were not paid for overtime, an operator's wage with overtime exceeded that of quality control supervisors. There were also helpers in this section, who were predominantly young

women, folding garments, matching pieces or providing the required raw materials to operators. They were classified as unskilled labour and paid the legal minimum wage.

After being sewn, the garments were sent to a group of women who removed any untrimmed threads. These workers were elderly (in garment industry terms) women in their 40s and 50s, who were also classified as unskilled. They were located at the bottom of the job hierarchy and paid the legal minimum wage. Unlike the young helpers who have a long work life ahead of them and can hope to climb up the job ladder, those women do not have any such chance. There was also a small group of women workers who were employed on a daily basis, doing handwork, such as opening buttonholes and seaming or un-seaming under the supervision of two of the factory's core workers. These workers were housewives in their 40s, who occasionally worked at the factory's request. As such, the factory labour regime benefits from the age difference among women, by paying the lowest wage to older women who started work at later ages and employing them on more precarious terms than their counterparts.

After garments have had any threads trimmed, they are sent to the ironing, quality control, and packaging section. Within the job hierarchy, ironers come after the operators and before the quality controllers and earn TL100 above the minimum wage. After garments are ironed, quality controllers, who work next to ironers, check the garments and identify faulty ones. The last phase of production is labelling and packaging. Workers in this section were also classified as unskilled and mostly paid the minimum wage.

The factory had all the departments required for the garment manufacturing process: pattern-making, sampling, printing, cutting, sewing, trimming, ironing, quality control, labelling and packaging. The factory had two floors: the offices and the sample production unit were located on the ground floor and all the sections of the assembly line production on the first floor. The production process was tightly organised and the division of labour in the assembly line department was strict. Everyone had certain tasks to perform.

The organisation of production and the differentiation of labour had significant impacts on labour conditions. I will now analyse the labour regime in factory-based production and trace the effects of labour informality.

5.1.1. The Conditions of Factory Labour

Grey was a formal enterprise. Based on my observations and the narratives of the workers, all the workers were employed formally and registered with the social security system. In Turkey, Social Security Law no. 5510 states that every worker must be registered by the employer with the Social Security Institution from his/her start date. During my work at Grey, monthly wages and overtime payments were paid fully on a regular basis. All workers were paid at least the minimum legal wage. The factory also provided a shuttle service for workers' transportation in order to utilise the labour supply in the city.

As stated in Chapter 2, labour informality can be found both in formal and informal enterprises. Although Grey seemed to operate in compliance with the law, it violated labour rights defined by the law. For instance, it was under-reporting workers' salaries in order to make smaller social security contributions. Social Security Law no. 5510 requires private sector employers to pay workers' monthly insurance premiums (15.5% of monthly gross salary) to the Social Security Institution. However, Grey was paying workers' social insurance premiums based on standard monthly wages rather than the actual wages including overtime, in order to avoid paying higher premiums. To do so, overtime payments were not formally recorded and given in cash instead of being paid into workers' bank accounts. Given the excessive overtime at Grey, this under-reporting of workers' wages significantly reduces labour costs. On the other side of the coin, workers receive lower severance payments and pensions because these are calculated based on the total of premiums paid. This problem is not peculiar only to Grey. The lack of social security coverage and falsification of records are common labour rights violations across the whole garment industry in Turkey (CCC, 2005: 33), as well as elsewhere (e.g., Esbenshade, 2004; Mezzadri & Srivastava, 2015)

Another important reason behind unregistered overtime is related to another feature of labour informality: illegally long working hours. As I stated in Chapter 3, Turkish labour law states that the standard work week cannot exceed 45 hours, overtime cannot exceed 270 hours a year, and wages for each overtime hour must be remunerated at one and a half times the normal hourly pay. While Grey was paying one and a half times the normal hourly pay for overtime, the number of overtime hours greatly exceeded the legal limits. A regular workday was from 8 am to 6.15 pm on weekdays. So, employees were working 9 hours a day (excluding breaks), and 45 hours a week. However, working until 10 pm on some weekdays and from 8 am to 4 pm on Saturdays was almost a rule. Some workers also told me that they worked 36 hours straight during busy delivery times and can sometimes work 100 hours overtime in just one month. Thus, overtime was not exceptional but integral to the operation of Grey. Research conducted by the CSGB (CSGB, 2015b: 79) found that overtime in the Turkish garment industry could be as high as 500 hours per year.

Although, according to the law, overtime is voluntary and no one can be forced to do it, in effect it was mostly mandatory at Grey. The number of workers obliged to do overtime depended on the required operations: sometimes all sections of the assembly line department had to do overtime, sometimes it was only specific sections. During my time at the factory, every day the women discussed whether there was going to be overtime that day or not. In general, they were told to do overtime only towards the end of the workday and in such cases, they looked sad or angry. If they did not have a serious reason (e.g., a death, wedding or health problems) they could not refuse overtime. For example, Kader was forced to work until 10 pm on her wedding anniversary although she had said that she did not want to do overtime: "Where can you go after 10 at night? You are a worker; you have to go back to work the next morning" (Kader, 37/W/FW), she said. As such, forced and excessive overtime was one of the most significant working problems cited by the women factory workers. Given the choice, most of them preferred not to do overtime.

Forced overtime reduces labour costs by producing more with fewer workers. As Breman and Van der Linden (2014: 926) argue, lengthening the workday and workweek is an important part of the flexibilisation policy. Since hiring new workers incurs employee benefit costs for employers, many firms prefer to maintain a smaller labour force and demand that these employees work excessive hours (Anner, 2015: 297). Moreover, factory workers tend to work harder in order not to do overtime, hence deepening work intensity. While working at Grey, I observed this situation many times. Women that did not want to do overtime organised fellow workers to work harder so that they could meet their targets without overtime. Therefore, the threat of overtime serves to increase productivity and extract more surplus value from workers.

On the other hand, the standard monthly wages of the workers in the assembly line department was very low, ranging between the minimum wage and TL 200 above it. Since it was difficult to make a living with their standard wages, some workers willingly did overtime in order to meet the costs of their social reproduction. Suzan (40/W/FW), married with three children, said: “My monthly wage is better off with overtime. Otherwise, my standard wage is not sufficient. Of course, I wish I could get that money without overtime as my standard wage”. Low pay was also a common source of complaints for the women interviewees from other factories. For example, Asya said that she has to work one and half month’s hours in one month (through overtime) in order to earn enough money to live on. Similarly, Ruwanpura (2012: 19) states that overtime is “a necessary evil” for the garment workers of Sri Lanka because the legal minimum wages do not reflect cost-of-living increases and do not constitute a living wage. Consequently, low wages are also an important method of labour control.

Although it was not the case at Grey, another critical problem faced by factory labour is irregular and unpaid salaries. During my fieldwork, many women told me that they had not been paid their salaries from some factories where they had worked. For example, Eda had not received her last six months’ salary from the factory where she had worked for nine years. The owner of the factory in question had emptied the workplace overnight. “Nothing was left

behind, not even a rag” (Eda, 35/W/FW). Declaring bankruptcy and/or emptying the workplace overnight are frequently used strategies by employers in İzmir’s garment sector. In such cases, employers usually disappear without paying workers’ wages or compensation. Another strategy to reduce labour costs is sacking and re-employing workers on paper within a year. Alev, for example, had left a firm because, on paper, its workers left every six months and were then re-employed, although employees had sometimes been working at the company for years. By doing so, employers avoid the costs of legal labour rights, such as severance pay and annual paid vacation, given to workers who work in the same firm for more than a year.

Difficulties in taking sick leave and paid annual leave are other common problems resulting from labour informality. Workers who have bank or hospital appointments during the workday get stressed about asking permission for time off from management. They are so afraid of being sacked that even if they have a medical certificate from a doctor they continue to go to work. For example, Sevgi told me that one day she had an allergy and went to the doctor. The doctor gave her sick leave, but she refused to use it as she had used ten days two months previously. Research conducted by Kümbetoğlu, User and Akpınar (2015: 267) on the food, textile, and service sectors in Turkey similarly reports that women workers are usually not allowed to take a leave of absence for medical reasons – and when they are allowed they are not paid. Among my sample, Alev was one of those workers who had been sacked because of using sick leave. In the past, she had worked for another factory where workers were forced to work until two or three o’clock in the morning. “I am very good at operating a sewing machine. You already know, you have seen me working. Indeed I am very speedy with a sewing machine,” she said. However, at the end of her fourth month in the factory, she had been fired:

I had severe neck and back pain. I went to the doctor. She [the doctor] said I have a herniated cervical disc. She gave me one week off from work. At the end of that week, I started to work again, but it was impossible. I could not even move my arms. The doctor gave me one more week off. The day I went back to the factory, they [management] said that I had been fired as I had taken too much sick leave (Alev, 40/W/FW).

With respect to annual paid leave, many workers at Grey told me that they were only allowed to use one week of their two week statutory entitlement. Moreover, workers could not decide when to take leave; management decided instead, depending on the intensity and timing of orders. However, since any form of paid annual leave is rare in the garment sector, some workers still appreciated Grey. Aliye, for instance, who had been working in the garment sector for 15 years, had never been given her paid annual leave except at Grey. Moreover, while Grey does its best to avoid giving paid sick or annual leave to workers, it does not refrain from giving unpaid leave during the lean season or periods of low demand. Workers told me that just one month before I began working at Grey, management made all workers take one week's unpaid leave because there was insufficient production demand. It was mandatory, not voluntary. Forcing workers to take unpaid leave is yet another extreme example of the flexible use of labour and labour informality.

As Mezzadri (2017) states, garment work is always an unhealthy experience. One of the major health risks for the factory workers was the exposure to high levels of dust and fibres. There was a lack of fresh air and workers were not provided with protective gear. During my two months working there, management provided disposable dust masks only once and some workers had been diagnosed with allergies, pharyngitis, bronchitis and asthma as a result of breathing in cotton dust.²⁵ The other most commonly cited occupational diseases among factory workers were muscular problems, backache, herniated discs in the neck and lower back, vision disorders and mental illnesses. Of 20 factory workers, 13 reported that they had lower back and neck problems due to doing repetitive motions, forceful exertions and heavy lifting at work.

²⁵ Ruwanpura (2014b) notes that worker's interests and choices, and managements' health and safety policies do not always overlap and reports the examples of workers' contestation and opposition to some health and safety regulations in the Sri Lankan garment factory, such as the use of cutlery and the prohibition of bringing mobile phones to work. In the case of Grey, since the management provided dust masks only one time during my two months working there, I was not able to observe whether workers were willing to use dust masks if they had been provided every day.

There was a small one-room clinic to provide health services to workers at Grey. According to Law No.6331 enacted in 2012, enterprises employing more than ten workers are required to provide an occupational physician in the workplace. According to the law, the CSGB outsources this service to joint health and safety units (JHSUs), private agents, which are authorised by the ministry to provide health services to workplaces. Employers bear the cost as they buy the service from their local JHSU. The occupational physician at Grey was available for two hours twice a week. When I interviewed him and asked what JHSU officers do when they see a health risk in a workplace, he replied: “You [the JHSU officer] have a right to notify the ministry if the employer does not solve the problem after three warnings. However, no-one would do that because they are afraid of losing their job”. This shows that the employer-employee relation (i.e. the profit-loss relation) between the firms and JHSUs impairs the quality of the legally mandated health and safety service.

Moreover, employing an occupational physician serves the interests of employers by enabling workers to get simple health services in the factory, lessening the need for them to go to the hospital to receive treatment. The occupational physician at Grey emphasised how beneficial they are for employers:

Employers see this [regulation] as a burden on them. In fact, it is profitable for them and we try to explain this to them. I see many workers here at the factory. In this way, workers do not go to the hospital and employers do not lose labour power. Moreover, I do not give workers sick leave easily. If they go to a hospital, they will take sick leave. Instead, I tell them to see me again two days later, and they go back to work (JHSU officer at Grey).

As seen, the medical service in the workplace becomes an important method of labour control especially when an occupational physician acts as a disciplining agent by not giving workers sick leave ‘easily’ and making them continue to work. Similarly, Hewamanne (2008: 115) found that the medical centre and the nurses in the Sri Lankan garment factory, in which she conducted her research, worked as disciplining agents controlling ‘unnecessary’ disruptions to the production process. The transfer of the state’s responsibility to the market, that is, the privatisation of workers’ health and safety, does not go much beyond fulfilling the bare legal requirements rather than offering a

quality health service to workers. When asked whether they benefit from the health service provided by the factory, workers replied that they saw the occupational physician for simple health issues, such as getting painkillers, but they did not think it was a quality health service. Ruwanpura (2017), similarly, illustrates that the presence of medical facilities in Sri Lankan garment factories does not guarantee that workers get sufficient medical attention as and when they need it.

One of the factors that affected the labour conditions at Grey were the codes of conduct (COC), which the international brands expected it to adopt. “Codes of Conduct can be described as voluntary policy tools that set up social (and environmental) standards for multinational corporations in their supply chain operations around the world” (Prieto-Carron, 2008: 5), and they consist of national labour laws and international labour standards. The main principles are promoting a safer workplace, decent working hours, freedom of association, protection of the environment, and eliminating discrimination, bonded labour and child labour in the workplace. All four garment factories that I visited, including Grey, had social compliance audits from independent international organisations, namely the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) and SEDEX. These organisations are responsible for auditing factories and their subcontractors once every one or two years.

COC play a role in relatively better working conditions (the absence of child labour, regular and full pay, and the provision of social security and health services to workers) in export factories compared to small-scale ateliers that are not audited. Because these minimum legal requirements are easy to check, factories generally have to fulfil them. Nevertheless, factory labour conditions are still often below national and international labour standards. As indicated above in the case of Grey, labour informality exists in different scales and forms, and labour rights continue to be violated in export factories. The irony of the situation is that the big companies that are at the top of the supply-chains themselves produce the conditions that lead to violations of COC (Hale, 2000: 353). The pressure on the supply-chain resulting from purchasing practices of companies, such as price reductions, exclusive relationships followed by

withdrawn orders and refusal to promise future orders if conditions improve, undermine the labour standards that the codes are supposed to protect (Prieto-Carron, 2008: 9). COC have a very limited effect also because they mainly target a permanent labour force in the factory realm of production in a context where, instead, labour is increasingly casualised and informalised (Mezzadri, 2012).

Beyond the neoliberal labour regime imposed by the international brands, there are other practical reasons that undermine the implementation of COC. Firstly, factories are notified about the date of the audit which reduces the audit quality by enabling management to get ready. To illustrate, I learned from Emine, a woman worker at Grey, that a couple of years ago Grey had been outsourcing to the subcontractor firm operating in the factory. However, there was no legal contract between Grey and the subcontractor, and thus all the subcontractor's workers were employed informally. Emine had previously worked for this subcontractor firm. She told me that these unregistered subcontracted workers were hidden out of sight during the audits and returned to work when the auditors had left. Similarly, when one day in the factory I was surprised that the toilets were clean and supplied with toilet paper, workers told me it was because there was going to be an audit that day. Ruwanpura (2016: 434) observed a similar situation in the Sri Lankan garment industry: during visits from auditors or labour governing bodies; factories pretend to enforce local labour laws and codes that, in fact, they do not adhere to.

Although audits are also supposed to target the subcontractors of the main supplier, I learned that some of Grey's subcontractors were unrecorded. Therefore, there were no audits on labour conditions in these firms. Moreover, it seemed that audits were not done, or taken, very seriously. When I visited Ada, there was an audit by SEDEX. A Grey quality controller working at Ada told me that "it has a mere procedural function". Beyond these implementation problems, although codes apply in the sectors that are mostly dominated by women, they neglect gender issues (Prieto-Carron, 2008: 12). COC do not tackle 'non-employment' issues faced by women garment workers such as childcare, housing, education and healthcare (Ruwanpura, 2011: 203).

In sum, garment factory labour is highly informalised. Although pay is usually made in full on a regular basis, it is too low to make a living. Workers are forced to do long overtime hours above the legal limits. Wages are under-reported by employers so that they can pay lower social security contributions. Workers face difficulties in using their statutory sick leave and paid annual leave. They work in unhealthy physical conditions without being provided with protective equipment and suffer from severe musculoskeletal and respiratory diseases. The health service provided by the factory is not sufficient, and is rather used as a way to control labour and to reduce labour costs, alongside low wages and excessive overtime. There were also other mechanisms of labour control in the factory. In the following pages I will discuss these mechanisms as well as work pressure and stress, which are other significant aspects of labour informality.

5.1.2. Labour Control, Work Pressure and Alienation of Labour

As a labour-intensive industry, labour productivity is one of the main sources of profit in the garment industry. This fact reveals itself as intense work pressure and discipline of workers. Employer workplace repression is one of the main systems of labour control since it is at the point of production that capital is most concerned with disciplining labour to realise their gains (Anner, 2015: 295). There were various methods of labour control in Grey. There was a fingerprint reader, which recorded workers' daily entry and exit times and during working hours, workers were forbidden from talking to co-workers about issues unrelated to work, using earphones, having visitors or using mobile phones for any reason. During my work at Grey, whenever workers needed to use mobile phones or wanted to talk to a colleague working far from their workstation, they asked me to help. This further confirms what I discussed in Chapter 4, regarding the asymmetric power dynamics existing between the workers and myself, despite my commitment to participant observation. Still, it also confirms that I managed to gain workers' trust, through my genuine commitment to help where I could.

While working in the sewing section, when I had short chats with the operators, I was often warned by the production manager and belt leaders not

to talk to the operators in the course of production. Operators worked under the surveillance of belt leaders. Surveillance and verbal oppression were more evident in the quality control and packaging section. The forewoman of this section frequently shouted at workers to “work harder” and “do not idle”. Talking to each other was more difficult there although we were working around the same table, close to each other.

Another important form of labour control is dismissals. From my conversations with workers, I learned that at the end of each year a couple of workers from each department were fired at Grey. As my last weeks at Grey were also the last weeks of the year, I overheard many workers’ conversations focused on who was going to be fired that year. This was a source of anxiety, especially for newly-recruited workers. As well as these periodic dismissals, there were also occasional dismissals. For example, a young woman who started work on the same day as me in the packaging section was fired after three months without any notice. Workers told me that it had happened to long-term workers as well. One day the management calls a worker to the office, and no one sees her/him again. These dismissals were usually not directly related to their job performance but instead aimed to discipline workers through threatening them with unemployment. As I argued before, labour informality is used by employers as an important tool for labour control. Although these dismissals may incur short-term costs for the employer, long-term profits that could result from labour discipline through which workers are expected to increase their productivity and put up with exploitative management policies are expected to be higher.

The main and most effective mechanism of labour control in the factory was based on *time study*.²⁶ For each new garment model, the textile engineer noted the time needed per task, timing each worker with a stopwatch. Workers were then informed how many pieces they were expected to finish per hour. The main rationale behind the time study is to intensify the extraction of labour power at the point of production. As Thompson (1967: 80) argues, with the

²⁶ Time study is also known as *work measurement*. It is usually done by textile engineers in garment factories, in order to determine the standard time for a particular task.

development of industrial capitalism, the changes in manufacturing techniques demanded greater synchronisation of labour, and so time measurement became a means of labour exploitation. Today, the productivity of labour depends on the degree to which it is disciplined and coordinated in a regularised fashion (Postone, 1993: 210). In this regard, time study is a significant way of disciplining labour in garment factories. One day the textile engineer told me that they were giving high targets “so that the workers do not get lazy”. If a worker does not meet the production target assigned, the textile manager stands over that worker, stares at her and tells her to work faster. The pressure to meet production targets leads workers to reduce their toilet or regular break times.

We are scared when we go to the toilet and are five minutes late. We have to give a specific number of pieces every evening. You cannot shirk. Be ill, have a stomach-ache, or have a private health issue [be on your period], you cannot stay long in the toilet. You should go back to work as soon as possible. Either the work behind piles up or the workers ahead of me wait for my work. It is like a chain (Sevgi, 32/W/FW).

Workers were also required to attach bar codes on a sheet, showing how many pieces they processed each day and these daily sheets were then used to compile a list showing workers’ monthly performances which was hung on the wall for everyone to see. In this way, the management tries to create pressure and competition among the workers to produce more. The workers told me that the management had told them that wage raises were going to be determined by these performance records. Moreover, the names of the workers with the poorest performances were highlighted and carried the implicit threat that they were at risk of being dismissed. Thus, disclosing performance information is another strategy implemented by management to discipline workers through the threat of job loss.

In short, managerial domination is very strong and workplace discipline is very tight in the factory. Atelier workers who had previously worked in factories described it as ‘turning into robots’ and ‘self-sacrificing’. Melek, for instance, told me that she used to work like an android in the factory: “No talking, no laughing...Everything is forbidden; you must only work. When the

bell rings you take a tea break, when the bell rings you take a lunch break. You even go to the toilet one by one” (Melek, 41/W/AW).

However, the coercive mechanisms mentioned above are not the only methods of labour control. As Burawoy (1979) illustrates in his seminal work, *Manufacturing Consent*, management must supplement coercion with consent in order to persuade workers to cooperate in the pursuit of profit. Grey’s management also offered some incentives to workers as a means of labour control. It gave a quarter gold coin (roughly \$55 as of December 2015) to those who worked full-time for four months without taking any leave, including sick leave. By doing so, management tries to eliminate absenteeism, which represents a cost to the factory. This corroborates the finding of Carswell and De Neve (2013: 68-69), who reported that in Triruppur (India) factory owners pay bonuses in the local festival period to reduce high labour turnover and absenteeism and that of Ruwanpura (2014a: 9) who found that in Sri Lanka “[c]ultivating their stature as fair employers [was]...imperative to attract and maintain their cadre, where championing reputational stakes as fair employers was important”. Moreover, at Grey, management organised a spring picnic and a New Year celebration every year which all workers, management and the owner attended. Furthermore, at the New Year celebration event that I attended, the employer held a free draw with some workers winning household goods and technological devices. These incentive mechanisms are an effective way of building consent among workers and positively shaping workers’ opinions about the employer. Even if not all workers benefit, the draw involves symbolic power, harmonising the interests of employers and workers at the ideological level.

Also, the tight organisation and harsh discipline mechanisms of the labour process have serious implications for the health and safety of workers (Mezzadri, 2015: 6). Given the repressive labour control mechanisms mentioned above, work stress and pressure was the most commonly cited work problem among the factory workers. Work stress reached its highest levels when workers began to process a new model until they got used to the new task. Moreover, as seen from Sevgi’s narrative above, working on an assembly

line fosters work pressure and stress on workers. The fear of failing to catch up with the pace of the assembly line and the anxiety of having to meet targets damages workers' mental health. Four factory women in my sample told me that they had had severe psychiatric disorders due to work stress. Emotional and mental difficulties caused by the labour regime affect workers' whole lives and can destroy their social relationships out of the workplace. Many workers complained about being unhappy at home and aggressive towards family members due to work stress.

Marx's theory of alienation provides a foundational explanation of the destructive effects of capitalist production on the physical and mental conditions of human beings and social processes. For Marx, as capitalist work is not part of the worker's "nature", the worker feels depleted in manifold ways; she is physically exhausted and mentally debased (Marx, 1963 [1844]: 125). The story of Bahar, aged 27 and married, is an illustrative example of alienation of labour. She was working in the Secret Atelier at the time of the interview, but had worked at one factory for over six years in the past. She said that the main difference between factory and atelier work was the strict discipline in the factory and told me her reasons for quitting the factory job:

The factory made a contract with a new firm and we started to produce a new model. It came to a point where I was unable to recognise or use the machine that I had been using for six years. Why? Because everyone was talking all at once. Everyone was behaving like a boss, a forewoman, a supervisor. I felt like an apprentice. But, in fact, I was a first-class operator; I was using my machine perfectly. Whereas I was once able to take apart and repair my machine, I was no longer able to use it. My hands, legs were all shaking. The buyer of that model was coming to the factory, randomly picking a piece from the box that was faulty and returning the work to me. You know, they [fellow workers] spread the word to everyone if it is faulty. And they were special, expensive fabrics. They were expensive for us [the factory]. A special belt was going to be set when that production started. I made samples for two months. Everyone talked at once and I could not use my own logic, could not recognise or use my machine...Just then I had somewhat of a nervous breakdown. And I could not do the other tasks that I used to do very well. I could not bring myself to accept this (Bahar, 27/W/AW).

While telling me her story, even several years later, her voice quivered with tension. She still found it difficult to speak about what happened to her. Her case is helpful to understand what Marx calls 'alienation from the act of production'. Bahar became alienated from the machine she had used for years. The means of production and her own activity became independent of her and

dominated her. The expensiveness of the fabrics intensified the contradiction between her and the product of her labour, causing her to feel more anxious about failing in her job. The frustration of failing at her normal tasks and being despised by other people deepened the alienation generated by the act of production. As a consequence, Bahar started to have severe headaches and blackouts in the factory. Her hands started shaking, she began to feel dizzy and to perceive the machine as moving on its own. Eventually, she was diagnosed with migraines and a mental breakdown and when she asked for sick leave due to her mental health problems the factory fired her without giving her any severance pay. She did not have the energy or mental strength to fight them on this: “I left my 25,000 Turkish liras severance pay there, but my health was more important. I am glad that I quit that job” (Bahar, 27/W/AW).

In sum, the labour regime in the factory is very oppressive. Factory workers work under intense work pressure and discipline, and harsh labour control. They are subject to serious mental issues due to this labour regime, which constantly tries to extract more labour surplus value from them. Working on an assembly line and doing highly repetitive tasks triggers negative effects on workers’ health. Admittedly, labour conditions and labour control strategies are not always the same across different scales of production. I will now analyse the features of the organisation of work and labour conditions in ateliers and compare them to those experienced in the factory.

5.2. Atelier-based Production

In Turkey, garment ateliers stand at the heart of value chains, providing backward linkages to factory production (Dedeoğlu, 2011a: 666). They serve as a buffer for factories, which can adjust production to the fluctuations in orders and reduce production and labour costs. Moreover, small-scale atelier production plays an important role in the domestic garment market in Turkey,²⁷ supplying relatively affordable garments to the local markets for

²⁷ Since ateliers are usually run informally and atelier owners usually falsify their business records, and there are no official statistics or surveys, there is no available information on the share of atelier-production in the total garment production in Turkey.

domestic consumption. As I stated in the previous chapter, I worked in four different ateliers, which I call Cold, Dark, Secret and White.

Opening an atelier does not require high start-up capital and is relatively easy. The owners of the Cold, Dark and Secret ateliers, for instance, had been garment workers before opening their ateliers. They began their own businesses with a small number of machines and workers. At the same time, ateliers are more likely to fail in the market because they generally only have short-term business agreements with customers and process small orders. Production demands are not regular, but seasonal. All the atelier owners that I worked for told me that their production falls during the winter due to the seasonal slowdown in demand. In November 2015, while walking around the Günaltay neighbourhood and occasionally talking to people, I met one of the atelier owners on the street. He told me that most of the ateliers nearby were already closed or about to close, as it was the beginning of the winter. It was true: when I went back to one atelier whose owner had agreed to employ me two weeks earlier, I found it had closed down. Due to irregular orders, closing businesses – or stopping production for a period – is relatively common in atelier-based garment production. As such, production flexibility is even higher than in factory-based garment production.

Another characteristic of ateliers is their limited scope of production. Ateliers usually work on a specific task with a small number of workers. For example, the first three ateliers only sewed garments; there were no other production sections such as cutting, ironing or packaging. Other ateliers in the neighbourhood, however, concentrated only on packaging or ironing. Hence, ateliers may be highly dependent on other actors in the market. This is another reason why they are more prone to fail. Leman, for instance, the owner of Secret, used to complain to me about the wholesaler she produces for because he did not allow her to do business with other wholesalers. Generally, ateliers' autonomy over business activities is more restricted than that of factories.

Ateliers also differ from factories on the basis of the presence of unrecorded/unregistered business activities, which are very high. Dark atelier,

for instance, was operating without legal registration, entirely informally. Informal companies operate free from the obligations of labour market regulations, tax laws and other rules regarding their behaviour (Onaran, 2002: 770). The other three ateliers were registered, but all of them were evading their legal obligations. When asked about their business records, all the atelier owners asked me if I wanted to learn actual or official figures. In the words of Leman (28/W/AO), they were “official thieves who evade tax”. However, they believed that their tax evasion was inevitable, as it was impossible to run an atelier with current costs of production whilst also paying taxes. There is no strict statutory control by state institutions of small-scale ateliers and atelier owners told me that inspections are usually carried out only in the case of specific complaints.

In terms of the organisation of production inside the ateliers, it was simpler and less rigid than in factories. There were only two categories of workers in the first three sewing ateliers: helpers and sewing machine operators. There were no forewomen/foremen in the ateliers where I worked. When they were in the workplace, it was the atelier owners who did the jobs of organising production and quality control and when they were away, experienced and trusted workers took over. Moreover, the division of labour in the ateliers was more flexible than in the factory. Indeed, atelier workers switch tasks when needed. If there is no garment left to sew for an operator, for example, she/he helps with another task.

Unlike the factory, there was no assembly line in the ateliers. Sewing machine operators did not always do the same task. The tasks required and allocated to operators changed depending on the model. This is why atelier operators are expected to be good at different sewing tasks. Asked about his employment strategies, Osman (47/M/AO) told me that “a factory worker [operator] does not suit us. She always does the same task; sews pockets, legs or necks. A helper in my atelier is more useful than a factory worker”. It was true that helpers had a more important role in atelier production compared to factory production. They ensure the flow of production by organising and serving as a bridge between operators. The owner of Dark one day told me that

one helper, who had been working for her for two years, was her right hand in the atelier: “He is the first person to be saved from a fire. He will stay, others can leave” (Kerime, 37/W/AO).

Ateliers’ position in the supply chain, characteristics of their business relations, and the organisation of production have significant effects on labour conditions. In the following pages I will analyse the labour regime and labour conditions in ateliers and trace the differences in labour informality between ateliers and factories.

5.2.1. The Conditions of Atelier Labour

Physical working conditions and safety measures in ateliers were far worse than in the factory. In addition to dust, loud noise and the lack of fresh air, there was the lack of daylight and safe heating systems. Cold and Dark ateliers were totally deprived of daylight; there was only artificial lighting. I started to work in the ateliers in mid-January when the weather was cold in İzmir.²⁸ There was no heating in Cold and the workers wore layers of clothes to keep warm. In Dark and Secret, there was a *soba*, a kind of stove in which waste fabrics were burned to heat the workplace. However, *sobas* are very dangerous to workers’ health and safety as there is a high risk of toxic gas release and fire. There was no ventilation in Cold, Dark or Secret. In the ateliers, toilets, small kitchen worktops and production workstations were all together on the same floor. No cleaning staff were employed: helpers and young workers occasionally cleaned ateliers. There was not even a first aid kit to treat minor injuries. Moreover, workers were allowed to smoke while working at Cold, Dark, and Secret. Therefore, the air filled with thick tobacco smoke was more polluted and harmful than that of the factory. Thus, atelier workers are exposed to serious health and safety risks in the workplace.

²⁸ According to the General Directorate of Meteorology database, the average daily temperature in İzmir in January from 1938-2017 was 8.7 °C.

Cold Atelier, 20/01/2016, Karabağlar

Dark Atelier, 12/02/2016 Karabağlar



Secret Atelier, 26/02/2016, Karabağlar

White Atelier, 10/03/2016, Konak

Figure 8: Pictures of the Ateliers

Source: Pictures taken by the author

Daily working hours in the ateliers were no different from those in the factory. Workers laboured nine hours excluding breaks; ten and a half hours in total. While overtime was very rare during my time at Cold and White, it was common at Dark and Secret because of the high amount of orders during the time of my fieldwork. In each case, overtime was compulsory; workers could not refuse. One of the main differences between atelier and factory labour conditions is the payment of overtime. Each hour above the legally defined limit of 45 hours was counted as overtime and remunerated at one and a half times the normal hourly pay in the factory. In ateliers, even Saturday working hours were counted within the normal weekly working hours. Hence, atelier workers worked around 20 hours a month without remuneration.

With respect to wage levels and payments, there are significant distinctions between the factory and ateliers. The monthly wages of workers in

the assembly line department were around the legal minimum wage at Grey; the difference between the lowest and highest wage was around TL 200. However, the wage differential is much higher for atelier workers. Despite the significant role they play, helpers, who are predominantly children, are usually paid less than half the minimum wage, whereas some 'first-class' skilled operators are paid almost twice the minimum wage. The main reason behind the higher 'first-class operator wages' is atelier production's dependence on skilled sewing machine operators. Given the small numbers of the workforce and operators' varying sewing capabilities, skilled operators play a vital role in atelier garment production. Losing one skilled operator out of four has more devastating effects for an employer than losing one skilled operator out of 50. Thus, atelier owners pay relatively higher wages to operators that they do not want to lose.

Another significant reason behind higher operator wages in ateliers is related to another aspect of labour informality: unregistered employment. The rate of registered employment is very low in ateliers. Only three workers out of 14 at Cold and one out of 11 at Secret were legally employed and registered with the social security system. None of the eight workers at Dark were recorded. Thus, employers did not pay social security contributions for unregistered workers. In most cases, wages and the cost of providing workers' lunches are the only sources of labour costs for atelier owners. Due to unregistered employment, most atelier workers are deprived of legal labour rights and work without social security coverage. For skilled garment workers, there is a trade-off between higher wages now and future pensions. Whereas the former provides better living conditions while working, the latter provides better living conditions in the future when too old to work. In the words of Alev (40/W/FW), "We [factory workers] suffer, but it ends at some point [when we retire]. After that, we get comfortable. But theirs [atelier workers' suffering] never ends".

Unsurprisingly, atelier workers were not given paid annual leave or sick leave. When workers take a leave of absence, it is always unpaid. Informal employment also explains the wages below the legal minimum wage in ateliers

as employers feel no obligation to comply with the minimum legal working standards. Unlike the factory workers, the atelier workers cited irregular and missing wage payments as a critical problem.

Replacement of permanent and full-time labour by casualised labour is a key component of labour informalisation (Breman & van der Linden, 2014: 925). Given short-term business relations and extensive informality, the rate of labour turnover is higher in ateliers than factories. During my time at Cold, the number of workers fell from 23 to 14 in two weeks. Three workers quit and four started work in two weeks at Dark. When I visited one month after I had left, the number of workers at Secret had doubled. Moreover, there is a group of women workers in ateliers who work half-days or specific days each week. In general, ateliers that operate all year have a couple of core workers and a number of 'peripheral' workers, which varies depending on the amount of orders. All atelier owners told me that they recruit new temporary workers during periods of high production demands.

The lack of formal employment underpins high labour turnover in ateliers. Atelier owners usually fire workers without any notice. While I was working at Cold, the employer one day told one 'less skilled' operator not to come to work the next day. By hiring and firing workers at short or no notice, atelier owners avoid the cost of employing permanent labour. As such, there is a significant distinction between factory and atelier labour in stability of employment. While the average length of time at their current job was one and a half years among atelier workers, it was four years among factory workers. Similarly, at the time of interviews, around 54% of the atelier workers had been working at their current firm for less than a year, compared to only 15% of the factory workers. Hence, atelier workers face greater job insecurity than factory workers.

Temporary and flexible employment predominantly maximises employers' profits by enabling them to manage peaks and troughs in work orders with lower labour costs. However, it sometimes works against their interests for it involves the risk of losing their highly-skilled workforce. All

atelier owners complained that atelier workers tend to suddenly quit their jobs when they found another with higher wages. “You feed them when the production is low, but they sell you out when the production season begins, and you really need them,” most atelier owners said. This triggers competition among atelier owners to recruit skilled workers. Osman (47/M/AO) complained that some atelier owners “try to strip you of your workers by giving three to five cents more salary”. This is why, for instance, the owner of White allowed one of the workers to take cigarette breaks during working hours. He did not want to lose her. The owners of Cold, Dark and Secret were paying higher wages to newly recruited skilled workers and asking them to promise not to quit the job for another one.

Moreover, the division of labour in ateliers was more flexible than in the factory. Unlike factory workers, who perform one specific task repetitively, atelier workers perform different tasks. The main reason behind this is that ateliers produce at short notice, in smaller quantities with small numbers of workers. Atelier owners allocate different tasks to workers depending on the model and time of delivery. For example, one day when all the material had been sewn, all the workers at Cold trimmed the excessive threads on sewn garments for the last working hour. The atelier workers preferred the flexible division of labour instead of ‘working like robots’ within strictly defined time periods. Moreover, in this way, they acquire different production skills which make themselves more employable.

Production flexibility and a less complex, more flexible division of labour have a significant impact on work timing in ateliers. The time discipline in ateliers is less strict than that in factories. At the ateliers that I worked in, the beginning and end of the working day, and break times were flexible compared with Grey. There was no bell telling workers to start or stop production. If a piece of work was close to completion, breaks were given 15-30 minutes later. A 15 minute-tea break was sometimes extended to 20 minutes. If there was an urgent order to be completed, workers worked 20-30 minutes longer that day. Some workers willingly worked during breaks. As such, atelier workers were different from the factory workers who immediately stopped working when the

bell rang. They appreciated the relatively flexible working hours in the ateliers and those who had previously been factory workers complained about the strict timing in factories.

Workplace discipline in ateliers was relatively tolerant in comparison to the factory. Workers were allowed to make short phone calls, smoke, and listen to music with earphones during work. As a result of the flexible production and flexible division of labour, no hourly production targets were set for individuals and no one counted the number of pieces processed by each worker. There was, of course, pressure on workers to work with higher speed and higher quality, but it was not as intense as in the factory. Workers at White took two extra short breaks a day without the employer's knowledge. One of the main reasons given by the atelier workers for choosing an atelier rather than a factory job was the less disciplined and less stressful working atmosphere in ateliers. For example, one middle-aged man operator at Cold told me that he had left his factory job because he had been seen on CCTV looking around and warned for not focusing enough on his work. "Look at here! No production target and no-one is standing over you," he said.

Labour discipline and control in ateliers is mainly organised through direct surveillance by employers. When asked about her employment strategies, Kerime (37/W/AO) replied:

I make sure they are honest. I pay attention to how they work when I am not in the atelier. I look at how many times they go to the toilet, and whether they go because they need it or to shirk work. I watch all of them when I am in the atelier.

I observed that atelier workers were more relaxed and slowed production when employers were out of the workplace. When the employer came returned, chats stopped, and they started working more seriously. On the other hand, humiliation, swearing and yelling are more common in ateliers than factories and is one of the main reasons why some women avoid working in ateliers. I witnessed this at Cold and Dark. Atelier owners used to yell at all the workers, especially the child workers.

As illustrated in the section above, atelier workers work in more informal circumstances than factory workers. They are deprived of social security coverage, severance pay and pensions, and paid annual leave and sick leave. They are more likely to be paid irregularly and usually are not paid for overtime. Atelier owners employ workers on highly flexible terms as a way to manage irregular orders from buyers. Thus, atelier workers face greater job insecurity than factory workers. On the other hand, atelier-based garment work is characterised by a relatively flexible division of labour and less work pressure. Working without hourly production targets and performing different tasks provides workers with a more relaxed working environment. Notably, higher labour informality in ateliers has significant implications for the social composition of the workforce: the illegal employment of Syrian refugee workers and child workers.

5.2.2. Syrian Refugee Workers and Child Workers in Ateliers

In recent years, Syrian refugees, who have fled their country because of war, have become a significant part of garment labour in Turkey. By February 2016, around 2.8 million Syrians had found refuge in Turkey (Göç İdaresi, 2016) and the garment industry is one of their main employers. There are three main factors behind the high rates of Syrian employment in the garment sector. Firstly, the extensive informality and flexibility within the sector provide the perfect environment for the unrecorded employment of Syrians. Secondly, since garment-making is usually learned through experience and on-the-job training, it has become a natural destination for less-skilled Syrians from low-income families. Lastly, many Syrians already had work experience in garment production back in Syria.

Syrian refugees are legally classified as foreigners under temporary protection and were not issued work permits until January 2016. Prior to this, all Syrians under temporary protection had been working illegally without legal protection. In January 2016, the Regulation of Work Permits of Foreigners Under Temporary Protection was enacted to regulate the labour market access of Syrians and legalise their employment. However, the effectiveness of this regulation in terms of empowering Syrians in the labour market and

eliminating their informal employment is controversial because this regulation does not actually give Syrians the right to work: rather, it gives employers the right to employ Syrians. According to this regulation, only employers can apply to the CSGB to employ a Syrian worker. In 2017, employers had to pay TL 537.50 if their application to employ a Syrian for a year was accepted.

While this regulation may benefit well-educated, highly-skilled Syrians, its potential for bettering working conditions for less-skilled Syrians working in labour-intensive sectors, such as garment production is very low. Given the costs of formal employment (minimum wage, social security contributions, taxes, etc.) and bureaucratic burden, most employers avoid employing Syrians formally. According to the CSGB database, just 30,672 Syrians were granted a work permit in the whole of Turkey between January 2016–November 2017, and only 452 were given permits in İzmir in this period. These figures indicate that the majority of Syrians continue to be employed without any legal protection. According to a report by the BSCI and FTO (Foreign Trade Association) (2017: 4), 400,000 Syrians are estimated to work informally across all sectors in Turkey.

Syrians in the garment sector usually work long hours for low wages, without legal protection or social insurance. According to a research project conducted by Erol et al. (2017: 53) on İstanbul's garment sector, Syrian workers earn less than their Turkish citizen counterparts. Syrian men garment workers earn 78% of native men worker wages, whilst Syrian women workers earn 65% of native women worker wages. The research also shows that all women Syrian workers in their sample were employed informally and paid far below the legal minimum wage (Erol et al., 2017: 54). As such, women Syrian garment workers face the poorest working conditions. The Syrian refugees that I worked with in the ateliers told me that women usually did not, or were not allowed to, work in Syria. However, after fleeing to Turkey, young Syrian women started to do paid jobs in the Turkish informal economy to support their families. Thus, having less work experience in the garment sector intensifies women's subordination arising from patriarchal gender ideologies.

İzmir, according to the Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, has the ninth highest number of Syrians under temporary protection in the country. There were 134,875 registered Syrians under temporary protection in the city as of April 2018 (Göç İdaresi, 2018), living predominantly in the Karabağlar, Konak, Buca and Bornova districts (Çamur, 2017: 121). Since there is no refugee camp for Syrians in İzmir, all of them live in private accommodations in the city. The distribution of Syrians across the employment sectors in İzmir is not known due to the lack of large-scale, representative surveys. Being one of the leading cities of national garment production, İzmir's garment industry is believed to employ a significant proportion of them.

Syrians were the most significant part of the workforce in the ateliers that I worked in. Half of the 14 workers at Cold, six of the eight at Dark, seven of the 11 at Secret, and two of the six at White were Syrian refugees. In total, 20 out of 39 atelier workers were Syrians. Apart from one from Rojava, all were from Aleppo. Only two of the 20 Syrian workers were females, aged 15 and 20. All Syrians I worked with thought that the cost of living in Turkey was very high compared with Syria and those who had worked in Syria's garment industry found the working conditions in the Turkish garment sector worse. A young Syrian man at Secret told me, "It was not a problem being two or three hours late to work in Syria, but if you're five minutes late here they call you and ask 'where are you?'" All those I asked told me that given the choice they would prefer to go back to their pre-war life in Syria.

Syrian refugees significantly increased the supply of informal, cheap labour in the Turkish garment industry. All atelier owners told me that Syrians' participation in the garment sector was very advantageous for employers, meeting a labour shortage in the sector. They all told me that they could now find many workers when they needed to. Consequently, the Syrian labour supply has turned into an effective means of labour control in ateliers. Many native workers said that they were afraid of demanding better working conditions because employers threatened to replace them with Syrian workers. Since the reserve army of labour has grown with the inclusion of Syrian

refugees in the garment industry, atelier owners use the threat of unemployment more strongly to discipline workers.

From my conversations with Turkish citizens and Syrian workers, I learned that Syrian refugees were employed under worse working conditions, being subject to longer working hours, lower wages, and maltreatment in their early years in the country. However, as they had become familiar with the labour market and understood that the sector needed them, they started to demand better working conditions. There was a competition among atelier owners to employ highly-skilled Syrian operators. For example, during my work at Dark, a young Syrian man began to work. He was a first-class operator, sewing quickly and extremely competently. After the trial period (a couple of days), he and the atelier owner negotiated his employment conditions. Since the owner did not want him to leave, she offered the wage (TL1700) he wanted. He was receiving the highest wage in the atelier. Also, although he had initially said that he was not going to eat the lunches provided by the employer and did not ask for extra money to buy his own, after a week he demanded the cost of lunch and the employer accepted this as well. While telling me about this situation, the atelier owner said: "He is a very good operator. He promised not to go to another workplace" (Kerime, 37/W/AO). Owing to the growing bargaining power of Syrians and the competition among atelier owners, Syrian garment workers' labour conditions are likely to get better compared to the early years.

Child labour is another serious labour problem in the Turkish garment industry. According to Law no. 4857 Article 71, the employment of children under 16 is prohibited in Turkey. However, there were child workers under the age of 16 in all ateliers. There were three child workers at Cold: a 13-year-old Kurdish girl from Diyarbakır, a 13-year-old Kurdish Syrian refugee boy, and his 15-year-old sister. There were two child workers at Dark: a 12-year-old Arab Syrian and a 15-year-old Kurdish Syrian refugee boy. There was a 12-year-old Arab Syrian refugee boy at Secret. Finally, there was a 16-year-old Turkmen Syrian boy, who had been working at White for three years.

Child workers were working full-time in conditions that children should not be exposed to. They were working the hours as adult workers, including overtime. One day at Dark, the employer told the workers to do three hours overtime at the end of the workday. When the 12-year-old Syrian boy asked if he had to do it as well, the employer answered: “Why not? *Sen paşanın oğlusun?* [Are you privileged?] As if you worked hard all day!” (Kerime, 37/W/AO). In fact, all child workers worked non-stop. They worked as helpers, regulating and carrying heavy garments as big as themselves, cleaning ateliers, and shopping for atelier workers. Their monthly wages were far below the minimum wage, ranging between TL 250-500. They were also scolded by adult workers and employers when they made a mistake or could not work fast enough.

As seen above, most child workers in the ateliers were Syrian refugees. Not only in İzmir but also across the country generally, Syrian child refugees are increasingly employed as cheap labour in the garment industry (FWF, 2017: 1), and the presence of Syrian child workers in Turkey’s garment sector has received a significant deal of international media attention. A BBC Panorama documentary, for example, found that Syrian child workers had been working for more than 12 hours a day in sweatshops that produced for big UK brands, such as Marks & Spencer and Asos (BBC, 24 October 2016). However, the reaction of most big Western brands to this media coverage was simply to cut ties with producers to avoid damage to their reputations, rather than trying to find any solutions (FWF, 2017).

Most of the Syrian child workers in the ateliers had siblings or relatives working in the same workplace. The Syrian children spoke Turkish better than the adult Syrian workers and hence they acted as a bridge between Turkish citizens and Syrian workers, ensuring the flow of work. The main reason why Syrian children worked seemed to be poverty: many Syrian families are dependent on their children’s income to survive. All child workers told me that they give their income to their parents to support their families. For example, Sami, a 12-year-old Syrian boy, had been working at Dark for three months. When I asked his young male cousin working in the same atelier why Sami was

working instead of going to school, he said, “His family has four children. Sami is the eldest child. He has to work because his father’s income is not enough to live on”.

According to the Directorate General of Migration Management, only 3,437 of the 14,774 Syrian child refugees in İzmir aged 5-10 were enrolled in school as of April 2016 (Ud, 2016). The child workers in the ateliers had never attended school in Turkey. I tried to convince a 13-year-old boy at Cold to go to school; after remaining silent for a while, he told me, “My mother would not let me. My sister is working here with me. We are coming together. They would not let her come here alone.” The family was entrusting a 15-year-old girl to her 13-year-old brother. I told him that I could talk to his parents and he promised me that he would talk to his parents. After two days, when I reopened the subject, his answer was definite: “I do not want to go to school. I will continue to work here.” He was a smart and hardworking boy and practiced on the sewing machines during breaks in order to become a skilled operator. He dreamt of opening his own atelier in the future and made fun of the adult workers, telling them that he was going to employ them in his own atelier in the future. There was a huge difference between the children who had just started to work and those who had been working for a couple of years. While the former were shy and timid, the latter were defensive and competent, acting like adults. Harsh garment work life had made them grow up fast.

In sum, the Turkish garment industry utilises Syrian labour and child labour extensively. Syrian workers and child workers concentrate in small-scale ateliers that mostly operate informally. As is the case with the group of older women factory workers who start work at later ages, they face further exploitation because of their disadvantaged social positions. This again shows that (women) garment labour is not a homogenous group whose members are subjected to the same working conditions and experience the same level of exploitation and subordination. Beyond gender, factory and atelier labour regimes benefit from social inequalities based on migration and age. However, these groups are not the only least advantaged groups of garment workers. I will now analyse another disadvantaged group of garment workers: home-

based women workers, whose vulnerability stems from a combination of gender, age and limited mobility. After discussing the organisation and characteristics of this work, I will analyse labour conditions and the forms in which labour informality manifests itself.

5.3. Home-based Garment Production: The Organisation of Work and Labour Conditions

Since the post-1980 neoliberal era, home-based production has been an integral part of the subcontracting relations in the Turkish garment industry (Sarioğlu, 2013: 482). Homeworkers play a key role in the massive garment production chain (Hale, 2000: 352). As a result of just-in-time production and adopting flexibility and outsourcing as employment practices, the industry increasingly uses home-based workers (Roychowdhury, 2015: 88). With the rise of the just-in-time system, home-based production has particularly increased in countries (such as Turkey) that are located close to the European and North American markets (Carr & Chen, 2001: 7).²⁹ Home-based garment production refers to production carried out in domestic spaces, predominantly workers' homes. In İzmir, it mainly includes thread trimming, buttonholing and embroidery. As these tasks do not require industrial machines, they can easily be carried out at home. All the home-based workers I interviewed were embroidering nightdresses or wedding dresses. Because İzmir is the leading city in the production of wedding dresses, home-based garment production is especially concentrated on embroidery.

There are three main groups of actors in the home-based production realm: main firms, middle-women and home-based workers. The main firms outsource the work to middle-women; however, there is generally no formal contract between firms and middle-women so that the firms can avoid paying taxes. However, informal business relations with middle-women run the risk for firms of losing fabrics and garments. I learned that some middle-women steal expensive wedding dress/nightdress fabrics and disappear suddenly. This is why firms usually work with middle-women who are known in the sector or

²⁹ Due to the lack of large-scale surveys, there is no information on the number of home-based workers or the share of home-based production in the total garment production in Turkey.

those who have a reference from reliable people in the sector. A middle-woman I met at a bus stop in the Kuruçeşme neighbourhood told me that firms had not given her work for a couple of years because they had not known her. Owning a flat or living in the same flat for a long time are other warranties that middle-women can provide, showing that they would not steal garments and disappear.

Middle-women act as a bridge between firms and home-based women workers. They are responsible to firms for delivery and quality of production, hence, they are expected to be good at operations done by home-based workers and have a certain number of home-based workers. The number of workers employed by a middle-woman varies depending on the amount of orders. At the time of the interviews, Esmâ had 40-50, Hayat 30-40, and Derya 12 home-based women workers. Middle-women sometimes outsource some work to the home-based women who work for them to distribute to other women. As the number of firms a middle-woman works with and the size of the order increases, the number of middle-women in the chain grows.

Middle-women who are new to the job begin by employing members of their extended families and women living in their neighbourhoods. As work orders grow over time, recruitment networks enlarge, extending to different neighbourhoods. Kinship and neighbourhood relationships play a significant role in home-based production and recruitment is done mainly by word of mouth. A study by Mezzadri and Srivastava (2015: 245) on the Indian garment industry similarly reports that recruitment, especially at the peripheral end of the employment spectrum, is based on informal social networks and mediated by acquaintances and kinship. This is also the case in İzmir: home-based women workers teach each other how to embroider and when they are behind schedule, they get help from friends and neighbours. Thus, the family and friend relationships of women are the driving force behind the low-cost and high-quality home-based garment production.

Middle-women also sometimes do embroidery themselves, either to meet deadlines or to make more money. Wilkinson-Weber (1999: 119) observed a similar situation among women agents in the Lucknow embroidery industry:

they work as embroiderers as well as agents in order to earn more money and get more work. Since many middle-women use public transportation to move the garments between workers and firms, they often meet other middle-women and thus extend their business networks. Two of the three middle-women I interviewed sometimes got help from their husbands when moving garments between the firms in the city centre and women's houses. Husbands drove the car (if they had one) or carried garments. However, it is always women who are in contact with firms and women workers because men's close interaction with home-based women workers is perceived as inappropriate. Two middle-women had small one-room shops, which were located on the basement floor of the buildings they lived in, to distribute and collect garments.

Home-based workers are subject to the most flexible and informal form of employment in the Turkish garment industry. Payments are piece-rate. As Breman and van der Linden (2014: 922) state, wage payment based on quantity and quality rather than time worked has become widespread in the age of labour informalisation. Main firms determine the rate for each task and the middle-women take a share of the money for each piece. This share is not fixed, but depends on the middle-women. Also, as the number of middle-women involved in the order increases, the piece-wage paid to women workers decreases. Although home-based production is the most labour-intensive part of garment production, the pay is very low. Two of the main complaints of home-based women workers were the difficulty of the job and the low pay; women workers earn far below the minimum wage. Their average income for a 10-hour working day was around TL 20-30. Mezzadri's (2016a: 1890) study on the Indian garment industry reports similar findings and shows that even when women home-based garment workers do more intricate, complex designs, they are still paid lower rates due to their gender and more limited opportunities. Irregular payments by firms and middle-women were cited as another critical problem by the middle-women and home-based workers.

Table 6: Average Monthly Earnings and the Wage Differentials (as of October 2015)

	Average monthly wage, based on 10-hour working day, 20 days a month	Average maximum gap between the lowest and highest monthly wages
Factory Assembly-line Workers	TL1000 (\$330)	TL 200 (\$65)
Atelier Workers	TL1000 (\$330)	TL 1500 (\$500)
Home-based Workers	TL500 (\$165)	-

Source: Author's own calculation based on the field findings.³⁰

As Elson (1994: 205) says, home-based workers have no guarantee of regular work and their homes suffer from the pollution of garment production. The irregularity of work and pollution caused by the job of embroidering were serious working problems for the women. Some of them had problems with their family members because of the mess and pollution resulting from the job. They said that their work, and so income, increased during summer and declined in winter. They work up to 12 hours a day depending on demand as there are no fixed working hours or working days. Many women work all night, and every day of the week during periods of high production demands. Mollona (2014: 192) argues that while in the classical industrial contract it is workers' time that is commodified, based on an agreement exchanging a set amount of time for a set wage, under flexible, informalised production it is the entire existence of workers that is commodified in temporary contracts, based on part-time, seasonal, casualised or 'zero-hour' terms and conditions. The latter applies to home-based workers as well, who work without any contract for unspecified hours. Consequently, much of the risk and loss associated with irregular orders fall on them, instead of the main firms (Carr, Chen & Tate, 2000: 129).

As women work in their homes, there is no labour control at the point of production. Nonetheless, this does not mean that there is no labour control at all. Middle-women put pressure on home-based workers to meet short deadlines imposed by firms. This is why, despite the lack of assembly line and the individual aspect of home-based production, work stress resulting from strict short deadlines was cited as a critical problem by the home-based women workers. Orders were expected to be finished at short notice and firms put

³⁰ The data shown in the table was collected through interviews and participant observation. It does not specify any gender, but reflects average incomes and wage differentials of both women and men workers.

pressure on middle-women, threatening to impose financial penalties if deadlines were not met. Moreover, there is a dependency between the workers of main firms and home-based workers as a result of the division of labour between them. In general, embroidered garments are sent to firm workers to do last operations before their delivery. If embroidered garments are delivered after the deadline, firms make their own workers do overtime to deliver the dresses to customers on time. When I was working at White, workers were putting pressure on the middle-women to deliver embroidered wedding dresses soon so that they could finish the job in time without extreme stress and without doing overtime. "Tell your home-workers to finish the job faster", they frequently said to the middle-women. Unsurprisingly, home-based workers, the last link in the chain, are the most affected party of this pressure. Due to the lack of defined working hours, they feel work stress all day. Since there is usually no formal employment relationship between firms, middle-women and home-based women workers, firms do not know who the home-based workers are and workers have no contact with the firms they work for. In other words, home-based workers do not have an official employer to negotiate employment conditions. Consequently, they are deprived of any legal labour rights.

Moreover, the reason why home-based women are vulnerable to higher levels of exploitation also lies in their social profiles. Unlike factory and atelier workers, home-based workers are, without exception, women and almost all are married. There are a small number of young single workers, who occasionally work to meet their personal needs. All 14 home-based women workers in my sample were married with children. While the average number of children per married/divorced factory and atelier women workers was 0.67, it was three among home-based women workers. This situation leads to their stronger identification with the domestic sphere and the role of housewife, which in turn "casts them in the role of 'leisure-time embroiderers' [by employers], unworthy of the wages and attention given to 'real' workers" (Wilkinson-Weber, 1997: 51). Home-based women also tend to be older than factory and atelier women. In my sample, the average age of factory and atelier

women was about 35, while it was around 41 for home-based women. Eraydin and Erendil's study (1999: 265) on Istanbul's garment industry similarly reports that home-based workers tend to be older than other women garment workers.

Due to being older and having limited mobility outside the home – mainly due to familial and childcare responsibilities – home-based women workers possess less bargaining power, endure worse working conditions and face greater job insecurity than factory and atelier women. In other words, the garment industry benefits from social inequalities based on gender, age and mobility. However, it cannot be said that home-based women do not hold any bargaining power. In general, there are a couple of middle-women operating in each neighbourhood and the competition between middle-women to recruit workers sometimes results in higher payments. When they have different options, home-based women workers bargain about the rate of piece-wage. But, of course, their bargaining power is less than factory and atelier women who have more options for work.

Informal home-based production does not only lower labour costs: by turning workers' homes into workplaces, firm owners also avoid and/or reduce other production costs, such as rent, electricity, and water. Moreover, in this way, they avoid any possibility of workers' organisation and demands for better working conditions. Undoubtedly, home-based women's labour is the most vulnerable labour in the garment sector in İzmir.³¹ They work long and uncertain hours for low pay, without any social benefits or protection or the possibility of organising. They face greater job insecurity than factory and atelier labour.

5.4. Conclusions

With the rise of neoliberalism, industrial production has become more flexible through the expansion of outsourcing and subcontracting. This is

³¹ Home-based workers are not necessarily the most vulnerable group of garment workers across the world. For instance, in the Chinese garment industry, not all home-based women workers are at the bottom of the employment ladder in terms of underemployment and wage levels (Mezzadri & Lulu, 2018: 18).

evident across all scales of production in İzmir's garment industry. There is a complex network of subcontracting, starting with international buyers and reaching all the way down to home-based women workers. Subcontracting enables employers to manage peaks and troughs in production demands with lower costs. This is why factories operate throughout the year and are more likely to stay afloat in the market and increase their market share, whereas small-scale ateliers stop production whenever there is not enough demand and are more prone to fail in the market, and there is no guarantee of work in home-based production.

This external organisation of garment production has significant impacts on internal labour conditions in production units. Labour informality, which this thesis understands as a process characterised by a labour-unfriendly regime, is pervasive in all scales of garment production in İzmir. Low and irregular wages, the lack or falsification of social security records, unhealthy physical conditions, and job insecurity are features of labour informality present across all scales. However, job insecurity and violation of labour rights intensify towards the end of the supply chains.

Since factories have a stronger position in the market and have a longer life, factory workers' duration of employment tends to be longer than that of the atelier and home-based workers. Exporting factories are also more likely to operate in compliance with the law than other production scales. They usually employ workers formally and provide the minimum legal wage and social insurance, paying their employees fully and on a regular basis. Although they have problems and limitations at ideological and practical levels, buyers' codes of conduct, which they ask producers to comply with, are a factor in determining the relatively higher compliance with the law in factories. Nevertheless, the main reason behind labour informality is not always the lack of legal regulations, but state authorities' and employers' unwillingness and labour movements' incapacity to protect labour rights. In this sense, labour informality reveals itself as a systematic form of labour rights violations across factory-scale production. Factory workers are paid very low wages, face difficulties in using their statutory paid annual leave and sick leave, receive

lower severance pay and pensions than they should because employers underreport their wages and are forced to do overtime, often in excess of the legal limit.

Moreover, labour informality encompasses more than material working conditions and legal labour rights. It also means intense work pressure and harsh labour control and factory workers are especially subjected to this. As a result of the strict division of labour, they do highly repetitive tasks on the assembly line. They work under the constant pressure of keeping up with the production targets given by textile engineers, under the surveillance of forewomen/foremen, and under the permanent threat of job loss. Given strong management domination and tight workplace discipline, the labour regime in factories is more oppressive than in other scales of production.

On the other hand, working conditions in terms of job security, the health and safety of workers and the enforcement of labour laws are worse in small-scale ateliers than in factories. Atelier workers are mostly deprived of legal employment and its benefits. They usually work without labour contracts, social insurance, paid leave, severance pay or pensions. While skilled operators earn higher wages in ateliers than in factories, those who are regarded as unskilled are paid less than the minimum wage. Because ateliers mostly operate informally and produce at short notice and in small quantities, atelier workers face greater job insecurity than factory workers. The presence of high informality also explains the widespread illegal employment of children and Syrian refugees in ateliers. Child and Syrian workers are subject to poorer working conditions because of their disadvantageous social position. In other words, atelier owners benefit from social inequalities based on age and migration by paying lower wages and not providing social security benefits to these groups.

However, although labour informality is higher in the sense of job insecurity and violations of legal labour rights, it is less intense in terms of workplace discipline. The labour regime in ateliers is less oppressive than that in the factory. At ateliers, there are no time study or hourly production targets,

which are some of the main sources of work stress for factory workers. Atelier workers are allowed to make short phone calls, use earphones to listen to music and have visitors for a short period during production time. Due to the relatively flexible division of labour and the lack of strict managerial control, there is less pressure on atelier labour than factory labour. As a result of this relatively relaxed labour discipline, atelier workers report less work-related stress than factory workers.

The most vulnerable group of garment workers are home-based women workers, who work under 'purely' flexible conditions. They do not even know which firms they work for and thus cannot negotiate employment conditions with firm owners. They are completely dependent on middle-women who take work from firms and allocate it to them. They have no guarantee of work and, when they do work, it is without clear employment conditions, defined working times or legal protection. They work uncertain and long hours without any job security for low wages far below the minimum legal wage. The main reason why they are subjected to higher levels of exploitation than factory and atelier women workers is rooted in social inequalities based on age and mobility. They tend to be older and have limited mobility because of being married with higher numbers of children.

The labour regimes and labour conditions discussed in this chapter shape workers' everyday life and intra-class relationships on the shop floor. They also shape the ways in which women's productive work and reproductive work interact with one another. In the light of the analysis developed in this chapter, in the next chapter I will examine the socio-cultural atmosphere and everyday life in İzmir's garment industry and illustrate the ways in which gender norms shape them.

CHAPTER 6. CLASS BEYOND STRUCTURAL POSITIONS: SOCIO-CULTURAL AND EVERYDAY LIFE, AND GENDER DYNAMICS IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY

In the previous chapter, I examined the organisations of production and labour conditions across factory, atelier and home-based scales of garment production in İzmir. However, as I argued in Chapter 2, class cannot be reduced to economic location and material conditions alone. It is a socio-cultural formation as well as an economic one (Thompson, 1965). A satisfactory class analysis requires us to look at the particular ways in which class members experience and understand their material conditions of existence in the daily transactions of social life. Moreover, being a social relation, class cannot be separated from other social relations and forms of oppression. Gender is one of these social relations and is integral to the existence of capitalism and class formation. There is a reciprocal, co-constitutive relation between patriarchal processes/values and production relations/everyday life at work. Thus, in this chapter, I will analyse the general traits of socio-cultural and everyday life on the garment shop floor in İzmir, and the particular ways in which gender shapes it. Since the discussions will be centred on the workplace culture and relations, in this and the next chapters, I will mostly focus on factory and atelier workers.

I will begin by presenting the socio-cultural atmosphere in garment workplaces, daily life on the shop floor, and the impacts of the material conditions of work on workers' feelings and opinions about themselves and their lives. I will show that poor work conditions and the repetitious and draining characteristics of garment jobs make garment workers feel bored with and unhappy about their work, which in turn leads to dissatisfaction with their lives. Then, I will move on to analyse women workers' social profiles through tracing the many life paths leading them to the garment sector. As I will explain, since these women come from low-income migrant families, live in the suburbs, often started full-time work when still children and have low social and economic capital, the garment sector is almost their only working option.

In the third section of the chapter, I will focus on the gendered nature of garment jobs and everyday life on the shop floor. Beginning with employers'

opinions on women's employment in the sector, I will analyse the sexual division of labour, gender relationships and sexual harassment against women workers in the workplace. I will then go on to discuss the general societal perception of women garment workers as 'bad' women. I will present women's reactions to this perception and discuss the patriarchal control exercised by women over women in the workplace. Overall, this section will shed light on the ways in which patriarchal ideologies shape the organisation of production, everyday life on the garment shop floor, and women's class experiences.

6.1. The Socio-Cultural Atmosphere and Everyday Life on the Shop Floor

When one enters a garment factory in İzmir, the loud noise of the machines is accompanied by *arabesk* music, and by cotton dust floating around. One immediately sees tens of people working very hard and appearing committed to their work. On the first day of my work at Grey, I was greatly impressed by the organisation and harmonic pace of production, and by the great amount of labour that tens of garment workers were putting. Workers were talented and experts at their jobs. Moreover, they were highly productive and fully committed to garment production. In the course of my employment, I witnessed many times how they cooperated with management and employers to facilitate the production, and thus, to create greater surplus value. They spontaneously found solutions to speed up production or improve quality, hence facilitating their own exploitation.

The factory that I worked in – and the others situated nearby – look like semi-open prisons. They are surrounded by high walls and locked gates. Workers need to get permission from the management if they want to leave the factory during their 45 minute lunch break. Ateliers, on the other hand, are like smaller and more 'primitive' versions of factories. The difference between the inside and outside is sharper in ateliers. The inside is mostly tiny, dark, cold, and airless. Yet, the world outside the locked doors is much wider than that of factories. There are no boundaries. Atelier workers are free to go wherever they want during their breaks, as long as they return to work on time.

During breaks, workers chat with their fellow workers, mostly accompanied by tea and cheap cigarettes. They share their personal/familial or work-related problems with each other, talk about young single workers' love affairs or current issues in the country, gossip about other workers or the management/employers, or play games on mobile phones. Women workers call their children to check how they are and to tell them what to do (to prepare food, do homework or cleaning). Women factory workers sometimes sleep at and on the sewing tables during lunch breaks. In the ateliers, there are many young girls and boys who are cheerful and full of life. They talk about dream partners during breaks: "I do not want him to be too tall. He shall be 1.95 cm (laughs)". "When I lay my head on his chest, my head should be on his heart (sighs)". Child workers practice diligently on sewing machines during breaks to acquire the skills necessary to become operators.

Time at work does not pass quickly in the garment sector. Throughout my work at Grey, the most commonly heard refrain was workers telling each other "I wish we had finished work and gone home" and during the day they counted the minutes until their next break. Being exhausted by work, I sometimes did the same. When, one day, a woman worker at Grey saw that I was constantly checking the wall clock, she said, "Do not look at the clock, time will not pass if you do."³² When the break bell rings in the factory, all the workers stop working immediately and run to get tea. They look like primary school pupils, running outside when the school bell rings. They are eager for their shift to end so that they can go home. If it is the beginning of the week, they wish it were the end of the week. And finally, their biggest wish is to retire, as that would signify the end of their toil.

A Thompsonian class perspective requires the analysis of the interrelations between material and social life. Labour processes and objective production relations are embodied in the ideas, feelings and expectations of the class subjects. In garment work, the repetitious and draining character of the work causes boredom, fatigue and dissatisfaction among workers. To them,

³² For a detailed historical account of the changes in time apprehension and time measurement with the development of industrial capitalism in England, see Thompson (1967).

every day feels the same; their lives feel monotonous. “We are just killing time” was a phrase that I heard from many workers. This feeling is rooted in the material conditions of their work and life. As I illustrated in the previous chapter, in the best-case scenario, they have one day off a week and one week off a year and do repetitive tasks under a harsh labour control system for most of their life. A middle-aged man worker at Grey remarked:

Look at all the workers in this sector. All of them are unhappy. It is rare to meet happy people here [in the sector]. Just imagine that someone put you in a box, where every day you must do the same work, in the same place surrounded by the same people!

Moreover, as workers receive very low wages, they suffer financial hardship. Thus, they are deprived of both sufficient time and economic resources to have a satisfactory life. Also, as I will illustrate in more detail in Chapter 8, women workers have much less free time than working men because they spend most of their non-production work time on reproductive tasks in the family. Therefore, the unequal division of labour in the family further increases fatigue and dissatisfaction among women.

The areas that garment workers live in and the lifestyles that characterise them are important in understanding their socio-cultural world. One day, while returning home on the shuttle bus provided by Grey, a young woman worker told me to write that all women garment workers are *varoş kadınlar* [suburban women]. *Varoş*³³ refers to both the lifestyle in the peripheries of large cities and the underground or kitsch aspects of contemporary urban life (Demirtaş & Şen, 2007: 88). It is true that most garment workers live in the *varoş* neighbourhoods – the suburbs of the city, such as Kozağaç, Kuruçeşme, Günaltay, Yıkıkkemer, Gültepe, Limontepe and so on. These neighbourhoods are mostly *gecekondu* (literally ‘built overnight’) settlements that host low-income migrants in the city.

One main characteristic of the *varoş* lifestyle is the aforementioned dissatisfaction with life. It seemed from my observations and conversations with workers that they were unhappy with their lives. There is a huge gap

³³ For a historical analysis of the transformation of the concepts *gecekondu* and *varoş*, see Demirtaş & Şen (2007).

between the life that they live and the one that they desire to live. Moreover, there is a dominant view among garment workers that they are “mental”³⁴ people. I heard from many workers that no ‘normal’ people work in the garment sector. By being “mental”, they mean being unhappy and aggressive, rather than having been diagnosed with a mental illness. One condition mentioned in support of this negative self-image is having *façalı* (scratched) arms. *Façala* *atmak* is a type of self-harming behaviour taking the form of cutting or scratching arms and is one way in which garment workers express their anger and frustration at their lives. I met many young men and women garment workers in their 20s and 30s who had cut their arms years ago, when younger. They made fun of themselves when telling me about their self-harm in an attempt to conceal their past experience of pain and overcome it through sarcasm. Sarcasm is often used as a weapon of the weak (see Chari, 2003). The body, in this example, becomes the terrain in which class conflicts and resistance to capitalist work are manifested. In other extreme examples, as in the case of Malay factory workers in the 1980s, the devastating effects of capitalist work on the human body reached the point where the factory workers were believed to be possessed by evil spirits (Ong, 1988).

Another important part of the socio-cultural life in garment workplaces, which also shapes workers’ self-image as “mental” individuals, is *arabesk* music, which is played loudly in factories and ateliers. *Arabesk* music, which emerged in the 1960s in Turkey, is regarded as the music of squatter settlements and attributed to the culture of squat dwellers. It embodies feelings, such as fatalism, despair, suffering and blows of misfortune, heartache, and disappointment with socio-economic conditions. *Arabesk* music is regarded by garment workers as their *ruhun gıdası* (soul food). In the words of a middle-aged man worker at Cold: “*Arabesk* is a must for us. We cannot work without it.”

Apart from their life and work conditions, another main reason why garment workers feel frustrated with their lives is the fact that they usually start full-time work at a very early age. Many factory and atelier workers are erstwhile child labourers. In my sample, 18 out of 36 factory and atelier

³⁴ This is a translation from the Turkish word “kaçık” that they used.

workers had started a full-time garment job before the age of 16, and five before the age of 18. They were obliged to leave school and deprived of a childhood. Similar to the child labourers in Marx's time, who worked unduly long hours in manufacturing industries under strenuous conditions and who were robbed of the moral and physical conditions of development and activity (Marx, 1982 [1867]), they were physically and mentally damaged by the harsh material and emotional conditions of garment work.

I heard from many workers that they could not enjoy their childhood and youth. They were children who had to grow up fast. Sevgi, a Kurdish factory worker, is a former child labourer. At the time of the interview she was 32 and married with two children. She looked serious and unhappy while working at Grey but when she came to my house for the interview she was very different – cheerful and friendly. She said that there is another Sevgi inside her, 'little Sevgi', who wants to fall in love and do whatever she could not do while she was a child and teenager. She said that the child inside her is still alive, but she cannot set her free:

I could not live my childhood. I could not live my youth and adolescence. I do not know what it means to be an adolescent. We were not allowed to play on the streets or to go to our friends' homes. We did not have free time, either. We were working all the time! We were born to work. We are possessed by ambition, we deem ourselves incomplete unless we work. Even now, I feel wretched when I sit idly because I have been accustomed to working since I was a child. Now if they ask me: "Sevgi, what would you like to change in your past?" I would say: "I wish I had been born in İzmir and my parents had been from İzmir." I wish my parents had not had the mentality that they did [that makes them make their children work at an early age]. After all, we bring children into the world. We are working for them so that they will not be dependent on anyone in the future (Sevgi, 32/W/FW).

In sum, the gap between the life garment workers live and the one they desire to live is large. Starting full-time work at a very early age is a major source of dissatisfaction with their lives. The material conditions of garment work also trigger this sense of dissatisfaction. Working long hours in poor conditions for low wages and performing repetitious and draining tasks, garment workers feel bored and unhappy with their work and lives. Workers manifest their dissatisfaction with the material conditions of their existence by engaging in acts of self-harm, or listening to and identifying with the *arabesk*

music culture. Their negative self-image as “mental people” is rooted in this socio-cultural world.³⁵

There are several reasons why women start work at an early age and why they currently work in the garment sector. In the next section, I will discuss workers’ social profiles and the life paths and socio-economic conditions that lead girls to become child workers in the industry.

6.2. Workers’ Social Profiles and the Life Paths that Lead Them to Be a Garment Worker

Garment workers represent the less-educated segment of the society. Of the 50 women interviewed, 9 had no formal schooling, 9 had dropped out of primary school, 23 had completed primary school and 6 had completed high school. Only two women, aged 26 and 29, had taken two years’ vocational education after graduating high school. As such, 86% of women were either unschooled, primary school dropouts or primary school graduates. Notably, the least-educated group among women was home-based workers. Only three out of 36 factory and atelier workers compared to six out of 14 home-based workers were unschooled.

Table 7: Educational Status of Women

No schooling	9
Primary school drop-outs	9
Primary school graduates	23
High school drop-outs	1
High school graduates	6
Two-year university graduates	2

Source: Author’s own calculation based on the field findings.

Another significant demographic characteristic of garment workers is that most of them are rural-to-urban migrants. It seemed from my observations and conversations with workers that either they or their parents had migrated from rural areas to İzmir, mostly in the 1970s-80s. In my sample, 78% of women workers had migrated from villages mostly in the eastern and southeastern regions (such as Erzurum, Ağrı, Van, Erzincan, Diyarbakır, Mardin

³⁵ For a seminal analysis of how the working classes in Britain experience and struggle devaluation and degradation, see Skeggs (2004) and Skeggs & Loveday (2012).

and Urfa) or Central Anatolia and the Aegean regions (such as Manisa, Aydın, Denizli, Afyon, Yozgat and Sivas).³⁶ Only 11 of the 50 women were born in İzmir. However, nine of those women were from migrant families. Only two women said they and their families were natives of İzmir.

Table 8: Migration Status of Women

Number of women who migrated to İzmir	39
Number of women who were born in İzmir	11
Number of women who were born in İzmir but whose families migrated to İzmir	9
Number of women who were born in İzmir whose families are natively from İzmir	2

Source: Author's fieldwork.

Given the dissolution of traditional forms of agriculture and the hardships faced in villages, the most common reason for migration indicated by the women (23 of 48) was to seek employment and earn a living in İzmir. The second most common reason was marriage: ten women had migrated after marrying a man living in İzmir. The third most common reason for migration, indicated by Kurdish respondents, was the conflict between the Turkish State and the PKK in Kurdish-populated cities. Five women said that their families had migrated from Mardin (3), Tunceli (1) and Erzurum (1) due to fear for their lives or the security measures implemented by the state. Alev was one of those women: her family had to migrate to İzmir when she was 12 years old:

I remember my childhood there [Tunceli] very well. I remember bad things rather than good things. No one could go out when it got dark, at four or five in the evening. Soldiers were hard on people. In the end, they forced us to leave the village (Alev, 40/W/FW).

In addition to Turkish and Kurdish urban migrants, ethnic Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria are another significant part of the workforce in İzmir's garment industry. Muslim Turks who had settled in Bulgaria during the Ottoman rule, started to immigrate to Turkey by the end of the 19th century: while around 700,000 had immigrated between 1878-1984, in 1989 alone 370,000 fled to Turkey due to political oppression (Vasileva, 1992: 346-7). In İzmir, these people are called *göçmen* (immigrants). In my sample, there were two *göçmen* women. One, 45-year-old Sultan, had come to İzmir from Bulgaria

³⁶ To see the places of birth and ethno-cultural identities of the interviewees, see Appendix I.

in 1995 at the age of 25. She was married with one child when she and her husband decided to migrate (her parents and some other relatives were already settled in İzmir). She said that they had been fed up with the oppression they had faced because of being Muslim in Bulgaria.

Table 9: Reasons for Migration

Economic reasons	23
Marriage	10
Political reasons	6

Source: Author's fieldwork.

The only woman in my sample who had migrated to İzmir on her own – at the age of 18 – was Eda. She had been previously lived with her family in Manisa, a city neighbouring İzmir, and worked in the fields. When asked why her family had migrated to İzmir, she said:

I migrated first. My uncle was living with his family in İzmir and I came to İzmir to visit them. My aunt-in-law told me not to go back to Manisa. She said "I am working in textiles [sector]. You can, too. You start as a helper". I did not find it reasonable at first. Then, I went back to the village. Of course, there is farm work in the village in summer! I went back to İzmir that winter and told my aunt-in-law 'I will stay with you. I will not go back to the village'. She said okay. My father was very angry with me and told me to go back to the village. I had a fight with him for a year, but I did not give up. Then, he agreed I could move to İzmir. I lived away from them for around one and a half years. Then the rest of my family moved to İzmir (Eda, 35/W/FW).

In general, unlike Eda's story, male family members – sons, brothers or fathers – moved to İzmir first, found a job and then brought their families to join them. Most migrants knew somebody from the same village or extended family who had previously migrated to İzmir and would help them in the first years of migration. Support was manifested in a number of ways, such as hosting people upon arrival and sharing the same house, finding them jobs or providing them with financial support. These support networks made it easier for newcomers to adapt to city life.

Living together with extended family members under one roof and having a common budget was a dominant strategy to make a living in the city, especially in the first years of migration. Nine women reported that in the past they had lived with their husband's family for periods ranging from one to 25 years, only moving out when they built their own houses or were able to afford

the cost of rent and other household expenses on their own. At the time of my fieldwork, six women were still living with their own (2) or husbands' (4) extended family members. In addition to financial difficulties, another significant reason behind living with extended family members was patriarchal norms. As I will discuss in detail in Chapter 8, in Turkey, women are not only expected to take care of the nuclear family members but also to engage in collective reproductive duties, such as looking after elderly members of the extended family. Given the choice, all the women in my sample reported that they would prefer not to live with their husbands' family members.

Coming from poor migrant families, most women had to start work full-time at an early age. As I showed above, 96% of the women in my sample are rural-to-urban migrants or from migrant families. All the women workers who had begun to work before the age of 18 reported that they had had to work because their families needed their income to make a living. In most first generation migrant families, mothers could not (due to household responsibilities) or were not allowed to work, while fathers lacked the networks and skills to find a well-paid job in the city that could provide sufficient income for their families. Those families, who lack sufficient economic sources or skills to find a well-paid job, made their children work as unskilled labour in the informal economy.

For poor migrant families, child labour was one of the main ways of surviving in the city. In my sample, all the women workers came from large families of between four and 13 children. In each family, other children also worked in the garment sector or other highly informal sectors. All the women, except Melek, said that they had given all or a large part of their wages to their parents until they got married. In addition to covering household expenses, their wages were spent on building a house, buying household furniture and education or marriage expenses of other siblings. Five women stated that their families had built a house – in the squatter settlements – using their children's income. Thus, child and young women's labour have enabled migrant families to make a sustainable life in the city.

When we look at women's current reasons for employment, we see that household income level has a significant impact. Most women reported that it would be impossible for their households to make ends meet without their earnings. A clear majority of my sample (80%) reported that their wages were the primary source of household income. For married women, there is a close link between their employment and the occupations/incomes of their husbands. In my sample, the women's husbands had low-paid and insecure jobs, working mostly in the garment or construction sectors, supermarkets or restaurants. Factory and atelier women workers earned similar wages to their husbands. Ruwanpura and Hughes (2016) similarly found that economic forces, that is, income inequality, low household income, deprivation and poverty, are strong factors in women's entrance to the garment labour market in Karachi, Pakistan. In Turkey, Dedeoğlu (2012) reached the same conclusion in her research on İstanbul's garment industry: women garment workers' work is greatly influenced by their husbands' occupations and household income levels. Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits (2008) similarly observed the close link between the income of the husband and the wife's employment status but in the other direction. They found that in Turkey where there is no significant need for additional income in the household, women are less likely to work outside the home whether because of family members' objections or their own decision (2008: 114).

Moreover, two unmarried women and all six divorced women stated that their wage was the only source of household income. Only 10 of the 50 women reported that their income was not necessary for their families to meet their commitments. Most of these women were unmarried women workers. They spent most of their income on their personal necessities and dowry. Even though their families did not depend on their income, they said, they often paid for groceries and sometimes bought household furniture for their families.

Another current reason for women's employment is buying or building a home. Four factory and atelier women workers were paying a mortgage at the time of the interviews, and four factory workers had repaid a debt or mortgage

in the past. Many women also reported that they had spent a significant amount of their income on home improvements.

Pension rights were cited as another significant reason among factory women workers. As I explained in the previous chapter, all factory workers were insured through the social security system. During my work at Grey, women often talked about retirement, asking each other how many more years they needed to work to be entitled to pensions.³⁷ All the factory women, except Suzan, a 40-year-old woman who had only started factory work three years ago, stated that they aimed to complete the required number of years to retire. They perceived pensions as security for their future. Many said to me, “When you retire, you know that you will receive that money on the same day every month”. The testimony of Sevgi clearly demonstrates the importance of pensions for women:

I am working because I do not trust my husband. How do I know he is not going to abandon me in the future? He is that kind of person; if something happens to me he would not look after me. In fact, that is the reason why I am working. If I retire in the future, at least I can spend my own money freely. Even if I live with him, he would not let me spend his money. He would say ‘It is my pension’. In any case, I do not want to be dependent on him (Sevgi, 32/W/FW).

The possibility of receiving pensions at the end of their working life makes women feel more secure and independent, as they would not be dependent on anyone when they got older. Ruwanpura (2013: 157-159) similarly observed that pensions are a crucial factor in the work decisions of Sri Lankan women garment workers, who are in their late forties or mid-fifties. In İzmir, since few atelier workers and none of the home-based workers were insured through the state social security system, they did not mention pension rights as a reason for doing paid work.

The cost of children is another substantial reason for women’s working. All women workers with children (70%) stated that they often spend a significant amount of their wages on children’s necessities, the most commonly cited being education and marriage. I heard from many women that they planned to continue working after they were eligible to retire until their

³⁷ The number of working years for women to be entitled to pensions ranges from 15 to 20 years depending on the starting date of employment.

children completed university or got married. Further, there is also a group of women who began to work as 'unskilled' workers in their 40s in order to cover their children's university or marriage expenses. In their own words, they did not want their children to feel less fortunate than others. They want to provide them with a better future than they had had in the past.

Divorce is another reason for women to seek employment. For instance, one of the women at Cold had started to work outside the home after she got divorced when she was 41 years old. A second woman, who was 54 with five (adult) children, had got divorced five years ago and started to live alone in a rented flat. She had been engaged in animal husbandry during her marriage but after getting divorced, she had to find a paid job. At the time of my fieldwork, she was working as a helper doing unskilled work at Cold. "No one knows what will happen to them", she said. The garment sector remains one of the main destinations for middle-aged or older divorced women who lack skills and/or work experience.

These two groups of women who start work at an older age without job experience, either for their children's education/marriage expenses or because of getting divorced, constitute a minority in the workforce. And yet, they are an important part of it for employers because their disadvantaged social position allows them to be further exploited. In the factory context, they are employed part-time and paid the minimum legal wage. In the atelier context, they are the lowest paid after child workers. This again shows that women garment workers are not a homogenous group, but differ in their working conditions and how they experience exploitation, depending on their social positions.

Home-based women workers do garment work for similar reasons to those given by factory and atelier women. All home-based women workers, except one, reported that they were in need of money as their families had financial difficulties. Their paid work was important for the livelihood of their families. As Fatma (38/W/HW) said, "The flat is rented and husbands earn only the minimum wage. How can you make a living if you do not work? We would not even take a needle in our hand if we were not in need of money". Their

income is usually spent on household furniture, grocery shopping, bills, households' daily urgent necessities and children's regular expenses. Although the amount of their monthly income is unstable due to the irregularity of work that I explained in the preceding chapter, they work almost every month.

A large majority of the factory and atelier women (86%) had been working for more than ten years in the garment sector at the time of the interviews. Nine home-based women workers out of 14 had been working for around ten years, while the remaining four had been working for at least five years. All described their paid work as indispensable; their wages were one of the household's main sources of income. Ultimately, despite its precarious nature, garment work was not perceived as temporary but as a permanent occupation by both factory and atelier workers, and by home-based workers. This finding contrasts with that of Dedeoğlu (2012: 104) who researched İstanbul's garment industry and found that women's garment work is viewed as temporary and undertaken to provide security and stability until the exceptional economic difficulties faced by their families are over.

When asked about the reasons for choosing the garment sector, most women said that it was the easiest job for them to find. The way in which they responded to this question suggested that they had not thought about it before, before replying that they did not have many options to choose from. In their words, "It was the only job that we could do"; "it was the job that the people around were doing".

The social networks and settlements that women workers grew up or were living in have a significant impact on women's access to the labour market. As I mentioned in the previous section, many garment workers had settled in squatter areas, which have traditionally supplied much of the labour to İzmir's garment sector. Thus, their entrance into the labour market has taken place through these neighbourhood networks: the majority of the factory and atelier women workers told me that they had had family members or acquaintances already working in the garment sector before they started. At the time of the interviews, around 45% of the factory and atelier women had family members,

30% had relatives, and 14% had close neighbours or friends working in the garment sector. In short, consistent with the literature (e.g. Dedeoğlu, 2012; Mezzadri & Srivastava, 2015; Mezzadri, 2017; De Neve, 2008), my findings show that the women’s access to the garment labour market is very much determined by family and kin networks, and the neighbourhoods that they live in.

Table 10: Factory and Atelier Women’s Social Networks in the Garment Industry

Number of factory and atelier women	36
Number of factory and atelier women that have family members in the garment sector	16
Number of factory and atelier women that have relatives in the garment sector	11
Number of factory and atelier women that have close neighbours and friends in the garment sector	5
Number of factory and atelier women that reported no previous connection	4

Source: Author’s fieldwork.

Another important factor in determining women’s choices in the labour market is the fact that they had started to work full-time at an early age. As I showed in the previous chapter, the garment industry is one of the main sectors employing child labour in Turkey. Since most factory and atelier women were legally not allowed to work when they had started to, the garment sector with its high informality was a natural and inevitable destination. Women’s low level of education was another factor that limited their job opportunities and led them to work in the garment sector. Garment work allowed less-educated women to do a paid job without having had a formal education. All women workers except two stated that they had not formally studied garment production but acquired their skills while working.

In short, women garment workers with different ethnic identities are mostly rural-to-urban migrants, with low levels of education, who started work at an early age to support their families. Low household income levels, the low economic profile of husbands, children’s education and marriage expenses, and pension rights are the main reasons these women work. As women’s incomes are usually one of the main sources of household income and are vital to their families, their employment is permanent rather than temporary. Having a low

level of formal education, starting to work at a (very) young age, and living in the suburbs of the city, women usually 'end up' working – rather making an active choice to work – in the garment sector.

As the socio-cultural atmosphere and everyday life on the shop floor cannot be separated from the broader social context, it intersects with and is produced by other sets of social relations. Gender is one of these social relations. I will now analyse how gender shapes the organisation of production, everyday life, and women's class experiences in İzmir's garment industry.

6.3. The Gendered Nature of Work and Everyday Life in the Garment Industry

In parallel with global and national trends, the workforce was heavily feminised in the workplaces where I conducted research. All the factory owners that I interviewed reported that about 70% of their workforce were women. In the ateliers I worked in, the rate was around 50%. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the patriarchal images attributed to women (such as careful, diligent, disciplined, manageable and patient) and to men (such as careless, 'naughty', and complaining) have accelerated women's labour force participation in the garment industry (Salzinger, 2003; Caraway, 2005; Wright, 2006; Ruwanpura & Hughes, 2016). My research findings support this argument. All eight employers I interviewed reported that they preferred employing women. When asked why, the men employers explained their preference with references to women's 'natural' characteristics and dexterity making them inherently suited to do garment work. Semih, for example, believed that women were more responsible and mature, whereas men were problematic and capricious. For Osman, women were more loyal to their work, but men were more likely to shirk. Melih and Arif considered women workers to be more compliant and easy-going.

When asked the same question, none of the women employers referred to the 'natural' dispositions of women. Kerime said that she preferred women workers because she gets along better with women than men. Leman told me that she feels more comfortable with women workers. Both Kerime and Leman were erstwhile garment workers. They both explained women's high labour

force participation in the garment sector as the result of socio-economic factors, such as poverty and low levels of education. According to Kerime, the main reason was that poor families used to send their daughters to needlework courses in their neighbourhoods instead of to school. For Leman, it was because women in need of money did not have sufficient skills to do other jobs. Thus, it appears that women employers, being women and former workers, have a better understanding of the cultural, socio-economic factors behind women's participation in the garment industry.

Garment workplaces are as gendered as other social spaces. Modern industrial institutions produce and reproduce cultural concepts of patriarchal domination and women's subordination through circulating discourse and practices in daily conditions (Ong, 2010: 162). My research findings show that traditional patriarchal norms are diffused throughout the production structures, labour conditions and social relationships in the garment sector. Firstly, the organisation of work was gendered. The division of labour at the factory and ateliers was gender discriminative. At Grey, only men performed the ironing, cutting, warehouse, and shipping tasks. These tasks were seen as 'men's work' as they were believed to require 'men's strength'. Moreover, men were paid more than the women workers in the same sections. For example, all the ironers working in the quality control section were paid TL 100 more than women workers checking the quality of garments and packaging in the same section. Instead, thread trimming, packaging and handwork (opening buttonholes, seaming or ripping out seams) were seen as 'women's work' and performed only by women and, exclusively older women without previous work experience at that. As I noted earlier, these women were regarded as unskilled and paid the lowest wages in the factory.

At the Cold, Dark and Secret ateliers, there was no gendered division of labour in productive tasks because there was only a sewing section. However, there was explicit gender discrimination regarding reproductive tasks performed at the ateliers. Unlike the factory, none of the ateliers employed staff for cleaning and serving lunch or tea. Since these reproductive tasks are regarded as 'women's work' and associated with women's traditional roles,

they were only performed by women workers in the ateliers. At all the ateliers, workers cleaned the workplaces together at the end of the workweek. In this division of labour, women were in charge of 'dirty' and 'women's work', such as cleaning toilets, washing dishes, sweeping and mopping floors, whereas men were responsible only for cleaning their sewing machines with compressed air devices. Crucially, women workers were not paid extra money for these reproductive tasks because they were naturalised as part of their duties at work, even if unpaid. In other words, women's reproductive work at ateliers was as invisible, devalued and unpaid as their reproductive work at homes.

With regard to wages, all women workers at Grey reported that there was no wage difference between women and men doing the same task. However, some reported that they had been paid less than their men counterparts in their previous factory jobs. In the ateliers, most atelier women said that their married men colleagues were paid TL 50-100 more as they were regarded as main breadwinners. Moreover, many atelier women workers said that men workers were given leaves of absence more readily than women. Notwithstanding that, none of the factory and atelier women workers mentioned gender discrimination regarding promotions. All employers and women workers reported that women and men have an equal chance of being promoted. In Grey, for example, two of the three belt leaders in the sewing section were women, and the supervisor of the ironing, quality control, and packaging section was a woman. When asked whether there is gender discrimination against women regarding promotion, Selma (28/W/FW) replied: "No, they look at how she/he works, her/his speed, if she/he can do the job". Similarly, Emine (26/W/FW) said, "No, there is no gender discrimination. It depends on how much self confident she/he is and how good she/he is at her/his job". Kader thought that it does not matter if one is a woman or a man; the important thing is how close relationship one has with management.

On top of the division of labour and labour conditions, women workers reported that they had difficulties in assigning tasks to their men colleagues. Funda, for instance, told me, "They [men workers] do not care what I say to them. If I were a man, they would care. I experience many things at work that

make me wish I were a man” (Funda, 26/W/AW). Similarly, Hasret, a forewoman, said that men workers were offended by being supervised by her. Women feel that men look down on them because they are women. In sum, consistent with the literature (Brooks, 2007; Ong, 2010; Mezzadri, 2016a, 2016b among others), my findings illustrate that the patriarchal norms that define women as inferior to men are reproduced in garment workplaces in İzmir.

Overall, patriarchal norms have a significant impact on labour processes and labour conditions to the detriment of women. However, their effect is not limited to this. Patriarchal ideologies also shape the socio-cultural atmosphere and everyday life on the shop floor. The subordination of women not only shows itself as a devaluation of womanhood but also manifests in acts of sexual violence against women. I will now move on to discuss gender relationships and sexual harassment at work.

6.3.1. Gender Relationships and Sexual Harassment at Work

Given that the socio-cultural life at work is not separated from the broader social context, we need to consider how these broader social relations shape everyday life on the shop floor. In Turkey, for example, it is regarded as improper for women to be in close contact with unrelated men, and women are expected to avoid close interaction with the opposite sex (Koçturk, 1992: 82). As a result of this dominant conservative-patriarchal social norm, gender relationships in the garment industry are carefully kept at a distance. Many women workers stated that “you have to keep some level of distance from men”.

The factory and atelier women reported that they usually have good relationships with men fellow workers. However, these relationships resembled a family relationship rather than an equal colleague relationship. Most women described women and men workers as “sisters and brothers”. They usually addressed their men fellow workers as *abi* (older brother) or *kardeş* (sibling). Zuhale (39) and Delal (20), for instance, emphasised that they call all men fellow workers *abi* regardless of their age. Women workers use fictitious family

relations as a safer and more acceptable way of having relationships with unrelated men; it is a way to keep their distance from men and to prevent any threats to their reputation. Moreover, using fictitious family relations is not only present in garment workplaces but is prevalent throughout socio-cultural life in Turkey for the same reasons: it symbolically excludes the possibility of sexual affairs between women and men.

Given this, unsurprisingly, women tend to have closer relationships with their men colleagues when there is a big age difference. Factory and atelier women were more likely to have warmer relationships with men fellow workers that were younger. Middle-aged, married or divorced women workers in particular had very limited interaction with men workers of similar ages. Melek (41/W/AW), for example, said, "I will talk to him [any men colleague] if he is quite a bit younger than me, about the age of my son. Otherwise, I would just say good morning and goodbye". In fact, relationships with young men colleagues can be normalised as those between mothers and sons, and hence be reproduced within the traditional patriarchal schema and norms.

The usage of fictitious kinship relationships in society in general, and in garment workplaces in particular, is not peculiar to Turkey; it is also present in other strongly patriarchal societies. For instance, Kabeer (1991) and Brooks (2007) report similar findings in the Bangladeshi garment industry and society. Kabeer (1991: 151) argues that the creation of fictitious kinship plays a significant role in defining acceptable forms of gender relationships, not only in garment factories but is used widely throughout Bengali society to allow exchanges between non-related women and men.

Patriarchal norms and male domination, which shape everyday life on the shop floor, cause another serious problem for women garment workers: sexual harassment at work. Both factory and atelier women workers reported the presence of sexual harassment at work. Two-thirds (24 of 36) of the factory and atelier women said that either they had heard about (nine), witnessed (four) or experienced (11) sexual harassment in their work lives. Based on the testimonies of the women that specified the harassers, eight of the perpetrators

were foremen, four were co-workers, and three were employers. The types of sexual harassment that women mentioned included physical harassment (forceful touching), coercion of sexual activity by threat, demanding sexual activity for a promise of benefit or reward, obscene humour about sex, repeated unwanted sexual invitations, and obscene gestures.

Table 11: Sexual Harassment Incidents in the Workplace

Number of factory and atelier women workers	36
Number of factory and atelier women that experienced sexual harassment	11
Number of factory and atelier women that heard about sexual harassment	9
Number of factory and atelier women that witnessed sexual harassment	4
Number of factory and atelier women that reported no sexual harassment	12

Source: Author's fieldwork.

When asked, most women initially said that they had not been harassed or witnessed sexual harassment at work. This was because they understood sexual harassment to be limited to physical harassment. When I explained the range of sexual harassment (as above), many of them said that they had been harassed or witnessed harassment according to this definition. In other words, women garment workers tend not to recognise non-physical sexual harassment. Only Esin said that her men colleagues' offensive sexual jokes were verbal harassment: "I warned them. I asked them to stop telling these jokes, but they did not stop" (Esin, 50/W/FW).

During the interviews, all of the atelier owners admitted the presence of sexual harassment in the sector. Osman, (47/M/AO): "Everyone says the textile sector is immoral, but it never happens here [in his atelier]. I never keep that kind of men. People [women] working for me are family to me". Kerime, (37/W/AO), said that she prefers to recruit women because "there are many women who are harassed by men in this sector. At least they can work here without fear". Leman, (28/W/AO), stated that she does not employ 'sleazy' men: "There are women workers here. He should not harass them". Similarly, Hatice, (48/W/AW), the forewoman of White, said that she asks her employer not to recruit dirty-minded men: "There are many dirty-minded men in this sector. They stare at women. I have seen many men of this kind in this sector".

The patriarchal culture and pressure shape women's struggles and responses to sexual harassment. All the women, bar two, stated that they had not told anyone else that they had been harassed. They either changed jobs, kept quiet or acted as if it never happened. For example, Kader, (37/W/FW), who had been harassed by her employer and foreman at her previous jobs, said that she had stayed away from those people or quit the job. When asked if she told anyone about her experiences, she replied: "No, you cannot tell these kinds of things to anyone". Similarly, Selma's previous foreman had repeatedly invited her for drinks late at night although she had refused each time. When I asked whether she had thought of complaining to the manager or employer, she replied, "No. These people protect each other. Instead, I quit the job" (Selma, 46/W/FW).

The main reason why women keep quiet about sexual harassment is rooted in the patriarchal norms that depict women as responsible for the sexual harassment that they are subjected to. Women think that if they tell anyone that they are being harassed, everyone would think that it was their fault. They are afraid of getting a bad reputation: "You can never prove it. Everyone would blame you by saying that 'if you do not play up to men, it would not happen to you'" (Handan, 38/W/FW). Sevgi, similarly, could not tell anyone that her foreman had harassed her because she was afraid of being found 'guilty': "People would say 'why he has not done this to others, but to you?'" (Sevgi, 32/W/FW). Kümbetoğlu et al. (2015: 272) also found that women workers tend to talk about sexual harassment as "something that happened to someone else" due to their fear of being accused of encouraging the men.

Only two women in my sample, Nazan and Melek, reported that they had complained about their harassers to the employers. In response, the employers fired the perpetrators in both cases. However, neither the employer nor the women took any legal action against the harassers. Similarly, only two women, Alev and Hazal, reported that they had intervened in sexual harassment incidents at work that happened to someone else. Alev had warned a foreman who was harassing a woman worker that if he did not stop she would tell the employer. Hazal had once denounced what a man worker was doing to a

woman worker as verbal harassment: “But he did not stop, and the woman quit the job in the end” (Hazal, 51/W/AW).

Patriarchal pressure is more intense on divorced or widowed women workers in the garment sector. In my sample, six were divorced and one was widowed. “Being a divorced woman is a heavy burden, especially in the garment sector”, said Melike (38/W/FW). When talking about the difficulties of being a woman in general and a woman worker in particular, all of these women highlighted the hardship of being divorced or widowed because of the negative image attributed to them by society. Divorced or widowed women are considered as being more likely to ‘go astray’ and they are regarded as more open to harassment or inappropriate sexual affairs. “As a divorced woman, you are a wrong person anyway”, (Melike, 38/W/FW). Similarly, Nermin (35/W/FW) told me that she had heard many times from her close friends that men workers talked about her behind her back, saying “I can easily have her, she is divorced anyway”.

Thus, the risk of being subjected to sexual harassment is higher for divorced or widowed women workers. For example, Melike’s manager threatened to fire her if she did not accept his dinner invitations. She said that she and her divorced women colleagues had quit many garment jobs because they had been subjected to harassment: “If you are a divorced woman in this sector, they impose two options on you: either you dally with men or run away from them. Senior men, especially, do this” (Melike, 38/W/FW). In order to avoid a bad reputation, which makes them even more vulnerable to sexual harassment, women usually try to hide that they are divorced or widowed from other workers. For instance, Nurcan (43/W/FW) initially hid the truth at Grey, but: “They learn, in some way, after a while”, she said. Similarly, Zuhail (39/W/AW) and the employer’s wife had hidden the fact that Zuhail had got divorced from everyone at work, including her employer. When asked if anything had changed after everyone learned the truth two years later, she said: “Yes. There was an *abi* with whom I got along in the atelier. But after learning that I was divorced, he started to ask me for dinner. I constantly refused, and he stopped after a few times”.

Due to this negative image, divorced or widowed women are more restricted in their relations with fellow men at the workplace. All divorced and widowed women said that they were particularly careful not to have close interaction with men workers. For instance, although Aysun, (40/W/FW), had been working at Grey for 13 years, she had stopped talking to the men after she got divorced six years ago: "Just hello, hello! I call them *abi*. You cannot get close". Similarly, Canan, (46/W/AW), refrained from talking to men at the atelier: "I talk to them about work issues. Otherwise, as a divorced woman, talking to men would be misinterpreted. I usually go to my home during lunch breaks to stay away from men". Moreover, being divorced or widowed restricts women's job opportunities and their mobility in the labour market. For instance, Aysun said that she could not change firm because she was a divorced woman: she was afraid of the problems that she would face in other firms because of being divorced and wanted to continue at Grey with the people that she had known for a long time.

In sum, women are restricted in their relationships with men and in their acts on the shop floor. In line with the patriarchal culture in Turkey, which disapproves of women having close contact with unrelated men, women workers tend to keep their interaction with fellow men workers to a minimum. They use fictitious familial relationships as a safe and acceptable form of relationships with men. The women's narratives also indicate that sexual harassment at work is a significant problem in the garment sector. Women lack full awareness of what constitutes harassment and lack solidarity networks to stand together and fight it. They usually feel helpless and hopeless about their ability to change the situation and therefore tend to keep quiet and/or leave the job if they are sexually harassed. The patriarchal pressure and the risk of being subjected to harassment are higher for divorced and widowed women due to the 'bad' image attributed to them. However, it is not only divorced and widowed women workers who are labelled as 'easy' in the garment sector: there is a public perception of women garment workers as 'loose' and 'easy' in general. In the following pages, I will examine this negative image, women's

responses to it and women workers' patriarchal control over other women workers.

6.3.2. The 'Bad' Image of Women Garment Workers and Women's Control over Other Women

The need to control women is one of the main features of patriarchal societies. The norms and practices that impose control over women are present everywhere, including workplaces (Bhasin, 2004: 4-5). Many women told me that women garment workers should be careful about how they behave, what they wear and how they talk in the workplace. The work environment in the garment sector was generally described as "immoral" by workers. Many factory and atelier workers told me that there are too many overly familiar modes of behaviour between women and men in the garment sector: "You cannot believe what kind of things happen in this sector"; "You do not know whose hand is in whose pocket" were oft-expressed sentiments. Workers described relationships as inappropriate if one was married but flirted with others, or if one had more than one partner at the same time even if both partners were single. Workers' perceptions are shaped by the fact that patriarchal norms that exclude extramarital sexual relationships and emphasise virginity and chastity are deeply ingrained in Turkish society (Koçturk, 1992: 82). Both women and men workers told various stories, which they either had heard about or witnessed, about people having sex in the workplace, flirting with each other or having secret relationships outside the workplace.

Within this 'immoral' picture of the sector, unsurprisingly, those who are stigmatised are women workers. There is a dominant negative image constructing women garment workers as 'bad women', who are 'easy' and 'loose'. During my fieldwork, many women complained about being regarded as 'loose' women. For many of them, this bad image was one of the main issues of being a garment worker. "They think you go to work, not to work, but to do something else [inappropriate things]" (Selma, 46/W/FW).

One reason for this image is that women work in close proximity to men for long hours, and sometimes spend nights at work doing overtime. Another

reason is the presence of sexual harassment against women and the commonly believed existence of inappropriate relationships in the sector. Lastly, many women said that it was because there were many divorced or widowed women workers in the sector. The perception of divorced and widowed women as 'immoral' affects all women garment workers.

One day I met with a male acquaintance who had worked in the garment industry for many years. In the course of our meeting, he mentioned that there is a common belief that "women garment workers are not the kind of women you want to marry" because they are believed to "live everything" (i.e. they are seen sluts). After several months, the story of Sevgi's younger sister (Kibar) corroborated this belief. Kibar was a garment worker like her sister Sevgi. Sevgi told me that Kibar and her boyfriend lied to the boy's parents about her job:

His parents had told him that they did not want a bride from the garment sector, as they thought that women garment workers change partners every day. My sister and her boyfriend lied that she was a helper in a pharmacy. This is how they could marry (Sevgi, 32/W/FW).

Ecevit's research (1991: 58) conducted in the 1980s in Bursa similarly reported that young factory girls were called "company girls" and this term implied promiscuity, loss of respect, and moral degradation. Moreover, the negative reputation and perceptions of women garment workers are not only present in Turkey, but are, as Ruwanpura (2011: 203) states, pervasive in most countries of the Global South. Kabeer (2000), for example, states that Bangladeshi women garment workers are dominantly regarded as having loose moral character. Similarly, Ong's (2010) study of Malay women factory workers also suggests that factory work is associated with perceptions of loose morals.

Women garment workers' reactions to this image are significant in understanding what they think about patriarchal norms humiliating and oppressing them. When asked about the reasons behind the bad image, all but two of the women were unanimous in the view that it was because of 'a few bad apples'. For them, those women who are 'easy' and 'flirtatious' are responsible for this image. "There always is a rotten apple, but everyone blames the whole barrel. It is the same for us. There are a few people like that, but everyone

stigmatises all of us”, said Kerime (37/W/AO). Similarly, Melek believed that those married women garment workers who flirted with men at work, made people think that all women garment workers are like them. She said that there are these kinds of women in both factories and ateliers in the sector. Of those who talked about the roots of this bad image, only Alev and Asya blamed men rather than women for it.

Women who consider other women workers as responsible for the bad image believe that some women in the sector tend to use their sexuality and allow men to take advantage of them. When asked why they would do so, they replied that it is to secure their position in the workplace, be promoted, or work less with higher wages. The forewoman of the quality control section at Grey, for example, told me that Eda, a woman working in the same section, was flirting with the supervisor because she wanted to be promoted and to take her (the forewoman’s) position. Similarly, Melike, (38/W/FW), argued: “Some women flirt with their foremen to be protected in the workplace. Other people work very hard and honestly, sweating blood, but he [the foreman] does not give them two hours leave of absence. But, she [the flirting woman] takes two days off”. She said that she had witnessed many cases like this. Leman, (28/W/AO), the owner of Secret and a former garment worker, claimed:

Women pave the way for this [bad image]. They use their femininity in order to be protected by employers. I find women guilty. Why did not they [men] do it to me? I call them *abi*, they call me *abla* [older sister]. Women let it happen. By doing so, they secure their positions at work.

Many women believed that women workers were more likely to seduce men in the garment sector. They gave examples of women who tried to attract married men workers or who had more than one relationship at the same time. “Let me tell you something. I am a woman as well, but I find today’s women very immoral”, said Hatice (48/W/AW). Zuhail, (39/W/AW): “If a woman protects herself, a man would never dare to make a pass at her. It is up to women. If you use obscene language with your employer, then he would hit on you”. In sum, there is a strong tendency to blame other women for the bad reputation of women garment workers yet at the same time to differentiate oneself from

these 'bad examples' in order to vindicate themselves and to gain social respectability.

Stigmatising women sometimes implies justifying men's bad behaviour. When I asked a woman worker at Cold whether her husband was a garment worker like her, she replied: "No. I would never marry a man from the garment sector. Even if he is not a corrupt man, women in this sector would seduce him". When I asked Zuhail if men were not responsible for this immoral image of the sector and women workers, she replied:

No. Well, men test women in this sector. But if he does not get a positive response, he would not take a risk, he would step back. But if he gets any positive reaction, he would touch you or rub himself against you. This originates from women (Zuhail, 39/W/AW).

I heard from many women that men try their luck with women: "Men do not have any qualms about it", many said. As such, women seemed to neutralise men's role in the immoral image of the garment sector. There was no equivalent 'easy' image for men garment workers. Men's role in 'inappropriate relationships', even sometimes in sexual harassments, was normalised by women. Thus, there was a strong double standard concerning sexual behaviour. Having intimate relationships with men led to a bad reputation for women, whereas taking advantage of 'easy' women was naturalised for men both in society and in the minds of women.

Women's negative self-image and their compliance with traditional societal expectations are rooted in their socialisation by patriarchal thinking. As Lerner (1986: 218) argues, "women have...participated in the process of their own subordination because they have been psychologically shaped so as to internalise the idea of their own inferiority". Women are not free of patriarchy. They tend to comply with the patriarchal norms in order to have social respectability. Obviously, this state of affairs is not peculiar to İzmir or Turkey. Kümbetoğlu et al. (2015: 272), who conducted research in five different cities in Turkey, similarly found that women tend to condemn women who are harassed for not protecting themselves properly, that is, acting immorally; and Brooks (2007: 131) reported similar examples of women garment workers in El

Salvador who think that some women flirt with owners or managers to move up the labour hierarchy.

As a result of women's cooperation with patriarchy, they exercise pressure on and control over their fellow women workers in various ways. Control takes direct and indirect forms. Gossip and surveillance are the main methods of indirect control by women. Gossip is pervasive in İzmir's garment sector. "This sector is a rumour mill", almost all workers agreed. The fear of being a subject of rumour and getting a bad name undermines women's freedom in the workplace. For example, Nurcan, a widow, had a partner who had previously worked at Grey. During breaks, I often heard some women workers gossiping about her. They were condemning her for having a lover because they thought that she did not need a man to survive, as she was living in the house that her husband bought before his death and she had a job. "She is not looking for a 'life guarantee' but a lover," they used to tell each other. The fact that she was veiled and had two adult daughters made her even 'guiltier' in these women's eyes. She was under surveillance by other women and she was obviously feeling the pressure. During the interview, she said:

Women look for something else behind what you do. The other day, I was waiting to see the doctor in front of his office. One of the women told me 'I guess you like the doctor. Whenever I see you, you are in front of his door'. I tried to explain the situation, saying that he wanted to see me again to check if I needed a different medication. That kind of things happens here. Whenever they see you talking to a man, they assume there is something between you (Nurcan, 43/W/FW).

Similarly, Nermin, aged 35 and divorced, complained that her women colleagues were always telling her to be careful about her behaviour in the workplace. Women also tend to stay away from those women who are labelled as immoral. Emine, for example, told me that she had been a close friend with Sezen, who was a 27-year-old divorced woman at Grey. They had known each other for a long time. While I was working at Grey, Sezen was having a relationship with a man. Their relationship was public: her boyfriend sometimes took her home in his car. Emine told me that people were saying very bad things about Sezen behind her back and that she had ended her relationship with Sezen because she thought that Sezen was now a corrupt woman.

Although being a divorced or widowed woman creates more social pressure and a higher risk of being a subject of rumour, all women are subject to surveillance and control in the workplace. Social pressure and control restrict women's actions and relationships with men in the workplace. For Nazan, one of the difficulties of working in the garment sector was being labelled a 'bad' woman if a woman has close relationships with men: "People assume that there is something between you and him when they see you close to a man in the factory" (Nazan, 33/W/F). She told me that she had fought with some women in her section because they had called her a "slut". Similarly, Sevgi refrained from having close relationships with men: "There is Ali *abi* in the cutting section. He is a good person. We get along well. He sometimes gives advice to me. But I cannot talk to him much because I am afraid of gossips" (Sevgi, 32/W/FW). In sum, due to the social control exercised by women through surveillance and gossip, women do not feel free to make friendships with men. In other words, women's relationships with men are also restricted by women in the workplace. Ong observes a similar situation among Malay factory women. She states that gossip is a powerful mode of social control enforced by women by idealising chastity and criticising others perceived to be 'easy', and works against their own emancipation (Ong, 2010: 191).

The social control exercised by women also restricts what women wear in the workplace. Women workers tend to judge what other women wear and control them in direct and indirect ways. One day at Grey, a woman worker in her late 40s/early 50s told me that she saw the young women high school trainees³⁸ as her daughters, and added: "I always advise them against wearing revealing clothes in the factory". Similarly, one day when I was talking to a young woman customer representative, she told me that she had been warned not to wear revealing clothes when she went to the assembly line department, 'for her own good': "This is why I wear jeans and T-shirts when I come here" she said. In these cases, the control over women's bodies is exercised under the guise of protection. However, this is not always the situation: while I was

³⁸ In Turkey, vocational high school students do a compulsory part-time internship in the last year of their education. Grey was one of the companies in which the students in garment-related departments worked.

working at White, Hatice, the forewoman, told me that a woman embroiderer (Nevin) was constantly criticising another embroiderer (Sinem) to her, saying: “Look at what she has worn today!” “Her breast is exposed!” “Her bottom is exposed!” Hatice thought that Nevin’s behaviour towards Sinem was hostile. Instead, she said, she (Hatice) warned Sinem about her clothes in a friendly manner. In short, women tend to judge and limit their fellow women workers in their choices of clothes, both in friendly ways under the guise of protection and in hostile ways.

My findings also support the claim of Ruwanpura (2011: 199) that the need to protect the “moral worth” of unmarried and unsupervised young women workers is a pervasive discourse in the garment industry in the Global South. This discourse results in direct forms of intervention in young women’s activities on the shop floor. One day at Cold, a 15-year-old Syrian girl was chatting to men operators and laughing with them. An older woman operator took her aside and warned not to behave ‘loosely’. The girl’s expression suddenly changed to a sad and serious face, and she stopped talking. Another time, when I visited the Star factory, I had lunch with workers. A forewoman that I met in the cafeteria told me that parents entrust their young daughters to her. She said she controlled the young women’s entry and exit times. “The other day, one of the girls’ boyfriends came to the factory to see her. She asked to take time off from work, but I did not give her permission. I allowed her to see him in front of my eyes”, she told me. She was proud of keeping young unmarried women under surveillance in the workplace. These examples suggest that the workplace is a space of patriarchal control and pressure and that the factories and ateliers “reproduce the same structures of oppression women often face in their private sphere” (Mezzadri, 2016a: 1889).

In conclusion, neither garment workplaces nor women themselves are free from patriarchal ideologies. This ideology leads the garment sector to be labelled as ‘immoral’ and women garment workers to be labelled ‘easy’ and ‘loose’. Being socialised by patriarchal thinking, most women blame other women ‘who act immorally’. Most women garment workers believe that (other) women tend to use their sexuality to work in more favourable conditions,

secure their job, be promoted or receive higher wages. Moreover, women's behaviours, dress, and relationships with men are carefully monitored and restricted in the workplace. My findings show that women garment workers are important agents of this social control. They judge and exercise control over their fellow women workers through gossip, surveillance and direct interventions, but do not apply the same standards to men.

6.4. Conclusions

Class cannot be reduced to economic relations; cultural and social phenomena are integral to the very existence of class and it is not a fixed concept (Thompson, 1979). Subordinate classes experience relations of production in their own particular ways (Wood, 1990). From this perspective, we see how garment workers experience class in manifold ways, and also in their shared feelings of unhappiness with their work and lives. There is a huge gap between the life they live and the life they desire to live. Being deprived of childhood because of starting work at an early age, working in poor conditions for low wages, and doing repetitious, draining tasks at work lead to a socio-cultural atmosphere characterised by feelings of suffering, misfortune, hopelessness and dissatisfaction. Workers manifest their dissatisfaction with the conditions of their existence by engaging in acts of self-harm, or listening to and identifying with *arabesk* music culture. Their negative self-image as "mental" people is rooted in this socio-cultural world.

Women garment workers from various ethnic identities are mostly rural-to-urban migrants, with low levels of education, and from low-income families. They start full-time work during their childhood to support their families in the city. Low household income levels and economic profile of husbands are the key drivers of their employment in the garment sector. For most women, their income is one of the main sources of household income and it is a necessity for the livelihood of their families. Their garment work appears to be permanent rather than temporary. Their entrance into the garment sector is determined by their socio-economic conditions and the characteristics of the garment labour market. Firstly, as garment work is mostly learned on the job, it does not require workers to have a formal education. Secondly, due to high

levels of informality, the sector is a natural destination for child workers. Lastly, the suburbs the women live in have traditionally been a labour source for the garment sector and most women find their jobs in the sector through neighbourhood, family and kin networks. Overall, the garment sector almost seems a necessary 'choice' for women.

Garment jobs and workplaces are heavily gendered in terms of division of labour, labour conditions, and everyday social life on the shop floor. Gender wage differentials between women and men doing similar work at the same level of qualification is more likely to occur in ateliers. However, there is also a gendered hierarchy in which 'men's work' is paid more than 'women's work' in factories. Ironing, cutting, warehousing, and shipping tasks in the factory are exclusively performed by men and paid more than other tasks performed by women in the same sections. Trimming, quality control, packaging and handwork are performed only by women, and usually older women with no previous work experience. These women are paid the lowest wages because of their disadvantageous social profile. In ateliers, the gendered division of labour shows itself especially in the reproductive tasks performed during work time. It is only women who regularly serve lunch, make tea, clean toilets, wash dishes, sweep and mop floors in ateliers. Notably, women workers are not paid for these reproductive tasks: women's reproductive labour at work is as devalued as their reproductive work at homes.

Patriarchal ideologies profoundly shape socio-cultural life on the shop floor. Patriarchal norms denying women close contact with unrelated men require women garment workers to keep their men colleagues at a distance. In order to avoid threats to their reputation, women use fictitious familial relationships in the workplace. They describe gender relationships at work as sister-brother relationships as this is a safer and more acceptable form of gender relationship as it de-sexualises their interaction with the opposite sex. Another significant problem arising from patriarchal norms is sexual harassment at work. In my sample, around 32% of factory and atelier women had experienced sexual harassment, and a further 37% had heard about or witnessed incidents of sexual harassment in the workplace. Women lack full

awareness of what constitutes harassment and do not have solidarity networks to stand and fight together. Victims also tend not to confide in anyone due to the social stigma created by patriarchy. The fear of getting a bad name prevents them from speaking publicly about sexual harassment and struggling against it. Thus, when and if sexually harassed, they usually act as if it never happened or quit the job. Patriarchal pressure and the risk of being subjected to harassment are higher for divorced and widowed women due to the negative image society attributes to them.

However, it is not only divorced or widowed women workers who are stigmatised as 'bad' women; there is a general public perception of women garment workers as 'loose' and 'easy'. Working for long hours with men, the presence of sexual harassment and the commonly believed existence of inappropriate relationships in the sector provide fertile ground for the reproduction of this negative image. The vast majority of garment women workers think that those who act immorally are responsible for this image and that women workers use their sexuality to promote their own interests in the workplace. For them, the 'bad apples' tarnish all women garment workers' image. Being socialised by patriarchal thinking, they condemn women who act 'flirtatiously' and differentiate themselves from these 'immoral' women in order to gain social respect. As such, they reproduce the dominant patriarchal norms in society which subordinate and oppress women.

As a result of their cooperation with patriarchy, women exercise social pressure on their fellow women workers. They directly and indirectly control and restrict other women's relationships with men, what they wear, and how they behave in the workplace. Gossip is a powerful tool of indirect control by women and the fear of being a subject of gossip and getting a bad name curtails women's freedom at work. Social control is sometimes exercised directly by interfering in women's choices and actions on the shop floor. Women's expectations of other women are shaped by patriarchal norms regarding women's autonomy and sexuality and consequently they reinforce their lack of freedom.

Having discussed the general traits of everyday life on the garment shop floor and how gender inequality and discourse shapes it, in the following chapter, I will extend my analysis to the social relationships among workers. I will examine workers' perceptions of the workplace, their social relationships at work, and the ways in which the combination of different ethno-cultural identities, the neoliberal labour regime and patriarchal norms shape intra-class and intra-gender relationships in İzmir's garment industry.

CHAPTER 7. CLASS AS A COMPLEX SET OF SOCIAL RELATIONS: INTRA-CLASS RELATIONSHIPS IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY

“Factories produce human beings. Never forget this!” (woman garment worker, 07/09/2015)

“Under capitalism, the production of commodities is simultaneously the production of the labourer” (Burawoy, 1979: 25).

In the preceding chapter, I discussed socio-cultural and everyday life on the shop floor and the ways in which patriarchal gender norms shape the organisation of work and everyday life in İzmir’s garment industry. In this chapter, I will further my analysis to include intra-class relationships, intra-gender relationships among women, and the impacts of ethno-cultural identities, the neoliberal labour regime and patriarchal norms. As I stated in Chapter 2, in this study class is understood as a complex social relation, not based only on a structural social location, but also shaped by experience. Class occurs as individuals live their productive relations and experience work and life within the total ensemble of social relations (Thompson, 1978: 150). From this perspective, it is crucial to understand how workers, individually and collectively, experience and understand their class location and condition, and the ways in which economic, political and cultural formations shape them. This Thompsonian approach to class as a process and lived reality of social life allows for the inclusion of workers’ own perspectives, and for an analysis of the interplays between class, ethno-cultural identities and gender.

I will begin by analysing social relations at work from the perspectives of the workers. I will discuss workers’ perceptions of the workplace and relationships with colleagues. Working in a labour-intensive industry, women describe the workplace as home and their fellow workers as family. However, this family discourse of unity among workers does not necessarily correspond to reality, and it is often challenged by the multiple differences across the working class. In the following section, I will analyse the impacts of different ethno-cultural identities on intra-class relations in the garment industry and illustrate the destructive effects of identity-based clientelism and discrimination against members of oppressed minority groups, namely Kurds,

Alevis and Syrians. In the last section, I will analyse the impacts of the neoliberal labour regime and patriarchal norms on intra-class and intra-gender relationships. I will argue that, in the lack of a broader, collective class and feminist struggle, labour informality makes workers compete with each other and maximise their own interests at the expense of their fellow workers, whereas patriarchal ideologies damage women's intra-gender relationships by fuelling personal competition and jealousy.

7.1. Workplaces Beyond Commodity Production

Factories and ateliers are not only places where commodities are produced; they are also places where social relationships are (re)produced. The production of things is at the same time the production and reproduction of social relations (Burawoy, 1979: 16). Workers are not only people working together to earn a living, they share a major part of their lives. Working in a labour-intensive industry, the relationships and social environment in the workplace gain a special importance for garment workers. As one said, "We spend most of our life with colleagues, not with our families." I heard from many women that if one does not get along well with her colleagues, it does not matter how much money she earns: she cannot work in such a work environment. For women, the social environment and social relationships at work are decisive in deciding to continue with or change a job.

Women place a great emphasis on working at a 'workplace that is peaceful'. By a 'peaceful' or 'good' environment, they mean relatively less competitive and with more respectful relationships at work. For instance, one of the main reasons why women at Grey did not want to leave was that they said that they had a peaceful environment in the factory, which they thought was hard to find in the garment sector. Damla, (29/W/FW), for example, had a one and a half hour commute each way, but she did not intend to leave Grey, even for a job closer to home: "I do not like changing jobs. [The social] environment and tranquillity are more important than money for me". Similarly, Sema said that she had sometimes thought of changing jobs, but never actually went through with it because she had been working at Grey for ten years and she was afraid of not finding such a good social environment

elsewhere.

Getting used to a workplace environment and fellow workers is crucial for women garment workers. Women prefer working with people that they know and in a social environment that they are familiar with. This brings reluctance to change employer and feeds the fear of losing one's job. According to Alev, a factory woman, the main reason behind women workers' silence about poor work conditions is the fear of not getting used to a new work environment. Hayri, (52/M/FO), a factory owner, corroborated this, saying that compared with men, it is harder for women workers to adapt to a new workplace: "Women workers do not want to change job once they get used to and like the workplace and have their circle of fellow workers". He was right. From my conversations with women, it appeared that women prefer to continue working in the same company due to the fear of not being able to find a good environment or getting used to a new one. Ruwanpura and Hughes (2016: 1279) similarly state that women garment workers are more likely to work at the same factory for longer in Karachi, Pakistan. In İzmir, the main reason behind women's fear of changing job lies in the complex power relations at work among garment workers, which I will discuss in detail later in this chapter. A new job means a new struggle to establish a position within workplace power relations and to be accepted by workers there. For instance, Kader, who had been working in the garment sector for 24 years since she was 13, said:

I have been here [Grey] for four years. You struggle a lot to get used to somewhere, and at the end you do. You do everything to make yourself accepted among others. Sometimes you think of quitting the job because of work stress or excessive overtime. But then you say to yourself, "Never mind. I shall continue working here. They [fellow workers] understand me, I understand them, and we get along well (Kader, 37/W/FW).

Moreover, there was a prevailing tendency among the factory and atelier women workers to describe people in the workplace as 'family' and the workplace as 'home'. Despite the many problems with their worklife, one of the shared positive experiences in women's narratives was 'being like a family in the workplace'. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, workers called each other 'sisters and brothers' in all the workplaces that I worked. This is in line

with Ong (2010: 188), who vividly illustrated how factory workers in Malaysia describe themselves as members of a single family.

Further, the use of fictitious familial relationships was not peculiar to workers. Almost all the employers I interviewed highlighted that they compared their workers to a family. When asked about how he settled problems with workers, Semih (49/M/FO) said, “They [the workers] burst into my room and tell me about their problems. I am brother to them.”. When asked whether there had been any strikes, Gamze (56/W/FO) replied, “No, it has never happened. We are like a family here. We solve problems face to face”. For Osman, the owner of Cold, his workers were like his family members: “Of course, sometimes problems occur [with workers]. But think, are there no problems in the family!? Even children have problems with parents. Spouses have problems” (Osman, 47/M/AO). When asked about her relationships with her workers, all of whom were younger than her, Leman, (28/W/AO), replied: “I see girls as if they were my daughters and I behave like an older sister towards boys”. Hayri stated that they tried to create a family atmosphere in the factory: “I see workers in the production space and we say hi to each other. We eat lunches all together, at side-by-side tables. They sometimes collect money to meet someone’s need and they come and ask me for money as well” (Hayri, 52/M/FO). The deployment of paternalistic language and fictitious familial relationships by managers and/or employers as a way to disguise class conflicts is not peculiar to Turkey but also present in China (Wright, 2006), Sri Lanka (Lynch, 2007), and India (De Neve, 2001).

The idea of belonging to a family usually gives a person a sense of security, as it suggests the presence of solidarity and unity among members. There were solidarity networks among workers, which were similar to familial forms of solidarity. For instance, workers at Grey took up collections when a colleague was in need of money due to the death of a family member, a serious illness, marriage, or unexpected expenses. This happened twice during my time at the factory. I heard many similar stories from others working in different garment firms. Solidarity networks among workers are not limited to financial support. They also collectively attend each others’ wedding ceremonies, baby

showers, family members' funerals, religious ceremonies held on the anniversary of family members' deaths and so on. In short, workers support each other in non-work-related personal issues.

However, being a family in the real sense involves many problems, contradictions, disappointments, and betrayals as well as solidarity and unity. Family "is a location where people with different activities and interests...often come into conflict with one another", as well as having strong emotional ties (Hartmann, 1981: 368). Being like a family in the workplace involves similar tensions to being a family in the real sense. For instance, although most workers said that they are like a family in the workplace, the number of fellow workers that they socialise with and show support to is limited. Workers, especially those working at large-scale companies like Grey, act in groups. This is less likely to occur in small-scale ateliers due to the small number of workers and low levels of differentiation of labour.

Some factors that band workers together in groups are working in the same section, being old or new in the company, being from the same hometown, knowing each other beforehand or having a similar political view. While sometimes all factors come together, sometimes just one factor might be enough to be a member of a group. As members of a group, they eat lunch together, spend breaks together, go out together, support each other at work, correct each other's faults in production, and act in concert when a collective position is needed in the factory.

Factory workers tend to form a group with those working in the same section and usually do not have much interaction with workers in other production sections. The relationships between different groups in the same section can be friendly/less conflicting or competitive/antagonistic. At Grey, the groups in the sewing section were an example of the first type. There were no clashes between the groups. I heard from different groups that they get along better with their own group members, but are not enemies of other groups. Even though there was no tension between the groups in the sewing section, they still talked behind other groups' backs and gossiped about their personal

lives or what they had done in the workplace. Yet, there were two groups in the quality control section, which were antagonistic to each other. The ostensible reason behind the clash between the two groups was being on the side of either the former forewoman or the new foreman. One group did not like the former forewoman because they felt she had discriminated against them, and took the new foreman's side. The members of the other group felt threatened by the new foreman and his closeness to the first group. During my work at the factory, the tension between these two groups sometimes escalated into verbal and physical fights. In those cases, the foreman and production manager resolved the conflict by talking to the members of each group, and warning them not to repeat such behaviour.

Women factory workers predominantly tend to and are expected to act in a group. When someone new starts work, after a while she usually becomes a member of a group. While working at Grey, I also felt pressured by workers to be a member of their particular groups. I always tried to approach all groups in the same way and to develop a relationship with all of them. However, this was unusual for them as everyone was expected to be a member of a group. While not being a member of any group was understandable to workers to some degree, getting along and spending time with all groups was not. Thus, it was difficult for me to get the right balance to engage across all different groups in the beginning. When I went out with one group for a coffee or dinner, other groups' members told me the day after that they had heard I was out, and with whom. Sometimes they gossiped about other group members and expected me to approve and support what they said. Sometimes they expected me to spy on others. In short, they tried to make me take their side and drag me into their power relations. However, this situation disappeared after a while when they understood that it was not going to happen. It was gratifying to me to hear from a woman worker during my last days at Grey that everyone at the factory liked me. She said that it was very unusual in this sector: "If someone likes you, others would automatically dislike you". With hindsight I can see that this enabled me to better grasp the sources and results of power relations on the shop floor and to include various perspectives from different workers.

Notably, despite the potential for fracturing class solidarity across multiple lines, acting in groups is not always necessarily to the detriment of working-class interests. It may also create potential for solidarity among group members against the management. Many times while working at Grey, I witnessed groups criticising management and taking a collective decision when needed. This is one of the main reasons why employers avoid hiring relatives or close friends together at the same time: it increases the risk of collective action by workers and the risk of labour 'instability' in production, which might cause serious trouble, especially in the sewing sections.

In sum, the relationships and social environment in the workplace is very important for women garment workers who spend most of their life on the shop floor with their fellow workers. Working in a peaceful work environment and with people that they know and get along with is key in women's decisions to continue working in the same company. From women workers' perspectives, their fellow workers are like a family and the workplace is like a home. In line with this discourse, they support each other on non-work-related issues, such as marriage, death, illness and so on. However, being like a family in the workplace also involves contradictions and conflicts similar to being a family in real life. Factory workers act in groups and do not have much communication with others in different sections. In the best case, the different groups in each production section remain distant from each other and only gossip and talk behind each other's back. In the worst case, they become hostile to each other, to the extent of verbal and physical fights.

Acting in groups is not the only factor that challenges and damages workers' discourse that they are like a family in the workplace. As I stated in Chapter 2, (garment) labour is not a homogeneous group. Class and other social relations are not separated but tightly interwoven. In the next section, I will look at the ways in which different ethno-cultural identities shape intra-class relations in the garment industry and examine the destructive effects of identity-based clientelism and discrimination against members of minority groups.

7.2. Different Ethno-cultural Identities on the Garment Shop Floor

As I showed in Chapter 6, garment workers are mostly rural-to-urban migrants from different ethno-cultural identities. İzmir, in general, and the garment sector in the city, in particular, have a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural social structure. The dominant ethno-cultural groups consist of Sunni Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Turks, Alevi Kurds and a growing number of Syrians. The dominant and hegemonic social group in Turkey is Sunni Turks. Being poor migrants, garment workers usually live in the suburbs in which a mixture of Turkish, Kurdish, and Alevi migrant families live together. When asked about their relationships with other social groups in their neighbourhoods, all the (*göçmen*) Sunni Turkish workers said that they had good relationships with other ethnicities, namely Kurds and Alevis. Kurdish and Alevi workers confirmed that they are not discriminated against and get along well with their neighbours from different ethno-cultural backgrounds.

Nevertheless, not all Kurdish people were welcomed in İzmir in the first years of migration. Damla recalled that when their neighbours had learned that her family was Kurdish, they started to keep themselves at a distance. Similarly, although they had acted warmly before, Nur's neighbours began to act differently and to insult Kurds when they found out that her family was Kurdish. Hatice said that her family with five children had slept at the train station for a week in the first days of migration because house owners would not rent to them because they were Kurdish. I heard many other stories, which corroborated the presence of discrimination against Kurds in the first years of migration. However, all these women said that they had become like a family with their neighbours over time. Different socio-cultural identities tend not to be a source of discrimination after long years of interaction. In other words, discrimination against minority groups seems less likely to occur in long-term neighbourhood relationships. Of course, this does not mean that there is no discrimination against minority groups in the working-class neighbourhoods in which families from different ethno-cultural backgrounds have been living together for a long time, but that it does not occur in direct forms as serious clashes, but rather in subtle forms.

Workers' intra-class relations are not isolated from the broader social relations that I discussed above. In line with the picture above, there are no significant clashes between different ethno-cultural groups in daily work life. It seemed from my observations and conversations with women that workers from different ethno-cultural backgrounds do not have serious problems with each other on the shop floor. Many women workers from different backgrounds told me that they, as people with different identities, are all like a family under the roof of the workplace. They said that they are all like brothers and sisters in the workplace and ethno-cultural identities are not a criterion for becoming friends. This was basically true. During my fieldwork, I witnessed many close friendships between workers from different ethno-cultural identities. My interviewees also confirmed this. All the Turkish, Kurdish and Alevi women told me that they have very close colleagues from other identities. Working together for long years, similar to being neighbours, gives rise to a potential for interaction between different identities and allows the overcoming of negative biases.

Nevertheless, despite this dominant peaceful and non-racist picture, there is discrimination against minority groups in the sector; this is mostly seen in subtle forms, although occasionally it may also manifest in more direct ways. Some of the Kurdish and Alevi interviewees said that they had felt discriminated against at least once in their work life, whereas none of the Sunni Turkish workers reported that they felt discriminated against in their work environments. The dominant form of discrimination seemed to be a sort of a disguised contempt, emerging in petty arguments between individuals. "You feel it, they look at you differently. You hear that they talk behind your back", the Kurdish and Alevi women said. In general, insults are not directed at individuals, but at the social group they belong to: "They make insinuations, rather than saying something directly to your face. They insult Eastern [read Kurdish] people and then say: 'Kader, take no offence'. But, of course, I feel offended as I am from the East as well", said Kader (37/W/FW).

Discrimination sometimes takes more direct forms as a way to interfere in what workers can or cannot do on the shop floor. One day while we were on

break at Grey, a close colleague of Kader told her to stop watching the Kurdish dance video that she was watching on her mobile phone. When Kader said, "What is the big deal? I like Kurdish dances", she replied: "Stop. I have an 'allergy'." Similarly, Esin, a Turkish woman, told me that the forewoman of the quality control section at Grey never allows them to listen to Kurdish music on the radio: "She changes the radio channel when a Kurdish song is broadcast. For me, humiliating Kurdish music is also humiliating those people" (Esin, 50/W/FW). Similar cases occur at ateliers as well. The experience of Hasret, a Kurdish woman, in the workplace was illustrative of the discrimination at ateliers. She said that one day her employer decided to ban listening to Kurdish music at the atelier and to fire the Kurdish workers who had been listening to it, after receiving complaints from other workers. Thereupon, Hasret met him and defended the Kurdish workers: "You say music is universal, but when it comes to Kurdish music you ban it! I do not accept this", she said to him. When she threatened to leave in solidarity with the sacked Kurdish workers, the employer backed down: "I was a forewoman there; he could not find another person like me. He had to back down" (Hasret, 32/W/AW).

While working at Grey, I personally experienced discrimination because of my Kurdish identity. On one of my first days at the factory, I was on a break with a group of women. They first asked me where I was from, and then, if I was Kurdish. I told them that, yes, I was Kurdish. After a couple of days, when at a coffee house with the same group, one of them asked if I was one of the 'good' or 'bad' Kurds. I was offended and answered: "What do I look like?" to which she replied, "How can I know your inside?" She was aggressive, and the dialogue ended at that point. There were two other Kurdish women at the table, and they remained silent during this dialogue. In Turkey's recent history, 'good Kurds' refer to those who approve state-based Turkish nationalist hegemonic discourse, whereas 'bad Kurds' refer to those who support pro-Kurdish political parties and claim their identity rights. After a couple of days, Alev, a Kurdish-Alevi woman that I was close to, warned me not to say again that I was Kurdish. She said that some women workers were gossiping about me, saying that I was a member of a terrorist organisation [read PKK]. There were three instances

that could have led to their conclusion. Once, I had remained silent rather than supporting them while they were celebrating the acts of state security forces and human rights violations in Kurdish cities.³⁹ On a second occasion, I had told them about a story I read in the news, of a mother keeping the dead body of her ten-year-old daughter in the fridge during the clashes in Şırnak. On a third occasion, I was considered too courageous and confident in declaring my Kurdish identity. However, I should note that this did not prevent me from getting close to workers, probably because there was no tension between us after these episodes, and probably with time they became convinced that I was not, after all, a terrorist!

It appeared to me that discrimination is more likely to occur against Kurds who are supporters of pro-Kurdish political parties and reject the Turkish nationalist hegemony of the state. One occasion⁴⁰ at Grey illustrates the type of discrimination that can occur against this group. In Turkey, people stand in silence every 10th November, at 9.05 am to commemorate the anniversary of the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. Grey was no exception. Everyone stood in silence apart from two Kurdish women and a man. While the women remained seated, the man went to the toilet so as not to take part. However, their behaviour was not accepted as free choice. On the contrary, it was associated with being a 'separatist' or 'traitor'. These three people were taken to the management room and scolded by the supervisors and the production manager. Many women mentioned this event during the interviews; they condemned the workers involved, associating their act with support for the PKK. No physical fight or big argument happened, but many workers gossiped about these workers and kept their distance.

Further, as I discussed in Chapter 5, Syrian refugees have become a significant part of the workforce in garment ateliers. In all the ateliers I worked, Syrian workers spoke their first language among themselves and listened to songs in their own languages. Middle-aged and elderly Syrians were less likely

³⁹ For the United Nations' report on human rights violations in the region, see UN (2017).

⁴⁰ This occasion happened when I was on a break at the end of my first month in the factory. Almost all the women that I interviewed after the occasion described it similarly.

to speak Turkish and to socialise with Turkish-citizen workers. Younger ones could speak Turkish and had closer relationships with non-Syrians. All atelier workers ate lunch together around the same table and during lunch breaks, child/young Syrian workers socialised with their Turkish citizen peers in the workplace or in the neighbourhood.

There was no explicit discrimination against Syrians at the ateliers. Most Turkish-citizen workers had an inclusive class perspective towards Syrian refugees; they were both just trying to earn a living. Their shared struggle to live by selling their labour power was seen as binding them together in the same class. Based on interviews and conversations with workers, it appeared that atelier workers were more likely to be biased and hostile towards Syrian workers in the first years of migration which started in 2011. However, many Turkish-citizen workers said that after learning Syrian workers' personal stories and about the war conditions back in Syria, they began to empathise with them and even started to help them. However, this does not mean that there was no discrimination against Syrians at all, but again it was subtle rather than overt and consisted mostly of keeping their distance from or despising Syrians. Many atelier workers thought that the presence of Syrians was eroding wages in the sector and some workers told me that they would rather not have Syrians living in Turkey and working in the garment sector. Middle-aged workers were more likely to discriminate against Syrians than younger workers.

Furthermore, belonging to the same ethno-cultural identity seems to be the main source of clientelism at factories and ateliers. Almost all factory and atelier women reported that there is identity-based clientelism in the garment sector. For example, at Grey, the forewomen in the sewing section were *göçmen* (Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria). I heard from many operators that *göçmens* were working in better job positions because they bestowed privilege on each other. "Göçmens are either employers or supervisors. They are shrewd. They protect each other", a woman operator at Grey told me one day. Similarly, Sevgi thought that the same forewomen gave higher wage increases to *göçmen* workers and also approved their leaves of absence more easily. Asya, a Sunni

Kurdish woman, said that the foremen in the factory in which she had previously worked were Alevi and protected Alevi workers, turning a blind eye to their faults. Hasret, a Kurdish forewoman, admitted to protecting and supporting Kurdish workers in the atelier. According to Zuhail and Ceylan, Syrian workers also protect each other by covering for each other's mistakes in production and shifting the blame to non-Syrians.

All these examples illustrate that ethno-cultural identities significantly shape intra-class relationships and the experiences of garment workers on the shop floor. All ethno-cultural groups tend to support their own group members, especially when they are the majority in the workplace or hold managerial positions. However, I believe that the solidarity within these groups carries a potential for collective action. These intra-group solidarities may serve to further the class interests of workers when these groups participate in collective organised actions. If some of the group members believe in and participate in labour struggles, they can organise other group members thanks to existing intra-group bonds. Notwithstanding, in reality, this solidarity is usually exercised at the expense of other ethno-cultural groups. In other words, in a context where collective labour resistance is missing, identity-based solidarity results in clientelistic behaviour that can also fuel unrest among workers.

The sources, forms and results of power relationships among workers are not limited to those discussed above. I will now examine the destructive effects of the neoliberal labour regime and patriarchal norms on intra-class relationships and power relations on the shop floor.

7.3. Intra-Class Relationships under the Neoliberal Labour Regime and Patriarchy: Competition or Solidarity?

The logic of production relations is embodied in daily life on the shop floor and the experiences of the working class. The relations of production and the lived experience of those relations cannot be separated from one another (Burawoy, 1979: 17). In this sense, the neoliberal labour regime in the garment sector causes fierce competition and lack of trust among workers. More

precisely, precariousness of jobs, labour discipline, poor working conditions and the lack of organised class power make workers compete with each other in order to secure jobs and better their working conditions at the expense of fellow workers.

Everyday life on the garment shop floor is marked by prevalent complex, dynamic and intricate micro power relations. From the perspectives of workers, working in the garment industry is difficult and hard, not only because of poor working conditions but also because of the uneasy, competitive social relationships at work. There was a common belief among workers that people in the garment sector try to *ayağını kaydırmak* [get one over on each other]. I heard from many women that “You have to defend yourself in this sector. Otherwise, everybody bullies you”. They believe that they have to be a strong person in the sector because if they remained passive others would abuse and take advantage of them. In most cases, the bullying means having to work harder than others, doing more stressful/unpleasant tasks and staying at the bottom of the employment ladder. Sevda, for instance, said that she had always been bullied in her work life because she was a quiet [passive] person: “For example, there is a job to be done. Others say that they cannot do it, but you say I can. They defend themselves, but you cannot. So, they always bully you” (Sevda, 36/W/AW).

Intense work pressure and harsh labour control is one of the reasons for competition and conflicts among workers. As pressure on workers to work faster and more accurately increases, competition and unrest among workers intensifies. During my work in the ateliers, for instance, workers argued with each other about who was working the fastest when there was work to be completed by the end of that day and the employer put pressure on them to work faster. On the other hand, since labour discipline is harsher and work pressure is higher in the factory context, competition and unrest is likely to be higher among factory workers. For example, competition based on the number of pieces produced in a certain amount of time is more likely to occur in large-scale factories because workers are assigned production targets. Pressures to meet production targets usually result in conflict between workers. At Grey, for

example, sewing machine operators doing the same task were assigned the same production targets and were not remunerated for pieces they produced above the target. However, as I stated in Chapter 5, the management had told workers that wage raises were going to be determined by their performance, and the number of pieces processed was a significant measure of their performance. Thus, because producing above the target could bring higher wage raises, promotion or job security, some workers were competing to produce more. Sometimes women argued about handing in more than the targets at the end of the workday and some complained to me about women who worked through during lunch breaks to produce more than others. “When you ask ‘why did you give a high number?’ she says ‘Oh! I was not aware of it’. In fact, she does it on purpose to be better than you” (Sevgi, 32/W/FW).

As Burawoy (1979: 70) states, the organisation of work structures conflict and confrontation among workers. In this sense, working on an assembly line fosters tension among factory workers. One worker’s mistake on the assembly line means more work and pressure for others. When one worker cannot keep up with the pace of the assembly line, others have to wait for them. In such cases, they get stressed about completing the assigned number of pieces and start to argue with their colleagues. Thus, the pressure from the management to produce faster makes workers exert pressure on each other. In other words, pressure comes not only from the management but also from fellow workers.

Low wages in the sector also stimulates conflict among workers. The wage difference between workers working in the same section (usually around 10-15%) is an important source of competition. One day at Dark, sewing machine operators were stressed about getting the required number of garments completed by the end of the day. Work stress led to tensions and arguments among operators about who was working harder. Melek said to a young Syrian worker: “You are getting more money than me. Work harder!” Moreover, due to the competition for wages, workers tend to keep their salaries secret or to lie about them, often at the behest of the management. Emine, for example, told me that she did not share her actual salary even with her closest

friend in the factory because the forewoman had told her to say TL 50 less than her real wage. The production manager at Grey openly told me that it was a management policy. When he gave me the list showing employees' wages, he warned me not to share the information with any of the workers because they did not want workers to know each other's salaries. Atelier workers were similarly told not to share the details of their salaries with their fellow workers.

The length of work experience in the workplace is another source of power relations among workers. As Burawoy (1979: 103) observed, seniority provides workers with a stronger position on the shop floor. Senior workers usually think that they deserve to get higher wages than new workers. On the one hand, many workers from different workplaces complained about being paid a similar amount of money to those who had just started working there. On the other hand, workers commonly believe that long-service workers are hard on those who are newly recruited. Many women said that established workers in the workplace bully new workers, acting as if new workers know nothing about the job. "It is common, especially among sewing machine operators. They look down on new workers", a man worker at Cold told me. Because of this situation, women think that one must assert herself in a company when she is new. "Old workers do everything to get rid of new workers so that they could be the best one and employers be in more need of them", said Zuhail (39/W/AW). The main reason behind the tension between old and new workers is the fact that the competition to be promoted and the risk of job loss increase as the number of workers doing the same task grows.

The fear of job loss arising from the widespread precariousness in the sector fosters competitive individualism among workers. The garment job is characterised by a master-apprentice relationship because it is mostly learned through work experience. However, I heard from many workers that experienced workers in the sector refuse to teach their job to anyone else because they are afraid that these workers would supplant them in the workplace. Furthermore, some workers said that some people deliberately teach their job incorrectly in order to be the best in the workplace. Many women said that they had had a difficult time learning the job from experienced

workers who did not want others to acquire their skills. From the perspective of senior workers, it could be dangerous to their job security to be well disposed towards others in this sector. For example, Hatice had sworn not to teach anyone her job after she heard that her friend had been fired and replaced by a new worker to whom she had taught the job. Thus, workers' reluctance to teach their jobs to newly employed colleagues stems from the fear of losing their jobs.

Further, most women complained that garment workers tattle on each other to supervisors or employers. While working in the Dark and White ateliers, I witnessed many cases of workers complaining about their colleagues to employers. The grounds for complaints were working slowly, speaking to other workers, wasting time with mobile phones, or taking long toilet breaks in the course of production. Many women complained that garment workers fawn over employers or supervisors for their personal interests, that is, in order to secure their place in the company, to get higher wages or be promoted.

Unsurprisingly, this fierce competition leads to distrust among workers and a negative self-image. Most women described garment workers as two-faced. A phrase that I heard from many workers was, "They [garment workers] smile to your face, but talk behind your back". For example, the forewoman of the quality control section in Grey thought that Eda was trying to get her position by telling everyone that she had worked as a forewoman before. "She [Eda] seems a good person, but she is very sneaky," the forewoman told me. Similarly, Sevgi thought that people in this sector are dangerous and malevolent. She said that she had been betrayed many times by colleagues whom she had trusted:⁴¹ "Now, I am sceptical of everyone in the workplace. I do not know what they really think about me" (Sevgi, 32/W/FW). During one of the tea breaks at Grey, I asked a group of women whether there were collective actions against the management or the employer about the working conditions in the factory. They told me that there is no unity but rather competition among workers. This idea was not peculiar to Grey employees. The view that garment

⁴¹ Betrayals she was talking about were both about her private life (telling her secrets to other workers) and work life (stealing better job positions that were going to be offered to her first).

workers are competitive and overambitious was dominant among many workers.

As Burawoy (1979: 81) puts it:

The constitution of the worker as one among many competing and conflicting others masks their common membership in a class of agents of production who sell their labour power for a wage, as distinct from another class of agents who appropriate their unpaid labour.

As a result of this constitution, workers tend to measure their work speed and quality against others. During my participant observation and the interviews, many women complained about doing harder tasks, producing more, or working longer hours but getting the same salary as others or not being rewarded for their efforts. When asked about injustices done to workers in the sector, women mainly referred to having unjust working conditions in comparison with their fellow workers. Rather than complaining about employers or general poor work conditions in the sector, they tend to complain about not having better work conditions than their colleagues.

The articulation of the neoliberal labour regime and patriarchy has particular impacts on women's intra-gender relations on the shop floor. When asked about women-to-women relationships at work, almost all factory and atelier women said that women are jealous of each other. In almost all interviews, it was the first thing said to describe women's relationships in workplaces. According to them, women workers compete with each other and try to be better than anyone else. Indeed, the neoliberal labour regime makes all workers individually compete against the others. The negative impact of labour informality and the various labour control mechanisms mentioned above also damage women-to-women relationships. As in the case of general intra-class relationships, the most commonly cited sources of competition among women were struggles to get higher wages, be promoted, work more comfortably or secure their positions at work.

However, the neoliberal labour regime is not the only factor behind the damaged intra-gender relations among women workers. For example, when asked about relationships between women and men on the shop floor, none of

the women mentioned the presence of competition between women and men. When I specifically asked whether there was any competition between women and men workers, many said that it was very rare and unlikely. Furthermore, being overambitious and jealous was specifically attributed to women workers, not to men workers. Most of the women thought that women are jealous of each other and do not want other women to be in a better position. However, this assumption does not accurately reflect reality. As I illustrated above, although there were conflicts and competition between women workers regarding assigned targets, promotions, wages and/or work speed, there were also acts of solidarity, which I will illustrate in the following pages. The negative self-image of women garment workers as purely competitive and jealous of one another is definitely a partial, patriarchal way of interpreting reality.

The roots of women's negative self-image lie in patriarchal thinking, which they were socialised in and which they have internalised. Patriarchal thinking causes women "to see [them]selves as always and only in competition with one another for patriarchal approval, to look upon each other with jealousy, fear and hatred" (Hooks, 2000: 14). It creates hierarchy and imposes competition on women to gain respect in society. The stereotype that considers women as jealous and their own worst enemies is widely accepted and reproduced in society. This further strengthens and normalises negative assumptions about women (garment workers).

Furthermore, due to patriarchy, women workers compete because they occupy the same social position, and so, possess similar social power. Also, the gendered division of labour in production fosters competition between women. Since workers doing similar tasks in the same section are mostly composed of the same gender, women measure themselves against other women and compete with them to have better working conditions. Their speed, quality of work, and work conditions are more likely to be compared with those of other women, not with those of men.

However, it is important to note that the intra-class relationships and negative self-images of workers analysed above should be assessed in the

context of lack of unionisation or labour organising. Unionisation rates are very low and there are no other forms of collective labour action in İzmir's garment industry. From interviews with labour union representatives, I learned that Deri-Teks has around 700 member workers, Öz İplik-İş around 700-800, Teksif 480 and Disk-Tekstil around 200 member workers in İzmir, compared with the total number of registered garment workers of 37,819 in 2016 (SGK database). Moreover, as I stated in Chapter 3, a labour union is only authorised to conclude a collective labour agreement if more than half of the workers in a company are members of that labour union. Given the legal barriers, out of 2,175 registered companies in the city in 2016 (SGK database), Deri-Teks and Öz İplik-İş were authorised to conclude a collective labour agreement in only one company each, Teksif in three, while Disk-Tekstil did not have authority in any company.

Table 12: Labour Union Statistics in İzmir's Garment Industry at the Time of Fieldwork

	Approximate number of labour union members	Number of companies with which they are authorised to conclude a collective labour agreement
Deri-Teks	700	1
Öz İplik-İş	700-800	1
Teksif	480	3
Disk-Tekstil	200	0

Source: Author's own calculation based on the interviews with the labour union representatives.

Therefore, competitive intra-class relationships and workers' negative perceptions of their fellow workers should be understood as part of the weak class power and lack of organised collective actions. As Thompson (2013 [1963]) states, class is a dynamic process. This is why class relationships and perceptions change in other contexts; for example, when workers organise around their class interests and participate in the collective struggle against the class of bourgeoisie. This also applies to women-to-women relationships. The women workers' relationships on the same shop floors would be different if they had collectively organised and fought against the forms of the patriarchal and capitalist forms of oppression and exploitation.

However, it would be misleading to consider intra-class relationships and women's intra-gender relationships in the garment industry as composed of only competition and conflict. There were individual or group-based acts of

solidarity among women workers. One day when I was on a lunch break at Grey, a group of women were talking about a woman worker who had been on sick leave for a while. The management had asked these women to testify that she had not returned to work after her sick leave was over. However, since they did not want to cause her dismissal, they refused to testify. While working at Grey, I also observed that some operators helped and supported each other when, for example, one had made a sewing mistake, by repairing faultily sewn garments during breaks. The story that Suzan recounted during her interview confirmed my observation: "One of our colleagues had a problem with the management. In fact, the source of the problem was not her, but the sewing machine. Then, we stood together and told the management that her fault is our fault" (Suzan, 40/W/FW). These forms of support and solidarity, which are shown towards one person, are more likely to happen within group members.

There were also more collective acts and 'everyday forms of resistance' among workers. As Scott (1989: 5) argues, everyday hidden acts of resistance are "the most vital means by which subordinates classes manifest their political interests". From this perspective, the decrease in the birth rate and the rise in the number of divorces can be read as acts of resistance to the capitalist discipline of work (Federici, 2012: 97), or the persistence of subsistence farming among sub-Saharan African women can be read as a protest against the commercialisation of agriculture and the separation of agricultural producers from the land (Federici, 2012: 128). At the point of production, for instance, high labour turnover and high rates of absenteeism among garment factory workers in eastern Sri Lanka are examples of workers' resistance to everyday shop floor life (Goger & Ruwanpura, 2014: 15). Similarly, supposed 'spirit possession' episodes, surreptitious attacks on factory machines and crying among factory women in Malaysia can be read as tacit acts of resistance and protest against labour discipline and male control at work (Ong, 1988, 2010).

In İzmir's garment industry, in the factory context, the most important form of everyday hidden resistance against managerial domination was slowing down production. At Grey, women workers slowed their speed while the textile engineer was calculating production targets with a stopwatch. Everyone

secretly warned each other when the engineer started counting pieces. Slowing down production speed was required to be done collectively as workers were working on the assembly line and a steady production pace was expected to be evident. Many women said that, apart from a few, the operators were running the job at low speeds, and trying to give similar numbers in order to prevent the management from implementing higher production targets. “If you hand in more than the target, they ask you to produce more”, many women told me.

Moreover, as I stated in Chapter 5, workers were supposed to stick bar codes on a sheet to show the daily number of processed garments at the end of the workday. However, sewing machine operators did not always stick all their bar codes on the sheet on days when they exceeded the target, instead keeping some in reserve so that they could work less intensely on other days yet still, on paper, meet their targets by using their hoarded bar codes. Further, those doing the same task sometimes shared bar codes with others who could not meet the target. These examples illustrate that despite competition and conflicts between women, they sometimes support each other against management pressures. There were also examples of open resistance among factory workers against management attempts to increase the expenditure of labour. One day at Grey, the management told all operators to sweep their working area every day during the 45 minute lunch break, before eating their lunches. However, the operators collectively refused, saying that the lunch break was already short and the management backed down.

Building on Scott’s theoretical approach, Katz (2004) refines the conceptualisation of resistance by teasing it apart into three different forms of social practice: resilience, reworking and resistance. She states that we need to distinguish social practices “whose primary effect is autonomous initiative, recuperation, or *resilience*; those that are attempts to *rework* oppressive and unequal circumstances; and those that are intended to *resist*, subvert, or disrupt these conditions of exploitation and oppression” (Katz, 2004: 242). Resistance draws on an oppositional consciousness to confront and redress some conditions of oppression and exploitation (Katz, 2004: 251), which we see in the examples above. Resilience acts are those where people act in their own

interests, try to 'get by' but not to alter the conditions of oppression and exploitation (Katz, 2004: 244-247). In this sense, workers' workplace choices and desire to do overtime to earn extra money can be seen as examples of resilience. Reworking usually involves the explicit recognition of problematic conditions and alters the conditions by offering focused and pragmatic responses to them (Katz, 2004: 247). Some practices of workers were part of their attempts to 'rework' the conditions, such as praying in the workplace. Although they were not allowed to pray at Grey, some workers took turns praying secretly in the changing room because some prayer times fell during working hours. Six of the 20 women in my sample prayed in the factory. All the workers in the assembly line department were aware of and respected this, cooperating tacitly.

Similarly, in the sample production and sewing sections, workers collectively 'reworked' the labour conditions by, for example, opposing doing overtime after they had been doing overtime for an extended period; in such cases, the management and workers negotiated and reached a compromise. Workers also acted collectively when there was a problem regarding the food service or transportation provided by the employer.

In small-scale ateliers, collective labour action is less likely to happen. Since there is no assembly line in ateliers, workers slowed their individual production speed when employers were not present. In other words, resistance in ateliers is mostly compromised of individual actions. Some atelier workers reported instances of reworking such as acting collectively to change the food service or the start/end time of a workday (but not the actual hours). However, atelier workers tend to solve their problems individually with employers. The main reason behind the lack of collective action in ateliers is the higher job insecurity and less labour protection as I discussed in Chapter 5. Atelier workers both face more difficulties in creating solidarity networks and potential for collective action due to short-term employment and are more afraid of losing their job in case of collective action because of higher job insecurity. Moreover, as workforce numbers are low in ateliers, the

replacement of atelier workers (except high-skilled operators) is much easier should there be a collective struggle against employers.

In the case of home-based women workers, there was no collective action against middle-women or main firms. As I stated in Chapter 5, home-based women workers do not even know which firm they work for and their supply of work is highly dependent on middle-women. These are serious obstacles to their organisation and the individual characteristic of the work adds to these obstacles. However, solidarity among themselves was stronger than factory and atelier workers. None of the home-based workers mentioned the presence of competition or tension: on the contrary, they helped each other when one was not able to finish embroidering before the deadline. Since home-based workers generally live in the same neighbourhoods, they can come together on short notice and finish production all together. All women workers said that they had learned the job from other women workers around them. For instance, Esma, a middle-woman, was grateful to the women in her neighbourhood for teaching her how to embroider and organise production. One reason behind stronger solidarity among home-based women workers is that they have known each other for years as neighbours or relatives and already have close relationships: their relationships do not begin in the workplace as fellow workers. Another significant reason is the lack of harsh labour control at the point of production and the lack of a formal employer-employee relationship in home-based production. Because, in most cases, middle women are their relatives and/or neighbours, home-based women workers are less likely to fear being fired. Moreover, competition would bring no promotion or improvement in employment benefits, such as social insurance, paid annual and sick leave, severance pay and so on; their job is already insecure and totally informal.

In sum, the neoliberal labour regime and patriarchal ideologies damage intra-class and intra-gender relationships among garment workers. Intense work pressure, harsh labour discipline, job insecurity, and poor working conditions lead workers to compete with each other and seek their own benefits at the expense of their fellow workers. Working on an assembly line

and being assigned production targets fosters tensions and conflicts between factory workers. With the lack of collective labour struggle, workers tend to exert pressure on fellow workers to work faster and without mistakes, avoid teaching new workers, keep their wages secret, and tattle on each other to supervisors or employers in order to increase their job security, get a higher wage increase, be promoted, or work with less pressure. Consequently, most factory and atelier workers regard garment workers as competitive, overambitious and unreliable, and colleague relationships in the sector as pragmatic. Further, due to being socialised within patriarchal norms, women attribute negative attitudes, such as jealousy, over-ambition and gossiping to women, but not to men workers. Due to the gendered division of labour in production, occupying the same social position, and being socialised within the patriarchal stereotypes of women, women tend to have an over-generalised negative stereotype of themselves. However, intra-class and intra-gender relationships do not only consist of fierce competition, but also of acts of solidarity and everyday forms of resistance. Factory workers sometimes stand together to support their group members against the management, to circumvent management attempts to increase the expenditure of labour in production and to resist managerial domination by slowing down production. Due to the lack of assembly lines, higher job insecurity and higher labour turnover in ateliers, atelier workers tend to resist sporadically and individually. For home-based women, there is no collective action against the middle-women or main firms, but there is relatively stronger solidarity among themselves than among factory and atelier women. Nevertheless, none of these acts of resistance and solidarity amounts to a long-term organised labour struggle. Instead, they aim at limited tacit gains.

7.4. Conclusions

This chapter, as well as the previous one, applied a Thompsonian class analysis to İzmir's garment industry in practice. In line with the main theoretical frame, these chapters have illustrated the interrelations between material and social life. They have explored the specific ways in which garment workers experience and understand their class location and condition and the

ways in which other forms of social oppression (i.e. gender, age, migration and ethno-cultural identities) shape class experiences. While the previous chapter shed light on the general traits of socio-cultural and everyday life on the shop floor, this chapter has focused on the intra-class and intra-gender relationships in the industry.

This chapter has illustrated that as a result of working in a labour-intensive industry and spending most of their lives with fellow workers, the social environment and relationships at work are very important to women workers. Women tend to continue working in the same company once they get used to the social environment and have their own circle of fellow workers. From the workers' perspective, the workplace is like home and the people at work are like family. In line with this discourse of 'being like a family at work', they show solidarity with and support each other on non-work-related issues such as marriage, death and illness. However, being like a family at work involves similar problems and tensions to those encountered within real families. Workers, especially those working in large-scale companies, act in groups and do not have much interaction with other groups on the shop floor and this creates a fragmented social environment in the workplace. While this usually manifests in social distance in daily work life, it sometimes causes antagonistic tensions between groups.

Other factors leading to fragmentation and conflicts among workers are identity-based clientelism and discrimination against members of oppressed groups on the shop floor. İzmir's garment industry has a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural workforce, the main ethno-cultural groups being Turks, Kurds, Alevis and Syrians. Ethno-cultural identities substantially shape workers' experiences and intra-class relationships on the shop floor. In general, there are no big clashes between these groups in daily work life. Living and working together for many years has made it possible for workers to reduce pejorative biases about oppressed identities and to develop close relationships with people from different socio-cultural identities. However, shared class experiences and years of interaction do not necessarily replace hostility with anti-racist culture: there is discrimination against Kurds, Alevis and Syrians in garment workplaces.

While this discrimination mostly takes subtle forms (such as remaining distant and/or despising or insulting the social group as a whole rather than single individuals), it sometimes takes direct forms; for example, Kurdish workers have had their actions restricted in the social work environment. The most explicitly discriminated against group of workers are Kurds who support pro-Kurdish political parties and reject the Turkish nationalist doctrine of the state. Moreover, people from the same ethno-cultural identity tend to bestow privilege on each other and protect their own people against other identity groups. All ethno-cultural groups (Turks, Kurds, Alevis and Syrians) tend to support workers from the same identity at the expense of other workers, especially when they are the majority in the workplace or hold managerial positions. As well as carrying a potential for collective action, identity-based solidarity appears to be a source of fragmentation and clientelistic behaviours and lead to conflicts among workers in the lack of collective labour struggle.

The neoliberal labour regime and patriarchal ideologies are other significant factors that damage intra-class and intra-gender relationships among garment workers. Conflicts intrinsic to class and patriarchal societies divide workers in general and women workers in particular. The fear of losing one's job, low wages, strict labour control and the lack of organised class power make workers compete with each other in order to secure their positions, get promoted, receive higher wages or work with less pressure. Working on an assembly line and being assigned production targets stimulates conflicts among factory workers. Job insecurity and poor working conditions lead workers to exercise pressure on fellow workers to work faster without mistakes, avoid teaching their jobs to new workers, keep their wages secret, or tattle on each other to supervisors or employers. Thus, there is a lack of trust among garment workers who have a pejorative image of their fellows as competitive, overambitious, and two-faced. Notably, women mostly attribute these pejorative stereotypes to other women workers but not to men. Being socialised by patriarchal thinking, occupying the same social position, and working in a gendered division of labour, women tend to compete with each other and describe fellow women garment workers as jealous of each other.

However, it is worth noting that these competitive intra-class and intra-gender relationships and women's negative perceptions of their fellow workers are present in the absence of collective class and feminist struggles. In other words, these are not fixed but dynamic processes that would change with a process of collective organised struggles.

However, intra-class relationships, in general, and intra-gender relationships of women, in particular, do not only consist of competition and conflict. Even if there is no collective class struggle directed against the class of bourgeoisie, there are acts of solidarity and resistance among women workers. Factory workers sometimes act together against managerial domination to support their group members or to circumvent management attempts to increase the expenditure of labour in production. Both factory and atelier workers act collectively in demanding improvements in the services provided by the employer. Atelier workers tend to resist work pressure individually due to the lack of assembly lines, higher job insecurity and higher labour turnover in ateliers. Among home-based women workers there is relatively stronger solidarity than among factory and atelier workers, although there is no collective action against middle-women or main firms. Overall, the acts of solidarity and resistance, however, are aimed at limited short-term gains rather than radical long-term collective gains.

In the last three chapters, I have focused on women's paid work and explored the ways in which it shapes their conditions of existence well beyond work. However, since women continue to work at home and their paid work is tightly interwoven with their reproductive work, the analysis so far is not sufficient to fully understand women's work and life experiences, nor how they interplay. In the following chapter, I will examine women's reproductive labour and the ways in which productive and reproductive work shape each other.

CHAPTER 8. DOMESTIC AND CARE WORK – WHOSE WORK? : WOMEN GARMENT WORKERS’ REPRODUCTIVE LABOUR

In the previous three chapters, I have analysed women’s paid industrial work, intra-class relationships in İzmir’s garment industry and the ways in which women experience and understand the material conditions of their work and life. However, the picture that I have painted until now is incomplete and insufficient to grasp women’s class experiences and the role of their labour in the perpetuation of capitalist organisation of production. Women carry the double burden of reproductive and paid work since they are still primarily responsible for reproductive work in the family as well as participating in the labour market. Women garment workers are not only exploited by employers in the workplace, but also by men in the home. It is crucial to consider women workers’ productive and reproductive work together, for they are interwoven and cannot be separated from one another. The problems of women as wage labourers cannot be grasped without considering their subordination in the family (Hensman, 2011: 22; see esp. Pun, 2005; Wright, 2006; Kusakebe & Pearson, 2010; Ong, 2010; Schling, 2014; Mezzadri, 2017). In this chapter, in pursuance of the main aim of this study, I will analyse women’s unpaid reproductive labour in the family, how women understand and feel about their reproductive labour and the relationships between their reproductive and productive work.

In the first section, I will provide a general picture of women’s reproductive labour and the unequal division of labour at home. As I will demonstrate, women spend most of the time and energy they have left after they finish their paid work on housework and care work. Throughout the section, I will discuss and provide the main aspects of reproductive labour. In the second section, I will represent and analyse women’s opinions and feelings about their reproductive work and the unequal division of labour at home. I will argue that rather than seeing it as ‘an act of love’, women are unhappy with and angry about the existing division of labour, and believe that it is unfair to them. In the third section, I will focus on the interplays between productive and

reproductive work. I will specifically look at the limiting effects of women's reproductive work on their garment work and the ways in which women's unpaid reproductive work subsidises the capitalist organisation of work. In the fourth section, I will discuss the significance of what I term the 'women's reserve army of reproductive labour'. In particular, I will show that the limiting effects of reproductive work on paid work are mitigated thanks to the unpaid labour of women relatives. In the last section of the chapter, I will focus on women's life beyond paid and unpaid work, and their future expectations and dreams. As I will demonstrate, women have little time, budget or freedom for their own pleasures. Their hopes and dreams rest on their children rather than on themselves.

8.1. Productive and Reproductive Work Together: The Unequal Division of Labour at Home

"I wish there was a magic wand for working women that would clean the house in a second."
Married woman worker, 41, White Atelier

The conceptualisation of women's reproductive labour in the family is a crucial concern for our understanding of the relation between production and reproduction. Reproductive work is more than a list of domestic tasks to be performed. In fact, it is better understood as a series of processes, rather than a series of tasks, which are inextricably linked and often operating at the same time (Schwartz Cowan, 1983). It involves organisation, management and supervision, and thus requires mental and emotional, as well as physical labour. However, the mental and emotional dimensions of reproductive work are rarely acknowledged (Eichler & Albanese, 2007: 231). In my research, I use the term *reproductive labour* in its broad sense, encompassing both housework and care work, and including their organisational and emotional aspects.

When I explained the main question of my research to women workers, their common response was that "Women's work never ends. You go home after work, but there is more work waiting for you at home". Domestic chores and care work were the most common reasons why women refused interviews: they simply did not have the time. When I was working at the factory and ateliers, women workers complained almost every day about the domestic

work that they had to do after getting home. Some had left dishes unwashed, some had not cleaned the house for more than a week. They were not ashamed or reproachful. They understood each other as they had similar problems: it was a normal part of their lives. "Do you have food for dinner today?" they asked each other at the end of every workday. If they had cooked the night before or there had been food left over from the previous night, they were happy; if not, they were stressed. This illustrates that the work stress of women garment workers is not limited to their paid work. As Elson and Pearson (1981) argue, women's stress not only arises from low wages or long working hours, but also from the pressure to ensure family survival under these conditions.

During my fieldwork, I focused on the division of household labour in routine housework, which is characterised as 'women's work' and must be done daily, and in care work, such as childcare, care for the sick and elderly, emotional support and so on. Regarding regular housework, cooking was the most time-consuming and tiresome task that women workers were stressed about. Married women garment workers went into the kitchen to prepare dinner for the family shortly after they got home. When I went to the women's houses to do interviews, we either prepared food that they had cooked the night before or cooked together. After having dinner, we cleared the table and washed dishes and then began the interview. Male family members, when present for the meal, with only one exception, did not participate in any of these tasks.

Beyond cooking, there are many domestic chores waiting for women on workdays, such as dishwashing, tidying up the house, washing clothes, ironing, etc. Continuing to work at home, women, especially married women, barely have time to rest, let alone have fun and spend time with their families. They go to work more tired rather than rested the next day. "You get tired at work the whole day. You go home, but you get even more tired at home" (Kader, 37/W/FW). All women thought that being a worker was more difficult for women than men because:

You go home in the evening. It is 10.30 at night if you do overtime. What is the first thing you think of: What should I cook? You have no time for sitting down, resting,

having a chat with your husband, watching television or reading a newspaper. I have longed for these all my life (Alev, 40/W/FW).

It [being a worker] is more tiring for women; it cannot be compared to men's jobs. Men get tired at work as well, but they have a chance to rest at home. He lies down and says: "Bring my tea!" But you are not like him. You have to work at home as well, although you're dead tired. You cannot say, "I will not do it". You have to. It is a heavy burden on women (Handan, 38/W/FW).

All outside [paid work], home [housework] and children together... But there is nothing to do. You have to endure it. Imagine – I stand on my feet the whole day due to my job; I am a quality controller. You want to go home and lie down, but it is impossible. You go into the kitchen as soon as you come home. I spend at least one and a half hours a day in the kitchen (Aliye, 36/W/FW).

As I explained in Chapter 5, factory and atelier women workers usually do not do overtime on Sundays. However, in fact, they work much harder on Sundays. That is why married factory and atelier women looked stressed on the last workday of the week: they were telling each other about the domestic tasks that they had to do on the weekend. Many women told me that they were busier on Sundays. For example, Alev (40/W/FW) said, "I am up at seven on Sunday mornings as well. I prepare breakfast, vacuum, mop the floors, wash the clothes, and cook dinner... You lose track of time. I have no luxury to rest". Similarly, Sevda (36/W/AW) said that she hated Sundays, because:

You wake up and prepare breakfast. Then, you start cleaning. When you finish cleaning, you go to the market for shopping. It is already evening when you return home. My Sundays are wasted with housework. I get more tired than on workdays.

Women workers' housework is not limited to the activities that they perform in their own homes. Married women workers also do domestic work for both their natal and husbands' families. Nazan said that she does cleaning and ironing almost every weekend for her natal family. Handan told me that she is tired of and bored with doing housework in her relatives' houses, whenever she visits. Similarly, Aliye said that she does not want to go to her mother's house because she is expected to do domestic work each time she goes there. Arzu complained that her husband's parents expect her to serve them whenever she goes to their home, or they come to her house. Thus, my finding supports the argument of Eichler and Albanese (2007: 248) that housework is not only performed in one's own home, but also in someone else's home.

When we look at the division of labour at home, we see that it is exclusively women who assume primary responsibility for household chores. Of the 50 women workers in my sample, 18 reported that the men in their households never contribute to housework. This figure corresponds to around 28% of factory and atelier women, and about 38% of home-based women. These women reported that their husbands/fathers or adult sons/brothers do not do any domestic work at all, not even occasionally: "He [husband] wants me to stir his tea" Nazan (33/W/FW) said. Fatma told me that her husband does not even go to the kitchen to get water, but asks her to bring it.

Thirty-one of the 50 women workers reported that their husbands or fathers 'help' with housework, but none of them share tasks equally or do housework on a regular basis. The range and frequency of men's domestic work differs. For instance, Kader's husband only mops floors very rarely, Nurcan's ex-husband used to only do shopping, and Aysun's ex-husband rarely used to help vacuum. Eleven women out of 31 said that their husbands (eight) or fathers (three) never do any cleaning, but sometimes repair something at home or help with cooking. Among those who help with cleaning the house, the husbands of two women (Hayat and Arzu) never hang clothes on the balcony or clean the balcony and windows so as not to 'disgrace' themselves in the neighbourhood.

Moreover, there are specific conditions under which those men do housework. Seven women mentioned that their husbands help only when they cannot complete all the housework by themselves. Ceylan, for example, said that her husband only helps her by preparing a meal when she has other domestic chores to do and does not have time to cook. Seven women stated that the men in their families help them with domestic chores only if they are too exhausted or sick and there are no other women at home. For example, Bahar reported that her husband had helped her with housework in the first months of her pregnancy. Another circumstance in which men do domestic chores is women's engagement in excessive overtime work. Nine factory and atelier women reported that their husbands cook or clean the house when they are working overtime, but if they are at home their husbands do not do domestic work. Women also reported that husbands may take on domestic work upon

retirement if they (the women) are still working outside the home. Reyhan told me that her husband had started to do some housework after he retired. Similarly, Eda’s father had started to cook on weekdays after retiring, because both she and her mother were working outside. “When he [her father] was working too, it was always my mother who cooked after coming home from work”, Eda (35/W/FW) noted.

Table 13: Men’s Share in Housework in Women Interviewees’ Households

Never do any housework	18
Sometimes ‘help’ with housework	31
‘Shares’ housework	1*

*discussed below (Hazal)
Source: Author’s fieldwork.

Table 14: Circumstances in Which Men Help with Housework in Women Interviewees’ Households

When women do not have enough time because of other housework	7
When women are too exhausted or sick	7
When women are working overtime for long hours	9
When women work outside but men are retired	3

Source: Author’s fieldwork.

As seen above, what ‘help’ is given by men is conditional and very limited. None of the 31 women said that the men in their family do housework as their daily responsibility or even regularly. Women have to ask and tell men what to do and how to do it. Thus, it is again women who plan, organise and monitor housework. Planning and organisation is a significant but usually overlooked part of reproductive work. In fact, it requires a lot of mental work, which is mostly invisible. Given their busy work lives, factory and atelier women need to plan and control household chores from work to keep their families functioning. Men usually just follow orders with less effort. Women reported that the men of the family only carry out housework if they want to, and as a favour. As a result of appropriating women’s labour, they secure an overall standard of living for themselves, which is significantly higher than that of women (Kynaston, 1996: 225).

There was one exception out of the 50 women who reported on the division of household labour between spouses: Hazal. When I went to her home to interview her one Sunday evening, her husband was cooking dinner. He also

made coffee for us when we finished the interview. When asked about the division of labour at home, Hazal told that she does housework “together” with her husband: “If one of us vacuums and washes clothes, the other mops and washes dishes” (Hazal, 51/W/AW). She emphasised that she and her husband share housework equally. However, it had not always been like that: “He was doing nothing before. All the housework was on my shoulders. Then, we both retired. [Then they decided to work again as their pensions were not enough to survive on.] I got work but he could not find a job. He started to do housework afterwards” (Hazal, 51/W/AW). Thus, what made a more equal division of labour at home possible was the fact that the husband did not have paid work outside the home while Hazal did. Moreover, when asked which, if either of them, was more responsible for reproductive work: “Yes, I am. I am the only one who takes care of the children”, Hazal replied. She had two adult sons. At the time of the interview, her 28-year-old son had been in jail for more than ten years but was allowed home visits for limited time periods, as he would be released soon. The other son was 24 and lived with them:

I took care of all of the needs of my children. Their meals, cleaning, education, financial issues, problems, health...everything! It was always me taking them to hospital or taking time off from work for their teacher meetings. They [sons] still want everything from me. It is still only me who prepares their meals or irons their clothes if I am home (Hazal, 51/W/AW).

Thus, although it seemed that there was an equal division of labour between the spouses at first glance, it was not the case. This leads us to another important aspect of reproductive work: childcare. All of the women with children stated that they raised their children mostly on their own. In the same way, all young unmarried women reported that without exception their mothers had taken almost all the responsibility for them and their sibling(s) when they were young. Almost all of the women with children also said that their husbands are not involved in their children’s physical needs, such as feeding, personal cleaning, dressing or health problems.

However, care work is not limited to meeting physical needs and it is not just a small extension of housework. It involves close personal and emotional engagement (Folbre, 2006), and the development of a relationship between the

carer and the person being cared for (Himmelweit, 2005: 5). Care refers to both caring activities, such as feeding and bathing, and caring feelings, such as those of concern or affection on the part of a caregiver (Folbre & Nelson, 2000: 129). Regarding the mental and emotional aspects of care, it was again women who took care of children's personal development, problems, education, and job or marriage issues. These tasks consume large amounts of time and huge emotional and mental labour. Elif (36/W/FW) said, "Never mind taking care of children's personal cleaning or food, he [husband] does not even take them out. I always tell him to take the children to a cinema or theatre, but he does not". Zuhail said that she had got divorced because: "He [ex-husband] was treating the house like a hotel. He was always at *kahvehane*⁴² after work. He used to come home to eat and sleep. He was not interested in our children at all" (Zuhail, 39/W/AW). Sevda said that her husband does not even know the names of the medications that their daughter has to take. Besides, as seen in Hazal's case above, childcare is not limited to small children but also extends to adult children (Eichler & Albanese, 2007: 232). For Hatice, a 48-year-old married woman, it was exhausting to be the only person taking care of her daughters' (aged 17 and 23) emotional situations, school or financial problems.

Only 11 of the 35 women with children said that their husbands (or ex-husbands) had helped or were helping with childcare. However, this 'help' was also conditional and very limited, as with housework. For example, the husbands of Nazan and Sevgi only help children with their homework when their wives are not capable of doing so. Elif, Derya and Hazal all stated that their husbands only look after their children if they are ill and their wives are at work. Ceylan, Havva and Berivan reported that their husbands watch the children while they, the women, are busy with domestic work.

Women workers' care work also includes care for sick family members, whether children or parents. If their husbands do help, the women have to organise and monitor the care. I met two married women workers, one at Grey,

⁴² *Kahvehane* is the name given to the traditional coffee houses in which men gather and spend time together drinking tea and coffee, playing games, watching football matches and listening to music.

whose mother had cancer, and one at Cold, whose father was paralysed. These two women visited their parents' houses almost every day, doing domestic chores and providing personal care; they made sure that their parents took their pills, washed them and made them exercise. Similarly, Bahar said that on days when her mother has an epileptic seizure she always goes to her parents' house after work, does the personal cleaning of her mother and cooks for the family. In short, as with housework, women also perform care work out of their own homes.

In addition to their own parents, married women are also expected to assume responsibility for the care of elderly parents-in-law. As Himmelweit (2005: 3) notes, the perceptions of who is considered in need of care, and who should provide the care and how, are shaped by social and personal norms. In Turkey's social structure, brides are usually expected to be hard workers (Dedeoğlu, 2011b: 33). They are often expected to assume the same responsibilities as the blood daughters of parents. This increases the reproductive workload of women and causes more pressure and stress. In my sample, five married women were currently living with their husbands' parents and nine had lived with them in the past. However, women are expected to look after their husband's parents even if they do not live together. For example, Canan, a 46-year-old divorced woman, said that when she was married, she had to regularly clean her parents-in-law's house and cook for them because her mother-in-law was sick. Esma looked after her mother-in-law for a couple of months every year. It was always Ceylan who took her mother-in-law to hospital and stayed with her each time she was hospitalised. Similarly, Hazal had looked after her sick mother-in-law in her [Hazal's] house for eight months: "I was working back then, too. I used to prepare her food and put it on the table the night before" (Hazal, 51/W/AW). None of the husbands of the women in my sample had taken care of their own parents. As Kynaston (1996: 231) says, men "discharge perceived familial obligations through the medium of their wives' labour, rather than their own labour".

In the light of the discussions above, women's reproductive work in the family can be conceptualised in four main aspects: on the basis of *forms of work*,

types of labour, receivers of work and places of work. Firstly, reproductive work includes two forms of work: *housework* consisting of routine domestic tasks, such as cleaning, cooking, dishwashing, and ironing, and *care work* involving a direct involvement with another person, such as childcare, care of the sick and/or elderly people, and emotional support. These two forms of work cannot be separated from one another as they are usually performed simultaneously. Secondly, reproductive tasks require different types of labour. I use the phrase to specify the different labour types involved for the two forms of work. Although physical labour is the most visible type of labour, both housework and care work involve physical, mental and emotional labour and these different labour types are by no means isolated from each other. Thirdly, receivers of women's reproductive work are not limited to their household members. As indicated above, women also perform reproductive work for the well-being of extended family members. Lastly, reproductive work is not only performed within the women's own homes: it is also performed in relatives' homes or public places such as hospitals.

My findings also support the argument that I put forward in Chapter 2 that women's participation in public industry (Engels, 1972 [1884]: 137-8), or in "common productive labour" (Lenin, 1965 [1919]: 43), is not a way forward for women's liberation. Working in the garment industry means more work and more exploitation for women, as they are still primarily responsible for reproductive work in the family. In other words, women are not only exploited by employers in the garment industry, but also by the men in their families.

As I argued above, women's reproductive work is not only physically demanding and wearing, but also mentally and emotionally demanding and wearing. Meleis & Lindgren (2010: 744) note how "emotional costs of worry, overload, or one's sense of oppression" are significant aspects of women's reproductive work that should be taken into consideration. In the following section, I will discuss women's feelings and opinions about their reproductive work and the unequal division of labour at home.

8.2. “Men Have One Job, Women Have a Thousand”⁴³: Women’s Opinions and Feelings

Women’s experiences and perspectives of reproductive work revealed several significant discussions and arguments that the reproductive work literature engages with. A common feeling that women expressed refers to the fact that carrying out reproductive work is not a free choice made by women but an obligation. The idea that women’s unpaid reproductive work is founded on freedom reinforces the devaluation of women’s work. Women are no freer than the wage-labourers who have to sell their labour-power to the capitalist to live, but are portrayed by capitalism as free to choose their own lives and make their own decisions. While it is the wage that masks the exploitation of paid workers in the productive realm, it is patriarchal gender norms and the assumed love among family members that conceals the exploitation of women in the reproductive realm. Also, since the wage relation between the worker and the capitalist recognises the work the worker performs, the latter can bargain and struggle around and against working terms and conditions (Federici, 2012). In reproductive work, however, the obligation relation is more obscured because there is no social contract.

Contrary to the representation of reproductive work as ‘free choice’ and an ‘act of love’, a clear majority of women (86%) in my sample stated that they do not like and do not want to do housework, but they have to. Only seven women out of 50 said that they sometimes enjoy doing housework, depending on their mood. When talking about their domestic labour, women referred to it in terms of a compulsory obligation, something that they had to do, not wanted to, many times during the interviews:

I do not want to do [housework] because I am already tired. [When I come back from work] I want to rest, go out, but I cannot. Your body is tired. Your brain is already tired. When you come home, you do not want to do anything (Kader, 37/W/FW).

I cannot say that I like doing housework. I do it because I have to do it, but not fondly (Handan, 38/W/FW).

I wish I had a cleaner (laughter). In fact, I do not want to do housework. I do it because I have to (Aysun, 40/W/FW).

⁴³ A Turkish saying that the home-based women workers in the first focus group mentioned.

I mean you have to do it because everything awaits you at home (sigh)... You are obliged to do it (Canan, 46/W/AW).

All the women in my sample described housework as hard, burdensome and exhausting. Further, many women underlined and complained about the repetitive and routine features of housework. This is why they usually described housework as boring. They find housework endless and 'ungrateful' because, in Sevgi's words, "It is like a toy. You wake up every day, do the same thing. You do it again and again. There is no end" (Sevgi, 32/W/FW). As Simone de Beauvoir (1956: 438) puts it, "Few tasks are more like the torture of Sisyphus than housework, with its endless repetition: the clean becomes soiled, the soiled is made clean, over and over, day after day." Being repetitive, endless and exhausting, housework is a source of unhappiness and dissatisfaction for the women I interviewed, as seen in the quotes below:

I do not like housework. I find it difficult, really very difficult! It is your home; you are doing it compulsorily. But I am fed up with it (Sultan, 45/W/FW).

Sometimes I find it very difficult [to do housework] (laughter). But you have to do it; you have no choice (Selma, 46/W/FW).

Housework is an ungrateful work because you do it today, tomorrow you have to do it again. But it is an obligation; you have to do it (Hayat, 33/W/HW).

Imagine you do the same things every day. You wake up early in the morning; get your children ready for school and your husband for work. Then, you start cleaning. Always the same things (Eda, 35/W/FW).

How shall I explain? I am bored of it! I have no strength left for it. It is always the same work. You do it, but it is same the day after. Then, you say to yourself "Let it be messy" (...) To be honest, I do not like [doing housework]. It is exhausting; it is always the same work. You get fed up (Reyhan, 55/W/HW).

I find it [housework] very draining. You come to the point that you have no strength left, you cannot think of anything due to fatigue (Hazal, 51/W/AW).

I wish I had an opportunity to hire someone for cleaning and cooking, so that I could spend time with my children, husband and friends (Hatice, 48/W/AW).

To be honest, I wish I had a cleaner (Melek, 41/W/AW).

Given their class positions and low-income status, none of the women in my sample could afford paid help for housework. As I illustrated in the previous section, there is a huge gendered unequal division of labour in the women's households and all of the women thought that this was unfair to them. During

the interviews, they got angry and upset while talking about it. From their point of view, men were selfish and irresponsible about domestic duties:

Imagine, I come back home in the evening. I feed them [her husband and two sons in their 20s]. They lie on the sofa and watch television after having dinner. I make tea, but they do not even bother to go to the kitchen to get their tea. Some days it drives me mad. I say to them "You work, but I work too. I am older than you. I am working until I go to bed, but you do not even get your tea." They say that I am right, but nothing changes (Esma, 48/W/HW).

When asked how they would allocate domestic duties between family members if it were up to them, all of them changed the current division of labour and allocated more equally. They wished that other family members, especially husbands, did more housework. When asked whether men are able to do all the reproductive work that women do, most of the women replied: "Of course, they are. They have hands, eyes as well, but they would not do it"; none of the women specified any particular skills needed to do reproductive work. Nor did any of them explain the patriarchal division of labour at home with reference to the nature of men or women; instead they referred to 'traditions'. For many, the main reason was the way parents raise their sons and the social norms that exempt men from reproductive work; they complained about the patriarchal thinking that constructs housework as 'women's work'.

However, I should note that the women's thoughts were not entirely organised but fragmented and sometimes contradictory. Some of them started conversations by reproducing patriarchal gender roles. For example, while Bahar was proud of her husband for helping her with domestic work, she stigmatised her brother as being *layt* [light]⁴⁴ as he had started doing housework, "even cooking", after getting married. Some women reported that men could not do certain tasks, such as cleaning the bathroom or mopping floors. Others told me that they advise their sons to do housework after getting married, in case their wives work or get sick. However, as the conversations continued and I expanded discussions with further questions, they began to challenge some of the patriarchal assumptions that they had expressed previously. As well as having been socialised in patriarchal thinking, these

⁴⁴ "Not being 'man enough'".

women had not systematically questioned or discussed any of these issues before, and they openly told me so.

Moreover, living in a strongly patriarchal society, women's expectations of men were limited. While criticising the existing unequal division of labour, most women stated that they wanted their partners to "help them more" with housework and childcare; only a few phrased it as "sharing equally". They either criticised or appreciated their husbands in comparison with other men in their social environment. Nine women stated that they were grateful to their husbands for helping them with domestic chores. They thought themselves lucky compared to other women, whose husbands never helped. Further, most women justified their demand for equal division of labour by emphasising that they worked outside the home just as their husbands did. "If we do men's jobs and work outside, men should do women's jobs as well", many said. Thus, women tend to defend themselves with the weapons of traditional patriarchy, which imposes the role of breadwinner on men and the role of home-maker on women.

However, there was one main argument that was underlined by all the women: "reproductive work is work". All of them claimed that housework and childcare are real work and in most cases, they expressed this argument without being asked directly. They were aware of the fact that working women do double work. "We do one [paid] job until the evening and do another job when we are back home. We cook, wash clothes, do ironing, look after our children. This is double work", Meral (33/W/AW) said. Similarly, according to Selma (46/W/FW), "Women work at home as well. What we do at home is work as well, such as preparing breakfast, doing cleaning". However, as Sevgi (32/W/FW) stated, "The work you do outside has a name, but the work you do at home has no name". Elif was angry about this situation: "I do not understand why domestic work is not considered as work. Imagine, if I leave these dishes here, they will stay here forever. But I clear and wash them up. This is work" (Elif, 36/W/FW). Many women argued that not only is domestic work 'work' just as much as garment work, it was often more exhausting. Without being

prompted, 18 women stated that domestic work is much harder than any paid work.

As I argued in Chapter 2, one reason why women's reproductive labour is invisible is the fact that there are no fixed working hours for house-workers. The intertwinement of working hours with leisure hours blurs the fact that reproductive work is 'real work'. What differentiates the reproduction of human beings from the production of commodities is the holistic character of many of the tasks involved (Federici, 2012: 123). It is difficult to differentiate women's leisure time from their work time in the house, because, as Fortunati (1995: 92) states, in housework, the working day tends to be the same as the duration of the day itself. Many women cited 'the lack of fixed working hours and fixed working tasks' as a reason why they thought being a (full-time) housewife was harder than being a garment worker:

Women are *emektar* [labourers]. Women get more tired with domestic work than with paid work. You have at least specific working and resting hours at work, but the work at home never ends. Housewives should be entitled to social rights as much as working women (Melike, 38/W/FW).

Being a housewife is more difficult than working outside. [When you work outside] you eat breakfast, start working, then you have a lunch break, tea breaks. But if you are home, you start to worry about domestic chores as soon as you eat breakfast: 'Should I clean the house? Should I prepare a meal for the children? Should I tidy up the house?' It is more difficult because there is no end. The work that you do outside ends at some point, but housework is everlasting (Handan, 38/W/FW).

For example, my mother [a full-time housewife] gets more tired than me. I have specific tasks to do at work, but she works at home more than me working at the factory (Sema, 28/W/FW).

Housewives get more tired than us because we have a certain task to do and have break times at work, but they do not (Eda, 35/W/FW).

Housewives get more tired than us because we focus on one task while working, but they do not have such a chance. They do many things at the same time. They get more tired than us, both physically and mentally (Melek, 41/W/AW).

You work from the moment that you wake up until you go to bed. Children, cooking, laundry, dirty dishes... These are all work. It is a very, very, difficult job (Helin, 25/W/FW).

The second significant reason behind the devaluation and invisibility of women's reproductive work is its unwaged condition. As Federici (2012: 16) argues, domestic work has been naturalised, rather than being regarded as work, because it has been destined to be unwaged. Unlike unpaid reproductive

work, paid work is based on the recognition of someone's labour, and it is paid accordingly as the only condition under which life under capitalism takes place. It is not naturalised or essentialised (Federici, 2012: 16). All the women in my sample responded positively to the question as to whether women should be paid and registered with social security on the basis of their reproductive labour: three women expressed this idea even before I asked. Many women gave the example of paid domestic workers who earn money in exchange for their labour, pointing out that women do these tasks every day in their own homes. Havva (35/W/HW), for instance, mused: "If you think about chefs, they are paid for cooking. Some people pay for ironing. But women are not paid for the same tasks". Women thought that women should be remunerated for domestic labour, the same as those workers who sell their reproductive services in the market.

Beyond remuneration, women put special emphasis on pension rights. They believed that women should be entitled to social rights as a recompense for their lifelong labour attending to the well-being of their families. As Hirway (2015: 8) suggests, the unequal distribution of unpaid work between men and women "violates women's right to social security as unpaid workers". It is one of the sources of women's dependency on men and resignation to patriarchal oppression. During interviews, women emphasised that housewives feel insecure because they get nothing in return for their labour and they have no security for the future. For them, pensions could make them feel secure and more independent. Just as the Wages for Housework Campaign rightly considered wages for housework to be a way to stand up to men, women considered pensions for reproductive work as a way to resist men and gain independence.

The third reason behind the invisibility of women's reproductive work is that it is attributed to their 'natural' capabilities and dispositions. The women in my sample objected to the patriarchal assumptions that associate women with caring and housework and see them as women's work, as their natural responsibility. Melike (38/W/FW), for example, said, "People consider domestic work as women's duty, but in fact, it is not. Women should be seen as

labourers". Meral was annoyed at the idea that women are obliged to carry out domestic work: "Why do we have to? Are we slaves?! Why should I have to clean a man's clothes, please him, take care of his children?! Is that why he wants to marry me? It is better if he hires a housemaid" (Meral, 33/W/AW). Hatice thought similarly:

Domestic work is considered as women's responsibility, but it is not. No woman comes into the world to do housework. I am not the only person living in this house. Everyone [all family members] uses this space, we dirty the house together. Why is all the work on my shoulders?! It is not just *my* children or *my* mother. Why I am the only one who takes care of them?! (Hatice, 48/W/AW).

Beyond being unremunerated, women's reproductive work does not receive appreciation due to its naturalisation. Many women complained that their domestic work is not recognised as important, but is constantly degraded by men: "Husbands say to us: "What did you do at home the whole day?! You are sitting down!" many women reported. They were fed up with not being appreciated and being constantly criticised by men in the family: "They do not like the meal you cook, the ironing you do. They always look down on you and underestimate your work". Kader gave an example involving her mother: "She has been a housewife throughout her life, she has never worked outside. She never sits down at home, always working. But you know what my father always asks her: 'What do you do at home all day?' (condescending tone)" (Kader, 37/W/FW).

The devaluation of women's work leads them to feel devalued as human beings. It dehumanises and objectifies them. Women reported that men make them feel lesser humans and more like objects – like a vacuum cleaner as Fidan said, or for Sevgi, a knife – by ignoring, underestimating or belittling their reproductive labour. As a result, women feel that their individuality and personality is undermined. The compulsory, repetitive and isolating features of domestic work add to the feeling of dehumanisation experienced by women. Consequently, it becomes one of the main sources of their unhappiness:

People treat women like a vacuum cleaner. 'Women should do the cleaning, do their duty in bed, always have a meal ready on the table, be good mothers to their children.' This is not humanity. Humanity requires treating people as human beings (Fidan, 38/W/HW).

Do you know what a woman is? It is an animal, an object. She is a maid at home, a woman in bed, a mother of children... You can use her as a tool for everything, like a knife, a nail cutter, or a screwdriver. She is that kind of thing. You can benefit from her meat and milk like an animal. A child benefits from her as his mother, a husband benefits from her as his wife, a mother-in-law benefits from her as she thinks a bride is a maid. Especially in the first years of my marriage, I was the maid of my mother-in-law, the wife of my husband, the mother of my children. I had no other life (Sevgi, 32/W/FW).

I should note that women's opinions and feelings regarding childcare work were very different to those about housework. As I illustrated above, women complained that their husbands do not take responsibility for their children. However, factory and atelier women with children usually experience feelings of inadequacy, guilt and sadness for not being able to look after their children properly. For most of them, one of the most common hardships of being a working woman was the inability to raise their children by themselves. In my sample, 10 out of 16 factory and atelier women, who had worked outside the home while their children were young, said that they wished that they had had sufficient household income to stay at home and raise their children. During the interviews, many of these women became emotional while talking about it. Long working hours, excessive overtime and the lack of enforcement of legal labour rights in the sector add to their inability to be present during the childhood of their offspring:

I did not witness my son growing up. I did not see him going to school. I feel regretful about these things. I did not see him in a school uniform. I took one week's leave from work when he started primary school. That is it! I did not see him in a school uniform ever again (Sultan, 45/W/FW).

I missed the childhood of my children. They became ill, but I could not look after them at home. I could not take them to and from school. They have grown up, I cannot believe it (Sevgi, 32/W/FW).

You cannot witness your children growing up. You cannot spend time with them. I feel deep sorrow and remorse for not being able to spend enough time with my son. This is the worst part of [being a working woman] (Zuhal, 39/W/AW).

Like housework, care work is not the 'free' choice of women. In general, people (usually women) do care work because they are assigned this responsibility by social norms on the basis of specific, gendered, kin relationships (Himmelweit, 1999: 29, 31). Folbre (1995: 76-77) talks about three possible motives behind caring labour: altruism arising from the pleasure derived from other people's well-being; long-term expectations of reciprocity of

either tangible or emotional services; and the fulfilment of a moral category of obligation or responsibility. As she states, these three motives shape each other and thus are interrelated and difficult to distinguish empirically (Folbre, 1995: 77). Irrespective of which motive(s) is dominant, unlike housework, women develop an emotional relationship and a strong sense of responsibility towards their children. Thus, working outside the home while children are growing up seems to be a heavy emotional burden for many women garment workers.

As I have illustrated so far, although women work outside or in the home to earn money, their primary duty continues to be keeping the house clean, feeding the family, and taking care of children, husbands and members of the extended family. Being primarily expected to be 'good housewives', women's reproductive work affects and limits their paid work life in different ways. I will now analyse the limiting effects of women's reproductive work on their garment work.

8.3. The Interplays between Reproductive and Productive Work

As I stated at the beginning of the chapter, productive and reproductive work cannot be separated from each other. It is not only because the unfree and unpaid reproductive labour of women is a precondition for capitalist development and maintenance of a capitalist society, but also because it shapes and limits women's productive work and employment conditions.

Firstly, reproductive work prevents women from working outside the home.⁴⁵ Childcare is one of the main obstacles to women's paid employment, as it is regarded as their primary responsibility. As I stated in Chapter 5, most factory and atelier women had started to work full-time at an early age, when they were still children. For those who had started at a later age, the main obstacle was childcare. In my sample, Suzan had started to work in the garment industry at the age of 37, Esin at 47, Hasibe at 27, and Canan at 41, because they had been looking after children until that time. Similarly, part-time working women and the women trimming threads at Grey were exclusively in their 40s

⁴⁵ Since the thesis focuses on women who currently work in the garment sector, it does not analyse women who had to quit their jobs because of their reproductive obligations in the family.

and 50s, and had only started to work outside the home a few years previously. When asked why, they reported that they had had no one to look after their children and could only start to work outside the home when their children were old enough to take care of themselves. Pun observed the same negative relationship between women's reproductive obligations and employment but in the other direction. In China, young women factory workers are compelled to leave their jobs around the age of 25, to get married and to "continue their labor by giving birth to sons and serving the patriarchal machine" (Pun, 2005: 184). Given that, patriarchal divisions of reproductive labour strongly condition women migrants' employment opportunities in China and contribute to their construction as disposable labour (Schling, 2014: 59).

Similarly, childcare was one of the main reasons why home-based workers could not work outside the home. Individual responsibility for childcare in capitalist society makes women particularly vulnerable to the oppressive conditions of home-based work (Vogel, 2013: 155). Given the high number of children per woman (an average of 3.14), they were unable to leave them with someone from the extended family. Furthermore, having children under school age prevents women from taking home-based garment work. One day, I went to the Limontepe neighbourhood to interview a home-based woman, but I did not find her at home. While I was waiting in front of the building, a young Kurdish woman, around my age and with two small children, invited me to her home which was opposite the building. I stayed for two hours at her house and two friends of hers joined us. They were a similar age, and had two and three young children. All were full-time housewives: they told me that they wanted to do embroidery from home but it was impossible since young children required so much attention. One of them said that she had previously done embroidery, but she had to stop after having children. The strict deadline pressure in home-based production that I discussed in Chapter 5 makes it harder for women with young children to do embroidery jobs. Thus, unpaid care work financially penalises women because it blocks the potential income to be had from working the same amount of hours but in a paid job (England & Folbre, 1999: 41). My findings are consistent with Himmelweit and Sigala

(2003) who found that having pre-school children prevents low-income mothers from taking employment in the UK.

For home-based women workers, garment work is more tightly intertwined with reproductive work; they are both full-time housewives and garment workers. They work at embroidering or stitching and engage in domestic work and childcare at the same time. As Hensman's study (2011: 219) on Indian women garment workers shows, the persistent interruptions of work by household tasks mean that women do less waged work, and so earn less, because the work is paid at piece rate. Moreover, since they do housework and look after children in the daytime, they usually do embroidery at night after they have finished doing reproductive work and family members have gone to bed. Many women said that they often work until the early hours of the morning. Thus, the total working hours of home-based garment workers are longer than factory and atelier women.

For factory and atelier women, reproductive work limits their ability to engage in overtime. As I stated in Chapter 5, overtime is one of the biggest problems for factory and atelier women workers and, given the choice, most married women prefer not to do overtime. When complaining to me about excessive overtime, many women referred to housework and childcare. Kabeer (2004: 16) similarly found that many married women workers in the Bangladeshi garment industry prefer to go home to attend to their domestic responsibilities rather than doing overtime. For married women, it is harder to keep or catch up with reproductive work when overtime is added to the already long standard working hours. I often witnessed factory and atelier women worrying about domestic responsibilities when the forewomen/foremen or the atelier owners told them to do overtime and their complaints to the management or employers always referenced not having enough time to do housework or take care of children. This also shows the structural blending between productive and reproductive activities in women's never-ending work schedule. They can make a trade-off between productive and reproductive time, but there is no trade-off to be made between work time and non-work time. On the other hand, being free from reproductive work, men workers tend not to

reject overtime: I never heard any factory or atelier men complaining about overtime. The main reason why men workers earn more than their working women counterparts doing the same task is the fact that men do more overtime than women.

Being unable to do overtime also restricts women's employment opportunities and workplace choices. It was one of the reasons why most atelier women could not work in factories. For example, Canan, a single mother, and Sevda, a married woman, told me that they could only work at workplaces that would not ask them to do overtime because they had no one to leave their small children with. Similarly, Zuhail said that she had always worked in ateliers mainly because she could not work in factories with night shifts because of her children. When asked if she would prefer to work in another workplace, she said that she would but could not:

I am working here because it is two minutes' walk from home. When I was working in Çankaya [the city centre], I was wasting a lot of time on buses. My sons were going hungry in the evenings, waiting for me to come home. But now, I am at home as soon as I finish working (Zuhail, 39/W/AW).

Similarly, Canan, who had started to work outside the home after getting divorced, said that she would prefer to work at a bigger company with more labour rights, but she could not:

My little son was five years old [when she had started to work in ateliers]. I had no one to leave him with. I had to work in the ateliers that were close to my home. He [her son] used to come to the ateliers and stay with me before he started school. I was sometimes going home for two minutes to check if he was okay. No employer would accept this. No one would allow my son to come to the atelier. What if he gets harmed in the atelier? It is risky for atelier owners. I am working here because Osman Abi [her employer] accepted me with my son (Canan, 46/W/AW).

Location is an important factor in the workplace choices of women workers. Atelier women usually live in the same neighbourhood as the ateliers they work in. This is not a coincidence, but an informed choice; working close to homes enables atelier women to spend more time on reproductive tasks. At Cold, Dark and Secret ateliers, many married women, especially those with children, often went home during the lunch breaks to do housework or to look after their children. Their houses, ateliers and children's schools were located in the same neighbourhood, within walking distance of each other. This made it

possible for them to reach their children if there was a need for them at home or school. Further, children came to the ateliers before or after school, sometimes to get pocket money, sometimes to spend time there. Ceylan, for example, said that she was working at Cold because it was within walking distance of home and the atelier owner allowed her children to come to the atelier. Her children came to the atelier every day after school, ate lunch together with the workers and then went home. Beyond routine childcare, women prefer to work close to their home in case their children have a special health care need. For instance, Zuhail, an atelier woman, stated that when her son had a broken leg, she had gone home a few times a day for a short time to look after him. Kusakabe and Pearson (2010: 29) similarly indicate that some Burmese women factory workers in Thailand leave their jobs when keeping their child with them is not possible or change employment to a factory where they can keep their child with them either in the factory or in the dormitory.

It is not only childcare but also care for elderly family members that prevents women from doing a paid job and limits their employment opportunities. In the case of home-based women workers, one main reason why they had never worked outside the home was the patriarchal imperatives that obliged them to look after their own and their husbands' parents. In some cases they even had to stop working *at home*; for example, Ayten had to stop doing home-based embroidery after seven years because she had to look after her elderly parents-in-law. She said that she started again after they died. Similarly, there was a woman operator in her 40s at Cold who said that she preferred to work at Cold because she was taking care of her sick father and her parents' house, her own house and the atelier were close to each other. She went to her parents' house almost every night and sometimes during the lunch breaks in order to help her mother with domestic work and her father's personal care.

Beyond overtime and workplace choices, care work also limits women's standard working hours and makes their paid work more precarious. In my sample, two atelier women, Ceylan and Sevda, were working half-days. Ceylan had two children of primary school age and stopped work at four o'clock every day because she had to look after the children. She said that she would prefer to

work full time with higher wages and social security, but there was no one she could call on to help with childcare. Similarly, Sevda could only work in the atelier when her nine-year-old daughter was at school. She started work after taking her daughter to school in the afternoon, and finished when her daughter left school.⁴⁶ As a result, these women's bargaining power with employers remains weak. Carswell and De Neve (2013: 67) observe a similar situation in the Tiruppur garment industry: some women workers seek flexible working arrangements to fulfil reproductive obligations, such as collecting water from the municipal taps or picking up their children from school.

The discussions made so far support the argument that I put forward in Chapter 2 that women's unpaid reproductive work in the family is crucial for the perpetuation of capitalism and the reproduction of society. As my fieldwork findings demonstrate, women reproduce not only their own existence and labour but also those of their family members. They ensure the maintenance of adults and raise their children to fit into the social structure. The capitalist organisation of work and the contractual labour relations of the free proletarians are built upon this non-free and unwaged labour of the houseworker (Mies, 2014 [1986]; Federici, 2012). Because this labour reproduces the worker's capacity to work and to be exploited, it contributes to the accumulation of capital and it is actually 'work' for capital (Federici, 2006). It would be impossible for capitalists to maintain profits without the unpaid reproductive labour of women, which reduces the wage costs paid for the reproduction of the capacity to labour. Women's unpaid reproductive labour also ensures the maintenance of society. As Folbre (2006: 189) says, it improves productive human capabilities and the well-being of the community as a whole. In other words, there is an inherent relationship and interdependency between reproductive and productive work, and between reproductive work and the maintenance of capitalism and society as a whole.

Beyond its central role in the perpetuation of capitalism at the macro level, women's unpaid reproductive work also subsidises the capitalist process at the point of production. Firstly, since women's reproductive responsibilities

⁴⁶ In Turkey, some state schools run on morning and afternoon shifts.

prevent them from working outside the home, it leads them to work from home and endure poorer working conditions (see Mezzadri, 2016b on Indian women garment workers). In other words, women's limited mobility arising from the unequal division of labour in the family allows garment firms to decrease their costs of labour and production. As I illustrated in detail in Chapter 5, home-based women workers work without any social benefits, for long and uncertain hours, for very low pay and with greater job insecurity. Moreover, by turning women's houses into workplaces, capitalists cut other costs of production, such as rent, electricity, and water.

Secondly, as their reproductive responsibilities lead some women to start working at a later age with no job experience, garment firms employ these women at the bottom of the job hierarchy with less job security and/or lower wages. In both factory and atelier contexts, those who were regarded as unskilled, paid the lowest wages (after child workers in the atelier context) and seen as more 'disposable' were the women who started garment work at a later age, mostly because of their prior childcare responsibilities. These women were working as helpers, trimming threads, or doing handwork. Moreover, the only group of workers who were employed part-time at the Grey Factory were housewives in their 40s and 50s who worked only when (and rarely at that) called upon. Thus, women's disadvantaged social position resulting from reproductive obligations turns into an advantage for the employer as they can employ this group more flexibly and with lower costs.

Finally, the main factor behind the atelier women's labour supply is women's reproductive obligations. As I showed above, there is a group of women who cannot work in factories because of excessive overtime, or have to work in ateliers close to their homes in order to provide either childcare or care for elderly family members. Moreover, some members of this group have to work part-time for the same reasons. This allows atelier owners to employ those women without implementing legal labour rights, for lower wages, and with the higher flexibility that reduces the risks of the unpredictability of demands.

Thus, women garment workers' reproductive and productive work is highly intertwined with regard to both women workers and capitalists. However, the extent of the interplay between productive and reproductive work cannot be fully understood by only focusing on women directly engaged in garment work. There is also the need to acknowledge what I define as the 'women's reserve army of reproductive labour' behind women's paid work. In the following pages, I will discuss the complex features of this reserve army.

8.4. Mothers, Sisters, Daughters: The Women's Reserve Army of Reproductive Labour

The gender division of labour within the household represents only a partial picture of the subjects and amount of reproductive work in the family. As, in the neoliberal era, it has become almost impossible to rely solely on a male breadwinner and more and more women have started to work for wages, housework and care work tasks within the working-class households have to be allocated among different actors beyond household members. Ehrenreich and Hochschild's (2003) edited book, *Global Woman*, provides comprehensive coverage of the international division of reproductive work in contemporary society. It vividly documents the extraction of women's reproductive labour from the Global South to the Global North and discusses the conditions and relations of (re)production on both sides (North and South, employer and 'care worker').

In the case of women garment workers in İzmir, however, the distribution of reproductive work usually does not happen between women and men or between women and paid (international) care workers, but between different groups of women whose reproductive work is totally unpaid. I define these women groups around women garment workers, who allow them to participate in the labour market and contribute to the well-being of their families by taking on some of their reproductive responsibilities, as the 'women's reserve army of reproductive labour'. Members of this reserve army are mostly women who cannot do a paid job because of the patriarchal norms and imperatives that restrict their autonomy. The relations of reproductive

work among these women are determined by kinship and neighbourhood networks.

As I illustrated in the previous section, childcare is one of the main obstacles to women's employment. Given the low wages in the garment sector, women cannot afford to pay for childcare. What enables women with children to work outside the home is the unpaid labour of women relatives. Atelier and factory women with children reported that they had started to work again when their babies were between one and two years old and that their mothers-in-law (9), mothers (6), sisters (3) or daughters (3) took care of the young children. Beyond my sample, I talked to many factory and atelier women with children about how they managed childcare. Their responses were no different. Their mothers, mothers-in-law or sisters were taking or had taken care of the children. In most cases, women workers and grandmothers lived close to each other in the same neighbourhoods, in some cases even in the same house. Unpaid reproductive labour provided by women relatives is not peculiar to Turkey. For example, Massey, Hahn & Sekulic (1995) state that having an older mother or mother-in-law in a household in which a single parent or both parents work outside the home, and especially if they have children, is typical among Yugoslav households. A study by Kabeer (2004: 17) on the Bangladeshi garment industry reports that women workers with young children usually leave the children with their families in the countryside or rely on older siblings or neighbours for childcare. Similarly, Kusakabe and Pearson (2010), and Pearson and Kusakabe (2012) show that the help from women family members regarding childcare is a significant factor that allows Burmese migrant women to work in Thailand.

Furthermore, grandmothers generally not only look after their grandchildren but also help women workers with domestic work. They clean or cook for women garment workers' families. Nazan, for example, told me that her mother-in-law does the bulk of the housework. Zuhail said that it had been much easier to work when she was living in the same building as her mother: "When I went home, she had already fed the children, and cooked dinner" (Zuhail, 39/W/AW). A woman operator at Grey said that her mother, who looks

after her child, also cooks dinner every night. “If she is not there to cook, we eat bread and cheese. I do not have time to cook meals”, she said.

Moreover, women workers receive help with housework from mothers and sisters even when they do not live in the same house or do not have young children in need of care. For example, Melek said that her mother and sister clean her house and cook for her family most weekends. Sultan stated that her mother, who lived in the same building as her, cleans her house and cooks some days of the week. Thus, beyond enabling women to work outside, the unpaid labour of mothers, mothers-in-law and sisters reduces the burden of reproductive work on employed women’s shoulders and contributes to the well-being of their families.

The marital status of women and the number of women in the household are important factors in the amount of housework that women garment workers do. While talking about the difficulties of being a woman worker, the first thing that married women workers mentioned was the domestic responsibilities on their shoulders and the difficulty in balancing garment work and their domestic responsibilities. However, it was not the same for unmarried women workers. Unmarried women thought that being a woman worker was good for them, emphasising that this was because they were single and living with their mothers. They talked hypothetically about the difficulty of doing productive and reproductive work together, as something waiting for them when they get married. Sema (28/W/FW), for example: “I am not married now. When I come home from work my dinner is ready, I sit down and everything comes in front of me. But if I were married, it would not be like that”. All unmarried women in my sample, except Emine, reported that they ‘help’ their mothers with domestic chores but they were not primarily responsible for them. Generally, they did not do housework on workdays but helped their mothers on Sundays. Only Emine regularly did most of the housework since she was the only daughter at home and her mother was old and too ill to carry out all the domestic chores.

In my sample, almost all of the unmarried women's mothers were full-time housewives. This made it possible for them to find the house clean and dinner ready when they got home. Thus, the unpaid labour of their mothers decreases the time that unmarried women workers spend on housework. Similar to unmarried women workers, divorced women living with their mothers spend less time on domestic chores as their mothers carry out the bulk of them. Consequently, women's access to free time is substantially determined by their marital status and the number of women (and daughters of 'helping age') in the household. When asked to list what they do in their free time, married women reported that they mostly do reproductive work (i.e. it was not free time), whereas unmarried women said that they rest, watch television, meet friends, or go out to have fun and do personal shopping. According to the narratives of married women, it was much easier to work when they were single and living with their mothers. Arzu, who had got married a year ago, explained her experience of the difference between being a single and a married woman worker:

It was not a problem to do overtime when I was single. When you go home, you can shower or go to sleep whenever you want. No one asks you why you are sleeping. But, it is not like that when you are married. For example, I wait until late for my husband to come home. You have to serve him, tea or food, whatever he wants... You have to clean for him. You do not have a mother who does the cleaning, washes clothes and dishes instead of you. That is all on your shoulders (Arzu, 27/W/FW).

Child labour is another significant factor determining the amount of time and energy that women spend on housework and childcare. Children, primarily girls, not only create housework but also perform it. Housework and care work is a significant but usually overlooked part of child labour (Montgomery, 2009; Lin & Adsera, 2013; Edmonds, 2003). In my sample, the sons of women tended not to contribute to housework or childcare. However, all the daughters had started to help their mothers with household chores when they were around 10 years old. In most cases, women workers' daughters regularly did a significant amount of the housework. Moreover, three factory and atelier women workers mentioned that their older daughters (aged from 13 to 16) were taking, or had taken, care of their younger siblings while they, the mothers, were working outside the home. Regarding home-based workers, their daughters similarly

bore a significant burden of housework and looked after their younger siblings, especially when their mothers had difficulty in meeting deadlines. In this way, women could spend more time on embroidery. Wilkinson-Weber's (1997: 56) research on women embroiderers in Lucknow's garment industry similarly reports that women's contribution to housework depends on the presence of daughters or daughters-in-law to whom they can delegate tasks.

The women's reserve army of reproductive labour goes beyond women workers' immediate families. It can be women neighbours or sisters-in-law who enable women to work outside the home by providing help with housework and care work. For example, Esma, a middle-woman, said that she was able to continue to work thanks to help from her neighbours when her husband had a broken leg: "When I was working outside the home, they [women neighbours] prepared meals and brought them to him" (Esma, 48/W/HW). Emine remembered that when her mother had been sick, her aunt-in-law had looked after her mother while she was at work. Similarly, Alev reported that she was only able to work because her sisters-in-law looked after her mother-in-law, who lived with Alev. Likewise, there were two sisters-in-law who worked at Grey and lived in the same building. One day when one of them was told to do overtime, she asked the other one to prepare dinner for her husband: they said that they regularly help each other when one of them does overtime.

In conclusion, the women's reserve army of reproductive labour supporting women garment workers is crucial to women's paid work. Being able to work outside the home or not, the amount of time and energy that women garment workers spend on reproductive work, and the well-being of women's families all depend on the labour provided by this reserve army. It is always women who take over reproductive tasks at the point when a woman worker has to leave. The reserve army of reproductive labour is a necessity for women garment workers to be able to participate in waged work, as they cannot afford to pay for housework and care work. In a broader sense, women's employment in poor work conditions requires the unpaid labour of 'women in general'. Thus, the exploitation of women's reproductive labour does not happen on an individual basis, but on a larger social basis. Capitalists lower the

cost of labour and men have higher living standards than women by taking advantage of the support networks among women. To put it differently, the capitalist labour regime depends on the exploitation of the unpaid reproductive labour of women as a whole, beyond that of those women who actively participate in the labour markets.

8.5. Realities and Dreams of Women Workers

After having shown women's intense labour behind the everyday reproduction of family members and its relations with their productive work, in this section, I will focus on women's life apart from paid and unpaid work, and their feelings and opinions about their future. The following questions are integral to the analysis of women's own reproduction: where do women garment workers spend their free time (if they have any), other than the workplace and home? What (if any) activities do they do for their own pleasure? Do they have any future plans? What are their dreams for the future? As I will demonstrate, the answers to these questions are shaped and limited by the conditions of their garment work and reproductive work which are determined by social relations of (re)production and patriarchal pressure.

Given the long working hours in the garment industry, women workers have little free time. The burden of reproductive work further restricts their time for personal care and leisure. As explained above in this chapter, being married and having young children increases the time and energy that women have to devote to reproductive tasks and, as a result, married women with children barely have time for pleasure. The most common activity that women workers do in their free time is visiting their parents. However, as I mentioned before, they usually do housework in their parents' homes too. Watching a movie or TV shows at home, going for a walk, attending weddings, or spending time on the Internet are other common activities that they do in spare time. Many married women with children complained about not having enough time to go out or socialise with their neighbours and friends. Earning low incomes makes it harder for them to spend money on going to restaurants or coffee houses. Moreover, factory women, who were the only group exercising the right

to annual leave, spend most of their annual leave looking after children and doing household chores.

In contrast, divorced or widowed women with older or adult children have more time for themselves. They generally go out with friends more often than their married peers. Most divorced and widowed women said that they meet their friends, go shopping or to the hairdressers on Sundays. In particular, those living with their mothers have more time for their own pleasure and unmarried women workers spend most of their free time on personal care and leisure; they usually go out on Sundays, meeting friends or boyfriends at restaurants or coffee houses. Also, compared to married and divorced women, unmarried women spend more money on buying goods and clothes for themselves. Spending less time on reproductive tasks and being relatively less responsible for the family budget, they are more able to afford and do pleasurable and enjoyable activities.

Beyond time and financial limits, pressure from men is another source of women's restricted mobility out of the home. In my sample, 13 of 32 married women said that they have to get permission from their husbands before going out, and cannot go out if permission is refused. For example, Melek reported that her husband does not let her visit friends whose houses are not within walking distance of her house. A woman in her 30s at White refused to do an interview at my sister's house, which was a 10 minute walk from her house, saying that her husband would not allow her to go. I had to persuade Nazan's husband on the phone to let her come to my house, which was 15 minutes from her house, to do the interview.

Unmarried or divorced women are relatively more independent in deciding to go out. All of these women, except Zuhail, reported that it would not be a problem to spend time outside the home as long as they informed their families. This is another reason why they go out more often than married women. Only Zuhail, a divorced woman with two children, said that she had to ask permission from her brother, who lived on the same street with her, before going out. Nonetheless, even in cases of women who are relatively freer to go

out, their families subject them to restrictions which are not applied to the men of the family. All the women in my sample said that their freedom was much more restricted than that of husbands or brothers.

However, women find ways to bypass patriarchal oppression and lying to their family is one of these ways. Many women in my sample said that women garment workers do go out after work but tell their families that they are doing overtime; the prevalence of excessive overtime in the sector makes this believable. While I was working at Grey, groups of women sometimes went to the parks or coffee houses after work and I accompanied three groups at different times: I found out that at least one woman in each group had lied to their family about where they were, saying that they were working overtime. During the interviews, 12 of the 36 factory and atelier women told me that they go out after work but tell their families that they are doing overtime. Moreover, five (one single, four married) out of nine women who came to my house to be interviewed, did not tell their parents or husbands that they were at my house but that they were doing overtime. Thus, women do not totally abide by patriarchal norms but find strategies to challenge it. Working outside the home and in an overtime-intensive industry is one of the conditions that enable women to do so.

Given the socio-economic pressures and constraints that they face, women cannot live the life that they want to. They had desired to learn karate, become a theatre actress, ride a horse, become a teacher. They could not even try to realise these dreams. At the end of each interview, I asked about their current plans and dreams for the future. People's plans and dreams are shaped by their material and social conditions of life. However, plans are more informed by actual opportunities and capabilities; many women had dreams, but no plans. Working without job security and living in poverty conditions, many women could not plan their future. In Zuhail's words, they were mainly trying to survive until the next payday. Being married to men with low-paid precarious jobs also increased their sense of uncertainty about the near future.

Compared to married women, unmarried women were more hopeful about the future. The main desires of single women were getting married and having children. They dreamed of a happy married life. Having conservative families, marriage is the only way for them to live with the men they love and to have children. Moreover, many single women saw marriage as a way to escape from garment work as they hoped that they would not need to work after getting married. Pun (2005: 194) observed the same thing among Chinese women workers. However, given my observations and the experiences of married women dreaming the same thing, it is very unlikely to occur because it is usually impossible to live on the income of the men that they marry. However, young single women's desires were not limited to marriage and children. Five wanted to open their own businesses: three ateliers and two coffee houses; they wanted to be employers, not employees.

Notably, the dreams were grander than any plans. Women were freer to dream about the future, even if it was not going to happen. Yet still, they had modest dreams, which were mainly linked to their material conditions of life. With reference to the works of Braudel (1981) and Bourdieu (1984), Mitchell, Marston and Katz (2004: 9) emphasise that desire is not only individual but also class-based and intrinsically linked to social hierarchy. All the women stated that they do not want to be rich, but to have decent living standards. Owning a home of their own was the first condition for this. Of the 38 women who were not living with their parents, 14 rented because they could not afford to buy a house. Many of the women who owned their own houses said that they were poorly constructed and lacked modern heating. Thus, women mostly and firstly dreamt of having their own houses, with modern infrastructure, especially with a garden and in a quiet green area. Some of them also dreamt of owning a car and buying a house for their children, parents or siblings. Another common desire of married women in 30s and 40s was to travel around Turkey. Lacking sufficient budget and the right to paid leave, most of them could not even travel out of İzmir. They hoped that they would be able to travel around Turkey and see different cities when they and their husbands retired.

Of the 50 women, only Alev's biggest dream was not individualistic but social. She wanted a socialist revolution in Turkey and was affiliated with a leftist political organisation. She was not a formal member but participated in meetings and events and the members of the organisation, whom she called 'comrades', had become her friends in daily life. She was a 40-year-old married Alevi woman who, although she wanted children, did not have any. She said that the revolution was her only dream stronger than the desire for a child. This example is important to acknowledge the existence of socialist women workers for whom revolution is their foremost desire.

As I illustrated above, women workers dream about higher living standards for their families. For working-class families, the main hope to realise this dream rests on their children. In my sample, the married women had mostly given up on themselves, feeling that their lives were pretty much over. Nevertheless, they had the fervent hope that their children would have better lives. A better life did not only mean increased material conditions of living. As Sennett and Cobb (1977: 49) argue, children are a significant reason for hope for the working class because if they move up the class ladder, parents perceive they would also acquire dignity in others' eyes. This is also the case in İzmir among women garment workers. When talking about their children's successes at school, women's eyes sparkled with proud happiness.

None of the women in my sample wanted their children to become a garment worker; they wanted them to go to university. Their families of origin had sacrificed them, but they would not do the same thing to their own children. On the contrary, they sacrificed many things to provide a good future for their children. Spending significant amounts of money on children's education was the most common sacrifice for women because education is an important way that manual labourers can give their children occupational mobility (Sennett & Cobb, 1977: 166). For working-class parents, education is seen as their children's path to a better job and life than they have (Dalla Costa & James, 1971: 8). All the women dreamt of white-collar jobs for their children and said that they would feel gratified if they saw their children standing on their own feet and having better lives. All the sacrifices they made would gain meaning

with the success of their children. Melike, for example, was a single mother with a 17-year-old son in high school. She always advised her son to have high goals and she wanted him to be an engineer:

[My only dream is] to be happy. How will I be happy? When I see that my son succeeds. I am now 38 years old. I got married when I was 19. I am sacrificing my life for him. Maybe I will be 60 when I see that my son climbs the ladder. But then, I will be the happiest person in the world. I will be glad to have sacrificed all my years, my youth for him (Melike, 38/W/FW).

However, given the structural class inequalities in the education system, it seems unlikely that the children of garment workers could attend a high-quality university, which would help them to make the move to middle-class. In my sample, only a daughter of Halime and a daughter of Hatice had graduated from university (as teachers). The former was working as a teacher in a state school, while the latter was preparing for the exam⁴⁷ to become a teacher in state schools. The rest of the children who were old enough to go to university or work were either unemployed or doing precarious jobs in the service sector. As Erdoğan (2012) wrote, although the education apparatus in Turkey partially served to reduce social and class-based inequalities before the neoliberal era until the 1980s, thereafter it almost completely stopped being a way for lower-class children to move up the class ladder. In short, it seems unlikely that the children of women garment workers will make the transition to the middle-class category through education.

In sum, under the burden of productive and reproductive work, women have very limited time and budget to spend on themselves. Patriarchal oppression further restricts women's opportunities to do activities they enjoy. In comparison with married women (with children), unmarried women and divorced women with older or adult children have more time, budget and freedom to enjoy themselves. Coming from poor families and working precariously, women cannot plan their futures. Their main dreams, such as owning a modern house or a car, are simple aspirations to a 'decent' life, but they generally remain out of their reach. This is why married women's hopes

⁴⁷ In Turkey, teacher candidates have to take the 'Public Personnel Selection Examination' in order to be employed in state schools. However, far more people take the exam than there are jobs available (See Tarhan & Susar, 2015).

rest predominantly on their children. They dream that their children will graduate from university and move up the socio-economic ladder. They sacrifice their money, time and energy for the sake of this dream, which, however, also sadly seems unlikely to come true for many.

8.6. Conclusions

Women's unpaid work is one of the main sources of their oppression and subordination. Women assume the roles of both paid workers in the garment industry and unpaid workers in the family. Adult male family members do not share the domestic burden, but rather only rarely and limitedly 'help' women with housework and care work. Therefore, women's working hours and pressures are not limited to their paid work. In fact, women work seven days a week and far beyond garment working hours. In this sense, the home is a workplace for women, in which they perform physically, mentally and emotionally demanding tasks. Physical labour is the most observable aspect of housework and care work, whereas the organisational and emotional labour aspects are more invisible and overlooked. In fact, women not only clean the house and feed children but also plan the work, manage family activities, ensure the socialisation of children and create individuals that will fit into the social structure of society. Moreover, women's reproductive labour is not only performed for the well-being of household members, but also for the well-being of extended family members. They perform reproductive work within their own houses and also in their relatives' houses and public places.

From the perspectives of women, housework is exhausting and boring because of its never-ending and repetitive features. They carry it out not because they choose to or want to do it, but because they feel obliged to, describing it as a 'duty to fulfil'. Given the choice, they would prefer not to do housework but, with their low household incomes, they cannot afford paid domestic help. All the women in my sample thought that the unequal gendered division of labour at home is unjust, and feel angry and unhappy about it. For them, the source of this unequal division of household labour lies in traditions rather than the natural abilities of women/men. They oppose the patriarchal assumptions that see reproductive work as women's natural responsibility and

think that women should be paid and entitled to pensions for their domestic labour. The fact that men in the family usually ignore, underestimate or belittle women's reproductive labour adds to women's feeling of anger and unhappiness. On the one hand, the devaluation of their labour causes them to feel devalued as human beings. On the other hand, unlike their feelings about housework, women garment workers with children who work outside the home while children are young usually experience feelings of sorrow and guilt because of the emotional ties and the strong sense of responsibility towards their children.

Women's reproductive and productive work is highly intertwined. Reproductive work limits women's paid work in many ways. Firstly, childcare prevents women from working outside the home: it is the main reason why home-based women workers cannot work outside and have to endure working at home for low wages and without labour rights. Secondly, factory and atelier women try to avoid doing overtime because of housework and care duties. When they are forced to do it, the burden on their shoulders increases and they feel more stressed and exhausted. If they reject overtime, they earn less income and their employment opportunities are limited. Thirdly, reproductive work obliges (some) women to work in nearby ateliers so that they can fulfil their responsibilities looking after children or elderly parents as they can go to their houses during lunch breaks. Lastly, childcare responsibilities prevent women who have nobody to leave their young children with from working full-time and with full labour rights. As a result, reproductive work decreases women's bargaining power against employers and makes their paid work more precarious. Overall, the conditions of productive and reproductive work shape one another. Women make a trade-off between better working conditions in the garment industry and more time and energy to devote to reproductive tasks. Whichever their (forced) choice is, the trade-off is almost always between productive and reproductive work, but rarely between work and non-work. Productive and reproductive work is also internally linked from the capitalist point of view. It ensures the maintenance of capitalist and patriarchal society,

and it is a real necessity for the capitalist organisation of production, to ensure the supply of labour and to control and lower its costs.

Finally, in order to fully understand the relation between women's productive and reproductive work, it is crucial to acknowledge what I termed here the 'women's reserve army of unpaid reproductive labour'. The presence of mothers, mothers-in-law, sisters, daughters and sometimes women neighbours enables women to work outside the home as the 'reserve army' looks after small children or elderly parents without remuneration, thus reducing women garment workers' reproductive work burden and contributing to the well-being of their families. The marital status of women and the number of women in the household are significant factors determining the amount of time and energy that women garment workers spend on reproductive work. Whereas married women (with young children) spend most of their non-paid work time on reproductive work, unmarried and divorced women living with their mothers spend much less time on the same tasks thanks to the unpaid labour of their mothers. It is always other women who take over reproductive work at the point where women garment workers have to leave it. The women's reserve army of reproductive work is a necessity for women garment workers to be able to participate in waged work because they cannot afford to pay for domestic and care work. In a broader sense, the neoliberal system benefits from cheap precarious women's labour owing to the unpaid reproductive labour of this reserve army. The support networks among women allow capitalists to keep the costs of reproduction of labour low, and men to have higher living standards than women.

Being determined by the social relations of (re)production, the time and money that women have to spend on their personal care and leisure is very limited. Compared to married women, unmarried women and divorced women with older or adult children have more time, money and freedom to engage in activities that they enjoy. Nonetheless, women spend most of their energy and time on productive and reproductive work. Patriarchal oppression further prevents women from going out and socialising with friends. However, women do not totally abide by the patriarchal rules in their families but find ways to

bypass them. Working in an overtime-intensive sector, their main tactic is lying to their families that they are doing overtime when they want to spend time with friends. However, given the choice, all of them would prefer to live different lives. Their dreams in the past had not been fulfilled, and it seemed to them that their lives were not going to change much. Working in precarious and poor conditions, they cannot plan for their future. They generally dream of owning a modern house or a car, so that they and their children could feel more secure in life. The main source of their hope lies in their children and they dream that their children will graduate from university, have white-collar jobs and move up the class hierarchy. Although all their money, time and energy are channelled into the realisation of this dream, it will most likely remain unfulfilled.

The findings presented here, together with those of the previous chapters focused on paid garment labour, suggest that women's productive and reproductive work are inextricably linked. Women garment workers face severe exploitation and subordination across both production and reproduction realms. Exploitation and subordination in one realm trigger and reinforce exploitation and subordination in the other. Ultimately, trying to ensure their families' wellbeing by engaging in both paid and unpaid work, women lack the time, budget and autonomy to see to their own.

CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to investigate the interplay between the productive and reproductive work of women workers in the garment industry in İzmir, Turkey. It has explored the dynamic relationship between class and gender across the realms of production and reproduction from a political economy and feminist historical materialist perspective. More specifically, the theoretical framework of this thesis has combined the Thompsonian approach to class with a Marxist-feminist approach to reproductive labour. In combining these two approaches, this study suggests that women's productive and reproductive work should be examined as an integrated process and an interrelated social relation, in constant dialogue with other social relations. At its broadest, this thesis has argued that the material and social conditions of women's productive and reproductive work are inextricably intertwined and shape each other. The exploitation of women's informal labour in the garment industry and the exploitation of women's unwaged reproductive labour in the family co-constitute and reinforce each other.

The following sections present the key findings of this thesis. The first section revisits the theoretical framework and the methodology of this study. The second summarises the empirical findings on the material conditions of work, the labour regime and how gender shapes them, in the light of the discussions on labour informality and women's labour in the garment industry. The subsequent section provides a Thompsonian and feminist analysis of everyday socio-cultural life, intra-class and women's intra-gender relationships on the garment shop floor in İzmir. The fourth discusses the main empirical findings concerning women's reproductive work and its relationships with their productive work. The final section acknowledges the limitations of this study and offers recommendations for future research.

9.1. Women's Productive and Reproductive Labour from a Feminist Historical Materialist Perspective

This thesis is based on the Marxist historical materialist understanding of class elaborated by Thompson, which emphasises the significance of the interplays between economic relations and social relations at large. According

to the Marxist historical materialist approach, the material conditions of individuals are central to the analysis of social reality (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1846]: 37). However, this does not mean that there is a one-sided relationship between individuals and their material conditions. The production of life appears as a twofold relation: both as a natural and as a social relation (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1846]: 48-49). Moreover, the *material* and the *social* are not separate and isolated entities but are always interrelated. Accordingly, class cannot be analysed as a purely economic location and a fixed concept, separate from other social relations. Instead, it should be understood as a dynamic process (Thompson, 2013 [1963]: 8), and as a socio-cultural formation as much as an economic formation (Thompson, 1965: 357). A satisfactory class analysis requires the analysis of its relationships with other social relations, such as gender, age, ethnicity, and migration, and the analysis of the historical and social context in which it exists.

Thompson rejects the understanding of class in purely economic terms and the relegation of culture and social norms to a secondary and 'less real' status (Thompson, 1979: 17-18). As well as arguing for the centrality of the mode of production, he opposes the idea that social and cultural phenomena are less important than economic ones because, for him, they are, at their source, involved in the same nexus of relationships (Thompson, 1965: 356). Thompson locates class in human relationships. He understands class as an experience, which eventuates as individuals "experience their determinate situations 'within the *ensemble* of the social relations', with their inherited culture and expectations" (Thompson, 1978: 150). In other words, in his view, class is not a homogenous category whose members experience social relations in the same way; rather class subjects experience their given class position in differing ways.

Thompson's class approach allowed this study to analyse the dynamic relationships between different forms of social oppression, and to trace the effects of these relationships in the daily transactions of social life. However, in order to get the whole picture, his approach had to be complemented with Marxist-feminist insights on women's reproductive work, which stress the role

of patriarchal norms and women's unpaid reproductive work in shaping the relations of (re)production.

Women have always played a crucial role in social reproduction throughout all modes of productions including the capitalist mode (Federici, 2014 [2004]). Although gender systems did not arise as a result of capitalism, they have been re-articulated by capitalism. With the rise of capitalism, women's reproductive activities started to involve different social relations from those of men, and ceased to be seen as 'real' work (Federici, 2014 [2004]: 25). Women have been isolated in the home and forced to carry out reproductive work (Dalla Costa & James, 1971), and the domestication of women and their transformation into housewives became the model of the gendered division of labour under capitalism (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 69). Capitalist production relations are built upon the exploitation of women's unpaid coerced reproductive labour, and their dependency on men (Dalla Costa & James, 1971; Mies, 2014 [1986]; Federici, 2012; Fraser, 2017).

However, the central role of women's reproductive labour in the perpetuation of capitalism has usually been overlooked by Marxist thinkers. Large swathes of Marxist analysis have primarily focused on production and ignored the centrality of reproductive labour to capitalism and to the exploitation of women in capitalist societies (Mies, 2014 [1986]; Federici, 2012; Dalla Costa & James, 1971; James, 1975; Stolcke, 1981; Fortunati, 1995; Ferguson et al., 2016; Bhattacharya, 2017a). The traditional Marxist separation between productive and reproductive work suggests that the worker is productive only if she produces surplus value for the capitalist, and thus, contributes to the self-valorisation of capital (Marx, 1982 [1867]: 644). This narrow definition of productive labour and consequent devaluation of what traditional Marxists term 'unproductive' labour has been a major reason behind the lack of attention to women's reproductive labour.

Maria Mies offers an alternative definition of productive labour, claiming that it "can only be productive in the sense of producing surplus value as long as it can tap, extract, exploit, and appropriate labour, which is spent in the

production of life, or subsistence production, which is largely non-wage labour mainly done by women” (Mies, 2014 [1986]: 47). Moreover, women’s reproductive labour contributes to the accumulation of capital as it reproduces the worker’s capacity to work and to be exploited, which is the most important commodity that capital has (Federici, 2006). The reproductive work of the woman house-worker in the home is every bit as necessary as the productive work of the man worker in the factory, as her work transforms the means of subsistence into the labour power of the entire working family (Fortunati, 1995: 92). Women house-workers are unpaid workers who raise and discipline children (i.e. future workers), prepare working members of their families for the next workday, and ensure the perpetuation of societies. Thus, women’s reproductive work is actual work for capital. A Marxist analysis of production relations must include the analysis of women’s reproductive labour, as production and reproduction are tightly interwoven.

The combination of the Thompsonian class perspective with the Marxist-feminist social reproduction approach enabled this research to analyse women garment workers’ material conditions of existence, the interplays between the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres, and the strong interaction between their productive and reproductive labour. This theoretical framework required this study to conduct a multi-method fieldwork, which combined the ethnographic extended-case method – composed of ethnography, participant observation and in-depth interviews – with quantitative data and secondary sources. Since theory and research cannot be separated from each other (Burawoy, 1998: 28), the choice of method was derived from the theoretical framework chosen. Inspired by Burawoy, this thesis was largely built on the ethnographic extended-case study, which included participant observation – in this case, employment as fieldwork (two months at a garment factory, two months at four different small-scale ateliers, and two months at the middle-women’s shops and home-based women workers’ homes) – and 71 in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted with different actors (50 women workers, eight employers, the chairpersons of five different trade unions and a representative of eight different sector associations). To have a broader picture

and substantiate field findings, the ethnographic extended-case work was complemented by multiple sources of secondary data, including newspaper archives, academic and NGO studies, and official reports and statistics that were mainly gathered from the TURKSTAT, SGK, CSGB, Official Gazette, WTO, ILO, and OECD databases. This overall method allowed the study to develop a deep analysis of İzmir's garment labour regime, including social relationships at work, the interplays between different forms of social oppression, and the inextricable link between production and reproduction. The following sections summarise the main field findings in more detail and bring this work to its conclusion.

9.2. Labour Informality and Women's Labour in the Garment Industry

During the neoliberal era, which began in the late 1970s/early 1980s, capitalism has become more global, companies have increasingly made their production flexible, labour has become more precarious and insecure, and women's participation in paid work has considerably increased. Today, women constitute the majority of informal labour and are over-represented in its most vulnerable and lowest paid segment (Horn, 2010; Chen, Vanek & Heinz, 2006; Chen, 2007; Brown, McGranahan & Dodman, 2014), mainly because of reproductive obligations and the patriarchal stereotypes attributed to them. The state has been an important actor in the informalisation of labour (see Mezzadri, 2010), the decline of collective labour power (see Hensman, 2001; Seguino, 1997), the flexibilisation of women's labour and the reinforcement of patriarchal norms that associate women with reproductive obligations (see Seguino, 1997, 2000; Pyle, 2005; Mohandesi & Teitelman, 2017). The garment industry is one of the largest sectors in which these transformations have taken place. It is characterised by highly informal, precarious, cheap and non-unionised labour (Hale, 2000; Kumar, 2014; Wills & Hale, 2005; Mezzadri, 2010; RoyChowdhury, 2015), and is heavily feminised (RoyChowdhury, 2015; Kumar, 2014; Hensman, 2011; Ruwanpura, 2011; Mezzadri, 2010; Wills & Hale, 2005; Kabeer 2004). Women garment workers are subject to low wages, forced overtime, higher job insecurity, lack of equal pay for work of equal value,

various forms of violence, and lack of maternity protection (ILO, 2014: 12; Wills & Hale, 2005: 1; Hensman, 2011: 219).

These global transformations have had a significant impact on the political economy of Turkey, the geographical focus of this research. In line with the global neoliberal transformation, Turkey shifted from an ISI to an EOI strategy and started to adopt neoliberal policies in the 1980s. Although anti-labour and pro-capital policies started to be introduced in the early years of the transition (Boratav, 1990: 225), the consolidation of neoliberalism only became possible after the AKP came to power in 2002 owing to its one-party rule since then. The informalisation of labour has been a fundamental part of the AKP's neoliberal agenda. During the AKP era, precarious (subcontracted, part-time, temporary) employment has been legalised, job security undermined, overtime work facilitated, private employment agencies established through law, labour movements suppressed and the organised power of the working class weakened as a result of the party's actions.

The informalisation of labour in general in Turkey has gone hand in hand with the informalisation of women's labour and the reinforcement of patriarchal norms. In fact, women have always been under-represented in employment and over-represented in low-paid, more precarious and labour-intensive sectors in Turkey. However, since the year 2000, precarious and unregistered employment has become more widespread among women of working class families because of increasing income inequality and decreasing wages (Buğra & Keyder, 2003; Dedeoğlu, 2010). In the same era, the AKP has deployed patriarchal ideologies and norms assigning women the primary responsibility for reproductive work as a way to legitimise the informalisation of labour. Labour market deregulation policies have been implemented by the party under the guise of increasing women's employment and reconciling their family and work life. In practice, the party's stance regarding women's employment has aimed to expand the informalisation of women's labour in the market and to increase the appropriation of their unpaid reproductive labour in the family. To this aim, it has pursued neoliberal, anti-feminist and pronatalist policies, reinforced patriarchal gender roles, and passed several pieces of

legislation that define women on the basis of motherhood and promote the further flexibilisation of women's labour.

In line with global trends, the Turkish garment industry is one of the main industries deploying cheap and precarious (women's) labour. İzmir is second only to İstanbul in garment exports and has the third highest women's employment rate after Edirne and Denizli. Field findings indicate that İzmir's garment industry is heavily feminised and characterised by high production flexibility and high labour informality. The case studied here illustrates that Turkey's garment industry, like those in other garment-export countries, is characterised by a complex subcontracting chain that starts with international buyers and reaches down to home-based women workers. Flexible production and massive subcontracting rates allow employers to deal with irregular production demands with lower costs. Within this chain, factories tend to operate year-round to stay in business and increase their market share. Small-scale ateliers, however, usually have short-term agreements with customers and tend to stop production for some months a year and/or fail. There is no guarantee of work at all in home-based production, which is highly insecure and volatile.

The organisation of garment production has important implications for the organisation of work in workplaces and for the labour regime generally. Factories usually produce for export or produce high-quality, relatively expensive garments for the domestic market. They tend to have all the departments necessary for garment manufacturing, from pattern-making to packaging. Accordingly, production inside factories is tightly organised and the division of labour is strict. Ateliers, on the other hand, produce relatively cheaper garments for local markets and/or produce for factories. Compared to factories, ateliers usually concentrate on specific tasks, such as sewing, ironing or packaging, and operate with a small number of workers. Therefore, the production inside ateliers is simpler and less rigid, and the division of labour is more flexible. In home-based production, work is organised around firms, middle-women and home-based workers. Workers carry out production individually, mostly in their homes.

The external organisation of production and the organisation of work have a huge influence on labour conditions across factory, atelier and home-based production. Labour informality is pervasive across the different scales of İzmir's garment industry. Unhealthy working conditions, low and irregular wages, the lack or falsification of social security records, forced overtime and job insecurity are widespread across the whole industry, intensifying towards the end of the supply chain. Because factories hold a stronger position in the market and have a longer work life, the duration of factory workers' employment tends to be longer than that of atelier-based and home-based workers. Exporting factories are more likely to operate legally, employ workers formally, provide the minimum legal wage and social insurance, and pay wages fully and on a regular basis. Despite their ideological and practical limitations, this has much to do with international compliance and codes of conduct, which international buyers impose on suppliers as a condition of doing business with them.

However, labour informality does not only result from lack of legal regulation but also from state authorities' and employers' reluctance to enforce the labour laws and the labour movements' incapacity to protect the interests of the working class. In this regard, the factory labour regime is characterised by systematic labour rights violations. Factory workers are subject to forced overtime, are often denied their legal sick leave and paid annual leave, and receive lower pensions and severance payments than they should as a result of employers underreporting their actual wages. Moreover, labour informality is more than an issue of legal compliance: factory workers are also paid very low wages and work under the constant threat of job loss.

In the case of ateliers, workers' health and safety conditions are often poorer and labour rights violations higher than in factories. Ateliers usually employ workers informally. Thus, atelier workers are mostly deprived of their legal rights, such as social insurance, paid leave, severance payments and pensions. In ateliers, skilled sewing machine operators usually earn higher wages than their counterparts in factories, whereas those who are regarded as unskilled earn far less than the legal minimum wage. Moreover, since ateliers

usually operate informally and produce in small quantities and at short notice, labour turnover is higher than in factories. Consequently, atelier workers face greater job insecurity than factory workers. Atelier owners also benefit from social inequalities based on migration and age: the high informality and illegality in ateliers shows itself in the prevalence of the illegal employment of children and Syrian refugees who work in poorer conditions due to their disadvantaged social positions.

Across all three production scales – factory, atelier and home-based – those who work under the most precarious conditions are the home-based women workers. They do not know which firms they work for and cannot negotiate employment conditions with firm owners; instead they are hugely dependent on middle-women who take orders from firms and distribute them. They have no set working hours, no guarantee of work, no legal protection and no social insurance. They work long and uncertain hours for piece-rate wages far below the legal minimum wage. The decisive factor behind the higher levels of exploitation in the case of home-based women is rooted in social inequalities based on mobility and gender. Home-based women workers tend to be older than factory and atelier women, and have more limited mobility, as they are often married with many children.

Labour informality, which in terms of labour rights violations and job insecurity intensifies towards the end of supply chains, is not only about the material conditions of work and legal compliance. Labour control and discipline mechanisms are also significant aspects, which should be given equal consideration, especially in the case of labour-intensive sectors where labour productivity is particularly linked to profit. In this regard, the factory labour regime is characterised by harsh labour control and heavy work pressure. Fingerprint readers, CCTV, periodic dismissals, time study, disclosure of performance records and managerial surveillance are all utilised as methods of labour control in factories. Factory workers are forbidden to talk to colleagues about non-work-related issues, have visitors, or use mobile phones or earphones for any reason during production. Textile engineers set hourly targets for workers and put enormous pressure on workers to meet them.

Working on the assembly line under a strict division of labour and doing highly repetitive tasks under intense managerial domination dehumanises factory workers, causing them to feel less 'human' and more 'robotic' and this has serious repercussions on their mental health.

In the case of ateliers, workplace pressure is less intense compared with factories. Since ateliers produce at short notice in small quantities, the division of labour is more flexible and, unlike factory workers, atelier workers perform different tasks. There are usually no hourly targets given to workers. Accordingly, the time-discipline is less rigid in ateliers. Furthermore, atelier workers are allowed to listen to music with earphones, to have quick visits (often from their children), to smoke and to make short phone calls during production. This is not to say that there is no workplace discipline or labour control in ateliers, but it mainly takes the form of direct surveillance by employers and is not as intense or harsh as it is in factories. Home-based workers are not subject to workplace discipline as they work individually in their homes but they do experience work pressure from the middle-women to complete orders in a short timeframe. This pressure, though, is not as strong as in the factories and ateliers where workers are under the direct surveillance of management and employers. In short, although labour informality intensifies in terms of job insecurity and labour rights violations, it lessens in terms of labour control and discipline towards the end of supply chains.

As I argued above, the garment industry in general is heavily feminised and gendered in terms of organisation of work and labour conditions. İzmir's garment industry is no exception to these global trends. Women accounted for around 70% of the total workforce in the four factories and around 50% in the four ateliers that this study researched. These ratios are far above women's share of total employment (31% in 2017⁴⁸) in the country.

Moreover, wages are also highly gendered in İzmir's garment industry. Although the gender wage gap between women and men doing similar work at the same level of qualification is more likely to occur in ateliers than factories,

⁴⁸ Author's own calculation based on TURKSTAT database (accessed December 20, 2018)

there is a gendered job hierarchy in the factory context in which 'men's work' is paid higher than 'women's work'. Ironing, cutting, warehouse, and shipping tasks are seen as 'men's work' because they are believed to require 'men's strength', whereas trimming, packaging, quality control and handwork are seen as 'women's work' and performed mostly by older women who lack previous work experience and are paid the lowest wages because of their disadvantaged social profile based on gender and age.

In the atelier context, the gendered division of labour of productive tasks is less likely to happen because ateliers usually concentrate on one task, such as sewing or packaging. However, there is an obvious gendered division of labour in terms of reproductive tasks. Unlike factories, atelier owners do not employ staff for cleaning and serving lunch or tea and it is always young girls and women workers who serve lunch, make tea, wash dishes, clean toilets, and sweep and mop the floors. Since these reproductive tasks are seen as women's traditional duties, this division of labour is naturalised and women are not paid for these reproductive tasks. Women's reproductive work in the garment ateliers is as devalued, invisible and unpaid as their reproductive work in the family.

The material conditions of work discussed above are central to the historical materialist analysis of class. However, class cannot be reduced to material conditions and economic locations alone. It is not only an economic formation but also a socio-cultural formation (Thompson, 1965). Moreover, the effects of patriarchal norms on class experiences are not limited to the organisation of work and labour conditions; they also significantly shape the socio-cultural atmosphere and intra-class relationships on the shop floor. In line with the feminist, Thompsonian class approach, the following section will discuss the particular ways that workers experience and understand their class situations and the relationships between different forms of oppression, that is, class, gender and ethnicity.

9.3. Class as an Experience and a Social Relation

From a Thompsonian perspective, class is not a fixed 'thing', but a dynamic process. As well as acknowledging the centrality of the mode of production and economic factors, Thompson opposes defining class *only* in economic terms and disregarding the importance of culture, norms and values. For him, social and cultural phenomena are not additional or secondary to the economic, but "they are, at their source, immersed in the same nexus of relationship" (Thompson, 1965: 357). Accordingly, it is crucial to analyse how class is experienced in socio-cultural ways, how it eventuates in social relationships on the shop floor and how it is related to other social relations.

The social profiles and life paths leading women to work in the garment industry are central to understanding the class and gender experiences of these women. Garment workers are usually urban migrants living in the suburbs of the city, from low-income families, with low levels of education. The interviews carried out as part of this research showed that 86% of women are either unschooled, primary school dropouts or primary school graduates, and 96% of them are urban migrants or from migrant families. Coming from poor migrant families, most women have to start working in the garment industry during their childhood to support their families' survival in the city. Women's entrance to the garment industry is determined by these socio-economic conditions and the features of the garment labour market. Since the garment sector does not require workers to have a formal education, employs children due to its high informality levels, and deploys labour recruited in the suburbs, it is almost the only 'choice' for women. Other reasons for women's employment in the sector include the low economic profile of their husbands and low levels of household income. Women's income is generally one of the main sources of household income and is vital to their families' livelihood. Hence, despite the apparent temporariness and precariousness of their garment job, women's employment is actually permanent, yet permanently insecure.

Given the socio-economic profiles and the conditions of their work, garment workers are often unhappy with their jobs and dissatisfied with their lives. Factory workers work in buildings that look like semi-open prisons and

atelier workers usually work in tiny, cold, dark and airless one-room shops. In most garment workplaces, *arabesk* music, which embodies feelings, such as despair, fatalism, suffering, misfortune and disappointment, plays during production. Many garment workers self-harm, scratching or cutting [*faça atmak*] their arms, as a way to express their frustration with and anger at their lives. There is a huge gap between the life that they live and the one that they long for. As a result, most workers have a negative self-image: they think that garment workers are “mental people”, aggressive and unhappy.

From a Thompsonian perspective, everyday life and the intra-class relationships on the shop floor are central to understanding the ways in which workers, individually and collectively, experience and understand their class positions and the ways in which class, gender and ethnicity are interrelated to one another. It is not only commodities that are produced in workplaces, but also social relationships. Garment workers spend most of their lives in their workplaces with their colleagues. Working in a labour-intensive sector, the social environment and relationships at work are very important to garment workers. Women put a great emphasis on working in a peaceful environment with people that they know and get along with and, as a result, they are often reluctant to move to another firm once they have got used to the social environment and fellow workers. For most women, the workplace is like a home and her fellow workers are like a family. Similar to familial forms of solidarity, workers give each other moral and material support in cases of death, illness, marriage or unexpected occasions.

Nevertheless, this professed family-like atmosphere and discourse do not necessarily correspond to reality. Workers, particularly those working in big companies, form and act in small groups on the shop floor and do not have much interaction with others outside their groups. This causes a fragmented social environment, generally expressed as social distance between groups, but which sometimes escalates into antagonistic tensions. Another source of fragmentation among workers is discrimination against members of oppressed ethno-cultural groups and identity-based clientelism. İzmir’s garment industry has a multi-ethno-cultural labour force, mainly composed of Turks, Kurds,

Alevi and Syrian. These ethno-cultural identities have significant impacts on workers' experiences and intra-class relationships on the shop floor. Although significant clashes between these groups are rare due to their shared class experiences and extended period of interaction between them, there is discrimination against Kurds, Alevi and Syrian. Although it is mostly seen in subtle forms, such as social distance, or despising or insulting a particular social group as a whole rather than an individual, in the case of Kurdish workers, especially those who support pro-Kurdish political parties and reject the Turkish nationalist ideology of the state, discrimination is sometimes seen in more direct forms, something that negatively influences and restricts their actions in the workplace. Furthermore, each ethno-cultural group tends to support their own members at the expense of other workers, particularly if they are the majority group or occupy managerial positions. Although this identity-based solidarity may carry a potential for collective action in the presence of organised class struggle, it becomes a source of fragmentation and clientelistic behaviours, which leads to clashes and conflicts among workers in the lack of an organised labour struggle.

Another significant factor that damages intra-class relationships and leads to competition and conflicts among garment workers is the neoliberal labour regime. As Burawoy (1979: 16) writes, the production of commodities is simultaneously the (re)production of social relationships. In this regard, job insecurity, poor working conditions, labour control and discipline, and the lack of organised class struggle cause competition among workers to get better work conditions at the expense of their co-workers. Workers tend to exert pressure on their co-workers to work faster and more accurately, keep their wages secret, avoid teaching their job to new workers and report each other to supervisors or employers in order to secure their positions, obtain wage rises, get promoted or work under less pressure. Significantly, because labour discipline is harsher and work pressure is greater in factory-based production, competition and conflicts are likely to be more serious among factory workers. Being assigned hourly production targets and working on the assembly line trigger unrest and splinter solidarity among factory workers.

The competitive social relationships at work lead workers to have a negative image of fellow garment workers. Women workers often see their fellow workers as competitive, overambitious, and two-faced. Notably, women workers usually attribute these pejorative images to other women, but not men. Having been socialised within patriarchal thinking, subject to the same social position of subordination, and experiencing the gendered division of labour, women tend to compete mainly with each other and to think that other women workers are jealous and overambitious. Patriarchal ideologies, which drive women “to look upon each other with jealousy, fear and hatred” (Hooks, 2000: 14), create hierarchy and impose competition on women as a way for them to gain respect in society. The negative effects of patriarchy on everyday life on the garment shop floor are not limited to these: they also shape the whole socio-cultural atmosphere and intra-class and intra-gender relationships in manifold ways.

The dominant patriarchal norm in Turkey that compels women to avoid close contact with unrelated men leads women garment workers to keep their relationships with men co-workers distant or secret. Women are more likely to have closer relationships with men colleagues when there is a big age difference and so the relationship can be normalised within the traditional patriarchal norms. They use fictitious family relationships in the workplace to avert threats to their reputation, calling men co-workers *abi* (older brother) or *kardeş* (younger brother) and describe gender relationships at work in terms of sister-brother relationships. This is a more acceptable and safer way of having a relationship with unrelated men because it symbolically de-sexualises the interaction.

Another serious problem resulting from patriarchal culture and male domination is sexual harassment of women garment workers. The interviews conducted with the factory and atelier women indicated that around 70% of them had experienced, heard about or witnessed incidents of sexual harassment in the workplace. Despite being a common problem, women usually keep quiet about sexual harassment because they are afraid that they will be blamed and they, not the men involved, will get a bad reputation. They lack the

collective power to stand together and fight sexual harassment and feel hopeless and helpless about changing the situation. Thus, they tend to act as if it never happened and/or resign when they are sexually harassed at work. The risk of being subjected to sexual harassment is higher for divorced and widowed women workers because society has already stereotyped them as 'easy' women.

Nevertheless, it is not only divorced and widowed women who are labelled as 'easy' in the garment sector. There is a general public perception of the garment sector as 'immoral' and of women garment workers as 'easy' and 'loose' (see also Kabeer [2000] on Bangladesh on this). Working in close proximity to men for long hours, public belief in the existence of widespread inappropriate relationships in the sector and the high incidence of sexual harassment all further this negative perception of garment women. Within this schema, women often tend to blame other women who supposedly act 'immorally' and thus tar them all with the same brush. Most women think that there are overly familiar relationships between women and men in the sector, and that many women use their sexuality to advance their interests at work; yet, at the same time, in their personal narratives they differentiate themselves from the 'bad apples' to claim social respect.

Indeed, garment workplaces and women garment workers are not free from patriarchal norms imposing gendered control. Women themselves are significant agents of patriarchal oppression at work: they directly and indirectly control and restrict their women co-workers through gossip, surveillance and direct interventions about what they should wear, how they should behave and how they should interact with men on the shop floor. In sum, as a result of socialising in and cooperating with patriarchal norms, women tend to reproduce the patriarchal culture that oppresses and subordinates them and thus they reinforce their lack of freedom.

As highlighted above, the conflicts inherent in class and patriarchal societies divide workers, in general, and women workers, in particular, in many ways. However, the competitive and uneasy relationships among (women)

workers should be considered in concert with the lack of collective class and feminist struggle in the sector this research focused on. In 2016, only around 3,000 out of 38,000 registered garment workers in İzmir were union members. Unsurprisingly, in the same year, labour unions were only authorised to conclude collective labour agreements in five out of a total of around 2,200 registered garment companies. Thus, competitive relationships and workers' negative perceptions of their (women) fellow workers are also the results of the absence of working class and feminist struggles. Because social reality is a dynamic process, intra-class and women-to-women relationships on the same shop floors would show fundamental differences if collective class and feminist struggles were present.

Importantly, intra-class relationships and women's intra-gender relationships in the garment industry are not only composed of competition and conflict. Notwithstanding the lack of organised class and feminist struggles, there are individual or group-based acts of solidarity, 'resilience', and 'reworking' (Katz, 2004), and everyday forms of resistance among (women) workers (see also Carwell & De Neve, 2013). In the factory-scale, workers sometimes stand together to defend their group members against management, oppose managerial attempts to increase labour casualisation and resist managerial domination by slowing down production. Both factory and atelier workers usually act together when they demand improvements in the services provided by employers. In ateliers, workers are more likely to resist individually and sporadically because of the lack of assembly line production, higher labour turnover and higher job insecurity. For home-based women workers, there is no collective resistance against middle-women or main firms since they do not know which firms they are working for, and they are hugely dependent on middle-women supplying them with work. However, there are relatively stronger networks and acts of solidarity among home-based workers than factory and atelier women workers because there is no formal employer-employee relationship, no labour control at the point of production, and no competition to be promoted or to have better employment benefits because their job is totally informal. These women usually come together to help each

other when one is unable to meet a deadline. However, none of these acts of solidarity and resistance among factory, atelier and home-based workers is aimed at long-term collective gains, but rather at limited short-term ones.

All these arguments indicate that the socio-cultural life and social relations at work cannot be separated from the broader social context and broader social relations, and that they are significantly shaped by the capitalist labour regime and patriarchal ideologies. However, the thesis has also demonstrated that the analysis of women's garment work must be complemented by that of their unpaid reproductive labour and that the two are tightly interwoven. The following section will sum up the field findings on women's reproductive work and its relationships with their productive work.

9.4. Subordination and Exploitation beyond the Garment Industry: Unpaid Reproductive Work of Women Garment Workers

Capitalist production relations, labour regimes and women garment workers' conditions of work and life cannot be fully understood without looking at women's reproductive work in the family. As all the women garment workers participated in this research said, 'a woman's work is never done'. Women also work at home for the well-being of their families. Their reproductive work consists of two main forms of work: *housework*, that is, the domestic chores which have to be done daily, and *care work*, such as childcare, care for ill and elderly, emotional support for adult members of the family, and so on. These two forms of work require not only physical labour but also mental and emotional labour. They are more than just a list of tasks to be performed and cannot be separated from one another. Reproductive work must be understood as a series of processes that are closely linked and often operate simultaneously (Schwartz Cowan, 1983; Anderson, 2001).

The division of labour in women garment workers' households is highly patriarchal; they almost always do all the cooking, they clean the house, wash dishes and clothes, provide care for sick family members, and take care of their children's physical needs, personal development, problems, education, jobs and even marriages. Adult male family members' contributions to reproductive

work do not go beyond conditional and very limited 'help'. Even when men do provide help, it is rarely pro-actively offered; women have to request it, and even then, plan, organise and monitor it. Thus, women still have to carry an important part of the work, even when they supposedly manage to delegate part of it.

Moreover, reproductive work is not only performed for the well-being of women's household members but also for that of the extended family. Women garment workers do housework for their relatives, especially for their natal and husbands' families, and provide care for their elderly and/or sick parents and parents-in-law. These are not exceptional tasks, but a significant part of women's 'normal' reproductive obligations. Women carry out reproductive work not only in their own homes but also in their relatives' homes and public spaces such as hospitals.

As is the case with their class experiences in the garment industry, women's own narratives describing their feelings and opinions concerning the conditions of their reproductive work are significant and enlightening. A common feeling shared by women reflects the fact that being the primary responsible for reproductive work is not their free choice but an obligation. Contrary to the patriarchal representation of women's reproductive work as an 'act of love', women see it as a compulsory duty. Given the choice, most women would prefer not to do housework but their low household incomes mean that they cannot afford paid help. Women find housework boring, burdensome and exhausting, mainly because of its repetitive and endless features; thus, it is a source of unhappiness and dissatisfaction. Women also think that the unequal division of labour in their families is unfair to them, and are angry about it.

One of the reasons why women's reproductive work is invisible is that it is associated with femininity and attributed to women's 'natural' dispositions and skills (see also Mies, 2014 [1986]; and Elson & Pearson, 1981). However, for women, the main reason behind the unequal division of labour is not the supposed inherent nature of women and men, but the patriarchal norms that associate women with reproductive work. They are very clear on this. The

second important reason for the invisibility of women's reproductive work is the lack of fixed working hours. Women usually think that being a housewife is more difficult than a garment worker because there are no fixed working hours or tasks. The last, but not least, reason is linked to the unwaged condition of reproductive work. Notably, women garment workers know all too well that reproductive work is actual work and they believe it should be paid and provide entitlements to pensions and social security.

The naturalisation and devaluation of women's reproductive work leads to women's devaluation as human beings. Women do not feel appreciated for their lifelong labour in support of their families' well-being. Instead, they feel lesser humans and more like objects because their labour is ignored, criticised and belittled by the men of their families. The repetitive, isolating and compulsory features of housework add to this feeling. Notably, although women would like equality both in housework and childcare responsibilities, their feelings and opinions concerning childcare are very different. Unlike housework, care work involves developing a relationship between the carer and the person being cared for (Himmelweit, 2005: 5), and a close emotional engagement (Folbre, 2006). This is why factory and atelier women usually experience feelings of guilt, inadequacy and sorrow for not being able to take care of their children properly. Working outside the home while children are growing up is a great emotional burden for women garment workers.

Furthermore, women's reproductive obligations limit their garment work in many ways and lead to further exploitation of their labour in the sector. For women, being able to work outside the home or not, doing overtime, the type of work, and workplace choices are very much determined by their conditions of reproductive work. Firstly, care responsibilities prevent some women from working outside the home and compel them to work as home-based workers for low wages without labour rights. Secondly, the same responsibilities cause other women to start outside work at a later age when they are only offered the lowest paid, most insecure jobs. Thirdly, reproductive obligations force some women to work in ateliers that are close to their homes and/or to work only part-time in order to do housework or care work. Tellingly,

those who work part-time in ateliers due to their childcare responsibilities work for lower wages and without labour rights. Lastly, reproductive work leads both factory and atelier women to avoid doing overtime. When they are compelled to do so, the burden on their shoulders increases and they feel more stressed and exhausted. On the rare occasions that they are able to refuse overtime, they earn less income, and if they cannot do overtime because of their reproductive work, their employment opportunities are restricted as it is compulsory at most firms. Thus, women garment workers' reproductive responsibilities significantly restrict their employment opportunities, lower their bargaining power against employers and make their paid work more precarious. Women make a trade-off between better working conditions (more job security, higher incomes, social security, etc.) and more time and energy to devote to reproductive tasks. The trade-off is not between work time and non-work time, but between productive and reproductive work.

Women's reproductive work ensures the reproduction of capitalism as women reproduce both their own and family members' labour, and raise their children to fit into the social structure. However, women's reproductive work not only ensures the perpetuation of capitalism at the macro level but also subsidises the capitalist processes at work. Garment firms reduce labour and production costs by outsourcing work to home-based women workers who cannot work outside the home due to their reproductive obligations and thus have to work without social insurance, for very low pay, and with greater job insecurity. In a similar way, factory and atelier owners employ women who start working at a later age or who work part-time because of their reproductive responsibilities under more precarious terms and with lower wages. As such, women's reproductive work becomes a highly effective way for employers to control and lower labour costs. In sum, women's productive work and reproductive work are strongly interrelated both at the macro and micro levels, and from the perspectives of both women workers and capitalists.

Furthermore, it is not only women workers' own reproductive labour that is a fundamental necessity for capitalism but the unpaid reproductive labour of all the women around them, too. Women garment workers are only

able to participate in the labour markets because of what I termed in this thesis as 'the women's reserve army of reproductive labour'. Members of this reserve army are mainly composed of women workers' mothers, mothers-in-law, daughters, sisters, sisters-in-law, women neighbours and friends, who usually do not have a paid job. These women reduce the limiting effects of women workers' reproductive obligations by undertaking some of their responsibilities without remuneration. Most importantly, these women allow women garment workers to work outside the home by looking after small children or elderly parents who need care. They also reduce the burden of reproductive work on women garment workers' shoulders and contribute to the well-being of their families by helping with domestic work. In this sense, the number of women in the household and the marital status of women garment workers are decisive factors in the amount of time and energy that they spend on reproductive work. Married women (with children) spend most of their non-garment work energy and time on reproductive tasks, whereas unmarried and divorced women who live with their mothers spend much less energy and time on reproductive tasks owing to the unpaid labour of their mothers.

Thus, in the case of women garment workers in İzmir, reproductive work is usually not shared between women and men; it is usually other women in the family who take up the reproductive slack when women garment workers' productive work takes precedence. As such, the capitalist labour regime depends on the unpaid reproductive labour of 'women in general', beyond the unpaid reproductive labour of those women who participate directly in labour markets. Capitalists reduce labour costs and men enjoy higher standards of living by taking advantage of women's support networks and exploiting their reproductive labour on a larger social basis.

Being determined by the conditions of their productive and reproductive work, women garment workers have very limited time, energy or money to spend on their own reproduction. Patriarchal oppression by their families reduces their autonomy and further restricts the activities that they enjoy. In comparison to married women (with children), unmarried and divorced women with older or adult children have more freedom, money and time for

themselves. However, women do not completely bow to patriarchal pressure, using tactics (such as lying to their families) to bypass it. In any case, they cannot live the life that they desire. Living and working in poor and precarious conditions, they cannot make future plans. Instead, they have dreams, such as owning a modern house or a car. Their main hope of achieving a better standard of living lies in their children; without exception they dream of their children going to university and climbing the socio-economic ladder. Although it appears unlikely to happen, women sacrifice money, time and energy to make this dream come true.

In conclusion, the overall findings of this study indicate that the material and social conditions of women's productive and reproductive work are inherently linked and shape one another. The subordination and exploitation of women in the production and reproduction realms co-determine and stimulate each other. Accordingly, any class analysis of capitalist production relations or study of women's labour market participation must also consider women's reproductive labour in the family.

9.5. Limitations of the Thesis and Recommendations for Future Research

This study has two main limitations. The first is that it did not examine class and gender relations in garment workplaces where there is strong unionisation among workers or where a unionisation process is under way. Instead, it prioritised intra-class and intra-gender relationships in contexts lacking class and feminist struggles. These, unfortunately, are dominant across the garment industry in İzmir and more generally across the country. A further study could examine the effects of class and feminist struggles in workplaces on intra-class and intra-gender relationships on the shop floor.

The second limitation of this study is the lack of analysis of Syrian women garment workers' reproductive work. Because the research sample included only two Syrian girls (aged 15 and 19, working in Cold Atelier), it was not possible to make a satisfactory analysis. The reproductive work of Syrian refugee women and its relations with their paid work would be a fruitful area

for further work. How does migration shape Syrian women's reproductive work burden? How does being a refugee influence Syrian people's access to public services such as health and education? How does their (lack of) access to public services influence Syrian women's reproductive work in the family? In what ways does the language barrier affect the reproductive work burden of Syrian women who do not speak Turkish? How do the productive work and reproductive work of Syrian women shape one another under these particular conditions?

Further research regarding the women's reserve army of reproductive labour would also be worthwhile. For instance, what are the specific material and social conditions that lead women to become members of this reserve army? How do the women who carry out reproductive work across different households manage their onerous responsibilities? How do these reproductive responsibilities influence their own employment status? What do these women think and feel about their reproductive work?

Despite the importance of women's reproductive work and its relations with their paid work, there remains a scarcity of research on this issue. Further studies could usefully apply similar research to other industrial and non-industrial sectors. This would allow us to see the particular ways in which women's productive and reproductive work shape each other depending on labour regimes in different sectors, such as services, agriculture or technology-intensive manufacturing, and among different groups of women with different levels of education or levels of (household) income.

Women, historically and today, carry the bulk of the burden of maintaining societies. Although this has formed the basis of their oppression and exploitation, it also points to the great transformative potential of women. This research has offered valuable insights into their productive work in the garment industry and reproductive work in the family, and the close interaction between the two. I hope it will be of use to women workers in their struggle against their oppression and exploitation, in Turkey as well as elsewhere.

Appendix 1: Interviews with Women Workers

Interviewee	Age	Educational Status	Marital Status	# of children	Birth of place and Ethno-Religious Identity	Workplace	Employment	Age started garment work	Union Membership	Code of the interview
Aliye	36	Primary School-left	Married	1	Erzurum Kurdish-Alevi	Grey Factory	Quality Control	14	None	36/W/FW
Damla	29	Vocational School of Higher Education	Single	-	Diyarbakır Kurdish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Quality Control Supervisor	22	None	29/W/FW
Esin	50	High School	Second Marriage	2	İzmir (İzmir) ⁴⁹ Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Packaging	47	None	50/W/FW
Emine	26	Primary School-left	Single	-	Erzurum Arab-Sunni	Grey Factory	Sewing Machine Operator	15	None	26/W/FW
Arzu	27	High School-left	Married	-	İzmir (Afyon) Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Packaging	18	None	27/W/FW
Hasibe	42	Primary School	Married	2	İzmir (Ağrı) Kurdish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Quality Control	27	None	42/W/FW
Kader	37	Primary School-left	Married	-	İzmir (Mardin) Arab-Sunni	Grey Factory	Sewing Machine Operator	13	None	37/W/FW
Handan	38	Primary School-left	Married	3	İzmir (Bulgaria) Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Quality Control	13	None	38/W/FW
Suzan	40	Primary School-left	Married	3	Isparta Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Helper	37	None	40/W/FW
Sultan	45	High School	Married	1	Bulgaria Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Forewoman	25	None	45/W/FW

⁴⁹ Cities shown in parentheses are the birth places of the parents of those who were born in İzmir.

Eda	35	Primary School-left	Single	-	Manisa Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Quality Control	17	None	35/ W/ FW
Sema	28	Primary School-left	Single	-	İzmir (Sivas/Ağrı) Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Needle Control Procedure	14	None	28/ W/ FW
Nazan	33	Primary School	Married	1	Şanlıurfa Kurdish/ Turkish	Grey Factory	Quality Control	15	None	33/ W/ FW
Sevgi	32	Primary School	Married	2	Ardahan Kurdish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Sewing Machine Operator	13	None	32/ W/ FW
Alev	40	Primary School	Married	-	Tunceli Kurdish-Alevi	Grey Factory	Sewing Machine Operator	16	None	40/ W/ FW
Melike	38	Primary School	Divorced	1	Afyon Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Quality Control Supervisor	16	None	38/ W/ FW
Elif	36	Primary School	Married	2	Erzincan Kurdish-Alevi	Grey Factory	Thread Cleaning	15	None	36/ W/ FW
Nurcan	43	Primary School	Widowed	2	Yozgat Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Sewing Machine Operator	16	None	43/ W/ FW
Aysun	40	Primary School	Divorced	1	Tokat Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Quality Control Supervisor	14	None	40/ W/ FW
Selma	46	High School	Divorced	2	Aydın Turkish-Sunni	Grey Factory	Quality Control	24	None	46/ W/ FW
Canan	46	Primary school	Divorced	2	Nevşehir Turkish-Sunni	Cold Atelier	Helper (multi-task)	41	None	46/ W/ AW
Ceylan	36	Unschool ed	Married	2	Kars Kurdish-Sunni	Cold Atelier	Sewing Machine Operator	18	None	36/ W/ AW

Melek	41	Primary School	Second Marriage	2	İzmir (Aydın) Turkish-Sunni	Dark Atelier	Sewing Machine Operator	14	None	41/ W/ AW
Zuhal	39	Primary School	Divorced	2	İzmir (Bitlis) Kurdish-Sunni	Dark Atelier	Sewing Machine Operator	12	None	39/ W/ AW
Nur	26	Primary School	Single	-	Mardin Kurdish-Sunni	Atelier	Sewing Machine Operator	12	None	26/ W/ AW
Bahar	27	Primary School-left	Married	-	Van Kurdish-Sunni	Secret Atelier	Sewing Machine Operator	11	None	27/ W/ AW
Delal	20	Primary School	Single	-	İzmir (Mardin) Kurdish-Sunni	Secret Atelier	Multi-task/ Assistant Forewoman	14	None	20/ W/ AW
Hatice	48	Unschool ed	Married	2	Batman Kurdish-Sunni	White Atelier	Forewoman / Cutter	14	None	48/ W/ AW
Hazal	51	Unschool ed	Married	2	Batman Kurdish-Sunni	Atelier	Sewing Machine Operator	14	None	51/ W/ AW
Meral	33	High School	Single	-	Erzurum Turkish-Sunni	Atelier	Embroider	23	None	33/ W/ AW
Asya	32	High School	Single	-	Afyon Turkish-Sunni	Former Factory Worker	Sewing Machine Operator	20	Former Member (Deri-Teks)	32/ W/ FW
Helin	25	Primary School	Single	-	Muş Kurdish-Sunni	Former Factory worker	Packaging	16	Member Deri-Teks	25/ W/ FW
Nermin	35	Primary School	Divorced	1	Aydın Turkish-Sunni	Former Factory worker	Dyeing	27	Former Member (Deri-Teks)	35/ W/ FW
Funda	26	Vocational School of Higher Education	Single	-	İzmir (İzmir) Turkish Alevi	Atelier	Pattern Design	20	None	26/ W/ AW

Hasret	32	Primary School-left	Single	-	Diyarbakır Kurdish-Sunni	Atelier	Multi-Task Forewoman	17	None	32/ W/ AW
Dilber	55	High School	Married	5	Diyarbakır Turkish-Sunni	Home-Based	Embroidery	45	None	55/ W/ HW
Fidan	38	Unschool ed	Married	2	Sivas Turkish-Sunni	Former Home-Based Worker	Embroidery	23	None	38/ W/ HW
Ayten 1 st Group Interview	43	Primary School	Married	4	Mardin Kurdish-Sunni	Home-Based	Embroidery	30	None	43/ W/ HW
Fatma 1 st Group Interview	38	Unschool ed	Married	3	Mardin Kurdish-Sunni	Home-Based	Embroidery	25	None	38/ W/ HW
Zeynep 1 st Group Interview	42	Unschool ed	Married	4	Mardin Kurdish-Sunni	Home-Based	Embroidery	29	None	42/ W/ HW
Esmâ	48	Primary School	Married	2	Sivas Turkish-Sunni	Home-Based	Middle-woman	43	None	48/ W/ HW
Havva	35	Primary School	Married	2	İzmir(Manisa-Sivas) Turkish-Sunni	Home-Based	Embroidery	33	None	35/ W/ HW
Berivan 2 nd Group Interview	32	Unschool ed	Married	4	Erzurum Kurdish-Sunni	Home-Based	Embroidery	24	None	32/ W/ HW
Adar 2 nd Group Interview	35	Primary School	Married	3	Van Kurdish-Sunni	Home-Based	Embroidery	27	None	35/ W/ HW
Halime 2 nd Group Interview	48	Unschool ed	Married	3	Bingöl Kurdish-Sunni	Home-Based	Embroidery	40	None	48/ W/ HW
Rojda 2 nd Group Interview	34	Primary School	Married	3	İzmir (Erzurum) Kurdish-Sunni	Home-Based	Embroidery	26	None	34/ W/ HW

Hayat	33	Unschool ed	Married	5	Erzurum Kurdish- Sunni	Home- Based	Middle- woman	23	None	33/ W/ HW
Sevda	36	Primary School	Married	1	Erzincan Kurdish- Alevi	Atelier	Sewing Machine Operator	14	None	36/ W/ AW
Reyhan	55	Primary School	Married	2	İzmir (Sivas) Turkish- Sunni	Home- Based	Embroidery	40	None	55/ W/ HW
Derya	39	Primary School	Married	2	İzmir (Sivas) Turkish- Sunni	Home- Based (Forme r Factory Worker)	Middle- woman	15	None	39/ W/ HW

Appendix 2: Date and Place of Interviews with Women Workers

Interviewee	Date of interview	Place of interview	Location (District-Neighbourhood)
Aliye	1 October 2015	Her house	Buca- Kozağaç
Damla	2 October 2015	Her house	Bornova- Osmangazi
Esin	3 October 2015	Her house	Buca-Evka1
Emine	3 October 2015	Her house	Buca- Yıldız
Arzu	5 October 2015	Her house	Buca- Kozağaç
Hasibe	6 October 2015	My house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Kader	22 October 2015	Her house	Buca- Yıldız
Handan	23 October 2015	Café	Buca
Suzan	25 October 2015	Her house	Buca- Kozağaç
Sultan	25 October 2015	Her house	Bornova- Atatürk
Eda	3 December 2015	My house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Sema	4 December 2015	Her house	Buca- Adatepe
Nazan	7 December 2015	My house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Sevgi	8 December 2015	My house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Alev	10 December 2015	My house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Melike	11 December 2015	Her house	Buca- Adatepe
Elif	12 December 2015	My house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Nurcan	20 December 2015	Her house	Buca- Yıkıkkemer
Aysun	21 December 2015	My house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Selma	23 December 2015	My house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Canan	19 January 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Günaltay
Ceylan	21 January 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Günaltay
Melek	6 February 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Günaltay
Zuhal	9 February 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Günaltay
Nur	15 February 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Sevgi
Bahar	16 February 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Günaltay
Delal	17 February 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Günaltay
Hatice	6 March 2016	Her house	Buca-Evka1
Hazal	6 March 2016	Her house	Buca-Evka1
Meral	8 March 2016	My house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Asya	11 March 2016	Café	Torbalı
Helin	14 March 2016	Café	Çiğli
Nermin	26 March 2016	Her house	Karabağlar
Funda	2 April 2016	My house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Hasret	2 April 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Bozyaka
Dilber	2 April 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Bozyaka
Fidan	10 May 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Limontepe
Ayten	11 May 2016	Fatma's house	Karabağlar- Limontepe
Fatma	11 May 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Limontepe
Zeynep	11 May 2016	Fatma's house	Karabağlar- Limontepe
Esmâ	17 May 2016	Her house	Karabağlar- Limontepe
Havva	17 May 2016	Esmâ's one-room shop	Karabağlar- Limontepe
Berivan	23 May 2016	Hayat's one-room shop	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Adar	23 May 2016	Hayat's one-room shop	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Halime	23 May 2016	Hayat's one-room shop	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Rojda	23 May 2016	Hayat's one-room shop	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Hayat	25 May 2016	Her one-room shop	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Sevda	25 May 2016	Her house	Buca- Kuruçeşme
Reyhan	6 June 2016	Her house	Buca- Buca Koop.
Derya	6 June 2016	Reyhan's house	Buca- Buca Koop.

Appendix 3: Interviews with Employers

Interviewee	Gender	Age	Company Name	No. of employees	Company Location	Date of Interview	Interview Code
1.Semih	Man	49	Grey Factory	200	Buca	15 September 2015	49/M/FO
2.Osman	Man	47	Cold Atelier	14	Karabağlar	13 February 2016	47/M/AO
3. Kerime	Woman	37	Dark Atelier	8	Karabağlar	8 February 2016	37/W/AO
4. Leman	Woman	28	Secret Atelier	11	Karabağlar	11 February 2016	28/W/AO
5. Melih	Man	35	White Atelier	6	Konak	2 March 2016	35/M/AO
6. Hayri	Man	52	Star Factory	125	Gaziemir	23 March 2016	52/M/FO
7. Gamze	Woman	56	Fashion Factory	62	Buca	24 March 2016	56/W/FO
8. Arif	Man	42	Blue Factory	72	Bornava	7 April 2016	42/M/FO

Appendix 4: Other Interviews

Interviewee	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
President of İzmir branch of the Trade Union of Textile, Knitting, Clothing and Leather Workers'	11 March 2016 and 8 April 2016	The office of the union and a café (İzmir)
President of Aegean branch of Öz İplik-İş	17 March 2016	The office of the union (İzmir)
President of İzmir branch of Weaving and Textile Workers' Trade Union	9 March 2016 and 14 March 2016	Café and the office of the union (İzmir)
President of Söke branch of Textile Workers' Trade Union	8 April 2016	The office of the union (İzmir)
A group of unionists from İzmir branch of Revolutionary Textile Workers' Trade Union	15 September 2015	The office of the union (İzmir)
Official from Aegean Exporters' Associations	15 March 2016	The office of the association (İzmir)
Official from Aegean Region Chamber of Industry	16 March 2016	The office of the association (İzmir)
Official from Aegean Clothing Manufacturers' Association	15 March 2016	The office of the association (İzmir)
Official from İzmir Chamber of Commerce	16 March 2016	The office of the association (İzmir)
President of Turkish Clothing Manufacturers' Association	18 April 2016	His office (İstanbul)
Fashion, Textile, Garment Industrialists Businessmen Association	7 April 2016	The office of the association (İzmir)
Official from İzmir Branch of TURKSTAT	20 April 2016	The office of the institution (İzmir)
A woman from İzmir Women's Labour Platform	6 April 2016	Café (İzmir)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acar, F. & Altunok, G. (2013). The 'politics of intimate' at the intersection of neoliberalism and neo-conservatism in contemporary Turkey. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 41, 14–23.
- Acker, J. (1988). Class, Gender, and the Relations of Distribution. *Signs*, 13(3), 473-497.
- Afshar, H. & Barrientos, S. (1999). Introduction: Women Globalization and Fragmentation. In H. Afshar & S. Barrientos (Eds.), *Women, Globalization and Fragmentation in the Developing World*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Akça, İ. (2014). Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey and the Changing Forms of Authoritarianism. In İ. Akça, A. Bekmen & B. A. Özden (Eds.), *Turkey Reframed Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*. London: Pluto Press.
- Akça, İ., Bekmen, A. & Özden, B. A. (2014). Introduction. In İ. Akça, A. Bekmen & B. A. Özden (Eds.), *Turkey Reframed Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*. London: Pluto Press.
- Anderson, B. (2001). Just Another Job? Paying for Domestic Work. *Gender and Development*, 9(1), 25-33.
- Anderson, K. & Jack, D. C. (1991). Learning to Listen: Interview Techniques and Analyses. In S. B. Gluck & D. Patai (Eds.), *Women's Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History*. New York: Routledge.
- Anner, M. S. (2011). *Solidarity Transformed: Labor Responses to Globalization and Crisis in Latin America*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Anner, M. S. (2015). Labor control regimes and worker resistance in global supply chains. *Labor History*, 56:3, 292-307.
- Arnold, D. & Bongiovi, J. R. (2013). Precarious, Informalizing, and Flexible Work: Transforming Concepts and Understandings. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(3), 289 –308.

- Arruzza, C. (2016). Functionalist, Determinist, Reductionist: Social Reproduction Feminism and its Critics. *Science & Society, 80(1)*, 9–30.
- ASPB [The Ministry of Family and Social Policies] (2011). Türkiye’de Aile Yapısı Araştırması, 2011 [A Research on Family Structure in Turkey, 2011]. Retrieved November 10, 2017 from <http://www.cocukhaklariizleme.org/wp-content/uploads/turkiyenin-aile-yapisi-arastirmasi-20111.pdf>
- Atılğan, S. (2007). Evden İçeri Bir Ev: Ev Eksenli Üretim ve Kadın Emeği [A Home beyond Home: Home-based Production and Women’s Labour]. *Birikim, 217*, 134–140.
- Aydiner-Avşar, N. & Onaran, Ö. (2010). The Determinants of Employment: A Sectoral Analysis for Turkey. *The Developing Economies, 48(2)*, 203–31.
- Bakır, O. (2017). Türkiye’de Kiralık İşçilik ve Özel İstihdam Büroları [Labour for Rent and Private Employment Agencies in Turkey]. *Emek Araştırma Dergisi (GEAD), 8(11)*, 129-135.
- Bakker, I. (2007). Social Reproduction and the Constitution of a Gendered Political Economy. *New Political Economy, 12(4)*, 541-556.
- Balaban, U. (2011). *A Conveyor Belt of Flesh Urban Space and the Proliferation of Industrial Labor Practices in Istanbul’s Garment Industry*. İstanbul: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Balaban, U., & Sarıoğlu, E. (2008). *Home-Based Work in Istanbul: Varieties of Organization and Patriarchy* (Working Paper, Social Policy Forum). Retrieved March 10, 2018 from http://www.spf.boun.edu.tr/docs/HBW_in_Istanbul_Varieties_of_Organization_and_Patriarchy.pdf
- Bannerji, H. (2005). Building from Marx: Reflections on Class and Race. *Social Justice, 32(4)*, 144-160.

- Barrett, M. (1980). *Women's Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis*. London: Verso.
- Barrientos, S. & Smith, S. (2006). *ETI Impact Assessment 2006*. London: Ethical Trading Initiative.
- Barrientos, S. (2001). Gender, Flexibility and Global Value Chains. *IDS Bulletin*, 32(3), 83-93.
- Barrientos, S. (2013). 'Labour Chains': Analysing the Role of Labour Contractors in Global Production Networks. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 49(8), 1058-1071.
- Başlevent, C. & Onaran, Ö. (2003). Are Married Women in Turkey More Likely to Become Added or Discouraged Workers?. *Labour*, 17(3), 439–458.
- Başlevent, C. & Onaran, Ö. (2004). The Effect of Export-Oriented Growth on Female Labor Market Outcomes in Turkey. *World Development*, 32(8), 1375–1393.
- BBC (24 November 2014). Turkey president Erdogan: Women are not equal to men. Retrieved February 16, 2015, from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30183711>
- BBC (24 October 2016). Child refugees in Turkey making clothes for UK shops. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37716463>
- Bekmen, A. (2014). State and Capital in Turkey During the Neoliberal Era. In İ. Akça, A. Bekmen & B. A. Özden (Eds.), *Turkey Reframed Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*. London: Pluto Press.
- Beneria, L. (2003). *Gender, Development, and Globalization: Economics as if People Mattered*. New York: Routledge.
- Bennholdt-Thomsen, V. (1981). Subsistence Production and Extended Reproduction. In by K. Young, C. Wolkowitz & R. McCullagh (Eds.), *Of*

Marriage and the Market: Women's Subordination in the International Perspective. London: CSE Books

Bernard, H. R. (2011). *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches.* Lanham: Altamira Press.

Bernstein, H. (2007). Capital and labour from centre to margins. Paper presented at *The Living on the Margins Conference* (Stellenbosch, 26-28 March 2007). Retrieved on March 28, 2015, from <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.464.2120&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

Beşpınar, F. U. (2010). Questioning agency and empowerment: Women's work-related strategies and social class in urban Turkey. *Women's Studies International Forum, 33*, 523–532.

Bhasin, K. (2004). *What is Patriarchy?* New Delhi: Pauls Press.

Bhattacharya, S. (2014). Is Labour Still a Relevant Category for Praxis? Critical Reflections on Some Contemporary Discourses on Work and Labour in Capitalism. *Development and Change, 45*(5), 941–962.

Bhattacharya, T. (2017a). Introduction: Mapping Social Reproduction. In T. Bhattacharya (Ed.), *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression.* London: Pluto Press.

Bhattacharya, T. (2017b). How not to Skip Class: Social Reproduction of Labor and the Global Working Class. In T. Bhattacharya (Ed.), *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression.* London: Pluto Press.

Bianet (09 January 2015). Aile Programında Erkeğin Adı Yok [The man has no name in the Family Program]. Retrieved November 3, 2017 from <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/kadin/161439-aile-programinda-erkegin-adi-yok>

- Bianet* (28 January 2015). Davutoğlu'nun Ekonomik Kalkınma Planı: Evlilik ve İnşaat [The Development Plan of Davutoğlu: Marriage and Construction]. Retrieved February 2, 2015 from <http://bianet.org/bianet/ekonomi/161867-davutoglu-nun-ekonomik->
- Birgün* (13 July 2017). We make use of state of emergency to ban strikes, says Turkey's Erdoğan. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from [https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/we-make-use-of-emergency-to-ban-strikes-says-turkey-s-erdogan-169586.html](https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/we-make-use-of-state-of-emergency-to-ban-strikes-says-turkey-s-erdogan-169586.html)
- Birgün* (3 February 2016). Davutoğlu: Doğum yapan kadın aslında vatani bir görev yapıyor [Davutoğlu: The woman giving birth is actually doing a national duty]. Retrieved November 8, 2017 from <https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/davutoglu-dogum-yapan-kadin-aslinda-vatani-bir-gorev-yapiyor-102669.html>
- Blank, G. (2014). Class and the Renewal of Historical Materialism. *Workers of the World: International Journal on Strikes and Social Conflicts*, 1(4), 6-33.
- Boratav, K. (1990). Inter-class and Intra-class Relations of Distribution under Structural Adjustment: Turkey during the 1980s. In T. Arıcanlı & D. Rodrik (Eds.), *The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Braudel, F. (1981). *The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Breman, J. & van der Linden, M. (2014). Informalizing the Economy: The Return of the Social. *Development and Change* 45(5), 920–940.
- Breman, J. (2013). A bogus concept?. *New Left Review*, 84, 130-138.
- Brooks, E. C. (2007). *Unraveling the Garment Industry: Transnational Organizing and Women's Work*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- Brown, D., McGranahan, G. & Dodman, D. (2014). *Urban informality and building a more inclusive, resilient and green economy* (IIED Working Paper. London: International Institute for Environment and Development). Retrieved March 12, 2017, from <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10722IIED.pdf>
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- BSCI & FTO (2017). *Syrian Nationals Working in Turkish Supply Chains*. Retrieved March 21, 2018, from http://www.amfori.org/sites/default/files/Guidance-Documents-Syrians-in-Turkey_FINAL_ENG-July2017.pdf
- Buğra, A. & Keyder, Ç. (2003). *New Poverty and Changing Welfare Regime of Turkey*. Report prepared for United Nations Development Programme. Ankara: UNDP.
- Burawoy, M. (1979). *Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Burawoy, M. (1998). The Extended Case Method. *Sociological Theory*, 16(1), 4-33.
- Burawoy, M. (2000). Introduction: Reaching for the Global. In M. Burawoy et al., *Global ethnography: Forces, connections, and imaginations in a postmodern world*. London: University of California Press.
- Burgess, R. G. (1991). Sponsors, Gatekeepers, Members, and Friends: Access in Educational Settings. In W. B. Shaffir & R. A. Stebbins (Eds.), *Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publications.
- Çamur, A. (2017). Suriyeli Mülteciler ve Belediyelerin Sorumluluğu: İzmir Örneği [Syrian Refugees and the Responsibility of Municipalities: The case of İzmir]. *Bitlis Eren Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 6(2), 113-129.

- Caraway, T. L. (2005). The Political Economy of Feminization: From “Cheap Labor” to Gendered Discourses of Work. *Politics and Gender*, 1(3), 399-429.
- Caraway, T. L. (2007). *Assembling Women: The Feminization of Global Manufacturing*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Carr, C., Chen, M. A. & Tate, J. (2000). Globalization and Home-Based Workers. *Feminist Economics*, 6(3), 123-142.
- Carr, M. & Chen, M. A. (2001). *Globalization and The Informal Economy: How Global Trade and Investment Impact on the Working Poor*. Geneva: ILO.
- Carswell, G. & De Neve, G. (2013). Labouring for global markets: Conceptualising labour agency in global production networks. *Geoforum*, 44, 62–70.
- Castells M. & Portes A. (1991). World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy. In A. Portes, M. Castells & L. A. Benton (Eds.), *The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries*. London: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Castells, M. (2010). *The Rise of the Network Society*. West-Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing.
- CCC [Clean Clothes Campaign] (2005). *Workers’ Voices: The situation of women in the Eastern European and Turkish garment industries*. Retrieved November 15, 2017 from <https://cleanclothes.org/resources/national-cccs/05-workers-voices.pdf/view>
- CCC (2014). *Stitched Up: Poverty wages for garment workers in Eastern Europe and Turkey*. Retrieved November 15, 2017 from <https://cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/stitched-up-1>
- Çelik, A. (2015). *The Right to Strike is Under Threat in Turkey*. Retrieved February 2, 2015, from <http://azizcelik.org/2015/01/31/the-right-to-strike-under-threat-in-turkey/>

- Chan, J. W. (2006). Chinese Women Workers Organize in the Export Zone. *New Labor Forum*, 15(1), 19-27.
- Chang, D. (2009). Informalising labour in Asia's Global Factory. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 39(2), 161-179.
- Chari, S. (2003). Marxism, Sarcasm, Ethnography: Geographical Fieldnotes From South India. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 24(2), 169-183.
- Chen, M., Vanek, J. & Heinzl, J. (2006). Informality, Gender and Poverty: A Global Picture. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 41(21), 2131-2139.
- Chen, M.A. (2007). *Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy and the Formal Regulatory Environment* (DESA Working Paper No46). Retrieved February 12, 2017, from http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp46_2007.pdf
- Çınar, E. M. (1994). Unskilled Urban Migrant Women and Disguised Employment: Home-working Women in Istanbul, Turkey. *World Development*, 22(3), 369-380.
- Civelekoğlu, İ. (2015). Enough is Enough What do the Gezi Protestors Want to Tell Us? A Political Economy Perspective. In I. David & K. F. Toktamış (Eds.), *Everywhere Taksim: Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- CNN (9 June 2016). 7 times Turkish President 'mansplained' womanhood. Retrieved November 10, 2017 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/09/europe/erdogan-turkey-mansplained-womanhood/index.html>
- Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (2017). *Ekim 2017 Açlık ve Yoksulluk Sınırı* [The Hunger and Poverty Lines in October 2017]. Retrieved November 16, 2017 from <http://www.turkis.org.tr/EKIM-2017-ACLIK-ve-YOKSULLUK-SINIRI-d11626>

- Corfield, P. J. (2011). *Dorothy Thompson and the Thompsonian Project*. Paper presented at *The Eighth Historical Materialism Annual Conference* (12 November). Retrieved on March 18, 2015, from http://www.penelopejcorfield.co.uk/PDF%27s/CorfieldPdf19_DorothyThompson-and-the-ThompsonianProject.pdf
- Coşar, S. & Yeğenoğlu, M. (2009). The Neoliberal Restructuring of Turkey's Social Security System. *Monthly Review*, 60(11), 36-49.
- Coşar, S. & Yeğenoğlu, M. (2011). New Grounds for Patriarchy in Turkey? Gender Policy in the Age of AKP. *South European Society and Politics*, 16(4), 555-573.
- CSGB (2011). Hazır Giyim Sektöründe Çalışan İşçilerin (Risk Grubu: Kadın İşçi) Çalışma Koşullarının İyileştirilmesi Programlı Teftişi Sonuç Raporu [The Audit Report on the Improvement of Garment Worker's Work Conditions (Risk Group: Women Workers)]. Retrieved on November 24, 2017, from https://www.csgb.gov.tr/media/6009/2011_52.pdf
- CSGB (2014). Ulusal İstihdam Stratejisi (2014-2023): Tekstil ve Hazır Giyim Sektörü Raporu 2014 Yılı II. Dönem [The National Employment Strategy (2014-2013): Textile and Garment Sectors Report, 2014 Second Period]. Retrieved on November 25, 2017, from www.uis.gov.tr/media/1086/tekstil_hazir_giyim_sektoru.docx
- CSGB (2015a). 6356 Sayılı Sendikalar Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Kanunu Gereğince; İşkollarındaki İşçi Sayıları Ve Sendikaların Üye Sayılarına İlişkin 2015 Temmuz Ayı İstatistikleri Hakkında Tebliğ [In Compliance with the Law No 6356 on Trade Unions and Collective Labour Agreements: Communiqué Regarding the Numbers of Workers According to the Sector of Activity and Union Membership: July 2015]. Retrieved October 24, 2017 from https://www.csgb.gov.tr/media/1721/2015_temmuz_6856.pdf

- CSGB (2015b). *Hazır Giyim Sektöründe Çalışan İşçilerin Çalışma Koşullarının İyileştirilmesi Programlı Teftişi Sonuç Raporu* [The Audit Report on the Working Conditions of Garment Workers]. Retrieved November 20, 2017 from https://www.csgeb.gov.tr/media/6069/2016_81_hazirgiyim.pdf
- CSGB (2015c). *Çalışma Hayatı İstatistikleri, 2015* [Working Life Statistics, 2015]. Retrieved November 20, 2017 from https://www.csgeb.gov.tr/media/3299/calisma_hayati_2015.pdf
- CSGB (2017). *6356 Sayılı Sendikalar Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Kanunu Gereğince;İşkollarındaki İşçi Sayıları Ve Sendikaların Üye Sayılarına İlişkin 2017 Ocak Ayı İstatistikleri Hakkında Tebliğ* [In Compliance with the Law No 6356 on Trade Unions and Collective Labour Agreements: Communiqué Regarding the Numbers of Workers According to the Sector of Activity and Union Membership: January 2017]. Retrieved October 24, 2017 from https://www.csgeb.gov.tr/media/5203/2017_ocak_6356_duzenlenmis.pdf
- CSGB (n.d.). *Yıllar İtibariyle İmzalanan Toplu İş Sözleşmeleri: 1984-2015* [Collective Labour Agreements Signed by Years: 1984-2015]. Retrieved October 24, 2017 from <https://www.csgeb.gov.tr/media/3248/tis.pdf>
- Cumhuriyet* (10 June 2017). Taşeron yüzde 500 arttı [Subcontracting increased by 500%]. Retrieved July 8, 2018 from http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/ekonomi/758388/Taseron_yuzde_500_artti.html
- Dalla Costa, M. & James, S. (1971). *Women and the Subversion of the Community*. Retrieved on March 18, 2015 from <https://libcom.org/library/power-women-subversion-community-della-costa-selma-james>
- De Beauvoir, S. (1956). *The Second Sex*. London: Jonathan Cape.

- De Neve, G. (2001). Towards an Ethnography of the Workplace: Hierarchy, Authority and Sociability on the South Indian Textile Shop-Floor. *South Asia Research*, 21 (2), 133–160.
- De Neve, G. (2008). 'We Are All Sondukarar (Relatives)!': Kinship and Its Morality in an Urban Industry of Tamilnadu, South India. *Modern Asian Studies*, 42(1), 211-246.
- Dedeoğlu, S. (2000). Toplumsal cinsiyet rolleri açısından Türkiye’de aile ve kadın emeği [Family and women’s labour in terms of social gender roles in Turkey]. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 86, 139-170.
- Dedeoğlu, S. (2010). Visible Hands – Invisible Women: Garment Production in Turkey. *Feminist Economics*, 16(4), 1-32.
- Dedeoğlu, S. (2011a). Garment Ateliers and Women Workers in Istanbul: Wives, Daughters and Azerbaijani Immigrants. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 47(4), 663-674.
- Dedeoğlu, S. (2011b). Gendering Industrial Subcontracting Work: A Qualitative Study of Garment Ateliers in Istanbul. *Asian Women*, 27(3), 25-51.
- Dedeoğlu, S. (2012). *Women Workers in Turkey: Global Industrial Production in Istanbul*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Dejardin, A. K. & Owens, J. (2009, February). *Asia in the Global Economic Crisis: Impacts and Responses from a Gender Perspective*. Paper presented at the ILO High-level Regional Forum on Responding to the Economic Crisis – Coherent Policies for Growth, Employment and Decent Work in Asia and the Pacific, Manila, Philippines.
- Demirtaş, N. & Şen, S. (2007). Varoş Identity: The Redefinition of Low Income Settlements in Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43(1), 87-106.
- Denning, M. (2010). Wageless Life. *New Left Review*, 66, 79-97.

- Devereux, S., & Hoddinott, J. (1993). Part 1 Overview: fieldwork from start to finish. In S. Devereux & J. Hoddinott (Eds.), *Fieldwork in developing countries*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Doğan, M. G. (2014). The Deradicalisation of Organised Labour. In İ. Akça, A. Bekmen & B. A. Özden (Eds.), *Turkey Reframed Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*. London: Pluto Press.
- DPT (1989). *Altinci Bes Yillik Kalkinma Planı 1990-1994* [The Sixth Five-Year Development Plan]. Retrieved November 20, 2017, from <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Lists/Kalkinma%20Planlar/Attachments/4/plan6>.
- Ecevit, Y. (1991). Shop floor control: the ideological construction of Turkish women factory workers. In N. Redclift & M. T. Sinclair (Eds.), *Working women: International perspectives on labour and gender ideology*. London: Routledge.
- Edmonds, E. V. (2003). *Child Labour in South Asia* (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No.5). Retrieved on 02 August, 2017, from <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/586070427316.pdf?expires=1501680631&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=13D93B083BCC637E90AE73C92A867A89>
- Ehrenreich, B. & Hochschild, A. R. (Eds.) (2003). *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Eichler, M. & Albanese, P. (2007). What is Household Work? A Critique of Assumptions Underlying Empirical Studies of Housework and an Alternative Approach. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 32(2), 227-258.
- Elson, D. & Pearson, R. (1981). The Subordination of Women and the Internalisation of Factory Production. In K. Young, C. Wolkowitz & R. McCullagh (Eds.), *Of Marriage and the Market: Women's Subordination in the International Perspective*. London: CSE Books.

- Elson, D. (1994). Chapter 10: Uneven Development And The Textiles And Clothing Industry. In L. Sklair (Ed.), *Capitalism & Development*. London: Routledge.
- Engels, F. (1890). *Letter to J. Bloch*. Retrieved October 6, 2017, from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1890/letters/90_09_21.htm
- Engels, F. (1972 [1884]). *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*. London: Pathfinder Press.
- England P. & Folbre, N. (1999). The Cost of Caring. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 561, 39-51.
- Eraydın, A. & Erendil, A. (1999). The Role of Female Labour in Industrial Restructuring: New production processes and labour market relations in the Istanbul clothing industry. *Gender, Place and Culture*, 6(3), 259–272.
- Erdoğan, N. (2012). Devlet Okullarında Sınıflar ve “Sınıflar” [The Classrooms and “Classes” in State Schools]. Retrieved on May 10, 2018, from <http://www.muhalet.org/haber-sinif-karsilasmalari-3-devlet-okullarinda-siniflar-ve-siniflar-necmi-erdogan-13-3106.aspx>
- Erol et al. (2017). *Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Türkiye’de Emek Piyasasına Dahil Olma Süreçleri ve Etkileri: İstanbul Tekstil Sektörü Örneği* [The process of Syrian Refugees’ labour market involvement and Its Effects: The Case of the İstanbul Textile Sector]. İstanbul: Birleşik Metal-İş Yayınları.
- Esbenshade, J. (2004). *Monitoring Sweatshops: Workers, Consumers, and the Global Apparel Industry*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Evans, A. (2017). Patriarchal unions = weaker unions? Industrial relations in the Asian garment industry. *Third World Quarterly*, 38(7), 1619-1638.
- Evrensel* (10 November 2017). Erdoğan: Nikahlanın, evlenin, çoğalın [Erdoğan: Marry, reproduce]. Retrieved November 11, 2017 from

<https://www.evrensel.net/haber/337625/erdogan-nikahlanin-evlenin-cogalin>

Eyübođlu, A., Özar, Ş. & Tufan, H. (1998). Kentli kadınların çalışma koşulları ve çalışma yaşamını terk nedenleri [Urban women's working conditions and reasons for leaving working life]. *İktisat Dergisi*, 377, 37-43.

Federici, S. (2006). *Precarious Labor: "A Feminist Viewpoint"*. Retrieved on March 18, 2015 from <https://inthemiddleofthewhirlwind.wordpress.com/precarious-labor-a-feminist-viewpoint/>

Federici, S. (2012). *Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle*. New York: Autonomedia.

Federici, S. (2014 [2004]). *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*. New York: Autonomedia.

Ferguson, S., LeBaron, G., Dimitrakaki, A. & Farris, S. (2016). Special Issue on Social Reproduction: Introduction. *Historical Materialism*, 24(2), 25-37.

Fernandes, L. (1997). *Producing Workers: The Politics of Gender, Class, and Culture in the Calcutta Jute Mills*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Finch, J. (1999). It's Great to have Someone to Talk to': Ethics and Politics of Interviewing Women. In M. Hammersley (Ed.), *Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice*. London: Sage Publications.

Folbre, N. & Nelson, J. A. (2000). For Love or Money -- Or Both?. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14(4), 123-140.

Folbre, N. (1991). The Unproductive Housewife: Her Evolution in Nineteenth-Century Economic Thought. *Signs*, 16(3), 463-484.

Folbre, N. (1995). "Holding hands at midnight": The paradox of caring labor. *Feminist Economics*, 1(1), 73-92.

- Folbre, N. (2006). Measuring Care: Gender, Empowerment, and the Care Economy. *Journal of Human Development*, 7(2), 183-199.
- Fortunati, L. (1995). *The Arcane of Reproduction: Housework, Prostitution, Labor and Capital*. New York: Autonomedia.
- Fraser, N. (2017). Crisis of Care? On the Social Reproductive Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism. In T. Bhattacharya (Ed.), *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*. London: Pluto Press.
- Fukunishi, T. & Yumagata, T. (2014). *The Garment Industry in Low-Income Countries: An Entry Point of Industrialization*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- FWF [Fair Wear Foundation] (2015). *Country plan Turkey 2015*. Retrieved November 11, 2017 from <https://www.fairwear.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Country-plan-Turkey-2015.pdf>
- FWF (2017). *How the Syrian conflict is impacting the Turkish garment sector*. Retrieved March 21, 2018, from <https://www.fairwear.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/FWF-article-child-labour-Turkey.pdf>
- Gereffi, G. (1994). The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S. Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks. In G. Gereffi & M. Korzeniewicz (Eds.), *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.
- Göç İdaresi (2016). İstatistik [Statistics]. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/istatistik_558_560_8971
- Göç İdaresi (2018). *Temporary Protection: Distribution of Syrian Refugees in the Scope of Temporary Protection by Province*. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik
- Goger, A. & Ruwanpura, K. N. (2014). *Ethical Reconstruction?: Primitive Accumulation in the Apparel Sector of Eastern Sri Lanka*. ICES Research

Papers, Research Paper No: 14. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from <http://ices.lk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/14-Ethical-Reconstruction.pdf>

Gündüz-Hoşgör, A. & Smits, J. (2008). Variation in labor market participation of married women in Turkey. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 31, 104–117.

Haider, A. & Mohandesi, S. (2015). *Making a Living*. Retrieved October 6, 2017, from <https://www.viewpointmag.com/2015/10/28/making-a-living/>

Hale & J. Wills (Eds.) (2005). *Threads of Labour: Garment Industry Supply Chains from the Workers' Perspective*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Hale, A. (2000). What Hope for “Ethical” Trade in the Globalised Garment Industry?. *Antipode*, 32(4), 349-356.

Hall, C. (1990). The Tale of Samuel and Jemima: Gender and Working-class Culture in Nineteenth-century England. In H. J. Kaye & K. McClelland (Eds.), *E.P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Harding, S. G. (1987). Introduction: Is There a Feminist Method?. In Harding, S. G. (Ed.), *Feminism and methodology: Social science issues*. Indiana University Press.

Harrison, F. V. (2007). Feminist Methodology as a Tool for Ethnographic Inquiry on Globalization. In N. Gunewardena & A. Kingsolver (Eds), *The Gender of Globalization: Women Navigating Cultural and Economic Marginalities*. New Mexico: School for Advanced Research Press.

Hartmann, H. (1981). The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: The Example of Housework. *Signs*, 6(3), 366-394.

Hennessy, R. & C. Ingraham (1997). Introduction: Reclaiming Anticapitalist Feminism. In R. Hennessy & C. Ingraham (Eds.), *Materialist Feminism: A Reader in Class, Difference, and Women's Lives*. London: Routledge.

- Hensman, R. (2001). Globalisation and Informalisation. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 36(13), 1073- 1074.
- Hensman, R. (2011). *Workers, Unions, and Global Capitalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hewamanne, S. (2008). *Stitching Identities in a Free Trade Zone: Gender and Politics in Sri Lanka*. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Himmelweit, S. & Sigala, M. (2003). *Internal and External Constraints on Mothers' Employment: Some Implications for Policy*. (ESRC Future Work, Working Paper No.27). Retrieved on 21 May, 2018, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228897874_Internal_and_external_constraints_on_mothers%27_employment_Some_implications_for_policy%27
- Himmelweit, S. (1999). Caring Labor. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 561, 27-38.
- Himmelweit, S. (2005). *Can we afford (not) to care: prospects and policy* (London School of Economics, Gender Institute New Working Paper Series, Issue 15). Retrieved on 10 May, 2018, from <http://www.lse.ac.uk/gender/assets/documents/research/working-papers/Can-we-afford-not-to-care.pdf>
- Hirway, I. (2015). *Unpaid Work and the Economy: Linkages and Their Implications* (The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No.838). Retrieved on 15 May, 2018, from http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_838.pdf
- Hooks, B. (2000). *Feminism is for Everybody: Passionate Politics*. London: Pluto Press.

- Horn, Z. E. (2010). The effects of the global economic crisis on women in the informal economy: research findings from WIEGO and the Inclusive Cities partners. *Gender and Development*, 18(2), 263-276.
- Horner, R. & Nadvi, K. (2018). Global value chains and the rise of the Global South: unpacking twenty-first century polycentric trade. *Global Networks*, 18(2), 207-237.
- Hoskins, T. E. (2014). *Stitched Up: The Anti-Capitalist Book of Fashion*. London: Pluto Press.
- Humphries, J. (1977). Class Struggle and the Persistence of the Working-Class Family. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 1(3), 241-258.
- Hurley, J. & Miller, D. (2005). The Changing Face of the Global Garment Industry. In A. Hale & J. Wills (Eds.), *Threads of Labour Garment Industry Supply Chains from the Workers' Perspective*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Hürriyet* (21 August 2013). Yeni başkandan açıklama: 3 çocuk yetmez 5 olsun [The new President's statement: 3 children is not enough, let it be 5]. Retrieved November 6, 2017 from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yeni-baskandan-aciklama-3-cocuk-yetmez-5-olsun-24559478>
- Hürriyet* (21 January 2013). Bu fotoğraftan sonra fikrini değiştirdi [He changed his mind after this photo]. Retrieved November 6, 2017 from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/bu-fotograftan-sonra-fikrini-degistirdi-22405839>
- Hürriyet* (23 April 2008). Ayakların başı yönettiği yerde kıyamet kopar [It is the end of world when the tail leads the head]. Retrieved October 30, 2017 from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ayaklarin-basi-yonettigi-yerde-kiyamet-kopar-8766021>
- Hürriyet* (7 March 2008). Erdoğan: En az üç çocuk doğurun [Erdoğan: Give birth to at least three children]. Retrieved November, 7, 2017, from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-en-az-uc-cocuk-dogurun-8401981>

İHA (8 June 2013). Şahidi, Bakan Şimşek oldu [The marriage witness was Minister Şimşek]. Retrieved November 6, 2017 from <http://www.ih.com.tr/haber-sahidi-bakan-simsek-oldu-280090/>

İlkkaracan, İ. (2010). Uzlaştırma Politikalarının Yokluğunda Türkiye Emek Piyasasında Toplumsal Cinsiyet Eşitsizlikleri [Gender Inequalities in the Turkish Labour Market in the Absence of Reconciliation Policies]. In İ. İlkkaracan (Ed.), *Emek Piyasasında Toplumsal Cinsiyet Eşitliğine Doğru: İş ve Aile Yaşamını Uzlaştırma Politikaları* [Towards Gender Equality in the Labour Market: Reconciliation of Family and Work Policies]. İstanbul: Women for Women's Human Rights and Istanbul Technical University (WSC-SET).

İlkkaracan, İ. (2012). Why so Few Women in the Labor Market in Turkey?. *Feminist Economics*, 18(1), 1-37.

ILO (2002). *Decent work and the informal economy*, Geneva: ILO.

ILO (2013). *Learning from Catalysts of Rural Transformation*, Geneva: ILO.

ILO (2014). *Wages and Working Hours in the Textiles, Clothing, Leather and Footwear Industries*. Geneva: ILO.

İZKA (2015). *İzmir Regional Plan 2014-2023*. Retrieved on December 19, 2017 from http://www.izka.org.tr/upload/Node/30422/xfiles/2014-2023_izmirBolgePlani-En.pdf

James, S. (1975). *Sex, Race and Class*. Retrieved on March 18, 2015 from <https://libcom.org/files/sex-race-class-2012imp.pdf>

Johnson, J. M. (1975). *Doing field research*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Kabeer, N. & Mahmud, S. (2004). Rags, riches and women workers: Export-oriented garment manufacturing in Bangladesh. In M. Carr (Ed.), *Chains of fortune: Linking women producers and workers with global markets*. Commonwealth Secretariat. Retrieved on April 13, 2015, from

<http://www.wiego.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/Kabeer-Mahmud-Export-Oriented-Garment-Bangladesh.pdf>

- Kabeer, N. (1991). Cultural dopes or rational fools? Women and labour supply in the Bangladesh garment industry. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 3(1), 133-160.
- Kabeer, N. (2000). *Power to Choose: Bangladeshi Women and Labor Market Decisions in London and Dhaka*. London: Verso.
- Kabeer, N. (2004). Globalization, labor standards, and women's rights: dilemmas of collective (in)action in an interdependent world. *Feminist Economics*, 10(1), 3-35.
- Kanawaty, G., Gladstone, A., Prokopenko, J., & Rodgers, G. (1989). Adjustment at the Micro Level. *International Labour Review*. 128(3), 269- 296.
- Katsarova, R. (2015). *Repression and Resistance on the Terrain of Social Reproduction: Historical Trajectories, Contemporary Openings*. Retrieved October 6, 2017, from <https://www.viewpointmag.com/2015/10/31/repression-and-resistance-on-the-terrain-of-social-reproduction-historical-trajectories-contemporary-openings/>
- Katz, C. (2001). Vagabond Capitalism and the Necessity of Social Reproduction. *Antipode*, 33(4), 709-728.
- Katz, C. (2004). *Growing up global: economic restructuring and children's everyday live*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kazgan, G. (1982). Türk Ekonomisinde Kadınların İşgücüne Katılması, Mesleki Dağılımı, Eğitim Düzeyi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Statüsü [Women's Labour Force Participation, Occupational Distribution, Education Level and Socio-Economic Status in the Turkish Economy]. In N. Abadan-Unat (Ed.), *Türk Toplumunda Kadın* [Women in the Turkish Society]. İstanbul: Araştırma, Eğitim, Ekin Yayınları.

- Koçtürk, T. (1992). *A Matter of Honour: Experiences of Turkish Women Immigrants*. London: Zed Books.
- Kumar, A. (2014). Interwoven Threads: Building a labour countermovement in Bangalore's export-oriented garment industry. *City*, 18(6), 789 –807.
- Kümbetoğlu, B., User, İ. & Akpınar, A. (2015). Gıda, Tekstil ve Hizmet Sektörlerinde Kayıtdışı Çalışan Kadın İşçiler [Unregistered Women Workers in the Food, Textile and Service Sectors]. In A. Makal & G. Toksöz (Eds.), *Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye'de Kadın Emeği* [Women's Labour From Past to Present in Turkey]. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.
- Kurtuluş-Korkman, Z. (2015). Blessing Neoliberalism: Economy, Family, and the Occult in Millennial Turkey. *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, 2(2), 335-357.
- Kusakebe, K. & Pearson, R. (2010). Transborder Migration, Social Reproduction and Economic Development: A Case Study of Burmese Women Workers in Thailand. *International Migration*, 48(6), 13-43.
- Kynaston, C. (1996). The Everyday Exploitation of Women: Housework and the Patriarchal Mode of Production. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 19(3), 221-237.
- Lee, C. K. (2005). Livelihood Struggles and Market Reform (Un)making Chinese Labour after State Socialism, Occasional Paper 2, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Retrieved on January 2, 2018 from [http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetITFramePDF?ReadForm&parentunid=755EB01A0C1A165BC125700E00380454&parentdoctype=paper&netitpath=80256B3C005BCCF9/\(httpAuxPages\)/755EB01A0C1A165BC125700E00380454/\\$file/OPGP2.pdf](http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetITFramePDF?ReadForm&parentunid=755EB01A0C1A165BC125700E00380454&parentdoctype=paper&netitpath=80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/755EB01A0C1A165BC125700E00380454/$file/OPGP2.pdf)
- Lenin, V. I. (1965 [1919]). *Collected Works, Volume 30*. Progress Publishers: Moscow.

- Lerner, G. (1986). *The Creation of Patriarchy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lier, D. C. (2007). Places of Work, Scales of Organising: A Review of Labour Geography. *Geography Compass*, 1(4), 814–833.
- Lin, T. & Adresa, A. (2013). Son Preference and Children's Housework: The Case of India. *Population Research and Policy Review*, 32(4), 553-584.
- Luxton, M. (2006). Feminist Political Economy in Canada and the Politics of Social Reproduction. In K. Bezanson & M. Luxton (Eds.), *Social Reproduction: Feminist Political Economy Challenges Neo-liberalism*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Lynch, C. (2007). *Juki Girls, Good Girls Gender and Cultural Politics in Sri Lanka's Global Garment Industry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Makal, A. (2001). Türkiye'de 1950-65 Döneminde Ücretli Kadın Emegine İlişkin Gelişmeler [The Developments regarding Paid Women's Labour in the Era of 1950-65 in Turkey]. *A.Ü. SBF Dergisi* 56(2), 117-155.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1998 [1846]). *The German Ideology*. New York: Prometheus Books.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (2008 [1848]). *The Communist Manifesto*. London: Pluto Press.
- Marx, K. (1963 [1844]). *Early Writings*. London: C.C. Watts.
- Marx, K. (1982 [1867]). *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I*. London: Penguin Books.
- Massey, G., Hahn, K. & Sekulic, D. (1995). Women, Men, and the "Second Shift" in Socialist Yugoslavia. *Gender and Society*, 9(3), 359-379.
- McNamara, K. (2008). *The Global Textile and Garments Industry: The Role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in Exploiting the*

Value Chain. Retrieved on March 25, 2015, from http://www.infodev.org/infodev-files/resource/InfodevDocuments_582.pdf

Meagher, K. (1995). Crisis, Informalization and the Urban Informal Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Development and Change*, 26, 259-284.

Meleis, A. I. & Lindgren, T. G. (2010). Man works from sun to sun, but woman's work is never done: Insights on research and policy. *Health Care for Women International*, 23(6-7), 742-753.

Mezzadri, A. & Lulu, F. (2018). 'Classes of Labour' at the Margins of Global Commodity Chains in India and China. *Development and Change*, 49(4), 1034–1063.

Mezzadri, A. & Srivastava, R. (2015). *Labour regimes in the Indian garment sector: capital-labour relations, social reproduction and labour standards in the National Capital Region*. Retrieved October 18, 2017, from <https://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/reports/file106927.pdf>

Mezzadri, A. (2008). The Rise of Neo-Liberal Globalisation and the “New Old” Social Regulation of Labour: A Case of Delhi Garment Sector. *The Indian Journal of Labour Economics*, 51(4), 603-618.

Mezzadri, A. (2010). Globalisation, informalisation and the state in the Indian garment industry. *International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, 20(3), 491-511.

Mezzadri, A. (2012). Reflections on Globalisation and Labour Standards in the Indian Garment Industry: Codes of Conduct Versus ‘Codes of Practice’ Imposed by the Firm. *Global Labour Journal*, 3(1), 40-62.

Mezzadri, A. (2014). Backshoring, Local Sweatshop Regimes and CSR in India. *Competition and Change*, 18(4), 327–44.

Mezzadri, A. (2015). *Garment Sweatshop Regimes: The Informalisation of Social Responsibility over Health and Safety Provisions* (Centre for Development

Policy and Research, School of Oriental and African Studies, Working Paper 30/15). Retrieved on March 25, 2018, from http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/19605/1/Mezzadri_WorkingPaper.pdf

Mezzadri, A. (2016a). Class, gender and the sweatshop: on the nexus between labour commodification and exploitation. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(10), 1877-1900.

Mezzadri, A. (2016b). The informalization of capital and interlocking in labour contracting networks. *Progress in Development Studies* 16(2), 124–139.

Mezzadri, A. (2017). *The Sweatshop Regime: Garments, Exploitation, and labouring Bodies made in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mies, M. (2014 [1986]). *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour*. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Milliyet (11 February 2012). Erođlu zam yaptı 5 çocuk istedi! [Erođlu asked for more, he wanted 5 children]. Retrieved November 7, 2017 from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/eroglu-zam-yapti-5-cocuk-istedi--siyaset-1500777/>

Milliyet (13 December 2014). Bakan Işık'tan Gelin ve Damada Üç Çocuk Tavsiyesi [Minister Işık's three children advise to the bride and groom]. Retrieved November 7, 2017 from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bakan-isik-tan-gelin-ve-damada-uc-cocuk-sakarya-yerelhaber-521842/>

Milliyet (18 November 2012). Bakan Şahin yeğeninden de 3 çocuk istedi [Minister Şahin asked three children from her niece]. Retrieved November 7, 2017 from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bakan-sahin-yegeninden-de-3-cocuk-istedi-siyaset-1628928/>

Milliyet (28 August 2016). Başbakan Yıldırım, Bakan Işık Kızının Nikah Şahidi Oldu [Prime Minister Yıldırım was a wedding witness to the Minister Işık's daughter]. Retrieved November 7, 2017 from

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/basbakan-yildirim-bakan-isik-kizinin-kocaeli-yerelhaber-1530556/>

Ministry of Development (2013). Onuncu Kalkınma Planı (2014-2018) [The Tenth Development Plan (2014-2018)]. Retrieved October 30, 2017, from http://www.sbb.gov.tr/Lists/Kalknma%20Planlar/Attachments/12/Onuncu_Kalkınma_Planı.pdf

Ministry of Development (2014). Onuncu Kalkınma Planı (2014-2018): Tekstil-Deri- Hazır Giyim Çalışma Grubu Raporu [The Tenth Development Plan (2014-2018): The Report by Textile-Leather-Garment Working Group]. Retrieved on November 25, 2017, from <http://www.kalkınma.gov.tr/Lists/zel%20htisas%20Komisyonu%20Raporlar/Attachments/243/tekstil%20deri%20hazır%20giyim%20OIK.pdf>

Ministry of Economy (2016). *Hazır Giyim Sektörü* [The Garment Industry]. Retrieved November 15, 2017 from <https://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/portal/content/conn/UCM/uuid/dDocName:EK-051190>

Mitchell, K., Marston, S. A. and Katz, C. (2004). Life's Work: An Introduction, Review and Critique. In K. Mitchell, S. A. Marston & C. Katz (Eds.), *Life's Work: Geographies of Social Reproduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing

Mitropoulos, A. (2006). *Precari-Us?*. Retrieved March 7, 2017, from <http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/precari-us>

Moghadam, V. M. (1999). Gender and Globalization: Female Labor and Women's Mobilization. *Journal Of World-Systems Research*, 2, 367-388.

Mohandesi, S. & Teitelman, E. (2017). Without Reserves. In T. Bhattacharya (Ed.), *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*. London: Pluto Press.

- Mollona, M. (2014). Informal Labour, Factory Labour or the End of Labour? Anthropological Reflections on Labour Value. In M. Atzeni (Ed.), *Workers and Labour in a Globalised Capitalism: Contemporary Themes and Theoretical Issues*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Montgomery, H. (2009). *Introduction to childhood: An anthropological perspective on children's lives*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
- MSIT (2015). *Türkiye Tekstil, Hazırgiyim ve Deri Ürünleri Sektörleri Strateji Belgesi Ve Eylem Planı* [The Strategy Document and Action Plan on the Turkish Textile, Garment and Leather Sectors]. Retrieved November 15, 2017 from <http://www.sanayi.gov.tr/DokumanGetHandler.ashx?dokumanId=17a4c14f-6cf1-4276-a804-c1c17975cf30>
- MSIT [Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology] (2014). *Tekstil, Hazırgiyim ve Deri Ürünleri Sektörleri Raporu (2014/1)* [The Report on the Textile-Leather-Garment Sectors]. Retrieved on November 25, 2017, from <http://sanayipolitikalari.sanayi.gov.tr/Public/SectorReports/10>
- Mullings, B. (1999). Insider or outsider, both or neither: some dilemmas of interviewing in a cross-cultural setting. *Geoforum*, 30, 337-350.
- Ntvmsnbc* (10 October 2009). Erdoğan: İş işten geçmeden en az üç çocuk [Erdoğan: At least three children before it is too late]. Retrieved November 10, 2017, from <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/erdogan-is-isten-gecmeden-en-az-3-cocuk,ZEQhCeWHVks06lEDhd72Ng>
- Oakley, A. (1981). Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms. In H. Roberts (Ed.), *Doing Feminist Research*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Official Gazette* (22 November 2016). Kanun Hükmünde Kararname: KHK/678 [The Emergency Decree Law No. KHK/678]. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/11/20161122-2.htm>
- Okely, J. (2007). Fieldwork embodied. *The Sociological Review*, 55(1), 65-79.

- Onaran, Ö. & Oyvat, C. (2016). The Political Economy of Inequality and Boom–Bust Cycles in Turkey: Before and After the Great Recession. In P. Arestis & M. Sawyer (Eds.), *Emerging Economies During and After the Great Recession*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Onaran, Ö. (2002). Measuring wage flexibility: the case of Turkey before and after structural adjustment. *Applied Economics*, 34(6), 767-781.
- Ong, A. (1988). The Production of Possession: Spirits and the Multinational Corporation in Malaysia. *American Ethnologist*, 15(1), 28-42.
- Ong, A. (2010). *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia*. New York: SUNY Press.
- Öniş, Z. & Bakır, C. (2007). Turkey's Political Economy in the Age of Financial Globalization: The Significance of the EU Anchor. *South European Society and Politics*, 12(2), 147-164.
- Özateş, Ö. S. (2015). *Malumun İlanı, Kadın Emeğinin Saklı Yüzü: Ev İçi Bakım Emeği* [Stating the Obvious, The Hidden Face of Women's Labour: Domestic Care Labour]. Ankara: Notabene.
- Özden, B. A. & Bekmen, A. (2015). Rebellious against Neoliberal Populist Regimes. In I. David & K. F. Toktamış (Eds.), *Everywhere Taksim: Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Öztan, E. (2014). Domesticity of Neoliberalism: Family, Sexuality and Gender in Turkey. In İ. Akça, A. Bekmen & B. A. Özden (Eds.), *Turkey Reframed Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*. London: Pluto Press.
- Paus, E. (2009). Winners and Losers from Offshore Outsourcing: What Is to Be Done?. In E. Paus (Ed.), *Global Capitalism Unbound: Winner and Losers from Offshore Outsourcing*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pearson, R. & Kusakabe, K. (2012). *Thailand's Hidden Workforce: Burmese Migrant Women Factory Workers*. London: Zed Books.

- Pearson, R. (2007). Beyond Women Workers: gendering CSR. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(4), 731-749.
- Postone, M. (1993). *Time, labor, and social domination: A reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Prasad, P. (2015). *Crafting Qualitative Research: Working in the Postpositivist Traditions*. New York: Routledge.
- Prentice, R. (2008). Knowledge, Skill, and the Inculcation of the Anthropologist: Reflections on Learning to Sew in the Field. *Anthropology of Work Review*, 29(3), 54-61.
- Prieto-Carron, M. (2008). Women Workers, Industrialization, Global Supply Chains and Corporate Codes of Conduct. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 83(1), 5-17.
- Pun, N. & Smith, C. (2007). Putting transnational labour process in its place: the dormitory labour regime in post-socialist China. *Work, Employment and Society*, 21(1), 27-45.
- Pun, N. (2005). *Made in China: women factory workers in a global workplace*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Pun, N. (2007). Gendering the Dormitory Labor System: Production, Reproduction, and Migrant Labor in South China. *Feminist Economics*, 13(3-4), 239-258.
- Pyle, J. L. (2005). Economic restructuring in Singapore and the changing roles of women, 1957 to present. In N. Aslanbeigui, S. Pressman & G. Summerfield (Eds.), *Women in the Age of Economic Transformation: Gender impact of reforms in postsocialist and developing countries*. London: Routledge.
- Rosen, E. I. (2002). *Making Sweatshops: The Globalization of the U.S Apparel Industry*. London: University of California Press.

- RoyChowdhury, S. (2005). Labor Activism and Women in the Unorganized Sector, Garment Export Industry in Bangalore. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40(22/23), 2250-2255.
- RoyChowdhury, S. (2015). Bringing Class Back in: Informality in Bangalore. *Socialist Register*, 51, 73-92.
- Ruwanpura, K. N. & Hughes, A. (2016). Empowered spaces? Management articulations of gendered spaces in apparel factories in Karachi, Pakistan. *Gender, Place & Culture*, 23(9), 1270-1285.
- Ruwanpura, K. N. (2007). Shifting theories: partial perspectives on the household. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 31, 525–538.
- Ruwanpura, K. N. (2011). Women workers in the apparel sector: a three decade (r)evolution of feminist contributions?. *Progress in Development Studies*, 11(3), 197–209.
- Ruwanpura, K. N. (2012). *Ethical Codes: Reality and Rhetoric – The Sri Lankan Story*. ESRC, University of Southampton. Retrieved February 23, 2018, from <https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/337113/1/ESRC-EndofProjectReport2012.pdf>
- Ruwanpura, K. N. (2013). It's the (Household) Economy, Stupid! Pension Reform, Collective Resistance and the Reproductive Sphere in Sri Lanka. In J. Elias & S. J. Gunawardana (Eds.), *The Global Political Economy of the Household in Asia*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ruwanpura, K. N. (2014a). *Ethical Trading and Sri Lankan Labour Practices in the Apparel Sector*. Asia Research Institute, Working Paper Series No. 222, Retrieved March 25, 2018, from http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/wps/wps14_222.pdf
- Ruwanpura, K. N. (2014b). Metal free factories: Straddling worker rights and consumer safety?. *Geoforum*, 51, 224-232.

- Ruwanpura, K. N. (2016). Garments without guilt? Uneven labour geographies and ethical trading—Sri Lankan labour perspectives. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 16, 423-446.
- Ruwanpura, K. N. (2017). Limited Leave? Clinical Provisioning and Healthy Bodies in Sri Lanka's Apparel Sector. In Prentice R. & De Neve G. (Eds), *Unmaking the Global Sweatshop: Health and Safety of the World's Garment Workers*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Ruwanpura, K. N. (2018). Militarized Capitalism? The Apparel Industry's Role in Scripting a Post-War National Identity in Sri Lanka. *Antipode*, 50(2), 425-446.
- Saad-Filho, A. & Johnston, D. (2005). Introduction. In A. Saad-Filho & D. Johnston (Eds.), *Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader*. London: Pluto Press.
- Salzinger, L. (2003). *Genders in Production: Making Workers in Mexico's Global Factories*. California: University of California Press
- Sanyal, K. & Bhattacharyya, R. (2009). Beyond the Factory: Globalisation, Informalisation of Production and the New Locations of Labour. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 44(22), 35-44.
- Sarioğlu, E. (2013). Gendering the Organization of Home-based Work in Turkey: Classical versus Familial Patriarchy. *Gender, Work and Organization*. 20(5), 479-497.
- Sayer, D. (1987). *The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytical Foundations of Historical Materialism*. Retrieved March 18, 2015, from <http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/sayer1.htm>
- Schling, H. (2014). Gender, Temporality, and the Reproduction of Labour Power Women Migrant Workers in South China. *Sozial.Geschichte online* 14, 42-61.

- Schwartz Cowan, R. (1983). *More Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave*. New York: Basic Books.
- Scott, J. C. (1989). Everyday Forms of Resistance. In F. D. Colburn (Ed.), *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
- Scott, J. W. (1988). *Gender and the Politics of History*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Seguino, S. (1997). Gender wage inequality and export-led growth in South Korea. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 34(2), 102-132.
- Seguino, S. (2000). Accounting for Gender in Asian Economic Growth. *Feminist Economics*, 6(3), 27-58.
- Seidman, I. (2006). *Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Sennett, R. & Cobb, J. (1977). *The Hidden Injuries of Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Silver, B. J. & Arrighi, G. (2001). Workers North and South. In L. Panitch and C. Leys (Eds.), *Socialist Register 2001*. London: Merlin Press.
- Skeggs, B. & Loveday, V. (2012). Struggles for value: value practices, injustice, judgment, affect and the idea of class. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 63(3), 472-490.
- Skeggs, B. (2001). Feminist Ethnography. In P. Atkinson, A. Coffey, S. Delamont, J. Lofland and L. Lofland (Eds.), *Handbook of Ethnography*. London: Sage Publications.
- Skeggs, B. (2004). *Class, Self, Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, S., Auret, D., Barrientos, S., Dolan, C., Kleinbooi, K., Njobvu, C., Opondo, M. & Tallontire, A. (2004). *Ethical trade in African horticulture: gender, rights and participation* (IDS Working Paper 223, Brighton: Institute Of

Development Studies). Retrieved April 22, 2018, from <https://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/ethical-trade-in-african-horticulture-gender-rights-and-participation>

Standing, G. (1989). Global Feminization Through Flexible Labor. *World Development*, 17(7), 1077-1095.

Standing, G. (1999a). *Global Labour Flexibility: Seeking Distributive Justice*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Standing, G. (1999b). Global Feminization through Flexible Labor: A Theme Revisited. *World Development*, 27(3), 583-602.

Standing, G. (2009). Offshoring and Labor Recommodification in the Global Transformation. In Paus, E. (Eds.), *Global Capitalism Unbound: Winner and Losers from Offshore Outsourcing*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Standing, G. (2011). *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. London: Bloomsbury.

Staveren, I., Elson, D., Grown, C. & Çağatay, N. (Eds.) (2007). *The Feminist Economics of Trade*. New York: Routledge.

Stolcke, V. (1981). Women's Labours: The naturalisation of Social Inequality and Women's Subordination. In by K. Young, C. Wolkowitz & R. McCullagh (Eds.), *Of Marriage and the Market: Women's Subordination in the International Perspective*. London: CSE Books.

Sugur, N. & Sugur, S. (2005). Gender and Work in Turkey: Case Study on Women Workers in the Textile Industry in Bursa. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 41(2), 269-279.

Tarhan, O. & Susar, F. (2015). Teacher Candidates' Views on Public Personnel Selection Examination. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 186, 874-881.

- Tartanoğlu, Ş. (2017). The voluntary precariat in the value chain: The hidden patterns of home-based garment production in Turkey. *Competition & Change*, 22(1), 23–40.
- Taylor, S. J., Bogdan, R. & DeVault, M. L. (2016). *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: A Guidebook and Resource*. New Jersey: Wiley.
- Thompson. E. P. (1965). The Peculiarities of the English. *Socialist Register*, 2, 311-362.
- Thompson. E. P. (1967). Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism. *Past & Present*, 38, 56-97.
- Thompson. E. P. (1978). Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?. *Social History*, 3(2), 133-165.
- Thompson. E. P. (1979). Folklore, Anthropology, and Social History. *Studies in Labour History Pamphlet*.
- Thompson. E. P. (1995 [1978]). *The Poverty of Theory: or an Orrery of Errors*. London: Merlin Press.
- Thompson. E. P. (2013 [1963]). *The Making of the English Working Class*. London: Penguin Books.
- Toksöz, G. (2007). *Women's Employment Situation in Turkey*. Ankara: ILO
- Toksöz, G. (2011). Women's Employment in Turkey in the Light of Different Trajectories in Development-Different Patterns in Women's Employment. *Fe Dergi*, 3(2), 19-32.
- Toksöz, G. et al. (2014). Türkiye'de Kadın İşgücü Profili İstatistiklerinin Analizi [The Analysis of Women's Labour Statistics in Turkey]. Report prepared for the Ministry of Family and Social Policies-Directorate General on the Status of Women. Retrieved February, 13, 2018, from <http://kadininstatusu.aile.gov.tr/data/58528516369dc524d057a5fe/Tü>

rkiye%27de%20Kadın%20İşgücü%20Profili%20ve%20İstatistikleri%27nin%20Analizi%20(Nihai%20Rapor).pdf

Toksöz, G., Rittersberger-Tılıç, H. & Çelik, K. (2012). The Reality behind the Brand City: Working Poor, Retrieved on March 25, 2017, from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Guelay_Toksoez/publication/303287430_The_Reality_Behind_the_Brand_City_Working_Poor/links/573b159408ae9ace840e9bd2/The-Reality-Behind-the-Brand-City-Working-Poor.pdf

TURKSTAT (2008). *Zaman Kullanım İstatistikleri, 2006* [Time Use Survey, 2006]. Retrieved November 23, 2017 from http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Kitap.do?metod=KitapDetay&KT_ID=7&KITAP_ID=138

TURKSTAT (2016a). *Doğum İstatistikleri, 2016* [Birth Statistics, 2016]. Retrieved November 10, 2017 from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=24647>

TURKSTAT (2016b). *Aile Yapısı Araştırması, 2016* [The Research on Family Structure, 2016]. Retrieved November 10, 2017 from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=21869>

TURKSTAT (2017). *İşgücü İstatistikleri: Temmuz 2017* [Labour force Statistics: July 2017]. Retrieved October 24, 2017 from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/HbGetirHTML.do?id=24632>

Ud, M. (2016). *Suriyeli Mülteci Çocuklar Okulsuz* [Syrian Refugee Children are without a School]. Retrieved on 23 February, 2017, from <https://metehanud.wordpress.com/2016/08/14/suriyeli-multeci-cocuklar-okulsuz/>

UN (2017). *Report on the human rights situation in South-East Turkey, July 2015 to December 2016*. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/TR/OHCHR_South-East_TurkeyReport_10March2017.pdf

- Vasileva, D. (1992). Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return. *The International Migration Review*, 26(2), 342-352.
- Vogel, L. (2013). *Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Vosko, L.F. (2010). *Managing the Margins: Gender, Citizenship, and the International Regulation of Precarious Employment*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Whitelaw, G. H. (2008). Learning from Small Change: Clerkship and the Labors of Convenience. *Anthropology of Work Review*, 29(3), 62-69.
- Wilkinson-Weber, C. M. (1997). Skill, Dependency, and Differentiation: Artisans and Agents in the Lucknow Embroidery Industry. *Ethnology*, 36(1), 49-65.
- Wilkinson-Weber, C. M. (1999). *Embroidering Lives: Women's Work and Skill in the Lucknow Embroidery Industry*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Wills, J & Hale, A. (2005). Threads of Labour in the Global Garment Industry. In A. Hale & J. Wills (Eds.), *Threads of Labour: Garment Industry Supply Chains from the Workers' Perspective*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Wilson, K. (1993). Thinking about the ethics of fieldwork. In S. Devereux & J. Hoddinott (Eds.), *Fieldwork in developing countries*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Wood, E. M. (1982). The Politics of Theory and the Concept of Class: E.P. Thompson and His Critics. *Studies in Political Economy*, 9, 45-75.
- Wood, E. M. (1990). Falling Through the Cracks: E.P. Thompson and the Debate on Base and Structure. In H. J. Kaye & K. McClelland (Eds.), *E.P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

World Economic Forum (2016). *The Global Gender Gap Report 2016*. Retrieved November 4, 2017 from http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR16/WEF_Global_Gender_Gap_Report_2016.pdf

Wright, M. W. (2006). *Disposable Women and Other Myths of Global Capitalism*. New York: Routledge.

WTO (2013). *International Trade Statistics 2013*. Retrieved November 9, 2017 from https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2013_e/its2013_e.pdf

WTO (2017). *World Trade Statistical Review 2017*. Retrieved November 9, 2017 from https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2017_e/wts2017_e.pdf

Yalman, G. (2009). *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press.

Yaman Öztürk, M. (2010). Ücretli İş ve Ücretsiz Bakım Hizmeti Ekseninde Kadın Emeği: 1980'lerden 2000'lere [Women's Labour in terms of Paid Labour and Unpaid Care Labour: From the 1980s to the 2000s]. In S. Dedeoğlu & M. Yaman Öztürk (Eds.), *Kapitalizm, Ataerkillik ve Kadın Emeği: Türkiye Örneği* [Capitalism, Patriarchy and Women's Labour: The Case of Turkey]. İstanbul: SAV.