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State/corporation/security: Relations, practices, governmentality

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Abstract

This dissertation argues that emergent discursive practices of *security* are transforming state-corporate relations in ways that produce increasingly tighter integration of state and corporate forms. Conventional analysis of the expanding and proliferating role of corporations in diverse security domains take for granted the centrality of ‘the state’ in relation to ‘security’, as well as a specific understanding of the state (i.e. in Weberian terms) and therefore its relations with other (‘non-state’) entities such as corporations. By contrast this dissertation argues that a focus on the actual practices in and through which state-corporate relations are re-produced reveals that the key effect of discursive practices of security, in diverse domains, is to generate forms of tighter integration between state and corporation. In this dissertation, both states and corporations are understood as aggregates of practices – i.e. as fluid and contingent bundles of relations that are stabilised and attain agential properties – that belie conventional analytical separations such as state/corporation and public/private. This is not to argue that such conceptual divides are meaningless (and thus analysis is better served by frameworks such as ‘assemblages’ or ‘hybridity’), but that these conceptual divides acquire meanings within specific security domains. Further, it is to argue that these divides are continually re-produced through practices, and any understanding of the boundary has to begin with a focus on these practices, rather than with a priori assumptions about states and corporations or public and private. This is because the boundary is internal to the relations between states and corporations rather than something that is external to states and corporations understood as pre-formed and bounded social entities. The dissertation will consider three security domains, namely, the use of military force, resilience and peacebuilding.

Acknowledgements

கற்றது கைமண்ணளவு
கல்லாதது உலகளவு என்று
உற்ற கலை மடந்தே ஓதுகின்றாள்
மெத்த வெறும் பந்தயம் பேசவேண்டாம் புலவர்
எறும்பும் தன் கையால் எண்சான் அறி

What has been learnt is a handful,
What is yet to learn is the size of the world,
Proclaims the goddess of wisdom
Don't make empty boasts scholars –
Know that even an ant is eight times its handspan

(Own translation of verse by Avvaiyar, a Tamil poet, circa 3rd century BCE)

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Appah and Ammah have been supportive in more ways than I can express in words. I have had their unfailing presence and backing all through my life, but it is especially appreciated when they didn't understand why I would want to

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Table of Contents

Abstract	3
Acknowledgements	4
1. Introduction: Investigating state-corporate relations in security	9
1.1 Introduction	9
1.2 The argument	12
1.3 Theoretical framework	17
1.4 Security domains	24
1.4.1 Force	25
1.4.2 Resilience	28
1.4.3 Peacebuilding	32
1.5 Chapter outline	35
2. Literature review: The centrality of the state to security studies	39
2.1 Introduction	39
2.2 Origins of security studies	43
2.2.1 From military to security	44
2.2.2 Broadening and deepening	47
2.3 Unseen corporations	52
2.3.1 Weapons production	52
2.3.2 Securitised finance	54
2.4 Corporations in security provision	58
2.4.1 Military-industrial complex	61
2.4.2 Corporations in the exercise of force	62
2.4.3 Privatisation and control	65
2.4.4 The state remains key	72
2.5 Changing relations	76
2.5.1 Corporations and (in)security	76
2.5.2 Impacts for ‘security’	78
2.5.3 Rethinking the relationship	82
2.6 Conclusion	88
3. Theory: Relations, practices and governmentality	93
3.1 Introduction	93
3.2 Locating boundaries	99
3.3 Relations before entities	105

3.3.1	A typology	110
3.4	Relations as practices	118
3.4.1	The practice turn	119
3.4.2	A critique	122
3.4.3	Bourdieu-inspired analysis	125
3.5	Governmentality	133
3.5.1	Key terms in governmentality scholarship	136
3.5.2	Governmentality and social order	138
3.5.3	Governmentality as political rationality	141
3.5.4	Governmentality as methodology	145
3.6	Neoliberalism	155
3.6.1	Definitional issues	156
3.6.2	Limitations	159
3.6.3	Neoliberalisation	162
3.7	Conclusion	165
4.	<i>Privatisation?: State-corporate relations in the British military</i>	167
4.1	Introduction	167
4.2	Corporations in International Security	170
4.2.1	Privatisation	171
4.2.2	State capacity	176
4.2.3	'Corporate' private actors	182
4.3	'Privatisation' in the UK	187
4.3.1	Three decades of change	187
4.3.2	The British military	194
4.4	QinetiQ – one more privatisation	199
4.4.1	'Just' another company	200
4.4.2	Yet another privatisation	204
4.4.3	Implementation problems	209
4.5	Rethinking state-corporate relations	214
4.5.1	Mutual constitution	217
4.5.2	In it together	221
4.6	Conclusion	226
5.	<i>Resilience: reconstituting British state-corporate relations</i>	231
5.1	Introduction	231
5.2	Resilience in the literature	234
5.2.1	Resilience and neoliberalism	236

5.2.2	Complexity	240
5.2.3	Generating resilience	244
5.2.4	Concerns of critical scholarship	248
5.2.5	Critical infrastructure resilience	252
5.3	Securing critical infrastructure	255
5.3.1	Critical infrastructure resilience in the UK	256
5.3.2	Safeguarding electricity assets	265
5.3.3	Planning for telecoms crises	271
5.3.4	Insights	275
5.4	Resilience as constitutive	276
5.4.1	Relations are key	277
5.4.2	Joint responsibility	279
5.4.3	Limitations of neoliberal governmentality	281
5.5	Conclusion	284
6.	<i>Peacebuilding: The corporate core of USAID</i>	288
6.1	Introduction	288
6.2	USAID and development corporations	293
6.2.1	USAID programmes	298
6.2.2	USAID's 'implementing partners'	304
6.3	Locating the public-private divide in USAID	313
6.3.1	USAID and 'implementing partners'	314
6.3.2	USAID country strategy	319
6.3.3	Expertise	327
6.3.4	Self-improvement	335
6.3.5	Conclusion	341
6.4	USAID and international security	342
6.4.1	Explaining the rise in USAID contracting	343
6.4.2	Missing the salience of security	346
6.4.3	Borderland dangers	350
6.5	Conclusion	354
7.	<i>Conclusion</i>	357
8.	<i>Bibliography</i>	369

1. Introduction: Investigating state-corporate relations in security

1.1 Introduction

The corporation has become ubiquitous in all aspects of modern life, including security. The security scholarship on corporations shows that private contractors “have been active on every continent but Antarctica” and their “operations have become integral to the peacetime security systems of rich and poor states alike” (Singer 2003a, 9–17). These corporations operate in more than 50 countries in an industry estimated to be worth hundreds of billions of dollars (Pattison 2010; Kinsey 2006). In 2010 the US Department of Defence alone was said to employ 170,000 military contractors (Pattison 2010, 425), and between 1994 and 2002 the US military alone signed 3,000 contracts with firms estimated at a contract value of more than \$300 billion (Singer 2003, 15). Indeed, “it is impossible to get a solid and comprehensive picture of the full scope and nature of security privatisation, let alone its impact within affected countries and on international relations” (Mandel 2002, 4 cited in Kinsey 2006, 2).

Despite the scale and scope of corporate activity in diverse security fields - and the private military companies discussed above are only a small part of this - security scholarship has been slow to focus on this. This is in great part due to the centrality of the state to analyses of all aspects of security. Security studies has broadened beyond its origins in military matters, to consider matters such as the protection of human beings, the environment, etc. It has also deepened to

challenge conceptions of security, and their relations to insecurity. More recently, there has been a move to attend to non-state actors in the provision of security, in particular corporations. Despite all this, the state has remained dominant. Even as other referent objects of security emerged, the state retained its centrality, for example, as the provider of security. Moreover, it is a specific conception of the state that dominates the literature i.e. the Weberian state with a monopoly over the legitimate exercise of force within a given territory.

Given the centrality of the state to analysis, the relationship between corporations and the state in the context of security is generally understood through the framework of ‘privatisation’ of state activities i.e. of the ‘transfer’ of state capacities and functions into corporate control (though see exceptions in Leander 2016; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b; discussed in Chapter 2). This has led to a prevailing focus on private military and security companies within the relatively small literature on corporations in security studies. This literature generally takes a substantialist approach, beginning with security provision as the preserve of the ‘state’ and assessing changes to state attributes and as it transfers those responsibilities to non-state entities. In other words, analysis treats the state and corporations as pre-formed and clearly bounded entities, and on this basis, focusses on the transfer of responsibilities from the state to the corporation. However, this leads to analysis focussing on the problems related to ‘privatisation’, such as accountability, control, governance, regulation, etc. While these are useful

avenues of research, this dissertation argues that they also serve to miss the more deep-seated ways in which corporations are becoming integral to security practices and contexts.

In contrast to the substantialist approach of much of the literature, this dissertation takes a relationalist approach to the study of corporations and states in security. Using a governmentality approach, it seeks to show how everyday security practices serve to constitute the state and the corporation, as well as relations between them. The dissertation focusses on three security domains, namely the use of force, resilience and peacebuilding. State and corporate actors are deeply involved in each. While mainstream scholarship treats the state and the corporation as analytical prior to the study of security, this dissertation shows how the pursuit of security itself serves to intensify closer relations between state and corporation. Thus, this dissertation makes the claim that security practices are mutually constitutive of increasingly intimate relations between states and corporations.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section sets out the argument of this dissertation. Section 3 summarises the theoretical framework adopted in the analysis of the three security domains that serve as case studies. In brief, the analytical approach starts with relations, rather than self-evident entities such as state or corporations; treats practices as embodying and reproducing those relations; and uses governmentality in an effort to take seriously the effects of the

practices observed and to interpret the meaning of those practices independent of any pre-existing ontological or epistemological understandings of the world. The section also briefly discusses the concept of neoliberalism, as no discussion of state-corporate relations in the modern era can avoid locating itself in relation to it. Section 4 then summarises each of the three cases, and provides a brief discussion of the ways in which security practices in the exercise of force, resilience and peacebuilding work in different ways to generate closer integration between states and corporations within those security domains. The chapter concludes with an outline of the chapters in the rest of the dissertation.

1.2 The argument

The central argument of this dissertation is that emergent discursive practices of *security* are transforming state-corporate relations in ways that produce increasingly tighter integration of state and corporate forms. Conventional analysis of the expanding and proliferating role of corporations in diverse security domains take for granted the centrality of ‘the state’ in relation to ‘security’, as well as a specific understanding of the state (i.e. in Weberian terms) and therefore its relations with other (‘non-state’) entities such as corporations. By contrast this dissertation argues that a focus on the actual practices in and through which state-corporate relations are re-produced reveals that the key effect of discursive practices of security, in diverse domains, is to generate forms of tighter integration

between state and corporation. In this dissertation, both states and corporations are understood as aggregates of practices – i.e. as fluid and contingent bundles of relations that are stabilised and attain agential properties – that belie conventional analytical separations such as state/corporation and public/private. This is not to argue that such conceptual divides are meaningless (and thus analysis is better served by frameworks such as ‘assemblages’ or ‘hybridity’), but that these conceptual divides acquire meanings within specific security domains. Further, it is to argue that these divides are continually re-produced through practices, and any understanding of the boundary has to begin with a focus on these practices, rather than with a priori assumptions about states and corporations or public and private. This is because the boundary is internal to the relations between states and corporations rather than something that is external to states and corporations understood as pre-formed and bounded social entities.

The dissertation will consider three security domains, namely, the use of military force, resilience and peacebuilding. In each of these domains, it demonstrates how the problems that practitioners seek to solve, and the solutions that appear self-evident to them within that context, generate specific state-corporate relations and also re/constitute both state and corporations in ways that are unique to those domains. That is, in each security domain, the relations and practices are specific to that context and are informed by logics that operate in ways that are contextually situated. However, as the three security domains discussed below

reveal, the common rationality underlying these practices is one of bringing the state and corporations into even tighter relations *in the service of security*. The purpose of this dissertation is not to make a general claim about identical effects across the different security domains, but rather to excavate the distinct ways within each domain that this rationality manifests.

To clarify, this is not an attempt to critique theories of the state or the corporation so as to develop a better one. Political scientists and economists have developed numerous theories in their attempts to explain, respectively, the state or corporation. The approach here, however, is to avoid such overarching, totalising theories, and instead to investigate the practices constitutive of a given security domain, working inductively. Further, this is only made possible by taking a theoretical approach (described below) which avoids *a priori* assumptions about the public-private divide.

In arguing that emergent discursive practices of security are transforming state-corporate relations in ways that produce increasingly tighter integration of state and corporate forms, this dissertation does not deny that various state-corporate arrangements that have occurred at different points in history. To begin with, the corporation is and has always has been a creation of the state, first through mandates, and then laws (Robins 2012; Gelderblom, De Jong, and Jonker 2013; Barkan 2013; Ciepley 2013). As such, the corporation could not exist without the state, and analyses that posit the two as separate and discrete entities serve to

reproduce a liberal common sense about the separation of the political and economic. What is worth noting is that this ‘common sense’ separation is often the starting point for scholarly analysis, and also is often the basis for policy design and practice (as demonstrated by the three security domains discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6). However, even within this overall recognition of the legal dependence of the corporation on the state, it is nevertheless possible to chart historical transformations in the ways in which this relation has been mediated both discursively and institutionally, with specific implications for the character and governance of social spaces, and for practice. For instance, education in the UK has evolved over time from a mainly private enterprise to one mainly provided by the state, to the increasingly private provision today. Similarly, in security, state-corporate relations have evolved from corporations having their own militaries, which were then largely ‘nationalised’ such that the public monopoly on the exercise of force became a defining aspect of the modern state, to the increasing presence of private military and security companies in state’s military functions (see discussion in Chapter 2). The formal separation of personnel and resources across the public and private domains has also varied over time (see, for instance, Anderson 1981 on the oil industry and Baker 2010 on the financial sector).

For all these reasons, it is important to be clear about the claim being made in this dissertation. Much of the security literature begins with the assumption – in many ways a characteristic of the mid twentieth century – that there remains a

meaningful divide between the state and the corporation (public and private) at the level of both discourse as well as practice and personnel. The public/private divide is not solely discursive but corresponds to a real separation traceable across diverse domains and practices. Perhaps the key assumed divide in security studies is that between the military and private uses of force – it is partly for this reason that there has been so much scholarly focus on the ‘privatization’ of security (see discussion in Chapter 2). The issue is not that the corporation has ceased to depend on the state in terms of law, but rather the ways in which in law and practice the nature of that dependence itself is being changed, such that the very question of whether it makes sense to talk about the relations between two entities comes to the fore.

In contrast, this dissertation begins in a different place: taking for granted that the corporate form is a product of law, and hence of the state, it goes looking for the dividing line between public and private in relation to security. Adopting a Foucauldian approach, it does not begin with entities that interact but rather with practices which are productive of the appearance of discrete entities. What it demonstrates is that in addition to the formal dependence of the corporation on the state, at the level of practice and personnel the assumption of a distinction - whether conceptual or empirical - is increasingly problematic. Indeed, claims about the nature of the distinction are instrumentalised and deployed tactically within the context of what is effectively a shared social space, and tellingly, this is

nowhere more evident than in relation to military force and security. It is through exploring the specific logics around the public/private divide that operate within and shape practices within this security domain (Chapter 4), and those of resilience (Chapter 5) and peacebuilding (Chapter 6), that the overall argument that security discourses are transforming state-corporate relations in ways that produce increasingly tighter integration of state and corporate forms is made. The next section describes the theoretical framework that makes this argument possible.

1.3 Theoretical framework

This dissertation utilises a governmentality framework to empirically excavate the rationalities that shape and are embodied in the security practices studied. The conventional International Security literature begins with states and non-states as discrete substances i.e. entities. Treating the boundary between state and non-state as external to those entities, it then seeks to understand their interactions across that boundary and the consequences thereof. In contrast, this dissertation takes a relational approach, understanding both states and corporations as bundles of relations that are formed by and shaped through those relations. It begins by analysing practices as a way to empirically grasp those relations, and, rather than interpreting relations through pre-existing frames, and uses a governmentality approach to excavate the rationalities that underpin and are formed through those

practices. This section elaborates this theoretical framework, while Chapter 3 expands on it fully.

To make possible its analysis, this dissertation makes four key analytical moves.

First, it emphasises the importance of seeing the state/non-state ‘border’ as *internal*, rather than prior, to the production of social and political order. Second, it emphasises the utility of relationalist over substantionalist analysis for bringing to the fore how such borders are enacted, thereby generating the solidity of commonly taken for granted ‘entities’ such as states and corporations. Third, it emphasises the importance of focussing on practices, as embodiment and productive of relations. Finally, it emphasises the utility of a governmentality framework in excavating the diffuse yet potent workings of ordering rationalities that inform and are constituted by relations embodied in practices. In this way it is able to demonstrate the ways in which the discursive practices of security rework relations between state and corporation in ways that tighter integration of state and corporate practices become essential to the achievement of security.

While some disciplines (such as gender studies) have always viewed the public-private divide as a site of politics and contestation, this has, by and large, not been a concern of International Security scholars. Rather, in maintaining the centrality of the state to the discipline (as discussed in Chapter 2), these scholars also continue to conceptualise the state as a pre-formed entity, one with distinct external boundaries that can interact with other (state or non-state) entities. The

boundary between the state and non-state (public and private) is thus taken for granted as prior to analysis. In contrast, this dissertation seeks to understand the boundary between states and non-states (in this case corporations) as internal to social and political order. In other words, being mobile, the boundary itself becomes the site of politics. By seeing the boundary as contingent and uncertain, it becomes possible to ask questions about the ways in which the state and non-state, and the relations between them, are produced through practices and the consequent effects. This is not to dismiss either the ‘entities’ or the boundary as irrelevant to analysis, but rather to see them as internal to the institutional mechanisms that maintain order.

Seeing the boundary as a structural effect (T. Mitchell 1991) makes it possible to begin to investigate the relations that establish and re/produce the boundary, while at the same time studying how it changes. A relationalist approach therefore facilitates the study of change. The substantialist approach taken by most of the International Security literature, which sees the state and non-state as discrete entities that are interacting (i.e. have relations across the pre-existing boundary) cannot study changes to these relations and the entities they re/produce. In contrast, a relationalist approach sees states and non-states as part of the flows they are engaged in, even as they are constituted by them (Emirbayer 1997). Using the work of Jackson and Nexon (1999), this dissertation discusses the application of their typology of concepts for the project being undertaken here. They begin

with ‘processes’, and aggregate them into ‘configurations’, which can then be aggregated into ‘projects’ with agential properties. Further, they discuss ‘yoking’ as a means of narratively stabilising projects. This typology allows for the conceptualisation of states, corporations, etc. as projects and allows for a relationalist analysis of them.

However, capturing processes – required to begin understanding social order at its most fundamental in Jackson and Nexon’s analysis – is difficult. Thus, the dissertation turns to practices as a means of empirically grasping relations. There has been a recent ‘turn’ to practices in International Relations led by scholars such as Emmanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, and as such it is now an established methodology in International Relations. While there is similarity between Jackson and Nexon’s view of processes as “a causally or functionally linked set of occurrences or events” (1999, 302) and Adler and Pouliot’s concept of practices as “socially meaning patterns of action” (2011c, 6), practices are easier to grasp. However, they do not have to be approached from a relationalist perspective, as indicated in the work of Adler and Pouliot themselves (2011a, 2011b). Indeed, one of the criticisms of the practice turn in International Relations is precisely that this scholarship is limited because practices have to be interpreted through prior social meaning, with the consequence that the understanding of practices is constrained by scholars’ understanding of these prior social contexts (see for instance the discussion of Duvall and Chowdhury 2011 in Chapter 3).

In contrast, post-structuralist scholars do not presuppose the meaning of practices, but instead seek to begin with the practices themselves and analyse inductively. Thus, this dissertation turns to the scholarship on governmentality to provide a tool through which the rationalities that shape and are produced through practices can be excavated. Foucault coined the neologism ‘governmentality’ to describe the governing mentality that operated independent of direct state action. He, and scholars who have been inspired by his work, seek to understand relations between states and non-states by beginning with observation of the practices they are enmeshed in, and understanding the rationalities that shape and are produced through them. Thus, governmentality is a tool uniquely suited to the empirically grounded approach of this dissertation.

As discussed above, it is also necessary to distinguish the analyses presented in this dissertation from the rationality that has dominated the focus of governmentality scholarship, and had been motivated by the visible changes over the past three decades in the organisation of both the public and private i.e. neoliberal governmentality. While it has long been recognised that neoliberalism need not be the only rationality at work in a given context (see for instance Valverde 1996; Nadarajah 2010), given Foucault’s own scholarship on this (2007) and the simple fact that the main work by scholars utilising governmentality was in studying neoliberalism, this rationality has come to dominate governmentality studies (see for instance Rose 1996; Rose and Miller 1992; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991).

This is especially the case in the security-related governmentality literature (see for instance Dillon and Reid 2009; Zebrowski 2016; B. Evans and Reid 2014).

Neoliberalism as a concept is heavily contested, with understanding ranging from seeing it as a set of ideas, as a policy formulation, as an ideology, as a project, or as a political rationality. The contestation can be ascribed to scholarly attempts to analytically capture a phenomenon that covers changes across diverse activities and that has been undertaken through diverse modalities, practices, and forms of institutional change, resulting in very different effects in various locales (Brenner et al, 2010).

One key problem in this regard is differentiating cause from effect – ‘neoliberalism’ has become at once a description of a set of phenomena and the explanation for why these come about. This problem emerges in great part because of the contradictory nature of the neoliberalism, and is reflected, for example, in differences between ideas about neoliberalism and what has been termed “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002). This dissertation does not attempt to locate its argument in relation to neoliberalism. Rather, it suggests that the sets of analyses presented in the three security domains reflect the processual nature of neoliberalisation (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010). A key criticism of scholarship on ‘neoliberal governmentality’ is that in focussing on contingent and contextually specific emergences of ‘neoliberal’ rule in diverse settings, what can’t be explained is the ‘family resemblances’ between changes in diverse settings

(Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010). This dissertation serves the purpose of more precisely excavating the rationalities operating in different security contexts in order to take more seriously the apparent contradictions in neoliberal social order.

In terms of methodology, this dissertation adopts an inductive 'bottom-up' approach to the analysis of the shifting relations between states and corporations in the context of security. In particular, it seeks to build an account of these relations, their transformations and implications through an analysis of the practices through which they are effected. There are several reasons why such an approach is called for. First, much analysis of the state-corporate relation assumes in advance it knows what is to be explained. It takes the substantive reality of the state and the corporation as given and then explores how relations between these entities emerge and develop. Throughout the analysis it is assumed both the state and the corporation remain much the same even as the relations between them become more complex. This makes it harder to see where and how the state and the corporation are transformed in and through these processes. In contrast, a relational approach to the conceptualisation of the state and the corporation allows for an exploration of how those entities and the effect of their substantive reality and the boundary between them is produced. Second, if the object is to explore how a particular form of social order is produced - as it is here - then the analyst is forced to adopt an approach that is open to the discovery of forms of order that may not be well-captured by assumptions of the discrete and

substantive nature of states, corporations and their relations. Following Foucault, it is necessary to adopt forms of analysis that do not prejudge the outcome of the empirical inquiry. An inductive analysis of practices - as the sites and mechanisms through which social relations and the wider configurations of which they are a part are produced - is the best way to ensure this openness. Among other things, this delivers the potential to discover new or altered forms of social order in the analysis that may be compared with competing claims about the kind of social orders in which we live.

1.4 Security domains

This dissertation discusses practices in three security domains. As outlined above (and elaborated in Chapter 3), it begins with practices as a way to empirically grasp the relations that are constitutive of and engaged in by states and corporations. The security domains discussed are the exercise of force, resilience and peacebuilding, and this section provides a summary of the analysis of each. The dissertation works through specific practices in each area, using a governmentality approach to excavate the rationalities that underpin and are formed through those practices. In doing so, it discovers slightly different rationalities in each security domain, which is to be expected as the problems that are being 'solved' in each context are different. However, as discussed above, these

also point to the variety of ways in which states and corporations are becoming increasingly more integrated through practices that seek to increase security.

1.4.1 Force

The first security domain studied is that of the exercise of force. This has traditionally been seen as one of the primary functions of the state, reinforced by Weber's definition of the state as the entity claiming the monopoly over the use of physical violence within a given territory. Despite the increasing presence of corporations in all aspects of security, including in the military, the security scholarship generally ignores them, seeing these as secondary to the key actor, the state. Amongst the small literature that does consider the engagement of corporations in security matters, the focus tends to be on private military and security companies. Here too, these are understood as private corporations who have taken over responsibility for activities that used to be the preserve of the state (see for instance Singer 2003a; Krahmann 2010). Thus, the dominant lens through which state corporate relations are viewed is that of privatisation. This leads to explanations such as the state either being weakened by loss of control, or being strengthened by increasing the capacity and skills that it can deploy – depending in great part on the normative stance of the author (see for instance Kinsey 2006; Leander 2013a). Consequentially, this approach leads to specific problematisations (and consequently to related solutions), such as issues of control

over the corporations, of accountability for their actions, of appropriate governance arrangements, and of legal and regulatory mechanisms, resulting in such accounts dominating the literature (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 for more detailed discussions). As discussed in those chapters, a great deal of the analysis turns on the notion of the contract as definitive of the relationship i.e. it sees the state-corporate relationship, and associated problems, in contractual terms.

As the case study in Chapter 4 establishes, this understanding of state corporate relations is not unique to security. Since the 1980s the British government has significantly transformed the state by reorganising the delivery of many services that used to be provided by the state. Conventionally understood as privatisation, this public-private reorganisation has seen the creations of many British corporations and privately-run industries, including in transport, manufacturing, utilities, and telecommunications (Parker 2012, 2013). Further, the 'privatisation' efforts saw private sector more intricately integrated into all aspects of the state, through Private Finance Initiatives and Public Private Partnerships. The British military was no exception to these reorganizational efforts, with large private contracts let for many activities from strategic communications to recruitment. Indeed the British military sought to maximise the use of contractors (Uttley 2004).

This dissertation examines the case of QinetiQ, a company listed on the stock exchange, that was established in the early 2000s by transferring a section of the

Ministry of Defence into private ownership. A review of the practices of the time reveals that the conventional explanations for privatisation do not apply: there was neither an increase in the capacities and skills available to the state, nor did it result in efficiencies or cost savings. Rather, driven by a view that saw a lack of private participation in aspects of the state as problematic, the British state set out to resolve the problem by creating a private actor capable of participating in an aspect of security provision – weapons testing and commissioning. This was not a case of transferring activities from the state to a private sector, because there was no private sector, resulting in the need to create one. The ongoing reliance of QinetiQ on the British state, and the continuing reliance of the British state on the service provided by QinetiQ is documented in annual reports from the company and from the Ministry of Defence.

Subsequent reviews into the privatisation process focused on problems of implementation; on the competitiveness of the process, on the sufficiency of the sale price, and the compensation received by various parties involved. What was never considered problematic was the heavy involvement of private actors in the privatisation process, or indeed the necessity for the sale itself. If, instead of seeing it as privatisation, QinetiQ is seen as an example of the mutually constitutive relationship between the public and private sectors, alternative issues, challenges and solutions are revealed. The transfer of activities was not across an external boundary between the state and the private sector, but rather was an internal

reorganisation driven by the state that then established a public/ private divide between a reformed state and a newly formed corporation. Thus, the transfer price and the process would not be seen as significant questions to ask, and instead questions could be asked about the rationality for the transfer, the identities created, the possibilities that became plausible and the technologies that made this possible. In this case, state and corporations became partners in the exercise of force, opening the way for further future integration, as evidenced by recent contracts to allow QinetiQ to restructure and shape the Ministry of Defence procurement processes even further. Not only is the British military currently dependent on a private actor for all aspects of going to war, from procuring weapons to testing them and maintaining the proficiency of its soldiers with those weapons, but it is also allowing the corporation to shape how future procurements are to be made. These would not be visible under any analysis undertaken through the lens of privatisation.

1.4.2 Resilience

The second security domain is that of resilience. Resilience has emerged in the last few decades as a key approach to security. Emerging out of a conceptualisation of the world as complex, with unforeseeable threats, resilience is understood as the capacity to better deal with these unquantifiable and unimaginable threats. Thus, in a complex system of numerous parts (in this case state, corporations,

individuals, etc.) the system itself is understood to be made more resilient by the parts working more closely together. This means that a resilience approach to security relies on states and corporations becoming more closely integrated into security practices. The conventional approach in both policy documents and scholarship has it that states and corporations working more closely together leads to greater resilience. However, as this dissertation argues, resilience based security practices are about the integration of corporations into state security practices, and thus integration itself becomes resilience (rather than leading to resilience).

There is a split in the security literature related to resilience between problem solving scholars who seek to make critical infrastructure more resilient, and critical scholars who are more interested in engaging with the concept of resilience and its consequences. While the former take the presence and engagement of corporations for granted, the later do not study corporations and their relations with states at all. The correlation between resilience and neoliberalism (see for instance Walker and Cooper 2011; Zebrowski 2013) has resulted in a lot of scholarship on the similarities between the two concepts, and lead to a lot of governmentality scholars focusing on resilience as a technique of governing, with its consequences for both state and populations (see for instance Chandler 2014; B. Evans and Reid 2013; Joseph 2013a). This dissertation documents how the scholarly literature on resilience fails to critically engage with

the presence of corporations, before turning to resilience practices to theorise the rationalities that shape and are produced through them.

Focusing on critical infrastructure as an area in which resilience practices can be observed, this dissertation traces how resilience approaches impact state corporate relations. Looking at different examples of resilience building and responding to crisis, it demonstrates (in Chapter 5) that resilience approaches result in closer state-corporate relations, not as a means to an end (being resilient) but rather as an end in themselves. The case studies discussed in this dissertation refer to making electricity substations resilient and responding to telecommunications crises, both of which are national infrastructure sectors in the United Kingdom. The national defence and security strategy makes clear that economic prosperity is vital to a secure and resilient UK, indeed that the resilience of the UK “ultimately rests” on the relationships between state and corporations (House of Commons 2017, 43). Further, the practices demonstrate that the security and prosperity of the corporation is a shared responsibility of the state, as this is essential to the security of the state. Thus, relations are key to resilience, particularly the relations between states and corporations.

In the case of the critical infrastructure sectors studied, state-corporate relations as *being* resilience is even more pronounced. Corporations are at the forefront of all the activities documented, leading not only the bodies planning resilience, but also the bodies responding to crises. This is not to marginalise or side-line the state,

and is not a replacement of the state by corporations, but rather, is a reorganisation of responsibilities between states and corporations in delivery of their joint responsibility for resilience. Representatives of the state, industry, regulators and individual corporations work together in all aspects. While the practices documented would be conventionally understood as ‘building resilience’, the ability to force action beyond the plans and the meetings is non-existent. Thus, resilience measures achieve the integration of corporations into the security practices of the state, and that becomes what the resilience approach seeks to (and succeeds in) achieving.

None of the practices described fit neatly within the broader description of neoliberalism – they cannot be explained by a view that prioritises competition or sees the market as being a better allocator of resources and thus matching supply and demand. On the contrary, the security practices in this case study result in non-competitive scenarios. Not only are the state and corporation partners, rather than distinct entities, but corporations within an industry also work together in a resilience approach. Though the constituent parts are based on the public-private divide, the practices bridge this divide, even as they serve to reconstitute it in new ways. A neoliberal understanding of states as transferring activities to private actors, or of encouraging market competition, cannot observe or explain these practices.

1.4.3 Peacebuilding

The third security domain assessed is peacebuilding. While the global South has long been the locus of concerns for international security, with the collapse of the Soviet Union these spaces gained new prominence as a range of overlapping security issues – e.g. ethnic conflict, mass atrocities, ‘new wars’, global criminal networks, disease, ‘rogue’ states, etc. – replaced nuclear confrontation as the primary threats to international order. Consequently, the post-Cold War era has been characterised by numerous West-led international interventions to produce lasting stability, equated with democracy, markets and the rule of law – what has come to be termed ‘liberal peace’ (Duffield 2001). Despite decades of efforts, peacebuilding – understood here as not just conflict resolution but the wholesale transformation of Southern spaces – is generally seen to have failed (see for example Cooper 2007; Duffield 2007; Nadarajah and Rampton 2015). Notably, the vast literature on peacebuilding focuses entirely on the target spaces of intervention. By contrast, this chapter explores the consequences of developmental interventions on the US state, specifically the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

USAID is the world’s largest provider of bilateral donor assistance, and in peacebuilding scholarship and policy analyses, it is treated as an arm of the US government i.e. a ‘donor’ (see for instance CRS 2015). However, this does not reflect the dramatic transformation that has occurred in USAID in the post-Cold

War era, and in particular, the centrality of large US corporations, not only to what USAID does (i.e. its operations in the South), but to what it is. Not only are *ninety percent* of USAID's workforce contractors, many of them are also in key management and decision making roles within USAID (Verkuil 2017). Since the early 1990s USAID has increasingly contracted out program design, management and oversight to giant US based corporations; "the private sector now effectively implements *and* assesses USAID's agenda," (Stanger 2009, 117, 119 emphasis added). Institutionally, USAID has been described as a 'wholesaler to wholesalers' of aid programmes, as it lets large contracts for aid work to consultancies who then sub-contract the work to other corporations or NGOs (Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005). Consequently the constitutive role of private actors – mainly for-profit corporations, but also non-profits – is, as a matter of routine, unreflectively written out in analysis of USAID in both scholarly and policy literature on peacebuilding, development, etc. 'USAID' is analysed as an actor ('donor') even though the massive and protracted (often multi-year) material projects that form the basis for what is being analysed are entirely the operations of non-state actors, in particular, large US corporations

Long ignored in scholarship, the 'rise' of USAID development contracting has recently drawn attention (see for instance Roberts 2014; Stanger 2009; Bate 2006). However, the phenomenon continues to be understood as the 'privatisation' of aid, with criticism focusing on as to whether privatisation has 'gone too far'. However,

as this dissertation shows, the privatisation framework distorts understanding of the intricate and intimate relations between ‘state’ and ‘corporation’ in USAID practices. By empirically tracing key functional aspects of the dense configuration of state and corporate practices making up USAID, this dissertation demonstrates how conventional approaches work to obscure the centrality of corporations to USAID.

Moreover, with its focus on contracts, accountability and the transfer of state assets to private control, scholarship misses the centrality of evolving *security* discourses to these transformations in USAID. This dissertation documents how security discourses, whereby an array of diverse threats in/from the global South eventually coalesced into the (technically manageable) problem of ‘fragile’/‘failed’ states, are central to explaining the thorough integration of state and corporations in US peacebuilding. In other words, the donor state is ignored in the security literature, while the effects of security discourses are ignored in the scholarship that seeks to understand changes in the donor state (with the sole exception of the work by Jamey Essex (2013, 2016) which is attentive to the impact on USAID of security discourses, but in treating it as a self-evident arm of the US state, ignores the centrality of corporations to its everyday practices).

The dissertation (in Chapter 6), first, empirically illustrates in detail how large US corporations have become essential to all aspects of USAID operations, not only with regard to peacebuilding operations (as ‘implementing partners’), but also

within ‘core’ internal functions such as country strategy setting; expertise in research and training, and also USAID’s efforts to ‘reform’ procurement and evaluation in response to persistent and vociferous criticisms. Second, the dissertation shows how, in contrast to the ‘privatisation of aid’ literature, what is central to the deep corporatisation of USAID are *security discourses* in the post-Cold War-era. Thus, the dissertation makes the case for how security discourses, in which US peacebuilding interventions appear as vital responses to dangerous threats from the global South, serve to generate both closer integration and mutual constitution of both state and corporations, and the intimate relations between them.

1.5 Chapter outline

Chapter 2 reviews the International Security literature. It argues that despite the broadening and deepening of the field, the state continues to dominate the discipline. Thus, even as the scholarship expands to account for the presence of corporations, analysis begins with assumptions about the state, and is overwhelmingly focussed on the privatisation of the exercise of force, and thus on private military and security companies. Even where the literature has attempted to move beyond ‘privatisation’, it is hampered by the fact that it begins with states and corporations as discrete entities before trying to develop an understanding of the changing relations between them.

Chapter 3 sets out the key analytical moves that the dissertation makes towards its analysis. It begins by establishing the importance of seeing the state/non-state border as internal to the production of social and political order, rather than prior to it. It establishes the utility of relationalist, as opposed to substantialist, analysis for bringing to fore how such borders are enacted, thereby generating the solidity of commonly taken for granted ‘entities’ such as states and corporations. It then discussing practices as both embodiment and productive of relations. Lastly, it emphasises the utility of a governmentality framework in empirically excavating the diffuse yet potent workings of ordering rationalities that inform and are constituted by relations embodied in practices.

The following three chapters follow this methodological approach in three distinct areas of security.

Chapter 4 looks at the role of corporations in the exercise of force. By tracing the practices that resulted in the formation of QinetiQ, and the ongoing relations between the British state and the corporation, the chapter makes the case for the mutual constitution of the state and corporation through the changing security practices observed. The chapter argues that the problem that the ‘privatisation’ of QinetiQ solves is the *absence* of corporations in a particular aspect of the Ministry of Defence’s work, resulting in the British state setting out to create, and continuing to support, a private partner in addressing this lack. This would be missed by mainstream approaches in the International Security literature, as these

begin with the state and corporation as a priori distinct entities, and thus cannot capture the mutually constitutive relations between them.

Chapter 5 turns to practices of resilience, with a focus on two sets of practices in relation to critical infrastructure. The two case studies - resilience building and responding to a crisis, respectively - demonstrate that while greater integration of corporations into the relevant critical infrastructure sectors is seen as necessary for and leading to resilience, in practice, the extent of integration *itself* becomes a measure of resilience. The chapter traces the problematisations that resilience practices seek to solve, thereby revealing the underlying rationalities of closer state-corporate relations. Resilience renders security a joint project of states and corporations, thereby recasting the public-private divide, even as it relies on this division to justify closer relations and problematise their absence.

Chapter 6 discusses the corporation in international peacebuilding, focusing on USAID as the leading international and humanitarian arm of the US Government. The chapter documents the centrality of corporations to all aspects of USAID practice, including both its implementation programmes ‘in the field’ and its internal institutional practices. These demonstrate how explanations that focus on privatisation or outsourcing inadequate are in capturing the thick configuration of state-corporate relations that constitute ‘USAID’. The chapter then turns to the limited literature on USAID-linked development contracting to demonstrate how the lens of ‘privatisation’ has focused attention on US party political and

institutional to explain the rise of contractors, thereby largely divorcing analyses from the wider global changes after the Cold War; in particular, the chapter shows how the key driver of the extraordinary rise of US development contracting are evolving security discourses have positioned the global South as a key source of threats to international security, and USAID interventions as vital international responses to these.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by summarising the argument. It also suggests areas for future research made possible by the analytical approach adopted in the dissertation.

2. Literature review: The centrality of the state to security studies

2.1 Introduction

This chapter surveys the International Security literature, a growing and increasingly theoretically plural field that is centred around questions such as the character of security, how it is achieved, who it is for, what is a threat, and what is to be protected. The discipline has its origins in military and strategic studies but has since expanded theoretically and empirically. The theoretical pluralism has generated important and ongoing debates that have critically interrogated the concept of security itself (Der Derian 1995) and have generated a variety of responses (see for example Little 1981; Smith 1999; Buzan 1991; Baldwin 1997; Sheehan 2005 for a range of views). For some scholars, security is “a social and cultural field shaped by fluxes of power, shifting social and cultural tensions, institutional dynamics and cultural values”, resulting in difficulties reaching agreement on the definition of the term (Burgess 2010, 587; see also Liotta 2004). To others, the term is either under investigated, or the search for a definition is an effort to circumvent discussions about power and dominance (Smoke 1975; Grayson 2004). Further, the field itself has been accused of engaging more in a normative debate, than a definitional one, focussed on “the actors that *should* be included and the issues that *should* be examined” (Tarry 1999, 1, emphasis in original). Alongside this growing theoretical engagement, the security scholarship has also moved to examine new issues such as health, migration and the

environment as sources of threat and insecurity whilst also considering the individual or the human – rather than the state – as the object of security. Yet, amidst these important changes, the state conceptualised as a territorially and socially bounded entity has remained foundational to all understandings of security. Even as the field has expanded to study non-state actors (corporations, civil society actors, armed civil insurgencies, criminal gangs, etc.) these are understood as external to the state and clearly distinguishable from it. Thus, the argument here is that the boundary between the state and the non-state, or the public and the private, is taken for granted and understood as existing outside the state, separating it from the space of non-state actors. This dissertation challenges this taken for granted binary separation between the state and non-state or public and private and focusses relations between states and corporations in security to show how these often quotidian practices mutually transform the character of the state and the corporation whilst also re/producing the boundary between them. Thus, the boundary is internal to their changing relations, and to social order (see Chapter 3 for a deeper discussion of the analytical logic).

The review of the security literature on the corporation presented here sets out the ongoing centrality of the bounded conception of the state. Even scholarship that has sought to move beyond the public-private divide has struggled to get past the centrality of the state. For instance, scholars have turned to hybridity theories (Leander 2016) or to assemblages (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011) or to symbiosis

to (O'Reilly 2010) try to explain operations across the public-private divide in ways that transcend 'privatisation'. However, they continue to begin with an a priori assumption about the existence of a public-private divide and analyse the interactions across that divide. This form of analyses which begins with the state and the corporation as taken for granted and pre-formed entities is unable to grasp the extent to which ongoing relations transform both the state and the corporation whilst re/constituting the boundary between them. This is not to deny the existence of the public private divide but to suggest that ongoing security interactions between states and corporations re/constitute both states and corporations and the boundary between them. In other words, the boundary between the state and the non-state is re/formed in the relations between them rather than something that exists outside of the state and prior to its relations with the corporation. While the turn to hybridity and assemblages is welcome as it seeks to move beyond privatisation in understanding the role of the corporation in security, nevertheless, these approaches begin with a taken for granted separation between the state and the corporation and thereby obscure the transformative effects of security practices that are the subject of this dissertation.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section (section 2) summarises the broad International Security literature. It documents the move from an initial focus on military and strategic matters, to a theoretically and empirically broader understanding of security. Moving beyond the state as the sole referent object of

security and source of threat, the section documents the ways in which the discipline focused on human beings, environment, health, etc, as both objects to be protected and sources of threat. Through all of this, the state, understood primarily as a territorially and socially bounded entity, remained key, with the focus on the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Section 3 discusses the ways in which the focus on 'security', and the state centric nature of the field, results in the corporation itself remaining invisible, even when the practices and issues being studied are dominated by private actors. The scholarship discussed is indicative of the ways in which corporations, even as they have gained centrality in security praxis, have failed to draw as much attention in the literature. The remainder of the chapter deals with the literature that does address the engagement between the state and the private sector in security. Section 4 surveys the literature on corporations in security and documents the overwhelming focus on the 'privatisation' of state activities to private military and security companies. It notes the ways in which the scholarship has turned from a focus on the military industrial complex to the involvement of corporations in the exercise of force, with consequent discussions on control. As the section concludes, the state remains key throughout all these debates. Section 5 then evaluates the capacity of the 'post-privatisation' literature to explain the security arrangements that states and corporations engage in. Some scholars focus on the changing role of the corporation, while others study how understandings of security are themselves

shaped by these arrangements. However, the section demonstrates that while, as discussed above, some scholars do seek to re-theorise state-corporate relations in new ways, their ontological commitments to a fixed and external public-private divide limits their analysis. The chapter concludes with a restatement of the argument and how this dissertation contributes to the literature.

2.2 Origins of security studies

Though the theoretical underpinnings of International Security are now traced back to Hobbs, Kant, Clausewitz and Machiavelli among others, the discipline gained coherence in the post-World War II period, as the policy demands of the Cold War moved the focus from war studies to security studies (Barkawi 2011). Further, International Relations scholars began to comprehend the ‘national interest’ as being synonymous with security (Wolfers 1952; Baldwin 1997), resulting in realists focusing on the discipline. Despite numerous evolutions since then, the state has remained core to the discipline, as the brief history in this section establishes. The section concludes with a discussion of the continuing centrality of the state to the discipline, despite the changes, and plethora of approaches and analytical concerns, that have emerged.

2.2.1 From military to security

The centrality of military matters to the discipline of security was expressly stated by core authors in the field – “security studies may be defined as *the study of the threat, use and control of military force*” (Walt 1991, 212 emphasis in the original; though see Barkawi, 2011 for a response). Others have claimed that “the subjects that form the central focus of international security studies ... are general issues, such as the causes of war and of alliances, as well as policy-oriented research on military and other threats confronting particular countries” (Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988, 6). While this may not be surprising given that the field evolved out of war studies and foreign policy scholarship (Wolfers 1952), eventually the field did move on from purely military matters to a broader focus on security.

Driven by the Cold War ideology (with a suggestion that it was hard to justify a focus on purely military matters when doing so from the side of liberalism and freedom) the field broadened to consider civilian and nuclear matters. During the Cold War, one of the main foci was the theorisation of nuclear war, with the proliferation of ideas such as mutually assured destruction, the security dilemma, and nuclear peace, which also resulted in a focus on civilians as the objects most heavily affected by the possibilities of war and peace. In fact, scholars later noted that “nuclear war spurred theorizing because it was inherently more theoretical than empirical: none had ever occurred” (Betts 1997, 14). However, even as the field moved beyond realism and the search for “cumulative knowledge about the

role of military force" (Walt 1991, 222), realist ideas became so "deeply embedded in Western consciousness that many adherents refuse to accept it as a 'mode' of thinking at all" (Shy 1986, 185). It also had the consequence of embedding the state as central to the concept of security, as the centralisation of military control and a monopoly on the exercise of violence became one of the core identifiers of the state itself. Alongside the centrality of the state, this early literature also delineated what could, and could not be included, as matters of concern for serious security scholars. While this is presented as neutral objectivity, some argue it is based on a deeper understanding of rationality and is constitutive of the very factors it purports to study (Krause and Williams 1997, 38–47). Even critical scholars such as Alexander Wendt who argued that 'anarchy is what states make of it' focused on relations between states and the security of states (Wendt 1992, 1995). There was always an argument that the field *ought* to be broader than just military matters, on the basis that "defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality" and that this only has the result of increasing insecurity (Ullman 1983, 129). But it was not until the 1990s that this shift took hold in a significant way, though even to this day, many matters remain beyond the concerns of the field.

With the end of the Cold War, the focus changed from managing "an arms race and superpower competition" to managing "the implosion of a superpower and the disintegration of a global power structure ... presumed highly impervious to

change” (Weldes et al. 1999, 3). Thus, the 1990s saw the emergence of a number of alternative, non-realist theories to explain security concerns, including a broadening and deepening into ‘critical’ security studies. This is not to suggest that these arguments had not existed prior to the end of the Cold War, but rather to argue that these grew in prominence in the post-Cold War environment and that they were able to more intrinsically challenge the entirely state centric nature of the field. Academics began challenging not only the referent object of security, but also understandings of what constituted threats and how that threat was to be dealt with. Thus, the understanding of threats as ‘out there’ and of the state as solely the provider of security began to be discussed, on the basis that “the military and political aspects of security cannot be so easily separated” (Fierke 2007, 13).

Key to all of this is that the state was central to the analysis. Constrained by the territorial trap (Agnew 1994) and its origins in military studies, the discipline took the state for granted. While the focus was the military, the Weberian understanding of the state as the only entity with legitimate authority over the exercise of force ensured that the state was implicit in all analysis, when it wasn’t explicitly mentioned. The move from military studies to security expanded the objects of analysis, but underlying the analyses was an assumption of the state as provider of security, the object to be secured, and the source of threats. This is implicit in the boundaries of the field – for instance domestic violence or the violence human beings enact on the natural and animal worlds are not generally

considered matters of International Security, if they are thought of as matters of security at all. This emphasis continued even as the field expanded beyond the military.

2.2.2 Broadening and deepening

In moving to the ‘wider agenda’ of security, the discipline expanded in a number of ways. Two significant shifts include the expansion of the objects of security, with a push to consider human beings as appropriate referent objects, and the widening of the range of threats under the rubric of securitization. Further, the idea of security itself was challenged, as discussed below.

Led by the United Nations and a few core diplomats, the notion of human security gained policy credence and then emerged in the literature (Hampson and Daudelin 2001; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2006). Though the idea was not new (Leaning 2004), advocates argued that “citizens of states that are ‘secure’ according to the traditional concept of security can be perilously insecure in terms of their daily existence” (Newman 2004, 358). They focused on the ways in which the narrow definition of security “falsifies the policy process” by diverting scarce resources into the military at the expense of the population and sought instead to put “the individual at the centre of debate, analysis and policy” (Thakur 2004, 347–48; see also Hampson 2004; Acharya 2004). The idea of human security is not

without contestation, with even proponents admitting “it is at best poorly defined and unmeasured, and at worst a vague and legally inconsistent slogan” (King and Murray 2001, 6; see also Liotta 2004; Buzan 2004; Paris 2004). However, advocates argue that this multidimensional approach is deliberate, sacrificing precision for inclusiveness (Thakur 2004), and that while there may be theoretical issues with the concept, it is “an idea that works in practice” (Hubert 2004). While the human security initiative appears to have stalled or failed as a policy project by the early 2000s (Suhrke 2004), it not only remains a useful analytical device, but also achieved the objective of moving the referent object of security in the policy arena beyond the state.

Another path in the expansion was the attention paid to how threats are identified or understood as such, as conceptualised in the literature on securitization. Rather than focusing on the referent object of security, securitization scholars sought to diversify the understanding of threats¹. Engaged with a concern about the “intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word *security* onto an ever wider range of issues” (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998, 1), these scholars sought to broaden the concept while at the same time limiting it. Arguing that security is fundamentally about survival, they sought to limit security threats to

¹ Though not all scholars who focus on non-military security threats take a securitization approach.

existential issues, with threats mainly determined on the basis that they provoked exceptional responses (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 93). Securitization “frames the issue as either a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998, 23) and involves calls made by powerful state actors to securitize an issue, thus allowing the state extra powers to legitimise the use of force on that issue (Sheehan 2005, 53). In this view, threats are not necessarily objective realities (Wæver 1995, 54) but are naturally occurring events that are ‘recognised’ as an existential threat, raising them ‘above’ the merely political (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998, 5). This allowed the discipline to shift from seeing only the military might of other states as threats, to paying attention to how issues like HIV/AIDS, SARS, Ebola and climate change came to be constructed as security threats (see for instance Elbe 2010, 2009). Securitization too is not without its criticisms, including that it enables militarisation of previously non-military matters by moving responses into the hands of “state institutions such as the military and the intelligence community with the power to override human rights and civil liberties” (Elbe 2006, 120; see also Dalby 1997; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 102–4 has a fuller critique). Or in the words of Lothar Brock, speaking of expanding the concept to environmental security, “we may end up contributing more to the militarization of environmental politics than to the demilitarization of security politics” (1992, cited in Dalby 1997, 5). Despite these challenges, securitization remains important for its role in the focus

that it brings to the construction of threats, and thus the move beyond the state in terms of the referent objects of security.

The deepening of security scholarship resulted in challenges to how security itself was to be understood and studied. From seeing security as a positivist and self-evident objective scholars moved on in diverse ways, generating critical scholarship that sought to engage more deeply with the concept itself (see for instance Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010; Buzan and Hansen 2009; Sheehan 2005). Scholars sought to create a ‘networked manifesto’ on critical approaches, to understand security as discursively created or to see it as a tool of liberal order making (CASE Collective 2006; Campbell 1998, 1992; Neocleous 2008). Some argue security is a value-laden and contextually located (rather than neutral) concept (Burgess 2009), while others question whether it is a concept (Huysmans 1998), or argue that rather than worrying about definitions and theories, questions ought to be more practical, about the impacts on people’s lives (see for instance Valverde 2011; Sylvester 2012).

Despite the deepening and broadening of security scholarship, the state remained core as the implied provider of security. While perhaps not surprising given the wide range of issues analysed and yet to be addressed, this ignores changes in praxis – the corporation, now deeply engaged with the provision of security remains peripheral to the scholarship. While there has always been a presence of corporations in security (see the literature on the military industrial complex

discussed in section 4) and given the dominance of neoliberalism as a policy paradigm this has been growing in scale and scope. Thus, while it may not be surprising that they are present in security praxis, the point is that corporations remain peripheral to the security scholarship². The following section discusses the absence of the corporation in the mainstream security literature even in the analyses of issues where corporations are ubiquitous., followed by subsequent section which analyses the literature that does address the corporation in security.

² Another literature that focuses on the intersection between states, corporations and security is that on economic sanctions. This literature also by and large begins with a substantialist and liberal ontology – i.e. it takes for granted that states and corporations are entities and that there is a separation between them. In other words, it begins with the liberal separation of politics and economics (states and corporations) and from that point of departure, seeks to explore if, how, when and why economic decisions (sanctions) by one group of political actors (often states) against another political actor (often states but sometimes corporations) can and does or does not have an effect on these and secondary actors (corporations and other economic activities) such as to achieve the required policy change in the target actors. This liberal substantialist assumption underpinning the literature on economic sanctions means that analysis begins from very different origins and proceeds in very different directions to that undertaken in this dissertation. Moreover, in ways similar to the security literature discussed in more detail in this dissertation, the economic sanctions literature also is characterised by the kinds of analytical problems discussed in this chapter. Often, the corporation or private sector is absent from any analysis (see for instance Pape 1997), with the focus being on the causes and effects in relations between sending and target states (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990), or on the impact on rational calculations by the relevant states in modifying or maintaining their behaviours (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988). Where the private sector is addressed, the discussion is, also in rationalist ways, on state control over private enterprises, discussed either through regulatory and legal frames or through the issues of principal-agent problems (for instance see Drezner 2011; Rodman 1995). Such shared analytical problems are discussed in this dissertation with reference to the security literature.

2.3 Unseen corporations

In the security literature, the growing presence of corporations in many areas of security practice is either ignored altogether or only tangentially addressed in analyses of other issues. A sample of these studies is discussed below to demonstrate the different ways in which the centrality of the state in security studies limits the analyses that is produced. The dominance of the state in the discipline is so overwhelming that the expanding and evolving arrangements between states and corporations have always been seen through the lens of the state, and in particular, state control. Corporations are neglected because they are seen simply instruments acting under state control. However, the corporation often plays a critical and constitutive role in the phenomenon that are being studied. For instance, corporations are vital to the financing of violence and weapons production whether as banks and financial institutions or as arms manufacturers, yet scholars have managed to produce seminal works without referring to corporations at all, as this section summarises.

2.3.1 Weapons production

There is an established literature on the security implications of weapons production. Some worry about the international security challenges posed by the globalisation of the arms industry, arguing that it is the next “proliferation challenge” (Bitzinger 1994). Others have argued that it does not pose a threat to

world peace, and emblematic of this literature is the seminal book by Stephen G. Brooks, titled ‘Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict’. Brooks assesses the impacts of the globalisation of production processes and argues that “the increased geographic dispersion of MNC production will, ceteris paribus, increase the stability of great power relations” (2007, 8). While the introduction makes clear that it is looking precisely at the production arrangements of multinational corporations and the impacts of these on security, neither the investigation nor the argument takes the corporation seriously as an object of analysis. Rather, the focus remains on ‘American’ firms with production facilities in China, or on ‘European’ firms selling to the US military. In other words, even as multinational corporations are mentioned (frequently), the focus is always on the *territorial* distribution of the production of military technologies. Corporate activities are understood through the lens of the territorial state in which the corporation is based or with which it is associated; even as it is the implications of decisions by corporations – where and how they organise production activities – that is being considered, the corporation is almost immaterial to the investigation. While the book has been criticised for many aspects (see Kirshner 2007; Caverley 2007; Gholz 2007), Brooks’ work is significant here for the fact that the corporation is *analytically absent* from his argument. The possibility that there might be friction, between the practices and decisions of corporations and the interests of states, is neither acknowledged nor interrogated.

and thus the corporation is taken for granted as somehow an entity that will always be acquiescent to the strategic decisions of ‘its’ state – the ‘nationality’ of the firm becomes the overriding criterion of analysis, such that the corporation itself disappears. Security is only ever addressed in terms of the advantages and disadvantages to states of territorially distributed production facilities. Not only does the text fail to account for corporations as actors with agency that might be different from those of states, it also assumes that the state is not impacted by the activities of the corporations in dispersing production, except in so far as it changes the calculus of war – i.e. it is only a factor of degree rather than possibly fundamentally changing the questions and possibilities that states might consider in the new, globally dispersed military technology production environment. The reliance on the separation of economics and politics, and an understanding of the corporation as merely an economic actor that is not of concern to discussions of war, permeates this work.

2.3.2 Securitised finance

Another subject area where the corporation itself remains invisible, even as the activities studied are corporate-led is finance. There is a large and growing literature that looks at connections between finance and security, transcending the divide between International Relations, International Economics and International Political Economy. For instance, a special issue of *Security Dialogue*

focuses on the global governance of security and finance (Boy, Burgess, and Leander 2011; Aitken 2011; Walker and Cooper 2011; Amicelle 2011; Favarel-Garrigues, Godefroy, and Lascoumes 2011; Kessler 2011). The contributors focus not only on the ways in which finance and security concerns have been explicitly merged in the era of the War on Terror, but also the ways in which financial instruments were essential to the rise of modern governments. But given that finance is largely (and has been for a long time) a private activity (i.e. not conducted by the state), even as this literature focuses on phenomena that are the result of corporate activity, it ignores the role of the corporations that are responsible not only for developing those financial instruments and creating and maintaining the markets for them, but also in maintaining the movement of funds that is explicitly being traced as part of the war on terror.

Marieke de Goede's monograph, titled 'Speculative Security: The Politics of Pursuing Terrorist Monies' (2012) discusses the ways states regularly trace financial flows on the basis that they are tracking those going to terrorist organisations. Her interest is on the profound effects that this everyday tracing of donations and remittances has on the lives of people who use financial services – i.e. everyone in the modern democracies she surveys. Donations and remittances are not illegal acts in themselves, but could be linked to the financing of terrorism and are thus considered 'legitimate' for surveying and scrutinising. As the book traces the ways in which the finance-security assemblage functions, the focus is on

the individual (or NGO) on one end and the terrorist organisation on the other, assessing the activities of the state in controlling and regulating against these movements of money. By beginning with either end of the transaction, and the role of the state in it, the book ignores the role of the numerous corporations – banks, hedge funds, insurers, etc. – through whom the funds pass and whose decisions and very existence have huge implications for the subject being studied. Even as the book focuses on the *circulation* of money as being the objective of the finance-security assemblage, the corporations who arrange and financially benefit from this circulation, with commissions here and fees there, are not accounted for as serious actors capable of having an interest in and influence on these flows. Corporations are understood as either the ‘infrastructure’ through which the funds flow (the equivalent of pipes or tracks) or as the means through which the state achieves its objective of monitoring the flows of funds. Even while there is acknowledgement that the technology that banks developed to support their own operations (such as Customer Relationship Management software) is now being utilised for the purpose of surveillance and scrutiny of potential terrorists (De Goede 2012, 79–80), that the banks themselves might have a role in the issues being studied, is not considered analytically significant. This is another example of the ways in which the role of corporations in the very practices that are being critiqued are obscured by the choice of analytical objective. The book reimages financial corporations as mere infrastructure, and by abstracting analysis to the

level of industry, markets, and states, the role of firms and corporations, and their role in and impact on the issues being analysed, are obscured or side-lined.

The topics discussed are not unusual in the literature, and are merely selected to discuss in detail for the fact that their focus is on areas that are directly relevant to this dissertation. Others have looked at the security implications of the rise in gated communities without addressing the private sector role in building, selling, maintaining and managing these enclaves (Bislev 2004). Similarly, scholarship on critical infrastructure often avoids mention of the role of corporations (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011; Aradau 2010; Lipschutz 2008; Lentzos and Rose 2009) (as discussed further in Chapter 5). Studies on the relationship between international and domestic security (i.e. militaries and police) often ignore the numerous corporations that are involved in delivering both international and domestic security and are instrumental in the increasing convergence of the two (see for instance Cerny 2015). Meanwhile, much critical literature on the donor state ignores the corporation altogether (Essex 2013, 2016), or focuses on the donor state to the exclusion of its security engagements (Berrios 2000; Stanger 2009; Autesserre 2014) (as discussed further in Chapter 6).

The point here is simple – it is common to discuss security in ways that focus on levels of aggregation that do not seriously account for the corporation as a factor in those discussions, even if the issue being discussed is one that corporations have significant control over or to which corporations are essential. Though the

relationships being discussed are often ones that cut across states, corporations and security, scholars focus on either the role of the state, or on impacts on security, (or both) and as a result, the corporation is not an object of the analysis. The chapter now turns to the security literature that *does* study corporate actors and assesses the ways in which they present the interactions between states and corporations. In doing so, it notes the ways in which the literature understands security as having been, should be, and remaining something that is provided by or at least controlled by states.

2.4 Corporations in security provision

As mentioned above, there is a small, but growing security literature that addresses the role of corporations in security affairs, with various ways of accounting for this and its implications. Though the relationship being discussed is one that brings together states, private actors and security, scholars tend to focus on only one of these, such that a lot of the literature does not bring corporation, security and the state together in a significantly meaningful way. There is an older literature that focused on the military-industrial complex, but the main focus there was on the potential for corruption of the state. Recently, scholars have turned to the emergence of private military and security corporations (PMSCs) in security provision, and the understanding of this relationship as one of ‘transfer’ of activities from state to corporation (i.e. privatisation) has led to a focus on the

problems of control, accountability and governance, which maintain the state as the entity that ‘ought’ to have control over the exercise of force. However, scholars who focus on security do not generally discuss corporations, while scholars who focus on the state tend to deal with corporations (if they acknowledge them at all) as integral part of other aspects, such as populations, regions, or communities. Thus, the separation between economics and politics (the public-private divide) is preserved, even as what is being studied is the ways in which security practices operate precisely across this line.

Before proceeding to the discussion, it is worth noting that there is a large literature on theories of the corporation that emerges from economics and political economists who are keen to conceptualise this entity or from legal scholars. Economists have developed theories of the firm, discussing them as organisational entities seeking to minimise costs, or as nexuses of contracts (Coase 1937; Williamson 1985; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Alchian and Woodward 1988). They have assessed how and why firms grow to become large corporations that can then be distinguished from other businesses (Roach 2005; Dunning and Lundan 2008; Hood and Young 1979; Dunning 1971). Meanwhile legal scholars have tackled the form and substance of large corporations (Muchlinski 2007; Trickler 1984). Some tackle the form and consequences of legal personhood while others focus on the arguments about corporations as ephemeral due to their contractual nature (Yeoman 2006; Barkan 2013; Horwitz 1992; Harris 2006; L. E. Mitchell 2006).

Some scholars have even started to engage with the corporation as a political actor (see for instance Bakan 2005; Ciepley 2013). However, the International Security literature does not engage with this literature, maintaining a separation between politics and economic and generally not investigating the ‘black box’ of the corporation beyond the fact that it is *not* the state. Thus, in the security literature, the corporation is seen only as a profit seeking economic entity, and the public-private divide serves to make it unworthy of further analytical interest.

This treatment of the corporation, caused by disciplinary boundaries, is not unusual, as the understanding of the state itself is fairly standard across the International Security literature as this chapter establishes. From pluralist theories to historic materialist class based analysis, from understandings of the state as constitutionally structured to seeing it as technocratic in nature, scholars have developed many different insights into the state (see for instance Vincent 1987; Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987; P. B. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). Despite this, International Security scholars continue to rely on the Weberian ‘ideal type’ of the state as a bureaucratic institution with a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force in their ongoing analysis, as the following discussion demonstrates.

2.4.1 Military-industrial complex

The term ‘military-industrial complex’ was used by US President Dwight D Eisenhower in his farewell address in 1961, when he warned against the “acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist” (cited in Fallows 2002, 46). While there is an argument that Eisenhower was referring to the cost of the military (Fallows 2002), in security scholarship it came to refer to the relations between the arms industry, the military and the legislature that was seen as having the potential to inappropriately influence public policy. The “global industrial armaments business” (McNeil 1982, 241 cited in Held et al 1999, 108) that emerged after warfare was industrialised in the nineteenth century had grown to such an extent that it was felt to be potentially ruinous to the state, and the focus was on the potential distortion of national interests by the “vested interests” that could impose “a burden on the rest of society” (Dunne 1993, 92). Taking the relations between legislature, military and industry for granted, the scholarship often focused on the extent and purpose of the complex (Moskos Jr 1974; see also Mintz 1985 for a review of the literature). Beyond the United States, where the phenomenon was first critically analysed, scholars have also begun to study similar issues across the globe as the presence of corporations in the provision of military hardware grew (see for instance Dover 2007; Heidenkamp, Louth, and Taylor

2013; Mintz 1985). In all of this, while this literature took the corporation seriously, it remained focussed on the potential distortion of the *state*, and thus retained the state-centric analysis of the discipline (see for instance Baack and Ray 1985).

More, recently, the focus of the literature has been on studying on the presence of corporations in the provision of security services. The main distinction is the shift from companies as suppliers of weapons to corporations as providing personnel who fight alongside (or instead of) soldiers who are officially affiliated with the military of a state. Thus, the issue that pervades the literature is the engagement of these firms in the exercise of force.

2.4.2 Corporations in the exercise of force

As mentioned previously, the provision of security is generally understood normatively as the preserve of the state. Even among scholars who see it as acceptable or desirable for security to be provided by private actors, there is an implicit assumption that the state had sole responsibility over security in the past. Thus, even as activities are ‘transferred’ to corporations, the state is understood as maintaining control over, and accountability for, security provision. The increasing presence of corporations in security is understood, in this light, as a matter of ‘privatisation’ of activities that had once been the preserve of the state,

leading to an understanding of the relationship as a contractual one, with the contract being key. The literature has focused on the supply and demand factors that creates a ‘marketplace’ of corporate entities that provide security services, and discussions of ‘control’, thus maintaining the central role of the state as either one side of the economic equation or as the principle in charge of the relationship.

When assessing the role of corporations in security, the novelty for many scholars is in the private actors themselves, and as a result, their analysis focuses on the factors that contribute to the emergence and growth of these entities. The literature is concerned with the ways in which these actors are now engaged in activities that once used to the preserve of the state (Avant 2005a; Singer 2001; Kinsey 2006). Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying some terminology in the literature. Different scholars refer to these corporations as private military companies or firms (PMCs or PMFs) or as private security companies (PSCs) to distinguish between the military sector and security provision more broadly. Some scholars argue that the distinction is not worth making, as not only do the corporations themselves not make those distinctions, but that in practice it is difficult to distinguish between the two (see for instance Leander 2013b).

Therefore, the wider term private military/security companies (PMSCs) has emerged to cover all corporations engaged in providing services in the military sector. This dissertation will use the term PMSCs – private military and security

companies – except when quoting from the literature, when the original nomenclature will be used.

Even though PMSCs have been part of global military activities for a few decades, they only emerged into the international field in a significant way in the early 1990s (Pech and Beresford 1997 cited in Duffield 2001, 65). The main initial driver of the literature was the activities of two firms – Executive Outcomes and Sandline International. Scholars focused on how they operated and the (mostly negative) consequences of their activities (see for instance Howe 1998; Vines 1999; Francis 1999), but the literature quickly expanded beyond these, especially as the industry also grew rapidly. No longer the mercenaries of old, these “profit-driven organisations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare” (Singer 2001, 186) now provided all types of services, from support services, through advice and training, to front-line soldiers actually engaged on the battlefield.

A significant effort is made in the literature to distinguish PMSCs from mercenaries. International Security scholars spent many years justifying the state monopoly on legitimate violence, resulting in a need to distinguish these ‘new’ actors from the mercenaries, who has been heavily discredited. PMSCs are defined as “profit-driven organisations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare” (Singer 2001, 186). The legality of the corporation is utilised to legitimise their activities, as the use of mercenaries still remains outside the law in

many jurisdictions (Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007b; Chesterman and Fisher 2009c). The permanent nature of the corporation, as an entity that lasts beyond each conflict or engagement and can therefore, potentially, be held accountable even after engagement is over, has also been mentioned (see for instance Krahmann 2010, 6–7; Singer 2001, 190–93). In all, the point is that these corporations are treated as ‘taking over’ activities that used to be the preserve of the state (thus maintaining the role of states at the heart of security) and thus much of the literature is focused on issues of privatisation and control as discussed next. It must be noted that these discussions are not unique to security, but rather develop out of a broader discussions on the relationship between states and corporations in light of neoliberalism and the increasing presence of corporations in many areas that used to be understood as solely the preserve of states (see for instance Strange 1996; Cable 1995; Hocking 2004). However, there is a significant International Security literature that discusses the same themes as discussed below.

2.4.3 Privatisation and control

While the presence of contractors, “replacing uniformed soldiers” and forming “an integral part of contemporary civil-military relations” (Krahmann 2010, 8) is acknowledged, the analysis remains on what is being replaced and the state activities that these private service providers are taking over. Thus, privatisation

forefronts the analysis of the corporate role in security, as seen through the lens of the state. This then leads to a discussion on the ‘control’ by the state of the actor(s) responsible for providing the privatised services, and the understanding of the whole relationship hinges on the contract between the two entities.

Scholars have traced the beginning of the modern military privatisation era to the end of the Cold War – while there were private military providers prior to this time, it has been argued that their exponential growth, in terms of numbers and scale of activities, began in this period (Kinsey 2006). The phenomena of private firms hired to provide military services – privatisation – has been explained from both the supply and demand sides of the ‘market’ (Stanley 2015; Singer 2001; Kinsey 2006). On the demand side, two explanations are proffered, both tied to the end of the Cold War. In the global South, where the practice was first documented, poor state capacity, combined with the withdrawal of support from former superpower partners, is cited as creating a demand for the services (Singer 2001). As the end of the Cold War led to the superpowers (and their allies in each bloc) no longer supporting the numerous local conflicts they had overtly or covertly backed until then, states that had previously relied on this support to conduct their wars now needed trained soldiers and specific military expertise they did not have in their own ranks (G. Mills and Stremlau 1999a). There was also demand from numerous non-state actors, such as NGOs and corporations, who sought out these corporations on the basis that they were operating in the

global South and needed protection that was not available from those states (Singer 2001; Kinsey 2006; G. Mills and Stremlau 1999a). Meanwhile, in the global North, as states adopted neoliberal policies that ostensibly sought to make states less bureaucratic and ‘smaller’, they turned to private operators to provide many of necessary services, including military services, resulting in increased demand for soldiers capable of delivering many of the activities that had previously been delivered by the state. Thus scholars document that “every major US military operation in the post-Cold War era” has involved “significant and growing levels” of support from PMCs (Singer 2001, 188), while “every multilateral peace operation conducted by the UN was accomplished with the presence of private military or security companies” (Avant 2004, 153–54).

On the supply side, explanations focus on the ready availability of soldiers seeking work, and the development of a second-hand market for weapons as cash-strapped states sought to sell, rather than destroy, old hardware. Scholars argued that the changed security environment after the end of the Cold War “sparked a chain of military downsizing around the globe” resulted in a glut of soldiers and military hardware, available to other others states and to private companies (Singer 2003b, 194; Christensen 2016). The soldiers also came from all aspects of the military, resulting in the availability of (mainly) men capable of supporting states in all aspects from support services, through advice and training, to front-line soldiers actually engaged on the battlefield. Evolving technological factors also

contributed, as obsolete hardware was also sold on the private market, both to refill state coffers, and to create a more viable market (Krahmann 2010). In this explanation, supply meets demand and a private security sector is born.

Seen through the light of privatisation, the ‘problems’ that consequently emerge to be analysed and dissected centre on issues of control and accountability. There is an extensive literature that studies the control and management of PMSCs and their activities. This takes two the form of two strands, depending by and large on the discipline from within which the question is being approached. From a regulatory perspective, it is a question of the availability or appropriateness of various laws. Meanwhile, from a political perspective, it is more an issue around how much control the principal (state) has over the activities carried on its behalf by the agent (corporation).

Often there is a focus on the appropriateness (or not) of international or domestic law and regulation in the control of PMSCs (see for instance Abraham 1999; Bakker and Sossai 2012; Schmitt 2005). An analysis of the various laws available to control these corporations concludes that that while the solution is to regulate or prohibit them, this will be difficult due not only to problems around identifying which individual entities are PMSCs, but also to the difficulties in clarifying the activities over which the control is sought (Singer 2003b). Issues around which organisation would have oversight responsibility for, and enforcement authority of, any such regulation or prohibition have also been identified (Singer 2003b).

Studies have also focused on the ways in which the ‘patchwork’ nature of the different domestic and international laws (both contract and regulatory) fail to add up to a coherent structure of regulation and control (Cockayne 2007; Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007b). Reviews of the standing of PMSCs under different laws concluded that none of the laws were sufficient for the purposes they purported to address (Dickinson 2005; Lehnardt 2008; De Nevers 2009a), while reviews of the role of self-regulation in the US and UK markets and found that in neither market was the industry sufficiently controlled (De Nevers 2010, 2009b).

On the other hand, scholars approaching the problem of control from a political perspective analyse it as a principal-agent problem. In this literature, the focus is on the control the state has over these private actors who are their agents in the field. It has been noted that the presence of these private contractors on the field of battle “not only requires new mechanisms of democratic control and accountability by the state, but also by the armed forces and the citizens” (Krahmann 2010, 18). Scholars have identified that PMSCs challenge accountability and control in at least three ways: first, through the lack of information, such as on troop levels, injuries, deaths, etc.; second, through inadequate oversight arrangements in a war zone; and third, through the difficulties of managing activities performed by entities engaged via numerous subcontracts, such that the entity performing the activity may not be in any contractual relationship with the military nominally in charge (Godfrey et al.

2014). There has been work distinguishing between political, functional and social control over the role of PMCs in the exercise of state force (Avant 2005b). Scholars have also studied the implications of the marketisation of security for state control over the exercise of force (Avant 2006, 2007).

Looking at the principle-agent issue from a state perspective, it has been argued that the issues raised by private forces are harder to quantify and capture, leading to questions around how to control that which cannot be known (Avant and Sigelman 2010). The conflict between the wider engagement possible through the use of PMSCs and the covert nature of these engagements leading to a lack of clarity around the agendas being pursued have also been assessed (Avant and De Nevers 2011). Another approach to the principle-agent problem is to focus on the agent (corporate) side, looking at the capacity corporations bring to the engagement and their ability to influence the market through destabilising weaker states (Leander 2005a). The ability of corporations to influence conceptualisations of security, thereby establishing the role of the private sector as the experts, has been assessed (Leander 2005b) (discussed later in section 5). The ‘symbolic’ capital of PMSCs that contributes to making them hard to control or prosecute in the event of lapses has also been studied (Leander 2010).

Other scholars have challenged the idea that problems of control are about the behaviour of the PMSCs, arguing that the problem is one of oversight, rather than bad behaviour or a lack of regulatory tools. The argument is that this is an issue

with the state, rather than with the corporations or with the tools of management.

While the issue of state capacity is dealt with later, and in more detail in Chapter 4, it is considered briefly here because it is about control. Questioning the control states have over their agents once a large number of private contractors have been hired, some scholars point to the ways democratic control is not enhanced by the private actors enacting policy (Cohn 2010; Isenberg 2007). Other scholars argue that the issue is the lack of capacity to manage these contracts within the state (Singer 2007). Yet others make the case that the problem is organisational rather than contractual, in that the problems of control are not about the terms on which private contractor are employed but rather about the preparedness of soldiers to operate with PMSC contractors (Petersohn 2011). Yet another approach to the issue of control is that conventional mechanisms, designed to cope with the frontline soldiers, do not have the structures and dynamics required to control PMSCs, with the very factors that make them successful economic actors limiting the possibility for control (McCoy 2010).

This review has highlighted the level to which the question of control by the state leftovers core to the International Security literature. In all, the literature sees the corporation as taking on the responsibilities of the state (i.e. as privatisation), and as accommodations having to be made to adjust to these new, but legitimate, security providers. The section now turns to looking at the understandings of the state that pervade the International Security literature.

2.4.4 The state remains key

The security literature that looks at private actors also theorises the state, sometimes explicitly, but often implicitly. The geographic division in the literature shapes the assumptions of the state that pervade the literature. A large part of this literature focuses on the global South, where the state is presented as missing, incapable or ‘weak’. Another part of the literature focuses on the global North, and here, the states are either discussed in terms of ideological drivers, or as being ‘weakened’ by the forces of globalisation and other economic factors. Regardless of whether the state is ‘weak’ or not, the underlying conceptualisation of the state in the literature is that of a Weberian one, with a focus on the monopoly on the use of legitimate force³. The literature on privatisation and control set out above relies on a view of a Weberian state seeking assistance from the private sector to enforce this monopoly, either because it cannot do so itself, or because it is good practice to operate a small state with market-led competition for service provision (i.e. the effects of neoliberalism).

³ As it is not the intention of this dissertation to develop a theory of the state, theories of the state are not discussed beyond recognising the prevalence of the Weberian ‘ideal state’ description as having the monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force (see Vincent 1987 for a discussion of various theoretical approaches; Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987 offer an analysis focusing on liberal democracies).

As mentioned above, a large part of the privatisation literature focuses on areas where the state is missing. This is partially explained by the early impetus for the literature on PMSCs – both Executive Outcomes and Sandline International were studied through their operations in Africa, in Angola and Sierra Leone. But even as the literature moved beyond these two companies, the focus remained on regions where the state was absent, from Latin America, to, more recently, the conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan (Singer 2001; Kinsey 2006; Leander and Munster 2007; Avant and Sigelman 2010). A 2007 special issue of *International Relations*, titled ‘The Privatisation and Globalisation of Security in Africa’, was an output of a conference of the same name held a year earlier and was edited by Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams, with contributions from recognised names in Security Studies, such as Deborah Avant and Anna Leander. It looked at all aspects of security, from the private sector in wars in Darfur to policing in South Africa, and as the editors acknowledge, “security privatisation in Africa has almost inevitably been interpreted theoretically as indicating a decline (or even an absence in the case of so-called failed states) of state sovereignty and authority” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007b, 131–32).

Despite the preponderant focus on Africa, the literature also looks at other regions, with increasingly a focus on the activities of Europe and America (Krahmann 2010; Leander 2013a; Stanley 2015; Brooks 2007). Where the state is not weak or absent, the literature (usually implicitly) understands the state in Weberian terms,

as an entity with a monopoly on violence. The focus on PMSCs itself is driven by a focus on the ‘novel’ shift in the control over the exercise of force. This reifies the Weberian understanding of the state as the entity with monopoly over violence, even as it looks at how this is changing. Despite the long-standing reliance by militaries on private actors for supplies, weapons, etc., these had not been seen as ‘essentially’ military activities. PMSCs emerge as an unusual phenomena precisely because the individuals they deploy in the theatres of conflict are “employees of a private company … performing tasks inherently military” which does not accord with mainstream understandings of either business or warfare (Singer 2001, vii).

While the image of wars as being fought by uniformed soldiers in the service of their states is a myth⁴, it is a powerful one that continues to dominate the literature even as the focus is on the role of non-state employees engaging in war fighting. The post-Cold War rise of PMCs is *only* exceptional if seen in the light of a presumed transfer of activities from state to corporations.

Some of the literature sees this as a ‘weakening’ the state (Leander 2003, 2005a, 2010; Avant 2006, 2007, 2004), which is in keeping with a broader literature that

⁴ In the global North, the existence of private armies has been declining as the state militaries became stronger, or as mercenaries coordinated activities under corporate structures over the past 300 years, (Peter Singer, quoted in Krahmann 2010, 1; Avant 2000), but mercenary activity has always co-existed with the state, especially in the conflicts of the global South engaged in by the colonial empires (Kinsey 2006). The development-security nexus that emerged post decolonisation has resulted in “governments … entering into partnerships, known as strategic complexes, with other interested parties to confront the humanitarian crises occurring in this new arena” which has “opened up possibilities for PMCs and PSCs to provide security” (Kinsey 2006, 57).

characterises the impacts of privatisation as a zero-sum game where the state loses as corporations gain through the forces of globalisation and neoliberalism (Strange 1996; Cable 1995; Haufler 2006; May 2006). But others see the state as evolving, rather than weakening, adapting to accommodate the challenges through the development of new governance arrangements that result in states and corporations operating together to manage security (Krahmann 2005b; Abrahamsen and Williams 2007b; Bayley and Shearing 1996). It has been argued that

“rather than private security eroding the power of the state, or threatening its power and authority, its proliferation is linked to changes inside the state, and its power stems not primarily from the barrel of the gun but from its embeddedness in contemporary structures of governance and its links to public forms of power and authority” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b, 3).

This suggests an understanding of changes in understanding of the state, and these are dealt with in the next section. However, for the purpose of this section, the literature that seriously addresses the presence of corporations in security does so through the lens of the state. In other words, the state remains (normatively) central to discussions on the provision of security, even where the presence of corporations is not seen as problematic (see for instance Singer 2001; Kinsey 2006). Where it is seen as more problematic, it is because of the ways in which it challenges the central role of the state or raises issues about how the state maintains control over these ‘external’ actors (see for instance Krahmann 2010;

Avant 2005b). Thus, the Weberian state remains dominant in much of the International Security scholarship on corporations.

2.5 Changing relations

Some security scholars accept that the state-corporate relationship is changing and seek to understand these changes and the impacts they have for security. Scholars have problematised the idea that it is the state that is responsible for security, by looking at the ways in which corporations are also responsible for violence. Others are concerned about the impacts of these changes, whether for concepts of security or for governance arrangements, while some scholars are beginning to rethink the state corporate relationship itself. These are assessed in turn.

2.5.1 Corporations and (in)security

Scholars have begun to challenge the idea that corporations do not engage in security practices in their own right. They focus on the ways that corporations are complicit in creating situations of (in)security. This literature looks at corporations in security matters more broadly i.e. corporations that, in the course of their commercial activities, nonetheless have an interaction with or impact on security concerns, for example mining companies (Hönke 2013; Hönke and Müller 2012; Hönke 2012). That commercial interests can have an impact on security has a long

pedigree in the security literature, having been traced back to the works of Kant and Montesquieu (see Doyle 1997 for a more in-depth discussion), but the arguments assessed here are not about commerce more broadly, but rather the activities of specific corporations. Security scholars generally study these corporations in conflict zones, either because their business is development or peace building, or because they are engaged in extractive activities. The focus on the extractive industry is driven by the significant presence of these corporations in conflict zones – as the existence of valuable commodities usually drives the presence of these corporations rather than other investment decisions, extractive corporations tend to dominate in insecure regions where other corporations might be more hesitant to venture. Their operations are assessed not only for the security arrangements they have created independent of the state (they often manage their own security forces), but also because they have emerged as sources of insecurity in their own right as a result of their practices (Watts 2004; Pegg 1999; Frynas 1998; Omeje 2006; Hönke 2012, 2013). Scholars have been interested in the arrangements and accommodations that states and corporations come to between themselves around the provision of security. This literature therefore focuses on the arrangements for control *between* states and corporations, rather than about the control *of* corporations discussed earlier.

There is an argument that illiberal practices can be fostered by corporations, even though the firms themselves might be otherwise considered exemplars of how to

engage in rights-sensitive ways (Hönke 2013). Jana Hönke's study of mining companies in the Democratic Republic of Congo argues that these corporations are involved in the security practices of the state, determining some areas as secure and making other areas insecure. Separately, there is another argument that understands corporations as engaging in violence. Thus, a study of Shell in Nigeria concluded that it is "actively involved in creating and exacerbating violence against local populations (Pegg 1999, 475). There is also an argument about whether extractive industries contribute to insecurity (Omeje 2006) or have adapted to any insecurities and prosper amidst them (Frynas 1998). Separately it has been argued that the resources themselves can be understood as a nexus around which state and corporate forces group, resulting in the creation of different governable spaces (Watts 2004). All these scholars challenge the understanding that security is the preserve of the state. They see that corporations are active participants in security concerns, and *not* as agents of the state or on behalf of the state. Thus, they begin to reconceptualise what are the foundations of most of the scholarship. But they do not go beyond to theorise these changes in terms of state-corporate relations.

2.5.2 Impacts for 'security'

Other scholars focus on the impacts of these changes, whether for security, or for arrangements to manage its provision (governance). The presence of private actors

in security is seen by some scholars as changing security itself. They argue that security is being commodified as a result of the changed relations between public and private actors. For instance, this is seen as “previously public goods and services become commodities that can be bought and sold in a competitive marketplace” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007b, 135). In order to be commodified, security has to be made measurable and quantifiable in technical ways, potentially altering, but definitely raising issues around, what security is (Krahmann 2008b). While some take it for granted that security (and violence) are commodified (Leander 2003), others focus on whether this commodification impacts conceptions of security as a public good (Krahmann 2008c, 2008a).

While the discussion around the reconceptualization of security is posed as a debate, often the scholars take for granted that security is (or should be) a public good provided by the state, and then seek to understand how the changes matter. Some argue the state monopoly on violence, which has been central to the conception of security as a collective good, is potentially challenged by the increasingly crowded marketplace of security provision, with potential implications for the nature of security (Krahmann 2008a). However, others argue that security can only ever be a collective (or public) good as:

“private security [is] a contradiction-in-terms, an oxymoronic way of thinking about and delivering personal and community safety ... If security is always in some profound sense 'social', then the attempts of collectivities, or individuals within them, to purchase security in the marketplace, or to obtain it by

retreating behind a 'defended enclosure', are doomed to failure" (Loader 1997, 155).

While this points to the ways that seeking security for the individual (or few) contributes to insecurity for the collective (or many) (Burke 2002), it does not address the issue of whether privatisation automatically makes security about the few rather than the many. Krahmann makes this argument by focusing on the theoretical aspects of security and public and private goods (Krahmann 2008c, 2007, 2008b, 2011), but others argue that security can have the characteristics of public, private or common goods, and that all these can be provided in combination (Engerer 2011). There is also a separate argument that what is seen as commodification is a result of policies aimed precisely at breaking the state monopoly on violence, especially by the police in a domestic context (Loader 1999).

In all, the discussion on whether the nature of security has changed continues, with the causes and implications being debated. This has also lead to a discussion on the pragmatic consequences, seeking to understand the necessary changes to governance arrangements. Scholars who accept that there has been a fundamental change in the provision of security see the issues caused as being greater than control, and thus seek to understand this in terms of the governance arrangements needed. The switch here is from seeing security as being governed by or through the state, to seeing the need for arrangements in which corporations are engaged. Understanding governance as the coordination of relations in the absence of a

unifying authority (i.e. the state does not have full control), scholars focus on the ways in which political authority on security is dispersed among a range of public and private actors.

Some scholars argue that there has been a fundamental change in security governance (Newburn 2001; Bayley and Shearing 1996). While others, relying on a market driven by public opinion that is opposed to security moving out of state control, argue a fundamental change in security production would be difficult (Hoppe 1989). Some study the actions taken between states and corporations to coordinate security provision arrangements (Krahmann 2003), and argue that “the very fact of being a private security contractor is increasingly a source of authority” (Leander and Munster 2007, 205–6). It has been noted that “assuming that private security is either an erosion of state authority, or that it stands outside legitimate (state) authority, obscures the breadth of its operations and the conceptual and political challenges it poses” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007a, 238). These are the scholars who seek to re conceptualise state-corporate relations in security, and their focus is often on the changing power relations between states and corporations.

2.5.3 Rethinking the relationship

A few scholars study the changing relations between states and corporations in security. They see it as changes in power balances, as hybrid rule, or as assemblages, each of which is discussed in turn.

Anna Leander (2005b), for instance, argues that corporations now have the power to shape shared understandings of security. Using scholarship on power, she argues that PMSCs have epistemic power to influence the agenda but also have structural power due to their position in the field of security (Leander 2005b, 812–24). She understands power as having ‘shifted’ from the state to the corporation and is thus distinguished from the argument here. While the focus of this dissertation is not power, the state-corporate relationship as it is understood here is not an adversarial one of gains and losses, but rather a collaborative one that, significantly, is also mutually constitutive. More recently, Leander argues for a reconceptualization of relations between states and private military companies as one of hybrid rule (Leander 2016). She argues that “one of the rare widely agreed-on truths is that the public and private are deeply intertwined” with both public and private present. She concludes that “the core implication of this argument that is on the importance of tackling these seen-unseen dynamics head on and paying direct attention to hybridity and hybrid rule. Hybridity is redrawing the boundaries of security” (Leander 2016). While this points to the central concerns of this dissertation – the mutually constitutive relations between state and

corporation – hybridity is an analytically unhelpful approach. Apart from the inherent difficulties with the concept (for a discussion, see Nadarajah and Rampton 2015), the suggestion that the public private divide is disappearing (by virtue of hybridity of rule that means these should be seen as ‘enmeshed spheres’) risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Leander is right that thinking in terms of distinct public and private realms distorts analysis, but, as this dissertation argues, this divide is central to how state-corporate relations, and thus the state and corporation, are being reworked. That is, it is not that the public-private divide does not work, but that it does particular work in the reconstitution of the state, the corporation and the relations between them.

In another effort to capture the evolving relations between state and corporation, Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams (2011) seek to study the new ‘modalities of power’ that they see as emerging out of these. They situate private security providers within a broader frame of social transformations, especially of the state, and argue that it has become “a pervasive part of everyday life, and in many countries private security personnel now outnumber their public counterparts by a considerable margin” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b, 1). Thus, they show that security itself is being rearranged as a result of the engagement of private actors. Using the term ‘global security assemblages’, they point to the ways in which these “link national and global structures and give rise to new security institutions that simultaneously cross the national and global, the public and

private” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b, 16). They do not see this as necessarily a ‘downward spiral’ of the state but rather argue that, it is context specific. For instance, they argue that where “the legitimacy of the field of security is already under question, the provision of security by private actors need not necessarily be socially coercive” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b, 235).

While Abrahamsen and Williams go far towards seeing that states and corporations work together in ways which far transcend ‘privatisation’, they are constrained in their analysis by their starting point. In their conception, it is the *assemblage* that crosses the public-private divide, meaning that the state and corporation remain distinct entities on either side of the divide. Thus, they start with pre-conceptions of the public state and the private corporate and show the ways in which they work across this divide – hence assemblages. While they recognise that these assemblages represent “a reconfiguration of the relationship between the public and the private” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b, 236), they start with the public and private as distinct entities that relate across the divide, and in the process become different (or more precisely, gain different attributes). In contrast, this dissertation argues that the public-private divide itself is being reconfigured, and not just relations across the divide. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, by beginning with an understanding that the public-private divide is internal to social order, rather than an external boundary between discrete entities, this dissertation shows the ways in which both the public-private divide

itself, and both states and corporations are being re-produced through their relations. What is discussed here is not a ‘reconfiguration of relations across the divide’, but rather the reconstitution of the divide itself. Hence, while useful, Abrahamsen and Williams do not go far enough to explain what they observe – by starting with a priori assumptions about the public and the private, they are unable to see the ways in which public and private are themselves being recast through these security arrangements.

Other scholars, starting with Bourdesian frameworks, have worked on state-corporate relations in the context of security (the work of Leander is discussed above but other examples include works by Bigo and O'Reilly which are discussed below). Didier Bigo focuses on the emergence of a field of security experts and identifies that the field is not confined to the police (state) (2002, 2013, 2006). He shows, for instance, how debates and struggles around the securitization of migration include a clear voice for private corporations and sets out the ways in which these “professionals in the management of unease” are increasingly important in not only the securitization of migration (Bigo 2002, 64), but also in the emergence of a European security community (Bigo 2013). Bigo argues that the “practices of security are not given by nature but are the outcome of political acts by politicians and specialists on threat management” (2002, 68). Bigo's interest is in mapping the field of these ‘professionals of management of unease’, in defining the “convergence of defence and internal security into interconnected

networks” which “lies at the heart of the transformations concerning global policing” (Bigo 2006, 6). He shows how this field is composed of discourses, architectural facilities, administrative measures, regulatory decisions and scientific expertise that manages life on the basis of “profiles that signify differences, on exceptionalism with respect to norms” (2006, 44). In doing so, he illustrates the ways in which these practices traverse any divide between states and corporations. However, Bigo’s level of analysis does not extend to rethinking the state and corporate forms themselves, or how the relations between them are co-constitutive. Rather, he is interested in compositions and contestations, at both the individual level of actors and the composite level of the field itself.

However, there are other Bourdieu-inspired scholars who focus on this level of abstraction. Conor O'Reilly studies organisational complexes in transnational policing, in particular, the role of the security consultancy industry. He seeks to capture the “re-configuration of state-ordered power across the security field” in which “closely aligned state-corporate actors have emerged within a dominant – albeit complex and fluctuating – coalescence of interests” and he argues that “it is more profitable to analyse ‘the ties that bind’ these actors together in the transnational policing sphere” (O'Reilly 2010, 196). He draws on the seminal work of Gary T Marx on domestic undercover policing, which notes that “public and private police may serve as functional alternatives for each other. Although sources of conflict and competition can be identified, public and private police

may be drawn together to supplement their respective weaknesses” (1987, cited in O'Reilly 2010, 196). O'Reilly sees similar arrangements in transnational policing and, by analysing the role of the professionals in transnational security consultancy, he argues they facilitate “an ongoing close association between state security and corporate security” resulting in a relationship he labels “state-corporate symbiosis” (2010, 184). To O'Reilly, “a symbiotic relationship suggests an ongoing close association between two organisms where the outcome for one is strongly connected with that of the other” (2010, 197), whether it be a situation of one benefiting to the detriment of the other, one benefiting without affecting the other, or a situation of mutual benefit.

Despite O'Reilly's ambition to capture a more complex and dynamic relationship than that offered in the privatisation literature, he fails to develop this beyond a functional/ transactional relationship between states and corporations. For example, in referring to a “fluctuating security amalgamation” (O'Reilly 2010, 202) he is concerned with how transnational security consultancies (TSCs) are now deeply embedded in various security activities, from managing risks to harnessing their informality and contributing to insecurity discourses on the basis of their reputations for technical expertise. The focus of analysis is on how corporations are increasingly taking on more activities (from states) in the security arena, in ways that make the state reliant on these TSCs. (Somewhat surprisingly, he does not examine how or whether the corporations are reliant on the state - though

this is implied in his discussion of espionage on behalf of the corporation (2010, 2011) he doesn't develop this). Significantly, what remains unexplained in O'Reilly's account of such dependence (characterised as 'symbiosis') is why either states or corporations persist in these relations of acute dependence, or why these relations come about in the first place, or are subsequently reproduced. (In that sense, Susan Roberts' (2014) account of the persistent mutual dependence between USAID and select large development contractors focusses on the self-reproducing dynamics of a long-established, if varying, 'development industrial complex'.)

By contrast, this dissertation moves well beyond such arguments reliant on transactional (mutual) dependence and focusses on the co-constitutive effects of security discourses in both the emergence and intensification of such relations, and, going further, on the implications for state and corporate forms.

2.6 Conclusion

This review of the role of corporations in the Security Studies literature indicates three issues that obscure the possibility of deeper understandings of the relationship between states, corporations and security. These deeper understandings are possible if the analysis begins with a focus on the relations between states and corporations, rather than with the states and corporations themselves (this is elaborated in the next chapter). However, these issues point to the contribution that this dissertation makes to the field more generally. All three

problems result from the centrality of the Weberian state as an *entity* in the discipline. The alternative approach taken in this dissertation, of understanding states and corporations as bundles of relations re/produced through their relations, begins with the relations and thus sees the rationalities that are both produced through and shaping those relations.

The three issues are, first, the focus on PMSCs that overwhelms any discussion on corporations and security. Second, the dominance of the Weberian state in the literature is such that approaches to security practices, and in particular security provision, is predicated on the primary role of the state, resulting in discussions about privatisation, outsourcing, weakening, etc., but not allowing for any conceptualisation of the state-corporate relationship beyond this. Third, as a result of the above, the literature struggles to capture changes in state-corporate relations. Each of these issues is now discussed in a more detail.

First, the overwhelming focus in the International Security literature that looks at corporations is on PMSCs. While the work by Abrahamsen and Williams is ground-breaking for its attempt to shift away from private military to private security providers more generally, it is the exceptionality of this in the literature that sets it apart, even though it stays within the field of security corporations more broadly. This is perhaps not surprising given the history of security studies as a field and its antecedents in military and strategic studies, but it is noteworthy the extent to which scholars, even as they move beyond the conventional focus of

security studies, are constrained to find ways to tie back to this. Further, even where the focus is not on PMCs but rather in the role of corporations in conflicts or peace, it remains predominantly within war zones. Thus, moving beyond PMSCs, to the role of corporations in security matters more broadly, is a contribution of this dissertation.

Second, the state is seen as either weakened by the corporations, or needing to adapt to accommodate their presence. This comes, partially, out of the enduring demarcation between public and private, even in the literature that seeks to challenge the perception of the divide, but also through the dominant understanding of the state as Weberian, which means that any 'loss' of control is a serious challenge that needs to be dealt with. This prevents deeper engagement with changing security practices which challenge the notion of state 'loss' and corporation 'gain'. At the same time, this Weberian framework also overlooks the role of the state in developing policies that encourage the presence and growth of corporations in security. This dissertation contributes by engaging directly with the issue of the changing role of the state in security – two of the case study chapters (on the military and on resilience) illustrate the ways in which the state is instrumental in inviting, creating and growing the space for corporations in those aspects of security, while the third on the donor state in peace-building challenges the idea of the donor 'state' itself. The chapters

document how current practices of security occur across the public-private divide, even though the International Security literature struggles to grasp this.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the literature struggles to capture and theorise these changes. Those scholars that focus on the changes wrought by corporations in security, either study the implications or are more concerned with challenging accepted narratives, such that even those who ostensibly engage with changing state-corporate *relations* do so on the basis of already constituted and self-evidently distinct states and corporations. Beginning instead with practices, this dissertation is focussed on the changes to both states and corporations that have resulted through their engagements and interactions with each other. It thus argues, through a focus on three separate ‘issue’ areas in security – national defence, resilience and peacebuilding – that the evolving relations between state and the corporation are mutually constitutive in ways that unsettle foundational assumptions and conclusions in the literature.

Chapter 3 lays out the advantages of a relationalist approach over a substantivist approach, and discusses the study of practices as a way to empirically capture relations. It then discusses governmentality as a framework for interpreting practices, such that their rationalities can be inductively revealed, rather than being analysed through pre-formed and totalising theories. Finally, it discusses the analytical purchase (and limits) of neoliberalism. The subsequent three empirical chapters illustrate the argument in relation to three different security domains.

The chapters point to the lack of any single or consistent narrative for the relationship between states and corporations, emphasising that investigations should not begin with (*a priori* conceptions of) units, but rather with relations between them as embedded in practices. Further, investigations of security cannot make *a priori* assumptions about the public-private divide, but must rather investigate the ways in which this divide manifests and is re/produced in these evolving practices. In sum, the case study chapters point to the ways in which practices work to secure the centrality of the corporation in contemporary social order (security).

3. Theory: Relations, practices and governmentality

3.1 Introduction

The central argument of this dissertation is that emergent discursive practices of *security* are transforming state-corporate relations in ways that produce increasingly tighter integration of state and corporate forms. Conventional analysis of the expanding and proliferating role of corporations in diverse security domains take-for-granted the centrality of ‘the state’ in relation to ‘security’, as well as a specific understanding of the state (i.e. in Weberian terms) and therefore its relations with other (‘non-state’) entities such as corporations. By contrast this dissertation argues that a focus on the actual practices in and through which state-corporate relations are re-produced reveals that the key effect of discursive practices of *security*, in diverse domains, is to generate forms of tighter integration between state and corporation (both understood here as aggregates of practices) in ways that belie conventional analytical separations such as state/corporation and public/private. This is not to argue that such conceptual divides are meaningless (and thus analysis is better served by frameworks such as ‘assemblages’ or ‘hybridity’), but that these conceptual divides acquire particular meanings within specific security domains – the dissertation will consider three, namely, the use of military force, resilience and peacebuilding.

Before developing these analyses in the next three chapters, this chapter elaborates four key analytical moves. First, it emphasises the importance of seeing the

state/non-state ‘border’ as *internal*, rather than prior, to the production of social and political order. Second, it emphasises the utility of relationalist over substantionalist analysis for bringing to the fore how such borders are enacted, thereby generating the solidity of commonly taken for granted ‘entities’ such as states and corporations. Third, it emphasises the importance of focussing on practices, as embodiment and productive of relations. Finally, it emphasises the utility of a governmentality framework in excavating empirically the diffuse yet potent workings of ordering rationalities that inform and are constituted by relations embodied in practices. To restate the central argument, the discursive practices of security – in generating various problematisations, responses and calculations inherent to specific security domains – rework relations between state and corporation in ways that make tighter integration of state and corporate practices integral to the achievement of security.

A number of different analytical approaches could be used to explore evolving state-corporate relations, including in the context of security. Given that the focus is on states and corporations, one line of investigation that focuses precisely on this area is scholarship on the role of elites. This literature generally emerges from a liberal perspective, focusing on the individual elite actor and seeking analysis of the networks in which they are embedded. Charles Wright Mills, who wrote the first book that looked at the role of notable men occupying positions of authority in major institutions and organizations, argued that these elites harboured a

“hidden design” and were “omnipotent in their powers” (1956). Elites studies focuses on a “relatively small, dominant group within society who enjoy a privileged status envied by others” (N. Kakabadse, Kakabadse, and Kouzmin 2012, 2 citing Parenti 2007), and on issues such as the salient characteristics of elites, the dynamics of (trans)formation of elite groups, and their power sources and structures (see N. Kakabadse, Kakabadse, and Kouzmin 2012 for a more detailed survey). In this approach, the focus is on the individual, and the corporation is understood either as an instrument of these elites, or as an actor (entity) in its own right. Analysis that emerges from these starting points tends to be behavioural, focusing on question about how these elites (whether corporations or individuals) achieve their objectives. Scholars have explored such questions in varied contexts such as global finance (Richardson, Kakabadse, and Kakabadse 2012), global inequality (Freeland 2012), feminism and capitalism (Eisenstein 2015), development (e.g. contributions to Amsden, DiCaprio, and Robinson 2012), surveillance (Jeffrey 2009), business leaders (Lawrence 2012; Petrovic, Kakabadse, and Kakabadse 2012), etc. Although a productive line of analysis, elite studies does not interrogate relations between state and corporate forms, and given its ontological points of departure, is also incapable of handling questions about constitutive effects, such as those being posed in this dissertation in relation to what the state and corporation are, and how they are transformed via their inter-relations.

Another possible alternative, Marxist analysis, would be an advance from elite studies as the focus there is often precisely on problematising state-corporate relations. Marxist analysis typically focuses on the fusion of capital and the state - 'the capitalist state' rather than the state in a capitalist mode of production. It tends, even when adopting the latter approach, to focus on the logic of capital and its (secondary or derivative) institutional forms, rather than on how the production of state and corporation is itself an ongoing effect of practice. While the starting point is different to that of elite studies, such work is also committed to substantivist notions of power and conceptions of the state and corporation i.e. as self-evident entities that interact. This is evidenced, for example, by the long-standing work on the transnational capital class (see for instance Sklair 2001; Robinson and Harris 2000). As elaborated below, by contrast to elite studies and Marxist scholarship, this dissertation adopts a relationalist approach that does not rely on a prior conceptions of state and/or corporation.

As established in Chapter 2, International Security remains largely state-centric. Moreover, the literature understands the state as a discrete entity with a clear separation between it and other entities, such as society. However, boundaries between these entities is not easy to establish, and many scholars have argued for it to be seen as an *internal* to a social and political order, rather than as external to discrete entities (T. Mitchell 1991; Rose and Miller 1992). While these scholars are studying the state, they do not do so for the purpose of understanding or

theorising the state itself, but rather as a way to study the workings of social and political order. In this light, the public/private boundary is not prior to politics, but is rather a site of politics. This is of course not new to scholarship in many disciplines; for example, some scholars have long argued that the personal is political – i.e. public – (Peterson 1992; Gavison 1992; Weintraub 1997), while others have assessed the hierarchies that are constituted into the separation (Warner 2005; Bobbio 1989) and governmentality scholars have also, in different ways, sought to transcend this divide (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Rose and Miller 1992; Foucault 1991). However, this remains relatively uncommon in International Security scholarship. The next section (section 2) summarises the literature that understands the border as internal to the production of social and political order, rather than a self-evident separation between discrete entities, and the consequences of this. To this end the section draws on the argument Timothy Mitchell (1991) makes in his seminal article, as he presents the consequences of this approach for International Relations.

To allow the politics of re/producing this internal boundary to become the focus of analysis, this dissertation takes a relational approach, beginning with the relations that form and are enacted by entities, rather than with substantial units, such as states or corporations. Section 3 draws on the scholarship that demonstrates the value that a relationalist approach brings to the study of the world and, in particular, International Relations. It traces the scholarship on substantialism and

relationalism through the work of Mustafa Emirbayer (1997) and the application to International Relations in a seminal article by Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon (1999). Jackson and Nexon work through the logic of, and benefits from, conceptualising states as a congregation of processes, and argue that this conceptualisation provides a useful analytical framework for understanding the emergence of concepts such as agency, power, states and corporations, the relations between them, and more significantly, changes in all of these. They argue that to begin with entities (substantialism), and the consequent failure to account for relations, entails certain ontological and epistemological assumptions which lead to distorted analyses.

However, processes, relations, or even ‘processual relations’, in the terminology of Jackson and Nexon, can be difficult to delimit or specify. Practices offer a way to empirically identify, capture and analyse not only relations, but also the way relations produce entities, and changes to both relations and the entities they produce. Section 4 provides a survey of the literature on practices, focusing in particular on the ‘practice turn’ in International Relations (Adler and Pouliot 2011a, 2011b). This provides insight into how to understand practices, and the ways in which they are useful for empirically analysing relations.

A key criticism of the ‘practice turn’ literature is that while practices can be observed and documented, it is hard to interpret them unless there is a pre-conceived formulation of the ‘proper’ social and political order (see Duvall and

Chowdhury 2011 discussed below). Foucault's concept of governmentality can prove useful here, as it provides an analytical tool through which to empirically study the meaning of practices, in the absence of a pre-existing framework. Thus, section 5 reviews the literature on governmentality more broadly, and more precisely on its utility as a methodology for excavating the rationalities that underpin and arise out of the practices being observed.

Section 6 then provides a brief discussion of neoliberalism, as no discussion of corporations is possible in the contemporary era without reference to this concept. While governmentality has proven a productive form of inquiry, and given the framework of this dissertation, it is necessary to establish why a neoliberal governmentality framework is insufficient to explain the practices explored in the three security issue domains (in Chapters 4-6). The chapter concludes with a brief elaboration of the argument of this dissertation, which arises as a result of taking this approach to the study of security.

3.2 Locating boundaries

As the discussion of the extant literature in Chapter 2 revealed, the state remains central to International Security. Even amidst the growing theoretical pluralism of the field, which now ranges from mainstream approaches to include feminist, post-structural and postcolonial approaches among others, the state remains key to understandings of security. Neither has the centrality of the state been affected by

the breadth of ‘new security’ issues that have expanded beyond the traditional realm of the military and defence to include human security, and issues related to the environment, health, finance, and so on. Amidst this growth and diversification, not only has the state remained a stable object of analysis, but its conceptualisation has also remained relatively unchanged. In other words, the state remains predominantly understood in the international security literature as a pre-formed entity, as an actor, capable of making decisions on security matters, including to act, to protect, to threaten, to build, and so on. Further, this ‘entity’ is one with clear boundaries between it and other ‘entities’ such as society, the population, corporations, civil society organisations, and so on. Moreover, these distinctions between the state and non-state actors are solid and clear, with relations taking the form of interactions across these boundaries. This separation then becomes, to borrow Meera Sabaratnam’s turn of phrase, “the *central ontological fulcrum* upon which the rest of the political and ethical problems sit” (2013, 267 emphasis in original).

However, there is a fundamental problem with this formulation, and while the issue will be discussed here in relation to the state, it is true of all socially constructed entities. The problem, as Mitchell (1991) argues, is that what is supposed to be an external division between one entity and another, is rather an *internal* division within the mechanisms through which social and political order is reproduced. Thus, the boundary between state and society, with which Mitchell

was concerned, or between the state and corporation, which is the focus of this dissertation, are internal demarcations within the arrangements of social and political order, and not external boundaries between independent entities. In other words, decisions about the different categories analysed, such as what is state and what is not, “are the results of power relations in the world, they are not neutral or transhistorical ‘concepts’” (Bigo 2013, 125). As John Clarke has shown (2004), whether something is public or private is contextual, with the market for instance, being both public (in contrast to families and individuals) and private (in contrast to the state) depending on the context.

In his seminal article tracing the ‘limits of the state’, Mitchell notes that “it remains difficult to explain exactly what is meant by the concept of the state” (1991 77). It is worth noting that Mitchell was not attempting to define the state or discover a better theory of the state. Rather, he was seeking to provide a better account of how social and political order is reproduced. While it can be argued that other scholars of the state seek to do the same, they often reduce social and political order to the actions of the state, and therefore restrict the avenues of analytical inquiry. The focus of analysis here is not on the state per se, but rather on state-society relations and the attendant consequences. Mitchell sets out the debate between those who seek to address the difficulties of defining the state by either abandoning the state-society distinction in favour of an encompassing systems approach (such as Netl 1968 cited in Mitchell 1991) and those who seek to

define the state more narrowly as something more autonomous from society (such as Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985 cited in Mitchell 1991). He shows that both approaches falter on the difficulty of establishing a clear state/society boundary. As Mitchell notes:

“For the advocates of the statist approach the dispute concerns where to center political explanation, in the action of the state or in society; for their opponents it concerns the feasibility and usefulness of this distinction. … their opponents are correct in pointing to the difficulty state theorists encounter in defining the state-society boundary. Yet it can be shown that the same boundary problem is present, in a different way, in their own approach. In fact for systems theorists the boundary itself expanded without limit to fill the entire space of society” (1991, 78).

In contrast to approaches that seek to establish a more precise state-society boundary, or those that seek to move away from it, Mitchell calls for the boundary to be taken seriously as an internal demarcation, rather than an external one.

Noting that “the institutional mechanisms of a modern political order are never confined within the limits of what is called the state”, he argues that the focus should be on rethinking the state/society boundary itself; “the state-society divide is not a simple border between two free-standing objects or domains, but a complex distinction internal to these realms of practice” (T. Mitchell 1991, 90). Calling for research that begins with a focus on this “uncertain boundary”, scholars are encouraged to think about the questions raised:

“In a given area of practice, how is the effect created that certain aspects of what occurs pertain to society, while others stand

apart as the state? More importantly, what is the significance of effecting this distinction?" (T. Mitchell 1991, 89).

Understood this way, the state needs to be analysed as a structural *effect*, "examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist" (T. Mitchell 1991, 94). The state, therefore, should be studied as "an effect of detailed processes of spatial organisation, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided" (T. Mitchell 1991, 95). Alternatively, as Rose and Miller argue:

"the state can be seen as a *specific* way in which the problem of [producing social and political order] is discursively codified, a way of dividing a 'political sphere', with its particular characteristics of rule, from other 'non-political spheres' to which it must be related, and a way in which certain technologies of [order making] are given a temporary institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of relations with one another" (Rose and Miller 1992, 177 emphasis, inserts added).

This is not to suggest getting rid of the state as an object of analysis, nor that state and society are in a "single, totalised structure of power" (T. Mitchell 1991, 90). Rather, the argument is that state and society should not be seen as separate from each other – that the "distinction must not be taken as the boundary between two discrete entities, but as a line drawn internally within the network of institutions mechanisms through which a social and political order is maintained" (T. Mitchell 1991, 78; see also Ferguson and Gupta 2002). The distinction between state and society is not an illusion and, against both statist and systems approaches, it is

important because “producing and maintaining the distinction between state and society is *itself* a mechanism that generates resources of power” (Mitchell 1991, 90, emphasis added). Moreover, the “essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but *the producing and reproducing of this line of difference*” itself (T. Mitchell 1991, 95 emphasis added).

Thus, the argument being made is that the state-society boundary is an internal one, rather than one external to discrete entities. Further, this boundary is the site of politics, rather than it being something that exists prior to politics. Whether this is understood as a state-society boundary, or state-corporation, or public-private, all these boundaries are internal to the production of the broader social and political order. As noted above, this is not a new idea, with many disciplines and many scholars accepting that the personal is political and that boundaries are politically constructed (for instance Peterson 1992; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Owens 2008; Horwitz 1982; Weintraub 1997). Rather, it is emphasised because the idea of the state/society boundary being a site of politics is relatively novel in International Security, with its over-riding conception of, and analytical reliance on, a Weberian state. Rather than beginning the analysis with the pre-formed entities, this dissertation takes a relationalist approach to security. The next section discusses the literature on substantialism and relationalism and the value of taking a relationalist approach.

3.3 Relations before entities

This section elaborates the advantages that a relationalist approach offers over a substantialist approach, including the varying insights and problems that become apparent from taking a relational approach. In a seminal article on substantialism and relationalism, Mustafa Emirbayer (1997) points to common dichotomies in academic literature, such as material versus ideal or structure versus agency, and argues that more fundamental than these is the choice between substantialism and relationalism. Reviewing the literature in sociology, he argues that the most significant conflict in the field is not about methodology or theory, but about whether the world consists of static things such as entities (i.e. is substantialist) or dynamic relations (i.e. is relationalist).

Substantialism is an assumption that relations are dependent on a ‘real being’ which is then added to or modified through the relations in which it engages (Cassirer 1953 cited in Emirbayer 1997, 283). Thus, scholars begin with those ‘real’ entities and seek to study the interactions between them. In International Security, for instance, states, are understood as entities that protect, to be protected, to be secured against, etc. John Dewey and Arthur Bentley (1949) identified two aspects of substantialism, namely self-action and inter-action. They posited that self-action sees entities as being engaged in self-generating, self-moving activities in an empty matrix. In this view, things act under their own

powers, acting in relational matrices that are “empty media for their self-generating, self-moving activity” (Emirbayer 1997, 283). The alternative substantialist explanation Dewey and Bentley provide is inter-action, which sees entities as being “balanced” against each other in “causal interconnection” (1949, 108 cited in Emirbayer 1997, 285). Thus, entities can be seen as independent, but “no longer generate their own action, … [instead] the relevant action takes place among the entities themselves. Entities remain fixed and unchanging throughout such interaction, each independent of the existence of the others, much like billiard balls or the particles in Newtonian Mechanics” (Emirbayer 1997, 285–86).

In contrast, Dewey and Bentley suggest a third way: relationalism they argue, introduces an alternative dimension of trans-action. While interaction saw entities engaging in causal connection, a trans-action approach sees “systems of description and naming … employed to deal with aspects and phases of action” (Dewey and Bentley 1949 cited in Emirbayer 1997, 286). In other words, “the very terms or units involved in a transaction derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing) functional roles they play *within that transaction*,” (Emirbayer 1997, 287, emphasis added). Things “are not assumed as independent existences present anterior to any relation, but . . . gain their whole being . . . first in and with the relations which are predicated of them. Such ‘things’ . . . can never be ‘given’ in isolation but only in ideal community with each other” (Cassirer 1953, p. 36, cited in Emirbayer 1997, 287). Thus, in a relational view, socially constructed

objects are not independent of their relations, but are constituted by and through their relations with each other.

The transactional approach “sees relations between terms or units as pre-eminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties among inert substances” (Emirbayer 1997, 289). A substantialist approach would see entities as pre-existing discrete units that interact but continue to be essentially the same even after the interaction- i.e. they are conceptually unchanged by the interaction. In contrast, a relationalist, transactional approach sees relations constituting entities, such that what emerges are new actors, entities, and relations, different from whatever existed before those relations (Abbott 1995, 863). Thus, relationalists argue that “it makes no sense to envision constituent elements apart from the flows within which they are involved (and vice versa)” (Emirbayer 1997, 289). For instance, Emirbayer argues that concepts such as power, equality or freedom can all be reformulated through a relations approach. Power, he argues, is seen in a substantialist view as something to be seized or held. In contrast, in a transactional approach, “the concept of power [is] transformed from a concept of substance to a concept of relationship. At the core ... is a fluctuating, tensile equilibrium, a balance of power moving to and fro” (Elias 1978, 131 cited in Emirbayer 1997, 290–91). As Norbert Elias notes, this “fluctuating balance of power is a structural characteristic of the flow of every figuration” (cited in Emirbayer 1997, 291).

Similarly, a relational view would see the state as “an effect of processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance” (T. Mitchell 1991, 95). Thus, the state needs to be “examined … as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist” (1991, 94). In such a view, “the question is no longer one of accounting for government in terms of 'the power of the State', but of ascertaining how, and to what extent, the state is articulated into the activity of government” (Rose and Miller 1992, 177). Here, government refers not to the political power of the state (parties, institutions, etc) but rather to the idea of governing towards the production of social and political order. This conception points to how governing can be undertaken by different actors in different instances, such as the captain of a ship, the teacher of a school, or even an individual over themselves. This is a governmentality approach to relations, and is discussed in more detail in section 5. The point here is that instead of trying to a priori delimit and define the state and its agencies, the relationalist approach examines *how* “relations are established between political and other authorities” and asks questions around “what funds, forces, persons, knowledge or legitimacy are utilised; and by means of what devices and techniques are these different tactics made operable” (Rose and Miller 1992, 177).

Jackson and Nexon (1999) take the discussion around substantialism and relationalism out of sociology and into International Relations, moving the focus

from interactions between states to the relations that constitute states. The analytical move is emphasised by the title of their article: ‘Relations before States’. Noting that the focus on methodology and epistemology have obscured the extent to which substantialism and relationalism fracture International Relations, they argue instead for relational approaches to be incorporated into the discipline. They explain the prevalence and attraction of substantialism on its common-sense appeal based on the substances all around us. They argue that the ‘state’ that International Relations scholars study is an unchanging one, with only its *attributes*, such as military capacity, changing. It is for this reason they argue that “substantialism makes change difficult to explain” (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 296) for the entities it studies do not (and cannot) ever essentially change. They focus on what they call ‘processual relationalism (or p/r)’, and argue that the configuration of ties that give rise to entities (things) are not static, but rather ongoing processes. Such a view, they argue, best allows for the analysis of states as things that can change in themselves, rather than only in their attributes (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 292).

Jackson and Nexon make the case for the complementarity of substantialism and relationalism. Using the analogy of light, which is understood as both particles and waves at the same time, they argue that substance and processes can be complementary. In other words, the objects of analysis can be understood both as actors (entities), and as a combination of processes (relations), with no

contradiction between the two. This ties to the findings in Emirbayer's 'manifesto for a relations sociology', where he works through the writings of key sociology scholars including Charles Tilly, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, Arthur Stinchcombe and Harrison White to show how they rely on both substantialist and relationalist approaches in their works (1997, 289-290). Thus, it is not a matter of relationalism being better than substantialism, but that to begin with entities (substantialism), and the consequent failure to account for relations, entails certain ontological and epistemological assumptions which limit the possible analyses and conclusions.

3.3.1 A typology

Jackson and Nexon develop a typology of four key concepts – processes, configurations, projects and yoking – that can be used to operationalise the study of relations. Processes, the first and analytically most basic of these concepts, are described as "a causally or functionally linked set of occurrences or events which produce a 'change in the complexion of reality'" (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 302–4). Processes can be owned (attributable to a doer) or unowned, and their examples of unowned processes include entropy and the spread of rumours. They argue that while rumours can be studied by focusing on the owned aspects (i.e. who told who and so on), this is not to study the spread, but rather to focus on the interactions that impacted the rumour itself. As the authors note, this does not explain "how

the process, which is the spreading of the rumour, alters the *relations* which constitutes the group” (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 302 emphasis in original). In relation to the objects of analysis in International Relations, they point to nuclear proliferation and economic interdependence as processes that are conventionally understood as ‘owned’ processes, but which can also be considered as unowned processes, existing independent of the entities that are engaged in them.

The second concept is configurations, understood as aggregations of processes. The distinction between configurations and processes is one of degrees of stability, rather than distinction in type, as aggregations can be unbundled into their component processes. Nevertheless, Jackson and Nexon argue that this distinction is analytically useful because it allows a relatively stable aggregation of processes to become the object of analysis and study. Configurations, they argue are specific to the object of analysis. For example, scholars of economic interdependence caused by globalisation might want to study interdependence itself as a configuration of economic processes of trade and institutional relations, while for other scholars, interdependence might be better analysed as a process in itself. A substantialist approach that would see the object of analysis as an entity with attributes that can be studied as variables, and develop causal stories based on independent and dependent variables. In contrast, Jackson and Nexon argue that in a p/r approach, the idea is to develop “causal stories by looking at configurations of processes” (1999, 306) rather than by looking at variables. Thus, they call for a

relational explanation of the phenomenon being studied. For example, scholars of state formation might want to study the state itself as a configuration of the various processes of formation (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 304), while other scholars might prefer to analyse the state as a project, as discussed later. They point to the work of Charles Tilly as illustrative of what they are suggesting. For Tilly, state formation is not a matter of variables, but is instead explained through a causal story that links together fiscal, military and centralising bureaucratic processes, with states thus emerging as “configurations of capital … and coercion”. In this light, Tilly understand the appearance of the nation state as the convergence of military-technical practices and political authority (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 306).

The third concept is a project, understood as “a special type of configuration with great importance for social scientists … a configuration with agent properties, a social entity with the ability to make choices and exercise causal power” (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 307). That is, just as configurations can be disaggregated into processes, projects can also be disaggregated into configurations, but the distinction is that projects are able to make choices or exercise causal power. The concept of a project is important as it allows for an analysis of relatively stable entities and their agency, without affording these entities ontological priority. As the authors note, “rather than simply examining what agents do, [this] analysis can provide us with theories of what agents *are* and how their agency is produced and

sustained” (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 308 emphasis in original). They return to the concept of the state to illustrate the ‘project’. Previously, they discussed the state as a configuration, citing Tilly who was interested in studying state *formation*. However, others, who might be interested in states in the world, would study the state as a project, a social entity with the properties of an agent. By doing so, these scholars would be able to retain the emphasis on the agential properties of a state, while at the same time analysing the processes and relations that sustain and reproduce states and ‘their’ agency

The notion of the state as a project also provides an alternative understanding of the divides between public and private, external and internal, etc., that are central to understanding the state, but invariably belie and undermine a priori attempts to define and demarcate the state and its activities. As Jackson and Nexon note, these demarcations should not be considered in the abstract, but rather, each historically and socially situated state project

“consists of the particular ways in which these demarcations are expressed at a given point in history. Thus the state project does not, in our view, *derive from* these demarcations of social space as much as it *produces and reproduces* them” (1999, 308 emphasis in original).

This echoes Mitchell’s characterisation of modern politics as ‘the producing and reproducing’ of the line of difference between the state and society (1991, 95). In this sense, although closer state-corporate relations emerge from security practices, these demarcations vary in different contexts. For example, in the

contemporary era, state corporate relations in different security arenas take different forms as discussed in the three security issue case study chapters of this dissertation. In the exercise of military force (discussed in Chapter 4), the line of difference is produced by the state actively seeking to create a private corporation, explicitly predicated on the state's future reliance on it. In contrast, in resilience practices (discussed in Chapter 5), the state-corporation boundary is actively overridden, as the state brings corporations further into security practices organised around protecting the corporation as integral to national security e.g. 'critical infrastructure'. Finally, in peacebuilding practices (discussed in Chapter 6), the public/private divide serves as the basis upon which international interventions are undertaken such that state is reworked with corporate actors becoming central not only to 'core' state functions, but also to the process by which the state is reworked.

Understanding the state as a project reveals that rather than territorial boundaries constituting the state, it is the practices congealed in the state project that produce conceptual and territorial boundaries. For example, the production of a 'hard' border with Europe in post-Brexit Britain is not a pre-given geographical reality but rather produced through practices such as increased passport control, checkpoints and customs control. Further, this hard border might become 'fuzzy' between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, in which case from the British perspective, Ireland will occupy a curious position half inside and outside

the ‘hard’ border with Europe. As Jackson and Nexon elaborate, “the state project cannot be thought of as restricted to some kind of territorial ‘container’, since one of the effects of the state project is to produce and reproduce the very division of the social world into ‘inside’ and ‘outside’” (1999, 311 citing Walker 1993).

The fourth and final concept is yoking, which is understood as the means by which processes are stabilised into projects, with associated agential properties (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 313–17). Jackson and Nexon note that while it is possible to assert that a project is an entity, more than an assertion is required to determine *how* the ‘entity’ is underpinned, supported and generated. They point to the different narratives that might be yoked into the effort of stabilising the project – for instance, an analyst might seek to reproduce mainstream narratives of ‘the state’, while a reformer might seek to yoke new narratives together around processes to stabilise the configuration of a reformed state, or a different state form. Thus, discourses, narratives, myths, stories, etc. assist to yoke stable configurations into projects with agential properties. Taking the approach that Jackson and Nexon propose would allow study of the relations and processes that form, stabilise, maintain and reproduce ‘entities’ such as ‘the state’. This would allow much greater insight into any changes noticed in the ‘state’ (rather than just insight into the changing attributes of the state) and also allow inquiry into how the agency of the state is (re)produced and for what purpose.

For example, in this dissertation a relational approach has allowed for a different understanding of the manner in which force is exercised by the British state.

Chapter 4 looks at the case study of the creation and continuing existence of a particular company, QinetiQ. This is understood, in a substantialist view, as an example of privatisation by the British state of a part of the Ministry of Defence that used to provide weapons design, purchasing and testing services to the British armed forces. In contrast, taking a relational approach reveals effects that are not captured by the term privatisation. For instance, QinetiQ was created by the British state, but in ways that are predicated on and thus reproduce closer relations between the state and that corporation. Further, numerous corporations were deeply engaged in the process of creating QinetiQ, from banks to consultancies and law firms. It is notable that the ‘market’ itself did not exist in this area, and the creation of QinetiQ was an (unsuccessful) state-led effort to create such a market. Since its formation, QinetiQ continues to be dependent on the British state, pointing to the ways in which it is not ‘just another corporation’ but rather continues to be in deep and mutually constitutive relations with the British state. These would not be visible, or would be seen as exceptions or distortions of the market, in any analysis that began with privatisation. The relational approach taken in Chapter 4 revels the underlying rationality of closer integration of corporations in the security practices of the state. Thus, the public-private divide, which is fundamental to the QinetiQ narrative set out in Chapter 4,

is being reproduced in new ways through the ongoing relations between the British state and QinetiQ. In the exercise of force, the boundary between the British state and QinetiQ is an internal one to the social order within which it is reproduced – the British state can no longer go to war without the concomitant activities of a ‘private’ actor. Further, the corporation itself is not only reproduced in its current form because of the British state, but is also organised in ways that make it increasingly more integral to the military activities of the state.

However, Jackson and Nexon’s approach to studying relations is, by itself, insufficient for the analyses of this dissertation. While they provide a very clear progression from processes through configurations to projects, and yoking as a means of explaining how projects are stabilised, Jackson and Nexon’s typology does not explain how to identify processes. Where should such an analysis begin? With what should an analysis into the relations that formed and continue to reproduce the British state and QinetiQ be empirically captured? One answer is by a focus on practices, which can be understood as the embodiment of relations, and therefore can offer insight into the constituted entities that undertake these practices. The next section now turns to practices, as the building blocks of the relations that this dissertation seeks to study – the relations between states and corporations in the field of security. By studying practices, the dissertation seeks to argue an alternative way of seeing the effects that other scholars have understood as privatisation, contracting, inefficiency, ineptitude, corruption, etc. The

dissertation begins with relations to reveal the rationality of closer state-corporate relations that both drives, and is constituted through, the practices observed.

3.4 Relations as practices

Having worked through the mainstream approaches in International Security that prioritise ontological objects, in particular the state, the previous section established the advantages of taking a relationalist approach to the study of International Relations in general, and particularly security. In following the methodological approach of Jackson and Nexon, it is possible to see what might otherwise be understood as ‘entities’, instead as projects, i.e. configurations of processes that are stabilised through the yoking of narratives to establish their agential properties. However, Jackson and Nexon do not set out how to determine where to start investigating the processes they identify. Thus, this section turns to practices as a means of capturing insights into relations, as crystallising them into something that can be empirically analysed. This section therefore clarifies what is meant by practices, before dealing with some of the ‘sympathetic critiques’ that have been offered about the ‘practice turn’ in IR. In particular, the dissertation addresses the criticism that practices need to be interpreted through a pre-conceived formulation of the ‘proper’ social and political order, by turning to governmentality, which will be discussed in section 5.

3.4.1 The practice turn

There has been a significant growth in scholarship that focuses on ‘practices’, which emerges independent of the substantialism / relationalism debate, yet tackles many of the same issues that the advocates of relationalism sought to address. Many scholars, especially those following the methods of analysis developed by key scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu or Michel Foucault, have studied practices, noting that “the questions of practice and action are the central questions to ask” (Bigo 2013, 123). Recently this scholarship has been expanded, leading to what Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot have termed the ‘practice turn’ in International Relations (2011a, 2011b). Advocates of the ‘practice turn’ claim that it helps to transcend the traditional dualisms in academia, for example, between structure and agency, stability and change, ideas and matter, etc (Adler and Pouliot 2011c). They see practices as the “basic feature of politics” (Cornut 2015, 1) such that “one can look at states, organisations, wars, social movements, class or event personhood as practices” (Andersen and Neumann 2012, 468). Put another way, those engaged in studying practice “zoom in on the quotidian unfolding of international life and analyse the ongoing accomplishments that, put together, constitute the ‘big picture’ of world politics” (Adler and Pouliot 2011a, 1).

It has been noted that “social action emerges from immanent practices” (Bigo 2013, 123) where practices are understood to be ‘immanent’ because

"social actions are not determined by a rational choice, by a conscious calculus. It certainly goes against a certain modern understanding of Western thought and is heterodox in that way as it discusses the priority of the individual agency, of its free will and proposes instead to begin with the middle, with the relations between (in)dividuals" (Bigo 2013, 123).

In other words, a focus on practices is to begin with relations, rather than with substantialist entities. However, what practices are remains to be clarified. Some note that "practices are not a level of analysis, depending on a choice of the analyst to begin with them. They are the waves or particles of the social universes. They are what is at stake in human lives and actions" (Bigo 2013, 125). This analogy, of practices as both waves and particles, echoes the comments by Jackson and Nexon discussed earlier, on the complementarity of substantialist and relationalist approaches. Practices therefore serve to crystallise intangible and constantly evolving relations, and can therefore be understood as the embodiment of relations. In other words, practices can serve as a snapshot of relations that are entangled, constantly moving and complex.

Alder and Pouliot (2011a, 2011b), who have been at the forefront of the recent scholarship on practices in International Relations, define practices as "socially meaning patterns of action which, in being performed more or less completely, simultaneously embody, act out and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world" (2011c, 6). This requires first, that patterns of action have meaning, which can only be understood when seen through the lens of the underlying social discourses and knowledges they reflect and

re/produce. Second, in saying practices are ‘performed’, Adler and Pouliot suggest not only that they involve doing or action, but also that they are social in that the ‘audience’ needs to understand the performance. Third, Adler and Pouliot see practices as being patterned, with regular occurrences over time (so they are not one off) (2011c, 7). Finally, they note that practices bring together the discursive and material worlds, and rely on, and reflect, shared background knowledges to do so.

There has been a proliferation of works that take a practice approach to theorise International Relations. For instance, scholars have studied security governance (Hönke and Müller 2012; Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014), security (Hansen 2011; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011a; Morgan 2011), diplomacy (Neumann 2002, 2012; Pouliot and Cornut 2015), and international organisations (Eagleton-Pierce 2013; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014; Hurd 2017; Sending and Neumann 2011; Voeten 2011) among other topics. An example of taking a practice approach is offered by Abrahamsen and Williams (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011a), with the authors pointing to the ways that security privatisation can be understood as being a result of numerous practices, including individual decisions about acquiring security through commercial arrangements, shifting moral registers, processes of responsibilization and commodification, and neoliberal public policy initiatives. Another example is Morgan’s study of deterrence as “an elaborate social endeavour rather than a set of very limited and very hostile

relationships of greatly detached actors” (2011, 168–69). In a similar line, this dissertation takes a practice approach to studying key security concepts of force (Chapter 4), resilience (Chapter 5), and peacebuilding (Chapter 6). However, unlike the scholars cited, these chapters address the core criticisms of the ‘practice turn’, which are discussed below.

3.4.2 A critique

Taking a practice approach is not without criticism. As discussed above, practices do not have any inherent meaning; they are the repetitive and normal habits which account for “what most of us do most of the time” (Hopf 2010, 547). Thus, they need not be conscious action on the part of the ‘practitioner’. However, given practices are understood as the “patterned nature of deeds in socially organised contexts” (Adler and Pouliot 2011c, 6), the nature of this pattern (the meaning) cannot be understood by investigating what is ‘in the mind’ of the practitioners. Thus, while practices are repetitive actions which have meaning, in order to understand the meaning, those actions need to be interpreted through social contexts. This is the main criticism of the practice turn that has been offered by ‘sympathetic critics’ (Duvall and Chowdhury 2011). While endorsing the potential of the practice turn for scholarship on international politics, Robert Duvall and Arjun Chowdhury raise questions around the subject, the meaning and the nature

of change which they argue need to be addressed by scholars undertaking a practice based approach to analysis.

Firstly, they focus on the subject of the turn, in particular the idea of ‘competent’ performances. The critique that Duvall and Chowdhury offer is that in focusing on ‘performances’, the theorists limit practices to the actions of doers (2011, 337–43).

Further, they argue that in focusing on the need for the performances to be ‘competent’, the scholars require the actions to have social recognition, which might miss subversive practices that are not recognised by the social context, such as those that cause revolutions. This leads to their second critique that practices need to have meaning, the criticism here being that “the meaning of practices may not be self-evident or transparent to their author or their recipient” (Duvall and Chowdhury 2011, 343). Thus, as Hopf (2010) noted, meaning cannot necessarily be ascribed to practices by asking practitioners. As Duvall and Chowdhury argue, a practice “enacts a certain discursive formation … brings it into existence, so to speak” (2011, 345). In other words, the practice is the embodiment of the relations within which it emerges. They use the example of workers striking, arguing that the “strike as practice is a statement that materialises the labor-capital struggle, bringing it into being” (2011, 345).

The proponents of the practice turn, Duvall and Chowdhury note, seem to rely on pre-existing frameworks to interpret practices. Whether practices are competent is a matter of social judgement, but that judgement is *only* possible on the basis of

pre-existing frames of understanding, which the relationalist approach seeks to avoid. Thus, these pre-existing frames get in the way of understanding practices, because they already prescribe what is being seen, rather than allowing what is occurring to be interpreted and theorised in its own right. As Bigo, who takes a post-structuralist approach has argued, “empirical research is about the knowledge of human practices and their reasons, and … theorisation comes from reflexivity towards them, not from an a priori dogmatic decision about the world done in an armchair” (2013, 123). Thus, Duvall and Chowdhury criticise the practice turn in IR for theorising practices based on what Bigo calls ‘a priori dogmatic decisions’. In other words, “practices have to be understood via an extended understanding of rationality or more exactly an understanding of plural rationalities or “reasons” which are always quite “practical reasons”” (Bigo 2013, 123).

The critique is not a call to abandon the turn to practices in IR, but rather to find a way to avoid limiting them even before they are studied. The question arises of how to interpret practices in the absence of a priori concepts – or rather, how to study practices and their effects without presupposing meaning. This dissertation turns to governmentality – taken up in the next section – precisely to overcome this challenge. Governmentality, offers a way to interpret practices in the absence of a pre-existing conceptualisation of the proper social and political order. This is precisely what Foucault set out to do when he developed the neologism, in that he

sought to theorise observed practices without being bound by pre-existing categories or frames.

Before turning to a substantive discussion of governmentality, it must be acknowledged that governmentality is not the only theoretical frame through which practices can be analysed. In particular, the work of Pierre Bourdieu offers a rich set of tools, as evidenced by the review of Bourdieu-inspired security scholarship in Chapter 2. Emerging from the different if sometimes overlapping questions that Foucault and Bourdieu were exploring, the conceptual tools and frameworks they respectively generated through and for studying practices have been deployed towards similarly different lines of inquiry by the scholars they've inspired. The following is a (very short) discussion of some of the key concepts in Bourdieu's work, and the kind of research that scholars who have been inspired by his approach and tools have undertaken, before concluding with a discussion of the differences between Bourdieu inspired and Foucault inspired approaches.

3.4.3 Bourdieu-inspired analysis

In seeking to move beyond the structure-agency dichotomy, Bourdieu began with a focus practices as a way to understand the intertwined mechanics constitutive of both (see for instance 1977, 1990). Bourdieu argued that the distinction between (in his words) 'mechanism' and 'finalism' is a 'false dilemma', instead calling for

the abandonment of theories that treat practice as a mechanical reaction to structure, and of those that reduce action to agency alone (1977, 72-73). Bourdieu sought instead to uncover the structures of the social worlds and the mechanisms that ensure their reproduction, or contribute to their transformation through the actions of agents (Reay 2004). To this end, he developed three important concepts, namely habitus, fields and social capital, geared towards different sorts of analytical inquiry.

The *habitus* is “a generative schema in which the forms of elemental social structures come, through the process of socialisation, to be embedded into individuals, with the result that people necessarily act in such a way that the underlying structures are reproduced and given effect” (Nash 1999, 177). The habitus then, serves to “demonstrate the ways in which not only is the body in the social world, but also the ways in which the social world is in the body” (Reay 2004, 432 citing Bourdieu 1981). The habitus reflects the history of the group and is acquired through formative experiences. It bridges the agency/structure divide because “habitus is internalised structure and the physical embodiment of objective structure” (Nash 1999, 184). Practices, then, are generated by a habitus (by definition) and at the same time practices “give evidence of the structures of the habitus that generates them, and it follows that the methodological problem for a researcher working with the concept of habitus is to analyse social practices

in such a way that the principles of the generative habitus are disclosed” (Nash 1999, 178).

While habitus is an important concept in explaining the re/production of social order (reproduction of class being Bourdieu’s focus), the most widely deployed concepts in security studies have been *field* and *capital* (though it is important to stress that these concepts apply within the broader Bourdieusian framework which includes habitus). *Field* refers to the social space of contestation within which the “positions of social actors, and the relations between these positions” can be located relative to each other, where the relational nature of the positions are important because all social attributes, privileges, and powers – ‘capitals’ in the theory of fields – are also relative (Bigo et al. 2007, 9). Thus the social position of one actor or institution within the field – space of contestation - depends on the capitals held by other institutions or actors, and given the complexity of the social world, multiple positioning systems and struggles over diverse types of capitals can be in operation at any point. The *field* therefore refers to “a specific social space structured by struggles over a specific capital determining part of what is at stake in these struggles” (Bigo et al. 2007, 9). As Bourdieu notes “the structure of the field … depends at every moment on the forms of capital engaged in struggle over their respective weights within the structure” (Wacquant 1993, 24). Thus, the field is a specific point or place of struggle over various forms of capital. Conversely, it is possible to identify and understand the relative positions of different actors and

the different capitals over which they struggle by beginning analysis with the field.

While Bourdieu focused exclusively on domestic issues in his scholarly work, an increasing number of scholars have started to apply utilize his conceptual and analytical tools to the study of phenomena of concern to International Relations (Adler-Nissen 2012). As Rebecca Adler-Nissen argues, international relations scholars can “rediscover the everyday practices, symbolic structures and arenas of conflict that bring many actors into perspective, rather than just focusing on nation states that produce … international politics. … Bourdieu allows us to explore how people create international relations in their daily activities” (2012, 1). The focus on relations has enabled different insights into various aspects of international politics, from diplomacy to foreign policy (Neumann 2002; Hopf 1998), and in relation to international security, scholars have used Bourdieu’s concepts to analyse diverse phenomena such as the role of (in)security professionals (Bigo 2006, 2012), the role of identity politics (Huysmans 2002), and the role of private contractors in defining security (Leander 2005b) (see also the discussions in Chapter 2). Trine Berling for instance takes IR scholarship to task for failing to understand European security after the Cold War, arguing that a “Bourdieuian reformulation adds new types of agency, focuses on the social production of forms of power, and stresses the processual rather than the substantive character of social reality” (2012, 451). She posits that European

security should be seen as a “field of struggle in which power is unevenly distributed”, in which the field is determined by the “the struggle … over the right to define European security in the face of the loss of the central demarcating enemy , the Soviet Union” (Berling 2012, 463, 465). She sets out the ways in which capital could serve as ways to access agency and to understand the relative positions of agents in the hierarchy of the field. As she notes “capital [provides] a prism through which to see the patterns of practice in the field and the boundaries surrounding it” (Berling 2012, 473).

Bourdieu-inspired scholars seek to understand the power configurations and contestations that can explain how certain outcomes emerge in certain specific locations (i.e. in a *field*). That is, they explore outcomes and decisions that cannot be explained in terms of material power (see, for instance, discussion of dynamics at the WTO in Eagleton-Pierce, 2013). In so doing, they identify the capital(s) being contested, and the levels of agency and authority available to the different actors in the field under analysis. While the concept of field allows encompassing of actors and practices in ways that are not constrained by *a priori* (e.g. substantialist) assumptions of states and corporations, for example, the analytical focus is on explaining outcomes (of contestations) in the field, and not on the wider transformative consequences of these practices and outcomes.

The work of Didier Bigo is illustrative in this regard as he has used both the Foucauldian concept of governmentality and the Boudieusian concept fields to

explore the practices of security agents in the European Union, but to ask very different questions.

In using a governmentality approach, Bigo seeks to ask, for example, why “despite the many critical discourses that have drawn attention to the securitization of migration ..., the articulation of migration as a security problem continues” (2002, 64). As he goes on to elaborate:

“What are the reasons [for] the persistent framing of migration in relation to terrorism, crime, unemployment and religious zealotry, on the one hand, and to integration, interest of the migrant for the national economy development, on the other, rather than in relation to new opportunities for European societies, for freedom of travel over the world, for cosmopolitanism, or for some new understanding of citizenship?” (2002, 64).

Thus, in this work, what Bigo is interested in is how particular discourses come to dominate such that the issue continues to be understood (and policy made) on the basis of the security concerns around migration. Though Bigo is empirically working on the “transnational field of professionals in the management of unease”, what he is actually interested in is the “multiple discursive practices ... as well as the heterogeneity of the nondiscursive practices as part of the same ‘dispositif’ (legal devices, political rhetoric, police practices, surveillance technologies, discourses on human rights, resistances of actors, and so on) in order to understand the articulation of knowledge and power relations” (Bigo 2002, 84). Thus, he uses

governmentality to focus on how power/knowledge relations transform the wider (security) management of migration.

In other work, however, Bigo is more interested in focusing on the “convergence of defence and internal security into interconnected networks, or into a “field” of professionals of management of unease” (2006, 110). In this article, his focus is on showing how there is “a *single* strategy that unifies different groups of professionals at the transnational level” and thus to engage with the “anonymous multiple struggles” that contribute to global domination of security practices and discourses that he identifies (Bigo 2006, 110–11 emphasis in original). More precisely, Bigo’s interest is in mapping the ways in which the ‘professional managers of unease’ establish their authority – in other words, the contestations over these issues. (Thus, these two works by Bigo, while empirically focussed on the same set of practices, are asking very different sets of questions, albeit potentially complementary ones.) In yet other work that uses the theory of fields, Bigo is part of a project mapping EU security agencies (see Bigo et al. 2007 for a discussion of the project). The scholars involved seek to account for “the boundaries and hierarchies that structure relations between professionals of security, while avoiding the pitfalls of the exclusively institutional, sectoral or national approaches”. Their interest is to analyse “the interdependencies between different professionals (police, military, customs, judges, border-guards etc.)”

while acknowledging the ways in which the field is “a bordered and fragmented social space” (Bigo et al. 2007, 8).

These examples of work by a prominent security scholar well illustrate the differences between a Bourdieusian approach and a Foucauldian governmentality approach; the central one being the analytical purposes to which they are deployed. In the first, the questions being posed begin by identifying a *field* and then analysing the contestations and the kind of capital that determines power configurations (see for instance the arguments made by Berling 2012 discussed in Chapter 2). The epistemological focus is on “the struggles, the relations and positions structuring the field” (Bigo et al 2007, 9). Indeed, it was a criticism made by Bourdieu of Foucault that he (Foucault) focused on *modus operatum*, rather than *modus operandi* (cited in Callewaert 2017), pointing to Bourdieu’s deeper interest in the causes of the phenomenon (outcomes) observed and the essential factors – capitals – that contributed to these and the struggles that shaped it, rather than to broader questions of how these outcomes are co-constitutive of the re/production or transformation of wider social order. As illustrated by Bigo’s work, a Foucauldian governmentality framework is well suited to exploring such questions.

Thus, were a Bourdieu-inspired analysis to be applied to the empirical phenomena studied in this dissertation, the questions asked would be different to those currently posed. A Bourdieu inspired approach would focus on a given field (for

example, comprising resilience specialists in UK, or those engaged in decisions about the appropriate arrangements for the UK's exercise of military force) and identifying, through reference to outcomes of the contestations in it, the struggles in that field that might reveal the sorts of capital being contested; that is, such analysis would be interested in the relations and positions that structure the field and mark its boundaries, periphery, centre, etc. In contrast, a Foucauldian governmentality approach begins with constitutive discourses and seeks to identify the ways in which political questions have been made technical so as to excavate the underlying political rationality embodied in transformation of governance (e.g. of a 'resilient UK' or an 'efficient British military'). In adopting just such an approach, the purpose of this dissertation is precisely to understand the broader implications of such circulating political rationalities for social order, with particular to the transformation of state-corporate relations and state and corporate forms, enacted by discourses of security.

3.5 Governmentality

While Foucault coined the term governmentality in the 1970s, research using his methods and ideas began flourishing in the 1990s. Most of the scholars who turned to governmentality were sociologists (for example Nicholas Rose, Peter Miller, Graham Burchill, Colon Gordon, and Andrew Barry), interested in studying the phenomenon of neoliberalism. Foucault himself was also interested in liberalism

and neoliberalism, and his development of governmentality centred on these political rationalities. Significantly, Foucault was actively seeking to avoid reliance on what he termed ‘totalising theories’, and instead sought to explain liberalism and neoliberalism through observation of concrete practices, rather than relying on an a priori account of liberalism or neoliberalism as theory or philosophy (2007). The sociologists whose work are the genesis of governmentality studies in diverse disciplines were similarly particularly interested how the ideas, logics and calculations integral to ‘neoliberalism’ become widespread so quickly and especially in social areas seemingly beyond the activities of the state (Rose and Miller 1992; Rose 1996; Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996a).

Governmentality is the study of the means of producing social and political order that is not reliant on or directly consequent to state action. By looking at practices, governmentality scholars seek to establish the rationalities that are revealed through those activities, and which shape social order without having to rely on conscious (e.g. ideologically committed) action on the part of the practitioner. As noted above, this scholarship arose mainly out a desire among sociologists to understand how society and the welfare state in what they called advanced liberal democracies or post-industrial states (Rose 1996) changed so quickly to adopt neoliberal practices. They were interested in how problems were recast to make new solutions and new ways of being imaginable that were commensurate with a particular ideal of social order. For instance, the change in subjectivities from

unemployed to job-seekers, the reimagining of parents as ‘responsible’ in governing children, the reinvention of the citizen as an entrepreneurial individual and ‘customer’ of the state, all altered the governing problems to be solved and the solutions available to address them. These were not driven by state activities (alone), but rather taken up by diverse non-state actors and indeed individual citizens. In short, with a focus on how the production of social order advanced rapidly in the realm *beyond* the state, governmentality offered a way to study the forms of power and rationalities that drove these new problems, identities, behaviours, etc.

A main critique of the practice turn, as identified earlier, was that practices need to be ‘competent’ in that they need to have social meaning. However, the question of how practices are to be theorised without pre-existing theories of good social order remains unanswered in the practice turn literature. Governmentality is precisely the rejection of a prior (‘grand’) theories, with emphasis instead on the specifics of concrete practices:

“I believe precisely that the forms of totalization offered by politics are always, in fact, very limited. I am attempting, to the contrary, apart from any *totalization* – which would be at once *abstract* and *limiting* – to *open up* problems that are as *concrete* and *general* as possible, problems that approach politics from behind and cut across societies on the diagonal, problems that are at once constituents of our history and constituted by that history” (Foucault 1984, 375–76 emphasis in original).

Governmentality scholars avoid presuppositions about what is being analysed (Valverde 1996), on the basis that these are based on overarching ('global' or 'totalising') theories and would prove to be a hindrance to research. Instead, like Foucault, they seek to generate a "localized, non-centralized kind of theoretical production, one ... whose validity is not dependent on the approval of established regimes of thought" (Foucault 1980, 81). Governmentality based inquiry seeks to achieve a "shattering of conventional thought that strikes at the heart of our most taken for granted motivations" (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996b, 6).

This section sets out some of the key conceptual terminology that is used when taking a governmentality approach. It then explains the three ways in which Foucault himself used the term 'governmentality' – as a form of power, as a political rationality, and as an analytical tool. This leads to the penultimate section of this chapter, which discusses neoliberalism as a governmentality.

3.5.1 Key terms in governmentality scholarship

Because he was developing a methodology for developing theory by studying practices (i.e. inductively theorising), Foucault developed a vocabulary along with his methodology. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify some key terms, in particular, government and political rationality.

‘Government’ does not refer to the political processes of the state. Rather, for Foucauldian scholars, governing refers to *any* “form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon 1991, 2). The power to govern is not about states and governments, and governing is not about institutions or structures, but rather about the ways in which anyone has an influence over someone else’s conduct – i.e. ‘government’ refers to the “conduct of conduct” (Walters and Haahr 2005, 290; Foucault 1991; Gordon 1991). This can be about the priest being able to influence how a parishioner behaves, or a teacher setting the rules for a student, or a captain managing a ship, but it also includes the ways in which individuals govern themselves (Walters and Haahr 2005, 289; Gordon 1991). In particular, it refers to the ways in which the ‘conduct of conduct’ is managed, such that the population manages itself, independent of state action, towards an ideal of social order. Foucault argues that:

“what government has to do with is not territory but rather a complex composed of men (sic) and things. The things with which in this sense government is to be concerned are in fact *men*, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory ...; men in their relation to that other kind of things, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, etc.; lastly men in their relation to that other kind of things, accident and misfortunes, such as famines, epidemics, death, etc.” (1991, 93).

Therefore, government is “a right manner of disposing of disposing things so as to lead ... to an end which is ‘convenient’ for the things that are to be governed,” (Foucault 1991, 95), that is, a given ideal of social order. Consequently, a

“Foucauldian approach draws attention to how subjects are created in different places and at different times” (Raco 2003, 78), where subjects refers to those individuals who are not always coerced or disciplined, but of their own volition engage in activity that is in line with the governing rationality. Importantly for Foucault, this was about governing *through* the freedoms that an individual or collective had, rather than by controlling them (Rose 1999). In other words, it is not about controlling populations or individuals, and limiting their freedoms, but making freedoms be about acting according to prevalent rationalities. It is this governing political rationality – the govern-mentality – that Foucauldian scholars seek to excavate. The idea of political rationality is discussed in more detail below, as one of the ways in which Foucault used the term.

3.5.2 Governmentality and social order

Governmentality is “a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government … capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable to both its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced” (Gordon 1999, 3). This is the first way in which Foucault uses the word, as a form of productive power that operates independent of a governor.

Apart from a few exceptions, much analysis of power focuses on power as either a possession or an instrument (see for instance Lukes 1986; Barnett and Duvall

2005). Conventional analysis generally begins with a focus on the actor or entity that owns, controls or exercises power and then proceeds to assess how it operates. This is also true of institutional approaches which, while they move away from ownership or control, still take for granted the existence of the entities which are both constrained and enabled by a given set of rules, norms and decision-making procedures. In using governmentality, Foucault was attempting to theorise beyond these understandings of power. For Foucault, power is ubiquitous:

Power is everywhere: not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. ... Power is not an institution, nor a structure, nor a possession. It is the name we give to a complex strategic situation in a particular society (1990, 93).

Power is a central theme in Foucault's work. However, he approaches it through the empirical study of issues such as sexuality, discipline or madness, as his focus is not on some abstract idea of power, but rather on "the special cases in which relatively stable *power configurations* can be identified" (Hindess 2006, 116, emphasis added). It is in such a context that a governmentality framework become indispensable. However, taking a governmentality approach is not to deny the salience of rules and norms, which may themselves co-constitute governmental relations, but is rather to refuse methodologically to assume in advance the nature of the entities or relations produced through the practices studied. Power is not given but rather is an effect of governmentality – it is not given any analytic or ontological priority (this is located with the practices themselves) thus avoiding

the typical assumption of power as a substance, whether as possession, instrument, or institutional arrangement.

Foucault identifies that social order works through three different forms of power, which he referred to as sovereignty, discipline and governmentality. Sovereign power refers to the ability of the state to dictate action by proscribing or mandating – i.e. by making illegal and by threatening with loss of freedom or life if the appropriate actions are not forthcoming. Disciplinary power is when the object of governance makes a rational decision to behave in certain ways based on the incentives and disincentives on offer – that is rather than dictating the appropriate action, it is induced through a mix of sanctions and rewards.

Governmental power is when discipline is internalised, such that the subject behaves according to the rationality, even in the absence of a direct link to disciplinary mechanisms. This power has no clear separation between governed and governing, but rather ‘circulates’ among the population, and it is the effects of this circulating power that Foucault was interested in capturing. It must be noted that Foucault did not see these three forms of power as a progression or temporally distinct, but rather as all operating at the same time. While accepting that sovereign and disciplinary power exist alongside governmental power, studying governmentality is about moving beyond focusing on the state and seeing power as being centred in it, to understanding power as ‘circulating’ among the population that is being governed.

Consequently, governmentality inquiry is an attempt to move the study of government from the institutional centres of power to the ‘techniques of power’.

As Colin Gordon explains:

State theory attempts to deduce the modern activities of government from essential properties and propensities of the state, in particular its supposed propensity to grow and swallow up or colonize everything outside itself. Foucault holds that the state has no inherent propensities; more generally, the state has no essence. The nature of the institution of the state is, Foucault thinks, a function of changes in practices of government [i.e. governing conduct], rather than the converse. Political theory attends too much to institutions, and too little to practices (1991, 4, insert added).

As can be seen, this argument is similar to that made by other scholars discussed above such as Mitchell (1991), Emirbayer (1997) and Jackson and Nexon (1999). This is that by beginning with the state, scholars miss the ways the state itself is shaped by practices. To paraphrase Gordon on Foucault’s thinking, substantivist scholars fail to see that the state is the result of changing governmental practices, instead analysing government practices as changing as a result of alterations in ‘the state’. (This point is further discussed below, in relation to the ‘governmentalisation of the state’).

3.5.3 Governmentality as political rationality

The second way in which Foucault uses governmentality is to refer to the political rationality that informs the practices of ‘governing at a distance’. Here

governmentality refers to the rationality of governance, the “relation between government and thought” (Dean 1999, 19). As discussed above, Foucault was not interested in investigating if practices conformed to some existing grand theory, but rather sought to “discover which kind of rationality they are using,” (Foucault 1981, 226 cited in Lemke 2002, 55). A political rationality is not “pure, neutral knowledge which simply "represents" the governed reality” but rather is “an element of government itself which helps to create a discursive field in which exercising power is “rational”” (Lemke 2002, 55). In other words, it is not about seeing if practices conform to a pre-existing formulation of right conduct, but rather investigating actions to see what rationality they conform to and therefore how right conduct can be understood through the effects of those activities.

In this sense, governmentality has also been referred to as the “mentalities of government” (Dean 1999, 16), which can be disaggregated into the “collective, relatively-bounded form of thought in which individuals and groups are typically immersed” (Walters and Haahr 2005, 290). Because they are immersed in it, it is rarely “readily examined by those who inhabit it” (Dean 1999, 16). This addresses a point raised earlier about the immersion of practitioners in their everyday activities (see Hopf 2010 in section 3 above). In an approach that seeks to understand the political rationality, practitioners do not need to espouse or believe in the rationality, as what is being studied is not their belief. Rather, it is the effects of their actions, which might be in line with beliefs, but can also be counter

to them. Scholars of political rationalities focus on “the knowledge that is part of the practices, the systematization and “rationalization” of a pragmatics of guidance” (Lemke 2002, 55). Rationality here refers to the historic processes through which practices make sense (are rational), not to some ahistoric conceptual framework. As Foucault notes:

One isn’t assessing things in terms of an absolute against which they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they play within them, because it’s true that ‘practices’ don’t exist without a certain regime of rationality (Foucault 1991, 79).

Thus, it is not about practices being judged against how they conform to an ideal, but rather taking the observed practices seriously in their own right and seeking to excavate the underlying rationality, that both drives, and is produced through, those practices. Understanding the relationship between practices and rationalities in this way leads to moving beyond pre-formed ontological frameworks and explanations, and allowing the consequences of the practices to be taken seriously in their own right.

Importantly, in this light, no rationality is ever completely successful, because it is a constant contestation between the various practices and rationalities. Moreover, the scholarship itself turns away from totalising or global projects (Dean 1999, 34–38). Thus, scholars see a governmental rationality as one that is always contested

and requires effort to be reproduced. Separately, but relatedly, actions may serve more than one rationality. Mike Raco (2003) for instance, in tracing the role of the Scottish business community in the independence question, shows how the government sought out business opinion and institutionalised their interests to further a rationality of Scottish independence. However, when viewed through the light of the analysis in this dissertation, it also illustrates the advance of a rationality of closer state-corporate relations in the pursuit of an ideal of social order. Thus, references to the ways in which “the views of business have been actively sought out” and the launch of the “Pathfinders initiative . . . to provide Scottish business with an opportunity to draw up a business agenda for the new Parliament” (MacDonald 1999, 3 cited in Raco 2003, 83) are in keeping with the practices analysed in the case studies that follow in the next three chapters.

Further, as this shows, it is not a matter of a single rationality operating at any one time. Moreover, to study a political rationality is not presume that it is relentlessly advancing such that the ideal of social order will be successfully achieved; it is anticipated that goals will be unevenly achieved and resisted, and that programmes will be appropriated or subverted. Thus, this is not about seeking an overarching or totalising explanation of rule, but rather about understanding what the different logics and contestations are. As has been noted, it is not the “*extent* of the rule, but the rationality and practices of effecting rule . . . that

governmentality studies are most concerned with” (Nadarajah 2010, 39 emphasis in original).

Thus, one understanding of governmentality is as a political rationality – ‘a mentality of governing’ – that underlies action. A rationality of government is “a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern, what governing is, what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable to both its practitioners and to those upon whom it is practiced” (Gordon 1991, 3). Those engaged in that activity do not need to believe in or subscribe to that rationality (as say an ideology might work), but their actions will nonetheless have the effect of furthering that rationality. In light of this, rationalities are always contested and contentious, such that it is always an ongoing project, one which never completely succeeds.

3.5.4 Governmentality as methodology

The third and final sense in which Foucault uses governmentality is in reference to the tools and methodology through which a rationality can be excavated. Any methodology using Foucauldian tools is not about a theory of the world, or some mythical worldview, but rather is about the ethos with which the investigation is being conducted (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996b). Observations are not made on the basis of some preconceived idea that they are the culmination of some grand

historical process, but rather the issues being studied are investigated to identify how they come to appear the way they do. Thus, “the coherence with which the present presents itself to us ... is something to be *acted upon* ..., to be cut up and decomposed so that it can be seen as put together contingently out of heterogeneous elements, each having their own conditions of possibility” (Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996, 5). In other words, a reason for utilising Foucauldian tools is to investigate current practices to destabilise them, rather than to seek some historic or self-evident reasoning for them. Therefore, this provides an ideal tool for interpreting practices, and especially practices that are concerned with the relations between politics and economics and the ‘right’ social and political order.

It is worth noting that governmentality can be used alongside other grand theories, depending on the questions being posed. For example, Tanya Li ‘complemented’ Foucault’s ideas with Marxist and Gramscian thought, as well as anthropological field work to study two centuries of attempts to shape livelihoods, landscapes and identities in Indonesia. She makes clear that she “tolerate[s] the untidiness and tension introduced by different theoretical traditions because of the distinct questions they pose and the tools they offer to guide my analysis” (Li 2007, 19). Thus, it is the questions being asked that determine the tools selected in this approach. As a tool to analyse power and rationalities, the focus is on “ascertaining how, and to what extent, the state is articulated into the activity of government: what relations are established between political and other authorities; what funds,

forces, persons, knowledge or legitimacy are utilised; and by means of what devices and techniques are these different tactics made operable” (Rose and Miller 1992, 177). Scholars seek to understand the rationality – “the schemata for representing reality, analysing it, and rectifying it” (Rose and Miller 1992, 179) – that drives the practices of governing not only individuals, but also other entities within and beyond the state (Larner and Walters 2004).

In a governmentality approach, practices of government are not straight forward things that can be understood as an expression of a principle or as forming totalities that can be understood by studying their parts. Rather, “they should be approached as composed of heterogenous elements having diverse historical trajectories, as polymorphous in their internal and external relations, and as bearing upon a multiple and wide range of problems and issues” (Dean 1999, 29).

This means that governmental practices bring together many elements that seem disparate, but serve to further a common rationality. Governmentality as a methodology is about analysing these disparate practices to excavate the common rationality. This dissertation for instance brings together practices of resilience, arrangements around the exercise of force, and activities around peacebuilding to reveal a common rationality of closer state-corporate relations that underlies and is formed through quotidian practices in each issue area.

The methodology for studying governmentalities has been termed an ‘analytics of government’ (Dean 1999). It begins with the identification of ‘problematizations’

and includes four dimensions that ought to be examined. Problematizations are the specific situations in which the ‘conduct of conduct’ becomes a problem – they are “the calling into question of how we shape or direct our own and others’ conduct” (Dean 1999, 27). Problematizations are made “on the basis of particular regimes of practices of government, with particular techniques, language, grids of analysis and evaluation, forms of knowledge and expertise” (Dean 1999, 28). This means that investigation does not begin with “any substantive or a priori understanding of its status” (Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996, 4) but instead with questions about the conduct of those involved in the matter being studied. In other words, investigations of problematizations begin with practices.

Problematisations themselves are the problems that observers see with the social order and the solutions that emerge to address them. They have been defined as an account of the ways that scholars “have measured the real against the ideal and found it wanting” (Rose and Miller 1992, 181). For instance, Rose and Miller trace the problematisations of the welfare state to “the declining birthrate; delinquency and anti-social behaviour; the problem family; the social consequences of ill health and the advantages conferred by a healthy population; and the integration of citizens into the community” (1992, 192). They note that these were not novel problems, “but in the post-war period they were to be problematized by a multitude of official and unofficial experts and, crucially, were to be governed in new ways” (Rose and Miller 1992, 192).

Thus, problematisations are about a way to think of political questions in technical terms so that they become manageable, and suggest certain solutions based on the underlying rationality. For instance, in the case of resilience (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5), the problem is one of a system unable to cope because there are too many parts with too responsibility too widely spread. Critical infrastructure, for instance, is owned and managed by private actors who have to be cajoled and convinced into contributing towards their defence, for they cannot be coerced. This understanding of state security as complex and responsibility as being dispersed leads to problems of how to overcome the distance between the relevant parts. This in turn leads to a solution that brings the separate parts together, thereby making closer state-corporate relations the solution to problems of how to build resilient critical infrastructure.

The four dimensions of the analytics are “the fields of visibility”, “the technical aspects”, understanding practices as a “rational and thoughtful activity” and the “formation of identities” (Dean 1999, 20-38). The first, ‘fields of visibility’, is about asking questions regarding what is made visible, and more importantly, what is obscured, in the focus currently taken. The example generally cited is pictorial maps, which highlight certain aspects and obscure others, but fields of visibility do not have to be pictorial: they can, for instance, refer to the focus on the state in security studies, that serves to obscure the significant contributions of corporations to all aspects of security. The second dimension refers to studying the technical

mechanisms, procedures, techniques, instruments, tactics, technologies, and vocabulary of the object of analysis. An implication of this approach is that it contests “those models of government that wish to view it solely – or even mainly – as a manifestation of values, ideologies worldviews, etc.” (Dean 1999, 31). As Dean notes, however, this is not to reduce government to something that is purely technical, but rather to say that the *techne* of government is “necessary, somewhat autonomous and irreducible” (Dean 1999, 31). For instance, in this dissertation, the technologies include the meetings, reports, agreements, arrangements, actors, and plans that exist around responses to crises in telecommunications (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5).

The third dimension refers to approaching the practices as rational and thoughtful. This concerns the thoughts, knowledges and expertise that arise from and inform the practices of governing, what Dean (1995) calls the *episteme* of government. These are ‘rational and thoughtful’ in that they make sense from within the governing rationality and therefore are logical within it. Shunning a social realism that “simply describes or analyses what exists, or how practices work” governmental approaches seek the questions, plans, know-how, visions, objectives (Dean 1999, 31–32) that are driven by the rationality and emerge to shape it. For instance, in the case of the welfare state, it “can be understood less as a concrete set of institutions and more as a way of viewing institutions, practices and personnel, of organising them in relation to a specific ideal of government” (Dean

1999, 32). Thus, in this dimension, a governmentality approach is about seeking the logical ideas and knowledges that reveal, and shape, the ideal that underpins the rationality.

The fourth, and final, dimension then is the identities that are formed through, and shape, these engagements and practices. The analyst should ask questions about “what forms of person, self and identify are presupposed by different practices of government and what sorts of transformations do these practices seek?” What statuses, capacities, attributes and orientations are assumed of those who exercise authority … and those who are to be governed? What forms of conduct are expected of them?” (Dean 1999, 32). Dean notes that regimes “do not *determine* forms of subjectivity. They elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents” (1999, 32). For instance, Mike Raco (2003) points to the Scottish identities that have formed through, and influence the devolution and independence debates in that country, particularly with regards to the business community. This emerges out of a problematisation of needing business support for Scottish independence. This dissertation for instance shows how states and corporations are transformed into partners working together under this rationality. Corporate representatives become convenors of emergency meetings (that a conventional analysis would see as being led by the state) or the architects of resilience building practices (as discussed in Chapter 5).

As Dean concludes the:

“four dimensions of government presuppose one another. However, they are not reducible to one another. They are each relatively autonomous and it would be erroneous to reduce a regime of practice to any one of its dimensions. Transformation of regimes of practices may take place along each or any of these axes, and transformation along one axis may entail transformations in others” (1999, 33).

Finally, governmentality scholars often focus on discourse – text, documents, etc.

However,

“if [governmentality] exhibits an interest in discourse, this is less for the reason of factoring it in as one more explanatory variable but instead denaturalising many of the terms that we might otherwise take for granted. Making these terms *stand out*, *making them less familiar*, is a necessary precondition for thinking and acting otherwise” (Walters and Haahr 2005, 291 emphasis added).

This is in keeping with what this dissertation seeks to do – it seeks to draw attention to terms like ‘partnership’ and show, by drawing attention to the practices that surround them, that these are not mere rhetoric, pretext, or hyperbole, but rather suggestive of a deeper rationality that underlies the actions and discourses documented.

Thus, governmentality serves as a useful method for interpreting practises without beginning with pre-existing ideas about their meaning. While most of the governmentality literature does not study the state, it is important to remember that the rationality of governing influences the state just as much as it does society. Foucault talks about the “governmentalisation of the state” (cited in Dean

1999, 102). By this he refers to the ways in which the state is just as much a result of the governmental power and influenced by, and influencing governmental rationalities as any other ‘entity’, be it the citizen, society, individual, corporation, etc.

As discussed above, governmentality as a methodology is concerned with analysing disparate practices co-constitutive of order-making to excavate the desired ‘ends of rule’ being pursued, and thus, the shared rationality of rule. The empirical requirement for the researcher is to identify the precise practices that are salient for a given phenomenon. For this dissertation, the requirement is to identify relevant practices in the three security domains under study – i.e. the exercise of military force; resilience; and peacebuilding – through which state-corporate relations, and the state and corporate forms, are being re-produced. An ethnographic approach may have been appropriate, but inevitably, difficulties exist in acquiring sufficient levels of access for observation and interview. However, on the other hand, such access was not critical for the analysis undertaken in two of these three cases (i.e. exercise of military force and resilience) as the central relevant practices have been well documented, both as a matter of routine in the processes by which these relevant reconfiguration of state-corporate relations came about, and also in detailed evaluations of these processes in subsequent years. In addition, key details of relevant practices are produced in statements, reports, etc. by the relevant corporations and state actors.

For example, the UK's creation of a private sector partner – QinetiQ – in reorganising its exercise of force (Chapter 4) and the long drawn out process had both been well documented, and been subject to a review by the National Audit Office. With respect to the UK's efforts towards (infrastructure) 'resilience' (Chapter 5), government plans, agreements, instructions for how to structure and conduct crisis meetings, etc. were also accessible. However, in the third case under study - peacebuilding (Chapter 6) - important information was not easily accessible (e.g. only to be found in the form of confidential contracts). Consequently, the practices under study there were identified through interviews and participant-observation conducted in Washington DC in the offices of a leading USAID contractor, which also assisted my research by identifying relevant (publically accessible, if not easily locatable) documents. In the first two cases however, the extensive documents available made it possible to build a thorough and detailed account of key practices, and thus to excavate the rationalities embedded therein, without the need for extensive interviews. To clarify, undoubtedly interviews with participants in the key processes would have enriched the empirical basis for the research, but the extent of available material is sufficient for confidence in the findings presented in this dissertation. Moreover, although the analysis presented in this dissertation relies on such texts, these are not treated as self-evident descriptions, but rather critically examined to identify the ways in which state-corporate relations, and state and corporate forms, are

being re/constituted in different domains of security, and thus to build the overall argument of the dissertation.

A governmentality approach offers a tool by which to begin with practices and interpret them in their own right, rather than understanding them and their ‘competence’ through a pre-formed lens. Before turning to how this approach leads to the argument in this dissertation, it is necessary to mention neoliberalism and some of the literature around it. In the modern age, it is not possible to discuss state and corporations without having some concept of the role of neoliberalism. However, as the next section notes, neoliberalism is insufficient to explaining the security practices the empirical cases in this dissertation point to. This is because neoliberalism has become too broad a phrase, capturing too much to explain the specifics of the practices, many aspects of which are contrary to what might otherwise be understood as core elements of neoliberalism.

3.6 Neoliberalism

In a 1964 court case on ‘hard pornography’, US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart is cited as saying that it might not be possible to capture all the definitions of ‘obscenity’, but “I know it when I see it,” (Nawi 2001). Similarly, while neoliberalism defies definition, it is nonetheless an intrinsic part of contemporary life, especially in post-industrial, or advanced liberal countries. While the rise of neoliberalism is popularly traced to the governments of Ronald Reagan in the US

and Margaret Thatcher in the UK, some scholars argue it predates this, to the ideas of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek in the 1940s, the order imposed on West Germany after WWII, and to trials in Chile in the 1970s (Harvey 2005; Foucault 2007). The practices grouped under the rubric of ‘neoliberalism’ are broad, wide-ranging and sometimes contradictory (see Eagleton-Pierce 2016 for a discussion of the contradictions within key concepts; see also Venugopal 2015). This makes defining neoliberalism hard, with little clear understanding of what it is or what it is supposed to be. Nonetheless, while this dissertation is not about neoliberalism *per se*, but rather about specific rationalities of closer state-corporate relations revealed by a focus on security practices, no discussion of corporations in the contemporary era is possible without saying how it relates to neoliberalism. This section sets out a short discussion of neoliberalism and its defining features, before moving to problematise this with reference to the range of practices and issues that get grouped under the term.

3.6.1 Definitional issues

The lack of scholarly agreement on what neoliberalism is points to the difficulties in capturing it. Following Marx’s analysis of capitalism, neoliberalism has been labelled “capitalism on steroids” (Clawson 2008, 208). While some argue it comes in ‘waves’, with the current version being ‘neoliberalism 3.0’ (Hendrikse and Sidaway 2010), others suggest it is “the most successful ideology in world history”

(P. Anderson 2000, 13; but see also Mudge 2008). There are so many definitions of neoliberalism that it has been called a ‘rascal concept’, in that it is “promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested” (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010, 184; Clarke 2008). It has also been categorised as a “grab-bag of ideas based on the fundamentalist notion that markets are self-correcting, allocate resources efficiently, and serve the public interest well” (Stiglitz 2008). The point here is not to debate these difficulties, but rather to indicate how unhelpful neoliberalism has become as a concept. Neoliberalism can now refer to everything or to nothing, and thus it “might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes” (C. Barnett 2005, 10).

The term ‘neoliberalism’ can be understood in a number of ways, including as a set of ideas, as a policy formulation, as an ideology, as a project or as a political rationality. At its simplest, neoliberalism is understood as a set of ideas about freedom of choice and market logics as being the most efficient way to organise life. In this light, the aim is to “produce optimal economic outcomes … based on efficiencies produced by market applications” (Burchill 1996, 18), and markets are seen as the “better way of organising economic activity” as they are associated with “competition, economic efficiency and choice” (Larner 2000, 5). Some scholars see neoliberalism as being state-led policies that focus on decentralisation, privatisation and individualisation and succeed by framing economic policy as a

technical matter of expertise, rather than a political or cultural matter amenable to accountability or critique (Brodie 2011; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2004; Duggan 2004; Teeple 2000), or trace neoliberal policies to ideas about a strong state that targeted central planning and not welfare (Jackson 2010). Others see it as a class project, with the capital class reasserting its dominance after the labour and wage gains of unions during the decades since the end of the second World War and resulting in ‘creative destruction’ (Harvey 2005, 2007). This is in line with the logic that seeks to analyse neoliberalism as an ideology of the superiority of market and private interest, as opposed to state intervention (Shaikh 2005; Duménil and Lévy 2005). These scholars argue the muddled, heterogeneous impacts of neoliberalism can be traced to the resistance that neoliberalism generates (see for instance Clarke 2004; V. A. Schmidt and Thatcher 2013b, 2013a). Relatedly, a final understanding of neoliberalism, and one that is important for this dissertation, is that of a governmentality. Wendy Larner make the case for neoliberalism to be considered a governmental rationality, rather than a set of policies or an ideology, on the basis that the discourse produces a “system of meaning that constitutes institutions, practices and identities in contradictory and disjunctive ways” (2000, 12). While the Foucauldian understanding of governmentality is concerned with problematizing the state, its concern with governance (rather than government) means that it is better equipped to explore *how* neoliberalism “encourages both institutions and individuals to conform to market norms” (Larner 2000, 12) such as

the principles of competition, efficiency and choice (see also Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008; Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996). This form of ‘market governance’ involves a form of ‘degovernmentalisation’ whereby there is not ‘governance from above’ but rather through technologies such as accountancy, audits, budgets and so on, in combination with commercial approaches such as competition and market demand (Larner 2000, see also 1997).

Despite these theoretical debates, neoliberalism is nonetheless recognised as having resulted in a set of visible changes over the past three decades or so in the way public is organised – what Brenner et al (2010) call the ‘restructuring present’. These changes – which include, for example, the reduction of the welfare state; the increasing commodification of public goods provision, and the ‘privatisation’ of state functions and assets - have been underway across the world through diverse modalities, practices, and forms of institutional change, and with very different effects in different locales (Brenner et al, 2010). It is through scholarly efforts to capturing this diversity unevenness in a singular fashion that the explanatory utility of ‘neoliberalism’ has become unclear and contested.

3.6.2 Limitations

One key problem in this regard is differentiating cause from effect. ‘Neoliberalism’ has become at once a description of a set of phenomenon *and* the explanation for why these come about. Take, for example, the rise of the large corporations

undertaking ‘wholesale’ the implementation of USAID operations (discussed in Chapter 6). The rise of this ‘development-industrial complex’ both serves as the empirical evidence of neoliberalism, and is explained by neoliberalism as a project or policy. That is, neoliberalism serves as a term for both the phenomenon and its outcome.

This problem emerges in great part because of the contradictory nature of the neoliberalism. This is reflected, for example, in differences between ideas about neoliberalism and what has been termed “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002). It has been claimed that “actually existing, as opposed to ideologically pure, neoliberalism is nothing like as devoted to free markets as is claimed” (Crouch 2011, viii). For instance, the idea of competition is considered central to neoliberalism, not only as a means of addressing resource (re)allocation problems, but also for how all entities, from individuals to communities to states, should organise themselves (Eagleton-Pierce 2016, 33).

However, Colin Crouch points to the contradiction inherent to competition, between the process of competition that would result in a large number of firms in the market, on the one hand, and, on the other, the logical outcome of competition, which results in oligarchies or monopolies as large corporations succeed in overcoming other competitors (2011, 16–17, 53–55).

Another paradox is in the role of the state, between an active state that breaks up monopolies and legislates to maintain a competitive market (Davie 2014 cited in

Eagleton-Pierce 2016, 34) as opposed to the passive, non-involved state that the ‘pure’ neoliberalism demands in order to allow the market to operate with minimal interference. However, as this dissertation argues, if rather than competition, the rationality operating is one of closer state-corporate integration, then these no longer appear as contradictions or paradoxes. It is not about a smaller state, but rather a state that is reconfigured to allow closer relations with corporations. Similarly, it is not about the number of participants in markets, but rather corporations in sufficient numbers and of sufficient capacity to allow state-corporate partnerships to flourish – thus whether this requires a competitive process or outcome (in Crouch’s language) will be a matter of the industry and circumstances in which the discussion occurs.

Further, Crouch (2011) notes that large public-private partnerships, which are increasingly characteristic of a wide range of policy domains, are only competitive at the start, converting into inflexible monopolies once awarded. As he notes, it is difficult for arrangements under a private finance initiative to be changed once awarded as the terms of the contract are fixed at the time of award, and many large, long-term contracts are awarded without competition or transparency if the situation demands it (Crouch 2011, 86–93). This is born out in the case studies in this dissertation, for instance in peacebuilding, where multi-year ‘indefinite quantity contracts’ are introduced to streamline the onerous tendering process at USAID, at the expense of competitive bidding for each job (see discussion in

Chapter 6). Similarly, in the case of QinetiQ, even as the ‘competitiveness’ of the process by which the firm was privatised has been questioned by the National Audit Office, there is no disquiet over the large number of non-competitive contracts regularly awarded to the firm since it was established (see discussion in Chapter 4). Further, all three case studies have instances of ‘the state’ actively working to encourage and foster cooperation among what might otherwise been seen as competitor firms, be it through competitors working together on privatisation deals (as with QinetiQ), through long-term multi-corporate contracts (with USAID in Chapter 6), or in responding collectively to potential crises (as with electricity and telecommunications corporations in the UK discussed in Chapter 5).

3.6.3 Neoliberalisation

Responding to the emergent impasse in theoretical debate, Brenner et al (2010) argue that what is being neglected on all sides is the *processual* nature of neoliberalisation. That is, how the visible empirical effects being studied are “simultaneously patterned, interconnected, locally specific, contested and unstable,” (Brenner et al, 2010: 184). For them, neoliberalisation is “a politically guided intensification of market rule and commodification,” (*Ibid*). ‘Politically guided’, however, does not presuppose a top-down imposition of change; rather neoliberalisation-as-process entails “a tendential, discontinuous, uneven,

conflictual and contradictory reconstitution of state-economy relations," (Ibid). In particular, echoing the ethos of governmentality scholars, and of other sociological work that avoid substantialist assumptions, it allows analytical engagement with the 'restructuring present' in ways that do not rely on a priori assumptions about an (intended) end-state, for example. At the same time, it addresses a key criticism of scholarship on 'neoliberal governmentality' made by Brenner et al (2010) - and, indeed, some governmentality scholars; that is, in focussing on contingent and contextually specific emergences of 'neoliberal' rule in diverse settings, what can't be explained is the 'family resemblances' between changes in diverse settings.

Taking a governmentality approach serves the purpose of accepting the complex, and sometimes contradictory aspects of the phenomenon. This is because governmentality, like processual relationalism, does not take units as a priori entities, but rather seeks to understand the processes and power distributions that contribute to creating those units or entities. For example, in the early days of governmentality scholarship, scholars sought to distinguish neoliberalism as an ideology from the governing mentality in post-industrial states (see for instance Rose 1996), but scholarship has moved on from this distinction (see for instance Walker and Cooper 2011; Joseph 2013a; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Larner 2000). This dissertation adopts a governmentality approach to study phenomena that are typically associated with neoliberalism (i.e. the intensifying relations between states and large corporations), but it does so without assuming the rationality

informing these state/corporate practices is self-evidently ‘neoliberal governmentality’. To do so would be to prejudge the outcome of the analysis i.e. to presuppose both what neoliberalism is, and what rationality is at work in the practices being studied. Therefore the dissertation sets questions about *neoliberalism* to one side. The focus instead is on showing how the practices in and through which state-corporate relations are re-produced reveals that the key effect of discursive practices of security, in diverse domains, is to generate forms of tighter integration between state and corporation in ways that undermine conventional analytical separations such as state/corporation and public/private.

On a final note, a key lacuna in the neoliberal governmentality literature is attention to the corporation. As discussed above, there has been a lot of scholarship on neoliberalism as a governmentality and how the ideas of neoliberalism spread beyond the actions of the state, (Rose 1999; Rose and Miller 1992; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996a; Dean 2014). More recently, scholars have focused on the effects of neoliberal governmentality on a global scale (Dillon and Reid 2009; B. Evans and Reid 2013, 2014; Joseph 2013a). However, because the focus on governing beyond the state has been on specifically on individuals, communities, etc, and thus the population, corporations have not been ignored in analytical engagement. As a result, the rationalities of state-corporate engagement and the effects they have on state and corporations has remained unexplored by these scholars. Thus, there is first, a

need for more precise excavation of the rationalities operating in different contexts if the apparent contradictions in neoliberal social order are to be taken seriously and explained, and second, a need to excavate the rationalities that are produced through and shape relations between states and corporations. This dissertation makes a small contribution in this direction.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has made four key analytical moves in order to establish the methodological approach that has led to the analyses set out in this dissertation. It began by emphasising the importance of seeing the state/non-state ‘border’ as *internal*, rather than prior, to the production of social and political order. Then it discussed the utility of relationalist over substantionalist analysis for bringing to the fore how such borders are enacted, thereby generating the solidity of commonly taken for granted ‘entities’ such as states and corporations. Third, it emphasised the importance of focussing on practices, as embodiment and productive of relations and finally, it emphasised the utility of a governmentality framework in excavating the diffuse yet potent workings of ordering rationalities that inform and are constituted by relations embodied in practices. It concluded by discussing neoliberal governmentality and the limitations of this framework for excavating the specific rationalities that this dissertation points to.

To restate the central argument, the discursive practices of security – in generating various problematisations, responses and calculations inherent to specific security domains – rework relations between state and corporation in ways that make tighter integration of state and corporate practices integral to the achievement of security. Conventional analysis of the expanding and proliferating role of corporations in diverse security domains take-for-granted the centrality of ‘the state’ in relation to ‘security’, as well as a specific understanding of the state (i.e. in Weberian terms) and therefore its relations with other (‘non-state’) entities such as corporations. Thus, they are unable to reveal the ways in which state-corporate relations are re-produced and the key effect of discursive practices of *security*, which is to generate forms of tighter integration between state and corporation in ways that belie conventional analytical separations such as state/corporation and public/private.

4. Privatisation?: State-corporate relations in the British military

4.1 Introduction

Theoretically, the defence of the nation remains one of the primary security functions of the state. The use of force to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, and the national social and political order within, is taken for granted, by both the public and state managers, and by much security scholarship, as the paramount role of the state. This conception of the state is pervasive in the social sciences more generally, with Max Weber's definition of the state as a community that successfully claims the monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory being an enduring point of departure for analysis of the state. It is also the foundational conception of the state for the dominant theory in International Relations, realism, and indeed for the theory's conception of 'security' itself. So strong is this conceptualisation of the state that the significance of the rapidly increasing and now expansive role of corporations in the state's organisation of military force is still largely neglected in social science scholarship.

As discussed in Chapter 2, there is however, a burgeoning (albeit still relatively small) literature on private military and security companies (PMSCs). Security scholars have explored the now ubiquitous presence of corporate actors in various aspects of state use of military force. However, this chapter argues that analysis is limited by a continuing commitment to the foundational conceptions of the state

and (relatedly) the corporation and, in particular, a self-evident public/private divide (but see discussion in Chapter 2; Leander 2016; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b). This is exemplified in the dominant account in scholarship of the ‘rise’ of private companies in the state’s provision of defence: ‘privatisation’. That is, the increasing role of corporations in a variety of functions, even core ones, within the state’s traditional provision of defence, is understood as the ‘transfer’ of these from the ‘public’ realm to the ‘private’ realm. In this way, conventional substantivist conceptions of the state and the corporation continue to frame growing attempts to explain what, this chapter argues, are in fact practices that both reflect and advance a profound transformation of both the state and the corporation, and the relations between them. Understanding these in terms of the ‘privatisation’ of military force serves to misconstrue the objects of analysis.

Rather than beginning with the state and corporations as substantivist entities, this chapter begins with a relational approach that examines the practices of interaction between states and corporations to show how these transform, and thereby re/produce, the state/corporate or public/private divides. By beginning with the security practices in which states and corporations are engaged, it presents an alternative explanation of the effects observed. In this light, what is occurring is not the transfer of ‘state’ activities to a ‘private’ corporation, but is rather the rearrangement of security provision within state-corporate relations. The practices discussed in this section establish the different ways states and

corporations are being reconstituted through their relations. In the military case analysed here, for instance, the British state has created a private firm and ensured that any future capacity to exercise force is dependent on a private partner.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section (section 2) reviews the literature on corporate actors in the military sphere, demonstrating how the framework of ‘privatisation’ is taken-for-granted in scholarly debates. Following a short restatement of how the privatisation discourse dominates the literature, the section will provide a discussion of the views on the state and corporation that underlie and lead to the privatisation narrative. Section 3 sets out a brief history of privatisation in the UK since the 1980s, followed by a more in-depth analysis of how the British military engaged in privatisation activities. Section 4 provides an extended case study of how QinetiQ⁵, a PMSC, was formed by transferring to private ownership important functions of the British military and Ministry of Defence (MOD). It provides a summary of how the corporation presents itself in annual reports and publicity material, before setting out how it was actually formed through the sale of a section of the MOD. This section concludes by arguing that the notion of privatisation is inadequate to understanding the relations between the British state and QinetiQ. Subsequently, section 5 provides

⁵ The name, pronounced the same as ‘kinetic’, was said to represent qi (hinting at the company’s energy), net (pointing to the company’s networking ability) and iq (representing the company’s intellect) (BBC News 2007).

an alternative account based on an analysis of the security practices of the British state showing that what appears as privatisation is better understood as the mutual constitution of the state and corporation through changing security practises. The chapter concludes with a summary of its argument and brief discussion of some implications.

4.2 Corporations in International Security

This section reviews the literature on corporate actors in the military sphere. As already noted (in Chapter 2), the dominant framework in the literature is that of privatisation, with related focus on the various political, legal, and ethical consequences of the ‘transfer’ of state military functions to private corporate actors. The aim of this section is to, first, show how this framework is unreflexively taken-for-granted as the appropriate one to explore the phenomena under study, and, second, how the ensuing debates are deeply shaped by this. That is, ‘privatisation’ serves to both describe the developments being analysed but also informs critique - for example, in accounts of the state ‘losing’ while the corporate ‘gains’ (see for example Leander 2005), or the characterisation of key problems in terms of contracts and principal-agent dynamics (see for example Avant 2007). This section works through taken-for-granted understanding of the relationship as privatisation, and then discusses the underpinning distinction of the state and corporation that this rest upon. As will be seen from the discussion, the literature

generally takes the state and corporation for granted as entities interacting with each other, and the privatisation narrative provides the dominant account of activities transferred from the state to the private provider.

4.2.1 Privatisation

The framework of privatisation, deployed either explicitly or implicitly, dominates the literature. Peter Singer (2003), for instance, is explicit that he is dealing with issues caused by the transfer of functions from states to corporations – understood as privatisation or outsourcing. His exploration of “Corporate Warriors” begins with anecdotes from Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia, arguing that “a critical factor” in each case was “a private firm being hired to offer military services” (2003, 7). The book is also focused on the “breakup of [the] public monopoly of the military profession” and argues that “the very fact of their function” means that private military companies “break down what have long been seen as the traditional responsibilities of government” (Singer 2003a, 8). As he puts it, “by removing absolute control from government … and privatizing it to the market, the state’s hold over violence is broken” (2003, 18). Meanwhile, while focusing on the ‘outsourcing’ of military activities to corporations based in the United Kingdom, Christopher Kinsey states that “the enthusiasm for outsourcing government services has spread rapidly around the world” including in the provision of

security (2006, 3). Neither Singer nor Kinsey see privatisation as problematic per se, but rather that there are subsequent problems to be managed (discussed below).

Two edited volumes out of the Institute for Internal Law and Justice at New York University School of Law also explicitly focused on privatisation. The first analysed the implications of the private actors changing from being mercenaries to corporations as the title indicates – “From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies” (Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007b). The editors argue that “the appropriate balance between private and public interests is a key question whenever the provision of a public service depends on private actors” (Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007c, 7). The second volume titled “Private Security, Public Ordering: The Outsourcing of Public Functions and Its Limits” continues the theme but shifts to focus on the limits of outsourcing (Chesterman and Fisher 2009c). It begins by stating that “private actors are increasingly taking on roles traditionally arrogated to the state” (Chesterman and Fisher 2009b, 1) and the subsequent sections focus on issues of accountability, lessons from privatisation in non-military sectors and the limits of privatisation.

The various approaches to the privatisation of force are well captured by another volume edited by Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (2008). Focusing on the commercial orientation of PMSCs and their ability to offer their services to multiple clients, the editors state these facts “*appear to* bring them into conflict with the norms which have long been at the heart of moral

theorizing about, and legal regulation of, organized coercive force” (2008, 1 emphasis added). They go on to note that there have been a range of responses to these apparent conflicts:

“Some argue that once the true nature of PMSCs is understood, or the rationale for the norms fully spelt out, it will be evident that the conflict is *merely* apparent. Others take it that the conflict is real, though they differ about what follows from that. Some think that if the right kinds of adjustment to the organization and regulation of PMSCs are made, the conflict will disappear. Others think that, in light of contemporary realities, the conflict will not disappear, but that changes do need to be made to the norms which we accept as governing the activities of PMSCs. Finally, there are those who believe that given the reality of the conflict, PMSCs should be forbidden, or at least tightly circumscribed in their activities” (2008, 1).

The contributors to the edited volume cover a range of these approaches, from those who think that appropriate regulation will be able to constrain PMSCs (D.-P. Baker 2008) to those who argue that PMSCs are morally and ethically problematic (Frost 2008). Similarly, Elke Krahmann takes for granted that she is researching the privatisation of the military. She begins explicitly with a Weberian understanding of the state to argue:

“Democratic control over the use of collective force for national and international security has been a problem since the rise of modern democracy in Europe and North America. By the twentieth century, however, the issue finally appeared to have been resolved. Public and parliamentary oversight of national armed forces comprising professional soldiers or citizen-soldiers promised to prevent the abuse of military power by both state and non-state actors” (2010, 1).

She sees PMSCs as “replacing uniformed soldiers” and forming “an integral part of contemporary civil-military relations” (2010, 8). She argues that this is significant because it challenges “key mechanisms for preventing private and collective abuses of military power” (2005a, 2). From this basis, she focusses on investigating the ideological drivers of privatisation, as she documents different approaches in the United States, United Kingdom and Germany. Krahmann sees privatisation as part of the problem as it challenges the possibility of state control. She argues that the debate over the role of PMSCs in the West should be seen in light of oversight, both public and parliamentary, operating as barriers to abuse of power. That is, oversight is essential for “democratic control over the use of collective force for national and international security” (Krahmann 2010, 1). Other scholars argue that the privatisation of the use of force is in and of itself problematic (Pattison 2010), but still take for granted that what is happening is ‘privatisation’.

Some scholars do not explicitly discuss privatisation, but nonetheless assume this framework. For instance, the ‘Routledge Handbook of Private Security Studies’ (Abrahamsen and Leander 2015) is structured around this assumption. Part 2 is titled “The Place of the Private in Contemporary Security”, and the chapters include works on the role of the private sector in areas such as security guards, piracy, logistics, intelligence and cyber security and surveillance, etc. (Liss 2015; Berndtsson and Stern 2015; Erbel and Kinsey 2015; Dunn Cavelty 2015; Spearin 2015). This reinforces the idea that private security is different to national

security, the legitimate provision of which is (or was) the sole preserve of the state. The focus in part 4 of the book on “Regulation of Private Security” makes this more explicit, with the chapters focusing on regulation, governance, norms and the implications for democracy (for instance Percy 2015; Katz 2015).

Regardless of whether the stated intent is to study privatisation or whether this is the assumed framework, adopting this lens and the associated public/private divide channels analysis towards seeing specific problems. These include, for example, implementation problems, service delivery issues, contractual management difficulties, evaluation problems, etc, as discussed in Chapter 2. The issues identified by the rich and diverse literature says much about evolving state-corporate relations in the military sphere/domain. It is not that the literature identifies problems where they don’t ‘exist’, but that these are cast as problems in specific ways. For example, understanding the public sector as being ‘taken advantage’ of by the private sector relies on a prior understanding of the former as a ‘client’ and the latter a ‘contractor’ or service provider. This allows a set of problems to be identified in ways (e.g. as contractual obligations) that would not be applied if we were instead considering relations within the public sector – e.g. between an intelligence agency and the military (the enacting of market logics with the public sector notwithstanding). Simply put, the wider issue for this dissertation (as discussed below) is that analyses of the relationship between state and corporation rests heavily, explicitly or implicitly, on ‘the contract’. At a

prosaic level, of course, contracts are signed (in rapidly increasing scale), provide the legal basis for interactions and so on. However, contracts and the associated logics cannot explain, for example, the continuation of privatisation apace, despite the persistent failure of previous contractual arrangements (and often with the same ‘suppliers’) or indeed, why the state (the client) does not aggressively seek redress for such ‘delivery’ problems.

4.2.2 State capacity

This section now turns to the conceptions of the state that underlie the privatisation framework and some consequences of this. Inherent to the framework of privatisation is the treatment of state and corporation as distinct actors – substantialist entities – linked by *contractual obligations*. This is reflected in the rationales offered for why the state turns to private actors in the first place, and the implications for the state of doing so. A key concept in this regard is that of state *capacity*, and this dominates discussions, whether in relation to the ‘weak’ states of the global South, or to political and legal capacity in the ‘strong’ states of the global North. This in turn leads to the problems that the scholars assess, whether in terms of principal-agent problems, or issues of control (whether democratically or appropriate contractual mechanisms).

The lack of military capacity of states in the global South is a dominant theme in the literature. Africa is often the focus, with civil wars and ‘weak’ states identified as leading to heightened demand for private contractors. The introduction to “The Privatisation of Security in Africa” (G. Mills and Stremlau 1999b, 2) argues that:

“Africa’s special attractiveness as a market for mercenaries is no mystery. Mass violence has become endemic, typically arising from reactions to authoritarian rule, exclusion of minority or majority groups from governance, socio-economic deprivation and inequality, and the inability of weak states to manage political and social conflict”.

Sierra Leone is a representative example for this literature, being described for example as being in a state of “absolute anarchy” with “roadside ambushes, night time massacres of villages, and machete mutilations … the norm of life and death” (Singer 2003a, 3). In Yugoslavia, “the new militaries of the Croat and Bosnian governments were generally amateurs at best … short on weaponry, training and established institutions” (Singer 2003a, 4). What is important here is the focus on ‘weak states’, understood as unable, or unwilling, to deliver on their responsibility to maintain a monopoly on legitimate violence. This rests on the premise that “providing for national, and hence their citizens’, security was one of the most essential tasks of government. Indeed it defined what government was supposed to be” (Singer 2003a, 7). Consequently, weak states are seen as ‘justified’ in seeking (external – i.e. corporate) support, although there are subsequent problems for the states concerned (as will be discussed below).

As is now well documented, states that are not considered ‘weak’ also utilise PMSCs, with states such as the UK and the US at the forefront in this regard. Here too a capacity argument is deployed, but in a different sense. Some scholars see state demand as related to political capacity – for example, “states sometimes have indirect interest in retaining the services of PMCs, whether to support themselves in times of weakness or to reduce the economic and political costs of pursuing a foreign policy” (Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007a, 251–52). Others focus on the state’s (lack of) legal powers, seeing the problems of privatisation as being about the “lack of a satisfactory legislative solution” (Kinsey 2006, 3).

The literature starts with the framework of privatisation and thus understands these processes as ‘transfers’ of military capacity between states and PMCs and consequently focuses on the problems that ensue as the result of such ‘transfers.’ For instance, (the lack of) accountability is often a concern in the literature, with empirical studies, for example, examining the problems caused by Sandline International and Executive Outcomes (Howe 1998; Vines 1999; G. Mills and Stremlau 1999a; Cleaver 2000) to the issues around the actions of Blackwater in Iraq (Chesterman and Fisher 2009a; Scahill 2008). A central problem in these studies is states’ ability to ‘control’ the contractors they hire. Partly this is attributed to problems with the companies’ behaviours, but there is also a concern with the state’s capacity to *oversee* the contractors. For instance, Singer suggests the very lack of complete information on the US’s use of private contractors is

indicative of a “lack of sufficient management and oversight”: neither the US Congress, not the Pentagon, are able to quantify “exactly how many contractors are working for the United States in Iraq, exactly how much has been spent on them, or even how many have been killed or wounded” (Singer 2003a, 245). In this approach, the catalogue of the problems that states face in dealing with PMSCs are seen as deriving from what might be classified as principal-agent problems. These include the differing interests between the PMSCs and the state, behaviours of the PMSCs that cannot be monitored by the state, and the impact on the democratic control of force (Singer 2003a; Frost 2008).

For Krahmann (2010), looking at contexts in the global North, the issue is not capacity per se because the implications she identifies are not implementation problems (i.e. are not the result of ‘poor’ privatisation or of a lack of state capacity to manage the contract). Rather, she argues privatisation itself causes problems for the state, in that the state loses *democratic control* over the exercise of force. She notes that “Weber … sought to define the state, and not explain why the state did, or indeed should, lay claim to the monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force” (Krahmann 2010, 21). She relies on social contract theory to explain why the state *should* have a monopoly on violence. Arguing that conflict “has been a permanent feature of human interaction”, she suggests that “the key object of the Social Contract between the citizen and state is the provision of security” (2010, 22). She acknowledges that the state need not necessarily be the source of security

provision but, based on the social contract, argues that “it is the sovereign’s *monopoly* on the legitimate use of collective violence that provides security” (2010, 23 emphasis in original). Consequently, she seeks to identify why states would be willing to give up their monopoly on violence, and concludes that ideology drives the various decisions states have made on what and how to privatise. Krahman’s argument is that the ideologies driving privatisation are undermining the state’s ‘democratic control over the use of armed force’ (2010, 275). Baker (2008), meanwhile, starts from the same understanding but reaches the opposite conclusion to Krahmann. He assesses whether the use of PMSCs can be ethical and concludes that there is no reason to presuppose not, on the basis that “if it turns out that there are ways of *regulating* the private military profession such that these private warriors may be employed in ways that are generally beneficial” then there is no reason not to use them (2008, 41, emphasis added). Thus, these scholars reach different conclusions, but share an understanding of the problem they study as being one of control.

Other scholars focus their attention on control, but rather than focusing on the ethical issues, they study the appropriateness of the control mechanisms. For instance, the contributors to ‘Commercialising Security in Europe’ (Leander 2013a), are concerned with the issues faced by European states as they engage the private sector. The volume’s conclusion argues that “European approaches to the control and management of contracting are *lax and ad-hoc* [for reasons that

include] ... the tendency to obfuscate commercialization and to rely on hybrid contracting arrangements that keep the state formally involved” (Leander and Spearin 2013, 215 emphasis in original). Control is said to be difficult because commercial contracts are not made public, and therefore not subject to scrutiny. Further, the arrangements are structured in ways that formally involve the state, even if in practice there is very little engagement in ensuing corporate practices. This produces the illusion of control, at least in the public perception. Arguing that while “security commercialization appears banal” in Europe, the book concludes with the concern that “armed forces become locked into ... a dependence” on the services of the PMSCs and worry about the consequences of this for future efforts between European states and their allies in conflict zones (Leander and Spearin 2013, 209).

In sum, then, there is general agreement that there are “a range of governance mechanisms ... with which to control the growing private military service industry” and therefore, the crucial question is “whether and how governments use these measures depends on their understanding of the dangers involved in the privatization of military functions” (Krahmann 2005b, 291). In all these works, the focus on state capacity is driven by the underlying logic of privatisation. The ‘transfer’ of state activities is explained as deriving from the inability or unwillingness on the part of the state to undertake its core function: the use of military force. Relatedly the problems that are then identified also emerge out

through privatisation lens, with issues like accountability, control, and oversight dominating the literature. The range of mechanisms, problems with them, lack of information, etc. are all problems that emerge from the phenomenon of inquiry being privatisation. However, states are not the only focus of study; the same problem is examined in relation to the corporation, as discussed below.

4.2.3 'Corporate' private actors

Though much attention in the literature has focussed on privatisation in terms of its implications for the state, there are also discussions of these dynamics in terms of how it relates to the corporation. The focus on privatisation means that the entity to which the state's activities are being transferred needs to be legal and reputable (Chesterman and Fisher 2009b). As such, a major focus of the literature that addresses PMSCs directly is to differentiate these corporate actors from mercenaries. Generally it is accepted that mercenaries are those military actors outside the law and without a permanent structure that continues between engagements (Krahmann 2010; Singer 2003a). Although the debate on 'mercenaries or contractors' is not relevant to the chapter's focus, it is elaborated a little as it well illustrates the conceptions of PMSCs and their relations with the state that underpins the literature as a whole: as a legal and reputable private actor that augments state-capacity.

Some scholars see these as “firms providing services outside their home states with the potential for use of lethal force, as well as of training and advice to militaries that substantially affects their war fighting capacities,” (Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007c, 3) with the emphasis on operations outside the home state of the corporation and cross state-border operations. They have also been defined as “business organisations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare” (Singer 2003a, 8). The emphasis on the corporate form of these entities is related to an effort to differentiate them from mercenaries. While some argue there is no analytical difference between PMSCs and mercenaries, as “mercenarism … can occur in many historic forms, like loose mercenary bands [and] internationally operating” private military companies (Steinhoff 2008, 28), this is the exception rather than the norm.

Those who try to define the difference focus on the practices and modalities of how PMSCs operate. For example, PMSCs are said to be different due to the company’s relationship with its employees – Cleaver (2000, 133), for example, argues that “as regular employees of a company … these individuals [cannot] be considered as specifically recruited for any given conflict.” Other scholars focused on the corporate *structure* of PMSCs, arguing they are formalised businesses that engage in military activity on behalf of one or more governments and retain their organisational structure between engagements, and this is what separates them from mercenaries who join individual conflicts and disband thereafter (Krahmann

2010, 6–7; Singer 2001, 190–93). PMSCs are “legal businesses with permanent structures, headquarters and management … subject to corporate and contractual law, sector regulations and national and international legislation” (Krahmann 2010, 7). The corporate form then becomes an advancement on mercenary activity. Moreover, it is often pointed out that PMSCs themselves seek to distinguish themselves from mercenaries by emphasising their own ethical standards and the disciplining influence of share prices, as they reflect the reputation of the company (Krahmann 2010, 5–6). It is suggested that “the companies within this field embody an industry that represents a profound development in the manner that security itself is both conceived and realized” (Singer 2004, 2).

The key significance of all this is the prevailing common-sense that because of the rise of this “privatized military industry, clients can now access capabilities that extend across the entire spectrum of once state monopolized military activities, simply by writing a cheque” (Singer 2004, 2). What is significant therefore is how the PMSC is conceived of as a *service provider* to states (‘clients’). Indeed, private military services have been defined as “services directly related to the provision of national and international security which are offered by registered companies” (Krahmann 2005b, 279). Yet, there is something distinctive about the involvement of private actors in the use of force that makes it no ordinary ‘service’. Indeed, PMSCs are distinguished from states as a “new type of security actor” (Kinsey

2006, 3), with the clarification that this difference turns on “the sources of funding, the nature of the relationship between provider and user, and the employment status of the deliverers” (Singer 2003a, 7). Others focus on their commercial orientation, and the capacity to offer their services to a number of militaries and non-state actors (Alexandra, Baker, and Caparini 2008, 1).

As noted above, the ethical considerations related to *corporations* in the context of the ‘privatisation of force’ has also drawn scholarly attention. The premise here is that if the company is understood as ‘taking on’ activities from the state, this carries with it moral implications well beyond other contractual relations, say between two corporations. The financial motives of corporations for instance are posited as a reason why they should be tightly controlled, on the basis their interests may be at odds with interests of the state (Percy 2007). However, others argue that PMSCs, as a specific category of corporation, require specific regulation “due to the nature of their service offerings” (K. A. O’Brien 2007, 31). Some note that conventionally corporations are seen as lacking “accountability and transparency”, making them incapable of delivering on these activities in an ethical manner (Frost 2008, 43). On this basis, the argument is made that “regulation by public bodies” is key to preventing “ethically noxious outcomes coming about as a result of the process of privatization” (Frost 2008, 54). Together these concerns amount to issues of control – i.e. suitability of the external contracting party, which is assumed a priori to be ethically questionable and

therefore needing to be controlled (see also D.-P. Baker 2008). While there is debate on whether this control is possible (discussed here, and above with regards to state capacity), that there is need for control in managing an external contractor is not disputed. This is in keeping with the concerns of the privatisation narrative more generally.

This section argued that the literature on corporations and the use of military force relies on understanding the relationship as one of privatisation of state functions, with ensuing focus on the political, administrative and ethical problems that rise. These are worthwhile questions, but this approach relies, first, on conceptions of state and corporation that treat them as distinct entities and, second, on a self-evident public/private divide. As discussed below, this serves to misconstrue the integral relations between state and corporation that are characteristic of the use of PMSCs in state security provision. There is a small subset of the literature that has moved beyond understanding corporations as substantialist entities, and instead studied the relations between them and the consequences for understandings of security. But, as already discussed in Chapter 2, the arguments those scholars make are different from the argument being made in this dissertation, and are not revisited here.

The next section presents a short overview of the history of ‘privatisation’ in the UK, both generally and specifically in relation to the military. Section 4 presents an extended case study of one PMSC, QinetiQ, formed when the British MOD

'privatised' what had until then been various internal divisions responsible for research, development, and testing and evaluation services for the British armed forces. Despite the centrality of these functions to the state's 'traditional' role, national defence, the privatisation of QinetiQ was not considered unusual, as a discussion of reviews of the process, discussed at the end of section 4, will demonstrate.

4.3 'Privatisation' in the UK

This section sets out a brief history of the changing state-corporate relations in the United Kingdom, before narrowing to focus on the evolutions in the relationship between the British military and corporations. As most of the literature understands this as privatisation, or outsourcing, this section will also use these terms, with the caveat that this approach is precisely what this chapter seeks to problematise. This problematisation, and alternative explanation, is presented in section 5, after a discussion of QinetiQ in section 4.

4.3.1 Three decades of change

In setting out the context of large scale transformation of the British state within which discussion of the case study – QinetiQ – is situated, this section draws on the work of David Parker, who was tasked by then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair

in 2004 to write the ‘Official History of Privatisation’ (2012). This is, of course, a largely uncritical account, but for the purposes of this chapter it usefully provides the contours of the background against which the events from the early 1990s to the present, especially relating to QinetiQ, are discussed below.

While Parker’s two volumes document the history of privatisation in UK between 1979 and 1997, it is well known that, as a policy orientation, privatisation did not cease in 1997. Rather, what began as a policy under the Margaret Thatcher led Conservative government (see Gamble 1994; Jackson and Saunders 2012 for a broader discussion) continued under subsequent Labour, Coalition and Conservative governments, with the last big sell-off being that of Royal Mail, completed in 2015. Parker notes that the 1979 Conservative manifesto did not plan to privatise industries that had been nationalised in the immediate post war years, though there had been some discussion about the ‘problems’ of nationalisation: “Despite a clear recognition of the failings of nationalisation, privatisation formed only a modest component of the approach of the incoming Conservative Government in 1979” (Financial Secretary Peter Lilley quoted in Parker 2012, 2). The opposition Labour Party initially opposed privatisation, promising re-nationalisation if elected, but it too changed its stance within a decade.

“By the late 1980s, Labour MPs railed against the payments to the City during privatisations and the so-called “fat cat” salaries that were awarded to top management in the newly privatised companies. But there was now no serious prospect of significant re-nationalisation. It was clear that there was no real appetite

for returning to extensive state ownership within the Labour leadership. In the 1990s “New Labour” quietly accepted privatisation as the new status quo” (Parker 2012, 7).

Indeed “there was a remarkable degree of policy continuity after 1997 with some privatizations postponed by the Conservatives completed under Labour” (Parker 2013, 343). The significance of this in relation to QinetiQ and the conventional account of ‘the state’ in national defence will be discussed below.

Privatisation was “unplanned in 1979 and evolved over time”, but arguably, “so did the objects of privatisation” (Parker 2012, 2). Parker notes that while each case of privatisation was different, they shared some general objectives⁶. The government’s focus shifted from the early days, when releasing cash from the sales was a main driver, to later when achieving the ‘supply side’ benefits such as “widening share ownership, increasing competition and consumer choice, raising efficiency and reducing the power of the trade unions”, became more significant drivers (2012, 2–3).

Privatisations under the Labour government, between 1997 and 2010, were smaller, “reflecting the fact that almost all of the large state enterprises had been transferred to private ownership under the Conservatives” (Parker 2013, 351).

⁶ Between May 1979 and June 1987, fourteen large state enterprises were privatised, namely British Petroleum, British Aerospace, Cable & Wireless, Amersham International, National Freight Company, Britoil, Associated British Ports, Enterprise Oil, Jaguar, British Telecommunications, British Shipbuilders’ warship yards, British Gas, British Airways and Rolls-Royce. Over the remaining years of the Thatcher and Major governments, privatisation continued apace, with the airports, British Steel, British Leyland, the water industry, the electricity industry, the coal industry and railways all being privatised.

Notably, by this stage there was no internal documentation on the privatisations beyond total asset acquisitions and disposals by department, as Parker himself laments: department level “disposal figures include general sales of assets alongside privatization sales and are therefore not useful to derive privatization data” (2012, 351 at footnote 5). Also worth noting, for the analysis presented here, by this stage it was not just state enterprises but also a steady stream of government assets that were now being transferred into private ownership.

A significant shift in the privatisation process occurred during the years of the Major government. The Competing for Quality white paper, produced in 1991, introduced a differentiation between three types of services – services that were inappropriate for government and ought to be discontinued or privatised; services that were unsuitable for government delivery and should be contracted out; and services that were appropriate for government *and should be decentralised and subject to market testing*. Under this initiative, all government departments were subject to numerical market-testing standards (Pint et al. 2001, 3–29). What is notable here is that no state functions were protected, with even those ‘appropriate for government’ provision to be subject to ‘market testing’.

The next innovation in state praxis was the Private Finance Initiative (PFI); introduced in 1992 it required state departments to assess if it was more efficient to involve the private sector in providing their ‘services’. This would involve the private sector investing, managing and operating capital assets, with the relevant

department or public sector client paying for the service delivery via a long-term contract (Pint et al. 2001). As part of implementing PFIs, the government established a private finance panel within Treasury, which included managers from the private sector. (Note here, and a point returned to below, how privatisation of state functions is *itself* a joint ‘private-public’ endeavour.) The role of the Panel was to encourage line ministries to establish PFI funding for new initiatives. By 1994, a “universal testing rule” required that private financing should be considered for “every public sector project” (Spackman 2002, 285). Consequently PFI contracts increased from two to thirty-nine per year within just the first two years (1994 to 1996).

The New Labour government which won office in 1997 continued the policy, renaming them Public Private Partnerships (PPP), wherein ‘partnering’ between the state and corporations became foundational to state functions. The term ‘partnering’ was ostensibly used to refer to a relationship “intermediate between full cooperation and arm’s-length adversarial relations” (Pint et al. 2001, 13 footnote 21). That is, the PPP process was aimed at identifying mutual interests between the department and the contractor, such that both parties conducted themselves as if they were in a partnership, rather than a client-contractor relationship. It also encompassed a move from focusing on operating assets to also privatising service provision.

What is significant for the analysis of this chapter is the ascendancy of a new rationality of rule in the practices of the state. ‘Public Private Partnerships’ might be banal ‘management speak’, but it also well captures a common sense now well embedded in state practice as a whole i.e. that public-private integration in public goods provision is both normal and appropriate, such that it is deviations from this (i.e. sole state responsibility) that need justification. This is of course not to say that all state employees support this view, or even think this way, but that nonetheless state practices everywhere routinely include private actors’ practices – including here, in a key case of reworking ‘the state’ itself.

For example, a key aspect of the privatisation and outsourcing agenda was the integration of the private sector into the process of privatisation itself. Whilst now extensive, this has long been so routine that its implications are hardly considered in security scholarship of state-corporate relations, or even in policy reviews, as the National Audit Office review of the QinetiQ privatisation discussed in section 4 reveals. Parker documents the principal advisers to each privatisation between 1987 and 1997; in each transaction he identifies roughly 20 corporations, from banks and underwriters, to financial advisers, legal advisers, accountants, stockbrokers and public relations firms (Parker 2012, 529–34). The sale price in each occasion was set by the department concerned and the Treasury, but this was

“on the advice of the Government’s financial adviser (the merchant bank/investment bank handling the sale for the Department), the financial adviser to the company, stock

brokers, and usually an independent adviser brought in to provide a further opinion” (2012, 6).

Of course, whether these privatisations have been successful is heavily debated.

There is a vast critical scholarly literature that has questioned the premises, failings, etc. of privatisations as well as the deleterious and far-reaching consequences on British society. However, for the analysis presented here, the significance is that problems were even apparent to state managers and officials – even as privatisation continued apace. The evidence on the privatisation is said to be “more complex and uncertain than sometimes acknowledged” (Parker 2012, 8).

On the criteria for success – such as effectiveness, value-for-money, risk, complexity, accountability, and governance, etc. (Hodge and Greve 2007; Flinders 2005; Spackman 2002) – the results are decidedly mixed. However, the focus of state reviews of privatisation has been overwhelmingly on issues of control, accountability, proper implementation, adequate compensation, and so on.

Neither the ideology behind privatisation, nor the suitability of specific assets/functions for privatisation, were seriously challenged within British politics post-1995, once the Labour Party had dropped its commitment to public ownership. Parker considers testament to the enduring changes that Margaret Thatcher had made to the British polity that there was “no longer any ideological predilection for nationalism, in the mainstream of British Politics” (2012, 501).

While this is debatable, especially given the recent rise of Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, Parker’s statement can be considered right in that a rationality of

public-private partnership – has long been well embedded in the British state's everyday practices. The rest of this section discusses how these broad changes in British government policy, and in particular the increasingly complex forms of privatisation, impacted the British military. Section 4 then takes up the specific case of QinetiQ.

4.3.2 The British military

Until 1980, a key tenet of British military governance was that the MOD and armed services “provided directly all the services for which they were responsible and owned the main resources necessary for the provision of those services (the assumption of self-sufficiency)” (Uttley 2004, 146). However, as privatisation became routine in the UK, the military also began to follow suit. Not only were military assets sold off to the private sector as a way of supplementing government budgets (as with many other government assets, as discussed above), but as state ‘services’ were increasingly opened to market testing and contracted out, sections of the military were also ‘privatised’. It has been noted that while in other countries there were debates about what the core functions of the state and armed forces are (or should be), in the UK “such a discussion has largely been missing in the public and political discourses” (Krahmann 2010, 86).

The changing approaches to privatisation generally described above also manifested in relation to the military. Initially, the military outsourced services to the private sector, with the military maintaining ownership of the assets, while contracting corporations to provide services such as maintenance or management. The MOD had been using contractors on an ad-hoc basis as early as during the 1990-91 Gulf War. However, between 1998 and 2003, the MOD went from using contractors “whenever appropriate” to *maximising* the use of contractors as it sought to hand over an increasing range of functions to the private sector (Uttley 2004, 145). Driven by the logic of ‘efficiency’, standard policy became to ‘test’ internal support functions against the market, and wherever the industry was cheaper, to contract out (Uttley 2004). By 1994 the MOD was involved in 22 PFI contracts valued at £900 million (Krahmann 2010, 84–118). In 2000, the Minister of State for Armed Services declared that about half of the 160 areas of activity, costing some £1.5 billion annually, could be contracted out to private providers (quoted in Krahmann 2010, 91). By 2004 the MOD had 42 PFI projects that ‘brought’ £2 billion of private investment ‘into’ the military as well as another 40 projects that could potentially generate another £12 billion (Uttley 2004).

As with privatisations in other sectors, the initial contracts were often for between five to seven years and usually with single companies. However, as with arrangements in other sectors, MOD contracting relationships also evolved to longer term and complex ‘outsourcing’ arrangements. Moreover, the MOD also

began to issue prime contracting arrangements, where one company took responsibility for a wide range of services provided by a complex web of sub-contractors. An example is the Defence High Frequency Communication Services (DFHCS), which covered long-distance strategic communications between Army units, RAF aircraft, Royal Navy ships and headquarters (Uttley 2004). This was let as a 15 years contract in 2003 to VT Merlin Communications (now the Babcock International Group) and involves numerous sub-contractors providing beyond line-of-sight communications systems to all military branches of the British state.

Another example is the MOD's agreement with Capita, for the company to handle *all* recruitment for all three services. In 2012 Capita, a business process outsourcing firm performing 'essential' functions for many other private sector clients, signed a £440 million deal to handle 'full recruitment solutions'. The contract was expected to be worth £1.3 billion over 10 years. Under the contract, while the Army retained ownership of recruitment policy, entry criteria and assessment standards, Capita was responsible for "the entire process for the attraction and recruitment of soldiers and officers to the Regular and Territorial Army", as well as for providing an "information and communications technology (ICT) platform to underpin recruitment for the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force" (Capita n.d.). During the 10 year contract, the military was projected to save £300 million and see the release of 1,000 military personnel from recruitment duties back into the front line (Preez 2012).

In the first year problems emerged, with the Army being 2000 personnel short of its 2013 recruitment target, and Capita paying fines of £750,000 in one month alone for failing to meet targets (Hughes 2015). Then Defence Secretary Philip Hammond acknowledged that the service in 2013 was 'sub-standard' (Cottell 2014) and also admitted temporary "workaround" solutions were costing £1 million a month (The Telegraph 2014). The Army had to put *more* personnel into front-line recruitment and there were reports of applicants being 'lost in the system' (Recruiter 2014). In the first three months of 2014, the army recruited less than 75% of the targeted 1750 new reserves. Capita executive Paul Pindar told parliamentarians that the recruitment crisis was because "there are no wars on" (Leftly 2014). What is significant here is how, despite these problems, the contract is considered a success, with Capita boasting of its achievements including reductions in hiring times, reduced hiring costs and reductions in military personnel manning recruitment positions (Capita n.d.).

Other, more complex, contracts were signed as the MOD followed the general state trend in building closer cooperation with industry. Consequently, in state practices there was a replacement of the idea of "control premised on short-lived contracts and dense specifications" [with] 'long-term, high-trust relationships', building on common goals and information sharing" (Krahmann 2010, 100). Moreover, the government moved to long term contracts (20-25 years), governed by warnings rather than penalties for underperformance; profit sharing on any

savings made through efficiencies; and *the use of integrated project teams from across the armed forces and private contractors* (Krahmann 2010). This is significant because it points to the partnership between public and private and the obscuring of that very divide, which this dissertation argues is indicative of the mutual constitution of state and corporations as a result of their evolving relationship.

All of this indicates fundamental changes in the rationality governing relations between the military and industry i.e. state and corporation. However, these developed from significant changes that are visible even in more ‘straightforward’ privatisations. This is elaborated in the next section’s discussion of the process by which a core state function in relation to the UK MOD and military became the private company, QinetiQ. This section outlined the changing processes and policies of privatisation in the British state, followed by how this impacted the British military. Even in the military, privatisation evolved from simple contracts, to outright privatisations, to more complex ‘partnering’ relationships that envisaged the state and corporations working together in security practices. It can already be seen that the dynamics in play are not well captured by conventional assumptions of ‘the state’, the ‘public/private divide’ or ‘privatisation’. The discussion of QinetiQ in the next section examines how the creation of this company and its ongoing relationship with the military is generally understood through the conventional accounts of privatisation that inform the PMSC

literature. Section 5 then presents an alternative explanation of these dynamics in terms of the mutually constitutive relations between state and corporation.

4.4 QinetiQ – one more privatisation

This section sets out an extended case study, of how QinetiQ, a PMSC listed on the London Stock Exchange, was formed and operates today, a process that is conventionally understood as the ‘privatisation’ of a division of the MOD. It should be noted that in accounts of UK privatisation, QinetiQ is just one among many ‘transfers’ of state assets to private hands, such as British Rail or Jaguar (Parker 2013). Even in accounts of ‘transfers’ from the British military to the private sector, QinetiQ disappears into a plethora of privatisations, from contractors on the front lines to training and logistics (Krahmann 2010, 84–118; Uttley 2004). However, as discussed below, QinetiQ is a slightly unusual case, in that what was transferred to private ownership was a set of core capacities for the British military and thus the state’s ‘traditional’ role of national defence. Precisely for this reason, the QinetiQ case serves as a useful illustration of how a focus on rationalities embedded in state and corporate practices makes visible how state and corporation are mutually constituted. That is, on the face of it (i.e. through the lens of privatisation) the creation of QinetiQ is akin to the ‘brains’ of the British military establishment being handed over to private hands. Yet, as discussed in the next section, the same dynamics can be understood as (a) an emerging configuration of state and corporate practices by which the state’s ‘traditional’ role

in national defence is undertaken, and (b) the mutual constitution of state and corporations by the practices through which they are related to each other.

4.4.1 ‘Just’ another company

QinetiQ describes itself as “a leading science and engineering company operating primarily in the defence, security and aerospace markets” (QinetiQ 2016a, inside front cover). The company has been variously described as “the new Q” (QinetiQ Blog 2012) and “geeks with guns” (Corporate Watch 2006). It bills itself as mainly “scientists and engineers” playing a “critical role in helping customers meet current and future challenges” (QinetiQ n.d.). That is, QinetiQ sees itself as a research company, developing and selling products, and providing advice and services to militaries but also to other companies more broadly. QinetiQ employs more than 6,000 staff worldwide.

The company website says it “works across the equipment lifecycle from initial concept through to final disposal”, which is clarified as meaning from research and experimentation, to testing and evaluation, and finally training on the chosen solution (QinetiQ n.d.). It is not a manufacturer – though it also sells a portfolio of hi-tech products, ranging from robotics to unmanned vehicles, and more recently, cyber security that it designed and developed. Rather, QinetiQ identifies itself as a “trusted, impartial and independent” company working “in partnership” with

aerospace and defence companies, and drawing revenues mainly from “research, technology, advice, test and evaluation, technology solutions and the royalties from licensing” (QinetiQ n.d.). Thus, QinetiQ does everything from developing solutions, to testing and evaluating weapons systems, and making recommendations about the most suitable ones for its customers’ needs.

The company is headquartered in the UK, but through acquisitions has subsidiaries in the United States and Australia among other countries. The company lists 57 subsidiaries and 2 associates in its 2016 Annual Report, including 33 subsidiaries in England and Wales, 6 in the US, 7 in Australia, 3 in Canada, 3 in Scotland, 2 in Belgium, and one each in Guernsey, Philippines and Sweden. This was up from 6 subsidiaries listed in 2015, of which 4 were in England and Wales and 2 in the United States. This branching into a plethora of subsidiaries and interconnected companies is not unusual, reflecting the way modern companies structure themselves. What is unusual is how, nonetheless, the UK military continues to be central to QinetiQ’s existence as a company (see below).

As with numerous other PMSCs, QinetiQ’s ties to the UK and US militaries are pointed to by its appointments of former senior military and defence officials to senior posts, especially in the United States.⁷ However, beyond this, an analysis of

⁷ For example, George Tenet, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, served as a non-executive director on QinetiQ’s board between 2006 and 2008, before moving on to the board of QinetiQ North America, a wholly owned subsidiary. Retired US Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr

the company's customer base and Annual Reports reveals the tie more clearly. In notes to editors in press releases, QinetiQ describes its customers as "predominantly government organisations including defence departments, as well as international customers in other targeted sectors" (see for instance QinetiQ 2016b). The company has home markets in the UK, US and Australia, with projects in more than 10 countries. Key markets are defence, security and aerospace, but the company also has a growing position in some commercial markets.⁸ In 2016, the company had revenues of £755.7 million and operating profit of £108.9 million, down from revenue of £763.8 million, and underlying operating profits of £111.3 million in 2015 – though profit was lower, 2016 was a year in which the company planned share buy-backs, purchased many subsidiaries and paid dividends of 6%.

However, while QinetiQ competes with other corporations in the military equipment and service provision industry, not only in the UK but also globally, it is utterly reliant on the British state. In the last two years, 67% of QinetiQ's

replaced him on the QinetiQ board. A former assistant Secretary of Defence for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, Duane Andrews, served as chief executive of QinetiQ's North American business between 2006 and 2013. He was replaced by a QinetiQ insider, J D Crouch, who had previously held roles as Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy and U.S. ambassador to Romania.

⁸ It has a small but growing range of non-military clients and products. For instance, British shoe company Clarks measures customers' feet in their shoe stores using 3-D cameras that are supplied by QinetiQ and were first used in tank warfare. Meanwhile, Tarsier is a QinetiQ developed system for detecting debris on runways that has been sold to commercial airports, and a system used to detect mines buried in mud has been applied to a device to measure the heartbeat of unborn babies (BBC News 2007).

revenues came from the MOD⁹ (QinetiQ 2015a, 2016a). The MOD notes that in 2015/16 QinetiQ was “the most dependent of the top 10 MOD suppliers on MOD business”, and significantly, that only 12% of the revenue that QinetiQ received from the MOD was competitively tendered (Ministry of Defence 2016, 9–10).

The company identifies itself as focused on “listening to and helping to shape the needs of our customers”, but, as shown above, of particular importance among these is the British MOD (QinetiQ 2015a, 15). In this regard, the company mentions on the one hand, how it is aligning its structure with MOD Front Line Commands and, on the other hand, how it is working with the MOD to “*support [the MOD’s] transformation*” (QinetiQ 2015a, 15 emphasis added), a point returned to below. In 2016, the MOD gained even greater priority for QinetiQ, becoming key to one of the company’s three strategies; the QinetiQ Strategic Enterprise would see the corporation paid £153 million over five years for the delivery of technical services to fast jets and the A400M heavy-lift aircraft (QinetiQ 2015b). In 2016 QinetiQ also hosted, on behalf of the MOD, a major event of the Maritime Theatre Missile Defense (MTMD) forum, which consists of ten countries. The At Sea Demonstration 2015 (ASD2015) was described as “a ground-breaking opportunity to conduct numerous naval interoperability tests”

⁹ Six percent of the company’s revenue was US Department of Defence, while revenue from other government agencies (globally) amounted to between 10-11% in 2015 and 2016.

(QinetiQ 2016a, 17). Formally, the event was hosted by the UK. It took place around Europe's largest range – the QinetiQ operated Hebrides range - and saw information shared “almost simultaneously from ships in the Hebrides to stations in the UK, USA, Germany, Italy and Spain, across 14.7 million square kilometres of tactical data link network”, all managed from a facility operated by QinetiQ (QinetiQ 2016a, 17).

From the above outline, the centrality of QinetiQ to the UK MOD's and militaries' activities is clear, as is the centrality of the latter to QinetiQ's existence. Further, the back story to QinetiQ's emergence as a 'private' commercial actor, set out below, throws a different light on the relations between the British state and corporations.

4.4.2 Yet another privatisation

The present relations between QinetiQ and the British military go back to the origins of the company. QinetiQ was formed when the UK government 'privatised' an important arm of the military establishment, the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA). In 2001 the vast majority of DERA's activities were placed into a new organisation and rebranded as QinetiQ. The parts of DERA that were not included under QinetiQ were renamed Dstl and remained in government control. DERA itself had been formed in 1995 from the

amalgamation of various defence research and testing organisations in the UK state. The core of DERA was the Defence Research Agency (DRA), which itself was formed in 1991 from the amalgamation of several divisions across the military including aerospace, armament research, signals and radar.

What is significant for the analysis here is the explicit logic driving these changes. A 1993 UK Government White Paper anticipated that the newly reorganised agency (DRA) would establish “a strategy for its relationship with industry which will encourage the transfer of technologies … [that will] … enable the Agency to become progressively more commercially competitive” (UK Cabinet Office 1993, 41). As was made clear later, QinetiQ was created “*specifically to allow the majority of DERA’s activities to be privatised*” (National Audit Office 2007, 4, emphasis added). The goals of privatisation, as set out by the MOD, were among other things, to introduce “commercial disciplines” into state practice as a means of achieving cost reduction; to provide “enhanced flexibility to develop commercial business partnerships and engage in a greater range of joint ventures”; and to develop “effective and productive relationships between private and public sector” (National Audit Office 2007, 4).

It is worth noting here the significance of what the British state was undertaking in this case. An abiding assumption in the specialist security literature in theorising state relations with PMSCs turns on the latter augmenting state capacity – i.e. either providing it when it does not exist or providing it more efficiently –

and thereby enabling the state military to concentrate on ‘core’ functions. In the case of QinetiQ, however, the state is explicitly transferring to private ownership a core set of capacities and knowledges that were both accumulated over decades and which are central to the state’s assumed primary role – national defence. Further, these are capacities that did not exist in the ‘market’, hence why QinetiQ had to be created, rather than the activities being transferred, and, as will be discussed later, the lack of a ‘market’ continued even after QinetiQ was sold.

One of the key functions of DERA was to provide testing and evaluation services to the MOD and other government departments. This included managing firing ranges, testing facilities and instruments and measurement equipment, all of which would impact on the ability to purchase future equipment. All these activities were placed under (the to-be-privatised) QinetiQ without competitive tendering. Several contracts for testing and evaluation that had already been awarded to another company, SERCO, as part of a previous privatisation deal were terminated and included in QinetiQ’s portfolio. Moreover, even as it was envisaged for privatisation, QinetiQ was set up to not only provide research services to the MOD, but also to *advise* on its future procurement of equipment. Indeed, the explicit vision for QinetiQ was that it would have “*a vital role* in carrying out research and advising the [MOD] on the development and procurement of equipment as well as managing the testing and evaluation of this

equipment” (National Audit Office 2007, 4). The business was sold under the Public Private Partnership (PPP) framework in 2003 (Parker 2013).

The decision to privatise those state capacities placed within QinetiQ, and how to go about doing this, were subject to extensive consultation with the private sector. Along with senior officials from DERA, the MOD and other government agencies, the steering group also ‘invited’ “external members from the private sector” (National Audit Office 2007, 13). The private sector invitees included a former chief executive of the London Stock Exchange and the Founder and President of AITRO, the industry body for organisations in innovation, research and technology. Two private companies, PricewaterhouseCoopers and UBS Warburg, were appointed to “advise jointly on the possible route to a transaction and to support the process” (National Audit Office 2007, 13).

The consultation process sought responses from a wide range of interested parties, including the defence industry, and their expressed concerns heavily influenced key decisions. For instance, a key concern for the defence industry was that QinetiQ might commercially exploit the intellectual property it had gained over decades while it had been part of the state. To ease this concern, the MOD audited all intellectual property arrangements that were part of the deal and came up with a solution that satisfied the industry. In fact, the MOD “did more than was legally required in auditing the intellectual property” and though there was continued grumbling from within the industry, these were rejected by the MOD on the

grounds that “further work would not have changed the views expressed by industry critics, who were likely to be sceptical of the benefits of privatising DERA given their position as competitors” (National Audit Office 2007, 15).

The sale of QinetiQ was conducted in two stages. In 2003, 37.5 percent of the business was sold (33.8 percent to the Carlyle Group (a US venture capital group) and 3.7 percent to the then employees). The decision was made to seek an equity partner rather than to wholly privatise the firm so the business could be ‘developed’ ahead of a public flotation, which took place in 2006. The government continued to retain a 19 percent stake in the publicly listed enterprise until 2008, when it sold its remaining shares in the company. Until 2012, the government retained specific controls over what kind of activities the firm could engage in.

However, in 2012 these controls were relaxed, with the government giving up the ‘golden share’ that allowed it to veto QinetiQ’s activities, though it retained the right to prevent any shareholder from building up ‘too big a stake’ (Jones 2012).

"These changes include removal of the MOD's right to veto any transaction or activity and the introduction of a less onerous compliance system similar to those of QinetiQ's peer companies," then chief executive Leo Quinn was quoted as saying (White 2012).

QinetiQ was established through a process that was (and continues to be) perceived as another straightforward case of privatisation, including in key government reviews of the over a decade long process. While the sale was

completed, there continued to be questions about it, and in 2007 the National Audit Office released a report identifying issues with the privatisation. The UK parliament's Committee of Public Accounts also investigated the sale, reporting in 2008. These documents are drawn on next to trace how the process was critically evaluated, following which, section 5 draws on the material presented in this section to suggest an alternative way (to privatisation) of conceptualising the QinetiQ process, and thereby state-corporate relations.

4.4.3 Implementation problems

The two reviews conducted by different arms of the British state identified certain problems with the privatisation of QinetiQ. These included the largely uncompetitive process, the insufficient sale price, the generous compensation received by senior managers and the role of Treasury incentives ('sweeteners') for investors. In short, the problems with privatising QinetiQ were only in relation to its implementation. Some of these are discussed here; the purpose is to illustrate how the reviews' criticisms reflect the same conceptions of (state) control and decision-making that underpin analyses in the literature on PMSCs. As the next section shows, however, the key decisions attributed to the MOD below were, in fact, always made jointly with one or other of the various private (non-military) corporations that were involved in the protracted process of 'privatisation'.

The reviews criticised the uncompetitive process for selecting a partner, especially as it eventually resulted in only one ‘credible’ bidder (National Audit Office 2007, 17–19). Of the 40 pre-qualification questionnaires issued in March 2002, 16 were returned by interested bidders. Seven indicative bids were then received in May 2002, and while the MOD had intended to shortlist six, only four were taken forward (see below). That only four bids were taken forward was explained as because the three eliminated bids “were not as strong as the four shortlisted bidders” but, as the National Audit Office noted, “they were strong enough to be included in an expanded shortlist” (2007, 18). However, the National Audit Office did note that the MOD disagreed with this view (2007, 18). The process was also criticised for decisions that “weakened the competitive process for selecting a strategic partner” (Committee of Public Accounts 2008, 5), and that “it is likely that an expanded list would have improved competition and potentially avoided the eventual outcome of receiving only one bid that was acceptable to the [MOD]” (National Audit Office 2007, 19).

In the early days of the sale, the value for QinetiQ was uncertain, with different initial valuations putting the company as between £551 million to £862 million (National Audit Office 2007, 21), though these figures could not be substantiated after the sale. In autumn 1997 DERA estimated that proceeds from privatising the entirety of DERA would be £780 million, and a Comprehensive Spending Review in 1998 assumed that the PPP, to be completed by April 2002, would generate

£250 million for the MOD (National Audit Office 2007, 12). Carlyle's final bid in August 2002 valued QinetiQ at £374 million. However, by the time of finalisation of the bid, in February 2003, company valuation had been reduced by £55 million, resulting in the taxpayer "losing £21 million in value" between the appointment of Carlyle and the final announcement that they were the successful bidder (National Audit Office 2007, 22). As was noted, "by appointing Carlyle as preferred bidder with price-sensitive issues outstanding, the transaction *changed from a competitive to a negotiated process*" (National Audit Office 2007, 22 emphasis added). The lack of competition is addressed in the next section. The Committee of Public Accounts said this process netted £90 million less for the MOD than it could have, on the basis that Carlyle received 2.5% more of the company than had been planned in the initial documentation (2008, 6). While the MOD justified the reduced price (and increased percentage) on the basis of 'market conditions', there remained suspicion that "the business may have been undervalued in the sale to Carlyle" (National Audit Office 2007, 22). Thus, the key question is whether the MOD had sold QinetiQ for the appropriate amount ('market value').

The privatisation process was also criticised for being rushed, in that the Treasury created an incentive to finalise the sale quickly, and thus, potentially, to not seek the best price. Including the sale proceeds in the 1999- 2002 Comprehensive Spending Review "had the potential to create pressure for the PPP to be completed by the end of the financial year in March 2002" (National Audit Office

2007, 12). Because the MOD and Treasury agreed that the timescale should not impact “achieving overall value for money”, the Treasury agreed to credit the MOD with £250 million in the 2002 budget “even if the project was delayed up to 31 March 2003 to preserve value for money” (National Audit Office 2007, 12). But the MOD and Treasury had also agreed that “any receipt in excess of [£250 million] would be returned to the Exchequer” (National Audit Office 2007, 12). Thus the conclusion is drawn that “this agreement meant there was less incentive on the [MOD] to obtain more than £250 million” (National Audit Office 2007, 12). As discussed below, there are important other aspects related to timing, but those decisions (instigated by private actors involved) were not deemed problematic by the reviews.

Finally, the compensation to senior managers of QinetiQ (state employees who went on to be senior managers in the privatised corporation) was also a focus of criticism. Highlighted was the fact that senior managers were rewarded under a “very favourable share incentive scheme linked to performance targets” (Parker 2013, 354). Senior managers were said to have gotten £200 for every £1 they invested, while the taxpayer only got £9 for every £1 (Committee of Public Accounts 2008, 5). As was later noted, “the resulting scheme gave management returns far in excess of what was necessary to incentivize them” (Committee of Public Accounts 2008, 6; see also National Audit Office 2007, 39). This was considered all the more controversial because QinetiQ senior managers were

involved in drawing up the incentive scheme through which they profited, while the MOD itself chose not to participate (Massey and Shidlo 2010). The criticism also focused on the role of the then QinetiQ chief executive, who received a 19,900% return on his investment (Parker 2013, 355). That the senior management of QinetiQ profited from the sale is not in itself considered problematic, including by the National Audit Office or the Committee on Public Accounts, whose criticism is only they profited ‘excessively’. At the same time, no concern was expressed regarding the fees charged by a wide range of key ‘private’ architects of the sale, such as UBS Warburg, Simmons and Simmons, or Arthur Anderson (see below). As such, any criticism of ‘excess’ is a value judgement based entirely on the managers’ role as ‘public sector employees’ at the time.

Thus, the problems identified with the sale of QinetiQ focused on how the privatisation was implemented. Whether the activities ought to have been privatised were never considered – the National Audit Office for instance identifies in a subheading that the “decision to privatise was taken because the status quo was not sustainable” but the section does not clarify *why* it was unsustainable, apart from a reference to a fall in the research budget (2007, 11; see also Committee of Public Accounts 2008, 5). QinetiQ bills itself as one among many suppliers to the British military though, as has been discussed, the relationship is much closer, not only as a result of how the company was created,

but also as a result of the particular services that only QinetiQ can provide (i.e. the lack of a market for those services). The next section now revisits both the privatisation and ongoing relations to present an alternative explanation for QinetiQ. The company was not created to provide capacities lacking in the state, or because those services could be done more efficiently by private corporations. Rather, it was a matter of creating a private vehicle through which states and the private sector could work more closely together, driven by a rationality that favoured such cooperation. Moreover, both state and corporations were reconstituted through, and in furtherance of, that rationality.

4.5 Rethinking state-corporate relations

Instead of beginning analysis from the view that QinetiQ was a part of the MOD that was privatised, if the practices by which the ‘transfer’ of DERA activities to the private sector are examined from the perspective of how state-corporate relations are reworked through this process, it is possible to see a different analytical account of the QinetiQ story. What is presented here is not a moralising or ethical argument against the privatisation of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force, but rather an argument about the different dynamics that are revealed by moving away from ‘privatisation’ and instead taking seriously the rationality of the practices observed.

Before beginning, it is worth summarising Krahmann's discussion (2010) on the difficulties of the privatisation explanation per se. She seeks to understand why different states opt for different kinds of privatisation. While the fact that she begins with an understanding of the issue as 'privatisation' has been critiqued above, the focus here is on her turn to ideology to explain the differences. Noting that there is tension between Republicanism and Liberalism in explaining how the Social Contract should function, she argues this can explain the differences in implementation between (mainly Republican) Germany and (mainly Liberal) UK and USA. She concludes that the "privatization and outsourcing of military services in Europe and North America are in the process of fundamentally transforming the relationships between the state, the citizen and the soldier in modern democracies" (Krahmann 2010, 275). On this basis, she proceeds to a critical discussion of the effects of this on the "democratic control over the legitimate use of armed force" (Krahmann 2010, 283).

However, the argument of this chapter is that this is to have cause and effect in reverse order. Rather than the 'privatisation' of the use of legitimate armed force causing transformations in the social relationship, it is changes in understandings of the rightful relationship between states, corporations and citizens that is causing the increasing transfer of state activities to corporate actors. If, rather than seeing ideology as contributing to different implementations, attention is paid to the ways in which governmental rationalities concerning appropriate relations

between states, corporations and public life become embedded in state practices, it is possible to see how these also rework notions around the state's legitimate exercise of force. In other words, what is happening as illustrated by the QinetiQ case should be understood not as privatisation, but rather as the re-constitution of both states and corporations, and their relations. Taking seriously the underlying political rationality – the logics embedded in evolving practices – points to the ways in which what is understood in Security Studies as ‘privatisation’ has far more significant implications.

That is, the transfer to private ownership of a core function of the UK military had long ago become in-and-of-itself unremarkable in state practice. Section 3 set out how the ad-hoc denationalisations of the early Thatcher years shifted under the Major and Blair governments to a ‘partnership’ between the state and corporations, as exemplified in PFIs and PPPs. This governing logic of a partnership between state and corporations did not cease with the early Labour years, but intensified and continued through numerous changes in government. It is worth noting that PFIs and PPPs, by definition, “involve long-term relationships. Success can be achieved only if the public authority and the contractor *approach the project in a spirit of partnership*, with understanding of each other’s business and a *common vision* of how best they can work together” (Spackman 2002, 298 emphasis added). Understanding all these as ‘privatisation’ is to miss the point that since the 1980s the practices of state and corporation have

come to embody a very different rationality – one of close co-operation as being the ‘right’ way to dispose of social order. The rest of this section works through the mutually constitutive relations between states and corporations that have been revealed through the case study and the ways they have been reproduced as being in a joint project of not only the exercise of force, but also the production of social order more broadly.

4.5.1 Mutual constitution

Conventional understandings of the QinetiQ case as one of ‘privatisation’ would see the state and the corporation as essentially unchanged by the process. However, it is argued here that, seen through the lens of the British state’s reorganisation of the provision of military force, the state and the corporation have been significantly reworked through the practices outlined above, and that they are continuously and mutually constituted by their respective practices.

Understanding the creation of QinetiQ as act of privatisation rests on the assumption that the British state continues to maintain its monopoly over the legitimate exercise of violence - provided it exercises effective control over the new ‘service provider’. This then leads, as discussed above, to discussions of the problems of control and accountability, and implementation problems in the principal-agent vein. However, at base, the British military can no longer carry

out in isolation its essential function (national defence) because key activities within this – such as buying new hardware, testing equipment, making decisions on the effectiveness of weapons, etc. – necessarily have to be undertaken by a ‘private’ actor. There has been a fundamental transformation of the British military, such that what it is and what it can do are inextricably reliant on a private (‘external’) entity, one that is conventionally seen as (by its nature) at odds with the state – a corporation. As a result of spinning off QinetiQ, the British military and state are now *dependent* on the ‘private sector’, but not in the superficial ways suggested by the privatisation literature, but at a deeper, constitutive, level.

Moreover, the change outlined above goes beyond outsourcing, as QinetiQ manages all the UK’s firing ranges and testing facilities; is responsible for all testing and measuring instruments and equipment; and is an essential part of the process when the British military needs new equipment. This is not ‘opening up competition,’ but rather the handing over to the private sector of an essential (constitutive) part of the British military. This transfer was wholesale, rather than the cumulative result of multiple transfers. In other words, this moves well beyond increasing the commercial competitiveness of the DRA envisaged in the early moves of 1993 (UK Cabinet Office 1993). Now an essential part of the MOD has been moved into the private sector and, significantly, continues to provide many of the activities it carried out while part of the MOD, except that it now

makes a profit on the activities. (The very idea of competitiveness is questionable, as will be discussed below.)

Meanwhile, as a private company in the defence and security industry, QinetiQ is able to profit from technologically advanced products and services that (a) it relies on the British state (for the most part) continuing to purchase and (b) are developed on the basis of research that had been funded and undertaken by the British state over decades. As noted above, the ‘privatisation’ of the state’s intellectual property, even in the core arena of national defence, was considered unremarkable before, during and (as in the government reviews) after QinetiQ passed into private hands. Indeed, during the privatisation process, only commercially sensitive intellectual property (i.e. information that belonged to other corporations) in QinetiQ’s possession was the subject of discussion (National Audit Office 2007, 15). Also unremarkable was that the company was given responsibility for not only testing any new weapons or equipment the MOD might desire to purchase in the future but also to advise the MOD on appropriate future purchases – and that all these are services for which the British state would have to pay.

The extensive government reviews of the QinetiQ privatisation process in 2007 and 2008 did not focus on any of these aspects – rather, as the National Audit Office noted, QinetiQ was seen as a ‘good’ candidate for privatisation: “It had a solid asset base, good cash flows, and stable customers. It also had a number of

significant contracts, including the Long Term Partnering Agreement which, although not in place at the time, would be finalised before the deal was completed” (2007, 21). Whether the state capacities and activities that had been relocated within QinetiQ were appropriate for privatisation was never the issue.

The state-QinetiQ partnership continues to change the way the British MOD and military operates. In 2015, QinetiQ and the MOD announced a Strategic Enterprise framework agreement that will change the way they collaborate in the future. Although the details are yet to emerge, it will bring individual platform projects under the same framework and will compel the MOD to “select required outputs from a standardised list … rather than developing and agreeing a bespoke set of tasks for every new project” (QinetiQ 2016a, 16). This is projected to deliver savings due to “improvements in joint working arrangement” (QinetiQ 2016a, 16).

This is unproblematic in the ‘privatisation view’ as the MOD (the customer) will have final control, but it will (and is designed to) change the way the way the MOD operates, with defence employees and projects being constrained by the pre-agreed list, or costing extra to modify the list. As QinetiQ states, its current work includes to “*support [the MOD's] transformation*” (QinetiQ 2015a, 15). That is, integral to continuing state-corporate relations in this instance is envisaged further reworking of the state and its practices.

Thus, both the British state and QinetiQ have been reconstituted through the processes described. Political questions of how best to organise social order, were

problematised as technical questions around how to more efficiently provide government services. Over time, the rationality of closer state-corporate relations as the best way to organise service provision dominated to such an extent that ‘efficiency’ is assumed in the QinetiQ case to have been created through the sale, with no evidence provided, or even sought, to support this (as will be discussed below). What has resulted is an arrangement that will continue to reconstitute both state and corporation to drive even closer relations. However, closer public-private relations are not limited to the MOD and QinetiQ, as discussed below – the process of privatisation itself was a joint one between the public and private sectors.

4.5.2 In it together

As discussed above, a central assumption in the security literature on PMSCs is that the state and corporation should be understood as distinct actors linked by contractual arrangements – i.e. between client and service provider – and consequently, analysis turns on questions of (state) control and accountability, and related principle-agent problems. However, this is to rely on assumptions of decision making whereby not only does the state (the principle) have final authority over the corporation’s conduct (the agent), but also that the state is always the key decision maker.

However, the process by which QinetiQ was created and then moved into private ownership well illustrates that such assumptions are problematic. At every step of the process the state always worked closely with private corporations in *making* key decisions. Corporate actors were pivotal to the ‘privatisation’ process itself as expert advisors; members of the state’s steering committee, providing various key legal and management guidance; etc. Such ‘public-private’ relations – ‘inside’ state institutional practices – are so routine and widespread as to be unremarkable in much analyses, but they are nonetheless hugely consequential.

Dr Michael Lawrence and Sir Alan Rudge were invited on the steering group of the project precisely because they were from the private sector (National Audit Office 2007, 13). Sir Alan in particular was the then President of the Association for Innovation, Research and Technology Organisations (AIRTO). AIRTO describes itself as “the foremost membership body for organisations operating in the UK’s innovation, research and technology sector” and exists to “influence and improve the strategy and climate for innovation for our Members by forging links and progressing dialogue with key decision makers in government and industry across technology intensive sectors” (AIRTO n.d.). Thus, not only was it unproblematic, it was *appropriate* for the head of the industry association representing the competitors of the new organisation (i.e. other suppliers to the military) to be on the steering group.

Similarly, private corporations were heavily involved in the privatisation process not just as financial advisors, but also in assisting the MOD in *designing* the process and also *selecting* the private sector partner (Carlyle Group) for the privatisation. UBS Warburg, for example, earned over £2.5 million for the work it did on the project, but the figure pales in comparison to the law firm Simmons and Simmons which made over £10 million. The management consultancies PWC and ArthurAnderson together were paid over £5million - out of a total consultancy cost of £28.7 million (National Audit Office 2007).

The work done by UBS Warburg (now rebranded UBS), a global firm providing financial services and present in over 50 countries, is indicative of the routine interweaving of public and private *in state practice* that this chapter points to. The date of QinetiQ's privatisation was delayed from 2002 to 2003 because UBS Warburg convinced the MOD that the commercial climate for floating a new company was poor in 2002¹⁰. UBS Warburg was then involved all the way through the process of selecting the firm with which to enter into the part privatisation arrangement. There had been considerable interest in the potential privatisation since 1999, and UBS Warburg had maintained contact with forty-four potential investors in the interim period. When the MOD met with potentially interested

¹⁰ The information in this paragraph comes from the National Audit Office report (2007), in which this is presented as unproblematic data.

parties, UBS Warburg was responsible for arranging the meetings. After the process was officially launched, market responses were assessed by the MOD and UBS Warburg. Indicative bids were evaluated jointly by the MOD and UBS Warburg, with input from the board of (soon to be privatised) QinetiQ. The state's decision to reduce the shortlist from seven to four was based on advice prepared by UBS Warburg, which concluded that three of the seven bidders were "not strong enough to be taken forward to the next round" (as noted above, MOD disagreed with this, but nonetheless 'its' decision was to shorten the list). Final bids were again jointly evaluated by the MOD and UBS Warburg. Once the Carlyle Group was selected as the equity partner of choice, UBS Warburg also advised the MOD on the contractual adjustments that the Carlyle Group sought, which resulted in negotiating a price reduction of £30million and an increase in Carlyle's stake from 35 percent to 37.5 percent (National Audit Office 2007, 17–18).

What is noteworthy about such private involvement in state practices is the extent to which they are so normal and ubiquitous as to not warrant attention. While the National Audit Office was concerned about tensions between the MOD and the (pre-privatised) QinetiQ Board, it made no mention of the relationship between the MOD and UBS Warburg. Throughout the report, where certain decisions are questioned, the decisions are portrayed as being made by 'the Department' while any refutations are provided by 'the Department and UBS Warburg' (National

Audit Office 2007). Thus, the company is discursively written out of its central roles in gathering information; controlling the meetings; analysing the data; making recommendations; and *also* in making key decisions such as who to partner with and when. Driven by an understanding of what happened as ‘privatisation’, the fiction of a government in control while private sector actors ‘provide services’ and merely augment the government with certain capacities, is maintained. This is not to point to some conspiracy at work, but to highlight that it is taken for granted as a normal part of contemporary state practices. Analytically, however, it calls into question the assumptions inherent to conceptualising state-corporate relations in security arenas as essentially contractual ones.

Notably, the joint effort between public and private sectors does not stop once the ‘contract’ is signed. As the Capita case study discussed in section 3 establishes, these arrangements are seen as successful even as both state and corporations continue to take what might otherwise be seen as ‘losses’. To dismiss these as ‘exceptions’ relies on the ongoing lack of analysis about how these finances operate – and as the reviews into QinetiQ show, this is never the focus of criticism or review. That so many disparate actors failed to analyse or indeed question financial losses, missed targets and the lack of competition cannot be explained as ideology or conspiracy. Instead, it is better explained as the effect of a political rationality in which closer state and corporate relations is an unquestioned good,

driving a set of practices that come to be termed ‘privatisation’ but instead can be seen as mutually transforming the state and the corporation and constituting them in new relations with each other.

4.6 Conclusion

Although routinely viewed as (yet) another instance of privatisation of state assets, the creation and transfer to private hands of QinetiQ is, on the face of it, a peculiar development. First, what this entailed was the British state amalgamating and transferring wholesale to private ownership a set of functions, capacities and knowledges that are arguably integral to what is considered to be the primary function of the state: national defence. In effect, the British state sold the ‘brains’ of its military establishment. This was not a case of ancillary functions being privatised or outsourced, so the military could focus on its core functions. Neither was it a case of core state capacities being augmented by private capacity - indeed, it was not self-evident at any stage that overall British military capacity would be enhanced by privatising DRA, DERA or QinetiQ.

Second, it is clear from the criticisms highlighted by the government’s own reviews of 2007 and 2008 that in commercial terms, the sale did not provide the state with a windfall. Indeed, the conclusion seems to be that the taxpayer lost out (even relative to the ever changing ‘market valuation’ provided by private actors tasked with executing the sale). Third, from the outset it was always envisaged

that QinetiQ, after being privatised, would remain the key advisor to British military on its future procurement and planning, and therefore to the state's primary role of national defence. That is, that QinetiQ would have "a *vital role* in carrying out research and advising the [MOD] on the development and procurement of equipment as well as managing the testing and evaluation of this equipment" (National Audit Office 2007, 4).

What, then, was the point? This chapter suggested that the lens of 'privatisation' is unhelpful for answering this. Privatisation is a specific epistemic approach, and one loaded with both theoretical, and often normative, assumptions. By contrast, it is argued here that the QinetiQ case should be understood as the working through British state practices of a governmental rationality wherein the combining of public and private conduct is the *essential* basis for the production of good order (security). In Foucauldian terms, government is the 'conduct of conduct', and a governmental rationality is an ideal of "the *right* disposition of men and things, arranged so as to lead to a suitable end," (2007, 96 emphasis added). Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, a governmental rationality, "in and of itself, does not prescribe exact policies or practices; rather, it defines 'the problem-space' of producing order in ways that make the governing of conduct intelligible, calculable and 'practicable'" (Rampton and Nadarajah 2017, 448). The above exploration of the case of QinetiQ – just one amongst numerous such 'privatisations' and public-private partnerships over recent decades – enables

excavation of how the rationality governing (here, British) state conduct is about the state-corporate relationship *itself*. In other words, it is less about the specific cost/benefit calculations inherent to this or that instance of ‘privatisation’, or indeed the perceived governing problems for which private agency is deemed to provide the answer. Rather, the essential *problem* of rule becomes the absence of private agency within state practice. Therefore, the question for governing conduct becomes not *whether* the corporation should be integrated into state action, but *how*.

Whilst this might appear not very different from neoliberal governmentality, there are important differences. For example, it is not simply about the primacy of market logics and competition per se, but the uniting of the public and the private in governing practices. The notion of ‘Public Private Partnerships’ might be seen as banal ‘management speak’, but it also well captures a commonsense now well embedded in British state practice as a whole i.e. that public-private integration in public goods provision is both normal and appropriate, such that it is deviations from this (i.e. sole state responsibility) that need justification. Focussed primarily on attempts to manage individual conduct and, through this, the population, neoliberal governmentality scholarship has largely neglected the specificity of state-corporation practices (this is discussed further in the next chapter). While neoliberal governmentality is seen to turn on logics of competition, entrepreneurship, self-reliance, etc., these were noticeably absent in the

protracted state-corporate practices that created QinetiQ and transferred it to private ownership. They are also noticeably absent in post-privatisation relations between QinetiQ and the British state, with the former heavily reliant on the latter (including in the form of non-competitively allocated contracts) for its continued viability.

Further, conventional explanations of the value of increased competition through the involvement of the private sector also do not explain the practices observed. The process of ‘privatising’ QinetiQ changed to a “negotiated process” rather than a competitive one (National Audit Office 2007, 22) as soon as the Carlyle Group was appointed. Moreover, as both the National Audit Office and the Committee on Public Accounts found, significant decisions were made only after this decision, including the percentage of the firm sold, and at what price. Further, the lack of a market for the services provided by QinetiQ was explicitly acknowledged by the National Audit Office, which recognised the “absence of other comparable service providers” (2007, 9). Instead, these all become explainable when viewed through the lens of a political rationality of closer state-corporate relations.

Given the ascendancy over four decades of this rationality in the states representative of ‘advanced liberalism’ (Rose, 1999), such as the UK and US but others besides, it is not surprising that it has also extensively colonised the realm of the state’s use of military force. The historic tracing above of the case of the ‘privatisation’ of QinetiQ illustrates this. The project emerged and was sustained

over a decade and by successive governments. Yet its initiation was not prompted by any obvious problem for state management, let alone for state use of military force. In this context, the significance of transferring to private ownership core functions of the state in relation to national defence has never been the subject of criticism or debate, although the process itself was conducted without secrecy and has been subject of at least two major *post hoc* reviews. Indeed, as one review noted, QinetiQ was seen as a ‘good’ candidate for privatisation (National Audit Office 2007, 21). Thus, the key governing problem solved by the privatisation of QinetiQ was, at base, the absence of corporate involvement in this area of state practice: the goals, as set out by the MOD, included that of developing “effective and productive relationships between private and public sector” (National Audit Office 2007, 4).

The next chapter now turns to rise of resilience as a security practice. While this is conventionally understood as a response to the ‘increasing complexity’ of the threats faced, closer attention to how state corporate relations are being reproduced through resilience practices reveals that the underlying rationality is also one of closer integration between the practices of states and corporations.

5. Resilience: reconstituting British state-corporate relations

5.1 Introduction

In the last few decades, resilience has emerged as a – if not the – key approach to security. In policy documents, the concept of resilience emerges out of a conceptualisation of the world as a complex place with a range of often unfathomable and unquantifiable threats. Resilience is consequently understood as a process or capacity that makes societies, states, corporations and other actors more secure by making them better able to deal with, or recover from, threat.

Actors are held to become ‘more resilient’ through the acquisition of the necessary skills, capacities and capability to deal with unknowable threats and – resilience is the process by which organisations move towards being more resilient. National or state security demands resilience in a complex system with many parts and resilience has increasingly become understood as the closer integration of these parts. In this view, if the various parts of a society work more seamlessly together, then society itself is more resilient. In the modern era, with neoliberalism as an overarching governing mentality, corporations have become a significant part of discussions about resilience and their integration into security practices is seen as essential for a resilient state. However, in the scholarship on resilience, the presence of the corporation is either taken for granted or ignored.

A variety of disciplines address the issue of resilience: from psychology to ecology, organisational design to management. There is also a significant scholarship in

International Security on the topic, which is the focus of this chapter. However, this scholarship is divided on the role of corporations in resilience. Problem-solving and policy scholars are interested in the process and problems of resilience building. They accept that the corporation is normatively central to any discussion, whether as asset owners or as part of the business community that must contribute to making the state secure. Critical scholars, on the other hand, are more concerned with issues such as the genealogy of the term, the underlying assumptions about complexity or the impact of resilient approaches for populations and concepts of security itself (as discussed below). To them, the corporation may be part of the process of resilience building, but it is not worthy of study and thus is not the object of their analytical focus. Thus, the state corporate relationship in resilience has not been critically investigated in the scholarship.

This chapter seeks to address this gap by reviewing resilience practices. It finds that the process of building resilience is described, in both the problem-solving literature and policy documents, as being about closer integration between the state and corporations. The view, as discussed in detail later, is that the way to make the state more resilient is by bringing corporations more below into state security practices. For instance, in areas like critical infrastructure, the greater the involvement of the private sector, the more resilient the sector is assumed to be. In contrast, predominantly state-led sectors are assessed as having to ‘do more’ to

become resilient. Thus, policy documents and the problem-solving literature posit closer integration of corporations into state practices as *the way* to achieve resilience. In contrast, this chapter argues that this has become the end goal of resilience practices. Thus, rather than integration being the means to an end, it is now the end in itself. By seeing resilience as a rationality of governance, and by investigating the practices of resilience, this chapter argues that resilience building or being resilient are understood as integrated relations between the state and corporations. The broader framework of neoliberal governmentality cannot capture this nuance: with its focus on competition and market logics, it cannot explain the uncompetitive and oligopolistic practices observed here. The analysis offered here sees these instances instead as part of a rationality of resilience in which closer state-corporate integration itself enhances state security.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the security literature as it pertains to resilience. It begins with a discussion of the relationship between resilience and neoliberalism, before turning to the criticality of the idea of complexity to any discussion of resilience. It then surveys discussions on generating resilience to show the centrality of corporations, before surveying the critical literature, to show that despite the multitude of analytical concerns, this scholarship does not engage with corporations as an object worthy of investigation. The section concludes with a review of the scholarship on resilience in critical infrastructure. Section 3 then turns to the case study on critical

infrastructure. While the focus is on the UK, the section begins by locating the security of critical infrastructure in policy documents, not only in the UK but across five states, to show that the approach to critical infrastructure resilience is not restricted to the British state. It discusses resilience in two critical sectors in the UK, Energy and Telecommunications. The discussion of Energy focusses on plans to make electricity substations more resilient to flooding while the discussion of Telecommunications analyses crisis response plans. These cases cover different aspects of what is understood as ‘resilience’ – the Energy sector case is about *building* resilience, while the Telecommunications sector case is about *responding* resiliently to crisis. Section 4 then revisits the cases in light of the claim made here about the centrality of corporations to resilience. It demonstrates that in both these sectors resilience *is* understood to be realised by closer state corporate relations, rather than closer integration facilitating resilience through the emergence of new capacities or reduced risk. The chapter concludes with a summary of its argument and a brief discussion of some implications.

5.2 Resilience in the literature

This section surveys the literature on resilience and security. It begins by setting out how resilience emerges in International Security, tracing the history of the concept through the work of Crawford S. Holling in ecology and Friedrich Hayek in economics. Given the correlation between resilience and neoliberalism, and

that these scholars in particular were interested in solving similar puzzles, as discussed below, neoliberalism and resilience are seen by many scholars as closely aligned (see for instance Walker and Cooper 2011; B. Evans and Reid 2013; Kaufmann 2013). Though other scholars dispute this link (see for instance Heath-Kelly 2016) resilience comes into prominence as a technology of security in the era of neoliberalism. In the neoliberal era, corporations are vital to many aspects of state security, especially resilience as this chapter argues.

Resilience, as a concept, exists in various disciplines and addresses different concerns in each. Psycho-social theorists were concerned with human beings and their varying abilities to handle and recover from life events (see for instance Werner and Smith 2001; Curtis and Cicchetti 2003; Werner 1993; Masten and Garmezy 1985; Wilson 2012). Environmental and ecological scholars analysed ecological systems and their ability to recovery from disasters and return to a state of equilibrium or to adapt (Winkelman, Bishins, and Kooshian 2010; Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007). Business scholars focus on resilience with the corporate arena, whether this be in terms of organisational design or business continuity planning (Bell 2002; Alesi 2008; Sahebjamnia, Torabi, and Mansouri 2015). In security scholarship, the idea of resilience has been traced to the strategies of Napoleon's armies, which were organised around the tolerance of uncertainty and the fostering of an *esprit de corps* whereby morale supplemented the physical capacities of the forces (Zebrowski 2016; Heath-Kelly 2016). However, the

concept merged to dominate the security policy and International Security lexicons after the 1970s, when scholars put together work in systems ecology and economics, to analyse the ability of socio-ecological systems to adapt and handle adversities (Walker and Cooper 2011; De Weijer 2013; Zebrowski 2013).

Resilience has also been studied as being both top-down and bottom-up processes (see for instance Rogers 2013; Bourbeau and Ryan 2017). That is, some see it as being generated from within populations while others see it as being generated through policies imposed from the state (i.e. above). The focus in this chapter is not on individual corporations or humans, but rather on the resilience as a technology for re/producing social order. Thus, this chapter is concerned with resilience in terms of the system as a whole (the social order). However, despite the systemic nature of resilience being studied, and notwithstanding the assumptions of policy makers and problem-solving scholars, resilience is not primarily a state-led project, as discussed below.

5.2.1 Resilience and neoliberalism

The relationship between resilience and neoliberalism is not only well documented, it is taken for granted. Both concepts emerged and became dominant at a similar time and out of similar concerns around managing complex systems.

The core of the relationship is summed up in Jeremy Walker and Melinda

Cooper's influential article, which suggests that resilience has been so successfully incorporated into the social sciences due to "the proximity between the emergent discourse of 'resilience' and contemporary neoliberal doctrines" (2011, 145). The authors point to the accord between Holling's work in systems ecology and Hayek's work in market economics to justify their claims.

In the early stages of both economics and ecology, the idea of a return to equilibrium in the aftermath of a shock or disruption was key. However, as the fields developed, they moved away from this idea of a given equilibrium, or in the case of ecology, a 'balance of nature'. Instead, they began to focus on the ability of the system to remain cohesive through adversity – to adapt to meet handle the crisis. Holling (1973), for instance, distinguishes between engineering and ecological resilience. Engineering resilience is the ability of a system to return to equilibrium after a disruption, while ecological resilience is the ability of a system to remain cohesive through the disruption. He saw resilience as "a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of ... variables and parameters, and still persist" (Holling 1973, 17). Thus, this view of resilience meant a shift from thinking about a state of equilibrium, to focusing on the necessary conditions for persistence in the face of adversity (Zebrowski 2013). This view of resilience came to dominate, especially when seen in light of the work of the 'Austrian' school of economic philosophy led by Hayek.

Working at a similar time, Hayek understood social systems as complex, adaptive, and non-linear – similar to how Holling saw ecological systems. Hayek advocated for an epistemology of limited knowledge and uncertain futures, in preference to what he saw as the intellectual failures of a Keynesian system that falsely promised certainty. He argued that disruptions were not only inevitable, but also necessary to ensure the creativity of complexity and the market (Hayek 1974). Thus, to Hayek, allowing market forces to dominate would ensure a system that was better able to respond to the uncertain futures, and “the immanent laws of market freedom [must be] prior to those of state or any other transcendental law-making power” (Walker and Cooper 2011, 150 insert added). This is because economies “rather than being shielded … through state finance, would need to be opened to [wider economies], in order to allow processes of adaptation and co-evolution to operate” (Zebrowski 2013, 169 insert added). It is worth noting that under the analysis below, it is not about the state shielding economies or corporations. Rather, corporations and the state are both essential to resilience approaches and they work together on this, but more on this below. For now, it is sufficient to note that the close relationship between neoliberalism and resilience is established through the discussion of the similar concerns and ideas that led to their emergence in the social sciences at a similar time in the 1970s. The bringing together of market logics, with the understanding of the social world as a complex

system, results in resilience emerging as a conceptual frame for tackling insecurity and the production of a secure state and society.

There is an emergent criticism of the focus on the relationship between resilience and neoliberalism. Philippe Bourbeau has argued for example that “by contending that resilience is in essence a product of neoliberal doctrine at the service of states, these approaches to resilience do not sufficiently distance themselves from the discourses and practices of liberal democracies” and that they “appear to make the mistake of equating a particular government’s use of resilience with the concept of resilience” (2015, 379; see also Corry 2014). The possibility that resilience may manifest in other forms elsewhere (though Bourbeau himself offers no examples and notes that the scholars he criticises do not do so either (2015)) are not relevant here. It is the practices of the British state that are being studied in this chapter and the analysis undertaken is not on forms of resilience *per se*, but rather on resilience in security. Others have argued that resilience is not a continuation of neoliberalism but rather a response to it (J. Schmidt 2015; Hall and Lamont 2013). But this too is not a concern here, as the exact nature of the relationship between resilience and neoliberalism is not what is being assessed. Rather, all that is being claimed here is that there are links between resilience and neoliberalism, in their emergence from concerns with similar problems. Despite these links and common origins, resilience practices are not easily or adequately explained as expressions of a neoliberal governmentality. The discussion below shows that resilience practices

that might appear surprising or at odds with neoliberal principals and concerns are better understood as instances of a governmentality of closer state-corporate integration. The following section discusses the scholarship on complexity, before turning to the literature on generating resilience.

5.2.2 Complexity

The idea that resilience is dependent on a concept of the world as complex has engaged the attention of many scholars. Problem-solving scholars take complexity for granted, and focus on developing policies to cope with it (De Weijer 2013; Boin and McConnell 2007a). Critical scholars on the other hand have critically interrogated the idea of complexity; to understand how it is construed and the implications thereof (Chandler 2012; O'Connor et al. 2016) and to uncover and evaluate the underlying epistemological changes that lead to complexity becoming taken for granted as the frame through which the world is viewed (Aradau 2014).

These are now discussed in turn.

In policy praxis and positivist scholarship, the complexity of the world is taken for granted and scholars focus on the policies and practices needed to develop or enhance resilience (De Weijer 2013; Boin and McConnell 2007a). Taking for granted that threats are complex, too numerous and varying for any useful analyses thereof, the scholarship focuses on dealing with emergencies, understood

as unforeseen but predictable events (Perry and Lindell 2006), and crises, which are conceptualised as events of a higher magnitude ('t Hart 1993; Rosenthal, Charles, and 't Hart 1989). In this view, understanding the nature of threats is important, but only to the extent of quantifying their impact. Thus, the nature of the threat – whether it is a natural disaster or terrorism, for instance – is irrelevant for discussions on the resilience of the system. This is captured in the practice of dealing with 'all hazards', rather than seeing them as threats or events (as discussed below; see also Paton and Johnston 2001; Berkes 2007).

Critical scholars also accept that complexity is important to resilience, but they do not take it for granted as a 'natural' phenomenon (Walker and Cooper 2011; Bourbeau 2013; Chandler 2012; Brassett and Vaughan-Williams 2015; Brassett, Croft, and Vaughan-Williams 2013). They seek to study not only how this view of the world as complex comes about (Aradau 2014), but also what the implications of that might be (Pospisil and Kühn 2016; O'Connor et al. 2016; Chandler 2014).

Claudia Aradau (2014) traces the changing understanding of contingencies through three possible epistemic regimes – ignorance and secrecy, risk and uncertainty, and surprise and novelty. She argues that while in the first regime knowledge is to be discovered by studying the world, in the second it is to be known through the analysis of parallel worlds of models and simulations. By contrast she argues, in the third regime events are always emergent, such that future events can never be fully known. She argues that this is the epistemological

world in which resilience emerges as a way of dealing with these ‘unknown unknowns’. This refers to seeing threats as future events, and therefore always surprises or contingent, and in this view, “the unknown is always already part of the world, but it cannot be made visible either through accessing a deeper secret or through modelling uncertainty through risk management techniques” (Aradau 2014, 77). Others focus on the implications of seeing the world as complex. Similar to Aradau, David Chandler (2014), for instance, argues that this is a new understanding of social order within which resilience emerges as a form of governance. His focus is on the ways these new forms of governance evade traditional liberal ideas of representation and government. He categorises the liberal approach as managing ‘known knowns’, and the neoliberal approach as managing ‘known unknowns’, before arguing that a resilience approach is more concerned with ‘post-neoliberal unknown unknowns’. He argues that unknown unknowns are “only revealed *post hoc*, through the appearance of the problem” (Chandler 2014, 62). Thus, dealing with them requires the development of attributes such as self-reflexivity and responsivity. Others have suggested that a complexity approach means that resilience is about living through contingency and uncertainty, rather than seeking to mitigate or avoid them (B. Evans and Reid 2013; Chandler 2012). This is taken up again later in the section on critical scholarship on resilience.

The impacts of a complexity approach are clearer when applied to a specific practice, such as development. In that space, the argument is that the development-security nexus (Duffield 2001) is being challenged by an emerging resilience-disaster management nexus (O'Connor et al. 2016). These scholars argue that the focus has shifted from security to uncertainty, with resultant changes in what is to be done to develop states and how it is to be done (Söderbaum and Sörensen 2012; see also Pospisil and Kühn 2016). For instance, it is argued that a view of the world as complex and uncontrollable leads from attempting to fix 'failed' states, to seeing them as 'fragile' entities to be managed (Pospisil and Kühn 2016). Another example would be in the context of food security. Scholars argue that a non-resilience security approach might seek to pre-empt or contain disruptive events, or develop strategies to avoid the disaster in the first place, while a resilience approach would aim only to equip the population with the capacity to live with instabilities caused by complexity (O'Connor et al. 2016). Problem-solving scholars see the causes of food insecurity as natural (cyclical or systemic) instabilities, and their focus is on developing policy options for dealing with them (Hamann et al. 2011; Pingali, Alinovi, and Sutton 2005). For instance, in seeking to enhance food system resilience, scholars posit the stresses on the food system as being external to it and beyond control, before analysing the policy options and implications of different responses (Pingali, Alinovi, and Sutton 2005). Critical scholars, on the other hand, would argue that socio-economic and political

instabilities (complex hazards) are created through the neoliberal food system and that resilience seeks to manage that instability rather than eradicating it (O'Connor et al. 2016).

However, it is important to note that where complexity per se is the object of analysis, the centrality of corporations is often obscured. In contrast, the corporation is visible and often central to discussions of resilience in specific fields. For instance, in the context of food security, resilience practices are understood to be about “transforming food insecure farmers into global food producers with access to diverse food production inputs and markets” (O'Connor et al. 2016, 14). Or resilience is in the “market-oriented mechanisms [that] are embedded into the practices of both civil and emergency services in partnership with the private sector” (Rogers 2013, 323). In these studies, the centrality of the state-corporate relationship to resilience is recognised. However, given their focus on complexity, this is not investigated further. The scholarship on generating resilience does however take for granted the centrality of the private sector, and the section now surveys this literature.

5.2.3 Generating resilience

Resilience does not emerge in a vacuum, but is rather a “a sociohistorically informed, dynamic, and varied process” (Bourbeau 2015, 381). As discussed above,

the characteristic assumptions and practices of resilience have been shaped by its co-emergence with neo-liberalism. Resilience has become incorporated into an array of neo-liberal practices such that the idea of resilience as a way to achieve security has become the “preferred dialect of management-speak, the standardized and standardizing bureaucratic parlance” of governance (Davis 2016, 136). The problem-solving scholarship, which takes conceptions of resilience and complexity for granted, recognises the central role of corporations in resilience, albeit often implicitly.

These scholars focus on the practices and policies needed to achieve resilience. Suggestions include the need to develop adaptability, and redundancy in the system, thus creating the resources, capabilities and capacities needed to cope with crises (De Weijer 2013). Practical steps suggested include training first responders, developing business continuity plans, and engaging all relevant parties in planning, preparation and training processes (Boin and McConnell 2007a). Governments are encouraged to provide private actors with incentives to “anticipate, mitigate and plan” for adverse events (Boin and McConnell 2007a, 55). Scholars also call for the development of practices that generate options at the time of crisis, including ‘institutional multiplicity’ which refers to creating alternatives for those seeking support during and after adverse occurrences (De Weijer 2013).

In crisis management, resilience building is about considering the components of the disaster cycle (response, recovery, mitigation and preparedness) together in making decisions about how to handle a disaster (G. O'Brien and Read 2005). This creates capacity and avoids the gaps between the various organisations responsible for different aspects of disaster response. In urban planning, resilience is increasingly being applied to and embedded in the built environment of the city (Coaffee 2006). Articulations of resilience are said to be different to traditional notions of emergency planning or disaster recovery, because they provide threads around which different disciplines congregate, such as greater preparedness, the broadening of the emergency planning agenda, and the promotion of institutional resilience (Coaffee 2006, 397–99). Again, the idea is that resilience lies in the integration of the different parts of the system so as to ensure the security of the whole system.

This section of the literature recognises the significance of the private sector – whether as first responders, the institutions to be made resilient, or as asset owners and critical infrastructure developers, private actors are essential to these efforts. However, the scholarship generally assumes that the state is in charge of the project (De Weijer 2013; Boin and McConnell 2007a; Coaffee 2006; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011). Resilience is understood as a “top-down project”, with the state in charge via a “clear responsibility chain with a named lead ministry attached to it” (Pospisil and Gruber 2016, 210). Policy recommendations also stress

that the responsibility lies with the state. For instance, one strategy for enhancing resilience is that *governments* should “get to know these private actors who will be their counterparts during a crisis” (Boin and McConnell 2007a, 55). Or in discussions of critical infrastructure, the puzzle is posed as to “how public authorities and front-line agencies should respond” (Boin and McConnell 2007b, 2). In all these examples, the responsibility for responding to crisis or ‘making resilient’ is assumed to lie with the state. This often results in corporations not being seen as a worthy object of analysis.

Thus, in this literature, corporations are recognised as vital to resilience, albeit the ‘final’ responsibility is seen as resting with the state. This view sees states and corporations as being in a principal-agent relationship, whereby the state maintains control of designing and developing policy, while corporations play a key role in implementation only. Thus, corporations are secondary to the state, with no attempt made to understand them as having agency in resilience practices¹¹ and results in policy prescriptions for building resilience being directed at the state. As will be discussed in section 3, this is not borne out by resilience practices, which instead reveal that efforts are a joint exercise between corporations and states, rather than being state-led.

¹¹ The literature on corporate, business or organisational resilience deals with these actors (see for instance Bell 2002), but the focus is on the entity itself and as such does not discuss the system or social order, which is the focus of this chapter.

5.2.4 Concerns of critical scholarship

Critical scholars are more concerned with understanding the implications of taking a resilience approach rather than with the details of so doing. The analysis that is focussed on tracing the genealogy of the concept (Zebrowski 2016, 2013; Walker and Cooper 2011) has been discussed above in dealing with the relationship between resilience and neoliberalism. Other critical scholars have generally taken a governmentality approach and seek to understand the effects of resilience practices on populations. They see resilience as a rationality of governance and seek to analyse the effects of this ‘conduct of conducts’ (B. Evans and Reid 2013; Joseph 2013a; Lentzos and Rose 2009; B. Evans and Reid 2014; Dillon and Reid 2009). To them, resilience is not an end state, but rather a logic of governance, which leads to discussions on how the responsibility to achieve security is transferred from the state to the entity to be secured (Joseph 2013a; Kaufmann 2013), and raises questions about whether the ways it makes life more uncertain (B. Evans and Reid 2014; Chandler 2012).

To some scholars, resilience transfers the responsibility from the state to the other agents, individuals or other actors. Thus, these other actors become the agents of their own security (Joseph 2013a). Often this is understood as individuals being responsible for their own arrangements, with the argument that “in order to survive the uncertainties of complex systems, people have to show their own

initiative as active and reflexive agents capable of adaptive behaviour" (Joseph 2013a, 39). Others understand the consequence of the transfer of responsibility as leading to 'self-organisation', because in a world of 'connectivity', the objects of security have a responsibility to arrange themselves to achieving it (Kaufmann 2013). Programmes to 'build resilience' are no longer about protecting populations, but rather the populations are "appealed to organise themselves according to a given ... protocol" (Kaufmann 2013, 61). Another approach is that, in managing life among 'unknown unknowns', resilience is about developing attitudes such as 'self-reflexivity' and 'responsivity' in the population (Chandler 2014). Thus, resilience results in the object of security (understood as the population) having a responsibility to secure itself. Other scholars are more interested in the broader effect, on whether resilience leads to security. While the governmentality literature has always understood security as prioritising some forms of life over others (Dillon and Reid 2009; Chandler 2012), scholars study the ways in which resilience leads to insecurity. For instance, there is an argument that resilience is about making the exceptional normal, not seeking to prevent disruptions but accepting them and organising life on that basis (B. Evans and Reid 2013, 2014). In this view, the underlying ontology of life is vulnerability (B. Evans and Reid 2013, 84), and life is made precarious because populations have to adapt to suffering, rather than working to prevent it.

This scholarship has been criticised for being too totalizing, with the suggestion that resilience is portrayed as a state-led project that will be ‘inevitably successful’ (Bourbeau 2015; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011). The criticism is that governmentality and biopolitics in particular have been used as a catch-all (Coleman and Grove 2009), where resilience is studied as a “fully formed mode of governance [that] … actually works” as the authors describe it (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011, 375 insert added). This scholarship is also criticised for presenting resilience as the “continuity of a state’s rationality, interest and dominance” (Bourbeau 2015, 379; see also Corry 2014). Instead, these critics argue that resilience can be transformative, with its focus on “remodelling an individual or social structure” (Bourbeau and Ryan 2017, 6). Bourbeau for instance, offers an alternative understanding of resilience as “the process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks” (2015, 375). The focus is on the positive effects of resilience, rather than seeing it as negative or as part of a broader rationality that cannot be challenged. It has also been noted that the objects being made resilient are not uniform, and instead are “open, vulnerable, and often absurd systems that continually falter and backfire” (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011, 369).

However, these criticisms, like the scholarship they seek to criticise, have overlooked the role of corporations in their analyses. The public-private relationship that is at the core of resilience is deemed not worthy of analytical

concern, either taken for granted or not ‘seen’. This is not to suggest that these scholars are ignorant of the role of corporations or that they seek to normalise these relations. Rather, it is that they accept that this occurs in praxis but choose to analyse resilience in ways that do not need to account for the corporation and its relations with the state.

Jonathan Joseph for instance, draws on UK policy documents that are explicit about the centrality of state corporate relations (but see also Fjäder 2014 for a similar discussion of Australian policy documents). For instance, he refers to the British understanding that the best way to generate resilience is through “a coalition of public, private and third sectors, between owners or operators of critical sites and essential services; with business, with local authorities and communities” (Joseph 2013b, 255). He himself understands the effects of resilience as being “active [state] intervention into civil society and the opening up of new areas to the logic of private enterprise and individual initiative” (Joseph 2013a, 42).

Thus, in his view, the effect of resilience is the promotion of market logics. His analytical frame of reference remains at the level of markets and capital, and thus he does not see the state-corporate relationship itself as being of analytical significance. Indeed, he is more interested in understanding the “new philosophies of the social order that emphasise a shift away from a focus on things like social structure, class, the state and stable identity in favour of a belief in contingency,

complexity and uncertainty” (Joseph 2013b, 254). Therefore, he does not investigate corporations themselves.

5.2.5 Critical infrastructure resilience

This section now concludes with short overview of the resilience literature on critical infrastructure, before moving onto the case studies. Infrastructure emerged as being of relevance to security in the 1990s in the United States, under the Clinton administration (S. Collier and Lakoff 2008). Definitions of critical infrastructure vary widely, with not only difficulties in determining which infrastructures are ‘critical’, but also in understanding the circumstances under which they become so (Boin and McConnell 2007b). Despite this, there is a burgeoning literature on their security and resilience. The focus of this chapter is not on critical infrastructure per se, but rather on the practices of resilience that can be observed around them.

Scholarship on the resilience of critical infrastructure has generally focused on the effectiveness of systems and the development of better policy prescriptions. Positivist approaches are summed up by a special issue of the *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*. In the light of Hurricane Katerina and the failure of critical infrastructure in its aftermath, the scholars “identified causes of failure, explored potential consequences of breakdown, and discussed remedial

courses of action" (Boin and McConnell 2007b, 1). The resulting edition consisted of articles on the efficiency of international disaster management planning, strategies for dealing with the potential social effects of infrastructure failure, design principles for better management, plans for protection in unstable environments, and the prospects for a pan-European strategy (LaPorte 2007; Boin and McConnell 2007a; Schulman and Roe 2007; De Bruijne and van Eeten 2007; Fritzson et al. 2007). In these texts, the criticality of infrastructure to the legitimate security concerns of the state is taken for granted, and increasing the resilience of critical infrastructure is seen as critical to the security of the state. The focus of study therefore tends to be around appropriate policy development (Boin and McConnell 2007a), understanding changes in what is considered to be critical infrastructure (Egan 2007), and seeking to understand the factors that contribute to their reliability (De Bruijne and van Eeten 2007). These scholars do not seek to study resilience as a concept, but rather to understand how critical infrastructure is to be made resilient. Like other problem-solving scholars, they take the central role of corporations for granted and thus do not investigate the state-corporate relationship either.

In contrast to the problem-solving literature, critical scholarship on resilience and critical infrastructure focuses on the links to broader issues around security (Lentzos and Rose 2009; Fjäder 2014; Dillon and Reid 2009). In one view the concern with making critical infrastructure resilient is understood as being a shift

from the protection of states to the protection of material things, and thus operating at the level of determining what is valued in a society (Aradau 2010). Here, resilience is understood as working to define “the boundaries of what counts as human and nonhuman, what comes to matter and what not” (Aradau 2010, 509). Others have focused on the social and political aspects of the rise in resilience as a way of securing critical infrastructure. Ronnie Lipschutz (2008) for instance argues that despite purporting to be about material assets, the actual focus is people. Beginning by acknowledging the near impossibility of preventing attacks on critical infrastructure, he argues that this results in a shift to try and pre-empt attacks through detection, and through the “disruption of the social relations and networks that might give rise to such violence” (Lipschutz 2008, 211). In this light, the focus on securing critical infrastructure enables the targeting of people who pose a potential threat. Other scholars have been concerned with the forms of governance that emerge through attempts to secure critical infrastructure (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011). Arguing that critical infrastructures are “open, vulnerable, and often absurd systems that continually falter and backfire”, they make the case for “an excess of life in biopolitics” (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011, 369, 381). In all these examples, the literature has again moved away from the state-corporate relationship to theorising resilience, or the state-population relationship. Even

though the cases are about privately-owned assets, corporations and their relations with the state are analytically not significant in the research.

This short summary of the scholarship on resilience in critical infrastructure has supported the broader claims made earlier about resilience more generally. Those who study resilience in order to provide policy prescriptions take for granted the centrality of the corporation and thus do not investigate it, whereas those who analyse resilience critically do not make corporations the objects of their analysis.

The next section presents the case studies, studying them by reviewing policy documents and practices, before the revisiting state-corporate relationship in resilience.

5.3 Securing critical infrastructure

The section begins with a background into approaches to critical infrastructure more broadly, followed by a closer examination of UK policy documents. It discusses the Critical 5 Initiative, before turning to the UK's National Defence and Security Strategies since 2008 and the sector resilience plans that emerge out of them. The chapter then discusses two case studies: making electricity substations resilient to flooding (in the Energy sector) and guidelines for responding to crises (in the Telecommunications sector). The section concludes by drawing the insights from these case studies together. These insights will then be discussed in section 4, to make the argument that understanding resilience as a governmental

rationality points to the ways in which resilience is about integrating corporations into state practices in order to secure the social and political order. That is, closer state-corporate relations are not the means to the end goal of security, but rather becomes the end goal itself.

5.3.1 Critical infrastructure resilience in the UK

Critical infrastructure is a key focus of resilience practices in security. The societal reliance on private networks, both physical and virtual, for the flow of goods, information and services has made these be conceptualised as a site to be secured (Boin and McConnell 2007a; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011). Not all infrastructure is a matter of security concern for the state, only those deemed critical (or the term national is sometimes used in the UK). Aspects of infrastructure are deemed ‘critical’ on the basis that they “are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on our defense and economic security” (United States President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997, 3 cited in S. Collier and Lakoff 2008). While the definition of critical infrastructure remains vague, the term usually refers to “facilities, systems, sites, information, people, networks and processes, necessary for a country to function and upon which daily life depends” (CPNI n/d). Thus, critical infrastructure is a key site in which to analyse the practices of resilience as a means to achieving social order (security).

The ‘Critical 5’ initiative identifies common themes in approaches to infrastructure and resilience by drawing on the security and resilience plans of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States to develop a “shared narrative” on how to secure critical infrastructure (New Zealand Government 2014, 2). The initiative defines critical infrastructure as “the systems, assets, facilities and networks that provide essential services and are necessary for the national security, economic security , prosperity, and health and safety of their respective nations” (New Zealand Government 2014, 2). These are deemed important because:

“when there are disruptions to the services of critical infrastructure provides, such as energy, transportation, and communications networks, there can potentially be costly direct economic impacts, such as the cost of repairing damage to physical structures, and indirect economic impacts to society, such as the business disruption to the global supply chain and an increase in short term and long term unemployment” (New Zealand Government 2014, 5).

The implication is that the focus is on the system, not on an individual asset, provider or facility. Further, it is a (potential) disruption to the system that is the security concern, not the smooth running of it. The resilience of critical infrastructure is identified as being important because this is “the backbone to modern society and it is essential to national prosperity” (New Zealand Government 2014, 5). Thus, infrastructure is posited as needing to be secured because it is essential to prosperity. As will be seen later, economic prosperity is posed as a key objective to developing a resilient UK. The link between economic

prosperity and security is in itself nothing new, having been long established (see for instance Dover 2007). But in the context of resilience it matters in a different way, because the growth and strength of the private sector becomes a necessary condition for resilience. Thus, it is not just a matter of economics and security, but rather that, through the lens of resilience, the success of corporations (or rather the corporate form) is now also as much a responsibility of the state as it is of the corporation (discussed below).

It is worth noting is that all five countries have adopted an ‘all hazards’ approach (New Zealand Government 2014, 3). This treats all potential crises, regardless of whether they are man-made incidents or natural disasters, as the same – a cyclone and a terrorist incident are planned for in the same way as a gas pipeline bursting or a wild fire. What is important, when taking an all hazards approach, is the impact on, and response required from, the entity that is facing the hazard. For the purpose of this chapter, this is noted because, given that state and corporations are *together* crucial for resilience, a threat to one is a threat to the resilience of the system itself. This then explains how attacks on corporations (be they cyber or physical) become a security concern for the state. Further, it supports the reasoning set out above, that the relations between economic prosperity and state security are not just about economics and politics, but rather that the success of critical corporations is now also a shared responsibility between the state and the corporation because the resilience of the state depends on it.

It is important to note that the Critical 5 initiative presents the task of making critical infrastructure resilient as being the responsibility of the state. The five referred to in ‘Critical 5’ are states and the analysis is based on the policy documents of various governments. However, it goes beyond this – the narrative reports on the efforts that each government has taken to manage risks to critical infrastructure (New Zealand Government 2014, 3). With regards to economic prosperity, the report identifies that it is “when *governments* focus on making critical infrastructure more secure and resilient by managing risk” that economic growth is facilitated (New Zealand Government 2014, 4 emphasis added). This is in keeping with the literature, which also sees resilience as a state responsibility. However, as discussed below, resilience practices point to it being a joint effort between state and corporations. This is not captured by either the literature or the policy analysis because the state-corporate relationship is interpreted through the lens of the state (principle) making the decisions and having control over the actions of the corporation (agent).

Despite the focus on state responsibility, however, the Critical 5 initiative recognises that the confidence of the private sector is key, albeit this is couched in the language of the need for economic growth. Economic growth is facilitated by the “trust and confidence [that] is enhanced in the public-private relationship” (New Zealand Government 2014, 4). Moreover, the report notes the need to build the confidence of the private sector – this is “*highlighted* within the strategic

guidance of all the Critical 5 member nations” (New Zealand Government 2014, 4 emphasis added). Thus, it is not just about working with the private sector, but about gaining their willing buy-in to the ‘project’ of making the state resilient. The dominance of the principle-agent view of state-corporate relations is in the statement that all five nations “work hard to build partnerships with their individual owners and operators and coordinate with public and private sector partners on how to make that infrastructure more secure and resilient” (New Zealand Government 2014, 5). Here the language of ‘partnerships’ is used, pointing to resilience being more than a state-led project, even as the onus is placed on the state to build the partnerships. However, as this chapter establishes later, practices reveal it goes well beyond the buy-in by one entity to the activities of another, or even a ‘partnership’, with implications of ‘shared’ responsibility. This is not a scenario where the partners have ‘equal but separate responsibilities’, where some parts could succeed while others fail. Rather resilience is a ‘joint’ project, where success depends on both states and corporations being responsible for all aspects. This is how closer state-corporate relations are built, and will be discussed in more detail below.

This section has so far identified some common themes on infrastructure security and resilience across the five countries. It noted the focus on economic prosperity as being important to the security and resilience of the state. While this is stated as a prosaic ‘reality’, this chapter recasts it, when viewed in light of an ‘all hazards’

approach, to explain how this makes the success of the corporation a shared responsibility between the state and corporation. It also noted the dominance of the principle-agent conceptualisation of the state-corporate relationship, such that, even though it is discussed as a partnership, the state is still understood as being in charge of resilience. These will be taken up in section 4, when the implications of this argument are discussed in more detail. This section now moves to the UK's national security strategies which set out the understanding of how the British state can be made more resilient. It will be followed by the two case studies, on the protection of electricity substations from flooding and the plans for recovery from a telecommunications crisis.

Resilience was introduced into UK security policy in the 2008 National Security Strategy (UK Cabinet Office 2008). Prior to this, British government policies and strategies referred to defence, but this document, subtitled 'Security in an Interdependent World', reflected the change to focusing on security, and to seeing it as something to be managed in the midst of complexity and interdependency (Pospisil and Gruber 2016, 206–7). Now, resilience is so embedded in UK's security policies that, it has been claimed that "the UK government's perceptions of the security landscape in the early 21st century are increasingly shaped by the concept of resilience" (Brassett and Vaughan-Williams 2015, 33).

The 2008 National Strategy states that taking forward the recommendations of the Pitt Review¹² on critical infrastructure would be key to the resilience of the state (UK Cabinet Office 2008, 43). As a result of the Pitt Review, the government had already set up “a nationwide network for resilience, coordinated by the Cabinet Office” (UK Cabinet Office 2008, 41). This was the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), the “government authority for protective security advice to the UK national infrastructure”, established in 2007 (CPNI n/d). Under the strategy, the government also decided to develop ‘Sector Resilience Plans’ to “reduce the disruption caused by natural hazards in the UK’s critical infrastructure” (UK Cabinet Office 2011, 4). These plans are classified, with distribution limited to the CPNI, the Minister in charge of the lead department, and the Cabinet Office, but a summary is made public and provides limited insight into what is being made resilient and how. Initially, critical infrastructure consisted of nine sectors, but by 2016, thirteen sectors¹³ had been identified.

In 2015, UK national security strategy was set in a document titled ‘National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review’, with a subtitle of ‘A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom’ (House of Commons 2017). The subtitle

¹² The Pitt Review was a result of an independent review (by Sir Michael Pitt) into the summer floods of 2007, which were the most expensive in the world, in a year where there were over 200 major floods world-wide. Those few months in 2007 resulted in 55,000 houses being flooded, around 7,000 people evacuated, and 13 people dead, while half a million households lost essential services such as water, gas and electricity, and transport services failed entirely (Pitt 2008).

¹³ These were Chemicals, Civil Nuclear, Communications, Defence and Space, Emergency Services, Energy, Financial Services, Food, Government, Health, Transport and Water (UK Cabinet Office 2016).

reflects that economic prosperity had become a matter of national security (and resilience). In the previous plan, the government had already noted that promoting “business continuity” was key to improving resilience (UK Cabinet Office 2008, 41). However, by 2015, the private sector was seen as key to the security of the *state* itself, with “promote our prosperity” identified as one of the three National Security Objectives (House of Commons 2017). This required the state to work “more closely with the private sector and allies to increase our innovation and strengthen its contribution to our national security” (House of Commons 2017, 12). This is reinforced later, when the strategy clarifies that resilience “depends on all of us – the emergency services, local and central government, businesses, communities and individual members of the public” (House of Commons 2017, 43). Thus, the state will “expand and deepen [its] partnership with the private and voluntary sectors, and with communities and individuals, as it is on these relationships that the resilience of the UK ultimately rests” (House of Commons 2017, 43). This again, can be understood as the prosaic statement of the relevance of commerce and trade, but as discussed earlier, points instead to the much deeper engagement between states and corporations that is required under the logic of resilience. While this will be discussed in more detail in section 4, it is worth noting that the UK strategy points to practices that support this claim. For instance, the government also pledged to strengthen the resilience of sectors that are entirely privately owned: on finance, “as well as

building resilience to financial crisis” the government also said it would “strengthen the resilience of the UK’s finance sector to operational threats, including cybercrime” (House of Commons 2017, 73). Thus, UK security is not just about the resilience of the state, but also about the resilience and security of corporations.

The strategy does not see the private sector as just a partner operating alongside the state, though the language used is often that of partnership. The strategy makes clear that the security of the state relies on the *further integration* of corporations into the state’s security arena. For instance, the state pledged to support the “defence, resilience and security industries to grow, including through exports and through investment in skills” (House of Commons 2017, 12). The strategy notes the contributions that the defence and security industries make to British prosperity through employment and their collective turnover. It pledged to “refresh our defence industrial policy and take further action to help the UK’s defence and security industries to grow and compete successfully” (House of Commons 2017, 75). The government planned to “maximise the commercial opportunities for supplier companies arising from our national security procurements, and make these opportunities available to a broader range of potential suppliers” (House of Commons 2017, 76–77). Thus, the greater integration of corporations into all aspects of security is posed as the way to make the UK more resilient.

According to the 2015 strategy, securing the UK is about making it resilient and economic prosperity is a key objective. It is not just a matter of the relevance of trade and commerce, but rather that corporations are essential to resilience and national security. The state not only has a stake in the success of corporations, but also has a responsibility to contribute to it. Further, in areas that might be perceived to be the purview of the state – the security and defence sectors – the state has a responsibility to increase the opportunities for corporations and thus further integrate them into the sector. The case studies now work through the practices of making electricity generation resilient by protecting substations and of responding to a telecommunications crisis. These are not only different aspects of critical infrastructure, but are also in sectors that are key to cross-sector resilience – a crisis in energy and/or communications will impact the ability of other sectors to cope with any situation (UKRN 2015).

5.3.2 Safeguarding electricity assets

Energy is one of the UK's critical infrastructure sectors (UK Cabinet Office 2011), with the (then) Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) taking lead on sector resilience. As part of making this part of critical infrastructure resilient, and following the recommendations of the Pitt Review (2008), it was determined that work needed to be done to make electricity substations resilient against future flooding. As a result, “the electricity network companies … worked together with

Ofgem under the auspices of the Energy Network Association” to produce a technical report that set out the process of doing this (UK Cabinet Office 2008, 9). As there are several entities mentioned as being involved in the production of the report (more on which below), it is necessary to clarify them at this stage. Ofgem is the government regulatory authority for the energy sector. The Energy Networks Association (ENA) identifies itself as “the voice of the networks, representing the ‘wires and pipes’ transmission and distribution network operators for gas and electricity in the UK and Ireland” (ENA n/d). In other words, it can also be described as the industry body responsible for representing the interests of corporations in the energy sector in discussions with the government. The network companies are the private corporations that own the physical assets of electricity production¹⁴. Thus, the technical report was the output of the electricity corporations working together with their industry body, the state regulator and the government department responsible for the sector. As will be discussed in the next section, this is a clear example of the close relations between state and corporations under logic of resilience. While this can be understood as a

¹⁴ As a result of the way the electricity sector was privatised, the physical infrastructure was split into separate transmission and distribution companies. The transmission networks carry the quantities of electricity across long distances and own the cables and overhead lines. The distribution networks own the assets that take electricity from the overhead wires and converts it to lower voltages so it can be used (ENA 2015). These are distinct from the supply companies, who are the entities from whom customers buy their electricity, though industry consolidation has resulted in some cross ownership.

process by which to achieve resilience, it is more plausible to see it as resilience in and of itself, as activity could have stopped at this stage (discussed below).

The report, titled ‘Engineering Technical Report 138’ (ETR 138), sets out “a common approach to the assessment of flood risk and the development of target mitigation levels that are subject to cost benefit assessment” (ENA 2009, 3). It was produced by the Energy Emergencies Executive Committee (E3C), which is a committee of the Energy Emergencies Executive (E3), which in turn is a standing body of DECC. E3 is headed by a DECC employee and authorises the E3C to carry out work on its behalf, but the E3C consists of members from the department and industry, and is chaired by an individual from the industry. For instance, in 2014, the only year for which an Annual Report was published, the chair was Chris Train, the CEO of Cadent, a gas distribution company (DECC 2014).

E3C has been described as “a real partnership between government, the regulator and industry, which ensures a joined up approach to emergency response and recovery” (Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, Minister of State in DECC 2014, 4), and this point on viewing it as a ‘partnership’ is taken up below. E3C identifies itself as the “principal fora for identifying both the risks and mitigating processes and actions necessary to manage the impact of emergencies affecting the supply of gas and/or electricity” in the United Kingdom (DECC 2014, 5). Thus, this state-corporate partnership is *the main* body responsible for resilience across the energy sector in the UK. While much of the literature and policy documents both assume that

resilience is state-led, as discussed in the previous sections, the practices discussed here reveal that the responsibility for resilience lies with an integrated state-corporate body that involves corporations, government and regulator. Further, this is not unique to this case, as will be discussed below with regards to telecommunications.

The report itself, ETR 138, was titled ‘Resilience to Flooding of Grid and Primary Substations,’ (ENA 2009). It sets out a risk based methodology that provides guidance on how to improve the resilience of electricity substations to flooding. The required ‘improvement’ in resilience is described as needing to be to a level “acceptable to customers, Ofgem and Government”, with the additional clause that “a cost/benefit assessment for each site” must be taken into account in determining acceptable improvements (UK Cabinet Office 2011, 9). This is worth pointing out, because the corporation is not mentioned in the list of entities to whom the plans have to be acceptable. This could be seen as implied, or covered in the clause on the need for a cost benefit analysis. However, arguably, this points to a deeper insight – that the interests of the corporation have *already* been incorporated into any decision; it is only the parties whose interests might not have been considered in the decision that have to be separately consulted in order to ensure the plans are ‘acceptable’ to them.

The implementation of the ‘most appropriate’ flood protection system is identified as being “dependent on the availability of necessary funding” (ENA 2009, 12).

Noting that the cost of resilience will vary between sites, the report tasks network owners to “carry out cost/benefit assessments for each substation at risk in order to determine which resilience level is appropriate in any given case” (ENA 2009, 16). Cost/benefit analyses should include “consideration of customers’ “willingness to pay” for this type of network resilience” (ENA 2009, 16). All resilience programmes are to be included in each company’s “investment plans as appropriate” (ENA 2009, 17). It is clear from the report that cost is a significant factor in any decision to undertake the planned projects – the report’s appendix, comparing the various options, lists high or medium costs in the negative side of the analysis (ENA 2009, 27). Note that this suggests that projects to protect substations *do not* have to occur – they are dependent on financial considerations which the report and its authors cannot control. This can be understood as resilience building stopping at the level of establishing the process and therefore, potentially just a ‘fiction’. However, an alternative understanding, that accepts these practices as rational within the context of the underlying rationality, is that this *is* resilience (discussed in more detail in the next section).

The report also makes a more directed point on where responsibility for resilience lies. After setting out the various resilience building measures that the owners of the substations can take, it identifies the pros and cons of engaging each option, and establishes possible work programmes for the implementation of substation flooding resilience. As the first step to making substations resilient, asset owners

are to identify all substations within scope, establish flood risk for each, and identify the impact of any flood. They are also to determine “if the site is or will be protected by a flood protection scheme sponsored by the appropriate public authority” (ENA 2009, 8). It is only if the site is unprotected by a public authority that the asset owner is to “establish the most appropriate options for protecting the site” and then propose an appropriate solution and conduct a cost/benefit assessment (ENA 2009, 9). This is significant, because despite the continuing examples where the corporation takes the lead on specific resilience practices (such as E3C here, or in the telecoms case below), the state still has a broader responsibility for resilience. Implied is that if the state, for other reasons, ensures that a corporate asset is protected (i.e. public flood protection schemes exist), then the corporation is not expected to contribute to that. This reinforces the claim of this chapter that resilience is a joint effort between states and corporations.

This was a short summary of key points, not only about how electricity substations are to be made resilient, but also on how the plans for making them resilient were developed. The section now presents the next case, before the theorisation of these practices are taken up at the end of the section.

5.3.3 Planning for telecoms crises

Communications is another UK national infrastructure sector, with telecoms one of the sub-sectors and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) having lead responsibility for resilience across the sector (UK Cabinet Office 2011, 8). The telecommunications industry is assumed to be inherently resilient, on the basis that it is “in the interest of telecoms companies, in an extremely competitive market, to maintain service by ensuring a good level of resilience” (UK Cabinet Office 2010, 15). The ‘inherent resilience’ of the sector is ascribed to “the competitive nature of the sector, historic investment in the infrastructure and the range of alternative systems (e.g. land line, mobile, internet)” (UK Cabinet Office 2011, 12). Furthermore, “resilience building is driven by a combination of competition, new technologies and the need to meet legislative requirements, licences or standards” (UK Cabinet Office 2013a, 13). Note also that resilience is not about any one provider – the “ability to switch between the major networks, combined with industry and Government cooperation to mitigate against disruption to telecoms services, has ensured a good level of inherent resilience” (UK Cabinet Office 2010, 15). Thus, the industry is assumed to be resilient on the basis of the large number of private actors in it.

Note though that for the customer, the number of providers is not a guarantee of resilience, nor is it meant to be. As the Cabinet Office notes in an internal memo, “obtaining telecommunications services from more than a single supplier may not

enhance resilience” (2013b), because there is no way to be certain that different service providers use different parts of the infrastructure. The industry often consists of virtual networks, with different suppliers to the customer sharing the same physical infrastructure. This means that while market logics (such as competition) are understood to enhance resilience, they are not necessary in all aspects of the system, and the presence of oligopolies is not problematic from a resilience perspective. Further, it suggests that these practices are designed to enhance the resilience of the system, not necessarily that of the individual customer.

The guidelines for dealing with a telecommunications emergency were developed by the Electronic Communications – Resilience and Response Group (EC-RRG). The objective of the EC-RRG is to “take the lead in developing and maintaining cooperation between the telecommunications industry and the government” (UK Cabinet Office n.d.). It has “representatives from all of the major telecoms providers as well as the relevant Government Departments” (UK Cabinet Office 2011, 12). Members of the group include corporations that own or operate key aspects of the telecommunications infrastructure in the UK, data centre owners and operates, OFCOM, the Cabinet Office, CPNI, and the relevant government departments. The chair and deputy chair of the EC-RRG are always industry representatives. In 2015, the chair was Mark Jones of Airwave; in 2016, it was Paul Mitchell from Vodafone; and Geoffe Eveleigh from Telefonica UK (O2) took over

the chairmanship for 2017. As with the electricity case above, corporate actors take the lead in the decision-making bodies, and as discussed below, it is this body that takes the lead in deciding how to respond to a crisis.

The EC-RRG owns the National Emergency Plan for the UK Telecoms Sector which sets out the response to a telecoms emergency (UK Cabinet Office n.d.). The “initial responsibility” for “leading the response” is with the company affected by the disruption (EC-RRG 2010, para. 1). With industry expected to “manage their own internal response”, the government is to be informed “should there be an emergency of any severity” (EC-RRG 2010, para. 2). Thus, once again the integration of state and the private sector is vital to resilience practices, and as with the electricity case study earlier, resilience efforts are led by industry, and not the state.

The plan documents that the main response to an emergency is to be coordinated through the National Emergency Alert for Telecoms (NEAT) (EC-RRG 2010, para. 4). NEAT is described as “a forum to co-ordinate an industry response to a crisis as well as for liaison between industry and government” (EC-RRG 2010, para. 4.1). It consists of a conference call to be “convened by any Telecoms provider or government department if they believe that there is a problem or potential problem with the communications infrastructure” (EC-RRG 2010, para. 4.1) and the NEAT call is to be convened within one hour of the initial alert. This rapid response can be seen as akin to how the state deals with emergencies, such as the

COBRA committee, and this will be taken up later. Notably, the conference call itself is operated by two named corporations (BT or Cable and Wireless) and the plan establishes that to deal with crisis in a resilient manner requires coordination and close cooperation between the state and the industry. Furthermore, the corporation convenes the call, and the state participates. Again, this is very different from the state-led resilience that the literature and policy documents describe.

Alongside the National Emergency Plan, EC-RRG also operates a Memorandum of Understanding and a non-disclosure agreement. The MoU is a document to be signed by all parties to NEAT and

“allows the sharing of human and material resources amongst providers when required in an emergency. This ensures that all Telecoms Operators who take part in a NEAT call can discuss problems with their own and other operator’s networks in the knowledge that this information will be treated confidentially” (EC-RRG 2010, para. 4.2).

The non-disclosure agreement then specifies the penalties for inappropriately revealing confidential information shared during the NEAT call. This places corporate interests at the heart of (if not prior to) resilience practices. The confidentiality of the corporations’ business practices is to be preserved, even in times of crisis, and agreeing to this is a precondition for entry to the emergency response body.

Thus, the telecoms case too reveals the centrality of the corporation to resilience. While corporations take the lead, not only in dealing with the events and responding to crises but also in coordinating the broader response, resilience remains a joint effort, with the state having a key role to play. The section concludes with a summary of the issues that the empirical details have revealed.

5.3.4 Insights

The discussion above revealed that the security of the corporation is now a shared responsibility of the state and that resilience practices are joint responsibilities of the state and the corporation. The Critical 5 Initiative and the UK National Security and Defence Strategy categorise economic security as vital to state security thereby making the success of corporations a vital national security interest. This is not a reference to any one individual corporation but rather to the corporate form and the corporate way of operating. Moreover, on the basis that 'all hazards' are to be dealt with jointly, threats to corporations are a threat to the security of the state and thus the state has responsibility for the protection of the corporation. This makes the success and growth of corporations a shared project between state and corporations. This also requires greater integration of corporations into sectors the state dominates, especially security and defence. As the UK strategy establishes, this is key to state resilience.

Further, while the literature and the policy documents characterise resilience as state-led, albeit with a recognition of the importance of the corporation, the practices reveal it is more the case that resilience is a joint responsibility. Both electricity resilience efforts and telecoms crisis responses are led by corporations. Despite the corporate lead on these issues, the state nevertheless retains a key role. Not only is the state engaged in the practices described, it also has resilience responsibilities in other areas (such as in flood defence more broadly) to which corporations are not required to contribute. This is not the replacement of the state that neoliberal logics would suggest, but neither is it a ‘partnership’ though it is often discussed as such in the literature and in praxis. Here, rather than being a responsibility shared between partners, resilience is a joint responsibility with all responsible for the success of all aspects. This requires the integration of state and corporates into a seamless unit with responsibility for resilience. This does not mean that they formally or organisationally integrate, but that operations on the issue of resilience are integrated.

5.4 Resilience as constitutive

Having discussed the insights revealed by the case studies, this section retheorises the empirics in the context of the argument being made here. To recap, the argument is that resilience *is* the closer integration of state and corporations. Under a resilience rationality, the objective is the closer integration of state-

corporate relations – rather than states and corporations needing to work together to *achieve* resilience, resilience *is* about state and corporations working closer together. The practices discussed in the last section are recast to argue that first, resilience is about the relations between states and corporations, and second, that resilience is a joint responsibility between states and corporations.

5.4.1 Relations are key

The empirics clearly establish that resilience is *all about the relations* between the state and corporations. This is summed up by the UK National Strategy, which clearly states that “it is *on these relationships* that the resilience of the UK ultimately rests” (House of Commons 2017, 43 emphasis added). This could be dismissed as hyperbole, but as the case studies show, this statement is supported by ongoing practices. The very different resilience practices discussed above reinforce the extent to which resilience is about the relationship.

The state and corporations share responsibility for the security of the corporation, which again stresses their relationship. Under an all hazards approach, all threats are equal and it is only the impact that matters. Thus, a devastating attack on the private sector is just as much a matter of national security as a devastating attack on the state. This means that the state must protect the corporation. Moreover, the link between economic prosperity and security reinforces this responsibility – the

state must protect corporations in order to ensure its own economic prosperity. Policy documents bear this out; securing the UK and making it resilient understood as not only resulting in a vital role for corporations in national security, but also in the state needing to make corporations more suitable for that role. This requires the state to make the private sector more innovative, so it (the private sector) can “strengthen its contribution” to national security (House of Commons 2017, 12). The state also pledges to strengthen entirely privately owned sectors, such as finance (House of Commons 2017, 73). It is also about the state creating the possibility to *further* integrate corporations into key sectors where they are not fully engaged, such as defence (House of Commons 2017, 12). The state pledges to “refresh … defence industrial policy and take further action to help the UK’s defence and security industries to grow and compete successfully” (House of Commons 2017, 75). The strategy also identified state responsibility to “maximise the commercial opportunities for supplier companies arising from our national security procurements, and make these opportunities available to a broader range of potential suppliers” (House of Commons 2017, 76–77). So not only is resilience about closer relations between the state and corporations, it is the responsibility of the state to create the conditions for that to happen.

The two cases also support the significance of state-corporate relations in resilience. For instance, the technical report on making substations resilient is the product of the combined efforts of electricity corporations, their industry body,

the state regulator and the government department responsible for the sector. This could be seen as the process through which resilience is to be achieved – i.e. when the substations are made resilient. However, to do so misses that the implementation of substation projects is entirely voluntary – i.e. there is no compulsion for it to happen. Thus, it cannot be claimed that these activities (of getting together and developing the report) have had, or definitely will have, a material effect on electricity substations. Rather, the only thing that has definitively happened through these activities is closer relations between the state and corporations. Rather than closer state-corporate relations being a process to an end state of a resilient state (or sector), resilience in practice *is* closer relations.

5.4.2 Joint responsibility

While the literature sees resilience as being state-led, the cases suggest that it is a *joint responsibility* between state and corporations. Even though the Critical 5 initiative begins with the state, it acknowledges the vital role of corporations. The report notes that states “work hard to build partnerships with … owners and operators and coordinate with public and private sector partners on how to make that infrastructure more secure and resilient” (New Zealand Government 2014, 5). Because it is state centric, the report views the state-corporate relationship through the lens of principle-agent, and thus uses the language of ‘partnerships’. This is also reflected in the electricity case study, where the E3C, the committee

responsible for the ETR 138 resilience plan, is described as “a real partnership between government, the regulator and industry” (Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, Minister of State in DECC 2014, 4).

But seeing it as a ‘partnership’ is insufficient to explain resilience practices. It is not a shared effort, with states having some responsibilities, and corporations having others, where one ‘part’ of the project can succeed even as others fail.

Rather, resilience is the protection of the essential whole, and cannot be subdivided, and the concept of ‘partnership’ fails to capture these relations.

Resilience is about integration, rather than collaboration, which makes it more than ‘partnerships’. The case studies help to illustrate this. Making electricity substations flood resilient is the responsibility of the E3C, a committee with representatives from corporations, the state, and the regulator, which is always chaired by an industry representative. Similarly, the telecommunications recovery plan and process is owned by the EC-RRG, which too has representatives from corporations, state and regulator, and is always chaired by an industry representative. These practices are not about either the state or the corporation, because they cannot occur without the presence of both. Thus, resilience is a joint responsibility.

The telecommunications recovery plan makes the case for joint responsibility even more directly, especially with regards to responding to crises. NEAT operates as the committee responsible for handling telecoms emergencies. It can be seen as

similar to COBRA, which is the committee that coordinate the UK's response to national crises – it is initiated at times of crisis, and needs to convene and make decisions in a timely manner (one hour). NEAT not only has corporate representatives, it is also initiated by a private sector provider. While a more conventional analysis or resilience might begin with the numerous relevant legislations, and focus on BIS as the lead department, to make a case for state-led resilience, to do so would be to miss the integration of state and corporations that is documented here as being the best way to respond to a crisis – i.e. to be resilient. Instead, seeing resilience as a joint responsibility between states and corporations, which requires the closer integration of both, better explains both the problem and the solutions revealed. That is the problem that is being addressed through resilience is one of making the parts of a complex system work better together. It does not require the merger of the different parts into one unit – in other words, this is neither the diminishing of the state nor the takeover of state functions by corporations. Rather the practices of resilience in security require closer integration across the public / private divide rather than its effacement.

5.4.3 Limitations of neoliberal governmentality

The cases also point to the limits of neoliberal governmentality as a framework for explaining these practices. In the telecoms case, competition was neither

sufficient, nor required, even though the application of market logics is in other places understood as sufficient to create resilience. Similarly, in both cases, corporations work together on resilience practices, whether it is in developing a plan for making electricity substations (regardless of owner) resilient to flooding, or planning how to handle a telecoms crisis, regardless of which company experiences the ‘hazard’. The logic of competition cannot explain the practices documented. This is not to say that corporate interests might not be different or competitive as the telecoms case establishes. To the contrary, the need for a non-disclosure agreement in the telecoms case, and the fact that signing this is a condition of entry into the crisis response, make it clear that corporations continue to engage with each other as competitors. The point is that the broad remit of neoliberal governmentality is unable to explain the co-operative practices documented here.

Policy makers take for granted that market logics will lead to resilience. This is supported by the sector resilience plans, which identify some sectors as almost being ‘inherently’ more resilient on the basis that they are private. For instance, the resilience of the Food sector is attributed to its “highly effective and resilient food supply chain” and the “*competitive nature of the industry*” (UK Cabinet Office 2016, 15); the Finance sector is said to reflect “a mature approach to resilience” due to “ongoing investment by firms” (UK Cabinet Office 2016, 13). In Energy, although “infrastructure types and business environments differ, each

sub-sector has *invested proportionately* to build resilience to major risks” (UK Cabinet Office 2016, 12 emphasis added). In telecoms, resilience is ascribed to the fact that it is “in the interest of telecoms companies, in an extremely competitive market, to maintain service by ensuring a good level of resilience” (UK Cabinet Office 2010, 15). The “competitive nature of the sector, historic investment in the infrastructure and the range of alternative systems (e.g. land line, mobile, internet)” (UK Cabinet Office 2011, 12), and “resilience building … driven by a combination of competition, new technologies and the need to meet legislative requirements, licences or standards” (UK Cabinet Office 2013a, 13) are said to explain the resilience of the sector. All these attribute high levels of resilience to the dominance of private actors in the sector. While this could be seen as supporting an argument for neoliberalism being a sufficient frame to explain the practices discussed, the practices discussed unsettle this claim.

In both the electricity and telecoms cases, corporations work together in resilience practices. Thus, it is not just about state-corporate relations (though that is the focus of this analysis) but also the re/production of corporations as cooperative partners with each other. Corporations work jointly, not only with the state, but also with each other through the logic of resilience. An observation in the telecoms case, in particular, makes clear the extent to which competition is not an overarching logic. The NEAT conference call is established on the basis of cooperation, rather than competition. Further, the system tolerates oligopolies (in

the telecoms networks) as cooperation at times of crisis will enable solutions to be developed. Thus, the practices of resilience establish relations of mutual support between corporations, even among those who are competitors. Neoliberal governmentality cannot easily explain these practices or relations but they are quite easily understood as instances of a security rationality that seeks ever closer integration of the state and corporation.

This section has discussed the way in which resilience practices have constituted both states and corporations into ‘partners’ in a joint project. The state takes on responsibilities for the success of the corporate form (this is not the same as any individual corporation) and together, both state and corporations work to achieve the resilience of the system, and thus, the security of the social order. Resilience, understood as closer relations between states and corporations, results in both being re/constituted through their relations to enable even closer engagement.

The chapter will now conclude with a discussion of some of the implications of this.

5.5 Conclusion

The chapter set out that resilience is conventionally understood as a process of states and corporations working together to achieve the goal of a resilient social order. It has demonstrated that corporations are obscured in the literature, albeit for different reasons. Some scholars take the centrality of corporations to

resilience for granted, and thus deem it not worthy of analysis. Others, are more concerned with broader issues around relations between states and populations or concepts of security, and thus do not consider corporations a suitable object of analysis. Regardless of the cause, the security literature on resilience does not discuss state-corporate relations, despite recognising the centrality of corporations to resilience praxis.

In policy documents and the problem-solving literature, resilience is understood as a state-led project to integrate corporations into critical sectors. Thus, as the UK state resilience strategies make clear, the state is to be made resilient through the integration of corporations into state practices. This includes the state firstly, taking responsibility for increasing the capacity of corporations to be thus integrated, and secondly, opening up sectors that are dominated by the state to increased corporate integration. However, as the case studies demonstrate, resilience practices entail the integration of state and corporations, with no need for action beyond the integration. For instance, there does not have to be action beyond integrated resilience planning, as the discussion of electricity substations reveals. Further, crisis response plans bring states and corporations together as partners, but the ultimate responsibility for action resides with each corporation's own business practices and is not within the remit of resilience. Thus, all that plans for resilience have achieved is the closer integration of states and corporations. Resilience can therefore be understood as a practice in the

furtherance of a governmental rationality where the combining of public and private conduct is understood as essential to the production of good order.

Both states and corporations are being re/constituted, through their relationship, to make them better able to combine practices. The state for instance is re-produced as facilitative of corporate engagement in security practices, with the UK resilience strategy clear of the need for the state to strengthen corporations so they can contribute. Further, the state is supposed to revisit its own defence practices to increase their engagement and fosters the growth of industries, particularly in defence, resilience and security (House of Commons 2017). In the cases discussed, the state's responsibility is not to build resilience, but to facilitate the engagement of corporations in decision making and resilience practices. While the state is involved in the production of the reports and plans, both are clearly industry led efforts. Thus, the state is reconstituted as facilitative of corporate integration into state practices through the logic of resilience. Similarly, the corporation is re-produced as a partner in security provision. Both NEAT and electricity substation resilience posit corporations not only as partners of the state, taking the lead on many aspects, but also as partners with each other. Through the logic of resilience, states and corporations are produced into a position of joint responsibility for the security of the state, i.e. the production of good order. No longer just private actors secondary to the state, corporations are now re-produced as having a rightful and necessary role in security matters.

The broader focus of this dissertation is establishing that the state-corporate relationship is reconstituting both states and corporations. The dissertation took a relational approach, that begins with the state-corporate relationship itself, rather than with states and corporations as discrete entities. In doing so, it discussed the practices through which states and corporations are begin reconstituted.

The argument of this chapter is that the end of resilience practices are closer state-corporate relations – that is, more closely integrated state-corporate relations are equated with a more secure social order. This integration entails a mutually transformative relationship between states and corporations. The chapter illustrated this argument through to empirical cases that made visible the mutually transformative and thereby mutually constitutive relationship between states and corporations. The next chapter turns to peace building to demonstrate the rationality of closer state-corporate integration in yet another security environment. There, the focus is on how the state disappears in practices, even as its presence is discursively reinforced, all on the basis of security discourses.

6. Peacebuilding: The corporate core of USAID

6.1 Introduction

The global South has long been the locus of concerns for international security.

While recently exemplified by the ongoing ‘War on Terror’, the ‘War on Communism’ also saw repeated western interventions – not only military, but developmental and other socially transformative efforts – in countries across the developing world (see for example Klare 1989; Latham 2000; Rampton and Nadarajah 2017). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global South gained new prominence in international security, as a range of overlapping security issues – e.g. ethnic conflict, mass atrocities, ‘new wars’, global criminal networks, disease, ‘rogue’ states, etc. – replaced nuclear confrontation as the primary threats to international order. At the same time, liberalism’s ‘defeat’ of communism deemed the basis for international order to be self-evident; what constituted both peace/security and the institutional arrangements for achieving it comprised democracy, markets and the rule of law i.e. ‘liberal peace’ (Duffield 2001).

Consequently, the post-Cold War era has been characterised by numerous West-led international interventions to produce liberal peace in the global South. These simultaneously led to the rise of a diverse array of intellectual specialisations and global institutional configurations themed around ‘conflict resolution’, ‘democratisation’, ‘development’, ‘peacebuilding’, ‘state-building’, ‘humanitarian intervention’, etc. In particular, with poverty and underdevelopment becoming

taken-for-granted as the root cause of the above problems, as Mark Duffield (2001) argues in his seminal book, security and development became ‘united’ within international interventions. (For this chapter, ‘peacebuilding’ refers not just to conflict resolution, but to the wider project of stabilising and transforming Southern spaces in the image of western market democracies.) However, after a quarter century of these West-led efforts, the verdict is one of failure, even crisis (see for example Cooper 2007; Duffield 2007; for an overview see Nadarajah and Rampton 2015). Afghanistan and Iraq are prominent examples, but there are few successes amongst the dozens of countries where peacebuilding has been attempted.

There is a vast and sophisticated literature on these international interventions, but overwhelmingly attention has been on the *targets* of intervention, with comparatively very little attention to the transformative effects of peacebuilding on *intervening* states. The US and UK, for example, appear in analysis in terms of their military interventions or, more generally, simply as ‘donors’. Attention to ‘implementers’ of donor-funded projects meanwhile has been overwhelmingly on NGOs (Cooley and Ron 2002; Williams 2013). As part of this dissertation’s focus on corporations and international security practices, this chapter explores the consequences of developmental interventions on the US state, specifically on the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

USAID is one of the most internationally visible arms of the US state. The Congressional Research Service describes it as: “the leading international humanitarian and development arm of the US government,” “the workhorse of the US foreign assistance program,” and “the representative of the US government on development issues throughout the world” (CRS 2015, 1). This is representative of how USAID appears in most analysis of peacebuilding. However, this does not reflect the dramatic transformation of USAID in the post-Cold War era. A closer look, set out in this chapter, reveals the centrality of large US corporations not only to what USAID does (i.e. its interventions in the global South), but to what it is.

To begin with, *ninety* percent of USAID’s workforce are contractors (Verkuil 2017, 54). However, the notion of ‘contractors’ does not reflect their significance to USAID’s workings. As Paul Verkuil’s recent study points out, contractors “play a central role in planning and execution,” and according to one recent USAID head, “some of his *key advisors in top management decisions are contractors whose special expertise is highly valued*,” (Verkuil 2017, 54 emphasis added). Even more significant is the radical institutional transformation of USAID. By 2005, as Carol Lancaster, a former USAID deputy head, and Ann Van Dusen, a former senior USAID staffer, put it, USAID had become “more of a ‘wholesaler’ of aid programs (that is, outsourcing the planning and implementation of aid-funded activities), rather than a ‘retailer’ (that is, designing and implementing its own

programs and projects)" (2005, 33). "Indeed, in many cases, USAID has become a wholesaler to wholesalers – letting large contracts for aid work, usually to consulting firms, which then subcontract much of the work to other firms or NGOs," (Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005, 33).

Although this 'wholesale' outsourcing by USAID had been increasing since at least 1990 (see below), it has drawn surprisingly little scholarly attention, with most work appearing recently (see for example Roberts 2014; Stanger 2009; a lone early example is Berrios 2000). The 'privatisation of aid' is now drawing critical commentary both in the US and in the UK, where similar dynamics are emergent with the Department for International Development (see for example Provost 2016; House of Commons 2017). USAID's reliance on giant corporate 'partners' has drawn criticism from critical political economy scholars (Roberts 2014), liberal reformers (Stanger 2009) and neoconservatives such as the American Enterprise Institute (Bate 2006). Despite their different theoretical and political perspectives, their criticisms are similar: at base, the problem is one of privatisation/outsourcing having 'gone too far' to the benefit of large US corporations. Whether explained in terms of the (autonomous) power of development corporations, ineffective management (of competition and accountability) by the public sector, or simply the capitalist state's largesse to private corporations ('beltway bandits') or a combination of these, the corporatisation of USAID is explained as neoliberalism (privatisation) on steroids.

First, however, the framework of ‘privatisation’ or ‘outsourcing’ does not adequately represent, indeed it distorts understanding of, the intimate relations between ‘state’ and ‘corporation’ in USAID practices. This chapter empirically traces aspects of the dense configuration of state and corporate practices making up USAID to demonstrate this. Second, what is neglected in accounts of the rise of the ‘development-industrial complex’ centred on USAID (Roberts 2014; Norris 2012) is the significance of the evolving security discourses that accompanied the post-Cold War transformation of USAID¹⁵. In other words, implicitly or explicitly taken for granted is the existence of various threats in the global South to which US-assisted development should be directed; the problem is how USAID is (not) going about this. By contrast, this chapter argues that the transformation of USAID – such that it is at once an arm of the US state and a dense configuration of state-corporate practices – has been generated by both the institutional reforms compelled by political and institutional pressures in the United States and USAID’s central role in US security engagement with the global South. That is, discourses of security – whereby an array of diverse threats in/from the global South eventually coalesced into the (technically manageable) problem of ‘fragile’/‘failed’

¹⁵ Conversely, the sole exception to this, Jamey Essex’s (2013) thoroughgoing study of the impact on USAID of historically changing US geostrategic – i.e. geopolitical and geoeconomic – ambitions and calculations, pays almost no attention to the transformation of USAID into a configuration of corporate practices.

states – are central to explaining the close integration and mutual constitution of state and corporation through US peacebuilding interventions.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next two sections provide an overview of the centrality of large corporations to USAID's everyday operations. Section 2 focuses on state-corporate relations in the implementation of USAID programmes, while section 3 explores how large corporations have been a mundane part of the internal, everyday institutional practices of USAID. In doing so, they illustrate how notions of 'contracting' / 'privatisation' and, relatedly, the public/private divide are unhelpful for understanding the state-corporate relations that make up USAID. Section 4 then explores explanations in the limited scholarly literature for the dramatic rise of USAID contracting. It shows how emphasis on US party political and institutional contestation in Washington has dominated analysis in ways that largely divorce USAID's post-Cold War evolution from the wider changes in global politics. In particular, it ignores the evolving security discourses that position the global South as the source of key threats to international security, and USAID's interventions as vital responses. The conclusion summarises the chapter's analysis and discusses some implications.

6.2 USAID and development corporations

This section provides an overview of the relations between USAID and development corporations, generally understood as 'implementing partners'. It

outlines the mechanisms by which USAID funding is disbursed, and illustrates the scale of corporations' involvement in USAID operations 'in the field'. The next section takes a closer look at some of the integral roles of corporations in central USAID functions (specifically, country-strategy setting, expertise-building, and self-improvement). Apart from setting the empirical context for the analysis of the problem of considering what is at play in terms of 'privatisation' or 'outsourcing', the goal of these two sections is to empirically illustrate the distorting effect of reliance on self-evident public/private and state/corporate divides in such analyses.

It may be useful to begin with an illustration of an analytical problem. In a major recent book in peacebuilding studies titled 'Peaceland', Severine Autessere points to USAID as a prominent (positive) counterexample for a key reason for the persistent failure of international peacebuilding operations, namely the high turnover of 'in-country' international staff due to short-term rotations (2014, 83–84). For this she cites a multi-donor evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in South Sudan (Bennett et al. 2010). A key reason USAID was among the "most effective bilateral donors" (her words) there between 2005 and 2010, is that USAID had retained "a number of key staff ... with extensive experience and knowledge of South Sudan" (the report's words). Autessere adds, again citing the multi-donor study, "the combination of continuity of staff, local knowledge and in-depth conflict analysis proved in fact so successful that other donors requested USAID to manage their funds," (*ibid*). (The next section explores

precisely the practices by which USAID acquires ‘local knowledge’ and conducts ‘in-depth conflict analysis’.)

What is unreflectively excised from the quote from the multi-donor report is that the key staff are retained by USAID “either directly or working with implementing partners” (Bennett et al. 2010, 133). Moreover, the multi-donor report notes elsewhere: “USAID, the largest donor, channels its funding exclusively through private contractors, NGOs and UN [agencies]” i.e. rather than donor pools (2010, 68). Whilst the ‘pass through’ via USAID of US aid funding to UN agencies is discussed below, what is significant here is that the implementation (design, planning, execution and evaluations) of USAID-owned projects in Sudan, as elsewhere, is exclusively undertaken by contractors, both ‘for-profit’ and ‘non-profit’ – as explained below, this distinction is not important for the analysis of this chapter. In Sudan, these ‘implementing partners’ included large specialist US corporations such as Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), International Resources Group (IRG), Management Systems International (MSI), etc. For example, IRG implemented the Sudan Transitional Environment Program (STEP), a program which started in 2005 with a \$1.24 million, eighteen-month contract which was modified in 2006 to add \$4.6 million (and extended to 2009), and again modified in 2007 to add \$2.46 million (though this tranche was held back). The IRG-run STEP project was evaluated for USAID by MSI (USAID [MSI] 2008). Between 2011 (when the USAID established a mission in independent South

Sudan) and 2016 alone, MSI evaluated “approximately \$1.2 billion of the USAID portfolio in South Sudan” (Management Systems International 2013a).

To give another example, in the wake of the 2005 Sudan peace agreement, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) launched projects to “support emerging local civil authorities” and to promote “peaceful dialogue among communities”. OTI’s partners in these included non-profits such as Pact Inc. and the Education Development Center, and the US corporation, DAI. DAI was tasked by USAID to provide “basic equipment to launch government services, critical capacity-building training and technical assistance to emerging local governance structures”. OTI hails its efforts “through DAI” for having “improved the ability of local governments to deliver services to citizens and increased the opportunities for - and the quality of - dialogue between local officials and their constituents,” and were “instrumental in rehabilitating water systems, schools, and health facilities in key locations” (USAID 2006b). OTI also “funded a small number of grassroots reconciliation efforts in Darfur through DAI.” Amongst its other projects on behalf of USAID, DAI also administered four grants “to help Upper Nile University begin to re-establish its fundamental services”; administered grants to support “27 dramatic performances to deliver messages of peace to six states along the North-South border that rarely have access to independent information”; and “collaborated with civil authorities in Wau to provide access to clean water for three quarters of the population” (USAID 2006a, 3). With regard to

the last of these, USAID said: “DAI was able to fill a critical gap in the state ministry’s water, environment, and sanitation program by supplying submersible pumps, generators, water tanks, and water pipes” (2006a, 3). Indeed, the multi-donor evaluation report cited by Autessere in turn cites as reference for other donors requesting USAID to handle their funds an evaluation of the USAID-funded Sudan Basic Education Programme (SBEP). SBEP, a five-year, \$20 million program, was implemented by a large non-profit consortium led by CARE International, and the cited project evaluation was conducted for USAID by OWN & Associates Ltd, a Kenya based corporation.

What the above shows is how the constitutive role of private actors – mainly for-profit corporations, but also non-profits – is, as a matter of routine, unreflectively written out in analysis of USAID in both scholarly and policy literature on peacebuilding, development, etc. ‘USAID’ is analysed as an actor ('donor') even though the massive and protracted (often multi-year) material projects that form the basis for what is being analysed are entirely the operations of non-state actors, in particular, large US corporations. For example, the multi-donor study cited by Autessere (2014), when citing USAID documents for its analysis, routinely adds the name of the corporation responsible for producing the document and the analysis in it. Yet, beyond the occasional reference to ‘implementing partners’, the study ignores their centrality to USAID operations when, for instance, asserting “USAID is one of the few donors to have clearly articulated its approach to

working in Sudan in terms of fragility. This enables much closer and more frequent monitoring and a much better understanding of [Sudan] as well as [South Sudan] contexts” (Bennett et al. 2010, 132–33). (It is worth noting here the reference to Sudan, in this instance, as a self-evident context of ‘fragility’; as argued below, this discursive move is central to the growth of development contracting within USAID’s engagement with the global South.)

6.2.1 USAID programmes

USAID is the world’s largest provider of bilateral donor assistance - alone representing about 14% of all Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2013 - and one of the most respected: “historically, USAID led other donors in offering innovative ways to address challenges in the health, agriculture, microcredit, democracy promotion, environment, and private sector development fields” (CRS 2015, 2–3). However, as discussed below, it is also a key *security* arm of the US state. As the 2015 CRS study notes, “in the past decade, Department of Defense secretaries under administrations of both parties have argued the importance of USAID development programs in combatting national security threats,” (2015, 2). USAID’s own mission statement is explicit: “We partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing [US] security and prosperity” (USAID n.d.).

USAID serves three key roles in US foreign policy: (a) ‘development assistance’, (b) ‘humanitarian aid’, and (c) ‘political-strategic aid’ (CRS 2015, 3). However, as the CRS report for Congress on USAID notes, the primary purpose of all three are explicitly in relation to *security*. Development assistance programs aim to “foster sustainable broad-based economic growth, good governance, and social welfare” in developing countries,” (2015, 3). However, “where once they served as a counterpoint to communism, these programs are generally viewed as instrumental in building trade partners and future allies, *preventing breeding grounds for terrorists, addressing a range of common international concerns*, and exercising U.S. leadership abroad.... [These] are often viewed as long-term efforts that may have the effect of *preventing future crises*,” (CRS 2015, 3 emphasis added). By contrast, humanitarian aid programs “are devoted largely to the immediate alleviation of natural and manmade emergencies, and reflect the traditional charitable impulse of the American people, *while also attempting to stifle a cause of instability*,” (CRS 2015, 3 emphasis added). Moreover, in relation to ‘political-strategic’ aid, the CRS report makes clear, “while largely indistinguishable from development aid programs, the primary purpose of political-strategic aid is to address special US economic, political or security interests, such as the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan or alternative agriculture programs in centers of illicit narcotics production,” (CRS 2015, 3).

The chapter explores more closely the centrality of evolving international security discourses in the post-Cold War transformation of USAID operations into a thick web of corporate practices. However, it is sufficient to note here that, first, the contexts of the global South in which USAID operations are intended and assumed to unfold are understood not only as unfortunate spaces of underdevelopment and poverty, but fragile and dangerous sources of instability, future crises, breeding grounds for terrorism, centres of illicit drugs and criminality, etc., and second, it is within this worldview that USAID identifies ‘partners’ with whom it will achieve its operational goals.

Based on “an estimated appropriation total” of \$20.6 billion for 2015, the CRS study (2015, 14) suggested USAID activities made up more than half of total US foreign assistance (other vehicles for this include the Department of State, the Millennium Challenge Account, and, not least, the Department of Defence). However, as the CRS study notes, this number distorts the actual amount of money available to USAID as “each year some funds — contributions to a few international programs, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and cash transfers to various governments — merely pass through USAID,” (2015, 10). For example, the top two in USAID’s top-20 ‘implementing partners’ in FY2014 were the World Bank (\$2.05 billion) and the UN World Food Program (\$1.5 billion). However, the focus of this chapter is on USAID’s own operations. In this regard, the literature is unanimous – the vast majority of

USAID's funding goes through contracts (rather than grants), and the vast majority goes to US corporations (Roberts 2014; Stanger 2009; Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005). As discussed below, this pattern has become problematized in specific ways as USAID has come under pressure to diversify its partners away from giant US-based corporations, both to smaller firms and, in particular to 'local' – i.e. recipient country – governments, NGOs and firms. Even more important is the changing distribution of *responsibilities* within USAID operations. As Allison Stanger explains, since the mid-1990s:

"Contracting had always been present, but USAID now contracted out new things: *program design, management and oversight*. As a result, the responsibility for implementing USAID's agenda shifted from government employees to private actors. USAID became a fund-dispensing agency that provided only a marginal management role and relied almost exclusively on contractors and grantees to do the work. ... *The private sector now effectively implements and assesses USAID's agenda*," (2009, 117, 119 emphasis added).

In 2008, three former USAID chiefs – despite their own roles in this transformation – lamented the USAID's 'loss' of technical expertise, pointing out, for example, that by 2001 the agency had only had six engineers and 16 agriculture experts as employees instead of the hundreds of 'direct hires' in the 1980s (Atwood, McPherson, and Natsios 2008, 127; Natsios 2010).

As noted above, there is comparatively very little literature on the nexus of state-corporate relations and practices that make up what Susan Roberts (2014) calls the 'development-industrial complex' centred on USAID. This is in part because

research needs to address the complex array of corporations, non-profits (some of which are effectively fronts for corporations), contracts and sub-contracts, and diverse appropriation accounts – with different rules and flexibilities established in appropriation legislation, and frequently with Congress' preferred earmarks – by which funds flow into and out of USAID. As Roberts points out, this empirical data is fragmentary, inconsistently recorded and also hard to access, not least because USAID and its development partners often “close ranks to frustrate attempts ... to obtain even the most basic information”, (2014, 1032). Moreover, a great deal of USAID contract (and sub-contracting) data is legally commercially confidential (Stanger, 2014, 122) – and so is a great deal of the information produced in relation to USAID operations. For example, the categorisation of countries as fragile/failed, etc. is itself sometimes classified as a matter of security (Essex 2013). Nonetheless, for the purposes of this chapter, the rich seam of published material available - including the few academic works, reports by investigative journalists and development industry bodies and, in fact, even the numerous reports that USAID itself publishes on its operations (as well as the self-publicising material produced by its contractors) - enables the building of a picture substantial enough to illustrate the state-corporate nexus centred on USAID. The primary and secondary material drawn on below is supported by interviews and conversations with employees of US-based development contractors, including

Management Systems International (MSI), who permitted me to spend several days at their offices in Washington D.C. in 2016.

As Roberts shows, over only the past three decades, development contracting has become an established US industry (2014, 1039). More specifically, few of the corporations that make up this industry existed before the rise of USAID contracting. Indeed, the giants of this industry (e.g. Chemonics International; Development Alternatives Inc (DAI); John Snow International (JSI); etc.) were created in the 1970s by entrepreneurs looking to not only “execute development efficiently” but pursue liberal internationalist ideals in the context of the Cold War (Roberts 2014, 1036). Today, as then, these now giant corporations depend heavily on the US state, with each describing USAID as its biggest ‘client’ (*ibid*). That is, “the industry of contracting firms and the developing contract ‘market’ coevolved and co-constitute one another,” (Roberts 2014, 1035). While Roberts’ analysis of the industry treats USAID as essentially an external source of funding flows that sustain this market, this chapter shows below how this “sprawling, inchoate assemblage that enrolls scattered and heterogeneous subjects and objects in asymmetrical relation with one other” (*ibid*) has also coevolved with and constitutes USAID *itself*.

6.2.2 USAID's 'implementing partners'¹⁶

This subsection next discusses the ways in which USAID distributes funding to execute its mandate. An aggregation of USAID contract data for 2015 produced by Devex, a respected web-portal for the development industry (Orlina 2016), shows that USAID awarded at least \$4.8 billion in contracts to corporations and non-profits that year, overwhelmingly to large US-based entities (see figure 1). However, Roberts (2014, 1035) compiled data shows that in each year from 2007-2013 the total of contracts and grants amounted to \$12-14 billion (up from \$2bn in 2004). A distinctive aspect of USAID contracting for decades, the majority of contracts (by value) go to a handful of giant US-based corporations and non-profits. As discussed below, in recent years this has been the focus of critical scholarly analysis and also problematized in important policy critiques and thus in USAID self-improvement attempts under the Obama administration. Yet, as illustrated by Devex's chart for 2016 (see figure 2), the pattern continues, with the top three recipients in 2016 comprising 39 percent of all USAID contract funding.

¹⁶ Note that implementing partners are different from resource partners. Resource partners are the corporations with whom USAID enters partnerships where they contribute resources including cash (under public-private partnerships), such as for instance, the one with Walmart (Feed the Future Initiative).

USAID Top 20 Contractors for 2015
In US\$ Million




Figure 1: Top 20 USAID contractors in 2015. (Source Orlina 2016)

USAID Top 20 Contractors for 2016

In US\$ Million




Figure 2: Top 20 USAID contractors in 2016. (Source Orlina 2017)

USAID has two ways of distributing funding for development; as assistance and as acquisitions. Assistance is money handed out as grants and Cooperative Agreements, both of which generally involve the recipient being given the

funding to implement a developmental project in the field. That is, grants are funding mechanisms through which USAID provides support (and final evaluation), but otherwise is not engaged in the project, instead leaving it to the partner to design and implement the project. USAID has an objective of handing out 30% of its overall funds as direct grants. Cooperative Agreements are mechanisms where USAID has a ‘substantial involvement’ in the project, and in practice this has meant USAID is more prescriptive i.e. CAs are closer to contracts than grants (CRS, 2015). As USAID partners cannot charge profits on tasks awarded through Cooperative Agreements, corporations rarely bid on these. In USAID’s democracy promotion activity, for instance, 60% of projects awarded (by number, not value) are Cooperative Agreements, with the logic being these can be awarded more quickly because there is less contention when they are released for bidding. (This is not to say corporations are not involved in management of grants. For example, in the mid-2000s, USAID operated a \$50 million grant in Sri Lanka to support peacebuilding (even as the war there intensified); the pool was managed by DAI, which received and assessed applications and disbursed funds to local organisations on USAID’s behalf.)

Acquisitions are contracts awarded to for-profit or not-for-profit ‘partners’. While these are often competitively awarded (but they need not be), there are two types of contract, and the distinction is an important one. A standard contract, as might be expected, is offered by USAID calling for tenders and assessing all those who

submit bids to pick a suitable partner. The process is protracted and, responding to widespread criticism, USAID has “sought reforms of its procurement processes to make them more efficient and cost-effective” by cutting the time it takes from the production of a contract statement of work to the time of an award: “A goal was set of cutting the time by about 48%, from 513 days in FY2009 to 268 days. At the end of FY2013, the time had been cut by 17%,” (CRS 2015, 34). However, another reason why contract awarding is often long delayed is that, given the vast amounts of funding at stake, USAID award decisions often result in legal challenges and protracted litigation.

However, there is another kind of contract that is widely used by USAID (and, even more so, by the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Health, and Veterans Affairs): the Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) – sometimes referred to as Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts. IQCs are designed to speed up the contracting process by allowing USAID to *pre-qualify* bidders, such that a select number (usually 1-5) of partners are appointed under a large contract for a less precisely termed programme (i.e. when the exact quantities and timing for products or services is not known at the time of award). When a task becomes available under that contract, then those partners could be directly approached to fulfil the ‘order’. IQCs thus amount to a form of retainer, such as a corporation might issue for a law firm. IQCs are multi-year contracts worth millions, or even billions, each, and establish enduring long-term relationships between USAID and

the contracting ‘partners’. What is also key here is that IQCs shift the administrative burden of large development programs from USAID to the contracting firm (Roberts 2014, 1036).

For example, in 2015, USAID awarded its historically largest IQC, alone worth a staggering \$9.5 *billion* over 10 years, to a consortium led by Chemonics International (Igoe 2015, 2017). The ‘Global Health Supply Chain – Procurement Supply Management’ project “coordinates a massive logistical effort to distribute lifesaving drugs and treatments to combat and treat a range of diseases, including HIV and AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis” in more than 50 countries (Igoe 2015).

In 2017, the project was in serious trouble with USAID protesting the results so far as ‘unacceptable’ and a Congressional hearing to be held on Chemonics’ ‘mismanagement’. However, for now at least, Chemonics is keeping the contract with USAID ‘watching closely’ future performance (Igoe 2017).

The IQC had previously been held by Partnership for Supply Chain Management (PSCM), and was transferred to Chemonics in an acrimonious and heavily contested decision (Igoe 2015). (This decision in part explains the difference in the awarded contract profiles for USAID between 2015 and 2016 – see figures 1 and 2 above.) PSCM describes itself as “a *nonprofit* organization providing global procurement and distribution services in low- and middle-income countries”.

However, PSCM includes two of the leading international health consultancy organizations in the US —JSI Research & Training Institute, Inc. (JSI RTI) and

Management Sciences for Health (MSH). Both are registered non-profits and JSI RTI is a 50% partner in PSCM. However, JSI RTI is closely linked to the large corporation, John Snow, Inc (JSI) and is widely described as the latter's non-profit arm, and in 2011 the CEO of JSI was paid \$450,000 as CEO of JSI RTI (Roberts 2014, 1037–38). MSH, meanwhile, is a non-profit founded in 1971 by Joel Lamstein, who formed the for-profit JSI in 1978 (*ibid*). The above is illustrative of why, for the purposes of this chapter, which considers the co-constitutive role of large corporations in USAID's operations, the distinction between for-profit and non-profit 'partners' is not important.

Work allocated by USAID under contract can be, and often is, sub-contracted to a range of other entities: firms, non-profit organizations, and individuals can be contractors, subcontractors, or both (Roberts 2014, 1033). First, this means that losing a competitively awarded contract to a rival does not mean a firm will not be involved in implementing the work. Second, relatedly, if a contract is awarded to a 'small' firm, it is quite likely large firms will be heavily involved in implementing the project. For example, in recent years, in great part due to criticism of the dominance of large corporations in its contract awarding, USAID has been under increasing pressure to use small and/or disadvantaged businesses. These are described as businesses employing less than 500 employees and with capitalisation of up to \$7.5million. For IQCs, this means USAID can appoint a small business *without* competitive tendering. However, (as is often recognised at the outset)

often these small businesses cannot deliver the entire project, so they will in turn engage a larger corporation as a sub-contractor, and, provided the small firm delivers 51% of the contract, they are not in breach of the USAID contract.

What all this means is that despite vast blocs of (taxpayer) funding being appropriated and allocated to a given country, the majority of USAID expenditure ends up with large American corporations (see for example Roberts 2014). It is this simple and inescapable empirical fact that has both prompted and, as discussed below, shaped much of the critical scholarly and policy analysis on USAID's relationship with US corporations. However, as discussed below, the a priori separations of state and corporation and public and private that inform such analyses serves to misconstrue the state-corporate nexus that *is* 'USAID', and neglect the centrality of security discourses related to the global South in re/producing it.

USAID has used IQCs at least since the 1980s to undertake large scale projects, but these expanded rapidly in 1990s, primarily for projects in the now former Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union spurred a massive West-led international effort to transform member countries in the image of western market democracies. The devastating consequences of the IMF-led 'shock therapy' and broader liberal transformative efforts have been well documented. What is important for this chapter is the centrality of IQCs to the United States' bilateral efforts, led by USAID. Amid the goal of supporting "the transition from communism to

democracy and market-oriented economics, ... a primary focus of US assistance [was] private sector development, which includes economic stabilisation and restructuring and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises” (Government Accountability Office 1994, 2). USAID’s ‘Enterprise and Restructuring and Privatization’ project – for Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and the Czech and Slovak Republics – was authorised in 1990. It was implemented through IQCs awarded (on a competitive basis) in 1991 to four major US accounting firms – Deloitte and Touche, KPMG Peat Marwick, Coopers and Lybrand and Price Waterhouse. Each firm, however, represented a consortium of subcontractors “having expertise in several critical disciplines, such as legal and management areas,” (Government Accountability Office 1994, 2). Notably, Coopers and Lybrand’s consortium included Chemonics, and Deloitte’s included DAI. (KPMG’s consortium comprised financial firms, including Lehman Brothers). Rubén Berriós’ book, the single study on USAID contracting at the time, provides aggregates of top-25 USAID contractors between 1991 and 1996 (Berriós 2000, 46–47). It shows that in those five years, in total, Coopers was awarded over \$190 million in contracts, Deloitte over \$430 million, Price Waterhouse over \$475m and KPMG over \$710 million. For its work (globally) for USAID in the same period, Chemonics was awarded over \$860 million.

The chapter returns to IQCs in the next section, as these are a key technology in the transformation of USAID over the past three decades. The aim of this section

was, first, to demonstrate the scale of USAID contracting and the concomitant substantial shift in responsibilities to large US-corporations, and second, to demonstrate how this is routinely written out of analysis of USAID in peacebuilding scholarship.

6.3 Locating the public-private divide in USAID

This section discusses some key sets of practices which reproduce the intimate relations between USAID and US corporations. The overall purpose is to illustrate the difficulty in separating the ‘public’ from the ‘private’ in these practices, as well as the mutually constitutive effect of these practices on state-corporate relations. To this end the section focusses on three aspects of USAID activity: the country strategy (how does USAID decide its overall strategy for a country (the example here being Sri Lanka?); professional knowhow (how does USAID acquire the knowledge of how to engage with developmental spaces, the example here being conflict management?); and self-improvement (how does USAID identify institutional weaknesses and how to fix them?). As the section shows, corporations are deeply integral to all these state activities.

6.3.1 USAID and ‘implementing partners’

To provide some context for the analysis in this and the next sections, this subsection sets some details of USAID and a development corporation, Management Systems International (MSI) MSI is a subsidiary of Tetra Tech, Inc, the second largest USAID corporate contractor in 2016.

USAID was established in 1961 under an executive order by President Kennedy, as mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act (Paterson 1989). This reorganized US foreign assistance programs by separating military and non-military aid, and bringing together several foreign assistance organizations and programs scattered through the US state into a single agency charged with foreign economic development and supported by funding through the Foreign Assistance Act (1961). USAID sees itself as having a two-fold purpose, of furthering US interests while improving lives in the developing world i.e. it “carries out US foreign policy by promoting broad-scale human progress at the same time it expands stable, free societies, creates markets and trade partners for the United States, and fosters good will abroad,” (USAID n.d.). (As discussed later in the chapter, USAID explicitly unites these goals in terms of the pursuit of US and international security.) To these ends, USAID has projects across Africa, Asia, Europe and Eurasia, the Caribbean, Latin America, and the Middle East.

USAID is organised on a matrix structure, with some divisions, known as bureaus, that are geographically focused and others that are thematically focused, as set out

in the organisational chart in figure 3. In many countries, USAID has a country ‘mission’, operating alongside the US embassy. Development and humanitarian relief projects are undertaken both by missions and Washington DC-based central offices that can also work through regional offices (for multi-country projects). Bureaus have several specialist offices. For example, the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) has nine offices, headquartered in Washington, D.C. One of these offices is the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), which supports U.S. foreign policy by “seizing emerging windows of opportunity in the political landscape to promote stability, peace, and democracy by catalyzing local initiatives through adaptive and agile programming” (USAID [OTI] n.d.). Also part of DCHA is the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM). CMM is the lead office in providing conflict knowledge, broadly defined (i.e. a broad range of expertise related to conflict contexts, including impact of climate change, diaspora, etc.) and also provides specialist training for USAID staff, for example on conflict assessment (USAID [CMM] n.d.). OTI and CMM are mentioned here because they are relevant to the analysis below, but they are neither unique nor substantially different from other parts of USAID in terms of organisation or day-to-day functionality.




Figure 3: USAID Organisational chart. (Source USAID n.d.)

The US-based corporations that are USAID's 'implementing partners' operate in all those countries that USAID engages with, with many of the large corporations active in multiple countries for USAID. In a given country, a corporation may implement different projects for multiple offices and bureaus within USAID, while also implementing projects for other arms of the US, such as the military, or for other donors. In Sri Lanka, for example, in the late 2000s, DAI was simultaneously implementing projects for USAID's OTI and for the US Pacific Command (PACOM) in the same locales in the island's east province, following the Sri Lankan military's successful capture of the area from the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in 2006/7.

Consequently, these corporations have substantial expertise and institutional capacity in relation to a given country. This is not to make a judgment as to the quality of that expertise, but to reiterate, first, how USAID simply cannot undertake development projects anywhere without necessarily partnering with a corporation; and, second, how, for many of these corporations, retaining their claimed expertise and institutional capacity is only possible insofar as USAID (often their largest single client), other arms of the US state (e.g. the Pentagon) or other donors are engaged in that country. Put simply, the question as to whether USAID does or does not have country expertise cannot be answered without first locating the boundary between ‘USAID’ and its ‘implementing partner’. As this section shows, this is not self-evident.

Management Systems International

Founded in 1981, Management Systems International (MSI) is a Washington, D.C.-based international development firm. In 2008 MSI became a subsidiary of the Australia-based development firm, Coffey International. In 2016 Coffey was acquired by Tetra Tech, Inc., The acquisition expanded Tetra Tech’s geographic presence and positioned Tetra Tech as the leading global consulting firm for international development, supporting development agencies from the US, Australia and the UK. With 400 offices worldwide, Tetra Tech has 16,000 staff and

13 subsidiaries, including MSI. Tetra Tech's is also a defence contractor and its work for the US military includes large projects for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the US Navy.

MSI is heavily involved with USAID, earning \$126 million from the agency in 2015. While an MSI annual report is not available, estimates are that around 80 percent of MSI's income is from USAID, with the rest from the State Department and other smaller projects. On its website, MSI lists a number of ICQ and other funding mechanisms it holds with USAID, which allows the agency to access MSI services on a pre-qualified basis. Among the fifteen ICQs listed, some are with MSI as prime contractor, and others are where MSI subcontracts through another prime contractor. Thus, on the USAID Program/Project Management Training ICQ, MSI subcontracts through Engility Corporation, while on the USAID Global Civil Society Strengthening Leader with Associates (LWA), the company subcontracts to the non-profit Counterpart International. Through one of the agreements with the US state, "any agency in the Federal government can procure MSI's services for consulting, facilitation, and survey services, and project management support on a pre-qualified basis." MSI's website describes the firm thus:

"MSI has helped clients solve complex development challenges, often in areas torn apart by hunger and violence. Our projects help to stabilize communities and countries emerging from conflict, improve government accountability, and bolster civil society. Our innovative tools and methodologies build capacity and ensure sustainability – all with a focus on

development effectiveness. We also generate analytical content that underpins programming decisions, and have conducted nearly 1,000 evaluations in 100 countries since our founding.” (Management Systems International n.d.)

6.3.2 USAID country strategy

USAID is a bilateral donor, meaning that overall that its assistance is understood as country-to-country. USAID defines its strategy for engagement in a country based on a Regional or Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). The purpose of the CDCS is to allow USAID to “accommodate the different planning realities in each country context while still ensuring that the strategy reflects Agency priorities and budget parameters” (USAID n.d.).¹⁷ By setting out US developmental strategy and priorities for a country, the CDCS therefore heavily influences the practices reproducing state-state relations. Using Sri Lanka as an example, this sub-section explores how USAID, as an arm of the US state, acquires the understandings of a given country’s context, dynamics, etc. such that a future-oriented framework for US developmental engagement can be defined and subsequently implemented. As shown below, US-based corporations play a key, albeit indirect, role in formulating the CDCS.

¹⁷ However, not all country engagements have a CDCS – for example, USAID is active in over 120 countries, but 25 have total annual commitments of less than \$1 million. Of 62 current USAID missions, 60 have completed a CDCS, although some are years old.

The latest CDCS for USAID in Sri Lanka was formulated in 2016, and sets out overarching goals and specific focusses for the period 2016-2019. It was formulated hurriedly following a sharp resurgence in USAID funding for Sri Lanka following a decline since 2010. The US and Sri Lanka have had excellent relations since the country's independence, and the US was heavily involved, especially since 2000, in Sri Lanka's eventually successful counter-insurgency against the LTTE (Rampton and Nadarajah 2017). However, relations between Sri Lanka and the US and other western states deteriorated from 2010 to 2014, in great part due to a growing international campaign for accountability for Sri Lankan state forces' war crimes and crimes against humanity in which 40,000 Tamil civilians were killed in the final months of the war in 2009, and the victorious government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa then defying the West-led international criticism while also repudiating wholesale the tenets of liberal peace in favour of authoritarian and explicitly Sinhala nationalist governance. Though a CDCS strategy for 2011-2013 had been formulated, USAID scaled down engagement with Sri Lanka – though as discussed below, some large projects were continued by partners DAI and MSI.

In the January 2015 presidential elections, the shock defeat of Rajapaksa by the opposition candidate, Maithripala Sirisena – Rajapaksa's Health Minister who defected to the opposition to stand as a rival candidate – was widely hailed by the international community as heralding a turn from authoritarianism and repression toward democracy, human rights, inclusive governance and inter-ethnic peace. As

reflected in widespread criticisms since then, from Tamil civil society groups, international rights groups, and several UN Special Rapporteurs on human rights, subsequent developments have been far from the (even then wildly) optimistic international expectations. Nonetheless, the United States deemed Sri Lanka to be a country now in ‘transition’ from conflict and repression to ‘good governance’ and peace, and in mid-2016 USAID announced a \$40m injection of aid, while an ‘abbreviated’ USAID/Sri Lanka CDCS for 2016-2019 (henceforth the CDCS) was hurriedly formulated.

The CDCS sets out “a multi-year strategy that reflects USAID collaboration with the [Government of Sri Lanka] to focus investment in key areas of democratic reform and economic growth that will shape the country’s overall stability and prosperity” (USAID 2016a, 2). It declares that: “With innovation and partnership at its core, this strategy will provide high impact engagement opportunities in economic growth, democracy, rights, and governance, international trade, transitional justice, and reconciliation programming that ensure a stable and democratic Sri Lanka,” (USAID 2016a, 2). The focus here is not on the increasing disjuncture between the realities of the country and the account of Sri Lanka that is reflected in, and forms the basis for, the CDCS, but on the role of US development corporations in how the priorities, goals and targets for USAID set out in the CDCS came about. The CDCS states that

“to inform and develop its strategy in a changing operational environment, USAID relied on *recent assessments of the Sri Lankan development and operational context, as well as evaluations done on previous projects*. To gather more detailed technical information in specific areas and guide the strategic application of limited resources for maximum impact, USAID also conducted further analyses and assessments, as well as a number of informal stakeholder discussions,” (USAID 2016a, 11 emphasis added).

The single most important study in this regard was the 2015 USAID report, titled ‘Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Assessment of Sri Lanka’, published in December, having been initiated immediately following President Sirisena’s election victory in January. This 70-page DRG Assessment was conducted *jointly* by USAID and MSI; “Working together, the US Embassy, USAID and the State Department assembled an assessment team consisting of Gavin Helf, senior democracy and governance adviser for Central and South Asia in USAID’s Asia Bureau, and Lynn Carter, senior vice president at Management Systems International, *as team co-leaders*” (USAID [MSI] 2015b, 65 emphasis added). First produced in March 2015, the report was updated following the August 2015 parliamentary elections by two MSI consultants – one of whom was the US-based Sri Lankan scholar Neil De Votta. The program recommendations laid out in 2015 DRG Assessment are directly reflected in the CDCS, produced in December 2016. MSI’s expertise on Sri Lanka, which led to its central role in producing the DRG country assessment that profoundly shaped the CDCS, comes from long engagement in the country. This included conducting a previous country

assessment in 2001, but its main recent experience was administering for USAID from 2012-2017 (i.e. initiated during the period of strained relations between Sri Lanka and the US) a \$15 million project to strengthen civil society organisations, the Support for Professional and Institutional Capacity Enhancement (SPICE). (The genesis of the SPICE program is informative for the analysis here, and is discussed below).

SPICE was designed “to address the problem of alarmingly diminished space for effective civic engagement and the protection of citizen rights,” and to this end “aimed to expand space for independent collective action by citizens, protect citizens’ rights and support critical voices by focusing on the key issues of governance, inclusion and reconciliation,” (USAID [Democracy International] 2017, i). MSI began implementing SPICE in December 2012 with a “focus on civil society in the north and east of the country, while working with strategically important national CSOs.” The Tamil-majority North and East were the regions where the three decade-long civil war had taken place. However, in 2014 “SPICE was modified to provide capacity enhancement services to 14 recipients [who were] direct grantees of USAID,” and also “gradually extended its geographic scope to include the south and center of the country” (*ibid*). While the final evaluation of the program was not completed until 2017 – by the US-based consultancy Democracy International Inc. – in terms of formulating the CDSC, the SPICE project enabled MSI to reproduce and develop its Sri Lanka expertise and

capability. The experience also enabled MSI to offer key recent in-country expertise for USAID when what US Secretary of State John Kerry called an “extraordinary opportunity” presented itself following the 2015 change in government for USAID to support Sri Lanka’s ‘transition’ to peace and democracy (AFP 2015).

Meanwhile, USAID had generated other country assessments and project evaluations to draw on whilst formulating the CDSCS. DAI, for example, had also recently undertaken a major USAID project in Sri Lanka from 2010 to 2013 i.e. the project was formulated before but implemented during the period in which US-Sri Lanka relations were deteriorating. The \$23 million Reintegration and Stabilization in the East and North (RISEN) program “aimed to establish and manage a quick-response mechanism that would strengthen Sri Lankan confidence and capacity to address the consequences of conflict, violence, and instability,” (USAID [Social Impact] 2014, viii). The evaluation report for the RISEN project was produced in 2014 by Social Impact, Inc, another US-based development corporation. Meanwhile, in 2013, USAID had commissioned another scoping study to provide “an assessment of opportunities to support livelihoods development for vulnerable populations in the Northern and selected Eastern districts of Sri Lanka” (USAID [Chemonics] 2013, 5). This study was again jointly conducted by USAID and Chemonics; the study team comprised William Baldridge of USAID’s Asia and Middle East Bureau, two Chemonics consultants,

Melissa Scudo and Joelle Thomas, and Carol Tyroler, an employee of Banyan Global, a subcontractor to the Chemonics-managed USAID project Asia and the Middle East Economic Growth Best Practices (AMEG) project.

What the above is intended to show is that while the CDSCS represents the key policy document governing US (represented by USAID) development assistance relations with a recipient country, and is reliant on ‘USAID’ “assessments of the ... development and operational context, as well as evaluations done on previous [USAID] projects,” (USAID [CMM] n.d.) these are always produced by corporations, either solely or jointly with USAID staff. Therefore, the separation of state and corporation implied by understanding US developmental assistance in terms of state-state agreements, and of corporations as simply USAID’s ‘implementation partners’ serves to misconstrue the central role the latter have in shaping, even defining the former.

In this regard, USAID’s SPICE project illustrates another challenge to both the state-corporate analytical divide and the principal-agent reading of USAID-contractor relations. As noted above, SPICE began in 2012, at a time when the Sri Lankan government of President Rajapaksa was aggressively shutting down space for civil society activity, and in particular international donor-funded projects focussed on democracy promotion, human rights, etc. – seeing these (rightly) as an important part of western intervention in Sri Lanka. As also noted above, this itself contributed to the deterioration in Sri Lanka’s relations with the US and

other western countries. Unlike DAI's RISEN project, which had been initiated in 2009, when US-Sri Lanka relations were positive, the launch of SPICE was a notable departure from USAID's hesitancy to commit new developmental funding to Sri Lanka. In practical terms, the project was a result of the existing working relationship between senior staff at MSI and senior staff at USAID Mission in Sri Lanka. Both parties agreed on the principle that there was a need to continue to be engaged in Sri Lanka, even as the government attempted to close space for such involvement. Consequently, the SPICE project was conceptualised, on relative loose objectives, and MSI proposed it to another USAID partner, Counterpart International, a US-based non-profit organization. MSI already had a sub-contracting arrangement with Counterpart International under a cooperative agreement (CA) the latter had with USAID for Global Civil Society Strengthening (GCSS). As noted above, unlike contracts and IQCs, USAID awards CAs on a non-profit basis. The SPICE project was agreed with Counterpart International on the basis that delivery would be the sole responsibility of the party bringing in the contract – in this case MSI – while Counterpart International received a percentage of the contract for 'subcontracting' MSI. Thus, while Counterpart International was the formally contracted partner for USAID, the work, publicity and administration for the five-year project were entirely conducted by MSI. Given the nature of USAID funding stream – i.e. the non-profit CA – for MSI to be able to undertake the project, the corporation had to forego declaring a profit.

Nonetheless, the project covered MSI's costs in Sri Lanka and, more importantly, well positioned the corporation for further roles there with USAID when suitable conditions emerged in due course.

6.3.3 Expertise

This subsection explores the practices by which specialist knowledges required for USAID to undertake its mandates circulate within the organisation. The example here is expertise in conflict management. The lead USAID office in this regard is the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), founded in 2002. Aspects of CMM activities key to the analysis in this subsection are outlined below; they are reproduced from CMM's website so as to illustrate the Office's presentation of self, so that the integral, but invisible, role of corporations to its work can be better demonstrated:

“DCHA/CMM provides analytical and operational support to USAID overseas missions, development officers and program partners to enable the Agency to better address the causes and consequences of violent conflict.

“DCHA/CMM also serves as a liaison between USAID and the broader conflict resolution and peacebuilding community, ... representing USAID in the academic, interagency, and international donor communities.

“DCHA/CMM also leads USAID's efforts to ensure all its activities are sensitive to local conflict and security dynamics.

“Through technical leadership, DCHA/CMM seeks to distill practical lessons from scholarship, evaluation, and experience to

improve the quality of development programming and policy-making.

“DCHA/CMM provides technical assistance to USAID field missions, regional bureaus, and other operating units to enable them to identify and better respond to conflict dynamics. DCHA/CMM works with missions to develop conflict management and mitigation programs and provides conflict sensitive guidance throughout the Country Development and Cooperation Strategy process. DCHA/CMM provides field support through conflict assessments, program design, training, strategic facilitation and grant monitoring.” (USAID [CMM] n.d.)

Amongst the activities central to CMM’s work are (a) “advanced applied” research and (b) training of USAID and other US state personnel, and also those of implementing partners. These are discussed next to illustrate the integral role of corporations, the example here being MSI, to CMM’s core mandate and activities. However, like other USAID offices, CMM relies heavily on contractors, retained through indefinite quantity contracts (IQC) in executing its mandate. One example is the Programming Effectively Against Conflict and Extremism (PEACE) indefinite quantity contract (IQC).

The stated purpose of the PEACE IQC is “to provide services in support to Knowledge Generation, Dissemination and Management; Training; Field Implementation Programs; and Analytical Services for USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.” The IQC is held by five private sector actors, including MSI. As of October 2017, ten ‘task orders’ have been publicly listed as issued; six of those – totalling \$75 million – have been issued to MSI (the four

others are one each to DAI (\$19.3 million – for a project in Kenya), Creative Associates (\$12.9 million), FHI360 (\$11.3 million) and Democracy International (\$2.4 million). As usual, a USAID would issue a task order to an IQC partner, but the corporation may sub-contract aspects of the work to other providers (for example, Democracy International's consortium includes Chemonics).

Announcing its award of the PEACE IQC, MSI stated on its website:

“Our [consortium] members offer USAID access to exceptional analytical, training, and program implementation capabilities. ... Our consortium’s approach addresses conflict and fragility with a deep understanding of conflict dynamics and resilience. MSI and several partners have worked closely with USAID to develop and refine their approaches and frameworks, including USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 and guidance on Countering Violent Extremism.” (Management Systems International 2013b)

Moreover, the company says of its expertise: “MSI is known for its work on governance, conflict and violent extremism as well as its monitoring and evaluation (M&E) expertise and effective training on conflict programming” (ibid).

The task orders CMM issued to MSI under the PEACE IQC include both research and training, and these are discussed below.

Training

According to CMM:

“A key part of DCHA/CMM's mandate is to act as a change agent for USAID. One way we do this is by helping foster a new

generation of development officers who are knowledgeable about conflict dynamics and have the required skills to guide Agency investments in conflict-prone environments. Training both USAID development officers and partners in conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive programming is, therefore, an important part DCHA/CMM's portfolio." (USAID [CMM] n.d.)

The CMM training is provided by USAID staff, but also by contractors under IQCs. One of MSI's task orders, titled 'Conflict Technical Capacity Building and Training' (CTCBT), runs between 2015 and 2019. The task order is to "disseminate conflict technical capacity building and training curricula that incorporate state-of-the-art peacebuilding and conflict sensitive approaches; and deliver quality DCHA Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) technical capacity building and training." (Management Systems International 2015, 1). What this means is that while it is CMM that, as per its mandate, 'provides' conflict-related training to staff both at USAID and other government departments, in practice it is *actually provided* by MSI. Figure 4 below provides an overview of the training that the corporation carries out for CMM under the CTCBT task order. As the annual report details, the work MSI carried out for CMM included "co-training" on several courses - including 'Conflict 102', 'Gender & Conflict', and 'Advanced Conflict Assessment'; curriculum design for multiple courses; providing logistical and administrative support for all courses in 2015; e-module development and the creation of an online Community of Practice (CoP); etc.




Figure 4: MSI Training support to CMM. (Source Management Systems International 2015, 1)

The ‘Advanced Conflict Assessment’ (ACA) course, for which C102 and G&C courses are pre-requisites, is a three-and-a-half day course to “ensure participants understand the [CMM’s] Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF); familiarize USAID staff with the process of assessment and considerations for planning; improve participant skills in using the CAF to guide data collection and analysis; and provide tools for synthesizing information into findings and linking those findings to concrete recommendations for USAID programmatic response.” MSI also ran a ‘Training of Trainers’ (ToT) course, “designed to train potential C102, G&C, and ACA trainers on facilitation skills needed for each course. The ToT is for “upcoming trainers to learn the curriculum and content of each course and to

practice facilitating various modules” (Management Systems International 2015, 4). The 2015 annual report also details another planned course – ‘Advanced Conflict Programming’ (ACP) – of three-four days to be “offered to experienced USAID staff to increase application of conflict-sensitive principles to the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of USAID programs worldwide.”

The online Community of Practice (CoP), meanwhile, serves to “showcase CMM’s technical and learning leadership within the global peacebuilding community, and to other practitioners, academics, and individuals interested in learning more about leading practices in conflict-sensitive approaches.” Housed on a web-portal managed by MSI’s subcontractor, Search for Common Ground’s (SFCG), the CoP “capitaliz[es] on an existing network of 4,000 members in over 130 countries.” Among the other accomplishments listed in the report are the knowledge surveys created for three courses – C102, G&C, and ACA - through which “MSI is able to track knowledge gained throughout the course” which allows “CMM and MSI to better understand which concepts participants struggle with, and which concepts participants understand” (Management Systems International 2015, 2). CMM’s website presently states: “Since 2012 DCHA/CMM has trained more than 900 US Government, interagency and non-government partners in the necessary tools to design programs and ensure a peacebuilding approach in conflict-affected environments” (USAID [CMM] n.d.). In 2015 alone MSI’s courses above trained

142 of these individuals, 13 of whom were staff of other contractors, and the rest employees of USAID or other US government agencies.

Research

According to CMM, “a *core component* of DCHA/CMM’s programming is devoted to advancing applied research in topics pertinent to conflict, security, and development,” (USAID [CMM] n.d. emphasis added). To this end, “*DCHA/CMM* analyzes the causes and consequences of violent conflict, supports early warning and early response to violent conflict, and integrates conflict mitigation and management into USAID's analysis, strategies and programs,” (ibid emphasis added). Moreover, CMM says, “DCHA/CMM engages in research areas such as countering violent extremism and insurgency, program effectiveness, natural resource management and gender. ... DCHA/CMM's portfolio of publications offers cutting edge research to the Agency and its partners on a variety of conflict-related topics” (ibid).

However, several of the key research publications available in CMM’s portfolio have been produced for CMM by private contractors, including MSI (USAID n.d.). For example, the ‘Technical Brief: Advancing Early Warning of Mass Atrocities Against Civilians’ (2013) was produced by MSI’s parent company, Tetra Tech, Inc. The ‘Climate Change and Conflict’ conflict toolkit’ (undated) was produced by the

Engility Corporation. The ‘Technical Guidance on Diaspora in Crisis Settings’ (2011) was produced by AMEX International (and authored by the leading diaspora and security scholar, Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff). MSI-produced CMM publications include: ‘Conflict Diagnostic Considerations for Food for Peace’ (2014); ‘Organized Crime, Conflict and Fragility: Assessing Relationships through a Review of USAID Programs’ (2015a); ‘The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa: A Programming Guide’ (2013a) and ‘Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism’ (2009a). In producing the 2015 ‘Organized Crime, Conflict and Fragility’ study, for example, CMM “commissioned MSI to conduct research on the relationship between organized crime, conflict and fragility” (USAID [MSI] 2015a, 3). The year-long research project included a literature review and country case studies in Guatemala, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that examined “the interaction between organized criminality and USAID conflict and fragility programming … with regard to how criminality affects USAID implementation and results, and how assistance affects criminality” (USAID [MSI] 2015a, 5) The study says this research “helped generate a set of general principles and options for the role and activities of development organizations with respect to organized crime” (*ibid*).

As with all USAID literature, all these reports – whether produced by private contractors or ‘in-house’ – always appear in USAID livery, with the name of the contractor and the order (and occasionally their logo) appearing on an inside page

with the contract code. This is emblematic of how the practices and personnel of state (USAID) and corporation (MSI, for example) are thoroughly integrated within “a core component” of CMM’s mandated activity: “advancing applied research in topics pertinent to conflict, security, and development”. Similarly, as the discussion above of CMM’s training programming shows, state and private practices and personnel are also seamlessly integrated in the execution of another of CMM’s “key” functions - “to act as a change agent for USAID, [including] by helping foster a new generation of development officers who are knowledgeable about conflict dynamics.”

The next subsection briefly discusses the integral role of large corporations in one of the central aspects of USAID’s activities over time: its repeated efforts, amid the ceaseless criticisms that have dogged USAID (see, e.g., Stanger, 2009; CRS, 2015), to reengineer its management towards better delivering its mission. The discussion focusses on key initiatives since 2009 related to procurement and evaluation.

These are chosen because they also centre on the primary focus of this chapter, USAID’s total reliance on private ‘implementing partners’ to carry out its mandate.

6.3.4 Self-improvement

As the 2015 CRS study of USAID notes, in recent years the agency undertaken a number of reengineering efforts as part of Implementation and Procurement

Reform. These reforms have always been contested by USAID's diverse implementing partners – for example, efforts to change rules on acquisition and assistance (grants). The aim of this subsection, however, is to highlight the integral role of corporations in generating for USAID management the key knowledge, understanding, recommendations and strategies by which USAID remakes itself.

Soon after the President Barack Obama took office in 2009, the new administration launched a major and ambitious effort to overhaul USAID, including 'restoring' capacities deemed to have been lost under the Bush administration. This included evaluation (in 2006, responsibility for overseeing evaluation in USAID shifted to the Bureau of Foreign Assistance in the Department of State, as part of efforts to integrate the work of the agency and the department of State). When the Obama-era reform initiative, dubbed USAID Forward, was launched in November 2010, an important aspect of its agenda was placing evaluation at the heart of USAID's work, including making it mandatory for future program and project cycles. Shortly before USAID Forward was launched, USAID's Bureau for Policy Planning and Learning (PPL) was established in June 2010. In January 2011 USAID launched its now much-hailed *Evaluation Policy*.

As part of the large-scale self-reflection that led to USAID Forward, the agency commission a number of studies. With regards to evaluation, this included two major paired studies commissioned in 2009: the first was 'Trends in International

Development Evaluation Theory, Policy And Practices' (USAID [MSI] 2009b); the second was 'Trends in US Foreign Assistance Over The Past Decade' (USAID [MSI] 2009c). Both were contracted to MSI. The stated purpose of the first study was to "provide USAID with a portrait of trends in international development evaluation over the past decade. Coverage includes the findings of previous reviews of trends in evaluation; information on other donor evaluation policies and guidelines; and an analysis of trends in USAID evaluation reports for the period 2005 through 2008" (USAID [MSI] 2009b, iii). Moreover, another stated purpose was to "*include options for USAID's [planned] new Office of Evaluation that are consistent with current donor practices and USAID's own history*," (USAID [MSI] 2009b, 1 emphasis added). The second study was clearly intended as a critical evaluation of the Bush administration's policies. MSI sought to mitigate the risk of retaliation by a future Republican administration by stating "though [this] paper identifies and discusses important trends in the organization and delivery of US foreign assistance, it does not take a position on the worth or appropriateness of those trends," (USAID [MSI] 2009c, 1). Instead, this second report pointed to the first, wherein MSI's policy recommendations are explicitly located, here in relation to "important trends over the past decade in the evaluation of international development programs" (*ibid*). More importantly for the analysis here, the second report adds: "Taken together, these two papers will be used to identify considerations and implications regarding the purpose, focus and practice of

evaluation of U.S.-supported international development activities. *These implications are, in turn, presented in a third paper that MSI is producing for USAID in order to inform discussions and decisions related to evaluation policy and practice at USAID and its US Government and non-government partners,*" (USAID [MSI] 2009c, 1 emphasis added). What the above highlights is the key role of corporations in producing the knowledge, understanding and recommendations that informed a core aspect of USAID Forward: the *Evaluation Policy* and the creation of the Bureau for Policy Planning and Learning (PPL).

USAID deems the *Evaluation Policy* initiative of 2011 to have been highly successful. A 2016 stock-taking report, titled 'Strengthening Evidence-Based Development: Five Years of Better Evaluation Practice at USAID', states: "Evaluation Policy has served as a model for other agencies, and external organizations have credited USAID for having one of the most comprehensive policies on evaluation of any federal agency" (USAID 2016b, 2). For example, the Department of State is said to have modelled its own 2012 *Program Evaluation Policy* on USAID's *Evaluation Policy*, "adopting much of the language on purposes, methods and standards for evaluation," (ibid).

However, as indisputable evidence of its claim of *Evaluation Policy*'s positive impact on USAID's operations, the stock-taking report states: "To better understand whether these and other efforts are working, the Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning commissioned *independent* studies to examine evaluation

quality (2013) and evaluation use (2016) at USAID,” (USAID 2016b, 10). Both these independent studies were conducted by MSI under USAID contract.

The first study was the ‘The Meta Evaluation of Quality and Coverage of USAID Evaluations: 2009–2012’ (USAID [MSI] 2013b) which, according to USAID, “reviewed to what extent evaluation quality had changed since the Evaluation Policy was put in place,” by examining a sample of 340 USAID evaluations “representing every geographic region and technical area in which USAID works” and by “gathering qualitative data from USAID staff and evaluation providers” (USAID [MSI] 2016, 16). The second study was the ‘Evaluation Utilization at USAID’ (USAID [MSI] 2016), which, according to USAID, “concluded that USAID evaluation utilization practices are already strong and compare well to those of other US Government agencies examined in previous studies conducted by the US [Government Accountability Office]” (ibid). In recent years, the above reports are not the only studies, including of evaluation, conducted for USAID management by MSI. Other large corporations have also been conducted under contract other studies of USAID operations for USAID management.

A second aspect of USAID Forward relates to procurement reform. USAID’s complex and protracted procurement processes have long been (and indeed continue to be) the subject of persistent and intense criticism. In 2013, USAID commissioned “an extensive study of its procurement processes”, the Award Cost Efficiency Study (ACES), and although ACES focused on maternal and child

health projects, “the resulting recommendations had wide application to the whole range of USAID procurement activities,” (CRS 2015, 34). The ACES was produced by the management consultancy Oliver Wyman, “with the generous support of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,” (USAID 2014). USAID began implementing the recommendations in January 2014 and “adopted numerous steps that aim to better define what awards should achieve and improve the process of selecting the type of procurement, the evaluation of costs, and the assessment of partner performance,” (CRS 2015, 34). In a report, titled ‘A New Model for Development: USAID Management & Process Reform’, USAID states “We are working proactively to sustain and build this reform effort by assessing how these recommendations can be applied to further improve our efficiency and effectiveness,” (USAID 2014, 1).

The practice of large private corporations advising government departments and agencies on restructuring, management reforms, efficiency and other performance improvements is not, of course, novel in the US, UK and other major western states. This (government-contracted) work has been a staple of the large management consultancy industry for decades. However, what is noteworthy here is that while USAID has long faced – and indeed internalised – intense criticism of its procurement and other management processes, the same corporations that are recipients of the criticised contracting processes are deeply integrated into the reworking those processes.

6.3.5 Conclusion

This section sought to empirically explore some key sets of practices – themed as country strategy-making, professional knowhow, and self-improvement - which are functionally central to USAID and, at the same time, serve to reproduce the intimate relations between USAID and US development corporations. The overall purpose was to illustrate the difficulty in separating the ‘public’ from the ‘private’ within these practices, as well as the mutually constitutive effect of these practices on state-corporate relations. While the interweaving of quotidian state and corporate practices within USAID is so extensive that it is difficult to see where the public ends and the private begins, not only is this divide is nonetheless assumed as self-evident, the relationship is taken-for-granted as amenable to principle agent problems. To return to the example cited at the start of the chapter, when Severine Autesserre explains the success of USAID efforts in Sudan in terms of “the combination of continuity of staff, local knowledge and in-depth conflict analysis [which] proved in fact so successful that other donors requested USAID to manage their funds,” (2014, 83–84 insert added), not only is the corporation rendered invisible in state action, but analysis of peacebuilding as a set of powerful interventionary practices is distorted.

6.4 USAID and international security

What explains the rise of development corporations in USAID operations? The limited literature on this (for example Berriós 2000; Bate 2006; Stanger 2009; Roberts 2014) offers slightly different reasons. However, despite their authors' different theoretical frameworks and normative commitments, these works share common assumptions of a state/corporate and a public/private divide. Moreover, these works pay little or no attention to what is arguably the definitive characteristic of international peacebuilding operations: the 'uniting' of security and development (Duffield 2001). In contrast to the above literature, this chapter's argument, elaborated in this section, is that discourses of security – whereby an array of diverse threats in/from the global South eventually coalesced into the (technically manageable) problem of 'fragile'/'failed' states – are central to explaining the close integration and mutual constitution of state and corporation such that USAID is at once an arm of the US state and a dense configuration of state-corporate practices.

First, it discusses explanations in the limited literature on the rise of US development contracting, illustrating how the theoretical frameworks and historical assumptions adopted neglect important shifts in global security politics, and second, it outlines the convergence of diverse problematisations of the global South that intensified in the post-Cold War and reached a new urgency in the post-9/11 'War on Terror'. The section concludes with a discussion of how the

ensuing security imperatives intensified the corporatisation of USAID through the now familiar technology of IQCs.

6.4.1 Explaining the rise in USAID contracting

There is general agreement that the rise of USAID development contracting can be traced to the 1990s, even though it reached new intensity in the 2000s. However, many of today's giant corporations (such as Chemonics, Inc., Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), and John Snow, Inc. (JSI)) had been well established since the late 1970s. In this regard, much emphasis is placed on US domestic politics - in particular, on vociferous Republican attacks on foreign aid and USAID - and, equally, on the intensification of Reagan-era neoliberalism after the Cold War. Berriós' (2000) book was the first major study of USAID contracting, and for several years afterwards it was the only work. The historical narrative offered in the book is widely accepted (for example Bate 2006; Roberts 2014; CRS 2015; see also Essex 2013). In short, the Reagan administration implemented a radical project of market-oriented state reforms, and this was continued by the Clinton administration i.e. "USAID became part of the new wave of privatisation," (Berriós 2000, 13). At the same time, under the Clinton administration foreign aid, and particularly USAID, came under strong attack by Republicans – one of the most vocal critics, Senator Jesse Helms, famously described foreign aid as "throwing money down foreign rat holes," (cited in Bate 2006, 114). Even as overall US

foreign aid funding declined, USAID operational budget cuts produced a steady and rapid decline in ‘direct hire’ staff, leading to the loss of technical expertise and the closure of dozens of country Missions. To defend its funding and indeed its existence, USAID embraced US development corporations – this not only allowed USAID to justify foreign aid (and its own worth) on the basis of ‘US jobs’, but also generated a much-needed lobby in Congress given the agency itself could not do this. In this way emerged a development-industrial-complex that was able to limit Congress’ attacks on USAID, while funnelling large funding flows to corporations. However, the decline in ‘direct hire’ staff numbers also strained USAID’s ability to effectively oversee - i.e. assess, monitor and evaluate - proliferating contracts (contract management is the particular focus of Berriós’ book). Thus, the core elements explaining the growth of the US development contracting industry are the confluence of privatisation dynamics, domestic US politics, and rapid USAID institutional weakening.

More recent works, focussed on the post-2000 era, have reproduced these themes, with varying attention to some global dynamics. For example, Stanger’s (2009) book, ‘One Nation Under Contract’, devotes a chapter to ‘The Slow Death of USAID’. Her focus is less on development contractors per se than the ‘hollowing out’ of the US state, including USAID, consequent to excessive privatisation, on the one hand, and excessive reliance on US contractors - as opposed to recipient-country ‘partners’. (The same criticisms of USAID’s long-term relations with a few

large, US contractors is made by critical geographers (Roberts 2014) and neoconservative think-tank staffers (Bate 2006). For Stanger, the key relevant global changes for USAID, as a bilateral donor, are the rise in private development flows (e.g. large firms' 'corporate social responsibility' initiatives and migrant remittances), changes in international development thinking that emphasised focus on individuals (as opposed to countries). USAID's efforts to reform and improve its performance were undercut by Congress' budgetary interference through earmarks for pet interests on funding appropriations, and the Bush administration's determined efforts to marginalise and bypass USAID, for example, by creating other foreign aid vehicles such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (on the MCC, see Mawdsley 2007). Bate (2006), however, hails the MCC – which provides funding to recipient country entities based on strict conditionalities and metrics – precisely as a superior alternative to USAID. His is a straightforward public choice theory-derived attack on USAID's long-term relationships with handful of large US contractors (i.e. lack of competition amongst partners, who are anyway more expensive – and less capable – than 'local' partners, and USAID's inability or unwillingness to adequately oversee the contacts). This nexus of corporate actors centred on USAID is also the target of Roberts' critique (2014). In the most detailed and recent study since Berrios' book, she maps the network of profit and non-profit entities, their respective industry groups, associated industries (e.g. law firms), etc. that make up the 'development-

industrial complex', but her analytical focus is on building a critical geographical understanding of 'development capital' i.e. how the 'local' that USAID actually develops is the wealthy suburbs of Washington D.C. and surrounding counties where these corporations are based.

For the analysis here, what is important is the taken-for-granted separation between state (USAID) and corporation ('contractor') in all these works such that the contract becomes the analytical pivot i.e. what is happenings is 'privatisation' of state functions concomitant with the loss of state capacity. In fact, for Stanger (2009) the problem is not privatisation per se, but 'bad privatisation' (as with Bate (2006) and Roberts (2014), her recommendation is greater reliance on 'local' firms, NGOs and governments). For Berrios, the problem is at base poor contract oversight (due to lack of sufficient numbers of well-trained contract management staff). For Roberts the rise of development contracting is the result of "the money pouring out of a neoliberalised state into a world where public money becomes private accumulation (including on the part of so-called nonprofits) in the name of development" (Roberts 2014, 1046).

6.4.2 Missing the salience of security

What is also missing in the above analyses is attention to the impact of evolving discourses of international security. For example, one of the factors in the growth

of development contracting that Roberts (2014, 1036) points to is how, having established themselves in the USAID-centred assemblage, development contractors specialising in health (which includes all the major contractors) were able to take advantage of the Bush administration's post-2000 emphasis on global health and the associated massive funding, for example, through the President's Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). It is generally accepted in the above and other literature that the 2000s were "paradoxically, a time of US investment in global development and a time of further marginalization of USAID," (Roberts 2014, 1034)¹⁸. The Bush administration created PEPFAR – a five-year, \$15 billion initiative – in 2003. Indeed, in contrast to Stanger's claim of this initiative bypassing USAID, "in addition to its existing USAID-funded programs, USAID implements about three-fifths of the PEPFAR program. As a result, HIV/AIDS funding implemented by USAID leapt from \$407 million in FY2003 to \$3.8 billion in FY2010, representing roughly 17% of USAID's total budget in that year," (CRS

¹⁸ Indeed, developments then and in recent years challenges some of the assumptions of the narrative Berrios' set out. The Bush administration sought to merge USAID into the State Department in 2006 but it also authorised an increase in 'direct hire' staff. The Obama administration launched a major rejuvenation of USAID (the USAID Forward initiative), but also later limited direct hires and did not separate USAID from State (as since 2006, both still produce a joint foreign affairs budget request).

2015, 8). Meanwhile, the Bush administration also committed hundreds of millions of dollars to the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.

What is crucial in explaining this explosion in US funding for the fight against HIV/AIDS is that by now the disease had become well established as a prominent international security issue. For example, in July 2000 the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1308 declaring the epidemic an international security issue. Stefan Elbe, the leading scholar on HIV/AIDS and international security, has extensively studied the discourses through which the disease became securitised as a ‘crisis’ and an ‘emergency’ - the latter term appearing in PEPFAR’s name (2002, 2006, 2009). Indeed, as Elbe’s research shows, concerns about HIV/AIDS and other ‘emerging viruses’ had already drawn the attention of senior US officials by 1995, and in January 2000 the US National Intelligence produced an influential national intelligence estimate titled The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States (Elbe 2009, 3). Meanwhile, USAID had started its HIV/AIDS program as long ago as 1986, and in 1996, the agency played a key role in the creation of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

The discourse of HIV/AIDS as a security issue linked its potential consequences to traditional security issues and to sub-Saharan Africa – e.g. conflict, the hollowing out of state armed forces, and HIV/AIDS as a ‘weapon of war’ (Elbe 2002). In 1999, the United States launched a government-wide initiative – USAID and the

Departments of Health and Defence - on HIV/AIDS, with a \$100 million increase in US support for sub-Saharan African countries, the epicentre of the epidemic. In 2013, 40% of USAID funding went to sub-Saharan Africa (CRS 2015, 8). Moreover, it was increasingly recognised that broader developmental interventions were needed to negate conditions assisting the epidemic's spread (for example Stillwaggon 2005; Hunter 2007). In this way, USAID's global health programmes became not only a matter of international development, but international security. (As discussed below, development more broadly has become a security issue in particular through the linking discourses of conflict and 'fragile'/'failed' states.) Meanwhile, in the mid-1990s, with the US having pursued a massive domestic effort against HIV/AIDS, development contractors such as JSI had developed expertise in the disease in particular, and health in general. Indeed, associated with increasing international emphasis on 'global health security', is an increase in the perceived need for specialist developmental expertise. To borrow Elbe's turn of phrase, it is not just the securitisation of health but also the 'medicalisation of insecurity' (Elbe 2011).

In sum, explanations of the rise of USAID development contracting in the post-Cold War era that neglect the import of shifting international security logics distorts analysis. That is, the decline of US 'direct hire' staff numbers and the rise of development contracting cannot be linked without explaining why, and for what purposes, foreign aid has been made available. What is argued here is that

attention to security discourses about the global South – the site of donor-led intervention – are essential to understanding this.

6.4.3 Borderland dangers

In 2015 Prime Minister David Cameron announced that 50% of DFID's budget must be allocated to developing 'fragile and failing states' as part of a 'full spectrum' response to the terrorist threats (cited in Mawdsley 2017). The criteria for defining a 'fragile' state varies amongst indices, but the OECD defines 56 states as fragile (OECD 2016). Fragile states became a foremost international security concern after the AlQaeda attacks on the United States in 2001. In 2005 USAID produced a specific Fragile States Strategy in which the term is said to "refer generally to a broad range of failing, failed or recovering states," (USAID 2005, 1).

In his forward to the report, USAID head Andre Natsios listed some phenomena associated with these – "governments collapsing, criminal and terrorist networks, humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty" – before stating: the "root of the national security threat to the United States and the broader international community is the lack of development, which can't be addressed by military or diplomatic means alone," (USAID 2005, v).

However, the understanding of underdevelopment as the root of security threats to the international community emerged a decade earlier, as economicistic

understandings of civil war, especially those at the World Bank (for example P. Collier and Hoeffler 1998; see also Kaldor 2009) asserted that material interest, rather than claimed political grievances, best explained armed conflict. These soon became taken-for-granted in development programming; as a statement by the G8 put it: "Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for violent conflict and the emergence of new security threats, including international crime and terrorism. There will be no lasting security without development and no effective development without security and stability," (cited in Willett 2005, 569). It is in this way that security and development merged (Duffield 2001).

Meanwhile, the logics of diverse international interventions underway in the global South – e.g. conflict-resolution, peacebuilding, development, counter-insurgency, etc. – converged on a shared answer to generating stability: market democracy i.e. 'liberal peace'. More generally, a security-based dichotomy became institutionalised in these interventions: the stable, peaceful West/North and its dangerous borderland, the global South (Duffield 2001; Laffey and Nadarajah 2012). As two retired senior US military officials, addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of over fifty retired flag and general officers put it in March 2008, in comments representative of widely shared commonsense, "We know that [our] 'enemies' in the world today are actually *conditions*—poverty, infectious disease, political turmoil and corruption, environmental and energy challenges," (cited in Atwood, McPherson, and Natsios 2008).

What these means is that diverse aspects of USAID's operational agenda – development, health, democracy promotion, climate change, energy security, anti-corruption, etc. – became key *security* responses. However, these diverse 'conditions' became amendable to technical responses precisely through the notion of state 'fragility'. That is, USAID's diverse work (as a bilateral donor) and that of other country and multilateral donors, the UN's agencies, etc. came to centre on the *technical problem* of fragile states (i.e. rather than diverse political questions inherent to conflict, inequality, repression, etc.).

However, even then, there remains the question of how to plan and organise the necessarily long-term interventions to turn these borderland spaces into 'zones of peace' (Laffey and Nadarajah 2012). In other words, how to undertake the technically sophisticated work of wholesale transformation of spaces deemed fragile, underdeveloped or in 'transition', given their unpredictability such that, quite apart from being host to potential malevolent forces (terrorists, fanatics, organised crime and illicit networks, ethnic hatreds, etc.), spaces such as South Sudan or Sri Lanka held the potential for both sudden regression (e.g. outbreak of conflict) and sudden progress (e.g. a peace agreement). In short, the problem for an actor like USAID is how could it obtain the material and intellectual capacity to intervene quickly, efficiently and effectively in diverse and complex spaces, without a standing army of staff?

For USAID, the answer proved to be large development corporations and the Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC). As discussed above, IQCs proved invaluable in the agency's sudden requirement for rapid multi-country intervention at the moment the Cold War ended – i.e. the transformation of Eastern Europe. IQCs enabled a rapid and scalable response to both the opportunity of expanding the 'zone of peace' and the urgency of seizing it. As the GAO review of IQCs used in USAID's Eastern Europe privatisation program explained, this modality of organising interventions provided flexibility and adaptability in open-ended conditions of uncertainty:

“The IQC approach was chosen (as opposed to standard contracts) because, at the time, East European governments' commitment and approach to privatization were subject to uncertainty and change. IQCs ... provided the necessary flexibility in terms of when, where and how much assistance could be provided.

“US officials believed that this structure was necessary in order to be responsive and provide quick support for the rapidly evolving economic and political reforms occurring in the region.” (Government Accountability Office 1994, 2–3)

Therefore, against the globe-spanning ambitions for producing liberal peace, the growth of large US developmental contractors in the post-Cold War era is not surprising. Since 1990 the US has taken a lead role – through USAID, the Departments of State and Defence, etc. – in the project of producing global liberal order (Rampton and Nadarajah 2017), first in Eastern Europe and also in other parts of the global ‘borderland’. Within this, as USAID has pursued its mandate it has done so in intimate relations with US corporations which have in turn grown their capacities within the transformative project. (This is not to say these transformations have been successful – as discussed above, in great part they have not (see overview in Nadarajah and Rampton 2015).

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter explored the centrality of large corporations to a key set of international security practices since the end of the Cold War, namely peacebuilding. To this end it focussed on USAID. The mainstream view of USAID, and one taken for granted in the vast peacebuilding literature, is as the world’s largest provider of bilateral donor assistance. However, this does not capture the dramatic transformation of USAID that has taken place in the past quarter century, such that it is at once an arm of the US state and a dense configuration of state-corporate practices. Over only the past three decades, development contracting has become an established US industry (Roberts, 2014, 1039). The

relations between USAID and these corporations is conventionally understood as between ‘donor’ and ‘implementing partners’. In this way, analysis misconstrues the deeply constitutive role of private actors – mainly for-profit corporations, but also non-profits – in not only what USAID does (i.e. its operations in the global South), but what it is.

First, the chapter first empirically traced some key sets of practices which reproduce the intimate relations between USAID and US corporations. The overall purpose was to illustrate the difficulty in separating the ‘public’ from the ‘private’ in these practices, as well as the mutually constitutive effect of these practices on state-corporate relations. To this end the chapter focusses on three aspects of USAID activity, namely, the country strategy (how does USAID decide its overall strategy for a country (the example here being Sri Lanka)?); professional knowhow (how does USAID acquire the knowledge of how to engage with developmental spaces, the example here being conflict management?); and self-improvement (how does USAID identify institutional weaknesses and how to fix them?). In this way the chapter sought to empirically demonstrate that the interweaving of quotidian state and corporate practices within USAID is so extensive that it is difficult to see where the public ends and the private begins.

Second, the chapter argued that that discourses of security – whereby an array of diverse threats emerging in the global South eventually coalesced into the (technically manageable) problem of ‘fragile’/‘failed’ states – are central to

explaining the close integration and mutual constitution of state and corporation through US peacebuilding interventions. It did so by showing how, against understandings of global borderland spaces as volatile, unpredictable and dangerous, open and long-term contractual relations with large corporations appeared as a self-evident way to organise the necessarily long-term interventions to turn these into 'zones of peace'.

The next chapter then concludes the dissertation by reflecting on the rationalities excavated in the three security domains and suggesting areas for future research made possible by the approach adopted by this dissertation.

7. Conclusion

International Security scholarship has, thus far, largely investigated states and corporations by beginning with states as the entity with a monopoly on the exercise of force, before proceeding to assess the consequences of these activities transferring to the private sector. Thus, the state/corporate and public/private divides have been taken for granted, with the consequence that the literature has struggled to conceptualise changes in each of these categories. In contrast, this dissertation took a relationalist approach to three security domains, and in doing so built an argument about the re/constitution of states and corporations through security discourses more broadly. By beginning with relations, and understanding practices as the empirical embodiment of relations, this dissertation was able to excavate the rationalities that shape, and are produced through, those practices. By way of conclusion, this chapter summarises the core argument of this dissertation, discusses the theoretical approach that allowed the argument to be excavated, and makes some observations about the insights that have been made possible through this approach. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of this approach for security research more broadly.

A substantivist approach to security, which begins with the (Weberian) state, and the (distinct, economic) corporation, can only see changes in the attributes of the state or corporation (number of personnel or contracts, value of contracts or assets, number of divisions, etc.). It cannot account for transformations in either the state

or corporations themselves. In contrast, by taking a relationalist approach that focused on the practices that re/produce state-corporate relations, this dissertation revealed the ways in which states and corporations are not only becoming more closely integrated, but are also being transformed in ways that make closer relations possible. The transformation of the fluid bundles of relations that are states and corporations could not be analytically grasped through conventional approaches. The core argument of this dissertation is that security practices are transforming state-corporate relations, causing them to become even more tightly integrated – the mutually constitutive relations between state and corporations is re/producing states and corporations as partners through the logics of security discourses.

The approach taken in this dissertation has made possible a way to address a key lacuna in security scholarship. On one hand, security scholarship, driven by the ongoing assumption of the public-private divide as prior to politics, understands state-corporate relations through the lens of privatisation, and transfer of activities from one entity to another. This in turn results in problematisations and explanations that focus on control and other related principle-agent issues. Even security scholarship that observes how practices are transcending traditional public-private divides (see for instance Leander 2016; Leander and Munster 2007; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011b), is unable to move beyond their ontological origins in state and corporations as substantialist entities. Thus, their explanations

of hybridity or assemblages cannot explain what is happening and why. On the other hand, governmentality scholars accept that the public private divide is a site of struggle and power. However, in doing so, they seek to move beyond the divide, to focus on the broader implications (for populations and concepts of security) of changing security discourses (see for instance Dillon and Reid 2009; Lentzos and Rose 2009; Aradau 2014). As a result, they do not turn their analytical gaze onto state-corporate relations. This dissertation sought to bridge this gap, by taking a governmentality approach to study state-corporate relations. In doing so, it provided a methodology for developing an inductively researched argument around the ways in which ever closer state corporate relations are being re-produced.

Contrary to conventional security analysis which begins with substantivist entities and seeks to assess the interactions between them, this dissertation began with a theoretical framework that focused on relations and practices. It approached states and corporations as stabilised aggregations of practices, and by using a governmentality approach, this dissertation was able to avoid relying on totalising grand theories. Instead, it excavated the rationalities that inform and are re-produced through the practices in the different security domains studied. By adopting this theoretical framework and methodology, the dissertation was able to draw insights that would have been missed in conventional analysis.

This dissertation makes three distinct contributions to International Security scholarship – first, it was able to reveal the mutually constitutive relationship between states and corporations; second, it documents the discursive practices that work to make corporations ‘invisible’ in policy documents, and therefore security studies scholarship more broadly; and third, it begins an investigation of ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism in security domains, documenting the ways in which states and corporations are being drawn into ever closer relations. These are discussed below in turn.

The mutually constitutive relations between states and corporation is only visible through a relational approach that focusses on practices and sees states and corporations as bundles of relations *within* a social and political order, rather than as discrete entities. The dissertation demonstrated the mutually constitutive relations of states and corporations across the three domains. In different ways in each case, states and corporations have been re-produced as partners and proxies for each other through the logics of security. In the case of the exercise of force in the UK, QinetiQ becomes a partner through whom the British state can operate its military functions. Absent a partner (the lack of a ‘market’ in this area is illustrated not only by the need to create QinetiQ but also by ongoing relations of dependency, whereby QinetiQ relies heavily of the British state for its very continuing existence) the British state not only created one, but also continues to work closely with that partner to reform itself. As QinetiQ identifies in its annual

reports, it is involved in projects to shape future procurement in the military itself, including establishing and maintaining the systems for future choices (QinetiQ 2016a). Thus, the state is being reconstituted by the practices of the corporation, even as it constitutes the corporation. Differently in peacebuilding, the USA continues to have a ‘strong’ presence in volatile areas of the global south through USAID, even as the work is carried out by corporations – the branding of projects as USAID regardless of which corporate partner carries it out ensure this. Thus, state and corporations emerge as ‘partners’ in this effort to preserve the ‘presence’ of the state, even in its absence. Finally, not only is the British state (represented through both departments and regulators) a partner in building resilience and responding to crises, but corporations enter a collaborative relationship amongst themselves to secure the system. Thus, corporations are partners not only with the state, but also with each other in their joint responsibility for social order. These new identities could be dismissed as hyperbole or rhetoric, except for their consistent reoccurrence across domains, which indicates that they must be taken seriously as patterns.

Second, this dissertation has documented the discursive practices that work to make corporations ‘invisible’ in both security policy and scholarship, thus serving to preserve the primacy of the state. The understanding of the state in security in Weberian terms, as having a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force within its territory, is maintained through the practices in all the security domains

investigated. For instance, in the case of investigations into the ‘privatisation’ process that created QinetiQ, the presence of UBS Warburg is documented but the bank is never discussed as a decision maker. In the documentation produced by the National Audit Office, the Ministry of Defence is blamed for all perceived ‘failures’, even as responses to challenges posed are acknowledged as coming from both the Ministry and the bank (2007). Despite documentation of the ways in which the bank made decisions on the selection of bidders, the suitability of bids, the organisation of meetings with potential purchasers, etc., the failures of implementation identified are described as failures of the state. Differently in the peace-building case study, the invisibility of the corporation is even more pronounced. Despite corporations doing the work of USAID, whether in delivering ‘state-to-state’ aid or providing the research and training that USAID is mandated to perform, these are not labelled as such. All projects are (and mandatorily must be) labelled with the USAID branding, while all documentation carries the USAID imprimatur. Thus, the corporation is discursively written out of USAID activities through the combined practices of state and corporation (for corporations are complicit in not running projects or producing documentation under their own brands). This discursive sleight of hand serves to maintain the façade of the state as having the sole responsibility for security, and contributes to the privatisation, principle-agent and control narratives that dominate the literature.

Third, and finally, the dissertation has argued the limitations of neoliberal governmentality as a framework for analysis. The main issue is in the ways in which neoliberalism has become both the phenomenon being described and the explanation for that phenomenon – states and corporations working more closely together is neoliberalism, but *why* and how they work closely together is *also* explained as neoliberalism. This makes neoliberalism of limited utility as an analytical framework. In contrast, the approach taken here points to the ways in which practices draw states and corporations together, which can then be described as neoliberalism. Thus, the rationalities discussed in the three security domains studied here can not only explain behaviour that is contrary to the principles of neoliberalism, but can also explain effects that can then be described as neoliberalism. The rationality of closer state-corporate relations described in the different cases is not one of marketisation or competition, but rather one of closeness between the corporate and state forms (i.e. between those bundles of relations that have been stabilised and have agential properties as states and corporations). Further, even while the stabilisation of relations is recognised, there is an acknowledgement of the fluidity and fragility in the stabilisation, such that change can be observed and assessed in ways that are not possible under a broader neoliberal governmentality frame.

The three security domains studied point to the different ways in which the rationality of closer state-corporate relations operates. In the case of QinetiQ, it

was a matter of the British state creating a partner with whom it could then operate in managing military weapons procurement activities. By contrast, there was no need to create a partner in energy or telecommunications, but rather a matter of creating the conditions under which states and corporations rationalise that working together is the way to achieve security of the system (i.e. to achieve order). Differently again, in peacebuilding, the US state works through corporations to enhance its ability to deal with the issues posed by the global south. Contrary to presentations in the literature and policy documents, none of these are activities that are fronted by the state as the case studies demonstrate – indeed, the ‘state’ disappears the more detailed the investigation becomes.

However, to describe the practices observed as being examples of corporations replacing the state or taking over its activities to the detriment of the state, is also to miss or ignore the detail. The peace building study is a case where USAID could have been abolished and the funds dispersed directly through the corporations, but this has not happened. Thus, the complexity and contrariness of neoliberal governmentality is captured in this dissertation in a way that a conventional analysis could not grasp. Common across all the domains discussed is the way security discourses, which treat the state as the *sole* provider of security, produce the discursive problems for which closer state-corporate relations becomes the logical solution. This is then observable as privatisation or ‘neoliberalism’ in operation.

There are some areas of future investigation that are made possible as a result of the methodology adopted in this dissertation. First, it might be possible to theorise the impacts on both states and corporation of the emerging rationalities documented. It was not an objective of this dissertation to develop an overarching theory of either the state or corporation. However, given the changes to both observed, and with an understanding that there is already scholarship that seeks to describe the ‘corporatization’ of different aspects of life, including the state (see for instance Rushkoff 2009; Fleming 2014; Edwards 2014) and to theorise the corporation as a political actor (see for instance Barkan 2013; Ciepley 2013; May 2006), this is a viable avenue of future research. This methodology would point to changes to both states and corporations that the scholarship referenced above struggles to grasp.

The full extent of the effects of the new identities that the mutually constitutive relations between state and corporation are producing have not been explored in this dissertation. Not only in the security domains analysed, but across security more broadly, the possibility exists to excavate more, related, rationalities, allowing deeper engagement with the variations of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ in security practices. The approach take in this dissertation would allow for an investigation of the ways in which the ‘state’ is not necessarily a bundle of the same practices in every instance, but rather can consist of different (and perhaps even contradictory) practices. This could lead to a more in-depth

analysis of the claim that not only are states being re-produced as ‘corporatized’ states, but also that corporations can now be seen more in the light of ‘public’ corporations. Thus, the state is not only reliant on corporations, but also becoming more corporate in its own practices, while similarly, and contrarily, the corporation is being re-produced to become even more engaged in security practices that conventional analysis would have as being the preserve of the public sector. The dissertation began to excavate the beginnings of practices that could be understood as evidence for an argument about the existence of a particular kind of corporatized state and public corporation in security, and extending this approach to further domains would allow this to be theorised more fully. In particular, it would allow for an understanding of the uneven effects and contradictions of any such claim.

Separately, neoliberalism (privatisation) has become both the phenomenon observed and the explanation for why they are happening across many areas of society. While the public-private boundary as a site of politics, something that is constantly re/constituted through practices, is already acknowledged in other disciplines, it is not generally acknowledged in International Relations or security studies. As noted throughout this dissertation, the public-private divide is not to be disregarded for frames that seek to transcend the division, but rather to be understood as the basis on which the divide is transcended, even as it is reinforced. For instance, many issues currently understood as state ‘failure’ (often described as

being a result of privatisation or of poor control over corporate actors) could be explained differently if investigated under the theoretical approach taken in this dissertation. A recent example in the UK is the ‘failure’ of the local council that led to the Grenfell tower fire and its aftermath. Debates about appropriate responses, and who is (and should be) responsible for what, have dominated, and will continue to dominate the media and will most probably generate much scholarship. Following the approach taken in this dissertation, and excavating the exact ways in which the protection of similar assets is discursively shared between the public utilisers and the private owners, could contribute not only to a better understanding of the rationalities and logics that resulted in the fire, but also the possibilities for addressing those gaps. It could also lead to a better understanding of how responsibilities are dispersed between the various ‘state’ representatives involved, be they departments, local councils, or first responders such as the emergency services and among the disparate private actors, from owners, to contractors, to manufacturers. While not seeking to develop a theory of the state, this approach well lends itself to theorising modern practices, especially in an era where multiple corporations are a significant part of all state practices.

This approach also holds much possibility for research into areas that are not limited to security. For instance, there is ostensibly a disconnect in the attitude of the state towards its veterans – soldiers who have returned from modern war zones. On one hand, they are lauded as heroes for their contributions to the war

effort, and events like the Invictus Games celebrate the ongoing valour of those who have lost limbs in the wars. On the other hand, the ‘rise’ in the number and scope of charities to support veterans, suggests that the ongoing support for them after they return does not correlate to the discourses of gratitude for sacrifice. This seems like a contradiction within the state, in funding events that laud them as ‘heroes’ while at the same time failing to support them appropriately. However, this relies on an ‘external’ boundary between the state and those charities, that would be challenged by the approach utilised here. If instead, states and charities were understood to be internal to social order, this could lead to a detailed excavation of the rationalities that drive the dynamics discussed here. These are merely suggestions for the ways that the methodology of this dissertation could have application not only in deeper theorisation of the security practices observed, but also in broader discussion beyond either security or corporations.

In sum, this dissertation has argued that states and corporations are in mutually constitutive relations and that they are engaged in practices that render rational the even further integration between states and corporations as a means of achieving the appropriate social order (security). Across three security domains, this dissertation was able to excavate the rationalities of state-corporate engagement and the effects they have on state and corporations. As a result, this dissertation made a start towards explaining the ‘family resemblances’ (Brenner et al 2010) between changes in diverse security settings.

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