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Divergent Paths: A Comparative Analysis of Soviet and Turkish Historical Narratives of Central Asia, 1922-1937

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Abstract

The period between the end of the Russian Civil War and Turkish War of Independence (1922) and the start of the Great Terror (1937) was one of social and political upheaval, as well as state formation according to bold new patterns across Eurasia. As part of this dynamic, both the Turkish and Soviet governments sought to refashion the self-identification of their citizens through new national histories. These meta-narratives were intended to educate as well as indoctrinate, setting new rules and boundaries for inclusion and participation. Through my doctoral project, I problematize the role of state ideology (Gökalpian nationalism in Turkey; Stalinism in the Soviet Union) in the writing of the pre-Islamic history of Central Asia, with a particular focus on issues of nationhood and belonging. I seek to explain why the two narratives diverged sharply by the mid-1930s, despite having access to roughly the same body of primary sources and scholarly research. Turkish accounts stressed cultural and racial unity among Turkic-speakers, while Soviet histories emphasized miscegenation and the historically contingent nature of nations. They were articulated in school textbooks, conference presentations, monographs, popular histories and propagandistic publications, and were therefore available to all levels of society. By making use of a wide spectrum of all of these materials in Turkish, Russian, Kazakh, Azerbaijani, Crimean Tatar, Turkmen, Uzbek, Tatar and Kazakh, I explore the development of the narratives, their content and language of enunciation from the consolidation of Soviet and Turkish statehood until the eve of the Second World War. In doing so, I demonstrate the manner in which history became a tool of the state and its efforts to influence a rigid and highly controlled worldview on Turkish and Soviet citizens respectively.
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Introduction

“And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the difference of your languages and colours. Lo! Herein indeed are portents for men of knowledge.”

(The Holy Qur’an, The Romans, 30:22)

To belong is not a choice that one makes through one’s own agency alone. Inclusion is a two-sided process, one that involves both action on the part of the individual, and acceptance on the part of the group. This ideal scenario, however, requires consciousness on the part of the group that it constitutes a group, as well as by the individual that she might exhibit the characteristics and qualities necessary for belonging. This knowledge comes from many sources, the most obvious being family and friends, who utilize genealogy, family mythology and urban lore to inform and reinforce individual identities, convincing someone of her place inside or outside of a given group. In the modern era, the state became another actor in this drama of social existence. Mandatory education, propaganda, invented traditions, military conscription and systems of social insurance and welfare have all contributed to the State’s power in shaping and harnessing individuals’ consciousness of their place within communities and societies. For much of the 20th century, these societies were not portrayed to be contractual communities under the umbrella of a benevolent state, but rather nations united through more than just voluntaristic participation. The nation, loosely speaking, was a society based on common history as well as common intangibles: language, religion, morality, race, descent and other attributes, depending on the context. The state, the nation and the individual became entwined
in a triangle of mutual support: the state utilized the nation as a means of accessing legitimacy and compliance; the individual had recourse to the nation in her dealings with and opposition to the State; and the nation relied on the actions of both the individual and the state in its continued existence and development over the course of the last century.

States, however, are not all created the same. Some, such as the British and French ones, emerged from long periods of dynastic rule and pre-modern consolidation. The polity sought its legitimacy in an extant tradition of cooperation between subjects or citizens in the construction of society. Other states were born through conscious efforts to create a polity based on shared ethnicity, language or political goals. Germany and Italy are the best-known of these experiments, arising out of cultural movements in the late 18th and 19th centuries. Culture was the basis, but not the only means, of creating a political society with sovereignty over its own lands and rights vis-à-vis other States and nations in the international arena. These polities created a unique challenge to another form of state: the Empire. Similar to Britain and France, Empires could rely on long traditions of existence and suzerainty, if not sovereignty, to buttress their quests for continued importance and vitality within the modern world. On occasion, the nation and the Empire largely coincided, permitting a smooth transition from one model of statehood to another, as in the case of Japan. On Europe’s eastern fringes, however, the birth of the nation-State struck deep at the raison d’être of three large Empires whose foundations were rife with ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, arguably the most economically sound of the three, was the first to feel the pressure of national movements, and was forced to recognize their potency with the creation of
the dual monarchy in 1867. This development would serve as both a model and a warning for Imperial powers further to the east.

In Russia and the Ottoman Empire, national movements were later to arrive and less deeply rooted in the diverse populations of the State, but they did prove to be considerable challenges to the continued sovereignty of both the Romanovs and the Ottomans. Poland and the Polish national movement – based on a pre-existing tradition of statehood – proved to the Russian crown how vulnerable it remained to national pressures and their exploitation by other European powers. Given the plethora of ethno-linguistic communities throughout the Russian Empire, particularly on its southern and western boundaries, mobilization of the National Question and Russification became exceptionally important aspects of modernization and state-building in the Romanovs’ lands. In the Ottoman Empire, the national idea and a new, loosely conceived ideology known as nationalism resulted in a rapid shrinking of the areas under Istanbul’s sovereign reach. Here, too, quasi-national and national ideas began to be employed either as means of linking subjects and citizens to the crown, or as enemies against which to elaborate state policy. In Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the nation and nationalists harangued both the government and its opposition, creating unexpected rifts and alliances in the fight for the levers of power. Eventually, both Empires would collapse at the close of the First World War for reasons that can only be partially attributed to nationalist movements. The national idea mixed with economic, social, political and international pressures to produce cataclysmic effects for the ancien régime in both countries, initiating periods of bold new state-building endeavours across Eurasia.
With the end of the Russian Civil War in 1922 and the foundation of the Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923, the issue of the State’s sovereignty was largely resolved. Borders would not be stable until 1938 for the Republic of Turkey and 1945 for the Soviet Union, but in both countries the drive moved from territorial consolidation to the consolidation of citizenry in the early 1920s. The era of national movements informed greatly both States’ approaches to sovereignty and citizenship, albeit differently. In Turkey, the nation became the foundation of the State, encouraged in part by the Wilsonian 14 Points, according to which world leaders drew the post-World War One map of Europe. In the Soviet Union, nationalism was one of Moscow’s bête noires, a force to be reckoned with in some parts of the Union, and one to be nurtured in others as a means to the end of Socialism. In both cases, the nation took its appropriate place in the régime’s worldview. It was understood and explained according to largely cohesive ideologies espoused and developed by State and parastatal apparati in Ankara and Moscow. The State, however, was not just concerned with its rights and privileges in the international arena. With the collapse of the imperial order, citizens, too, were called to participate in the experience of sovereignty through the various organs of political life. Mass participation in society had its dangers, especially given the recent creation of the two polities, and both the Soviet authorities and the Kemalists took great pains in order to ensure that citizen involvement did not pose a threat to the stability and persistence of the new order. A pre-condition for mass participation was therefore mass education; or mass indoctrination and coercion, as some opposition members would claim.
Education served many practical purposes, including increasing literacy and numeracy rates among the population at large, but it also functioned as a conduit for inculcating citizens with State-sanctioned ideology. In the Soviet Union, this ideology was Marxism-Leninism, quickly turning into Stalinism as Joseph Stalin, né Dzhugashvili, tightened his grip on power in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The reigning worldview in Turkey is much more difficult to pin down, especially given the fact that the Republic’s first President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, did not produce the same volume of philosophical or theoretical tracts as his Soviet counterpart. For the purposes of this study, however, I have opted to qualify the dominant worldview in Kemalist Turkey as Gökalpian Nationalism. I provide a detailed approach to this ideology, as well as its ontology and epistemology of the nation, in a later chapter. Similar to Stalinism’s relationship to Marxism, Gökalpian Nationalism is not merely an application of Ziya Gökalp’s thought to a later period, but rather a community of scholars’ and intellectuals’ posthumous elaboration of an existing corpus of texts and ideas. Stalinism and Gökalpian Nationalism were both living, dynamic systems of thought that informed and were informed by the political, economic and social realities of the first half of the 20th century.

The examination of ideology and its transfer through education is a broad subject; one that can and should be undertaken from multiple angles. I intend to contribute to this endeavour by looking at two particular examples through the lens of historiography. More specifically, I will investigate the manner in which State structures in the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey utilized historical narratives about the pre-Islamic history of the peoples of Central Asia in order to inculcate their citizens with the ideologies of Stalinism and Gökalpian Nationalism.
respectively. For the Soviet Union, such historical works were important tools of linking the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Siberia to Soviet socialist statehood. In Turkey, they were means of binding Turkish-speakers to a regime that sought legitimacy through ethno-territorial continuity. I will focus upon issues of race, ethnicity and belonging to demonstrate the manner in which the worldview of the two régimes appears in their respective explanations of physical appearance, language, custom and lineage, as well as these categories’ relationship to inclusion in or exclusion from the object known as the nation. In doing so, I raise a number of questions to whose answers I contribute through the completion of this project: to what degree is history, and indeed epistemology, responsive to the dictates of ideology? Is historical truth accessible through intellectual investigation, or are all scholarly activities tainted by the demands of the present? How malleable are our visions of ourselves, our families and our communities in the face of intrusive State-directed pedagogy, patronage and propaganda?

Why choose these sets of narratives about the pre-Islamic history of the Central Asians? It would be, admittedly, far easier to track the development of ideological infiltration into history texts by examining one set of histories on its own. Indeed, as we will see, similar studies have been conducted for both the Soviet Union and Turkey. They have not, however, been compared in a meaningful manner that highlights the inconsistencies arising in both corpi of historical accounts of pre-Islamic Turkic groupings. I do not intend to simply compare the results of existing historiographical studies. Rather, I propose to return to the original texts and recontextualize them in dialogue with each other and with the prevailing political and ideological climate of the 1920s and 30s. Both Soviet and Turkish authorities
faced considerable domestic and international challenges to their legitimacy, and
history was a convenient and powerful tool in buttressing their sovereignty against
internal and external attacks. Both Turkish and Soviet scholars claimed to be
employing rigorously objective and scientific approaches to the investigation of
historical truth, but their focus on a period of Central Asian and Turkic history before
the production of a large amount of documentary evidence meant that
interpretation of material and human remains featured heavily in their end products.
The problematization and interrogation of these products in relation to one another
and the tenets of the respective ideological systems help us to understand just how
far State-sponsored scholarship went in justifying and legitimizing the status quo and
attacking real and imagined threats to it.

This study consists of seven chapters, including the current introduction. This
chapter introduces the topic and provides some, although not all, definitions for the
concepts employed in this work. Chapter two is a review of the relevant scholarly
literature pertaining to historiography. As my investigation touches upon two
otherwise unrelated metanarratives, I seek to provide overviews of both
Turkological and Sovietological studies in a meaningful and informative manner.
Chapter three provides a methodological review of linguistics, archaeology and
anthropology. Although I am concerned primarily with historical narratives, I cannot
ignore the important contribution made to their writing by the output of these three
disciplines. To this end, I have attempted to provide the reader with an
understanding of the current state of the three sciences, as well as their relation to
history and the major issues that have arisen over the twentieth century as
linguistics, archaeology and anthropology were used to explain the remote past.
Chapter four is an extended definition of the concept of ideology and of the two worldviews under investigation in my project: Stalinism and Gökalpian Nationalism. I remain ontologically agnostic towards the concept of the nation, and thus rely on this chapter to provide my readers with a view to the epistemic systems’ own perceptions of the nation and its content. Chapter five is the first corpus of narratives under review: those produced in the Turkish Republic. Chapter six provides a similar approach to Soviet narratives. Finally, chapter seven consists of a comparison of the two metanarratives and concluding remarks.

And so, prior to moving on to an overview of the existing literature, I will first address three important concepts that appear frequently in the course of my study: the state; race; and ethnicity. I will begin with the state, as it is, in many ways, the least controversial of the three. Throughout this work, references to pre-20th century states will be made, especially in the primary sources from Turkey. In such cases, I take the usage of the word as it appears: if the author defines it, I will make such a definition explicit; if not, I will leave the term undefined. More pressing, however, is a definition of the state in the 20th century, as this is a concept to which I have recourse on a frequent basis. Throughout the last hundred years, philosophers, anthropologists, political scientists and other scholars have sought to provide us with an understanding of what the state is and from where it came. Antonio Gramsci, whose writings we will review in the section on ideology, viewed the state as having arisen from a “will to class power”, the desire of a specific section of society to exercise “political-cultural hegemony” over the whole of that society. It was thus the “historical unity” of these dominant groups and the manner in which they exercised power over social segments that might be classified as the state. As later scholars
carried on this definition, they articulated more clearly the imagination of the state as a mass of relationships, both those in the form of institutions – such as ministries, cultural institutions and universities – as well as informal and intangible mechanisms such as patronage, cultural programming and language reform (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 3–4).

In the 1970s, Foucault turned such an understanding on its head, putting the state after rather than before the emergence of social governance. In other words, the state was merely an expression of the gradual rise in disciplinary functions and relationships within society, rather than a mechanism of imposing them for the end of gaining and reproducing political power (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 4). Indeed, Foucault’s interpretation of the state was a highly fluid one in which an exact definition could not be pinned down precisely because of the fluidity of governance and discipline within society as a whole. Our idea of the state might be an image of a monolith, controlling and guiding our behaviour and interactions, but in truth those mechanisms of control and guidance depend on what we see as being controllable and guidable, and therefore change throughout time (Migdal 2001, 18–19).

Foucault’s deviation, however, runs into problems when looking at newly formed states, or those in which the culture within which the institutions of governance operate is radically different from the culture of large parts of the population. Wilson and Nugent have both exposed such issues in Peru, where core and periphery are markedly distinguished within the borders of a sovereign polity (Nugent 2001; Wilson 2001). Fiona Wilson’s work on schools as outposts of the state in Peru is particularly useful in relating these definitions to the current work, as conditions in the Latin American country – where much of the population was
estranged from the language, culture and institutions of the colonial administration in Lima for centuries – can be compared to Anatolia and Central Asia in the early part of the 20th century. Here, the state is represented by relations that come from the top down, similar to those of Gramsci’s definition, and that do not find immediate resonance within all levels of the society over which the dominant class seeks political power (Wilson 2001, 313–14). In particular, Wilson relies on Gupta’s 1995 work to come out with two different processes that problematize the state as part of, rather than above, society: “One is the production of the state as a translocal presence, a shared imagination of the state spreading like a color wash across the map and distinguishing one national homogenizing space from others beyond its borders. The other process involves the implanting of institutions and agents that constitute networks through which messages and directives can flow between central state and province. Color washes and flows need to be conceived as potentially involving two-way exchange, though these may be blocked or ineffective under reigning constellations of power.” (Wilson 2001, 316)

From this, I propose that we view the state, for the purpose of my study, as a two-tiered entity. The top tier is what we traditionally associate with the state: the institutions of government that are tasked with the organization of life and development in a given territory. In the case of both Turkey and the Soviet Union, the distinction between party, government and state is too complicated a nexus to unravel as a component of my own research. As one-party states building a new governance order following revolution, such a task might prove impossible in any case. The second tier represents the interface between citizens and those institutions. Teachers, orators, bureaucrats, police officers; all these people are
responsible, in some way, for the implementation of the first tier’s vision of the world and its policies for the populace. While they might not make decisions regarding the direction of the country, they do indeed influence the country’s progress towards the enunciated goals of the upper tier. Their willingness to accept the policies of the first tier and enact them, or their refusal to do so, will be taken as a marker of their inclusion in, or exclusion from, the state itself. In many cases, they are the only representatives of the state for those living far from its core institutions of power and governance. This conceptualization is not terribly different from that of Migdal, who sees the state as both idea and practice (Migdal 2001, 15–18), with the exception that it allows for the reality of domestic core and periphery to be integrated into the composition of the state.

The state, of course, is ultimate composed of people; people who are to be counted, categorized and labelled according to one of many different typologies, including race. When speaking of the academic debate about race, ontology, even more than epistemology, is at the crux of the matter. While historians and historiographers might spend their time arguing over the means of accessing historical truth, those who study race and racial differences have expended considerable amounts of energy debunking, or at least radically reimagining, the very existence of the concept as an element of the physical sciences. For much of the post-modern period, race was largely conceived of as a purely social construct. That is, apart from its sheer retinal manifestations (skin, hair and eye colour; hair type; nose, eye, lip and cheekbone shapes), the other information encoded in race is a product of social dynamics and hierarchies of power (Ware 1992, 118–19; Jones 2005, 613–14). Race comes into consideration more as a binary between same and
other, or us and them, than as a unitary object to be defined in its own right (Ware 1992, 122). Advances in genetics and the biological and medical sciences, however, have opened up vast new possibilities for understanding race. A much more nuanced approach to it is now encouraged, with the caveat that “race” might not be anything close to what it is popularly imagined to be. Race as purely physical appearance or characteristics is too simplistic; race as an exclusively social construct misses the biological truth of communities defined by common traits, many of which are invisible to the naked eye (Jones 2005, 612–17). Some have gone so far as to suggest that the biological sciences have, in part, coopted the social construct of race as a convenient shorthand for clusters of genetic and biological markers unrelated to its social, cultural and political meanings (Lorusso 2011, 535–36). With this in mind, I divide conceptualizations of race into two separate categories: the physical/biological and the social/psychological.

The physical/biological aspect of race encodes largely what is most latent: that a group of people tend to have darker or lighter skin; curly or straight hair; slim builds or wide frames. To this we may add the very modern understanding of a group of people with a high propensity for common genetic markers. Descriptive categories of physical or biological race, while often giving way to generalizations and stereotypes, are nonetheless based on visual observation. On occasion, I will make explicit definitions and characterizations of this type in citations from the various primary sources of interest, with reference to both the ancient populations of Central Asia and the region’s contemporary inhabitants. Although I have included biological components in my definition, for the most part these do not come into play, given the developmental stage of genetics in the 1920s and 30s. At most, they
appear as discussions of blood types, although these claims are very limited in their appearance in the literature of 1930s Turkey or the Soviet Union.

On the social/psychological side, the social constructs referred to by Vron and other scholars come into play. Here, the question is not so much what an individual or a group of individuals look like, but rather what the appearance of individuals tells us about their society, their history, their culture and their propensity for specific activities and emotions. Conversely, these may also take the form of statements of a deductive nature: what the qualities and characteristics of a certain person or people tell us about their physical appearance. This understanding of the connection between the physical and the psychological had its start with the 19th century French writer and statesman Arthur de Gobineau, whose The Inequality of Human Races was quickly taken as proof of the supremacy of white Europeans over other peoples (De Gobineau 1915; Gobineau 2009). Such thinking found its heyday, and indeed was developed most thoroughly, during the 1930s and 40s, but it has since been roundly discredited (Jones 2005, 44–51). Race in the proscriptive sense is now understood to be yet another part of individuals’ identity formation, a category that operates in an unending dialectic with class and gender, reproducing itself and morphing as social conditions evolve (Ware 1992, 121–23).

A second, and more difficult, concept to define is that of ethnicity. Yinger himself has recognized that race and ethnicity often overlap, with little clarity offered by scholars of either, or both, topics, regardless of their field of knowledge (Yinger 1985, 158–59). Moreover, the boundaries between social group, caste, ethnos and nation are murky at best, and more than a few scholars have argued for contextualized definitions, rather than universal ones (see Khazanov 1983, 405–6;
Rather than focusing on the immutable and essential, these scholars prefer to tie ethnic identity to the voluntaristic and subjective selection of components of an extant, supra-ethnic culture in response to exogenous socio-political or economic pressures. They see the outward manifestations of ethnicity—linguistic variation; dress; architecture; cooking; customs—as being conscious selections from or variations upon the options available to a wider population at any given time (Stovel 2013, 13). This, of course, clashes with the so-called “objective” school of thought, which assigns hard and fast boundaries to ethnic groups, albeit ones that might shift diachronically. Jones in particular highlights the problem with this as being the shaky theoretical grounds of objective criteria chosen subjectively, as well as the propensity of scholars and others to make pronouncements on authenticity based on objective markers rather than self-declaration (Jones 2005, 57–58). Yinger defines the group as follows:

“[An ethnic group is] a segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves and/or others, to have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture and who, in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are significant ingredients. Some mixture of language, religion, race, and ancestral homeland with its related culture is the defining element. No one of these by itself demarcates an ethnic group.” (Yinger 1985, 159).

It is important to stress that ethnicity is, in many ways, an action that is both reflexive and transitive. While I have emphasized the idea that ethnic identity is formed through the usage of existing material and intangible objects to create a group sense of self, it is also borne from the denomination or characterization imposed upon a group by outsiders. This is important in situations of contact.
between two groups – such as between neighbouring communities of sedentary and nomadic peoples – and in those of domination and submission (van der Vliet 2003, 258). Barth put the accent on the bidirectional nature of ethnicity as early as the late 1960s:

“[A] population which:
1. is largely biologically self-perpetuating
2. shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms
3. makes up a field of communication and interaction
4. has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.” (Barth 1970, 10–11)

The idea of a “biologically self-perpetuating” community has provided, to some degree, the basis for a primordialist conceptualization of ethnicity that is not entirely out of line with many of the components of the voluntaristic definition. In short, it stems from the fact that kinship bonds (i.e. family bonds) often determine certain aspects of a given individual’s culture, such as her name, language, social customs and religion, which in turn underlie the ethnic affiliation of the person. Scholars of this camp therefore argue that ethnic identity is a part of human nature and, while not coded in our genetic makeup, is nonetheless our reflex mechanism of relating to other individuals (Jones 2005, 64–66). Those researchers who hold an entirely voluntaristic view fall into the instrumentalist camp, which includes such authors as Barth and Yinger, and which has been the dominant strand of thought for the last few decades. It has a number of different threads and understandings, but contrary to the proponents of primordialism, its champions all agree on the fluidity of identity and the situational nature of ethnic expressions (Jones 2005, 72–79). Whether primordial or instrumental, however, anthropologists, ethnographers and others generally seek to avoid the romanticization of blood and the essentialization
inherent in the archaeology, anthropology and ethnography of the 19th century and first half of the 20th century. Even for those individuals who argue in favour of a quasi-deterministic model of ethnicity, change and mutation are still possible; they just happen at a much slower pace.

When seen in this way, there is no basis for extrapolating contemporary or recorded ethnic phenomena to a distant, unrecorded past; nor can they be linked to some sort of essential and durable core of ethnic identity. Contemporary archaeology and historical anthropology therefore hold that ethnicity is a historically contingent process directed more by human volition than by natural forces or innate characteristics. For the purpose of my study, then, I will utilize a conception of ethnicity that, similar to the definitions of Yinger, Stovel, Barth and others, sees it as a collective expression of temporal traits – both material and immaterial – that, while perhaps relying on durative objects such as language, place of origin or a shared historical experience, are in no way immutable or essential.

These brief definitions will help to bound our discussion of the nation in the following chapters. They are intended only as guidelines, and for this reason have been left vague: my purpose here is to provide a distinction between the nation, the race (whether descriptive or prescriptive) and the ethnos. In all three cases, I am agnostic as to controversies over the ontologies of the three objects. Just as I do with the nation, I will take the authors’ own understanding of the terminology, whether implicit or explicit, at face value. In a similar vein, I do not adopt a preference for whether peoples are described as Turkish or Turkic; a distinction routinely made in Russian works, but not entirely current in Turkish. While we understand Turkish to refer to the people, language and culture of Anatolia, and Turkic to be the broader
ethno-linguistic community stretching across Eurasia (similar to Italians, French, Spaniards on the one hand and Latins on the other), I generally take their authors’ use and misuse of these terms as given. Nevertheless, there are times at which I must make a distinction between different objects of study, or refer to a concept that is not made explicit by the author him or herself. In these cases, what will be most important is the three-way distinction between the physical characteristics of a broad grouping of people (race); the process of distinguishing oneself from one’s neighbours through selective expressions within the established culture (ethnicity); and something in between, a loose collectivity whose boundaries are more fluid than race but still more sharply defined than the ethnos (the nation). The three-way division will not be of uniform importance throughout this project, as different binaries were of greater or lesser importance at different times in the period in question in both Turkey and the Soviet Union.

There are a few steps remaining before delving into the appearance of these three topics in the primary literature. The first is a review of the extant literature regarding these topics, followed by broader definitions and an exploration of dominant ideologies.
Literature Review

The very nature of scholarly endeavours that cross disciplinary boundaries implies that the scholar does not have one set canon on which to rely. As a result, authors of such research must look to various sources and groups of researchers for guidance. They select from a variety of literatures in order to build a corpus of prior scholarly work. From this, they may then construct theoretical and methodological frameworks and analyze collected data. The same holds true for this particular project. A structure of some sort is still necessary, and to this end I have organized the works reviewed into four distinct collections: the interpretation of ancient history and archaeology; Soviet Marxist historiography; Central Asian historiography; and Turkish historiography.

Interpreting the remote past

On the theoretical level, I draw from established scholarly traditions of ancient history, archaeology and historiography. In particular, I seek guidance from scholarship on the interpretation of ancient history and archaeological remains, and their inclusion in historiographies of either Marxist or nationalist colouring. As my geographical area of study is outside of what is traditionally referred to as the Classical World, I have expressly, although not exclusively, sought to rely on works concerned with the interpretation of the ancient outside of Greece, Rome and the Near East.
Soviet historiography

The first studies that I address relating directly to my objects of investigation belong to the corpus of research on Soviet historiography, a subsection of the once-thriving discipline of Sovietology. Cold War-era Sovietological works come from both NATO countries and Soviet scholars, with differences evident in both access to resources and the sensitivity of the author to the dictates of political élites. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the study of this former superpower as a single, cohesive entity has undergone a process of self-criticism. Researchers now ask how an entire field devoted to the study of the USSR could have failed to detect the phenomena that would eventually lead to its demise.

Central Asian historiography

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has also provided for the creation of another domain of scholarship from which I draw, which I call Central Asian historiography. The scholars who participate in this field are distinguished from Sovietologists by the influence of a multipolar world order; their increased access to resources in the former Soviet Union; and their tendency to investigate and analyze aspects of the historical sciences that had been suppressed for political reasons during the Soviet period.
Finally, the last subset of sources relates to Turkish historiography. In this section, I have sought to balance works by Turkish writers with those of foreign ones, in order to allow for an exposition of the peculiarities of history writing praxis in Turkey.

Thus I begin this review with an overview of studies relating to ancient history and archaeology, and their interpretation for modern ends.

Ancient History and Archaeology

It is the written record, in whatever form it might be found, that distinguishes the realm of ancient history from pre-history. The latter may only be investigated through the use of archaeology and related social sciences. Archaeology, however, is not solely the preserve of pre-history, and may indeed be employed in the study of the age of writing. The interplay of the material (archaeology) and the immaterial (content of the written record) appear both explicitly and implicitly in studies of pre- and ancient history. In his study of the 16th century BCE Edict of Telipinu, Liverani delves directly in the question of whether such documents should be taken at face value, or understood as tools of political legitimization and myth-making (Liverani 2004). Similarly, Soekmono’s discussion of archaeology and Indonesian historiography (Soekmono 2007) tracks competing interpretations of Muslim graves and their significance for the spread of Islam and Islamicate culture in the Indonesian archipelago. His own interpretations depart from those of previous, Western scholars, demonstrating both the flexibility of interpretation, and the sensitivity of material evidence to competing politicized readings (Soekmono 2007, 43). Both
scholars bring to the fore – explicitly in Liverani’s case, implicitly in Soekmono’s – the manner in which reading and interpretation can be powerful forces in shaping our understanding of pre- and ancient history, and its implications for modern life.

Individual, subjective interpretations are not the only means by which the scholar can affect our reading of the historical and pre-historical past. On an abstract level, the application of modern theoretical constructions to the interpretation of ancient history is not, a priori, problematic. Indeed, the use of theoretical models to understand ancient history with or without the complementary evidence of archaeology and other social sciences is an idea that is developed at length in Neville Morley’s *Theories, models and concepts in ancient history* (Morley 2004). Morley discusses the often controversial application of theoretical models to analyses of Ancient Greece and Rome. He provides ample evidence of this occurrence in writings by scholars identified with both conservative and progressive political ideologies. Indeed, his exposition is clear and readily applicable, albeit restricted to traditional Anglo-American, French and German studies of the Classical World. Morley’s work is intended to be an introduction, rather than an exhaustive study of the historical and archaeological sciences the world over. As such, it is an apt starting point for any study that seeks to problematize both the writing of history in a particular time and place in the past, and this activity in its contemporary manifestations.

**Nationalist Archaeology, the State and Ideology**

A passionate plea for reflexivity in order to forestall such personal biases in the analysis of archaeological data is found in Fowler’s work on nationalist uses of archaeology (Fowler 2008). The author employs three examples of nation-states’
(Mexico, Britain and China) use and abuse of archaeology as a parable for contemporary archaeologists. Fowler’s choice of Aztec Mexico is puzzling, given the anachronism of applying the concept of the nation-state to a pre-Columbian polity. It nevertheless exemplifies the process of attributing national characteristics to pre-modern communities, a frequent occurrence in Republican Turkish historiography. Although his case study of the People’s Republic of China is lacking in evidence of nationalist ideology, it does provide valuable insight into the manner in which archaeological findings can be massaged to legitimize government dogma. Fowler quotes Qian et al.’s explanation of recent findings as follows: “The sculpture of the Qin [dynasty] is wholly based on reality and draws its material from actual life. It reflects the spirit of the times of the First Emperor of Qin as he unified China with his powerful army, and it brings out a national style of lucidity and grandeur.” (Fowler 2008, 114) It is easy to draw parallels between the praise for the presence of “reality” and “actual life” in Qin artwork and the contemporary aesthetic doctrine of Socialist Realism (Lahusen 1997, 5). Although Fowler fails to make the point explicitly, his quote highlights the manner in which archaeological work has been used to weave the values of the Maoist régime into the history and traditions of the Chinese masses.

A more pointed analysis of the (mis)use of archaeology and prehistory for political ends is conducted by Arnold in her work on the National Socialist régime’s appropriation of the discipline (Arnold 2008). She problematizes the cooperation and collusion of German pre-historians with the Nazi state, investigating both practical and theoretical issues surrounding the evolution of prehistory in Germany from the end of the First World War until 1945. Of particular interest are the questions that
Arnold raises regarding the degree to which symbiosis was established between a
government seeking scientific support for its extreme views on racial supremacy and
a discipline yearning for greater recognition and legitimacy among related historical
sciences (Arnold 2008, 125–26). Her analysis deals largely with the presentation and
interpretation of findings, rather than the methodologies and philosophies of
contemporary archaeology, and is thus suitable as a springboard to the study of
other examples of archaeology and prehistory conducted under totalitarian and
similarly non-democratic, ideologically-driven régimes. This is of particular use in the
study of both the Soviet Union and Republican Turkey, where archaeological findings
were frequently utilized by the State as a propaganda tool for the legitimization of its
historical, political and ideological agenda among the masses.

Recent scholarship on the display of Roman artefacts by the Italian state
conducted by Arthurs (Arthurs 2007) adds further credence to the validity of
querying the relationship between the disciplines of prehistory and archaeology, and
the ideologues of the state. Arthurs tracks the evolution of the *Mostra archeologica*,
a showcase of Roman artefacts organized by the Italian government, from its
inception in 1911 to its re-emergence as the *Mostra Augustea della Romanità* in
1937 and its post-WWII incarnation. His analysis allows for a comparative approach
to the use of antiquity and archaeology as a tool of inculcating state ideology in
Liberal, Fascist and post-War Liberal Democratic Italy. It is particularly instructive on
the manner in which not just the explanation of the artefacts, but their exposition
and organization were used as means of encouraging the adoption of ideologically-
tinged historical narratives. Arthurs explains how both the 1911 and 1937 exhibitions
were part of a largely state-sponsored teleological framework that connected
Roman greatness, European civilization and the contemporary Italian state’s drive for modernity. The two events can also be used to contrast the respective ideological values adopted by the contemporary Italian state. In 1911, science and technology, whether found in Roman remains or in the advances of modern Italian archaeology, were on display (Arthurs 2007, 33–35). In 1937, on the other hand, uniformity, hygiene and martial virtue were all incorporated into the displays of Roman daily life, encouraging the view that the core values of Mussolini’s fascist régime had always been central to Roman, and therefore Italian, civilization (Arthurs 2007, 36). Similar to Arnold, Arthurs’ study provides a model framework with which to problematize attempts by the Turkish government to utilize archaeological remains from Anatolia to promote its own values of nationalism, laicism and loyalty to the state among its population, and to establish its inalienable right to the land of Asia Minor.

**Archaeology in Anatolia**

Indeed, Tanyeri-Erdemir has explored similar lines of analysis of the use of archaeology and ancient history by the contemporary Turkish state during the 1920s and 1930s (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006). Here, the author seeks to contextualize early Republican endeavours in the field of archaeology within a state-sponsored drive to encourage national pride and ethno-national self-identification. She makes particular usage of the concept of archaeology as a signifier of modern scientific and technological achievement. Unfortunately, in her zeal to demonstrate such phenomena, Tanyeri-Erdemir omits, *grosso modo*, the important contribution of German archaeologists and classicists to the development of Turkish social sciences and humanities, as well as assessments of the relevance or soundness of Turkish
scientific pursuits and scholarship according contemporary criteria (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 384–85). Indeed, the logical incongruence of claiming that the guiding principle of historical research in the 1930s, the Turkish History Thesis, was intended both to demonstrate the manner in which ancient civilizations had contributed to the creation of the Turkish nation and how the Turkish nation had been the origin of such civilizations (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 382) casts doubt over the salience of Tanyeri-Erdemir’s conclusions.

Nevertheless, the relevance of the study of ideological content in Turkish archaeology and ancient history remains intact thanks to the work of other scholars. These include Eisuke Tanaka, whose research has elucidated the complex relationship between the modern Turkish state and the ancient patrimony of Anatolia (Tanaka 2007). He explores the means by which Anatolianism, an intellectual construct that identified the modern Turkish nation with the historical development of Anatolia, has been manifested in the state’s adoption of all cultural patrimony present in the peninsula – whether created by ethnic Turks or not – as the heritage of the current population (Tanaka 2007, 67–68). Tanaka’s research provides an insight into conflicting concepts of locality, ethno-national identity and state that overlap in the official historical narrative of the Republic of Turkey.

Archaeology, Anthropology, Race and History

The Turkish state was not the only one that sought to use the physical and human wealth of the Eastern Mediterranean to support its political claims. In her study of Greek concepts of nationhood, race and ethnicity, Sevasti Troumpeta tracks the manner in which ideas of belonging and the purity of the Greek people evolved
over time, from a loose collectivity based on faith to a racialized and deterministic conceptualization fuelled by eugenics (Troumpeta 2013). She describes in detail the delicacy of issues of miscegenation and assimilation, during the period when racial differences became more important for West European, and particularly German, scholars (Troumpeta 2013, 160–61). In this way, the difficulties of connecting the great civilizations attested by the ruins that dot the Peloponnese to the modern-day Hellenes are thoroughly documented and explained in her work. This exposition is important for the parallels that can be drawn with Turkish attempts at appropriating the physical patrimony of Anatolia. Moreover, it begs the question of what impact Greek efforts to document and classify the non-Greek populations of Asia Minor during the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) might have had on Turkish imaginations of national belonging (Troumpeta 2013, 157–58). At the very least, Troumpeta’s study contextualizes Turkish historical narratives within a wider Balkan phenomenon of the use of ancient history for nationalist projects.

While all régimes might be accused of massaging or twisting narratives of pre- and ancient history to suit their own needs, the manner in which they do so varies in tandem with the ideology of the state. The state’s guiding principles affect the interpretation of all historical evidence, and it is to these various systems that I turn next.

**Nationalist Historiography**

One of the most powerful concepts in the modern era to influence the formation of historical narratives has been the nation. It has also had a profound impact on the ordering of political thought, producing, among other results, the
ideology of nationalism. Similar to other political ideologies, nationalism has altered
the manner in which history has been written and interpreted. The existence of two
similar but distinct disciplines of national and nationalist historiography, then, begs
the question of the nature and depth of the differences between the two.

This topic is treated in detail by John Breuilly in his overview of the genesis of
nationalist histories and their defining characteristics (Breuilly 2007). He tracks the
emergence of national history from the 18th century as a new paradigm in which
history was categorized according to national groupings. Historians became
concerned with the manner in which wars, revolutions, agreements and other
historical events were to be interpreted within the context of the nation, rather than
a ruling dynasty or a complex of individuals. Breuilly lays particular emphasis on the
fact that national histories become nationalist when the nation is elevated to a
status above all other values and institutions present in a particular period and
society (Breuilly 2007, 2–3).

Breuilly’s analysis is particularly useful in its attempt to find common
characteristics for all nationalist historiographies, a topic he takes up in a study
published in 2009. In this later work, he explains that considerable differences exist
between the civic-nationalist historiography inspired by the French Revolution and
the culturally-based one that first emerged in Germany (Breuilly 2009, 10). He also
clarifies that the importance of a people’s past in encouraging national
consciousness and the forging of a sense of common destiny has allowed for
historiography to be closely linked to nationalist political projects. This results in an
inverse relationship between diversity in historical narratives and authoritarianism
among the political élite (Breuilly 2009, 15). Such dominant models are taken up in
Stefan Berger’s nation-by-nation study of European historiographies (Berger 2009). Berger categorizes the various meta-narratives according to their broad characteristics (victor nation vs. oppressed nation; proletarian nation vs. bourgeois nation; etc.), establishing a convenient framework within which the student of national histories might begin to compare and contrast competing accounts of historical events.

**The Nationalists according to the Marxists**

A critique of the clean dividing lines drawn by scholars such as Breuilly is offered by the Hungarian historian Jenő Szűcs in his *The Nation and History* (*Nemzet és Történelem*) (Szűcs 1974). The work contains a number of essays on the concept of the nation and its historicity, with particular attention paid to France and Germany and the emergence of a proto-national consciousness in the Middle Ages. Its publication in Hungary during the Socialist period makes it especially useful, as Szűcs’ analysis of nationalist historiography is tinged with the dominant Marxist school of thought. According to Berger, this was often mixed with nationalist proclivities in the countries of Eastern Europe (Berger 2009, 31). Szűcs takes the modern origins and contingency of the nation as given, arguing that it is a Romantic concept that has been backdated by nationalist activists in order to motivate contemporary political movements (Szűcs 1974, 27). He also argues that all nationalist historiographies contain elements of both civic and cultural nationalism, with east-west differences a matter of proportion (Szűcs 1974, 30). Finally, he takes a critical look at the nationalisms of Eastern Europe in the inter-war period, and finds that where the concept of the nation as a political unit has failed to be popularized
and fully implemented, nationalist history will often be used to legitimize extraordinary political situations and restrictions on access to power (Szűcs 1974, 38). Although Szűcs was writing about Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania, it is easy to extrapolate this insight to Turkey, where the birth of the Turkish History Thesis coincided with the beginning of the one-party period.

**Marxist Historiography**

Similar to nationalist historiography, the analysis of Marxist historical theory must grapple with the existence of a plethora of schools and trends, as well as regionally-based differences. Of particular interest is the utilization of Marxist interpretations of history in agrarian and semi-industrialized non-European territories during the first half of the 20th century. Historians and other scholars from such peripheral regions struggled to reconcile the realities of their own existence with the precepts of a theory developed to explain the historical development of European societies. The result was highly nuanced interpretations of Marxist historical theory, some of which demonstrate a fusion of Marxist and nationalist principles.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Marxist historiography of non-European societies was the Asian Mode of Production (AMP). The AMP was mentioned briefly by Marx as one stage of socio-economic development in his 1859 writing (Fleischer 1973, 18). It was characterized by a hegemonic bureaucratic class allied to a despotic state, and a dominated class of peasants (Mommen 2011, 92). In his 1976 work on the controversy surrounding the AMP, Sawer provides a detailed and thorough account of the use and development of the concept in Russian and
Soviet circles, as well as its demise in the 1930s and its reappearance in the 1960s (Sawer 1979). His study is an exceptionally useful tool in understanding the origins of the Stalinist aversion to the AMP and the possibilities of its usage as a means of adapting Marxist historical models to non-European regions. Sawer’s concentration on the early years of the debate (1900 to 1937) is supplemented by later Soviet accounts that focus primarily on the rehabilitation of the theory in the 1960s (Nikiforov 1977). The AMP, however, was not the only problematic aspect of the application of Marxist ideas on history to non-European societies, as studies on attempts at creating Marxist histories of Asian peoples readily attest.

East Asia: a Fusion of Marx and the Ancient Nation

The historiographies of Korea and Japan from the period between the two World Wars provide telling examples of this attempt to make contemporary Marxist interpretations coalesce with nationalist ideas. Ki-jung Pang explores the efforts of Paek Nam’un, one of the founders of Korean Marxist historiography, to find such a balance (Pang 2005). He pays particular attention to the manner in which Nam’un charted a course between orthodox Marxist interpretations of the nation as a purely historical construct and contemporary Korean nationalist and Japanese colonialist historians, who sought to imbue the Korean nation with essentialist, and therefore anti-materialist, qualities (Pang 2005, 271). Nam’un’s solution was a reordering of the historical stages developed by Marx and Engels according to the evolution of Korean society, which he argued was an organic product of the cultural and economic processes documented in the Korean peninsula (Pang 2005, 278). Pang therefore provides a succinct introduction to the manner in which Korean Marxist
thought managed to preserve the notion of the historically constructed nation – crucial to Marxist interpretations of history – while adapting the Marxist stages of historical development to the idiosyncrasies of Korea’s evolution.

Periodization of historical development was not the only aspect of Marxist historical sciences that non-European writers and thinkers sought to reconfigure. Inter-war Japanese Marxist historians struggled with the concept of the nation and its historical formation, as this was a topic of prime interest for nationalist historians seeking to justify aggressive Imperial expansion. Gayle explores this aspect of Japanese Marxist thought as an introduction to his study of post-War Japanese Nationalism (Gayle 2002). He investigates these historians’ conceptualizations of the Japanese nation’s emergence in order to contrast this with post-War Marxist responses to Japanese Imperial nationalism. Gayle focuses on the manner in which left-wing Japanese intellectuals navigated the narrow straits between Marxist Orthodoxy on historically constructed nations and nationalist propaganda on the assimilation of non-Japanese Imperial subjects into the dominant culture. The Stalinist definition of a nation, therefore, was a welcome development for Japanese Marxists, as the presence of territoriality as an identifier of a nation – together with common language, economic life and psychological cast of mind – provided a ready-made means of differentiation from the nationalists (Gayle 2002, 26–27).

The author goes on to explain that racial homogeneity was also embraced as a significant variable explaining the development of national solidarity and communal identity amongst the Japanese in the feudal period, rather than the capitalist period when the state emerged as a strong national institution. This considerable departure from orthodox Marxist interpretations of the emergence of
the nation was a significant challenge to Imperial and nationalist theorizations of the state and nation as organically intertwined, and thus is further evidence of manipulations of Marxist theory in the face of highly contextualized confrontations (Gayle 2002, 31). Such theories provide counterexamples for both the Soviet Union, where the nation was believed to be a product of the capitalist age, and Turkey, where state-formation was seen as a defining characteristic of the Turkish nation (see Kurat 1992; Merçil 1985; Turan 1980). More importantly, however, both the Korean and the Japanese cases demonstrate the much more delicate process of nativizing Marxist thought and praxis in societies profoundly different from that of Marx and Engels. These phenomena appeared throughout Eurasia, and will be seen quite clearly in primary literature produced in Central Asia in the 1920s.

Pang and Gayle’s studies, therefore, provide an important point of contrast in comparing the practice of Marxist historiography inside and outside of the Soviet Union. Until the 1950s, the Soviet Union was the guiding light for Marxists on matters both practical and theoretical. This does not mean, however, that all Soviet interpretations were strictly Marxist, a fact made obvious by the ample scholarly work devoted to the study of the historical sciences in the Soviet Union.

**Soviet Historiography**

Sovietology – the study of the Soviet Union – is a rich and multifaceted discipline that continues to capture the attention of scholars across the world. Within Sovietology, the study of national minorities (i.e. the non-Russians) is a particularly active field, spurred both by academic interests and the presence of diaspora organizations in Western Europe, North America and Israel. While work on
nationalities (национальности) often focuses on their political and socio-economic status within the Soviet Union, inter-ethnic relations, and dissent, a number of scholars have also written on Soviet historiography of the national minorities. Among other subjects, the political history of the absorption of these groups’ territories into the Russian Empire and/or the Soviet Union has produced much scholarly output. The spectrum of topics is a reflection of the diversity of motivations for the study of such historiographies: while some authors are interested in the nexus of Marxist historical sciences and Russian colonialism, others seek to comprehend better the manifestations of national identity and belonging that have emerged in the successor states of the various Soviet Republics. The result has been an exceptionally diversified set of hypotheses on and expositions of the manner in which centralized institutions of power in the Soviet Union shaped and directed the emergence of contemporary identities over the course of its history.

The Friendship of Peoples

The impact of the Friendship of Peoples – the late-Stalinist ideology that stressed historical harmony and mutual assistance between the peoples of the Soviet Union – on Soviet historiography has been thoroughly examined by Lowell Tillett (Tillett 1969). Tillett provides considerable background on nationalities policy and minority historiography from the inception of the Soviet Union until the 1960s, despite the fact that his main period of interest begins in 1947. His analysis is not strictly chronological, and neither does it focus on one particular national historiography, although the lion’s share of the first half of the book is devoted to the North Caucasus and Kazakhstan. Rather, he selects specific episodes in the
evolution of the historical sciences in the Soviet Union and uses them as case studies, correlating the changes in official nationalities policy with controversies in scholarly attempts to write national histories for the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Tillett’s work is a product of its time, and bears the hallmarks of the ideological biases of the Cold War (Suny 2011, 8–9): Party bosses are boorish and conniving; historians who refuse to toe the Party line are heroic or, failing that, martyrs to scientific integrity; and compliant historians are nothing more than Party hacks. Many of the case studies address the historiography of national heroes and episodes of rebellion or insurrection from the 18th century onward, and Tillett does not question why some historians chose to defy official Communist Party ideology and lionize the insurgents. Despite this, his accounts of the historical sciences in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as the wealth of resources used for his study, provide invaluable guidance in the field of Soviet historiography of the Turkic peoples.

Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush’s work on Muslim nationalism in the early decades of the Soviet Union can be interpreted in the same way. Bennigsen and Wimbush relied on the writings of Sultan Galiev, the Tatar Muslim Communist, as well as those of Kazakh, Crimean Tatar and Azeri figures from the first half of the 20th century, to provide an overview of the ideology and political programs of Turkic intellectuals who survived the Revolution and Civil War and remained in the Soviet Union after the Bolsheviks’ consolidation of power (Bennigsen 1979). The account, however, exemplifies the monumental changes witnessed in Sovietology and historiography since it was written nearly forty years ago. To begin with, the authors do not seek to explain the nuances and evolution of
Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist doctrine on the issue of nationality, and thereby fail to educate the reader on the manner in which both Lenin and Stalin saw class, social organization and ethnicity as overlapping in the production of nations (Bennigsen 1979, 11). As a result, their study is overtly biased against Soviet theorists, making it difficult to discriminate between aspects of theory and failings of practice. Secondly, their understanding of the nation does not take into consideration the complex approach now employed by historians, ethnologists, political scientists and anthropologists. By taking for granted the existence and self-consciousness of Tatar, Kazakh, Bashkir and other national groups, they do not problematize the crucial role that Muslim intellectuals played in shaping such identities, particularly through the usage of historical narratives. Similar issues arise in the scholarship of Dumont, a Cold War predecessor of James Meyers, who investigated pre-Soviet Muslim Turkic writings, albeit with a heavy reliance on works available outside of the Soviet Union – most notably Turkey – rather than those from Soviet Turkic spaces themselves (Dumont 1974).

A Soviet View of Soviet Historiography

In contrast to Tilett’s and Bennigsen and Wimbush’ thematic and critical approach, Kulagina and Kuznetsova, in their review of fifty years of oriental studies in the Soviet Union, analyze the development of this branch of the social sciences from a strictly chronological point of view (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970). Their study is meant to provide an overview of the establishment and consolidation of Soviet research on the “peoples of the East”, including the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia. Much of the work reads as if it were an inventory of organizational
changes within the Institute of Oriental Studies, or of the reports published between 1917 and 1967, but there are crucial elements of criticism that can be gleaned from the chapters on the 1920s and 1930s. The authors attack the output of the period from a methodological point of view, criticizing particular scholars or groups of scholars for the unsound assumptions and hypotheses on which they base their research. These episodes of disapproval, however, neatly coincide with the politically- and ideologically-motivated purges described by Tillett. Although the influence of Pokrovskii, the leading Soviet historian of the 1920s, is not mentioned, both Barthol’d and Marr are subjected to criticism, the former for his opposition to the centralization and agglomeration of the various branches of oriental studies (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 54), and the latter for his unscientific hypotheses on the formation of languages (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 58–59). Similarly, the scholars of the 1930s are singled out for their “ignorance” of Asian history and for their “insufficient assimilation” of Marxist theory, particularly the Asian Mode of Production (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 98). The authors’ criticism provides important evidence of the fact that, long after the end of Stalinism, contemporary writings continued to be considered anathema to official Soviet policy on the history and identity of the peoples of Soviet Union.

Such criticism of the histories that were written in the inter-war years continued well into the 1980s. This was the decade when Glasnost and Perestroika, the movements credited by some Sovietologists with the ultimate demise of the USSR, were creating spaces in which the ideology of the state could be contested openly. Nevertheless, historiographical works on Central Asia continued to deny the validity or acceptability of histories produced during the height of Stalinism. In his
review of Soviet Kazakh historiography (Nusupbekov 1989), Nusupbekov pays scant attention to these historians, except for a short explanation of their cardinal sins. His criticism is important for confirming that the most serious transgression involved the lionization of the “Warrior-khans” at the expense of the masses (Nusupbekov 1989, 324–25), but clarifies little else. He makes specific mention of the histories written by Chuloshnikov in the 1920s (but not his critic, Tynyshpaev), and of Asfendiiarov in the 1930s (but not his execution for alleged pan-Turkist sympathies in 1938), while also recounting the compilation of the History of the Kazakh SSR by Pankratova et al. during the early 1940s. Apart from the misuse of local archives by Pankratova and her colleagues, Nusupbekov leaves his reader with few details on the theories, hypotheses and discoveries of nearly three decades of Soviet historiography of Central Asia (Nusupbekov 1989, 334–35).

In contrast to Nusupbekov, Kozybaev engages in a franker discussion of the reasons for the suppression of non-canonical history texts and uncooperative historians in his historiography of Kazakhstan, published immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Kozybaev 1992). He conducts a detailed analysis of the implantation and growth of Soviet historical sciences in the Kazakh SSR from the post-Civil War years until the 1980s, providing ample statistics on the blossoming and transformation of the Academy system in the Republic. With respect to the 1930s, archival materials had still yet to surface regarding the extent of suppression and denial perpetrated by Stalinist officials. Nonetheless, the author problematizes the study of nationalist movements and histories during this period. Kozybaev thus transforms a significant gap in the understand of Soviet Kazakh historiography into a passionate plea for a more critical investigation of history-writing under Stalin
(Kozybaev 1992, 19). It is precisely this call that was heeded by the historiographers of the newly independent republics of Central Asia.

Central Asian Historiography

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars of the historiography of the Soviet Turkic peoples have generally benefitted from greater access to Soviet archives (see Rittersporn 2004; Khlevniuk 2004), as well as regional sources of information in both Russian and Turkic languages. Some scholarship has sought to track the evolution of the Friendship of Peoples and Soviet historiography into the post-Soviet period ((Akiner 1995); (Lowe 2003); and (Kudaibergenova 2013)), providing a long-term historical perspective on the establishment of national histories. Others have focused on the Soviet historical sciences during the 1940s and 1950s, including studies devoted to histories on Kazakh national heroes ((Kendirbaeva 1999); (Fruchet 2003), (Yilmaz 2013a)), or on issues of ethnogenesis and the boundaries of national identity ((Subtelny 1994); (Auezova 2011); (Yilmaz 2013b); (Abashin 2014)). Knowledge of Central Asian languages among Western scholars is still not widespread, and thus there is a marked tendency among authors such as Lowe, Fruchet and others to rely on resources in Western European languages or, occasionally, in Russian. In contrast, authors with access to such material, such as Auezova, Meyers, Sabol, Subtelny and Yilmaz, have opened up new vistas in understanding the effects of Stalinist nationality and educational policies on the elaboration of histories of the Soviet Turkic peoples. The sharing of such research has been facilitated by a number of conferences that bring together scholars from disparate academies, such as that held by the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul.
in 2015 (Nilsson Schlyter 2014). And all researchers have, in many ways, purged the discipline of some of the more overt ideological biases present in Tillett’s work.

In order to explore these trends, I will look specifically at the literature on two different former Soviet spaces: Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

Kazakhstan

As intimated in the section on Tilett, and as shall be seen in the primary materials, Kazakhstan was a rich terrain for Soviet historians, and is thus a profitable object of investigation for contemporary historiographers. Auezova’s study, entitled *Conceiving a people’s history: The 1920-1936 discourse on the Kazakh past* (Auezova 2011), provides a detailed overview of three histories of the Kazakhs written between 1920 and 1936. Unlike Tillett, whose work focused on histories of the relationship between Russians and national minorities, and among the national minorities themselves, Auezova investigates a wider spectrum of scholarship dealing both with the formation of the Kazakh ethnos and the relations of Kazakhs with neighbouring peoples. Her analysis centres on the writings of three particular historians (Chuloshnikov, Tynyshpaev and Asfendiiarov), with an emphasis on the differences between indigenous and Russian historiographies. She brings to light the degree of diversity that existed during the 1920s and 1930s, particularly with respect to the manner in which history was conceived (dynastic vs. popular, written vs. oral, Western vs. traditional methodologies) and thereby provides a background against which the post-1936 elimination of plurality and initiative can be judged.

When Auezova’s research is combined with the work of other scholars who study the period, a clear picture of Kazakh intellectual development emerges. In
particular, Kendirbaeva provides a crucial view of the evolution of national identity movements among Kazakh intellectuals in the half century immediately preceding the October Revolution (Kendirbaeva 1999). Although a considerable portion of her paper focuses on literary and educational trends in post-1905 Kazakhstan, her descriptions of competing secular-nationalist and religious-nationalist groupings are invaluable in explaining the development of Kazakh historical narratives in the 1920s and 1930s. They also aid in understanding the relationship between Kazakh intellectuals and other Turkic peoples during the Tsarist constitutional period and the first years following the February 1917 revolution (Kendirbaeva 1999, 6–16). Kendirbaeva’s anachronism of attributing a widespread national identity among the 19th century Kazakhs and her failure to discuss the limited reach of intellectuals during the period are addressed by Steven Sabol in his study of Kazakh national consciousness (Sabol 2003). Sabol provides a succinct overview of the structure of 19th century Kazakh society and the impact of Russian colonization on the Kazakhs, before investigating the lives and contributions of three turn-of-the-century Kazakh intellectuals. His research is largely pertinent to the pre-Revolutionary period, but it does elucidate greatly the intellectual climate of the region at the onset of Soviet hegemony. Together, Kendirbaeva and Sabol describe in detail the notions of identity within the nationalist Alash Orda movement, and the schools of thought that competed with Marxism in 1920s Kazakhstan.

The Great Patriotic War and Kazakh History

At the other end of the time frame in question, Stalinism and its nefarious effects on intellectual life in the late 1930s and early 1940s have provided another
rich nexus of study for Sovietologists and historians. Within this, the issue of rehabilitation of Soviet figures and responsibility for Soviet rule is often a critical component of current Central Asian historiography, especially when addressing the works of Soviet-era historians and their validity in the study of Central Asia's past. In his study of the 1943 History of Kazakhstan (Yilmaz 2012), Yilmaz addresses the rehabilitation of the First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, Zhumabai Shaiakhmetov, by the government of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan. This posthumous revival of Shaiakhmetov’s reputation is based in part on his role in the compilation of the 1943 history of the Kazakh SSR and the protection he extended to Kazakh historians in the face of Moscow's displeasure with their writings. Yilmaz provides an in-depth view of the socio-political environment present in Kazakhstan during the Second World War, and the importance afforded to Kazakh history by Soviet authorities in their agitprop efforts. Nevertheless, the stinging indictment of Shaiakhmetov that he promises in the introduction is lacking in bite and appears to condemn him more by the absence of evidence of his involvement than by any sort of exposition of his meddling in the compilation of a historical narrative (Yilmaz 2012, 414). Yilmaz’s analysis, therefore, provides the reader with a view of the wartime trends discussed by Tillett that includes a broader consideration of the nexus between history and propaganda throughout Kazakh society. It fails, however, to elucidate the degree to which the Marxist, nationalist or other ideological convictions of particular actors or groups might have influenced the content of the work or the interpretation of Kazakh history.
Azerbaijan

Such convictions are on full display in Yilmaz’s analysis of the 1937 history of Azerbaijan, written at the height of the Stalinist purges (Yilmaz 2013b). Here, the author tracks the evolution of both a national consciousness and ethnonym for the Turkic people of Azerbaijan from the final days of the Ottoman Empire until the height of the Stalinist period. Yilmaz explores the influence of the emerging nation-state idea in both Turkey and Iran in the 1920s and 1930s on Azeri and Soviet concepts of national identity. He ties these into a broader Soviet dynamic in which the historical and linguistic sciences gradually came to fall under the tight grip of the Stalinist bureaucracy. He queries the influence of Nazi Germany in Turkey and Iran as a motivation for Soviet attempts to distance the Azeris from both countries. Yilmaz, however, ultimately decides on the application of the Stalinist concept of the nation, in which territoriality is a defining aspect of nationhood, as the main driver in the adoption of the 1937 thesis that linked the Azeri people to the Medes (Yilmaz 2013b, 527). He sees competition with the Armenians and Georgians over claims to the resources of the Caucasus as a key factor in this decision, but given the role of exiled Russian Turkic intellectuals in the composition of the Turkish History Thesis, it is difficult not to inquire on the importance of Turkish developments in the formation of the 1937 thesis of Azeri ethnogenesis.

In 2015, Yilmaz returned with a comprehensive volume that incorporated all of these theses and areas of interest, as well as comparative material regarding Ukrainian historiography. Although this expanded scope of interest allows for the construction of a pan-Soviet dynamic, little new information regarding Turkic
historiography is added to the work; neither does it provide more in-depth analysis of the interplay of Stalinist ideas and the praxis of history-writing (Yilmaz 2015).

**Broader Trends**

Other scholars in both the former Soviet space and the old Atlantic Treaty countries have continued to deepen their approaches to Soviet Central Asian history writing. Among the most prolific is Al’frid Bustanov, a student of Michael Kemper, whose interests are wide and varied. Bustanov has provided us with views of the dynamics operating in the centre, particularly with respect to the division of labour between Leningrad and Moscow (Bustanov 2015), as well as the changes underwent in the academies of the individual republics – specifically Kazakhstan – over the course of Soviet hegemony (Bustanov 2017). Bustanov’s work is an important contribution to the field, and an invaluable guide for the present project. Nonetheless, his concern for the long-term, as well as his particular interest in the internal politics of the academy, rather than the interplay of ideology and history writing, marks his scholarly pursuits as belonging to a related, although distinct, discipline from the current one.

Scholars are also expanding their interests beyond simply academic historiography in order to apply the methods of post-modern historical investigation to Central Asia as well. Dadabaev, in particular, has been keen to utilize oral history methods in investigating the Soviet past in Central Asia. In the process, he has uncovered fascinating results about respondents’ attitudes towards the historiography and identity formation dynamics of the Stalinist period, as well as their own relations to academic subjects in Russian versus their native languages.
Others, such as Emre Gürbüz (Gürbüz 2014) and Gasimov (Gasimov 2014) address changes in post-independence Turkic historiography, with copious reference to the texts and processes of the Soviet period. Language and history in contemporary Uzbekistan are investigated by Schlyter (Nilsson Schlyter 2014), while their complex interaction in the Qing Empire, with specific reference to Uyghur communities, is taken up by Schluessel (Schluessel 2014).

Other researchers have touched on historiography through problematizing other aspects of early Soviet society. Arne Haugen’s insightful study of the division of Central Asia into national republics is a prime example of this. Although he is most interested in the contemporary political dynamics of territorial division, he necessarily explores as well the conditions necessitating the elaboration of national histories (Haugen 2003). To this we may add the work of Marianne Kamp on women and nation-formation in Uzbekistan in the 1920s (Kamp 2007); Adeeb Khalid’s scholarship on the dynamics of Empire in early Soviet Central Asia (Khalid 2006); as well as Lynn Edgar’s comprehensive and incisive study of nation-building in Turkmenistan in the same period (Edgar 2006).

Indeed, Breuilly’s own observation that each nation-state feels the need to demarcate its own history, no matter how short or long a period of political independence it has experienced (Breuilly 2007, 8), reflects the post-1991 explosion in studies on all the Turkic republics and federal subjects within the Russian Federation. In the case of Turkey, the field might not have widened, but it has indeed deepened over the last thirty years. It is to this that we now turn as the final stage on our tour of secondary literature.
Turkish Historiography

Since the return to full electoral democracy in Turkey at the end of the 1980s, there has been an increased interest in the writing of the past. In part, this has been spurred by an opening inside Turkey itself, allowing for greater critical analysis of the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. Authors have taken new tracks in approaching the seminal texts – often forgotten or neglected – of Turkish national consciousness. Among these, Umut Uzer has provided us with a much-needed updated look at the genesis of Turkish nationalism and Turkism, along lines similar to those of Jacob Landau (Uzer 2016). His An Intellectual History of Turkish Nationalism gives to us an in-depth view to the writings and activities of some of the greatest names in Turkish intellectual life, including Namık Kemal, Yusuf Akçura (Uzer 2016, 56–63), Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Ziya Gökalp (Uzer 2016, 63–91). Uzer does so, however, more in the vein of political histories rather than historiography, tracking the infusion of Turkish political life with nationalist rhetoric and ideas, rather than problematizing those ideas and their usage by the very authors Uzer investigates. A more detailed analysis of Gökalp’s transition from Islamist to Turkist, and his views on the belonging of Turks within European civilizational frameworks, is provided by other scholars, including Mehmet Kaan Çalen. Çalen’s most recent publication, “Yeni Hayat”tan “Millî Hayat”a, Intihardan Terkiibe Ziya Gökalp (Ziya Gökalp from “Yeni Hayat” to “Millî Hayat” and from Suicide to Synthesis) explores this development and the importance of the transition from an imperial system to the world of nation-States in Gökalp’s thinking (Çalen 2016).
Behar on the Influence of the State

Most important for the current study, however, is Büşra Ersanlı Behar’s comprehensive and critical analysis of the Turkish History Thesis, İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “resmi tarih” tezinin oluşumu 1929-1937 (Behar 1992). The first section of her work is a thorough examination of the philosophical and ideological influences that shaped Ottoman and early Republican historical sciences, with a particular emphasis on Romanticism, Positivism and German Historicism. Behar then provides her readers with an overview of the first history textbooks of the Republic and a detailed account of the proceedings of the First Turkish Historical Congress. She stresses the opposition of historians to the state’s leadership in the establishment of a historical narrative, and the gradual suppression of dissent in academic circles. Her work also asserts the continued influence of the Russian Turkic nationalist debates of the period 1905-1917 on Turkish historical sciences in the 1930s. Ersanlı’s conclusions focus largely on the nefarious effects of political repression and the state’s dominance in the public sphere on the content and robustness of Turkish history. Nevertheless, her critical examination of the emergence of a thoroughly Republican historical narrative, and its inclusion in school texts and curricula, provides an invaluable resource for the study of Turkish historiography as a whole and the Turkish History Thesis in particular.

Turkish History in Context

Étienne Copeaux follows Behar’s general line by problematizing Turkish historiography within the context of history textbook production in the Republican
period (Copeaux 1997). His study admits a broader range of topics than just the Turkish History Thesis, and a longer time period, than does Behar’s, and thus does not provide as detailed an analysis of the socio-political and ideological context in which Republican historiography came into being. Nevertheless, his outsider’s view of Turkish historical sciences allows for a positioning of the discipline’s dynamics within regional trends, particularly in comparison to the development of a new interest in Turkic history in the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s (Copeaux 1997, 49). Such comparative explorations create a valuable framework for comprehending the evolution of Turkish historiography in the face of innovations in a variety of European scholarly circles, especially the work of the Swiss anthropologist Eugène Pittard and the Russian Turkologist V. V. Bartol’d (Copeaux 1997, 52–67). This discussion also highlights contemporary Turkish views on sources perceived as influenced by Marxist, fascist or other European ideologies.

As Behar and Copeaux both make clear, the Turkish History Thesis was largely based upon European sources, but its formulation and enunciation were entirely in the hands of Turkish and Turkic thinkers. One influential intellectual to be involved in this process was the Azeri Ahmet Ağaoğlu, whose ideas on the Turkish nation and its historicity are thoroughly treated in two studies. Gülseren Akalın contextualizes Ağaoğlu’s writings on Turkish nationalism within broader intellectual trends before and after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 (Akalın 2004). She describes how race and religion were both of key importance for Ağaoğlu’s definition of the nation in his earlier works (Akalın 2004, 69), establishing a point of contrast for later conceptualizations analyzed in a paper by Can Erimtan (Erimtan 2008). Erimtan tracks Ağaoğlu’s early intellectual development in Russia and Paris before
focusing on his shift of interest to the Turks of Anatolia around 1920. Of greatest importance to the current study, he dissects Ağaoğlu’s *Pontos Meselesi* (The Pontos Question), a historical tract written in support of Ankara’s claims to sovereignty over Anatolia based on the history of the Turkish nation. As such, Erimtan highlights the Azeri’s decision to drop religion from his defining characteristics of the nation, focusing on race and language instead, and his appropriation of the Hittite civilization, which would become part of the Turkish Historical Thesis and state dogma in the 1930s (Erimtan 2008, 164–65).

A Nietzschean View of Turkish Historiography

The production of official history theses and history texts for state-run mandatory education places the state directly into the creation of historical discourse. A Nietzschean analysis of the role and motivation of the state in such endeavours is the focus of a study conducted by Edward Webb, who seeks to explain ninety years of Republican Turkish historiography through the categorization of history established by Friedrich Nietzsche (Webb 2011). Nietzsche identified four different approaches to non-scientific (i.e. value-laden) history employed by both individuals and states: monumental, antiquarian, critical and amnesiac. His analysis is useful in its abstraction away from specific interpretations of historical events or trends towards an understanding of the ideological motivations of the state in concentrating on some aspects of Turkish history, while ignoring others.
Alternatives to the Turkish History Thesis

This does not imply, however, that the historical sciences were completely dominated by the state and its agents early on in the history of Turkish Republic. Behar described in detail the opposition of some members of the establishment towards the dominant themes of the Turkish History Thesis, and a short monograph by Frank Tachau provides further evidence of alternative nationalist histories that rejected the emphasis on Central Asian origins (Tachau 1963). Tachau’s discussion of early versions of Anadoluculuk, or Anatolianism, which partially eschewed Ziya Gökalp’s concept of nation through education by emphasizing connection to a territorial Fatherland, demonstrates the existence of nationalist currents opposed to the focus on Central Asian ethnogenesis. The group’s concentration on Seljuk Anatolia as the locus of emergence of an “Anatolian nation” and its insistence that “Turk” referred to a race rather than a nation, establishes the existence of alternative visions of national identity in the intellectual milieu of the 1920s (Tachau 1963, 167). When combined with the persistence of pan-Turkist statements by prominent members of the Turkish Hearths as late as 1927 (Tachau 1963, 171), this more complete view of the Turkish historical sciences encourages further study of the motivations of the Turkish History Thesis’ architects in their decision to pursue a historical narrative predicated on the emergence of a Turkish nation in Central Asia, when alternative currents, including those that would eventually be adopted in the 1940s and 1950s (Tanaka 2007, 68), were readily available.
A Lone Comparison

The literature on both Soviet and Turkish historiographies is not lacking entirely in comparative approaches. One work, in particular, has addressed the similarities and differences between the Turkish and Uzbek cases of national history writing in the 1920s and 1930s (Segars 2003). Segars investigates the use of both language and national history as a means of creating and encouraging national consciousness. His work, however, suffers from a lack of any local-language sources from either Central Asia or Turkey. Moreover, Segars fails to touch upon contemporary debates and scholarship on the nature of modernization and nationalist trends in both the late Ottoman period and the first decades of the Turkish Republic. One wonders, therefore, how he comes to the conclusion that “[t]he Turkish History Thesis sought to provide a clear distinction between the Turks of Anatolia and Turks elsewhere, in an attempt to forestall the growth of pan-Turkic sentiment” (Segars 2003, 89–90) without having read contemporary work on the Thesis or Turkish government pronouncements on educational policies.

Nevertheless, the author’s work does provide a convincing basis for further study of the indigenous and imported intellectual trends that led to the enunciation of the first national histories in both Turkey and Central Asia.

Thus, we come to the end of a brief overview of the secondary literature pertinent to my comparative study. It should now be evident that such a multidisciplinary approach requires the construction of a new space bounded by definitions and concepts created and expanded upon within a broad set of, at times, disparate scholarly fields. With this in mind, we now pass to the creation of such a space.
through an examination of linguistics, archaeology, anthropology, and their politicized interactions throughout the 20\text{th} century.
History, Language and Archaeology

The interactions of history, language and archaeology have been complicated and troubled since the various disciplines emerged. At times, scholars have clashed over their interpretations of the past. On other occasions, contrived interdisciplinary research in the interests of legitimizing non-academic hypotheses and theories left the practitioners of the historical sciences wary of closer cooperation (Blench 1997, 3). This does not mean, however, that such cross-boundary studies are without value. In fact, in recent decades, the breakdown of paradigms dominant in linguistics through much of the late 20th century has allowed for greater investigation of the pre-history of language. In order to broaden their scope of analysis, scholars engaged in such projects have relied on other fields of the social sciences, humanities and natural sciences (Robins 1989, 396–401). Once these studies are divorced from the nefarious aspects of extremist political thought, they can excite great interest among researchers reopening century-long polemics, including those involved in the debate around monogenism (a single origin for the human species) and polygenism (Bouissac 1997, 53–54).

This chapter is intended to be a compass, a means of locating my own study, and our wider academic community, along the coordinates of time and space within our contemporary plane of scholarly production. In it, I will investigate the broad links established between the disciplines of linguistics, archaeology and anthropology throughout the twentieth century, as well as the milestones of change and evolution in the same period. In order to do this, I will begin with linguistics, perhaps one of the most important disciplines for both Turkish and Soviet...
historiographies, followed by archaeology and anthropology. I will end at a case study based on Biblical studies in the eastern Mediterranean region. The course of the linguistics section is determined, in large part, thematically, while those on archaeology and anthropology, as well as the case study, are chronological. All sections depart at some point from these schema, as is appropriate for further explanation of particular topics. The purpose of the chapter is to contextualize my problematization of Turkish and Soviet studies the origins of the Central Asians. Rather than provide an exhaustive review of these developments, I will instead highlight trends in the convergence and divergence of the various epistemologies, as well as past and present questions regarding such approaches. In doing so, I will use several questions as heuristics: What is the goal of employing a cross-disciplinary methodology? Are intra-disciplinary projects less prone to political and ideological interference than inter-disciplinary ones? Are the disciplines nothing more than artificial categories that have been constructed for political purposes, or are they philosophically and universally meaningful? It seems fitting, given the semantic and socio-linguistic implications of this last question, to take historical linguistics as the starting point of my journey.

Language and Proto-Language

Beyond issues of the origin and development of the human species, studies of proto-languages – the ancestors of the languages and lects spoken today – can provide valuable information about the lives and societies of people prior to the advent of writing. If we assume that the corpus of words that makes up a language’s lexicon reflects the environment within which its speakers live, we can then
extrapolate from a core hypothesized vocabulary towards the living conditions of such peoples (Pejros 1997, 149–50). This assumption, however, is a controversial one, a direct challenge to Chomskian arguments about the universality of language (Blench 1997, 19). Cultural reconstructions based on hypothetical proto-languages are attacked on the basis of more than just theory. On the most basic level, reconstructions cannot take into account the diversity in both language and culture that might have existed at any given point in time (Pejros 1997, 149). If multiple dialects of a given language exist today, why would they not have done so in the past? A dearth of evidence, moreover, implies that such constructions are based on small linguistic samples at best. The absence of lexical elements pertaining to specific activities – whether social, economic, political or religious – does not necessarily mean that these activities were not practiced in a given society. In the past, such limitations have not prohibited linguists or anthropologists from arriving at such conclusions (Pejros 1997, 153). In spite of all of these drawbacks, it is widely accepted that paleolinguistics – the study of languages in the remote past – can provide innovative approaches to prehistory when combined with the data of other disciplines.

Language, Land and Culture

It is important to stress that while contemporary historical linguistics recognizes that a connection between the speakers of a language and a particular territory can be made, the establishment of similar connections between the material culture of a region and a linguistic community remains beyond the frontier of current possibilities. In other words, historical linguists, working in conjunction
with paleobotanists, geographers and other social and physical scientists, can
determine whence a group of speakers originated and some of the characteristics of
their society (basic familial and social relations, dress, food, economic activity). They
cannot, however, specify that the material remains of a culture unearthed by
archaeologists were left by a specific language community. This is true even when
they have proven that such a community originated from the same region as the
particular remains (Pejros 1997, 156–57). Such caution was not always exhibited by
linguists, archaeologists, or anthropologists, and the history of the development of
these disciplines is dotted with examples of what now appears to be egregious
extrapolation.

In the following chapters, then, there are two broad issues related to
historical or paleo-linguistics and the writing of historical narratives that I will
highlight. The first regards attempts at identifying homelands and territories of
ethno-linguistic genesis. As Viktor Shnirelman has pointed out, these can be
delineated through the usage of comparative historical linguistic studies of the
names of flora and fauna, albeit in conjunction with material evidence supporting
any hypotheses. Scholars must tread cautiously in this endeavour, however, as only
generic terms for plants and animals can be identified. Even these may be
misleading, as the process of semantic shift implies that the names of plants in the
original homeland may be applied to unfamiliar subspecies or species encountered
in areas of migration (V. Shnirelman 1997, 162–63). One need only consider the use
of the word *robin* for a variety of different subspecies around the world to see
modern examples of this phenomenon.
The second issue concerns mass movements of peoples and language acquisition or loss. Once the tenuous connection between proto-language and ethnicity is recognized, the capacity of peoples to retain the lects of their forbearers, as well as the decision to adopt new languages, become concepts of great importance in the use of historical linguistics to reconstruct the past. For languages that have been carried great distances from their original homelands – including the Turkic languages – contact with new peoples and idioms is inevitable. Such interactions lead to intensive language borrowings or the complete absorption of linguistic groups. If these occur early enough, determination of substrata (the language originally spoken by a community) versus superstrata (the new language encountered by a group) and the genetic relationships between seemingly distinct communities can become exceedingly difficult to determine (Fortescue 1998, 2–3).

Ecologies and Economies of Language

In both concerns, the natural environment plays an important role. With respect to the location of a linguistic homeland, knowledge of flora and fauna, as well as ecological changes, is crucial to correlating proto-language elements with specific climatic zones and regions. Given the length of time involved in reconstructions of proto-languages – occasionally ten or fifteen millennia – such information is gleaned from more than just botanical and zoological studies. The fundamental changes to the earth’s landscape and climate during and since the Ice Age require that archaeological and paleological data be consulted in order to confirm the likelihood that specific species inhabited particular regions, and that particular economic activities, such as hunting, gathering, fishing and sedentary
agriculture, were possible in a given climatic zone (Renfrew 1987, 120–44; Campbell and Poser 2008, 332; Fortescue 1998, 204–42).

The natural environment, however, is important for more than just the knowledge that it provides about the location of linguistic genesis. Landscape and climate are crucial factors in determining the probabilities of contact and interaction between different linguistic groups. Ecological change can also be interpreted as a push factor for the migration of large groups of people out of their regions of habitation. In the past, models based on the hypothesized movements of the Indo-European and Semitic peoples were blindly applied to other proposed proto-linguistic communities, thereby influencing concepts of genetic or areal relationships among the languages of Africa, Asia and the Americas (Fortescue 1998, 2). Such models did not account for the peculiarities of life in the outer reaches of Eurasia, for example, where resources were scarce and population sparse. In northern Eurasia, then, it was more likely for linguistic groups to remain isolated from one another, unlikely to influence each other’s modes of expression or ways of life except in extraordinary circumstances (Fortescue 1998, 19–20). Ecological change and geography can also impact the likelihood of absorption of unrelated language groups, creating a substratum effect that further complicates the search for a proto-language. In so-called bottlenecks – relatively narrow points of passage between natural obstacles such as glaciers or bodies of water – language contact is likely to be intense and may result in the assimilation of linguistic communities. By contrast, in expansive regions of migration, such as the Central Asian Steppe, language contact is likely to result in borrowing and convergence, but not necessarily absorption or assimilation (Fortescue 1998, 19). An accurate picture of climate and geography at
the time of migration, then, is essential for the historian seeking to determine when and how a proto-language might have first underwent structural changes induced by exogenous shocks.

**Endogenous Change**

The modelling of contact with other linguistic communities is important for understanding the sources of convergence and divergence that occur throughout the evolution of a language family. Exogenous shocks, however, are only one of a number of motors of linguistic change. Isolated groupings, whether previously affected by interactions with speakers of other lects or not, can also exhibit considerable innovation in phonology, morphology, syntax and lexicon. Even “Stone-age” groups should not be assumed to be speaking languages that are closer to the original proto-language than communities with a long history of sustained contact with outsiders (see, for example, Chacon 2014, 301; Haiman and Benincà 1992, 99; Edelman and Dodykhudoeva 2009, 775–777). Indeed, earlier assumptions of the ahistoricity of isolated language groupings and communities that had failed to attain European levels of socio-economic development have only served to compound hypothesized primordial homogeneity (Blench 1997, 23; Bouissac 1997, 54). There are, as well, cases in which languages that have been in contact with related lects have changed through internal processes in order to differentiate themselves from those around them (Foley 2000, 359). Indeed, historical linguists have observed that central dialects – those in the middle of the geographical spread of a language group – tend to exhibit far greater innovation than the more conservative dialects on the edge of the linguistic territory (Blažek 1999, 53). Isolation does not imply
conservatism, and those linguistic communities living in close contact with unrelated languages cannot be discounted as being without value in the reconstruction of the proto-language.

The assumption of ahistoricity has important impacts on hypotheses about the proto-language. The belief that “Stone Age” communities provide the key to prehistoric linguistic constructions has the potential to skew hypotheses about the origins of a particular language family, and to create false assumptions about relationships between seemingly unrelated languages. When ample historical evidence is present to attest to population movements, social organization and economic and political development, the sub-discipline of socio-linguistics can advance greatly our understanding of the means by which contemporary language and dialects appear. We can then pick apart, to some degree, the evolution of speech patterns, a far more rigorous means of investigation than the serendipitous discovery of “virgin” dialects. Processes of koineization, whereby various dialects and languages merge into one cohesive speech community, can be contextualized and correlated to similar processes of social mobility and poli-economic change (Tuten 2000, 97–99). Such heuristics, however, are not accessible to scholars of communities without traditions of written history. As there is no means of assessing whether the isolated group might have completely absorbed another linguistic community in the distant past, there is similarly no means of proving that their unique patterns of speech are remnants of a forgotten time, rather than the product of synthesis between two language families (Chacon 2014, 278).
Family Relations

This leads to the question of how linguists determine relationships between two or more different language groups. In general, scholars recognize two different types of relationships: genetic, or descent from a common proto-language; and areal, or relationships arising from intensive linguistic contact resulting in borrowing and convergence. Given the length of time involved, distinguishing between the two can be challenging, especially if the daughter languages of a hypothesized proto-language are themselves quite distant from one another (Foley 2000, 358–59; Enrico 2004, 230). In such cases, the presence of isolated family members can assist in discriminating between genetic and areal affiliations. In the case of the Uralic languages, for example, Samoyed – which remained in Siberia and did not migrate westward, as did other proto-Finnic, -Hungarian and other languages – provides a useful benchmark. Its isolation allows specialists to distinguish linguistic features shared between Indo-European and Uralic languages that came about from prolonged contact between speakers, from those that are candidates for proof of genuine genetic affiliation (Hajdú and Domokos 1978, 61). Geography, paleontology and archaeology thus feed into the classification of relationships by determining when or if linguistic communities might have come in contact with one another; in which circumstances; and for how long.

The most basic type of relations – whether genetic or areal – are established through typologies. Languages are grouped together according to types of sounds, words or structures that they employ in expression and then classed according to similarity. In some cases, similarities are borne by characteristics so common
amongst the world’s languages as to provide no conclusive evidence regarding the affiliation of one lect to another. The use of postpositions in subject-object-verb languages is a case in point. It is therefore from a substantial accrual of unique or uncommon similarities that the hunt for a common ancestor or common mixing-ground begins (Fortescue 1998, 1–2). Word-lists and grammars compiled before the profound impacts of colonial language penetration and enforced migrations of the 19th and 20th centuries have been especially useful in this respect (Hajdú and Domokos 1978, 11–20). From these similarities, linguistic evolution can be hypothesized: differences in pronunciation and usage are woven into a model seeking to explain not only how the various languages and lects developed, but also what the probable components of the proto-language were (Fortescue 1998, 36–37).

**Typologies and Mythologies**

Part of the problem that has arisen in the establishment of language families is the manner in which the first such family was constructed. Historical linguistics, or comparative philology, arose at the end of the 18th century. It was sparked by an interest in the relationship between Latin, Ancient Greek and Sanskrit, as noted by Sir William Jones, an English judge at the High Court in Calcutta. His scope was gradually widened and Jones sought to show the similarities and genetic affiliations between a host of dead languages, effectively creating a linguistic web across Eurasia that defied contemporary knowledge of the landmass’ history. A comparative approach was utilized to come to this conclusion, and it was soon applied to the languages of north-east Africa and the Levant in order to demonstrate their relations to one another as well (Renfrew 1987, 9–11). Jones was not the only pioneer in this
field: Jäger engaged in similar speculations about the Indo-European languages in the 17th century, while Edwards pointed out connections between indigenous American languages in the 18th. What all these studies have in common is that, unlike modern linguists, many of the first comparative philologists were concerned with racial connections between peoples, of which language was one aspect (Campbell and Poser 2008, 6–10). A much more self-contained linguistic science, therefore, would have to wait until the 19th century.

Comparative philology began with the correlation of lexical components between distinct languages in order to assess the similarity between them, and their potential genetic relations. The faults inherent in such a system became easily apparent in the study of the Indo-European languages, particularly isolated variants, such as Armenian. Here, heavy borrowing from Persian created the appearance of a close genetic relationship between the two, until Hübschmann demonstrated that such proximity was produced through loans rather than common descent (Campbell and Poser 2008, 80). In addition, the assumption of semantic shift muddied the waters further. It is often employed by those who seek to utilize lexical comparisons alone in order to establish relationships between distant languages. Semantic shift implies that a word from the proto-language has undergone changes in meaning in the daughter languages, and necessarily implies speculation on the evolution of a term or expression. Occasionally, such shifts are easily explained – consider the French term, bœuf “cow” and its modern English equivalent beef, which was borrowed from Norman – but more often they are not. Such tools introduce an element of stochasticity into historical reconstructions that is not readily tolerated by the wider community: “When semantically non-equivalent forms are compared,
the possibility that chance accounts for the phonetic similarity is greatly increased.” (Campbell and Poser 2008, 195)

Eventually, historical linguists began to understand that lexical comparisons could be only one part of a three-pronged approach in which lexicon, phonology (the sounds of a language) and morpho-syntax (the structure of expressions) would be compared. The American linguist Edward Sapir was among the first to call for an investigation into “submerged” similarities between languages. Sapir recognized that the components of proto-language grammar might mutate over time in the form of the daughter languages, but that “what is most fundamental” would be retained (Campbell and Poser 2008, 168–79). In other words, a means of understanding the world and the expression of such comprehension – such as in the use of moods, divisions of time, systems of classification or a propensity for nouns over verbs – would remain relatively fixed within the descendants of a given linguistic community.

These approaches have proven relatively successful when applied to languages spoken by communities that have well-attested histories, whether in written or non-written material form, such as the Indo-European or Semitic families. When one investigates the linguistic communities of indigenous America or Australia, however, their revelatory power begins to diminish. In Australia in particular, the passage of time since the existence of the proto-language might render the search for it futile. The result is not just an ontological gap; an admission that we may never know if one or more languages were spoken at the time Australia was first populated by humans. It also impacts the epistemology of Australian historical linguistics. The assumption of a single proto-language promotes the search
for genetic relationships between languages rather than areal ones. It implies that shared innovations in supposed daughter languages give clues to the time since divergence, rather than the periods at which two different linguistic communities came into sustained contact (Campbell and Poser 2008, 155–58). This purely linguistic conundrum has obvious implications for the usage of language and comparative philology in wider historical narratives about ancient peoples; a phenomenon that will become readily apparent in my investigation of Turkish and Soviet histories of pre-Islamic Central Asia.

Alternative Attempts

Comparative philology has not always been immune to attack on a theoretical level, in addition to its shortcomings on a practical one. Even among its earliest proponents, there were those who saw it as a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing linguistic relationships between communities. Wilhelm von Humboldt, the Prussian linguist who was a champion of the aforementioned methodologies, also espoused philosophical methods for the division of languages into groups. In particular, he believed that the grammar of a language was an expression of the Volksgeist (the spirit of the people) of the nation that spoke it (Campbell and Poser 2008, 232). Humboldt’s combination of objective methods with subjective ones should not be seen as an early rejection of the standard methodology now in place, but rather as a reflection of the idealist environment in which he lived. The collective spirit of the nation, a Romantic and idealist reaction to the universalism of the Enlightenment, was particularly important in the study of all aesthetic, moral and religious systems, and thus could not be neglected in the study
of language as well (Antoni 1962, 78). Humboldt’s failure to reject the universalist approach, however, implied that his deviations from comparative philology were not as radical as later attempts in other parts of the continent.

In the 1920s, the Soviet Marxist linguist Nikolai Marr introduced a new means of grouping and categorizing languages. His theory was so revolutionary as to be accused of contradicting the fundamental principles of comparative philology as a discipline (Marr 1926b, 286). It relied on the Marxian understanding of the economic base’s importance in determining changes in the non-economic superstructure (Marr 1931, 12), as well as that of mixing and cross-pollination, rather than splitting and fusion (V. A. Shnirelman 1995, 121). What was most important to Marr was avoiding the traps caused by viewing language development through the lens of European languages. To do this, he proposed turning to the material existence of pre-historic man (Marr 1926c, 193). As such, language became an object similar to ideology, a representation of the consciousness and cognitive processes of humans at given stages of development. Those who had achieved a particular socio-economic level passed from cognition and expression in forms (Japhetic) to language based on ideas and reason (as evidenced in the languages of the Indo-European group) (Marr 1926b, 301–5). Language, similar to religion, politics and gender relations, could not escape the dialectic between base and superstructure.

Marr demonstrated this through an eclectic sampling of Eurasian languages’ phonemes, morphology and syntax. Morphemes that appeared phonetically and semantically similar between languages — such as laḥm ‘meat’ in Arabic and ‘bread’ in Syriac and Hebrew — demonstrated semantic shift through gradations of socio-economic development (Marr 1931, 27–30). In contrast, purported lexical
borrowings between languages were remnants of the influences of different classes participating in social conflict within a single linguistic grouping (Marr 1931, 25; V. A. Shnirelman 1995, 122). More broadly, Marr believed that the Caucasian and Semitic languages were the remnants of an older family called the Japhetic – relying on the established tradition of using the Biblical narrative to provide scientific classification – which had been displaced by Aryan migrations (Marr 1926d, 8–9). The homeland of this linguistic group was in the Caucasus mountains, a fact that had, thus far, gone unnoticed by other specialists, despite the importance of the Japhetic peoples in the development of Mediterranean culture (Marr 1926a, 35–36). This theory was meant to fill in the gaps created by language isolates, such as Etruscan and Basque; ancient and contemporary languages that did not fit the Indo-European, Turkic, Semitic or Uralic mold, but that needed to be accounted for in terms of a regional history (Marr 1926a, 73–80).

The Japhetic theory was intended to be anti-racialist and anti-bourgeois; a means of encouraging the study of all the languages of the world on an equal basis, regardless of their connection to the nations of Europe (Marr 1926c, 190–91). As such, it was opposed to the metaphysical and idealist traditions represented by both Humboldt and the modern followers of his “doctrinaire” and “scholastic” approaches to the topic (Marr 1926b, 287). Marr refused to countenance the division of languages according to ethnicities and nations, and the idealist insistence on “seeing in the masses pockets of virgin nations” (Marr 1931, 18). Eventually, his theory fell out of favour with the Stalinist authorities too, and by the early 1930s proponents of Marr’s hypothesis of language change were clearly on the defensive against the ideological purges of the Stalinist era (Marr 1931, 13). Indeed, the profession on
both sides of the Iron Curtain has largely remained faithful to the belief that non-linguistic evidence cannot be employed as the bedrock of language family construction (Campbell and Poser 2008, 205–6).

**Sifting through the Evidence**

Marr’s diversion notwithstanding, language classification can provide a window onto the past, albeit a partial one. Even in the event of borrowings, valuable information about the history of both languages can be gleaned from this comparison. For example, in the case of Aramaic loanwords in 7th century Arabic (as attested by early written versions of the Qur’an), sound changes vis-à-vis Imperial Aramaic provide data on the dating and circumstances of linguistic contact between the two Semitic languages. They also inform the researcher of the linguistic expanse of given lects of a particular language at specific points in time; confirming, in this case, distinctions between the Aramaic of Nabatean communities in the Arabian Peninsula and those of the Levant (Retsö 2015). Historical linguistics, therefore, does provide some answers to questions posed about the past. In the absence of the ultimate benchmark of truth or falsity – native speakers of ancient languages – the discipline is nonetheless capable of enriching our vision of the linguistic landscape of the pre-historic world. The example of 7th century Aramaic, however, points to its limitations. Although we might be able to say, on the basis of written and other data, that two distinct dialects existed in Palestine and Nabatea, to what extent did these linguistic bonds imply cultural similarities or differences? After several centuries of activity, it appears that historical linguistics is not well-equipped to provide an answer one way or another; at least not on its own. In order to move closer to a
determination, it must be combined with other studies from the realms of the historical sciences, including archaeology.

**Archaeology**

Archaeology, more than linguistics, has been embroiled in political and ideological scandals through both the 19th and the 20th centuries. Archaeologists themselves made the remains of material culture into valuable tools for explaining and legitimating Western European cultural and political hegemony during the age of imperialism. Moreover, archaeology and archaeologists were often employed in state-sponsored drives for control over political, economic and cultural power in the periphery. The last decades of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th are particularly rich in examples of the use and abuse of this historical science by those both inside and outside of the academy (Fowler 2008, 110; Arnold 2008; Marchand 2008, 259–64; Klejn 2008). Such dynamics stemmed, in part, from perceived imbalances in public and state views of archaeology vis-à-vis other historical sciences, particularly the writing of history (Levy and Higham 2005, 4–5). As the discipline struggled to gain recognition and support, it fell prey in some countries – especially, but not exclusively, Nazi Germany – to the intervention of ideologically racist and nationalist elements (Arnold 2008, 124–26; Klejn 2008, 325; Troumpeta 2013, 172). The power of archaeology to serve the interests of the state can be intuited from Levy and Higham’s explanation of the role of archaeology within modern society:

“Archaeology’s most precious commodities have been the control of ‘time’ and ‘space’. *Time* – to clarify historical events and processes, and *space* – to isolate
the material remains associated with history in meaningful social and temporal contexts.” [original emphasis] (Levy and Higham 2005, 6)

The discipline provides the material support for imagining historical narratives as they unfold along the temporal and spatial dimensions. Given the manner in which régimes and their competitors have coveted the tools of rewriting the past, it is no wonder that archaeology, too, has been a prized possession of the powerful. Although Levy and Higham were writing at beginning of the 21st century, their understanding is of considerable benefit when applied to an investigation of early 20th century archaeological endeavours as well.

Archaeology in the Era of Extremes

Between the late 19th century and 1945, statesmen and ideologues made considerable use of archaeology in order to bond the citizen to the state in a variety of countries. That it was viewed as an eminently political tool by élite classes is undeniable in a broad swathe of polities, particularly those that adhered to authoritarian or totalitarian ideologies. In Nazi Germany, where the superiority of German science and scholarship were perceived as unquestionable, archaeology became a participatory venture, a means by which the citizen could take part in proving the glorious past and divining the illustrious future of the Germanic race (Arnold 2008, 128–29). As the 1930s progressed, state intervention grew: the Nazi Party delineated official terminology, and the various party organs engaged in “pseudo-archaeological” expeditions to shore up public support for official ideology, thereby alienating academic practitioners (Arnold 2008, 131–39). In nation-states
self-conscious of their failure to achieve specific levels of socio-economic development, archaeology and the interpretation of material remains were also tightly controlled by the state. This mirrored both a desire to apply rigid connections between the remains, science and the guiding principles of the state, as in Fascist Italy (Arthurs 2007, 35–36); and a belief in the need for top-down standardization and industrialization, as in the Republic of Turkey. In the latter case, a conviction that popular interference would sully the credibility of official interpretations was a strong impetus to present archaeology as a highly specialized and esoteric pursuit suitable only for experts and the initiated (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 385).

In many ways, we can summarize contemporary interpretations of pre-World War Two archaeology as being naïve, colonial, unscientific and downright ideological. This is evidenced by the fact that descriptions of this period are often relegated to histories, rather than guides to the practice of archaeology. The late 19th century concern with Biblical narratives and ancient Greek and Near Eastern epics is often glossed over quickly in the rush towards the New Archaeology of the 1960s (Kohl and Fawcett 1995, 14; see also Renfrew 2004, 26–40; Härke 1995, 49–50). Peter J. Ucko’s qualification in the introduction to his Theory in Archaeology: A World Perspective speaks volumes about perceptions of such periods:

“At another level, also, comments on nationalist archaeology, and the theory which drives such archaeology, are still all too often presented at an acceptable level of generalization. In the hands of some (particularly British?) archaeologists, all archaeologists within such regimes are patronized and stereotyped [...] In reality, of course, where archaeological theory is considered a worthwhile pursuit at all [...], it will be discussed with intelligence and sophistication by those who attempt to practice it,
Even when valorizing individual actors, Ucko still tends to paint the entire period with a broad brush, recognizing, to some degree, the considerable challenges that faced practitioners during this period.

We can, despite these obstacles, establish a few different trends that emerged before the onset of the Cold War. The first is that archaeology as a discipline emerged in Western Europe and the United States, and gradually bled out into other countries and regions. This was partially due to the view of colonial possessions as ripe for archaeological study, and the assumed cultural and scientific superiority of the West (W. M. K. Shaw 2003, 213–16). In semi- or post-colonial countries (of which there were admittedly few prior to 1945), archaeology and the preservation of the past was often seen as a means of asserting an indigenous and independent national identity (Rejwan 1974, 57; W. M. K. Shaw 2003, 209–10). Here, the concern was with the creation of a definitive and palpable link between the ancient past, as represented by material culture and its interpretation, and a modern political project designed to transform society. The success or failure of this instrumentalization of archaeology often rested on the ability of political and scholastic figures to convince the public of both the saliency of their arguments, and the immediacy of the ancient culture (Dekmejian 1971, 89–92; Pizzo 2002, 9–10).

**New Archaeology**

Whereas the historical sciences of the first half of the 20th century were marked by overt subservience to the state, or cloaked subversion of its agenda, the
latter half of the last century saw the rise of a self-consciously objective approach. This new brand of archaeology drew upon the positivist belief in the importance of the material and the scientific, rather than the idiosyncratic and subjective. Ann Killebrew explains it in the following manner in the introduction to her study of ethnicity in the ancient Near East:

“New Archeology and its later developments, often termed processual archaeology or Middle Range Theory, can be considered as a quantitative and scientifically-based approach to interpreting the past. New Archeology focused on methodologies that were ‘objective’ or measurable and on uncovering universal laws that govern human behaviour and material culture deposition in its environmental context. By using scientific approaches to the past that entail a research design and hypothesis testing, the past is knowable and it is possible to formulate paradigms and construct universal systems that reveal the relationship between behaviour and material culture as well as between causes and effects.” (Killebrew 2005, 3)

In this respect, the archaeology of the 1950s onwards can be seen as being more robust in its methodology and hypothesis-testing, aided, as it were, by the technological advances of carbon-dating and related means of analyzing material remains (Trigger 2003, 18–19). The conclusions that it drew from such results, however, were challenged in the decades from the late 1960s onwards, as post-structuralism and post-modernism chipped away at the glossy veneer of objectivism. Practitioners of the New Archaeology were now accused of ignoring the agency of those who lived in the societies they studied, and the importance of non-material components such as ideology and religion (Killebrew 2005, 4).

Even if the process-oriented practices of archaeology consciously sought to ignore the subjective and the immaterial, they were rarely successful in escaping one
particular ideology: nationalism. In some cases, chauvinism and racialist approaches to the builders of past cultures and civilizations did indeed persist. More often, however, this nationalist legacy continued on in a much more mundane manner, allowing for contemporary national labels to be applied to pre-modern peoples, or through the search for ancient equivalents to modern communities (Kohl and Fawcett 1995, 15). This has been reinforced by the dictates of the post-colonial period, in which every nation-state is expected to have its own past and its own archaeology. It is often incorporated into state structures and organized along the same lines as the discipline in the Euro-Atlantic arena, where state-sponsored national schools are the norm (Silberman 1995, 256–57). The evolution of archaeology thus largely mirrors similar developments in the writing and teaching of history during the process of decolonization (Breuilly 2007, 8). The difference between pre- and post-World War Two historical sciences, however, is that the intellectual revolution of the 1960s has allowed for the greater problematization and investigation of all the non-material inputs that flavour the writing and interpretation of the past around the globe.

The Intangible versus the Material

Today, both New Archaeology and post-modern approaches to the material remains of past cultures exist side by side. Neither system has demonstrated its ability to solve all of the obstacles that continue to face the use of archaeology in the pursuit of truth about the past (Dever 2005, 413). A topic such as ethnicity – a core component of my project – is recognized as containing both material and intangible components, and thus neither stream of archaeology is capable of revealing on its
own a full understanding of individuals’ ethnic identities in past cultures. For the most part, objective schools of thought frowned upon the reconstruction of ethnicity through the use of material remains. Recently, however, a more nuanced approach has sought to combine ideological components with aesthetics – that is, the stylistic aspect of material remains – in order to understand, at least in part, manifestations of identity in the past (Killebrew 2005, 8–10). This too is a fine balance, however, as too forceful an emphasis on ideology and the intangible aspects of a past culture carries with it the danger of implying a wholly volitional character to ethnicity. Such an action might either ascribe particular decisions to members of that society that were never contemplated, or gloss over the importance of lineage and kinship in the process of identity-formation.

A Synthesis of Archaeology and Linguistics

If I previously problematized the usage of archaeological data and methodology by linguists, it is only fair that I investigate the reverse formulation: when might archaeologists borrow inspiration from linguistics, and how does this impact their conclusions? Archaeology has, in the past, allowed historical linguistics to lead, albeit not always with promising results. The most infamous of these syntheses occurred with the adoption of the Indo-European language group as a broader cultural and racial grouping, motivated first by the German historian Gustav Kossinna, and then encouraged by the National Socialist (Nazi) régime. The tragic events of the Nazi period and the Second World War have largely discredited this experiment, as well as some of the methodologies used to pursue it, such as craniometry (the study of skull sizes). Nevertheless, some scholars, including Colin
Renfrew, have, in the age of New Archaeology, called for revisiting the possible clues that historical linguistics might uncover for further archaeological research (Renfrew 1987, 3–5). Renfrew sees these as a means of imbuing studies focused on purely material remains with some sort of understanding of the ideology and belief systems of early communities. The problem here, however, is once again remembering that there are “differing rates whereby languages and genes move through space and time” (Fortescue 1998, 2). Thus when Renfrew argues for the use of language to inform archaeology and concludes that “Many of the features, then, which define the Irishness of the Irish, or the Spanishness of the Spanish, or the Britishness of the British, go back very much deeper [than is widely thought]”, we ought to ask ourselves if he is not perhaps looking too hard for modern concepts of linguistically defined nations in periods in which they did not exist (Renfrew 1987, 6; Davies 2000, 57). His ultimate hypothesis is that supposedly Indo-European cultures predate the arrival of proto-Indo-European speakers to the European continent, but even this neat division of language, culture and genes might be too simplistic a formula – one influenced by modern boundaries of identity – to represent the reality of the prehistoric period.

Added to this conundrum is the fact that what we do have in terms of linguistic evidence from peoples who were not literate often comes to us in second-hand form. Greek or Roman historians occasionally compiled wordlists of “barbarian” languages. Early names also survive in the forms of toponyms and given names, or through oral histories and folklore (Renfrew 1987, 20–21). These fragments are combined with material remains in order to shed greater light on prehistoric societies. They encapsulate, however, the worldview and understanding of
the later peoples through whom we received this information. The word *barbarian*, from the Greek *barbaros*, meaning one who is not Greek, or does not speak Greek, is evidence of the way in which these communities were perceived as Others and were therefore conceived in opposition to the culture and civilization of the scribe. At times, such descriptions may prove more instructive of the self-image of the recording culture than of that of recorded one (Davies 2000, 115).

Even when the scribes depict their own cultures, however, archaeology and linguistics are not quite congruent disciplines. As Schniedewind explains with reference to Near Eastern ceramics:

“...whereas pottery is mass-produced and circumscribed by this [mass] mode of production, inscriptions represent the idiosyncrasies of individual scribes, unique social locations and historical circumstances.” (Schniedewind 2005, 405)

The paucity of epigraphic evidence – effectively the meeting point of archaeology and historical linguistics – combines with post-modernist understandings of the agency and individuality of the subject to create considerable ambiguity in the interpretation of material evidence. Materiality, the supposed foundation of objectivity within archaeology, is now disturbed by the arbitrary and highly subjective nature of humanity. It reminds us of Dever’s warning that:

“Archaeology is not an ‘objective science’, because it deals with that most intractable of all phenomena – the human psyche, which is not the object but the subject, in the investigation.” (Dever 2005, 414)

Material remains provide us with concrete and unchanging objects upon which to focus. The expressions contained therein – especially those of a linguistic variety –
believe, however, the same difficulties of interpretation and comprehension that can be found in any other human or social science. With respect to epigraphy, this is made all the more complicated by the absence of standardized linguistic and orthographic norms, which are inherently modern phenomena (B. R. O. Anderson 2006, 80). Such concerns, however, as we shall see, were far from pressing in the rush to create master narratives in both Turkey and the Soviet Union.

It would be disingenuous to pretend that linguistic and para-linguistic components of material remains are the only subjective components of archaeology as a discipline. In addition to interpretation within a scholarly setting, the presentation of findings and hypotheses have proven to be exceptionally important in the validation of archaeology and its function as an epistemology in the hunt for historical truth. These endeavours have been far from value-free, and are now understood to be just as influential in the narration of the past as written histories.

**Museums, Exhibitions and Retinal Narratives**

Archaeology, similar to linguistics and history, has experienced a degree of popularization. The methodology and findings of the discipline have, at various points in time, been made accessible to an audience broader than just the academy. While part of this process relies on the publication of texts and written explanations of the historical sciences, this particular branch of study concerned with the investigation and analysis of material remains benefits from another means of dissemination: the exhibition. The origins of the contemporary Western museum lie in 15th-century Italy, where they were seen as a means of collecting and understanding nature and natural history. As such, they acted as a scholarly forum
for the enlightened and rationalistic élite (Findlen 2010, 1–3). It was the 19th century that saw the advent of a public exposition space endowed with educational as well as narrative functions, intended to explain the material remains of cultures proximate and distant (Hooper-Greenhill 2000, 16–17). As Eilean Hooper-Greenhill puts it:

“The modernist museum shares many of the cultural and epistemological functions of maps. It unifies and rationalises, pictures and presents relationships. The modernist museum depicts ‘reality’ and ‘shows the way things are’ in an apparently neutral way... Relationships between people, nations, and ideas are produced thought the objects selected, the way they are displayed and the relationships between them. Hierarchies of value are constructed, inclusions and exclusions made, the self and others separated.”
(Hooper-Greenhill 2000, 17–18)

The study of these institutions, termed museology, has delved into the economic, social, political and ideological content bound up in “the treasure house of history”, to use the title of one guide (Li 2002). The overt manipulation of these collections during the first half of the 20th century is well documented for a number of countries. Joshua Arthurs, for example, has explored the manner in which the exposition of Roman artefacts was exploited by both the Liberal Democratic government of pre-World War One Italy as well as by the Fascist régime of Benito Mussolini. The former sought to highlight the country’s place in Europe and the progress of its historical sciences, while the latter strove to justify martial discipline, Social Darwinism and extreme nationalism (Arthurs 2007, 32–35). What was nominally the same exhibition, then, proved to be exceptionally malleable in its ideologically-driven presentation to citizens and guests.
Post-Modernism and the Museum

The advent of self-avowedly objective science in the second half of the 20th century, however, does not mean that today’s museums and related institutions are bereft of manipulation. Art critics and philosophers have exposed the manner in which modernism’s supposedly neutral and objective approach to the visual can indeed result in subconscious associations outside of the realm of logic. The appeal to the rational and scientific can therefore have the consequence – whether accidental or intentional – of calling upon the irrational and emotive in the mind of the viewer (Krauss 1994). Moreover, the eminently rational action of collecting, collating and indexing the various components of the museum has the effect of creating schools, styles and trends. In other words, curators, through their organization of the museum, bring into being the supposedly organic developments in artistic endeavor that they have uncovered for the enlightenment of the masses (Krauss 1986, 141–42). Riegel helps to extend this to the ethnographic museum and other nominally non-artistic institutions:

“Under the guises of philanthropy, value-free knowledge and a certain patina of ‘culture’ and civilization, museums have made it their business to reproduce other cultures for the visual consumption of their visitors.” (Riegel 1996, 83)

Here, the historical and social sciences cross over into the realm of art, semiotics and psychology, combining a myriad of disciplines on the scholarly side in order to produce, or to explain, the uniquely human experience of sensory interaction with material remains. Spatial organization, lighting, auditory accompaniment, labeling and the production of written guides can have profound
impacts on the interaction of visitors with a narrative of the past. It should not be a surprise, then, that some of those involved in the historiographic projects described in the following chapters, including Nikolai Marr, also had considerable experience in the organization and exposition of physical remains in their regions of expertise. Unlike the curators of exhibits of contemporary art, museum curators are painfully aware that their creations may induce sensations of proximity or distance, similarity or difference, and continuity or rupture, none of which were actually contemplated at the time when the material remains were first produced (Riegel 1996, 84). Within the context of “banal nationalism”, to paraphrase Michael Billig (Billig 1995), the encoding of exhibits with national qualifiers and characteristics can help to project backwards an anachronistic notion of identity in a seemingly uncontroversial and benign manner. A poignant example of this is the decision to include the artistic creations of Canadian and American indigenous peoples in ethnographic museums rather than art galleries. These communities are thus alienated from dominant national culture to such a degree that even their aesthetic expressions are perceived as being outside of the realm of art (McMaster 2007, 71–72). The museum, then, through its mission of spreading clarity, knowledge and objectivity to the hoi polloi, can effectively void the studied attempts of archaeologists, linguists, historians and others to rid their respective disciplines of the nefarious influences of contrived identity-formation (Gable 1996, 178–79).

From this exposition of the exhibition and its encoded ideological components, it should be obvious that post-modernism and post-structuralism have shaken profoundly the notions of objectivity and neutrality within the historical sciences. The past and our representations of it are now seen as considerably more
human and flawed. In coping with our humanity and that of our ancestors, it is not the study of language or material culture that helps us grapple towards truth, but another discipline: that of anthropology.

**Anthropology**

Anthropology is concerned with the study of humanity, particularly human cultures and civilizations, whether in isolation or in comparison. For the most part, anthropologists focus on the present, investigating current cultural phenomena or those of the recent past. Throughout the twentieth century, however, there have been individuals who have applied their knowledge of the field to the study of civilizations in the remote past, with a keen interest in discovering the origins of human civilization and its spread around the world (Trigger 2003, 23). As Bruce Trigger has explained:

“Archaeological findings supply valuable information about technology, subsistence, circulation of goods, settlement patterns, and the distribution of wealth, and data of this sort are becoming increasing abundant and comparable for early civilizations. It is, however, very difficult to infer social and political organization from archaeological evidence alone... A holistic understanding of early civilizations such as is necessary for this study also requires information about religious beliefs, cosmologies, and secular and spiritual values. While religious structures and tombs loom large in the archaeological record, the beliefs that inspired these monuments can be recovered only from written or verbal records.” (Trigger 2003, 31–33)

In other words, a culture or civilization is more than simply the sum of its material components. Archaeology, then, cannot provide us with a complete view of people who lived thousands of years ago, including how they conceived of themselves and
the world around them. In order to fill this gap, then, we must turn towards anthropology and its related disciplines.

Anthropology has not been immune from the main dispute to affect all other social sciences and some humanities over the second half of the 20th century: the battle between objectivity and subjectivity, or relativity, in the approach of individual scholars towards their objects of study. The former insists on the ability of measuring cultures against a transcendental and objective benchmark. It is, therefore, quite similar to positivistic interpretations of history and the social sciences. The latter is not entirely novel, as relativist approaches to the social sciences are easily found in the late 19th century and early 20th century works of such pioneers as Max Weber (Antoni 1962, 183). The current iteration, however, rests largely on post-modern and post-structuralist understandings of the relationship of the individual to others and to herself (Trigger 2003, 6–8). While this split has had a wide-ranging impact on the field as a whole, its importance in diachronic studies manifests as the discussion on the origins of culture and civilization. Claude Lévi-Strauss, the famous French anthropologist, argued that culture was born through the universal process of binary creation, with different binaries selected by different groups. The linguist Edward Sapir claimed that culture was the product of the constraints imposed by a language group’s grammar on the worldview of its speakers. Both men believed that these were universal stimuli to which humans were responding, in outwardly different forms, when their cultures first formed. Those of the post-modernist camp, on the other hand, insist that culture comes about through individualized response to unique and specific phenomena, with change occurring because of reinterpretations of such responses, rather than exogenous shocks (Trigger 2003, 9–10). They see it as
an intensely personal and idiosyncratic process, one that cannot be theorized and replicated *ad nauseum*.

**The Ecological Push**

From the 1950s onwards, the relativist – later post-modernist – point of view began to gain ground within the wider anthropological community. In part, relativists claimed that those who employed universalist approaches had de-contextualized components of various societies, and had therefore drained their own hypotheses of explanatory power. Added to this was the particular difficulty, as discussed in the section on linguistics, of differentiating similarities based on a common origin (in this case, a common response to the same stimulus) from similarities resulting from cultural contact. As improvements in historical and archaeological techniques and methodologies would have allowed for greater application of anthropological comparisons across time and space, the appetite for comparative studies diminished greatly (Trigger 2003, 18–21). When anthropology turned its gaze on the past, however, the materialist camp held sway, thanks in part to the profound impact of the work of Julian Steward in 1949. Steward argued that ancient civilizations should be divided into primary ones and secondary ones. The former arose in arid climates, as the need for social and political organization was more pressing in those areas in which large-scale agriculture was only possible through irrigation. These societies developed first as priestly theocracies, only to be replaced by military autocracies, whose use of force ensured the necessary labour supplies for major infrastructure projects. Secondary societies were derivative collectivities relying on the development of primary ones, and were therefore not
worthy of consideration as generators of early civilization. Steward’s analysis was based on flawed methodology and incomplete data, but it continued to influence those interested in similar topics of the chronological origins of civilization for some time (Trigger 2003, 24).

This desire to see similarities across time and space is about more than just monogenism and polygenism. It implies a classification of civilizations according to their primary or secondary nature, linking the historical value of those cultures arising in naturally fertile or lush regions directly to the accomplishments of a nearby arid-zone culture (Trigger 2003, 24–25). Although it might not have been Steward’s goal, his classification scheme could be used to bolster chauvinistic claims of a particular society to the title of generator of all human civilization. Moreover, such a search for origins has also raised the question of what types of political organizations – city-states, territorial states or federations – were the first to arise as guarantors of the stability needed for large-scale socio-economic development (Trigger 2003, 26–27). If such disputes raged after the period of liberalism’s temporary suppression (Hobsbawm 1995, 124–29), it should be no wonder that state-formation was a crucial component of pre-historical narratives in the 1930s, particularly in authoritarian Turkey, as we shall see.

**Historical Anthropology**

From the 1960s onwards, the sub-discipline of historical anthropology came into its own. Roughly speaking, it sought to introduce the concept of time and the practices of historians into the realm of anthropology. This was not simply an apolitical attempt at adding a temporal aspect to the spatial one. It also implied a
shift of the core focus of anthropological studies from the metropolis to the periphery, reclaiming anthropological knowledge for the peoples of post-colonial societies. The original mission of this new sub-division was to dismantle notions of the ahistoricity of colonized societies, while also explaining their development in the post-colonial order. As Brian Keith Axel explains: “Rather than the study of a people in a particular place and at a certain time, what is at stake in historical anthropology is explaining the production of a people, and the production of space and time.” (Axel 2002, 2–3) It was briefly coopted by the American government during the Cold War as a means of studying the behaviour of diasporic communities, seeking to measure their distance from their spatial and temporal origin, and the likelihood of their assimilation into American patterns of behaviour (Axel 2002, 5). The original intention has since been reclaimed by practitioners in both North America and Europe, and has led to the problematization of the use of the archive, the main source for ethnographic and anthropological research of the colonial period and the years immediately preceding it.

Apart from this, and far from the archive, means of uncovering knowledge about individuals’ behaviour and the process of self-identification have also been applied to the analysis of texts from the remote past. Such research demonstrates the manner in which written records can help us to understand the structure and functioning of a society even when it appears to be contradicted by material evidence. In the case of the Hittite, Marco Liverani does this through a re-reading of the Edict of King Telipinu, a 16th century BCE document that tells the story of King Telipinu’s ascent to the throne. Previous historians had accepted the Edict as a historical account of the reigns of the monarchs prior to King Telipinu, an
interpretation that stands to be either confirmed or repudiated by archaeological excavations. By contrast, Liverani argues for an understanding of the document as an attempt at régime legitimization, utilizing history to justify and sanctify the current monarch as the restorer of divine favour upon the Hittites (Liverani 2004, 51–52). In this process, however, it is easy to see how a more refined approach to the cultural and religious sensitivities of a past society might allow for contemporary emotions and practices to seep in, whether through interpretation or judgment. Similar examples abound in Turkish historiography of the end of the period under study, reflecting the ease with which such processes can be read into ancient texts, only to then be utilized as historical legitimation of the current regime.

Postcolonialism in the Pre-colonial Era

Indeed, it can be difficult to determine where the line is drawn when deciding just how robust a hypothesis is. On the one hand, the expansion of archaeological study from the monumental to the mundane banality of quotidian existence – which necessary implies theorizing about the lives of average citizens through the use of historical anthropology – seems justified. This relies on an understanding of the process of identity-formation and the influences it undergoes from contact with intra- and extra-communitarian Others. With reference to the material remains that form the core focus of archaeology, it reformulates the question in terms of a dialectic between product and producer, insisting that material goods are shaped by, and shape, ethnic and other identities in a dynamic fashion (Izzet 2007, 209–11). In order to do this, anthropologists and archaeologists draw from pre-existing theoretical constructs, including those relating to the construction and performance
of identity in colonial and post-colonial societies, referred to as Post-Colonial Theory (Izzet 2007, 213–15). Although these approaches do provide us with parallels that are believed to have existed between pre-historic societies and modern ones, it begs the question of whether recourse to Post-Colonial Theory for pre-historic studies ignores one of the most central components of colonial expansion and interaction: capitalism. How is it that the identities of the colonized and colonizers of the Classical period interacted and mutated in ways similar to those of 19th century Nigeria or India, when pre-Christian Etruria or Anatolia lacked the essential components of colonial infrastructure, such as the division of labour, commoditization, marketization, state-supported trading companies and trade barriers? Theoretical overreach is something well-documented and understood in the realm of history (Morley 2004, 33–50), and may point to the limitations, or the dangers, of diachronic interdisciplinary approaches.

The preceding discussion has relied, to a large extent, on an overview of the theoretical advances and challenges in linguistics, archaeology and anthropology most pertinent to the current study. As a concluding section of this chapter, I will use their longest nexus of interaction – the investigation of the Bible – as a form of bridge into the core of the doctoral project.

**Bible Study**

Although archaeological endeavours in South-West Asia have at times focused on other periods and topics, the narratives of the Bible – both the Old and New Testaments – have been powerful impetuses for the undertaking of excavations and research in modern-day Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
As Carlo Antoni explains, the study of the Bible as a historical document emerged in the 19th century, as secularism gradually voided the text of its divine and revelatory nature. In the hope of salvaging at least some of the foundation of the Western Churches, historians, philologists and other scholars sought to prove the veracity of the narrative itself, moving it from the realm of parable to that of objective history (Antoni 1962, 44). In the first half of the 20th century, Biblical Studies were largely based on a literal reading of the sacred text, and thus intellectual endeavours were guided by the words themselves, interpreted with the help of philologists and theologians (Killebrew 2005, 3; Ziadeh-Seely 2007, 328–29; Silberman 1998, 178–81). Indeed, although this approach has been weakened greatly in the latter half of the 20th century, it continues to hold considerable sway over the investigation of the ancient Near East:

“From its 19th-century beginnings until today, the primary force that still drives the major excavation projects in this area [the southern Levant] is the ancient scriptures – first the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament, then the New Testament and finally the Koran.” (Levy and Higham 2005, 4)

When New Archaeology came to the fore, such passions were associated with an older school of thought. During the last two decades of the last century, the term “Biblical Archaeology” itself was perceived to be a charged one, carrying with it the implications of an archaeology guided by, rather than corroborating, the sacred texts (Levy and Higham 2005, 5).

The solution to these difficulties – the apparent tainted nature of Biblical archaeology and related fields – was the recontextualization of the discipline within a broader geographical and chronological framework. In particular, it involved the
adoption and study of non-Biblical texts from the same region and roughly the same period in order to connect Biblical societies with their neighbours (Levy and Higham 2005, 6).

Isreal Reboot

Had the study of the Bible and Near Eastern archaeology remained a scholarly or erudite concern, its direction likely would have remained far less controversial than it currently is. The Zionist movement, however, and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, radically changed the meaning of Biblical research and material remains. While archaeologists of the latter half of the 20th century might have discovered the use of para- and non-Biblical texts as a means of balancing their investigation into the veracity of Biblical accounts through excavations, early 20th century political Zionists tended towards the opposite direction. In particular, they sought to centre Jewish identity and Zionist belief on a de-sacralized Old Testament, privileging the story of Jewish inhabitation in the Levant over diasporic literature and memory. With Zionist control over the land of Mandatory Palestine, the importance of linking text and materialization became ever more apparent. Through the institution of Moledet (Motherland) studies, children and the general public were introduced to the Bible as a source of historical truth and ideological motivation made real through excavated and preserved archaeological sites (Ram 2011, 21–23). Near Eastern archaeology had gone from a staid and sterile approach seeking confirmation of the Biblical narrative to a 20th century adaptation of Dilthey’s Verstehen; an experience of land and architecture as explained via a Zionist take on the Old Testament.
The important role played by Biblical archaeology and related historical sciences during the crucial decades of nation-state construction is put into relief by Michael Feige:

During the 1950s and 1960s, biblical archaeology was considered to be a central part of Israel’s ‘civil religion’ (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983) and was even hailed as ‘the national pastime’ of the newly-established state. The excavations of Hatzor, Masada and the Judean desert caves were headline news. Professional archaeologists, most notably Yigael Yadin, became popular heroes. Academic conferences of the Israel Exploration Society attracted audiences of thousands, among them top political leaders. Coins, stamps, and other national symbols expressed the country’s interest in the field. By the 1970s, though, the popular enthusiasm for archaeology had dwindled, and today few nonarchaeologists follow developments in the field with interest.” (Feige 2007, 277)

Until the eruption of post-modernism onto the academic scene in the late 1960s, then, archaeologists and other practitioners of the historical sciences worked largely in sync with government and state bodies in the construction of the nation. The perception of a relationship between politics and archaeology was not seen as being either unproblematic or unidirectional. Political figures and archaeologists alike recognized the importance of professional discipline and rigour, even if there was a desire to support the dominant historical narrative (Feige 2007, 290–91). The dawn of the post-modernist and post-processual age in the 1970s opened up a fissure between the political establishment and the scholarly community, which allowed for the nationalist archaeological project to be captured by other, non-specialist groups (Feige 2007, 278–79). To be certain, this process was also motivated by regional factors, the most notable of which is the outcome of the 1967 Six Day War and the
subsequent movement to settle the newly-conquered territories with Jewish Israelis. As such, the influence of both popular, or populist, phenomena, and changes in the intellectual climate in Israel and the world at large helped to radically alter the meanings of archaeology, anthropology, history and the control of land (Ziadeh-Seely 2007, 327; Feige 2007, 292).

**Last Stand at Masada**

A particularly poignant example of this use of archaeology, Biblical narrative, and pre-history is the site of Masada. The story of Masada revolves around a Jewish revolt against Roman soldiers occupying the province of Judea in the year 66 CE, leading to the sack of Jerusalem in 70 CE and the last stand of a band of rebels at a mountain redoubt in 73 CE. When it became apparent that they could not withstand the siege, the hold-outs decided to commit mass suicide rather than submit. It is not a story from the Old or New Testaments, but does represent a component of the cultural and historical context within which the New Testament was elaborated. The Zionist interpretation of the events paints this as an example of Jewish national consciousness, as well as historical proof of Jews’ defense of their residence in Judea against foreign – notably European – occupation and dispossession. The narrative contained within the Roman documents of Josephus Flavius, however, paint the occupiers of Masada as a band of brigands, thieves and murderers known as the Sicarii, who chose death over facing Roman justice for their crimes against Jews and non-Jews alike (Ben-Yehuda 2007, 254–56).

Excavations took place at Masada between the 1960s and 1980s. Considerable effort was undertaken by Israeli archaeologists to interpret the
material finds at Masada as lending proof to the idea that resistance at Masada was led by patriotic and nationalistic zealots, rather than murderous Sicarii. In part, this involved the use of para-Biblical texts such as scrolls from nearby Qumran to lend credence to the claim that the people at Masada were from various different religious and sub-ethnic groups, rather than being predominantly Sicarii (Ben-Yehuda 2007, 258–59). Moreover, the groups of skeletons found were described, prior to the 1990s, as being consistent with family units likely composing the nuclei of the rebellious Jews. Later investigations and interpretations of the human remains would suggest that there is no evidence for familial relations, let alone participation in the siege. Interpretation, then, was conducted according to exceptionally liberal criteria, allowing for the excavations to confirm and propagate one of the state’s founding myths (Ben-Yehuda 2007, 264–66). What is important here is that discoveries are not fabricated but rather re-contextualized through the usage of flippant anthropological interpretations, in order to provide added credence to a particular view of history as expounded by official sources.

In the last decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, Masada gradually lost its symbolic importance for the State and the political establishment. It continued to be seen as a powerful magnet for tourists, prompting further development of the site with tourist infrastructure. However, it is no longer used as a means of bonding new and old citizens to the state and its narrative (Baram 2007, 311–12). Today, Masada is less interesting for both the academic world – which is concerned with introducing “more cultures into the narrative of the Israeli past, the uncovering of ‘forgotten periods’ and minorities within the dominant archaeological epochs, and the presentation of other peoples’ histories” (Baram 2007, 311) – and
mainstream, secular Israelis, who “are almost as apathetic about Jewish history as they are about Jewish theology” (Feige 2007, 281).

**Nonobjective Objectivity**

The objectivity and scientific nature of the historical sciences of the 1950s to the 1970s provided an important boon to the State of Israel in more than just the confirmation of foundational myths. As in other newly-created states, a thriving and respected academic community was a means to international recognition as a modern, industrialized and Western state. Neutrality is thus as much a political asset as it is a mark of scholarly rigour (Feige 2007, 290). The degree to which those who continue to believe in an objective and value-free archaeology oppose attempts at infusing post-modernist and literary approaches into the study of the material remains from the Levant is therefore not surprising. Its importance is palpable in William Dever’s polemic against such experiments:

“I [William Dever] have fought all of my professional life to keep religion, politics, and nationalism out of Near Eastern archaeology, and now I see zealots and demagogues (what a colleague calls ‘cultural beserkers’) dragging these pernicious elements in via the back door.” [original emphasis] (Dever 2005, 419)

What prompts this outburst are the attacks leveled by some sections of the discipline against the mainstream narrative of a 10th century BCE United Kingdom in Israel. Dever admits that some of these criticisms are based on literary and non-traditional approaches to the Biblical narrative, but that others have been produced by contemporary political and ideological positions as regards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Dever 2005, 415–16). The salience or soundlessness of his critics’ points of
view notwithstanding, it is apparent that Dever himself is taking a value-laden position with respect to critiques of the traditional chronology, qualifying those who promote them as “zealots and demagogues” rather than dissident scholars.

Objectivity, too, can engender flaring passions normally reserved for the subjective and emotional.

It is not just the tone of Dever’s comments that raise the question of ideological neutrality’s supposedly objective stance. In addition to bemoaning the infiltration of ideology into Biblical archaeology, Dever has also decried the discipline’s turn away from American dominance and expertise (Silberman 1998, 177). A diversification of narratives and opinions has been accompanied by a widening of practitioners and schools, ending American preponderance in the human capital responsible for both the excavation of Biblical sites and the interpretation of material remains found therein (Silberman 1998, 185). Objectivity has long been the gold standard of the American historical sciences; a monumental pursuit that guaranteed the apolitical nature of the discipline and its continued professionalization (Novick 1988). We can thus question if objectivity as a belief is not a particularly American one, expressive of American views of the world and evaluations of source materials and interpretations. A defense of objectivity thus becomes a fight for the continued American grip on our understanding of the Bible and its historicity, not a struggle for the soul of the discipline and academia in general. As this hold loosens, so too does the secular vulgarity of the once-sacred text.
A Return to God’s Country

The de-sacralization of a religious text implied by objective approaches is, of course, not an irreversible process. Texts remain in public circulation and can always become the objects of contention and struggle between disparate social forces. The Bible, as one of the most, if not the most, widely published books on Earth is far from immune from this process. Despite the considerable efforts of the Zionist movement in the pre-1967 period to temporalize and concretize Biblical narratives as a basis for the State of Israel’s contemporary existence, post-1967 Israeli society saw the reinvigoration of their holy nature within public political discourse. As Rabbi Kook, the spiritual leader of Gush Emunim (a group dedicated to the settlement of the occupied West Bank by Jews (Feige 2007, 280)) and son of the Chief Rabbi of Mandatory Palestine, justified the settlement movement: “We find ourselves here by virtue of our forefathers’ inheritance, the foundation of the Bible and history, and there is no one that can change this fact.” (Masalha 2000, 115) In the second half of the 20th century, then, the Bible had once again been separated from the temporal discipline of history and divested of the earthly interpretations accorded it by philology, archaeology and anthropology. The process is not much different from that experienced by other holy texts, including the Qur’an (Ziadeh-Seely 2007, 342–43).

To be certain, a return to idealism and mystically-infused Biblical narratives is not the only trend that is noticeable in contemporary treatments of the Scriptures and related physical sites. As Silberman has pointed out, a neo-liberal push to exploit the hard-currency earning potential of historical attractions has given birth to a
different interpretation of the value of archaeology and the past. This “strictly utilitarian archaeology” is no longer intended to act as a tool of ideological movements or as a purge of non-objective elements of the social and human sciences. Rather, it is to be ideologically ambivalent and epistemologically agnostic, responding instead to “domestic politics and the hope for economic benefit.” (Silberman 1995, 259–60) Here, neutrality and objectivity in archaeological and anthropological praxis might find a convenient bedfellow in profit-maximization motivations, as the desire to avoid offending potential tourists and clients induces those responsible for excavations and the interpretation of material results to eschew views perceived as highly controversial or prejudicial (Baram 2007, 306–307). Capitalism, ever dependent on positivism and materialism, may prove to be more successful than Marxism or scientific neutrality in providing a counterweight to a return to tendentious uses of the historical sciences.

Ideation and the World

This chapter has explored the manner in which changes in linguistics, archaeology and anthropology relate directly to ideational components inherent in the human and social sciences. Some practitioners have openly embraced these components, engaging in post-modernist critiques of the disciplines and endeavouring to make explicit the subjective nature of interpretation and hypotheses. While not a core component of modern historical linguistics and comparative philology, the worldview of past civilizations and cultures is now understood by both archaeologists and anthropologists as being a crucial aspect of understanding both the social organization and material remains of communities.
now long disappeared. This perception of life and reality can be broadly subsumed under the term ‘ideology’, a word that is rife with controversy and dispute. Rather than tackle the definition of the term within the context of this brief outline of the human and social sciences, I will address it in a much more comprehensive manner in the next chapter, in which its evolution and appearance in both the Turkish and Soviet cases are explored in full.
In structuring my research question, I have emphasized that it is the impact of state-sponsored ideology, rather than political goals, that I seek to track through historical narratives. Such a structure begs the question: what exactly is ideology? In this chapter, I will seek to provide an answer. My purpose is twofold. First, I will explore the definition of ideology and its evolution up to the 1930s. This is indeed ambitious, and the scope of my exploration will be heavily biased towards Marxist sources as both a heuristic for the concept, and groundwork for the second aim of this chapter. More specifically, the last two-thirds of this section will construct the conceptual framework for the histories I examine in the core of the thesis. It will outline the dominant ideologies of both the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey prior to and during the period in question. Again, such topics are broad and merit several doctoral projects in their own right. I have opted to focus, in my creation of a cohesive definition, on the peculiarities of dominant ideologies with respect to the history and historiography of the nation. Questions of the ontology, epistemology and historicity of the nation will be brought to the fore in the search for a theoretical structure upon which to understand and evaluate the interplay of ideology and history writing in the Soviet Union and Turkey.

Throughout this chapter, I have consciously omitted contemporary analysis of ideology; this omission extends back to 1945. This is because the thinkers who shaped our understanding of ideology prior to 1937 also contributed considerably to
the enunciation of Stalinism and what I call Gökalpian nationalism. While
contemporary analysis of ideology would be helpful in positioning us vis-à-vis the
objects of study, and reveal our own biases and prejudices, it would not, in my view,
enrich the methodological framework upon which I dissect the two metanarratives.

Our journey towards this end begins with a brief definition of ideology for the
purposes of historiography. It is followed by a historical contextualization of ideology
that will examine both its development and the evolution of our understanding of
the concept. This provides a gateway into the discussion of Soviet Marxist, and
eventually Stalinist, ideology, and Turkish nationalist worldviews. By the end of the
chapter, we will have sufficient knowledge of the ideological frameworks in both
countries to proceed to an examination of the historiographies themselves.

Ideology: A Definition for Historiography

Ideology, similar to many other objects of academic investigation, is a
concept for which competing definitions exist. By and large, I accept the one put
forward by Peter Novick in his study on the quest for objectivity in American
historiography. In it, he calls ideology “an overarching, and at-least-tacitly-coherent
outlook on the world.” This world-view or Weltanschauung, to use the German
expression, is multifarious, and includes components that extend into science, the
arts, gender relations and roles, philosophy, governance, justice, economics, religion
and a host of other realms. In order to make the application of the concept to
historiography more manageable, Novick describes its mapping to the social and
political components of a polity as consisting of three components: “(1) a picture of
the way the world is; (2) a picture of the way the world ought to be; (3) a set of
propositions about the relationship between the first and the second. (The third
element has several dimensions: sheer distance, getting closer or getting farther
apart, moving slowly or rapidly, evolving smoothly or requiring ruptures, etc.)”
(Novick 1988, 61–62). To be certain, this scheme is influenced by the area in which
Novick constructs it; namely, the late 19th and 20th century United States.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is loose enough to be applied to my regions of interest
when a fourth aspect is included in the set: a statement about the acceptable
sources of technologies to measure the gap between (1) and (2). With this, we can
say that ideology includes an ontology (the first two parts of Novick’s definition), an
epistemology (part three) and a mechanism of evaluation that permits the evolution
of the epistemology in a fairly coherent fashion.

Marx’ Contribution

As an ideal object, ideology has been the subject of debate by philosophers
and other theoreticians throughout the 19th and 20th century. Its origins can be
found in the French Enlightenment thinker Antoine Destutt de Tracy, for whom its
definition was far from uniform. It vacillated between a science of ideas and a
particular political framework associated with liberal, anti-clerical bourgeois
elements in France. Eventually, it was adopted as a term of derision by Napoléon
and his cadres for those intellectuals more concerned with theory than actual
practice (Vincent 1992, 1–3).

Even within broad intellectual currents, such as Marxism, disputes regarding
the nature and evolution of ideology exist. As Tom Rockmore explains, “there are at
present some 100 distinguishable views of ideology, many of which are
incompatible.” (Rockmore 2002, 80) Across the various strands of Marxism, too, there is no consensus on what ideology might be. This is, in part, the result of a long delay in the publication of a coherent and explicit text in which Marx analyzed the concept. In those publications that were available to the general public, he addressed a variety of aspects of ideology, occasionally using the term itself and occasionally not. This has given rise to a confused grouping of references that do not appear to give a wholly satisfying definition of ideology free from contradiction. Nevertheless, students of Marx and his writings have managed to piece together a reasoned guess regarding his view of the concept (Larrain 1991, 7–8). By and large, Marx’ approach to ideology was a critical one, intended to dissect components of specific historical periods and to explain their role within the development of productive forces and the latent class struggle. It was a negative one, which Jorge Larrain describes as follow:

“[T]his negative dimension is always utilised for the critique of a specific kind of error which is connected in one way or another with the concealment or distortion of a contradictory and inverted reality. It is in this sense both a restricted and historical concept: restricted because it does not encompass all kinds of errors and because not all the ruling ideas are affected by it; historical because it depends on the evolution of contradictions… It [ideology] only emerges when ideas are related to changing contradictions in specific ways. So non-ideological ideas may become ideological and vice versa.” (Larrain 1991, 42)

In Larrain’s reading, then, Marx envisioned ideology as a mystifying factor intimately tied to the conditions of a specific, historical society. We see then that if ideology is meant to conceal the contradictions and paradoxes of a given time, it must necessarily be described in historical terms: 18th century French ideology; 19th century Sicilian ideology. Beyond this, the components of that ideology are varied:
while God might be a core ideological concept in Mediaeval Rome, it might be replaced by the nation, and de-ideologized, in 19th century Bremen.

The First Marxists’ Debate

In the decades following Marx’ death in 1883, Marxian writers did not immediately latch onto the concept of ideology as one in need of elaboration, preferring instead to focus on the development of historical materialism and the dialectic. Engels did expand it to include a class component, implying that ideologies were not only restricted by place and time, but also by the social class that employed them to mystify the contradictions chipping away at its own hegemony (Larrain 1991, 53). Successive Marxists again touched on the issue, but were in agreement neither on the need for consensus nor for a deep and comprehensive study of the topic. In large part, ideology was analyzed in conjunction with other components of the superstructure and was discussed within the context of debates over economic determinism, social and political Darwinism, and the role of consciousness in historical development. The inaccessibility of Marx and Engels’ *The German Ideology* is largely to blame for this state of affairs. Confusion between the terms *ideology* and *idealism* also created difficulties in determining whether discussants were arguing over a component of the superstructure or the dichotomy between materialism and idealism. To this we might add a confusion between ideology as a particular form of thought, and ideology as the totality of consciousness in a given society; a common feature of some late 19th century Marxists’ writings, such as those of Plekhanov (Larrain 1991, 55–63).
In order to see how the concept of ideology truly became an issue of Marxian creativity, rather than interpretation, we must turn to *The German Ideology*, published for the first time in Moscow in 1932. As its name would suggest, it contains the closest we have to a Marxian definition of ideology. This definition stemmed from Marx’ theory of alienation, whereby man is alienated from his true nature through the division of labour and the commodification of the fruit of his productivity (Fleischer 1973, 15). As Rockmore paraphrases from the work, “ideology is a theory of the production of false consciousness tending to mislead observers about the nature of the social world.” (Rockmore 2002, 78–80) Marx believed that ideas are linked to the social surroundings in which they are produced. Ideology, then, is the result of an alienation of ideas from their social supports, resulting in an inversion of reality. In other words, rather than empirical facts being used to inform abstract ideas, ideology represented the application of abstract concepts to shape our understanding of the empirical world (Rockmore 2002, 84–85). From this it should be apparent that what writers gleaned from available works prior to 1932 was not terribly different from that which appears in *The German Ideology*, although the latter was much more self-evident than bits of information pieced together from various texts. Moreover, it implies that positive definitions of ideology, such as those that will be explored below, would have been quite controversial had they been enunciated when *The German Ideology* was freely available.

**Lukács and History and Class Consciousness**

An important turning point in the Marxist understanding of ideology came through the writings of Vladimir Ilich Lenin during the last five years of the 19th
century and the first two decades of the 20th (Larrain 1991, 63). Nevertheless, Lenin’s contribution to the debate is of even greater importance for the development of Stalinism, the dominant ideology of the Soviet Union that I will investigate in detail below. For this reason, I will now turn to another figure whose intellectual products helped establish the transition from the Second to the Third Internationals: the Hungarian Marxist Lukács György.

Lukács’ greatest work of Marxist thought, History and Class Consciousness, provides us with an insight into his understanding of ideologies and, more importantly, Marxism’s position vis-à-vis the ideal concept. Lukács rejects the idea that Marxism’s value lies in its propositions, focusing more on the method inherent in Marxian approaches: dialectical materialism. The dialectic teaches individuals that both subject and object influence one another, and thus that the categories, typologies and theorems employed in bourgeois science – and, by extension, every other type of science – are malleable and fluid. Marxism is not an ideology similar to fascism, liberalism or Catholic action, because it insists on the ephemerality and permeable nature of definitions and explanations. Epistemologies and ontologies uncovered by any other means are historically contingent and mystify the true contradictions underlying the social order (Lukács 1971, 4). It is important to point out, at this juncture, that Lukács does not limit his criticism to expressions of a purely philosophical nature, but takes aim directly at the supposedly neutral and objective sciences. These, he argues, are necessarily ideological in their insistence that the contradictions in capitalism are the product of a still incomplete body of scientific knowledge, rather than being inherent in capitalism itself (Lukács 1971, 10). Unlike Novick, then, he sees objectivity as more than just a fallacious heuristic, but also as a
weapon in the class struggle destined to continue until humanity achieves full and
real consciousness.

It is later in *History and Class Consciousness*, in the essay “Legality and
Illegality”, that we have Lukács’ explicit statement about Marxism and historical
materialism as an ideology:

“Marxism is the doctrine of the revolution precisely
because it understands the essence of the process (as
opposed to its manifestations, its symptoms); and
because it can demonstrate the decisive line of future
development (as opposed to the events of the
moment). This makes it at the same time the
ideological expression of the proletariat in its efforts to
liberate itself.” (Lukács 1971, 258–59)

Ideology is now an entirely positive concept, a tool to be used by the proletariat in
breaking through capitalist order and realizing its own liberation. No longer is it
merely a means of obscuring the true social relations underlying a communal
existence, but it is a weapon wielded in the name of oppression or freedom,
obscurantism or consciousness. It is here, too, that Lukács exposes the difference
between politics and ideology with particular reference to those Marxists who
engage in parliamentarianism and opposition activities. Novick divides ideologies
into dominant, accommodationist and oppositional, but Lukács clearly lumps the
first two into the arena of political conflict. Those who accept the system maintained
by the ruling class – including its concepts of legality and illegality – inherently accept
its ideology. A true shift in ideology does not mean reacting to the system imposed
by the dominant class as much as refusing to accept its perpetual legitimacy. Rather
than a delusional refutation of the actuality of the dominant and reified concepts, it
implies a belief in the inherent mutability of one’s understanding about the world
and how one might explain it (Lukács 1971, 262–63). Ideology, therefore, is not a priori a mystification of the world, as much as a frame of mind that might be harmful or helpful in quickening the pace of historical social development.

Nevertheless, Lukács’ own conception of ideology and the role of the dialectic in exposing it appears to belie an inherent universalism that would become part and parcel of later Stalinist understandings of history. In returning to Marx, he argues that all of the partial components of society can be found, in isolation, in the totality of any given society. It is their arrangement and presentation – which in part implies the ideology of the society – that is historically contingent (Lukács 1971, 8–10). In this manner, the apparent absence of a particular phenomenon in a particular society, such as slavery, tithes, guilds or patriarchy, is a matter of ideology, and one need only to dig deep enough, to apply the dialectic rigorously enough, to make them appear. Lukács’ understanding, then, appears to contain a particularly troublesome contradiction, as it insists on the finality of the definitions and typologies arrived at in the final stage of human development, Communism. This contradiction, however, would either be accepted or ignored by future Soviet writers on the concept of ideology.

Gramscian Creativity

The final non-Soviet Marxist, or Marxian, thinker whose writings on ideology that I will treat is the Italian Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci is unique in part because of his relative isolation from the debates on Marxist interpretations of concepts in the late 1920s and early 1930s. It was during this period that he was imprisoned by the Fascist authorities in Italy and was forced, therefore, to reflect on society without
the interference of political squabbles (Gramsci 1977a, xxiii-xiv). Similar to Lukács and Lenin (as we shall see later on), Gramsci conceived of ideology in positive terms, positing it as both a system of beliefs or views of the world, as well as a code of conduct that motivates individuals to act in accordance with the system. This had been missed, according to Gramsci, because scholars had split ideology in two, seeing it as either “the necessary superstructure of a given base” or “the arbitrary elucubrations of a given individual” (Gramsci 1977b, 2:868). He thus identifies ideology as not simply a product of the mind, but one of action, too, that manifests itself in the daily interactions of individuals with their fellow humans (Gramsci 1977b, 2:1217). He provides us with a fairly concise definition when writing on the topic of religion:

“It can be called an ‘ideology’, if by ideology one gives in fact the meaning above of a conception of the world that is manifested implicitly in art, in law, in economic activity, in all of the individual and collective manifestations of life.” (Gramsci 1977b, 2:1380)

This conceptualization of the world is not immaterial to the course of history, contrary to the belief of those Marxian thinkers, such as Bernstein, who interpret dialectical materialism to imply that only the base, and not the superstructure, can be of importance to the unfolding of human destiny. Gramsci points to the fact that untangling base and superstructure in reality is nearly impossible and can only be achieved post factum. Indeed, as Marx argued, ideology is as important as a material force, and should be treated together with material factors. As the two cannot be separated from one another, Gramsci proposes that the material forces are content and ideology the form: the former cannot be physically manifest without the latter,
and the latter is meaningless without the former. The distinction that should be made, then, is between organic ideologies, which spring from a need of the base, and those that are “arbitrary” and “desired”, and serve only to cause polemics (Gramsci 1977b, 2:868–72).

Gramsci further expanded this concept of ideology by introducing new gradations in the levels of ideological influences on everyday life. Rather than simply a system for the élite – which he labelled “philosophy” – Gramsci proposed that ideology could be found in various forms at various echelons of society (Gramsci 1977b, 2:1378). In its manifestestations, it appeared as religion, common sense and folklore (Larrain 1991, 80–82). The role of politics, then, was to ensure that the system of beliefs and the associate code of conduct remained unified and uniform across social classes, inhibiting the sort of schisms that induced the heretical movements of the Middle Ages (Gramsci 1977b, 2:1383). In the modern era, political structures achieve this through the use, first and foremost, of the press. In addition to newspapers, book publishers, pamphleteers and other aspects of the press, schools, the courts, religious institutions and other implements of mass socialization are key in ensuring that the worldview of the hegemonic classes is inculcated in all sections of society, making revolution and radical social change an issue of a conscious opt-out rather than opt-in (Gramsci 1977a, 1:332–33). Gramsci might not have influenced the course of Stalinist thought, but his elucidations certainly bring home the idea that political agents might use the tools of mass information and education to reinforce the reproduction of an ideology.
Alternative Hypotheses: Durkheim and Weber

Discussions on the nature of ideology were not the preserve of Marxian thinkers in the 19th century. Marxists have, of course, engaged in considerable discussion of the topic because of the importance of distinguishing between base and superstructure. Other intellectuals who did not identify as Marxian or Marxist, however, have also approached the subject. The French social scientist Émile Durkheim provides us with an early example, one that will be important for later developments of ideology in Turkey. From Durkheim’s *The Rules of Sociological Method*, we see that he did not conceive of the term *ideology* as an internally coherent world view, but as a reliance on ideas and reasoning, rather than empirical facts and objective analysis (Durkheim and Lukes 1982, 86–87). The “ideological method” of understanding society, history and the workings of the world engages only with the “surface of ideas”, a film that obscures the real forces and motivations impelling actors to engage in meaningful changes in their lives and those of the members of their communities (Durkheim and Lukes 1982, 168).

This is not to say that Durkheim did not conceive of something close to some of the Marxian conceptions of ideology, particularly when writing on the topic of religion. When describing the perfect society that is the end goal of religious practice, he argues that

“this society is not an empirical fact, well defined and observable; it is a fancy, a dream with which men have lulled their miseries but have never experienced in reality. It is a mere idea that expresses in consciousness our more or less obscure aspirations towards the good, the beautiful, and the ideal. These aspirations have their roots in us; since they come from
the very depths of our being, nothing outside us can account for them.” (Durkheim and Fields 1995, 423)

Nevertheless, this view of the perfect world also contains the evil and the ugly, thereby mirroring the gamut of phenomena and experiences of reality. The difference lies in the fact that these phenomena are intensified in their character and attributed qualities and powers that are far beyond the possibilities of ordinary humans. For Durkheim, this comes from the “effervescence” of conscious thought and morality borne out of social existence: “the collective ideal that religion expresses is far from being due to some vague capacity innate to the individual; rather, it is in the school of collective life that the individual has learned to form ideals.” (Durkheim and Fields 1995, 426) Unlike the cruder Marxians, however, he sees this as more than simply a reflection of material forces. Religion – and thus other conceptions of the world – represents the fusing and synthesis of individual consciousneses, a playing field on which humans, the ultimate social animal, express their collective personality and imagination in the formation of an ideal of the perfect society (Durkheim and Fields 1995, 426). Rather than a smokescreen intended to mystify and blind the oppressed, religion, and by extension ideology, is the positive output of humanity’s desire for better.

Max Weber, too, exercised considerable influence on the formation and development of the social sciences in Germany and in Europe. Weber belonged to the German intellectual tradition that produced disputes about objectivity and the role of historians, social scientists and philosophers in the determination of truth about past and present societies (Bentley 1999, 90–91). It should not be a surprise, then, that in Weber’s works we find a distinction between objectivity and
subjectivity, with the former the preserve of science and the latter the domain of politics, including ideology (Midgley 1983, 31). The social scientist believed himself to have been successful in draining his own intellectual activity of insidious ideological taints through the application of a scientific method (Midgley 1983, 19). This, of course, is not to say that he did not believe there to be a particular role for ideology in society, but rather that it was entirely in the realm of the subjective: politics. As such, ideology was the set of arbitrary values and ideals that were the basis for choices; “extraneous value judgments” that cannot be explained through the laws of nature (Midgley 1983, 31). Not all ideologies, or value judgments, however, are created equal. Indeed, for Weber, there exists an objective standard by which to measure the ethical nature of values, one that requires an evaluation of both the means and the ends of political decisions (Weber 1994, 355–57; Roth 1984, 126–28). The internal consistency of a worldview is, in some ways, of little importance to Weber, as what matters more is whether it duplicates or flaunts the benchmarks inherent in his own objective ethic.

A clear distinction that can be made between the Marxians and Weber is the latter’s insistence that there need not be class or material bases for particular ideologies or worldviews. In his discussion of constitutional democracy in Russia, for example, he distinguishes between the “‘bourgeois’ intelligentsia”, who are characterized by their “general outlook on life and level of education”, and the “true ‘bourgeoisie’, and in particular the large industrialists,” who do not seek to exercise positions of power within local councils for the sake of promoting their own conceptions of the world. The former he calls “radical ideologues”, speaking disparagingly of their idealism and “readiness for sacrifice” in the face of opposition
from those with actual economic interests in the expansion of local government in Russia (Weber 1994, 34–35). Ideologues, and by extension ideology, thus appears to be entirely divorced from the objective, empirical basis upon which sciences such as economics are founded (Weber 1994, 42). In *Suffrage and Democracy in Germany*, Weber appears to go even further than those Marxists who eschew ideology as a positive concept. More than a mystification of reality, ideology is created by the dominated or neutral classes who refuse to see the objective truth of society (Weber 1994, 90). Thus, ideology is subjective fantasy created not to perpetuate a system of social relations for the benefit of a given class, but rather as a means of divorcing oneself from reality and avoiding the more arduous task of constructing a wholesome and productive social ethic.

The preceding discussion has provided us with a definition of ideology, as well as a flavour of the intellectual climate within which the dominant ideologies of the two polities under study – the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey – were born. If I have been disproportionate in my emphasis of Marx and his followers in outlining a definition of the concept, it is largely because the explicit nature of ideology within Marxism allowed for it to be treated openly within the context of the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that ideology was understood to be something that could be managed and employed under the Soviet Communist Party’s reign; a statement that finds no equivalent in the Turkish case. With this in mind, I will continue directly into an examination of ideology’s Soviet manifestations, with an ultimate eye on a succinct but coherent explanation of Stalinism.
Soviet Ideologies

At the outset of this chapter, I stated that I would examine Soviet and Turkish ideologies with a particular focus on the nation and its definitions. One might therefore ask how, if at all, the national question came into focus in this development of leftist intellectual discussions in 19th century Europe. The answer to this is, in no small part, Russia. The universalist tendencies of Marxist thought faced little practical opposition from Western European contexts, but their expansion to Eastern Europe and beyond created considerable tension. While there were undoubtedly a number of points of contention, one particularly unresolvable one was the application of Marx’ understanding of the development of human society to peripheral communities. Within this was the issue of the necessity of those communities to undergo the same paths of development as the German, English or French proletariat. More specifically, if bourgeois nation-formation was part and parcel of the emergence and progress of capitalism to its ultimate demise, would every ethno-linguistic group need to go through such a stage to reach Socialism? Russia was a core component of this discussion, as Marx had, at different stages, identified it as both the leader of the reactionaries and the most promising source of revolt and social change (see K. Anderson 2010). Russian ideologues and socialists (in the sense of those operating in the Russian Empire), therefore, were key to pushing this understanding further, and teasing out its implications for the national question and Marxian thought as a whole.

Russia was important for a whole host of reasons. On the one hand, its government was a steadfast supporter of the reaction throughout Europe, and its
people seemed, until the latter half of the 19th century, to have been cowed into subservience. Beyond this, however, it was a massive, multiethnic and multilingual empire, even more so than the Hapsburg one. Its traditions, and those of the various communities that lived within it, both majority and minorities, presented unique challenges to the understanding of social progress. No dual monarchy existed, as it did in Austria-Hungary, to provide an implicit guide to social and communitarian reform (Fowkes 2008, 207–8). This diversity gave rise to various currents within Russia’s socialist movements: Bolsheviks, including Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky; Mensheviks; Bundists and the Jewish labour movements; and other ethnically and linguistically-based groups (Carr 1958, 1:8–9). Plekhanov, mentioned above, played an undeniably important role in the development of Marxist thought inside the Soviet Union, as well as outside of it. As one of the primary theorists of the Menshevik faction of the Communist Party, he fought an often losing battle with Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky over core concepts that would shape Soviet policy and politics for decades to come (Steila 1991, 2). Despite this, his contribution, particularly with respect to the concept of ideology, is greatly overshadowed by the father of Soviet ideologies, and of the Soviet Union itself, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

**Lenin, the Party and the Importance of Ideology**

Why is Lenin such a central figure? As the primary instigator of both theory and practice in the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP) – which would become the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) in the course of the second and third decades of the 20th century – he was responsible for converting ideology into political and social organization. As Larrain has highlighted, the claim of
some socialist states that they have overcome class contradictions implies that they
have achieved, effectively, a post-ideological stage of development (Larrain 1991,
45). Such an understanding, however, was never applied to the USSR by its first
leader, and thus ideology was never absent from early Soviet life. Beyond this,
however, Lenin’s conceptualization of the role of the Party in spurring and
perpetuating the revolution allowed for the introduction of a new definition of
ideology, one that was far more positive and active than anything Marx had ever
conceived (Larrain 1991, 63–64).

Lenin’s concept of ideology was intimately linked to the consciousness of
class interests. In particular, it was an understanding and vision of the world tied to a
particular class and, most importantly, expressive of that class’ ultimate economic
interests. In his elaboration of such a definition, however, Lenin makes a distinction
between “spontaneous” class consciousness, as in that of the syndicalists, and
“social-democratic” class consciousness, which is enunciated by revolutionary
intellectuals. A truly revolutionary and Socialist ideology can only ever be
propounded by enlightened and progressive thinkers, as the workers themselves are
prone to being coopted by the dominant ideology. It appears, according to this
explanation, that Lenin’s ideology is something to be created by an élite and
imposed upon the masses, a criticism that was leveled by both Kautsky and Rosa
Luxemburg. Plekhanov, by contrast, accused Lenin of idealism, divorcing his ideology
from praxis and elevating Marxism to the role of a science “outside of social
determination”. In defense, Lenin insisted that such a worldview would only ever be
elaborated through a dialectic between intellectuals and the proletariat, ensuring
that it would never exist within an idealist vacuum or immune from the democratic
workings of the Party (Larrain 1991, 65–68). Still, the Party was to be a separate force, one that would help correct the mismatch between spontaneous proletarian consciousness and the Socialist ideology of the intellectuals, thereby sparking revolutionary dynamics (V. I Lenin 1961b, 451–67, 1961b, 375). Lenin’s writings also give the impression of a clear hierarchy in the creation of party policy and ideology; one that privileged the organization’s upper echelons, and which would be clearly exploited following his death by Joseph Stalin.

Leninism or Marxist-Leninist Ideology

In order to emphasize the pedigree and unbroken continuity of Marxist intellectual history, Lenin’s ideology was generally referred to in the Soviet Union as Marxism-Leninism (Марксизм-Ленинизм). Lenin’s role as the founder of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics allowed him to remain a prophet, together with Marx and Engels, of Soviet ideology throughout the duration of the USSR’s existence. It was not enough, however, to ensure that his writings and ideas would not be massaged, manipulated and occasionally ignored as the State’s dominant ideology responded to the needs and desires of the country’s leaders and socio-economic conditions. Some concepts did prove durable. One was the conception of Marxism as an ideology distinguished from bourgeois ideologies by its scientific nature. The result was the elevation of Marxist-Leninist ideology from a mere view on the world to a component of the only belief system through which true, objective fact is attainable. The similarity with Lukács’ ideas is unmistakable, as the Hungarian thinker was influenced in no small measure by Lenin’s writings (Larrain 1991, 68–69).
As one would expect from Lenin’s personal history and interaction with a pan-European network of socialists, his ideology rests largely on the foundations created by Marx and Engels and elaborated by their various disciples throughout the latter half of the 19th century (V. I Lenin 1961b, 369). The particular situation of Tsarist Russia – on the periphery of Europe, but still participating in its economic development – meant that he devoted greater time and effort to certain aspects of Marxian theory than others (V. I Lenin 1961c, 339–40, 1961a, 31–34). In *What is to be Done?* (V. I Lenin 1961b, 453–55), we intuit a different approach to revolutionary and trade-union struggles because of the peculiarities of Russian autocracy. In *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, published in 1916, we see a concern for both a new stage of capitalist development and the connections between the inner and outer rings of European economic structures. Both imply an interest in the Russian situation, as Russia had experienced a burst in capitalist development through the importation of capital from Western Europe, seeking higher returns on investment within the Russian market. This was substantially different from the experience of England and France, where industrialization occurred through domestic capital accumulation (Vladimir Il’ich Lenin 1999, 70–74). Among the most important of the issues facing Socialists in Eastern Europe, however, and one that preoccupied Lenin throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, was that of nationalism and self-determination. While the questions of the Irish in Great Britain and the Polish in the Russian Empire were of theoretical importance to Marx (K. Anderson 2010), national aspirations were of pressing practical concern to any nascent political party in the three empires of the continent’s eastern half: the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman and the Russian (Holdsworth 1967). Given the
relevance of the nation and its manifestations within state ideology to my research topic, it is on this aspect of Leninist and Stalinist thought that I will focus. Unlike Marx, the intellectual milieu within which Lenin formulated and developed his theoretical positions was dominated by Central and Eastern Europeans, rather than Western Europeans. Moreover, he was far from a lone outpost of leftist thought in a sea of competing and disparate intellectual systems. By the start of the 20th century, a plethora of Socialist parties from across Europe and beyond were organized into a Second International, a collection of thinkers and activists loyal to the ideas of Marx. Thus, in addition to non-Marxians of the left and right, Lenin’s works were also directed at other self-avowed Socialists, many of them from Austria-Hungary or the Russian Empire. These debates often focused on topics that Marx had not had the opportunity to address, or on competing interpretations of the original philosopher’s system of thought (V. I Lenin 1961b, 349–51).

**Lenin and the Second International**

Among the most controversial topics discussed by the Second International was support for the Polish national liberation movement, which frequently pitted Lenin against Rosa Luxemburg (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1947b). Although the definition of a nation was not a core component of this dispute, Lenin did indeed take seriously the matter of delineating and bounding the concept. In his dealings with the Bund, a Jewish Socialist organization in Tsarist Russia, he made it clear that ethnic and linguistic unity might be necessary for the formation of a nation, but that they were not sufficient conditions (Holdsworth 1967, 269). Despite his later denunciation of Karl Kautsky (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1970), Lenin expressed his admiration for the Czech
thinker’s conception of language unification as a benchmark of the universalization of the capitalist market, rather than as a yardstick of ethnic or national cohesion (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1947b, 566). Given Kautsky’s opposition to self-determination and his other points of contention with the leadership of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (K. Anderson 2010, 57), Lenin’s explicit agreement points to motivations that were more practical than theoretical. He was well aware that the issues of nationality, language and democratic revolution were coming to a head in the multilingual and multi-ethnic empires of Eastern Europe and Asia, particularly Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Persia (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1947a, 65–66). He was also cognizant, however, of active discussions about the nation within Austrian Socialist circles, a fact attested by his decision to direct Stalin to study and refute the opinions of the Austrians in 1913 (Connor 1984, 30).

The Nation According to the Austrian Socialists

The National Question had built up steadily in the Hapsburg Empire throughout the 19th century, with a violent explosion during the revolutions of 1848. While initial attempts at national liberation were quashed, the decision to transform the Empire into the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary in 1867 partly legitimized the national principle (Taylor 1948, 130–39). The issue of ethno-national groups’ political and cultural demands was complicated by dispersed settlements and widespread intermingling (Bauer 2000, 260-261). This led the Austrian Socialists to propose cultural rather than political autonomy, implying preservation of the multi-ethnic state while promoting the conservation and development of multiple national cultures within its borders (Bauer 2000, 281). Cultural autonomy ran directly counter
to orthodox Marxist beliefs that the universalization of language within national
borders was necessary for the construction of a unified market (Nimni 1991, 18).

Otto Bauer, a prominent Austrian Jewish theorist and member of the Social
Democratic Party of Austria, elaborated a comprehensive account of the various
necessary and sufficient conditions of nationhood. He emphasized the importance of
a common history – the basis on which a common culture and psychology might
come about – as a crucial component of nation formation. Common language was
seen only as the tool for dissemination and reproduction of a common culture
embodying the shared historical experiences of a given people. Bauer dismissed a
common territory as a necessary condition for nationhood, as modern
communications technology (at the outset of the 20th century) facilitated the
retention of an individual’s native culture even in locations distant from her
homeland (Bottomore and Goode 1978, 102–5). In short, the nation “is the totality
of men bound together through a common destiny into a community of character.”
(Bottomore and Goode 1978, 107) Here, then, we see that Bauer imbued the nation
with more than simply an economic character: he recognized psychological and
aesthetic qualities that could not be explained by the division of labour and
unification of market forces alone.

Indeed, Bauer’s writings further conceded the disjunction between
nationality and bourgeois capitalism through the historicity of the nation. Unlike
Marx, he conceived of nationhood as being a component of both primitive
communism and the final, emancipatory stage of Communism. Class society,
whether slave-owning, feudal or capitalist, caused cleavages between the various
socio-economic segments of a given nation, causing it to disappear from the
progress of history. The nation was a “process” and its membership, which was fluid, a “reflection of historical struggles” (Bottomore and Goode 1978, 108–9). Bauer thus accepted the duration of the nation while rejecting primordialism, and recognized that national character, similar to all aspects of identity, is malleable.

On two accounts, this particular juncture is a profitable one for at least a partial introduction to Stalinist ideology. The first is the clear connection between Stalinist conceptualizations of the nation and the work of the Austrian Socialists. The second, however, elucidates the special nature of Stalinism within the treasure chest of Marxism. For Erik Van Ree, both Lenin and Stalin deviated from, or elaborated upon (depending on one’s point of view), traditional Marxian thought as constructed by Marx and Engels. Lenin introduced notions of bureaucracy and the vanguard party, while “[Stalin] introduced crucial deviations from Classical Marxism of his own. They mostly concerned the national question.” (Ree 2003, 13–14) It is apt, then, to begin this study of Stalinism with Joseph Stalin’s definition of the nation, before proceeding to contextualize the maturing ideology within the intellectual environment of the inter-war period.

The Stalinist Theory of the Nation

By far, the most important reaction to the Austrians’ works came from the RSDWP. In response to their arguments, Iosif Stalin, a Georgian member of the Party, wrote what would become a foundational text on nationalities in the Soviet Union. The content of the Stalinist theory did not remain unchanged throughout Stalin’s reign, either in general or in its application to particular groups and regions (see (Tillett 1969; Yilmaz 2013b; Martin 2000; Kozybaev 1992; Auezova 2011; Hirsch
2005). Nevertheless, the core components of the nation’s definition and its historicity were not altered and thus provided guidance to generations of historians documenting the histories of the Soviet peoples (Auezova 2011, 225). Moreover, it was these core, unchanging principles that would be used to determine which groups were indeed worthy of being called nations, and which would be relegated to gradual assimilation into other collectivities (Hirsch 2005, 277–80).

The Russian Context

It is important to stress that Stalin’s development of a theory on nations occurred against the backdrop of two, rather than one, controversies. First, there were the disputes among the members of the Second International, which have been described above. Secondly, were the historical narratives and conceptualizations of identity current in Russia itself. At the end of the 19th century, Western European trends in historiography had been adopted by liberal Russian historians. A school known as the École russe, which followed French preferences for social history, had become well respected inside and outside of Russia. Their primary opponents were members of the pan-Slavist, traditionalist élite, the most prominent of whom was the historian Danilevskii. Danilevskii argued for the fundamental incompatibility of Germanic, Latin and Slavic civilizations, claiming that they each followed their own paths through specific laws of rise and decline (Bohn, Thomas M. 2003, 203-204). It was, indeed, this second school that posed the greatest ideological threat to the RSDWP’s bid for power: Lenin himself had made it clear that Great Russian chauvinism was a considerable menace to the success of proletarian revolution in the Russian Empire (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1947b, 576).
Marxism and the National Question

The publication of Stalin’s *Marxism and the National Question* in Vienna in January 1913 was against this backdrop of both rising national sentiment in Russia as well as the intellectual disputes of the Second International. Indeed, the Austrian Socialists’ ideas had gained considerable traction among the activists of the Bund, and particularly Vladimir Medem, who conceived of language, rather than territory, as being the defining characteristic of the historically-contingent nation (Traverso 1994, 106). Added to this were competing Marxist interpretations of the nation from within Russia. The former RSDWP member and founder of the Socialist Zionist organization Poale Zion, Ber Borokhov, published in 1905 his explanation of the nation. It was based on an analogy of Marx’ distinction between “class in itself” and “class for itself” in order to distinguish between “people and nation.” For Borokhov, it was consciousness, rather than mere collectivity, that defined the nation (Traverso 1994, 114–15). In the end, however, it was Stalin’s work that was to form the theoretical basis for the Bolshevik approach to nationhood. Here, Stalin clarified that the nation was “a defined community of people” that is “neither racial nor tribal” (“определенная общность людей ... не расовая и не племенная”) (I. Stalin 1913, 2). He thus immediately distanced nations from primitivized and racialized communities, a distinction that would become a trademark of early Soviet nationalities policy (Martin 2000, 352).
The Four Components of a Nation

Stalin continued by explaining that although the various nations of the 20th century were the products of miscegenation, the conglomeration of peoples was not sufficient for the production of national groupings. Certainly, the empires of Caesar and Alexander would not be considered nations, as their cohesion was based on the military success of the élite, rather than a sustainable community of peoples. Nor could Russia and Austria have been seen as such, as a “national community is unthinkable without a common language” (I. Stalin 1913, 2). Thus a common “popular-spoken language” (as opposed to an “official-clerical language”) was one of the necessary characteristics of a nation (I. Stalin 1913, 2).

Similar to Lenin, a common language was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for nationhood for Stalin. This was because “the nation develops only as a result of long and regular communication, as a result of the shared life of the people from generation to generation”; and so a common territory was the second condition for the formation of a nation (I. Stalin 1913, 3). It was therefore early on in Stalin’s enunciation of the nation’s defining characteristics that he came into direct confrontation with Bauer. While both recognized the importance of language in the creation of national communities, Bauer’s belief in the efficacy of modern communications technology led him to different conclusions on the necessity of territorial compactness. Stalin’s definition also provided theoretical support for Lenin’s attack on the Bund: as the Jews were a dispersed people without a compact territorial homeland and common language, they could not have been considered a nation (I. Stalin 1913, 4).
The third condition that Stalin established was that of a common economic life, or economic connectivity (“экономическая связность”) (I. Stalin 1913, 3). This component is a clear reference to, yet vague expression of, classical Marxist thinking. Stalin provided the example of the Georgian nation, which he claimed did not come about until the second half of the 19th century, with the collapse of “the economic isolation of the principalities” and the implantation of capitalism. Thus a nation could only be formed through economic unification, even if there was a long tradition of a common language and territory among its various members (I. Stalin 1913, 3).

However, Stalin did not go as far as Marx in making explicit the role of the bourgeoisie in this drive for economic community, or in explaining the anachronism of a “single language” in Georgia despite the lack of market mechanisms and division of labour requiring ease of communication. Nor did he provide greater clarification for this apparent point of difference from the Western European experience, especially given the frequency of its observance among “nations passing the stage of feudalism and developing capitalism” (I. Stalin 1913, 3).

Finally, the psychological cast of a nation “plays no small role” in its distinction from other nations speaking the same language. It is the product, similar to the nation itself, of the existence of the collectivity through successive generations. Thus, the last component of the definition of a nation is the common “psychological cast” of a people (“общность психического склада”) (I. Stalin 1913, 4). It is unclear just how much of a departure from Marx and Engels this is, as Stalin does not specify how a change in economic conditions (the base) might affect this psychological cast (the superstructure). More importantly, though, it appears to be
in direct contradiction to Lenin’s dislike of Bauer’s focus on the intangible, immaterial aspects of nations (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1947b, 566).

Stalin summarized this with a concrete and compact definition of the nation: “The nation is a historically developed stable community of people, arising on the basis of common language, territory, economic life and psychological cast [of mind], appearing in the form of commonality of culture.” (I. Stalin 1913, 4) This statement is closely followed by a comment on the historicity of the nation and its mutable nature: “From this it is fully understood that the nation, like every historical phenomenon, obeys the law of change, has its own history, beginning and end.” (I. Stalin 1913, 4) Although this sentence appears cursory, it carries with it the whole weight of Marxist historical materialism: nations are neither timeless nor primordial, and should be understood within the appropriate historical context.

Stalin’s View of Historicity

On the historicity of the nation, Stalin made clear his adherence to the Marxist concept of the nation as a product of capitalism, but he also provided an important distinction between West and East. In Western Europe, nations came about with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and were largely accompanied by the appearance of states. In the East, the nuclei of nations (Germans in Austria, Magyars in Hungary and Great Russians in Russia), formed the apparatuses of state power, but assembled multinational empires around the centre. This process could only occur where feudalism persisted, and the implantation of capitalism was weak (I. Stalin 1913, 7).
The subjugated nations in these multinational empires were gradually “awakened” by aspects of the capitalist mode of production, such as the press, theatre and liberal bourgeois politics (I. Stalin 1913, 7–8). Such language is a departure from Marxist orthodoxy. If nations are awakening, then they must have been slumbering. If they were slumbering, then they existed before the emergence of national consciousness. This statement appears to introduce a contradiction between the explicit modernity and implied primordality of the nation in Stalin’s framework. Instead of clarifying it, Stalin is explicit about nationalism being the product of the bourgeoisie’s desire to create a protected market for its goods (I. Stalin 1913, 8). The pursuit of closed markets cannot be explained wholly through the standard Marxist interpretation of nations as a means of perfecting the division of labour, and so must be considered a Stalinist innovation. Moreover, it precludes the appearance of nationalist forces within economic zones bereft of commodity production, as it is difficult to imagine the importance of market protection in the absence of perfectly substitutable goods.

Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question thus provided both a definition of the nation and a view to its historicity, albeit based mostly, but not entirely, on European experience. Despite cursory attempts at application to the peoples of the Caucasus (I. Stalin 1913, 29–30), Stalin made no serious effort to address the incompatibility of European processes of identification and evolution to the collectivities of Central Asia and Siberia. However, the tract was not initially meant to provide an all-embracing theoretical framework for academic pursuits, but rather to convince non-Russians of the RSDWP’s bona fides about respect for non-Russian cultural rights and aspirations (Connor 1984, 34–38). It was only later, after the
victory of the Bolsheviks following the Russian Civil War and Stalin’s ascension to the head of the Communist Party in the late 1920s, that it was implemented fully as intellectual dogma. Prior to this point, however, its dominance was sublimated to the supremacy of Leninist, rather than Stalinist, ideology.

**Leninism vs. Stalinism**

It is important to stress that Leninism and Stalinism developed in two very different historical contexts. For much of his life, Lenin was in exile or hiding. Many of his writings were concerned with the rise of the RSDWP to power. When the Bolsheviks did capture the state in October 1917, the next five years were spent negotiating with former enemy states for a complete end to the hostilities of the First World War, and then seeking to solidify Moscow’s sovereignty, through the Russian Civil War, over what would become the USSR. Lenin died in 1924, granting him only two years to implement the construction of the proletarian state. Stalinism, however, benefitted from the stability of the 1920s and 1930s, with the gradual recognition of the USSR by foreign powers (Ree 2003, 33–34). Rather than ascension, it was concerned with consolidation, particularly following Stalin’s attainment of the highest post in the Soviet Union in 1928. Both Leninism and Stalinism underwent changes through the course of their lives as ideologies, but the former did so largely as the worldview of the dominated classes, while the latter developed as the system of the dominant class in an authoritarian, if not totalitarian, state (Ree 2003, 1–3; Fitzpatrick 2000, 2).

The nature of Stalinism has long been a source of disagreement among Western Sovietologists. The relative ease with which Soviet political and economic
statistics could be acquired by American and European scholars, compared to
cultural and social data, prioritized economists’ and political scientists’ definitions of
it as a political system. The collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991, however, has
helped change this picture dramatically, converting Stalinism into a “culture” in the
eyes of many contemporary researchers (Fitzpatrick 2000, 2–3). This shift in thought
has re-cast Stalinism as an attempt to radically change Soviet citizens’ perceptions of
themselves and of the world around them; in other words, a state-sponsored
ideology. Sovietologists of the 1970s onwards have tended to agree that 1929 marks
a watershed in the implementation of a new conceptualization of Soviet government
and society. They generally disagree, however, on whether this was truly socialist
(i.e. in the footsteps of Marx, Engels and Lenin), or if it represented a reactionary
movement that cemented a fossilized bureaucracy of former proletariats with
socially conservative views in a dominant position over peasants and intellectuals
alike (Kotkin 1997, 2–4).

Stephen Kotkin points out that Stalinism can be viewed as a left-wing
reaction to the gradual drift of Soviet society towards the centre of the political
spectrum during the 1920s. The New Economic Plan (NEP) had allowed for the
return of private enterprise and the market, sparking questions about the course of
the revolution. Stalin was well versed in both Bolshevik bureaucracy and in Leninist
thought, allowing him to capitalize on this discontent and ascend to the heights of
Soviet power by 1928, bringing with him a new emphasis on Marxist-Leninist
ideology (Kotkin 1997, 16–17). It should not be a surprise, then, that the period of
1928 to 1937 should be marked by a tightening of control over the various aspects of
state-citizen interaction, both through the bureaucratization of all aspects of Soviet
life, and the infusion of ideological orthodoxy – as determined by Stalin – into intellectual and popular endeavours (Kotkin 1997, 356–57). Within this, emphasis was placed on scientific objectivity, congruent with the régime’s belief in the power of the pure sciences for the generation of rapid progress towards Socialism. This, however, was not a resurgence of positivism, in which science would influence politics and worldview, but a direct and calculated attempt to feed ideology into science, which was in turn fed back into society at large as a means of further legitimizing the state’s ideological stance (Pollock 2006, 2–3; Andrews 2003, 126–27). This obsession with objective, scientific approaches to the construction of Soviet society was far from absent in ideological considerations regarding the nation, as we shall see in the fate of the term throughout the 1920s and 30s (Pollock 2006, 4).

A Brief Window of Pluralism

In the 1920s, it was far from a foregone conclusion that Stalinist interpretations of the nation would become Soviet orthodoxy. During this decade of eclecticism in official policy, both Marxist and non-Marxist historical narratives were written for the peoples of the Soviet Union (Margulis 1993, 129). Histories of the Ukraine were composed by both a Marxist historian, Iavorskii, and a non-Marxist Ukrainian historian, Hrushevskii (Tillett 1969, 38–39). In Central Asia, too, the initial years following the end of the Russian Civil War (1917-1922) were remarkable for intellectual pursuits of a variety of persuasions (Kudaibergenova 2013, 161). Historians such as the Russian Chuloshnikov and the Kazakh Tynyshpaev, who had been involved with the nationalist Alash Orda movement, sought to replace politically suspect works on the history of the Kazakhs by pre-Revolutionary authors,
albeit without reference to a strictly Marxist schematic (M. Tynyshpaev 2002, 10–12). They were complimented by Asfendiiarov, who was a Marxist and a disciple of the Russian Marxist historian Pokrovskii (Nusupbekov 1989, 334). It should be evident, then, that the eventual dominance of the Stalinist thesis, rather than any other formulation of the nation, was not the product of a dearth of alternative schools of thought.

Group Hierarchy

By the late 1920s, however, official circles in the Soviet Union began preparing for a stricter implementation of Stalinist ideology throughout society. The creation of new terminology, and the cleansing of supposedly bourgeois elements from academia, served as a means of constructing a new intellectual infrastructure for Stalinist social sciences and humanities (Hirsch 2005, 266). This included a rigid nomenclature to categorize the various collectivities throughout the country. A *nation* (нация) was a group that possessed all four different characteristics of a nation outlined by Stalin, as well as a state. Below the nation came the *nationality* (национальность), which had a national consciousness but lacked one of the four determinants. Finally, a *people* (народность), had some of the characteristics of a nation, but lacked national consciousness (Hirsch 2005, 266–67). The use of these words to describe specific groups was closely managed by authorities in the Soviet Union, as they had political and economic benefits understood by both the Kremlin and national movements (Zabarab 2011, 112; Mironova 2012, 87). Beyond this, however, the implementation of the new terminology made conceiving of the world in any way other than the Stalinist one significantly harder for speakers of Soviet
national languages. This was as much an act of accommodation and survival on the part of individual members of the Soviet apparatus as it was an imposition from on high. In the words of Matthew J. Payne:

“As [Shiela] Fitzpatrick’s classic studies of the cultural revolution, collectivization and everyday Stalinism show, the vision of the Soviet state at the highest levels matters, but so too do the desires, strategic calculation and contingent responses of those who implemented them.” (Payne 2011, 62)

Nonetheless, as the French phenomenological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty has argued, such interventions in language are often the hallmarks of a desire to infuse an extreme form of objectivity into speech communities, and an attempt to banish agency and subversion from the use of language by individual members of a given society (Merleau-Ponty 1969, 9). In other words, Stalinism’s ideological stranglehold on Soviet writers and scholars continued to tighten.

The Asian Mode of Production

The long tradition of debate regarding Marxian thought implied that it would take much more than redefining terms to make Stalin’s interpretation of the world the dominant one. With respect to the nation and its historicity, divergence was motivated partly by Marx’ reference to an “Asian Mode of Production” (AMP) in his description of the various stages of socio-economic development (Fleischer 1973, 18). This comes from the Grundrisse, in which it is listed along with other, strictly historical (as opposed to geographical) types of development, thereby introducing ambiguity into the position of the concept with respect to other types of societies (B. R. O. Anderson 2006, 155–57). The AMP was characterized by two social groupings: a
bureaucratic class within a monopolistic state engaged, benignly, in the provision of public goods; and a peasant class that provided labour and surplus (Sawer 1979, 20).

It had initially caused controversy within the RSDWP because of its adoption by the Menshevik faction, who applied it to Russia and argued that it was proof that the country would not benefit from a European-style revolution. The Bolsheviks refuted this assertion, arguing that Russia still exhibited, *grosso modo*, European patterns of development (Sawer 1979, 16). Within historiography, the champion of the Menshevik cause, Plekhanov, eventually lost the battle over theory to the Bolsheviks' preferred historian, Pokrovskii, but the larger dispute in the RSDWP refused to die (Sawer 1979, 18).

The AMP was a difficult fit within the five-period organization of history established in the Soviet Union. This schema was drafted based on Engels’ elaboration of Marx’ work and included primitive communism, slave-ownership, feudalism, capitalism and Socialism (Fleischer 1973, 65). Although Marx had written extensively on India, China and the Americas, his general focus when explaining history had been with respect to European trends (K. Anderson 2010, 6–7). Part of the ambiguity described above, therefore, was whether the Asian Mode of Production complemented these five stages, and therefore was compatible with their historical presence, or if it was a substitute for the some or all of the pre-Communist stages of development. The AMP did provide an opening for the adaptation of Marxist history to regions outside of Europe (Sawer 1979, 24). Such modifications were pursued by the exiled Hungarian Varga Jenő, who was influenced by Max Weber’s study of China and proposed alternative models of development for non-European societies (Sawer 1979, 19). The AMP also challenged the historicity of
the nation that had been proposed according to European models. If Asian societies did not develop along the same lines as European ones, then it would only be natural to assume that Asian nations, too, did not necessarily appear at the same stages of development as their European counterparts. In particular, the importance of the state in the pre-capitalist manifestations of Asian societies might have implied greater flexibility in an understanding of the reasons for nation-formation; a direct challenge to Stalinist orthodoxy. It is no surprise, then, that the period of the AMP’s popularity among Soviet intellectual circles was short-lived.

The Ideological Vise Tightens

The 1930s saw the gradual imposition of Stalinism as the only ideological option available to historians. The AMP came under increasing criticism from theoretical, methodological and political vantage points in the late 1920s (Sawer 1979, 34–36), and was eventually expunged from all official histories in 1931 (Sawer 1979, 25). In 1934, the Soviet People’s Commissariat issued the decree “On the Teaching of Civic History in the Schools of the U.S.S.R.”, which effectively made the Stalinist interpretation of history, and thus the nation, the only valid one in the Soviet Union (Menhert 1951, 26–28). Historians who had previously been seen as paragons of Marxist historiography (Auezova 2011, 256), as well as non-Marxist ones who had survived earlier witch hunts (Sabol 2003, 115), were caught up in the purges of 1937 and summarily executed. Even in post-Stalinist Soviet accounts of the historical sciences in the USSR, the 1930s are remembered as a time of great production, but one when many scholars demonstrated, in the words of the Soviet-Tajik historian and apparatchik Bobodzhan Gafurov, an “insufficient assimilation of
Marxist methodology ... and ignorance of the concrete history of the peoples of the East” (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 98). Ideological purity was thus enforced at the highest price.

This was reinforced by the official policy of “Socialism in One Country”, a product of the power struggle that followed Lenin’s death and the gradual demise of the NEP (Carr 1958, 1:24–26). In Carr’s view, this was a necessary result of realizing the pragmatic side of a revolution in all three branches of government. His reading is based on a racialized view of history that is highly anachronistic to the modern scholar. Nonetheless, it still points to the manner in which ideology and statecraft, theory and praxis, were occasionally mutually exclusive principles that had to be welded together by the Soviet Strongman. In terms of foreign policy, it meant that the Soviet Union would no longer seek to export its ideology or its revolution to those struggling abroad. This was a realpolitik reaction to the geopolitical context: Soviets had failed in Hungary and Bavaria following the First World War; the Chinese Revolution of the 1920s had failed to materialize; and Communist parties were banned or in danger of being banned across a wide swathe of European and Asian states. However, it also allowed for all control of Communist and Stalinist thought to remain in the hands of the Muscovite élite (Vatlin 2008, 62). Inside the Soviet Union, too, revolution was fossilized and bureaucratized. An analysis of the country’s national composition had been completed along Stalinist lines, and the number of constituent nations was now firmly established by Stalin’s personal fiat. Pluralism and candid exploration in historical narratives posed a direct threat to this control by casting the possibility of doubt and diversity into the past, which would only come back to haunt those obsessed with total control.
Thus, by 1937, the establishment of Stalinist orthodoxy in the Soviet Union was complete. The nation was defined by four characteristics (common language, common territory, common economic life and common cast of mind) and was limited in its application to the period of capitalist production. It eschewed the Eurocentrism of the “bourgeois” historians, and replaced this with Soviet-centric discourse. Yet Stalin’s own ambivalence towards the historicity of the nation and its importance in human development continued to be felt. In particular, Stalinism explicitly eliminated the concept of non-historical nations from Soviet Marxist historiography, establishing instead a hierarchy of more- and less-important nations (Lukin 1963, 443–45). This decision effectively came down in an administrative decree from the central organs of Soviet power, rather than through academic debate and intellectual exploration. The level of discussion and argument should not be diminished: scholars, politicians and activists inside the Soviet Union took opportunities to challenge orthodoxy whenever possible. However, with so much of the Soviet system tied to nationality – borders (Hirsch 2005, 165), official languages, resource allocations, rights to residency and access to official positions (Martin 2000, 355–58) all became dependent on it – political forces were quick to co-opt the ontology of the nation. This ensured that by the end of the 1930s the only acceptable national histories were those of the nations that the State had deemed to exist (Abashin 2014, 146). Given the dogmatic nature of this particular State, it was upon that part of the dominant ideology first written in 1913 that such decisions were ultimately made.

In contrast to the case of Stalinism, the Republic of Turkey’s state-sponsored worldview is far more ambiguous an object. Centralization, ever a goal of both the
Imperial and Republican administrations, was far from perfected with respect to the intelligentsia. As such, flexibility is required in tracing out its antecedents and ultimate genesis.

**Turkish Ideologies**

Just as the concept of ideology is, in itself, a nebulous one, early Turkish Republican worldviews can easily be described as amorphous. Unlike in the Soviet Union, neither the men and women who formulated the institutions that would become the bedrock of the State, nor scholars studying their efforts after the fact, have ever produced the sort of comprehensive guide to early Turkish Republican ideology that exist for Stalinism or other ideologies. The *Halk Fırkası* (HF), renamed the *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* (CHF) in 1924 and later the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP), ruled the country from 1923 until 1950, often as the only legal political party. It adhered to the “six arrows” (*altı ok*): republicanism, laicism, nationalism, statism, populism and reformism (*cumhuriyetçilik, laiklik, milliyetçilik, devletçilik, halkçilik, inkilâpçilik*) (Zürcher 2004, 181–82). All six of these items carry the abstract noun suffix *-lik*, an indication of the fact that they floated above the fray of common practicalities such as “republic”, “redistribution” or “religious law”. While some of these could be described as ideologies in their own right, their selection by a political party, and their coexistence within its policies, implies that they were used more as heuristics for political decision-making, rather than coherent views of the world; contrary to what Neşe Gürallar asserts in her study of *Halkevleri* (*People’s Houses*) and architecture in late Kemalist Turkey (Yeşilkaya 1999, 44–59). Many of these were used in contradictory fashion, or were applied selectively – as in the cases of laicism,
statism and populism – which only reinforces the claim that they were useful tools, rather than cohesive and coherent visions of reality and aspiration.

Another candidate for the dominant ideology of the Turkish Republic, then, must be sought, and I propose returning to the decades immediately preceding the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate in order to find a suitable candidate. In doing so, I will explore the intellectual production of a society at first stifled under strict censorship, and then suddenly reanimated with the fall of restrictions on expression in 1908. I will track the emergency of worldviews particular to the intellectual, and then political, élite of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic, with the end goal of reconstructing a coherent system of ideology. I call this system “Gökalpian nationalism”, a recognition that it may ultimately be traced back to the writings of Ziya Gökalp; but one, similar to Marxism, that underwent tremendous changes at the hands of Gökalp’s successors (Kaan Çalen 2016; Dressler 2015).

Late Ottoman Ideology

Élite ideology in the 19th century Ottoman Empire has largely been associated with Islam, as explained in Şerif Mardin’s work The Genesis of Young Turk Thought (Mardin 1994). To be certain, the State and the intellectuals connected to it employed different discourses to encourage identification of citizens with the Empire, including both Ottomanism and Islamism, but it was the prism of Islamic theology and philosophy through which they saw the world (Özön and Namık Kemal 1997, 87; Kushner 1977, 41). As the century progressed, however, this began to change, and new ways of viewing humanity and the world it created, or sought to
create, began to creep into the writings of the Empire’s learned class, both at home and in exile. Ethnicity, too, became a means of categorizing and separating the peoples of the world, with insinuations about the suitability of particular ethno-linguistic groupings’ capacity to protect the Empire’s interests coming to the fore (Mardin 1994, 119). This should not be seen as a complete abandonment of Islamic concepts of solidarity and allegiance based on faith, and the organization of society according to divinely inspired rules, particularly given the absence of a coherent and self-contained understanding of reality to replace Islam in its entirety (Mardin 1994, 122–24). Nevertheless, there emerged new analyses of the manner in which society functioned, or how it should function, and the suitability of intra-faith divisions based on language, shared history, and political allegiance. This much can easily be gleaned from the writings of the Persian Islamic modernizer Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, whose gradual conversion from a disparager of ethno-national divisions among Muslims to a supporter of the supra-confessional nation pre-dated his lectures in 1890s Istanbul (Amara 1984, 137–39).

Opposition to the policies of Sultan Abdülhamit II, which had begun after the suspension of the constitution in 1878, gathered pace in the 1890s as territorial losses, economic malaise and ethnic conflict seriously undermined the stability of the Empire. Opposition figures organized themselves at home and abroad, albeit in different fashions. At home, dissent was largely expressed within military ranks, and was practically oriented. In exile, intellectuals who gathered in Cairo and Paris can be divided into the pro-English, liberal camp led by Prince Sabahettin; and a Francophile group centered around Ali Riza (Mardin 1994, 141–47). In addition to these opposition elements, there were nationalist groups such as the Dashnaks, who
advocated Armenian demands and only occasionally worked with Muslim Turkic elements. Although the relative freedom of association and the press in both France and British-occupied Egypt allowed for the publication of manifestos and programs, it has yet to be proven that these intellectual products had considerable impact on dissidents inside the Empire (Zürcher 2004, 88–90).

Populism and the Narodnik Connection

Some foreign elements, however, did indeed impact political development in the Ottoman Empire. One such influence was the Narodnik movements among Russian intellectuals in the second half of the 19th century, when Russian thinkers debated intensely the adoption of European culture and political systems. The Narodniki (literally, populists) called on the intellectual élite to return to the Russian village and to seek out the essence of Russia in its peasant communities. This form of populism was ideologically and politically quite flexible, having influenced both Communist and conservative movements throughout the 20th century (Zisserman-Brodsky 2003, 151–55; Taggart 2000, 55–57). Dostoyevsky accused many Slavophile populists of the same sin as the Westernizers: that of attempting to resolve the practical problems of Russian socio-economic development through the application of theoretical constructs. While the Europeanists were disdainful of the masses and their lack of contemporary European knowledge, the Slavophiles derided modern literature and society as false and empty (Dostoevskij et al. 1998, 11–15). He leaned towards the Slavophiles in his own outlook, having discovered the soul and mindset of the masses while in exile in Siberia. It was this experience that had provided the author with a metaphysical counterweight to the objective and staid European
liberalism that had previously dominated his outlook in the Imperial capital (Lauth 1996, 365–66).

For Dostoyevsky, the problem of the Slavophile *Narodniki* was, essentially, their reification of the people. Many were content to rely on outsiders’ impressions of the *Volk* rather than to approach them directly. As Reinhard Lauth has put it, “And those who called themselves friends of the people, also saw in them an object for theorization, and were obliged to recognize that in the final analysis, they [the people] were a riddle for them [the friends of the people].” (Lauth 1996, 367)

Moreover, they refused to admit the historicity of all human populations, and that the peasants’ culture, similar to that of the urbanites, had evolved with Russia’s changing fortunes. In short, the Slavophiles proposed a rose-tinted memory of pre-Peter the Great Russia as a solution to modern problems; a solution that Dostoyevsky dismissed as flawed. While the issues of the people were pressing and their resolution was crucial to Russia’s development, “renewal could only be brought about with the *new*” (Dostoevskij et al. 1998, 18). These debates, and particularly the views of the *Narodniki*, resonated considerably with Ottoman intellectuals and reformers, many of whom did not favour an outright adoption of European norms and innovations (Mardin 1994, 119). The contradictions inherent in their program, as exposed by Dostoyevsky, however, would not be resolved in the Ottoman context until Ziya Gökalp tackled them in the second decade of the following century.

**Northern Turkic Influences**

Another source of inspiration from the north were the writings and activities of Russian Turkic intellectuals, including İsmail Gasprinski and Yusuf Akçura (Meyer...
These individuals were doubly influential in their exposure to the polemics of the *Narodniki* and their grasp of the practical difficulties of fusing Western, or Russian, culture with that of Muslim communities. Gasprinski was a Crimean Tatar who worked tirelessly for the expansion of a new method of education that would simplify the spread of literacy among the Russian Empire’s Muslim populations. Inherent in this were two revolutionary ideas: that education should be directed towards secular as well as religious goals; and that education about participation in a non-Muslim polity was preferable for Muslim subjects of the Czar to a passive form of resistance (Gasprinskij, Akpınar, and Gasprinski 2004, 93–95). Gasprinski traveled extensively to Istanbul and Cairo in order to promote Islamic unity, and his journalistic endeavours were also circulated in the Ottoman realms. Yusuf Akçura, on the other hand, was a Tatar from Kazan and a subject of both the Ottoman and Russian Empires. His most important work was *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (*Three Forms of Politics*), published in Cairo in 1904. In it, he explores three different systems of governance – Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism – before deciding upon the appropriateness of Turkism for the Ottoman Empire (Duymaz 1995, 18–22). Although they are nominally called “politics” (*siyaset*), what is under discussion is in fact ideology: whether the basis for social organization in the Ottoman Empire should recognize political allegiance, religion or nationality as the most natural and durable division of peoples into cohesive polities.

**The Tide Turns**

Whatever ideological rumblings that might have existed at the turn of the century and might now be perceptible in hindsight were largely hidden from public
view by strict censorship in both the Russian and Ottoman Empires. This changed dramatically in February 1905, when a constitutional revolution in Russia forced Nikolai II’s hand on civil liberties and created a broad new space in which issues of identity and worldview could be brought to the fore: the press. Minority groups, particularly the Turkic Muslims of the Russian Empire, suddenly found themselves with an opportunity to express their opinions on the operation of the Empire, and of their communities, in a much more explicit manner (Köçərli 1976, 107; Malikov 1972, 149). Many of the issues discussed did not relate directly to the Ottoman Empire, but they did address political and social problems similar to those bubbling up in the Well-Protected Domains. In particular, the clash between ethno-linguistic and religious identification featured prominently in the writings of Russian Turkic intellectuals (Gasprinskij, Akpınar, and Gasprinski 2004, 118; Köçərli 1976, 85; Novruzov 1988, 89–90; Uyama 2013, 109). These works gradually made their way to Istanbul, Cairo and Salonika, among other cities, influencing Ottoman debates too. More importantly, the rapid return of authoritarianism on the part of the Czar, combined with a relaxation in censorship in the Ottoman lands, would induce many Russian Turkic intellectuals to seek refuge in Istanbul towards the end of the first decade of the 20th century (Akalin 2004, 24–26; Meyer 2014, 1–2; Usmanova 2009, 413; Dumont 1974, 316). This influx changed the philosophical landscape of the Imperial capital greatly just before the First World War.

In the Ottoman Empire, it was military concerns more than anything else that created an environment ripe for revolt. Fears of the imminent loss of Macedonia to Great Power machinations, combined with Ottoman officers’ dissatisfaction with Imperial bureaucracy, led to a revolution in Istanbul in April 1908. Sultan Abdülhamit
II agreed to reinstate the Ottoman Constitution, which had been suspended since 1878. The result was a restoration of freedom of the press and a veritable explosion in Ottoman-language publications. The conspiratorial group that had led the revolution, the Committee for Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti; CUP), was now able to operate openly and legally. The problem, however, was that the main motivator of its members who remained inside the Ottoman Empire was the preservation of Imperial sovereignty. There appears to have been little connection between them, in their base at Salonica, and the exiled intellectuals who were busy working on highly theoretical political and ideological projects in opposition to the Imperial government (Zürcher 2004, 93–95). The result was a clear lack of a philosophical or ideological basis for CUP activities. Indeed, as Mardin has explained, both the exiles and the Young Turks who remained inside the Empire were often happy in the pre-revolutionary period to engage in personal attacks on the Sultan as a means of distracting the public gaze from their own lack of a consistent program (Mardin 1994, 151). The Committee, not yet a fully-fledged political party, was therefore forced to seek out an éminence grise who would be able to formulate a coherent and convincing set of ideals for future activities.

**Enter Ziya Gökalp**

The CUP found such a source of intellectual legitimization in Ziya Gökalp, a schoolmaster in the city of Diyarbakir in eastern Anatolia. Gökalp had been a medical student in Istanbul in the 1890s who was arrested for anti-government activities in 1896, imprisoned, and eventually exiled back to his hometown of Diyarbakir. Despite the fact that Gökalp had never travelled outside of the Ottoman Empire prior to
1919, his residence in the outer reaches of Anatolia meant that he had come in contact with Ottoman thinkers who had been exiled there for their own oppositional activities. The result was that he became acquainted with European intellectual production, particularly in the realm of sociology, in addition to the traditional Sufi philosophy of the region. Gökalp was influenced heavily by the writings of Émile Durkheim, the French sociologist of the 19th century whose intellectual system shaped greatly the emergence of the social sciences in Western Europe (Heyd 1950, 24). This intellectual journey would have remained intensely personal, had it not been for his sudden activity in support of the CUP and its ideals in Diyarbakır in 1908, and again in the following year, when a failed counter-revolution led to the ousting of Sultan Abdülhamit II (Heyd 1950, 28). Gökalp and his family were invited to move to Salonica, the home base of the CUP and one of the Empire’s most cosmopolitan and progressive cities. From this time onward, his fate was linked to that of the Committee, and his works became crucial texts for the understanding of the Empire’s rapidly changing political landscape (Parla and Üstel 2009, 13).

Gökalp became convinced, thanks to Durkheim’s works, that groups were more amenable to modernization and contemporary European civilization than was the isolated individual. Whether in politics, economics, education or religion, Gökalp believed that the only means by which a society could face the future and develop quickly and harmonious was through group organization (Gökalp 1959, 274–75). This point of view is evident from his writings as well as his debates with another leading Ottoman thinker, Husri Bey. Husri Bey, who later became Sami al-Ḥuṣrī, a prominent figure of political Arabism, was an avowed liberal and supporter of the role of the individual in the construction of a modern society (Kenny 1963, 231–32). From early
Gökalp’s Conversion

It is important to point out that Ziya Gökalp’s writings were not explicitly nationalist when he moved to Salonica. Indeed, just as the CUP was largely concerned with preserving the sovereignty of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire, so too was Gökalp focused more on social organization than nation-building. The turning point came in 1912 with the First Balkan War, in which Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro attacked the Ottoman Empire. The result was the loss of Macedonia and the shrinking of Ottoman territory in Europe to a small area around Istanbul and Edirne. The birth of an independent Albania, the first Muslim-majority people to declare their independence from the Ottoman Empire, created an ideal opportunity for Muslim Turkic intellectuals in the Empire to begin espousing much more overly ethnicist and nationalist opinions regarding the population and government of their polity. Upon being evacuated to Istanbul, Gökalp, who had already been influenced by the heady swirl of nationalist ideologies in Salonica, was no exception (Heyd 1950, 32–33). The dismal performance of the Ottoman army in 1912-13 led, eventually, to a putsch in 1913 that catapulted the CUP and a triumvirate of Pashas – Enver, Talat and Cemal – to the head of the Ottoman government (Zürcher 2004, 109–10). Although Gökalp was not identified closely with the executive, this change in political climate allowed him to exert considerable
ideological influence on the upper echelons of the Ottoman state. It also made him acutely aware of the need for radical change in the Empire and its worldview.

Ziya Gökalp was by no means the only thinker present in CUP circles in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, and neither was his particular ideology the only one espoused by Ottoman, or Turkic, intellectuals. In 1909, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, a young Azeri liberal who had been a student of the French philosopher and orientalist Ernest Renan, arrived in Istanbul. Ağaoğlu was exceptionally active in political and intellectual milieus and was a tireless advocate of liberalism until his exclusion from the State during the period of single-party rule (Ozavci 2012). The Ottoman Socialist Party was founded in 1910, but was repressed after the 1913 coup d’état (Şişmanov 1990, 49–53). And of course, there continued to be Islamically-inspired opposition to a wholesale switch to nationality-based governance, both from outside of the CUP and its model of governance (Zürcher 2004, 131), and within it (Nur 1967). Despite all of this, Gökalp’s writings proved to be the most influential for the triumvirate. His general ideas about the formation of modern society were further buttressed by a critical mass of other Ottoman and Turkic intellectuals who had now organized themselves into the Turkish Homeland (Türk Yurdu), a pressure group that promoted Turkist and Pan-Turkic ideas at home and abroad (Üstel 1997, 46).

Gökalpian Nationalism

Gökalp’s interests were wide-ranging, and his works belie a preoccupation with the various components of social activity: education, gender politics, economic organization, political structures, the arts, poetry, and especially religion. What unites all of these disparate pieces of his considerable corpus of works after the
1913 putsch is a steadfast belief that the nation was the most appropriate form of social organization for the modern era. Throughout the 20th century, Gökalp’s philosophy has suffered from a serious glut of critical analysis, and, as a result, it has been twisted and massaged by groups on both ends of the political spectrum (Gökalp 1959, 14–15; Kaan Çalen 2016). He has been portrayed as a secularist, in line with the standard narrative of nation-building, despite the fact that a considerable proportion of his oeuvre, right up to the end of his life in 1924, was concerned with religious affairs (Heyd 1950; Dressler 2015). His primary interest was, however, in social organization, rather than systems of morality or state-formation. He saw the world as naturally divided into linguistically- and culturally-defined nations, and any attempt to organize a society according to other means as working at cross-purposes with the modernization process (Gökalp 1959, 81–82). Religion, gender, occupation, class and political creed were all seen as serious topics in Gökalp’s writings, but he was a true nationalist in Breuilly’s sense, as he subordinated them to the nation and national characteristics (Gökalp 1959, 100).

Ziya Gökalp’s poetry and prose are rich and varied. Within them, his worldview and theory of the nation become complex and resonant objects to be studied from various points of view. For the purposes of brevity and pertinence to my own study, however, I will examine only three particular aspects of what I call Gökalpian nationalism: nation by education; the distinction between culture and civilization; and the ahistorical nature of national characteristics. “Gökalpian nationalism” is in no way a well-established, or even recognized, ideology. It is a heuristic that I have developed for the purposes of this study in order to embody the dominant ideology of early Republican Turkey. I have sought, as a basis, the
amorphous and vague concept of nationalism, for which no roundly accepted
definition exists, and qualified it as Gökalpian, to denote the intensely personal and
bespoke enunciation of this former concept by the man whose works we shall now
examine.

Nation by Education

Among the most controversial aspects of Gökalp’s persona is his ethnic
identity. Throughout the 20th century, academics and the general public have argued
over whether he was a Turk or a Kurd (Heyd 1950, 21). In his own words, Ziya Gökalp
believed himself, and the urban residents of Diyarbakır in general, to be Turks.
Although he employs various threads of argumentation, including genealogical and
linguistic ones, the most important comes from the realm of his own personal
development: “I would not hesitate to believe that I am a Turk even if I had
discovered that my grandfathers came from the Kurdish or Arab areas; because I
learned through my sociological studies that nationality is based solely on
upbringing.” (Gökalp 1959, 44) Unlike later ideologues of Turkish nationalism, racial
affiliation and genetics were largely inconsequential to Gökalp’s conceptualization of
the nation. Rather, it was education – including socialization – that created nations
in the past as well as those found in the present.

Gökalp’s conceptualization of the nation was concerned mostly with the
present, and as such he rejected the suggestion that a nation should return to some
sort of idealized past of racial or ethnic purity. Indeed, the very process by which a
nation was formed implied a mixing of races and ethnicities, and the creation of a
culture through shared patterns of living and historical experience (Gökalp 1959, 25).
In his *Türkçülüğün esasları* (*Principles of Turkism*), published in 1920, Gökalp made explicit his definition of the nation: “[it is] composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, morality and aesthetics, that is to say, who have received the same education” (Gökalp 1968, 15). Gökalp’s idea was akin to the Hellenistic ideology of 19th century Greece, which did not deny the intermingling of peoples in the production of a nation, but claimed that that the nation’s duration and essence relied on its core cultural component that allowed for the socialization, or assimilation, of new elements (Troumpeta 2013, 151–54). Both effectively recognized the reality of centuries of Ottoman rule, in which peoples of various ethno-linguistic characteristics had mixed and mingled without concern for the purity of the ethnos.

As education was the basis of Gökalp’s nation, new nations might arise in the future: the Tatars of Russia, seeking to create a language and culture of their own, might have been on such a path (Gökalp 1968, 17). For this reason, Gökalp saw Turkism and Turanism as separate yet interrelated socio-cultural movements. The former was an immediate or medium-range goal that would forestall the split of Oğuz Turks – Anatolians, Turkmens, Azeris – into separate nations. The latter, on the other hand, was a long-range goal, not dissimilar in its horizons from Communism, of the creation of a social, cultural and linguistic union among all Turkic speakers across the Eurasian landmass. From this grouping the Hungarians, Finns, Mongols and Tunguses would be excluded, as their languages and cultures were too dissimilar from those of the Turkic peoples to be reconciled with them (Gökalp 1968, 19–20).

History, then, was a fait accompli for the ideologue of the Kemalist revolution; socio-economic development something that could not be overcome through appeal to an
ethnic core lost in the mists of time. Turkic unity could only be assured through education, through a view to the future rather than the past (Gökalp 1968, 20).

From this, it is a short step to the general theory of nation-building that emerges from Gökalpian nationalism. Rather than expunging the nation’s racial stock of foreign elements, a task that Gökalp believed to be impossible, the nation could only be constructed through instilling citizens of the collectivity with the knowledge of their community’s characteristics (Gökalp 1959, 134–38). Nationality is a voluntaristic process, a performance whereby those who are socialized into a specific linguistic and cultural group demonstrate their allegiance to it and work with their co-nationals to its benefit. Such a conception of Turkish nationality would permeate debates regarding Turkishness throughout the last century, and the state would largely adhere to a policy of nationalization through education (although not always in a voluntaristic spirit), particularly with respect to the country’s ethnic minorities (Üstel 1997, 162; Gunter 1988, 391).

The process of enunciating and educating the nation, according to Gökalp, was not quite as unique as might appear at first blush. Indeed, in many ways, his calls for a reconciliation between high and low cultures echo the arguments made by Dostoyevsky a few decades earlier (Dostoevskij et al. 1998, 26–28). His writings on the village and rural life demonstrate that, unlike the Narodniki, Gökalp did not romanticize pre-modern forms of rural social organization. In fact, he associates these with the Kurds, arguing that Turks have tended to settle in cities because of the relative freedom and equality permitted by urban societies (Gökalp 1959, 138–41). At the same time, he sees no redemptive qualities of upper-class assimilation of European culture. If the nation is culturally and linguistically defined, and a people
should remain faithful to their nation, then it is not the cultural production of a Europeanized élite that should dominate the nation-state. Rather, Gökalp called upon his intellectual peers to turn to the Volk as a source of knowledge and inspiration in the revival of a truly national culture. It was up to the nation’s intellectuals to go “towards the people” and rediscover the basis upon which the modern polity should be constructed (Gökalp 1959, 259). While this prescription is unsurprising from the point of view of German nationalist thought (Breuilly 2007, 3), its combination with Gökalp’s Francophile leanings adds to the uniqueness of his nationalist creed.

But if the masses provide the content for the term “culture”, what purpose, then, do the élite serve? In answer to this, we turn to the second component of Gökalpian nationalism: the distinction between civilization and culture.

Civilization versus Culture

Among Gökalp’s best-known works is the short tract entitled *Hars ve Medeniyet* (*Culture and Civilization*). Originally published in 1913, it provides a blueprint for the modernization of the Turkish nation within the confines of the Ottoman Empire. The crux of the work is the distinction between two concepts: culture, which is the essence of the nation; and civilization, the accumulated stock of ideas and technologies upon which modern societies are based:

“Beliefs, moral duties, aesthetic feelings, and ideals are, in general, of a subjective nature and are the accepted norms of a certain culture-group. Scientific truths, hygienic or economic rules, practical arts pertaining to public works, techniques of commerce and of agriculture are all of an objective nature and are
the accepted norms of the civilization groups.” (Gökalp 1959, 97)

This dichotomy between subjective and objective is far from that conceived by the Marxist thinkers. For Gökalp, both are necessary for the proper functioning of a society, and neither can be neglected by a modern nation (Gökalp 1959, 108). Moreover, a strict barrier exists between the two: literary expression can only ever be seen as the product of culture, a facet of the national spirit. Whether a society is mired in feudalism or is on the cusp of socialization of the factors of production, its literature will remain true to the emotions of the nation, unaffected by the application of new scientific discoveries and industrial technologies. There is no room for a distinction between base and superstructure, nor for a dialectic between them.

The implications of Gökalp’s distinction for the acceptance or rejection of foreign elements is clear. The decision must be based on whether a particular concept is subjective – in which case it must come from the national culture – or objective, and therefore a component of international science and technology. Once this determination has been made, the choice of a native creation or a foreign import becomes axiomatic; it is apolitical and divorced from ideology. Religion, as a system of beliefs and morality, was firmly placed within the realm of national culture, and thus the distinction, in Gökalp’s system, was between Islam and Turkishness, not Islam and European civilization (Gökalp 1959, 103). Moreover, while civilization is clearly a historical concept, culture appears to be ahistorical, or at best semi-historical. The core components that make up the culture of a nation might change in name and appearance through the ages, thereby acquiring a history, but
their essence can be tracked down to the original social group that first emerged as the proto-nation (Gökalp 1959, 108).

At its heart, then, Gökalpian nationalism is an ideology that is modernist, or modernizing, and yet distinctly anti-cosmopolitan. Its view of the world as being divided between the subjective and the objective allowed for two-track nation-building, incorporating both materialist and idealist elements. In many ways, it was this ambivalence towards the materialist-idealist debate that permitted the exploitation and assimilation of an eclectic body of principles and methods within historiography, as shall be seen in the following chapters. Right now, however, the distinction between the sources of culture and civilization provide an ideal starting point for examination of the final component of Gökalpian nationalism that I will examine: the historicity of national culture.

The Endurance of National Characteristics

Although Gökalp was critical of the blind imitation of Western cultural practices among the Ottoman élite, it was not actually German, French, Italian or British cultural imperialism that he blamed for the decline of Turkish national culture. Rather, it was the remains of Byzantine, Persian and Arab cultures that had caused the dilution and near-disappearance of Turkic subjective norms from the élite of Anatolia (Heyd 1950, 101–2). By separating Islam into its cultural components (taken from Arabs and Persians) and its civilizational ones (the objective message of Islam about the approach of the individual towards God), Gökalp demonstrated that the Turks of the 10th century onward had been forced to adopt both halves of Islam, and so assimilated cultural products unsuited to their society, or to modernity.
The proper means of national education, then, would be to socialize members of the Turkish nation in a culture stripped bare of foreign imports, the content of which was not congruent with the values and mores of the nation. These would be replaced by the true subjective ethics of the Turkic peoples, particularly those such as gender and class equality, democracy and solidarity, which were most amenable to European forms of modern civilization (Gökalp 1959, 284–313).

The begs the question, however, as to where one might find examples of such pre-Islamic customs and beliefs. To be certain, Gökalp encouraged the study and popularization of early Turkic literary works, such as the Orkhon inscriptions (Gökalp 1959, 95). The inscriptions, however, did not provide enough evidence on which to form a complete code of conduct. To complement them, then, Gökalp turned to Mahmut Kashgar’s Shajarat-i Turk, as well as the rites, rituals, customs and beliefs of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Siberia (Gökalp 1968, 115). Despite his attachment to Anatolian Sufism, he did not shy away from seeking examples of Turkic wedding customs or household dynamics from Christian and Animist peoples, such as the Yakut (Gökalp 1975, 202–4). Nor did he exhibit any hesitation in mining the practices of the Kazakhs, Salars, Kyrgyz or Turkmen – all of them nomadic and relatively untouched by traditional Islamic statecraft – for his conceptualization of true Turkic morality and customary law (Gökalp 1975, 143–46). What is important here is that Gökalp viewed the culture of these peoples as ahistorical, not unlike Marx and Engels. In contrast to the Marxians, however, he valued this positively, identifying the nomadic Turkic groupings as repositories of pure Turkic culture and a source of regeneration for Anatolian and Rumelian Turks as a nation. His view of
human society was at once historical and primordial, attributing the benefits of chronological socio-economic development to some, while denying it to others. In the following decades, a similar understanding of the world would prove to be exceptionally useful in the construction of nation-state symbols and narratives, including in the realm of history.

The implementation of Gökalpian nationalist ideas began in earnest after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. This was motivated, in part, by the transition from multinational empire to nation-state, and by the desire of the new government based in Ankara to create a tangible break with the previous régime. Gökalp died in 1924, thereby limiting his contribution to state-formation. His ideas, however, lived on as the basis of the State’s plan for the construction of a Turkish nation, and were reimagined by successive waves of theorists and politicians (Uzer 2016, 89–90).

 Ağaoğlu’s Contribution and Proto-Anatolianism

During the years of the War of Independence and beginning of the Republic, emphasis was placed less on the edification of a loyal citizenry and more on the defense of Ankara’s sovereignty against perceived irredentist claims from Greece and the Armenians. In line with President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the strongest basis for such arguments was perceived as the presentation of long-standing national presence in a given territorial space (Zürcher 2004, 144–46). The Republican government drafted in scholars, many of them exiles from the Soviet Union such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Yusuf Akçura, to aid in this effort. Ağaoğlu saw the nation as being based primarily on common language, followed by a common
religion, customs and kinship. This was reflected in a shared history, homeland and destiny; a formulation that was largely in line with Gökalpian ideas (Akalın 2004, 63). This conceptualization, stripped of its religious component, entered Republican discourse early in the 1920s thanks to the work Pontos Meselesi (The Pontos Question) penned by Ağaoğlu to refute Greek claims to northern Anatolia. In doing so, he relied considerably on 19th century European Idealist sources, projecting backwards Turkish identity onto both archaeological remains in Central Asia and the land of Anatolia (Erimtan 2008, 157–60). As might be expected, it was from the fiercest proponents of the subjective, including Ağaoğlu, that an understanding of the nation and its culture began to crystallize.

Ağaoğlu’s tract was written in support of the government in Ankara as a part of its international propaganda campaign, but it did not form part of an official narrative at the time. Similar discussions on the nature of the Turkish nation took place in a number of different unofficial circles, including Istanbul University. Here, a group of students opposed Turanist ideas that the Anatolian Turks’ homeland was in Central Asia, proposing instead that Anatolia be seen as the cradle of the modern Turkish nation (Tachau 1963, 167–68). The students’ views were therefore counter to both the Turanist ideas of a Central Asian origin of the Turks and Gökalp’s “nation through education”, stressing instead the formative experience of miscegenation during the Seljuk period in Anatolia (Tachau 1963, 168). This is an inherently historical approach to nation-formation, eschewing ideas of racial purity, essentialism and cultural chauvinism. Although their writings indicate that alternative conceptualizations of the Turkish nation did exist among intellectuals in the 1920s, their reach must have been exceptionally limited and short-lived. The
students’ journal was suppressed under the government’s wide-ranging emergency measures introduced in the Takrir-i Sükûn in 1925 (Tachau 1963, 169).

The racialization of Akçura

This crackdown on dissent did not hinder the activities of intellectuals allied to the ruling CHF. Russo-Turkic and Turkish writers were thus able to continue to contribute to an understanding of the nation, particularly through the Türk Ocağı’s (Turkish Hearth) historical publications (Behar 1992, 93–94). Akçura published his Türkçülük (Turkism) in 1928, in which he explained that national feeling emerged from the development of the sense of difference felt by every tribe and clan in relation to other groupings (Akçura 1978, 34), a sort of inversion of the Othering process explored in post-modernist thought. He continued by arguing that the nation is “a human grouping that creates unity and togetherness in social consciousness thanks to unity on the basis of language and race (ırk)” (Akçura 1978, 35). Akçura, however, believed that consciousness of this difference emerged amongst the Turks only in the 19th century (Akçura 1978, 36). His concept of the nation was therefore similar to Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolism (A. D. Smith 1987): effectively a modern object, but one based on much older ideas. Together with Ağaoğlu, Akçura made explicit the notion of nationality involving bloodlines or race. By now, the idea of the nation being the most appropriate basis for dividing humanity was firmly in place, but these thinkers had altered the mechanism by which such nations would be ascertained. Unlike Gökalp, for whom a nation was a matter of education, both Russo-Turkic émigrés insisted on the importance of descent as part of belonging. These racialist overtones were strengthened by the
writings of the Bashkir exile Zeki Velidi (Togan)\(^1\), who introduced European concepts of physical racial types into Turkish historical discourse (Copeaux 1997, 47). Through these four, both the ontology and the epistemology of the nation were strengthened: the nation was a primordial group; those who belonged to it could now be identified in theory, and with Togan’s addition, they could also be identified in practice.

The State Looms Large

Akçura was a particularly vocal critic of attempts at incorporating scientific endeavours into the apparatuses of the state. His opposition to state control was supported by the President of the Türk Ocağı, Hamdi Şüphi (Tanrıöver). Both men, however, were overcome by CHF drives to subsume civil society within the one-party state. The organization was eventually absorbed into the Party in 1931 and converted into the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Tedkik Cemiyeti, TTTC) (Behar 1992, 96). This allowed the Party and Atatürk to exert direct control over scholarly activity and to direct it towards the goals of the state. They did this by formalizing the TTTC’s role in completing a task that Atatürk had given to Afet İnan, a member of the Ocağı, in 1930: the writing of a new historical narrative for the Turks

\(^1\) A note on names: Surnames were introduced by law in the Republic of Turkey in 1934. Citizens were required, at this point, to choose a surname for registration by the government and use on all official documentation. I have chosen to follow the standard practice in the secondary literature of putting surnames that individuals would choose in 1934 inside brackets when referring to events occurring and works published prior to this date. In this way, I hope to provide clarity on the authorship of works while also representing the name of the author at the time of publication.
that would demonstrate the superiority of the Turkish nation, establish its claims to Anatolia, and distance it from the Islamicized Ottoman period (Copeaux 1997, 55).

The new narrative was initially conceived as a means of aligning school curricula with the government’s guiding principles. Indeed, the first Turkish Historical Congress, held in 1932, was largely attended by school teachers and officials (Behar 1992, 119). At the Congress and in the textbooks and monographs published up to 1932, the long history of the Turkish nation was stressed: a fully formed nation was claimed as far back at 20000 BCE (Behar 1992, 110). This timeline, similar to the exact definition of the nation, was subject to considerable revision and ambiguity. The general lack of available documentation or professionalized historical study led to nearly blind reliance on out-of-date European sources. This was compounded in the early 1930s by little serious debate of scholarly work in public settings (Copeaux 1997, 56, 67). Many academics were fearful of being perceived as either anti-scientific or anti-state should they criticize what was taken to be the official line, and thus many of the works – which were blatantly skewed towards the State’s preferred ideology – went undisputed and unchallenged (Behar 1992, 124).

**The Use of Anthropology and Archaeology**

The 1930s witnessed a change in the content of the nation, spurred in part by developments in Europe as well as those in Turkey. The First History Congress highlighted a more intensive usage of anthropology and prehistory, as well as biology and racial studies, as sources of historical knowledge. Gökalp had encouraged the usage of textual supports and ethnographic data for the fleshing out of a modern Turkish culture, and to these two tools a host of other scientific, and
supposedly objective, mechanisms were added. İnan sought to incorporate the brachycephalic skull as a physical feature of Turkishness, pushing the concept of the Turkish nation towards a racialized and primordialist one and away from Gökalp’s voluntaristic ideal (Copeaux 1997, 52–54). This prompted criticism from the established scholar Fuat Köprülü, largely because of İnan’s conflation of race and physical characteristics with linguistic relations. Köprülü’s criticism was not extended to the entirety of the State-supported concept of the nation, but it did point to the spurious employment of a myriad of European concepts for its construction (Behar 1992, 129–32). By the time the Second Turkish History Congress was held in 1937, considerable emphasis was placed on the “scientific” determinants, such as archaeological data, biology, craniology and anthropology, rather than the humanities. This positivistic foundation for the historical sciences was perceived by the government as reinforcing its laicist tendencies (Behar 1992, 174), a need that Gökalp had not envisioned in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Regardless, the ontology of the nation within Gökalpian nationalism had undergone an important shift thanks to the onward march of the social and medical sciences: it had taken on a biological component that, similar to the “psychological cast of mind” for Lenin and his followers, had never been an ingredient in the original system.

Hittites, Sumerians and Anatolia

The Second History Congress was also important for the change in focus from the origins of the Turks to their continued presence in Anatolia, which required that culture and language be used in close reading with both archaeology and physical anthropology (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 385). The Sun Language Thesis (Dil-Güneş...
Teorisi), which posited that Turkish was the oldest language and the root of all other languages, provided the first step towards the appropriation of the achievements of peoples whose relationship to the Turks had yet to be proven (Behar 1992, 175–77). It was combined with a variety of European sources on the origins of the Hittites and the Sumerians in order to claim that the Hittites were Central Asian Turkic migrants who had settled in Anatolia long before the arrival of other peoples, such as the Greeks or the Armenians (W. Shaw 2007, 180). It necessarily implied, however, that the original Turkish inhabitants of the region had forgotten their native language, culture, religion and kinship ties to related groups in Central Asia. It thus greatly altered the voluntaristic understanding of the nation in Gökalp’s original writings, already massaged to a certain extent by Akçura and Ağaoğlu, and made it largely dependent on physical anthropological studies of skull and blood types.

The new idea of the nation and its historicity, nevertheless, served an important purpose for the government. It established the bona fides of the régime’s claims to Anatolia as the homeland of the Turks, to the exclusion of the Greeks and the Armenians (Tanaka 2007, 67). It also legitimized the government’s attempts at nation formation through education and cultural policy, returning, in a perverse manner, to the original Gökalpian understanding of the nation. If all populations resident in Anatolia had originally been Turks, and only the more recent Turkic arrivals had retained their native language, then enforcing the teaching and usage of Turkish in all domains of public life would not be repression of ethno-linguistic minorities, but a means of returning wayward members of the nation to the fold ( Çağaptay 2004, 93–95). In this process, the concept of the nation had become divorced from its roots in the Idealist, Romantic and Positivist traditions of late 19th
century Europe. Gökalpian nationalism had therefore become thoroughly nativized and reimagined as racialism married to nationalization through education. The world was viewed as having always been divided among various nations whose characteristics – physical, cultural, social and political – were immutable. It was within this framework that the one-party state sought to mould its citizens into ideal Turks, incapable of escaping the destiny written in their blood.

**Onwards and Upwards**

The preceding discussion serves as a basis for the main component of my project, an examination of historical narratives written about the ancient Central Asians in both Turkey and the Soviet Union between 1922 and 1937. Many of the claims included in the ideologies outlined above appear outlandish or patently incorrect to modern readers, and might raise questions about how readily or widely they were accepted by citizens of both polities. This is not the point of my study. Rather, the ideologies form the loom upon which historical narratives were woven, and it is according to these structures that the narratives must be decoded. As Yasir Suleiman has written on the Arabic language and Arabist ideology:

“[t]reating ideology as discourse, we may say that concepts of national identity are subject to varying interpretations by members of the (putative) nation. It is ultimately they who can act upon it and convert it into reality. Whether they do act on it or not, and if they do whether their efforts will be met with success or not, is epistemologically irrelevant here.” (Suleiman 2003, 7–8)

In moving forward, then, I will interrogate historical narratives as tools of advocacy for these particular ideologies. Their acceptance by Turks or Soviets is a
matter of heated debate, and is best left to others to explore. Instead, I will focus on just how these views of the world were enunciated in the realm of history, and how such enunciations changed as the state adapted its ideology.
Turkish Historical Narratives

In this chapter, we explore the first of the two metanarratives that I study as the core of this project. In particular, I will guide the reader through a tour of Ottoman and Turkish historiography with a special focus on the nation, and on its pre-Islamic apparition among the Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia. As is fitting for a historiographic study, I will do this chronologically, beginning with the emergence of an interest in Turkic national history in the Ottoman Empire, and then follow it through the 1908 revolution, the First World War and finally the birth of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The bulk of the material comes from the period 1930 to 1937, as this is when the state, in the person of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, directed the country’s intellectual élite to create a historical narrative for Anatolian Turks. Nonetheless, the antecedents of such cultural products will be explored in the run-up to this sub-section, in order to create the necessary genealogy of Turkish historiography and to demonstrate its metamorphoses under the pressure of state-based actors. The section will end in 1937, a year before Atatürk’s death, in order to coincide with the Second Turkish Historical Congress, the last major gathering of Turkish historians and foreign Turkologists in Turkey before the outbreak of the Second World War.

Over this period, I will explore the manner in which the historical sciences, as they existed at the outset of the Republican project, were rapidly and thoroughly transformed from a budding field of scholars interested in national history into an arm of the Republican state’s campaign to inculcate citizens with its preferred ideology. In doing so, I will focus particularly upon the use of Turkish identity and
national belonging – both its ontology and epistemology – as a core component of this campaign. Our path to that end begins some seventy years before Atatürk’s passing, in an Istanbul mired in the heavy censorship of the Hamidian period.

Ottoman Turkic Studies

Interest in a historical Turkic community was a late phenomenon among Ottoman thinkers. History was often seen as a means of legitimizing the ruling house of Osman and its continued sovereignty over the Empire. Indeed, many of the histories published during the latter half of the 19th century bore titles such *Osmanlı Tarihi* (*Ottoman History*), the name of the 1887 work published by the Ottoman writer Namık Kemal (Boyar 2007, 13–14). Consciousness of a Turkish or Turkic people, united by language and descent across a wide swathe of territory, was at first limited to linguistic and literary studies. Central Asian members of Sufi tarikats resident in Istanbul provided various studies on the Turkic languages of Central Asia for Ottoman intellectual circles, but these were largely concerned with the legacy of Chagatay as a literary language (Kushner 1977, 13). Ottoman interest in Central Asia, in turn, was largely based on a sense of community of faith that united a people under pressure from Chinese and Russian advances, rather than ethnic or national ties. Namık Kemal’s call for greater Ottoman attention to the plight of the region, and to the plight of all Muslims, was based more on issues of religion than on questions of nationalism (Özön and Namık Kemal 1997, 87). Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine the opposite, given the absence, to a large degree, of an ethnonym to describe this imagined community and its members.
Between the 15th and 18th centuries, the term Türk was generally conceived, among the Ottomans, as referring to the rurally-based, Turkic-speaking inhabitants of the Ottoman realms. 19th century European studies of Central Asian Turkic peoples, however, helped to change these perceptions, particularly as Westernizing elements of the Ottoman intelligentsia began to follow European scholarly output on the languages and history of Turkic peoples (Şen 2014, 82–83). Ahmet Vefik Paşa, an Ottoman functionary, popularized the idea that the Turkish language and people were older than the Ottoman dynasty through his work on the Chagatay manuscript Shajarat-i Turk (Sofos and Özkırımlı 2009, 53). It was the exiled writer Ali Suavi, however, who, beginning in 1869, wrote more completely about the pre-Ottoman history of the Turks. Suavi’s work presented the Turkic speakers of Eurasia as part of a broad linguistic family, with mutual incomprehension a product of borrowing of non-Turkic elements by the Ottomans, rather than differing origins of the various Turkic languages (Şen 2014, 83–85).

Ottoman Turkic Identity and History

The seed had thus been sown for a new identity and historiography to flower; one that saw the Ottomans as part of a broader Turkish or Turkic narrative, rather than Turks as a tile in the Ottoman mosaic. This was in part encouraged by the appearance of European works on the history of the Turks translated into Ottoman during the last decades of the 19th century. Treatises by the Frenchman Léon Cahun and the Hungarian Vámbéry Armín fed Ottoman interest in the pre-Islamic, Asiatic origins of the Turkic peoples (Kushner 1977, 30). Ottoman writers such as Şemseddin Sâmî (who would become a proto-Albanian nationalist under the name of Sami
Frashëri) argued for the dissociation of the language and culture of Anatolia from the House of Osman. Sâmî proposed instead that they be given a more appropriate name – Türk – in recognition of the similarities and common origins that they shared with the languages and cultures of Central Asia (Doğramacıoğlu 2010, 257).

It is only natural, then, that a narrative would be necessary to unite these western Turks to their erstwhile cousins further east. Süleyman Hüsnü Paşa was the first historian to provide a comprehensive pre-Islamic history of the Turks in his Tarih-i Âlem (History of the World), published in 1876 (Sofos and Özkırımlı 2009, 53). The true watershed, however, was Necip Asım’s Türk Tarihi Umumisi (General Lines of Turkish History) composed together with Mehmet Arif and published in 1909, after the fall of the pan-Islamist Sultan Abdülhamit II (Iggers 2008, 199). The work was based largely on European Turkological sources, and was concerned primarily with the exposition of Turkish greatness prior to the advent of Islam. As such, it was concerned more with demonstrating the superiority of the Turks vis-à-vis other Muslim peoples, especially the Arabs, rather than Europeans. More importantly, Asım linked the ancient Turks to the Mongols, breaking the link between identity and faith, and allowing for the conceptualization of an ethno-linguistic, rather than religious, sense of belonging (Kushner 1977, 31–37).

Asiatic Pride

A contemporary textbook of world history provides an interesting exposition of this shift. The Büyük Tarih-i Umumî (The Great General History) was edited and compiled by Ahmet Refik Bey and published in 1909. It consisted of six separate tomes, the fourth of which was entitled Muhacerat-i Akvam ve Rumalîlar

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(Migrations of Peoples and the Romans) and authored by Hüseyin Kazemzade. The history was based primarily on Chinese sources, similar to the histories of Turks written contemporaneously in Europe and Russia. Nevertheless, Kazemzade also made use of Turkic epics and legends in order to explain the Turkic narratives of the genesis of the Oğuz and their emergence from Central Asia. These legends included aspects of the Turks’ Asiatic origins, as well as claims that the Oğuz had accepted “the faith of Abraham”. The historical narrative thus stressed the Turks’ Asian and Islamic bona fides, while tying the modern nation to the European world through its acceptance of European epistemology (Kazemzade 1327, 4:263–64).

Of greatest importance for comparison to later narratives, Kazemzade, similar to Necip Asım, stressed the Asiatic nature of the Turks as a people. In terms of their physical appearance “their faces were bony; their foreheads prominent but also low; their chins were sharp; their hair black, stiff and shiny; their beards pointed; their skin pale; their eyes close to their foreheads, black and a bit sharp; their cheekbones prominent; their upper eyelids small; their heads large and round; their necks and napes thick; their shoulders wide and solid. Their bodies were generally big and thickset; in relation to their bodies, their legs were of short or medium length” (Kazemzade 1327, 4:267). Culturally, these early ancestors of the Ottomans also shared in common Central Asian traits. Similar to the other peoples of the region – the Mongols, Manchus, Hungarians and Finns – the Turks never lost their “national” language, despite pressure from other peoples. And like the Mongols and the Manchus, the Turks were never really a pious lot; while they adopted various faiths throughout their history, eventually settling on Islam, it was likely Buddhism that was most suited to the Turks’ “imagination, pride and
individuality” (Kazemzade 1327, 4:276–77). The work is striking in its abandonment of Islam as the ultimate guide to the identity of the Turkish nation. Indeed, the disregard for religion – the Turks were likened to the Christian Hungarians and Finns and the Buddhist Mongols and Manchus – demonstrates a break with the *Umma* as a community of belonging in favour of perceived cultural and linguistic similarities. Implicitly, the narrative accepts European world views in which culture, language and race or physical appearance come together to determine the belonging of a collectivity. What is more interesting, however, is the explicit rejection of previously dominant Islamic epistemology, in which belief is more important than ethno-linguistic or racial characteristics; irrelevant differences bestowed by the unitary God of the Abrahamic faiths.

**Young Turk Turkism and the Rise of Gökalp**

This focus on the pre-Islamic qualities and merits of the Turks would reach a new level of refinement with the advent of CUP rule in 1912-13. It would be a mischaracterization to imply that the Committee itself was responsible for the rise of Turkist thought and policy. Rather, as Şerif Mardin has argued, the CUP’s lack of a cohesive and coherent ideological framework forced its core members to adopt independent but sympathetic currents of thought following the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 and, more urgently, their seizure of power from the Sultan’s government in 1913 (Mardin 1994, 29). While numerous Turkists were present in Istanbul, Salonica and other cities during the first decade of the 20th century – including Yusuf Akçura and Ahmet Ağaoğlu – it was a middling bureaucrat, poet and philosopher from Diyarbakır named Ziya Gökalp who would eventually provide the
core of CUP, and Kemalist, thought. Gökalp had been in contact with the early members of the Committee when studying in Istanbul in the late 1890s, and was influenced by the works of Cahun, Süleyman Paşa and meetings with the Azeri nationalist Hüseynzada. (Heyd 1950, 28–29). As we saw in the chapter on ideology, Gökalp was concerned primarily with the definition of the nation, particularly the Turkish nation, and its adaptation to the conditions of modern life. The transition from a confessionally-based empire to a nation-state had plunged the Ottoman Empire into crisis. Only the identification of the true characteristics of the nation, and its needs vis-à-vis the process of modernization, would help stabilize the situation of the Turks (Gökalp 1959, 24).

**History and the Gökalpian Nation**

Where might such characteristics be found? In his *Türkçülüğün esasları* he examined in detail the various components of Turkish culture and society, and the “revivals” of ancient Turkic culture that would realign Turkey’s national development to its long-term path. The “aesthetic taste of the ancient Turks was very high,” yet “the faults of Ottoman craftsmen” had caused it to fall far short of European standards (Gökalp 1968, 95). The ethics of the ancient Turks were also based on “very strong patriotic morals.” However, they did not concentrate on loyalty to a dynasty or autocratic ruler, but rather “the tribe (i.e., nation)” and “equality.” This equality was both political and social, as the ancient Turks were the world’s “most feminist” ethnic group (Gökalp 1968, 102–4). The Turks had lost such ethics – a loss implicitly attributed to the Ottomans – but could attain a degree of modern morality by returning to their past, rather than abandoning it (Gökalp 1968, 115). Gökalp
conducted similar discussions of law, the economy, politics, philosophy and religion, always praising the ancient Turks in comparison to the base Ottomans. A fully-fledged concept of ethnic identity, based on a return to the values of the Volk, albeit a long dead one, had thus come into being.

Knowledge of this distant past was gleaned from more than just epics and Chinese, Byzantine and Iranian chronicles. It was also found in modern examples among the Turkmens and other Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Iran. Aesthetic values could be learned from Turkmen rugs (Gökalp 1968, 95). Family values could be corrected with examples from Yakut and Siberian Turkic families, which did not exhibit Byzantine and Iranian-style patriarchy (Gökalp 1975, 202–4). In general, the customs and mores of the Turkic peoples of Eurasia would provide as much guidance in the re-establishment of a truly national culture as the Chinese, Iranian and Arab chronicles.

This linkage between ancient and contemporary Turkic peoples, and the identification of customs and mores asserted to be free of ethnic or racial contamination, bear on a wide swathe of Gökalp’s vision of the world. In the case of history, it provides us with a clear view to the new mindset of the CUP’s intellectual élite. Gökalp’s repudiation of the Semitic and Iranic components of Islamic culture ring the final death knell of a supranational, faith-based imagination of collectivities and social development, whether in the present or the past. The focus on Turkic ethics and social organization in the pre-Islamic period, and their connection to contemporary communities, allows for the backdating of ethno-national groupings far back into the prehistory of the Turkic peoples. Gökalp remained true to his interpretation of the nation as a group based on education and socialization by not
defining its members; he had neither positive criteria, as did Kazemzade in 1909, nor normative guidelines, as future historians would develop. Nonetheless, his writings paved the way for a decisive break with the Ottoman Islamic tradition of historiography and for the creation of a new historical science in the service of reviving national glory, right at the beginning of the age of nation-states.

Stabilization and Hegemony

Gökalp died in 1924, a year after Turkey had formally transitioned from empire to nation-state (Heyd 1950, 39). In 1923, the Sultanate was abolished, allowing for a Republic to be proclaimed. The following year, the Caliphate was eliminated as well, and with this came the subordination of organized religion to the government in Ankara. The new régime was not in a position to embark on major ideological projects immediately after its formation. Ten years of war – from the First Balkan War in 1912 until the end of the Greco-Turkish War in 1922 – as well as deaths from associated hardships and mass migrations under the Population Exchange with Greece, had made socio-economic stability and development the government’s utmost priorities (Zürcher 2004, 164–65). Nevertheless, the state still recognized the need to forge a national identity among the remaining population and to legitimize itself, vis-à-vis the now defunct Ottoman Empire, in the eyes of its own citizens and the world (Ersanlı 2002, 121–22). The issue of the former’s loyalty became a serious concern following the Şeyh Sait Rebellion in 1925 and the Izmir Incident – in which Mustafa Kemal was targeted for assassination – in 1926 (Zürcher 2004, 169–74). Added to this was the need to buttress Turkish claims to the land of Anatolia in the face of possible Greek and Armenian irredentism. The key to this,
particularly through the 1930s, was a focus on the Central Asian origins of Anatolia’s prehistoric population (Keyder 2003, 49).

The Turkic peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia were a particularly sensitive topic for the Kemalist government. The Soviet Union was the first state to recognize the new government in Ankara with a friendship agreement signed in 1920 (Zürcher 2004, 153). Given Enver Paşa’s activities in Azerbaijan and Central Asia during the first years following the First World War (Khan 1929, 43–47; Landau and Landau 1995, 55), Ankara’s policy of Yurttta Sulh Cihânda Sulh (Peace at Home, Peace in the World) was designed to assure neighbours that it harboured no irredentist policies (Oran 2001, 314). Indeed, the government went so far as to expel troublesome Turkic exiles to Europe, and it was Warsaw and Paris, rather than Istanbul or Ankara, which became centres of Soviet Turkic nationalist activities in the 1920s (Resulzade 2010, 10).

Scholars have interpreted this rejection of aggressive pan-Turkism as an indication of the lack of political or ideological content within Turkish historical narratives (Lowe 2003, 89–90; Tachau 1963, 172). Such assertions, however, are based on a top-down approach to the relationship between the ruling Cumhuriyet Halk Firkası (Republican People’s Party; CHF) and the historians active in Turkey during this period. As shall be seen, many of the individuals who participated in the writing of the Turkish History Thesis were either confirmed nationalists or Turkic exiles from the Soviet Union who retained an interest in their ethnic brethren to the north. Moreover, during the late 1930s and early 1940s, when Turkey walked a fine line between the Allies and the Axis, virulently pan-Turkist associations would reappear quickly and would make no secret of their interests in the Turkic peoples of
the Soviet Union (Landau and Landau 1995, 89–90), leading us to question how thorough the purge of the mid-1920s actually was.

**Early Government Intervention**

The CHF remained largely aloof from historiographical enterprises in Turkey until the commissioning of a national history thesis in 1929. This helped to ensure both the continuance of some degree of eclecticism in history writing, as well as the profession’s relative independence from political pressure (Behar 1992, 98). Complete freedom from interference, however, was not assured. As early as 1921, Ahmet Ağaoğlu was asked by the quasi-state based in Ankara to write a piece on the Turkishness of the Pontus region in northern Turkey. The purpose of the work was to bolster Turkish claims to the region, according to the Wilsonian Fourteen Points, based on the Turanian origins of the Pontus’ first inhabitants, the Hittites (Erimtan 2008, 156). At the other end of the spectrum, discussions among students at İstanbul Darülfunûnu (which would become Istanbul University in 1933) regarding an Anatolian ethnogenesis for the inhabitants of modern Turkey, appear to have been suppressed under the Takrir-i Sükûn (Law on Order) promulgated in 1925 in order to crush the Şeyh Sait rebellion (Tachau 1963, 167–69). Nevertheless, government meddling was neither systematic, nor necessarily aimed at altering historical narratives per se.

**Turkist Publications and Societies**

In 1920s Istanbul and Ankara, there were a number of forums for scholarly discussion of history and historiography. The Turkist periodical *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish
Homeland), founded in 1912, resumed publication after the War of Independence in 1923. It was pronouncedly Turkist in nature, and it boasted of a membership that included future members of the Republic’s Turkist élite, including Akçura, Gökalp, Köprülü and the female author Halide Edip (Adıvar) (Üstel 1997, 46; Dumont 1974, 319). In addition to the Yurdu’s periodical Türk Ocağı, two more scholarly journals appeared between 1925 and 1929, both edited by the historian Fuat Köprülü: Türkiyat mecmuasi (The Journal of Turkic Studies) and Hukuk ve iktisat tarihi mecmuasi (The Journal of the History of Law and Economy). A third journal that was also edited by Köprülü, Hayat (Life), appeared in 1928-1929 (Ersanlı 2002, 126).

Apart from the journals, the Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearths) association provided social clubs for intellectuals where ideas could be discussed and debates conducted for the benefit of the new nation-states. The Ocaklar first appeared in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918), the same time as the foundation of the Türk derneği (Turkish Support), a non-profit organization founded in 1908 to support Turkish linguistic identity along with Ottomanism (Üstel 1997, 25–26).

The Türk Ocakları were among the longest lived Turkist organizations of this period: they survived from their foundation in 1911 until their closure in 1931 (Üstel 1997, 51). After the proclamation of the Republic, the Ocaklar were reorganized and Ziya Gökalp wrote in the newspaper Altın Yurd (Golden Homeland) that the network of social clubs would strive to develop and spread Turkish culture (Üstel 1997, 126). However, the literary and cultural orientation of Gökalp and other late Ottoman intellectuals was soon challenged by Turkist writers, who argued that the Ocaklar should be employed in an analogous manner to that of their counterparts in fascist Italy: to champion the causes of the Turkic peoples outside of Anatolia. Although
they recognized the plight of Turkic groups in the Soviet Union, the brunt of their fury was directed at Iran and its designs on Azerbaijan (Üstel 1997, 130–32). One of the Ocaklar’s members, Rüşni Bey, published articles on the Turks of northern Iran and Azerbaijan, arguing that the Azeris had always been the ethnic kin of the Turks of Anatolia (Manafzadeh 2009, 174–77). The activities of the irredentists in the Türk Ocakları did not go unnoticed in Iran and prompted the Azeri-Iranian politician Ahmed Kasravi to author a study of the origins of the Azerbaijanis and their Turkification under the Seljuks and Mongols (Kasravi 1993, 34).

Opposition to the Turkist and pan-Turkist ideas of some of the Ocaklar’s members came from Turkish quarters as well. A segment of the intelligentsia, including Halide Edip, rejected the idea of a Turkic cultural union that extended beyond the borders of the new Republic. Rather, they argued in their periodical Anadolu Mecmuasi (Journal of Anatolia) that the Türk Ocakları should in fact be called the Anadolu Ocakları (Anatolian Hearths), and the organization should seek to promote an Anatolian Turkish nationalism, rather than one that embraced the Turkic peoples of Eurasia (Üstel 1997, 136–37). Their concept of Anadoluculuk (Anatolianism) would eventually win out in the late 1940s, as the state sought to incorporate the history of Anatolia into the history of the Turkish people (Tanaka 2007, 68–69). Such ideas, however, found little resonance among the Türk Ocakları organizers of the 1920s, who opted instead for continued emphasis on the wider Turkic world (Üstel 1997, 146–47).
Who is a Turk?

The *Ocakları*’s embrace of Eurasia, however, was not a sign of its openness to the diversity of the Turkic world and the origins of Turkic peoples. During the First Congress of the *Türk Ocakları*, delegates discussed the requirements for membership. A commission had suggested two different forms of rules: one similar to those of a political party, in which adherence to core values would be the key to accession; and one similar to those of a nationalist association, in which membership would be decided based on an applicant’s Turkishness (Üstel 1997, 153). Although the latter appeared to catch the imagination of the delegates present, they could not agree on a suitable means of determining the acceptable threshold of national identity. Language was not sufficient, as a Turanist view would have that the Hungarians and Bulgarians, who held few ideals in common with the Turks, should be considered acceptable. Another suggestion whereby recognition by society as a Turk would be enough was rejected because groups of “Turks” who culturally and linguistically had assimilated to Abkhazian, Georgian or Laz communities would be excluded. However, the reality of centuries of intermarriage and conversion also meant that a blood test for Turkishness would likely reveal that most Turks were, in fact, not racially pure (Üstel 1997, 154–55). Eventually, the *Ocakları* decided on admitting both members of pure Turkish stock and those who had shown complete commitment to Turkism and Turkish culture (Üstel 1997, 162).

This discussion points to two factors that would become mainstays of research on the origins and spread of the Turks during the 1930s. The first was the attempt at defining the characteristics of Turkishness and racial purity. Scholars
would disregard the practical difficulties of identifying a pure Turkish type and
centuries of miscegenation in order to establish, according to anthropology and
craniology, criteria for the scientific inclusion or exclusion of whole populations from
the Turkic family. Secondly, in recognizing Anatolia’s historically high rate of ethno-
linguistic diversity, these same intellectuals would devise a means of finding the
Turkish roots of peoples who did not self-identify as Turks. This trend would be a
recurring theme of Turkish society until the 1990s, with Kurdish communities
intermittently referred to as “Mountain Turks” and denied their right to self-
identification (Gunter 1988, 391).

Closure of the Türk Ocakları

The announcement of a state of emergency in response to the Şeyh Sait
Rebellion in 1925 began the process by which the Türk Ocakları would eventually be
absorbed into the ruling CHF (Üstel 1997, 166). In April of the same year, the
suggestion that Türk Yurdu, the organization’s official organ, be used as a means of
educating and enlightening the “outside Turks” was accepted by the Ocaklar’s
second Congress (Üstel 1997, 171). The Ocaklar continued to engage in a variety of
polemics regarding language and culture in Turkey, particularly with regards to the
inability or refusal of segments of the population to assimilate into a Turkish identity
(Üstel 1997, 199–200). Meanwhile, members of the Turkist old guard, including
Akçura and Ağaoğlu, as well as the President of the association, Hamdulla Şuphi
(Tanrıöver), fought an increasingly difficult battle against government intervention.
In 1930, the association was dissolved, and a year later a new institute, the Türk
Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti (Turkish Historical Research Society) was created within the
ruling CHF (Behar 1992, 96–97). Over the five years between 1925 and 1930, intellectuals allied to the Ocakları continued to be active on matters of history and identity, albeit not under the organization’s formal structure.

Of Two Türkiye Tarihleri

Historical narratives written during the 1920s were far from abundant, but the few that did appear are worthy of note. What might be described as the first monograph on history during the new period was published in 1923. The eminent Ottoman and Turkish historian Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, descendant of pashas and statesmen, penned the work, which was titled Türkiye Tarihi (The History of Turkey). This first book of what was intended to be a series was dedicated entirely to the period of Turkish history prior to the invasion of Anatolia. Of its 256 pages, the first 16 deal with the issue of “Race and Language” (Irk ve Lisan), while the next 42 are an exploration of the pre-Islamic history of the Turkic peoples. Köprülü’s work is unique for its inclusion of a bibliography at the end of each chapter, albeit in prose form, rather than the lists to which we are currently accustomed. From these, we see that he both challenges established Western Turkology, and is heavily indebted to it: “Information given about the Turkic languages and cultures in general Western works, such as encyclopaedias, geographies and dictionaries, is quite old and is occasionally unbelievably basic or cliché.” To this category, he adds the works of Cahun, Berezin and Rompuy, which he labels as being “worthy of criticism.” Nonetheless, the recent production of both V. V. Radlov – including his Phonetik der Nordlichen Türktsprachen from 1883 – and the writings of Jean Dény are identified as essential reading for the budding Turkologist. These, of course, are only for the use
of the linguist, as works on “the Turkish race” are still not worth citation, despite the urgency of their production (Köprülü 1923, 10). It is therefore unclear on which works Köprülü based his own study, but one might suspect that it was these very same European monographs that he decries. Certainly, the preponderance of glossed French or German words, which appear in the original Latin spelling, would indicate that this is the case.

In terms of content, too, the Tarih does not depart considerably from European models. The opening section, on the race and language of the Turks, seeks to link them back to peoples of the Old Testament, as well as placing them on the same level of historicity and immutability as the Chinese and Iranians. While Köprülu does lay the groundwork for later narratives, particularly when insisting upon the activity and dispersion of the Turkic peoples long before the advent of written historical records, he is relatively conservative in his approach to named civilizations within the realm of pre-history. In this vein, the Assyrians, Chaldeans and Sumerians are identified as others, before whom Turks had created states in Anatolia and other parts of Western Asia (Köprülu 1923, 3). Indeed, he is playful with timelines, placing, for example, discussions of Islamic Turkic states founded in Egypt and India (the Mamluks and Moghuls, respectively) immediately after his exposition of the Huns’ Turkic origins. Although not explicit, this formula allows for a re-enunciation of Gökalp’s thesis: miscegenation is clearly recognized and, while not celebrated, is taken as a neutral element of human existence. Meanwhile the decontextualized listing of Turkic communities throughout history allows for the exposition of essential and durable Turkic traits (Köprülü 1923, 4).
The sections of Köprülü’s work that deal with the pre-Islamic history of the Turkic peoples are largely in line with European sources and, more closely, with their Ottoman adaptations, as seen in Kazemzade’s 1909 history. Parts of the narrative are very similar to Gökalp’s writings as well, as they examine the morals, ethics, social organization and politics of the pre-Islamic Turks. What does depart from the previous model, however, is the author’s explicit use of ethnography, anthropology and craniology in order to ascertain the nature of Turkishness, particularly in the prehistoric and early historic periods. He blasts those anthropologists and ethnologists who divided the world into races tinged with notions of inferiority or superiority, and particularly the assignation of the Turkish race to the yellow races, found below the white races on the hierarchy of civilization. The study of linguistics and the history of the Turkic peoples, however, had helped to rectify this, and to remove this misguided conception of race from scholarly literature. His distinctions between race, language and culture are clear, but they are not intended to be blows struck in the name of miscegenation; rather, they are useful in referring to the original Turks as blond and blue-eyed, while those Turkic peoples with Asiatic features are merely Turkified Mongols, or other Asian peoples (Köprülü 1923, 6–7). This is not a reason for expulsion or exclusion, however, as the it is the linguistic history of the Turkic and associated peoples, including the Mongols and Manchus, that can provide us with the crucial pieces to the puzzle of pre-historic Turkic socio-political organization and evolution. This is true of the linguistic fragmentation of Turkic languages, which encodes important clues to the human and environmental storms that battered Turkic collectivities throughout the ages (Köprülü 1923, 8–9). With this, we see the same acceptance of mixing as a fait accompli, as in Gökalp’s
work, and the desire to engage in both synchronic and diachronic analysis. Köprülü’s eclecticism with respect to race, ethnicity, language and belonging belie Gökalp’s practical approach to contemporary Turkic societies, seeking to locate both the enduring and the mutable in order to complete the rich tapestry of the national past.

In 1926, the second component of *Türkiye tarihi* was published for use in schools. The authors of the work, Hamid and Muhsin, altered previous Ottoman histories only through their inclusion of material on the foundation of the Republic, and otherwise followed a standard European periodization of the Ottoman Empire (Ersanlı 2002, 124). Although the text did not contain extensive materials about the pre-Islamic history of the Turks, it did incorporate a new interpretation of Ottoman history, one that emphasized the importance of ethno-linguistic factors in the success of the Empire. As will be seen later in works about the Huns, Hamid and Muhsin stressed that the rapid advance of the Ottomans and the establishment of the Ottoman state up to the 14th century were due to the lack of intermingling between Turkic and non-Turkic elements. It was this purity of Turkish influence that “made the formation of a state possible” (Ersanlı 2002, 127). The second tome of *Türkiye tarihi*, despite its reliance on standard European and Ottoman sources of history, and Köprülü’s strictly Gökalpian interpretation in the first tome, had begun the process of identifying state-formation and Turkishness as intrinsically linked categories, and highlighting the corrupting influence of non-Turkic elements in Turkish history. Such heuristics would become the mainstays of Turkish historiography throughout the Republican period (Webb 2011, 494).
Azerbaijan in the Turkish Imagination

Two years earlier, in 1924, Cihangir Zeyneloğlu’s published his history of Azerbaijan, another component of very early Republican historiography of the Turkic peoples. There is no indication that his work was commissioned or encouraged by the newborn state, but it does have the hallmarks of later narratives about the history of the western Turkic peoples. It seeks to provide an explanation of competing theories about the origins of the name Azerbaijan. As such, Zeyneloğlu surveys extant ideas on the origin of the Azeris, rather than innovating on contemporary thinking. After this, however, he moves to considering the population of the region and its origins, arguing that the first peoples to inhabit Azerbaijan were the Medes. This, evidently, is not much different from what Kasravi and other Iranian scholars had claimed (Rizā 1981). Zeyneloğlu states that although the origin of the Medes is unknown, they are believed to have migrated to the region from Turan, an implicit argument that they must, therefore, be Turanic and Turkic, not Aryan. After the Medes, however, the Massagetae arrived and settled in the Caucasian and Iranian Azerbaijan. The Massagetae were a branch of the Ak (White) Huns, and thus were the first explicitly Turkic inhabitants of the region, soon to be joined by other groups such as the Alans and Khazars (Zeyneloğlu 1924, 14–15). Zeyneloğlu, similar to Ağaoğlu before and scores of writers after him, uses the tactic of labeling peoples as Turks despite the fact that their ethnic affiliations had yet to be proven to be Turkic. It is a mechanism that takes on blind faith the endurance and immutability of ethno-linguistic identity and a convenient means of founding the claims of modern communities to land and sovereignty.
Miscegenation is not denied, but it is used as the excuse for the clear
differences that exist between the Azeris and their Turkic cousins in Anatolia and
Central Asia. Here, fully formed peoples – Kurds, Tats, Laz, Arabs and others – are
seen as the reasons which the Azeri nation drifted from the purity of its Turkic
origins (Zeyneloğlu 1924, 17). Nations are understood to be essential and enduring,
if prone to mixing and debasement, with little contemplation of endogenous
development or symbiotic cultural adaptation. In establishing one’s claim to land and
rights, too, it is not residence and participation, but bloodlines and ethno-national
composition that matter:

“[A]lthough a portion of true Turks came to Azerbaijan
during the Babek rebellion that took place between
190 and 220 AH [, from what has been presented
above, the Turks’ residence in Azerbaijan from much
before the Hijra has been established.” (Zeyneloğlu
1924, 16)

Whatever basis there might have been for Islamic solidarity against Russian
hegemony and Armenian and Georgian encroachment has now been eliminated.
What matters is that the land has always been inhabited by true Turks, and their
*bona fides* as lords of modern Azerbaijan are established by their resistance to the
nefarious effects of cultural adaptation and ethnic mixing. The means of identifying
pure Turkish origins have yet to be identified, but the need for such a definition is
clearly demonstrated.

Sadri Maksudi’s Legal History

Crude racial characteristics and bloodlines were not the only concerns of
those seeking to cast back the net of national identity. Between 1925 and 1928, the
Tatar émigré Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), then a professor of law at Ankara University, penned Türk hukuk tarihi (The History of Turkish Law), a detailed overview of legal frameworks developed by the pre-Islamic Turks. Much of the work was based on the Orkhon inscriptions and the Kudatku Bilig; the former a series of Runic Turkic engravings, the latter an Uighur document, both from the first millennium CE. Maksudi was particularly interested in issues of language, law and history, and thus the work contains a number of different discussions based on etymologies. One, first proposed by Maksudi in Paris in 1924, argued that the ethnonym Oğuz or Oğur was in fact an Arabic corruption of the plural of Ok, a tribal confederation. Maksudi continued by explaining that the Oğuz, the people from whom the Turkmen, Azeris and Anatolian Turks originally descended, were not in fact a homogenous ethnic group, but rather a political agglomeration of various tribes. In Maksudi’s words, “there were no Oğuz Turks, only a Turkic Oğuz [tribal confederation]” (Arsal 2002, 7). This is a convenient means of de-emphasizing the importance of linguistic diversity among the Turkic peoples, while also stressing the purity of their ethnic origins. Other scholars, including Barthol’d, might have cast doubt upon the racial and ethnic purity of the Turkic tribes during the Hunnic era by arguing that supposed ethnonyms were, in fact, political or social identifiers. Maksudi’s formulation turns this on its head and seeks to reinterpret historical texts and endonyms along strictly ethnic lines. Yes, the Oğuz might have been a political confederation, but they were a political one formed on a solid and pure ethno-linguistic basis, ensuring a clear national consciousness in the pre-Islamic era and a case for the ethnic purity of the original settlers who came westward, populating Anatolia and the Caucasus.
This is a usage of law and social organization in service of nationalist rhetoric. Maksudi allows, thereby, for a bridge to be constructed between primordialist views of nationhood and belonging, and Gökalp’s nation through education. Law and community organization are important components in the socialization of individuals, and Maksudi’s location of these deep within the confines of the ethnic group allow for admissions of nationalization through education without denying the importance of the ethnic component.

The Turkish History Thesis

The turning point for Turkish historiography was reached in 1929, during an encounter between Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and a secondary school teacher known as Afet Hanım (İnan). Afet Hanım complained to the leader of the Turkish Republic that European-inspired textbooks had assigned the Turkish people to the “yellow races” and pointed out their inferiority with respect to the Europeans. Mustafa Kemal assured Afet Hanım that such comments were nothing more than slander, and invited her and Turkish historians in general to rewrite the history of the Turkish nation. He asked them to stress three key points: the lack of influence of Islam in Turkish history; the greatness of the Turkish people despite European misinformation; and the inalienability of Turkish claims to Anatolia (Copeaux 1997, 55). The initial project focused on the creation of a new textbook for history courses, Türk Tarihinin Anahatları (The Outlines of Turkish History), which was begun in 1929 (Ersanlı 2002, 124). However, it would rapidly develop into the Türk Tarih Tezi (Turkish History Thesis), an overarching historical framework that sought to recast Turkish, and indeed Turkic, history according to the nationalist creed of the new
Republic. In broad strokes, the Thesis claimed that the Turks were a white race who originated from Central Asia, where they had developed an advanced culture, and had been pushed to migrate in all four cardinal directions several millennia before the Common Era by a series of ecological disasters. The Turks were therefore the founders of all of the great civilizations of the ancient world, including those of Anatolia, and were the true aboriginals of Central Asia and Asia Minor (Mansel, Baysun, and Karal 1942, 8–10).

The Thesis has been interpreted in various ways. Wendy Shaw, for example, sees in it an attempt by a former subaltern to subvert European forms of history in order to counter European hegemony in the production of knowledge about the periphery (W. Shaw 2007, 170). I do not ascribe to this view. First, it fails to take into account Gökalpian notions of the division between civilization and culture, as outlined in my chapter on ideology. Science and technology – in which linguistics, archaeology, paleography and other social sciences were included – were conceived of as components of an international pool of knowledge, exempt from nationalist claims. Only subjective aspects of the nation, such as aesthetics, philosophy, literature and religion, could be seen as truly national, and thus should reflect national circumstances and heritage. Gökalpian nationalist understandings of the historical sciences, then, would not have permitted the subversion of scientific methodologies and technologies, particularly if they were perceived as being crucial to the development and progress of the nation. Indeed, the lack of up-to-date information on the state of the historical sciences in Europe – the opposite of the Soviet case – would lead one to believe that what was at play was adoption and assimilation, rather than response and refutation. Many of the works that formed
the core of the Anahatları and the Thesis were based on uncritical readings of European secondary sources, some of which were already out of date by the time the Turkish studies were presented (Behar 1992, 129–30). The target of delegitimization attempts within the framework of the Thesis was not European science, but rather the Ottoman Empire and specific critics of Turkish greatness. On a technical level, historians sought to demonstrate that the new nation-state had broken with the Ottoman practice of chronicle-writing and had embraced European historiography. With respect to content, they condemned the cosmopolitanism and religiosity of the Empire, exalting, in its place, the strength of states founded upon national ideas (Ersanlı 2002, 137–38).

Secondly, the enunciation of the Thesis and its monogenistic components helped to resolve one of the core paradoxes of Turkish nationalist historiography. As we shall see, a number of prominent historians, including Köprülü, decried Afet İnan’s confusion of race, ethnicity and language. Apart from methodological and epistemological problems inherent in this approach, it also made the connection of the Turks to the Aryan super-race of northern Europe harder to prove. If a people remained faithful to its language at the time of ethnogenesis, and the Turks spoke a language that was shown to be non-Indo-European (i.e. non-Aryan), then according to İnan’s logic, the Turks could not be Aryans. By positing that Turkish and Turkic culture were at the root of all languages and civilizations, the dominant argumentation of the Thesis could be accepted, without refuting the universally-recognized distinction between Turkic languages and Indo-European ones. In this way, the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory inserted Turks and Turkey into the Aryan family of races, rather than putting them at odds with it. More
than this, part of the Turkish claim to superiority rested on the inclusion of the Turks in the same racial grouping as Western and Central Europeans, rather than the general superiority of the Asian races over the European ones (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 31). Such arguments became common in other peripheral historiographies, including Greek histories. They were intended to heighten the appeal of a particular national grouping to racialist German historians, rather than to counter their theories (Troumpeta 2013, 172; Turda 2011, 357–64).

This leads to the third reason for my skepticism. Turkish efforts operated within a context of regional competition in addition to core-periphery dynamics. Although the Republic’s borders in the west might have been settled by international agreement, its eastern frontiers remained somewhat contentious. Ankara openly contested Alexandretta and Mosul’s exclusion from its sovereignty, and was ever fearful of Armenian and Soviet irredentist claims to the north-east of Anatolia. Iran, although now a modernizing régime under the Pahlavi dynasty, was also viewed with suspicion. Similar “linguist” claims were made by the Arabist ideologue Zaki al-Arsūzī, a native of Alexandretta who is noted for his anti-Turkish streak (Suleiman 2003, 150–52). Al-Arsūzī’s works are not well known outside of specialist circles, and certainly would not have been widely available before the 1970s (Suleiman 2003, 146–47), but they do give an indication of currents of thought within the Middle East. More importantly, Turkish historians and politicians alike had to grapple with Iranian writings on the Asiatic origins of the Turks. Ahmad Kasravī’s *Azari, ya Zabān-e bāstān-e Āzarbaiğān* (Azeri, or the Ancient Language of Azerbaijan) was first published in 1925/26, and was intended to provide clarification of the origins of the
toponym “Azerbaijan” as well as the ethnic origins of the Azeris. In it, he argues that the Turks arrived en masse with the Mongols and, although he distinguishes between the two as separate ethnic groups (Kasravī 1993, 50–52), it is clear that both are presented as violent interlopers and usurpers. He does not ascribe to ideas of racial purity, but does view the pre-Turkic inhabitants of Iran and Azerbaijan as a mixture of indigenous and Aryan stock, inherently different from the Turkic tribes who migrated to the region from Central Asia (Kasravī 1993, 38).

Kasravī’s work was translated into both English and Russian and was disseminated by the Royal Asiatic Society in the United Kingdom. He had been made a member of the Society in the 1920s, although it is not clear whether he was aware of this, and does not appear to have sought actively to use this position for the spread of his views (Ridgeon 2006, 7). Nevertheless, Western and Soviet interest in his work implied that the Iranian – and, by extension, Persian – view of the racial origins of the Turks had received the attention and praise of the scholarly establishment in the West (Kasravī 1993, 36). It is already well documented that Turkish claims about the origins and ethnic composition of the early Azeris – which were clearly skewed towards a millennial-long presence of Turkic or Turanic peoples (Zeyneloğlu 1924, 16) - had sparked considerable consternation in Iranian circles (Manafzadeh 2009, 178–79). It is not a far step, then, to see how Turkish historical narratives would have been conceived as a weapon against regional rivals, rather than European hegemony, particularly given the importance of Western European support in disputes with other peripheral nations.
**Turco-Soviet Relations**

Insofar as the Thesis and related materials were directed towards the East, the major competing narrative came from the Soviet Union rather than Iran. In 1926, the Soviet government organized the First All-Union Turkological Congress in Baku, capital of Soviet Azerbaijan. In 1929, the Congress was hailed by the then Chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR, Gazanfar Musabekov, as a showcase of a new revolutionary Turkic culture based on the Latin alphabet and scientific discoveries (Musabekov 1962, 56). A delegation of Turkish scholars under the leadership of Fuat Köprülü took part in the Congress, and was therefore apprised of Soviet attempts at organizing Turkological studies (Korneev 1969, 21). The works of the famous Russian Orientalist and specialist on Central Asian history, Vassily Barthol’d, were well-known in Turkey (Copeaux 1997, 67), and Barthol’d remained in contact with a prominent member of Istanbul’s historiographical circles, the Bashkir exile Zeki Velidi (Togan) (Barthold 1973, 462).

Hirst, among others, has pointed out that Turco-Soviet relations remained warm and centred around a common opposition to Western hegemony right up to the middle of the 1930s. On closer inspection, however, it is easy to see that the thrust of this cooperation was economic. What cultural endeavours were undertaken were largely focused upon contemporary production, rather than historical connections, even when within the ambit of two state visits conducted in the 1930s (Hirst 2013). Despite the fact that a number of joint academic and archaeological endeavours were planned between the Soviet Union and Turkey over the decade 1925-1935, few came to fruition (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 97).
This might have been due to inertia on the part of the Turkish side (Barthold 1973, 464). It is also likely, however, that hostility to Barthold’s – and by extension, Soviet – perceived anti-Turkic stance on the history of Central Asia motivated Turkish wariness to engage with Soviet scholars (Copeaux 1997, 67–68).

What was so unpalatable to the Turkish intellectual establishment? Barthold was not a scholar of the Turkish Republic, and although there were disputes regarding the class structure of Turkish society between Turkish and Soviet scholars (Saffet 1930, 71), political issues do not appear to have been the main point of contention (Oran 2001, 314). Rather, the source of disagreement should be sought in dominant Turkish narratives of the distant Turkic past and the manner in which they clashed with Soviet ideas about Turkic nationhood.

Reşit Saffet and the Origins of the Turks

One of the first works of the Thesis period to espouse a stridently pan-Turkist line was Türklük ve Türkçülük İzleri (Traces of Turkishness and Turkism), written by Reşit Saffet in 1930 and published through the Türk Ocakları just before their dissolution (Landau and Landau 1995, 84–85). Saffet’s book is not, strictly speaking, a history text, nor is it a travelogue. Rather, it is a collection of anecdotes regarding Saffet’s meetings with various scholars and academics during his travels through Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as an article regarding the Turkic communities of Afghanistan and Iran. In the description of his meetings with European and Soviet academics, however, a view to the new conceptualization of Turkish history emerges, as well as some of the disputes that arose with these historians regarding the more problematic aspects of the Turkish History Thesis.
The İzleri begins with a review of sources relevant to the history of the Turks, as well as historiographical inspirations. Saffet remarks that Marxist historiography is inadequate for narrating the story of the Turkic peoples, as the essentialism of their national characteristics as a nomadic community escapes Marxist analysis. In any event, most Russian scholars, Saffet claims, reject Marxist historical analysis and recognize instead the value of the Enlightenment tradition, including Vico and Montesquieu (Saffet 1930, 11). His choice of prominent historians is puzzling, given the manner in which he fails to include a century’s worth of French romantic and German historicist, idealist and neo-Kantian scholars, many of whom had profound impacts on 20th century history writing in Turkey (Behar 1992, 22). Nevertheless, historiography is not the crux of Saffet’s work, nor the most interesting component of his account. The introduction does provide us, however, with a poignant rejection of the supposed dogmatism of Soviet scholarship, and an implicit recognition of the role of ideology in the interpretation of historical truth.

**Turco-Hungarian Connections**

Saffet’s first stop on his tour of Europe was Budapest, where he was invited by the head of the Turan Society, Ferenc József, to speak at a conference held at the Hungarian Parliament. This occasion was of particular importance, given that Hungary was the “first European settlement of the Turks”: it was here that the Uralic Huns settled. It was also in Hungary that “Turkic” style graves, in which the horse is buried with its owner, were found. Nevertheless, Saffet quickly revealed his disappointment about the lack of academic interest in Turkish studies among the Hungarians, who appeared to have organized the conference for political reasons.
Saffet attributed this to “religious fanaticism” spread by the Germans (Saffet 1930, 17–25). The coolness of the Hungarian delegation is far from surprising. As late as 1917, the Hungarian Turkologist Vámbéry Ármin claimed that the Hungarian ethnogenesis came about from a Turkic ruling class intermixing with Uralic subjects (Vámbéry 1914, 61). However, a genetic relationship between the Turkish and Hungarian languages had already been rejected by most Uralists by the mid- to late-19th century (Hajdú and Domokos 1978, 15); Mehmed Fuat Köprülü had said as much in his own history of the Turks published in 1923 (Köprülü 1923, 8). Moreover, interest in the Khazars, a 9th and 10th century Turkic polity from the Caucasus who might have fed into the formation of Hungarian ethnic groups in the Carpathian Basin, was focused more on the possibility of Jewish origins and infiltrations, rather than genetic links to Turkic communities (Büchler 1910, 105–7). Indeed, as early as 1910, Bücher claimed that “the Khazar language is not similar to either Turkish or Persian, indeed to any other language on earth” (Büchler 1910, 118). It is therefore difficult to understand why the author of the current work under consideration would have expected a fraternal welcome. Saffet’s claim about conspiracies, however, reflects two particularly pertinent aspects of Turkish nationalist historiography. The first is the belief that betrayal by an allegedly brotherly nation can only be motivated by racial mixing and outside interference. The second mirrors the motivation behind the Turkish History Thesis project: a suspicion that Turkey and the Turks were surrounded by enemies, eager to see their downfall and subjugation. Such paranoia would indeed become a common element of Turkish historiography throughout the 20th century.
A Rude Awakening on the Hittites

This suspicion emerged once again during his visit to Prague, where Saffet met with Bedrich Hrozny, the Czech historian who deciphered the Hittite language and classified it as Indo-European in 1915 (Erimtan 2008, 157). This too, as well as other perceived anti-Turkish expressions, was attributed to religious animosity spread by the Germans. Hrozny rejected strongly Saffet’s claim that the Hittites were related to the Turks:

“He [Hrozny] was not convinced that the Hittites were related to the Turanic peoples. Based on what is understood from the artefacts that were discovered in Anatolia and that are exhibited in the Ankara Museum, among the characteristics of the Hittites’ appearance – who ruled over parts of Anatolia, Syria, Iraq and Iran 3000 years before Christ – were their large noses and large foreheads; a type that the Professor believes to be completely incompatible with the Turkish type. Professor Hrozny says that, among those elements living in Eastern Anatolia today, those with foreheads and noses that are similar to the faces found on the Hittite stones are Armenians and Keldanis [Chaldeans].” (Saffet 1930, 43–44)

The obsession with racial type and physical characteristics is seen in other aspects of Saffet’s writings. In his account of the German explorer Albert von Le Coq’s discoveries in the Uyghur town of Bezeklik, he commented on how the German’s translation of Uyghur tablets describes the beys as being not dissimilar in appearance from Europeans. This is further confirmed by statues found in a nearby township:

"As in the writings of Ibn al-Nuwwaz, courtier of Harun Resit, the types of the Turks that are shown in these pictures are considerably tall, well-proportioned,
handsome, beautiful. Even as is seen in a statue found in Tohar township, there were blue-eyed, blond-haired types present among these Turks." (Saffet 1930, 40)

The discussion of race and appearance is even more pronounced in Saffet’s account of his travels through the Soviet Union. On the issue of hair and eye colour, the gift of a fresco discovered in Turfan and presented to Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) provided him with the occasion to discuss the Turks’ Aryan descent (Saffet 1930, 85). The finds at Turfan lend credence to this assertion, as they proved “the original type of Turkishness, that is its connection to the Aryan race, its ancientness and its civilization, in the most unbiased and scientific manner.” Prior to this, “it has been alleged that the Turks are a short, nearly hairless yellow race; that is, connected to a race that is considered to be second rate – by our enemies who wish to belittle the Turks through the spread of these ideas” (Saffet 1930, 88). While Saffet admits that the Turks must have mixed with other races, he claims that they were the last to leave the original Aryan homeland, and thus “preserved complete Aryanness for the longest period” (Saffet 1930, 89). The pressure of Soviet and Persian influence, on the other hand, had caused many of the modern-day Central Asians, Azeris and Afghans to forget this, or to link their Aryan descent to Persian, rather than Turkic, roots (Saffet 1930, 152–53).

**Skull Sizes**

The idea of self-identification is totally absent from Saffet’s conceptualization of race and belonging. Despite speaking Persian or another non-Turkic language and belonging to a cultural milieu formed through the symbiosis of Turkic and Persian
cultures, these people are to be instructed of their connection to the Turkic world and, therefore, the Aryan race. This primordialist approach to ethnicity went beyond assertions regarding descriptions and paintings of ancient populations. Saffet alludes to the cornerstone of the science of identifying Turkic populations in his account of meeting the scholar Dr. Kuftin of the Ethnographic Museum in Moscow. Here, he discusses Kuftin’s ethnographic research on the Turks of Russia; the Turkmen; the Russians of the east and centre of the country; and the Kazakh-Kyrgyz. Of these, the Kazakh-Kirghiz were nearly 90% brachycephalic; the Russians of the centre and east of the country were 81% brachycephalic; and the Turkmen and Turks of Russia had significantly lower incidence of brachycephalic skulls (Saffet 1930, 65). As brachycephalic skulls were understood to have been spread exclusively from Central Asia with the original Turkic migrations, the implications were clear: the Russians of the east and centre and the Kazakh-Kirghiz were largely of pure Turkic origin. These two groups provide the ideal populations for exemplary Turkishness: the fair-skinned and eyed Russians and the nomadic Kazakh-Kirghiz, noted for the relatively superficial acceptance of Arabo-Persian culture and their lighter skin tones than the Turkmen (Kendirbaeva 1999, 15).

**National Science, Scientific Nationalism**

Saffet’s primordialism exposed, to some degree, the rift that was opening between Soviet and Turkish historical studies. On his participation in the Congress of Ukrainian Oriental Studies in Kharkhiv, he remarked that he could not see how scientific historical enquiry could be truly international or universal (Saffet 1930, 69). Although the concept of the Asian Mode of Production had not been explicitly
banned by the Stalinist régime in 1930, it was certainly not a sanctioned concept (Sawer 1979, 29–30). Saffet’s claim, then, that Soviet historical sciences were not applicable to other societies (particularly Turkey), would not have been roundly accepted by orthodox Soviet historians at the Congress.

Moreover, Saffet’s assertion that Turkey and the Soviet Union’s defeat of “religious fundamentalism” would allow for a truly scientific history to emerge in both countries was not enough to ensure that the two intelligentsias would agree on fundamental aspects of Turkic history (Saffet 1930, 69). Not only did he reject Barthold’s claim that the Turkic peoples could not have appeared west of the Volga before the 5th century CE, but he also roundly criticized the Russian’s conceptualization of the term Turk originally implying personal characteristics, rather than an ethnonym (Saffet 1930, 55–56). Barthold’s argumentation was in accord with Marxist interpretations of the nation as a product of the capitalist era (Connor 1984, 7), yet it clashed with the emerging Turkish conceptualization of an essentialist, immortal national consciousness uniting the Turkic peoples.

Perhaps most important is Saffet’s evident obsession with physical characteristics and their importance as heuristics of ethno-national belonging. On first blush, this appears to contravene the Gökalpian nationalist ideation of nation as education. Upon deeper inspection, however, it is congruent with specific aspects of Gökalp’s formulation. Gökalp’s works did not leave us with a particular means of determining which populations in particular would provide modern Turkish leaders with the appropriate data for the creation of a national culture. Saffet, and those whose approach to history was similar to his, proposed to fill this gap by investigating the historical origins of Turkic populations and delimiting criteria for
the identification of their modern-day descendants. Once this had been completed, populations to be educated in Turkishness – a Turkishness, and Aryanness, that they had forgotten – could be set aside and reintegrated into the modern Turkic community. Saffet’s keen interest in brachycephalic skulls, skin coloration and body types is informed by contemporary European understandings about racial anthropology in addition to European preferences for specific racial types. Moreover, its scientific, or pseudo-scientific, nature places it firmly in Gökalp’s category of “civilization”, a tool for the rejuvenation of national culture through the identification and analysis of the historical and pure national morality of the Turkic race. Science and the arts; past and present; Asia and Europe would all soon be joined together in an intellectual closed circuit that admitted no other world view.

From Root to Branch

The dominance of this approach to Turkic history was aided by a seemingly unquestioned acceptance of documentation deemed favourable to its proof. The development of a critical attitude towards scholarly materials occurred much more quickly when it came to secondary sources, the majority of which were European, rather than the original primary sources upon which histories of the pre-Islamic Turks were based. Caferoğlu, for example, expressed his skepticism over earlier French and German interpretations of the ethnic origins of the Avars in his article on titles in pre-Islamic Turkic communities, published in 1931. Rather than conceiving of a particular institution as being the product of a given socio-economic milieu, he is more concerned with the assignation of the institution of the Qaganate to either a Turkic or Mongolic source, ruling out, off hand, the suggestion made by P. Pelliot
that it might have originated in Iranian communities (Caferoğlu 1931, 106–7). This comes despite the fact that readings of the Chinese sources provided information about socio-political formations only, rather than specifically ethnic or racial appellations as understood in the modern sense (see Lee 2016).

There is a distinct insistence on seeing the appearance and re-appearance of particular cultural and socio-economic phenomena as an essentialist component of the Turkic identity. In returning to Caferoğlu, we see that he reviews the various Qagans’ names from the Tukyu and Uyghur collectivities and notes the repeated occurrence of the morpheme ay (“moon” in the Turkic languages). While he generally denies that this is a direct influence of the spread of the dualist Manichaean religion throughout Central Asia – something that Müller claims to be the case – he does concede that Mani might have been influential in reviving old Turkic customs. Thus, rather than admitting successive waves of religious and cultural influence resulting in a dialectic of cultural change, Caferoğlu prefers to see an essential component of Turkic identity that is either revived or repressed in response to external stimuli (Caferoğlu 1931, 114–15). Criticism is justified only insofar as it might support the ultimate desire to paint the picture of a pure and crystalized Turkic identity. Just as Gökalp claimed that there were elements of ancient Turkic culture that would be revived and nurtured by the demands of the modern era, Caferoğlu sees this as a process that repeats itself throughout history, recalling the shamanistic rites and beliefs of the ancient Turks, who, as if programmed biologically, respond to them subconsciously.
The First Turkish Historical Congress

The new characteristics of this immortal Turkic culture and people were fully delineated at the First Turkish Historical Congress in 1932. They were forcefully enunciated by Afet (İnan), the teacher to whom Atatürk had bestowed the honour of creating a new historical meta-narrative for the Turkish nation. As the head of the Türk Ocakları at the time of their dissolution, she was a scholar of prime importance at the First Turkish History Congress (Behar 1992, 147–48). Much of her research was based on the work of the Swiss anthropologist Eugène Pittard, whose student and friend Afet would become in the mid-1930s. Pittard had sought to counter European prejudices and misinformation regarding the Turks through his knowledge of the country and his study of Turkish history and archaeology. His research was often based on erroneous or misleading information, and those conclusions that he did reach rarely expressed the same degree of certainly about the racial origins or relationships of the Turks as the Turkish History Thesis (Copeaux 1997, 53–54). Nevertheless, his positive attitude towards the Turks and their place within the European family of peoples won him considerable fame and affection among nationalist historiographical circles in Turkey, and made his findings a core component of the Thesis’ scientific foundation.

Laicism and Rationalism

The emphasis on science was of double importance for the Congress and the State as a whole. In addition to lending credence to the Turkish History Thesis, it also introduced rationality and the values of the Enlightenment into state-sanctioned
historiography. It therefore provided a new tool in supporting the laicist campaign against which Ankara had already faced stiff opposition (Behar 1992, 174). This drive towards a more scientific history had also been a component of Young Turk historiography (Kazemzade 1327, 4:264), but it was made explicit by the Minister of Education, Esat Bey, in his opening remarks at the Congress (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 6). When combined with the content of the actual Thesis, however, it allowed for a two-pronged approach to building pride in national identity: proof of the greatness of the nation’s Turkic ancestors during the prehistoric period; and proof of the advanced state of Turkish social sciences in the Republican period (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 381). In this manner, the weaving of a historical narrative that relied on textual analysis, archaeology, anthropology and ideological rhetoric was remarkably similar to contemporary efforts related to the showcasing of the Roman past in fascist Italy (Arthurs 2007, 35–36). This much is clear from the introduction to the volume of speeches and proceedings from the First Historical Congress, where the mission of the State with respect to history is explained:

“In order to prove with scientific documents and disseminate the history of the Turkish nation, which gave the world the first light of civilization, which has shown a thousand and one instances of evidence of its creative existence on every page of the history of world civilization and on every scene of human activities, he [Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)] has taken the Turkish Historical Research Society, which he founded, under his great protection.” (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, v)

This brief introduction ties history, science and nationalism into a tightly braided narrative of legitimization, linking the glories of the ancient Turks with the father of
the modern Republic and saviour of the nation. Most importantly, through the presentations that follow, it allows for legitimacy to flow directly from ethnogenesis to contemporary political leaders, without the intercession of the Seljuk and Ottoman periods besmirching the righteousness of the Republic.

Afet Hanım’s View of the Ancient Turks

Among the most important sciences employed by Turkish scholars in the 1930s were craniology, geography and archaeology. This scientific trifecta formed the empirical basis for Afet Hanım’s presentation to the First Turkish Historical Congress, Tarihten evel ve Tarih fecrinde (Before History and at the Dawn of History). The creative use of both craniology and archaeology allowed her to claim that, in the prehistoric period, there emerged a race of brachycephalic humanoids in Central Asia. Research on the historical geography of the region, on the other hand, explained that climatic changes occurred 12 000 years ago, ensuring that Central Asia was a fertile region cut off from the rest of the world by high mountains of ice. The isolation of the steppe provided an ideal environment in which racial mixing would be prevented and the brachycephalic race would be able to develop metal working and agriculture (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 22–24). It was these people – undoubtedly white, and not yellow – who brought the seeds of civilization with them when, forced by a natural calamity, they migrated out towards Europe and the Fertile Crescent, expelling the original inhabitants or mixing with them (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 27).
At stake, then, was ascertaining exactly the identity of this advanced race that conquered the lesser peoples of Eurasia. In other words, who were the indigenous inhabitants of Central Asia? When placed together with another question – where is the homeland of the Turks? – the answer became obvious: the Turks are not only the indigenous peoples of Central Asia, they are also the direct descendants of the creators of human civilization. This latter group spoke proto-Turkish, and therefore should be recognized as belonging to the Turkish race. Any attempt to associate the Turkic peoples with a non-white race, such as the Mongols, would amount to slander (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 30–31). The confusion of race, ethnicity and language is blatantly obvious from Afet Hanım’s argumentation. While archaeology might show that the original inhabitants of Central Asia were brachycephalic and even that they practiced customs and rituals noted among later inhabitants of the same region, the lack of written evidence makes the link between them and later Turkic speakers of the same area tenuous at best. Scientific fact is thus massaged and stretched in order to accommodate the nationalist ideas of the Republic’s political élite.

Modern Examples of Ancient Prototypes

However, in linking modern linguistic data to prehistoric finds, Afet Hanım created a new problem: that of explaining why today’s Turkic-speaking Central Asians resemble their non-Turkic Asian neighbours much more than Germans or the Swiss. In her response, she sought to answer this challenge while still dissociating the Turks from the Mongols. While mixing did occur between the Turks and Mongols through the long history of Genghis Khan’s empire, the numerical superiority of the
Turks led to their name being attached to the offspring produced by miscegenation (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 32). Racial mixing, then, contaminated the purity of original Turkic populations, and distanced them from the purer groups of Turks, who were clearly of the white race. Moreover, those Turkic speakers whose physical characteristic were more Asiatic than European – presumably members of Central Asian ethnicities – were merely Tungusic peoples masquerading as Turks. Such handy rhetoric allowed Afet Hanım both to praise the qualities of the Turkic peoples and to distance the Anatolian Turks from groups whose physical attributes would make them unpalatable to the most fervent supporters of the racialist sciences.

Afet Hanım’s study was not an outlier, but rather an opening salvo that marked the new trend in Turkish historiography. It was supported by an even more detailed consideration of craniological evidence from archaeological discoveries presented by the Turkish Anthropologist Şevket Aziz (Kansu). Aziz presented to the Congress on an anthropological study of Turkish and French subjects employing craniological methods. Such research does not represent a radical departure from previous theses. It does, however, demonstrate a recognition of the need to weave the various branches of the social sciences into a coherent and complex narrative linking past and present, as well as Europe to Anatolia and Central Asia. Aziz spends considerable time explaining the project conducted at İstanbul Üniversitesi, comparing skulls found in Anatolia with live subjects from both Turkey and France. The end goal is to demonstrate that Turks represent the origin of the Alpine peoples of Western and Central Europe, the wellspring of contemporary white superiority (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 274–78).
Aziz explained that there were three types of Europeans: Northern, Mediterranean and Alpine. The first two groups were dolichocephalic, while the last one was brachycephalic. Racist European scholars had originally believed that these brachycephalic peoples came from Asia, but that there were two different groups of them: a white-skinned one, and a yellow-skinned one. Their “prejudices” led these scholars to group the Turks with the latter group, rather than realize that they were in fact members of the former. Such a conclusion is evident from the anthropological research conducted by two German scholars on the Turkmen of Anatolia – descendants of the Hittites and Akkadians – who exhibit a high percentage of auburn hair, fair skin and brachycephalic skulls. Moreover, despite being a controversial theory, Aziz nevertheless argued that a “yellow race” as such did not exist, but rather that it was the product of mixing between white and black peoples (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 48–50). The Turkmen provided an ideal means of linking the various components of this argument together: estranged from the centres of Ottoman power, they were uncorrupted by the various influences that subverted Ottoman culture and society from its Turkic foundations. As nomads and semi-nomads, their lifestyles and worldview encapsulated the best of the hardy, independent Central Asian Turkic ethic so often lauded by Gökalp and his followers. Yet their appearances – fair-haired and blue-eyed – preserved the Turks’ pride of place among the upper echelons of European peoples.

A Guide to the Turkish Race

It was, finally, the doctor and politician Reşit Galip Bey who provided the most eloquent enunciation of the Thesis’ racial component. When transcribed in the
record of presentations to the Congress, his speech exceeds 60 pages; by far, one of the longest orations. In it, he explains authoritatively the nature of race; the Turks’ place within the global categorization of races; and the fate of the proto-Turks during the pre-historic period. His presentation is replete with references to the superiority of the Alpine race over the other peoples of the world, while stressing that the last wave of Alpine migrants to move westward and conquer Europe were the Turks, repeating Reşit Saffet’s emphasis on the manner in which the Turks’ preserved their “Aryanness” (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 112–13). This is not to imply, however, that the first waves of Turkic migrants were not skilled. Rather, the evidence uncovered by archaeologists at the Ano excavation site, near Ashgabat, showed that the Sumerians had migrated to southern Iraq from modern-day Turkmenistan, and that they brought with them advanced methods of irrigation (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 118). Monogenesis was thus a proven fact, but rather than it elevating the civilizations of the ancient Middle East, Reşit Galip Bey pushed the origins of human advancement to Central Asia, the Turkic heartland.

Turkish historians did more than simply adopt and repeat the European concept of monogenism shifted east to Central Asia. The original theory held that the Fertile Crescent was the site of the first civilizations, but this had little to no bearing on the modern populations inhabiting those regions (Fowler 2008, 110). Successive waves of migration had introduced new racial and ethnic groups to the Middle East – the last of which was the Arab Conquest – and the contemporary populations could be said to bear little resemblance to the original inhabitants of Sumer or Akkad (Fowler 2008, 110–11). The Turkish History Thesis, however, argued
that the inhabitants of Central Asia had always been the Turks. It established a direct line of descent from these first creators to the modern peoples of Anatolia and the Turkic populations of Central Asia. Reşit Galip Bey stressed that it was a “blood libel” fuelled by Christian extremism against the Turks, as well as Semitic chauvinism, that caused European scholars to reject this conclusion (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 153–55). His message was clear: the enmity between Ottomans and Europeans blinded the latter to the fact that the *Volk* of Anatolia – regardless of their religious persuasions (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 134) – were, similar to their Central Asian brethren, the genetic heirs of a people far superior to the ancestors of the Europeans.

**Epistemologies, Ontologies and National Goals**

Similarly, Sadi Maksudi [Arsal], who would provide the closing address at the Second Historical Congress in 1937, brought to the fore an understanding of the importance of race for national and international belonging. Although he revives Gobineau’s ideas of racial superiority and the primacy of the Aryans, he is not uncritical in their adoption. He encourages greater focus in the research of the Turkish Historical Research Society on the importance of race for Turkishness (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 348–50). Within this, there is an implicit understanding that it is not just race, but which race, that matters in the determination of belonging and national history: Galip argues for white Turks, while Togan, ever enamoured of the Mongols and Chingisids, parries on behalf of an Asiatic ethnogenesis. Reşit Galip was not shy about calling this a political, rather than
scientific, debate. He claims that those who espouse a view that drought and ecological disaster, rather than socio-economic reasons, forced mass migration from Central Asia are those who truly love their co-racials in Central Asia (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 386–87). The distinction is not entirely explicit, but it does bear upon our understanding of the early Republicans’ comprehension of authenticity and belonging. If Galip prevails, then it is the Gökalpian approach which wins the day, seeking in idealized and now white Turkic tribes outside of Central Asia a source of national culture upon which to draw. If it is Togan, however, miscegenation and a strictly historical approach to the evolution of Turkic society must be accepted, one that denies racial purity and essentialism a place in the definition of Turkishness.

All of this together is intended to be more than simply the establishment of a new, objective and neutral epistemology. While the scholars present are indeed concerned with the construction of sciences friendly to Turkish nationalism, their end goal is much more than the uncovering of historical truth. An understanding of the past is an epistemology in and of itself which leads to ontological certainly about Turkish and Turkist consciousness, the undying conviction of the nation as a real and tangible component of political, economic and social life. As Şemsettin Bey puts it:

“If every individual of the Turkic world, every Turkic union that was formed, every Turkish state had been in possession of and protected their own consciousness, one would be able to easily conceive of the contemporary Turkic inheritance on the face of the earth.” (*Birinci Tsürk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 423)
National consciousness is a core component of the race that, through miscegenation, cultural dilution and imitation, has been forgotten. Those present at the Congress sought to weave together disparate parts of Gökalp’s philosophy, the history of the Turkic peoples and modern political prerogatives into a coherent understanding about the modern world. By conflating race and national culture, they argue that the modern Turks must recognize their innate duty to the Turkish nation and, unlike those who were led astray in the past, show obedience and reverence to the contemporary national leadership in its struggle for cultural, political and economic independence and glory (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 568).

Silenced Opposition

As I have alluded to above, the assertions of Afet Hanım, Şevket Aziz, Reşit Galip Bey and Sadri Maksudi were far from unchallenged at the First Turkish Historical Congress. The historian Fuat Köprülü attacked directly Afet Hanım’s confusion of race, ethnicity and language, as well as her reliance on an immature science of racial anthropology. Köprülü exposed the manner in which race had often been used, both in Europe and Iran, as a propagandistic tool for political ends (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 42–45). The Bashkir intellectual Zeki Velidi (Togan), meanwhile, argued that assertions regarding the advanced civilization of Central Asia could not be substantiated by scientific evidence, a key component of any historical study (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 171–74). Both men cautioned their fellow historians on the dangers of specious reasoning and unsubstantiated conclusions.
Their calls for self-critical approaches to history, however, were drowned out by supporters of the official line (Behar 1992, 134, 147). State control of historiography tightened, and dissenting views found fewer and fewer outlets to challenge the dominant narrative (Ersanlı 2002, 126).

Zeki Velidi and Reşit Bey effectively clashed on methodology and source criticism; this confrontation, however, still bears upon issues of ideology when placed within the context of the Thesis. The former sought to rely on Russian sources, particularly Barthol’d and other well-respected founders of Soviet Turkology, while the latter is clearly in favour of a return to Chinese, Uyghur and other primary sources, including oral histories (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 177–82). Velidi represents, to some extent, a universalist approach to the historical sciences, insisting upon the sacrosanct nature of European epistemologies; the civilizational component of Gökalp’s culture and civilization dichotomy. Reşit Bey, by contrast, argues for a distinct Turkish historical science; an epistemology that, while borrowing technical aspects from its European counterpart, stays true to the moral and aesthetic values perceived as being core to the immortal Turkic nation. Neither one can be said to be more or less Gökalpian; at issue is where the line is drawn between culture and civilization. The nationalist critics of Togan, in particular, expressed their opposition to his criticism not along the lines of scientific rigour or theoretical accuracy, but rather adherence to the nation’s morality and national pride. Similar to Gökalp’s formulation of civilization and culture both serving the end of improving the nation’s fortunes, this was a dispute about improving historical sciences for the betterment of Turkic communities, rather than any sort of purely academic advance.
Methodology was indeed a key area of concern for all those present, and it formed the core of the presentation of one of the founders of Turkist thought, Yusuf Akçura, in his closing address to the Congress (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 585–607). At the outset, Akçura appears to provide us with a prescient call to recognizing the positionality and subjectivity of the historian, whose own ethnic, professional, class and other identities will bear upon her interpretation of history (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 587). This quickly descends, however, into an accusation against not only European history, but also Ottoman-era historiography, of being anti-Turkish, because of the identities of the historians who wrote it and the milieus in which they lived (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 597). Once he comes to the need for new history texts for Turkish schools, he makes the urgency of replacing such histories, which prize European and Semitic achievements over those of the Turkic peoples, explicit: “It will be understood from what I have said that history is not an abstract science. History is for life; history is for the preservation of nations’ and peoples’ existences and the expansion of their strength.” (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 605) The role and goal of history is thus clear, and it is tied directly to the revival of the nation’s fortunes, as was Gökalp’s reorganization of society. And, as a tool in service of the nation’s benefit, it could not possibly be formulated according to universalist or foreign rules.

Akçura’s is a speech consistent with a young science that has only recently come under the protection and watchful eye of a single-party regime.
What the pro-Turkist group appears to be engaged in is a purge of perceived anti-Turkic bias, rather than the construction of its own epistemology and ontologies. Reşit Bey takes aim at Barthol’d and his asserted anti-Turkic prejudices, while Ahmet Ağaoğlu, another product of the Imperial Russian educational system, launches a broadside at all previous scholarship on the Turkic peoples for its racist approach to the Turkish nation (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 262). Little attempt is made to stake out new means of uncovering historical truth apart from criticizing the old. Positive reinforcement is provided through recourse to the same mechanisms employed by Gökalp himself: an extrapolation from contemporary ethnographic data about the Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Yakuts, Nogays and others to the pre-Islamic populations of Central Asia (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 263–65). In the midst of this, Akçura himself reassures the audience that this is not revenge or chauvinism in itself, but rather a search for unadulterated historical truth: “The most basic attribute of our thesis is that it is unifying, not discriminatory; just, not tyrannical; that it advocates peace and not enmity. In this manner, our thesis, which is based on objective investigation and scientific composition, is lofty from a spiritual and moral point of view.” (*Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları* 1932, 607) There is no need for criticism, as, unlike previous European and Ottoman histories, this new narrative is objective and fair, aimed at rectifying the festering wounds of outdated histories.

As the 1930s progressed, the régime sought to put greater emphasis on the Thesis’ scientific bona fides. As a result, it imported a considerable number of foreign
academics and specialists, often from Germany, as a means of bolstering its ability to produce local historians, linguists and archaeologists (Behar 1992, 169–71). In the Historical Research Society’s publications and at the Second Turkish Historical Congress, historians stressed archaeology, rather than textual analysis, as a crucial source of data to inform the Turkish History Thesis (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 385). The fact that the State could only sponsor such endeavours in Anatolia, rather than in Central Asia, implied that the focus of history writing now switched to Turkic cultures in Asia Minor, rather than the Turkic homeland (Ersanlı 2002, 154). Nevertheless, some historians – particularly those of a nationalist persuasion – continued to write about Central Asia and its early Turkic populations, including the Huns.

Of Drafts and Dogma

The work of the First Turkish History Congress was intended to support the larger project of enunciating a meta-narrative for the Turkish nation. The considerable presence of educators at the Congress, as well as speeches such as Akçura’s on the need for new history textbooks, demonstrated the State’s concern with a cohesive account of the history of the Turks that could be employed in the education and socialization of the country’s youth. As such, in the years following the Congress, work began on components of the Türk Tarih Anahatları, or Guide to Turkish History. The grand project was never realized, but a number of chapters survive in draft form. They are collectively known as the Türk Tarih Anahatları Müşveddeleri, or Drafts of the Guide to Turkish History. The chapters that survive indicate that work was completed by individual scholars in no particularly organized fashion. The typeset and bound works include chapters on ancient Iranian history.
(No. 7); Ottoman history (Series 3, No. 11); a history of Turkish music (No. 26); and an account of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (Series 2, No. 13A). Some of the works were completed prior to the First Historical Congress, but the majority were produced in the period 1933 to 1936.

The surviving drafts demonstrate that the process of writing and collating a grand history of the Turkic peoples from their emergence in Central Asia up to the 20th century was very different those employed in the Soviet Union. A general structure was mandated by the CHF or a centralized editorial committee, as the works are all identified as subsections of larger components. These subsections are duly indexed and ranked, implying that there was some form of prior organization of the final product. Research, composition, style and focus, on the other hand, were all apparently left to the authors. The monographs are identified as the product of individuals, rather than committees or boards, and there is no mention of editors. With this, we might assume, at first blush, that they represent, in large part, the beliefs, opinions and interpretations of the individual academics. State intervention was not nearly as direct as it was in the Soviet system, but this does not imply that it did not exist, nor that the State’s ideological agenda did not influence the output of those who participated in the project. This was, after all, funded by and implemented under the aegis of the Kemalist régime. Moreover, the CHF had eliminated open political competition, and opportunities for publishing works that ran contrary to the dominant ideology were few and far between. Finally, one need only look to the example of Zeki Velidi Togan, who left Turkey for Vienna in 1934, to see what possible sanctions might exist for those who transgressed the limit established by the Kemalist State.
Sumerians and Bulgars

The manner in which aspects of Gökalpian nationalism entered into the Müsveddeleri can be seen in two of the monographs. The first, Türklerin yazıyı icat etmekle medeniyete hizmetleri: Alfabenin de menşei, Sumer Türklerinin yazısıdır (The Turks’ Service to Civilization through the Creation of Writing: The Alphabet’s Origin too was the Writing of the Sumerian Turks) was written by Ahmet Cevat (Emre) and published in typescript form in 1933. It is number 11 of the first series of müsveddeleri. The second work I will examine is Bulgar Türklerinin Eski Tarihi (Ancient History of the Bulgar Turks), number 26 of the first series, and written by Hâmit Zübeyr (Koşay). It was published in the same format, likely in 1932. In both cases, the research and narratives presented by the authors is firmly within the realm of 19th century European philological and archaeological work. Emre begins his account of the unearthing and decoding of cuneiform inscriptions from south-west Asia with French and German discoveries (Emre 1933, 3–5). Koşay, on the other hand, makes considerable usage of Armenian, ancient Greek and Byzantine sources to trace out the migration and describe the culture and social organization of the ancient Bulgarians (Koşay 1932, 1–2). In neither case are European epistemologies challenged, only the conclusions at which earlier scholars arrived. Far from revolutionary or nativist, the historical narratives traced out by both men were obviously intended to be firmly within the European tradition.

In Emre’s account, considerable stress is laid on the fact that the Sumerians were not only Turks, but that they were certainly not Semites. Although he does not cite specific sources, he makes certain to point out that many contemporary experts
and scholars believed that the Sumerians as a nation ("millet") and the language that they spoke resembled the ancient Turks and their idiom. Moreover, the writing system created by the Sumerians was not a product of their residence in southern Iraq, but rather was brought with them from their original homeland ("memleket"), which is implied to be Central Asia, given that they are clearly identified as Turks (Emre 1933, 7). Turkish genius is identified in various ways: the manner in which the alphabet was adopted by up to 20 other nations (Emre 1933, 10); the analogous role that Sumerian culture played in the eastern Mediterranean to the role of Latin in Mediaeval Europe (Emre 1933, 8–9); the considerable influence of Sumer on the other peoples of the ancient world, including the Egyptians (Emre 1933, 16). Of greatest importance is the manner in which the Sumerians’ invention is perceived as a technological advancement, rather than being culturally determined. As a component of civilization, alphabetic writing was amenable to being spread to other nations throughout the ancient world. By contrast, when this technology arrived in Phoenicia, the Semitic Phoenicians adapted it to their own linguistic needs, eliminating vowels and degrading the Sumerian alphabet to the level of an abjad (Emre 1933, 14). This new, culturally-bound mutant was no longer suitable for anyone but the Semites: it entered the parochial realm of the nation, ideal for the Phoenicians, Jews and Arabs, but sub-par when applied to other languages.

The implications of this interpretation are obvious. The alphabet, a component of international civilization, is a far better fit for the writing of modern Turkish than the Arabic script, which is tainted by the limited realm of Semitic culture. The Kemalist régime’s decision to impose the Latin alphabet in 1928 was therefore sanctioned by the science of Gökalp’s nationalist sociology. Beyond this,
However, the alphabet as a technology was also a return to ancient Turkic wisdom and innovation. In this sense, the argumentation is similar to that used by Gökalp in his promotion of gender equality. Not only would it mirror trends in European socio-economic development, it would also allow for a rediscovery of ancient Turkic morality and family organization. In this way, the two components of Emre’s argument come together. It is not enough to demonstrate that the alphabet is a technology and therefore a part of global modern civilization. By emphasizing its origins in the Sumerians and Central Asia, the adoption of the Latin alphabet reconnects Turks to their roots, the practices of their forefathers, and a means of expression that has escaped the nefarious influence of the much-denigrated Semitic peoples. The historical narrative, presented in the light of supposedly objective European science, thereby becomes a tool for régime legitimization.

Koşay’s examination of the Bulgars is far smaller than Emre’s account of Sumerian writing, but it too contains aspects of Gökalpian nationalist ideology. To begin, Bulgar “national” legends are used as sources of historical and sociological data. The myth, similar to language and custom, is conceived as a key to the past of the nation, its view of the world and its group consciousness (Koşay 1932, 2). This approach to oral history and folk literature – both of which were frowned upon in Soviet epistemologies – belies the Gökalpian division between culture, which is restricted to the nation, and material technological development, which is shared between nations. The value placed on morality, ethic and cast of mind, all of which belong in the national ambit, is further strengthened by the claim that Turkic elements were responsible for the organization of states and state structures in the Balkans. Slavic elements are presented as the secondary force in the creation of the
polities confronting the Byzantines in the latter part of the first millennium CE (Koşay 1932, 8). It foreshadows a Turkish nationalist trope about the importance of state construction among the ancient Turks; a mainstay of nationalist propaganda throughout the 20th century (see Kurat 1992).

More importantly, however, Koşay utilizes his description of Bulgar Turks in the Italian peninsula to reiterate Gökalp’s nation by education. He claims that “these Turks who migrated to Italy lost their language and forgot their origins and spread out among foreign tribes.” (Koşay 1932, 7) The nation thus disappears not through the dilution of blood, but through a loss of language and custom. This is the original Gökalpian formulation of the nation, albeit one that is extreme in its views on the possibility of cultural change and assimilation, negating the idea of hybrid part-Turkic cultures arising in areas of Bulgar settlement. It is an indication of the unique manner in which Gökalpian nationalism informed the historical sciences, keeping them from veering haphazardly towards contemporary German conceptions of race and nationhood, while also rejecting the universality and historicity of Soviet historical studies. Change is presented as an entirely exogenous affair and, even if race does not appear in the text, dilution, rather than adaptation, comes as the greatest threat to national consciousness.

The Second Turkish Historical Congress

In 1937, the TTTK convened a second Congress intended to follow up on the first one in 1932. Events of the previous five years made for a considerably different affair in both form and content. Among the most important was the gradual withdrawal of Atatürk from public political life, leaving the running of the country to
the Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü. Atatürk, however, did not become a recluse; his attention focused much more on scholarly and pseudo-scholarly activities, particularly in the realms of history and linguistics, rather than the administration of the government and the socio-economic development of the country as a whole. Indeed, he even met with the Soviet linguist Nikolai Marr, whose work was discussed in the section on linguistics in chapter 3, during the latter’s visit to Turkey in 1933. They apparently spent 12 hours discussing language and history, including the campaign to purge Turkish of Arabic and Persian words (Hirst 2013, 48). Atatürk still wielded unquestioned power, but his decisions were no longer based on an intricate knowledge of the challenges facing the government and the nation; a source of considerable tension between the President and the Prime Minister over the 1930s (Zürcher 2004, 182–83). On the international front, too, rapid changes were afoot. The rise of extremist governments and regimes in Europe, as well as the enmity between Germany and the Soviet Union, bore considerably on Turkish policy. While the government in Ankara shied away from an open alliance with Nazi Germany, preferring instead official neutrality, it was heavily influenced by the trappings of fascist Italy and Horthy-era Hungary, basing the newly formed Halkevleri (People’s Houses) largely on models from Italy, Hungary and Germany (Yeşilkaya 1999, 70–71). Irredentism, too, was far from dead, as the 1930s saw considerable Turkish pressure on the international level to address “Hatay Issues.” This referred to the status of the former Alexandretta Sanjak, hitherto part of French-mandate Syria; Hatay being a name coined by Atatürk with the direct aim of linking the territory to the ancient Hittites. The government in Ankara had refused to recognize the territory’s exclusion from its sovereignty in 1923, and had long lobbied for its return. Controversy still
exists over the manner in which Turks were counted in the French census immediately before the elections in 1938 that led to the regional assembly seceding from Syria, and eventually requesting absorption into the Turkish Republic (Suleiman 2003, 141-42).

Within the Congress itself, such changes manifested in a number of different ways. To begin with, the Congress attracted a far greater number of foreign scholars. Official delegations from Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Romania, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary attended, as well as individual academics who were not affiliated with specific governments. It is notable, however, that there was no official or unofficial representation from Soviet intellectual circles. This, despite the fact that Soviet scholarship often found its way into Turkological studies, and that finds within Soviet territory were often the subject of discussion during the Congress presentations (Türk Tarih Kurumu 1943, XLI-XLII). In terms of content, the Congress focused less on source criticism and philology, and more on the findings of the scientific pursuits of archaeology, anthropology and biology. In addition, the Sun-Language Theory (Dil-Güneş Teorisi), whereby Turkish was posited to be the root of all other languages, placed a greater emphasis on theoretical analysis and innovative approaches to data, rather than a reverence for traditional methods of scholarship. Together, all of this was intended to highlight the manner in which the Republic was making up for the inadequacies of the Ottoman period, adopting new technologies and scientific discoveries in the pursuit of historical truth and national pride (Â. İnan 1943, 10).

On the issue of national pride, it is apparent from the pronouncements of a number of the Turkish delegates that the general feeling of participants at the event
was that the connection between the material remains uncovered throughout Anatolia and Central Asia, and the glorious past of the Turkish nation, would become evident in short order. Åfet İnan, official representative of the TTTK at the Congress, said as much during her account of the archaeological activities of the Institution during the 1930s. This was a two-pronged approach: first, Turkish scholars would demonstrate that Anatolian civilization – in large part, the Proto-Hittites and Hittites – rivalled that of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, the two great Hamitic and Semitic polities of the Classical world; and secondly, an irrefutable link with the homeland of the Hittites in Central Asia would be established (İnan 1943, 12–13). These sentiments were echoed by the head of the excavations at Alacahöyük, Dr. Hamit Zübeyr Koşay: “One stumbles upon this culture in the nomads who have been given the name of Eurasia’s mounted peoples (= Reitervölker) and, undoubtedly, the homeland of this first culture [of Anatolia], according to research conducted up to the present time, is Central Asia.” (original emphasis) (Koşay 1943, 31). However, it is not enough to leave it at that. These peoples, the progenitors of Anatolian civilization, have been identified by European scholars as the Altay peoples, who imparted their civilizational advances to the ancestors of the Indo-German race. They are, certainly, the same as the Turks (Koşay 1943, 31–32).

Racial and civilizational superiority set the tone for the conference right from the beginning. İnan reminds her audience, both domestic and foreign, that “this happy task [the writing of Turkish history] takes its inspiration and its plan from these foundations: the Turks are a white race and brachycephalic.” While she does assert that the Turks undoubtedly spread civilization from Europe to the Pacific Ocean and beyond, the most important aspect of İnan’s speech is that racial
continuity is even more prominent than racial superiority. The Hittites and the Turks, without doubt, are one and the same, and thus Anatolia has been inhabited continuously by the same racial grouping for several millennia (Â. İnan 1943, 8–9). When taken together, important political and ideological signposts can be seen in both İnan and Koşay’s addresses. Politically, the state’s priority of establishing its right to the land of Anatolia, as opposed to Greek and Armenian irredentists, is clear from the discussion of endurance and continuity. Many of the components of a nation – language, morality, social organization, culture, economy – differ radically between the ancient Anatolians and the modern Turks. Nevertheless, by substituting racial characteristics for psychological and cultural ones, the intellectual establishment applies an innovative mechanism to legitimize continued Turkish sovereignty over all of Anatolia. Moreover, the insistence on a white race, as opposed to Mongoloid or Negroid, obviates any sort of call for mandatory or colonial administration over Turkey. Such systems are suitable for the peoples of Asia and Africa, but if the Turks are as white as the peoples of Europe, there can be no question of subordinating the government in Ankara to London, Paris or Berlin (Ergin 2008, 837).

On the ideological level, a more nuanced approach reveals considerable similarities between Gökalp’s understanding of the nation and modern social organization, and the narratives of both İnan and Koşay. First, the insistence on Anatolia’s civilizational advancement compared to Egypt and Mesopotamia negates any sort of view that the Semitic contribution to Turkish culture might have, in some way, enriched and advanced it. Koşay admits that Proto-Hittite and Hittite civilizations were in fact influenced heavily by neighbouring societies, but this
appears to have been the case after these societies’ highly-advanced cultures were transported from Central Asia (Koşay 1943, 28). One then sees the importance of learning about the past and the pure Altaic cultures of pre-Islamic Central Asia. If the ancestors of the modern Turks were the instructors of the now dominant Indo-Germanic peoples, then clearly a return to the core beliefs and values of the Altaic societies will reverse the corruption and debasement brought about through centuries of sustained Byzantine, Persian and Semitic influences. National morality and social organization, as in the works of Gökalp, are key to this rejuvenation, and the tools with which we uncover them are embedded in the modern, international sciences adopted by the new Republic. Culture and civilization, each in its appropriate place, aims to rebuild and reinforce the nation as a social construct. Gone is the Islamic concept of belonging through belief; here now is belonging through being, a society educated about its own pertinence to the Turkish racial-nation, founder of human civilization.

Even Gökalp’s insistence on the voluntaristic notions of language-based belonging have been tweaked to meet the needs of the dominant understanding of inclusion. The Sun-Language Theory was intended to provide a key to showing the superiority and long life of the Turkish language, but it was also a mechanism for rooting out racial imposters. Hasan Reşit Tankut’s address to the plenum provides us with insight into how this is achieved. He picks up on Gökalp’s claim that race, ethnicity and language are unconnected and limits this assertion to the historical period only. By employing the methods and discoveries of history, archaeology, ethnography, racial anthropology, toponomy and other social sciences, one can then see that physiognomy and sound production – the core of language formation and
enunciation – are inextricably linked. In this way, people might learn to speak another language and assimilate into its related culture, but they will forever be doomed to speaking that language incorrectly because of their physical construction (Tankut 1943, 221–22). Once the form of the articulatory organs suited to Turkish is identified, it is an easy, short step to determining the ideal Turk; a certification that does not negate the inclusion of other, Turkified groups, but one that does create a hierarchy of originality and imitation.

“Many intractable phonemes – which have guarded their secrets – harken back to a substratum that is accepted as lying in the depths of the past, to the deepest primordial level of cultural creation. The basis of this substratum is racial elements.” (Tankut 1943, 223)

Far from a conciliatory approach to other languages and borrowings from them, the Sun-Language theory then becomes a means of explaining the effects of miscegenation on language and culture. Other speech communities developed because, according to Tankut, the corruption of the Turkish race made the resulting descendants of mixed provenance incapable of properly producing Turkish sounds. Their bodies were, literally, unsuited to speaking the purer forms of original human speech (Tankut 1943, 223). Similar to their parentage, their tongues, too, were bastardized. In many ways, this logic is an extension of the epistemology employed by Gökalp. He argued that the purer forms of Turkic creation in morality, esthetics and customary law were better suited to the nation’s cultural development. One cannot be surprised, then, that the historians of the 1930s, caught up in the general excitement for racial anthropology and eugenics, would take this one step further and argue that authentically Turkish physiques, too, were better suited to the
national language. It is subjective and tautological – pure Turkish is spoken by anyone with pure Turkish features suited to the production of Turkish sounds – but no more subjective than some of the theories advanced by contemporary European scholars. Indeed, when compared with them, Tankut’s primary distinction was not its specious nature, but the manner in which it dovetails with state-sanctioned ideology.

The Master Speaks

The danger inherent in opening the Congress to foreign participation was, of course, that foreign academics were far less susceptible to the pressure brought to bear upon Turkish and Turkic ones. To be certain, the sort of outbursts and disputes witnessed during the First Historical Congress in 1932 are not recorded in the accounts of the Second Congress. Nevertheless, the finer details of the narrative, including those that caused consternation among the participants at the First Congress, proved to be harder to control in the presentations of the foreign guests. Hancar’s speech on the importance of Caucasian pre-history for the history of Anatolia is instructive in this regard. Although he lauds Turkish achievement in pre-history as in the modern era, the scholar does not fail to mention the important contributions made to Anatolian social, political and economic history by other groupings, including Semites and Egyptians (Hancar 1943, 51–52). Immediately following the reading of the prepared remarks, Koşay interrupted the Congress to provide two clarifications on Dr. Hancar’s analysis. The first was to draw attention to the fact that “neighbouring peoples” implied those groups that had clearly moved from east to west, and was therefore an affirmation of the links between Central
Asian civilizations and pre-historic Anatolia. The second was a correction of the timelines included in the Professor’s sketch of Caucasian history. These clearly did not correspond to the periodization and chronology inherent in the Turkish History Thesis, and therefore created an opening for criticism of the state-sanctioned narrative (Hancar 1943, 64).

Wayward approaches to the approved chronology and boundaries of inclusion were not uncommon among the foreign participants. Sometimes, these would be tolerated because they equated the Turks to other communities identified as superior. This can be seen in the presentation of the Austrian W. Koppers, who argues for the usage of folklore and oral history to demonstrate the lofty place reserved for the Turkish and Indo-German races (Koppers 1943, 653–54). Others, however, were not as well received. A report by the French anthropologist Henri Vallois demonstrates how ambiguities and uncertainties were managed by the Turkish organizers. Vallois and the Swiss Marguerite Dellenbach of the University of Geneva (Dellenbach 1943) both spoke on the importance of anthropological studies for determining the relationship of the Turks to the Alpine race and the racial grouping’s history with respect to other groups involved in long-range migrations. Vallois, however, made clear that language, race and nation were three distinct categories, with race an entirely physical attribute and nation a historical one (Vallois 1943, 457). These pedantic matters, however, were deftly ignored by the Chair of the session, Afet İnan, who instead drew delegates’ attention to the importance of Vallois’ tentative conclusions on the relationship between Turkey, Turks and the titular nations of the surrounding states:
“I would like to thank the Professor for this very valuable study. Moreover, I will stress that when we observe the races of the regions that surround our homeland [Anatolia], only this one [the Turkish race] appears to be suitable to be called the Anatolian race. In my opinion, they [people from surrounding countries] used this terminology [Anatolian race] and relied on Sumerian sculptures, noting that they had long ears. However, sculptures do not show us exactly what the racial type was. On this, I will refer specifically to the following point: we are the original Alpine type, the Anatolian race cannot be shown to be anything different from the European type.” (Türk Tarih Kurumu 1943, 483) (original emphasis)

İnan steamrolls over both Vallois’ caution in drawing conclusions about the present from the material remains of the past, and casts doubt on the validity of archaeology as an epistemology. Her flexibility with regards to science, interpretation and objectivity are thus laid bare by her determination to connect the ancient peoples of an Alpine type with the modern-day Turks, refusing Vallois’ own uncoupling of race and nation.

An even more overt challenge by one of the most important foreign guests, the Swiss scholar Eugène Pittard, proved even more difficult to manage. Not only was Pittard present at the Congress, but his historical and anthropological writings formed the basis of much of İnan’s own work. As an academic revered by many in the Turkish establishment and clearly perceived to be a friend of Turkish nationalism, his own departures from the teachings of the Thesis could hardly be dismissed as mere errors. For the most part, Pittard delivered information that was hardly surprising to those familiar with the core of the dominant Turkish narrative. Moreover, he relied on Turkish assessments of material remains from Anatolia in order to confirm his hypothesis about brachycephalic skulls, ensuring that the
probability of a split with the state-sanctioned discourse was minimal (Pittard 1943, 67–72). Pittard was forthcoming in his support of the Turkish appropriation of the Hittites, and of the demographic connections established between Anatolia in the west and Central Asia to the east. In doing so, however, he skewed from the approved line and makes the claim that Turkmen, Turks and Iranians, thanks to their racial features, can quite easily be seen to be descendants of the same people, the original Alpine Turks of Central Asia (Pittard 1943, 72). These racial features include dark hair, dark eyes and a shorter stature, in addition to a brachycephalic head (Pittard 1943, 82). They match, in large part, the description of the average Turk, but are indeed far from the imagined Aryan superman.

Amazingly, such statements are not refuted by the Turkish delegates present. This might be explained in part by the gradual change in Turkey’s geopolitical position: no longer is it important for pan-Turkists to reclaim Azerbaijan, which is largely in Iranian hands, from the rule of a foreign nation. More important is forging the basis of a nationalist ideology legitimizing the state and its continued sovereignty over Anatolia. If Turks and Iranians are both descended from the original Alpine peoples of Central Asia, this fact has no bearing on Ankara’s claims against Armenian and Greeks over Asia Minor. Added to this is Pittard’s understanding of the dynamics of cultural and linguistic change. Large armies that move across huge distances, particularly in periods of slow transport, cannot possibly overwhelm the existing population of a region and dilute its original stock. Even the Mongols, who conquered most of Eurasia, were forced to replenish their forces with local recruits, the majority of whom were of “Turanic” blood. For this reason, it is foolish to assume that successive Greek, Macedonian, Semitic or Mongol invasions had the
effect of altering the racial make-up of Anatolia or Central Asia (Pittard 1943, 73–77).

This is, perhaps, the strongest approbation of the government’s basis for its Turkification programs. There is no need to eliminate non-Turkish brachycephalic communities by force, as they are only non-Turkish by ethnicity and language, but not blood. By constructing the nation through education, it returns them to the fold of their original stock and reveals from within their true character. Pittard might not have rehashed the Turkish History Thesis verbatim, but his report did provide a sheen of scientific rigour to the state’s meta-narrative of Turkishness.

**Race: A State of Mind**

There can be no doubt that one of the distinguishing features of the Second Congress vis-à-vis the First is its focus on the social and physical sciences, in addition to the humanities. There were presentations devoted to historiography and comparative philology, but these were supplemented by explanations of the history of the Turks through archaeology, paleography, psychology and even biology. The insistence on biological features did not clarify the boundaries between race, ethnicity and nation. Rather, by confounding the meta-epistemologies of psychology, racial anthropology and biology, the dominant catchall concept of the Turkish Historical Research Society was reinforced. In his presentation “Research on the Biology of the Turkish Race: Blood Groups and Fingerprints,” Sadi Irmak makes this abundantly clear in his definition of race: “Race is a biological and psychological unity. This unity is made up of many components. Anthropology, history, sociology, psychology and biology can compile these pieces by [working] hand in hand.” (Irmak 1943, 841–42) If the nation cannot be shown to be entirely essential – a limitation
inherent in Gökalpian nationalism itself – then the shifting of psychological and spiritual elements, typically conceived of as national characteristics, to the concept of race allows for such automatic inclusion to be in-built into the Gökalpian nationalist narrative.

Irmak’s aim is not to track out the history of the Turks through their biological and racial features, but rather to add the health sciences’ contribution to the metanarrative of the Turkish state. In doing so, he both identifies biological markers of inclusion and exclusion, and seeks to provide rough guidelines for utilizing biology as an explanatory tool of the emergence and spread of the Turkish race. He explains that the four blood type groups – O, A, B and AB – are representative of lineage and racial purity. O marks the purest of the races, and is very common among the Maya, the Inuit and other indigenous peoples of the Americas, while A is the predominant type of the European or Alpine races. The Yörük of southern Turkey, a nomadic Turkic ethnicity, show a higher than average level of type O, especially among those Yörük who continue their nomadic lifestyle with little interaction with urban peoples. Urban Turks, on the other hand, have high percentages of type A, marking them as belonging to European racial groups and distinct from Arabs, Roma and Persians. In their fingerprints, too, he identifies a number of typical patterns that tie the Turkic peoples to those of northern Europe. Irmak calls for greater study of Turkic populations in Central Asia, as well, to confirm this thesis, but his preliminary results are clear in their implications for the metanarrative and its epistemology (Irmak 1943, 843–45).

Race and nation overlap here, but in a manner that fills out, rather than changing, the foundational understanding of the nation proposed by Gökalp. Much
as Marx failed to leave us with a comprehensive definition of the nation, Gökalp did not provide a means of identifying Turkic communities in the past, or those retaining a high degree of pure Turkishness in the present. İrmak allows for the continuation of the Gökalpian understanding of a nation by psychology and education, but ties it now to the international civilizational tools of biology and racial anthropology, constructing the Gökalpian nation on the basis of a modern approach to human society. He also confirms the Gökalpian belief that the nomadic Turkic peoples of the Middle East and Central Asia form a repository of pure, uncorrupted Turkishness, extending it from culture and custom to blood. In this way, the durability of the nation is confirmed, while biology and the study of fingerprints allows the researcher a quick and easy means of identifying those communities whose customs, social organization and economy represent as closely as possible the original Turkic civilization of pre-Islamic Central Asia.

İrmak is echoed by another Turkish biologist, Nureddin Onur, in his presentation entitled “A Study of the Inception of the Turkish Race from the Point of View of Blood Groups.” Onur takes a slightly different tact from İrmak with respect to the O blood type, one that can be deduced from İrmak’s speech but is not necessarily explicit. If the O group is that which is a marker of racial purity, then it must also be an indicator of the direct descent of population groupings from the first humans to inhabit the earth (Onur 1943, 848). This does not mean that the Inuit and Maya are descended from the Turks, but rather ties peoples with high ratios of O-type amongst their general populations to be traced back to a primeval world. In the case of the Yörük, this fact, combined with the historical and anthropological evidence presented regarding the early creation of a Turkic civilization, implies a
durable link between the Turkic populations of Anatolia and the progenitors of human civilization in Central Asia. For those who are of the A-type – particularly common among urban Turks – they are not only fully incorporated into the European family of peoples, “the Turkish race is the main root that brought the A-type to Europe.” As the B-type is a marker of the “coloured” races, its low occurrence among Turks, combined with the preponderance of A- and O-types, mark the boundaries of Turkishness inside those of whiteness, excluding the Semites and Iranians as well as the peoples of Africa (Onur 1943, 850–51). Such language is not intrinsically dismissive or injurious towards peoples of the B-type, but it does speak to two desires: the first, concordant with contemporary concerns about race, shows a yearning to be included among the white nations of Europe; the second, by contrast, is a wish to connect Turks and Turkishness to a pre-Islamic, pre-historic greatness that lives on in the nomadic peoples of the present.

An Ill Wind from the North

It was not just the participants’ view of the world that clashed implicitly with state-sanctioned Soviet dogma. Soviet research and interpretations of material finds in Siberia, too, were challenged explicitly by Turkish scholars who presented to the assembled audience. Although no Soviet delegates attended the 1937 Congress, the presence of foreign academics from Europe did ensure that at least some of those who spoke to attendees were cognizant of, and relied upon, work coming out of the Soviet Union. The Finnish professor T. J. Arne made use of standard Soviet ideas about the Iranian origins of the Turkmen, who were primarily dolichocephalic. This was one of Barthol’d’s theses that was not challenged by the Soviet ethnographers
and historians of the 1930s (Arne 1943, 607). Most of the other presenters did not provide the publishers of the Congress volume with a list of sources utilized in the preparation of their work, and thus it is not possible for us to determine the extent to which other scholars made use of Russian and Soviet materials from the 1920s and 30s. One startling exception, however, is the report of the Turkish academic Abdülkadir İnan, whose presentation, entitled “An examination of the situation of horses in excavations at Pazirik in the Altai, from the point of view of Turkic burial customs” is a direct response to Soviet scholarship. It represents the only explicit and complete refutation of Soviet ethnography, archaeology and historical sciences that can be found in the Congress volume.

İnan’s work focuses on the discovery and excavation of several graves at Pazirik by Soviet archaeologists in the late 1920s. The report he refers to was published in 1929 by Rodenko, and although it was printed in the Circular of the Soviet Institute of the History of Material Culture, the fact that it predates the emergence of the Stalinist historiographic line in 1934 implies that it cannot be seen as a hard and fast example of Stalinist scholarship. At the outset, it appears that İnan’s problem is with the methodology and rigour of the article. However, it soon becomes apparent that his refutation is largely directed at Rodenko’s assignation of the remains to an Aryan community, which he defines as being non-Turkic (A. İnan 1943, 143–44). The presence of ten horses with their tails cut off, as well as the accumulated domestic and military artefacts found in the tombs, point directly to grouping such as the Scythians, believed to be Turkic by Turkish scholars. Where the Soviets preferred to rely on geographically- or artefact-based appellations, İnan makes reference to current ethnographic scholarship and contemporary ethnic
communities, citing longstanding research into the reverence for the horse that is found among the Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and Nogay, as well as the practice of burying animals with their owners among the Yakut (A. İnan 1943, 146–49). If Rodenko does make the assertion that the Scythians were Aryans, this appears as a historically-bound statement: they are not proposed to have been the direct ancestors of any particular grouping, nor are they assumed to have represented a perfectly formed national community. İnan, on the other hand, shows the bidirectional process of nation identification: the presence of ancestors legitimizes a contemporary community in its rights and privileges, while the back-projection of cultural, economic and linguistic traits allows for the nation to claim its past and stamp it in its image. While this process was celebrated in Turkey, it was dubious, at best, in Europe, and completely beyond the pale for the social scientists of the Soviet Union.

Arsal’s Legal History Returns

With the departure of Zeki Velidi Togan from Turkey in 1934, the pan-Turkist camp of Soviet Turkic exiles was clearly in a stronger position among the historical establishment presenting at the Second Historical Congress. Among them were Sadri Maksudi Arsal, a Kazan Tatar émigré who had studied Turkic law in the 1920s and who testified, in 1932, to the persistence of disputes between Togan and other Russian Turkic scholars from the days of the Russian Civil War. Arsal had the honour of being the final presenter at the Congress, an opportunity that he used to deliver an address entitled “The Turkish Race’s Role in the Development of the Concept and Institutions of the State and Law in the History of Humanity.” The unwieldy title is an indication of the complexity of his object of study, as well as his argument. He works
within the German tradition that links historiography, culture and law to produce an understanding, based on 18th and 19th century German philosophers, of the emergence of the state as a function of social organization among nomadic groups. Such societies required strict obedience to a central commander because of the precarious nature of their existence, and thus the initial institutions of the state were to be found in these collectivities. The Turkic peoples, as the famed nomads of the Eurasian Steppe, were the ideal candidates for the title of the first creators of these structures, and thus should be viewed inventors of the state (Arsal 1943, 1066–68).

This assertion is not novel, as Arsal is merely quoting German thinkers who first formulated it. Instead, he innovates upon it by claiming that coercion and militaristic discipline are not enough for the creation of a state on their own, but that “civilization”, in the form of the arts, commerce, and science, must be encouraged too, in order to convince settled populations of the wisdom of the nomadic state structure. The ancient Turks, then, were skilled not only in nomadic raiding parties but also in the encouragement and development of sedentary civilization, which they imparted onto other races (Arsal 1943, 1070). Arsal, therefore, marries the German sociologists’ understanding to the Turkish History Thesis, establishing the state, similar to agriculture and metallurgy, as one of the Turkic race’s contributions to human civilization.

If this were the end of Arsal’s line of argumentation, the use of the word race (ırk in Turkish) would appear to be nothing more than a substitute for nation or ethnos. The latter part of his presentation, however, demonstrates how Arsal, too, accepts the idea presented in Irmak’s work that race is both physical and psychological. He makes the distinction clear by insinuating that the nation is merely
an apparition of the race: “There are few races, other than the Turks, that have lived as a politically independent nation throughout 2000 years without interruption.” (Arsal 1943, 1076) What allows for the continuance of this political structure known as the nation or the state, or the nation-state, is the inherent discipline that every member of the Turkic race shows to leader of the nation. Indeed, it was the core element of Turkic state-building skill and genius that allowed for the Golden Horde to sweep across Asia once the entity they produced had been “wrenched” from the Turks by Genghis Khan and the Mongol race (Arsal 1943, 1071–73). Arsal’s reasoning takes the concept of race and allows for it to be integrated into various levels of Gökalp’s theorization of the nation. On the one hand, the respect for authority and discipline that is apparently inherent in the Turkic race is presented as a cultural trait, an aspect of the morality and ethics of the Turkic peoples that is exempt from international or civilizational adaptation. Liberalism, anarchism and democracy are all systems that are not the hallmarks of an advanced civilization, but rather the peculiarities of nations and races to whose moral characteristics they are best suited. On another level, strict social organization that subordinates individual interest to social interest (as identified by the state’s leadership) – a key component of Gökalp’s sociology and solidarist views (see Parla 2009) – are legitimized by the history of the Turkish race. The state over the family, society over the individual, and race over religion: Arsal has completed the conversion of Gökalp’s originally voluntaristic social reorganization into top-down, paternalistic approach to the past, present and future.

The main beneficiary of this utmost devotion, however, is not an abstract state, but its founder, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself. Arsal takes one final step along the path of aligning history with the state’s agenda when he identifies the
President as one of a long series of leaders who have always come to the aid and salvation of the Turkic race: “throughout the long history of the Turkic race, whenever the Turkic nation has fallen into dire straits, a leader appears and protects Turkishness.” (original emphasis) (Arsal 1943, 1075) Atatürk’s decisions are not to be challenged, not simply because he is the benevolent father of the nation, but because he is realigning the laws and morals of the nation to their racial basis. To rebel is not merely to reject the kind hand of the state; it is to renounce the genetic material from which one is made (Arsal 1943, 1090–91). While there is, undoubtedly, a concern expressed by Arsal, İnan, Irmak, Onur and others about the classification of the Turks as white or coloured, it is apparent that theirs is not a racism that is driven by eugenics. Rather, race is important precisely because it is physical and essential: unlike political allegiance, religion or even ethnicity, it cannot be changed.

If there is paranoia about skin colour, facial features and hair type, it is because Europeans have ended up victorious in the colonial race. In order to escape European tutelage, and to ward off its neighbours encroachment on Anatolia, Ankara must establish its own bona fides as a historic leader of a great race:

“The role played by the Turkish race in the world, particularly in the history of Asia, is the same one played by the Romans in the Classical era and the English in recent centuries. That is, it is the role of a great ruling nation. This role included the provision of security, calm and the rule of law over a wide geographic area while bringing various nations under its discipline.” (original emphasis) (Arsal 1943, 1093)

It is thus up to Turks themselves to understand the historical foundations of their destiny, and the promise of the future as encapsulated in the new society to be organized by Atatürk and his CHF.
Moving On

With this final component on the works of Sadri Maksudi Arsal, our period of analysis ends. Throughout this chapter, I have charted a chronological course from the beginnings of ethno-national historiography during the Hamidian and Second Constitutional Periods of the Ottoman Empire, through the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the end of multi-party rule and finally up to the last year of Atatürk’s life. The texts of this section have demonstrated a gradual hardening of ideological components within historical narratives, with a mutation of the original ideology of Gökalpian nationalism in order to take into account the practicalities of governance as an independent nation, and advances in science and technology.

Gökalp’s original ideation of the nation as a community bound together through education – informed by enduring and essential customs and ethics – formed the basis of an ontology and epistemology elaborated by a new generation of Turkish and Turkic historians. In particular, discoveries in the realms of biology, anthropology, archaeology and linguistics were assimilated by Turkish academics, and the state’s campaign for a national historiography put this concept into practice. Meanwhile scholars added to it by utilizing contemporary sciences to answer the question to which Gökalp had provided no response: how do we identify Turks in the past, and their descendants in the present? Historians’ suggestions and propositions were manifold, but they all show a remarkable consistency in picking up on the state’s domestic and international priorities, particularly in the realm of forming a new citizenry loyal to the state’s worldview.
We now move on to a consideration of the development of historical narratives in Sadri Maksudi Arsal’s country of origin, the Soviet Union. When taken together, this and the following chapter will provide the basis for our final, concluding section, in which a comparison of experiences will further elucidate the manner in which ideologies caused a wedge between Turkish and Soviet scholarship.
Soviet Historical Narratives

In this chapter, I will track the development of historical narratives about pre-Islamic Turkic communities in the Soviet Union. Similar to the previous chapter on the Republic of Turkey, I will follow a chronological line of approach. The chapter begins with a view to pre-Revolutionary ideas of history and identity among the Russian Empire’s Turkic communities. This will allow for a greater understanding of the shift in perspectives that occurred between 1917, the year of the Bolshevik Revolution, and 1922, the end of the Russian Civil War. From this, we are ready to jump into the first decade of Soviet historiography, and to examine the eclecticism that reigned in the writing of narratives. In order to navigate the complex agglomeration of different publications, I will spend some time exploring the types of works under consideration, and how they fit into the broader scheme of history writing. This subsection will close with an overview of archaeology during the 1920s, and its role in the enunciation of historical narratives. Finally, we will come to the 1930s, and the era of far more organized and targeted histories designed for the new national republics, ending in the year of the Great Terror, 1937. We start, however, over a century before then, with a familiar topic of study: Azerbaijan’s contentious origins.

The Change of Groupings

In 1828, the Russian Empire and Persia signed the Treaty of Türkmençay following the Russo-Persian War. It established the Russian border south of the
Caucasus Mountains, incorporating today’s Republic of Azerbaijan into the Russian Empire (Swietochowski 2002, 6). While the impact of Russian sovereignty over the region was not immediately felt in the form of direct administration, it did open up new opportunities and horizons for various sections of Caucasian society. The incorporation of the Qasim Khanate into the Russian Empire in 1681 had introduced Russian administrators to the first shock of ruling over Muslim subjects (Meyer 2014, 51–52), but this was their initial foray into a new realm of the Islamicate world, one much more closely linked to the large empires of the Middle East. It allowed for the gradual unification of various independent khanates into one administrative unit governed by Russian administrators (Swietochowski 2002, 3–4). Moreover, Russian sovereignty permitted young Muslims from the newly incorporated territories to access Russian systems of education. Schools were not immediately established for the local populations, let alone universities and institutes of higher learning (Swietochowski 2002, 13–14). Some members of the local élite, however, managed to pursue scholarship at universities in Russia proper, most notably St. Petersburg and Kazan (Rzaev 1965, 4).

Among the earliest participants in this trend were the Azerbaijanis Aleksandr Kazem-Bek and Mirza Fathali Axundzada, also known as Akhundov. The two were in correspondence with one another, although their collaboration does not appear to have been profound (Rzaev 1965, 44). Kazem-Bek found his niche in universities in Kazan and St. Petersburg, where he taught Persian and Arabic from the 1850s onward (Rzaev 1965, 13). Here, he was active in shaping the Russian perception of Muslim areas recently incorporated into the Empire (Bobrovnikov 2006, 212), both by bringing in more Azerbaijani teachers and scholars to Kazan and St. Petersburg,
and by reorganizing the Oriental Studies department at the University of St. Petersburg (Rzaev 1965, 82–84). He was highly critical of Islam, arguing that it was the cause of despotism and economic backwardness in the East (Rzaev 1965, 45). His anti-Islamic views, however, did not preclude positive evaluations of the past and potential future contributions of Muslim peoples to human civilization (Rzaev 1965, 99). On the issue of methodology, he encouraged historians to utilize anthropological data in order to provide greater insight into the past and the development of peoples who had not left written records (Rzaev 1965, 92–94).

Kazem-Bek was passionate about the investigation and analysis of folk culture and dialects in Caucasian and Iranian Azerbaijan, and he believed that the Azeris were of Iranian, rather than Turkic origin. Despite their gradual Turkicization, the Azeris had long possessed a consciousness of being a separate collectivity existing to the north of Mount Ararat, an identity that transcended religious differences and linguistic divides. In other words, Kazem-Bek argued that the Azeris, long before the arrival of the Oğuz Turks, had achieved a proto-national consciousness (Rzaev 1965, 112–14).

Axundzadə too was interested in questions of national and ethnic identity. Despite being a speaker of the idiom that would be called Azeri Turkish in the 20th century, Axundzadə was fiercely proud of Persian culture and history, writing once that “supposedly I am Turk, but my race is from the Parthians [Persians].” (Ādamiyat 1970, 118) He decried the decline of the Persian Empire, attributing it to Arab incursions (Ādamiyat 1970, 120), while calling on contemporary Iranian political figures to adopt pre-Islamic symbols as signifiers of Persian nationhood (Akhundov 1976, 33). Finally, in line with his conceptualization of a civic nationalism based upon freedom from despotism and superstition (Ādamiyat 1970, 115), he railed against
the tyranny of Abdülhamit II’s Istanbul (Akhundov 1976, 7) and urged the reconciliation of Muslims and Zoroastrians as one great Persian nation cognizant of its glorious past (Ādamiyat 1970, 118).

In addition to his pan-Iranist views, Mirza Fathali Axundzada also advocated the creation of a common Turkic language to be used for education and communication among the Turkic peoples of the Caucasus (Swietochowski 2002, 25). His proposal was revolutionary, calling for the abandonment of the Arabic script in favour of Latin characters (Akhundov 1976, 6). When considered from the point of view of Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities based on a common linguistic environment (B. R. O. Anderson 2006), Axundzada’s formula creates a conundrum. He advocated the use of a language intended to unify the Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire, but also sought to spur feelings of solidarity and commonality with the peoples of Iran, who spoke a different language. Similarly, the application of Ernest Gellner’s theory of nations and nationalism arising during the transition from feudalism to capitalism is also problematic (Gellner 1983). With Axundzada’s linguistic and cultural bonds pointing in two different directions, his nation could not possible have provided the basis for the unification of a single common economic unit. Rather, his writings are exemplary of the complex imbrication that constituted the identities of Turkic intellectuals. This complexity ran through many of the works of Turkic writers through the later part of the 19th and early part of the 20th century, and it created fertile ground on which notions of belonging distinct from European ones could be articulated.
Walikhanov’s Proto-Nationalism

While Islam and the merging of religious and political identities were important innovations in Russian Turkic intellectual circles, it would be disingenuous to insinuate that religion, and indeed the Muslim religion, was of paramount importance for all Turkic thinkers in the Russian Empire. A combination of nomadism and great distances kept many Kazakh communities, in particular, isolated from developments in regions to their south and west (Sabol 2003, 5). Concurrently, Russian incursions from the north brought Russian settlers, but not necessarily the influence of Tatar notables who were beginning to monopolize state-citizen relations in Muslim areas (Meyer 2014, 51–52; Pustarnakov 1990, 14). Rather, the Russian invasion induced profound economic changes to Kazakh society, which proved to be the most forceful catalyst for the development of a sense of broader community in the late 19th century (Sabol 2003, 22–23; Amanzholova 2006, 18). Related to this, access to Russian and European-style education created two new effects on the Kazakh masses: it convinced some, although not all, writers and scholars of the wisdom of Western-style technological development (Amanzholova 2006, 17); and it produced growing numbers of literate Kazakhs trained in Russian literature and science, including ethnography.

One such newly-trained Kazakh writer was the engineer Choqan Walikhanov. As early as the 1860s, Walikhanov wrote in Russian about the preservation of Shamanistic beliefs among the Kyrgyz (the pre-Revolutionary name applied to the Kazakhs). He provided detailed accounts of contemporary practices among the nomads, as well as their historical roots and connections to beliefs held by non-
Muslim peoples of the Steppes, particularly the Mongols (Valikhanov 1985, 4:41–70). In discussing Kazakh religious perspectives, moreover, he recognized that religious conviction did not necessarily imply the immediate connection of a group to a wider Islamic community. He noted the impact of Tatar preachers on Kazakhs, encouraging the adoption of gender segregation, pilgrimage and ritual previously unknown among the nomads. As such, he compared the influence of the Tatars on the Kazakhs to that of the Byzantines on the Russians (Valikhanov 1985, 4:71). Despite the importance attached to Islam in Kazakh society, Walikhanov saw in the Russians a counterbalance to the “fanatics” among the Tatars, an alternative route to modernity and civilization that would be no more harmful to Kazakh identity than continued cultural appropriate from fellow Muslims (Valikhanov 1985, 4:72–73).

Similarly, Walikhanov’s ethnographic notes on the Turkmen from the same period make explicit the Turkmens’ differing names for those of pure or “clean” Turkmen descent and those of mixed Turkmen, Kazakh, Uzbek and Persian origin (Valikhanov 1985, 4:165). The very nature of tribal society, including Turkmen society, implied a heightened awareness of differences of lineage (Edgar 2006, 17–18). As such, it is not surprising that 19th century Turkmen nomads would retain distinctions based on descent. What is notable is that they referred to “clean” and unclean groups based on language and ethnicity rather than religion or tribal affiliation. Whether the Turkmen conceived of these three groups as homogenous outsiders or distinct ethno-linguistic collectivities is unknown, but it appears clear that language and custom were bound up with clan and lineage in a complex tapestry of identity. As for Walikhanov, he might not have explicitly described the Kazakhs or Turkmens as separate nations, but his writings provided ample evidence
of the conception of societies and identities within the *Umma* that remained distinct from one another.

**Education Wars**

Indeed, pan-Islamism and its nationalist interpretations were far from the first intellectual innovations in Turkic communities to bring issues of identity and belonging to the fore. Rather, the catalyst was education and, related to it, language. As early as 1881, Ismail Gasprinski was calling for the Tatar-language education of Russian Muslims in order to allow for their integration, rather than assimilation, into the Russian population as full and equal citizens (Gasprinskij, Akpınar, and Gasprinski 2004, 118). The issue of educational reform in the Russian Empire would crystalize through the last decade of the 19th century and the first one of the 20th as a battle between Kadimists (representatives of the old order) and Jadidists (proponents of new methods of teaching) (Pustarnakov 1990, 15–16). The Jadidists argued for a new approach to education among the Empire’s Muslim populations, one that would promote the spread of knowledge and skills useful in the capitalist market and in interactions with state institutions (Khasanov 1977, 148–49). While it was eventually agreed by various Muslim notables in 1906 that Russian should be taught in the Jadidist schools only at the secondary level, the choice of language for primary instruction proved to be a point of lasting contention (Gasprinskij, Akpınar, and Gasprinski 2004, 338).
The Language Question

The question of language was more than just an administrative one. Gasprinski saw a common language as one of the key components of a nation, in addition to a national idea and national education (Gasprinskij, Akpınar, and Gasprinski 2004, 329). His proposal for a common language of instruction (and therefore printing and communication) for Russia’s Muslims was a modified version of Ottoman Turkish (Meyer 2014, 142). It appears that this was largely ignored by the Muslim intellectuals of the Caucasian peoples, who saw Russian or their own language (in the case of the Kabardians) as the gateway to modern education (Turkaev 2002, 183–84; Zul’pukarova 1990, 155; Osipyan and Kind 1957, 162–64); similar sentiments were expressed by some Azeri intellectuals as well (Swietochowski 2002, 30). Gaspirinskii’s suggestion, however, was also rejected by Kazan Tatar circles, who viewed their own version of Tatar to be the most practical language of common communication (Meyer 2014, 142–43). After the 1905 Revolution, opposition was encountered from Kazakh intellectuals, such as Ahmet Baitursynov, who advocated the purging of Tatar and Russian elements from the Kazakh language, and the development of a Kazakh curriculum for use in Kazakh schools (Sabol 2003, 96). Such an objection to Gasprinski’s plans is notable because of the context within which Baitursynov was writing. By the end of the 19th century, Russian colonization of Kazakh areas had led to the growth of bilingual Russian-Kazakh schools. Although teachers and materials were scarce, they were leading to considerable increases in the number of bilingual and literate Kazakhs – an outcome
that almost certainly would have obviated the need for a Jadidist education system along Gasprinski’s lines (Sabol 2003, 59).

Central Asia, too, remained largely aloof of the political wrangling among the rest of the Russian Empire’s Turkic peoples. Although there was a sense of community with all other members of the *Umma*, the recently absorbed territories south of the Kazakh Steppe were outside of the general ambit of Muslim politics prior to and after the 1905 Revolution, including their discussions of language (Khalid 1998, 194). Since the Islamicization of the Turkic peoples in the 9th century, two distinct literary cultures with two separate literary standards had emerged: Ottoman in the West and Chaghatay in the East (Çobanzada 1924, 81). For the Turkic peoples of Bukhara, Samarqand, Khiva and Tashkent, Chaghatay was the source of linguistic cohesion, rather than Ottoman Turkish or Tatar. Religious bonds notwithstanding, issues of language provided a clear enough barrier to prevent the infiltration of Gasprinski’s, Axundzada’s or Tatar attempts of utilizing an Oğuz or Kipchak dialect as a means of uniting the Central Asians to other Muslims in the Russian Empire (Khalid 1998, 190). Yet, locally, language still competed with religious identity for a sense of belonging, as Turkic-speaking Jews were referred to as a separate, distinct *millet* (Khalid 1998, 192–93). Central Asian intellectuals, then, were not willing to heed the advice of Axundzada to Muslims and Zoroastrians, and to forsake religious difference in favour of ethno-linguistic cohesion.

Thus, while the idea of a Muslim identity among Russia’s adherents to the Islamic faith might have been strong, the community’s élites were rapidly warming to the idea of language as a marketable form of identity for sections of Russia’s Muslims (Bobrovnikov 2006, 222). Within this, consciousnesses of collectivity and
difference were being formulated, and historical bases for these distinctions were increasingly sought after.

Azerbaijan’s Contentious Origins

Questions of belonging and position were also motivated by the flux of international politics. The Russian Empire’s southern fringe, incorporated imperfectly into the state apparatus throughout the 19th century, proved to be a focal point of such influences. In particular, Azerbaijan provided a battlefield for imperial contests between Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Persia, with scholars frequently joining the fray (Rizā 1981, 7–10). This dispute became acute after 1905, when an easing of restrictions on the press gave rise to considerable nationalist agitation (I. Stalin 1913, 1; Novruzov 1988, 103). The path of the Azeri Ahmet Ağaoğlu is exemplary of this competition. He was the first Azeri to receive a European-style education in Saint Petersburg and Paris (Akçura 1978, 193) and began his career writing on Persian culture and Shiism, core components of Azerbaijan’s cultural make-up (Mübariz 2007). His time in Paris acquainted him with the Islamic modernist works of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the liberalism of the French Revolution, both of which would influence his approach to identity (Akalın 2004, 18). After the 1905 Revolution, Ağaoğlu became active in politics, defending the interests of Turkic communities in the Caucasus and, true to the works of al-Afghani, promoting sectarian accord among Russia’s Muslims, a crucial step in transforming religious reformist movements into national ones. His activities in the post-Revolutionary period would eventually force him to migrate to Istanbul in 1909, where his conversion from
Persianized scholar of religion to Liberal Turkist philosopher would be completed (Akalin 2004, 24–26).

Inside Azerbaijan, too, the political storm was encouraging a rapid change in self-perception among intellectuals. The first head of Soviet Azerbaijan, Nariman Narimanov, moved between competing identities, eventually throwing his hat in with the Soviet authorities. In 1899, prior to engaging in politics, he wrote the play *Nader Şah*, about the 18th century Persian Shah who relied on popular support to counter palace intrigues. Narimanov stressed the dangers of sectarian divide and the importance of devotion to the nation – albeit a nation that was Persian, rather than Turkic (Nərimanov 1971, 7–8). The play was written in Azeri Turkish, which highlights the complex interaction of language and identity. In the end, however, Narimanov decided to rely on his class identity and work within the Soviet system, rather than flee abroad and pursue nationalist politics in exile (Abasova 2007, 162). Again, this can hardly be seen as an opportunistic grab at power, as *Nader Şah* is imbued not only with patriotic fervor, but also a conviction of the wisdom of connecting the masses with loci of power (Nərimanov 1971, 8). Identity was fluid enough to accommodate multiple visions of the world, and it was only when Narimanov, similar to other Turkic intellectuals, was forced by circumstance to choose between the different elements of his personality, that he focused on one component in particular.

These individual stories belong to a very different time. They come to us from a period in which intellectual activity was restricted to a small subset of the population; an era of educationally-segmented communities. The October Revolution helped to sweep away the foundations on which such segmentation was
based, and to usher in a new society in which the masses, rather than the elites, would be the primary targets of historical narratives. Nonetheless, these mass meta-narratives were not created in a historical vacuum, and indeed many of the debates and divides that were highlighted in the preceding paragraphs informed the evolution of the historical sciences in the Soviet Turkic world for decades following the overthrow of the Provisional Government in October 1917.

**Historic Revolutions and Revolutionary Histories**

1917 is actually a year of two revolutions, rather than one. The first, in February, saw the overthrow of Czar Nicholas II by a coalition of political forces, and the establishment of a Provisional Government under Admiral Kerensky. This new government sought to reorganize the Russian Empire and to cope with the massive human and financial drain of the First World War. While the reasons for revolt among the peoples of Petrograd were many, the sacrifices of the war, and the bubbling social tensions caused by half a century of socio-economic development were among the most pressing issues. These were the issues that had to be dealt with first and foremost (Lohr 2006, 662–64). This was a revolution that was brought about thanks to workers and soldiers, and the resulting government largely reflected their political representatives. Nonetheless, the Duma also contained factions such as the Kadets, who were both liberal and imperialist, in the sense that they defended the continued presence of the monarchy and Imperial statehood, as well as ethno-nationalists from the Empire’s minority groups (S. A. Smith 2006, 115–16). Across the country, smaller forms of councils – whether soviets or zemstvos – were popping up, and these were either composed of members of revolutionary parties, including the
Bolsheviks, or by average villagers and workers who had simply rejected the authority of the Tsarist state (S. A. Smith 2006, 117–19).

In the months following the February revolution, it was the War and its conduct that proved to be one of the most important factors in the country’s political future. Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries were split between those who supported a comprehensive peace and the hawks who argued for continued hostilities, while the Bolsheviks benefitted from being steadfastly anti-War. The distinction was particularly important in greatly enhancing the profile and fortunes of the Bolsheviks among soldiers and peasants (S. A. Smith 2006, 123–27). As both the political and economic situations went from bad to worse in the summer and fall of 1917, society became much more polarized, with class gaining more currency than nationality as a form of identification among ethnic Russians. As Kerensky became more and more secretive in his exercise of power, and the popularity of the Bolsheviks hit a new high, Lenin and his inner circle decided to launch a full-out assault on Kerensky’s government and on remnants of the Tsarist state. Between 23 October and 26 October 1917, the Bolsheviks seized the reins of power, bringing an end to the Provisional Government. Although it took place in November according to the calendar in place at the time, this event would be known as the Great October Revolution and would usher in more than 70 years of Soviet rule (S. A. Smith 2006, 133–35).

In the months following the Bolshevik seizure of power, considerable wrangling occurred between the new masters of the state and their two closest allies, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. This, however, proved to be the least formative aspect of Soviet statecraft. Instead, it was the Russian Civil War
that was most decisive in cementing the foundations of Bolshevik, and particularly Stalinist, policy (Raleigh 2006, 140). It would be naïve to act as thought the Civil War was something in whose inception Lenin and his party neither had a hand in, nor welcomed as a “baptism by fire” (Suny 2011, 5). While bringing about further destruction and misery, it also ensured that Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky and others would be able to demonstrate their revolutionary bona fides and reorganize in earnest both theory and praxis within the parts of the Russian Empire under their control.

The full history of the Civil War and the triumphs and vagaries of the fledgling Soviet state over this period are a subject broad enough for several heavy tomes. What is of greatest importance here is that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, whereby the Bolsheviks sought to end Russia’s involvement in the Great War, and the ensuing hostilities across Eurasia, caused seismic shifts in all communities and parties across the political spectrum. Left and right factions broke away from all parties, reorganizing themselves or joining other existing groups. The result was a renewed focus on organization and ideological education on the part of the Bolshevik leadership. Those institutions of the state that they did indeed control, including the newly-formed Red Army, were the focus of intensive educational and indoctrination campaigns aimed at rooting out enemies in theory as well as in praxis. This was further complicated by the incursions of a handful of foreign powers into Soviet territory, whether to seize sensitive installations or to lend support to the anti-Communist factions, as well as the apparent spread of revolutionary fervour to other parts of the world, including Bavaria and Hungary (Raleigh 2006, 143–47). Amidst all of this, nationalist antagonisms mixed with local grievances, causing no small
headache for the Bolshevik centre in Moscow, and Red Army commanders in the field.

During the Civil War, the Bolsheviks learned two important lessons that seemed to pull the Party in opposite directions. One was the need to provide a relaxation of revolutionary zeal and to allow for some continuation in the socio-economic life of a country now ravaged by eight years of war and hardship. From this came the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the period of eclecticism that we will examine in the coming sections (Raleigh 2006, 157–66). The second lesson had to do with centralization; a theme that was undoubtedly far more enduring throughout the life of the Soviet Union than flexibility. This was not just an issue of the war effort, but also of political, cultural and economic change according to a highly theorized imagining of the new Russia. Famine, economic collapse and generalized proletarian and peasant opposition to the Bolsheviks reinforced the idea that centralization could not be imposed with blunt force. Nonetheless, the need for the centre to command and control in order to direct the revolution was painfully apparent (Raleigh 2006, 152–57). It is therefore with this intractable dilemma between flexibility and control in mind that we move on to the building of the Soviet state and, particularly, Soviet scholarship.

Soviet Scientific Reorganization

With the establishment of Bolshevik hegemony following the Russian Civil War in 1922, Bolshevik interpretations of Marxism began to seep into the structure and content of Soviet scholarly endeavours. The Oriental Department of the Academy of Sciences was reorganized a number of times, with debates raging
between various members of the Academy as to whether Oriental Studies was mature enough to become more specialized according to academic interest (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 54). Ethnography, long an interest of Tsarist officials and scholars, was revolutionized by the advent of Soviet power. In addition to new approaches to concepts of ethnicity, culture and nationhood, ethnographic praxis was transformed by its close association with centres of power, as ethnographic data became a component in the determination of the new national republics in the 1920s and 1930s (Polyakov 1980, 21; Abashin 2014, 146–48). Linguists, even those of a decidedly Marxist bent, did not necessarily repudiate the findings of the pre-revolutionary era. They did, however, seek to infuse the social sciences with a new concern for the social conditions in which language, culture and identity are formed and evolve. Some also involved themselves directly in the projects of Soviet authorities, forsaking political neutrality in the interests of infusing public policy with a scientific sheen (Polivanov 1928, 4–7). Archaeology underwent major alterations as well, as those members of the Tsarist intelligentsia who remained in the Soviet Union and were committed to Marxist thought sought to purge the science of its old worldview. All of these changes were reinforced by the aggressive drive to train new scientists and scholars according to Soviet scientific doctrine, ensuring not only that the Tsarist epistemology would be destroyed, but that the new Marxist one would have its own means of reproduction (Okladnikov 1975, 3–4).

By the late 1920s and early 1930s – the period of Soviet history known as the “Great Break” – all sciences (applied, pure and social) came under considerable pressure from the centres of political authority to incorporate ideological components into their supposedly objective laws (Pollock 2006, 4). The smoothness
of the transition that is frequently described in Soviet historiographical works of the 1970s and 1980s is often betrayed by the same authors’ repudiation of the products of the era under study. In many ways, this is not much different from the repudiation of pre-1945 Western archaeology seen in chapter 3. With respect to history, accounts of the period often speak to the “misinformation” contained in the analysis of contemporary scholars, particularly on the peoples of the East (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 99; Nusupbekov 1989, 334–35). Nevertheless, the 1920s in particular are known to be a decade of eclecticism in terms of Soviet historians’ approach to the histories of the non-Russian peoples of the Union, and, at least until 1931, non-Marxist, as well as Marxist, scholars participated in forming a national historical narrative for a number of Soviet nations (Tillett 1969, 38–39).

What exactly were the changes that Soviet historians put into place? As one might expect in a state dominated by ethnic Russians, Russian historiography provides the greatest number of examples of the transformation underway. Historical research was largely carried out under the aegis of the newly created Soviet Academy, within which a Society of Marxist Historians was formed in 1925. This was under the direction of Mikhail Pokrovskii, who believed it to be a bulwark against the dominant non-Marxist schools of thought in Russian historical scholarship (Enteen 1976, 91–92). Lenin, as we have already seen, warned against the dangers of Great Russian chauvinism, and more than a few historians set about changing dominant narratives of the creation and expansion of the Russian state (Bodger 1991, 566). As such, imperial expansion was no longer presented as a glorious or progressive force, but rather a tyrannous one for the benefit of the bourgeoisie; a reformulation of the earlier dichotomy between official and popular
Russia that had dominated 19th century historiography (Tillett 1969, 10). Within this narrative, however, eclecticism reigned supreme. So long as Lenin was alive and holding the reins of power, this variety of approaches was permissible, and even vaunted. It was not until the rise of Stalin, and the hardening of leadership disputes, that Russian scholarship began to focus on a particular epistemology. At this point, particularly around 1927-28, the Soviet academic leadership undertook serious purges of its academic structures, aimed particularly at eliminating the use of pre-Revolutionary, bourgeois scholarship and its heuristics. This included the standard European periodization of global history into categories such Ancient, Mediaeval and Renaissance (Enteen 1976, 95–97).

Within the Marxist camp, of course, there was only marginally greater uniformity than across the discipline as a whole. There were two great historians whose views were adopted by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks respectively: Pokrovskii, mentioned above, and Plekhanov. Their dispute was largely one regarding the characterization of Russia’s historical socio-economic development, but their alignment with different camps led their scholarly production to become highly politicized (Baron 1974, 386–87). For the most part, theirs was a dispute that was not much different from the one between the Liberals and the Slavophiles of the previous century: the former argued for a similarity between Russian and European historical development, while the latter favoured a bespoke schema. Both were, as one might expect, tinged with class analyses and social elements as well (Baron 1974, 390). Given the access of both strains to the various nuclei of the Communist Party and its affiliate organizations, it is to be expected that this class-infused
historical analysis would win out; the triumph of universalism over exceptionalism, however, is largely due to the links between Pokrovskii and the Bolsheviks.

This insistence on a new, class-based and universalist approach to the history of peoples did not spread evenly over all Soviet national historiographies. At a certain level, there was a split between Russian, Polish and, to a lesser degree, Tatar historiography, and that of the other, smaller nations of the new Union. Among the historians of Russia, Ukraine and the Tatars, particularly those of Marxist persuasion, a new approach was born in which class became a heuristic for understanding the past (Enteen 1976, 93). Among those of the smaller nations, however, nation and nationality retained pride of place in the dissection of historical development. To quote Bodger, “It was argued that this [class-based alliances between the more advanced Tatars and backwards Bashkirs] had not come about because at that stage their interests clashed over possession of the land. The idea of a deeper community of interest based on their common social situations - where it was postulated - was held to have been too embryonic to have overcome more immediate material contradictions. The development of class consciousness among the subject peoples of the empire was held to have been a much later development.” (Bodger 1991, 566)

Even for those peoples who had reached a level of socio-economic development in which signs of capitalist-era discord were clearly visible, then, the same sort of analysis afforded to Russian history was not extended to that of the Turkic communities.
Central Asian Historiography

In comparison to Russian historiography, Central Asian history writing presented both advantages and challenges to the new Soviet régime. On the one hand, the dearth of modern histories written about the peoples of the region implied little need to worry about ingrained historical worldviews against which the State would have to struggle. On the other hand, the lack of source materials and trained local historians meant an uphill battle in assembling facts that could then be massaged according to Marxist theory. Among the Russian and Russian-trained historians, the most widespread of ideas regarding the history of the region was the assumption that Aryans were autochthonous, and that the speakers of Iranian languages were their descendants. By contrast, the Turkic peoples were viewed as interlopers, new arrivals who had conquered the Iranian peoples and usurped their cultural achievements (Bustanov 2017, 46–52). Such hypotheses were rapidly dealt with on a Union-wide basis, particularly at the close of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s, as we shall see. This does not mean that they did not persist, or even flourish during later periods; indeed, Shnirelman has demonstrated just the opposite (V. Shnirelman 2009). Nevertheless, they did cease to occupy the limelight for much of the period in question, allowing for other narratives to take centre stage.

V. V. Bartol’d

In the 1920s, the undisputed master of Central Asian history in the Soviet Union was Vasilii Vladimirovich Bartol’d. Bartol’d had begun writing about the history of the region in the early 1890s, and his production of scholarly works
between then and the October Revolution allowed him to claim a position of considerable importance in the new Soviet academy (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 60). Bartol’d was also responsible for the organization of training activities for local historians at Turkestan University in Tashkent, thereby ensuring that his influence would be felt among Soviet historians of Turkic extraction, as well as Russians (Auezova 2011, 248). A 1963 collection of Bartol’d’s works contains a long list of his various ideological and methodological errors in his scholarship, yet it appears that his commitment to historical materialism and social history was sufficient to allow his writings to continue to be used and praised throughout the decades following his death in 1930 (Barthold 1963, 11–16).

In the 1920s, Bartol’d contributed in numerous ways to bettering Soviet understanding of the peoples and history of Central Asia. His История культурной жизни Туркестана (History of the Cultural Life of Turkestan), published in 1927, had originally been commissioned by the Academy of Sciences in 1919. Its purpose was to form part of a report intended to inform Soviet efforts to raise the “cultural level of Turkestan.” The report was never compiled, but Bartol’d’s contribution was published as a separate piece (Barthold 1963, 169–70). Similarly, the monograph Киргизы: исторический очерк (The Kyrgyz: A Historical Study), published during the same year, was undertaken on the request of the Scholarly Commission of the Division of People’s Education of the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast. It was motivated not only by the lack of suitable historical materials on the Kyrgyz, but also by a desire among sections of the Kyrgyz population to know about their people’s history (Barthold 1963, 473). His 1929 publication Очерк истории Туркменского народа (Study of the History of the Turkmen people) was the first Western work written on
the history of the Turkmens, and was undertaken to provide the basis of further studies by future Soviet historians (Barthold 1963, 547). In addition to these specific items, there were a host of other lectures and monographs on the history of the Caucasus, the Caspian region and Islam in Central Asia, as well as reports on excursions, expeditions and business trips to the region, to Western Europe and Turkey. All of these provide a rich view of the development of Turkological studies in the Soviet Union in the first decade of Soviet statehood.

Bartol’d’s use of primary sources was largely traditional. Many of his studies were based on close readings of Chinese, Greek, Byzantine, Arab, Armenian, Georgian and Persian chronicles. This practice is evident in his studies of the Kyrgyz (Barthold 1963, 474–75), the Turkmen (Barthold 1963, 548–50) and the cultural history of Turkestan (Barthold 1963, 171–73). Despite this, his interpretation of the data included in these works demonstrates a critical approach to the source material that is inflected with aspects of Marxist historiography. As noted above in the discussion of Reşit Saffet’s interactions with Bartol’d during a visit to Moscow, Bartol’d cast doubt on use of the word Turk as an ethnonym by groups in Central Asia. In his work on the Turkmen, he argued that it might be Oğuz which was used as an ethnonym, while Turk referred only to a political appellation that was later popularized by the Oğuz as they migrated westward (Barthold 1963, 554). Such insinuations of political and class divisions among a pre-capitalist linguistic group dovetail with orthodox Marxist conceptualizations of pre-national collectivities (Connor 1984, 7), although they also appear to retain their currency among non-Marxist scholars even today (see Lee 2016; Golden 1982). They contradicted, however, Turkish assertions of the unity of a classless nation, and of the essentialism
of an ethno-national identity. At the First Turkish Historical Congress, Afet Hanım claimed that the original populations of Central Asia were Turks, even if they did not call themselves as such (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferanşları, Münakaşaları 1932, 78). In the preceding decade however, Bartol’d appears to have asserted that the opposite process was at work: individuals consciously associated themselves with a Turkish party, independent of their ethno-national affiliation.

Bartol’d and Race

At a deeper level, however, Bartol’d’s writings challenged the very notions of Turkic ethno-racial purity and autochthonism on which the Turkish History Thesis was based. In The Kirghiz, he points out that the Kirghiz were fair-haired, blue-eyed and pink skinned, according to Chinese, Persian and Arab sources. However, the sharp differences between these original Kyrgyz and the modern-day populations bearing the same name leads Bartol’d to a very different conclusion from Saffet, Şevket Aziz and Reşit Galip Bey: “[f]rom all of this, evidently, it is possible to conclude that the Kyrgyz were Turkified Yenisei Ostyaks and that they waged war against their kinsmen who had kept their earlier language” (Barthold 1963, 480). Linguistic assimilation is also highlighted in Bartol’d’s estimation of modern Turkmen nomads: “In most recent times, ‘the mixture of dolichocephalic nomadic Iranian tribes’ is used to identify the characteristic sign of the Turkmen type; dolichocephalism. Aristov had already expressed such an opinion in 1896; the anthropological studies of L. V. Oshanniy are now taking the same direction” (Barthold 1963, 551). Language, ethnicity and race were therefore three separate and bounded concepts in Bartol’d’s view of history. Linguistic assimilation and
miscegenation were not processes that diluted or degraded the nation. Rather, they were the means by which distinct ethno-national groups were created, similar to the Marxist concept of history being the aggregate of the uncoordinated and unconscious actions of the individual members of a given society (Fleischer 1973, 33).

Bartol’d’s Views of Turkic Origins

What was perhaps most at odds with the Turkish nationalist historical narrative was Bartol’d’s opinion on the indigenous inhabitants of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Central Asia was initially inhabited by Iranian peoples of both sedentary and nomadic social organization. Although their origins were unknown, it is likely that they only arrived in Persia as a result of pressure from Turkic migrants flooding into Central Asia and displacing them from their first homeland (Barthold 1963, 109–10). The original Azerbaijanis, meanwhile, were likely neither Turkic nor Aryan, but rather members of the Japhetic race imagined by the Soviet historian Nikolai Marr (Barthold 1963, 775). The most damning condemnation of Turkic claims to Central Asia, however, was reserved for Bartol’d’s review of contemporary efforts to install Soviet systems of education and governance in the region. After a trip to Turkestan in the second half of 1920, he decried efforts by the local élite, who “were under the influence of Turkish, or, according to local terminology, ‘Turkic’, nationalism” to make their own languages official, to the detriment of “the actual aboriginals of Turkestan, the Iranian-Tajiks” (Barthold 1973, 395). Not only did Bartol’d deny the duration of Turkic settlement in Central Asia, but he also alleged that autochthonist
claims were nothing more than political propaganda encouraged by Ottoman exiles and adventurers.

Indeed, while later Soviet historians and ethnographers would insist upon the distinctions between race, language and culture in order to emphasize that the latter two objects frequently travelled far beyond the boundaries of the former, Barthol’d appears to be somewhat reluctant on the matter. In a 1925 publication on the Tajiks and their origins, he insists on drawing a straight and unidirectional trajectory from the two “cultured Iranian peoples” of ancient Central Asia, the Sogdians and the Khwarezmis, to the modern-day Tajiks. On closer inspection, however, Bartol’d’s own limitations with respect to his analysis of ancient and mediaeval Central Asia become apparent. As a historian, rather than an archaeologist, an ethnographer or anthropologist, he relies most on written sources and chronicles. The basis of continuity, then, is the political power and prestige of the city of Khwarezm, which endure the invasions of Alexander the Great, the Greco-Bactrian kingdoms, Muslim warriors and Turkic nomads, according to those who recorded its history (Barthold 1925, 93–94). Material and spiritual culture, when it appears in his works, is therefore biased towards that of the upper classes. It is a process that is distinctly different from later Soviet historians, who relied on material remains in addition to textual ones in order to paint a fuller picture of social organization and economic activity, in addition to political and cultural achievements (Bustanov 2017). This lack of material evidence combined with hypothesized social dynamics allows sweeping statements about Sogdians “losing their language under the influence of Turkification” (Barthold 1925, 97). His is therefore a conceptualization of the Tajiks as a people who are Turkic in language only, and retain their essentially Iranian racial
composition. Absent is intermarriage, social class and commercial migration, all of which might have resulted in a demographic reality far more complex than this simplistic image. These groups, in other words, appear to be exempt from the same processes that brought Turkic collectivities into existence in the pre-Islamic period.

The ultimate incongruity of Bartol’d’s analysis with the principles of Stalinist nationality policy also become apparent from his accounts of Sogdian cultural supremacy in eastern Central Asia. In particular, his reference to the “national alphabet” of the Sogdians trespasses on two aspects of the dominant understanding of the nation (Barthold 1925, 95). It first casts back the title of nation to a people whose socio-economic organization could not have possibly met the requirements of a modern capitalist structure under the tutelage of a self-conscious bourgeoisie. More importantly, however, his use of the term national to describe an aspect of language problematizes the use of this object as a necessary but not sufficient condition of nation-identification. The use of Sogdian as a language would have, in any Stalinist analysis, been a necessary but not sufficient component of qualifying the Sogdians as a nation. But what of those people who used a non-national alphabet to express themselves? Do they, in some way, forfeit part of their belonging to the nation and its purest core? To that end, did the Turkic peoples, particularly the Uighurs of the 8th and 9th centuries, compromise in full or in part their Turkic-ness by adopting an alphabet based not on their own innovations, but on those of their non-Turkic neighbours? While such a question might appear arcane, it had real implications for Soviet authority in the 1920s, as the government prepared to introduce a new alphabet for Turkic speakers across the Union. The insinuation that a particular alphabet might be more suitable than another one for
the national aspirations of a given people had the potential to derail the push to create Soviet nationalities. As the grandfather of Soviet Turkological studies, Barthold’s interpretations could have serious trickle-down effects on the acceptance and adoption of new Soviet identities.

Chuloshnikov: a Brief Sideline

Among those ethnic Russians who joined Barthold in his endeavour to uncover the history of Central Asia for primarily Russian readers was Aleksandr Petrovich Chuloshnikov. Chuloshnikov’s История Киргиз-Казахов (The History of the Kyrgyz-Kazakhs) was far from a work of source criticism or historical analysis. Rather, it was intended, similar to Barthold’s 1924 work on the history of the Turkmen, to be a starting point for the study of these two people by trained historians and ethnographers. For this reason, there is much space devoted to reviews of extant works and their merits (Chuloshnikov 2006, 190–91). Although he does make an attempt at refashioning the writings and conclusions of Walikhanov along Marxist lines – particularly by correlating the latter’s histories of his people to specific stages of socio-economic development – most of Chuloshnikov’s approach to Kazakh and Kyrgyz – and indeed Turkic – history is dominated by a dissection of the pure ethno-racial components that might have mixed together to give rise to the Kazakh and Kyrgyz nations (Chuloshnikov 2006, 197–209). Eclecticism was obviously a feature of individual works, as well as the disciplines as a whole. It should not be a surprise, then, that Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev, the first native Kazakh to write a European-style history of his people, would be so critical of Chuloshnikov’s approach in his own 1927 history, as we shall see shortly. Serious fieldwork had yet to be
conducted among the peoples of Central Asia themselves, and Chuloshnikov’s
relegated the oral histories of the region to ethnography and anthropology, rather
than seeing in them sources of historical truth (Chuloshnikov 2006, 216–17). It would
therefore take those intimately familiar with the region, its people and their
languages to provide the basis upon which a new national historiography,
corresponding to both European and native epistemologies, would be founded.

**Of Soviets and Locals**

This begs the question of how local historians and intellectuals conceived of
their own national histories. The extent to which such national nomenclature can be
used for large parts of the Soviet population is a contentious issue that has yet to be
resolved within the literature (Amanzholova 2006, 15–17; Subtelny 1994, 51).
Certainly, the desire to be labeled as a Kazakh or an Azeri meant, to some degree, to
be able to participate in Soviet society. The Bolsheviks believed that the passage
from pre-capitalist social formations to capitalist nations was necessary for the
development of socialism in the Soviet Union and were also conscious of the need to
respect the national sentiments of the “the Tatars and Bashkirs, the Uzbeks and
Kirghiz, the Turkmens and Tajiks, … peoples retarded in their cultural relations” (I. V.
Stalin 1957, 110). To this end, they created a number of different national republics,
autonomous republics and oblasts, all designed to allow for the development of a
socialist economy and socialist national culture. The process proved to be difficult
even in those areas in which Imperial rule had long been established, and where the
cultures and “nations” themselves were fairly familiar for the Muscovite élite, such
as Belarus (Hirsch 2005, 149–50). In the region east of the Caspian, the initial
delimitation of borders occurred in 1924 under the aegis of the Central Asian Bureau. The Bureau’s decisions – which led to the creation of Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics, a Kazakh Autonomous Republic within the Russian Federation, and a Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast within it – were based on reports from local authorities as well as ethnographic data and socio-economic surveys. From the outset, these were intended to be provisional decisions which were continually updated according to the findings of ethnographers, anthropologists and other specialists, as well as petitions from ordinary citizens (Hirsch 2005, 161–65).

Indeed, between 1924 and 1936, the map of Central Asia continued to change, with new entities appearing and others disappearing, while various extant Republics or Oblasts changed their names, thanks to modified terminology within the discipline of ethnography (Haugen 2003, 165–210; Hirsch 2005, 161). As the reality of new nationally-based structures set in, people began to understand the very real and practical advantages of belonging to a specific category, no different than in other regions of the world in which the state tied rights and privileges to citizenship (Haugen 2003, 111–15). Adoption of nationally-inspired endonyms and exonyms therefore meant buying into an ideologically-constrained social order that continued to eliminate alternative world views as the 1920s progressed. This situation was further complicated by the fact that ethno-national identities defined by the Soviet authorities were far from clear-cut. Frequent disputes erupted over the ethno-national affiliation of various social and kinship groupings (Edgar 2006, 59–60). In this respect, broad-based Kazakh, Uzbek or Azeri historical consciousness and imagination during the 1920s are amorphous and poorly delimited concepts at best (Hirsch 2005, 145).
Turkic Intellectuals and Their Languages

When we talk of intellectuals, however, the picture is slightly different. Among the Turkic writers, ethnographers, historians, philosophers and social activists whose work I survey, all had long-term and sustained contact with Russian and European scholars and scholarly materials. The earliest Russo-Turkic ethnographers and orientalists who were regarded as such, including Aleksandr Kazem-Beg and Choqan Walikhanov, often worked within Russian Imperial structures. The Azeri aesthete and dramatist Axundzada was employed as a translator in negotiations between the Russian and Persian imperial courts. I do not believe, therefore, that it is problematic to use national designations for the later generation of Turkic intellectuals, many of whom left us documentary evidence as to their preference of ethno-national identification. Some even participated in the state-sponsored drive to popularize and routinize the use of approved ethnonyms. In those rare cases in which controversy about a writer’s affiliation persists, I will make note of it; otherwise, I will not seek to work against the grain of mainstream scholarship.

While I do not consider writers’ ethno-national belonging as a fruitful point of discussion for the elaboration of my thesis, their choice of language, I believe, does warrant further scrutiny. Russian, as the international language of the USSR – both in terms of relations between the USSR and sovereign states, and in communication between national groupings within the Soviet Union – was assured a privileged place in the social sciences. In the 1920s and 1930s, Russian was used, therefore, by linguists, historians, ethnographers, archaeologists and others who hoped to access
Union-wide and international scholarly publications (Hirsch 2005, 316). It was also the language to be used for political messaging destined to all but the most parochial of audiences, including Communist party organs and multi-national gatherings of Party members and citizens (Bromlei 1983, 363–64). All of the Turkic scholars studied in my project wrote at least some of their works in Russian, particularly those destined for academic and intellectual milieux.

At the other end of the scale are works in vernacular languages that do not have a long tradition of scholarly or literary production for mass consumption. These include the lects upon which Kazakh, Crimean Tatar, Tatar, Turkmen, Uzbek and Kyrgyz were based. For centuries, Ottoman Turkish and Chagatai were the two vehicles of literary production for western and eastern Turkic communities respectively. They were non-vernacular languages that changed far more slowly than the vernacular dialects spoken by non-élite communities across Eurasia. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, issues of vernacular-medium education and publication were highly controversial around the start of the 20th century. After the Bolshevik rise to power and defeat of counter-revolutionary forces in 1922, vernaculars cemented their position as the only vehicles of education in the Soviet Union (Shneer 2003, 198–99). These dialects, which would soon be elevated to the status of national languages by Soviet linguists and politicians, were perceived to be lacking in the terminology necessary for the elaboration of scientific works about the history and archaeology of Central Asia. They were therefore used largely for persuasive purposes. Works written in Kazakh, Uzbek or other languages tended to be geared towards convincing speakers of the languages’ abilities to express modern concepts, of the new vocabularies created by central planning committees, and of
the worldview espoused by the Soviet authorities, including its historical components (Shneer 2003, 200). We will see such trends in many of the works under investigation in the following sections. As such, cultural production in these lects found a ready home in the various periodical publications issued by the Soviet authorities, such as *Yer yu’zi* (*Worldwide*, Uzbek); *Yeshil Ada* (*Green Island*, Crimean Tatar); *Oqu Ishleri* (*Reading Matters*, Crimean Tatar); *Temir Qazaq* (*Iron Kazakh*); *Qyzyl Qalam* (*Red Pen*, Azeri); *Tyrmken Medenijeti* (*Turkmen Civilization*); and *Maorif va Uqutg’uvchu* (*Education and the Teacher*, Uzbek).

Finally, the non-vernacular Turkic means of written communication did not cease to be used in the 1920s. A modified version of Ottoman Turkish, quite close in its structure and lexicon to modern Azeri Turkish, was employed by writers from the western Russo-Turkic world, as well as some Kazan Tatar authors. The works written in this language, which was preferred by Ismail Gasprinski in his own writings, tended to be aimed at an audience between the cultured élite and the masses. Although some works were argumentative or persuasive in nature, there was also expository scholarly production in the language. The Crimean Tatar Bekir Çobanzada is a notable example of the linguists who wrote in this medium. His most frequent topics of dissection were the structure of the Turkic languages, their relationship to one another, and the prospects for linguistic modernization. Given the limitations of writing in such a language for either mass distribution or dissemination within international scholarly circles, I believe that these types of products were destined to the restricted community of Turkic intellectuals. These individuals had previously participated in the debates on language, identity, political representation and social organization in the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Many such monographs were
produced in advance of the 1926 All-Union Turkological Congress in Baku, in which both Soviet and foreign – including Turkish – delegates participated.

**Soviet Ethnography**

As Soviet power became entrenched, such expressions of language and ethno-national belonging, however, became much more controlled among both intellectuals and the masses. From the mid-1920s onward, the process of converting the Stalinist concept of the nation from theory to practice was pursued in earnest. The Soviet state sent out teams of ethnographers to the far reaches of the Union in order to determine which nations existed and who belonged to which group (Hirsch 2005, 236). This was not a typically colonial exercise of assigning tribal, ethnic or national affiliation to subject populations, but rather a far more complicated process that involved negotiations of power between individuals, local élites, scholars and the central government (Hirsch 2005, 174). At least until the early 1930s, national identity was not seen as primordial, but rather the conscious choice of the individual (Martin 2000, 354). Individuals were therefore asked to describe their ethnicity to census takers, who would then have to evaluate the truthfulness and accuracy of the statement. Meanwhile, local élites had learned, during the decade prior to the October Revolution, the usefulness of appealing to national interests in affecting Moscow’s decisions on local matters and in securing greater authority for themselves vis-à-vis rivals (Hirsch 2005, 161).

Ethnography, local culture and language were all bound together in the very sticky question of language standardization and reform. In particular, given the importance of language as a necessary but not sufficient condition for nation
formation, it is understandable that the selection of a particular dialect as the basis of a standard language – which would then become the official language, alongside Russian, of the Soviet Republic bearing the name of the group who spoke it – would generate heated debates regarding the characteristics of given lects. In discussions on Uzbek dialects, for example, the issue of synharmonism or vowel harmony was of particular importance, given its absence in many of the urban dialects in Soviet Uzbekistan. This would not be a question of importance for my study, were it not the manner in which linguistic diversity and change were framed in historical and identitarian terms. Specifically, the loss of synharmonism was explained as the gradual Iranicization of the urban dialects of Tashkent, Samarqand and Bukhara. The explanation therefore carried an implicit judgment on the possibility of phonemic change brought about by endogenous pressures, as well as the authenticity of speech patterns and speech communities. This does not necessarily mean that such dialects were perceived as being less worthy of becoming national languages; in the case of Uzbek and the interpretation of the Uzbek writer Abdullo Alavi, quite the opposite. The loss of synharmonism was perceived as one component of the lect’s history as encapsulated in its current form (Alavi 1926, 40). Valorization of change, variation and cultural mixing, therefore, could be a tool for use in two arenas: political jockeying of local and regional élites for influence vis-à-vis Moscow; and the historiographic fight between ethno-nationalist purists and Marxist-influenced proponents of the Soviet régime.
Finding Local Histories

Since the mid-19th century, language and history had been perceived by intellectuals as keys to protecting or improving the lot of their constituents in the face of demands by other groups across Central Asia (Kendirbaeva 1999, 15). Kazakh intellectuals, in particular, saw the writing and teaching of history as a means of ensuring the socio-political unification of Kazakh speakers and the preservation of cultural and linguistic peculiarities in the face of assimilationist pressures by both Uzbeks and Tatars (Kendirbaeva 1999, 21). The works of a writer such as Bökeikhanov – a member of the nationalist Alash Orda movement and supporter of a Westernized Kazakh identity (Amanzholova 2006, 37) – could have provided the basis for a Soviet Kazakh history in the 1920s. His association with the “bourgeois nationalist” Alash Orda made Bökeikhanov politically suspect, however, and thus disqualified him from writing an acceptable historical narrative (Malikov 1972, 203–5; Auezova 2011, 247). An indication of why his writings might have met with suspicion can be seen in the article “Tarikh kerek” (“History is necessary”), published in the journal Qyzyl Qazaqstan in 1922. Here, Bökeikhanov argues that nations have lifecycles similar to those of humans, rising, maturing and dying in due course. He infuses the ethno-national grouping with a sense of historicity, claiming that it is written history that assures the preservation of the nation in the modern world, not oral culture (Bökeïkhanov 2013, 169). On the whole, historicity is in line with Marxist orthodoxy, even if it is not explicitly tied to socio-economic development. It is therefore not necessarily grounds for censure.
It is later in his article that he begins to stray from sanctioned wisdom in both interpretation and methodology. To begin, he recognizes that “the basis of history is class struggle”, an essential component of any Marxist narrative. However, he also believes that history is a critical apparatus with which the nation views and corrects its faults, thereby ensuring its regeneration (Bökeïkhanov 2013, 170). The nation’s success and survival, therefore, are seen as historically contingent, but the nation as an object might, in fact, be eternal and primordial. Placement of the nation at the top of social priorities is the essence of nationalist thought (Breuilly 2007, 2), and such prioritization clashed fundamentally with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Moreover, written history is mandatory; but history based on written documents is not.

Bökeikhanov understood that the Kazakhs possessed a rich tradition of oral history and literature upon which historians would have to draw if the people were to participate in the writing of their own narrative: “Up to this day, the Kazakh has no written history. History is passed from mouth to mouth.” Alternative methods of data collection and analysis would have to be utilized in the construction of a Kazakh national history; methods that might conflict with the widely accepted rules of source criticism employed by Western historians (Bökeïkhanov 2013, 171). Within the context of a system that placed greater and greater emphasis on materiality and scientific rigour, the call for employing oral sources and folklore would be met with skepticism at best, and charges of anti-Marxist idealism at worst. As we saw in Chapter 4, Gramsci perceived of folklore as a useful key to the overall worldview of a society; but Gramsci had not influenced Stalinism, and thus only a scientific approach could be tolerated in the dominant system that would be espoused by the state.
At this point in time, however, eclecticism still ruled supreme in Soviet historiography, and continued to guide historians of both Russia and the peoples on its periphery. The use of history—particularly oral history—was understood by those involved in agitprop for the Soviet authorities to be crucial in convincing the nomadic peoples of Central Asia of socio-economic reforms. A 1923 article about the Kazakh land question in the periodical *Qyzyl Qazaqstan (Red Kazakhstan)* pressed readers to accept that oral history would enable the Kazakhs to demonstrate their long-standing relationship to the land and their social customs surrounding its usage (“Qazaq zher meselesi” 1923, 33–35). A piece from later that year entitled “Tarikhi Maghlumatdary” (“Historical Information”) encouraged the use of the traditional sources of historical knowledge by native historians in order to write the narrative of the people themselves, and to separate this from works of “literature” that made up the body of pre-Revolutionary historical accounts. This emphasis on nativist and objective historiography is proposed as a counterbalance to Russian and European efforts to racialize the Turkic peoples of the Steppe as Turkified Aryans, and thereby to deny their indigeneity or the validity of their Turkic identity. This anti-colonial approach to historiography, which makes use of Arab, Chinese and Persian chronicles, is aimed at placing the Kazakh and Kyrgyz on the historical map as longstanding nations, in contradiction to classical Marxist teaching (“Tarikhi maghlumatdary” 1923, 76–79).

The overall reshaping of history by local historians, then, was a two-step process. The first, demonstrated by this article and others like it, was the infusion of European objectivity and professionalization, without an attempt at enforcing ideological rigour. So long as recourse was made to scholarly research, it was
deemed acceptable to argue that the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were fully-formed nations long before the appearance of capitalism, or that ethno-national identity could be conceived of as pure or diluted (“Tarikhi maghlumatdary” 1923, 89). It was only later, once Stalinism became an ideological force to be reckoned with on all levels and in all disciplines, that interpretation, as well as sources, would be reorganized and purged by the state. The second was recourse to local sources of knowledge, marrying national content to a universal form. This brought the definition of the nation and its evolution firmly within the grasp of native élites, who balanced between nationalist rhetoric and the Stalinist orthodox in the name of advancing their constituents’ interests.

Azeri Hangovers

Similar trends can be found among other Turkic communities whose literati and scholars of the Revolutionary period sought a place for themselves once Bolshevik hegemony had been established. A 1925 article entitled “Azərbaycan haqqında” (“About Azerbaijan”) in Maarif İşçisi (The Education Worker) written by Hüseyin Mirzacemalov provides us with insight into the acceptability of historians who would later be tarred as bourgeois-nationalists throughout the 1920s. In his introduction to the history of Caucasian Azerbaijan (as opposed to the Iranian region south of the Arax River), Mirzacemalov refers his readers to a work written by Ahmet Ağaoğlu (called Ağayev in the note) during his studies at the University of Jena in Germany (Mirzacemalov 1925, 23). Ağaoğlu would later be accused of “poisoning workers’ slogans with nationalism” (Köçərli 1976, 88); of being a proponent of Islamic solidarity – rather than class consciousness – among the Turkic speakers of
the Caucasus (Köçərli 1976, 112); and of working with the Qazan Tatar Yusuf Akçura to further the cause of pan-Turkism from their base at the Türk Ocakları in Istanbul (Pustarnakov 1990, 21). For the time being, however, he was an example of native scholarship on the history and development of the Azerbaijani nation. More substantially, Mirzacementalov sought to push back the beginnings of Turkic colonization in Azerbaijan to the arrival of Hunnic emissaries keen on commercial links with Byzantium and China in the 6th century CE. Diplomatic relations evidently began the slow and steady ("aqın aqın") settlement of the region by Turkic peoples. (Mirzacementalov 1925, 25). Although this builds upon readily accepted contemporary scholarship, and is therefore not terribly different from Zeyneloğlu (whom we saw in chapter 5) and his history of Azerbaijan published in Istanbul in 1924, it extrapolates from mainstream theses in order to comment on the ethnicity of the Huns and of the length of a substantial Turkic presence outside of Central Asia, core components of the Turkist nationalist creed.

*Maarif işçisi*, it should be noted, was not wed to a particular non-Marxist view of Turkic influences in Azerbaijan. A 1927 piece by Fathali Melek Mehmetzade on the ethnography and demographic history of the Quba governorate traces out the various groups present in the region in the 1920s. Of these, Russians and Armenians are dealt with summarily, while there is considerable space devoted to the history and development of the Tat (Iranic) and Lezgi (Caucasian) communities. After this, a brief exposition of the Turkic groups is provided in which these are identified as the soldiers of the Mongol army that arrived with Tamerlane. Although they are ethnographically classified as Turks because of their customs and language, the prevalent Lezgi myth about their arrival with Tamerlane’s army means that they
continue to be known as “Mongols”. The periodical’s editorial board explains that although this article should have appeared in the ethnographic section, its incorporation of important historical information led them to publish it in the regional history chapter (Mehmetzade 1927, 70–71). In many ways, Mehmetzade’s brief account of the region’s ethnographic diversity provides us with an indication of the flexibility in approaches to history and belonging that characterized historical writing in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. No mention of physical features or racial types is made, and in this no attempt is made to meld this cacophony of opinions and ontologies into a cohesive and coherent view of the world and its past.

On the issue of methodology, a 1926 article in the Azeri journal Maarif işçisi on the Uday ethnic group, however, demonstrates that a lack of source criticism or hypothesis testing was not a universal characteristic of all writing at the time. The language of the article is closer to that of Ottoman Turkish than modern Azeri, indicating that its author was likely schooled in the Ottoman literary language and aiming at an audience with a similar background. In it, Mirbağırzade, a frequent contributor on matters of ethnography and anthropology, traces out the history of this community, their customs and their language. Much of the article is concerned with the ancestors of the Uday, the Albanians and the Erranians. The author makes, in a passing comment, the claim that the Albanian nation (millet) was of Turanic origin, while the Armenians – widely believed to be of Aryan origin – were late-comers to the region of the southern Caucasus (Mirbağırzade 1926, 88). This picture of the Albanians is completed with a brief description of their moral and psychological life and their physical appearance. “Albanian society, from the point of view of its ‘character’, was a clean-virtue, pure-hearted nation [temiz hasiyetli, saf
This is followed by speculation that the exonym “Albanian” comes from the Latin word for white (albus), as the Albanians were known to have “hair that was white [as] in the colour of a rose.” (Mirbağırzade 1926, 97) These statements are not anathema to Stalinist doctrine in their entirety, as character or cast of mind was part of the Stalinist definition of a nation, and physical characteristics were here used not to prove superiority, but rather to explain historically-contingent exonyms.

The later exposition of relationships between Uday and the Caucasian languages of Daghestan, rather than Turanic languages (Mirbağırzade 1926, 104), would indicate that linguism was not a feature of Mirbağırzade’s writing. Nor can linguism be detected in an earlier article in the same publication about sources of Azerbaijani history written by Pokhomov and translated into Azeri by Efendizade. This particular piece returns to the issue of cuneiform clay tables found in Eastern Anatolia around the modern city of Van and dated to the period of the Assyrian invasions. Pokhomov explains that the tablets are in a language that is neither Semitic nor Aryan, and that is believed to be Japhetic by the linguist Nikolai Marr (Pokhomov 1926, 76–77). No assertion is made, however, that there is any connection between the language in which the texts have been composed, nor, for that matter, the ethnicity of the composers, and modern populations and languages of the same region. Rather than a presentation of a cohesive nationalist view of the world, these articles are collections of contemporary scholarship on the ethnic groups of Azerbaijan, with little concern for ideological rigour. They demonstrate the eclectic nature of the scholars who focused on the history of this part of the Union,
and of the intense desire for historical information to fill the pages of all forms of publications.

**Effusive Epistemologies**

Nonetheless, Soviet authorities appear to have been active in ensuring that whatever activities were undertaken by these amateur historians and local leaders did not spill over into hostile nationalist opposition to Moscow. These efforts were complicated when it came to non-Russian publications, particularly those in vernaculars rather than literary languages, because of the dearth of Marxist terminology. The abundance of materials in Russian on historical materialism, dialectical materialism, Marxian thought, nationality questions and economic analysis meant that there was no particular problem in rendering complex Marxist-Leninist analysis in language that, while erudite and at times esoteric, was not wholly foreign to monolingual Russian readers. In the lectures that would form the basis of Crimean Tatar, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uzbek and other Soviet Turkic languages, however, such vocabularies were not in existence. Moreover, the borrowing of a Russian word might spark confusion at best and accusations of Russification at worst. For this reason, articles by such famed theorists as Bukharin were translated from the Russian into Uzbek, Azeri, Kazakh and others, and supplemented heavily with linguistic notes (see Bukharin 1926a; Bukharin 1926b; Bukharin 1926c; “Bajshylyq, ultshyldyq salt-sanagha qarsy attanys” 1929; “Ult tuwraly qysqasha maghlumat” 1928). Terms were coined and explained, often with their Russian equivalents in brackets. This had the advantage of portraying the language of Marxist analysis and theory as modern and progressive in the fight for mother-
tongue literacy. It also allowed for the theoretical basis upon which Soviet social sciences were based to seep into non-Russian intellectual culture, and nativized the epistemologies and ontologies of Stalinist national histories among communities with their own traditions of historiography.

These epistemologies did not die in 1917. The eclectic nature of Soviet planning during the 1920s meant that some pre-Revolutionary trends continued after the change of regime. This can be seen easily in the examples above. Moreover, the Civil War deprived Moscow of sovereignty over large parts of the country. The anti-Bolshevik forces were not always sympathetic to nationalist causes, although they did indeed tolerate them when beneficial to the anti-Soviet cause (Bennigsen 1979, 25; Ryskulov 1984a, 153). Tolerance of those involved in such causes continued after victory in 1922, at least for a short period.

Whatever traditions existed, however, they were in constant competition with Soviet orthodoxy. In a 1923 issue of the Crimean Tatar journal Yengi Çolpan, both Stalinist interpretations of the nation and non-Marxist understandings of a specific nation are on display. The latter appears in Aqçoqraqıl’s exposé of Qazan Tatar literature. He recognizes that the majority of Crimean Tatars have only become acquainted with the Tatars of Central Russia and Siberia in recent years, thanks to the expansion of commercial opportunities and political activity following the 1905 Revolution. They are thus poorly informed about the Qazan Tatars’ origins, culture and customs. In a brief outline of their lineage, he provides the opinions of a number of experts, including pre-Revolutionary Russian scholars who link the Tatars to the Volga Bulgars and thence to the Huns; Arab chroniclers who believe them to be a mixture of Turks and Slavs; and unnamed historians who claim them to be the
Islamized remnants of a Turco-Finnic union (Aqçoqraqlı 1923, 42–43). Aqçoqraqlı does not overtly espouse a nationalist or idealist approach to the historicity of national groupings, but the absence of any sort of historically contingent component in his analysis leads us to believe that Stalinist nationalities doctrine was not necessarily a priority for him.

In contrast to the article on the Qazan Tatars, a piece in the same journal entitled “Rusiya’dan millet meselesi ve onun surt-i hallı” (“The national question in Russia and the form of its solution”) is a shining example of Soviet dogma. Although the piece, written by Osman Zeki, is ostensibly a history of national relations within the framework of the Russian state, it begins with a definition of the concept of the nation. A brief review of the ideas of Springer and Bauer are soon followed by a clear definition of the nation, printed in a bold-faced type that is larger than the rest of the text:

“The nation is a community of language, territory, economic life and psychological structure (which you see in a civilizational community) that is formed in a historical framework. That is to say, this community is not a union of race or tribe. Historical community, unity is necessary. Today’s Anatolian Turks, Italians, English, French and others like them are nations that are formed from various races and tribes and that came about in response to historical circumstances.” (Zeki 1923, 27)

Although no citation is given, there can be no doubt that this particular formulation of the definition of a nation bears an uncanny resemblance to that found in Stalin’s 1913 essay on the national question. It is a forceful and explicit rebuttal of nationalist ideations of the nation, while retaining the idealist component of a cast of mind. The reinforcement is negative, as well as positive. In addition to a clear
definition of the nation, Zeki refutes the idea that the Crimean Tatars form a common nation with the Krymchaks and the Karaim, two Jewish groupings that speak ethnolects of the Crimean Tatar language (Zeki 1923, 27). In doing so, he transgresses the most important of nationalist precepts: that language and culture are more important than confessional differences. The result is not an absolute negation of pan-Turkic or nationalist ideology, but it does lay the groundwork for a reformulation of nationhood and belonging within Turcophone communities.

Part of this process required breaking down existing threats and identity movements. Pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism were two obvious targets of the authorities, and efforts were taken to convince non-Russian citizens of the need for loyalty to Moscow rather than other centres of power. In the Crimean Tatar journal İleri (Forward), Editor-in-Chief M. Nedim discussed the differences between national culture ("milli kultura") and class culture ("sınıfi kultura") as early as 1926. The article starts with a quote from Leon Trotsky on the intimate connection between national culture and the ideology of the dominant class (Nedim 1926, 33). What follows is a somewhat contradictory account of nations and national culture that demonstrates the tension between Leninist and Stalinist ideas. After quoting Lenin, Nedim applies the Leninist concept of two cultures within one nation – that of the bourgeoisie and another of the proletariat – to the Islamic world, claiming that “to present the Tatars, Turks, Arabs and Acems [Persians] of the East each as a unified grouping is nothing more than to perform a service for the petit bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie.” (Nedim 1926, 34) As such, there is no specifically “national” culture to which a people might belong, but rather a class-based one. In the West, the distinction is between bourgeoisie and proletariats, but in the East it is between the
dominant petit bourgeoisie (including the clergy) and the pastoral or peasant classes (Nedim 1926, 36).

The problem with this analysis is that it ignores the historically-contingent aspects of class and nation formation. If the peoples of the East and West have different dominant and dominated classes, it is, according to Marxist-Leninist interpretations, because they have reached differing points of socio-economic development. Those of the East have yet to transition entirely into capitalism, and so their “nations” cannot have been fully formed in the same manner as those of the Russians, Germans or Poles. Capitalism is a *sine qua non* for the Turkish, Tatar or Arab bourgeoisies to impose their own cultures on dominated classes through the creation of “national cultures”. Nedim therefore uses Leninist doctrine to encourage a break with pre-Revolutionary conceptions of a wider Islamic communities as well as parochial systems of belonging, replacing them with class-based ideas of inclusion and identification. He also, however, has recourse to Stalinist laxity in the application of the national model to non-European groups. Similar to Stalin’s approach to the Georgians and their formation of a nation prior to the arrival of capitalism, as seen in the discussion on ideology in chapter 4, Nedim’s call for the abandonment of national cultures among the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union fudges the historical limits of the nation, and brings the Crimean Tatars into the Stalinist worldview of peoples and groups. Although it is lacking in any sort of historical dimension, this article and others like it routinized the usage of the concept of the nation and thus naturalized it among Turkic communities.

The use of terminology such as “national” was far from circumspect in even more politicized contexts, including the materials published for the 1926
Turkological Congress in Baku. A speech on the Latin alphabet by the representative of the Uzbekistan government to the Congress, Xorezimli Mulobekjon Rahmonog’lu, demonstrates the level of mixing that occurred in official Communist Party writings, albeit those in languages other than Russian. The speech was delivered in what appears to be Azeri or a related Oğuz dialect, rather than Uzbek, and addresses the development of writing among the Turkic peoples. Rahmonog’lu describes how the Turkic inhabitants of Central Asia were introduced to the Arabic script through the Arab invasions of the seventh and eighth centuries CE. The Turkic communities had their own “national” writing, which competed with that of the Arabs, but the latter eventually won out, thanks to the overwhelming influence of the Islamic faith and the centrality of the Qur’an to it (Rahmanog’lu 1926, 9). His interpretation, therefore, bestows national status on two groups that would otherwise be labelled as tribes because of their lack of feudal or capitalist organization of the factors of production. Nevertheless, the use of the word “nation” – to be contrasted with the modern division of Turkic-speakers into “peoples” (xalqlar) (Rahmanog’lu 1926, 10) – indicates not only a departure from Stalinist orthodoxy, but also a refusal to elevate socio-economic factors above idealist and ethnic characteristics in determining belonging. Even those with an interest in preserving and expanding Soviet power over Central Asia were evidently far from averse to the usage of what would later be termed reactionary language in the description of their parochial constituencies.

Professionalization and Objectivization

Part of the process of naturalizing quasi-nationalistic forms of speech resided in introducing Turkic populations to the hierarchical epistemological structures of
Western scholarship. The occasion of the First Turkological Congress in Baku in 1926 provided a propitious opportunity for this, and various scholars were involved in the campaign to inform literate citizens of the goals and benefits of such a gathering. Foremost among the proponents was Bekir Çobanzada, the Crimean Tatar linguist who spent much of his working life in Baku. Çobanzada wrote for both the Crimean Tatar periodical İleri and the Azeri-language Maarif İşçisi, as well as penning ad hoc monographs. In “Şarkçılık Müesseseleri” (“Orientalist Institutes”), published in Maarif İşçisi in 1926, he provided a detailed overview of the history of Orientalist scholarship in Europe and Russia, its uses and abuses, and the importance of the gradual refinement and specialization of scholarly disciplines (Çobanzada 1926a, 8–10). Most importantly, he highlighted the need for the new generation of Western- and Soviet-educated Turkic youths to take up the cause of Turkological scholarship in the spirit of objectivity and scientific rigour. Only in this way would the untruths fed into European studies for the purposes of supporting colonialism and interest-based foreign investment be unmasked, and scholastic endeavour reoriented towards the benefit of the Turkic nations (Çobanzada 1926a, 15–16). Çobanzada was careful to make intention and integrity the criteria for evaluation, rather than language and ethnicity. This permitted him to make judgments on the worthiness of Turkic and non-Turkic scholars’ works without concern for a nationalist credo about blood and patriotism, and to embrace Western writers while disparaging pan-Turkist ones from Istanbul.

The importance of Western-style institutions, hierarchies and epistemologies was about more than simply establishing the credentials of individuals who might appear to be tainted by their work with the Soviet authorities. It was about re-
ordering the world in such a way as to encourage buy-in to the Soviet means of cultural curatorship and reproduction. Apart from Çobanzada’s writing, Uzbek journals also carried a series of articles about the new efforts undertaken by the Soviet authorities in Central Asia to conserve and protect the ancient monuments of the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. These efforts were portrayed as both preservation and education, stressing the manner in which class enemies had failed to incorporate such physical remains into the construction of an educated and class-conscious society of Central Asian Muslims (Nichkin 1926b, 1926a; S. Ayni 1926). One such article defined archaeology as “a modern science (buryng’y zaman ... fann) that has studied and informed [us] about the antiquities left over from spiritual life and exposed to the elements.” “With the archaeologists’ experienced hands,” the author goes on to claim, “they [archaeological excavations] began to give up unseen artefacts that had been dug out from the belly of the earth ... they are making the artefacts of old rise up and are informing [us] of their secrets, of the ideas kept in their hearts, and of their histories of development and inhabitation.” Asia, in particular, had benefited from modern archaeology’s advances, especially in the post-World War One (and thus Soviet) period (R. Ayni 1926, 50). Archaeology and the forward march of modern, European science, therefore, was not a threat to the cultures and histories of the peoples of the East; rather, it had helped them to claim their rightful place in world history.

Obviously, there was much that still needed to be done, and problems did exist. Emphasis was laid on the lack of resources, both physical and human, that hindered the immediate undertaking of serious scholarly work on the history, ethnography, literature and language of the Turkic peoples. The renowned
Turkologist Ismail Samoilovich himself was engaged to write of the problems he faced in order to deliver lectures on Turkology in Baku and Central Asia in the first five years after the end of the Civil War. Here blame is laid on the ancien régime and the solution to the situation is clear: until the Soviet authorities have built the necessary infrastructure for educational and scholarly endeavours, research and discussion will continue in Leningrad and be diffused out towards the periphery (Samoilovich 1926). Turkic Soviet citizens are to put their faith in the emissaries of the Soviet régime and their pronouncements while a fair and functional society that enables their desires to explore their own pasts, presents and futures is being constructed.

Such trust was important for Çobanzada. His articles in other periodicals sketch out views of the world that do not accord with nationalist or pan-Turkist ideas about language, belonging and authenticity and would have required some force of scholarly authority to be accepted. In an article for İleri in 1926 on the role of Turco-Tatar intellectuals in civilizational creativity, his conception of the Turkic world is one that jars considerably with the ideas of both the nationalists and the Stalinist hardliners of the 1930s. Here, no distinction is made between writers who would later be considered Turks, Azeris, Crimean Tatars or Qazan Tatars, a grave crime against Stalinist orthodoxy. However, it is not the indivisible and eternal unity of a Turkic brotherhood that is on display, for the Albanian nationalist Şemseddin Sami (Sami Frashëri) is included in the list of Turco-Tatar intellectuals (Çobanzada 1926b, 6). This, then, is a Turkic or Turkish society of thinkers, a belonging based upon voluntary linguistic traits and a willingness to participate in a given socio-cultural milieu. Consciousness and cast of mind are obviously not of prime importance, as
both Sami and the Azeri intellectual Axundzada opted to identify with non-Turkic collectivities (the Albanian and Persian respectively). Blood and lineage, too, are ignored, as it is the product of the mind, rather than descent from a common ancestor, that motivates inclusion and exclusion from Çobanzada’s collection of Turkic minds.

Indeed, even when authors make a specific claim regarding the study of Turkic history, general calls to ethnic pride or racial cohesion are entirely absent. A 1927 article from *Maorif va Uqutg’uvchu*, “On Uzbek History” (“O’zbek tarixi ustida”) is remarkably practical in its approach to the topic. Histories based upon the works of Léon Cahun, the well-known 19th century French scholar of the Turkic peoples, are seen as not only outdated, but also irredeemably tainted by the political and ideological biases of their times. New, modern histories need to be written, especially given the stress placed on the study of history by the People’s Commissar of Education. Of greatest importance is the infusion of materialism into the analysis of history, a key component of any narrative that departs from the mysticism of mediaeval historical texts. The author, Rahim, engages in many of the same complaints found in other articles on the topic – the need for infrastructure; the need for money; the need for state-support of those who are committed to the study and interpretation of history – but he also introduces a new element into the mix. He recognizes that the Uzbeks are part of the broader group of Turkic peoples, but that they are, essentially, a separate collectivity. He argues that the process of creating a new Uzbek history will be far easier than it might first appear, thanks to the considerable volume of material collected for general Turkic history, especially with reference to Azerbaijan and Tatarstan. However, this material needs to be
translated, reorganized, and most importantly re-interpreted – with emphasis placed on Uzbek history during the period of Genghis Khan – according to the principles of materialism (Rahim 1927, 44–45). It is important for our study, because it recognizes the implicit conclusion that the Uzbeks are a separate Turkic people (qavm), and because it explicitly calls for an abandonment of the idealist understanding of national history, so dear to Turkish historians, in favour of a materialist paradigm. This materialist structure can only be a dialectical one within the bounds of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, given Rahim’s insistence on highlighting the Uzbek role in the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Uzbekistan the Urban, Uzbekistan the Rural

The next issue of the same periodical gives us an example of how a new type of Turkic history might be written. Bulon Soliyev, an author of historiographic articles in previous issues, responds in this piece to the criticisms of Aziz Abdullin about Soliyev’s earlier article entitled “O’rta Osiyo Tarixi” (“The history of Central Asia”). Abdullin’s remarks centre on four different topics: (1) sources; (2) Marxist theory’s lack of importance; (3) the probability of feudalism’s influence over that of capitalism; (4) Timur and the Mongols” (Soliyev 1927a, 41) On the first count, Abdullin’s criticism of Soliyev arises from the latter’s usage of Russian, rather than Arab and Persian, sources. Soliyev admits that the Arab and Persian sources are useful, especially when studying the Mediaeval period, as they reveal the extent of social, political and economic development in both the cities and the countryside. Russian sources, however, provide a different view, as they are based upon the chronicles of the ancient Chinese and Greeks, and therefore add to the scant
information available on Central Asia before the Islamic period. Soliyev is particularly keen to laud Bartol’d, whose attention to detail and sharp analysis make his works more valuable than those of Vambéry and other Western scholars (Soliyev 1927a, 41–42). Of interest to us is the manner in which the two sets of sources are treated differently. The Arab and Persian sources are seen as primary accounts of life in mediaeval Central Asia; a window onto the reality of the 12th to 16th centuries. Their content is to be taken at face value and then analyzed as appropriate. Russian sources, however, as secondary works of scholarship, are to be taken as completed analysis to be accepted without the application of source critique methodology. This is not a matter of Western versus Oriental knowledge, as Soliyev explicitly criticizes the work of 19th century European scholars. Rather, it is a tacit suggestion of the importance of revolutionary epistemologies, a reordering of the world according to a Marxian, rather than religious, understanding.

The issue of sources leads us to the next two points, the value of Marxist science and the influence of capitalism versus feudalism. Soliyev still recognizes the usefulness of the Arab and Persian sources, as they include accounts of both city life and of rural and tribal societies, and particularly the socio-economic relations that arose between town and city. Through them, as well as the Russian sources, a balanced view of social organization in the vastly diverse region of Central Asia can be reconstructed and a careful account of the social history of Central Asia can finally be written. In this endeavour, revolutionary Marxism, focused as it is on materialism, is far superior to the bourgeois idealism and its historiographical methods. Marxism concentrates on what was and what happened, rather than on what is imagined to have been. Marxist history, however, is unduly biased towards the city and urban
development, according to Abdullin. As such, its application to Central Asia as a historical region has resulted in the over-valuation of capitalism’s influence, when feudalism was a much more powerful force in the development of Central Asia’s institutions and social structures (Soliyev 1927a, 42–43). The relative strength of capitalist and feudalist impulses is a crucial question in determining the emergence of national groupings, given the Stalinist scheme of historical socio-economic development of ethnic communities. In the case of Central Asia, however, it is not the simple transition from feudalism to capitalism with which we are dealing, but rather something far messier.

In Europe, the boundary between feudal social structures and capitalist ones might have been blurry, but it was only two distinct modes of production about which Marx was writing. In the Turkic regions of Transoxiana, another element – nomadism – had to be considered. In truth, it appears that Soliyev’s understanding of feudalism versus capitalism was much more akin to trade versus subsistence, as it is the commercial activities of Sassanian, Khwarezmi and other urban centres that he contrasts to the autarkic economic activities of peasants on the land. Still, it is evident that a problem exists for those who would claim that all peoples – those of the cities, those of the countryside, and the nomads of the steppes and the deserts – formed a unified nation. As Soliyev himself notes, the Turkic tribes who first entered the region in the 7th century were not the same groupings as the tribal nomads of the 12th and 13th centuries, implying that different collectivities had experienced socio-economic change at different rates (Soliyev 1927a, 44). If anything, different modes of production engendered different socio-economic structures, which implied different ethnic and possibly linguistic boundaries. The situation was far too complex.
to characterize Uzbeks or Central Asians as a whole, even if religious and possibly political allegiance bound them to one another.

Soliyev’s conclusions become apparent as he moves to describe the Seljuks. They emerged in the 9th century, at a time when trade throughout the Islamic world was growing substantially. The Seljuks, according to Soliyev, “were from among the old peoples of the Caspian [Sea region]. They were a people organized as a strong state.” As such, they were able to capitalize on the increase in trade through the region and, similar to the other polities in Transoxiana, managed to accumulate capital in substantial amounts. The proof of this is the importance that they played in the geopolitical strategizing of the Sassanians, the Qara-Khitays and the Karahanids, as well as the respect their leaders had from the Caliphs of the period. The leaders of the Seljuks, however, were not considered to be a proper bourgeoisie in traditional scholarship, despite their motivations for capital accumulation. This is because the past and current biases of Orientalists and Turkologists have led to a prevailing belief that the Turkic peoples, including the Seljuks, were nothing more than savages, constantly in conflict with the sole creators of civilization in Central Asia, the Iranians (Soliyev 1927a, 44). Indeed, Soliyev is adamant that nomadic peoples of all ethno-linguistic groups – including the Mongols – be accorded the dignity of civilization and progression. In answering Abdullin’s final point about Timur and the armies of Genghis Khan, here too he seeks to polish off the tarnished name of non-Aryan collectivities and colour them with a civilizing hue by refusing the standard narrative of the Mongols’ barbarism and anti-civilizational attitude (Soliyev 1927a, 45).

Together, Soliyev’s criticism of Abdullin’s four criticisms seeks to break down traditional narratives of the development of Central Asia, as well as newer
nationalist ones, in favour of a Marxian interpretation. A sedentary life, although the hallmark of European feudalism and capitalism, need not be seen as a sufficient condition for the development of capitalist socio-economic dynamics. Moreover, the usage of a wide variety of sources, both Marxian and non-Marxian, allows for a richer picture of the history and emergence of Central Asian collectivities, none of which should be based upon religious, socio-economic or linguistic identities alone.

Soliyev’s Marxist historical interpretation was flexible enough to stretch onto Central Asian realities, granting the Turkic peoples of the region access to the title of “nation” without resorting to the idealism of the bourgeois-nationalist historians, or their typologies. Similar to the Turkish models, European chauvinism is challenged; not from the redoubt of idealism and essentialism, but from a strictly Marxian interpretation adapted, rather than simply adopted, to the peculiarities of Central Asia.

**Uzbek Origins**

Any idea that Soliyev might be a misguided, but nonetheless sincere, adherent to the Stalinist thesis is scuppered by his following piece on the history of Khwarezm. Soliyev appears to have been a specialist on Mediaeval Central Asian sources, and he therefore is quite comfortable in the use of Arabic and Persian materials from the period. He employs an account by Ḥamawi, first, to describe the foundation of the city of Khwarezm. The information reported by Ḥamawi comes from an oft-repeated legend, and tells of a Persian king who sent a group of people to found a settlement in modern-day Turkmenistan. A few years later, a messenger is dispatched to bring news of the pioneers, and returns with tales of the progress
they have made in agriculture, fishery and urban planning. As a reward, the king sends to them various gifts, including forty Turkic concubines. In a footnote to the text, Soliyev explains that the description of the concubines as Turkic ("turkî jariye") should not be taken as a later addition to the story, as there is ample evidence of the historical existence of Turkic peoples throughout the region (Soliyev 1927b, 47). The purpose of the footnote is two-fold: first, it aims to stem the narrative that the usage of the word “Turkic” in Central Asia is a mediaeval or modern invention; it also helps to establish the ethnic bona fides of the people of the region. If their progenitors were originally Turks by ethnicity, then there is no basis for the claim that they were Turkicized Persians or other non-Turkic peoples. Racial purity may not be assured, but at least language can be accompanied by ethno-national belonging in the narrative Soliyev seeks to establish.

Next, the author turns to Russian scholarship on the same source material. He explains that a Professor Veselovskii has searched Al-Birûnî’s history of Khwarezm and established up to twenty different names of individuals present in the city prior to the advent of Islam. Soliyev reviews a number of them and explains how they are etymologically Turkic, in addition to the various modern appearances of the names among the Kazakhs, Nogays and Uzbeks. From this evidence, he concludes that, although the exact origins of the Khwarezmis is unknown, his hypothesis that they are Turkic is well-founded (Soliyev 1927b, 48). The Turkic ethno-national identities are thus cast backwards and assumed to represent, at their core, the original culture and social structure of pre-Islamic Khwarezm. From his earlier complaint about the boorish nature forced upon the ancient Turks by modern Orientalists and Turkologists, we may assume that it was particularly important for Soliyev to
demonstrate their high level of civilizational achievement. The only means of doing this is to defy both mainstream interpretations – whereby the Iranian elements of Khwarezmi culture would be identified as loans into Turkic ones – as well as the Stalinist paradigm whereby neither Turks nor Iranians could exist as contained and bound national groupings in pre-capitalist societies.

The issue that confronts us, however, is that Soliyev’s Turkic collectivities are never fully defined. When describing them, he makes ample use of both the adjective Türkî “Turkic”, as well as names that contain socio-economic, linguistic and tribal elements, such as Türkmen and Og’uz. Rather than using the word millet “nation”, he uses xalq “people” (Soliyev 1927b, 50). Even when he has recourse to racialist discussions of the origins of the Khwarezmis, there is no sense that physical attributes correspond to linguistic or ethnic boundaries. He mines the works of Maqdisî to find descriptions of the peoples of the region, noting that their heads, and particularly foreheads, were wide but the sides of the head narrow. These features, Soliyev claims, correspond to the physical appearances of the Og’uz and Turkmen, but not other Turkic groups. The Turkmen and a portion of the Og’uz remained nomadic communities for the large part, building only those structures that were required for transhumance. Another portion of the Og’uz eventually settled into fixed communities, pushed to this new socio-economic structure by the vagaries of the hunt for water and fodder (Soliyev 1927b, 52). Thus, if the people of Khwarezm were indeed originally Turkic, and the Turkic settlements in the region had been recorded as early as 200 BCE (Soliyev 1927b, 49), then one can only assume that Turks, as such, were a loose grouping of peoples with a common language, but not many other shared characteristics.
Soliyev’s two articles highlight another interesting aspect of Soviet Turkic historiography during the 1920s. His conclusions and paradigms might not be ideologically Stalinist, even in the loosest of senses, but they do appear to be so politically. Soliyev ends his article on the history of Khwarezm by emphasizing that both Iranic and Turkics peoples – generally the Og’uz and Turkmen – had important roles to play in the development of the great civilizations of Central Asia (Soliyev 1927b, 53). He is not terribly concerned with the idea of proving the existence of a fully-formed Turkic nation in the first millennium BCE, but he does hammer home the indigeneity of the Turkic peoples in their current areas of residence. At a time when borders continued to be challenged, and sub-union governments across the region were vying for the right to claim their allegedly ancestral lands, such a narrative was crucial in bolstering Turkic claims against Tajik plaintiffs before the central authorities in Moscow. Such narratives were repeated in other forums too, including readers and literacy materials produced in the new alphabet propagated by the Soviet government. Here, the Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik nations are all allotted their specific national homelands, described as if they were the natural habitats of exotic species (Ataçan 1928, 176–77). Such examples of the naturalization of national histories and boundaries are an indication that even before Stalin had cemented his grip on supreme power, historians and other scholars were actively engaged in bending their writings to the requirements of a supposedly scientific and objective system.
Turkic Hands, Russian Tongues

As mentioned in the section on the language of periodicals and journals, Russian was seen, in many respects, as the international language of science and cooperation. In addition to Turkic languages, many of the authors and scholars mentioned above also wrote works in Russian, usually for audiences that were considerably different from those of the Turkic magazines and journals. Translations that appeared in the Turkic journals were usually from the Russian, but those found in Russian-language media were occasionally produced in German, French, English or other languages used outside of the Soviet Union. Russian-language published materials, therefore, can be seen as a conduit through which some ideas, hypotheses and theories from non-Soviet sources entered Turkic intellectual circles.

Baku, as the site of the First Turkological Congress and the only university in a Turkic-majority city with a Turkology department (including a history section), was a particularly rich source of Russian-language materials. Azerbaijan State University printed an Orientology Journal edited by Bekir Çobanzada and A. V. Bagriia beginning in 1926. Among the articles in the first volume concerned with Turkish and Turkic history there is a review of the work entitled “On questions of the formal study of the poetry of the Turkish [sic] peoples,” written by T. Kowalski of the University of Krakow. The ideas encapsulated in the book are obviously those of an academic outside of the Soviet Union, and thus cannot be attributed to state-sponsored Stalinist ideology. Nevertheless, the selection of this particular book and the approval or refutation of its main points are telling of Baku’s scholastic
establishment’s acceptance of certain attitudes towards the study of the Turkic peoples and their histories.

Given the fact that the article is a translation, it is difficult to tell whether the use of the term турецкий (turetskiĭ, “Turkish”) instead of тюркский (tiurkskiĭ, “Turkic”) was on the part of the author; an error in translation; or a deliberate decision by the editors of the journal. For this reason, I will not concentrate on this particular aspect of the piece. Instead, when we turn to Linin’s brief review of Kowalski’s history of the Turkic peoples and their culture, we see a far clearer affinity between the author’s approach to the Turkic peoples and the views of the Gökalpian nationalists, rather than Soviet Turkologists. Kowalski notes that the Turkic peoples migrated westward in two waves: one going to the north of the Caspian and Black Seas, and the other to the south, through Iran and into the Middle East. The remains of the former wave – the Huns, Avars, Pechenegs, Cumans and others – were absorbed into the Slavic and Magyar communities of Eastern Europe by the 18th century. There are therefore no ethnic, linguistic or cultural remnants of these peoples to be found. Those that passed along the southern route, however, “preserved their own independent language and ethnic characteristics.” (Linin 1926, 141) Turkishness, or Turkicness, is therefore marked off as entirely foreign, not something that might be identified as a component of an otherwise “European” people such as the Hungarians or the Bulgarians.

This is not to say that the Turks of Turkey or the Middle East and Rumelia – those that came with the southern branch of the migration – are examples of pure Turkicness either. Rather, their culture was tainted by Arab civilization through the imposition of Islamic ideas and values. Turkish – and for that matter, native Iranian –
aspects of creativity were wilfully ignored by Western scholars who saw these as imports, rather than indigenous ethnic cultures bubbling to the surface of an otherwise alien soup (Linin 1926, 143). By far, however, the purest of Turkic traits is to be found among the Central Asian nomads, whose customs and language bear a striking resemblance to those of the ancient Turkic peoples recorded in the pre-Islamic inscriptions of the Orkhon River and western China. The reviewer is quick to point out that creativity and ahistoricity are two very different concepts: the peoples of Central Asia might not have changed drastically since the first millennium CE, but that does not mean they were passive in their development of their own cultures or in their adoption and adaptation of foreign elements (Linin 1926, 142).

Of course, Soviet ethnography, anthropology and history were characterized by plentiful examples of the importance of miscegenation and ethno-cultural cross-pollination throughout the pre-capitalist history of all peoples. Within the orthodox paradigm of Soviet historiography, the aforementioned mixing would have been taken as a statement of fact, a fait accompli intended to underscore the irreversible differences between the Turks of Anatolia and the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Salars and Yakuts. The reviewer, however, chooses a different path of interpretation, stressing instead the commonalities of Turkic poetry, and seeking within them a route to the pre-Islamic unity of Turkic culture: “Therefore, if in these four points [the Altai; the environs of Turfan; Qazan; and the Ottoman Empire] – which do not directly abut one another – we find the same principles of versification, then one cannot speak of borrowing. We must evidently seek out the reasons for this considerable resemblance in the common origin of the residents of the aforementioned regions; and from this the conclusion follows that these foundational principles of poetics
must be pan-Turkic.” These similarities could not be due to the unifying influence of Islam, as they are most pronounced in those small communities that did not accept the faith (such as the Yakut) and because Turkic poetry is “anathema” to Islam (Linin 1926, 146). Rather than floating the hypothesis that such versification might be the effect of Turkic phonemic structures, and comparing them to the poetry of language groups with similar structures such as the Mongolic or Uralic ones, Linin prefers to bring the Turkic peoples one step closer to pre-capitalist nation formation. Within the isolated communalities of Turkic speakers scattered throughout the Eurasian landmass, there lie cues to the primordial moral and aesthetic beliefs of the earliest Turkic peoples, united in a cultural union, waiting to be discovered by the modern scholar.

Thus, a general pattern of selective assimilation is adopted vis-à-vis Western stereotypes of the Eastern peoples. The chauvinist’s view of indolent and unintelligent nomads is denounced as “false” (Linin 1926, 142). The ahistoricity thesis – endorsed by Marx himself – is, however, readily adopted and even adapted to the needs of the modern Soviet Turkic scholar. While Marx saw ahistoricity as proof of a community’s inability to pass into capitalism and thence socialism as a cohesive grouping, Kowalski and Linin perceive it to be a point of strength, an assurance of the continuity of untainted cultural traits. History is, of course, a core component of the Stalinist definition of a nation, and thus one wonders if such a proposition would have been censored had it been written a decade later. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate that Soviet Turkic writers were not unfamiliar with the type of reasoning central to Gökalpian nationalist thought. Indeed, far from
ignorance, they seem even appear to have welcomed it as a tool against the misguided conclusions of earlier Orientalists.

**Race, the Superstructure Supermodel**

My division of works according to language and ethnicity of the authors is not intended to create the impression that Turkic intellectuals strayed from orthodoxy, while Russian and European ones held fast. There are, of course, examples of prominent Turkic Turkologists who did eschew nationalist tropes in favour of Stalinist ones, as we have already seen. Agazade and Karakashly’s 1928 history of the Latinization movement among Turkic communities provides us with another example of the manner in which ethnicity is interpreted as being less important in belonging than conscious choice and belief. Agazade was a journalist, pedagogue and linguist active in Azeri public affairs until his death in 1931 (Abasova 2007, 20). Üzeyir Hacıbəyov’s encyclopedia of Azerbaijani civilization has no entry for Karakashly, and neither does there appear to be biographical information about him in other sources. In their history, they take aim at European accusations of Turkic racial inferiority based on the community’s emergence from Mongoloid peoples; the same accusations that would lead Afet İnан to approach Atatürk about anti-Turkish “slander” in 1929. Agazade and Karakashly, however, pursue a radically different tact from the Turkish establishment, denying the importance of race as an explanatory mechanism in its entirety:

“The current cultural backwardness of the Turco-Tatar world is the direct result of the agro-economic backwardness in which it found itself – or better yet, in which it was forced to find itself – throughout long
centuries because of the mis-development of historical circumstances.

“Meanwhile, some bourgeois writers find the reason for this backwardness in the fact that the Turco-Tatar nationalities [национальности], as representatives of the Mongoloid race, are deprived of the capacity to assimilate to the spirit of contemporary European culture.

“First and foremost, people are white or black not because they belong to the white or black race, but because the geographic environment makes its imprint on the life forms of humans who live within it.”
(Agazade and Karakashly 1928, 46)

With this argument, Agazade and Karakashly attack European racialist attitudes from the left, rather than the right. Instead of the aggressive attempts to demonstrate the whiteness of the Turkic peoples, and their ultimate connection to the Aryans—a feature of the First Turkish History Congress in 1932—they apply dialectical materialism to vitiate race as a meaningful component of identity. The pages following the quote provide an alternative explanation for their scientific and educational backwardness of the Turkic peoples: their low levels of socio-economic development. Of the Turkic communities of Central Asia, many remained in the pre-feudal form of social organization, clinging to nomadism and only occasionally settling and constructing urban communities. This left them vulnerable to the despotism of the dominant class and the fatalism of the Sufis. Even the arrival of Western missionaries, such as Il’minskii, the original transcriber of Qazan Tatar into the Cyrillic alphabet, did not introduce them to the material truths inherent in Socialist progress (Agazade and Karakashly 1928, 47–48).
Agazade and Karakashly hammer home the importance of dialectical materialism as a tool for the analysis and explanation of all manifestations of the human existence. Even physical appearance is said to hold no inherent value, as it is a component of the superstructure, a derivative effect of the factors of production (especially land and environment) and a phenomenon liable to change as climatic conditions are altered. Under these circumstances, there can be no value in seeking out original populations of specific ethno-linguistic groups and tying them to contemporary residents of any given region. What is important is the development of a society, its reactions to the world that surround it, and its ability to transform itself as class conflicts emerge; in essence, its history. There can be no sense in the attachment of idealistic qualities to particular physical manifestations, as identity is produced through doing, rather than being.

The First All-Union Turkological Congress

Domestic opposition or a plurality of opinions, of course, were seen as very much distinct from siding with the dominant ideologies of foreign nations. In Russian-language publications, we see that many of the Turkic authors wrote of the benefits of Soviet society, even if they espoused a particularly idealist view of the nation. Çobanzada wrote in Azeri on both the importance of the scholarly endeavours regarding historiography, and of the draw of Moscow versus Ankara for Crimean Tatar youth (Çobanzada 1926c). An Azeri writer, Agamali-Ogly, explains in his article about the importance of objective and scientific rigour, with particular emphasis placed on the fact that practical use must flow from science, rather than science being directed by practical consideration (Agamali-Ogly 1926, 2). Ethnic and
linguistic affiliation are no match for the march of history and socio-economic development, as Stalinist ideology would insist, given that the national idea is tied exclusively to the capitalist stage of development, while it is the worldview of Socialism that is the gateway to man’s final destiny.

This does not mean, however, that foreign powers were not considered by those who wrote about the history and ethnography of the Turkic regions. In his contribution to the edited volume of essays regarding the First All-Union Turkological Congress, Mikhail Pavlovich writes more pointedly than Çobanzadə, accusing directly exiled nationalist politicians such as Mehmet Emin Resulzadə and the remnants of the Azeri nationalist Musavat party of orchestrating campaigns against Soviet Turkological studies. As the Congress was held two years before the switch to the Latin alphabet in Turkey, one of the most controversial aspect of the Congress was its endorsement of Latinization (Frings 2005). On this, and other social, cultural, economic and political issues, Pavlovich makes clear that it is the Soviet Union that is the leader in improving Turkic communities’ standards of living and qualities of life, and a true beacon of enlightenment among the peoples of the East. Material improvement, not oppression, is the key to Soviet influence among Turkic-speakers from Ukraine to Siberia (Pavlovich 1926, 6).

However, there is also a veiled threat against the Republic of Turkey, warning it that the only means of guaranteeing its continued relations with (but not influence among) the Turkic peoples of the USSR is to toe the ideological line enunciated by Moscow. Coupeaux has already analyzed Stalin’s desire to utilize the Baku Congress as a showcase of Soviet Turkological studies, and it appears, from Pavlovich’s article, that it was also intended to be a guide to orthodox interpretations as well. Of
interest is the fact that, while the Turkish historian Köprülü is lauded for his positive report on the state of education amongst Soviet Turkic peoples (Pavlovich 1926, 6–7), it is the exiles – many of whom had found refuge in Turkey – who come under sustained criticism. The change in tone from the Leninist era is remarkable. A 1923 Kazakh-language article on “The National Question at the 3rd International”, published in Temir Qazaq, criticized Menshevik opposition to Soviet-Turkish cooperation, rather than nationalist politics. The author, Turaqulu, reminded his readers that anti-colonial politics in the East far outweigh any concerns about nationalism and its connections to the nascent Turkish, Persian or Chinese bourgeoisie (Turaqulu 1923, 5–6). Of course, this article is immediately followed by a detailed account of the manner in which the Soviet authorities have fully realized the hopes and aspirations of the national minorities, ruling out the possibility that the Turkish model might be more suitable for the Turkic speakers of the Union (Ghaybas 1923). The change in attitudes over three years – from paternalistic exposition to strident denunciation – demonstrates what might be seen as a gradual cooling of Soviet enthusiasm for the Turkish project, and of Turkish ideology, as Stalin cemented his grip on power. It begs the question, therefore, of just how concerned Soviet authorities might have become about the roles such exiles played in the writing of historical narratives in the Republic of Turkey, given the heavy representation of former political leaders from the Bashkirs, the Tatars, the Azeris and others among the new Turkish intelligentsia.

The second volume of the Organizing Committee’s Bulletin contains another example of non-Turkic approaches to the reform of Turkic languages and their connection to trends in the Republic of Turkey. Written by Artur Rudol’fovich Zifel’d-
Simumiagi, an Estonian who was best known for his studies of the Tats of Azerbaijan (Vasil’kov and Sorokina 2003b), the article provides a class-based approach to the language reform issue. Zifel’d-Simumiagi identifies three different trends in the modernization of Turkic terminology; a crucial stage in the preservation of the spoken languages of the Turkic world as well as their adaptation to the demands of contemporary Socialist society. He links those who seek neologisms in Arabo-Persian sources with the feudal past, while at the same time tagging borrowers of European terms as lackeys of the capitalist order. These latter reformers show nothing but contempt for the people of the East and their languages, and therefore can never be seen as their allies (Zifel’d-Simumiagi 1926, 9–10). The pan-Turkists, by contrast, fall into one of two groups depending on the source of their inspiration. For the majority of pan-Turkists, the model of a common language is to be sought in the literary idiom of Istanbul. This particular variant is tainted by its association with the Ottoman court and the Arabized and Persianized culture of the ruling classes, and thus those who espouse its generalization are clearly hangovers of a feudal past. The minority wing of the pan-Turkists are utopians: specialists who wish to create a single Turkic language that can be understood “from Constantinople to Kashgar.” Such an endeavour is “doomed to failure,” as it purposefully ignores the specificities of speech that have arisen because of the unique socio-economic conditions of the Uzbeks, Ottomans, Kirghiz, Crimeans, Tatars and Azeris (Zifel’d-Simumiagi 1926, 13).

Zifel’d-Simumiagi hammers home this point by explaining that only those groups of languages belonging to the same sub-group of the broader Turkic family have a chance of merging into one common idiom. Thus, Ottoman (or Republican) Turkish, Gagauz, Azeri and Turkmen, all of which are members of the Oğuz sub-
group, are possible candidates for convergence. However, each of the four is unique in its own way; a uniqueness induced partly by political realities, but mainly by the socio-economic conditions within which the speakers live. Indeed, it is only Azeri and Turkmen that have a reasonable chance of merging, as the great progress embodied by the Soviet march towards Socialism will undoubtedly level the difference between the two groups’ socio-economic statuses, and enable their speakers to develop a common means of communication (Zifel’dt-Simul’iagi 1926, 12–13). While these arguments might appear to be a boast about the superiority of Soviet planning compared pan-Turkist utopias, they are also a recognition of the revelatory power of socio-economic, rather than essentialist or racist, explanations for language change. This is put into relief by an earlier passage on the initial spread of the Turkic languages westward:

“The Turkic language in Azerbaijan and in Turkey, the Slavo-Russian language between the Don and the Neva, the Arabic language in North Africa, Syria and Mesopotamia: none of these were, at the beginning, the languages of the entire population of these countries. They were the languages of small garrisons of tribal warriors or commercial settlements. They became, through the power of historical circumstances, the mandatory languages of inter-tribal relations for the multilingual defeated populations of these countries. With every generation, the circles of people who spoke and understood them widened, and gradually they dispersed the weaker indigenous languages. The autochthonous people remained, but, forgetting their earlier language and assimilating the language of inter-tribal communication, they mechanically lost their earlier nationality [прежняя национальность] and entered into the composition of the victorious nation. In racial terms, contemporary Great Russians are more Finnish than Slavic; ‘the Arabs’ of North Africa are more Kabyllo-Berber than Semites; the Azeris and Ottomans are more Japhetids than
What is described in both sections, then, is not history repeating itself so much as the process of the development of social forces at work. Nations are not made from homogenous racial, linguistic and ethnic groups, but rather are constructed through changing socio-economic and political situations. Peoples enter into new nations not through some ancient predisposition to one group or another, but because they are drawn into new forms of social and economic organization, and are forced to adopt the language and culture of the dominant class. It is a strong statement of Stalinist orthodoxy regarding the formation of the nation. Its application to the history and future of the Turkic peoples is clear: you have not always been part of a Turkic nation, nor will you be part of one forever. With time, you too will merge into the Soviet nation, just as your history has proven your ancestors once assimilated to a Turkic one.

While such a strict Stalinist interpretation of the nation might have been difficult to refute, the means by which one understood the process of the emergence of a Turkic nation – or its demise – was certainly up for consideration. In the same volume, Il’ya Nikolaevich Borozdin, a Russian historian of the Crimean peninsula (Vasil’kov and Sorokina 2003a), repeats the call for a more intensive investigation of the origins of the Turkic peoples and of their ancient history, especially that of the (Crimean) Tatars. Of prime importance, of course, is the use of archaeology and “archaeography” (the gathering of manuscripts), to investigate the pre-history of the “Khazars, Volga Bulgars, the Turkic tribes of Central Asia, etc.” Trade routes and socio-economic relationships, rather than political ones, must be
understood in greater depth; a result achievable only through the “sociological” approach. Given the emphasis on economic relations, “sociological” in this context likely implies a Marxian analysis based on social forces, i.e. the base. As an end result, such studies will “[bring about] the crash of the old legends. [They will produce] new data for the rejuvenation of the economic, social and political structure and culture of the [Crimean] Tatars.” (Borozdin 1926, 19)

The Kazakh intellectual Baitursynov, however, hit back at these calls for the usage of European epistemologies that effectively devalued knowledge culled from native Turkic sources. At the end of the Bulletin’s second volume, he writes of the importance of returning to the Volk for sources of linguistic, and therefore social, reinvigoration. He notes that while some Turkic communities suffered from diglossia and a split between the culture of the dominant and the dominated, the Kazakhs did not. The appeal to folk sources of new words – and, by extension, other means of comprehending and understanding modern life – was, in Baitursynov’s eyes, a profoundly democratic process. The march to the people ensured not a “patriotic-nationalistic” reaction to Socialist science and progress, but rather the enfranchisement of the masses and their persuasion of materialism’s benefits (Baitursunov 1926, 22). We know from other environments that Baitursynov, similar to Bökeikhanov and other Kazakh intellectuals of the early Soviet period, was a strong proponent of popular involvement in the modernization and codification of Kazakh history and culture. His short contribution to the Bulletin may be, nominally, a work of linguistics and language reform, but it speaks to the divergence in approaches to dialectical materialism as an epistemology. It also exemplifies the process that Hirsch has explored at depth in her study of Soviet ethnography: the co-
option of Marxist and Soviet language by Central Asian intellectuals and politicians in order to advance their own agendas.

Planned Science

The masses were, evidently, not the only ones in need of persuasion regarding the usefulness of the State’s scientific endeavours. Bureaucrats and apparatchiks too were targeted by the propaganda surrounding the Congress. In the Organizing Committee’s first bulletin, Gubaidulin provides a listing of the various actions that must be undertaken by the Soviet authorities to ensure that indigenous Turkic scholars are able to author meaningful and well-researched histories of their peoples. These include paleographic support through the translation of ancient texts into the modern Turkic languages, as well as a concerted push to introduce non-traditional methods of primary-source collection:

“The ancestors of many contemporary Turco-Tatar peoples in our Soviet Union either did not, effectively, keep written sources, or, if they did, such sources are of remarkably small quantities. On this basis, only the remains of the monuments of material culture can be used as sources for the study of the ancient period of these peoples, as well as oral folk culture. Thus, on the one hand, archaeological excavations must be strengthened, and, on the other side, a more intense collection of oral folk culture is essential, before it has been lost under the onslaught of culture and the elements and all-obliterating time.” (original emphasis) (Gubaidulin 1926, 14)

Gubaidulin’s warning clearly highlights the importance of material remains in the quest for a comprehensive history of various Turkic peoples. However, it is also quite telling that there is an implicitly teleological explanation to the presence of such
remains and their ownership. Rather than assigning them to the populations who lived in the various areas under consideration (the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia), they are immediately linked to modern collectivities whose most defining feature is language rather than areal dispersion. This is remarkable, given the general trend among Soviet archaeologists to refrain from connecting pre-historic and modern, especially in areas with highly contested claims to indigeneity (Bulkin, Klejn, and Lebedev 1982, 275).

The appeal for the preservation of oral folk culture and its valorization as a source of historical truth is echoed in the following piece, on the current state and future requirements of the ethnography of Turkic communities in the Caucasus. Here, Chursin states that “in scientific [relations], it [ethnographic study] assists in the explanation of the origins and formation of the Turkic peoples, their history and cultural relations with other peoples.” (Chursin 1926, 15) Both Gubaidullin and Chursin assume that the ahistoricity of Turkic peoples limits their ability to adopt “culture” from the more advanced Europeans, to borrow the wording found in Gubaidullin’s piece. The continuity and permanence implied in this view of folk culture conflicts with the general Stalinist understanding of national culture being fluid and responsive to the changing demands of the economic base. Both might have understood the importance of not adhering to a fetishistic materialism and allowing for study of the meaningful impact of the superstructure (as in Stalin’s inclusion of cast of mind in the definition of a nation), but it is the dialectic that they have yet to grasp. Nonetheless, what we see here is a general conviction of the importance of the immaterial, as well as the material, in the search for historical
truth. Aspects of Stalinist theory might be in place, but they fail to subsume all other lines of thought.

Baitursynov, Borozdin, Zifel’t-Simumiagi, Gubaidulin and Chursin might all be convinced of the desirability of the State’s end-goal – the creation of a Soviet society with uniform levels of socio-economic development regardless of language and ethnicity – but the manner in which they get there differs greatly. Top-down versus bottom-up; nomothetic versus organic; technocratic versus democratic: the 1926 Congress obviously attracted a plurality of opinions about uncovering historical truth and its relationship to the present, as well as the role that Turkic nations would play in their determination of their own identities.

**Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev**

Away from the intellectual foment of early Soviet Baku, a native historian did arise from the Kazakhs during this formative period. Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev was a railway engineer and an amateur lover of history, after having studied briefly under Bartol’d at Turkestan University. Given his academic genealogy, it should not be a surprise that he was not ashamed of demonstrating the mixed heritage of the Kazakh nation. Along the same lines as Russian historians, including Bartol’d, and quite in contrast to Turkish scholars, he identified the absorption of Mongolic and other elements into the Kazakh tribes by the 17th century as a formative element in their ethnogenesis (Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev 1991, 83). Such wording does not imply that there had not existed, at some point, an ethnically or racially pure grouping. However, it is the manner in which this fact is analyzed, as a simple step along the route to national consciousness rather than a form of corruption, that
marks the difference between his own works and those of the nationalists. Indeed, he tarred their Kazakh representatives with accusations of collaboration with and co-option by the wealthy landed classes who supported the Tsar and Russian chauvinism. His vociferous denunciation of the Alash Orda and Bökeikhanov in a 1921 issue of Zhizn Natsional’notsei (The Life of Nationalities) is indicative of his refusal to be seen as a member of the nationalist intelligentsia long before the start of the Stalinist terror (Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev 2009b, 67–68).

This is not to say that Tynyshpaev had fully assimilated a Marxist view of nationalities and their historicity. In his История Тюрко-Монголов (History of the Turco-Mongols), published in 1925 in Tashkent, he repeats the Marxist concept of ahistorical nations, positing that only the western European nations, and their colonial offshoots, are worthy of being categorized as historical nations. This assertion is not uncritical, as Tynshpaev argues that the developed peoples considered the underdeveloped ones no better than “animals”, allowing the former to exploit the latter. For the Kazakhs, then, history is the key to determining their place in the world and their ability to withstand the vagaries of time. Here, he is not much different from Bökeikhanov, as we saw in the latter’s articles in Qyzyl Qazaqstan. What is novel, however, is his decision to divide the history of the Turco-Mongolic peoples – who, he claims, emerged from the ancient Turkic peoples – according to political events rather than socio-economic ones (Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev 2009a, 196–97).

Tynyshpaev might not be bothered about racial purity, but he is keen on ties of descent, religion and idiom. His anti-capitalist bent in earlier accusations against
the Alash Orda soon takes on more of an essentialist, rather than Marxist, tone, as he combines notions of an idealistic and eternal brotherhood of peoples:

“These peoples [the Muslim Turkic peoples of Eurasia] are united by blood, by language and by faith. No matter how differently they live from one another, they can speak with one another and explain themselves without a translator. The peoples related to the Turco-Mongols are the present-day Mongols, Manchurians, Yakuts, Finns, Magyars [and] Bulgars. All of these aforementioned peoples are called the peoples of Turan.” (Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev 2009a, 198)

There is little difference between Tynyshpaev’s explanation of the deep origins of the Turkic peoples and those of the Turkish nationalists and 19th century European scholars. His opposition to the nationalists of Alash Orda, then, can be interpreted as politically, rather than ideologically, motivated. 1925, of course, is a full three years before Stalin’s rise to power, and nine years before the announcement of a new historical science. That Tynyshpaev was able to espouse such clearly essentialist and nationalist views, and still go on to publish another work, is a clear indicator of at least tacit acceptance by the authorities of a plurality of approaches to history during the heyday of Soviet eclecticism.

Kazakh Ethnonyms

In 1927, Tynyshpaev published История Казахского народа (History of the Kazakh People) (M. Tynyshpaev 2002, 11–12). The work begins with a scathing criticism of Chuloshnikov’s 1921 History of the Kazakh-Kirghiz. Here, Tynyshpaev finds Chuloshnikov’s work to be lacking on a number of levels: its failure to explain the relationships between the Kazakhs and non-Turkic neighbours; its continual use of the incorrect ethnonyms Kyrgyz and Kara-Kyrgyz; and Chuloshnikov’s insistence
on the ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs occurring in a socio-economic dispute with their Uzbek fellow travelers (M. Tynyshpaev 2002, 50–56). From his critique of Chuloshnikov’s history, it is already apparent that Tynyshpaev was still not focused on the racial or ethnic purity of the Kazakhs. Indeed, similar to Walikhanov before him, Tynyshpaev made ample use of the oral history and folklore of the Kazakhs, in addition to Bartol’d’s sources, in order to track the symbiotic relationship of the Kazakhs and their neighbours (Auezova 2011, 251–52).

Among the most important issues to be dealt with in this pursuit is the origin of the ethnonym Kazakh. Tynyshpaev surmises that its sporadic and inconsistent usage in various chronicles until the 15th century implied that it was applied to a variety of different groups, not just the nomadic Kazakhs (M. Tynyshpaev 2002, 114). Between the 15th and 17th centuries, both Turkic and Mongol sources, according to Tynyshpaev, used the terms Kazakh and Uzbek interchangeably, indicating that, at least to outsiders, the difference between the two groups was not immediately apparent (M. Tynyshpaev 2002, 116–18). His claims of ambiguity regarding the exact definition of Kazakh populations before the 17th century defied the dominant theme of continuity and authenticity that ran through the various components of nationalist historiography, including the Turkish History Thesis. In Tynyshpaev’s view, ethnonyms, languages, socio-economic structures and even territories were all mutable, and it was exactly this mutability that afforded the Kazakhs their particularity within the tapestry of Central Asian peoples.

Suddenly, then, we see a new appreciation of the base and socio-economic factors, rather than bloodlines, in the writing of Kazakh history. Tynyshpaev’s work is hardly a paragon of Stalinist historical interpretation, but it does indicate a shift in
focus and a sharpening of intellectual lines. For the time being, this would create uncertainty within the community of historians, an uncertainty motivated in no small part by the political wrangling of the latter half of the 1920s.

**Political Motivations of National Identification**

To pretend that this ambiguity was motivated solely by scholarly integrity and a critical approach to sources would be disingenuous. Throughout the 1920s, the Soviet authorities were continually addressing the concerns of local populations regarding the borders of Central Asian republics drawn in 1924 (Hirsch 2005, 164). Tynyshpaev’s work was one aspect of the scholarly information that was taken into account during such instances of arbitration, and his attempts to render the distinctions between Kazakhs and Uzbeks fuzzy was intended to help bolster Kazakh claims to lands included in the Uzbek SSR (Auezova 2011, 252). A similar process occurred between Tajik and Uzbek representatives when the former petitioned Moscow for a separate Tajik SSR to be formed. In this case, Uzbek politicians argued that Tajik speaking populations were in fact Persianized Uzbeks who had lost their mother tongue because of the Emir of Bukhara’s state language policies. Tajiks, in turn, claimed that they were the indigenous inhabitants of the region and that large numbers of Uzbeks were in fact Turkified Tajiks (Hirsch 2005, 175–80). Far from being a mark of shame or denigration, miscegenation and cultural appropriation was promoted as a normal process in Central Asia by the various nationalities’ intellectuals, one that did not preclude the inclusion of multilingual populations into a single national grouping.
Within this horse-trading, the supposedly objective social sciences and humanities were often called upon to provide clear evidence of one position or another. It was no coincidence that this occurred at a time when these disciplines were themselves the beneficiaries of direct state support and intervention. Among the best patronized in the fight for recognition and territory was archaeology, thus far a neglected discipline in Central Asia.

The Material Past

Similar to the other historical sciences, archaeology in the 1920s was marked by an eclecticism of method, organization and interpretation. Marxist ideology was certainly present, but so too were other schools of thought, including those that had been dominant in the pre-1917 period. Unlike in Turkey, where archaeology during the Ottoman period and the first decade of the Republic were largely Western European affairs, in the Soviet Union there was a long and established tradition of Russian and non-Russian expeditions and excavations throughout the 19th century (Tekin 1926, 34; Bulkin, Klejn, and Lebedev 1982).

Archaeology and, in particular, the archaeological excavations that were undertaken in Turkic-dominated parts of the Soviet Union were promoted as examples of the scientific and materialist quest to uncover and understand the past. An article in the Crimean Tatar journal İleri from 1926 cheerfully recounts the proceedings of an archaeological congress held in Kerch in honour of the city museum’s centenary. A precursor to the Stalinist historical thesis enunciated in 1937 – in which all nations’ histories were to be woven into one grand narrative beginning with prehistoric societies and ending at the Soviet Union – is visible in the account of
the reports presented to the assembly. Great emphasis is placed on the manner in which excavations in Kerch and across the Crimean Peninsula have resulted in important finds that will further our understanding of the history of human civilization (Akçokraklı 1926, 43–45). “Archaeology,” Aççoqraqlı explains, “is engaged today in finding and studying the oldest works of the history of human material civilization.” (Akçokraklı 1926, 45) Crimea and the Crimean Tatars thus have a role to play in humanity’s saga, one that ties them to other men and women around the world, rather than penning them in the tight boundaries of the national grouping.

The Stalinist view is not the only one on display in this brief article. Aççoqraqlı continues on to describe one of the most pressing questions of contemporary European scholarship: “Should the Scythians – who have not been investigated as they should be by today’s historians of the world – be considered as Aryans, or as Turanians?” In order to resolve the issue, he notes that Nikolai Marr, whose theory of Japhethism was discussed briefly in chapter 3 (on linguistics, archaeology and anthropology), has reinvigorated the debate: “To this end, the academic Marr has thrown a new theory by the name of Japhethism into the mix. By investigating the Scythians according to this theory, he is working to determine which nations today came from the Scythians.” (Akçokraklı 1926, 45) This appears to be a perversion of Marr’s late theories, as he specifically refuted the “bourgeois-nationalist” approaches towards historical linguistics that were espoused by Western European scholars. It also provides a counterpoint against which to evaluate how seriously Stalinist concerns with countering Nazi propaganda were taken during the 1930s. Here, there is unabashed identification of Europeans with the Aryan race.
(ırq); as Hirsch has examined, such ideas would soon be censored in the race to disprove German racist anthropology (Hirsch 2005, 231–33).

The point of the matter, however, is that conjecture about race and belonging was largely left to speculation about bones and skulls rather than material culture. While later Nazi scholarship and propaganda might have been quick to proclaim a race not advanced enough to produce a given level of art or industry, Soviet scholars seem to have been concerned with categorizing and typologizing physical features. Thus, in an article about a new treasure trove of artefacts from northern Mongolia in the 8th issue of İleri, the author, Tekin, limits his comments about ethno-national connections to descriptions of human remains found in graves. These, he says, “demonstrate [that they are of] a type [cins] that is different from that of the Chinese and Mongols.” When it comes to the gold artefacts found with the human remains, speculation is about “relations” with the Mongols, Chinese, Iranians, or Greeks, not about the ethnic origins of the people who built these particular structures. Most interesting, perhaps, is the complete lack of mention about Turkic or Turanic connections, even when Tekin speaks of the Scythian-style artefacts and the heavy presence of horse-themed items (Tekin 1926, 36). Race, then, was not to be confused with anything other than physical characteristics, congruent with the Soviet proposition that it was an accident of nature, rather than a meaningful component of human differentiation. Whatever might be said about the physical remains of cultures past, nothing could be gleaned about the racial or ethno-national affiliation of the people who produced the artefacts.

In returning to Aqçoqraqlı, whatever his intentions might have been in making statements about race, he was evidently not concerned with connecting
contemporary Turkic communities to ancient peoples through his discussion of Scythians. Rather, the exposé of Turco-Tatar archaeology and Turkology was kept as a distinct part of the article, in line with the creation of a new Turco-Tatar section for archaeological pursuits at the Conference. This department appears to have been composed of archaeologists, ethnographers, musicologists and other social scientists. The bulk of its work was focused either on modern practices and customs among the Crimean Tatars, or on the Turkic settlements of the Peninsula between the eleventh and eighteenth centuries. The closest that one comes to discussion of Turkic or Tatar ethnogenesis and relations to other groups is a presentation on the use of seals (tamḡalar) to determine that some Crimean Tatars resident around the lakes of Crimea’s interior are the descendants of Uzbek and Kyrgyz migrants (Akçokraklı 1926, 46–47). A distinct line had clearly been drawn between the realm of prehistory, suitable for hypotheses based upon material remains and their reconstruction; and history, to be elucidated with the help of written documentation. The former was a field in which only loosely-identified groupings featured, while only in the latter would ethno-national designations, tied to linguistic trends, be tolerated.

Certainly, even if they did not espouse orthodox Stalinist interpretations, many of the historians of ancient cultures and archaeologists who contributed to these periodicals did not share publicly the dominant themes of Turkish historical narratives. In a piece on recent discoveries in archaeology published in the Uzbek-language *Maorif va Uqutg’uvchu* in 1926, Ayni waxes poetic about the value of archaeology in elucidating the various ancient cultures of Eurasia and North Africa. He speaks of the Sumerians, a mysterious people who inhabited the south of
Mesopotamia and who had achieved a high degree of socio-economic development, without once mentioning Turks or a connection to Turan or Central Asia. More importantly, he highlights the case of the Hittite civilization of Anatolia as a cause for hope in studies about the Sumerians. Ayni explains how modern archaeological excavations, including those conducted by the French Mandatory authorities in Syria, have helped accumulate material evidence about the economy, politics, culture and social structure of Hittite society. No emphasis is laid on the ethno-linguistic affiliations of the Hittites, or their racial type, but instead they are described as being an anti-colonial bloc inhibiting the expansionary drive of Pharaonic Egypt. This, of course, represents considerable socio-economic progress in Near Eastern history, until the Hittites themselves descended into barbarism (vahshat) and their civilization collapsed (R. Ayni 1926, 51). Race, blood and belonging might not have entered into the equation, but politics certainly did. The term “colonialist” (mustamlakachilik) was undoubtedly reminiscent of Soviet propaganda directed at colonial and semi-colonial societies in Asia and Africa. If colonialism as understood in the modern sense of the word could have only arisen in capitalist societies, then the process by which the Hittites confronted the Egyptians could not have been analogous to British or French expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries; a paradox I explored briefly in chapter 3. Nevertheless, it was a powerful tool for authorities to encourage a view of history based on social group conflict, rather than ethno-national antagonism.

As for Central Asia, the Turkic regions appear to receive short shrift. Despite the fact that this is an article written for Uzbek speakers, it does not provide information on the excavations undertaken and the finds made on the southern
fringes of the Soviet Union. Rather, it focuses on the rich material remains of northern India. Again, there is no attempt to link material culture to ethnicity, language, race or nationhood. However, this is important for more than just the way that it deprives the nationalist of a scholarly basis for claims of ethnic or racial superiority. It also refocuses the search for the wellspring of human civilization from Central Asia – the preferred location of 19th century European scholars – to northern India. Ayni quotes a Professor Vavilov as arguing, on the basis of plant cultivation and historical geography, that the Sindh and Punjab regions are the most likely areas in which human civilization first emerged. This, despite Ayni’s pronouncement on the need to continue the study of Nikolai Marr’s thesis on Yaphetism and a pan-Eurasian ethno-cultural unity (R. Ayni 1926, 51–52). Whatever the case may be, Ayni gives his readers no reason to believe that their forbearers are either connected to them through an unbroken racial link, or that they were the first in the world to harness the power of agriculture and social organization for the good of the community.

**Russian Preferences**

When it comes to Russian-language works by Russian authors, there appears to be even less sympathy to the idea of Turkic continuity in the material landscape of Central Asian civilization. A 1925 article by A. A. Semenov in a collection about the Tajik ASSR makes this point from the outset. Entitled “Материальные памятники арийской культуры” (“Material monuments of Aryan culture”), it contains the statement that the “Tajiks... are the descendants of the ancient aborigines of the country [Tajikistan and Central Asia], the Aryans of Asia.” (Semenov 1925, 113) There
is no mention of Turkic peoples for the first ten pages of the article, despite the fact that Semenov outlines material remains from Issyk-Kul and the Fergana Valley, regions that are currently inhabited by large Turkic communities, and where there are long-standing Turkic settlements that have been recorded by Chinese and other chroniclers (Andreev 1925, 152). The first mention comes of Turkic nomads in Zhetsyu (Semirech’e) in the 7th century CE. Here, however, Semenov claims that the opening of a trade route between China and Western markets (particularly Byzantium) brought about a massive influx of “Aryan-Sogdian” colonists who settled the Turkic nomads and taught them agriculture (Semenov 1925, 121). The implications of this account are clear: nomadic civilization in Central Asia is to be associated with Turkic peoples, while sedentary and urban civilization was the exclusive domain of Aryan Iranian ones. When extrapolated from Zhetsyu to the rest of Central Asia, a clear picture of the ethnic and racial implications for region’s material history emerges. Architectural, agricultural and artisanal accomplishment are now wholly dependent on connection to the Aryan races, effectively dispossessing Turkic speakers of their current residence’s material past.

The most remarkable aspect of Semenov’s writing is that, unlike Bartol’d, he appears to be consistent in his confusion of race, language and culture. While it is true that the Tajik language belongs to the Indo-European (previously Indo-Aryan) language family, there is no means of determining if the current speakers of Tajik are in fact related to the original speech communities that used the Indo-European languages. Nevertheless, the author does not shy away from proclaiming that “Its [Kasan’s] Aryan population has been preserved to the present: Kasan is even now inhabited by Tajiks.” (Semenov 1925, 122) The same study’s ethnographic report on
the Tajiks, compiled by Andreev, provides some indication of the process whereby Turkic peoples spread into formerly Tajik lands. While assimilation took place at the start of the 20th century through the gradual acceptance of Turkic dialects by previous Tajik speakers, the groundwork for this was laid in previous centuries, when Turkic political leaders cleansed large swathes of land of Tajiks and gave them to Turkmen allies instead. Iranic language and culture were preserved only in the valleys and mountains, where Tajiks and related peoples remained isolated from the Turkic onslaught (Andreev 1925, 155–56). This is further confirmed by the physical differences between the mountain and valley Tajiks: “Thanks to their greater preservation of Aryan blood, the mountain Tajiks in general coincide more with European types of peoples than do the valley dwellers.” Their skin, eyes and hair are lighter, their stature greater, and their bodies broader, than the nomadic Kyrgyz of the region (Andreev 1925, 158–59). Racial purity and linguistic purity combine with civilizational advancement – in terms of a preference for settled versus nomadic existence – in order to paint a clearer picture of the origins of Central Asians.

The materiality of archaeology – concerned as it is with the study of material remains from the past – was no guarantee of the abandonment of earlier, pre-Soviet idealistic views about race, language, ethnicity and continuity. Times were a-changing, however, and soon the simplistic, uncritical approach adopted by both Semenov and Andreev would be dropped for a more sophisticated view of sources, both written and material.
Ethnography, Anthropology, Sociology

As explored in chapter 3, history and archaeology, far from being isolated from other aspects of the social sciences, were increasingly combined with ethnography and historical anthropology over the 1920s and 30s in order to elucidate the construction of past societies. In pre-Revolutionary and Republican Turkish sources, it was common to see historical aspects of social structures ignored or wiped out of the analysis. For Soviet scholars – as explained by Çobanzada in his piece on Turkology – the various branches of the social sciences were combined to provide greater insight in a more holistic manner. Maksimov’s brief study of totemism in Siberia is an example of such a trend. Written in 1928, a year before Stalin would defeat Bukharin, his final ideological adversary, it is noteworthy that he chooses a geographic region – Siberia – rather than ethno-national groupings. The study effectively covers five linguistic groups: Samoyeds, Turkic peoples, Uralic speakers, Mongols and the Tungus. Nevertheless, areal features and cultural appropriation are taken as foundational assumptions, and thus it is the people who inhabit a given region, rather than a nation regardless of where it lives, that becomes the focus of the study.

The bulk of the study, however, is concerned with Turkic communities, including the Yakuts and the Kyrgyz. An overview of totemistic practices – the reverence of and identification with a particular animal as the representative of a tribe or familial group – is conducted of contemporary Siberian groupings, in order to flesh out the ethnographic component of the study. This is followed by recourse to the Rashīd al-Dīn’s history of the Mongols from the 13th century in order to
provide a means of diachronic comparison. The result is the creation of a thoroughly historical approach to the phenomenon of totemism among the Turkic peoples, and its gradual loss as social conditions changed (Maksimov 1928, 6–7). It is not sufficient to assume that the socio-economically backwards peoples of the vast Siberian landscape are ahistorical; modern representatives of an ancient culture untouched by European civilization, the only form of modernity. Rather, their societies, too, are understood to have developed over time, with culture responding to the needs and exigencies of the economic base.

Historicity, however, is not the only departure from traditional scholarship on the nomadic and pastoral peoples of Siberia. Maksimov also employs a critical approach to both the sources and the epistemology at play in earlier studies in order to problematize purportedly totemistic phenomena and their relationship to the social structure. By using Rashīd al-Dīn’s detailed account of the Oğuz and their system of identification based on the elements and animals, he outlines a complex and seemingly tribal mode of social organization. He then contrasts this with other accounts of Mongol military structures, pointing out that divisions similar to those catalogued for the Oğuz arose in response to organization and discipline of large military units (Maksimov 1928, 8–10). No definitive conclusion is reached, and Maksimov does admit the need for further study of both contemporary ethnographic data and classical sources. Nevertheless, his questioning of the nature of appellation, rank and social order strikes at the heart of nationalist assumptions about the cohesiveness of early Turkic communities. If these phenomena are indeed totemistic, then they likely belie the early tribal roots of the Kyrgyz, Oğuz, Yakuts and other Turkic groups. In other words, descent from a common ancestor is highly
likely, and so claims of racial purity or corruption can be maintained. If, however, they are indicators of military organization, then there is no a priori basis for the assumption of common descent. Military titles and divisions might have been re-imagined at a later date to be indicators of familial lines, but at their origin they had no connection to kinship relations. The nationalist myth of descent from a common stock implodes, and racial characteristics are explained solely through miscegenation, not obeisance to national morality.

A Decade of Eclecticism

The preceding overview of a variety of articles and publications on Turkic history, intellectual life, ethnography and linguistics should make one aspect of the period under examination clear. The 1920s were characterized by a plethora of epistemologies and worldviews when it came to categorizing and understanding the populations of the new Union. To be certain, there were elements of the Russian- and Turkic-language writings on these topics that foreshadowed the more rigid approaches of the 1930s, but these were not the only options available to writers or readers. Continuity with the scholarship of the pre-Revolutionary period; non-Marxist endeavours of a new generation of academics; and Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy-infused studies all competed for space and attention in the writings of early Soviet intellectuals. At this point, we can certainly speak of the agency and personal initiative of many of the writers; theirs is not an era that can be characterized by a command and control system of cultural production. Articles and books were frequently published with just the names of authors, many of whom are easily recognizable as established academics. As we shall see, this trend of individual,
if not individualistic, production was curtailed sharply in the 1930s, providing fertile
ground for a rigid structure of centrally-planned history writing.

The Vise Tightens

In 1927, Stalin began his most aggressive push to dominate the Communist
Party, at first expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev, and then Bukharin in 1929. Five years
after the death of Lenin, Stalin had ended up on top, and was free to begin reshaping
the Soviet Union according to his own worldview. Socio-economic crises, including
famines, prevented him from directing the full force of his power against perceived
and real ideological enemies within the Academy at the very beginning of his reign.
Collectivization efforts across Central Asia, often involving the sedentarization of
nomadic populations and the mass exodus of peoples out of the Soviet Union
resulted in turmoil in many Turkic communities (Payne 2011).

In scholarship, any expression of characteristically human complexity became
highly unpalatable over the course of the 1930s. With the decision to denounce the
Asian Mode of Production as Trotskyist in 1931, a new era of official intolerance
towards interpretative diversity in history began (Sawer 1979, 31). Among the first
Central Asian victims were those intellectuals who had been tied to the pre-
Revolutionary and Revolutionary-era nationalist organizations, such as the Alash
Orda or the Musavat Party. Those who had made their peace with the Bolsheviks
and entered into the service of the Party – including men such as Baitursynov – were
summarily rooted out and eliminated in the early 1930s (Ryskulov 1984c, 210). In
1934, the Communist Party, under the direction of Stalin, Zhdanov and Kirov,
explicitly intervened in the writing of history for usage in schools, enforcing a strictly
chronological approach to all narratives used in the Soviet Union. Moreover, they insisted that histories of individual republics and peoples be suppressed in favour of histories of the USSR as a whole (Tillett 1969, 40–41). This was not immediately achievable, given the generalized paucity of resources in the social sciences, and was put on hold once war broke out with Germany (Yilmaz 2012). Before that point, however, change was slow but noticeable in the writing Central Asian scholars.

For those Turkic citizens who continued to read historical narratives – now in Latin script instead of the Perso-Arabic one – the Stalinist view of nationalities was largely on display. The number of such publications from this period appears to be exceptionally smaller than those of the 1920s. This is to be expected, given both the economic crises of the period as well as the move towards state-controlled and directed production. Whereas the writings of the 1920s were produced by individual authors, those of the 1930s were increasingly organized by groups of scholars, including editorial boards. Some of the periodicals published during the 1920s remained in existence, while new publications began circulation. In many cases, both the drafts of those works composed during this time and the final published narratives are still in the process of being discovered, as governments open up their previously sealed archives to researchers, and previously banned works are catalogued and investigated by scholars.

Turkmen Linguistic Unification

In those items that remained available to readers, gone were the attempts at explanation and justification of Marxist chronologies of nation-formation, and instead the link between socio-economic status and national conscious was simply
assumed. In the article “Tyrkmen edebi diLiniŋ esaası̇ jaœdajLaœ” (“The fundamental situations of the Turkmen literary language”), published in the journal *Tyrkmen Medeniyeti* (*Turkmen Civilization*) in 1930, K. Bөөrijif writes that “the Turkmen tribes, who lived in a variety of feudal-tribal conditions wherever they were, were unable to form a nation after their socio-economic status failed to pass into capitalism.” (Bөөrijif 1930, 3) By 1930, then, it was taken for granted that nation-formation was a function of bourgeois statecraft, a means of capturing a defined market and exploiting it for the benefit of capital holders. Such statements were not uncommon in other contexts, including Communist Party discussions of sedentarization and industrialization in Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia (Ryskulov 1984b). Bөөrijif continues by arguing for the construction of a national literary language for the Turkmen, one that satisfies the needs of the modern era. His suggestion is that it be created scientifically, through the survey and synthesis of the particularities of the various tribal dialects, rather than on the basis of a single dialect (Bөөrijif 1930, 3). This provides insight into Soviet nationality policy in two ways. The first is that it shows how Moscow and its allies in the Republics sought to engineer what had previously been accomplished by historical accident, as in France, Russia, England and other nations with established common languages. The second is that the new national language would be tied definitively to the core constituent social groups identified as Turkmen. Unlike in Italy, where the selection of Tuscan as the basis of the national language would allow Dante and Boccaccio to be absorbed into *Italianità*, the decision to spurn a specific dialect as the basis of standard Turkmen would cut off pre-Revolutionary literary figures from the pantheon of
national heroes. All that was pre-capitalist was also pre-national and, indeed, anti-
national through its association with a specific tribal dialect.

**Karakalpakia and the Travails of the Undocumented**

Of course, those communities that could call upon written resources, even tribal ones, were still luckier than those without such fonts of historical knowledge. Smaller Turkic peoples, such as the Turkmen, the Nogay or the Karakalpaks, were inhibited in their production of national histories because of the general lack of written sources. As we have seen, even Western sources on the history of the Turkmen were limited until Bartol’d’s volume on the topic was published in 1929. While the Uzbeks, Azeris and Tatars had, for one reason or another, come to be versed in the practice of recording events, other Turkic groups had not left written records of their pasts. In the case of the Karakalpaks, this dearth of materials meant that much of their existence prior to the 16th century remained a mystery for historians in the 1930s. None of this is novel, given the discussions about methodology and objectivity conducted by the historians of the 1920s. The 1930s, however, were characterized by a much greater reticence to make definitive statements based upon oral history. In the case of the Karakalpaks, the bulk of what could be used was oral history, often described as “quasi-legendary”, based upon connections between past and present tribal and familial links. Genealogies were seen as clues to socio-economic organization over previous centuries, allowing for some level of Stalinist interpretation of Karakalpak history (Ivanov 1935, 9). Nonetheless, in Ivanov’s 1935 study of the Karakalpak past, some of the confidence noted in the histories of the 1920s has clearly faded. The author erred on the side of
caution regarding the use of both traditional epistemologies and contemporary material as the basis of theories extrapolated into the past. Moreover, the Arab, Persian and Chinese chronicles no longer held the same weight that they once did, as Ivanov overtly values any form of Karakalpak written or oral font over those created by non-native elements.

The fact that sufficient sources for a definitive history of the pre-Islamic Karakalpaks do not exist does not mean that other scholars had not theorized about it. Ivanov notes that there are two camps present: one that believes there to be a link between the Karakalpaks and the Pechenegs, who migrated west into Eastern Europe around the start of the second millennium CE; and the other, which believes that this question is “unresolved”. If any conclusion is to be reached, of course, it will take the combined effort of “orientalists, together with Russian historians, ethnographers, archaeologists and linguists” (Ivanov 1935, 10). One can only wonder if the use of the ethnonym *rusškiĭ* was intended to imply that non-Russian, i.e. Turkic or Tajik, scholars were suspect in their writing of Turkic history, not least because of possible nationalist leanings. Whatever the case, the entire account of the contemporary situation within Turkology with respect to the Karakalpaks is typical of post-1920 trends in scholarship: an ambivalence towards possible results; a fear of independent analysis; and a preference for joint works as opposed to writings authored by a single individual.

In terms of the Karakalpaks themselves, Ivanov returns to the Pechenegs in order to provide an account of their eastern branch, which remained in southern Russia following the migration of the western branch in the 9th and 10th centuries. The picture painted is one that is much more in accordance with Stalinist
understandings of the nation than previous Turkic histories had been. Ivanov writes of a proto-feudal social organization divided along lineages, with recurrent class wars — between the dominant aristocracy and low-born familial leaders — ending in the domination of the Pechenegs by the Oğuz. Gradually, a change in socio-economic conditions, most notably sedentarization, produced a widening of the ethnonym to allow for Karakalpak to apply to the entire community of mixed Pecheneg-Oğuz descent, and a more cohesive polity with feudal as well as tribal elements began to form. The neighbouring Kipchaks, too, influenced this community thanks to their overwhelming political and military strength, although this was a process of gradual and mutual cultural borrowing, rather than aggressive assimilation (Ivanov 1935, 12–15). The word “nation” is not once used in this context, and indeed the concept of a collectivity is not even brought into play until some sort of sedentary social organization is shown. It is largely social and material factors that are employed in the determination of group existence and demarcation of boundaries between ethnic groups. Physical appearance in particular is unimportant: whether the Karakalpaks bear physical resemblance to the descendants of the European Pechenegs does not factor into their development as a people, the way that shared social organization with the Oğuz or Kipchaks does.

The Return of Çobanzada

The distinct flavour of Ivanov’s study of Karakalpak history might be taken as an indication of the new forms of education arising after the October Revolution. Without definitive information about his educational background, it is difficult to say how or when such an influence might have entered his writings. We can, however,
glean insight into the changes that were undergone by other authors thanks to a 1934 article by Bekir Çobanzada in the periodical Inqilab va Madaniyyat (Revolution and Civilization, published in Baku from 1925 until the mid-1930s). Entitled “Lenin va Dilcilik” (“Lenin and Linguistics”), it explores the application of Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist theory to the study of language. In particularly, Çobanzada begins the article noting that a strictly dialectical materialist approach to the discipline of linguistics has yet to be adopted by a number of scholars in the field, requiring that their mistakes be noted and corrected in his article (Çobanzada 1934, 15). From the start, then, we see that it is not a question of engaging with alternative views, but rather of correcting the incorrect, as only one specific interpretation of either linguistic data, or, for that matter, dialectical materialism, is tolerable. Marr, too, finds a place in Çobanzada’s exposé, but only insofar as his writings confirm Lenin’s ideas (Çobanzada 1934, 17). Much of the article is dedicated to the theoretical plain: an explanation of Lenin’s dictates on language and grammar, and the manner in which such interpretations might be enacted. Only in sporadic parts do we see Azerbaijan and its linguistic history emerge as topics of study.

What does Çobanzada say about Azeri? There is little in the article about Azeri historical linguistics; a topic on which we have already seen the author is an expert. Rather, here we find brief references of the application of this new Marxist-Leninist interpretation, in its Stalinist iteration, to the history of the Azeri language. We see that there can be no talk of a single, national language existing prior to the October Revolution, given the linguistic class differences encouraged by the bourgeoisie during the 19th century (Çobanzada 1934, 16). We learn that Arabisms were introduced by the intellectual lackeys of the feudal and bourgeois upper classes
as a means of “mocking” the workers and peasants (Çobanzada 1934, 17). The insistence on a socio-cultural divide within ethno-national groupings is typically Leninist, but the force with which it is applied within the article is clearly something new, especially given our knowledge of the author’s more nuanced touch on ideological matters in previous works. The focus on criticism of Bukharin’s writings, as well as those of Plekhanov, smacks of Stalinist academic preferences. Indeed, this becomes much more strident in the final column of the article, where we are informed that “formalism, dominant nation chauvinism, pan-Turkism and local nationalisms” are all aspects of bourgeois ideological theories. The “national in form, socialist in content” formula, instead, will help to fill libraries and schools with the works necessary to encourage a materialist approach to the social sciences, and this is all thanks to the great work of Comrade Stalin. Çobanzada reminds us that implementing Stalin’s plans in Azerbaijan is essential, if Azeris are to root out the remaining hangovers of pan-Turkist, nationalist and bourgeois science (Çobanzada 1934, 18).

This article is not a historical narrative, and neither should it be stretched into one. Nonetheless, given our knowledge of the author’s penchant for using language and linguistic studies as a starting point for historical investigation, it is instructive in a change of perspective with respect to the social sciences and their guiding principles. In the mid-1920s, Çobanzada wrote effusively about the importance of professionalization and specialization, aiming to convince readers of the value of self-contained Turkological studies for the discovery of historical truth. In 1934, however, he espouses the political writings of men who are quite obviously not specialists in linguistics or anthropology as a foundation upon which the new
linguistics should be based. While extrapolation into historiography is unwarranted on the basis of a single article, the strength with which this one-time avid supporter of pan-Turanist views (Çobanzada 1920) now flogs Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist dictates of socio-cultural and linguistic development is instructive in and of itself.

Asfendiiarov and the Kazakh Experiment

Similar trends toward orthodox Stalinist interpretations of history and the social sciences can be seen in Kazakh narratives as well. What Mukhammadzhan Tynyshpaev might not have assimilated from Marxist ideology, his successor Sanzhar Asfendiiarov applied in earnest. Asfendiiarov was an avowed Bolshevik who combined an interest in history, Islam and Soviet philosophy to produce a number of works on the history of Kazakhs, Kazakhstan and Muslim social thought. He cannot be seen as a confirmed Stalinist, however, given his approval and citation of the works of the early Soviet historian Mikhail Pokrovskii. Nevertheless, unlike Tynyshpaev, Asfendiiarov’s critical eye was turned upon both the Kazakh nationalists of the Alash Orda movement and the pre-Revolutionary and Western scholars of early Turkic history. While Tynyshpaev spoke of nations as if they were fully-formed historical entities long before the emergence of capitalism, Asfendiiarov was careful to employ a strictly Marxist schema in the development of Kazakh identity, insisting upon the historicity of ethnogenesis and its close links to the socio-economic status of any given people (Asfendiiarov 1993, 14–15).

His faith in social constructs and formations belies both a Marxist approach to the study of history and a clear and forceful rejection of the racialist ideas encapsulated in the works upon which Tynyshpaev and earlier scholars had based
their writings. Indeed, Asfendiiarov chastised these academics for “wasting twenty
years” of study of Central Asia by trying to “stress that the reason of all the greatest
historical events in Asia were ‘the white-skinned, European, brachycephalic race of
the Tinglings.’” Combined with this, they sought to associate the Mongoloid peoples
with nothing but “desertification and destruction.” The Turkic nationalists, too, were
guilty of racial supremacist theories in their own right, albeit by attempting to prove
the very opposite of their European counterparts (Asfendiiarov 1993, 16-17). By
contrast, Asfendiiarov argued that the presence of a Kazakh nation could be
ascertained not from racial or ethnic identifiers, but rather through the study of
socio-economic “survivals” (пережитки). These would lead scholars to a deeper
understanding of the social organization of pre-Revolutionary Kazakhs and Kyrgyz
and, in the process, elucidate the exact stage of historical development to which the
Kazakhs had arrived on the eve of 1917 (Asfendiarov 1993, 19).

By claiming that nomadism was a form of feudal social organization,
Asfendiiarov was able to cast a form of national consciousness and early
ethnogenesis on the Kazakh peoples without having recourse to racialist discourse.
Indeed, rather than denying the Marxian approach of five stages of socio-economic
development, he sets out on a recharacterization of the socio-economic conditions
of the Kazakhs over their history. If the mountain will not come to Muhammad, then
Muhammad must go to the mountain. His interpretation is similar to Soliyev’s
reading of the Seljuks and their adoption of proto-capitalist tendencies, albeit with a
much more stridently ideological tone.

Asfendiiarov’s approach to historical truth is not wholly opposed to the
methods employed by Tynyshpaev in his own studies. Etymologies and legends are
seen as being out of bounds, because of their unscientific nature and their usage to support a racialist view of the nation’s origins. Nevertheless, traditional understandings of history, including oral histories, are important in reconstructing the socio-economic structure of populations, and their economic relations within the group and with other groups (Asfendiarov 1993, 24–25). A people, for Asfendiariov, was “not a biological, but above all a social” concept. For this reason, there was no sense in trying to determine either the physical attributes of a given collectivity, or their production through miscegenation, as racial categories were entirely fictitious (Asfendiarov 1993, 25). This allows him to accept, in large part, the standard historical narratives about the Huns, the Turks and other nomadic peoples of the Eurasian Steppe and to incorporate them wholesale into Marxist historical praxis. War, discord and broken alliances between the Oğuz, the Uyghurs, the Kyrgyz, the Huns and other collectivities are explained entirely along socio-economic lines, rather than through tropes of national or racial solidarity and betrayal (Asfendiarov 1993, 27–32). Without an emphasis on the racial bases of belonging, it is unimportant to Asfendiariov whether those who rebelled or those who remained loyal were of particular physical types.

The competition between Turks and Iranians, a feature of much of the scholarship that came from early Russian Soviet scholars as well as the Turkish historians of the 1930s, is noticeably absent from the writings of Asfendiariov. Indeed, he goes so far as to propose that it was the symbiotic relationship between Turkic speakers and Iranian ones – particularly the Sogdians – that gave rise to the unique culture and socio-economic organization of the people of the Kazakh Steppe, including those who self-identify as Kazakh in the 20th century (Asfendiarov 1993,
This is perhaps the strongest attack on the essentialist position held by previous Turkologists, despite its outwardly benign character. By refusing to point to the Iranian peoples or the Turkic ones as the true autochthones of the Central Asian region, Asfendiiarov makes clear that he views ethno-national belonging as an issue of culture and society, rather than appearance or language. It is an insistence on a Marxist view of history that posits that socio-political collectivities and their trappings, including the rules of inclusion and exclusion, react to deeper socio-economic forces in a dialectic, rather than a being the driving force in the history of a grouping.

In short, Asfendiiarov provides us, at the end of the period under study, with an approach to the nation that is Stalinist in content and Kazakh in form. The historicity of the nation is clearly attuned to Marxist precepts, but the peculiarities of passage from one stage of development to the next are tied to a distinctly Central Asian pattern of history. This allowed for Asfendiiarov’s chronology to be in line with the 1934 intervention described at the start of this section. It is therefore similar to Stalin’s application of the development of nationhood to the Georgians. National, or proto-national, characteristics can be read into specific aspects of Kazakh history thanks to a creative approach to socio-economic developments. Meanwhile, the insistence on agency in the grouping and regrouping of Turkic communities demonstrated, to some degree, a “common cast of mind”; in other words, a consciousness about communal interests and a shared means of acting upon them. With this, the shaping of a Kazakh nation could be cast long back into the past, without recourse to racially-charged descriptions, or indeed a break from Stalin-era historiographic dictates.
Stalinist Repression

Asfendiiarov was the last representative of his generation among the Kazakhs. He was arrested, convicted, and executed for supposedly anti-Soviet and pan-Turkish tendencies during the wave of repression that was unleashed in 1937-38 (Auezova 2011, 256; Yilmaz 2013b, 530; Kozybaev 1992, 16–17). The impact of the “Red Terror”, to paraphrase a work by the Kazakh writer Gülnar Nurbetova, was more than simply an interruption of the intellectual and scholastic life of a generation of Soviet citizens. It suffocated the very notion of free thought, critical analysis and plurality of opinions:

“Freedom of thought, thinking differently and criticism of the ruling party were limited increasingly by the limits of legitimacy of Soviet ideology and of the Party itself. The high price of Marxism, as a social theory and epistemology adopted by Russian [NdT: российские Russian citizens, not ethnic Russians] Marxists, particularly Bolsheviks, began to metastasize into pretensions towards the monopolistic control of truth and the perfection of all interpretations of Marxism. Analysis and the suggestion of mistakes were ignored.” (Nurbetova 2003, 93)

Totalitarianism was not simply a process of killing off those who opposed, it was also a means by which the search for truth was channeled towards service and survival of the Party, with Stalin at its head. Education and, by extension, history were both of great importance in this respect. The lack of generalized literacy and schooling in the pre-Revolutionary period implied that many were incapable of participating in the arenas in which this epistemic and ontological management took place. By using education as a tool, historical narratives were converted into a useful and fruitful
mechanism for modeling the minds of citizens in a manner most befitting to the preservation of the state (Nurbetova, 94).

The head of Kazkraikom, the Commissariat tasked with the organization and administration of the Kazakh regions, Goloshchekin, emphasized what was to be replaced in his estimation of the challenges facing the Komsomol:

“‘Ideological bias in the [ethnic] Russian part of the Komsomol is attributable to Great Russian chauvinism; in the Kazakh part, it is the influence of the Alash Orda, a nationalistic bias. The chauvinist is an uncultured person, even though he might be literate, even though he might be educated and have an engineering diploma. He is an uncultured, ignorant person.’” (Nurbetova 2003, 96)

It was therefore not simply a matter of making peasants, workers and nomads literate. They were to be taught how to be good Communists and Soviets, and part of this teaching necessitated stamping out the remnants of pre-Revolutionary nationalist ideas. Indeed, one can only wonder if Goloshchekin’s comment about “an engineering diploma” is a veiled reference to Mukhammadzhan Tynyshpaev, one of the clearest examples of the post-Revolutionary Kazakh adoption of earlier European narratives.

In 1937, Nikolai Mikhailovich Lukin, Editor of the journal Историк-Марксист (Historian-Marxist), heralded the new, Stalinist view of world history. In it, the non-historical nations would have their appropriate role, but those of the Soviet Union would be overshadowed by the great achievements of the Russian people in their drive towards establishing the world proletarian revolution (Lukin 1963, 449). With one article, the Stalinist régime had managed to collapse attempts to locate the history of the Central Asian peoples within regional dynamics and their
own traditional sources of information. In its place, the State left a reorientation of
historiographical endeavours towards a teleological history of the Soviet people.

With this, we close the chapter devoted to the development of historical
narratives in the Soviet Union over the 1920s and 30s. Although it would be an
oversimplification to pretend as thought there was a clear, linear trajectory from
chaotic pluralism to rigid centralization and ideological monotony, a broad trend can
be established. The 1920s were characterized by a burgeoning of historical writings
about the Turkic peoples from a variety of viewpoints. While some authors espoused
a distinctly Marxian approach to the socio-economic history of the region, others
were faithful to pre-Revolutionary narratives and nationalist ideas. This gradually
gave way to the 1930s, a decade in which the cheap and easy medium of
communication – periodicals – appears to have trailed off, and the more disciplined
and bureaucratic process of monograph production reigned supreme. In this period,
Stalinist orthodoxy, while not always painfully evident, is nonetheless palpable in
many of the historical narratives. Gone are the stridently nationalist and pre-
Revolutionary interpretations that carried on right up to 1927-28.

In the next, and final, chapter, these strands will be brought together and
matched with their Turkish counterparts. In it, we shall how just how much these
two paths diverged over the two decades, and the extent to which each of them
bear the hallmarks of the respective state-sponsored ideologies under which they
were written.
Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, I have provided an overview of the development of linguistics, archaeology and anthropology over the 20th century; a discussion of Soviet and Turkish ideologies; and a detailed view of intellectual and cultural production on the history of the Turkic peoples Turkey and the Soviet Union. The collection of articles and theses culled from periodicals, bulletins, drafts, and printed books is intended to be a guide to general trends; the full extent of views and opinions put down as ink on paper will only be known at some time in the future, once scholars have had the opportunity to go through all of the materials held in previously closed archives in both Turkey and the former Soviet Union. In this final chapter, I will utilize the material presented in the previous two chapters in order to draw conclusions about the interaction of ideology and historiography in the two countries, and to compare them to one another on three specific points:

1. The historicity of the nation;
2. Markers of identification and inclusion;
3. History as a guide to social and political cohesion.

These three aspects will form the bulk of the chapter. At its conclusion, I will draw broad lessons to be learned from the corpus of both historiographies. This will take the form of general comments, intended to look back at the core aim of the project and its implications for our understanding of the period in question, and its lasting effects on the states in question.
The Historicity of the Nation

In both Turkey and the Soviet Union, authors and representatives of the state failed to reach water-tight consensus on the historical appearance and continuity of the nation. Nonetheless, in both countries, broad-based agreement was reached on how and when to locate this particular concept along the temporal spectrum. Gökalpian nationalist thought would have that the nation was constantly being reimagined and reconstituted through education, and thus had always existed. From the final days of the Ottoman Empire, up to the end of the Second Turkish History Congress, most writers espoused the view that a Turkish or Turkic nation, defined in one way or another, had been in existence since the dawn of human civilization. For the most part, this was achieved through a reading of classical sources that stressed group names as ethnonyms, rather than socio-economic or political appellations. Gökalp’s own understanding of the nation and its presence throughout history proved to be far more flexible than might have been expected, particularly given the later iterations of nationalist ontology. Gökalp imagined it to be a grouping united around a core collection of aesthetic, moral, political and socio-economic beliefs, with membership fluid and defined through socialization, rather than blood. As such, nationality was essential but voluntaristic.

Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, greater stress was placed on the former characteristic, rather than the latter. Authors, particularly Afet İnan, Reşit Saffet, Şevket Aziz and Sadri Maksudi Arsal, and others, insisted upon the durable and primordial characteristics of the nation, confusing socialization with race and biology. As pluralism in opinion was watered down, and the State cemented its grip
on the centres of cultural and intellectual production through sponsorship and coercion, the identifiers of the nation were described more and more frequently as being unchanging and hard-wired into the minds and hearts of those identified as Turks. Gökalp believed that nations could disappear and be resurrected through re-education. Later Turkish scholars took this view to an extreme, arguing that the biological makeup of the members of a particular nation made them predisposed to that nation’s morals, mode of economic organization and language. Whereas Gökalp believed in unconscious disappearance and conscious revival, the scholars of the 1930s argued for conscious dissimulation and reflex rediscovery. The nation could not disappear entirely, it could only go underground, awaiting a great leader to reawaken it to its divine calling.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the intellectual climate proved to be less and less tolerant of immortal nations as time passed. Stalinist doctrine on the nation, which was enunciated in 1913 in response to the challenges of the Austrian Socialists, clearly identified the nation as a product of the capitalist era. Although this became part and parcel of Soviet nationalities policy after 1917, it was not implemented uniformly in the first decade of Soviet hegemony. Some authors, including those who wrote in Turkic languages and for Turkic audiences, appear to have toed the line fairly carefully. Others did not, and from the October Revolution in 1917 until Stalin’s elimination of Bukharin from the Soviet Communist Party in 1929, it is not hard to find references to the pre-capitalist nation in all forms of historical narrative. These were not just popular histories, but also political statements, school texts, conference presentations and scholarly articles meant to accompany materials that were produced for the First All-Union Turkological
Congress of 1926. The nation as a pre-modern, pre-capitalist apparition was taken as given by no small number of writers, as is reflected in many of the works seen in chapter 6.

Bartol’d, Baitursynov, Çobanzada and others all managed to incorporate, to some degree, an idealist view of the nation during periods of nomadic or feudal social organization, albeit not to the degree expressed in Turkish nationalist writings. Bartol’d’s death in 1930 allowed him to escape the beginnings of Stalin’s cleanse of the historical sciences, while Baitursynov met a similar fate at the hands of state security. Çobanzada, on the other hand, continued to produce works for public consumption through the 1930s, and these provide us with a view to the shift in state tolerance following Stalin’s entrenchment at the top of the Communist Party. We saw that, by 1930, “national” languages would be denied to peoples such as the Turkmen until their society had been reorganized according to Soviet lines. In 1934, Çobanzada gave us a masterclass in the re-writing of the historical linguistics of national lects, denying the sort of linguistic unity required by national groups until the advent of socialist, rather than just capitalist, power. And of course Asfendiayarov, the last scholar under study, demonstrated the ultimate acquiescence to ideological rigour: the massaging and creative interpretation of historical circumstances in order to fit the rigidity of the Stalinist timeline of nationhood.

In our two cases, the dynamics are similar and yet intensely different. On the one hand, in both the Soviet Union and Turkey, the hardening of ideological positions is reflected, with a lag, in the coalescence of ideological positions within dominant historiography. Ideology and politics act within a dialectic, with the first informing the conduct of individuals in the second, and the latter in turn feeding
back into the former to adapt it to contemporary situations. Both Gökalp and the early Stalin could not have foreseen the challenges of the 1930s, and it is only to be expected that they or their successors would tweak or stress different aspects of their worldviews as the circumstances around them changed. In both countries, historical narratives became much more strident in their insistence on the historicity or ahistoricity of the nation as the 1930s wore on. In Turkey, however, the focus was on proving an inalienable right to the land of Anatolia, and this involved an emphasis on the early formation of nationhood in Central Asia and its exportation to Asia Minor before the arrival of other peoples. In the Soviet Union, where parochial nationalisms and inter-ethnic conflicts were of greater concern, it was the ephemerality of the nation, and the importance of universal human dynamics, that won the day. The long and short of the matter is that narratives of nationhood in Central Asia split along the border between Turkey and the Soviet Caucasus, with no attempt at reconciling the two to each other, or to extant research on social formations among the pre-Islamic Turkic people.

The nation, then, was either temporally and spatially indelible, or merely skin deep. The same might be said of the means of individuals’ inclusion in the nation, and the characteristics that might be key to drawing a line in the sand between Us and Them.

**Markers of Identification and Inclusion**

The historicity of the nation was an issue of disagreement between Turkish and Soviet historians, but it could hardly be called a bone of contention. The same, however, cannot be said of the means of determining who might be counted as part
of a given nation, and who not. Gökalp dismissed the idea of bloodlines. No small number of his compatriots opted for the same line in discussions in the *Türk Ocakları* and the two Historical Congresses, as we saw throughout chapter 5. Nonetheless, there remained a receptiveness to primordial, racialized interpretations of Turkish nationhood and belonging, which paved the way for the full-blown use of craniology, biology and racial anthropology to bolster historical narratives right up to the of the period under study. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, an aggressive stance against the use of physical attributes, and particularly race, as means of determining the belonging and identification of an individual began in earnest in the 1920s. Agazade and Karakashly, in particular, provide us with a robust example of the Soviet belief that outward appearance and race were nothing more than historical and geographical accidents, of little explanatory power beyond elucidating the environment within which an individual’s forbearers had lived.

In many ways, both Turkish and Soviet scholars began from the same circumstances. In terms of foundational texts, neither Gökalp nor Stalin provided a clear means of determining how one might be labeled a member of a particular ethno-national grouping. In Gökalp’s own writings, this seems to have been a question of best-fit: into which nation had the individual been socialized, and where might her own ideas and worldview accord with the priorities of the community? For Stalin, as we have seen from the work of both Francine Hirsch and Terry Martin, the early years of Soviet power were ones in which auto-identification was *de rigueur*. Citizens were free to choose the collectivity to which they belonged, although they were encouraged, in some respect, to consider what the historically and materially
most appropriate answer might be. In neither case did the progenitors of the two ideologies espouse a litmus test for bringing in or throwing out groups of people.

On another level, too, both cadres of historians began from the same corpus of historical texts upon which to determine the ethno-national belonging of the Turkic peoples. Both had access to the Chinese, Greek, Armenian, Persian and Arab chronicles, as well as the various Runic inscriptions in Old Turkic. Both read and discussed the works of Radlov, de Guignes, Cahun, Vámbéry and other early Turkologists. And both were aware of scholarly production coming out of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland and other European academies throughout the 1920s and 1930s, albeit with various delays. What mattered, then, was interpretation and collation of data, as well as the conscious choice to omit or include specific studies in the broader corpus of secondary materials.

In the Soviet Union, omission and suppression were imposed selectively, as the denunciation of particular scholars as bourgeois, nationalist, Islamist, or all three was seen as just effective in discouraging future scholars from reviving their theses as was a simple and silent funeral. While De Guignes, Cahun and others from the period prior to 1917 were roundly criticized by Turkish and Soviet scholars alike, the Soviet case presents us with greater evidence of internal criticism and censure, as well as revision. Turkish scholars appear to have respected the use of race and racial anthropology as a meaningful heuristic in the determination of group identification and belonging, while Soviet scholars gradually came round to the idea that these were without explanatory power. First, Bartol’d challenged the idea that some, although not all, descriptions of race and appearance were tied to auto-denominations and ethnic communities. His characterization of the word Türk as a
political appellation rather than an ethnonym was in opposition to those historians, including Turkish ones, who sought a direct bloodline or biological link between contemporary communalities and closely-knit ethnic communities in the past. However, Bartol’d and his followers, including scholars such as Semenov, clearly believed the Tajiks to be direct descendants of ancient Iranic racial groupings, while native Turkic scholars such as Soliyev and Tynyshpaev tried to flip his logic to apply it the other way around.

As the 1930s progressed, the spread of racial anthropology, biology and eugenics through Western European scholarship produced polarized reactions in Turkey and the Soviet Union. Turkish historians, influenced in part by European sources, intensified their adoption of physical and biological markers as means of identifying historic Turkic communities. In order to make these meaningful and coherent within the dominant worldview, they tied them to the identifiers of Turkishness outlined by Gökalp: bone structure and stature determined suitability for specific socio-economic pursuits; skull sizes facilitated or hindered the proper production of language; blood types encoded a likelihood to remain loyal to leader and race. Those scholars who disagreed, refuting the links between race, language and ethnicity, were either forced to go abroad or fell into the background of historical endeavours during this period. Foreign historians, on the other hand, were routinely reinterpreted in order to ensure that their conclusions matched the dominant Turkish view.

In the Soviet Union, descent, appearance and blood were played down either implicitly or explicitly. Some of the aforementioned historians who had proposed racial means of identifying historic communities were partially or wholly refuted and
their findings deemed unsuitable for further scholarship. Other narratives appeared that stressed the unimportance of race in the face of individual and communal interest and politicking. Asfendiiarov in particular demonstrated this manner in which the much vaunted racially-motivated loyalty or betrayal that appeared in Turkish narratives was explained away through socio-economic developments and political machinations. Çobanzada highlighted distinct intra-national divisions between the various class elements of the nation, while reminding readers of Marr’s view of language evolution and mixing as a product of class warfare and socio-economic advancement, rather than miscegenation. And Popov, in turn, refused to endorse the direct links between Kipchaks and Karakalpaks, breaking the link between language and lineage that was so important for Turkic nationalist narratives. All of this was intended to decouple descent and nation, and to insist upon the four Stalinist characteristics as the only means of identifying the nation, rather than any sort of biological marker.

Race, then, came to be either supremely important, or supremely meaningless, on either side of the Turco-Soviet border. Nationhood was identified either by examining an individual, or by listening to her explanation of her own identity, but never a mix of the two. Underlying this, of course, was a deeper and much more fundamental aspect of state-sponsored history and education in general: the creation of a unifying myth, and the means of binding citizens to states in the march of human development.
History as a Means of Social and Political Cohesion

Social cohesion and loyalty to a particular regime or even political system can be interpreted as intensely political phenomena: choices to be made within a matrix of given options, based on one’s own values and beliefs. Ideology, we might say, will tell us how individuals make those choices – that they are inherently selfish beings, or that altruism is an important factor, or even that they are pushed by the invisible hand of a higher being – but the content of that choice is inherently political. In the case of both the Soviet and Turkish systems, however, social cohesion and political loyalty were seen as core components of the ideological system, dictated quasi-deterministically through a variety of mechanisms. This determinism, or at least a form of sub-conscious inclination, found its way into historical narratives, too. As such, the narratives themselves were not simply influenced by the dominant ideology of the state, they were also important tools in legitimizing and reinforcing it.

In the Turkish case, Gökalp’s solidarist leanings, and his belief in the nation as the ultimate modern form of social organization, made for a strongly normative element in the Gökalpian nationalist view of how society ought to be reshaped. Gökalp was in favour of a hierarchy of needs and interests in which the individual was subordinated to society, with the corporation acting as a possible mediator between the necessities and desires of the masses and the ultimate goals of the nation (see Parla 2009). In describing historically-bound societies in the distant past, no small number of Turkish historians sought to replicate this formula in their studies of pre-historic Turkic communities. The Huns, in particular, were a favourite
topic of analysis, from Köprülü through to Saffet and Arsal, as a prime example of strength of social cohesion among the Turks, and the supremacy of political and ethnic loyalty, with dire consequences for any of those Turks who betrayed their ethnic kin. The lesson was therefore clear: loyalty to leadership is a component of Turkishness, which is in turn a marker of inclusion and belonging. To defy the nation’s leaders is to defy the nation.

Towards the end of the 1930s, greater and greater emphasis was placed on this, especially as one-party rule went from the exception to the norm both in Turkey and Europe. The introduction of racial and biological markers into the identification of pre-historical Turkic communities and the ahistorical duration of nationality allowed for a new means of carrying this historical narrative into the present. The usage of skull sizes, physical appearance, fingerprints and blood types in order to categorize Turks according to their racial purity was now linked to the moral and legal traditions of the nation. Gökalpian nationalism allowed for national characteristics – including political allegiance and social cohesion – to be classified as immortal and essential qualities, and the new biologically and anthropologically informed history metamorphosed them into inalienable, quasi-deterministic elements of every Turk’s psychological make-up. History became a morality tale, elucidating citizens on the futility of straying from the flock by insisting upon the circular nature of human social development.

At the other end of this spectrum was the Soviet Union, where ideology was founded on more than a century’s worth of philosophical study insisting upon the linearity of human progress. While not explicitly part of the Stalinist view of the nation, the vision of history as a unidirectional path from primeval quasi-socialized
communities to futuristic Communism underpinned all Soviet, and indeed Marxian, thought. This, combined with the ephemerality of the nation, and the categorical refutation of race as a meaningful heuristic, implied that the Stalinist historians, and indeed most Soviet historians, could not and would not espouse a view of social cohesion and political loyalty as being hardwired. Although loyalty to Moscow and the Soviet Socialist system was a crucial component of the reimagining of the social sciences, it was expressed in a very different manner in the Soviet historical narratives about pre-historic Turkic peoples.

Already in Bartol’d’s histories of Central Asia, we can clearly see the implications of an insistence on Turk as a political designation, rather than an ethnic one. Here, individuals, or at least groups of individuals, are described as having affiliated themselves with particular leaders and wider communities out of self-interest. As time passed and the period of eclecticism in Soviet historiography came to a close, such explanations took on greater class connotations. Soliyev, in particular, provides us with a view to this with his descriptions of the differences between town and country – implying that socio-economic conditions, rather than ethno-linguistic ones, were crucial in the formation of identities – and his insistence on the capital accumulation of the Oğuz and the Seljuks. This latter aspect allowed him to claim allegiance through the base; that is, the creation of socio-economic bonds, rather than biological or racial ones, that tied these people together in the beginnings of a national structure. Soviet historians might have insisted on national loyalty and cohesion in the late pre-Islamic period, but they did so on the basis of economic development and social advancement, rather than any sort of predisposition to elevating the group’s interests over the individual’s.
By the 1930s, the call for loyalty to the centre was both implicit to the narratives and explicit. On the implicit side, class consciousness was infused into a variety of the components of historical narratives. The only enduring component of these stories was the presence of a dominated class, whose coerced cohesion to a national idea was the product of a bygone capitalist age. With the message that Turkic peoples had, in the past, chosen to ally themselves with a number of different rulers based on ostensibly misguided analyses of self-interest, it was a short leap for the reader to understand that the current period, in which workers, peasants and nomads were educated as to their proper class interests, would feature adherence to a new leader, one who had their welfare and advancement at heart. On an explicit plane, the decrees of 1934 and 1937 made clear that all histories were to become exercises in teleology, directing those interested in history to the quasi-deterministic linear path that leads all peoples towards the glorious victory of Socialism and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat – to which all proletariats owe allegiance – with its capital in Moscow. While Turks were told that their destiny was written in blood, Soviet citizens were informed that those who failed to act in accordance with the inevitable march of human development would be left in the “dustbin of history”, to paraphrase Leon Trotsky.

In the introduction to this study, I stated that I would contribute to answering a number of different questions: to what degree is history, and indeed epistemology, responsive to the dictates of ideology? Is historical truth accessible through intellectual investigation, or are all scholarly activities tainted by the demands of the present? How malleable are our visions of ourselves, our families and our
communities in the face of intrusive state-directed pedagogy, patronage and propaganda? Although I have not been explicit in answering these questions throughout the body of this work, responses can be gleaned from the preceding chapters.

The thrust of the project has provided ample examples of the degree to which history, and indeed all social sciences, can fall prey to the vagaries of ideologically-based demands. In both Turkey and the Soviet Union, the 1920s and 1930s are replete with narratives and individuals who were forced to change, or forced to disappear, in response to the dictates of the state’s policy and worldview. The most powerful stories are those of historians who, similar to Çobanzada, Asfendiiarov, and Baitursynov, were murdered at the hands of the Stalinist state. Slightly less egregious are the cases in which scholars were forced into exile, as in the case of Zeki Velidi Togan – who left Turkey for Vienna in 1934 – or Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who opted for silence, rather than continued participation in public and scholarly life. More interesting, however, is the diachronic change that can be traced, like an arc, through the writings of historians and academics throughout the period. Such trajectories can be seen in the works of Bartol’d, Marr, Tynyshpaev, Çobanzada, Ağaoğlu, Arsal, and a host of other intellectuals who retained the ability to produce throughout the period in question. Here I hesitate to place agency in the hands of either the state or the individual, but rather point to the symbiotic relationship that developed, or was coerced, by the prevailing structure of the social sciences at the time. Did these individuals undergo considerable change in their own worldviews, and seek to align their writings with the dominant ideology of the period? Were they coerced by a state capable of the cruelest of punishments for those who
transgressed its red lines? Or was the truth somewhere in the middle, a pull-push combination in which the draw of the idea, together with the thrust of the state’s monopoly on the use of violence, warped previously enunciated opinions and theories beyond recognition?

The answers to such questions are beyond the scope of this study, and require intensive research into the personal papers of the individuals concerned. What can be said, however, is that ideology clearly did influence the interpretation and receipt of historical narratives in both countries. While some narratives require a look beyond the timeframe of this study – particularly into the pre-Revolutionary period in the case of Russian writers – some of those who produced historical tracts between 1923 and 1937 only demonstrate a marked shift in their interpretation and enunciation of historical narratives. Çobanzada, for one, provides us with a poignant example of an individual who, having espoused a clear interest in the ethno-nationally tinged interpretation of early Turkish writers immediately following the Revolution, appears to have fallen into step with the régime’s desired view of ethnogenesis. More often, however, it is the rise and fall of fortunes within one particular component of the drive for national histories that grants the clearest portrait of state-sponsored ideology influencing the process of history writing. In that case of Kazakhstan, the fall of Tynyshpaev and Baitursynov, who were replaced by Asfendiiarov – who was to meet an untimely demise himself in 1938 – demonstrates that personal conversions themselves were not enough to satisfy the demands of the Party. Similar, too, is the trajectory of the Turkish intellectual community. Here, the heavily Eurasian Turkic intelligentsia made its mark on early
academic pursuits, only to be sidelined or exiled in the early 1930s, replaced with more reliable figures, including Atatürk’s protégée, Afet İnan.

In both the Soviet Union and Turkey, therefore, the agency of the individuals writing these narratives is a clear feature of the history writing process. Rather than the “editorial committees” that would become quite common in Soviet academic publishing from the 1940s onwards, real people, with real subjectivity, were involved in the production and dissemination of historical narratives on behalf of State-sponsored organs. Their individuality allows us to demonstrate the manner in which the state, as acting through its various agents and bodies, sought to control and influence these individuals in order to implement its ideological aims. The methods were varied – the tantalizing opportunity of participating in building a new society, as well as expulsion, threat, withdrawal of funding, execution, disappearance, – but the end was largely the same: a shift in the creation of history in order to reflect more closely the ideological dictates of the state. In doing so, these historians became members of that second tier of the state apparatus, the softer and more human mechanism for interaction between ordinary citizens and institutions. Far from monolithic, the State acted through individuals and upon individuals.

With this, we come to the end of my study. The success of the narratives under consideration can be measured by their endurance in national historiography. In Turkey, they live on stripped of their most blatantly racist elements and imbued with a new-found respect for the Ottomans and Islam. In the former Soviet states, they too proved to be enduring, although recently attempts by government from Gagauzia and Azerbaijan across to Kazakhstan have seen many of their elements replaced by calques on the Turkish History Thesis. In both cases, however, it is
content, rather than production, that is cause for praise or concern; little interest is shown in the manner in which these theses came about, or the context in which they were necessary. The 1920s and 30s were the formative years of Soviet and Turkish historical scholarship, and the period’s actors and sagas should not be forgotten. Theirs was a struggle to balance the search for historical truth with personal convictions and the needs and demands of sometimes insecure, sometimes overbearing state apparatuses. Their own individual successes are difficult to measure, but their efforts should not be forgotten, nor their roles in the establishment of contemporary scholarship across the Turkic world be ignored.
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