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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.
Abstract of Thesis

"The Concrete Expression of Abstract Ideas in Indian Philosophy, with special reference to Comparison as Means of Evidence".

The first chapter will contain a discussion of the various pramāṇas (means of establishing proof) and their relative importance. The second chapter will deal with Alamkāra (poetics) and the prominence and elaborate nature of figures of speech in this branch of literature. This will be followed by a detailed consideration of the simile as employed in the philosophical texts and as reflecting the general condition of Indian society together with the physical environment. The fourth chapter will supplement the application of the concrete reality by the discussion of a reality of fiction in the philosophical sense for the purpose of evidence. Finally there will be a short summing up of the conclusions arrived at.

The chief texts and commentaries referred to will be: Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad (with commentary), Vedāntasāra, Saṅkhya-kārikā, with Gauḍapāda's commentary and Saṅkhya-tattvavakamudī, Yogasūtras with Vyāsa's commentary and Vācaspatimiśra's gloss, Malliṣeṇa's Syādvadamañjarī, Nyāyabindu and commentary, Udayana's Kusumāñjali, Nyāyasūtras, and Mādhava's Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha.
THE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF ABSTRACT IDEAS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO COMPARISON AS MEANS OF EVIDENCE.

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• Sāhityadārpaṇa
• Ślokavārtika
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• Taittirīyabhāṣyavārtika
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Chapter I. Means of Evidence in Cognition.

A glance at any list of titles of Sanskrit works cannot fail to reveal an astounding emphasis on "illumination". An overwhelming proportion of works on all subjects (logic, grammar, poetics, law) boast titles ending in -ādarśa (mirror), ṭāṭipa or ṭāṭipikā (lamp), -prakāśa (elucidation, revelation), -kaumudī (moonlight), -āloka (light), and the like (e.g. Kāvyādārśa; Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa; Bhṛddīpikā; Viśvapraṅkāśa [a dictionary]; Sāṅkhyaśātattvakaumudī; Dhvanyāloka; and "Prabodhacandrodaya" - the rising of the moon of knowledge [lit. "awakening"]). The Buddha is the "enlightened one", but primarily one who has "awakened". Here not only the mental illumination is referred to, but the concrete image of a man awakening from the darkness of sleep to meet the daylight underlies this more abstract idea. The highest, the perfect, knowledge is known as "sambodha" - complete awakening or illumination; while intuition (such as sometimes comes during trance) is termed "pratibhā", - that which shines towards one.

It is through the dawning of the divine light of intelligence that liberation is achieved, and illumination in any sphere was regarded as effective. Not only the practice of devotional exercises, but any activity of the human mind, could bring about complete knowledge, and hence the cutting of earthly ties. This may explain in part why grammar and poetics were included among the philosophical systems, - which in their turn never severed
themselves from religious aims.

Right thinking, then, was of the utmost importance; and each philosophical system had its own criterion or criteria on which its thought was based. True or correct knowledge is known as pramā, "measure", while the instrument or means for acquiring pramā is "pramāṇa". The thing to be measured, the object of investigation, is "prameya", the act of acquiring pramā being known as pramiti, and the agent of the "measuring", the performer of the mental act resulting in a right cognition, as pramātya. The three latter are identified by the Buddhist Idealist (Vigñānavādin) from an epistemological standpoint, and in the Vedānta doctrine too there is nothing ultimately save knowledge (or "consciouness") which reveals itself. The logicians, however, insist on maintaining the distinction between cogniser, cognised and cognition.

The Sānkhyā definition of pramā is "right knowledge, resulting from the cognition by the senses of objects not previously cognised, and not obscured by doubt or error; and from the co-ordination of such cognitions through a function of the mind (citta-vṛtti) (Sānkhyatattvavākṣya 4). The Vedānta definition (see Vedantaparibhāṣa I) is similar, but it is pointed out that when memory is included in the definition of pramā, pramā is simply "knowledge of an object which is not contradicted (by the senses)". The Mīmāṃsaka says that right knowledge consists in cognising an object not cognised before (and therefore deduces
that God has no right knowledge, as he must always know). The Naiyāyika replies that this definition is non-pervasive, as it fails to apply to repeated knowledge; and also of too great extension, as it applies to erroneous judgments such as "this (mother-of-pearl) is silver". (Kusumānjali and Comm. IV,1). The test of a cognition should be "artha-kriyā-kārītva "the fact of leading to the performance of an action with a purpose", and a purposive action cannot take place when the knowledge is subsequently contradicted. The Buddhist, however, points out that an erroneous cognition does sometimes lead to the fulfilment of a purpose, as when the light of a jewel shining through a keyhole leads us to the jewel itself (See "Reality of Fiction").

The following is a list of the pramāṇas or means of establishing evidence:
(1) pratyakṣa, direct perception, the evidence of the senses.
(2) anumāna, "measuring along", inference (see below)
(3) śabda or āptavacana, scriptural authority, or reliable testimony (e.g. "Indra is the king of the gods"; or "The land of the Kurus is in the North").
(4) upamāna, "by-measure, measuring with, or upon; superimposing one thing on another", i.e. analogy (e.g. "a bison is like a cow"; "a pond is like the sea").
(5) arthāpatti, inference from circumstances (a. drṣṭa- (seen): Caitra is not at home, but he is alive (therefore he must be ou
b. śruta- (heard): we are told that Devadatta is fat, although he does not eat by day (therefore he must eat at night).

(6). anupalabdhi or abhāvapratyakṣa, proof from non-existence (e.g. "since there are no mice (in their usual haunt), there must be cats here"). (N.B. in the Sānkhyakārikā, abhāva and anupalabdhi are two distinct terms, and abhāva is referred to as fourfold, while anupalabdhi is eightfold. See below.).

(7) sambhava, equivalence, co-existence (four kuḍavas = one prastha (measure); or 100 is included in 1000).

(8) aitihya, tradition or fallible testimony ("people say that there is a Yakṣa in this banyan tree")

(9) ceṣṭā, gesture. (see below, p. 26)

Of these, the Mīmāṃsā (except Prabhākara) and the normal Vedānta recognise (1)-(6), while the Paurāṇikas add (7) and (8), and the Tāntrikas (9). Prabhākara does not admit abhāva, and recognises (1)-(5); while the Nyāya has (1)-(4), and the Sānkhya-Yoga school (1)-(3). One school of Jains divided the pramāṇas into a) direct (perception) and b) indirect (inference and "word" (śabda), while perception was further divided into ordinary (saṃvyavahārīka) and supernormal (mukhya) (both of these having subdivisions). The Bāṣeṣṭika school admits only pratyakṣa and anumāna, including (3) and (4) under anumāna. The Buddhist logicians too consider the senses and intellect to be the sole sources of cognition, and of these, only the senses are ultimately to be trusted (and then only in indeter-
minate cognition). The Cārvākas or materialists go still further, and admit only perception, refuting inference on the ground that there is no means of establishing the invariable connection of the līgha or middle term with the līṅga or major term.

Let us know consider each pramāṇa, and try to gain some idea of their relative importance. The only pramāṇa which is admitted by all schools without exception is that of perception praty-ākṣam, "reference back to the eye" (which represents all the senses). As a general rule, the evidence of the senses is infallible: "The eye is Brahman. What one hears (i.e. by hearsay) with the ears may be false, but not what one sees with the eyes" (Bṛh. Up. and Comm. 4,1,4). Except in the case of some organic defect, such as timira (an eye disease), the senses cannot be mistaken. Jaimini (Mīmāṃsā) defines perception as the cognition produced in the self by the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects. The Naiyāyika contends that this definition includes doubtful perception and erroneous perception and in his turn defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition resulting from intercourse of sense-organs and objects, not associated with any name (i.e. indeterminate), but well-defined. The Vedāntin points out that if the mind is considered to be a sense-organ (which he does not admit), then the Naiyāyika condition of perception (the contact of sense-organ and object) is fulfilled at all times, and pratyakṣa is the only pramāṇa.
This is an important statement, for, as we shall see presently, in a sense it is possible to reduce all pramāṇas to pratyakṣa.

Perception acquires an added authority, as it is held to include the supernatural knowledge of gods and yogins,- for almost all schools of Indian philosophers believe in supernormal perceptions. The Nyāya "alaukika-pratyakṣa" (not-worldly perception) requires a better training than the average man's. It has three divisions: sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇa, jñānalakṣaṇa, and yoga-ja. The first, sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇa, signifies a knowledge of the genus from the perception of its particulars (cf. the Nyāya view of parts and whole, which we shall discuss later). The second, jñāna-lakṣaṇa, is really what we should call association of ideas. For instance, when a man sees a sandal tree in the distance, he has the sensation of its sweet smell, and says "I see the sweet sandal". According to the Vedāntin, the knowledge conveyed by this sentence is direct cognition in regard to the sandal, but indirect in regard to the sweet smell (since scent is not a fit object for the sense of sight). (Vedānta-paribhāṣā I). The third form of alaukika-pratyakṣa, yoga-ja, is the Yogan's intuitive vision of the whole of truth, even down to the normally imperceptible atoms. (For the intuitive knowledge known as pratibhā, - a vision of the truth after hearing an expert's description, see Sāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. 3).

It is evident that the perception even of illusory objects can be explained as sām jñāna-lakṣaṇa- we see "alaukika" silver
in a piece of mother-of-pearl (See "Reality of Fiction"). The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, from his part, subscribes to the doctrine of "svatah-pramāṇya", the self-evidence of truth (see e.g. Strauss, pp. 175-6). He maintains the truth of every cognition as such, owing to the fact that even a false cognition (as of water in a mirage) produces the same reactions in the percipient as a true cognition. Kumārila agrees, and points out that what is corrected is not the cognition, but what is cognised. Sarvam-eva jñānam samīcinam- "All knowledge is right knowledge".

Inference (anumāna) may be classified in various ways. There may be a threefold division, as follows:

a. pūrvavat. Fire is inferred from smoke (since the two have formerly been seen together). Or (Sānkhya view) there may be a deduction from cause to effect: The cloud is swollen, therefore it will rain.

b. seṣavat. This signifies (1) inference from part to whole, as when one tastes salt in one part of a pool, the inference is that the rest of the pool is also salty; or when one grain of rice in a pot is cooked, the rest must be;

or (2) proof by elimination, e.g. clay and pot (in the Sānkhya view) are one, since neither the relation of union nor that of separation exists between them (see Keith, p. 90);

or (3) inference from effect to cause, as when we infer that it has rained, on seeing a swollen river.
c. sāmānyato-drṣṭa, which is applied to things and circumstance beyond our normal experience, e.g. 1) the sun, moon and stars move, because they are seen in different places, like Caitra; or, having observed mangoes in flower in one place, one infers that they are flowering elsewhere as well; and 2) from seeing that the activity of farmers etc. has a result, we infer that that of monks and hermits has, too, though it does not come within our experience. (See Nyāyasūtras I,5; Śāṅkhyāk. Comm. 5)

Sometimes anumāna is divided into drṣṭa-linga (inference of smoke fire from smoke— an argument from one combination of circumstances to another of the same sort), and adṛṣṭa-linga (corresponding to sāmānyato-drṣṭa), e.g. the inference of the existence of wind as substratum of hot and cold touch; and the inference of the relation of prakṛti and Puruṣa (in the Sāṅkhya).

Yet another classification (Śāṅkhyāk. Comm. 5) is a) from linga (characteristic) to lingin (characterised), as when the existence of a pilgrim is inferred from the sight of his staff; and b) from lingin to linga, as when, having seen a pilgrim, one concludes "this is his staff". À propos of this relation of linga and lingin, Dr. Beimann (p. 87, "Indian and Western Philosophy") has pointed out that India never leaves the ground of empirical reality, even in its syllogism,— for "smoke, the visible object, is the property, and the unseen fire is its bearer".

We have seen that the Cārvāka does not admit the validity of inference. He says: "The step (which the mind takes) from
the knowledge of smoke to the knowledge of fire can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception (or by its being an error) (Sarv. I, p. 4; and cf. Kusum. Comm. Introduction, III, 6-7). But, says the Buddhist, one who says "anumāna is no pramaṇa" is contradicted by his own words, for if he seeks to prove, i.e. to infer, that it is none, it will be like asserting his own mother to be barren (Sarv. II, p. 6; and cf. Nyāyabinduṭikā III, pp. 63-4).

It is, however, expressly stated in the Nyāyasūtras (I, 5) that inference is dependent upon perception (tat-pūrvakam); but on the other hand we cannot dispense with inference, for it is inference which corrects errors due to faulty perception (as e.g. the perception of a fiery circle, which is really a rapidly rotating fire-brand). But again, when we infer that such things do not really exist, such an inference is nothing more nor less than the memory of a past perception (cf. Nyāyabinduṭikā III, p. 52, where smaraṇam is a synonym for anumāna; also ibid. I, p. 8, where anumāna is defined as "measuring, after the remembrance of the connection of the invariable mark" (liṅga)); and dependence on memory can be shown to exist in all perceptions. It may even be suggested that a perception is itself nothing but inference, for when we say "I see a tree", it is only a part of the tree that is seen, and the whole inferr from the part. The Naiyāyika cannot admit such a suggestion, for according to him, we see the whole when looking at a part,- and our perception is verified by our ability to hold the tree
etc. (also, one can walk around the tree and see it from all angles). (See below, Chapter VII, pp. 201-2).

The schools which acknowledge the pramāṇatā of āptavacana or śabda, assert that inference cannot stand when it contradict the authority of revelation (e.g. Sarv. V, p. 59). (The Sāṅkhya school is independent of the authority of scripture, but credits the words of the expert). According to Dignāga, however śabda is either inference, if we infer that the credible person words agree with reality; or perception, if we learn by (subseq experience that the speaker's statement is avisamvādin, i.e. not disagreeing (with the true facts). (See Randle, Ch. V).

But surely we should rather say that it is perception, not by oneself, but by another person? The raising of āptavacana, not in the sense of revelation, but in that of "credible testimony" to the status of a pramāṇa, is yet another proof of the belief in the infallibility of the senses,- not only one's own senses, but also those of others. The pramāṇatā of śrutī as revelation on the other hand, is bound up with the eternity of the "holy word", which can still be heard as it was heard by the first "seers" (for the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of the eternity of sound, see Chap. VIII below); accordingly in this sense also "śabda" is practically synonymous with "pratyakṣa".

It is a significant fact that "revelation" should have remained one of the most important pramāṇas in the majority of the systems. Indian philosophy has not been able to develop
independently of religion. And, in India especially, religion in its turn is dependent on, or expressive of, biological and physical conditions. (cf. my R.A.S. essay). A primitive culture has developed to its limits without interference from outside, and this fact largely explains the unique and specifically Indian character of logic, ethics, metaphysics and other fields of learning. "So ergibt sich für das indische Geistesleben das Paradoxon: Primitiv in der Grundlage, in der Behandlungsweise Höchstkultur". (Betty Heimann, Zur Struktur des indischen Denkens). The presence of a caste devoted to the pursuit of knowledge (i.e. the Brāhmans), attached to the schools of the different Vedas, and frequently engaged in friendly argument and rivalry (as we see from the Upaniṣads, e.g. Brh. Up., where Yājñavalkya is put to the test by his fellow Brāhmans) led to the development of an extraordinary variety of theories about the origin of the world, the nature of the Divine, man's ultimate purpose, and the like; and these discussions later led on to the Saṃvāda custom of polemical dispute between the philosophical schools, whether these were "orthodox" or not. A cursory glance at the Nyāya system of logic reveals that it was built up on the foundations of argument, and is no mere abstract theoretical structure. In no country have so many creeds,—theistic, pantheistic, and frankly atheistic,—been able to flourish side by side without danger of suppression; the vast size of India, and her isolation, are to be thanked for the survival of an infinite
variety of religious beliefs and social customs, which no ruler, even had he so desired, would dare to suppress, and which have often mingled one with another. (Cf. also the number of rulers who became monks, such as Aśoka, Kaniska, etc.).

But there is another side to the question. The same conditions which allowed of an intellectual development unrestricted by outside influences, also fostered a remarkable conservatism of ideas. Untouched by the stimulating leaven which is so often a consequence of foreign invasion and the mingling of stocks, old mythology and new philosophy did not, as might have been expected, cancel one another out. In every department of thought we repeatedly see an extraordinary unwillingness to discard any of the old beliefs, even though they are at variance with new ideas. The Vedic gods, and their successors, are incorporated into philosophical systems with which they are incompatible; in the same way that Indra, for example, is allowed to retain his place (though a much altered one) in Buddhist literature.

The Indian love for combining seemingly incompatible factors is well illustrated by the application of the fourth pramāṇa, analogy or upamā. The stock illustration of upamā is as follows: A man who is about to go into the forest is told by a forester that he is likely to meet an animal called a gavaya (bison); further, he is informed that the gavaya looks like a cow. Going into the forest, he meets an animal answering
to this description, and realises that it must be a gavaya. The advocates of upamā as a separate pramāṇa are not all agreed as to what the fruit of upamā is. The Naiyāyika says that the discriminative knowledge (pariccheda) of the connection of a name with the thing named is the fruit of comparison. The Vedāntin asks, "Why should not likeness be simply a common property (samanadharma), and comparison be that proof which produces the cognition thereof?" When it is suggested that upamāna is simply perception, the Māmsaka points out that after the cognition that the gavaya is like a cow, we may also have the cognition that the cow is like a gavaya, even though the cow is not then present to the senses (i.e. there is a definite element of judgment in upamāna). (See Kusum. III, 8-12, Comm.).

The Sāṅkhya, refusing to recognise upamāna as a fresh pramāṇa, says: "The knowledge resulting from hearing the sentence 'yathā gaus tathā gavayaḥ' is nothing but āptavacana. The knowledge that the word gavaya means something similar to a cow is an inference. And the knowledge of similarity to a cow which is confirmed when the gavaya is actually seen, is nothing but perception,—likewise the remembrance of the cow's likeness to the gavaya." The Naiyāyika is particularly anxious to point out that upamā cannot be included under inference: there is no inference of the appearance of the unseen gavaya from the seen cow (as in the case of seen smoke and unseen fire), but a recognition of the seen gavaya as such, through information previously acquired. (See Nyāyasūtras II, 42-
We conclude, then, that upamā is a coordination of different pratyakṣas; like āptavacana, it enlists the aid of other people’s experience (see for example Randle, p. 315; a person is told of the medicinal properties of a certain plant resembling a bean, and thereupon, when he actually finds such a plant, he knows and makes use of its properties). Though from one point of view it may be argued that it can be included under perception, or inference, or credible testimony, as the case may be, yet on the other hand upamā has a definite value of its own, not merely logically, but also psychologically. Its chief use is in the elucidation of (otherwise) abstract ideas; in the establishing of specific resemblances between different objects. In poetics, upamā is the highest pramāṇa, as we shall see in chapter II. The structure of the Indian syllogism, which is in essence inference from examples, shows us again how important was the concrete illustration, the "udāhāraṇa", the "upamā". Not only positive, but also negative examples, were adduced to clarify the nature of the probandum and it was an established rule that an example (udāhāraṇa) must be an object or circumstance regarding which there was a concurrence of opinion among both laymen and philosophers (see Nyāyasūtras I,25).

arthāpatti is described as a process that "consists in finding a supposition which reconciles a prima facie contra-
The examples for drṣṭa- and śruta-arthāpatti have been given above. The Sāṅkhya view is expressed as follows: "Arthāpatti is an inference not from examples, but from circumstances. If anything which is not all-pervading is not in one place, then it must be in another. We see that Caitra is not at home; and we are told (āptavacana) that he is alive; therefore we infer that he has gone out" (see Sāṅkhyaatattvakaumudi 5).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is similar. The upholder of arthāpatti however, (Vedāntin) says that if we try to reduce instances of arthāpatti to inference, we shall have for a major premise not a proposition expressing a direct relation of invariable concomitance between the middle and the major term (anvaya-vyāpti), but between the absence of the major term and the absence of the middle term (vyatireka-vyāpti); and this cannot lead to an inference. (Vedāntaparibhāṣā). The Naiyāyika points out that if there were no affirmative pervasion (anvaya-vyāpti), there would be no realisation of absurdity or inconsistency: therefore arthāpatti is included in inference. (see Kusum. Comm. III,19).

We may note also that the element of analogy enters into it: we observe that (example b, above, p.7) people must eat in order to grow fat, and accordingly when we see a fat man we assume that he eats sometimes, if not in the daytime, then at night.

The admission of abhāva, "proof from non-existence", among the pramāṇas is an evidence of the polaric aspect ("the polarity of being and non-being") which is peculiar to Indian philosophy. (See Betty Heimann, "The Polarity of the Indefinite", Journal Indian Society for Oriental Comarasan Volume).
There are four varieties of abhāva:

(1) prāg-abhāva (something that does not yet exist), e.g. Devadatta as a boy and as a youth, etc.

(2) anyonya-abhāva or itaretara-abhāva, mutual non-existence, e.g. the non-existence of "jar" in "cloth".

(3) atyanta-abhāva, (absolute non-existence, i.e. an impossible) e.g. an ass's horns, the son of a barren woman, or a flower in the sky; or (Sarv. X, p. 91) the non-existence of colour (or form; (ṛupa) in the air.

(4) sarvabhāva (complete non-existence, i.e. non-existence of something which has previously existed, in consequence of destruction), e.g. like a cloth that has been burnt; or (through inference) as through the sight of dried-up corn, the non-existence of rain is inferred. (See Sāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. 4).

The term abhāva, then, refers to a specific condition of non-existence, a condition which does not depend on the cognising powers of any particular subject. Anupalabdhi, on the other hand, as its etymology indicates, is "non-grasping", i.e. failure to apprehend something which is potentially cognisable, owing to some defect or impediment affecting the senses. There are eight divisions of anupalabdhi:

a. atidūrāt- (owing to too great distance), e.g. Caitra, Maitra in another district, or a tree on a mountain peak.

b. sāmipyāt- (owing to too close proximity), e.g. collyrium on the eyes.
c. indriya-abhīghatā (owing to injury to the sense-organs), e.g. there is no perception of form or colour or sound on the part of one who is blind or deaf.

d. mano'navasthānāt- (owing to instability of the mind; absent-mindedness), e.g. one does not hear even a distinctly spoken discourse when one’s mind is elsewhere; or one does not see a jar in broad daylight when preoccupied by passion etc.

e. saukṣmyāt- (owing to subtility), e.g. the perception of minute atoms of smoke, water, snow, etc. in the sky.

f. vyavadhānāt- (owing to obstruction), e.g. the non-perception of things behind a wall (STK ad loc: the king’s wives are hidden by a wall).

g. abhibhavat- (owing to overpowering), e.g. the non-perception of the light of stars and planets in the daytime, when the sun is shining.

h. samāna-abhīhārāt- (owing to intermixture of like things), e.g. the non-perception of a pigeon among a flock of pigeons, or of beans, lotus or myrobalan flowers in heaps of the same; or of milk and water separately in a mixture of the two. (Sāṅkhya-Kārikā Comm. 7; and cf. Sarv. V., pp. 51-2).

In a different class from non-perception is erroneous perception, due to faulty vision, digestive disorders, swift movement, jaundice, and the like. Such erroneous cognitions will be discussed in Chap. IX ("Reality of Fiction"). Doubt (sāṃsāya) e.g. as to whether a distant object is a post or a man, may almos
be classed under "anupalabdhi owing to too great distance", but see "Reality of Fiction".

The logical application of the abhāva-pratyakṣa, the proof from non-existence, is restricted to cases where an object is missing from its accustomed place, and would be seen by a person with senses intact, were it present to sight. The Vedāntins and Mīmāṃsakas, who admit abhāva as a separate proof, insist that the non-perception of an object is as positive as the perception of it; but the other schools assert that our cognition of an absent object cannot logically be the cognition of that object, but only of the place which it formerly occupied. This involves an inferential process, in which we proceed from non-perception of an object as present to realisation of its absence. But one cannot help feeling that there is a positive perception of a thing's absence, even before one is conscious of its site; and though the schools which do not admit abhāva generally inclu it under inference, there is certainly a greater element of perception than of inference in the process. (See for instance Nyāyabhaṣya II,74-5: When a person is sent to fetch a non-blue cloth, he recognises it through the absence in it of blue colour.

We shall have occasion to discuss the question more fully in Chapter III, à propos of the jar (ghaṭa).

The pramāṇa of abhāva, then, is chiefly interesting in its capacity as corollary to pratyakṣa; and as illustration of the polarity of Indian philosophical thought. We find the same
polarity (or perhaps in this case rather "permutations and com­
binations") in the Jain doctrine of Syādvāda, which claims that
a thing may not only exist, or not exist, but may exist in a cer­
tain way, and at the same time not exist in a certain way, and
in relation to other things. That is to say, there are potential­
ities in all things, and it is wrong to assume that they have
a static existence or non-existence. This is only one of many
illustrations of the Indian tendency to consider a subject from
all angles. As Dr. Heimann has aptly said, "To the Indian mind
an object's sphere is a combination of innumerable sectors of
circles to which innumerable other things also belong" (Indian
and Western Philosophy, p. 91).

The remaining pramāṇas,— sambhava, aitihya, and cēṣṭā, may
quickly be disposed of. Sambhava, inclusion, may easily be
reduced to inference. Thus if we hear that a man has three
sons, we naturally infer that he has (at least) two; or else
the knowledge that small measures, e.g. a Drona, Ādhaka, or
Prastha, are included in a larger measure, e.g. a Khāri, is
explained by the Sāṅkhya as resulting from an inferential proces­
(STK 5). This may seem to us a totally unnecessary and childish
process; but we must remember the interminable Brāhma­nīc dis­
cussions about ritual, and the like, e.g. "If a man having two
sons is mentioned, will a father of three sons be debarred?".
Here again the inferential process is evidently based on a former
perception (or on a present perception, if we actually have the
man and his sons, or the smaller and larger measures, before us).

Aitihya, tradition, can also be reduced to inference, with the proviso that it is only valid when substantiated by fact. See STK 5; Nyāyasūtras (vṛtti) II,67). But here we are walking on thin ice. The Čārvākas (see above, p. 0 provided us with one argument in favour of regarding pratyakṣa as the sole ultimate pramāṇa and this seems to be another. If a self-respecting school of philosophers could solemnly maintain that their ancestors had discovered the presence of a goblin in a banyan-tree, and that therefore they inferred that it must still be there, what credence are we to attach to their view of anumāna? Surely this is simply pratyakṣa carried ad absurdum, in that not merely "credible" testimony, but also unreliable tradition, is accepted as a means of evidence?

Cestā, gesture, may also be reduced to inference, on the ground that it is not the actual gesture (e.g. a nodding of the head to indicate consent) which produces knowledge, but our understanding of what the person means by it. But we might just as well say that when someone assents by saying "Yes", this is not a perception, (not a cognition through the organ of hearing) but an inference, as we have had first to learn the meaning of the word "yes". Here there is a confusion between inference and instinct, such as is clearly exhibited in the passage of Brh. Up. Comm. (4,3,6) in which it is said that when we see
other people eat, we infer that we should eat too, as we shall
be kept alive by eating!

As Randle rightly points out ("Indian Logic", p. 311, and
in other places), there is a constantly recurring confusion
between logical grounds of knowledge and psychological causes
of knowledge. None of the pramāṇas, with the exception of praty-
aksā and anumāṇa, can be said to give a logical ground of know-
ledge; though some, such as upamāṇa, may serve a special and
useful purpose.

Having established the dependence of all pramāṇas on praty-
aksā and anumāṇa, can we now dispose of anumāṇa, and admit only
pratyakṣa? If we restrict pratyakṣa to the present, and to the
actual person collecting evidence, the answer is no. If we admit
the perceptions of people in the past, who may not even be known
to the subject, as well as the subject's own past perceptions,
then the answer is yes. To be more explicit: anumāṇa can be
reduced to pratyakṣa, with the proviso that it is a kind of
cumulative perception, the fruit of all past perceptions which
have been proved correct, or rather, the fruit of all past ob-
servations of the relation of cause and effect. The objection
to this statement will no doubt be that, as soon as a judgment
is made, as soon as the element of weighing or balancing possi-
bilities enters into the process, it ceases to be a pure per-
ception, and becomes an inference. But for that matter there is
no such thing as a pure perception. As soon as we have seen a
given thing more than once, a mental element enters into our perception; and if that mental element were not there, the perception would not be acceptable as a proof, for the person concerned would not be capable of passing judgment. One would hardly accept a baby's perception as a *pramāṇa*. It must be admitted that *all* perceptions may be reduced to inference just as well as inference may be reduced to perception,—and in the West the former alternative would probably hold. But because of the avowed predominance in India of *pratyakṣa*, and the firm belief in the infallibility of the senses, there the contrary process is, one feels, the right one.

The belief in the efficacy of perception must have been fostered by the conviction that there existed some material link or communion between the senses and the objects of sense. And, curiously, the normal belief is that it is not the senses themselves, but the sense-objects, which are active, and which throw out rays, or rather invisible yet cogent emanations, connecting them with the eye, the ear, and other senses. It is significant that these sense-objects are termed *atigrahas*, "over-graspers", whereas the senses are just *grahas*, "graspers"; and in the *Kātha Up.* (3,10) it is explicitly stated that the sense-objects are higher than the organs of sense. The organs, however, are not completely passive recipients of the subtle emanations,—they, too, emit a like substance, and the resultant material link between organ and object ensures the accuracy of the per-
ception. It is only when the link is destroyed by defects such as defective vision, that the senses are not to be trusted.

We must remember, however, that this was not the only theory of perception in ancient India. The lack of exact science at that period naturally meant that diverse speculations could flourish without fear of contradiction. For example, the orthodox Nyāya view was that, in visual perception, an invisible light-ray travelled out to the object (see Nyāyasūtras III, 28-45); while in hearing, waves of sound are transmitted to the ear. On the other hand, the Vedānta view, as expressed in Vedānta-paribhāṣa I, was that the organs of smell, taste and touch produce their perceptions while remaining in their own sites, while the organs of sight and hearing go out towards their own objects (the internal organ being modified in the form of those objects, see below, Chap. III). The organ of hearing can move out to its objects, because it consists of the all-pervading ether, limited by the ether in the auditory passage. (For further details, of other schools, see Sinha, Indian Psychology; Perception, Chap. I).

No matter which theory a philosopher subscribed to, he always believed in a material contact between organ and object, and one can gain some idea of the stress laid on this contact, by noting that Caraka and his followers held that there was only one sense-organ, that of touch. (see Nyāyasūtras III, 47 et seq.). Further, in the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika view, each sense-organ
is composed of its own particular element: smell, of earth; taste, of water, etc. (See Nyāyasūtras III,55).

The various theories of sense-perception lead us on to the consideration of the problem of matter and spirit, which figures prominently in Indian philosophy. The solution of this problem depends upon the standpoint taken, according as the one or the other is regarded as the most important predominant. For example: (a) In Jainism, karma, (the effects of past actions) is supposed to have a material influence, in the shape of subtle material substances (good or evil), which pass into the soul. Further, the soul itself is supposed to vary in size with the size of the body.

(b) In the Vaiśeṣika system, the atoms are not merely material facts, but they constitute metaphysical problems: atoms and elements are only the first emanations of the primaeval spirit; while on the other hand soul is a substance (one of the nine dravyāni).

(c) In the Sāṅkhya, matter and spirit (prakṛti and puruṣa) are equally important and equally eternal; but spirit is totally inactive, and the operations of thinking, willing, etc. are purely mechanical processes carried on by the internal organ,—an emanation of matter.

(d) The Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā provide us with many examples of a material conception of the sacrifice not only of material concrete things, but also of knowledge, hearing, breathing, and the like.
These examples will suffice to show that even in their highest flights of fancy, the Indians never quite severed themselves from the earth. In the early days, when the gods were held in awe, that awe never led the worshipper to regard them as eternal or omnipotent,—they were too concrete for that, and heavenly beings were (on a higher plane) as fallible as men (see e.g. Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 126 et seq. (Coomaraswamy): there was rebirth also among the gods).

Later, however, when pantheistic polytheism and kathenotheism had yielded place to monotheism or monism, the Indians evolved a kind of "transcendental materialism" (Betty Heimann) which, paradoxical as it may seem, led them to heights of mysticism unequalled elsewhere. Religion, as its name implies, should provide a link between God and man. As soon as rites have lost their imagery, and the Deity has become a mere abstraction, the value of the worship is gone. It is then (as happened in Upaniṣadic days) that rites give place to practices such as that of Yoga, with its restrictions (control of the breath, etc.) aiming, through complete mastery over the material body, at the attainment of spiritual absorption (in which there is still a sense of material contact—cf. the illustration at Br̥h. Up. 4,3,21 et seq.: "As a man fully embraced by his beloved wife knows nothing of what goes on in the world outside, likewise the Self when embraced by the Supreme Self (in suṣupti)."
It may be argued that the mental and physical condition which precedes and governs a trance must be the same whether in East or West. But the attitude towards the process of spiritual absorption is different. In the West, the subject realises that there must be a cessation of body-consciousness before the spiritual forces can have full play, i.e. the material factor must be eliminated as far as possible. In the East, the idea persists that it is the body which is the medium of the absorption i.e. that there is some material contact between the body, or the soul in the body, and the Absolute whose attainment is striven after; and it is with this idea that all sorts of postures and schooling of limbs and senses are practised. Moreover, the Yogin is advised to concentrate upon material objects, becoming progressively subtler and subtler, until finally, in the highest stage of all (which most devotees never reach), no object remains, and the trance is nirbija, "seedless". The Yogin was a recognised demonstrator of the power of mind over matter, and could materialise thought-forms at will (in thaumaturgy). It should be noted, further, that in the West the mystic is born, while in India there are schools of mysticism, for only with the aid of a teacher can one attain liberation (moksha). The standardisation of Yoga has had far-reaching results.

The second-sight of the Yogin is perhaps regarded as infallible, mainly because of the belief in material contact of soul and soul, which is the counterpart, on a higher level, of
the subtle link between sense-organ and sense-object. Thus it is that the greatest possible abstraction, - Nirvāṇa, - is actually more concrete than our notions of heaven and hell, which after all are figments of the imagination, comparable to fairy tales; for Nirvāṇa means simply absorption into, and identification with eternal or primaevul matter, - a merging into the ocean of being. And thus it is that this seeming abstraction is only to be grasped (i.e. made concrete) by an Indian mind, which sees no hard-and-fast line drawn between the material and the spiritual.
Chapter II. The Role of Alamkāra in Philosophy.

That poetics are allowed to be included in philosophy is a proof of the concrete and all-embracing nature of the Indian outlook. The art of poetics is regarded as a science, the pursuit of which has the four conventional aims of mankind,—dharma, artha, kāma, mokṣa,—in view. That is to say, true poetry can have practical as well as aesthetic value: it not only gives pleasure to the reader or hearer, but, rightly used, it constitutes one of the paths to liberation. Sarasvatī, goddess of wisdom, is also called Vāc, Word personified. The "light of speech" is often referred to, e.g.

"idam andham tamaḥ kṛtsnam jāyeta bhuvanatrayam
yadi śabdāhvayam jyotir ā samśāraṁ na dīpyate." (Kāvyād. I,4).

"These three worlds would relapse into blind darkness, if the light called speech did not shine till the end of time." It is not only with reference to poetry that the illuminatory powers of speech are mentioned; we shall also find such references when considering the various figures current in the philosophical systems proper.

What is the test of good poetry? It is not necessary for the poem to be in verse; not is all verse regarded as poetry: for there are many prose poems (e.g. Daśakumāracarita), while countless lawbooks and abstract treatises are couched in verse, as an aid to memory. It is significant that the Sanskrit equivalent
for "Ars Poetica" is Alāmkaśāstra, the "teaching of the ornaments" (i.e. poetical embellishments or figures, literal meaning "state of sufficiency, balance, rounding off, making perfect"). For the art of poetics has been developed to such an extent, and the poet's work circumscribed by so many rules regarding metre and rhetorical figures, that it is often impossible to see the wood for the trees. Poetry should deal with one or more of the so-called rasas or tāstas, sentiments, viz. vīra heroism, śṛngāra love, karuṇā pity, bhūḥtāsa disgust, raudra anger or fury, bhayānaka fear, hāsya mirth, adbhuta wonder, and (though this last is not accepted by all schools, and is of later development than the others) sānta contentment, tranquillity. The term sānta, in the religious sense, is applied to the man who has conquered all desire and is ripe for liberation; it is thus a requisite of the fourth aim, mokṣa.

But it stands to reason that poetry must in any case deal with emotions such as these, and it is not the rasas as such, but the alāmkaśāras themselves which determine the aesthetic value of a poem. Their importance may be measured by the fact that there are no fewer than 32 varieties of simile (to mention only one figure of speech) prescribed in the Kāvyādārśa. Most of the similes must perforce be concerned with the task of connecting man with his surroundings, the animals, plants, and planets. For instance, there are 25 different ways in which a
girl's face may be compared to a lotus. The only restrictions to the resultant concrete expressions are those dictated by decency or a sense of fitness, e.g. one should not compare a faithful servant to a dog. On the other hand, the poet may use metaphorically terms which he could not apply in the accepted sense. For example śthīv, and other words meaning "expectorate" may with propriety be applied to phenomena of nature, such as the sky, or flowers; or (just as in English) a cloud may be described as "pregnant", whereas one should not refer to a woman in that condition.

Here it may be well to note the amazing metaphorical potentialities of the Sanskrit language, which are well illustrated by the innumerable aleśas or puns (literally "intertwining, connecting") which abound throughout the literature. Even the simplest word may have twenty different meanings, all of which are employed to the full by the ambitious poet. Thus "go", an ox or cow, may also mean "anything coming from or appertaining to an ox or cow", e.g. milk, flesh, skin, hide, leather, strap, bow-string, sinew; while it has in addition such divergent meanings as "the herds of the sky" (the stars), rays of light, the sun, the moon, water, an organ of sense, the eye, a billion, the sky, a thunderbolt, the hairs of the body, a region of the sky, the earth (as the milch-cow of kings), a mother, speech, Sarasvatī, (goddess of speech); and it may also apply in a figurative derogatory sense to a stupid person, "an ox".
The Kvyādarśa (II.57 sq.) gives a significant list of the synonyms for "like". First we have comparative particles, such as iva, vad, yathā which have no secondary metaphorical sense. Not quite in their class is sama, level, even (and hence equal). Then we have a group of terms having reference to weights and measures: samāna, sammita, upamā, upamita, tulya, tulita; then words meaning image or illumination, such as nibha, san-nibha, samkāsa, nikāsa, prakāsa, pratibimba, ābha, praticchanda. Next, a group of terms referring to various common attributes, e.g. likeness of form (sarūpa, pratirūpaka); of appearance (sadrśa, sadṛkṣa), and colour (savarṇa); shading through less personal, more social aspects, denoting equality of birth (sajāṭīya) and country (deśya, desīya) to still more intangible and logical characteristics, e.g. samvādin and anuvādin, in agreement with (from logic or perhaps music ?), prakhya one who may be addressed in the same way, and salakṣaṇa having the same (logical) mark. Lastly, we have a group which once again illustrates the polarity of Indian thought: on the one hand sapakṣa on the other (friend, on the same side), pratīnidhi representative, and virodhin out of harmony with, pratipakṣa a match for, pratīdvandvin adversary, and pratyanīka vying with (bringing an army against).

So much for adverbial particles and adjectives (or nouns, - for nouns and adjectives are practically interchangeable
in Sanskrit). Of verbs expressive of likeness, the following are mentioned: spardhate rival; jayati conquer, dveṣṭi hate, druhyati threaten, and pratigarjati vie with (lit. roar against), all metaphors from the battle-field. In a narrower sense, i.e. in the home, we have ākroṣati scold, avajānāti despise, nindati blame, hasati laugh at, īryati and asūyati envy, niṣedhati forbid.

Then there are two denominatives, kadarthayati consider as a useless thing (lit. for what purpose?). and viḍambayati make an image of, mock. The only verb which has an agreeable sense is sandhatte harmonise (=join), be reconciled. It will be noticed that many of these terms imply not merely equality but superiority particularly those meaning despise, laugh at, regard as worthless.

Why is there less variety in the ideas expressed by the verbs enumerated above than in those expressed by their corresponding nouns? The answer may lie in the fact that a verb is naturally more dynamic than the (more pliable) noun. When dealing with verbs, we can no longer look at all the aspects of likeness such as we saw exhibited by the nouns, for most of those aspects are more or less static; the only dynamic idea in the entire list is that of rivalry, which is utilised to the full by the verbs, and which with the addition of the emotions of envy, mockery and contempt, and of the friendly action of combining,
forms the sphere of the expression of likeness in this group.

The implicit assumption of likeness in Bahuvrīhi compounds is too frequent a phenomenon to require much illustration; examples are sāsānka-vadana having a moonlike face; bāhulatā arm-creeper; padamboja lotus-foot. From compounds we pass on to phrases, e.g. tasya muṣṇāti saubhāgyam (she) steals its charm; tasya kāntim vilumpati (she) plunders its beauty; tena sārdham vigrnāti he contends with it; tulām tenādhirohāti he mounts the balance with it (or him); tatpadavyām padām dhatte he places his foot in his footsteps; tasya kakṣām vigāhate he plunges into its orbit or sphere; tamanveti he follows him; anubadhnāti tacchīlam he binds himself to (i.e. follows closely) his behaviour; tanniśedhate he suppresses (surpasses) him; and tasyānukaroti he imitates him.

Even a cursory glance at the above list will give some idea of the ornate and elaborate character of Sanskrit poetry; and a consideration of the Alamkāras, or "ornamentations" only serves to deepen this impression. It has already been mentioned that, according to Dāndin (Kāvyādarśa), there are 32 different kinds of upamā or simile. Thus for example we have the vastupamā a comparison in which the common quality is omitted, e.g. "Thy face is (beautiful) like a lotus"; vikriyopamā a simile in which the object of comparison is regarded as produced from that to which it is compared, e.g. "Thy face, O fair one, seems to be
cut out from the disc of the moon, or from the centre of a lotus"; hetūpamā a simile accompanied by reasons, e.g. "You, O King, imitate the moon by reason of your lovableness, the sun by your splendour, the ocean by your steadfastness"; tulayogopamā, combination of equal qualities (of unequal objects), as when a king is compared to Indra, by reasons of his fighting prowess. By way of variation we have the viparyāsopamā, inverted comparison, in which the relation between upamāma and upameya, object and subject of comparison, is reversed; e.g. "The lotus is like your face"; the asambhāvitopamā, simile implying an impossibility, as "a harsh word from that mouth would be like poison from the moon's disc (instead of nectar) or fire from sandal"; abhūtopamā, something that has not happened, as "your face gleams as if the essence of all the glory of lotuses had been collected together"; pratiṣedhopamā, a comparison expressed in the form of a prohibition: "The moon cannot compete with your face, for it is tainted (with spots) and cold (or stupid)". The virodhopamā, or comparison founded on opposition, is illustrated as follows: "The lotus, the autumn moon, and your face, - this triad is mutually opposed". Then we have the praśamsopamā, or laudatory comparison: "Brahmā was born from a lotus and the moon adorns Śiva's forehead; yet your face is equal to these". The opposite of this is the nindopamā, a simile involving reproof: "The lotus has much pollen (or the
quality of rajas, passion); the moon is subject to consumption (waning); therefore your face, though equal to them (as regards other qualities) is really superior. The simile implying a doubt, saṃśayopamā, is as follows: "Is this a lotus with a bee moving inside it, or is it your face, with its wavering glance?"

It will be seen that doubt, to become a poetical figure, must not be the doubt which arises from circumstances, such as the common example "Is this a post or a man?" It must be "a doubt raised by the imagination (pratibhā) of the poet" (Keith). The atiśayopamā, hyperbole, is a favourite figure: "Your face is a part of you, and the moon is in the sky - there is no other difference between the two." Then we have the complementary pair of similes, niyamopamā and aniyamopamā, restricted and unrestricted comparisons: "Your face is equal to the lotus and to nothing else"; and "Your face imitates the lotus, and it may imitate anything else, if (a worthy object of imitation) exists." The mutual (anyonya) upamā, as a final example, brings out the good qualities of both upamā and upameya: "Your face is like the lotus, and the lotus is like your face."

This does not exhaust the list of upamās, but it is fairly representative, and once more shows the polarity, love of juxta-position, confusion of reality and fiction, and mixture of logical and psychological arguments which we saw from the consideration of the pramānas. When a girl's face is to be compared
with a beautiful object such as a lotus or the moon, the Indian poet is by no means satisfied with saying "your face is beautiful like the moon (or lotus)" or even "your face is, as it were, of the very substance of the moon". No: the various known or imagined, actual or mythological, attributes of the moon are gathered together, and pressed into use: not only its waxing and waning, its shining, and its coldness; but also its spots, regarded as taints, or as the mark of the hare or deer, and the fact that it is supposed to have been worn on Śiva's forehead, and to consist of nectar which is drunk by the gods. These qualities, some of which may be regarded as faults, give endless scope for comparisons, some of which emphasise the lofty nature, and others the defects of the upamāṇa, but all of which are designed to flatter the upameya, the subject of the comparison.

The rūpaka, or metaphor, is described as an upamā with the particle iva or vat omitted. It has almost as many varieties as the upamā, and some of them correspond, e.g. the heturūpaka, or metaphor accompanied by reasons, as when a king is a mountain because of his dignity (or heaviness); the sea because of his depth (profondity of character); and the wishing-tree because he grants desires to people. Here, as so often, we see the important role played by ślegas or puns, without which no poem worthy of the name would be complete,
and for which the Sanskrit language gives such scope.

We have already seen how many meanings one word can have; let us now glance at a selection of synonyms for common phenomena. The moon, for example, is known as candra, candramā, candramasa (from cand, shine, be bright); indu (originally "drop", "bright drop", "spark"—this was applied only to the moon in the Brāhmaṇa, but later to Soma juice, and hence the confusion of the two ideas later); āvēṭārcīśa, āvēṭāṁśu, cold-rayed (in contrast to the sun); saśin, saśāṅka, saśa-lāṅchana, and maṅgāṅkita, "hare- or deer-marked", alluding to the spots, our "man in the moon". This by no means exhausts the list of synonyms, but it gives some idea of their possibilities.

There is an even greater variety of terms for "lotus"; though we must remember that a number of these terms are simply names for the different varieties of flower, and have no particular metaphorical significance. For example: utpala and puśkara, (lotus in general); kamala, pink lotus (from kam, to love,—there is no doubt a symbolic reason for applying this term to a pink or red lotus); padma, white lotus; tāmarasa and kairava, day and night lotuses (for the former, cf. tāmra, copper. The night lotus is white. It is noteworthy that these two distinct varieties of flower should correspond in colour to the sun and moon respectively, and thus foster the belief in the mythical
friendship between day-lotus and sun, and night-lotus and moon; indīvara, blue lotus (also: nilotpala, asitotpala). Then we have a group of terms which refer to the especial characteristics of the lotus: rājīva, streaked or striped; nalinī (from nala, reed, because of its hollow stalk); satapatra, the hundred-leaved; aravinda (from ara, spoke, alluding to its wheel-shape); bisinī, having filaments. Further, bakasamavāsin, living in the same place as the crane; and kumuda, "exciting what joy?", a reference to its aesthetic value. A number of words refer to its place of origin, eg. ambhoja, ambhoruha, paṅkaja, saroja, vanaja, ambuja, amburuha, abja, nīraja (water-born, water-grown, lake-born, wood-born, etc.).

The synonyms for "bee" are interesting. First we have bhṛṅga and bhramara, "wanderer" (though perhaps bhṛṅga is also onomatopoetic, referring to the buzzing); and, from bhramara, the curious term dvirepha, the creature with two r's in its name. Other aspects of the insect are expressed by ali, "the creature with a sting"; madhukara, "honey-maker", madhupa, "honey-drinker", and madhuvrata, "devoted to honey"; and satpada, "having six feet".

The sun cannot be said to have captured the Indian imagination to the same extent as the moon. Apart from one or two names of deities identified with it, such as
Sūrya, Savitṛ, Puṣan, Āditya, its light and heat are practically the only qualities referred to. For example: tapana, bhāsvant, bhāskara, bhānu, bhāsāṁ nidhi, (abode of light or lustres), candakara and uṣṇāṃśu (hot-rayed: the antithesis of śiśirāṃśu, the moon), and simply amśumāt, having rays. The sun's function as bringer of day is indicated by the terms divākara, dinakara, dinapati and divaseśvara (lord of day); dyumanī, jewel of day. More obscure terms are arka (arc, meaning praise, adorn, shine), ravi (possibly from ru, roar?), mihira (=Avestan Mithra?), and ina, strong, mighty. With arka, cf. rājā, king, and tejas, splendour. That which śines is praiseworthy and powerful. (For etymologies of "sun" synonyms, cf. Chānd. Up. I,2; I,4, VI,8, etc.; Maitrī Up. VI,7).

Synonyms for "cloud" abound, and refer almost exclusively to its two functions, namely obstructing (ghanā, abhṛa), and (most important) the giving of water: m megha, ambhoda, dhārādhara, jalada, jalamuc, payoda, pāthodhara, payodhara, jaladhara (allending in derivatives of verbs expressing the ideas "hold", "give", or "release"). Then we have parjanya, rain-cloud, of doubtful etymology, possibly connected with pṛc, give lavishly, or pṛj, and perhaps ultimately from pṛ, to fill (or "speckled"); and jīmūta, also meaning a rain-cloud.
The words for "sea" to some extent correspond to those for "cloud", since both are holders of water. Thus we have ambudhi, udadhi, vāridhi, abdhi, samudra ("gathering together of waters"), jaladhi, varāṇ nidhi ("abode of waters"), jalanidhi, toyadhi, payodhi, ambhonidhi, pāthodhi, vārdhi, udanvat, sindhu (flowing). Further, jalarāṣṭi and amburāṣṭi, "heap of water"; arṇava (having waves? Probably from ṛ, go). More metaphysical expressions are akūpāra (unbounded), and ratnākara, home of gems. The ocean is also known as Sāgara, after Sagara (sa-gara, "with poison", - this may have some reference to the mythical churning of the ocean); and is frequently referred to as the lord of rivers- srotāppati, nadiśa, payasāṃ nātha.

As a final example let us take the earth,- so very important in an agricultural community. It is "the broad one"- prthvī, prthivī, īrvī; or "great"-mahī. Or it is "the bearer, supporter", dhara, dharanī, or "abode, dwelling", kṣiti; "the patient one", kṣama, or kṣama, because it submits to tilling; "immovable, solid"-kṣoni, kṣauni. Then we have references to its fertility, and the giving of treasure, whether as food or as precious stones: medini (having fatness or fertility), vasudhā, vasuṃatī, vasuṃdhara. Lastly, bhū and bhūmi, bhuvana, from bhū, to become, (since earth is ever changing).

From these examples it will be evident that Sanskrit was
a language peculiarly suited to poetic development, and particularly rich in fancies. It was no accident that Word was deified; and that the art of poetry was incorporated into the study of philosophy. And when we find terms which in any other language would be restricted to poetry, e.g. mahīdhara (mountain = "bearer of the earth"), or mṛgāṅkita (moon = "deer-marked") appearing in dull logical treatises, we are bound to admit that words in India are real bearers of meanings,—they are live things, concrete, dynamic.

It is well-known that primitive people cannot grasp the conception of genus. They may have terms for red cow, black cow, etc., but no term for cow in general. In the same way one may be tempted to call the highly developed Indian tendency to specialise,—to dwell on one aspect of a thing at a time,—a survival of the primitive. And, to the extent that Indian culture has developed from a primitive to an advanced stage with little or no interference from outside, and has therefore exhibited a marked conservatism of ideas, and an unwillingness to discard beliefs and turns of phrase, (See above, Ch. I, p. 12) this is no doubt true. Mythological and metaphorical expressions for natural phenomena, etc., which were invented in the Rigvedic age, were still in current use among poets three thousand years later, even though these poets had devised new terms of their
own as well. But to accuse the Indian people of inability to classify would be ludicrous. Classification with them became a passion, and was extended to all fields of learning: philosophy (cf. the names of the systems, e.g. Sāṅkhya, "enumeration"; Vaiṣeṣika, the system relating to differences or distinctions); cosmogony (3 or 7 worlds); grammar, which like poetics was regarded as a branch of philosophy. The Sanskrit alphabet alone is evidence of an instinct for orderly arrangement which we at our advanced stage have not yet reached. We may note, further, that the Indians had a method of classification according to principles strange to us. They frequently classified not according to species, but according to other distinctive characteristics, e.g. colour, shape, motion or the lack of it. And even a proper name can be replaced at will by a synonym (e.g. Kaṇāda, Kaṇabhuja, Kaṇabhakṣa). (See Betty Heimann, Zur Indischen Namenkunde, Studia Indo-Iranica, Ehrengabe für Wilh. Geiger, 1931).

We are therefore justified in concluding that the wealth of synonyms which may be observed on any page of Indian poetry is a natural consequence of a distinctive tendency to look at an object from all possible angles, to gather up all its separate parts, and fit them together to form a complete whole,—a whole which is the more complete because
it is the more concrete, i.e., because each of its parts has been separately examined and grasped before it joins the rest to form the finished picture. It is significant that in logic (Nyāya philosophy) a thing consisting of sixteen parts is regarded as in reality consisting of seventeen (sixteen parts and the whole). Cf. Oldenberg, _Weltanschauung der Bühnenwirkung_, p. 49 et seq., esp. p. 49, _Sonderanmerkung_ 2.

In India, then, words give more rational associations than their more abstract counterparts in the West, and therefore they survive more. Instead of being liable to be supplanted by a more popular synonym, a Sanskrit word has an unlimited span of life; and the Mīmāṃsā idea of the eternity of sound was based not so much on a knowledge of the character of the ether, as on an appreciation of the sanctity of Word. It is common knowledge that oral tradition has had a greater rôle in India than perhaps in any other country: the necessity for preserving the Vedic texts syllable for syllable, without committing them to writing, sharpened the memory, and at the same time instilled into the listener an awe at the wonder of words. (For the "spōṭa" theory, see e.g. Sarv. XII, XIII; and cf. Chap. VIII below).

The theory of dhvani, "tone, sound" as applied to poetics, lays stress on a more subtle function of words and sounds. This theory in its full development belongs
to a fairly late stage (about 820 A.D.), and was expounded by Anandavardhana. The gist of it is that the unexpressed meaning of a poem is of more importance than the expressed meaning. This applies to metaphors, and also to words which have a double sense, and can accordingly be employed in šleṣas (e.g. kara, which means ray (of the sun), or hand, or tax). This is the rational sense of dhvani; in the irrational or instinctive sense it applies to the use of metres and sounds which fit the subject-matter, and by satisfying the critical ear, help to mould the poem into a perfect whole. A threefold division of poetry is laid down. First, true poetry, which the implied meaning is of greater prominence than that which is expressed; second, medium poetry, in which the implied meaning is of secondary importance, and only serves to fill out and embellish that which is expressed; and third, the least valuable poetry, which relies on fine language and various embellishments alone. This doctrine is of interest in that it crystallises the marked fondness for šleṣas or puns which has already been observed, and which is yet another example (as its very name shows) of the co-ordinating tendency which refuses to look upon any phenomenon as single and separate, and which seeks to knit together heaven and earth, and all that therein is, into one whole.
Let us consider one or two instances of śleṣas. Kāvyād. 2,87 demonstrates the śliṣṭa-rūpakam, or punning metaphor:

rājahamsopabhogārham bhramaraprārthyasaurabham sakhi vaktrāmbujam idaṃ tava.

This means (1) Your lotus-face is fit to be enjoyed by excellent kings, and its fārg fragrance is desirable to young men. (2) Your lotus-face (the stress this time being on lotus) is fit to be eaten by the king-swans, and its perfume is desired by the bees.

A pure śleṣa, without an obvious metaphor, is, for example:

atyacchenāviruddhena suvṛttanāticāruṇā
antarbhinnena samprāptamauktikenāpi bandhanam. (Böhtlingk, Sprüche I,165).

This means (1) Even a transparent, unimpeded, well-rounded, lovely pearl becomes bound (upon a string) when it is pierced. (2) Even one who is striving after emancipation, who is very pure, not at strife with anyone, of good conduct and well-esteemed, is bound (by earthly ties) when he is divided in himself.

Finally, a śleṣa which depends for its effect on a different dividing up of words and syllables, and accordingly almost trespasses on the ground of sabdālahākāras, figures of sound, as opposed to arthālahākāras, figures of sense:

akṣamālāpavṛttijñā kuśāsanaparigrāhā
brāhmīva daurjanī saṃsād vandanīyā samekhālā (same khalā).

(Böhtlingk, Sprüche I,52).

"An assembly of rogues should be greeted respectfully, as well as an assembly of Brahmins, for it knows when the rosary is at an end.
(or: it knows how to live by envious talk), takes a seat of Kusa gmass (or assimilates bad teachings), and wears the girdle (of a Brahman) (or: is malicious towards a good person).

This leads us on to glance at the sabdalamkara proper, whose chief representative is the yamaka (literally: twin), paronoma-sia, or the repetition in the same stanza of words or syllables similar in sound but different in meaning. For example:

vāraṇo vā raṇoddāmo hayo vā smara durdharaḥ

na yato nayato 'ntam nastadaho vikramastava (Kavyād. 3,9)

"We are astonished, O god of love, at your bravery, in that you lead us to death, although you possess neither an elephant which is eager for battle, nor an unrestrainable horse." This is only a very simple and elementary example of the figure which is sometimes carried to unbelievable lengths.

Wherever we look, we are driven to the same conclusion; we are always confronted with different aspects of the ever-present love of coordination and combination, and the tendency to look on words as live and concrete objects which may be juggled with at will. Indeed, the right use of words is a means of reaching heaven with distinction as indicated in Sarv.XIII, p. 113: "Those who use words rightly go to hemben in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech. Those who speak haltingly must go on foot."
Chapter III.

Two standard symbols: Jar and Cloth.

Having given a general account of the pramânas and their significance and having considered the rôle of figures of speech in poetics, let us now turn to the philosophical texts proper and examine upamā as pramāna. It is difficult to separate texts and commentaries, as the latter are necessarily dependent on the former, but although it would involve too much repetition to make a hard and fast division between them, yet we must realise the distinct character of the two styles. The texts themselves are, in varying degrees, original compositions, succinct and unelaborated, and often somewhat obscure. It is the task of the commentaries to elucidate and enlarge upon the texts; accordingly it is here that we may expect to find the greatest number of comparisons which bring the philosophical speculations into line with daily life. A commentary, since its function is to explain and clarify, is necessarily concrete in its approach (though we must not ignore the paradox that some commentaries are so involved and abstruse that they in their turn require a commentary before they can be understood!), and the commentary habit is in a great measure responsible for the number of illustrations from daily life which abound in Sanskrit philosophical literature.

But this is not all. The commentaries follow the texts and introduce examples to elucidate the texts, it is true; but unless the texts themselves had set the example by introducing concrete
illustrations, this practice would probably not have developed to any extent. And once the ball had been set rolling it could not stop but was given an impetus by writer after writer, and commentator after commentator, each of them eager to stress some fresh aspect of an example or to use it to worst an opponent.

Here we can see wheels moving within wheels: not only are the controversial speculations themselves subjects of discussion among the different schools, but also the concrete examples. In the main there was a tendency to transfer the attention from the original object to the stock example which had been chosen to represent it. This tendency had its advantages and its disadvantages. On the one hand, it helped to popularise philosophy and to inculcate truths which would otherwise have remained restricted; but on the other hand, it often tended to obscure the issue by encouraging people to dwell on one aspect of a thing at the expense of the others. For it stands to reason that a metaphor or simile is necessarily limited in its application. For instance, there is the favourite formula: "The earth must have had a maker, for it has the nature of an effect, like a jar." We can see at once where this example is defective: it takes no account of the fact that the earth is a live, evolving thing, while the jar is inanimate and static.

Let us now examine the examples that occur in the texts, starting with those which occur most frequently and may be said
to be the common property of all the systems.

The article which more than all others has, not captured the imagination perhaps, but attracted the attention of the logicians, has already been mentioned, the jar. The philosophers of all the schools constantly take the jar as an example, almost regardless of what it is that they wish to illustrate. The general and obvious qualities which are dwelt on are its material nature, its perceptibility, the fact that it is a product or effect (clay being the cause) and, as such, both in space and in duration, and that, being produced from the unconscious, inanimate clay, it is itself unconscious and inanimate (Śāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. 1:11: as vyaktam is insensible, likewise pradhānam). These are the jar's common, objective qualities about which most schools are agreed.

Let us now see how the various schools use this example to illustrate their particular theories and aspects of outlook. The most engrossing point of view is the ontological one, the relation of cause and effect. The Śāṅkhya school is particularly explicit on this subject. From one standpoint the effect (i.e. the jar) does not differ from the cause (i.e. the clay), cp. Brh. Up. 1,6,1. For the material is the same in both cases, and one could not exist without the other. But it is also emphasized that the jar, as effect, has a different function from the clay, as cause. The jar arises from the clay, not the clay...
from the jar, and a lump of clay cannot hold liquid (curds, honey, water), as a jar can (Sāṅkhyakār. Comm. 15; cp. N.S. II. 33, holding and pulling). This apparently contradicts the assertion of the superiority of avyakta over vyakta, but is an example of the usefulness of the concrete manifested object, as opposed to the unmanifested, shapeless basic material.

When two things are different from one another, they do not stand in the relation of material cause and material product, e.g. a jar and a cloth which are negations of one another. Things which are inseparably connected with certain special characteristics have as material cause something avyakta (ununfolded, undifferentiated) which has these characteristics latent in it. Thus e.g. clay contains the characteristics necessary to a jar, and unbeaten gold contains those which will be manifested in a diadem or earrings.

Here we have a striking illustration. Just as the limbs of a tortoise appear and disappear as the tortoise extends or contracts them, but the limbs are not different from the body and are not destroyed when they are withdrawn from our sight, so it is with the jat, the diadem, and all other special forms (vikāras) of clay or gold (and likewise with the successive evolutions of prakṛti). When they come out, i.e. are manifested, we say "they arise", when they go in, i.e. vanish from our ken, we say "they are destroyed". But in reality there
can be no manifestation of unreal objects, nor destruction of real ones:

"nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ" (BhG II,16; cf. ibid II,58; and Kṣurikā Up. III). And as the tortoise is not different from its contracting and expanding limbs, so the jar, diadem, etc., are not different from the clay or the gold. (Sāṅkhya-tattvākaumudi 9; and see ibid 15).

This question, "Does the existent arise from the existent, or from the non-existent?" or "Does the effect exist prior to its manifestation, or not?" was one of the basic problems which occupied all philosophical schools. The jar is, by common consent, the object which is taken as a cosmogonic symbol to illustrate the rival theories of sat-kārya and asat-kārya.

The Nihilist asserts that a jar does not exist before its manifestation, and deduces that there was nothing before the origin of the world. If existence were the true nature of a jar, says he, then the activity of the potter would be superfluous. The same would apply if non-existence were its nature. And "both existence and non-existence" and "neither existence nor non-existence" may be rejected as mutually contradictory. Therefore everything is void (śūnya). (Sarv. II, p. 11).

The Naiyāyika admits that, although the effect (jar) is not manifest, yet the cause (clay) is not non-existent;
but he maintains that the jar is not produced without destroying the lump of clay. The follower of the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya schools replies that it is only the form that is changed, not the material; the effect must exist before its manifestation, for nothing can come out of nothing. A further proof (sic!) of the pre-existence of an effect is the fact that the knowledge of gods and yogins regarding a future jar is infallible: i.e. as a superior being can visualise a jar as existing in the future, that same jar cannot be entirely non-existent in the present. From a more realistic point of view, most schools say that when we see a jar in process of being made, we can safely assume its future existence (e.g. vr̥tti on NS II,180; VS VII,2,17), for the internal organ functions in all three times,- in contrast to the senses of a normal person, which only function in the present (Sāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. 33). The Buddhist kṣaṇikavādin, however, does not admit a judgment regarding a future jar.

Clay is not the only material which is necessary for the making of a jar; and another Sāṅkhya proof for the pre-existence of an effect is "the possibility of a skilled person's producing things". For instance, a potter, by using clay, wheel, stick, iron filings, rope, water, etc., is able to produce a jar out of a lump of clay (Sāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. 9); and these materials cannot manifest the
jar without the intervention of the independent potter. Similarly, according to the Yoga system, it is not the Puruṣa's aim (puruṣa-artha) that sets the creative causes in motion, but Īśvara (Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras IV, 3).

But, in the Indian view, there are exceptions to the rule that to make a jar one must have materials. In Chapter VIII of Sarv. ("recognitive" system) it is stated that Śiva can create the world by his will alone; and further, that the jar produced by yogins, without clay or other materials, serves the same purpose as the jar which comes from clay. Accordingly the clay, etc., cannot be regarded as the efficient cause of the jar, for it is not indispensable to its production. On the contrary, it is the will of the producer that is the chief factor. And it should not be objected that the yogin actually sets atoms in motion when he exercises his volition,—for even then we should lack the other materials, potter's wheel and stick, etc. (Sarv. VIII, pp. 77-8). The point is noteworthy, for it is an outstanding example of emphasis on the concrete, when even what we should term "figments of the imagination",—the products of the volition of a supernormal person,—can serve their purpose as tangible objects in every-day life. (Cf. the Vedāntin's views on dream-consciousness, especially à propos of chariots etc., below, Chapter IV).
Turning to a specific theory of the Sāṅkhya school, we find that the three gunas (qualities) which together, in their state of equipoise, constitute prakṛti, give rise to each other, as the clay gives rise to the jar (Sāṅkhya-kārikā 12); and as the jar is a vikāra (modification) of clay, so the different elements, etc., are vikāras of prakṛti. The five gross elements and the eleven senses (jñāna-indriyāṇi, karma-indriyāṇi, and manas) are only modifications, not basic forms. And a jar, a cow, a tree, etc., in their turn are modifications of the element earth, and do not constitute a separate principle from that of earth, any more than their own vikāras, milk, seed, etc., and further vikāras, curds, shoot, etc., differ materially from the original (Sāṅkhya-tattvavākṣyam 3). For, as far as their bodies are concerned, cow, jar, etc., although distinct, have the common qualities of being material and perceptible to the senses, and are therefore grouped together, in contrast to puruṣa, soul, which is not a vikāra.

With the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the jar is the stock example in connection with the atom theory. Each object is made up, according to its own nature, of different collections of atoms, which are not perceptible individually, but which assume perceptibility when massed into a complete whole, e.g. a jar (Nyāyasūtras II, 34 (vṛttī). This whole,
according to the Naiyāyika, is an entity which has its own special nature, apart from the characteristics of its parts. The Sanskrit term for whole is significant, for it epitomises the Indian outlook: "avayavin", "having limbs or parts" (See above, Chap. II). When a jar is fired, the Naiyāyikas maintain that there is simply a change of colour, i.e. the red jar becomes a black jar; but the Vaiṣeṣika view is that there is a change in each separate atom during the baking process (See e.g. vṛtti on Nyāyasūtras II,40-1; also III,115-6; 138; IV,5; IV,63. In the latter passage, the change of colour is an analogy for the throwing off of the bonds of kleśa, which need not be permanent).

An example of emphasis on the concrete is the controversy between the different schools on the subject of the jar's development. In the first place, it is evident that there is a distinct succession of evolution in the various stages between the appearance of the lump of clay and the manifestation of the completed jar. It is evident also that there is an inverse process of evolution when the jar is broken, the complete succession being as follows: powdered clay > lump of clay > jar > potsherd. Here each change is independent of the preceding one, and is perceptible to the senses. But what of the life of a jar between its manifestation and its destruction?
The Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools hold that a jar begins to grow old as soon as it leaves the potter's hands. Theirs is the doctrine of parināma or constant change; and the Jains, from their relativity standpoint, are substantially in agreement with this idea of permanence-in-change.

The Buddhists go further, and use the jar as an example for their theory of kṣaṇikatva, "momentariness". According to them, a jar at one moment is completely distinct from the jar of the next moment, which is simply its successor; and origination is the sole cause of destruction, for from the moment of its manifestation the jar travels steadily on the road to decomposition. The Naiyāyikas strive to overthrow this contention by saying "There can be no doubt as to constancy (of objects), nor as to perception... and the same proof which establishes the oneness of the object during a moment also establishes it during a longer period."

This is in reply to the Buddhist refutation of the plea of recognition ("This is the jar I saw yesterday") on the ground that there is a doubt as to its being the same jar. The Naiyāyika from the logical point of view says that if this kṣaṇikatva involves a jump from moment to moment, but a static condition during each moment, then the jar may just as well remain static in composition for a longer period. He adds: "A jar, e.g., is one and the same, not
different, even when it exists in different moments,—
just as there is no restriction on the association of one
cognition (jñāna) with different objects,—for it is
associated with different times through dependence on the
succession of different causes." (Kusumāṇjali I,17, Comm.
 cf. also NBT p. 49 etc.)

Turning to metaphysics, we find that the Naiyāyika
uses the jar as a proof for the existence of a soul. He
says: Since we see that the jar is always found where the
clay or the two halves are, and is never found in the
absence of the material, we learn that an effect must have
a (material) cause. Hence by rejecting earth and other
elements as the material cause of qualities such as knowledge,
desire, and the like, we establish that they must have
a cause other than the gross elements,—i.e. soul (Ātman).
Alternatively, we can employ the argument from negative
instances: "that which is not a half-jar, or a lump of clay,
has no jar connected with it by intimate relation; and
similarly, that which is not soul (Ātman) has no knowledge,
etc., connected with it." (Kusumāṇjali Comm. I,19).

The Vedāntin exponent of non-duality says that as
clay is the essence of various sorts of jar, so all beings
are modifications of the indivisible Brahman; any supposed
differences in the Universal Self belong only to "name and
form", and in reality a jar, a cloth, a cow, a tree, are
but different names of the Supreme Spirit which dwells in all (cf. Ch. Up. 6,1,4: "As by one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known,—every distinction (vikāra) being a modification of speech (vācārambhanam), a name,—and the clay being the only reality..." (likewise the Self is in all). This doctrine was later carried to its logical extreme, when the entire empirical world was regarded as unreal, when contrasted with the sole transcendental reality, Brahman. For example, in Vedāntaparibhāṣā I:
The rejection of jars etc. as unreal follows upon realisation of Brahman, i.e. for the purpose of everyday activity, we must accept material objects as virtually real; but when enlightenment is attained, it is realised that nothing has a real existence apart from Brahman.

One of the chief objections to the deduction that the earth (or the seas, mountains, etc.) must have had an intelligent creator, since it has the nature of an effect, like a jar (see above, p.48) is that if the analogy is carried further, and the maker is assumed to have a body, like the potter, then he cannot be supposed to be omnipotent or omniscient. This argument is debated at great length among the Nyāya and other schools (see e.g. Kusumāṇḍjali V,1; Syādv. St. VI, pp. 21-4; Sarv. VII, pp. 67-8). One way out of the difficulty is that propounded in the Kusumāṇḍjali, I,4,
where the existence of a God who supervises the working of merit and demerit is sought to be established. "But," says an objector, "if the cause of a jar, etc., were eternal, there would be the (undesired) result that the jar etc. would also be eternal; therefore we must assume the jar's cause to be itself only occasional (kādācītiki), and this would involve an uninterrupted succession of occasional causes (each dependent on its previous cause)." To meet this objection of a regressus in infinitum, the Naiyāyika adduces the example of the seed and the shoot, i.e. the eternity of succession of cause and effect (an allowable regressus in inf.- see below, Chapter VII).

In the Vedānta view, the jar is an object of the projection of mind. That is to say, the mind, through a mode or vṛtti, projects itself through the eye and assumes the form of the jar (See Vedāntaparibhāṣā I; esp. pp. 178-9;). This action is further compared to the function of a lamp, which manifests the jar, and at the same time dispels the darkness enveloping it. In the same way the intellect and its underlying consciousness both come into contact with the jar: the intellect destroys the ignorance regarding it, while the discriminative consciousness (viveka) manifests it (Pañcadasī 7,91). (With this, contrast the Buddhist Viśṇa-vādin's view that everything is consciousness alone, and
that there are no external objects. See below, p.64).

The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that after the cognition of a jar has taken place, a quality called "cognisedness" (jñātatā) is produced in the jar. They apply the rule that an action must produce some effect on its object, and therefore deduce that the action of cognition must do likewise. The Naiyāyika overthrows this contention, mainly on the ground that there is no visible effect produced on the jar by its contact with the sense-organs; and further, action implies motion (spandana), and cognition is not a motion. The Nyāya view is that it is the cognition alone which distinguished the particular knowledge of the jar, and not any surmised qualities such as "jñātatā" (Kusum. Comm. IV, 3-4). The Mīmāṃsaka theory is noteworthy, however, as evidence of the concrete connection between sense-organ and sense-object.

Because the jar is gross and easily perceptible, it is conversely used to illustrate non-perception, i.e. when all the conditions of perceptibility are present, and the jar is still not perceived, it must be absent. This is with reference to abhāva, as distinct from anupalabdhi (non-perception owing to defects of sense etc.), for which see Chap. I above. We first imagine the jar as present in a certain spot, and then realise that it is absent; accordingly
our negative judgment is preceded and conditioned by a positive one (See e.g. NBT II, pp. 32-4; III, p. 58, p. 87, etc.). The schools which do not recognise abhāva as a separate proof (pramāṇa), e.g. the Sāṅkhya and Nyāya schools, seek to include it under perception or inference. The Sāṅkhya takes the cognition of a jar's absence to equal the cognition of the bare patch of ground on which it formerly stood. The argument is as follows: "Abhāva is simply pratyakṣa. The "non-existence" of a jar on a patch of ground is nothing but the particular modification of the ground which can be called its "being alone"; for everything, except puruṣa, is subject to modification every moment." This modification of the ground can be grasped by the senses, hence there is no need for a separate pramāṇa. The Naiyāyika works from the angle of the jar, not of the patch of ground. In replying to the Čārvāka's statement ("Just as we conclude that a jar is not existent when it is absent from a given patch of ground, so we conclude that God is not existence, because we cannot see him" (Kusum. III,1, introduction)), he says "Non-perception cannot preclude the existence of God; moreover it is not a distinct proof at all." He argues that the cognition of the jar's absence is preceded by a non-perception of which we are ourselves unconscious, and therefore it is a case of perception. If, on the other hand, the cognition were preceded
by a conscious non-perception, it would be a case of inference. We cannot say that the senses are occupied in the perception of the patch of ground, for just as the ear can detect the cessation of sound in the ether, without a perception of its substratum, the ether, so the eye can detect the absence of form, without a separate cognition of its substratum (Kusum. Comm. III, 20).

The Naiyāyika does not, however, deny that the patch of ground has its part to play in the cognition; he merely emphasises that the senses are the true cause of the cognition. The perception of the substratum is inseparable from the function (vyāpāra) of the senses—otherwise the eye, etc. would be superfluous. He further postulates a certain intimate relation between the jar's absence and its substratum, and establishes his contention that abhāva is simply perception, by stating that the relation between the eye and its object, which is necessary in every act of perception, is here fulfilled by this svarūpa relation between the spot of ground and the absence (of the jar) (Kusum. Comm. III, 212-2).

Those schools which admit abhāva as a separate pramāṇa (Vedānta and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā) hold that the evidence which causes the apprehension of non-existence in the ground is non-perception, not perception; for we cannot see that which is absent (sc. the jar), nor can the perception of the patch
of ground be said to lead to the inference of the jar's absence. We are aware that we do not perceive the jar, before we cognise the ground as possessing the jar's absence. (See e.g. Kusum. Comm. III,22, Introduction).

From whichever angle we regard the cognition of non-existence, it is evident that a good deal depends on the imagination, which is carried to the extreme by the Buddhist logician when he says: "When we wish to deny the identity of a visible object, such as a jar, with another object, it does not matter whether the latter is perceptible or not. For example, if we wish to arrive at the judgment, "This is a jar, it is not a demon (piśāca), we must first imagine the demon as visible, and then deny its identity with the perceptible jar." (See NBT II, p. 38).

With regard to the jar's relation to other things, it is often mentioned in connection with a lamp, particularly in metaphysical examples. Thus when the soul has freed itself of its impediments (wrong notions), and has realised its identity with the Supreme, it is comparable to the light of a lamp which shines forth unhindered when the enclosing jar is broken. The simile of the range of a lamp's light within a jar or within a mansion illustrates varying degrees of spiritual illumination, or else (Jain theory) the expansion or contraction of a soul to accommodate itself to the body.
it inhabits.

A jar which is placed in the sun shines; similarly this "aggregate of body and organs", though itself inanimate material and therefore unconscious, performs its functions, such as resting and working, as if it were conscious, because it is illuminated by the light of the Self (Brh. Up. Comm. 4,3,7). In this connection, cf. Vaiś. Sūtras II,1,7: "(The body or senses are not the seat of perception), because it is not known (that any degree of consciousness exists in a jar, etc.)." This is explained by the Upaskāra on III,1,6: "If consciousness did exist in the ultimate atoms of the body, it would also exist in a jar, etc. (since both are vikāras of earth)". By contrast, the Buddhist Vijñānavādin asserts that there is nothing apart from consciousness, which assumes its own form as well as those of objects.

The Sāṅkhya observes that a jar, although itself inanimate, becomes hot or cold through contact with the atmosphere, or with hot or cold water. In the same way, the principle of buddhi (mahat), and other modifications of pradhāna, becomes possessed of consciousness, as it were, through their association with the conscious puruṣa (Sāṅkhya 20).

One of the less obvious functions of a jar is to act as the container of ether. This does not imply any real
distinction in the indivisible ether, for the ether
particularised by a jar in a house is not distinct from
the ether that pervades the house (although jar and
house are two different upādhīs or limiting conditions
of ether) (Vedāntaparibhāṣā I. But see below, Chap. VIII,
for the Jain view of ether as permanent and impermanent).
It may be noted that the illustration goes to show that
a jar is dull and heavy, and impedes knowledge and
illumination. This follows from the fact of its having
limits, and being material and gross. And it is only a
limited thing which is checked by another thing with which
it is in relation, as a jar is checked by a post or a
wall.

Only the Sāṇkhya system has noted a person's psychological
reactions to a jar. One may feel sattva, contentment, towards
a jar if one possesses it; rajas, desire, if one wishes to
possess it; and tamas, indifference, if one is not interested
in it. (Sarv. XIV, p. 122).

In our perception of a given object, e.g. a jar, the
general notion (ghaṭatva) must come first, and then we
become aware of the object's special characteristics.
The sequence is as follows: first, "thing" in general;
second, "jar" in general; third, "jar" in particular (yellow
jar, black jar, etc.). In the Sāṇkhya philosophy, this
illustration shows the function of mind as distinct from the other senses; mind has the special faculty of "discrimination", which sets it apart both from senses and sense-objects, such as jars etc.

A puzzling problem was "which comes first, the particular or the general (ghaṭa or ghaṭatva)?" This was supplemented by such questions as, Is the universal proper to a species immanent in all existent objects of that species, or is it something external? Is it a substance in itself, or is it something intangible? The Vaiśeṣika seeks to solve the problem by postulating an intimate relation (samavāya) between the universal and its particulars. He asserts further that this samavāya is one, indivisible, and eternal. The Jain argues in reply: If the samavāya relation is one and eternal, etc., then the qualities of jar could reside in cloth; and when a jar perished, the samavāya would perish with it (Syādv. p. 32, St. VII). The Buddhist, in his turn, says: "If the universal is not a substance, it cannot be in intimate relation with the jar; while if it is a substance, it must be of limited dimensions, and cannot attach itself ad lib. to each fresh jar." Accordingly he concludes that specific individuals alone exist, and that the universal has no reality. The Jain does not go quite so far. He says that the likeness between different individuals belonging to
the same class is the real universal, and that there is no need to assume a universal class-essence. Here again we find an emphasis on the concrete, such as is expressed by Betty Heimann in her review of Sénart's Brhadāraṇyaka Up. trsl. (JRAS 1937): "Sénart hints that the Indian basis of thought is not merely formal logic when he translates arkatvam not as the abstract idea of arka but as "the name arka", i.e. name as the concrete and magical essence of the thing expressed."

As a kind of supplement to the idea of ghaṭatva, we may mention the Buddhist theory of kurvadrūpatva. From the biological point of view, the Buddhists hold that the occasional quality of kurvadrūpatva ("efficient form") resides in each object when that object is actively engaged in producing its effect, as a jar in holding water, or rice in producing a shoot. The Naiyāyikas retort, from the merely logical and not biological standpoint, that this would result in a confusion (saṃkara): i.e. the admission of this quality would involve a division or distinction between, e.g. rice that is growing, and rice in a granary, but a non-distinction between barley and rice (when both are growing). In their turn they urge that a species should be subdivided according to material, e.g. silver, earthenware, etc., jars. But the real species, ghaṭatva, depends on the static form, not on material or function. The general appellation "jar"
arises from our viewing all jars as possessed of a common attribute, viz. the being composed of parts which (though of different composition) share a particular kind of arrangement (i.e. shape) (Kusum. Comm. I,16).

Another inanimate object which, like the jar, is in great favour as an illustration of the relation of cause and effect, is the cloth (paṭa). It is stated several times in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. (e.g. 11,14,61) that the cloth does not differ from the threads which compose it: when black threads are used, the cloth will be black, and when white threads are used, it will be white. The effect does not differ from its material cause, and just as the cloth arises from the threads, so the visible world, pervaded by the three guṇas, arises from the undifferentiated avyakta, which is likewise composed of the three guṇas. In another passage (Sāṅkhya. 16) this is expressed rather differently: "Just as the three streams of the Ganges fell on Śiva's head and formed a single stream, so the "triguṇam avyaktaṃ" evolved into the single "vyaktam"; or just as the combined threads give rise to the single cloth, so avyakta gives rise to the successive qualities, mahat, etc., owing to the collaboration of the three guṇas. And just as the cloth contains the qualities of the threads, so also the products of avyakta, mahat, etc. which are distinguished by the three guṇas, have inherited these qualities from their cause,
the basic avyakta. In spite of the differences between the undifferentiated basic material, avyakta, and the evolved product, vyakta, they are fundamentally one, as the latter is contained in the former. It is definitely stated (Sāṅkhyak. 14) that whoever sees the manifest world, sees the unmanifest original matter also: "yo vyaktam paśyati, sa pradhānam api paśyati, tad-viparyaya-abhāvāt."

The fullest defense of the identity of material cause and material product is found at Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī 9. Four reasons are given for the identity of cloth and threads, and thence of product and material: (1) the cloth and the threads have the same particular quality (dharma), unlike a cow and a horse, which differ from each other in this respect. (2) Cloth and threads stand in the relation of material cause and material product (upādana and upādeya), unlike a jar and a cloth, or a horse and a cow (Sarv. XIV), which differ materially from one another. (3) Cloth and threads cannot come together and be separated, as different things such as a dish and the fruit which is placed in it can; or be forever separate, like the Himalaya and Vindhya mountains. (4) Cloth and threads have the same weight on the scale, unlike e.g. a golden ornament of two palas' weight, and a golden ornament of one pala. On all these grounds, it is established that the cloth is nothing but a particular modification of the threads, and is not materially different
from them.

But the Naiyāyika here interposes four reasons for the difference between cause and product (in support of his belief that the whole is something separate from the parts which compose it): (1) kriyābuddhi, the understanding of the production (of the cloth) (i.e. if the cloth and the threads were really identical, it should not be necessary to produce the one from the other); (2) nirodhabuddhi, the understanding of the destruction (of the cause, before the effect is manifested); (3) vyāpdeśabheda, the difference in terminology; and (4) arthakriyābheda, the difference in practical use.

The first two arguments are met by the illustration of the tortoise and its limbs (see above, p.50); i.e. the qualities in cloth and threads which respectively appear and disappear are mutual, and the manifestation or destruction of one or the other is only apparent. The difference in terminology presents no difficulty for the Sāṅkhya, for the expression "the cloth is (contained in) the threads" is analogous to the expression "the Tilaka trees are in this wood" (where the wood and the trees are co-extensive) (N.B. this example is contrary: it should be "the wood is contained in the Tilaka trees"). Nor is the difference in practical use difficult to account for: even one object may have several different uses, as for instance a fire burns, gives light,
and may be used for cooking. And as a single servant (viṣṭi) can only be employed on a journey to point out the way, but many such servants are able to bear the palanquin, so the separate threads are not able to cover (the body), but en masse they can perform that function. (Cf. Sarv. XIV, pp. 1212-2: "...the office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement").

Here the Naiyāyika steps in with a quibbling argument:
"Is the manifestation of the cloth, before its material cause is at work, existent or non-existent? If non-existent, then our theory of the production of the existent from the non-existent must be granted. If (it is already) existent, what is the use of the activity of the cause? If the product is already there, what is the use of the material? And if we had to assume another manifestation (of a former product) before that manifestation, there would be a regressus in infinitum."

The Sāṅkhya reply turns the tables on the Naiyāyika:
"What is the production of a previously non-existent object? Is it real (=existent) or unreal? If it is real, then what is the use of the material? If it is unreal, then we should have to assume another (previous) production, and you would in your turn be faced with a regressus in infinitum. But if you say that existence is the nature of the cloth, then you could
substitute the word "existence" for "cloth", and it would be tautological to say "the cloth exists". And you could not say that the cloth was destroyed, as existence and destruction cannot be present in a thing at one and the same time. Therefore this manifestation of the cloth is impossible, whether you regard it as inherent in the functionary cause of the cloth, or as inherent in the fact of the existence of the cloth (cf. NS IV, 90,92. The Naiyāyika holds that the cloth inheres in the threads, and is dependent on them, and this accounts for the fact that it is not grasped separately, though, as a whole, it is something complete in itself).

On the contrary, continues the Sāṅkhya, our theory is established, and the existent arises from the existent. The material cause (in this case the threads) is set in motion by some efficient cause (in this case the weaver). And you Naiyāyikas cannot say, further, that the production of the cloth is due to a combination of the material cause with the colour of the cloth; for the colour has no activity, and the material cause, when operating for the production of an article, must always be in relation with activity,—otherwise it would not have the nature of a cause."

Jacob (Popular Maxims, Vol. II, pp. 122-3), under sūtra-śāṭikānyāya (the thread about to be woven into a garment, and already regarded as the garment) discusses this question of the pre-existence of the effect, and quotes Ballantyne's
translation of the Nyāyasūtras II, 126; and IV,1,50: "from the design" (tādarthya); "He makes a mat" (kaṭa) implies his aiming after a mat, inasmuch as it is a thing nonexistent (until made) can have (at the time when one is spoken of as making it) no maker". Further: "The weaver sets himself to work, having considered "In these threads (i.e. constituted by these threads) there will be a cloth", but not with the understanding that "there is a cloth", (for in the latter case the weaver's labour would be superfluous).

The general qualities of a cloth, apart from its relation to the threads composing it, are comparatively seldom referred to. We have evidence of the importance of the art of weaving, in the common expression "paratānta" meaning "dependent on others", but literally "interwoven with another" (tantra= loom, or warp of a cloth). This expression occurs e.g. in Sāṅkhya-kārikā commentary, 10: "All the derivatives of avyakta are interwoven one with another. Cf. also Brh.Up.3,6,1 - water is woven through (ota and prota) with air, air with the sky, etc. etc. Mund. Up. 2,2,5.- reference to the one Ātman, on whom heaven, earth, sky, mind and all the prānas are woven; Maitrī Up. 6,3: "the sun is Om, consisting of three mātras - "and by these all things are woven and interwoven (otam, protam)"

Being a product, like a jar, the cloth is subject to destruction, and to parināma or constant change (Sāṅkhya-kārikā).
Even a new cloth, as soon as it enters upon the succession of moments, begins to grow old; but conversely, it does not grow old all at once, but must first pass through the ageing process of parināma.

The dyeing of a cloth is used as an illustration for the assimilating by the mind of certain impressions. As a cloth becomes a deep yellow when dyed with turmeric, so the mind receives pleasant impressions when in the presence of objects of enjoyment; and a man in such circumstances is said to be "attached", as the cloth is said to be dyed. (Erh. Comm. 2, 3, 6.) (cf. the psychological colour of the Jain, (at 45).

An opponent of the Naiyāyika says that there is no such thing as a "whole", for one sees that a cloth may be reddened with safflower (mahāranjana) in one part, and not in another, - and a composite whole should not have contradictory parts. But the Naiyāyika holds that the two colours produce one "citrarūpa" (variegated form), and the latter belongs to the (whole) cloth, while the colours themselves belong to the parts. The Jain, from his relativity standpoint, says: red and blue are in the same cloth, though in different parts of it. As two colours are predicable of one and the same thing, likewise "being" and "non-being" (i.e. any given object is neither entirely existent, nor entirely non-existent). (Śyādv. p. 149, St. XXIV).

The eight conditions of attitudes (bhāva) of Sāṅkhya,
viz. dharma, adharma, jñāna, ajñāna, vairāgya, avairāgya, aśvarya and anaśvarya, pervade or perfume the intellect (buddhi); and as the subtle body (sūkṣmaśarīra) is associated with the intellect, it too is perfumed by the bhāvas,- just as a cloth or garment, through contact with sweet-smelling Campaka flowers, is pervaded by their perfume (Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudi 40). (But this smell is not natural to the cloth,- cf. Vaiś. Sūtras 2,2,1).

The karma which ripens into a period of life (āyur-vipākam karma) is either speedy or delayed (sa-upakrama or nir-upakrama: as for example a wet piece of cloth, when well spread out, dries in a short time, but when the same cloth is rolled up, it takes a long while to dry (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras III,22). A wet garment (vastra) collects the dust brought to it from all sides by the wind; in the same way the soul, wet with the water of impurities (kāṣāya, sins) collects.. the actions brought to it by yoga (= a natural attraction?) (Sarv. III, p. 30).

The modifications (vṛtti) of the afflictions (kleśa) are destroyed by meditation (Comm. on Yogasūtras II,II). When the seed-power of the kleśas has been burnt up, they disappear (when the Yogi's mind is absorbed into its primal cause); but when they still retain their seed-power, their fresh modifications or functions can be checked by the power of meditation. As the heavy (sthūla) dirt on
clothes is shaken off first, and then the fine dirt is washed off by effort and appliance, so the gross modifications of the kleśas are easily destroyed, but the subtle or potential ones are powerful antagonists. Vācaspatimisra questions the propriety of this illustration, saying that it is impossible to remove the potential afflictions by meditation; they disappear with the disappearance of the mind. The portion of the comparison which is valid is the reference to grosser and finer dirt, as of course the potential kleśas are more inaccessible than those which are already present; but the "removability by effort" does not apply in the case of the potential kleśas.

The moulding of jars and the weaving of cloths are regarded as fine arts, originally imparted to man by the Creator: "The traditional arts now current, as that of making cloth, etc., must have been originated by an independent being, from the very fact that they are traditional usages like the tradition of modern modes of writing" (alluding to the supposed divine origin of the Devanāgarī script) (Kusum. Comm. V,1). Further on (II,2) we find the following passage: "Just as a magician having made a wooden doll pulled by strings, tells it to bring a jar, and thus causes the jar to be brought, and thereby furthers the education of a child, likewise Isvara, having assumed two bodies in the mutual
connection of master and disciple, and thus initiated the
tradition (of words), and taught their meanings to the men then
newly created. In the same manner having himself originated
the tradition of (making) jars etc., he instructed them
therein." (cf. ibid. i, 3, and v,§ 5, Comm.).

Like the jar, the cloth is frequently cited in arguments
about the destructibility of matter, e.g. Kusum. Comm. v,1:
"the universe is destructible by an effort, like cloth which
can be torn apart". Or Bhagavadgītā II,22: "The embodied
person (dehin) casts off bodies and assumes new ones, just
as a man discards old, worn garments and puts on fresh ones."
There is a complicated argument at Sarv. xii, pp. 107-8:
"If you object that non-existence (abhāva) cannot be a cause,
says the mīmāṃsaka), then it must be asked whether non­
existence is an effect or not? If it is not, then the eternity
of (e.g.) a cloth must be admitted, since there is no proof
of its destruction. If it is an effect, then what fault is
there in its being a cause? (This is a "rope which binds at
both ends- ubhayatah pāśa rajju- a dilemma).

anyonya-abhāva or itaretara-abhāva, mutual exclusion,
is exemplified by the relation of a jar to a cloth; while
sarva-abhāva, complete non-existence, or destruction, is
seen in a cloth which is burnt up (Sāṅkhyakārika 4).
The burnt cloth is also referred to in the Vedāntasūtra (172):
"(When the mental state of absolute oneness is attained)
this modification of consciousness, accompanied by the reflection of pure thought (=Brahman), makes the (hitherto) unknown supreme Brahman (from which the individual soul does not differ) its object and destroys the ignorance regarding it. Then, just as a cloth is burnt when the threads composing it are burnt, so all the effects of ignorance are destroyed when their cause, i.e. ignorance, is destroyed. And accordingly the mental state (cittavṛtti) of oneness or absorption (lit. "indivisibility"- akhaṇḍa) which has caused the destruction of the effects of ignorance, is itself destroyed" (and the individual soul is merged in Brahman).

With regard to anyonyābhāva, it should be noted that according to the Vedāntin, the cloth, although it is the negation of a jar, is a positive entity, not a nonentity. The Jain view, however, is rather different. Propounding the doctrine of Syādvāda, he says that absolute existence or absolute non-existence cannot be predicated of any object. A jar, say, exists "in a certain way", and in relation to other things. It exists in its own nature, but not as regards a cloth, for example. As far as the cloth is concerned, the jar is non-existent; accordingly each object is negative as well as positive. (Cf. the Buddhist theory of apoha (negation conveyed by word): ghaṭa = ghaṭa-itara-ahāvavyāvṛtti).

On the other hand, the Nyāyabinduṭṭika III, p. 76, dis-
cussing a syllogism relating to omniscience, observes: "If there were altogether no incompatibility (virodha) between omniscience and the faculty of speech) they could have been observed as coexistent, just as a jar and a cloth." This is Stcherbatsky's rendering - it should be noted that it is also possible that the "virodha" may be construed with virodha ghaṭapatayār, i.e. if there were no incompatibility or contradiction as between a jar and a cloth. Here is yet another instance of the polaric outlook: the very example which by common consent represents mutual exclusion, is here taken to illustrate co-existence.

All that has been said about the species jar (ghaṭatva) may of course equally apply to the species cloth (paṭatva). It is only necessary in this connection to mention the following discussion in the Nyāya chapter of the Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha. The Naiyāyika, anxious to establish a proof for the existence of a Supreme Being, produces his usual argument: "The mountains, seas, etc. must have had a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar." He adds: "Our middle term cannot be rejected as asiddha, since it can be established by the fact of the subject's possessing parts." His opponent objects: "What are we to understand by 'possessing parts?' (śārayavatva), Does it mean 'Existing in contact with parts', or 'in intimate relation (samavāyitva) with parts'? It cannot be the first, since
this would equally apply to (eternal things) such as ether (gagana), nor can it be the second, since this would prove too much, as applying to such cases as the species thread (tantutva), (which exists in intimate relation with the individual threads)

The Naiyāyika replies by suggesting that "possessing parts" may be explained by "belonging to the class of substances which exist in intimate relation (samaveta-dravyatva)" ("substances" excludes tantutva, and "in intimate relation" excludes ether, etc.). Accordingly it is implied here that the species or universal is not a substance (Sarv. XI, p. 97).

We have treated these two stock examples separately because of their unlimited application. Various aspects of Indian civilisation (in the sense of Latin 'cives') will next be dealt with in their employment as upamās.
Chapter IV. The immanent story of ancient Indian culture, as reflected in the Upama.

(a) _Arts and Crafts._

It is difficult to make any hard and fast division between "arts and crafts" as such, and their application in social life. For instance, weapons such as arrows and swords belong both to the work of the smith and to the pursuit of soldiery. Where weapons and instruments of various kinds are specifically mentioned in the analogies, without a definite reference to the person wielding them, it will be simpler to treat them under the head of "arts and crafts", even though the social sphere might be more appropriate.

We begin with metals and their modifications. The most frequently mentioned metals are gold, iron, brass, copper, and silver, the two former being the most popular. We have already had occasion to refer to gold when dealing with the jar and the cloth (above, pp. 570 and 69), where it is pointed out that the golden ornament is a modification of unbeaten gold; and that a golden ornament of the weight of two palas differs from one which weighs one pala. (Cf. also Kusum. Comm. v, l). Elsewhere (Sarv. XIII, p. 118) it is said: "That which remains as the true (satya) during the process of modification, as the gold remains under the form of the earring,- that wherein change comes and goes,- they call the supreme Nature (prakṛti)."
And again: "Whatever is possessed of certain attributes must have had a cause possessed of the same,—thus a ring has gold for its material cause, because it has the attributes of gold" (in reference to the three guṇas) (Sarv. Xiv, p. 122).

According to the followers of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools, a substance (dharmin) undergoes paripāma or modification of three kinds: (1) dharma, "property"; (2) lakṣaṇa, characteristic; (3) avasthā, condition. The first change occurs when the gold is made into a bracelet, or diadem; the second is a change of the ornaments themselves, from one shape to another; while the third change refers to relative newness or oldness, owing to lapse of time (See e.g. Syādv. p. 16, St. V).

In Sarv. XIV, pp. 130-1, these three changes are applied to the function of the understanding (citta). When citta perceives, e.g., the colour "blue", there is a change of dharma, as when gold becomes a bracelet, diadem, or armlet (i.e. the understanding is coloured by the object, and previous impressions are obliterated). When the perception recedes into the past, there is a change of lakṣaṇa, and when there is an alternate manifestation and non-manifestation of blue, etc., this is a change of avasthā. Elsewhere (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras III,13) it is stated that it is only the condition that changes states in the past, present, and future; the substance is not changed. Thus when a vessel of gold is broken to be made into something else, it is only the condition that
changes, not the gold. Vācaspatimisra adds that when vessels or ornaments of gold are termed e.g. a rucaka or a svastika, they differ only in appellation, not in substance. The (efficient) cause of the differentiation is the goldsmith. The goldsmith who makes bracelets, may make them from gold which is not materially different from the gold of the earrings; but he is responsible for the difference in form. Similarly, the cause of change or modification of the mind is a sense-object other than that which is occupying the mind at the time (See also Vyāsa on Yogasūtras II,28).

The Buddhist, on the contrary, holds that there is no such thing as an unchangeable substance (e.g. gold), and says that it is only the characteristic which exists (i.e. the ornaments, as successors of the unbeaten gold) (See e.g. Vācaspati on Yogasūtras III,13).

The example of the relation of gold and necklace is often quoted side by side with that of clay and jar to illustrate the relation of cause and effect. But gold has one distinctive characteristic which is not shared by clay, viz. that even after it has been modified in the shape of an ornament, that ornament can be melted down again, and transformed into another. “Moreover, even when there has been the destruction of a maṅs, e.g. of gold, through the destruction of the union of its parts by the blows of a hammer, an earring can still be made therefrom; while a jar, or the like, originates without the
destruction of the nature of the bowl-shaped halves (kapāla) etc. (which are put together to form the jar)." (Nyāyasūtras II, 109 et seq., and vṛtti). This puts the matter from a slightly different angle, but goes to show the same thing, namely that gold is more flexible than clay. Later, it is stated that things which have undergone a change do not again return to their original form (ibid. II,111). Someone objects that this is not right, for gold, having abandoned the condition of a bracelet (kaṭaka), and having assumed that of a ring, (kuṇḍala), can again assume the condition of a bracelet. The reply is that these modifications do not relinquish the nature of gold, their original basis,—it is different in the case of e.g. milk and curds, which have the fixed relation of material and modification, which cannot be reversed (II,118, vṛtti). (The subject under discussion is the letter i, and whether it is actually changed to y in sandhi, or merely substituted by y).

An ingenious way of surmounting the difficulty of how an "eternal" substance can submit to change, or a modified article rest on an eternal basis, is afforded by the Jain Syādvādin who explains that objects are nitya+anitya()permanent and impermanent); and modifications of a "characterised object" (dharmin) are both distinct from it and identical with it. In their character as distinct from it, they are susceptible to change, and therefore impermanent; but as identical (in substance) with it, they are eternal. It is a question of relativity. (Syādv. st.5)
Gold is, of course, regarded as a precious metal, and the process of freeing it from dross is eagerly seized upon by the moralist as an analogy. "Just as a goldsmith (peśaskārī, alternative trsl. embroiderer) takes apart a little quantity of gold and fashions another - a newer and better form, so does the self throw this body away, and make (assume?) a newer and better form, suited to the Pitṛs or the Gandharvas, or the gods, or Virāj, or Hiranyakarbhā". (Brhad.Up. 4,4,4) "The mind (citta) becomes established in its true nature when the impurity of Rajas is removed" (Yogasūtras I.2) Purified of the dross of Rajas and Tamas, through heating with the re-agents of practice and freedom from desire, the gold of Sattva becomes established in its own nature. The three tests of real gold are kāsa, cheda, and tāpa; now each of these words has a secondary meaning as applied to the ascetic : he is to purify his mind through the doctrines of the Jina, to cut himself off from evil influences, and to undergo severe penance (tāpa). The teachers of the other schools of thought teach doctrines which cannot stand such a test (and which are, therefore, not gold but base metal). (Syādv. st. XXXI, p. 177). "As one would mend gold with salt, silver with gold, tin with silver, leather with tin, iron (loha) with lead, wood with iron, and leather with wood; in the same way one mends the wounds of the sacrifice through the power of these worlds, of the deities and of the threefold knowledge". (Ch.Up. 4,17,7). "Just as those not knowing the district (akṣetra-jña)
might walk about above a hidden gold treasure, and yet not find it; similarly all these living creatures (prajā), though going day after day (in deep sleep) to the world of Brahman, yet do not discover it. (Ch. Up. 8.3.2)

In seeking to refute the Vedānta doctrine of advaita (non-duality), the Sāṅkhya says that to attribute the nature of the unintelligent Creation to the pure Brahman would be like mistaking gold for silver (kaladhauta) (Sarv. XIV, p. 122). Silver evidently ranked quite low in the scale of metals (of its frequency) (cf. also Sāṅkhya-karikā Comm. 9: "The existent must be the cause, for things cannot arise interchangeably; as for instance there is a non-existence of gold in silver, grass, dust, sand, etc.").

Gold has always had a high mystical value (cp. alchemy in the Middle Ages); it is the colour observed in the Sun, the moon and in fire, and this adds weight to the conception of its purity. e.g. golden vessel = sun Isā Up. 15; "golden person in the heart" passim in Upahāsas (often identified with the sun), e.g. maitri Up. 6.1; gold and silver shell (earth and heaven) Ch. Up. 3.19.1. "The genus of fire is that universal (sāmanya) which is found with intimate relation (samaveta) in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon and gold " (Sarv. X, p. 87). Compare also Upaskāra on Vaiś. S. II.1.3; IV.1.7; IV.2.11. Gold, as well as a jewel, is "taijasa", compounded of light. But gold and jewels (e.g. pearls) are not visible without exter-
nal light, whereas a lamp, or the moon, etc. are self-luminous (Syādv. st. V, p.14). Through its name (suvarṇa) gold is linked with the mysteries of speech: "He who knows the correct sound of this Sāman (vital force) obtains gold". (su-varṇa means both a good tone and gold) (Brhad Up.1,3,26). Finally, though the illustration is not taken from a philosophical text, we may note the curious idea found in the Pañcatantra (II.2) that a may mouse jump to any height through the magic potency of a bag of gold buried beneath the floor.

Next to gold comes iron. Like gold, iron is heated; but in this case the effect is not wholly beneficial. In fact the most frequent allusion to the heating of iron is the simile of "the red-hot iron ball" which deludes a man into thinking that it is gold: "For the truth is that any attempt to establish happiness (as the summum bonum) since it is inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man (viz. his action) who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that it was gold (tapanīya)" (Sarv. XI,p.96). Or: "This Pure Consciousness which is known as "turīya", when not discriminated, like a red-hot iron ball, from ignorance and the Consciousness with which it is associated, becomes the direct meaning of the sacred utterance, mahāvākyā (tat tvam asi) and when discriminated, it gives us its implied meaning". (Ved-āntasāra 50) That is to say, the direct way of expression, vācyā does not discriminate between the iron and the fire latent in
it; while the indirect way, lakṣya, refers to the fire, though the word "iron" is used (e.g. "the (red-hot) iron scorches." The same simile is applied to the primary and implied meanings of the word "tat" and "tvam" respectively, according as collective ignorance and individual ignorance is being considered (Vedāntasāra 144, 146).

Cf. also Vedāntaparibhāṣā I: "Through superimposition (adhyāsa) of the nature of fire, which is the seat of the power of burning, we commonly say "The iron burns". Similarly in everyday life we say "I am happy" or "I am miserable", through superimposition (on the Self) of the complete internal organ, which is modified into the form of pleasure, etc."

In a discussion on sleep and dreams (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 2,1,19) the intellect in the waking state is supposed to extend along the network of arteries (nāḍī) in the body. When sleep is ended, the intellect comes back along those arteries, and the individual self too comes back and remains in the body, uniformly pervading it, as fire pervades a heated lump of iron.

The Jains, discussing the nature of āsrava, "flowing", the action of the senses in attracting the soul to objects, say: "as when water is thrown on to a heated lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water from all sides, so the jīva (soul), heated by previous sins, receives from every side
the actions which are led to it by yoga" (Sarv. III, p. 30. See also above, p. 75).

Iron is the symbol of things that are heavy, dense, strong, or unimaginative. For example: "Iron-souled are they in whose heart Thou canst find no resting-place, through their hearts are thus washed by many floods of śruti (scriptural texts) and nīti (rules of conduct)." (Kusum. V, 17). In Syādv. St. XI, pp. 62-3, the Mīmāṃsaka is represented as arguing that hīṃsā is sometimes justifiable. A piece of iron is heavy and therefore liable to sink; but by certain processes it can be made to float on water when used in ship-building (just as a deadly poison may sometimes be used as a medicine, and fire lose its burning power, when treated with Vedic rites and spells). Analogously, hīṃsā, though bad in itself, is sometimes meritorious (in sacrifices, etc.). The Jain replies that the simile of the iron is out of place. The pieces of iron are used as parts of a ship and are therefore capable of floating; but the Vedic mantras do not cause the sacrificed animals to cease suffering, nor is there evidence that they attain a better condition in the hereafter, through having been sacrificed.

The magnet and its effect on iron or iron filings is a useful simile. We have already referred (above, Chap. I, p. 11) to the supposed etheric connection between sense-
objects and sense-organs. This connection is also likened to that between a magnet and the iron it attracts. The understanding (citta) resembles the iron, and is drawn by the influence of the object, acting as magnet or loadstone, through the medium of the senses. When this influence is not at work, no new knowledge is produced (Sarv. XV, p. 130; and see Vyāsa on Yogasūtras IV,17. But at ibid. I,4, citta is itself likened to a magnet). Similarly, the sense of hearing acts like iron, being drawn by the sounds coming from the mouth of the speaker, which act as a loadstone. The sounds are then transformed by the hearing into its own modifications (svavṛtti-paramparayā), and thus sensed (ālocayati) (Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras III,41). Vācaspati adds, significantly: "It is for this reason that for every living creature the perception of sound in external space is, in the absence of defects, never void of authority."

The same illustration, with a different application, is found in Syādv. p. 51, St. IX, where the Vaiśeṣika claims that there are manifold all-pervasive souls, which, until released, are in contact with particles of matter, forming the bodies in which the souls abide. If the souls were not all-pervasive, they could not exercise an influence on the particles of matter, and thus would be eternally liberated (mukta). No, says the Jain, we have the analogy of the
magnet, which can attract a piece of iron without being in contact with it. (Cf. also Syādv. St. VI, p. 27).

The instinctive movements of a baby (to its mother's breast) are compared to the movement of iron towards a magnet (Nyāya Sūtras III, 21-2). But, says the Naiyāyika, this is no analogy, for it does not apply in other cases (i.e. a lump of clay does not move towards a magnet). He deduces that the movements of the infant must have an underlying cause, scil. the remembrance of former lives.

A telling comparison occurs in Sarv. XIV (p. 123): "Just as a movement takes place in the iron in the proximity of the unmoved magnet, so a movement takes place in Nature (Prakṛti) in the proximity of the unmoved Soul (Puruṣa)."

The other metals are rarely specifically referred to. Brass is usually mentioned in the form of brazen vessels (e.g. Maitri Up. 6, 22, where the sound of a brazen vessel (kāmsya) is one of the similes for the sound-Brahman within the heart); and silver, either in contrast to gold, or in connection with the stock illustration of an illusion,—the mistaking of mother-of-pearl for silver (See below, "Reality of Fiction").

There is a reference to copper in Sarv. VII, p. 73, where "mala" (taint, natural impurity) is compared to the husk in rice (tuṣataṇḍula), or the rust on copper (tāmra). As molten copper, when poured into a mould, assumes its
shape, so the mind (citta), reaching objects (through the sense-organs, assumes their shape (Upadesahasasrahī XIV, 3).

And (Ch. Up. 6, 1, 5-6) from one copper ornament, everything made of copper is known. Likewise from one pair of nail-scissors everything that is made of iron. (See above with reference to clay, Ch. III, p. 58).

Further, with regard to metal in general: "As the dross of metals (dhātu), when they are melted, is consumed, so the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of the breath." (Sarv. XV, p. 141).

Before going on to a consideration of the various articles fashioned from metal, let us deal with previous stones, which form a most important part of "arts and crafts". The highest praise that one can bestow on a philosophical system or on the founder of a system is the title "crest-gem", referring either to the imaginary crest-gem of the serpent Takṣaka, or to the Kaustubha jewel of Viṣṇu. For example, at the end of Sarv. XV, the system of Śaṅkara is called the crest-gem of all the systems; and at the beginning of Sarv. I it is said that the synopsis of all the systems has been made by Madhava, "the Kaustubha jewel of the milk-ocean of Srī Śaṅkara". The well-known "three jewels" of Jainism are jñāna, darśana, and cārita, knowledge, vision, and good conduct; while the Buddhist triad is Buddha, dharma, saṅgha. Another group of jewels deserving mention is the Cakravartin's collection of seven, consisting of his chief
queen, his prime minister, treasurer, elephant, horse, wheel of power, and sceptre (maṇi).

It is not always easy to detect the true nature of a jewel at the first glance, — a glittering object may be a precious stone, and it may also only be a piece of quartz. Thus it happens that the jewel is a favourite example for illusion (See below, "Reality of Fiction"). The invisible power of a word, called śphoṭa, is revealed gradually, as each successive letter is pronounced, — just as the real nature of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is finally revealed (Sarv. XIII, p. 116).

In the realm of metaphysics, the influence of the Self on the intellect, etc., is compared to that of an emerald or other gem, which imparts its lustre to the milk into which it is dropped for testing. Similarly the Self, being self-luminous, imparts its lustre to the body and organs, including the intellect, — although it actually abides within the intellect (Bṛh. Up. Comm., 4,3,7).

Another Vedānta simile is that of the ornament on the neck. A man looks for his ornament (or jewel), while all the time it is hanging around his neck. Similarly, although we are already free, and Brahman, we do not realise this until instructed by a competent teacher (Atmatattvaviveka p. 130).

There is a Sūtra (a play on the word, whose primary meaning is string, thread) by which this life and the next,
and all beings, from Virāj down to a clump of grass, are strung together, like a necklace on a thread. This Sūtra is Vāyu, wind (represented in living beings by prāṇa, the vital force). When the thread is gone, gems that are strung on it are scattered; and if Vāyu is the Sūtra, and the limbs of man are strung upon it, it follows that when Vāyu is gone, they will be loosened (i.e. at time of death) (Bṛh. Up. and Comm., 3,7,1-2). (Cf. Bhagavad-gītā VII,7: "Everything is strung on me (=Kṛṣṇa) like gems on a thread"); and Syādv. p. 173-4, St. XXV: The Syādvāda is a synthesis of the systems (naya), like a necklace of pearls strung on a single thread.).

The Buddhist exponent of momentariness says that everything, including Ātman, consists of a plurality of separate momentary ideas; for him there is no thread running through the gems and connecting them. If he admits any connecting link, any "Sūtra", it is vāsanā, the subtle impressions left by experiences in a former life (See Syādv. p. 127, St. XIX).

The followers of Śiva, more materially minded, believe that when the nature of the Supreme Being (Śiva) is attained, all joys are acquired at the same time, just as if a man obtained possession of Mount Rāhana, he would acquire all the treasures it contained (Sarv. VIII, p. 75).
Returning to metallic objects, we find that another sort of chain, the chain of bondage, has a wide symbolic application. The desire for liberation which characterises all the Indian religio-philosophic systems, is naturally accompanied by an intense revolt against the "chains" and "fetters" of existence. The chains of matter are numerous: e.g. the kleśas, mala, desire (trṣṇā), karma, sense-organs and objects (grahas and atigrahas). Each of these in turn is mentioned as responsible for continued existence, and it is only when their chains are realised and broken that liberation of the soul can take place. Life itself is also compared to a chain (Vyāsa on Yogasūtra 1.16), but this is with reference to the continuity of existences rather than to its binding power; however, the chain of life is made up of past karma, which have strengthened it and postponed liberation. There is some difficulty as to whether the Ātman can ever be regarded as bound, for the Supreme Self, in the Vedāntic view, is the only entity that exists, and is eternally liberated. This is argued in the Brhad. Up. Comm. 4.4.6.: "Nor can liberation be a mere negative something—the cessation of bondage, like the breaking of fetters, for the Supreme Self is supposed to be the only entity that exists. And there is no other entity that is bound, whose freedom from bondage would be liberation. Therefore, the cessation of ignorance alone is commonly called liberation."
Akin to chains, though not of metal, are snares, nets and ropes, which likewise provide symbols for sin; the bonds of karma; and attachment to the pleasures of sense. References of this sort are too numerous to deal with in any detail, but we may just mention the connection between "net" (jāla) and so-called "illusion" (cf. Indrajāla); see for example Svet. Up. 3,1; 5,3. Here the māyin (Brahman) is also called "possessor of the net" (jālavān).

From the physiological point of view, the structure of arteries meeting in the heart is likened to a net (e.g. Brh. Up. 4,3 2,3). These arteries are known as "Hitā", and it is said that they branch off everywhere like the filaments of a Kadamba flower; and that the subtle body is nourished by the food which passes along them, and is held fast as by a cord (ibid., Comm.). When liberation is attained, the "heart's knot" is cut (e.g. Mund. Up. 2,2,8). The intellect, whose abode is in the heart, is pictured as extending along the Hitā arteries which are interwoven like a fish-net, and which cover the whole body like the veins of an Aśvattha leaf; and when the Self has been absent during sleep, it comes back along those arteries,- for it follows the nature of its limiting adjunct, the intellect. (Brh. Up. and Comm., 2,1,19).

The rope will be dealt with later in another connection ("Reality of Fiction"). We have mentioned (above, Chap. III,
p. 77) the rope that binds at both ends". The Indian schoolman is particularly fond of posing such dilemmas, this being the easiest way of refuting an opponent.

We now come to weights and measures, and coins. Measures give us a standard by which to judge things, and we have already met with them in their metaphorical function as pramāṇas, or means of right knowledge: "The thing which is to be measured is ascertained by the pramāṇa, just as rice is measured by the prastha, and sandal etc. by the balance (tulā) (Sāṅkhya-kārikā 4). And "the fact of being an object of right knowledge (does not destroy the character of a proof), as the judicial character of a balance (is not disproved by the fact that you can weigh the balance itself in another pair of scales)" (Nyāya-sūtras II, 16 - Ballantyne's translation). Just as the balance is a cause of knowledge when gold, etc., is weighed on it, but an object of knowledge when it is itself weighed, so the senses, etc., can likewise be both causes and objects of knowledge. (vṛttī, loc. cit.)

The scales have a prominent part to play in the ordeal by weighing. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas held that a certain capacity was produced in the scales by the ceremony of the ordeal, and that this caused the defendant to rise or sink in the balance (Kusum. Comm. I, 13). The Naiyāyika maintains that it is the innocence or guilt of the defendant which determines whether the scales are to rise or fall, not a "capacity" (śakti) in
the scales themselves.

With regard to coins, we have the maxim of "the unwitting employment of base money", (kṣakārāṇāpana), which is used by Kumārila in Tantravārtika, I, 3, 3, and quoted by I Jacob (III, p. 23). In an argument of the relative value of Śruti and Śmṛti, Kumārila maintains that any Śmṛti teaching which is incompatible with Śruti teaching should be given up, just as a man who finds that he has been using counterfeit coins unknowingly should at once stop doing so. In Tantravārtika I, 3, 8, Kumārila compares words to coins which can be tested by intelligent people. A man who has lost a small coin does not spend a large one looking for it. (See Reality of Fiction).

One of the chief tasks of the workers in metal was the making of weapons and sharp instruments of all kinds,—swords, lances, arrow-tips, axes, razors, knives, etc. The sword typifies a shining weapon, whose brightness is revealed when it is drawn from its sheath: it illustrates the light of the Self in dreams, when freed from the restrictions of the waking state. (cf. "sword of knowledge for cutting of doubt" Bhagavadgītā. IV. 42.). Elsewhere in the Brhad. Up. (I, 4, 2,) the existence of the Self in a body is compared to that of a razor in its case: "This Self has entered into these bodies up to the tip of the nails, as a razor may be put in its case". (also Kauś. Up. 4, 19). In describing where the performers of the horse sacrifice
go, the space at the juncture of the two halves of the cosmic shell is likened to the edge of a razor, i.e. it is very fine (Bṛh. Up. 3,3,2). (Cf. also Kaṭha Up. 3,14; and Svet. Up. 5,8. In the latter passage, the individual soul is said to be "of the measure of the point of an awl (ārāgra)".

Actions that have begun to bear fruit are stronger than knowledge, and must continue to have an effect, even though revelation has been attained, as an arrow that has been let fly continues its course for some time. (Cf. the potter's wheel, and its continued revolving).

The flight of an arrow towards its target provides a favourite figure in the Upaniṣads. For instance: "Taking the great weapon of the Upaniṣads as a bow, one should fix to it an arrow sharpened by meditation... and pierce (or: know (viddhi)) the Imperishable (akṣaram) as the target. The syllable Om is called the bow, the individual self the arrow, and Brahman the target." (Mun. Up. II, 2,3-4). Cf. also Maitri Up. 6,24: "the body is the bow, Om the arrow, its point the mind. Darkness is the target. One should pierce through the darkness (and proceed to the light)."

There is a graphic illustration of the feeling of doubt (e.g. taking a post for a man) in the Sāṅkhya-tattvavākumudī 30. A man sees an indistinct object in the half-
light, and his imagination runs away with him: he sees a robber with drawn bow, and arrow ready to shoot, and decides to flee. The sense here seems to be that the working of the various functions of mind and organs is not simultaneous, in a situation where the eyes, etc., are not directly to be trusted; it is the mind which draws the conclusion, only partly aided by the imperfect visual knowledge. A contrast to this situation is the case in which a tiger is revealed by the light of a flash of lightning: here perception, conclusion, and action (=running away) are practically simultaneous. (ālocana, saṃkalpa, abhimāna, adhyāvasāya).

There is one class of instrument, which for convenience's sake we shall call axe, though there must have been several varieties (paraśu, kuṭhāra, etc.), that was used almost exclusively for cutting down trees, or chopping wood. For example, the practice of the branches of Yoga is the cause of the separation of impurity (from the Self), as the axe separates a piece of wood from a tree (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras II,28). When the axe (or knife- vāsi) is operating on a piece of wood, we can cognise it as a special representative of the genus "instrument"; but when, e.g., the eye is engaged in acting as instrument for the cognition of colour, we cannot cognise it as special representative of the genus "sense". Such a cognition may be possible for Yogins
and gods, but not for mortals. (The eye is sometimes defined as that which cannot see itself). (Sāṅkhyaatattvakaumudī 5).

An illustration of the complete distinctness or independence of two objects is "When the axe is aimed at the Khadira tree, it is not the Palaśa tree that is cut." This occurs, e.g., in Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras I,6-7, as an objection to the statement "The result is the knowledge by the Puruṣa of the modifications (or functions: vṛtti) of the mind". The objector asks, "How can knowledge on the part of the Puruṣa be a result of a modification of the mind?" The reply is that the knowledge may be compared to a reflection, consciousness reflected in buddhi, which takes the form of the object of perception. Puruṣa's cognition seems independent, but is not really so.

A problem which puzzled the philosophers was "Is there an invariable connection between a word and the object it signifies?" The answer in Nyāyasūtras II,51 is "No. For if a word were inseparably connected with its meaning, then when the words "food", "fire" and "axe" (vāsi) were mentioned, the mouth should water, burn, and splat (pāṭana) respectively." At Syādv. p. 42-3, St. VIII, there is a lengthy imaginary argument between the Jain and the Vaiśeṣika, on the subject of the relation between knowledge (jñāna) and soul (ātmā). In the course of it, the Vaiśeṣika upholds a samavāya connection between the two, urging that a distinction between jñāna
and ātman is required owing to their being related as agent and instrument (kartṛ and karaṇa), like the carpenter and his adze (vāśī). But, says the Jain, the position is different: jñāna is an internal karaṇa, while the adze is an external one. Moreover, the example does not prove what it sets out to prove, for it does not point to an absolute distinction between the carpenter (kartṛ) and his tool (karaṇa). The carpenter has to resolve (a process of ātman) to use the tool, and has to make the tool one with himself (pariṇāma) before he can cut wood with it. In the same way, ātman resolves to know a particular object by means of jñāna, undergoes pariṇāma and assimilates the jñāna with itself, and then the two in conjunction produce the effect, viz. cognition or knowledge of an object (saṃvittī).

The axe (kuṭhāra) features again in a later chapter of Syādv., when the Jain is engaged in refuting the arguments of the Buddhist Nihilist. The Buddhist says that the existence of ātman cannot be proved by inference, since there is no characteristic (linga) on which the inference can be based. The Jain produces a number of arguments in reply to this, the first being as follows: "The perception of form etc. (=the objective world) requires an agent, because it is an action, like cutting. This agent, or percipient, is the ātman. Could the senses (sight, etc.) be the agents? No, for they are instruments, dependent on someone who uses them, just as the
axe is dependent on the carpenter or woodcutter. They are instruments, because they are made up of matter, and therefore are inanimate in the absence of a conscious (spiritual) stimulus. (Cf. a similar comparison applied to the act of hearing, Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras III,41; and see Nyāyasūtras III,104: "One cannot consider that the body is intelligent, for we see movement etc. even in axes (when an intelligent person operates them").

The Sāṅkhya explanation of the "Creation" is that the primaeval matter, pradhāna, gradually evolved, and undertook to work for the good of the Puruṣa, only vanishing when that object should be accomplished. The idea of a personal Creator is superfluous, for it is only matter that is active: "an inactive carpenter does not employ his adze and other instruments" (and therefore Iśvara cannot be the creator) (Sāṅkhyaatattvākaumudī 56).

The hammer (mudgara), according to the Buddhist, does not produce a new nature in a jar when it destroys it; for both a hammer and jar are momentary, and began to perish as soon as they came into existence (Syādv. p. 104, St. XVI. Cf. also NBT II, p. 38).

There is a reference to a smaller, less deadly instrument, in Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras III,41: "If there were no ether (ākāśa), shapes and forms would be so closely packed together that the space between them could not be pierced
even by a needle-point. Everything would be obstructed by everything else.

A semi-metallic object like a mirror may be dealt with here. We have already referred to the reflection of consciousness in the mirror of doubt buddhi, by which the Puruṣa appears to be affected, by a sort of reflex action (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras I,4; I,6; II,20). The process is further explained at Sarv.XV, p. 125, lines 10-14: the citrākta or bhoktrākta is reflected in buddhi and appears to partake of buddhi's nature (lit. "modifications" = vṛtti), while Puruṣa looks on at the ideas of buddhi and in his turn appears to be identified with (= reflected in) buddhi, though in reality quite detached. Cp. also Yogasūtras III, 35: "The reflection of Puruṣa in buddhi depends upon Puruṣa, as the reflection of a face in a mirror depends upon the face". (Citta or "mind-stuff" assimilated the objects which actively impress themselves upon it, and then passes on the impressions to buddhi, the thinking principle, which consciously coordinates them. Citta is thus the passive recipient of impressions, while Puruṣa is completely detached and only appears to be identified with buddhi. It is only buddhi and the sense-objects themselves which are active).

The same figure is employed by the Jains, the Vedāntins, and other schools. Seeking to expose the fallacy of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga epistemology, the Jain says: "A man may be reflected in a mirror, but that does not mean that even Indra can make the mirror alive". Accordingly buddhi must not be taken to be active, just because the conscious Puruṣa appears to partake
of its nature. Moreover, it is not correct to assume that an incorporeal being like Puruṣa can be reflected at all. (Śyādv. pp. 97-9, St. XV). This view is reiterated in a slightly different form in Sarv. III, p. 22: "In perception, consciousness in the shape of knowledge of a jar, etc., is experienced with a definite reference to each man's personality (ahamahamikā), even without taking the form of the sense-object, and is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a mirror."

Certain Maheśvaras, followers of Śiva, introducing the Supreme Lord into their epistemology, say that He manifests, in the mirror of each man's soul, all objects as if they were images reflected in it (Sarv. VIII, p. 74). Following a description of the state of samādhi, absorption, in the Vedāntasāra, 173, it is said that on the destruction of this state of absolute oneness, there remains only the Supreme Brahman, identical with the individual self, just as the image of a face in a mirror is resolved into the face itself when the mirror is removed. With this, cf. Kaṭha Up. VI,5: "one perceives the Ātman within one's self as in a mirror..."; and Śvet. Up. 2,14: "Just as a mirror (bimba) smeared with dirt shines forth in splendour when cleaned, so the embodied one, on seeing correctly the essence of the Ātman, has his end attained, and is freed from grief."

With regard to the theory of speech and language, it
is said in Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras III,17 that words are single and without parts: it is only the single letters composing them which change places in relation to each other. "This happens in the same way as a face of constant colour and features shows varying reflections when placed at different angles in regard to a mirror, a dagger, and a jewel. The difference is only apparent, not real." (Cf. Īśkāra on Vaiś. Sūtras 2,2,37). It is stated that the letters are not actually parts of a word, but that by means of differences in their order, the word itself assumes different forms. This is no doubt because when we are familiar with words, both spoken and read, we think in words, not in letters.

Before leaving metallic objects, we may deal with musical instruments. The moving from side to side of the tongue of a bell (ghanṭālālā) is an illustration for indecision or fluctuation (Syādv. p. 31, St. VI). The Mīmāṃsaka tenet of the eternity of sound is refuted by the Naiyāyika on the ground that when a bell (ghanṭa) or gong (kāṃśya) is being rung, and the hand or the like is brought into contact with it, there is a cessation of sound. An opponent (Sāṅkhya, not Mīmāṃsaka this time, according to Ruben's note 160) urges that since the contact of the hand with the bell stops the sound, therefore the sound must really reside in the bell, and not in the ether. This objection will not hold, for the ether, which must be the substratum of sound, is intangible. Contact
with fire (which is tangible, like a bell) does not produce sound: therefore the cause of sound must be intangible. A peculiarity of sound is that it can have various divisions, even in a single subject such as a conch-shell. This is another argument for the presence of an intangible substratum, which causes alterations without altering the shape of the instrument. (See Nyāyasūtras II,102 et seq.). Cf. also Upāskāra on Vaiṣ. Sūtra II,2,28: sound is non-eternal, because it is produced by a cause, such as the conjunction of drum and drum-stick.

From an aesthetic, mystical point of view, the sound of a bell is one of the seven similes for the sound-Brahman within the heart (Maitri Up. 6,22).

The drum (dundubhi), the conch-shell (śāṅkha) and the lute (vīṇā) are employed as metaphysical similes in the Brh. Up. When each of these instruments is being played, the listener cannot distinguish between the various different notes, but a general impression of sound or tune is produced, and through grasping, e.g. the drum and the drummer, the sound too is grasped. Similarly nothing in particular is perceived in the waking and dream states apart from Pure Intelligence. This is a telling example: it illustrates how all individuals have their particular note, all notes being unified in the Supreme Harmony of Brahman, which includes all varieties of genus within itself (Brh. Up. 2,4,7-9; 4,5,8-10).
An imaginary illustration of the manner of departure of a man's soul appears at Brhad. Up. 5,10,1: "When a man departs from this world, he reaches the air, which makes an opening (kha) for him there like the hole of a chariot-wheel. He goes upwards through that and reaches the sun, which makes an opening for him like the hole of a tabor. He goes upwards through that and reaches the moon, which makes an opening for him like the hole of a drum." Evidently the respective sizes of these things were well known.

There is a valuable illustration of the prior existence of pramâpa, at Nyâyasûtras II,15. The Buddhist Mâdhyamika denies the validity of all proof, on the ground that it cannot be established for any of the three times (=past, present, and future). Says the Naiyâyika: "This fact is not to be denied as regards all the three times, because (the validity of pramâpa) is proved, as the (previous existence of) a drum is proved by the sound." (The drum, or other musical instrument, exists even before the sound which proves its existence is produced; the postcedent illumination of objects is inferred from the (prior) existence of the sun; while the existence of fire is inferred from the smoke which is synchronous with it.). And from the pramâ, "right knowledge"(which always follows the pramâna, or means of establishing right knowledge) the prior existence of the pramâna (pratyakṣa, anumâna, etc.) is demonstrated.
The "building" metaphor was a favourite one in connection with ontological and metaphysical problems. In the course of his proofs for the existence of a soul, the Jain says: "The powers of growth and healing or repair clearly indicate the presence of a soul which dwells in the body. For we observe that a house does not grow of its own accord or repair itself without the agency of a mason or carpenter. In case anyone quotes the example of a tree to illustrate spontaneous growth and repair, I would point out that the tree (like a human being) is a living organism possessing a single sense (that of touch), and an indwelling soul." (Syādv. p. 119-120, St. XVII).

As mentioned above, the usual syllogism to establish the existence of a Creator is "The earth must have had a maker, because it has the nature of an effect, like a jar." A further assumption is that there can only be one Creator, otherwise there would be a conflict of wills, and the harmony of the universe would be non-existent. The Jain denies the necessity of this corollary, and quotes the examples of a palace made by many artisans, an anthill (śakra-mūrdhan) made by many ants (kīṭikā), and a beehive (madhucchatra) made by many bees (saraghā), all working harmoniously. Moreover if all the world were produced by one maker, all other artisans would be superfluous (Syādv. p. 25, St. VI; cf. also Sarv. III, p.25).
We find another building simile for the Creation in the Comm. on Aitareya Up. I (Anandāśrama ed. p. 29).

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga school lays stress on the fact that everything constructed exists not for its own sake, but for the sake of another. For instance, citta is diversified by countless impressions, and exists for the enjoyment of another (scil. Puruṣa) because it is a composite substance, like a house (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras IV.24) (Cf. also Ait.Up.Comm. I.3; Anand.p. 46).

A favourite simile with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga schools is that of beds and chairs. An inanimate, unconscious bed or couch (paryāṅka), composed of framework, pillow, headpiece, bedclothes, etc., does not exist for the sake or use of itself, nor do its separate parts exist for the use of each other. On the contrary, the bed is meant to be enjoyed by the man who lies on it. In the same way the body, as conglomeration of the five gross elements, is inferred to exist for the sake of another, viz. Puruṣa (Sāṅkhya-kārikā 17). In the Sāṅkhya-tattvavākumudī on the same passage, "beds, seats, and toilet powders" are referred to, while in Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras II. 20, this simile is applied to the function of buddhi, working for the benefit of Puruṣa.

The Buddhist logician is scathing about the Sāṅkhya proof from beds and chairs. It is posited by the Sāṅkhya that the senses etc., being composite, exist for the sake of
a simple substance, viz. puruṣa. But, says the Buddhist, why should the composite exist for the sake of the simple? As a matter of fact, the opposite is proved by this proposition: for the man who uses the beds and chairs is himself composite. Even if it is admitted that the senses exist for the benefit of someone else, it by no means follows that that someone or something is Puruṣa, Soul (See NBT III, pp. 61-2, 77-8).

With regard to other objects making up the house and its contents, we may note that the vital force (prāṇa) is compared to the post of a house, for it is the internal supporter of the body (Bṛh. Up. Comm (Introduction) 2,1,1). The post will feature later in the "Reality of Fiction" chapter, as an illustration of "doubt" (mistaking a post for a man), and also as the result of bodily derangement ("flaming post"). The wall, a common instance of an obstructing agency, has already been mentioned in Chapter I, and also in passing, in connection with the jar (Chap. II, p. 45). The ascent of a ladder or staircase (sopānārohaṇa) is a simile for the gradual acquiring of knowledge (e.g. Bhāmatī 1,3,8. And in regard to the power of words, Sarv. XIII, p. 119: "This is the first foot-round of the ladder of final bliss"). References to doors and gates, of obvious metaphorical value, (e.g. the moon as the door of the heavenly world, etc., etc.) occur passim, and it will not be necessary to enumerate them.
See for instance the fully worked out allegory of the "slaying of the doorkeeper on the road to (the hall of) Brahman" (i.e. ahamkāra, egotism, which is a hindrance to the realisation of the Self),- Maitrī Up. 6,28. In the Sāṅkhya theory of perception, the outer sense-organs are called doors, and the threefold "internal organ" (karaṇa = antahkaraṇa) is the door-keeper, using discrimination as to admitting objects which seek to pass through the doors (Sāṅkhya-kārikā 35).

A favourite context for gates is the "city with nine (or eleven) gates" (=the body, with nine or eleven orifices): e.g. Śvet. Up. 3,18, and Kaṭha Up. V,1; therein dwells the Ātman of the size of a thumb, seated in the citadel (=the heart) like a king (Kaṭha Up. Comm. V,4). (See also Muṇḍ. Up. 2,2,7: brahmapura; and Sāṅkhya-tattvavākyaumūḍī 41: purī ṣeṭe).

A word suggestive of building is mātrā, "that which is used for measuring out; material". As Dr. Heimann has pointed out, the stock translation of -mātra (e.g. cin-mātra) as "only" overlooks the literal meaning, which is "having (cit) as its material". The fact that it has only cit and nothing else as its material is of secondary importance.

We return to the objects found within a house. In the course of a discussion on the relation between letters and the word they form, Vācaspatimīśra says: "It may be in one of two ways that the literal sounds may produce the mental impression of the object, when each is pronounced as a part
of the complete word. Either they may each have the capacity of signifying the object, like pegs (nāga-dantaka, "elephant's tusk"). They were originally of ivory, but the word was later applied to any peg which give support to a hammock hung from them; or they may give support to the meaning as several stones placed together give support to a stool (piṭhara). Both theories are forthwith refuted. In the first case, if the pronouncing of one letter conveyed the notion of the object to the mind, the pronouncing of the other letters would be pointless. In the second case, what is possible for the stones is not possible for the letters, for they are not uttered simultaneously (whereas the stones are arranged at the same time and in the same place). The final conclusion is that the letters are like separate rods of iron, and cannot individually be said to partake of the nature of the word. (Yogasūtras III, 17).

At Syādv. p. 119, St. XVII, the bellows (bhasrā) blown by an intelligent person is cited as an argument for the existence of a soul (which inflates the body).

The chariot or cart was a particular favourite as a symbol from pre-Upaniṣadic days on. Being composed of numerous parts set in a particular arrangement, it comes under the "building" category; and this aspect is uppermost in Brh. Up. 4,3,10. In the previous verse (4,3,9) it is stated that when a man dreams, he takes away some of the impressions of the
waking world, discards his body, and himself builds (nirmāya) a dream body... and himself becomes the light." Further, (A,3,10) in the dream world there are no chariots, nor animals to be yoked to them, nor roads to travel. It is the Self which creates the chariots, animals and roads. No materials are required for this creation, and there is no direct activity; but "in the waking state... the body and organs, illumined by the light of the Self, perform work that (later on) produces the modifications of the mind representing the impressions of the chariot etc." (ibid., Comm.). We meet an elaboration of the theme in Vedāntaparibhāṣā I, where it is said that the appearance of chariots etc. arises through the incidental defects of sleep. Self-luminous consciousness forms the substratum of the chariot, the road beneath it, etc. The perception of the chariot, it should be noted, is only apparent, for the sense-organs cease to function in dreams. And when chariot, etc., vanishes, its destruction is due either to the rise of a second contradictory modification of the mind (vṛttī), or to the destruction of the defects of sleep.

Yājñāvalkya says to Janaka: "As one wishing to go for a long journey would secure a chariot or a boat, so you have fully equipped yourself with many Upaṇiṣads (for your journey after you leave this body)" (Ṛh. Up. 4,2,1). Above (Chap. II, p.46) we have met the grammarians' fancy of "Well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech", which lead one to the heavenly world.
There is a long and detailed passage in the Brhad. Up. (and Comm.), in which the embodied Self is compared to a heavily loaded cart. Just as a cart, packed up with household utensils, mortar and pestle, winnowing fan and cooking vessels, goes on its way creaking under its load, so the Self, when breathing becomes difficult at the time of death, makes noises, as it seeks an outlet from the body. If it be asked, "Why should the Self, about to be united with the Supreme Soul, make noises?", the answer is that the Self, through the subtle body (lingasarīra) and the vital force, which act as its limiting adjuncts, is afflicted by the consciousness of the body's afflictions. (Brh. Up. 4,3,35).

At Maitri Up. 2,3 it is likewise said that the body is like an unintelligent cart (śakaṭa). Further on (2,6) the Ātman is designated its driver, the organs of sense its reins, the organs of action the horses, the mind the charioteer, and character (prakṛti) the whip. In the better-known passage of Kaṭha Up. (3,3, et seq.) buddhi is the charioteer, and manas the reins; the senses are the horses, and the objects of sense the road traversed. (See also below, Ch. VI). And "higher than the senses are the objects of sense" (cf. graha and atigraha).

The simile of chariot and charioteer is also favoured by the Sāṅkhya school, as typifying the relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. For instance: "Everything that has the
nature of the three guṇas must be ruled and guided by another, as the chariot is by the reins (of the charioteer)" (Sānkhya-tattvakaumudī 17). The Jain expresses himself similarly: "The body is ruled over by a definite agent, (i.e. the Soul) because it is the seat of a definite activity (like a chariot)" (Syādv. St. XIX, p. 119).

Among the most famous "chariot" similes is the one in the Buddhist Milindapañha (Trenckner's edition, pp. 27-8). In an argument with King Milinda, Nāgasena, the Buddhist monk, establishes that a chariot cannot be identified with any one of its component parts,—pole, axle, wheel, framework, flagstaff, yoke, reins, or goad. Nor yet can it be regarded simply as the aggregate of all these parts (cf. the Nyāya idea of the whole as separate from the parts). No; it exists in dependence on (paṭicca) each of the parts that there arises the ordinary designation "chariot". In the same way, argues Nāgasena, it is not necessary to assume the existence of a soul, for the name of a person is given on account of the various parts of the body (including consciousness etc.).

A badly performed sacrifice brings harm to the sacrificer, as a one-legged man walking, or a chariot with one wheel, comes to grief. Properly performed, the sacrifice is like a two-legged man walking, or a chariot with both wheels intact. (Ch. Up. 4,16,3-5).
This leads us on to a symbol that is vast in its application,- the wheel. To mention only a few of its metaphorical uses, the wheel (originally a sun-symbol) is the sign of the universal monarch (Cakravartin), and also of him who liberates from worldly ties: Buddha. On the one hand it symbolises the cycle of birth, death and liberation (samsāra and mukti), while on the other the union of its parts represents the inseparability of all beings and all worlds, which are fixed in the Supreme Self, and have no existence apart from it.

Mrs. Rhys Davids ("Zur Geschichte des Rad-Symbols", Sonderdruck Eranos-Jahrbuch 1934) has traced the gradual evolution and degeneration of the wheel-symbol, which began by being associated with progress, the forward motion of the chariot along the road; and ended by being forcibly divorced from its medium, and left to roll around aimlessly, making no progress, and- worse still- catching up the beings who had travelled happily along with it, and forcing them into an endless cycle of misery.

It is not always the chariot wheel that is referred to. Often the wheel in question is that of the potter, or else the wheel by which the buckets in a well are raised and lowered.

From the psychological point of view, the wheel of "tendencies" or mental attitudes is frequently referred to. Thus e.g. in the Yoga system we meet the "six-spoked wheel
of the world", consisting of virtue and vice; pleasure and pain; attachment and aversion; all of which in their turn generate a fresh cycle of tendencies. Thus the exercise of virtue brings pleasure, and pleasure gives rise to attachment; while on the other hand vice begets pain, and pain aversion, and then attachment and aversion respectively produce a new virtue and vice (in another life, or in another person). Here, as ever, there is a positive and a negative aspect to be considered, but the sum-total of both good and bad tendencies is evil, for the "driver of the wheel" is ignorance, leading to rebirth.

The cycle of saṃsāra is described at Brh. Up. (and Comm.) 6,2,15. The souls of ritualists, set on the Pityyāna (for which see below, Chap. VIII), go to the moon, and then come down to earth as rain, enter into the plants, and thence become food for man, and are reborn, thus rotating constantly, like a water-wheel, until such time as they attain knowledge of Brahman, and enter upon the Devayāna, or else attain immediate liberation. "When they know the meditation of the five fires they are freed from this rotation and reach the flame" (= illumination). (Cf. Bhagavadgītā III,14-6, for the wheel of existence and karma: from karma results yajna (sacrifice), from yajna, rain; from rain, food; from food, beings (bhūtāni). And see also Sarv. XI, p. 94).

A very similar illustration is that of the actual buckets
attached to the water-wheel of a well (kūpayantraghaṭikā).
The man who is ignorant of Brahman is likened to such buckets, which alternately rise and fall in the water of a well, and have no stable existence (See Jacob III, pp. 68-9).
Or else, from a more worldly standpoint, fortune is never constant, and the full become empty, and the empty full, like the buckets on the water-wheel ("The last shall be first") (Mṛcchakaṭīkā X, 60).

The vital airs remain for two and a half ghaṭikās in each artery (nāḍī) from sunrise onwards, like the revolving buckets on a water-wheel (Sarv. XV, p. 140).

In the Sāṅkhya philosophy, a favourite illustration is the cakra-bhramaṇa-nyāya, the simile of the (continued) revolving of the potter's wheel. This is used to explain the continued bodily existence of the Yōgin who has acquired the saving knowledge which should liberate him. Just as the potter's wheel continues to revolve even after the potter has withdrawn his hands and staff, and only stops when the effect of the impetus has subsided, so the Yōgin's previous deeds continue to exert an influence even after he has attained samyag-jñāna, "right knowledge". (Sāṅkhya-kārikā 67; cf. also Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 4.1.15, for the same simile from the Vedānta standpoint). Such a man, however, is not affected by good or bad deeds, for he is jīvan-mukta, "liberated while (still) living". A slightly different application occurs
in the Jain chapter of Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha, where it is stated that the previous meditations of the embodied soul for the attainment of mokṣa exert their influence even after they have ceased, and help to bear the soul upward, just as the potter's wheel continues to revolve after hands and stick are withdrawn (Sarv. III, p. 33). (Cf. Mātrī 2, 7, 3, 3).

So much for the wheel as a whole. Its different parts, nave, felloe and spokes, are often mentioned without any reference to the idea of motion. Here are a few examples.

"Everything is fixed in Prāṇa, as the spokes in the nave of a wheel" (Chānd. Up. 7, 14, 1; Praśna Up. II, 6). At Praśna Up. VI, 6, the same figure is applied to the kalās or parts of a person, as centred in Puruṣa. "Just as all spokes are fitted into the nave and felloe of a chariot-wheel, so all beings, all gods, all worlds, all organs, and all individual selves are fixed in the Universal Self, and cannot be separated from it, without damage to the whole." (Brh. Up. 2, 5, 15). Kauś. Up. 3, 9: "Just as the felloe of a chariot is fixed on the spokes, and the spokes on the hub, so the gross elements (bhūta-mātra) are fixed on the organs of sense (prajñā-mātra), and these in their turn on the vital force (prāṇa)". See also Māṇḍ. Up. 2, 2, 6; Śvet. Up. 1, 6; 5, 8; 6, 1; and (a mystic simile) 1, 4. A similar illustration occurred even in the Rigveda (X, 32, 6):
"There was the One, inserted into the everlasting nave, in which all living beings are fixed." (See Sākra-vartin, Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 169).

An alternative application of the simile is when a man's body is likened to the nave of a wheel, and his external trappings, wealth etc., are built around it, like spokes and felloe. Accordingly if a man loses all his worldly possessions, but saves his life, he is regarded as having lost his external trappings, like a wheel losing its spokes and felloe, which may again be added if the nave is intact. (Bṛh. Up., 1,5,15 and Comm.)

Finally, we have an imaginary "wheel", the "alāta-cakra", which illustrates the fallibility of perception (pratyakṣa). Here a rapidly rotating point of light (usually represented by a firebrand) may appear to be a fiery circle or wheel; and in such a case we must make use of anumāna (inference), and infer that our senses are being deluded (See NBT I, p. 12; Yogasūtras I,6-7 (Vācaspatī); II,5 (ditto). Also under "Reality of Fiction"). At Nyāyasūtras III,125, it is said that different perceptions follow one another with lightning rapidity, so that it seems as if they occur simultaneously, as illustrated by the whirling firebrand.

But the reference at Maitri Up. 6,24 "Having pierced through darkness, one sees the Brahman who sparkles like a wheel of fire (alāta-cakra)", the alāta-cakra does not seem
to have the implication of illusion,—merely of brightness.

Most of the other references to daily life can best be dealt with in the next chapter ("Structure of Society"). But as a transition between "arts and crafts" and "social grades" we may take cooking and medicine.

In the Yoga system, different objects are represented as changing the functions or modifications (vṛttī) of the mind, as fire changes the rice when it is cooked (raw and cooked rice (tapālā and pulāka) are two different aspects of the same substance (Vācaspatī on Yogasūtras II,28). And any action is seen in relation to the subject, the instrument and the object. As cooking is seen in relation to Caitra, fire and rice, so also illumination (i.e. neither fire nor the mind can be regarded as self-luminous). (Vācaspatī on Yogasūtras IV,19).

According to the Sāṅkhya, just as food flavoured with the six flavours (sweet, acid, etc.) is prepared (for someone to enjoy), so this body must exist for the use of somebody, viz. the soul. (Sāṅkhyaik. Comm. 17). And just as a person desiring cooked rice sets to work and cooks it, but stops as soon as the rice is ready, so Prakṛti works for the benefit of Puruṣa, but does not continue its work after the soul is released (Sāṅkhyaatattvākaumudī 56).

The Cārvāka, from his purely material standpoint, urges men to grasp visible pleasures. He says, "Men do not refrain
from sowing rice because there are wild beasts (who may devour it); nor do they abstain from putting cooking-pots on the fire, because there are beggars (who may want a share of the contents). We must take the good with the bad,—the fish with its bones, and the rice with its husk."
(Sarv. I, p. 2). (For "imaginary sweets", see "Reality of Fiction").

Charms, elixirs and drugs are often classed together, as producing supernatural results, similar to those obtainable through samādhi (profound meditation). (See for example Yogasūtras IV, 1 and Comm.). When the Cārvāka rejects the authority of inference, he observes that its occasional justification is accidental, just like the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, etc. (For the counteracting of the effects of poison by mantras (spells) see e.g. Upaskāra on Vaiś. Sūtras V, 1, 3).

But the properties of medicine are also discussed semi-scientifically. The three "jewels" of Jainism, when united, bring about liberation, a result which they are unable to achieve separately, just as, in the case of a medicine, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues, and its actual employment, which produce the desired effect. (Sarv. III, p. 27). The Naiyāyika, in denying the existence of the "capacity" (śakti) upheld by the Mīmāṃsaka (who might allege that the medicine worked by reason of this capacity),
says that the drinking of the medicine produces an equilibrium between the three humours, and it is this equilibrium which is the means of the subsequent curing of the disease. (Kusum. I, 11) (Comm.). The seeker after truth is urged to drink the wholesome though bitter medicine of Jain Siddhāntas (Syādv. p. 9, St. III).

Hardly worthy to be classed with medicine, though likewise compounded of herbs etc., are intoxicants. The Cārvāka asserts that intelligence is produced from a mixture of the four elements (alone), just as the intoxicating power is produced from a mixture of kīrṣṇa (ferment, bassia) and (other ingredients having no such power in themselves). (Sarv. I, p. 3)

But, says the Jain, if consciousness is a property of matter, then it should be seen in every particmle of matter, as we see the power of intoxication in intoxicants (madya-angeṣu). (Syādv. p. 132, St. XX).
Chapter V. The immanent story of ancient Indian culture, as reflected in the Upamā.

(b) The Structure of Society.

We shall include in this chapter references (so far as they illustrate various philosophical theories) directly appertaining to people of all social grades, e.g. Brāhmans, kings, ministers, actors, thieves, soldiers, and slaves. Family relationships will also be included; likewise certain physical characteristics or defects affecting men's relations with society; and some legends, e.g. those of Sunda and Upasunda, or Tāla and Betāla.

As the Brāhmans were responsible for the so-called "orthodox" systems, we do not find many uncomplimentary references to their caste, save in Buddhist and Jain texts. (for which see e.g. Tevijja Sutta, Ry Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha Vol. I, p. 298 et seq.; also ibid. p. 105; and Suttaniṭṭha Vagga 3, Sutta 9, where we find that the Arahant is the true Brahman; birth alone does not make a Brahman. There is an uncomplimentary reference in the Jain Syādvādamaṇjarī, p. 69, St. XI, where the Brāhmans are depicted as filling their stomachs with the proceeds of the sacrifices they perform.).

In the orthodox schools, indeed, it is a tacit assumption that a Brāhmaṇ must necessarily be learned and pious. When one sees a young boy fulfilling religious observances (vrata-
dhārin), one is able to assume that his parents are Brāhmans (Sānkhyakārikā Comm. 15). In the same way, the cause is always inferred from the effect; when one sees anything which is composed of the three guṇas (triguṇaḥ mahādaśādiśivame), the natural conclusion is that it is an evolvent of Prakṛti (pradhāna). The Naiyāyika uses this assumption of the Brāhman’s integrity and learning to exemplify a possible "fraud" (chala) in logic: When a man says "This is a Brahman, so he must be possessed of learning and good conduct," his opponent replies "How is that possible? For a Brahman in childhood is not necessarily well-behaved or learned" (Nyāyasūtras, vṛtti, I,54). This is known as sāmānyachala. (Cf. also Comm. on Bṛh. Up. 4,3,7 (beginning), Brāhmans and Vedic learning).

One of the arguments against a (periodical) creation and destruction of the world is "A Brāhman must be born from a Brāhman, but since at the beginning of a creation no one could be a Brāhman (for want of previous merit), you could not establish the succession of Brāhmans in the subsequent period either." The Naiyāyika replies that certain plants (and scorpions) can be produced spontaneously (from manure, etc., and do not necessarily require a generator of their own species. Likewise, though usually a Brāhman springs from a Brāhman, yet there might be spontaneous production (of a Brāhman) at special times, through the action of a
particular fate alone (and this would not clash with the Nyāya theory of different species of effects—"vaijātyasya kāryatā-avacchedakatvāt"—for which see above, Ch. III, p. {67}).

We turn to the king, who is the centre of government. He is commonly supposed to be in the happy position of being able to do as he pleases,—and in this he is classed with a Brāhman, or a child (kumāra) (Brh. Up. 2,1,19: illustrations of the Soul’s experiences in the dream state). As the king does what he pleases in his own realm, so pradhāna disposes the subtle body (īṅgam) in different bodies (Sāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. 42). An illustration of the mutual functions of the three guṇas is the following: A king who strives for the good of his subjects (by enforcing law) brings happiness to the cultured, but misery and bewilderment (moha) to the wicked. Likewise one guṇa (e.g. rajas) may occasionally partake of the functions of the other two (sattva and tamas). (Sāṅkhya-k. Comm. 12).

The king may, however, be restricted in his absolute power by his ministers (cf. Brh. Up. Comm. 5,6,1) or by his treasurer. Thus when the Supreme Self is compared to a monarch (Brh. Up. 4,4,22), it is explicitly stated in the commentary that there is no question in this case of ministers holding sway, for the Self is the independent lord of all beings, from Hiranyagarbha down to a clump of grass. (Cf. also ibid. 2,5,15, Comm.). There is a sidelight
on the deputing of powers to a minister in the commentary on Praṣna Up. VI,3: "As for the illustration that the king is by courtesy called the dees doer, when his minister actually is, that is inapplicable. It is not reasonable to suppose that an unintelligent thing can take heed of circumstances, and work for the good of Puruṣa, and for the attainment of Puruṣa's emancipation". (This is the Vedāntin's argument for the refuting of the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti-Puruṣa combination).

Certain Śivaites hold that though God is the universal agent, he is not independent of the actions (ācārīces, etc.) of human beings, any more than a king, when exercising his bounty, is independent of the treasurer. It should be noted, however, that this does not detract in any way from his power. (Sarv. VII, p. 67). In a Jain list of "obstructions" to right knowledge (āvarāṇa), it is stated that antarāya (intervention) produces obstacles to liberality, as the treasurer (kośa-adhyakṣa) hinders (the king by considerations of economy). (Sarv. III, p. 31). The useful side of the treasurer's work is stressed in the commentary on Bṛh. Up. 3,8,9: "As in life an accountant appointed by his master carefully calculates all items of income and expenditure, so are all divisions of time controlled by the Immutable (aṅśara = Brahman).

When the soul leaves the body, it may be objected that it has no power to take up another, for it is dissociated from the body and organs; and there are no others who, like servants,
wait for it with another body in readiness, as a King's retinue await him with a house for his use. This is the answer: The whole universe is the means to the realisation of the fruits of Karma, and when the soul goes from one body to another in order to fulfil its object, the universe provides the requisite means. Just as when a king is about to arrive, the Ugras (members of a fierce tribe, who sometimes act as policemen) and Sūtas (charioteers or equerries) and village-leaders gather together and wait for him with food, drink and residences, so do all the elements await the person who has realised the fruits of his actions. And just as the Ugras, Sūtas and village-leaders approach the king when he is about to depart, so all the organs approach a man at the time of death, when breathing becomes difficult (ūrdhva-ucchvāsin).

When the individual self departs for the next world, the vital force follows, as the Prime Minister follows the king; and then all the organs such as the organ of speech follow in their turn. (Bṛh. Up. 4,3,37-8; 4,4,2 (Comm.).

At Sāṅkhya-tattvākāumudī 36, the respective functions of the external sense-organs, mind (manas), ahaṃkāra, and buddhi are compared to the functions of various officials in tax-collecting. The village overseers collect the taxes from the people, and pass them on to the governor of the district, who in his turn gives them to the supreme (finance-) minister, by whom they are then presented to the king. In the same way
the senses cognize objects, and then pass the cognition on to manas, which establishes it (saṃkalpya), and passes it on to ahaṃkāra. Ahaṃkāra forthwith applies the cognition to itself (abhimatya), and it finally reaches buddhi, the sarvadhyakṣa, acting on behalf of the puruṣa. At Praśna Up. III,4, there is a reference to the king's appointment of officers to look after villages. Likewise the vital force (prāṇa) eśamadās commands the other prāṇas (the organs—eye, etc.).

The king is also mentioned in connection with the army. When soldiers gain victories or suffer defeat, the fruit or loss accrues to their master, the king, although he has taken no active part in the struggle. Similarly bondage (i.e. saṃsāra) and freedom, existing in the intellect (buddhi), are ascribed to Puruṣa, so long as the distinction between Puruṣa and Praṇā is not realised (Sāṅkhyaśāstra 62; Vyāsa on Yogasūtras I,24 and II,18). As the troops of the village-overseers and other officials are included in the troops of the prime minister, as well as having their own separate functions, so the sense-organs and manas and ahaṃkāra aid in the functions of buddhi, while at the same time performing their own respective duties (Sāṅkhyaśāstra 37).

The army features again in a discussion on the nature of atoms (Nyāyaśāstra II,34 and vyṛtti): "If anyone (i.e. a Buddhist objector) should say that it is like the case of an army, or
a forest, we reply that it is not so, because atoms (ātu) are beyond the range of the senses (atindriya)". That is to say, the Buddhist observes, that though a single man or a single tree may be imperceptible at a distance, yet an army or a forest would be perceived (as a mass) without cognisance of the separate units composing it; could this not be an analogy for an atom or a collection of atoms, say a jar? It could not, says the Naiyāyika, for the condition of perceptibility in the case of an army or a forest, is bulk (mahattva), and this could not apply to atoms, as they have no bulk and are supersensual (atindriya).

Just as a number of men make an appointment to go and attack another body of men, and work in harmony, the lancers handling only their lances and no other weapon, the club-bearers their clubs, the swordsmen their swords, etc., so the various sense organs work in harmony, each having regard to the separate activities of the other organs. If it be objected that the men are animate beings, while the organs cannot work on their own without a guide, the reply is that they all work for the benefit of the Puruṣa; the opponent is referred to the example of the milk and the calf (Sāṅkhyaatattvakaumudī 31).

As an inexperienced archer aims first at large targets and then at small ones, so the beginner in Yoga first learns the nature of the five gross elements etc... and then the subtler ones (Yogas. I. 17, V's gloss). Piercing the centre of a target is a simile for something difficult of accomplishment, such as
the overcoming of worldly temptations, and the acquisition of merit. See Jacob III, p. 78.

It is said at Vaiś. Sūtras III, 20, that plurality of souls is proved by differences of status,—i.e., some folk are rich, others poor. We find a similar contention on page 52 of Sarv. (Ch. V). The Śivaite says that duality is proved by inference. The Lord differs from the individual soul, because the one he is obeyed, and the other obeys: just as a king differs from his servant (bhṛtya). As servants keep their master’s commands, through fear of his displeasure, (lit. "thunderbolt" vajra), so this world, together with sun, moon, planets, etc., obeys the divine law (of Brahman). (Śaṅkara’s Comm. on Kaṭha Up. VI, 2, 3).

Among the many Śāṅkhya similes for the relation of matter and spirit, we find the following: "Just as a good and willing servant exerts himself for the comfort of his master, even though that master is ungrateful and confers no benefits in return, so Prakṛti exerts itself for the benefit of Puruṣa, without expecting any reward.” (Śāṅkhyaatattvākaumudī 60. See also Śāṅkhyaik. Comm. 11: "vyakta is common to all, like a slave who is bought for money (mūlyadāśīvat)"). But further, Prakṛti is represented not only as a slave, but as an unselfish person who works for his friend’s interests as if they were his own (svārtha iva parārtha ārambhah), and does not expect or receive any thanks (Śāṅkhyaśikārikā 56).
There is an amusing simile in Sāṅkara's bhāṣya on Brahmasūtras 3.1.8. Sāṅkara states that when a man returns to earth in a new incarnation after a sojourn in the moon, he brings with him a remnant of past karma, called anuṣaya, just as when oil is poured out of a vessel, some drops still cling to its sides. When it is asked why he does not remain in the moon until the whole of his merit is exhausted, the reply is that, just as a retainer serving in a king's household may eventually find his wardrobe reduced to a pair of shoes and an umbrella, and must then take his departure, so a man is unable to stay in the moon when he is only equipped with a small remnant of merit. (For the chattri-nyāya or maxim of the men with umbrellas, see Jacob I; and cf. dandi-nyāya, "men with sticks", Jacob II, p. 22. See below, "Reality of Fiction", for "shoes on the neck", and "shoes on a foot already shod". For the men bearing the palanquin, see above, Chapter III, p. 71. This simile also illustrates how all the words in a sentence unitedly convey its sense (Nyāyamañjarī p. 397, l. 12).)

Servitude is not always regarded as a degrading state, as we see from the following etymology of dāsya, "slave": "To be a slave to Maheśvara is to be a recipient of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the divine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things according to his pleasure (i.e. from dā, to give) (Sarv. VIII, p. 74).
The Buddhist Madhyamikas hold that the doctrine of Buddha leads on progressively to a total void (sarva-śūnyatā), like the gradual steps of the mendicant (monk) (when he tries to obtain a footing in the house of a rich patron). (Sarv. II, p. 11). Each sense-organ, says the Sāṅkhya, is confined to its own objects (the eye to form and colour, the tongue to flavour, etc.), just as a mendicant lives by alms, and by no other means (Sāṅkhya. Comm. 28). In another passage (ibid. 19) Puruṣa is referred to as neutral, like a wandering mendicant, who goes among villagers who are occupied with their various tasks, such as ploughing, yet is himself indifferent. While the guṇas carry on with their functions, puruṣa is neutral and inactive. Meanwhile, just as ordinary people go about their tasks (kriyā) with the object of attaining freedom from desire, so avyakta (the primal principle) works for the release of Puruṣa (Sāṅkhya. 58).

Speaking of travellers, there is an illuminating proverb employed by Vedāntins: "A man who is already in a village is not anxious as to when he will reach it, as a man in a forest might be". The person whose meditation is fixed on the Self as identified with the vital force (prāṇa-ātman) need not pray for its attainment (for he has already realised his identity with the Supreme) (Brh. Up. Comm. 1,3,28. See also below, "Reality of Fiction"). Cf. also Brh. Up. Comm. 4,4,22:
"A man from Benares who wishes to reach Hardwar, does not travel eastward. And those who seek the three worlds are not entitled to the monastic life.

The importance of having a competent teacher is frequently stressed, e.g., "As when a man is blindfolded and taken out of the land of the Gandharas, and left in an uninhabited district, he may start running forward in any direction, but being a sensible person, when told in which direction the Gandharas lay, he would (when his eyes were unbandaged) ask his way from village to village until at last he found himself back in the Gandhāra country. In the same way a man who has a teacher may attain right knowledge and release." (Chānd. Up. 6,14).

The symbolic application of "path" or "road" (to liberation, etc.) is too well-known to require discussion here. A few references, picked at random, are: Śvet. Up. 6,15; Maitrī Up. 4,1; 6,10; 6,30; Muni. UF. 1,2,1; 3,1,6; Sarv. XIII, end; Sādv. p. 179, St. XXXII.

Travellers were apt to be plagued by highwaymen and thieves, who must have caused great distress to caravans, for Vācaspatimiśra (on Yogasūtras II,30) states that a truth which proves injurious to living beings is not to be regarded as truth: a man who has taken the vow of truth, and is subsequently asked by a gang of thieves whether he has seen a certain caravan pass, is not to be commended for his
veracity if he gives them the directions they are seeking.

When a man who is not himself a thief is seized in company with thieves, and regarded as one, this is taken as an illustration of the nature of Puruṣa, who seems to partake of the characteristics of the three guṇas, though in reality inactive. (Sāṅkhya-kārikā 20). Scoffing at the Buddhist combination of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) and a continuant consciousness (santāna), the Jain says: "Seeking shelter under a "kṣaṇika-santāna" is like being afraid of one robber and seeking refuge with another". (Syādv. p. 125, St. XVIII).

[The punishment for theft was severe, as we see from Ch. Up. 6.16. When a man was seized and accused of theft, he was made to grasp a heated axe, and at the same time protest his innocence. If he was innocent, the axe did not burn him; but if guilty, he was burnt (and subsequently put to death).]

After thieves, it will be appropriate to consider debtors. In the course of an important passage warning the credulous against exclusive belief in the efficacy of rites, it is stated that the ignorant man regards himself as in the debt of the gods, who may hinder him from attaining liberation, because he is useful to them and supports them by sacrifices, etc. When once he has eliminated desire, which includes the wish to be protected by the gods, he can shake himself free of them, and devote his attention to the Self, and thereby attain liberation. (Bṛh. Up. Comm., 1.4.16).
The sthāvaravādin, or advocate of permanence, opposes the following argument to the upholder of kṣaṇikatva (momentariness): "The thing acquires from its progenitor ("cause"-hetu) a nature which keeps it stable for some time, and then allows it to perish," But, says the kṣaṇikavādin, this proves too much: even in the presence of the destroying agent, e.g. the hammer, the object (e.g. a jar) will maintain the nature which prevents its destruction, and so it will never be destroyed, for it will continually take on a new lease of life. An analogy would be the case of the debtor (a merchant) who puts off his creditors from day to day, writing that he will pay them on the morrow. But if may be rejoined that though the nature of a thing is persistent, it eventually perishes when brought into contact with a destroying agent. The kṣaṇikavādin retorts that nothing can alter the nature of a thing. If we see anything perish, we must assume that its perishable nature has been active from the beginning, therefore it must perish as soon as it comes into existence, and the doctrine of kṣaṇikatva is established. (Syādv. p. 104, St. XVI. See also above, p.103, Chapter IV).

For the contretemps of "daybreak near the toll-collector's hut", see below, "Reality of Fiction".

One of the best-known of Sāṅkhya similes is that of the dancer, who, having given her performance, retires from the view of the spectators. In the same way Prakṛti, having
worked for the benefit of Puruṣa, retires when the Puruṣa-artha (= the realisation of the distinction between matter and spirit) has been revealed. This simile is criticised in the Syādvā. p. 100, St. XV, where it is said that the unintelligent Prakṛti is not capable of such thought as is pre-supposed in the analogy. Further, says the Jain, the comparison does not exemplify what is sought to be established, viz. that Prakṛti entirely ceases to work when the Puruṣa-artha is accomplished: for the dancer repeats her performance when the spectators clamour for her. The Jain argues, therefore, that mokṣa (liberation) is an attribute of Puruṣa, and takes place when all karma is exhausted. It is not logical for it to be dependent on the unintelligent Prakṛti, for if Prakṛti is by nature active, surely its activity will never cease? The Sāṅkhya reply,—namely that when the puruṣa-artha is accomplished, Prakṛti automatically retires,—is easily refuted; if Puruṣa is an inactive spectator (cf. prekṣakavat, Sāṅkhya. 65), how can Prakṛti, a senseless active principle, know when to retire?

A kindred illustration is that of the actor. Just as an actor assumes various roles, such as that of Paraśurāma, or Ajātaśatru, or the king of the Vatsas, so the subtle body (liṅgaśarīra) assumes this and that gross body, e.g. that of a man or woman, or of an elephant, or of a tree. (Sāṅkhyaārīka 42; Sāṅkhya-tattvakaumudi ad loc.). The kleśas
or afflictions which exist in the mind do not really affect 
Puruṣa, though they appear to do so. It is as if an actor 
were impersonating Rama, and mimicking all his actions, but 
all the time not losing his own true nature. (Vyāsa and 
Vācaspati on Yogasūtras 1.24). Cf. Maitri Up. 4,2: "Like 
an actor (naṭa), always changing his attire (is the individual 
Soul)". See "Reality of Fiction" for further references to 
actors.

In the Vedānta view, the body is like a wooden puppet 
or toy (yantra), which must be operated by an intelligent 
principle, i.e. the Soul (Ātman) (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 3,4,1; 3,7,1). 
The same analogy is employed by the Jain in his confutation 
of the Śūnyavāda: there must be a soul, for we see that a 
puppet (dāruyantra) does not open and shut its eyes, or move 
its limbs, unless it is worked by an agent with a will of 
his own (Syādv. p. 119, St. XVII) (See also Kusum. II,2,- 
above, Chap. III). With this analogy, compare the view of 
the creation as the "play" (līlā) of the Creator, and see 
for example Bhagavadgītā XVIII,61: "The Lord (Īśvara) dwells 
in the heart of all beings, causing by his creative power 
(māyā) all beings to whirl around, like puppets on a wheel."

Besides being compared to a spectator, Puruṣa is some-
times termed a witness. Just as in daily life plaintiff and 
defendant bring a dispute before a (neutral) witness, so 
Prakṛti shows her activity before the impartial (but intelligent
puruṣa (Sāṇkhya-kārikā 19 Comm.; and Sāṇkhya-tattvākāumudī 19). (cf. also the designation "witness" as applied to Iśvara, Kusum. I,20).

With the exception of painting, this practically exhausts the more frequently mentioned occupations, so far as they illustrate philosophical theories. Painting is in nearly all contexts, an example for something having the (illusory) appearance of reality; accordingly we shall best deal with the subject in the "Reality of Fiction" chapter. We find mention of the (sometimes profitable!) pastime of gambling at Chānd. Up. 4,1,4: "(To him who has right knowledge) all good things will fall, just as the lower throws of the dice fall to the winning throw (kṛta)."

The next topic is the human being in general, including parts of the body. A favourite example (with the Sāṇkhya and Yoga schools) for the operation of the three guṇas is that of the beautiful woman, who inspires sattva (in the form of contentment), rajas (=jealousy) and tamas (=gloom) respectively in her husband, her co-wives, and a man who does not possess her (cf. the same as applied to a jar, Chap. III above) (Sāṇkhya-kārikā 12; and see Yogasūtras II,28 (Vyāsa)). The illustration is carried further in Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras IV,15, where it is sought to establish the plurality of souls (puruṣas). The idea of Caitra differs from the ideas of Maitra, Devadatta, etc.; and one man cannot remember
what another has seen (this is a proverbial saying, for which see e.g. Sarv. VII, p. 69; Vais. Sūtras III, 17; Syādv. p. 117, St. XVII; p. 41, St. VIII; Comm. on Yogasūtras I, 32; IV, 4).

But different people can establish the identity of the object of their ideas. For example, they can come to the conclusion that the same woman is the object of many varying feelings on their part. Therefore the object must be different from the idea regarding it; and there must be a plurality of souls. This interpretation is borne out by the passage in Sāṃkhya-tattvākāraumudī 11, where it is stated that many spectators can remember a single glance from the eyes of a coquettish dancer. If there were nothing apart from consciousness, as the Buddhist Viśānavādins hold, this would not be possible. (Cf. also the Jātāvatāvādins criticism of the Buddhist theory—the pupil would remember an idea passing through the teacher's mind (without its being voiced). Sarv. III, p. 21).

A Sāṃkhya argument for the plurality of souls is that, if another possibility were admitted, everyone would die or become blind when one person died or was blinded (Sāṃkhya-k. Comm. 18). And one cannot say that the soul is really one and indivisible, but differentiated through its various limiting conditions (upādhis), i.e. the different bodies, for then the division of birth, death, and the like would also be dependent on such upādhis. And we do not observe that a young woman dies when her hand is cut off, or is born
when a part of her body such as a breast develops (Sāṅkhya-tattvākaumudī 18).

There is a similar argument, from another angle, in the Commentary on Kusum. I,15; this time the Naiyāyika and the materialist (Gārvāka) are the protagonists. The Naiyāyika says that if the Self were identical with the body, then when a hand was cut off, the body ought not to remember the experiences of that hand, as it would no longer form a material part (upādāna) of the body. The Jain, upholding his view that the soul is conterminous with the body, says that when a hand is severed from the body, it lies throbbing with life, for some "pradeśas" (atomic parts?) of Ītman have gone with it (Syādv. St. IX, pp. 53-4). The Vaiśeṣika, for his part, asserts that the soul is ubiquitous. Otherwise how could people who experience pleasure etc. in the Deccan, still experience such feelings when they move to the midland country (madhya-deśa)? (NBT III, p. 69).

We have noted that the Gārvāka regards the soul as identical with the body. The only liberation, for him, is the dissolution of the body. Among the logicians, on the other hand, a stock example of "upacāracaḥchala" (fraud in respect of a metaphor) is the case in which the opponent quibbles over the expression "I am eternal", saying "How can you be eternal, since you were born of So-and-so?" (Here it is evident that by "I" the speaker meant the soul not the body) (Nyāya-
sūtras I,55, vṛttī).

A man who is attached to one woman does not hate all other women; he may have been attached to others in the past, and there may also be others in the future (Yogasūtras II,4). This illustration concerns the statement that it is not the substance that changes, but the characteristics (cf. the example of gold, above, Ch. IV). Or again, the same woman is regarded differently according as she is thought of as a mother, a daughter, or a sister. (Another example is that of the figure 1, which means something different according as it stands alone or is followed by one, two or three noughts) (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras III,13).

A very similar illustration is found in connection with the Syādvāda, which is stated to be not an assertion of the absolute identity of Being and Non-being, but only an assertion of their relation to the same subject from different viewpoints. Thus one man may be father, son, uncle and nephew, etc.—it is all a question of relativity. Other examples are the many-coloured gem (mecakaratna), and multi-coloured cloth (citrapaṭa), for which see above, Chap. III). (Syādv. p. 149, St. XXIV).

According to the Śāṅkhya, pradhāna is inferred from its resultant effects, which may yet be like or unlike their cause, as a son may be like or unlike his father (Śāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. 8).
The sense-organs are termed "envious kinsmen", because they are born with a person, and turn his attention (through attachment to sense-objects) away from the Self. As soon as a man realises his identity with the Self, his envious kinsmen are crushed (Brh. Up. 1,3,7; cf. also ibid. 2,2,1). A kinsman of noble birth is generally assumed to be unfriendly, owing to the constant rivalries between petty kings and chieftains, and one of the common terms for a king's enemy is the one used here, "bhrātṛya", (cousin).

Prakṛti's manifestation to Puruṣa, and subsequent disappearance, is charmingly illustrated by the analogy of a woman of noble family, who keeps herself withdrawn from the sight of strange men, but who one day is accidentally seen by one, and ever after is most careful to prevent such a thing from recurring (Sānkhyatattvavākaumudī 61). There is a variation on page 124 of Sarv. (Chap. & XIV): a woman whose faults have been seen by her husband does not return to him.

Coming once again to the theory of momentariness, we meet the examples of hair and nails, which grow and are cut. The kṣaṇikavādin says that an apparent recognition of a jar as the same jar that was observed a moment ago, may be due to similarity, as in the case of hair, nails, etc. that have been cut and have grown again. The Vedāntin, or Naiyāyika opponent of the Buddhist replies that in this case the re-
cognition is due only to an identity of species; we do not assume that the hair and nails have not altered, even though they appear identical. But in the case of a jar we have no evidence of growth, and proof that it is not the same jar as the one of a moment ago (See Kusumāñjali Comm. I,17). The same analogy is employed by the Naiyāyikas in an argument against the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the eternity of sound. The Mīmaṃsaka holds that we can recognise e.g. the letter g as the same letter that we have heard before. Such a recognition, says the Naiyāyika, is only due to identity of species, as in the case of a man's hair which has been cut and has grown again, or of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh (Sarv. XII, p. 104). (Cf. also Syādv. p. 135,St. XXI).

The living (soul) is to be known as a part of the hundredth part of the end of a hair, divided again into a hundred, yet it is fitted for infinity. (Svet. Up. 5,9). (Cf. the same simile as applied to the arteries which converge in the pericardium, Kauṭ. Up. 4,19; Bṛh. Up. 4,2,3). For the (erroneous) vision of a mass of hair (instead of a number of single hairs), see below, "Reality of Fiction".

The Yogi who is striving for liberation is particularly sensitive to the & "stream of pain" (duḥkhasrotas), consisting of the effects of good and bad actions. It is said (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras II,15) that the enlightened may be compared to the eyeball, and the effects of karma to a thread
of wool. When such a thread comes into contact with any of the other organs or parts of the body, it does not have much effect; but when it so much as touches the sensitive eyeball, it causes distress. Similarly the Yogin is sensitive even to future pain, which would not affect an ordinary person.

The physical affliction of blindness is frequently referred to. A purposeless regressus in infinitum is symbolised by "a continuous series of blind men" (andhā-paramparā) (e.g. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 2,2,30.37). And those who think themselves wise, though really dwelling in the midst of ignorance, go about being tormented in their bewilderment, like blind men being led by a blind man (Mūṇḍ. Up. 1,2,8; Maitri Up. 7,9).

But though the physical sight and hearing may be destroyed, the sight and hearing of the Ātman is constant; e.g. a blind man may see his brother in a dream, or a deaf man hear a mantra (Ait. Up. II,1 (p. 64, Anand. Edn.). And two men who are afflicted with diverse physical defects may join forces and so accomplish their object. The best-known instance of such a union is probably the Sāṅkhya parable of the lame and the blind, each of whom can make up for the fault which the other lacks (the lame man mounting on the blind man's shoulders and directing him). Having worked in harmony until their purpose, viz. finding
a way through the forest, is accomplished, they separate.

In the same way creation is brought about by Prakṛti and Puruṣa combined (just as a son is born through the union of man and woman,—cf. Sāṅkhyak. Comm. 12: guṇas are anyonyamithunāḥ; and Sarv. VIII, p. 78), and Prakṛti leaves Puruṣa when Puruṣa's liberation is accomplished, while Puruṣa, having seen Prakṛti, goes to kaivalya (liberation) (Sāṅkhyakarika 21). (Cf. Maitrī Up. 4,2: "(the individual soul before attaining liberation) is bound as a cripple (paṅgu) by the bonds of the fruits of good and evil (deeds)").

Another parable, employed by the followers of the Pratyabhijñā-darśana, or "recognitive" system, is that of the girl and her lover. A girl hears of the many good qualities of a certain suitor, falls in love with his description, and writes to him, begging him to visit her. When he arrives, she fails to see the qualities she has heard of, and is unhappy. But when her friends point them out to her, and she gradually recognises them, she becomes quite satisfied and contented. In the same way, although it may be generally known that the personal self is identical with the Supreme Soul, this knowledge produces no satisfaction; but as soon as the spiritual preceptor has taught each individual to recognise in himself the attributes of Maheśvara, such as omniscience and omnipotence, he is satisfied (Sarv. VIII, p. 79).
The Vedāntins make use of a similar parable to illustrate the union of the individual soul with Brahman. A certain prince was left as an infant in the home of a hunter (vyādha), and brought up by the hunter as his own son. Thinking that he was himself a hunter, he performed the duties of one until one day a kind man told him who he was, and he then, knowing himself to be of royal blood, set about regaining his kingdom. Similarly the individual self, which is of the same category as the Supreme Self, has become separated from it through ignorance, and has assumed to itself the attributes of the body which limits it. But when a spiritual preceptor points out the identity of individual and Supreme Self, the individual becomes convinced of his high station, and abandons the pursuit of mundane objects.

A student of Western philosophy, when examining the similes current among the Indian philosophical systems, cannot fail to be struck by the intermixture of analogies from daily life and from mythology and legend. For example, the drinking of the ocean by Agastya, or the conversion of the kingdom of Daṇḍaka into a forest, were accredited instances of the supernormal powers of Yogins (See e.g. Vyāsa on Yogasūtras IV,10). Other legendary or demi-legendary figures were Nahaṣa, Dhruva, and Nandīśvara (see e.g. Bhāṣya on Yogasūtras II,12-3), all of whom underwent unusual transmigrations, owing to the effects of special karma.
The Sâṅkhyin says: It must not be thought that because the three guṇas are mutually contradictory, that they therefore destroy each other, like (the two mythological brothers) Sunda and Upasunda. On the contrary, they bring about a common object (like the three bodily humours, which cause illness if their balance is disturbed, but keep the body healthy when working in harmony). (Sâṅkhya-atâttvâkâumûdī 13).

According to the Jain, different rival systems fight amongst themselves, and destroy each other like Sunda and Upasunda, leaving the Jina supreme (Syâdv. p. 154, St. XXVI). Another legendary pair of demon brothers was Tāla and Betâla, whose example is quoted in connection with the erroneous attribution of characteristics where they are not applicable (as Tāla, Bâliah, really not affected, went away as well as Betâla when an offering of blood was given to the latter (Sarv. XII, p. 106).

Here again is evidence of the concrete outlook which does not permit of any hard and fast division between real life and fiction. We shall have more to say on the subject in Chapter IX ("Reality of Fiction"), but now we pass from the world of humans and superhumans to the animal kingdom.
Chapter VI.

The Animal World in Comparisons.

Striking features of animals are made use of by philosophers to illustrate their theories. The extreme frequency of the jar among inanimate objects is in the animal world paralleled by that of the cow. This is quite natural, for just as the jar is the most useful and common article in every-day life, so the cow - the giver of sustenance - is the most valued and indispensable of animals.

We have already seen (above, p. 54) how jar and cow are classed together as representing modifications of earth (prthivī). The familiar figure of the cow is easily recognizable, and can be pointed out without difficulty. Accordingly, when an objector complains that the Self has not been fully described, the Vedāntin replies: "Brahman has none of these distinguishing marks. Hence it cannot be described as we can describe a cow by saying "There goes a white cow with horns" (Brh. Up. Comm. 2,3,6; cp. also 3,4,2 where a horse is also mentioned). Some say (wrongly, according to Śaṅkara) that the self is an entity that has both unity and difference, just as a cow is one as a substance, but has special characteristics, the dewlap etc. which differ from each other (Brh. Up. Comm. 4,3,30). Perhaps the only comparison of Self with cow permitted by the Vedāntin Vedāntin is the following: "Just as in the world one may find a missing animal, such as a cow, by searching it
through its footprints, - similarly when the Self is attained, everything is automatically attained" (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 1,4,7).

The cow has no independence, but is subject to its owner. Similarly, a man who does not know the true nature of the Self, and who worships the gods thinking that they are different from himself, becomes subject to them and is used in their service as a cow is used for carrying loads or yielding milk (Bṛh. Up.1,4,10). See also Sarv. VI & VII; p. 66: the master, the cattle and the fetter (= the Lord, the soul & the world). In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga philosophy, the guṇas are represented as unchanging, though they appear to be possessed of the characteristics of the phenomena in which they reside, and therefore seem subject to birth and death, etc., just as we consider a man to have become poor when his cattle die, though there is no actual destruction of his own substance (Vyāsa on Yogasūtra II,19).

A propos of the cow we meet the usual discussion as to the nature of the Universal and the Particular. The vital force (prāṇa) pervades the bodies of all creatures, from an ant up to an elephant, as the essential characteristics of a cow (gotvā) are present in each individual cow (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 1,3;22). Although such eternal things as the ether are beyond the grasp of sense, the nature of a cow is eternal (and perceptible)
The Vaiśeṣika (Syādv. p. 36, st. XIII) asserts that the universal Being (sattā) is not a substance (dravya), because the characteristic of a substance is that it should be made of many constituents or of no substance, but never of a single constituent substance. Like dravyatva, sattā resides in each dravya; and nothing that resides in a single dravya can be a dravya itself. As the Universal "Being" (or "existence") is present in a single substance - e.g. gotva in a single cow no less than in many cows, - it cannot itself be a substance. Another proof of its unsubstantiality is that you cannot ride aśvatva or milk gotva, for you require for that the real particulars and not abstract universals (Syādv. p. 86, st. XIV).

From the logical point of view it may be argued that the Universal which applies to one particular species is not properly universal at all. When we see cows we see particular cows, each with its own special shape and colour; we see no such thing as sāmānya - universal essence - of cows. Further, is this sāmānya one or many? If one, is it everywhere or only at particular places? If it is everywhere, why is it not found in the space between this cow and that cow? Besides, if it is one, existing everywhere, why does not gotva include also jars and cloths as well as cows? (Syādv. p. 86, st. XIV). The position is stated in the Nyāyabinduṭṭika: "The intervals between
the particulars include other particulars, as well as ether, (अकाश), which is destitute of particulars. Although the Universal "cow" is perceived in some particulars, it is not perceived in others, e.g. in horses etc; nor in ether. It follows that it is absent in these places." (NBT III, p. 87).

This distinction between different individuals of different species, as we shall see later ("Reality of Fiction") formed a ground for the statement of impossible (or unlikely) changes of nature, e.g. "a cow cannot become a horse". When we see a cow, we not only think of its likeness to other cows, but also observe its distinction from other animals such as buffaloes, horses, etc. (An "anvikāntika" (inconclusive) inference is "it is a cow, because it has horns" (i.e. it might also be a buffalo)). But we may also say that there is no complete similarity between two cows (e.g. Vyāsa on Yogasūtras III,53: a black-eyed cow, an auspicious cow, etc.); their likeness only becomes evident through their common contrast with horses, for example (e.g. Vācaspati on Yogasūtras III,13)—and on the other hand cow and horse, as representatives of animate beings, are united in opposition to inanimate objects, such as jar and cloth. The all-embracing Universal, "existence", is differentiated by being resident in cows, horses, etc.; but these sub-species are not really separate, for they all form part of the summum genus. (See Sarv. XIII, p. 117). And, from a purely practical standpoint, diverse objects may be
united in a common purpose, or through a common attribute. Thus wick, oil and fire together form a lamp; and a number of animals, - cow, horse, buffalo, and elephant, - modify into a single substance, salt, when they are thrown together into a saltmine. Similarly the three guṇas, although differing, may be united in a single function (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras IV,14).

The cow is used as an illustration of the incompatibilities of thought and language. The word, object, and idea "cow" are recognised as distinct from one another, and appear as such to the Yogin in savitarka-samādhi. In nirvitarka-samādhi, on the other hand, the object alone, cow, jar, etc., is reflected in buddhi, which is "sva-rūpa-śūnyā" (void of its own form, i.e. not conceiving any ideas, but merely occupied with the realisation of the concrete object). (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras I, 42-3)(Cf. ibid. III,3, and Vyāsa; also III,17). For the logical-etymological point of view, see Nyāyabinduṭṭikā I, p.8: "If the proper use of a the word involved nothing but dependence on the senses, then sense-knowledge (or sensation) alone could be called direct knowledge of the object signified, but not mental sensation, etc. Thus it is that the word go "cow", although it is derived (sic!) from the root gam, "go", is generally accepted as denoting a cow, whether moving or not." (Cf. also Sarv. XIII, e.g. p. 114; 117).

The likeness of the gavaya (bison) to a cow, forming the
stock example of the use of upamāna (comparison) as means of evidence, has been referred to above, Chapter. I.

The horns of a cow come into existence simultaneously, but are not related as cause and effect. Therefore it cannot be said (by the Buddhist) that perception and object are simultaneous, for they are related as cause and effect. (see Sarv. III, p. 21; Syādv. p. 102, St. XVI; and Vācaspati on Yogasūtras I, 32).

The most important function of the cow is the providing of milk. A picturesque Sāṅkhya simile is that of the milk and the calf: "Just as the unconscious milk (produced from grass and water consumed by the cow) streams forth for the benefit of the calf (that it may grow), and when the calf has grown, disappears, so too does Prakṛti, which is itself without feeling, work for the release of Puruṣa." (Sāṅkhya-karikā 27, and 57). In Brh. Up. (5, 8, 1 and Comm.) we are told that one should meditate on Speech (Vāc) as a cow, producing food for the gods in place of milk. Her bull is the vital force, and her calf the mind. (Cf. Sarv. XIII, p. 112: "Word (Śabda), rightly used, because the desire-milking cow (Kāmadhuk) in heaven."

Milk is an excellent example of satkārya (the production of the existent from the existent); we know that it is present in the cow, and no-one can say that it is unreal or non-existent prior to manifestation; but the cow must be milked before the
milk is manifested (Sāṅkhya-tattvakaumudi 7,9). Further, milk itself has the potential power of being modified into curds, just as the whole universe is a modification (vikāra) of original matter, but is not essentially different from it. (See e.g. Vācaspati on Yogasūtras I,24). In Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 2,1,24, it is urged that Brahman has in himself the power to produce the world, just as the power to produce curds resides in milk. An objector may say that the action of heat is necessary for the production of curds, so that milk is not the sole agency. The reply is that if the power to produce curds were not always present in milk, no amount of heat etc. would engender it. The case for satkārya is stated succinctly in Sāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. 9: "He who desires something takes its material cause (upādāna); he who wants curds takes milk, not water. Therefore the effect is existent (in the cause)".

The Naiyāyika points out that when milk is once changed into curds, it does not become milk again (Nyāyasūtras II,111; and 118 (vṛtti). The Buddhist kṣanikavādin uses the transformation of milk into curds as an illustration of the moment-to-moment change in substances; but the Naiyāyika retorts that in the case of milk and curds, we actually see the change taking place (and this is no reason for assuming that a similar change is going on in, say, a stone). The Sāṅkhya, in his turn, points out that the milk does not vanish, it only undergoes modification, and manifests new qualities (Nyāyasūtras III, 81-3).
Milk is no exception to the rule that objects of everyday life are used to illustrate metaphysical problems: "Like butter in curds (or milk)... so is the Atman grasped in one's own soul." (Svet. Up. 1,15-6) (and cf. ibid. 4,16). Ghee does not have its original nature destroyed by being heated; similarly the light of pure intelligence does not change (through having distinguishing attributes temporarily superimposed upon it). See Maitri Up. 7,11 (and Rāmatīrtha's Comm. ad loc.). Just as, when curds are churned, the most subtile portion rises upwards, and become butter; likewise when food is eaten, the most subtile portion rises upwards, and becomes mind. Likewise the most subtil portion of water when drunk becomes prāṇa; and of fire (tejas), speech. (Ch. Up. VI,6,1).

The eternal sweetness of the milk of cow, goat, buffalo, etc., is used by the Jains as an analogy for the endurance of the quality "sthiti" (Sarv. III, p. 31). And "as in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, etc., there exists, by its excessive or scanty nature, a special capacity for producing its several effects (curds, butter, etc.), so in the different material bodies produced by our actions (karma-pudgala) there exists a special capacity (anubhāva) for producing their respective effects." (ibid., p. 31-2).

For "milk and cowdung", see "Reality of Fiction". A mixture of milk and water signifies an intimate union between two things (an example of anupalabdhi- see Chap. I; also a
The swan is popularly supposed to have the power of separating milk and water; see e.g. Kaṭha Up. Comm. II, 2: "The wise man considers the relative importance of the good and the pleasant, and divides them as a swan divides milk and water, and follows the good." (for milk is the symbol of purity.

As the cow is the giver of sustenance, so the bull is the symbol of virility. The hymns of the Veda are packed with references to the bull who rains down (parjanya); and in Sāṅkhya-kārikā 13 (Comm.), the quality of rajas is illustrated by two bulls who are incited to wrath when they meet.

The philosophers sought to make the mysterious vital force (prāṇa) more understandable by personifying it as various animals, notably the calf and the horse. Thus in the Brh. Up. (2,2,1): "He who knows the calf (śisū) with its resting-place, its special resort, its post and its tether, kills his seven envious kinsmen". Here the "calf" is the vital force, strength its post, and food its tether (which holds it chained within the body); while the sense-organs in the head are the envious kinsmen.

But when the vital force rebels against its captivity, and seeks to escape from the body, it is likened not to a docile calf, but to a fine strong horse, who tears at the pegs to which his feet are tied (paḍvīśaśāṅku) (Brh. Up. 6,1,13; Ch. Up. 5,1,12; cf. also Comm. on Brh. Up. 2,5,19; and Ch. Up. 8,12,3;
"Prāṇa is yoked to the body, as a draught-animal is yoked to a wagon".

In the famous Kāṭhaka simile of the chariot, the senses (indriya) are represented as horses, which may either be well-controlled by the chariot-driver (buddhi), or unrestrained, when they are allowed to roam at will (Kāṭha Up. 3.3-5; cf. also Maitri 2.3-4; Svet. Up. 2,9; and Śāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. 17: "The chariot with spirited horses goes smoothly through the supervision of the charioteer; likewise the body through the supervision (adhigṛbhanāt) of the soul". Elsewhere (Ch. Up. 8,13,1) the horse is a simile for the Soul, which, in perfecting itself, shakes off evil as a horse his hairs; and shakes off the body, as the moon releases itself from Rāhu's mouth.

It is typical of the all-embracing nature of Indian thought, that an illustration drawn from daily life is here found side by side with one from mythology, and that both are designed to clarify the mystical course of liberation. (see also the description of a symbolic horse sacrifice, where the different parts of the horse represent parts of the universe; Bh. Up. 1,1,1-2). Lastly, an example of an inference which is entirely fallacious is "because it has horns, therefore it is a horse" (Vaiś. Sūtras III,1,16; and see "Reality of Fiction").

The donkey, being inferior to a horse, cannot hope to catch up with a man mounted on horseback, and bring back what he has carried off. In like manner, a statement established
through the authority of Sruti cannot be contradicted by Smṛti, mere secular knowledge (e.g. Tantravārtika 1,3,3). The donkey's braying serves to guide people in the dark (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 4,3,5). For the imaginary "donkey's horn," see "Reality of Fiction". Practically the only specific references to the donkey's relation, the mule, are in connection with the current belief that a she-mule dies when in foal. (aśvatarī-garbha-nyāya). As her offspring, the foal, is the cause of the mule's death, so knowledge, which springs from ignorance, forthwith destroys its source (ajñāna) (Raghunātha. See Jacob II, p. 5). A kindred saying is the vṛścikī-garbha-nyāya, referring to the female scorpion.

Sheep and goats are not greatly in favour as symbols for philosophical theories. Probably the most important reference to the goat is the cryptic expression, found for the first time at Śvet Up. 4,5, "eka eva ajā..", the one (unborn) goat, with three sons, red, white and black (i.e. the three guṇas of Sāṅkhya). This goat represents the material principle, Prakṛti; but the pun on "a-ja" is of more importance than the actual animal. The maxim of the "she-goat and the sword" (ajā-krpanīya) illustrates an accidental happening (see Jacob I).

As regards sheep, a continuous stream of sheep signifies blind imitation of others (as with us in Europe); while the psychological effect of certain mental impressions is compared to grey sheep's wool (pāṇḍvāvikam) (Bṛh. Up. 2,3,6; see also
Among domesticated animals, the dog is usually regarded as a symbol of impurity; thus even a severe penance, when vitiated by desire, produces only disgust in the Lord, like milk (or butter- pāyasa) that has been licked by a dog (Sarv. XV, p. 137). Even cow's milk becomes impure when kept in a vessel made of dogskin. Likewise those teachings of the Buddha which seem to correspond with Śruti, have no authority (for Brāhmans), and are not to be regarded as salutary (Jaiminīya- nyāyamālāvistara, 1,3,4). But the faithful watchdog deserves man's gratitude: see e.g. Hitopadesa II,3.

Patañjali illustrates the vārtika "ekadeśa-vikṛtam- ananyavat" by saying "the cutting off of a dog's ears or tail does not turn it into a horse or a donkey"; while the attempt to straighten a dog's tail is an illustration of wasted effort (See "Reality of Fiction").

The striking feature of the cat is its ability to see in the dark; and therefore in the Nyāyasūtras, III,38, for example, the peculiar light which can be observed in the dark in the eyes of cats and other feline creatures is considered to strengthen the hypothesis that there is also such a light in the form of a subtle substance in human eyes, constituting the sense of sight. In the case of cats, et.c., the connection of eye with object suffices to cause perception, without external light; but the human eye requires light to enable the connection
of eye and object to be effective.

Cat and mouse, like snake and ichneumon, fawn and lion, and other antipathetic pairs, illustrate two things which are naturally inimical, like truth and untruth. In the life of the jungle, the ruling principle is the "survival of the fittest."

Among semi-domesticated beasts of burden, the elephant and the camel are most frequently mentioned. The elephant, a large animal with a distinctive shape, is an example for perception, which must take precedence over inference: "If one sees an elephant, one does not need to infer its existence through its foot" (or its trumpeting) (Kumārila, Tantravārtika p. 87; Upaskāra on Vaiś. Sūtras III,2,10). In this connection there is the usual converse to be considered,- if we seem to see an elephant in what is really a lump of clay or a heap of straw, our vision must be defective. And similarly our consciousness, because we are blinded by illusion, appears in a form which in reality it does not possess. But see Vedāntasāra 195: "In the state of savikalpa-samādhi, the revelation of the Absolute (advaita) shines forth even in spite of continued consciousness of duality, as in the case of seeing a clay elephant, we know that it is of clay."

The parable of the elephant and the blind men (Syādv. p. 86, St. XIV) provides an analogy for different views, each partially true, held e.g. in regard to the relation of samānaya and vīśeṣas (whether the particular, or the genus, can be regarded
as the sole reality, or whether a mixture of the two). Each blind man grasps one particular part of the elephant, and forms his concept of the animal accordingly; the complete picture is not realised by any of them, nor is it made up of the sum total of the partial aspects, but on the other hand each one realises a portion of the truth, which would be complete for one in possession of all his senses. (See also ibid. p. 129, St. XIX. This simile is also used to illustrate the different views held by the ignorant about Iśvara or Brahman, among Vedāntins). Elsewhere (Syādv. p. 122, St. XVIII) the doctrine of momentariness is admitted by the Jain to contain a partial truth, like the gaja-nimīlika, elephant's blinking. (The elephant is supposed to keep only one eye open at a time, when looking from side to side).

Error, incompetence, and contentment (viparyaya, aśakti, tuṣṭi) are represented in Sāṅkhya philosophy as forming a goad, prior to acquiring siddhi (the attainment of right comprehension, or, more usually, supernatural powers. Siddhi leads to tattva-jñāna; and tattva-jñāna to mokṣa). Just as the goad or hook of the elephant-driver keeps the elephant in check, so people who are mastered by these three tendencies become subject to ignorance; therefore one should avoid them, as the elephant avoids the hook (Sāṅkhya 51; and STK ad loc.). It is characteristic that it is the elephant's point of view that is considered here, not the driver's.
Apart from a few general references, which might apply equally well to any other animal, the camel is mentioned specifically in connection with its habit of eating thorns. Saṅkara, in disagreeing with the Sāṅkhya theory that things in themselves cause pain or pleasure or bewilderment, says that the differences in people's own tendencies (bhāvanā) (or agreea), produce varying effects on the part of the sense-objects (Brahmasūtrakhaśya 2,2,1). Anandagiri's comment contains a reference to the peculiar pleasure experienced by a camel in eating thorns. (Cf. "one man's meat is another man's poison"). This practice led to the camel's being looked down upon, and regarded as an outcast among its fellow-animals: "of what use is this thorn-eater to us?" (Pañcatantra I,8; Hitopadeśa 4,9). Cf. Kusum. III,12, upamiti, where the description of a camel, with a long neck, and eating thorns, leads to the (re-)cognition of such an animal when it is seen later.

There are three timid animals which feature frequently in proverbial sayings produced in polemical discussions with the object of refuting the opponent: the deer, the hare, and the mouse. A weak argument is dubbed as effective as "a young deer's standing up to a full-grown lion (or hyena)" (Sarv. XI, p. 97, etc.); while an impossible argument is likened to the horns of a hare or of a mouse, or to the expectation of germination from a seed eaten by a mouse (Sarv. II; X; etc. See also "Reality of Fiction").
In the Pāli Buddhist scriptures, citta (mind, consciousness) is repeatedly likened to an ape or monkey, inquisitive, inconstant, and insatiable: "Just as an ape in the forest, roaming through the woodland, clutches a bough, lets go and clutches another, so is what is called citta, mind, ever changing as it arises and ceases" (Samyoutta-Nikāya II, 95; quoted by Mrs. Rhys Davids). This is a concrete simile which has found frequent depiction in Buddhist symbolic art.

When we see a monkey jumping about in a tree, we do not need to infer that the tree is moving as well as the monkey. There is a lengthy argument on the subject of the "conjunctions and disjunctions" of monkey, tree and space, on p. 194 of Nyāyakandali (summarised by Randle, page 113 of "Indian logic in the Early Schools"). Srīdhara holds that motion is perceptible, and does not need to be inferred from "conjunctions and disjunctions."

We may also mention a mediaeval simile concerning bhakti, "participation" between soul and God. The Vadagalais or followers of the Northern school of Rāmānuja, held that liberation through the favour of Viṣṇu was only possible when the devotee co-operated actively, as a young monkey holds fast to its mother when she is carrying it to a safe place. The Tengalais, or followers of the Southern school, were of the opinion that man must throw himself entirely upon the mercy of God, like the kitten which is carried in its mother's mouth, without itself
being active. (See Glasenapp, Der Hinduismus, München 1921, p. 386).

The lion and tiger complete our list of the mammals which find favour as philosophical illustrations. The lion's glance (śīṃha-āvalokana), i.e. looking forward and backward, is applied to a word in a sentence, which is connected with what precedes and with what follows; or it sometimes refers to a recapitulation of subject-matter (e.g. Sāṅkhya-tattvākāumudi 7). The "lion in the forest" exemplifies two things which mutually aid or protect each other.

A favourite figure is the narāśīṃha-nyaya, the union of man and lion. The Jains use it to exemplify the complexity of existence: things are neither exclusively permanent (nitya), nor exclusively impermanent, but are in reality both, a complexity like the man-lion or cock-serpent (kukkuṭṭha-sarpa). The same applies to bheda-abheda, a distinct category of existence (Syādv. p. 20, St. V; p. 128, St. XIX). The Rāmānujas argue against this view, asserting that the man-lion or the elephant-headed Ganeśa are not really complex or multiform, for the separate parts have separate natures, complete in themselves, and no true connection with each other. Therefore these examples are inapplicable to such doctrines as existence and non-existence at one and the same time, because they both exist, though in their separate parts they are incongruous. (Sarv. IV, p. 37). Note that both Jains and Rāmānujas take
it for granted that beings with two separate existences can exist (See "Reality of Fiction"). The "man and lion" figure is also used in Alāṅkāra.

The tiger in India is the best-known and most feared of wild animals. The Indian equivalent of "between the devil and the deep" is "ito vyāghraḥ itastatā" (on the one side a tiger, on the other a precipice), and this is applied to philosophical dilemmas from which no outlet is apparent. (e.g. Syādv. p. 122, St. XVII). In the Brh. Up. Comm. 1,4,10, the gods are represented as being distressed over the loss of a worshipper (through his attaining right knowledge), just as a man is distressed when one of his domestic animals is seized by a tiger. (See also Vācaspatimisra on Yogasūtras I,31). The vision of a tiger ready to pounce, as revealed to a man in darkness through a flash of lightning, is used as an instance of the (practically) simultaneous production of perception, conviction, application to oneself, and effort (adhyavasāya, properly "mental effort", but here it seems to include both the decision and the subsequent action of running away) (Śāṅkhya-tattvākaumudī 30).

Among reptiles, the snake easily carries off the honours as prime symbol and illustration. The uncanniest and deadliest of all animals, it inspires fear and awe through its mysterious properties, namely its distinctive shape and (seemingly) inexplicable gliding motion (the snake is commonly called
gūḍha-pāda, "having hidden feet", and it is said that only a snake can see a snake's legs), its glittering eye and forked tongue, the periodical shedding of its skin, and—most fearsome of all,—its power of inflicting almost instantaneous death by an injection of venom. All these characteristics find abundant mention in Indian literature, and provide the foundation for an extensive serpent cult in which snakes of everyday life and of mythological fame flourish side by side.

In the philosophical texts, the most frequent mention of the snake is in connection with the mistaken notion that a rope in the dark is a coiled serpent (See "Reality of Fiction", but note that owing to taboo notions a snake is euphemistically referred to as "rope", "toothed rope", etc.).

The casting of the slough naturally suggested an allegory for reincarnation, and eventually for final liberation. For instance: "Just as the dead slough of a snake, when cast off, would lie on the anthill, so does this body lie... but that which is bodiless and immortal, the vital force (prāṇa), becomes pure Brahman, and pure brilliance (tejas)." (Brh. Up. 4,4,7; and cf. Comm. on Praśna Up. V,5). The ant-hill is recognised as the usual haunt of snakes (especially cobras), and this connection is exemplified e.g. in the Vammika-sutta (No 23) of the Majjhima-Nikāya. Here an allegory represents the human body as an anthill, at the bottom of which a cobra lies concealed,—symbolising the "Almsman in whom the cankers are
no more." (Vogel, Indian Serpent-Lore—additional notes).

The number of references to the snake's poison and bite is too large to be dealt with at any length. As far as philosophical significance is concerned, the likening of the senses and sense-objects to dangerous serpents immediately suggests itself. Puns on "grasping" (graha and atigraha, etc.) are made more complete by comparison with deadly reptiles, while the connection of senses and objects is made very clear by exaggeration, as in Maitri Up. 4,2: "Like one bitten by a great snake—bitten by objects of sense" (the objects being definitely active). Cf. Sarv. XV, p. 141: "The serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of the breath."

A snake's poison is supposed to contain the devouring power of fire, and accordingly the snake is regarded as an eminent possessor of the semi-magical quality tejas. When knowledge has been attained, the power of avidyā (ignorance) is as negligible as that of a snake whose fangs have been removed (Sureśvara's vartika on Bräh. Up. bhāṣya 1,4,1746). (see also Vācaspati on Yogasūtras II,55,—the connection between a serpent and its poison, as an analogy for the poison of the kleśas). Though its poison is deadly when inflicted on others, the snake itself is not affected by it. In the same way, although Brahman is the substratum of ignorance (avidyā), yet the effect of ignorance is seen only in and through created beings. A dogmatic statement which defeats its own end (e.g. "nothing
is known") is compared to a snake biting its own body (Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka p. 67).

The pain consequent on attachment to worldly pleasures is forcibly illustrated by the simile of a man who, being afraid of the bite of a scorpion (=non-attachment, loneliness), is bitten by a poisonous snake. (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras II,15).

(for the spontaneous production of scorpions, see Kusum. II,2).

The snake and the ichneumon are quoted as examples of innate hostility between two things (e.g. Pañcatantra V,2; and Ātmatattvaviveka p. 53); and, like the cat and the mouse (see above, Chap. I), they illustrate "proof from non-existence" (abhāva). I.e. when we see that the ichneumon is absent from its usual haunts, we conjecture that its natural enemy the snake is present (though there is no true vyāpti here) (Nyāyasūtras II,7). Conversely, if we see a snake getting angry, we infer that an ichneumon is hidden in the bushes (Upaskāra on Vaiś. Sūtras III, 1,13).

In the Vedānta, the relation of the Supreme Self and the individual soul is regarded as analogous to that of the snake and its coils. Viewed as a whole the snake is one, undifferentiated, but an element of difference appears if we view it with regard to its coils, hood, and so on (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 3,2,27). This simile may be compared with those of lake and water, or forest and trees (Chap. VII below). In a different application, the serpent's coils are used to exemplify the relation of jñāna
and karma. The Vaiśeṣika asks, "If there is no distinction (bheda) between jñāna and karma, how is their relation of agent and instrumental cause (kārtṛ and karaṇa) to be accounted for?" The Jain replies, "On the analogy of a serpent who makes a coil of his body by his body. It may be said in criticism that the relation of kārtṛ and karaṇa in the case of the serpent is simply imaginary. But this is not so, for we actually see the effect, viz. the coil...? Even a hundred efforts of imagination could not make us believe that a pillar was going to wind itself into a coil." (I.e. there cannot be a kārtṛ-karaṇa-bhāva in the case of purely static objects) (Syādv. p. 43, St. VIII).

The Jain seeks to strengthen his argument in favour of the soul's co-extension with the body, by saying, "Ātman may well abandon its former size (and grow with the growth of the body) without ceasing to be. Take, for example, the case of a snake which can change its size by expanding or contracting its hood." (Syādv. p. 53, St. IX).

The hooded serpent was supposed to carry a priceless jewel in its hood, (besides being in a general sense the natural guardian of the earth's treasures). Such jewels were believed to possess magical or healing properties (in contrast to the obvious destructive powers of the snake; cf. inoculation), but nobody was likely to be in a position to test such properties, particularly in the case of the mythological serpent-demons.
Accordingly an unrealisable aim is compared to "an instruction to obtain Takṣaka's crest jewel as a febrifuge" (Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā p. 3). But on the other hand mythology is put to a practical use in the explanation of the different postures of Yoga (cf. the kuṇḍalinīs), e.g. Vācaspati on Yogasūtras II,47: the Yogin is recommended to concentrate on the idea of Ananta, the thousand-hooded serpent, and thus attain absorption of his mind. (Ananta was regarded as a paragon of asceticism).

References to reptiles other than snakes are practically negligible in the philosophical texts. Two references to the iguana (godhā) will be found under "Reality of Fiction", while the Sāṅkhya simile of the tortoise and its limbs has been dealt with above; and we shall meet "hair on a tortoise" in Chap. IX.

An amphibian reptile, the alligator, is regarded as the natural complement of its habitat, the lake, and the "hrada-nakra-nyāya", like the vana-siṁha-nyāya, is illustrative of two things mutually aiding or protecting each other (Vedānta-kalpataruparimala, p. 100).

The frog, half-way between the reptile and the fish, is already familiar to us in the Rigvedic age (e.g. the comparison of the Brāhmans with frogs, RV 10.99, which is not to be taken as insulting, as it would appear to a European. The croaking of frogs evidently had some mystic significance (perhaps because of association with the coming of the rains), for it forms one
of the seven similes for the sound-Brahman, the "sound of the space within the heart", which is heard when the ears are covered (Maitri Up. 6,22).

Frogs are supposed to become assimilated to the earth on the cessation of the rainy season, and only to revive when the rains fall once more. Similarly, the mind of the Prakṛti-laya (a particular class of Yogi) enjoys a state of freedom for some time (between incarnations), but once more becomes associated with a body, by virtue of the non-completion of karma. (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras I,19). The same figure is applied to the alternate manifestation and disappearance of words (sphoṭa) at ibid. I, 27; and cf. also II,17. In the two latter passages it appears to be plants (udbhid-ja), not animals, which are supposed to revive with the rains.

A helpless person is compared to a frog in a waterless well (e.g. a person in the grip of samsāra: Maitri Up. 1,4). The Māndūka-ṣūlī-nyāya, maxim of a frog's leap, indicates the skipping of one rule, and passing on to another (in grammar, or in Alamkāra). Lastly, an alternative for the imaginary "horns of a hare" is "a crest of matted hair" (jaṭābhāra) on the head of a frog (Syādv. p. 86, St. XIV).

The movements of fish are not so easily observed as those of other animals (although Death espied the gods, hidden in the three Vedas, "as one sees a fish in water"—Ch. Up. 1,4,3), and accordingly similes containing references to fish are not very frequent; but there is a notable one in the Brāhī Up. (4,3,18):
"As a great fish swims alternately to both banks of a river, the nearer and the farther, so does this infinite being (the Self) move to both these states, the dream- and waking-states." Śaṅkara explains that the point of the illustration is that the self is distinct from the body and organs, and ultimately unaffected by all limiting adjuncts. The separateness of fish and water is used to exemplify the relation of Puruṣa and Prakṛti,—matter and spirit being distinct and yet interconnected (Mahābhārata XII, Mokṣadharmaparvan). (Alternatively, Puruṣa dwells in Prakṛti like a wasp in a fig).

At Maitri Up 6,26, the control of the breath is represented as a sacrifice: "As the fisher (śākunika) draws in those who wander in the waters (i.e. fish) with his net and sacrifices them in the fire of his stomach, thus does one draw out these breaths with Oṃ and sacrifice them in the fire that is free from ill (anāmaya) (i.e. the Universal Self).". Though not strictly of philosophical application, the mātasyāyāya, indicating the oppression of the weak by the strong, may be mentioned in passing.

The easy, effortless flight of birds provided the philosophers with a ready-to-hand analogy for the liberation of the soul. Here the body is usually regarded as a cage, from which the bird must escape (e.g. Sarv XI, p. 95; and cf. introduction to Brh. Up. 4,4,3. In the former passage, a Naiyāyika opponent is represented as objecting to the Jain comparison with a bird,
on the ground that it leaves a doubt as to whether the soul possesses form or not). The vital force (prāṇa), while it remains in the body, is like a fluttering bird, which causes its cage (the body) to vibrate (Sāṅkhya-kārīka Comm. 29). A more detailed comparison occurs in the course of a discussion on prāṇa: "Just as eleven birds shut up in one cage may, although each makes a separate effort, move the cage by the combination of their efforts, so the eleven prāṇas (breaths) which abide in one body may, although each has its own special function, by the combination of these functions produce one common function called prāṇa" (Thibaut's translation). As long as the soul continues to identify itself with matter, thinking "This is I", or "That is mine", so long does it remain bound (binding itself by itself), like a bird in a snare, (and so long does it continue to pass from incarnation) (Maitri Up. 6,30; and 3,2).

The simile of the bird is also applied to the dream state: "Preserving its lower (or worthless) nest (the body) by means of the vital force, the one golden immortal swan (of spirit) soars out of that nest" (Brh. Up. 4,3,12). Then follows an account of the dreamless state of the soul: "As a hawk (svena) or an eagle (suparna), having flown about in the air, exhausted folds together its wings and prepares to alight (on its nest), so the spirit hastens to that condition in which, asleep, it feels no desire and sees no dream" (Brh. Up. 4,3,19). The
following passage from the Chandogya Up. (6,8,2) also has
reference to this state: "As a bird fastened with a string,
after flying in this direction and in that without finding
a support (āyatanam) elsewhere, (comes down) and resorts to
this same string, even so the mind, after flying in this
direction and in that without finding a support elsewhere,
resorts to breath alone; for the mind has breath (prāṇa) as
its a fastening."

Cosmical unity is emphasized (Maitri
Up. 6,34) by a reference to the golden swan, or diver bird
(madgū) "who dwells in both the heart and sun"; (for the swan
as metaphor for the soul, see e.g. Svet. Up. 1,6; 3,18; 6,15;
Maitri Up. 7,7½; cf. the "Paramahāmapa", an ascetic of the
highest order, cf.

The followers of the Pūrṇaprajñā system hold that Soul
and the Lord are completely distinct entities, like a bird
and the string that binds it; and only the man who realises
their difference can be liberated (Mahopaniṣad, quoted
in Sarv. V, p. 57, with a view to refuting the opinion expressed
in the Tattvavādārahasya, viz. that the example of the bird
tied with a string teaches unity, or at any rate close inter-
connection). In the Fraśna Up.,(IV,7) dependence on the Supreme
Soul is likened to the flight of birds to a tree, which serves
as their resting-place, just as the Ātman is the resort
of all; while in the Muṇḍaka Up. (3,1,1; and also Svetāsvatāra
4,6), individual soul and Supreme Soul are represented by two
birds, companions on the same tree, one of whom (i.e. the individual) eats sweet fruit, while the other (the Supreme Self) looks on without eating. In this comparison, only the impartiality of Brahman is dwelt upon, not its vastness or all-embracing character; and for this reason it is not as convincing a simile as e.g. that of the rivers converging in the sea.

In the commentary on Kusum. V,1, it is said that "the world depends on some being who is able to prevent it from falling, because it is steadfast (dhṛtimattvāt), like a stick supported (in the air) by a bird."

An example of a syllogism which is "indefinite in regard to locality" (āsrayaṇa-asiddha) is "there is a peacock in this cave, because we hear its cries"; for if there are a number of mountain caves close together, there may be a mistake as to the exact location of the peacock (Nyāyabinduṭīkā III, pp. 68-9). The peacock's cry is regarded as a sign of approaching rain, and forms part of a threefold inference of rain, the other two signs being the swelling of the river, and the carrying off of their eggs by the ants. When an objector says that these phenomena may result from other causes, e.g. the cry of the peacock may have been imitated by a man, while the river may have been dammed up, and the ants' nest damaged,- the reply is that there is no fault in the signs (liṅga) leading to right knowledge, since the actual cry of the peacock differs from
that uttered by a man (while the carrying off of the eggs resulting from fear is different from that which heralds rain (and the other signs of rain are lacking); likewise the damming of the river produces a different swollenness from that due to rain,—i.e. two apparently identical results may be differentiated by referring back to their causes) (Nyāyasūtras I,35-6). The longing of the peacock for the cloud is a favourite Kāvyā fancy. (See also Upaskāra on Vaiś. Sūtras III,2,11: even when water is in sight, inference of water is made for corroboration, from the sight of waterbirds (valāka).

We have seen (above, p.100) how the swiftest possible succession of sense-perception, mental grasp, and determination is illustrated by the sudden vision of a tiger. In the corresponding passage of Sāṅkhya-kārikā, it is shown how the same process takes place much more slowly when there is a doubt regarding anything seen at a distance; e.g. when a person cannot decide whether a certain object is a post or a man, and is gradually led to the conclusion that it is a post, from seeing a bird perched on it (or a creeper growing on it) (Sāṅkhya-k. Comm. 30; cf. ibid. 46). One of the example for non-perception (anupalabdhi) resulting from intermixture of equal things (samāna-abhihārāt) is the non-perception of a particular pigeon among a number of others (Sāṅkhya-k. Comm. 7); while a bird flying high in the sky is not perceived (although there is technically no obstruction to perception), owing to too great distance (atī-
The usual similes adduced to ridicule views opposed to one's own include several about birds. Most of them will be found in the "Reality of Fiction" chapter, e.g. "Cooking one-half of a hen and keeping the other half for laying" "Examining the teeth of a crow", and "Looking for the footprints of birds in the sky": and it will be shown that, in the concrete Indian view, these are not such absurdities as they seem.

A roundabout way of doing a thing is illustrated by the "baka-bandhana-nyāya", the maxim of the capture of a crane. A man, wishing to secure a crane, puts √ butter on its head, waits until the butter has melted, run into its eyes and blinded it, and then captures the bird (Vivaraṇaprameyaśaṅgraha, p. 262, line 9) (Something like our "putting salt on a bird's √ tail").

The Jain, having demonstrated the futility of his opponents' (Buddhist) doctrines, asserts that those opponents ( kutīrthya) should return to the true belief, on the analogy of the little birds who fly away from the mast of a ship, but return to it when they are unable to see land (Syādv. p. 127, St. XIX).

An equivalent of the "lion's glance" (above, p. 116) is the maxim of the crow's (single) eyeball, which is supposed to move at will from one socket to the other. This is generally used of a word which applies to two portions of a sentence; or of persons or things fulfilling a double purpose. The simile of the alighting of pigeons on a threshing-floor is used,
particularly in Alamkāra, to illustrate the production of a certain effect by the simultaneous action of numerous causes (e.g. Nyāyamālavistara 11.1.3 (p. 621); Sāhityadaranā 739). The "accident of birth", the determination of the family into which a man is born, is represented in Yasas-tilaka II, 153 as a purely fortuitous occurrence, like the accidental seizing of a quail by a blind man. (This seems to be contrary to the usual karma theory). The seizing of a pigeon by a hawk, or the "crow and the Palmyra fruit" (which drops on to its head and kills it) also maxims expressive of an accidental happening (e.g. Nyāyabinduṭikā p. 6: "even accidentally (kakatālīyāpi) there is no accomplishment of an object (arthādiddhi) arising from false knowledge"). The "crow as a destroyer of curds" (kakadadhīhāta) represents the figure of upalakṣaṇam, or pars pro toto. If a boy were urged to protect the curds from the crows, it would imply that dogs and all other possible raiders were also to be warded off (Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya II, 314).

Owls, like cats, can see in the dark (see e.g. Syādv. p. 14, St. V). We shall meet them in a discussion on the nature of darkness, below, Chapter VIII.

A curious remnant of the age of magic is the injunction "Let him who desires to kill his enemy by incantation offer a hawk", quoted in Kusumaṅjali (Comm. I, 11; V, 13) as an example of a command producing not only the desired effect, but also
an undesirable result (viz. hell) for the performer. Lastly, any account of the importance of birds as philosophical illustrations would be incomplete without a reference to the "cosmic egg" which forms a basis for one of the principal theories of creation (e.g. Brh. Up. (and Comm.) 1,2,2, etc.; Ch. Up. 3,19, 1-2 (an egg consisting of a golden half-shell (the heavens) and a silver one (the earth). Here the mountains form the outer shell, clouds and mists the inner skin, the rivers veins, and the sea the liquid.).

Among insects, the spider occupies a place apart, by reason of its capacity for producing a thread from its own body, and then moving about on the web of its own construction. In the Vedanta view, Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe, just as the spider (luta), through its own inborn nature (sva-pradhānatayā) is the efficient cause of the web, and through the nature of its body, is also the material cause (Vedāntasāra 56). The same simile appears in Brh. Up. 2,1,20: "As a spider (ūrṇanābhi) goes forth by means of the thread (it produces), so from this Self go forth all organs, all worlds, all gods and all beings."

And in Mund. Up. 1,1,8: "As the spider sends forth and withdraws (its thread), as the plants grow on the earth, and as hairs arise from a living person, so in this world do all things together come out of the Imperishable One (akṣara)."
Svet. Up. 6,10 refers to "the one God, who covers himself, like a spider, with threads arising from primary matter (pradhāna)..."; while Maitri 6,22 uses the same simile with a different application: "As a spider rising up by means of its thread (tantu) attains a free space, even so does the meditator, rising up by means of Oṃ, attain ādeo independence" (svātantrya: a pun on the word tantu, by which it is made clear that independence is something to be striven after by oneself alone, no outside help availing).

A Yogin can walk over a spider's web without breaking it: see "Reality of Fiction".

In accounts of creation, and in summaries of all living creatures, the ant is taken to be the limit of minuteness (e.g. Sūlagraha-pipilīkāvat, Sāṅkhya. Comm. 40f). The Ramanuja, arguing against the Jain idea of the co-extension of soul and body, asserts that in that case the soul of a human being would not be able to occupy (subsequently) the body of an elephant; and on entering the body of an ant, it would lose the capacity of filling its former frame. (Sarv. IV, p. 37).

Above (p.173) we have referred to the inference of approaching rain from the fact of the ants carrying off their eggs; and see above, Chap. IV, for the two examples of harmonious cooperation between many individuals,—an anthill made by many ants, and a beehive made by many bees.

The honey of bees provides a synonym for the finest essence
of anything (or an effect, = anna). (Cf. Kusum. I, 1). Thus Bṛh. Up. 2, 5, 1: "This earth is honey to all beings, and all beings are honey to this earth." Śaṅkara explains: "Just as a beehive is made by a great many bees, so is this earth made by all beings. Likewise all beings are the honey or effect of this earth." The same applies to the Self within the earth, and within the body; and to the corresponding four entities in the case of water, fire, air, sun, the quarters, the moon, lightning, cloud, ether, Dharma, truth, and the Universal Ātman. (Bṛh. Up. 2, 5, 1-14). In the Chand. Up. (3, 1-3, 5) there is a detailed description of the sun as "the honey extracted from all the Vedas", each set of rays representing certain honey-cells, with their appropriate bees and flowers. The upward rays are regarded as the most important, for their bees are the Upaniṣads, and their flower Brahman. In another passage of the same Upaniṣad (6, 9, 1-2) the condition of the various juices which go to make honey is used as an analogy for the individual souls when they are absorbed in Brahman: "As the bees prepare (nitiṣṭhanti) honey by gathering the juices of different genuses of trees and causing them to be unified, and as then (those juices) are not able to discriminate "I am the essence of this tree", or "I am the essence of that tree", even so, indeed, all creatures here, although they are absorbed into Being (sat), know not "We have been absorbed into Being" (in deep sleep and in death)." (Cf. also Maitri Up 6, 22; and
Comm. on Praśna Up. IV,1).

The Carvākas back up their creed of "carpe diem" by quoting the popular saying, "When a man can find honey in an Arka tree on his way, why should he go to the mountain for it?" I.e. one should enjoy present pleasures, and not worry about the future; or according to another interpretation, if one can accomplish an object by simple means, it is not necessary to adopt a roundabout method. But to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga school, as indeed to all non-materialists, indulgence in pleasures of sense may be compared to the eating of a mixture of honey and poison, having pain as its result (e.g. Vācaspati on Yogasūtras II,15; also Sarv. XI, p. 96) (Cf. also "licking honey from the edge of a sword", an illustration of vedanīya; Sarv. III, p. 31).

A noteworthy illustration of the subordination of senses to mind (citta) is employed twice by Vyāsa, in his Yogasūtra-bhāṣya: "Just as the bees fly, when the queen (in Sanskrit, "king") flies; and rest, when the queen rests,— so the senses become restrained, when the mind is restrained" (pratyāhāra) (II,54). And when the Yogin masters the method of control of body by mind, and is able to transfer his mind (during his lifetime) to another person's body (this is one of the siddhis)—on that occasion the senses, etc., follow the mind, as the bees follow their queen. (III,38). Vyāsa was not the originator of the simile, however, for it appears in Praśna Up., II,4,—
this time emphasizing the subordination of mind as well as senses, to prāṇa, the vital force.

Another insect with a special peculiarity of its own is the firefly; and accordingly the mistaking of its luminous glow for fire, or for a light, is used as an example of erroneous perception, to be corrected by other means of evidence (Saṅkara on Brh. Up., 3,3,1). (See also ibid. 4,3,6). The spasmodic illumination of the fire-fly (indragopa) provides a symbol for some mental impressions (such as a flash of intuition) (Brh. Up. 2,3,6). When the knowledge (of a Yōgin) becomes infinite, then little remains to be known, as little as a glow-worm ści (comparison with) space (ākāśa) (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras IV,31). A fleeting pleasure is also compared to a glowworm (e.g. Sarv. XI, p. 97).

During the Brh. Up. account of transmigration (4,4), and Saṅkara's commentary thereon, many similes for the passage of the soul from one body to another are accepted or rejected. For instance, does the soul leave the old body and go to another like a bird going to another tree? Or is it carried by another body serving as a vehicle to the place where it is to be born?.. Finally, it is decided that the appropriate illustration is that of a caterpillar, which goes to the end of a blade of grass, reaches out and takes hold of another support, and then draws itself over to its new resting-place. In the same way, the transmigrating self prepares a new body before leaving the old
one, and when that new body has been fashioned in accordance with past karma, the old one is discarded in its favour (Brh. Up. 4,4,3; see also above, Chap. IV, p. 85; and Comm. on Ait. Up. II,1 (p. 74, Anand.).

A man who, in his ignorance, becomes absorbed in the path of ritual, and fails to know his Self, is compared by the Vedāntin to a silkworm, which becomes helplessly enmeshed in its own cocoon (Brh. Up. Comm. 1,4,17). The simile of the ṣalabha, the moth which flies recklessly into a flame, is more favoured in Kāvyā works than in philosophy; it signifies a person who runs heedlessly into danger, or, according to Merutunga, one who is envious of someone else's brilliance, and seeks in vain to diminish it (Quoted by Jacob, III, p. 85).

Gnats and flies represent minor worries; and are seen when one has had a blow on the eyes (like our "seeing stars") (Comm. on Praśna Up. VI,4). At the junction of the two halves of the cosmic shell, there is an opening as large as the wing of a fly (Brh. Up. 3,3,2).

Among the Jain divisions of Jīvas or souls, the lowest of the "moving" Jīvas are those possessing two senses only (touch and taste), and in this category are classed worms. The maxim of "worms bred in poison" indicates a state of things which, though fatal to others, is advantageous to whose who are used to it (cf. the camel's eating thorns) It is referred to in Saṅkara's commentary on Brh. Up. 6,1,14, where the food
of the vital force is under discussion. The vital force being present in all beings, must subsist on the food eaten by all beings; but this does not mean that, while associated with the body of, e.g. a Brāhmaṇa, it should not refrain from eating food forbidden by the scriptures. Vyāsa (Yogasūtras II,9) asserts that, even as a worm just born knows the fear of death, and as this fear cannot be explained by perception, inference, or tradition, we are led to believe that the pain of death has been experienced in a former life.

The animal kingdom, then, provided the philosophers with ample material for their musings; and we can observe how close was their observation of nature, and how unceasingly they sought to bring their theories into line with everyday life. Comparisons which to the European seem a little strange, even ludicrous (see for example the calf = vital force, and frog = Brāhmaṇa), are quite natural for the Indian, who seeks to bring all things into relation with one another, and to whom even mythology and so-called "illusion" are potentially real and concrete.
It is scarcely possible to deal with more than a brief selection of the countless references to vegetation, seeds, trees, flowers, fruits, with which almost every page of Sanskrit literature is besprinkled. Just as in English, there are innumerable allusions, scarcely metaphorical any longer, to the "seed", "root" and "fruit" (of good and evil deeds, etc.). We shall in general only quote passages containing worked-out similes or metaphors.

The relation of seed to shoot is employed, in one form or another, in the argumentations of practically every philosophical school. We have already had occasion (above, Chap. III) to refer to the eternal series of seed and shoot, a permissible regressus in infinitum; and to the principle of kurvadrūpatva, efficient form, which operates e.g. in rice when it is engaged in producing a shoot. The eternal succession of seed and shoot can be confirmed by the evidence of the senses, so there is no fault in it (see e.g. Kusum. Comm. 1,4). On this analogy the Jains accept an eternal succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers (Sarv. III, p. 25); while elsewhere (Sarv. VII, p. 73) the same comparison is used to illustrate the never-ending, never-beginning series of the results of action (karma). (Cf. also Sāṅkhyaatattvakau-mudī 52).

But the seed cannot give rise to the shoot without external
aid; there must be concurrent causes, such as earth, water, sun, wind, etc. The Buddhist Kṣanikavādin (exponent of "momentariness") argues as follows: When the seed takes on the assistance of the complementary causes (sahakārin), it must do so with the assistance of other subsidiaries, for otherwise the seed would always be producing a germ. This second addition (atiṣaya) in its turn would require to be aided, and thus we should have a regressus in infinitum; and this in its turn would lead to a second and a third infinite regression. On the other hand, let it be granted that an addition identical with the entity (=seed) is taken on. In this case, the former entity (the seed minus the addition) does not exist any longer, and a fresh entity identical with the addition, and styled kurvad-rūpa (efficient form, or effect-producing object) comes into being: and thus the doctrine of momentariness is established (Sarv. II, pp. 8-9). The retort of the Naiyāyika has already been mentioned (above, Uhap. III; and cf. Kusum. Comm. I,16). The Jain, from his relativāty standpoint, asserts that the seed always possesses the power (śakti) of producing a shoot, and yet uses the power only occasionally, when the accessories, viz. water, soil, etc., cooperate. But because the putting forth of the shoot is occasional (kādācitka), it does not follow that the power of putting forth the shoot is also occasional (for, in a certain way, it is eternal (nitya)). (In the same way, because "aham-pratyaya"
(fundamental notion of self) a "variety of application" (upag yoga-viṣeṣa) of Ātman) is occasional, it does not follow that the "I" or "Self" is occasional. (See Syādv. pp. 118-9, St. XVII; and cf. also ibid. p. 17, St. V, for a further criticism of kṣaṇikatva).

The doctrine of momentariness is linked up with the doctrine of "santāna", a continuous stream of consciousness, which accounts for memory, a familiar instance being the following: When mango seeds, after being treated with sweet juices, are planted in carefully ploughed soil, there is a definite certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the joints, the stem, the branches, and the buds etc., and so on by an unbroken series (paramparayā) to the fruit itself. Or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding a redness in the cotton, through the same series of shoot, etc. (i.e. in each line or "stream" of successive experiences the entity of one moment reaps the fruit of the previous moment's action; but one particular line of experiences, say X, cannot suffer and remember the sensations of another line of experiences, say Y).

The Jain objects to this example being used to account for memory (since there is no memory in the cotton of what was done to the seed); moreover, he says, the example does not confirm the theory of kṣaṇikatva: for if everything were momentary, then the redness applied to the seeds should not last
until it reached the fruit. Accordingly the Jain syllogism, "Where there is otherness (difference) there can be no memory" (yatra anyatvam tatra sm'tir-na bhavati) is not invalidated by this example (Sarv. III, p. 20; Syādv. p. 125, St. XVIII).

The Sāṅkhya philosopher, who says that the existent can only arise from the existent, naturally disagrees with the kurvad-rūpa theory, for this would mean that all products could be produced at any time, without a cause being operative ("Barley is produced from barley, and rice from rice; if the non-existent could be produced, then rice-grains could arise from chaff"— Sāṅkhya. 9). He points out that although the shoot only becomes manifest after the destruction of the seed, yet it is not the destruction of the seed, but rather something real and active,—viz. a portion of the seed itself,—which causes this manifestation. Only the already existent entity can be manifested, as e.g. the oil in sesamum seeds, which is brought to light through pressing (cf. sāṅkhyaatattvakaumudī 9. Cf. Svet. Up. 1,15: "as oil in sesamum seeds... so is the Ātman grasped in one's own soul, if one looks for it with true tapas"), or the grain in corn (through threshing) (Sāṅkhyaatattvakaumudī 9.1; Sarv. XIV, p. 121). And conversely, nothing can be produced from an inactive cause; sesamum oil cannot be pressed from a stone (or from sand (sikatā)), because the latent effect is not present there, as it is in sesamum grains (STK 15).

But even over this example we find the well-known polarity
appearing. Reference has been made above (p. 53) to the question of the possibility of a jar's being produced by the will of the thaumaturgist, without materials. Alternatively, the yogin may produce a tree, without the use of a seed (Sarv. VII, p. 78). Further, we have the case of spontaneous generation: a certain herb can either be produced from the seed of its particular species, or it may arise from the manure of rice-dust (Kusum. II, 2 (Comm.)). See also Kusum. Comm. I, 11: the Mīmāṃsaka believes in a particular power (śakti), such as ensures that only rice is produced from rice-seed, and also that ploughing in a certain month (owing to a "śakti" or capacity in the ground) produces a good crop several months later. The Naiyāyika replies that it is the qualities of the various atoms which produce distinctions.

The seed and the shoot are mutually dependent; and so also creation is twofold: "There can be no subtle body without the conditions for it; nor can there be a fulfilment of the conditions without a subtle body" (na vinā bhāvair liṅgaṁ na vinā liṅgena bhāvanirvṛttīṁ) (Sāṅkhya-kārikā 52). The mark of buddhi is adhyāvasāya, "mental effort, determination"; this quality is latent in buddhi, as the shoot is latent in the seed (Sāṅkhya-k. Comm. 23); and the effects of karma are ready to take a man to the next world, "like a seed about to sprout" (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 4,3,9).

Turning to metaphysics and psychology, we find the example
of the seed and shoot quoted against the ep exponent of the 
recognitive system: "If the divine nature is essential to 
the soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this "recogni­
tion"; for if all requisites are supplied, the seed does not 
fail to germinate because it is unrecognised." In the reply, 
a distinction is drawn between "external" and "internal" act­
ivity; the first is illustrated by the seed and the shoot it 
produces, and the second by the intuition of the nature of the 
self, which determines happiness. For the purely mechanical 
function, no "recognition" is necessary; but for the unification 
of individual and impersonal Soul, a recognition of the nature 
of the soul is essential (Sarv. VIII, p. 79).

A slightly different angle on the nature of cause and effect 
is found in the Nyāyabinduṭīkā. Here it is the logical point 
of view which is expressed. The shoot is the effect caused by 
the seed, but it is not capable of cognising its cause. In 
cognition, on the other hand, the product (= the cognition) 
cognises the sense-object which is its cause (see NBT I, p. 18). 
The seed, even if we do not perceive it, is capable of producing 
a shoot. But smoke, the logical mark (liṅga) of fire, will not 
produce the cognition of the presence of fire, if we do not 
perceive it (See NBT II, p. 22).

The seeming miracle of the production of a huge tree from 
a tiny seed could not fail to engross the philosophers' attention. 
Vācaspati (on Yogasūtras II,19) says: "Nyagrodha seeds are cer-
tainly not capable of giving rise at once to the full-grown, dense Nyagrodha tree, which is able to protect people from the heat of the sun. The tree only develops gradually through the successive appearance of shoots, leaves, and branches."

In the same way there is a set order of development for every evolvent of Prakṛti. The eternal fig-tree (aśvattha) with root above and branches below (each root being continuous with its own branch) is a symbol for samsāra. Its root is the highest, for the tree extends from Brahman down to the immovable (Kaṭha Up. VI,1; Maitri Up. 6,7; and cf. Chānd Up. 6,12).

Those who are not fit for liberation (lit. svarga, "heaven") cling to a meagre bush, though a large banyan tree is before them (Maitri Up. 7,8).

There is an interesting discussion on possible changes of letters (in sandhi), Nyāyasūtras II, 105 et seq. The Naiyāyika says that letters are not changeable, (e.g. from i or ō to y in sandhi), for by reason of increase in the original, there would be increase in the product. "This is not true", replies the advocate of change (Sāṅkhya); "for modifications may be smaller, equal, or larger in comparison with the original material. For example, the thread formed from cotton is smaller in bulk than the raw cotton; or a cocoanut tree, smaller than a banyan-tree, is produced from a cocoanut, which is larger than the banyan-seed. The Naiyāyika, in disposing of this objection, replies: "I referred to the discrepancy between the products
whose original matter was unequal (i.e. the υ resulting from combination of short ι with another letter would be less in bulk than the υ resulting from combination with long ι); the example of the tree and the seed is not in point, and is a metaphorical fallacy (upacāracchala). Accordingly I uphold the theory of substitution, not of change." (The discussion is continued with the illustrations of gold, milk and curds, etc., for which see above, p. 84, etc.). (See also below, p. 286).

As the existence of seeds is inferred from the appearance of blades of grass shooting up in the rainy season, so it is inferred that he who falls into a state of ecstasy when hearing of the path of liberation, has acquired a store of Karma tending to liberation (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras IV,25).

It is only natural that, in a land of predominantly luxuriant tropical vegetation, there should have been an extensive metaphorical application of the biological processes of growth and decay. Sāṅkhya and Vedānta alike counsel the uprooting of the "tree of relative existence", which has karma as its seed, and ignorance as the field in which it grows (see e.g. Brh. Up. Comm. 1,4,7; Sāṅkhyaḥakārikā Comm. 67). Sāṅkhyaṭattvavākumudī 67 expands this metaphor: "When the field of buddhi is watered with the water of the kleśas (afflictions), then the seeds of karma send forth their shoots; but how can they do so when they fall upon a barren waste, from which all the water has been absorbed by the fire of right knowledge?" Normaly it is seed
the seed itself which is represented as having its germinating power destroyed by fire: e.g. Sarv. XV, p. 143: "This foremost of men (the enlightened Yogin) finds that the seeds of the kleśas, like burnt rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they perish together with the mind (manas)" (See also Vyāsa and Vācaspati on Yogasūtras I, 1; II, 2; II, 4; II, 10, 11, 13; II, 26; III, 49; III, 54; IV, 27). We find the same illustration in the Syādvādamañjarī, p. 170, St. XXIX: "Just as the shoot cannot grow when the seed has been burnt, so the shoot of existence cannot grow when the seed of karma has been burnt." In much the same connection there is mention of seeds spoilt by contact with oil (Vedantakalpataru p. 545, I. 17); or eaten by a mouse (Buddha chapter of Sarv., p. 9, at the close of the passage already referred to (above, p. 129): "On the second alternative (i.e. if a supplementation is taken on) the expectation of its permanency is as reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate." (See also "Reality of Fiction").

In the Yoga system, trances may be divided into sabīja and nirbīja (with and without seeds). The "seedless" is that which has no object for its basis (corresponding to the nirvikalpa-samādhi of the Vedāntin) (Yogasūtras, passim). As an alternative explanation, Vācaspatimiśra suggests that the seed consists of the abode (āśaya) of afflictions and actions (kleśa and karma), and when these have vanished, the trance is "seedless" (Yogasūtras I, 18).
At Nyāyasūtras IV 42 et seq., there is a discussion as to whether the fruit of good and evil deeds can ripen a long while after the deeds are committed. The Naiyāyika points to the example of the tree, which bears fruit many years after the seed was planted. But the (materialist) opponent retorts that in that case the substratum is the same, but it is not so in the case of fruit (of actions) in a subsequent life (i.e. he does not believe in a continuant soul).

The relation of the particular to the general comes in for its share of notice: e.g. Kusum. V,Ś: "A particular effect has a particular cause". The Commentary explains: "Nor may you say that the effort of the experiencer (bhoktr) is the cause only in (individual) action (ceṣṭā), and not in action generally (kriyā-sāmānya), because even though a particular kind of effort may be the cause in the case of (individual) action, this does not preclude volition generally as the cause of action generally; otherwise, because a particular seed is the cause of a particular shoot, it would follow that seeds in general (i.e. the class, seed) could not be the causes of shoots in general."

Put more simply, this seems to mean that the relation of cause and effect exists between the general classes (genera) as well as between the particular representatives of the species.

On p. 107 of Sarv. (Chap. XII) we find the following passage: "Wrong knowledge (as well as right knowledge) is a particular kind of knowledge, and the totality of the Universal
enters into the totality of the particulars, just as the totality "tree" enters into any particular tree, as e.g. the सिंम्सपापा; (otherwise we might suppose that the particular had no instrumental cause at all)." (सामाग्री = totality, materials, effects).

As the genus "tree" can be conveniently subdivided, it features frequently in syllogisms, e.g. "This is a tree, because it is a सिंम्सपापा", or "there are no trees here, because there are no सिंम्सपापा trees". In the latter case, we are told to imagine two adjoining hills, the one covered by forest, the other consisting of bare rock alone. We cannot say that there are no सिंम्सपापा trees on the wooded hill, as we are not near enough to distinguish them; but in the case of the bare rock we can pronounce a definite judgment. (Nyāyabinduṭīkā II, pp. 36-7. See also p. 44 ibid.)

At a distance, when we see a tree, we cannot say definitely "it is an सिंम्सपापा tree"; but we can say "it is a tree". When we are nearer, we say "it is a tree, and it is also a सिंम्सपापा". The notion "tree" and the notion "सिंम्सपापा" differ only by reason of the differences in exclusion (vyāvṛtti-bhedena) (i.e. when we think of झिंसपापा we mentally exclude banyans, figtrees, etc.; when we think of "tree" as such we mentally exclude rivers, mountains, etc.) (NBT III, p. 53.) In Chapter II of Sarv. (p. 6) it is likewise stated that there is an invariable concomitance expressed by "A सिंम्सपापा is a tree", if a सिंम्सपापा were to lose its tree-nature it would lose its own self (for there is a
relation of sāmānādhikaraṇya between them). (A tree on a
mountain in the distance is an example of anupalabdhi,— see
Chapter I above. For the perception of a "moving tree", see
Chap. I, and also "Reality of Fiction").

We come to the well-known Vedānta simile of the forest
and the trees. As trees considered as an aggregate are denoted
as one, viz. the forest, or water is collectively called a
lake, so also ignorance, existing in individual souls (jīvas),
and being diversely manifested, is collectively represented as
one. Conversely, as a forest, from the standpoint of the units
that compose it, may be designated "a number of trees", and as
a lake from the same point of view may be spoken of as quantities
of water, so also ignorance when denoting separate units is
spoken of as many. And as the ether limited (avacchīnna) by
the forest is identical with the ether limited by the trees,
(or as the ether reflected in the water is identical with the
ether reflected in the lake), so Iśvara and Prajñā associated
with the individual and aggregate ignorance are identical.
Lastly, like the unlimited (anupalāta- not associated with an
upādhi) ether which is the substratum (or support: ādhāra) of
the ether limited by the forest and the trees, or the ether
(= sky) reflected in the water and the lake, there is an un-
limited consciousness (caitanya) which is the substratum of the
aggregate and the individual ignorance as well as of the con-
sciousness (Iśvara and Prajñā) associated with them. This is
called "Turīya". (The same simile is also applied to the subtle and gross bodies (sūkṣma- and sthūla-śarīra), according as they are regarded as an aggregate or as separate entities).

The sum total of the gross, subtle and causal (kāraṇa) worlds makes a huge universe (prapañca), as the sum total of smaller forests makes a large forest, or as a collection of smaller lakes makes a vast expanse of water. Consciousness associated (upahita) with this (universe), from Vaiśvānara to Iśvara is also one and the same, as the ether limited by a number of smaller forests is the same as that limited by the large forest of which they form part, or as the sky reflected in different smaller lakes is the same as that reflected in the vast expanse of water which they form (Vedāntasāra 36, 40, 47-9, 90, 96, 116, 118-9. For ether and all-pervasiveness, connected with trees etc., see Nyāyabinduṭīkā III, p. 86).

The relation between forest and trees has been referred to above (p. 131) in a discussion on the nature of atoms. Vācaspati (Yogasūtras 1, 43) uses this example, too: "The notion of a wood as a single whole comes into the mind, because the intervals between the trees are not perceived, although they exist. The theory, therefore, which speaks of the atoms as being visible and gross in themselves and as having no intervals, is false." Elsewhere, it is said that a group is of two descriptions. The first is that in which the distinction of individuals disappears in the whole, e.g. the body, tree, herd, or forest. The
second is where there is a distinction between different indi-
viduals of the same group, as in the case of a group of both
gods and men. The homogeneous group may be further subdivided
according as its parts are self-contained entities, as e.g. a
forest, or dependent on other parts, as in the case of a tree,
a body or an atom. (Vyāsa and Vācaspati on Yogasūtras III,44).

We find the "group" idea in connection with the Mīmāṃsā
tenet of eternity of sound, e.g. in Sarv. XIII, when the power
of a "sphoṭa" is under discussion: the opponent holds that it
cannot be the single letters which convey the meaning of a word,
for a collection of separate letters, without any one pervading
cause, could never convey an idea, any more than a collection
of separate flowers could form a garland without a thread to
unite them. Nor can it be the aggregate of letters which is
efficacious, because the letters are separate and successive,
unlike a group, e.g. of different kinds of trees (dhava, ṣhadira
and palāśa), or of an elephant, a man and a horse, seen together
in one place. Another biological figure is employed in the reply
to this accusation: "The seed is implanted by the sounds, and
when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition (āvṛtti),
the word is understood simultaneously with the last uttered
letter" (Sarv. pp. 115-6).

Let us glance once again at the Nyāya view of the relation
of parts and whole. (Nyāyasūtras II,28 et seq.). Someone may
say that perception is nothing but inference, for when we see
e.g. a tree, we only see a part of it and infer the existence of the rest. The Naiyāyika replies (Sūtra 30) that in every perception of a part there is also the perception of the (invisible) whole which is made up of the parts (and yet has a separate existence). An opponent objects (vṛtti on Sūtra 31) that there cannot be such a thing as a whole,—merely a conglomeration of parts,—for we see contradictory characteristics, e.g. shaking (in one part of a tree, and not in another), (or redness in one part of a cloth and not in another). The Naiyāyikā reply (Sūtra 32) is that if there were no such thing as a whole (apart from the parts), everything would be imperceptible, for bulk (mahattva) does not appertain to atoms.

The Nyāyabindu (and Ṭīkā) contains several references to the Jain theory of universal animation. One of the Jain syllogisms is: "Trees are sentient beings, because they see sleep" (i.e. close their leaves at night) (NBT II, p. 23). But the Buddhist points out that this syllogism is not of universal application, for all trees do not close their leaves at night. Another deduction is "Trees are animate beings, because they die when deprived of their bark". The Buddhist does not accept this statement, for he defines death as characterised by an extinction of sensations and sense-organs (vijñāna-indriya-āyur-nirodha); and this kind of death cannot take place in trees. The Jain credits plants with a single sense, the sense of touch, and maintains that death in plants does not differ materially
from death in human beings; but the Buddhist argues that death
from exsiccation (śoṣa) cannot be taken as a proof of the
previous existence of consciousness. He asserts, therefore,
that this syllogism has an unreal reason (hetu) (NBT III, p. 67).
(But on the other hand it should be remembered that it was
a particularly Buddhistic belief that trees were inhabited by
spirits—cf. "yakṣa in banyan tree"). (See above, p. 109, where
the capacity of a tree for repairing itself is quoted as a
proof for the existence of a soul).

The Vedāntic view of the all-pervading Soul provides a
variation on this theme. For example, Ch. UP. 6,11: "If one
were to strike at the root of a large tree, it would bleed,
yet still live. Likewise, if one struck in the middle, it would
bleed, yet still live; and also if one struck at the top.
Being pervaded by the life force, it would stand there, drinking
in moisture, and rejoicing. But if the life principle leaves
one single branch, then that branch withers. It leaves a
second, a third: they wither. Then life leaves the whole, and
the whole tree withers. Only when abandoned by life (Soul),
does it die. The life force itself (= Soul) does not die."

As a complement to the above, there is a passage in the
Brh. Up. (3,9,28) in which the certainty of the rebirth of man
is deduced from his likeness to a tree: "As is a tree, the lord
of the forest, so verily is a man. His hairs are its leaves, his
skin its outer bark. When he is wounded, blood flows from his
skin, as sap from the bark. His flesh is its inner bark, and his sinew its innermost layer of bark. His bones lie beneath, as does the wood, and his marrow is comparable to the pith.

If a tree, after being felled, springs anew from its root, from what root does man spring forth after he is cut off by death? Knowledge, bliss and Brahman comprise the root of the universe, from which man springs forth anew". (Cf. Ka. Up. 1,6: "a mortal decays like grain, and like grain is born again"). (for further references to trees, see e.g. Sarv. V, p. 56; Mund. Up. 1,1,7; Svet. Up. 3,9; 6,6. The Khadira and the Palāṣṭa, see "Reality of Fiction"; similar is the "rice and the Śyāmāka grain" - two separate entities - Nyāyavartika p. 46).

When the body becomes emaciated and decay sets in, then the soul detaches itself from the parts of the body (āṅga) as a mango, or a fig, or a peepul fruit is detached from its stalk, and betakes itself to another body, for the continuance of the vital force (prāṇāyāma) (Bṛh. Up. 4,3,36). Saṅkara is so convinced of the truth of his beliefs that he says "when both scriptural evidence and argument start to demonstrate the unity of the Self, they can show it as clearly as a bilva fruit on the palm of one's hand" (Introduction to Bṛh. Up. 3,1,1) cf. also Ch. Up. 7,3,1½. This simile is also applied to the vision of (future) things on the part of a Yogin- NBT I, p. 15, though here the fruit is a myrobalan (āmalaka). See also Sarv. IX, p. 80).
The analogy of two fruits attached to one stalk is used by writers on Alarkāra to illustrate a particular kind of paronomasia,—the combining of two meanings in one word. In the opinion of some philosophers, the production of sound is to be compared to the simultaneous bursting forth of the buds of the Kadamba tree (see Bhaşāpariccheda verse 166) (while the more usual simile is that of wave-undulation (vīcitaraṅga)).

All the philosophers were pleased to fancy their doctrinal expositions as "garlands of flowers" (e.g. Syādv. p. 179, St. XXXI; Kusumāñjali (a title suggestive of this idea) I,1 and V,19). The last reference contains a śleṣa: "What does it matter whether this handful of flowers of moral philosophy, of flaming beauty, perfumes the right and left hand or not (or, "the sakṣaṇa and viśpakṣa of my argument")?"; while the former (I,1) bristles with double meanings. (see also Sarv. I, p. 1: "Who is not delighted with a garland of many various flowers?" (= the different philosophical systems). On the other hand, a garland of flowers is classed with sandal-wood and lovely women, as being illustrative of fleeting pleasures, which distract one from striving after liberation (e.g. Sarv. XV, p. 133; Vedāntasāra¹), etc.)

Saṅkara (Brh. Up. 2,3,6) pokes fun at his rivals' wrong notions of the nature of the self. Having referred to the principal rival schools, he continues: "Some self-styled followers of the Upaniṣads (i.e. the followers of Bhartṛprapāṇca) divide the universe into three: 1) the gross and subtle elements;
2) the Supreme Self, and (3) the sum total of one's meditations, actions and previous experience, together with the individual self which is the agent and experiencer.... They also establish a connection with the logicians by stating that the actions etc. abide in the subtle body (lingaśarīra). Then, afraid that this is too much like Sāṅkhya, they conform also to the Vaiśeṣika view by saying that just as odour, which abides in flowers, can be conserved in oil through boiling, even when the flowers are gone, so even when the subtle body is gone, all actions etc. are conserved in a portion of the Supreme Self". There is another reference to this simile in the Commentary on ibid. 4,3,22, where Śaṅkara points out that it is inappropriate to the topic.

Flowers feature again in a discussion on the nature of the soul, Syādv. St. IX, p. 49. The Jain says that Ātman is "madhyama-parimāṇa," adjusting itself to its medium, or the body in which it dwells. This, he says, is borne out by our consciousness for we are not conscious of ourselves as either infinitely vast or as infinitely small, but as co-extensive with our body. If the case of a flower, which emits its fragrance beyond itself, is quoted, this is no exception; for it is minute particles of odorous substance (gandha-pudgala) that go out to the nose (and then return to the flower) (this approximates to the Vaiśeṣika view,- cf. Upaskāra on Vaiś. Sūtras VIII, 1,4: contact with odours of imperceptible dispersed particles of campaka flower or
camphor is due to substance) (For flowers which perfume a cloth, see above, p. 75). Another point of view is expressed in Śaṅkara's Comm. on Bādarāyana Sūtras 2.3.23: As a drop of sandal-oil, applied to one part of the body, produces a pleasing sensation throughout the whole body, so the Soul, though having its abode in one spot only, yet gives the impression of pervading the whole body.

The Jain sees no absurdity in the proposition, "Devadatta is living; he is also dying". He says that "petals" (dalika) of life are falling from us all the while that we are living. It may be argued that the word "death" ought only to be applied to the last stage of extinction, not to the whole period preceding the final decline. But this is wrong: the word "death" should apply to the whole process of the falling away of the petals of life, even before the last petal drops (Syādv. p. 106, St. XVI) (For jasmine blossoming afresh, see above, p.145).

Of particular flowers to be used in similes, by far the most popular is the lotus, to whose rôle in Alāṅkāra we have referred above (Chap. II). As India's flower par excellence, it has a special symbolic and mystic significance (cf. connection with sun and moon), which we can observe from the fact that the heart, the vital internal organ, is referred to as a lotus. For instance: "The state of lucidity (jyotismati) is the light shining in the lotus of the heart. Let the mind be concentrated upon this lotus. It has eight petals and is placed with its face
downwards. Its face has first to be turned upward, by the process of the expirative control of the breath. In its stalk the artery of Brahma (brahma-ṇadī) with its face upwards. " (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras I,36. See also Vyāsa on Yogasūtras III,34: "In the lotus-like cavity, the temple in the city of Brahmā, the intelligence lives". Also e.g. Ch. Up. 8,1,1-2; Maitri Up. 6,1; also e.g. Brh. Up. Comm. 4,3,7; 4,4,1; 4,4,22).

There is a curious argument for the metempsychosis doctrine in Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras IV,10. The laughter or tears of a newly-born baby are taken as evidence of memory of the pleasure or pain it has experienced in a former existence. If one should say that such laughter or tears can be taken to be natural, like the budding and blowing of a lotus, the answer is that even this is not inherent, otherwise it would not stand in need of another cause for its manifestation. The contributory (āgantukā) cause of the opening of a lotus flower is the contact with the rays of the sun. Similarly the happiness of a baby, which is inferred from smiles, should also be considered as a proof of a previous life. (Cf. also Nyāyāsūtras III,18).

The Yoga school holds that the Soul is infinitely vast: "Everything which possesses the quality of being larger or smaller, has a limit beyond which it cannot go, as is the case with the lotus, the emblic myrobalan, and the bilva tree. The quality of largeness exists in these to a greater or less extent. But in the Self the largeness is such that there is no greater
"This my self within the heart... (is greater than the great, and smaller than the small)."

Impressions received by the mind may resemble a white lotus (probably = calm, pure thoughts) (Eṛḥ. Up. 2,3,6).

The follower of the Vaiśeṣika system objects to the Jain theory of body-sized Atman, saying that if it were true, mutilation of the body would involve mutilation of the soul. "Agreed," says the Jain; "Do you not see that when a limb is cut off, it continues to throb with life? If you ask, 'How do the parts unite again?' I say that they were never absolutely separated, in the manner in which a lotus-fibre (tantu) is separated from the stalk. It is only a temporary severance, and reunion may be brought about by fate (adrṣṭa) (Syādv. p. 54, St. IX).

The Mīmaṁsaka holds that knowledge (jñāna) cannot be self-revealed; there must be a jñāna of the jñāna, and so on in succession. The Jain replies that there is no proof that the jñāna and the jñāna of the jñāna arise one after the other. It may be argued that they do arise one after the other, but that the succession is so quick that we do not perceive it. For instance when we run a needle through a pile of one hundred lotus-leaves, it seems as if we have pierced them all simultaneously, whereas actually they have been pierced consecutively. The Jain replies that between the first and the second jñāna must come the "jijñāga" of the jñāna- the desire to know the knowledge (so that in any
case one cannot say that the one immediately follows the other. And the very fact that a jijñāsā must precede a jñāna, proves that jñāna does not depend upon another jñāna, but is actually self-revealing (Syādv. p. 76, St. XII).

The (liberated) soul is supposed to be as undefiled as the leaf of a lotus, from which impurities roll off like water (Sarv. XV, p. 125; Chānd. Up. 4,14,3; Maitri Up. 3,2, etc.) (For the "lotus in the sky", see "Reality of Fiction").

Let us close this section with a few miscellaneous plant-similes. According to the Jains, the soul, when freed from the bonds of karma, rises upward, just as a gourd (alābu) rises in the water, when the clay which encased it is washed off. (See "Reality of Fiction" for gourds sinking and stones floating). Alternative similes are the elastic seed of the castor-oil plant, or the natural upward tendency of a flame. (Sarv. III, p. 33).

The aupaśamika state of the soul arises when all the effects of past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise,—as when water becomes pure through the mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing nut-plant (kataka) (Sarv. III, p. 28).

The Vedāntin explains that during the waking state the Self, being (falsely) identified with the organs etc., cannot be shown as separate from them, as a stalk of grass is extricated from its sheath. It is for this reason that the world superimposes all activities peculiar to name and form on the self, and the self on those activities (Brh. Up. Comm. 4,3,7). (Cf. also Kaṭha
The Sānkhya-Yoga tenet of parināma is illustrated by the condition of barley-grain which has been kept in a granary for a number of years, and has at last been reduced to a state of disintegration, so that it falls apart at a touch. This cannot take place in the case of new grain, but is a result of gradual change of condition (avasthā) (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras III,15). For the "chaff" of doubts (ṣānkā-tuṣa), see Kusum. IV,6, Sarv. XI, p. 92; and cf. Sarv, VII, p. 73, where mala (natural taint) is compared to the husk in rice.

The Vedāntin is versatile in coining similes to illustrate the impermanence and illusory nature of the world. We find a heap of them in Brh. Up. Comm. 1,5,2, where it is said that the world resembles a flowing river or a burning lamp (in its transience), is lacking in fibre like a banana or plantain stalk, and comparable to foam, illusion, a mirage, or a dream. We may add to these jugglery, and a city of chaurās clouds in the sky (Comm. on Katha Up. VI,1; and cf. Maitri Up. 4,2). (See below, "Reality & Fiction").

The various juices of plants are supposed by the follower of the Sānkhya school to be modifications of the water which falls to earth as rain. In reply to the question, "How can the single guṇas manifest themselves in different forms?" he says, "through modification, like water. For just as the rain has only one flavour as it falls from the cloud, but alters its flavour according to the kind of ground on which it falls, so that it takes on
the flavour of the fruits of the cocoanut, the fan-palm, bilva, myrobalan, cīrabilva, prācināmalaka and kapittha, becoming sweet, sour, bitter, pungent, or astringent; in the same way the three guṇas are subject to modifications which model themselves upon their original (pradhāna), and between them give rise to the entire visible world, in which people and objects differ according to the predominance of the different guṇas (Sāṅkhya karikā and STK, 16). Vācaspatimiśra (gloss on Yogasūtras III,14) says that earth is possessed of five qualities (gandha, rasa, etc.), corresponding to the five senses; while water possesses four, and so on. He continues: "A modification of all these is seen in the variety of all the forms of juice, etc., found in the roots, fruits, flowers, leaves, etc. of tree, creeper, cane-plant, etc. All these cannot be the modifications either of the ground or of the water different in nature from themselves." (i.e. the existent comes from the existent and all is of the nature of all).

The follower of the Pūrṇaprājña system says that as the juices of various trees differ, likewise the deity and the individual soul (Sarv. V, p. 57. For the juices unified in honey, see Chap. VI above).

Thorns are classed with snakes as causes of pain,— see e.g. Upaskāra of Vaiṣ. Sūtras I,1,4; X,1,1; X,1,6; and Vyāsa on Yogasūtras II,17— knowledge as the means of avoiding pain. The Naiyāyika points out that when a person absentmindedly troads on a thorn, the internal organ speedily draws his attention to this
occurrence. This proves that the contact of sense-organ and
sense-object is the essential condition in perception (as one
can be conscious of sensation without paying attention) (Nyāya-
sūtras III, 100).

Cavilling and argument are permissible when one wishes to
determine and protect the truth, just as one shields seeds in
a field by surrounding it with thorns and branches. (Nyāyasūtras
IV, 3).

Turning from the plants themselves to the means of carrying
on agriculture, we may mention two references to the task of
the husbandman. The first likens the preparation of the mind for
a receptive attitude towards influences leading to liberation,
to the task of the husbandman (kṣetrika), who does not actually
lead the water with his own hands to the roots of plants, but
simply removes the obstacles, so that the water may flow down from
one field to another, and seep into the soil of its own accord
(Vācaspati on Yogasūtras II, 18; Vyāsa on ibid. IV, 3. Cf. also the
Vedānta theory of perception, below, p. 233, Chap. VIII). The
other passage occurs in Chap. VI of Sarv. (p. 65), where it is
stated that man's actions may sometimes be fruitful and sometimes
fruitless, according as the creator furthers them or not. But
this will not prevent men from performing works, for they will
engage in them as the husbandman engages in husbandry, though
the crop be uncertain. The field and the "knower of the field"
are common metaphors for the body and the soul; see e.g. Svet. Up.
5,3; 6,16; Maitri Up. 2,5; 5,2; Bhagavadgītā XIII,1-4.

An argument that will not hold water is likened to a well dug in sandy soil, whose sides are liable to fall in (Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya 2,2,32); or alternatively to a rotten pumpkin (kuṣmāṇḍā) (Sarv. IV, p. 49; and XII, p. 108). The maxim of the well-digger, used by Raghunātha, is applied as follows: "As the mud and dirt which falls down while a well is being dug, is washed away by the water, so the faults and stains of wrong knowledge are washed away by the realisation of non-duality". (See Jacob III, p. 24). Finally, the maxim of the laying-down of an irrigating canal is an example of one thing serving more than one purpose,—for the canal not only promotes vegetation, but also provides drinking-water.

Other references to vegetation will be met incidentally in other chapters: for example, see "Reality of Fiction" for the "crystal and the flower" (which makes it appear coloured); and see Canp Chapter I (and also "Reality of Fiction") for "sweet sandal" as an example of alaukika-pratyakṣa,—an out-of-the-ordinary perception.
Chapter VIII. The Elements (mahābhūtāni) and their role in regard to Upāmahā.

The remaining natural phenomena may be divided up among the five (sometimes four) "gross elements" of earth, water, fire, air and ether (prthvi-āp-tejo-anila-khāni), each of which has a special relationship with one of the sense-organs. (See e.g. Nyāyasūtras III,55). Among the Cārvākas, the four elements (ether being excluded) are the sole originators of mind and matter alike.

The element of earth has the characteristic quality of "odour" (gandha). It includes the earth itself, mountains, plains, stones and rocks, and also enters into the composition of bodies of all kinds, and precious stones (the latter being chiefly compounded of light or fire). In the account of creation, e.g. Bṛh. Up. 1,2,2, it is said that "that which was there like froth on the water was solidified and became this earth". Earth, then, is not the primary element, but it is the most accessible and tangible (though, curiously, it is "air" which is accorded the quality of "touch" (sparśa)). According to the Vaiṣeṣika system, the first four elements are grouped together, as being composed of indivisible atoms; while ether is classed as an eternal substance, together with time and space, and is accordingly in a different category from the other elements, (whose atoms are eternal, but whose modifications are transitory). (See Vaiṣeṣika Sūtras, passim;
and Tarkasaṅgraha. The Jain theory is similar: earth (e.g.) is both permanent (nitya) and impermanent (anitya), as regards its atoms and modifications respectively. In the Jain classification of "immovable" (sthāvara) souls, we find earth, water, fire, air, and trees; but a distinction is made between e.g. the dust of the road, which is simply "earth" (and inanimate), and a brick, which is an aggregated "body of earth", and as such may be inhabited by a soul (Sarv. III,p. 29).

The earth itself typifies material things as opposed to things spiritual, and must not be regarded as eternal (e.g. Vyāsa on Yogasūtras II,5). When the all-embracing nature of the soul is being illustrated (Ch. Up. 3,14,3), it is first said to be more minute than a grain of rice, or of barley, or of mustard, or of millet, or even the kernel of a grain of millet. Then, widening out into the cosmos, it is said to be greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than these worlds. Man's horizon must on no account be bounded by the limits of this earth.

The particular fold in the earth's crust which is known as a mountain is well-known in India, the land of the world's highest peaks. It is therefore small wonder that a mountain should often be referred to by the philosophers as a representative of something unmistakable and obvious. For instance the Self cannot be pointed out like heaven or Mount Meru,
for it is the very Self of those who seek to point it out (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 4,4,20). Elsewhere (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 2,4,12) Śaṅkara opposes the cognition of mountains and the like to the cognition of the only true Reality: "There may be things in the relative world as big as the Himalayas, for instance, created by a dream or illusion, but they are not real (transcendentally)."

A critic of the validity of upamā as a pramāṇa says that it is never argued, on the ground of there being a very slight similarity, that a mustard-seed is like Mount Meru (Nyāyasūtras II,2 42) (Cf. Upaskāra on Vaiṣ. Sūtras 4,1,2). We find mustard-seeds and mountains mentioned as examples of existent (and momentary) things on p. 10 of Sarv. (Chap. II). A favourite syllogism for establishing the existence of a Supreme Being is "the mountains, seas, etc., must have had a maker, because they are effects, just like a jar." And if the opponent argues in return that they cannot have had a maker, because they were not produced by a body (i.e. embodied being), (since no such person is visible), he is confounded by the fact that his syllogism seeks to prove too much ("since they were not produced" would have sufficed) (Sarv. XI, p. 97. See also Sarv. VII, pp. 67-8).

A legitimate inference (according to the Śaṅkhya-Yoga school) is "the Vindhyā mountain does not move, because it is not seen going from one place to another, like Caitra"
(Vyāsa on Yogasūtras I, 6-7). The Sahya and Vindhya mountains are examples of absolutely separate things (see above, Chap. III). The mountain is the abode of jewels,—see above, Chap. IV, for Mount Rohana and its gems.

Being easily visible from a distance, the mountain is the stock stronghold of (suspected) fire, as evidenced by the syllogism "The mountain has fire, because it has smoke" (as we see the connection between smoke and fire in the kitchen). The knower of Brahman does not provide a refuge for faults, just as deer and birds do not resort to a mountain that is on fire (Maitrī Up. 6, 18).

The elevation of a mountain naturally suggests superiority: "Having attained the illumination of wisdom, the wise man is no longer an object of compassion; he has compassion on others, as one upon a mountain looks down upon those in the plains." (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras I, 47). "acala," the "immovable" mountain, and guhā, mountain cave, have a religious significance: for instance, Brahman dwells in the heart, as in a cave (guhā), (which is hidden and solid).

The stones and boulders that help to compose a mountain have a precarious existence, for when their support is removed, they roll down into oblivion. Similarly when the Yogi has attained liberation, buddhi and guṇās disappear together (lit. "buddhi has done its duty. The guṇās recede into their cause (sva-kārāpe), and disappear together with it"), for they can no longer find a support, "like stones rolled down
from the edge of a hill-top" (Vyāsa on Yogasūtra II, 27). If a disputant presents a faulty case, objections will fall upon him "like a shower of stones" (Sarv. II, p. 8).

But on the other hand, a stone is the embodiment of lifelessness and impassivity (e.g. Maitrī Up. 2, 7: "Inanimate and lifeless, like a stone"). When the (fallacious) syllogism "He is not free from passions, because he possesses the faculty of speech" is presented, an example by contrast is that if something has no passions, it cannot speak, as e.g. a stone. In this case, although both the attributes are absent in a piece of stone, this example cannot be taken to prove the proposition ("everyone who is free from passions does not speak") in its general application (Nyāyabindu and Tīkā III, p. 96) (See "Reality of Fiction" for "a piece of stone does not produce a germ", also for "floating stones" and for the Yōgin's supernatural power of entering a stone, etc.).

The impassivity of the stone also has its useful side, for it is a sign of strength. In the account of the conflict between gods and Asuras (Chānd. Up. 1, 2, 7–8; and Brh. Up. 1, 3, 7), the gods are represented as asking each organ of sense in turn to chant the Udgītha for them; and each organ the Asuras were able to smite with evil. But when it came to the turn of the vital force within the mouth, the Asuras once more attempted to strike with their evil, but this time they themselves were shattered, as a clod of earth is shattered.
when striking against a solid stone or rock. Likewise anyone who wishes evil to one who knows this, is shattered,—for he who knows the secret of union with the vital force is as a solid stone.

When the phrase "the Self in the midst of the organs" (Brh. Up. 4,3,7) is used, Śaṅkara hastens to point out that the use of the locative case implies that the self is different from the organs, as e.g. "a rock in the midst of the trees" indicates only proximity, not identity. (Divested of the light of the Self, the organs are like wood or clods of earth (Brh. Up. Comm. 4,4,18; cf. Kauṣ. Up. 2,14)). This is presumably said in order to refute the possible suggestion of a school of Cārvākas, who identify the Self with the sense-organs (See Vedāntasāra 125). (But note that the locative case is often used in the sense of "submerging in", which implies identity,—e.g. in the case of the dharaniś or tubular vessels of the body, at time of death)

A stone, being a portion of the element "earth", must have the quality of smell; but this is not directly cognisable, though it exists. Similarly, according to the Śaṅkhya, pradhāna, primal matter, exists, though it cannot be cognised (Śaṅkhya 15). It is pointed out by Upaskāra on Vaiś. Sūtras 2,1,1; and 4,1,9; that smell is perceptible in the ashes of a stone, though not in the stone itself.

Physics and metaphysics are combined in a comparison
between atoms and moments of time, as follows: "When a piece of stone is divided up again and again, until it reaches a point beyond which it cannot go, it is said to have reached the limit of minuteness. The minute portion which then remains is called an atom. Similarly, the utmost limit of minuteness of time is a moment" (which corresponds to the atom in space) (Vācaspatimisra on Yogasūtras III,52). Time is real and concrete in Indian thought (cf. astrology), but space is still better known, and space-notions underlie time-notions.

Another portion of "earth", namely desert land, is referred to in two passages of the Brh. Up. Comm. Saṅkara first propounds the view of the followers of Bhartṛprapañca, who say that, instead of the individual self being inseparable from the Supreme Self, there are actually three entities: one composed of the gross and subtle elements, one (the highest) being the Supreme Self, and the third, intermediate between the two, consisting of the sum total of one’s meditations, actions and previous experience, together with the individual self, the agent and experiencer. They go on to say that ignorance, though it springs from the Self, is not an attribute of it, just as a desert does not affect the whole earth (2,3,6). In the other passage (3,2,13), it is stated that (according to Bhartṛprapañca), a man is not liberated even though the grahas and atigrahas (sense-organs and objects) hav and their causes have been uprooted, for he is separated from the Supreme
Self by ignorance, the "desert on earth", and remains in an intermediate stage, from which he may be released through meditation on the Self. Saṅkara asks, "How can the disembodied man, after his organs have been destroyed, attain the realisation of the Supreme Self through hearing, reflection and meditation?" His conclusion is that the followers of Bhartṛprapañca cannot make out a convincing case for their "desert and earth" theory, for they are caught on the horns of a dilemma. (Cf. "rain on a saline barren waste", below, "Reality of Fiction").

There are other things which might justly be connected with the element of earth: jewels, minerals, or for that matter vegetation and the animals which live on the earth. But these have for the most part been dealt with under other headings, and only certain broad physical features are left for this chapter. With regard to the minerals, however, there is one important one common to both earth and water, namely salt; and this shall serve as a connecting link between these two elements. It is found in salt mines on earth, but it is soluble in water, and is abundantly present in the sea,—and it is the connection of salt with water which provides the philosophers, from Upaniṣadic times on, with one of their favourite similes.

At Chāndogya 6,13, in the course of a detailed exposition of the nature of the Self, and of the world-reowned phrase,
"tat tvam asi" ("That art thou"), the pupil is instructed to place a lump of salt in water, and return on the morrow. The following day he is told to seek for the salt,—and behold, it has vanished. He then sips from all parts of the water, and finds that the salt has pervaded it entirely. And so it remains. In like manner, says the teacher, the Truth (sat) pervades everything, yet the uninstructed cannot perceive it.

This simile is in common use among Vedāntic writers. It appears in almost the same form in Bṛh. Up. 2,4,12: "As a lump of salt is thrown into water dissolves into the water, and it is not possible to take it out, but from whichever part one takes (water), it tastes salt,—likewise this great, endless, unbounded reality is one mass of intelligence (vi-jñāna-ghana)". (Cf. also Bṛh. Up. 4,5,13) Any differences which seem to exist between the individual and the Supreme Self are due to ignorance, for in reality there is nothing but the Supreme Self, homogeneous like a lump of salt. (See also ibid. Comm. 3,8,12; 4,3,21; 4,4,22; Vedāntasāra 198, and Maitri Up. 6,35; 7,11).

In the Pūrṇaprajña system, which teaches duality, the Mahāyoginiṣṭhāna is quoted, to prove that "like fresh and salt water", etc., soul and the Lord (Īśvara) are for ever different. (Sarv. V., p. 57).

The simile of the solution of salt in water also extends
to logic, for the discovery of a sea-water pool which tastes salt (in one part) leads to the conclusion that the rest of the water is also salt; and this is taken as an example of "seṣavat" inference, - the inference of the nature of the whole from knowledge of the part. (Randle gives a different interpretation of "seṣavat", - see his "Indian Logic", Ch.III).

In the Bṛhad. commentary (1,6,1), all sounds are declared to spring from Speech (Vāc), like particles of salt springing from a salt rock; for they are all modifications of a single genus and Cf.ibid.4,3,33. Likewise different animals thrown together into a salt mine approximate one to another, as their differences become obliterated (See above,p.70). Salt (borax salt?) is used for repairing gold (Ch.4,17,7 - see above,Ch.IV).

Another illustration which dates from the Upaniṣads, and which is more or less the monopoly of the Vedanta philosophy, is that of the rivers merging in the sea. For example in the Muṇḍaka: "As the rivers flowing into the ocean disappear, leaving name and form (nāmarūpa), so he who knows, being released from name and form, is absorbed in the Heavenly Being, who is higher than the high (parat param)" (Muṇḍ. Up. 3,2,8; a parallel passage is Praśna Up. 6,5). This image is worked out in greater detail at Chāndogya Up.6,10,1-2) "These rivers... flow, the Eastern towards the East, the Western towards the West. Coming from the sea, they flow into the sea. There the sea comes into being. As there they know not
"I am this one", "I am that one", even so, indeed, all
creatures here, though they have come from Being(Sat) (sc.and
will be absorbed into Being again), know not "We have come
from Being". (Cf. Comm on Brh.3,8,9, - the divine law which
causes some rivers to flow to the east, and others to the west.

The simile of rivers and the sea is worked out in
several passages of the Brhad, Ut (text and commentary), and possible
objections to it as illustrative of the unity of Brahman are
posited and answered. At 2,4,1, - a key passage - all the
sense- organs, mind, and the organs of action (karmendriya),
are stated to be the goal of their special objection, as the
ocean is the goal of all kinds of water. And through successive
steps each object of action, together with its receiving organ
(N.B. graha and atigraha) is merged in Pure Intelligence, and no
limiting adjuncts remain, but only the Self is left, boundless
like the ocean. Here and in the following verse (2,4,12), it
is not only the rivers and such like bodies of water that are
mentioned as becoming one with the ocean, but also the character­
eristing parts of the ocean itself, namely foam, bubbles, waves.
We may see a wave rise and fall, as it seems vainly to seek
escape from the sea, but always and inexorably it is drawn back
and made to sink its individuality in the whole; and so with
foam and bubbles appearing now here, now there, but never
marring the unity of the vast expanse of water. Similarly the
elements, transformed into body, organs, and sense-objects have
their individuality destroyed or absorbed through the knowledge of Brahman. (See also comm on 3,2,11; 3,5,1).

\[ \text{Vāyu} \]

4,3,33; 3,7,2 ("Vāyu... whose external forms, like the waves of an ocean, are the 49 maruts").

Some, having a limited comprehension of the Vedānta ideals, say that the Internal Ruler is the slightly agitated state of the ocean of Supreme Brahman, the Immutable, while the individual self, which does not know that internal ruler (= the Īśvara) is the extremely agitated state of that ocean. (Bṛh. Comm.3,8.12). The followers of Bhartṛprapañca, too, contend that the example of the ocean and its parts does not illustrate unity, but both unity and plurality. (See also ṚBṛh. Up. Comm.5,11).

We are forcibly struck by the way in which similes may be turned and twisted until the real issue is obscured. In the earlier passages of the Bṛhad., cited above, the imagery of the ocean and its parts seems perfectly suited to illustrate the unity of Brahman; and yet a little further on (Bṛh Up.5,1.1) this very simile is seized upon by an opponent, and condemned as "inappropriate" by the orthodox Vedāntin! And the example of the rivers and the sea is taken to represent simple duality in the Pūrṇaprajñā system (Sarv. V. p. 57; Mahopaniṣad): "Like rivers and the sea..., so are Soul and the Lord for ever different." That is the whole fault of metaphors and similes: one, or perhaps two or three, characteristics of a thing are taken and transferred to something else, like and yet not like;
and the opponent forthwith picks on the other characteristics which have been ignored,—quite rightly for the purpose,—and proceeds to demolish the entire theory, hoisting its advocate with his own petard. Nevertheless, the Indian philosopher, refusing to be divorced from the concrete, continues to seek ever better and more fitting similes, which alone can drive home his (otherwise) abstract and abstruse theories.

Elsewhere (Brh. Up. Comm. 2,4,10) Sāṅkara admits that when the limiting adjuncts of the Supreme Self, "name and form", or individuality, are differentiated, that is separated from their original source by ignorance, it is impossible for the uninitiated to tell whether they are identical with or different from it, just as it is impossible to tell whether the foam of water (regarded as an impurity) is a part of the ocean, or is separate from it for the time being. (See also Comm. on ibid. 1,4,7; 1,5,2; and see above, Chap. VII, p.211). The Maitrī Up. (6,35) has a similar thought: "They (=the individual souls) who rise forth perpetually like the spray-drops..."; and cf. Aitareya Comm. I,1 (p. 24, Ānand.): foam and water illustrate the difference and non-difference (bheda-abheda) of ātman and world (jagat).

When the ascending ratio of joys (ānanda), starting with human enjoyment, and being multiplied a hundred times in geometrical progression until the unit of joy in the world of
Brahman (as Hiranyagarbha) is reached, -- has been elaborated, it is stated that the joys of all the worlds are but particles of the supreme joy of Brahman, at which mathematical calculations cease; just as the drops of the ocean are innumerable infinite particles of a vast body of water (Bṛh. Up. Comm., 4.3, 33).

The symbolic use of the ocean extends beyond the relation of Ātman and Brahman. Any great man may be called "ocean of compassion" (karunā, kṛpā), "ocean of knowledge", and the like; while as an epithet applied to a divine being, "ocean of joy" or "compassion", as the case may be, is of frequent occurrence (e.g. Kusum. V, 18: "Though our minds have long been plunged in Thee, the ocean of joy"). Anyone who is under the influence of delusion is said to be plunged in a sea of bewilderment or darkness, as for example (in the Yoga system) one who has an excess of the quality tamas (Sarv. XV, p. 131); whereas the mind concentrating itself upon the notion of "I am" becomes like a waveless ocean, calm, infinite, pure egoism (āsmita-mātram) (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras I, 36).

The most well-known of all the metaphorical "seas", and one that is common to the systems, with the exception of the materialists, is the "sea of samsāra" (cycle of existences), from which no unenlightened person can escape. There is a graphic description of the sufferings of one who is submerged in this sea, at Aitareya Up. I, 2 (pp. 35-6, Ānand.), where
there is a fully elaborated description of the ocean of samsāra - its waves, sharks (=death), wind, storms, shores, raft (=full knowledge, pūrṇa-jñāna), etc. This metaphor is a particular favourite with the Buddhists; and it has spread from the philosophical and religious texts into Kāvya and other branches of literature, perhaps chiefly because it offers such rich opportunities for punning (śleṣas) (e.g. graha = "shark" and "sense-organ") (Cf. the titles of various works, e.g. Kathā-sarit-sāgara, the ocean of streams of story).

The man who succeeds in crossing the ocean of samsāra (or in mastering any branch of knowledge) is known as "pārāga", one who has gone to the farther shore". It is the normal term for a fully fledged student of the Veda, or (in Buddhism) for an Arahant in his final existence (Pālī "Pāragu"). The very titles of the two great systems of Buddhism, "Mahāyāna" and "Hinayāna" (great and lesser vehicles) indicate that they were intended to carry the devout across the sea of samsāra. The "farther shore" seems to have been more frequently that of a river than that of a sea; thus Śvet. Up. 2,8: "A wise man with the Brahma-raft (uḍupa) should cross over all the fear-bringing streams". Or Muni. Up. 2,2,6: "Thus meditate upon the Ātman as Om. Good fortune to you in crossing to the farther shore beyond darkness!" (Cf. also ibid. 3,2,9; Maitri Up. 6,30; and Kaṭ. Up. 1,4.).

Most of the Upaniṣads contain references to Brahman as a boat, a raft, or bridge (or dam- setu), whereby one may
cross over ignorance and darkness (e.g. Maitri Up. 7,10; Mund. Up. 2,2,5; Svet. Up. 6,19; Mund. Up. 1,2,7). There is a sustained metaphor at Maitri Up. 6,28, descriptive of the progress of a soul striving after the Supreme: "Having slain the doorkeeper (ahamkāra- see above, Ch. IV),... having crossed over with the raft of the syllable Oṃ to the other side of the space in the heart, in the inner space which has been revealed one should enter the hall of Brahman". ("Crossing over death"- see. Isā Up. 14; Maitri Up. 7,9). The Brh. Up. Comm. (2,5,15) has a plea for the orthodox method of studying with a teacher: "Those alone who tread the path shown by the Sruti and spiritual teachers, transcend ignorance. They alone will succeed in crossing this unfathomable ocean of delusion, and not those others who follow the lead of their own clever intellect." A recognised guru or the founder of a system is said to have "gone to (or "seen to") the "farthest shore" of the ocean of logic, or whatever it may be (e.g. Sarv. p. 1).

Besides combining all beings and including all beings, the Supreme Self is conceived as having the function of separating the different worlds, by interposing itself between them like an embankment or dam (setu). From this angle, the sea is regarded as both combining and separating the territories which flank it,— and here the dam does not serve as a link, but rather as a greater barrier than the sea itself (Brh. Up. 4,4,22; Ch. Up. 8,4,1; Maitri Up. 7,7; cf. also
Comm. on Brh. Up. 3,8,9).

The relentless ebb and flow of the ocean- or river-waves may give rise to philosophising on the finality of one's actions: "Like the waves in great rivers, that which has previously been done cannot be turned back. Like the ocean tide, hard to keep back is the approach of death." (Maitri Up. 4,2). The rhythmical ebb and flow has its counterpart in the waves of sound which travel to and from the organ of hearing (vicī-taraṇga-nyāya, e.g. Bhasāpariccheda, verses 165,166).

We find a sustained metaphor describing the nature of the individual soul at Svet. Up. 1,5:

"We understand him as a river of five streams from five sources, impetuous and crooked;

Whose waves are the five vital breaths, whose original source is fivefold perception (buddhi),

With five whirlpools, an impetuous flood of fivefold misery,

Divided into five distresses, with five branches." (or: with fifty divisions-panca-sad-bhedam)

(Translation from Hume's "13 principal Upaniṣads").

The individual soul may apprehend the Supreme Soul within itself, like water in rivers (or oil in sesame seeds, butter in cream, or fire in the fire-sticks,- i.e. the one is bound up with the other) (Svet. 1,15). And the ceaseless
flowing of rivers provides an image for the sound-Brahman within the heart, which may be heard when the ears are closed (Maitri Up. 6,22). The falling of the (heavy tropical) rain is another simile at the same passage. Īśa A flowing river, being transient and unstable, provides a symbol for the evanescence of the relative universe (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 1,5,2).

A continuous stream or current (pravāha or dhārāvāha) is used as a metaphor for a persistent state of mind, and the like. For instance, a syllogism is brought forward by the Vaiśeṣikas to prove that the nine viṣeṣa-guṇas of ātman must cease to exist in the state of mokṣa. It is based on the hetu "santānatvāt", i.e. "because they are streams" (Syadv. p. 38, St. VIII) (Cf. also the Buddhist "stream" (santāna or santati) of consciousness). According to the exponent of Yoga, the "stream" (nadi or srotas) of mind flows both ways, towards good and towards evil. The stream of happiness flows down the plane of discriminative knowledge, towards perfect independence (kaivalya), while the stream of sin flows down the plane of ignorance, and leads to rebirth (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras I,12). See also Bhāṣya on Yogasūtras I,32- the "one-pointed mind". When the stream of buddhi is unhampered by the disturbing guṇas, (rajas and tamas), and when ignorance has been removed, the Yogi attains intellectual illumination, and is ready for release
(Vyāsa on Yogasūtras I,47; and cf. II,26). The Vedāntic conception of "antahkaraṇa-vṛtti", (the modification of the internal organ, which takes the form of the object perceived) is similar,- "(There is no variation of knowledge) in the case of a continuous stream of cognition" (Vedānta-paribhāṣā I). Cf. the theory of perception, ibid.: antahkaraṇa, going out through the door of the eye or other sense-organ, takes the form of the object,—just as the water of a lake issues through a hole (=drain-pipe) as a thin stream, and forthwith takes the form of the field it enters. The "stream of guṇas" (guṇaughha) which defiles the soul and carries it along in the wrong direction, is referred to at Maitri Up. 3,2.

A flowing river, being transient and unstable provides a symbol for the evanescence of the relative Universe (Brh. Up. Comm. 1,5,2). See above for an account of the Vedānta theories of reflection and apparent limitation, as illustrated by the examples of (a) a forest and its trees, and the space enclosed by them; and (b) a lake and its waters, and the skies reflected in them.

It is not to be wondered at that in a country like India which is dependent on the regularity of the monsoon, rain should be a variety of water that greatly engrossed the philosophers when they sought to illustrate their theories
with examples from daily life. The Sāṅkhya school points out that the unintelligent rain (water, jalāṇa) acts for the welfare of living creatures; likewise the unintelligent Prakṛti may act for the liberation of the soul (Sarv. XIV, p. 123). The rain falls on all places alike, without discrimination as to whether there is need of water or not; in the same way the various rules of grammar are applied at once to many examples (Pāṇini chapter of Sarv. p. 112). At Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya 2, 3, 42, Śaṅkara affirms that just as the rain causes the production of barley, rice, shrubs, etc., by its action on the seeds, so God, making use of man's previous actions, impels him to either good or evil. Here, in contrast to the Sāṅkhya view, the rain is not regarded as functioning spontaneously.

Although the rain falls upon all places alike, yet its effect will differ according as it falls on barren or fertile ground (cp. the parable of the Sower and the Seeds). "As water rained upon rough (impassable, durga) ground runs (to waste) in different directions among the mountains, so he who sees qualities (dharma) separately, runs after them alone. As pure water poured forth into pure, is assimilated (and keeps its original nature) so becomes the soul of the sage (muni) who has discriminative knowledge" (Kaṭha Up. IV.14-15). In the Sāṅkhya view, the modifications of the three guṇas, and the degree in which they are present in different objects, may be
likened to the different flavours of the juices (from fruits) of various trees which are regarded as proceeding from the rain, as it alters its taste according to the ground on which it falls (Sāṅkhya-kārikā 16). So the three guṇas which proceed from one original source (pradhāna) may yet assume various modifications, without any inconsistency. For the variety of all forms of juices (Yogasūtras III.14) see ch. VII, above and for rasa in poetry cp. ch. IV, p. 29).

An example for anupalabdhi (non-perception) owing to an intermixture of equal things (samāna-abhihārat) is a number of rain-drops fallen from a cloud into a lake - for they cannot be separately recognised after being merged in the whole (Sāṅkhya-tatttva-kāmudī 7).

We have noted in chapter II (above, p. 39) that the chief function of the cloud, as reflected in synonyms referring to it, is the pouring forth of water. A certain trance-condition in Yoga is the "cloud of virtue", dharma-megha, not because it obscures right action, but because it "pours forth showers of light upon all the virtues (or qualities, dharma) of things to be known" (V's gloss on Y.S. IV.31). The coming of the rain-clouds brings happiness to the world in general, but it also means activity for tillers of the field and sorrow for separated lovers, so on this analogy it is evident to the follower of Sāṅkhya that the guṇas, though each has its own
predominant characteristic, may share, in a lesser degree, each other's attributes (anyonyavṛttayaḥ, S.Kārikā 12).

The Sāṅkhya school places the inference of (future) rain from the observation of a heavy cloud in the class of pūrvavat inference, i.e. inference based upon former experience of the sequence of clouds and rain. (This would not be a valid inference for the Buddhists who hold that causes are not necessarily followed by their (usual) results). The Naiyāyikas too admit the validity of such an inference, but the Mīmāṁsaka seeks to bring it under the head of arthāpatti, conjecture: "since the cloud is not in the same place as the rain, this is not an instance of invariable concomitance (vyāpti); therefore the case does not fall under the head of inference" (Nyāyasūtravṛttī, book II, 69 sq.). The Naiyāyika replies that arthāpatti must certainly be included under inference, as there is a vyāpti between rain and cloud (rain must come from a cloud, though any cloud does not necessarily cause rain). The upholder of arthāpatti replies to the objection that rain does not always result when clouds are observed, by saying that when rain does not result, the arthāpatti has served its purpose (Nyāyasūtras & ṛttī, II. 70 - 72). (Or: it is a legitimate conjecture to deduce the existence of clouds from the experience of rain; but not to conjecture that there will be rain, from having seen clouds).
We have had occasion to refer (above, pp. 177-178) to the threefold inference (applying to all three times) of rain from the state and activities of river, peacock and anta (Nyāyasūtras II.35,36, and Sānkhyatattvavākaumudī 33). The regularity of the rains is hinted at in Kusumānjali II.2:

"If you wish to prove that the days of the rainy season have been uninterruptedly preceded by similar rainy days, you must first have the condition (upādhi) that they have been preceded by a certain period of the sun's course limited by its entrance into certain sāguna of the Zodiac; and so here if you would prove that day and night must have been uninterruptedly preceded by day and night (i.e. that the mundane creation has no beginning and no end), then you must have as the condition an uninterrupted samsāra of beings (due to previous ma karma)."

As an offset to its function of giving rain and thereby causing fertility, the cloud has the negative property of obscuring the light of the sun, and in this capacity provides an analogy for the darkness of ignorance, hiding the light of knowledge. "Thus obstructions (āvaraṇa) cloud the knowledge and intuition (darśana), as a cloud obscures the sun, or a shade (virodhāyaka-kumbha) the lamp". (Jain ch. of Sarv. p. 31). In the Vedāntic view, just as a small patch of cloud obstructs the vision of an observer, and conceals..."
(for him) the sun which really extends "for many miles", similarly ignorance, though limited by nature, is able to conceal the Self which is unlimited and not subject to saṃsāra (Vedāntaśāra 52). The second stage of samādhi, trance absorption, is that in which the Saint contemplates the reality as though it were veiled by a thin cloud, while in the third and final stage it is clearly revealed (Nyāyabinduṭīkā I.p.15). According to the Jains, the mind is affected by doğas or taints of passion, etc., but the fact that these doğas may vary in power and number points to the fact that they may be eradicated altogether, on the analogy of a screen formed by clouds which (sometimes) cover the sun. (Syādv. st. XVII, p. 120). The Ātman in Vedānta is for ever untouched by such relative attributes as hunger and thirst, as the sky is untouched by impurities like clouds etc. (Bṛhad. Up. Comm. 3,5,1).

The Buddhist doctrine of kṣaṇikatva (momentariness) is well illustrated by the fleeting nature of clouds: "Whatever is, is momentary like a cloud and like (all) these existent things" (Sarv. II, p.10). But an opponent, seeking to refute this dogma, says: "In the example of the cloud, etc., was your "momentariness" proved by this same proof, or by some other? It could not be the former, because your desired momentariness is sometimes visible in the cloud, and therefore, as your example is not a proved fact, your supposed inference cannot
stand. Nor can it be the latter—because you might always prove it your doctrine by this new proof (if you had it). " (Sarv. III, p. 21). Such a presentation of a seemingly insurmountable dilemma was very much in vogue among the philosophers, as constituting an easy method of confusing an opponent during a sāṇḍvāda.

A favourite simile, remarked on above (p. 110) is "like the drop of water on a lotus leaf," usually applied to the impurities which do not affect the immortal soul. The example of the mirage in the desert, a common analogy for the futility of mundane existence, particularly among the Śāṅkara Vedāntins, (who liken the relative universe to a mirage, which vanishes when the truth (i.e. Brahman) is known) will be discussed in Chap. IX.

The normal characteristics of water, notably its coldness, are averred by the Cārvākas to arise from its own nature, not from any external cause (i.e. God) (Sarv. I, p. 4). The sweetness of (fresh) water is considered by some schools (not Vaiśeṣika) to be an inherent quality, distinct from the function of the atoms composing the water (e.g. Vācaspati on Yogasūtras I, 43).

It is the nature of water to flow downwards when poured on to a higher level; but an embankment may be made to check its downward flow. In the same way, the quality of sattva, which appertains to buddhi (intellect), is naturally pleasing
and luminous, and if unchecked, it tends towards discriminative knowledge; but it is often hindered by a predominance of rajas or tamas, which can only be removed by leading a blameless life, or by the practice of Yoga (V's gloss on Yogasūtras II,28). When a farmer desires to lead water down from one bed to another, he simply removes the weeds and other obstacles, and allows the water to make its own way to the desired spot. Similarly, when vice, the obstacle to virtue, is pierced through, the creative causes making for advance are enabled to take effect (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras IV,3; see also II,18, and above, Chap. VII, p.213). When no obstacles impede its flow, water is all-pervading; and "the divine organ of speech" likewise becomes all-pervading when ignorance and attachment disappear (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 1,5,18).

Water has, of course, a cleansing effect (see e.g. Kusum. V,17). But the agency of the clearing nut-plant is sometimes required to remove contaminating mud; and this simile is applied to the aupāśamika state of the soul, when the effects of past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise (See above, Chap. 8 VII, p.210). The mixed (miśra) state is as when the soul, like the water, is partly pure (Sāry. III,p. 28).

Another use of water is as an aid in certain handicrafts such as pottery. Jars, for instance, are not produced spontaneously from their causes, but are helped into manifestation by water, etc. (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras III,14; and cf. ibid.)
This statement is by way of qualifying the theory of satkārya, viz., that effects are already latent in their causes.

The Mīmāṃsaka, seeking to establish the existence of a special quality "capacity" (śakti), asks "How (otherwise than by admitting this quality) will you account for the liquidity of water being prevented in ice (or hail-karaka) etc.?" The Naiyāyika replies that there is no necessity to assume a separate capacity conducive to the production of ice; it is to be explained by a conjunction of water with special causes (e.g. cold atmosphere) (Kusum. Comm. 1,12). An inference to prove that the meanings of words in a sentence are invariably connected, would break down because of involving too much (anaikānta), for it would have to apply to such phrases as "he sprinkles with water" (an impossibility in the case of water in the form of ice) (Kusum. 3,13). In the course of a mystical speculation (Bṛh. 6,2,16) Śaṅkara says: "The liquids called faith which were offered in the fire of heaven and took the form of the moon,—i.e. with which a new watery body was built for the enjoyment of the ritualists in the moon,—melt on the expiration of the fruits of their past karma, like a lump of ice in the sunshine." In the text on which this is based, all the elements are linked together, in a description of the cycle of rebirth (See above, Chap. IV, p.113). (See esp. Bṛh. Up. 6,2,9-14).
Water and fire are for ordinary purposes regarded as diametrically opposed. In the Nyāyasūtras (1.47, vṛttī), an example of a contradictory (viruddha) reason,—a reason invariably attended by the negation of what is to be established,—is "This is fiery, because it is a lake (hrada)"; and the lake is the normal vipakṣa in the syllogism "The mountain has fire because it has smoke". But in the account of creation it is said that fire rests on water (see e.g. Brh. Up. Comm. 1.2,2); while credence is attached to the myth of the fire in the ocean (vāḍavāgni) (see e.g. Svet. Up. 6,15). Fire, indeed, is associated with fertility (in trees, in water, and cf. the digestive fire, which works with water). Moreover the Jain, true to his tenet that all things are related, avers that as water and fire, the two elements are opposed; but as substance (dravya) they are one (Syādv. p. 89, St. XIV).

As a connecting link between the aqueous and igneous elements, we may now deal with the reflection of the sun or moon in water. In the Vedānta philosophy, the comparison with such a reflection is considered to be the most satisfactory illustration for the "entrance" of the Supreme Self into the universe. Before the manifestation of the universe, the Self is not perceived, but it is later observed within the intellect, like the reflection of the sun, etc. in water (Brh. Up. Comm. 1.4,7). And as the reflections of sun and moon vanish when their cause, the water, is removed; and only the sun and moon
themselves, the realities on which the reflections are based, remain, so in the end only the endless infinite Pure Intelligence remains, shorn of limiting adjuncts (ibid, 2,4,12-3). The same sun may be reflected in different sheets of water, giving the appearance of plurality, though actually the various reflections become merged in the original reality. In like manner all seeming differences in the universe and all that pertains to it are like reflections of the one Supreme Self, and have no existence apart from it. (Brh. Up. Comm. 1,4,7).

Above (p.lov) we have discussed the reflection of consciousness in the mirror of buddhi, by which Puruṣa appears to be affected, though in reality remaining aloof. This happens in the same way as when the moon is reflected in pure water. It then appears to be transferred into the water, though actually it is in no way dependent on the water for its existence. (Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras II,20). Buddhi is predominantly of the nature of one or other of the three guṇas; and when consciousness is reflected in it, the guṇas in question appear to belong to consciousness (caitanya), just as the moon in the water appears to tremble on account of the unsteadiness of the water (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras III,35). This is just another example of the linking-together of all phenomena which is so markedly characteristic of Indian thought (See also Vācaspati on Yogasūtras IV,22).

Although the reflection of the moon is not the real sub-
stantial moon, yet it has a certain reality from the very fact of its being perceptible (see below, "Reality of Fiction"), and moreover it cannot be said that, because the reflection does not exist as a moon, therefore the real moon does not exist. In the same way, because consciousness is reflected in buddhi, and appears to assume its characteristics, it does not follow that consciousness itself is non-existent. The mind is coloured (uparakta) both by the object of perception, and by the impartial Furuṣa (See above, Chap. IV, p.104) (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras IV,23) see also Brāhma Up. Comm. 2,1,19 for a similar illustration in regard to the dream state).

A certain school of Buddhists (Yogācāra) contends that jñāna (knowledge) is produced by artha (the object of knowledge), and that the jñāna which is the effect cognises the artha which is its cause. In reply, the Jain says that such an idea is contrary to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, and inquires, "As regards your contention that jñāna apprehends objects because it springs from objects, and because it possesses their form, we ask whether these two causes operate together or separately?.. If separately, the first moment of the potsherd (ṇapāla) would apprehend the last moment of the jar, because the one produces the other; and jala-candra (reflection of the moon in water) would apprehend nabhas-candra (the moon in the sky), because the one bears the form of the other (tadākārata)" (Syādv. p.108,St.16)

The Vijnānavādin relies upon the following inference to
prove that ज्ञान and अर्थ are not separate: As the cognition (ज्ञान) of an object is invariably found together with that object, therefore they must be identical, as for example an illusory moon has no separate existence apart from the real moon (See Sarv. II, pp. 13-14). In this case, the reference is not to a reflection of the moon, but to the actual perception of an illusory moon, owing to eye-disease (timira). (See also "Reality of Fiction", and Brh. Up. Comm. 1,4,10).

The simile of "the moon upon the bough" (शाखा-चन्द्र) illustrates an apparent connection between two objects which are not actually related (applied to certain aspects of Brahman, Taittirīyabhashya-varta 2.1,2321 cf. also Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha, p. 202 (quoted by Jacob Vol. II,p. 45.).

Strictly speaking, there is little of "fire" about the moon, but fire and light are connected, and the moon comes under the heading "fire" mainly because of its association with its co-illuminator, the sun, which represents one division of the triple Agni, as manifested on earth, in the atmosphere, and in the heavens (भुर, भुवध, स्वर). The celestial fire is represented by the sun, moon, and planets; the atmospheric by the lightning, and the terrestrial by the fires on earth, in which we include that of the lamp. (See e.g. Maitri Up. 6,24: "the Brahman that is beyond darkness, that shines in yonder sun, also in the moon, in fire, in lightning.." The mineral fire (in gold and jewels, etc.) has already been dealt with above.
Incidentally, it is perhaps worth remarking that the legendary connection of fire with water (vādava-āgni) probably originated with the observation of the flashes of lightning occurring in the midst of a rainstorm. This is borne out by the existence of a later Vedic triad, Sun, Indra, fire,—where Indra must represent the fire of the atmosphere, as connected with rain and thunder (cf. the theory of creation which emphasizes the generative power of water—e.g. Rigveda X,121).

The moon and its light (candra and candrikā) typify two inseparably connected objects. This fancy is a favourite one in the Kāvyā literature. Moon-beams are proverbially pure, because of their white radiance: a Yogi is advised to concentrate upon the forms of moon, sun, planets or precious stones in order to attain internal lucidity, a state in which he becomes inspired (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras I,36). Gold and precious stones, though of the nature of light (taijasa), are not visible without the aid of external light, while the moon (like the lamp, which will be discussed below) is self-luminous. The fact of this difference between things which outwardly resemble each other is taken by the Jain to prove that it is impossible to assume a uniformity between things of one element (as the Vaiśeṣikas do) (Syādv. p. 14, St. V).

Moonlight, being much less powerful than sunlight, helps to cause a different kind of perception from that which is possible in the daytime. Similarly, full knowledge of the unity
of the Self may be attained by divergent processes, as e.g. as a result of one's actions in a past life, or through intense meditation and reflection (Brh. Up. Comm. 1,4,2). When the individual self is about to leave the body in which it abides, the sun appears as clear, shorn of its beams like the moon. For the rays which had formerly come to aid the "being in the eye" now consider that their duty is discharged, and come no more (Brh. Up. Comm. 5,5,2). *This*

It is noteworthy that the moon is regarded as particularly associated with the mind, in contradistinction to the sun, which is connected with the eye (e.g. Brh. Up. 2,5,5; 2,5,7, etc.: "This moon is like honey to all beings. The same with the shining, immortal being who is in this moon, and the shining, immortal being identified with the mind in the body." (sun and eye at 2,5,5; see also ibid. 3,1,4; 3,1,6; 1,3,14; 1,3,16; 3,2,13; 4,1,6; the moon is the presiding deity of the manas (mind)). But cf. Brh. Up. 1,5,4: "the mind is the sky"- here there is no mention of either moon or sun, and it may be a case of totum pro parte). At Praśna Up. 1,5, it is said that the moon is substance, wealth (rayi), while the sun is the life-breath (prāṇa). In another passage (Chānd. Up. 6,6,5) we are told that the mind consists of food (because one who has not eaten cannot think clearly). Now the moon is conceived as the food of the pitr̥s (its waning being accounted for by the diminution of the food supply). So it is not impossible that the association
of moon and mind may have some relation to the semi-mythological belief that the moon is the goal of the pitṛyāna, the path traversed by ritualists. For the pitṛyāna is the lower path, the way of those who pin their hopes on rites and on calculations, (and who have not divorced themselves entirely from mundane pleasures), as opposed to those who rely on meditation and revelation (the eye = truth = the sun). The pale, cold light of the moon fades into insignificance beside the blaze of the noonday sun, beneath which nothing can remain unrevealed (pratyakṣa, perception, and pratibhā, revelation, inspiration, are most reliable).

Like all other material objects, the moon is impermanent; the taking of the non-eternal to be eternal is "the possession of such notions as that... the firmament with the moon and the stars is permanent..." etc. (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras II,5). References to the moon's waxing and waning, the bright and dark fortnights, etc., are more common in the secular than in the philosophical literature (But see Bṛ. Up. 3,1,52 "Through identification with the moon one goes beyond the bright and dark fortnights, just as through identification with the sun one goes beyond day and night"). We find a punning comparison with the influence of the moon on the tides, at Syādv. p. 1, lines 5-8: "The sea of good thought is awakened into activity by the illustrious Hema-candra." For an inference of the meaning of the moon from the rising of the sun, see Upaniṣads on Vaiṣ. Sūtra 17, 2, 2.

The liability of both sun and moon to eclipse (in Sanskrit:
"being swallowed by the demon Rāhu") affords an analogy for
the limitations to which the soul is subjects, and which it
endeavours to overcome. E.g. "(the liberated soul)... shaking
off the body, as the moon releases itself from the mouth of
Rāhu" (Chānd.Up. 8,13,1); and Bṛh. Up. Comm. 4,3,7: "(It is
hard to discriminate between the self and the intellect, for)
the self is perceived as associated with the intellect, as the
planet (or demon-graha) Rāhu is with the sun and the moon
(when they are covered in eclipse)".

Turning to logic, we find an example of a thesis contra­
dicted by conventional acceptation: "The word "hare-marked"
(ṣaśī) does not mean the moon" (Nyāyabindu III, and Tīkā, p. 63).
Such a thesis is inadmissible, since it runs counter to the
generally accepted meaning of the word ṣaśī. (Vinītadeva adds,
on this point, that this thesis is also overthrown by the
fact that "every word can have any meaning", since the meaning
of a word is a matter of conventional agreement: "You may if
you like call the jar a moon". The characteristic mark of the
moon (hare- or deer-mark) is referred to again by Vācaspati on
Yogasūtras I,49, during a discussion on the validity of pramāṇa:
"It is not necessary that the reality which is to be known should
cease to exist, just because there is no means of knowing it.
Those who rely upon the ordinary means of knowledge (i.e. per­
ception, mainly,) do not doubt the existence of a deer-like mark
in the moon at a time when only the other side (or only a small
portion) of the moon is visible." A stock example of the use
of inference, proceeding from the known to the unknown, is
"The moon and stars are moving objects, because they are seen
going from one place to another, like Caitra" (e.g. Vyāsa on
Yogasūtras I,6,7).

The other planets and stars are usually mentioned in com-
pany with the sun or moon, and not very often separately.
For instance, an example of non-perception (anupalabdhi) through
being overpowered (abhibhavat) is "One does not see the planets
and stars in the daytime, owing to (their light's) being over-
powered by that of the sun" (Sānkhyakārikā 7). There is, however,
one maxim that is worthy of note: the Arundhatī-pradarśana-
nyāya, "the pointing out of the star Arundhatī". Anyone wishing
to locate the tiny star Arundhatī is first directed to look at
bigger and brighter stars, thus gradually training his eye until
he is able to find the right star. In the same way, the differ-
ent (wrong) views of the nature of the Self (e.g. that it is
the body, the organs, one's son, etc.) are not wholly valueless,
for by discarding each of them in turn one is enabled to arrive
at the truth. (See Nṛsimhasarasvatī's Comm. on Vedāntasāra 134;
and cf. Brahmāsūtrakāṭaūgya 1,1,8). The astronomer (who was
nearly always an astrologer at the same time) was held in high
repute in India, and the Jains in particular believed that
such a man must be omniscient. A Jainistic syllogism ("Omniscient
or absolutely trustworthy is a man who teaches astronomy, as
e.g. Rṣabha, Vardhamāna, and others") is quoted in Nyāyabindu
and refuted on the ground that it is by no means definitely established that the teaching of astronomy gives one a claim to omniscience or trustworthiness (āptatā).

Cf. Upaskāra on Vaiś. Sūtras II,20, where an illustration of "doubt" (saṃśaya) is that an astronomer may or may not predict an eclipse correctly. For the rising and setting of nakṣatras and stars, and inferences therefrom, see Upaskāra on Vaiś. Sūtras IX,2,2; and see "Reality of Fiction" for "consulting the stars after performing the head-shaving ceremony".

A good few of the attributes of the moon also apply to the sun. For example, it rises and sets, is subject to eclipse, and is material and impermanent ("The essence of that which is gross, mortal, limited and defined is the sun that shines").

But the "being that is in the sun", the divine spirit, is the essence of that which is subtle, immortal, unlimited and undefined. (Brh. Up. 2,3,2-3). In the Commentary on ibid. 2,3,4, it is said that the eye is the essence of the three elements of the body (= the three humours); for it is that which lends importance to the three gross elements in the body, just as the sun does with reference to the gods. This connection of sun and eye, with its emphasis on the importance and infallibility of perception (pratyakṣa) has already been dwelt upon more than once, for it is of the utmost importance to an understanding of the Indian viewpoint. Cf. Kaṭha Up. V,11: "As the sun, the eye of the whole world, is not tainted by the external faults
of the eyes, so the one internal Ātman of all living things is not tainted by the world's misery, being outside it." Here Śaṅkara in his commentary explains "bāhya-doṣa" as "unclean things that are perceived by the eyes", not as "errors of vision".

The rays of the sun have a mystic significance, and a connection with the light in the eye ("The eye is the Uktha (source) of all forms (rupa), for all forms spring from it"). As the rays of the setting sun all become merged in the brilliant orb itself, and go forth again when it rises, even so does everything here become one in mind (manas-Ś, the highest god. (Praśna Up. IV,2). When the master Yogin has created his impromptu bodies at will, he draws them in again "as the sun draws in its rays" (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras IV,5). There is a sidelong on the composition of the sun-rays at Syādv. St. VI, p. 26: "The case of jñāna (knowledge, regarded as an attribute or guṇa of ātman) is sometimes illustrated by the analogy of the rays of the sun, which, though a guṇa of the sun, travel out and illumine the world. But this analogy will not bear scrutiny. The rays are not a guṇa of the sun, but a substance (dravya) made of luminous matter (pudgala); luminosity (prakāśa) is their guṇa, and cannot travel out of them. Similarly, jñāna is a guṇa of ātman and cannot travel out of ātman." The true analogy, for which see above, Chap. IV, p.90-1) is that of a magnet, which works at a distance. See also Maitri Up. 6,26;
and 6,31 (all living creatures come forth into this world, as light-rays come from the sun); and Sarv. IV, p. 40, lines 11-14 (gem, sun, etc., and Atman and knowledge).

It would be wearisome to recount all the possible variations of the symbolic application of the sun and its light, e.g. the light of knowledge, which illumines ignorance as the sun dispels the darkness; or the self-luminous Soul, which like the Sun, requires no other light to reveal it. For figurative "illumination" is not monopolised by Indian thinkers, though the heat and light of the sun are more powerful and striking in India than in northerly climes. But there are one or two passages which may profitably be mentioned, as for example the exposition of the "light of the self", Bph. Up. Comm. 4,3,2-30.

The Vedāntin sets out to prove that there is an internal, self-luminous light within the body, yet separate from it, and not material. When the sun and moon have set, and the fire has gone out, and sound (lit. "speech") is stilled, then the Self serves as the light for a man (4,3,2-6). A materialist may urge that there is never an absence of such lights as the sun, etc., to enable one to perceive this self-effulgent light as isolated from the body and organs. The Vedāntin's reply is that in the dream state, when the man is oblivious to all external light, the Self is his light. In the waking state, the light of the Self may be obscured by the functions of the organs, intellect,
mind, external lights, etc. But in dreams, since the organs do not act and the lights such as the sun, that normally help them, are absent, the Self becomes distinct and isolated, and creates bodies and impressions and surroundings of its own accord (4,3,9-10). And the Self then passes on from this dream state to the state of deep sleep (suṣupti), in which it realises its identity with all, having shed ignorance. For ignorance is not a natural characteristic of the Self: whatever is natural to a thing can never be eliminated, as for instance the heat and light of the sun. (4,3,20).

There is another point of resemblance between the Self and the sun. Just as the light of the sun, coming into contact with the things it is to illumine, appears as green, blue, yellow, etc., although in reality it is just pure white light, so the light of the Self, revealing the whole universe as well as the organs of sense (eyes etc.), assumes their form (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 4,3,7; 4,3,30). (Cf. also Sarv. VIII, p. 77: the unity of light and the unity of the Deity). Ignorance is illusorily superimposed upon Brahman, but Brahman, like the sun, illumines ignorance and its product (in the shape of the universe), and also like the sun it is never affected by ignorance.

Above (Chap. II) we have referred to the customary classification of objects according to a common shape, colour, etc. as for instance "something red" can be a man, plant or animal (soṇo dhāvati, "the red (horse) is running" is an example of
"ajahallakṣaṇā", a rhetorical figure: see Vedāntasāra 164-5). The path of liberation, which is realised by a Brähman is conceived as being white, blue, grey, green or red (Brh. Up. 4,4,9). This is explained by Śaṅkara either as denoting the arteries suṣumṇa, etc., which are fancied as filled with different coloured liquids (see Brh. Up. 4,3,20); or alternatively as denoting the "path of the sun" (i.e. the spectrum- cf. Chānd. Up. 8,6,1), and Kauś. Up. 4,19). There was a mystical association between the chief artery, suṣumṇa, along which the soul was supposed to travel when leaving the body at time of death, and one of the sun's ra (seven) rays, also termed suṣumṇa. Among other notable colour-associations are the white, red, and black of the three Sāṅkhya guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas (see e.g. Svet. Up. 4,5); while the elements of fire, water and earth (lit. "food") are distinguished by red, white and black colour respectively (See Chānd. Up. 6,4,1-4). The colour "blue" (nīla) is the a common illustration of something (i.e. a quality, as opposed to an object) perceptible.

As light is the forerunner of the sun at sunrise, so mental illumination (pratibhā or tāraka) precedes discriminative knowledge (vivekajñāna) (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras III,33). The time-sequence between the sun and its light is compared (Nyāyasūtras II,15) to the relation between right knowledge (pramā) and its cause (pramāṇa) (See above, Chap. IV,p.103).

The light of the sun may be obstructed by black clouds,
as well as by the darkness of night (see above, p. 232). As in the autumn, (after the rains), the sun, being freed of clouds, shines brightly and with a strong light; so also the light of sattva (clear knowledge), when freed from the alloys of rajas and tamas, becomes infinite, and but little remains to be illumined (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras IV, 31).

It is natural that the sun should be the subject of all sorts of mystical speculations and symbolic applications, e.g. "The sun is the sacrificial post" or "the head of the sacrificial horse is the dawn, its eye the sun". (Bṛh. Up. 1, 1, 1). With most of these we cannot here concern ourselves, but we may just remark that "there can be no day and night for one who has identified himself with the sun" (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 3, 1, 5); and as the element of fire includes the sun, we may note the symbolic connection between celestial sun and terrestrial fire, as exhibited in two sample passages, Bṛh. Up. 1, 5, 12 (and Comm.) and 6, 2, 9. In the first passage, the vital force, or Vāyu, is said to have sprung from the union of fire and sun at the junction of the two halves of the cosmic shell. Fire here represents the mother, or the organ of speech; while the sun is the father, or the mind (i.e. performing the functions of manifestation and generation respectively). The appropriation of functions here is probably explained by the greater accessibility of fire to human beings. At 6, 2, 9, (in the course of an enumeration of different symbolic fires, it is said that the
(heavenly) world is fire, the sun its fuel, the rays its smoke, the day its flame, the four quarters its cinders, and the intermediate quarters its sparks. In that fire the gods offer śraddhā (faith), and out of that offering the moon is produced (as an abode for the sacrificer).

From the sun we pass on to the atmospheric fire, lightning. Lightning is a fitting symbol for a flash of intuition, which comes apparently from nowhere, yet illumines everything around it (e.g. Bṛh. Up. 2,3,6; in the commentary ad loc., it is said that a mental impression resembling a flash of lightning is the property of Hiranyagarbha. See also Maitri Up 7,11, where the utterance of the sacred syllable Om is said to light up the whole body, like lightning). The non-perception of a flash of lightning, owing to defects in the sense-organs, is an example of anupalabdhi (Sarv. V, p. 51).

From the metaphysical point of view, those (individual souls) who rise forth from their source "like the spray-drops" (see above, p.227) are also compared to "the lightning flashes of the light among the clouds" (Maitri Up. 6,35).

From the logical standpoint, lightning is taken as an example for something that is not produced by an effort, and yet (unlike ether) is not eternal, but evanescent. This fact helps to upset a good many syllogisms, in which similar and contrary cases must be produced. For instance, jars and the like are produced by an effort, and are admitted to be impermanent. But it is not possible to maintain the contrary, namely
that whatever is not produced by an effort is eternal, for the example of lightning refutes this view. (See Nyāyabindu and Tīkā, p. 23, and in several other places). From another angle, the Jain asserts that a flash of lightning (taḍḍil-latā) is certainly material (paudgalika), even though it does not admit of analysis into successive parts (Syadv. p. 90, St. XIV). And if it is material, should it not be regarded as produced by an effort?

We now come to the fire on earth, which is no less mysterious than its counterparts in the heavens and in the atmosphere,- although in this case man may play his part in producing and regulating it. The predominant characteristics of fire are its heat, its light and flames, and its association with smoke. Of these, light is the only quality which is also shared by all the other representatives of the element ignis; while smoke is peculiar to terrestrial fire. But as the main object as in lightning a fire is to obtain heat, we shall deal first with that quality.

In the Nyāyabinduṭīkā (II, p. 40) it is said that an "efficient" fire is distinguished from other fires by its capacity of removing cold. For there are fires which are not capable of doing so, as e.g. the fire of a lamp. The natural properties which are observed in a thing cannot be separated from it, as the heat (or light) of fire, or the light of the sun (an illustration for the unchanging nature of the Ātman,
Byh. Up. Comm., passim). But in Vācaspati’s gloss on Yoga-sūtras IV,10, it is said that what is natural to anything, does not stand in need of any other cause for its manifestation; and even fire stands in need of other causes for the manifestation of its heat (and in the same way, the opening of a lotus bud is helped on by contact with the rays of the sun).

The Naiyāyika contends that the conjunction of a sense-organ with its object is the chief cause of perception (and not the attention of the mind). One example adduced in proof of this is the conjunction of the organ of touch with fire, which spontaneously produces a sensation of burning, even when the mind is not attending (Nyāyasūtras II,26, vṛttī. Cf. also ibid. II,104-5, discussed above, p.1047).

In logic, an example of a “mistimed” (kāla-atyaya-apadiṣṭa) argument is e.g. when one argues that fire does not heat, because it is produced by an effort,- it having previously been ascertained by the evidence of the senses that fire does contain heat (Nyāyasūtras I,49) (See "Reality of Fiction" for "cold fire"). The Jain says that the test of contradiction is "Do the two things exclude each other- as do cold and heat?" When he applies this test to existence and non-existence (sattva and asattva), he finds that they are not contradictory, for they are two aspects of the same thing (Syādv. p. 149, St. XXIV).

For the Buddhist theory of moments of heat gradually replacing moments of cold when a fire is lit, see Nyāyabinduṭīkā
III, pp. 72-5. The doctrine of momentariness, it should be noted, does not absolve one from responsibility for past actions. A man who carelessly leaves a fire burning cannot plead, when arrested for burning another man's field, that it was not the same fire as the one he left behind, for the last (moment) of fire could not have arisen if no fire had been lighted at first (See Milindapañho, Tremckner p. 47).

We may just touch upon the semi-magical power of heat (tejas), which glows at the same time as it devours. In the Maitri Up., the soul, manifested as Iśāna, Sambhu, and so forth, is said to give forth heat, and is imagined as covered with a thousand-eyed golden ball (or egg-āṇḍa) (= the sun or the universe (brahmāṇḍa)), like a fire covered with a fire (or: a small fire overpowered by a large fire- Rāmatīrtha) (6,8). Having passed through what is enveloped in darkness, one sees Him who sparkles like a wheel of fire. (see above, Chap. IV).

In the Upaniṣads, the sparks that fly forth from a fire are a favourite analogy for creation (and reabsorption): "As from a well-burning fire sparks in thousands, of like form, spring forth, so from the Imperishable living beings of various sorts are produced, and thither also return (āpiyanti- lit. "swell, increase" (Mund. Up. 2,1,1). As Śaṅkara points out in his commentary on a similar passage, Brh. Up., 2,1,20, this illustration is intended to show an original unity, and a single cause (similar to the one ocean with its foam and waves showing
unity in diversity). (Cf. also Bṛh. Up. 2,4,10 and Comm.; Maitri Up. 6,26 and 31.) A variation occurs in the Kaushitaki Up. (3,3; 4,19): When a man awakens, the vital breaths (prāṇa) disperse from the Self and resort to their respective stations (āyatana = senses?); from the vital breaths come the tutelary deities (devas); and from these, the worlds,—as from a blazing fire sparks would disperse in all directions. At Praśna Up. 3,5, "seven flames" are referred to. These are the seven organs of sense in the head (eyes, ears, nostrils, mouth), and they are compared (by Saṅkara in Comm. ad loc.) to seven sacrificial oblations,—the enlightenments produced by their activity being the flames of the sacrifice, and the sense-objects their fuel. All seven are coordinated by the mind (manas) (located in the heart), which presumably represents the fire. (Cf. Mund. Up. 1,2,4: the seven "tongues" of fire). At Praśna Up. 4,3, it is said that "Life's fires (prāṇa) alone remain awake in this city (=the body)". In this and the following verse and Commentary, a further association between the vital breaths and the sacrifice is elaborated. The body is commonly regarded as the abode of fire: either the fire of life (e.g. Yogasūtras III,40 and Comm.), or the digestive fire.

The kindling of fire,—one of the first accomplishments of primitive man, and of obvious importance to every sacrificial rite,—is a favourite analogy, particularly in the Upaniṣads. For example: "As the material form (mūrti) of fire, when latent
in its source (i.e. the firewood), is not perceived; and yet there is no destruction of its subtile form (linga); and as the material form may be grasped again by kindling in the source (indhana-yoni-grhya); so, indeed, both (the universal and the individual Brahman) are to be found in the body by means of the sacred syllable Qm." (Svet. Up. 1,13). And in the next verse: "By maing one's body the lower friction-stick, and the syllable Qm the upper one; by practising the friction of meditation (dhyana), one may see the God who is hidden, as it were." For if one seeks painstakingly, the Universal Soul may be apprehended in one's own soul, where it lies hidden, like fire in the fire-sticks (see above, p.13). (Cf. also Maitri Up. 7,7: "He is the Self within the heart, very subtile, kindled like fire, assuming all forms"; and Kausitaki 4,19: "Just as a razor might be hidden in a razor-case, or fire (viṣvambhara) in a fire-receptacle or source (=wood), even thus this intelligential Self has entered the body right up to the hair and the tips of the nails." (also Brh. Up. 1,4,7).

As the digestive fire in the body has to be nourished with food, so the burning fire is fed with fuel. The connection between food and energy is well illustrated at Chānd. Up. 6,7, when a student of the Vedas, after fasting, is unable to remember his texts. His guru then tells him that as a single small coal may be left over from a great fire, and only burn feebly; but when covered with straw it blazes up again,,- in
like manner when a person does not eat, only one of his "16 parts" (kalā) is left over, and he must eat to regain full strength. For the mind consists of food (i.e. is dependent upon food for clear thought), the breath consists of water, the voice consists of heat (tejas). (Cf. Maitri Up. 6,34: "As fire without fuel becomes extinct (upaśāmyate) in its own source (yoni), likewise the mind (citta) by the cessation of its functions (= when objects cease to impress themselves on the consciousness)". See also Maitri Up. 6,10; 6,12). The "karma which ripens into a span of life" (āyur-vipākam karma) is either sa-upakramam, developing speedily, like fire let loose on dry hay, and fanned by wind; or nir-upakramam, developing slowly, like fire applied to single pieces of straw out of a heap. (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras III,22).

Although it is imperative to keep the fire in one's body tended during life on earth, yet the ideal state to strive after is "śānti", when the fire is extinguished and all desires calmed. At Svet. Up. 6,19, for example, there is mention of "Him who is without parts, inactive, tranquil (śānta),... the highest dam (setu) of immortality, like a fire with fuel burned (up)". (Cf. also Brh. Up. 5,14,8; and Comm. on ibid. 4,4,22-3; Chānd. Up. 5,24, 1-3). "Like fire, does a Brāhman guest enter houses. (They call) this (the bringing of water) his appeasing (śāntim tasya: pun on appeasing of the Brāhman, and extinguishing of fire)." (Kāṭha Up. 1,7). For by fire
all evils and passions are burned up, and calm and peace remain in its ashes.

We come to the third of the major characteristics of fire, viz. its association with smoke. On this association is based the stock example of "drṣṭa-liṅga" inference, also known as "pūrvavat"; where, of two things previously observed together, one is perceived, and the presence of the other inferred therefrom, - as fire from smoke (both existing simultaneously in this case: see Nyāyasūtras II, 15; and above, Chap. IV, p. 103). The resultant syllogism takes the form: "Where there is smoke, there is fire. As in the kitchen (mahānāsa). The mountain has a smoke: therefore it has fire." (For a full elaboration of this inference, see Nyāyabinduṭīka I, pp. 16-7; II, pp. 35-41; III, pp. 89-90; pp. 54-5; also (for wrong hetu (reasons) etc) Nyāyasūtras I, 40, 47, 50, 55, etc., and Vṛtti). The vipakṣa or counter-instance in this case is the lake, which cannot contain fire (although it may have mist rising from it, having the appearance of smoke).

We have referred to the Vedānta theory of perception (above, Chap. III, pp. 59). In the case of inference, there can be no movement of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) and its modification (vṛtti) towards the fire, for there is no contact between the eye and the fire. In this case the vṛtti is in the form of recollection of the fire formerly perceived in the kitchen, etc., and it is only the knowledge of the mountain,
the substratum of the fire, that is direct (pratyakṣa). (See Vedāntaparibhāṣā I).

The Carvākas, denying the validity of inference, assert that it is mere supposition to conclude, on the perception of smoke, that fire accompanies it.

In refuting the Buddhist theory of kurvadrūpatva (for which see above, Chap. III, p. 42), the Naiyāyika says: "If you assume this "efficient form" (and at the same time do not abandon your theory of momentariness), there can be no valid inference, for fire can only then be the cause of smoke, when its nature as fire acts as the "efficient form" of the (first moment's) smoke. And you cannot infer therefrom that fire in general is the cause of smoke in general; so that no inference can be established. And without inference it is impossible to establish the theory of kṣaṇikatva." (Kusum. Comm. I, 16).

It must be remembered that the vyāpti or "invariable concomitance" of smoke and fire refers only to the invariable presence of fire where there is smoke, for it is possible for fire to exist without smoke, though not vice versa. The condition (upādhi) for the presence of smoke is said to be "a fire laid with damp fuel" (See e.g. Comm. on Sāṅkhya). 5). Cf. Maitri Up. 6, 32: "As from a fire laid with damp fuel, clouds of smoke separately issue forth; so from this great Being has been breathed forth (nihāvasitam) that which is
Rgveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda, etc." (see also Brh. Up. 4,5,11). The "Puruṣa" (soul) of the Kaṭha Up. is "of the measure of a thumb", and "like a flame (jyotis) without smoke." (Kaṭha Up. 4,13; and cf. Maitri Up. 1,2).

An example of fire devoid of smoke is the fire that is latent in a red-hot iron ball (for which see above, p.87-8). We may give two further references here, both from the Maitri Up. As a lump of iron, when it is beaten by workmen, changes into a different shape when it has been pervaded (lit.: overcome- abhibhūta) by fire, so the elemental soul (bhūtātmā), overcome by the inner person (puruṣa) and beaten by qualities (guna), takes on a different form. But as the fire in a lump of iron is not overcome when the iron is hammered, so that puruṣa is not overcome. (3,3). But as fire, iron-workers, and the like can make no impression on a piece of iron which has passed into the condition of clay in the earth (i.e. been absorbed in the earth), so mind (citta) together with its support vanishes away (through intense concentration)" (6,27).

Above (Chap. III, pp.64-7) we have pointed out the divergent views of Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, etc., on the subject of genus and particular qualities, as applied to jars and the species jar. There is a similar discussion revolving around fire (Kusum. Comm. I,6). The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that we must assume as a cause (of the production of fire) the fact of there being present a "capacity" favourable to fire.
According to Śrīkara Cārya: "There is an eternal capacity favourable to fire, abiding in straw, the arāṇi wood, and the burning gem." But the Naiyāyikas assert that the fire resulting from straw is in a different class from the fire produced by the firesticks, and the fire which is manifested through the agency of the burning gem and the sun's rays is different again. This, they say, may be seen by the evidence of the senses; for the fire of a lamp is evidently different from the fire on the hearth, the varying fires being united by the common quality of heat. Hence "capacity" is not to be assumed as a separate category.

Further arguments in support of "capacity" follow. For example, the powers of the "burning gem" and the "extinguishing gem" (pratibandhaka) are discussed. Sāya the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka: "If the fire burns of itself and not by reason of its capacity, we should have to expect the effect of burning to be produced, wherever there was contact between the fire and the hand, even though the fire-extinguishing gem were worn. Instead of which, we say that this gem destroys the burning capacity." The Śrīkara Mīmāṃsakas, in their turn, assume an eternal (not, like the Bhaṭṭas, a varying) capacity in fire, which is dulled when the pratibandhaka is present. But (says) the Naiyāyika) we cannot agree with this theory, as we should then have to assume an endless number of different capacities, as that of the extinguishing gem to cause the dulling of the burning capacity,
of the burning gem to destroy the dulling, etc. (Kusum. I, 10, Comm.). (Cf. Upaskāra on Vaiś. Sūtras I, 2, 2; III, 1, 12).

The Vaiśeṣika attributes the natural properties of fire, etc. to fate, the unseen power, adṛṣṭa; for such phenomena cannot be explained by any known causes. The Jain thereupon asks, "Could not these properties be regarded as the very nature of fire, rather than have to be accounted for by an obscure cause of which we know nothing?" (Syādv. p. 50, St. IX). In their view, the natural upward tendency of the flame is an analogy for the rising of the liberated Soul (Sarv. III, p. 33). The Gārvāka, too, from his materialistic standpoint, believes that all qualities arise from a thing's own nature.

For the illusory perception of a circle of fire, see above, pp. 28-29; and "Reality of Fiction".

The fire of the lamp has been mentioned incidentally (e.g. pp. 258). It is supposed not to be an "efficient" fire, but it burns nevertheless, and there is a popular proverb regarding "the burning of a city through a child's playing with the wick of a lamp" (See Jacob III. p. 64). Cf. also the "burning lamp" which provides one of the similes for the transitory empirical universe (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 1, 5, 2); and the moth which singes its wings on the flame of a lamp (above, Chap. VI, p. 186).

The main function of the lamp, however, is to give light, in the absence of the heavenly light of sun and moon. For the
lamp-light is feeble in the day-time, when overpowered by the radiance of the sun (an example of anupalabdhi through being overpowered: Sarv. V., pp. 51-2). Analogously, consciousness (caitanya) reflected in the modification of the understanding (citta-vṛtti) is unable to illumine the Supreme Brahman, self-luminous and identical with the individual self; and it is overpowered by it. (And on the destruction of the "state of oneness" (akhaṇḍa-vṛtti), only the Supreme Brahman, identical with the individual self, remains. See above, Chap. IV, p.105). (Vedānta-sāra 173).

It will not be necessary to do more than glance quite cursorily at the relation of lamp and light, except as regards features such as self-illumination, of which the lamp is the stock example. Symbolic applications, too, are fairly obvious (e.g. "ānvīksikā (philosophy)... the lamp of all sciences (vidyā)") (Sarv. XI, p. 94); or "with the essence (tattva) of the Self, as with a lamp, a practitioner of Yoga beholds the essence of Brahman" (Svet. Up. 2,15). We have referred (above, Chap. III) to the expanding and contracting light of a lamp, according as it is confined to a jar and or a mansion. The Jain philosophers hold that a soul adapts itself to the size of the body it inhabits, as the light of a lamp varies in range according to its container (see e.g. Yogasūtras IV,10 (Bhāṣya)). This possibility is denied by the Rāmānujas, on the ground that it would involve the non-eternity of the soul, were it subject
to such modifications (Sarv. IV, p. 37). And the Vedântic view is expressed at Brh. Up. (Comm.) 1,3,22: "The vital force cannot be merely of the size of these bodies (ant, elephant, etc.), for it is formless and all-pervading. Nor does the equality mean just filling up those bodies by contraction or expansion, like lamp-light in a jar, a mansion, etc. . . . For there is nothing inconsistent in an all-pervading principle assuming, in different bodies, their particular size." The Vedântin admits, however, that this all-pervading principle may be temporarily limited in individual persons, by reason of attachment and other evils caused by ignorance. But (when the soul leaves the body) mind, vital force, and organ of speech pervade everything in their cosmic form, like the light of a lamp when its enclosing jar is broken (Brh. Up. Comm. 1,5,17,18; and cf. introduction to 4,4,3).

According to Raghunâtha, the ghaṭa-pradīpa-nyāya, simile of the lamp inside a jar, is applied to one whose knowledge of Brahman is of a low order; for a lamp within a jar illuminates only the interior of such a vessel. Writers on Alamkāra, on the other hand, apply this maxim as follows: "as the lamp continues to burn after it has lighted up the interior of the vessel, and is indeed essential to the continuance of that illumination, so the expressed meaning of a sentence is absolutely essential as a basis for the figurative meaning which it also conveys" (Jacob's summary of Dhvanyāloka I,12; III,33;
see Jacob II, p. 16. And for the "lamp in a vessel with many holes", see Jacob II, p. 30). Speaking of alamkāra and sentence construction, we may refer to the "lamp on the threshold", which illumines both the interior and the exterior of a house. This figure is applied to anything fulfilling a double purpose, as e.g. a word referring to two separate portions of a sentence (see e.g. Śaṅkara's bhaśya on Muṇḍ. Up. 3.1.5).

From the metaphysical point of view, we infer the existence of an all-powerful agent (=Brahman, in the Vedāntic view) from the sun and moon which give light to human beings; just as we infer the existence of a maker when we see a lamp (See Brh. Up. Comm. 3.8.9). In this passage, the lamp is regarded as an instrument, controlled by a superior force; and this is evidently the case, from the material point of view (Cf. also Brh. Up. Comm. 4.3.7: "The intellect is the instrument that helps us in everything, like a lamp set in front amid darkness"). But when the actual light of the lamp is considered as part of light in general, it can be said to be self-revealing (svayam-prakāśaka).

The various schools have many conflicting arguments on this score,—some asserting that a lamp is self-luminous, and some setting out to prove that it is not. In general, the Naiyāyika school holds that it is self-luminous. For instance, Nyāyasūtras V,10: "As a lamp does not require another lamp to reveal it, so an example (dvāstānā) does not need a counter-
example to illustrate it"; and Nyāyasūtras and vṛtti, II,19, which says that light is the very nature of a lamp, which reveals e.g. a jar (as well as revealing itself). Similarly, the pramāṇas are the illuminators of things which are rightly known. Otherwise even the lamp would not be the illuminator of the jar, etc., for fear of a regressus in inf. (i.e. sight is the revealer of the lamp; consciousness the revealer of sight, etc.).

In one passage of the Brhad. Comm. (1,5,3) it is said (ostensibly as the view of Śaṅkara) that the organ of speech is self-luminous, like a lamp, which does not require another lamp to reveal it. But the normal Vedāntic view is that a lamp does not require another lamp in order to be revealed. But it is revealed by an intelligence other than itself. A similar idea is expressed on p. 40 of Sarv. IV: The lamp is not able to illumine hitherto unillumined objects, for it is knowledge alone that illumines. And even in the presence of a lamp it is knowledge that reveals objects; the light of a lamp is merely an auxiliary to the cognition by dispelling the obstructing darkness and thus aiding the eye which is the real instrument of the cognition.

In reply to the contention of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, namely that Jñāna (which is compared to a lamp) is not self-revealed,
because revelation is an action (kriyā), and no action can have itself as an object, the Jain says that the light does not have itself as an object, but springs into existence as illumination and in that sense is svayaṃ-prakāśa.

At Ślokavārtika p. 508, a critic is pictured as asking: "What do I want with eyes when I can see by means of a lamp?" But it then pointed out that the eye is an illuminator, greater than the lamp itself, for blind men cannot even see by using hundreds of lamps. In the course of the discussion (Syādv. p. 75, st. XII) between Jaina and Mīmāṃsaka, the Jain asserts that knowledge is self-revealed. This, he says, can be shown by an anumāna: "Jñāna illuminates objects while it illuminates itself, because it is an illuminator, e.g. a pradīpa". The objection raised to this is that the hetu of the syllogism is is inconclusive, for the eyes are illuminators, but they do not illuminate themselves. The Jain replies they are illuminators not as physical organs, but as sensuous consciousness (bhāvendriya), and such consciousness is self-revealed. For the Nyāya theory of perception see N.S. III, 23 - 45 (and above, pramāṇa).

A further argument against the Vaiśeṣika view (brought forward by the Jain in this case) is the following: "According to your system (the Vaiśeṣika) an object and its quality (dharmin and dharma) are absolutely distinct. Now you must admit that the lamp (or fire as the case may be) is the dharmin, and illumination...\]
(prakāśa) its dharma. So how can a lamp be self-illuminating? If you assert, in the teeth of your principles, that it can, i.e. that prakāśa and pradīpa can be separated and yet pradīpa can illumine itself and other objects, then there is no reason why a jāt or a cloth should not be equally able to illumine themselves" (Syādv. pp. 41-42, st. VIII.).

The following is an instructive quotation from Brahma-sūtrabhāsya 2,2,28, showing that there is a limit to the ability of a lamp to illuminate itself;—just as an idea cannot exist independently of the knower, so a lamp must needs manifest its light for the benefit of a person: "If you say that (discriminative) knowledge (vijñāna), like a lamp, does not need anything else to reveal it, but shines forth of itself, it would be equal to saying that knowledge (exists) which cannot be reached by any of the pramāṇas, and is without a person to understand it (anavagyantṛtvam). This is like the shining forth of a thousand lamps (hidden) in the midst of a mass of rock".

(For other examples of absurdities, such as e.g. taking a lamp to assist in hearing sound (Nyāyabindu), and attempting to dispel darkness with a lamp no bigger than one's finger (Ātmattattva-viveka p. 52), or trying to remove the dimness of one lamp by lighting another, see "Reality of Fiction" chapter.)

A favourite expression of the Vedāntin is that ignorance and knowledge cannot co-exist; to expect to cognise ajñāna by
means of a pramāṇa would be like going to look for darkness with a brilliant lamp (Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī, ed. Venis, p. 125), cp. Brhad. Comm. 1,41 4,10. But surely one can realise, when a lamp is lit, the contrast between the present light and the past darkness? In the case of a lamp appearing for the first time out of darkness, there is a double function to be performed: (a) the removing of the darkness, and (b) the covering of the object to be illuminated, with light. This process is referred to at Vedāntasāra 179-80, where it is likened to the action of buddhi and its underlying consciousness: "Both the intellect and the reflection of consciousness (cittābhāsa) depending on it, come into contact (lit. "reach" vyāp) with the jar. In this case the intellect would destroy the ignorance (regarding the jar) and the reflection (of consciousness) would bring the jar to light". (quoted from Pañcadaśī 7,91). It should be noted that, for the Vedāntin, ignorance (avidyā or ajñāna) is a positive entity which takes the place of knowledge until such time as knowledge displaces it. We may remark here that the question of whether or no darkness can be regarded as a positive substance, and not merely as the negation of light, was often under discussion among the various schools. The Jain, true to his doctrine of the Syādvāda, says that darkness (tamas) is quite as visible as light (āloka), and therefore is as much a material substance as the latter. The Vaiśeṣika may object
that darkness is not really visible, for whatever is visible requires light to make it so. The retort to this is that a tamas is seen by owls without the help of light; therefore it is visible of itself (Syādv. p. 14, St. V). (The Vaiṣeṣika holds that darkness must be a negative something, since it cannot be classed as a substance, a quality, a or an action (see Vais. Sūtras V,2,19-20). The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins hold that darkness is a substance, because it moves; some Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas consider that it is the mere absence of light the cognition of light; while the Naiyāyikas think that it is the mere absence of light. Śrīdhara holds the curious view that darkness is a dark blue colour which is superimposed (āropita) on those places where light is lacking; to which the Vaiṣeṣika retorts that one might as well believe that the (colourless) sky is blue. For these varying views, see e.g. Nyāyakandalī Book I, Chap. 2; Sarv. X, pp. 90-1; Nyāyasūtras, Bhāṣya I,49).

Another Jain contention is that a lamp is at once impermanent and permanent (in opposition to the usual distinction between ether (permanent) and lamp (impermanent, transitory). The difficulty in the way of regarding a lamp or light as permanent is our experience of darkness as its negation. But the Jain treats darkness as a positive substance, a kind of matter (pudgala) into which light is at times transformed. Thus the particles of light persist as the original matter,
and it is only their form which changes (paryāya) (Syādv. p. 14, lines 18-26). The Buddhist, of course, regards the lamp as not merely impermanent, but also momentary (kṣaṇika) (ibid. p. 20, St. V). Just as the light-rays of a lamp are new every moment, so a series of momentary cognitions (jñāna) seem to be the same, but in reality form an unbroken succession, each one lasting but a moment. (ibid., p. 127, St. XIX) (cf. also Nyāyasūtras III, 112). (As a contrast to this view, cf. Maitri Up. 6,30: "Unending are the rays of him who like a lamp dwells in the heart.").

A man whose mind is unaffected by attachment and other evils is likened to the flame of a lamp when sheltered from the wind; and in this state he may enter into nirvikalpa-samādhi (Vedāntasāra 214; and cf. Vyāsa on Yoga-sūtras III,51). The same figure from the opposite angle occurs in Maitri Up. (6,35): "Even as a lamp stirred by a gentle breeze, so flashes up he who goes among the gods". The obstructions which cloud the intuition may also be compared to a shade, covering the light of a lamp (Sarv. III, p. 31). And final liberation, according to the Śaṅkara school of Vedāntins, (and others) is like the going out of a lamp (see e.g. Brh. Up. Comm. 3,2,13; and Kusum. II,3, Comm.).

From the empirical point of view, a lamp is a combination of several things, - oil, fire, wick, support. In themselves, these constituent parts would be regarded as contradictory;
but in unison they effect the illumination of objects.
Likewise, in the Sāṅkhya philosophy, the three guṇas, though naturally contradictory, serve their purpose in harmony, and bring about the illumination or revelation of the "puruṣa-artha" (Sāṅkhya, and Sāṅkhya-tattvākaumudī, 13, and 36. See also Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras IV,14). A similar illustration, but without the idea of incompatibility, is at Maitri Up. 6,36: "As the existence (sāmsthiti) of a lamp is because of the combination of wick, support and oil, so these two, the (individual) self and the bright (sun), exist because of the combination of the Inner One and the world-egg."

A Seeking to overthrow the Naiyāyika's classification of different genera, an opponent says: "But may we not say that as one and the same lamp gives light, causes the wick to alter, and illumines jars, etc., so we may have one single cause, either the one Brahman (Vedāntic view), or Prakṛti (Sāṅkhya view), which is not to be distinguished from the different intellects (buddhi) which vary according to each particular soul (puruṣa)?" (and therefore there would be no need of a separate Creator). The Naiyāyika's retort is, that if the same nature which existed when one effect was produced, continued to exist at the time of the production of another, then the nature of water might exist in fire. The instance of the lamp, he says, can be explained by a difference in the materials necessary to produce the different effects. (Kusum.
Comm., I, 7). (Cf. also Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras IV, 4, where the possibility is discussed of there being only one mind, which pervades more created bodies than one, just as the light of a lamp is diffused on all sides and illuminates more bodies than one).

We may conclude our study of the lamp by a glance at logic. In Chapter II of the Nyāyabinduṭīkā (p. 22) we meet the following statement: "We do not admit that the logical mark (linga) is comparable to the light of a lamp, which occasionally brings hitherto unperceived objects, like such as jars etc., to our notice (haphazardly). On the contrary, in the case of the linga, there is an invariable concomitance." That is to say, before the light is lit, one does not know which objects are about to be revealed; nor is there any logical connection between the lamp and the objects it illumines (Though the Naiyāyikas maintain such a connection). A logical reason, on the contrary, is based on a previously observed connection, as between smoke and fire. (see also NBT p. 29; p. 52; and Syādv. p. 107, St. XVI: "It may be said, further, that an illuminator (prakāśaka), e.g. knowledge (jñāna), acquires existence from the object it illumines (=arthā), and then becomes the illuminator of the object which is to be illumined. (i.e. the effect reveals the cause). This is fallacious, for a lamp is the illuminator of a jar, yet the jar is not produced by it.")

So much, then, for the element of fire. "As fire, though
one, has entered the world, and has taken on different forms according to every form (rupa), so the Inner Soul (antarātman) of all beings, though one, takes on different forms corresponding to every form, and yet is outside." (Katha Up. 5,9; and cf. Maitri Up. 6,27).

The element of air is all-pervading in a wider sense than fire; it is everywhere, and enters into everything. The all-pervasiveness of the Inner Soul is compared not only to that of fire, but to that of wind (Katha Up. 5,10). We have mentioned the wind as affecting the flame of a lamp (above, p. 177). The Carvakas regard the coolness of a breeze as springing from its own nature, and not from any external causes (Sarv. I); while the Vaiśeṣika cites the natural properties of air, etc., as a proof of adṛśta (see above, p. 218), and the Mīmāṃsaka attributes qualities of air such as sensibility to touch, to the special category "capacity" (Kusum. I,12, Comm. Introduction). See above, p. 218, for air and "sparśa"; any other references to wind, etc., have been dealt with incidentally.

Practically the only specific references to the sky are in connection with its (apparent) colour, etc., and will be dealt with in the Reality of Fiction chapter. See above, p. 180 and 183, for the Vedantic simile of the skies reflected in water. Finally, तम as the sky is untouched by impurities such as clouds, so the "witness of vision" (i.e. the Universal Self) is untouched by such relative attributes as hunger and

The sky is sometimes identified with the ether, or space (ākāśa); e.g. in the Vedānta simile just referred to ("ether" which is reflected in the water). According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the ether constitutes a separate, indivisible entity, which is eternal, being absolutely changeless; while the Jain seeks to prove that it is both permanent and impermanent. Among the Buddhists, ākāśa is a reality only in Hīnāyāna circles (being regarded as "asamskrta-dharma"). The Mahāyāna and Sautrāntika schools did not admit the reality of eternal, unchanging elements. But although unreal according to them, ākāśa could be used as a negative example in syllogisms. The Advaita Vedāntin, for his part, cannot accept even ether as eternal, for according to him only Brahman is real and unchanging.

The Jain uses the following argument to prove that ākāśa is both permanent and impermanent: When a jar is removed and a cloth takes its place, the ether formerly limited by the jar is replaced by that limited by the cloth. Thus one ākāśa is destroyed and another is produced. If it is objected that this is mere quibbling (upacāra), the reply is that although ether is all-pervading (and therefore, in one sense, eternal), it is nevertheless modified through its association with various objects, jar, cloth, etc. Thus the production and destruction of jar, cloth, etc., and through these of ghaṭa-ākāśa, paṭa-ākāśa, etc., amount to the production and
destruction of ākāśa itself. (Śyādv. St. V, pp. 15-6). (See above, Chap. III, p. 65, for the Vedānta view of a jar and a house as two upādhis or limiting conditions of ether).

Above (Chap. III, p. 74), we have quoted an argument between a Naiyāyika and his opponent, as to the meaning of the phrase "possessing parts", and its possible application to such eternal entities as ether. The Mādhyamika Buddhist, asserting that the relation of cause and effect is an imaginary one, says that a things which is generally accepted as eternal has no need of a cause, e.g. ether (while that which is non-existent cannot be brought into existence by any cause, e.g. "flowers in the sky"). (Sarv. II, p. 10). In logic, it is likewise argued that wherever there is production, there is change, as in a jar; if something is changeless, it is not a product, like ākāśa. (Nyāyabindu and Tīkā, p. 47, etc.). This argument is used to prove the non-eternity of the sounds of speech, which are products (see Nyāyabindu III, passim, for examples of inconclusive syllogisms dealing with this subject of the eternity of sound.). In Nyāyasūtras II,115 (vṛtti), it is argued that as, although such eternal things as ether are beyond the grasp of sense, yet the nature of a cow, etc., is eternal (and perceptible), so too, though other eternal things are unchangeable, letters may be susceptible of change.

Though the Vedāntin may not accept the eternity of ether, he admits its all-pervading nature, and takes it as an
analogy for the infinite self (Brh. Up. Comm. 5,1,1) (The same analogy is used by the Vaiśeṣika: "The soul is infinitely large, like the ether, being pervasīve (vibhavāt)" (Vaiś. Sūtras 7,1,22). But at another passage of the Brh. Up. Comm. (4,3,30) we find this statement: "Although the ether is conceived as all-pervading, etc., it has no attribute of its own called all-pervasiveness; it is through its association with all as limiting adjuncts that it is designated as all-pervading, when as a matter of fact it is present everywhere in its natural form. The same is true of atoms (for which see below, p.129). Therefore there is no example to prove that a substance which has no parts can possess many attributes."

In logic, the ether is taken as an example to prove that anything which is simultaneously inherent in different objects, regardless of their situation, must be all-pervasive. Hence, it is argued, a "universal" must be all-pervasive (Nyāyabinduṭīka III, p. 87-8). The Jain, in criticising the Vaiśeṣika tenet of a "samavāya" relation between an object and its qualities, says that as this relation is asserted to be "one, eternal, and all-pervasive", it must therefore be in touch with everything simultaneously, like ākāśa; and this would make the qualities of a jar reside also, e.g. in a cloth (Syādv. p. 32, St. VII).

Some philosophers, e.g. the Jain, may say that the Self may have different parts, owing to various limiting adjuncts, just as the ether enclosed in a jar is different from the ether
in the pores of earth. The Vedāntin retorts that any such apparent differences belong only to "name and form" (nāmarūpa), and cannot be attributed to the Self. The ether is one and indivisible, in spite of apparent modifications. "When the logicians find distinguishing characteristics in the ether, then only will they find such characteristics in the Self" (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 2,1,20). Further, "To those who say that sound etc., perceived through the ear and so on, contradicts the unity of Brahman, we ask, does the variety of sound and the rest contravene the oneness of the ether?" (ibid.; and cf. also 2,3,6; 4,4,20. The Vedānta view was that the organ of hearing consisted of the ether limited by the auditory passage,- see Vedānta-paribhāṣā I).

The intangibility of the ether lends it a mystical quality, which leads it to be associated with the seat of knowledge and emotions,—the heart. For instance, Bṛh. Up. 4,4,22: "That great unborn Self which is made up of intelligence (vijñānamaya) and is in the midst of the vital breaths, lies in the ether that is within the heart" (Cf. also ibid. Comm. 4,3,12; Maitri Up. 6,22; and Maitri Up. 6,27: "The ether-storehouse of the heart is bliss, is the highest refuge (ālaya)..."). In the Commentary on Yogasūtras I,36, it is said that the "essence of buddhi" (or the quality of sattva in relation to buddhi) is like the ākāśa; this probably means that it moulds itself easily to fit impressions.
It may be of interest to note that ākāśa is regarded as inactive (e.g. Syādv. p. 24, St. VI: "Without a body a maker can do nothing; he would be as inactive as ākāśa"). But on the other hand it is pointed out by Gauḍapada (Sāṅkhyak. 38) that each element may be the cause of varying sensations (sukham duḥkha, moha), corresponding to the characteristics of the three guṇas. The ether, for example, is a cause of contentment to a man going out into the open (out of a stuffy atmosphere), but it causes suffering and is ghora for one who is overcome by heat, cold, wind, rain, etc., and bewilderment for one who has wandered from the path in a wood, and lost his sense of direction. In the same way vāyu (wind) is welcome to one overcome by heat, terrible for one plagued by cold, and very bewildering when it is laden with dust and pebbles. Other references to ether are e.g. Sāṅkhyak. Comm. 29; Brh. Up. Comm. 3,7,2; and 6,2,16. A good deal more could be said on the subject if space permitted.

We have already referred more than once to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the eternity of sound; but as sound dwells in the ether, it may not be out of place to discuss it more fully here. There is a dea detailed argument on the subject set out in Nyāyasūtras II, 79-121 (and vṛtti). The Naiyāyika says that sound (as expressed in speech) is not eternal, for it is not cognised before pronunciation, and yet we do not perceive any obstruction which might prevent its being cognised (if it were cognisable). If sound were eternal, a lecture would be under-
stood by the disciple, even without his preceptor uttering a
word. The Mīmāṁsaka replies: "If sound (or the words to be
employed in the lecture) did not exist during the intermediate
time, how could the lecture take place? The non-cognition of
the sound is accounted for by the non-functioning of its mani-
festers, i.e. tongue, palate, throat, etc. Further, sound must
be permanent, because it is dwelt upon (e.g. one can recite a
passage of the Veda 100 times, without variation; just as one
may look 10 times at a colour, which is admittedly a persistent
(though not necessarily eternal!) thing.)" "No", says the
Naiyāyika, "dwelling upon" anything does not establish per­
sistency, for there may be a numerical difference.. Further,
there are the changes in letters, owing to sandhi, etc. (e.g.
i or I may become y)." "That", replies the Mīmāṁsaka, "is no
obstacle. For you cannot prove that an eternal entity is necess­
arily static."

This sums up the main arguments pro and con, though there
are several more quibbling ones. The logical expression of
the grounds for belief or disbelief in the eternity of sound
is dealt with in Nyāyabindu and Tīkā at several places (e.g. III,
p. 70, where four inconclusive arguments are adduced). It is
shown to be difficult to produce a conclusive argument that will
not be confounded by the non-pervasiveness of the reason. For
instance, the Mīmāṁsaka may not assert that the sounds of speech
are eternal, because they are not impenetrable bodies of limited
dimensions) for this would fail to convince his Vaiśeṣika opponent, believing as he does that atoms, which would constitute the negative example, are eternal. (See NBT III, p. 70, 91, 94, etc.). Another illustration of an erratic (sa-vyabhicāra) reason is given at Nyāyasūtras I,46 (vṛtti). If anyone were to argue that sound is eternal, because it is not the object of touch (like the ether), the reason alleged would lead to more conclusions than required, for the quality of conjunction or of disjunction, for example, is not the object of touch, yet no one argues for its eternity.

To sum up: the Mīmāṁsaka asserts that sound is eternal, any apparent break in its continuity being due to absence of manifestation of what is always present (in the ether). His opponents, on the other hand, base their objections to this theory mainly on the ground that what is eternal can never be a product, and sounds are quite evidently products, and have genus, like a jar, etc. (See Syādv. p. 89, St. XIV; Vaiś. Sūtras passim, but esp. II,2,26-36; VII,2,9-10); and Sarv. XII). It is noteworthy that the Mīmāṁsā system, generally regarded as the dullest and most pedantic of all the Indian philosophies, should have been alone in anticipating the truth which we in our modern age have but just "manifested" through the telephone and radio.

A particular branch of "sound" in the ether is that made by thunder, produced, according to the Vaiśeṣika, by conjunction
with and disjunction from waters. For the spontaneous production of knowledge through the conjunction of sense and sense-object, (as e.g. the organ of hearing with the thundering of a cloud,) see above, Pr. 259.

Though the Vaiśeṣika did not admit the eternity of sound, he himself evolved a complicated system of "categories" (vīṣeṣa), in which the atoms of the four gross elements were regarded as eternal (see above, p. 215); likewise ether, the substratum of sound. Though the atoms themselves, as constituting the ne plus ultra of minuteness, are indivisible and eternal, yet their aggregates are evanescent, consisting as they do of ever-changing permutations and combinations of the invisible atoms. The Jains have an atom theory of their own, according to which "pudgala" (matter) is made up of endlessly small parts.

The Sāṅkhya system did not officially admit any such theory, as conflicting with the function of the basic undifferentiated avyakta; but Gauḍapāda in his commentary on Sāṅkhya-kārikā 12 says: "the guṇas are dependent on one another, like a combination of two atoms (dvy-anukavat)". The Yoga system enlarges or reinforces the idea of the parināma of prakṛti, by admitting the possibility of the existence of atoms, corresponding to moments in time (see above, p. 221).

Just as we ordinary beings are able to distinguish cows from horses, owing to their special characteristics (colour, hump, bell, swift gait, etc.), so yogins can perceive the
distinction of one atom from another, in spite of their looking alike. This, says the Vaiśeṣika, must be in virtue of some special quality (viśeṣa) (Śyādv. p. 36, St. VIII; see also Vyāsa on Yogasūtras 2.3.44; 3.52; 4.14; etc.). He contends that each atom has various qualities (such as odour, colour, etc.), some more than others, according to the elements they represent. The Jain atom, on the other hand, has taste, colour, odour, two kinds of touch, and though itself soundless, is a cause of sound: all atoms being qualitatively alike.

In the Vaiśeṣika view, the ultimate atoms, being imperceptible, are inferable only. The dvī-apūka, or combination of two atoms, is still invisible, but an aggregate of three multiplied by two forms the smallest perceptible object, as represented by the speck of dust seen in a sunbeam. It may be noted in parenthesis that it was necessary to assert the impossibility of infinite division, on the ground that this would involve the equality of in size of Mount Meru and a mustard seed, since infinities are equal (Nyāyārvārtikatātparyatikā IV,2,17; etc.).

The later Vedāntin also accepted the atom theory, as we see from Śaṅkara's commentary on Brh. Up. 4,3,30: to the contention that the possession of varying qualities involves the possession of parts, and hence contradicts indivisibility (i.e. of the Self), the Vedāntin retorts that "An atom, say of earth,
which consists only of odour, is the minutest particle of it, and it itself odour; one cannot conceive that it again has a property called odour. Therefore there is no example to prove that a substance which has no parts can possess many attributes." It will be observed that this view differs from that of the Jains and Vaiśeṣikas.

The Vaiśeṣika theory of atoms was of importance for the teaching of the eternal cycle of world-creation and world-dissolution. In the process of dissolution, all combinations of atoms are destroyed, and the atoms remain isolated. A detailed account of the twofold process of creation and dissolution will be found in Praṣastapāda's Bhāṣya, pp. 48 ff. (edition Benares, 1895). And cf. also Comm. on Kusumāṇjali V,1; where it is stated that only a Supreme Being could bring about the necessary conjunctions of atoms at the beginning of a creation.

We now seem to have reached a point which to European thinking marks something definitely abstract or theoretical. But we must never forget that to the Indian mind, which thinks in terms of life and feels in sentiments of a live universe, even that which we call abstract has a concrete nature and can only be grasped through a concrete representation (cf. the personification of the creative forces of Nature in a diversified pantheon of gods in superhuman forms). Therefore it does
not surprise us that even purely fictitious (often fantastic and miraculous) images of life, which should fall under the category of illusion, are considered by the Indian to be real and capable of concrete representation. In this sense we are entitled to speak of a "reality of fiction", to the consideration of which we shall now turn.
Chapter IX. The Reality of Fiction.

In Chapter I we have enumerated the different divisions of "non-existence" (abhāva), and "non-apprehension" (anupalabdhi). Let us now consider in greater detail the application of both abhāva and anupalabdhi, with reference to those conditions which are partly due to natural (external) non-existence, and partly to defects in the cognising faculties of the individual.

Previous non-existence (prāg-abhāva) is exemplified by two proverbs which are intended to show futility: 1) Proclaiming the name of one's son before he is born (e.g. Nyāyamanjari p. 345; - this may be taken as the equivalent of "counting your chickens before they are hatched"), and 2) The partition of an Iguana's flesh while it is still in its hobe (This is an impossibility if taken literally, but if it is a mental "partition", it is another case of "counting one's chickens") (e.g. Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā p. 640).

Whereas prāg-abhāva implies an anticipation anticipation of reality, itaretara-abhāva (mutual non-existence) is eternal, for it illustrates the complete distinctness of objects with divergent natures. For example, one person cannot remember what another has seen or experienced (e.g. Kusum. I,15; Vācaspati on Yogasūtras I,32; III,14); nor does the falseness of one person prove another to be false. A Brāhmaṇ living in a village inhabited solely by Kīrātas does not on that account become one of them (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras I,5); nor does an
Iguana become a snake simply because it creeps along (Mahābhāṣya 1,1,23.). From seeing smoke rising from one house, we do not infer that there is a fire in another house (e.g. Tantravārtika (p. 180) on Jaimini’s sūtras, 1,3,15); Śyāmāka grain cannot be made to germinate as rice, and if an axe operates on a Khadira tree, it is not the Palāśa tree that is cut (see above, Chap. VII). A cow and a horse cannot be identified with one another (see above, Chap. VI); and a dog with an ear or tail cut off, is still a dog, not a horse or a donkey (see Jacob III, p. 89)।

A Sāṅkhya argument for the production of the existent from the existent is the fact that not even the cleverest person can make that yellow, which is by nature blue (Sāṅkhyaatattvakaumudī 9; Sarv. XIV, p. 121). (N.B. The process of changing blue to yellow is not an empirical impossibility, but it is logically impossible). A man who says "It is the ten pomegranates which will become the six cakes", is not a trustworthy person, and his words cannot be taken as āptavacana (Vācaspati on Yoga-sūtras I,7). Finally, an example of an impossible sequence is "munir manute, mūrkho mucyate"—a sage meditates, and a fool attains liberation (Vedāntatattvaviveka, p. 37). This is both a contradiction in terms, and a logical impossibility.

It will be observed that in nearly all of the above instances the statement is a negative one, and couched in terms which deny a manifestly impossible state of affairs. But the very denial implies that the positive statement either has been made, or is
capable of being made,—and accordingly even that positive statement is not entirely absurd. The Western philosopher would say that such a sentence as "a cow is not a horse" is correct, but absurd and unnecessary, as it leads us to no useful conclusion. The Indian, on the other hand, with his polaric outlook, holds that such a statement is useful, as it leads us to an understanding of the sequence of essential qualities in cause and effect, and of the classification of species, which after all comprise the great universal category "Existence" (See above, Chap. VI).

Pradhvaṣpa-abhāva, non-existence by destruction, may be dealt with quite briefly. The Naiyāyikas say that it has a beginning, but no end,—in contrast to previous non-existence, which has an end, but no beginning. The Advaita Vedāntins argue, however, that the destruction of e.g. a jar, by breaking it into pieces, ends when those parts are further destroyed; for the further destruction of the fragments of the jar cannot be said to be the further destruction of the jar itself. They are probably driven to some such conclusion in order to uphold their conviction that only Brahman is eternal,—nothing else, not even non-existence, can be allowed to compete with Brahman in this respect.

It follows that the Vedāntins must deny the permanence even of atyanta-abhāva, absolute non-existence. As everything except Brahman is non-eternal, therefore even the non-existence of
qualities in any particular object must, like the qualities themselves, be perishable. That is to say, existence and non-existence follow the same law. (See Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 176-7).

It is this last type of non-existence which will yield the greater part of our illustrations; and it deserves special notice, for it is a notion that could not find a place in European logic. At first sight it would seem that such a conception must be proof of a love of abstract thought; actually, though, it is more concrete than the concrete, for it means that even the unreal and uncognisable is conceived and grasped in the same process as the cognisable and existent. The wealth of terms for non-existent things is due no doubt to an ever-present disbelief in the reality of the empirical world; but also, paradoxically, to a very real apprehension of Nature's abundance, as manifested by India's tropical vegetation. Here, in the presence of quick-growing, yet quick-decaying plants and insects, even the impossible might one day come to pass.

One of the stock examples of absolute non-existence is the "lotus in the sky", which is quoted in Sāṅkhya. 4, Comm., together with an ass's horns, and the son of a barren woman. The same illustration is used by the Buddhist Mādhyamika in support of his contention that everything is void, and that the relation of cause and effect is an imaginary one; anything that has real existence as its nature does not require an efficient
cause to manifest it; while no cause can bring about the production of a non-existent effect, like flowers in the sky (Sarv. II, p. 11).

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga view is expressed in Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras II,19: "The state of equipoise (sāmyatā) of the three guṇas is nowhere of use in fulfilling the objects of the Puruṣa. Therefore it does not exist as efficacious. On the other hand, it does not admit of being rejected as non-existent, like the lotus of the sky." That is to say, the effect is not directly efficacious while it resides in the cause in posse, but it cannot for that reason be said to be entirely non-existent (for when the sāmyāvasthā is resolved, the various guṇas perform their own functions) (Cf. also Vācaspati on Yogasūtras III,13k: "That which is non-existent is never visible and does not perform any function, like the lotus in the sky" (but the empirical world cannot be referred to such a category)). The opponents of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga satkārya-vādin may allege that, since we deduce the non-existence of the sky-lotus etc. through their non-appearance to sight, similarly we should be at liberty to conclude that every product before its manifestation is equally unreal. And conversely, if we admit the reality of the product even before it becomes visible, we should also admit the potential reality of the lotus in the sky, the hare's horn, and all other such products of the imagination (Sāṅkhyaatattvakaumudi 6). This is a legitimate criticism, and one that cannot be absolutely refuted.
The most that can be said in reply is that nobody has so far seen a lotus in the sky, and therefore we can assume that it is entirely non-existent; but nobody can state with assurance that such an object will not come into existence at some future time, for both lotus and sky are real in themselves: it is the combination of the two which has not yet materialised. And with regard to the first half of the criticism, the answer is that it is actually possible to see the effect being produced from the cause (e.g. curds from milk) (parināma).

As alternative, or supplement, to the "sky-lotus" we often find mention of the horns of a hare, or (less frequently) those of a horse, a donkey, a mouse, or a man. Here again two objects which are in themselves real are linked together to form an impossible combination. The "sky-lotus" and "hare's horn" are used interchangeably in many contexts to illustrate satkārya, asatkārya, and other theories of cause and effect (e.g. Sarv. XIV, p. 121; Vācaspati on Yogasūtras III, 13). In the last-mentioned passage (where nara-visāna, man's horn, takes the place of hare's horn) there is the further statement "The non-existence of perception does not disprove the existence of anything proved to exist by other means of knowledge" (but the horns of a man are not capable of being proved existent). There is a similar topic under discussion at Kusum. 3,1 et seq. The Naiyāyika is seeking to establish the existence of a supreme Being. His opponent infers God's non-existence from his not being perceived.
and argues, "If you reply that the Supreme Being is not a suitable (yogya) object of perception, and therefore, since we cannot here have a valid non-perception, we cannot assume His non-existence, we retort that in the same way we might prove that a hare's horn may exist since we have only to maintain that it is not a suitable object of perception."

The Naiyāyika's reply is that if the absence of perception or perceptibility meant denial of existence, we should be forced to deny the existence of everything beyond the reach of the senses, e.g. ether, and such qualities as merit, demerit, etc. But a horn, if it existed, would certainly be a legitimate object of perception so we conclude that there is no such thing as a hare's horn, since we do not see it. If the opponent, however, insists that a hare's horn is not a legitimate object of perception (i.e. that it may exist although invisible), then its existence is not impossible, though there is an absence of proof to establish it. The same, however, does not apply to the existence of a Supreme Being, which is confirmed by inference and scripture, if not by direct perception (Cf. the similar discussion on page 97 of Sarv. (Chap. XI), which supplements the above. Analogous passages are found at Sāṅkhya-tattvakaumudī 8, with the substitution of the saptama-rasa (7th flavour, there being only six flavours acknowledged) for the hare's horn; and Sāṅkhya-kārikā Comm. 7, with the substitution of a "second head" or "third arm" (in reference to the non-perception of puruṣa and prakṛti).
The Nyāyabinduṭīkā provides us with a statement of the logical value of a "non-entity": "The horn of a hare has not (ever) been an object of sight. But still it has been recognised as not being an object of practical purposive action (because it has not been present to sight, i.e. through being imagined). For in the case of a hare’s horn etc., a non-existent object of action, which is simply the cause of non-presentation to sight (i.e. which must be imagined, in order to be rejected as non-existent), has been established by proof (that is, by inference)", (NBET III, p. 49). This stress on the value of fiction and imagination is evidence of the difference between Western and Eastern psychology.

For other mentions of "hare’s horns", etc., see Syādv. p. 162, St. XIII, XXVIII; p. 153, St. XXVI; p. 77, St. XIII; p. 70, St. XI; p. 77, St. 116, St. XVII (last three: "horse’s horn"); p. 85, St. XIV ("donkey’s horn"); Vacaspati on Yogasūtras III, 52.

In the last-mentioned passage, Vacaspati says that the succession of moments exemplifies a different sort of unreality from the unreality of the hare’s horn. Their succession is a mental concept, unreal because no two moments can exist simultaneously, and be ranged together for comparison. But previous and future moments are not of the nature of the horn of a hare, though they are just as intangible— for they are part of the process of evolution. And the Yogin can obtain direct knowledge, by Saṃyama, of the moments and their succession.
Other "wrong combinations" are "the hair on a tortoise's back" (Sāṅkhyaatattvakāumudī 6; Syādv. p. 136, St. XXI); and "a crest of matted hair on the head of a frog" (Syādv. p. 86, St. XIV); and the "hairs of the sky (ākāśa)" (Syādv. p. 106, St. XVI). A knowledge of the "hairs of the sky" is wrong knowledge, for it has no object (nirviṣayam). This is the prima facie view, but the Jain points out that one who has first seen real hair cannot even imagine hair in the sky; therefore it is not "nirviṣayam jñānam".

The "imaginary sweet" was also a subject for speculation. The Bāuddha, having stated that the object and the cognition thereof are identical, leaves himself a loophole by adding, "Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the flavour, energy and digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual sweetmeat will be identical; for though the intellect (buddhi) is, strictly speaking, exempt from the modes of subject and object (vedya-vedaka), yet there is a certain practical distinction." (Sarv. II, p. 13). A parallel passage occurs in Vācaspati's gloss on Yogasūtras IV,16: "Effects cannot arise spuriously from causes other than their appropriate causes.. For, is it proper that an object, being the cause of the knowledge of itself, should also be the cause of itself? If this were so, then the sweetmeats which one hopes to eat in the future (existing in the imagination), and the sweetmeats which one eats in the present, would not differ from one another in their taste, strength, and effect on the digestion." The "reality" of fiction, then, is on a different
plane from empirical reality; but the power of the imagination cannot be denied. (See also Vācaspati on Yogasūtras 1,32: "One cannot cook with imaginary fire").

Another "wrong combination" is the concept of "oil from sand," used by the Sāṅkhya to show that there can be no production or the non-existent (Sāṅkhya. 9). We find a combination of absurdities in Bhartṛhari's Nītiśataka verse 5 (quoted by Jacob, III, p. 96): "One might obtain oil from sand by pressing hard; when thirsty one might drink water from a mirage; and while wandering about one might even come across a hare's horn; but one could never please the heart (citta) of a fool." The "germinating stone" is a further contradiction in sense (see e.g. Sarv. II, pp. 8,9).

A fruitless enquiry is ridiculed by comparison with "an examination of a crow's teeth" (for a crow has no teeth) (see e.g. Nyāyabinduṭīkā I, p. 1,3); and information leading to no useful result is like "instructions for obtaining Takṣaka's crest jewel as a febrifuge" (See above, Chap. VI). In the same category may be placed the act of "looking for birds' footprints in the sky, and fishes' footprints in the water" (a search for something unattainable) (e.g. Brh. Up. Comm. 4,4,22; Ait. Up. Comm. II,1 (p. 67, Anand. edn.) (This is applied to (a) seeking for (external) means to realise the Self with which one is identical; and (b) attempting to see distinctions in the one Reality). (Cf. also Brh. Up. Comm. 4,4,6). But we must note that such an action is
not as absurd as it might seem, for the sky is the path, the mārga, of the birds (and the water of the fish),—so that such an attempt would be the translation of terrestrial reality to another sphere.

Before turning to a different branch of "unrealities", we may mention the "picture without a canvas", and the "shadow without a post". In this case it is not a combination of two incompatible things, but a severance of two things which are inseparable: for the picture depends upon the canvas, and the shadow upon the post or some other substratum. At Sāṅkhya-kārikā 41, these two illustrations are applied to the inseparable connection between the subtle body (liṅga) and the characteristics (viṣeṣas) with which it is associated in each incarnation. But here again we must not lose sight of the polaric aspect: The Lord Viṣṇu, or a Yogi, by means of supernatural powers, can paint without a canvas (see e.g. Sarv. VIII, p. 78).

This leads us on from contradictions in sense to contradictions in terms, which express an ideal incompatibility. The One of the stock examples of atyanta-abhāva is the "garland without a string" (Sarv. XII; mentioned in connection with sphoṭa; see above, Chap. VII); while one of the most frequent of all illustrations of non-existence is the vaṁśhā-suta, the son of a barren woman. The Bauddha, in ridiculing the Čārvāka's claim that perception is the only pramāṇa, says: "If, while you assert that inference is no form of evidence, you produce some headless
argument to prove, i.e. to infer, that it is none, you will be involved in an absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren." (Sarv. II, p. 6). Precisely the same argument is used with regard to internal and external perception, Sarv. II, p. 14 ("No man in his senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless mother"); and in Sarv. XII, p. 104, with reference to the authority of the Veda (which must be admitted to prove what is not provable by other evidence). The Jain, arguing against animal sacrifice, says that to say that hiṃśā is a cause of acquiring merit is to say that a woman can be a mother and yet be barren (Syādv. p. 62, St. XI; cf. also ibid. p. 77, St. XII; p. 128, St. XIX).

The counterpart of the vandhyā-suta is furnished by the story of the impotent husband (Vyāsa on Yogasūtras II, 24). The Sāṅkhya-Yoga theory of mokṣa has been explained. Someone ridicules this by the story of the impotent husband. A foolish wife says to her husband, "My sister has children; why have I none?" and he replies, "I shall give you children when I am dead." Similarly, the saving knowledge has no power, while it is in existence, to make the mind cease from action; what hope is there that it will cause cessation (i.e. liberation) when suppressed?

The resolving of a contradiction in terms is "The bride is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom". This is applied to the non-emergence of an inference when there is no difference between the example (and the probandum). (Sarv. V, p. 52).
Sāṅkara's school, with its nirguṇa and saṃguṇa Brahman, and its contention that the empirical world has no reality, provided a ready target for accusations of inconsistency and absurdity. For instance, an opponent might say that to think of the transcendent Brahman as the (identical with) the relative self, would be like thinking of fire as cold. But the Vedāntin says that such sentences as "Knowledge, Bliss" do not contradict perception etc., as "fire is cold and wets things" would. (Cf. Brh. Up. Comm. 2,4,13: Maitreyī asks, "How can the Self be simply Pure Intelligence, and yet after attaining oneness, have no more consciousness? The same fire cannot be both hot and cold."). (For cold fire, dark sun, and the like, see Chap. XIII above).

A similar contradiction in terms is "floating stones". "If you allege Sruti as the proof (i.e. of eternal happiness), we reply that Sruti has no place when the thing itself is precluded by a valid non-perception; or if you allow its authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things as floating stones", (alluding to the Vedic phrase, "grāvānāḥ plavanti") (Sarv. XI, p. 96). (While grounds sink—see above, Chap. VIII).

Two well-known absurdities which frequently occur together are the "half-old woman", and the "half-cooked hen" (ardhavaiśasanyāya, the simile of the slaying of one half of the body, while the other half is kept alive). These absurdities are employed by the Buddhist to illustrate his conviction that, when mother-
of-pearl is mistaken for silver, both substances are equally unreal: "Nor can the rule of the half-old woman be admissible (ucitam). For it is not imagined that one-half of a fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs" (i.e. neither mother-of-pearl nor silver can be half real and half unreal) (Sarv. II, p. 11. Cf. also Śaṅkara on Brh. Up. 2,3,3, with reference to gross and subtle cosmical forms).

A rather less ingenious "impossibility" is the dead man come back to life. Allowing that knowledge and knowable are distinct and cannot be identified, the Vaiśaṅkikas cannot make knowledge itself a knowable, as surely as they cannot revive a dead man (Praśna Up. Comm. VI,3). (According to the Vedāntin, knowledge is one and indivisible, and therefore self-luminous).

The biological "impossibilities" of the germination of seeds eaten by a mouse, destroyed by fire, or spoilt by oil, have been mentioned above (Chap. VII). A dimensional impossibility is expressed by the sentence "There are a hundred herds of elephants on the tip of my finger." Anyone making such a statement cannot claim credence (as an āptavacana) (See Jacob III, p. 3).

Let us now consider the cases in which there is not merely an perception, owing to various causes (anupalabdhi). Owing to too great distance, one sometimes mistakes a post for a man, or a heap of straw for an elephant (for the former, see Nyāyasūtras II,1; Sāṅkhya-kārikā 30 and 46; and for the latter, Jacob III, p. 55). At Nyāyabhāṣya IV, 101, it is emphasized that there must
be an initial likeness, otherwise one thing cannot be mistaken 
for another (see also Vaiś. Sūtras II,3 2,17) (See above, Chap. I). 
Faulty observation causes one to mistake an iron ball for gold 
(see above, Chap. IV), while eye-disease or a blow on the eyes 
leads to the vision of a double moon, or "gnats and flies", or 
a mass of hair (instead of a conglomeration of single hairs) 
(see above, Chap. VIII; also Comm. on Praśna Up. VI,4, and 
Nyāyasūtras IV,77). All these are real cognitions for the per­ 
cipient, though they do not conform to actual fact; and the same 
Applies to the vision of a flaming post (jvalita-stambha) which 
appears to one suffering from a disturbance of the humours 
(Nyāyabindūṭīkā I, p. 12). Only when the cause of the illusion 
is removed, can the object be seen in its true light. When the 
cause is internal, it may not be eliminated at all, but when 
it is external (e.g. in the case of the distant post or heap of 
straw), the apparent likeness is realised on close inspection 
not to exist.

Another complaint affecting the vision is jaundice, which 
leads a person to see a white conch-shell as yellow. This is 
clearly not a right cognition, but it is a cognition of the true 
shape and genus of the object, though not of its correct attributes. 
This erroneous knowledge, then, is a mixture of true and false; 
moreover even though the percipient may know that his cognition 
is incorrect, he cannot alter it, though he may make allowances 
for the organic defect. (see e.g. Kusum. Comm. III,21; Syadv.
p. 135, St. XXI; Nyāyabinduṭīkā I, p. 5. The latter passage says that this is not a cognition of the true form (ākāra), but this clearly refers not to the form but to the colour.

A moving vehicle provides an external cause of illusion, leading to a wrong representation of the locus of an object, e.g. a tree. Though this is not strictly a right perception, it leads the percipient to a real object, i.e. a stationary, not a moving, tree. (See Nyāyabinduṭīkā I, pp. 5, 9). Another perception which though strictly erroneous, yet leads to reality, is the supposition that the light of a jewel seen through the keyhole of a door, or a slit in a screen, is the jewel itself (See e.g. Sarv. II, p. 18; NBT I, p. 5). This is styled samvāḍibhrama, an error which has a corresponding reality behind it; to mistake the distant shining of a lamp through the keyhole of a door for a gem, is an illustration of visamvāḍibhrama, an error devoid of an underlying reality (though even here light is the real substratum). In a passage of Pañcadaśī IX, treating of meditation (dhyāna) as a means of arriving at right knowledge of Brahman, it is said that dhyāna directed towards Brahman with qualities (saguṇa), though erroneous, leads to the underlying Brahman without qualities, as the light of a jewel leads to the jewel.

Two technical terms which occur frequently in the philosophical texts are upādhi and adhyāropa; the former being used in the sense of "superimposition", and more especially the superimposition of one substance upon another, leading to the erroneous
transference of attributes, the school example being the red flower which lends colour to the transparent crystal (cf. Kusum. III,7 Comm.) Adhyāropā has a slightly different significance: it means the substitution of one object for another object which resembles it closely, through failure to perceive the distinction, as when a rope is mistaken for a snake in the darkness (See Vedāntasāra 32).

The Vedāntin points out that though a crystal may appear coboured through association with various colours, yet in reality it is pure and unaffected by limiting attributes; similarly the sense-organs etc. appear to be associated with the Self, which is naturally Pure Intelligence (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 4,3,30; and cf. ibid. 2,4,12; 4,3,20). The same simile is applied to the nature of the Puruṣa, which is unaffected by things affecting consciousness; or to the impressions made by objects on consciousness (Yogaṣūtras I,3; 1,4; 1,41 (Vyāsa and Vacaspati); see also V's gloss on Yogaṣūtras III,17), and Nyāyasūtras III,77-8).

A similar erroneous cognition is the perception of (blue) colour in the sky ("ether"); or the vision of the sky as concave, having parts, and the like. The "blue" or "concave" sky is quoted in several passages (esp. Bṛh. Up. Comm.) together with such obvious illusions as a mirage in the desert, the mistaking of a rope for a snake, or of mother-of-pearl for silver, to all of which is likened the attribution of limiting characteristics to the indivisible Self (e.g. Bṛh. Upl Comm. 4,3,1; and other places; Kaṭha Up. Comm. III,14). We note, however, that at in
In this case it is only by inference that we know the absence of colour in the sky; and if a person did not see that colour, his senses would be mistaken.

The equivalent of our "castle in the air" (formed by cloud-banks) is gandharva-nagara, "city of the heavenly minstrels" (e.g. Kaṭha Up. Comm. VI, 1; Nyāyasūtras IV, 95-6). In the latter passage, a (Śūnyavādin?) opponent of the Naiyāyika suggests that the notion of pramāṇa and prameya is as illusory as a dream, a magic show, a city in the clouds, or a mirage. The Naiyāyika thereupon suggests that dreams at any rate have a basis in reality, for they arise mainly through previous (waking) experiences. (See also NS IV, 98-9). At Nyāyabinduṭīkā p. 5, it is said that a dream is a wrong representation of time: e.g. we see at midnight an object which we really saw at noon. That is to say, a dream, like an inference, is a smara (remembrance) of pratyakṣa (perception).

Optical delusions which are common to most include the mirage seen in the desert, the tricks of the conjuror (māyin), and the appearance of a fiery circle when a fire-tipped stick is swung rapidly. The first (for which see e.g. Nyāyabinduṭīkā I, p. 4; Br̥h. Up. Comm. 1, 5, 2; 2, 3, 6; 5, 1, 1; Syādv. p. 107, St. XVI; p. 132, St. XX) is an actual freak of nature, formed by light-waves, and as it is an experience shared by numerous persons, is not entirely unreal, though it ultimately vanishes. The Jain points out that the knowledge (jñāna) which accounts for the setting out of a man in the direction of the supposed water, is not mṛga-
trāṇīka-jñāna, knowledge of the mirage, but jala-jñāna, knowledge of water (which is subsequently corrected). In this case, therefore, jñāna has come into being without its corresponding artha (object). (Syādv. p. 107, St. XVI). (Cf. Bṛh. Up. Comm. 4,4,22: "Because a man who sees water in a mirage proceeds to drink from it, another who sees no water there, but merely desert, is certainly not so inclined").

The conjuror’s tricks, similarly, produce a semblance of reality, which actually exists (even if only in the minds of the onlookers) for the moment. We find several references to the magician (māyin) in the Upaniṣads (e.g. Maitri Up. 4,2; Ka. Up. VI,1 (Comm.); Svet. Up. 4,9-10). The world is produced by Brahman as a "māyin", but the tertium comparationis does not lie in the unreality of what is produced, but rather in the sovereign power of the conjuror, who is able to produce a multiformity of shapes. A particularly noteworthy passage is found in the Comm. on Ait. Up. 1,1 (p. 30, Anand. edn.): "Just as a wise (vijnānavān) magician (māyāvin) can, by his own power, without a material cause, show himself (lit. measure out- nirmāne-,- cf. connection with māyā) as walking on the sky,- even so the creator (the mahāmāya) creates (measures out) the world out of himself by his own power." This bears out Dr. Heimann’s interpretation of māyā as "that which is measured" (see "Indian and Western Philosophy", pp. 52-3, for the inferiority of "measured" empirical objects to the immeasurable Avyaktam; and see also Cakravarti, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads,
The third example, alātacakra, the fiery wheel, has been dealt with in Chap. IV. It is an illusion called forth through insufficient quickness of sight. A similar mistake is made when a firefly in the darkness is regarded as a light, or as fire (Brh. Up. Comm. 3,3,1; see above, Chap. VI). In a slightly different category is the "confusion of directions", when a man who knows the points of the compass is suddenly perplexed about them (e.g. Brh. Up. Comm. 1,4,10; V's gloss on Yogasūtras I,7; II,5). This phenomenon may be explained by too quick movement (in turning), or by an incidental defect of the internal organ. (similar to anupalabdhi "mano'navasthānāt").

A fault not in visual perception, but in taste, is the sensation of "bitter treacle" (or molasses), when there has been a bilious disturbance (see e.g. Upaskāra on Vaiṣ. Sūtras III,2,3).

The two best-known school examples of adhyāropa,— an illusory object based on an inadequate substratum of reality,— are the "rope and the snake", and the "silver and mother-of-pearl". The Vedāntin holds that the "snake" is the creation of ignorance (avidya being something positive, not merely negative like our "ignorance"), just like the attribution of qualities and limitations to the absolute Brahman. "Just as the snake which is the vivarta (wrong transformation) of a rope is discovered to be nothing but the rope, so the
world of unreal things, beginning with ignorance (ajñāna), forming the vivarta of the Reality (vastu), is realised in the end to be Reality (Brahman) alone". (Vedāntasāra 137; cf. ibid. 53-4; and Brh. Up. Comm., passim).

The Jain, however, says that the sight of the (illusory) snake undoubtedly produces the effect of fear, just as a real snake would (Sarv. III, p. 21). The Mīmāṃsā view is similar—to all intents and purposes it is a snake that is seen, and not a rope; it is not a substitution, but a non-realisation (a-khyāti) of the normal reality. According to the Naiyāyika, the perception of illusory objects can be explained by the theory of jñāna-lakṣaṇā, intuitive knowledge (see above, Chap. I), or the application of memory. We know that a long twisted object is (or can be) a snake, so that when we dimly see a similar object, our pre-existing knowledge functions, and we see a snake.

An illusion of the same class is the mistaking of mother-of-pearl for silver. The different theories of illusion have been dealt with thoroughly by Rrandle (Indian Logic in the Early Schools) and Sinha (Indian Psychology: Perception- Chap. XV), with special reference to this example, so it will not be necessary to do more than touch upon it here. The five principal theories of error are: (1) Ātmakhyāti (Buddhist Vījñānavādin), according to which the object of erroneous judgment is subjective or ideal, and has no existence apart from the mind. (2) asatkhyāti (Buddhist Madhyamika), according to which the object of error is non-existent. But, argues
a critic, something absolutely non-existent can never appear in consciousness at all. The most that can be said is that the mother-of-pearl does not exist as silver. (3) Anirvacanīyakhyāti (Vedāntin), according to which the object as of error is not expressible as existent or as non-existent. (See Vedāntaparibhāṣā I) An "indefinable" silver is produced by the action of avidyā, and continues as long as the illusion lasts. The criticism of this theory is that at the time of the erroneous cognition, the object of error is definitely designable as existent, while when the error is realised it is as definitely designable as non-existent. (4) Anyathā-khyāti (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika), according to which one thing is simply mistaken for another, both being real. It is the recollection of silver which produces the perception of it; if we merely regard an illusion as a reproduction of past experience, we neglect its psychological character. The later Naiyāyika goes farther, and maintains that we actually perceive transcendental silver, in an extraordinary perception (alaukika-jñānam). The silver that we see actually exists in another place. The Vedāntin thereupon points out that if this were admitted, then an immediate cognition of fire etc. could take place, and inference would be unnecessary (Vedāntaparibhāṣā I). (5) Akhyāti (Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā), the theory of "neglected difference", according to which we see only the common qualities of mother-of-pearl and silver, and not their own distinctive qualities. All knowledge is fact, sarvam jñānam pramānam, and error simply does not exist, except as incomplete knowledge. When
we see a glittering object, and leap to the conclusion that it is silver, we have simply neglected the difference between two similar things, and have not grasped the fact that it is mother-of-pearl and not silver that we see. But although not the whole truth, it is certainly a partial truth; and it is the inner eye, not the sense-organ, which is at fault. Finally, the idea of unreality in illusion is completely dispelled by the Rāmānujas, who say that when a piece of mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, it is because the silver has an ontological existence in the mother-of-pearl at the time of the perception (satkhyāti). This theory is based on the cosmological doctrine of the triplication or quintuplication of the elements. With this cf. the idea that as a matter of fact a black bee (for example) possesses all the (give) colours, but only one of them is visible, while the rest are latent. So that everything is potentially visible (cf. the three guṇas in Śāṅkhyā,- one predominating at a time).

We have discussed the various forms of non-existence, and the different sorts of faulty perception, due to internal disorders or external circumstances. It now remains to consider incompatibilities, errors of judgment and the like, and physical impossibilities. In most cases statements of manifest absurdities are used to ridicule the opponent in a Saṃvāda, and to demonstrate that his arguments are unsuitable or absurd, ridiculous. For example, it is evident that a hyena or lion does not have a suitable opponent in a young fawn (see above, Chap. VI); while a blind man is not qualified for work involving the examination of butter, nor a
lame man undertake any task involving the strides of Viṣṇu (Vaiyāyikanyāyamālā 3,4,2 (sūtras 18-20). Quoted by Jacob III, p.48). Not even by a thousand blind men can a house be adequately guarded from thieves (Vācaspatimīśra in ṭīkā on Nyāyavārtika 1,2,2), nor a thousand blind travellers find the right road (Bhāmati 1,1,5).

Examples of wrong judgment are numerous. For instance, there is the man who does not take the milk suitable to a sick person, but enjoys the sour gruel (sauvīraruci). This is used of one who abandons the view that liberation is the manifestation of happiness, and accepts the view that it is merely the cessation of misery (Sarv. XI, p. 96). A carter would be beheaded rather than pay a hundred pieces of money, but was quite willing to give five score (refusing to admit one thing, but admitting it under a different guise, e.g. accepting the falsity of the universe, but not its unreality,—Sarv. V, p. 58). When an opponent is compelled to accept certain conclusions, or else adopt an absurd alternative, he is compared to a man who will not wear shoes on his feet, and has to hang them around his neck instead (Citsukhi 1,11, etc.). A man who abandons the search for the knowledge of Brahman in order to enjoy worldly pleasures is likened to one who gives up the Cintāmaṇi, and prefers a piece of common glass (See Jacob II, p. 17). The proverb of the tenth man is a favourite: each man in a party of ten fails to count himself, until the error is pointed out. Similarly the Self (i.e. an individual who forms part of the universal Self) may imagine itself to be miserable, until it is
pointed out that it cannot be (see Br̥hī Up. Comm. 1,4,15).

Other examples of wrong judgment are: enquiring as to a suitable date (according to the planets) for shaving one's head, after that ceremony has already been performed (Nyāyamañjarī p. 171); speaking of Kovidara trees when questioned about mangoes (see e.g. Bhāmati 1,1,22; Vedantakalpataru 1,4,1). Further, it is a topsy-turvy state of affairs when a Niṣādī woman gives birth to a son, and her husband drinks the medicinal potion prepared for her (Vedāntatatttvaviveka, p. 37). One does not need a mirror in order to look at a bracelet on the wrist (see Jacob III, p. 41), nor should one take a lamp to assist in hearing sound. See above, Chap. VII, for the absurd way of capturing a crane. Any faulty logic is compared to the logic of the "milk and cow-dung": "All that is produced from the cow is milk. Cow-dung is produced from the cow; therefore cow-dung is milk." (Vācaspati on Yogasūtras 32; and see Sarv. II, p. 15).

Examples of an unlooked-for result are for instance a snake biting its own body (= making a statement, e.g. "nothing is known", when this is itself not known. See above, Chap. VI); and "day-break near the toll-collector's hut", which indicates failure to accomplish a desired object (uddeśya-asiddhi);— in this case the passing of the hut in the darkness, to evade the toll (see Sarv. XIII, p. 116; Syādv. p. 29, St. VI). A man who is completely worsted in argument is compared to someone who goes to ask for some oilcake (pinyāka), and has instead to agree (to give) a kharikā of oil (Sarv. V, p. 52).
On p. 52 of Sarv. (Chap. V) it is said that "The statement of the Advaita-vādins, who thirst for reunioin with the Supreme Lord, that Viṣṇu, the most excellent abode of virtues, is but a mirage, is like cutting off the tongue while desirous of obtaining a fine plantain; for it happens that, through incurring Viṣṇu's anger, they sink into blind darkness" (and so are not liberated at all). Another proverb indicating the destruction of the instrument for obtaining an effect is "Wishing to grow, you have even destroyed your root", which may also mean "While seeking to obtain interest, you have lost that and the capital too" (Sarv. III, p. 22). The maxim "rain on a saline barren waste" is an illustration of something not having any useful effect.

A useless effort undertaken through wrong judgment is "catching at straws", which signifies being driven to an untenable argument (e.g. Sarv. III, p. 21). Actions barren of result are e.g. whispering in a deaf man's ear, or showing a looking-glass to a blind man (see Jacob II, p. 4, etc.); and sacrificing on ashes (see Chapter VIII above), or straightening a dog's tail (see Jacob III, p. 89). Useless repetition is likened to the grinding of chaff (tusakhandana), or the grinding of what is already ground, or seeking to put a shoe on a foot that is already shod (the last two are impossible as well as useless). No satisfaction is obtained through attempting to dispel darkness with a lamp no bigger than one's finger (Atma-tatttvaviveka p. 52). A man who is already in a village is not anxious to reach it, as a man in a forest might be (see above, Chap. V, p. 34).
A thief's offer of his body for examination *who* after the gold has been found under his armpit is an example of pointless bluff (e.g. Sarv. XII, p. 109); and the vigilance of the watchmen after the house has been plundered is likewise misplaced in time (see Jacob I).

There is a series of proverbs setting out the limits of human capacity; these may be termed examples of *physical* impossibility. For example: "No young actor, however skilled, is clever enough to mount on his own shoulder" (Syādv. p. 73-4, St. XII), and "The edge of a sword, even though very keen, is not employed to cut itself" (similarly, argues the Mīmāṃsaka, no action can have itself as an object, and knowledge is an action. See also above, Ch. VIII, on the self-revelation of knowledge). Or "(Knowledge cannot know itself), just as the tip of a finger cannot be touched by itself" (Nyāyavārtikatātparyātīkā p. 466). The maxim of "pulling the root of the ear with the tip of the nose" is applied in Sureśvara's Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika 4,3,1184 to those who are deluded, and speak of impossibilities. (But cf. the alleged power of Buddha to touch his ear with his tongue).

When a questioner inquires, "Why should a man not be reborn even after mukti has been attained?", the exponent of Sāṅkhya-Yoga replies in terms of cessante causā cessat effectus. If the effect could arise even in the absence of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and suchlike absurdities. As the Śruti says, "A blind man found a jewel; (or, pierced it: with) one without
fingers seized it, one without a neck wore it, and a dumb man praised it." (Taitt. Āraṇ. 1,11,6). (If the effect could arise without a cause, such things would be possible, not absurd) (Yogasūtras, Comm. IV,31).

The maxim of "treacle on the elbow" refers to anything that is almost (if not quite) inaccessible (e.g. Sarv. XI, p. 95).

The inaccessibility of the sky made it a favorite ground for speculation. At Svet. Up. VI,20, it is said, "When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather, then shall there be an end of misery without knowing God". Those who attempt to see distinctions in the one reality are as it were wishing to encircle the sky with a shield, or to ascend the sky as if it were a ladder. (Ait. Up. Comm. II,1 (p. 67, Ānand. edn.). A favorite way of silencing an opponent is to say that his argument is a vain attempt to strike the sky with his fist (e.g. Sarv.XII, p. 108). An equivalent expression is "gagana-romantha", ruminating on ether (Sarv. IV, p. 39, and XIII, p. 116). But this occupation is supposed to be the special prerogative of the snake, whose epithet is vātabhakṣa, "feeding on air"; so that this expression, though intended to denote impossibility or futility, must be qualified. A man who ridicules another's attempt, and at the same time tries something much more impossible, is reprimanded in these terms: "You ridicule the man who ties his gold up in a corner of his garment, but you yourself take the gold and tie it up in a-bē the border of the sky." (Āmatatattvaviveka p. 58).
In the same context as "looking for birds' footprints in the sky", we find "swimming on land under the impression that it is water" quoted as an impossibility (Bṛh. Up. Comm. 4,4,22, - see above, p. 301). But here again we must not lose sight of the polaric aspect. That which is not possible for the ordinary human being, is an everyday affair for the Yogin, who has supernatural powers second only to those of the gods. He can move from one place to another at will, in defiance of time and space. He can assume any form he pleases, either becoming lighter than cotton wool and walking over the rays of light or webs of spiders, or expanding to fill the universe. He can touch the moon with his fingertips, or plunge into the earth as if it were water. The saintly Yogin has prophetic vision, and past and future time are all present to his eyes. Moreover, he can create material things out of nothing, and make inanimate things animate. (See e.g. Sāṅkhyak. and STK 23; Yogasūtras III,42 (Vyāsa); IV,5 (Vācaspati), IV,10 (Vyāsa).

It may be argued that the power of the Yogin is beyond human knowledge, and does not affect the lives of ordinary mortals. But remember that in India there were schools of mysticism; it was believed that, with perseverance and application, anyone could conquer time, space and the elements. The Yogin collects and summarises that which is separate in other men; he combines divergent things, and resolves turns illusion into a "reality of fiction".

From the metaphysical point of view, too, we have seen how certain schools of thought regarded "illusions" as not entirely
false. On the one hand, the Vedāntin holds that the whole world is an illusion, and that faulty perceptions (e.g. of silver in mother-of-pearl) are no more unreal than the perception of any empirical object, e.g. a jar (though on a different plane). The only difference is that in the case of the apparent silver, the cognition can be contradicted in everyday life; while the jar etc. is only unreal when contrasted with the ultimate Reality, Brahman. On the other hand, the Rāmānujas Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas say that every cognition is true, and that there is no illusion; while the later Naiyāyika clings to his belief in abnormal perceptions (alaukika), not only for Yogins, but also for the average person.

From yet another point of view, one has only to look at a collection of Indian paintings or sculptures to see the manifoldness and exuberance of Nature depicted and symbolised in seemingly fantastic ways. Gods and goddesses with multiple heads and limbs—or-quite are quite de rigueur, while combinations of man and beast (e.g. man-lion, elephant-headed god, and the like) were not only accorded their place in art, but also in philosophical discussions (see above, Chap. VI).

It is therefore quite in order to give "illusion" a recognised place in the world of reality, and to value it as a means of attaining truth.
In a survey of the kind which we have now completed, there are two possible ways of approach: a) from the angle of the philosophical theories, grouping together the similes relevant to each theory; and b) from the point of view of giving a picture of Indian civilisation and culture, by assembling the similes in their appropriate sphere, and showing how each symbol may illustrate divergent philosophical theories. We have chosen the second method, at the risk of some repetition where the theories and dogmas are concerned; because in this way it can more clearly be shown how philosophy in India was never divorced from everyday life. For this purpose the whole classical period has been treated as one, without an attempt at following an exact historical sequence in the texts.

Some systems have come in for a larger share of notice than others, mainly because they specialise in striking similes. Certain metaphors and similes have been appropriated by one particular system,— e.g. the dancer, the lame and the blind, and the milk and the calf, which are regarded as the special property of the Sāṅkhya school. But the vast majority of figures of speech are common to all schools, and we have noted more than once how the arguments in a Sāṅvāda tend to revolve around the example which symbolises the theory,— the example which is common to layman and philosopher alike, and which makes it possible for (otherwise) abstruse doctrines to be expressed in a concrete way.