AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF POLITICAL ACTION IN A BAJUNI VILLAGE IN KENYA

by

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ABSTRACT

The main theme of this thesis is a sociological analysis of a process of political conflict in a village community. The village - Tundwa - has a population of just over a thousand persons and is situated on an island lying just off the north Kenya coast, near the border with Somalia. It is a village where political factionalism is an important element in social life. My aim in this thesis has been to show that conflicts between the factions were an expression of underlying social and economic causes and that the recruitment of support for the factions was based on the pre-existing structure of linkages in the community. The focal material of this thesis is therefore contained in Chapter VIII where I describe in detail the series of connected 'social dramas' or crisis situations which punctuated the development of factional conflicts in Tundwa in 1965.

The first part of the thesis is devoted to an analysis of the three most important aspects of Tundwa's social organisation - economic organisation, kinship and social stratification. Each of these aspects of social organisation creates a contextual framework for social action, and each of them is influential in determining the alliances of people in political crises. These frameworks do not always coincide however and so one has situations where people have a conflict of loyalties - perhaps between their loyalties to kin as opposed to their economic
interests, or perhaps between their economic interests and their social status.

In the second part of the thesis I concentrate exclusively on the politics of Tundwa. First I describe the relationship between the people and the Central government. The character of this relationship provides a further dimension to our understanding of political action. In Chapter VIII and the Conclusion I show that by looking at factionalism in dynamic sociological terms we can understand its basic underlying causes.
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

This is a study of political action in a Kenya village community, based on field work which I carried out in 1965-6. The village, Tundwa, is of sociological interest for several reasons. In the first place it is internally stratified into three ascriptive strata; the Masherifu or reputed descendents of the Prophet Mohamed, the Waungwana or free men, and the Wachumwa or ex-slaves. Secondly it is a community within which there are considerable differences of wealth. Unlike status in the stratification system which is ascribed by birth, economic status may be achieved within a man's lifetime. There is a rough but not finite coincidence between ascriptive status and achieved economic status.

Thirdly this is a community whose structure is based on a network of inter-personal linkages rather than on a patterning of inter-related groups. The strata are not groups but ascriptive categories. There are no economic groups based on co-operative production since this is an economy based on individual ownership of property. There are no lineages or other large-scale kinship groupings. This is a non-unilineal Kinship system in which groupings based on kinship are limited to certain minimal household units.

Fourthly there is no formal system of authority relations here. There are, it is true, government recognised leaders (a Headman and his

1. This research was made possible by the award to me of a University of London Postgraduate Studentship.
deputy) but these men are not given the kind of local support such that one could speak of them as political leaders of the village. Apart from crime, and civil offences such as tax-avoidance, which are the concern of government officers, social control here is 'diffuse' rather than 'organised'.

Finally this is a society which has been subject to many drastic changes in the past seventy years. Probably the most important of these was brought about by the intervention of Britain into the area around the turn of the century. Not only did British intervention bring to an end the virtual political autonomy of the village, but it also meant the abolition of slavery and with it the economic basis of the stratification system. I think it is reasonable to say that the people of Tundwa are still adjusting to this situation. But there have also been other changes. With the development of urban centres in Kenya, a process of migration and emigration from the village began - a process which involved both men and women and which has gone on until the present time. Political changes too - first the experience of colonialism and then the process of Independence - have all affected the people's interaction with one another and with the outside world.

It is in this context that political action takes place. During 1965-1966 when I carried out my field work there were first two, later three political factions in the village. Political activity is one of the very rare occasions on which men in this community act together

and as such it is of interest in itself. But in the absence of other political, economic or kinship groupings in the community, one is also faced with the problem of how such factions arise and how they recruit support.

In Tundwa factions seem to represent temporary crystallisations in an overall pattern of individual linkages. They do not represent the conflict of pre-existing and permanent groups in the village since there are no such groups. As Nicholas has pointed out however, factions are typically not corporate groups since they are ephemeral and non-institutionalised. In addition Nicholas makes the point that factions are leader oriented. They are in fact ego-centred quasi-groups rather than corporate groups. The significance of factions is that they organise political conflicts, and as Nicholas points out they are often associated with social change. In many cases this is because social change in the kind of societies we study is usually that brought about by colonial intervention. Such intervention often leads to the disruption of the traditional political system in which political conflict may have been institutionalised, and the setting up of an external authority. Colonial intervention may also lead to economic changes - labour migration, the introduction of cash crops and new methods of agriculture. All such developments change the previous structure of wealth differentials, though in many cases those who were traditionally wealthy are those best able to benefit from new opportunities.

1. R. Nicholas (1965, p.21-60).
2. I use this word in A. Mayer's sense (1966, p.97-8).
Tundwa is in exactly this position. Its traditional political system was ignored by the colonial rulers and the system of patri-clans on which it was based has declined in importance. The centre of power has passed from the village to the central government. New economic opportunities and the abolition of slavery have led to a redistribution of wealth – though this process has not yet gone far enough to sharply change the pattern of wealth differentials within the community. The point however is that wealth differentials in pre-colonial times had bolstered up a traditionally powerful minority in the village, and any redistribution of wealth was likely to endanger their position.

In any such situation the traditionally powerful and wealthy minority will try to readjust to the new status quo in order to preserve their privileges. At the same time the traditionally underprivileged aim to turn the new opportunities into political power for themselves. In the absence of political parties (where these are banned for instance) a situation of this kind at the village level creates political factions. Such factions are aimed primarily at achieving a monopoly of access to the real source of power – the central government – which lies outside the village, with the ultimate aim of preserving the status quo within the village. In this thesis I wish to examine the context in which factions have arisen in the village, and to show how the leaders of such factions take advantage of their diverse linkages with others in order to recruit support.

This is also a study of social status, since it will be my
contention that an increasing lack of correlation between ascriptive and achieved status is a typical feature of one stage in the development of political factions. As I explained earlier this is a stratified society, divided into three ascriptive categories. A person's status within the stratification system is fixed by birth, and mobility within the system is practically impossible. On the other hand there are, and always have been, ways of achieving status independently of this ascriptive system. One way of doing this was through achieving wealth, the other through piety. However, since piety could not be translated into wealth, nor wealth into ascriptive status, these three means of achieving status tended to form three separate frameworks. The slaves, however, who were at the bottom of the ascriptive framework, were barred in pre-colonial times from advancing within any other framework. Since the abolition of slavery, however, they too have entered into the competition for economic resources, and to a lesser extent for piety, and in this way some of them have achieved status independently of their descent status. What I want to examine in this thesis is how the contradictions between ascriptive and achieved status have begun to show themselves in political action.

In the first part of this thesis I shall discuss the various frameworks within which social action takes place, the most important of these being the framework of economics and the framework of stratification. I also include here an analysis of kinship networks because kinship linkages are the basis of any leader's support, and because
kinship linkages cut across the patterns of achieved status and to some extent those of ascribed status too. I also discuss ideology—the view of social reality which is preserved by the people themselves. Ideology upholds a view of the village situation and the wider environment which, although it does not strictly accord with reality, nevertheless influences people's actions. In the second part of this thesis I discuss the formal political framework of the village (i.e. that set up by the central government) and then analyse political conflict as it expresses itself in factionalism. The aim of this thesis is to examine the basis of factionalism in a society which is less formally structured than most societies studied by social anthropologists.
I. THE VILLAGE, THE AREA AND THE PEOPLE

The village of Tundwa has many names and pronunciations. Some people pronounce it Tchundwa, and on some maps, the island is labeled Pate or Patta island, after the ancient town of that name which is situated in its south-east corner. This is not the local usage however, and it is this to which I have kept.

The village of Tundwa is situated on Faza island which lies just off the north Kenya coast, near the border with Somalia. A small island, about fifteen miles by ten, Faza is the largest of the islands that make up the Lamu archipelago. It is an island fringed by mangrove trees and swamps and much of its area is taken up by salt flats on which the sea encroaches every six hours. The central area of the island is dotted with coconut and tamarind trees and small patches of annual crops, and here are situated most of its nine villages.

Faza is one of the most isolated places in Kenya. To reach it from Mombasa, Kenya's main port, one has to make a journey of two hundred and fifty miles. The first stage of the journey is to Lamu, two hundred miles north of Mombasa, a journey of ten hours by bus over unmetalled roads, often flooded and impassible during the rainy season. Lamu is a small town situated on another island to the south of Faza. Here is situated the headquarters of Lamu District, of which Faza forms a separate Division. From Lamu two or three small and very old motorised passenger boats ply irregularly to Faza island. The boats take about four hours to cover the thirty five mile journey, from Lamu harbour through the narrow mangrove bordered channel between Manda island and the mainland, across the stretch of open sea that separates Manda from

1. Pronounced Tchundwa.
2. On maps the island is labelled Pate or Patta island, after the ancient town of that name which is situated in its south-east corner. This is not the local usage however, and it is this to which I have kept.
Faza island, and round the mangrove-edged island of Faza to Rasini, the main village on the island and its administrative centre.

Most of the people of Faza's nine villages call themselves Bajunis. The Bajunis are a 'people' who are united by a sentiment of common identity. They share a common language - Kitikuu, a dialect of Swahili - and a common religion, Islam. They claim that about three quarters of the land on Faza island together with a large tract on the mainland opposite belong to all the Bajuni people by right of customary usage. But not all Bajunis are to be found in this area. Some are to be found in all the small off-shore islands north of Faza, and even as far north as Mogadishu in Somalia. Small pockets of them are also to be found in most communities along the Kenya coast and even as far south as Pemba, Tanga and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.¹

The Bajuni have never been united under an overall political system. They are not then a 'tribe' in the normal Africanist sense of the word. For hundreds of years each village has been a city state in itself, each with its petty ruler with his soldiers and his slaves, his supporters and his enemies. This state of affairs of course came to an end with the advent of British colonial rule around the turn of the century and the introduction of a reasonably effective administrative system. But even today political action tends to unite or divide people within villages rather than creating links between villages. And until today the village is the basic sociological unit within which

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¹. An anthropological study of the Somali Bajuni has been made by the Italian anthropologist, V.L. Grottanelli (1955). In addition A.H.J. Prins has worked amongst Bajunis in Lamu and in Malindi (Prins: 1961 and 1965).
almost all social activities take place, and it is largely autonomous in the fields of marriage and subsistence economy.

There are nine villages on Faza island, with a total population of about 8,000. The main village is Rasini, built at the mouth of an estuary and on an islet of its own so that at high tide it is impossible to reach it from the other villages without a small boat. Rasini is the administrative headquarters of Faza Division, and is a large village of about 2,000 people. The District Assistant — the government officer responsible for Faza Division — lives in Rasini, and all government business is conducted from there. Here there is also a Primary school and a Dispensary. Rasini is a village of square mud houses and palm-thatched roofs. The only two-storied buildings in the town are the government offices and police quarters, which are ancient stone edifices on the water front. Rasini is primarily a fishing village, though there are also many men who have farms, and many who find employment simply because Rasini is the commercial, administrative and distributive centre for the whole island.

There is no telephone link between Rasini and Lamu, and only a minimal postal service. All communication between the District Assistant and his superiors in Lamu has to rely on messages sent by hand.

1. The Kenya census of 1962 put the total population of the island at 5,500 but I think this was an under-estimation — see p.21.

2. Again this village is usually labelled Faza on maps. I was corrected many times by the people in this usage however — Faza is the name of island they affirm, whilst the main village is called Rasini. The latter comes from the Arabic rasān meaning two heads or promontaries. Interestingly, however, the Pate people sometimes refer to Rasini as 'Paza'.
with the boat captains. The District Assistant has no boat of his own. The significance of these inadequate communications is mainly political. It means that surveillance from above is very difficult and limited, and this gives much rein both for the local representative of government and for the Bajunis themselves. During 1965 the District Commissioner (the District Assistant's immediate superior in Lamu) visited only once - a very brief visit during which he gave a speech in Rasini. The District Assistant is also hampered in his work by the fact that he is kept most of the time very busy in Rasini and has only a handful of police, all of whom are stationed in Rasini.

He is also hampered by the difficulties of communication within the island. There are no roads and not even one wheeled vehicle. It is impossible to use even a bicycle there because of the thorn-filled and soft sand and the mud of the mangroves, quite apart from the fact that the sea air and salty ground rusts any metal after a few weeks. Hence all communication within the island is by foot. There are many donkeys but these are used mainly for transporting goods rather than for riding.

To the north east of Rasini lie two villages - Bajumwali which has about a thousand people, and Nyabogi which is little more than a hamlet. The men of these two villages are mainly farmers, though many of their farms are situated in the more central area of the island, since the land nearby is sandy and infertile. Bajumwali and Nyabogi are separated by a wide stretch of sand and mud, dry when the tide is
out and the sea filters away down an inlet which gives them access to the sea. But it is not until one comes to Kisingitini - almost an hour's walk from Rasini, that one reaches the open sea. Kisingitini is a village almost as big as Rasini and like Rasini many of its people are actively employed in fishing, although there are some farms round about.

To the south east of Rasini lies Siyu, in the very centre of the island and apparently at its widest point. In fact the black mud of the mangroves on one side and the salt flats on the other make it one of the narrowest area. But the land round about is the most fertile on the island and Siyu is surrounded by its farms. Siyu is somewhat bigger than Bajumwali, though not as big as Kisingitini. What is noticeable immediately is that many of the houses there are of stone, bigger and more well built than those of other villages mentioned so far. It is said locally that Siyu was founded by Omani Arabs before the Bajunis arrived on the island. Now-a-days most of its population is Bajuni, though a small group claim to be descendents of the original Omani settlers.

Beyond Siyu, in the south of the island, the land becomes more barren with thorn forests and scrub grass and salt flats right up to Pate town, a further one and a half hour's walk. Pate town itself is more like a museum than a living settlement. More than half of it is stone ruins and the people still live in two-storied stone houses with paved paths between the houses. The Pate people also claim to be Arabs,
descendants of Omanis who settled there in the thirteenth century and at one time exerted their sovereignty over the whole north Kenya coast. Now-a-days the Pate people, of whom there are only about five hundred, earn their living by growing tobacco between the ruins of their old town. They barely interact with people from the other villages. Contact is kept to a minimum by the people of Pate settling all their needs direct from Lamu by dhow, whereas the other villages are served by Rasini in this respect.

Tundwa, the village with which this thesis is concerned, is situated in the central and most fertile part of the island, half an hour's walk from Rasini. It is a village of just over one thousand people and has 239 palm thatched single-storey houses built of mud on a framework of mangrove poles. The only stone buildings in the town are the three mosques, and the ruins of an old fort, an old house and four ancient mosques. People say that the town was much bigger in the past than it is now, and certain evidence would seem to support this contention. Firstly the Friday mosque, the biggest of the three at present in use, is situated right on the outskirts of the village, with the nearest house twenty five yards away. It is said that this mosque was once almost in the centre of the village. The four old ruined mosques are all just beyond the periphery of the present village. In the second place some of the land surrounding the village is very uneven, which suggests that houses were built there in the past. Thirdly, the village is separated on nearly all sides from its cultivated land by a belt of scrub land dotted with small thorn bushes and here and
Tundwa Village from the east

Village houses
there a giant tamarind tree. Some of this land may well have had houses built on it in the past.

There is no central point to the town - no market or square or meeting place. If men congregate at all they do so in small groups near a shop or one of the mosques. Women gather in small groups in the yards of each other's houses or by the wells. The town is not laid out in any particular pattern. Little footpaths run between the houses and through the coconut palms, banana and paw-paw trees which are interspersed between the houses. The town is divided into thirteen locations (mitaa) which merge into one another. For the most part these locations have no social significance, though in the past certain locations were solely occupied by slaves. Nowadays, although this is no longer strictly true, there still tends to be a predominance of Wachumwa in such areas.

Like the other villages on the island Tundwa has neither electricity nor piped water supplies. There are several wells in the village as well as one government and seven private water tanks which collect water during the rainy season and store it for the dry season.

On one side of the town there is access to the sea through a long, narrow and winding channel through the mangroves. When the tide comes up, this channel and the mud flats on one side of the village are flooded with water. In this place are anchored the two or three small dhows used by the village's fishermen.

Beyond the belt of dry thorn and grass are Tundwa's farms, full
of coconut palms, tamarind, cashew nut and mango trees. Here there are also patches of maize, simsim, cotton and millet. The farms stretch as far as the cultivated areas of the surrounding villages and intermingle with them. In some cases Tundwa men have to walk as far as seven miles in order to reach their farms.

In the 1962 census Tundwa is reported to have had a population of 667 persons. My own census of November 1965 showed it to have a population of 1042. There are two reasons why it seems unlikely that the population could have increased by 375 in only four years. In the first place there has been a continuous and steady flow of emigration and migration from all the villages on the island. Most of this emigration has been to Mombasa and it has been going on for almost half a century. The evidence which I mentioned earlier as indicating that the village was once much bigger in the past is suggestive of a gradual population decline. In the second place the natural rate of increase appears to be very low. Lamu District has one of the lowest fertility rates in the country and there is a high degree of infant mortality. During the period March 1965 to January 1966 my own records of births and deaths in Tundwa showed a net increase of only three. 36 births were counter-balanced by 33 deaths, of which 26 were of children. In other words, it seems probable that the census of 1962 greatly underestimated the population not only of Tundwa, but the total population of all the villages.
Table 1. Breakdown of Tundwa population by age and sex (November 1965)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex/Age categories</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adults Males</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults Females</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children Males</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children Females</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A breakdown of Tundwa's population shows a high proportion of women as opposed to men. One of the reasons for this is the labour migration of men to Mombasa and other urban centres in Kenya. As will be made clear in later chapters however, Tundwa women also migrate to Mombasa as prostitutes, as well as accompanying their husbands there. So this is not the total answer - and indeed I cannot fully explain this demographic feature. If we accept the 1962 census figures, it is a feature also of all the other villages except Pate where the numbers of males and females are exactly equal. Migration of men has taken place from all villages - though far less from Pate than from other places. But the migration of women is not so common from other villages as it is from Tundwa - and it is unknown from Pate. In Tundwa the imbalance will largely right itself in the next generation as can be seen from the proportion of male as opposed to female children.

Economy of the island

Nearly everyone on the island depends either on agriculture or
fishing in order to make a living. Fishing in most of the villages is purely for the internal market. The fishermen of Kisingitini and Rasini however sell much of their produce to an Indian-owned company operating from Lamu. The company has a refrigerated boat which collects the best fish and takes it to Mombasa to sell. Towards the end of 1965 however plans were in hand to build a refrigeration plant on a small islet near to Rasini where fish can be stored. I believe this has now been substantially completed.

Most men on the island are however involved in agriculture. As I have mentioned the Bajunis claim a large area of land opposite the island to be theirs by customary right. Traditionally this area was planted with annual crops rather than trees and the cultivators were the slaves and some of the poorer free men. They would spend a good part of the year living there, first clearing and firing the bush land, then hoeing the ground and planting and later watching over and harvesting the crops. The soil on the mainland is more fertile than that on the island and is said to have produced considerably higher yields. But it seems that cultivation on the mainland has always had its dangers and was insecure at the best of times. To begin with there are large herds of elephants in the area which frequently destroy crops. But more importantly there seems always to have been a threat from Somali raiders from the north. They came down and despoiled the villages and took the crops and sometimes killed or took as prisoners all the slaves they found working there. When the British arrived
they drove back the Somali marauders and effectively policed the border. A period of relative security ensued, and with the ending of slavery any man from the island has considered it his right to clear a plot of the fertile land there. But in recent years the marauders - who are known as mashifta - have returned to pillage the villages, loot the houses and take the crops. The matter has now taken on a political tinge. Since Independence there has been a border dispute between Kenya and Somalia and Somalia has armed the marauders. For the past three to four years cultivation on the mainland has been almost impossible. In early 1965 only six men from Tundwa went to the mainland, together with a few men from other villages. They cultivated a small area of about three miles square there. Towards the end of the year the settlement was attacked by the Shifta and one of the men from Tundwa was captured. Until four years ago there were several small villages on the mainland and one larger settlement - Kiunga - all occupied by Bajunis. With the new wave of Shifta raids the people of these villages have fled - some to Mombasa, some to Lamu, and many also to the island of Faza. In July 1964 there were about 450 refugees living in the various villages on the island.¹ Most of these were in Rasini and none at that time were in Tundwa. During 1965 two small groups of refugees arrived in the village, and one of them, composed of two women and a child settled down there. Some of the refugees, and especially those from Kiunga, have tried to return to the mainland only to be driven away again and again by fresh raids. Eventually they have begun to settle down in the

¹ I am indebted to the then District Assistant, Suleiman Shakombo, for this information.
island and have built themselves two small hamlets - one near Siyu, called Shanga after the ancient town near whose ruins it is built, and one near Mtangawanda in the far southern corner of the island opposite Pate town.

With the ending of mainland agriculture the people of the island suffered some temporary hardship. Fortunately, however, the population of the whole area appears to have declined between the wars owing to extensive migration to Mombasa, and with it the numbers requiring land to cultivate. The new hardships seem simply to have had the effect of accelerating the process of migration. Annual crops, traditionally grown on the mainland, are now grown on the island, on land which is probably owned by people who have long ago emigrated to Mombasa. At present there is no shortage of land on the island for all those who wish to use it, but were the population of the island to increase without the alternative of mainland agriculture again becoming possible there would definitely be pressure on the land. In 1967, however, Kenya and Somalia came to some agreement on the border problem and it seems likely that mainland agriculture will again be safe in the future. In the following chapter, however, I shall examine the economic organisation of Tundwa as it existed during 1965.
PART 1. FRAMEWORKS
II. ECONOMIC ORGANISATION AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF WEALTH

"There is no work in Tundwa, only farming". A Tundwa migrant

In this chapter I wish to substantiate the argument that wide divergences of wealth are a typical feature of Tundwa's economy. This will lead on to my later analysis of factionalism where I shall show that a basic discontent about inequalities in wealth is one of the driving forces of political action. I shall also map out in this chapter the nature of the linkages which are created by the production and consumption of goods since such links may be called upon in the recruitment of political support. Economic linkages fall into three main types. First there are the relationships of economic dependency which are usually created by marriage and the birth of children. The second type of relationships are those created by indebtedness - the relations, that is, between money lenders and borrowers. Finally there are relations which have arisen as a result of cash cropping between the producers of crops and the buyers. Such buyers are often outside the village so these linkages are not important in the recruitment of support. But they may be politically significant in other ways as we shall see in later chapters.

Finally in this chapter I show some of the ways in which wealth can be achieved, thus introducing the element of change into the picture.
As patterns of wealth change so we would expect the patterns of political action to change.

**Agriculture: Mashamba and Mahonde**

78% of Tundwa's adult males are occupied in agriculture, the major income-producing occupation. There are two kinds of farming practised which can be equated with two kinds of rights over land. The first of these is ownership, the second usage. When a piece of land is owned outrightly it is called a *shamba* (plural: *mashamba*); when it is simply used but not owned outrightly it is called a *honde* (plural: *mahonde*). Since there are no precise English equivalents I shall use the Swahili terms. *Mashamba* can be bought, sold, given away or inherited. Their permanence is indicated by the fact that they are mainly used for growing trees - coconut, mango, cashew nut and tamarind. No such permanent rights are held over *mahonde* which can neither be sold nor inherited and are exclusively used for the cultivation of annual crops - maize, millet, cow-peas, cotton and simsim. *Mahonde* are temporary plots cultivated by the techniques of slash and burn. One plot is cultivated for two to three years and then abandoned. The distinction between these two kinds of farming is not merely a technical one - it also indicates a basic socio-economic distinction in the community since the average income from a *honde* is only half of that which can be gained from a *shamba* (acre for acre).

In Tundwa 87 men (31.5% of all adult males) and 19 women (5.4% of all adult women) own *mashamba*, and together they own an area of 597 acres. Some of these *mashamba* have been inherited, others bought or
given. Most of the produce from shambas is sold – this applies particularly to coconuts (which are sold for copra) and to cashew nuts. Coconuts have been a cash crop for as long as anyone can remember, but the development of the cashew nut as a cash crop is fairly recent – within the last ten years. Some of the tamerind and most of the mangoes are kept for household use, whilst others are sold. Shamba produce is sold either to Rasini shopkeepers (if the amount is fairly small) or to Lamu merchants (if the amount makes this worthwhile).

The profitability of shambas depends on a great many factors – the fertility of the soil, the age of the shamba (trees take from two to ten years, depending on the species, before they produce an adequate harvest), and the variety of trees planted. Usually the major part of any shamba is planted with coconut or cashew nut trees, with mango and tamarind trees interspersed. From a good and well-established shamba planted with coconut palms or cashew nut trees one can earn an annual income of between £62 and £72 gross per acre. Two points must be made here however. In the first place this is by no means the average profit since shambas vary considerably in quality. A figure of about £50 would be more realistic for the average income and it is this which I have used for later assessments.¹ In the second place one has to distinguish between gross profit and net profit, since many expenses are involved in cultivating a shamba. To begin with the seeds have to be obtained, either from other farmers or from government

¹. All these figures were arrived at after discussion with several informants as to the normal yield of their shambas. An estimate was then made of the value of this produce sold at 1965 prices.
agents. Then there are all the costs of 'waiting'. Whoever works on the shamba must be maintained or maintain himself until the trees start to be productive. Usually this involves only the owner himself. Very few men can afford to employ permanent labourers to cultivate their land, though quite a few employ temporary labour at times when there is extra work (such as harvesting the fruits of the shamba or clearing the undergrowth and weeds from between the trees). Not many men can expect automatic help from their sons in this work if the latter have passed the age of puberty. They may however make an arrangement with them on a shared profits basis. Thus a son may help his father if his father agrees to pay his bridewealth or help him in some other way. On both sides it is a case of, "if he helps me, then I help him". (This lack of co-operation is related to the frequency of divorce and the norm that children stay with their mother after she has been divorced by their father). Only fifteen men are helped by their adult sons, though five more are helped by other young adult male relatives. A few more are helped by small children, but the rest (50%) cultivate alone. Women shamba owners are in a more difficult position since women do not cultivate in this community. They are therefore forced to employ labourers to cultivate for them, or to rely on male kinsmen to do the work in return for a share in the profits. It is for this reason that not many women own shambas. When a shamba owner dies women heirs usually sell their shares of the land to male heirs.

The process of starting a shamba from scratch, until it begins
to be productive, usually takes about five years. Meanwhile some annual crops or bananas may be grown in part of the shamba. As a result of this expensive waiting some men have land which they cannot afford to utilise. Unless a shamba is continually restocked moreover, it will revert to bush after about seventy years. There are pieces of land around Tundwa almost indistinguishable from the surrounding bush and with nothing except for a few ancient coconut palms and the occasional giant tamarind tree to indicate that they were once shambas. I suspect that a good deal of land on the island was at one time planted with coconuts but has long since reverted to bush with the depopulation of the area as a result of labour migration. This is not the only reason for land reverting to bush however. There are three pieces of land near the village whose owners died about a decade ago, after a lifetime of exploiting their shambas without restocking them. In two cases the men left very young children to inherit the land, in the other case the man died without heirs. Even in such cases, however, a person who inherits land, even if it is only bushland without trees, is in a better position than a honde user since if he can find a buyer he can sell his land. Such land would fetch from £2 to £10 an acre. If a shamba is well planted however it may fetch as much as £65 per acre - or more if the year's harvest is not yet collected.

Out of the 106 persons who own shambas, only a few are wealthy in the sense of owning a large amount of good and well-stocked land. The average holding is 5.6 acres. In this particular case however an
average figure is deceptive since the holdings range in size from 44.8 acres to only half an acre. There is thus a wide variation between the very rich and the poor shamba owners. The following table will show this in more detail.

Table 2. Amounts of land owned by Mashamba owners (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of shamba</th>
<th>Number of Men</th>
<th>Number of Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1. over 12 acres</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2. 9-12 acres</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3. 6-9 acres</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4. 3-6 acres</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5. 1-3 acres</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6. below 1 acre</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the table, the majority of shamba owners are to be found in the middle categories in terms of the amount of land they own. Only a small percentage are very rich (by local standards that is), and a rather larger, but still small percentage are in the lowest category. The biggest category of shamba owners has between three and six acres of land. This table however indicates only the amount of land which is actually owned - it does not indicate the amount from which an income is gained. In some cases there are considerable discrepancies between the two amounts. There are two reasons for this.
The first is a reason to which I have already referred - that is that some land has fallen into disuse and therefore does not produce a full income - and in some cases no income at all. The second reason is that the land may be being used by someone else other than the owner - in which case the owner may receive no income from it. The pattern of income from shamba land is thus not a simple and direct reflection of the pattern of land holding. I shall return to the matter of income later.

Some shamba owners have additional sources of income in addition to their land. Fourteen men have a small honde on which they grow annual crops to supplement their income from shamba produce. Nine shamba owners cultivate a shamba belonging to a relative in addition to cultivating their own. In addition there are a few men who earn a small income as Koran school teachers or temporary labourers. But more importantly there are some shamba owners who are able to reinvest their profits in other enterprises - in particular those of shopkeeping and/or money lending. There are seven shopkeepers in Tundwa, three of whom are also money lenders. In addition there are seven other shamba owners who lend money. For the most part it is the mahonde cultivators who borrow money so I shall return to the role of the money lenders later in discussing them. The point I want to make here is that by reinvesting profits earned from shambas the rich are able to expand their incomes still further. (Conversely a man who makes profits in other ways - from labour migration for example -
Mashamba owners are a very significant socio-economic category in Tundwa. This is mainly because of the nature of their wealth which gives them a degree of security which no other occupational category enjoys. This remains true even though some shamba owners do not have enough land to do other than eke out a meagre existence. The majority of shamba owners however are wealthier than others in the community. This has certain consequences. To begin with these people are not dependent on others for a living - on the contrary others, such as agricultural labourers, are dependent on them. It is for this reason that we find nearly all Tundwa's political leaders in this category. Such people have a basis on which to recruit political support. In addition mashamba owners tend to marry the daughters and sisters of other shamba owners - though not necessarily the daughters or sisters of men of equivalent wealth. This category thus tends to perpetuate itself over the generations as a result of the process of inheritance.

Mashamba users

There are some seventeen men in Tundwa in the anomolous position of owning no land themselves, but having been given license to use the shamba of another person. For most purposes such men may be classed with the shamba owners, but they are different in one very important respect, that unlike the shamba owners they have no security of tenure. These men may not give anything to the owner of the land they work,
though this depends on the circumstances. For example, a shamba owner who has more land than he can manage may allow a kinsman or friend (though it is usually the former) to cultivate a part of it and take the profits. Alternatively the owner may take a small percentage of the profits – if he is old, for example, he may ask for enough to feed and clothe himself. Women owners often allow a male kinsman to cultivate their land for the price of feeding them. Eight of the seventeen shamba users are cultivating the land of a female relative. Owners who are away in Mombasa – not many and generally owners of small amounts of land – often allow another person to use their land without charge whilst they are away. It is a distinct possibility that usage may have transformed itself into ownership in some cases if the owner never returned, though I do not know of any certain cases of this.

As can be seen from Table 3, some mashamba users may cultivate quite large amounts of land, and in fact the range of holdings follows a very similar pattern to that of the mashamba owners. Again there are slight discrepancies here between the amount of land used and the amount from which an income is being gained. This is because some of the land may have fallen into disuse.
Table 3. Amounts of land cultivated by Mashamba users (B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of shamba</th>
<th>Number of men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1. over 12 acres</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2. 9-12 acres</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3. 6-9 acres</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4. 3-6 acres</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5. 1-3 acres</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6. below 1 acre</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Men who use but do not own land may be well off whilst they are using the land. Two of these seventeen men are in fact money lenders, though one of these only lends on a small scale. But since such men have no security of tenure they can be dispossessed at any time. The following case will illustrate this.

**Case 1. Time: July 1965**

Sura¹ is a very old Sharif man, the richest man in the village (for details of his wealth see below p.55). His wife, M, is also very old and blind. The couple live with an unmarried son, X, who looks after them and sees to all their needs. Another of Sura's sons, Mohamed, is using a large piece of his father's land, and was giving his father a share of the profits. Mohamed has two sons, Ahmad and Zein, both young men in their twenties. They were using a shamba of 6.4 acres belonging to their grandmother M. They had worked in this shamba since they were children, and had planted some of the coconut palms growing there. In July 1965 however the old lady was forced by X and another son, Y, to sell the land. She did not want to sell it, but since she was living with X and was completely dependent on him she had no alternative but to accept his decision. Mohamed was strongly opposed to the idea, but in spite of his opposition the land

¹. All names used in case histories are fictitious.
was sold. This suggests some pre-existing antagonism between X and his brother Mohamed, but on what this was based I am not sure. The point I am making here is that the sale of the land left Ahmad and Zein without income. Later some of the trees in the shamba were found to have been destroyed, kerosine having been poured on their roots. No culprit was discovered, but Ahmad was widely suspected. Following this affair, Mohamed, the father of the two boys, announced that henceforth he would keep all the profits from his father's shamba for himself.

If the mashamba users have no security of tenure they at least have a reasonable income whilst they are using the land. The mahonde cultivators are in a much more precarious position since without land of their own they can only cultivate annual crops, which bring in far less income for a greater amount of work.

As I explained in the previous chapter Tundwa's annual crops were until recently grown on the mainland opposite Faza island. It is only in the last four years that incursions of Shifta insurgents from Somalia have made cultivation there practically impossible. During 1965 six men from Tundwa did cultivate a small area near the tiny mainland hamlet of Saadani. But most of Tundwa's mahonde in this year were situated on the island. Most of the mahonde are in areas where there are no shambas. They lie beyond the belt of mashamba which surrounds Tundwa on three sides. Other mahonde are on shambas which are not at present being utilised by their owners (the owner's permission must be obtained but no rent, either in cash or in kind, is paid).

Most of the crops grown on mahonde are meant for consumption
rather than sale. Only simsim and cotton are generally grown as cash crops, and since the land here is not very fertile crop yields are low. Many mahonde users cultivate small amounts of cash crops in addition to crops for subsistence - maize, millet, cow-peas etc. Where crops are sold they go either to money lenders in lieu of debts (I shall return to this later), to Faza shopkeepers, or to government agents. (Cotton as a cash crop has been introduced fairly recently and the government has a monopoly in its purchase).

The process of cultivation takes several months and is back-breaking work. A man clearing a new honde first has to select the area. There is no chief or overseer who organises the apportionment of land, although there was such a man (the fundi wa kulima or agricultural expert) in the past when annual crops were cultivated on the mainland. At this point in time there is no shortage of land on the island, so a man has a wide choice of where to site his plot. There are large areas lying uncultivated, and whilst some of these may be required in order that the agricultural technique of shifting cultivation can operate there is still plenty of room for manoeuvre. There are even two non-Bajunis in the village - a Digo and a Pokomo - who cultivate mahonde without any protest being raised. Some of this land may in fact belong to men or their heirs at present in Mombasa. I do not know how difficult such men would find it to reactivate their claims (most people do not possess title deeds for their land), but they are often already forgotten in the village and their land is
considered to be common land, free for any Bajuni to use. This is in line with the general view that a disused *shamba* may be used for annual crops with the owner's permission where he is known.

In theory a man is not supposed to plant permanent trees on land which he does not own. In the past when the *mahonde* cultivators were mainly slaves this rule was presumably enforceable, and in any case the *mahonde* were situated on the mainland. To have planted permanent trees there would have involved the inconvenience of permanent residence on the mainland. In the last few years, however, since *mahonde* have been situated on the island, the rule may be breaking down. In 1965 I found two men who had planted coconut palms and mango trees on *honde* plots. Although this caused some ill-feeling no-one made any attempt to prevent the men from continuing and in public it was denied that the rule had been broken. One of these men was a faction leader and a Koran school teacher. We shall hear more of him in Chapter VIII. The other was a stranger in the village, a Lamu man married to a Tundwa woman.

The process of cultivation begins at the end of the year. Usually a group of men clear plots adjoining one another, the advantage of this being that the whole area can be fired at one time. Such men are friends or relatives, and nearly always they are members of the same social stratum. In December and January, when the weather is at its hottest, the dry thorn bush and brush in the plot is cut down and laid in piles. A broad path is left around the edge of the plot so
that when the bush is fired there will not be a general conflagration. When the annual crops were cultivated on the mainland the occasion of firing the bush was a very special one, made auspicious with a host of rituals and recitations. Vast areas were fired on the same day. But although some of these rituals were carried out in Saadani in 1965 they were not carried out on the island.¹

When the bush has been razed to the ground and reduced to ash, the land is hoed and the seeds planted. All the work on the mahonde is done with a simple hoe and a knife - indeed there are no other agricultural implements. From the time when the seeds begin to sprout a careful watch is kept on the land. The main problem is wild pigs who come to spoil the crops. When the crops have grown tall, look-out posts are built and men spend most of their time in the fields, coming back to the town only on Fridays for the Friday prayer. In late July and August the harvest is gathered in and the seasonal cycle comes to an end. A man may cultivate the same plot of land for two to three years but he should then abandon it and clear a new plot. I was told that the bush should lie fallow for about ten years before it is fired again.

As with the shambas, the degree of co-operation is minimal. Throughout most of the year a man cultivates alone or with the help of small sons. Only two adolescent sons helped their fathers to cultivate mahonde in 1965. For the most part young men of this age wish to be independent and would sooner cultivate a honde for themselves or work

¹ Perhaps the rituals were an attempt to ward off the dangers and insecurity of mainland agriculture which I mentioned in Chapter I. For more information on the recitations see Chapter VI.
as temporary labourers for others rather than help their fathers. Wives do not help their husbands because women do not cultivate in this community. (There was one exception to this rule, a woman cultivating a honde on her own account. But she was a very poor woman of the lowest category of ex-slaves.) Only one honde cultivator was able to employ a full-time labourer in 1965, and he planted a large area of nine and a half acres. At the time of harvest however some temporary labour may be employed and on this occasion the whole family may turn out to help.

It is very difficult to assess the profitability of mahonde, since many farmers mix their crops and there is variation in the soil between one area and another. But roughly speaking, if a person plants only cash crops he can earn an annual income of between £15 and £32 per acre. Alternatively he needs to plant at least one and a half acres of maize or millet in order to feed a family (a man, his wife and two children) until the next harvest.

69 Tundwa men and one woman cultivated mahonde on the island in 1965. (This figure does not include men who also own or use mashamba since they are in quite a different position). In addition a further six men cultivated mahonde on the mainland. Those on the island cultivated altogether an area of 209 acres (an average of 2.9 acres per cultivator). The range of variation in the size of the various mahonde is much narrower than in the case of the mashamba. But there is

1. When I asked why women did not cultivate, one woman replied by pointing significantly at her genitals. "We women cultivate here. That is enough". Strangely enough, however, Bajumwali women do help their husbands to cultivate and are not ashamed to be seen doing so.
nevertheless quite a wide span between the largest honde of just over eleven acres and the smallest of .8 of an acre. Table 4 shows the distribution in the sizes of mahonde.

In theory a man can cultivate as large an area as he wishes on the common land. In practice, however, the amount of land he can cultivate is limited by several factors. A general ceiling is set on the size of the honde by the lack of modern agricultural equipment. Equipped only with a knife and a hoe a single man can only cultivate a certain amount. And as we have already seen the honde cultivator is in most cases working by himself. Probably the optimum amount of land a man can cultivate alone is six acres. Above this amount he needs more help, whether from his children or from temporary labourers. The area a man cultivates is also related to the number of dependents he has to feed. This can clearly be seen from Table 4, where it is shown that the number of dependents a man supports varies directly with the amount of land he cultivates.

Table 4. Amounts of land used by Mahonde Cultivators (C) related to
Number of Dependents
(Table does not include mainland mahonde, the sizes of which are unknown).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of mahonde</th>
<th>Number of men</th>
<th>Average Number of Dependents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1. over 12 acres</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2. 9-12 acres</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3. 6-9 acres</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4. 3-6 acres</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5. 1-3 acres</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6. below 1 acre</td>
<td>10 men, 1 woman</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69 men, 1 woman</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another factor that has to be taken into account when considering mahonde cultivators is the fact that about 80% of them are wholly or partly dependent on money lenders. This is partly because in times of difficulty they have no capital or savings on which they can fall back. In addition their income is based on a yearly seasonal cycle. Whereas the owner of a good shamba gets some kind of fruits two or three times a year, the honde cultivator gets only one crop a year. To put it another way, the cultivation of annual crops requires one year's 'waiting' before a crop is produced. If a man has no savings how does he live for that year? It is this situation which creates indebtedness in Tundwa.

There are twelve men in Tundwa who normally lend money, and there are several others who may lend money from time to time. Such men are known as matajiri (singular tajiri, literally rich man). At the beginning of the season a man wishing to cultivate goes to a tajiri. He asks him either for a loan of a specific amount, or simply to provide for all his wants until the following year when he reaps a harvest. For either of these two kinds of loan he has to promise the tajiri the surety of his harvest. For the first kind of loan he can borrow 30/- in return for the promise of each 100 lb bag of maize or millet. When the harvest is reaped debtors must repay their matajiri in kind - the first kind of debtor giving him the promised number of bags of produce, the second giving him enough to repay the debt he has incurred. The money lender then sells this produce at almost 100% profit. Thus
it may be that in order to live a debtor has to buy back his own produce at nearly twice the original price. Very often a debtor starts off the new season having been unable to completely repay the debts of the previous year. In this way he may be tied to the same tajiri throughout his life.

Obviously in deciding how much to lend a person, a money lender has to weigh up the man's 'credit-worthiness'. Is he strong enough to work the proposed amount of land with the help he has available? Is he a good farmer who can be counted upon to do the work properly? What is his past record? By taking all these factors into account the money lender tries to ensure that he does not make a loss on the loan. This means that the old, the sick and the inexperienced cannot get loans. But in addition no money lender has unlimited funds so he has to make a choice between fairly evenly matched claims. Although it is extremely difficult to get precise information on this subject we may assume that he does not decide on a purely rationalistic basis who to give loans to, but in terms of the existing structure of social relations in the village - the pattern of kin and neighbourhood ties and seemingly most important, the pattern of social stratification.

Connected with the question of credit-worthiness there is also the question of whether sanctions can be taken against a man who defaults on his debts. As far as I could discover default is very rare. It is more usual for a man to simply carry over his debt until the next harvest, and for the money-lender to agree to this in the hope of eventually
recouping his losses, than it is for the money-lender to break off the relationship and accuse the debtor of default. I do not in fact know of any case of the latter. There is no written agreement between debtor and money-lender so it is difficult for the money-lender to take someone to court in such a case. If he were to press a man too hard for payment public opinion would turn strongly against him. If however he makes a loss year after year he will simply cut his losses and refuse to lend any more money to the man. It may be that the high rate of interest charged by money-lenders is an indication of the frequency of such situations. On the whole however it is in the money-lender's interest that a man should not completely pay off his debts, for if he were to do so it would mean the end of a profitable business.

The debtor's point of view is not so very different, since he too wishes the relationship to continue - indeed he may depend upon it for his very existence. Some men may cheat by selling part of their harvest secretly in Rasini before the money-lender gets his hands on it. Others may even run off to Mombasa leaving their debts unsettled. But this is rare, simply for the reason that such a man would never again be able to raise a loan.

Not all those who take loans are wholly dependent on a money-lender. Some only borrow small amounts of money from time to time and such small loans are not subject to such a high rate of interest. And about 20% of the mahonde users take no loans at all. These latter seem to be either young men living at home and still being supported by their
families, or men whose fathers are rich enough to loan them money without interest.

The mahonde cultivators form an economic category in contrast to those who own or use mashamba. Primarily this is a lower income category, though the poorest shamba owners overlap with the cultivators of the largest amounts of honde land. Some of the honde cultivators are, as it were, permanent residents in this category. In order to cultivate they have to depend on money-lenders, and as a result of this dependence they are inhibited from accumulating either the capital or the savings which would enable them to be independent. Other men are obviously in this category only temporarily, since when their fathers die they will inherit the whole or a part of a shamba from him. At any one time however the mahonde users are a category of dependents, and we should not be surprised that this is a category which produces no political leaders. These men have no economic security and no economic power which they could wield over others.

Other occupations

Not all men own or cultivate land for themselves. There are a small minority who cultivate for others. Many of these are assisting kinsmen - usually their fathers, whilst others are employed on a more formal basis by non-relatives. For the most part these latter are young men who no longer wish to assist their fathers but have not yet become independent cultivators. In addition there are a few older men, some more or less permanently attached to particular employers. The
usual wage for agricultural labour is 3/- to 5/- per day, depending on the work and the experience of the labourer. For the most part agricultural labour is a phase through which many men pass before they begin to work on their own account, rather than a permanent condition.

Although agriculture is the mainstay of Tundwa's economy, 21% of the adult male population is engaged in other occupations. Many of these are engaged in fishing, which occupies fifteen men. Six of these fishermen are employed in one or other of the coastal villages; the rest work in Tundwa. Three of the Tundwa fishermen are boat owners and the others are their relatives. The fish which these people catch is all sold within the village and since meat is rarely available they do quite well. This is indicated I think by the fact that one of the boat owners is a money-lender (he lends money mainly to other fishermen and has bought himself a shamba of one and a half acres in size with the profits).

Of the rest of the population, some are engaged in craft production, such as basketry, carpentry, or house building. Others are donkey porters, mangrove cutters or water carriers. Sixteen men have no work and have to rely on others to support them. In general these men are old or sick or mentally deficient or have fallen temporarily on hard times. A few however are resting labour migrants. Table 5 (below) gives an occupational breakdown of Tundwa's adult male population. As can be seen from the table, the only occupation which is of real economic significance in Tundwa is agriculture. Other occupations are purely marginal.
Table 5. Occupational breakdown of adult male population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number of Men</th>
<th>% of Total Adult Male Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Mashamba owners</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Mashamba users</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Mahonde cultivators</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1. Agricultural labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) For kin</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) For employer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2. Fishermen</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3. Other occupations</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4. Unemployed</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The categories in this table are mutually exclusive. Thus a man who owns a shamba and is also a fisherman is shown under the category of shamba owners, not fishermen.

Women's work

I have said nothing so far about women's occupations, except for those few women who own shambas and the one woman who cultivates a honde. The sexual division of labour is very marked in Tundwa and has wider social implications. As I have suggested already, a woman will only cultivate with her own hands if she is reduced to the lowest economic circumstances. She expects to be supported by a male relative - usually a husband if she has one, or perhaps a son or a son-in-law if she has no husband. On the other hand there are certain minor occupations which women can carry out without shame, and which old men and the unemployed can resort to in time of need. Nearly every woman plaits strips of
matting which are sewn together by the children of the Koran schools into sacks (magafaa). From this job both the women and the Koran school teachers derive some advantage. Other jobs from which women can earn a small income are making the thatching (makuchi) for house roofs, removing the seeds from the sticky tamarind fruits and sorting out the good cotton from the bad. From all these occupations, if carried out full time, a woman can earn about one shilling a day, on which (if she were forced) she could just about subsist. But normally women use some of this money to contribute to household expenses, and the rest is spent on small luxuries for herself and her children. Any money she earns in this way is her own to spend as she likes - her husband has no control over it.

The important social aspect of women's work is that it keeps them in the village all day whereas men go to their farms to cultivate. Women work together in small groups of two and three and visit each other constantly during the day. This factor contributes to what I shall call the 'commensality' of women as opposed to the 'individuality' of men. Women are the ones who spread gossip and have an important, if not an over-riding influence in the establishment of 'accepted opinion' on any matter. The commensality of women is shown physically on the occasion of life-crises and also in the political sphere, as we shall see in Chapter VIII.

In addition to all the forms of income so far mentioned, some women earn money as prostitutes (malaya). It is difficult to estimate
the extent of prostitution in the village. Some people (both men and women) assured me that practically every woman was a prostitute ("Wote wanafanya malaya"); others said it was only half of the women. One woman said, "Tundwa has no more wanawali (unmarried virgin girls) - all of them do their 'work' ". Nor is it possible to assess the amount of income that can be gained in this way. Payment is more in the form of a 'gift' than a 'price', and I heard estimates of as high as 5/- and as low as five cents (one-fifth of a shilling - some women, it is said, would let small boys have intercourse with them for as little as this). But more usually the gift is a shilling or so. Prostitutes drift in and out of marriages with their lovers so there is no defined class of prostitutes. It is only when such a woman leaves Tundwa for Mombasa that she becomes a professional prostitute.

Labour migration

That labour migration is an ever-present possibility is an important factor in Tundwa's economic situation. More than half as many Tundwa men and women again are in Mombasa or other urban centres as are in Tundwa. Or, to put it in another way, more than 60% of Tundwa's households have relatives away. But many of these are emigrants rather than labour migrants - in other words some of them were born in Mombasa or elsewhere and many will never return. But all these people retain some sort of link with Tundwa, however tenuous,1 either by sending letters or money back, or by visiting occasionally. During 1965, 22% of all known Tundwa migrants visited the village - 17% of the men

1. There are Tundwa emigrees - or more likely their children and grandchildren - who do not maintain such links, and whose numbers I cannot of course estimate.
migrants and 26% of the women migrants.

The kind of men who leave as migrants are usually young men who have no land of their own or men who have small shambas which they cannot afford to cultivate. This can be seen from the fact that only fourteen out of 172 male migrants own land in Tundwa. They owned a total of altogether 56.8 acres (a rough average of four acres each) of which 14.3 acres has reverted to bush and the rest is being used by relatives or friends. There are four men out of this number however who have large and well-established shambas to which they plan to retire when they are no longer fit for active work.

The following table shows the number of known adult migrants in various Kenya centres as compared with the total adult population in Tundwa. As can be seen the vast majority of migrants are in Mombasa which is about 250 miles away. In Lamu there is very little work available and Nairobi is rather far for people to go. Other migrants are in places as far apart as Mogadishu in Somalia and Dodoma in Tanzania. Few of the male migrants have any skills to offer. The largest number work as manual labourers, mainly at Kilindini Docks in Mombasa. Another fairly large group is self-employed - this group includes petty traders, purveyors of Swahili medicine, plasterers and butchers as well as various other small scale business occupations. The rest are either more skilled - working as machinists, fishermen, goldsmiths etc. - or they have some education and can work as Koran school teachers, policemen or for government. This latter group is very small however - little
more than five per cent. A few are students, and the remainder have no work.

Table 6. Tundwa migrants away in 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of migrants</th>
<th>Migrants in</th>
<th>Total number of</th>
<th>Cf. Adult Tundwa Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mombasa Nairobi Lamu Elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>140 10 7 15</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>147 9 8 4</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>287 19 15 19</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the table the number of women away almost equals the number of men. Some of these women are married, either to Tundwa migrants or to men they have met in Mombasa or elsewhere. By and large they are married to other Bajunis, even if not from Tundwa. 63% of the women are however unmarried, and the vast majority of these are divorcees. Most of these women (they may perhaps number one hundred or just over) are prostitutes. Prostitution in Mombasa is a highly profitable business if the girl is young and pretty. It is less so of course as she grows older. A young and pretty girl, I was told, could earn up to £500 per month! This I imagine was an exaggeration. Others told me £50 to £200 per month. An older woman would earn less of course.

22% of Tundwa's resident adult population has had some migration experience in the past, and a few of these have been away thirty or forty years. But labour migrants who return are often in effect 'failed' emigrants who have not made good. When they return to Tundwa
A Sharif hoeing his shamba.

Young men building a house
therefore they are usually without savings. This applies particularly to men migrants. There are a few men however who make enough money to buy land in Tundwa on their return, as we shall see from later case studies.

In many African societies remittances from labour migrants help to support the village economy. This is not really the case for Tundwa however. Small scale and very irregular remittances are sent back to Tundwa, but the labour migration of men does not really bolster up the home economy. Its importance is rather that it ensures that there is no pressure on the limited land resources of the Bajunis. The labour migration of women to Mombasa as prostitutes is much more Tundwa-focused in that prostitutes invest their money in building and repairing houses in Tundwa, houses in which their mothers can live and care for any illegitimate children they produce, and to which they can retire in their old age. They may also invest their money in buying land, though this is rarer. Many of them also buy gold ornaments. Even in the case of prostitutes however, many who are successful stay for most or all of their lives in Mombasa.

**The social implications of economic organisation**

**Wealth differentials in Tundwa**

Tundwa is by no means a homogeneous community in terms of wealth. There are quite wide divergences between the rich and the poor, with some very rich men and some very poor men. This much I think will have been evident from the figures which I have already given. The
richest man in the village is an old Sharif, Sura, who is about eighty-five years old and now unable to move from his house. He originally owned 76.8 acres of land, some of it inherited, some bought. Since then he has given outright 22.4 acres to his son-in-law, making him the second richest man in the village, 4.8 acres to his son and 4.8 acres to his daughter. Of the remaining 44.8 acres, 12.8 have practically reverted to bush, 16 are being used by another son (who takes most of the profits - see Case 1, p.36) and 16 are used by a third son. Profits from this last shamba go mainly to the old man with whom the third son (who is middle-aged and divorced) lives. The old Sharif also owns a house in Rasini and one in Lamu from which he receives some rent. He owns land in Lamu too, though I do not know how much, and a safe in his Rasini house is said to be "stuffed with money". There are a handful of men in Tundwa, who, though not as rich as this man, are nevertheless very well off. Such men are able to re-invest the money they make from agriculture in other income-producing activities - especially shop-keeping and money-lending. The rich thus tend to get richer.

At the other extreme we have men who own no land and who are in permanent debt. The very poorest are the old and the sick who cannot cultivate any longer and who cannot get loans. Such people are dependent on their relatives or in the last resort on begging. Old women

1. The son-in-law already owned 12.8 acres which he had inherited. He was married to Sura's eldest daughter and was probably the first to benefit in Sura's redistribution of property which he could no longer exploit adequately himself. (The land was passed over in 1936). Why Sura gave his son-in-law so much land is not known to me. This was the only case of which I know of a man giving land to his son-in-law.
are often in a similarly difficult position, and especially if they have no children. One old woman, who died whilst I was in the field, had spent many years in Mombasa as a prostitute and had been singularly successful. But all her earnings had gone on living a pleasurable life in Mombasa. She had not even built a house in Tundwa and she had never borne a child. When she grew old and her savings ran out she returned to Tundwa, lived alone in a house belonging to another (unrelated) woman, and had to beg for her food.

I have spoken of various kinds of production in Tundwa, each of which has a different earning potential. In the following table I have reduced all types of production to the common denominator of income so that one can get a better idea of the extent of economic differences. Obviously the table is somewhat rough and ready since it is not possible to ascertain the exact income of any person. For the purposes of the table I have assumed that an average acre of shamba land will produce an income of £50 per annum, and that the average honde will produce only half this income.\footnote{Based on figures given earlier of profitability of mashamba and mahonde (p. 29 and p. 41).} I have allowed for the fact that some shamba land has reverted to bush and produces no income, and that other land is newly planted and only brings in a small income. But I have not allowed for differences in the quality of the soil, about which I am not qualified to speak. I have assigned men carrying out other occupations (or additional occupations) according to a rough estimate of probable earnings - for example I have ascribed fishermen to category five, or category four if they are boat-owners, agricultural labourers...
to category six.

The table shows that the majority of the population falls into the two lowest categories. The majority of shamba owners, however, fall into the first four categories and therefore make up the wealthier section of the population. Those in the lower categories are made up of honde cultivators, agricultural labourers and workers in other occupations. Since many of these people are debtors their incomes are probably even lower than is indicated by the table.

Table 7. Income categories (I) of all adult males

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income category</th>
<th>Number of men</th>
<th>% of all adult males</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I1. over £600 per annum</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I2. £450 - £600 per annum</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I3. £300 - £450 per annum</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I4. £150 - £300 per annum</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I5. £50 - £150 per annum</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I6. below £50 per annum</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What do these income differentials mean in social terms? Income in Tundwa comes either from land or from money. The existence of common land ensures that any man may cultivate, even if he does not own land, so we do not have here a large class of landless agricultural labourers exploited by a class of wealthy land owners. As we have seen, agricultural labourers account for only 5.8% of the adult male population.
and for most of these men this is simply a temporary phase. But as I have already made clear, a much larger income is to be gained from the ownership of land rather than its use. The mashamba owners thus stand as an economic category in contrast to the mahonde cultivators.

This socio-economic distinction is emphasised by the fact that most of the mahonde cultivators are in debt to shamba-owning money-lenders. A man needs more than land in order to live. He also needs cash to buy seeds and tools, to pay his taxes and to feed his family whilst he waits for a harvest. He is thus forced into dependence on a money-lender. We have here some elements of a class situation in which the money-lenders own one of the means of production and use their monopoly in order to exploit the mahonde cultivators. One must point out however that neither money-lenders nor debtors organise themselves in terms of their common interests. In addition the number of mahonde cultivators who are completely dependent on a money lender for their existence is relatively small in relation to the total male population (perhaps about 18%). On the other hand there are many other men who are partially or temporarily in debt, as we shall see later.

Wealth or income differentials do not create overt status groups in Tundwa, graded in terms of the amount of income or prestige that their members receive and distinguished by different styles of life. To some extent different occupations do have a different prestige ranking. Some occupations such as fishing, mangrove cutting or water carrying are considered menial and low, whereas others, such as shamba
ownership or Koran school teaching give one respectability. But
different occupations do not involve different styles of life.

Nor is wealth in itself used in Tundwa to support different
styles of life. This is not a society where individual conspicuous
consumption, in dress, food or manner of living is tolerated. I quote
from an (unsolicited) essay written by one of my assistants which
corroborates this point. He sees the great economic difference in
Tundwa to lie between the mashamba owners and the mahonde cultivators,
and as we have seen this is largely the case:

"In the life of the men of the mashamba and that of the men
of the mahonde there is no difference whatsoever. If you
see a rich man or a poor man, both appear the same, they
eat the same food and live in the same kind of houses. You
cannot tell whether a man is rich or poor."

When asked to explain why this is so, people say that men fear
the envy of others (or more specifically the 'evil eye'), and that envy
can bring misfortune. On the other hand hiding one's wealth has
obvious practical advantages in a community where the wealthy are sub-
ject to perpetual demands from others to share their wealth. (Fear
of the evil eye has to some extent been superceded these days by fear
of the District Assistant in his role as tax assessor). Envy may even
lead to robbery - three serious cases occurred whilst I was there, and
it is no accident I think that the three victims were money-lenders.

Curiously enough the only people who seem to have no fear of
the envy of others are the professional prostitutes. In 1967 when I
returned to the island for a short visit, two of these girls had recently
been to visit their mothers. They had each had transported all the way from Mombasa a whole suite of modern formica-covered bedroom furniture - double bed, wardrobe, coffee table and chairs. Considering the difficulties of this journey even for people it is something of a miracle that these goods arrived. The houses of ex-prostitutes or their families are full of fancy-framed photographs taken in the photographic studios of Mombasa. But prostitutes get away with this show because they are also prepared to spend their money on public feasts to celebrate weddings or circumcision ceremonies. Rich men on the other hand rarely do this unless it is for the celebration of the Prophet's birth. Even then it is noticeable that some of the richest men invite the fewest guests. In general men would prefer to keep their money in order to buy themselves security in the form of land.

**Socio-economic relationships**

A more useful way of looking at the social implications of wealth differentials is not in terms of static economic categories, but more dynamically, in terms of the use to which men put their income. If we do this we can see that each man uses his wealth to create and support a network of linkages of which he is the centre. For most men this network consists only of his wife and children or a slightly larger group of relatives or affines. He is at the centre of what I shall call a 'dependency unit' (since it is not necessarily synonymous with the household). The average size of such groups in Tundwa is 3.7 persons, of whom 1.7 are children. A unit of this size requires about
£75 a year in order that its members should live reasonably well, and that the man can pay his tax and buy essential clothes for his dependents. Examination of Table 7 shows that many men are existing at below this level. Some of these are exceptionally poor whilst others have very small families or are simply youths still living with and being partially supported by their families. I shall discuss the dependency unit in more detail in the following chapter.

For the wealthy man in the community however, support of such a unit does not dispose of all his resources. Since it is considered not only thriftless but also dangerous to expend the surplus on conspicuous consumption, he reinvests it in order to make more money. There are two primary methods of doing this, both of which are significant because they create a wider set of relationships with people who become dependent on, and therefore obliged to the wealthy man. The first way of reinvesting money is by buying more land. Up to a point this land simply brings in more profit for the landowner which he can use to buy yet more land. At a certain stage in this process however he has more land than he can profitably work himself. At this stage, or even beforehand, he either has to employ permanent labourers or he has to begin giving his land away. In either case he will create dependency relations. The case of the richest man in the village which I described earlier is illustrative of the process of giving land away. The wealthy man may give parts of the land away outright, or he may allow other persons to use them. The point is that the wealthy man
usually uses economic resources of this kind to cement wider kinship
ties – he gives the land to a son or a father, a daughter or a sister's
son (see e.g. the case of Sharif Sura). In general these will not be
people with whom he is residing – it creates links beyond the household.
A man may or may not get much materially out of this redistribution,
but he has the security of firm social relations which can be used when
the need arises – to mobilise political support perhaps or to arrange
a marriage. He is also more or less assured of help in his old age
and will gain in social approval for having "helped" people.

Money-lending is the other main way of reinvesting one's income,
and it also creates wider links, though of a more formal and less
friendly kind. Money-lenders lend money not only to honde cultivators,
but also to shamba owners, traders, fishermen, donkey porters and women.
The details of the transaction involved in each case are slightly
different, but the main contrast between these forms of money-lending
and that entered into by the honde cultivators is that they do not
involve complete dependence on the money-lender. Thus shamba owners
may borrow money to tide them over the time whilst they are waiting
for trees to mature. Or they may need money to help them over a
difficult period such as sickness or life crises when extra expenses
are incurred. In every case however their shamba acts as surety for
the loan. About half of the shamba owners take loans from time to
time, but they do not normally need to borrow as much as the honde
cultivator, and in any case, because of the higher profitability of
shambas they are usually able to pay back their loans eventually without being continually in debt. In the last resort they sell the shamba which was the surety for the loan. The process involved can be seen from the following case which involved a money-lender from Rasini.

Case 2. Time: Circa 1960

Before the 1963 Zanzibar revolution many men from Tundwa used to go to the island of Pemba every year to trade amongst the clove pickers who gathered there. Around 1960 a Tundwa man called Mzee Bwana went to a Rasini money-lender and borrowed £250 in order to buy goods for trading in Pemba. He had to go to a Rasini money-lender because no Tundwa money-lender could afford to lend an amount of this kind. As surety for the loan he pledged the money-lender one of his shambas. Unfortunately Mzee made no profits whatsoever in Pemba and on his return he was forced to sell his shamba in order to repay the loan.

Indebtedness then involves many more men than just the mahonde cultivators, and within the category of debtors there are quite considerable differences, from the man who is completely tied to a particular money-lender and has no capital of his own, to the man who only makes occasional small loans in times of difficulty, but otherwise lives on his capital. In addition thirty per cent of Tundwa's adult male population neither lend nor borrow money. Such men are either so poor or physically weak that they have neither property nor labour to offer as surety for a loan, or they are reasonably well-off men who do not need to borrow money but who do not wish to lend money. Not all wealthy men lend money - the richest man in the village, mentioned above, as well as six others in Income category 1 do not lend money. By and large this is because of the opprobrium which the money-lender inevitably reaps and which the rich man fears. The relationship between
money-lender and debtor is predictably an ambivalent one. This can be seen from the comment made on a rich man who refused to lend money. He was said to be afraid of the unpleasantness and quarrels caused by money-lending, but also to be "too mean to help people".

Each money-lender in Tundwa must support an average of about fourteen debtors - some permanently tied to him, others only partially or temporarily dependent on him. These links not only bring him a handsome profit but they can also be turned to good use when political support is required. At the same time the money-lender is never secure, for although he "helps" people, he also exploits them and must expect hostility.

Other ways of reinvesting surplus income such as buying a shop or a fishing boat may also create linkages, though of a less intensive and permanent kind. Shop-keeping is important partly because the more successful shopkeepers are money-lenders. But in addition every shopkeeper gives credit to his trusted customers, and this is another form of lending which creates linkages. Boat owners are small-scale employers of labour - the three boat owners in Tundwa each provide employment for two to three fishermen. We shall see the significance of these wider linkages in later chapters.

The changing patterns of wealth

I have described the pattern of wealth differentials which existed in Tundwa in 1965. But this is neither an isolated nor a static community, and wealth is continually being redistributed within
the community over time. Part of this redistribution is a result of the natural process of death and inheritance. The inheritance system in Tundwa follows largely the Islamic law of inheritance - thus a person may inherit from either male or female relatives and men inherit double the share of women. Those who inherit larger amounts of property start off with a built-in advantage. But property may also be amassed during a person’s lifetime. Savings from labour migration, prostitution or other occupations may be spent on buying land or houses. Even today however land does not change hands very rapidly. No more than five pieces of land belonging to Tundwa men were sold in 1965. About fifteen per cent of the shamba owners have bought all or part of their land. Alternatively, property achieved or inherited may be lost through misfortune, or it may decline in value due to the lack of liquid capital required to sustain it. Through the disintegrating process of inheritance, large fortunes may be divided into uneconomic units.

Wider economic processes have also had their effects on Tundwa’s economy. Previous to colonial rule Rasini was one amongst other small ports on a trading route between Africa and Arabia. Arabian dhows from the Persian Gulf and other areas called there annually, and slaves, ivory and mangrove poles were exported to Arabia. This trade began to decline when the British colonised the area around the turn of the century and slavery was abolished. The British however developed other aspects of the economy. A market for copra existed and producers of
coconuts were encouraged. Cashew nut trees and cotton were introduced by the British as new cash crops, and efforts were made to persuade the Bajunis to plant them – efforts which were eventually successful. And over this whole period Kenya's towns were developing. A new and modern port was built at Mombasa and new industries sprang up. Both the first and the second World Wars affected East Africa and Mombasa was flooded with British and other soldiers. There were thus expanding markets both for migrant labour and for prostitution, and Bajunis began going to Mombasa in increasing numbers.

The following case histories will illustrate the effects of these wider changes on Tundwa's economy. Both of them show that men have been able to take advantage of these changes in order to amass wealth within their own lifetimes.

Case 3
Sharif Idarus is now an old man getting on for ninety years old. His father died when he was quite young, leaving him a small piece of land and thirteen slaves. When Sharif Idarus was a young man a British officer arrived on Faza island, announcing the abolition of slavery. The officer announced that up until a certain date any slave master could obtain a compensating sum for the manumission of his slaves. Sharif Idarus did not however get the compensatory sum. Along with many others he thought the British officer was buying slaves, and the 'price' offered (100 rupees) was considered to be too low. Now he says that he could not have 'sold' his slaves because "they had become like relatives". With the end of slavery however Sharif Idarus found himself without labour to work his land. Along with others he went to Mombasa to look for work. He became a wholesale seller of mangrove poles and stayed in Mombasa for about ten years. He found this business very profitable – so much so that after ten years he returned to Tundwa and bought two shambas, each of six and a half acres. Both shambas were well-planted and brought him in considerable profit. He is now a moderately wealthy man and has enough income to lend money out to others, thus increasing his wealth still further.
This case indicates the effects of the abolition of slavery on the slave owners. It also shows that wealth can be built up by labour migration and turned to good use at home. The following case illustrates the achievement of wealth by a mwungwana man.

Case 4

Haji is now a man of almost seventy, so he was born around the turn of the century. When he was almost eight years old he was taken to Kismayuu (Somalia) by his father's sister and he lived with her there until he was fifteen. Then his father died and Haji returned to Tundwa. His father had left him no land however, and he found that there was, "no work in Tundwa, so I went to Mombasa with some friends to look for work". On his first journey he stayed for twelve years, then returned for a short while to Tundwa. His second visit to Mombasa lasted for seven years. During all this time he worked as a labourer in the Port at Kilindini, Mombasa, which was just being built when he first arrived there. His wages were £2 a month at first, later rising to £3.10.0. All his money was spent in Mombasa on maintaining himself. He married and divorced four consecutive wives during this period - all Tundwa women, two of whom he had met in Mombasa. On the outbreak of war in East Africa in 1940 he was no better off than he had ever been. He married his fifth wife around this time, a woman to whom he is still married. The Port of Mombasa was filled with soldiers and sailors at this time, and Haji decided to leave his labourer's job at the port and go into partnership with an Indian, selling beer on the black market. Until 1945 when the war ended, Haji made big profits from this business and earned enough not only to send back remittances to his wife in Tundwa, but also to put some by as savings. When the war ended he returned to Tundwa and bought a piece of land of about eight acres, which had completely reverted to bush. He began to plant this land very gradually with trees, but the work did not progress very fast as he also returned to Mombasa periodically in order to trade in dried fish. By 1965 however he was becoming too old for these trips and had been ill the previous year. In 1965 he planted annual cash crops on his shamba as well as more trees, in which work he was helped by his eldest son, a boy of about fifteen years.

Both these cases show that wealth may be achieved through labour migration, even if the men who are able to do this are somewhat exceptional. Haji's first period of migration, before the Second
World War is far more typical of most Tundwa labour migrants than is that of his second period during the war, when he made big profits. Nevertheless, the patterns of wealth in Tundwa are now changing faster than ever before, not only because of labour migration, but also because of the introduction of new cash crops. The traditionally wealthy minority who have inherited their wealth are threatened by a new category of men who have achieved their wealth. And behind this second category of men are others who will take advantage of the new opportunities to achieve wealth in the future. The conflict between the old wealthy elite and the nouveau riche is expressed in political terms as we shall see in Chapter VIII.
III. THE NETWORK OF KINSHIP

"All Bajunis are one brother". Old mwungwana man

Following Barnes I can find no better metaphor for the structure of Bajuni kinship than 'network'. Kinship networks are important in Tundwa because, amongst other things, it is through them that political leaders recruit support. Barnes defines his usage as follows:

"The image I have is of a set of points, some of which are joined by lines. The points of the image are people or sometimes groups, and the lines indicate which people interact with each other".1

In discussing the kinship system of Tundwa we are dealing with a system which is basically non-unilineal. Lineal descent is of importance here in only one respect - in that through it one establishes one's place in the stratification system, and thereby one's place in society. Membership of a stratum is ascriptive in the male line. But it is not necessary to memorise lengthy genealogies in order to establish one's claim. This is a small community and it is only necessary to know who a person's father was in order to categorise him. And even in this matter of stratification there is an exception to the rule of patrilineal succession. For if a child is born illegitimately

he simply takes the stratum status of his mother (i.e. that which she had previously inherited from her father).

Beyond the father, descent in itself is not significant and is remembered only in so far as a person wishes to trace lateral links. Such links may be traced matrilaterally as well as patrilaterally, and even through affines. Genealogies remembered are typically short—rarely more than two to three generations deep.

Except for the basic division of the society into the three patrilineally ascribed strata (and these are categories rather than groups), people in Tundwa are not divided into mutually exclusive groups on the basis of descent or kinship. There are in fact no kinship groups in Tundwa beyond the level of certain domestic units which I shall describe shortly. Beyond this level, kinship in Tundwa only makes sense if we look at it from the point of view of the individual with his personal set of relationships—and this I propose to do.

In contrast to the study of unilineal descent systems, the structural implications of which are now fairly well understood, the study of non-unilineal systems is as yet in its infancy. It is a relatively unchartered field of knowledge, with as yet no generally acceptable and precise conceptual language of its own. One is therefore inevitably faced with problems of terminology in describing such a system. It seems to me that the simplest way to clear these problems out of the way is to make a preliminary statement as to the terms used and their meaning. I shall be mainly using the three following concepts:
1. 'Universe of kin'. I take this term from Firth (1963), and I use it to indicate the widest number of people recognised by a person as being related to him - what one may call his nominal kin.

2. 'Kinship set'. For this term I am indebted to P.H. Gulliver (personal communication). A kinship set is a particular kind of ego-centred quasi-group - that is it is made up of a set of related people who interact together frequently. These are the effective kin of a person who will always be present on occasions when help is required. The kinship set is recruited from a person's universe of kin.

3. The kinship set must be conceptually distinguished from the 'action set' which is the set of people who assemble on any particular occasion in response to the request of ego for assistance.¹ By observing a series of action sets one can build up a picture of any person's kinship set - in other words a kinship set is a generalisation from the particular action sets of any one individual.

We need terms like this in a study of non-unilineal kinship systems simply because in such a society there are no mutually distinct kin groups based on descent which may form the framework for action in any particular situation. There are only two kinds of kinship group in Tundwa, and these are both groups limited to the household. Moreover they may cut across one another. The first of these groups is composed solely of women and is based on mutual help. I call it a female kin unit for want of a better term. Its significance will become clear shortly. The second kind of kinship group is based on

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¹ I am following A. Mayer's definition of the concept. (Mayer, 1966, p.98 onwards).
economic ties and is composed of a primary income earner and his or her dependents (some of whom may be minor income earners). I call this group a dependency unit because ties of economic dependency are its main feature. Its members reside under one roof, which they may share with one or more similar groups. A few examples of more or less typical dependency units will illustrate both the concept and the range of types.

Example 1: Bauru is a rich man with nearly thirteen acres of land. He is the focus of a dependency unit of his wife, one grown-up daughter waiting to be married and six younger children. His wife and daughter are minor income earners because they do women's work such as plaiting strips of matting.

Example 2: S. is not so well off as Bauru. He has a little less than six and a half acres of land which he has bought. He is potentially rich however because his father is one of the richest men in the village. At present his dependency unit consists of nine people including himself, his wife, an adolescent son who helps him on the land, an adolescent daughter of marriageable age, two younger children, his wife's small son by another marriage and his wife's divorced sister and her baby. The wife's sister was reputed to be a prostitute, and may have earned some income in this way, but I doubt if she earned enough to keep herself.

Example 3: M. owns just over three acres of land. His dependency unit consists of himself, his wife, his wife's mother and his wife's
mother's mother.

**Example 4:** R. owns just over five and a half acres of land which he bought. He supports his mother, and his younger brother who is still a child. His father is dead.

**Example 5:** J. is the owner of a house in which she lives with her younger brother, her mother and her mother's sister. She has been twice married and divorced and has never borne a child. She is well known in the town to be a prostitute and built her house with the proceeds from this. She and the other women in the house also occupy themselves with women's work.

**Example 6:** A. lives with her five illegitimate children and her adult daughter. Both these women spend much of their time in Mombasa, but return frequently to Tundwa. Both are divorced women who either are or have been successful prostitutes. It is not so easy to say here who is the primary income earner - mother or daughter. In Mombasa they usually live together.

**Example 7:** M.K. is an old woman. She supports her young grandson, whose mother is in Mombasa. She is the owner of her house and acts as a 'housekeeper' for two middle-aged men who have no wives and no relatives with whom they can live. Both men are farmers and M.K. cooks their food for them and takes enough for herself and her grandson too. She also gets small and irregular remittances from Mombasa - both her son and her daughter are there.

These examples show that there are two main types of dependency
unit — those focused on a male income earner and those focused on a female income earner. Statistically speaking the latter are far rarer than the former as the following table shows. In addition the average number of people they encompass is less. Nevertheless the number of female oriented dependency units is high enough to indicate that such a possibility is economically viable.

Table 8. Dependency units in Tundwa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependency units</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Average size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male earner as focus</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female earner as focus</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The four examples of male focused dependency units which I have given indicate the main types found — the simple nuclear family of a man with his wife and children, the nuclear family together with female affines of the male income earner, or a nuclear family of a man with his mother and younger brothers and sisters.

Within a household one can sometimes find two dependency units though the majority have only one. Thus there are in Tundwa 205 occupied houses, and altogether 286 dependency units. An example will make this clear. Bauru's household (example 1) contained not only his own dependency unit but also his married daughter and her husband, Hury. These people were not Bauru's dependents. Hury did
not help Bauru, but cultivated his own land and thereby supported his wife. Every day he would give her a few shillings for the necessary expenses of the day, in the same way as Bauru would give his own wife money every day. The women of the household cooked together and sometimes ate together. The men usually ate separately. Thus although there was co-operation between the women of the household, there were two separate and distinct sources of income here creating two separate groups of dependents. When Hury later divorced Bauru’s daughter and left the household, the daughter again became part of Bauru’s dependency unit and he was again responsible for her needs.

In many societies we should be able to speak of the household as one socio-economic group because it would have a leader - the household head - who would be in control of its affairs and in particular of its economic affairs. He would own, or at least be in control of, any household property. He would organise the production of the household and distribute its income. Other members of the household would be under his authority - although this might be limited by the authority of outside bodies.

In Tundwa this situation is not found. To begin with there is no institutionalised role of household head, though in some cases a man may be de facto head in the sense I outlined above. If we take the example we have been discussing so far however, we find that neither Bauru nor Hury is in sole control of the economic affairs of the household, nor are they in joint control. Put in another way one can say
that neither controls the affairs of the other or has authority over him. Each has his land and there is no co-operation in production. Each distributes his income to his own dependents as he pleases.

Another factor also complicates this situation. Neither Bauru nor Hury own the house in which they all live. The owner is Bauru's wife, Mwarabu. And this is by no means an exceptional case — it is in fact the general rule in Tundwa that women should own houses. 86.5% of Tundwa's houses in fact belong to women. There are three ways in which women obtain houses. They may inherit them. Men in this community accept that "it is important for a woman to have a house" (the reason why it is important will become clear shortly), and so when a woman dies leaving a house to be inherited the male heirs usually waive their rights to a share of it, leaving the field clear for female heirs to inherit the house. The second way in which a woman may obtain a house is by building one. Building requires capital and it is usually only prostitutes who are able to build houses. The third way of obtaining a house is by gift — usually from the husband. The husband builds a house which he then gives to his wife. In the case we were examining it was Bauru who built the house and gave it to Mwarabu. He will usually do this only if the marriage seems to be more or less established.

The rule that women rather than men own houses has two effects. It means that when a man marries he has to move out of his mother's house and into that of his wife or her mother. Many men are living therefore with their affinal kin. It also means that when he divorces
his wife he is the one who has to move out. Normally he goes back to live with his mother or his sister. When Huru divorced Bauru's daughter for example he went to his mother's for a while before going to Mombasa to look for a job.

There are thus two ways of looking at a household such as that of Bauru's. One can look at it as two dependency units each focused on a male income earner, as I did in the preceding paragraphs. Or alternatively one can see it as a core of related and permanently settled women (the female kin unit) plus two isolated and temporarily settled men. I think there are both these structural tendencies in any domestic unit in Tundua. In so far as men are the main income earners here and women depend on them for support, we can see the main focus of kinship networks as dependency units. But in so far as women rather than men own houses and are permanently settled, and in so far as they can earn an independent income by prostitution or other means, it is small groups of related women that form the nodes of the kinship network, and men are isolates who attach themselves to one or another such groups at various stages in their life.

It is probably easier to understand what I have said so far if it is set down in diagramatic form. I take Bauru's household as the example. As Diagram 1 shows, the female kin unit cuts across and links the two dependency units. And since Bauru's wife owns the house it is she, rather than Bauru or Huru who is at the centre of this set of relationships.
Diagram 1.

Household of Bauru

Key

- Links of dependency
- Links of mutual help
- Dependency Unit
- Female Kin Unit
There are thus as it were two centripetal tendencies acting here, and since a slightly different balance of forces is achieved in each domestic group we find a wide variety of possible groupings. Ideally a man would like to be in firm control of a group consisting of his wife and children, and later his daughters and their husbands. In such a situation he is not threatened by his wife's ownership of the house and may even give her a house he has built. The symbol of this male ideal is ownership of a shamba since it is this which gives him the capital to be independent. Women however put their security in the close knit group of mother, sisters, grandmother and daughters, if possible all residing under one roof. Their argument is that a husband cannot be trusted since he is always running after other women and will think nothing of divorcing his wife and abandoning his children on any flimsy excuse. But one's mother or sister can always be relied upon to help in times of need. The symbol of the woman's ideal is therefore a house where the female kin unit can co-reside.

Men and women then pursue different ideals – ideals which in practice are irreconcilable. A woman who has neither house nor co-residing female relatives will always work towards achieving this end because without one and/or the other she has no security. A woman who has established a strong female kin unit and who owns her house is however in a strong position to manage without men. The female kin unit then becomes a woman oriented dependency unit. One or more of the women can engage in prostitution whilst a subsistence can be gained
from women's work (see Example 5, p.73). However, without extensive prostitution or other means (such as a shamba worked by agricultural labourers, or remittances from Mombasa) such a household is not economically viable for long, and an attempt will be made to inveigle a man into marrying one of the female relatives. (One woman in such a household described it as "marrying for food"). A man who marries into such a household is not likely to stay for long however since he finds himself supporting all the women in it.

Even in normal circumstances however, a man marries into a house in which he is faced with a strong and united group of female affines, the most formidable of which is usually his mother-in-law. Next to adultery, quarrels with in-laws are probably the most frequent cause of divorce in Tundwa. The following case will illustrate the process.

**Case 5. Time: July 1965**

Athman 'divorced' his wife Momo. He had been living with his wife and three small children in a house belonging to his mother-in-law. The couple shared the house with Momo's mother and father and younger brothers and sisters. Athman complained that when he was ill his mother-in-law never came to visit him even though they were living in the same house. Later, when Momo's mother herself became ill Athman did not visit her. Momo was angry, they quarrelled and Momo demanded a divorce, whereupon Athman left the house and went home to his mother. People said that the couple were divorced. Further unpleasantness was caused when Momo's father brought the three children to Athman and told him they did not want them. As Athman pointed out, this is against the custom of Tundwa, since children stay with their mother after a divorce.

A few days later however the couple were reconciled. This was only achieved however by their removing to another house, an empty and almost derelict house belonging to Athman's FENM, and situated nearby Momo's mother's house. Later Athman began to build a new house on the outskirts of the town.
This case not only illustrates the kind of petty quarrels that arise as a result of the rule of marriage residence - it also indicates the type of solution which men typically seek - that is, they try to separate their wives from the female kin unit by building them a new house or occupying an empty house belonging to a relative. Even where quarrels do not occur men try to move away from their affines. Out of the 186 married men in Tundwa, however, 54.3% are living with female affines (in addition to their wives) whilst 45.7% are living independently with their wives and children.

The strong male-dominated dependency unit is threatened by the existence of female kin units and vice-versa. The fact that men strive for the former and women for the latter makes for frequency of divorce and domestic instability. At any one time there are a high percentage of divorced persons in the village, as can be seen from the following table.

Table 9. Marital status of adult population in Tundwa: 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total Adults</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married persons</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Unmarried adults</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced persons</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Adult population</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Any person who has passed puberty is considered adult in the sense that he or she may now marry.
The table also shows that single women are in the vast majority as opposed to single men — indeed this necessarily follows since there is already an excess of adult women over men in the village. One solution to this problem would be polygamous unions, but Tundwa women reject this possibility outright, although they are aware that it is allowed by Islam. There are in fact only two polygamously married men in the village. This is partly an indication of the strength of women in Tundwa. In addition however a man has to be fairly well-off before he can afford two wives, both of whom he will have to support, and in separate houses, since even a woman who accepts a co-wife will not live in the same house with her. Since polygamy is unacceptable to most women however, it is inevitable that at any one time many of them will be in the divorced state and turn to prostitution. And since prostitution is in many cases more profitable than being married, it allows a woman to build up the capital required to build a house where her mother or sister can live. It is generally through prostitution that female kin units can become woman oriented dependency units.
Younger members of Bauru's household
Wider kinship linkages

I next want to say something about the linkages which people maintain beyond the household. Since in this community kinship links may be traced in any direction a person in effect chooses the kin with whom he will interact. His choice is not however purely random - it is influenced by age and sex, by social status, and to a lesser extent by economic standing. This much will emerge from an examination of the kinship sets of various individuals. The choice is also influenced by geography, in the sense that the limit of most people's kin universe is within the village. This stems from the preference for intra-village endogamy, which I shall discuss in the following chapter. Some people have kinsmen in other villages whom they may visit from time to time, but their links with them are rarely as close as those with kinsmen and kinswomen in the same village.

A person recognises many people as being related to him in one way or another - matrilaterally, patrilaterally or affinally. But he does not generally interact with all these people. A few are selected, with whom he maintains regular contact, whilst contact with the others is more infrequent. Bajunis refer to all persons within their universe of kin as ndugu. At its most precise this term means 'brother' or 'sister', but it is extended to first include cousins, and then at a wider level maternal and paternal kin and even affines. Its precise meaning in any situation depends entirely on the context. Occasionally it is even used to suggest quasi-kinship, as when it is said, "Bajuni
wote ni ndugu mo'ya" (literally: All Bajunis are one brother).

Relations between ndugu may be activated in many ways - by ordinary visits, by attendance and assistance at each other's life crisis rituals (marriage, circumcision, birth, death etc.) or by financial assistance in order to give feasts or in times of need. Such activities are the oil that prevents a person's own kinship set from breaking down. Where firm links have been established, other consolidating activities may be tried such as the arrangement of marriages between the sons and daughters of kinsmen. Certain property arrangements such as I described in the previous chapter are also nearly always based on the kinship set. In all these ways a person may attempt to consolidate his kinship set.

As we might expect, the kinship sets of male members of a household are different to those of female members, though they may coincide at various points. Since men and women rarely interact publicly - that is to say they are segregated in any public ceremony - men's links tend to be with men and women's links with women. Women are far more assiduous than men in keeping kinship links alive. It is they who visit constantly, who are the core of all life crisis rituals and who help each other in small ways day in and day out. The relationships of women are intensive because women need each other. Men, on the other hand, do not help each other very much, nor do they visit their kindred often. They spend their days in their farms and usually work alone. At night they may go to pray at the mosque, or they sit at home
and rest or they visit male friends or relatives. If they are unmarried of course the pattern is slightly different since they spend their evenings with other youths, roaming the town looking for girl friends, or holding dances. An older man who is at all well-off will try and organise a yearly Koran reading and feast (maulidi) for the birth of the Prophet. He will invite as many men as his means allow, both close kinsmen and others who may be more distantly related or not related at all. Other than this he attends the funeral of any person that dies, political meetings if he is interested in politics and the marriage ceremonies and maulidi feasts of other men if he is invited.

To illustrate the way in which these wider networks are utilised I shall return to the case of Bauru (See Diagram 2). During 1965 there were several occasions on which members of his household made use of their kinship networks. Bauru's daughter bore a child which later died. His wife also bore a child. His son was married to his patrilateral parallel cousin. Bauru also held a maulidi feast. On each of these occasions the help and support of relatives was required. In other words, an action set was recruited on each occasion. By observing these successive action sets I was able to build up a composite picture of the kinship sets of Bauru and his wife. On page 87 I have shown these kinship sets in diagrammatic form. They are based on the series of action sets which were recruited by Bauru and Mwarabu during 1965.

The female kin unit in this household, consisting of Bauru's wife
Diagram 2.
Kinship sets of Bauru and Mwarabu

Key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Links of dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Links of mutual help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wider social links</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependency unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female kin unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note

Relationships of women (right hand side) to Mwarabu.
Relationships of men (left hand side) to Bauru.
Mwarabu, and two grown up daughters (one of whom was married) had several intensive relations with women in other households. The closest of these were with Mwarabu's mother and sister who owned houses next to that of Mwarabu. These two women were in and out of the house all the time, and were always ready to help when required. The other group with which they interacted frequently was a female kin unit consisting of Bauru's sisters and sister's daughters. None of these women were married at the time. They supported themselves by prostitution. One of the sisters was the mother of Hury, Mwarabu's daughter's husband. Together with another of Bauru's sisters, this group attended the births of both children born during the year, the funeral feast of the child that died and the marriage of Bauru's son. When it came to the maulidi feast they were unable to attend since they themselves were in mourning for the death of a small child of one of Bauru's sister's daughters. For the feast then Mwarabu had to call on other and more distant relatives for help in cooking - and to some of these she was related through her husband, to some through her mother (see diagram).

All this help was to some extent reciprocated. Bauru's married daughter attended the mourning for her father's sister's daughter's child. When Mwarabu's father held a maulidi feast Mwarabu and her daughters helped Mwarabu's mother with the cooking. And when Mwarabu's sister was sick (she had tuberculosis) they all visited her and helped her in her household tasks.

Bauru had no real need to call on the help of kin during the
year. When he held his maulidi feast and on the occasion of his son's marriage he invited kinsmen along with others. Those kinsmen that attended are shown in the diagram. He in his turn attended the maulidis that were given by his father-in-law and his mother's sister's son.

In the marriage of Bauru's son we have an example of an attempt to consolidate this kinship set. As we shall see in the following chapter, people often try to use the marriages of their children in order to consolidate their own kinship linkages. They express this in a commonly heard phrase: "it is good to marry ndugu (relatives)".¹ Bauru's daughter was already married to his sister's son, Hury, and now his son was to marry his brother's daughter. This son was a youth of about seventeen or eighteen when he married. He worked as a labourer on his father's land - in other words it was his father who made it possible for him to support a wife. Bauru paid the marriage payment to his brother - a sum which is spent mostly on buying new clothes for the bride and decorating her bedroom. After the marriage ceremony, in which Bauru's son was ceremonially transported from his father's house to that of his bride, Bauru continued to be helped on his shamba by his son, even though the young man now lived with his mother and father-in-law. The bride used to visit Mwarabu and her daughters from time to time.

Later events however showed how short-lived such consolidations can be. As I mentioned earlier Bauru's daughter was divorced by her husband Hury - Bauru's sister's son. Hury returned to his mother's house

¹. see p.104, Chapter IV.
for a while and then left for Mombasa to look for work. Bauru's daughter stayed at home for a while and then she also went off to Mombasa to work as a prostitute. When I returned to Tundwa for a short visit in 1967 she was at home on a visit. She had been very successful in Mombasa and was already in the process of constructing herself a house in Tundwa situated just behind that of her parents. She told me that she did not intend to be re-married for at least another year.

Bauru's son had also divorced his cousin by 1967 and had married another girl to whom he was also related but so distantly as to make the connection insignificant. This marriage he had arranged himself, his parents had no hand in it.

The kinship sets of Bauru and his wife overlap with the sets of other people, but no two people, except perhaps for the women of one female kin unit share exactly the same network. If we were to follow out some of these links they would lead us on to other links. If, for example, we followed up Mwarabu's link with her husband's sisters we should find that they in their turn called on other links in time of need as well as that with Mwarabu. Their set included people whom Mwarabu had little contact with and did not visit or help - as we shall see shortly.

It is not always possible to say why certain people are included or excluded from a person's kinship set. Basically however the rule seems to be that a person helps those kinsmen who help him. Some people
are popular and always ready to help others and they can always call on help in times of need. Other people are 'mean' or bad-tempered, and they do not receive much help in times of need, even from close relatives. A good example of the latter was B. A somewhat disagreeable and miserable woman, always complaining, she had quarrelled with her sister and brother over quite minor matters. At the beginning of 1965 she had been recently widowed and was therefore in ritual seclusion (this seclusion, which is called eda, lasts for four months and ten days). In addition her husband had died when she was two months' pregnant. According to local custom she had therefore to stay in seclusion until the child was born. She had three children, the eldest of whom was a boy of only about twelve years. She was thus in a very difficult and trying situation. During this whole period her sister never visited her and she received very little help indeed from any one.

A person's relationships are not solely confined to his kin, but include also friends, acquaintances, and neighbours. This wider category is usually referred to as jamaa - a term which can include kin but usually has a wider implication. In Tundwa however the two categories - kin and non-kin - are not entirely separate; they merge into one another. As a result of extensive intermarriage almost everyone in Tundwa is related to everyone else, directly or indirectly. But since genealogical memory is short not all these links can be traced. And even where they can be traced they are not always explicitly recognised.
It would be difficult to say, for example, whether the second girl whom Bauru's son married should be classified as ndugu rather than jamaa (she was Bauru's MBSD). But sometimes an even more distant link is considered significant - as for example when an old woman explained to me that she was helping another woman with her sick child because the latter was her MMZDSDD! In other words to claim kinship may simply be a justification for maintaining useful links, whereas other links, equally close, may be neglected.

Wider non-kinship links may be more important for some people than for others. Generally they are more important for men than for women. Mwarabu, for example, does not have many wider non-kinship links since most of her friends and neighbours are also her kindred. But there are a few other neighbours round about with whom she maintains some contact, and whom she would visit if they were ill. One or two of these were present when she bore her child. Bauru's wider links are more extensive, but, like his kinship links, not particularly intensive. One of his shambas is worked by a permanent labourer, an ex-slave man without relatives. But Bauru does not appear to maintain any contact with him after work is done, and the man lives elsewhere in the village. Bauru is not active in political affairs, though he attends the occasional meetings that are held. When he held his maulidi feast however he took care to invite the other wealthy and free-born men of the town - that is those of his own social standing. The man who led the prayers was a Sharif, a man from the highest social
stratum. He also invited men to whom he was distantly related as well as his neighbours.

Bauru's household is fairly typical of most in Tundwa in the extent of the links which it maintains, and in the intensity of the kinship sets of its women members as opposed to those of its men. But since kinship sets overlap every person is ultimately linked to every other, and hears of the goings-on of others. Women's sets act as channels of communication to pass on gossip and to form opinions on the affairs of the day. They also operate as a form of social security as well as being an index of a woman's popularity. Men's sets are less significant in some ways since men do not rely on other men for help in the ordinary course of events. In another sense however they may be more significant, since men who are politically active use their own and their wife's links with ndugu and jamaa as a basis of support. I shall illustrate this by taking another example of a rather atypical household which consists only of a man and his wife. The man, Madi, is an active political leader, though not a particularly successful one. To some extent Madi's lack of success can be explained by the fact that he has very few kinsmen in Tundwa. His two brothers and a sister were in Mombasa.

Madi had been twice married, the first short-lived marriage producing a son and a daughter, the second and long-lived one another daughter. In addition he had brought up his second wife's sister's daughter, Aisha, whose mother was dead. Again however all his children,
except for a daughter by the first wife were in Mombasa. His second
wife, Madina, was a very distant relative of his - she was his MMFBSSD.
Madina was very popular in Tundwa and was always ready to help others.
During the year 1965 there was only one occasion on which she needed
help from her kin. This was on the marriage of her daughter Kadi.
Two years later however Madi died and Madina had real occasion on which
to call on her kin for help. The core of this help came from Madina's
mother who lived nearby, her two half-sisters (same father, different
mother), her mother's sister's daughter, her husband's mother's sister's
daughter, and her husband's daughter by his previous marriage. Also
included in Madina's network were a number of women to all of whom she
was related through her half-brother's wife, Biti. (She and her
brother shared the same mother but had a different father). Biti had
an extensive network of female relatives - the focus of which was her­
self and a sister with whom she lived. In addition she had one other
sister. All three sisters maintained close links with a strong female
kin unit consisting of their late mother's sister's and sister's
daughters. Through her brother's wife Madina was in close contact
with all these women. In 1960 she had married Aisha (her sister's
daughter) to the MZS of her brother's wife (see Diagram 3). Aisha
and her husband left for Mombasa soon afterwards. In 1965 Madina's
daughter, Kadi, was married, and all the women mentioned so far came to

1. It is of interest that the female kin unit with which Madina main­
tains a relationship through Biti is the same group of women with
whom Mwarabu, in our previous example, maintains contact. But
Mwarabu and Madina do not maintain links with each other.
Diagram 3.
Kinship sets of Madi and Madina
(Key as for Diagram 2)

Explanatory genealogy
help. Kadi was married to the MBS of Madina's brother's wife - thereby creating another affinal link with this group of relatives and consolidating this part of the network. Madina's daughter and her husband went to Mombasa soon after the marriage but Madina's links with this group of women persisted. She repaid their help by attending a circumcision ceremony which one of these women organised for her young son, and a funeral feast held for the child of another. She also helped in cooking at a maulidi feast organised by her half-brother and his wife.

Madi, Madina's husband, had as I have said no close kinsmen in Tundwa. His father and mother were dead and his siblings were in Mombasa. Both his daughter's husband and Aisha's husband were also in Mombasa with their wives. He had of course a general relationship to all the women with whom his wife interacted but the only male link amongst this group that he could draw upon was his daughter's husband's father. In his attempt to achieve political support therefore, Madi had to cultivate other links. One of these was the old headman of the village, another a pair of inseparable friends with whom he had a somewhat shaky political alliance. Other than this he tried to keep in with all the important and wealthy men in the village and he invited all these people to his daughter's wedding. When it came to an election however the political alliance he had established had broken down and the old headman was forced to stay neutral. He gained only 48 votes and over two-thirds of these were from women members of his wife's kinship set and its wider ramifications. His daughter's husband's
father voted for him and a few other men but he gained only eleven votes from men.

I shall be returning to Madi's bid for power in a later chapter. Here I simply want to point out the importance to him of the support based upon his own and more particularly his wife's kinship set. Had it not been for this he would have had barely any support at all. Other political leaders were more successful for two reasons - firstly because their kinship linkages were more extensive and secondly because they were also able to gain support from non-kinsmen.

This brief analysis of kin relations in Tundwa by no means exhausts the subject, and in fact raises several interesting points which might be followed up later. For the purpose of this thesis, however, I think I have said enough to elucidate the connection of kinship with political action in this community. It is not that political action here involves the opposition of pre-existing descent groups (as it might in the archetypal model of the segmentary lineage system). Nor does any political leader have, in his kin group or lineage, a ready-made set of supporters. In Tundwa a person must build up his own kinship set, and women in particular spend most of their lives doing so. Political leaders are in a similar position - and they use the links they have established on a kinship basis as a platform from which to recruit support.

Both of the examples which I have discussed in detail in this chapter involved Waungwana men with Waungwana wives. Neither of these
men have any members of the other two strata in their kinship sets. Some Waungwana do have such links where there has been intermarriage across the strata. But since the preference is for endogamous marriage such links are rare. In the next chapter I shall examine the system of social stratification since stratification imposes an overall framework on the network of individual linkages which I have discussed so far.
IV. THE ASCRIPTION OF STATUS: MARRIAGE CHOICES

"Everyone is a Bajuni, but the Bajuni are divided into three strata (makabila). There are the Sharifs, then there are the Waungwana and then there are the Wachumwa". A Sharif man

"There are two strata (makabila) here - the Waungwana and the Wachumwa. The Wachumwa are bad and inferior people. Also there is another stratum, the Masherifu". A mwungwana woman

Everyone in Tundwa can categorise everyone else in terms of the stratum to which he or she belongs, and he is able to do this because he knows how that person's father was categorised. The people see the community as divided into three patrilineally ascriptive strata: the Masherifu¹ or reputed descendents of the Prophet Mohamed, the Waungwana² or free men and the Wachumwa³ or ex-slaves. These three ascriptive strata are ranked by the people, with the Masherifu at the top, the Waungwana in the middle and the Wachumwa at the bottom. Demographically speaking the Waungwana are by far the largest category, as the following table shows. Nevertheless the other two categories make up 35.4% of the population and are certainly not an insignificant minority which can reasonably be ignored.

Table 10. Stratification in Tundwa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratum</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Total Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Masherifu</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Waungwana</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Wachumwa</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The strata in Tundwa are not corporate groups. They have no leaders or common property interests. There are no occasions on which all members of a stratum identify themselves openly by acting corporately, and no rituals in which stratification is symbolised. On the contrary, superficially the Bajunis appear to be socially undifferentiated. There are no sharp differences in the material style of life of members of the different strata; all live in the same mean houses, eat the same kind of food and wear the same kind of clothes. There is a tendency for members of the ex-slave stratum to cluster together in certain locations of the town, but this is not immediately obvious.

It should not be thought however that the framework of stratification exerts no influence on social action. It does in fact exert a profound influence, and in particular marriage choices are determined by it. The strata are perpetuated because by and large people marry within their own stratum, and they justify their marriage choices in terms of the prestige ranking of the strata. We must first then understand the basis of this prestige ranking.
In discussing prestige ranking in Tundwa we are dealing partly with differences which have a basis in historical fact and partly with the evaluation of the historical facts by the people themselves. It is not always easy to disentangle the two. The basic division in the community is between those who are free born and those who are the descendents of slaves. That the institution of slavery existed is not in doubt and we know that slavery was abolished in East Africa in 1897. Nor do local accounts of the operation of the institution of slavery seem implausible. Slaves were brought from the mainland, after having been bought in slave markets or captured. They were virtually chattels, the property of their masters. They were employed in farming - mainly on the mainland where annual crops were grown. Women slaves also did some agricultural work, but generally they worked in the houses of their masters. Slaves thus freed their masters from the drudgery of manual work. Not all free men were wealthy enough to have slaves however, and these men had to work for themselves.

This much seems plausible. Slaves were strangers, the property of their masters, virtually outside 'society'. But the Bajunis go further than this. They assert that there is a 'racial' difference between the Waungwana and the slaves. The Waungwana, they say, are Arabs, whereas the ex-slaves are said to be Africans. It is clear to anyone that the Bajunis are a very racially mixed people, varying at one extreme from people who are very dark-skinned and have typically negroid features, to people who are quite light-skinned and have narrow
features. And there is a full range of mixtures of these two extreme physical types. But it would not be entirely true to say that colour and physical differences coincide with the distinction between the Waungwana and the Wachumwa. And there is no proof that the Waungwana themselves were ever the descendents of Arabs. Nevertheless the Waungwana firmly believe in this myth and evaluate physical differences accordingly. Fairness of skin and straightness of hair are highly valued; 'black' skin and negroid features are thought of as ugly.

It is in the field of marriage that this argument is typically used. Endogamous marriage is justified in terms of racial purity and thus the evaluation of history has become more significant than the actual historical fact of slavery itself. Today the name mchumwa no longer means literally a slave, since slavery as an economic institution has long since been abolished. It means rather an inferior, low and ugly person.

The Masherifu seem to have been late-comers into this situation. Some of them have been in the area for seven generations or more (perhaps about two hundred years?) whilst others have come more recently. Like the Wachumwa then they came as strangers and outsiders, but strangers of a completely different character. In the first place they came voluntarily, unlike the slaves, who were brought by force. They seem to have come mainly from Somalia, but like the Waungwana they claimed to be of Arab ancestry. Not only this but they also claimed to be of the illustrious line of the Prophet himself. Their proof was in the
written genealogies which they preserved showing an unbroken male line of descent back to the Prophet. On the strength of this they claimed a superior status to the other Waungwana. In so far as the Bajunis are Muslims they appear to have accepted this claim and some of them agreed to marry their daughters to the Masherifu. The Sharifs however never allowed their daughters to marry men of lower strata, and in so far as this was accepted by the Waungwana, the Masherifu were able to establish themselves as the topmost stratum in the social hierarchy. But the Masherifu were always the smallest category and they were unable to translate their high social status into power over others, either in the political or the religious field. The Waungwana - or at least the wealthy amongst them - kept this power very firmly in their own hands. The Masherifu were however able to gain wealth at the expense of the Waungwana and are now the wealthiest category in the village.

This then is the background, historical and ideological, to the ranking of the three strata in Tundwa. I shall go into its economic and political aspects in later chapters. In this chapter I want to examine the means by which the strata are perpetuated - that is through preferential marriage choices. I shall examine the basis for these choices and suggest some reasons why the patterns are changing. At present however marriage choices perpetuate the strata and create discontinuities in the overall pattern of kinship linkages. This has political consequences as we shall see in Part II of this thesis.
Marriage choices

Various factors affect the choice of spouse in Tundwa - Islamic prohibitions, geography, kinship, wealth, and most important of all, stratification. The pattern of marriage choices which perpetuates the three strata makes more sense however if we discuss it in the context of other factors.

According to Muslim law a man is allowed to marry anyone except for a small range of very close kin (M, D, Z, FZ, MZ, BD, ZD, SW, GM and GD). But other rules, preferences and prohibitions, not stated in Muslim law, are significant amongst the Bajunis. First there is a tendency for intra-village endogamy - only 14.8% of Tundwa's extant marriages involved a partner from outside the village. Nearly all of these were men married into the village. This marriage pattern is more a matter of convenience than specific preference. As I explained in the previous chapter, when a man marries he normally goes to reside with his wife. If his wife is in another village, whilst his land is near his own (and this is the usual pattern) such an arrangement causes a lot of inconvenience. Nor is there a great deal of interaction between villages such that a man would normally find it easy to marry in other than his own village.

Secondly there is an expressed preference for marriage to kin (ndugu). This preference is only strongly expressed however in the case of the first marriages of girls where the control of parents is uppermost. Young girls are to some extent secluded before marriage
(they are supposed to stay at home and are not allowed to attend public ceremonies such as marriages or feasts). In general therefore they are subject to the more effective control of parents - or of their mothers if their father is at this stage married to someone else - than are young men. Young men, if they are already economically independent - and as we have seen, many of them are - can no longer be controlled by their parents. They roam around the village freely, especially at nights when they hold dances and visit prostitutes. They generally have to find their own marriage payments and they usually choose their own wives. It is only where a young man's father provides some or all of these payments that he has any control over the choice of his son's spouse. Young girls are however completely dependent on their parents until their first marriage.

When people say, "it is good to marry ndugu", they do not mean marriage into a bounded group of kin. As we have already seen, the universe of kin is an unbounded category which includes maternal and paternal kin, and even affines. It shades off into an even wider category of friends, acquaintances and neighbours (jamaa). When people say that it is "good" to marry ndugu they mean that it is better to marry one's daughter to the son of a person who is already known and trusted because one already maintains a relationship with him or her. Parents in other words use their daughters to consolidate their own set of kin and quasi-kin linkages. But marriages may also be used to extend a person's kinship set. The marriage of Madina's sister's
daughter, Aisha, described in the previous chapter, extended Madina’s kinship set and the new links were later consolidated by the marriage of Madina’s daughter, Kadi.

Marriages to kin do not appear however to be more stable than other marriages in the community. Kin marriages are usually first marriages and when they end in divorce (which is the way nearly two-thirds of Tundwa’s marriages end)¹ neither men nor women are any longer under parental control. At this point a person is building up his own set of kin, not working in terms of that of his parents. Later marriages are therefore less likely to be to kinsmen. As one woman put it: “It is good that one’s first marriage should be within the ndugu. Later one may marry further afield (mbali)’’.

Taking all this into account, what can one say of the incidence of marriage to ndugu? One thing seems certain – marriage to close kin such as cousins is not so frequent as one might expect. Out of Tundwa’s 186 extant marriages in 1965, only nine were cousin marriages. All except one were first marriages of the woman involved. Beyond the range of cousins we cannot sensibly talk of the incidence of marriage to ndugu, since this term does not represent a bounded group.

There are no financial incentives for arranging marriages to kin rather than unrelated persons since marriage payments do not vary on this principle. Two payments should be made on marriage. The first

1. There is a register of marriages and divorces kept in Faza District office. Since 1951 every man has been legally obliged to register his marriages and divorces. This rule is not however enforced in Faza and only some men register their marriages. The register however shows that out of 67 marriages contracted and registered by Tundwa men between 1951 and 1957, forty (59.7%) had ended in divorce by 1965. This is probably a reasonable reflection of the divorce rate in Tundwa.
is mahari ('bridewealth'), and the second is pesa ya harusi (marriage payment). The first is promised on marriage and should be paid either immediately or very soon afterwards to the girl herself. In the last analysis, if not previously paid, it should be given to the girl upon divorcing her (and is thus a kind of insurance against divorce). In fact in Tundwa, the total payment, though promised, is rarely made at all. (In only about 16% of all registered divorces is it fully paid). The reason is that many women voluntarily forfeit the payment by demanding the divorce. The amount varies from about 40/- to about 800/- but the customary payment is 240/-. It does not vary according to the type of marriage (first or later, kin or not kin, within or outside the stratum) but according to the wealth and prestige of both sides. The marriage payment by contrast goes to the father of the bride in a first marriage and to the bride herself in a second marriage. This payment is obligatory and is always paid before marriage. It varies between 200/- to 700/- for the first marriage and 50/- to 100/- for later marriages, the amount varying according to the same criteria as those above. It is meant in all cases to provide the girl with new clothes, a bed and other household requirements. Both types of marriage payment therefore go to the bride or her family but there is no financial advantage or disadvantage to be had from marrying a girl to one of her kinsmen.

Economic considerations of another sort do come into the picture however since we find a tendency for close kin marriages to occur more
often where the two families are fairly well-off. Although I never heard anyone give inheritance as a motive for marrying a person, such marriages would obviously keep whatever property there was within a narrower group. And sometimes one finds a pattern of such marriages repeated over the generations, creating very tightly-knit groups of kindred. Again this process is only marked where the families involved are wealthy. One section of the Masherifu is very closely intermarried in this way, as are some of the Waungwana.

The third factor which influences marriage choices is wealth. There is a general tendency in Tundwa for intermarriage between people of like economic status. There is also a strong tendency for people with property (particularly shambas) to marry the daughters and sisters of other property owners.

The first and most important consideration in choosing a spouse however is not kinship or wealth, but the stratum membership of the proposed spouse. The strongest preference is always expressed for marriage within the stratum. To some extent we can see the preference for stratum endogamy as simply an extension of the preference for marriage to kindred. The difference between the stratum and the kindred is that the former is a bounded unit whereas the latter is potentially unbounded and based on individual egos. The strata are bounded because of the rule of patrilineal succession, but it must be noted that this does not make them unilineal descent groups. As I have already pointed out, the strata are not groups but categories.
In addition however they have no overall genealogical framework, either real or fictitious. Most people remember genealogies of only two to three generations. Only the Masherifu keep written genealogies and have an eponymous ancestor – the Prophet Mohamed. But even in this case the written genealogies are not displayed, recited or memorised, and one Sharif clan in Tundwa has even lost its written genealogy. Even for the Sharifs then what is important is not the written genealogy but the single known link of father to son. As they themselves put it: "We know [a person's] father and that is enough for us". Neither the Waungwana nor the Wachumwa keep written genealogies and their strata have no eponymous ancestors.

The term that the Bajuni use for stratum is kabila (plural makabila). This term may have many meanings but it always carries with it the implication of relationship. At its most general it can be applied to any two objects that have something in common, and can thus mean 'type' or 'kind'. With reference to social units it usually carries the implication of kinship, real or assumed. Thus it is applied to units that we would separately describe as 'tribe', 'people', 'stratum' or 'clan'.¹ Such kinship may or may not be unilineal, and as far as the Bajuni are concerned it is more generally seen as

¹. All free-born men (Masherifu and Waungwana) in Tundwa are members of clans, but these clans no longer have any social significance as groups. Clan names are inherited from the father. It is the name rather than anything else which is socially significant these days, since it establishes one as a free man. There are no Wachumwa clans.
multilateral. I do not think it unreasonable therefore to assert that the Bajunis see the stratum as a kind of bounded kin unit. As the same time however the strata are ranked categories whose members are concerned to maintain their differential status. And one way of doing this is through discriminatory marriage choices.

Marriage and stratification

When a Sharif or mwungwana man wishes to get married he looks for a girl who has both good descent (nasab) and a good character (tabia). In other words he looks for a girl from a good family within his own stratum (one which has no slave descent), which can be trusted to have brought her up properly. Only if he can find no suitable girl in his own stratum does he begin to look in the next lower stratum. The preference for endogamy is very strongly expressed — to marry outside the stratum is disapproved of because it, "destroys the stratum (kabila)", and hypergamy, though allowed, is not thought of as highly as endogamous marriage. The following table indicates the extent to which these ideal rules are followed.

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1. One sometimes gets the impression that at some time in the past the Bajunis — or perhaps just the Waungwana — saw themselves as a people with a common patrilineal ancestry and that the strata and clans were corporate descent groups. One also gets the impression that patrilineal descent meant more in the past than it does now. But this may simply be a general tendency on the part of people to over-simplify the past and to remember it as a time when people always obeyed the rules.
Table 11. Marriage and stratification in Tundwa: Analysis of 186 marriages extant in 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratum</th>
<th>Type of marriage partner</th>
<th>Total No. of Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endogamous</td>
<td>Hypergamous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I  Masherifu</td>
<td>24 (12 men 12 women)</td>
<td>7 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Waungwana</td>
<td>210 (105 men 105 women)</td>
<td>16 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Wachumwa</td>
<td>80 (40 men 40 women)</td>
<td>17 women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No. of Partners</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>46 (23 men 23 women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No. of marriages</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total</td>
<td>84.4%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Two men married polygamously are counted twice.

Endogamy: The norm

Table 11 shows that to a large extent endogamy is the statistical norm in Tundwa. It would be even more true to say that it is the ideal norm for the two higher strata - the Masherifu and the Waungwana. This ideal is justified in three ways - first by reference to 'racial' purity, second by reference to morality, and thirdly by reference to status. As I have already indicated, members of each of the two higher strata believe themselves to have distinctive physical features which set them apart and in particular which distinguish them from the ex-slaves. The Masherifu believe themselves to look "like Arabs" but also to have
certain distinctive physical traits (never clearly specified) which set them apart from other free men. The Waungwana too believe themselves to look like Arabs, and believe that they have fair skins and straight hair. Both these strata are united in their view of the physical characteristics of the Wachumwa, who are said to be "black", and to be Africans rather than Arabs.

Not only this but moral evaluations are linked to physical appearance. The Wachumwa have ascribed to them all the worst moral attributes - bad manners, sexual promiscuity and untrustworthiness. The name Waungwana in itself carries all the values which this category attributes to itself. Besides meaning free men as opposed to slaves, it also means noble and civilised. The Waungwana believe themselves to be the antithesis of all that they describe the Wachumwa to be - they think of themselves as morally proper, proud and refined in manners. The Masherifu, in addition to claiming all the moral characteristics of other free men, speak of themselves as watukufu - exalted and pious men. I need hardly add that moral attributes do not in fact divide the population in this way.

It is only one step from these essentially 'racialistic' attitudes to the concept of 'purity' (usafi). Usafi can mean two things. It can be applied to one who personifies all the virtues of a free born man (i.e. those I outlined above). Or it can mean purity of 'blood' (damu safi) in which case it is applied to a person whose father and mother were both free born. Thus although a person takes
the stratum status of his father he is not considered 'pure' unless his mother was also free born. When I asked why the status of one's mother should be considered significant in view of the rule of patrilineal succession I was told: "True the name comes from the father, but the behaviour and personality (zitendo) are from the mother". The two meanings of usafi are in fact two aspects of the same idea. A person who is pure in blood is also 'pure' in the moral sense of having all the virtues of a free born man. It is individuals rather than groups or families that are labelled 'impure'. If such an individual marries into his own stratum and his children similarly the matter is forgotten. There are many cases such as this, even amongst people who are normally spoken of as Waungwana safi. It is only if the marriage pattern is repeated in later generations that a more general stigma is attached. In other words one cannot say that the Waungwana are divided into those who are 'pure' and those who are not, since 'purity' is a matter of degree.

The ideology of racial and moral purity backs up the strong preference for endogamy. Transgression is a matter of shame (aibu). "We cannot marry Wachumwa", said one mwungwana adolescent girl. "That would be very shameful because they are black. We marry Waungwana. We can also marry Sharifs - they are Waungwana". The Masherifu, who are at the top of the social hierarchy are also concerned to maintain their status vis-à-vis the Waungwana. Therefore they argue that: "A Sharif must marry a Sharif or the stratum will be destroyed".
Waungwana women

Women at a wedding dance
The ideal norm then is clear, and by and large the statistics show that it is being followed. We would probably have expected however that more than ideal norms were required to uphold such an important principle of the community. Endogamy however is not supported by any organised sanctions, either negative or positive. As I have already explained, the marriage payments do not vary according to whether a marriage is within or outside the stratum, but according to quite different criteria. Only the Sharifs claim to demand a higher mahari (bridewealth) than other strata – 400/- as opposed to the customary 240/-, but in practice they often offer and accept less. And in any case, since mahari is so rarely paid this barrier is purely theoretical.

If there are no positive organised sanctions there are no negative ones either. No-one actively intervenes to prevent marriages taking place across strata lines. All the sanctions are diffuse and can be summed up in two kinds of motive – economic self interest and concern for public opinion. As we shall see in the next chapter there are real economic differences between the three strata, and it is generally in any person's economic interest to marry within his own stratum rather than marrying into a lower one. Secondly public approval is bestowed on those who marry endogamously, whilst those who marry out are criticised.

Finally one can say that the on-going pattern of kinship networks encourages endogamy, since most people's kin are of the same stratum as themselves. Interaction between members of different strata
is thereby minimised and intermarriage is less likely to take place.

**Divergence from the norm : 1. Hypergamy**

In spite of the strong ideology supporting endogamy, 12.4% of Tundwa's marriages in 1965 were hypergamous - that is they were marriages of men of higher strata to women of lower strata. Such marriages are usually justified by the argument that since a person takes the stratum status of his father such a marriage cannot be deleterious to the man's children. As we have seen however, concepts of racial purity would contradict this argument, since to be pure a person must have both father and mother from the same stratum. This explains why a mwungwana woman could say: "We could not be married by so-and-so, even though his father is our relative. We should say, 'Your mother was a slave'." This ambivalence about hypergamous marriage reflects a similar ambivalence in the kinship system, which, formally speaking, is patrilineal, but in practice is very far from patrilineal.

We must distinguish here between the attitudes of women towards hypergamous marriage as opposed to those of men. On the whole women welcome a hypergamous marriage since it means that their children will be born into a higher stratum than themselves. For women it means a step upwards. For men however hypergamy is always a second best choice to marrying a woman from his own stratum. For him it is a step downwards.

We must also distinguish here between hypergamous marriages of Masherifu men with Waungwana women, and those of men of either of the
two higher strata with ex-slave women. Whereas the former type of marriages are respectable since they involve two free born persons, the latter are considered degrading and are subject to much social disapproval.

In contrast to the Waungwana, the Masherifu in Tundwa are such a small category that some of them are more or less forced to marry out. At present too the Masherifu are the only category which has an excess of adult men over women. As a result some Sharif men are forced either to marry into Sharif families in other villages (with the consequent inconvenience of this course of action) or to marry hypergamously. Most of them choose the latter course.

There is I think another reason for Masherifu hypergamy. Were they to practise total endogamy they would have no kinship links binding them to other categories and their descent status relative to these other categories would remain undefined. It is only through hypergamous marriage that one can both establish links with other categories and at the same time show through action that one is superior to them. Since the Masherifu lack political power and are such a small group they need some links with other groups to bind them into the community. Some of these links may be created through the use of wealth, but kinship links are equally important.

Support for this argument is contained both in ideology and in the pattern of Masherifu hypergamous marriages. The proud boast of the Sharifs is that, "You can always tell the child of a Sharif, even
if his mother was not a Sharif*. In other words they are asserting that their descent cannot be sullied by the mother, no matter who she is. Non-Sharif women on the whole are prepared to accept the Sharifs' claims to be specially favoured in the eyes of Allah. (In this they are less critical than men). To bear the child of a Sharif is therefore to gain blessings (baraka) both for themselves and the child. Waungwana women so honoured will point to their child with pride — "this one is a Sharif". Ideology thus supports and justifies Masherifu hypergamy.

The pattern of Masherifu hypergamous marriages is also significant. There were seven of such marriages extant in 1965, of which all but one were with Waungwana women. This is not surprising since links with the Wachumwa are of little use to a man who is concerned about his status. The only Sharif married to a mchumwa woman was an old man of the lowest economic category. This marriage moreover was of such long standing that I suspect that the woman involved was originally a slave concubine. She had no known relatives.

Moreover it is not the case that only poor Masherifu men marry hypergamously. Such men come from all economic categories including the highest and the lowest. In general they were married to women of equivalent economic status to themselves.¹ It seems to be the case

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¹. On a somewhat rough and ready assessment of the woman's economic status, according to her father's income, or that of her mother's husband, her sister or her sister's husband as seemed appropriate — these being the people who would support her if she had no husband.
then that wealth or lack of wealth is not the cause of Sharif hypergammy, but rather a shortage of Sharif women together with the desire to create links with the Waungwana. Through these seven extant marriages, together with similar marriages which have taken place in the past, the Sharifs are linked to both of the political factions and to the Sheikh of the mosque.

Waungwana hypergamy is a different matter altogether since in such marriages Waungwana are linking themselves with the lowest stratum of ex-slaves. Such marriages can only diminish the prestige of the man within his own stratum. The people contrast this situation with the past when, they say, hypergamous marriages between free born men and slave girls were more frequent than they are now. It cost nothing and involved no reflection on a man's status for him to 'marry' his slave or to make her his concubine (suria). Quite the contrary; such a marriage simply asserted his ownership of the slave girl. The children of such a marriage do not seem to have suffered. There are quite a few cases of this kind which emerge from examination of the genealogies of rich Waungwana families - families that is which would have had slaves in the past. At present however marriage to an ex-slave woman is similar to marrying a woman of any other stratum - marriage payments of equivalent order have to be paid. And in addition a man now endangers his own status by marrying an ex-slave woman. Thus it would seem likely that hypergamous marriage is less frequent now than in the past, and that it would be resorted to mainly by men of low
status within their own stratum.

This deduction is largely supported by the evidence. Out of the sixteen Waungwana men who are married hypergamously only two could be considered at all wealthy, and these two are only in the middle income category. The rest are all in the lower income categories. Three quarters of them own no land and have to cultivate mahonde or carry out other less well paid occupations. They are mostly married to women of similar or slightly lower economic status. Two exceptions are of interest however. One is a man without land who cultivates a honde. He is married to a mchumwa woman who owns a small shamba inherited from a previous mchumwa husband. The other man is also a honde cultivator who was born in Lamu. He is married to a woman whose son is one of Lamu District's Members of Parliament and who receives regular and generous help from him. In these two cases then the men were actually raising their economic status by marrying down.

None of the Waungwana men married hypergamously hold any political or religious office: such men take care to marry endogamously. Affinal links in one generation however turn into maternal links in the next, and it is certainly true that some links of this sort, cutting across the strata may become significant in the context of political activity in the next generation.

Two of the Waungwana men who are married hypergamously are themselves the sons of Wachumwa women. They are therefore not 'pure'
Waungwana. By contrast four of the Wachumwa women so married had Waungwana mothers and were marrying back up into the Waungwana stratum. It seems to be fairly general that one marriage across the strata leads to others. Three of the six Sharif men married to Waungwana women themselves had Waungwana mothers. The reason seems to be that once a kinship network is established which cuts across the strata it acts as a kind of bridge for later generations to cross. One of the consequences of such a succession of marriages, if they are by Waungwana men to Wachumwa women is that the children may be discriminated against in marriage. This does not seem to be very common, but it does occasionally happen as the following case shows.

Case 6. Time: circa 1960

Aba is the only child of a mchumwa mother, Ilaji, and a mwungwana man Sheebwana (see genealogy). It is of interest that Ilaji’s mother, Yumbe, is herself a mwungwana woman, and the sister of Sheebwana’s mother. For reasons which I do not know, Yumbe married a mchumwa man, Said, and bore him Ilaji, her only child. Ilaji was then married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Sheebwana. Like her mother she bore only one child, Aba. Sheebwana died when Aba was quite young. Aba went to Primary school in Rasini, unlike most children in Tundwa, (until 1966 there was no school in Tundwa) and later he accompanied his mother to Mombasa where he attended secondary school. He later trained to be a tally clerk in the port of Mombasa. As an educated man and with a white collar job he would ordinarily have been a very desirable partner. Nevertheless when he made attempts to marry his patrilateral parallel cousin, Riziki, a very fair-skinned girl with straight hair, he was refused. The girl’s mother and father are both dead and she lives with her mother’s sister. It was this woman, herself a mwungwana, who was most strongly against the marriage and effectively prevented it from taking place. She argued that Aba and Riziki were too closely related, and that such a marriage would cause quarrels. This was obviously a flimsy excuse since such marriages are normally commended. I was
told by others that the real reason was that Aba’s mother was a mchumwa. Aba later married a mwungwana girl from Rasini.

This case is extremely interesting because from it one can observe the long term effects of hypergamous and other marriages across strata lines. This case represents an extreme example of what may happen. More commonly however, the children of a Waungwana – Wachumwa hypergamous marriage will be insulted by being called ‘slaves’ even though their father was a mwungwana.

Two other general features of hypergamy are that it may occur where the woman involved is a prostitute since this allows her to have contacts with a wide range of men. There are three cases of this kind. Secondly the percentage of marriages involving a spouse from outside Tundwa is double the percentage for the village as a whole (31.3% as opposed to 14.8%). Such stranger spouses are to some extent outside the local pattern of strata relationships. This explains why Aba, after having been refused a mwungwana girl in his own village was able to find a mwungwana spouse in another village. The following case the illustrates/influence of the factors of prostitution and stranger status.


Mwanatime is a mchumwa woman. She was first married to a mchumwa man, bore him one child and was then divorced. She left for Mombasa and spent several years there working as a prostitute. During this time she met with an Indian, a Hindu, who wished to marry her. He was disowned by his family, became a Muslim and came back with Mwanatime to Tundwa. As an Indian he was classed as a mwungwana. I very much doubt that he was aware of Mwanatime’s status before he married her. He worked as a fisherman in Tundwa – an occupation which is usually carried out by Wachumwa.

To sum up then we can say that hypergamous marriages are
contracted out of necessity by some Masherifu men, whereas those of Waungwana men are generally associated with low economic status.

**Divergence from the norm : 2. Hypogamy**

If we are to believe the people themselves, hypogamous marriage is a phenomenon of recent years. As one mwungwana woman put it, in commenting on one such marriage which took place in 1965: "These days people don't care. In the past they only married endogamously (kufu-kufu)."⁠¹ In this particular instance I think the local version of history is probably accurate and is not simply an attempt to glorify the past. We must distinguish however between hypogamous marriages between Masherifu women and Waungwana men (both free born) and hypogamous marriages between Masherifu or Waungwana women and Wachumwa men. I have no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any marriages of the former type occurred until recent years, but it could be argued that the evidence has been conveniently forgotten. As for marriages of the second type, I think it most unlikely that any could have occurred either prior to the abolition of slavery or in the years immediately succeeding abolition. In view of the status of the slaves as chattels, no slave man would have been allowed to marry a free born girl. And in the years immediately succeeding abolition very few slaves had the wealth either to provide the necessary marriage payments or to make it worth the while of a mwungwana woman to suffer the public disapproval that such a marriage would entail.

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⁠¹ From the Arabic kaf'ah (equivalence in status)?
The very earliest known case of a mwungwana woman marrying an ex-slave man is not without significance. It occurred about forty years ago and involved a mchumwa man who, as a result of labour migration, had purchased a shamba.

Hypogamous marriages then seem to be an indicator of social change. In so far as one can rely on oral accounts and genealogies they appear to be increasing. As can be seen from Table 11, there were only six in 1965 (3.2% of all marriages). Two more occurred towards the end of that year - of two Sharif women significantly enough. Of the six marriages extant in 1965, all except one were of Waungwana women married to Wachumwa men. The exception was a Sharif woman married to a mwungwana man. But there has even been a case in the recent past of a Sharif woman marrying an ex-slave man (see Case 8, p.126).

Two general tendencies seem to be at work here, the most important of which is the ability of Wachumwa men nowadays to achieve wealth and thereby become more eligible as spouses. In line with these changes in the distribution of wealth have come other changes - an over-riding authority (first Britain and latterly Independent Kenya) which have ignored the fact that this is a stratified community, and an increasing emancipation of women through prostitution. All these changes, if not actually encouraging hypogamy, have at least made it more possible now than in the past.

Certain factors emerge from an analysis of cases of hypogamous marriages. The most important factor seems to be the wealth of the
man involved relative to that of the family into which he marries. It appears to have been significant in five out of the six extant cases, in many of the cases which have occurred in the past and in two cases which occurred after I made my census. In so far as the possibility of achieving wealth in one's own life time rather than inheriting it is growing, one would expect the number of such marriages to increase. Other factors are also significant however. Nearly always the girl has been previously married to and divorced from someone of her own stratum before contracting this hypogamous marriage (five out of the six extant cases were of this kind). As I have indicated, later marriages, unlike first marriages, are not subject to parental control. Secondly it is often the case that the girl's mother was of a lower stratum than her father, and the girl has thus married into her mother's stratum (this accounts for half the extant cases). Thirdly the status of the girl herself may be low, either because she is illegitimate or a prostitute or both (three out of six cases - in only one case neither the second nor the third factors are relevant). Fourthly the woman may be barren or past child-bearing (again half the cases are of this type). This feature is significant because in such cases the woman has no need to consider the fact that any children she bears will be of a lower stratum than herself. Finally the geographical origin of the man may be significant, as it was in hypergamous marriages.

Most of these points will be illustrated in the three following cases, the first of a Sharif woman to a mchumwa man (which was not extant at the time of my census but is extremely interesting because it
is the only such case of which I know) and the other two of Waungwana women to Wachumwa men.

**Case 8. Time: 1957 – circa 1961**

Mwanakimwenye is a Sharif woman of 35 to 40 years, daughter of a Sharif man and a mwungwana woman, now dead. She was first married to a Lamu Sharif from the same clan as herself, and bore him a son, whom she left behind when she was divorced. Then she was married by Bwana Adi, one of the richest shopkeepers in Rasini. Bwana Adi was not only not a Sharif but was in fact from the lowest stratum of ex-slaves. A mahari of 400/- was promised but not paid. Mwanakimwenye bore Bwana Adi three children, one girl and two boys, then they quarrelled and were divorced. It is said that Mwanakimwenye's father did not want a divorce to take place. During the duration of the marriage Bwana Adi had built a large water tank near the house and carried out extensive repairs to the house itself. (Mwanakimwenye's father did not live in this house but in one adjoining it. He spent all his days in his daughter's house however, and ate his meals there). In return Mwanakimwenye's father gave Bwana Adi a piece of land, which although it belonged to Mwanakimwenye's father was not being utilised and had reverted to bush. It was in the father's interest that it should be utilised and since he is an old man and has only daughters he could not do it himself. Bwana Adi spent a great deal of time and money planting the land with trees - coconut, mango and cashew nut. Some say that the quarrels between Mwanakimwenye and Bwana Adi came to a head because Bwana Adi thought he was being used by the old man. When Bwana Adi divorced Mwanakimwenye her father demanded back the piece of land on which Bwana Adi had spent so much time, and which was just beginning to produce. In lieu of the land Bwana Adi gave the old man the water tank, from which he now derives a moderate but regular income. (The water is rain water, fresher than well water, and is sold for drinking).

Relatives of Mwanakimwenye explained her father's eagerness to marry her to a mchumwa by saying it was the man's wealth which overwhelmed him. The woman herself, interestingly enough, was the only Sharif to ridicule the idea that Sharifs must marry endogamously. "We don't have to marry Sharifs", she said. "If we like someone we marry him". Mwanakimwenye has since been married to her FFBDS (a Sharif) but this marriage, though it produced one child, was short lived.

This, to my knowledge, is the only case which has ever occurred in Tundwa of a Sharif woman marrying a mchumwa man. As can be seen, several of the factors I mentioned above are relevant here. This was
not a first marriage. Mwanakimwenye was first married to a man from her own clan, and after having been divorced from him was free to choose her own spouse. But in this case her father actively approved of her choice and primarily because of the wealth of Bwana Adi. The other feature which is significant here is that Bwana Adi came from Rasini, not Tundwa. It seems to be the case that the rules are less shamefully and obviously broken if the man is a stranger, rather than one who is unequivocally familiar as a member of a lower stratum. It is of interest that Bwana Adi subsequently married another Tundwa woman, this time of the Waungwana category (i.e. another hypogamous marriage). He later divorced her too and returned to Rasini.

Case 9. Time: circa 1952 to present

Mwana Amina 'K', a mwungwana woman, has "no father" (i.e. she is illegitimate) although she uses as her second name the name of what she claims to be her 'clan'. It is derided as non-existent by others. She is an elderly woman, well past child bearing, and as far as is known, has never borne a child. She spent several years in Mombasa working as a prostitute and is believed to have earned quite large sums of money there. She is also rumoured to have pocketed for herself quite large sums of money collected for a dance society which operated in the town about fifteen to twenty years ago. She bought a piece of land, which though not very large, is fairly profitable. Women in Tundwa do not cultivate their own land and have to rely on male help - a son, husband or labourer - the latter being the most expensive method. Mwana Amina had no sons but she married Bwaheri, a mchumwa man with no land. Bwaheri now cultivates her land and they live in a house owned by Mwana Amina, situated in a location of the town where wachumwa cluster.

In many ways this case contrasts with the previous one, but like Mwanakimwenye, Mwana Amina was making her own choice very definitely here - her mother is dead and she has no father. Bwaheri was not
wealthy, but he can provide an income for them both by working Mwana Amina's land. I may of course be jumping to conclusions about the reasons why Mwana Amina was prepared to marry a mchumwa, but it is certainly true that, once having done so, the arrangement is advantageous for both of them. The fact that she was a prostitute is also significant. As I have already pointed out, prostitution is fairly common, but attitudes of men towards it are somewhat ambivalent. A man who is considering marriage is likely to think twice before marrying a known prostitute, since such a woman cannot be relied upon not to practise her occupation even whilst married. Such a woman therefore has a low status as a possible marriage partner, though not necessarily in other contexts. In the case of Mwana Amina this may have been one reason why she did not marry a mwungwana man. On the other hand, as a prostitute she was likely to have had contacts amongst men of all strata and thereby be more easily able to contract a marriage across strata lines. But in addition Mwana Amina was well past child-bearing and in normal circumstances would no longer be of interest as a spouse. Since she has no children or other close relatives to support her, this would put her in a difficult position which would worsen as she became older. Mwana Amina had other assets however, whether earned lawfully or not, and as such was a good proposition. By marrying a man of inferior status, who incidentally also had no living close relatives, control of the profits from her land was ensured.
Case 10. Time: 1964?

Bule is the daughter of a mchumwa woman, Javo, and a mwungwana man, Yasin. Javo's sister, Maryam, spent much time in Mombasa as a prostitute, returning with a great deal of money. With part of this she bought a piece of land. This land was cultivated by her brother Ngasho, since Maryam had no sons and no husband at the time. Ngasho it is said, later appropriated the land for himself (though he gives Maryam some of the produce), making him one of the richest wachumwa in the village. He married a woman, Fatima, who had a grown-up son, Ali, by a previous marriage. (Both Fatima and her son were wachumwa). Ali then helped his step-father to cultivate the land. It is Ali to whom Bule is married - her MBWS. The curious feature of this case is that it is said that Bule and Ali have never been legally married and are just living together. It is claimed that Bule was a prostitute previous to her relationship with Ali. If this were true it would be the only case in the village of an unmarried couple living together.

This case is a good example of one marriage across strata lines providing a bridge for others to cross. Bule's mother is a mchumwa and Bule has close contacts with her mother's relatives. She is a young woman, but must have been previously married (since she is said to be a prostitute), but unfortunately I do not have details of her previous spouse or spouses. She has no living child as far as I know.

Here the income of the man appears to be significant in relation to that of the woman, who no longer lives with her parents, but with her sister in a house belonging to their mother. The fact that she and Ali are not actually married raises interesting questions. It means that if Bule ever does bear any children to Ali they will not be legally
his, and they will therefore not be wachumwa either, since as I have already mentioned illegitimate children take their stratum membership from their mother. Whether this is indeed the reason they are not married I cannot say, but it certainly has advantages for the woman, whose children in such a marriage normally lose the descent status which she herself has.

What is perhaps surprising in this case is the negative influence of Bule's father, Yasin, a mwungwana man still married to Bule's mother. Yasin moreover has brothers and sisters who have children to whom Bule might conceivably have been married. It is probable that as a divorced woman and a prostitute she is beyond the control of her father, and possibly not a very desirable spouse. It is also possible that as the child of a mchumwa woman Bule was unacceptable to her cousins. This sometimes happens as we saw from Case 6.

I have devoted more space to the subject of hypogamy than might seem necessary considering that hypogamous marriages make up only 3.2% of the total of all marriages. I have done this however because I consider such marriages to be indicative of patterns of social change - of a restructuring of wealth differentials, and of a movement away from status distinctions based on ascription towards status based solely on achievement. These cases of hypogamy also highlight the fact that without the compliance of women a discriminatory pattern of marriage choices cannot work. Compliance is required because in Tundwa there are no sanctions that men can use against women who break the rules.
Hypogamy is thus an indication of the status of women, and emphasises their freedom to make their own choices.

But at present hypogamy is the exception rather than the rule, and in so far as the majority of marriages in Tundwa are endogamous, the limit of most people's kin universe is within the stratum. Nevertheless, since hypergamous and hypogamous marriages also occur, many people also have some kin who are of lower or higher stratum than themselves. This is more true of the Masherifu, whose small numbers have necessitated a higher degree of marrying out than for other strata. 25% of all married Sharifs are married outside their stratum as opposed to 11.7% of Waungwana and 21.5% of the Wachumwa. This is the situation at present. In other words there are no sharp discontinuities between the kinship network of one stratum and that of another - it is rather that the number of kin linkages across the strata is far less than those within it. But these linkages may themselves acquire a special significance, as we shall see in Part II of this thesis.
V. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF STRATIFICATION

In the previous chapter I have shown that the vast majority of men and women in Tundwa still prefer to marry within their own stratum. In this chapter I want to substantiate the argument that the on-going pattern of marriage choices indicates more than simply a carry-over of old attitudes, however strongly entrenched. I shall show that by and large economic realities support the social framework of stratification, and that this reflects itself in the power structure of the village. I would think that unless this were so the pattern of marriage choices would long since have broken down. I shall show that wealth differentials in Tundwa today not only reflect the differences between the strata, but that these differentials give the two higher strata a measure of economic control over the ex-slaves. The material also shows however that no stratum is an undifferentiated economic category, and this reflects itself in political divisions, especially amongst the largest category, the Waungwana.

Wealth and stratification

Wealth differentials in Tundwa today have their origins in the institution of slavery. Prior to the abolition of slavery no slave could own land since he was simply a chattel of his master. He had to work either on the mashamba in the island or in the cultivation of annual crops on the mainland. A few slaves were also occupied in fishing or in mangrove-cutting. Those Waungwana who owned slaves
were thereby free to engage in other activities. They traded ivory and slaves to passing Arabian dhows and they occupied themselves in religious learning. The Masherifu, like other free men, were also rich in slaves and land. According to some Waungwana the Masherifu came to the area in the first place as traders, and this is said to be the way in which they built up their wealth.\(^1\)

Little or nothing is known of the intervening period between the abolition of slavery and the present. Some ex-slaves left to work in Mombasa or other places, and a few made enough money to buy land on their return. Others cultivated annual crops on the common land or carried out their traditional occupations of fishing and mangrove-cutting. The present structure of wealth differentials in Tundwa should show us the extent to which the Wachumwa have been able to rise from their previous status as chattels. It will also indicate the extent to which the Masherifu are in a superior economic position to other free men.

The most crucial factor in assessing the economic status of the various strata in Tundwa today is the factor of capital - and in particular, land. As we saw in Chapter II the shamba owners are not only the wealthiest members of the community but they also have economic security. Furthermore the wealthiest amongst them are people who can turn their wealth into economic power over others. Obviously therefore it is important to see how wealth in mashamba is distributed throughout the community. I shall ignore here the nineteen women who

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\(^1\) The Sharifs have their own, quite different explanation of why they came to the area as we shall see in the following chapter.
own mashamba since they make no significant difference to the pattern (three of them are Masherifu, fourteen Waungwana and two Wachumwa).

The table below gives the relevant data.

**Table 12. Mashamba ownership and strata membership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social category</th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Acreage</td>
<td>% of Total Acreage</td>
<td>Average acreage per owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Adult Males</td>
<td>Shamba Owners</td>
<td>Land Owned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Masherifu</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>122.9 acres</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>12.3 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Waungwana</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>331.2 acres</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>5.3 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Wachumwa</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>74.4 acres</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>4.9 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>528.5 acres</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third column shows that the proportion of men in each strata owning land rises as we go up the social hierarchy. The fifth column makes sense when we consider that of the 87 shamba owners, the Masherifu are only 11.7% but they own 23.4% of the land. 71.2% of the owners are Waungwana, but they own only 62.6% of the land. And 17.2% of the owners are Wachumwa, but they own only 14%. This contrast is emphasised if we consider the sixth column which shows that the average amount of land owned by each man varies according to his stratum and that the Masherifu owners are better off than the Waungwana and so on. This does not mean however that all Masherifu owners are better off than all Waungwana owners, and all Waungwana owners than Wachumwa.
owners. The range of wealth in land of the owners in each stratum is shown in the following table.

**Table 13. Range of wealth in land related to strata membership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of shamba</th>
<th>Masherifu</th>
<th>Waungwana</th>
<th>Wachumwa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1. over 12 acres</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2. 9-12 acres</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3. 6-9 acres</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4. 3-6 acres</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5. 1-3 acres</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6. below 1 acre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table shows there are proportionately more Masherifu owners in the higher categories than there are Waungwana or Wachumwa, and fewer in the lower categories. In other words proportionately more Sharifs own larger amounts of land and proportionately fewer own smaller amounts of land. And there is a similar though not so marked difference between the Waungwana and the Wachumwa.

In addition however the two richest men in the village are to be found amongst the Masherifu. These two men between them own eighty acres of land. There are also four Waungwana owning large amounts of land. Between them they own 61.6 acres of land. This is very important because these men have either surplus land or surplus income which they can re-distribute. And as we have seen, such redistribution
creates ties of economic dependency. There are no Wachumwa in the wealthiest category of shamba owners.

Thus we find that the surplus land of the Masherifu and Waungwana is redistributed to relatives within the stratum. 17% (4 men) of Masherifu adult males are cultivating the land of a relative, as opposed to 6.3% (11 men) of the Waungwana and only 2.5% (2 men) of the Wachumwa. We also find that the surplus income derived from land by the two higher strata is used for other activities. Thus, out of the twelve principal money lenders in Tundwa, two are Masherifu, nine are Waungwana and only one is a mchumwa. Six of the seven shopkeepers are Waungwana and the seventh is a Sharif.

The ownership of capital then varies proportionately with stratum membership, the higher categories owning a higher proportion than the lower categories. The consequence of this unequal distribution of wealth is an unequal distribution of economic control over others. I shall return to this point shortly.

**Mahonde cultivation**

If we take the mashamba owners together with the mashamba users we find that 59% of the Masherifu are engaged in mashamba cultivation compared with 41% of the Waungwana and only 22% of the Wachumwa. The Masherifu thus have the highest proportion of men in the greatest income producing occupation whilst the Wachumwa have the least. We might therefore expect that the Wachumwa, who collectively own the least land, would make up for this by cultivating on the common land.
This however does not seem to be the case since there are proportionately fewer Wachumwa honde cultivators than there are men from other strata. Instead the Wachumwa are carrying out other occupations as an alternative to mahonde cultivation as can be seen from the following table.

Table 14. Occupational Breakdown of Adult Male Population in relation to stratum membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Masherifu</th>
<th>Waungwana</th>
<th>Wachumwa</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashamba owners</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashamba users</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahonde cultivators</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Help to kin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. For employer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishermen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other occupations or no work</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Why is it that there are not more Wachumwa cultivating mahonde, since after all this was their traditional occupation? As we saw in Chapter II, a man needs more than land in order to cultivate. He also needs cash, and this may come from one of three sources - from his savings, from his father or from a money lender. Very few mahonde
cultivators have savings so this is the least likely of all sources of cash. Some mahonde cultivators are however the sons of shamba owners from whom they will eventually inherit. If the fathers of such men have a large enough amount of land they may lend their sons enough cash in order to cultivate, and such a loan would be without interest. It is of considerable importance then that all but one of the seven Sharif mahonde cultivators are the sons of shamba owners (85.7%), whereas only 16.6% of the Waungwana (eight men), and only 10% of the Wachumwa (two men) are in a similar position.

A man whose father cannot or will not lend him money and who has no savings, is forced to turn to a money-lender. And as we saw in Chapter II the dependence of the mahonde cultivator on the money-lender is almost complete, since he takes a loan to cover his expenses for a whole year and often carries over his debts from one year to the next. And whereas only three (32%) of the Masherifu honde cultivators are debtors, 85% (41 men) of the Waungwana, and 95% (19 men) of the Wachumwa honde cultivators need loans in order to cultivate. Since all but one of the money-lenders are Masherifu or Waungwana this means that an ex-slave man wishing to cultivate must put himself into debt to men who were once his former masters. (The only mchumwa money-lender is a fisherman who lends money almost exclusively to other fishermen). The extent of the interest charged by money-lenders makes this form of indebtedness a condition very similar to slavery.

There are then two possible explanations for the fact that not
many Wachumwa cultivate mahonde. One is that the Wachumwa themselves do not wish to enter into a relationship of complete dependence on Waungwana money-lenders, and instead prefer to carry out other occupations which provide a ready cash income and do not involve such dependence. Two points must be made here however. The first is that the other occupations open to Wachumwa, such as fishing (in which a large group of them is occupied), or mangrove-cutting, or agricultural labour for an unrelated employer, are all occupations considered to be menial and low. In carrying them out the Wachumwa merely confirm the already existing Waungwana stereotype of them as inferior people.\textsuperscript{1} The second point that must be made is that there are many Wachumwa other than honde cultivators who go to money-lenders for smaller loans. 49.1\% of the other Wachumwa take loans from Waungwana money-lenders from time to time, as opposed to 44.8\% of the Waungwana and 29.4\% of the Masherifu. Loans of this kind do not however involve complete dependence on a money-lender, since they are either small loans, or they are backed by the surety of a shamba.

There is another possible explanation of why more Wachumwa do not cultivate mahonde. It may be that Waungwana and Masherifu money-lenders are not prepared to finance them to the extent that would allow them to cultivate, or to put it in another way, that since their funds are limited they would prefer to support men of their own strata. The reason for this may be that the Wachumwa are considered untrustworthy or that they have fewer links with money-lenders – for

\textsuperscript{1} It will be noted from Table 3 that there are three Waungwana fishermen. It is consequent with the attitudes towards this occupation that all three of these men work in other villages, not in Tundwa.
example through kinship or friendship — by which means the money­lenders may be persuaded to lend large sums of money. In addition the Wachumwa as a category do not have enough capital to provide backing for large loans.

Income distribution

The unequal distribution of capital in Tundwa is reflected in an unequal distribution of income between members of the three strata. The average Sharif earns about £200 a year, whereas the average mwungwana earns £135 and the average mchumwa only £95. There are no very rich Wachumwa men and very few poor Sharifs. The Waungwana represent an intermediate group since they have proportionately fewer very rich men than the Sharifs, and proportionately fewer very poor men than the Wachumwa. This is shown in more detail in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Category</th>
<th>Masherifu</th>
<th></th>
<th>Waungwana</th>
<th></th>
<th>Wachumwa</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£600 p.a.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£450-£600 p.a.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£300-£450 p.a.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£150-£300 p.a.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£50-£150 p.a.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>below £50 p.a.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. For the method of construction of this table see Chapter II, p. 56-7.
In spite of considerable differences between the income distribution patterns of each stratum, it is clear that the strata are not homogeneous economic categories. This however we could hardly expect, since in discussing the strata we are dealing not with corporate groups in which wealth is held jointly, but with social categories whose members are individual producers. That wealth and income differentials do to some extent coincide with strata differences today is an indication of the influence of past wealth patterns. It is not an indication of corporate sharing of property or income. Nevertheless the differences between the strata are distinctive enough first to back up the traditional pattern of marriage choices and secondly to underpin the ideology of the stratification system. This last factor is further heightened by the disposition of occupations, with the Wachumwa carrying out the jobs considered menial and low by others. Not only this, but it is through marriage and inheritance patterns that these wealth differentials are maintained. In so far as endogamy is practised by the vast majority, wealth stays within the strata. In any marriage across strata lines (whether hypergamous or hypogamous) it is the property of women, not that of men, which is inherited across strata lines. The property of men always stays within the stratum because the rule of patrilineal inheritance ensures that a man's children, his main heirs, belong to the same stratum as himself. This fact is significant because a woman inherits only half the share of an equivalent male heir, and so the amount of property crossing
strata lines through marriage and inheritance is minimised.

**Ties of economic dependency**

The significance of these wealth and income differentials is mainly that they allow men of the two higher strata to exercise economic control over men of the ex-slave stratum. It is Masherifu and Waungwana rather than Wachumwa who have surplus land which they require labour in order to cultivate. Some of this labour may come from poor Waungwana men whilst the rest comes from Wachumwa labourers. Ties of this sort may not be very long lasting however since many labourers are young men who will later begin to cultivate for themselves. In addition most of them are not tied to a permanent employer but work casually for different employers at different times.

Ties of indebtedness however are more binding, and most Wachumwa need to rely on a money-lender at one time or another. If they are fishermen they can go to the only mchumwa money-lender. He is not a very rich man however and cannot lend very large amounts of money. Nor does he lend money for cultivation. Wachumwa borrowers are therefore forced to go either to Waungwana or Masherifu money-lenders. Poor Waungwana men are in a similar position. Ties of indebtedness thus link rich Masherifu with poor Waungwana and Wachumwa, and they link rich Waungwana with poorer members of their own stratum as well as with poor Wachumwa.

The difference between the poorer Waungwana and most of the Wachumwa is not very great in purely economic terms. They are people
who either have no capital and are completely dependent on money-lenders, or they are people who own such small pieces of land that they can barely provide a subsistence for themselves and their families. What intermarriage there is between the free-born and the ex-slaves nearly always involves poor Waungwana families, as we saw in the previous chapter. The difference between the two categories is more a matter of social status than of economic differences. But it does have important political consequences since the ex-slaves will always ally themselves with factions of the poorer Waungwana against the rich Waungwana. I shall return to this point in Chapter VIII. It seems probable that wealth differences within the Waungwana stratum are of long standing. I pointed out in an earlier Chapter that men who own shambas tend to marry the sisters or daughters of other shamba owners. Many of these men were the slave owners of the past, and their existence as a wealthy minority has been perpetuated by intermarriage. The poor Waungwana today are probably those who owned no slaves in the past and had to cultivate annual crops for themselves on the mainland alongside the slaves. Today many of them are tied to Waungwana money-lenders or employers, and in this way they resemble the ex-slaves who are even more dependent on rich Waungwana. But for the poor Waungwana these ties do not have implications of a past social system as they do for the ex-slaves.

For some older Wachumwa moreover this system is not entirely defunct. They still feel themselves 'attached' to their old masters
and are prepared and willing to help them on various occasions. Such help may be limited to small services such as fetching water for those who are in mourning, or it may be more extensive as the following cases will show.

Case 11. Time: 1965

Duri is an old woman, perhaps about seventy years old. She has no known father and is probably illegitimate. She has no known relatives. Originally she was the slave of an old mwungwana man. Whilst she was still a slave he married her, but she never bore any children. He divorced her many years ago. Until now however she cooks for him and looks after him, spending half of each day in his house. In return she is given food and help in times of need.

After slavery was abolished, most Wachumwa broke off their ties with their former masters. As this case indicates however some Wachumwa could not afford to break them off. This applied particularly perhaps to slave women without relatives who depended on their masters for a living. To continue as if slavery were still an on-going institution was for them a way of achieving social security. Such attitudes are not openly expressed however and some excuse will usually be made to explain the behaviour of the ex-slave - that he or she is a 'friend', a 'relative' or a neighbour.

Case 12. Time: April-October 1965

Mwajuma was a very old mchumwa woman - some said she was over a hundred. One day she fell in her house and hurt her leg. She was taken to the house of a mwungwana woman called Mwana Shale. Mwana Shale had been brought up by Mwajuma as a child and called her mame (mother). Mwana Shale nursed Mwajuma for three and a half months but the old lady eventually contracted pneumonia(?) and died in July 1965. It was only during the course of her funeral, and as a result of several unusual occurrences that I eventually discovered that Mwajuma had been a slave.
The funeral took place from Mwana Shale's house. The number of women who turned up was exceptional considering that Mwajuma had no known relatives in the village. (I later learnt that her children and grandchildren were all in Mkunumbwi, a village on the mainland about seventy miles away). It was also exceptional in that Mwajuma being very old and having been ill for so long, her death was a surprise to no-one. I only once saw more women attend a funeral and that was of a young woman who had died suddenly after the birth of twins. The reason for these large numbers was partly the popularity of Mwana Shale and other persons involved and partly I suspect, the fact that Mwajuma's death represented for Waungwana the symbolic passing of an old order.

Three women were involved in washing the corpse and preparing it for burial. These were a Sharif woman, Mwanakimwenye, and two Waungwana women, Nase and Time. Later I discovered that all these people were related to Mwana Shale (they were her MBD, her MMZD and her MPBDD respectively — see genealogy). But more important, two of these women were related to her with respect to the original ownership of Mwajuma.

During the washing and binding of the corpse, when the whole house was full of sobbing women, an old man entered and began to mourn loudly for Mwajuma. Now the only men who are supposed to enter a house where women are mourning are the two who come to fetch the body for burial. Except for this occasion I never saw another man enter in this way, and for a man to mourn in this way, like a woman, was unheard of. The man was Sharif Idarus, father of the Mwanakimwenye mentioned above. He was over eighty and one of the oldest men in the village. Normally he never left his house, so the incident was also exceptional in this sense.
Outside the men of the village were gathering to take the body for burial, and to read the funeral prayers, led by the Sheikh of the village. Mzee, a mwungwana man (see genealogy), was organising the funeral and I later heard that he had paid for nearly all the expenses - at a cost of altogether about 115/-.

Why were all these Waungwana and Masherifu involved in the death of a slave? The reason later emerged. Originally Mwajuma was the property of Sharif M. (see genealogy). Sharif M. married a mwungwana woman, Mkuu, and as part of the wedding presents he gave her Mwajuma. After bearing Sharif M a son - Idarus - Mkuu was left a widow. Later she married a second husband (a mwungwana) to whom she bore a son - Mzee. Later still she married a third husband, also a mwungwana, to whom she bore a daughter - Tiya. Tiya and Mzee are now middle-aged. I do not know when Mkuu died, but it was almost certainly after the abolition of slavery. Nevertheless I was told that her children 'inherited' Mwajuma (walimurithi), who had almost certainly helped to bring them up. Tiya later went to Mombasa - where she still lives - and there she bore an illegitimate child - Mwana Shale. This child she brought back to Tundwa, where, until her marriage she was looked after by Mwajuma. When Mwajuma was beginning to get old she went to Mzee, son of her previous mistress, and pledged her house to him on the understanding that he would meet all the expenses of her funeral when she died. This he did, and took over her house afterwards. This was a good bargain as far as he was concerned, for three months later he sold the house for 400/- to the son-in-law of Mwana Shale. Mwana Shale's daughter and her husband moved into the house in the following year.

This case is interesting because it shows that the ties which used to bind together master and slave are still operative - though on a completely different level. In other words Mwajuma's funeral was not that which a slave would have received before abolition - when, we are told, the corpses of slaves were simply thrown into the waste ground near the village. In particular a striking reversal of roles is seen in the fact that whereas traditionally, washing corpses was a job done by slaves only, in this case the corpse of an ex-slave was washed by three free born women. But nearly all the people involved were involved simply because Mwajuma had been the slave
of Mkuu. It is interesting however that the actors did not explain their behaviour to me in these terms. Since they could not openly state that Mwajuma was a slave (this explanation was given to me secretly by others) they said that Mwajuma was one of their jamaa — that is, a friend or a distant relative.

This case brings to light several points. Mwajuma became the property of a mwungwana woman, Mkuu, as a result of a hypergamous marriage. But Mkuu later made two endogamous marriages. Mkuu's kinship linkages thus cut across the lines of stratification. The set of people which was activated on the death of Mwajuma was really Mkuu's kinship set, to which Mwajuma was 'attached' by virtue of being Mkuu's slave. That it was Mkuu's set rather than Mwana Shale's is indicated by the fact that when, later in the year, Mwana Shale's brother died, only a few of these people were involved, and many others were involved who were not involved here.

Perhaps the most important point which emerges from this case is that Mwajuma's behaviour — a life-long and loyal service to her former masters — was a form of social security which brought dividends. It ensured her help in times of need and the reassurance that her funeral would be properly conducted. What I am suggesting is that for some Wachumwa it is advantageous to continue as if the old system, in which slaves were totally dependent on their masters, still operated. It is advantageous because, in the absence of other forms of social security, it provides support in times of need. This is obviously true
for the old (to whom the system obviously means more, since they were born under it), and for those who have no relatives of their own. Waungwana for their part foster such ties. They do not refer to these people as their 'slaves' and they give them help when necessary. Such ties are useful in the recruitment of political support.

Young people in the ex-slave category however are not prepared to accept such ties of past subservience. Many Wachumwa living today have been born since slavery was abolished, and to them the pattern of submissive relations which it suggests is anathema. They will not accept to be called Wachumwa, nor will they help their former masters. Mwajuma's death was therefore inevitably seen as symbolic to the Waungwana and Masherifu - she represented a system of social relations which has almost disappeared.

**Mobility and change**

Mobility is theoretically impossible in this system of stratification since a person's status is determined solely by reference to his descent and not by reference to any other factor. Marriage across strata lines may raise or lower the prestige of a person within his own stratum (depending on the status of the spouse) but it cannot affect his status in the stratification system. A mchumwa man who flouts the rules and marries a mwungwana woman does not himself thereby become a mwungwana. Through such a marriage he may raise his prestige within the ex-slave stratum, but his children will be ex-slaves like himself.

On the other hand stratification is not the only status framework
in Tundwa. A man can also achieve wealth in an economic system which is essentially based on individual enterprise. I have shown in this chapter that wealth differentials today largely reinforce the stratification system. But the patterns are beginning to change. There are some Wachumwa who have earned enough, from fishing, labour migration or some other occupation to buy land, even though most of them are not large land-owners and are a minority compared with other Wachumwa. These men have raised their economic status. But economic status cannot be translated into status within the stratification system. Nor have the few rich Wachumwa married into Waungwana families of equivalent economic status. They are all married to other Wachumwa women. Thus not only are wealth differentials in Tundwa weighted against the Wachumwa, but even those who achieve wealth cannot use it for raising their status in the stratification system.

Alternatively it is open to an ex-slave man to leave Tundwa altogether and migrate to Mombasa. But this is not an escape from the stratification system. In Mombasa the migrant needs the help of fellow Bajunis in order to get a job and to find a place to live. And if he marries a fellow Bajuni in Mombasa (and the vast majority do) he is more or less forced to marry someone of the same stratum as himself. 83% of married migrants are married endogamously.

With this in mind it is of interest to compare the migration patterns of men in different strata (see table 16 below). As can be seen there are proportionately more Wachumwa men in Tundwa today
who have had migration experience in the past than there are men from other strata.

Table 16. Migration patterns past and present, related to stratum membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social stratum</th>
<th>Adult male population of Tundwa</th>
<th>Past migrants (in Tundwa now)</th>
<th>Migrants away now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of total adult males</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masherifu</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waungwana</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wachumwa</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This evidence does not necessarily indicate that there were actually more ex-slave men than Sharifs or Waungwana migrating in the past. It merely shows how many ex-slave men have returned from Mombasa — and this could indicate that Wachumwa men are actually less successful in Mombasa than men from other strata — otherwise they would have stayed there instead of returning. Figures of migrants away at present seem to support this conclusion — the Wachumwa seem to migrate proportionately less than men of other strata, not more. The reasons for this are probably complex — difficulty in getting together the small initial capital required for the journey, lack of an effective network in Mombasa for getting jobs, and the realisation that even in Mombasa there is no escape from their inferior status. On the whole then the Wachumwa have not resorted to migration in large numbers. But a few of them have returned wealthy enough to buy land. Four of the returned Wachumwa
migrants are *shamba* owners and three more have bought fishing boats.

In this context the following case history is of great interest because it traces the achievement of wealth by one *mchumwa* man back to the period just after abolition.

**Case 13**

About forty years ago, Diki, a man of the ex-slave category, went to Zanzibar to work as a fisherman. He stayed there for several years, eventually returning to Tundwa with a few meagre savings. At that period *shamba* land on Paza island was both plentiful and cheap. There were two reasons for this. First was the fact that many men were leaving for Mombasa to find work. The other was that at that time the market for annual crops such as maize was better than that for the fruits of the *shambas*. This was the time when mainland agriculture was possible and the soil there was fertile and gave large yields. Diki was therefore able to buy cheaply a *shamba* of seven acres which had practically reverted to bush. Diki was married to an ex-slave woman called Inyakame, who bore him four sons. When Diki died two of his children were still quite young, a third had left for Malindi to work as a fisherman there and the fourth was a fisherman in Tundwa. None of them wanted the almost derelict *shamba* which Diki had barely begun to plant and which required the patient work of many years in order to make it productive. Inyakame could not afford to have it cultivated herself, so, keeping one-third of it to be cultivated by one of her young sons, she gave away the rest to her younger brother, Makka. Inyakame had helped to bring up Makka after their parents had died, and she had maintained him whilst he attended Koran school for several years. Makka was thus more learned than most *Wachumwa* and he had set up a Koran school, the only ex-slave ever to do so. With the income he earned from this, together with money which he borrowed, he was able to maintain himself whilst he planted the *shamba* with trees. Eventually the *shamba* began to bring in a small profit and with the proceeds Makka bought another *shamba* of 4.8 acres. As a moderately wealthy man and a Koran school teacher Makka is outstanding amongst the ex-slaves and by 1965 had become a minor political leader in Tundwa. He was also one of the only two polygamous men in Tundwa, having married concurrently two ex-slave women.

This case is indicative of more than the achievement of wealth by one ex-slave. It also shows that although Makka has not been able to convert his wealth into status in the stratification system (both his wives are ex-slaves) he has been able, as a result of his wealth,
to achieve a political and religious status irrespective of his descent status. The contrast here is between descent status which is essentially ascriptive, and wealth or political and religious status which are essentially achieved. In general however a person's ascriptive status tends to delimit his ability to achieve status in any other way, and although the patterns are beginning to change, Makka's case is at present rather the exception that proves the rule. In addition there is another dimension to Makka's role as a minor political leader. Whilst his wealth and religious learning explain why he, rather than another ex-slave, should be playing this role, it is his descent status that makes him politically significant in the context of the whole village. He is politically important because, with him as an ally, a free-born political leader can gain the support of many of the other Wachumwa.

Political power is not simply a reflection of wealth differentials in Tundwa - it also has much to do with the people's awareness of belonging to a stratified society, and with the relative numbers of the three strata. As we shall see in Chapter VIII all the important political and administrative positions in Tundwa are held by Waungwana. Although such roles are not intrinsically tied to descent status no member of any other stratum has been able to challenge the Waungwana monopoly of political leadership in Tundwa. In spite of the wealth and superior descent status of the Masherifu, no Sharif has ever been able to gain an important political position in the town. Similarly
no mchumwa - other than Makka, who plays only a minor political role - has ever gained such a position. The reasons for the political predominance of the Waungwana are complex and will be discussed at length in Chapter VIII. Here I simply want to make the point that although roles of political leadership are achieved, not ascribed, a person's chances of gaining such a role are largely dependent upon his having been born into the Waungwana stratum.

One can make a similar point about religious roles, and again Makka is the exception that proves the rule. A man who is pious and religiously learned is highly respected in the town. Piety and religious learning moreover are not something a man is born with; they have to be achieved. Thus the pursuit of religious learning may enable a man to achieve status irrespective of his ascriptive position - as it did Makka. With the exception of Makka however all the religious roles in Tundwa are occupied by Waungwana. One might have expected the Masherifu, with their superior descent and link with the Prophet to have been dominant in the religious field. But the Sharifs have been able to play only a minor religious role in Tundwa (and this holds true for other Bajuni villages too). And if the Sharifs, with their high social status, are unable to control religious activity in the town, the Wachumwa are even less influential.

Although everyone in Tundwa is nominally a Muslim, not all attend mosque regularly. It is more usual to find men of the Masherifu or Waungwana stratum frequenting the mosques than it is to find Wachumwa.
The siting of Tundwa's four mosques - the Friday mosque, two other old mosques and one new mosque - is in itself significant. The Friday mosque is right on the edge of the town in a predominantly Waungwana and Masherifu location. The two old mosques are also situated in Masherifu/Waungwana locations whilst the new mosque (which was built in 1966) is in the very centre of the town, but again in a Waungwana location. None of the predominantly Wachumwa locations has a mosque.

Not only are those who regularly attend mosque mainly men from the two higher strata, but they are also generally the most wealthy amongst them rather than the poor. There is a direct connection between wealth and piety (and as we have seen, between wealth and status in the stratification system). In order to take an active part in religious affairs one has to have a modicum of religious knowledge - to be able to read and recite the Koran at least. To get this knowledge one has to attend a Koran school for a considerable length of time and to pay for one's attendance. In the past only the slave owners could afford this luxury. For the poorer Wachumwa today such time and money cannot be spared since it is required in order to make a living. Thus it is that religious affairs in Tundwa are dominated by men of the two higher strata. But there is more to it than wealth, since all the religious roles in the town are held, not by Masherifu, but by Waungwana. The most important of such roles is that of Sheikh - the man who leads prayers and reads the Friday 'sermon' (hotuba). The Sheikh usually has a deputy who can act for him if he should fall ill
The Mudhari mosque in Tundwa

Children of one of Tundwa's Koran schools with the strips of matting which they sew together.
or have to be absent for any reason. To some extent these are lucrative roles, since these are the people who generally solemnise marriages, read special prayers and conduct funeral services - and for all of these they receive fees. Other more minor religious roles are those of the muedhin (the man who calls people to prayer at the stated hours), and the Koran and madrasa school teachers. Another role, less specifically religious, is also of significance here - this is an informal role of mosque 'patron'. Thus the collection of money and organisation of work required to repair the Friday mosque was carried out by an old and respected - and rich - mwungwana man. One of the other mosques was looked after by the Sheikh (until he was ousted and built the new mosque), whilst the third old mosque is looked after by two Waungwana cousins, leaders of one of Tundwa's political factions, and also very wealthy men. With one exception - that of Makka, the ex-slave Koran school teacher - all these religious roles were held in 1965 by Waungwana. Most Wachumwa lack even the minimal religious education that would be required in order to perform even such minor religious roles as those of Koran school teachers. And to be able to qualify for such a post as Sheikh one requires a much longer period of study, ability to read and write in Arabic script, and some understanding of Arabic itself. As I have suggested the inability of the Wachumwa to achieve such an education is related to their poverty. Only the wealthy can compete for the post of Sheikh - and the wealthy, by and large are Waungwana and Masherifu. On the other hand the Masherifu
are the wealthiest stratum in town and yet in 1965 they held no religious role. Why have the Sharifs not been able to gain control of even some of these positions? One reason is that before the Sharifs ever arrived in Tundwa the role of Sheikh was the preserve of a particular Waungwana clan. Three generations ago however one of the Masherifu was 'taught' to read the sermon by the mwungwana incumbent. Since then this Sharif's son and grandson have both held the post of Sheikh or acted as his deputy, though two Sharifs have never held the post concurrently. At the same time clans began to lose their political significance and the post was open to anyone who could gain support. In order to gain support however one had to have the backing of the political leaders of the town — and these have always been Waungwana. In early 1965 the deputy Sheikh was a Sharif, grandson of the first Sharif incumbent. He incurred the displeasure of the leaders of one of the Waungwana factions of the town and was ousted from the post together with the Sheikh, a mwungwana man who had supported him. The Masherifu therefore, far from controlling religious activity in Tundwa are themselves controlled by the Waungwana. The Masherifu, after all, form only 7.9% of the population of the town. A Sharif can only hold the post of Sheikh therefore if he is supported by the Waungwana. He is, as it were, on sufferance. Thus although the pursuit of religious learning allows one to achieve status

1. In the following chapter I discuss traditions of the Sharifs' historical role.
2. I shall discuss this case at more length in Chapter VIII.
independently of one's ascriptive status, there are greater opportunities for the wealthier Waungwana to do this than for the Wachumwa, and the religious activities of the Masherifu are closely controlled.

In this chapter I have tried to show that the division of the Tundwa people into three ranked strata has important social consequences. At the present time, being born into a particular stratum affects not only a person's status in the community, but it also affects many other aspects of his life. It affects his economic position, since a man born into a higher stratum is more likely to inherit wealth than a man born into a lower stratum. He therefore starts off with an advantage, even in a society whose economy is individually oriented. A person's stratum status also delimits his choice of a marriage partner, as we saw in the previous chapter. And in addition a person's ability to achieve roles of importance in the community (such as political or religious roles) is largely dependent upon him being born into the largest stratum - the Waungwana. At the present time there is thus some coincidence between the various frameworks of social action. But the 'fit' is by no means perfect, and political action in Tundwa today is largely a reflection of the contradictions arising from this.
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGY

"God created some people superior and others base and nasty".

A mwungwana man

In the previous chapters I have shown that stratification in Tundwa imposes an overall framework on kinship linkages through the process of marriage and on wealth differentials through the process of inheritance. I have also shown that wealth differentials are utilised by wealthy men in order to maintain some economic control over poorer men, and that since wealth differentials largely coincide with the lines of stratification this in effect means that men in the top two strata have some economic hold over the ex-slaves. Further than this I have shown that the difference in numbers and wealth of the three strata reflects itself both in political control of the village, and in religious control of the mosque. But I have also pointed out that patterns of wealth are changing. Not only this but there have been many changes, both political and economic, in the wider society, beginning with the abolition of slavery by the British and ending in 1963 with the coming to power in Kenya of an independent government which not only preaches equality but is also African. All these changes threaten the power and influence of the top two strata. Faced with this situation they look back with increasing nostalgia to the old days. Nowadays they say, "many things have been destroyed".
In this chapter I want to outline the historical and ideological arguments which are used by the Waungwana and Masherifu both to explain and to justify their present position. My argument will be that this ideology has a two-fold significance. Firstly it supports the status quo in the village, and this is its manifest and most important function. In addition however it is a world view which both affects the Bajuni's evaluation of events in the outside world and influences their reaction towards them. Ideology is thus an organising framework for social action.

The mythology of stratification

There is no myth of the origin of stratification as it exists in Tundwa today; there is only an explanation of why there are Waungwana and Wachumwa in the world. The difference between the two is said to be divinely inspired and to go back to the time of Noah (Nuhu). One account states that Noah was given a black son by God as a punishment, and that this son was the first mchumwa. "God created some people superior and others base and nasty", said a mwungwana man in commenting on this explanation. ¹ A slightly different version was

¹ I do not know from what source the Bajunis derived this story, but it is fairly well known on the East African coast. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam it comes from Islamic legends and is a distortion of the story of Noah in Old Testament writings. In Genesis Chapter IX it is recounted that after the ark came to rest on dry land Noah planted himself a vineyard. One day he became drunk on the wine and fell down in his tent naked. His son, Ham, father of Canaan, came and saw his father in this condition. When Noah discovered that his son had looked upon him with such disrespect he cursed him saying, "Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren". Chapter X concludes with the words: "by these [The sons of Noah] were the nations divided in the earth after the flood." The Islamic version is different. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam, Islamic legends relate that:
given to me by an old Sharif man. He was trying to explain to me why the Bajunis are also sometimes called Watikuu. Watikuu he said was a name given by Noah to denote free noble persons with straight hair, as opposed to Wachumwa, enslaved persons with frizzy hair.¹ The implications of both these stories is clear - first that God is being enlisted in support of social discrimination and second that social differences are being equated with physical differences. The stratification system is in fact being given a racial connotation. The system was in fact first explained to me in the following terms: "Do you not see people here who look like Africans? They are Africans". And whereas the Wachumwa are labelled 'Africans', the Waungwana claim to be 'Arabs'.

One would perhaps expect then that the Waungwana would have myths to support an Arabian origin, but this is not entirely the case. 'History' in fact speaks with many voices and tends to be contradictory. One must emphasise however that not all Bajunis are interested in history. Some knowledge of traditions is shared by most adults, but as in many other societies, it is old men who are most interested in the past since in a changing society they have very little stake in the present. But in Tundwa, history is also intimately connected with stratification.

"Nuh [Noah] also took Adam's body with him in the Ark which was used to separate the women from the men. For in the Ark continence was ordered, for man and for beast. Only Ham transgressed and for this was punished with a black skin". (Vol.III, Part 2, p.943).

¹ The literal meaning of Watikuu (equals Wa iti kuu) is 'People of the big country', but which big country is being referred to is uncertain unless it is the land of the eight clans described below. The Bajuni dialect is always called Kitikuu.
and since it is only the Waungwana and Masherifu who have any stake in the continuation of the system, it is only they who 'remember' history and care to recall it.

There is no written history of the Bajunis, only traditions which have been handed down by word of mouth from generation to generation. One source of history is enshrined in what are known as the **Yave**. These are connected series of verses on Bajuni history, originally recited annually on the occasion of firing bushland on the mainland in preparation for a new season's cultivation. Three points concerning the **Yave** must be made. First is the fact that they appear to be very ancient, being couched in language the meaning of which is not always evident even to the Bajuni themselves. Secondly they are known by very few people - in Tundwa only one man knew them properly and he was a Rasini man married into the village. Nevertheless although they themselves are not well known, certain information in them is well known. Thirdly, and most important to us here, is the fact that they ignore completely the division of the Bajuni into three

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1. To some extent this always appears to have been the case since they were recited by Waungwana specialists of particular clans who took it upon themselves to teach a successor. My Tundwa informant had learnt the verses from his father's brother (Bini Ahmed), a Rasini man. An attempt is now being made by Professor Wilfred Whitely to collect and translate the **Yave**. They have been written down by a Mombasa man, Yahya Omar, at Bini Ahmed's dictation, but they have not yet been published. The possibility is that the **Yave** will eventually be lost to oral tradition since the annual ceremony at which they were recited is no longer held - the reason for this being that mainland agriculture is no longer possible (see Chapter II).
strata and are in fact an account of Waungwana rather than Bajuni history. Basically the Vave relate that the Bajuni are descended from a man called Juni and a woman called Mwana Talaya. They originated it is said, in a town called Shungwaya, in the 'district' of Miuli. Shungwaya was in Somalia. There were ten clans of the Bajuni at that time ("the ten of Miuli"). Eventually they were driven out of Shungwaya by a marauding tribe, the Gallas. They progressed southwards, where they were joined by eight other clans ("the eight of the coast").¹ When they reached what is now Kenya they crossed over onto the island of Faza, God having parted the waters in answer to their prayers so that they could cross over safely. Once on the island they built the various villages, the first being Tundwa.

In general circulation this story has become somewhat distorted. Miuli is indeed often stated to be the Bajunis' original homeland, but it is said to be situated near Madina ("in the Yemen")! Yet other people assert that certain Waungwana clans originated in Egypt or Syria (Misri and Sham). One clan for example – the Rasmali – are said to be descendents of the Prophet Solomon (Rasuli Suleiman). Old men say that the ancestors of these clans journeyed from Arabia and came to Africa where they intermarried with local people and became many. In particular, no-one asserts, as the Vave state, that the Bajunis have one origin; the story is rather that they have several.

¹. The land cultivated by the Bajunis on the mainland opposite the island is known as "the land of the eight" (iti za nane). The Vave begin with the lines: "In the name of Allah let us tell/ To God let us pray/ The Creator of beings/ And the land of the eight..." (Bismillahi tuambe/ Mungu tumwombe/ Mvumba zivumbe/ Na iti za nane...)
It should be pointed out that the ten clans of Miuli and the eight of the coast are all Waungwana clans. Neither Sharifs nor slaves are mentioned as amongst them. And yet everyone whom I asked claimed that the Bajunis were already divided into three strata on their arrival in the island. The Masherifu however have their own myths of origin. Some say they came from Hinati "near Madina" in Arabia, whilst others say that Madina itself was their origin. Some say they came from Tarim, also in Arabia, whilst yet others say that Hinati and Tarim are the same place. More important for them however is the claim to be the descendents of the Prophet Mohamed, through his daughter Fatima and her son Hussein.

The Masherifu are notable in being the only stratum which keeps written genealogies (nasabu). I have seen three of these - all of which were versions of the genealogy of one of the two Sharif clans in Tundwa - the Ahli Nadhir. The other clan (the smaller one) has lost its genealogy. The three genealogies which I saw were practically identical, and showed an unbroken line of male descent back to Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter, and thence to the Prophet himself, through 38 generations. From the Prophet the line goes back a further 21 generations to Adnaan, ancestor of all the Northern Arabs. One of these genealogies had been written in this generation, one in the previous generation and one three generations ago. It seems probable that the earliest was copied from a yet earlier one. If one asks a Sharif for his genealogy he will always reply, "it is written".

1. All written in Arabic script.
Sharifs do not memorise these genealogies however and are even loth to show them. In their heads they remember only a few generations back in the same way as do other members of the community. To claim that a genealogy is written however emphasises that the Masherifu are a literate group - and literacy here means literacy in Arabic script, which means ability to read and recite the Koran. This in its turn denotes piety and piety carries implications of status and wealth, as we saw in the previous chapter.

In general this claim to be descendents of the Prophet Mohamed is accepted in the community, but there are, even here, some sceptics. "Some people in Tundwa say that there are no Sharifs and that everyone is equal. They say all the descendents of the Prophet were killed", so a young Sharif man explained it to me. This is an argument which is occasionally heard all along the East African coast (where there are other groups of Masherifu), as it is heard in Arabia. It is said that when Hussein, grandson of the Prophet, was killed at the battle of Karbala he left no sons and that therefore there are no Sharifs. The Masherifu however claim that Hussein left a son, Ali Zein Al Abidin, and that the line from him to themselves is unbroken. My impression however was that scepticism of the Masherifu's claim did not centre very strongly on this point.

Sharifs in Tundwa say that long ago their ancestors left Arabia and came to Africa. Some say they came directly to Faza, but most say that they settled on the Benadir coast in Somalia, where they
joined up with the Bajunis, intermarried with them and "became
Bajunis". It must be admitted however that there is some ambivalence
about this claim on all sides. The Sharifs often add that they are
Arabs and not really Bajunis. Similarly Waungwana, if asked
specifically, will sometimes say that the Masherifu are "not our tribe",
"not Bajunis". Nevertheless most people commonly speak of the Sharifs
as Bajunis, as the Sharifs also speak of themselves. The fact that
the Masherifu claim to be Arabs does not distinguish them from the
Waungwana, who have always made the same claim.

It is perhaps interesting to examine the history of one partic­
ular Sharif family, as remembered by an old man of that family (Sharif
Idarus - see genealogy). The ancestor of the family, Ahmed bin Ali,
came to Tundwa from Barawa (in Somalia) seven generations ago.
According to the old man there was much disagreement amongst the
Waungwana of Tundwa and other places at that time and they asked
Sharif Ahmed to come and make peace between them. So he came and
settled down amongst them and married a mwungwana girl. "In the
old days", said my informant, "the Sharifs had supernatural powers
(karama) and could do anything". The son of Sharif Ahmed (Omar)
built three mosques - one in Tundwa, still called "moskichi wa Mwenye
Omar", 1 but now fallen into disuse, one in Bajumwali, and one in
Nyabogi. According to my informant, Sharif Omar's karama was so great
that he built these mosques almost single-handed, with only the help
of one slave and one donkey. "Now", the old man added sadly, "there

1. The mosque of Sharif Omar - "Mwenye" is a title by which the Sharifs
are usually addressed. It means, literally, 'having'.
Genealogy of Sharif Idarus

Ancestor of all the Northern Arabs .............. △ Adnaan

The Prophet .............................................. △ Mohamed
  Fatima △ Ali Talib
    △ Hussein
      △ Ali Zein Al Abidin

Emigrated from Barawa to Tundwa .................... △ Ahmad

Builder of three mosques .............................. △ Omar
  △ Zein
    △ Ali Abubakar

First Sharif Sheikh of the Friday mosque ........... △ Omar
  △ Sura △ Mohamed
    △ Idarus

Second Sharif Sheikh .................................
Third Sharif Sheikh .................................
is no more karama - and where are the Sharifs today?"

This kind of story fits in with the role Sharifs are always supposed to play - i.e. that of holy men, ritual peacemakers.¹ How many Waungwana would accept this story is difficult to say, but there are certainly some who do not accept it. "A lie!" said one. "They came as traders. Of course they did reconcile some disputants by reciting the fatiha". This is a prayer which is said when both parties in a dispute have agreed to forget their differences - it sets a ritual seal as it were on the agreement. But it is not always the mediator (if there be one) who says the fatiha, and neither mediator nor recitor need be a Sharif.

There are obviously some contradictions in the various versions of the Sharifs' traditional role - both between the Sharif version and that of some Waungwana, and it may be added, even amongst the Sharifs themselves. My old Sharif informant for example admitted that the Masherifu, in spite of their karama, were not given the job of reading the Friday sermon. "They were strangers", he pointed out. It was only later that one Sharif Omar Zein (see genealogy) was taught to read the sermon by the existing incumbent. Later Sharif Omar's son, Sura, held the post, and later still his grandson, Mohamed Sura, took the job for some time. (Waungwana confirm this story). Other Sharifs however somewhat exaggerated the position, describing the

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¹ See for example the role played by the Sanusi of Cyrenaica (the Grand Sanusi was a Sharif), or that played by the Seyyids (Masherifu) of the Swat Pathan, or, nearer home, that played by the Seyyids of Hadhramant, Southern Arabia from whence the Bajuni Sharifs claim to have come. (E. Evans-Pritchard, 1949, F. Barth, 1959, A.S. Bujra, 1967).
Sharifs of the past as very learned men who were able to teach others, and who have always read the Friday sermon.

I have never heard any claim however that the Masherifu had been political rulers in Tundwa. Everyone knows that it was the Wachandaa clan of the Waungwana who supplied the first rulers (wafalme) of the village, and it was also they who monopolised the post of Sheikh of the mosque, thereby controlling an important institution and forum of communication in the town. Later the Zitindini clan (also Waungwana) assumed control, and in spite of attempts by another group, led by a man of a third Waungwana clan (the Mui wa Mote) to oust them, they remained in power until the British arrived at the end of the nineteenth century.¹

Of the Waungwana's traditional position other than this, one is told very little. Their life is usually contrasted with that of the slaves. That the freeing of the slaves was a regrettable reversal of affairs for many Waungwana is obvious from the glowing accounts they tell of the past. In the old days they say, the Waungwana did not work. Their lives were very pleasant, eating, sleeping, and taking the air occasionally. They were rich, with land and slaves, and they were pious and learned men, able to read and recite the Koran and to teach others the elements of religious knowledge. In those days they say, the island was noted for the learned men it produced. Waungwana women were modest and proper in the old days; they did not go out, but spent their time indoors plaiting each other's hair.

¹. These events will be described in more detail in Chapter VIII.
About the conditions in which the slaves lived we know a little more.¹ They worked in the shambas of their masters on the island, or on the mainland opposite, where the annual crops were grown. They were the fishermen of the island, and all menial tasks such as fetching water and washing corpses fell to the lot of the slaves. Women slaves also worked in the shambas, but their main work was in the house, to do the cooking and to clean and wash clothes. Stories of slaves being walled in alive for misdemeanours, and of slave children being roasted alive in front of their parents as a punishment for spoilt food are common — though told with some horror. It is also said that slaves were not burned like free men, but that their bodies were simply thrown into the waste land, "like donkeys".

There are old men alive now who can recall the system of slavery as it operated in the closing years of the nineteenth century. Their accounts are more detailed and less sweeping than those of the younger generation. True, they say, about half of the Waungwana were wealthy and had ten or so slaves apiece, but there were also poorer Waungwana who had to work for themselves and were helped by their richer brethren. Such old men are also able to fill in the

¹. I should perhaps add that none of the following stories came from the Wachumwa themselves, who, even after I had been able to identify them, were notably uncommunicative on such matters. None of my historical or ideological material was collected by direct questioning, but only by taking advantage of the opportunity to ask further questions if a person raised the matter himself. No ex-slave ever mentioned the past to me and it would have been extremely difficult to frame a question on the subject without indirectly implying that one was aware of his status as a mchumwa.
details of the institution of slavery. Slaves, they say, used to work for their masters every day except Friday. On this day they were allowed to cultivate annual crops for themselves on the common land. Their work was organised by overseers (wasimamizi) who were also slaves but who were given preferential treatment. Slaves were fed by their masters, the main item of their diet being a small red-brown grain called wimbi. (One often hears people bemoaning the fact that these days they have fallen on such hard times that they are forced to eat wimbi, "the food of slaves"). Slaves did not as a rule live with their masters. They lived in separate locations of their own, building their houses from materials freely available in the area. Slave women could be 'married' by their masters (really a form of concubinage) or by other slaves on the payment of a fowl to the slave girl's master. The girl remained the property of her master however, and any children she bore were his also. When questioned as to where the slaves came from in the first place, such old men will say that they were bought from Dar es Salaam or Kilwa, but that some men used to seize people by force to be their slaves. Sometimes it is said, slaves were sold to passing dhows from Arabia.

Slavery was abolished in East Africa in 1897, and the British sent officials to see that the order was carried out. The Bajunis remember that about the turn of the century, a man whom they call "Honi" arrived in Rasini and announced that up until a certain date any slave master could obtain a compensatory sum for the manumission
of his slaves. After that date no more compensation would be paid, but all slavery would cease forthwith. Many slave owners in Tundwa it is said, did not take advantage of this offer. No doubt they mis-understood its intent, for even now they talk of "Honi" having come to "buy" the slaves. One man, who had inherited thirteen slaves from his father explained to me that he could not sell them, "because they had become like relatives". It may be, in addition, that most slave owners thought that the price offered by Honi (one hundred rupees it is said) was too low. In any case with slavery no longer legal, slave owners either had to begin working for themselves or had to pay wages to their former slaves. How this difficult transitional period worked out it is now impossible to tell. The story, as told to outsiders, always ends: "and now everyone is equal", or "and now everyone wants to be a mwungwana".

I have tried to present this account in the Bajunis' own words, specifying the various sources from which the account comes. Certain deductions can be made from the traditions - unfortunately not deductions about the 'true' history of the Bajunis, since no other evidence exists at present - but deductions concerning the social significance of history in this community. One prominent feature I

1. There is some mention of the Bajunis in the Pate Chronicle, translated and published by A. Werner, 1915, and an unsatisfactory article by J.A.G. Elliott (1925) gives some traditions of Somali Bajunis. Other than this there is very little indeed that I know of.

2. What evidence I have suggests that the following comments would be equally true for the other Bajuni villages on Faza island. There is a common body of traditions more or less equally shared by people in all villages, though obviously there are local variations.
Glories of the past

The ruins of an old house in Tundwa, said to have been the residence of one of the kings of Tundwa. Adjoining these ruins there is the wall of his 'fort'.
have already mentioned is that memory of and interest in the past is not spread evenly throughout the community but is related firstly to age and secondly to social stratum. We would not expect the Wachumwa to be interested in traditions which laud the deeds of men who once exploited and maltreated them. Secondly there is in the telling of the traditions a strong element of regret for the lost wonders of the past. The old Sharif man bemoaning the fact that the Masherifu of today are nothing, that their supernatural powers have failed them. A young Sharif man complaining bitterly that nowadays hardly anyone gives the Sharifs their traditional sign of respect — the kissing of their hands. "Many things have been destroyed these days". Waungwana commenting on their present impoverished state, and on how in the past they were pious and learned people. One middle-aged mwungwana woman telling with wonder how her father walked all the way to Mecca. "Many things have changed these days".

This kind of regret for the "good old days" is found in the traditions of many societies. Here I think it indicates an awareness on the part of Waungwana and Masherifu as to the pace of social change, and the extent to which it has undermined their position. And it could be that the horror now expressed at the treatment meted out to slaves, and the assertions that the slaves had become "like relatives" are attempts to readjust to the change in the status of slaves, from chattels, to people who have to be contended with. There is an element of this too in the argument that, "and now everyone is equal".
This brings us on to another point — the inconsistencies in the traditions with regard to the Sharifs. For if the status of the Wachumwa is at present ambiguous that of the Masherifu seems always to have been so. We see here very clearly an illustration of Leach's argument that myth, "is a language of argument, not a chorus of harmony".¹ There is considerable discrepancy between the Waungwana and the Sharif version of the latter’s role. Whereas the former argue that the Sharifs were traders who came to cash in on the wealth of the Waungwana, the latter say they were invited to come because of their supernatural powers and ability to settle disputes. There is a clear indication here of the present ambiguous position whereby the Sharifs claim the topmost place in the social hierarchy and are the wealthiest stratum but have no political power or dominant religious role. The attempt by some Waungwana to belittle the Sharifs and even to suggest that there are in fact no Sharifs, shows that they resent the wealth and arrogance of the Sharifs. Sometimes this is put more directly, as when people speak of the Sharifs as "mean" (meaning that they are wealthy, but not prepared to give or lend their money to others) or when they accuse them (behind their backs) of pocketing for themselves funds entrusted to them for charitable purposes.

Finally it is clear from the traditions that each category is considered separate and of a different origin. Both the Waungwana and the Masharifu concur in the view that the Wachumwa came from African hinterland. And not only do the Waungwana and the Masharifu

¹. E. Leach, 1954, p.279.
have their own versions of history, but they claim to have originated from different places - the Masharifu mainly from 'Hinati' and the Waungwana from 'Miuli'. If I am right in my supposition that the Vave are very ancient, it appears that the Waungwana originally claimed to have come from Somalia and the argument that Miuli is in Arabia is a later gloss on the Vave myths. Hinati is definitely said to be in Arabia,¹ as are the other towns from which the Sharifs are said to come. Whatever the truth of the matter may be, and it is probably impossible to tell now, the claim of the Waungwana and the Masharifu to be Arabs is an extremely important part of their ideology. This claim is not restricted to them - it is a myth of origin that is widespread on the East African coast. There have undoubtedly been Arab settlers in East Africa from early times, but whether all those who claim to be their descendants in fact are so seems unlikely. A more likely interpretation is that an identification was made with the Arab invaders, some of whom established Sultanates and began to extend their power over wider areas. The Arabs were also traders and they brought a modicum of prosperity to the whole coast. It was Arabs from Oman who are said to have established Pate town on Faza island in 1204 A.D.² The Bajunis claim that the Pate people were already living on the island when they arrived. For about two hundred years, from 1300 to 1500 A.D.

¹. It is probably a corrupted version of the name 'Ainat, a Sayyid (Sharif) town in Hadhramaut, Southern Arabia.
². According to the Pate Chronicle that is. (See A. Werner, 1915).
the Sultans of Pate ruled over much of the northern coast of Kenya, including Paza island. Later they were overthrown by the Portuguese, though never completely defeated. Later still the Busaidi Arabs of Zanzibar were the powerful force on the coast and the Bajunis came under their nominal sovereignty. I suspect then that the Bajunis' claim to be Arabs was as much a political identification as anything else. The Arabs were powerful, rich and cultured (the word for civilisation in Swahili is in fact ustaarabu) and thus a people whom one did well to emulate. In addition the Arabs were fairer-skinned than the people they settled amongst and they were also slave traders. It does not seem too wild a speculation then to assume that fairness and Arabness became associated with high status, whereas blackness was associated with slave status. The myth of Noah which is preserved by the Bajunis is a charter for this latter association. In Tundwa this myth justifies discriminatory marriage rules, and through these rules the stratification system, and with it the status quo in Tundwa are maintained.

At a wider level however the physical and racial connotations which are given to the stratification system are an attempt by the Waungwana to size up the world around them and to understand it in their terms. At this level the stratification system becomes a world view, it is the spectacles through which they view happenings in the wider environment. Sometimes this merely means the evaluation of other peoples in terms they can understand, thereby dictating the
appropriate behaviour to adopt towards them. This is particularly important in the context of labour migration when Bajunis must mix with other peoples. It is of interest then that Bajuni women have extended the marriage rules of stratification to include other ethnic groups. "We can marry Indians and Europeans and Arabs", said one woman. "It is only Africans we feel shame to marry. A slave is a slave!" And when a mwungwana woman declared that: "The English are equal with us; we are Waungwana", she was making a judgement about relations with other peoples. Anyone who is fair-skinned must be a mwungwana, a free and noble person, "like us".

The implications of these views may also be political. They have deeply affected the Bajunis' understanding of the political changes which have come about in the area and to some extent their reaction towards these changes. We shall see in the following chapter what these changes have been and how the Bajunis have adjusted to them.
PART 2. FACTIONS
"If only the British would come back. They never behaved like this - they are Waungwana".

Old mwungwana man

As a political unit Tundwa has two aspects. In the first place there is an administrative framework of posts created by the Kenya Central Government. In addition there is an unofficial political structure of factional oppositions. Obviously the two can only be analytically divided, since the second exists by virtue of the first. Again, looking at the situation analytically we can distinguish two important areas of confrontation in terms of which the structure of political action in Tundwa is evolved. These are the relationship between the Central Government and the people, and secondly the relationship between the political leaders of the village and other members of the village. In this chapter I shall examine the first area of confrontation — that between the Central Government and the people.

The pre-colonial period

For about five hundred years the Bajunis have been subject to some external control. Before the 16th century the most important centre of power on the north Kenya coast was at Pate on Faza island where the Nabahani ruling family had been established since the 13th century. The Nabahanis claim to have fled from Oman in 1204. Between 1587 and 1740 the Portuguese exerted control over Faza island, but the
rulers of Pate were in almost continual rebellion against them. Around the mid-seventeenth century a phase of active Omani intervention in East African affairs began which culminated in the removal of the capital of the Omani ruler, Seyyid Said, to Zanzibar in the mid-nineteenth century. By the time Seyyid Said died in 1856, the whole coast, including Faza island, was under his control. In all these moves the Bajunis played no major part except to acknowledge each successive suzerain and to provide soldiers occasionally. In addition they were always careful to keep on the winning side in any conflict. This is aptly illustrated in the Pate Chronicle where the Bajunis are described in 1843 as acknowledging the Sultan of Pate, but sometime later "by much cunning and many words", they transferred their support to the Sultan of Zanzibar (this at a time when the Sultan's forces were winning). At the end of the nineteenth century the coastal strip of Kenya became a British Protectorate leased from the Sultans of Zanzibar.

The physical conditions of Faza island are such that external control can never have been fully effective and for most of this period...
was probably merely nominal. Each Bajuni town was ruled by its own
king and was virtually an independent city-state. Nevertheless the
existence of external suzerains had one important effect — it estab­
lished a pattern of Bajuni political manoeuvring which we may des­
cribe as expediency, a policy based on the recognition that the Bajunis
were not strong enough or united enough to effectively question the
power of their overlords.

**British rule**

The entry of the British into the area around the turn of the
century was more serious than the activities of previous overlords
because the British imposed a more effective administrative system.
The independent kings of each village were put in their place by
being demoted to the post of village headman. The village was made
the basic unit in the administrative system. In Rasini, the main
village of Faza island, there was a Mudir, a local man appointed by
the colonial government. Faza island was made part of Lamu District
with its headquarters in Lamu town. Here were stationed a District
Commissioner (D.C.) and a Liwali. The former was a European and the
latter a Muslim from the coast who was appointed by the British to
deal with matters affecting the administration of Muslims. The
existence of such an official was necessitated by the Protectorate
status of the coastal strip of Kenya (the rest of Kenya was a Colony).
Other changes took place as a result of British administration. The
most significant, which I have mentioned in earlier chapters, was the
abolition of slavery. But in addition taxes were imposed and royalties charged on the cutting of mangroves and on the procuring of ivory. Criminals were punished, serious disputes settled and certain minimal public health measures insisted upon. The D.C. visited all the villages in his area from time to time and controlled the appointment of village headmen. In the early fifties a Primary school was set up in Rasini, and a small dispensary was also built there. Ten government tanks were built for collecting rainwater, agriculture - and in particular cotton - was encouraged, and the boat-building industry of Rasini was helped by the setting up of a training centre.

During this whole period the relationship between colonial officials and people was pervaded by paternalism on the one side and dependence on the other. This much is indicated by the comments made in the Visitors' Book¹ of Faza Mudirate (as it was known before 1963). Officials made brief entries here on each of their visits. The period covered by the book is from September 1957 to April 1964. The very first entry records that the people had asked for Famine Relief, but that the D.C. had decided that they were just wanting "to save themselves work". Continuous demands were made by the people on the government officials, for assistance in farming, and for amenities of all kinds. In 1959 one D.C. commented that, "they will not get anything if they do not behave better". There were some attempts to initiate a spirit of self help, but the tone was always patronising.

¹ Available in the District Office in Rasini.
In 1959 the people complained that the path from Faza to Siyu was becoming very overgrown and they wanted it cleared. "This is really a matter which should be fixed up locally", commented the D.C. "I made it clear that government cannot do such jobs and they must revert to the admirable old custom of everyone turning out when necessary..." (Unfortunately it never has been the custom on Faza island for cooperation in such matters). On the other hand the people contributed over £35 in 1958 to the building of an extension to the dispensary. (The amount is not particularly large however when one considers that prostitutes have been known to spend more on giving a feast for all the men of their village).

It is paradoxical that the Bajunis now look back on this period as a golden age in which they were left to their own ways. "The British never interfered in our lives". This kind of comment can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly there has definitely been an increase in government intervention in the lives of the people since the Independence of Kenya in 1963 - and I shall return to this point shortly. More significantly however this kind of comment relates to the status of the Bajunis under British rule. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the centuries-long over-rule of this area by Arab suzerains led to a political identification by the Bajunis with their overlords. Being an 'Arab' had advantages in this period, and it continued to do so under British rule when 'Arabs' were given certain privileges, in jobs for example, from which 'Africans' were
excluded. 'Arabs' were also on a special tax roll. The British
recognised many individual Bajunis as 'Arabs' when identity cards were
issued to them from 1952 onwards, and the Primary school in Rasini was
designated as an 'Arab' school. The British therefore bolstered up
the Bajunis' own image of themselves. In addition the British were
classed by the people as Waungwana, noble and free born. The comment
of one old and respected mwungwana man makes this clear. "If only
the British would come back", he said to another mwungwana man. "They
never behaved like this - they are Waungwana. Even though they are
not Muslims they are good people and pity the sick and the poor and
try to help them". In other words then the Bajunis tended to see
British rule as an extension of their previous historical experience.

The Independence of Kenya in December 1963 brought about a
radical change in this situation. As independence drew near, many
Bajunis at first supported the cause of coastal autonomy, and some
of those in Mombasa formed political parties to further this end.
As I have indicated the coastal strip of Kenya had Protectorate status,
unlike the rest of Kenya, which was a Colony. Sovereignty was
nominally held by the Sultan of Zanzibar and his flag was flown on
public buildings. There were many on the coast, including Bajunis,
who wanted the coastal strip to remain independent of Kenya and either
to be allied to Zanzibar or to form an independent State. The cause
of coastal autonomy (Mwambao) was intimately linked with the idea of
'Arabness'.

It soon became clear however that this cause was doomed to failure and that the coastal strip would be integrated into Kenya. At this point there was a sudden reversal of attitudes on the coast. Many people who had been recognised as 'Arabs' under the British and who had thought of themselves as superior to the Africans now realised that the latter were going to rule them and that they must come to terms with the new situation. The Bajunis were in a similar position. I have pointed out that the Bajuni stratification system is justified in terms of an ideology of racial differences in which the Waungwana and Masherifu claim to be 'Arabs' whilst they despise the Wachumwa as 'Africans'. The reverse proposition is also held by them to be equally true. Not only are the Bajuni ex-slaves called 'Africans', but any African is also referred to as a 'slave'. Obviously however such comments could no longer be expressed openly if the Bajunis were to achieve any political ends in the new situation. Some time before Independence the Bajunis in Mombasa formed a united political party of their own – at first it was called the National Union of Bajunis, but later its name was changed to the Shungwaya Freedom Party (S.F.P.). The name is significant since it refers back to the supposed origin of all Bajunis (and incidentally of some other African coastal tribes such as the Giriama) in Shungwaya, Somalia, thus putting the Bajunis firmly in Africa. This party allied itself with the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), the Federalist party made up of minority tribes like the Bajunis. SFP branches were set up in Rasini and other Faza villages.
In the General Election prior to Independence, the Tana-Lamu constituency (of which Faza island is a part) had two SPP candidates—one putting up for the lower House, and one for the Senate. Since the Bajunis form a large proportion of the electorate in the constituency, both SPP candidates were elected. But in the country at large it was not KADU, but the other major party in Kenya, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) which won most seats and therefore formed the government after Independence.¹

Even prior to Independence however the Bajunis were attempting to adjust to the new situation. When the Liwali visited Faza island in March 1963 he was surprised to discover that many men were refusing to pay the special Arab and Asian tax and were asking to be taxed at the African rate. "They say they are Bajunis, and not Arabs or Asians!" (Visitors' Book). After Independence the Bajunis as a whole were recognised as an 'indigenous African tribe', and it was now in their interests to foster this interpretation, since all the privileges now went to Africans, not Arabs. As one man put it, "Nowadays no-one says he is an Arab. He can't get a job in Mombasa if he does. But if he says he is a Bajuni he will be given". It is significant that many Arabs who fled from Zanzibar after the Revolution there, and who are now living in Mombasa, call themselves 'Bajunis'.

Post-Independence period

Independence brought many changes to this area, both in the

¹ Bennett, G. and Rosberg, K. (1961) give an account of the political history of Kenya from early colonial times up to 1961, including full details of the 1961 election.
sphere of administration, and that of ideology. The whole administra-
tive system was reorganised. The posts of Mudir and Liwali were
abolished, and instead there is now a District Assistant (D.A.) in
Rasini whose superior is the District Commissioner (D.C.) in Lamu.
The main point about both these officials is that they are Africans,
not local people. Whereas the Mudir was himself a Bajuni and a
Muslim, the D.A. is an outsider appointed to carry out government
policies in the area. He may be a coastal African, or an African
from up-country, and he may or may not be a Muslim (two out of the
four D.A.'s who served in Faza during 1965 were Muslims). A new
post, that of Chief, was set up intermediary between the D.A. and the
village headmen. The Chief was appointed by the D.A. and was
salaried according to the qualifications (e.g. literacy) which he
possessed. In 1965 Faza's Chief was a Kisingitini man. The village
with its headman remained the basic unit in the system, though the
headman was expected to perform more duties than in the past. In
addition a system of elective local government posts was set up – which
as far as the Bajunis are concerned are fairly ineffective. Each
village elects a Councillor and this man sits on a Faza Area Council,
which in its turn elects members to sit on the Lamu County Council, and
so on. These Councillors are supposed to look after the interests
of the people in their own villages and to make useful suggestions
as to how progress may be achieved. Although they do not play this
role very effectively as yet, the introduction of an elective system
is important since it introduces the element of numbers into a system which was previously based on influence.

Lamu District also has political representation at national level, as I have already indicated. Two members of parliament are elected, and curiously enough both the two men standing in 1965 were originally from Tundwa. (One has since been defeated). Diagram 4 is a simplified version of the existing administrative system in Kenya, and will help to make clear what I have said so far.

In order to understand the attitudes of the Bajunis towards the post-Independence administration we may profitably look more closely at the functions and powers of the District Assistant. We have to understand that, in local terms, the D.A. is quite a powerful man. He has a small force of police at his disposal and may use them to arrest men for tax offences or for failure to carry out government orders. He acts as an informal 'court of first hearing' in civil cases, and it is he who decides whether a case should be transferred to Lamu (where there is a formal court) or whether the two disputants must accept some form of reconciliation. In criminal cases it is he who has the responsibility of arresting the suspects and sending them to Lamu for trial. It is the D.A. too who has the responsibility for appointing the Chief and the headmen - though he must also have formal approval from his superiors for any candidate he selects. All matters of government concerning the people in the Division are dealt with by the D.A. Apart from a Medical Assistant
A simplified diagram of the structure of administrative-political roles in Kenya.

President △

KENYA

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

COAST PROVINCE

Provincial Commissioner

PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY

COUNTY COUNCIL

AREA COUNCIL

LAMU DISTRICT

District Commissioner

Distict Assistant

Chief

FAZA DIVISION

District Assistant

CHIEF

TUNDWA VILLAGE

Headman

Councillor
and the teachers at Faza Primary school there are no other specialist officers in the island. Thus it is the D.A. who sees that public health measures are enforced and that educational and economic schemes are running properly. More importantly it is the D.A. who assesses and collects taxes, though a person may complain to the authorities in Lamu if he thinks he has been assessed at too high a rate. The D.A.'s power is enhanced by the fact that Faza is an island and communications are poor. The D.C. visits very rarely and never stays more than a few hours. Occasionally there are visits from Community Development officials, agricultural experts and the like, but otherwise the D.A. is free from surveillance from above. On the other hand the D.A.'s power is limited in one very important respect. All taxes collected in Faza are sent to Lamu and it is the D.C. and Lamu County Council which decides how the money should be spent. Consequently it is difficult to get money for schemes of development in the island or for loans to farmers and traders. The D.A. thus has many sanctions at his disposal, but few incentives to offer. And he has to carry out government policies which may make him very unpopular.

Since Independence taxes have been raised and there is much more government intervention in the lives of the people than there was under the British. It is this which makes the Bajunis look back nostalgically to the old days. "Ever since the Europeans left", said one to another, "this government has been playing games with us". Villagers are exhorted to begin self-help schemes, to build schools,
dispensaries and bridges, to fasten their animals, to clear paths, to clear villages of certain trees etc. etc. — and all this in the name of "African socialism" (ujamaa wa Kiafrica), and of "nation-building" (kujenga taifa).

In some ways the new Administration has simply taken up where the British left off. In particular the relationship between people and government is still cast in a paternalistic mould. But the ideology of the new era is completely different. It is an ideology of African-ness, of equality, of 'socialism' and of 'harambee' (pulling together). "African socialism expects the citizens of this new country to help voluntarily and whole-heartedly (bila uchoyo) in the building of the nation..." "African socialism means complete democracy and equality (demokrasi iliyo kamili, na usawa kabisa)."  

Bajunis do not of course fully understand the language of this ideology, but they are aware that it gives no support whatsoever to the concepts on which their own stratifications system is based. The contrast could not in fact be greater. The ideology of the stratification system is one which preaches inequality and which claims Arabness as the highest value. In addition self-interest is closer to the Bajunis' way of thinking, than 'pulling together'. Thus there are two conflicting ideologies operating here — that of the Central Government and that of the village. The first is backed up by the united strength of the Administration with its panoply of

1. These quotations are taken from Pamphlet No. 28 — "Teach Yourself Citizenship" ("Jifunze Uraia") put out by the Kenya Government Information Service (April 1965).
officials, police and courts. The second is backed up by the status quo in the village where the Waungwana are pre-eminent. In order to gain power any Bajuni political leader must manipulate these two value systems successfully. Thus it is that men who commonly refer to themselves as 'Arabs' in the village situation say that they are 'Africans' in their relations with the Central Government. Public protestations of, "We are all Africans", are a common feature of political meetings, as are dutiful calls for the rallying cry: "Haaaaambeee!!" And although most Waungwana view the present government as serikali ya wachumwa (a government of slaves) and interpret most of its activities in terms of this ideology, they must disguise these attitudes if they are to achieve any political or economic ends in the new situation. In the following chapter we shall see the influence of this conflict of ideologies on factional disputes in Tundwa.

The framework of Tundwa political action is provided by the structure of administrative roles in the village, which I shall now discuss in more detail as an introduction to the analysis of factions in the following chapter.

Administration in the village

At the village level the official representative of the government is the head man. His duties are imprecise to say the least. There is, as far as I know, no written statement which assigns special tasks to him. Each D.A. therefore has slightly different
expectations of the role. It is obvious however that all of them understand this as an administrative role - the headman is a government servant (he is paid a salary every six months to sustain him in the position) and he should help them in carrying out government policy. He was supposed to inform villagers of government decisions affecting them and see that these were carried out. He should inform people of meetings to be held and see that they attended. He was supposed to inform the D.A. of any unrest in the village and help him with investigations into any disputes which were taking place. In disputes over land or other quarrels, the disputants had to go first to the headman who would try and settle the matter. If he was unable to do so then the D.A. was called in. Finally the headman was supposed to help the D.A. in assessing villagers for tax and to provide the names of tax offenders.

Most D.A.s soon realise that their village headmen are not fulfilling these expectations fully. One reason is that the headmen have no sanctions whatsoever. It should be remembered that communications within Fasa island are on a very primitive level - there are no roads and no motorised vehicles of any sort, and needless to say, no telephone links between the villages. All communication is by foot or by donkey. It is hardly surprising then that the D.A. keeps all of the handful of police assigned to him in Rasini. The headman then cannot be easily backed up in unpopular actions. Nor do the headmen have rights to fine or imprison people. Thus when the D.A.s
refer to their headmen, as they often do, as "uncooperative" we can understand the reasons behind the headmen's lack of eagerness. In addition however the headmen are not particularly sympathetic to the government, for reasons which I have already suggested.

The other 'official' in the village is the Councillor. His role is even less precise than that of the headman, since the idea of local government by discussion is such a new idea. It is not at all clear what such persons are supposed to do. They certainly do not have any real power. The Councillor is paid 5/- for every meeting of the Area Council which he attends. In theory he is an independent representative of the villagers, but in practise he does not play this role, and any attempt to do so is regarded by the D.A. as trouble-making. As we shall see the Councillor in Tundwa used to curry favour with the government by helping the D.A. to make tax assessments.

One should make the point that in a system like this, administration and politics are inseparable. No role is purely administrative. Since 1964 Kenya has had a one party system of government and the D.A. and other administrators must be members of KANU. They are empowered to exhort the people in their areas to join KANU and to form party branches. Since the M.P.s are also supposed to carry out this task there is inevitably competition between them and the D.A., each trying to gain credit for whatever achievements the people make. Looked at from the village level there is also a
blurring of the distinctions between the administrative and the political sphere. Thus the Councillor, who in theory plays a political role, is occasionally treated as an administrative functionary by the D.A. The headman, in theory a government servant, is regarded as a political figure in the village since he is usually a member of a particular faction. He can rarely be neutral.

This is the system as it existed in Tundwa at the beginning of 1965. During that year there were some changes made, as we shall see in the next chapter in which I analyse the factional conflicts in Tundwa.
VIII. Factionalism in Tundwa

"There is no unity or cooperation here in Tundwa"... Deputy headman of Tundwa, privately.

"Everyone here in Tundwa gets on well"... Deputy headman in Tundwa, in answer to question from visiting official.

All major political roles in Tundwa are held by the Waungwana, and it is they who thereby control all channels of communication with the Central government. At the same time it is they who feel most strongly about stratification and believe most firmly in its ideology of physical and moral differences. Paradoxically therefore this has led to a situation in which the Central Government backs up that stratum in Tundwa which most strongly opposes it.

But the Waungwana in Tundwa are not united, and never have been. In pre-colonial times they competed for the role of 'king' (mfalme) and the basis of power was in physical strength and wealth. In 1965 there were two political factions in Tundwa and towards the end of that year three, all led by Waungwana and all competing for power in the village. But now the basis of power lies in ability to control the politico-administrative posts which govern the people's relations with the Central government. As I shall show, this reinterpretation of the basis of power led to a shift within the Waungwana stratum, away from the kind of men who would or could have been leaders.
in the pre-colonial period, to men who could never have aspired to such power. During 1965 however a faction composed of more traditional type leaders emerged and finally took over control.

The factions had wider implications in that they allied themselves with larger-scale opposing groups outside the village, and to some extent used these to further their own battles. I shall indicate some of these wider alliances where necessary, but shall not go into them more fully.

The main theme of this chapter then will be the development of political factionalism in Tundwa. I shall show that political leaders are concerned with control of the channels of communication between villagers and Central government, and that in order to achieve this end they compete for posts set up by the government. The reasons why faction leaders seek to control these posts are various. They may wish to ensure that they and their supporters are taxed at a rate lower than that consonant with their property holdings. Alternatively they may wish to engineer tax rises for their opponents. They may wish to prevent or hinder active intervention in the affairs of the village, or they may wish to use the power of the government to engineer changes against the wishes of their opponents. A man who has links with the government can use these links against others, but in so doing he creates enemies and will be opposed by others who would prefer these links to be used to their own benefit. Men do not seem to seek such positions simply for prestige or for monetary considerations,
though there is also an element of this in the competition for power.

Competition for control of the channels of communication with the government is the main theme in Tundwa politics then. But there is also another theme in the development of factional conflicts in Tundwa. Political leaders are also concerned about the control of activity within the village itself, and in particular with religious activity. To achieve this end they try to ensure that only a candidate of their own choice holds the post of Sheikh of the Friday mosque. The mosque is important partly because it acts as a forum for communication – public notices relevant to the townspeople are made there as well as the prayers and the sermons, and men often meet informally outside to discuss the affairs of the town. Secondly the position of Sheikh, as I pointed out in Chapter V, is quite a lucrative one. More importantly however, the role of Sheikh can be an influential one. The Sheikh is a leader whose word is usually respected, and he may act as mediator in serious disputes where the relations between two groups have become estranged. The political factions therefore try to control this important post, and their conflicts over it form a 'sub-plot' to the general theme of political conflict. At the same time there is some distinction, both of personnel and of interest, in disputes over religious matters as opposed to those over political matters, and this I shall try to indicate.

In order to understand the present stage of political factionalism in Tundwa it is necessary first to sketch in the historical background to present day political conflicts.
The historical development of the role of village headman

In pre-colonial times political action in Tundwa revolved around the patri-clans. When the British arrived in Tundwa around the turn of the century they found a man of the Zitindini clan of the Waungwana holding the office of king and this office had been in his family for three generations. Before that his clan had seized it from another Waungwana clan, the Wachandaa, who according to tradition had been the rulers of Tundwa since the Bajunis had arrived on the island. They had also traditionally provided the Sheikh for the Friday mosque and continued to do so for some time. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the Zitindini had to defend their position from attack by a third Waungwana clan, the Mui wa Mote clan. Slave and Waungwana soldiers were used by both sides, and a fort built from which the Zitindini could protect their position. In the end the Zitindini won, though only after many years fighting and the natural deaths of the two rivals for the office of king. It seems quite clear then that in the nineteenth century at least the position of king went to the man with most power - and power in this situation can be defined as Waungwana support together with enough slaves to defend one against attack from rivals. Secondly it is the clans which are remembered as holding political power; succession to the post of king was within the clan - usually passing from father to son, or occasionally from elder brother to younger brother. Thirdly control of the mosque seems traditionally to have gone hand in hand with control of the town, though this situation was less clear cut after the Zitindini assumed power. Finally it is clear that although
there were dissensions amongst the Waungwana during the nineteenth century, all the contestants for the post of king were from that stratum - in other words political action was an internal affair of the Waungwana stratum. The Wachumwa were mere slave chattels at the time, and there is no evidence in oral tradition that the Masherifu played an influential role in this period. With the arrival of the British certain fundamental changes took place.

The last Zitindini king of Tundwa was recognised by the British as headman. When he died the British ignored the claims of the Zitindini to the succession and merely appointed someone on whose loyalty they could rely. The man appointed was Shauri, a man of the Maukachwa clan. At one time he had acted as Sheikh in the Friday mosque. He seems to have been an old man already when he took over the post, for by 1930 he had become too old and blind to continue in the job. More is known about this period than about the period when Shauri became headman. The D.C. at the time kept a small notebook in the house of the headman of Tundwa in which he recorded a few observations in English on each of his visits. This notebook, very tattered, is still preserved by the man who succeeded Shauri - Aboud. He cannot read it since not only does he not speak English but he is also practically illiterate. The notebook contains entries covering the period from January 1929 to May 1933, after which it was never used again. This period however was exactly that in which Aboud took over from Shauri. In 1929 the first entry records
the D.C.'s dissatisfaction with Shauri: "Doubtful if any successor will make a more satisfactory job of the headmanship. The trouble appears to be in the Tundwa people themselves". It seems obvious from this notebook and from other evidence that Aboud manipulated the situation in order to get the job. He was the son of a pious and learned man of the Kiwayuu clan who was at one time Sheikh of the Friday mosque, but Aboud himself was more known for seducing women than for his religious learning. He spent a lot of time cultivating annual crops on the mainland as he had no land of his own. Before becoming headman he had gone almost every year as a sailor to Mombasa, Dar es Salaam or Mogadishu. He had been helping the old headman for some time and the latter believed him to be his friend and referred to him affectionately as mtoto wangu (my child). Being blind he was not aware that Aboud was having an affair with his wife behind his back. Aboud suitably impressed the various D.C.'s who came to the village (one of whom described him as a "capable fellow") and encouraged their belief that he was a relative of the headman's. From 1929 to 1931 he is referred to as Shauri's "son". In 1932 when Aboud finally took over the post of headman, the entry reads: "Mzee the old man - i.e. the headman absolutely past work, blind, and work all done by Aboud, his nephew. Village clean as H.M. knew of my arrival beforehand. Mzee Shauri given Head Tax Exemption Certificate and Aboud will receive wages".

Certain points emerge from examination of this process. Support
in the village and wealth in money or slaves ceased to be of importance in achieving political position, as did clan membership. What was important was ability to ingratiate oneself with the British officers who visited the village from time to time. Not everyone would want to do this since the post of village headman held few rewards. The salary was small (even in 1965 Aboud was receiving only 75/- every six months) and the headman had to carry out unpopular government decisions. In 1930 for example Aboud had to take a man suspected of involvement in a stabbing incident to Lamu where he was imprisoned for several months. He had to see that the village was kept clean – an almost impossible task. (The last entry in 1933 reads: "Town clean in parts, particularly where D.C. was expected to walk"). He had no power or sanctions of his own and was at one time fined by the D.C. for failing to see that the town was kept clean.

The post of king had been completely transformed. The only similarity between the past and the present was that, in the past, only Waungwana were competing for the post.

In 1965 Aboud was still headman of Tundwa, but he was about 75 years old and becoming blind and deaf, and the processes of 1930 were repeating themselves all over again. For several years he had been helped by a man called Madi, a mwungwana of the Losii clan. Madi was acting in an unpaid and unofficial capacity and his stated aim was to succeed to the post of headman when Aboud became too old. He was thus following almost the same tactics which Aboud himself had
followed some 35 years before. He and Aboud were good friends and
Madi used to visit Aboud nearly every day to discuss the affairs of
the village and to write any letters that had to be written. In
spite of the fact that the position of deputy to the headman was quite
unofficial, the D.A. in fact treated Madi most of the time as if he
were already headman. Recognising this, people had begun to call
Madi "the nowadays headman" (hediman wa kisasa), and when disputes
arose they took them more often to Madi than to Aboud.

The life-history of Madi helps us to some extent to understand
his present activities. He attended Koran school for one year in
Tundwa when a young boy. He cultivated for some time on the mainland
opposite Faza island and then went to Mombasa. His father was at
that time a butcher in Machakos (an up-country town in Kenya) and Madi
soon went to join him there. He worked as a butcher there himself
for seventeen years, returning to marry in Tundwa. He took his wife
back with him and she bore him a daughter there who attended school in
Machakos. Madi himself attended an Adult education class there for
one year, and in this way became literate and knowledgeable of a few
English words. His butcher's shop was at first a success, but due
to a series of misfortunes and illness (he was a diabetic) he began
to make losses, and eventually returned to Tundwa. There he culti-
vated a small shamba which he had inherited on his father's death.
In 1965 he was about 50 years old. He was an able and ambitious
man, and more committed than most in the village to a belief in 'modern'
'progressive' ideas - for example he was strongly in favour of building a school in Tundwa and urged the people to form a farmers' co-operative. As such he was the kind of man likely to be acceptable to government officials. He was not the kind of man who would have been traditionally acceptable as a political leader. Like the head-man he was relatively poor - his shamba was only one and a half acres in size and he had no savings. Like Aboud too he had been a labour migrant for many years, and this experience had given him a degree of familiarity with the ideas and standards of the outside world which most others lack. Another similarity with Aboud was his minimal religious education - though Madi could cope here better than Aboud, who was openly ridiculed when he tried to recite the Koran.

The other 'official' in the village at the beginning of 1965 was the Councillor, Hobein, who had been elected to the post some time before Independence. Why this particular man was chosen is not at all clear now. He faced no opposition and no-one seemed to be aware of the significance of the post at the time. Hobein is a member of the Kiunga clan of the Waungwana. He has no land of his own but cultivates a shamba of about four and a half acres belonging to his mother which had almost reverted to bush before he took it over. Before the Zanzibar revolution he had gone three years in succession to Pemba to trade amongst the clove pickers there. Hobein is said to have never uttered a word in Area Council meetings and did not report back on them to the villagers. He was a colourless man whom
most people regarded as merely a front for another man, an inseparable friend of his called Muhaji. It was Muhaji who was the real power behind the role of Councillor. Muhaji was a Koran school teacher. He had no land of his own, but had violated local rules by appropriating for himself a piece of common land and planting permanent trees there. Although this created some ill-feeling against him no-one did anything to stop him because there is no land shortage at present in Tundwa. Muhaji was a mwungwana of the Mazumi clan - a very small clan. More importantly however his mother was an ex-slave, and he was therefore looked down upon by most 'pure' Waungwana. As such it was difficult for him personally to pursue political ambitions, so he pursued them through Hobein. His status was significant in another respect as we shall see shortly. But both Hobein and Muhaji were more like traditional leaders than was Madi or the headman. They were both men with a veneer of religious piety, which gave them some status. It is of some interest too that neither had been labour migrants in the normal sense of the word. Muhaji had visited other places such as Mombasa but had never worked there. But like Madi and the headman neither were wealthy men.

**Factional conflicts**

At the beginning of 1965 Hobein, Muhaji and Madi were the leaders of a faction group which they themselves described as "on the side of the government" (I shall call it Faction 1). Aboud, the

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1. This part of the Chapter will be clearer if reference is made to Diagram 5, p. 207.
<table>
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**Notice**

- This notice is effective from January 1, 1966
- The Departmental Headman
- The Municipal Committee
- The Divisional Officer
- The Sub-Divisional Officer
- The Officer in charge of Law and Order
- The Officer in charge of Education
- The Officer in charge of Health Services
- The Officer in charge of Social Welfare
- The Officer in charge of Public Works
- The Officer in charge of Revenue
- The Officer in charge of Transport
- The Officer in charge of Police
- The Officer in charge of Fire Services
- The Officer in charge of Electricity
- The Officer in charge of Water Supply
- The Officer in charge of Sanitation
- The Officer in charge of Housing
- The Officer in charge of Roads
- The Officer in charge of Agriculture
- The Officer in charge of Industry
- The Officer in charge of Handicrafts
- The Officer in charge of Tourism
- The Officer in charge of Welfare
- The Officer in charge of Information
- The Officer in charge of Planning
- The Officer in charge of Tribal Development
- The Officer in charge of Rural Development
- The Officer in charge of Social Security
- The Officer in charge of Public Health
- The Officer in charge of Housing and Urban Development
- The Officer in charge of Roads and Bridges
- The Officer in charge of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
- The Officer in charge of Industry and Commerce
- The Officer in charge of Handicrafts and Cottage Industries
- The Officer in charge of Tourism and Heritage
- The Officer in charge of Welfare and Community Development
- The Officer in charge of Information and Publicity
- The Officer in charge of Planning and Policy Development
- The Officer in charge of Tribal Development and Social Welfare
- The Officer in charge of Rural Development and Social Welfare
- The Officer in charge of Social Security and Housing
- The Officer in charge of Roads and Bridges and Public Health
- The Officer in charge of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry and Industry and Commerce
- The Officer in charge of Handicrafts and Cottage Industries and Tourism and Heritage
- The Officer in charge of Welfare and Community Development and Information and Publicity
- The Officer in charge of Planning and Policy Development and Tribal Development and Social Welfare
- The Officer in charge of Rural Development and Social Welfare and Social Security and Housing
- The Officer in charge of Roads and Bridges and Public Health and Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
- The Officer in charge of Industry and Commerce and Handicrafts and Cottage Industries and Tourism and Heritage
- The Officer in charge of Welfare and Community Development and Information and Publicity and Planning and Policy Development
- The Officer in charge of Tribal Development and Social Welfare and Rural Development and Social Welfare and Social Security and Housing
- The Officer in charge of Roads and Bridges and Public Health and Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
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headman, was also loosely associated with this group, but his age made him irrelevant. When this faction described itself as "government men" they had some cause. They were the core of a small minority in the village which had supported their M.P.'s crossing of the floor in Parliament. Originally both Lamu M.P.'s had belonged to the Shungwaya Freedom Party. After Independence however one of the Bajuni M.P.'s (whom I shall call M.P.1) was persuaded to cross the floor and join KANU (the government party) as a political move. Later Kenya became a one-party state and KADU and its constituent parties were voluntarily dissolved. M.P.1's crossing of the floor lost him much support amongst the Bajunis, though he continued to have some supporters, of which this faction was one. It is not altogether clear that in supporting him they were concerned about national politics. But KANU was obviously a powerful force and had its local representative in the D.A., a man on whom the headman and his deputy depended for their positions. Although this did not in theory apply to the Councillor, in practice he had very little room for manoeuvre, even had he wanted it, because it was the D.A. who had power in Faza Division, not the Area Council.

There were other reasons why this Tundwa faction supported M.P.1. M.P.1's mother belonged to the mchumwa category like Muhaji's mother, though on his father's side M.P.1 was a mwungwana of the Rasmali clan. The two men were in fact related - though very distantly. More important than the actual relationship however was the fact that
this put both men into the nether world between the Waungwana and the Wachumwa. Although they were formally speaking Waungwana, the accusation that "your mother was a slave" was liable to be levelled against them at any time.

Faction 1 thus depended for its position mainly on its relationship with the D.A., at that time an African Muslim from one of the coastal tribes. In order to win his approval and continued backing they were forced into assisting him with tax assessments. This was nominally the headman's job but he was too old and too deaf to be an effective help. As far as both the D.A. and the villagers were concerned the headman was largely irrelevant and was ignored for most of the time.

Hobein and Muhaji also helped the headman or his deputy in the settlement of disputes, though it was usually the deputy headman, Madi, who took the main part in such affairs.

It was mainly their role in tax assessments which created ill-feeling against Faction 1 in the town, and predictably it came from wealthy men who were in danger of being taxed at a high rate. As I understand it, previous to Independence every adult male was taxed at the same rate (12/- per annum). After Independence however taxes were raised and a new scheme of graduated personal tax came into being. The basic minimum rate under this scheme was 48/- per year, the maximum £30. Most adult men in Tundwa were paying at the rate of 48/- per year which should have meant that they were earning not more than £96
per year. (Many of them were probably not earning as much as this — see Chapter II). When a man was stated by the deputy headman or the Councillor to have a shop or a large shamba however he was usually asked to pay at the next rate — 72/- (for men earning between £96 and £144 per year). The tax of the richest man in the village (Sharif Sura whom I mentioned in Chapter II) was assessed at 480/- in 1965 (for men earning between £516 and £600 per year). Two points must be made here. First is that none of these three men helping the government were liable to more than 48/- on the strength of their earnings, so they had nothing to fear personally. Second is the fact that there has been no government assessment of property ownership in Tundwa — no D.A. knows how much land is under cultivation or how much any person owns or uses. He thus has to rely entirely on the advice of such men as these. And whereas I do not think they ever claimed that some persons had property which they did not have, it seems very likely that they did not mention the property holdings of others.

Wealthy men in the village were resentful on two accounts. In the first place they did not think it fair that they should pay more tax than other people, and secondly they were angry that certain men should inform on them to the government. "The leaders (majumbe) of this place are very bad", said one. "They tell the D.A. we have property we don't have and the D.A. doesn't know and has to believe them". The problem of those who opposed Faction 1 was that the only
way to remove its leaders was to discredit them in the eyes of the government and this could not be done in terms of tax assessment. On the other hand Madi in particular was well aware that he could not go too far and that his relationship with the government depended also on him not entirely losing his support in the village. This was particularly shown on the first occasion when the leadership of the other faction (which I shall call Faction 2) began to show itself.

Political action: Phase 1

An order had been issued by the Chief stating that huts must be built on the outskirts of the village in which animals (goats and donkeys mainly) should be fastened at night. Normally they were left to roam freely about the village and this was one of the reasons why the town was so dirty. An anonymous letter was sent by some Tundwa men to the D.C. in Lamu complaining about the order and saying that the animals would catch diseases from mosquitoes if they were treated in this way. It was signed: "We, your subjects". When the D.C. sent this letter back to the D.A. demanding that the authors be discovered and reprimanded, the D.A. inquired from both the headman and his deputy as to who had written this letter. Both claimed to be quite unable to discover who the culprits were, although everyone in the town was well aware that the leaders of Faction 2 had written it. Eventually Mudathir, the main leader of Faction 2, voluntarily confessed to having written the letter and was reprimanded. The first move of this faction had therefore failed whilst Madi had not endangered his standing in the village.
Before examining the process whereby Faction 2 usurped the power of Faction 1 it is of interest to examine its leadership and compare it with that of the other faction. Its two main leaders were Mudathir and his father's brother's son Shahibu. Shahibu was also married to Mudathir's sister, making them brothers-in-law. Both these men were Waungwana of the Kiunga clan like Hobein – they were in fact Hobein's patrilateral parallel cousins, all three being descendants of a common grandfather. Why they were in different factions is very difficult to explain since no-one would admit that the men had any personal differences (I do not rule this possibility out however). It is of interest however that the descendents of their grandfather fall into two groups – one which is wealthy and greatly intermarried (five intermarriages within two generations) and to which Mudathir and Shahibu belong, and the other which is much poorer and within which no intermarriages have taken place and to which Hobein belongs. When asked to explain this situation Mudathir said, "I like to be on the side where all my relatives and friends (jamaa) are; Hobein has no jamaa on his side, he is all alone". Although not strictly true, this explanation is significant as we shall see.

Mudathir owned a large piece of land about eleven acres in size, so he has never needed to migrate, although he has visited Lamu and Mombasa. Together with his cousin Shahibu he is the 'patron' of a mosque in a location of the town where both live. Both men are learned in the traditional sense of being able to read and recite the
Koran and thereby to play a respected role in maulidis or funeral prayer readings. Shahibu was even more wealthy than his cousin since in addition to owning eleven acres of better planted land than Mudathir he also owns a shop and lends money. Both these men are strong and forceful in character, and like the leaders of Faction 1, were occasionally called to mediate in land disputes.

Behind these two were other minor leaders such as Baishe and Nassibu, both shopkeepers like Shahibu, though by no means as wealthy as him. But equally important were two Sharifs, who could more aptly be described as 'influential backers' rather than leaders since they rarely came out into the open. One of these, Sharif Hassan, was again a shopkeeper and a money lender who owned six and a half acres of land newly planted. The other was Sharif Hussein, the son-in-law of Sharif Sura and the second richest man in the village. None of these people had been labour migrants.

Thus all these men were wealthy and learned in the traditional manner, respected men of the town who came from 'good' families (i.e. ones with no slave ancestry). They were the kind of men who might well have been leaders in the past. The faction which they formed was at first 'anti-government' in a sense. They were supporters of the other Lamu member of Parliament, M.P.2, whose mother was Shahibu's sister.

Control of the mosque: Episode 1

Even before 1965 Mudathir and Shahibu had shown themselves to
be powerful men in the town, as is shown in the following case study of their clash with the Sheikh of the mosque.

About fifteen years previously the Sheikh of the mosque, who was a mwungwana and father of the present headman of the village, died. His deputy, Sharif Sura (the richest man in the village) was also very old and soon relinquished the post to his son, Sharif Mohamed. Sharif Mohamed was married to a mwungwana woman whose brother was a man I shall call Sheikh Luki. At this time Sheikh Luki used to go to Pemba every year, trading amongst the clove pickers who congregate there during the season. He also traded in Mombasa and paid labourers to cultivate for him on the mainland opposite Faza island. He was thus quite wealthy, although he owned no land. (His father was however a very rich man, owning almost thirteen acres of land, which Sheikh Luki will eventually inherit). He was able to go to Mecca on pilgrimage and to visit Egypt, the Sudan and Somalia on the way. He also studied religion in Zanzibar. It was after he came back from Zanzibar that people began to call him sheikh—which in this more general sense means a religiously learned man. He began to act as Sharif Mohamed's deputy in the mosque. He still visited Pemba every year however and was thus unable to read the sermon all the time.

About this time two events occurred which affected the position of both men. Firstly Sharif Mohamed became engaged in a scandal which invoked the wrath of Mudathir and Shahibu, leaders of Faction 2. He
was at the time a money lender, lending money mainly to women. He is said to have drawn up agreements stating that if the money was not repaid within a certain time, the woman would forfeit her house. Most women who borrowed from him did not realise what they were letting themselves in for. What is not clear is how many houses he actually confiscated in this way. Some people said several but I only know certainly of this one case. Sharif Mohamed lent 200/- to a very old woman who was practically senile. Her house was the surety, though whether or not she understood this is not clear. The old lady did not repay the money and she died soon afterwards. When the period of mourning was finishing Sharif Mohamed came along to take possession of the house. Unfortunately for him, the old lady was a relative of Shahibu's. Shahibu and Mudathir refused to let Sharif Mohamed take over the house, claiming that the certificate of ownership was in the name of the old lady's daughter. This daughter was Shahibu's sister. There was a quarrel and the case was taken to court. Sharif Mohamed was defeated and from this time onwards this faction worked to get Sharif Mohamed removed from the post of Sheikh, by rousing up feeling against him in the town. They eventually succeeded at the beginning of 1965.

Meanwhile the revolution in Zanzibar (1963) prevented Sheikh Luki from trading in Pemba and the Shifta incursions prevented further large-scale cultivation on the mainland. He was therefore free to take over the post/and this he did. At the beginning of 1965 he was
doing all the work of Sheikh and Sharif Mohamed had completely stopped reading. Sheikh Luki was thus without a deputy. After a while he began to suggest that Sharif Mohamed should come back and be his deputy. He complained that he could not be in the mosque every Friday and needed someone to help him. But feeling against Sharif Mohamed was still running high and no-one wanted him to return.

In early 1965 therefore Faction 2 had not only secured the dismissal of Sharif Mohamed, but had also put Sheikh Luki in the position of supporting an unpopular man. At this period however Luki was acceptable to Faction 2 as Sheikh of the mosque since he was the son of a rich man who was one of their supporters. In addition he stood head and shoulders above anyone else in the town in terms of the extent of his religious learning, and he was greatly respected for this. Someone told me at the beginning of 1965 that, "if Sheikh Luki says a thing, people follow". This was an exaggeration, even at that time, but it does give some indication of Sheikh Luki's standing in the town. Faction 2 therefore looked upon him as a useful supporter.

At the same time however there were also links between Sheikh Luki and Faction 1. He was linked to this faction first through Madi, or rather, Madi's wife, Madina. If reference is made to Chapter III it will be noted that Madina maintained contact with several women through her brother's wife, Biti. Sheikh Luki was Biti's brother. (Sharif Mohamed was also linked to Faction 1 in this way since he was married to Biti's sister). Faction 1 was also indirectly associated
with Sheikh Luki through Muhaji, the Koran school teacher and co-leader of Faction 1 with Madi and Hobein. Both Muhaji and Luki were supporters of an Islamic 'missionary' called Ibrahim. This man had arrived in the island about ten years previously from Lamu. He had come specifically to teach religion and had been sent by a powerful group of Lamu Sharifs who control the largest Friday mosque there and are believed to have supernatural powers. They belong to the Jamallylel clan of the Masherifu, a clan which came from the Comoro islands at the beginning of this century. They are not related to the Bajuni Sharifs therefore except by ultimate descent from the Prophet. It is said that "the people of Kisingitini" (probably just a section of them) went to the Lamu Sharifs and requested them to send a religious teacher to Kisingitini. Ibrahim - who was not himself a Sharif, but who had been taught by the Lamu Sharifs - was sent. He set up a madrasa (a kind of Islamic secondary school) in Kisingitini and after a few years had gathered around him a band of dedicated and energetic followers who set up madrasas in most of the other villages on the island. One was set up in Tundwa, with Sheikh Luki as one of its main backers.

Ibrahim is an extremely clever man and a born politician, who manages to be all things to all men. It is not at all easy then to assess his true position on any matter. But two facets of his teaching are of relevance to us here. The first is that at an early stage

1. P. Lienhardt has written an account of the history and religious role of the Lamu Sharifs (Lienhardt, 1959).
in his stay at Kisingitini he turned against his mentors, the Lamu Sharifs. (The reason for this change need not concern us here). He began to preach against them, arguing that they were against 'progress'. He put forward this point of view as specifically concerning the Lamu Sharifs, not Sharifs in general. In this way he managed not to antagonise the Bajuni Sharifs, many of whom supported him. But there were some Sharifs and Waungwana, who, whilst supporting Ibrahim's teaching work, did not follow him in the matter of the Lamu Sharifs. Sheikh Luki was amongst these, as we shall see.

The second facet of Ibrahim's teaching which concerns us here is that concerning 'Western' education. Ibrahim and his followers were believers in Islamic education, and some of them even argued that Western education was forbidden by their religion. The heart of both these controversies was in Kisingitini, but they had their echo in other villages too, since Ibrahim had followers almost everywhere.

This then is the background to Sheikh Luki's structural position in Tundwa at the beginning of 1965. He had links with both factions and was an important man in the town. The issue of who should control the mosque had been temporarily settled and did not arise again until July. In the meantime however Faction 2 was beginning to assert itself as a political force in the town and was challenging the position of Faction 1.

Political Action: Phase 2

Faction 2 first tried to separate the old headman from the other
faction. They told him he should have nothing to do with Madi and the others, and that he should assert himself. Faction 1 countered this by visiting Aboud constantly and "consulting" him about village affairs. Faction 2 also complained to the D.A. that Madi and Muhaji were going around looking into people's houses at their wives and threatening them that their husbands would be imprisoned. The D.A. took no notice of these complaints.

It was just about this time that the D.A. was transferred and was replaced by a Kikuyu (i.e. an African from up-country Kenya). The attitude of the majority of the people in the town to this man is perhaps predictable. "How is it that a slave is given a job like this?" asked one man. "Why, he can't even speak Swahili". It was at this time that I was first told the story of Noah's punishment, which I recounted in Chapter VI. In addition however the new man took such a tough line about tax assessments and the prompt payment of tax that the divisions in the village were obscured by a temporary unity. The new D.A. also expressed annoyance at the lack of progress achieved by the Bajuni in self-help projects. Village Committees should be set up to forward this end he announced. Madi obediently set about forming such a committee in Tundwa, and although no-one was particularly enthusiastic to take part in it, he was able to take a list of twelve names to the D.A. next day. He had been careful to see that whilst his own supporters were all on the committee, the other side was also represented. In this way he was able to assure the D.A.
of the support of the whole village for the scheme and thereby to
gain his approval. The Committee never met or carried out any
activities; it was a committee in name only.

Around the end of May the D.A. began to demand that everyone
pay his tax immediately. Since the harvest had not yet been gathered
in many men had no ready cash with which to pay and resentment grew.
Other men complained that they had been assessed at too high a rate.
The resentment was carefully fostered by Faction 2, which eventually
sent a deputation of three of its supporters to see the D.C. in Lamu.
They did this at the suggestion of M.P.2. The main leaders did not
go - it seems probable that they were unwilling to show themselves
openly at this point. Two of the men who went probably had a fair
complaint about their tax assessments, but the third, Sharif Hussein,
the second richest man in the village, certainly had none. All three
appear to have tried to deceive the D.C. regarding the extent of their
property holdings. They came back reporting that the D.C. had pro­
mised to look into their cases and to visit Tundwa, but he did not
come and nothing further came of the affair.

By now however feeling was running high and soon many men in
Tundwa were refusing to pay tax and the 'boycott' began to spread to
other villages. At this point the D.A. was transferred to another
area. Faction 2 claimed this as a victory achieved by them and many
people argued that the D.A. had been removed, "because he insulted
the people of Tundwa". The new D.A. was a temporary man – he stayed
for only three weeks, during which time he arrested twelve Tundwa
men and some men from other villages who were in arrears with their
tax, and the tax boycott spluttered to an end. The D.A. was careful
to arrest men who were weak and without political power in the town,
thus avoiding the possibility of a dangerous confrontation with the
real leaders of the affair.

At the end of June the temporary D.A. left and his successor
arrived. This man was a Muslim from Mombasa and therefore in a
different category altogether as far as the Bajuni were concerned.
Nevertheless he was still a representative of the Central government,
an African government. After he had been in his post for about a
month the D.A. came to Tundwa to hold a meeting at which he gave a
speech. One of his biggest complaints was that the Tundwa Village
Committee had done nothing since its formation, and that it should
now start to be active. But his main aim in holding the meeting was
to set up a branch of KANU in Tundwa. He argued that the people in
this area had got nothing so far out of Independence because they had
no party members and did not speak with one voice. But all were en-
titled to the benefits from Independence since everyone had fought for
it. (As an afterthought he added, "Did you not fight against the
Arabs and the Portuguese?") A KANU branch should therefore be set
up immediately. There was some attempt by Faction 1 to prevent this
happening - particularly from Muhaji. At first it was not clear why
they were doing this, but eventually Madi admitted that they were waiting
for the arrival of M.P.1 with whom they had agreed to discuss the formation of such a party branch. M.P.1 did not have much support in the town at that time since he was said not to "help people" (i.e. to get their taxes reduced), so Faction 1's objections were pushed aside, and the D.A. retired whilst the branch officers were being 'elected'. Madi took control immediately, calling out names and asking if people were willing to participate. As on the previous occasion (of the formation of the Village Committee) he managed to get his own men, including himself, into the group, whilst at the same time organising the other faction into participating. The membership of the Village Committee and that of the KANU branch turned out in fact to be almost identical. Madi nominated himself as Secretary, with Mudathir, leader of Faction 2 as his deputy. He also nominated Hobein, Muhaji and another supporter of this faction, Makka, a mchumwa Koran school teacher. The other seven members of the committee were all supporters of the opposing faction. They included Shahibu, three young Sharifs, two shopkeepers and another man. Nassibu, one of the shopkeepers, was made Chairman.

The meeting was also notable for the fact that the election for a new Councillor was announced. Madi stood up and said that Hobein would stand again, and arguing that unity was important in the town he suggested that it would be better if there was no opposition. Throughout the meeting then Madi attempted to display his authority in the town to the D.A. whilst the other faction remained largely apathetic.
We have to remember that the leaders of Faction 2 were by no means supporters of KANU. They had originally been supporters of the S.P.P., but the S.P.P. had been voluntarily dissolved when Kenya became a one-party state. But to have refused to serve on the KANU branch would not have improved their standing with the D.A., so they raised no protest. The composition of the KANU branch was significant in that superficially it showed that there was no discord in the town. But why did Madi not put more of his own supporters on the committee? The reason was simply that amongst the important and reputed men of the town (the watu mashuhuri) - the kind of men who typically attend such meetings - Faction 1 had little support. Most of these men are wealthy and they particularly resented the role of the leaders of Faction 1 in the tax assessments. Madi therefore appointed Makka, the mchumwa Koran school teacher to the committee. This move was very important. As we have seen in earlier chapters, Makka was one of the richest men amongst the Wachumwa and their only Koran school teacher. As such he had to some extent achieved a status higher than that with which he was born. But as a man of the ex-slave category Makka had many relatives in this category - M.P.1 and Muhaji were both very distant relatives of his on their mother's side. He was also an exceptionally passive man, somewhat similar to Hobein in character, never speaking in public meetings. He could thus be relied upon to bring in support for Faction 1 whilst at the same time not questioning its leadership.
As can be seen, the Sharifs were all on the side of Mudathir. The real Sharif support for this faction was not on the committee however - the two men involved, Sharif Hassan and Sharif Hussein, always kept in the background. The Sharifs on the committee were not particularly well off, but they were the son, the nephew and the brother respectively of the two men mentioned above.

The KANU branch, like the Village Committee, never held any activities. After this meeting Madi made some half-hearted attempts to reactivate the Village Committee and Makka was made its Chairman. He did not have much success and soon his activities were diverted into canvassing support for Hobein in the forthcoming election. M.P. put forward the money for Hobein's nomination fee. Meanwhile the other faction met secretly and announced its intention of putting up Mudathir for the post of Councillor. Those who attended this meeting were the main leaders of Faction 2 - Mudathir, Shahibu, Baishe, Nassibu, and Sharif Hussein, and a few other supporters. Sheikh Luki was one of those invited. Mudathir's nomination fee was paid by himself and Shahibu. There were rumours that the meeting had decided to ask the D.A. to remove the headman and put Shahibu in his place - rumours which were later verified. This move was directed mainly against Madi. Faction 2 even went so far as to write a petition asking the D.A. to appoint Shahibu as headman. I was told by one man that this petition received 190 signatures, though this was probably an exaggeration. He said he had signed the petition because,
"it is better to follow". Some men who were supporters of Faction 1 refused to sign it however. From this point onwards the Village Committee ceased to exist again as it was now too sharply split.

With the appearance of Mudathir as a candidate, Madi's support for Hobein ceased to be an affirmation of his belief in village unity and became a political position. The D.A. called him and warned him that he must be impartial in the intrigues that were going on in the town. He also called Mudathir and told him that he would not stand for any attempts to undermine the position of his headman. Nothing more was heard of the move to remove the headman and the petition was never delivered. Madi took good note of the D.A.'s advice and became more non-committal in his public comments on the election.

Control of the mosque: Episode 2

In the month before the election however Tundwa had been split on another issue. At the beginning of July Sheikh Luki began to make arrangements for the town's maulidi (annual Koran recital to celebrate the Prophet's birth). It has been customary for many years for certain villages on the island to invite the Lamu Sharifs for this occasion to read the maulidi, and Sheikh Luki decided to invite them to Tundwa. Unfortunately for him however, this created a great controversy in the town, very few people wanting the Sharifs to come. This was partly a result of Ibrahim's activities (in Kisingitini however the controversy was much more serious than in Tundwa) and partly the result of a pre-existing antagonism which Ibrahim had merely
fostered. It is said that in the past the Lamu Sharifs used to take advantage of their supposed supernatural powers and superior status in order to 'marry' and seduce women secretly for the two nights or so of their visit, divorcing the women when they left. The women seemed to rather enjoy these visits and were in favour of the Sharifs being invited, but understandably most of the men did not, and they described the Sharifs as "women snatchers" (walipokonya wanawake tu).

In this particular conflict the leaders of Faction 2 were united against Sheikh Luki's move to invite the Lamu Sharifs, though one or two of their supporters were in favour of inviting them. Faction 1 was however completely divided. Madi was not particularly averse to the visit of the Sharifs, and even allowed his wife to head a women's 'committee' to help Sheikh Luki organise the affair. Muhaji however, as a strong supporter of Ibrahim, the missionary, bitterly opposed the visit, and Hobein tagged along with him. A curious feature of the conflict was that the Tundwa Sharifs were themselves divided on the issue - some of them strongly opposed the visit of the Lamu Sharifs whilst others supported Sheikh Luki. (Sharif Mohamed was in this latter category, though he kept very quiet through this period. So too were two Sharif supporters of Faction 2). The complaints about the invitation increased in volume until Sheikh Luki was forced ignominiously to retract it. He then went to Lamu, leaving one of his Sharif supporters to organise Tundwa's maulidi. The maulidi was notable in that one Tundwa follower of Ibrahim used the occasion to make a speech severely criticising the religious learning
of the Lamu Sharifs. Sheikh Luki did not return until after the maulidi was over and the dissension had died down.

The Sharif's lack of unity in relation to this issue is significant. Earlier, when Sharif Mohamed had alienated support by his money lending activities the Masherifu as a whole did not rally to his support — he had some Sharif supporters, but very few. As a minority group, such action would not have gained them anything. But in addition, most of the Masherifu were already supporters of Faction 2 and they would have had to renounce this position in order to support Mohamed. On the issue of whether or not to invite the Lamu Sharifs their loyalties were more sharply divided. As Sharifs they were necessarily sympathetic to the Lamu Sharifs, even though the latter were of a different clan and origin to themselves. But the Sharifs in Tundwa also claim to be Bajunis, and as Bajunis they are well aware of the activities of the Lamu Sharifs. Moreover they themselves have never had the power to sustain a role amongst the Bajunis similar to that of the Lamu Sharifs, and they are well aware that they are unlikely to gain such power. Support of the Lamu Sharifs would have alienated them from other Bajunis.

Political Action : Phase 3

This issue had practically simmered down however by August, when the election for a new Councillor was held. The results were as follows:

Hobein.................. 68 votes (42% of the votes)
Mudathir............... 91 votes (58% of the votes)
The election was by secret ballot so it is not possible to say certainly from where the support of each side came. Some points can be made however. Out of the total adult population of Tundwa of 626 persons, only 264 were registered voters and of these 159 voted (i.e. about 60%). 58% of those who voted were women. Half of the Sharif women came to vote, a little more than a quarter of the Waungwana women, and a third of the Wachumwa women. Of the 42% of the men who voted less than a quarter of the Sharifs and Wachumwa men voted and only a third of the Waungwana men. When I asked privately why Hobein had received so many votes when he was not generally liked in the town, I was told that many Wachumwa women, relatives of Muhaji's mother, had voted for him. This would certainly explain the relatively high proportion of Wachumwa women who voted, and others must have been recruited by Makka. The contrast between the small number of men voting compared with those of women is more difficult to explain though it was a feature also of a later election. Generally when it comes to it, men are very reluctant to commit themselves since to commit oneself is to accept certain obligations and to reject the other side. Whereas for women it is generally only kinship ties which determine voting habits, for men other ties are relevant as well - ties of indebtedness or economic dependency for example, and more directly political sympathies. Men in general however prefer to keep on the side that is winning, as the Bajuni themselves do in a wider context. Where it is not clear which side will win, many
prefer to stay neutral — as they did here. In addition however the number of Wachumwa men who voted was exceptionally small — only fourteen men. Wachumwa men are notably passive in political affairs. They rarely attend public political meetings and never speak at such meetings. I shall return to this point later. Sharif men too did not come in large numbers to vote.

For a short period after the election there was a complete transformation in the town. Mudathir held a victory meeting and announced that, "I am ready to work for you and for the government to end the hardships of our life". He and his main supporters promised that a school and a dispensary would be built and other projects started. Mudathir went to see the D.A., who told him that he had found Madi a very useful man and that Mudathir should give him every respect and co-operate with him. Mudathir agreed to do this — Madi's attempt at neutrality before the election had been noted all round — with approval by Faction 2 and with anger by Muhaji and Hobein. The ill-feeling between Faction 2 and M.P.1 was dissipated at a meeting organised by the D.A. to arrange a reconciliation, and at a later meeting Muhaji and Hobein were superficially reconciled with the leaders of Faction 2. The Village Committee suddenly became active again and organised mass cleaning operations in the town and parties to clear the path to Rasini. The only men who actively refused to take part in these activities were Muhaji and Hobein. Madi took part, as did Makka.
In all these activities Mudathir was making a determined attempt both to impress the D.A. and to unite the town behind his leadership. He appears to have succeeded in the former, and he also succeeded in the latter for a short while.

**Control of the mosque : Episode 3**

Meanwhile it was not long after the election that a fresh storm blew up in the village concerning Sharif Mohamed. At the end of August Sharif Mohamed went to Lamu and reported to the police that certain men in Tundwa had guns and were purchasing bullets without a licence. The police came to Tundwa to search the houses of the men named by Sharif Mohamed, but the weapons were quickly hidden and were not found by the police. The main point is that two of the men whose houses were searched were Mudathir and Shahibu, with whom Sharif Mohamed had earlier come into conflict over the house. One can only assume that Mohamed was in this way trying to revenge himself on the two men. Unfortunately they heard of his involvement in the police search and Mohamed found the whole town against him. Sheikh Luki stepped in at this point and tried to effect a reconciliation between Sharif Mohamed and Mudathir and Shahibu, but was unsuccessful. At this time then Sheikh Luki had not only reaped opprobrium by his action in inviting the Lamu Sharifs, but also by trying to effect this unsuccessful reconciliation.

Sheikh Luki went on reading the sermon, but Faction 2 began to work against him from this time on, and his support in the town began
to dwindle. Sheikh Luki at this point shifted his allegiance to Faction 1.

The main point about this episode was that Sharif Mohamed's action was directly related to the political factions in Tundwa. Mudathir having won the election it became clear to everyone that Faction 2 had gained power in the village, and that they would now be able to exert more effective control over the mosque. Their power in the village was however directly related to their standing with the government. Sharif Mohamed was trying to destroy the good impression which Mudathir had succeeded in making on the D.A., and to discredit all the leaders of Faction 2. It is perhaps of relevance here that one of the names mentioned by Sharif Mohamed to the Lamu police was that of another Sharif - Sharif Hussein. Hussein was Mohamed's brother-in-law. As we have seen earlier however Sharif Hussein was also an important backer of Faction 2. Sharif Mohamed's bid to discredit Faction 2 failed however and he became very unpopular in the town.

The other significant feature of this case was Sheikh Luki's unsuccessful attempt to mediate between Sharif Mohamed and the leaders of Faction 2. This failure was an index of Sheikh Luki's lack of popular support at that time - and this in its turn was related to his move in inviting the Lamu Sharifs. I said earlier that the role of Sheikh could be an influential one, in that he might mediate in certain kinds of disputes. But it would be inaccurate to suggest
that the Sheikh has any 'authority' to settle disputes - he has influence rather than authority, and he is only allowed to exert as much of it as the two disputants are prepared to accept. At a public meeting much earlier in the year Sheikh Luki had stepped in to prevent a dispute between M.P.1 and another man breaking into violence. On this occasion he had been successful, firstly because at that period he was greatly respected in the town, and secondly because public opinion was behind him. By August however Sheikh Luki's popularity had declined and in addition his support of Sharif Mohamed went completely against public opinion. Therefore he could not achieve a reconciliation. A mediator can only be successful moreover if he is genuinely neutral. And not only was Sheikh Luki obviously prejudiced in this case, but in addition, since the post of Sheikh is itself a subject of political factionalism it is almost impossible for its holder to be neutral.

Political Action: Phase 4

Having successfully foiled Sharif Mohamed's scheme to discredit them, Faction 2 was even more in control in the village than they had been after the election. In early October a further opportunity arose for them to demonstrate their pre-eminence. The D.A. announced that the government wished to appoint four sub-chiefs for the Faza Division, one for Tundwa, one for Kisingitini and Bajumwali, one for Siyu and one for Pate. The sub-chiefs were to assist the Chief, and the posts were to be salaried and permanent. The selection
procedure was to take the form of an interview with the D.A. to assess the candidates' literacy and knowledge, an election to assess the candidates' local support and finally on recommendation by the D.A. himself (which of course was to count for the most). The idea was that eventually the sub-chiefs would replace the headman.

In Tundwa three candidates stood for election, all three of whom were members of the Village Committee and the now defunct KANU branch. One was Baishe, the other Madi and the third Muhaji. At this point then it became clear that Faction 1 had split in half. Madi argued that he should stand because for two years he had suffered "all the insults and difficulties of being the Deputy Headman", and he had received no salary. Now he felt he deserved the job. Obviously however Muhaji and Hobein had refused to stand behind him and had insisted on Muhaji standing as well. There were two reasons for this. Firstly Madi had withdrawn his active support for Hobein in the election for Councillor after being warned by the D.A. that he must be neutral. Not only this but he had joined in wholeheartedly with the projects sponsored by Faction 2 after the election. Madi was basically an opportunist. He knew that the basis of his power lay in his relationship with the D.A., and that since he was disliked in the village for his role in tax assessments the only course of action open to him was to latch on to those who had power in the village. I suspect that Madi's alliance with Muhaji and Hobein had always been an uneasy one, and he stayed in this alliance only so long
The D.A. (looking back), the Chief (with umbrella) and a policeman at a meeting in Tundwa

Shahibu, one of the leaders of Faction 2
as Hobein was Councillor. The more immediate reason for the split in Faction 1 however had been the divergence of opinion concerning the visit of the Lamu Sharifs.

Baishe was a shopkeeper and a strong supporter of Faction 2. He had also been a money lender in the past. He was a member of the Zitindini clan, that is those who originally ruled the town, but as far as I know this did not help him to gain support. One of Madi's supporters claimed that Mudathir and Shahibu had put up Baishe for the post of sub-chief because they thought that if he got the job they would be able to control him, and persuade him, amongst other things, not to report tax defaulters.

All three men went around canvassing support, and set their wives on doing the same. In view of the number of votes cast by women as opposed to those cast by men in the election, the canvassing of the women seems to have been more effective than that of the men. Baishe used to canvass support from the customers in his shop. Later he told me that many of the women had told him they were very sorry that they could not vote for him, since they must vote for their jamaa (in this case they meant the relatives of women with whom they maintained contact).

The entry of Muhaji into the electoral arena also introduced the factor of social status more directly. Muhaji appealed to the Wachumwa for support, though without directly referring to the matter of their lowly status. They for their part said amongst themselves:
"Better if we vote for Muhaji. Didn't those Waungwana maltreat us in the past?"

Interest in this election was greater than that in the election for Councillor. In the first place all the people of Tundwa were eligible to vote, not just the registered voters. Before the election began women supporters of the three candidates gathered in three groups - those of Madi in his house which was nearby, those of Baishe in the house of Mudathir's sister which was also nearby, and those of Muhaji, the Koran school teacher, by the madrasa (Tundwa's Koranic 'secondary school'). The men did not pre-group themselves in this way. The three candidates were asked by the D.A. to stand whilst their supporters, first men, then women, lined up behind them, and were counted. This time then I was able to see more clearly who was supporting which candidates, though in the time available I could get only some of the names down. Altogether 325 people voted, more than half the adult population of the town. 60% of the voters were women, only 40% men. The results of the election showed more clearly than before the relative strength of the three factions and from whence it came. Baishe won, securing 181 votes. Muhaji came next with 96 votes, whilst Madi secured only 48.

Whereas Baishe's supporters were more or less equally divided between men and women, with a slight excess of men, 77% of both Muhaji's and Madi's support came from women. This can partly be explained by the fact that both these men were disliked in the town.
Madi, Muhaji and Baishe (from left to right) present themselves before the electorate in the October election.

The school, begun in late 1965, as it was in mid-1967.
because of their role in the tax assessments. Women however pay no tax, so this issue did not really concern them. But in addition almost all the powerful and rich men of the town — the shopkeepers and the money lenders and the big landowners — were on the side of Faction 2, and these men had many male economic dependents of one sort or another who might be recruited as supporters. Afterwards Baishe claimed that all the men in the town were behind him and that "men know what is right and sensible. Women are weak-willed and can easily be swayed and misled. They vote for a person only because he is their relative". The men from whom both Muhaji and Madi might have expected support — i.e. the poorer men and in particular the Wachumwa men, are as I suggested earlier, those most apathetic about taking part in political activities. The election showed clearly however that the Wachumwa who voted were behind Muhaji and not Madi. Practically all Madi's support came from relatives — mainly members of his wife's kinship set — all Waungwana. Most of the Wachumwa who voted, including Makka, voted for Muhaji. A few however voted for Baishe. The Sharifs almost all voted for Baishe. Two exceptions were a Sharif woman and a Sharif man who voted for Muhaji. The man was Sharif Mohamed's son, who in this way registered his protest against the leaders of Faction 2. But neither he nor Sheikh Luki turned up themselves for the election.

In the test Madi did better than the others and the D.A. seemed to be most sympathetic towards him. For this reason he was not
too downcast after the vote, informing me that it was really up to the government and not the people to decide. The D.A. later described Muhaji privately as "a cunning Koran school teacher, using religion as a tool to oppose progress".

But like so many other things, the activity to find a sub-chief came to nothing. After several months, in which the candidates waited patiently, the government for some reason dropped the scheme. Nevertheless Faction 2 had clearly established itself in the town as the party of the Waungwana and Masherifu, and Faction 1 had split into a small dissident Waungwana group led by Madi and a Wachumwa-Waungwana group led by Muhaji and Hobein.

Having established itself, Faction 2 sat back and the town reverted to its usual dirty state. The D.A. worked steadily for three months to persuade the people to build a school in Tundwa by self-help, but although on the surface everyone claimed to be enthusiastic, nothing was done. The real opponents of the school were Sheikh Luki and Muhaji, and all the other followers of Ibrahim, the Kisingitini missionary. Their antagonism to the school was based on religious arguments. A distinction is always made in Tundwa and other Bajuni villages between Islamic scholarship (elimu) and 'western' education (which is usually referred to as masomo ya dunia - 'study of this world'). Elimu has great prestige, and possession of it gains a man much respect in the eyes of others. Such a man is not only learned; he is also by definition pious. A western education carries
no such prestige, though many people are aware that knowledge of this kind can earn one jobs and status in the wider economy. Some people argue that western education is forbidden by Islam, whilst others are ambivalent. Some people, such as Koran school teachers, have a vested interest in opposing schools, whilst others are afraid that their children will forget their religion if they are sent to school.

At the beginning of 1965 there was only one school on the island – a Primary school in Rasini. A few Tundwa men (such as M.P.1 for example) had been educated there, but even in 1965 only nine boys from Tundwa attended. The journey every day (two and a half miles each way) put some off, whilst others could not afford to pay the fees (which were moderate by town standards, only fourteen shillings per term). But it was the prejudice against the education offered by the school that prevented most people from sending their children.

Ibrahim, the Kisingitini missionary, had always encouraged these prejudices, and his followers in every village were even more opposed to schools than he was himself. It was undeniable however that since Independence the mood was beginning to change. When Tundwa's madrasa teacher left the village at the beginning of 1965 no-one took his place. And from Independence onwards every government officer who visited the village made it plain that the government expected the people to build a school for themselves. Government officials looked with approval on those village leaders who supported this idea. It is not surprising then that Madi was a strong supporter
of schools - though in his case, as a self-taught man, his support was probably genuine.

After the election of Mudathir as Councillor Faction 2 presented itself as being in support of the idea of building a school in Tundwa. The issue first arose however just before the election. Madi was called to Rasini by the D.A. With the D.A. were some of the Lamu Sharifs who had come to read maulidi in some of the other villages on the island. They suggested to Madi that he put forward the idea in Tundwa of using the madrasa building as a school (this move was of course directed against Ibrahim and his followers, whom both the D.A. and the Lamu Sharifs found to be troublesome, though for different reasons). When Madi returned to Tundwa he did suggest the idea, but no-one took much notice. In the 'Victory meeting' held for Mudathir after the election however, Shahibu raised the matter of the school, and asked if all those present were in favour of sending their children. The meeting's response was a unanimous, "Yes!" This was all part of Mudathir's attempt to gain government approval and no-one took it very seriously. Sheikh Luki was however disturbed by the idea. He hastily found a teacher and reopened the madrasa, and on the following Friday he preached in the mosque against the idea that the madrasa be used as a school. As we know however Sheikh Luki was not popular with Faction 2 at this period as he had tried to effect an unsuccessful reconciliation between Sharif Mohamed and the leaders of Faction 2 in the matter concerning the Lamu police. That
very afternoon the Village Committee, with its majority of Faction 2 members, passed a resolution in favour of the madrasa being used as a school. They suggested that the madrasa could still be used for religious teaching early in the morning. The motives of the leaders of Faction 2 in taking this stand was partly to gain the approval of the D.A., but more importantly to spite Sheikh Luki. One of their Sharif supporters justified their stand by saying that if the madrasa building was used as a school it would have to be equipped by the government with blackboards, chairs, pencils etc. — and that this equipment could then be used also for religious education. But Sheikh Luki was extremely offended by the Committee's decision and he appealed to M.P.1. As we have seen M.P.1 was a supporter of Faction 1 rather than Faction 2. He agreed with Sheikh Luki and intervened with the D.A. to suggest that it might be better to have the school in a separate building. The D.A. accepted this argument — apparently he too had had second thoughts on the advisability of using the madrasa building as a school, since to do so would put the government in the apparent position of being anti-religion. Eventually everyone else also agreed upon this idea and a piece of land was set aside for the school. Then months went by before work began, showing clearly I think that the enthusiasm for the school had been more a matter of expediency than anything else. The leaders of Faction 2 claimed that before they could begin work on the school they must first repair the Friday mosque. Eventually however, at the very end of 1965
the building began, and a one-class primary school was opened in the middle of the following year, whilst the building was still incomplete. When I visited the village again in 1967 the school was still unfinished.

Mudathir, like his predecessor, did not report on Council meetings or appear to take much active part in them. The Village Committee again became inactive and when the Chief called upon it to help in searching out tax offenders only the old headman, his deputy Madi, Makka and Shahibu turned out. On the Chief's next visit even Shahibu did not come, and the other three men made a pretence of helping the Chief. On the other hand land disputes were now more commonly taken to the leaders of Faction 2, although some were still taken to Madi. Hobein and Muhaji no longer played any political role in the village.

At the end of the year then things were back to normal except that there had been a shift of power within the Waungwana category. Eighteen months later this was made complete when Madi died and the old headman had to go into hospital in Mombasa. The D.A. made Baishe headman in his stead. There is at present no deputy.

Control of the mosque: Episode 4

The end of the year also saw the final overthrow of Sheikh Luki. In December there was again discussion about finding a deputy Sheikh. Sheikh Luki again suggested Sharif Mohamed. Why he persisted in demanding the return of the unpopular Mohamed is not entirely clear to me. Two factors would seem to be relevant however. One is
that Sheikh Luki and Sharif Mohamed were friends and brothers-in-law. The other factor is that Sharif Mohamed was a man of some religious learning and was undoubtedly the best 'qualified' man for the office. The leaders of Faction 2 however refused adamantly to accept Sharif Mohamed. They suggested Abakari, a middle-aged mwungwana man, brother of the headman and thereby son of the man who used to read the sermon with Sharif Mohamed's father. Reluctantly Sheikh Luki was forced to accept Abakari. The following Friday, when Sheikh Luki went to the mosque to read the sermon he found Abakari already there, acting in his place. Sheikh Luki was extremely angry and offended, and protesting that he had not been informed that Abakari would begin to read that Friday he left the mosque. After he had left pandemonium broke out in the mosque, insults were hurled and men got out their sticks and knives. But eventually order was restored, though some men left.

After this Sheikh Luki refused to enter the mosque and prayed at home. Abakari went on reading the sermon with the support of Faction 2. At the end of the following year a young man was appointed as his deputy, the son of one of the members of this faction.

As a result of this quarrel Sheikh Luki set about the work of collecting money to build a new mosque. Much of the money came from Bajuni women in Mombasa, and the mosque was eventually opened in early 1967. The opening ceremony was performed by two of the Lamu Sharifs.
In this chapter I have described the main events which characterised the development of factional conflict in Tundwa during 1965. I have perforce had to describe these events in terms of the leading personalities who took part in them and I have sketched in the social background only where this seemed necessary for the understanding of the 'story'. In the Conclusion to this thesis I shall analyse the sociological significance of these events and I shall do this in terms of the outline of social structure which I gave in Part 1.
CONCLUSION: AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL ACTION IN TUNDWA

In the first part of this thesis my aim was to separate out the various contextual frameworks in terms of which social action in Tundwa takes place. In the second part of the thesis, and in Chapter VIII in particular, my aim was to describe a dynamic process of political conflict. In this Conclusion I shall first make an analysis of political action in Tundwa in terms of the existing pattern of social relations in the community. Following this I shall attempt to relate my particular research to other work on factionalism being carried out by social anthropologists.

Political action in Tundwa

Everyone in Tundwa was directly or indirectly involved in the political struggles which took place in the village in 1965. Political action creates crisis situations, and in such situations people align themselves, not randomly, according to the whims of the moment, but in accordance with the pre-existing pattern of social relationships in the community. This is why, as Bailey says: "Crisis situations have a diagnostic value". In Tundwa such situations are of particular interest because Tundwa's social structure is not such that one could easily say in advance what line the alignments of any individual are going to take. This is mainly because of the absence in Tundwa of

any corporate or other more or less permanent groups in which the individual would be subsumed and to which he would owe a loyalty. Each individual in Tundwa is linked to many others through the cross-cutting networks of kinship, friendship, neighbourhood and economic ties. In any political conflict he may find that some of these linkages would dictate one kind of allegiance, whilst other linkages may dictate the opposite allegiance. In such a situation he may remain neutral or he may decide that his interests are best served by supporting one side and ignoring his links with the other. In making such a choice a man is generally influenced by his position in a community which is by no means socially or economically undifferentiated. Men tend to align themselves politically with men who are of the same social stratum and economic status as themselves. As we have seen however there are sometimes contradictions between a man’s social status and his economic status. There are some men who have achieved a high status through wealth or piety irrespective of their descent status. The political alignments of such men are particularly important because they indicate the present significance of achieved as opposed to ascriptive status in the social organisation of the village.

In order to fully understand the significance of political action in Tundwa however we must not only assess the influence of internal social factors such as these, but we must also take into account the fact that Tundwa is part of a wider political system. The
The historical background to factionalism

Three points emerge from examination of Tundwa's political history over the last one hundred years. The first is that political conflict is no new phenomenon in this community. During the nineteenth century the town was divided on at least two occasions by rival claimants for the office of king. The protagonists were all Waungwana, and they were supported in their bids for power by their clansmen. If necessary they had to be prepared to fight, and for this they needed many slave and Waungwana soldiers. It seems fairly clear then that power in this period was based on wealth and force of numbers, and that only the Waungwana entered the political arena.

The period of British rule was in complete contrast to that which preceded it, and it was also a period in which political relationships of a completely different nature were established. Common clanship, wealth, or religious piety all became irrelevant in achieving political power. The real power was now vested in the Colonial government. Government officers appointed the headman of the village, and the man appointed needed only minimal support in the village itself. In order to gain the position a man had to be able to convince government officers of his loyalty to the government. Although all three men who have held the office were Waungwana, the last two
were not wealthy men and could not have hoped to gain power in pre-colonial times. As far as one can judge from the available evidence (oral tradition and the Faza Visitors’ Book) this was a period of political inactivity in the village. There are many reasons for this. The rich Waungwana were dispossessed of their slaves but not of their wealth in land. Their economic power in the village was as strong as ever and it was a long time before there were substantial changes in wealth differentials in the community. In so far as the political office of king was transformed into that of a mere administrative functionary the wealthy Waungwana were also dispossessed of their political power. But no other stratum rose to challenge them, and the colonial power appears to have unknowingly reinforced the local ideology of stratification.

The period since Independence has seen the resurgence of divisive political conflicts in the community — but with a difference. The coming to power in Kenya of an African government has threatened the whole basis of status relations in Tundwa, and as we have seen the Waungwana have had to adjust accordingly. But in addition elections were instituted just before Independence, thus reintroducing the necessity for a candidate for political office to have local support as well as government approval. The most important feature of this development was that it brought women and the ex-slaves into the political arena for the first time. As we have seen, adult women outnumber men in the village, and their votes in any election are
therefore vital. Political leaders are only slowly beginning to realise this. Most men would agree with Baishe when he said that only men know what is right and sensible, and that women can easily be swayed and misled. Women in general are not as politically educated as men. Even now they do not attend political meetings, because to mix with men so openly would be considered improper. They do not hold any political office in the village and are not represented on the village committee. Nor do they play much part in politico-religious disputes. The mosque is a man's world and they must pray at home if at all. With the introduction of elections however awareness of the political issues at stake is no longer vital. What matters now is numbers.

In pre-colonial times slaves were of course excluded from public life. Even now Wachumwa men rarely attend political meetings and never speak in them. But since the Wachumwa form 27% of the total population of the village their votes too are important, and in any division amongst the Waungwana they could hold the deciding vote. As we have seen however their freedom to vote as they wish is compromised by their economic position. I shall return to this point later.

There is another feature of the post-Independence period however which counteracts the importance of the introduction of elections. Since Kenya became a one-party state in 1964, it has been illegal to organise any opposition to the government. Other than KANU no political parties are allowed. Any political activity is therefore suspect.
This is the reason for the cloak and dagger tactics of the factions in Tundwa. It is also the reason why the factions are not organised groups and why their leaders must gain government approval before they can achieve any public office.

At the present time then any political leader in Tundwa has to achieve two objectives if he is to be entirely successful. Firstly he has to have a basis of local support in the village and secondly he has to gain government approval. I shall discuss these two objectives in turn, beginning with the matter of local support.

The significance of inter-personal linkages in determining political allegiances

Since there are no ready-made groupings in Tundwa from which a leader can expect support, inter-personal linkages are very important in Tundwa politics. The most important kind of linkages are those of kinship - or rather kinship reinforced by friendship, since the existence of a kinship link between two people need not automatically involve them in social interaction. The other kinds of inter-personal linkages which are important are those of friendship and neighbourliness. All these are ties between equals, and a man may reasonably expect support from people with whom he maintains contacts of this kind.

Ties of kinship and friendship are important in two respects. Firstly it is clear that the leaders and main supporters of each faction are bound together by a network of inter-personal ties, and
Diagram 7.
The network of linkages binding together the leaders and main supporters of Faction 2

Key

--- Kinship (as in Diagram 6)

--- Friendship

I Sharif

(I) Sharif with affinal or maternal connections with Waungwana

II Mwungwana
in particular, ties of kinship. I have tried to indicate this in Diagrams 6 and 7, where I show how the most active supporters of the two factions are linked to their main leaders. As can be seen from the diagrams, not all the links are direct. Shahibu, for example, is linked to Baishe through three other men, all supporters of Shahibu. Chains of linkages of this kind are quite common.

Comparison of the network of linkages binding together Faction 1 and Faction 2 is of some interest. Whereas the two main leaders of Faction 2 are themselves linked by kinship and affinal ties, and are thereby more or less equally linked to their main supporters, the support for Faction 1 comes from two different sources. Madi had one set of relatives and friends whom he brought in as supporters, whilst Muhaji had quite a different set. There was only one link between these two sets of supporters – that between Number 6 (Madi's wife) and Number 16 (the mother's brother of Madi's wife, a man who was also affinally linked to Makka). Hobein by contrast brought in very few supporters. He was in fact more closely linked by kinship to the leaders of Faction 2 (his cousins) than he was to either Muhaji or Madi. Most of his close relatives were therefore faced with a choice between their kinship link with Hobein and their link with Mudathir and Shahibu. Most of them chose Mudathir and Shahibu, the wealthy and dynamic leaders of Faction 2, rather than the colourless and less wealthy Hobein. Hobein's only real supporter amongst

1. Madi's following, as shown in Diagram 6, may usefully be compared with the diagram of his own and his wife's kinship set given in Chapter III (Diagram 3, p.95).
his close kin was his father’s sister’s son, a man who would probably have supported Faction 1 in any case (he was a poor mwungwana man married to an ex-slave woman, and also the next-door neighbour of Makka). Apart from this man Hobein was affinally linked to Madi and to Number 10, one of Madi’s women supporters. When Faction 1 split into two, with Madi as the leader of one section and Muhaji as the leader of the other, their supporters divided accordingly. (The line of division is shown in Diagram 1). In this situation Number 16 abstained – he did not vote in the October election. It would have been logical for Hobein to have followed Madi, since he had some kinship links with him, but instead he followed his friend Muhaji, with whom he had no kinship links. He took with him his father’s sister’s son, but no-one else. This was partly what Mudathir meant when he said, “Hobein has no jamaa on his side, he is all alone”. He also meant however that Hobein had gone to a side that was predominantly supported by ex-slaves, whom no proud mwungwana would count as amongst his jamaa.

Another factor that emerges from examination of these two diagrams is the importance of certain crucial friendships. (In some cases these might better be described as political alliances). The most obvious case is the friendship between Hobein and Muhaji. As a man whose descent status was suspect, Muhaji needed an ally amongst the ‘pure’ Waungwana in order to gain Waungwana support. Hobein, for his part, needed Muhaji’s supporters since he had so few of his own. Other important political friendships were those between Mudathir
and Shahibu and Sharif Hussein, and that between Nadi and the headman. Inter-personal linkages are not only of importance in binding together the leaders of a faction and their main supporters. Political leaders also use these linkages as a basis for recruiting wider support. Here we have to consider the structure of political factions. For reasons which I have already stated, a faction cannot organise itself as a political party with a formally recognised leadership and known party members. Each faction is however informally structured. At the head of each faction there are the main or focal leaders who either contend themselves, or put forward other candidates for public office. Behind the main leaders there are what we may call second-rank leaders - the close political allies of the leaders who help to determine what position the leaders should take on any issue, who speak out in public meetings and who are most important in recruiting support for the main leaders. Behind these second-rank leaders there is yet another rank of what we may call active supporters - men and women who are open in their support for the faction and whose main role is to recruit voters for it. The men shown in the two diagrams are the men of these three ranks. Beyond them are the mass of supporters for the factions - people whose only political action may be to vote in an election. It is through the second-rank leaders and active supporters that these voters are recruited. Thus, to take a particular example, Mudathir's link with Nassibu (his sister's husband's brother) was not just important in itself. It was also
important in that Nassibu in his turn had a set of relatives and friends whom he could bring in as supporters when the occasion arose. Members of Nassibu's set of relatives and friends again have other links which they in their turn can use to bring in support. Thus the leader of any faction is linked to his supporters through a series of overlapping sets of relationships.

At this point we may usefully compare the significance of women in recruiting support as opposed to that of men. The effectiveness of women in bringing in voters is indicated by the fact that more women than men vote in elections. It was also indicated symbolically in October by the way in which women gathered together in three groups before the voting took place. That women should be more successful in recruiting support than men would seem to follow reasonably enough from the intensive nature of the links which women maintain with each other as opposed to those which men maintain with other men (see Chapter III). When Baishe said scornfully that women vote for a person, "only because he is their jamaa" (relative or friend), he was in fact making a statement of some importance. In general the political loyalties of women are determined by their loyalties to other women with whom they are in relationships of mutual help, and not by awareness of the political issues at stake — some of which may in any case not concern them directly.

By contrast, the relationships of men with their male kin are far less intensive than those of women with their female kin, though
men usually maintain far more extensive non-kinship links than women. Two consequences follow from this. Firstly, in any political dispute men are more likely to have links with both sides than women. Secondly, since these links are likely to be less intensive than those which women maintain, a man has more room for manoeuvre. In any political division a man may therefore follow one of three courses of action. Firstly, if he feels his links with both sides to be equally strong he can abstain from supporting either side. That many men follow this course of action is shown by the voting figures. Secondly he may make an assessment of the balance of forces and vote for that side which appears to be the strongest. (It is always better to have been a supporter of the candidate who will later stand between you and the government). That many men follow this course of action was clearly shown in the October election. Whereas the women supporters of Madi and Muhaji stayed firm, most men felt it would be in their best interests to support the obviously stronger Baishe. We must add however that another factor was also influential here in that Faction 1 was far more conscious of the importance of women voters than was Faction 2. Muhaji in particular went out of his way to recruit women supporters. Finally, a man may consider the political issues at stake, and in view of his own economic and social position decide which side will best support his interests. In many cases the outcome of this consideration may be the same as if he had followed the second course of action. This will be so for example if he is economically dependent on men in the strongest faction.
Economic considerations are always of more concern to men than they are to women since it is men rather than women who are the main income producers here.

**The economic significance of factional disputes**

Any person in Tundwa could, if he wished, claim a link with almost anyone else in the village if he followed out the chains of kinship and friendship emanating from his own set of close friends and relatives. There are no sharp discontinuities in the overall network of inter-personal linkages. If we were to limit our investigations of political action in Tundwa to the use made by political leaders of inter-personal linkages therefore we would have no explanation for the political divisions in the town. Obviously there are other factors operating here with over-ride this overall network, and which cause people to emphasise some of their linkages at the expense of others. One factor which is obviously of importance is economic self-interest. In some cases a man may even disregard his links with close kin if his economic interests are at stake. This is shown for example by the case of the old headman's son, Boa. As the headman was closely allied with Faction 1 one might have expected his son to support the same side. But Boa, unlike his father, was a moderately wealthy man. He had given his father a small shamba from which the old headman derived a small income, and he had a large new shamba of his own which, in 1965, he had completely planted with cotton (a cash crop). He was wealthy enough to lend out small sums of money to other
men. His economic interests therefore lay with Faction 2 rather than Faction 1 and he voted accordingly. In the middle of 1965 Boa consummated this relationship with Faction 2 by marrying Shahibu's brother's daughter.

If we compare the leadership and main support of Faction 2 with that of Faction 1 we find that, by and large, Faction 2 is dominated by rich men and their close kinsmen. Faction 1 on the other hand is dominated by men in the middle range of incomes - men rich enough to gain respect, but also poor enough to resent the hold on the town of the very rich. This is shown in the following table where I have set out the range of incomes derived by the leaders and main supporters of each faction (these are the same men shown in Diagrams 6 and 7).

It is also shown in the different policies pursued by the two factions, for whereas Faction 1 helped the government to collect taxes, the main concern of Faction 2 was to avoid or reduce taxes.

Table 17. Income categories of Faction leaders and their main supporters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Category</th>
<th>FACTION 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>FACTION 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leaders</td>
<td>Supporters</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.C.1 over £600 per year</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.C.2 £450-£600 per year</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.C.3 £300-£450 per year</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.C.4 £150-£300 per year</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.C.5 £50-£150 per year</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.C.6 below £50 per year</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Madi, Hobein and Muhaji.
2. Mudathir and Shahibu.
Faction 2 not only had some of the richest men in the town amongst its most vociferous supporters, but most of the other rich men supported this faction in the elections. Such men are not simply rich; they are also powerful. Amongst the main supporters of Faction 2 were to be found five of the town's principal money-lenders, whilst Faction 1 had the support of only one small-time money-lender (who was affinally linked to the headman). All the other money-lenders in the town appeared to give their tacit support to Faction 2, though not all of them voted in the elections. Moreover, six of the town's seven shopkeepers were known supporters of Faction 2 (four of them appear in the table above). The sympathies of the seventh were unknown, but his shop was very small. Shopkeepers are important because they are suppliers of credit to their customers. In addition, the rich men who support Faction 2 are those who are most likely to employ labour on their land from time to time and they are also those who can give or lend land to others, particularly kinsmen. Such men thus have a measure of economic control over many other men in the town, and they use this power for political ends. On the strength of their economic links they can either recruit support for Faction 2 or they can force men who would otherwise have voted for Faction 1 to abstain.

This use of economic power for political ends is a fairly new factor in recent Tundwa history, though in pre-colonial times wealth was a necessity for any political leader. Under colonial rule a man
could gain power only by ingratiating himself with the colonial authorities and the extent of power so gained was very limited. It is only since Independence and the institution of elections that a man has been able to gain political power through local support. It is not surprising therefore that men have begun to use their economic power for political ends. In addition however rich men in Tundwa stick together. The reason for this is that the leaders of Faction 1 used their links with the government against the rich men (in the tax assessments that is) and as a result gained support from the poorer sections of the community. In this situation the wealthier men of the town drew together to defend their interests. (This seems to be rather an unusual situation if we are to judge from other studies of factionalism which have been made. In many cases rich men appear to compete with each other for power. I shall return to this point however in the second section of this conclusion).

Economic realities thus impinge on political loyalties in two ways. Other things being equal, a man will generally vote with and for men of roughly equivalent economic status to himself. Wealthy men will generally vote for Faction 2, whilst the poor and moderately well-off will vote for Faction 1. Some men however are economically dependent on men richer than themselves, men whom it is in their own self-interest not to oppose.

Although economic self-interest plays a very large part in influencing both the character of political action in Tundwa and the
direction of people's allegiances, it is not the only factor of significance. We have already seen that a man may weigh up his economic interests against his kinship loyalties. Another factor that is of primary importance is his awareness of belonging to a stratified society.

Politics and stratification

In order to fully understand the nature of political action in Tundwa we have to see the situation as the Bajunis themselves see it. In pre-colonial times - and I speak now in terms of how the people themselves remember this period - political action was solely the affair of the Waungwana. The Waungwana were, after all, by far the largest category of people in the village. The Wachumwa played no part in political affairs since they occupied a position of complete economic dependence. The Sharifs were 'strangers', resented for their claims to superior status, and greatly outnumbered by the Waungwana. They were allowed to play some part in religious affairs (watched over jealously by the Waungwana), but they were more or less excluded from the political arena. The Waungwana might be divided amongst themselves, but they were united in excluding others from the political field.

In spite of the many changes which have since taken place, both in colonial times and since Independence, the Waungwana still think of themselves as the rightful 'rulers' of the town. Moreover it would not be much of a distortion of reality even at the present time to say that, in order to be an important political leader in Tundwa, one must come from the Waungwana stratum. Why should this be
so? We have to remember that the Waungwana form 64% of the town's population. Even were the Masherifu to ally themselves with the Wachumwa in one faction (a most unlikely eventuality), they would still be outnumbered by the Waungwana. Nor could a leader from any other stratum gain a majority vote in the town unless he was supported by some, at least, of the Waungwana. And until the present time the Waungwana have not been prepared to support a candidate from any other stratum. This is shown by the fact that all the main leaders of the factions are Waungwana, as are their closest political allies and nearly all their most active supporters. Nevertheless there are four ex-slaves amongst the active supporters of Faction 1, and five Sharifs amongst those of Faction 2 (see Diagrams 6 and 7). The position of these people in the factions is revealing however. The only important political figure amongst the ex-slaves is Makka. As we have seen, Makka did not arise independently as a leader of the ex-slaves - he owes his position solely to the patronage of the Waungwana leaders of Faction 1. He never spoke in public meetings and he was not politically active on his own account. Amongst the Sharif supporters of Faction 2 only Sharif Hassan and Sharif Hussein were at all important, and neither of them could be described as even second-rank leaders. The close political allies of Mudathir and Shahibu were Baishe and Nassibu, not Sharif Hassan or Sharif Hussein. What I am trying to suggest is that whereas the two Waungwana factions might draw strength from alliances with other strata they keep a firm
hold on the main leadership. Not only this but members of the other strata at present appear to accept this position. Why should this be so? Why is it that no Sharif or mchumwa puts himself forward as a candidate for political office?

We might have expected that, as the richest stratum in the village, the Masherifu would be in a good position to compete for political offices. But we have to remember that they are a very small category - comprising only 7.9% of the population. They could not gain power therefore without Waungwana support. And one reason why this has not been forthcoming is that the Masherifu are not very popular in the town. Their wealth is envied, they are sometimes accused of being mean, and occasionally there are suggestions that they have achieved their wealth by exploiting others. (I could find no actual evidence of this except for the case of Sharif Mohamed which I described in the preceding chapter). Also their assumption of superiority is resented and any claims they make on these lines are often belittled. I do not want to over-emphasise the extent of feeling against the Masherifu - they are not publicly belittled or derided. It is rather that the Waungwana have set certain limits to the expression of their descent status, and so long as they keep within these limits they are tolerated and even respected. When I asked a mwungwana man why no political leader in the town was a Sharif he replied that they were afraid of destroying the respect they enjoyed as people topmost in the social hierarchy ("jua katika daraja").
If the Masherifu are a rich but very small category in the village, the Wachumwa are far more numerous but poor. Although they are no longer slaves they are still subject to some economic control by men of higher strata and very few of them have achieved a position of wealth. Even today they can not marry the daughters of men of higher strata and they are still despised as racially and socially inferior to the free-born men of the town. One would not then have expected them to accept Waungwana patronage so readily. We have to remember that although the leaders of Faction 1 (which are supported by most Wachumwa) are poorer than those of Faction 2 they are in other ways men of very similar standing. Madi, Hobein and Muhaji are as proud of their descent status as any other Waungwana. All three remember their clan names with pride—names which establish them as noble and free-born men. None of them are married to ex-slave women. In this they are far more like Mudathir and Shahibu than they are like the Wachumwa. Why have the Wachumwa not formed a political faction of their own to challenge this Waungwana hegemony? Not only would the Wachumwa seem to have a good local reason for rejecting Waungwana leadership, but in addition the whole trend of wider political developments would seem to be in their favour. They have been despised as 'Africans' in the past; now the country is governed by Africans. This development has already improved their situation, if only marginally. Waungwana are now much more careful not to refer openly to people as 'slaves' since to do so would impair
their image with the government. But one might have expected that the Wachumwa themselves would have reacted favourably to the new situation — that they might even have identified themselves with the new African government and have risen against their former masters. Some Waungwana, I was told, were afraid of this very eventuality and went around saying that now the Wachumwa would wish to enslave them, the noble ones! But this did not happen. We have to remember that the aspirations of the Wachumwa are formed in terms of the local stratification system. Although they do not wish to be referred to as 'slaves' any longer, neither do they wish to be called 'Africans' — a name which to them is synonymous with 'slaves'. Their aspirations can be summed up in the following common phrase: "Everyone wants to be a mwungwana now". This is nicely illustrated by the following incident — the only occasion on which I ever heard the matter discussed openly. A mwungwana woman, Mwanaisha, was sitting with other women outside a house on the occasion of a funeral feast. Amongst the other women was Tuma, a mchumwa woman. Mwanaisha began to joke, saying, "I am not a Bajuni. I am an African. My father and mother came from Kisumu [an up-country African town]. Look! You can see I am an African — I have African hair". The other women laughed heartily at this, and one of them pointed to Tuma — "And she is her sister. They are of one kind". Tuma was very annoyed at this and protested vehemently that she was not an African. "I am a Bajuni" she asserted.
Two points can be made about this incident. The first is that Mwanaisha would probably not have made such a joke about herself five or six years ago. It is a reflection of the reversal of roles that have taken place in the wider political system, whereby Africans now rule the country. But it is also of interest that, in spite of this, Tuma would not accept the appellation. To her the title 'Mwafrika' was synonymous with 'slave' – and this indeed was how the other woman had meant it to be taken.

One reason then why the Wachumwa do not form a faction of their own in direct opposition to the Waungwana is that they are unwilling to openly identify themselves as ex-slaves. But this is not the only reason. Many of the Wachumwa are too dependent on Waungwana money-lenders, shopkeepers and employers to actively oppose the Waungwana. If they are to survive economically they must give at least tacit assent to the status quo. In addition there is a conservative element amongst some older ex-slaves, who think of the Waungwana as the rightful and proper leaders of the town. Such people are often partially or wholly dependent on their former masters for food and clothing or help in times of need. (I described two such cases in Chapter V). Waungwana foster such ties. They do not refer to these people as their slaves and they help them when necessary. Faction 2 was effectively able to play on linkages of these two kinds in order to win some Wachumwa support, though it seems more likely that their power showed itself in Wachumwa abstentions.
than in active support. This would explain the apparent political apathy of Wachumwa men which I commented on in the previous chapter.

The Waungwana leaders of Faction 1 had no economic links of this nature with the Wachumwa, but they had links with them of a different kind. Not only this but they were more aware than the leaders of Faction 2 of the political importance of the Wachumwa category. Their links with the Wachumwa were based on maternal and affinal ties. These kind of ties put them at a disadvantage relative to other Waungwana, but gave them a positive advantage in recruiting Wachumwa support. The most important figure in this respect was Muhaji, whose mother was an ex-slave. Through his mother Muhaji was linked, directly or indirectly, with many Wachumwa. In addition three of Faction 1's other Waungwana supporters had Wachumwa wives and three more had Wachumwa mothers (see Diagram 6). By playing on these linkages Faction 1 was easily able to enlist Wachumwa support. In this connection Faction 1's nomination of Makka as Chairman of the Village Committee was a clever move to gain Wachumwa support. As Chairman, Makka appeared to have been given an important position, though it was in fact Madi who ran the meetings. Nevertheless the appearances were there. Makka was in fact little more than a puppet for the leaders of Faction 1, but he certainly brought in some Wachumwa support. But the support of too many Wachumwa men was neutralised by their dependence on rich supporters of Faction 2, for Faction 1 to be completely successful.
I am therefore making two points about the significance of stratification on politics in Tundwa. The first is that it is the Waungwana who monopolise positions of political leadership in the town, and they use their links with other strata in order to gain support. But the Waungwana are not united, and never have been. Their present internal conflicts are basically a matter of wealth differentials, with the leaders of Faction 2 trying to preserve their superior wealth and economic power, whilst the leaders of Faction 1 are trying to undermine the economic power of the wealthy minority in the town. It is worth pointing out I think that a conflict of this kind amongst the Waungwana could not have occurred in pre-colonial times, when the competitors for power were all men of wealth. Men like the leaders of Faction 1 have only been able to gain power in the town by taking advantage of their links with an external power – the Central government. They discovered that under the new graduated tax system they had a weapon which they could use against the rich Waungwana and Masherifu, since by informing on them to government officials they could get their taxes increased. Their natural allies in these moves were the Wachumwa who, more than others, have been exploited by the rich men of the town. The natural allies of the rich Waungwana were the Masherifu, whose economic position is very similar to that of the rich Waungwana. The second point I am making then is that since wealth differentials largely reflect the lines of social stratification it is not surprising that we find the Masherifu allied
with the rich Waungwana, whilst the Wachumwa ally themselves with
the poorer Waungwana.

But there is something more to this pattern of alliances
than simply a matter of wealth differentials, important though these
are. There is also the matter of differences in social status. The
Wachumwa are poor because they were once slaves, and even if they
achieve wealth they are still treated as socially inferior. The
Masherifu are concerned to maintain their superior social status to
other Waungwana, and will generally not marry their daughters to
Waungwana men, no matter how rich such men may be. There is also
then, in this pattern of alliances, an element of loyalty towards
the other members of one's stratum. I am not suggesting that either
the Masherifu or the Wachumwa act together corporately in political
disputes. What I am suggesting is that each individual Sharif and
each individual mchumwa acts politically in accordance with his
status in the community, and that if he is unable to do this he will
generally abstain. That this is not simply a matter of economics
is shown by the fact that even the poor Sharifs (such as Number 7
and Number 10 in Diagram 7) support Faction 2, and even rich Wachumwa
(such as Makka and his sister's husband — who were richer than any
of the Waungwana leaders of Faction 1) support Faction 1. These men
are not acting according to their economic interests, but in solidarity
with other men of the same social status.
The two ideologies

Finally I would like to examine the relationship between the Central government and the political leaders of Tundwa. In Chapter VII I pointed out the contrast between the ideology of the Central government and that of the village. The dominant ideology of the Central government is essentially an 'African' and egalitarian one. The dominant ideology of the village is an 'Arab' one and this has many implications. The claim of the Waungwana and Masherifu to have originated from Arabia is very important to them. It asserts at one and the same time their nobility, their status as free born men and their racial superiority. It also asserts their religious piety, for we must not forget that the language of Islam is Arabic. I will return to this latter point shortly.

We have seen that political leadership in Tundwa is monopolised by the Waungwana, and we have also seen that no political faction can be successful in gaining power unless its leaders have government approval. To gain this approval a leader must subscribe - or at least pay lip service to - the ideology of the Central government. Even for the leaders of Faction 1 this is difficult, for few Waungwana are genuinely in sympathy with a "government of slaves".

But in addition men who wish to be leaders must have a basis of local support, if only because a man who has no local support is of little use to the government in promoting self-help schemes. This is why elections are now held. And in order to gain support in the
village any political leader must also subscribe to the dominant ideology of the village. Even the Wachumwa subscribe negatively to this ideology to the extent that they refuse to be called 'Africans'. In order to be entirely successful then a man must be able to manipulate both ideological systems - that of the government and that of the village. No existing leader has been entirely successful in this since the two systems cannot really be reconciled. Madi was perhaps the most successful in manipulating the ideology of Africaness and thus in gaining government approval. His success was directly related to his long sojourn in Machakos, an up-country African town in Kenya. But he had little support in the village, and I heard a young man one day even question Madi's status as a mwungwana. When Faction 1 split in two even the Wachumwa did not follow Madi. By contrast Mudathir and Shahibu were so committed to the status quo in the village that they found it hard to gain government approval.

As far as most Waungwana are concerned, any change in the status quo (and the government is continually demanding changes) represents a direct threat to their position. To maintain their standing with the government they must support these changes, whilst to maintain their position in the village they must oppose them. We can see this very clearly in their reactions to the government's insistence that they build a school in Tundwa. For government officials the building of a school represented 'progress', but it looked very different to the Waungwana. As far as they were concerned a school
would oppose religion, and religion is one of the buttresses of their status. All the political leaders in Tundwa were men respected in the town for their religious 'respectability'. They were all men who could read and recite the Koran and from whose lips pious Arabic phrases were wont to drop. They were the kind of men who were always invited when maulidi feasts (at which special Koranic prayers are recited) are held. Mudathir and Shahibu were the patrons of a mosque and Muhaji and Makka were Koran school teachers. In Chapter V I pointed out that, for historical reasons, religious learning is directly associated in Tundwa with descent status. Until today it is Waungwana and Masherifu who most frequent the mosques and who thereby have the greatest say in their control. This is why control of the Friday mosque was so important for the political factions in Tundwa. The mosque is a symbol of Islam, and Islam is part of the Arab civilisation with which the Waungwana have identified themselves for so long. It is not surprising therefore that the project for building a school, which would compete directly with religious teaching, met with little enthusiasm in Tundwa. Faction 2 was prepared to support the project only in so far as this would gain them government approval and oppose Sheikh Luki's position. Shahibu and Mudathir were not really committed to the idea however and preferred (symbolically) to work on the repair of the Friday mosque rather than build the school. The position of Madi is again of interest. Of all the political leaders he was the one with the least religious learning. He was also a strong supporter of the school - a position which in his
case cannot be explained by any quarrel with Sheikh Luki. Madi had no quarrel with Sheikh Luki and was in fact linked to him indirectly by kinship. But again Madi gained little or no support in the town for his position (though he gained greatly in government approval), and the Wachumwa gave their main support to Muhaji, a Koran school teacher who was bitterly opposed to the school.

In many ways then the relationship between government and people - and in particular between the government and the political leaders of the village - is a very ambivalent one.

In this conclusion I have attempted to analyse the complex of social factors which contribute to the character of political action in Tundwa. I am not trying to suggest that any one of these factors is pre-eminent and over-rides all others, since I think that to do so would involve an over-simplification of the social reality which exists in Tundwa today. Not only this but I think that political action arises here precisely because the various frameworks of social action - economic, kinship and stratification - do not coincide. Political divisions are an expression of conflicts and contradictions in the social organisation of a community which is undergoing many social, economic and political changes, and they must be analysed as such.

**Conclusion**

To conclude this thesis it is necessary to discuss briefly the
methodological and theoretical context in which it was written. The methodological approach adopted in the book owes a great deal to Turner (1957) and Bailey (1960), and basically it is the method of situational analysis.¹ In the first part of this thesis, by separating out the various fields of social action, I was able to deduce certain structural principles and to illustrate the way in which these principles operated in practice. I was there using cases basically as "apt illustration" (to use Gluckman's term).² I also attempted to show however, that the many exceptions to the principles were of interest in themselves, as they indicated either a conflict of principles or a change in the principles themselves. When we come to deal with the analysis of political action in Tundwa however, the method of illustrative cases is no longer useful. We are here dealing with a situation in which there are no clear cut structural principles and in which the individual is often faced with a conflict of loyalties. The most useful way of analysing situations such as these is to examine in detail a series of connected cases, or crisis situations, in which people have aligned themselves on one side or another. Turner calls such extended case studies 'social dramas', and he argues that: "the dynamic interaction of specific persons and groups in the process which I have called the social drama falls within the province of the sociologist no less than the analysis of the

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¹ The term 'situational analysis' was, I believe, first used by Van Velson, 1964, p.xxv.
statistical and ideal norms of social structure. In the social drama we see social structure in action". ¹ Whilst agreeing wholeheartedly with the first part of this statement, I would argue that the social drama highlights not "social structure in action", but rather the inconsistencies and contradictions of any social structure and in particular the contradictions resulting from rapid social change. It seems to me that the term 'social drama' is very apt for descriptions of situations which are essentially dramatic, and they are dramatic precisely because social structure does not provide clear principles for action.

There is a theoretical as well as a methodological reason for using the method of situational analysis. To use this method is to assume that people act, not so much in accordance with precise and rigid structural principles, but in accordance with the logic or dynamic of the situation. Each crisis is a new and unique situation in some way, and it thus requires a new assessment both of principles of action and of direct advantage to be gained from any course of action. The influence of the dynamic of events could be seen many times in the development of factional conflict in Tundwa. In particular we may recall the action of Faction 2 in supporting the proposal to use the madrasa building as a school – a position which they probably would not have taken if they had not been concerned simply to oppose Sheikh Luki.

¹ Turner, 1957, p.231.
The comparative analysis of factionalism

In taking factionalism as my main interest in this thesis I have not had a large body of comparative material to draw upon. The study of factionalism as such has been of interest to anthropologists only in the last ten years. Some of the more important recent writings have been by Firth, 1957, Beals, 1959, Beals and Siegal, 1960, Nicholas, 1963 and 1965, Mayer, 1966, and Boissevain, 1968. The main aim of most of these writers has been to give a sociological definition of factions in order to distinguish them from other types of social groupings such as political parties or opposed moieties. There has also been some attempt to distinguish types of faction. In particular Beals and Siegal distinguish between pervasive and schismatic factionalism, Mayer distinguishes between factions in terms of the type of leaders they have and the methods these leaders pursue, and Boissevain distinguishes between establishment and anti-establishment factions. Finally there are the beginnings of a discussion about the social concomitants of factionalism. In particular it has been suggested that factionalism is always associated with social change. I shall discuss each of these points in turn.

The definition of factions

Nicholas (1965) gives the most exhaustive definition of factions, though some of the points he makes arise from earlier writers. His definition is in the form of five points which can be briefly summed up as follows:
1. Factions are conflict groups.
2. Factions are political groups.
3. Factions are not corporate groups.
4. Faction members are recruited by a leader.
5. Faction members are recruited on diverse principles. (Nicholas 1965, p.27-29).

There are several points which may be made about these propositions. The first is Nicholas's use of the word 'group'. This usage has been superceded I think by Mayer's article of 1966 in which he points out that factions can better be described as quasi-groups based on a series of action sets. Quasi-groups are essentially ego-centred and "the actions of any member are relevant only in so far as they are relations between him and ego or ego's intermediary". Nicholas hints at this point however in his third and fourth propositions where he says that factions are leader oriented and that they are not corporate groups. His usage of the term 'corporate' is however a misleading one. He uses the term as if it were synonymous with 'permanent' or with 'institutionalised'. Whilst the concept of institutionalisation may be more or less synonymous with corporate-ness, the notion of permanence is not. In using the term in this way Nicholas creates for himself a non-existent problem because, as he shows, many factions exist for long periods. If we are to accept Radcliffe-Brown's definition however, corporate-ness has the following implications. A corporate group must act together, must have a leader

and must own some property in common. Whilst factions have leaders who instigate action on the part of their followers, factions do not own property in common. I would therefore agree that factions are not corporate groups, but not for the reason which Nicholas suggests.

It is probably the last two propositions which are the most important and one can add some additional points to Nicholas's analysis. Faction leaders can usefully be compared with leaders of other kinds. In some societies leadership or authority roles are institutionalised (all traditional rulers - such as the Mukama of Bunyoro or the Paramount Chief of the Ashanti for example - would fit into this category). Faction leaders do not occupy a role however, they create one. They are not appointed or elected, they arise spontaneously. Faction leaders may also be compared however with other spontaneous leaders - such as for example, the Prophets who arose amongst the Nuer in response to colonial rule. Such leaders used existing structural groups and existing principles of fission and fusion in order to gain support. (The Grand Sanusi operated similarly among the Cyrenaican Bedouins). Faction leaders however recruit support on diverse principles. In addition however there is no evidence that Nuer Prophets competed with each other in order to create a following as faction leaders do. The Nuer Prophets and the Sanusi holy men were able to unite the discrete elements of a tribe.

against a common enemy. Faction leaders by contrast always have rivals, and factionalism creates conflict within a community. This raises a problem which no writer has so far attempted to answer - why is it that factionalism does not occur in all societies? Why is it that in one society or community a leader can unite all behind him whilst in another faction leaders challenge each other and divide the community? I shall return to this point shortly.

The final point which I wish to make about Nicholas's five propositions concerns the ethnographic examples from which he claims to have derived them. He gives five examples - the Bambuti pygmies, as described by Turnbull (1961), the Ndembu, as described by Turner (1957), the village of Vunioki in Fiji as described by Mayer (1961), the village of Namhalli in India as described by Beals (1959) and Japanese political factions at State level described by Scalapino and Masumi (1962). To these brief examples he adds a more extended analysis of Govindapur, an Indian village, and the Iroquois - both drawn from his own research. It seems to me however, that if we accept Nicholas's definition of factions, only three of these examples are concerned with factional conflict - i.e. that of Vunioki, that of Namhalli and that of Govindapur. The conflicts which occur in the Bambuti band are not really factional conflicts since the conflicting units are, as Nicholas says "three patrilineal groups with a few affines attached to each" (p.23). The conflict then involved the

1. Some writers - e.g. Boissevain, 1968 - suggest that it does. I shall discuss his argument shortly.
"simple recruitment of supporters along kin lines" (p.23). One conflict between two brothers which threatened to split such a group was swiftly suppressed, thus indicating I think that conflict here is a matter of the opposition of existing structural groups, not factionalism. The so-called factions in Japanese political parties may have begun as factions but they now appear to have become institutionalised groups. (This would seem to be an inherent possibility in any factional conflict, but it does not mean that we must use the same term to describe the social unit as it is at the beginning and as it is at the end of the process). The same criticism could be applied to the Iroquois example – the 'factions' described by Nicholas seem to have long ago solidified into political parties which could exist independently of particular leaders – indeed it is noticeable that Nicholas barely mentions leaders in this section of his article.

Conflicts and rivalries amongst the Ndembu are much more difficult to label. In Ndembu villages there is rivalry for the headmanship and the various contenders each have their followers. Unsuccessful candidates occasionally secede from the village, taking their followers with them. But who are these followers? As Gluckman says in the Foreword to Turner's book: "Each crisis marks the culmination of a period of altering alignments of power and shifts of allegiance within the village - though matrilineal attachment is always dominant in the end"¹ (my underlining). The matrilineage amongst the Ndembu is a very unstable unit, as Turner clearly shows, but the aim of

political leaders in competing for the headmanship of a particular village is always to provide a solid residential base for such a unit. Political leaders may make alliances with the leaders of similar matrilineally based groups in order to gain power but they do not seem to appeal for supporters on any other principle. (This situation is however beginning to change, especially since cash crops were introduced into the area and wealth differences became more important). Are we to call this kind of conflict factionalism or is it the opposition of already existing structured groups? It seems in fact to fall somewhere between the two, which is why I am doubtful about this example.

Having made these points however I think that Nicholas's definition is a reasonable and useful one, and it has certainly been of use to me in formulating my own material.

Theories of factionalism

A definition however is only the first step towards a theory and I do not think it can be said that Nicholas puts forward any hypothesis about factions or about factionalism. At present the ethnographic material is so limited that it is difficult to make general statements about factions. One example will, I hope, make this clear. Nearly all the examples of factionalism come from communities or societies which are relatively complex, in the sense of being socially and/or economically differentiated. (This generalisation does not of course apply if one includes the examples
of the BaMbuti and Ndembu which I do not consider to be factionalism). Indeed one can go even further and say that a majority of the examples are either from Indian villages or from overseas Indian communities. One could not of course assume from this that factionalism is a peculiarly Indian vice (or virtue as some would have it), but simply that Indianists have taken more interest in the subject than others. On the other hand one might be able to argue reasonably that factions (as defined by Nicholas) are only found in societies which are socially and/or economically differentiated. It may be that this is simply a function of the definition itself, for in order for a leader to recruit followers on diverse principles (kinship principles, principles of social stratification and economic principles are the ones usually suggested) one must have a society in which there are such diverse principles. By this definition a society which is organised primarily on kinship principles can never have factionalism. But there may be more to it than this. It is noticeable I think that the community which I have analysed in this thesis is far more similar to many Indian communities than it is to most African communities (judging at least by the ethnographic evidence). It is a stratified community in which differences of wealth are marked. It differs from most Indian communities however in the looseness of its kinship structure - but in this it would also seem to differ from many African communities. Is this a mere coincidence, or does socio-economic differentiation have something to do with factionalism? I do not think that one can
give a definitive answer to this question at present, though it would seem to be a reasonable hypothesis. Certainly however it focuses attention on the nature of the principles on which faction leaders recruit support, and we may now examine these more closely. Only Nicholas and Mayer give details of the kinds of principle on which the leaders have recruited support and it is of some interest to compare these two examples with the situation in Tundwa.

Mayer (1966) describes an election for a Municipal Councillor in Dewas town (India) whilst Nicholas describes the election for panchayat (village council) members in Govindapur (also India). It emerges that kinship was the most important principle on which leaders recruited support in both these elections, whilst economic factors come a close second (in Govindapur economic dependence was the nature of these economic links between supporter and leader; in Dewas Mayer does not specify the nature of the economic factors). Caste appeared to be less important - though since castes are endogamous kinsmen are also caste fellows. In Tundwa I did not make a quantitative analysis of people's motives for allying themselves with one faction rather than another - indeed I doubt very much if the information would have been easy to obtain in this form. But judging from the composition of the two factions it would appear that kinship, economics and social stratum were all important in determining alliances.

Following Bailey, Nicholas argues that where one caste is dominant, caste affiliation is not particularly significant in
determining political alliances. By 'dominant' these writers appear to mean primarily superiority in numbers, though ritual status and wealth may also be important. The dominant caste is itself the political arena and it is generally divided amongst itself. Govindapur is a community with a dominant caste, the Mahisya. Although the social strata in Tundwa are by no means as rigid as caste groups, the situation there would appear to be similar to that described by Nicholas for Govindapur, with the Waungwana, divided amongst themselves, as the sole figures in the political arena. But I have argued that the other two strata allied themselves according to their status in the total framework of a stratified community, whereas Nicholas argues that in such situations caste does not very much influence political alignments. It is true that in Govindapur caste groups appear to have been divided. Nevertheless there does appear to be some evidence that caste was significant in alignments and that people expected it to be so. In Dewas there was no dominant caste, and although we might have expected from the above argument that caste would have been more important here in determining alliances, it seems in fact to have been less so. It seems to me more likely that caste would be important where there was a dominant caste group (or stratum preponderating in numbers) rather than where there was not, for the simple reason that the smaller groups or categories would be more insecure in such a situation and more anxious to assert their positions vis-à-vis the dominant group.
The evidence is not however substantial enough to confirm or refute this argument and other factors would also have to be taken into account— in particular the character of inter-strata relations in each case. One factor in such relations is the extent to which the lines of social stratification coincide with those of wealth differentials. In Tundwa I have shown that they do coincide to a large extent. They are also often found to coincide in many caste societies. There is however an interesting contrast between factionalism in Tundwa and factionalism in many Indian communities. As we have seen economic factors play a large part in factionalism in Tundwa. One of the factions was supported largely by the richer section of the population together with some of their economic dependents, whilst the other faction was led by only moderately well-off men supported by the poor men of the community. In such a division there were many poor men who were economically dependent on the rich men and who were so paralysed by their conflicting loyalties as to be unable to act. In Tundwa then there is a fairly clear horizontal division of the society which is reflected in the existence of the two factions. Most of the Indian material presents quite a different picture however. There, a faction leader needs wealth in order to succeed. The wealthy men of a community are rivals for political power and they divide the community vertically in their attempt to gain power. What is the reason for this difference? As we saw, Tundwa in pre-colonial times followed a pattern very similar to this latter model— all the
competitors for power were rich men. The reason the community is now divided on different lines is partly a matter of historical accident and partly a matter of the nature of the posts available for competition. In the colonial period the only post of importance was that of village headman, and this was a post without power or sanctions attached to it. There was no competition for it because the headman was appointed by the colonial government. And since it had few rewards to offer very few people would have wished to hold it. Only a fairly poor man could have been interested in the salary offered and therefore the post fell into the hands of poor Waungwana. With the coming of Independence this post, that of Deputy Headman, and the new post of Councillor were all in the hands of fairly poor men. Suddenly these posts acquired a new significance since their holders had a large part in assessing tax rates under the new scheme of graduated taxes. Obviously only the rich men had much to lose in this situation and they rapidly set about organising opposition to Faction 1. The institution of elections provided them with a means of competing for the positions, and their economic power ensured their success. But it is still in their interest to stick together.

Although the relevant comparative material is not always available the Indian situation seems to have been very different. There was no sharp break with the past as there was in Tundwa, and the posts available for political competition seem to have offered more rewards (both in terms of political power and economic benefit) than
they did in Tundwa. Rich men would always therefore have been interested in controlling such posts, and they have done so until the present time.

This brings me on to another point however — the distinction between types of factions. Boissevain (1968) argues that factional oppositions always involve an 'establishment' and an anti-establishment faction, and that, "the establishment/opposition conflict is basic to all human societies". He is discussing the factional oppositions in a Maltese village, and in particular the establishment of two religious factions based on loyalties to two different saints. He shows that parish priests are often controlled by the local establishment — a clique of wealthy and influential persons. Towards the end of the last century however a particularly independent parish priest was able to challenge this establishment in one Maltese village and he set up a faction devoted to a new saint. "He recruited his following...not surprisingly from the anti-establishment elements in the village; the uninfluential, the poorer families and, so several informants indicated, many young men... The supporters of St. Joseph still occupy the lower rungs of the local prestige ladder" (p.11). The factions had in the meantime become institutionalised. The point I want to make here however is that the division in this community too was a horizontal one, as in Tundwa. But it is demonstrably not the case that this kind of conflict "is basic to all human societies". In many of the Indian cases 'the
establishment' is itself divided and there is no real anti-establishment opposition. The fact that, in elections, some candidates stand for the Communist Party is misleading. As Nicholas points out, "there are as many 'rich peasants' in the Communist camp as there are in the Congress". Rich men support the Communist party simply because their opponents support the Congress party. In the same way Faction 1 in Tundwa was associated with one M.P. whilst Faction 2 was associated with the other. M.P.2 later supported a left wing splinter group at national level and Faction 2 continued to support him, even though this was a faction led by the richest men of the town. Boissevain's distinction does not then seem to be very useful, and is certainly not universal.

Mayer's distinction between factions on the basis of their leadership and the methods used to gain power seems to be more useful. Mayer distinguishes for example between leaders who act as 'brokers' and leaders who are 'patrons'. Whereas patrons offer direct benefits to their followers, brokers offer to intercede with a third party on behalf of their supporters. However, in a situation such as that of Tundwa a leader must be both patron and broker if he is to succeed. He must both be able to offer direct benefits to his supporters (such as loans or credit) and he must also be able to intercede with the government on behalf of his supporters. One reason why Faction 1 did not succeed in keeping its position was that its leaders had little to offer (or alternatively to threaten with) in the local situation.

Mayer also distinguishes between leaders who offer general benefits to all and leaders who offer specific benefits to a few key figures in the hope that these will then each bring in their own supporters. Again however I think that it is possible to follow both these methods - as leaders in Tundwa did, though they put most of their faith in the second method. Mayer makes other distinctions concerning the linkages between leaders and supporters - how direct or indirect these are and whether or not lateral linkages exist between supporters. He argues that a leader whose supporters are all directly linked to him will follow a different plan of campaign to another whose supporters are linked to him more indirectly. This may in some cases be a useful distinction, but the information I have from Tundwa (see earlier diagrams) suggests that both factions there are similar in this respect.

A different kind of distinction is made by Siegal and Beals. They distinguish between 'pervasive' factionalism and 'schismatic' factionalism. This seems to me to be the least useful of all distinctions. Siegal and Beals define factionalism as, "overt conflict within a group which leads to the eventual abandonment of cooperative activities".¹ Nicholas disagrees with this on the grounds that it is too negative - factions have a positive function, he argues, in organising political activity. For Tundwa this definition seems largely irrelevant. For men at least there are few cooperative activities which can be abandoned. On the other hand it is possible for people

¹ Siegal and Beals, 1960, p.399.
to be factionally opposed without extending this hostility to all social occasions. In Tundwa for example, at the height of the factional disputes many private maulidi feasts were held. All faction leaders were invited to all feasts and all attended and ate together amicably. Following this basic definition, Siegal and Beals describe a type of factionalism which they describe as pervasive. Unlike schismatic factionalism which is "conflict between two well-organised groups", pervasive factionalism seems to be without rhyme or reason. "Analysis of opposed groups involved in any single dispute shows relatively few indications of consistent differences between them in terms of policy or kinds of people who belonged" (p. 397). This distinction seems to me to be implausible. Factions in reality lie somewhere between these two extremes. They are never well-organised because there is always the possibility that marginal supporters may change sides at the last minute. At the same time there is always some kind of social reason why people support one side as opposed to another, as there is also some element of purely personal sympathy or antipathy.

Finally I turn to the point that Siegal and Beals make concerning the association of factionalism with social change. Nicholas agrees with this, as does Boissevain. Boissevain argues that social change causes an increase in factional conflict because it introduces new techniques for factional fighting, new posts to be competed for and new ideologies which may be used as symbols by opposing sides.
Boissevain also adds that social change threatens established elites. All these points would seem to me to be important, but perhaps they presuppose a more fundamental question. I would agree that factionalism is always associated with social change, but I would also argue that all societies are undergoing some form of social change. What we have to know then is, with what kind of social change is factionalism associated? No writer seems to have an answer to this question, and on the available evidence it is difficult to come to any satisfactory conclusion. But as a conclusion to this thesis I suggest the following very tentative hypothesis concerning the conditions necessary for factionalism to arise - I assume here all the propositions which Nicholas puts forward. Factionalism, I would argue, arises only in face to face groups or small communities in which there is some social or economic differentiation. In situations where the lines dividing one social or economic category from another become blurred as a result of external pressures, and where these pressures may be modified in some way by political action, factions will tend to arise. Depending on factors which are not at present clear to me such factions will either represent rivalry between men of the higher socio-economic categories, each of whom will use their socio-economic position in order to try and monopolise political power, or it will represent a division between the rich and influential in the community as opposed to the poor and uninfluential. In any situation where numbers count the latter category of people are always important
because they are usually more numerous than the rich. They must either represent themselves then or be represented by rich or moderately well-off patrons.

Testing the usefulness of this hypothesis will depend on further work. It seems to fit the case of Tundwa and also the other cases of factionalism which I have discussed here, but other studies may show it to be invalid.
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