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The Untold Story of FIFA’s Diplomacy and the 1966 World Cup: North Korea, Africa and Sir Stanley Rous.

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The Untold Story of FIFA’s Diplomacy and the 1966 World Cup: North Korea, Africa and Sir Stanley Rous

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Abstract: The article addresses the diplomacy practiced by Sir Stanley Rous, FIFA president (1961-1974), and the international history of DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) involvement in, and the boycott by African nations of, the 1966 World Cup in light of a number of newly available primary sources. The new materials reveal firstly, Rous’ diplomatic practice and the tension between formal and informal diplomacy he pursued; and secondly the disquiet in London over North Korean participation, a problem relieved in great part by Rous’ interventions. Concerns over anthems, protocol, and flags, were mediated by Rous as he negotiated with the British foreign policy-making establishment from his position as FIFA president. The analysis illuminates the negotiation, representation and communication underpinning the diplomacy of the 1966 World Cup. Rous was also influential, though to contrasting effect, in the case of the opposition of the Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF) to apartheid in South Africa and CAF’s support for the emerging pan-African cause. The article offers new insights into the diplomatic role of Rous and FIFA, and throws light upon the tension between formal and informal diplomatic practices underlying the staging of a global tournament in the 1960s amid the dual pressures of the Cold War and an emerging pan-Africanism.
Introduction

The Fédération Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA’s) first World Championship, to become known in the post-1945 era as the World Cup, was staged in Uruguay in 1930 when the hosts – Olympic football champions in 1924 and 1928 – took the title. The previous year FIFA had celebrated its 25-year anniversary with a celebratory paean to the values of the expanding organisation in the form of a book outlining its essential mission from the perspective of its key stakeholders. These were neither the players nor the fans but its administrators. In this volume FIFA president, Jules Rimet, described football as ‘the chivalry of modern times’. Belgian Rodolphe Seeldrayers, FIFA president from 1955-56, also contributed, writing that national associations and federations could be strong and secure only if ‘under the aegis of a strong and respected international federation’. He added that international football conducted in ‘an atmosphere of high sporting spirit’ can create for both spectators and players ‘a state of mind/soul superior to that resulting from the weekly struggle for a [national] championship’. In this Seeldrayers argues that international football had the capacity to transcend national issues under FIFA’s aegis, pre-empting both the tension that Sir Stanley Rous would face as president and the consequent diplomacy of 1966. Rimet and Seeldrayers preached a creed - and preach they did in almost biblical terms - that was steeped in the nineteenth-century Corinthian philosophy of fair play and athleticism. Such a view of sport illustrated the tension between national and international realms and was to become increasingly important as FIFA’s profile grew alongside the consolidation of its major asset, the FIFA World Cup.

The creed of the early FIFA leaders was also the framing philosophy of Englishman Sir Stanley Rous (1895-1986), who was FIFA president from 1961 to 1974. In this position - tarnished in the twenty-first century by the corrupt practices of Sepp Blatter - Rous faced a series of challenges concerning the balance of power between Europe, South America, and the emerging post-colonial world. These challenges reflected international affairs of the 1950s and 1960s and intensified in the run up to the 1966 World Cup finals in England, hosted by The Football Association (FA). In the build-up to the event Rous was immersed in discussion and decision-making of import for FIFA far beyond what would happen on the field of play. It is from such a perspective that this article explores this untold story of diplomacy before and during the 1966 World Cup Finals.
In exploring the international history of sport and international affairs the article makes three new and interrelated contributions. First, it revisits the story of North Korea’s participation in the 1966 World Cup Finals tournament; second, it explores the non-participation of African nations in the 1966 World Cup as an example of the sporting boycott – the only one the FIFA World Cup has suffered; and third, running across the previous two, it demonstrates the significance of the role played by Rous as both official and unofficial diplomat. The analysis presented in this article is not explicitly a study of the Cold War nor of pan-African history. It does nevertheless contribute to an enhanced understanding of the breadth of the multidimensional Cold War – the Global Cold as Odd Arne Westad termed it – in spheres such as international sport; and recognises an underplayed element in the emergence of organised pan-African strategies and initiatives. The analyses of the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and CAF (Confédération Africaine de Football) experiences of the 1966 World Cup are connected to their broader contexts so reaffirming the socio-political and diplomatic significance of the practices and interventions of institutional actors in the international sporting world. The analyses illustrate new historical insight into the operation of an international federation in the light of the overarching geopolitical realities of the Cold War and pan-Africanism, and Rous’s diplomatic practice in those contexts. Here the diplomatic background to the North Korean presence at World Cup ‘66 is depicted in more layered depth than hitherto understood; and the CAF boycott of the tournament can now be told in the light of previously understated negotiations that took place, and contemporaneous perspectives provided by the voices of indigenous sources.

Rous saw himself as a bastion of complementary Corinthian, British and Olympic values; and in his presidential role at FIFA as a diplomat for football. It was in his role as FIFA president that his own approach to diplomacy can be clearly seen as it impacts upon the 1966 World Cup. Self-styled, and only occasionally reflective of his role, Rous’s diplomatic practice was that of an objective independent adjudicator which could arbitrate between different points of view and prevent conflict escalating. In short, he sought to be a diplomat in the manner of the international referee he had been previously. Whether in direct contact with ‘formal’ diplomatic actors in the shape of the Foreign Office or as a diplomat-in-chief as President on behalf of FIFA, Rous ‘was a remarkable man, a born
ambassador’ according to the Labour British sports minister Denis Howell (1964-70 and again 1974-79). Tensions nevertheless existed in Rous’s diplomatic outlook and application from the outset and were distinct from his approach to FIFA leadership. His ‘laid-back’ diplomatic style and ‘unfailingly good manners’ served to attract ‘people to him and created confidence’. It was therefore difficult, if not impossible for him to escape the vestiges of his high office, in which his leadership retained the traits of his schoolmasterly training to preach and instruct. So whilst his diplomatic style may have been informal, his position was formal, and whilst his character meant he was approachable, he also had the capacity to instruct. So, although Howell’s analysis suggests Rous ‘did not assert himself unduly but he attracted great respect’ his failure to accurately read and respond to the changing nature of global affairs meant his approach was outmoded by the time the England team lifted the Jules Rimet trophy in July 1966. Myopia on the issue of South African apartheid was not only distasteful to many in Africa and beyond then and now, but almost as soon as he became President, these views undermined his position. Brazil’s João Havelange was ready to exploit this in campaigning against Rous and ultimately defeating him for the FIFA presidency in the 1974 election.

By then Rous had been on a remarkable journey from modest roots in Mutford, Suffolk, to being trained as a schoolteacher and physical educationalist while also becoming an outstanding international football referee. He moved professionally from schoolmastering to football administration when becoming secretary of The Football Association (FA) in 1934, a post he held for 28 years up to and beyond the point of his election as FIFA president, and was knighted in 1949 for services to charity and sport including his instrumental contribution to the organization of the first post-war summer Olympic Games in London in 1948.

Underpinning his approach and practice Rous had a sacred belief that there should be a separation of sport and politics. The latter he saw in national statist terms, immune to the notion that politics was at play in other realms. His belief in the separation of sport and politics, shared by many at the time and since, was dogma when it came to issues such as addressing apartheid South Africa. In pursuing the separation of sport and politics - deconstructed by Lincoln Allison as a ‘myth of autonomy’ - Rous’s approach was flawed. In one address to an early CAF meeting he proclaimed: ‘The essential aim of sport is to render service to youth and if the Laws of sport conflict sometimes
with politics, we should not criticise the decision taken and Politics must not interfere with our activities.” Rous’s words reveal a naivety that would challenge the application of his diplomatic practice in relation to both CAF priorities and North Korean qualification for the 1966 Finals. The failing in Rous’s approach was to think that football could operate without influence from the geopolitical environment of the Cold War and of the decolonising environment of the 1950s and 1960s.

In each of the three dimensions that shape the article, analysis is supported by newly available original primary source material, comprising previously unseen archive material from the private papers of Stanley Rous, and oral history transcripts of interviews with protagonists featured in BBC World Service coverage of the African boycott. Rous’s private papers, for several decades in the custody of his former secretary and assistant, complement public records consulted at the National Archives (Kew, London), and materials archived in the FIFA Museum and Library (Zurich). Further, the article draws upon and complements recent literature that has brought together the study of sport in all its dimensions in international affairs in the emergent field of sport and diplomacy. This body of academic literature is consciously multidisciplinary, encompassing conceptual and empirical work on particular historical events, configurations and phases; it embraces a raft of recent publications which have recognised sport as a serious and substantial subject of historical study. This takes history beyond the subfield of ‘sport history’ and acknowledges the connectedness of forms of sport and diplomacy within the wider fields of global history, international history and diplomatic history.

1. A World Cup debut: The North Korean case

The 1962 World Cup Finals tournament in Chile featured 16 national teams, ten from Europe, five from South America, and Mexico from FIFA’s grouping of central America and the Caribbean. No team from the African or Asian continents qualified for the event. It was the last World Cup Finals at which the championship was contested by only nations from Europe or the Americas. For 1966, just one place was offered the two confederations representing Asia and Africa, to be competed for across not only the two continents but also Oceania’s South Pacific region which included the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand (Oceania was not a fully, formally constituted confederation until 15 November 1966). As the second section of the article will show no African nation accepted this paltry
offer, with CAF withdrawing *en masse* from the qualifying competition after FIFA failed to respond to its ultimatum over allocation of places at the World Cup finals tournament. Only two countries, one from the Asian confederation and the other from the fledgling Oceania grouping, were left to contest this single slot in the event.

The 1966 World Cup finals tournament therefore comprised ten European teams, four from South America, one from the central Americas/Caribbean, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or ‘North Korea’ as the country was more colloquially known across the world. In Phnom-Penh, Cambodia, in November 1965, North Korea had faced Australia in a two-match play-off for the final place for the tournament. The over-confident Australians were humiliated, losing both games, 6-1 and then 3-1, in a 9-2 aggregate defeat.

Martin Polley has previously provided a dedicated account of the ‘diplomatic background’ to the North Korea question at the 1966 World Cup, based on his careful reading of Foreign Office and related documents in the National Archives (London, UK), though Rous’s role in resolving diplomatic crises remains relatively neglected.\(^{15}\) Polley’s balanced analysis focusing upon the state’s involvement confirms the seriousness with which British government personnel, ‘Whitehall officials’ as he describes them, approached the North Korea issue but overlooks Rous’s individual role. The Whitehall officials contextualised DPRK’s participation within the broad Cold War setting of the Two Koreas and the Two Germanys. His concluding analysis shows, first, that events such as a World Cup are recognized as significant by government; second, that appropriate branches of government have the capacity to work with sport administrators ‘despite the difference in remit and agenda’; third, that sport could not be immune from ‘the complexity and magnitude’ of the UK’s Cold War diplomacy; and finally, that the diplomatic background that shaped the political response to North Korea’s qualification for 1966 involved ‘machinations’ that were ‘hidden from public view’.\(^{16}\) What Polley’s interpretation of the official Foreign Office (FO) papers does not show is the nature and scale of those ‘machinations’ which were carried out by Rous operating in the space between formal and informal diplomacy. Rous features only twice in Polley’s study: first, appearing as an invitee to an early consideration of the issues by the Foreign Office in December 1965; and second, in relation to the resolution of the North Korean issue acknowledged in a letter from Edwin Bolland of the Foreign
Office’s Far Eastern Department (25 March 1966) in which Bolland also expressed his sympathy over
the loss of the World Cup trophy. Rous was more deeply involved than this though in the diplomacy
of the 1966 World Cup, acting on behalf of the Foreign Office on occasion, as his newly uncovered
private papers reveal alongside a number of little-cited and overlooked files in the National Archive
(Kew, London). Rous’s involvement centred not only on the DPRK and the African boycott but also
and equally significantly for this analysis on his diplomatic role in advancing FIFA’s overall interests.
Polley notes that papers from the Department of Education and Science (DES) concerning the North
Korean issue were not traceable, and ‘proved impossible to locate’ in the National Archives, while
the new access to documents in the private papers of Rous confirm the extent of his role in
negotiations that determined the outcome of the North Korean problem.

North Korea was an unwanted guest at FIFA’s football party in the eyes of the British
political and diplomatic establishment which was concerned from the outset at the implications of a
North Korean presence for the United Kingdom’s strategic Cold War relationships. Following North
Korea’s qualification the Foreign Office began to consider the diplomatic implications of participation
by an unrecognised country. North Korea was technically still at war with its southern neighbour – the
Republic of Korea (South Korea), to whom the United Kingdom had provided military support
numbering almost 100,000 troops and its fleet in the Far East in support of a US-led United Nations
force, during the Korean War 1950-1953. Within diplomatic, political and military circles DPRK
involvement was a major issue, and provides a revealing case study of the diplomatic challenges of
the time, and Rous’s efforts to resolve them.

When Rous became FIFA president in 1961, he recognised the opportunity to shape football’s
place in international affairs that this platform provided. He declared that there has ‘never been a
more exciting time in football as an international game’; dozens of newly independent countries in
Africa and Asia ‘have clamoured for membership of F.I.F.A. and a place in the international football
sun’. It was FIFA’s ‘great challenge’, Rous observed, to help ‘organize their game in every possible
sense.’ Revealing his Corinthian paternalism on behalf of FIFA to guide worldwide football
development, and his conviction in the separation of sport and politics, he continued ‘they have to be
helped play the game in the very best spirit and to take their place in the international brotherhood of
football nations above and beyond and apart from any political considerations’. North Korea’s qualification presented Rous with the opportunity to put his principles into practice as a diplomat who could meld the realms of sport and politics while disavowing the connection between a range of stakeholders: The Football Association (The FA); FIFA; North Korea’s national association as a member of FIFA; and the Foreign Office, involving the Secretary of State and the Far Eastern Department, along with other ministerial departments in the British government. Such a melange of actors is now recognised in the sport diplomacy field, but to acknowledge as much at the time would have been to undermine the belief in the separation of sport and politics. Nonetheless, Rous situated himself firmly in the midst of these different stakeholders and this allowed his brand of diplomatic practice to unfold with mixed results.

Evidence of Rous’s diplomatic practice can be seen in the invitation he and The FA’s secretary general Denis Follows received to the Foreign Office for a meeting on 14 December 1965. While Polley acknowledges their presence as ‘interested parties’ to discuss DPRK involvement his account does not then include detailed consideration of Rous’s contribution at that meeting and his ongoing role as informal diplomat for the Foreign Office in addressing the matter. In this December meeting the broader Cold War context was to the fore as was Rous’s capacity to engage in a brand of personal diplomacy as three aspects of North Korean participation emerged as cause for concern. The concerns were over the playing of national anthems, the language to be used to describe the North Korean team, and the flying of participants’ flags at the stadiums. A compromise on the issues of anthems and language was proposed to Rous to reconcile Foreign Office concerns and FIFA protocols. The compromise was a recommendation that the national anthems of the two competing countries should be played at the opening and final matches only; no anthems played at any other of the other matches; and in all official publications, ‘the name of the participating country … would be North Korea’. The calculation here, expressing the desire not to convey official state recognition, was that the North Korean anthem would never be played. Rous’s longhand annotation on Fellows’s report observed that ‘There may be others’ [as well as North Korea] ‘who will not like the arrangement’. The ‘others’ that those gathered in December 1965 were contemplating were the Soviet Union. The minutes from the December 1965 meeting agreed that ‘an important factor’ in resolving the matter.
would be the attitude of the Soviet delegate at the meeting of the Executive Committee of F.I.F.A.’ at its next meeting in January 1966. Rous, ever confident of his own abilities but also supported by the Foreign Office adopted the role of de-facto ambassador. Edwin Bolland’s minute recorded, with underlining in the original, ‘Sir Stanley Rous undertook to try out the conditions above on the meeting and to see what their reactions would be.’ Rous, according to Bolland, expanded the role and stated that he would ‘try and get in touch with the President of the North Korean Football Association and invite him either to that meeting or to meet separately.’ This would come to pass when a North Korean delegation was hosted by Rous in late February in the United Kingdom with tacit Foreign Office approval. In all this it was agreed Rous ‘would avoid saying that these conditions were being laid down by the Foreign Office’. Here the tension between Rous as official diplomat on behalf of FIFA was evident as he doubled up as unofficial representative for the Foreign Office.

Rous was therefore already playing multiple roles when the North Korean delegation visited England in February/March 1966. He was fulfilling his official role as FIFA president but also simultaneously acting as de-facto ambassador for the United Kingdom in unofficially relaying to the North Koreans the Foreign Office’s deliberations. Blending the official and the individual, Rous personally hosted the North Korean delegation by taking them to ‘a match Arsenal vs. Blackpool at the Arsenal Stadium’, and then ‘lunch at The Hurlingham Club on Sunday, 6th March’ while they also visited match venues in north-east England. The political sensitivity surrounding the North Korean delegation meant they were afforded privileges which went beyond the protocol of any normal routine visit by competing finalists at the time. However, this did not prevent Rous relaying the Foreign Office line on the nomenclature that would be used for their country through the World Cup. Rous explained that the team and football association would be referred to as ‘from North Korea’ despite the request that their country be called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Rous noted in his report, ‘I explained that in England we thought of Korea being two countries, North and South; Germany being East and West and Ireland North and South, but in official documents their country would be given their appropriate title (perhaps in brackets).’ There is no direct record of a response from the North Koreans to Rous’s advice, but a memo by Bolland noted ‘Sir Stanley explained our positions about not playing national anthems except at the first and last matches. The Koreans
accepted this quite calmly’. From there the matters of the anthems and the nomenclature ceased to be an issue for Rous or for Whitehall with Rous noting that the North Koreans had no problems over the agreed arrangements for the national anthems, which they saw as reasonable, nor with the ‘fact that their team would be known as the North Koreans’.

While Rous and his Foreign Office contacts could feel satisfied with the outcome on anthems and language, the issue of national flags remained contentious. This was no surprise to those in Whitehall and to Rous. Bolland had written a memo to his Foreign Office colleague Arthur de la Mare on 1 March explaining that he had spoken to ‘Sir Stanley Rous this morning before he met the North Koreans and told him that Ministers had examined the compromise about flag flying’. There are two points of note here: firstly Rous spoke with a senior Foreign Office official immediately prior to meeting the North Koreans; and secondly, the formula put forward from these discussions - reflecting the Foreign Office’s broader Cold War concerns in giving the North Korean flag an unwarranted level of prominence - was to remove the DPRK flag despite FIFA protocol being for all flags of the participating nations to be flown at all stadia throughout the tournament. According to Bolland ‘Rous commented at once that he did not like this as it discriminated against the North Koreans and he felt sure that when they heard of this ruling they would react strongly against it. I said that I must agree with what he had said’. Importantly in comprehending Rous’s diplomacy, Bolland suggested to Rous that he engage with the sports minister Denis Howell, or respected civil servant Sir John Lang, having already informed the latter that he may receive a call from Rous.

Illustrative of the diplomatic practice at hand here, it is worth triangulating Rous’s relationship with Foreign Office officials with his relationship with Sir John Lang. Lang was to prove an effective foil to assist in resolution of the flags episode and a perfect institutional ally for Rous at the interface of official and informal diplomacy in the resolution of the delicate North Korea question. Denis Howell later wrote that Lang, as a veteran of British public life was the perfect accomplice for having sport recognised within the political system:

[Lang] had served Winston Churchill in the war and he could not have been held in higher esteem throughout Whitehall. Wherever Sir John went, at any level of government, he was deferred to.
Rous’s diplomatic practice was to gain much from his dealings with an operator of such pedigree, as Lang channelled the Foreign Office line to Rous. In his conversation with Bolland on 1 March, Rous said ‘he would wait until after he had spoken to the Koreans before speaking to Mr Howell’, telephoning Bolland later on in the morning to report that ‘his conversation with the Koreans. …had gone very well.’ By this stage Bolland had concluded, after consultations with colleagues, that ‘the ball was now at Sir Stanley Rous’ feet and that it was up to him to persuade Mr. Howell that the arrangement … was discriminatory against the North Koreans and that he would not be able to put it to them’. Rous had formulated his response. Bolland wrote to his Foreign Office counterparts Arthur de La Mare and Lord Walston ahead of Rous hosting the North Koreans for the Arsenal match. Bolland stated that Rous had ‘repeated what he had said to me that he was sure that the North Koreans would not wear any discrimination on flag flying.’ According to Bolland’s memo, Rous then said, so illustrating the latter’s agency, that he ‘had therefore decided himself when discussing this question with the Koreans before their departure that he would say no final decision had yet been taken on the question of flags but that some arrangement would probably be made in line with the non-discriminatory compromise that we had agreed.’

The compromise brokered by Rous suggested that national flags of all the competing countries would be flown at the opening match, and at regional matches the flags of the four countries in the group would be flown at the two grounds. At quarter-final games the flags of all eight quarter-finalists would be flown; at semi-finals, those of all four semi-finalists: at the ‘Loser’s Final’ all four semi-finalists’ flags would be flown, and at the Final itself ‘the flags of all competing finalists would be flown’. The compromise between Foreign Office prerogatives and FIFA’s position reflected the belief that the North Korean team would not stay in the competition very long for its flag to gain great exposure, and that the flag would appear relatively anonymously at the first and final matches of the tournament.

Shortly after meeting the North Koreans on 5-6 March 1966, Rous and Lang met with sports minister Howell. After which, and demonstrating the multi-directional nature of the diplomacy at hand, Lang wrote to Bolland at the Foreign Office, copying in Rous, Howell and John Harris (the Special Assistant to Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart) making the North Korean disquiet clear:
They made it clear that they understood that the usual arrangement, hallowed by long usage, was that all the flags of competing countries were flown during the whole of the final series of matches and that they [FIFA] could not agree to any variation of this unless it were clear that what was proposed applied to all participants and was accepted by all. In other words they were suspicious and difficult.\textsuperscript{34}

The suspicions of the Koreans as relayed by Rous to Bolland and Howell, with Lang operating as foil for both parties, proved instrumental in the Minister’s backtracking and acceptance of the FIFA position that ‘all flags should be flown on all occasions’. Lang confirmed that Howell ‘accepts Rous’s view that FIFA cannot be expected to accept the discriminatory solution and insists that all flags on all occasions is the only possible solution. He emphasised that he has given way on the national anthem point (which originally he was inclined to press for) and urges that the F.O. should keep “their part of the bargain”.\textsuperscript{35} In this Rous’s role had slipped from relaying a Foreign Office position to advocating on behalf of FIFA, illustrating the tension between his official and informal undertakings. Lang also wrote to Harris enclosing a copy of the letter to Bolland. This was done ‘at the request of Mr. Howell’, and in a covering note Lang summarised the ‘background of this problem’ from its emergence in November 1965 through to the resolution in the late Spring of 1966.\textsuperscript{36} A key focus in this overview was on Foreign Office insistence that all flags could not be flown at all seven grounds for all matches, ‘particularly having regard to the repercussions on the East Germany situation’. Lang noted to Bolland that Howell would not accept this Foreign Office position, and what had transpired was further talks between Howell and Lord Walston, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The outcome of the Howell and Walston exchanges was that the FIFA principle Rous had argued for with Howell of flying all flags across all the stadia was, eventually, supported across both the Ministry of Sport in the Department of Education and Science and the Foreign Office.

A combination of Rous’s mediation with the North Korean’s and advocacy to Howell was essential to the resolution of the flag issue. On 25 March Bolland wrote to Rous confirming that the Foreign Office would ‘raise no further objection to the flying of the North Korean flag at all matches’, though concerns about how to explain this to the West Germans and the South Koreans meant that this arrangement was agreed ‘only with great reluctance’.\textsuperscript{37} What Polley calls ‘machinations’ of
governmental departments is a complex story; it involved to a far greater degree than previously recognised Rous’s diplomatic role as a critical mediator and advocate, working with a key interlocutor in Lang whose insight, guidance and influence allowed Rous and FIFA’s views to prevail.

In contrast to his heavily typed ‘Dear Bolland’ when writing to his Whitehall colleague, Lang deployed a respectful and intimate long-hand ‘Dear Stanley’ in a summative communication, dated 28 March, explaining how the resolution had been achieved. The veteran civil servant noted the Foreign Office’s compromise that would now permit competing countries’ flags, including North Korea’s, to be flown at all the matches was on two conditions ‘accepted by Mr Howell in a packaged deal’.38 The North Korean issue was therefore resolved with a compromise that allowed the Foreign Office and FIFA to move forward, with Rous writing to Bolland stating he was sure that Lang would be ‘pleased that it [the North Korea issue] has been settled satisfactorily especially as [the] Minister held such strong views’.39 As if to confirm to himself the role he had played, Rous noted – with a palpable degree of self-satisfaction – to his secretary general Dr Helmut Käser at Zurich’s FIFA office (29 March 1966) that his time with the North Koreans had been well spent: ‘I can assure you that the visit was successful’, he wrote with almost pedantic emphasis. Equally, he had reported to both the Foreign Office and FIFA that the North Korean delegates left expressing ‘their thanks for all the attention which had been given to them … that they had been deeply impressed with all they had seen in England’.40 Lang’s concluding remarks to Rous illustrate the lack of profile Whitehall officialdom wanted to give to the whole North Korean episode. ‘In my view all this should receive a minimum publicity, if it is possible so to arrange’.41

Reflecting the global implications of the Cold War for the Foreign Office the North Korean issue could not be dealt with in isolation, as the response to the refusal of requests for visas for GDR sport journalists – conveyed by telegram from Berlin on 11 July 1966 – was to show.42 The Foreign Office insisted that the compromise Rous had helped broker could ‘in no way provide a precedent for any future visits to this country by East German teams and this has been made clear to the Department of Education and Science, who are responsible for matters of sport’.43 The Foreign Office Western Department was committed to a hard line on the question of East Germany in relation to the 1966 tournament. Receiving the telegram addressed to Foreign Minister Stewart, the Department responded
in Cold War style by deliberately not acknowledging the request. The telegram reported on a meeting
the GDR’s ‘presidium’ of its sport journalists’ association had held on 7 July in Berlin, called to
respond to the refusal of visas for their members who had been promised straightforward access and
working conditions by the ‘British organizers’.

Avery Brundage the American President of the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) was supportive of their rights to cover the tournament, and as
the GDR’s journalist association’s president Felix Livetan noted had written to the international
association of sport journalists in March calling for equal treatment and access for all approved
journalists. The telegram from Berlin played up the lack of the ‘traditional British concept of fair-
play’ in ‘this unsportive act’. The response was unequivocal. A prompt minute stated that although
the issue had ‘elicited notice in The Times’, ‘No action’ was required. The ambassador at the West
German embassy was updated on the situation in a memorandum from A.H. Campbell, dated 18 July,
confirming that ‘we did not send a reply to this communication; and nor shall we do so’.

Not all diplomatic challenges could be overcome or resolved with the compromise that was
struck between FIFA protocol and the Foreign Office’s concerns in response to the North Korea issue.
In achieving this compromise Rous’s networking and informal diplomatic interventions were
significant. His practice and the Foreign Office’s concerns may have been tested further had the North
Korean team, already having overachieved by defeating former World Champions Italy 1-0, held on
to its 3-0 lead in the quarter final match against Portugal. However, Portugal’s rally to win 5-3 meant
their progression, and the Foreign Office and Rous had avoided the prospect of a match between
North Korea and England in the semi-final at Wembley.

That the North Koreans were present at the 1966 World Cup at all was in part due to the
withdrawal from the qualifying stages of the competition of all of Africa’s national associations. The
boycott of the World Cup competition by the African confederation was a diplomatic challenge on
another scale for Rous, a diplomatic world away from the well-oiled networks of his English base and
milieu. The African question emanated from the emergence of pan-African cultural and political
claims and aspirations generally, and the increasing international profile of the anti-apartheid
movement. It is to this aspect of the relatively unknown and only partially told story of 1966 that the
article now turns.
2. **A continent withdraws: the African boycott of World Cup ’66**

In January 1963 the *Confédération Africaine de Football* (CAF) began a five-year campaign that culminated in 1968 with FIFA’s allocation of a guaranteed place in the World Cup Finals for an African country. Their tool which saw pan-African politics and sport meld together was a boycott of the 1966 World Cup tournament by all its members. This was announced in July 1964 and came into force that October. The only boycott in the competition’s history pre-empted the more widely known Cold War-inspired Olympic Games boycotts of 1980 and 1984. Rous’s position as FIFA president during this period placed him at the centre of this story. His response to the biggest African question of the time, apartheid in South Africa, has been critiqued as being pro-apartheid in his stubborn and naïve support for the white-dominated South African Football Association. This was a decisive factor in his defeat when he stood for re-election as FIFA president a decade later in 1974. whilst Rous’s blind-spot on the South African issue is undeniable, a closer look at his relationship with the emergent African confederation, particularly concerning the allocation of World Cup places, throws a more nuanced light upon the nature of his dealings with the forces of pan-Africanism of the time.

Rous sought to navigate the politics of a de-colonizing world and achieve his and FIFA’s developmental goals through his model of diplomacy. He was a confirmed and consistent champion of the development of continental confederations that would be both autonomous organisations, and recognised as affiliated to the world governing body FIFA. At its first full conference in Cairo, Egypt in January 1963, key players emerged in CAF who would contribute to events in 1966. At that Extraordinary General Assembly CAF brought 23 national associations together ‘to take part [in] the works of a real constituent assembly. Sir Stanley Rous, the President of FIFA, was present’. CAF, the first pan-African organisation – preceding the Organisation of African Unity by six years – had been initiated after a meeting of African delegates to the FIFA Congress in Lisbon in 1956. The following year on 21 June 1957, FIFA’s executive committee in Zurich approved the CAF statutes and the African confederation came was formally recognised. Earlier in 1957, the first CAF-promoted international competition had been launched in Sudan with just three teams competing, Egypt and Ethiopia as well as the hosts. Significantly for what was to follow, absent was South Africa ‘who
refused to present a multi-racial team’.\textsuperscript{49} CAF’s early meetings – labelled General Assemblies – took place alongside FIFA’s Congress, but were little more than an extended executive group as many African national associations lacked the resources and funding to attend such meetings. The Extraordinary General Assembly of 1963 was therefore a transformative moment as CAF’s second president since 1958, Egyptian General Abdelaziz Mostafa, secured his government’s support to cover the travel and subsistence expenses of all 23 delegations. Mostafa’s success here reflected two factors: the Egyptian football federation’s support for a CAF headquarters to be located in Cairo, and the broader inspiration under Gamal Nasser for Egypt to be a focal point for pan-Arab and pan-African leadership. Mostafa chaired the pivotal 1963 meeting, and in the hitherto neglected minutes of this formative event, oversaw the unanimous and ‘heartily acclaimed’ election of two vice-presidents of the confederation: Ohine Djan of Ghana, and Ydnekatchew Tessema of Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{50} Both were to play vital roles in the African boycott of the 1966 football World Cup tournament.

The boycott was in many ways a logical extension of the emergent forces of pan-Africanism of the mid-twentieth century.\textsuperscript{51} The initiative of newly-independent countries show a prolific level of international collaboration with a distinct growth in cross-continental association and organisation. It was from 15-22 April 1958 that the First Conference of Independent African States was held in Accra, with eight nations in attendance.\textsuperscript{52} South Africa was the only independent state not to participate. Their absence was to be significant for the published goals of the conference, and ultimately for the 1966 boycott. Alongside goals to emancipate the continent, to be neutral and unaligned in relation to the ‘two antagonistic blocs in the world’, and to work towards a ‘fundamental unity’ between African states, a resolutioncondemning racism was also passed. This resolution urged all African states to ‘take vigorous measures to eradicate, where they arise, vestiges of racial discrimination’.\textsuperscript{53} This broad manifestation of pan-African thinking was reinforced by Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah’s words that the aspiration of the pan-African movement was ‘the total liberation of Africa’.\textsuperscript{54} Wallerstein, and others since, saw such ambitions as major political developments in African thought at the time and pointed to pan-Africanism as ‘the movement toward African unity’.\textsuperscript{55}
It did not take long for the mix of sport and politics to emerge as part of the continent-wide struggle for pan-African goals, particularly in the African response to apartheid South Africa. In the same month as Commonwealth leaders gathered in London, and South African Prime Minister H.R. Verwoerd withdraw the newly formed South African Republic from the Commonwealth, the third All African Peoples Conference met in Cairo in March 1961. The most notable outcome was a ‘Resolution on South Africa’, covering boycotting of South African goods and severing of diplomatic relations, and, in its final clause, football. The resolution stated that the conference ‘welcomes the move for barring South Africa from the Federation of International Football Associations, and urges the formation of the All-African Sports Federation.’ Such a clause had dual goals: to up the pressure on FIFA to address South Africa’s discriminatory policies, and to call for an ‘All-African’ response in the sphere of sport. The former was intimately related to the latter as CAF was conceived in this atmosphere of pan-African activism, where football was part of the broader political armory to address Africa’s place in the world. As such the emergence of Djan and Tessema as CAF Vice Presidents and their leading call to support a broader cause and boycott an international forum was a logical extension to sport of the commitment to pan-African solidarity.

Ohine Djan was the key figure in Ghanaian President Nkrumah’s use of football to achieve diplomatic ends. Together they saw football as a platform for the nurture and assertion of ‘Ghanaianness’, a nationalising project designed to transcend tribal divisions in Ghana, and contribute to the emerging pan-African ideology. Nkrumah blended his vision of the future with a mission to unite the continent: ‘His conception of Africa as encompassing one “people” and one “country” was premised on both traditional and modern values and principles, with both traditional and modern political aims’. Djan’s wife Matilda Adjei confirms that ‘Nkrumah encouraged him [Djan] to put football in Africa on the world map’. Djan had become chairman of the Ghanaian Amateur Football Association in September 1957, and de-facto Sports Minister as Director of the Central Organisation of Sports in 1960. He oversaw the formation of a national football league and sought international fixtures for a Ghanaian national side. The latter became a vanguard for African football, and in its nickname the ‘Black Stars’ symbolized both Africa’s football potential and aspirations and the pan-African concept and project more generally. A ‘Kwame Nkrumah’ Gold Cup competition
consolidated Ghana’s place at the forefront of developments in sport and in continental pan-
Africanism.61

Djan was appointed to FIFA’s executive committee in 1962 and the summer of 1966 should
have been the pinnacle of his, Ghana’s and Africa’s footballing life. He was replaced though as the
country’s director of sports and secretary of its football federation in the spring of 1966 after General
Ankrah’s military coup of February 1966 deposed Nkrumah.62 However, by then and despite Ghana’s
Black Stars being African champions in 1963 and 1965, CAF’s boycott was in full effect. The
commitment to the pan-African cause trumped the desire to play at a World Cup, as the Reverend
Osei Kofi, one of the Black Stars players, recalled 50 years later. Kofi stated ‘The World Cup, this is
what Ohine Djan and Kwame Nkrumah made us forget about … after all Africa is bigger than
Europe, and Nkrumah did not believe in the wider way that FIFA handled Africa. It was a cheat’.63
Ohine Djan’s star faded fast after the end of Nkrumah’s presidency.64 Before that and with
Nkrumah’s backing his contribution had been critical in shaping the history of his continent’s football
diplomacy.

In contrast to Djan, Ydne Tessema’s contribution to CAF’s diplomacy was marked by
longevity. Tessema, from Ethiopia, was selected as president of CAF in February 1972 and held the
position until his death in August 1987. He had been one of the founding members of CAF thirty
years previously. In a photograph of the 15 founders he stands out; aged just 35 he was seated in the
front row in a pair of white trousers, an open-necked white shirt topped by a casual sports jacket,
wearning just light sandals, and a briefcase balanced between his feet.65 Later in an address to CAF’s
25th anniversary gathering in Cairo in September 1982, Tessema expounded a personal approach to
the diplomacy that underpinned his vision for the confederation:

CAF considers its task as a political, social and humanitarian duty to the service of
peace, equality and fraternity between men … a well-structured federation, solid on its
foundations and capable to assume its mission in the framework of the building-up of a
united and powerful Africa.66

This is a language of transformation anchored in pan-African ideals; it contrasted with Rous’s self-
constrained vision of a sporting federation’s diplomatic role.67 Fékrou Kidane, former Director of
International Relations at the IOC, journalist and consultant as well as football referee, worked with Tessema for many years. Kidane recalled him as someone who did ‘everything for our country. He was not only player, translator, administrator, he was also giving courses to all of us: football administration, football rules and so on. He was a democrat too, he was a responsible person and wanted to help the development of his own country. He was sort of a visionary, reading all the time. There was no subject that didn’t interest him, so he knows everything’.68 The cultural and political possibilities of the post-colonial moment were everything for Tessema, his peoples and his continent, and like Djan he would use football as the vehicle for a vision of pan-African activism.

The main focus of the pan-African vision as it impacted upon Rous, FIFA and the 1966 World Cup was, as CAF’s historic 1963 Extraordinary General Assembly recorded, ‘The Case of South Africa’. Although it would be the most extensive item in the minutes it was filed under ‘Miscellaneous’. The CAF President had invited Rous ‘to speak to the African delegates about the decision taken by the Executive Committee of FIFA … to lift the suspension’ of the South African Football Association (FASA). FIFA’s approach over the previous three years had oscillated reflecting the difficulties it had in addressing South Africa. When Rous became president in September 1961 FIFA’s Executive Committee confirmed a decision to ‘decree the suspension – until further notice’ of the South Africa association, which it had agreed at its Rome assembly in 1960.69 When the Executive Committee next meet in Santiago in May 1962, it was agreed that ‘the suspension would remain in force’, pending the visit of a FIFA delegation to review FASA’s claims to be inclusive.70 The investigation saw a visit by Rous and FIFA colleague Jimmy McGuire of the USA, to South Africa (15-19 January 1963) preceding the Cairo Assembly.71 Rous’s Executive Committee then supported the recommendation for South Africa’s readmission to FIFA in a 13-5 vote, and this provided the stimulus for CAF to campaign against the FASA within FIFA.

The Cairo meeting was to prove a baptism of fire for Rous in FIFA’s relations with CAF. According to the minutes, his opening remarks were characteristically paternalistic in tone:

Sir Rous said that in every similar organisation, any decision approved by the majority, should be accepted and … that he was sure that the African delegates would accept the
Rous proposed that where there was ‘no complete unity’ they could ‘overcome all difficulties with cooperation and high spirit’. Delegates from across the continent lined up to question Rous about the FIFA Executive Committee’s intention to readmit South Africa. Rous responded tamely, pointing to his visit earlier in the month where he and McGuire had seen ‘no discrimination between the associations and the FASA is open to any association wishing to be affiliated’. Rous fell back on his increasingly antiquated viewpoint – becoming a mantra in this interrogation and elsewhere on the subject – of co-operation, answering ‘that the discussion would not come to any conclusion if the conference did not find a resolution. The South African organisations of football must help each other to overcome the difficulties with friendly spirit between whites and non-whites. Everybody must cooperate and that is always the aim of the FIFA’. Rous’s reliance on ‘cooperation’ betrayed a lack of appreciation of both the political context, that of a hastily decolonising African continent, and the limits to his own brand of diplomatic practice.

McGuire, supporting Rous, sought to defend the FIFA approach and, in a tone which replicated Rous’s capacity to preach stated: ‘African delegates should not shut the door and must help the associations in South Africa, which had good sporting spirits, but [where] the Government stood against their wish’. In their remarks both McGuire and Rous sought to uphold the distinction between sport and politics that would allow them to say firstly that the South African association was distinct from political influence, and secondly, that at the same time – however paradoxical a claim – football could be an agent for influencing government policy.

CAF president General Mostafa saw things differently. Mostafa asserted that the assembly ‘had the right to make a decision according to the real situation … We, the Africans, should express our points of view’. At that point Rous and McGuire left the meeting and the discussion continued, the Chairman observing that ‘the case was a very important one, and the Assembly was more capable than the [FIFA] Executive Committee’ of giving proper consideration to the case. Discussions were followed by the framing of a resolution, led by Djan which directly reflected their pan-African
thinking, and marked a paradigmatic shift away from the unifying paternalism and purportedly apolitical conduct of Rous:

In view of the fact that the re-admission of South Africa Football Association (F.A.S.A.) which practises racialism in Football, by F.I.F.A., will mitigate against true Football harmony on the Continent of Africa:

Be it resolve, and it is hereby resolved by the bonafide members and accredited representatives of the African Football Confederation here assembled in Cairo on the 24th January 1963, that:

1. the African Football Confederation shall have nothing to do with the F.A.S.A. until such time that its obnoxious apartheid policy is totally eliminated from its Set-Up, and operation and that

2. our objection and dis-satisfaction be conveyed to the Executive Committee of F.I.F.A. with the warning that the A.F.C. proposes to table a substantive Motion for the complete expulsion of the South African Football Association from F.I.F.A. at the next Congress to be held in Tokio in 1964, if by that time the damnable apartheid Policy was still practised by the South African Football Association.'

CAF’s language was wholly different to that of Rous; of confrontation rather than compromise. Rous was privately irked, underlining afterwards in his copy of the minutes the words ‘damnable apartheid’ and adding the comment ‘not practised’. Rous’s recipe of shared spirit, co-operation and consensus was moribund in the context of an emergent pan-African movement. Tessema and Djan set the tone, and others followed such as the delegate from the U.A.R. stating ‘that the racial discrimination practised in South Africa could not be accepted by any human being’. The significance of such language was that at CAF’s first truly substantive and representative meeting it presented a new and challenging agenda for FIFA, one which explicitly brought politics to bear and required diplomacy to address.

The scene was set for CAF to prove to Rous that sport and politics did mix. The assembly’s final decisions were to reiterate dissatisfaction with the FIFA Executive’s decision to lift the suspension of the football association FASA; to maintain the expulsion of FASA until discrimination
was totally eliminated from its *modus operandi*; to push for total expulsion of FASA from FIFA at the Tokyo 1964 Congress should discrimination still be practised at the time; and to urge African national associations at Tokyo to table a substantive motion for African unity. In these outcomes the antecedents of pan-African thinking was clear. The absence of African teams from the qualifying phase for a place at the 1966 World Cup Finals would be a small price to pay to achieve CAF’s threefold goal. First, to bring pressure to bear on FIFA to respond to South Africa’s apartheid policies; second, to gain a fuller recognition of the claims of CAF to have a guaranteed presence at the 1970 World Cup Finals and beyond; and third, to contribute to pan-African identity. In sum, Rous was dealing with politically motivated pan-Africanists in CAF led by Djan and Tessema, protagonists prepared to indelibly mix sport with political causes. In this context, as the 1966 World Cup honed increasingly into view during 1963 and 1964, the CAF threats to Rous’s model of ‘co-operation and goodwill’ materialised into the only ever confederation-wide boycott of the event.

Linking political opposition to South Africa to matters at the heart of FIFA, prior to the 1964 Congress Djan had stepped up the pressure on FIFA in regard to the lack of any guaranteed place for an African team at the 1966 Finals. In a telegram from Accra on 8 February 1964 Djan wrote to General Secretary Helmut Käser at FIFA’s Zurich office:

> registering strong objection to unfair and unreasonable world cup arrangements for afro-african countries *stop* 25 afro-asian countries struggling through painful expensive qualifying series for ultimate one finalist representation is pathetic and unsound *stop* at the worst Africa should have one finalist in London tournament *stop* urgent reconsider.80

Tessema too pressed Africa’s case in a letter which Käser forwarded on to Rous on 19 February 1964. The FIFA president and its general secretary were left in no doubt that a full protest was in the offing yet seemed unable or unwilling to adapt and respond. Both financially and geographically, Tessema stated, the prospect of a match between the qualified African team and Australia appeared preposterous: ‘… it appears that the Afro-Asian group is a mockery of economy, politics and geography’; the link FIFA proposed between Asian countries and Africa, he asserted, was ‘completely unjustified’.81 Citing also the improved level of performance and ability of African national teams, Tessema made the case for an allocated African place in the Finals, asking:
… that one place in the final competition be accorded to Africa who, by the number of Associations affiliated to FIFA, by the number entered in the World Cup competition 1966, by the worthy results gained by national teams, by the efforts being made in each Association to raise the standard of football, merits greater consideration from the organisation whose task it is to control justly and comprehensively football throughout the world.82

Käser’s covering letter to Rous conceded that although ‘some of Mr Tessema’s arguments appear to be reasonable’, the Ethiopian’s request could not be supported as the decision had been made by the 1966 Organizing Committee in Zurich.83 Rous wrote back to Käser three days later confirming ‘that the decisions reached in Zurich can not be altered’, but that he would share Tessema’s protest with the Executive Committee.84 There was a hint of sympathy in Rous’s response - as his paternalism dictated - in noting that any political, geographical or economic difficulties arising in the later stages of the qualifying process might lead to the World Cup Organising Committee making some ‘possible’ adjustments. There was though no counter offer on the table from FIFA that might have appeased CAF’s concern. All was now in place for CAF to follow through with its threat to boycott. Djan had condemned the ‘discriminating decision of FIFA’ and recommended the withdrawal of the African countries in January 1964.85 The action was confirmed in a resolution adopted by CAF’s Executive Committee meeting in July 1964. The covering note from the CAF General Secretary Mourad Fahmy accompanying the Resolution said that this was for ‘all those who have at heart – both in Africa and elsewhere – the cause of making the World Championship a real world manifestation far from any exclusivism’.86 CAF was not bluffing though, and at the CAF General Assembly in Tokyo on 7 October 1964, a unanimous vote (26 in favour) confirmed withdrawal from the World Cup. An anti-apartheid stance opposing FIFA’s proposed reinstatement of South Africa, a pan-African mission that motivated the confederation’s leaders, and the unfairness of World Cup allocations combined to make a powerful case.

The response from Rous and FIFA was paltry. Rous, addressing the full FIFA Congress on 8 October after the CAF decision was taken, said that he was ‘shocked to hear that the African countries had decided to withdraw from the World Cup’. Such ‘setbacks were alarming’ he added, and he
would be ‘most distressed’ if he were informed officially of this decision. Rous’s personal distress was not a factor in CAF’s overarching goals; his moral pleas were to no avail.

CAF’s goals of addressing South Africa’s status, securing a place at future World Cups, and overarching African representation on the international stage were the core focus of the confederation. Indeed, when in July 1965 the FIFA Executive issued a demand that all withdrawing associations pay a fine of 5,000 Swiss francs Tessema issued a swift and derisory response. He argued, using language that Rous would recognise, that each national association in CAF ‘felt that it had renounced its most elementary rights and sacrificed its own interests for the sake of the unity of world football’. Tessema continued by laying the responsibility for the predicament at FIFA’s door:

[CAF’s members] were [previously] convinced that the lesson would be learnt [by the threat of the boycott] and that they would receive justice and compensation from the FIFA in future international competitions. Unfortunately, on the contrary the FIFA has adopted a relentless attitude against the African Associations and its decisions resemble [sic] methods of intimidation and repression designed to discourage any further impulses of a similar nature.

The issue of a representative allocation of a Finals place for Africa remained an unpleasant distraction for Rous and the FIFA Executive in the year preceding the tournament in England, and Africa was not officially represented on the field of play when the first ball was kicked between England and Uruguay at Wembley on 11 July 1966.

African representation was however present in England in the summer of 1966. Tessema was an invited guest in the United Kingdom throughout the event and reported on the tournament subsequently to CAF’s sister confederation – the Union of European Football Associations UEFA - and his condemnation of FIFA was damming. Tessema wrote:

In playing all of England’s matches at Wembley, in designating seven British referees for Brazil’s three games; in appointing as referees for the games England-Argentina and Germany-Uruguay a German and an English referee respectively; in ignoring almost totally referees from other continents (above all after the quarter-finals); in not designating the referee for the final at the start, FIFA has committed a pile of blunders.
It has not sought to place itself beyond suspicion … so provoking, above all among its critics, the feeling that England got a helping hand in winning the World Cup.89

In pointing to the allocation of referees throughout the tournament as a ‘pile of blunders’ - of the 32 games at the 1966 World Cup Finals, 25 were refereed by Europeans - the criticism of Rous was twofold.90 Explicitly Tessema was criticising FIFA’s running of the tournament, and implicitly he was challenging Rous as the UEFA audience knew full well that the president of FIFA was a former international referee. Cumulatively by pointing out that FIFA was not ‘beyond suspicion’ he was directly challenging Rous’s diplomacy.

Tessema’s report was a prominent intervention, framing debates concerning the 1966 tournament and Rous’s role in it. A successful outcome to CAF’s campaign would follow before the next Finals tournament in Mexico in 1970. In early 1968 Rous, attempting to illustrate his diplomatic skills in reconciling ‘splits’, informed the CAF General Assembly in Addis Ababa that FIFA had no wish to see Africa withdraw from the forthcoming 1970 World Cup qualification process. Rous stated that the Organising Committee for that event would include Tessema as representative for Africa. It would be Tessema’s task, along with other organizing committee members, to propose a ‘grouping of teams for the various stages of the Competition’.91 The battle had effectively been won by CAF, and the boycott had achieved a major goal in Africa being awarded its first dedicated qualification slot for future World Cups. Equally significant, the first pan-African organisation of any kind – political, cultural, sporting – had accomplished its initial mission to assert the continent’s rights in a post-colonial world. ‘Right from the very beginning, this was a story about cultural politics in the post-colonial period’: CAF, as the first pan-African organisation, had assumed a ‘geo-political role’.92

Africa’s withdrawal from the 1966 World Cup qualifying process constitutes a unique continent-wide withdrawal from a major sporting occasion. It drew attention to the limitations of Rous’s model of diplomacy, exposing the unsuitability of his judgement when encountering the political realities of the decolonising era. Most of all, alone or accompanied by like-minded individuals in unfamiliar cultural and political settings, Rous was shown to be flawed in his underlying belief that FIFA could transcend politics. Rous’s continuing support for South African football’s reinstatement lost him the support of CAF, where the likes of Djan and Tessema could not
accept his argument that the football system in South Africa was open to all, and that apartheid was an exclusive problem of politics not sport. Kidane recalled Rous as a pleasant individual unable to recognise the significance of the South African issue, ‘he was very nice and very sociable with everybody. The only problem was when it came to South Africa’. So whilst many at CAF might not condemn Rous as a person, the Englishman’s pro-South Africa line in FIFA’s Executive Committee and his patronising and threatening tone at the CAF 1968 Congress, were unacceptable for the leader of the sport’s governing body.

Rous’s reputation in Africa could not survive these flaws; few could forget or forgive his comments on CAF’s conduct at the 1968 Congress in his Presidential address. In confirming the allocation of the dedicated World Cup slot for Africa, he took the opportunity to chide CAF on its support for possible IOC sanctions against South Africa:

We are here concerned with football, the FIFA and the AFC [CAF], not with the I.O.C. and are responsible for our own decisions not for those of others. Gentlemen, making threats in our football family is not good legislation. The result could rebound very unfavourably on those who make them.

Rous’s diplomacy failed in this not-so-veiled threat. Even without this faux pas, his individual personal charm allied to an idealistic conception of FIFA’s mission and values were no match for the political activists to whom CAF was an agent for political and cultural change and necessary pan-African progress. Rous’s schoolmasterly and refereeing experience and his adherence to a world view rooted too much upon trust and assumed loyalty were inadequate tools with which to grasp the scale of change that would characterise the transformations of a decolonizing world.

It was not only in Africa where Rous’s diplomatic qualities were critiqued. The beginnings of a movement which would see South American opinion turned against Rous, were also evident in 1966, and critically for this analysis they were evident to the Foreign Office. While the forces that Havelange would successfully rally to defeat Rous in the 1974 presidential election would coalesce in the favour of the Brazilian, the lack of respect for Rous in South America after 1966 was clear. In early September 1966 the British embassy in Buenos Aires, in the person of Ramsey A. W. Wright, reported that the favourite joke running the rounds in local football circles after the controversial
game at Wembley in which England defeated Argentina had been ‘that FIFA was run by three people, Sir, Stanley and Rous’. Similarly, back in the Foreign Office in London David F. Duncan condemned Rous’s handling of the South American criticisms in a confidential longhand note dated 18 August, to colleague Caroline Petrie: ‘The vast majority of Latin American comment has been exceptionally unfavourable’, Duncan began, before concluding that ‘Sir Stanley Rous mishandled the whole situation in a deplorable fashion.’ Petrie did not disagree. She had written to all 18 South American embassies on 12 August, referring to accusations against World Cup organizers that had widely emphasised that the FIFA president was British and the finals were held in England, which ‘has meant that Britain as a whole and not merely FIFA has incurred a good deal of odium’.

Rous’s diplomacy was seen as less effective in the case of South America than it had been in relation to North Korea where he was the Foreign Office’s interlocutor in chief with the DPRK delegation, and also as potentially damaging to British interests. Beyond the divergent opinions of Rous in the Foreign Office the FIFA president’s paternalistic, eurocentric and often patronising practice was to become increasingly detached from the rapidly changing topography of international affairs in the later 1960s. The vulnerabilities of his forms of personal diplomacy became a strong factor in his defeat in the 1974 FIFA presidential election when Brazil’s João Havelange was elected as FIFA’s first non-European president.

**Conclusion: The Diplomatic Tensions of 1966**

While Geoff Hurst’s impact on the World Cup Final in 1966 was unmatched with a hattrick that saw England lift the Jules Rimet trophy, Sir Stanley Rous’s influence on the diplomacy of the 1966 World Cup tournament as a whole was equally as important. His impact was felt from the outset of his FIFA presidency in September 1961. He practiced and preached a form of diplomacy that had been honed through a series of increasingly high-profile positions blending public performance and private discussion. This formula characterized his conduct as an international football referee in the late 1920s and the early 1930s and his activities as secretary of The Football Association from 1934 to 1962. Rous should have been at the peak of his influence in world football governance and development at the time of the 1966 World Cup; however, a close analysis of his diplomacy leads to a
more mixed picture. Consideration of DPRK involvement in the World Cup Finals, the ‘North Korea’ issue, has shown how Rous’s diplomatic practice in liaising across individual and institutional networks, and on behalf of the Foreign Office, could contribute effectively to the resolution of delicate diplomatic matters. A counter-example is provided by the boycott by African nations of the 1966 World Cup, demonstrating how Rous’s personal philosophy of fair-play and commitment to the distinction between sport and politics was less effective in the post-colonial context where football was conceived as part of a political process for pan-Africanism.

Following his defeat in 1974 by João Havelange for the FIFA presidency, Rous reflected on his reasons for having stood (at the age of 79 years) for a further term as president. Seemingly oblivious to the fact that the only boycott to that point, and since, in FIFA’s history took place during his term he noted: ‘I felt the diplomacy which had avoided any serious split in the past [i.e. his own diplomacy]… might still be of value to FIFA’. His words reveal a misguided self-rationalisation that was out of step with the 1974 campaign when Havelange mobilised opinion from what was then called the developing world to oust Rous. His words also evoke an ultimately flawed conception of diplomacy which was integral to his thinking from the outset of his presidency and throughout the diplomatic machinations of the 1966 World Cup tournament.

It is the approach to diplomacy that Rous individually, and FIFA collectively, practiced which stands out in the analysis of diplomacy at the World Cup of 1966; an approach in which tensions between formal and informal, official and unofficial, and individual and representative diplomacy are highlighted. The tensions were evident in the model of diplomacy practiced by Rous and FIFA more widely, embodied in their belief that sport was distinct from the political reality in which it existed. Individuals such as Rous blended professional status and individual networks, underwritten by their individual style. Such an approach is shaped by the individuals’ experiences and the strategic cultural dispositions that they espoused. Ken Weisbrode argues, building on the identification of paradiplomacy in the 1990s, that when ‘para-diplomatic bodies’ - such as FIFA - ‘enter the picture they are important diplomatic facilitators’. Weisbrode writes: ‘By enlarging the field of diplomacy in this way, such organizations and the policy entrepreneurs who work for them can play several roles: foil, cheering section, loyal opposition, “team b” – sometimes all at once. They are also diplomats of a
An understanding of FIFA as a diplomatic actor, as exemplified in this article, supports the argument that the interconnected worlds of sport and diplomacy, as they become manifest in high-profile sports events, constitute a prime venue in which the tensions of diplomacy are played out.

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3 Ibid., 56.

4 Ibid., 57.


6 The boycott from Africa was not absolutely wholesale; Egyptian referee Ali Kandel took charge of one group game between Chile and North Korea on 15 July 1966. Equally, four of the Portugal team that made it to the semi-finals, including tournament top-scorer Eusebio were effectively African, having been born in Mozambique which was then a Portuguese colony.


9 Ibid.
Access to the Rous papers has been granted by the owner of the papers, the former personal secretary of Sir Stanley Rous, by whom the papers have been filed into circa 65 box-files. The papers and associated items are currently under consideration by interested parties for inclusion, in part or their entirety, in collections. These parties include the National Football Museum (England), The Football Association, and the FIFA World Football Museum. This process also includes examination of the feasibility of a UK University funding the digitisation of the papers and associated materials, with a view to making all of the resource available online and at no cost to future researchers.


Examples of this recent surge in literature include special editions of leading academic journals such as *Diplomatic History*, xl/v (2016), Hallvard Notaker, Giles Scott-Smith, and David J Snyder, (eds); *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, xxvii/ii (2016), J Simon Rofe (ed); *Sport in Society*, xvii/ix (2014), J. Simon Rofe and Geoffrey A. Pigman (eds); and *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, viii/iii-iv (2013) Stuart Murray (ed). In addition to these collections a number of texts illustrate the strength of the field: Stuart Murray, *Sports Diplomacy: Origins, Theory and Practice* (London and New York: Routledge, 2018); J. Simon Rofe (ed), *Sport and Diplomacy: Games within Games* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018); Heather L. Dichter and Andrew L. Johns (eds), *Diplomatic Games: Sport, Statecraft, and International Relations since 1945* (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books 2014); and Aaron Beacom, *International Diplomacy and the Olympic Movement—The New Mediators*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Prior to these volumes the paucity of high-quality scholarship linking diplomacy and sport was punctuated by Barbara Keys, *Globalising Sport:*


17 Ibid., 12.

18 Ibid., 11.


21 Ibid.

22 World Cup 1966 – North Korea, report from Denis Follows, 3 March 1966, Private Papers of Sir Stanley Rous. There appears to be no carbon copy of this report in the Foreign Office files at The National Archives.


24 Ibid.

25 ‘Record of a Meeting Held in Mr. Bolland’s Room at 4 P.M. on Wednesday 14 December, to Discuss North Korean Participation in the Finals of the World Cup’, FO371/181150, FK1801/1(E), The National Archives, Kew, London.


27 Ibid.


30 ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ memo on ‘North Korean Footballers’, from Edwin Bolland, Far Eastern Department, to Arthur de la Mare, 1 March 1966, FO371/187181, FK1801/4(B) The National Archives, Kew London.


32 Howell, Made in Birmingham, 143.
33 ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ memo on ‘North Korean Footballers’, from Edwin Bolland, Far Eastern Department, to Arthur de La Mare and Lord Walston, 3 March 1966 FO371/187181, FK1801/4(B) The National Archives, Kew, London.


35 Ibid.


From Miss V. Beckett, Western Department, Foreign Office, to D. Gladstone, Esq., Bonn, 6 April 1966, FO371/187181, FK1801/5, The National Archives, Kew, London. The question of precedent was of great concern to Foreign Office personnel in the context of the Cold War between East and West. Should North Korea be ‘recognised’ as an equal alongside all other countries and political regimes in symbolic representation of distinctive national identities and ideologies? What might ensue were the GDR (German Democratic Republic) be scheduled to play a UK-based ‘nation’ should ‘East Germany’ arrive in the UK for a match, or be drawn to play against a British team in a European or FIFA-based competition, or Olympics-based football tournament? Some principles, agreed with NATO, were in place to deal with the issue of East German sports teams and individuals but it was not until February 1973 that Britain ‘opened diplomatic relationships with the GDR’, as Kay Schiller observes, in ‘Communism, Youth and Sport: The 1973 World Youth Festival in East Berlin’, in Alan Tomlinson, Christopher Young and Richard Holt (eds), Sport and Transformation in Modern Europe: States, Media and Markets 1950-2010 (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 52. Further examination of wider European Football development in the Cold War context can be found in Philipp Vonnard, “How did UEFA govern the European turning point in football? UEFA, the European Champion Clubs’ Cup and the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup projects (1954-1959)”, in Philippe Vonnard, Grégory Quin and Nicolas Bancel, eds., Building Europe with the Ball: Turning Points in the Europeanization of Football, 1905-1995 (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016), 165-186.

The National Archives, FO371/189291, document RG1621/94.

Nonetheless, the North Korean team made an indelible mark on the tournament particularly amongst the people of Middlesbrough where they had played their group matches which became the subject of an award-winning film in 2002 ‘The Game of Their Lives’. See https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0354594/


Ibid., 8-9.
The literature on pan-Africanism is expansive. The following were particularly useful to the authors: Hakim Adi, *Pan-Africanism: A History*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2018); and Guy Martin, *African Political Thought*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), Chapter 4 ‘Pan-Africanism and African Unity: From Ideal to Practice.’

Those attending were Ghana, Liberia, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Morocco and Ethiopia.

Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide – Revised Edition* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, first published 1962), 42. This book is a compilation of original documents and it is from these primary sources that quotations in this article are taken.


Legum, 272.


Interview with Matilda Adjei, by Piers Edwards, Nsawam, Ghana, April 2016.

For an account of Nkrumah’s strategy for and cultural politics of football, see Darby, “Let us Rally,”. This general description of Djan’s role in Nkrumah’s project draws upon Darby’s account.


Interview with Matilda Adjei, by Piers Edwards, Nsawam, Ghana, April 2016.
The photograph is in Mahjoub, *Confédération Africaine*, 9.


Tessema himself had led an all-African team to a tournament in Brazil in the early months of his presidency, at the invitation of the campaigning João Havelange, purportedly as part of the celebrations of the centennial of Brazil’s independence. See ‘The African selection in the past’, *CAF News* (Official Bulletin of the *Confédération Africaine de Football*), No. 60, January 1997, 23.


FIFA Executive Committee 24 May 1962, Santiago, Chile, minutes dated 10 October 1962, agenda item 13, 7, Private Papers of Sir Stanley Rous.


Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 12.

Ibid.

Ibid., 13.

Ibid.

Ibid., 14-15.

Ibid., 15.

Telegram to FIFA, 8 February 1964, Private Papers of Sir Stanley Rous.

Letter from Tessema to CAF, Private Papers of Sir Stanley Rous.

Ibid.
Letter from Käser to Rous, 19 February 1964, Private Papers of Sir Stanley Rous.

Letter from Rous dated 22 February 1964, Private Papers of Sir Stanley Rous.

Mahjoub, *Confédération Africaine de Football*, 95.

Quotes from the Resolution and Fahmy’s covering note are from the Private Papers of Sir Stanley Rous.


Letter from Tessema to Käser, undated (in all likelihood, 28 July 1965), Private Papers of Sir Stanley Rous.

Tessema was writing in UEFA, *Bulletin Officiel de L'Union des Associations Européennes de Football*, No. 36, September 1966, 420.

On the issue of refereeing, Dr A. Foni, coach of the Swiss national team, wrote that the premises for England’s victory included ‘decisions by referees that were slightly but very clearly favourable’ (Tomlinson, *FIFA*, 57).


CAF, Minutes of the Meeting of the VIIIth Ordinary General Assembly of the African Football Confederation held at the Africa Hall – Addis Abeba on 10 January, 1968, at 9h.45 A.M., Private Papers of Sir Stanley Rous, 3.


