

Popular Front, War and Fourth Republic Politics in Senegal:

From Galandou Diouf to L.S. Senghor

1936-1952

Thesis submitted for the degree

of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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ABBREVIATIONS

AEF: Afrique Equatoriale Française
ANC: Assemblée Nationale Constituante
ANSOM: Archives Nationales Section Outre-Mer
AOF: Afrique Occidentale Française
ARSD: Archives de la République du Sénégal, Dakar
BDS: Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais
CEFA: Comité d'Etudes Franco-Africaines
CEP: Certificat d'Etudes Primaires
CFLN: Comité Français de la Libération Nationale
CGT: Confédération Générale du Travail
EGCF: États Généraux de la Colonisation Française
ENFOM: Ecole Nationale de la France d'Outre Mer
GEC: Groupement d'Etudes Communistes
IOM: Indépendants d'Outre-Mer
JOANC: Journal Officiel-Assemblée Nationale Constituante
MAA: Mouvement Autonomiste Africain
MNA: Mouvement Nationaliste Africain
MUR: Mouvement Unifié de la Résistance
PCF: Parti Communiste Français
PNR: Parti National Républicain
PODT: Parti Ouvrier et Démocratique de Thiès
PPF: Parti Populaire Français
PPS: Parti du Peuple Sénégalais
PRS: Parti Républicain Socialiste
PSS: Parti Socialiste Sénégalais
PTI: Parti Travailleurs Indépendant
RAC: Régiment d'Artillerie Coloniale
RDA: Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
RPF: Rassemblement du Peuple Français
SFIO: Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière
SIP: Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance
SOL: Service d'Ordre Légionnaire
UDS: Union Démocratique Sénégalaise
URS: Union Républicaine Sénégalaise

INTRODUCTION

The present study examines the impact of French colonial rule on the development of black politics in Senegal from Galandou Diouf to the rise to power of Léopold Sédar Senghor. The period 1936-1952 is significant on two counts: From a Senegalese angle, it is the final chapter in the history of the monopoly of political life by the Quatre Communes, for 1951 marks not only the ascendancy of L.S. Senghor but also the victory of the bush over the communes de plein exercice and of prewar 'subjects' over 'citizens.' From a French angle, it is an early chapter in the history of the decolonization of Black Africa, a process that was greatly accelerated by the Second World War.

The paucity of scholarly work on the late prewar period and on the Second World War in French West Africa partly explains the vacuum one encounters in divers political histories of the postwar era which invariably begin with 1945. Notwithstanding the fact that historians unanimously agree that the war was a turning point in the history of colonialism in Africa, little attempt has been made to address the war as the complex process of upheaval and change that it was. Even less is known about how its impact was felt by various strata of African society, for the response to the war was not monolithic.

It is inevitable that these gaps have restricted our understanding of the postwar period in French West Africa and

of the dynamics that created the conditions leading up to political independence. In Senegal, in particular, the atypical path of African nationalism from assimilation to independence makes fascinating history as it unfolds from the late 1930s onward.

It will be the task of this study to explore some of the dimensions of the impact of the Second World War and assess its long-term ramifications, using this framework as a base upon which to analyse the political history of postwar Senegal. The Popular Front era, which is the point of departure of this study, brings the war into even sharper focus.

Within the existing body of historiography, an attempt will be made to fill in the lacunae of Edward Mortimer's book, France and the Africans: A Political History, 1944-1960, (1969) which does not contextualise the complexity of the repercussions of the Second World War. In addition, this study aspires to follow up Wesley G. Johnson's pioneer work, The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900-1920, (1971).

Regrettably, one of the shortcomings herein is that socio-economic variables and the role of Islam are to a large extent dealt with peripherally and only insofar as they affected specific political events. In other words, this is not a comprehensive history of the period or of Senegal as a whole, but rather a political history of the Three Communes. Certain aspects of colonial rule and political life have been analysed

at great length at the expense of others. The criterion used was the desire to elucidate events which have either been misinterpreted or else neglected. I have tried, however, to give as detailed and complete a picture as possible of the Senegalese political arena, incorporating dominant as well as marginal forces.

I should also add that a great omission in this study is the central role of the rural elite in postwar politics in Senegal. This elite first began to emerge as a political force under the Popular Front and has only been alluded to herein, when it deserves a study in its own right. Little is known about those French-educated bureaucrats, technocrats and teachers who became the backbone of Senghor's party. Even less is known about their formative years and about the nature of their relations with the originaires in the Three Communes in the late interwar period and during the Second World War.

I will highlight the following themes: The first is the evolution of the policy of assimilation which characterised black politics in the Three Communes,¹ and the African response to it. Assimilation as a colonial doctrine had emerged with the French Revolution, when the Declaration of the Rights of Man established the equality of all citizens and, by extension, the indivisible unity between France and her overseas

¹. In 1929, the commune of Gorée became part of what was called Dakar et Dépendances. For this reason, I will be alluding to the communes de plein exercice as the Three Communes from here onwards.

territories. This did not preclude, however, the assumption that French civilisation was superior to other cultures; indeed, the goal of the "politique d'assimilation" was, in theory at least, the gradual political, socio-economic and cultural integration of the colonies into a greater France. In Africa, assimilation was implemented with the view to create black Frenchmen.²

Senegal was the only colony in Africa where France had attempted to fully implement assimilation on an administrative, political, and to a lesser extent, social plane. Thus, the communes de plein exercice had a representative in the French Parliament since 1848, when approximately 12,000 Africans were granted French citizenship. The Conseil Général (similar to its metropolitan counterpart but with more extensive financial autonomy) was established in 1879. In 1880, Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque and St. Louis were accorded the status of^a metropolitan département, that is, full-fledged communes under French law (as was the case with the old French colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe). Thereafter, Senegal's Quatre Communes became a showpiece of French assimilation in Africa and were often held up as models for other African colonies.

². For a discussion of assimilation see Michael Crowder, Senegal: A Study of French Assimilation Policy, (London: Methuen, 1962), pp.1-3; also Raymond F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Policy, 1890-1914; J.D. Hargreaves, "Assimilation in 18th Century Senegal," Journal of African History, vol. iv, no. 2, (1965), pp. 177-184; M.M. Knight, "French Colonial Policy--the Decline of Association," Journal of Modern History, vol. 5, no. 2, (June 1933), p. 208; H.M. Dubois, "Assimilation où adaptation?" Africa, vol. II, fasc. 1, (January 1929), p. 4.

Even after the policy of assimilation was abandoned for the "politique d'association", the political process continued to be dominated by the division between 'citizens' and 'subjects.' (Association was premised on the principles of reform, decentralisation and collaboration rather than integration.) Only the originaires (those born in the and descendants Quatre Communes) qualified as 'citizens' with voting rights. 'Subjects' were not accorded political rights until after the Second World War and until then, the only representative institutions in the protectorate were the mixed communes.³

Until the late 1940s, the Three Communes constituted the epicentre of political activity in the colony. As long as the schism between 'citizens' and 'subjects' defined political participation, the goal of Senegalese nationalism was assimilation. After the war, the division between 'citizens' and 'subjects' was at its lowest and the Senegalese évolués anticipated the implementation of full-scale assimilation (embodied in the postwar slogan "equal rights for equal sacrifices").

³. There were 14 mixed communes in Senegal on the eve of the Second World War, nearly all of which represented key peanut trading centers. Mixed communes had elected councils comprising Europeans, African 'citizens' and a handful of 'subjects,' elected on a restricted basis. The councils were presided by administrators acting as mayors and appointed by the local governors and had little decision-making power. Since few Africans in the protectorate enjoyed citizenship status (notables, some traders, and after 1939, war veterans), the councils represented almost exclusively the interests of French traders. See Sheldon Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (Columbia University, 1967), p. 58.

The constitution of the Fourth Republic, however, failed to meet African demands for equality with Europeans and assimilation was abandoned as a political goal on the part of Senegal's évolués. The ensuing African reaction against assimilation (best exemplified in the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais) did not assume its full significance until a decade later, and this partly explains why independence was not publicly advocated by Senegal's leaders until the late 1950s.

The second theme traced in this study is the shifting ground of metropolitan politics and the way it affected French colonial policy-making as well as the Senegalese political arena: The politics of the Popular Front, Vichy, Free France and the French postwar coalition governments were closely paralleled by political developments in Senegal. Subsequently, the role Lamine Gueye and L.S. Senghor played in the postwar deliberations on the future relationship between France and the colonies illustrates the qualitative changes in the interrelationship between metropolitan and colonial politics, and in the process by which French politics affected the fortunes of the Senegalese deputies at home.

Thirdly, the role of high-level colonial administrators (Colonial Ministers, Governor Generals and local Governors) who dominated policy-making will be examined, with particular emphasis on their relationship with African deputies. Individuals such as de Coppet, Governor General of French West Africa under the Popular Front and Wiltord, Governor of Senegal

in the postwar era, not only played a pivotal role in colonial policy-making but also in the careers of African deputies and vice versa. In fact, Galandou Diouf and L.S. Senghor were instrumental in engineering the downfall of the aforementioned French colonial administrators, following the power struggles that developed between the two parties.

The study is structured chronologically. Chapter I examines the factors which shaped the policy-making of the Popular Front and briefly overviews the reforms undertaken by the socialist government in various spheres of national life from politics to education and labour. The objective is to evaluate the Popular Front's agenda of reform against what it actually accomplished.

Chapter II assesses the impact of the Popular Front on the development of black politics in Senegal. The socialist politics of the Popular Front might have stimulated political activity across the colony, but they also constituted a severe setback for Galandou Diouf while directly benefitting his opponent, Lamine Gueye. The Dakar-Niger strike of 1938 demonstrated the authority the Senegalese deputy still exercised in France (despite his decline in influence at home) and signalled the sudden collapse of the socialist colonial administration in French West Africa.

Chapter III focuses primarily on the military dimension of the Second World War and on the way it affected colonial policy-making, including Senegal's military involvement and contribution in the war; the impact of the armistice; the

events leading up to the proconsulate of the High Commissioner Pierre Boisson, and the pursuit of the policy of neutrality. Finally, the Anglo-Free French aggression on Dakar (the only theater of war in French West Africa), and the theme of the 'loyal African' will be dealt with at some length.

Chapter IV examines Vichy policy-making (with particular emphasis on the role of Boisson and the Governor of Senegal, Georges Rey) in terms of its political, economic and ideological repercussions on the African milieu. Even though Vichy was undoubtedly a period of increased authoritarianism in French West Africa, its economic policy-making yielded some positive results, while its grassroots propaganda in the protectorate in particular, contributed to the considerable popularity the regime enjoyed amongst a sizeable segment of the African population.

Chapter V evaluates the impact of the Free French administration in Senegal, arguing that the advent of the new government did not merely signal the 'return to republicanism.' Rather, it denoted the commencement of the most trying and exacting phase of the war for Africans (economically as well as militarily). Political activity resumed but along racial lines, thus upsetting the delicate balance of assimilation politics. Even more importantly, the colonial administration's brutal suppression of the soldiers' mutiny in Thiaroye in 1944 exacerbated an already divisive climate and inflicted a severe blow on the future of Franco-Senegalese relations.

Chapter VI focuses on Senegalese aspirations after the war and French colonial policy-making, putting into sharp focus the shifting ground of metropolitan politics from the Brazzaville Conference of 1944 to the legislative elections of 1951, and the way it affected colonial legislation. The pivotal role that Gueye and Senghor played in the first and second Assemblée Nationale Constituante and in the legislation of colonial reform (such as the Lamine Gueye laws) is highlighted along with the alliances the deputies formed with metropolitan parties to maximise their authority in France and at home.

Chapter VII traces Gueye's leadership and politics from the Bloc Africain to the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière and briefly overviews the various opposition parties which mushroomed in Senegal after the dissolution of the Bloc (with particular emphasis on the Senegalese branch of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain and the Groupement d'Etudes Communistes. The Dakar-Niger railway crisis of 1947-48 is examined in some detail, particularly with respect to the role political parties played in the strike and the fateful involvement therein of Lamine Gueye and the Socialist Party.

Chapter VIII analyses the diverse factors that contributed to the decline of the SFIO in Senegal, the rupture between Gueye and Senghor and the foundation of the BDS. The rise of Senghor's party to power and the nature of the BDS constituency, organisation and ideology are examined at length. They are also reflected in the young leader's political tactics

(particularly his strategy vis-a-vis the Union Démocratique Sénégalaise and with Islamic leaders) which contributed to his spectacular victory in the 1951 legislative elections.

Finally, the ramifications of his rise to power are assessed.

Most of the material collected for the research of this study originate from the Archives de la République du Sénégal in Dakar and the Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer in Paris, France (now in Aix-en-Provence). The former is rich in reports of colonial governors (série 2G); documents of the secret police (série 21G); election material (série 20G); political and administrative reports (série 13G); political memoranda from the French West African federation (série 17G); labour reports (série K); and military documents pertaining to the Second World War (série 2D). In the French archives, I consulted mostly the section Affaires Politiques and the invaluable collection of private papers (Diouf, Moutet, Boisson, Mandel and Deschamps).

I also had the privilege of interviewing Abdoulaye Ly, Amadou Ali Dieng and Jean Suret-Canale (whose private papers on the GEC and the Union Démocratique Sénégalaise at the Institut d'Etudes du Temps Présent in Paris are indispensable), as well as a host of Senegalese World War II veterans who talked extensively about the war, their role in combat and the conditions of their return to Senegal.

Chapter I.

POPULAR FRONT IDEOLOGY, POLICY-MAKING AND REFORM: THE DE COPPET ERA (1936-1938)

Until recently, French colonial rule in West Africa under the Popular Front had been the subject of only a few fleeting references within the vast volume of monographs and articles devoted to the tripartite coalition proper.⁴ Political histories of postwar West Africa and Senegal have made passing remarks on the socio-political conditions on the eve of the war, often incorporating the Popular Front as part of a continuum of French colonial rule in the interwar period.⁵ This has conveyed the impression that the immediate prewar years were relatively uneventful and has reinforced the widely-held assumption that

4. Within the last 15 years, a series of studies have emerged on the Popular Front including Nicole Bernard-Duquenot, Le Front Populaire et le Sénégal (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985); William B. Cohen, "The Colonial Policy of the Popular Front," French Historical Studies, vol. VII, no. 3, (1972), pp. 368-393; Yves Person, "Le Front Populaire au Sénégal (Mai 1936-Octobre 1938)," Mouvement Social, (1979), pp. 77-101; Jean-Pierre Phan, "Le Front Populaire au Sénégal," Mémoire de Maitrise, University of Paris I, 1974.

5. This is prevalent in most political histories of French West Africa which begin with 1945. Even Edward Mortimer's otherwise excellent study on France and the Africans 1944-1960 (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), devotes one paragraph to the Popular Front and five on the Second World War. Africans have also been victims of this approach. For instance, as Nicole Bernard-Duquenot argues in her dissertation "Le Front Populaire et le Sénégal" (University of Paris VII, 1976), p. 240, Sembène Ousmane's classic "Bouts de bois de Dieu," on the Dakar-Niger strike of 1947-48 refers to the 1938 strike only passingly, greatly underplaying its significance.

colonial reform and trade union activity did not commence until after 1945. As a result, key political developments which were set in motion by the Popular Front only to assume their full significance after the war have been largely underestimated: for instance, between 1936 and 1938, the Senegalese section of the SFIO Federation (which became the dominant party in the political arena after 1945) emerged as the leading opposition party under the leadership of Lamine Gueye; the first African branch of the PCF was founded; and political activity spread beyond the Three Communes to the urban centers of the protectorate (Thiès, Kaolack, Ziguinchor).

The Popular Front lasted longer in Senegal than it did in France and became closely identified with the proconsulate of the socialist Governor-General de Coppet (October 1936-October 1938), who dominated policy-making and was the instigator of most reforms. De Coppet was too radical an administrator for the majority of colonialists in France and in West Africa. Thus, even though he was committed to reform (within the colonial system), the political parties comprising the government coalition were not. In fact, the conditions of the Popular Front's rise to power and the colonial doctrines of the tripartite government largely explain why the government's reforms never materialized. Throughout his term of office, the Governor-General operated in a vacuum, with little or no metropolitan support other than from the Minister of Overseas France, Marius Moutet.

De Coppet's programme, as outlined in the Conference of Governor-Generals in 1936, was a plan of socio-economic rather than political reform which if implemented, would have improved the lives of a great number of Africans. However, it met with strong resistance from the Senate, the Government-General of AOF and the local administration in Senegal. Once the Blum government fell and the Radical Socialists assumed control of the ruling coalition, de Coppet's agenda of reform dissipated in thin air.

The historian William Cohen has argued that

The accomplishments of the Popular Front in the colonial sphere were limited. The colonial peoples had neither been liberated nor had their lot improved markedly. The failure of reform by the political parties most dedicated to change overseas augured ill for the French empire... Much of the Algerian elite lost its hopes for reform within the colonial system and became sympathetic to nationalist ideology. Although the intensity of the development in Algeria was then exceptional, it portended the development of nationalism in all the overseas territories and the subsequent dissolution of the French empire.⁶

Even though it can be argued that the accomplishments of the Popular Front government were limited, its impact in Senegal was nonetheless crucial. Moreover, what transpired in Algeria (where the elite lost hope for reform) did not take place in Senegal. In fact, it might even be argued that the opposite happened in France's oldest black African colony: The political freedom and labour legislation introduced by the Popular Front directly

⁶. William B. Cohen, "The Colonial Policy of the Popular Front," French Historical Studies, vol. VIII, no. 3, 1978, p. 393 .

benefited the urban elites ('subjects' as well as 'citizens') and thus had a profound impact on the perception of their relationship with France, reinforcing their hope for reform within the existing system by way of further assimilation.

The ideological impact of the Popular Front explains in part the regime's popularity amongst Africans but also sheds some light on the aspirations of the African elite and the dynamics of Senegalese political activity after the Second World War. Contemporary witnesses vividly remember the great influx of French socialist and communist administrators and teachers eager to share their radical ideas with Africans as well as apply them in colonial policy-making and in local politics.⁷ They also remember a Governor-General who for the first time in French colonial history opened the palace gates to Africans and heard their grievances with concern. The Popular Front is still alive in the minds of many Senegalese, not as much on account of its liberal policy-making as for the political openness and hope that it created as well as for the climate of change it foreshadowed.

THE POPULAR FRONT IN POWER.

The domestic and international conditions which surrounded the accession to power of France's first socialist government determined the coalition's colonial programme to an unprecedented extent: without defeating the right wing by a substantial majority, the Rassemblement Populaire constituted a

⁷. Interviews with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984 and with Amadou Ali Dieng, Dakar, July 3, 1984.

"reflète de défense instinctive" against the economic depression, the paramilitary forces of the fascist leagues and the rising threat of German National Socialism.⁸ In addition,

La France souffrait aussi d'un vieillissement et d'une inadaptation de ses structures. Dans tous les domaines, des réformes s'imposaient pour mettre l'État et la société à l'heure de la Révolution industrielle.⁹

The differing motivations that led the SFIO (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière), the PCF (Parti Communiste Français), and the Radical Socialists to form the Popular Front were immediately reflected in the confused, ambiguous and often contradictory policies of the fragile and precarious coalition.¹⁰

A week after the electoral victory, a wave of strikes spread throughout France, enabling the Prime Minister Léon Blum to press for the Matignon agreements which increased wages by 12%, introduced the 40-hour week, paid holidays, collective agree-

⁸. It was the Radical rural votes of the impoverished south-west of France that supported the SFIO. The urban working class had opted for the PCF. Georges Dupeux argues in Le Front Populaire et les Élections de 1936, (Paris: Colin, 1959), p. 175, that "Cette modification de l'équilibre des tendances au sein du Front Populaire posait alors le problème de la solidité de celui-ci et de sa résistance à l'exercice du pouvoir." Blum's government was from the beginning a socialist exercise of power within the existing constitutional framework; see Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire Politique de la Troisième République, vol. 6, (Paris: PUF, 1965) and Joel Colton, "Politics and Economics in the 1930s: The Balance Sheets of the Blum 'New Deal'," in Charles K. Warner (ed.), From the Ancien Régime to the Popular Front, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 187.

⁹. Bonnefous, op. cit., 1965, vol. 6, p. 370.

¹⁰. Dupeux, op. cit., 1959, p. 175, and Joll, "The Front Populaire..." op. cit., (September 1965), p. 32.

ments, the nationalisation of arms factories, state control of the Bank of France and the right to form trade unions. However, in the summer of 1937, this dynamic phase of radical reform was followed by a conservative 'pause.'

While within France economic conditions deteriorated (production plummeted, unemployment rose sharply, and the franc was devalued), the disastrous policy of non-intervention in the Spanish civil war deepened the divisions within the coalition and revealed the Parliament's lack of confidence in the government.¹¹

Overwhelmed with domestic and international problems, Léon Blum appeared less concerned with what were traditionally matters of secondary importance, such as colonial affairs. In vain, liberal colonial administrators like Robert Delavignette entreated the new government not to consider the colonies "comme une difficulté secondaire" as previous administrations had done, nor to see in them "la facile occasion de réformes symboliques."

En réalité... les affaires coloniales se sont de plus en plus enchevêtrées dans les affaires métropolitaines. Telle loi 'sociale' faite pour la France d'Europe dépend aussi d'un tarif douanier qui affecte directement le travail des paysans noirs. La semaine des 40 heures et l'organisation des loisirs dans nos cités repose sur des 'pilotis coloniaux', sur des piliers asiatiques ou africains.¹²

While left-wing administrators were impatient for reform,

¹¹. Particularly on the part of the Radicals whose support of Blum's policies was highly questionable.

¹². Robert Delavignette, "Le Front Populaire devant l'Afrique Noire," Afrique Française, (May 1936), p. 254.

colonialist circles were alarmed and viewed the socialist government with suspicion and hostility. The reshuffling of the colonial office, the amnesty of nationalist leaders overseas¹³ and the suspension of repressive decrees--measures that were taken upon the government's accession to power--clearly demonstrated the new direction the Blum administration was intent on enforcing.

But the colonialists were not about to be intimidated by a handful of decrees and leftist rhetoric. Colonial rule, they professed, would continue to operate independently of the squabbling that characterized French party politics.

....le gouvernement nouveau courrait aux pires reniements s'il pensait que le bonheur des indigènes résulte d'un décret....[car]...l'oeuvre colonial n'est ni de droite, ni de gauche.¹⁴

In the overseas territories (as the colonies were now officially called), the accession to power of the Popular Front aroused optimism and euphoria among leftist administrators, teachers and évolués. There was talk of a new era where colonialism would go hand in hand with socialism and with 'freedom, equality and fraternity.'

Nevertheless, there was little justification for such expectations. Upon being elected, the Popular Front had hardly

13. Thirty-eight West African nationalist leaders were among those released. See Jean-Pierre Phan, "Le Front Populaire et le Sénégal," Mémoire de Maîtrise, University of Paris I, 1974, p.33.

14. "Demain," Afrique Française, (May 1936), p. 251.

deliberated on the colonial dimension of French policy. Its pre-election platform contained only one paragraph which vaguely promised the designation of a parliamentary commission to inquire into the political, social and economic conditions of the overseas territories.¹⁵

As the Governor Charles-André Julien noted in 1936, "aucun parti n'a établi de doctrine coloniale cohérente"¹⁶ and contrary to popular belief at home and overseas, none of the parties were committed to colonial reform.¹⁷

THE COLONIAL DOCTRINES OF THE POPULAR FRONT.

a) The Radical Socialists.

The Radical Socialist party had abandoned its attacks against imperialism around the turn of the century when it became a member of the Bloc des Gauches government. After a brief espousal of assimilationist ideals, the party became an official advocate of 'liberal association', envisaging 'administrative autonomy' for the colonies. However, commitment to reform had not excluded support for repressive policies (e.g. in the Moroccan Rif rebellion in 1925). More often, it simply meant that any measure that was not 'prudent' or that might upset the status quo was interpreted as a threat to the unity of the French Republic. In the words of a Radical Socialist,

15. Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), (March 21, 1936).

16. Charles-André Julien quoted in Georges Lefranc, Histoire du Front Populaire (1934-1938), (Paris: Payot, 1965), p. 302.

17. Cohen, "The Colonial Policy..." op. cit., 1978, p. 368.

La thèse radicale, en matière coloniale, se caractérise par la répudiation du nationalisme. Nous ne jugeons pas légitime l'égoïsme impérialiste... Non point l'évacuation... Parliementarisme indigène? Ce n'est pas l'essentiel. L'essentiel c'est la politique sociale, c'est d'arracher l'indigène à l'exploitation éhontée dont il fait l'objet, de hausser son niveau de vie.¹⁸

Reluctant to acknowledge the need for political reform, the party advocated socio-economic change. In the 1920s, Albert Sarraut, a former Colonial Minister and leading figure of the party, formulated the doctrine of mise-en-valeur, which laid the foundations for state-controlled and self-financed economic development. In many respects, it foreshadowed the postwar FIDES (Fonds international de développement économique et social). Sarraut's plan, however, was designed to intensify colonial production only for the satisfaction of metropolitan demand. The empire was essentially perceived as a reservoir of manpower, raw materials and potential wealth, while the commitment to France's "mission civilisatrice" was only incidental.¹⁹

b) The SFIO (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière).

Upon assuming power in 1936, the SFIO was bitterly divided on colonial policy. Fearful of nationalist movements, the right-wing of the party defended colonialism and espoused assimilation

18. Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Le radicalisme devant l'impérialisme," La Lumière, (October 4, 1930), p. 10.

19. Albert Sarraut, La mise-en-valeur des colonies Françaises, (Paris: Payot, 1923) and Michael Crowder, Senegal: A Study of French Assimilation Policy, (London: Methuen, 1967), pp. 31-32.

as the only socialist alternative to colonial rule. The extension of metropolitan social legislation overseas constituted the party's main goal but with an important qualification:

L'assimilation, ne consiste pas à transporter en bloc aux colonies, et dans les mêmes formes, toutes les institutions de la métropole. C'est une tendance plus qu'un système, et qui est loin d'exiger partout une uniformité d'application contraire à la nature des choses.²⁰

The extreme left-wing of the SFIO (Zyromski, Guérin, Pivert and the Bataille Socialiste group) contested the legitimacy of France's "mission civilisatrice," maintaining that Europe had colonized for the sole purpose of economic exploitation. This faction supported nationalist movements indiscriminately and denounced imperialism in all its forms.²¹

Léon Blum and the center of the SFIO maintained that 'superior races' had a right and duty to elevate backward peoples and exploit the world's 'neglected resources'.²² Oddly enough, under Communist pressure, the Prime Minister had in the late

20. Lagrosillière, quoted in Manuela Semidei, "Les socialistes français et le problème colonial entre des deux guerres 1919-1939," Revue Française de Science Politique, vol. 18, (1968), p. 1132.

21. But even this group was torn with strife, leading to the separation of the Groupe Révolutionnaire from the SFIO and the formation of the Parti Socialiste Ouvrier et Paysan in 1938 which supported the right of all peoples to self-determination.

22. In Léon Blum's words, "Nous avons trop l'amour de notre pays pour désavouer l'expansion de la pensée, de la civilisation française..." quoted in Semidei, "Les socialistes français..." op.cit., (1968), p. 1139.

1920's made allusions to

...l'indépendance entière [le plus tôt possible]. Nous n'admettons pas, qu'il existe un droit de conquête, un droit de premier occupant au profit des nations Européennes sur les peuples qui n'ont pas la chance d'être de race blanche ou de religion chrétienne. Nous n'admettons pas la colonisation par la force. Nous aurons accompli... notre mission civilisatrice le jour ou nous aurons pu rendre les peuples dont nous occupons les territoires à la liberté et à la souveraineté.²³

However, Blum's argument for independence was blatantly contradicted by his outright dismissal of what he called oversimplified and thence dangerous alternatives such as native insurrection and French evacuation.

The equivocal tone of Blum's doctrine persisted well into the first year of socialist rule. In fact, the Blum-Violette plan for Algeria was seen as assimilation leading to independence. However, when the bill neared collapse because of conservative and colonialist opposition, assimilation was abandoned for moderate socio-economic reform.²⁴

The SFIO Colonial Commission.

An ad hoc committee of socialist colonial experts was organized in 1935 to neutralize the ongoing factionalism within

23. ibid., p. 138.

24. In Moutet's words, "la colonisation pour nous, c'est le développement même des masses qui habitent les colonies, par l'élevation de leur niveau matériel, social, économique, intellectuel et culturel." Note the absence of the political from Moutet's statement; ibid., p. 1148. See also William B. Cohen, "The Colonial Policy of the Popular Front," French Historical Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, 1972, pp. 368-93.

the SFIO which prevented the adoption of a cohesive party doctrine on colonial matters. Intent on reconciling socialism and colonialism, the Colonial Commission recognized political emancipation as the objective of socialist policy but only under metropolitan instigation and guidance.

En parlant d'émancipation politique totale, [on] ne pose pas une thèse de séparatisme, car [on] ne pense que l'émancipation politique des peuples retardaires ne peut avoir de chance de succès durable que si elle est le prolongement dans les colonies d'un mouvement de libération mené à son terme dans la métropole et permettant au prolétariat vainqueur de se porter à l'aide des populations moins éduquées que lui politiquement.²⁵

The Commission's long term goal was the creation of local socialist sections throughout the colonies.²⁶ In addition, the demands of colonial peoples for equality were to be encouraged in order to win over the support of civil servants who could then act as a 'force d'encadrement' for the peasants.

A series of reports on reforms for West Africa were drawn up by prominent colonial specialists. The implementation of metropolitan legislation overseas within three months, freedom of association, the legalization of trade unions, 'equal work-equal pay,' the abolition of the indigénat and the enlargement of the electoral corps were singled out as key reforms.

²⁵. Please ignore the double negative in the quote. Landrau report entitled "Le socialisme et le fait colonial," Commission Coloniale de la SFIO 1936-37, Papiers Deschamps, Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer (ANSOM).

²⁶. Ibid.

While the Commission continued to meet throughout the Popular Front era, it failed to overcome the divisions present at all levels of the SFIO. As a result, its 'technical' and advisory role never contributed effectively to policy-making.²⁷

c) The PCF (Parti Communiste Français)

Since 1924, the French Communist party had indisputably been the most consistently anti-colonial segment of French public opinion advocating universal suffrage, free and universal education, progressive taxation and the abolition of rule by decree. Unconditional support for nationalist movements and independence persisted until the VIII Party Congress of January 1936, when suddenly the fierce rhetorical campaign against imperialism abated and the doctrine of assimilation was expediently adopted. This about face was a direct result of the rising specter of fascism in Europe which brought about a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

The 1936 congress resolution on colonialism essentially endorsed the Popular Front programme, highlighting republican liberties such as freedom of association, the press and the abolition of the indigénat. The right of colonial peoples to independence was recognized but with an important qualification: "Le droit au divorce," argued Maurice Thorez, the leader of the party, "ne signifie pas l'obligation de divorcer," thus rehashing

²⁷. Daniel Guérin, Front Populaire, révolution manquée, (Paris: Julliard, 1963), p. 179.

the official stalinist party line.²⁸

d) The Comité de Vigilance des Intellectuels Antifascistes (CVIA).

A more ambitious programme was put forth after the elections by the CVIA, a Popular Front association of Radical, Socialist and Communist intellectuals. But the CVIA manifesto reflected no less the ambiguity and inherent contradictions of the coalition's collective efforts in colonial policy-making.

The purpose of the manifesto was to stipulate the urgency of rudimentary colonial reforms in order to hasten the advent of independence. "Il ne reste qu'une attitude digne... c'est de préparer par des réformes profondes et des moyens pacifiques l'émancipation future des peuples coloniaux."²⁹ The CVIA rejected assimilation outright on the grounds that colonial peoples did not aspire to integration with France. Yet, separation from the metropole was repudiated lest other European powers take over. Similarly, the manifesto paid close attention to the question of citizenship but argued against mass naturalization and for the allocation of added power to the local assemblies to offset the omnipotence of the commandants de

28. Jacob Moneta, La politique du Parti Communiste Français dans la question coloniale 1920-1963, (Paris: Maspero, 1971). See also Raymond Betts, Tricouleur: The French Overseas Empire, (London: Cremonesi, 1978), p. 119. Thorez is quoted from Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Colonisation ou imperialism: la politique africaine de la France entre les deux guerres," Mouvement Social, no. 17, (April-June 1979), p. 63.

29. Paul Rivet et al., La France en face du problème colonial, (Paris: no publisher listed, 1936), p. 18.

cercle.

In other words, the reforms proposed by the CVIA were no different from those of the Socialist Commission, the center and right wings of the SFIO and the Radical party. The manifesto had intended to strike a blow against assimilation; yet it failed to remain consistent in its espousal of independence. Its recommendations were radical but comfortably within the republican tradition.³⁰

LEON BLUM'S COLONIAL CABINET

Largely ignorant of the dynamics of colonial politics, Léon Blum was careful to select highly competent collaborators from a broad political spectrum.³¹ However, they nurtured dissimilar notions with regard to colonial policy-making.

The Ministry of Overseas France was entrusted to Marius Moutet, a committed socialist and critic of administrative abuse in the colonies. Hubert Deschamps, a socialist colonial administrator in favour of immediate assimilation, René Barthes, a communist sympathizer, and Robert Delavignette, a liberal governor, were amongst the key figures of Moutet's cabinet.

Robert Delavignette was one of the few who believed that colonial rule did not lie exclusively within the association-

30. ibid., pp. 33-56; see also Claude Liauzu, Aux origines du tiers-mondisme: colonies et anti-colonialistes en France 1919-1939, (Paris: Harmattan, 1982).

31. Charles-Andre Julien, "Léon Blum et les pays d'outre-mer," in Léon Blum, chef de gouvernement 1936-1937, (Paris: Collin, 1967), p. 395.

assimilation framework. While fusing elements of both formulas, Delavignette warned that no single doctrine could serve as a blueprint for colonial policy. The great diversity of France's empire called for decentralization which could in turn allow for greater autonomy without necessarily weakening its ties with the metropole.³² Delavignette envisaged a French Eurafrican Federation founded on the African peasantry. Like Moutet, he opposed the emergence of black politics in Africa on the grounds that the socio-economic base of the territories was not sufficiently developed.³³

Charles-André Julien, the Secretary General of the newly-founded Haut Comité Méditerranéen de l'Afrique du Nord, was the only administrator who recognized the urgency of independence as early as 1936:

La seule justification morale de la colonisation serait de préparer sincèrement l'indépendance des peuples indigènes... Comment pourra-t-on le faire si l'on continue à réserver à une minorité, souvent infime, de Français la majorité des sièges dans les assemblées élues dans les colonies... ne peut-on envisager une forme internationale de mandat qui préparait efficacement les colonies à l'indépendance et marquerait un progrès considérable sur l'impérialisme national? ³⁴

32. Robert Delavignette, Freedom and Authority in French West Africa, (London: Oxford University Press, 1950).

33. Delavignette, "Le Front Populaire devant l'Afrique noire," Afrique Française, (May 1936).

34. Charles-André Julien quoted in Georges Lefranc, Histoire de la Troisième République, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 302.

This was the first time in French history that a Colonial Ministry comprised socialist and communist governors. It was even more unusual that the cabinet became a forum for radical ideologies ranging from Delavignette's French Eurafrican Federation to Julien's call for international mandates leading to independence.

MARIUS MOUTET, MINISTER OF OVERSEAS FRANCE.

Moutet had studied law in Lyon and taken courses on the French empire while also campaigning on behalf of the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme.³⁵ As the first socialist to hold the post of Colonial Minister, he received the undivided attention of the metropolitan left-wing press. Eulogies and noble promises were made in his name:

Jaunes et noirs de nos colonies, jusque-là livrés aux grands concessionnaires, accablés de travail, affamés, tenus dans l'ignorance, ou bien admis aux plus hauts grades universitaires et écartés des fonctions publiques correspondantes, privés du droit de vote, d'association et même de libre lecture, mitraillés, emprisonnés, torturés pour avoir réclamé une vie meilleure, allaient redevenir, aux yeux du gouverneur, des hommes.³⁶

Despite the radical rhetoric, however, Moutet went out of his way to dispell the fears of the 'colonial party' by repeatedly denoting the continuity of his policies with ^{those of} his predecessors.

³⁵. Biography of Marius Moutet in Annales Coloniales, (September 23, 1936).

³⁶. Moutet interview in La Lumière, (August 15, 1936), Papiers Moutet, File 1, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

D'aucuns se figurent qu'il y a nécessairement chez les hommes de gauche une idéologie anticoloniale. Mais le plus grand nombre se sont bien rendu compte de l'oeuvre bien immense à accomplir en prenant au sérieux la mission civilisatrice que peut poursuivre une nation n'oubliant ni ses traditions ni ses principes.³⁷

Colonialist circles welcomed his appointment and acknowledged, somewhat sarcastically, his about face from "critique irresponsable" to "chef responsable de la conservation [de l'Empire]."³⁸ Others, like Daniel Guérin, a radical left-wing colonial specialist, bitterly protested that Moutet had come to identify with the colonial administration to such an extent, that he became suspicious of all criticism.

Moutet believed that a colonial system could be viable only if animated from within. He strongly urged that French colonial economic policy shift its focus from the prevention of famines to raising the native standard of living by concentrating production on subsistence rather than cash crops and by decreasing taxation to ease the cash burden on the peasantry. The colonies should not have to rely on their meagre resources for economic development, argued the Colonial Minister. It was the duty of France to partake in the mise-en-valeur of the empire without resorting to forced labour or increased taxation.

³⁷. Marius Moutet quoted in Charles-Robert Ageron, France Coloniale ou Parti Colonial?, (Paris: PUF, 1978), p. 260.

³⁸. Afrique Française, (October 1936), p. 505. The same paper quoted Moutet saying: "Si je pouvais faire comprendre en France que par ses colonies notre nation est un grand pays et que, pour ces raisons, elle doit donner ses préoccupations constantes au développement colonial."

Moutet proposed the creation of a Colonial Fund to promote basic technology for small scale projects that would benefit the rural masses as opposed to a handful of extravagant large-scale projects:

Nous ne ferons en apparence que de petites choses dans de petits villages ignorés... au lieu de déposer sur le sol de l'Afrique... des grands travaux qui ne sont que des 'grands outils morts', nous devons nous attacher davantage à la vie même du village.³⁹

The acquisition of French citizenship would be facilitated, but political reform would remain secondary to social change

...j'estime aussi que nous ne devons rien faire politiquement, tant que nous n'aurons pas donné à ces masses, par une instruction et par un code de travail, une organisation sociale.⁴⁰

Moutet also envisaged a new form of collaboration between the colonial administration and the évolués by providing training for the former in ethnography, native languages and traditions and by creating African municipalities based on the Conseil des Notables for the latter.

The Colonial Minister's programme of socio-economic reform raised delicate and complex problems. Moutet had to at once

³⁹. Unsigned report, Fonds Moutet, File 1, Dossier 1, ANSOM. Agricultural machinery would be bought by the Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance and be gradually reimbursed by peasant profits. [The SIP were created in Senegal in 1910 (Kaolack, Tivouane, Baol) and 1911 (Louga, Thiès). See Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 218.

⁴⁰. Unsigned report, Papiers Moutet, File 1, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

appease the 'colonial party'; promote radical rhetoric to reconcile socialism with colonialism; satisfy the aspirations of colonial peoples; fight against an apathetic, if not hostile, Parliament and public opinion; and contend with a dynamic but non-cohesive colonial cabinet.

MARCEL DE COPPET, GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF AOF

The authoritarian Governor-General of AOF Jules Brevié was transferred to Indochina in August 1936 and the socialist Marcel de Coppet assumed his post. This was part of an extensive purge of the colonial service decided upon by the Socialist Party congress of 1936 when 18 out of 30 administrators were promptly replaced.⁴¹ However, the lower echelons of the colonial corps, both in France and overseas, remained intact and thus authoritarian and resistant to change.

De Coppet had studied law and oriental linguistics in Paris. His service in Madagascar, Senegal, Guinea, Dahomey, Oubangui-Chari, Djibouti, and Mauritania,⁴² earned him the reputation of being a "négrophile."⁴³ Even before assuming his post, de Coppet had made more enemies than friends. The colonialist press regretted Brevié's departure but avoided attaching importance to

41. AOF, (November 21, 1936).

42. Ibid.

43. In 1931 he had saved Chad from famine: a cricket invasion had ruined the harvest in Chad, Niger and Nigeria and de Coppet spent half of the reserve funds to procure millet. He was subsequently blamed for spending six and a half million francs "on feeding blacks..." Le Sénégal, (August 27, 1936).

the new Governor-General's socialist leanings. Afrique Française, a colonial daily, referred to him as "un peu plus vagabond" than his predecessor but noted with relief that de Coppet did not intend to break with traditional colonial policy.⁴⁴ Unable to prevent his appointment, colonialist circles were eager to find an opportunity to replace him.

De Coppet launched a programme of socio-economic reform for AOF which was similar to Moutet's. The Governor-General wanted to 'rationalise' agriculture and combat backward practises and prejudices. He also wanted to improve educational opportunities for Africans, including the construction of new schools and the africanization of the teaching staff.⁴⁵ Regarding citizenship, de Coppet was convinced that even if native access to naturalization was substantially facilitated, only a minority of 'subjects' would take advantage of it. Africans, (évolués apart), he believed, were indifferent to electoral politics and nurtured different aspirations. The task of the administration was to sense those needs before they were translated into grievances. One such pressing issue was the widespread practice of the indigénat which he wanted to restrict to "extraordinary circumstances."⁴⁶

44. Afrique Française, (August-September 1936).

45. Henri Labouret, "Les projets du Gouverneur-General de Coppet," Afrique Française, (December 1936) and "Development throughout West Africa," West Africa, vol. 21, (January 8, 1938).

46. Henri Labouret, "Les projets du Gouverneur Général de Coppet," op. cit., (December 1936).

THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNORS-GENERAL, 1936.

Both Moutet and de Coppet had outlined a programme of reforms based on Léon Blum's motto: "extraire du fait colonial, le maximum de justice sociale et de possibilités humaines."⁴⁷

The absence of political reform became apparent in the Conference of Governors-General convened in November 1936 to discuss the main points of the Popular Front's colonial agenda. The plan that was drawn up concentrated almost exclusively on administrative and economic policies,⁴⁸ while its recommendations were vague and general enough to be accepted by all parties as guidelines of 'altruistic colonization.'

In the opening speech of the conference, Moutet argued that the Popular Front's creed was founded on the necessity of alleviating the colonial fiscal regime and introducing progressive taxation, thereby increasing the purchasing power of the colonial peoples.⁴⁹ The French personnel imposed a heavy load on the colonial budget and Moutet proposed the africanization of the civil service. He also maintained that if Africans and Europeans had the same title and post, their salaries should be identical, except for the special indemnities the French would continue to receive as compensation for leaving the metropole. Europeans

47. Léon Blum in Hubert Deschamps, Roi de la brousse, (Paris: Berger-Lévrault, 1975), p. 178.

48. Affaires Politiques, File 179, Dossier 1, ANSOM deals extensively with the Conference of Governors-General.

49. See Moutet's speech of November 5, 1936, Papiers Moutet, File 1, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

would also provide the 'cadres' for rural and public projects.

Closer communication between the metropolitan and overseas colonial personnel and a more rigorous process of selection of administrators for the higher echelons of the colonial corps were urged and the need for further administrative decentralization and financial autonomy for the colonies was also acknowledged.⁵⁰ The creation of a Colonial Fund to complete ongoing projects and modernise colonial agriculture was paramount in the conference and an ad hoc commission was instituted to draft a parliamentary bill. Finally, a capital investment programme allocating 200-300 million francs to the colonies (French West Africa's share would be 29.7%) was approved.⁵¹

Detailed reports of the conference recommendations were drawn up in each territory. The Governor of Senegal alluded to the intensification of cultivation of local crops such as sisal, rubber and cotton that could reduce imports. Peasants, he argued, should be given incentives to devote more land for the cultivation of food crops by raising the prices of their produce and leading them without force to the granaries of the Sociétés Indigène de Prévoyance for the provision of foodstuffs. The Governor also made references to the need for a more careful selection of imported manufactured goods to correspond with

50. "Voeux adoptés par la Conférence des Gouverneurs Généraux," Affaires Politiques, File 179, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

51. Priority would be given to national defense projects employing wage rather than forced labour. Health projects and the SIP would receive the remaining capital.

Senegal's needs.

However, the focus of the Conference recommendations was on groundnut production. By 1936, France absorbed most of Senegal's groundnuts (500.000 tons of shelled and 300.000 tons of unshelled nuts annually) thanks to the protectionist decrees of August 1933 and January 1934. Further protectionist measures, the Governor of Senegal argued, could result in a Senegalese monopoly of shelled nuts and a substantial increase in the export of unshelled peanuts.⁵²

The recommendations of the conference of Governors-General were strongly resisted in Senegal. The administrator of Dakar, Ponzio, argued that they were contradictory--recommending a decrease of direct taxes which could only materialize if indirect taxation rose.⁵³ He further objected to the africanisation of the civil service (particularly to the proposed parity between European and African salaries) on the grounds that there were few Africans in Dakar that could replace the Europeans.⁵⁴

The indigénat was not discussed at the conference and nothing concrete was resolved regarding the reorganisation of the Ministry of Colonies. The Colonial Fund bill was adopted in July 1937 by the Chamber of Deputies but was soon afterwards rejected

52. "Conférence des Gouverneurs Généraux; rapport du Gouverneur du Sénégal," 17G 322 126, Archives de la République du Sénégal, Dakar, (ARSD).

53. Ibid., "Rapport de la circonscription de Dakar et Dépendances," (September 1936).

54. Ibid.

by the Senate. In fact, most of the recommendations of the Conference failed to materialize because funds were not made available.

THE INQUIRY COMMISSION

In an exercise of good will, the French Parliament agreed to set up a commission in 1937, to inquire into "les besoins et les aspirations légitimes des populations habitant les colonies..."⁵⁵ The Inquiry Commission was composed of 42 members encompassing the entire political spectrum⁵⁶ and was headed by the socialist former deputy and minister Guernut.

A subcommittee was appointed to investigate black African affairs comprising three distinguished colonial administrators (Delavignette, Deschamps and Labouret), four public figures (among them the ethnologist Lévy-Bruhl and the writer André Gide) and five members of Parliament. Labouret was in charge of demographic questions; Delavignette dealt with agriculture; Gide and Lévy-Bruhl with the aspirations of the colonial peoples.

The Commission's task was to prepare "un programme d'action conforme à la fois aux vœux légitimes des masses indigènes, aux intentions généreuses du gouvernement et aux possibilités de la

55. Law authorising the constitution of an Inquiry Commission, 17G 252 108, ARSD, and Journal Officiel de la République Française, (February 6, 1937).

56. Among them were Lozeray of the PCF, Taitinger of the Fédération Républicaine de France, Paul Reynaud of the Alliance des Républicains de Gauche et des Radicaux Indépendants, Gide, Charles-André Julien, Paul Rivet of the CVIA, 17G 252 108, ARSD.

Métropole."⁵⁷ Moutet emphasized that the Commission would be an independent body with considerable authority rather than an academic establishment, and its recommendations would be promptly implemented. Research was conducted into a host of issues such as demography and statistics, the standard of living, mode and evolution of colonial production; labour conditions, education, and the problem of the formation of native elites; medicine and hygiene; and finally, the creation of a Comité d'Études des Coutumes Indigènes.⁵⁸

"Association" and "autonomous government" were frequently raised as desirable goals of colonial policy but it was underscored that it was up to the Commission to "ne pas faire naître certaines espérances trop vastes qui risqueraient d'amener de trop pénibles désillusions."⁵⁹

A research team headed by the socialist Georges Nouelle organized a two month trip (January-February 1937) to AOF. Its reports on native labour, education, justice and administration were surprisingly moderate in tone and supportive of the status quo. For example, while female and child labour abuse were condemned, there was no call for the abolition of forced labour per se:

57. Ibid., "Rapport de la commission d'enquête des territoires d'Outre-Mer," (July 8, 1937).

58. Report on the Inquiry Commission, Fonds Moutet, File 4, Dossier 128, ANSOM; see also Commission Guernut, File 48, Dossier B5, ANSOM, for the questionnaires of the Commission.

59. See Moutet's speech at the opening session of the Inquiry Commission, July 8, 1937; ibid.

Dans l'état actuel de la colonisation, l'emploi de la main d'oeuvre indigène est nécessaire. La suppression de ses usages ne sera possible qu'à la longue, lorsque se poursuivra l'évolution vers la civilisation de tous les indigènes de l'Afrique.⁶⁰

In the sphere of education, the report condoned assimilation and criticized the Gorée school of African teachers for not having high enough standards because its graduates were "not French enough."

Subsequently, instead of sending an investigation team in Africa to acquire first-hand information on socio-environmental conditions, the Inquiry Commission distributed questionnaires to colonial administrators. The questionnaires focused on food, housing, industry and living conditions of the Europeans, the métis, and the assimilés. Most administrators completed them within 20 days.

The survey on industry dealt with the different types and sizes of enterprises, the ethnic composition of the workers and their salaries. The questionnaire on the Europeans, metis and assimilés, classified individuals according to their professions and country of origin.⁶¹ While the material was valuable and insightful, it was never followed up by any reports.

After the fall of the Blum government in July 1937, the Commission lost its initial impetus and its members became

⁶⁰. Lozeray Report, "Voyage d'enquête en AOF," Affaires Politiques, File 513, ANSOM.

⁶¹. 17G 252 108, ARSD.

disillusioned with the feasibility of the proposed reforms. In 1938, the Chamber of Deputies suspended the meagre 3 million francs which sustained the organization, and most of the reports were left unfinished. Among the few that were published was Lévy Bruhl's study of witchcraft and cannibalism.

POLITICAL REFORMS.

The most ambitious political programme undertaken by Maurice Violette and Léon Blum sought to extend French citizenship to a maximum of 25,000 Algerians without jeopardizing their 'statut personnel.' Even though Blum could have presented the endorsement of the decree as a fait accompli in order to bypass colonialist opposition, he hesitated. Wishing to remain within constitutional limits, he merely presented the bill in Parliament long after opposition from Algerian colonials had effectively organized its defeat. The collapse of the Blum-Violette motion was significant in that it demonstrated the Radicals' lack of commitment to the coalition's policy-making. It further made it clear that settler and colonialist high handedness could outweigh governmental authority.⁶²

Citizenship was equally contentious an issue amongst the urban 'subjects' of French West Africa and particularly Senegal. The decree of July 23, 1937 postulated that citizenship would be

62. Charles-André Julien, "Léon Blum et les pays d'outre-mer," in Léon Blum, Chef de gouvernement, (Paris: Colin, 1967), pp. 379-82. Also William B. Cohen, "The Colonial Policy of the Popular Front," French Historical Studies, vol. 7, no.3, (1972), pp.383-85 and Rudolf von Albertini, Decolonization, (New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 326-35.

granted on the basis of merit to those who had served France in the spheres of commerce, agriculture and industry provided they were celibate or monogamous; residents of AOF for at least two consecutive years; integrated into French lifestyle and manners and free of any act of hostility toward the metropole. Finally, a clear criminal and military service record were also required.⁶³

In France, opinions regarding the reform of the citizenship laws differed widely. The Socialist Colonial Commission argued that "...la liberté politique d'un individu ne réside nullement dans le fait qu'il est citoyen ou protégé français."⁶⁴ Thus, it was argued, the extension of citizenship to the Four Communes in Senegal during the Great War had constituted a grave political error committed under the pressure of recrutement. Similarly, Galandou Diouf's efforts to include as 'citizens' certain categories of 'subjects' (for example those bearing the Croix de Guerre) were categorically rejected.

Several metropolitan newspapers hailed the decree as an antidote to the rising nationalism in Indochina. Granting citizenship to West African elites could avert future political disasters because it was argued that "sans passé historique, ni

⁶³. Circulaire sur les conditions d'application du décret du 23/7/37 relatif à l'accession des indigènes de l'AOF à la qualité de citoyen français, (Gorée: Imprimerie du Gouvernement-Général, 1937), p. 7, ARSD.

⁶⁴. Bouscayrol report, Commission Coloniale SFIO 1936-37, Papiers Deschamps, ANSOM.

culturel, le noir intelligent n'a qu'à brûler les étapes."⁶⁵

In Senegal, the decree was received enthusiastically and Lamine Gueye praised it as a "significant social reform."⁶⁶ In the past, he argued, granting French citizenship was an administrative act or favour. If the request was refused, no explanations were given and the decision was irrevocable. Under the new decree, applications would be addressed to the chef de circonscription who would then transmit them to the magistrate's court, the Attorney General and finally the Governor-General. If within two months there was no opposition to the request, citizenship would be granted. If the request was problematic, it would be referred to the tribunal. The entire procedure would be free of charge.⁶⁷

Despite the African support for the new decree, detailed citizenship figures were not recorded after 1936, making it difficult to evaluate the impact of the reform.⁶⁸ However, judging by the fact that the number of voters who participated in the local elections during those years remained unchanged, the restrictive conditions of the decree (such as integration to

65. "Le Petit Parisien," (August 4, 1937), in Fonds Moutet, File 1, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

66. Périscope Africain, (August 7, 1937).

67. Ibid.

68. In 1935 there were 21 requests for citizenship out of which 6 were positive and 15 were negative. In 1936 there were 22 requests, 1 positive, 2 negative and 19 pending. Rapports politiques annuels AOF, 1935-38, in Affaires Politiques, File 539, Dossier 5.

French culture and manners, and service to France which were highly equivocal clauses), did not allow a sizable number of Africans to acquire French citizenship.

THE ECONOMY.

The Popular Front in Senegal coincided with the economic recovery from the 1930 crisis and a boom in groundnut production which paved the way toward the new government's popularity. The Governor of Senegal designated 1936 as the 'year of the groundnut': peasants increased the land under groundnut cultivation and 5.000 more seasonal workers (navétanes) were brought in to cope with increased production.⁶⁹ Groundnut exports rose from 389,000 tons in 1935, to 487.000 in 1936, to a record of 587.000 in 1937.⁷⁰ Their price in the French market rose from 100 francs per kilogramme in 1935, to 144 francs in 1936, thereby substantially increasing the purchasing power of the Africans. In 1936, a euphoric Lieutenant-Governor maintained that

La sécurité de l'avenir économique du pays doit être avant tout recherchée dans l'augmentation de la production de la graine qui a constituée, jusqu'ici, la source première de sa prospérité.⁷¹

However, as malnutrition and high mortality rates continued into the first half of 1937, it became apparent that figures

⁶⁹. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1936, 22G 36 5 and Rapport Économique Annuel, Senegal 1937, 2G 37 15, ARSD.

⁷⁰. Ibid.

⁷¹. Speech by Martinet in the Colonial Council, July 1936, Journal Officiel du Sénégal, (July 3, 1936).

indicating recovery were misleading and that groundnuts were not synonymous with prosperity.

Le mouvement des exportations et importations peut avoir une allure brillante, les recettes douanières s'accroissent, les impôts rentrent facilement, les budgets se clôtent en équilibre ou même en excédent, la dure réalité demeure pendant plusieurs mois de l'année que l'indigène ne mange pas à sa faim.⁷²

Necessity usually led Africans to borrow money from traders under unfavorable terms, such as exorbitant interest rates. To combat this practice, the administration agreed in 1934 to render obligatory the constitution of granary reserves to guarantee peasants a food supply through the Sociétés de Prévoyance. Fears of famine increased along with the unchecked cultivation of groundnuts:

Le Sénégal, que son mouvement commercial pouvait faire considérer comme un pays riche, et qui se donne en effet, pendant quelques mois de l'année l'illusion de la richesse, est en réalité un pays que hante continuellement le spectre de la faim.⁷³

In 1937, under instructions from Marcel de Coppet, inspector Ruffel presented a report on the dangers of Senegal's exclusive reliance on groundnuts. Ruffel delineated how peasants gradually abandoned the cultivation of subsistence crops and were forced to pay dearly for imported foodstuffs. During the period 1934-36,

72. Rapport Ruffel, "Le Sénégal, pays de monoculture," (January 1, 1937), Affaires Politiques, File 630, Dossier 3, ANSOM.

73. Ibid.

rice imports increased by 141%, further entrenching Senegal's dependence on France. And yet, Ruffel claimed, French economic planners continued to promote the 'guerre de l'arachide.'⁷⁴

Ruffel proposed the intensification of the cultivation of subsistence crops such as millet, rice, manioc and corn. A system of 'rational agriculture' would prevent Africans from exhausting the soil through the regular rotation of crops, a careful selection of seeds, manuring of fields, and an equitable cultivation of cash and subsistence crops.⁷⁵ De Coppet dealt lengthily with this report and agreed that

...l'augmentation de la production vivrière au Sénégal, conjuguée avec le maintien à un niveau raisonnable des cultures d'exportation, reste le principal objectif d'une administration soucieuse avant tout du bien être de l'indigène.⁷⁶

The year 1937 was extolled as another 'year of the groundnut' but the administration went through great pains to convince the peasants to cultivate millet. In the beginning of June, "souna" millet was planted but, due to inadequate rainfall, the crop was destroyed. However, unlike other years, peasants did not instantly switch to groundnuts, but replanted more millet as well as other food crops. The yields were impressive: 434.000

74. "L'extension des plantations d'arachides peut se faire sans mise au développement des ensemences des céréales et autres plantes alimentaires," Circular of May 19, 1936, quoted in ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. De Coppet letter to Ruffel dated April 21, 1937, Affaires Politiques, File 630, Dossier 3, ANSOM.

tons of millet (compared to 300.000 tons in 1936), 57.150 tons of rice, 139.000 tons of manioc, 38.000 tons of niébés, and 18.000 tons of corn.⁷⁷

Despite the seeming economic recovery and phenomenal boom of the peanut economy during 1936-37, the devaluation of the French franc by 33% and the ensuing rise in the cost of living created dissatisfaction amongst the Senegalese peasantry. The price of rice shot up from 5.51 francs per 100 kgs. in 1935, to 70 francs in 1936 and 135 in 1937; loincloths cost 3.10 in 1935, 3.75 in 1936 and 6.10 francs in 1937.⁷⁸

Furthermore, the sudden fall of metropolitan prices in February 1937 temporarily worsened the condition of the peasants. Some resorted to keeping important grain stocks to themselves so that the SIP barely managed to distribute enough rice and millet in the interior to avert a famine.⁷⁹

The recession of 1937-38 made it impossible for de Coppet to reverse the trend of Senegal's monoculture economy via crop diversification and 'rationalisation' of agriculture. In France, the Bordeaux import-export companies which attributed Senegal's ailing economy to the Popular Front's radical reforms (particularly the legalization of trade unions) were quick to neutralize de Coppet's economic reform efforts.

77. Rapport sur la situation économique du Sénégal en 1937, Commission Guernut, File 56, Dossier B26, ANSOM.

78. Phan, op. cit., 1974, p. 52.

79. Rapport sur la situation économique du Sénégal en 1937, Commission Guernut, File 56, Dossier B26, ANSOM.

LABOUR REFORMS.

The 1884 metropolitan laws that legalised trade unions were not implemented overseas until 1920, and even then, they only applied to Europeans and to African 'citizens'. 'Subjects' were entitled to participate in 'sociétés d'entraide' or 'sociétés amicales.'⁸⁰ In Senegal, the first professional associations appeared in the 1920s⁸¹ pioneered by the railway workers, the seamen and the civil servants. Union activity focused primarily on wage increases and the main weapon used was the strike. The longest and most serious strike was fostered by the seamen's union in 1928.

Moutet called for for the extension of all metropolitan social legislation overseas

Le Gouvernement entend et j'y tiendrai la main, que les territoires d'outre-mer participent dans toute la mesure du possible, au bénéfice de la même évolution sociale que le territoire métropolitain.⁸²

On March 11, 1937, a decree extended the right to organize unions to Africans who spoke, read and wrote French fluently and held

⁸⁰. Iba der Thiam, "Recherche sur les premières manifestations de la conscience syndicale au Sénégal (1936-37)," Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, University de Dakar, PUF, no. 5, (1975), p. 241.

⁸¹. Nicole Bernard-Duquenet has traced them back to the 1900s, in "Le Front Populaire et le Sénégal," Thèse de troisième cycle, University of Paris VII, (1976), pp. 35-36.

⁸². Letter of Moutet to de Coppet dated June 29, 1936. Proceedings of the Meeting of July 9, 1936 on the Application of Social Legislation Laws, K 171 (26), ARSD.

the Certificat d'Études Primaires or an equivalent degree. In Senegal--which had a high literacy rate compared to the rest of AOF--only 150 out of 1.700.000 inhabitants obtained the CEP each year. When in 1937 a trade union was being formed in St. Louis, only 3 out of 400 workers held the precious diploma.⁸³ The vast majority of the workers did not qualify for union membership.

Those restrictions were repeatedly criticized in the Senegalese press which had anticipated more relaxed conditions for union membership and was infuriated with the routine argument whereby Africans were not "suffisamment préparés à en recueillir les bénéfices [de la législation sociale]."⁸⁴

De Coppet argued that the conditions were imposed to protect the peasantry against political opportunism.⁸⁵ In reality, there was pressure from France but also from within the Government-General of AOF: For instance, the Secretary-General of AOF, Vadier, found African union activity superfluous on the grounds that "le syndicat pour l'indigène c'est l'administration,"⁸⁶ and encouraged instead African participation to the Conseil des Notables. Professional associations were founded for 'subjects' who had been excluded from union membership (decree of March 3,

83. Commission Guernut, File 107, Dossier 19, ANSOM.

84. Périscopie Africain, (January 23, 1937).

85. "Législation sur les syndicaux en AOF, 1937" 17G 369 126, ARSD.

86. Proceedings of the meetings of July 9, 1936, on the application of social legislation laws," K 171 (26), ANS.

1937) but they also had CEP restrictions.⁸⁷

Despite the obstacles, 7.796 civil-servants, employees and wage-earners raced to the professional associations and trade unions. From May 1936 (prior to the official legalisation of unions overseas) to January 1937, 119 associations were created including 42 trade unions, 16 professional associations, 31 athletic, artistic and literary organizations as well as 19 mutual aid societies.⁸⁸ The Seamen's and Railway trade unions together with EMCIBA (Syndicat des Employés du Commerce, des Industries, des Banques et Assurances) and the General Federation of Civil Servants received the most support.⁸⁹

Following the enforcement of the June 1936 metropolitan laws on the 40-hour week, paid holidays, conciliation and arbitration procedures and collective agreements, an ad hoc committee was formed to study their extension overseas. The committee ruled that since the 40-hour week did not apply to French agriculture, it should only be implemented in Africa "when judged imperative."⁹⁰ Alluding to financial problems, the colonial administration did not enforce the proposed legislation except in the case of a handful of industries in Dakar which substituted

87. De Coppet report to the Governor of Dakar dated October 14, 1937, 21G 53 17, ARSD.

88. Afrique Française, January 1939, and Duquenot, for membership figures, op. cit., 1977, p. 147.

89. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar et Dépendances 1938, 2G 38 25, ARSD.

90. "Proceedings of the meeting of July 9, 1936 on the application of social legislation laws," K 171 20, ARSD.

the traditional two shifts of 12 hours with three shifts of 8 hours, improved food rations and increased minimum pay.⁹¹

Paid holidays only applied to European workers. Legislation on labour accidents was enforced in April 1937 and by the end of the year, 35 accidents were reported to the Labour Inspector and 5 were taken to the Tribunal for investigation and allocation of indemnities.⁹² The protection of female and child labour, the distribution of 4.000 labour booklets, and the increase in minimum wage from 4 to 7 francs per day were all set in motion in 1937.⁹³ However, wage increases did not correspond to inflation rates and the 'salaires de famine' prevailed.⁹⁴

Collective agreements became accessible to Europeans and assimilés with the decree of March 20, 1937. The first were negotiated by the European employees of commerce and Industry of AOF, the metal workers, and the builders. Serious problems surfaced when management refused to negotiate and respect the agreements (the creation of collective agreements depended on the consent of both parties). It took EMCIBA employees 6 months to negotiate an agreement.

⁹¹. West Africa, vol. xxii, no. 1096, (February 5, 1938), p. 117.

⁹². Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar et Dépendances 1937, 2G 37 1, ARSD.

⁹³. The decree of September 16, 1937 ensured the protection of female and child labour while the decree of June 1, 1937 raised minimum wage.

⁹⁴. Duquenet, op. cit., 1976, p. 158.

Some 41 strikes broke out in 1937 alone to protest against the spiralling cost of living and the delay in the formation of collective agreements as well as to demand salary increases.⁹⁵ Most strikes lasted one or two days and were peacefully resolved to the satisfaction of the workers, following the conciliation and arbitration procedures enforced by the administration.⁹⁶

All attempts to unite the trade union movement under the banner of the CGT (Confédération Général du Travail) failed in 1937 and it was only the following year that African unions in Dakar merged into a federation.⁹⁷ Throughout the Popular Front era, European unions remained distinct from their African counterparts except for the seamen's union and Air-France. This division was periodically exploited by political parties to intimidate the administration. The strike of Thiès in 1938 which will be discussed in chapter II, illustrates the impact of the

⁹⁵. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar et Dépendances 1937, 2G 37 1, ARSD; Gana Fall, "Le nationalisme sénégalais 1919-1939," Maîtrise, University of Dakar, (1979-1980); chapter on trade union activity under the Popular Front. See also Duquenet, op. cit., 1976, half of which deals with the development of trade unions in Senegal and Iba der Thiam's "Recherche sur les premières manifestations de la conscience syndicale au Sénégal," Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, University of Dakar, no. 5, (1975), pp. 237-48.

⁹⁶. Rapport Annuel Dakar et Dépendances 1937, Inspection du Travail, 2G 37 142, ARSD.

⁹⁷. Jean Suret-Canale, "Strike Movements as Part of the Anti-Colonial Struggle in French West Africa," Tarikh, vol. 5, no. 3: Protest Against Colonial Rule in West Africa, p. 51.



trade union movement on the politics of the Popular Front.⁹⁸

THE POPULAR FRONT AND ISLAM.

The new government claimed to attribute "une importance accrue"⁹⁹ to Islamic affairs and aimed at winning over the marabouts who were key power figures in Senegalese society. De Coppet made several symbolic gestures intended to underscore his respect for the Islamic leaders, such as participating in the ceremony of the Tabaski in Dakar--thereby renewing a tradition that had begun and ended with Faidherbe 70 years before.¹⁰⁰ He was also present when the first stone of the Great Mosque of Dakar was laid in March 1937.

Special facilities were granted to talibés who wanted to visit Mecca and their numbers rose from 27 in 1935, to 46 in 1936, to 62 in 1937.¹⁰¹ The Governor-General was also involved in the creation of a national medersa in 1937. The main reason behind administrative support for the medersa was that a group in the Chamber of Deputies led by Galandou Diouf was already pressing for the construction of a Great Mosque for Dakar with a

⁹⁸. For a full treatment of the trade union movement during this period see Iba Der Thiam, Duquenot, Canale, Fall, as listed in reference 87.

⁹⁹. Rapport Politique Annuel, AOF 1936, Affaires Politiques, File 539, Dossier 5, ANSOM.

¹⁰⁰. Périscopie Africain, March 6, 1937.

¹⁰¹. Rapport Politique, AOF, 1936, Affaires Politiques, File 539, Dossier 5, ANSOM.

caravanserai and a medersa. In this context,

M. de Coppet fait ressortir qu'il serait dangereux que l'administration ne puisse exercer un contrôle en cette matière et qu'il lui paraît du devoir de l'administration... de prendre sous son patronage et son contrôle cette entreprise.¹⁰²

The medersa would be an educational establishment for Islamic sciences, jointly administered by a Moslem and a European official and specialist of Islamic affairs.¹⁰³

The most important undertaking of the Popular Front on the Islamic policy front was a 1936 report on Koranic schools in Senegalese villages that strongly denounced the maraboutic exploitation of children. Pupils were abused like slaves, argued the report, and they often did not learn anything because they spent most of the time cultivating their masters' fields. "Les écoles [coraniques] ne comportent pas la moindre organisation, surveillance ou inspection. On peut dire que l'administration les ignore."¹⁰⁴

De Coppet urged the creation of more Koranic schools under minimal administrative intervention and 'discreet surveillance.' He further recommended that Koranic school teachers be graduates of a Moslem college of influential marabouts, knowledgeable in French, regional administration, hygiene and

102. "Note sur la création d'une medersa," ibid.

103. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated August 28, 1937, ibid.

104. Kleinschmidt report on the Koranic schools in Senegal, dated 1937, Affaires Politiques, File 2807, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

manual labour. According to de Coppet, this would eventually permit Koranic education to acquire a more professional character. While there would be no interference with the curriculum and with teachers' pay, control of the schools was judged imperative to ensure that pupils enrolled in French schools right after completing their religious studies.¹⁰⁵

Official reports convey the impression that the rapprochement with Islam advocated by the new government was above all a defensive maneuver. Local administrators wrongly accorded too much significance to external 'subversive' movements (i.e. Italian propaganda against French Islamic policy) and panislamic tendencies. The Mourides were closely watched as a potentially dangerous group with aspirations of political autonomy. All in all, the Popular Front's Islamic policy-making was formulated to discreetly but effectively appease and control, wherever possible, Senegal's religious leaders.¹⁰⁶

THE INDIGENAT AND PRESTATIONS.

The indigénat applies to the set of provisions which allowed French administrators to punish African subjects without reference to a court of law. Popular Front organizations had long criticized it but several high level administrators like Governor Antonetti fiercely defended the institution. It was

¹⁰⁵. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated October 12, 1939, ibid.

¹⁰⁶. "Rapport sur l'Islam en AOF 1937," Affaires Politiques, File 2807, ANSOM.

argued that the indigénat represented,

...surtout une forme simplifiée et adaptée au pays de notre juridiction de simple police... un moyen de répression simple, commode et rapide; il évite de recourir à d'autres procédés plus rigoureux. Il reste en harmonie avec le degré de civilisation et l'état d'esprit des populations indigènes.¹⁰⁷

Curiously enough, the colonial commission of the SFIO also rejected the abolition of the indigénat while the Governor of Senegal Lefèvre suggested that it should be maintained except for individual exemptions. Finally, under de Coppet's initiative, 560 prominent families and all African women were exempted (decree of December 8 and 9, 1936).¹⁰⁸ Under the Colonial Minister Mandel, Africans who served in the colonial army and their families also became exempt from the indigénat, forced labour, and the prestations.¹⁰⁹

The prestations was a form of forced labour whereby all able bodied men aged 18-60 were recruited for a minimum of 4 days annually for the execution of public and private projects (i.e. construction of bridges, railways, roads, mines). As late as 1930, France had refused to comply with the International Labour Convention agreement which outlawed forced labour. De Coppet wished to

107. Letter of Antonetti dated November 3, 1936, Affaires Politiques, File 540, Dossier 1, ANSOM and "Principales idées exposées dans la note de M. Antonetti de Novembre 1918," ibid.

108. Rapport Politique Annuel AOF, 1936, Affaires Politiques, File 539, Dossier 5, ANSOM.

109. Decree of May 14, 1938, Affaires Politiques, File 540, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

Faire disparaître les prestations en nature, outil de moins en moins commode... par ailleurs source permanente d'abus et de vexations pour la population indigène, en donnant au chef de la circonscription le moyen de recourir, pour l'exécution de tous les travaux jusque là accomplis gratuitement par nos administrés, à une main d'oeuvre progressivement spécialisée, normalement rémunérée, et convenablement nourris.¹¹⁰

He abolished direct administrative involvement in the recruitment of prestataires for private enterprises and substituted the prestations with an additional tax of 5 francs for each day of liability in 25 out of 109 cercles in French West Africa, 8 of which were in Senegal. The additional tax was exorbitant as minimum wage was 7 francs per day and other taxes had to be paid. The new tax was partly offset by another decree which henceforth taxed persons of 14 years of age rather than 8.

The decree of August 12, 1937 recognized the Geneva Labour Convention and acknowledged forced labour only as a form of taxation. Subsequently, de Coppet extended the additional tax pay-off period from 3 to 6 months, reduced the term of the prestations to a maximum of 4 days annually and implemented the 8-hour working day. Finally, he stipulated that only 25% of the male population between the ages of 18 and 45 would be recruited for military service thereafter.¹¹¹

The execution of de Coppet's instructions remained up to the

110. Circular dated August 16, 1938, Affaires Politiques, File 2808, ANSOM; see also Duquenet, "Le Front Populaire et le Problème des Prestations en AOF," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, nos. 61-62, (1976), pp. 159-172.

111. Duquenet, op. cit., 1976, pp. 90-100.

the individual goodwill of the governors and while conditions for the indigénat and the prestations improved, the institutions were never actually challenged.

EDUCATION.

The foci of de Coppet's 5-year education programme were to enlarge existing schools, build 400 new ones (including the first school for girls in Senegal) and offer more scholarships to Africans for the pursuit of higher education. The Lycée Faidherbe in St. Louis was enlarged and William Ponty's enrollment swelled from 75 students in 1936 to 100 in 1937, to 152 in 1938.¹¹² A girls' school was built in Rufisque in 1938 and the Lycée Van Vollenhoven was constructed during the same year. Scholarships enabling Africans to pursue further studies in France rose from 8 in 1937 to 14 in 1938.¹¹³

While de Coppet was in favour of introducing African languages and culture into the education system, the Inspector General and head of AOF education, Albert Charton, strongly opposed his views. Charton was in favour of a Franco-African métissage culture that would assimilate Africans while allowing them to re-examine and retain their traditional cultures. Even though he recognized the key role that the African elite would play in the future, he essentially considered African societies

¹¹². Journal Officiel de l'AOF, March 18, 1937, p. 337 and 17G 17 96.

¹¹³. Paris-Dakar, November 6, 1938, and Périscope Africain, August 20, 1938.

backward and inferior.¹¹⁴ After Charton's departure, de Coppet offered the post of Inspector General to Léopold S. Senghor who declined in order to pursue his own studies.

Finally, the Institut Français d'Afrique Noire was created in 1936 for the promotion of scientific studies in black Africa and particularly in AOF with an emphasis on the environment, culture and resources of the overseas territories. Founded under the auspices of de Coppet, IFAN comprised a High Scientific Committee based in Paris and a Research Council based in Dakar.¹¹⁵

CONCLUSIONS.

The Popular Front did not set out to erode the foundations of the colonial structure, nor to contest colonialism per se. Like other French administrations, it devoted only marginal attention to the empire and more importantly, it lacked a unified colonial programme. Even when the colonies were on the government's agenda, only North Africa and Indochina figured prominently. Black Africa was remote, tranquil and tightly ruled.

Coquery-Vidrovitch has argued that the Popular Front never questioned the French colonial past after it assumed power and that it was never committed to fundamental reform. However, even

114. Peggy Sabatier, "African Culture and Colonial Education: The William Ponty School," Journal of African Studies, (1984), pp. 2-10.

115. Journal Officiel du Sénégal, (September 3, 1936).

if the government did have a 'volonté politique révolutionnaire,'¹¹⁶ it would have been unable to enforce radical policy overseas without threatening its very survival. The liberalisation of colonial rule that the Popular Front strove to introduce did not intimidate the colonialists, nor did it shake the solidity of the parti colonial (as exemplified in the ill-fated Blum-Violette bill). In fact, considering that the Groupe Colonial (reconstituted in 1936) boasted 220 members in the Chamber of Deputies, it is no surprise that the administration had few chances of initiating, let alone implementing, socialist legislation overseas.¹¹⁷

As a result, the socio-economic agenda of colonial reform drawn up by Moutet and de Coppet met with stiff opposition every step of the way and received little support outside the small circle of committed socialist administrators. For this reason, the Popular Front did not have enough confidence to stand by its programme of reforms and ensure it was properly enforced.

It is also important to contextualize the Popular Front within the larger framework of the interwar period in AOF--a period of insular and authoritarian rule. Governors-General Merlin, Carde and Brevié had wished to maintain a rigid status

116. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Colonisation ou Impérialisme: La politique africaine de la France entre les deux guerres," Mouvement Social, (1979), p. 64.

117. Le Courrier de l'Ouest Africain, (March 13, 1937) for the reconstitution of the colonial party.

quo of limited assimilation and were reluctant to initiate political, economic or social change. The press was censored; political meetings were at best tolerated, under the continuous surveillance of the secret police; the abuses in the indigénat and the prestations went by unnoticed.

Against this background, the Popular Front era can be seen as a period of thaw in French colonialism, a liberal interlude during which the most flagrant abuses of colonial rule abated: the indigénat and forced labour declined; the prestations were replaced by the additional tax; and the arbitrary authority of administrators was curtailed. On the socio-political level, the Popular Front was a period of openness and innovation: The political arena became receptive to new ideas and influences from France; literate 'subjects' who were not qualified to participate in electoral politics joined the trade union movement which provided a new outlet for political activity, as trade unions which had hitherto operated illegally now laid their foundations, and professional associations were formed. Metropolitan labour legislation (such as collective agreements, conciliation and arbitration procedures, labour booklets, etc.) was implemented, even if in rudimentary form. The right to strike was fully exercised, a host of strikes were resolved to the satisfaction of the workers, and in many cases, their demands for salary increases were met.

Yet the majority of the Popular Front's reforms remained on the drawing board, partly because of the formidable opposition of

the 'colonial party,' but also because the lower echelons of the colonial administration were often reluctant to obey metropolitan orders (which they altered at will). As one administrator put it: "Est-ce le gouverneur qui gouverne le gouvernement ou le contraire? La réponse va de soi: c'est le gouverneur qui gouverne."¹¹⁸ However, even if the colonial reforms of the Popular Front were not fully implemented before the war, they laid the foundations of postwar French colonial policy-making and led the way for black political activity in French West Africa.

118. C.A. Julien, "Léon Blum et les Pays d'Outre-Mer," in Léon Blum: Chef du Gouvernement, op. cit., p. 382.

Chapter II.

CITIZEN POLITICS IN THE THREE COMMUNES: THE DIOUF ERA, 1936-1940

The Popular Front in Senegal marked a period of intense political and trade union activity which profoundly affected the political map of the country in a variety of ways: The emergence of Senegal's first modern political party, the PSS, followed by the rise of Lamine Gueye as the leader of the first African branch of a metropolitan party (the SFIO Federation), changed the course of Senegalese politics; the spilling over of political activity from the communes de plein exercice to the urban trading centers of the interior (by way of the Popular Front committees and SFIO local sections) was also a major breakthrough in the development of black politics in the protectorate; the sudden influx of socialist and communist Europeans in the political arena was responsible for the divisive politics of the SFIO, but was also a political school of sorts for Africans.

In fact, in a mere two-year period, possibilities of organizing greatly expanded for Africans not only in electoral politics but, perhaps more importantly, in the trade union sector. Trade union activity flourished, strike waves proliferated and the Dakar-Niger strike of 1938 paralysed the federation. This is not to say, however, that political and union activity reached the majority of the population; the Popular Front was almost exclusively an urban movement and its

legislation did not reach the protectorate.

The greatest casualty of the political changes set in motion by the Popular Front was Galandou Diouf. Metropolitan politics jeopardised Diouf's deputyship from the very beginning: the legislative elections of 1936 were a difficult victory for Diouf while Lamine Gueye emerged as a formidable opponent. Before Diouf was able to consolidate power, the Popular Front administration was organizing bases of popular support among the urban population, seeking an alliance with Lamine Gueye. When the Minister of Overseas France visited Senegal, it was with Gueye that he met, not with Galandou Diouf, the elected deputy.

From the point of view of the Senegalese deputy, metropolitan politics were instrumental in ruining his career, as the Popular Front increasingly relied on Lamine Gueye for support. However, the underlying reasons responsible for Diouf's decline were structural: his party was essentially an organization that campaigned only during elections, counting almost exclusively on the charisma of its leader. Before long, it could not compete with the SFIO which was a modern party, equipped with the latest in organization (regular party congresses, cards, statutes, etc.). In addition, Lamine Gueye was always one step ahead of his opponent, incessantly capitalizing on the administration's left-leaning sympathies.

An antagonistic relationship developed between Diouf and de Coppet, as the former watched his popularity and control over the

colony dwindle while his opponent gained electoral footholds across Senegal. When an opportunity to neutralize his rival and reassert his authority vis-à-vis the colonial administration presented itself at the height of the Dakar-Niger strike in 1938, Diouf exploited the crisis to the fullest, temporarily reversing the fortune of his party.

It has been argued that the Popular Front's "net result in Senegal was the bringing of more local Frenchmen into politics and the exclusion of many Africans."¹¹⁹ According to this interpretation, "Local African politics did not recede but had their struggle for originality arrested by the Popular Front. The greatest casualty was the Senegalese Socialist Party."¹²⁰ A closer look at the PSS, the SFIO, Lamine Gueye's political ambitions, the role of Europeans in the political arena, and the PSS-SFIO fusion paint a very different picture. Firstly, the PSS had many Europeans amongst its founding members in the late 1920s, and in 1935 (before the advent of the Popular Front), there were reports of a further europeanisation of the party. By "europeanising" his party, Gueye essentially took advantage of his European friends and of the Popular Front administration in order to further his own goals and give his party a metropolitan outlook and mass base. Ultimately, even the colonial authorities

¹¹⁹. Wesley G. Johnson, "African Political Activity in French West Africa, 1900-1940," in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa, vol. 2, (London: Longman, 1974), p. 559.

¹²⁰. Ibid., p. 560.

acknowledged that it was Lamine Gueye who benefitted most from the fusion of the SFIO and the PSS, and that the new party, notwithstanding its metropolitan name, was a 'Parti Laministe.' By 1939, the SFIO had won crucial victories in Senegal and stood a good chance of winning the 1940 deputyship elections. It is unlikely that Lamine Gueye would have scored such victories were it not for the political climate generated by the Popular Front.

Before examining the impact of the Popular Front on the Senegalese political arena, a brief outline of two crises in the history of Senegal that are critical to understanding political activity in the late 1930s is in order. This includes a) the 1930-1934 economic depression and b) the death of Blaise Diagne, Senegal's first black leader and deputy of 20 years, in 1934.

THE 1930-34 ECONOMIC DEPRESSION.

After the prosperity of the mid and late 1920s, the Great Depression inflicted a severe blow on the fragile Senegalese peanut economy. During 1929-30, groundnut production rose from 400.000 to 508.000 tons, but prices dropped from 2.500 francs per ton in 1927, to 875 francs in 1931 and exports fell from 500.000 tons in 1930, to 135.000 tons in 1932.¹²¹

The majority of peasants and traders who had relied exclusively on the cultivation and trade of groundnuts suffered

¹²¹. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1934, 2G 34 5, ARSD; see also Yves Person, "Le Front Populaire au Sénégal (Mai 1936-Octobre 1938)," Mouvement Social, (1979), p. 83; and Sheldon Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," PhD Thesis, (Columbia University, 1967), chapter on the "Peanut Economy in Crisis."

most. Their purchasing power declined, prices of imports (particularly foodstuffs) spiralled, and their standard of living deteriorated. Many deserted their villages and rushed to the urban centers where they faced rampant unemployment, plummeting salaries and inflated housing and transportation costs. During the period 1931-36, a wave of rural exodus swelled Dakar's population by 71%.¹²²

The crisis peaked in 1932 when the contraction of the peanut economy began to affect not only commerce, industry and banking but the colonial administration itself.¹²³ The federal budget which relied heavily on import-export duties, from a surplus of 46 million francs in 1930, neared bankruptcy in 1932 with a deficit of 18 million francs.¹²⁴

Blaise Diagne, Governor-General Brevié and the Bordeaux trading houses joined efforts and launched the 'battle for groundnuts.' The SIF were delegated the task of regulating peanut prices, intensifying groundnut cultivation and modernising agriculture.¹²⁵ Diagne and the 'colonial party' pressed for the adoption of protectionist measures on peanut exports to the

122. Duquet, "Le Front Populaire..." op. cit., 1976, p.11.

123. Gellar, "The Politics of..." op. cit., 1967, chapter on Peanut Economy, and Duquet, "Le Front..." op. cit., 1976, p. 7.

124. Person, "Le Front Populaire..." op. cit., 1979, p. 7.

125. Gellar, "The Politics of..." op. cit., 1967, chapter entitled "Peanut Economy in Crisis," and Duquet, "Le Front..." 1976, op. cit., pp. 8-10.

metropole.¹²⁶ Their efforts succeeded in August 1933 when a law was passed establishing a system of fixed quotas and increasing duties for foreign oilseeds, thus practically forcing French processing plants to import Senegalese rather than foreign (particularly Indian) peanuts.¹²⁷

Senegal's peanut economy began to show signs of recovery in 1934. Diagne survived the crisis with the help of two indispensable allies: the administration and the Bordeaux firms, and with the continued support of the Lébou chiefs and the First World War veterans for whom he had obtained French citizenship. Yet, his well organized political machinery was not as solid as it appeared. The economic recession had intensified the dissatisfaction of the younger Senegalese voters and a group of small, but influential, French businessmen who condemned the deputy's pact with the administration and commerce.¹²⁸ Some

126. Claudine Cotte, "La politique économique de la France en Afrique Noire, 1936-1946)," Thèse de troisième cycle, University of Paris VII, (1981), chapter "La sequelle de la crise."

127. The economic malaise provided an excuse for the colonial interparliamentary group which comprised 252 deputies in the French Parliament to press for a system of imperial preference as an antidote to competition from British and Japanese products in the world market. See Gellar, "The Politics of Development in Senegal," op. cit., 1967, pp. 82-84. In reality, they saw in it the long-sought opportunity to tighten France's economic links with the colonies. French industrialists endorsed the efforts of the colonial group, but processing plants opposed protectionism.

128. Small independent trade companies went bankrupt during the depression while big Bordeaux firms like Maurel et Prom., Peyrissac, etc. survived and profited as the peanut trade became their monopoly. The Bank of AOF refused to extend credit to independent African traders and European businessmen who turned to the opposition for support. See Gellar, "The Politics of..."

joined Diouf while others formed a new opposition party, the Parti Socialiste Sénégalais (PSS) to fill what they perceived to be a vacuum in the political arena.

Blaise Diagne's sudden death in May 1934 "jette le Sénégal dans une confusion politique sans précédent."¹²⁹ The Senegalese political arena which had for 20 years been dominated by Diagne's paternalistic and uncontested rule opened up to a frustrated opposition. 'Diagnisme' crumbled overnight as its supporters rushed to form alliances with Diouf or the PSS.

THE POLITICAL ARENA AFTER BLAISE DIAGNE¹³⁰

op. cit., 1967, pp. 70-77.

The young voters resented Diagne's defense of forced labour at the International Labour Convention in Geneva in 1930 and the absence of democratic institutions in the protectorate. His collaboration with the Laval government in 1931-32 as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies and his long trips to France (which he now regarded his home) further enhanced his reputation of being a pawn of the establishment and a defender of the colonial system.

129. AOF, (July 7, 1934).

130. Minor parties such as the Radical Socialists and right-wing groups are not dealt with at length in this study. A brief outline of the parties and their activities follows:

After being dormant for several years, the Radical Socialist Party renewed its activity in 1937 with 50 European members (mostly civil servants) to support the Popular Front government. The party was headed by Turbé, the President of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce, and dealt exclusively with French issues. See Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar et Dépendances 1937, 2G 37 1, ARSD.

The right-wing groups in Senegal (Parti Populaire Français, Croix de Feu, Progrès Social Français), were mainly local cells of metropolitan parties and were supported mostly by Europeans. All were against the Popular Front. The Croix de Feu boasted among its members the lawyer Paul Vidal of St. Louis and Dr. Sibenaler both of whom were also leaders of the PSS, [See Le Sénégal, (February 20, 1936)] and tried to gain the support of

a) Galandou Diouf and the Parti National Républicain.

Galandou Diouf was born in St. Louis in September 1875.¹³¹ His father was a Wolof trader while his mother came from a family of notables. Diouf received a Catholic primary and secondary education but was raised as a Muslim. After teaching primary school in Dagana for two years he was discharged, following which he was employed as postmaster, conductor on the Dakar-St. Louis line and stationmaster in Dakar. Disenchanted with discrimination in the civil service, he entered the private sector where he restlessly drifted for many years from one occupation to another without much interest or success: as an entrepreneur in Rufisque, as an accountant for a successful Moroccan trader in Dakar, as chief accountant for the Bordeaux firm Buhan-Teisseire and as agent for the Paterson House in Nianging.¹³²

Having established valuable connections in the public and private sectors, Diouf became the first African to enter communal politics when he was elected to the Conseil Général of Rufisque in 1909. His public denunciation of administrative abuse quickly

Africans. For more information on the right-wing groups see De Coppet Report, May 6, 1937, Commission Guernut, C107, D19, ANSOM.

131. A rich biographical profile of Diouf can be found in "Note a/s Galandou Diouf," unsigned and undated report, probably written circa 1940, 13G 17 17, ARSD. For a good account of Senegalese politics in the interwar period see Wesley Johnson, "African Political Activity..." op. cit. 1974, pp. 542-567.

132. Wesley G. Johnson, The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 146-149; see also Mamadou Diallo, "Galandou Diouf: Homme Politique Sénégalais, 1875-1941," Mémoire de Maîtrise, University of Dakar, (1972), pp. 19-20.

earned him the reputation of fearless critic of colonialism and in 1912, he helped found Africa's first political action group, the Jeunes Sénégalais.¹³³

Two years later, he emerged as a key figure in Diagne's campaign for the legislative elections. To set an example for the Diagne recruitment laws of 1916, he enlisted as a volunteer and was quickly promoted to sergeant. Diouf returned to Senegal wounded in 1918 and was awarded the Légion d'Honneur.¹³⁴ Next, he accompanied the deputy in his recruitment mission to AOF and in 1919 was elected mayor of Rufisque, under the Republican Socialist electoral roll.¹³⁵

Signs of friction between Diagne and Diouf first became apparent in 1920 when the former succumbed to administrative pressure and agreed to the restoration of the Conseil Colonial.¹³⁶ Rumours of rupture began circulating after the deputy concluded the controversial 'pact of Bordeaux' in 1923, and compromised with the Carde administration. Enticed by Lamine Gueye, Diouf--then vice-president of the Conseil Colonial and president of its permanent commission--dissociated himself from

133. Johnson, *The Emergence...*, op. cit., 1971, pp. 146-153; see also Phan, op.cit., 1974, p. 28.

134. Mamadou Diallo, op. cit., (1972), p. 27.

135. Three years later, he was dismissed from office after being implicated in a fraud scandal. The administration denounced him and Diagne failed to support him.

136. The appointment of 20 chiefs to the 40 member Conseil Général ensured the administration a majority in the assembly.

Diagne and joined the forces of the opposition.¹³⁷

The Périscope Africain group (Gueye, d'Oxoby, Guillabert, Paul Roche)¹³⁸ and the SFIO backed him in the 1928 elections but Diagne won. In the 1930 Conseil Colonial elections, Diouf's opposition forces (under the aegis of the SFIO) lost again to the deputy who had Governor-General Carde's support.¹³⁹ Diagne's appointment to the post of Under-Secretary of State to the Colonies and his brief rapprochement with Gueye in 1931 further entrenched his leadership and split the opposition.

In 1932, the Laval government fell, the Senegalese economy struggled through the worst year of the depression, and Diagne's political machinery showed signs of disintegration. When Diagne died in 1934, the 'Diagnists' did not rally to his protégé, Duguay-Clédor,¹⁴⁰ who thereafter exerted minimal influence in the political arena.¹⁴¹ Diouf defiantly boasted that "Diagne est

137. Cheick Anta M'Backé whom he had defended in the Tallerie affair was against Diagne and provided Diouf with ample financial support. See Mamadou Diallo, op. cit., 1972, p. 40.

138. The Périscope Africain, created in 1924, supported Diouf until 1935 when it became the main PSS instrument. D'Oxoby was the editor of the influential newspaper L'Ouest Africain Français, Guillabert was a Creole former President of the Conseil Général, and Roche was a French militant socialist from Rufisque.

139. Carde was accused of electoral fraud and was replaced by Brévié.

140. Duguay-Clédor, the head of the PRS, was also editor of the Franco-Sénégalais and president of the Conseil Colonial.

141. Apparently he had initially considered running for the 1934 elections but quickly gave in to Gueye, Le Franco-Sénégalais, (July 19, 1934).

mort, et le diognisme aussi. Il n'y a plus que le dioufisme."¹⁴²

Unlike Diagne and Gueye, Diouf was jovial and accessible. Proud to be African, he was only moderately assimilated in French ways: "Galandou représente sa race... [il] est considéré par tous les autochtones comme leur émanation directe."¹⁴³ Those qualities were also the reason why the colonial administration disliked him:

Diouf est une médiocrité dans toute la force du terme... peu d'instruction, il n'a pas une personnalité brutalement et foncièrement improbe comme Diagne..

[Il est] un tout petit politicien vaniteux, soucieux de faire payer ses dettes et d'épater ses compatriotes. Rien de l'envergure de Diagne.¹⁴⁴

Administrative reports disclose that the younger generation of Senegalese voters had similar reservations for different reasons:

Sa simplicité et son langage direct et imagé, qui lui ont attiré la sympathie de la population rurale et artisanale, ne sont cependant pas du gré de la population intellectuelle qui désirait un député plus préoccupé de leur avenir.¹⁴⁵

Diouf was proud of the contrast he offered to Diagne: Muslim, polygamous, "Républicain, ancien combattant, cultivateur, et

142. Report of July 1, 1934, 21G 137 108, ARSD.

143. Note a/s Galandou Diouf, 13G 17 17, ARSD.

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

l'ami du peuple" was how he presented himself.¹⁴⁶

Pour le moment, le Sénégal n'as pas besoin à la
Chambre des Députés d'un représentant savant... C'est
un cultivateur qu'il lui faut pour aider
l'administration à vaincre la crise.¹⁴⁷

Next, Diouf abandoned the rhetorical campaign against the
administration and the commercial establishment that had earned
him the reputation of being a communist and sought their
support.¹⁴⁸

After 25 years in politics, Diouf won the 1934 legislative
elections by almost 1.500 votes over Lamine Gueye and became
Senegal's second black African deputy. Subsequently, he
abandoned SFIO patronage, the Périscopie Africain and some of his
own supporters and founded the Parti National Républicain (PNR)
which was only nominally different from Diagne's Parti
Républicain Socialiste (PRS). Alfred Goux, an influential and

146. Report on the political arena after the death of Blaise
Diagne and Report of June 1, 1934; 21G 137 108, ARSD; For a good
discussion of Diouf, Diagne and Gueye in the 1930s see Wesley
Johnson, "The Senegalese Urban Elite 1900-1945," in Phillip D.
Curtin (ed.), Africa and the West: Intellectual Responses to
European Culture, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972),
pp. 139-188.

147. Report of June 29, 1934, 21G 137 108, ARSD.

148. He even began a cordial correspondence with the
Governor-General. On Diouf's efforts to rally the support of the
colonial authorities and commerce see letter of the Governor of
Senegal Beurnier to the Governor-General dated August 8, 1934,
13G 17 37, ARSD.

ambitious French businessman,¹⁴⁹ became his principal lieutenant. Goux was a highly controversial figure even among Dioufists, and his appointment appeared regressive to many évolués--a clear break from Diagne's Africanisation policy.¹⁵⁰

After the elections, the PNR split into three factions: the 'Dioufistes-Socialistes' led by Louis Martin, Turbé and the Périscope Africain group; the 'Dioufistes-Gouxistes' led by Goux, and Le Sénégal; and a smaller clique led by M'Baye Salzman. The origin of the discord lay in personal rather than ideological differences,¹⁵¹ and Diouf supported Goux. Following the triumphant 1935 municipal elections and the appointment of Aby Kane Diallo at the head of the Conseil Colonial, Diouf became the dominant force in the political arena.¹⁵²

Despite the rhetoric, Diouf faithfully followed in Diagne's footsteps: rigged elections, authoritarianism and personalistic politics. The opposition press resented his unconditional collaboration with the administration and the import-export houses to the point that in 1935, it accused the deputy of being

149. Goux had important connections with the Lébou community, the Lebanese and the small French businessmen, and owned Le Sénégal which became the mouthpiece of Dioufism.

150. Johnson, "African Political..." op.cit., 1974, p. 559.

151. Le Progrès, (January 26-31, 1935) and "Notice a/s Galandou Diouf," 13G 17 17, ARSD.

152. Goux was now mayor of Dakar, Diouf was mayor of Rufisque and Aby Kane Diallo mayor of St. Louis.

no more than "l'ami et le défenseur du gouvernement."¹⁵³

b) Lamine Gueye and the Parti Socialiste Sénégalais (PSS).

Lamine Gueye, the son of a Wolof Tijani trader from St. Louis was born in Médine, Mali in September 1891. After Koranic school, he attended the Institut des Frères de Ploermel and the École Faidherbe, following which he taught in Dakar, St. Louis and Bakel.¹⁵⁴ In 1914, he supported Blaise Diagne's candidacy to the deputyship as member of the Aurore de St. Louis group. Two years later, at Diagne's instigation, he went to Paris where he obtained his baccalauréat, served in the auxiliary forces of Lyon and in 1921 became the first African to receive a French law degree.¹⁵⁵

Upon returning to Senegal, Gueye began practising law in Dakar. His reputation grew as a result of his drafting the Diagne recruitment laws and his defense of the municipalities of Dakar and Rufisque against the powerful Bordeaux firms Maurel and Prom.¹⁵⁶ In 1922-23 Diagne parted ways with Gueye and the latter joined the Union Républicaine des Jeunes Sénégalais and the SFIO,

153. Périscope Africain, (May 4, 1935); It is interesting to note that only a few years back Diouf had attacked Diagne for being "l'homme de la finance, payé pour soutenir le gros Commerce, c'est l'homme qui est à la disposition du Gouvernement." 13G 17 17, ARSD.

154. Gueye's thesis dealt with the citizenship issue in the Four Communes.

155. Lamine Gueye, Itinéraire Africain, (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1966), pp. 13-15; also Périscope Africain, November 23, 1935.

156. Gueye, op.cit., 1966, pp. 41-43.

while the following year he acquired the newspaper AOF from the former deputy François Carpot.¹⁵⁷

His first major victory dates to 1925 when he won the St. Louis municipal elections and became mayor and colonial councillor. A brief truce with Diagne came to an end right before the 1928 legislative elections when Lamine formed a front with Diouf against the deputy.¹⁵⁸ Gueye pursued a rapprochement with Diagne but eventually retreated from the political scene. In December 1931, he accepted the post of magistrate in Réunion and was thus absent from Senegal during Diagne's last years of rule. Many Senegalese never forgave him for abandoning Diouf during the opposition's most critical period.¹⁵⁹

After Diagne's death, Gueye immediately returned to Senegal. On the eve of the municipal elections, Armand Angrand (a former Diagnist mayor of Dakar), Charles Graziani (a French businessman and publisher of the newspaper Clarté), Silvandre (an influential socialist lawyer), and a circle of young Diagnists formed the Parti Socialiste Sénégalais (PSS) and endorsed Gueye's candidacy.¹⁶⁰

The PSS was organized along metropolitan lines, projecting

157. Ibid, p. 53, and Duquetet, "Le Front Populaire...", op. cit., 1977, p. 16.

158. Gueye, op. cit., 1966, p. 54.

159. Person, "Le Front Populaire...", op. cit., 1979, p. 85.

160. The PSS was originally known as the Union Sociale Sénégalaise, see 13G 10 17, ARSD; detailed biographical profiles on Angrand, Graziani, and PSS leaders can be found in the Fiches de Renseignements, (July 17, 1940), 21G 10 1, and 13G 7 17, ARSD.

the image of a modern metropolitan party with an ideological platform. Unlike the PNR which operated on the basis of the personal interests of an omnipotent leader and his cohorts,¹⁶¹ the PSS had a doctrine and statutes that were conscientiously formulated by an ad hoc committee and ratified by regular congresses.¹⁶² Party cards were issued, propaganda was carried out methodically in large cinemas to proselytize new members, and by 1935 the party boasted 5.500 members¹⁶³ and branches in all the major trading centres of the interior.

Ce fut un événement sensationnel au Sénégal puisque pour la première fois, ici, on voyait se grouper des électeurs pour former un parti basé sur un programme bien défini et dont l'action devait être commandée par des règlements bien définis.¹⁶⁴

Lamine Gueye readily acknowledged that the PSS was ideologically indebted to the SFIO. The party programme called for the introduction of labour legislation, freedom of association and the press, and the reduction of taxes.¹⁶⁵ It also criticized the limited access to French citizenship and condemned the indigénat.

161. AOF, July 20, 1935.

162. The statutes of the party were formulated at the first PSS Congress held at the Rex theater in Dakar in June 1935. Some 300 delegates from all over the country participated including Turbé, Paul Vidal, Télémaque Sow, Graziani, etc. Gueye was elected President of the party; see AOF, (July 6, 1935).

163. The total electorate was 21.000 members according to Duquetet, "Le Front Populaire..." op. cit., 1976, p. 23.

164. Périscope Africain, (November 23, 1935).

165. AOF, (July 6, 1935).

Despite the label and rhetoric, the PSS was not a radical party. The fact that it emerged right after the economic depression partly explains its emphasis on socio-economic change. Thus, slogans such as "Les leviers de commande de la politique sénégalaise doivent être tenus par des mains sénégalais" had no separatist overtones. The party criticized the abuses of the colonial system but never challenged the principle of colonial rule per se:

Nous ne visons pas... 'self-government' mais nous avons bien le droit de demander, en contemplation de la devise révolutionnaire, l'égalité de traitement dans l'unité nationale, comme dans l'unité législative.¹⁶⁶

In fact, Gueye was both a model and herald of assimilation in Senegal. He was distinguished-looking, serious and a gifted orator in both Wolof and French, though he was less assimilated to French culture than Diagne. His newspaper, AOF, unflinchingly argued that there were no obstacles to Senegal's complete political and cultural assimilation with France.¹⁶⁷ "Notre tendance, notre but, notre idéal... c'est l'assimilation"¹⁶⁸ argued Gueye and the political objective of the PSS was to maximise the fruits of this policy.

The leadership and clientele of the PSS were not radical

166. AOF, (August 24, 1935).

167. The PSS rejected association as an ambiguous doctrine which served to perpetuate the subjugation of colonial peoples, see AOF, (August 24, 1935).

168. AOF, (August 24, 1935).

either; people like Turbé, president of the Chamber of Commerce and member of the Radical Party, Armand Angrand secretary-general of the PSS, and Graziani, vice-president of the party (both former Diagnists) had essentially formed the PSS in opposition to Diouf. The party's motto was "La défense des travailleurs blancs et noirs du Sénégal,"¹⁶⁹ when in fact, its clientele was elitist: the PSS primarily addressed itself and appealed to the low and middle colonial bourgeoisie, the urban and literate civil servants, commercial employees, traders, artisans and young ambitious évolués.¹⁷⁰

The year 1935 also marked the europeanisation of the PSS. As more Frenchmen infiltrated the party, the columns of AOF and Périscope Africain reflected the vaguely humanistic, eurocentric and paternalistic attitudes of the SFIO toward the colonies.¹⁷¹ 'Capitalist colonisation' was repudiated in favour of 'socialist colonisation' which was hailed as the formula of the future. But the contradictions were more pronounced than ever:

...la colonisation est chose naturelle, bonne dans la pensée si elle est créatrice de richesse de toute sorte... à la colonisation capitaliste fondée sur l'exploitation des indigènes, nous devons promouvoir une colonisation socialiste qui les affranchira en

169. Périscope Africain, (June 27, 1936). That was also the motto of Clarté.

170. Rapport Annuel sur l'organisation, Circonscription de Dakar et Dépendances, 2G 34 15, ARSD.

171. By 1938, AOF was largely indifferent toward local politics, see "Note relative aux mouvements sociaux intéressant la Direction de Sûreté Générale an AOF, 1938," April 12, 1939, 21G 53 17, ARSD.

faisant d'eux des hommes qui seront nos égaux. Nous voulons... une patrie sénégalaise majeure et libre, maîtresse de ses droits et de ses destinées, partie intégrante de la grande patrie française.¹⁷²

Behind the scenes, Lamine Gueye was putting together a stronger, more popular and national party.

THE 1936 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS.

Relying predominately on his reputation and status, Diouf embarked on a last minute tour of the principal urban centers, having already procured the support of the most influential voting groups: the Lébous, the Mourides, the veterans and appointees in municipal politics, the commercial houses as well as the colonial administration's 'benevolent neutrality'.¹⁷³

In sharp contrast, Gueye campaigned systematically amongst young voters, educated civil servants, the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, the Radical and the Socialist parties. In addition, he adroitly allayed fears of the establishment that had designated him as a 'socialiste bolchévisant.' According to an administrative report,

172. Emile Boyer, Socialist mayor of Seine, AOF, (December 14, 1935).

173. Renseignements, March 14, 1936, 20G 92 23, ARSD. See also Le Sénégal, (January 10, 1936), and Périscope Africain, (August 8, 1936). Diouf also summoned the support of Duguay-Clédor and his Voix du Sénégal group that had in 1934 supported Gueye. Thierno Amathe M'Bengue of the Parti Républicain Socialiste Indépendant Diagniste (Renseignements, April 4, 1936, 20G 92 23, ARSD) and the local right-wing Jeunesse Patriotes group of Pierre Taittinger also supported Diouf. Renseignements, March 18, 1936 and March 19, 1936, 20G 92 23, ARSD. The colonial administration as usual turned a blind eye to fraud and Brevié pointedly left Dakar during the elections.

Il apparait que le PSS, tout en restant foncièrement acquis à une vision des forces de gauche, est décidé à se désolidariser, du moins sur le plan électoral, d'avec les partis de l'aile gauche du Front Populaire; et à se réclamer au contraire d'une politique de large collaboration dans le cadre national.¹⁷⁴

The electoral platforms of the two opponents were remarkably similar in content and both claimed it was based on a "politique de gauche": equal salaries, indemnities and treatment for black and white civil servants; easy accession to high administrative posts and the implementation of metropolitan labour legislation; the restoration of the Conseil Général; the creation of additional communes de pleine exercice; compulsory primary education for the full communes; the protection of the peanut economy and the abolition of the indigénat.¹⁷⁵

In fact, what differentiated the two parties was their constituencies and, less importantly, their manner of electioneering and style (Gueye used sophisticated socialist jargon). Diouf relied on the traditional elites (the Lébous, the veterans, municipal appointees, etc.) while Gueye appealed to the newer elite (teachers, interpreters, traders, low and middle civil servants).

On the eve of the elections, the administration reported that "Il n'est pas exagéré de dire que l'avenir tout entier des

174. Renseignements, March 4, 1936, 20G 92 23, ARSD.

175. Le Sénégal, "Profession de foi de Galandou Diouf," (April 16, 1936); See also 17G 92 23; 20G 92 23, ARSD and AOF, (April 25, 1936).

deux partis politiques en présence est en jeu,"¹⁷⁶ mostly because a host of Diouf's most important supporters deserted him at the very last minute (Amadou N'Doye, Louis Martin, etc.). Even though at first it seemed that Diouf had won a landslide victory (with 8.323 votes against Gueye's 4.288), after verification, 2.874 votes were cancelled. The electoral body had swelled from 17.000 to 21.000 partly due to the fact that 'subjects' voted illegally, 'citizens' voted up to 10 or 15 times, and votes were cast on behalf of the deceased.¹⁷⁷

In reality, Diouf had won a difficult victory which Gueye subsequently contested in a telegram addressed to Blum. In it, he accused the Governor-General of being the deputy's puppet, assuming that the Prime Minister would gladly annul Diouf's victory.¹⁷⁸ Thus, the irony of the elections: Diouf who was already being identified with the establishment and whom the opposition press accused of being National Front was elected against a socialist candidate only a few days before the socialist government took power in France.

Diouf struggled to prove that the elections did not have a "political" character:

176. Renseignements, March 4, 1936, 20G 92 23, ARSD and AOF, April 11, 1936.

177. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1936, 2G 36 5, ARSD; and also Périscope Africain, (May 6, 1936).

178. Telegram of Gueye, undated, 20G 92 23, ARSD.

Il n'y a en AOF ni Front Populaire, ni Front National... Son [Lamine Gueye] échec ne signifie pas que les électeurs ont voté contre les socialistes plus que mon succès ne veut dire qu'ils ont élu un adversaire du Rassemblement Populaire.¹⁷⁹

Despite Diouf's victory, the opposition press was swept by a mood of euphoria. They condemned previous colonial administrations and particularly Brevié's proconsulate as a "régime de pourriture" and praised de Coppet and his team of socialist collaborators (Lefèbvre, Governor of Senegal, Geismar, Secretary-General of AOF, and Ponzio, Administrator of Dakar), presaging the dawn of a new era:

Depuis l'avènement du Front Populaire la politique coloniale est devenue un des principaux soucis du gouvernement républicain qui lui réserve toute sa sollicitude.¹⁸⁰

THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE POPULAR FRONT.

a) The Creation of Popular Front Committees.

Popular Front committees were formed throughout Senegal by order of the National Committee, the first having been founded in Dakar in May 1936 by Alibert (Ligue des Droits de l'Homme), Graziani (PSS), le Dallic (PCF-Section Sénégalaise), Turbé (Parti

¹⁷⁹. Le Sénégal, (June 19, 1936).

¹⁸⁰. AOF, (June 4, 1936). Brevié was accused of systematically barring Africans from the higher echelons of the administration, of discriminating against the lower cadre civil servants and of encouraging the creation of fascist leagues; see Périscope Africain, (August 22, 1936).

Radical) and others.¹⁸¹ All members¹⁸² pledged allegiance to the Popular Front and actively encouraged Africans to participate in political life.

The Popular Front committees organized festivities to commemorate July 14 in Dakar and St. Louis. Street demonstrations were a novelty in Senegal. For this reason, when crowds of 6.000 Popular Front sympathizers marched with placards and French, Communist and PSS flags it was reported that:

Pour la première fois à Dakar on a vu flotter au vent le drapeau rouge et pour la première fois aussi on a entendu les accents et le chant de l'Internationale. Il y a vraiment quelque chose de changé.¹⁸³

Diouf's party did not participate in the festivities and its absence was exploited by the PSS which now posed as a 'partie intégrante' of the Popular Front, claiming that the new government would annul the deputy's programme.¹⁸⁴

181. AOF, (June 4, 1936); and letter of de Coppet dated June 5, 1937; see also Commission Guernut, C 107, D 19, ANSOM; 21G 84 17, ARSD; and Périscope Africain, (July 11, 1936).

182. Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, SFIO, PCF, Parti Radical, PSS, Syndicat Air-France, CGT, Syndicat PTT, Syndicat des Inscrits Maritimes, Association des Travaux Publiques, 21G 84 17, ARSD.

183. AOF, (August 1, 1936).

184. AOF, (August 1, 1936) and Périscope Africain, (May 16, 1936). Galandou's caustic response that appeared in the metropolitan press further dissociated him from de Coppet. Afrique Française, (August-September 1936), and Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, (New York: Pica Press, 1971), p. 457.

b) The Foundation of the PCF--Section Sénégalaise.

A Communist party was formed in Dakar under the auspices of Governor Ponzio by le Dallic, manager of Air-France, in July 1936 after a visit from the editor of the communist daily L'Humanité.¹⁸⁵ Initially, it was composed mostly of Air-France and Treasury employees. Its attitudes toward the Senegalese were no different from any other party: only French citizens were allowed as full members while subjects were treated as "membres sympathisants."¹⁸⁶

During its first year of operation, the PCF's 96 active members attempted to influence local organizations affiliated to metropolitan groups like the Dakar-Niger trade union and the Section Dakaroise de Radio Liberté.¹⁸⁷ However, after the party's leaders Descombes and Lajus left Dakar, the PCF began to disintegrate. In 1937, the central committee became totally disinterested in the local AOF groups and lost a good opportunity to create bases across the Federation.¹⁸⁸

c) Moutet's Trip to Senegal (September 27-October 5, 1936).

Moutet's initiative to tour AOF, personally announce de

185. De Coppet, June 5, 1937, Commission Guernut, C 107, D 19, ANSOM. Renseignements, July 1936, 21G 137 108, ARSD.

186. Rapport Annuel, Dakar et Dépendances, Commission Guernut, File 6, B 35, ANSOM, 1936.

187. Yet they did not become involved in any strikes during 1936, see de Coppet, June 5, 1937, Commission Guernut, C 107, D 19, ANSOM.

188. Ponzio to de Coppet, October 9, 1939, 21G 53 17, ARSD.

Coppet's proconsulate and deliberate upon African demands further raised African hopes for reform. After a grand reception in Dakar, organized by the Popular Front committee, Gueye presented Moutet and de Coppet with a list of reforms such as 'equal work, equal pay,' tax cuts and the abolition of the prestations. Claiming to be the 'lawyer of colonial peoples', the Colonial Minister totally evaded Gueye's demands and focused instead on the urgency of 'moral unity' between France and the overseas territories.¹⁸⁹ Left-wing rhetoric alternated with moderate republicanism. Moutet called for the amelioration of the peasant standard of living yet, during his 8 day tour in Senegal, he only spent one hour in a single African village.¹⁹⁰

After the reception, a soirée was held at de Coppet's residence bringing together 700 Frenchmen and, to everyone's surprise, 700 Senegalese. Horrified by this novelty, the colonialist press in France grossly exaggerated the somewhat unfortunate ending of the party:

Vers 11 heures, on n'y voyait que des indigènes en boubous sales, répunants. C'étaient des graisseurs de voiture de chez Renault, des manoeuvres du port... Ivres, ils cassaient les verres et tous vomissaient devant le buffet.¹⁹¹

Diouf blamed de Coppet for allowing things to get out of hand,

189. AOF, (September 26, 1936).

190. Paris-Dakar, (October 5, 1936), interview with Moutet, and also 17G 220, ARSD. The village was Tiavando.

191. Courrier Colonial, (October 16, 1936), Papiers Moutet, File 8, ANSOM and Annales Coloniales, (October 1936).

while the European colonialists came to the realisation that the deputy could henceforth be used against the Governor-General.

On the whole, Moutet's trip was interpreted very differently in France and in Senegal. The metropolitan left-wing press was surprised at its moderate and somewhat inconsequential tone while the colonialist press was alarmed at its radical implications and expressed open hostility. For the Senegalese, Moutet's trip was important in several ways: this was the first time that, upon assuming office, a Colonial Minister had visited the territories under his jurisdiction in order to personally present his Governor-General. It was also the first time that colonisers and colonised were brought together to discuss the political rights and aspirations of Africans.

d) The SFIO.

Before the advent of the Popular Front government, the SFIO in Senegal was represented by a rudimentary, semi-clandestine clique of isolated European militants who had minimal, if any, connections with the metropolitan party. One finds references to a Dakar section in 1928 with Roger Roche as secretary general, and the Senegalese Galandou Diouf, Magatte Bâ, and Louis Martin (editor of the Périscope Africain) as militant members.

After the victory of the left in France, Maurice Jacquin (founder of the weekly Courrier de l'Ouest Africain) assisted by European trade unionists from Air-France, organized scattered party members into SFIO sections in order to absorb the opposition and provide a platform for black socialist activity through-

out AOF.¹⁹² The structure, statutes and congresses of the party were modelled on the metropolitan SFIO from which it received its policy line. The platform of the party focused on the purge of the colonial administration, the immediate application of social legislation without exception overseas and the creation of the Ecole Laïque.¹⁹³

Two main factions split the Dakar-based party during its first year of operation, primarily over the issue of African membership and progressively over ideological affiliation.¹⁹⁴ The Jaquin-Alberti-Roche group initially had an almost exclusively European membership that deliberated over French issues. The rationalisation for not admitting Africans except on an individual basis was that metropolitan politics were not relevant in the colonies. Gradually, 100 Senegalese swelled the ranks of the 350-member group but they were not allowed to belong to both the SFIO and the PSS. In fact, the PSS was regarded as "une organisation qui ne nous concerne pas" because the SFIO exerted no control over it.¹⁹⁵

Just before the SFIO National Congress of November 1936, Tétý (member of the Colonial Commission of the Socialist Party),

192. Rapport Annuel Dakar et Dépendances, 1936, Commission Guernut, B 35, ANSOM.

193. AOF, (May 8, 1937) "Congrès Consultatif du SFIO, May 2-3, 1937;" see also Périscope Africain, (May 15, 1937).

194. The Courrier de l'Ouest Africain mentions a third faction briefly surfacing with Tétý in 1937 that only gathered 55 members and exerted marginal influence in the party.

195. Courrier de l'Ouest Africain, (February 13, 1937).

instructed Etienne Alibert (founding member of the PSS) to found a mixed Socialist Federation in Senegal.¹⁹⁶ The Alibert-Martin faction began with only 14 Europeans and 50 Senegalese (among them Mamadou Assane N'Doye and Agrand) who were also members of the PSS. By May 1937, it boasted 787 members and admitted Senegalese on a collective basis.¹⁹⁷

SFIO sections were created in all the major urban centres.¹⁹⁸ The Aliberti-Martin faction was the mouthpiece of the Popular Front proper while the Jaquin-Alibert-Roche group supported an extreme-left clique, the Gauche Révolutionnaire.¹⁹⁹ The latter engaged in long discourses on class politics, anti-imperialism and the urgency of independence, thus exposing Africans to some overt criticism of colonialism and to the bickering factionalism that characterized metropolitan politics.

The creation of the SFIO in Senegal, the first African branch of a metropolitan party founded by Europeans, seems paradoxical considering that a local socialist party had only recently been founded. If anything, it points to the vacuum in which the SFIO began operating, independently of local political

196. Rapport Annuel Dakar et Dépendances, 1936, Commission Guernut, File 60, Dossier B 35, ANSOM; also AOF, (December 19, 1936 and April 1, 1939).

197. AOF, (May 8, 1937).

198. Ten sections were present at the party's founding congress in May 2-3, 1937. Ibid, and also Périscope Africain, (May 15, 1937).

199. Note relative aux mouvements sociales de la Direction de la Sûreté Générale en AOF, 1937; 21G 70 17, ARSD.

dynamics and presupposing a de facto superiority of political know-how over the Africans. Suffice it to note that the concurrent existence of four socialist groups accusing one another of being "faux socialistes" while each claiming legitimacy and authenticity must have constituted an enlightening political lesson for Africans.²⁰⁰

More important, however, was the creation of Popular Front committees and SFIO branches in the protectorate: The spilling over of political activity beyond the Three Communes into the peanut belt of the interior (Kaolack, Diourbel, etc.) signalled a crucial development in the evolution of Senegalese politics: the emergence of the urban trading centres of the protectorate as a political force.²⁰¹

200. Wesley Johnson argues that there were three socialist parties while in reality there were only the SFIO Federation and the PSS. The former had split in three factions which were not distinct political parties. Nor was there, as Johnson maintains, a socialist party with exclusive European membership that barred Africans from its ranks. Johnson, "African Political Activity..," op. cit., 1974, p. 561.

201. See Gellar, "The Politics of..," op. cit., 1967, pp. 88-89, for an insightful parallel between the power structure of the SFIO and the structure of the Senegalese economy.

THE PSS-SFIO FUSION.

Like the SFIO, the PSS was undergoing its own internal crisis during this period. The party's influential militants were either former Diagnists or young intellectual civil servants who belonged to both the PSS and the SFIO. The former wanted the PSS to safeguard its identity in order to win over the Dakar and Rufisque municipalities and the much sought-after key posts in the Conseil Colonial. The latter wanted to merge with the SFIO and lead the new party.

In turn, the SFIO was hoping to dissolve the PSS, admit as full members only the educated évolués, and cluster 'subjects' in the local support groups as 'sympathizers.'²⁰² In 1937, the party called upon Lamine Gueye (who was a member of both parties), to decide whether he would resign from the SFIO and lead the PSS or else agree to conform to SFIO doctrine.²⁰³

1936 proved to be a crucial year in Gueye's career. Despite the electoral defeat in the deputyship elections, he suddenly found himself in a singularly favourable position: the Popular Front administration had identified its interests with Gueye and had generously recompensed him for his support.²⁰⁴ His relation-

202. Renseignements, January 22, 1938, 21G 147 108, ARSD.

203. Rapport Politique Annuel, Police et Sûreté, Dakar et Dépendances, 1937, 2G 37 33, ARSD.

204. First he was appointed tax consultant to the Colonial Ministry, then entrusted with the collection of documents pertaining to private law in AEF and finally he was appointed to the newly founded Commission des Coutumes Africaines and the Fixation du Droit Africain committees Papiers Moutet, File 4, Dossier 107, ANSOM; see also Rapport Annuel, Police et Sûreté,

ship with the government markedly enhanced Gueye's stature as a leader so that by 1938, he boasted that if general elections were held, he would get 80% of the votes. The colonial administration even remarked that

Le PSS présente une vitalité qui paraît loin d'être à dédaigner et il n'est pas prouvé qu'il consentirait, le cas échéant, à se laisser dissoudre. C'est peut-être, un des éléments qui décideront de l'élection législative du Sénégal en 1940.²⁰⁵

It was on the electoral front that the PSS and the SFIO became aware of their potential impact, if united. The first breakthrough for the socialists in Senegal was the complementary municipal elections of St. Louis in February 28, 1937. Six Dioufist municipal councillors had resigned in January of that year to express their dissatisfaction with the mayor Aby Kane Diallo, also a Dioufist. The PSS and the SFIO for the first time presented a single Popular Front list which won a landslide victory.²⁰⁶ It is interesting to note that the Dioufist list comprised in its entirety Senegalese candidates while one third of the Popular Front candidates were Europeans.

On March 3, 1937, the nine new councillors resigned. The Popular Front committee of St. Louis demanded the dissolution of

Dakar et Dépendances, 1937, 2G 37 33, ARSD.

²⁰⁵. Rapport Politique Annuel d'Ensemble, 1937, Dakar et Dépendances, 2G 37 1, ARSD.

²⁰⁶. Périscope Africain, (March 6, 1937); see also Note relative aux mouvements sociaux de la Direction de la Sûreté Générale en AOF, 21G 70 17, ARSD.

the municipal council but the Governor of Senegal, observing political neutrality, decided against it. The nine Popular Front members were reelected in May (1.191 votes for the Popular Front versus 633 for the Dioufists).²⁰⁷ Violence erupted when Aby Kane Diallo and his supporters were accused of illegally using a second set of ballots. The mayor charged the police with violating electoral neutrality and called in a force of tirailleurs who aggravated the riot. De Coppet and the Périscope Africain deplored Diallo's abuse of power and suggested he be removed from office.²⁰⁸

The following day, the Popular Front councillors resigned for the third time and the municipal council was dissolved. The elections of June 27, 1937 were again victorious for the Popular Front (1.251 votes against 908 for the Dioufists) and Paul Vidal (vice president of the PSS) was elected mayor,²⁰⁹ along with 14 PSS and five SFIO municipal councillors. One of the causes of the Dioufist party's defeat lay in the authoritarian Aby Kane Diallo who was highly unpopular even within his own party.

A month later, the Popular Front won the July 20, 1937 Conseil Colonial elections by 23 votes against Diallo's 17 votes.

207. Telegram of de Coppet to Moutet dated March 1, 1937, Affaires Politiques, File 849, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

208. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated June 14, 1937, Affaires Politiques, File 828, Dossier 3, ANSOM; see also Périscope Africain, March 20, 1937, and letter of de Coppet dated March 3, 1937 in Affaires Politiques, File 849, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

209. Périscope Africain, (July 10, 1937); see also Liste des Conseillers Municipaux élus aux élections municipales, June 27, 1937, St. Louis, Affaires Politiques, File 849, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

Mustapha Malick Gaye was elected president and Robert Delmas vice president.²¹⁰ The complementary elections of September 18, 1938, three months after the PSS-SFIO fusion, further consolidated the Socialist Federation's position with an unprecedented victory over Diouf (1.526 votes for the Popular Front versus 862 for the Dioufists).²¹¹

The PSS and the SFIO had sought a rapprochement for electoral purposes. Moreover, in pursuing a fusion, both parties believed they would absorb the other in due time. The PSS Congress of June 5-6, 1938, voted almost unanimously in favour of a fusion between the two parties and appointed Lamine Gueye secretary-general, delegate to the National Council and member of the SFIO Colonial Commission. Alibert maintained his position as federal secretary and Ibrahima Seydou N'Daw (a powerful trader from Kaolack) and Télémaque Sow (a leading journalist) were delegated propaganda duties. The only ones that opposed the fusion were the Europeans Turbé and Graziani and rumours circulated that their motives were personal rather than ideological.²¹²

The dilemma surrounding the fusion consisted in whether the

210. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated July 27, 1937, Affaires Politiques, File 849, Dossier 2, and File 594, Dossier 1, ANSOM; also cable of Beurnier to the Governor-General dated May 13, 1936, 20 G 93 23, ARSD.

211. AOF, (October 24, 1938).

212. Turbé had opted for the presidency of the Radical Party and Graziani feared losing his position as vice president of the PSS. The Congress also ratified the expulsion of Jacquin, Roche and two of their colleagues (Bonifay and Desauvay).

PSS would become absorbed into the SFIO, reducing Gueye to puppet status, or whether it would remain a 'Laministe' group within the SFIO under a different label, with Gueye as its leader.²¹³

During the party congress, Gueye ascertained that his goal was to "conserver intactes les forces que nous possédons mais en leur apportant l'appui des forces de France."²¹⁴ However, his underlying message was clear: "Que SFIO ou PSS, le parti s'appelle Lamine Gueye."²¹⁵ Administrative reports also confirm that the new party was 'Laministe' except in name and that Gueye was the winner of the deal, having used the SFIO to broaden his base and enhance his reputation.

Therefore, contrary to Iba der Thiam's argument which claims that

La liaison qui existait alors entre ces deux partis [PSS and SFIO] fut en définitive si étroite qu'en 1938, le PSS se laissa purement et simplement absorber par la SFIO.²¹⁶

and contrary to G.W. Johnson who has argued the greatest casualty of the Popular Front was the PSS, the fusion did not entail the

213. Rapport Annuel, Police et Sûreté, Dakar et Dépendances, 1938, 21G 136 108, ARSD.

214. Ibid.

215. Ibid.

216. Iba der Thiam, "Recherche sur les premières manifestations de la conscience syndicale au Sénégal, (la période 1936-1937)," Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, University of Dakar, PUF, no. 5, (1975), pp. 240; Johnson has a similar argument in "African Political Activity..," op.cit., 1974, p. 560.

absorption of the PSS by the SFIO. It was rather an expedient and carefully planned stratagem which enabled Gueye to attain his stated goal of gaining access to a metropolitan party's machinery and know-how by swelling the SFIO's ranks without becoming absorbed into it.

It has also been argued that the fusion marked a culmination of assimilation and that Marxist jargon, metropolitan organization and propaganda seduced the local elite with their sophistication but arrested the development of indigenous political trends.²¹⁷ This interpretation is largely correct: Following the 1936 legislative elections during which the candidates' platforms were near identical, Lamine Gueye must have realized that the only way to beat his opponent would be to revamp his party and appeal to the ideological sensibilities of his constituency. To this effect, he formed the Socialist Federation. But the new party was composed of and ruled by Africans, not Europeans. (The PSS systematically barred SFIO leaders like Ostertag, Rogier and Silvandre from holding key posts within the party).²¹⁸

DIOUF-DE COPPET RELATIONS.

Upon the ascent of the Popular Front, Diouf had proclaimed:

217. Suret-Canale, French Colonialism., op. cit., p. 456.

218. Rapport Annuel Politique, Police et Sûreté, Dakar et Dépendances, 1938, 21G 136 108, ARSD; and "Note Relative aux mouvements sociaux," 21 53 17, ARSD; see also Affaires politiques, File 579, ANSOM. In August 1938, Angrand, Graziani, and Turbé reformed the PSS with the help of old Diagnist PSS members hostile to the fusion but the party remained of marginal importance. Renseignements, August 1, 1938, 21G 147 108, ARSD.

"Je suis avec le Front Populaire pour l'ordre et la légalité,"²¹⁹

and spoke favourably of the Governor-General:

Marcel de Coppet n'est ni négrophobe, ni négrophile. Il est négrojuste. Il est un gros travailleur, animé de sentiments sincères envers l'indigène. Il travaillera au mieux des intérêts du pays.²²⁰

Yet, during the course of 1936, Diouf became increasingly anxious of the rapprochement between the opposition and the administration as well as of the overt displacement of his party.

Exasperated by an impasse that befell him scarcely after electoral victory, Diouf relinquished ideological party labels, defensively upheld the strictly local character of his politics and resorted to traditional Diagnist tactics:

Je ne suis ni radical, ni socialiste, ni communiste, mais je puis demain mettre 400.000 nègres à la disposition de la France.

...dans ce pays, il ne peut y avoir ni communistes, ni Radicaux-Socialistes, ni SFIO. Nous sommes des Français. Il n'y a ni Front Populaire, ni Front National, il y a le Front Français.²²¹

For Diouf, the Popular Front must have been threatening from the start. After 25 years in politics, he had finally succeeded in winning the deputysip elections and the favour of the administration. Yet, within a month, his victory was being

219. Vendredi, (October 17, 1936).

220. Paris-Dakar, (October 12, 1936).

221. Renseignements, June 22, 1936, 20G 92 23, ARSD and Le Sénégal, (January 17, 1937).

contested and he found himself isolated on all fronts. His decline from protagonist to mere observer contrasted sharply to the PSS which was assuming the role of the dominant party.

An antagonistic relationship with far-reaching consequences developed between Diouf and de Coppet. In October 1936, the deputy had presented his political programme to the Colonial Minister demanding the return of the Conseil Général, administrative autonomy for the Three Communes, the abolition of the indigénat, and finally, the appointment of his friend Félix Martine, Lieutenant-Governor par interim, to the post of Governor of Senegal. Diouf strongly urged Moutet not to overlook his requests (particularly the last one), or else "Ce serait... porter atteinte à mon prestige de député dans ce pays..."²²² He also sent a copy of his agenda to de Coppet asking for his "loyal and correct cooperation." In return, he claimed,

Chaque fois que vous aurez besoin de mon concours vous pouvez absolument compter sur moi. Vous pouvez être certain que vous n'aurez jamais des ennemis avec moi comme certains le désirent.²²³

At the same time, Diouf admonished de Coppet that he would not stand by and watch his opponents ruin him.²²⁴

222. Letter of Galandou Diouf to Moutet dated October 20, 1936, 17G 369 126, ARSD. Blaise Diagne before him also asked for the appointment of governors favourable to his policies.

223. Letter of Diouf to de Coppet dated August 28, 1937, and September 18, 1937, 17G 369 126, ARSD.

224. Letter of Diouf to de Coppet dated October 24, 1936, 17G 369 126, ARSD.

During 1937, Diouf and de Coppet disagreed on most issues. The former campaigned for the extension of French citizenship (to the Anciens Combattants and the holders of the Croix de Guerre). The latter argued that neither 'subjects' nor 'citizens' actually wanted citizenship because they preferred African courts which allowed them to settle their disputes without external intervention. De Coppet further argued that if citizenship entailed the automatic rejection of the statut personnel and the substitution of French for African courts, then the administration would be confronted with the problem of massive naturalisation.²²⁵ Instead, he proposed the creation of a 'local citizenship' that would grant Africans political rights equal to those of Europeans but would not necessitate the renunciation of the statut personnel.²²⁶

Diouf repeatedly requested the suppression of the indigénat and the replacement of African by French courts but de Coppet objected on financial grounds. Similarly, when he demanded full municipal rights and metropolitan status for the Three Communes, the Governor-General claimed that the communes did not manage their finances responsibly. De Coppet supported what he called 'pertinent assimilation' and gradual change. The upgrading of mixed communes to full communes was rejected on similar

225. Diouf also opposed massive naturalisation.

226. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated December 7, 1936, 21G 143 108, ARSD.

grounds.²²⁷

While Diouf's frustration with the Popular Front on the aforesaid points cannot be overlooked, it was the added effect of the passivity of the PNR, and the influx of French socialist teachers and civil servants that supported the Popular Front which fuelled the deputy's suspicions and resentment.

Following the April 1936 elections, the defeated PSS became increasingly popular, while the victorious Dioufist party lost interest in its electorate, ceased much of its activity, and witnessed a dwindling of its power and influence.

Le parti dioufiste ne reste puissant que grâce à l'influence personnelle et au sens politique du Maire, qui se dépense et dépense beaucoup pour conserver ses électeurs. Travaux d'édilité, secours aux indigènes, démarches et interventions auprès des particuliers, et des pouvoirs publiques, etc... sont les moyens avec lesquels M. Goux essaye de pallier à la désaffection des électeurs envers le député.²²⁸

During 1938, the Dioufist party remained inactive and the administration claimed it would lose the 1940 elections unless it changed its strategy.

The infiltration of socialist and communist French teachers and administrators in local politics and in the African press had a two-fold impact. On the one hand, it interfered with the local and somewhat insular style of politics in the Three Communes.

²²⁷. Letter of de Coppet to Moutet dated December 14, 1937, Affaires Politiques, File 849, Dossier 3, ANSOM.

²²⁸. Rapport Politique Annuel, Police et Sûreté, Dakar et Dépendances, 1938, 21G 136 108, ARSD; see also Renseignements, January 8, 1936, 13G 17 17, ARSD.

The French credo of "assimilatory socialism"²²⁹ was translated into the conviction that évolués had to be politically educated in order to overcome their "provincialism."²³⁰ 'Democracy,' 'fascism,' French domestic issues, and marxist jargon became topical in the SFIO, particularly before the party fused with the PSS.

The political involvement of French socialist and communist teachers and civil servants further strained relations between Diouf and the administration. The European militants openly campaigned in favour of the SFIO, criticizing Diouf and his clan. For instance, Desaunay, a socialist teacher at the Ecole Blanchot, openly campaigned against Diouf at the St. Louis municipal elections of 1937. The deputy contested the elections and demanded sanctions against Desaunay, his entourage and the administrators Jaffre and Parenteau, but de Coppet denied that the aforementioned had engaged in illegal political activities.²³¹ After the SFIO was absorbed by the PSS, the influence of the Europeans in the political arena declined not

229. Hubert Deschamps' term in "France in Black Africa and Madagascar Between 1920 and 1945," in L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, (eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, Volume 2: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1914-1960, (Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 246.

230. Johnson, "The Senegalese Urban Elite...", op.cit., 1972, p. 182.

231. Letters of de Coppet to Moutet dated April 19, 1937 and May 6, 1937, Affaires Politiques, File 849, Dossier 1, ANSOM; see also telegram of Governor Lefèbvre to de Coppet, February 27, 1937; the same file contains reports on the inquiry into the Desaunay-Diouf affair.

least because the opposition on the part of the évolués was particularly forceful:

...nous démandons, qu'on cesse de nous considérer comme des hommes de deuxième catégorie...
...au lieu d'avancer nous reculons, car malgré les protestations officielles de fraternité, la question de couleur n'a jamais été portée à un si haut diapason...²³²

Diouf became further isolated when a Popular Front sympathizer, Turbé was elected president of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce in 1937 against Paul Charvin, the deputy's choice. In vain, Diouf attempted to arrest the decline of his party by putting pressure on de Coppet to abide by his rules. Dispirited and angry, he resorted to threats:

Je ne puis tolérer plus longtemps... que l'on semble ignorer la puissance de mon parti, et je souhaite aux responsables de cette situation de n'avoir pas à l'éprouver.²³³

Yet, the impasse that Diouf found himself in came to an end, albeit, violently, only a few months later.

THE THIES STRIKE OF SEPTEMBER 1938.

a) Background to the Strike.

The Popular Front era in France officially ended after the fall of the second Blum government and the accession to power of

²³². Le Progrès, (August 7, 14, 1937 and May 22, 1937), quoted in Sûreté Générale: Les revendications des originaires évolués vues à travers la presse locale 1936-1939, "January 27, 1939, Papiers Boisson, Archives Privées 30, File 6, ANSOM.

²³³. Letter of Diouf to Borrel, Governor of Dakar et Dépendances dated April 16, 1938, 17G 369 126 and also 13G 10 17, ARSD.

Daladier on May 13, 1938. The new government excluded the SFIO from its cabinet and replaced the Colonial Minister Moutet with the former Governor-General of Algeria and resident General of Morocco, Theodore Steeg. Subsequently, de Coppet's enemies escalated their campaign against him and his colleagues.²³⁴

Meanwhile, Senegalese peanut exports rose to a record 580,000 tons and the urban African standard of living declined markedly as manifested in the rice imports which plummeted from 78,407 tons in 1937, to 35,170 in 1938.²³⁵ The ensuing 41 strikes and 14 strike threats resulted in a wage raise of 15-30%. Seven 24-hour strikes broke out in 1938 when workers demanded additional salary increases and tax relief.²³⁶ Higher wages were only granted in one instance, while tax cuts were uniformly accepted.

It was the railway workers who found the most effective means of registering their discontent. The Dakar-Niger, Senegal's (and by extension, West Africa's) most significant

234. The French right-wing paper Gringoire (May 20, 1938) accused de Coppet of encouraging revolts overseas and of a "manie d'abaisser les Européens devant les indigènes..." It also accused him of receiving orders from Moscow for the demise of the empire. Other papers such as Paris-Dakar, the Annales Coloniales, and France-Afrique Noire also campaigned extensively against de Coppet. Conversely, a group of Europeans in Dakar and some évolués held meetings and addressed telegrams of support. See 21G 142 17, ARSD and 21G 146-7 108, ARSD.

235. 2G 37 15 and 2G 38 1, ARSD.

236. CFAO workers struck twice; workers of the commercial houses, port employees, the personnel of the Maison Peyrissac, were among the strikers. See strike statistics 1936-1938, undated, unsigned, K4 1, ARSD.

nationwide corporative organization of incontestable strategic value, employed approximately 400 Europeans and 7.000-8.000 Africans.²³⁷ It was headed by Albert Giran who was highly popular amongst Africans, and his not-so-popular assistant Lescanne.

Most European workers (along with a minority of Africans) belonged to the cadre supérieur or the cadre commun supérieur which meant that they enjoyed multiple benefits such as free accommodation, transport, hospitalisation, pensions, etc. Their union, the Syndicat des Travailleurs de Chemins de Fer de l'AOF (STCF-AOF) was a member of the Civil Servants' Union and comprised 269 Europeans and 346 Africans.²³⁸ Those Africans received a monthly salary and various benefits, including sick leave, holidays, pensions and basic health care.

The majority of the workers, however, were daily laborers, "irregulars" or "auxiliaries," working an average of 54 hours a week for 7-8 francs per day.²³⁹ They were often fired arbitrarily and were deprived of rights and benefits. Their deplorable living conditions were no secret to the administration:

Les règlements en vigueur n'autorisaient ni

237. Note de la Sûreté Générale, December 5, 1938, K2 1, ARSD.

238. Figures quoted from Duquenot, "Le Front Populaire.." op. cit., 1976, p. 199.

239. Giran report dated September 1937, 17G 374 126, ARSD; also Iba der Thiam, "La Grève des Cheminots du Sénégal de Septembre 1938," Mémoire de Maîtrise, University of Dakar, (1972), p. 51.

paiement d'heures supplémentaires, ni heures de nuit, ni retraite, ni indemnité de licenciement, ni incorporation des journaliers dans les cadres.²⁴⁰

Some 302 agents de cadre, 680 auxiliaries, and 54 contract labourers composed the Syndicat des Travailleurs Indigènes du Dakar-Niger presided by François Gning.²⁴¹ As a socialist, Gning was committed to de Coppet from whom he anticipated to be rewarded with significant concessions for the African workers. Therefore, he was compelled to collaborate with the administration, particularly at times of heightened international tension and right-wing insurgence.²⁴²

As evidenced from the above figures, the majority of the auxiliaries remained outside Gning's union. In September 1937, Giran obtained some concessions for the irregulars including paid holidays, sick leave, and hospitalisation. But as prices began spiralling and the African standard of living deteriorated, the auxiliaries became progressively hostile toward the moderate orientation of the Syndicat des Travailleurs Indigènes du Dakar-Niger. Like a good French socialist, Gning was above all concerned with maintaining the status quo which he felt was being threatened by the unjustifiable demands of the auxiliaries. In

240. Rapport de l'Inspecteur du Travail, in ibid., p. 199.

241. Its origins are to found in 1929 when it was launched as the Association Amicale et Professionnelle des Agents Indigènes du Chemin de Fer de l'AOF, see ibid., p. 55; see also Périscope Africain, (November 12, 1938) and K1 1, ARSD.

242. Thiam, "La Grève des Cheminots...", op. cit., 1972, pp. 116-117.

his view, the irregulars were moving too fast and were willing to risk too much.

If the basis for misunderstanding between the auxiliaries and Gning was already there, Diouf's involvement in the crisis was the catalyst which precipitated the rift. Gning's real concern with maintaining the preciously acquired rights was distorted into an attitude of neglect verging on hostility toward the underprivileged workers.²⁴³

Diouf planned to seize the golden opportunity of offsetting Gning's socialist union with a Dioufist counterpart that would effectively pressure the Governor-General into complying with his politics. His lieutenant was Cheick Diack whose brother was Diouf's municipal secretary in Rufisque while his father-in-law, Thierno N'Diaye, was the right hand of Maneck Seck, the PRS representative in Thiès and personal friend of Diouf since 1928. Diack began organizing meetings with a circle of auxiliaries under the pretext that Gning "ne s'occupe guère que des agents de cadre,"²⁴⁴ ^{auxiliaries} urging the ^ not to support him. In May 1938, they formed a delegation which was received by Lescanne on June 20. However, its demands for wage increases were rejected on the grounds that they lacked a union framework. On June 19, the STID-N general assembly witnessed absenteeism but the union continued to appeal for moderation and neglected to include

243. Ibid, pp. 118-119.

244. Renseignements, June 22, 1938, 21G 147 108, ARSD.

auxiliaries in the executive.²⁴⁵ Gning found the auxiliaries' demands for wage increases unjustifiable:

En raison de la crise économique et politique que nous traversons, nous sommes obligés de peser nos doléances et d'aller doucement... En cette période troublée par une crise économique excessivement grave, et par les nuages noirs qui s'amoncellent vers l'est de la France, nous devons nous serrer les coudes et rester plus que jamais unis.²⁴⁶

Meanwhile, the auxiliaries organized their own meetings and drafted their own resolutions. The apparent calm did not deceive de Coppet who was already foreseeing a strike.²⁴⁷

On August 8, 1938, the auxiliaries held an ad hoc meeting to discuss the formation of an autonomous union open only to irregulars. Gning immediately disassociated his organization from them on the grounds that they were creating

Un syndicat... plutôt politique que professionnel dans le seul but de semer à tout moment du désordre au Réseau, ce que notre syndicat actuel n'admet pas.²⁴⁸

245. Duquet, "Le Front Populaire...", op. cit., 1976, p. 201.

246. Rapport moral de Gning, June 19, 1938, K1 1, ARSD.

247. In his words, "Prière... d'étudier 'dans le silence du Cabinet' s'il serait possible légalement, sans le cas où éclaterait une grève dans un service public, par exemple au Dakar-Niger, de mobiliser les grévistes Européens et indigènes..." Note de Coppet, June 23, 1938, 17G 374 126, ARSD.

248. Gning further urged de Coppet to act swiftly and make a "firm decision" to punish the 12 auxiliary leaders "qui espèrent arriver à leurs fins grâce à leurs appuis politiques," Gning to de Coppet, August 11, 1938, K1 1, ARSD.

Lescannes underestimated the gravity of events. On September 26, he conferred with the Thiès commander par interim and reported that "le mouvement des cheminots n'est pas inquietant."²⁴⁹ Similarly, the security forces did not assess the situation as critical.²⁵⁰ Yet, according to the Governor of Senegal's report, that same evening the administrator of Thiès was informed by the police that the auxiliaries had decided to strike in protest ^{against} the arbitrary dismissal of Cheick Diack.

b) The Setting of the Strike.

Diack who had by now reasserted himself as the head of the auxiliary movement undertook to travel down the entire Dakar-Niger line to rally support. The administration denied him the right to travel to Bamako and appointed him instead to a minor post in Gossas. It was evident that the authorities were alarmed by the schism in the union movement which had hitherto been under the firm control of the socialist Gning.²⁵¹

An alternative rendition of events was sketched out by the Governor of Senegal: Diouf had first intervened in the Dakar-Niger crisis as early as September 24. While meeting with de Coppet, he extracted the promise that if Diack demonstrated good

249. Rapport Lescannes, September 26, 1938, K1 1, ARSD.

250. Only 45 municipal of Dakar-Niger policemen, 5 gardes de cercle and 6 gendarmes would be mobilized.

251. Governor of Senegal Report, September 8, 1938, K1 1, ARSD; Thiam has argued that Gning played a significant role in Diack's displacement; see Thiam, "La Grève des Cheminots...", op. cit., 1972, pp. 85-88.

will and took up the post in Gossas, he would soon be transferred to Dakar or Thiès. Diack knew about this proposition before he left Dakar. Furthermore, Maneck Seck organized a strike during September 25 and 26, encouraging the strikers to arm themselves.²⁵² Subsequently, Diouf ordered that the strike begin immediately.²⁵³

On September 24, the Director of the Dakar-Niger received a telegram from Coulibaly, the head of the Thiès auxiliaries, demanding the annulment of Diack's transfer or else further unrest would break out.²⁵⁴ After conflicting responses within the administrative ranks, the Governor-General confirmed Diack's transfer. The next day, Diack headed for Gossas after a brief stopover at Thiès. On September 26, the auxiliaries sent a telegram threatening to strike if Diack did not arrive on the 27th.²⁵⁵

On September 27, 1,410 auxiliaries went on strike. A group of 300 demanded wage increases but resumed work after their foreman claimed he was not qualified to assess their claims.²⁵⁶ Maneck Seck, (initially an outsider to the Dakar-Niger but who since August headed the Thiès auxiliary section) exploited the

252. Governor of Senegal Report, ibid.

253. Redouté Report, October 1, 1938, K1 1, ARSD.

254. Directeur de la Sécurité Générale Lefèbvre to de Coppet, September 30, 1938, K1 1, ARSD.

255. Rapport sur les événements antérieures du Septembre 27, K1 1, ARSD, and Lefebvre report, ibid.

256. Cau Report, March 30, 1938, K1 1, ARSD.

situation and hosted a meeting which had political, if not electoral, overtones. Some 60 to 80 workers simultaneously occupied an important level crossing to ensure no strike breakers interfered.²⁵⁷ A force of 80 soldiers attempted to disperse them. The strikers began throwing ballast stones at the police and at those who wanted to resume work. Violence spread rapidly. An isolated shot was fired, followed by approximately 50 more. Seven auxiliaries died and 125 strikers and policemen were wounded.²⁵⁸

At the end of the day, Diouf hurried to Thiès, openly projecting himself as the spokesman of the auxiliaries.

Cette affaire sera portée à la connaissance du Ministre, on ne tue pas des noirs comme des mouches, nos revendications seront defendus; ne reprenez pas le travail.²⁵⁹

On September 28, the strike spilled over to Dakar, Guin-guinéo, Louga and partially to Rufisque, Diourbel and Kaolack.²⁶⁰ De Coppet mustered the support of the marabouts Seydou Nourou

257. It is not certain if the strikers arrived there before the soldiers.

258. Of which 45 policemen and two officers. Some 29 were only lightly hurt. For a detailed version of the development of the strike see Lescanne report to the Inspector General of Public Works, no. 31, October 12, 1938, K2 1, ARSD; also Duquet, "Le Front Populaire...", op. cit., 1976, chapters on Thiès strike. Diouf, de Coppet, and the Governor of Senegal each gave a different version of events.

259. Rapport Redouté, October 10, 1938, K1 1, ARSD.

260. Iba der Thiam and Suret-Canale disagree on this point. The latter argues that the strike spread throughout the entire line while the former does not.

Tall and Moustapha M'Backé to break the strike.²⁶¹

Meanwhile, the European political arena was witnessing great turbulence as a result of the Munich Conference and rumours of general mobilisation. This state of affairs dictated an immediate resolution to the conflict.

On September 29, a delegation was received by the Governor-General and an accord was reached according to which there would be no sanctions against the strikers and no further obstacles to the formation of the auxiliary association. Some compensation for the strike victims' families was promised. Finally, in an exercise of good will, the administration agreed to reconsider the question of wage increases.²⁶²

Seck warned that an agreement should not be signed without approval from Diouf. Finally, impressed with de Coppet's steadfastness, Coulibaly recommended that the strikers return to their posts. Diouf contradicted this order and insisted that the strikers should cease work until they were paid for all the days they were on strike. De Coppet refused to go along with this demand, and suspicions of Diouf's motives heightened:

Devant ses indications la faveur dont jouissait le député semble en régression, les grévistes commencent à douter de son impartialité dans cette affaire, constatant au surplus que depuis qu'elle a pris l'ampleur que l'on connaît, on n'a jamais constaté sa présence effective aux côtés de ceux dont il dirige dans l'ombre

261. Tall reprimanded the strikers for disobeying the authorities, see Rapport Redouté, October 1, 1938, K1 1, ARSD.

262. Paris-Dakar, (October 1, 1938).

l'action revendicatrice.²⁶³

Eager to have the last word and emerge as the person responsible for putting an end to the strike, on September 30 Diouf authorized the return to work on condition that he personally submit the strikers' demands to the Governor-General.

In order to appease the auxiliaries and put an end to the crisis, de Coppet contributed 2.000 francs to the treasury of the Association Amicale et Professionnelle des Agents du Dakar-Niger, visited the main railway stations and offered 1.500 francs to every family of the strike victims. In addition, he approved the statutes of the auxiliary association, increased the auxiliaries' wages and dismissed Lescannes who had mishandled the crisis.

c) The Aftermath and Implications of the Thiès Crisis.

The strike was not only a spontaneous protest against meagre salaries, but a remonstrance against Gning's union that was indifferent to the great disparity in the standard of living between the auxiliaries and the agents de cadre, as well as to their rights and claims. It was also a call for the recognition of the dissident auxiliary union.²⁶⁴ From mid-August onward, the auxiliary movement

... a été accroché par le parti... dioufiste à l'effet d'un rétablissement d'une situation locale

²⁶³. Renseignements, September 29, 1938, 21G 146 108, ARSD.

²⁶⁴. Lescannes report and Redouté report, op.cit.

défaillante et de la réduction a merci du représentant du parti adverse.²⁶⁵

The Governor Lefèbvre argued that it was not possible to prove Diouf's active participation in the auxiliary movement in the days preceeding the strike. Yet, Diouf intervened twice in favour of Diack and took great interest in Alassane Dieng, one of the leaders of the strike. But, it was after September 27 that his participation in the rail crisis was evident.

According to Inspector Redouté's report, the évolués were convinced that politics played a significant role in the Thiès events and that Seck was responsible.²⁶⁶ Others believed that "... il s'agissait tout simplement d'une manoeuvre du député contre le Gouverneur Général."²⁶⁷ AOF reported that it was a case of

... une grève absurde, qu'aucun motif sérieux ne justifiait. Ce fut l'oeuvre malsaine de quelques politiciens déloyaux, intéressés à discrediter le Gouvernement actuel.

L'objectif des provocateurs? Faire partir pour toujours M. de Coppet... avec l'espoir de le faire remplacer avec un autre Gouverneur-Général, plus malléable et qui accepterait même de se compromettre pour l'impossible réélection de Galandou en 1940.²⁶⁸

while de Coppet argued that

265. Lefèbvre report, op. cit.

266. "Bien qu'étant ni syndiqué, ni ouvrier, c'est lui... qui a porté le droit syndical sur le plan politique. Redouté report, op. cit.

267. Ibid.

268. AOF, (November 5, 1938).

...[les] indigènes ... ignoraient pourquoi ils faisaient grève... seul le bilan des victimes donne à un banal incident local un caractère de gravité qu'il n'aurait pas revêtu sans la réaction des tirailleurs, qui se sont estimés en état de légitime défense.²⁶⁹

In France, news of the strike infuriated the right-wing which resented de Coppet's 'scandalous weakness.' The Colonial Minister Mandel ordered that an investigation be conducted into the crisis (Gaston Joseph Inquiry commission).²⁷⁰ Essentially, the Thiès strike signalled the end of the Popular Front era in Senegal, unleashing a second wave of propaganda against de Coppet. Mandel removed him from office under the pretext of vacation leave, following which he was transferred to Indochina.

Meanwhile, the Governor-General par interim Pierre Boisson engineered a plan to neutralise and dismantle the trade union movement. Some 40 arrests took place in Thiès, Dakar, St. Louis for rebellion and obstruction of the right to work.²⁷¹ Additional strikes followed but work was quickly resumed after the strike leaders were arrested. Diouf ceased to support the auxiliary movement and sided at once with Boisson who was not about to give in to the workers' demands or else, "ce groupement ferait la

²⁶⁹. Letters of de Coppet to Goux dated October 5, 1938 and October 1, 1938, 17G 369 126, ARSD.

²⁷⁰. Significant changes followed the arrival of Joseph: The Governor of Senegal Lefèbvre was replaced by Parisot (Paris-Dakar October 26, 1938) and the authoritarian Cunéo was appointed manager of the Dakar-Niger.

²⁷¹. Gana Fall, "Le Nationalisme..," op. cit., 1979-80, p. 64.

grève chaque fois."²⁷² Only then did the Dakar-Niger irregulars realize that the alliance with the PRS was but a political tactic on the part of the deputy.

CONCLUSIONS.

The 28-month period of Popular Front rule in Senegal had profound and far-reaching consequences in the development of black politics and the evolution of the trade union movement. Contrary to previous administrations which had at best tolerated political activity, the Popular Front encouraged political participation (by way of Popular Front committees, the SFIO and the PCF) not only in the Three Communes but, more importantly, in the interior. The emergence of the urban trading centres in the interior as a political force marked the beginning of a new era in Senegalese politics.

De Coppet's objective was to harness and control the Senegalese socialist movement so as to monitor its development. The result was substantially different: Seeking an opportunity to assume a leading role in the political arena, scores of Europeans became involved in the SFIO. Before the SFIO fused with the PSS, the SFIO was largely a European party preoccupied with metropolitan politics--in a sense, isolated from black politics proper (i.e. the Dioufist party and the PSS). Thus, even if many Europeans did become involved in local politics as Wesley Johnson has argued, it was not to the exclusion of

²⁷². Rapport Politique Annuel, 1938, 2G 38 31, ARSD.

Africans.

The SFIO-PSS fusion, though a triumph of assimilationist ideology, was scarcely a victory of the SFIO at the expense of the PSS. The legislative elections of 1936 had in fact demonstrated that Diouf and Gueye led parties with near identical platforms which differed only in terms of their constituencies. Gueye's alliance with the SFIO was a stratagem to invigorate his party with a metropolitan ideological and organizational apparatus in order to help win over his opponent's supporters.

Under the Popular Front, the political consciousness of African 'citizens' and 'subjects' in the Three Communes was heightened through socialist-organized activities in more ways than one. Initially, the squabbling between the factions of the SFIO provided the évolués with invaluable insight into the dynamics of French politics--a dimension they had not witnessed before. In addition, Africans witnessed open criticism against the administration, the very principle of colonialism and the French heads of state. However, the Senegalese elite before the Second World War did not step out of the boundaries of assimilation.

Les revendications extrêmes ne dépassent point, toutefois, les limites d'une assimilation de plus en plus poussée vers une égalité absolue avec l'élément Européen, et les jeunes Dakarais instruits sont sans doute ceux qui montreraient le plus d'hostilité envers une propagande à tendance nationaliste.²⁷³

273. ibid.

The relationship between Diouf and de Coppet grew increasingly antagonistic over the two-year period: the deputy expected the Governor-General to support him against the opposition, appoint administrators that would favour his policies and turn a blind eye to electoral fraud. De Coppet was not willing to perpetuate such relations. In addition, the development of Gueye's rival socialist movement further exacerbated the differences between Diouf and de Coppet. Notwithstanding his defeat in the deputyship elections of 1936, Lamine Gueye had within a year won control of the colony and was cultivating the image of de Coppet's protégé. Diouf witnessed a dwindling of his support and influence as the Popular Front and Gueye consolidated their own.

The Dakar-Niger crisis provided Diouf with perhaps the last opportunity to restore his power and play the administration and the 'Laministes' against each other. Thus, overnight, he found himself in a position of authority vis-à-vis de Coppet, the opposition and the French colonialists. While it is improbable that he engineered the strike, as Iba der Thiam claims, it is certain that he exploited it to discredit the opposition and oust the Governor-General, and with it the liberal politics of the Popular Front.

Chapter III

THE WAR, VICHY AND THE BOISSON REGIME, 1939-1942

The Second World War in French West Africa constitutes a catalyst in a period of political and socio-economic crisis that unleashed forces and ideas which contested the status quo of colonialism and the de facto superiority of the European coloniser and put into sharp focus the development of black politics in the federation and the future relationship between France and her colonies. While Africans did not contest the principle of colonialism per se, the monolithic image of a France 'une et indivisible' was forever shattered and with it a colonial order resistant to change.

Interpretations of Vichy rule generally fall into two main camps: the Vichyite and the Gaullist. Pro-Vichyite writers like Chenet and Martin du Gard²⁷⁴ have praised Boisson's lucid policy of neutrality for safeguarding the colonial territories (and by extension France) from German, British and Gaullist encroachment. Africans are hailed for their unfailing loyalty to the Vichy government throughout the duration of the war: They defended Dakar in September 1940 and willingly placed metropolitan needs for foodstuffs and raw materials above their own, stoically enduring the deprivations. The reported absence of African

²⁷⁴. P. Chenet, Qui a sauvé l'Afrique?, (Paris: L'Elan, 1949) and Maurice Martin du Gard, La carte impériale: Histoire de la France Outre-Mer, 1940-1945, (Paris: Editions André Bonne, 1949), La chronique de Vichy, (Paris: Flammarion, 1948), Le drame de l'Afrique Française: Choses Vues, 1940, (Paris: Sequana, 1941).

opposition and unrest in AOF is often cited as conclusive evidence of African loyalty towards France.

While the Vichyite interpretation did not survive the fall of the Pétain-Laval regime, the axiom of African loyalty became an integral part of Free French war propaganda and postwar historiography. In fact, the Gaullist rendition of events has influenced scholars of both leftist and conservative persuasions who share the conviction that Vichy was an interlude of unprecedented authoritarian rule characterized by racial discrimination and ruthless exploitation of African peoples.

Le gouvernement de Vichy a replongé le Sénégal dans les ténèbres... quatres années d'engouement, d'obscurantisme total ont fait reculer le Sénégal d'un demi siècle qui ont sapé les libertés démocratiques et syndicales au profit de l'Etat Français autoritaire, paternaliste, totalitaire, corporatiste, catholique, mais surtout raciste...²⁷⁵

Africans are portrayed as passive and helpless victims of an aberration of French colonial rule delivered by the Free French who restored 'republican liberties.' Their alleged exemplary loyalty toward Free France exceeded even French expectations: they had fought for France, defied capitulation, resisted the Vichy regime and awaited for the opportunity to serve and save de Gaulle's France.

African resistance is interpreted strictly within the

²⁷⁵. Falilou Diallo, "Le Sénégal sous Vichy 1940-43: contribution à l'étude du régime politique du gouvernement de Vichy au Sénégal," Memoire de Maitrise, (University of Paris 1, 1980), pp. 2-3.

Vichy/Free France framework. There is no hint to the effect that it might have been a manifestation of opposition to colonial rule rather than a protest against a particular metropolitan faction or else that it could have expressed a determination to protect self-interests.

The recent Marxian interpretation formulated by James Giblin has identified and challenged the presence of neo-Gaullist elements (such as African patriotism) in most contemporary historiography of Vichy rule.²⁷⁶ Giblin interprets Vichy as a period of African popular resistance to capitalist imperialism during which

.... a common people asserted themselves in the process of historical transformation and contributed to the molding of social and economic relations.²⁷⁷

It is further argued that Vichy interrupted the course of French colonial history and was instrumental in the formation of an African national bourgeoisie. While this interpretation sheds

²⁷⁶. In his essay, "The Image of the Loyal African During the Second World War and its Postwar Use by the French Communist Party," Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines, vol. 141, no. 2, (1980), pp. 319-326, Giblin criticises Denise Bouche, "Le retour de l'Afrique Occidentale Française dans la lutte contre l'ennemi aux côtés des alliés," Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, no. 114, (1979), pp. 41-68; D.B. Marshall, "Free France in Africa: Gaullism and Colonialism," in P. Gifford and W.R. Lewis (eds.), France and Britain in Africa, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 663-712; Hubert Deschamps, Roi de la Brousse, (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1975), and others for relying on Gaullist assumptions.

²⁷⁷. Jim Giblin, "The Vichy Years in French Africa," M.A. thesis, (McGill University, 1978), p. 24.

some new light on the period, the material has been made to fit into a Marxist framework all too readily. Thus, Giblin's analysis of the economic effects of the war and particularly the shift of African production from export to subsistence crops which he interprets as a form of African resistance to colonial rule, is inaccurate.

The absence of literature on Vichy rule in French West Africa accounts for the fact that many gaps remain regarding AOF's military and economic involvement in the war, the nature of the impact of the Vichy regime on the colonies and the African response. Many questions still surround the reported "enthusiastic response"²⁷⁸ of Africans to the recruitment campaign of 1939, the African contribution to the war effort and its implications for French-African relations after the war.

What was the impact of wartime conditions and Vichy policy-making on everyday life in Senegal? For whom did Vichy make a difference? How important was the military dimension of the war to colonial policy-making? What were the repercussions of the abortive British-Free French attack on Dakar? These are among the questions this chapter will attempt to address and contextualise.

AFRICAN MILITARY CONTRIBUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

The new colonial minister, Georges Mandel, was a

²⁷⁸. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 45.

conservative in the Radical Party. He had vehemently opposed the Munich agreements and aspired to a post in the Ministry of National Defense before reluctantly accepting colonial office. His arrival at Rue Oudinot was eloquently described by the Governor Hubert Deschamps: "Moutet lui montra, sur l'énorme globe terrestre du bureau ministériel, où se trouvaient les colonies françaises."²⁷⁹ Mandel was instructed to enforce war measures following the September 1938 session of the Council of Ministers.

a) Conscription.

Mandel generalised conscription in AOF so that by November 1939, the number of recruits surpassed the total number of Africans enlisted throughout the First World War (180.000 men).²⁸⁰ According to decrees promulgated during the interwar years, the draft applied to all males between the ages of 19 and 28. In reality, the absence of public records in rural areas

279. Hubert Deschamps, *Roi de la Brousse*, op. cit., 1975, p. 185. On Mandel's career and activities as colonial minister see F. Varenne, Mon Patron, Georges Mandel, (Paris, 1947), p. 149: "La question coloniale ne l'avait jamais passionné: il connaissait peu le ministère de la Rue Oudinot." Claudine Cotte, "La politique économique de la France en Afrique Noire 1936-1946," Thèse du IIIe cycle, (University of Paris VII, 1981), p. 45 argues that "Sa première et quasi-unique préoccupation est de faire de son unique ministère un ministère militaire et s'acharnant jour après jour et sans désespérer à mettre l'Empire à même de répondre aux besoins de la Métropole."

280. "Observations sur les rapports sur le recrutement pour 1940," Directeur des Affaires Politiques et Administratives to Chef de Cabinet Militaire, June 11, 1940, 4D 4 14, ARSD; see also Myron Echenberg, "'Morts Pour la France': the African Soldier in France during the Second World War," Journal of African History, vol. 26, no. 4, (1985), p. 364, for more detailed information on recruitment during the two wars.

allowed chiefs to recruit anyone between 16 and 40 years of age for the 1939-40 campaign.

Mobilization figures for the Vichy period fluctuate considerably: administrative reports claim that between 80.000 to 100.000 West Africans were sent to the European front and another 118.000 were held as reservists or recruits in AOF.²⁸¹ The historians Michael Crowder and Suret-Canale place those figures at 80.000 and 100.000 respectively, while Joseph Ki-Zerbo has raised the numbers of recruits and reservists to 127.320 for AOF, 15.500 for AEF and 34.000 for Madagascar.²⁸² Robert Cornevin has calculated that a total of 63.000 were sent to war and 24.000 were reported either dead or missing at the time of the armistice.²⁸³

281. "Observations sur les rapports sur le recrutement pour 1940," Directeur des Affaires Politiques et Administratives to Chef de Cabinet Militaire, June 11, 1940, 4D 4 14, ARSD.

282. Michael Crowder, "The 1939-1945 War and West Africa," in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa, vol. 2, (London: Longmans, 1974), p. 598; Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Histoire générale de l'Afrique Noire d'hier à demain, (Paris: Hatier, 1978), p. 470.

283. Robert Cornevin, "Le Corps des administrateurs de la France d'Outre Mer durant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale," Colloque: Les prodromes de la décolonisation de l'empire français 1936-1956, op. cit., 1985, p. (8) see also Frederick Pedler in Main Currents of West African History, 1940-1978, (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 5, cites that 65.000 soldiers were mobilized between 1939 and 1940. 459

Table 1. 284

	<u>Men Incorporated into Military Service</u>					
	<u>AOF and Senegal</u>					
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Senegal	11.143	2.045	4.700	2.428	2.318	285
<u>AOF</u>	57.279	16.346	20.050	10.719	9.908	5.290

Table 2. 285

Recruitment in Senegal: January to June 1940.

January 1940:	2.055
February & March:	1.900
May :	2.200
June:	2.000
<u>Total:</u>	8.155

Black fighters were grouped into seven African and three colonial divisions (out of a total of 80 French divisions), comprising nearly 9% of the French armed forces as opposed to 3% during the Great War.²⁸⁶ After the armistice and the subsequent demobilization of French forces, the disproportionate number of African to French soldiers (now serving in the Free French forces) increased even further. It has been estimated that by

²⁸⁴. in Giblin, "Vichy in...", op. cit., 1974, p. 144.

²⁸⁵. Figures exclude Dakar recruitment. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 2, ARSD.

²⁸⁶. Echenberg, "'Morts pour la France'...", op. cit., 1985, p. 364.

September 1944, 20.000 black Africans formed the backbone of the Free French army and no less than 20% of de Lattre's forces which fought on the side of the Allies.²⁸⁷ In terms of recruits and casualties (over 200.000 black African recruits of which 12% died in battle),²⁸⁸ the African military contribution in the Second World War far exceeded that of the Great War.

Senegal's originaires served either in the 6th Régiment d'Artillerie Coloniale (RAC), or in the Régiment Mixte de l'Infanterie Coloniale de l'AOF under the same conditions as the Europeans. By contrast, the 'subjects' who belonged to the second section of the contingent had inferior living quarters, food and clothing. Under Galandou Diouf's instigation, the French government created a third, 18-member college for veterans in the Conseil Colonial on April 8, 1939, in order to encourage enlistment.²⁸⁹ 'Faire tirailleur' was a 'symbole de promotion' and a unique opportunity to acquire the status, prestige and privileges of French citizens. As the Conseil convened only occasionally and was stripped of executive power,

287. Ibid.

288. Ibid., p. 365.

289. Decree of April 8, 1939; Affaires Politiques, File 635, Dossier 1, ANSOM; see also Mandel report of April 8, 1939 to President Lebrun in the same dossier; Session Ordinaire du Conseil Colonial, November 3, 1939; 13G 45 180, ARSD; thereafter, the Colonial Council was composed of 26 councillors elected by French citizens; 18 chiefs chosen by the chefs de canton and 18 councillors elected by veterans and subjects. Among the benefits accorded to the veteran councillors were exemptions from personal tax, prestations and the indigénat, see Phillipe Roquès, "L'Armée et l'Empire," Notre Combat, vol. 2, no. 6, (February 9, 1940), p. 10.

the reform was hardly comparable to the Diagne Laws of 1916 which had conferred French citizenship on the veterans.

Yet, convinced that it was only a matter of time before they would qualify for citizenship, a large number of 'subjects' raced to enlist as volunteers. Their enthusiastic and patriotic response to the war was, as Abdoulaye Ly has argued, a political bluff, a "réaction intéressée."²⁹⁰ When assigned to 'subject' ranks, they bitterly protested, contesting the legitimacy of the 'subject/citizen' dichotomy.²⁹¹

Mamadou Dia is a case in point. Despite his efforts to enlist as a volunteer, he was rejected on the grounds that there were no provisions for the admission of subjects in the military. Dia remarked that

Depuis que l'élément sujet est dignement représenté dans toutes les branches de l'administration, depuis qu'il forme la majorité de l'élite indigène, il paraît [word erased] de s'arrêter ces règlements qui ne s'adaptent plus aux conditions actuelles de l'évolution des populations et ne tiennent guère compte surtout des nécessités du moment.²⁹²

The 'citizens' felt threatened by the pressing demands of the educated 'subjects' and when they were not dispatched to the front, they feared that "... on veut se passer de nous et reprendre les droits de citoyens qui nous auraient été

²⁹⁰. Abdoulaye Ly, Interview in Dakar, July 17, 1984.

²⁹¹. Renseignements, October 10, 1939, 21G 74 17, ARSD.

²⁹². Letter of Mamadou Dia to Governor Parisot dated September 12, 1939, 13G 103 180, ARSD.

octroyés..."²⁹³ When due to insufficient stock they were given the clothing and food of ordinary soldiers, the 'citizens' took the issue to the Conseil Colonial.

In Dakar, mobilization caused "le désordre et la pagaille"²⁹⁴ as tirailleurs flocked to the capital overnight from all over AOF before being sent to the front. According to Maurice Maillat who was at the time serving in the 6th RAC, the first convoy left Dakar on September 6, 1939 with 2.000 men for Casablanca, followed by an additional 56 convoys with 69.268 soldiers.²⁹⁵

b) Prisoners of War, (POWs).

The First and Sixth Colonial Divisions fought the battles of Aisne and Argonne while the Fourth and Fifth Divisions defended the Somme in May 1940. Approximately 20.000 African soldiers were taken prisoners of war (see appendix 1), out of which only half survived captivity.²⁹⁶ After a year of imprisonment in Germany, they were usually transferred to front-stalags, labour camps in Vichy France, where they worked in arms manufacturing

293. Renseignements, Inspector Fessaguet, September 10 and 12, 1939, 21G 74 17, ARSD.

294. Maurice Maillat, Dakar sous la flamme de guerre 1939-45, no date, mimeographed, irregular pagination, p. 3.

295. Ibid., irregular pagination.

296. Echenberg, "'Morts pour la France'...", op. cit., 1985, pp. 364, 371; see also his section on prison and repatriation camps, pp. 371-375.

and mining industries for token wages.²⁹⁷

According to a government circular, POWs quickly became demoralised due to the frequent transfers from camp to camp; inadequate food, clothing, blankets and shoes; the fear of more cold winters in captivity; and the absence of news from their families.²⁹⁸ The tirailleur Ibrahima Teligne from the cercle of Kédougou who fought with the 201 RAC and was taken prisoner of war in Méricourt described his experience as follows:

Les prisonniers... marchèrent pendant six jours, pas nourris pendant ces six jours; sur les flancs de la colonne marchaient les soldats allemands qui piquaient des tirailleurs à la baïonnette où leur donnaient des coups de crosse... tout refus d'obéissance était sanctionnée par la mort immédiate; ... des prisonniers noirs abbatués à coups de fusils pour avoir ramassé des colis de victuailles jetés par dessus les murs par les Français. Des tirailleurs ayant réussi à quitter le camp et y revenir avec des pommes de terre obtenues dans la ville ont été immédiatement tués.²⁹⁹

Pulmonary disease was widespread among African POWs. Some were able to end their captivity on medical grounds (i.e. L.S. Senghor), while 5.000 others found their way to occupied

²⁹⁷. See Appendix 1, on prisoner of war camps in France.

²⁹⁸. Circular of January 19, 1942, 2D 28 24, ARSD. Some 150 Senegalese soldiers were held since 1940 in a Prisoner of War camp in the Ile de Walcheren in the Low Countries who, according to a French official, "qui sont dans le dénuement le plus complet, ne recevant ni nouvelles, ni colis de leur pays." Délégué Général Adjoint Burin des Rozières to Minister of Colonies, French Red Cross, January 22, 1944; Affaires Politiques, File 870, ANSOM.

²⁹⁹. Statement of Ibrahima Teligne June 25, 1941, 2D 28 24, ARSD.

Paris.³⁰⁰ The lack of interest on the part of the French authorities in the fate of the demobilized soldiers and the long delays in wage or indemnity payments demoralized Africans further. According to Boisson, this made POWs particularly vulnerable to German propaganda such as the following:

Le gouvernement Français se désintéresse du sort des prisonniers coloniaux après les avoir entraînés dans une guerre contre leur gré. Ils insinuent que, durant leur captivité et tandis qu'ils sont privés et démunis de tout, les Français dévalisent leur pays et laissent leurs familles dans la misère. Les Allemands se posent en défenseurs des opprimés.³⁰¹

According to the same source, the Germans claimed they had approached French authorities with the intention of negotiating the repatriation of POWs but the latter "font maintenant la sourde oreille car elles craignent des révoltes au moment du retour des prisonniers dans leur pays. Elles préfèrent donc les laisser à leur triste sort dans les camps."³⁰² Admiral Platon was particularly alarmed with the rumours of the preferential treatment Germans accorded to African prisoners such as privileged employment within the camps, food supplements and transfers to warmer camps in the southwest of France.³⁰³

According to one account, in Berlin, Germans

300. Echenberg, "'Morts pour la France'...", op. cit., 1985, p. 372-3.

301. Boisson circular of January 19, 1940, 2D 28 24, ARSD.

302. Ibid.

303. Platon letter dated February 14, 1941, 2D 28 24, ARSD.

...constitueraient des groupes d'indigènes qu'ils habillent, nourrissent bien... promènent dans la capitale, de café en restaurant auxquels ils donneraient même des femmes. Ils les feraient également parler à la radio.³⁰⁴

Though such instances were rare, the colonial administration manifested an attitude of suspicion and hostility toward POWs and returning soldiers in general, to the point where it ordered a close surveillance of all repatriated tirailleurs.

c) Demobilization.

Following the declaration of the armistice in July 1940, the disbandment of the Black Army began with the demobilization of approximately 75.000 tirailleurs, allowing Boisson to maintain an army of only 33.000 to 40.000 men.³⁰⁵ Inculcated with new and often radical ideas, the returning soldiers promptly took up the issue of equality. They formed committees which engaged in passionate discussions on what they considered to be the arbitrary and artificial distinction of peoples into 'citizens' and 'subjects.' Why, it was asked, were residents of the Three Communes born with rights superior to the inhabitants of the interior? While not contesting French supremacy, 'subjects' demanded the abolition of the special status of the

³⁰⁴. Note of the Inspector General of the Administrative Police, January 31, 1941, Affaires Politiques, File 870, ANSOM. See also Platon report of February 14, 1941, 2D 28 24, ARSD.

³⁰⁵. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 2, ARSD; Chenet, Qui a Sauvé l'Afrique?, op. cit., 1949, pp. 124-25.

'citizens.'³⁰⁶

Ils paraissent beaucoup plus raisonnables qu'on le croit; ils demandent pour les gens de leur couleur une distinction basée sur le mérite de chacun; ils ne demandent pas l'égalité avec la race blanche.³⁰⁷

THE MYTH OF THE LOYAL AFRICAN, PART I.

Three days after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the Governor General of AOF, Léon Cayla, sent the following telegram to Mandel:

Dans heures graves que vit la nation, les populations de l'AOF font preuve du plus ardent patriotisme - STOP - de plus en plus nombreux sont les volontaires qui désirent se joindre aux mobilisés - STOP - jamais la Fédération ne s'est sentie plus proche de la mère patrie vers laquelle vont toutes ses pensées.³⁰⁸

The colonial authorities in Senegal retorted that

La guerre a dressé la colonie tout entière contre l'ennemi commun: proclamations des chefs, prêche des marabouts, 'tracts' des lettrés, engagements volontaires dépassant toutes prévisions, traduisent l'enthousiasme général et la seule idée du moment 'combattre Hitler', et pour cela, aller en France, revêtir l'uniforme, sans distinction d'origine, de statut.³⁰⁹

306. Renseignements, July 11 and 15, 1940, 21G 74 17, ARSD.

307. Renseignements, July 15, 1940, 21G 74 17, ARSD.

308. Journal Officiel AOF, September 9, 1939. The Annual Political Report of 1939 mentions 534 volunteers recruited during that year.

309. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal, Affaires Indigènes, 1939, 2G 39 34, ARSD.

and the security forces recorded similar reactions:

Faisant abstraction de toute controverse politique, les indigènes de tout age, de toutes conditions, unis comme un seul bloc, n'ont exteriorisé qu'une seule idée, leur amour propre pour la mère patrie.³¹⁰

Unfailing patriotism, spontaneous mass enlistment, organic unity of the French family--all the elements that appear in the above statements coalesced into the myth of the 'loyal African.'

Police reports further argued that the originaires were fiercely anti-German, fearing Nazi racism (apparently Hitler's references to blacks as 'half-savages' were well known) and conscious of the implications of German colonial rule on their preferential status.³¹¹

Si par impossible, la France était vaincue...
c'est vous, Bambaras, Sénégalais, ou Mossis, qui
seriez les premiers victimes de sa défaite et ...
sous la ferule allemande, vous assisteriez à un
véritable retour à l'esclavage... Nous nous
battons pour nous mêmes...³¹²

Thus argued Galandou Diouf, stressing that if necessary, he could raise an African contingent of two million men. If this statement rings of Blaise Diagne, it is because Diouf no doubt saw in the war an opportunity to increase his power exponentially, by

310. Renseignements, September 4, 1939, 21G 74 17, ARSD.

311. Renseignements, July 11, 1940, 21G 74 17, ARSD.

312. Galandou Diouf quoted in Philippe Roquès, "L'armée de l'empire," op. cit., p. 5.

becoming Commissaire des Colonies (a position equal to that of Governor-General) as Diagne had done before him.

The deputy organized a solidarity meeting in Dakar and called for an end of all political squabbling, in the interest of union. The preservation of the elite's interests was signalled as a key factor of African loyalty to France and was highlighted in the deputy's speech: "A la Chambre des Députés... j'ai autant de droits que le plus blanc et le plus français des députés. La France nous a tout donnée."³¹³

The marabouts had similarly a lot to lose from this war. For this reason, they actively participated in the mobilization of soldiers and of public opinion. "If you pray for France, you pray for yourselves and for Islam" was the message the holy men addressed to their talibés.³¹⁴ El Hadj Dramé, the Tijani marabout from Louga and Seydou Nourou Tall from Kaolack among others, organized mass rallies where they warned their disciples of German brutality and extolled French virtues.

The 'citizens' and the marabouts who responded enthusiastically to the war were two groups whose hard-earned privileges would be seriously jeopardized by a French defeat. Conversely, educated 'subjects' (teachers, civil servants, etc.) who also responded with fervor to France's enlistment call

313. Renseignements, October 16, 1939, 21G 74 17, ARSD.

314. Renseignements, November 25, 1939, 21G 74 17, ARSD; See also the speech of Seydou Nourou Tall in Kaolack, Renseignements, October 1939, 21G 74 17, ARSD; the marabout El Hadj Dramé of Louga referred to the Germans as the "étérnels ennemis du genre humain"; La Justice, (October 9, 1939).

constituted the one group for which the war could substantially improve their position and further their ambitions.

THE ARMISTICE IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA.

According to the Franco-German armistice of June 18, 1940, French authorities had to: free Axis subjects in all French territories (article 19); dismantle the French fleet except for a small fraction which was deemed essential for the protection of colonial interests (article 8); and collaborate with the Germans "d'une manière correcte" (article 3).³¹⁵

Rumours of an armistice with Germany were circulating in Dakar since May 1940. Fearing Axis occupation, the African elite was even talking of forming a republic with U.S. help, to continue the war on the side of the British in the event of a French capitulation.³¹⁶ The évolués equated French weakness with ministerial instability and anxiously contrasted the British, French and German systems of colonial rule.³¹⁷

The sudden announcement of the armistice on June 21 came as a shock and a 'grand deuil' to Europeans and urban Africans. "L'espoir était si bien ancré dans tous les esprits que les bruits d'armistice furent accueilli avec une véritable

³¹⁵. The Franco-German Armistice Convention of June 22, 1940, 2D 14 2, ARSD.

³¹⁶. Renseignements, June 20, 1940, 21G 74 17, ARSD.

³¹⁷. Ibid., and July 9, 1940, 21G 74 17, ARSD.

stupeur."³¹⁸ There was a general disbelief that the hitherto omnipotent France had so readily given up the struggle. Moreover, amidst contradictory radio broadcasts and censored newspapers, no one actually knew what was happening on the European front. As the Vichyite historian Maurice Martin du Gard noted, "Le drame de l'Afrique ce fut de ne rien savoir de ce qui se passait en France..." ³¹⁹

The American Paul Atkins, while in Dakar, made a succinct observation regarding the French reception of the armistice:

One reaction on the part of many of the Frenchmen... was that it could not fundamentally be their fault. Such a major catastrophe to a proud nation... could only be the result of a betrayal, either on the part of their own government or on the part of the Allies. ³²⁰

The dissolution of the Third Republic and the institution of the fascist-type regime under the auspices of Marshall Pétain, the hero of the Great War, split the colonial corps in two main factions, the Vichyites and the Gaullists. A 'crisis of consciousness' troubled many French administrators who were torn between obeying the legitimate rulers that had betrayed France and embracing, what must have seemed, a risky resistance movement

³¹⁸. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1940, 2G 40 1, ARSD; see also F.J. Amon d'Aby, La Côte d'Ivoire dans la Cité Africaine, (Paris: Larose, 1951), p. 39.

³¹⁹. Martin du Gard, Le drame de l'Afrique française: Choses vues, op. cit., 1941, p. 5.

³²⁰. Paul M. Atkins, "Dakar and the Strategy of West Africa," Foreign Affairs, vol. XX, no. 2, (1942), p. 361.

of dubious credibility.

However, by and large, the colonial administration was dominated by right-wing individuals who, after the liberalisation of the Popular Front era, saw in Vichy a rare chance to restore authoritarianism in the empire. Members of the colonial lobby like Governor Brevié and Gaston Joseph (Director of Political Affairs in the Government-General of AOF) considered themselves above party politics and served the Vichy regime without any qualms.

As a rule, colonial administrators sided with Vichy out of a reluctance to endanger or jeopardize their positions, but there were some who fervently committed themselves to the ideals of the National Revolution (the Governor of Senegal, Georges Rey, is an example). A minority of officers in the higher echelons of the corps sided with de Gaulle (who was little known at the time) but not necessarily out of ideological opposition to Vichy. Allegiances were confused. Men like Governor Louveau were Pétainist and Gaullist at once, out of conviction that Pétain was playing a double game and that the two leaders had some secret accord between them.³²¹ Finally there were also left-wing Vichyites, anti-German Pétainists, right-wing Gaullists, and every other shade of political affiliation.

A substantial portion of the European community in Senegal

³²¹. Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900-1945, (New York: Pica Press, 1971), pp. 464-65.

was in favour of joining the resistance.³²² For instance, the business community of AOE for which the armistice was synonymous with a disruption of trade and ultimately ruin, was pro-British.³²³ Similarly, for privileged Africans, the resistance was a means to restore the status quo ante and protect their self-interests rather than a demonstration of patriotism towards France.

Mustapha Malick Gueye, the President of the Conseil Colonial, defied the armistice and sent a telegram to Mandel explaining that Africans were determined "de ne jamais reconnaître capitulation qu'elle [la population sénégalaise] est unanime à repousser."³²⁴ G. Diouf, the Lébous, the veterans, the students at the William Ponty school, the Amicale des Instituteurs Indigènes du Sénégal--in other words, all those who had something to lose from a French capitulation, such as the originaire and évolué groups rejected the armistice. Their

³²². See Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal and Dakar, 1939 and 1940, op. cit., for pro-Allied sentiments of Europeans. Jim Giblin in his "A Colonial State in Crisis: Vichy Administration in French West Africa," unpublished seminar paper delivered at the School of Oriental and African Studies Conference on Africa and the Second World War, (1984), p. 10 cites U.S. intelligence sources testifying to this.

³²³. Arthur Marder, Operation Menace: The Dakar Expedition and the Dudley North Affair, (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 34.

³²⁴. Telegram of June 1940, Affaires Politiques, File 872, ANSOM.

slogan was "Sénégal restera France ou ne sera pas."³²⁵

With the benefit of hindsight, Maillat has explained how decolonization became inevitable after the overnight collapse of France. A weakened, divided and defeated metropole, the nightmare of the colonial lobby, was for the first time revealed as such to Africans fighting in Europe or witnessing the struggle of Frenchmen against Frenchmen (Vichyites against Gaullists) at home. The myth of the indivisible France suffered an irreparable blow and its demise unleashed new forces.

Il faut bien le dire aujourd'hui alors que l'Afrique a acquis son indépendance que celle-ci était devenue inéluctable depuis cette armistice; nous avons perdu la face et notre prestige d'hommes blancs, ceci a été ressenti chez tous les peuples de couleur même si plus tard nous avons figuré parmi les vainqueurs de 1945, pour eux nous sommes restés les vaincus de 1940.³²⁶

The colonial administration argued that the armistice had the reverse effect, namely that the ensuing uncertainty and instability clustered Africans closer around France and vice-versa. In reality, the colonial administration's token demonstrations of solidarity with the African population--such as

325. Renseignements, October 10, 1939, 21G 74 17, ARSD; See évolué telegrams and letters to the Governors in 13G 103 180, ARSD; and in Affaires Politiques, File 872, ANSOM; also Abdel-Kader Diagne, La résistance Française au Sénégal et en AOF pendant la Guerre 1939-45, (Thiès, n.d. [circa 1950]), pp. 7-9; see also "Voeu du Conseil Municipal de St. Louis," June 25, 1940, 13G 103 180, ARSD.

326. Maurice Maillat was a Railroad Inspector who served in AOF for 28 years. He was drafted in the 6e RAC in 1939 and was demobilised in September 1940, op. cit., p. 2.

colonial personnel tours in remote villages and the creation of radio stations in the Médina of Dakar broadcasting patriotic messages in Wolof--were merely aimed at giving a semblance of continuity and control.³²⁷

PIERRE BOISSON: HIGH COMMISSIONER OF BLACK AFRICA
(June 1940-November 1942).

Pierre Boisson represents a case apart from the majority of colonial administrators who wavered between the Vichy/Free French camps. Born in 1894 to a family of school teachers, Boisson began his career as a teacher in Evian. During the First World War he fought in Artois, Argonne and Verdun, lost a leg, and was taken prisoner of war in Germany. After the war, he entered the École Coloniale where he graduated top of his class. In 1920, he was appointed to the Government-General of the Congo, following which he was awarded a licence in Law. Consequently, he served in Africa and Indochina and became the chef de cabinet for the Sarraut, Maginot, Reynaud and other governments. In 1933, he began climbing the echelons of the colonial administration first as High Commissioner in Cameroon, then as Secretary-General of AOF and Governor-General par-interim in AOF in 1938. Lastly, in 1939, at the age of 45, he became Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa.³²⁸

³²⁷. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1940, 2G 40 1, ARSD.

³²⁸. Boisson's biographical sketch is based on the "Brochure Pierre Boisson," Service d'Information de la France Libre, 1943, Papiers Boisson, Archives Privées 30, File 4, ANSOM; see also Boisson's testimony of January 27, 1944, ibid., File 1; and Martin du Gard, La carte impériale: Histoire de la France

Boisson is undoubtedly among the most controversial figures in French colonial history. The Vichyite historian Martin du Gard claims that he was obeyed, loved and respected by Africans and Europeans alike "pour n'être jamais pris au piège de l'ambition."³²⁹ For his Vichyite colleague, Daniel Chenet, the High Commissioner "bénéficie incontestablement du préjugé favorable."³³⁰ Conversely, pro-Germans and Gaullists condemned him for being a collaborator and an egotist:

Traitor to his past [as a wounded veteran of the 1914-1918 war], traitor to himself, traitor to the Republic, traitor to the country, traitor by a monstrous pride which finally deprived him of all lucidity by letting him believe in his own infallibility.³³¹

The Marxist historian Suret-Canale rightly argues that Boisson does not qualify either as a Gaullist or a Vichyite. Rather, he is portrayed as an intelligent but stubborn man with unlimited ambition and pride.

Boisson did not believe in Vichy. He believed only in himself. Vichy's position, the isolation of French West Africa, and the reliance on authoritarianism in the 'New State', gave him a fullness of power which no other proconsul preceding him had enjoyed.³³²

d'Outre-Mer, op. cit., 1949, chapter VI on Boisson, pp. 29-102.

329. Martin du Gard, *La carte impériale*, op. cit., 1949, p. 102.

330. Chenet, op. cit., 1949, p. 38.

331. Governor Louveau quoted in Suret-Canale, *French Colonialism...*, op. cit., 1971, p. 465.

332. Suret-Canale, ibid., p. 466.

Part of the reason why Boisson remains such a controversial figure is because the circumstances of his appointment to the post of High Commissioner of Black Africa remain obscure as are his political motives in accepting the post. For this reason, before making any further assessments on Boisson's policy-making, it might be useful to examine the events leading up to his proconsulate.

From the end of May 1940 onward, while serving in Cameroon, Boisson had been actively campaigning for the continuation of the war.³³³ The day the armistice was signed, he defied capitulation: "Si la patrie ne veut plus se battre, l'heure est venue pour l'Empire de rendre à la patrie un peu de ce qu'elle a fait pour lui et de continuer la lutte."³³⁴ During the week of June 18-25, Boisson was in daily contact with the governors of Africa and on the 24th, he expressed his determination to form a resistance bloc pending his receiving 'further instructions.'³³⁵

In effect, Boisson was not willing to take any initiative that could later hold him responsible for organizing a resistance movement to Vichy. Hence, he awaited the decision of General Noguès (Commander-in-Chief of the North African army and Resident General of Morocco) and the French fleet. When the Army Com-

333. Papiers Boisson, File 7, Circulars no. 85 and 61C, ANSOM.

334. Boisson quoted in P.H. Siriex and J. M. Hertrich, L'Empire au Combat, (Paris: Office Français d'Édition, 1945), p. 16. See also Boisson's interrogation of January 11, 1944, in Papiers Boisson, File 1, ANSOM.

335. Papiers Boisson, File 7, ANSOM.

mander-in-Chief Maxime Weygand ordered Noguès not to involve the French Fleet in dissident activities, the 'African Bloc' operation dissolved in thin air.³³⁶

On June 25, when Tunis and Algiers pledged their allegiance to the Vichy government and began to enforce the measures dictated by the armistice, Boisson did not follow suit. The Governor-General of AOF, Cayla, insisted that even without North Africa, a black African bloc could be formed but Boisson vacillated, allegedly awaiting reliable news and further instructions. On June 26, he received notification of his appointment as High Commissioner of Black Africa following which his attitude changed dramatically.³³⁷

The following day, he ordered all administrators to ban

³³⁶. Robert Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, (New York: 1972), p. 41; and Gibling, "The Vichy Years...", op. cit., 1978, p. 36.

³³⁷. In reality, Boisson was never responsible for all those territories. After Eboué sided with de Gaulle, he was no more than a Governor-General of AOF.

The details of Boisson's nomination remain obscure. Some sources cite an official telegram being dispatched to Boisson. Others claim he was informed by a personal message or by the Colonial Inspector Tezenas du Mentcel; see Papiers Boisson, File 2, ANSOM.

During his trial in 1944, Boisson argued that when he found out that AOF, Syria and the Fleet were executing armistice regulations, he decided not to side with the Allies. In his own words, "Je proteste, et je protesterai toute mon existence... contre l'inculpation que cette nomination avait eu une influence quelconque si petite soit elle sur ma nomination. Comment peut-on penser que dans les circonstances si pleines d'angoisse que nous vivions, j'ai pu un seul instant me préoccuper d'intérêt de carrière?", ibid., File 1. See also the Papiers du Comité d'Etudes de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, for the correspondence of General Schmitt, Chapter XI, p. 17 on Boisson's nomination.

meetings and demonstrations.³³⁸ In addition, he wired Cayla a message informing him that he had not heard from North Africa but that AOF, Cameroon and Madagascar could still proceed with the formation of a resistance bloc. A telegram received the same day from the Colonial Minister Rivière ordered him to enforce the armistice regulations. Boisson did not respond. The same evening, de Gaulle dispatched a telegram inquiring whether he would rally to the Conseil de Défense de la France d'Outre Mer. Boisson's radio broadcast relayed that AEF would await further instructions and remain united.

Je n'ai jamais conçu, je ne coinçois pas pour l'Afrique Equatoriale une attitude qui soit différente de celle qui sera prise pour l'Afrique du Nord, par l'AOF et nos autres possessions.³³⁹

On June 28, he denied having been nominated High Commissioner and later claimed that he was only notified on July 9.³⁴⁰ On July 20 he arrived in Dakar, and three days later, replaced Cayla who was transferred to Madagascar. AOF had already taken sides with Vichy yet, even at that point in time, Boisson could have rallied French Africa to the Allies, but not without personally putting at stake the security of the French territories. As Giblin has argued, if Boisson had had the backing of a senior military

³³⁸. Order of June 26, 1940, Papiers Boisson, File 7, ANSOM.

³³⁹. Speech of June 27, 1940, Papiers Boisson, File 7, ANSOM.

³⁴⁰. "Je démens formellement..." were his words; in ibid., File 3; see also File 2.

official like Noguès or Weygand, he might have led Black Africa to dissidence.³⁴¹ Under the circumstances, however, he was not prepared to jeopardise France's control of Africa nor did he trust de Gaulle whom he regarded ^{as?} a British puppet.³⁴²

Moreover, the British attack on the French fleet in Mers-el-Kébir on July 3 and 4 which inflicted heavy casualties on the French side, coupled with the attack on the battleship Richelieu in Dakar on July 8, signalled the rupture of French Africa's diplomatic relations with Britain and AOF's formal adherence to Vichy.³⁴³ On July 6, Boisson made a radio broadcast announcing that the African bloc had not been constituted; neither the French fleet nor the North African army had rallied to the British side, and AEF was not in a position to form a resistance movement in isolation.³⁴⁴ The Gaullist historian Michel Devèze has interpreted Boisson's vacillation in terms of personal ambition, fear of compromise, suspicion verging on hostility to

341. Giblin, "The Vichy Years..," op. cit., 1978, p. 37.

342. Boisson later justified his action in terms of not wanting to "faire une geste qui soit préjudiciable à la France." Interrogation of January 11, 1944, Papiers Boisson, File 1, ANSOM.

343. Cayla to Colonies Clermont, July 8, 1940, Affaires Politiques, File 928, ANSOM; see also Annet, Aux Heures.., op. cit., 1952, p. 34; Chenet, op. cit., 1949, p. 34, and Suret-Canale, French Colonialism.., op. cit., 1972, p. 465. On July 7, a British destroyer had asked permission to enter the port of Dakar in order to communicate a message to the Governor-General. The French refused, and the following day the British attacked the Richelieu but the five auxiliary crews refused to fight.

344. Papiers Boisson, File 3, ANSOM.

the British and loyalty toward Pétain.³⁴⁵

To conclude, Boisson was a Pétainist, anti-German, right-wing colonialist who was unwilling to take any risks that might imperil the integrity of the French empire or his own career. If de Gaulle's movement was closely associated or dependent on Britain and on left-wing radicalism and was prepared to risk the fate of the empire, Vichy was for Boisson the safe option, the reliable old guard that upheld tradition, authority and stability above all.

THE PURSUIT OF NEUTRALITY IN THE WAR.

Over the next three years, Boisson became a key figure in French colonial policy. The two axioms in his policy-making were "conserver et défendre," which equalled neutrality vis-à-vis the Germans, the Free French as well as British and U.S. expansionism. The institution of a fascist order was of secondary and possibly rhetorical importance for Boisson, but the same can not be argued for his collaborators (see Georges Rey's policies below).³⁴⁶ Colonial control was a real political factor under Vichy. In fact, the raison d'être of the Pétain government was to preserve imperial unity against foreign aggression in exchange

³⁴⁵. Michel Devèze, La France d'Outre-Mer: de l'Empire Colonial à l'Union Française, 1938-1947, (Paris: Hachette, 1948), p. 170.

³⁴⁶. File 3, Papiers Boisson, ANSOM; Martin du Gard, La Carte Impériale, op. cit., 1949, p. 103. Giblin argues that the institution of the New Order was not an issue for the Boisson administration. This is certainly not true of Georges Rey, and it would be interesting to see if other administrators in AOF took the opportunity to enforce quasi-fascist measures.

for limited autonomy in unoccupied France, as well as imperial status in a reconstructed Europe.³⁴⁷

British, U.S. and Free French fears of a potentially German-controlled Dakar led to exaggerated reports regarding the German presence in the AOF capital.³⁴⁸ The German Armistice Commission, headed by Dr. Klaube and composed of a dozen officers, arrived in Dakar at the end of June 1940 to obtain the release of German and Italian subjects. Boisson freed 1,814 Italian and 165 German prisoners interned in the Sébikotane camp in Senegal.³⁴⁹ The only other German who set foot in Dakar was Mulhausen, an official from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs who undertook a two week visit (in September 1942) under strict surveillance from Boisson himself.

Notwithstanding the constant pressure on the High Commissioner to accept various German teams of technicians, journalists, etc., Boisson always found a way to frustrate their plans, and on that account threatened to resign three times.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁷. Giblin, "A Colonial State in Crisis..," op. cit., 1984, p. 2.

³⁴⁸. See the correspondence of General Schmitt, Papiers du Comité de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, "La Légende de 'Jamais un Allemand à Dakar grace à Boisson,'" Archives Privées, File 357, ANSOM. In general, most Allied writing during the war exaggerated Axis influence in Dakar.

³⁴⁹. Report of August 20, 1940, Affaires Politiques, File 357, ANSOM, for the names and professions of all German prisoners.

³⁵⁰. Thomas C. Wasson, "The Mystery of Dakar: An Enigma Resolved," Foreign Affairs Service Journal, vol. XX, no. 42, (April 1943), pp. 214-17; see also, Martin du Gard, La Carte Impériale, op. cit., 1949, pp. 141-42; Chenet, op. cit., 1949,

He also opposed the Protocol of Paris of May 1941 which would have granted the Germans the right to use Dakar as a submarine base.³⁵¹

THE BATTLE OF DAKAR.

By 1939, Dakar was the most important port of call in the African coast (a 'station service de l'Atlantique Sud') with highly developed facilities for the provision and refuelling of ships sailing around the Cape of Good Hope to India, Australia or else destined to South America.³⁵² It was also equipped with an airport and was a major base for the French fleet. Its strategic location, only 1,620 miles (4 hours by plane) from Brazil meant that particularly for the Americans,

The formerly obscure town of Dakar has become (sic) a key point of the world-wide battlefield of the Second World War. As the global nature of the war becomes more and more evident, Dakar assumes a new significance.³⁵³

Roosevelt referred to the AOF capital as the "Atlantic fortress" and deemed essential that the U.S. consulate in the city re-open after the fall of France.³⁵⁴ The gold reserves of the Bank of

pp. 106-119.

351. Maillat, op. cit., irregular pagination.

352. Atkins, op. cit., 1942, pp. 360-61.

353. Emil Lengyel, Dakar: Outpost of Two Hemispheres, (New York: Garden City Publishers Co, Inc., 1943), preface.

354. Canadian Press Release, (November 10, 1942). The U.S. Consulate in Dakar had closed down in 1921 for financial reasons, see Wasson, "The Mystery of Dakar," op. cit., April 1943, p. 170;

France kept in Kayès further enhanced Dakar's significance.

For the Germans, Dakar was important as a potential air and submarine base for raids on North and South America particularly against British sea communications in the Atlantic. Grand Admiral Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the German Naval War Staff, had repeatedly brought Dakar to Hitler's attention in the summer of 1940. On July 15th, the Führer had demanded authorisation to occupy the ports of North and West Africa but Pétain had categorically refused. Darlan was subsequently warned that Vichy should be ready to defend French African territories according to the armistice regulations.³⁵⁵ After this incident, the German Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces shifted his attention to Europe, and Dakar was left to the attention of the Armistice Commission alone.

'OPERATION MENACE.'

While Churchill was anxiously seeking a show of force to draw German attention away from the U.K. and obtain access to African ports for the Royal Navy, the British and Free French intelligence networks relayed favorable messages regarding an

and Marder, *Operation Menace...*, op. cit., 1976, p. 7.

³⁵⁵. Peter Matthews, "Selling out the French Empire," Free Europe, vo. 4, no. 42, (June 13, 1941), p. 52; Maillat, op. cit., n.d, irregular pagination; Helmuth Stoecker (ed.), German Imperialism in Africa From the Beginnings until the Second World War, (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1986); and A. Kum'a Ndumbe, "Black Africa and Germany During the Second World War," in Africa and the Second World War, Reports and Papers of the Symposium organized by UNESCO at Benghazi, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from 10 to 13 November 1980, (UNESCO 1985), pp. 51-76.

immediate takeover of Dakar.³⁵⁶ In fact, for de Gaulle, Dakar was a possible centre of operations and seat for the resistance movement.³⁵⁷ Sensing that the British were going to undertake the operation with or without his support and fearing their annexationist designs, he conceded to the takeover on condition that it be peaceful--using a mixture of 'persuasion and intimidation.'³⁵⁸

De Gaulle had formulated a plan ("Operation Scipio") with Major General Spears and Major Morton, but the British premier presented on August 6 a new, more optimistic scheme to which the Service Chiefs reluctantly agreed. Over the next two weeks, the Force Commanders Vice Admiral Cunningham and Major-General Irwin opposed de Gaulle's plan of a surprise attack on Dakar and discussed possible alternatives. Ultimately, Churchill's initial plan of August 6 was adopted.³⁵⁹

Faulty intelligence reports, security leaks, growing doubts on the part of the Force Commanders, Vice Admiral Somerville, the Naval Staff, and low morale amongst officers and crew were

³⁵⁶. Churchill's first choice had been Casablanca but it was well defended. According to Gaullist intelligence reports, the Dakar garrison comprised 70% Gaullists, 20% undecided (neutral), and 10% Vichyites; see Maillat, op. cit., n.d., irregular pagination, and Marder, Operation Menace, op. cit., 1976, pp. 8-9.

³⁵⁷. Algiers was his first choice but it was too close to the Germans.

³⁵⁸. Marder, op. cit., 1976, pp. 20-21.

³⁵⁹. For the initial text of Operation Menace see Amiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, Souvenirs de Guerre: Juin 1940-Janvier 1941, (Paris: Plon, 1973).

not promising signs for the launching of "Operation Menace." In fact, Churchill almost cancelled it on September 15 for an alternative 'Konakry-Dakar' operation. The Service Chiefs opposed the new plan following which the Force Commanders, de Gaulle and Spears who supported "Operation Menace" were eventually allowed to proceed. In addition, after Cunningham chased away three French cruisers from Dakar to Casablanca on September 18, the Allied Commanders and the Admiralty's morale were momentarily boosted and "Operation Menace" was launched.³⁶⁰

The expedition arrived before Dakar on September 23 at approximately 5:00 a.m. Low visibility due to heavy fog was one of the decisive pointers that the initial plan was not going to proceed as smoothly as foreseen. The Commandant Major de Boislambert (a Gaullist dissident) who had left Bathurst on September 22, to summon the cooperation of the French army in Dakar, sabotage telecommunication systems and prepare the ground for the arrival of de Gaulle's emissaries (Phase 'Happy' of "Operation Menace") failed to carry out his mission.

De Gaulle's intelligence sources grossly overestimated the support for the Free French in Dakar and the disposition of the French army--those two factors being at the base of Boislambert's mission and of "Operation Menace" as a whole.³⁶¹ Instead of welcoming de Gaulle's messengers, Boislambert went into hiding.

³⁶⁰. Marder, op. cit., 1976, chapters 3,4,5. The cruisers were headed for Libreville where they were going to suppress dissidence.

³⁶¹. ibid., pp. 108-9.

The second stage of "Operation Menace" involved a surprise landing on the airfield of Ouakam to be followed by a desertion of the Vichy air force to the resistance. The outcome was similarly disastrous. Meanwhile leaflets with slogans such as "We are here to defend Dakar alongside you. We are here to bring food to Dakar" signed by de Gaulle, were dropped on the city.³⁶² When the Gaullist emissary Thierry d'Argenlieu landed in Dakar to deliver the Anglo-Free French call to dissidence to Boisson and his military staff, he was shot and wounded by the Vichy authorities.

The leaflets had virtually no impact in Dakar. However, several African and European veteran politicians organized small demonstrations in favour of the Free French and Boisson arrested the mayor of the capital, Alfred Goux, and the President of the Chamber of Commerce Turbé, along with 10 more Gaullists.³⁶³ De Gaulle's broadcasts warned that an 'enormous Allied force' would

362. Ibid., p. 110. One other slogan read:
Dakar is threatened by the enemy and by famine!
We must save Dakar for France!
We must resupply Dakar.
This is why French forces under my orders have arrived at Dakar.
Powerful Allied forces are ready to support them.
I urge the civil and military authorities to co-operate with me.
I ask that all elements of the land, sea, and air forces remain at their posts and contact the French troops which are coming to reinforce them.
I invite the population to demonstrate their patriotism by remaining calm and welcoming my troops.

363. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1940, 2G 40 1, ARSD; and Affaires Politiques, File 357, ANSOM.

be deployed if Dakar resisted. The ultimatum and a first bombardment of the city followed.³⁶⁴ The African Hospital, the barracks of the Sixth RAC regiment, the Porthos vessel in the Port of Dakar and several houses in the Plateau (the European section of the city) the Médina as well as Gorée were hit. Fortunately, panic gave way to a systematic evacuation of women and children (Dakar had no shelters), thus minimizing the casualty toll.

Amidst confusion, faulty communication and disillusionment, the chiefs of "Operation Menace" now resorted to 'Plan Charles' with a landing in Rufisque. After a second ill-fated venture,³⁶⁵ the British issued their final ultimatum to Boisson: "Votre attitude nous donne raison de penser que Dakar peut à tout moment être livrée par vous à l'ennemi commun..."³⁶⁶ to which Boisson replied, "La France m'a confié Dakar. Je défendrai Dakar jusqu'au bout."³⁶⁷ On September 24, the second day of the Battle of Dakar, phase 'Nasty' was put to action. A relatively inconsequential air bombardment was followed by the sinking of the Ajax Vichy submarine and a partial neutralisation of the

364. Bulletin d'Informations des Troupes du Groupe de l'AOF - Transmissions et Proclamations de De Gaulle, September 30, 1940; Affaires Politiques, File 357, ANSOM, has a very detailed chronological exposition of the events.

365. Jacques Mordal, La Bataille de Dakar, (Paris: 1956), pp. 120-27.

366. Ultimatum de l'Admirauté Britannique au Gouvernement et à la population de Dakar, 13G 103 180, ARSD.

367. in ibid.

battleship Richelieu. On September 25, the British decided to abandon "Operation Menace" and sail to Freetown as Dakar celebrated but not without heavy casualties.

Administrative reports estimate that as many as 175 died and 350 were wounded in the battle of Dakar.³⁶⁸ Another source cites 166 dead, of which 74 Africans (12 soldiers, 2 marines and 60 civilians), 92 Europeans (82 marines, 2 soldiers and 8 civilians) and 340 wounded (233 Africans, 107 Europeans).³⁶⁹

Soon afterwards, Boisson began a systematic prosecution of Free French sympathizers, African and European, condemning 115 to death, 60 to forced labour, 354 to prison sentences.³⁷⁰ He also began reconstituting a military force of 100,000 well-trained African soldiers, a battalion of Europeans, a half-brigade of Foreign Legionnaires ships and airplanes.³⁷¹ A few years later, while being tried for treason, Boisson claimed that this military force was part of a strategy leading to the AOF resumption of the war on the side of the Allies.

The importance of the defense of Dakar for the Vichy government was evident in the statement of the two German generals of the Grand Etat Major to General Hutzinger:

³⁶⁸. Figures are from the Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1940, 2G 40 1, ARSD; Bulletin d'Information des Troupes du Groupe de l'AOF, op. cit., lists 166 dead and 340 wounded.

³⁶⁹. Marder, op. cit., p. 158.

³⁷⁰. Sirieux et Hertrich, L'empire au combat, op. cit., 1945, p. 69.

³⁷¹. Papiers Boisson, File 2, ANSOM; and also Martin du Gard, La carte Impériale, op. cit., 1949, pp. 137-40.

...moins de 8 jours après l'occupation de Dakar par les Anglais, celle de l'Afrique du Nord par les Allemands aurait été accomplie. Si vous n'êtes pas capables, vous Français, de défendre l'Afrique Française, nous porterons immédiatement la guerre sur ce continent.³⁷²

For De Gaulle, the Dakar affair was a considerable setback for his movement, as was the case with the British (and their relations with Roosevelt). Colonel John A. Watson, a participant in "Operation Menace," later argued that

If "Menace" had had its fair share of luck, it might have resulted in one of the most spectacular and fruitful operations of World War II and might well have changed the course of that war to the advantage of the Allies.³⁷³

The Dakar affair helped Vichy gain prestige and credibility within AOF as de Gaulle and his resistance movement were in large part discredited. But there was a price attached to the victory: Africans, while praised for their loyalty, would carry with them lasting impressions of what they had witnessed first hand: division, enmity and full-scale war between Frenchmen followed by the subsequent disgrace of a French General. In addition, the internal 'reforms' enforced right after the British-Free French attack on Dakar began exposing a state in crisis.

³⁷². Quoted in Paul ~~Beaudoin~~, Neuf Mois au Gouvernement, (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1948), p. 398.

³⁷³. Watson quoted in Marder, op. cit., p. 158.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to obtain much needed succour from their African colonies, the French tried to portray the Second World War as a colonial conflict:

...la guerre actuelle n'est pas seulement une guerre pour la transformation radicale de l'Europe,... c'est une guerre pour le partage du monde entier, une guerre coloniale.³⁷⁴

In Senegal, African 'subjects' welcomed the war as an opportunity to serve in the army and qualify for the special privileges that were bestowed on veterans, leading finally, they hoped, to the acquisition of French citizenship. For African 'citizens,' the draft was a necessary evil--a means of ensuring that by fighting in Europe, their privileges at home would be safeguarded. The colonial administration had repeatedly criticised the Blaise Diagne laws of 1915 and 1916 which had integrated the originaires in the regular army, and entrenched their French citizenship status,

as a grave error committed under the pressure of wartime conditions. For this reason, African 'citizens' feared that the government could, at any time, strip them of their preciously-acquired status.

The armistice came as a shock to many urban Africans who had hitherto perceived France as an invincible power. In addition, fearing the worst, the African elite, (originaires, marabouts, and aspiring 'subjects') which had a great deal to lose from the war, was in favour of joining the resistance and fighting on the

374. Pierre Mille, Notre Combat, (November 10, 1939).

side of the Allies. Meanwhile, the colonial administration was in a state of disarray, misinformed and bewildered by France's collapse and divided into Gaullists and Vichyites.

The High Commissioner, Pierre Boisson, was a rigid and unimaginative civil servant of little vision and virtually no leadership qualities. In many respects, he was no more than a soldier who knew how to obey orders but could not take initiative. This was probably why he was appointed by Vichy in the first place and why the details of his nomination remain obscure. Gaullist criticism of his policy of neutrality is groundless but can be explained in terms of the resentment the Free French nurtured for Boisson after the abortive attack on Dakar. Archival sources clearly demonstrate that no Germans, Italians, or Britons set foot in AOF during Boisson's proconsulate.

Dakar was a strategically important region which had been heeded as a possible center of operations by the Germans and de Gaulle alike. The ill-conceived and poorly-planned attack on Dakar by the British and Free French forces was only a minor setback for the Allies, but it cost many African and European lives in Dakar, caused extensive damages in the capital, and marred the image of the Allies.

Under Vichy, the African elite's perceptions of the Europeans as colonisers and superior people were considerably shaken. African soldiers had witnessed French reluctance to fight in the war as well as the humiliation of capitulation and

German occupation. During the Dakar affair, Africans at home had observed Frenchmen opening fire against their fellow countrymen or fiercely denigrating each other. They had seen political leaders like the President of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce, Turbé, and the mayor of Dakar, Goux, arrested and tried for anti-French activities. They had become familiar with the implications of the terms 'dissidents' and 'collaboration.' In other words, they had become aware of the crisis the French colonial state and administration found itself in.

Africans who had been sent to the front and had fought side by side with Europeans returned with a heightened consciousness of their inferior status at home and a deeply rooted belief in equality between blacks and whites--the kind they had experienced in the trenches. Often, these soldiers had acquired radical ideas which were not compatible with the stereotype of the "loyal African" perpetrated by the colonial administration.

The 20,000 African prisoners of war who had been held in Germany in frontstalags had endured disease, malnutrition and deprivations of all sorts. Upon returning to Africa, they were treated with suspicion and hostility by the local authorities which were apprehensive of the effect of German propaganda on their colonial subjects. Yet the myth of the loyal African was preserved intact, largely because it was a vital component of French colonial policy-making throughout the war which, if put in question, could irreparably upset the relative calm in AOF and the delicate balance of assimilation politics. Subsequently, the

loyal African myth was perpetuated by the Gaullists who based the Free French movement in Africa and sought legitimacy wherever they could find it.

African military involvement in the Second World War far exceeded the continent's contribution during the Great War: It has been estimated that over 200.000 black Africans were recruited and as many as 25.000 died in battle. However, as Léopold Sédar Senghor eloquently argued in 1945, the war had equally catastrophic repercussions on imperial Europe:

Voici que meurt l'Europe des Empires
Et c'est l'agonie d'une princesse pitoyable.

Chapter IV.

THE IMPACT OF VICHY RULE IN SENEGAL, 1940-1942

Notwithstanding the fact that the Second World War was a turning point in the history of Senegal, the effects of Boisson's policy-making and the African response have gone by largely unnoticed. Vichy undoubtedly marked what the historian Jean Suret-Canale has called the "golden age of the 'true' colonialists,"³⁷⁵ to which it might be added that it was an era of contradictions compounded by the regime's attempts to reverse the tide of colonialism from the reformist spirit of the Popular Front toward a more authoritarian variant of colonial rule. In the name of national security, Boisson and the Governor of Senegal, Georges Rey, suspended local government and all forms of black political activity from party politics to trade union activity and the existing press.

Vichy's resolve to restore 'authority' and 'discipline' in the colony went even further: Boisson and his associates wanted to crush the trade union movement, impose harsher measures in the Native Penal Code, and reinforce the regime of the indigénat. Perhaps most sinister of all were the Vichy regime's efforts to strip African veterans of their citizenship rights on the grounds that their contribution to the Great War had been negligible.

³⁷⁵. Suret-Canale, French Colonialism.., op. cit., 1971, p. 578.

And yet, the regime was considerably more popular than both Frenchmen and Africans have admitted to date.³⁷⁶ Michael Crowder attributes Vichy's popularity to the regime's own version of assimilation.³⁷⁷ It is difficult, however, to find a consistent pattern of assimilation in Vichy policy-making. In addition, the colonial dimension of Vichy ideology, to the extent that one existed, was not monolithic. While several administrators fervently espoused the National Revolution, others acquiesced to it, while still others opposed it quietly. The contradiction in the dictates of Vichyite colonialists testifies to the disparity of views.

That Vichy demonstrated a desire to incorporate Africans (to) a Pétainist morality is largely true, and its systematic propaganda was particularly effective in the protectorate. However, the fact that Vichy encouraged young Africans to participate in the Legion and express their thoughts in the state-controlled press was not necessarily a sign of the regime's desire to assimilate. More importantly, it was an expedient tactic to preserve AOF free of internal unrest and dissidence by mustering support where it could find it. If anything, assimilation was anathema to Vichy colonialists like Boisson and Rey, but their efforts to mobilise African support were pivotal to keeping AOF neutral and sovereign from foreign aggressors.

³⁷⁶. Crowder, Senegal, op. cit., 1967, p. 40.

³⁷⁷. Crowder, Senegal: A Study in French Assimilation Policy, (London: Methuen, 1967), p. 41.

In the Three Communes, African 'subjects' made the best of the suspension of 'citizen' politics. Thus, it was no accident that most Africans who contributed to Vichyite publications were 'subjects.' They immediately seized the opportunity to express their point of view, which at times steered clear of assimilation and sounded more like négritude. Vichy also fared well among the peasantry because the decline of the peanut economy--while a major setback to ^{the} war effort--led to a boom in the cultivation of subsistence crops which benefitted a substantial number of Africans.

The argument that Vichy attempted to turn back the clock of colonial reform by defying assimilation raises more questions than it answers on the emerging attitudes of African 'subjects' toward assimilation and on the relationship between 'citizens' and 'subjects' in the wartime and postwar period, some of which will be addressed in the chapters that follow.

THE SUSPENSION OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

The decree of September 8, 1939 suspended elections and revisions of electoral lists on the grounds that overseas electoral campaigns were too tumultuous and likely to cause unrest--particularly in view of the introduction of the new veterans' college in the Conseil Colonial.³⁷⁸ The following month, the power of the municipal councils and mayors was

³⁷⁸. Exposé schématique de la situation politique de la fédération AOF au cours de l'année 1939, Affaires Politiques, File 928, ANSOM.

transferred to the French administration, thereby excluding Africans from local politics and laying the ground for Vichy policy-making.

BOISSON'S 'POLITIQUE D'ACTION ET D'AUTORITE'.

a) Policy changes within the French Colonial Administration.

Boisson wanted to expand the colonial administration by at least half its size and improve its training and specialisation, in order to "encadrer la masse" which essentially meant exercising tighter control of colonial peoples.

L'Afrique pour les tâches qui lui incombent n'a pas la moitié du personnel qu'il lui faudrait. Quand je constate que neuf sur dix de nos subdivisions sont tenues par un seul fonctionnaire qui cumule tous les emplois, je dis que nous occupons le pays mais que nous l'administrons pas.³⁷⁹

Vichy scorned the Ecole Coloniale for being "une grande École que sur le papier" (thus, leaving its director and former Governor Delavignette virtually free of supervision) but recommended that colonial studies be incorporated into primary education and the baccalauréat in order to combat ignorance and indifference to colonial affairs.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁹. Boisson, Circular no. 600: Trois directives de colonisation Africaine, (Dakar: Imprimerie du Gouvernement General, 1941), pp. 1-2.

³⁸⁰. On the Ecole Coloniale during the Vichy years see William B. Cohen, "The French Colonial Service in French West Africa," in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (eds.), France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 491-515; see also "Directives pour un programme d'équipement administratif et économique de l'AOF," January 15, 1942, 13G 81 180, ARSD.

The decree of October 16, 1940 gave the High Commissioner the power to 'temporarily remove' any individual threatening national security--lending Boisson a free hand to reshuffle the colonial corps and dismiss Jews, Freemasons and dissidents. By July 1, 1941, he had replaced 160 administrators (140 Europeans and 20 Africans) on the grounds of inefficiency, incompetence or participation in subversive activities.³⁸¹ In addition, four governors, nine administrators and the Secretary-General of AOF (all Freemasons) were dismissed in 1942, while the administrator of Dakar, Martinet, committed suicide for fear of exposure.³⁸²

The Governor of Senegal, Parisot, was replaced by Georges Rey in February 1941. Rey had fought in the First World War at the age of 16, attended the École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr and served in the Colonial Infantry. From officer in the Ivory Coast, he was promoted in 1925 to administrator until 1938 when he became Directeur des Services Economiques du Gouvernement Général in Dakar. As chef de cabinet of the Government-General in AEF during the war, he refused to join the dissident movement

381. Boisson circular, "L'Esprit Nouveau", no. 517, August 11, 1942; see also Weygand's letter to Boisson dated January 6, 1941, Affaires Politiques, File 638, Dossier 4, ANSOM. Weygand who was Delegate-General of AOF wanted Boisson to prosecute "ceux dont l'influence néfaste risquerait de ralentir le regroupement national"; Hubert Deschamps was almost removed from office for his zealous support of the Popular Front government.

382. Affaires Politiques, File 639, Dossier 12, ANSOM; and also Robert Cornevin, "Les corps des administrateurs de la France d'Outre-Mer durant la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale," Colloque: Les prodromes de la décolonisation de l'empire Français 1936-56, Paris: (October 1984), p. 9.

and transferred to the Ivory Coast.³⁸³

Rey was an enthusiastic Vichyite who fervently believed in Pétain's National Revolution and went out of his way to impose quasi-fascist policies. His first speech as Governor of Senegal was indicative of his loyalties:

Nous avons à instaurer un ordre nouveau, et de toutes nos forces travailler au relèvement de la France. Que nos mots d'ordre soient, Travail, Discipline, Union... Je ne veux plus de stratégies de veranda, plus de politiques d'après boire, plus de censeurs ni de conseillers. Plus de critiques, de discussions..., plus de classes ni de parties... Lui seul, le Maréchal, a les éléments de décision; nous, nous avons seulement le devoir de le suivre, où qu'il nous mène... en lui apportant notre confiance totale... aveugle...³⁸⁴

Throughout his governorship, Rey forcefully tried to systematically dismantle municipal government and political parties and to strip 'citizens' of their privileges. In most cases, he encountered opposition from Boisson who favoured a more gradual return to authoritarian colonial rule.

Champion of "une politique mieux adaptée aux nécessités de l'action et de l'autorité... qui me paraissait entrer complètement dans le programme de Révolution Nationale instaurée par le Chef de l'Etat,"³⁸⁵ Rey had grandiose projects of administrative

³⁸³. Sénégal, (November 28, 1943).

³⁸⁴. Prise de commandement de la colonie du Sénégal par Georges Rey, February 6, 1941, Affaires Politiques, File 635, Dossier 2, ANSOM; see also Paroles prononcées devant le Conseil de Notables de St. Louis, February 12, 1941, ibid.

³⁸⁵. Rey Report, February 28 and May 3, 1941; 13G 1 17, ARSD.

and political 'reorganization' for the Three Communes.

b) Political and Administrative Reconstruction.

Vichy extended the metropolitan municipal regime of November 1940 overseas, including the abolition of elections, professional associations, and the installation of officials appointed by the administration in local government.³⁸⁶ One of the first measures implemented by Boisson was the suspension of the government of Dakar which had been in favour of the continuation of the war on the side of the Allies (Goux, mayor of the capital, and Turbé, president of the local chamber of commerce had been arrested during the attack on Dakar for their pro-Gaullist sentiments and activities). According to the High Commissioner, the prestige of the municipal council had been irreparably compromised during the Dakar affair. On September 28, 1940 it was replaced by a special municipal delegation composed of civil servants appointed by Boisson and headed by administrator-in-chief Martine.³⁸⁷ According to administrative reports, Africans did not protest the suspension of the municipality but 'welcomed' the new delegation (due to divisions within the Dioufist party).³⁸⁸

³⁸⁶. Unsigned, undated report, "Projet de décret sur la réorganisation municipale des communes de plein exercice du Sénégal, Affaires Politiques, File 838, Dossier 12, ANSOM.

³⁸⁷. Commissariat National à l'Interieur et au Travail, January 20, 1943, Report on Boisson; Papiers Boisson, File 4, ANSOM; and Journal Officiel de l'AOF, September 28 and October 5, 1940.

³⁸⁸. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 28; ARSD, Report of High Commissioner 1940, Affaires Politiques, File 928, Dossier 2, ANSOM; and Affaires Politiques, File 635, Dossier 4,

Rey suspended the government of St. Louis on the grounds of financial incompetence and loose electoral morals, which had contributed toward what he called "un état archaïque et anarchique incompatible avec l'effort de rénovation et d'organisation que l'Etat exige présentement de tous."³⁸⁹ No warning, discussion or consultation with other governors preceded this decree.

Next, nine out of 14 mixed communes (the exceptions being Louga, Thiès, Diourbel, Kaolack, and Ziguinchor) were also abolished on the pretext of financial and political incompetence. While in the past municipal councillors were either designated by the governor of Senegal or elected by restricted suffrage according to the degree of evolution of the particular commune, only the former option applied thereafter.³⁹⁰ Mayors, their assistants and municipal councillors of communes with less than 50,000 people were designated by the Governor of Senegal and the High Commissioner. The municipal council and its members could be dismissed at will by administrative order on the grounds of national security.³⁹¹ Rey recognized that the suppression of the mixed communes would cause great problems which he expected would be resolved within a greater political, economic and administrative reorganization of the Federation.

ANSOM.

³⁸⁹. Rey Report, 13G 1 17, ARSD.

³⁹⁰. Decree of September 25, 1941; Affaires Politiques, File 635, Dossier 6, ANSOM; and Rey Report, 13G 1 17, ARSD.

³⁹¹. Journal Officiel du Sénégal, October 23, 1941, pp. 587-589.

Central to the reconstruction of political organization in the colonies was the abolition of the Conseil Colonial. Rey argued that the council, "lent, formaliste, onéreux, papérasier," was not fulfilling the functions it was created for-- functions that could be more efficiently performed, according to Rey, by the Permanent Commission of the council to avoid "l'effervescence qu'un parlement local ne manque pas de propager au sein de la masse."³⁹² In the past, Conseil Colonial sessions were not unlike political forums where policies and crises were discussed at length and reforms were proposed, often stirring serious agitation and criticism of the French administration. For this reason, Rey was in favour of dissolving the council and presenting it as a fait accompli to the municipal councillors.³⁹³

The decree of September 27, 1940 adjourned the Conseil Colonial and transferred power to the Permanent Commission. Rey subsequently insisted that "une administration active et d'autorité serait incompatible avec les inconvénients inhérents au régime politique que conserve la Commission permanente du

³⁹². Rey Report, March 21, 1941 and February 28, 1941; 13G 1 17, ARSD.

³⁹³. "Si mesure envisagée avait été prise par voie d'autorité... [le] fait accompli aurait été accepté dans réaction d'aucune sorte. Par contre, nécessité de prendre avis de la Commission Permanente du Conseil Colonial pourrait permettre à cette Assemblée de discuter un projet, éventuellement de lui faire opposition et de toute façon de lui donner une publicité peu propice à créer un climat favorable à la réforme." Rey to Boisson, January 5, 1942, 13G 1 17, ARSD.

Conseil Colonial,"³⁹⁴ demanding the outright dissolution of the Conseil Colonial in favour of what he called, an "advisory administrative commission."

Boisson was asked in 1941 to consider the dissolution of the circonscription of Dakar but the plan was abandoned on account of the heavy financial burden the capital would inflict on the economy of the Federation.³⁹⁵ Another project of reform under joint study by the Etat Major des Colonies and Boisson was the abrogation of the Diagne law of 1915, under the pretext of the 'mediocre military value' of the originaires and their reportedly feeble contribution to national defense during the 1914-18 campaign. It was argued that the Diagne laws had been ratified in the Chamber of Deputies "par un vote de surprise"³⁹⁶ without prior consultation with the Government-General of AOF. But it was also acknowledged that the abrogation of the laws

394. Rey Report, February 2, 1941 and March 21, 1941; 13G 17, ARSD; Journal Officiel de l'AOF, October 12, 1940; see also letter from Boisson to Secretary of State for the Colonies dated April 14, 1941, Affaires Politiques, File 635, Dossier 6, ANSOM.

395. According to Boisson: "Ce serait par surcroit rendre plus lâche l'encadrement de la population du Sénégal, mesure particulièrement inopportune au point de vue politique." Note pour la Direction de Contrôle, no date, Affaires Politiques, File 638, Dossier 12, ANSOM. Again Boisson was a mediating force caught between a reactionary Colonial Ministry in France and an equally reactionary Colonial Corps overseas.

396. See letters of Admiral Platon to Boisson, March 27, 1941; and Boisson's reply May 5, 1941; Affaires Politiques, File 636, Dossier 4, ANSOM. "Elle [la loi] a été votée dans un élan de générosité, en pleine guerre...", letter of Directeur Politique to Etat Major des Colonies, March 20, 1941, in ibid.

would constitute a great political error in time of war. Therefore, until such time as bold action against privileged Africans could be taken, colonialists like Gaston Joseph urged a return to authoritarian rule.

Une politique indigène équitable mais ferme, une discipline rigoureuse... rendront possible une reprise en mains des Sénégalais des Quatre Communes. Chez eux, la notion des droits et des devoirs a été pervertie par une présentation politique devenue plus puissante que le pouvoir gouvernemental local. La restauration de l'autorité pourra avoir rapidement raison de ces écarts.³⁹⁷

Other measures implemented by Vichy included the temporary dissolution of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce followed by the replacement of its elected members with government-appointed officials, and the adjournment of the Conseil du Gouvernement de l'AOF.³⁹⁸ Political parties were effectively neutralised but not dissolved, despite the wishes of Weygand and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meetings and associations were banned and strict control of organized activity was exercised thereby bringing political activity to a complete halt.³⁹⁹

397. Letter of Directeur Politique Gaston Joseph to Etat Major des Colonies dated March 20, 1941, Affaires Politiques, File 636, Dossier 4, ANSOM.

398. Decree of November 10, 1940; Journal Officiel de l'AOF, (November 30, 1940), and Cheikh Faty Faye, "L'Opinion Dakaroise 1940-1944," Memoire de Maitrise, University of Dakar, 1973.

399. Letter of Weygand dated November 27, 1941, 21G 84 17, ARSD.

c) Trade Union Activity.

Union activity was minimal during the war in Senegal as well as in AOF and in France. The dissolution of the CGT following the declaration^{of war} did not provoke any reactions amongst the unionised.⁴⁰⁰ Only nine unions and professional associations engaged in union activity to protest against meager salaries and the spiralling rise in prices.⁴⁰¹ The strikers succeeded in obtaining a raise in the minimum salary from 8 to 9 francs per diem in May 1940, to 10 francs in July 1940.⁴⁰²

In 1941, there was only one strike and the workers' demands for a salary raise were found exaggerated and unjustified by the Boisson administration. Those who refused to return to work were replaced.⁴⁰³ While livrets de travail were maintained under

400. Administrative reports argued with relief that "Les beaux jours du syndicalisme sont revolus... Les fonctionnaires et les employés de Commerce Européens, attachés à l'idée syndicale parce qu'elle représentait pour eux... le seul moyen légal de défense, se sont rendu compte que la force du nombre était souvent exploitée pour des fins politiques personnelles et qu'elle présentait à la colonie un réel danger: celui d'étraiîner des mouvements xenophobes et de provoquer, parfois la lutte des races." Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1940, 2G 40 1, ARSD.

401. The Dakar-Niger auxiliary workers, the workers of Podor, the teachers of the cadre commun secondaire, the students of the Ecole d'Apprentissage Blanchot (St. Louis), the marine workers, the Podor Public Works employees, the SOCOSAC workers and the employees of the Direction de l'Artillerie in St. Louis. Transmission de l'Inspecteur Colonial Chef de Mission Moretti, May 1, 1939, Affaires Politiques, File 633, Dossier 4; ANSOM; also Rapport Annuel, Police et Sûreté, Dakar 1939; 2G 39 20, ARSD; and Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 41 1, ARSD.

402. Journal Officiel de l'AOF, June 29, 1940; and Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1941, 2G 41 19, ARSD.

403. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1941, Affaires Politiques, File 579, ARSD.

Vichy, the working day was extended from 9 to 10 hours and the administration recommended that the 1942 Labour Code prohibit strikes and lock-outs and create a "patrimoine corporatif commun."⁴⁰⁴

d) Indigénat and Prestations.

Vichy abolished indigénat exemptions, except in cases of distinction for active participation in the economic development of the country.⁴⁰⁵ In March 1941, a Native Penal Code was promulgated defining all offenses and fixing minimum and maximum penalties. It was hoped that this measure would render arbitrary sanctions obsolete.⁴⁰⁶ However, in practice, punishment became more severe: "Les peines d'emprisonnement sont trop fortes, les amendes trop lourdes et les interdictions de séjour trop fréquentes et trop longues."⁴⁰⁷ The death penalty, hard labour of up to 25 years, fines and confiscation of property became more

404. Ibid.

405. The decree of July 2, 1941 removed exemptions for AOF women; the veterans' exemptions had ceased to exist in February 41; see Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1941, 2G 41 19, ARSD. See also Journal Officiel du Sénégal, June 17, 1941; Affaires Politiques, File 636, Dossier 14, ANSOM.

406. "L'incertitude de la coutume livrée trop fréquemment le justiciable à l'arbitraire et entraîne, de la part des juridictions, des erreurs, des divergences, des contradictions, dans l'applications des peines. Le progrès le plus réel de ce Code Pénal... consiste dans l'énumération et la définition de toutes les infractions punissables, dans la prévision d'un maximum et d'un minimum..." Report on Penal Code, Journal Officiel du Sénégal, March 27 to April 3, 1941, pp. 208-221 and Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1941, Affaires Politiques, File 579, ANSOM.

407. Amon d'Aby, op. cit., 1951, p. 72.

frequent forms of punishment under Vichy. Boisson remained in favour of 'native justice.'

....dans un pays élémentaire comme l'est l'AOF, la séparation des pouvoirs n'a pas de raison d'être. L'indigène connaît le 'commandant', et trouve tout naturel que ce soit lui qui règle ses affaires de justice. La justice indigène est d'ailleurs une excellente école pour connaître l'indigène.⁴⁰⁸

In September 1940, the High Commissioner established a military tribunal in Dakar which over the next 26 months handled 226 cases, condemning 115 men to death, (73 in absentia) and 60 to forced labour (4 in absentia).⁴⁰⁹ In 1940, 44.370 days of hard labour were assigned while in 1941 their number rose to 65.099. The crime rate rose considerably under Vichy and prisons which were designed to hold 400 men were forced to take up to 754.⁴¹⁰

Two more cercles (Podor and Matam) introduced the system of additional taxation (introduced by the Popular Front as an alternative to the prestations, (see chapter I) in 1940 so that out of 14 cercles only Kédougou and Tambacounda still enforced the regime of the prestations. However, on January 1, 1942, the additional tax in the full and mixed communes increased by

⁴⁰⁸. Rapport de tournée, November 19, 1941-December 2, 1941, Papiers Boisson, File 2, ANSOM.'

⁴⁰⁹. Commissariat National à l'Interieur et au Travail, January 20, 1943, Report on Boisson, Papiers Boisson, File 4, ANSOM.

⁴¹⁰. Rapport Annuel, Dakar 1941, Affaires Politiques, File 579, ANSOM.

50%.⁴¹¹ The rural population was also hard hit during 1942 by the increase in the personal tax, which ranged from 18% in Lower Senegal to 40% in Diourbel. The Sociétés de Prévoyance fees (which the peasants considered another form of taxation) increased by 11% in Kedougou to 49% in Diourbel even though peanut production plummeted to its lowest since the economic depression of the 1930s.⁴¹²

e) The Press.

By 1940, L'AOF, Le Sénégal, Le Courrier de l'Ouest Africain, Le Périscope Africain, and most other newspapers had ceased to appear.⁴¹³ Only Paris-Dakar and the Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce survived. After the law of December 12, 1941 which stipulated that all publications had to be authorized by the government, only four new newspapers appeared and all were tightly controlled by Vichy: Sénégal (Bulletin d'Information et de Liaison), Jalons (Revue d'Afrique Noire), Dakar-Jeunes (Hébdomadaire de la 'Jeune France Africaine' Pétainiste), and La Légion.⁴¹⁴ Le Sénégal carried speeches by Pétain, articles on

411. Rapport Politique, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 2, ARSD and Rapport Politique, Haut Commissariat, 1940, Affaires Politiques, File 928, Dossier 2, ANSOM; Journal Officiel du Sénégal, February 1942, p. 138.

412. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1942, 2G 42 1, ARSD. Peanut production for the years 1941-42 was 199.412 tons.

413. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1939, Affaires Indigènes, 2G 39 34, ARSD.

414. Before the armistice La Gazette du Tirailleur, and L'Union, were also published. The latter was published by Télémaque Sow and Ibrahima Diouf and only circulated two issues.

the Legion and the scouts, as well as patriotic poems written by administrators and imbued with Vichy ideology. Jalons rejected, at least in theory, the doctrines of both the extreme right and left which wavered between

mépris extrême ou assimilation systématique...
Le noir ... ce n'est pas le 'bon sauvage' de Rousseau,
il n'est pas le 'singe humain'.... c'est un enfant
terriblement compliqué, et s'il est enfant, c'est un
enfant grand pour son age!⁴¹⁵

Boisson himself wrote in Dakar-Jeunes that Africa was the land of blacks and whites who should learn to coexist, appreciate and love one another,⁴¹⁶ urging African intellectuals like Mamadou Dia and Ousmane Socé Diop to contribute to Vichy publications.

Yet, familiar themes ran parallel to Vichy's seemingly benevolent disposition toward Africans: the raison d'être of colonialism, it was argued, was to advance native societies under the firm guidance and control of France. Authority and coercion were strongly recommended for the effective subjection of the rural populations. In the urban centres, the African elite would participate in the political process but only under European leadership. For this reason, Jalons argued, "en aucun cas, il ne faut favoriser les contacts des jeunes Européens avec les

See Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1940, 2G 40 1, ARSD.

415. "Les Noirs et nous: Dédain ou assimilation?", Jalons, (November 1941), pp. 9-11; see also no. 9, (May 1942), pp. 33-37.

416. Dakar-Jeunes, no. 1, 1941.

indigènes."417 And yet, Vichy propaganda projected an ideal brotherhood between blacks and whites colourfully disguised in a cult of youth, patriotism, order, discipline and hierarchy. The ideological contradictions do not need to be highlighted any further: ultimately, Vichy's policy of benevolent paternalism sought to erode assimilationist values which it equated with anti-colonialism.

While extolling French colonialism, évolué 'subjects' seized the opportunity to write in the Vichy press, rejecting (even if indirectly) assimilation and exploring instead African history and culture: "L'essentiel est que notre culture plonge ses racines dans nos anciennes traditions et que nous apprenions à être fiers de notre Afrique ingénument sauvage."418

ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE WAR.

a) Vichy Economic Planning

With the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, the French empire resumed the role of manpower, foodstuff and strategic raw material reservoir for a weakened and divided France. A tight economic relationship between the metropole and the overseas territories and a planned economy were regarded as prerequisites for victory. The nationalization of foreign trade and mise-en-valeur of the colonial territories featured prominently on

417. P. Merlin, "Au sujet de la colonisation," Jalons, no. 6, (January-February 1942), pp. 15-23.

418. Mamadou Dia, Dakar-Jeunes, no. 10, (March 12, 1942).

Vichy's colonial agenda.⁴¹⁹

A Five Year Plan (1939-1944), "destiné à concourir l'intensification de la production coloniale en fonction des besoins de la Métropole et d'une façon plus générale à améliorer la balance commerciale française"⁴²⁰ was formulated by the Colonial Minister Mandel in 1938. Subsequently, he assigned the Conseil Supérieur de la France d'Outre Mer⁴²¹ the task of working out the details of the plan. Divided in three parts, (agriculture, public works and mines), the programme dealt almost exclusively with metropolitan needs "... et dans certains cas particuliers et exceptionnels, les travaux... permettent d'assurer un minimum de conditions vitales aux indigènes."⁴²² The Governor-General's version of the plan conveniently omitted the financial requirements of the programme and mise-en-valeur was conveniently shelved.

Vichy economic development planners formulated corporatist plans according to which the colonies would assume a new role in a reconstructed Fascist Europe (the role of protected markets for French capital and manufactured goods, as well as of agricultural

⁴¹⁹. Cotte, "La politique économique..," op. cit., 1981, p. 47.

⁴²⁰. Letter Mandel dated October 10, 1938, Affaires Politiques, File 2984, Dossier 6, ANSOM.

⁴²¹. Composed almost exclusively of professionals of the colonial lobby such as Vivier du Streel, Edouard de Warren, Le Neveu, etc.

⁴²². Quoted in Cotte, "La politique..," op. cit., 1981, p. 112.

producers).⁴²³ The reorganisation of the imperial economic structure would be state controlled via the Groupements Professionnels et Comités d'Organisation Coloniales (GPC's). However, GPC's were not created in Dakar until November 1942 and began operating in April 1943 under the Free French.

The mise-en-valeur programme in Senegal identified exhaustive peanut cultivation and soil erosion as the main problems of the colony's economic structure. The intensification of millet and cereal production was recommended to redress the ailing economy along with the introduction of agricultural machinery and technology. With the help of hydraulic projects, Vichy planners argued, the Fleuve region in northern Senegal would become a showpiece of development. New lands would open up to the cultivation of subsistence (rice, millet and maize) and industrial crops (cotton). It was argued that "la monoculture sénégalaise, maintes fois dénoncée et qui rend le paysan du Siné tributaire des cours mondiaux n'existera plus."⁴²⁴ In some respects, Vichy economic policy-making foreshadowed the developmentalist approach of the 1950s and 1960s which in theory advocated a return to the land, yet in practice championed industrialisation.

⁴²³. René Maunier, Éléments d'économie coloniale, (Paris: 1943); Bertrand Mounier, L'organisation de l'économie impériale par les comités coloniaux, (Paris: 1942), pp. 267-68; Giblin, "A Colonial State..," op. cit., 1984, pp. 2-3. Vichy fell before any of the plans were enforced; see Giblin, "The Vichy Years," op. cit., 1978, p. 69.

⁴²⁴. Senegal, Notice sur le plan général de développement économique et social, no date, 13G 81 180, ARSD.

b) The Decline of the Peanut Economy.

The effects of the war were immediately felt in Senegal as imports plummeted and prices rose by 40-50% against the fixed price of peanuts. Despite the drain in manpower, production did not decrease and the peanut trade continued.⁴²⁵ However, a recurrent dilemma for the administration throughout the war was how to increase peanut production to meet the needs of the French war effort and stimulate rice production to make up for the limited supplies of exorbitantly priced imports. The colonial authorities expected that

[Les cultivateurs] pousseront leur effort à la limite de leurs forces pour produire au maximum de quoi ravitailler la métropole et assurer leur propre subsistance.⁴²⁶

After the armistice and the introduction of the British blockade, commercial activity diminished and the first measures to reduce consumption were enforced (rationing of food, [June 24, 1940, food cards [July 18]). The colonial administration was forced to concentrate its efforts on the intensification of the cultivation of food crops in order to minimize the consumption of imports and prolong the available stocks to the maximum. But, it also feared that the drain in manpower (70.000 peasants had been mobilised in AOF and the number of migrant workers, navétanes,

⁴²⁵. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1939, 2G 39 35, ARSD, and Gellar, "The Politics of . . ." op. cit., 1967, p. 91.

⁴²⁶. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1939, 2G 39 35, ARSD.

had sharply declined from 64.460 in 1939 to 39.324 in 1940), combined with the fall of peanut prices could negatively affect groundnut production.

While production did not decrease substantially during the first year of the war (420.000 tons in relation to the 1930-39 average of 460.000), food shortage was acute, malnutrition spread rapidly and rumours of famine circulated.⁴²⁷ The purchasing power of the African (in steady decline since 1936) dwindled sharply:

Jamais dans l'histoire du Sénégal, même pendant les années de la crise 1930 à 1934, semblable effondrement du pouvoir d'achat avait été constaté.⁴²⁸

Table 4.⁴²⁹

	<u>Rice Imports in AOF</u> in tons
1938	41.101
1939	62.253
1940	62.753
1941	23.759
1942	1.362
1943	4.408
1944	2.903

The price of staple foodstuffs, with rice serving as a barometre for the purchasing power of urban Africans, rocketed in the space

427. Ibid., and Report of January 23, 1940, 2D 14 6, ARSD.

428. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 35, ARSD.

429. Senegal imported most of the rice destined to AOF. Annuaire Statistique de l'AOF, 1949, pp. 264-5.

of three months from 1.17 francs per kg to 3 francs; the price of bread rose from 1 franc to 1.50; milk from 3 to 5 francs and charcoal from 15 to 40 francs per kilo.⁴³⁰ NOSOCO would not sell sugar by the kilo unless its clients also bought half a pound of coffee.⁴³¹ The price of cloth increased by 70-100% and was sold at 9 francs per metre in Dakar and 16 francs in Thiès.⁴³²

A hundred kilograms of groundnuts which bought 116 kgs of rice in 1936, only bought 34 kgs of rice in March 1941. Until 1938, the advantageous price of peanuts had allowed Africans to buy rice and other foodstuffs. In 1940, 1 hectare of peanuts was equal to 500-600 kgs of rice, while 1 hectare of millet yielded only 350 kgs of rice. When in 1940, 1 hectare of peanuts procured only 200-250 kgs of rice, peasants switched immediately to the cultivation of cereals. In the Sine-Saloum for example, millet and peanut production were evenly distributed.⁴³³

In 1941, a severe drought contributed to the lowest yields in peanut production since 1931 (199.412 tons) and affected the millet, rice and cotton crops.⁴³⁴ Imports fell by 33% and exports rose by only 7.4% in relation to 1940 but a food crisis was averted with small quantities of rice from Indochina and

430. Renseignements, December 22, 1939, 2D 14 6, ARSD.

431. Report of December 29, 1939, 2D 14 6, ARSD.

432. Galandou Diouf's letter to Mandel, Le Sénégal, April 18, 1940, and Report of August 12, 1940, 2D 14 6, ARSD.

433. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 35, ARSD.

434. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1941, 2G 41 27, ARSD.

Madagascar, millet from the Soudan and maize from Dahomey and Togo. In the interior, peasants endured the requisition system which was set up to extract oil products, cotton, rice and rubber destined for the war effort and for troops in North Africa.

In 1942, the peanut harvest yielded an all time low of 112.900 tons and more peasants shifted cultivation from groundnuts to subsistence crops. But the fact that Africans abandoned peanut production does not necessarily have to be interpreted as a form of popular resistance to capitalist relations of production. Africans did not find it profitable to cultivate peanuts because they could not buy much with it. Moreover, more than any other government before it, the Vichy regime encouraged the cultivation of subsistence crops to compensate for the acute food shortages, to prevent mass unrest and contribute to the war effort (much of the foodstuffs were requisitioned). The shift in cultivation from export to subsistence crops was rather a response to the crisis--much like the response to the depression of the early 1930s.

c) The Foundations of Industrialisation

Eager to prevent the development of an African colonnat, Vichy encouraged a 'return to the land.' Boisson underscored the potentially crucial role of chiefs not as simple auxiliaries or intermediaries but as "les premiers agents de notre administra-

tion auprès des populations indigènes."⁴³⁵ With the decree of June 20, 1940, chiefs were appointed by the colonial authorities, thus further tightening administrative control over the protectorate.⁴³⁶

L'Afrique est paysanne. Elle doit, dans sa nécessaire évolution, demeurer paysanne et ce serait une erreur de la prolétarianiser en l'industrialisant.⁴³⁷

'Limited industrialisation' was the official Vichy colonial economic strategy.⁴³⁸ The British blockade which had critically affected the peanut trade economy and curtailed the volume of exports to France, contributed to the stimulation of industrial development, particularly the processing and machine finishing of the groundnut.

Prior to the Second World War, the French government had been under constant pressure from metropolitan processing plants to discourage oil production in AOF. The ensuing paradox acknowledged by the administration was that despite the fact that

⁴³⁵. Circulaire no. 265 au sujet du décret 10/4/35 in textes réorganisant l'indigène en AOF, Gorée 1936, Commission Guernut, File 59, Dossier B32, ANSOM; and Rapport de tournée, November 19, 1941-December 1, 1941 Nemo and Platon, Papiers Boisson, File 2, ANSOM.

⁴³⁶. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 2, ARSD.

⁴³⁷. Boisson, "Directives pour un programme d'équipement administratif et économique de l'AOF," November 15, 1942, 13G 81 180, ARSD.

⁴³⁸. See Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Vichy et l'industrialisation aux colonies," Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, no. 114, (1979), pp. 69-94.

Senegal had plenty of potentially edible oil of superior quality, cotton oil was imported for local consumption. The reason behind this disparity was that French oil industries were hostile to colonial industrialisation and anxious to avoid competition by ensuring that the colonies remained mere producers of raw materials. Those materials were exported and finished in France and then returned overseas as costly merchandise. French oil industries argued that every new oil plant in Senegal corresponded to the closing down of a French industry but eventually agreed with great reluctance to the production of oil overseas for local consumption.⁴³⁹ In 1939, exports of unshelled nuts for the first time exceeded the export of shelled groundnuts and the President of the Dakar Chamber of Commerce boasted that "Le Sénégal est outillé, s'il est besoin exporter sous forme d'arachides décortiqués la totalité de sa récolte."⁴⁴⁰

As a result of the war, the export of shelled nuts was banned in February 1940, the metropolitan demand for oil rocketed (several oil plants in France were destroyed) and the situation was reversed: unshelled nuts and peanut oil incentives were extended to producers; and 31 fixed and 32 mobile shelling industries were installed in the main producing centres of the

⁴³⁹. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1939, 2G 39 35, and Gellar, "The Politics of..," op. cit., 1967, p. 99; Suret-Canale, French Colonialism.., op. cit., 1971, pp. 592-93.

⁴⁴⁰. Allocution du Président de la Chambre de Commerce de Dakar to Weygand, March 1941, Affaires Politiques, File 638, Dossier 4, ANSOM.

peanut belt.⁴⁴¹ In 1941, the French oil industry Lesieur which had vehemently opposed oil processing in Senegal (and whose Dunkirk plant was destroyed in the war) set up a plant in Dakar. The rationale was that local industries were no longer competitors but "compléments nécessaires" to the French imperial economy.

Table 5.⁴⁴²

Peanut and Peanut Oil Production in Senegal
1938-1941, in tons

	<u>Shelled Nuts</u>	<u>Unshelled Nuts</u>	<u>Peanut Oil</u>
1938	365.732	142.999	5.681
1939	99.724	291.235	14.000
1940			20.800
1941	59.000	149.000	45.000

The isolation that the war inflicted on French West Africa stimulated the manufacturing of processed foods which had hitherto been imported from France. Flour and canned tuna factories were amongst the important new industries. Other plants included the Bata shoe factory in Rufisque, a wood industry in Casamance, two cigarette factories and the Ateliers et Chantiers de Dakar.

⁴⁴¹. See decree of February 1940 in Journal Officiel de l'AOF, February 3, 1940; and Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1942, 2G 42 24, ARSD.

⁴⁴². Rapports Economiques Annuels, 1938-1941; 2G 38 41; 2G 39 35; 2G 40 35; 2G 41 27, ARSD.

One of the consequences of this import-substitution industrialization was that the Bordeaux import-export firms lost the monopoly of economic activity they had previously enjoyed and began declining, as exports to France plummeted and the government bolstered the new local industries.⁴⁴³ New banks such as the Crédit Lyonnais and the Société Générale were founded while others established overseas networks.

While the number of Senegalese firms with 50 or more employees did not increase substantially between 1936 and 1945 (from 13 to 19),⁴⁴⁴ smaller industries proliferated. In addition, heavy industries such as Lesieur Oil which set up plants in Senegal during the war were to become the backbone of Dakar's industrialisation in the postwar era.⁴⁴⁵

THE IMPACT OF VICHY IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA.

Vichy rule in Senegal was premised on the assumption that assimilation had accorded Africans rights and privileges they had usurped and that it was urgent to modify the existing framework of African political participation. The suspension of political rights and the dwindling economic supremacy of the évolués had reduced the elite to 'subject' status. The originaires were no longer distributed the food rations accorded to Europeans; they

⁴⁴³. Rapport Annuel, Dakar 1941, 2G 41 19, ARSD; see also Gellar, "The Politics of..," op. cit., 1967, p. 100.

⁴⁴⁴. Giblin, "The Vichy Years..," op. cit., 1978, p. 91.

⁴⁴⁵. Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, op. cit., 1968, p. 498.

no longer shared their living quarters, food and uniforms in the army; and they were excluded from certain train compartments, building entrances and queues on a colour basis.⁴⁴⁶

It has been argued that Vichy practiced racial discrimination to an unprecedented extent. Yet, in reality, discrimination mostly affected the 'citizen' minority, insofar as they were no longer treated as a privileged group. For the 'subjects,' the status quo remained more or less unchanged.

The political scientist A. Zolberg has contended that Vichy's most important contribution was that it forced the African elite to identify, for the first time, with the 'subjects.'⁴⁴⁷ This argument is debateable for, according to administrative reports, the originaires refused to identify with the 'subjects' and believed that ^{the} state of affairs was only temporary.⁴⁴⁸ The reverse might, however, be argued: it was the urban 'subjects' who became more conscious of the diminishing gap that had set them apart from the privileged assimilés for nearly two centuries, as they witnessed the structure of assimilation and social stratification erode. Boisson even went as far as to claim that 'subjects' expressed satisfaction with the Vichy measures "disant même volontiers que les élections créaient des

⁴⁴⁶. Rita Cruise O'Brien, White Society in Black Africa, (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), p. 64.

⁴⁴⁷. Aristide R. Zolberg, One Party Government in the Ivory Coast, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 61.

⁴⁴⁸. Boisson letter to Vichy dated October 23, 1940, 13G 17 17, ARSD.

privilèges et que ce serait un bien de les voir abolir (sic)."⁴⁴⁹

For Vichy, the loyalties of the African elite were questionable throughout the war years. 'Dangerously isolated' and vulnerable to foreign subversive influences, the assimilés had protested vehemently against the armistice only to pledge full support to Boisson and Pétain a few weeks later.⁴⁵⁰ The underlying suspicion that educated Africans were in fact pro-British during the entire duration of the war persisted in administrative reports.⁴⁵¹

For this reason, it was argued that "l'élite doit être la préoccupation essentielle de l'Ordre Nouveau en Afrique."⁴⁵²

Closer ties with the originaires would ensure that the administration would "shape" and control their development in order to neutralize any independent action on their part.⁴⁵³ Apart from political parties, municipal politics and trade unions, the only other means of expression of évolué interests had been the literary, athletic and semi-political associations.

449. ibid.

450. Affaires Politiques, File 639, Dossier 5, ANSOM, for loyalty letters and telegrams toward Vichy.

451. See for instance, Renseignements, November 15 and 16, 1940, 2D 14 3, ARSD; Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1940, 2G 40 2, ARSD; Berthet Report, 2D 14 8, ARSD; Boisson to Vichy, October 23, 1940, 13G 16, 17 17, ARSD; Renseignements, October 15, 1940, ibid., ARSD.

452. Rapport Annuel, Dakar 1941, 2G 41 19, ARSD.

453. "Pour que l'élite indigène ne se sépare pas de nous, il faut que nous sachions la former... mais aussi que nous sachions la retenir..." Boisson circular, no. 600: Trois directives de colonisation, op. cit., p. 3.

According to Vichy legislation, all associations had to be authorized by Boisson, whose strategy was to strip them of political vestiges so that they would be "soutenu[s] et guidé[s] par les administrations locales."⁴⁵⁴ Only 11 associations were created during Boisson's proconsulate and most of them were athletic clubs.

Conversely, a plethora of scout groups ('éclaireurs,' 'archers,' etc.) sprang up across the country and a Maison de Jeunesse was founded in Rufisque. Schools became imbued with the cult of Pétain and a military atmosphere conducive to "l'enseignement patriotique," reigned. Physical education, agriculture and 'formation morale' became the three most important courses on the school curriculum.⁴⁵⁵ Amadou Ali Dieng still remembers the "écoles galères" which forced African schoolchildren to cultivate plots of land daily as part of their education.⁴⁵⁶ A contemporary observer spoke of the new horizons that Vichy education would usher schoolchildren to: "Déjà l'essor remarquable de l'éducation physique et de la préparation

⁴⁵⁴. ibid., Boisson became the president of many associations such as the Cercle Amicale William Ponty.

⁴⁵⁵. Examinations such as the brévet sportif populaire were introduced in schools; See Directives pour un programme d'équipement, 13G 81 180, ARSD. On the education system during the Vichy period see Peggy Sabatier, "African Culture and Colonial Education: The William Ponty School cahiers and Theater," Journal of African Studies, (1985), pp. 1-10.

⁴⁵⁶. Interview with Amadou Ali Dieng, Dakar, June 1984.

militaire ouvre une ère nouvelle."⁴⁵⁷

Under instructions from Rey and Boisson, the Légion Française des Anciens Combattants d'Afrique Noire encouraged the creation of scout groups such as the Pasteur des Cadets de St. Louis, the Cadets de Dakar, Eclaireurs de St. Louis, the Troupe Lyautey des Eclaireurs de France, etc. which organized campfire festivities, marches, parades--all in an atmosphere of military discipline and patriotism.⁴⁵⁸ Vichy's extensive propaganda network was largely responsible for their popularity. Radio broadcasts, 'causeries,' and newspaper articles popularised Vichy's message to young legionaires, and it seemed to have a powerful effect on young Africans.

a) The Légion Française des Anciens Combattants d'Afrique Noire

To minimize political dissent (particularly on the part of the évolués and the returning soldiers), and mobilise public opinion on a greater scale, Vichy created a hierarchically structured organization which absorbed all the existing veteran associations.⁴⁵⁹ Article 2 of the Legion's statutes defined it as

Le mouvement unique d'action civique ouvert aux citoyens désireux de s'associer aux anciens combattants pour servir les principes de la Révolution Nationale et

⁴⁵⁷. Marius Leblond, Comment utiliser nos colonies, (Paris: Editions Jules Tallandier, 1940), p. 21.

⁴⁵⁸. Sénégal, no. 7, (April 15, 1942).

⁴⁵⁹. Journal Officiel de l'AOF, February 22, 1941, p. 207, and Giblin, "The Vichy Years..," op.cit., 1974, pp. 53-55.

assurer leur application dans tous les domaines.⁴⁶⁰

Founded at the end of 1940 under the auspices of administrator-in-chief Martinet and Governor Martine, the Legion appointed Boisson as president and held its first meeting, quite significantly, at the Conseil Colonial quarters. Soon afterwards, veterans assembled at the stadium of the Lycée Van Vollenhoven in a "grandiose et émouvante cérémonie" where they swore allegiance to the Pétain government with the slogan "une foi-un chef-une discipline."⁴⁶¹ Boisson set the tone of the festivities: "La doctrine du Maréchal s'impose en bloc: elle requiert votre adhésion totale..."⁴⁶²

The High Commissioner distributed 4.600 membership cards (1.600 to 'citizens' and 3.000 to 'subjects') and in less than six months, the Legion boasted 3.000 African and European members.⁴⁶³ The professed objectives of the Legion were to crush dissidence; restore African faith in France's "mission civilisatrice"; make French public opinion aware of the importance of the African bloc; and "eliminate at all cost" Jews,

460. Boisson circular, March 8, 1943, 13G 8 17, ARSD.

461. Rapport Annuel, Dakar 1941, op.cit., ARSD, and Affaires Politiques, File 579, ANSOM, and Paris-Dakar, (June 19, 1941).

462. Paris-Dakar, (June 19, 1941).

463. Boisson letter to Colonies Vichy dated March 15, 1941, 13G 8 17, ARSD. See also Sénégal, no. 7, (April 15, 1942).

Freemasons and communists.⁴⁶⁴

The elite of the Legion formed nuclei to assist the administration in enforcing order and in recruiting legionnaires from different strata of the population to participate in the municipal councils and the nearly defunct governments of the mixed communes as well as to assume positions of leadership as mayors, presidents of special delegations, etc. Boisson personally appointed candidates to their posts, and by the end of 1942, 115 out of 143 councillors were legionnaires.⁴⁶⁵ Civil servants who refused to join were accused of "une attitude inadmissible" for refusing to promote the ideals of the National Revolution and fired on those grounds.⁴⁶⁶

Table 6.⁴⁶⁷

Legionaire Participation in Municipal Councils

<u>Commune</u>	<u>Municipal Councillors</u>	<u>Legionnaires</u>
St. Louis	17	17
Kaolack	18	10
Thiès	18	17
Ziguinchor	18	8

⁴⁶⁴. Boisson propaganda instructions to Legionnaires, March 25, 1941, 13G 9 17, ARSD, and Affaires Politiques, File 639, Dossier 12, ANSOM.

⁴⁶⁵. Boisson letter to Secretary of State for the Colonies dated June 8, 1943, 13G 8 17, ARSD; see also Boisson circular dated February 9, 1942, op.cit.

⁴⁶⁶. Telegram of Boisson to Colonies Vichy dated June 14, 1941, Papiers Boisson, File 1, ANSOM; and letter of Georges Rey to Boisson dated August 15, 1941, 13G 104 180, ARSD.

⁴⁶⁷. Berthet, Directeur Général-Affaires Politiques, Administratives et Sociales, letter to Boisson dated September 5, 1942, 13G 8 17, ARSD.

Louga	18	16
Diourbel	18	15
M'Bour	12	11
Fatick	12	9
Tivouane	12	12
Total number of councillors:	143	
Total number of legionnaires:	115	

Yet, behind Boisson's eagerness to champion the cause of the Legion and integrate it into the political life of the colony lay a concern over its possible politicization. The High Commissioner was determined to harness the movement to serve the purposes of the administration. Thus, he resisted the entrance of legionnaires in the police and in the garde cercles and excluded them from matters relating to the "politique indigène."⁴⁶⁸ When in late 1942, the Legion began demanding more autonomy in order to embark on^a 'coup de force' against the enemies of the National Revolution (more imaginary than real), Boisson resigned as president and relations between the Legion and the administration became strained thereafter.⁴⁶⁹

Yet, during that year, Governor Rey boasted that

[La Légion] tient dans le pays et à la colonie une place de premier plan et on ne concevrait plus la vie

⁴⁶⁸. Boisson circular, March 8, 1943, 13G 8 17, ARSD.

⁴⁶⁹. Boisson letter dated September 15, 1942, Affaires Politiques, File 639, Dossier 2, ANSOM; see also Boisson letter to Platon dated October 9, 1942, ibid., and Conclusion de la Direction des Affaires Politiques, November 6, 1942, Affaires Politiques, File 639, Dossier 12, ANSOM.

du Sénégal sans la Légion...⁴⁷⁰

La Légion ... a groupé à elle seule à peu près toute l'activité locale...⁴⁷¹

On account of their attachment to the values of authority, discipline and camaraderie, veterans were chosen as the most effective agents to unite Frenchmen and revive in them

"[L'] amour de la Patrie, [l'] attachement au sol natal, [la] cohésion, [le] respect de la famille, [le] goût du travail..., [la] soumission à l'autorité."⁴⁷²

The figures below demonstrate that 'subjects' in Dakar were not keen on joining the Legion, in sharp contrast to subjects in the protectorate who enlisted as veterans or volunteers. More 'citizens' were listed as volunteers than veterans, though pressure on the part of the administration might have contributed to it. Veteran 'subjects' in Dakar showed the least enthusiasm in the Legion while volunteer 'citizens' from the protectorate joined more massively than any other category.

⁴⁷⁰. Sénégal, no. 10, (May 10, 1942); and no. 7, (April 15, 1942).

⁴⁷¹. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1942, 2G 42 1, ARSD.

⁴⁷². Boisson propaganda instructions, March 25, 1941, 13G 8 17, ARSD.

Table 7.473

The Legion in 1942.

	<u>Veterans</u>		<u>Volunteers</u>	
	Citizens	Subjects	Citizens	Subjects
Dakar	1.848	241	2.282	259
Senegal	1.249	1.923	2.771	2.413

Veterans formed groups such as La France de Pétain, Service d'Ordre Légionnaire (SOL), Groupement des Vigilances Françaises, Jeunesse Boisson.⁴⁷⁴ The most important and popular of all was the SOL, a paramilitary group with distinct collaborationist tendencies.

Une force réelle, une élite agissante... à l'intérieur ... de la Légion, qui soit vraiment, grâce à sa formation politique... l'instrument révolution-

⁴⁷³. 13G 8 17, ARSD. The table also includes figures from all AOF colonies.

⁴⁷⁴. Affaires Politiques, File 929, Dossiers 1 and 4, ANSOM; La France de Pétain was authorized in September 1941. The Groupement des Vigilances Françaises was never authorized. It championed a systematic campaign against Jews, Freemasons, and Communists. Its members eventually adhered to France de Pétain. Directeur de Sûreté Générale de Dakar to Boisson dated May 31, 1949, Affaires Politiques, File 929, Dossier 4, ANSOM. The Jeunesse Boisson was formed by a Senegalese teacher from the Ecole Libre France-Afrique, but was refused authorization on the grounds that it was an "association de divertissement"; 21G 82 17, ARSD. Other groups like the Parti Populaire Français which were furthering the cause of Vichy were also active during this period but only semi-clandestinely, for Boisson never allowed extreme right-wing metropolitan parties to establish branches in AOF. See Report of Sûreté Générale, 13G 104 180, ARSD and Papiers Deschamps, Report of October 7, 1943, ANSOM.

naire par excellence.⁴⁷⁵

SOL members had to undergo extensive physical and political training before taking the ceremonial oath of allegiance to the National Revolution.⁴⁷⁶ SOL groups were formed in St. Louis, Thiès, Kaolack, Kédougou, Ziguinchor and Diourbel.⁴⁷⁷ Its statutes comprised 21 points, among which

Contre l'égalitarisme
contre la vaine liberté
contre la condition prolétarienne
contre la lèpre juive

pour la pureté française
pour la civilisation chrétienne
pour le corporatisme français
pour l'autorité.⁴⁷⁸

SOL sympathizers were grouped in the Amis de la Légion and the Volontaires de la Révolution Nationale.⁴⁷⁹ Legionaire houses were built across the country to provide study groups and hold soirées for fundraising purposes. Conferences, kermesses, prayers, and

475. Instruction générale sur le recrutement du SOL, Papiers Boisson, File 4, ANSOM and Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1942, 2G 42 1, ARSD.

476. SOL recrutement form, July 22, 1942, prepared by the chief of SOL, Grébert, Affaires Politiques, File 2557, Dossier 6, ANSOM.

477. See detailed membership list in Papiers Deschamps, ANSOM.

478. Causerie du SOL, March 21, 1942, Papiers Boisson, File 4, ANSOM and Paris-Dakar, (July 10, 15 and 22, 1942).

479. Rapport Politique Annuel, Dakar 1941, Affaires Politiques, File 579, ANSOM.

ritualistic ceremonies effectively conveyed the impression that Vichy was a rigorous and solid movement. In addition, parades and official ceremonies were elaborate and colourful--an integral factor of the Vichy appeal: "Grâce à la Légion les fêtes officielles... qui étaient particulièrement froides, rigides, devenues vibrantes, chaudes, spontanés..."⁴⁸⁰

The success of the propaganda was not limited to the urban centres. Eager to prevent dissidence and foster an image of legitimacy, Vichy had addressed itself and appealed to the youth, particularly the 'subjects' of the protectorate. By involving 'subjects' in the ritualistic politics of the Legion, Vichy increased its popularity. The prestige and appeal of the Legion dwindled rapidly after AOF rallied to the Allies in November 1942. The majority of its members resigned, its leaders were severely criticised and the campaign of denigration that followed raised new issues of contention amongst Europeans and Africans alike.

AFRICAN RESISTANCE.

The resistance movement in Senegal began in a systematic fashion only after the attack on Dakar in September 1940 with the foundation of the clandestine section of the France Combattante de Bathurst headed by Lieutenant Montezan. Its 314 European and African members (mostly 'citizen' teachers, merchants, civil servants) were led by a Muslim reformer and former municipal

⁴⁸⁰. Sénégal, no. 10, (May 16, 1942), Governor Rey article.

councillor Abdel-Kader-Diagne and the European Saussin.⁴⁸¹ A second resistance network operated under the leadership of the Mouride marabout Bassirou M'Backé of Kaolack. The objective was to carry messages from Bathurst to Dakar, oppose Vichy policy and prepare the ground for the future deployment of the Free French forces in Dakar.⁴⁸²

Within two months of operation of the resistance rings, 13 Africans and Europeans were arrested and condemned to death by the military court of Dakar but later their sentences were reduced to 20 years of forced labour. Eleven other Gaullists were condemned from two to four years imprisonment and confiscation of property. Some 568 civilians were prosecuted on charges of dissidence and 36 were tried by the Military Tribunal of Dakar.⁴⁸³ Special anti-dissident squads were founded in AOF to combat dissidence, and 11 concentration camps operated in the federation, two of which were in Senegal.⁴⁸⁴ Six dissidents were executed in Fann, one of them only 11 days after AOF had sided

481. Abdel Kader Diagne, La résistance française au Sénégal et au AOF pendant la guerre, (Thiès, no date [circa 1950]), pp. 4, 20.

482. ibid., p. 6, and Rapport de Abdel Kader Diagne sur la dissidence, September 22, 1943, Affaires Politiques, File 883, Dossier 14, ANSOM. See also Giblin, "The Vichy Years in ..," op.cit., 1978, chapter 4 on Smugglers and Spies: Resistance to Vichy in French West Africa.

483. Telegram of Boisson to Bureau Menées Antinationales dated November 4, 1941, Papiers Boisson, File 4, op.cit., ANSOM.

484. Cornevin, "Le corps des administrateurs..," op.cit., 1984, p. 7. There was one concentration camp in Guinea, one in Dahomey, one in the Ivory Coast, two in Togo, four in Sudan and two in Senegal, see Papiers Boisson, File 4, ANSOM.

with the Allies. The composition and leadership of those resistance networks ('citizens,' marabouts, etc.) points to the fact that for Africans, resistance had more to do with regaining their lost status than with supporting a particular metropolitan faction.

Another example of resistance was the flight of the Floup and Diola ethnic groups of Lower Casamance into Portuguese Guinea. In July 1942, they refused to provide recruits and foodstuffs requisitioned by the administration. The chief of the Floup, Alinsitoué, advised her people

....de ne pas obéir au blanc, de lui refuser les hommes pour le service militaire, les achats forcés paddy pour la constitution de réserves, enfin de ne pas entretenir les routes pour qu'il ne puisse contrôler ce qui ce passe dans la région.⁴⁸⁵

These isolated rebellions took over a year to suppress and were directed against colonial rule rather than against Vichy.

CONCLUSIONS

The Second World War signalled the abrogation of African political participation and the return to colonial authoritarianism. The climate of change and promise of reform which characterised the Popular Front era came to an abrupt halt. It was the wartime measures of the Third Republic, and not the Vichy regime as has often been assumed, which suspended elections, municipalities and associations, thereby paving the ground

⁴⁸⁵. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1942, 2G 42 1, ARSD and 17G 124 17, ARSD.

for Vichy's authoritarian policy-making. Boisson's regime was in a sense the culmination of policies already set in motion by a colonial administration in crisis.

Threatened by enemies and allies alike, Boisson pursued a policy of neutrality in the war, carefully maneuvering around potential foreign and domestic aggressors. The pressure of maintaining West Africa neutral far outweighed the urgency of implementing the New Order. Yet Boisson and the Governor of Senegal Georges Rey clearly wanted to rectify a colonial situation which they believed had gone too far under the Popular Front. The control of African political, social and economic activity was central to their decision-making. In addition, they turned a blind eye to the practice of the indigénat which intensified during this period and endorsed the Native Penal Code that was harsher than previous legislation.

Not all aspects of Vichy rule, however, had a negative effect on Africans. In economic terms, Africans fared better under Vichy than under previous administrations and certainly better than under the Free French. The decline of the peanut economy forced the colonial administration to concentrate its efforts on the cultivation of food crops in order to compensate for the acute food shortages as well as to prevent mass unrest. In addition, the British blockade curtailed the volume of exports to France and Vichy was compelled to encourage colonial industrial development, particularly the processing and machine finishing of the groundnut.

The Popular Front had been an urban movement which had addressed itself and appealed to the African elite. The Vichy regime stripped the originaires of their privileged status, political, economic and social. Anxious to appeal to African loyalty, it addressed itself to all Africans. The populist style of politics it introduced, namely boy-scout patriotism, parades, the cult of discipline and hierarchy, etc. integrated a segment of veteran 'subjects' from the protectorate and a large number of African youths who had hitherto been excluded from political participation into the colourful patriotic festivities that abounded under Vichy. The Legion and the press further popularized Vichy ideology.

On the other hand, the originaires whose hard earned rights had been abolished were left with a bitter taste of Vichy rule but also with a determination to safeguard their interests. It was they who got involved in the resistance movement and later welcomed the 'return' of the federation on the side of the Allies.

Chapter V.

FREE FRANCE IN SENEGAL, 1943-1945

The 'return' of French West Africa to the allied camp in November 1942 signalled the beginning of the most exacting and trying phase of the war for the federation. The resumption of the war effort intensified to an unprecedented extent, blurring the differences between two colonial administrations which claimed to be diametrically opposite. For instance, the Vichyite Boisson sounds remarkably similar to his socialist successor, Hubert Deschamps in the following speeches:

Pendant deux ans, nous avons assisté la France; maintenant, il faut la délivrer. Nous avons été choisis par le destin pour être les ouvriers de ce soutien et de cette délivrance.⁴⁸⁶

and

La libération de la Patrie doit seule occuper nos efforts et nos pensées. Ceci est le combat pour la liberté.⁴⁸⁷

The conditions under which AOF 'returned' to the war, the 'restoration of republican liberties'--to use some of the vocabulary that permeates the literature of that period--and the disastrous bataille de l'arachide had far-reaching consequences on the African milieu.

⁴⁸⁶. Boisson quoted in Paris-Dakar, (March 20, 1943).

⁴⁸⁷. Deschamps, Discours prononcé par Deschamps à l'ouverture de la session ordinaire du Conseil Colonial, August 23, 1943, p. 7.

The new element introduced in the war equation by the Free French was not, as the administration professed, the reinstatement of republican liberties. In fact, according to the African press, the oppressive habits of the Vichy regime were far from eradicated:

...rien ne parait changé. On croit vivre aux temps heureux du Pétainisme à outrance, même régime dictatorial, mêmes procédés policiers...⁴⁸⁸

The Africans' worst fears were confirmed when returning soldiers who had risked their lives for France faced a hostile administration and, when they protested, were brutally suppressed in Thiaroye.

It was the 'battle for groundnuts' which constituted the crux of Free France's policy-making, depleting African human and economic resources and indirectly committing itself to postwar reform as compensation. The sacrifices which Free France imposed on the African population coupled with French political division and the mishandling of domestic crises (such as Thiaroye) shook France's increasingly brittle grip on her colonies. Besides, there were other forces working against the colonial system. For instance, American and Soviet anti-colonialist ideology were putting increasing pressure on France and were infiltrating the insular social fabric of the originaires.

Political activity resumed in 1943 when the municipalities were restored and patriotic associations began shaping the

⁴⁸⁸. Réveil, (December 15, 1944).

political map of the colony. The polarisation between Europeans and Africans and the formation of patriotic associations along racial lines were the distinguishing feature of political activity in the immediate postwar period.

THE 'RETURN' OF AOF IN THE WAR.

The events leading up to the 'return' of AOF in the war have been largely neglected by contemporary historiography, and the transfer of power from Boisson to Cournarie has been dealt with as a clean break of policy. A closer look at the period reveals that the "ralliement" was not a 'spontaneous' manifestation of patriotism and that the proconsulates of Boisson and Cournarie, following AOF's resumption of the war, were in fact a continuum which was broken very gradually.

On the evening of November 8, 1942, notwithstanding the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa, Boisson renewed his allegiance to Pétain.

L'Afrique du Nord a été attaquée, ce matin, à l'aube par des forces Americaines et Britanniques. Nous connaissons le prétexte invoqué. Nous entendons à nouveau ce que nous avons entendu en Septembre 1940. Notre tour, sans doute, ne tardera pas. Il nous trouvera prêts a exécuter l'ordre du Maréchal.⁴⁸⁹

An emissary was sent to Morocco on November 10th, to inquire into General Noguès' position. He returned four days later to find

⁴⁸⁹. Note de renseignements sur les événements de Novembre 1942 en Afrique du Nord et en AOF, Commandement en chef des forces terrestres, aériennes, maritimes de l'AOF, 13G 104 180, ARSD.

that, despite the fact that news of the German invasion of unoccupied France had reached Dakar, the colonial administration remained loyal to Vichy.⁴⁹⁰ The previous day, Boisson and General Barreau (Commandant en chef des forces terrestres, maritimes et aériennes de l'AOF) had informed Admiral Darlan by telegram that they would neither accept defeat, military occupation and disarmament, nor a Gaullist presence in AOF.⁴⁹¹ Darlan, who aimed to regroup the empire and undermine the Gaullists at all cost, repeatedly underscored his close ties with Pétain to Boisson and Barreau.⁴⁹² Meanwhile, the envoy reported that, according to a secret telegram sent by Pétain, the Generals Noguès and Darlan were collaborating under the Marshall's orders.

With the exception of Barreau who was in favour of siding with the Allies, the military authorities in AOF remained apprehensive over what course of action to take. An Inquiry Commission dispatched to Algiers to investigate into the authenticity of the secret telegram returned to Dakar on November 22, having confirmed the emissary's findings.⁴⁹³ Boisson was swayed

490. Note du Général Barreau, Affaires Politiques, File 30, Dossier 2, ANSOM.

491. "Il serait impossible d'accepter la venue sur le territoire de l'AOF et dans ses eaux territoriales d'éléments Gaullistes quels qu'ils soient." Affaires Politiques, File 872, ANSOM.

492. Darlan proclamation of November 15, 1942, Algiers, 13G 104 180, ARSD; and Eléments de base de la position prise par l'Amiral Darlan, Affaires Politiques, File 872, ANSOM.

493. Compte rendu de la mission du Général Blaizot à Alger, December 21, 1942, Affaires Politiques, File 872, ARSD; and Pierre Queille, Histoire diplomatique de Vichy, (Paris: Albatros,

but the military stalled further.⁴⁹⁴ The following day, the High Commissioner addressed the historic telegram of "ralliement" to Darlan: "Considérant qu'en agissant ainsi nous restons fidèles à notre serment au Maréchal, l'AOF se range sous vos ordres."⁴⁹⁵

Having pledged allegiance specifically to Pétain and Darlan, Boisson essentially continued to serve the same men he took orders from under Vichy and he proudly boasted that AOF's realignment was but a minor shift of policy. His decision was predictable, if not inevitable: as was the case in 1940, he had acted only after a superior officer, Darlan, had committed himself first to a course of action. Thus AOF merely followed in the footsteps of North Africa.⁴⁹⁶ According to Boisson, the decisive consideration in his decision was "le souci de l'unité" with Darlan, the Navy and the military authorities.⁴⁹⁷

1976), pp. 259, 271.

⁴⁹⁴. Chenet, op. cit., 1949, pp. 147-150.

⁴⁹⁵. Telegram of Boisson to Darlan, Affaires Politiques, File 872, ANSOM; see also Ordre Générale, November 23, 1942, General Barreau, 13G 104 180, ARSD. The same day, Pétain had addressed the following message to AOF: "Il n'est plus que ses territoires et ceux des Somalis qui soient libres. Soldats, marins, aviateurs, j'avais confié l'AOF à votre garde, vous avez rempli votre mission. Il dépend encore de votre héroïsme et de votre fermeté que dans la tourmente, il existe une parcelle de terre d'Afrique sur laquelle flotte seul le drapeau de la France... vous resterez fidèles à mes ordres..." 13G 104 180, ARSD.

⁴⁹⁶. Papiers Boisson, Private Archives 30, File 5, ANSOM, on the 'return' of AOF to the Allied camp; also Faye, op. cit., 1973, p. 78.

⁴⁹⁷. Paris-Dakar, (November 22, 1942).

J'ai rallié l'Afrique Noire parce que j'étais désormais coupé de toutes relations sûres avec le gouvernement... La France était toute entière occupée et le Gouvernement était sur la contrainte de l'ennemi... Dans ces conditions, il m'appartenait de jouer la carte Africaine, je l'ai joué estimant que le moment était venu en ralliant l'Afrique Noire.⁴⁹⁸

As in 1940, Boisson was accused by the Gaullists of pursuing a policy of "attentisme" which was equal to collaboration in disguise. The High Commissioner retorted that the culmination of his policy of neutrality was the realignment of a united and militarily intact AOF to the Allied camp.⁴⁹⁹

The treaty of December 7, 1942, signed by Darlan, Boisson (member of the Imperial Council⁵⁰⁰) and Eisenhower, stipulated

498. Boisson interrogation of January 21, 1944, Papiers Boisson, Archives Privées 30, File 1, ANSOM.

499. Mission militaire de la France Combattante, Rapport sur Boisson, Accra, December 5, 1942, Papiers Boisson, File 4, ANSOM; and Interrogation of January 27, 1944, "Une politique se juge à ses résultats," ibid., Files 1 and 2. In Boisson's words: "L'AOF est rentrée dans la guerre contre l'Allemagne en bloc unanime, de son plein gré, sans sédition intérieure, sans que soient entamées, pour si peu que se soit, les principes d'ordre et de discipline...mais plus encore, à l'accomplissement des tâches de guerre. Elle y est entrée avec une armée coloniale reconstituée...Dakar est devenue... une base navale militaire de première ordre... avec une aviation navale inexistante à l'armistice...tout ce potentiel de combat et de victoire a été rassemblé sans qu'aucune contre partie ait été accordé aux Allemands. [Au niveau politique] on y voit l'AOF, terre française, traiter d'égal à égal avec les Alliés... sur le plan moral,... le prestige français y est demeure intact aux yeux de ses 15 millions d'indigènes... Je l'ai préservé des exagérations des ultras de la Révolution Nationale." Interrogation of January 27, 1944, ibid.

500. The other members of the Imperial Council were Generals Bergeret, Noguès, Giraud, and Yves Chatel (Governor-General of Algeria)

that AOF and Togo had 'spontaneously' adhered to Darlan.⁵⁰¹ On account of the peaceful and bloodless nature of AOF's 'return' to the war, Boisson was in a better position to negotiate with the Allies. The aforementioned treaty guaranteed French sovereignty over the colonies, wherein Free France reserved the exclusive right to promulgate orders and decrees.⁵⁰² In return, AOF ports, airports and other strategic military resources were put at the disposition of the Allies. Technical experts were also invited in, on condition that no foreign military force be permanently stationed on French African soil.⁵⁰³

The 'return' of AOF in the war generated considerable unrest in Dakar. The Vichyite Governor of Senegal Georges Rey defied the Gaullists and the "ralliement":

Que chacun sache bien que l'AOF, en se rangeant sous les ordres de l'Amiral Darlan n'a fait aucun pas en faveur du Gaullisme et n'abandonne aucun des principes de la doctrine du Maréchal. Je suis disposé à tolérer aucun désordre ou aucun retour sous une forme

501. Déclaration du ralliement de l'AOF aux côtés des alliés, December 7, 1942, Affaires Politiques, File 877, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

502. The Fleet remained under full French control while the U.S. and Britain pledged not to enforce measures pitting Frenchmen against their own people.

503. Déclaration du ralliement de l'AOF aux côtés des alliés, December 7, 1942, Affaires Politiques, File 877, Dossier 1, ANSOM. The treaty was followed by a convention signed on March 28, 1943 whereby U.S. forces were granted: access to the territory adjacent to Dakar (to be used as a petrol reservoir); permission to construct an airport at Yoff and a temporary aviation terrain in Bargny (near Rufisque) and install a fighter plane assembly line in Ouakam. Telegram of June 16, 1943, 5D 202 100, ARSD.

quelconque aux agitations politiques d'avant guerre.⁵⁰⁴

The festivities of June 18, 1943 during which a demonstration of 1.000 Africans and 500 Europeans vented violent anti-Boisson sentiments, revealed deep-seated divisions among the civilian population, a lack of confidence in the government's control of the situation and confusion over the legitimacy of the regime. According to one report, most Africans surmised that "Il n'y a plus de chef à Dakar, puisque tout est permis. Il n'y a plus de gouvernement."⁵⁰⁵ Governor Rey reported similar reservations in military circles:

Dans milieu militaire, signale très confidentiellement malaise qui provient ignorance où l'on est, de la forme que prendra la participation de l'AOF à la guerre et crainte que l'armée noire ne soit pas engagée en formations homogènes mais envoyés par petits paquets.⁵⁰⁶

In Dakar, pressure for the dismissal of the "Gouverneur Général de la collaboration" (as Boisson was often referred to), mounted.⁵⁰⁷ After a three month 'leave,' Boisson was tried and imprisoned until his death on June 20, 1948⁵⁰⁸ and Pierre

504. Note de service de Rey dated November 25, 1942, 13G 104 180, ARSD.

505. Report of the Chef de Sûreté, June 21, 1943, Affaires Politiques, File 872, ANSOM.

506. Rey to Boisson dated January 2, 1943, 13G 5 17, ARSD.

507. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 15, ARSD.

508. For details see Chenet, op.cit., 1949, p. 177 and Papiers Boisson, Files 1 and 2, ANSOM.

Cournarie was appointed Governor-General of AOF in July 1943. Vichyite historians have argued that he fell victim of de Gaulle's vengeance dating back to the humiliating Free French-British attack on Dakar.

After Boisson's deposition, a wave of purges jolted the colonial corps and an array of Vichyite administrators were dismissed from office. The socialist Hubert Deschamps who was appointed Governor of Senegal on January 4, 1943,⁵⁰⁹ was removed less than a year later, after being accused of racism and collaboration for speaking against de Gaulle. Born in Royan in 1900, Deschamps had fought as a volunteer in the Great War in the Orient. After teaching for a brief period in a lycée in Casablanca, he studied and taught at the Ecole Coloniale, and served in French Somalia and in the Ivory Coast.⁵¹⁰ A fervent supporter of the Popular Front, he claimed that he had not opted for Vichy as much as accepted legality. Yet, it was decided that he had compromised above the call of duty. He was recalled on December 10, 1943 and was replaced by Charles Dagain.

As usual, the lower echelons of the administration were not affected by the purges, partly because mobilisation had created a serious manpower shortage thereby limiting replacements to the absolute minimum. These purges were invariably followed by a

⁵⁰⁹. Deschamps claimed that he was appointed in Senegal for political reasons: "...il y a eu au Sénégal un mouvement ultra-vichiste extrêmement violent et il fallait déserrer cette espèce d'étou..." Procès d'épuration d'Hubert Deschamps, February 1945, Papiers Deschamps, ANSOM.

⁵¹⁰. Sénégal, no. 48, (February 6, 1943).

public denigration of Vichyite 'collaborators.' Pétain was reduced overnight from respected hero to traitor while de Gaulle was portrayed as the saviour of France.⁵¹¹ The complete reversal of roles of France's leaders exposed a fundamentally divided France with little control over its destiny, making a lasting impression upon urban Africans.

a) Mobilisation.

During the second half of the Second World War 80 battalions of tirailleurs, (approximately 100.000 men), sizeable cavalry and artillery forces, and a Foreign Legion battalion were sent to the European front.⁵¹² Senegal's recruits [2.194 men in 1943 and 2.318 in 1944]⁵¹³ participated in Marshall Juin's landing in Italy which liberated the south east of France and in de Lattre's forces that fought in Tripoli, following which they entered Paris along with Marshall Leclerc's colonial troops.⁵¹⁴

511. Marianne Cornevin, Histoire de l'Afrique contemporaine de la deuxième guerre mondiale à nos jours, (Paris: Payot, 1978), p. 81.

512. Rapport du Colonel le Masle, Chef d'Etat Major du Général Magnan, Général Commandant Supérieur, May 13, 1946, 2D 23 14, ARSD and Chenet, op. cit., 1949, pp. 166-167.

513. Only 66 volunteers enlisted as opposed to the anticipated 440. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16, ARSD; see also Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1944, 2G 44 20, ARSD.

514. Falilou Diallo, "Histoire du Sénégal de la Conférence de Brazzaville à la fondation du BDS, 1944-1948," Thèse de DEA, (University of Paris, 1983), p. 40; Echenberg, "'Morts pour la France'" op. cit., 1985, p. 374; see also Jean-Noel Vincent (Chef de Battalion), Les Forces Françaises dans la lutte contre l'axe en Afrique, (Paris: Ministère de la Défense, 1983).

Under the Free French, mobilisation proceeded relatively smoothly partly because, as Cornevin has argued "Le recrutement se fut de façon beaucoup plus modérée durant cette période du fait que les Alliés armaient les unités françaises avec réticence."⁵¹⁵ Some opposition, however, did surface amongst African 'subjects' who protested against the privileges accorded to 'citizen' tirailleurs: "Ils révendiqueraient un traitement strictement égal pour tous les noirs."⁵¹⁶ In turn, to neutralise the threat from below, the originaires overstated their privileges and assimilation to France and turned to the colonial administration for support. However, the colonial authorities appeared condescending or else ignored the special legislation regarding registration and mobilization procedures on the 'citizens'' behalf. Yet, "malgré leur désir, les autorités n'ont pas osé toucher au statut des originaires."⁵¹⁷

b) The 'Restoration' of Republican Liberties.

After Darlan's assassination on December 19, the Imperial Council unanimously appointed General Giraud head of French Africa. Giraud annulled laws, orders and decrees enforced under Vichy and reestablished "la légalité républicaine"--in other

515. Marianne Cornevin, op. cit., 1978, p. 11.

516. Berthet letter to CFLN dated February 10, 1943, Bulletin de Renseignements, June 1943, 13G 17 59, File 3, ARSD.

517. Etat d'esprit de la population indigène, March 3, 1943, Bulletin de Renseignements, Comité National Français, File 3, ANSOM.

words, the pre-1940 status quo.⁵¹⁸ A Commission de Validation Spéciale was founded in May 1943 to reinstate the rights of individuals who had been disgraced, fired or imprisoned under Vichy on charges of dissidence.

Elected assemblies were reinstated, but their functions were adjourned until the end of hostilities.⁵¹⁹ The municipal councils of Dakar, St. Louis and Rufisque and the mixed communes were revived in March 1943 and the Conseil Colonial convened for the first time since the war on April 2, 1943.⁵²⁰ Second degree communes such as Ziguinchor and Kaolack were reinstated in April 1943 while 12 mixed communes of the first degree were re-established in November 1943.⁵²¹

Alfred Goux, who had been arrested during the Dakar episode of September 1940, resumed the post of mayor on July 8, 1943 and his municipality convened for the first time since September 1940 on May 20th. In St. Louis, Mustapha Malick Gueye was appointed mayor on April 8. Before long, however, 10 municipal councillors petitioned for M.M. Gueye's resignation on the grounds of

518. Denise Bouche, "Le retour de l'AOF dans la lutte contre l'ennemi aux côtés des alliés," Revue Historique de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, Special issue: L'Afrique pendant la Guerre 1939-1945, vol. 29, no. 114, (April 1979), pp. 46-7.

519. Laws of March 27 and August 1943, Journal Officiel de l'AOF.

520. The ordinance of March 14, 1943, promulgated in AOF two weeks later, revived the municipalities; see Rapport politique Annuel, AOF 1943, 2G 43 1, ARSD; and "L'AOF depuis le débarquement...", op. cit., 1945, pp. 4-5.

521. Rapports Politiques Annuels, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16, and 1944, 2G 44 20, ARSD.

collaboration with Vichy. When their demands were not met, they resigned, and the Governor suspended the municipality (June 12) and replaced it with a five member (all originaires) special delegation.⁵²²

The Conseil Colonial⁵²³ met in a special session in October to elect a delegate to the Assemblée Consultative Provisoire in Algiers. Ely Manel Fall was elected for his exemplary loyalty to France but also because he was a 'subject.'⁵²⁴ Nine colonial councillors petitioned for the annulment of his appointment on the grounds that, according to existing legislation, only French 'citizens' could run for office. Moreover, Fall had been elected by only 14 members (out of which 13 had been chefs de canton) when at least half of the assembly (23 members) were required to endorse him.⁵²⁵

The Free French administration argued that "ce retour aux traditions françaises de liberté est le gage de l'union de tous

522. Dagain letter to Governor-General of AOF dated June 16, 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 872, ANSOM; Letter Cournaire to Pleven dated April 10, 1944; Pleven to Dagain dated July 13, 1944; and Dagain to Pleven dated August 14, 1944 in ibid.

523. The Council held its first session on August 23, 1943 and the permanent commission was reelected with Adama Lô as president; Sénégal, no. 56, (September 1943).

524. Fall was chef de canton of M'Bayar, colonial councillor from 1921 to 1925 and 1936, officer of the Légion d'Honneur. See Sénégal, no. 58, (November 1943).

525. Pétition de neuf membres du Conseil Colonial du Sénégal en suite de la désignation de Ely Manel Fall à l'Assemblée Constituante Provisoire, Affaires Politiques, File 874, Dossier 9, ANSOM.

les Français,"⁵²⁶ but in fact Europeans remained divided into Pétainistes, Giraudistes, and Pétainistes-Giraudistes, who had supported Vichy and now wanted to arrest the Free French movement;⁵²⁷ and Gaullists (traders, the business community) who interpreted CFLN policy-making as a return to the "regime traditionnel" which they contrasted to Vichy's "régime d'exception."⁵²⁸ Despite the colonial administration's allusions to unity, the persisting factionalism of French public opinion had a strong impact on the African urban milieu: "une inquiétude en résulte... sur la sincérité et la profondeur de l'union entre Français de tout appartenance politique..."⁵²⁹

For the traditional elites (originaires, chiefs, marabouts, veterans), the restoration of republican liberties was essentially tantamount to the reinstatement of their citizenship privileges which had been suspended under Vichy. Equality of rights between Europeans and African 'citizens' (including equal treatment in recruitment, salaries, benefits and employment) and the postwar status of the colonies were the dominant themes of the Conseil Colonial agenda during 1943.

The évolués were aware of U.S. and British pressure on their

526. Deschamps quoted in Sénégal, no. 52, (May 1943).

527. Bulletin Mensuel de Renseignements Politiques, March 1943, Deschamps Report, 2G 43 118, ARSD, and Papiers Deschamps, Deschamps instructions to Dagain, November 30, 1943, ANSOM.

528. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16, ARSD.

529. Rapport Berthet, administrateur en chef des affaires politiques, administratives et sociales d'AOF, February 10, 1943, Comité National Français, File 3, ANSOM.

rulers for the implementation of reforms. Some argued that France no longer exercised any authority over AOF but was reduced to receiving orders from the Allies.⁵³⁰ Governor Deschamps reported that Africans were alarmed at the prospect of a German defeat, following which France could become tributary to Britain and the U.S. for its war materials and food supplies. If reparations were demanded, an impoverished France might even consider "renting" its colonies. "Les colonies ne serviront-elles pas dans ces conditions de 'monnaie d'échange'?"⁵³¹

The marabouts, (who were favourable to Giraud), alone amongst the elites, were somewhat dissatisfied with the return of republican legislation which they equated with political squabbling and division amongst Muslims. The cessation of political activity under Vichy rule had improved religious observance, united the talibés and reinforced the authority of the marabouts. Thus, "les chefs religieux voient dans la remise en vigueur des anciennes lois une diminution de leur prestige et de leur influence auprès de la masse indigène."⁵³²

For the évolué 'subjects' (civil-servants, teachers, nurses, and interpreters), whom the war had thrust to the forefront of

530. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, March 1943, Senegal, Deschamps Report, 2G 43 118, ARSD.

531. ibid.

532. Bulletin Mensuel de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal March 1943, Deschamps Report, 2G 43 118, ARSD.

the political arena,⁵³³ the question of citizenship could not be put off any further and the future status of the colonies became an increasingly contentious issue particularly because it was inextricably linked to the question of citizenship. A sense of isolation from France which translated itself into an "esprit de revendication" was signalled by the administration.

Ils suivent avec une attention inusitée l'actualité tant politique que militaire... [et] le futur régime des peuples coloniaux. Ainsi s'affirme plus ou moins ouvertement, leur souci d'acquérir dès le temps de guerre des garanties supplémentaires pour une condition plus favorable, en interprétant et exagérant selon leur concepts particuliers les principes Français républicains dont ils se réclament.⁵³⁴

They were highly critical of the right to citizenship by birth and called for "l'extension de la qualité de citoyen à tous les indigènes de l'AOF pour récompenser leur participation à l'effort de guerre actuel."⁵³⁵ "Citizenship based on merit or no citizenship" was their motto.

'Subject' associations such as the Association Amicale Interprofessionnelle des Ouvriers du Siné-Saloum, and the Jeunesse Combattante Sénégal, presented their demands to high

533. Catherine Akpo, "Les élites Africaines d'AOF face à l'administration Gaulliste, 1943-1946," Colloque: Les prodromes de la décolonisation dans l'empire français, 1936-1956, October 4-5 1984, Institut d'Histoire Présent, Paris, conference paper, p. 2.

534. Bulletin de Renseignements, Dakar, August 5-September 5, October 23, 1943, Affaires Politiques, File 2557, Dossier 6, ANSOM.

535. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques Mensuels, April 1943, Senegal, Deschamps Report, 2G 43 118, ARSD.

officials visiting Dakar.⁵³⁶ The Sine-Saloum workers addressed a petition to de Gaulle in November 1943 demanding the reinstatement of the Conseil Général; the extension of French citizenship to all Africans; the restoration of the Mandel decree of April 1938 exempting veterans from native justice; and the right of persons tried in native courts to be defended by attorneys of their choice.⁵³⁷ The administration categorically opposed the reinstatement of the Conseil Général on the grounds that it would not represent all strata of the population,⁵³⁸ and the accession of all Africans to French citizenship as a "premature" reform.

A delegation led by Lamine Gueye and Thierno Amat M'Bengue (former publisher of Clarté and secretary of the permanent commission of the Conseil Colonial) went to Algiers in January 1944, to meet de Gaulle and discuss "le rétablissement des choses antérieures."⁵³⁹ Gueye was cynical about the disposition of the

536. Giraud visited the AOF capital in January 1943, and de Gaulle in January 1944. Bulletin de Renseignements Mensuels Politiques, January 1943, 2G 43 118, File 872, ARSD.

537. Note sur les revendications des indigènes du Siné-Saloum, January 23, 1943, Affaires Politiques, File 872, Dossier 3, ANSOM.

538. "Il s'agit, en effet, d'une institution métropolitaine artificiellement transportée en Afrique Noire et qui ne peut prétendre constituer une représentation véritable de l'opinion indigène." ibid., Deschamps also opposed the Conseil Général, see his letter to the Governor-General of AOF, 17G 159 28, ARSD.

539. Gueye quoted in letter of Pleven to Cournarie, January 21, 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 872, ARSD.

administration which interpreted his demands as anti-French.⁵⁴⁰

Il nous apparait aujourd'hui qu'on ne fait pas ici tout ce qui devrait être fait pour le resserrement des liens qui nous unissent les uns aux autres; pour montrer aux quinze millions d'indigènes de l'AOF le vrai visage de la France; pour les persuader que les discriminations raciales sont et doivent demeurer le privilège exclusif de nos ennemis communs.⁵⁴¹

The demands included: the abolition of the Code Pénal Indigène;⁵⁴² equal treatment for European and African civil-servants;⁵⁴³ the extension of CFLN measures to those who had been wronged by Vichy;⁵⁴⁴ fair compensation for lands confiscated under Vichy;⁵⁴⁵ effective action against racism;⁵⁴⁶ and the

540. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar 1943, 2G 43 15, ARSD.

541. Gueye letter to de Gaulle dated November 26, 1943, Affaires Politiques, File 872, ANSOM.

542. Gueye argued that Africans got more severely punished for specific violations after the Code was introduced; for instance, unpremeditated homicide corresponded to two years maximum imprisonment in French law and five years in native penal law; the same applied for theft, fraud, etc. Moreover, the Code Pénal Indigène had introduced new crimes that did not exist in French law such as opposition to the authority of chiefs; Letter Gueye to de Gaulle, January 26, 1943, Affaires Politiques, File 872, ANSOM.

543. Gueye called for the suspension of the March 6, 1943 decree according to which an African civil-servant of equal grade and seniority to a European received indemnities 8 times lower than his European colleague, ibid.

544. Gueye argued that as late as July 4, 1943 no African had benefitted from the CFLN legislation, ibid.

545. Vichy had confiscated Lébou property. Theoretically, the Lébous could claim back their land or obtain compensation for it but in practice, Gueye argued, Africans did not have the money for such trials and were thus offered ridiculously low compensations without being able to protest, ibid.

reorganization of the Conseil Colonial;⁵⁴⁷

What becomes apparent from those petitions is that the originaires and the educated 'subjects' had near identical grievances and objectives despite the fact that they were not acting as one group nor identifying the common ground between them. On the contrary, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the war had in some ways put into sharp focus the divisions separating them. What is striking during this period is the resolve of the 'subjects' to press for the acquisition of citizenship, as rightful compensation to the war effort. The return of 'subject' soldiers from Europe imbued with American and Soviet anti-colonialist ideas encouraged them further.

THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN ANTI-COLONIALISM.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union, France's allies in the war, did not consider the French colonies as permanent de facto appendages of the European powers. Their anti-imperialist

546. Gueye mentions "brimades systématiques contre les indigènes, ... refus de leur vendre des denrées de première nécessité, réservées... aux Européens, l'installation dans les magasins de deux caisses, l'une pour la clientèle Européenne l'autre pour la clientèle indigène, séparation systématique des deux éléments dans les files de stationnements, aménagements dans les trains de wagons spéciaux pour voyageurs Européens et pour voyageurs indigènes.." Deschamps had initially undertaken a campaign against racism, see for instance, his Circulaire contre le racisme, but it was not properly enforced. In response to Gueye's letter, the Free French administration replied that Vichy had not practised discrimination, ibid.

547. The administration had a permanent majority in the Conseil Colonial (via the chiefs it appointed) and Gueye pointedly noted that "c'est par une cruelle dérision qu'on continue à ranger le Sénégal parmi les colonies pourvues d'une assemblée délibérante..." ibid.

ideology exerted considerable pressure on the French government to implement reforms overseas and the infiltration of those influences ushered educated Africans into a new forum of ideas.

From July 1940 onward, the U.S. had (with Soviet approval) campaigned for the internationalisation of colonial territories. The Atlantic Charter, signed by Churchill and Roosevelt in August 14, 1941, pertained to, in the American president's words,

...not only to the parts of the world that border the Atlantic, but to the whole world; disarmament of aggressors, self-determination of nations and peoples, and the four freedoms--freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, freedom from fear...⁵⁴⁸

A special committee on Africa, the War and the Peace Aims was formed in the U.S. to report and document Africa's main problems (poverty and backwardness), propose reforms and emphasize the growing U.S. responsibility in African and world affairs:

The American share in the victory of the present war will give the Government of this country added power and responsibility for bringing about a just settlement in all parts of the world, including Africa, insofar as political adjustments or new arrangements may appear advisable.⁵⁴⁹

The Charter championed self-government, the end of all forms of exploitation, economic interdependence and the protection of labour. The European powers were encouraged to welcome nationalist movements and set a timetable for self-government in

⁵⁴⁸. Roosevelt quoted in the Atlantic Charter and Africa from an American Standpoint, (New York, 1943), p. 30.

⁵⁴⁹. ibid., pp. 28-29.

four stages, beginning with progressively greater representation of Africans in the civil-service, the legislative and the executive councils.

The Committee exerted pressure on the Allies to accept self-government; substitute the term "trusteeship" with "guardianship" for African territories "as it rightly implies that the relationship is not permanent but has, as its purpose the fitting of the ward for self-government as soon as his education and experience permit"⁵⁵⁰ and allow international inspection in African territories. Apparently, the Charter had considerable impact in Senegal where the administration acknowledged that certain "extremist elements" went as far as to "parler d'indépendance Sénégal en application Charte Atlantique."⁵⁵¹

Yet, American anti-colonial propaganda ran parallel to the imperial ambitions of the U.S. military in AOF. Boisson had always been suspicious of Americans, and despite the treaty of December 7, 1942 which guaranteed French sovereignty, Admiral Glassford's mission which arrived in Dakar two days later was viewed with distrust. The task of the mission was to supervise the installation of U.S. military bases in Dakar. Yet, the colonial administration argued that

Les Américains se sont...naturellement installés en force dans toute cette partie de l'Afrique. On doit même constater qu'ils paraissent en quelque sorte avoir

550. ibid., p. 105.

551. Rapport Politique Mensuel, Dakar, September 1944, 2G 44 139, ARSD.

réservé à leur influence et leur autorité Dakar et tout le territoire de l'AOF.⁵⁵²

Six months later, Roosevelt entrusted Glassford with

...build[ing] ... Dakar as one of the prime United Nations strategic strongholds. It was intimated to me in no uncertain terms, that Dakar itself should be taken over eventually by the UN to be administered by the US, as a delegate of the UN.⁵⁵³

The possibility of annexing Dakar to the U.S. was briefly considered by Roosevelt and Anthony Eden (the British Foreign Minister) in March 1943 but dropped at the Tehran Conference of November 1943. Yet, as late as June 1944 and until the invasion of France which changed the course of the war, Americans continued to nurture annexationist ambitions vis-à-vis Dakar.

One last point of interest is the impact of black American soldiers stationed in Dakar who made a great impression on the population and were responsible for "un ferment d'idées révendicatrices."⁵⁵⁴ The creation of the United Nations in May 1945 with the right to self-determination of all peoples as its first article further boosted the anti-imperialist climate.

THE IMPACT OF SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND THE FORMATION OF THE GEC.

The Soviet variant of anti-colonialism which inextricably

⁵⁵². "La politique coloniale des USA: Etude de Vichy," October 1943, Affaires Politiques, File 2661, Dossier 3, ANSOM.

⁵⁵³. Quoted in Giblin, "The Vichy Years...", op.cit., 1984, p. 8.

⁵⁵⁴. Bulletin de Renseignements Mensuels, March 1943, Senegal, 21G 147 108, ARSD.

linked political emancipation with the defense of peace could not, for political reasons, be dismissed by the Allies. The PCF officially supported independence but set restrictions of "economic readiness" for decolonization. French communists, who had constituted an important component in the resistance movement and in the postwar coalition government, painstakingly organized cercles d'études [which later became Groupes d'Etudes Communistes] during 1943 under the supervision of the PCF colonial affairs expert Lozeray.⁵⁵⁵ The origins of these groups can be traced back to the Groupe Social, an informal group led by a teacher of the William Ponty in Dakar during the Popular Front era.⁵⁵⁶

After the "ralliement," a handful of French communists in Dakar (workers and union leaders of the Syndicat de l'Arsenal de Dakar, one of the few mixed trade unions, such as Molinari, Cardie, Ospizy) began organizing GEC. Other influential members of these communist cells included Graziello (a lawyer and member of the patriotic association Comité Fédéral de France Combattante), and Quadrelli (an engineer). Since no African members were allowed until the end of 1945 (as demonstrated in chapter 1), the GEC were initially exclusively European political formations.

One of Dakar's GEC leaders, Jean Suret-Canale, defined the

⁵⁵⁵. Interview with Jean Suret-Canale, himself a leading member of the GEC in Senegal, November 1, 1984, Paris.

⁵⁵⁶. ibid.

groups as "écoles politiques" that initially offered weekly courses such as 'Communism and the Colonial Problem', 'Communist Policy in Black Africa', and 'The RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain) as Instrument of the Struggle Against Colonialism.' They stressed a pragmatic and action-oriented outlook free of theoretical abstractions.

Les cours élémentaires de GEC ne tendent nullement à l'enseignement abstrait de quelques formules passe-partout; ils tendent à éclaircir les problèmes africains du moment...[pour] apporter à chaque membre...les notions qui lui sont immédiatement indispensables pour bien accomplir sa tâche militante dans l'action de masse, qui est pour lui, un impératif absolu.⁵⁵⁷

The GEC sprung to the forefront of the political arena in the postwar era and became instrumental to the formation of the RDA.

THE REVIVAL OF POLITICAL LIFE: PATRIOTIC ASSOCIATIONS.

A mosaic of patriotic associations mushroomed throughout Senegal during 1943 and 1944, providing the first outlets for political activity after Vichy. They were first spurred by European Gaullists who, following the dissolution of the Legion Française des Anciens Combattants en Afrique Noire (February 12, 1943), sought to organize networks of support for the CFLN. The administration was dismayed with patriotic associations which it dismissed on the grounds that they "se paraissent du titre de patriotiques, [mais] n'en avaient que le nom et certainement pas

⁵⁵⁷. Introduction aux cours élémentaires des GEC au Sénégal, 1947, Papiers Suret-Canale, Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent, Paris.

l'esprit."⁵⁵⁸ It quickly became clear that their real purpose was to resume political activity and prepare the ground for the forthcoming elections.⁵⁵⁹

With few exceptions, (see Appendix 2) African and European associations developed separately. Africans were determined not to be excluded from the political process or be dominated by Frenchmen and according to several reports, relations between Europeans and Africans were "deplorable."⁵⁶⁰ European associations fluctuated between the two extremes of the political spectrum or else encompassed the most incongruous combinations of ideological affiliations. The Cadets de Gascogne, for instance, which were presided by an SFIO member, were widely known as notorious anti-Gaullists. Some of its members were fervent Legionnaires while others were at once Pétainists and Gaullists.

Patriotic associations were not always clearly distinct entities and allegiances were often confused. Branches of the same association sometimes adopted different statutes, thereby reinforcing rivalries and personal vendettas. Many individuals were frequently members of more than one association or else they shifted from one group to the other. Fusions between associations were common and instrumental to the formation of alliances

558. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16, ARSD.

559. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, June 1943, Deschamps Report, 13G 17 59, ARSD.

560. Rapport Mensuel Politique, Dakar, October 1944, 2G 44 139, ARSD. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, June 1945, 2G 45 144, ARSD.

and political parties in 1945. France Combattante, for instance, gradually gathered the support of 16 trade unions, the Combat AOF and the Association des Anciens Militaires.⁵⁶¹

The need for unity, the purge of Vichy elements from the administration and private enterprise and the resumption of political activity were the focal points of most associations.⁵⁶² The purge of Vichyites was initially a focal point of political activity for évolués and Europeans alike, as the Boisson administration became a convenient scapegoat for past and present ills. In some instances, Africans were able to use the purges to express grievances that were only remotely related to Vichyite policies, and press for reform. For example, Lamine Gueye attributed all of Senegal's financial and social problems to Vichyite 'agents and crimes',⁵⁶³ and shrewdly manipulated the sensitive issue of collaboration. The administration similarly blamed Vichy for whatever problems it confronted, thus absolving itself from responsibility. More often than not, the purges degenerated into vendettas where personal differences and partisan rivalries rather than collaboration with Vichy were at stake. Even when the lack of administrative personnel obliged the authorities to use Legionaires and SOL members to staff its

561. Synthèse inspection régionale de contrôle technique AOF, August 16, 1944, 21G 155 108, ARSD.

562. Etat d'esprit de la population du Sénégal, 1943, Bulletin de Renseignements, February 10, 1943, Berthet Report, Comité National Français, File 3, ANSOM.

563. Gueye in AOF, (November 17, 1944).

ranks, the denigration of Vichy rule continued unperturbed.⁵⁶⁴

African associations tended to remain secret or else operate clandestinely to evade administrative control, primarily because they demanded full equality with Europeans:

[une] politique essentiellement revendicatrice, selon laquelle les autochtones doivent avoir les mêmes droits et les mêmes salaires que les 'blancs', et qui taxe de raciste tout individu mettant en doute la capacité des indigènes à tenir tous les emplois confiés aux Européens.⁵⁶⁵

Amongst the most prominent and influential associations was the Union Republicaine Sénégalaise led by Khayar M'Bengue (Lamine Gueye's uncle) and veteran politicians like Amadou Bâ and Doudou Siby, who wanted to replace Mustapha Malick Gueye and his cohorts. The URS presented a comprehensive list of demands to Pleven on August 10, 1943, including equality of rights between Europeans and Africans, the Africanisation of the colonial administration and the civil service, and the right to vote for all Africans.

1. Egalité de fait entre tous les citoyens français sans distinction de couleur, dans l'armée aussi bien que dans les autres branches de l'activité (administration-commerce), car si l'indigène veut rester Français, il entend l'être totalement.

2. L'indigène doit avoir une large part suivant ses capacités dans l'administration de son pays. Il doit se substituer à l'élément Européen moyen dont l'incapacité est manifeste.

3. L'indigène veut avoir le libre choix de ses

⁵⁶⁴. See the Governor of Senegal's reply to Combat St. Louis patriotic association, no date, [circa 1944], 21G 1 1, ARSD.

⁵⁶⁵. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar 1944, 2G 44 19, ARSD.

dirigeants et de ses représentants.

4. mise-en-valeur réelle du Sénégal.⁵⁶⁶

In Dakar, the association Jeunes Sénégalais advocated a full-scale campaign to obtain 'complete equality' with the Europeans. while the Comité d'Etudes Franco-Africaines, (CEFA) and the Union des Jeunes called for the eviction of whites from Africa.⁵⁶⁷ The association IV^e République similarly specified the need to group together 'subjects' and 'citizens,' men and women, "à l'exclusion des Européens."⁵⁶⁸

The first explicit signs of the rift that separated European and African political activity were manifested during the elections to the administrative council of the Union Française des Anciens Combattants et Victimes de Guerre de l'AOF et du Togo. European candidates were excluded outright from the electoral process and the administration reported a dangerous anti-French climate.⁵⁶⁹

A similar phenomenon occurred in the development of political parties. For instance, Graziani's efforts to revive the PSS in 1943 failed, largely because Africans would not adhere to a

⁵⁶⁶. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Deschamps Report, August 1943, Service des Affaires Politiques, 13G 17 59, ARSD.

⁵⁶⁷. Etat d'esprit de la population évolué de Dakar, Rapport Politique Annuel, AOF 1943, 2G 43 1, ARSD; and Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal 1945, 2G 45 144, ARSD.

⁵⁶⁸. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, December 1944, 2G 44 155, ARSD; also Rapport Mensuel, Dakar 1944, 2G 44 139, ARSD, and Diagne, "La Résistance..." op.cit., pp. 27-31.

⁵⁶⁹. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar 1944, 2G 44 19, ARSD.

European-led party. The Governor of Dakar reported that "le temps où les Européens pouvaient être de chefs de file en matière politique est révolu."⁵⁷⁰

One of the most significant consequences of the polarisation between Europeans and Africans and the formation of patriotic associations along racial lines, was that a few associations underscored the importance of 'citizen'-'subject' unity in the struggle for equality with Europeans.

As a rule, the administration attributed African unrest and demands for equality to wartime conditions (food shortages, rampant inflation, lack of clothing, etc.) and it was assumed that the end of hostilities would allow a return to normalcy. Or else, it was interpreted as the work of "quelques centaines d'évolués à l'esprit mal équilibré..."⁵⁷¹ who manipulated discontent to further their own ambitions.

In 1944, the focus of African demands was defined even more succinctly and forcefully in slogans such as "equal work, equal pay," and "equal sacrifices, equal rights" which the administration interpreted with consternation:

Sans être 'autonomistes' les évolués cherchent à être indépendants à franchir une étape dans l'affranchissement de l'influence Européene.⁵⁷²

570. ibid.

571. ibid.

572. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1944, 2G 44 20, ARSD.

THE BATTLE FOR GROUNDNUTS.

According to the Free French, Vichy had isolated AOF from the world economy and established a unique relationship between the metropole and the overseas territories. In order to reduce commercial risks and avert popular unrest, the administration had bought the entire AOF agricultural and industrial produce at an artificially high price and sold it to the Allies at a considerably lower rate. This accounted for a spurious prosperity which the Free French claimed would be reversed by reducing prices to world levels, decreasing export duties and increasing the head tax.⁵⁷³ The 'return' of AOF in the war did not thus alleviate the economic crisis that befell the Federation. If anything, it further exacerbated the abuses of the requisition system, the severe shortage of foodstuffs, the black market, recruitment and portering. Alfred Goux described living conditions in Dakar under the Free French in a letter intercepted by the security police:

...le mécontentement augmente tous les jours tant chez les Européens que chez les indigènes. La vie augmente de façon extraordinaire. Le marché noir s'étale cyniquement partout, la police le voit et laisse faire... Les oeufs qui valaient 3 francs...en valent...6. La viande est hors de prix, et tout le reste est à l'unison.⁵⁷⁴

When promises of the abolition of ration cards, access to adequate food and clothing supplies were not fulfilled, disil-

⁵⁷³. Giblin, "The Vichy Years...", op. cit., 1978, p. 88.

⁵⁷⁴. Goux letter dated October 7, 1944, 21G 155 108, ARSD.

lusionment crept in. Notwithstanding a crisis of potentially disastrous proportions, Governor Deschamps launched the 'Battle for Groundnuts.' Much has been written on the extensive demands of the war effort upon the Africans, but nothing illustrates the 'mystique guerrière' of the groundnut operation more eloquently than a speech delivered by Deschamps to the chefs de canton, chefs de village and veteran delegates in the spring of 1943.

Table 8.⁵⁷⁵

Deschamps 'Battle for Groundnuts' Speech.

Cette guerre est une guerre pour la paix des Noirs tout autant que pour celle des Blancs. C'est la guerre du Bien contre le Mal! Hitler, le roi des Allemands, est méchant comme le Diable. Nous savons par ses livres qu'il hait et méprise les Noirs et qu'il les considéra comme des animaux. Il voulait faire de vous des captifs...

Il nous faut des arachides, des arachides et encore des arachides... Vous travaillerez plus que vous avez jamais travaillé, vieillards, vieilles femmes, hommes, femmes, enfants, tous vous ne devez plus penser qu'à une chose. Le travail de l'arachide. Chaque graine que vous mettez dans la terre sera comme une cartouche qui aura tué un allemand. Chaque journée de binate sera comme un obus qui aura démoli un canon allemand.

Ce n'est pas pour les Blancs que vous le faites, c'est pour vos enfants et les enfants de vos enfants... C'est pour vous un devoir prescrit par Dieu d'aider les Alliés par toutes vos forces. Celui qui mangera une graine de semence sera un mauvais homme qui aide les allemands...

Vous travaillerez même quand le soleil est haut! Vous travaillerez beaucoup plus que d'habitude, car en même temps que les arachides, vous devez produire votre nourriture pour l'année prochaine.

Deschamps's message was simple: All Africans were to become

⁵⁷⁵. Deschamps speech, no date [circa May 1943], Papiers Deschamps, ANSOM.

'soldats d'arachides,' and no sacrifice was big enough in this "African" war.⁵⁷⁶ On his part, the governor toured the peanut belt in late June and early July, distributing posters and giving numerous speeches to popularise what he called "[la] graine magique qui change notre sable en or."⁵⁷⁷ The Governor-General of AOF Cournarie and René Pleven, Commissar to the Colonies, also visited Senegal in August 1943 to boost the 'battle for groundnuts.'

An Economic Conference was convened in Thiès in October 25, 1943 to discuss the marketing of peanuts, setting a production target of 400.000 tons for 1943.⁵⁷⁸ To this effect, the administration appealed to prominent marabouts like Mustapha M'Backé to convert all their lands into peanut growing fields.⁵⁷⁹ In rural Senegal, troupes staged the highly popular "théâtre de l'Arachide" with the support of the SIP. Deschamps enthusiastically argued that

Cette propagande a trouvé dans le patriotisme sénégalais une résonance profonde. C'est dans l'enthousiasme qu'a été entamé ce que, d'une métaphore qui a fait fortune, on a appelé la 'Bataille de

576. The term 'soldats d'arachide' was used in Afrique en Guerre, (August 1, 1943).

577. Deschamps, speech of opening session of Conseil Colonial, August 23, 1943, Papiers Deschamps, ANSOM.

578. La Quinzaine, No. 4, (November 23, 1943); Sénégal, (November 1943), no. 58, and Papiers Deschamps, ANSOM.

579. Afrique en Guerre, (September 23, 1943), and Gellar, "The Politics of..," op. cit., 1967, p. 97.

l'Arachide.'⁵⁸⁰

and the return to the monoculture economy was qualified as "le retour à des conditions économiques normales."⁵⁸¹

In order to supply the peasantry with adequate food supplies, the administration made obligatory the constitution of food reserves in September 1943, following which the SIP stocked 30.000 tons of millet and distributed 50.000 tons of foodstuffs. A production plan was also drawn up whereby Guinea would export rice to Senegal and the Sudan would supply rice and millet. The British would furnish textiles, petroleum, coal and lorries while the U.S. would provide flour, sugar, milk and other staple foodstuffs.⁵⁸²

Many city dwellers returned to their villages to resume the cultivation of their fields while 45.000 navétanes from the Soudan and Guinea flocked to Tambacounda and Kaolack "grâce à une intervention administrative."⁵⁸³ But the driving force behind the resumption and intensification of peanut cultivation was the escalation of forced labour and of the regime of requisitions. In addition, lack of petrol and transport facilities rendered

580. Deschamps, opening speech to the Colonial Council, August 23, 1943, Papiers Deschamps, ANSOM.

581. Afrique en guerre, (August 1, 1943).

582. Pedler, op. cit., 1979, p. 49, and Gellar, "The Politics of..," op. cit., 1967, p. 98 and chapter on The Peanut Economy and the War.

583. Deschamps instructions to Dagain, November 30, 1943, Papiers Deschamps, ANSOM.

porterage frequent.

Pour une tonne de riz par exemple à transporter jusqu'à la gare la plus proche, à 300 kilomètres, l'on requisitionnait 600 hommes qui porteraient 15 kilos chacun sur le crane pendant douze jours, puis reviendraient toujours à pied en dix jours, plus de trois semaines au total, mangeant qui sait quoi en cours de route...⁵⁸⁴

In 1943, only 274.000 tons of groundnuts were produced, imports plummeted from 260.000 tons in 1942 to 197.000 in 1943 and exports suffered an all time low with 87.000 tons compared with 199.000 tons exported in 1942.⁵⁸⁵ The "bataille de l'arachide" proved to be a disaster partly because wartime propaganda failed but also because there were no goods in the stores to serve as an incentive for the peasantry. Whatever foodstuffs were available were exorbitantly priced: for example, by selling 100 kgs of peanuts an African bought

Table 9.⁵⁸⁶

<u>December 1939</u>	<u>December 1941</u>	<u>December 1943</u>
53 kgs rice	40 kgs rice	20 kgs rice
60 kigs millet	63 kgs millet	72 kgs millet
18 metres cloth	14 metres cloth	9 metres cloth

⁵⁸⁴. Jacques Richard-Molard, Afrique Occidentale Française, (Paris: Editions Berger-Lévrault, 1952), p. 167.

⁵⁸⁵. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 58, ARSD. Suret-Canale's figure of 460.000 tons of peanuts for 1943 is inaccurate.

⁵⁸⁶. Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 58, ARSD.

Table 10.⁵⁸⁷Price Index for Peanuts and Staple Foods

	<u>Dec. 1939</u>	<u>Dec. 1941</u>	<u>Dec. 1943</u>
100 kgs of shelled nuts	90 frs	140 frs	188 frs
Rice per kg.	1.70	2.85	9.00
Millet per kg.	1.50	2.25	2.60
Cloth per metre	5.00	10.00	20.00

The declining purchasing power of the Senegalese further deteriorated with rising taxes and the introduction of new taxes such as the 'special resistance tax' and the 'Emprunt de Libération.' The additional tax was raised to 15 francs and personal taxes to 50 francs per year. The war tax, created in August 1943, and set at 10 francs per person per annum amassed 155 million francs.⁵⁸⁸ 'Voluntary contributions' raised an additional 150 million francs (rural Senegal's share was 15.284.000 francs and Dakar's was 27.710.716 francs).⁵⁸⁹ As a rule, fiscal charges borne by Africans increased between 16% (Thiès and M'Bour) and 75% (Kédougou).⁵⁹⁰

Local administrators were also coerced into meeting the demands of the operation: "La carrière d'un administrateur tenait

587. ibid.

588. Journal Officiel du Sénégal, December 31, 1943, pp. 392-94 and Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16, ARSD.

589. Journal Officiel du Sénégal, September 23, 1943, pp. 266-67; Sénégal, October 1943; La Quinzaine, no. 5, December 12, 1943 and Paris-Dakar, December 22, 1943.

590. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16, ARSD.

à la livraison au chef lieu du contingent imposé à son cercle."⁵⁹¹

Most cercles were expected to produce arbitrarily selected crops and meet unreasonable production targets. Senegal produced 3 tons of rubber in 1941-42, 4 tons in 1942-43, 14 tons in 1943-44 and a staggering 41 tons in 1944-45. The difference in production targets under the Vichy and Free French administrations are clear.⁵⁹² Richard-Molard eloquently describes the excesses of this system:

On en arrive et sous des menaces draconiennes au besoin suivies d'exécution immédiate, à des exigences folles. 'L'effort de guerre' justifie tout. Tel cercle est imposé pour tant de tonnes de caoutchouc de lianes sans avoir de lianes sur son territoire. L'indigène est donc contraint d'aller à pied, très loin parfois, acheter du caoutchouc ailleurs, à n'importe quel prix, pour échapper à la 'justice' et vient le vendre au commandant, au prix taxe, plusieurs fois inférieur au prix d'achat.

Tel cercle est imposé en miel. Il n'en produit pas. Son commandant est puni pour avoir télégraphié à son gouvernement: "Accord miel. Envoyez abeilles."⁵⁹³

THE MYTH OF THE LOYAL AFRICAN: PART TWO
THE RETURN OF THE SOLDIERS AND THE THIAROYE MUTINY, 1944.

The Thiaroye mutiny of December 1, 1944 inflicted an irreparable blow on the myth of the loyal African and by extension on the myth of full scale assimilation as a feasible tenet of colonial rule. The tirailleurs had for centuries constituted

⁵⁹¹. Richard Molard, op. cit., 1952, p. 167.

⁵⁹². Rapport Economique Annuel, 1945, 2G 46 26, ARSD.
Richard-Molard,

⁵⁹³. ibid. During 1944, 2.505 tons of rubber and 662 tons of palm oil were produced in Senegal; Rapport Economique Annuel, Senegal 1944, 2G 44 34, ARSD.

an invaluable bastion of the colonial order, be it in the conquest and 'pacification' of French Africa or in frontline combat in the world wars. These soldiers enjoyed a formidable reputation and were aware of how indispensable they had been during France's most grave hours, having paid with their blood for the special relationship they enjoyed with France.

If to this background we add the horrid experience of African soldiers as prisoners of war in Europe and the renewed vigor of Gaullist propaganda hailing the return of republican liberties, the Thiaroye uprising assumes its full significance. It also accounts for the fact that today, it still remains an open wound for many veterans who allude to feelings of 'disbelief', 'deception' and 'betrayal' when reminiscing on the tragic events.⁵⁹⁴ The French were never forgiven for spilling the blood of those who stood by them during France's darkest hours. That Thiaroye is remembered as one of the most sinister chapters of Senegal's history became evident recently when the accomplished writer and filmmaker Sembène Ousmane released the film "Camp de Thiaroye," in an attempt to deal with a painful episode that has marked a whole generation of Africans.

In the morning of December 1, 1944, a detachment of about 1.200 tirailleurs awaiting demobilisation and repatriation at the barracks of the transit camp of Thiaroye, approximately 30

⁵⁹⁴. Interviews with Mustapha Fall and Ismael Diop, World War Two veterans, Dakar, February 1984.

kilometres from Dakar, was reported "en état de rebellion."⁵⁹⁵ It refused to be disbanded before its demands for the settlement of outstanding back pay and bonuses were met. The commanding general who came to speak to them was taken prisoner, following which he promised to pay the soldiers what they were due and send them to their country of origin. The following day a fight broke out, resulting in 35 to 38 dead and another 35 seriously wounded. On the side of the police forces, only 3 French officers and one African soldier suffered minor injuries.⁵⁹⁶

The insurgents comprised the first contingent amongst 10.000 African prisoners of war to return home after liberation. The four to five month delay in repatriation procedures effectively meant that instead of being welcomed as heroes, these men worked in military labour camps before being gathered in six centres de transit indigène.⁵⁹⁷ A month before the uprising in Thiaroye, the Colonial Minister had acknowledged that returning POWs had undergone fundamental changes in captivity:

⁵⁹⁵. Telegram Dakar to Colonies Paris dated December 12, 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 3498, ANSOM.

⁵⁹⁶. Figures on the casualties vary: According to the Note sur les incidents déplorables du camp de Thiaroye, Dakar, December 4, 1944 drafted by the Groupement d'Action Républicaine 38 died. An intercepted letter written by Colas, of the Union des Syndicat Confédérés de l'AOF to the Secretary General of the CGT dated December 14, 1944 cites 40 dead 21G 155 108; most reports cite 35 dead.

⁵⁹⁷. With no pay; see Myron Echenberg, "Tragedy at Thiaroye: The Senegalese Soldiers' Uprising of 1944," in Peter C.W. Gutkind, Robin Cohen and Jean Copans (eds.), African Labour History, (London: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 109, 113-14.

Séparés depuis plusieurs années de leur pays d'origine, placés dans des conditions d'existence exceptionnelles, ces indigènes ont contracté des habitudes et des manières de penser, ont acquis une mentalité qui tend à faire d'eux un élément très spécial.⁵⁹⁸

The French also feared that German propaganda (Nazi documents and paraphernalia were reportedly amongst the personal possession of POWs) might "susciter une révolte en AOF."⁵⁹⁹ It was recommended that ex-POWs be closely surveilled "afin que les indigènes qui nous reviendront en AOF aient à nouveau clairement conscience de la grandeur de la France."⁶⁰⁰

The political repercussions of demobilisation were already a serious concern for the administration, particularly in Dakar where "il peut se former... un groupe relativement important d'anciens prisonniers susceptibles d'influencer défavorablement l'opinion indigène."⁶⁰¹ Ex-POWs were sent immediately to their final destination so as to avert concentration of large numbers of demoralised soldiers. It should also be noted that some of these soldiers were victims of de Gaulle's "blanchissement" strategy, whereby 20.000 tirailleurs were dismissed from the Free

598. Letter of Pleven to Cournarie dated October 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 3498, ANSOM.

599. Annexe du rapport du Général de Perier sur les incidents de Thiaroye, n.d., Affaires Politiques, File 3498, ANSOM.

600. Telegram of Lt. Col. Sémidei, directeur du cabinet, dated December 6, 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 3498, ANSOM.

601. Pleven to Cournarie dated October 31, 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 3498, ANSOM.

French army in order to give a chance to French soldiers to share in the fruits of victory.⁶⁰² These men were as demoralised and humiliated as the POWs for having been removed from the battlefield and deprived of participating in the final stages of liberation.

In late October 1944, to appease their "esprit assez vivement révendicateur", the Colonial Minister promised to pay them back wages (a quarter of which they were to receive in France), demobilisation premiums of 500 upon arrival in West Africa, and give them civilian clothes.⁶⁰³ None of these promises were kept. Meanwhile, incidents of African POW unrest were being reported throughout France: 350 tirailleurs at Morlaix rebelled on November 4, 1944 but the uprising was suppressed a week later with 7 wounded. Similar incidents were reported at the Centre de Transition Indigène in Versailles the following month, in Marseilles in December and in several other places. A mutiny of the Bataillon de Prisonniers Sénégalais de la Base de Casablanca in Juen and other such episodes point to the fact that provisions for demobilisation and repatriation were chaotic and French commanding officers insensitive to the tirailleurs'

602. Echenberg, "'Morts Pour la France'," op. cit., 1985, pp. 373-74.

603. Minister of Colonies to Cournarie dated October 31, 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 3498, ANSOM. French soldiers received back pay for the entire duration of the war and a premium of 5.000 francs, see Echenberg, "'Morts Pour la France'," op. cit., 1985, p. 115.

sacrifices.⁶⁰⁴

In Thiaroye, unrest had commenced at the end of November when a detachment of 500 men was ordered to leave for the Soudan. The men refused to be disbanded until they received their pay. After negotiations, the military authorities promised to reimburse them within three days. However, upon reception of an order to dispatch the contingent to Bamako, the promise was broken, but for a brief time the Commander of the AOF forces was taken hostage. On November 30, a batalion from St. Louis with tanks and heavy artillery encircled the camp.⁶⁰⁵

The tirailleurs were described as being arrogant, jealous and obstinate for demanding equal rights with their European colleagues. Moreover, the fact that some of them had substantial amounts of savings [the Banque d'Afrique Occidentale had made transactions to the value of 18 million francs for 1.500 tirailleurs after the authorities forbade them to keep French francs] was resented by French soldiers.⁶⁰⁶ Letters of French soldiers to their families cited that this money had been illegally obtained, which also accounts for the fact that they saw no reason why African soldiers should be paid what was in fact due to them.

The colonial authorities identified the causes of the

⁶⁰⁴. Report of de Perier, op. cit.

⁶⁰⁵. Intercepted letter of Sergeant Boulard, op. cit.

⁶⁰⁶. Their savings came from wages earned in German camps, extract from a letter in Synthèse de l'inspection regionale des contrôles techniques AOF, December 1, 1944, 21G 155 108, ARSD.

'mutiny' as a 'changement de mentalité' that Africans underwent during the war which diminished the prestige and authority of the white man. According to Ousmane Sembène,

...before the war the African soldiers...had been your typical submissive colonial blacks. However, after having lived in Europe during some of its most difficult years they had come to know and appreciate Europeans and they realized that they were just ordinary people like everyone else. They lost their submissiveness. When they left for France they had been men without rights. Now, on returning to Africa, they were aware of their rights and more self-confident. Since they no longer had the same mentality it was not surprising that they had the courage to confront the colonial army and its commanding officer with their grievance.⁶⁰⁷

It was also argued that the haste in which embarkations were conducted was instrumental in the demoralisation of POWs: There were inadequate provisions with regard to back pay, promotions, food and clothing.

Les retards dans les paiements et l'octroi d'acomptes dans la métropole ont amené, chez les tirailleurs, une certaine méfiance et de la mauvaise humeur, qui ont été entretenues par l'inégalité de traitement entre les différents Centres de Transition des Indigènes Coloniales par l'obligation d'échanger les billets français--jugés dès lors de mauvaise valeur--par la lenteur des remboursements des livrets de caisse d'épargne, certains perdus ou volés, et par le non remboursement des dépôts d'argent effectués dans les caisses du 'frontstalag.'⁶⁰⁸

Contact with black American soldiers had further radicalised the

⁶⁰⁷. "Camp de Thiaroye." *Afrika*, (November-December 1987), pp. 28-30. Interview with Sembène Ousmane on his new film.

⁶⁰⁸. Rapport du Général de Perier, *op. cit.*

discontented soldiers. The tirailleurs spoke with admiration of black Americans whose uniforms, pay and food rations were the same as those of their white colleagues.⁶⁰⁹ Apparently they had even considered a U.S. intervention in the uprising.⁶¹⁰

Yet, the official rendition of events left no doubt as to the culpability of the insurgents:

Le prétexte de la rebellion aurait été le non-paiement à certains d'entre ces ex-prisonniers de primes diverses auxquelles ils prétendaient avoir droit... Apres des negotiations extrêmement patientes des autorités militaires,... des coups de feu eurent été tirés sur les unités chargées du maintien de l'ordre.⁶¹¹

All blame and responsibility were shifted to the ex-POWs and the central administration in Paris. It was even reported that the use of force could not have been averted unless the white man was willing to loose face and establish a precedent for future disasters. The concluding remark of General de Perier's report provides a rare insight into the mentality of French officers:

⁶⁰⁹. Letter of General Ingold dated December 30, 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 3498, ANSOM and de Perier report, op. cit.

⁶¹⁰. The following leaflet was distributed to U.S. authorities in Dakar after the uprising: "Million (sic) of Americans are died (sic) and others will died (sic) again, so that slavery, slaughter, and vandalish (sic) dissapaer (sic) in the world. At Dakar you assist indifferent to the wreth (sic) murder of 115 of your comrades in figth (sic). 'They were colored men perhaps' on 1st December 1944. If you allow those actions, for why do you figth (sic) Germane? (sic) All Negroes had expected in (sic) your nation but no (sic) they do not know." signed Poor Negroes (Remember Abraham Lincoln and Miss Stone); Annex to de Perier's report, op. cit.

⁶¹¹. Synthèse du Décembre 16, Inspection régionale des contrôles techniques AOF, 21G 155 108, ARSD. Emphasis mine.

Ce qui frappe le plus dans le récit des acteurs, c'est l'unanimité avec laquelle ils soulignent l'atmosphère de violence qui régnait, l'arrogance invraisemblable des mutins et le caractère de leurs menace; puis, une fois la sanction impitoyable du feu comprise, la soumission totale de ceux-ci subitement dégrisés de leur folie collective.⁶¹²

In vain, associations such as the Groupement d'Action Républicaine, the Union des Syndicats Confédérés d'AOF demanded the intervention of a civilian and military investigation committee and the dismissal of the responsible officers.

The trial of Thiaroye took place in February 1945 but despite Lamine Gueye's efforts to defend the insurgents, there were no acquittals. Out of the 34 men who were found guilty, two died, nine were given 5 to 10 years detention sentences, and 25 were imprisoned from one to five years. Fifteen were granted amnesty in June 1947.⁶¹³

It is unlikely that the mutiny was deliberately provoked by the colonial authorities as Suret-Canale has maintained.⁶¹⁴ It

612. Rapport de Perrier, op. cit.

613. Condamnations intervenues à la suite des événements de Thiaroye, Affaires Politiques, File 3498, ANSOM; letter of Colonial Minister to the Governor General of AOF dated May 20, 1947; Affaires Politiques, File 3498; letter of Général de corps de l'armée, Commandant supérieur de Boisboissel to the Colonial Minister, March 8, 1945, ibid.

614. Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire de la décolonisation aux indépendances, 1945-1960, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1977), pp. 14-15. In the author's words: "Y avait-il eu simplement mauvaise foi et incurie, ou provocation calculée?... L'état major vichyste, partisan de la 'manière forte', n'a-t-il pas délibérément cherché l'occasion de 'faire un exemple', pour mettre au pas les anciens combattants?"

is more plausible to argue that the French did not anticipate the former POWs to be as determined to stand by their rights as turned out. Unfulfilled promises had been made before without similar consequences. As a French officer unsympathetic to the African POWs but conscious of the irony of the situation wrote:

...hier ses hommes débarquaient à Dakar avec tous les honneurs militaires qui sont malgré tout du (sic) à des prisonniers de guerre, ils se tirent sains et saufs de la guerre de 40, ils viennent de faire tuer ici, dans leur pays par des gens de leur race...⁶¹⁵

What was different about Thiaroye was not the response of the administration but the organized nature of the protest and the indisputable legitimacy of the insurgents' demands for "equal sacrifices, equal rights" which the authorities tried to disclaim.

Nous sommes Français... nous voulons être traités à l'égal des Français... Nous considérer comme des Français de seconde zone c'est pratiquer un racisme indigne d'une démocratie.⁶¹⁶

Again, it was not unusual that the French were reluctant to acknowledge the gravity of the protest. The administration's lack of control over the development of events, quickly degenerated into the familiar 'politique de la trigue.' The

⁶¹⁵. Intercepted letter of Sergeant Boulard, op.cit.

⁶¹⁶. Soldiers quoted in letter of Chef du 1er bureau to Governor of Senegal dated January 26, 1945, 13G 44 17, ARSD. It was also reported that veteran 'citizens' and 'subjects' were being treated unequally, see Doléances des Anciens Combattants et Victimes de Guerre, 13G 44 17, ARSD.

parallels with the administration's handling of the Dakar-Niger strike of 1938 are abundant and worth bearing in mind.

CONCLUSIONS

Free French policy in Senegal took pride in the so-called 'smooth' transition of AOF from neutrality to resistance and from Vichyite authoritarianism to the 'restoration of republican liberties.' It also boasted about the federation's extensive contribution to the war effort, the lack of unrest in the colonies and the unwavering loyalty of the Africans. In reality, the Free French desperately tried to differentiate themselves from their Vichyite predecessors. They put up a front of normality, even when they secretly feared the forces which the war had unleashed. For example, they suspected the returning soldiers of being a potentially revolutionary element.

The crisis within the colonial administration during and after the 'ralliement,' the economic fiasco of the 'battle for groundnuts,' the resumption of political activity along racial lines, the impact of U.S. and Soviet anti-colonialism, and the Thiaroye mutiny had indeed changed the old colonial order permanently.

The war had also radically altered the human geography of Senegal as the effects of the rural exodus had a profound impact on the evolution of postwar politics. Dakar's population, for instance, swelled from 100,000 to 165,000 in a four year

period (1939-1944).⁶¹⁷ The unrestricted influx of immigrants and troops into the capital created pressing problems; housing shortage led to the emergence of bidonvilles that sheltered Africans and Europeans alike. Europeans found themselves in similar and sometimes worse conditions than Africans. Inadequate water supplies and improvised sewage systems resulted in the spread of epidemics such as diphtheria, smallpox and the plague.⁶¹⁸

Having relied heavily on the empire for manpower, resources, and for the organization of the resistance movement, the French argued that the metropole had become inextricably linked to the empire: "C'est à tort que bien souvent on distingue la France de son empire. Il y là une locution inexacte et inacceptable. Il s'agit de la France tout court..."⁶¹⁹ To this argument, Africans added that they expected a fair compensation for their sacrifices.

Les intellectuels attendent beaucoup de la situation actuelle des colonies allant (sic) au secours de la Métropole pour l'arracher à l'ennemi et lui redonner tout son éclat parmi ses rivaux. Ils pensent que ce sera pour eux la redemption du noir et qu'en cas de succès l'indigène africain aura conquis une place encore plus grande dans la famille française et,

617. Bouche, "Dakar pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale: Problèmes de surpeuplement," Revue Française d'Histoire d'Outre Mer, tome lxxv, no. 240, (1978), pp. 427-428.

618. ibid. This is an aspect of the war not examined in this study but deserves much attention.

619. General Catroux, Governor General of Algeria, June 6, 1943 speech, quoted in Ageron, France coloniale où parti colonial?, (Paris: PUF, 1978), p. 276.

partant, augmenté son prestige dans le monde.⁶²⁰

African expectations did not fit strictly within the assimilation framework, as patriotic associations (most of which shared the slogan "equal sacrifices, equal rights) developed along racial lines.

The colonial authorities only rarely acknowledged that the war signalled the beginning of fundamental changes, let alone decolonization: "L'on devine que l'équilibre sur lequel on avait l'habitude de vivre à la colonie va être modifié."⁶²¹ On the whole, administrators vacillated over the future of the empire from confidence to apprehension, envisaging at best a slightly more relaxed version of prewar colonial rule.

620. Bulletin de Renseignements Mensuels, April 1943, Deschamps report, 2G 43 118, ARSD.

621. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1944, 2G 44 20, ARSD.

Chapter VI

SENEGAL IN FRENCH POSTWAR COLONIAL POLICY-MAKING, 1944-1952

The history of Franco-African relations from 1944 to 1958 marks the beginning of an open-ended debate over the question of why French West African postwar demands for equality with France excluded independence--in sharp contrast to the neighbouring British colonies. Even though this question will not be addressed specifically,⁶²² the role of Lamine Gueye and L.S. Senghor in French postwar colonial policy-making and the dynamics of Senegalese politics during this period largely explain why independence was not a political goal in Senegal well after Ghana became a sovereign state.

Assimilation had defined the parameters of black politics in Senegal for nearly a century. In a sense, 'citizens' and 'subjects' after the Second World War placed their demands for reform within the political process of which they were a part. Even the reaction against assimilation which became the distinguishing feature of Senegalese (and Senghorian) politics after the war did not transcend the boundaries of the existing system.

⁶²². Michael Crowder's "Independence as a Goal in French-speaking West African Politics," in M. Crowder, Colonial West Africa: Collected Essays, (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 283-313, is an excellent response to this question.

SENEGALESE ASPIRATIONS AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

The single most important new element in the Senegalese political arena after the war was that politics ceased to be the exclusive domain of originaire elites. 'Subjects' and 'citizens' alike demanded to be part of the decision-making process that would define the status of the colonies within the French Community. The slogan "equal rights for equal responsibilities," assumed a new immediacy particularly because after mobilisation, the chronic shortage of European manpower had granted Africans positions that had hitherto been reserved exclusively to Frenchmen but without according them the corresponding salaries and privileges.⁶²³ Education became inextricably linked with race equality after the war, largely because it was closely identified with mass naturalisation. Africans demanded easy access to the brévet élémentaire et supérieur, the baccalauréat and university education within Africa. The abolition of the anachronistic regimes of the indigénat and forced labour were deemed imperative along with the extension of full municipal status to Senegal's Three Communes.⁶²⁴

Those demands date back to the First World War. This time, however, it was not only an elite minority of 'citizens' who voiced these grievances but a sizeable segment of évolué 'subjects.' According to the French journalist Louis Rouillon,

623. Akpo, "Les élites africaines.." op. cit., 1984, p. 7.

624. Bulletin Mensuel de Renseignements Politiques, February 1944, 2G 44 155, ARSD.

Africans were determined to oppose French rule until their grievances were met.

On note les prodromes d'une opposition à l'autorité Européenne. Ces noirs estiment être capables de participer à la gestion des affaires et n'acceptent plus passivement les directives et les ordres des agents de l'autorité... L'opposition ainsi exprimée n'est pas hostile à la France. Elle est plutôt le moyen de suggérer des améliorations...qui s'imposent.⁶²⁵

While 'subjects' who had been hitherto excluded from the political process and from the privileges of assimilation demanded integration with France, they also began questioning the direction of assimilation and its impact on African society. In fact, reaction against assimilation, which had briefly surfaced in the 1930's, became the distinguishing feature of Senegalese politics after the war.⁶²⁶ Thus, it is no coincidence that négritude "nationalism" was developed by a 'subject,' and a highly assimilated one at that [in Senegal, Senghor was referred to as toubab bu nuul (Black European)].

A pan-African type of nationalism identified as "l'esprit 'Nouvelle Afrique'" also emerged during this period with an emphasis on inter-African assimilation.⁶²⁷ Mamadou Dia wrote of the 'splendid isolation' that politics in Senegal had hitherto

⁶²⁵. Louis Rouillon, XX^e Siècle, (November 15, 1945).

⁶²⁶. Michael Crowder, Senegal: A Study of French Assimilation Policy, (London: Methuen, 1967), p.49.

⁶²⁷. Louis Rouillon, "Effervescence en Afrique Noire et au Sénégal," XX^e Siècle, (November 15, 1945).

operated in, which accounted for its elitist, personalistic and client-patron characteristics. The war had placed AOF on an equal footing with Senegal thus acting as a catalyst for the development of inter-African political activity. As a 'subject,' Dia envisaged a pan-African movement which would neutralise France's assimilationist 'divide and rule' policy.

Ni fusion, ni assimilation, mais association...
La politique d'assimilation doit se poursuivre à
l'intérieur de l'Afrique, entre éléments Africains.⁶²⁸

Négritude nationalism was not the only form of reaction against assimilation. African exposure to radical, anti-imperialist ideologies during the war and the rise of postwar nationalist movements in the colonies reinforced the urgency of the elite's demands.⁶²⁹ Independence was not always a foreign or forbidden ideal. It was reported, for instance, that the French retreat from Syria, Lebanon and Vietnam provoked anti-French demonstrations with placards such as "Africains, les Syriens nous montrent l'exemple,"⁶³⁰ rousing hopes that AOF would follow

⁶²⁸. Mamadou Dia, "Refonte Politique", AOF, (February 23, 1945). Also a slogan of the French centre and right wing, 'association' for M. Dia was equivalent to autonomy.

⁶²⁹. According to the Colonial Minister, "Avant la guerre l'indigène ne voyait rien d'autre que son propre pays et la France. Depuis, au contraire, il a acquis une certaine curiosité intellectuelle qui le pousse à regarder à l'extérieur." Letter to Governor-General of AOF dated April 1945, Affaires Politiques, File 2097, Dossier 15, ANSOM.

⁶³⁰. Bulletin de Renseignements, "La Crise Libano-Syrienne," June 1945, Affaires Politiques, File 2156, Dossier 5, ANSOM.

suit.⁶³¹ An anonymous tract entitled "Liberté" was circulated in St. Louis in 1945, advocating

...le Combat pour l'affranchissement du pays du joug qui a trop duré de la torture des colonialistes antidémocrates [qui] tend à persister. A partir de ce jour est né le Comité de Propagande, un quotidien qui a côté de ses frères "AOF, Réveil, Clarté" luttera pour l'indépendance.⁶³²

While independence was not a goal in Senegalese politics in the mid 1940s, it was used on several occasions by patriotic organizations, political parties and even by Senghor himself as a last resort--a threat, to impress upon Frenchmen that they could not go back on promised reforms.

Meanwhile, fearing the process of nationalism that assimilation had set in motion, the colonial administration was distraught over what it called "la psychose revendicatrice [indigène]...d'une raison inavouée..."⁶³³ A colonial administrator eloquently summed up his dilemma: "du moment que l'indigène est à mon niveau, je suis au niveau de l'indigène."⁶³⁴

THE BRAZZAVILLE CONFERENCE, 1944.

The French African Conference, convened to set the guidelines of French postwar colonial policy-making, and the

631. Rapport Politique, Dakar, April 1945, 2G 45 126, ARSD.

632. "Liberté," December 1945, 13G 17 36, ARSD.

633. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, November 1945, 2G 45 144, ARSD. "On veut être assimilé à l'Européen en solde, en indemnités, en présence, à l'hôpital..."

634. Ibid.

publicity surrounding it, heightened évolué expectations. The Senegal visit of four resistance leaders and members of the Consultative Assembly was an occasion of outright denunciation of race discrimination.⁶³⁵ Similarly, de Gaulle's symbolic stopover in Dakar was met with angry calls for equality between Europeans and Africans and his ensuing meeting with Lamine Gueye was a cause of embarrassment.⁶³⁶

A first disappointment set in when Senegal was not invited to participate in the Brazzaville Conference. Gueye protested that the protagonists of the conference were not qualified to deliberate on Africa's problems.⁶³⁷ Nevertheless, he conceded that Brazzaville's commitment to socio-economic reforms compensated for the absence of a political settlement and for the exclusion of independence as a future political goal⁶³⁸ [it was explicitly stated that there would be no independence from France]. Disillusionment grew when it became apparent that the

⁶³⁵. Jules Moches (SFIO), Gazier (CGT secretary), Poimbeuf (delegate to the christian unions) and Bissagnet; Bulletin Mensuel de Renseignements Politiques, February 1944, 2G 44 155, ARSD.

⁶³⁶. According to F. Pedler "At the reception where hundreds of people filed past de Gaulle to shake hands, Lamine Gueye was in the line, and when he came face to face with the great man, he asked him in a loud voice what he proposed to do for Africans. The great Charles drew himself up to his full height and said something sibylline in which justice was linked with discipline." Pedler, op. cit., p. 50.

⁶³⁷. Lamine Gueye, Bulletin Hebdomadaire d'Information, Ministère des Colonies, no. 4, (August 27, 1945), Affaires Politiques, File 129, Dossier 2, ANSOM.

⁶³⁸. Ibid.

conference would merely extend the privileged status that Senegal had hitherto enjoyed to the rest of the federation.⁶³⁹ The tone of the conference was vague and uncommitted:

C'est l'homme, c'est l'Africain, ce sont ses aspirations, ses besoins et...ses faiblesses...qui seront la préoccupation constante de cette même conférence; c'est l'incorporation des masses dans le monde français, l'évolution de nos liens avec elle;... c'est l'ascension de la population Africaine vers la personnalité politique qui retiendra une participation très importante et peut être la plus longue du temps de la conférence...⁶⁴⁰

The underlying assumptions were in principle assimilationist but not without discrepancies: colonial peoples would be granted the citizenship of a Greater France and would participate in the Constituent but not in the National Assembly; French citizenship would only be extended to évolués. As compensation, 'federal citizens' would take part, albeit on a restricted franchise, in a Federal Assembly and in local territorial assemblies which would be authorized to vote over the colonial budget.

Education received special attention in Brazzaville and was followed up by a conference in Dakar (in July 1944) under the auspices of the Governor-General Pierre Cournarie. An education plan focusing on 'village schools' was adopted, aiming at the creation of a "new black society developing from its own framework and customs but capable of adapting itself to the

⁶³⁹. Gellar, "The Politics of..," op.cit., 1967, p. 105.

⁶⁴⁰. Pleven's speech quoted in Lamine Gueye "La Voix des Absents," AOF, (December 1, 1944).

benefits of Western civilization"⁶⁴¹ within 20 years. It was projected that 50.000 primary schools, 200 upper primary schools, 75 écoles normales and 50.000 trained teachers would cater to the needs of 2.500.000 African students. Universal education would be attained within 50 years, but no provisions for the creation of African universities were foreseen and it was stipulated that African languages would under no circumstances be permitted as a medium of instruction.⁶⁴²

The indigénat and forced labour were abolished in principle,⁶⁴³ while a series of decrees exempted veterans, holders of the Légion d'Honneur, and electors of the local assemblies from the regime of native justice.⁶⁴⁴ A Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (FIDES) was created to finance overseas development. The establishment of a uniform African penal code was a half measure since it was based on the existing code. Trade unions were authorised throughout the federation and the five day, 40-hour week was recommended along

641. Free France, vol. 6, no. 8, (October 15, 1944).

642. Ibid.

643. Decrees of December 20, 1945 and February 20, 1946 for the indigénat. The regime was not entirely eradicated: "Pour rendre inopérante cette mesure on n'hésite pas à recourir à des procédés arbitraires tel que l'arrestation préventive et la détention durant 8 à 15 jours de prétendus prevenus qui sont ensuite relâchés ou bien défèrent les contravenants devant des tribunaux qui prononcent de lourdes amendes. Letter of Minister of Overseas France to the Governor General of AOF, April 8, 1946, 17G 139 17, ARSD.

644. Decree of October 12, 1945, Affaires Politiques, File 934, ANSOM.

with a pension scheme. Yet the question of discrimination between Africans and Europeans in the administration, the economy and the military which constituted the main grievance of the évolués, was not addressed.⁶⁴⁵ According to the colonial authorities,

La Conférence de Brazzaville qui aux yeux des évolués n'a pas réalisé l'égalité qu'ils souhaitent, est battue en brèche et tous, publiquement, affirment que ses recommandations ne réalisant pas leurs aspirations légitimes, doivent être abandonnées.⁶⁴⁶

Lamine Gueye retorted that discrimination would be fought by all legal means until it was abolished. In 1945, he took the issue to the Minister for Overseas France:

J'ai fait comprendre au Ministre qu'on attendait rien de substantiel de cette Conférence à laquelle le Sénégal n'a pas été représenté. La preuve en est, que, après la Conférence de Brazzaville, la première préoccupation du Gouvernement a été d'attribuer 4.50 de zone (sic) aux fonctionnaires indigènes et 150 aux fonctionnaires Européens. Cela est du vrai racisme M. le Ministre.⁶⁴⁷

Senghor responded more positively about the conference but expressed reservations with regard to their implementation of its recommendations: "[Les recommandations] sont un chef-d'oeuvre qui fera date dans l'histoire mondiale. Cependant

⁶⁴⁵. The conference recommended that Africans have freer access to administrative posts, but the higher echelons remained the exclusive domain of the Europeans.

⁶⁴⁶. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar 1944, 2G 44 19, ARSD.

⁶⁴⁷. Lamine Gueye note dated May 22 1945, 17G 127 17, ARSD.

l'indigène qui est en moi se dit: mais à quand l'application?"⁶⁴⁸

The Brazzaville recommendations did not provide a blueprint for decolonization. France's status as a world power was perceived to be inextricably linked with the empire and the French African Conference provided a rather abstract ideal of coexistence within a French Community: the concept of a "France une et indivisible" reigned supreme even though it was acknowledged that decentralization and greater colonial participation in the administration of local affairs were imperative. This set the context for the discrepancies in the constitutional proposals for a French Federation, Union and Community which were essentially modifications of the old assimilation-association models.

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES OF 1945-1946.

Colonial representation and parliamentary participation in the ANC were the key issues in the redefinition of relations between France and the colonies as outlined in Brazzaville. Gueye and Senghor played a prominent role in French postwar colonial policy-making through their participation in various political commissions; their interpellations in the National Assembly debates; and their contribution to the overseas parliamentary groups and the ratification of laws. The shifting ground of French political parties had a direct impact on the

⁶⁴⁸. Letter of Senghor, quoted in Ernest Milcent and Monique Sordet, Léopold Sédar Senghor et la naissance de l'Afrique Noire, (Paris: Editions Seghers, 1969), p. 78.

role of the Senegalese deputies in the French Parliament and by extension in Senegal. Thus, as long as socialists such as Moutet and Laurentie held key posts in the Ministry of Overseas France, Gueye was able to wield considerable influence in colonial policy-making in France while also enjoying the support of the administration in Senegal. However, when the SFIO began losing ground to the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) in late 1947, Senghor emerged as the dominant African leader in France and at home.

a) The Debate on Colonial Representation.

The French Provisional Government convened a preliminary Consultative Assembly as early as 1943 to deliberate on the colonial representation in the forthcoming Assemblée Nationale Constituante (ANC). The Conseil Colonial in Dakar requested two seats therein, but the Governor-General of AOF opposed the motion and appointed the 'subject' Ely Manel Fall.⁶⁴⁹

The debate over colonial representation in the ANC was an agonizing problem for the bureaucrats in Rue Oudinot as well as in Africa. The voluminous files of proposals and correspondence between colonial experts testifies to the magnitude of the task and the diversity of views.⁶⁵⁰ Colonial representation was

⁶⁴⁹. Cournarie had suggested that Senegal be allocated one seat and the rest of the Federation another. Cournarie to Pleven, December 31, 1943, Affaires Politiques, File 874, ANSOM.

⁶⁵⁰. The Colonial Minister, Giaccobi, wanted a single electoral college for the 'citizens' and the party list system for the 'subjects.' Giaccobi to Cournarie, April 26, 1945, 20G 2 1, ARSD. The Governor-General of AOF argued against a single

fervently debated in the Conseil Colonial of Dakar. The Comité de Coordination, a group of 20 patriotic associations led by Charles Cros, proposed that since AOF constituted a quarter of the French overseas population, it should be allocated a quarter of the total number of representatives and that Senegal should comprise a separate independent college from Dakar which merited special treatment, namely its own delegate.⁶⁵¹ The Groupement d'Action Républicaine, the Front National and the Groupement de Défense des Victimes des Lois d'Exception d'AOF recommended that the colonial territories be granted one third of the total number of representatives of France.

A Commission d'Etudes de la Représentation des Colonies was set up in February 1945 under the auspices of the Colonial Minister Giaccobi,⁶⁵² comprising 42 members (including 22

college that would essentially exclude French 'citizens' of metropolitan origin. He opposed the ballot system and proposed the division of AOF into three electoral circonscriptions voting in uninominal rolls. Senegal would constitute a separate circonscription on account of its large numbers of 'citizens.' He also supported the creation of separate colleges for 'citizens' and 'subjects,' and projected six 'citizen' colleges for the Federation along with restricted non-'citizen' electoral colleges. Cournarie to Pleven, June 16, 1945, and Cournarie to Giaccobi, May 2, 1945, 20G 2 1, ARSD. Pleven envisaged seven deputies for AOF, one for Senegal. Pleven telegram to Cournarie, circa May 5, 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 209, ARSD.

⁶⁵¹. Motion signed by Charles Cros, President of the Comité de Coordination, June 10, 1945, 20G 24 17, ARSD; see also Affaires Politiques, File 934; Laurentie agreed to a separate delegate for Dakar but the proposal was not taken up.

⁶⁵². Rapport de CER, no date, 20G 2 1, ARSD; see also Bruce Marshall, The French Colonial Myth and Constitution-Making in the Fourth Republic, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 164.

overseas deputies and professionals of the colonial lobby.) The idée force behind the Commission was the principle of equality between Europeans and Africans, 'citizens' and 'subjects.'⁶⁵³ It was headed by Gaston Monnerville, a mulatto from Guiana until 1946, when the new Colonial Minister Moutet appointed Lamine Gueye as president. Senghor also joined the ranks of the Commission, and campaigned for universal suffrage, the single college and proportional representation. The proposals for a single-chamber Constituent Assembly comprising 95 colonial deputies and for a double chamber with 66 colonial representatives for the lower chamber and 29 for the Senate

were rejected by de Gaulle and a minority within the Commission that was opposed outright to the representation of non-'citizens' in the ANC. Senghor became disillusioned.⁶⁵⁴ The double college was retained and only 33 overseas deputies were allocated to the ANC (two from Senegal). As the Commission did not have decision-making authority, its proposals remained 'lettres mortes' and its importance remained, above all, symbolic.

...l'élément essentiel retenu par cette Commission et qui milite en faveur de cette représentation est l'affirmation du principe de l'égalité fondamentale de

⁶⁵³. Intercepted letter of Senghor, May 5, 1945, 21G 110 28, ARSD.

⁶⁵⁴. De Serreys to Monnerville, May 17, 1945, 20G 2 1, ARSD. The government accepted the principle of universal suffrage and recognized that it should be adopted for the ANC but 'circumstances independent of the government's will' like the absence of registration offices, the lack of time to put to operation an electoral process for large numbers of dispersed natives, etc. necessitated the imposition of restrictions.

tous les hommes, de toutes les races dont l'union constitue la grande communauté française.⁶⁵⁵

A referendum to decide whether French citizens wanted the ANC to have constituent powers was scheduled to be held parallel to the elections. Only 'citizens' were eligible to vote in the Referendum while 'subjects' could vote in the elections. Yet, the ordonnance of August 22, 1945 which for the first time allowed a segment of 'subjects' to voice their opinions was of considerable significance. The number of voters tripled but remained very low throughout AOF.

Table 11.⁶⁵⁶

The Franchise, October 1945 for AOF.

	<u>Citizen College</u>	<u>Non-Citizen College</u>
Registered	54.698 *	118.039
Voting	34.742	95.039

* 43.000 were Senegalese.

b) The 1945 ANC Elections.

The October 21, 1945 elections to the ANC consolidated Lamine Gueye's leadership in the political arena and ushered in a man

⁶⁵⁵. Exposé des motifs, Ordinance of August 22, 1945, Affaires Politiques, File 934, ARSD.

⁶⁵⁶. Chef du Bureau to Governor of Senegal, January 26, 1945, 20G 139 174, ARSD. Mortimer's figures are very different from the ones I quote: for AOF he cites 172.500 as entitled to vote, and 127.500 as actually voting; for Senegal, his figures are 69.000 and 47.000 respectively, op. cit., p. 58.

hitherto unknown to the Senegalese --Leopold S. Senghor--
 to the forefront of 'subject' politics. The circumstances of
 Senghor's nomination shed some light on his relationship with
 Lamine Gueye and the SFIO over the next few years. In 1945,
 Senghor was a teacher in a lycée near Paris, a lecturer at the
Ecole Nationale Française d'Outre Mer and an aspiring poet with a
 first volume in the press. During this period, he focused his
 activities on the négritude movement which he believed to be
 instrumental to the formulation of a political doctrine.⁶⁵⁷ His
 first involvement in politics can be traced to March 1945 when he
 formed^{the} Communauté Impériale Française, a group of Europeans and
 Africans who endorsed the Brazzaville recommendations.⁶⁵⁸

657. Jacques Louis Hymans, Léopold Sédar Senghor: An Intellectual Biography, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), p. 96.

658. General Bertin was the president of the group while Senghor was one of its vice-presidents. Senghor, intercepted letter, Paris, March 8, 1945, 21G 110 28, ARSD. Another curious group which Senghor was accused of participating in was the Organisation Secrète de l'Afrique Indépendante, which according to the security reports was formed in 1945. Behanzin, Apithy, Amarin (Senegal), and Lamine Gueye were reportedly amongst its members. The group held meetings in Paris to "servir de guide aux masses et leur inculquer l'idée de haine contre le blanc qui les exploite." in Report of June 2, 1945, 21G 111 28, ARSD. They had two papers, La Défense de l'Afrique and L'Afrique Libre and the authorities suspected they received aid from the USSR. The Governor of Senegal was for a long time paranoid over this probably fictitious group, which he once identified with the Bloc Africain. Cournarie, who received the numerous police reports on this group, did not take Maestracci seriously. Senghor found out about his alleged participation in this group only in November 1945. See report of Lt. Colonel Labadie, June 2, 1945, June 20, 1945, 21G 111 (28), Cournarie to Maestracci, June 22, 1945; Maestracci to Cournarie October 25, 1945 and Cournarie to Maestracci November 15, 1945, and February 21, 1946, 21G 111 (28), ARSD.

Senghor only joined the SFIO 16 hours before he was appointed by the local party congress.⁶⁵⁹ His nomination was announced by Lamine Gueye during a visit to Paris in June. On Gueye's request, Abdoulaye Ly had convened a meeting of African students and intellectuals to discuss the nomination. The students felt betrayed because they considered Senghor to be a 'Black Frenchman.'⁶⁶⁰ According to Ly, Senghor and Apithy were chosen "en tant que membres de la résistance."⁶⁶¹ It is more likely, however, that Gueye based his decision on the fact that he needed the support of the MRP and the colonial circles with

⁶⁵⁹. AOF, (November 4, 1948). The article protested that Senghor's nomination did not conform to SFIO rules (article 14) which stipulated that a candidate for the legislative elections had to be a member of the party for three years. Senghor was described as "ce jeune professeur qui bien qu'inconnu dans son pays ne symbolisait pas moins l'avenir du Sénégal." In his correspondence with Armand Angrand in early June 1945, Senghor stated that he did not aspire to a political career and least of all a seat in the ANC: "Je n'ai pas d'ambitions politiques. Si je viens en Juillet ce sera surtout pour poursuivre des recherches d'ordre linguistique et culturel..." Intercepted letter, Senghor to Angrand dated June 1, 1945, 21G 110 28, ARSD. "Je n'aime pas beaucoup la politique mais c'est mon devoir de sortir de mon tour d'ivoire en ce temps de crise où se décide l'avenir de colonies, mais... je ne serais pas candidat aux élections..." Intercepted letter, Senghor to Angrand dated June 9, 1945, ibid.

⁶⁶⁰. Interviews with Abdoulaye Ly, July 17, 1984 and Amadou Ali Dieng, July 3, 1984 in Dakar. Bakary Traoré has argued that African students wanted Ly as candidate. Bakary Traoré, "L'évolution des partis politiques au Sénégal depuis 1940," in Bakary Traoré, Mamadou Lô et Jean Louis Alibert, Les Forces Politiques en Afrique Noire, (Paris: PUF, 1966), p. 22. Ly did not allude to it during our interview.

⁶⁶¹. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984.

which the young agrégé was well-connected.⁶⁶² The liberal administrator Delavignette and his ENFOM contacts also played a role in Senghor's nomination. Gueye's protégé had actually been Souley Diagne, a lawyer from Diourbel who had studied in Paris in the 1930's and was secretary of the Association des Etudiants Ouest-Africains of which Senghor was president.⁶⁶³

Lamine Gueye was elected deputy by 20.529 votes against his opponents Socé Diop (3.695 votes) and the Frenchman Maillat (1.227 votes). Senghor was elected with 14.107 votes against Ely Manel Fall (1.689), Charles Cros (1.350), Djim Momar Gueye and Pierre Diagne.⁶⁶⁴ The electoral campaigns focused on the abolition of the indigénat, the vote of women, the local assemblies, but there was little mention of the constitution. The elections were reported as unusually tranquil, as there was no real struggle between the contestants. Everyone knew Lamine Gueye would easily win.⁶⁶⁵ As a result, a considerable number of citizens abstained: only 57.2% and 65.4% of 'citizens' voted as opposed to the 91.1% and 83.2% of 'subjects' who zealously

662. According to Amadou Ali Dieng, the MRP "colonialists" virtually imposed Senghor on Gueye. In Senegal, as a 'subject,' veteran and young socialist, he was also popular amongst many évolué groups; more details in chapter 7.

663. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly; for biographical information on Souley Diagne, see Milcent, Senghor..., op. cit., 1969, p. 52. According to Pathé Diagne, Gueye's choice was Abdoulaye Sadjì. Interview with Pathé Diagne, Dakar, June 9, 1984.

664. Rapport de l'Activité des Services, Conseil du Gouvernement AOF, December 1945, 2G 45 104, ARSD. The elections are dealt with in detail in chapter 7.

665. Ibid.

exercised their voting rights.⁶⁶⁶

c) Gueye and Senghor in the Constituent Assemblies.

Created to deliberate on the constitution of the Fourth Republic, the ANC allocated 64 out of 586 seats to the overseas territoires, of which 10 to AOF (five seats for the 'citizens' and five for 'subjects'). The main issue in the assembly debates was how the republic would remain one and indivisible while allowing for the devolution of autonomy overseas. The Union proposal which was essentially assimilationist was supported by the right wing, while the motion for a Federation that was submitted by the left wing parties was premised on association.

The 53-year old Lamine Gueye, a veteran politician and lawyer, was at ease with the logistics of constitutional debates and parliamentary procedures. As a resident of France for over 20 years, Senghor had influential connections in the government and was also at home in French political circles. Together with Apithy, they contrasted sharply to the rest of the AOF delegates who had never visited France and lacked a university education and knowledge of the logistics of the French political system.⁶⁶⁷

Lamine Gueye was the exponent of assimilation par excellence. As the first African to obtain a French degree in law, he was a showpiece of France's assimilation policy. His law thesis had been devoted to the assimilation of the originaires; in the

⁶⁶⁶. Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷. Milcent, Senghor., op. cit., p. 89.

late 1930's he had merged the PSS with the SFIO and pressed for the recognition of Senegal as a French département. The Lamine Gueye law of May 7, 1946 (discussed below) marked the peak of his political career, distinguishing him as the most influential leader in Black Africa. It also won him a minor cabinet post in the Overseas Ministry and a seat in the executive committee of the SFIO.⁶⁶⁸

Gueye rejected both federalism and integration in the Assembly debates. He argued that federalism presupposed a minimum of political, administrative and financial autonomy which was absent in the colonies. Conversely, full-scale integration was rejected on the grounds that overseas territories could not be ruled by French laws and decrees.⁶⁶⁹ Gueye pressed for complete assimilation in the sense of equal rights between Africans and Frenchmen,

Les revendications du Sénégal sont très simples: il ne réclame ni indépendance, ni autonomie. Il accepte de tout coeur de participer à la vie française, dans la bonne comme dans la mauvaise fortune... Mais en contrepartie, il réclame l'assimilation totale à la métropole.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁸. Gellar, "The Politics of Development..." op. cit., 1967, p. 123; see his section on the Senegalese deputies, pp. 123-131. Gueye was also on the executive committee of the Association des Pionniers de l'Union Française, created in Paris in October 1945 by Moutet and Ginette Eboué. Report of August 7, 1948, 17G 267 111, ARSD.

⁶⁶⁹. Gueye, Itinéraire Africain, op. cit., 1966, p. 142.

⁶⁷⁰. Lamine Gueye interview, Bulletin Hebdomadaire d'Information, Ministère des Colonies, no. 41, (August 27, 1945), Affaires Politiques, File 129, Dossier 2, ARSD.

and a degree of decentralisation within the French Community.

Donnez-nous une autonomie plus grande et avec l'expérience, le temps, nous arriverons à nous diriger seuls dans le cadre français.⁶⁷¹

For the immediate future, Gueye wanted Senegal to be an integral part of the French Republic. This meant universal suffrage for all Africans; the abolition of the indigénat; the reduction of the governors' authority to that of the metropolitan préfets; the replacement of the Conseil Colonial, which he called a 'caricature' of representation, by the Conseil Général; the pursuit of an 'open door' economic policy without import taxes; trade-union freedom; and 'equal work, equal pay.'⁶⁷² In Gueye's scheme of things, Senegal would retain its special status within AOF and he would continue to be the key figure in Parliament and in the Federation.

A victim of what Senghor later coined as 'the mystique of equality,' Gueye remained faithful to assimilation throughout his life: his position was no different in the mid-fifties than in the prewar days. Gueye accepted assimilation ipso facto and did not question its underlying principles nor its implications, even when the electorate increased dramatically and his constituency no longer wanted assimilation at any price. Neither the Second

⁶⁷¹. Gueye speech at Rialto meeting in Dakar, August 10, 1946, Renseignements, August 11, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

⁶⁷². AOF, Bulletin Hebdomadaire d'Information, no. 41, (August 27, 1945).

World War nor the rise of nationalist movements shook his beliefs. There was no self-awakening in Gueye's thought.⁶⁷³ His political philosophy became increasingly anachronistic after the war and contributed to his eventual downfall.

Even so, Gueye's contribution to black politics in Senegal was of considerable significance insofar as he stretched assimilation to its limit, raised the political consciousness of the urban elite and exhausted what the ideology had to offer. With Gueye, the assimilation chapter of 'citizen' politics in Senegal came to an end.

L.S. Senghor, was a very different man from Lamine. A Sérère Catholic 'subject' from Joal, he was educated in missionary and state schools and won a scholarship at the prestigious Lycée Louis le Grand in Paris. Senghor was the first African to receive the Agregation de Grammaire from the Sorbonne in 1936. While teaching at the Lycée Descartes in Tours, he became involved in trade union activities and was secretary of the Section de Tours du Syndicat du Personnel de l'Enseignement Sécondaire as well as delegate to the national congress of the union. He helped found a "Workers' College," was an active member of the Comité de Vigilance des Intellectuels Antifascistes and voted communist in the 1936 elections.⁶⁷⁴ De Coppet offered

⁶⁷³. Irving L. Markovitz, "The Political Thought of Blaise Diagne and Lamine Gueye: Some Aspects of Social Structure and Ideology in Senegal," Présence Africaine, no. 72, (4 trimestre 1969), p. 22 and passim.

⁶⁷⁴. Milcent, Senghor..., op. cit., 1969, p. 63 and Hymans, op.cit., pp. 75-76.

him the post of Director of Education in AOF in 1936 but Senghor declined.

During the same year, he developed the theme of active assimilation ('assimiler, non être assimilé') at a conference organized by the Chamber of Commerce of Dakar. Upon returning to Paris, he attended the International Congress of the Cultural Evolution of Colonial Peoples where he delivered a paper on the resistance of the Senegalese bourgeoisie to the Ecole Rurale Populaire. As a 'subject,' he attacked the bourgeoisie of the Three Communes for deriding the ERP (which he perceived to be an embryonic form of an ideal French-African culture), for an exclusively French education which did not recognize or respect cultural differences.⁶⁷⁵

During the Second World War, he served in the 23rd and 31st RAC and was taken prisoner of war until he was freed in June 1942, following which he joined the resistance.⁶⁷⁶ In his first political essay presented at a colloquium in June 1943, Senghor rejected integration outright in favour of a federation with imperial citizenship and an imperial parliament with advisory as well as executive powers. Senghor's concept of a federation called for administrative decentralisation and political autonomy within the French Community and resembled the Communauté of 1958-

⁶⁷⁵. Later on he refuted this thesis.

⁶⁷⁶. Milcent, Senghor..., op. cit., 1969, p. 74.

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Senghor's network of influential contacts proved to be of paramount significance to his career.⁶⁷⁸ Within a year of his arrival in Paris, he was regularly dining at the Diagne household in the company of French ministers and politicians who initiated him to French politics. While a student at the Lycée Louis le Grand, he became best friends with Georges Pompidou (de Gaulle's envoy at the preliminary secret meetings with the Algerian nationalist movement, then President of the Fifth Republic) who introduced him to socialism.⁶⁷⁹ Another valuable friend was Robert Delavignette who later pressed for his nomination to the ANC. His association with French intellectuals like Sartre and Gide helped him found Présence Africaine⁶⁸⁰ in 1948--a literary review and movement which strove to disseminate and sensitize the French public to African culture and civilization. Lastly, as a Catholic, Senghor wrote for Esprit and developed close relations

677. Senghor, "Vues sur l'Afrique Noire ou Assimiler, non être assimilé," in Robert Lemaigen, L.S. Senghor and Prince Sisowath Youterong, (eds.), La Communauté Impériale Française, (Paris: Editions Alsatia, 1945), p. 85.

678. Janet G. Vaillant, "African Deputies in Paris: The Political Role of Léopold Senghor in the Fourth Republic," in Wesley G. Johnson, (ed.), Double Impact: France and Africa in the Age of Imperialism, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 141.

679. Hymans, Senghor..., op. cit., 1969, p. 24.

680. Présence Africaine originated as the Cercle du Père Diop, an association which organized lectures and discussions, see Milcent, Senghor..., op. cit., 1969, pp. 75 and Hymans, op. cit., p. 114.

with the MRP well into the 1950s.⁶⁸¹

If we were to simplify Senghor's political philosophy into a few basic principles those would be: cultural cross-breeding, active assimilation and négritude. When transferred to the political sphere, cultural cross-breeding became federalism while economic cross-breeding led to his doctrine of African socialism.⁶⁸² By exploring his African roots and personality Senghor sought to transcend what he called 'the false antinomy' of association/assimilation through 'active assimilation,'⁶⁸³ flexibility, moderation and pragmatism.

Senghor belonged to a generation of Africans whose formative years had been shaped by the experience of the Popular Front, the Second World War, the rise of nationalist movements and the metropolitan debate on the originality of colonial cultures and religions. The combined effect of those influences was reflected in the pan-African nationalism inherent in négritude and it accounts for his ideological differences with Lamine Gueye.

Colonial debates in the ANC were poorly attended by the French deputies who were overwhelmed with metropolitan postwar economic reconstruction and political modernisation. Gueye protested that Africans were not taken seriously,⁶⁸⁴ while the

681. Vaillant, op. cit., p. 143.

682. Hymans, op. cit., pp. 138-39.

683. Senghor, "Vues sur l'Afrique...", op. cit., 1945, pp. 84-85.

684. Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale Constituante, (JOANC), February 12, 1946, p. 663.

press in Senegal demanded "l'égalité absolue avec les citoyens métropolitains."⁶⁸⁵ Since independence had been categorically rejected at Brazzaville and strongly resisted by the coalition government (MRP, SFIO, PCF), the African deputies focused exclusively on the abolition of "abusive" legislation and the implementation of the measures adopted at Brazzaville. The prevailing sentiment, however, was that France was not doing enough for her colonies. Gueye spoke against racism, the indigénat⁶⁸⁶ and forced labour,⁶⁸⁷ and called for a purge of Vichy officials from the administration and for 'equal work, equal pay.'⁶⁸⁸ Senghor condemned the capitalist trusts (Unilever, SCOA and CFAO) and demanded secondary and higher education opportunities for Africans.

At the recommendation of the Colonial Minister, Senghor was appointed to the Constitutional Commission where he quickly

685. Rapport Politique, Senegal, August 1946, 2G 46 124, ARSD.

686. The indigénat was still restricted to 'exceptional cases' which effectively meant that the final word remained with the colonial administrator. The Colonial Minister Soustelle issued a decree on December 22, abolishing the administration's prerogative to impose sentences and relegated responsibility to the courts. It was Moutet who dismantled the indigénat (in principle) on February 20, 1946 but its practice persisted.

687. Forced labour continued largely because the Native Labour Code of June 18 had not been enforced, but also because its ambiguities allowed for the continuation of the regime.

688. JOANC, March 26, 1946, p. 945.

assumed the function of unofficial grammarian.⁶⁸⁹ However, the 42 member Commission only had 4 overseas deputies and was thus in a disadvantageous position to influence colonial reform.⁶⁹⁰ Socialist and Communist support was essential to offset the MRP's opposition to the overseas deputies' proposals.

Senghor underscored the limitations of the policy of assimilation, the need for respect of colonial civilizations and for interaction between colonial and French cultures. Since a Federation was not a realistic goal between politically, economically and technologically unequal states, Senghor's motion lay between the unitarian and the federalist viewpoints and left an open door for the future.⁶⁹¹

The proposal Senghor presented to the Assemblée Nationale on April 11, 1946, which was adopted by all African delegates and accepted by the Assembly a week later, was revolutionary. The proposed constitution virtually heralded the end of colonial rule and the formation of a French Union with the 'free consent' of all member territories. Premised on Federal principles, the proposed constitution accorded a certain degree of autonomy to the overseas territories with a view to the creation of a Union of partners with equal rights. Thereafter,

689. His moderate federalist ideas and his friendship with Delavignette were largely responsible for his designation, Hymans, op. cit., p. 146.

690. Marshall, op. cit., p. 166.

691. Mortimer, France and the Africans 1944-1960: A Political History, (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), pp. 77-78.

the colonies would be treated on an equal footing with the metropole,⁶⁹² and citizenship would be extended to all (though it was not specified if French or Union citizenship would be accorded). In addition, all Union territories would be represented in the Assemblée Nationale and the Conseil d'Union Française through deputies elected by universal suffrage.

The Commission's attempts to include separate provisions for the overseas territories in the constitution failed. Instead, the articles pertaining to the French Union were interspersed throughout the draft. Neither proportional representation nor universal suffrage were adopted. Instead, territorial assemblies with token legislative powers but with some authority over their budgets would be instituted. Despite its contradictions and shortcomings, the April Constitution was remarkably liberal. Senghor described it as "un système réaliste et équilibré. Réflétant l'état présent de l'évolution des territoires d'Outre-Mer, elle maintenait la porte ouverte sur l'avenir."⁶⁹³ Lamine Gueye proposed an amendment whereby 'citizens' and 'subjects' would participate in the constitutional referendum. However, this was declared illegal and deferred until after the adoption

⁶⁹². In Senghor's words: "Ce principe de libre consentement était d'une importance capitale. Il témoignait de la sincérité du peuple français et de son désir de mettre en application les principes de la démocratie." in "Les Négro-Africains et l'Union Française," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, no. 568, (June 1947), p. 206.

⁶⁹³. ibid., p. 206.

of the constitution.⁶⁹⁴

The Referendum of May 5, 1946 defeated the constitution. Senegal, along with other overseas territories, voted favourably (28.718 against 2.522 votes) but the total vote had been 10.584.359 for and 9.454.034 against.⁶⁹⁵ The political climate in France was changing rapidly while the spectre of war in Indochina and the widespread unrest in North and Tropical Africa convinced many Frenchmen that this was no time for colonial reforms. Yet, even though the first ANC failed to pass the constitution, it was responsible for the implementation of important legislation.

c) The Lamine Gueye Law of 1946.

The Lamine Gueye law of May 7, 1946 which extended citizenship to all colonial subjects has been described by the historian von Albertini as the Lex Caracalla of France.⁶⁹⁶

A partir du 1er Juin 1946, tous les ressortissants des territoires d'outre mer (Algérie comprise) ont la qualité de citoyen au même titre que les nationaux de la Métropole et des territoires d'outre mer.⁶⁹⁷

The promulgation of this law was a landmark for Africans even though the extension of citizenship did not make all Africans

⁶⁹⁴. Ruth Schachter-Morgenthau, Political Parties in French Speaking West Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 43-44.

⁶⁹⁵. Rapport Politique, Senegal, May-June 1946, 2G 46 124, ARSD; 13G 5 17, and 20G 2 1, ARSD.

⁶⁹⁶. Albertini, op. cit., p. 386.

⁶⁹⁷. On the Lamine Gueye law see 17G 107 17.

eligible to vote.

[La loi] ne prétend pas assimiler purement et simplement un certain nombre de ressortissants français, ni annexer par voie de dispositions générales certaines autres catégories de ressortissants... [elle] proclame avant tout un principe d'égalité. Il n'y a plus de sujets. Il n'y a plus de régime colonial. Le retour à ce régime n'est plus possible.⁶⁹⁸

The administration argued that when the law which abolished colonial rule as hitherto known was applied full-scale, it would be nothing short of revolutionary.

il n'y a plus dans les territoires d'Outre Mer des catégories différenciés et hiérarchisées d'habitants, mais une seule catégorie: des citoyens jouissant des mêmes droits publics.

Il n'y a plus de politique coloniale,... il y a une pratique coloniale et administrative dans les territoires d'Outre Mer, laquelle se fera avec beaucoup d'empirisme; souvent même sur les suggestions des intéressés.

Il faut l'appliquer [la loi] dans toutes ses conséquences...la loi...a fait la révolution, il faut maintenant la faire vivre.⁶⁹⁹

The indigénat would be abolished; Africans would have free access to the public service; the bureaucracy would be restructured; all discriminatory legislation against African workers would be obliterated; the electorate would increase; a single college would be instituted; and elections would be held on a common

⁶⁹⁸. Report of Minister of Overseas France to Governor-General of AOF on Lamine Gueye Law, no date, circa May 1946, 17G 152 17, ARSD.

⁶⁹⁹. Note sur la loi de 7 Mai, 1946, Berlan, Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques, Administratives et Sociales, July 1946, 17G 152 17, ARSD.

electoral roll.⁷⁰⁰

Since all laws were associated with the rejected April Constitution, the electoral regime of August 22, 1945 re-introduced the double college and the projected elections for the local assemblies were not held.⁷⁰¹ While the rejection of the constitution had little to do with overseas issues, its liberal colonial articles were not adopted by the second ANC.

News of the MRP's opposition to the Gueye citizenship law deeply angered Senegal's évolués. A 900-strong meeting of 11 associations and political parties ended with the slogan "[le] maintien des droits acquis, où séparation immédiate."⁷⁰² Leading political figures such as Amadou Assane N'Doye, Alexandre Armand, Guy Etcheverry and Joseph Corr  a demanded autonomy and local parliaments without European representatives, or else the resignation of their deputies from the ANC and the use of violence for the satisfaction of their demands. Ibrahima Sow, secretary-general of the Bloc Africain claimed that the preservation of the first ANC proposal was a 'matter of life and death.' The PCF spokesman, Corr  a, went as far as to suggest that unless the colonial deputies' demands were met, they would

⁷⁰⁰. Notes Documentaires et Etudes, no. 314, May 29, 1946, p. 6.

⁷⁰¹. Gueye, Itin  raire Africain, op. cit., 1966, p. 146.

⁷⁰². Rapport Politique, Senegal July 1946, 2G 46 124, ARSD. The parties and associations present were the: SFIO, Bloc Africain, Parti du Peuple, Union R  publicaine Socialiste du S  n  gal, Union des Syndicats, Victimes de Vichy, Anciens Combattants, Jeunesse Combattante, Fraternit   Musulmane, Anciens Prisonniers 1939-44, Avenir and Progr  s.

take the issue to the United Nations and demand independence.⁷⁰³

Lamine Gueye assumed the role of the mediator. He argued that Africa should not seek a place outside a "cadre strictement français"⁷⁰⁴ since what was at stake was not separation from France but "equal rights for equal responsibilities." Gueye's party colleagues did not endorse him. In fact, he had to go to great lengths to persuade them that the French Union would permit the devolution of local autonomy. In protest, many walked out during Gueye's speech. Senghor also estranged his colleagues when he cried in indignation "De quoi oseriez-vous vous plaindre?"⁷⁰⁵ to which Gueye sarcastically added whether his audience expected to elect the president of the Republic. "Vous avez obtenue l'autonomie et je ne comprendrais pas que certains continuent à la réclamer."⁷⁰⁶

In September 1946, a Comité d'Action des Partis de Gauche met in Dakar in favour of and issued a manifesto rejecting autonomy, federalism and assimilation for 'African sovereignty.'⁷⁰⁷ Telegrams were sent to Gueye and Senghor demanding a United Nations intervention if the single electoral college was not adopted by the second ANC. The telegrams were signed by virtually all Senegalese

703. Resumé de la réunion à M'Both, August 8, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

704. Ibid.

705. 21G 91 17.

706. Resumé de la réunion à M'Both, August 8, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

707. Renseignements, September 24, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

political leaders.⁷⁰⁸ What is significant about these incidents is that the African elite did not unanimously and unquestioningly endorse Gueye's and Senghor's views. The deputies encountered considerable opposition even from within their own party, the Bloc Africain. However, the electors of June 2, 1946 reappointed Lamine Gueye (31.288 against 925 for Maillat) and L.S. Senghor (20.718 votes without opposition) to the second ANC.⁷⁰⁹

The deliberations of the second ANC began in August 1946, against a background of independence movements well under way in Algeria, Indochina and Madagascar and a substantially strengthened MRP in the coalition government, at the expense of the left which had supported colonial reform. Colonial deputies were now on the defensive. Lamine Gueye condemned the dual electoral college which would effectively reduce the number of

⁷⁰⁸. Senegal, Affaires Politiques, Synthèses mensuelles des informations sur les partis politiques, September 1946, 2G 46 125, ARSD; and Renseignements, September 23-24, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD. The participating parties were the: Bloc Africain, SFIO, Union Syndicale, MUR, Collectivité Léboue, CEFA, Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, Front National, Anciens Combattants, GEC, MAA, MNA, PTI, Prisonniers de Guerre, and the Dakar municipality.

Ruth Schachter Morgenthau's analysis (Political Parties, op. cit., p. 136) differs from mine on the following points: she maintains that in 1945 there was a Comité d'Entente (the precursor to the Bloc Africain), grouping the SFIO, the MNA, the MAA, the GEC, the CEFA, etc. She also maintains that it was a response to the EGCF. I did not find evidence of such a Comité, probably because many of the parties she mentions did not exist at that time. For instance, the MAA and the MNA did not exist until August 1946. I do mention three Comités d'Entente (the Comité d'Entente of Cros in 1943, the Front National, and the Bloc Sénégalais) but not of a Comité d'Entente as Morgenthau defines it except maybe for the aforementioned Comité d'Action des Partis de Gauche which became active in 1946 not 1945.

⁷⁰⁹. Rapport Politique, Senegal, May-June 1946, 2G 46 124, ARSD.

overseas deputies to 20 and reintroduce dual citizenship. When he was told that the single college imperiled French representation, he bitterly remarked:

Voulez vous dire que si l'on envoyait ici des hommes comme Senghor ou Fily-Dabo Sissoko, où moi-même, ce ne serait pas de Français qui viendraient ici? Depuis quand?⁷¹⁰

d) The Intergroupe des Elus d'Outre-Mer and the Etats Généraux de la Colonisation Française.

Rather than work with metropolitan parties as was the case during the first ANC, the overseas deputies formed the Intergroupe des Elus d'Outre Mer under the initiative of Lamine Gueye [who also became the president of the group], to protect African interests and preserve what they considered to be the minimum gains obtained in the April Constitution.⁷¹¹

L'intergroup des députés des peuples d'outre-mer proclame le principe de libération du pacte colonial sous toutes ses formes, et il s'engage à les combattre dans la constitution de l'Union Française...il exprime son désir de voir la réalisation des aspirations légitimes de chacun de ces peuples, afin de leur permettre de vivre librement et dignement dans l'Union Française, qui doit être une réunion de peuples libres, égaux et fraternels.⁷¹²

The Intergroupe elaborated a 20-year timetable after which

⁷¹⁰. Gueye quoted in Marchés Coloniaux, (September 21, 1946).

⁷¹¹. Gueye, Itinéraire Africain, op. cit., 1966, p.160.

⁷¹². Press release of July 22, Intergroupe meeting, reprinted in Marchés Coloniaux, (July 27, 1948), p. 748.

the overseas territories would be free to decide between federation, integration or independence from France.

Self-government, local assemblies with legislative powers, and a French Union with proportional representation were among its principle recommendations.

The Commission des Territoires d'Outre Mer accepted the proposal by a majority of one but the Radicals, the MRP, and the revived colonial lobby, États Généraux de la Colonisation Française (EGCF), fearful of ministerial instability and the rising nationalism overseas, stiffly opposed it. The rigorous activities of the Comité de l'Empire and the resurgence of colonial associations⁷¹³ culminated in the convention of the EGCF on July 30, 1946 to 'save the Empire.' Senghor noted with dismay that amongst the EGCF one even distinguished members of the MRP and the Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines.⁷¹⁴

In Senegal, the local EGCF (Comité d'Action de l'Union Française) exerted some control though not nearly as much as it did in the Ivory Coast and Cameroon. The Dakar Chamber of Commerce adopted a resolution against the Lamine Gueye law and proposed that overseas deputies only be allocated a consultative role.⁷¹⁵ The Comité de l'Empire Français exerted pressure on the government to repeal the Conseil Colonial measures which exercised some control over their taxable profits and reinstate the

713. Albertini, op. cit., p. 388.

714. Senghor, "Les Négro-Africains...", op. cit., 1947, p. 207.

715. Gueye, Itinéraire Africain, op. cit., 1966, pp. 158-59.

control of the Chamber of Commerce over peanut seeds.⁷¹⁶

The EGCF opposed the single college, the Lamine Gueye Law, and abandoned assimilation in favour of decentralisation in a federal system with no colonial participation in government. Since colonial peoples were not particularly interested in the franchise and parliamentary representation, argued the EGCF, the Parliament should be exclusively restricted to French citizens.⁷¹⁷ They attacked the Intergroupe for being separatist and pressed the government to revise the colonial provisions of the rejected constitution. A divided and weakened Socialist party, led by Moutet, succumbed to MRP pressure and voted for some of the conservative proposals which swung the majority to the right.⁷¹⁸

The ensuing Charter of the French Union which was submitted to the Constitutional Committee became, with minor modifications, Title VIII of the October Constitution.⁷¹⁹ The Radical President Herriot condemned it as a blueprint of a "fédéralisme anarchiste et acéphale" that would reduce France to no more than 'a colony

⁷¹⁶. L'Action du Comité de l'Empire Français, Principales interventions auprès des pouvoirs publics: Octobre 1944-Mars 1946, (Paris: Editions de l'Empire Français, 1946), pp. 18, 69. It was reported that Graziani visited Paris in order to contact the EGCF in November 1946 but there is no further information on his activities. Rapport Politique Mensuel, Dakar, November 4, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

⁷¹⁷. Marchés Coloniaux, July 13, 1946 and June 1, 1946.

⁷¹⁸. Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 87.

⁷¹⁹. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 91-92.

of her colonies.⁷²⁰ A series of radical revisions followed, culminating with Bidault's fait accompli before the Constitutional Committee which nearly reintroduced the double college, the union citizenship, and centralisation.⁷²¹

Caught between increasingly unreliable socialists and reactionary colonialists, the Intergroupe left the Chamber and threatened to resign. Gueye, Monnerville, Abbas, Houphouët-Boigny and Césaire were received by the French president, Moutet and Coste-Floret. Their disillusionment and determination are evident in Lamine Gueye's statement:

No, monsieur le Président, there is no question of an attack on France, direct or indirect. The question is, are we Frenchmen like any other Frenchmen, or not? that's all. For example, why don't you declare that because there are so many Corsicans in Paris, therefore they must have a deputy of their own - and so on? Why is it only we who are subjected to special treatment? It's you who says that we are not Frenchmen like other Frenchmen; we had believed that we were. But that's the way it is, there's no point in our staying here. Of course you can issue decrees and order us about. We don't dispute that; but if you want to get us this way we say: 'No thank you...c'est fini...'⁷²²

Bidault reluctantly agreed to maintain the Lamine Gueye Law and delegate the electoral system of the overseas territories to an organic law. Thus, the double college was not included in the

⁷²⁰. JOANC, August 27, 1946, p. 334.

⁷²¹. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 98.

⁷²². Tape recorded statement made by Lamine Gueye, in Mortimer, op. cit., p. 99.

constitution.⁷²³ In fact, Gueye almost succeeded in abolishing it during the last debates of the ANC: the government had momentarily agreed to accept the single college for AOF and Togo but in attempting to extend it to AEF,^{the} opposition frustrated the reform altogether.⁷²⁴

In August 1946, during the height of the EGCF offensive, a disenchanted Senghor took everyone by surprise with a call for independence. He initially proposed a federal system along the lines of the Soviet Union, a Union of Equal French Socialist Republics, but then went as far as to "réclamer une République Noire..."⁷²⁵

[on peut]... préparer les cadres qu'exigera l'établissement d'une autonomie à quoi nous sommes surs d'accéder... en assurant les blancs de notre indépendance: il serait tout aussi sot que dangereux pour eux, de vouloir faire marcher arrière. Nous sommes prêts, s'il le fallait et en dernier recours, à conquérir la liberté par tous les moyens, fussent-ils violents.⁷²⁶

The political context accounts for Senghor's frustration and intransigence. The resurgence of reactionary colonialism which dominated the second ANC posed a direct threat to the gains Africans had extracted from the April constitution. His espousal of independence might have even been a bluff to warn the French

723. Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 87.

724. Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

725. Renseignements, October 22, 1946, 17G 139 19, ARSD.

726. Ibid.

that if they pushed things too far, even the most accommodating deputies would revolt. When Senghor realized that African deputies had no bargaining power, he changed his tactics and opted for collaboration, reaffirming his loyalty towards France, denouncing secession and voting for the October Constitution. 'Nationalism' and 'autonomy' were dismissed as pompous and meaningless words:

...l'autonomie n'est pas une fin pour nous, mais un moyen. En d'autres termes, nous voulons moins nous débarrasser de la tutelle de la Métropole que de la tyrannie du capitalisme international. Nous pensons qu'une autonomie qui nous ramènerait simplement au régime féodal des castes ne résoudrait pas le problème, bien que ce régime fut moins oppressif pour l'homme que le système colonialo-capitaliste.

Nous ne sommes pas des révoltés, mais des révolutionnaires...⁷²⁷

Gueye similarly defended the status quo: "Nous pouvons tout par la France, tout par le République, mais jamais rien sans la France et jamais rien sans la République."⁷²⁸ Thereafter, their efforts shifted toward the maximization of civil rights and economic reforms rather than the revision of the constitution.⁷²⁹

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC.

The Constitution of October 27, 1946 which was adopted by the Referendum of May 6, 1946 was a highly compromised version of

⁷²⁷. Senghor, "Les Négro-Africains...", op. cit., 1947, p. 208.

⁷²⁸. Gueye editorial, Le Sénégal, (January 13, 1947).

⁷²⁹. Hymans, op. cit., p. 152.

the April constitution that dissatisfied the coalition, the overseas deputies and the colonialist circles. The French Union comprised the Republic and the associate states and territories. AOF was part of the Republic with 13 deputies and 19 (out of 315) senators in Parliament. The Assemblée de l'Union Française was only consultative and therefore of little consequence except as a training ground for African politicians.⁷³⁰

Senghor thought the constitution regressive: "La nouvelle Constitution est une charte octroyée, pour ne pas dire imposée, aux peuples d'outre-mer."⁷³¹ The free consent clause was gone along with the referendum which would have given some say to the 'subjects.' The all-important article 115 of the April Constitution instituting local assemblies elected by direct and universal suffrage was removed; instead, local assemblies would be instituted by decree. Overseas territories no longer reserved the right to decide on their future status within the Union; the Assemblée de l'Union Française was virtually powerless and nearly all decisions emanated from Paris. Local assemblies were provisionally instituted by decree in October 1946. The law of August 1947 created the Grand Conseil in Dakar which was to vote the Federal budget of AOF, and advise the Governor-General. Each overseas territory elected five members to the Grand Conseil by proportional representation.⁷³²

730. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 101.

731. Senghor, "Les Négro-Africains," op. cit., 1947, p. 207.

732. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 103.

The Constitution was received with apprehension and anger in Senegal. The newspaper Communauté of the Mouvement Nationaliste Africain which issued a special report on it, denounced it as hypocritical.⁷³³ There were contradictions not only between the preamble of the constitution and title VIII but also within the preamble itself. The colonial debate became more entangled and complex with the introduction of the concepts of 'autonomy,' 'decentralization,' 'federation' and the 'community.' Still clinging onto the concept of a Greater France, the postwar government was essentially trying to fit decolonization therein.

The assimilationist and centralist political structure defined by the Constitution accounts for the apparentement of African political parties to metropolitan parties. In order to offset the rise of nationalist parties, the French actively harnessed local political activity and representation in the assemblies.⁷³⁴

THE BAMAKO CONGRESS OF 1946 AND THE BIRTH OF THE RDA.

It was the GEC of Dakar which first developed the concept of an African Popular Front.⁷³⁵ The occasion arose when African deputies in France became disillusioned with the SFIO and the MRP

733. Communauté, no. special October 9, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

734. Michael Crowder and Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, "French West Africa, 1945-1960," in J.F.A Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa, volume two, (London: Longmans, 1974), p. 671.

735. François Zuccarelli, Un parti politique africain: L'Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, (Paris: R. Pichon et R. Durano-Auzias, 1970), p. 43.

which sacrificed colonial reform for the sake of government unity. Those who had threatened to resign from the second ANC (Gueye, Houphouët-Boigny, Tchicaya, Apithy, Cissoko, Diallo, and d'Arboussier) drafted a manifesto in September 1946 calling African political movements to unite into a single Parti Démocratique Africain with inter-territorial bases which would be independent of metropolitan political parties. It was also agreed that the RDA might support a metropolitan party favourable to its cause.⁷³⁶

Without dissasociating himself from the SFIO, Lamine Gueye offered his support to the movement.⁷³⁷ Senghor, who was not present during the drafting of the manifesto, also joined. It was decided that a meeting would be scheduled right after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in Bamako.

The RDA called for a freely consented union between Africans and Europeans, individual and cultural freedom and local democratic assemblies.⁷³⁸ It denounced the MRP version of federalism as a cover-up for the return of authoritarian rule and assimilation "que nous rejettons formellement."⁷³⁹ It also rejected 'autonomy' based on utopian perceptions of African realities:

⁷³⁶. Rapport de la Commission Politique, Rapporteur Acka, Bamako Conference, October 20, 1946, Papiers Suret-Canale, [GEC-RDA], Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent, Paris; and Le RDA dans la lutte anti-imperialiste, (Paris: Impressions Rapides, 1948), p. 18.

⁷³⁷. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 105.

⁷³⁸. Manifeste du RDA, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

⁷³⁹. Ibid.

"Repoussant l'assimilation, nous réclamons au sein de l'Union Française une association librement consentie, fondée sur l'égalité des droits et des devoirs."⁷⁴⁰ It was repeatedly stressed that the RDA adhered 'without ambiguity' to the French Union and that the alliance between African and French democratic forces was essential.⁷⁴¹

The RDA protested against the constitution which condoned forced labour; forcibly integrated Africans into the French Republic contrary to the mandate of the San Francisco charter which France had signed; reinstated the double college in some territories; reduced the role of the territorial assemblies and did not abolish rule by decree.⁷⁴²

With the exclusion of the Communists (who had now passed to the opposition), metropolitan parties shunned RDA invitations to the Bamako Conference. Moutet decided that if the RDA was not prepared to be under the wing of the SFIO, it should not exist at all. Gueye and Senghor had made arrangements to attend the Bamako Conference.⁷⁴³ In early October, however, Moutet instructed Gueye to abstain. Unwilling to jeopardize SFIO support, particularly in view of the upcoming elections, Gueye obeyed.

⁷⁴⁰. Rapport de la Commission Politique, Rapporteur Acka, October 20, 1946, Bamako Conference, Papiers Suret-Canale [GEC-RDA], Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent, Paris.

⁷⁴¹. Gabriel d'Arboussier, "La grande espérance de Bamako," Action, (January 3, 1947).

⁷⁴². Le RDA dans la lutte anti-imperialiste, op. cit., 1948, pp. 14-15.

⁷⁴³. Paris-Dakar, (October 9, 1946).

Political and personal reasons induced Senghor to follow suit. With the legislative elections only a few weeks away, Senghor needed Gueye's support if he were to be reelected. Moreover, since Gueye made certain that their fellow socialist Apithy abstained from the Conference, Senghor claimed that he could not have been expected to attend on his own:⁷⁴⁴

Je ne suis pas allé à Bamako, pour n'avoir pas été dans les détails de l'organisation. Ayant rapidement signé un manifeste et voulant faire honneur à ma signature, je devais prendre l'avion avec Fily Dabo, mais ce dernier m'informa au dernier moment qu'il ne se rendait pas à ce rassemblement. Je me refusais donc d'y aller par solidarité.⁷⁴⁵

Back in Senegal, Senghor claimed that the Congress of Bamako was a manoeuver to oust Lamine Gueye and himself from power, and that it was on this account that he abstained.⁷⁴⁶

As the SFIO and the MRP were from the very beginning hostile to the RDA, it was only to be expected that the Rassemblement looked to the PCF for support and that it became increasingly communist-influenced. In fact, Houphouët-Boigny later remarked that if Gueye had attended the Bamako Conference, he would have probably become the president of the group and "nous aurions

⁷⁴⁴. Milcent, Senghor., op. cit., 1969, pp. 98-99.

⁷⁴⁵. Senghor quoted in Police et Sûreté, Synthèses Politiques Mensuels, Senegal, March 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD.

⁷⁴⁶. Rapport de Renseignements du SFIO, November 2, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

écrit une autre page d'histoire."⁷⁴⁷ The irony was, however, as Senghor later acknowledged, that the goals of the RDA were similar to the SFIO.⁷⁴⁸ The fact that Senegal's deputies chose to accomodate the French government was a blow to Senegal's leadership in West Africa.⁷⁴⁹ It also illustrates how metropolitan politics affected the political agenda of the Senegalese deputies not only in France but at home as well. Senghor later admitted to the error he and Lamine committed by abstaining from the conference: "Mon tort a été d'obéir à des ordres qui m'étaient imposé de l'extérieur."⁷⁵⁰ The absence of African socialists from Bamako defeated the original purpose of the Congress of an all-African rassemblement and paved the way to the 'balkanisation',⁷⁵¹ of African politics.

THE INDEPENDANTS D'OUTRE-MER AND THE REVIVAL OF THE INTERGROUPE.

After Bamako, Senghor found himself increasingly isolated from the assimilationist and anti-clerical SFIO. He began frequenting the socialist Paul Alduy, Dr. Aujoulat and the

⁷⁴⁷. L'Afrique Noire, (July 24, 1952) and Mortimer, op. cit., p. 106.

⁷⁴⁸. Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèses Politiques Mensuels, March 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD.

⁷⁴⁹. Crowder and O'Brien, "French West Africa," op. cit., 1974, p. 675.

⁷⁵⁰. Senghor, opening speech of the Congrès Constitutif, Convention Africaine, Dakar, January 11-13, 1957, in Traoré, op. cit., p. 35.

⁷⁵¹. Milcent, Senghor..., op.cit., 1969, p. 99.

MRP.⁷⁵² Aujoulat had just returned from the United Nations sessions on the future of Togo and Cameroon, convinced that independence was not only inevitable, but imminent. At the same time, he also realized that no metropolitan party would concede to it. For this reason, he wanted to regroup the overseas delegates into an autonomous, strictly parliamentary political group,⁷⁵³ and offer an alternative to the interterritorial SFIO and RDA.

Meanwhile, a full-fledged cabinet crisis erupted in France after the elections of November 1946 when the PCF and the MRP divided the seats of the National Assembly between them.⁷⁵⁴ The French Republic was becoming increasingly threatened by the Gaullist Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF) which was pressing for constitutional revision and the return of de Gaulle. War in Indochina, revolt in Madagascar and the Cold War were shaping the 'année terrible' of 1947.

The Malagasy rebellion was brutally suppressed. Its three deputies were stripped of parliamentary immunity and were subsequently arrested. Gueye and Senghor did not vote with the SFIO as expected; thereafter, the latter took less and less notice of party discipline until he was removed from the executive committee of the party in 1948. Conversely, Gueye became further entrenched in the SFIO. In December 1946, he

752. Ibid., pp. 108-109.

753. Aujoulat interviewed by Milcent, ibid., pp. 109-110.

754. The newly elected National Assembly comprised 168 PCF (and MUR), 167 MRP, 105 SFIO, 70 Radicals and UDSR, and 71 right-wing group members.

became Secretary of State and in March 1947, he was appointed president of the Grand Conseil of AOF. Thanks to Moutet's machinations, the SFIO got 12 out of 20 second college senators and 4 out of 12 first college senators in the elections to the Conseil de la République in January 1947. However, when at the end of 1947 the MRP assumed control of the Overseas Ministry and Moutet was replaced, Gueye's influence began to wane, and with it, the preferential treatment accorded to him by the Socialists.

With the support of the MRP and seven deputies, Apithy founded the Groupe des Indépendants d'Outre Mer in October 1948 primarily for electoral purposes. Senghor joined in November 1948, after resigning from the SFIO and breaking with Gueye. His resignation followed the Socialist party's opposition to a proposal that would have arrested the proceedings against the Malagasy deputies. Gueye resigned from the parliamentary socialist group only temporarily⁷⁵⁵ but Senghor, whose affiliation with the Socialists had been from the very beginning problematical, made a clear break.⁷⁵⁶ His personal differences with Lamine Gueye aside, he bitterly condemned the SFIO for voting against the single college, against equality for

755. Police et Sûreté, Synthèse de l'évolution politique et sociale, Dakar, September 1948, 2G 48 117, ARSD. Gueye argued that there was no proof whatsoever that the deputies had directly participated in the rebellion.

756. He accused Moutet of refusing to send an inquiry commission to Tananarive before the question of the removal of parliamentary immunity of the Malagasy deputies came up.

veteran pensions and proportional representation.⁷⁵⁷

Like the Intergroupe and the RDA, the IOM did not envision a political future for the colonial territories outside the French Union.⁷⁵⁸ Aujoulat wanted to affiliate the group to the SFIO; Senghor proposed an affiliation with the MRP. An intense rivalry developed between the RDA and the IOM, the former accusing the IOM of ideological expediency and 'scandalous' administrative patronage

... un groupe sans principes qui constitue une alliance par le haut, une coalition d'intérêts individuels, roué à la stérilité et à l'inaction, où tout au plus à une action anarchique, incapable de résister à la moindre divergence, dont le nombre... s'accroît en raison de la diversité des intérêts des membres du groupe...⁷⁵⁹

To some extent, RDA criticisms were well-founded: the IOM did not have clearly defined goals. Its affiliation with the MRP had little to do with support for Catholicism, and until the 1951 elections, its achievements were limited.⁷⁶⁰ Only in Senegal was an IOM member supported by a mass party. The IOM's sudden emergence as a pressure group in the Assemblée Nationale was primarily because its votes became decisive during the period of great ministerial instability of 1948-49. (The seven IOM votes

757. Ibid.

758. Paris-Dakar, (March 13, 1949).

759. Le RDA dans la lutte anti-impérialiste, op. cit., 1948, p. 64.

760. One of its few achievements was Aujoulat's April 1950 decree setting up an Institute for Higher Education in Dakar.

were instrumental to the defeat of the Schuman and Queille governments.)⁷⁶¹

One of the underlying reasons of the RDA-IOM rivalry was the struggle for political and economic leadership within AOF between Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny. As the Fourth Republic began shifting to the right, African deputies reconsidered their parliamentary alliances. In June 1950, the RDA parliamentarians approached the IOM in order to create a comité d'entente. The protocol was signed by Houphouët-Boigny, Hamani Diori, Coulibaly and Mamadou Dia (who also signed for Senghor) and called for a concerted programme of action against the imperiled interests of Africans.⁷⁶² The RDA agreed to sever ties with metropolitan groups and the IOM assumed that it would support IOM deputies throughout the Federation. The Indépendants eventually rejected the union proposal on the grounds that it was a carefully disguised political manoeuvre to neutralize them.

The IOM declaration of October 1951 shifted emphasis away from the political and Senghor stressed the need to replace the myth of independence with inter-dependence.⁷⁶³

761. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 130.

762. Protocole du Comité d'Entente, August 9, 1950, 17G 572 152, ARSD. Other members of the Comité were Aujoulat, Lisette, Tchicaya, Touré, etc. The protocol confirmed the autonomy of all members and their right to belong to their respective political parties and also "toutefois, pour la défense des intérêts Africains au sein de l'Union Française elles doivent faire table rase du passé et unir leurs efforts pour une collaboration efficace."

763. "Le Programme des IOM," Paris-Dakar, (July 9, 1951).

Le groupement des Indépendants d'Outre-Mer rappelle que l'Union Française attend une promotion technique et humaine autant qu'une structure juridique, et c'est pourquoi il donne la primauté aux réalisations économiques et sociales sur les préoccupations politiques.... [il] préconise sur le plan politique, la restauration de la personnalité des territoires. Celle-ci s'affirme par une déconcentration des pouvoirs et une décentralisation administrative...⁷⁶⁴

The same month, the RDA terminated its alliance with the communists.⁷⁶⁵ The RDA-IOM entente proposal was discussed again in October, but while the former was prepared to accept joint action in Parliament, some IOM territorial sections refused to merge with the RDA.⁷⁶⁶

This led to the revival of the old Intergroupe des Elus d'Outre Mer by Lamine Gueye in January 1951. Its avowed goal was a limited revision of the constitution (particularly Title VIII), and the implementation of constitutional promises.⁷⁶⁷ Its purpose, however, was little different from the IOM: "mieux servir l'Union Française en la réalisant."⁷⁶⁸

⁷⁶⁴. Printed in La Voix de la Guinée, (October 31, 1951), 17G 267 111, ARSD.

⁷⁶⁵. Gabriel Lisette, Le Combat du Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1983), p. 161.

⁷⁶⁶. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 157.

⁷⁶⁷. Particularly with regard to the Labour Code; the statute of the local assemblies; electoral, municipal reform, as well as reforms within the penal legislation; credits for FIDES; the statute of citizenship within the overseas territories; reforms within the health services and the statute of the native chiefs. Lamine Gueye, Règlement Intérieur et Manifesto des élus d'Outre-Mer, 17G 267 111, ARSD.

⁷⁶⁸. Ibid.

...ils se prononcent à nouveau contre tout système de colonisation fondée sur l'arbitraire, pour l'accession des territoires non autonomes à un statut de leur choix dans le cadre de l'Union Française et pour le respect des engagements internationaux pris à l'égard des Etats et des Territoires Associés. Ils sont plus que jamais résolus à bâtir et faire prospérer cette union de la France et des peuples d'outre-mer, basée sur l'égalité des droits politiques et sociaux, individuels et collectifs, sur le respect des libertés humaines, sur l'existence d'assemblées gérant démocratiquement les affaires locales et sur l'amélioration du sort matériel et moral des populations par le développement économique, social, culturel des pays d'outre mer, suivant les nécessités du monde moderne et selon leur propre génie.⁷⁶⁹

Gueye was elected president, Cros and Houphouët-Boigny were elected vice-presidents, Saller secretary-general and Djim Momar Gueye treasurer.⁷⁷⁰

In February 1951, the Intergroupe organized a meeting in Treichville. Gueye, Babacar Diop (vice-president of the Union Assembly), Djim Momar Gueye (Union councillor) and Maurice Gueye (general councillor and mayor of Rufisque) were sent to represent Senegal. Lamine Gueye argued that since no political parties were in agreement as to how to defend African rights, unity was necessary. Union, continued Gueye, did not mean fusion or another rassemblement. Each party would maintain its independence and ideology, but together they would effectively defend their interests within the French Union. The Intergroupe was above all

⁷⁶⁹. Ibid.

⁷⁷⁰. Letter of Gueye dated January 18, 1951, 17G 267 111, ARSD.

...un effort méritoire consenti par chacun de nous et il serait souhaitable que ce qui a été fait sur le plan parlementaire puisse être réalisé sur le plan fédéral et territorial.⁷⁷¹

As the legislative elections approached, however, the Intergroupe lacked a platform.

Gueye's last claim to popularity and leadership was not with the Intergroupe but with the Second Lamine Gueye law of 1950 which accorded equal treatment for Europeans and African civil-servants with regard to pay, recrutement, working conditions and benefits. The law was received enthusiastically in Senegal in 1950, even though a decade later it proved to be anathema to the independent government's budget. In a sense, with the passing of the 1950 law, Gueye had fulfilled his platform of equal rights.

THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1951.

The law of October 5, 1946 extended the franchise to former members of cooperatives and unions, wage earners, veterans, property owners, etc. but only three and half percent of AOF had been eligible to vote. In August 1947, the vote was extended to all those literate in French or Arabic. Senghor actively participated in a special overseas law which was presented to the Assemblée Nationale in April 24. According to this law, heads of households who paid taxes and mothers of two children would be

⁷⁷¹. Rapport de Treichville, February 2, 1951, 17G 267 111, ARSD.

extended the vote.⁷⁷² Fearing that the Conseil de la République would hold the law up until after the elections, Gueye, as leader of the Intergroupe, tried to pass a motion whereby Parliament could only be dissolved after the electoral overseas law had been approved.⁷⁷³ Despite pressure from the Queille government to withdraw the motion, the Intergroupe refused and voted against it.⁷⁷⁴ The law was debated again in May but the provisions had changed. African mothers were no longer eligible, the number of overseas deputies increased only slightly, while the double college was restored in AEF and Cameroon. Pressure from the Conseil de la République prevented the Assemblée Nationale from overriding the amendments.⁷⁷⁵

The extension of the vote, hitherto restricted to the urban elites, to women and to the rural areas was significant. The electorate increased from 44.292 registered voters in October 1945 to 192.861 in November 1946 and 665.280 in June 1951.⁷⁷⁶ The electoral law of 1952 for the territorial assemblies eliminated the clause whereby heads of families must pay taxes in order to vote.

The legislative elections of June 1, 1951 were a major

⁷⁷². Mortimer, op. cit., p. 163.

⁷⁷³. Mortimer, op. cit., p. 165; Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 101-102.

⁷⁷⁴. Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 102.

⁷⁷⁵. Ibid., p. 102.

⁷⁷⁶. Zuccarelli, op.cit., p. 32.

victory for the BDS at the expense of the RDA which lost three seats in the Assemblée Nationale. In Senegal, the trade union leader Abbas Gueye won a landslide victory over Lamine Gueye. The Indépendants emerged as the single most important parliamentary group. With 14 members in the Assemblée Nationale, it could now relinquish ties with metropolitan parties and officially constitute an independent group in Parliament. Senghor and Mamadou Dia envisaged the IOM becoming an inter-territorial party along the lines of the RDA. This would enable them to become less dependent on administrative support and to further Senghor's political programme. For Senghor, the IOM meant votes in the Assemblée Nationale and political dependents who could maximize his power and prestige.⁷⁷⁷ His appointment to the Council of Europe in September 1950, followed by his participation in the UN Trusteeship Council and UNESCO further enhanced his leadership.⁷⁷⁸

The Indépendants received credit for the passage of the Overseas Labour Code which put African workers on an equal footing with the French regarding pay, unions, etc. When Aujoulat stood up to the government and refused to share the post of Secretary of State for Overseas France (which he had held under seven consecutive governments) the credibility of the IOM increased further. However, Senghor was unable to capitalize on

⁷⁷⁷. William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 60.

⁷⁷⁸. Vaillant, op. cit., p. 146.

this gain. The party had neither territorial bases in Africa, nor a well-defined platform and Senghor's ambition did not materialize.

CONCLUSIONS

Postwar deliberations on the future status of the French colonies were from the very start a disappointment for Senegal's évolués. Their demand for equal rights was not met at the Brazzaville Conference and the constitutional status of the colonies was of less importance in French postwar colonial policy-making than socio-economic reforms. The conference's evasion of political issues was accepted by the African deputies who focused instead on implementing the proposed reforms, eliminating the most pressing abuses of the colonial system (forced labour and the indigénat) and ameliorating the standard of living of their people. Yet the single college and the concept of a Federal French community which were postulated at Brazzaville were to complicate the colonial debate between France and the colonies over the next decade.

Gueye and Senghor played a prominent role in postwar colonial policy-making as well as in inter-African politics. The Lamine Gueye laws and the Overseas Labour Code (for which Senghor received credit) testify to their contribution. If their demands, as outlined in the April Constitution, were not met, it was for a variety of reasons: ministerial instability in France; divisions within cabinets and metropolitan parties; a government plagued by a weak executive that could not stand by its programme

in periods of crisis; and the resurgence of the parti colonial in the Chamber of Deputies.

The parliamentary affiliation of African deputies with metropolitan parties which characterized the first ANC did not always work to their advantage. For instance, Lamine Gueye's influence began to wane as a result of his identification with the socialists who had heavily yielded to the wishes of the MRP. The second ANC reflected the conservative swing to the right in metropolitan politics. Rather than ally with metropolitan parties, African deputies formed independent groups to defend their interests and exert pressure on the government to extract reforms. Gueye formed the Intergroupe while Senghor later led the IOM. However, division, rivalry and metropolitan politics reduced the effectiveness of their actions, particularly in the case of the RDA following the Bamako Congress of 1946. Senghor broke from Lamine Gueye and subsequently rivalled Houphouët-Boigny for political leadership in West Africa.

The reaction against assimilation became increasingly evident after the constitution of 1946 was endorsed. The persisting discrimination with regard to salaries, indemnities and overall opportunities was attributed to assimilation which was often coined as a "duperie éternelle."⁷⁷⁹ Equality of rights did not necessarily imply a desire for integration. For the first time there was talk of progressive federal autonomy as the

⁷⁷⁹. Le Sénégal, (November 25, 1946).

...seule réalité du moment... qui consistera, avec l'assentiment et l'aide de la France républicaine, à abolir ici toutes méthodes de colonialisme, en faisant acquérir...à notre élite africaine...cette éducation politique et cette expérience qui feront d'elle de bons dirigeants et de bons gérants de la chose publique.⁷⁸⁰

The next two chapters will outline the process by which metropolitan politics and parliamentary alliances affected Lamine Gueye's assimilation politics and the rise to power of Senghor's prewar 'subject' constituency.

780. Ibid.

Chapter VII.

CITIZEN POLITICS OF THE LAMINE GUEYE ERA: 1945-1948

Postwar Senegal experienced an explosion of political activity which reflected in part the dynamics of change set in motion by the Second World War. Two interrelated features of political change stand out during this period: The end of European influence in Senegalese politics at the local level (exemplified in the defeat of the Bloc Français and the eclipse of the PSS); and the increasing dependence of African leaders on metropolitan parties for support. In the case of Lamine Gueye who became the dominant political figure after the war, the shifting ground of French politics and his subsequent identification with the SEIO proved to be a great liability that largely contributed to his downfall.

In prewar Senegal, Europeans like A. Goux, (former mayor of Dakar and Diouf's chief lieutenant), Graziani (founding member of the PSS), members of the Chamber of Commerce, and the colonial administration had played a pivotal role in local politics. After the war, when the aforementioned tried to reconstitute political parties along prewar lines (assuming they could still play a dominant role in the Senegalese political arena), they failed altogether.

Conversely, as a result of the constitution of the Fourth Republic, politics emanated from Paris rather than Dakar, and thus the ties of African leaders to metropolitan

parties became all the more significant.⁷⁸¹

Initially, Gueye succeeded in uniting the various patriotic associations, political and interest groups with little, if any, outside support. The Bloc Africain was a popular movement with a mass base and loyal following that enjoyed great electoral success. To some extent, the platforms of the contestants for the 1945 legislative elections were not all that dissimilar. As was the case with the 1936 legislative elections, it was the constituencies of the parties which differed markedly. Gueye did not appreciate this fact and tended to rest on his laurels instead, neglecting the needs of an expanding electorate which did not look favourably upon his relations with the colonial administration and his assimilationist loyalties. Gradually, he came to rely on his socialist friends (particularly Wiltord, and to a lesser extent Béchard) to neutralise his opponents.

In turn, the colonial administration sought to harness the Bloc Africain by inextricably tying Lamine Gueye to the SFIO, thereby diminishing the influence of the Bloc Africain as a coalition party. Eventually, the Bloc Africain became synonymous with the SFIO and with Lamine Gueye. By 1947, the former had become absorbed in the latter but not without a price: the SFIO showed signs of disintegration such as diminishing support amongst its constituency, internal factionalism and poor organization.

⁷⁸¹. Crowder and O'Brien, "French West Africa...", op.cit., 1974, p. 671.

After the absorption of the Bloc Africain by the SFIO, opposition parties proliferated and the climate was ripe for a leader to unite Gueye's political opponents in a new party. Many of these splinter parties spoke of independence but used it as a device to extract concessions rather than as a political goal. The most important of those groups were the GEC and the Senegalese section of the RDA or UDS.

Until the formation of the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais which united the opposition under its banner, an erratic political climate prevailed in Senegal. A colonial administrator described it as follows: "Le Sénégal est, en AOF, le berceau de la politique et cette politique y a ses méandres, ses voltes-faces sensationnelles, ses jeux d'alliances compliquées."⁷⁸²

Alliances with metropolitan political parties tied Gueye to increasingly unpopular policies which ultimately benefitted his opponent Senghor. It took a crisis to polarize the situation irreversibly: the Dakar-Niger strike of 1947-48 sealed the fate of Lamine Gueye and the SFIO while providing Senghor with a timely opportunity to launch his own party.

PATRIOTIC ASSOCIATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES.

By October 1943, African patriotic associations had coalesced into political formations to contest the municipal and legislative elections. The plethora of associations and the

⁷⁸². Bulletin d'Information, Senegal, October 1948, 17G 139 17, ARSD.

rivalries among their leaders created an erratic political climate of shifting alliances. Four groups, named after their leaders, emerged in the political arena: the Groupement Graziani (PSS),⁷⁸³ and Groupement Cros (Comité de Coordination des Associations Patriotiques de St. Louis)⁷⁸⁴ which gathered little support, and the Groupement Goux (also known as Bloc Français)⁷⁸⁵ and Groupement Lamine Gueye (SFIO) which dominated local politics.

Alfred Goux, the former mayor of Dakar, became leader of Combat AOF, a patriotic association regrouping the clientele of

⁷⁸³. The PSS attempted to regroup its old adherents but few responded to its call despite the fact that its platform was very similar to Gueye's: greater representation in local elected assemblies; creation of additional communes de plein exercice; universal suffrage; the reinstatement of the Conseil Général; and the creation of a federal AOF Chamber of Commerce in place of the Conseil du Gouvernement; Clarté, (May 11, 1945).

⁷⁸⁴. The full name of the coalition was Comité de coordination des associations patriotiques, républicaines, socialistes, Franco-Soviétiques et syndicales, and it comprised the following groups: Amicale des condamnés, internés et victimes de Vichy; Amicale des instituteurs, institutrices, moniteurs, monitrices indigènes; Association corporative du personnel PTT; Association des anciens combattants; Association des auxiliaires des gouverneurs; Association des grands mutilés de St. Louis; France-URSS de Thiès; Ligue des droits de l'homme de St. Louis; SFIO St. Louis; IV^e République; Syndicat des employés de commerce, industrie, et des banques; Syndicat des fonctionnaires des cadres supérieures originaires AOF; Syndicat des services civils; URS; Syndicat du petit commerce et artisanat; in AOF, (January 26, 1945). Charles Cros was previously head of the Fédération des Victimes de Vichy AOF et Togo.

⁷⁸⁵. The programme of the Comité d'entente focused on the purge of Vichy legislation; the extension of citizenship to certain categories of évolués; nationalisation of banks, mines, transport and other key industries; equality between African and European civil-servants; and a federal structure for France and her colonies. AOF, (January 26, 1945) and Renseignements, July 30, 1945, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

the Dioufist party.⁷⁸⁶ Under the instigation of Colonial Commissioner Pleven and Monod (head of IFAN and chief of a number of patriotic associations such as the Fédération de la France Combattante AOF, see appendix 2), he united the Groupement d'Action Républicaine, Croix de Lorraine, France Combattante, and a faction of the PSS⁷⁸⁷ into the Union Fédérale de la France Combattante, which adopted the name Comité d'Entente des Groupements Patriotiques de Dakar in August 1943.⁷⁸⁸ Goux and the colonial administration envisaged a French-dominated party that would fill in the vacuum created by the war. However, the Bloc Français failed to draw Africans to it, and Lamine Gueye refused to join it when he found out that Goux intended to run for office in the 1945 elections.

LAMINE GUEYE AND THE BLOC AFRICAIN.

While Goux maneuvered to put together the Bloc Français, Lamine Gueye unobtrusively worked behind the scenes and did not

786. Goux initially attempted to seize the leadership of all patriotic associations by projecting himself as de Gaulle's emissary. Telegram of the Government General of Dakar to Colonies Alger, August 3, 1943, Affaires Politiques, Dossier 2257, File 6, ANSOM. However, his prewar collaboration with conservative colonial administrations had compromised him in the eyes of the African electorate; see Gellar, "The Politics of..." op. cit., 1967, p. 104.

787. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1943, 2G 43 16, ARSD.

788. Goux became president, Graziani and Turbé were elected vice-presidents. Handwritten report, no date [circa August 1945], 17G 127 17, ARSD.

officially enter the political arena until September 1943.⁷⁸⁹ From February onward, however, he mounted a carefully planned campaign which the colonial authorities described as a "lent acheminement qui est véritablement comme un chef d'oeuvre de patience, de finesse et d'astuce politique."⁷⁹⁰ Gueye kept a low profile for several months, waiting for the right moment to launch his campaign and secure administrative support. The opportunity presented itself in the form of a meeting with de Gaulle in Algiers which Gueye used as a platform to establish himself as the most experienced and competent African postwar leader.⁷⁹¹

In February 1944, he reconstituted the Socialist Federation "exactement dans la ligne suivie par notre direction centrale d'Alger,"⁷⁹² but without incorporating Europeans in the party.

789. Renseignements, October 25, 1943, 17G 127 17; Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, February 1944, 17G 127 17, ARSD.

790. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17, ARSD.

791. Later he claimed that this meeting prompted the General to stop in Dakar on his way to the Brazzaville Conference. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, Senegal, 17G 139 17, ARSD. During his first public meeting at the Rex theater in Dakar, Gueye reiterated the promises obtained from de Gaulle, (abolition of the indigénat, purge of Vichy administrators and educational reforms), rather than hold a campaign meeting, a tactic which the colonial administration described as working in his favour.

792. Letter of Lamine Gueye to Cournarie dated February 28, 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 872, Dossier 3, ANSOM. When the Governor-General of AOF Cournarie insisted that the SFIO needed administrative authorization, he protested to the Colonial Minister: "Je ne veux pas surtout que notre existence où la cessation de notre activité dépendent de la seule volonté d'un Gouvernement local ou, si l'on aime mieux, de notre docilité envers lui." Ibid., and letter of Gueye to Colonial Minister

The Dakar section of the SFIO Federation met for the first time in October 1944 and elected Gueye secretary-general. The executive committee of the party included veteran politicians such as Adama Lô (president of the Conseil Colonial), Armand Angrand (an influential publisher), Magatte Bâ and Bibi N'Diaye.

Over the next two years, Lamine Gueye reorganized the prewar socialist electoral committees in the protectorate and established a network of alliances with patriotic associations. The administration noted that "Le Bloc Sénégalais est une organisation puissante, disposant d'un réseau d'agents repartis dans les plus petits villages de la colonie."⁷⁹³

An important victory was won in January 1945, when Gueye integrated the Union Républicaine Sénégalaise (URS) (former Foyer Africain), an association founded by his uncle Khayar M'Bengue, to the SFIO.⁷⁹⁴ A number of young 'subjects' had initially resisted the fusion with the SFIO, a party they believed served predominantly European interests.⁷⁹⁵ In November 1944, an URS

dated March 11, 1944, in ibid. A tense and antagonistic relationship began developing between Gueye and Cournarie.

793. The administration interchanged the names Bloc Africain and Bloc Sénégalais but it should not be confused with the Bloc Sénégalais established by the young évolués in St. Louis in opposition to Gueye's Bloc (as discussed below). Rapport sur les élections pour l'Assemblée Législative, no date, signed Maestracci, 13G 44 17, ARSD.

794. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, Senegal, 17G 139 17, ARSD.

795. "Ces indigènes tiendraient le parti SFIO comme un parti Européen, sans attache avec le pays..." Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, September 1944, Senegal, 2G 44 155, ARSD.

faction headed by Salzman united with St. Louisian associations such as Espoir and Avenir to found a rival Bloc Sénégalais which would operate independently of veteran politicians like Lamine Gueye, Goux and Mustapha Malick Gueye and favourable to young leaders such as Amadou Cisse (of the Délégation Spéciale de St. Louis.)⁷⁹⁶ To accomodate the demands of young évolués who demanded greater participation in political life, Gueye founded the Union des Jeunes which he incorporated to the SFIO in November 1944, with Amadou Boubacar Sarr as president.⁷⁹⁷ Finally, in January 1945, the URS unanimously decided to rally to Lamine Gueye and thus, "L'URS est morte, le Bloc Africain est né."⁷⁹⁸

Lamine Gueye subsequently united trade-unions, youth organizations, patriotic associations and political groups under the banner of the Bloc Africain, to support his candidacy in the deputyship elections in the form of a united African front against the resurging colonialists in France.⁷⁹⁹ He neutralised

796. Renseignements, November 1944, Dakar, 21G 116 48, ARSD.

797. The Union des Jeunes originated under Vichy rule (1942-43) under the name Maison des Jeunes which later became Jeunesse Rufisqueoise. Renseignements, September 30, 1946, 17G 534 144, ARSD. Its avowed goal was to "lutter pour l'amélioration du sort des noirs." Rapport Politique, Dakar, November 1944, 21G 116 48, ARSD.

798. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17, ARSD.

799. Synthèse des partis politiques en AOF, Durand to the Governor-General of AOF dated July 24, 1946, 17G 267 111, ARSD. Contrary to what Ruth Schachter-Morgenthau has argued in Political Parties., op. cit., pp. 136-37, I found no evidence of a Bloc Africain comprising the MAA, and MNA in 1945 (according to archival sources, the two parties were created in 1946). Nor

the PSS by integrating it into the SFIO⁸⁰⁰ and rallied the support of the Lébou and Wolof notables; the chiefs in the Fouta Toro; the Conseil Colonial; the Lebanese and Syrian communities and the President of the Chamber of Commerce, Tascher.⁸⁰¹

The Bloc Africain was run primarily by young évolués who envisaged an inter-territorial party led by Lamine Gueye.⁸⁰² Abdoulaye Ly has described the Bloc Africain as a nationalist movement and symbol of change, progress and unity at a time of resurging colonialism in France.⁸⁰³ In the words of El Hadj Bibi N'Diaye,

...la création du Bloc Africain a été décidée pour obtenir une union totale et solide de la masse africaine, freiner le joug colonialiste, lutter pour des intérêts communs, refaire une Afrique neuve sans distinction de race, de couleur et de religion.⁸⁰⁴

There is considerable evidence that the administration was

did I find evidence of a power struggle between the GEC and the SFIO leaders in Senegal in 1945 over the leadership of the Bloc. I do not think there was such a power struggle, in Senegal at least, largely because Lamine Gueye's leadership of the Bloc Africain was not seriously contested by any group or party--the communists did not exert much influence on local politics until after the Bamako Conference (a year later).

800. The fusion took place in December 1944. Graziani did not join the bloc because he resented Gueye's dictatorial powers. Renseignements, June 25, 1945, 20G 3 1, ARSD.

801. Rapport Politique Mensuel, Senegal, March 1946, 2G 46 124, ARSD.

802. Renseignements, May 12, 1947, 21G 111 28, ARSD.

803. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984.

804. Renseignements, May 12, 1947, 21G 111 28, ARSD.

fearful of the Bloc; Oswald Durand, (who was appointed Governor of Senegal in April 1946) reported that the Bloc Africain engaged in subversive activities in Matam, Louga, Thiès and Dagana, to impress on its constituency that "il n'y aurait plus ni Chef de Canton, ni Commandant de Cercle et qu'il ne fallait plus obéir."⁸⁰⁵

In order to arrest the nationalist impetus of the Bloc, the colonial administration sought to neutralise it⁸⁰⁶ by supporting Lamine Gueye, a committed socialist, so as to enable him to control and harness the party. In other words, after failing to rally support for Goux's Bloc Français, the colonial administration backed Gueye to stunt the development of what they perceived to be a potentially dangerous and unpredictable nationalist movement.

What ensued was not far from the colonial government's expectations. By 1946, the Bloc Africain had become synonymous with the SFIO and with Lamine Gueye.⁸⁰⁷ Metropolitan news and

⁸⁰⁵. Letter of Governor of Senegal Durand to the Governor-General of AOF dated August 14, 1946, 13G 36 17, ARSD.

⁸⁰⁶. According to Ly, the administration tried to make the platform of the Bloc obsolete. This was, according to the same source, one of the reasons why the colonial authorities conceded to the implementation of legislation such as the abolition of the indigénat and forced labour in Senegal. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984.

⁸⁰⁷. Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, Dakar 1944, 2G 44 19, ARSD. According to the administration, the Bloc Africain and the Union des Jeunes "...ne sont, en réalité, que des instruments de propagande créés en vue de soutenir la politique de Maître Lamine Gueye en vue des élections municipales prochaines."

views dominated AOF (the party's daily newspaper which had a circulation of 3.000) columns, thus eliminating the possibility of diverging views within the party. French socialists like Georges Mayer repeatedly dismissed the nationalist overtones of the Bloc and underscored its subordination to the SFIO--a subordination of Africans to Europeans--while still promising equality:

Le Bloc Africain n'est pas le Bloc des Noirs, mais le Bloc de tous les Français habitant l'AOF... L'Africain veut être l'égal du métropolitain et fera tous ses efforts pour cela, afin de coopérer avec lui..., il sait qu'il a besoin de ses conseils... il sait que se sont les métropolitains qui formeront et développeront son intelligence. C'est pour cela que le Bloc Africain a été créé.⁸⁰⁸

As early as 1945, Senegal had become "le fief incontesté d'un parti politique: la SFIO, à telle enseigne que ce parti y est à peu près entré dans les moeurs, qu'il y fait pour ainsi dire partie de la maison..."⁸⁰⁹ The SFIO was very active throughout the mid 1940s, owing to the stimulus of continuous elections. While Gueye spent much of his time in France, Senghor indefatigably toured the protectorate and heard peasant grievances against the chefs de canton and the Sociétés de Prévoyance,⁸¹⁰ steadily building a massive following for the

⁸⁰⁸. Georges Mayer (secretary general of the SFIO-AOF), AOF, (July 20, 1945).

⁸⁰⁹. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, Senegal, 17G 139 17, ARSD.

⁸¹⁰. Renseignements, Police et Sûreté, Senegal, November 16, 1945, 13G 36 17, ARSD.

party.

THE SFIO REACHES ITS APOGEE, 1946.

The municipal elections of 1945 were a triumph for the SFIO both in the communes de pleine exercice and in the mixed communes. In Dakar, Lamine Gueye was elected mayor after the Bloc Sénégalais d'Union Socialiste, Patriotique et Antifasciste won a landslide victory (8.590 votes) against Goux (Parti Dioufiste, Républicain et Antifasciste) and Graziani (951 and 240 votes respectively.)⁸¹¹

In St. Louis, there were two socialist electoral lists (Union Socialiste Patriotique Anti-Fasciste and the Bloc Sénégalais d'Union Socialiste, Patriotique et Anti-Fasciste), apparently in order to double the representatives of the party. The Bloc candidates Télémaque Sow and Salzman won with 2.306 votes over Aby Kane Diallo and Charles Cros (1.601 and 211 votes respectively).⁸¹² Only in Rufisque was the socialist candidate Ousmane Socé, defeated by Maurice Gueye (1.220 against 2.770 votes.)⁸¹³

The Bloc Français suffered an irreparable defeat and

811. Gellar rightly points out that Goux's defeat marked the end of the days when politicians had to be closely associated with both the colonial administration and the large trading companies to win. Gellar, "The Politics of ..," op. cit., 1967, p. 108.

812. Telegram of Maestracci to the Governor General of AOF, June 30, 1945 and undated post-election telegram, 20G 3 1, ARSD; and Renseignements, July 30, 1945, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

813. Paris-Dakar, (July 4, 1945) and 20G 3 1, ARSD.

virtually all Europeans in the Senegalese arena were eliminated from positions of leadership. Only the SFIO could afford to have men like Bonifay and Georges Mayer on its electoral lists. The jeunes of Thiès apparently went as far as to interpret the electoral results as "une victoire africaine, et un prélude à l'éviction des Européens."⁸¹⁴

Gueye's triumph in the municipal elections prepared the ground for an easy victory in the legislative elections. The Bloc Africain won with 20.529 votes against Socé (now campaigning as a Radical Socialist) and Maillat, Union Républicaine (3.695 and 1.229 votes respectively). Senghor also won with 14.914 votes over Cros⁸¹⁵ (1.340 votes), Ely Manel Fall (1.670), Djim Momar Gueye and Pierre Diagne even though, according to administrative reports, Senghor was still unknown to many voters who supported him out of party discipline.⁸¹⁶

The platforms of the contestants were remarkably similar.

⁸¹⁴. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, November 1945, 2G 45 144, ARSD.

⁸¹⁵. Cros contested the elections as an independent Socialist and member of the Front National. He had the support of some teachers, the group Souci du Lendemain and many chiefs who were weary of the jeunes within the SFIO (three days before the elections, however, the majority of chiefs rallied over to the Bloc Africain). His platform included accession to citizenship of 'deserving subjects'; suppression of the indigénat; equal treatment between 'citizens' and 'subjects' in the army; equal work-equal pay; greater representation in the Assemblée Nationale. Rapport sur les Elections pour l'Assemblée Législative 1945, Maestracci report, no date, 13G 44 17, ARSD; and 20G 24 17, ARSD.

⁸¹⁶. Elections Législatives 1945, 20G 2 1, ARSD and Cathala (Chef de Service) report, Thiès, October 1945, 13G 44 17, ARSD.

Their demands evolved around the extension of citizenship to all Africans, equal work-equal pay, a new constitution with greater powers for the territorial assemblies and increased autonomy over finances.⁸¹⁷ Gueye and Senghor's profession de foi was based on a simple formula:

Une seule catégorie de Français ayant exactement les mêmes droits puisque tous sont soumis aux mêmes devoirs, y compris celui de mourir pour la même patrie.⁸¹⁸

The extension of the women's vote to French citizens overseas was the cardinal issue in the legislative elections. The Colonial Commissioner René Pleven openly opposed the reform⁸¹⁹ and the Governor-General agreed with him, claiming that Muslims were hostile to the extension of the vote and the rest of the population was indifferent. Lamine Gueye who originally shared Cournarie's views, suddenly (and obviously for political reasons) became a champion of the women's vote and stirred considerable turmoil amongst the jeunes in Dakar and St. Louis.

Patriotic associations organized demonstrations and sent delegations to Paris, headed by Cros, Khayar M'Bengue, Télémaque Sow, and Salzmann. Finally, Cros and Lamine Gueye got credit

817. Senghor focused on the abolition of the indigénat and on educational reforms while Djim Momar Gueye was the only candidate to campaign on economic issues. The platforms of Senghor, Ely Manel Fall, Cros, and Djim Momar Gueye can be found in 20G 24 17, ARSD.

818. Afrique en Guerre, (October 20, 1945).

819. Telegram of Pleven to Cournarie dated October 20, 1944, Affaires Politiques, File 211, ANSOM.

for the promulgation of the decree of May 1945 which stipulated that female 'citizens' were eligible to vote on the same grounds as male voters. Two women were elected colonial councillors.⁸²⁰

In the legislative elections of November 1946, Gueye and Serghor beat the RDA (Corréa and Abdoulaye Sadji) and the Front Intercolonial (Sylvère Alcandre and Mathurin) with 128,284 votes versus 1,180 and 654 votes).⁸²¹ It was reported that "cette victoire complète du parti SFIO est surtout due à la personnalité des candidats qu'il représentait"⁸²² and that Lamine Gueye in particular would have been elected no matter which party he represented.

The last minute adhesion of the Parti Travailleiste Indépendant and the Parti du Peuple further demonstrated the leverage and influence Lamine exercised in the political arena, even over the opposition. Gueye weighed carefully which allies he had to entice at all cost and which he could afford to ignore. For instance, his opposition to the Mouvement Autonomiste Africain and the Mouvement Nationaliste Africain won him the support of

820. AOF rapports sur l'activité des services, Conseil du Gouvernement, December 1945, 2G 45 104, and Affaires Politiques, File 211, ANSOM.

821. Rapport Politique Senegal 1945-46, Wiltord August 28, 1947, Affaires Politiques, File 2142, Dossier 3, ANSOM. Also Synthèse mensuelle sur la situation politique au Sénégal, November 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD. The Paris-based Front Intercolonial called itself a Mouvement d'émancipation des peuples assujétis. For more information see Senegal, Sûreté, Synthèses Politiques, January 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD.

822. Senegal, Affaires Politiques et administratives, Synthèses des informations sur les partis politiques, November 1946, 2G 46 125, ARSD.

the chiefs who feared a possible diminution of their authority in the event that young radicals (who sought fundamental reforms of the power structure in rural Senegal) predominated. His indifference towards the RDA can be attributed to the fact that the Rassemblement was virtually inactive during the campaign, thereby posing no direct threat on the Bloc Africain.

In the Conseil Général⁸²³ elections of December 15, 1946 the union formula which had been very popular in the legislative elections was absent and individual candidacies proliferated (15 in the Siné-Saloum alone). Gueye had, in effect, shattered the opposition's attempts to form a front against him. Those who had been defeated in previous elections now struggled for power in the Conseil Général. Senghor organised the elections alone (Gueye was in Paris) and faced considerable opposition from the old guard SFIO militants who were weary of Gueye's alliance with his former opponent, Djim Momar Gueye of the PTI. Djim M. Gueye and Lamine who had been hitherto openly hostile towards each other were by late 1946 close allies. Senghor and the jeunes SFIO of Kaolack were also highly suspicious of this relationship.⁸²⁴

⁸²³. The Conseil Général had been reconstituted in early 1946. Its deliberations were now "definitive" and could not be overruled by the Governor-General. It was reported that this reform "marque une nouvelle étape vers la décentralisation politique et vers l'égalité complète des droits conformément à une politique d'assimilation respectueuse des particularités locales." Bulletin Hebdomadaire, Ministère des Colonies, March 11, 1946.

⁸²⁴. Ibid.

The Bloc d'Union Socialiste Républicaine got 80% of the vote,⁸²⁵ and 42 out of 60 councillors were socialists⁸²⁶. Lamine Gueye was elected president of the Conseil, Louis Le Gros and Paul Bonifay vice-presidents.

The municipal elections of October 19, 1947 were a further triumph for the SFIO⁸²⁷ even though the Dakar election was contested and annulled after the intervention of the Rassemblement Populaire Français (Gaullist party) and the RDA.⁸²⁸ In St. Louis, Mar Diop defeated Aby Kane Diallo (3.607 versus 2.607 votes) and Legros but deep divisions surfaced within the socialist party.⁸²⁹

THE DECLINE OF THE BLOC AFRICAIN.

As long as Moutet was Overseas Minister, Lamine Gueye had an indispensable ally who accorded him preferential treatment in return for support of socialist policy in Africa and in the

825. For electoral results in the four circonscriptions, see Rapport Politique, Senegal 1945-46, Wiltord, August 28, 1947, Affaires Politiques, File 2142, Dossier 3, ANSOM.

826. Etiquette politique des conseillers généraux, December 15, 1946, 17G 267 111, ARSD.

827. In Dakar, the SFIO got 28.450 votes as opposed to the RDA (1.963) and the RPF (1.768 votes); in Rufisque, the SFIO won by 13.938 votes over de la Rocca (72 votes); in St. Louis, the SFIO got 3.607 votes versus Aby Kane Diallo (2.607). Note sur les élections municipales du Sénégal, October 23, 1947, Affaires Politiques, File 2143, Dossier 2, ANSOM.

828. Rapport Politique, Senegal, 4e trimestre 1947, 2G 47 134, ARSD.

829. Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse Politique, October 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD. The divisions within the SFIO will be discussed in the next chapter.

French Parliament. For instance, Moutet had prohibited Gueye and Senghor from attending the Bamako Conference. In return, he acquiesced to the appointment of Gueye's friend, Wiltord, as Governor of Senegal. (It is also possible that Gueye played a role in the appointment of Paul Béchard, a close friend of his, as Governor-General of AOF and successor to René Barthes.) Wiltord was a Gouadeloupian former colonel in the French army and secretary-general of the government of Senegal. He became friends with Lamine Gueye (whose wife was from Gouadeloupe) and hoped for a promotion which curiously materialized while Governor Maestracci was on vacation.⁸³⁰ Gueye's loyalty to the socialist government also earned him the post of Secretary of State to the Presidency of the Council in Léon Blum's cabinet.

The dissolution of the unity of the Bloc Africain reflected the growing divisions of Africans in France following the Bamako Conference⁸³¹ and can be partly attributed to the intervention of the socialist administration. While the RDA did not necessarily present a threat to the Bloc Africain in Senegal, it most certainly could have^{done so}, if it ever became a united inter-territorial party. This was one of the reasons why the Colonial Minister Moutet firmly dissuaded Gueye and Senghor from attending the Bamako Conference. Moutet's fears were partly the result of

⁸³⁰. Bakary Traoré, "L'évolution des partis politiques au Sénégal depuis 1946," in Bakary Traoré, Mamadou Lô, and J.L. Alibert, Forces Politiques en Afrique Noire, (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1966), p. 26.

⁸³¹. Gellar, "The Politics of...", op. cit., 1967, p. 148.

the intense competition which had developed between the SFIO and the PCF in France over the leadership of the left as well as over the control of the trade union movement and of the overseas territories.⁸³² Equally decisive to the eclipse of the Bloc was the movement's lack of a specific platform and the resignation of its GEC members who shifted to the RDA.

Le Bloc Africain n'est pas un parti politique organisé mais un rassemblement d'électeurs autochtones dirigé par les intellectuels, entraînant derrière eux la masse des travailleurs avec leurs syndicats et associations diverses. Il se confond d'ailleurs avec le parti SFIO dont tous les membres appartiennent au Bloc Africain.⁸³³

Gueye's increasing dependence on the socialist administration (particularly the Governor of Senegal, the Governor-General of AOF and the Colonial Minister) allowed him to ignore the internal divisions of the SFIO, the increasing isolation of the party from its constituency and the growing opposition of the 'subjects' to his prewar political habits. As long as the socialists fared well in France, Gueye's leadership was secure. However, when in May 1947, the PCF left the tripartite coalition and joined the opposition, Moutet lost control of the Overseas Ministry (November 1947), the catholic (and conservative) MRP began dominating metropolitan politics and Gueye's political

⁸³². Ibid., p. 118.

⁸³³. Synthèse des partis politiques en AOF, July 3, 1946, Durand to the Governor-General of AOF, 17G 267 111, ARSD. Thus, the Bloc did not disintegrate as Schachter-Morgenthau argues, op. cit., p. 138 but was absorbed into the SFIO.

machine crumbled.

THE SFIO POLITICAL MACHINE.

The SFIO appealed to originaires, civil-servants, the Dakar and St. Louis Lébou community, and traders representing rural Africans.⁸³⁴ Bakary Traoré has also argued that what distinguishes the SFIO clientele is that it was a colonial-administrative bourgeoisie bred on assimilationist principles.⁸³⁵ Last but not least, as long as the socialists formed part of the coalition government, Gueye enjoyed a significant advantage over his opponents in the protectorate, as the chiefs were essentially in the service of an administration friendly to him and sensitive to his needs.⁸³⁶

His prewar political habits led him to believe he could maintain power solely on the basis of bush representatives and a favourable administration. However, the prewar monolithic party structure and outlook of the SFIO did not respond to the needs of the 'subjects' who were being progressively franchised. Eventually, the SFIO came to rely almost exclusively on Gueye's charismatic personality and network of connections with

834. Interview with Amadou Ali Dieng, Dakar, July 3rd, 1984.

835. Traoré, op. cit., p. 28.

836. Michael Crowder and Donal Cruise O'Brien, "French West Africa, 1945-1960," in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa, vol. 2, (London: Longman, 1978), p. 678-79.

notables.⁸³⁷ The bureaucratic structure of the party was deficient. Lacking a permanent base, the SFIO was forced, whenever necessary, to solicit the help of influential figures or groups. Only 6.000 of its members paid regular membership fees so that the party was financed mostly by individual contributions or salary percentages from municipal employers who owed their positions to Gueye.⁸³⁸

Lamine Gueye did not change his strategy even when the electorate increased fivefold. His main preoccupation was not how to adapt to a changing political climate and build a mass following but how to play the opposition parties against each other or else to recruit those he could not eliminate. For instance, Charles Cros, Ousmane Socé Diop and Alioune Diop, all opponents of the Bloc Africain at one time or other, became senators in 1947, thereby excluding representatives from the interior. The increasing impatience of the 'subjects' with Gueye's 'citizen' politics, the emergence of new centres of political activity in the protectorate, divisions within the SFIO, and Gueye's embarrassing neutrality in the 1947-48 Dakar-Niger strike eventually contributed to the eclipse of the SFIO.

AN OPPOSITION IN FLUX.

After the absorption of the Bloc Africain by the SFIO,

⁸³⁷. William J. Foltz, "Senegal", in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 19.

⁸³⁸. Ibid.

opposition parties proliferated even though their existence was often ephemeral and relatively inconsequential. The administration reported that: "on constate un fléchissement des partis extrémistes et une tendance très nette des partis africains à se détacher des partis métropolitains correspondants."⁸³⁹ These opposition parties were essentially a reaction against the alliance (and eventual absorption) of the Bloc to the SFIO. Independence was advocated by virtually all those groups but in a very particular manner: as a last resort and antidote to the assimilation politics of Lamine Gueye's party. Separation from France was more of a tactical device utilized to emphasize the readiness of the opposition to go to any length in order to extract reform and not be neutralised by socialists at home or in France.

Some opposition parties lacked clearly defined programmes and were not even consistent in their role as opposition parties. They shifted their allegiance constantly, often randomly opposing or else adhering to the Bloc Africain or the SFIO. More often than not, opposition leaders sought political favours and seats in the local elected assemblies without being overly concerned about political affiliations. For this reason, they did not succeed in forming a united front against Lamine Gueye until Senghor formed the BDS.

⁸³⁹. Undated, unsigned report, 1947, Affaires politiques, File 2255, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

a) The Mouvement Autonomiste Africain (MAA).

Formed in the summer of 1946, the MAA was primarily a party of intellectuals led by Amadou Bâ, a civil-servant based in Dakar. The party's professed goal was African 'sovereignty' within a French federation allowing for autonomy and africanisation.⁸⁴⁰ Its opposition to assimilation coalesced in the slogan "autonomie immédiate intégrale." The party participated in the RDA Bamako Conference⁸⁴¹ but as soon as the Rassemblement rejected autonomy, it sought an alliance with Gueye (with the exclusion of Bâ). Gueye eventually lured the MAA into the SFIO without according its members seats in the local assemblies.⁸⁴² As a result, Bâ and Etcheverry (MUR), formed a front against the Bloc Africain at the end of 1946.⁸⁴³

b) The Mouvement Nationaliste Africain (MNA).

The MNA was created in August 1946 in Dakar by Pierre Diagne (a civil servant and leader of the patriotic association Association Amicale des Anciens Militaires Coloniales de Carrière) who published the paper Communauté. Diagne's loyalties shifted from

840. Renseignements, September 17, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD for a full report on the MAA's programme.

841. Renseignements, October 21, 1946, 17G 139 17, ARSD.

842. Renseignements, October 1, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD and October 30, 1946; and Affaires politiques et administratives, Synthèse mensuelle des informations sur les partis politiques, October 1946, 2G 46 125, ARSD.

843. Renseignements, November 23, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

the Front Intercolonial⁸⁴⁴ to the Bloc Africain and to Djim Momar Gueye. According to Suret-Canale, the MNA was essentially a 'divide and rule' party and for this reason, the administration considered it "une éventuelle soupape de sûreté, sans aucun danger pour elle...."⁸⁴⁵ and allowed it to publish anti-French propaganda in Communauté.⁸⁴⁶ The party rejected assimilation and federation outright, but it also espoused and rejected immediate independence intermittently.⁸⁴⁷

c) The Communist Groups (MUR, PPS, PTI, PODT, CEFA).

A plethora of communist groups emerged after the war.⁸⁴⁸ While the PCF did not discourage nationalist movements overseas, it more or less rejected independence: "les colonies françaises [sont] absolument incapables d'exister économiquement et par conséquent politiquement comme nations indépendantes."⁸⁴⁹

844. Rapport Politique, October 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

845. GEC Cours no. 1, Senegal 1948, Papiers Suret-Canale, Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent, Paris.

846. While by contrast, it did not authorize the publication of the RDA paper for 18 months.

847. Communauté, (August 16, 1946 and July 30, 1947).

848. For instance, the Amis de la Liberté which also operated under the name Amis de l'Humanité; in St. Louis a Comité de Coordination affiliated with the PCF was created at the end of 1946. Bulletin de Renseignements, Dakar, December 1944-January 1945, 17G 139 17 and Rapport Politique, Senegal, 4 trimestre 1946, 2G 46 126, ARSD.

849. Henri Lozeray, Cahiers du Communisme, no. 6, (April 1945), pp. 71-76, quoted in Roger de Benoist, L'AOF de la Décolonisation à l'Indépendance, p. 33. Stalin's argument was less explicit than Lozeray's: "La question de la reconnaissance du droit à la séparation ne doit pas être confondue avec

Among the most prominent communist groups was the Mouvement Unifié de la Résistance (MUR). Founded in 1943, the 70-member strong MUR was led by the journalist Guy Etcheverry. Abdel Kader Diagne (president of IV^e République), Ibrahima Sarr and Alioune Seck were amongst its prominent members⁸⁵⁰ along with the Tribune Libre group of Doudou Siby and Latyr Camara.⁸⁵¹ From the beginning, the party was divided into several factions, and this accounts for its shifting support, first for the SFIO until September 1946, and then for the MAA.⁸⁵²

Another communist group was the Parti du Peuple Sénégalais (PPS). The PPS organized communal demonstrations with the Bloc Africain to protest against MRP policies with slogans such as "ou la France nous accepte dans son sein ou nous demandons notre autonomie" and "si le gouvernement français marche avec nous, ça va, sinon la séparation immédiate."⁸⁵³ Khayar M'Bengue (initial-

l'utilité de la séparation dans telles ou telles conditions." quoted in GEC cours no. 1, 1948, Papiers Suret-Canale, Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent, Paris.

850. Renseignements, March 22, 1946, 17G 127 17, ARSD. See also Synthèse des partis politiques, AOF, July 3, 1946, Governor Durand to the Governor-General of AOF, 17G 267 111, ARSD.

851. Tribune Libre was a weekly paper with a circulation of 200, aimed at uniting socialists, communists and independents into a Mouvement Unifié de la Jeunesse Africaine. See Tribune libre, (June 22 and September 28, 1946), 13G 102 180, ARSD.

852. Senegal, Affaires politiques et administratives, Synthèse mensuelle des informations sur les partis politiques, September 1946, 2G 46 125, ARSD.

853. Synthèse mensuelle sur l'évolution politique des groupements politiques, patriotiques et autres du Sénégal, July 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

ly one of Gueye's lieutenants and head of URS) formed the PPS in March 1946, with Aby Kane Diallo (former St. Louis mayor and president of the Conseil Colonial) as vice-president, Abou Sarr Lalla secretary-general and Moustapha Malick Gaye (ex-mayor of St. Louis and president of the Conseil Colonial).⁸⁵⁴ Members of the PPS were often affiliated with the Bloc Africain. M'Bengue claimed that the PPS was the official communist party even though it is clear that neither Mustapha Malick Gueye nor Aby Kane Diallo could ever be described as communists and their adherence to this party was suspicious.

The Parti Travailleiste Indépendant (PTI) of the Siné-Saloum was founded in October 1946 by Djim Momar Gueye. After adhering to the MAA, Djim sought an alliance with the SFIO. However, the conditions laid down by Lamine Gueye included the dissolution of the party, integration with the SFIO and public acknowledgement of the PTI's submission to the socialist party.⁸⁵⁵ In the spring of 1947, the PTI was approached by the RDA and agreed to represent the Rassemblement in Kaolack but a few months later, Djim's party once again joined the SFIO.⁸⁵⁶ Like the Socialist party, the PTI was also divided between jeunes and

854. ibid.

855. Djim wanted to become Lamine's right hand in case Senegal was allocated more than two deputies in Parliament. Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse politique mensuelle, March 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD.

856. Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse mensuelle politique, March 1947, 2G 47 133; and Rapport Politique, 4e trimestre, Senegal, 2G 47 134, ARSD.

vieux; the former supported integration with the socialists, while the latter rejected it.

The Parti Ouvrier et Démocratique de Thiès (PODT), a 320-member strong party was a staunch opponent of assimilation that appealed to the Union des Jeunes as well as to union leaders like Lamine Diallo (secretary-general of the Dakar unions) and François Gning (veteran socialist and Dakar-Niger union leader) who left the SFIO in late 1946. Sourys (publisher of Réveil) who founded the party in October 1946, openly sought to create a communist party to "grouper et unir les habitants du territoire en vue de la réalisation d'un programme politique d'émancipation des travailleurs."⁸⁵⁷

The Comité d'Etudes Franco-Africaines was created in May 1945 to study African political, socio-economic and cultural issues⁸⁵⁸ and organize professional groups and trade-unions. Armand Angrand was elected president and Joseph Corrèa (also in the GEC) secretary-general. Sadjì Abdoulaye (a teacher and member of the RDA) headed the Louga section and François Gning led the Thiès branch. Fall Papa Gueye (a teacher), Lamine Gueye, Senghor, Graziani, Ousmane Socé Diop, and Houphouët-Boigny adhered to the group. CEFA rejected separatism:

Nous voulons coopérer avec l'administration de notre pays sous l'égide de la France titulaire, dans l'ordre et la légalité républicaine, comme une proba-

⁸⁵⁷. Synthèse sur la situation politique au Sénégal, November 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

⁸⁵⁸. Statuts de la CEFA, 21G 71 17, ARSD.

tion fraternelle de notre nationalité française.⁸⁵⁹

When in March 1946, the CEFA dropped its support for the MAA and the MNA in order to appeal to a wider audience, its influence dwindled sharply.

THE GROUPEMENTS D'ETUDES COMMUNISTES.

Most important of all the communist groups were the Groupe-ments d'Etudes Communistes (GEC) which were instrumental to the formation of the RDA. During 1944-45, the GEC had been reluctant to admit Africans in their ranks, fearing that if the latter outnumbered them, they would take over the party and create a Bloc Africain type of movement. By the end of 1946, however, Africans had not only infiltrated the GEC but had outnumbered the Europeans. Yet, GEC following remained miniscule (30 members most of whom were trade unionists or RDA supporters).⁸⁶⁰ Based in Dakar, the GEC also had a section in Thiès and scattered members in Kaolack, Ziguinchor and St. Louis. Joseph Corrèa served as secretary-general until 1947 when he joined the RDA. Other leading members included Suret-Canale and his wife, Gérard Cauche (the administrator of Dakar) and Sourys (leader of the PODT).

Suret-Canale believed that the identification of the RDA with communism was an obstacle to the transformation of the

⁸⁵⁹. Clarté, (December 1944).

⁸⁶⁰. Interview with Jean Suret-Canale, Paris, November 1, 1984.

Rassemblement into a mass party. For this reason, he and the secretary-general of the RDA Doudou Gueye recommended that GEC activities be restricted exclusively to educating and providing an ideological platform for the political orientation of the RDA.⁸⁶¹

... vous avez intérêt à ne donner pour le moment aux GEC qu'une activité très réduite. L'essentiel pour le moment est d'élargir le RDA d'y faire entrer... des non communistes résolus à mener la lutte contre le colonialisme. C'est seulement dans la mesure où cet élargissement sera réalisé que le GEC prendra un sens; qu'il pourra remplir sa fonction et déterminer la ligne d'action du RDA...⁸⁶²

The GEC advocated independence on the condition that the process play a positive role in the world anti-imperialist struggle.⁸⁶³

But, it was argued, independence was not necessarily what Africans wanted:

Les communistes affirment que, dans le moment présent, les pays d'Afrique Noire n'ont pas intérêt à

⁸⁶¹. Doudou Gueye, Sur les Sentiers du Temple, (Ventabren: Les Rouyat Editions, 1975), pp. 28-29, quoted in Roger de Benoist, L'Afrique Occidentale Française de 1944 à 1960, p. 103. The GEC cours no. 2 defined the GEC as "un organisme d'éducation et de direction." Papiers Suret-Canale, op. cit. The task of the GEC was to educate its members in Marxist-Leninist theory; to study political and economic conditions in the individual African territories; to explain the strategy and tactics of the Rassemblement; and to popularize communist and Soviet ideology. The immediate objective was to fight for the implementation of the Constitution. GEC cours no. 2, Senegal 1948, Papiers Suret-Canale, op. cit.

⁸⁶². Letter of Suret-Canale to G. Sossa of Thiès dated March 1, 1947, 17G 267 111, ARSD.

⁸⁶³. GEC Cours no. 1, Senegal 1948, Papiers Suret-Canale, op. cit.

se séparer de la France... les communistes sont pour le maintien et la réalisation dans le cadre prévu par la Consitution, de l'Union Française.....⁸⁶⁴

Until such time, the task of the communists was to form a national front against imperialism (rather than local communist parties) uniting the working class, the peasantry and the 'honest intellectuals' in association with the 'less determined' elements of the population.⁸⁶⁵ An alliance with the working class in France was deemed both critical and indispensable.

THE RASSEMBLEMENT DEMOCRATIQUE AFRICAIN (RDA).

The Union Démocratique Senegalaise (Senegal section of the RDA, founded in June 1947),⁸⁶⁶ had 30 sections throughout the protectorate, organized with support from the CEFA and the GEC. The Louga branch operated under cover of an agricultural cooperative (Abdoulaye Sadjì who had been ousted from the SFIO became its leader) and was one of the most important local branches of the party. In St. Louis, the Tribune Libre group of Latyr Camara had organized the local UDS; the Anciens Combattants et Victimes des Deux Guerres, (presided by Auguste Gomis)⁸⁶⁷

⁸⁶⁴. GEC Cours no. 2, Senegal 1948, Papiers Suret-Canale, op. cit.

⁸⁶⁵. Ibid.

⁸⁶⁶. See Statuts de l'UDS, 21G 71 17, ARSD.

⁸⁶⁷. The following month François Gning became president of the group; see report of August 1947, 2D 24 28, ARSD; and Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse mensuelle politique; 2G 47 133, ARSD; also Senegal Sûreté, Synthèse politique mensuelle, March 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD.

founded the RDA-Ziguinchor which attracted an important following, while in Thiès the Parti Ouvrier et Democratique founded an RDA section that failed to win the support of the Dakar-Niger workers.

Table 12.⁸⁶⁸

Principal RDA Sections and Membership in Senegal, 1948.

<u>Town.</u>	<u>Membership.</u>
Louga	170
Kébemer	12
Podor	60
M' Boumba	15
Kas-Kas	7
N'Dioum	8
Matam	32
Bakel	n.a.
Diourbel	12
Bambey	n.a.
Kaolack	50
Gossas	40
Guinguinéo	40
Fatick	25
Tambacounda	90
Goudiry	20
Thiès	9
Ziguinchor	150
<u>Total:</u>	738

Outside Dakar, the party had 900 members in December 1948 (the above table does not include membership in the Three Communes) and gained an additional hundred during the Dakar-Niger strike.⁸⁶⁹ Doudou Gueye was elected secretary-general, Joseph

⁸⁶⁸. Liste des membres et status du Congrès RDA, July 30, August 1, 1948, 17G 539 153, ARSD.

⁸⁶⁹. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal, 1949, 2G 49 27, ARSD.

Corréa (an influential trader) and Abdoulaye Gueye became joint secretaries, Joseph M'Baye (a teacher) was allocated propaganda duties, and Gérard Cauche became the administrative secretary of the party.

The UDS was directed mostly at intellectuals, teachers, civil-servants, professionals and young 'subjects'⁸⁷⁰ who, dissatisfied with socialist politics, had taken up the cause of the more radical politics of youth associations.⁸⁷¹ Cheikh Diallo, former president of the Union des Jeunes and the Union des Syndicats Africains was one such case. Assimilation was the prime target of the RDA:

Nous sommes contre l'assimilation
parce que l'Afrique noire a une histoire, une
civilisation, des croyances et des traditions
propres que nous voulons défendre.
parce que les Africains ne descendent pas des
ancêtres Gaulois;
parce que l'assimilation que l'on nous propose est une
tromperie, un mensonge.
parce que la soi-disante assimilation de Lamine Gueye
et Senghor accepte pour l'Afrique:
 le régime des décrets...
 le suffrage restreint, contraire à toute démocratie...
 une représentation diminuée à l'Assemblée Nationale...
parce que la soi-disante assimilation du Sénégal est une
manoeuvre colonialiste pour diviser les Africains en
citoyens majeures et citoyens mineurs;
parce que nous voulons une vraie démocratie africaine;
assemblée territoriale à pouvoirs réels, college unique pour
tous les territoires, égalité des droits et des devoirs dans
Union Française librement consentie.⁸⁷²

870. Interview with Amadou Ali Dieng, July 3, 1984, Dakar.

871. Traoré, op. cit., p. 90.

872. Tract of November 1946, 17G 559 153, ARSD.

The UDS called for total emancipation⁸⁷³ within the French union. But total emancipation did not signify independence,

Le RDA... préconise une politique africaine essentiellement française devant conduire les Africains à la maturité politique et à la reconnaissance de leurs aspirations légitimes d'être des hommes libres.⁸⁷⁴

Rather, it entailed complete equality with France

[Le RDA] ... fera de notre Afrique une terre libre et heureuse au sein de l'Union Française que nous avons contribué à fonder enfin sur l'égalité des droits.⁸⁷⁵

and an end to colonialist abuse and domination

Le RDA veut combattre la politique de personnalité, le colonialiste oppresseur dont l'administration s'est faite la complice, l'implantation des partis métropolitains en AOF qui créent une lutte néfaste des classes.⁸⁷⁶

Nous réclamons le libre droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, l'égalité des droits et des devoirs sans distinction de race et de religion, un cadre unique pour les fonctionnaires autochtones ou métropolitains, l'unification des pensions pour tous les anciens combattants, le droit pour les Africains de s'administrer eux-mêmes et l'abolition de l'oppression

873. Rapport Politique, Dakar, 2 trimestre 1947, 2G 47 134, ARSD.

874. Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse politique mensuelle, March 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD.

875. RDA poster, Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse politique mensuelle, August 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD.

876. Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse politique, July 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD.

capitaliste.⁸⁷⁷

The UDS's efforts to recruit trade-unionists and young radicals dissatisfied with the SFIO met with little success. The Thiès section of the UDS attracted only 9 members. The party also failed to gain a grassroots base, even though its motto was from the beginning "conquérir la brousse."

Early on, it was apparent that the RDA was not going to be a mass party and serious contender to the SFIO.⁸⁷⁸ The UDS attributed this to financial restraints, the lack of regular contact between the local sections and the central committee, and the absence of a precise political agenda.⁸⁷⁹ The colonial authorities maintained that the Senegalese were hostile to a party in which they were not the driving force. In addition, the political maneuvers of Lamine Gueye and Senghor had neutralised the movement from the beginning. The SFIO accused the RDA of being a "mouvement de division," an anti-Senegalese and anti-Muslim party.⁸⁸⁰ As a result, on the eve of the municipal

877. Senegal, Police et Sûreté, October 1948, Synthèse politique et sociale de Dakar, 2G 48 117, ARSD.

878. Gellar, "The Politics of..," op. cit., 1967, p. 149.

879. Trait d'Union, no. 1, (July 1948), Papiers Suret-Canale, op. cit. In 1947, the RDA founded the Université Populaire Africain with Suret-Canale, Gaziello, Fodé Sakho, Ousmane Bâ; 13G 5 17, ARSD.

880. Rapport Politique, Senegal, 3e trimestre 1947, 2G 47 134, ARSD.

elections of 1947, the UDS considered allying with the RPF⁸⁸¹ against Lamine Gueye. After the elections, the RDA once again sought a rapprochement with the SFIO and in October 1948 it proposed a union with the Senghoristes of the party.⁸⁸² To conclude, unlike in Guinea and the Ivory Coast where the RDA filled a political vacuum, in Senegal it remained an isolated party of intellectuals.

OPPOSITION POLITICS IN THE PROTECTORATE.

New centres of political activity such as Siné-Saloum (the heart of the peanut belt) and Thiès (the Dakar-Niger headquarters) began competing for supremacy with the communes de pleine exercice after the war.⁸⁸³ Dissatisfaction with the Bloc Africain and with Gueye's dictatorial powers (Lamine was mayor of Dakar, president of the Conseil Général and the Grand Conseil, leader of the SFIO and the Bloc Africain and deputy to the French Parliament), had by the end of 1946 resulted in the mushrooming of opposition parties aimed at breaking up Gueye and Senghor.

Parallel to the proliferation of opposition parties, there

881. The Rassemblement Populaire Français was created in Dakar in the first half of 1947 by P. Franchi. It had 5.000 members and published L'Eclair. Abou Sarr Lalla (one of the party's few African members) was vice-president, Aby Kane Diallo was secretary, François Gning vice-president of the Thiès section, and Goux and Graziani headed the Dakar section of the party. The RPF never became an important contender for power.

882. Roger de Benoist, AOF, op. cit., p. 117.

883. Senegal, Affaires Politiques et Administratives, Synthèses mensuelles des informations sur les partis politiques, September 1946, 2G 46 125, ARSD.

emerged a series of organisations to defend ethnic or local interests outside party politics: the Société des Originaires du Oualo, the Association Toucouleur, the Association du Siné-Saloum de Kaolack, the Association des Natifs Originaires du Baol,⁸⁸⁴ the Bloc Thiessois, the Comité Indépendant du Siné-Saloum, the Ligue des Fluviaux, the Union des Sarakholés, are but some examples.⁸⁸⁵

The peanut economy also became a crucial element in political life due to the demands of the new electorate and the increasingly decisive [and political] role of the marabouts. While before the Second World War the peanut trade was entirely regulated by the colonial authorities, the BAO, the Chambers of Commerce and the large trading companies, by 1946 there was increasing pressure to introduce change. The SFIO (and later the BDS) campaigned for greater African participation in the regulation of the traite, higher prices for African producers and better opportunities for African merchants.⁸⁸⁶

If Siné-Saloum underscored the peanut factor in electoral politics, Thiès, the hotbed of the trade-union movement, became the center of the opposition.

884. Senegal, Sûreté, Synthèse politique sur l'évolution de la situation politique, January 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD; Rapport Politique, Senegal, 2e trimestre 1947, 2G 47 134, ARSD.

885. Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse politique, October 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD.

886. Gellar, "The Politics of...", op. cit., 1967, p. 156-57.

Thiès est une sorte de tribune libre où les futurs grands orateurs du Sénégal viennent essayer leur voix sans que leurs propos prennent l'importance et la portée qu'ils auraient ailleurs.⁸⁸⁷

The impetus of the opposition movement was accelerated by the Dakar-Niger strike which exposed the SFIO's subservience to the colonial government and demonstrated just how isolated and removed from its constituency the socialist party had become.

THE DAKAR-NIGER STRIKE OF 1947-48.

The trade union movement resumed its activities at the end of 1943,⁸⁸⁸ but as was the case before the war, and despite the CGT's instructions, unions were founded along racial lines.⁸⁸⁹ While the colonial administration was engulfed by the war effort, Africans demanded salary increases to offset the spiralling inflation and wage freezes effected during the hostilities.⁸⁹⁰ The Dakar-Niger workers threatened to strike twice during the war

887. Affaires politiques et administratives, Senegal, Synthèses mensuelles des informations sur les partis politiques, September 1946, 2G 46 125, ARSD.

888. See Suret-Canale, "Strike Movements as Part of the Anti-Colonial Struggle in French West Africa," Tarikh, vol. 5, no. 3: Protest Against Colonial Rule in West Africa, 1978, p. 53.

889. Rapport Annuel Sénégal, Inspection du Travail, 1943, 2G 43 22, ARSD. The European unions formed the Union des Syndicats Européens Confédérés de l'AOF and the Africans founded the Union des Syndicats et Associations Professionnels.

890. Salaries had increased in France since liberation but not in Africa. Suret-Canale, "The French West African Railway Workers' Strike, 1947-48", in Peter Gutkind, Robin Cohen and Jean Copans (eds.), African Labor History, (London: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 129.

(October 1943 and late 1944).⁸⁹¹ Pressure for salary rises persisted in 1945 but the African unions had no common platform with which to confront the management and the administration.⁸⁹²

L'année 1945 peut être placée sous le signe d'une constante tension sociale qui se résolut en Décembre en un conflit ouvert d'une rare ampleur.... Pour tout esprit averti... la crise était prévisible.⁸⁹³

The administration reported "une véritable psychose de la grève" in the public sector following the general strike in Nigeria,⁸⁹⁴ and the Labour Inspector warned the government of the potentially explosive situation created by the 'salaires de famine.' While the absolute minimum required for the subsistence of a family of four was officially estimated at 2.330 francs monthly, wages fluctuated from a minimum of 337.50 for apprentices, to a maximum of 1.743.75 francs for metallurgical workers.⁸⁹⁵

A delegation of the Union des Syndicats Confédérées Africains sent a resolution to the Governor-General demanding union participation in the revision of minimum wages and equality

⁸⁹¹. The employees of the Thiès air base struck for half a day while the dockers-charbonniers struck for over a month in 1944.

⁸⁹². Rapport Politique, Dakar et Dépendances, February, March, April and June 1945, 2G 45 126, ARSD.

⁸⁹³. Rapport Annuel, Dakar et Dépendances, Inspection du Travail, 2G 45 46, ARSD.

⁸⁹⁴. Ibid.

⁸⁹⁵. Rapport Annuel, Dakar et Dépendances, Inspection du Travail, 2G 45 46, ARSD. Masons earned 1.125 francs; metal workers earned 675 francs monthly; taxi drivers 1.125 francs and unskilled workers made 562.50 francs monthly.

of benefits for European and African civil servants (not including expatriation premiums).⁸⁹⁶ The administration tried to persuade the management to consider salary increases but was met with categorical rejections. A strike was imminent.

In the meantime, moderate union leaders had been replaced with radical and younger men like Lamine Diallo (Union des Syndicats Indigènes), Papa Jean Kâ (Syndicat des Employés de Commerce et de l'Industrie), and Abbas Gueye (Union of Metal Workers). Conversely, the ultra-conservative Roux had become president of the Union Intersyndicale d'Entreprises et d'Industries d'AOF, thereby aggravating relations between employers and wage earners.

A general strike broke out on January 14, 1946.⁸⁹⁷ The demands of the strikers were pronounced unreasonable by the administration, the strike unjustifiable as well as incompatible with CGT recommendations. Salary increases were generally obtained but the issue of equal wages with Europeans remained unresolved. Cournarie argued that the problem was not one of salaries but of an impoverished economy which had sustained the exigencies of the war effort but was in urgent need of French

⁸⁹⁶. Bulletin Hebdomadaire, Ministère des Colonies, January 28, 1946, ARSD.

⁸⁹⁷. The opposition paper Clarté reported in January 25, 1946 that "... les grèves actuelles revêtent un caractère nettement politique axé, non comme il se devrait, sur le principe de la lutte des classes, mais sur le plan racial, avec tendance à déborder sur le plan international: c'est en effet, le problème de la souveraineté qui est posé..."

support:

Il serait vain d'attendre une solution totale de la seule fixation des salaires, même si elle donne, lorsqu'elle est établie satisfaction aux travailleurs. Le problème des salaires ne peut être examiné sans celui du ravitaillement et des prix... Le moment est venu où l'AOF, qui a fourni un très lourd effort de guerre et qui en sort très appauvrie, doit non seulement être autorisée à "tourner" pour elle-même, mais encore il est nécessaire que la métropole lui fournisse une aide substantielle en personnel, en matériel et en crédits.⁸⁹⁸

Between August and December 1946, there were four strikes and one threat of a strike of an increasingly anti-colonial character.⁸⁹⁹ The strikers demanded the abolition of racial discrimination in salaries and labour legislation.⁹⁰⁰ In the hope that the crisis would dissipate with the emergence of a single trade union movement led by the CGT, the administration chose not to become involved in the conflict. However, as long as the CGT incorporated exclusively European unions, Africans were reluctant to join.

The anti-colonial character of the postwar strike waves was most apparent in the Dakar-Niger strike of 1947-48. On October 10, 1946, the secretary general of the Dakar-Niger union had

⁸⁹⁸. Rapport Cournarie sur la grève générale de 1946, February 3, 1946, K 42 1, ARSD.

⁸⁹⁹. The printers, the African workers of the Arsenal, the teachers, metal workers, the dockers and coal miners; the Dakar-Niger workers struck in September for 24 hours. Rapport Annuel, Dakar, Inspection du Travail, 2G 45 46, ARSD.

⁹⁰⁰. Suret-Canale, "Strike Movements...", op. cit., 1978, p. 55.

convened with the High Commissioner and obtained promises of salary increases ranging from 12-20%; the integration of all the diploma holders and contract workers into the cadres réguliers; and the creation of a single staff system for Europeans and African auxiliaries.⁹⁰¹

A Commission Consultative Paritaire was established in November 1946 to introduce the single staff system and a single union.⁹⁰² The management formed a union which opposed the single staff system, resigned from the CGT and demanded the suppression of the parity commission. In addition, it found the demands of the African workers unreasonable and feared the political implications inherent in the proposed reforms.⁹⁰³

The railway administration wanted to fire 3.000 African auxiliaries.⁹⁰⁴ In protest, the African delegates left the commission and, after fruitless negotiations with the colonial administration, decided to strike on April 19, 1947 for 24 hours. Moutet tried to defuse the crisis by seemingly siding with the parity commission: "que les Européens le veulent ou non, le

901. Rapport Politique, Senegal, 4e trimestre 1946, 2G 46 126, ARSD.

902. The Commission included representative members of the Régie, European and African personnel, and the administration and was presided by Governor Villedeuil. Rapport de l'Inspecteur Général du Travail Pellison, January 24, 1948, K 457 179, ARSD.

903. Rapport du Capitaine Pont Jean, Commandant de la Section de Gendarmerie de Bamako, October 11, 1947, K 365 26, ARSD.

904. Meeting of September 25, 1947, Cotonou, K 365 26, ARSD. The total railway work force was approximately 17.000 men.

cadre unique sera crée et les auxiliaires seront maintenus."⁹⁰⁵

Subsequently, Moutet ordered Barthes to implement the single staff system within a month.

The parity commission resumed its work. The railway administration conceded to the new system, provided it came into effect from January 1, 1947 onward for the agents de cadre and from October 1, 1947 for the auxiliaries.⁹⁰⁶ The strike progressed smoothly, and the same evening a motion was signed recognizing the single staff system. The shift to the right in the French government, however, encouraged the management to obstruct the implementation of the single staff system.⁹⁰⁷

The administration's director, Cunéo, threatened the workers that if they did not follow conciliation and arbitration procedures, the strike would be declared illegal and anti-strike action would be enforced. A conference was held on October 6, 1947 with Governor-General Barthes, Wiltord, Paolini (Governor of Dakar), Cunéo, Pillot (Director of the Dakar-Niger) and the

⁹⁰⁵. Meeting of September 25, 1947, Cotonou, K 365 26, ARSD.

⁹⁰⁶. Ibid.

⁹⁰⁷. Suret-Canale, "Strike Movements...", op. cit., 1978, p. 55. Cunéo argued that "...loin de constituer une position rétrograde ou réactionnaire, la division en catégories des indemnités de zone apparait comme une mesure qui répond aux vœux des organisations syndicales en prolongeant sur le plan des difficultés de vie, particulière à chaque localité la hiérarchie de la rémunération en fonction de la hiérarchie des responsabilités... L'unification entre ouvriers Européens et ouvriers Africains, ne résultera ni des règlements, ni des déclarations publiques mais seulement d'une unification de rendement subordonnée, avant tout, à l'instruction professionnelle et à l'éducation morale. Cunéo letter to Pallison dated February 28, 1948, k 457 179, ARSD.

military authorities to discuss security measures that would ensure the protection of Europeans during the strike.

A few days before the strike, the marabout Seydou Nourou Tall tried to dissuade Ibrahima Sarr (secretary-general of the African Railway Worker's Union and leader of the strike) and also met with Lamine Gueye and Senghor, requesting that they not get involved.⁹⁰⁸ Lamine Gueye's newspaper, AOF, sought to defuse the conflict and adopted a conciliatory tone:

Il s'agit de tenir parole et de prouver par là que l'Union Française n'est pas ce 'cliché sentimental'... mais bien une communauté vraie d'intérêts, ce qui implique l'égalité réelle.

Quand, de partout, germent des idées séparatistes, nous verrons, nous, demander une intégration plus effective dans la communauté française, avec l'accroissement des devoirs qui en résulte, n'y a-t-il pas là quelque chose d'émouvant, une attitude de nature à faire réfléchir une conscience française?⁹⁰⁹

Sarr met with the Governor-General Barthes on October 9, in what proved to be a futile meeting. The Governor-General sought to divide the railway workers and avert the strike. He rejected the integration of auxiliaries in a single staff system and opposed salary increases. According to Sarr, Lamine Gueye refused to get involved,⁹¹⁰ most likely because he was under pressure from the socialist administration not to support the strikers.

⁹⁰⁸. Renseignements, October 29, 1947, K 457 179, ARSD.

⁹⁰⁹. Diop Boubacar Obeye, AOF, (September 12, 1947).

⁹¹⁰. Meeting of October 9, 1947, K 365 26, ARSD.

The workers decided to strike for an indefinite period on October 10 (the day before the President of the French Union was due to arrive).⁹¹¹ Barthes reluctantly tried to mediate in the conflict but his disposition toward the strikers was far from favorable:

Grève sans conflit juridique ouvert entre la Régie et ses employés Africains... le Haut-Commissaire, décide à aider à la conciliation, estime que si la grève est déclenchée, les responsables syndicalistes cherchent uniquement à créer le désordre et tombent de ce fait sous le coup de la loi...⁹¹²

Most administrators considered the demands of the strikers "presqu'entièrement inacceptables."⁹¹³ Barthes held the workers responsible for their predicament and argued that from there on, "seule la fédération des cheminots africains a estimé que la grève devait se poursuivre, seule elle est responsable de la situation actuelle."⁹¹⁴ The administration failed to make the African delegates obey the orders of a mediator, the strike was declared illegal and Ibrahima Sarr was arrested and imprisoned.

The strike was almost total. By November 1, only 38 African

911. Suret-Canale, "The French West African Railway..," op. cit., 1978, p. 136. Another reason for the strike was that contrary to the agreement between the director of the railway and the African workers, the layoff procedures were held to be discriminatory. Report of Diop Boubacar Obeye, AOF, (September 12, 1947).

912. Procès verbal de la Conférence du 6 Octobre 1947, K 365 26, ARSD.

913. Pellison to chef du service central du travail et de la main d'oeuvre, November 4, 1947, K 457 179, ARSD.

914. Barthes letter dated December 31, 1947, K 457 179, ARSD.

workers remained in their posts out of a total force of 17.000.⁹¹⁵ The administration acknowledged that the strike was carried out in an "entente et... une cohésion qui ont marqué une étape nouvelle dans la vie sociale Africaine."⁹¹⁶ Few strike breakers were reported and Djim Momar Gueye along with Ibrahima Seydou N'Daw provided trucks to ensure the strikers had adequate food supplies.

After its calls for a return to work failed, the administration recruited workers and soldiers, and nearly implemented wartime legislation for the requisitioning of goods and personnel.⁹¹⁷

...cette grève... trouble l'économie de l'AOF; compromet le ravitaillement de la métropole et mène à une dangereuse impasse... Que des limites et ... des interdictions soient apportées au droit de grève quand il met, et c'est le cas, la vie sociale en péril....⁹¹⁸

Finally, it was the deterioration of the strikers' movement as well as the increasing apprehension of the administration and big business that contributed toward the resolution of the conflict on March 16, 1948. While not a full victory for the strikers, the administration agreed to rehire the workers it had fired and revoke all penalties. A salary increase of 20% was granted but the strikers were not paid for the days they had

⁹¹⁵. Rapport de l'inspecteur général du travail Pelisson, January 24, 1948, K 457 179, ARSD.

⁹¹⁶. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1948, 2G 48 30, ARSD.

⁹¹⁷. Note sur la grève des chemins de fer et des wharfs en AOF, December 1947, Affaires Politiques, File 2255, Dossier 1, ANSOM.

⁹¹⁸. Ibid.

struck. Moreover, while the single staff system was recognized in principle, in practice the privileges of the Europeans remained intact. Similarly, integration applied only to those possessing the requisite qualifications. Even though the strikers' demands were not satisfied, the administration did not succeed in contesting their right to strike and arresting the development of the union movement.⁹¹⁹

As with the Dakar-Niger strike of 1938-39, politics played a significant role in the the rail crisis of 1947-48. Lamine Gueye remained conspicuously silent throughout the crisis and did not come forth in favour of the strike. However, contrary to what Suret-Canale has argued,⁹²⁰ that was not the position of his party. The SFIO met on November 13, 1947 and expressed its sympathy and solidarity with the strikers, denouncing the intransigence of the railway administration and its efforts to inflict a mortal blow on the African trade union movement. It also called for a united front in the Assemblée Nationale, the Assemblée de l'Union Française and the Conseil Général to help find a just solution to the conflict.⁹²¹ Gueye chose to maintain discipline with the Colonial Minister (who prolonged the crisis), rather than with his own constituency and lost considerable credibility as a result of the strike. Gueye's acquiescence to

⁹¹⁹. Suret-Canale, "The French West African...", op. cit., 1978, p. 150.

⁹²⁰. Suret Canale, "The French West African Railway...", op. cit., 1978, p. 145.

⁹²¹. AOF, (November 14, 1947).

the Colonial Minister's intransigence effectively meant that he lost whatever support he had from the union movement to the RDA.⁹²² Moreover, as the tone of the strike increasingly became one of opposition to French colonialism, the SFIO became awkwardly identified with the establishment.

Senghor's role in the conflict was a little more forthright: On November 26, 1947 he sent a letter to the Colonial Minister arguing that

Le malentendu vient de ce que les promesses verbales faites par le Ministre de la France d'Outre-Mer d'alors n'ont pas été toutes consignées dans le protocole de grève...

Les revendications relatives à la suppression des discriminations raciales me semblent (sic) fondées, si l'on peut discuter sur le taux des soldes....

...on ne peut parler de cadre unique s'il y a discrimination à l'intérieur même de ce cadre, discrimination que condamne d'ailleurs la Constitution de la IV^e République.⁹²³

Senghor also pressed Coste-Floret to send an investigative commission to arbitrate the conflict.⁹²⁴ As will be seen in the

922. For a vivid account of the strike and Lamine Gueye's compromising role see Sembène Ousmane, Les bouts de bois de dieu, (Paris: Presse-Pocket, 1971).

923. Letter of Senghor to the Minister of Overseas France, November 11, 1947, K 457 179, ARSD.

924. Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse politique mensuelle, December 1947, 2G 47 133, ARSD. Apparently, Guy Etcheverry and the RDA agreed with Senghor's proposal. See also Senghor's letter of November 26, 1947 to Coste-Floret, K 457 179, ARSD. Senghor demanded the intervention of "un fonctionnaire qui serait chargé de régler le différend en s'appuyant non pas sur la lettre du protocole de fin de grève mais sur l'esprit de la constitution de la IV^e République qui proclame que l'Union Française est une union fondée sur l'égalité des droits et des devoirs, sans discrimination de race ni de religion."

following chapter, it is probably no coincidence that Senghor's Condition Humaine began to appear during the strike; nor that he founded the BDS shortly after the resolution of the conflict.

The RDA had at first refrained from supporting the strike. However, in October 1947, the party received an order to back the strike without taking an active part in the conflict.⁹²⁵ The following month, Cauche and Etcheverry held several talks with Sarr during which the union leader expressed his disillusionment with the socialists and asked for the RDA's assistance.⁹²⁶ Houphouët-Boigny and d'Arboussier repeatedly appealed to the High Commissioner to find a constructive solution to the crisis with motions carried by the Grand Conseil and the Assemblée de l'Union but with little success.

CONCLUSIONS

In many respects, Lamine Gueye's deputyship marked the end of Senegalese politics as hitherto known--an era dominated by the assimilation politics of the privileged elite of 'citizens' in the Three Communes. That Gueye emerged as the dominant postwar leader is not surprising; no one else had his experience, network of connections and charisma. His smooth takeover of the Bloc Africain further testifies to his ability as a leader and to the wide support he enjoyed among the people. The first

⁹²⁵. Renseignements, October 6, 1947, K 457 179, ARSD. Suret-Canale erroneously argues that the RDA defended the strikers throughout the strike.

⁹²⁶. Renseignements, November 25, 1947, K 457 179, ARSD.

landslide victories of the Bloc took place without the backing of the administration and commerce.

If anything, Gueye's increasing reliance on the socialist administration in Paris and in Dakar for electoral support proved to be detrimental to the Bloc Africain (which was absorbed by the SFIO) and ultimately, to his deputyship. After abstaining from the Bamako RDA Conference, he was under considerable pressure to justify the inconsistency of his actions. His argument was that he had never really agreed with the initial manifesto of the party but that his signature had been used without his knowledge.⁹²⁷

In reality, his party was already in a state of disarray and the opposition took full advantage of it. The SFIO was ridiculed as "une foire d'empoigne" and "le parti de la pagaie."⁹²⁸ After the eclipse of the Bloc Africain, the SFIO dominated political life but only thanks to Gueye's metropolitan friends:

La force SFIO ne réside plus que dans l'appui administrative et l'influence que celui-ci lui permet auprès des éléments qui en sont restés à l'époque où le Bloc [Africain] et Lamine représentaient, effectivement, un atout dans la lutte contre le colonialisme.⁹²⁹

In addition, the SFIO had structural problems which Gueye did not tend to even when the electorate increased fivefold. The

927. Affaires politiques et administratives des informations des partis politiques, Senegal, October 1946, 2G 46 125, ARSD.

928. Renseignements, August 26, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

929. Trait d'Union, no. 1, (July 1948), Papiers Suret-Canale, op. cit.

combined effect of the anti-assimilation climate, the emergence of new centres of political activity in the protectorate, divisions within the SFIO, and the 1947-48 Dakar-Niger strike had had a devastating and irreversible effect on the SFIO and on Gueye's leadership.

Chapter VIII.

LEOPOLD S. SENGHOR'S RISE TO POWER, 1948-1952

Léopold Sédar Senghor's rise to power ushered the colony into a new era of politics which featured the prewar 'subjects' of the protectorate on an equal basis with the 'citizens' of the Three Communes and was anti-assimilationist rather than integrationist in outlook. The reasons underlying the rupture between Gueye and Senghor were multi-faceted, ranging from the ideological to the tactical. Rather than being a contest between two leaders, it was a conflict between two constituencies rivalling for power and two styles of politics competing for predominance, roughly corresponding to prewar and postwar Senegal.

Within a few years of his landslide election in 1945, the opposition had succeeded in portraying Lamine Gueye as a dictator and nepotist who had sold out to the colonial administration and was little concerned with his constituency and with the future of his party. The crisis within the SFIO culminated in 1948, when mass resignations from the party proliferated as disillusioned socialists flocked to opposition parties. Senghor's break with Lamine Gueye essentially sealed the fate of the SFIO in Senegal and the timely formation of the

BDS (in the midst of labour unrest) at once met a favourable response.

The BDS quickly won the support of a broad spectrum of disenchanted socialists and, even more importantly, 'subjects' in the bush. In fact, Senghor made a point of identifying his party to be specifically "au service des populations de la brousse."⁹⁹⁰ Since the Three Communes were the strongholds of the SFIO, Senghor focused his attention on the protectorate, and particularly on the marabouts, the war veterans, various ethnic and regional groups and 'subject' peanut traders.

Senghor's "politique pro-paysanne" offered a sharp contrast to Gueye's urban politics of assimilation. Senghor addressed the most pressing issues of the 'subjects' in the interior of the colony, such as the extension of the vote in the protectorate and democratically run agricultural cooperatives. In the Three Communes, he won the support of the Lébous by appointing a relatively unknown labour leader, Abbas Gueye to run in Dakar against Lamine Gueye. In addition, he effectively neutralised the RDA which could have potentially been an obstacle to the IOM in the French Parliament.

Within a little over a year, the BDS had built a mass base across the country and had gone on the offensive vis-à-vis the

⁹⁹⁰. Senghor, Condition Humaine, (May 31, 1949).

Wiltord administration which openly supported Gueye. And yet, convinced that Senghor had committed the biggest political mistake of his career by breaking with Lamine Gueye, the upper echelons of the colonial administration refused to take the BDS seriously up until April 1951.

By 1950, the SFIO was in total disarray and Lamine Gueye was particularly ill-prepared for the legislative elections of June 1951. His party suffered a crushing defeat, largely due to the new electoral voting system which introduced proportional representation favouring the BDS but also due to the decisive support of the marabouts who overwhelmingly supported Senghor. After the 1951 elections, the path was open for the BDS to consolidate its gains.

'CITIZENS,' 'SUBJECTS' AND THE SFIO.

After May 1946, when the status of 'subjects' was abolished and all Africans legally became 'citizens,'⁹³¹ the division between 'citizens' and 'subjects' declined but did not become obsolete. For instance, even though the single electoral college qualified all Africans to the Conseil Général, 35 out of 50 councillors were 'citizens.'⁹³² Candidates were nominated through the SFIO and were usually Wolofs, Lébous, Creoles or

⁹³¹. Voting rights were not extended, however, to all Africans.

⁹³². Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 141.

Europeans from the Three Communes. Lamine Gueye was held responsible for perpetuating discrimination against the former 'subjects,' by delegating positions of power within the SFIO almost exclusively to originaires.

A new element in the 'citizen'/'subject' equation which transpired during this period was that the vocabulary used by the administration to describe the schism between Africans changed somewhat, to underscore the generation gap and increasing radicalism of aspiring 'subject' évolués. For instance, the word 'citizen' was often substituted for the term vieux, while 'subjects' were now referred to as jeunes. Other times, the division was depicted as one between "les inquiets" and "les impatientes," the 'citizens' being the "vieux inquiets" and the 'subjects' the "jeunes impatientes."⁹³³

The latter demanded rights effective immediately: "[ils démandent] des avantages toujours plus affirmés. La presse est révélatrice de cette soif d'avancer qui voudrait rompre très vite avec les vieux cadres sans mesurer le plus souvent ce qui les remplacerait."⁹³⁴ The socialist Governor of Senegal, Wiltord, was apprehensive of this young generation of Africans whom he considered potential radical nationalists. He inferred

⁹³³. Rapport Politique, Senegal, 1945-46, by Governor Wiltord (August 28, 1947), Affaires Politiques, File 2142, Dossier 3, ANSOM.

⁹³⁴. Ibid.

that French interests could only be safeguarded by creating a buffer zone of "une aristocratie des fonctionnaires,"⁹³⁵ which was precisely the constituency Lamine Gueye represented.

In Senegal, the division between jeunes and vieux was most pronounced within the SFIO, acting as a barometer that denoted the level of disintegration within the party. Sharp differences had developed between young radicals and veteran socialists of the Thiès SFIO branch as early 1946, when the Socialist Party was in its heyday. Led by Abdoulaye Sadj, Abdul Karim Sow, A. Angrand and Gomis, the jeunes deeply resented the politics of Lamine Gueye and his oligarchy.⁹³⁶ They proposed the dissolution of the Mouvement des Jeunes, which they perceived to be an ineffectual and marginal group within the SFIO created to appease rather than encourage political participation of former 'subjects.' They further projected the reconstitution of the SFIO on new foundations, giving greater powers to 'subjects' and younger leaders.⁹³⁷ To this effect, they formed a new executive committee with Sow as president. The vieux angrily demanded that Lamine Gueye reassert the

⁹³⁵. Ibid.

⁹³⁶. Renseignements, August 6, 18, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

⁹³⁷. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, October 1945, 2G 45 144, ARSD.

authority of the veteran socialists and neutralize the jeunes.⁹³⁸ Fearful of the radicalism of the former 'subjects' and compelled by Lamine Gueye, the administration dismissed four young radical civil servants who refused to comply with the orders of François Gning, the veteran trade union leader who unflinchingly backed the socialist administration.

Massive resignations from the SFIO occurred in late 1948, particularly on the part of the jeunes of Thiès, Diourbel and Siné-Saloum. Condition Humaine (the newspaper of Senghor's party) meticulously recorded every resignation. At times, entire SFIO branches resigned en masse (like, for instance, the Nioro du Rip section)⁹³⁹. The popularity of the SFIO dwindled even further when in 1948, the party's lieutenants became embroiled in a financial scandal; Amadou Bâ and El Hadj Bibi N'Diaye were accused of creating bogus posts in the municipality of Dakar (Lamine Gueye's fief) in order to appoint their partisans. Such scandals were not rare in Senegalese politics but compounded with the aforementioned factors, they increased the resentment of the 'subjects' vis-à-vis Lamine Gueye.

⁹³⁸. Rapport Politique, Senegal, August 1946, 2G 46 124, ARSD and Synthèses sur l'évolution de la situation politique des groupements politiques patriotiques du Sénégal, August 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

⁹³⁹. Condition Humaine, (October 28 and November 16, 1948).

The crisis within the party became so acute that, disillusioned with the SFIO, several vieux joined the ranks of the RPF and the PODS or else sided with the jeunes.⁹⁴⁰ Gueye was in France at the time and his cohorts were at a loss over what course of action to take. Eventually, the executive committee convened (almost clandestinely) to discuss the crisis and lay down a strategy. The schism within the SFIO was exacerbated irrevocably when the alliance between L.S. Senghor and Lamine Gueye came to an end in 1948.

THE GUEYE-SENGHOR RIFT AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE BDS.

The first rumours of a Gueye-Senghor split circulated in August 1946 during the French parliamentary debates where the former's assimilationist ideology conflicted with the latter's federal philosophy (as discussed in chapter 7).⁹⁴¹ Some believed that Gueye was being conciliatory in order to gain a seat at the Cour Suprême de Justice. It is more likely that he was simply not prepared to break discipline with the central committee of the SFIO, to which he owed much of his support.

In early 1947, Lamine Gueye decided not to support the election of Mamadou Dia to the Conseil de l'Union, contrary to

⁹⁴⁰. The BDS had not yet been created. Renseignements, Thiès, October 23, 1948, 21G 11 1, ARSD.

⁹⁴¹. Renseignements, August 31, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

his earlier promise to Senghor. Dia was a 'subject' teacher from Khambole who had graduated from William Ponty and then received a baccalauréat from the Lycée Faidherbe (the first African 'subject' ever to receive a bac). He had taught primary school in Senegal for several years but as a 'subject,' was barred from entering the cadre commun supérieur.⁹⁴² In many ways, Mamadou Dia epitomised the condition of the Senegalese postwar évolué 'subjects' who were frustrated with Gueye's politics that obstructed their careers and excluded them from political life. In fact, teachers like Mamadou Dia were to become the backbone of the BDS cadres in rural Senegal in the 1950s.

Senghor finalised his break with Gueye when the latter endorsed Moutet's refusal to dispatch an inquiry commission to Tananarive, before parliamentary immunity was revoked for the deputies of Madagascar.⁹⁴³ While personal antagonism and ideological differences explain in part the fragile and uneasy relationship between the deputies, the split between Gueye and Senghor reflected deeper divisions within the Socialist Party. This became fully apparent at the SFIO Congress held in Kaolack

⁹⁴². Biography of Mamadou Dia in letter of Pierre Diallo dated September 14, 1939, 13G 103 180, ARSD. See also the first chapters of Mamadou Dia's autobiography, Mémoires d'un militant du tiers monde, (Paris: Publisud, 1985).

⁹⁴³. Police et Sûreté, Senegal, Synthèse politique et Sociale, 2G 48 117, ARSD.

in September 21, 1948 where Gueye defended further centralisation of party organization while Senghor demanded more effective representation for economic, ethnic and interest groups. Backed by powerful allies, Senghor denounced the "politique de personnalité" of the SFIO and the segregation between the first and second college representatives, urging structural changes and the establishment of a permanent party base in Dakar.⁹⁴⁴ He also condemned Lamine Gueye's choice of Djim Momar Gueye whom he had ousted from the party in 1946, as SFIO candidate to the Assemblée de l'Union Française. Even though he did not override Gueye, Senghor succeeded in obtaining authorisation to found his own newspaper, La Condition Humaine. Gabriel d'Arboussier of the RDA noted

...la division voilée, mais réelle entre Lamine Gueye et Senghor, les divisions entre socialistes au Conseil Général, entre socialistes et indépendants, la division à Kaolack au sein même du parti SFIO entre des fractions d'intérêt personnels... La Fédération socialiste est partagée entre les unionnistes prêts à venir au RDA et les "jusqu'au boutistes" qui sont prêts même à employer des moyens violents.⁹⁴⁵

On September 27, 1948, Senghor addressed his letter of resignation from the socialist party to Guy Mollet and to the

⁹⁴⁴. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17, ARSD. Senghor was backed by the delegates of Thiès, Kaolack, Casamance and the Fleuve region.

⁹⁴⁵. Gabriel d'Arboussier report, December 8, 1947, quoted in de Benoist, L'AOF, op. cit., 1982, p. 119.

secretary-general of the SFIO in Dakar:

Mes raisons sont de deux sortes... La première est que l'organisation de la Fédération socialiste d'AOF est une organisation dictatoriale "ad majorem Lamini gloriam... fortunamque", c'est-à-dire une organisation qui a pour but d'asseoir le pouvoir personnel de Lamine Gueye. La seconde est que la SFIO, sur le plan parlementaire, ne défend plus que les intérêts électoraux métropolitains.⁹⁴⁶

During an SFIO meeting in October 1948, Senghor argued that socialist policy vis-à-vis the Malagasy rebellion, the African war veteran pension scheme and proportional representation had led him to resign from the party.⁹⁴⁷

Subsequently, Senghor resigned from the SFIO parliamentary group "non pour défendre la démocratie à Madagascar, mais pour la défendre en Afrique Noire"⁹⁴⁸ and accused metropolitan parties of treating overseas territories as voting machines. It was then that he made public his intention of forming the BDS and joining the Indépendants d'Outre-Mer (IOM). The issue of Condition Humaine which published Senghor's resignation letter also announced the formation of the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS).⁹⁴⁹

⁹⁴⁶. Condition Humaine, (October 5, 1948).

⁹⁴⁷. Renseignements, October 7, 1948, 21G 11 1, ARSD.

⁹⁴⁸. Senghor quoted in Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17, ARSD.

⁹⁴⁹. Condition Humaine, (October 5, 1948).

Lamine Gueye tried to appease Senghor and during the same month, he proclaimed before the party that there were no substantial differences between them.⁹⁵⁰ In the same vein, Gueye's party newspaper, AOF, initially refrained from attacking Senghor; rather, it alluded to a "crise politique grave"⁹⁵¹ within the SFIO but welcomed the creation of Condition Humaine. However, in October 1948, after Senghor allegedly tried to obstruct Gueye's election to the presidency of the Grand Conseil, AOF launched a fierce campaign against Senghor and his allies.

Senghor founded the BDS with a team of powerful associates on his side. There was Mamadou Dia, who became his chief lieutenant and secretary-general of the party;⁹⁵² then, there was Boissier-Palun (a Dakar-based lawyer and relative of Senghor's) and finally, Ibrahima Seydou N'Daw, the powerful diaraf (political party boss) of Siné-Saloum (and former SFIO leader of the region). According to Dia, right after Senghor's resignation from the SFIO, the founding members of the party

⁹⁵⁰. Compte rendu de la réunion politique du SFIO à M'Both, October 20, 1946, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

⁹⁵¹. AOF, (September 30, 1948).

⁹⁵². According to Dia, "Il est vrai que les statuts du B.D.S., c'est mon oeuvre. Et aussi, l'organisation du parti. C'est moi qui a organisé le B.D.S. en créant les sections, les unes après les autres. Senghor, c'était le leader; il cautionnait, lors de ses tournées; mais, celui qui organisait, c'était moi." op. cit., 1985, p. 61.

acted swiftly to establish bases of support in the interior:

Sans plus attendre, Ibrahima [Seydou N'Daw] m'a dit: "Maintenant, tu vas passer la commande des cartes et, dans une semaine, tu reviendras les retirer, et aller créer les sections." Une semaine après, je suis revenu prendre les cartes dont l'impression avait été payée par Boissier et je suis parti dans une camionnette, sillonnant les routes du Sénégal et créant région après région, les sections du B.D.S. ... j'ai commencé par la section de Fatick, qui fut la première section B.D.S. Après ce fut Kaolack. A partir de ce moment jusqu'au premier congrès du nouveau parti, à Thiès, le 17 avril 1949, le pays essentiel, dans un sursaut révélateur de sa volonté de changement, basculera en faveur du B.D.S.⁹⁵³

Following the Madagascar incident during which Gueye temporarily resigned from the Socialist Party, Lamine desperately tried to give a semblance of independence from the colonial administration, suggesting that if the central committee of the SFIO rejected further affiliation with the Senegalese section, an autonomous Socialist Party would be created.⁹⁵⁴ Before long, however, Gueye had returned to the ranks of the SFIO and did not break discipline with the party thereafter.

With the benefit of hindsight the rift between Senghor and Gueye seems inevitable because their alliance was never solid. The division between the two leaders grew increasingly sharp,

⁹⁵³. Mamadou Dia, op. cit., 1985, p. 41.

⁹⁵⁴. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17, ARSD.

as Senghor (primarily for electoral reasons) brushed over similarities and deliberately accentuated their differences. Gueye belonged to Blaise Diagne's generation for which assimilation reigned supreme. An intellectual with no close links with the peasantry, Lamine only occasionally toured the interior in his stiff 3-piece suit, leaving his representatives to maintain support in the bush.⁹⁵⁵

And thus, in Abdoulaye Ly's words, the "malentendu tragique": In 1945, Lamine Gueye, proud to finally be the deputy of the first college, had presented Senghor to his constituency as the "député de la brousse," in other words, "their" deputy, on the grounds that the latter had been born in the bush and notwithstanding the fact that his father was a notable assimilé.⁹⁵⁶ Senghor used this title to his advantage and "s'impose d'aller en brousse"⁹⁵⁷ in his khaki suit, closely interacting with the peasants, reassuring them that for the BDS, peanut prices, democratically run cooperatives and forced labour were far more important issues than French citizenship.⁹⁵⁸ The young deputy also craftily exploited the fact that he was

⁹⁵⁵. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984.

⁹⁵⁶. Ibid.

⁹⁵⁷. Ibid.

⁹⁵⁸. Condition Humaine, (October 19, 1948).

not fluent in Wolof to differentiate himself from the urban Wolof assimilés who dominated the SFIO and the municipalities. According to Abdoulaye Ly, Senghor capitalised on the fact that in Wolof, there is no distinction between autonomy and independence.⁹⁵⁹ This enabled him to appeal to virtually everyone, leading Ly to conclude that "Senghor jouait la carte chauvine."⁹⁶⁰

Another paradox and example of Senghor's brilliant statesmanship was that even though in France he was affiliated with the MRP which was to the right of the SFIO, in Senegal he claimed to stand to the left of the SFIO and was largely perceived that way. This discrepancy did not jeopardise his rise to power. On the contrary, it helped him win over a large part of Gueye's constituency and gradually, the support of the French colonial administration. Part of the explanation lies in Senghor's intellectual make-up which differed markedly from Gueye's. "Senghor était plus branchée dans les réalités du pays," claims Abdoulaye Ly. Being more aware of social problems and champion of négritude (which was in a sense antagonistic to the experience of blacks in the Three Communes)

⁹⁵⁹. Ly interview, op. cit. Ly claimed that people like himself joined the BDS because they strongly opposed the SFIO's assimilationist ideology and found Senghor's espousal of autonomy closer to independence.

⁹⁶⁰. Interview with Abdoulaye Ly, Dakar, July 17, 1984.

rather than assimilation, Senghor offered a sharp contrast to his former patron.

BDS MEMBERSHIP, DOCTRINE AND TACTICS.

To the SFIO's "politique citadine," the BDS put forth a "politique pro-paysanne" which was also directed against the chefs de canton. Senghor's agents against the chiefs were the marabouts whose influence and power he used extensively in his campaigns and who were largely responsible for his victory in the decisive legislative elections of 1951. For the marabouts, the BDS presented a rare opportunity to extend their religious leadership and influence into the political sphere in a far more substantial manner than in the prewar years. In addition, after being inundated with complaints from their talibés with regard to the SFIO, they welcomed Senghor's reported commitment to specific socio-economic issues affecting peanut policy and rural life in general.

Another significant source of support for Senghor was the Lébou community. By October 1946, Amadou Assane N'Doye, one of Gueye's most influential lieutenants, had sided with Senghor,⁹⁶¹ and before long, Thierno Amath M'Bengue, Ibrahima Thiaw and Maurice Gueye (former mayor of Rufisque) also pledged

⁹⁶¹. Renseignements, October 29, 1046, 21G 91 17, ARSD.

allegiance to the BDS. Two powerful Lébous, Ousmane Diop and El Hadj Ibrahima Diop, who had initially intended to remain neutral in the Gueye-Senghor rift, used their leverage to promote Senghor's list to the Conseil de la République elections in 1948 which featured the Lébou Fodé Sakho as the BDS candidate.⁹⁶²

Senghor also campaigned extensively among the war veterans, indefatigably touring the interior in his khaki suit calling for equal pensions with the Europeans--a demand that Gueye had opposed so as not to break discipline with the SFIO. In addition, he easily procured the support of the railroad workers in Thiès and Tambacounda after the Dakar-Niger strike of 1947-48 during which Lamine Gueye was accused of betraying the strikers. In order to offset Lamine Gueye's tight grip on Dakar, the BDS appointed the Lébou labour leader Abbas Gueye to run against him in the legislative elections of 1951. The risk was considerable but the labour leader's victory was spectacular.⁹⁶³ The administration reported with dismay that "beaucoup, dans les milieux ouvriers (cheminots en particulier) mêlent l'action politique pure à l'action syndicale souvent

⁹⁶². Police et Sûreté, Senegal, Synthèse sur l'évolution politique et sociale de Dakar, October and November 1948, 2G 48 117, ARSD.

⁹⁶³. Rapport Politique, Senegal, 1 trimestre 1948, 2G 48 131, ARSD.

sans apercevoir la différence entre les deux,"⁹⁶⁴ as union workers became progressively more involved as an interest group in party politics. In a similar vein, Mamadou Dia has underscored the importance of the railroad workers to the rise to power of the BDS:

Si nous n'avions pas eu des hommes comme Ibrahima Sar, Aynina Fall, Abdoulaye Ba, Sidiya Ndiaye etc, à cette époque là, le B.D.S. n'aurait pas tenu. Thiès était, en effet, le lieu névralgique et le centre de commande de tout le Sénégal. C'étaient les cheminots, à ce temps-là, qui étaient les meilleurs agents de recrutement politique, les meilleurs agents des partis.⁹⁶⁵

Senghor also addressed himself to ethnic and regional groups such as the Sérères (13% of the population) especially in Siné-Saloum, Thiès (where there were 95.000) and Baol (approximately 51.000). He was particularly influential with the Toucouleurs in Podor and Matam who were grouped in the Union Générale des Originaires de la Vallée du Fleuve, and supported the Toucouleur candidate Boubou Sall who beat François Salzman of the SFIO in the "élections-test" to the Conseil Général in April 1949.⁹⁶⁶ The BDS campaigned as "le parti des badolos" ("the party of the poor"), a slogan that appealed to many

⁹⁶⁴. Police spéciale du Dakar-Niger, April 1949, 2G 49 141, ARSD.

⁹⁶⁵. Dia, op. cit., 1985, p. 56.

⁹⁶⁶. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1949, 2G 49 27, ARSD. The term "élections-test" is from Dia, op. cit., 1985, p. 57.

regional groups and which contrasted sharply with the elitist jargon of the SFIO.⁹⁶⁷ Mamadou Dia remembers the significance of those elections:

Nous l'avons [Boubou Sall] emporté largement dans toute la région du Fleuve, sauf à Saint-Louis. C'est Saint-Louis qui nous a battus, parce qu'à l'époque, avec la représentation des villes qui était plus importante que celle de la brousse, Saint-Louis avait plus d'électeurs que l'ensemble de la région. C'est ainsi que malgré notre succès sur tout le reste de la circonscription électorale, ce déséquilibre de Saint-Louis venait tout bouleverser. Mais, ces élections c'était quelque chose d'extraordinaire: un triomphe. Là, aussi, c'était très exaltant. Cela a donné beaucoup de punch au B.D.S., dès le départ.⁹⁶⁸

The Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance also adhered to the BDS after Senghor's tour of the region in 1949.⁹⁶⁹

Perhaps the most dangerous opponent for Senghor was the RDA which had caused him considerable embarrassment following the Bamako Congress of 1946. By 1947, after failing to unite the opposition under its banner, the Senegal branch of the RDA was in decline. But Senghor maneuvered carefully not to alienate the UDS, arguing that the BDS could not

⁹⁶⁷. Dia, op. cit., 1985, p. 57.

⁹⁶⁸. ibid., p. 57.

⁹⁶⁹. The MFDC was created in March 1949 and its activity was restricted to Ziguinchor. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal, 2G 49 27, ARSD; see also Rapport Hebdomadaire, March 14-20, 1949, 13G 5 17, ARSD.

embrigader tout un peuple dans un parti qui, malgré tout, n'avait pas la confiance totale de la masse... Nous prétendons ne jamais aliéner notre indépendance par un apparentement plus ou moins définitif à des hauts métropolitains.⁹⁷⁰

At the same time, he kept the lines of communication open, at times leading the RDA to believe that a rapprochement was imminent. Twice, the RDA proposed a union with the BDS: The first time Senghor declined outright (in October 1948), while the second time--in April 1949--an alliance was forged that proved short-lived.

In pursuing an alliance with Senghor, the RDA nurtured secret hopes of absorbing the BDS. But the BDS consistently rejected a simple fusion and invariably evaded a commitment toward the UDS. Indeed, there was a grain of truth in what AOF reported on BDS-RDA relations: "Si [Senghor] a fréquemment sollicité le RDA c'est comme instrument de lutte contre Lamine Gueye."⁹⁷¹

Senghor was also able to capitalise on the economic boom and high groundnut prices in 1950. According to Abdoulaye Ly, Senghor took advantage of "la démocratisation de l'embourgeoisement" in rural Senegal, while Mamadou Dia focused the party's efforts on extending the benefits of the crédit

⁹⁷⁰. Condition Humaine, no. 20, (December 14, 1948).

⁹⁷¹. AOE, (October 28, 1948).

agricole to a greater number of peasants.⁹⁷²

In 1948, the SFIO had 54.000 members. A year later, the BDS boasted 27.000 members.⁹⁷³ Thiès, Kaolack, Guinguinéo, Tambacounda became the strongholds of the new party.⁹⁷⁴ The colonial administration was baffled by the way in which the SFIO disintegrated following the Gueye-Senghor fissure. Yet, it underestimated the significance of Senghor's party and predicted the BDS would not survive:

D'où vient alors cette brèche, cette felure qui paraît aujourd'hui se manifester au sein de la SFIO depuis que c'est consommée la rupture Lamine Gueye - Senghor et d'où vient que... Senghor, qui connaît mieux que tout autre la force et le crédit dont jouit son adversaire dans ce pays, à la présomption, courageuse peut-être, mais à priori insensée, de s'en aller, comme Don Quichotte, attaquer les moulins à vent?⁹⁷⁵

Even as late as 1949, when the party had scored important victories, the administration continued to report that the BDS was in rapid decline: "il [the BDS] n'enregistre aucun succès auprès de la population africaine qui paraît s'en désintéresser de plus en plus... bref, parti politique nettement en

⁹⁷². Condition Humaine, (April 10, 1951).

⁹⁷³. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1949, 2G 49 27, ARSD.

⁹⁷⁴. Rapport Mensuel, Police Spéciale du Dakar-Niger, April 1949, 2G 49 141, ARSD.

⁹⁷⁵. Bulletin d'Information, October 1948, 17G 139 17, ARSD.

régression, à l'influence insignifiante."⁹⁷⁶

The reason why the BDS became so popular in such a short period of time is partly because it was born at a time of labour unrest (the Dakar-Niger strike) which brought into sharp focus Lamine Gueye's allegiance to the colonial administration rather than to the party's constituents. The BDS offered an alternative to the SFIO which was the party of privileged originaire civil servants and traders from the Three Communes and their representatives in the bush. Lamine Gueye had chosen to represent those 'citizens' in the French Parliament, leaving Senghor the 'protectorate.' This was deeply resented by the 'subjects' who accused these 'citizens' of being insensitive to their needs and who, above all, wanted a voice of their own. Senghor made those former 'subjects' the backbone of his party, and from 1948 onward focused much of his energy to extending the vote to the interior.⁹⁷⁷ One of the slogans of the BDS was that

Il n'y a pas deux Sénégal, un des 'citoyens' et un des 'sujets,' mais un seul pays qui doit s'acheminer résolument vers une unité économique, sociale et politique indispensable à la modernisation de son standing de vie.⁹⁷⁸

⁹⁷⁶. Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse de l'évolution politique et sociale, August 1949, 2G 49 123, ARSD.

⁹⁷⁷. Hyman, op. cit., p. 167.

⁹⁷⁸. Abdoulaye Sadj, Condition Humaine, (August 8, 1951).

In other respects, the BDS professed to its disaffected constituency that it did not differ radically from the SFIO and the RDA both of which called for greater autonomy of the colonial territories within the framework of the French Union. Similarly, it vehemently rejected assimilation and independence as a goal

Nos buts sont les mêmes que ceux des partis et mouvements politiques qui ont pour objet la libération de l'Afrique dans le cadre de l'Union Française. Ne sont-ils pas tous d'accord, en effet, pour réclamer une autonomie rapidement progressive de l'Afrique Noire française? et nous disons autonomie, non indépendance. Nous sommes franc et net sur ce point capital. Et nous disons que l'assimilation est une illusion dans un monde où les peuples ont pris conscience de leur personnalité et nous affirmons que l'indépendance est un rêve dans un monde où l'interdépendance des peuples s'affirme si manifestement.⁹⁷⁹

Senghor envisaged a "socialist democracy" within the French Union "fondée sur la tradition négro-africaine renouée par les techniques de l'Europe."⁹⁸⁰ Interdependence and African socialism became central to BDS ideology and jargon but even greater emphasis was placed on addressing the interests of religious, ethnic and interest groups. Condition Humaine proclaimed

⁹⁷⁹. Condition Humaine, no. 1, (February 11, 1948).

⁹⁸⁰. Rapport Politique Annuel, Senegal 1949, 2G 49 27, ARSD

la mise en application d'un socialisme adapté aux moeurs du Sénégal et tenant compte des préceptes religieux en général, de la loi Coranique. Sur le plan social, le BDS doit poursuivre le développement des coopérative agricoles, mais en même temps, s'efforcer d'en faire des instruments de travail pour le pays et non des instruments politiques, soutenir l'action des syndicats, s'appliquer à faire multiplier les établissements d'enseignement. L'enseignement doit être laïque.⁹⁸¹

The BDS congress of March-April 1949 outlined the major themes of the party:

l'organisation des communes en AOF; la réforme et réorganisation de l'enseignement et le rattachement direct de cette branche au ministère métropolitain; la multiplication des dispensaires; l'action syndicale; le soutien des coopérative agricoles et le remplacement des Sociétés de Prévoyance par ces coopératives; l'organisation rationnelle de la polyculture; la révalorisation du prix de l'arachide.⁹⁸²

The electoral victories that the BDS won between 1949 and 1952 testified to a party which enjoyed mass support throughout the country and a formidable leadership. The October 27, 1948 elections to the Conseil Général⁹⁸³ which reappointed Gueye (against Aby Kane Diallo) as president and Adama Lô and Bonifay

⁹⁸¹. in Senegal, Police et Sûreté, Synthèse de l'évolution politique et sociale, April 1949, 2G 49 123, ARSD.

⁹⁸². Rapport Hebdomadaire, April 25-May 1, 1949, 13G 5 17, ARSD.

⁹⁸³. The Conseil Général had been reinstated in October 1946. Due to the fact that all its members were elected, the Conseil assumed the character of a political assembly; the SFIO majority followed the dictates of the president of the assembly, Lamine Gueye, the BDS was a minority clustered around Senghor, and there was one RDA councillor, Guy Etcheverry.

as vice presidents were the SFIO's last victory.⁹⁸⁴ The following month, the elections to the Conseil de la République signalled a major breakthrough for Mamadou Dia who was elected senator with 18 out of 50 votes.⁹⁸⁵ Up until then, the socialist party had held all three seats in the council. This time, however, Senghor had introduced proportional representation which worked to the advantage of the BDS.

Next, Senghor and the BDS waged an open war against the colonial administration, and particularly Governor Wiltord and Governor-General of AOF Béchard, Gueye's most important allies. According to Mamadou Dia,

A cette époque-là, nous étions en très mauvais termes avec l'administration coloniale. L'Administration soutenait la S.F.I.O., ouvertement et manifestement. C'était le cas du Gouverneur du Sénégal: Wiltord. Il était membre du Parti Socialiste S.F.I.O., ne s'en cachait pas; il était, surtout, un ami et même un protégé de Lamine Gueye. C'est ce dernier qui l'avait fait nommé Gouverneur et il faisait naturellement sa politique, avec beaucoup d'habileté. De même, les chefs de canton recevaient des instructions, à chaque élection, pour voter et faire voter S.F.I.O.⁹⁸⁶

⁹⁸⁴. Police et Sûreté, Senegal, Synthèse sur l'évolution politique et sociale, October 1948, 2G 48 117, ARSD. There were 12 BDS deputies in the Conseil Général.

⁹⁸⁵. For electoral results see Letter of Police Inspector Trouillet, Affaires Politiques, File 2143, Dossier 2, ANSOM.

⁹⁸⁶. Dia, op. cit., 1985, p. 58.

Senghor accused Wiltord of replacing key BDS office holders from Fatick, Diourbel, Dagana, and other cercles with SFIO men. For instance, Alioune Seck, secretary-general of the BDS in Fatick was transferred to Ziguinchor and Abou Sarr Lalla, regional secretary of the BDS in Diourbel was transferred to Louga under trivial pretexts.⁹⁸⁷ Senghor also charged the administration with falsifying the results of the complementary elections of April 10, 1949 and systematically obstructing BDS activities.⁹⁸⁸ In October 1950, Senghor, the Syndicat des Administrateurs d'Outre-Mer, and commerce succeeded in replacing Wiltord with Governor Bailly.⁹⁸⁹ Wiltord's departure became a contentious issue for the colonial authorities and the political parties alike, except for the RDA which was embroiled in an internal crisis.

⁹⁸⁷. Letter of Mamadou Dia to Minister of Overseas France dated February 10, 1949, 20G 67 17, ARSD.

⁹⁸⁸. Letter of Mamadou Dia to Minister of Overseas France, February 10, 1949, 20G 67 17, ARSD; see also Senghor's letter to Minister of Overseas France dated May 7, 1949, in ibid.

⁹⁸⁹. Renseignements, Sûreté, Senegal, October 19, 20, 1950, 13G 5 17, ARSD. The administrators' union opposed the appointment of governors who took sides such as Wiltord and Béchard who were openly 'Laministes,' while commerce opposed the agricultural cooperatives that Wiltord supported. As pointed out by O'Brien and Crowder, "French West Africa," op. cit., p. 678-79, while the central colonial administration was favourable to the SFIO, the lower echelons were Gaullist or else tended to support the MRP.

BDS-RDA RELATIONS AND THE 'DESAPPARENTEMENT.'

In July 1950, the IOM scored its first major victory as a pressure group in the French Parliament when their votes became instrumental to the nomination of René Pleven as president to the Conseil des Ministres with Aujoulat as Under-Secretary of State to the Colonies and François Mitterand as Minister of Overseas France. A promising meeting between Mitterand and the president of the RDA, Houphouet-Boigny was undermined by Governor-General Béchard, following which there was an effort to revive African unity and return to the spirit of Bamako.⁹⁹⁰

On August 9, 1950 the RDA and the IOM signed a provisional protocol (the signatories included Houphouet-Boigny, Hamani Diori, Coulibaly, Mamadou Dia, Senghor) outlining the conditions of a comité d'entente between the two groups.

Conscients des périls qui menacent les libertés et les droits des Africains français, ont décidé [le RDA et les IOM] de créer un Comité d'Entente chargé d'étudier les modalités d'un accord ... pour la réalisation, avant la fin de la législature, d'un programme minimum.

Les élus RDA reprendront leur autonomie pour constituer avec les IOM des formations parlementaires indépendantes des partis et des groupes politiques métropolitains... Toutefois, pour la défense des intérêts Africains au sein de l'Union Française elles doivent faire table rase du passé et unir leurs efforts pour une collaboration efficace.⁹⁹¹

⁹⁹⁰. Roger de Benoist, AOF, op. cit., p. 123.

⁹⁹¹. Protocole du Comité d'entente, August 9, 1950, 17G 572 152, ARSD. The committee members included Aujoulat, Lisette, Saller, Sigue, Tchicaya and M. Touré apart from the protocol

Houphouet-Boigny informed the central committee of the PCF in mid-October that the RDA would dissociate itself from the parliamentary PCF, having found a more effective way of promoting the party programme.⁹⁹²

In Senegal, the UDS was, according to the High Commissioner of AOF, the most badly informed of all the RDA parties in the federation regarding the break with the communists. From October 4 onward, the comité directeur of the party (Yaya Traoré, Ousmane Bâ, Joseph Corrêa and Abdoulaye Gueye), held daily meetings where the pros and cons of désapparement were discussed. Even though they opposed Houphouet-Boigny's new policy, "ils admettaient... que la collusion avec le Parti Communiste, voulue par d'Arboussier, était une cause essentielle de l'impopularité du RDA au Sénégal."⁹⁹³ At first, the party was intent on following the policy line laid down by Houphouet-Boigny. However, many UDS militants remained

signatories.

⁹⁹². According to Houphouet-Boigny's statement submitted to the press, "Constatant que l'action de tous les élus des T.O.M. sur la base d'un programme précis est la meilleure formule pour défendre efficacement les intérêts de l'Afrique, les parlementaires R.D.A. décident de se désapparenter des groupes métropolitains." The désapparement, according to Doudou Gueye, was attributed to the "dénouement d'un malentendu fondamental entre les dirigeants du R.D.A. et ceux du P.C.F. et qui couvait depuis le Congrès de Bamako: dans les méthodes de travail politique, dans le comportement idéologique, dans la conception de la Démocratie, de la Liberté." Both citations in de Benoist, AOF, op. cit., 1984, p. 124.

⁹⁹³. Letter of the Haut-Commissaire AOF to Ministère des Colonies dated December 2, 1950, 17G 572 152, ARSD.

fiercely loyal to d'Arboussier.

The administration reported a "crise profonde" within the party, particularly after Doudou Gueye was arrested and Guy Etcheverry and Cauche went to France. Financial problems also plagued the party: the UDS newspaper, Réveil, ceased to appear and there was no capital to finance the annual party congress.⁹⁹⁴ The party's concerted efforts to mobilise support met with near total apathy from its "sympathisants," while further divisions emerged between the GEC wing of the party and the UDS proper (as was the case in St. Louis.) When Etcheverry returned from France, contrary to the UDS' expectations, he defended Houphouet-Boigny's position, claiming that African parliamentarians wished to remove the colonialist excuse for opposing the RDA--its affiliation with the PCF.⁹⁹⁵ After Etcheverry was tried for defamation in St. Louis (for which he was imprisoned for a month and fined several thousands of francs), the UDS virtually ceased to exist and d'Arboussier assembled his cohorts to form a communist party.⁹⁹⁶

⁹⁹⁴. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 3 trimestre 1950, 2G 50 143, ARSD.

⁹⁹⁵. Some say Etcheverry had received 500.0000 francs in Paris which would help him reduce the deficit of his newspaper Réveil. Etat d'esprit de la population, December 1-15, 1950, 21G 13 1, ARSD; see also Rapport sur la situation politique et sociale, Senegal, Sûreté, October 15-December 15, 1950, 2G 50 145, ARSD.

⁹⁹⁶. Etat d'esprit de la population, December 1-15, 1950, 21G 13 1, ARSD.

Doudou Gueye, who was serving a prison sentence in Dakar, wrote he would continue to be loyal to "[l'] Internationalisme Prolétarien."⁹⁹⁷ At the general assembly of the UDS in November 1950, another d'Arboussier disciple, Abdoulaye Gueye, condemned the comité d'entente, arguing that the RDA's pact with the IOM would amount to little else than collaboration with the government.

Accepter cette collaboration... équivaudrait à rester définitivement sous le joug de l'opresseur; elle rendrait vide et stérile la lutte que mène le Rassemblement depuis sa création...⁹⁹⁸

The UDS members of St. Louis who were all members of the GEC sided with d'Arboussier and remained loyal to the PCF.⁹⁹⁹

However, in mid-December, Gabriel d'Arboussier instructed the UDS to accept the désapparement. Senghor publicly welcomed the désapparement:

Il est de notre devoir d'aider le R.D.A. à changer de politique dans l'intérêt de la France. Si l'on veut éviter la révolte, il faut supprimer les raisons de la révolte, mais ce n'est pas par la répression que l'on

⁹⁹⁷. Letter of Haut Commissaire AOF to Ministère des Colonies dated December 2, 1950, 17G 572 152, ARSD.

⁹⁹⁸. Ibid.

⁹⁹⁹. Rapport de la situation politique et sociale, Senegal, Sûreté, October 15-December 15, 1950, 2G 50 145, ARSD.

viendra à bout de celle-ci.¹⁰⁰⁰

An Intergroupe was formed in December 1950, comprising Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny and Charles Cros as an interim body that would oversee the fusion between the RDA and the IOM. By February, however, Senghor had dispelled the hopes of a fusion or an alliance between the two parties claiming that "il n'y a jamais eu d'alliance ou de regroupement entre ces deux formations."¹⁰⁰¹ It is difficult to know whether Senghor had seriously intended to forge an alliance with the parliamentary RDA and the local UDS or whether he was merely seeking to neutralise the Senegalese Rassemblement at least, once and for all. The overall effect of his strategy, however, was remarkable in that it quietly brought about the demise of the UDS without jeopardising in any way his own party.

Confusion lingered over BDS-UDS relations long after Senghor dismissed the possibility of an alliance between the two parties, and the issue of désapparentement remained alive in UDS circles for years to come. The party did not participate in the ensuing elections and was instructed to abstain from

¹⁰⁰⁰. Afrique Nouvelle, no. 171, (November 11, 1950), cited in de Benoist, AOF, op. cit., 1984, p. 125.

¹⁰⁰¹. Cited in de Benoist, AOF, op. cit., 1984, p. 128.

voting whenever there were no RDA candidates.¹⁰⁰² The schism within the party deepened as the Dakar delegates of the UDS became openly hostile to the GEC, insisting that they be totally suppressed or else, continue their activities underground, under the name Groupe d'Etudes pour la Jeunesse and on the condition that they bear no affiliation to the PCF.¹⁰⁰³

LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF JUNE 17, 1951.

As the elections to the Assemblée Nationale grew nearer, the colonial administration reported that the SFIO was "en pleine désagregation," witnessing "défections en masse" to the BDS.¹⁰⁰⁴ In April 1950, the SFIO held a congress in St. Louis but only 250 delegates participated (as opposed to 360 in 1949). Financial problems were discussed as was the bitter conflict between Maurice Gueye and Ousmane Socé in Rufisque. The federal bureau of the party was accused of neglecting the local SFIO branches in the protectorate, thereby losing control of the Fleuve, Siné-Saloum, Louga, and Linguère. For instance, the Louga SFIO section accused Gueye of only being interested

¹⁰⁰². Rapport Hebdomadaire, March 12-19, April 26-May 5, 1951, 13G 5 17, ARSD.

¹⁰⁰³. Bulletin Périodique d'Informations, no. 15, Synthèse, 20-27 November 1951, 17G 534 144, ARSD. See also Renseignements, December 7, 1951, 17G 539 153, ARSD.

¹⁰⁰⁴. Renseignements, November 12, 1951, 17G 539 144, ARSD.

in collecting membership fees from the local branches at the expense of party doctrine and political participation.¹⁰⁰⁵ Several SFIO leaders such as Diop Boubacar Obeye were charged with gross financial scandals.¹⁰⁰⁶ Diouf Ibrahim Mapenda, municipal councillor and president of a local SFIO committee was accused of "un désintéressement complet pour tout ce qui touche les questions du parti SFIO."¹⁰⁰⁷

Lamine Gueye's reaction to this heated congress was to underscore the benefits of assimilation, holding himself as the supreme example. He called all "democrats" to fight fascism which he claimed to be responsible for the country's problems. Gueye inopportunately continued to use European issues and terminology when addressing his constituency in the interior. His short-sightedness partly explains why he did not think it necessary to revamp the party and adapt it to the changing realities of postwar Senegal. Following the congress which revealed his party to be in total disarray, he did little to redress the decline of the SFIO except agreeing to increase the federal bureau of the party from 25 to 35, the executive committee by 20 members and the commission for the resolution

¹⁰⁰⁵. Renseignements, April 17, 1950, 17G 539 144, ARSD.

¹⁰⁰⁶. Renseignements, SFIO congrès, St. Louis, April 8-10, 1950, 17G 539 144, ARSD.

¹⁰⁰⁷. Renseignements, Senegal, Sûreté, May 6, 1950, 17G 539 144, ARSD.

of conflicts by 10 members--mostly to appease the jeunes of the party who were becoming increasingly impatient with their marginal role in the party.¹⁰⁰⁸ The BDS propaganda routinely accused the SFIO of not being interested in Senegalese politics and issues neither at home nor in Parliament and of paying lip service to the socialist sections in the protectorate during elections.¹⁰⁰⁹

The SFIO's counter-strategy was to organise "les mêmes manifestations populaires, au même moment [que le BDS]."¹⁰¹⁰ It also promoted the formation of marginal parties such as Afrique de Demain and the Entente Sénégalaise to regain some of Gueye's support which had been won by Senghor; for instance, an Entente Sénégalaise was formed in 1951 grouping together individuals dissatisfied with the BDS. This new political group was headed by a former BDS militant, Papa Amar Diagne. The SFIO also revived the UDS affiliate Jeunesse Socialiste, campaigned for RDA support,¹⁰¹¹ and formed a Comité de Coordination de Dakar, comprising Lébous and Toucouleurs to win over support.¹⁰¹²

¹⁰⁰⁸. Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁹. Mamadou Dia, Condition Humaine, (August 18, 1951).

¹⁰¹⁰. Renseignements, October 19, 1950, 17G 539 144, ARSD.

¹⁰¹¹. Renseignements, December 20, 1951, 17G 539 144, ARSD.

¹⁰¹². Renseignements, May 17, 1951, 17G 539 144, ARSD.

According to the administration, these groups were created with the intention of filling the need for socialist representatives in the Commission de révisions des listes électorales.¹⁰¹³

The overall outlook of Lamine Gueye and Léopold Senghor conveys the impression that the two parties were diametrically opposite. Electoral propaganda further accentuated those apparent differences. At closer look, however, the party platforms were remarkably similar.¹⁰¹⁴ It is legitimate to argue, therefore, that electoral platforms were not as important to the parties in question as was the nature of their support and the ethnic, professional and religious background of the individuals featured on the electoral lists. The BDS incorporated more Toucouleurs, Diolas and Sérères than Wolofs and Lébous in the territorial assembly and more schoolteachers than civil servants and traders.¹⁰¹⁵ Senghor's appointment of Abbas Gueye (head of the Senegalese section of the Confédération Générale du Travail) at the legislative elections of 1951 aimed at winning the support of the trade unionists most of whom were either members of the CGT or else of the RDA.

¹⁰¹³. Senegal, Secretary-General, Synthèse et rapport politique, 4 trimestre 1951, 2G 51 144, ARSD.

¹⁰¹⁴. For an excellent account on the 1951 legislative elections, see Kenneth E. Robinson and W.J.M. MacKenzie (eds.), Five Elections in Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960). See also Crowder, Senegal, op. cit., 1967, p. 63.

¹⁰¹⁵. Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 152.

The UDS which had urged its supporters to back the BDS in the legislative elections, in a last minute about face demanded its members to abstain from voting.¹⁰¹⁶ Meanwhile, in Bakel, Gueye had become engaged in an embarrassing dispute with the Governor Rey during which he slapped the colonial official in public. The incident shocked the administration which had hitherto bestowed a host of favors on the deputy. According to the Governor,

il [Gueye] me traita de 'sale Senghoriste,' de colonialiste exploitant sans vergogne le noir pour lequel je n'avais que du mépris, déclara que bientôt tout allait changer, et qu'avant peu, je serais chassé de ce pays ainsi que ceux de ma race..."¹⁰¹⁷

And yet, once again, the senior administration underestimated the BDS and predicted that

L'éventualité d'un succès BDS/RDA est très improbable, étant donné le prestige dont jouit Lamine Gueye dans milieux sénégalais et l'appui certain que donneront au leader SFIO la plupart des chefs religieux et coutumiers.¹⁰¹⁸

¹⁰¹⁶. Bulletin Quotidien, June 13, 1951, Délégation du Sénégal, Sûreté Locale, 20G 109 144, ARSD.

¹⁰¹⁷. Rapport sur les élections dans la subdivision de Bakel, 1951, Governor Rey, 20G 109 144, ARSD.

¹⁰¹⁸. Rapport Hebdomadaire, March 12-19, 1951, 13G 5 17, ARSD.

The same applied to Paris-Dakar which predicted "une majorité écrasante [de] la liste SFIO."¹⁰¹⁹

During this period, the BDS suffered a minor crisis partly due to Senghor's absence but also because intense rivalries had developed between the regional leaders of the BDS, particularly in Kaolack and Thiès. Three factions competed for supremacy, and each maintained that they alone represented "la pensée Senghoriste."¹⁰²⁰ One faction clustered around Ibrahima Seydou N'Daw, while a second group was led by his rival, Souleymane Dramé, comprising the majority of the municipal councillors and a large proportion of young BDS militants who entertained the possibility of striking a deal with the SFIO. Dramé was eventually expelled from the BDS and joined the SFIO. Finally, a third bloc was formed by party militants who awaited Senghor's return to demand the expulsion of Ibrahima Seydou N'Daw from the BDS or else they threatened to adhere to the RDA. More such crises were reported between Cisse Dia and Ibrahima Seydou N'Daw in Kaolack, while in Thiès, Abdul Karim Sow was under attack from all sides.¹⁰²¹ Upon Senghor's return

¹⁰¹⁹. Paris-Dakar, (June 10, 1951), 20G 109 144, ARSD.

¹⁰²⁰. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 3 trimestre 1950, 2G 50 143, ARSD.

¹⁰²¹. Rapport sur la situation politique et sociale, Senegal, Police et Sûreté, October 15-November 15, 1950, 2G 50 145, ARSD.

from France, the tensions and rivalries within the BDS abated as the party focused its efforts on the legislative elections.

The first results of the June 17, 1951 legislative elections were deceptive: up until 7:00 p.m., incoming figures pointed to an SFIO victory. By 11:00 p.m., however, the gap between the two parties had markedly narrowed, and after that the BDS alone scored, leading to a staggering 213.916 votes for Senghor and his partner Abbas Gueye against Lamine Gueye and Ousmane Socé who got 95.353 votes.¹⁰²² The BDS had won overwhelming majorities in the protectorate as well as in in one commune de plein exercice, Rufisque. Even Senghor was reportedly suprised by his landslide victory while the dispirited Lamine Gueye argued that his defeat showed "de façon péremptoire qu'on avait eu tort d'accorder le droit de vote aux illettrés."¹⁰²³ In fact, far more important to the BDS landslide victory in 1951 than the decline of the SFIO was the enfranchisement of new groups of voters from the protectorate--a pivotal election issue for the BDS--which increased the electorate from 280.000 to 670.000 voters.¹⁰²⁴ Some 44.5% of registered voters reportedly cast

¹⁰²². Bulletin quotidien, June 18, 1951, 17G 539 144, ARSD. For election figures see Condition Humaine, (August 18, 1951).

¹⁰²³. Bulletin Quotidien, June 19, 1951, 17G 539 144, ARSD.

¹⁰²⁴. Condition Humaine, February 8, 1951. On the 1951 electoral law see Bulletin de l'Association pour l'Etude des Problèmes de l'Union Française, (January 1951).

their ballots.¹⁰²⁵

Table 13.¹⁰²⁶

Comparative Table of Elections 1946-1952.
(Population: 1.990.885)

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Registered Voters</u>	<u>Actually Voting</u>	<u>SFIO</u>	<u>BDS</u>	<u>Other</u>
Assemblée 1.822 Nationale	1946	257.552	139.483	128.982	-	
	1951	622.000	314.207	95.947	212.317	
						(RPF)
Conseil de la République	1948	52	48	30	18	
	1952	52	52	8	43	1
<u>RDA</u>						
Assemblée 19.105 Territoriale	1946	197.423	108.386	87.743	-	
	1952	660.665	525.028	95.296	224.122	

The SFIO contested the elections and demanded they be annulled. Violence erupted in Tivouane, Tambacounda and other cercles when the BDS, angered by the accusations, demanded that civil servants partial to the SFIO be removed from office. The

¹⁰²⁵. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 2 trimestre 1951, 2G 50 143, ARSD.

¹⁰²⁶. Tableau comparatif des consultations électorales, Senegal 1951, 20G 104 144, ARSD.

issue went to the Assemblée Nationale which confirmed the electoral results (by 216 against 95 votes).¹⁰²⁷ A few weeks later, Senghor explained his victory before the Assemblée Nationale as follows:

D'abord, il [le BDS] a toujours eu comme objet de son action et de sa propagande les intérêts des masses ouvrières et paysannes qui représentent au Sénégal près de 95% de la population. D'autre part, nous avons recruté nos cadres chez les ouvriers, parmi les syndicalistes et, chez les fonctionnaires, parmi les instituteurs, médecins et vétérinaires. C'est dire la solidité de ces cadres, naturellement idéalistes... En face de nous, la liste socialiste comprenait deux grands bourgeois d'origine citadine qui avaient fondé leur politique sur la pression administrative et le prestige des honneurs officiels.¹⁰²⁸

ISLAM AS A POLITICAL FORCE.

Senghor would not have been able to profit from the new electoral law to the extent that he did, were it not for the powerful support of the marabouts. With the extension of the electorate to the protectorate, the marabouts became a key element in local politics as cantonal chiefs declined in popularity.¹⁰²⁹ In 1951, the administration singled out the

¹⁰²⁷. Condition Humaine, (August 30, 1951).

¹⁰²⁸. Senghor, Publication de la Présidence de la République, Séance du 15 août 1951, quoted in Zuccarelli, op. cit., p. 47.

¹⁰²⁹. Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 266. A Mouvement Islamique seeking to unite all the brotherhoods was formed in late 1946 opposing local politicians for allegedly favouring "l'émancipation de l'irréligion." They demanded Arab schools and Arabic to be the official language. See

increasingly political role of the marabouts as one the most important forces in the political arena, arguing that "Les grands marabouts du Sénégal semblent avoir joué un rôle déterminant sur l'opinion des électeurs."¹⁰³⁰ It also admitted that religion

...échappe le plus à notre influence et même à notre reconnaissance. A l'approche de la campagne électorale, les élus se préoccupent des marabouts dont la position conditionne pour ne pas dire commande le vote des électeurs.¹⁰³¹

Not only did the marabouts assume a crucial role in the political arena, but they also reversed a trend that had hitherto characterised their relations with politicians; rather than financially support their chosen candidate, it was the politicians who competed for their favours and subsidized them.¹⁰³² Initially, Lamine Gueye enjoyed a strong majority in the 1946 territorial assembly and was able to extend considerable assistance to the marabouts. By contrast, Senghor was unable to compete with Lamine Gueye in the dispensation of

Senegal, Affaires politiques et administratives, Synthèse des informations des partis politiques, October 1946, 2G 46 125, ARSD.

¹⁰³⁰. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 2 trimestre 1951, 2G 50 143, ARSD.

¹⁰³¹. Senegal, Secretary-General, Synthèse et rapport du 1er trimestre 1951, 2G 51 144, ARSD.

¹⁰³². O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal, op. cit., p. 266.

favours, with only minority support in the territorial assembly.¹⁰³³

Senghor had the support of the powerful Seydou Nourou Tall, who was particularly influential among the Toucouleur Tijanis in the Valée du Fleuve and in Dakar. A rare opportunity for Senghor to win over Mouride and Tijani support presented itself as a result of a series of grave errors committed by Lamine Gueye towards his former allies: Ababacar Sy, khalifa-general of the Tijanis who was considerably powerful in Thiès and Falilou M'Backé, khalifa-general of the Mourides who had an important following in Diourbel.¹⁰³⁴ According to Mamadou Dia, by untactfully supporting the brother of Ababacar Sy (Abdulaziz Sy) and Cheick M'Backé, the nephew of Falilou M'Backé, both of whom were antagonistic to the khalifas,[^] "nous avons été automatiquement adoptés par les deux khalifes."¹⁰³⁵

The SFIO permanently alienated the khalifa Ababacar Sy who had until then supported Lamine Gueye but without becoming involved in party intrigues. The dispute began when the SFIO reprimanded the administrator of Tivouane, Sankale, for

¹⁰³³. Ibid., p. 267.

¹⁰³⁴. According to Amadou Ali Dieng, Senghor instrumented the schism in the Mouride and Tijani camps so as to divide them, set them against Lamine Gueye, and then be in an advantageous position to win their support. Interview with Amadou Ali Dieng, op. cit.

¹⁰³⁵. Dia, op. cit., 1985, p.57.

refusing to register en masse 4.000 voters as the local SFIO chief had demanded. The SFIO used Ababacar Sy's name to obtain the removal of the colonial administrator without first consulting with the khalifa. The latter became indignant with SFIO tactics which put him in an awkward position with the colonial authorities. His son, Cheick Tidiane, a BDS sympathizer, asked the press to rectify the khalifa's integrity by printing the original rendition of events. Condition Humaine printed a correction but not the socialist newspaper AOF.¹⁰³⁶

Subsequently, the SFIO tried to get Ababacar Sy to renounce his son's actions but failed. On the eve of the elections, the SFIO's private militia, the bérets rouges, stoned the khalifa's house. Infuriated, Ababacar Sy informed his voters that relations with the SFIO had been severed and that they were to vote for the BDS.¹⁰³⁷ However, Aboubacar's brother, El Hadj Mansour Sy, remained faithful to the SFIO.¹⁰³⁸

¹⁰³⁶. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 2 trimestre 1951, 2G 50 143, ARSD.

¹⁰³⁷. According to Schachter-Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 148, Ababacar Sy was instrumental in the nomination of Abbas Gueye to the Senghor ticket for the Assemblée Nationale elections.

¹⁰³⁸. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 2 trimestre 1951, 2G 50 143, ARSD.

The administration was not as surprised with Lamine Gueye's loss of Tijani support as with the swing of the Mourides to the BDS which was a decisive element in Senghor's victory in the 1951 legislative elections.¹⁰³⁹ This was a direct result of a schism which developed within the brotherhood between the BDS supporters, led by the khalifa Falilou M'Backé, and the SFIO supporters led by Bassirou M'Backé (brother of the khalifa) and Cheikh M'Backé (the khalifa's nephew). In 1949, Lamine Gueye had travelled to Mecca with Cheikh M'Backé, thereby shunning the khalifa. Senghor recognized Falilou M'Backé as the only leader of the Mourides and was able to override his nephew with support from the colonial administration.¹⁰⁴⁰

There were other reasons that prompted Falilou M'Backé to support the BDS, most important of which was perhaps the fact that Mamadou Dia and Ibrahima Sarr (Dakar-Niger unionist) were members of the same brotherhood and the Mourides felt they could trust them. In addition, Senghor had promised Falilou M'Backé to assist him financially toward the construction of the mosque in Touba.¹⁰⁴¹

¹⁰³⁹. It was reported that "contrary to everyone's expectations," the Mourides had ordered their talibés to vote for the BDS. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques, Senegal, 2 trimestre 1951, 2G 50 143, ARSD.

¹⁰⁴⁰. O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal, op. cit., pp. 267-68.

¹⁰⁴¹. ibid., p. 267.

In 1952, the BDS which had denounced Cheikh M'Backé as its number one enemy during the electoral campaign became the champion of a reconciliation between the two factions which was resolved to the satisfaction of the khalifa Falilou M'Backé. But the entente was again, short-lived, as it became increasingly evident that politics had ruined the unity of the Mourides.¹⁰⁴²

On January 8, 1951, El Hadj Mansour Sy, El Hadj Abdoulaziz Sy, Cheikh M'Backé, Bachirou M'Backé and el Hadj Ibrahima Niasse formed a 'front commun' to oppose the BDS which they held largely responsible for the decree lowering the limit of schooling age and for the administration's determination to collect debts from agricultural cooperatives.¹⁰⁴³ They projected a congress of marabouts to defend Islam and fight against the BDS.¹⁰⁴⁴ To this effect, they began using their influence over influential traders like El Hadj Massamba Yacine Cissé, Bousso M'Baye, Abdourahmane M'Boye and Alioune Seck.¹⁰⁴⁵ After unsuccessfully trying to win the support of Falilou M'Backé,

¹⁰⁴². Rapport Politique, Senegal, 2 et 3 trimestre 1952, 2G 52 198, ARSD.

¹⁰⁴³. Synthèse et rapport politique, Senegal 1e trimestre 1952, 2G 52 198, ARSD.

¹⁰⁴⁴. Senegal, Secrétariat Général, Rapport et synthèse politique, 4 trimestre 1951, 2G 51 144, ARSD.

¹⁰⁴⁵. Senegal, Secrétariat Général, Rapport et synthèse politique, 4 trimestre 1951, 2G 51 144, ARSD.

Ababacar Sy's brother tried to influence Cheikh Tidiane who had temporarily sided with the SFIO. However, at the intervention of El Hadj Seydou Nourou Tall, Cheikh Tidiane returned to BDS.¹⁰⁴⁶ By 1952, the BDS had succeeded in winning over nearly all the influential marabouts who had hitherto supported the SFIO.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS.

After the defeat of the SFIO in the 1951 elections, Lamine Gueye was unable to reverse the decline of his party. Internal dissension steadily intensified, and in Rufisque, which was the only municipality where the BDS had won in the legislative elections, Maurice Gueye and Ousmane Socé Diop failed to reconcile their differences even after Lamine Gueye's intervention.¹⁰⁴⁷ For all intents and purposes, the SFIO had been all but eliminated as a political force in the Senegalese political arena.

In the territorial elections of March 1952, the SFIO suffered an even more humiliating and devastating defeat, winning only 9 out of 50 seats (almost exclusively in the municipalities of Dakar and St. Louis), while losing its last

¹⁰⁴⁶. Synthèse et rapport politique, Senegal, 1 trimestre 1952, 2G 52 198, ARSD.

¹⁰⁴⁷. See Ibrahima Thiam, "La vie politique à Rufisque de 1945 à 1958," Mémoire, Département d'Histoire, (University of Dakar, 1983), pp. 40-46.

strongholds in the protectorate, Matam and Kédougou.¹⁰⁴⁸ The distribution of votes was similar to the 1951 legislative elections: 31% for the SFIO and 69% for the BDS.¹⁰⁴⁹ The administration rightly pointed out that these elections were a decisive test for the two parties for what was at stake was whether the SFIO which had controlled the country since 1945 would give way to the BDS, thereby accepting its June 17, 1951 defeat. At the senatorial elections of May 1952, the BDS list was elected in its entirety. Mamadou Dia, André Foussou (a former commandant de cercle in Kaolack) and Legros (a pharmacist from St. Louis) won with 12, 12 and 11 votes respectively. The SFIO got 8 votes and the UDS one vote.¹⁰⁵⁰

The BDS now had a majority in the Assembly, which permitted it to obtain four members in the Grand Conseil (Senghor, Dia, Robert Delmas, Boissier-Palun), leaving Lamine Gueye alone to represent the SFIO. The following June, Boissier-Palun was elected president of the Grand Conseil over Lamine Gueye by 27

¹⁰⁴⁸. AOF, Affaires politiques, Synthèse des faits politiques et de l'activité syndicale, January-April 1952, 2G 52 159, ARSD.

¹⁰⁴⁹. Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁰. AOF, Affaires Politiques, Synthèse des faits politiques et de l'activité syndicale, May-June 1952, 2G 52 159, ARSD; see also Marchés Coloniaux, (May 24, 1952).

to 12 votes.¹⁰⁵¹ The entrenchment of the BDS in the political arena was complete.

CONCLUSIONS

The rise of the BDS as the dominant force in the political arena marked the africanisation of black politics in Senegal. The legislative elections of June 1951 in particular signalled the victory of the bush over the Three Communes, of the prewar 'subjects' over the privileged originaires and by extension, of négritude over assimilation.

By 1948, the SFIO was not only embroiled in internal dissension but Lamine Gueye was losing the preferential treatment which the SFIO had accorded him. Lamine went to great lengths not to break with socialist discipline in the French Parliament. However, when the MRP took control of the Ministry for Overseas Territories in November 1947, Gueye was left in a vacuum, isolated in France and at home. Moreover, the constitution of the Fourth Republic had essentially incorporated most of the (prewar) agenda of the SFIO. By 1948, the SFIO had no strategy with which to regain popular support other than the achievements already accomplished by Lamine Gueye. His message and appeal were to a large extent outdated

¹⁰⁵¹. AOF, Affaires Politiques, Synthèse des faits politiques et de l'action syndicale, 1952, 2G 52 159, ARSD.

and his audience confined primarily to the Three Communes.

Senghor's decision to break with Gueye was motivated by a variety of reasons ranging from personal antagonism to ideological differences not only in the Senegalese political arena but also in the French Parliament, dating back to 1945 when Senghor first joined the party.

Senghor carefully chose the time to assert himself as the postwar leader of the bush. Unlike Gueye, he was not isolated in France, for he had already joined the IOM and had powerful allies in the MRP which was in control of Ministry of Overseas France. At home, the Dakar-Niger strike had shaken the legitimacy of Lamine Gueye's deputyship. Labour unrest was followed by an economic boom which won the BDS the support of many peasants who equated prosperity with the politics of the new party.

In addition, Senghor's relations with the RDA, which could have caused considerable problems for the deputy particularly following his abstention from the Bamako Congress in 1946, effectively neutralised the Rassemblement in Senegal. Rather than permanently alienate the RDA, Senghor kept the party at bay, vaguely hinting at a possible alliance while probably having no serious intent of ever joining his party to it. The subsequent désapparementement threw the UDS in further disarray, demoralizing the GEC and the UDS proper.

The legislative elections of 1951 were a turning point for the BDS, demonstrating the massive popular support Senghor enjoyed in the protectorate. A significant element in the election was that the party platforms were not as important to the victory of the BDS as was the grass roots support and the electoral lists it presented, comprising candidates who represented the major regional, business, religious and ethnic groups. The BDS victory in the 1951 and 1952 elections, was only the beginning of a series of further electoral triumphs in the 1956 legislative elections and the 1957 elections to the territorial assemblies which entrenched Senghor's leadership.

CONCLUSIONS

It has been a persistent paradox in the scholarship of African colonial history that despite the fact that the Second World War has been widely acknowledged as a powerful symbol of the forces inherent in the development of nationalism and decolonization, its significance and weight have not been analysed or assessed in any depth. Remarkably little effort has been put to addressing the divers levels in which the war affected French Africa's inhabitants and the dynamics of change it set in motion within the colonial structure.¹⁰⁵² The present study has attempted to redress this trend by examining the Second World War as a period of African history and a catalyst for political, social and economic change, as reflected in the postwar history of Senegal from 1945 to 1952.

When I first began working on this project, I confined myself to the convenient dates 1939-1945. As I researched further into the war, however, 1945 seemed inconclusive as a cut-off point while the controversial atmosphere surrounding the years immediately preceding it also called for attention.

¹⁰⁵². The recently published collection of essays in David Killingray and Richard Rathbone, Africa and the Second World War, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), incorporates a chapter on French North Africa.

Initially I widened the scope of the study from 1939-1945 to 1936-1948, only to extend it further to 1952. In a sense, the advent of the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS) and L.S. Senghor to power was the culmination of the combined impact of structural changes as well as changes in French and African mentalités) brought about by the war, marking the africanisation of politics in Senegal as a prelude to independence.

From the point of view of French colonial rule, the Popular Front, Vichy and Free France did not in themselves mark clean breaks of colonial policy and AOE remained relatively tranquil and free of unrest during this period. However, the combined effect of the policies of those short-lived but rival administrations coupled with the vital and exacting contribution of the Africans in the war sent intermittent shock waves through the colony.

The importance of the Popular Front in Senegal lies primarily in its impact on the development of black politics rather than in the regime's policy-making and reforms (with the exception of the organisation of the trade union movement), which were, in fact, relatively limited in scope or else unenforceable. The Popular Front aimed at, and succeeded in curtailing some of the most flagrant abuses of the colonial system in the protectorate while also inaugurating a novel kind

of dialogue with the Senegalese elite in the towns. De Coppet in particular sought (for his own purposes) to stimulate African political activity by encouraging the creation of political parties and associations not only in the Three Communes but, even more importantly, in the major urban centres of the protectorate. He further expanded the possibilities of African organisation by legalising the trade union movement and by extending labour reforms, however rudimentary, in French West Africa.

The majority of urban Africans welcomed the liberal changes introduced by the Popular Front, but the same cannot be said of Galandou Diouf, Senegal's elected deputy. The politics of the Governor-General steadily sapped at Diouf's power, bringing to the forefront of the political scene his opponent, Lamine Gueye. If Diouf was the Popular Front's greatest casualty, Gueye was its prime beneficiary. Lamine adroitly used the opportunities that presented themselves under the socialist administration to build a mass support base and add an ideological platform to his party. He capitalised on French organisational know-how and in 1938 merged the Parti Socialiste Sénégalais (PSS) to the SFIO, thereby creating Senegal's first modern political party and Africa's first branch of a metropolitan party, while still retaining full control of the Socialist Federation. By identifying his party with the

Popular Front administration which enjoyed considerable popularity among the Senegalese, Gueye was able to extract a host of favours from the Minister of Overseas France while also manipulating the opposition press to exacerbate the antagonistic relationship between Diouf and de Coppet. The bloody Dakar-Niger strike of 1938 which Diouf expediently used to discredit and ridicule the Governor-General was indeed a humiliating finale for the socialist government and a bitter pill for the nascent Senegalese trade union movement.

The Second World War precipitated a crisis in the French colonial administration with Boisson caught in a delicate balancing act in his pursuit of a policy of neutrality at all cost vis-à-vis the Allies and the Germans, according to the terms of the armistice. Communication with the metropole was limited and often unreliable; French national security was perceived to be closely linked to colonial neutrality; and last but not least, African loyalty was carefully monitored rather than taken for granted. For those reasons, Vichy suspended elections and most forms of political and trade union activity, heavily censored the press and abrogated Popular Front legislation. It even attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to abolish laws dating as far back as the 1910s relating to the status of the originaires, and was particularly anxious to retract French citizenship and its corresponding privileges

from the African elite.

Political life under Vichy, however, did not come to a complete standstill for all Africans. For some, in fact, it was hardly a stagnant period. A small nucleus of educated 'subjects' including Mamadou Dia and Ouezzin Coulibaly were, perhaps for the first time, able to express its point of view in the state-controlled press and elaborate ideas on African culture and civilisation. On the other hand, the 'citizens' who had lost their privileges under the Vichy regime perceived their 'subject' status to be only temporary and often vented their discontent by joining the resistance movement. Thus, even if on the surface the war seems to have eradicated the division between 'citizens' and 'subjects,' the cleavage remained and, in some cases, became more clearly defined. While 'citizens' sought a return to the pre-1940 status quo of assimilation, a small segment of educated 'subjects' looked into their own culture and political tradition for alternatives. Moreover, when African soldiers returned to Senegal after the war, they did not merely demand a return to the prewar regime of limited assimilation. The sacrifices they had endured as prisoners of war and their experience in the European battlefield had transcended the narrow boundaries of association as defined by the colonial administration in the interwar period.

It is plausible to argue that the Vichy regime was most authoritarian in the urban centres and the Three Communes where Africans were particularly resentful of their lost privileges, rather than in the interior where opposition was less pronounced and the nationalist ideology of the Legion had made great strides in winning popular support. Moreover, under the strain of wartime conditions, Vichy was forced to implement economic policies aimed at making the colony self-reliant; those policies often met with the positive response of the African peasantry.

The Free French eradicated Vichy legislation and proclaimed the return of 'republicanism' when in actual fact they imposed stringent economic measures and authoritarian policies in order to meet the exorbitant demands of the French war effort. The disastrous 'battle for groundnuts' launched by Hubert Deschamps paralysed the economy but, more importantly, the tragic fate of the returning African soldiers in the camp of Thiaroye in 1944 alienated not only the veterans but the African population at large. This was partly reflected in the postwar pattern of political activity which was characterised by the polarisation of patriotic associations and political parties along racial lines.

The time clock of decolonization had begun ticking not only amongst 'loyal Africans' inside Senegal but also in the

international arena, as the Americans and Russians put pressure on France to instigate fundamental reform in the empire immediately following the termination of hostilities. If to those factors we add the military and economic contribution of French West Africa in the war, a clearer picture emerges of the forces that contributed to African postwar demands for full-scale assimilation. Urban Africans in Senegal followed the Brazzaville Conference with great interest and fervently debated colonial representation to the Assemblée Nationale Constituante. Their aspirations were zealously defended by Lamine Gueye who emerged as a highly popular statesman after the war, thereby easily facilitating his takeover of the leadership of the Bloc Africain which became the dominant party in the political arena. While before the war Gueye had succeeded in using the metropolitan SFIO to strengthen the PSS in Senegal, the reverse occurred after the war as the Bloc Africain became absorbed by the Socialist Party.

At first, metropolitan socialist support allowed Gueye to maintain a virtual monopoly of power, despite his increasing preoccupation and involvement with parliamentary politics in France. At home, he was content with the strong hold he exercised over the Three Communes and with a favourable administration. Indeed, he eventually came to rely almost exclusively on his representatives in the bush for support,

giving a free hand to his protege and former 'subject' Senghor who emerged as the leader of the protectorate.

By 1946, the SFIO had complete control of the colony. Gueye's assimilation politics at home, however, and his commitment to the socialist administration in France, turned from an advantage to a liability. After the Lamine Gueye laws of 1946 and the adoption of the 1946 constitution, the baron of originaire politics in Senegal was left without an agenda, at a time when his expanding constituency in the interior was pressing for social, political and economic rights. Gueye steadily began to lose ground to Senghor on both fronts, as his dwindling popularity at home ran parallel to his decline in France.

While discontent with the SFIO mounted inside Senegal, opposition parties proliferated, even if on the whole most lacked clearly-defined platforms. The most important of the opposition groups was the Union Démocratique Sénégalaise, but unlike other territorial branches of the RDA, it remained an urban party that failed to gain popular support in the interior. Opposition parties challenged the political supremacy of the Three Communes which in turn became unable to maintain a monopoly on political activity: economic and trade union centres such as Kaolack, Diourbel and Thiès began to assume an increasingly significant role in the political arena,

and by the end of 1946, aimed at severing the omnipotent alliance between Gueye and Senghor.

The culmination of events leading up to Lamine Gueye's eclipse from the political scene occurred whilst the Dakar-Niger strike of 1947-48 was in full swing and Gueye had fatally opted for a precarious neutrality which shocked and estranged many Africans. Senghor broke from Gueye and the SFIO at home and in the French Parliament for ideological as well as pragmatic reasons, namely Gueye's obstinate refusal to respond to the interests of his rural constituency. On closer examination, however, the rift between the two deputies reflected deeper divisions within the Socialist Party. The SFIO was engrossed in bitter and often petty factionalism which gradually split the party. Yet Lamine Gueye continued to neglect the SFIO while relying increasingly on his socialist metropolitan friends as well as on the Three Communes for electoral support. Unable to adapt to postwar political realities, Gueye continued on the path of assimilation and maintained his prewar political habits, only to fall victim to the shifting ground of French politics which in 1947 resulted in the victory of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire, with which Senghor had cultivated close ties and which was also the party that rank-and-file colonial administrators supported.

In sharp contrast to Lamine Gueye, as a statesman Senghor

combined pragmatic judgment and ideological flexibility. He strove to obtain the extension of the vote to the interior which he considered the single most important factor in tipping the political balance to his favour. Uneasy with Gueye's loyalty to an outdated and convoluted assimilation dogma which excluded the majority of the population from the political process, he offered the alternative of négritude politics. Moreover, the BDS did not political vision and a heightened sensitivity of the needs of prewar 'subjects' whom he deemed as a crucial force in Senegalese society and politics. address itself to the Three Communes for support but focused on the bush, positively responding to the aspirations of religious, ethnic and regional interest groups which rose to prominence after the war and gradually gaining their confidence. Eventually, Senghor attacked the Wiltord administration which was pro-SFIO and succeeded in removing it, thereby obliterating Gueye's last chance to have the all-important legislative elections of 1951 rigged to his favour.

Indeed, the election of 1951 marked the demise of Lamine Gueye and the apparent end of the domination of Senegalese political life by the Three Communes as well as the beginning of the Senghorian chapter of Senegalese politics which led Senegal from colonialism to independence.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1.¹

Principal Prisoner of War Camps in France.

<u>Front-Stalag</u>	<u>Name of Camp</u>	<u>Number of 'Senegalese'</u>
<u>Camps under the jurisdiction of Vichy</u>		
150	Auxerre (Caserne) Beauregard (Versailles)	182
151	Bourges Fontainebleau Jargeau	3 200 16
125	Melvin	104
151	Montargis Moulins	1.200 100
153	Orleans (Caserne)	400
152	Pithiviers II Salbris Sully sous Loire	121 300 200
	<u>Total:</u>	2.826
<u>Camps under the jurisdiction of Chateauroux</u>		
131	Cherbourg Meucon Rennes	569 982 373
	<u>Total:</u>	1.924

¹. Source: Délégué Général Adjoint Burin des Roziers to Minister of Colonies, French Red Cross, January 22, 1944; Affaires Politiques, File 870, ANSOM.

Camps under the jurisdiction of Maçon

213	Mirecourt	9
211	Toul	1.350
	<u>Total:</u>	1.359

Camp under the jurisdiction of Perigueux

222	Souge (Bordeaux)	3.000
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Total no. of tirailleurs POWs: 7.359

Appendix 2.

Patriotic Associations in Senegal 1943-45

A. European

<u>Association</u>	<u>Date of formation or authorization</u>	<u>Commune</u>	<u>President</u>
Association Patriotique et Républicaine	January 1944	St. Louis	Camou
Amis de Combat	August 1943	Kaolack	
	September 1943	St. Louis	Téty, SFIO
	May 1943	Dakar	
becomes			
Croix de Lorraine	May 1944	Diourbel	Richard
	September 1943	Kaolack	David
	May 1943	Dakar	
	May 1944	Casamance	Peyrot
becomes			
*Combat-Empire	December 1944		
Groupe Libération de Diourbel	November 1943	Diourbel	Bernard
Groupe Patriotique de la France Combattante	March 1944 1944	Thiès *Dakar	Th. Monod (head of <u>IFAN</u>)
Groupe d'Action Républicaine	May 1943	Dakar	Rimbaud (ex- <u>CGT</u> leader)
Fédération de la France Combattante <u>AOF</u> (fusion of <u>GRA</u> and Croix de Lorraine)	December 1943		Th. Monod
Groupement Centre Frater- nitaire Français	December 1943	Dakar	
becomes			
Forces Fraternelles Françaises	July 1944	Dakar	Th. Monod
becomes			
Amis de l'Humanité	August 1944	Dakar	Th. Monod

Amis de la Liberté

*France-URSS	June 1944	Dakar	Sylvandre (SFIO)
		Thiès	Fily Dabo
		St. Louis	Sissoko
		Kaolack	v/pres.
Union des Maquisards et des Français Libres	1945	Dakar	Milleliri
Les Amis de P'tit Jules	1946		

* indicates mixed associations (Europeans and some Africans)

B. African

<u>Association</u>	<u>Date of formation or authorization</u>	<u>Commune</u>	<u>President</u>
Union Républicaine Sénégalaise	July 1943	St. Louis	Khayar M'Bengue
Association Patrioti- que Indigène France Combattante	May 1944	Thiès	F. Gning (Dakar-Niger union leader)
	March 1944	Casamance	A. Gomis
Combat de l'AOF	1943	Dakar	A. Goux-Mayor
	1943	St. Louis	
	1943	Ziguinchor	Cherif Hadara
Amis de Combat	June 1943	St. Louis	M. Monville
	1943	Dakar	
	August 1943	Kaolack	Ibrahim Seydou N'Daw
Bloc Africain	1943	Kaolack	Amadou Nian Doumbé
Association Libération de la France	1943		
	formed by the		
Association des Anciens Combattants de Thiès	1943		
Jeunes Sénégalais			

Résistance de l'Afrique Française	1943		
	becomes		
IV République	1943	St. Louis	Abdel Kader Diagne
		Kaolack	
	becomes		
Union des Jeunes	June 1945		
Fédération des Anciens Combattants et Victimes de Guerre AOF et Togo	September 1943		Samuel M'Baye
Fédération des Victimes de Vichy AOF et Togo	1945		Ch. Cros
Jeunesse Combattante Sénégal	July 1943	St. Louis	
Amis de la Liberté	December 1943		
Petite Côte Gaulliste	1944		R. Senghor
Combat AOF		Louga Ziguinchor	
Souci du Lendemain			
	becomes		
Amicale et Fraternelle Sénégal	1944	Dakar	
Comité d'Etudes Franco-Africaines	May 1945	Dakar	
	1945	St. Louis	M. Sow
	1945	Thiès	F. Gning
	1945	Kaolack	
	1945	Ziguinchor	Carvalho
Association Amicale des Anciens Militaires Coloniaux de Carrière			Pierre Diagne Sarr, Papa Gueye

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