BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTHERN SUDAN, 1906-1956

A Study in Colonial Neglect

by

RAPHAEL KOBA BADAL

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ABSTRACT

The whole study is cast in an historical mould and falls into three basic parts corresponding roughly to the first two decades, the inter-war period, and post-war developments. In the first part, colonial motives are briefly examined, followed by a general description of the salient features of early administration. An account is also given of administrative attempts to impose Governmental authority upon the unwilling peoples of the Southern Sudan by the method of punitive expeditions. The point is made that although no general or comprehensive policy for the South had emerged at this stage, the period was significant for the formation of an official impression of the 'needs' of Southern Sudanese. Such an impression was not especially favourable to the introduction of external, Arabic and Islamic, influences in the Southern Sudan.

In the inter-war period, as a result of a half-hearted application of the policy of native rule, the South actually stagnated in the sphere of education, which the Sudan Government devolved almost entirely to Christian missionary societies. The lack of development schemes is noted and, as it turned out, no piece of socio-economic development effort initiated by the Administration ever advanced beyond the experimental stage. 'Southern Policy', the offshoot of native administrative policy, is of course discussed. The impression is created that the main preoccupation of the Administration till the outbreak of the Second World War
had been how to block the infiltration of Arab elements coming from the North. These efforts proved difficult to achieve in view of the reality of the Southern situation and the continuing dependence on Northern personnel by the Administration.

In the post-1945 period, combined nationalist pressures from both the Northern Sudan and Egypt forced a review of policy whereby the South was thrown open to external, mainly Northern Arab and Islamic influences. In the meantime any crash programmes for the economic and social development of the Southern Sudan ran out of time, and the Southerners found it almost impossible to adjust to the changed political circumstances. The outcome was a civil war, by which time the British had made their exit from the Sudan.
INTRODUCTION

At the turn of the century the Southern Sudan (approximately the Sudan south of the twelfth parallel of latitude) had already experienced two successive regimes. The first, often but mistakenly known as the Turkiya, was a foreign regime of Muhammad Ali, the ruler of Egypt, and lasted from 1821 to 1885. The other, the Mahdiya, was a Muslim theocracy which came into existence as a result of the overthrow of the first. Based in the Northern Sudan and founded by Muhammad Ahmed al-Mahdi, a religious leader of magnetic character, it is widely regarded as the first Sudanese indigenous regime. Partly because of the limited objectives of both regimes but largely because of sheer physical distance coupled with a strong tradition of local resistance, the pagan African peoples further south were hardly ever brought under effective control of either theTurco-Egyptian rule or the Mahdiya. Remote, hostile, inaccessible and extremely suspicious of all foreigners, the Southern peoples continued to enjoy a large measure of tribal independence.¹

This relative tribal freedom and independence was, however, frequently interrupted by tribal warfare

¹. For the history of the Southern Sudan in the nineteenth century, see
and the deprivations of European as well as Northern Sudanese slave traders which the administration in Khartoum was unable or unwilling to check. At any rate government control in the South, to be sure, remained weak, shabby and fragmented depending upon local conditions and strength of character (or lack of it) of the official representative 'on the spot'. In the impenetrable swamps of the Upper Nile and northern half of the Bahr al-Ghazal (the homeland of the intractable, cattle owning Nilotes - Shilluk, Nuer and Dinka) 'Turkish' authority was scarcely ever visible. On the other hand, in the south of the Bahr-al-Ghazal and Mongalla provinces where sociological and other conditions were different, and native interests were chiefly with agriculture, government control was possible but only within a very restricted range. Beyond the immediate confines of administrative markaz (or centre), violence, destruction and bitter hostilities often prevailed.

Under the rule of the Khalifa Abdullah, the successor of the Mahdi, the Southern Sudan reverted once more to a tribal independence, regarded by some foreign observers as a state of chaos. Private slave trade as well as organised cattle and slave-raiding by the Mahdists continued to flourish. The Khalifa's demand for slaves was dictated by the need of his army, the jihadia. When two serious efforts to conquer the Southern provinces failed, the Mahdist forces virtually withdrew from the South. The only influence the Mahdists had had in the South was restricted to areas along the
Nile and some parts of the Bahr al-Ghazal.

The joint Anglo-Egyptian rule, better known as the Condominium, resulting from the victory of Lord Kitchener's forces over the dervishes in September 1898, was not, prima facie, different from the two previous regimes. It provoked the usual Southern hostility which in turn invited punitive expeditions, thus contributing to the cycle of violence. The period of pacification which lasted from roughly 1900 until the early 1920's and in the case of the Nuer until 1930, was one of the bloodiest and most prolonged in Africa. Not less than thirty expeditions took African lives and destroyed African property. Several of these expeditions employed light artillery, and on two serious occasions R.A.F. bombers were deployed.

In the meantime, the Southern tribesmen tended to identify the Condominium with the Turkiya. After all, the Anglo-Egyptian forces entered the South by the same route, and in several districts used the same government stations. Over and above that, the new Administration employed Egyptian and Northern Sudanese personnel. The lower ranks of its regular army were entirely composed of Arabic-speaking Muslims until recruitment of Southern, Equatorial Corps began in 1911. Furthermore, day-to-day district administration was carried out not by British officials but by Egyptian ma'murs (district officers). These soldiers and ma'murs may have been better disciplined than their counterparts.

in the Turkiya, but their duties were very similar to those enjoined by the Turco-Egyptian regime. The Condominium Government, like its predecessor, also relied for revenue on the appropriation of grain and cattle (often seized by raids) and a state monopoly of ivory.¹

In due course, the Condominium was able to stamp its mark upon the societies of the Southern Sudan. If either the Turkiya or the Mahdiya was oriental in form and tended to exhibit the character of the transitory, the new administration unmistakably displayed something of a novelty. It sought to impress upon the natives the image of permanence designed to convey the message that the British were here to stay. It intervened in inter and sometimes intra-societal conflict by making demands upon the southerners that they should keep the peace. It employed the method of punitive expedition in an attempt to impose its will. More significantly, it could make and break tribal chiefs where these existed.

Judged against the record of its predecessors, the Condominium Administration seemed to have brought some positive benefits to the South. The Turco-Egyptian rule had symbolised all sorts of evil in government: corruption, inefficiency, misery, oppression and exploitation of the natives to the maximum. The Mahdists had raided the Southern peoples for recruitment into the army. The Mahdist state itself had had as its driving force the ideology of Islamic religious

¹ Ibid., pp. 93, 233-4.
perfectionism, which was quite irrelevant in the context of the Southern experience. In any case, the South was looked upon by both regimes as a vast reservoir of slaves ready to be drawn upon, whether to satisfy the greed of Muhammad Ali, the Khedive of Egypt, or to furnish recruits for the Mahdist forces. By contrast, the Condominium Administration had a clean record as the Government that put an end to these evil practices and gradually effected the emancipation of slaves in the Sudan as a whole. The new era also witnessed the introduction of the civilised and civilising notions of law and order, of justice and good government to the benefit of all. Missionary work which included the introduction of Western medicine and the rudiments of education was commenced. The display of military force that was necessary in the early stages was kept to the minimum and to be resorted to only in circumstances of extreme necessity. Tribal warfare on a large scale was also fairly effectively checked and with the advent of settled administration in the 1920's the stage seemed set for the South to clinch a better deal than was ever possible under the Turco-Egyptian regime or its Mahdist successor.

Yet, neglect of the South was very much a key feature of British colonial rule in the Sudan. This colonial neglect found inadequate expression in the lack of material progress and educational advancement of the Southern Sudanese. In 1935 a senior British official described the economic condition of the south as
"virtually prehistoric". A couple of decades later, the majority of the southern peoples were still without a cash-crop; they still paid their taxes in kind and bartered any surpluses of food-crops or livestock for cloth or iron goods. Education in the South was left almost entirely in the hands of the Christian missionaries whose primary object was evangelisation rather than general uplift or enlightenment.Until 1949 the Southern Sudan had no secondary school and has no University of its own to date. The native administration policy which was in vogue was never developed beyond the stage of judicial devolution. Worse still, the application of indirect rule policy in the South tended to slow down educational advancement and the social emergence of the southerner. In an area only slightly less than the size of Kenya there were, by 1934, only 42 British political officers and 18 senior technicians. In these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that in 1952 another high-ranking official frankly admitted that "in the Southern Sudan there are no large towns, no politicians, no newspapers. To the world at large these people do not exist." When these words were written the Sudan was only three years from gaining its independence.


In an attempt to account for the economic and social backwardness of the South, apologists of British colonial rule have been quick to point to the concrete conditions of the South itself. Of special importance are its remoteness, the inhospitable climatic conditions, lack of natural economic resources, and the extreme conservatism of some of its people. The Southern Sudan was also different from the rest of the country in other respects. In this segment of the country, the administrator walked a muddy and swampy area (literally as well as in a metaphorical sense) and the recurrent official qualifying phrase, 'except for the South', reminds us of this uniqueness. Lacking the cementing influence of Islam and the Arabic language which had given the Northern Sudan a semblance of a 'Nation', the South was characterised by social and political fragmentation. Its 'African' culture, loosely defined, scarcely provided a sure guide to a people threatened by powerful Islamic influences from the North. There were, in the South, estimated to be fifty tribes and tribal groups, speaking distinct languages or dialects. Different tribal systems with corresponding levels of political centralisation or fragmentation contributed a great deal to the overall picture of confusion. Set against the background of centuries of foreign intrusions and the depredations of the slave traders of the last century, the conditions of the South seemed bleak enough to warrant separate treatment.

The special conditions of the South invoked
an official British paternalism which aimed at the pro-
tection of the Southern Sudan against any possible
future exploitation by the North. In pursuance of this
objective, the Southern provinces were more or less
effectively sealed off from the Northern, Arab and
Islamic influences for much of the period of the
Condominium. The device employed to effect the cultural
and even physical 'separation' of the South from the
North assumed the form of a 'Southern Policy' formally
announced in 1930, but which had been germinating since
the start of the Condominium Administration. Very soon
after the second World War and for the reasons discussed
in Chapter VI, British paternalism became inoperative
and 'Southern Policy' was dramatically stood on its
head. The net effect of this vacillating policy proved
to be costly for the Independent Sudan in the context of
the North-South relationship.

The British were the first to conquer the
South and to rule it effectively; but having conquered
it, they failed to develop its people educationally as
well as economically to any appreciable extent. Develop-
ment efforts were, by contrast, concentrated in the
North, so much so that at independence on 1st January
1956, the inheritors of political and economic power in
the Sudan were drawn almost wholly from the Northern
Sudan. The resulting imbalance generated in the minds
of many Southern people fear and suspicion, whether
well-grounded or not, of Northern domination and exploi-
tation of the South, leading directly to the outbreak of
hostilities between the two communities in August 1955.
Until quite recently, academic and general interest in Southern Sudan has been focused on the 'Southern Problem' meaning, the relations between the North and South in the context of post-independence political developments, a phase dominated primarily by civil war and the expulsion of Christian missionaries from the South. In the propaganda war, the Khartoum government supported by political leaders in the North on one hand, and the Southern insurgents on the other, each interpreted British colonial policies in the South to suit their purposes. In either case, no major Sudanese study of British colonial administration in the South emerged. The present study is an attempt to satisfy this particular need. It is devoted to a critical examination of British Colonial performance in the Southern Sudan in key areas of policy identified as education, economic development and native administration. The thesis propounded here purports to demonstrate that the half century or so of British rule in the Southern Sudan can plausibly be interpreted as a history of colonial neglect and near-indifference.

My task in respect of availability of source material was infinitely facilitated by the existence of a wealth of archival material in the Sudan as well as in this country. The research work was carried out, therefore, partly at the Central Archives of the Government.

of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, but the bulk of it was completed at the Public Records Office, London, supplemented by a couple of trips to the School of Oriental Studies, University of Durham. Some official publications as well as private papers not available in the British Museum were consulted in the Bodleian Library at Oxford and the University Library, Cambridge. I also paid frequent and useful visits to the Library of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Special mention must be made here of the fact that the Sudan came under the Foreign, not the Colonial Office. Aside from official correspondence available at the Public Records Office, extremely valuable sources included various F.O. publications, particularly the handbook series packed with detailed information on individual provinces and even districts.

The most telling of the correspondences of the Sudan Government (like some of the F.O. handbooks) are marked 'confidential' or 'secret' or 'very secret'. This is no doubt because of the highly political and controversial nature of the policies adopted for the South which were increasingly coming under criticism both in the Northern Sudan and Egypt. The assassination of Sir Lee Stack (the Governor-General) in broad daylight in Cairo in 1924 by Egyptian nationalists provided the British with a pretext for the wholesale expulsion of all Egyptian officials and army officers from the Sudan. Henceforth the British, who had been at any rate the senior partners in the Condominium, ruled the Sudan virtually single-handed. Even when, by the Ango-
Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1936, Egyptian officials and technical staff were to return to the Sudan, very few indeed did so. The Governors-General, Sir Stewart Symes and Hubert Huddleston in succession, consistently refused to take in more Egyptian personnel on the ground that few were suitably qualified or that there were no vacancies.

Formal communications between Khartoum and the British Foreign Office were never direct. Official correspondence and Annual Reports of the Governor-General were first submitted to the British High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan (later renamed Ambassador) resident in Cairo who then transmitted them to the F.O. with or without comments of his own in a series of confidential despatches. The secrecy was all the more important when, during the Second World War and afterwards the Sudan Government had to cover up the acute shortage of British staff occasioned by the war and when 'Southern Policy' was being severely denounced in Northern Sudanese nationalist circles. Because the Governor-General's Annual Reports were submitted to the British Parliament and made public in Egypt, embarrassing remarks were often cut off from the final drafts.

Except for a brief period under Lord Cromer, neither the British Foreign Office nor the Ambassador in Cairo supervised the administration in Khartoum. The
Governor-General and his senior colleagues had a free hand in determining the policy of the Government and the manner of its execution. Khartoum policies for the South, it must be remembered, were sometimes vigorously contested by British Foreign Office staff but were never subject to a veto of any kind. This study is based, to a large extent, upon what British officials in Khartoum and the South thought, felt, and did or thought they were doing. Expressed in these terms, it can also be asserted that, very often, individual and private sentiments went for policy.

The Peoples of the Southern Sudan.

A few cursory remarks on the various tribal systems of the Southern Region may assist in understanding the following account.

The negroid and predominantly 'pagan' peoples of the Southern Sudan may be divided into three broad categories based on the rough criteria of linguistic affinity and geographical location. The sub-groups of the two ethnic and cultural groups known as the Nilotics and Nilo-Hamites are subject to the linguistic criterion, unlike those of the 'Western Sudanic' types, often lumped together merely on account of a common mode of

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1. The supreme body responsible for the administration of the Sudan was the Governor-General's Council, instituted in January 1910. The 'three secretaries', i.e., the financial, legal, and civil secretaries who used to act as advisors to the Governor-General, became ex-officio members of the Council.
life and physical location. The Nilotics inhabit the great flood plains of Upper Nile and northern Bahr el-Ghazal; the Western Sudanic types occupy the ironstone plateau, which stretches from the Nile-Congo divide northward to the fringes of the swampy area. The Nilo-Hamites live in the east and south-east of the country.

1- The Nilotes:

These comprise the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Anuak, Bor Bellanda, Burun, Jur, Shatt, Dembo, and Acholi. The Nilotes are usually tall, long-headed, long-legged, slender, and dark-skinned. The Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk are the best-known representative Nilotitic groups. The British found them to be extremely conservative, proud, reserved, and exceedingly hostile to all foreigners. The missionaries found them unimpressionable. The Nilotes despised clothing and scorned Arabic and European cultures. They are still today mainly pastoral, living a semi-nomadic life, and staying nearly half of the year in cattle camps in search of water and abundant pasturage. The Nilote's intimacy with, and love for, his cattle (which he seldom sells) abounds. This is because the Nilote is dependent, almost wholly, on the cattle for livelihood and the supply of basic necessities. Cattle provide him with milk and the cow dung he burns for fuel as well as for keeping out flies. Cattle also furnish him with sleeping-skins and girdles for adult women. More importantly, his marriage restitution and sacrificial gifts are all made in cattle.
Of all the Nilotics, only the Shilluk have a centralised political system under a monarch, the Reth. The hereditary monarchy dates back to the 16th century. In the past the King used to be killed if he showed loss of vitality, as it was believed that the health of the monarch was bound up with the welfare of his people and their livestock. The peoples who speak dialects of Shilluk are widely dispersed. The Acholi for instance live on the border with Uganda. The Shilluk-speaking peoples are pre-eminently agricultural and several have borrowed from the cultures of their neighbours. The only member of this linguistic group whose political system resembles that of the core Shilluk is the Anuak of Pibor district.

The Dinka constitute the largest single tribal group in the Southern Sudan, numbering about one million and a half and inhabiting a larger land area than any other ethnic group. Unlike the Shilluk, the Dinka do not form a single political entity but fall into a number of independent tribal units, very often warring with each other. Nevertheless, the sub-tribes (Malwal, Raik, Twich, Chich, and Agar) are all culturally homogeneous. The


influential authority in the tribe was the hereditary, rain-maker who used to be buried alive on attaining old age.

The Nuer\(^1\) are the second largest tribe, after the Dinka, whom they resemble very closely in physical characteristics, language, and customs. Among the Nuer, authority was exercised by persons wielding hereditary religious, rather than political, powers. Under the Condominium, it was not uncommon for 'prophets' claiming divine authority to emerge who gained wide recognition. It is reported that in the 19th century the Nuer crossed the Nile from the West Bank and ousted or absorbed most of the Dinka to the East of the Nile. They settled in their newly conquered territory.

\section*{11- The Nilo-Hamites:} \(^2\)

The major sub-divisions are: the Bari and Bari-speaking peoples, Lotuko-speaking, Didinga-speaking, and Turkana-speaking. In appearance the Bari resemble the Dinka, but differ greatly from the Nilotics in matters of language and culture. Bari language is far more Hamitic in type than Nilotic. In fact, the Bari-speaking peoples are akin to the tribes of the ironstone

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1. For ethnographic detail on the Nuer, see:

2. For ethnographic detail on the Nilo-Hamites, see:
plateau, and Evans-Fritchard suggests that they might have been conquered by the Bari, whose language and customs they have adopted. He also suggests that the Bari were far more numerous in the past than they are to-day, and were probably as pastoral as the Nuer and Dinka. They seem to be in a state of transition from pastoral to agricultural modes of life as a result of depleting livestock. The Bari political system is not clear-cut, but Bari society exhibits class divisions in which rain-makers have great prestige.

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III- The Peoples of the Ironstone Plateau.

The tribes of the ironstone plateau present a sharp contrast to the Nilotes and Nilo-Hamites in physical appearance, in temperament, and in culture. They may be divided into the following categories: The Azande, Bongo-Mittu group, Ndogo group, Moru-Madi group, Gbaya, Golo, Mundu, and Babuckur. The Azande offer the best-known of these peoples and will serve for illustration.

They are of medium build, and have a copper-coloured skin. Lighter-coloured than any other Southern tribes, the Azande in fact considered themselves 'White men'. They impressed British officers of the early period as being 'the most intelligent, keen and well-ordered tribe in the Bahr el-Ghaylan.' Zandeland

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was described as 'a fine country' and 'the cream of the Bahr el-Ghazal'. They showed themselves easily adaptable to changing conditions and were among the first to welcome trade goods and opportunities for wage-earning.

The Azande possess no cattle, but they are great cultivators. Their staple crop is maize; groundnuts, manioc, bananas, and a number of leguminous and oil-bearing plants are also cultivated. The Azande immigrated to their present home from former French Equatorial Africa at about the turn of the 19th century; at the arrival of the British they were already organised in three large kingdoms. To-day, two-thirds of the Azande live in neighbouring Zaire. Political authority was wielded by an aristocracy, the Avungera, whose nobles enjoyed hereditary status. No son of a commoner be he Zande or of the subject tribes could ever hope to attain noble rank.
CHAPTER I

BRITISH CONQUEST AND EARLY ADMINISTRATION (1900-20)

Introduction.

The first two decades or so of joint Anglo-Egyptian rule furnish a convenient starting point for an assessment of the impact of the new administration upon the societies of the Southern Sudan. Corresponding roughly with the Governor-Generalship of Lord Kitchener and Reginald Wingate, the period represents the formative years during which the foundations of British Rule in the Sudan were laid and Government policies towards the natives, their religion and beliefs and their way of life were evolved. The immediate objective was, of course, the establishment and maintenance of law and order without which the instruments of government could not operate smoothly nor progress of any kind made or anticipated. But the initial requirements and needs of the North and South as seen through the eyes of the British conquerors were different and so also were the strategies adopted. It is the differential impact of this decision upon the two halves of the country with which this chapter is concerned.

In September 1920 a senior Government official in Khartoum admitted that administration in the Southern Sudan had hitherto been a failure. "What a failure", he wrote, "after twenty years' time can be seen in (1) the frequency of the need for semi-military operations
To this list of administrative shortcomings may be added the very restricted range of Government control over the Southern peoples. As a rule the Administration was able to maintain its sway only over the smaller and more accessible groups. Of the larger tribal or ethnic groups only the Azande, geographically remote but more easily accessible than the Dinka and Nuer to the north, came under effective Government control in the first decade of British rule. Otherwise, the authorities contented themselves with keeping open vital lines of communication by patrolling the rivers and the very few tracks. Most of the clusters of people of the far south were also fairly effectively brought under Government sway. As for the people inhabiting the mountainous areas east of the Bahr el-Jebel, in the territory acquired from Uganda in 1914, these too were subdued but only by a series of virtually uninterrupted military campaigns between 1914 and 1918. This chunk of territory itself had never been administered or even occupied by the Uganda authorities. Meanwhile, in the great triangular marshland\(^2\) inhabited by the Nilotics, administration

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1. W. Sterry (Legal Secretary) To V. R. Woodland (Governor, Mongalla), CS/SCR/1/C/1, 23rd September 1920, Sudan Government Archives /S.G.A./ Khartoum.

2. The swampy area resembles a huge inverted triangle of land with its apex on the Bahr -el Jebel at about 6° N and its base running for some 500 miles roughly along the tenth parallel from 26° to 34°.
was confined to the northern and southern fringes of Dinka and Nuer country. Not until during and after the First World War were serious attempts made to subjugate the two largest groups; the Dinka and Nuer. The Dinka were finally pacified toward the end of 1918; the campaign against the Nuer, the most turbulent of all, continued intermittently till their final pacification in 1929-31. As for the collection of Southern peoples, the Burun, who lived east of the Nilotics along the Ethiopian frontier [they were not administered at all.1 Briefly, then, the three numerically significant cultural groups whose subjugation shall be examined presently in some detail are the Azande, Dinka and Nuer.

The very slender administration could not even pay for itself. In the immediate pre-war years Bahr el-Ghazal and Mongalla never managed to cover more than sixty per cent of a very unimpressive administrative expenditure of £30,000 and £23,000 respectively.2 If Upper Nile Province was able to make its accounts balance it was probably because it left the vast majority of its inhabitants unadministered. The need for military expeditions between 1914 and 1918, however, brought a sharp rise in expenditure, but this was

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1. For an introductory account of Burun, see A. R. J. Davies, "Some Tribes of the Ethiopian Borderland ..." Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. XLI (1960), pp. 21-34.

not matched by a corresponding rise in receipts. Some of the military action was devoted to the conquest of the mountain country ceded by Uganda in 1914, but most of it was undertaken in response to disorder or resistance among groups which had been nominally subject to Khartoum since the establishment of the Condominium. If the Administration's record in the South does not measure up to colonial expectations, then it is most appropriate to examine closely British motives for the conquest of Southern Sudan.

Motives for Conquest.

The celebrated Hobson-Lenin thesis on imperialism and colonisation singles out the economic motive as the driving force behind the nineteenth-century European colonisation of Africa. The whole enterprise was seen in terms of a plot by big financiers and the business world in general to utilise state power for the securing of: (1) raw materials for home industry, (ii) outlets for surplus capital and industrial goods and (iii) as source of cheap labour.¹ In the case of the British conquest of that the Sudan, it must be pointed out at once there was no clear economic gain to be made nor was the country fit for European settlement in the same way as, for instance,

Kenya. The immediate occasion for the conquest of the Sudan was to avenge the death of General Gordon at the hands of the Mahdists. Gordon himself had entertained little optimism for the future of the country. He once wrote that "No-one who has lived in the Sudan can escape the reflection what a useless possession is [the Sudan]. Few men also can stand its fearful monotony and deadly climate."\(^1\) His right-hand man Colonel J. D. H. Stewart agreed: "The country is only intended by nature for nomad tribes and a few settled Arabs along the banks of the Nile. It annoys me greatly to see blood and treasure wasted on it. I see nothing to be gained by its occupation."\(^2\) The Southern Sudan above all almost represented hell on earth. Of the Southern Sudan Ewart Grogan, the first man ever to walk from Cairo to Cape recorded the following: "... a desolation of desolations, an infernal region, a howling waste of weed, mosquitoes, flies and fever .." and added "I have passed through it, and have no fear of the hereafter."\(^3\)

The British were from the very start reluctant imperialists. Way back in 1897 Cromer persistently warned Salisbury, at that time British Prime Minister,

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against the policy of taking over "large tracts of useless territory which it would be difficult and costly to administer."¹ Big Power rivalry in the Nile Valley at the turn of the century, however, swept overboard all arguments against the acquisition of territories south of Egypt. Prestige and strategic considerations were, therefore, very much the driving force behind Salisbury's decision in June 1898 to take over as a single political unit "the whole Mahdist State from Wadi Halfa to Wadelai."² Several elements went into the British calculation: Great Britain was a major European colonial power and had manoeuvred the French out of Egypt a decade earlier; the French under the command of Colonel Marchand had established a presence in the Bahr el-Ghazal and at Fashoda; King Leopold II of Belgium had occupied the Lado Enclave in the far south, prompted by the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of May 1894; and Menelik II of Abyssinia had threatened encroachments in the Sobat Valley that might link up with the French in the West. Their success could cut off British possession in East Africa as well as expose Egypt's southern frontier to security risks. In the final analysis these encroachments, if left unchecked, would seriously undermine British standing in the world at large. As an over-riding priority, therefore, the British Foreign Office instructed the Sudan Government

2. Cromer to Salisbury, 15th June 1898, F.O. 78/5050.
to establish outposts in the disputed territories and to maintain lines of communication to them.¹

The problems of actually administering the local population would have to take their turn. If local resistance were encountered the urgent need of "effective occupation" meant that there would be no time for diplomacy or conciliation. As one observer noted, "the automatic reflex was to crush it as quickly and as thoroughly as possible."² On this reading, Fashoda and Wau between 1900 and 1906 when the borders were finally settled approximated less to the administrative headquarters of provinces than the rear and advanced bases for "patrols" which were essentially moves in the diplomatic strategy. In the meantime, administration proper was neglected. The primary cause for the British conquest of the South was, therefore, the local "scramble" for Africa, highlighted by the "Fashoda Incident" of 1898 which brought Great Britain and France to the brink of war.³

Early Administration

Even when the British had the occasion to apply themselves to the task of administration proper, military

1. The first Government expedition to the Bahr el-Ghazal was dispatched in the winter of 1900, when the conquest of the South officially commenced.


considerations remained paramount. The Administration made what it regarded as minimum demands on the natives namely, to keep the peace, to clear roads, to provide carriers, to build simple rest houses for Government officials and (in the early days) to bring in grain, meat, rubber and ivory for sale at fixed prices. Believing (correctly) that high taxation was a major cause of revolt against the Turco-Egyptians, the Government tended to keep the level of formal taxation as low as possible both in Northern and Southern Sudan. Taxes were payable in kind, particularly in the Southern Sudan. These demands, it is to be stressed, were consciously intended to be as light as possible in the hope of gaining confidence and securing the loyalty of the natives.

Good intentions on the part of the Government was one thing but the reality of the Southern situation was quite another and the 'light' demands were not necessarily so perceived by the natives, who were quite determined to resist this latest brand of intrusion. The Africans in the Southern Sudan, particularly the Nilotic group, had defied the repeated efforts of the Turco-Egyptians and the Mahdists to establish a semblance of administration in the South. What they had succeeded in doing in the past they hoped to repeat with the new regime. The response of the Government assumed the familiar pattern of punitive expeditions which burnt villages, carried off cattle and destroyed crops. As the "spiral of violence" provoked partly by local resistance and partly by the Southerners' refusal
to keep the peace even amongst themselves continued, punitive expeditions become a permanent feature of the first two decades or so of British administration in the Southern Sudan. In consequence:

"... the natives could detect but little difference between the old Turkish Government, the Dervishes, and the Sudan Government. They all raided, but the last was not interested in slaves but took cattle only and was possibly more efficient in its methods of getting them ..."

The Government needed the animals as provisions for its soldiers and carriers or as remunerations. But cattle were to the Nilotes what money was to the European and more. For instance, marriage restitutions and sacrificial gifts were all made in cattle. There is a sense in which cattle were as sensitive an issue to the Nilotics as religion was to the Northern Sudanese. If religious (neo-Mahdist) uprising constituted the main threat to law and order in the North, cattle raids were very much the cause of endless inter-tribal warfare.

Lack of appreciation of this fact was partly responsible for the massive and widespread Southern alienation which characterised, particularly, the period from 1914 to about 1922.

It is regrettable that military patrols should have been perpetuated partly out of sheer force of


habit and partly from military careerism. As late as 1926, one Inspector professedly "sick with patrols", could manage to find occasional fun in them. Furthermore, these patrols were only very rarely followed by settled administration. Even where settled administration was a reality, as in the Western District of the Barhr el-Ghazal, it was very much a second priority to military operations; and officers who took serious interest in native administration received little encouragement. Thus Bimbashi D. C. E. Comyn of the Western District who made a serious effort to administer the natives by peaceful management rather than punitive expeditions (of which he strongly disapproved) remarks sadly, "My maps and reports on the District I later discovered from a waste-paper basket in Wau office (i.e. the Province Headquarters). In the confusion of conducting the Niam-Niam (i.e. Zande) patrols they were flung aside," which is indicative enough of "official thinking" in this period.

The North

The picture of administrative failure in the

1. D. C. E. ff. Comyn then Inspector of Western District, Bahr el-Ghazal Province, asserted that punitive expeditions were undertaken "more often than not to give some one a promised beret or decoration," see (Anon) Service and Sport in the Sudan.


Southern Sudan contrasts sharply with the success story in the North. There, the principal object of British rule was for long the suppression of neo-Mahdist uprisings. To this end punitive expeditions were also employed, but with a difference namely, that the strategy of "divide and rule" which was adopted proved to be a success. In real, practical terms this meant that a maximum of severity to Mahdist dissidents went hand in hand with maximum conciliation to the adherents of orthodoxy as prescribed by the Government. In the Northern Sudan the Administration began with an idea of how to be conciliatory, and under the able leadership of Wingate they worked hard to keep open channels of communication with religious as well as other notables. The opinions of these dignitaries provided the necessary feedback for policy formulation. District Commissioners were instructed to master the local language, identify themselves with the people and penetrate as deeply as they could into the minds and characters of those over whom they ruled and to cultivate trust and confidence in them. In response to the wishes of the people the government was thus prepared to embark on a major revision of policies. One example of the Administration's responsiveness to local demand and wishes was the decision to climb down on an original commitment to abolish slavery. Rather than abolish it, the Government

used its authority to enforce slavery when it became clear towards the end of the first decade that the threatened disappearance of the traditional labour force was causing intense disaffection not merely among the "shaykhs" and notables but also ordinary Northern cultivators. The Government probably realised that a society long used to the luxuries of domestic slaves and free agricultural labour furnished by slaves would not take lightly to any drastic action aimed at their total abolition. Land reforms were also undertaken involving the restoration of alienated land to lawful owners and the prohibition of sale of land to non-Sudanese. These reforms effectively removed any cause for grievances on the part of the sedentary Arab cultivator or herdsman that might be attributed to foreign rule. Moreover, taxes were unrealistically kept low as matter of policy.  

Careful administration also brought real material benefits and prosperity to considerable numbers of people in the Northern Sudan. As an index of material prosperity there was considerable increase in the volume of external trade and commerce.

The increase in the volume of exports and external trade was greatly facilitated by improved communications and the creation of a harbour on the Red Sea.

2. Down to 1913 Egypt subsidized the Sudan.
coast which brought the Sudan within easy reach of international commerce as well as closer to the industrial centres of the world. In 1906 the construction of a vital railway line linking Khartoum with the Red Sea coast was completed and three years later Port Sudan harbour was formally opened. In 1910 works on two important road and rail bridges, one at Khartoum on the Blue Nile and the other at Kosti further south were concluded. From Kosti the rail route was extended westward to the heart of Kordofan, reaching El Obeid the provincial capital in 1911. Thus at the end of the first decade there were in existence in the Northern Sudan 1500 miles of rail road.¹

These development efforts were later crowned by four years of unprecedented prosperity throughout the First World War. As it turned out, there were good rains, good harvests and good prices for agricultural exports. In his annual report the Governor-General was able to record that,

the people are contented, happy, and loyal. When expressions of this happiness and contentment are heard it is satisfactory to feel that they are not merely word painting for the benefit of the rulers of the country, but are based ... on solid facts.²

With Muslim susceptibilities of both notables and commoners conciliated by the almost exaggerated respect

¹. The first rail road to the South reached Wau in the Bahr el-Ghazal in October 1962.

². Report by His Majesty's Agent and Consul General on the Finances, Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Sudan in 1911, Egypt, No. 1 (1912), cd. 6149, p. 55.
paid to "orthodox" Islam, the Government could count on virtually complete support of Northern Sudanese at the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914. Of special significance to the Government was the cultivated friendship of the two great religious leaders, Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi and his rival the Khatmiya leader, Ali al-Mirghani. Secular notables such as tribal shaykhs in predominantly nomadic communities, special influential urban personalities, urban merchants and a surprisingly large number of relatively prosperous middle-ranking ex-Mahdists also assumed the role of "collaborators". In short, although it was undesirable that Muslims should be subject to 'infidels,' few Northern Sudanese could see any practicable alternative to British Administration.

So far as the actual conquest of the South is concerned the first people to acknowledge the authority of the Sudan Government were, naturally, the small and disrupted tribes around Wau some of whom faced the threat of total disintegration. They had fled their original home further south on the ironstone plateau in the wake of the Azande expansion and in fear of Tambura "who appeared to have terrorised the whole province." Sandwiched between the Dinka in the north and the Azande in the south, these fugitives inhabited the zeriba (pallisaded enclosure) country, which had been greatly

2. Diary of El Miralai Sparkes Bey on Niam Niam (i.e. Zande) Patrol, 6th January 1901, Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 80, March 1901.
devastated and depopulated during the nineteenth-century slave trade.¹ Foreign invaders from the slave dealers to the Mahdists had always found this area the soft under belly of the Southern Sudan. The British expedition under Colonel Sparkes utilised the same soft spot for the establishment of a bridgehead for the eventual conquest of the South. Despite initial difficulties of obtaining supplies and carriers, the invading force made a rapid progress into the interior. On January 1st, 1901 Sparkes hoisted the two flags of the Condominium at Jur Khattas, a former slave depot about 120 miles south-west of Meshra er-Req, the original landing-ground. Leaving Major Boulnois in charge of the organisation there, he proceeded to Tonj where he established the temporary headquarters of the expedition. On 17th January, Wau (or Fort Desaix, which later became the permanent headquarters) was occupied. By the summer the whole area from Deim Zubeir, in the west to Rumbek in the east was dotted with Government posts. These included: Deim Zubeir, Wau, Tonj, Shambe, Meshra er-Rek and Rumbek. It is remarkable that these military posts were located at strategic points, usually on the site of a former slave trader's zeriba or Egyptian Government post.

The Azande.

The expedition's next task was to secure the

allegiance of the Azande or their Avungera Chiefs who inhabited the territory concurrent with the Nile-Congo Divide, strategic for the supposed borders with the Belgians and French. This was not to be done by force if submission could be obtained by peaceful methods. But of the paramount Zande Chiefs, only Tambura voluntarily sought accommodation with the British right from the start by agreeing to place himself and all his resources at the disposal of the Government. These included his army estimated at 1,000 rifles of all sorts and some 3,000 bow and spearmen. He also made gifts to the Sudan Government of eighty tusks of ivory valued at well over £1200, undertook the construction of a garrison at the site of a former French post, and promised to open trade relations with Khartoum. If the refugee tribes around Wau welcomed British rule on grounds of security, Tambura did so for quite different reasons. His acceptance of, and co-operation with, the British were dictated by considerations of enlightened self-interest. Quite apart from the fact that his previous experiences with Europeans, particularly the Belgians and the French, had taught him to respect

1. Tambura was one of two sons of Liwa, the aristocratic Avungera Chief who had established his rule in the Bahr el-Ghazal in the mid 1800's. All the big Azande Chiefs belong to the aristocracy of the Avungera clan.

2. "Diary of Sparkes Bey on the Zande Patrol, 4th June to 27th July 1901", Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 86, Appendix B (1), September 1901.

their superior technology, the majority of his subjects were not Azande at all, but consisted of a cluster of tribes notably the Bellanda, the Bongo and Ndogo.¹ His opposition to the British would have almost certainly resulted in the defection of these clients. To ensure his continued control over the non-Azande tribes, Tambura could not but submit peacefully to the Government in return for their confirmation of his paramount position. Moreover, he hoped to elicit British support against his Avungera rivals, especially Yambio, the other most powerful Azande Chief within the Sudan Government territory. "When Yambio is dead", said Tambura, "I shall be a much bigger man, for numbers of people will come to me."²

South of Tambura and with half of his country in Belgian territory, was Ndoruma, another paramount Azande Chief. He, too, submitted peacefully to the forces of the Government. Unlike Tambura, who understood the existing boundary with the Belgians perfectly well, Ndoruma did not realise that part of his country was outside the British sphere of influence.³ Nevertheless, "he was doubtful if he was backing the right horse

¹ A. B. Bethell, "Notes on the Different Tribes in Tambura's Court", 2nd July 1904, F.0.78/5367; Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 121, August 1904, Appendix "A".

² Quoted by Bethell in "Notes on the Different Tribes in Tambura's Court", op. cit.

³ A. Fell, "Notes on Sultan (i.e. Chief) Ndoruma" Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 128 (March 1905) Appendix D (a) 3.
or not in supporting the Sudan Government.\textsuperscript{1} The impressive force mustered by Colonel Sparkes might have coloured his decision to recognise the Government. Having reviewed the Government's troops assembled at Tambura's Mbanga (Court), Ndoruma marvelled that "soldiers like these must be the work of God."\textsuperscript{2}

In return for his cooperation, the Government promised Ndoruma non-interference with his own system of government on the condition that it was efficient and to the satisfaction of Government and that he and his people should give the Government their unqualified loyal support. Anxious for the creation of the Government presence in his country and following Tambura's example, Ndoruma constructed a permanent post for the troops. Thus, round about the end of 1904, the Sudan Government had, by persuasion, cajolery or threat of force, succeeded in winning the support and loyalty of two important Zande Chiefs. The Government was able to patrol the borders more effectively than ever before and "to show the flag".

The most powerful and most feared of the Azande Chiefs within the British sphere of influence, Yambio, had, however, yet to be subdued. But unlike Tambura or Ndoruma who had managed to strike a sort of modus vivendi

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\item 1. Major Boulnois, "Diary of Yambio Column, Bahr al-Ghazal Expedition", Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 128 (March 1905), Appendix "D" (a) 1.
\item 2. H. Fell, "Notes on Chief Ndoruma", \textit{op. cit.}, p. 16.
\end{itemize}
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with the British, Yambio was reputed for his extreme hostility to all Europeans irrespective of their nationality. When the Sudan Government forces arrived at Tambura's court all indications were that Yambio would oppose the British invaders with all the means available to him.\(^1\) In vindication of his contempt and defiance of the Sudan Government's call to submit this Avungera aristocrat made a deserter from the Government regulars into a 'Chief' and gave him a village.\(^2\) Yambio was so powerful and his prestige so great that a careful preparation was needed before launching the invasion in 1905. Tambura himself had warned his British allies that Yambio's men were numerically superior to his own. Ndoruma had concurred.\(^3\) However, when the Sudan Government was ready to launch its offensive two important factors were already at work which vastly eroded Yambio's power of resistance.

The Yambio expedition comprised two columns, with Tambura's men playing a supporting role. Prior to the British invasion, however, the Belgians south of the border had embarked upon one of their repeated incursions into Yambio's territory. The latter had responded in a characteristic fashion: summoning all his important lieutenants and their men, he hit back at

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2. A. B. Bethell's "Notes on Tambura's Country", (4th July 1904), Ibid.
3. H. Fell, "Notes on Chief Ndoruma's", Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 128. (March 1905), Appendix "D" (a) 3.
the Belgians. The two-day fight resulted in little
success and Yambio and his troops were repulsed with
heavy losses. The point to remember is that the Azande
of this part of the country had been in a permanent
state of war with the Belgians or with Tambura and
Ndoruma, so that even when they were not actually
fighting a war with the Belgians they were engaged in
a conflict with one or the other. Thus weary and
exhausted by wars, both Yambio and the natives lost the
will-power to fight the British advance. Unable to
face the superior forces of the Sudan Government, Yambio
fled but was pursued, captured and died later in the
Government camp of gunshot wounds.\(^1\) Thus the massive
expeditionary force accomplished the task of subduing
Yambio without encountering stiff resistance as was
originally feared. But a large part of the credit for
the successful conclusion of the campaign goes to the
Belgians whose actions indirectly contributed to the
defeat of the otherwise intractable Azande Chief. In
the words of one commanding officer, "We have to thank
the Belgians for giving us an easier task than was
anticipated as far as fighting is concerned."\(^2\) In any
case, it was supremely imperative to bring Yambio under
control as his region lay on the way to the Lado
Enclave which was under Belgian occupation.

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1. Boulnois Bey, "Diary of Yambio Column", Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 128 (March 1905), Appendix "D".
2. Ibid.
A second factor relates to the gradual erosion of the support and loyalty of the 'subject' tribes in Yambio’s country. Yambio, in addition to holding a direct sway in his own central district, maintained an overall control in the rest of his kingdom where minor chiefs, including some of his sons, ruled at the periphery. It was these 'Chiefs' and their subordinates in the peripheral districts who ruled over most of the non-Azande tribes such as the Babukur, Baka, Mundu and Baris. Pressed on both sides by two columns of the expeditionary force, these 'Chiefs' went into hiding after many of the subject tribes revolted and sought Government protection.\(^1\) The cruel and oppressive rule of Yambio and his lieutenants may have contributed in no mean way to the revolt of the non-Azande tribes. "Yambio", it has been said, "knew of but one punishment, and that was death, and it appears to have been meted out with great lavishness, life being held very cheap. Prisoners were taken out to the forest and killed with spears."\(^2\)

Tambura’s ability to retain hegemony over most of his non-Azande subjects had called for an alliance with the Sudan Government which in turn discouraged further defection from his court. Yambio, in preferring the course of war to the wise instrument of diplomacy, was doomed to destruction on two counts: internal

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1. Diary of Sutherland Bey, Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 129 (April 1905), Appendix "G".

2. H. Fell, "Notes on Yambio's Mbanga (i.e. Court) and Country", Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 128, (March 1905), Appendix "D" (c) 2.
weakness of his kingdom and the technological superiority of his British foes. Believing that the British invasion, like the French and Belgian incursions before it, was a transient phenomenon, Yambio sought in vain to prove the military prowess of the Avungera aristocracy. But as one British Officer remarked, "We did not want war, but were prepared for it. Yambio wanted war and had been killed."¹

Round about the Spring of 1905 most of the southern Bahr al-Ghazal area had come under effective control of the Sudan Government. In consequence Major Boulnois, the Governor of Bahr al-Ghazal, withdrew most of the troops, leaving a token force to patrol the borders and report frontier violations by either the French or the Belgians.²

The Nilotics.

The relative tractability with which Azande were conquered and pacified was bound to generate the false impression that the application of the same methods to the Nilotics immediately to the North would produce similar results. But the pattern of conquest of Zande-land could not be repeated in Dinka-country, much less in Nuer-land; and the application of the same methods

¹ "Diaries of Officers dealing with Yambio Expedition", Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 129, (April 1905), Appendix "c".

² A garrison of 150 officers and men was later established at Yambio to counter the activities of the Congolese.
would yield the desired effects only if sociological
and other conditions were the same. They were not.
Because authority in Zande society was sufficiently
organised and institutionalised, the total collapse of
the central force entailed the dissolution of the whole
political system. The fundamentally acephalous institutions of both Dinka and Nuer, by contrast, offered
little chance of a quick submission of an entire tribe
following a defeat in war. As a matter of fact there
was no conclusive war but a succession of battles which
could be won or lost.

(a) The Dinka

Government alienation of the Dinka seemed pre-
dictable in the light of the demands it made on them.
The demands for menial labour such as the clearing of
roads or the providing of carriers were especially
detested by the Dinka and Nuer. The Government also
made the unacceptable demand that the Southern Sudanese
should "keep the peace" when the Administration itself
was unable to suppress or effectively punish trans-
gressors of peace. None of the Dinka and very few of

1. In times of crisis, "emergency leaders" (some, but not
all, of whom were "prophets") had appeared whose power
and visibility tended to obscure the essential segmen-
tary nature of Dinka and Nuer societies.

2. The Nilotes detested being used as carriers not only
because it effeminate but because carrying service
deformed the decorative coiffures which were of great
social and aesthetic Value to young warriors.
the Nuer had been under any Government; they saw no reason why they should submit to this latest lot of "Turks". The Nilotes' belief in their superiority was not easily shaken. Bimbashi R. B. Airey, on a patrol through the country of the Raik Dinka in 1905 found he could not possibly enforce a fitting attitude: "their attitude throughout to me was that of a superior to an inferior."\(^1\) This attitude of the Nilotes to all foreigners was later confirmed by social anthropologists.\(^2\) The Dinka were also little impressed by the strength of the Hakuma which consisted of isolated posts and small patrols. At best "the government" was seen as a potential ally against a traditional or intractable adversary in the perpetual game of cattle-raiding.

The first group of Southern Sudanese to rise in rebellion against the British were the Agar Dinka who in 1902 killed a British officer, Bimbashi Scott-Barbour, and most of his escort. The grievance of the Agar was simply that they did not want "the government" in their country. The revolt threatened the earliest line of communication to be opened to the south-western frontier.\(^3\) The Government was determined not to be delayed in its dash for the frontier, and fearing a general Dinka

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3. R. O. Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, p. 80. The line of communication ran from the river post at Shambe to Zandeland via Rumbek (in Agar territory) and Tonj. In the second half of 1901 the transport system collapsed and Rumbek and Ronj were cut off from Shambe.
uprising reacted with extreme violence. The Agar were doubly punished; first by a small force under W. H. Hunter, who scattered the Agar warriors, burnt villages and captured cattle. Later, the "Shambe Field Force" under L. O. F. Stack (the future Governor-General) spent one month systematically laying waste the Agar-country, seizing cattle and grain and leaving "not more than a dozen houses ... standing in the whole district."1

The punitive expeditions against the Agar furnished a lustrous example of the Dinka exploitation of the Government to settle old scores and to help themselves to cattle and women, thereby perpetuating and intensifying inter- and intra-tribal violence. Where the regular troops were supported by other local groups on a punitive expedition these were known as "friendlies". The status of the "friendlies", however, was nothing like an iron-cast guarantee of continuing support and loyalty to the Government. The Atwot (a mixed half-Dinka and half-Nuer people) who acted as the friendlies on the Agar patrols were soon to resist the Government under the leadership of a "prophet" by the name of Awo. The point being pressed here is, although the Government relied initially on Dinka for the supply of information, interpreters and

guides, the primary motivation of such individuals and the "friendlies" was unquestionably self-enrichment. Even as late as the 1920's the "friendlies" could hope "to slink under shelter of Government and enrich themselves with captured cattle."¹

That the Dinka looked upon the Sudan Government more as an ally than a conqueror is indicated by the way some of the tribes chose to pay tribute and to accept limited control in return for Government protection against the Nuer, their traditional foes. At the arrival of the British there were in existence two areas of acute political conflict immediately north and south of Nuer-land. In the South, the Nuer were steadily expanding at the expense of the Southern Dinka. In March 1905 the Inspector of Upper Nile, H. H. Wilson, reported that the Ghol Dinka were "in a horrible state of fear of the Nuers" and that they wished to migrate en masse to Khor Fullas at the mouth of the Sobat river. The condition of their neighbours, the Nyareweng Dinka was even worse; Wilson found them living in the forest "like game" for fear of the Nuers and remarked that they were "only one example of the many (Dinka tribes) who through the absence of any security are deteriorating into wild men of the woods."²

The request of the Ghol to migrate to the

¹. The Story of Fergie Bey, (London 1930), A Biography of Vere H. Fergusson) p. 117.

north was turned down because the Khor Fullas itself was another region of acute friction. Dinka refugees from Nuer control had moved into this relatively accessible region at about the time of the arrival of the British and, like the small peoples of Western Bahr al-Ghazal, they had promptly offered to pay tribute and place themselves under Government protection. Thinking themselves thus secure "they kept up a kind of guerrilla warfare against the Nuer." From their protected base or sanctuary they launched hit-and-run raids and rustled Nuer cattle. Wilson also reported that these Dinka refugees missed no opportunity to vilify the Nuers to the Government.¹

By 1914 the only Nilotic groups under administration were the Northern (Khor Fullus) Dinka and the southernmost Dinka tribes² in the Bahr al-Ghazal and Mongalla Provinces. Here administration was direct and "bureaucratic", by Egyptian ma'murs, under British inspectors. In the far north-west, along the borders with Kordofan and Darfur Provinces, there was no administration of any kind. In between, in the land of the Raik Dinka there was a penumbral zone of light administration. British officials experimented with "native administration" but these attempts failed for lack of

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¹ H. H. Wilson, "Report on an overland patrol from Sobat to Bor", (10th March 1905,) Cairo Intelligence Report, 3/17/277, Sudan Government Archive, Khartoum.

² Corresponding roughly to the Agar, Bor, Ghol, Twi, Aliab, Chich and Luaich Dinka.
natural leaders. The appointed "chiefs" proved incompetent or treacherous and the frequent changes of Government "chiefs" only led to further confusion. Some of the appointed "chiefs" simply gave up like "chief" Jok of the Malwal, who went to live at the Government post at Nyamlell on account of weariness to pay from his personal cattle the fines imposed upon "his" village. Where possible, administration was restricted to tribute collecting expeditions (i.e. Government by raids):

Tribute was collected by the simple process of taking an adequate force of soldiers and seizing the animals. Apparently the troops behaved as if in an enemy country. 

Needless to say, behaviour of this kind simply alienated the cattle-owning Dinka. Even where "direct" administration existed the Government was quite unable to protect the Dinka against their local enemies. When (between 1914 and 1918) the Southern, administered, Dinka were under severe pressure from the Nuer, the most that the Government could do to protect the Ghol, Bor and Twi Dinka was to issue them in 1915 with firearms and ammunition - the very negation of pacific control. In the circumstances, it seemed legitimate that the Agar, Chich and Luaich Dinka should refuse to pay taxes in protest of the administration's failure to protect them

1. There appointed chiefs were often repudiated by their people and regarded as Government dogs, see Chapter III.

against the Nuer. Meanwhile, in 1917 and 1918 the Government launched major punitive expeditions against the Agar and Atwot Dinka. The Agar responded by attacking in concert with the Atwot, the District Headquarters at Rumbek.

The tax-paying Bor Dinka were equally unprotected from annual raids by their unadministered eastern neighbours, the Murle or "Beirs". The standard Government response - "Patrols against the Beirs" - failed to make any impact upon the Murle. Raids on the Bor Dinka continued uninterruptedly from 1906 to 1912, after which date the Government abandoned the idea of punishing the "Beirs" and sought to provide money for their administration. Under settled administration the much feared "Beir" ceased to worry either the Bor Dinka or the Government. In 1926, K. C. P. Struve described them as "a quiet and easily-handled people."

Another area of acute friction existed in the far north-west where the unadministered Dinka were under constant pressure from their traditional enemies,

the Baggara Arabs of southern Kordofan and Darfur, who raided for cattle as well as slaves. Government efforts, which did not begin until 1909, to check these incursions by a system of frontier patrols and the creation of a post at Nyamlell ended in complete failure. The limited Government resources proved inadequate to man effectively the overstretched border. By 1914 the Baggara were raiding the Dinka unchecked one hundred miles deep into the Bahr al-Ghazal and over an area of two hundred miles. Despite the crisis, the Dinka refused to cooperate with the Government even for their own defence. Not only did they refuse to construct the road to Nyamlell post to facilitate patrol of the border but actually rose in open revolt against the Sudan Government.¹ As one observer recently summed up: "Much as (the Dinka) hated and feared the Baggara, they hated and feared the Government more."² The permanent state of warfare and rebellion in the north-west of the Bahr al-Ghazal persisted well into the early 1920's when a close and careful administration was instituted.

By 1918 the alienation of the Dinka (save in the Khar Fullus region) appeared complete. Even parts of the area of the hitherto amenable Shilluk could not be visited "without a guard of at least twelve armed men, whilst none moved into the ... Dinka area without

far more."¹ In December 1919 the "directly" administered Aliab Dinka revolted and were joined by the Mandari. To forestall the participation of the Bor Dinka in this latest wave of rebellion a strong force was despatched to patrol the area. The operations against the Aliab cost the Administration the lives of two senior officers. A severe penalty was exacted against the Aliab. For three months (March-May 1920) the "Aliab Patrol" systematically ravaged the countryside, seizing cattle, destroying grain, standing crops and burning villages. In sum, "No more than 5 per cent of the Aliab (Dinka) will have a decent house to live in during the rains."² Neglect as well as oppression stung the Aliab into revolt. For one thing the Government failed to check the malpractices of their ma'murs, and for another, it failed to protect the Aliab from neighbouring Atwot marauders. Furthermore, the Administration was unable or unwilling to provide any material benefits to the Aliab. The Governor of Mongalla, V. Woodland, admitted bluntly that, "the Government has done nothing for the Aliab." Yet in return for nothing (or for worse); it had demanded both tribute and the detested carrying service.³

¹ C. A. Willis, "A Brief Survey of the Policy of the Sudan Government in the Upper Nile", June 1927, Sudan Government Archives, Durham, Box 212/10/1.
³ Ibid.
Faced with the veritable threat of total destruction (from the Government, the Baggara and the Nuer), the Dinka seemed to have found salvation in the charismatic leadership of a certain Bul Yol, universally known by his prophet name, Ariendit. A Malwal Dinka from the unadministered north-west, he rose to prominence from relative obscurity and to achieve a level of political unity rarely known to the Nilotics outside the Shilluk country. Unwittingly, this measure of political cohesion inevitably occasioned a central force the annihilation of which (as has been seen in Zandeland) often resulted in the total collapse either of the political system or of organised resistance. The eventual pacification (or subjugation) of the Dinka subscribed to this pattern of conquest. Thus having defied the British Authorities as sub-groups, the Dinka achieved an astonishing degree of political unity under a "prophet" only to succumb to the superior forces of the Administration.

There can be little doubt that Ariendit himself was a great man. The British described him as "a fine, intelligent-looking man" who, later in captivity, was even capable of impressing Muslim Northern Sudanese. His rise to fame and veneration dated from 1917, when he returned from self-imposed exile from "a far country" equipped with a magic stick and a divine mission to rid

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1. Intelligence Report, 1/20/10 (Ariendit), R. K. Winter (Acting Governor, Wau) to Civil Secretary, 8th December 1921: Kainmakam G. Brander, O. C. Patrol No. 101, Report of 3rd April 1922, Intelligence Report, 1/20/10 Sudan Government Archive, Khartoum.
the Dinka of oppression. The supernatural powers attributed to him were very impressive indeed. Apparently, he could raise men from the dead or "will" them to death. It is also alleged he could turn the Government's bullets to water. Most striking of all, he is reported to have withheld (in 1921) rain from the Government's Dinka while granting it to his own followers.\(^1\)

His other "miracles" included the construction of an audience chamber ("House of God") - with a capacity of over 300 men - unmatched by any traditional Dinka structure.

Toward the end of 1921 Ariendit was the undisputed leader of all the unadministered Dinka, who were now united in open rebellion against the Government. This involved virtually the whole population of Bahr al-Ghazal Dinka, as far south as the Gok and the Agar. As for the Dinka tribes in the administered and semi-administered zone, these were ready to rally to Ariendit's support at the first indications of his success.\(^2\) On hearing that Ariendit was about to launch a concerted attack (involving the whole Dinka population) upon Province Headquarters at Wau, R. K. Winter, the Acting Governor, was convinced that Ariendit was a "national hero." Thoroughly disconcerting to the Sudan

\(^1\) R. K. Winter to Director of Intelligence, 10th December 1921, W. Owen (Inspector of Nyamei) to Winter, 28th December 1921; statement by 'Ali (Arab merchant trading with Northern Dinka), 10th November 1921, Intelligence Report, 1/20/10, S.G.A. Khartoum.

\(^2\) Winter to Civil Secretary, 24th November, 8th December and 21st December 1921. M. J. Wheatley (Governor Wau), to Brander, 12th January 1922, S. G. A. Khartoum.
Government Authorities was Ariendit's appeal across tribal lines coupled with his skill in political organisation. For, he was capable of creating an efficient network of agents who "worked" the Dinka irrespective of tribe.¹

Ariendit's political movement was not directed against specific grievances. His was a simple and radical programme aimed at the liberation of the Dinka from Government oppression. The fighting ideology of his movement derived, not unnaturally, from a traditional religious stock, save that this ideology operated in quite untraditional fashion to create a pan-Dinka independence movement. So valid is the assertion that among the Nilotics

... no man may really claim to have a voice in the affairs of the "state" unless he has established himself as a true worker of big magic, fully capable of propitiating or calling in evil spirits and able to produce rain in time of drought.²

Ariendit had distinguished himself in these matters in a big way and was rewarded with astounding political success by his Dinka folk. His fatal mistake, possibly the result of his supreme confidence in divine inspiration,³ was his failure to combine political organisation

1. R. K. Winter to Civil Secretary, 8th December 1921, cf. Bahr Al-Ghazal Intelligence Report, November 1921, "There is no question but that Ariendit is a national hero." S.G.A. Khartoum.


3. Winter to Civil Secretary, 21st December 1921, op. cit.
with adequate military preparations. Thus when (in February-March 1922), Patrol No. 101 was despatched against him, Ariendit's movement collapsed almost without a fight.¹

Ariendit's efforts did not end in total failure, however. His defeat was followed, not by the severe punishment often exacted against the natives as on previous occasions, but by a radical change in policy. Following the defeat of Ariendit, the Governor-General (Sir Lee Stack) firmly "set his face against any more patrols ... especially against cattle-raiding. (And) a return was made to the old plan of peaceful penetration."² It was then agreed that fines on the Dinka should be light, that there should be no indiscriminating killing, or destruction or confiscation.³ A careful (and caring) administration was introduced. The "thoroughly Egyptian system", whose drawbacks were now recognised was abandoned. The title of "Inspector" was dropped and "District Commissioner" substituted. A District Commissioner was placed in charge of each district and ma'murs were gradually phased out.⁴ By the

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1. Sitrep, Report of Patrol No. 101, 24th February 1921; Wheatley to Civil Secretary, 14th March 1924, S.G.A. Khartoum.


3. Owen to Brander, 7th November 1921, S.G.A., Khartoum. The total fines (upon several Dinka tribes) of under-500 head of cattle contrasted sharply with the treatment of the Allab two years earlier whereby 6,300 head of cattle were taken and nearly 500 Dinka and Mandari were killed.

early 1920's the number of British administrative officers serving in the South almost doubled the pre-war figures. Furthermore, the calibre of the new recruits was remarkably different from that of their predecessors. They were carefully chosen from men, who by their patience, good temper and sympathy obtained the confidence of the tribes. They learned something, sometimes a great deal of language and of the customs of the people. They discovered matters in which unwittingly the Government had been riding roughshod over their tribal customs.

Once attempts were made to communicate with the Dinka rather than plunder and punish, they became responsive having accepted defeat after the collapse of Ariendit's "National" movement.

(b) The Nuer.

The Nuer by contrast accepted no defeat and were largely unpacified. The process by which they were eventually pacified (or subjugated) continued throughout the 1920s and was not concluded until early 1931. In the beginning, the British made little effort to administer the Nuer. As well as being more formidable warriors than the Dinka, the Nuer had for the most part never recognised or been administered by any Government. They were even more convinced than the Dinka of their own absolute superiority to all foreigners.

the British included. Because Nuer-land was less accessible than Dinka-land, it was far more difficult to patrol. Any patrol at all had to be conducted when the country was at its driest. Occasionally, the Government employed the system of despatching armed administrative patrols to Nuer regions in sufficient strength to enforce decisions "on the spot". Patrols of this kind did indeed command local respect but as soon as they were withdrawn or the rains came, Nuer-land easily reverted to another eight-month period of freedom and independence.¹

Strategically, the insular position of the Nuer did not warrant the permanent stationing of troops in Nuer country. Once, in 1902, when it became necessary to demonstrate effective British occupation in the Upper Sobat Valley and to thwart Menelik's ambitions, a patrol was despatched there which made the first serious contact with the Nuer. Led by Kaimakam A. Blewitt, an officer of unsavoury reputation,² the patrol bore all the hallmarks of the shortcomings of early British "administration":

indifferent personnel; subordination of all else to a "presence" on a disputed frontier; the almost automatic recourse to violence when faced with difficulties or delays; the indiscriminate use of "friendlies".³

² Some of his colleagues thought of him as a 'cynical careerist'.
The "friendlies" on this occasion were drawn from the Khor Fullus Dinka, a fact bitterly resented by the Nuer. Suspicious of Government patronage of the Khor Fullus Dinka, the Nuer were apt to regard the patrol as a large-scale Dinka raid with Government support. As may be expected, the Nuer took to the bush and refused to "come in" whereupon Blewitt proceeded to demonstrate "control" by a wholesale devastation of Nuer villages and raiding cattle.

This initial unfortunate encounter was not followed by any serious attempt to impose "administration" by force upon the Nuer. The Government simply had not the military and economic resources to embark upon such a venture. Unwilling or unable to extend control to the Nuer, the Administration restricted its activities to the "external" relations of the Nuer. It had to, because the Nuer were regularly raiding their neighbours and the tax-paying Dinka for cattle (and slaves). The District Commissioner of Central Nuer district once reported that "It was an established custom of the Nuer to raid the Dinka and steal their cattle whenever they were moved by the desire to possess more than lawfully belonged to them." In fact, the Nuer regarded the raiding of the Dinka for cattle as in the natural order of things. In the attempts to

contain these raids and to regularise Nuer relations with the neighbours the erroneous perceptions by both sides (by the Government of Nuer political structure and by the Nuer of the nature and functions of Government) were brought out in a far more dramatic manner than with the Dinka. A further complicating element in the relations with the Nuer pertained to the uncontrolled (and uncontrolled) traffic in firearms across the border from former Abyssinia. The possession of firearms by one or the other of rival groups often produced sudden and radical changes in the local balance of power thereby generating acute and widespread instability and conflict, which it was the lot of the British to sort out (often with only temporary success).

The Nuer, though for the most part independent and aloof, were not consistently hostile to Government. In 1905 a British officer described the central (Lau and Gaweir) Nuer as "cheery and open-hearted people", once you got to know them. The officer involved, Kaimakam H. H. Wilson, was able to establish friendly relations with Diu Deng, a "prophet" who had become the "emergency leader" of the Central Nuer. In 1907 the Authorities were also able to conclude a "diplomatic" modus vivendi with Diu. The Nuer agreed to pay a light tribute and to tolerate occasional peaceful visits of

inspection. By this diplomatic move the Nuer hoped to counter the claim of the Khor Fullus Dinka that they, and they alone, were the Government's allies. In return the Government undertook to check the depredations of the Dinka in Khor Fullus area. In July, Diu Deng died and the southern Dinka (Ghol, Nyareweng and Twi), hoping to exploit the situation, launched an offensive against the Central Nuer. The Nuer counter-attacked and the traditional raids and counter-raids between Dinka and Nuer in this region were resumed. In 1909 the Government intervened and a boundary between the two warring parties was agreed at an "international" meeting convened on the spot by senior British officials of Mongalla and Upper Nile Provinces. The right of the Nuer in the area they had conquered was recognised; and a police post was established at Duk Fadiat, two miles south of the new border line, to serve as a buffer between Dinka and Nuer.1

In 1910 the eastern (Jikaing) Nuer in the Pibor area, alarmed by the growing military strength of the Anuak, decided to "keep in with the Government"; they agreed to pay the very light tribute demanded of them in return for security. But the western Nuer (to the west of the Bahr al-Jebel) remained totally independent: they felt they had no enemy with whom they could not cope. The western Nuer also had the further advantage

of being isolated by the belt of Dinka who were either unadministered or "administered by raids." When visited in 1917, this section of the Nuer were found to be "completely independent, very rich in cattle, and the most truculent natives I have till now come across."¹

The modus vivendi with the central and eastern Nuer proved to be precarious mainly because the Nuer and the Government attached to it radically different interpretations. Whereas to the British it connoted acceptance of Government authority, to the Nuer it was a diplomatic bargain between equals. If, to the British, payment of tribute symbolised a subject status, the Nuer viewed tribute as a means of buying Government goodwill and protection. The Nuer were even inclined to conceive tribute-paying as a form of subsidy to an ally, "placing that ally under an obligation to assist the Nuer in their conflicts, or at the very least, to observe a benevolent neutrality while the Nuer settled matters after their own fashion" - by war.² Indeed when, in 1905, H. H. Wilson (an intelligent and perceptive officer) visited the "cheery and open-hearted" central Nuer he soon realised they were capable of frank and realistic political discussion. The Nuer were prepared to live in peace with (if not as subject of) the Government if

1. O. Bentley, (Senior Inspector Nuba Mountains Province), 29th October 1917, Intelligence Report, 2/26/215, S.G.A. (Khartoum).

only the latter refrained from siding with the Dinka. ¹

The Nuer perception of the nature and function of Government was clearly demonstrated by their reaction to the resurgence of Anuak military power. At the arrival of the British in the Southern Sudan the Anuak were engaged in a profitable business transaction with the Galla tribes of Ethiopia. This consisted of, mainly, the trading of ivory and slaves for arms in Ethiopia, where there was a virtually inexhaustible supply of arms and ammunition. As a result "practically every grown man among the Anuak had a rifle at least."² By 1911 estimates put the number of the arms acquired by the Anuak at 10,000 guns, most of which were comparatively modern breach-loading rifles. Encouraged by their newly acquired strength, the Anuak resolved to settle old scores with their traditional, Nuer enemies. They attacked the eastern (Jikaing) and central (Lau) Nuer, making away with cattle and women in four separate raids. In the last raid, the Anuak managed to penetrate as far west as the neighbourhood of Bahr el-Zeraf, some 250 miles from their original base.³ Captain G. S. Symes (the future Governor-General, at that time Chief Intelligence Officer) summarised the reaction of the Nuer in the following


In consequence of these raids the Nuers, who have just commenced paying a light tribute to Government, are loud in their demands for protection by the latter; and, in the meantime, are losing no opportunities of acquiring the rifles, by fair means or foul, which they consider, not unnaturally, to be essential for their protection. 1

The ominous thing was, Captain Symes reported, that the Gaajak section of the Jikaing, immediate neighbours of the Anuak, had already acquired some 600 rifles. The die was cast.

In response to Nuer complaints the Government twice (in 1911 and 1912) mounted punitive expeditions against the Anuak, but to no avail. The Anuak resisted with a certain amount of success and must have interpreted the ultimate withdrawal of the patrols as an Anuak victory. The eastern Nuer were not impressed by Government performance either. After the withdrawal of the expeditions they probably wrote off the Sudan Government as useless. In September 1912 the eastern Nuer, drawing inspiration from their own prowess and equipped with their newly acquired rifles, made a devastating reprisal raid on the Anuak. 2 By 1913 the central and eastern Nuer had acquired fresh rifles. The central (Gaweir and Lau) Nuer resumed their raids on the southern Dinka in contravention of the Nuer-Dinka frontier agreement of 1909. The Government resolved to punish this

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Violation of an "official" frontier by a punitive expedition, the first of a series of campaigns against the central Nuer which involved large-scale confiscation of cattle. Unfortunately for the Government the expeditions merely served to revive in full strength the conviction that the "Government" was, by all account, a dangerous and predatory ally of the Dinka.¹

Faced with the combined threat from both Government and Dinka, two major sections of the Nuer (Lau and Gaweir) took the rare step of forming a defensive alliance, and in 1915 and 1916 they successfully raided the Dinka tribes to the south of them. In the raids on the Dinka in the Khor Fillus area, most of the cattle were taken. These Nuer successes encouraged the western Nuer to raid the neighbouring Dinka tribes. In 1917 the Government staged a major punitive expedition led by Major E. A. T. Bayly, mainly against the central Nuer. Once again villages were destroyed and over 4,000 heads of cattle captured. The Lau Nuer were effectively discouraged from further large-scale raids on the Dinka.

In February 1920, similar large-scale operations against the eastern Nuer amounted to a full-scale war in which two columns of troops, each several hundreds strong, were supported by gunboats which patrolled the rivers to destroy canoes. This was an effective way to restrict Nuer mobility. In the meantime, R.A.F. aircraft

bombed Nuer villages and cattle-camps. By the end of the year, the eastern Nuer were forced to submit to the Sudan Government authorities. But the western Nuer were still regularly raiding the Dinka to the south of them. Another three years of major punitive expeditions elapsed before they were subdued in 1923.¹

In the first twenty years or so the British failed to establish effective administration, particularly in Nilotic areas. For the most part, they were engaged in supervising events with the help of temporary alliances. 'Administration' of any sort had to be done on the cheap, hence the reliance on the natives either as 'allies' or as collaborators. While they had superior technology, they lacked superior administration. The one thing they did establish fairly firmly in the minds of the natives was the futility of resistance to British power. Expressed differently, the notion of British hegemony was accepted as a result of fear of getting shot. Within that broad notion of hegemony the British were able to establish flimsy administrative structure, but knew as yet very little about the people they had come to conquer and to administer. The task of studying the customs, languages and tribal systems of the Southerners in the light of which a general and comprehensive policy could be formulated would have to take its turn in the following decades.

CHAPTER TWO

GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISLAM:
The Genesis of "Southern Policy".

The religious policy to be pursued by the Sudan Government was initiated by Lord Cromer in his speech to the Shaykhs and notables in Omdurman on 4 January 1899. While pledging low taxation he also assured them that there would be no interference in the religion of the people.¹ The policy statement received further emphasis and elaboration from Kitchener in a later memorandum to the provincial governors:

... Be careful to see that the religious feelings are not in any way interfered with, and that the Mohammedan religion is respected. At the same time Fikis teaching different Tariks, and dealing in amulets .... should not be allowed to resume their former trade .... ²

The important point to remember is that this prohibition did not apply to the Southern Sudan, which was in a different category. However, Cromer in Cairo and Kitchener in Khartoum were both agreed that it would be politically undesirable to allow Christian missionary work in the Muslim provinces of the Sudan and had warned Salisbury in similar veins.³ The Anglican Bishop of

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¹ Viscount Cromer's speech to the Shaykhs and notables of the Sudan at Omdurman, 4 January 1899, F.O. 633/25.
² Memorandum to Mudirs, enclosure in Cromer to Salisbury 17 March 1899, F.O. 78/5022.
³ Cromer to Salisbury, 11 October 1898, F.O. 407/147.
Jerusalem shared with them the view that it was necessary to "restrain the undisciplined invasion of the Sudan by missionary agents ... until the government of the country is fully and firmly settled ..."\(^1\)

But the prohibition did not apply to the predominantly pagan south, where "the establishment of missions at Fashoda and southwards" was permissible.\(^2\) Once again Cromer was the chief architect of the policy. In his Annual Report for 1904 he attempted to give a justification for the adoption of this policy.\(^3\) He placed Egypt, the Northern Sudan and the South in three separate zones, identified their peculiarities and prescribed for them separate treatment. In Egypt, there was a majority of Muslims but with an important Christian minority. A good number of the Muslim population was, however, highly educated, had been in long contact with Western ideas and Western methods of government. They understood the principle of religious toleration and were tolerant of other religions. In the light of this fact a sort of \textit{laissez-faire} religious policy was advocated whereby both Muslims and the Christian minority were allowed the freedom to convert each other, if they so wished, subject to the legitimate methods of persuasion. The Northern

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2. Ibid.
Sudan was in a totally different situation. With a population composed almost entirely of Muslims "at a very low state of civilisation", less exposed to Western ideas, Western influences and methods of government the same open policy could not safely be applied. He reckoned that the average Sudanese Muslim was still far from being able to distinguish between the action of the British Government in its corporate capacity and that of the individual European missionary.

The third zone, the Southern Sudan, was something approximating to hinterland of the hinterland and with an exclusively pagan population. Until the time of the conquest, the Southern Sudan had little contacts with any Christians except a few European travellers. Its contacts with the Muslims of the Northern Sudan, on the other hand, were often associated by Southerners with the cruelties of the Dervishes under the rule of the Khalifa, and with those of the Arab slave-traders under the previous regime. Thus it was decided to confine Christian proselytisation to the Southern provinces. There was no question of allowing Islamic missions into the South at this stage. In any case, no applications were received from interested bodies in this regard.¹

In summary, then, Cromer was absolutely convinced that

¹. Ibid; the problem of Egypt's right as a partner in the Condominium to send Islamic missions into the Southern Sudan did not arise until the nineteen thirties, coincidental with the period of the decline of Egyptian influence in the Sudan, see F.O. 371/20870.
the Sudanese were fanatical Muslims; that the premature start of missionary work in the Northern Sudan might injure Government as well as missions; that there was strong evidence to suggest that Muslims in the Sudan already believed the object of the British in conquering their country was to make them Christians. In that case they were bound to look upon missionaries as government officials. Thus both Cromer and Wingate submitted to the view that "the time was still distant when mission work could, with safety and advantage, be permitted amongst the Moslem population of the Soudan." This policy which entailed the preservation of the status quo in the Muslim North while encouraging the gradual Christianization of the South was the genesis of "Southern Policy".

The Sudan Government's religious sensibility in the Northern Sudan was prompted by political considerations rather than deference to the Islamic faith. Many years afterwards and in a private letter to Cromer, Wingate gave his opinion about Islam which was far from favourable:

... anyone who has been in close touch with the Egyptians and Sudanese Moslems for many years - as we both have been - can arrive at only one conclusion as regards the rottenness of Islam ...

1. Report on the Sudan, Egypt No. 1 (1903) 1902 ed. 1529 (p.60); 1904, ed. 2409, p. 140.
3. Wingate to Cromer (private), 31 March 1915, Wingate Papers, Durham.
This view was widely shared by British administrators in the Sudan: some also felt that "the religion the people already have is good enough for them; it is all they need, and all they can comprehend."¹ But Gwynne, the Anglican Bishop at Khartoum who had been the arch critic of the Government's religious policy was equally contemptuous of Islamic practices: "Mohammedanism has succeeded in making a woman a toy, a drudge and a slave."² He wanted the Government ban on Christian evangelical work in the Muslim provinces lifted because, he believed, the whole Sudan awaited the coming of Christ. Gwynne's was representative of the view widely shared at the time by many Christian missionary bodies which envisaged a crusade against Islam. Missionary propaganda literature of the late Victorian era conceived of the Sudan in terms of a battle-ground in the war between Islam and Christianity for converts in pagan Africa. "Over forty African tribes", declared one of them, "not yet captured by Islam, are said to be open to Christian approach. True missionary strategy demands that they be won before Mohammedan influences get in."³

The urgency for the need to launch a missionary offensive in the Sudan was underlined by the alleged fascination of the blacks with the Islamic faith: "The

blacks of the Sudan, who are largely non-Muslims, need no incentive to become Mohammedan, and very few of them need any urging." The reason for the special appeal of Islam to the blacks was given out to be that "The Mohammedan religion with its loose morality, plurality of wives, its ease and simplicity of divorce and, above all its love of loot, naturally appeals to the passions of the black man, as it always has to uncivilised peoples." Winston Churchill writing in 1899, subscribed to the same view that the Mohammedan faith appears to possess a strange fascination for negroid races. He drew attention to the fact that Muslim influence was gradually permeating the Sudan and that despite the relative ignorance of the people and natural obstacles in the way of the diffusion of ideas, the whole of the black race was gradually adopting the new religion. Furthermore, the Sudanese were already developing Arab characteristics. The negro in more remote and inaccessible regions further South and West were as yet unchanged by the Arab influence. These awaited the salvation of the Christian faith. 

The biased attitude and distaste for the Mohammedan religion displayed by the Missionary Societies and certain prominent individuals in Western Europe and

America were clear testimony of their ignorance of the tenacity with which the Nilotes, for instance, held to their pagan beliefs and practices. The bias and distaste, however, only provided additional fuel to missionary fervour which in turn led to increased pressure on the Sudan Government to permit evangelical work in the newly acquired territory. It was partly on account of the C.M.S. and Roman Catholic missionary societies and as a concession to them that the Southern Sudan was thrown open to missionary work. The Sudan Government on its part entertained the hope that missionary evangelical work in the pagan areas would not only help in its attempt to halt the spread of Islam into the heart of Africa but that it stood equal chance to lift or 'civilise' the 'pagan savages' - a formidable enough task. The enormity of the task the Government set itself became apparent when, in 1909, Wingate wrote:

"the Dinka and Nuer of the Upper Nile are well off from their point of view, as they possess cattle, and their crops are sufficient for their needs, and they are intolerant of any attempt to raise them in the human scale."¹

Islamic penetration of the Southern provinces made considerable progress during the Turco-Egyptian rule. It suffered a set-back during the Mahdia on

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¹ Report on Egypt and the Sudan (1909), Egypt No. 1 (1910), Cd. 5121, p. 79.
account of the brutalities of Mahdist raids and its fanaticism, but the picture was not completely reversed. As a matter of fact slave-raiding during both the Turco-Egyptian period and the Mahdia materially assisted the spread of Islam. Slave raiding had tended to either solidify group resistance rendering its members impervious to Islamic and foreign influences in general, or to wipe out or scatter or absorb weaker groups who were in turn Islamised. Weak and detribalised individuals or groups lacked tribal identity and, without tribal sanction or tribal protection, fell easy prey to Islamization. The second and more important way by which Islam gained a foothold in the Southern Sudan was as a by-product of trading activities of the riverain Arab tribes of the Sudan. Islam had always spread southwards, if gradually, to the interior of Africa along trade routes. Whenever and wherever Africans found themselves in contact with Arab nomads, traders or fekis, they either caught the 'plague' or resisted it—sometimes not for long. "... African Islam is different from Asiatic Islam", writes Trimingham. In pagan Africa, "Islam came, not as a religion, but as a cultural system which imposed itself upon African cultures, or rather there was a gradual transference and fusion of culture which produced a new unit. The new civilisation, Islam, was assimilated and

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became indigenous, the religious factor being secondary...
1 Except for Nubia in the Northern Sudan this was the manner, however sketchy the description, in which Islam came to the Sudan. At the time of the conquest Islam was gradually but surely gaining grounds in the pagan areas.

The special agencies fostering the spread of Arabic and Islamic culture in the Southern Sudan were, as may be expected, the jallaba.2 In the borderland areas there were also Arab settlers who also played a considerable role in the propagation of Islam. As early as 1903, Major Mathews, the Governor of Fashoda, reported the existence of a significant colony of Arabs living and trading in the Shilluk country. The sections of the Arab tribes involved were the Kenana, the Gawama, a few Baggara Arabs, and a sprinkling of the Hawazma further south. These Arab immigrants had their own Sheikhs. The Nuba were the only exception. Driven into the Shilluk country by the Dervishes, they automatically came under the jurisdiction of the Shilluk chiefs.3 In the same year Sparkes encountered two Arab traders, Ahmed Ali and Kambal Bishara, while on an administrative patrol in the

1. Trimingham, op. cit., p. 249.
2. Jallaba: trader; more specifically, traders mainly from the riverain Arab tribes of the Sudan. During the Turk-O-Egyptian period many of them acted as intermediaries in the Slave trade and some of them continued this practice well into the early years of the Condominium.
territory lying between Wau and Hofret en-Nahas in the Western Bahr el Ghazal who alleged robbery at the hands of local natives. Perhaps nowhere in the entire Southern Sudan were the British administrators struck by the evidence of Islamic and Arab influence in so dramatic a manner than when, on one occasion, Captain Greenwood visited six 'friendly' chiefs of the Western Dinka. He was impressed that some of them spoke Arabic of a kind, were well-dressed (in the Oriental fashion) and, to his surprise, were well-behaved. One of the chiefs, Sultan Abdel Rahman, "was long at Omdurman as prisoner of the Khalifa, and said he was an Emir in Slatin Pasha's time of captivity. He is still more like an Arab than a Dinka." The brother of one of the chiefs also proved a valuable guide to Greenwood. An ex-soldier who also subsequently served in the police force at Fashoda, "he now calls himself Hawaga (sic) Habib ... is an extremely shrewd man ... He explained the Fashoda system of cattle tax to the Sultans, and he told me he believed there would be no difficulty about it."

That traders from the North should be found doing business in this part of the Bahr el Ghazal and

1. "Diary of Sparkes Pasha: Patrol to Hofret en-Nahas, 13 January to 31 March", Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 105, April 1903.
3. Ibid.
every chief or person of importance should exhibit
Islamic cultural influence was inevitably given that
this segment of Dinka country, like the Western Bahr el
Ghazal, commanded the traditional trade routes between
the South and the Northern Sudan. The alternative
route of the White Nile, clogged by a creeping plant,
the sudd, year in year out had always proved a frus­
trating experience for European travellers, missionaries,
and traders alike. Not until the coming of the Condominium
administration was the White Nile opened up to better
navigation by the strenuous, but determined efforts of
the British and Egyptian engineers. On the other hand,
the overland route via Southern Kordofan and DarFur
provinces was closed only during certain period of the
year. By skirting the swampy region in a south-westerly
direction, even traders from as far away as Khartoum
and beyond could penetrate the Southern Sudan. Wrote
Captain Greenwood, "I was told everywhere that traders
flocked in during February and March chiefly for cattle
and sheep, but there is also ivory."1 These annual
trading expeditions, a feasible proposition only during
the dry season, accounted for much of the Islamization
and Arabization of this part of the Southern Sudan.

The facts of past history, of trading penetra-
tion and proximity to the Muslim provinces were one pack
of factors responsible for the spread of Islam in the

1. Greenwood's Intelligence Report. op. cit.; under the
two previous regimes, the search for ivory included
the search for slaves.
Southern Provinces, but the Anglo-Egyptian regime itself was another, if incidental, agency. Because of the Islamic character of its army and the lower ranks of its officials and as a result of the more permanent nature of its administration it became, unwittingly, an agent fostering Islam in these pagan areas. The posts which were occupied by its mainly Muslim army in the process of pacification of the South naturally attracted the jallabas and became centres for spreading Islam.

Wingate, the Governor-General till his transfer to Cairo as High Commissioner in 1916 knew that

... for one Christian officer or official who goes into the Southern districts there are hundreds of Muslims each one of whom is by the very nature of his religion, an embryonic missionary; moreover, the Moslem religion appeals to the blacks very much more than the Christian religion can ...1

The gradually stabilizing influence of the Condominium regime itself may have accelerated the Islamization of the South as well as the Nuba mountain region. Stack, then Sudan agent in Cairo lamented this point when he commented:

... It is sad to think that when by our administrative and civilising efforts we are able to induce the heathen tribes of the Sudan to live at peace with their hereditary foes, the Arabs, the former incline at once to Mohammedanism ...2

Although of only partial validity as regards the South this assertion certainly held its ground with respect to

1. Wingate to Gwynne (private), 4 December 1910, Sudan Archive, University of Durham.
2. Stack to Wingate, 25 March 1912, Sudan Archive, Durham.
the Nuba Mountains where increased public security brought the Nuba out of their hills to cultivate in the plains below thus inter-mixing freely with the Arab traders and settlers. Migration in search of work and recruitment for the Army also brought a large number of Nuba tribesmen into a purely Muslim environment. In either case, the net-effect on the Nuba had been their Islamization and Arabization.

Elsewhere, the transplanting of Muslim elements into the Southern Sudan was equally dictated by circumstances beyond the Administration's control. When the Lado Enclave reverted to the Sudan in 1910 from the Congo Free State, "a detachment of 500 soldiers, Muslim by religion, was stationed there and schools with Muslim teachers were begun." Some individual Governors, as a matter of fact, favoured the spread of Islamic culture in the South and gave it active encouragement. Consequently, there was a growing number of Muslim communities in Wau and its surrounding districts in addition to the border territory of Kodok and Renk in Upper Nile Province. In 1906 the first mosque in the South was built at Wau. Mosques were also erected at a later date at Kodok and Renk. By 1911 there were small private Koranic schools in the Bahr el-Ghazal at Kabaluza, Kossinga and at Wau.


Increased security in the Northern District of the Bahr el-Ghazal also attracted a considerable number of merchants reportedly making a profitable business there.\(^1\) In the Western District, an increasing use of money was recorded as a result of the activities of Arab traders.\(^2\) At Tambura Post further south, the existence of a colony of Arab settlers had a similar impact upon the surrounding Azande tribesmen as it had had elsewhere in Southern Sudan. Friday, the Muslim day of rest, was kept as well as all Mohammedan festivals. Arabic was the official language with the natural result that "those who wished to appear civilised would pick up as much as they could of it, speak it at every opportunity, and adopt Arab names". The logical consequence was that, as the Inspector of Tambura Post recorded, "a definite northern atmosphere hung about the place."\(^3\) About 1914, however, orders came from Governor Bahr el-Ghazal to the effect that, as a condition of their stay, the Arabs must accept Tambura, the native chief, as their overlord and be bound by Zande law. Unable to put up with the new terms, many left for Wau. Their return fitted neatly into the Government's secret plan to get rid of Muslim elements especially in the remote areas of the South. During the first two decades of the Condominium, 

\(^1\) Governor-General's Report for 1910, Egypt No. 1 (1911), Cd. 5633.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) P. M. Larken, "Tambura Administrative Notes" in Zande Background (typescript), T. A. T. Leitch (ed.) S. G. (1954), p. 44.
therefore, the British authorities in the Sudan became increasingly aware of the rapid progress of Islam and the Arabic language in Southern Sudan. This was rather alarming because as more and more Muslims came into the South, the general influence of Islamic culture was bound to render less and less the opportunities for the spread of Christianity. This, Wingate did not like.

However, apart from throwing the South open to missionary enterprise, Wingate had very limited options indeed. Given the small number of British Officers, the lack of locally recruited battalions and with the pacification of the South far from complete, the services of the Egyptian Army proved indispensable to the Sudan Government. Politically, the Government was engaged in cultivating the support and loyalty of the two most important religious notables, Sayed Abdel Rahman el-Mahdi and Sayed Ali el-Mirghani. These efforts borne divident in 1914 when World War I broke out in Europe. For some time it was feared that Turkey might sponsor holy war against Britain (and France) with German encouragement. Turkey did eventually join the war on the side of Germany, but the Sudanese Muslims remained loyal to their British masters throughout. Clearly, any administrative attempts to contain Islamic expansion in the South, particularly during the war years, were necessarily limited in scope and shrouded in utmost secrecy.

There was, however, one area of negative action open to Wingate, i.e., educational development.
Fearing the effects of Muslim education, he decided the Government would not extend its educational facilities to the South. Consequently, he ordered the closure of the school that was commenced in 1904 by the Governor of Bahr el-Ghazal to educate the children of province staff. The Director of Education and Health, James Currie, himself argued that by employing Muslim teachers" the net result of his teaching must tend towards Mohammedanism". The employment of Lebanese Christians was recommended instead. The Government also decided to stop the teaching of reading, writing and arithmetic. In 1906 when a proposal was made to re-open the school for the children of Government employees the Director refused once more and suggested that the eligible children should be educated in Khartoum. But the purely negative measures designed to check Muslim penetration of the South proved inadequate and Islam continued to make progress in both the South and the Nuba Mountains.

Why, it may be asked, was the Government so intolerant of Islamic progress in the pagan areas? If, as it was often alleged, the Mohammedan religion possessed an inherent power of attraction to the negro race, why was it necessary for the Government to attempt to arrest its progress in these pagan territories? It appeared safe enough to have allowed things to follow their natural course. Publicly, and as enunciated by

1. Boulnois to Currie; January, 1904, (Private), Sudan Archives, Durham.

Cromer, the Government assumed the posture of religious neutrality exemplified by the pledge of 'non-interference in the religion of the people'. Privately, however, Wingate who personified the Government of Khartoum was adamantly opposed to the spread of the Muslim faith beyond its 'defined boundary'. Way back in 1904 and in a private letter, he wrote:

... I am not at all keen to propagate Mohammedanism in countries in which that religion is not the religion of the inhabitants. As a Government I do not intend interfering with religious beliefs and prefer to leave all that in the hands of Missionaries ... Then again the language question comes in; the language of the Bahr el-Ghazal is not really Arabic, and therefore if any foreign language is taught, it ought to be English ...

Thus the fate of Arabic and the Mohammedan religion was sealed. Despite the 'natural' appeal of Islam to pagan Africa, Mohammedanism was not to be the religion of the South after all. A new and significant factor had been introduced into the picture. Needless to say the alliance of Christianity and the English language with the Senior Colonial power of the Condomini tended to further the cause of both to the obvious disadvantage of Islam and the Arabic language. Wingate's postulate regarding the Southern Sudan envisaged a 'cultural vacuum'; if this vacuum had to be filled then Christianity, not Islam, was the better candidate for the job. This implied the superiority of Christian civilisation over its Mohammedan counterpart. In the words of one Missionary propaganda literature: "We must offer the pagan

1. Wingate to Boulnois (private), 13 February 1904, Sudan Archive, Durham.
tribes of the Sudan something obviously superior to Islam. ¹ But the claim of the superior values of Christianity over those of Mohammedanism rested on no sounder basis than British preponderance in both Egypt and the Sudan - a reflection of power politics rather than the objective worth of a particular religion or culture. The point to remember, however, is that a beginning had been made and the seeds of future conflict sown. When, in some distant future, political power changed hands and circumstances now favoured Islamic propaganda the new Sudanese Authorities would react in a similar manner to check the advance of Christianity with equal determination as did the British Islam. The old but familiar drama of the cross and crescent would once more be played though in a different guise, under different circumstances and with some participants at a greater disadvantage than others. In the final analysis, and as neither Arabic and Islam nor English and Christianity were the language and religion of the South, only the inhabitants of that region stood to lose and evento suffer as the result of a cultural, religious and political conflict.

As has been said, force of circumstances and diplomatic considerations compelled Wingate to exert only a minimum effort in an attempt to frustrate Islamic

progress in the Southern Sudan. His real hope remained that only the Missionaries could provide the ultimate antidote to Islamic propaganda in the South. Missionary work (both medical, educational and evangelical), despite initial difficulties and on however limited a scale he perceived as a sure and eventual weapon in the fight against Islam. From 1910 onwards the Government doubled its efforts against Islamic penetration of the South and other pagan areas. Restrictions were imposed upon the Jallabas (Northern traders), who needed a special permit to trade in the Southern Sudan. In March 1911 the Government took an important corrective measure to further its undeclared policy. Following a tour of inspection of the Southern provinces Wingate decided to terminate the system which prevailed in the Sudanese battalions of the Egyptian Army whereby every recruit became a Muslim. He had little doubt in his mind that the system had greatly aided the progress of Islam in the pagan areas. In accordance with the new system, locally recruited Southern Sudanese under the command of British Officers replaced the Egyptian battalions.

The birth of the Equatorial battalion, as these Southern Sudanese units came to be known, was instrumental in the gradual reduction of Egyptian units stationed in the South. Although religious motive played a dominant role the reason for raising the new battalion was given out as financial and territorial.

The Government argued that financially, the Equatorials were cheaper than the regular 'Egyptian' units; territorially, they were needed for the occupation of the Lado Enclave. To enhance the Government's desire to eliminate Muslim elements in the South, Southern Sudanese were sent to military classes in Khartoum. The practice, however, proved counter-productive as the combined pressure of Northern colleagues and Muslim environment resulted in the recruits taking on Islamic names and, in some instances, making a formal profession of the faith. 1 Despite some set-backs the recruitment of native units continued and on the outbreak of the First World War, there were five Equatorial Companies and the number of Egyptian units stationed in the South was accordingly reduced. 2 Similar 'native' or territorial battalions were also recruited in the Nuba Mountains between 1913 and 1914. The process of eliminating Muslim elements or curbing Islamic influence in the South was slightly retarded by the war and owing to the mutiny of the Equatorials at Yambio in 1915. These minor interruptions over, the Government's policy of Native Administration or Indirect Rule although instituted for the country as a whole, became a principal instrument for checking the advance of Islam in the pagan provinces.


2. Wingate to Feilden, 28 March 1914, Sudan Archive, Durham.
CHAPTER III

NATIVE ADMINISTRATION

The principal lines of the administrative policy of the Sudan Government were set out in a Memorandum drawn up in 1921. "The administrative policy of the Sudan Government towards the native population," it was stated in the memorandum, "is one of decentralised control."¹ The memorandum in fact was an echo of the Milner Mission Report of 1920 which said of the Sudan:

"Having regard to its vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision .... Decentralisation and the employment, wherever possible of native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, in its present stage of development, would make both for economy and efficiency."²

The strategy to be adopted implied that the conquering Power would, by advice, guidance and correction where necessary, utilise the chiefs and shaykhs with the view to "assimilate traditional usage to the requirements of equity and good government."³

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¹ "Sudan Government Memorandum on General Administrative Policy", see A Note on Government Policy Towards the Native Population, 1926. App. "AV. (typescript), Sudan Archives, Durham.

² Quoted in "Sudan Government Memorandum", op. cit., p. 5.

proposed method of employing native agencies under British supervision for administrative purposes called for a criterion of selection. Two categories of prospective candidates were readily available and distinguishable. The first and most important group consisted of traditional Chiefs and Sheikhs who were in actual control of their people; the second comprised of executive officials selected and trained from the ranks of the common folk but of special character and a good family background. Of the two, the crux of the matter clearly revolved around the character of the individual Chief or Sheikh involved. If he proved efficient, his loyalty to the Government unquestionable, and retained the respect and confidence of his people, he could count on the continued support of the Government. If, on the other hand, he failed to prove his worth on account of moral degeneration and thereby ceased to command the respect of his people, he was to be replaced. A certain amount of inefficiency could be tolerated but total failure in a Chief was unacceptable.¹

For the first two decades of the Condominium Rule, administration was more or less direct all over the Sudan. It was military in nature and its principal objective was simply the maintenance of law and order and the punishing of infractions. The Inspector, as the District Commissioner was known, came to look upon himself increasingly as the father of the people with

¹ "Sudan Government Memorandum" op. cit., pp. 6-7.
the result that he expected, and encouraged, every
dispute to be brought to him for settlement.1 Direct
Rule, however, had its drawbacks. For one thing
collaborators, if any, were difficult to come by and for
another, the visible presence of a Foreign Power often
provoked resentment, hostility and even open rebellion.
The endless list of political or tribal uprising
especially in the Nilotic districts of the Southern
Sudan were notable as confirming evidence. Native
Administration, by contrast, promised two valuable
assets to the Sudan Government, namely economy and
expediency. Direct Administration, if practised in a
country of the size and resources as the Sudan it was said,
could be expensive. It was expensive. The only attrac­
tive course of action open to the British Authorities in
the Sudan was some form of devolution of authority upon
native agencies. Failing, the alternative would be "... a
 costly elaboration of the administrative machinery,
such as is impossible to contemplate with equanimity
..."2 Sir J. Maffey, the Governor-General and a staunch
advocate of Native Administration saw in the Sudan of
the 'twenties and 'thirties its "Golden Age". He was
anxious that opportunities were slipping away for the
foundation upon which a lasting structure of Native Rule
might be built, utilising the best 'material' available

1. Quoted in "Sudan Government Memorandum", op. cit.,
p. 3.

2. Report on the Administration, Finances and Conditions
 of the Sudan in 1926, Sudan No. 2 (1927) Cmd. 2991,
p. 6.
in the country. "A tribal organisation, tribal sanctions and traditions," he wrote, "still survive, though their validity varies from province to province." His main worry was that "... under the impulse of new ideas and with the rise of a new generation all these alike will tend to crumble away unless they are fortified betimes."¹

Sir J. Maffey's analysis of the situation of the Sudan in the 1920s was basically sound. The benefits and results of the Government education policy in the North were beginning to show. This enabled the Government, since the expulsion of the Egyptian Junior Administrators and Officers in 1924, to place an increasing number of Northern Sudanese in Government jobs as Executive Officers in the provinces. Out of a total of, for example, 130 executive posts of sub-Mamur in the Southern Sudan 103 were held by Northern Sudanese. There was already a military school in Khartoum confined to Sudanese which turned out officers for the army. There was also a medical school in Khartoum and over 500 Sudanese clerks in the various Government departments and the provinces.² Yet the enclave of Western influences was confined to the sedentary, mainly the riverain, Arab tribes. The vast rural population remained almost untouched by the new ideas and methods of Government that were becoming

¹ Report on the Administration, Finances and Conditions of the Sudan in 1926, Sudan No. 2 (1927) Cmd. 2991, p. 6.
familiar to the urban educated few.

It was to the rural population of the Sudan that the Government policy of Native Administration was to apply. To avoid a repetition of mistakes committed elsewhere, notably in the Oriental world, British Authorities in the Sudan were inclined to experiment with their own version of the Lugardian idea of "Indirect Rule". It was claimed that the common error Europeans had made in the East had been "to exalt Western civilisation almost to the exclusion of the native system, instead of using them as mutually corrective." ¹ This apparent admission of the principle of cultural relativism in the sphere of administration need not, as a matter of fact, lead to a loss of faith in the alleged superiority of Western civilisation over all others. It merely pointed to another option open to a colonial Government confronted with the concrete task of administering a vast country with a population regarded as still at a low stage of social and political development. If guided by the creed of Native Administration, it was indicated in the Memorandum, a conquering Power could start from things as they were, rejecting what was dangerous and unjust and supporting what was fair and equitable in the usages of the natives, and any inherited system of legislation was left to wait upon occasion. When felt needs arose, they were examined and provided for by measures specifically

¹ Quoted in "Sudan Government Memorandum", op. cit., p. 5.
tailored for them rather than by imported, ready-made, solutions. To ensure conformity to local customs the consent of the people was obtained before enforcing the measures.¹

That the applicability of the principle of Native Administration should tend to vary from one locality to the next depending upon the quality of tribal organisation had a universal validity in the Sudan. Needless to say it is one thing for an idea or theory to gain acceptance in a particular place and time but it is quite a different thing to attempt to effect its application to the letter. Even if genuine enthusiasm were shown for a thorough implementation of a programme, force of circumstance or accident could always conspire to defeat the cherished objective. This remark applies with equal vigour both to the fortunes of "Indirect Rule" as originally conceived by Lord Lugard and to "Native Administration", its offspring. For instance, from a purely conservative philosophy of Indirect Rule, Native Administration emerged both as a replacement and modification of the present thesis even in Northern Nigeria, its homeland. "Indirect administration in the Sudan," by contrast, "had evolved, not from a tradition of Indirect Rule (as was the case in Northern Nigeria), but from a tradition of indirect influence of wider political connotations in which the revival of tribalism figured

¹. Quoted in "Sudan Government Memorandum", op. cit., p. 5.
prominently.\textsuperscript{1} The application of the principle of Native Administration in both the South and the Northern Sudan differed considerably because local conditions differed widely. Despite the sharp differences in terms of custom and mode of life between the nomad and sedentary Arabs, the situation was simplified and made intelligible by the factors of Islam, a common language and a 'national' consciousness. The Mahdist revolution before the turn of the century may have had some disruptive effect upon tribal life, but the situation was not thought as beyond salvation. "The Arab", it was said, "particularly the nomad, is tenacious of tradition."\textsuperscript{2} Tribal institutions, tribal authority and tribal consciousness of some sort had survived into the Condominium period and were not constructed from scratch.\textsuperscript{3} The Sudan Government's brand of native rule, it is to be remembered, was closely modelled on Kitchener's instruction to the Governors as a policy guideline according to which they were to acquire the confidence of the people, develop their resources with the view to lifting them in the social and political scale. To realise this objective District Commissioners

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\textsuperscript{1} G. M. A. Bakheit, "Native Administration in the Sudan" in Y. F. Hasan (ed), Sudan in Africa (Khartoum, 1971), pp. 256-278; see especially Bakheit's doctoral thesis, British Administration and Sudanese Nationalism 1919-1939, Ph.D. Thesis (Cambridge 1965) ch.V. Briefly, the author argues passim, that Indirect Rule was adopted in the Sudan as an antidote to Northern Arab nationalism and the strategy adopted involved the erection of tribal walls in the country-side against urban nationalist agitation.

\textsuperscript{2} Governor-General's Report for 1923, op. cit., p. 6.

\textsuperscript{3} For the opposite view, see

G. M. A. Bakheit, British Administration and Sudanese Nationalism, op. cit.
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were to maintain perfect and harmonious contacts with the better class of natives, "through whom we may hope gradually to influence the whole population."¹ The two classes of native agencies involved, the Chiefs or Sheikhs and Executive officials, represented the instruments of devolution and bureaucracy, respectively. The attempt to associate the educated elements with Native Administration was designed to give them a stake in the system. In this regard the Government took advantage of tribal or family ties wherever possible. "By this means," the Governor-General explained, "the tribes gain from the services of educated men, and at the same time something is done to eliminate the suspicion with which the educated class is still inclined to regard the policy of devolution."² But the strategy did not work. The educated urbanists, drawn mainly from the sedentary Arab tribes, turned out to be, in due course, the arch critics of the system.

The development of Native Administration in the Southern Provinces did not proceed along similar lines as in the North. The activities of the slave traders, the Turco-Egyptian Regime and the Dervishes, in succession, plus the punitive expeditions which characterised the first two decades of the Condominium had, in their various ways, contributed to the disruption of tribal life in the Southern Sudan.³ Lack of

¹ Vide his Memorandum to Mudirs, enclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 March 1899, F.0.78/5022.
³ Governor-General's Report for 1931, Sudan No. 1 (1932) Cmd.4159, p. 130.
knowledge of local customs and traditions, of the numerous languages and cultures of the South compounded the task of British administrators in this sector of the country. The social and political organisations of the South, with the two exceptions of the Shilluk and the Azande, appeared confused and obscure to British administrators. They constituted more or less a maze of tiny clan heads or groups of elders with dark customs and the manner of the exercise of effective influence was a mystery.¹ In consequence, the primary objective of the Government was confined to the preservation of law and order and subduing turbulent tribes.

It was only when, in the 1920s, the Mamurs were removed and the control of British District Commissioners consolidated that it became possible to start experimenting in a few districts with "Lukiko Courts" borrowed from Uganda. These courts composed of panels of tribal leaders at district level and their main function was to enforce native custom and relieve the District Commissioner from petty litigation. Judicial devolution was regarded as a convenient starting point to experiment in Native Rule.²

In 1924, J. H. Driberg, a political officer with anthropological interest circulated a note in which he pointed out the flaws in existing native tribal organisation which might hamper progress in judicial

devolution. He distinguished three types of tribal structure in the Southern Sudan: those with the primitive organisation of segmented societies; those which had had some form of centralised tribal system in the past but had lost it in War, famine or catastrophe; and a few which retained real tribal organisation. Tribal consciousness and unity, however, were unfortunately lacking in all three. The essential thing before Chief's Courts could function properly, he proposed, was an educational process which would re-awaken the "tribal soul". The administration was to devote itself to strengthening the fabric of native organisation by conferring upon it such prestige as would revive it and make tribal authority effective. When that stage had been reached the council of Chiefs in each district might be endowed with administrative functions.\(^1\) The Governor-General recognised the wisdom of this strategy when he wrote:

"The most obvious line of advance towards the realisation of the objective (of effective indirect administration) was that of strengthening the authority wielded by the native chiefs over their people as judges in criminal and civil cases, for the power and status required by the chief as a judge, whether sitting alone or as president of a tribunal of elders, must naturally tend to enhance his authority as administrative and executive head of his tribe or district."\(^2\)

The Civil Secretary, MacMichael's proposal for native advisory councils in each district which was circulated

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1. Note on Administration in the Southern Sudan by J. H. Driberg, 25 May 1924 (Secret), attached to Civil Secretary's Circular to Southern Governors, 9 September 1924, Sudan Government Archive, CS/SCR/1/0/1. Khartoum.

2. Governor-General's Report for 1926, Sudan No. 2 (1927), Cmd.2991, p. 6.
together with Driberg’s note was thrown over-board by the Governors of the three Southern Provinces as impracticable. Experimenting with "Lukiko"-type courts while gradually strengthening the fabric of native institutions if available, continued to exercise the imagination of British administrators in the Southern Sudan.

Measures designed to enhance the power and authority of native chiefs or clan heads were not altogether wanting in Southern administration. In the Zande districts of Tambura and Yambio where ex-service-men behaved as if they were no longer bound by native customs, the District Commissioner took appropriate measures to ensure their return to tribal discipline. Guided by the mistaken belief that their military standing entitled them to a special status these retired soldiers had proved themselves a nuisance to their fellow-tribesmen as well as to the chiefs. A strategy was adopted whereby the discharged soldier, on reporting his arrival to the District Commissioner was immediately sent off with a chief’s policeman to the chief concerned for his acceptance or rejection of the newcomer, "which made it quite clear that detribalisation was not looked on with favour."\(^1\) Similarly, a colony of detribalised young men which had long served as a pool for carriers and labourers was disbanded and its members returned to tribal discipline for the same reason of unmitigated nuisance.\(^2\) As a rule anything, including

1. Major P. M. Larkin, "Yambio Station Notes" In Zande Background by T. A. T. Leitch (ed.) Sudan Government Publication (1952?).

2. Ibid. p. 54.
Government activities, which had tended to disrupt tribal (family) life was discontinued. Thus in Equatorial Province, the established practice of tax-assessment and collection on an individual basis had had a tendency to break up family units which was the basis of many communities. This system was reversed, permitting the assessment and collection of taxes not on an individual but a family or clan basis. The ultimate object of the change was explained as being "... to educate the people into appreciating that the rich should pay more tax than the poor," by leaving the decision between individuals to the elders of the tribes themselves. In Upper Nile Province, tribesmen were kept away from Malakal town where it was feared that beer shops and contact with mixed traders from the North and the detribalised elements from the South might exercise a demoralising influence on them.

Missionary education was doing just as much as anything else to break the indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs of the natives, the very infra-structure of a viable native rule: "any child passing through their hands becomes detribalised." This experience applied to most graduates of primary schools but, on going to higher educational centre at Wau, it was noted, they were apt to become "either


2. Governor-General's Report for 1935, Sudan No. 1 (1936) Cmd.5281, p.124; in 1935 a tribal village was constructed on the outskirts of Malakal town for visiting natives. The tribal villages, known as native lodging areas, or Malakia became a permanent feature of every principal Southern town and District Headquarters.
converts apeing Europeans or types of Effendi class despising their own people.\textsuperscript{1} The practice was especially common amongst pupils from the Italian Catholic Mission which had itself occupied an important position in the life of the Southerners. Drawn mostly from the peasant stock or small townsman class, few of the Catholic priests and fewer still of the Brothers and Sisters understood sufficient English to render possible the explanation or comprehension of the principles upon which British administrative policy in the Southern Sudan was founded. There was also ample evidence to suggest that the few priests of sufficient education and culture were not at all disposed to pay Indirect Rule policy anything more than lip-service. This was understandable because "... when Italian nationality, peasant up-bringing and ignorance of the English language are added to Catholicism, there is little hope that genuine understanding and cooperation (between Mission and Government) could be obtained."\textsuperscript{2}

The remedy consistently advocated by the staff at the British Foreign Office was wholesale expulsion of the Italian Missionaries from the Southern Sudan and their substitution by English clergymen.

If Italian loyalty to the furtherance of the Government Administrative policy was suspect, neither

\textsuperscript{1} District Commissioner Northern District Bahr el Ghazal to Governor Bahr el Ghazal (n.d.), (Strictly Confidential) ND/SCR/1/C/1, S.G.A. Khartoum.

\textsuperscript{2} Mr. Cox's Summary Note on Italian Missionaries in the Southern Sudan (Strictly Confidential), enclosure in Stewart Symes to R. I. Campbell, 15 October 1937 (Private and Confidential) F.0.371/20939.
expulsion *en masse* nor the gradual reduction of Italian nationals in the South offered an easy way out. Sir Stewart Symes who succeeded John Maffey in 1934 as Governor-General vigorously opposed the Foreign Office's suggestion. Not only was it materially impossible to effect the proposed substitution but it was common knowledge that the supply of English priests willing to undertake missionary work in backward parts of Africa under harsh climatical conditions had always been notoriously inadequate. The only people, it was stressed, who in practice had both the resources, organisation and personnel sufficient to furnish a religious foundation deemed necessary for the education of Southern Sudanese were the Italian Catholic Mission. "To drive them out", said the Governor-General, "would mean creating a vacuum which it would be impossible to fill from any other quarter."¹ The Roman Catholic Mission, he seemed to suggest, were doing the Englishman's dirty job for him and it would be contrary to the dictates of reason to seek to expel them. To supply the badly needed clerical and accounting staff and chiefs court clerks, the Government set up an Intermediate School² of its own in 1926 alongside those of the Mission. Thus the Italian Roman Catholics were

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¹ Minutes by Mr. Pink of the Foreign Office, 10 January 1937, F.0.371/20870; see also files 2756/548/1 in F.0. 371/20939.

² The first graduates of the Sir Lee Stack Memorial School received their training in accountancy towards the end of 1928; and in the following year 22 out of a total of forty clerical and accounting staff were locally educated inhabitants of the Province and for the first time accounts were kept in English.
allowed to stay and continue to perform their missionary and educational work as a necessary evil.

Two factors, the differential mode of life and the nature of the tribal structure, provide a clue to the trend of Native Administration in the Southern Provinces. They account not only for the varying developmental stages achieved in the different areas but also for the effective enforcement, or lack of it, of the decrees of the native courts. In general, where tribal authority was centralised and leadership institutionalised, as among the Shilluk, Azande and related peoples, \(^1\) rapid progress in judicial devolution was forthcoming and execution, effective. The only snag was that the autocratic nature of such chieftaincies was often unfavourably matched by a corresponding weakness of the clan system. Among the pastoralist Nilotics (Dinka and Nuer) and the Nilo-Hamites, by contrast, the social (tribal) system was highly fragmented and leadership, widely dispersed. Lacking a tradition of political leadership, the chiefs appointed by the Government had tended to be ineffective in execution with the result that native administration was too slow to take off the ground. A glance at the development of native administration in the provinces serves to shed a ray of light upon the matter.

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In the Bahr el Ghazal Chiefs Courts had been created to administer tribal custom in every district since 1922. Their purposes were, as the Governor described them "to relieve the District Commissioner of the countless number of petty cases and to teach the Chiefs and the people that the former are responsible for their country and that the latter must look to their Chiefs in the first instance." He was right. In the Zande district of Tambura where the experiment was first begun the District Commissioner, Major Larken, was instrumental in initiating Chiefs Courts. To save him enough time for the tour of his district, he called a meeting of all headmen and "as many people as possible" to obtain their consent for instituting a native court. The consent given, a court of three Chiefs rotating at monthly intervals was set up. Cases were written down in Zande by a clerk trained specifically for the purpose, and subject to revision by the District Commissioner who also heard any appeals. When, in 1926, the Government ordered that Chiefs Courts should be established throughout the country, the experience of the unofficial Court proved a most valuable asset to the District Commissioner as well as the people. The existence of a class of

1. On January 1, 1936 the Bahr el Ghazal and Mongalla Provinces were merged together to form the Equatorial Province. A whole district with its Headquarters at Yirrol was also transferred from Upper Nile to the new Province.

2. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 27 October 1924, BGP/SCR/1/c/1. S.G.A. Khartoum.

3. Leitch, Zande Background. op. cit., p. 55.
paramount Chiefs with hereditary powers based on the rights of tribal conquest ensured the speedy implementation of the Court's decisions. Native Courts in the Zande district in general grew from strength to strength so much so that in 1937 some of them were able to try and sentence their own members without partiality or favour.¹

Elsewhere in the Province, however, particularly in the Nilotic districts, the task of judicial devolution had been more difficult. The big Dinka block extending from the Nile to the borders of Darfur consisted of pastoral Nilotics who still retained their cattle and cattle culture. Their tribal system was devoid of a single autocratic Chief. Powerful war-leaders had from time to time emerged, whose influence varied depending upon the character and exploits of the individual concerned, but there was no evidence of a class of chiefs, as among the Azande, or a temporal and spiritual authority in the manner of the Shilluk King in the Upper Nile Province. Executive chiefs had to be selected, trained and appointed by the Government.

Among the Nilotes in general, as the Governor explained, the secular Chief was an imported institution and the success or failure of the appointed Chief depended almost entirely on his personality.² The Chiefs set up

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1. Governor-General's Report for 1937, Sudan No. 1 (1938) Cmd.5895, p.124. The trial of Chief Renzi by Tambura Court of which he was President furnished an excellent example. The Court examined over 400 witnesses, recorded parts of the evidence and recommended sentences which the District Commissioner on review upheld.

by the Government had to receive encouragement and instruction in duties in an attempt to counter any ill-
qualities in them before firm and high standard of Chieftainship could be established, which needed time. "In indigenous life," wrote one student of Dinka tribal system, "there was nothing comparable with the executive Chief ... among the Dinka, though in the history of their government some of them had become accustomed to an attempt at autocratic rule by official nominees."¹

If the idea of a strong, autocratic secular authority was foreign to Dinka culture, a highly developed totemic exogamous clan system had sustained tribal organisation before the introduction of Colonial Government. The clan and clan heads constituted an essential pillar upon which the edifice of Native Administration could be built. The clan or extended family group ('gol') was regarded as the "bricks of the Dinka Nation" upon which judicial power could be devolved. Thus the Courts set up by the Government appeared to be much nearer to the natural Dinka way of doing things and were able to score a measure of success from the start. Procedure was public and custom administered by elders whose integrity and commonsense had established their reputation. The Dinka courts, however, proved far too democratic for efficiency. "The Dinka", it was recorded "is intensely democratic."² One District Commissioner

¹. R. G. Leinhardt on the position of the Dinka Chief of the Sacred Spear, quoted in Beaton in ibid., p. 43.
answered a questionnaire from the Governor as follows:

When does the Court sit and where? Whenever Chief and people consider a case worth hearing. Composition of Court? Anyone of eminence with the Chief as President. Place? Preferably under a tree, where ordinary tribesmen can take part in the discussion as if they were court members. Method of Record? The memory of the general public. Fees to members? Nil. The Dinka regard fees as bribes.

What were the issues that engaged the attention of Dinka courts most? "Every man", the District Commissioner reported on another occasion, "is interested in several cases and there are several about every cow and almost every bull." Any of three things might occur when a Dinka filed a complaint to the District Commissioner that his cattle had been stolen and he was sent off accompanied by Chief's police to bring in both the offender and the cattle: either the defendant would run away or resist the police, or the police would be bribed and bring in the wrong man or wrong cattle, or the case would turn out to be falsely laid as a pretext to obtain police assistance in what amounted to robbery. However impartially the District Commissioner decided in the case, one or other of the parties involved would continue to act as if he had been wronged and robbed. One explanation of this curious behaviour stems from the Nilotics' love of cattle. Dinka clans were not only exogamous marriage groups but also owned cattle and a


piece of territory. As a rule no sub-chief however loyal to the Government wished to see the cattle passing out of the family group and would resort to every possible means to retain the possession of the cattle.¹

In Rumbek district there was evidence to suggest that the structure of Native Administration was not based upon solid foundations, nevertheless, a rudimentary system of native courts was in existence. Agar and Gok Dinka Chiefs continued to hear customary laws. If two parties were agreed or satisfied, the District Commissioner entered the result in his notebook; if they were not, he heard the appeal. In 1929 Dinka Chiefs had no judicial powers. Five years later Chiefs Courts with a President and a panel of Chiefs and family leaders had been invested with substantial powers of imprisonment. Despite the modest progress the courts were too weak to enforce their decisions and sentences were still scrutinised by the District Commissioner.²

The Dinka clan system, the pillar of Dinka administrative justice, was not uniformly developed. District Commissioners of Dinka districts, meeting as late as in 1938, recorded the following observation regarding the "brick" or the extended family group, the 'gol':

"In Yirrol the bricks are stacked and ready for use, and in some cases, have been laid.

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In Tonj they are 'stacked and ready. In Aweil they have been burnt, but not yet conveniently stacked ready for the builder's hand. In Rumbek it is doubtful whether the bricks have even been made, some may have been made, but they are not yet burnt.  

Further, customary law had been gradually disintegrating partly through the direct influence of Government and partly owing to changing conditions and arbitrary code of laws with scales of compensation by cattle had to be introduced and enforced. "It is now extremely difficult," reported one District Commissioner of Dinka districts, "to find out what is real customary law and what the Government had introduced" with the result that, in many cases, the natives had almost come to regard the imposed law as the real one.  

The old customs themselves varied greatly from tribe to tribe within a single district and the District Commissioner suggested some form of a levelling up of scales and codes involved.  

In the Western District the division of the population into scattered tribes made the application of the policy especially difficult. The tribal customs of the countless sections of this district whose tribal life was shamelessly disrupted by foreign invasions and plunder did not strongly support hereditary rule. It was said of them that "anyone who had a powerful enough right arm could set himself up, at least temporarily, as

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3. Ibid.
a chief— not by any means an exaggeration. On the credit side some progress had been made in the province as a whole and in the Azande districts in particular. Chiefs were progressively relieving the District Commissioners of many elementary routine duties. Chiefs Courts themselves had become so popular that a small fee had to be charged to litigants to discourage the purely frivolous complaints. The volume of cases heard by native courts continued to rise. The majority of the Courts commanded the respect and enjoyed the confidence of the people to whom they administered justice. As elsewhere in the Southern Sudan, their authority was not, however, so firmly rooted in the customs and traditions of the people as was ideally desired.

MONGALLA PROVINCE

The inception of native administration in Mongalla Province was the work of two young officers viz., Bimbashi Grove and Walsh. The first Chiefs Courts or "Lukikos" were set up in Opari District in 1921. The Courts were based on the Ugandan model and consisted of benches of between six and eight leading Chiefs under the presidency of the most important of them. The Courts sat at fixed periods of every one to two months. In the following year Walsh introduced the same system in the Latuka District and by 1929 the "lukikos" were established in all Districts. Modest fees were collected and

In 1930 the Chiefs received payments for the first time based on the number of tax-payers and almost simultaneously Chiefs' police were established on the same basis. The defects of the "Lukiko" courts (the long intervals at which the courts sat and the long distances the people had to travel to attend) were corrected when, in 1932, "A" Courts were started. The different Chiefs were given their own courts composed of themselves and their local elders. Great emphasis was placed upon these courts. They had the freedom to do their own things without too much interference by the District Commissioner and to evolve their procedure. Lower fees were taken and records kept in the same manner as in the "B" or "Lukikos". The "A" courts proved a great success as they gradually took over a great deal of the work of the "B" courts whose functions came to be confined to acting as inter-tribal courts and as courts of appeal. They were also consulted by the District Commissioners in general matters of common interest. In the Central District for instance, there was a Council of Bari Chiefs which met twice a year for the purposes of consultation.

The popularity of the "A" courts was demonstrated by the interesting differences of procedure evolved. In some Districts, in order to "have the floor of the house" the speaker must hold the "Talking stick" and move up and down a measured space. On the east bank among the Lotuka, the court composed of the whole
body of those assembled and everybody had the right of speech. Elsewhere, elders were more in evidence. In Opari District where the experiment was first started cases were heard by the headmen who must report their decisions to the Chiefs. Among the Bari in the Central District the litigants addressed themselves to the headmen who in turn addressed the assembled Chiefs. But the "A" Courts had not been successful in this District as elsewhere in the Province. The "A" Courts had, in the main, shown little difficulty in distinguishing between which cases they should try and which should be referred to the higher Courts. There was also a growing tendency of plaintiffs to seek direct redress in the Court of another Chief rather than await the reconvening of the inter-tribal courts. The bulk of the cases dealt with were civil cases and concerned matters of debt, bride price but adultery also figured prominently especially in certain districts.¹

Among the dominant ethnic groups in the Province, the Latuka, Toposa and Bari, no strong or autocratic Chief had ever emerged and Chiefs were arbitrarily appointed by the Government and the success or failure of the appointed Chief depended almost entirely on his personality. Traditional institutions of authority such as the rain-chiefs were not usually competent as Government appointees. Wherever rain-chiefs were discovered and invested with temporal office, nothing but failure was

¹. These Districts included, as a matter of course, the Azande districts following the amalgamation of Mongalla and Bahr el Ghazal Provinces in 1936.
recorded. Two factors, according to F. L. Nalder the Governor in 1935, accounted for the failure of the rain-chiefs as executive head. These were:

"... his almost necessarily innate conservatism and his people's probable disinclination to have his spiritual character disturbed by undue preoccupation with mundane matters." 2

The clan and clan heads, particularly among the Baris, were the solid foundation of tribal structure. It is no wonder therefore that in the absence of a single and autocratic ruler the popular councils rated high in the eyes of the natives. That these courts commanded the confidence and respect of the people to whom they administered justice is indicated by the sheer volume of cases handled. In 1935 Mongalla area produced a total of 15,697 cases while the courts of the amalgamated province dealt with 23,500 cases and with the accretion of Yirrol District from Upper Nile Province the record total of 29,993 was registered. 3

In spite of the enthusiasm shown by the tribesmen of Mongalla (later Equatoria) Province, no financial responsibility was devolved on Native Administration Authorities beyond teaching the Chiefs to account for moneys received as Court fees and as fines and for those disbursed as salaries or remuneration. 4

Indeed, it is doubtful if the Khartoum Authorities were seriously interested in raising the "Lukikos" to a higher plane of financial and administrative devolution. In 1924, three years before Maffey's enunciation of Indirect Rule policy, Governor Woodland was convinced beyond any shadow of doubt of the immense value of the "Lukikos" in relieving District Commissioners of petty litigation, enforcing tribal discipline and getting things done. Without hesitation he proposed that the Lukikos be empowered to raise local revenue and to expend it on rudimentary educational and health measures; they were to be equipped with tribal police to enforce the Courts orders, be given the powers of the second class magistrates under the Criminal and Civil codes and to cater for roads, leper colonias and to enforce better agricultural practices. Without doubt these far-reaching proposals would have transformed the Lukikos into something approximating to Native Administration proper. But the Governor's scheme was blocked by Khartoum's unwillingness to grant Native Courts any financial powers. Consequently, the Lukikos like Native Courts elsewhere, never developed into anything like their counterparts in the Northern Sudan.

UPPER NILE PROVINCE

Whether viewed in terms of pacification, missionary enterprise or native administration, the two Nuer districts of Upper Nile Province were certainly the most difficult to manage as well as the most intractable.
This impression was confirmed many years later by K. D. Williams (then Inspector of Education) when he wrote that although the Southern Sudan as a whole was underdeveloped, the Upper Nile province "is perhaps the most backward, the most resistant to foreign influence of trade or religion, or education." Inhabited almost exclusively by the cattle-owning Nilotic tribes (Nuer, Dinka and Shilluk) Upper Nile province had, indeed, been "the despair of the Governor"; and following the pacification of the early decades the Nuer in particular were ominously bracketed as "the problem of the future". Throughout the 1920's the Nuer persisted in their refusal to communicate with the Government or to have any dealings with it by simply removing themselves and their cattle to the interior of their very difficult territory. Thus in 1924 District Commissioner of Central Nuer despondently remarked that "he rarely saw more than the distant backs of Nuer, and then only fleetingly". When in 1927 Captain V. H. Fergusson, an enthusiastic and sympathetic officer admired by colleagues and superiors alike, entertained optimism about Nuer hostility to Government, he was murdered by


Nuong Nuer.¹

Nuerland was also vast; it had a land area of over 20,000 square miles of waterless plains which turned into swamp and bog during the rainy season. What is more, there were no roads of any kind. The two District Commissioners supported by two sub-Ma'murs and sixty police constituted quite insufficient force and personnel for the bid to control a population of 300,000 Nuer tribesmen.² These administrative difficulties were further complicated by the lack of identifiable traditional authorities upon which to devolve even the minimum of judicial power. Indeed, Nuer vocabulary was devoid of the word for "command" or "authority".³ According to one observer "the Nuer is the complete democrat and every man is as good as his neighbour".⁴

As a result primarily of later anthropological studies we know more about the Nuer and their social structure than British administrators of the 1920's and their predecessors could have possibly known. The Nuer are, in the literature of social anthropology, a

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1. The Story of Fergie Bey, (A biography of Vere H. Fergusson) (London 1950), p. 117. "Fergie Bey" was very much in love with the Nuer; he once wrote, "If you could see the real, genuinely uncivilised natives, hitherto untouched by anyone at all, you would fall in love with them at once ..." Ibid., p. 122.


classic case of the segmentary lineage system. Dr. P. P. Howell who combines anthropological training with wide administrative experience of the Nuer spells out the implication of the fragmentation of the Nuer social system in the following striking terms: "a group of persons or a segment of Nuer tribe may have political significance at one moment, and at another no significance at all". In his book, The Nuer (1940), Professor Evans-Pritchard wrote that political cohesion in Nuer society is maintained by the process of fission and fusion. Clearly a social system of this kind rules out any form of stable, institutionalised and hierarchical authority. This scheme of things does not, however, preclude the existence of personal leadership of an ephemeral kind, thrown up by accident or emergency factors.

In point of fact, a few influential men did exist among the Nuer - as there must be in every society - who were more or less ritual experts such as the "Leopard-Skin-Chief". Although such individuals commanded a measure of influence and could mediate disputes if asked, they lacked the enforcement powers and authority of an effective ruler. As far as administration


4. In Nuer Religion (1956), p. 290, Evans-Pritchard admits that this is a misleading term whose usage gained currency among administrations of the day; he himself prefers "Priest".
was concerned, prospective Nuer headmen refused to be vested with any power the exercise of which might prove troublesome or render them unpopular in the eyes of fellow tribesmen. Thus in 1923 the only two experiments in appointed 'Chiefs' ended in total failure; one was murdered by his own people and the other was driven out.¹ According to a former District Commissioner of Central Nuer, "Administration of the Nuer up to 1928 was of an attenuated form, and in the least accessible areas there was no administration at all."² Government action was restricted to the maintenance of public order, the prevention of Nuer raids on the Dinka and the collection of the very light cattle tribute. Needless to say, none of these efforts achieved any measure of success as the Nuer continued to defy the Government.

If, for nearly three decades, the Nuer had succeeded in defying the authority of the Sudan Government, 1928 represented a dividing line in the history of Nuer administration. Despite the lack of authoritarian political structure, the Nuer were sufficiently united to mount a concerted action against the Government in a final bid to rid themselves of the 'pale-faced Turks'. Ironically, and like the Dinka "national" movement under Ariendit, the great (and last) Nuer uprising of 1928 invited massive government response which ensured the

1. Governor Upper Nile to Civil Secretary, 2 December 1923 UNP/SCR/14, S.G.A. Khartoum.
final defeat and pacification of the Nuer. The killing of Captain Fergusson Bey in December 1927 sparked off widespread Nuer rebellion in which more British officials were killed and police posts attacked. Raids on the Dinka were also resumed on an unprecedented scale. Meanwhile, Government-appointed 'Chiefs' were powerless before the influence of 'witch doctors' who spearheaded the rebellion. The Governor, C. A. Willis, considered that the Nuer had ceased to be a problem in native administration and ought to be regarded as enemies, "the object of extensive military operations until they have learnt such a lesson that they will never need another."\(^1\)

On this note, the next two years witnessed large scale military operations against the Nuer in which cattle were confiscated and hostages taken. Ground forces were supported by a squadron of the R.A.F. which bombed the swamps to force out the young warriors who had fled there. By 1930 the ringleaders had been rounded up and most, if not all, of the Nuer region was pacified.

This 'Nuer Settlement' involved a thoroughly constructive administrative reform. A "No-Man's land" was created between the Dinka and Nuer to prevent further raidings. The displaced Nuer were resettled elsewhere and the different Nuer groups concentrated in specific areas. The Government also undertook to make a study of Nuer social organisation, amalgamate

\(^1\) Governor, Upper Nile to Civil Secretary, "General situation in the Nuer", 4 December 1928, CS/SCR/I/C/10 Vol. I S.G.A. Khartoum.
splinter groups into their parent communities and appoint Chiefs from dominant lineages or from Leopard-Skin Chiefs. A British District Commissioner was attached to each Nuer section to ensure that each group kept well within the camping and grazing sites allotted them. Meanwhile, the restive young warriors with their insatiable appetite for cattle-raiding were absorbed into tribal police forces. Evans-Pritchard who had successfully carried out research work among the Azande was brought in to act as anthropological advisor to the scheme.¹

The partially subdued Nuer came to accept the District Commissioner as their 'Chief' and to have respect for the power of the Government. Like the Dinka and others before, the Nuer realised at long last the futility of rebellion against a superior foe. On the other hand, time was ripe for the Government to approach the Nuer in a more conciliatory manner so that the 1930's turned out to be a period of appeasement.² All the same, it took considerable time for the Nuer to overcome the shock of their defeat. When Evans-Pritchard revisited the Nuer in 1931, they were unusually hostile to him on account of their humiliation by the government forces and the measures adopted to ensure the final submission.³

1. Minutes of Conference held at Malakal on the 5 and 6 January 1921 chaired by the Governor-General and attended by Civil Secretary, Commander Sudan Defence Force, and Nuer District Commissioners; see CS/SCR/I/C/10 Vol. II Governor Upper Nile to Civil Secretary, 18 February 1929, "Nuer Policy", CS/SCR/I/C/10 Vol. 1, S.G.A. Khartoum.


Until the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, District Commissioners in Upper Nile province tended to devote more time to the external relations of the tribes within their districts than to promoting native administration. The importance of this function was underlined by the regular holding of Chief's meetings attended by District Commissioners for settlement of inter-tribal disputes. One such meeting held in February 1935 and attended by the governor resulted in the establishment of exceptionally cordial relations between the central Nuer and the Southern Dinka. The Dinka Chief had asked for the return of the Nuer to their former homes (in the no-man's zone). When the request was granted "relations between Dinka and Nuer seemed more amicable than could have been believed possible ten years ago". The native courts instituted throughout Nuer-land remained weak and unpopular until the 1940's by which time the Nuer regarded litigation as a "stimulating pastime."2

In the non-Nuer districts of the province the Court of the Shilluk Reth continued to function satisfactorily.3 The authority of the divine Reth was sufficiently strong and vigorously backed by the District Commissioner and the Shilluk police, but the Reth's

subordinates were exceedingly weak. Among the segmentary, Khor Fillus, Dinka the courts held by Government-appointed Chiefs enforcing custom were undeveloped. Worse still, because of their proximity to the Northern Sudan the Northern Dinka tended to "ape the Arabs" and adopt a form of Islam to the disregard of tribal organisation. Though they loved litigation, like the Dinka everywhere else, their 'Chiefs' were found to be untrustworthy and incapable of enforcing decision. By 1936 there had been no significant improvement in the overall state of native administration in Upper Nile province. The Governor reported that because of lack of educated 'boys' it was difficult and often impossible to keep accurate records of the work done by the Chiefs' tribal courts. At the close of the thirties Upper Nile province had made little advance in either education or native administration compared with Equatorial province (following the amalgamation of Mongalla and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces).

On a more general level, any attempt to apply indirect rule theory to Southern Sudan was doomed to failure almost from the start. A highly elaborate structure of native rule could not easily be achieved among people with segmentary tribal structures only lately


2. Ibid. "Dinka and Devolution".

pacified.1 And in the light of the fact of the very few British administrators engaged in the South as against the size and population of that country, one can only suspect that the rhetoric of native rule had served to conceal the Administration's inability to provide adequate guidance, control and development. The point has also been made that the idea of native administration was a pure delusion and, that the mere presence of the white man in Africa made it impossible for the 'primitive' condition of things to continue:

Every motor-car, every mission station, every packet of cigarettes or yard of cotton print, every book to be read, every black man who can write - these and a thousand other things are altering the conditions in which and the ideas by which African natives live.2

It need not be stressed too strongly, in retrospect at least, that the quote summarises the direction of social change Southern Sudan would inevitably take, but which the British realised, only belatedly.

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1. G. M. Bakheit, British Administration and Sudanese Nationalism, op. cit., p. 197.
CHAPTER IV

SOUTHERN POLICY: 1950

... the only man who ever tried to carry out the Southern Policy was Carole - and he got a LEMON for his pains - so be warned in time.

The so-called Southern Policy enunciated formally in January 1930, was either redundant or doomed. Redundant, because the Nilotes did all right by themselves in keeping out alien cultures; doomed, because western Bahr el-Ghazal and the Wau area were too deeply penetrated by Northern, Islamic and Arabic, influences even to begin any serious implementation. What can plausibly be asserted is that Southern Policy was the logical outcome of Indirect Rule strategy; it was not, as is often believed by Sudanese nationalists, part of a British design to separate the Southern Sudan from the Northern provinces. The appearance of the Sudanese brand of Arab nationalism in 1919 necessitated the institution of Native Administration as an antidote. The 1924 mutiny of the Egyptian units stationed in Khartoum (which had the sympathy of prominent Sudanese nationalists) and the assassination, in the same year, of Sir Lee Stack

1. 'Handing over Notes', Western District Bahr el-Ghazal, 21 December 1933, WD/SCR/16/A/1. S.G.A. Khartoum.

2. In October 1943 the then Civil Secretary, Sir Douglas Newbold, said that for certain parts of the Southern Sudan economic indicators pointed North and South for others but nothing final came out of it; see F.O. 371/45986.
(the Governor-General of the Sudan) in Cairo were indicative of the growing strength of Arab nationalism which could spread southward to an Arabicized and Islamised Southern Sudan. Under these circumstances, it was thought necessary to block Arab influences from reaching the South. 'Southern Policy' supplied the rhetoric for this objective.

The salient features of the approved policy for the administration of the Southern Provinces were spelled out by Harold MacMichael, the Civil Secretary, in a memorandum dated 15th January 1930. The memorandum, which was circulated to the Governors and all District Commissioners of the Southern Provinces with instructions to study it, stated:

The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with structure and organisation based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permitted upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs. Among the measures to be adopted were: the provision of non-Arabic-speaking staff (administrative, clerical and technical); the control of immigrant traders from the North; British staff to familiarise themselves with the beliefs, customs and languages of the local tribes; the use of English where communication in the local vernacular was impossible. The aim of the Government was obviously to stamp out Arab influence in the South. If Arabic appeared to serve the function of a lingua franca among the heterogeneous peoples of the South, English

was to replace it. Furthermore, the four intermediate and technical schools in Mongalla and the Bahr el-Ghazal were to produce Southern staff and artisans to replace the Northerners. The language of official correspondence in the South was to be English instead of Arabic.¹

Immigration from the North to the South was to be severely restricted as well under the 1922 Closed District Ordinance. It was the aim of the Government, the memorandum continued, "to encourage, as far as possible, Greek and Syrian traders rather than the Gellaba type .... Only the best type of the Gellaba whose interests are purely commercial and pursued in a legitimate manner should be admitted."² To shield the rural community from, as it were, the 'obnoxious' influence of the Muslim traders, the memorandum forbade the Gellaba to trade in areas where there were no administrative or police post: "The limitation of Gellaba trade to towns or established routes is essential."³

Along with the Civil Secretary's appeal to the British Field Staff to learn the cultures of the people whom they administered went the task of converting the Southern native vernaculars into literary media.

¹. Ibid.

². Civil Secretary to Governors Bahr el Ghazal, Mongalla and Upper Nile, 25th January 1930, Sudan Government Archive/CS/very secret/1-C-1. "Southern Policy".

³. Ibid.
The Hejaf Language Conference held in April 1928 and attended by representatives from the Sudan, Uganda and Congo Governments as well as Christian Missionaries from the three territories had selected certain language groups for development into literary media. The outcome had proved fruitful from the points of view of both Government and Missions. It was noted that while the Gospel could be preached and learned through the media of group languages, they also provided solid barriers against the spread of Arabic. In the Equatorial Corps of the Sudan Defence Force English words of command had been introduced. While this was lauded, the Memorandum added that "Every effort should be made to make English the means of communication among the men themselves to the complete exclusion of Arabic." English classes were to be opened for the purpose with the Missions providing the instructors. British Officials were advised to learn the local vernacular and drop Arabic in conversation with the natives or resort to interpreters of the local tongue. Provided District Commissioners mastered the local vernacular, "The use of interpreters is preferrable to the use of Arabic." Because the restriction of Arabic was an essential feature of the general scheme it was hoped that if these guidelines were properly observed, Arabic would die a natural death being neither the language of the governing nor of the governed.

1. Civil Secretary to Governors Bahr el Ghazal, Mongalla and Upper Nile, 25th January, 1930, S.G.A./CS/very secret/1-C-1. "Southern Policy" Section D.
Governors of the three Southern Provinces of Mongalla, Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile were instructed by Khartoum in March of the same year to refrain from direct reference to the "Policy" and, instead, to allude to it vaguely under "arabicisation", Arab custom, etc., to convey the impression that it concerned administrative matters only. In reality, however, the whole region had been "made subject to an exclusive and secret policy designed to isolate it as much as possible from Northern Arab and Islamic influences. It contrasts the existing constitutional system and such commercial nexus as has survived with the Northern Sudan.\(^1\) Expressed in different terms, it was "directed to .... constructive political objective and .... determined by political criteria".\(^2\)

In pursuance of this policy Brock, then Governor of Bahr el Ghazal, instructed his District Commissioners to discontinue the use of Arabic words such as Sheikh, Sultan and wakils and their native equivalents substituted. Similarly, Police, Chiefs, dressers, and clerks should be called by native names and, failing that, by English names; chiefs and people should be discouraged from taking on Arab names either for themselves or their children.\(^3\) Merchants were to be advised to "cut out Arabic when dealing with their

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1. Sir G. Symes to Sir Lampson, 3rd July 1934. (No. 99 Confidential) F.0.407/217.

2. Civil Secretary to Governors Mongalla, Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile, 22 March 1930, CS/1-C-1/very secret/ Sudan Government Archive (henceforth abbreviated as S.G.A.) Khartoum.

3. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to all District Commissioners in the Province, 19 March 1930, B.G.P./SCR/1-C-12, (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.
customers and to talk either in English or the vernacular.\(^1\) The Governor actually felt that the state of affairs as regards the spread of Northern influence in his province was eminently unsatisfactory and that to obtain quick results more vigorous measures were urgently needed.\(^2\) In the Western District, for instance, where "practically all the natives" were in the habit of adopting Arabic names, the authorities faced considerable difficulty in inducing the people to re-adopt their own tribal names. In an effort to break this down one District Commissioner insisted on the Police, Chiefs, Chiefs Police, and Native Dressers all using their own names and entered only tribal names in Case Books of Chief Courts.\(^3\) Merchants were forbidden to make or sell Northern style clothes ('jallabia') and chiefs from buying them. Nevertheless, large quantities of "Arab" (sic) clothing were still being sold and worn and the District Commissioner gave fresh orders that "shirts should be made short, with a collar and opening down the front in the European fashion and not an open neck as worn by the Baggara of Dar Fur. Also 'tagias' (skull-cap) as worn by Arabs to wind emmas (turban) round are not to be sold in future. No more 'Arab'


2. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 1930 B.G.P./SCR/1.C.6, (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.

3. District Commissioner Western District Bahr el Ghazal to Governor Bahr el Ghazal, 17 January 1932, WD/SCR/1/C-1 (Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.
clothing is to be made as from today." ¹ The next District Commissioner commented on this ludicrous order as follows: "I do not think this is being obeyed ... The polo collar is the key to the Southern Policy." ² All over the South the message emanating from provincial headquarters was the same: if Southerners could not be induced to return to their traditional way of life but instead displayed a taste for the civilised way of life then European civilisation rather than its Middle Eastern counterpart was recommendable.

Wau, the provincial capital of Bahr el Ghazal presented another trouble-spot, if not a "melting-pot" from the viewpoint of "Southern Policy". Attracted by job opportunities, tribesmen from the surrounding areas had flocked there where they came in direct contact with numerous Northern traders, fugitives from West Africa (the Fellata) and exiled criminals from Egypt under the Turkish regime. There were in Wau in addition to a colony of redundant Northern artisans, a reserve company of ex-Sudanese soldiers and a mosque; Arabic was being taught in the Mission Elementary School whose pupils were drawn not only from the Wau area but also from the remoter regions of Central District. The resulting picture was quite clear: from its foundation everything was done to foster Arabic in Wau.


². Minute by District Commissioner Western District Bahr el Ghazal, in File WD/SCR/16-B-2, Sudan Government Archive, Khartoum.
The important Rejaf Language Conference in 1928 had recognised the special status of Wau and so did the subsequent Civil Secretary's Memorandum of January 1930. To Governor Bahr el Ghazal, however, the strategic position of Wau regarding Northern influence made it all the more compelling that "everything which in the smallest degree might contribute to the suppression of Arabic in the province should be done." The measures adopted included the elimination of the principal Arabic-speaking population of Wau, namely petty Northern traders (the Gellaba) and Fellata; the amalgamation and transfer of the Stack School and the Mission Intermediate School to Bussere, some twelve miles out of easy reach of Wau; the admission of pupils from the Wau area only to the Mission Elementary School, to the exclusion of children from the surrounding districts; the substitution of a "group language" for Arabic in the Wau area. The latter proposal involved the teaching of two "group languages", viz., Dinka and Zande with the numerous relatively insignificant tribes in and around Wau having to learn the one or other depending upon their affinity to the "language group". "It will not be

1. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 1930. B.G.P./SCR/1.C.6 (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.

2. Civil Secretary's Memorandum on Southern Policy, 15th January 1930, op. cit.

3. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to all District Commissioners in the Province, 19 March 1930, BGP/RC/RC-12; also Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.6, (Strictly Confidential), S.G.A. Khartoum.

4. Ibid.
easy" the Governor admitted, "to popularise either of the "group languages" in Wau area as many of the inhabitants, if not entirely detribalised, are neither Dinka nor Zande, and I doubt their adopting a completely strange vernacular in place of Arabic. English would stand a chance."¹

Good progress was made in producing text-books in native languages and grammars and in teaching English. In Wau itself there were fourteen English classes in June 1930 running for Equatorial Corps N.C.O.s, male hospital dressers, police N.C.O.s, and men, office messengers, drivers, sweepers and servants.² The Governor was able to observe with some satisfaction that "the elimination of Arabic in conversation with people such as messengers and servants, with whom one is in close contact, is not a lengthy progress."³ By 1932 the number of English classes for Province, Departmental, Army, Native Administration, employees and civilians had risen to over thirty-five and seven Northern merchants deported from the Western and Central districts alone.⁴ These were not spectacular advances, however, when weighed against set-backs. Except for

¹ Governor Bahr el Ghazal to all District Commissioners in the Province, 19 March 1930, BGP/SC/R1-C-12; also Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.6, (Strictly Confidential), S.G.A. Khartoum.

² Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 9 June 1930, BGP/SCR/16-B-1, quoted in G.M.A. Bakheit British Administration and Sudanese Nationalism 1919-1939, Ph.D. Thesis, St. John's College Cambridge, 1965.

³ Enclosure in Governor BGP to all District Commissioners in the Province, 20 January 1932, (Secret/BGP/SCR/1.C.14, S.G.A. Khartoum.

⁴ Ibid.
the clerical and accounting staff who had a unique advantage over the others in keeping up and improving their English, few people conversed in English where communication in the vernacular proved impossible; explanation of drills in the military and police continued to be in Arabic: "Arabic is ingrained in the military and police forces in Wau and Raga".¹ That visitors to the South brought along with them their Arabic-speaking servants was lamented; the Public Works Department, reinforced by Northern artisans, made little progress in English but advanced further in Arabic and so did most of the big merchants in the Province. Similarly, English made little progress in Western District and the Wau area so that the Missions found it necessary to conduct part of their service in Arabic.²

More constructive suggestions were made at an educational conference in Mongalla to the effect that reputable European traders /i.e. Greeks/ should be encouraged to employ local 'boys' as sub-agents on commission in out-stations, but these failed to materialise because the traders did not co-operate.³ A second suggestion that Southerners should, with Government


2. Ibid.

3. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to all District Commissioners, 10 June 1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.9 (Strictly Confidential). S.G.A. Khartoum.
loan, he encouraged to set up business of their own did not improve the situation or prove a viable proposition either. For one thing there was lack of sufficient local talents and for another, prospective Southern traders would still have to maintain business links with the Omdurman merchants to ensure steady supply of goods. Of the two native traders in the Yambio district who managed to prove their worth, one had long been in Omdurman and maintained client relationship with some of its merchants, the other had borrowed forty pounds worth of goods from a Northern merchant.¹ The way these two set themselves up in business was undesirable from the standpoint of the Government. In the Northern District one Nilote capable of running his own private business turned out to be a Muslim with a Northern mother and had spent most of his life in Omdurman.² The District Commissioner advised that "Until local natives have gained some experience as agents it would be most unwise to set one up as a trader by a Government loan ... the Nilotes were just in the process of learning the use of money."³ Certain clauses of the Civil Secretary's Memorandum were obviously impossible to implement especially in the Dinka areas. For instance, the limitation of trading to stations could not apply where, as in Dinka country, lies most of the

¹. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to all District Commissioners, 10 June 1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.9 (Strictly Confidential). S.G.A. Khartoum.

². District Commissioner Northern District Bahr el Ghazal to Governor Bahr el Ghazal, (nd?) ND/SCR/1/C/9. (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.

³. Ibid.
trade in native produce, cattle, hides, sismsim and dura /sorghum/. 1

The policy of encouraging local languages, tribal consciousness and English and of suppressing Arabic, could not be brought to a successful conclusion while continuous contacts between Southerners and Arab traders and nomads were maintained across overstretched borders with the Northern Provinces of Kordofan and Darfur. To check Muslim and Northern influences coming into Bahr el Ghazal along these traditional trade routes, Governor Bahr El Ghazal erected an artificial wall which consisted in the ejection of 500 West African Muslims from the sub-district of Kafia Kingi which was closed and its headquarters left to dilapidate to create a "No-Man's land" which nobody was allowed to cross. 2 Latitude 8°45' North was designated as the Northern limit of the Southern Policy. It was also proposed to move the district headquarters at Raga and the Roman Catholic Mission westwards to a new site because "there is a Mosque at Raga and I would like to see it fall into disuse as it would if Raga were moved." 3 Arab tribesmen

1. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.6. (Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.

2. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to District Commissioner Western District Bahr el Ghazal, 9 June 1930, BGP/SCR/16-B-2 (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum; also Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 9 June 1930, BGP/SCR/16-B-1 S.G.A. Khartoum.

3. Secretary for Education and Health to Civil Secretary, 30 April 1930, No. 1 C/1. (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum; Governor Bahr el Ghazal to District Commissioner Western District Bahr el Ghazal, 9 June 1930, (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.
were also banned from entering Bahr el Ghazal and if they did so illegally, they were to be arrested and extradited to their province of origin. The same ban applied equally to tribesmen from Bahr el Ghazal entering Kordofan and Dar Fur.

To give the new measure teeth the cooperation of Governors of Dar Fur and Kordofan was sought and obtained and a system of "pass" instituted. But the "pass" system did not work, at least not as efficiently as was originally hoped. District Commissioner Western was quite certain "... the regulations for trading in Closed Districts are honoured more in the breach than the observance .... The Arabs of the south of Dar Fur appear to be totally ignorant of the Ordinance and most other Northerners seem to be under the impression that permits are only required by licensed traders and that everyone else may come and go as they please ..." The Police of the Western District were purged of "all devout Mohammedans because they would in their present posts infect all new police." To complete the picture, grazing arrangements were revised to prevent contacts between Nilotes and Arabs as it was soon discovered these annual meetings were producing some 'ill-effect'

1. Agreement between Governors Darfur and Bahr el Ghazal at Safaha, 28.3.35 and also Minute of Meeting at Safaha signed by District Commissioner Western District Equatoria and District Commissioner South Daffur, 4 March 1941. S.G.A. Khartoum.

2. District Commissioner Northern District Bahr el Ghazal to Governor Bahr el Ghazal (n.d.?), ND/SCR/1/c/1. (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.

3. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March 1930, op. cit. also District Commissioner Western District to Governor Bahr el Ghazal, 8 August 1930, (Confidential) WD/SCR/16.B.2.
on the conservative Nilotes evidenced by their taste in
dress and a slight spread of Arabic.¹ The point of the
whole exercise was put more candidly many years after­
wards by a new District Commissioner Western District,
Equatorial Province: "... We do not want contacts
because whether an Arab comes to hunt or graze or preach
Islam or trade he is spreading Northern influence."²

The difficulty of giving Northern traders in
other parts of the Province, say, five years' notice to
quit was pointed out by Governor Bahr el Ghazal who felt
it inadvisable and unfair. "The majority of the native
trade in the Province," he explained, "is in their
hands. If they are removed en bloc non-native mer­
chants could not be found to replace them. Some of
them are men of substance who have been in the Province
for many years and have done good."³ In other spheres,
however, he recommended that Central Government Depart­
ments should send none other than non-Muslim employees
in to the Southern Provinces. Police training was to
be conducted in the South and Northern Officers in the
Sudan Defence Force to be removed from the Equatorial
Corps and replaced by British Officers.⁴

1. District Commissioner Northern District Bahr el Ghazal
to Governor Bahr el Ghazal (n.d.) ND/SCR/1/C/1.
(Strictly Confidential) S.G.A. Khartoum.

2. District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to
Governor Equatoria, 9 April 1941, WD/SCR/1-C-1 (Secret)
S.G.A. Khartoum.

3. Governor Bahr el Ghazal to Civil Secretary, 22 March
1930, BGP/SCR/1.C.6 (Strictly Confidential) S.G.A.
Khartoum.

4. Ibid.
British administrators in the field were, not unexpectedly, amongst the first to point a finger privately to the follies and shortcomings of Southern Policy. In 1952 District Commission of the Western District of Bahr el Ghazal indicated that "although the 'policy' was still secret and Khartoum afraid that public opinion in the North will be scandalised if the truth is told about the missions and so-forth," it was, nevertheless, no secret. The intelligentsia in Omdurman were well aware of the Government policy of attempting to eradicate Muslim and Arabic influences in the Southern Sudan. In fact "the only people completely in the dark were the English officials in the North."¹

For the information of his successor the District Commissioner wrote: "what the Southern Policy means here is trying to make these people as unlike Baggara Arabs or Moslem religious notables as possible." The attempt was worthwhile because "their instincts are, in some ways, more English than Arabian," but he was doubtful if Roman Catholicism "mostly instilled by Italian peasants" was the best substitute. "From the Southern Policy point of view," he continued, "the administration or maladministration" that was practised from the establishment of the Condominium till 1930 had not been helpful. The trend in the three decades had been to encourage Arabicisation and Mohammedanism which had destroyed any sense of tribal unity that might have existed. The aim of Southern Policy was to reverse

¹ Note by District Commissioner Western District Bahr el Ghazal, 13 November 1932, WD/SCR/1-C-1, S.G.A. Khartoum.
this trend.¹

In note-form the District Commissioner wrote in elaboration to his successor: "... the sort of things to go for (mostly difficult) are: (i) Languages (English and Kpala), (ii) Clothes (... we haven't tackled the ladies yet, (iii) Keep people out of the North and Northerners out of here (this is great fun, see various files.) By the way, no women from here are allowed to marry 'north' and in the (rare) case of a foreigner in the district marrying a local woman, District Commissioner's permission has to be got and children belong to the mother ... (iv) Support the Missions (difficult). They must be made to work in with the Government and hence with the Authorities. (v) Stop Arabian customs (e.g. female circumcision ... Arabian names. I do not allow Christian names either).²

The most serious indictment of Southern Policy came nearly a decade later when the policy itself was due for revision. Once again the District Commissioner of Western District Equatoria (following the amalgamation of Bahr el Ghazal and Mongalla Provinces in 1936) wrote to the Governor:

"You once wrote 'The spread of Arabian influences is as insidious as soil erosion - and just as difficult to stop.' Western

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¹. Handing over notes Western District Bahr el Ghazal, 21 December 1933, WD/SCR/16/A/1. S.G.A. Khartoum.

². Handing over notes Western District Bahr el Ghazal, 21 December 1933, WD/SCR/16/A/1. S.G.A. Khartoum.
District people still like Northern influences if left to themselves, you know only too well the immense amount of time, labour, money and patience that has gone into getting the people (most unwilling at first) to abandon Arabic names, Arabic dress and Arabic practices. The struggle is a hard one and the end is not yet in sight: success will be achieved only when active measures provide an alternative economy and culture which are inseparable ... 1

These carefully measured words were those of the District Commissioner Western District " ... where for ten years District Commissioners have been burning Arabian clothes and doubling their labours by simulating ignorance of Arabic and recording unpronounceable names ..." 2 The quote has also been especially chosen by the writer in an attempt to dispel the illusions of Sudanese Nationalist then, as now, that "for decades the fusion of the North and the South was delayed" as a result of the Southern Policy. The suggestion that encouraging the spread of Arabic and Northern influences rather than suppressing them would have speeded up the fusion of the North and the South is not borne out by evidence. If not the trap of an ideology then it must be a fallacy both of which must be identified and avoided. All the wealth of evidence, at least those made public by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan so far, indicate that the Western District of the Bahr el Ghazal and the Wau area presented the only real test-case for the working of

1. District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to Governor Equatoria, 9 April 1941, WD/SCR/1-C-1, (Secret) S.G.A.

2. District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to Governor Equatoria, 9 April 1941, WD/SCR/1-C-1, (Secret) S.G.A.
Southern Policy. Although similar measures designed to shield the South from Northern influences were adopted in Mongalla and Upper Nile Provinces, the extent and intensity of their application differed very remarkably from those in the Western Bahr el Ghazal. The reasons are not difficult to find.

The vast majority of the Southern population composed of the Nilotic tribes (Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer) were only very marginally, if at all, affected by Muslim influences coming from the North. The strong character of the Nilotes, their war-like tradition, uniformity of language, relative tribal cohesion, and their insular position had all provided a solid barrier and insulation against all foreign, including Arab and Muslim, influences. Except for dwellers in the border-areas and close to the Nile, these largely cattle-owning and semi-nomadic tribes were never conquered by the Azande or taken into slavery on any significant scale. Consequently, they were never subject to violent disintegration of their social life, customs and language. As has been seen, the Dinka were not closely administered before 1924, and the Nuer not before 1931. The upshot of all this had been that the task of the District Commissioner in any Nilotic District had been more or less one of defending a naturally strong position, not resuscitating one that had fallen. By

1. District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to Governor Equatoria, 30 June 1941, WD/SCR/1-C-1 (Secret), Sudan Government Archive.
contrast, the inhabitants of the Western District and the Wau area had undergone all the human degradations associated with the Zande conquest and the slave trade, between 1860 and 1900. Their social life and social structure disrupted, they were also administered by the new Government almost from the time of conquest of the Bahr el Ghazal in 1901. The effect of the pre-Southern Policy on them had been, one District Commissioner noted, "assimilation by methods ranging from a forced and subsidised conversion to 'Islam' of a sort in the Sudanese battalions to the compulsory adoption of Arabic names by all who came into contact with Government." Further, the Western District of Bahr el Ghazal by virtue of its proximity to Dar Fur had long trading contacts with the North. Both early Government policy and historical accident had conspired to attract Moslem elements and with them Arab influences into the Western District from across the border. As a result, one tribe in particular became so completely assimilated to the Mohammedan culture that it found no difficulty in identifying itself with an Arab tribe.  

Under circumstances as these, Southern Policy was of unique importance in Western District. For

1. District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to Governor Equatoria, (Strictly Confidential) 1 November 1941, WD/SCR/1-C-1, S.G.A.

2. These were the Feroge 'Arabs' whose Sultan Ahmed Fertak was amongst the Chiefs of Bahr el Ghazal who paid a courtesy visit to the Governor-General in 1904; see Sudan Intelligence Report No. 186, January 1910.
instance, the creating of larger units of administration was made impossible in the Western District where there were some 60,000 to 80,000 people divided into 14 tribes and speaking 14 languages. A native court to deal with inter-tribal cases could not be established because Arabic was the lingua franca and the Southern Policy forbade its use. The one cardinal weakness of the Southern Policy as the District Commissioner Western District saw it, was that the objective was so ambitious that only the most stringent measures coupled with time and an abundance of hope could realise it. This implied absolute devotion of the District Commissioner's time and attention to Southern Policy in Western District.¹

In a striking metaphor, he summed up the whole situation:

"... it requires more work to pump water up hill than to guide its natural flow. Arabian influence has breached the natural channel of Western District's tribal development and the leak has seeped to a veritable slough of despond. We have set ourselves no less a task than to pump it back, and dam the breach, and guide the channel to a better outlet .... "²

Of the major and fundamental lines on which Southern Policy was to be pursued in the Southern provinces as a whole, very few indeed were of any significance or relevance in the Nilotic districts. To summarise, the primary requirements for the furtherance of the Southern

¹. District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to Governor Equatoria, (Secret), 30 June 1941, WD/SCR/1-C-1, Sudan Government Archive.

². Ibid.
Policy as stated in the Civil Secretary's Memorandum already alluded to were as follows:

(i) the return to tribal law and customs;
(ii) the return to indigenous languages and group languages;
(iii) the revitalisation or recapitulation of tribal (family) life;
(iv) the encouragement by every means of English as a *lingua franca*;
(v) the attack on Arabic patois and names;
(vi) the discouragement of Northern customs and Northern-style dress;
(vii) the removal of Northern and West African Muslim elements and;
(viii) the provision of local staff for Government Service.

Except for the last, all these measures were almost entirely unimportant incidents in Nilotic administration. The first three were the fabrics of experience there and as for English, there was no real need for its adoption as a *lingua franca*: in the Dinka districts for instance, District Commissioners, merchants and people all spoke the same language, namely Dinka.¹

In the Western District and the Wau area, by contrast,

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¹. District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to Governor Equatoria, (Secret), 30 June 1941, WD/SCR/1-C-1, S.G.A.
all the remaining measures were cardinal requirements in realising the Southern Policy. Thus, whereas in the Nilotic districts the objectives of Southern Policy were entirely and essentially those of guiding the progress of an already established and flourishing system, in the Western Bahr el Ghazal the main concern had been reconstruction and revitalisation.

This analysis of the Southern Policy in terms of its differential application to the different socio-logical conditions in the South squares up quite easily with the official Government pronouncements in Khartoum. As defined by Sir G. Symes, the Governor-General, the purpose of Southern Policy was, "... with the minimum of British Senior staff, to build up a system of administration on indigenous foundations and with subordinate native personnel paid in accordance with the cheaper Southern standards of economy and costs of living." Behind the policy lay the assumption that in view of the relatively backward conditions of the South a simple educational system involving teaching in local vernacular and inculcating the moral principles of an approved religion (i.e. Christianity) would be sufficient to achieve the goal. Administration of the South was to be as inexpensively as possible to avoid imposing additional financial burden upon the North. To overcome the language problem, efforts were made to integrate

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1. District Commissioner Western District Equatoria to Governor Equatoria (Strictly Confidential), 1 November 1941, S.G.A. WD/SCR/1-C-1.
a babel of local languages and dialects especially in the southern-most districts and in the Western Bahr el Ghazal. In this regard the solidly Nilotic districts presented little difficulty. The Government also recognised a rough boundary between a Northern Nilotic pastoralist region and a southern agricultural region, composed almost exclusively of non-Nilotic tribes. Administration for the two regions was organised from two centres, Malakal and Juba respectively. In the former zone "authoritative" tribal organisations were identified or implemented and regularised. "Inevitably", wrote Sir Stewart Symes, "the administrative outlook with these pastoral folk is strongly tinged with 'tribalism' and essentially paternal; it aims at the condition of tribal units, compact, economically self-contained and uncontaminated by 'foreign' contacts." The Government saw little scope for economical development except for the simplest, made adaptable to a variety of local circumstances and to be enforced. Currency demand was to be stimulated for a small tax payment and so also was trade in hides and skins.

In the south of the Bahr el Ghazal and Mongalla Province sociological conditions were different and provided better prospects. The people in this second zone were equally backward but more tractable. Ivory trade


2. Equatorial Province Handbook.
had stimulated demands for cash so that people showed a willingness to seek alternative jobs to agriculture; road communications were much improved to accommodate motor transport; the land was fertile; above all, public security was good. When, in 1924, the whole of the Zande tribesmen were compelled to live along roads as a precaution against sleeping sickness, limited socio-economic measures became a practical proposition.¹ The accessibility and relatively favourable conditions in the second administrative zone naturally attracted the Gellaba-type and it was Government intention to restrict their movement for fear of possible exploitation of the Southerners. To win the confidence of the Southerners the Government found it necessary to build up a protective barrier against Northern merchants, a policy which later crystallised into "the Southern Policy". Government strategy for the South was, therefore, "separation until the South is strong enough to stand upon its own feet, and to develop in accordance with its own ethos ..."² The criticism often levelled against Southern Policy by the Northern educated Sudanese was itself questionable insofar as "exactly the same measures are in force in the 'Closed Districts' of the North itself, where unsophisticated and potentially truculent tribesmen were still liable to exploitation by the

¹ G. S. Symes to Sir Lampson (No. 99 Confidential) 3 July 1934. op. cit.
² Ibid; the Zande Agricultural Scheme was later opened in 1946.
clever 'Gellaba' from the riverain districts." It was with the same considerations in mind that the Government at one point contemplated the creation of a semi-independent Administration for the South organised from a single centre, say, Malakal.  

District Commissioners who wanted to push the Policy of fostering tribalism and the eradication of foreign influences in the South to its logical conclusion were dissatisfied with the performance of the Missions. Objectively, the enunciation of Native Administration Policy set the Government and the Missions, particularly the Italian Roman Catholic, on a definite collision course. Instructed by the Government right from the time of the conquest that their work in the pagan areas (and the South in particular) was essentially of a civilising nature, Missionaries found the policy of encouraging a return to tribal life incomprehensible. After all, the form of civilisation they were propagating with vigour was none other than Western.' In this respect progress of some sort had been made especially among the docile and less turbulent tribes. Almost of a sudden they were told that henceforth the kind of education they were to give the natives should tend to foster tribalism. In pursuance of this policy District Commissioner of the Western

District of Bahr el Ghazal suggested that the Missions should be instructed to baptise with tribal names. "I do not see why a native convert should not be just as good a Christian by retaining his own name as he should be by giving him a foreign one." If such customs were allowed to continue indefinitely there was a real possibility of everyone in the Western District and the Wau area being possessed of foreign (Italian) names in a not so distant future, which did not fit in at all well with the declared policy of Tribal Administration. Failing to check this undesirable practice, the District Commissioner argued that the natives might just as well be allowed to keep their Arabic names.

His other point with reference to tribal customs was about marriage. He found deplorable the rigid missionary practice whereby a couple married by the Catholic Mission were not allowed divorce under any circumstances. He thought this contrary to the principle of Tribal law of certain tribes whereby a divorce was invariably granted if proof of cruelty against the husband was produced. He suggested instead that the people be married by their own Tribal Laws and customs and thought it immaterial whether or not these marriages were actually carried out in villages or in a Church provided tribal rites only were adhered to. Finally, he proposed the abolition of Marriage Certificates issued by the Italian...

1. District Commissioner Western District to Governor Bahr el Ghazal, 17 January 1932 (Confidential), B.G.P./WD/SCR/1/C-1 S.G.A. Khartoum.
Catholic Missions as he was doubtful if this was the standard practice in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Egypt or Great Britain.  

Southern Policy is better seen and adequately explained in the context of native administration policy and its corrolary of educational development in the Southern Sudan. By indirect rule strategy the Government hoped to rule the country through indigenous institutions (natural or artificially created for the purpose) under the supervision of a British District Commissioner. In the Southern Sudan this implied not only the preservation of traditional customs, usage and beliefs of the people but also the elimination of foreign Arab influences coming from the North. As these Northern influences were widespread and endemic in certain areas of the South, the adoption of a definite line of policy was necessary to check their further advance or to eliminate them altogether. The need for trained local personnel for minimum administrative requirements necessitated cooperation between Government and Missions in the educational field. This in turn forced the question of language into prominence and led the Sudan Government to ask themselves whether Arabic should continue to be used as the linga franca of the South.

1. District Commissioner Western District to Governor Bahr el Ghazal, 17 January 1932, (Confidential) S.G.A. BGP/WD/SCR/1/C-1.
The issue as regards languages was dealt with by the Civil Secretary and the Secretary for Education respectively, in 1928. Mr. MacMichael argued very forcibly that to encourage, or permit, the spread of Arabic in the South would serve to promote the spread of Islam, "... the spread of Arabic among the negroes of the South means the spread of Arab thought, Arab culture, and Arab religion ...." If that were to happen, he reasoned, then the zone in which Moslem fanaticism with its attendant dangers was endemic would tend to increase with the addition of an equally large and populous area which was originally non-Moslem. It was his unswerving belief that such a development rendered the poorest of services to the Southerners themselves. Admittedly, Islam was on a higher plane than the corresponding cultures. Nevertheless Mohammedanism was, in his opinion, a stereotyped; it was stationary and therefore retrograde in tendency. More serious still, Islamic religion and its attendant culture were intellectually crippling to the mind and if Southern Sudanese were to be provided with a direct window to the wider world Western and Christian, rather than Oriental and Islamic, civilisation offered a better prospect for the moral, cultural and intellectual advancement of these pagan peoples. MacMichael also believed that the negro in general adopted Islam only as a potent form of ju-ju well worth acquiring.¹ The Secretary for Education,

¹. Civil Secretary's Memorandum on "Arabic and the Southern Sudan", 10th August 1928 (Secret), F.0.371/13865.
having traced the reasons which had led the Arabic language to occupy the position it had come to hold, i.e. as a lingua franca of the South, concluded that in any case the idiom in vogue was "a vile jargon", almost unintelligible to a person with a knowledge of the true language. By way of illustration he cited the following example taken from a blackboard in a little police station school in Amadi, Mongalla Province:

"Matar fi sanada katir kalashi; nas bita Beledi Moru iso Duru katir kalashi. Kamani Bara Ye'i ma mile katir. Lakini sana alifato Zamani matar bita Uwa ma anzili katir ze matar fi sanada kani Bara Ye'i ma mila. Alishani matar ma anzeli katir. Kabiri bita Mudiria Mongalla egi Ombari fi Amadi alashani sof Beledi bit Uwa, kolo ma nas, bita Uwa ma Markaze, bit Uwa."

This Nilotic Arabic, Mr. Mathews argued, represented a bastard form of Arabic and being neither the language of the administrator nor of those whom he governed it would tend to deteriorate still further. Unless it was unlearned by all parties concerned and a fresh start made, he summed up, it could not afford a suitable means of communication. He suggested instead that every encouragement should be given to the officials to learn the local vernaculars and where the use of vernacular was impossible, English should take the place of Arabic. "Then", he concluded, "one party would always be speaking his own language (and one hopes that it would usually be the native) and there would be some hope of a standard being maintained..."
instead of a language which is foreign to both ... "¹

The general conclusion to be drawn from these memoranda was that on political, educational, religious and administrative grounds it was felt desirable that Arabic as a general language or language of intercommunication should disappear from the Southern provinces. Southern Policy was the strategy adopted for the realisation of this goal.

The Administration's fear of what it regarded as disruptive effects of Northern Islamic influences on the pagan population was greatly reinforced by experiences in the Nuba Mountains which was in many respects similar to the Southern Sudan. Owing to the proximity of the Nuba Mountains to the North, but largely due to the success of cotton-growing, "civilisation" was rapidly spreading in these mainly pagan areas. There had been a cotton ginnery at Kadugli in early 1930s and by 1937 another one was completed at Dilling, a Government post thirteen miles from the nearest mission station. Money was gradually taking the place of sheep and cattle as a means of exchange. The young men drifted north to large urban centres such as El Obeid and Omdurman in search of job opportunities or driven there by the spirit of adventure. As a result "They returned sophisticated, spoiled, and contemptuous of anything but money-making, clothes,

¹ Memorandum by Secretary for Education and Health on "Arabic and the Southern Sudan" (Confidential), 24th June 1928 (En Route to Cairo), F.O.371/13865.
and the longing to read and write; they are fascinated by all the novelties they see." It was against the disruptive effect contacts with the Northern Sudan might have upon tribal life in the South that the Sudan Government attempted to erect a barrier between the two sectors of the country by the device of Southern Policy.

Southern Policy was launched with the knowledge and full backing of H.B.M's Government in London. The view the Foreign Office shared with the authorities in Khartoum was that the containment of the Southward spread of Islam was necessary. To encourage or permit the spread of Arabic in the South did not only involve the spread of Islam but that it had a further political implication already alluded to by Mr. MacMichael. "As a result", the Foreign Office maintained,

"the cleavage between the negroid areas of the Southern Sudan and the Arab regions in the North of the country will tend to diminish. The Northern Sudan already has a certain cultural and religious connexion with Egypt on its northern frontier, and it is not altogether fantastic to suggest that the extension of Islam and the Arabic language might ultimately, perhaps generations hence, make an inevitable fusion of the whole area from the Mediterranean to the Great Lakes into a single political unit."


There was, however, one dissenting voice who thought that Islam represented to the negroid races some measure of ethical culture, perhaps, "the highest type of culture they will ever be capable of assimilating." He did not think Christianity would ever be susceptible of effective assimilation by the Nilotic tribes. This is because for the Nilotics, neither Christianity nor Mohammedanism appeared superior and therefore more attractive than their pagan beliefs.

In taking stock of Southern Policy it is most appropriate to quote once more the observation of District Commissioner Western District, Equatorial Province who wrote:

"... the most disappointing aspect of the working of Southern Policy is the failure to produce in ten years any Southern staff trained for executive work. That Southerners are fitted for such work may not be doubted ..."

The annual (later biennial) progress report submitted to the Foreign Office by the Governor-General goes a long way to substantiate this charge. The following table gives the percentage of non-Muslims to the total Government staff:

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1. Mr. Patrick of the Foreign Office was the lonely voice.

2. District Commissioner Western District to Governor Equatoria (Secret), 30th June 1941, S.G.A. EF/WD/SCR/1-C-1.

3. Seventh Progress Report by the Governor-General on educational and Administrative policy for the Southern Sudan (Secret), 10th March 1938, Despatch No. 31/1-C-1. F.0.371/21999.
The Governor-General observed that even the apparent increase in the proportion of non-Muslim administrative and technical staff is misleading due to the replacement where possible of Northern Muslim staff by such northerners as Copts and Syrians as Southern-born and Southern trained men were still hard to come by. To account for the slight decrease in the percentage of non-Mohammedan technical officials to the total employed he pointed to the fact that medical officers, for instance, were all natives of the Northern Sudan and that there was no chance of their quick replacement: the necessity to employ them in the Southern provinces would have to
continue almost indefinitely.¹

The number of northern Sudanese traders operating in the South was given as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>466</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Governor-General reported that the liquidation of the Northern Gellaba merchant could only proceed by gradual stages. Most of them had been long established in the South and many were of irreproachable character and "dictates of equity and just administration forbid anything like a wholesale eviction". Individual merchants were evicted only on conviction of bankruptcy or misdemeanour. The Civil Secretary himself had warned his Field Administrators that adequate ground for eviction of Northern traders was necessary in case they were required to answer any complaints or inquiries from interested quarters in Khartoum.²

The use of English as a lingua franca for the Southern Sudan made only a limited progress. By contrast, the use of Arabic, particularly in the Upper Nile Province and at Juba, tended to spread mainly through the medium of Northern merchants and of Arabic-speaking officers and Northern officials, particularly

¹ Sixth Progress Report by Governor-General on educational policy for the Southern Sudan, Enclosure in Sir Lamison to Mr. Eden, 18th April 1936, (No. 432. Secret), F.O. 407/219.

² Seventh Progress Report by Governor-General, op. cit.
of the Medical and Public Works Departments, who were in daily contacts with native labourers and hospital patients. Although a "barbarous patois and a debased coinage," this form of Arabic was in currency. Like pidgin English, it was of doubtful educational value and had little religious or cultural significance. However, the fact that it was still making rapid progress despite official sanction was adequate reflection of the failure of Southern Policy. Progress was also slow in the use of English as the language of education and for the police and military forces so that words of command in the forces were still given in Arabic.¹

In summary, Southern Policy may have strengthened or reinforced Southern resistance to Moslem influences but it failed to instil in the Southerner a feeling of belonging to something bigger and higher than the tribe. If this was the set objective of the Administration, it was not necessarily in the best interest of the South. Down to the end of the Second World War the Southern Sudan acquired no constructive personality of its own, nor had there been any progress made. It had all been for the South a period of mark time in the fields of both education and economic development.

In its application, Southern Policy sounded implausible indeed. In order to block the South from

Northern (Islamic) influences would have necessitated administrative scope that was out of the question in context: it would have cost a lot of money (which was not available) and could only have been implemented by a huge administrative staff (which was not there either). Politically, Southern Policy had left a big question mark over the relation between the North and the South by the time it was revoked in 1946.
CHAPTER V

MISSIONARY EDUCATION AND ADMINISTRATION POLICY 1926-46

... tiny creatures in a remote bush school growing up with the idea that reading and writing and arithmetic are part of the normal human heritage, not esoteric, nor alien to their African life; girls imbibing the ideas of cleanliness and hygiene, ventilation and healthy diet, at a mission school; technical apprentices learning trades that will enable them to hold their own in the economic life of the world ...

The history of education in the Southern Sudan is closely bound up with that of the Missionary Societies who were permitted to carry out evangelical work in the non-Muslim areas of the Sudan following the establishment of the Condominium. Missionary education was, however, greatly influenced by Government Administrative policy. Until 1926 no definite policy for the South was devised. The strategic need to control the Nile Valley had necessitated the pacification of the Nilotic tribes, a task which was not fully accomplished until the Nuer Settlement of 1929-31. Financially the South was more of a liability than an asset to its British conquerors. The account of the Sudan Government itself did not balance until 1913 during which period it was subsidized from Egypt. In the meantime Government educational policy

2. The amount of the annual subsidy from 1925 was £.E.750,000 and remained so up to the 1940s.
for the South assumed a more or less negative character and missionary societies were left to experiment with the most elementary form of education.

Chapter eighteen of Administrative Regulations of 1933 sets out in stringent terms the rules governing the work of missionary societies operating in the Southern Sudan. The missionary societies involved in educational work in the Southern Sudan were: the Verona Fathers Mission (Austrian and later, Italian Roman Catholic); the Anglican Church Missionary Society; the United Presbyterian Mission; and the Australian and New Zealand Sudan United Mission. To avoid possible competition and conflict arising, each missionary society was allotted a "sphere" of influence within which to operate. At first the Americans were given the Abyssinian border, the Roman Catholics the Bahr el Ghazal province, and the Church Missionary Society, Upper Nile. Mongalla province also went to the C.M.S. save for the western portion of the Zande district based on Wau which was part of the Roman Catholic sphere. The piece of territory on the east bank which ceded to the Sudan from Uganda in 1914 was declared an open sphere where both the C.M.S. and the V.F.M. had equal rights. Later, considerable changes were made to this division. The Roman Catholic Mission was not new to the Southern Sudan. The first Roman Catholic Mission had been founded nearly half a century before

1. See Appendix IV.
2. See Appendix IV.
the Condominium period at Kondokoro in 1849 but closed because of ill-health in 1863. After the conquest the earliest Roman Catholic Mission stations were established at Kayango and Mbili (1904) and Wau (1905) in the Bahr el Ghazal and in Equatoria at Rejaf (1919). Protestant Missions were also founded by the Church Missionary Society in Upper Nile at Malakal in 1906 and in Mongalla at Yambio in 1913, Yei 1917, at Juba 1920, in Maridi and Yambio in 1924. The American Mission started work in the Sobat river area of Upper Nile province in 1902 and the Sudan United Mission also commenced work in the same province among the Dinka in 1913. The Roman Catholic Mission were also able to open stations in the "open sphere" at Torit and Lado in 1920; Nagichot and Topotha in 1924; Lerus in 1925; Isoke and Okaru in 1926 and 1929. Thenceforth whenever peace and security prevailed and human resources forthcoming, fresh stations were added here and there by the Missionary bodies. The point to remember is, however, that Missionary Societies in the South were often branches of their Northern headquarters. The Rev. L. H. Gwynne for instance supervised the work in the Southern Sudan as well as at Khartoum.

In the Southern Sudan wherever a mission station was founded an elementary school sprang up at the same site. This was the foundation of the Southern education system. Whereas in the Northern Sudan the

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Government took the initiative to set up schools for the education of the "sons of leading men, the heads of villages and heads of districts," in the Southern Sudan. The teaching and learning of the Gospel constituted the principal motive for the inception of a most rudimentary type of education. Lord Kitchener had intended Khartoum to be the centre of the education system the Government was to launch. When, therefore, on 8 November 1902, the Gordon Memorial College was inaugurated the foundation for a steady expansion of education in the Northern Sudan was safely laid. For an indefinite period the Southern Sudan was not to partake in the Government scheme. Government educational efforts were also supplemented by those of the missionary bodies. In keeping with Lord Cromer's religious policy of 1904 as reaffirmed by Kitchener in 1911, missionary work in the Northern Sudan was confined to social services namely medical and educational. The effect of the dual system of Government as well as non-Government schools had been the enhancement of educational progress in the North vis a vis the South.

In the Southern Sudan itself missionary educational endeavours ran into innumerable difficulties almost from the start. To begin with the intolerable climatic conditions, the absence of roads coupled with the extremely poor state of communication exercised inhibiting factors to missionary enterprise as a whole.

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Endemic tropical diseases, notably malaria and black water fever, took their toll of missionaries' lives. Linguistic diversity, the absence of cultural homogeneity and lack of a literary tradition all constituted a formidable enough task to any educational efforts. The nature of the Southern Sudanese themselves raised up another wall against educational endeavours. Most of the Southern tribes were transhumant pastoralists or practitioners of shifting cultivation. In either case, they were only barely touched by foreign external influences. The Dinka and Nuer in particular appeared well contented with their self-contained cattle economy. The cow was in fact the be-all and end-all of existence. Thus when urged to send their children to school their reply was, not unexpectedly, "who will look after the sheep and goats." Predictably, missionary education took roots among the sedentary agriculturalists where law and order was first established and where the people were more receptive to foreign ideas and influences. It seemed a lot easier to capture the mind of someone rooted to the soil than one on the move. Nevertheless, it took the missionary societies a great deal of time and effort to convince the Southern Sudanese of the value of western education. Except in the Western District of Bahr el Ghazal where the majority of the Chiefs were Mohammedans and where private individuals were running Koranic schools the majority of the natives

had little enthusiasm for education. ¹ Not until tangible material benefits could be shown to accrue directly from education did sending one's children to school become an attractive proposition.

The type of schools provided by the missionary societies were village or "bush" schools, elementary, intermediate and trade school. The schools were primarily for boys to which a limited number of girls could be admitted but if there was a sufficient number of girls wishing to attend they usually worked separately in a single enclosure pending the provision of a permanent building. By 1926 there were 22 boys' elementary schools, 9 girls' elementary, 2 boys' intermediate and 1 boys' trade school in the Southern Sudan. The bush schools or "out-schools", as the name implies, were usually located far from the mission stations and varied greatly in size and standards. The better ones taught the first two years' syllabus of elementary school course, leading to an examination for entry into the third class of the elementary school. These out-schools were on the whole similar to the northern type of sub-grade school but employed various local vernaculars as the media of instruction. But unlike the sub-grade schools in the Northern Sudan every pupil in a bush school could, if qualified, enter an elementary school although many had not the inclination

There was at this time 27 sons of prominent Chiefs in the mission school at Wau.
to do so at first. For the most part, however, the
bush schools were little more than centres for instruction in reading the Bible in the local vernacular and
some form of rudimentary hygiene.¹

The elementary schools ran a four-year course
similar to that in the North but English was often the
medium of instruction at least in the higher classes.
The curricula, syllabuses and teaching methods varied
depending upon the organisation of the individual
mission concerned. In some cases the standard of
English and arithmetic attained was higher than that
of the Arabic and arithmetic of many Northern schools
but the extent of general knowledge was appreciably
less. A considerable amount of time was devoted to the
teaching of the Christian religion.

The intermediate course for boys lasted six years. English was the medium of instruction for all
subjects save religion, which was taught in the vernacular. Graduates from elementary and intermediate
schools taught in bush schools and elementary schools
respectively. As for the catechists the Roman
Catholic Mission provided some training. The C.M.S.
did not do so until a later date. There were for
girls village and elementary schools only, as there
was little demand for girls' education during this early period. In view of the long distances between
the mission stations and the homes of the scattered

¹ L. M. Sanderson, "Educational Development in the
Southern Sudan 1900-1948", Sudan Notes and Records,
population most or all pupils of both sexes, were boarders. The approach of missions to education in the Southern Sudan made considerable sense. The boys received instruction in the acquisition of simple technical skills such as elementary carpentry, brick-laying and tailoring. The girls were taught health education, needlework and housecraft. In either case the missions were aiming at improving the general conditions of the Southerners and helping them to fit into their changing environment. The Government was pleased with the mission approach on realising that they were not after all concentrating all their time and efforts on evangelism. The ground was now prepared for Government intervention.

Despite shortage of cash and trained teachers some progress was made. The Government recognised the achievement of the Missions in the field of education and especially in reducing the multiplicity of the Southern tongues into literary media using the Roman script. In January 1926 Mr. Crowfoot, then Director of Education, wrote a memorandum containing definite proposals for subventions to missions. An Inspector of Education for the Southern provinces was appointed and in the following year 18 elementary vernacular schools, 3 intermediate and 1 trade school were considered worthy of grants. The actual total grant in that year was £.E.3,650 and a second Inspector for Southern Education was appointed. The subventions to missions were given

1. Sudan Government, Memorandum on Educational Policy in the Southern Sudan, (Khartoum, 30th May 1929), F.0.371/13865.
subject to the following general conditions:

(a) that a European exercise uninterrupted supervision over the school, and be withdrawn from the station only in cases of sickness and home leave.

(b) that the syllabuses as laid down be adhered to.

(c) that the Resident Inspector is satisfied with the progress and efficiency of the school.

(d) that if any of the conditions are unfulfilled the Resident Inspector may reduce or withdraw the grant for the following year.

The establishment of a system of annual subventions to mission schools opened up a whole area of cooperation between Government and Missions. At the same time the Government became directly concerned with the type and standard of education given in the schools. In return for a small Government subsidy the missions undertook to train a limited number of Southern Sudanese to fill Government posts as clerks, accountants and Chiefs Courts clerks. According to Sir John Maffey the Governor-General in 1929 the intermediate schools which had English as the language of instruction were "primarily designed to meet the demands of Government employment and to train teachers for the elementary schools."1 The system of regular inspection and

1. Memorandum on Educational Policy, (1929), op. cit.
supervision ensured that the schools lived up to the standard required by the Government.

The Rejaf Language Conference held in 1928 in Mongalla province represented the high water-mark of cooperation between Government and Missions. Chaired by the Secretary for Education and Health, Mr. Mathew, by the Missions the conference was strongly represented. The difficult question of which languages should be adopted as group languages¹ for educational purposes was settled and a uniform orthography adopted. Proposals were also made for cooperation in the production of text-books and the adoption of a skeletal grammar, reading books and primers for general use.² Intimately bound up with the issue of educational policy in the Southern Sudan was the largely political question of checking the southward spread of Islam from the Mohammedan North involving as it did, the further question of what should be the lingua franca in the South. Some form of pidgin Arabic had served this purpose in the past. But it was observed that Arabic was a vehicle for Islam, the spreading of which was undesirable from the points of view of both Government and the Missions. The Conference felt that as there were two languages to teach already, the local vernaculars and English, it was superfluous to add a

¹. The languages eventually adopted were: Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, Latuka and Zande.

third. The Governor-General noted later with approval that "these results of the achievements of the Conference would not have been obtained in the days when Government and Missions were as things apart."¹

He was right because it looked as though at that point in time the two organisations shared a common interest. The Government educational policy for the Southern Sudan crystallised in the late nineteen twenties. Briefly, the policy aimed to utilise the existing Christian missions for educational purposes, to subsidise them in order to increase their efficiency and to secure control over them, and, perhaps, later on, to found a Government secondary school. The alternative system of Government schools was ruled out as prohibitive of cost and therefore practically impossible at that time. "Our subsidies," the Government maintained, "make an existing arrangement more efficient by enabling the Missions to procure better and more numerous staff and give us a control which it would be almost impossible to exercise without them."² Furthermore, the introduction of another system even if it were practicable, it was argued, would not mean the disappearance of Missions from the Southern Sudan. They would still exist and would devote their energies to rapid proselytising and to such education as they might think necessary to that end. The reduction or withdrawal of

¹ Memorandum on Educational Policy, (1929), op. cit.
² Ibid.
Government subsidy would result in a deterioration of staff and the introduction of other nationalities to whom education and knowledge of the Southerners, let alone Government aims, were secondary considerations.¹

The policy of subsidized mission schools, however, caused Lord Lloyd (then British High Commissioner in Cairo) considerable misgivings. Experiences in other African territories had shown that missionary education was generally ineffective and Government intervention with schools of its own became necessary. In Kenya, for instance, the Government was compelled to open schools in certain districts. Similarly, in neighbouring Uganda where missionaries had had a free hand for some fifty years or so the results were no less unsatisfactory and the Government had to assume control of education and open schools of their own. The system of control by inspection and grants devised by the Sudan Government, he found equally insufficient. While appreciating the difficulties in the way of alternative policy of non-Mission schools, Lord Lloyd was emphatic that these difficulties should be faced. Accordingly, he recommended that officials in the Southern Sudan should be required, and encouraged, to learn the local languages and dialects; that every effort should be made by the adoption of group languages to simplify the language problem; that the use of Arabic should be discouraged and English gradually

¹. Memorandum on Educational Policy, (1929), op. cit.
substituted for it as the language to be used where communication in the local vernacular was impossible; and finally he was insistent that one or two Government schools should be established in selected localities to cope with the rising educational needs of the Southerners. He also warned against the dangers of a faulty policy in education above the elementary stage and expressed the view that missionaries should not be entrusted with its direction or even be the chief agents of that policy. His first three recommendations were in complete harmony with the views in Khartoum but not the last. In London, the Foreign Office were inclined to go along with the Sudan Government position that although the establishment of non-Mission schools was the ultimate objective, "for the time being the only thing to do is to carry on with missionary education."

Through annual meetings and the work of the Resident Inspector for Southern Provinces the Government was able to exert pressure on missionary societies to improve educational standards. Occasional educational conferences also proved valuable in the approach to tackle common problems and in the exchange of ideas.


2. Foreign Office Minutes on Lord Lloyd's despatch, Ibid.

3. The first educational conference that was fully representative of the South, unlike the Annual meetings was held in Mongalla in 1933.
Schools were classified into sub-grade, elementary, primary or intermediate, technical, agricultural and industrial. Sub-grade schools were re-modelled to feed elementary schools while a limited number of Southerners continued to go to Makerere College, Uganda, for secondary schools. English became the official language of the South and in 1945 an Assistant Director of Education was appointed to supervise educational work in the South with his headquarters at Juba in Mongalla Province. In 1933 there were 3 intermediate schools (the C.M.S. Loka intermediate school and the R.C.M. schools Okaru and Busere); 33 boys' elementary schools with a total attendance of 2,613; 11 girls' elementary and 3 trade schools (C.M.S. Loka school and R.C.M. schools at Wau and Torit. The Roman Catholic Mission were also running 2 teacher training colleges at Mupoi and Torit. In 1932 there were 263 out-schools attended by 7,500 children.1

When a regular system of subsidies were first instituted, Sir John Maffey boasted that "The happy combination of missionary enterprise and experience, on the one hand, and of Government aid, on the other, should afford sure ground and opportunity for the development of these negroid and pagan peoples," i.e. the Southerners.2 Clearly the

1. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from Within, op. cit., pp. 354-5.
2. Governor-General's Report for 1926, Sudan No. 2 (1927), Cmd. 2991, p. 8.
development of education for the following two decades did not bear out his prediction. By 1938 there was exactly the same number of intermediate schools as in 1928, namely 3 except that the attendance had increased from 130 to 300 boys. The 3 trade schools and two teacher training colleges remained constant save for a slight increase in attendance. These figures were repeated in 1945. Of the 35 boys' elementary schools with 300 pupils only 24 i.e. 78 per cent were certified as efficient and worthy of a grant. There were only 16 girls' elementary schools mostly in Equatoria province some of which received subsidies while over 600 village or sub-grade schools received no grant at all although the total attendance had risen to 15,435.\(^1\) The low figure in the number of schools was also reflected in the amount of Government subventions to missions. In 1927 the actual figure was £3,650 (not £3,800), in 1930 £7,925 while in 1936 there was only a slight increase bringing the total to £10,035.\(^2\)

During the great depression the Sudan Government might have been excused for not investing as much as she might have but, during the recovery years (1934-38) which had been for the Sudan a period of budget surplus,\(^3\) she had no excuse whatsoever. The ignorance

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2. *Foreign Office Memorandum on Education in the Sudan* (by Mr. Scrivener), 4th June 1936, F.O.371/20150.
and apathy of the Southerners during the early period may have slackened the urge to educational development. From the 1930s onwards there was a great demand for education. In 1933 for instance attendance at the American Presbyterian, the C.M.S. and the Roman Catholic Mission schools was good and even the Nilotics were no longer afraid or unwilling to send their children to school. Yet during this period educational impetus had slowed down.

Dissatisfied with the Sudan Government's educational record, the view of the F.O. by 1936 was that the time had come to take stock of educational policy in the Southern Sudan. The moment had certainly arrived, it was said, when the Sudan Government should make a better show in facing its inevitable task by taking over from the Missionaries or opening schools of its own. The Sudan Government was accused of abdicating entirely to the missionaries in the field of education. In the words of one F.O. staff, "The Sudan Government Policy is dangerously like a moment along the path of least resistance and minimum expense"; and he warned that "they may have to pay heavily one day." If the Sudan Government educational record was open to grave criticism she was not prepared as yet to apply herself seriously and effectively to the problem of educational development in the South. The Governor-General, Sir S. Symes argued that the time was not as yet ripe for

2. F.O. Memorandum (1936), op. cit.
educational expansion although he admitted the inadequacy of educational facilities in the Southern Sudan. The real danger of allowing abdication in favour of mission schools, as the F.O. saw it, was that it might go too far and continue too long.

After all, the Italian missionaries predominated in the field of education, which was politically undesirable especially following the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the subsequent expulsion of British missionaries. The Sudan Government were also accused of violating one of the cardinal principles of British Imperialism whereby the territories administered by H.M.'s Government were held in trust for the native inhabitants. "Unless something effective is done in the near future," the F.O. maintained, "the Sudan Government will lay themselves open to the same criticism as was levelled at Lord Cromer's regime in Egypt, namely that they have neglected the education of the natives and have instead concentrated on just and efficient Government." This was not, by any means, a far-fetched statement as there were other reasons for the adoption of lame duck policy by the Sudan Government regarding education in the Southern Sudan.

The Sudan Government's educational policy in

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1. Sudan Government, Memorandum on Educational Problems in the Sudan, (Despatch No. 109, 30th May 1936), enclosure in Lampson to F.O., F.0.371/20150.

2. The F.O. was pressing the Sudan Government to expel the Italian Missionaries from the Sudan in retaliation.

3. Vide the influential Foreign Office Memorandum on Educational Policy of the Sudan Government (by Mr. Pink), 18th September 1936. F.0.371/20150.
the South is better explained if looked at in the light of its other, administrative, policy. "The dominant theme of Government policy has always been," said one critic (himself a former administrator): "do not detribalise: make each boy a better member of his tribe."¹ The era of cooperation between Government and Mission was short-lived and many suggestions mostly aiming at the administration's ideals were not practised by the Missions. There was no open conflict as such, for it was in the interest of both parties to avoid one another as much as possible and the Government confined its criticisms of Missions within the covers of the secret files while it treated them in practice with spurious deference. The principle of Native Administration, as the Government saw it, implied that only the better class and better boys and not waifs and strays should be educated. Schools were started when there was no demand for education and chiefs tried out the unwanted boys. The results of thus educating boys with poor background had inevitably been the production of detribalised elements, of the anti-tribal type. This had brought the schools especially in Nilotic areas into disrepute and better-class parents, notably the chiefs, refused to send their children to school. One snag for the Government was that the poorer type of boys could not be re-

¹ J. B. Bowers, A Note on Mission and Education Policy in Upper Nile Province, (Secret) Khartoum, 14th February 1942. Being a summary of educational ideals and ideas in educational files, Malakal. The following information, unless otherwise stated, comes from the same source.
absorbed into tribal life as leaders of their people. The findings of the Committee of the Malakal Conference of 1942 had warned against this danger.

This touch of class bias in educational practice was unacceptable to the Missionary Societies who argued with some plausibility, that, "1. We have a Christian duty to waifs and orphans; 2. We cannot get the better boys." The latter point was especially true of the Dinka (C.M.S.), Nuer (American Mission) and Shilluk (R.C.M.) where the use of schools as evangelising agencies to educate the children of pagans away from their tribe aroused resentment and opposition from the parents. One possible reason, apart from mere suspicion, was that spiritual beliefs among these tribes were highly developed.¹

There was an inherent contradiction in the position adopted by Government and Missions. The primary aim of the Education Department in the Southern Sudan was defined as an attempt "to fit the ordinary individual [Southerner] to fill a useful part in his environment, with happiness to himself."² In pursuance of this policy the educational conference held in Juba in April 1933 decided that the majority of the boys educated at Mission elementary schools would return to the tribe. There was general agreement that the system of education must be adapted to prepare them for this

¹ C.G.d B.Z. Seligman, Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan (London 1932).
² Quoted in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from Within, op. cit. p. 353.
return and to enable them to use their acquired knowledge, however limited, for the benefit of themselves and their fellow tribesmen.¹ The Government also sought to limit post-elementary education to the needs of Government trade and Mission employment on the ground that "higher" education encouraged detribalisation. The limited number of intermediate school-leavers was therefore dictated by opportunities for absorption into Government service, teaching or other authorised profession. But mission education implied, almost by definition, detribalisation. The very practice of the C.M.S. and I.R.C. missions of giving converts or schoolboys foreign Christian names was in subtle conflict with the ideals of making each boy a better member of his society and fitting him for tribal life. The practice necessarily set up the Church or Missions as an antithesis of the tribal culture.

From native administration point of view, "Loka and Bussere intermediate schools were turning out waste products to the Upper Nile."² Paralleling this development was the fact that already "a considerable draft of half-educated potential (political) malcontents had gravitated to Malakal and other principal Southern towns" by the early forties.³

Both Government and Mission were well aware that any development of higher education in the South must accompany the general economic, cultural and

². J. B. Bowers, op. cit.
³. Ibid.
educational progress of the Southern tribes. But this was impossible to achieve while native administration policy was in vogue and Government education policy was pushed to the extreme of requiring younger age of entry into elementary school so that boys might return to tribal life before initiation. It was not that the Missions were not doing their job properly either. The Governor-General, Sir Stewart Symes, himself paid them tribute when, in 1937, he wrote: "The Missionary Societies have carried on their educational work steadily and to the best of their ability, and have continued to render valuable assistance in the production of text-books and grammars in the local group languages."¹ From this statement it may be inferred that the missions had done what was within their means but that the responsibility for lack of expansion in education, particularly post-elementary, rested squarely with the Government. As a matter of fact, with the educational ceiling thus fixed, the brighter boys who did not wish to take up Government jobs or return to tribal life often opted for seminary schools in preparation for priesthood.² If he failed or changed his mind at any stage he was competent enough to teach in mission schools. The practice was fairly common, especially in later years, among pupils of the Roman Catholic Mission

². The Protestant Missions had a different recruitment pattern.
schools. The R.C. Missionaries themselves often showed special interest in, and encouraged, the more intelligent of their pupils with the view to persuade them to heed the "call" of God.

Some British Field staff at the district level realised the difficulty of total reliance on missionary education to deliver the goods of the quality and quantity demanded by Government employment. Granted that the Missions were primarily religious institutions their opposition to the Government policy of native administration was inevitable. The Field staff were in agreement with the Central Government policy that in Negroid Africa education must be confined to the few but that these few, in virtue of their training, were going to obtain immense power over their uneducated brethren and it was essential that they should be carefully selected. Unfortunately for the Administration, it was impossible to realise this objective within the framework of subsidised missionary education. "The drawback to mission schools as opposed to purely educational schools," it was pointed out, "is that the Missions are out to break the indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs of the natives ..."¹ The inescapable inference was that secular or Government schools should be opened where future administrative staff (sons of Chiefs) and clerical staff could be educated without becoming detribalised.

¹ District Commissioner Northern District to Governor Bahr el Ghazal, (n.d.?) (Strictly confidential) S.G.A./BGP/ND/SCR/1/C/1.
It is difficult not to accept this conclusion as, apparently, one could not possibly teach the Gospel (or indeed the Koran) in Southern Sudanese schools at that time and hope that somehow or other the outcome would be something other than detribalisation.

Southern Policy entailed that Southern Sudanese boys should be educated to fill administrative, clerical and technical posts in the South in place of the Northern personnel. Yet as late as 1942 the number of boys passing out of the intermediate schools still fell far short of Government target. In his 1938 progress report on educational and administrative policy in force in the Southern Sudan the Governor-General admitted that the difficulty of turning products from the intermediate schools into efficient clerks, book-keepers or technicians was a formidable one; that the percentage of Southerners among the staff could only increase gradually and pari passu with increased results from mission education. He also noted that teaching was mainly in the hands of Italian missionaries, whose English was limited and inadequate. "Until a larger staff of better qualified teachers is available," he concluded, "progress will not be rapid." Despite this wise remark, the Government made no effort to open intermediate and technical schools of its own. The only Government school that ever existed in the South during this period was the Stack Memorial school at Wau.


2. Seventh Progress Report by the Governor-General on Education and Administrative Policy in the Southern Sudan (Secret), 10th March 1938, Despatch No. 31/1.C.1. F.O.371/21999.
opened in December 1927, for the sole purpose of training clerks and book-keepers, but closed towards the end of 1930. On re-opening in 1931 it was merged into the Roman Catholic Intermediate school situated at Bussere. It has been suggested that during the period under review Government educational policy aimed at improving the standard rather than quantitative expansion in elementary and intermediate education. This may now appear to have been short-sightedness on the part of the Sudan Government on account of its neglect of the education of the Southerners during a most crucial period.

If better-class children were to be educated for their future role of leadership, it follows logically that there should have been created an exclusive school designated 'for sons of chiefs'. But this aristocratic idea of education implied rapid advance towards Westernisation of some kind, a feature which was inconsistent with the policy of native administration prevalent in the Southern Sudan. The ill-effect of indirect rule on educational advancement in the Sudan came under severe criticism by Mr. (later Sir) James Currie, a former Director of Education and Health to the Sudan Government, thus:

As devised by men of the type of Cromer and Lugard, Wingate and Slatin, and developed by Cameron and Gowers, (indirect administration) was a fine conception. But to utilise

it as an excuse for closing down educational development is to pervert it, and this is what is occurring.1

In fairness to the Sudan Government it must be stressed that shortage of cash and the necessity to check Islamic penetration of the South were the real hindrances to the establishment of a system of purely secular education under Government management. As a result of these considerations the administration found itself compelled "to steer a course between the Scylla of a possibly hostile European Nationalist penetration by Italian personnel and the Charybdis of a pernicious and obscurantist form of Islam which would present itself quickly in the region if Christian endeavour at this stage was seriously relaxed."2

There can be little doubt that the administration felt that Mission education, dominated by Italian missionaries and however inadequate, was a lesser evil than Islamic propaganda in the South; hence the continuation of Southern Policy and reliance on Mission education.

From the late thirties the Sudan Government became more amenable to F.O. pressure, and to attempt a closer examination of missionary education. The De La Warr Report of 1937 (though not specifically concerned with the South) underlined the urgency for


educational reform in the Southern Sudan. The Commission attributed the disappointing results of Southern education to the following factors:

(i) lack of sufficient trained personnel
(ii) lack of proper organisation and planning
(iii) the absence of a common language for vernacular education.

While recommending the development of education within the existing Mission framework, it also expressed the view that Mission educators should be trained at the London Institute of Education or obtain an equivalent Diploma elsewhere. The Report also pointed out the insistent demand among the educated Sudanese for the immediate expansion of educational facilities to enable the introduction of Southerners to secondary schools in the North.¹

In 1937 Mr. Cox, the Director of Education went out to the South on an inspection tour of Mission schools. The Report he submitted to the Sudan Government on his return was described by the British High Commissioner in Cairo as of "considerable interest and importance."² It furnished increased proof of the danger, both political and educational, of allowing the Italian Catholics to continue to dominate Southern education. It re-affirmed the charge that the result

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¹ Lord De La Warr Commission Report 1937 (Sudan Government, Khartoum) but see F.0.371/21998.
² M. Lampson to A. Eden, Cairo Despatch No. 30 (83/3/38) of 11th January 1938, F.0.371/21998.
of missionary evangelical and educational work as a whole was quite inimical to the official policy of native administration. "The preservation, development and transformation of potentially valuable native customs," he wrote, "does not appear to have a place among the aims or methods of the Missions." The charge applied equally to all missionary societies, whether British or Italian, Protestant or Catholic. The Report pointed out that in the particular case of the Italian Catholic missionaries, nationality and upbringing debarred them from the possibility of appreciating the ideals of the Government policy. Illustrative of the Fathers' disregard of the dangers of detribalisation was cited an article in the Bussere Messenger dealing with the wearing of charms and tribal usage in which readers were urged that "Christianity is now your tribe."¹

In assessing the relative achievements of the leading Missions in the South, it must be pointed out that the Italian Roman Catholics were better organised and better equipped in terms of both money and manpower. They had a better educational (and evangelical) record than their Protestant competitors. The explanation, according to one observer lay in the fact that apart from shortage of cash, the C.M.S. officials were simply "too individualistic, too bothered by the anxieties of wives and children resulting in the poor education

¹ Quoted in Mr. Cox's "Memorandum on Educational Development in the Southern Sudan". S. G. (Khartoum, 1937).
The individualistic approach of the C.M.S. to both education and evangelisation also tended to discriminate against their boys seeking office employment. On Cox's findings, employers with experience of boys trained by both leading Missions appeared to prefer the more disciplined and amenable Catholic boy to the more independent Protestant. C.M.S. education, with its emphasis upon initiative tended to develop qualities of conceit and unreliability in its receiver. Catholic education was not without its drawback either; it seemed to have failed to encourage the training of leaders and the development of a sense of responsibility. The Resident Inspector wrote that he knew of no native who had ever received training for a post of even minor responsibility in the Catholic Mission. The Verona Fathers simply liked to have all authority concentrated in their hands, leaving little or no scope for delegated responsibility to the natives.

The techniques of recruitment to Mission education also differed widely; the method adopted by the Catholic Mission being the less fair and less preferable from the point of view of Government policy. In almost all Catholic Mission stations elementary education was conditional upon acceptance of the Faith. Catechumenates furnished excellent recruiting centres, and vacancies in schools tended to be filled by promising catechumens. In one school visited, all the pupils were

1. J. Robertson - R. C. Mayall (Private) 19th May 1944. F.0.371/4/1363.
2. Mr. Cox's "Memorandum on Education in the Southern Sudan", op. cit.
Catholics and in others all but a few in their first year. In marked contrast, the technique of the Protestant Mission often called for long schooling and vigorous tests, educational and financial, prior to baptism. Mr. Cox had not the slightest doubt that the recruitment pattern of Catholic education constituted one principle cause of failure of that Mission with the Nilotics, the largest tribal group in the Southern Sudan. Presented with the simple choice of Catholicism or continuation in illiteracy, the Nilote naturally opted for the latter.

The most serious side to continued Catholic education of the Southerners revolved around the political implication of the almost exclusively Italian personnel. (The point has been made) that the Italian missionaries as a whole had little sympathy with the Government or its officials. Granted that the majority of Government officials in the South were Protestants, it was felt inappropriate and undesirable that the natives should be taught by their Catholic masters that "the District Commissioners and other authorities will be damned eternally in Hell fire." According to Sir M. Lampson, the British Ambassador in Cairo, "it is

1. The author was among the lucky few to escape the six-month routine course in catechism in preparation for baptism. He was baptised in 1953 in the third year elementary, having distinguished himself by leading prayers in Church and winning several Bishop's catechism prizes.

2. F.O. Minutes on Sir M. Lampson's Despatch No. 30/84/3/38 of 11th January 1938, comments by Mr. Cavendish-Bentick who also admitted "this is not quite the way to put it", F.O. 371/21998.
in this political angle which really matters." He contended that any system which allowed the continued domination by potential enemy agents of the South was most unsound and dangerous. Hence his unshakeable conviction that a purely state education, despite practical difficulties and moral risks let alone the serious financial burden involved, was the real solution to the educational problem of the South.¹

Official pronouncements from Khartoum, however, discounted any "Caesarean" method of complete substitution of Italians by suitable non-Italians. Such a course of action would have been feasible if an English Order was forthcoming immediately to replace the Verona Mission, but there was not. Further, the Sudan Government would have to treat cautiously with the Vatican in matters affecting Italian Missionaries. Against this background, therefore, Khartoum was prepared to endorse the recommendations of the Director of Education. In a despatch to the British Foreign Office the Governor-General stated the position of the Sudan Government thus:

the best and most practical course open to us is to press urgently, not for the suppression of the Verona Mission as such, but for the early introduction of radical reforms on the lines advanced by Mr. Cox in Section IV of his report.²


Briefly, Mr. Cox's reform proposals included, among other things, the appointment of suitable non-Italians in key positions in the Roman Catholic Mission; the recruitment of qualified British teachers for educational work; and general improvements in educational system and methods.¹

What were 'radical' reforms by Sudan Government standards, majority opinion at the British Foreign Office saw as mere "palliatives". At least one senior official at the Foreign Office, however, found himself in considerable sympathy with the views from Khartoum as they "represent the policy which (the F.O.) have repeatedly attempted to enforce on the Sudan Government."² In the end it was realised that a careful balance was necessary, hence the Foreign Office's acceptance of Mr. Cox's compromise proposals.³

When the Mill Hill Fathers (British Order) replaced the Verona Fathers in the Upper Nile Vicariate in 1938, the Governor-General had three considerations in mind:

(i) strategically it was en route to Abyssinia
(ii) the British were more likely to succeed with the Nilotes

¹ C. Cox's "Memorandum on Education in Southern Sudan", op. cit. Section
² F.O. Minutes on Sir M. Lampson's Despatch No. 30/84/3/38, 11th January 1938, Comments by Mr. Pink.
³ F.O. Minutes on Sir S. Lampson's Despatch, op. cit.
(iii) it was thought that the move would be less difficult for the Vatican to accept and less bitter for the Verona Order to evacuate, as there were only four Italians involved.

Clearly, the limited reform affected only a fringe of the Italian empire. In the words of the Director of Education "The Bahr El Jebel [enlarged Equatoria] is a much bigger and much more prosperous affair." The first Government schools were not opened until 1944, comprising a central school under a British headmaster at Abwong in the Upper Nile Province and a village school at Tonj, all in the Nilotic heartland. They marked the beginning of a new era in state education.

1. C. Cox to Mr. Pink (private), 20th February 1938, F.O.371/21998.

ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE NEW SOUTHERN POLICY

An intricate web of political entanglement enveloped the British during and immediately after the Second World War. At the centre was the growing nationalist sentiment both in Egypt and in the Northern Sudan. While the Egyptian nationalists were ostensibly anxious that the British might frustrate legitimate Egyptian aspirations for the union of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown and constitution, the Northern Sudanese were equally suspicious that the Sudanese Government entertained a secret design for separating the Southern Provinces and annexing them to East Africa. In the ensuing political and diplomatic exercises, however, the Sudan Government became progressively receptive to Northern Sudanese political opinion. The United Kingdom Government, on the other hand, kept its ear close to the ground of Egyptian nationalist propaganda expressed in the slogan of "Unity of the Nile Valley". If Southern Policy had been a source of permanent embarrassment to the Sudan Government vis-a-vis Northern Sudanese, the future of the Sudan proved to be an equally enduring embarrassment to the British Government vis-a-vis Egypt. In any case, both the Sudan and the United Kingdom Governments walked a tight rope. As a result of international political developments, the British bowed to Arab nationalist pressures in return for strategic interests in the Suez and the Middle East in general. In the circumstances, however, the objective interests of the as yet politically immature
Southern Sudan were submerged and lofty principles sacrificed or deliberately lost sight of (a grim reminder of the primacy of national interest in the theatre of international politics). History repeats itself; sometimes in a cynical manner. Just as Big Power rivalries had led, at the turn of the century, to the conquest of the South so also would Anglo-Egyptian competition for influence in the Sudan fifty years later ultimately cast the fate of the Southern Sudan with that of the Arab Northern and Middle Eastern world. While the "Sudan Question" precipitated an Anglo-Egyptian crisis culminating in Egypt taking its sovereign claims over the Sudan to the Security Council of the United Nations, the fate of the Southern Sudan was hastily decided in Khartoum in a most controversial and unsatisfactory manner. The process by which the Sudan Government moved from a variety of positions to the adoption of a policy of developing Southern Sudan not on the Southern, Negroid and African but on the Northern, Arab and Middle Eastern lines is the concern of this chapter.

The War and Political Development in the Northern Sudan

To assess the impact of the war upon the development of political consciousness in the Northern Sudan, it is necessary to state in the briefest possible terms Sudanese contributions to Allied War efforts. When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, it seemed too distant and remote to cause any serious worry or concern to the Sudanese people. The entry of Italy on 11th June 1940, into the war on the side of Germany however, constituted an immediate
and dangerous threat both to the Sudan and to Egypt. To defend the 1,200 mile Sudanese frontier with Eritrea and Abyssinia from invasion by the Italian army of about 300,000 men presented an ominous and formidable task. The forces assembled to counter this threat composed of only the tiny Sudan Defence Force of 4,500 men and 2,500 British Troops without armour or artillery. The Sudan Defence Force, which had been first raised in 1925 to replace Egyptian troops, fought a war of bluff and succeeded in staving off the projected Italian invasion until a joint British and Indian army reinforcements arrived and were able, after a brief campaign in Eritrea and Ethiopia, to compel the Italian surrender. Throughout the war period the Sudanese gave their British masters material as well as moral support and some Sudanese recruits actually fought side by side with Allied forces in North Africa. The Sudan sold the United Kingdom about £20 million worth of cotton plus foodstuffs other than meat, hides and timbers in considerable quantities. Large quantities of manufactured articles were also sold at cost prices. In addition, the strictest control was also kept over prices, which had always been far below those in neighbouring colonial territories.  

The over-all effect of the war on the Sudan was to bring Northern Sudanese into the mainstream of world events and to give a great stimulus to Sudanese nationalism. The effect of the upheavals and stimulus of war upon the minds

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of the majority of the country people had been of an educative nature: it broadened their outlook and brought them out of the comparative isolationism or parochialism of their domestic life.¹ Among the educated class and more sophisticated urban dwellers (restricted mainly to the riverain Arab districts and centred in Omdurman), however, the effect had been much more pointed and dramatic: nationalist sentiment had been stimulated and there arose a natural demand for the rewards for the Sudanese efforts and sacrifices during the War.² The Governor-General, Sir Hubert Huddleston, bore testimony to the accelerating process of Sudanese³ political awakening thrown up by the war when he commented in late 1945: "The Sudanese are becoming more and more politically conscious and ambitious: they are growing towards nationhood and they are becoming increasingly interested in their future."⁴ Evidence of increased political consciousness and activity and a deep concern for the future is discernable from the emergence during the war of two major political parties in the Northern Sudan: the umma (nation) and the Ashigga (blood brotherhood) parties.

². Ibid.
³. Northern Sudanese Political awakening is here meant.
⁴. Governor-General's Memorandum on the future of the Sudan (secret), 12th September 1945, F.O.371/45985.
The Sudanese independence movement, like independence movements everywhere, did not and could not be expected to remain monolithic in structure and organisation. Differences of opinion centred on the question of the appropriate strategy to be adopted, ideological or religious rivalries, nationalist impatience and sheer personal ambitions were some of the component elements of potential rift within nationalist ranks. The nucleus of Northern Sudanese nationalism was the Graduates' General Congress founded in 1937 mainly for and by the Sudanese effendia. From an elitist and exclusive intelligentsia's social club, it increasingly took on the role of articulating the political aspirations of the Sudanese. Towards the end of the war, however, and as a result of Egyptian propaganda, a split developed within the Congress with opinions eventually polarised between support for union with Egypt or complete independence for the Sudan as soon as the Sudanese were sufficiently equipped with the necessary level of maturity and experience to determine the form of that independence.¹

The rift became apparent towards the end of 1944 when the pro-Egyptian party, the Ashigga, under the leadership of Ismail el Azhari² fought and won the Congress election of that year on a "union with Egypt" platform. Azhari and his followers deliberately exploited the sectarian Mirghanist³

1. Memorandum by Mr. Penney on the Political situation in the Sudan (Secret). Inclosure in Robertson to Mr. Mayall (personal), 25th October 1945, F.0.371/45986.
2. Azhari: President of Graduates General Congress and later, Chairman of the pro-Egyptian National Unionist Party and Sudan's first Prime Minister.
3. El Sayed Sr Ali el Mirghani: Head of the Mirghania (or Khatmia) Sufi order based in Eastern Sudan.
support to capture the Congress Executive Committee. The
Azhari-Ashigga-Mirghanist victory was largely due to the
success of their campaign and propaganda which threatened
the voters, if they failed to support Ashigga, with the
return of the Mahdia and Sayed Abdel Rahman as King of the
Sudan. Moderate patriotic opinion, opposed to any move
that might compromise future independence of the Sudan,
was alarmed as were the supporters of the Mahdist camp.
The Umma party, of which Sayed Abdel Rahman was patron,
represented organised expression of this alarm. What
prompted the formation of this Party was, in the words of
one of its founders:

... an urgent feeling that the time had
come for responsible indigenous Sudanese
opinion to organise itself and make the
real wishes of the vast majority of the
Sudanese known to the world, so that the
foolish and irresponsible clamour of a
minority that had been won by propaganda
from outside the Sudan should not be
taken as an expression of genuine Sudanese
feeling and exploited as such by Egypt...

Gradually, Congress became a movement representing the
Ashigga/Mirghanist interest only while a large number of
the more moderate of the educated Sudanese refused to be
associated with it. As the Umma party's inspiration was
in part Mahdist, the stage was set for a two-party contest
between the Ashigga and the Umma. A senior Sudan Govern-
ment official noted this fact when he commented, "it means

1. El Sayed Sir Abdel Rahman el Mahdia: Posthumous son of
Mohamed Ahmed el Mahdi and head of the Ahsar sect. It is
to be remembered that neither of the two Sayeds formerly
identified himself with any political group.

2. Ahmed Othman El Qadi to Sir Stafford Cripps (a retired
official of the Sudan Government) (private) Lst.
May, 1945; F.0.371/45984.
that our political adversaries have now resolved themselves into the old sectarian strife between Mahdists and Mirghanists.\textsuperscript{1} This was at least apparently inconvenient to the administration because the clarity of the main issue of "separatism" as against some form of union with Egypt was being obscured by the old Mahdist/Mirghanist rivalries. The Administration would have liked to damp down the Sayeds' rivalries or polarisation in favour of some sort of united front which would devote its immediate energies to the practical realisation of self-government programme, but the rift between the two notables was almost unbridgable.\textsuperscript{2}

The Umma Party failed to gain control of the Congress Executive Committee not because the Ashigga were necessarily popular but because of the Umma Party's own tactical errors. Although the Party adopted as its slogan "the Sudan for the Sudanese", its Mahdist origins damned it in the eyes of many tribal leaders and educated moderates. Some of the supporters of Sayed Abdel Rahman inadvisedly propagated the kingship idea which contributed greatly to the Umma-Mahdist defeat. The Sayed himself made no attempt to clear himself of the alleged royalist ambitions and his manner of living tended to lend support to the charge. The Party was largely financed and staffed by the Mahdist Treasury. The Party even selected as its main propagandists individuals notorious for their extreme Mahdist views. More serious

\textsuperscript{1} Penney to Haselden (secret) CS/SCR/10.C.7. 26th November 1945, F.O.371/45988.
\textsuperscript{2} Robertson to Fouracres (secret), 8th April 1945. F.O.371/45984.
than the Mahdist origins was an alleged Government connection. Having adopted as its programme what in effect was the Government's policy of gradual self-government for the Sudan, the Umma laid itself open to the obvious charge of being a Government Party. As a matter of fact scores of prominent Umma Party supporters dared to go to the extraordinary length of widely proclaiming that their party had the support of the Government.¹ The fact that the Government had encouraged the formation of an independent newspaper with a non-sectarian rural bias called "El-Umma" (before a party with the name was founded) seemed to confirm the Government connection. Needless to say, anti-Umma Party elements both in Khartoum and in Cairo capitalised on the alleged Government connection to party advantage. Despite obvious embarrassment to the Government the existence of the Umma Party was of potential value to the Administration. Sir James Robertson who succeeded Douglas Newbold as Civil Secretary explained the Government dilemma: "If we show neglect or mishandle (the Umma Party) as to lose its support we may find ourselves a trifle friendless when the inevitable show-down occurs..."²

The Civil Secretary's warning strikes a resounding chord and provides a vital clue to the direction of Government thinking in the Sudan. The Administration's strategy henceforth aimed at securing the alliance of the more moderate Sudanese nationalists whose interests would necessarily be in line with those of the British. Lord

¹. Robertson to Fouraces (secret), 8th April 1945. F.O.371/45984.

². Ibid.
Killearn, then Ambassador in Cairo, defined His Majesty's Government's objectives in the Sudan towards the end of 1945 as being "primarily, to maintain (British) preponderant position in a strategically important area, and, secondarily, to carry out our traditional policy of guiding (the Sudanese) by gradual stages towards self-government..." There was a widespread belief, or apparent belief, among British officials in the Sudan that on achieving independence the Sudanese would wish to associate themselves with the British Commonwealth. It was on this ground that Lord Killearn strongly urged that Egyptian influence in the Sudan should be kept to the minimum.

In the realisation of their objectives the British found a natural ally in the school of thought represented by Sayed Abdel Rahman and the Umma Party. The latter was regarded as the main defence-work against Egyptian 'invasion'. Its programme embodied the aspirations and fears of the majority of responsible and independent-minded Sudanese in urban as well as in the rural areas. By official estimation it was the strongest and most influential of all the nationalist parties. The nationalism advocated by this school of thought was fundamentally more indigenous and more purely Sudanese, both in its historical derivatives as well as long-range objectives, than the pro-Egyptian brand. The government felt that it was more likely to arouse the enthusiasm of every responsible Sudanese than the "foreign" nationalism inspired from Egypt. Sayed Abdel

1. Lord Killearn to Governor-General of the Sudan (secret), No.44/41/22/45. F.O. 371/45984.
Rahman himself made no bones of his support for, and gratitude to, the British for their administrative record in the Sudan. In a characteristic manner he once declared to a senior official of the British Foreign Office that he thought the British should be pleased to know that he, the son of Mahdi who was their enemy sixty years previously, was now their staunchest friend and ally.¹ He was confident that the Sudan could realise its true aspirations only through cooperation with the British Government and people. Egyptian propaganda alone seemed to present a serious threat to the prospects of an independent Sudan. Sayed Abdel Rahman was therefore adamant that should the British feel compelled to reward Egyptian war efforts the Sudan ought not to be made to pay the price as it would be grossly unfair to attempt to reward one party at the expense of the other.² The Khartoum government felt that pro-Egyptian Ashigga Party represented but a minor school of thought. Led by "a pair of clever demagogues and political intriguers", who exercised a certain amount of influence over the lower intelligentsia and artisan class, it had little standing in the country as a whole.³

A moderate school of nationalist thought in fact lacked both coherence and leadership: "it merely consists of a number of individuals who think vaguely along the same lines". Throughout most of the 1940s this group of

1. Note on Mr. Scriverner's interview with Sayed Abdel Rahman CS/SOR/91A.1, 27th February 1944, F.0.371/41363.
2. Ibid.
3. PIC Paper No.66 "The Sudan and the Future" (secret) PIC/191/37/13, F.0.371/41363.
nationalists remained confused, perplexed and indecisive about the future of the Sudan. Like the Umma Party, they too were opposed to any form of union with Egypt. They believed that the Sudan should have a nationality of its own and should be allowed to develop her own indigenous character and the institutions that would make possible self-government, but were ambivalent in their attitudes towards the two Co-Domini powers:

"... While they have a poor opinion of the Egyptians as statesmen and administrators and a healthy fear of being corrupted and ruined by Egyptian methods should they come under Egyptian political control, yet, on the other hand, they are averse to severing their connection with Egypt entirely and placing themselves under British protection ..." 1

The reluctance to place themselves permanently under British suzerainty stemmed from a feeling on the part of the Sudanese nationalists of natural links with Egypt. There was also the argument that, after all, Egypt's share in the Condominium served as a check on the British and a useful safeguard for the Sudanese. 2 For this reason this group of nationalists were inclined to favour the continuation of the Condominium for another decade or more. This school of thought, which might be called the realist school, found adequate expression in the person of Sayed Ali El Mirghani. Sayed Ali, without being at heart either pro-Egyptian or anti-British, was described as "a timid man with a strong preference for a non-committal seat on the fence." 3 Though

1. PIC Paper No.66 "The Sudan and the Future" (secret), PIC/191/37/13, F.0.371/41363.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
his weight in the country had diminished significantly at the end of the war, he was still a factor to take count of. He and his followers were opposed to Sayed Abdel Rahman's separatist policy towards Egypt not because they were ardent advocates of union with Egypt but more probably because they suspected him of royalist ambitions. In this context it became clear to the British officials in the Sudan that if the issue was forced upon him, Sayed Ali El Mirghani might easily come down on the side of the pro-Egyptian party. The late D. Newbold, then Civil Secretary, foresaw the possibility of this happening in August 1944. He reckoned that Sayed Abdel Rahman's separatist and royalist ambitions would drive the Mirghanists into the Egyptian camp; that Sayed Ali would go to any lengths to counter his rival's rather blatant campaign to "cash-in" on Sudanese self-government and that the end product of it all would be the emergence of a definite union with the Egyptian Party.¹ He was right.

Unquestionably, the number of politically-minded Sudanese was small and all the Nationalist groups put together only accounted for a small minority. Despite their small numerical strength vis-a-vis the total population, however, educated Sudanese opinion was what the Government could not afford to ignore or condemn as unreasonable. The relative strength of the nationalists was measured by the extent to which they could influence

¹ Quoted in Robertson to Fouracres (secret) CS/SCR/36.M.8, 8th April 1945, F.0.371/45984.
the non-political masses of the people, who had no love whatsoever for the Egyptians, and who had as yet the memory of Egyptian misrule before the Mahdia and of the malpractices of Egyptian Mamurs in the early days of the Condominium. Yet, Newbold stated the truth when he wrote that many Englishmen lived in a fools Paradise, thinking that if a straight choice between Britain and Egypt was asked of the Sudanese they would, as a matter of course, opt for Britain. He thought that tribal headmen and tribesmen mostly would do so including many older officials, but not the main body of effenda. More importantly, these educated Sudanese were becoming disillusioned at the pace of progress towards self-government: "They wish to advance at the speed of the fastest, not of the slowest nor even of the average." The Administration had not the slightest doubt, therefore, that "the vital thing on the day of the 'show-down' is not what will the Egyptian Government do or H.M.G. do, but what line the Sudanese (Nationalists) will take."  

Meanwhile, it appeared that the United Kingdom Government was not responsive enough to the growing Nationalist agitation in the Sudan. In his most important memorandum on the future of the Sudan, dated 12th September 1945, the

2. Douglas Newbold to R.C.Mayall (secret and personal) CS/SCR/97.4.6, 28th November 1943, F.0.371/35576.
3. Governor-General's Memorandum on the Future of the Sudan (secret), 12th September 1945, F.0.371/45985.
4. Newbold to Mayall (secret and personal) CS/SCR/97.4.6. 28th November 1943, F.0.371/35576.
Governor-General warned the British Foreign Office against the danger of keeping the Sudanese in the dark as to the eventual intentions of the British Government. Failure to give a quick promise of self-government to the Sudanese, he reckoned, might prejudice beyond recovery the chance of retaining some influence in the area. Special attention was to be paid to the winning and retaining of the confidence of Nationalists of the "realist" school who, though in favour of a strong British connection, were not ready to wait indefinitely for the promise of it. Time was definitely running out for them in their attempt to keep on the right side of both Condominium Powers and "it would be only natural if they turned rapidly to the Egyptian connection rather than the prolonged acquiescence in the British policy of excluding Egyptian influence from the Sudan." The Sudan Government's position may be summarised thus:

If the British appear to be delaying the achievement of self-government unduly, however worthy their motives, the educated Sudanese will turn increasingly to the Egyptians in the hope that they will grant it sooner and that they will also approve greater material aid in the development of the country.

Thus persuaded, the United Kingdom Government authorised Mr. Bevin, then Foreign Secretary, to make a statement in the House of Commons on 26th March 1946, to the effect that "His Majesty's Government looked forward to the day when the Sudanese would be able finally to decide their

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1. Governor-General's memorandum on the future of the Sudan (secret), 12th September 1945, F.0.371/45985.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
political future for themselves."\(^1\) This bold statement of policy, though prejudicial to the outcome of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiation scheduled for opening in Cairo late that year, went a long way to reassure the Sudanese Nationalists. It also prepared the ground for a healthy cooperation between the Government and the Nationalists in preparation for an orderly transfer of power in the Sudan.\(^2\)

The Sudan Government itself had not been neutral or indifferent but had deliberately encouraged Sudanese Nationalism partly in fulfillment of its obligations as trustee but mainly as a defence against Egyptian aspirations in the Sudan. The able and competent Civil Secretary, Sir Douglas Newbold, had warned his British officials of the difficulty of adopting a non-possimuss attitude over political advance after the war to the Sudanese, "when Egypt may be dangling a deed of partnership like a yellow carrot in front of their nose."\(^3\) In furtherance of the declared objective of self-government the Sudan Government had since 1942 initiated measures aimed at (i) the development of Sudanese local government, (ii) the progressive Sudanisation in all branches of the Civil Service, and, more importantly, (iii) the creation of an Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. This policy of educating the Northern Sudanese up to self-government was viewed in Egypt with suspicion and as aiming at the eventual complete separation of the Sudan from Egypt.

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2. The United Kingdom Government made a grant-in-aid to the Sudan to the value of £2 million pounds.

and its possible inclusion in the British Commonwealth.\(^1\)

The tug-of-war between Egypt and Great Britain over the Sudan could not have come at a worse time for either party in the Condominium. Britain emerged from the war tired, exhausted and militarily and economically weak. The ultimate sanction of force was out of the question in the dispute with Egypt over the Sudan. Not only would post-World War II international political climate not permit it, but Egypt was an ally and Egyptian military bases had been of the utmost importance for the defence of the whole Middle East, including the Sudan.\(^2\) Clearly, this was hard evidence that the Egyptians had carried out their obligations under the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance and Friendship to the full. In fact, Great Britain was also indebted to Egypt for her contributions towards Allied War efforts. As for Egypt, cultural and historical links with the Sudan did not prove to be of a special advantage. Sudanese political consciousness, as has been said, had developed considerably since 1936 so that at the end of the war the Sudanese were staking claim to a higher political status. For the first time ever in the history of the Condominium the wishes of the Sudanese would be a significant consideration, if not the decisive factor. The Egyptians were aware of this development and were clever enough to stake their whole cause

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1. Governor-General's Memorandum on the Future of the Sudan (secret), 12th September 1945, F.0.371/45985.

2. Note on Mr. Scrivener's interviews with the two Sayeds CS/SCR/91.A.1, 27th February 1944, Civil Secretary's Office, Khartoum. F.0.371/41363.
on a direct appeal to the Sudanese. The pro-Egyptian
Ashigga Party was a result of this appeal.

The political and constitutional developments in the
Sudan initiated largely by the Sudan Government were
warning signals to Egypt that British officials were
encouraging a separatist Sudanese movement inimical to
Egypt's interests and that unless she acted swiftly she
might lose the Sudan for good. During the war itself,
the future of the Sudan had been the subject of much specu-
lation in the Egyptian Press. The Sudan Government had
anticipated possible Egyptian moves and warned the British
Government accordingly. The heart of the Egyptian claim
lay in the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.
Article Two of the Agreement stipulated that "the Primary
aim of the administration in the Sudan must be the welfare
of the Sudanese." Although Egyptian troops and Egyptian
officials were to return to the Sudan following the
signature of the Treaty, this did not materialise and the
question of sovereignty over the Sudan was not touched upon
either. In late 1945 the United Kingdom Government

1. The appeal was to the effect that the Sudanese were
   Arab and Moslem brothers. This, coupled with offers
   of local autonomy had a tremendous appeal both in the
   Sudan as well as in the Arab world in general.

2. Newbold to Sanders (secret and personal) /CS/SCR/97.H.6/,

3. See "Political and Economic Weekly Report" No.11, week
   12th to 18th February 1943 (secret), and No.12, week
   19th to 24th, 1943. F.O.371/35530.

4. Governor-General's Memorandum on the Future of the
   Sudan (secret), 12th September 1945, F.O.371/45985.

5. See United Kingdom Command Paper No.5360 (Treaty Series
   No.6, 1937).
accepted an Egyptian request for negotiations with a view to the revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. During the negotiations in Cairo in 1946 the Egyptian representatives put forward the proposal that any revision of the terms of the Treaty must include a recognition of the Sudan as an integral part of Egyptian territory and must make allowances for the sovereignty of the Egyptian Crown over the Sudan. The negotiations broke down in November-December 1946 on the Egyptian proposal, with the views of the two Co-Domini powers differing widely on this issue. To the Egyptian Government the phrase "the unity between the Sudan and Egypt" meant a permanently unified Kingdom of Egypt and the Sudan in which the Sudanese might be granted a limited measure of local autonomy. The United Kingdom Government on the other hand, was opposed to any form of agreement prejudicial to the right of the Sudanese to choose their own political status, which included the options of complete independence, some form of association with Egypt or even total merger if they so wished. However, British rhetoric must be separated from her desire to exclude Egyptian influence from the Sudan, hence her insistence on "the welfare of the Sudanese" principle. The British Government remaining adamant over this point, the Egyptians took the dispute to the Security Council of the United Nations in July 1947. The whole matter was shelved for lack of sufficient affirmative votes to get through any single

resolution. Power politics is to blame.  

In reading the situation on the ground the Sudan Government were more realistic than either the British Government or the Egyptians in respect of the wishes of the Sudanese. The Sudanese, by the nature of things, had always had certain close ties with Egypt, namely, geographical, racial, lingual, religious and economic and to that extent Great Britain started with a considerable handicap in the competition with Egypt for the Sudan's favour. The Sudan Government felt that 45 years of British administration had not turned the Sudanese into African Englishmen, nor would another 30 years of it; that the eventual Sudanese form of self-government and the standards of public morality were bound to be fundamentally oriental; and Sudanese outlook, Arab and Middle Eastern, Any political concessions the British made, however generous, were not likely so to impress the Sudanese as to cement a lasting friendship: "What appears to the governing power to be a concession is to the ruled merely the granting, usually belatedly, of right." In the absence of spiritual ties, therefore, only substantial material aid promised a reasonable basis for projected Anglo-Sudanese friendship. This was regarded as the minimum specification required if the British were to


2. Governor-General's Memorandum on the future of the Sudan (secret), 12th September 1945, F.O.371/45985.

3. Ibid.
retain any string of influence in the Sudan. On the other hand, Sudanese nationalists of all shades of opinion were not in the least ungrateful for the benefits conferred on their country by either of the Condominium Powers. The majority of them resolved not "to exchange one master for another or one fetter for another, be the one a fetter of iron and the other a fetter of gold." Their primary consideration was the interest of the Sudan to the exclusion of anything else.

The Impact of Northern Nationalism in the South

The rapid political and constitutional advances in the Northern Sudan which in part gave rise to strained Anglo-Egyptian relations, far from obscuring the problems of the Southern Sudan actually served to focus attention on and to underline the urgency for tackling them. When the legislation for the formation of an Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan was promulgated on 1st September 1943, the first reactions of Sudanese public opinion included, among other things, outright condemnation and suspicion of an implied intention of separating the Northern from the Southern provinces. The Graduates Congress reacted in a similar vein by condemning the whole Southern Policy of the Sudan Government as apparently reflected in

Sudanese Press was equally critical of the Advisory Council Legislation. *El Nil* Daily for instance, asked three embarrassing but crucial questions:

"1. Why should not the North represent the South?

2. How can Government deprive the South of the rights and privileges now granted to (Northern Sudanese)?

3. Is the Advisory Council competent to examine matters, such as Budget, which concerns the whole country, while one-third of the population is not represented?"

The Egyptian Government was also alarmed by the scale of changes in administration in the Sudan, including extensive legal devolution to the Tribal chiefs without prior consultation with Egypt. The creation of the Advisory Council was the last straw which led the Egyptian Government to the same conclusion that the Sudan Government intended to divide the Sudan into two parts: a Northern and a Southern, "keeping the Southern Division isolated to be a pasture for the Christian Missionary Societies."

The Egyptian Government went on to warn the Governor-General of the Sudan of the tensions among Mohammedans throughout the Nile Valley which would result from the continuance of the Southern Policy.

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1. See Memorandum by Graduates General Congress to Governor-General of the Sudan, 6th October 1943, F.O.371/45986.


3. Egyptian Prime Minister to Governor-General of the Sudan inclosure in Killearn to F.O. (secret), 3rd June 1944. F.O.371/41363.
The secretive nature of the Southern Policy, and Government reluctance to permit the discussion of matters pertaining to the South in the Advisory Council or in the newspapers tended to reinforce Northern suspicion of Government intentions in the Southern Sudan. Twice on separate occasions members of the Advisory Council directly raised questions on matters affecting the South and twice the Chairman ruled against them. By 1945 it was evident that the Sudan Government's attempts to explain to the Sudanese public as well as to the Egyptians that the reasons for confining the Advisory Council to the six Northern Provinces were practical rather than political were ineffectual. The Sudan Government's sensitivity to Northern Sudanese and Egyptian public opinion on matters relating to the Southern Sudan is exemplified by the following despatch to the Foreign Office:

The eyes of Egypt and of the Northern Sudan are on the South, and our Southern Policy (or lack of policy) has been heavily criticised both in Cairo and Omdurman. Parts of the policy (it was conceded) will never commend themselves to the Northern Sudanese, and some of the criticisms have been hard to answer.

That was in August 1945. One month later the Administration felt that "our present secrecy over the Southern Sudan" gives rise to exaggerated suspicions in the Northern Sudan, and our silence or reticence on the subject to some extent

1. See Proceeding of Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, 4th Session, Question paragraph 4472 of Printed Record: Civil Secretary's Press Conference, 12th June 1945, Answer to Question 4 of Mohamed Amer Beshir.

prejudices the all-important good relations we hope to maintain with responsible Northern Sudanese. At this juncture the indications are that the Sudan Government were not as yet prepared to give way on their Southern Policy. While seemingly uncompromising on essentials, i.e. that responsibility to the Southerners was that of the Sudan Government not of the Northern Sudanese or anyone else, they were very cautious lest Northern Sudanese opinion be alienated.

Meanwhile, in the Southern Sudan itself certain factors were imperceptibly at work to make the reversal of Southern Policy a high probability. Since 1934 Mr. Martin Parr, Governor of Equatoria, had consistently advocated a frank and open statement of policy, which was accepted in principle by Khartoum. Even in Western Bahr El Ghazal legitimate and necessary seasonal trade was allowed. The pass system was relaxed and Arabs were permitted to come south of the grazing boundary in parties not exceeding three and without cattle to purchase grain. The authorities in Khartoum realised that "you could not put a Chinese wall between Darfur and Equatoria: if you tried you would defeat your own object." The acute shortage of British manpower felt during the first two years of the war compelled

1. Secretariat Khartoum to Chancery, Cairo, (1-C-1) 3rd September 1945, F.O.371/45986.
the Sudan Government to appoint Northern Sudanese officials for duty in the South selected from among those believed to be sympathetic rather than antagonistic to Southern culture. By 1944, however, the practice had proved to be a failure. It was noticed that many of these Northern Sudanese officials showed little sympathy with, and no regard for, the Southerner. The situation was complicated further by the fact that Southern employees themselves showed obvious discontent at the wage disparity between themselves and the Northern Sudanese: the higher rate of pay earned by Northern officials was not always justified. Similar Government embarrassments as well as Southern discontent engendered by wage disparity were also experienced in the attempt to recruit Southern Sudanese into Northern units of the Sudan Defence Force, and occasionally their subsequent transfer to service in Equatoria. To meet the demand for cattle to provide meat for forces in the Middle East a number of Northern Sudanese traders were especially licensed to tap the herds of the Nilotic Southern tribes. This led to the relaxation of trading restrictions imposed as a result of Southern Policy. Furthermore, the Mon-galla patois was permitted to be used as vehicle of communication among the rank and file of the Equatorials and prisoners. More serious still, some of the educated

1. 10th Progress Report by the Governor-General, enclosure to Khartoum Despatch No. 89 of 4th August 1945, F.0.371/45985.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
Southerners under Northern persuasion or motivated by personal ambitions were gravitating to Northern urban towns in search of higher wages and wider opportunities.\textsuperscript{1}

Despite the profound changes dictated by wartime needs the Government stand on the South remained officially the same at the end of the war. In August 1945 the Governor-General wrote:-

The approved policy is to act upon the fact that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, and that our obvious duty to them is therefore to push ahead as fast as we can with their economic and educational development on African and Negroid lines, and not upon the Middle Eastern and Arab lines of progress which are suitable for the Northern Sudan. It is only by economic and educational development that these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their future lot be eventually cast with the Northern Sudan or with East Africa (or partly with each).\textsuperscript{2}

The British Government approved the Sudan Government statement but by postulating these latter three possible futures for the South the ice had cracked. As early as 1943, Mr. Beckett of the British Foreign Office suggested as practical alternatives before H.B.M.'s Government the continuation of the Condominium with increased self-government. As a solution to the Southern question, he proposed the division of the Sudan so that the Southern and non-Arab part could become a purely British responsibility and the

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{10th Progress Report by the Governor-General, enclosure to Khartoum Despatch No.89 of 4th August 1945, F.O.371/45985.}

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Khartoum Despatch No.89 of 4th August 1945, F.O.371/45985.}
Northern and Arab part would go to Egypt with some guarantees of local autonomy. A colleague commented: "I do not suppose that we should like this course ... I don't think we shall come to partition ... we shall have to have a balancing of accounts with Egypt."¹ The Fabian Report found a great deal to be said for maintaining the policy of administering the South almost as a separate mandate and without making any decision to separate it in sovereignty from the North. It noted that such a step would be bitterly opposed politically both in Egypt and in the Northern Sudan. "Time, education and gradual economic development may show in the end whether it can be more suitably attached to the Middle East or to Africa."² Put differently, the future of the South was very much in the balance in 1945.

December 1946 was the most crucial and decisive month for the political fate of the Southern Sudan. In a circular to all heads of Departments, Directors and Governors of the two Southern Provinces, the Civil Secretary announced that since the previous year not only had further decisions on policy for the South been taken but also that great changes had taken place in the political outlook for the Sudan as a whole. Notable among these changes were: the rapid advance of the Northern Sudan to self-government involving the progressive reduction of British executive authority; the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty negotiations and the

1. F.O. Minutes on Newbold to Sanders (secret and personal), (CS/SCR/97.6.), 24th November 1943. F.O.371/35576.
postulated acceleration of public canvassing of the South itself. The Civil Secretary thought it essential, therefore, that policy for the Southern Sudan should be crystallised in a form capable of being publicly explained and defended and which should be based on what he called "constructive social and economic principles". The Sudan Government was to work henceforth on the assumption that the Sudan would remain one and indivisible country. The Southern Policy was re-stated thus:

"The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and arabicized Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future."

This major shift in Government policy towards the South was hardly thinkable in the 1930s. As late as 1938 the Governor-General could boastfully write that "an immediate purpose of our policy in the Southern Sudan is to prevent an insidious process of 'Arabicization' of the primitive pagans who inhabit the region." He considered that the process of Arabization of the South was a dangerously easy one, for Southerners would probably have to look to the North rather than to the South for superior culture, markets and material development. How soon and how widely Moslem influences and

1. Civil Secretary to All Heads of Departments, Directors and Governors of the Southern Provinces (secret), 16th December 1946, S.G.A./CS/SCR/1.C.1.
Arabic propaganda would spread from Egypt and the Arab states through the Northern Sudan into remote Southern regions, it was difficult to say.¹ Had the situation changed eight years later to warrant the reversal of a policy of extreme parochialism? Was the time ripe or was it merely a question of expediency that all efforts to "resist the entry into the South of debased forms of Islam and corrupt practices of Northern (Arab) Sudanese" should be halted so abruptly? The Civil Secretary admitted that urgency was the essence of the problem and that the Government no longer strived for the ideal: "We must aim at doing what is best for the Southern peoples in the present circumstances."²

British officials and administrators in the Southern Sudan were almost unanimous in their support for the restated Southern Policy. Marwood, the new Governor of Equatoria, changed his mind and no longer regarded the excision of the Southern Sudan and its attachment to neighbours on the South as practical politics or, indeed, in the interest of the Southerners themselves, "for they would still be 'Cinderellas' even more than they are now."³ The Civil Secretary's contention that the South was bound up with the North and that the two had 'got to hang together'

1. Governor-General to H.E. Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Cairo (confidential), No.26 (46.A.1.), 5th March 1938. F.O.371/21998

2. Civil Secretary to all Heads of Departments, Directors and Governors of the Southern Provinces (secret), 16th December 1946. S.G.A./CS/SCR/1.C.1.

as one country carried the day. For the effective im-
plementation of the fusion British field staff put forward
a number of proposals chief among which were: that every
effort should be made to stimulate political and civic
education of the Southerners; that differences in status
and conditions of Northern and Southern staff should be
terminated by the adoption of the principle of equal reward
for equal work; the lifting of restrictions imposed upon
Northern traders in the South and Southerners themselves
should be allowed to travel to the North in search of job
opportunities if they so wished. The South should also be
able to use the Gordon College, have its technical staff
trained at the Police School, Kitchener School and Military
College in Omdurman. It all boils down to the adoption of
corrective measures designed to create a common outlook for
both the South and North.¹

The Administration attempted to justify its action
in terms of the following practical and economic consider-
ations. "The North and the South were linked by the Nile;
Christianity was not necessarily the religion most suited to
the Southern Sudanese; the men of some Southern tribes were
far stronger in character than the Northerners; that there
was nowhere else for the Southerners to go (apparently Uganda
would not take them); that the South needed the financial
support of the North, which was promised; that the Northern
Sudanese no more liked living in the South than the Egyptians
liked living in Khartoum." The only alternative, it was

feared, was to keep the Southerners living in a zoo and that the real danger to the South in an independent Sudan was neglect. Implicitly, the Administration accepted Azhari's argument that it is not an essential condition for the unity of a country that all its parts should be on an equal level of development. One interesting consideration was that to the educated Sudanese the loss of the South was a matter of prestige. There was also a measure of anxiety and the fear that in the South might subsequently be discovered the wealth which could guarantee the Sudan's independence. Furthermore the South, like the Northern Sudan to Egypt, was a source of cheap labour. It has recently been suggested that the North wanted the South as a guarantee against absorption with Egypt. But concern for the upper sources of the Nile must have exercised the imagination of the educated Sudanese.

On the theoretical level and on all other grounds, however, the South ought not to have been united to the Arab North. Terms such as "partnership" or "power-sharing" are deceptive and when applied to situations of political conflict, actual or potential, tend to conceal their opposites. The perfect and most harmonious balances are those struck between entities of equal weights or strengths. In actual human experience, needless to say, absolute

2. Azhari's Memorandum to the Governor-General, 6th October, 1943. F.O.371/45986.
social harmony or power balance is a rare commodity if not an ideal to strive for. In the context of the Sudan the prospects of a true fusion or partnership (as against absorption of the South by the North) must have been bleak indeed. At the risk of repetition the North and South differed in their attitude to life, in language, in creed and above all, in their stages of social and political development that the use of the term "partnership" to describe their amalgamation must be condemned outright as preposterous.

T.R.H. Owen, Deputy Governor of Bahr El Ghazal Area, strikes the nail on the head in his criticism of the Minutes of the Sudan Administration Conference convened in Khartoum on 22nd April 1946. Having made the point that Southerners and Northerners were two sharply differentiated communities and that Northern officials regarded Southern Service as a temporary exile, he wrote:

... To assume, without the proof of time or the free choice of the Southerners themselves, that the interests of the North and South are identical and indis-solubly bound, or that the two can, in their present state, be made to fuse, is unjustified. You cannot fuse iron and clay...!

Owen's contention was that there can possibly be no legitimate partnership between a boy of 12 and a man of 40. The South had first to go through that stage of local government and growing responsibility which fosters the quality of citizenship before participating in the Central Government at Khartoum. The North had gone past this stage while the South was still in statu pupillari, with a long way to go.

Administration in the Southern Provinces was still too direct and such devolution as existed was confined to the judicial sphere. The South suffered from further handicaps: the lack of politically as well as educationally trained members to represent the South in Khartoum parliament; those who might possess half the minimum qualifications would still be in a permanent numerical minority operating in a milieu foreign to them and dealing with agenda which would be beyond their comprehension. The possibility also existed of the Northern 87% of the proposed Khartoum Assembly fully occupying themselves with the vital affairs of the North to the neglect of the pressing needs of the South.¹

The child-image of the South was what the Southerners themselves were deeply aware of and found an opportune moment to articulate their feelings at the Juba Conference convened by the Civil Secretary in July 1947 to sound the opinion of the South on the proposed fusion. Several Southern speakers stressed the need for a training period in Government before any final decision is taken on amalgamation. Sergeant-Major Philemon Majok stated that the Southerners were "like children in their relations with the grown up Northern Sudanese and that, as children must drink milk before they could eat bread," so the Southerners must first be afforded an opportunity to study the art of self-government before participating in governing. Another Southern member compared the progress already made in the North to pupils who had been through Class I and were

being promoted to Class II. As the South had not yet been through Class I, it would be absurd to try to put them straight into Class II. Chief Tete, drawing on the same simile-metaphor, stated that just as bringing up a child is a slow and gradual process, the Southerners must first learn to walk before they attempt to run.¹

The Sudan Government's decision to amalgamate is open to further criticism based on the principle of self-determination. To quote T.R.H. Owen once more: "What we ask for the South is the same as we ask for the North, namely free choice of their future by themselves as soon as they have reached political maturity and are fit to choose."²

The only official public reference to the right of the South to self-determination was made in August when Northern Sudanese journalists were warned that in writing about the problem of the South they should bear in mind its right to self-determination.³ It is rather puzzling how the arguments advanced so far had been skilfully employed by the Sudan Government in their attempt to damp down the Ashigga’s agitation for union with Egypt. Against the union with Egypt idea the Sudan Government argued that the principle of the equality of rights could not be guaranteed while the Sudan was in a backward condition; that a fusion under those circumstances would result in the weaker partner being submerged by the stronger in every field; that if personal qualifications constituted the only valid title to

¹ Proceedings of the Juba Conference on the Political Development of the Southern Sudan, June 1947. See Appendix No.VIII.
senior Government posts, it was rationally impossible that the Sudanese, inferior as they were to their Egyptian brothers in qualifications, would be able to obtain even a small proportion of posts. The same consideration applied to the fields of commerce and industry and indeed to any field in which there was competition between the Sudanese and the Egyptians. The same argument also applies to the question of numbers and parliamentary representation so that it was possible the Sudanese might fail to obtain the agreement of the Common Parliament to any proposal in the interest of the Sudan if that interest happened to be in conflict with the interests of Egypt.  

If these were the arguments put forward against fusion of Egypt with the Northern Sudan which were bound by racial, lingual and religious ties, they apply with greater force still against the union of the South and North, which had none of these common characteristics.

In order to understand the U-turn in British Southern Policy it is essential to recapture, briefly, the political and constitutional advances in the Northern Sudan from April 1946 to July 1947. It is advanced as a thesis that in April 1946 the British - or rather, the Sudan Government - had already made up their minds regarding the political future of Southern Sudan. In the wake of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for the revision of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance and Friendship and in the face of increased nationalist activities both in Egypt and in the Northern Sudan it must have been decided that no room existed for

either isolationism or separation of the Southern Sudan. On April 22nd, 1946, the Sudan Administration Conference was convened by the Governor-General to explore ways and means of associating the Sudanese more closely with the Government of their country and to make recommendations to that effect. This implied the conversion of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan into representative and responsible Legislative and Executive Councils. This was a giant leap in the progress towards self-government. Nevertheless, the South was not represented. Although its report was not submitted until March 1947, the Conference's minutes were made available to all Governors and District Commissioners as well as senior British staff. The Conference recommended that

"the best method of developing the Advisory Council so as to give greater representative character and more responsible functions is by the constitution of a Legislative Assembly of elected Sudanese members for the whole country to exercise legislative functions in conjunction with a newly constituted Executive Council which would replace the Governor-General's Council".1

It also stated that the South must look to the rest of the country for economic and social development.

In June 1947 the Civil Secretary called a conference in Juba to sound out the opinion of the Southerners on representation in the proposed Legislative Assembly and indirectly on the proposed fusion of the North and South. The Sudan Government treated the Conference almost as a

life in a united Sudan, attention shifted to the question of safeguards. When the Civil Secretary introduced to the Council his proposal that for better or for worse the Southern Sudan should be wedded to the North he stressed the necessity of safeguarding the cultural and social integrity of the South against domination and mismanagement by a government composed mainly of Northern Sudanese. Without protection, the Southerners would not be able to develop along indigenous lines, would be overwhelmed and swamped by the North and would "deteriorate into a servile community hewing wood and drawing water for a supposedly superior aristocracy."¹ At the Juba Conference the Southerners expressed fear and suspicion of Northern domination and demanded a number of safeguards. When field administrators unanimously welcomed the new Southern Policy as re-stated by the Civil Secretary in December 1946, their support was conditional on adequate safeguards for Southern identity. But what were these safeguards? Deputy Governor Bahr El Ghazal Area argued that in view of the recognition of the "distinctively African and negroid" character of the South, there ought to be granted a large measure of autonomy for the South. The post of a Lieutenant-Governor was also proposed. Perhaps the best suggestion was that the British should "stand guard here till the South can dispense with a guard" to avoid domination by an Arab-civilisation.² The Civil


2. Deputy Governor Bahr El Ghazal to Governor Equatoria Province, (strictly confidential), January 5th, 1947. S.G.A./I.C.1./SCR.
footnote to the main events in Egypt and the Northern Sudan. The idea of a Southern style Administration Conference was not that of the Civil Secretary but of Marwood, the Governor of Equatoria Province. The Conference lasted only two days. At the end of it, there were no resolutions passed or recommendations made. The majority of the Southern members were clerks and chiefs all on the Government payroll. The best educated Southerners, the Intermediate school teachers were not invited. By contrast, the Northern Sudanese delegation was led by their powerful spokesman, Judge Mohammed Saleh El Shingeiti, who so dominated the Conference. If anything, the Conference served to demonstrate to the Government that the semi-educated Southerners were angry and indirectly blamed the Sudan Government for the backwardness of the South. Official arm-twisting may have been instrumental in making the Southern members change their minds on the second day of the Conference and acquiesce to the proposed fusion of the country.

The 559th Meeting of the Governor-General's Council endorsed the Sudan Administration recommendation that the Southern Sudan should be represented in, and be subject to, the proposed Legislative Assembly. Once the decision was taken to commit the South to the rough and tumble of

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2. The educated, articulate minority in the South were later to charge that Southern delegates at Juba were bribed, blackmailed into accepting 'one-Sudan' policy.
Secretary himself argued that the ideal safeguard for Southern development along healthy lines was certainly the maintenance in the South for the next fifty years of a British controlled administration staffed by British Governors and British District Commissioners and carefully selected Sudanese assistants. Given the urgency of the situation, however, such an arrangement was out of the question.¹

Of all the safeguards proposed only one gained acceptance to both the Sudan Government and the Northern Sudanese nationalists: the suggestion that the British Governor-General should remain head of state until the future status of the Sudan was decided and a satisfactory system of parliamentary rule established.² One cannot help feeling that in essence the whole deal had been a betrayal as far as the South was concerned. Indeed, strong views were felt in some British quarters against "handing over the South to the North."³ In the attempt to mediate between bundles of conflicting interests the British landed themselves in a major contradiction on matters of principle. While union of the Sudan and Egypt was denied to the aspirants of "Unity of the Nile Valley", the Sudan Government supervised the fusion of the North and South; the


2. This safeguard was only temporary. When independence came on January 1st, 1956 any guarantee for the South depended upon Northern goodwill.

exercise of the principle of self-determination which was
granted to the Northern Sudan was flatly denied to the
Southerners mainly to placate and win the favour of Northern
public opinion. In every sense the Northern Sudan had
always been the favourite child of the British. The South
was treated as a "Cinderella". The point is better put
by a young Shilluk tribesman:

...We have been neglected. The North
has gone ahead but we have been retarded.
If a few of us are educated we can thank
the missionaries. It is only in the last
few years that the Government has shown
any real interest in spreading learning
among our people. Now we are expected to
learn in Arabic, because it is the
official language of the Government in
Khartoum. The introduction of Arabic is
a plot to bring us under Northern
domination. The Arabs took our people
as slaves and taught us nothing. The
British gave us protection, but still
we are ignorant. The North is up, and
we are down...1

Yet, as a result of changed policy, it seemed extremely
doubtful whether the Southern Sudan could stand on its own
as an independent unit or state. "Intensely backward in
health, education, and economic development it was bound
to be an enduring economic liability to any country which
accepted it." Only the North was willing to assume the
responsibility for the South. There was also a well-
founded fear that should Southern representation in the
Legislative Assembly be delayed, or were the jurisdiction
of the Assembly to be limited to the North only, as was
that of the Advisory Council, "the agitation that would
be inevitable in the North would also be echoed in the

1. Quoted in Hyslop, J., Sudan Story (London, 1952)
   pp.70-1.
South." The Sudan Government would, paradoxically, lose the trust of many Southerners and be accused of maintaining in the Southern Sudan, a sort of human "Whipsnade".¹ Waking up almost suddenly at the eleventh-hour the British decided, therefore, that it was to the ultimate welfare of the South to be opened up and to take a gamble at the ultimate cohesion with the North.²

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² In a recent book, Sir James Robertson re-affirmed his belief in the wisdom of the decision to unite the two halves of the country; see Transition in Africa: A Memoir, (London, 1974).
CHAPTER VII

POST-WAR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

Of all the problems confronting the British Administration in the Sudan, the prospects of socio-economic development of the South must have been the most daunting. When the British occupied the country at the turn of the century it became apparent that the 'pagan' and Negroid South was far more backward and less developed than the Moslem and Arabised North. By the outbreak of the Second World War the development equation had further altered significantly and decisively in favour of the North. The contributing factors of Southern backwardness were primarily natural and historical, but some were man-made. Indicative of the British attitude to Southern socio-economic development, no serious feasibility study of the natural resources and development potential of the South was undertaken before 1954.¹ Individual administrators and missionaries experimented (relying on casual labour) with anything from dairy farming (to meet the meat and milk requirements of Government officials) to Mission station orchards. And where possible, cotton-growing on a restricted scale was encouraged among certain of the non-Nilotic tribes.²


2. Torit District in Equatoria Province was the only one to produce consistently large quantities of both cotton and grain over the years. For evidence of lack of official encouragement of cotton-cultivation among the Nilotics in late 1920's see: Vere H. Ferguson, The Story of Fergie Bey (London 1930), pp.209-10.
It was not so much the size and sparse population of Southern Sudan that baffled the British administrator as its remoteness from the industrial and commercial centres of the world. Landlocked and extremely backward, the South offered little urge or incentive for rapid socio-economic and educational influence: until quite recently the peoples of the Southern Sudan lived a life of subsistence economy. In the absence of sufficient mineral and other wealth to attract foreign capital, agricultural improvements seemed to provide the only basis of possible future development of Southern Sudan. But the great distance from the main internal market and the country's only sea-port made this task difficult to achieve. In a straight line the nearest point in the Southern Sudan lay nearly 250 miles from Khartoum and 600 miles from Port Sudan. The furthest point was located over 1,000 miles from Khartoum and 1,200 miles from Port Sudan. Measured along the existing lines of communication (roads, rivers and railway), however, the shortest distance of various localities in the South from Khartoum and Port Sudan was a nightmare.

The transport problem was further complicated by the existence of great natural obstacles to communication. The upper reaches of the White Nile, the main communication artery of the South, were far from ideal for navigation. The clay soils that feature largely in this area often became flooded or water-logged during the

1. J.J. Basinski, "Some Problems of Agricultural Development in the Southern Sudan", (typescript), Development Branch (Khartoum, 1956); see Appendix No. III.
rainy seasons, making overland transport extremely difficult if not impossible during the wet season.¹

The costly and inefficient transport system both within the Southern provinces and from these to the Northern Sudan greatly limited the economic development prospects of the South. It effectively lowered the value of local products on outside markets as well as placing serious obstacles in the way of possible modernisation of agricultural production methods. For instance, costs of imported fertilisers, implements, machinery and fuel were bound to increase well above the economic level. Major C.H. Stigand, who had had enormous experience of the South (as Governor of Upper Nile and Mongalla in 1915 and 1919 respectively), was quite aware of the remoteness and communication problem of the Southern Provinces. He, therefore, proposed the complete separation of the Negro Provinces of the Sudan from the Arab Provinces on economic grounds. Having separated the administration of the Negro Provinces from the Arab, he wrote:

> the wage rate of the former must be kept as low as possible ... the more the labour wage in a country far from the coast can be kept down, the greater is the chance of that country being able to enter into competition with more favourably situated lands. ²

Stigand was concerned that if the "exorbitant" wages paid to servants and artisans in Khartoum were allowed to gain

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a footing in the black provinces, then all hope of their competing in the world market was quashed for good. It is remarkable that this argument carried the day and was made the cornerstone of the Government economic policy in the South (if ever it had one).

The sociological variable played just as much a role as the environmental in shaping and determining the course of Southern economic development or under-development. There was, for example, the attitude to labour of certain of the Southern tribes, misinterpreted as laziness. The acute shortage of labour felt by the administration, particularly in the early decades, though not peculiar to the South alone, was not taken lightly by the British. In 1908 Captain Cameron, then Governor of Mongalla, reported that "short of putting a man to work under the eye of a policeman, there seems to be no way of getting regular steady work out of any of these people."¹ What was not realised was that the Southerners as a whole had few and simple wants which were easily satisfied with little labour. Some scarcely needed any clothing; the houses need not be built to keep out cold; the people only required a small amount of fuel for cooking purposes. In economic terms they had little incentive to work. Education could be "remedial" in this regard, but only after several decades. And the turbulent Dinka and Nuer accepted government at best as a necessary evil. In the eyes of the administration "they would make fine

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¹ Reports of His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Egypt and the Sudan in 1907, Egyp. No.1 (1908), Cd. 3966, p.235.
soldiers, but not desirable citizens." Could it be that the price for their love of freedom and independence was neglect - official neglect?

The debilitating effect of the tropical climate and malnutrition played no less a role in the Southerner's poor economic performance. From the viewpoint of nutrition the Southerners fell into two broad categories: the tribes inhabiting the tse-tse infested areas of the Equatorial region and the cattle-owning tribes living mainly in Northern Bahr El Ghazal and the Upper Nile Province.

Peoples of the first category on the whole had a satisfactory diet quantitatively but not qualitatively. Simply, starvation was rare since cassava, other root crops, bananas and later, mangoes usually provided sufficient food reserve. However, as their diet lacked an adequate amount of protein, they may be described as "protein hungry". The livestock-owning peoples on the other hand had a satisfactory diet in terms of quality but not quantity. Some of them seldom produced enough grain for themselves and were classified as "chronically hungry". Others had alternating periods of good and lean years when hunger conditions could be very severe. As a rule the livestock-owning peoples suffered annually from seasonal food shortages. The trouble was that the 'hungry-gap' affected crop output adversely since it occurred at the crucial time of cultivation, planting and early weeding of

2. Southern Investigation Team, op.cit.
a new crop, when demand for labour was at its peak.

Natural and historic factors tend to account for the economic and social backwardness of the South prior to the establishment of British rule; they do not provide adequate explanation for continued Southern under-development during most of the Condominium period. For that, it is best to look elsewhere; namely, to man-made factors. Of these, lack of funds was the most limiting. As a matter of Government policy the Northern Sudan was provided with capital in the form of railway, port, dam and irrigation schemes almost from the start. In the Southern Sudan there was no agreement on the urgent need for development and its method and native administrative practice precluded the possibility of the social emergence of the natives. The British High Commission for Egypt and the Sudan concealed a contradiction when in 1925 he affirmed that,

"The development of the people along their own natural lines is essential; and organised improvement of material conditions will not be allowed to result in the loss or debasement of the traditional ideas which form the basis of the character of the people."

The occasion was the opening of the Sinnar Dam, the backbone of the Gezira Scheme.¹ According to Civil Secretary Douglas Newbold, the real causes of Southern under-development (apart from the great distances and poor

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¹ Quoted in the Governor-General's Report for 1925, Sudan No.2 (1926), Cmd.2742, p.6.
communications, climatic and tribal apathy and conservatism already enumerated were:

- a recurrent scepticism in Khartoum about the economic possibilities of the South: a natural preoccupation in Khartoum with Northern problems of greater urgency or proximity: a tendency in the South to interpret the Southern Policy, as laid down in 1930, on Arcadian lines and ignoring of the political time factor.

The last point is significant. In the hey-day of Southern Policy, Mongalla and the Bahr el Ghazal Provinces were amalgamated to form a huge administrative unit, which was not suited to a dynamic development policy. The measure aimed at the reduction of all administrative work in the Nilotic areas to the minimum possible, and only a very strictly limited agricultural survey in the remaining areas.

The Arcadian school of thought certainly attracted some British romantics in the Southern Sudan. Admitting the existence of some critics of schemes which involved the social emergence of "primitive" people, Major Wyld D.C., Zande District wrote:

No one who has known the simple African in his primitive state, and has seen the impact of ... civilisation upon many of them, can fail to have regrets, doubts and fears. The horrors of urbanisation, the growing pains of

1. Civil Secretary to Secretary, Governor-General's Council, 3rd April 1944, Inclosure to Khartoum Despatch No. 89 of 4th August 1945. App. "B" (Secret), F.O.371/45985.

2. Sir S. Symes had actually envisaged the disappearance of the District Headquarters of Aweil, Raga, Tonj and Yirrol, but this was found impracticable.
semi-education, and the wrong-headedness produced by improperly understood motives, are all very real and very distressing.¹

Many years afterwards Captain Greenwood, who had served in the Bahr el Ghazal during the difficult period of pacification, expressed the same view:

I always did like the Dinkas. Happy, idle, contented people, with few wants and no cares, singing to their cattle in the sun. Stark naked and free by the river banks and all they wanted was to be left alone.²

The Impact of War upon the South

From 1939 onwards, under the impact of war-needs and demands, all arguments and doubt about the economic worth of the South began to give way for a more forward-looking valuation policy. The high administrative/tribal apathy and conservatism was destroyed once and for all, at least among the non-Nilotic tribes, and the impact was felt the most in areas closer to former Abyssinia. In the Yei River District of Equatoria, for instance, the natives met all the heavy man-power demands made upon the district for essential works, particularly the construction of Nimule-Juba and highways connecting Juba-Aba. "The response was excellent", the District Commissioner noted, "Yei River gangs on the former highways being regarded as the best." Large numbers

of natives also joined the armed forces and travelled with the King's African Rifles as far afield as India, Burma and Ceylon.¹

In the West, Zande chiefs met all demands made upon them for conscript labour for roads and other work up to 400 miles from their homes. Like the Bari-speakers in Yei, many young men enrolled in the Equatorial Corps. In 1942 alone (at the time of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia) 2,365 conscript labourers were supplied and 529 men joined the "Pioneer Corps".²

In the Torit District in the East, the scene of considerable military activity, a large transit camp was built and much work was done on the main road running from Juba out to the Abyssinian border. At least 1,200 men enlisted in the Sudan Defence Force and another 500 in the King's African Rifles (who later saw active action in the Buruna campaign). The district also met labour demands for work connected with the war. Thus in 1944 labour gangs worked a total of 20,525 men-months. To encourage war-time production of food crops, cotton-growing was slowed down. As a result "large quantities of grain were produced by the cultivators, and in 1942/43 3,200,000 rotles were purchased by the Government". War projects of permanent value include the setting up of a saw-mill at Katire in the Imantong Mountains and the provision of a piped water supply in Torit. While

¹. Equatorial Province Handbook (1948) Vol.II. Unless otherwise stated, the following information is from the same source.

Katire later established itself as a useful producer of timber, the piped water is said to have greatly contributed to "the spectacular decrease in sickness among officials." The war also brought vast changes to Juba (the present Regional Capital of the South), once a minor and backward townlet. "All the machines of war, planes, ships and lorries poured men and materials into Juba and bore them off to battle areas." An area Headquarters was created in Juba employing a vast army of labour to keep the war machine going efficiently. The outcome of the war-time influx of people into Juba was that, by 1948, the town had grown out of all recognition. It now boasted a steadily rising population of 8,000 and a large and thriving market; buildings of a permanent nature multiplied steadily, and further supply was limited only by the post-war shortage of materials. Elsewhere, the cattle-owning tribes were able to sell considerable numbers of cattle for the supply of meat to the armed forces in the Middle East.1

At the 521st Meeting of the Governor-General's Council held on Saturday, 15th August 1944, the policy of more intensive economic and educational development in the Southern Sudan was approved. Sir Douglas Newbold pointed out that the Government had a moral obligation to redeem the inhabitants of the South from ignorance, poverty and malnutrition. He argued:

"To acquiesce in the continuation of traditional Arcadian existence of

the South would be to abandon hope of the economic and educational progress necessary to fit the Southerner for survival in the closer contacts with the outside world which must inevitably sooner or later be forced upon him. Government cannot hold the ring for him for ever. 1

This statement reflects the changing official attitude towards the social and educational advancement of the South since the late thirties. One of Mr. Cox's strongest impressions while on a tour of inspection was that the South (1937) was being left further and further behind the North. In his report he stressed the urgency of speeding up developments in the Southern Sudan. 2 His impression was later confirmed in 1944 by the new Civil Secretary, James Robertson who found it incomprehensible that a district Headquarters like Yambio, where the District Commissioner looks after a quarter of a million people should have no telegraph or telephone. He thought that roads and rivers could be made more all season without a great deal of expense. He reckoned that if there were masses of "decent" things around to buy - such as good cooking pots, reasonable clothes, in fact anything to stimulate consumer desires amongst the "mass" of people - then these things would become fashionable and the natives would have to get down to it and work for them. 3 Thus


3. J.W.Robertson to R.C. Mayall, 19th May 1944, F.O.371/41563. Mr. Scrivener of the F.O. commented: "The author (i.e. Robertson) is the Deputy Civil Secretary - an extremely balanced and able Scot." See F.O. Minutes 8th June 1944, F.O.371/41563.
on its own massive evidence the Sudan Government admitted in 1945 that "progress in the South has been on the whole, only spasmodic, compared with the Northern Sudan."  

Apart from moral and economic reasons, there were strong political reasons to compel the adoption of a more positive policy in Southern Sudan. The Northern Sudanese nationalists and Egypt had long had their eyes on the South. They disliked the Government educational policy of use of Missions and teaching of English instead of Arabic and criticized in severe terms the backwardness of the South:

If the Missionaries had enlightened the Southerners and raised their standards to the level of Northerners, we would not have objected to their presence and would have looked upon them as servants of humanity and civilisation ... Unfortunately they have done nothing of the sort.  

Furthermore, funds were not only available after the war but official opinion both in the South and Khartoum seemed to be more favourable to a firm development policy. Leading Northern politicians freely advocated the use of Northern funds for development programmes in the South. In the words of the President of the Graduates General Congress, "We wish to see money from the Central Treasury spent generously on the development of the South. None of us would like to see his fellow-countrymen naked any longer."  

One other reason why the Sudan Government found

1. Civil Secretary to Secretary Governor-General's Council, 3rd April 1944, op.cit.

2. Memorandum by President of the Graduates Congress to the Governor-General of the Sudan, 6th October 1943, F.O.371/45986.

3. Ibid.
it imperative to go faster in both education and material
development was international opinion after the War: in
particular, American opinion and the impression that the
existing backward state of the South would give way to (say)
a Mandate Commission of a Regional African Council.¹ Such
were the reasons that persuaded Khartoum "to balance
necessity of discounting the cost of transport for Southern
produce against the inevitability and desirability of
general uplift, not of wages by themselves, but of health,
education, husbandry, social standards, labour conditions,
revenues ... together with wages."²

The Development Programmes

As a first administrative step in keeping with the
declared policy of social, educational and economic
advancement of Southern Sudan, a proposal was made in
January 1945 for the redivision of Equatoria into more
manageable units.³ Meanwhile, a profound change had also
taken place in colonial administrative thinking: in place
of native administration with its traditionalist and
retrograde tendencies, local government councils were
instituted with all the democratic principles and practice
implied. Experiment in local government was especially

¹. Khartoum Despatch No.89 of 4th August 1945, App. "B" (i)
(Secret), F.0.371/45985.

(Secret), F.0.371/45985.

³. "Memorandum on Proposed Re-division of Equatoria",
1945, (Very Secret), S.G. F.0.371/45985.
popular among the Dinkas. The first successful experiment in local government was carried out in 1947 at Gongrial which became the proto-type for other areas:

Here the lack of autocratic tradition was not unhealthy, for it enabled the autocratic stage of native administration, through which the Northern Sudan had to pass, to be skipped and the system to have a broader and more democratic basis.

The new system was based on a council of members drawn from all parts of the district and meeting several times a year. The council exercised control over a permanent executive of three men (changing by rotation periodically) who were themselves responsible for all routine administration. This executive committee showed "remarkable grasp of their functions and responsibilities." The whole attempt led to the establishment of a warranted local government with an independent budget at Gongrial in 1949. A system of similar, though not warranted administrations, was later extended to the whole of Bahr el Ghazal. In Wau township, a town council was set up at first without a warrant or independent budget. Equatorial Province and Upper Nile in turn received similar treatment. Despite the initial amateurish character, the device proved to be useful in the training of men in civic duties and in stimulating interest in public affairs.

In the sphere of education, the Director submitted to the Governor-General's Council a programme for expansion

3. Ibid.
of Southern education, both sideways and upwards, employing both Government and Mission institutions. His proposals were incorporated into the general five-year programme for the expansion and improvement of the education system in the Sudan as a whole put forward in 1946. The main objects for the Southern Sudan were the consolidation, improvement and expansion of the existing Mission framework coupled with the gradual introduction of Government schools and institutions. The specific objectives were summarised thus:

"(a) the lengthening of the elementary course from 4 to 6 years and the filling of classes to capacity. Elementary schools would then become known as Primary schools.

(b) the extension of the village school course from 2 to 3 years and the gradual conversion of certain village schools into Elementary school proper.

(c) a steady output of teachers for village schools and the lower classes of Primary schools from the Teacher Training Centres and an improvement of their General standard of education.

(d) the improvement of the intermediate schools which would become known as Junior Secondary schools and an increase in the number of pupils attending them.

(e) the setting up of two Teacher Training Colleges for training teachers for the higher classes of Primary Schools, one at Mundri primarily for the Protestant schools and one at Bussere primarily for the Roman Catholic schools.

(f) the setting up of District Education Councils to afford more direct partnership between Government, Missions and local people in local educational responsibility."
(g) pay and conditions of service of African teachers to be commensurate with those of Government employees.¹

Government grants to Missions were increased to cover three quarters of the cost of maintaining and running the schools as well as three quarters of the capital costs of the new buildings necessitated by the plan.

The plan also envisaged the setting up of certain Government schools. In 1943 a Primary school for the Dinka was started at Tonj and two others were opened at Aweil and Rumbek in 1947. A Senior Secondary School for the three Southern Provinces was started at Rumbek in 1949 after a preliminary year had been run in at the Intermediate school at Atar in the Upper Nile. The Ministry of Education assumed the responsibility for training personnel for the Department of Agriculture and Forests in 1947, and the training of clerks and book-keepers and general education of Medical Assistants and Sanitary Overseers in Juba in 1948. A further five-year plan for educational development was drawn up in 1950. This dealt, primarily, with the introduction of the teaching of the Arabic language in mission schools and the creation of more state-owned schools.² But the execution of the new programme was delayed, partly on account of intense political activity of the early 1950s, but mainly because of outbreak of a mutiny in Equatoria in 1955 which necessitated the closure


of Southern schools and the transfer of a few to the North.

The Zande Scheme.1

Amongst post-war development plans for the Southern Sudan the Zande scheme must rate as the most important. Conscious of the rule that economic development ought to accompany, and not precede or follow, educational expansion the Sudan Government decided to launch the Zande development scheme in late 1945. The Central Government stressed that the scheme was intended "not to exclude but to complement a general campaign to increase and improve food crops and animal husbandry."2 The strategy envisaged the achievement of self-sufficiency in a balanced range of foodstuffs as the first priority with the production of exports taking second place. The Civil Secretary informed the British Foreign Office in August 1945 that the scheme had been approved "as an act of faith in the innate capacity of the Southerners to make good, given the capital with which to start: as the Northern Sudan has made good having, by geographical and other accidents, been given capital first."3

The official responsible for initiating the development scheme in Southern Sudan was Dr. J.D. Tothill, then Director

1. An account of later progress of the Zande Scheme may be found in C.C. Reining's book, The Zande Scheme (Illinois, 1966).


3. Ibid.
of Agriculture. Prior to coming to the Sudan Dr. Tothill had held a similar post in neighbouring Uganda. His experience was, therefore, invaluable. In 1939 and 1940 he visited the Zande areas of Yambio, Maridi and Yei. He appreciated their agricultural potentialities as well as the immense problem of developing these potentialities in view of the remoteness of the areas concerned. Dr. Tothill's plans and deliberations resulted in a ten-year economic development plan framed in 1940. The war supervened to prevent any substantial implementation of the plan. In 1943 he put forward a further specific proposal for development in a limited area; he chose Zande land as the area most likely to produce results. He called his scheme "a proposal for the social emergence of a remote and backward people." ¹ On the recommendation of the Board of Economics and Trade in December 1944, the Governor-General agreed to the setting up of an Equatoria Planning Committee with the following terms of reference:

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| The Board also agreed the creation of an ad hoc Committee to visit the site of the proposed Zande scheme, "investigate the details of the scheme, consider the establishment of a trading unit and, by maintaining close contact with the Equatoria Planning Committee, facilitate the early submission of considered plans to the Board of Economics. |
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¹ See Dr. Tothill's Memorandum on Zande Development scheme dated 16th December 1943, S.G.A. Khartoum.
and Trade.¹

The ad hoc Committee modified Dr. Tothill's plan in one significant respect. The policy of self-sufficiency was defective because total prohibition of all imports recommended by Tothill was not only undesirable but also impossible to achieve. Not only would the machinery required to enforce a policy of that kind be colossal but smuggling would increase and "there would be general dissatisfaction if cheap and otherwise desirable articles available elsewhere in the Sudan or just over the border were denied to the Azande." Moreover, local building materials were not always satisfactory for all purposes and their exclusive use might prove to be expensive, thus delaying construction.²

In 1946 the combined efforts of the two Committees backed by the recommendations of the Board of Economics and Trade resulted in: the creation of an Agricultural Projects Board for Equatoria (E.P.B.), the acceptance of a modified Zande scheme under the overall management of the E.P.B. and the establishment of a Trading Unit to operate throughout Equatoria under the auspices of the Equatoria Projects Board. The E.P.B. had an initial capital of £E.500,000 later increased to £E.1,000,000. The Board was charged with responsibility

1. Financial Secretary to Secretary Governor-General's Council, (FDF/341-1) 22nd June 1945, App. "C" (ii) (Secret) of Enclosure to Khartoum Despatch No. 89 of 4th August 1945, F.O.371/45985.

2. Record of Meetings held at Yambio between 22nd and 28th February 1945 by ad hoc Committee for Zande Development Project, see AT I. "C" (i) (Strictly Confidential) of Enclosure to Khartoum Despatch No.89 op.cit.
for creating industries whereby peasant-grown crops would be processed on the spot into tradeable goods, thereby saving transportation costs and at the same time providing the Azande with a cash crop.

The Financial Secretary, J.W.E. Miller, felt that the scheme as a whole was not one that a sound commercial body would undertake. Nevertheless, it had tremendous advantages from the point of view of the South: "it does offer employment to over 450 Southerners as clerks, artisans or shopkeepers, a remunerative market for the produce of several thousand cultivators." When linked with the programme for educational development already formulated, the scheme should be capable of providing the means for a general rise in the standards of living and social well-being in a part of Equatoria.¹ This was sound observation.

In 1949 when the projects were completed Nzara, some 12 miles west of Yambio had become the industrial centre of the project with ginning factories, spinning and weaving mills, oil presses, a soap factory, workshops and stores. Sakure on the frontier with the former Belgian Congo became the centre of a jaggery sugar industry.²

The fruits of the Zande scheme were also supposed to filter out to the remaining Southern communities through the agency of the Trading Unit of the E.P.B. The structure of the Trading Unit itself was designed to enhance this purpose. Based on fixed points or base shops

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1. Financial Secretary to Secretary Governor-General's Council, op.cit.

where wholesale stores were situated, a network of smaller townships and bush shops radiated. Thus as the Zande scheme progressed and matured, base shops with garages and stores were established at Wau, Yambio and Juba with the primary functions of supervising and stocking small townships shops at Aweil, Tonj, Rumbek, Maridi, Tambura, Amadi, Yei, Torit in addition to 30 bush shops and stores. A travelling shop or "Canteen Lorry" was also provided to cover areas where the population, although plentiful, was scattered and to cater for the needs of semi-nomadic tribes. In establishing a Trading Concern as a subsidiary of the E.P.B., the Government hoped to achieve the following objectives:

(i) to instill into the minds of Southern Sudanese an idea of value, uses and conscience of money as a medium of exchange, and to eliminate bartering;

(ii) to stimulate the desire for simple and useful goods with the view to generating and sustaining trade and voluntary labour;

(iii) to provide basic commercial and trading services at an official standard of price and quality "without the danger of being exploited or deceived by rapacious merchants and the unnecessary but inevitable incidence of numerous middlemen;"

(iv) to provide opportunities in commercial education to suitable Southerners to enable some of them to open up trading ventures of their own.

Why was an area so remote from either Northern Sudan or East Africa selected as the site of an important agro-industrial complex? Zande land, located on the Nile-Congo Divide, is very near the centre of Africa. It is remote

1. "Zande Development Project" by J.W.E. Miller Financial Secretary, App. III, (to "G" (ii)) of Enclosure to Khartoum Despatch No.89, op.cit.
from natural communications arteries of the South defined in terms of navigable waterways. It is equidistant from Juba and Wau by about 330 miles. The former is the most Southerly navigable point on the Nile within the Sudan and the latter is also the Southernmost navigable point on the Jur River, open for only two or three months in the year during high flood. Juba is approximately 1,700 miles from Port Sudan and 1,800 miles from Wadi Halfa, a border post on the Egyptian frontier. There was an important road linking Juba with Uganda but the distance from Yambio (the headquarters of the E.P.B.) to Soroti which was the terminus of the Kenya and Uganda Railway was about 700 miles. Soroti itself was about 800 miles from Mombasa. The other important road from Juba westward to former Belgian Congo had its shortcomings too: the distances to any main navigable waterway or railway were equally immense. There can be little doubt that this remoteness had direct bearing on the conception of the Zande scheme, but this does demand further explanation.

When Dr. Tothill picked the Zande as the area most likely to yield quick results he had very good reasons to do so. Ecological factors as well as ideal sociological conditions combined with historical accident to outweigh the fact of inaccessibility. A vital ecological survey had been undertaken by Dr. Myers, appointed in 1937, of the area around Yei, Maridi and Yambio. Until his untimely death in 1942, Myers devoted himself to the task of teaching the natives new agricultural techniques and introducing new varieties of crops to the area. Dr. Tothill paid him
tribute when he recorded that the Zande scheme could never have been dreamed of but for the pioneer work so enthusiastically and intelligently carried out by Myers. The South he said, owed to Myers a great debt of gratitude.¹

The region covered by the scheme is about 360 miles wide. It is best described as "grassy woodland" and has an average of 55 inches a year of rainfall and frequently gets 60 or even 70 inches a year. Its altitude is nowhere below 2,000 feet, and rises to 3,000 feet in a plateau south of Yei. The region is well watered and well drained, unlike the flood region in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile Province, and there are no swamps of any size. Between the rivers the country is generally undulating.

The agricultural soil occurs as reddish clays and clay loams.² Cotton was the most immediately practicable cash-crop and Myers reckoned that it could be grown profitably in the Zande country.

The great advantage of Zande districts over all other areas in terms of agricultural potential lay in the sphere of the traditional occupation of the people:

"Agricultural development requires not only suitable land but also suitable cultivators; and, fortunately, the Western half of the area is peopled by Azande, who are pre-eminently agricultural and amenable to administration. They


² Detailed descriptions of the soils of Zande country may be found in Tothill (ed.) Agriculture in the Sudan, op. cit. at pp. 120, 140 and 156.
have few domestic animals, but produce very diversified crops, many with numerous varieties." 1

Major J.W.G. Wyld who had been District Commissioner for the Zande district of Yambio for over sixteen years wrote that the variety of cultivated and edible plants and crops in Zande country was prodigious:

The grain is elusine or finger-millet. Other grains grown are maize, a little ordinary millet, bulrush millet and rice. The main root crops are cassava and sweet potatoes. Ground nuts are universally grown in large quantities and form one of the most important articles of diet. There are at least half a dozen varieties of beans; sesame thrives ... the commonest fruits are mangoes, bananas, pineapples and limes. All forms of citrus grow readily. The oil palm thrives in the 'green belt', though it is not indigenous. Robusta coffee can be grown with success. There are many forms of native vegetable including pumpkins, marrows, yams and various kinds of spinach. 2

The catalogue of food-crops is evidence of the fact that a number of foreign plants had been successfully introduced. Cassava, maize, sweet potatoes, and ground-nuts with wide distribution in Equatoria Province, are all originally non-African plants. But cassava, ground-nuts and oil palm warrant special attention for quite different reasons. Cassava was a favourite food-crop with the Azande and an insurance against famine, since it is not eaten by locusts and involves no storage problems: it can remain

1. Tothill, Agriculture in the Sudan, op.cit., p.589.
in the ground in satisfactory condition till required, for up to 4 years. As for groundnuts, so important in the diet on account of their protein content, they could yield two crops in a year. The newly introduced oil palms were equally essential in the diet for their high content of vitamin 'A'. There was, however, one great deficiency in the Zande diet, and that was meat. The only domestic animals, chickens and dogs, were not eaten. The former, of the poor and stringy type, were mainly used for consulting oracles, while the latter were greatly valued and used for hunting. This explains why the Azande craving for meat was almost pathological. Nevertheless it was quite prudent and appropriate that the scheme should be located in an area free from famine or threat of it. Zande land was selected for the agricultural experiment because it was where the food problem did not cause anxiety. "Unfortunately", said Major Wyld again, "there are areas in the Southern Sudan where crops and food supplies are produced on a meagre subsistence basis only."  

The receptiveness and amenability of the Azande to foreign or external influences may have also influenced the choice of the Zande as the site of first major economic development project. Way back in 1902 the first officer-administrators of Zande country noted that the Azande were prosperous people and anxious to progress. "The Niam

2. *Zande Background* (typescript), op.cit. p.74.
Niams /Azande/ are well-disposed to Government and anxious to trade generally."

A couple of years later Major Boulnois, the Moudir of the Bahr el Ghazal reported that there was a great demand for clothing and civilised commodities among the Azande and related tribes. This was in sharp contrast to the "deep-rooted mistrust of Government motives ... by the Dinkas and Nuers." On the whole, then, the Azande's propensity to appear to be civilised was well-established fact even in the early decades of Condominium rule.

Five years after its launching the Zande scheme proved beyond any doubt that if properly equipped and given sufficient incentive, the Southerner was capable of fending for himself. The implementation of the scheme had called for the resettlement of population in accessible groups of homesteads, taking due regard to the best soil and the availability of water supplies. The operation, conducted piecemeal, involved the erection of nearly 1,000 villages to accommodate nearly 51,000 families that made up the population of Yambio district. The District Commissioner reported that the Azande partook in their resettlement "with the utmost cheerfulness and have grown crops in a reasonably methodical and efficient manner."

In 1948 the cotton yield was only a little short of


50,000 kantars which was the target set for the spinning and weaving industry. The Azande cheerfully met all the labour demand for road construction and building both at Yambio and Nzara. The estimate for 1948 of adult males who supplied the labour market was 80%, by far the highest by Southern Sudan standards. Nevertheless, the Azande were not industrialized, as peasant agriculture still provided the most important occupation for the vast majority of Zande tribesmen. Indeed, it was estimated that industrial occupations would absorb about 2% of the total population only.¹

All the achievements of the Zande scheme were made without incurring the terrible disruption in the tribal life that was greatly feared in the pre-war years. Perhaps, the British in the Sudan realized belatedly, "that no area in the world can be segregated or, if you like, preserved, from the onflowing tide of sophistication and the upheaval of progress."² For this reason it is appropriate to conclude this chapter by repeating the familiar nationalist charge that the British provided "too little too late."

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² Zande Background, op.cit., p.77.
CHAPTER VIII

THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN

The persistent theme of neglect, stagnation and underdevelopment which dominated official thinking in the South prior to 1947 could hardly escape nemesis of some kind. Inevitably, either the Sudan Government or a succeeding administration would have to pay heavily at the end of the day. The Southerners, inexperienced in the techniques of local government (administration was still very direct) had no Advisory Council of their own to function as preparatory school of political education leading to self-government. Needless to say it cost the South valuable time and lives before recognising and utilising legal and constitutional channels as means by which political grievances might be vented and redressed. The South's first impulses were thus to resort to direct action as a rational and practicable alternative.

Rapid Sudanisation of Administration and the Military establishment in fulfilment of the self-rule pledge scarcely brought the South immediate material benefits. Political immaturity, combined with inadequate preparation both educationally and economically, led to predictably violent outbursts in the South. Jealous, frustrated and highly suspicious of Northern intentions, the Southerners could visualise but little prospects for themselves in an independent Sudan. The upshot of this fissiparous tendency had been to deny Southern Sudan a peaceful transition to
self-rule and independence and to plunge the country into a bloody, protracted, and costly civil war. As for the British colonial masters, the outbreak of mutiny in the South in 1955 which marked the beginning of the civil war was but a painful reminder of their failures in the South.

A - The Juba Effendia Strike.

On 1st October 1947 the town of Juba was hit by a wave of strike which involved both skilled and unskilled labour, hospital dressers and unclassified staff. Government workshops and the Post and Telegraphs services came to a halt but essential services were maintained. On the second day, the strike continued and spread to Southern classified staff (Article II), to the sanitary services and house-servants most of whom withdrew to the Native Lodging Area (N.L.A.). Strike pickets at times numbering a hundred men blocked the road from the Native Lodging Area to Juba town. The authorities could neither pin down the ringleaders, the prime movers, nor identify the cause of the strike and the strike itself appeared well organised.¹

The extent and seriousness of the strike was indicated by the instances of intimidation and molestation which

¹ Governor Juba to Civil Secretary (telegraphic, urgent), CS/SCR/36. M.15, 1st October 1947; "Diary of Juba Strike" in Governor Equatoria to Civil Secretary, (Secret), CS/SCR/36. M.15, 3rd October 1947, 2 Dakhtia 1/5/24, S.G.A. Khartoum. The following sources unless otherwise given are from the same file.
occurred on the third day of the strike, 3rd October 1947. Cars and commercial vehicles were stoned and their wind-screens smashed. Not only was his own car stoned but the District Commissioner himself was shouted down by the strikers. The contractors' mail lorry from Yei was intercepted and its contents confiscated. House servants and labourers who attempted to break the picket line were stopped and beaten up. One houseboy who continued to work in defiance of the strike was molested inside the house of his master, a Northern Effendia. A Southern tribesman found bargaining with a Northern merchant over a sheep was stopped and prevented from completing the sale. A hotel barman was attacked and beaten on his way to work. In another incident one or two Northern clerks of the Province Headquarters were accosted on their way to work. Even the Governor's own driver was prevented from attending his duties. Intimidators also entered the Mission premises and deterred Southern employees from continuing with their work. Because the strikers had the sympathy of the police, the pickets were a hundred per cent effective.¹ The Assistant Governor reported that "The atmosphere was one of emergency and considerable tension. Main roads were completely empty ... cessation of petrol supply."² In fact so grave was the situation that the District Commissioner established a small emergency Police post in the heart of

¹ "Diary of Juba Strike", A.C. Beaton to Civil Secretary (Secret) EP/SCR/36.B.5/1.

the Native Lodging Area where the strikers were concentrated.¹

The Juba strike was hardly over when fresh outbreaks of sympathetic strikes hit the districts and other Southern townships. Three days after the eruption in Juba, Article II clerical staff and Southern employees in Torit in Eastern Equatoria threatened a sympathetic strike.² At Loka and Kagelu forest camps on the 7th October, reluctant labourers joined Articles II and III in a sympathetic strike action.³ Similar strike actions were also reported at Tonj and Nyinakoke in the Bahr el Ghazal on the 9th October.⁴ This wave of strikes was soon terminated but clerical staff at Rumbak went on a belated strike on the morning of the 13th October which soon fizzled out.

More ruffling to the Administration than the scuffles and lootings was the initial lassitude of the local chiefs and headmen; the fact that the strike had the sympathy of the Southern Welfare Committee (a pseudo-political organisation); that no prior warning was given of the impending strike nor constitutional approach followed (i.e. no formal complaints had been filed through Heads of Departments or the District Commissioner). Most upsetting and the grimmest of all, the police themselves were alleged to have participated in turning back people on their way to

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
work, and at least one police driver was reported to have taken part in car stoning.¹

The immediate cause of the strike was the 'pernicious rumour' that grain in Juba market had suddenly risen in price by forty per cent.² In a region where newspapers³ of any sort were non-existent, let alone a wireless station,⁴ it is no wonder that "rumours were rife and spread uncontrollably". Because this particular piece of rumour concerned matters of livelihood it was "the most difficult ... to scotch."⁵ Initially, it was presumed that Juba's Native Lodging Area was infested with unemployed elements who were themselves trouble makers and that by living parasitically on their employed kinsmen the idlers brought the living standards of the employed to below normal. The assumption was that Government officials and other Southern employees were being paid a normal living wage. Thus the authorities resolved to purge the N.L.A. regularly of "parasites" as soon as the strike was over.⁶

As the dust settled, however, it became apparent that


3. The Messenger and Light owned by the Roman Catholic and Protestant Missions respectively, were often packed with Church news. Missionaries were forbidden to meddle in 'political' matters.

4. The only Government wireless service which broadcast in Arabic was located at Omdurman in the North, over a thousand miles from Juba.


6. A.C. Beaton to Civil Secretary (Secret) EP/SCR/36.5/1, 6th October 1947.
unemployed elements were merely the tip of the iceberg.

The strike was actually organised by Southern Article II and Article III staff to draw attention to the high cost of living in Juba where Southern pay packets hardly kept pace with the ever-rising prices of foodstuffs and essential consumer goods. Juba (like Omdurman), it was pointed out, was an artificial town in an area which contributed little or nothing to its sustenance, for the surrounding inhabitants not only did not sell surplus produce in Juba but would even import grain in the Juba market to supplement their own. As nearly all grain needed in Juba had to be imported from the North, factors such as transport costs, several middlemen's pickings and the much lower Southern rates of pay and wages (than they were in the North) contributed a great deal to the high cost of living. In brief, all prices in Juba were "Northern prices plus".  

Evidence of Government inattention to the immediate post-war needs of the South as a whole abounds. Scarcity of meat in Juba as in many other townships in Equatoria, for instance, was a fact of life. Meat had to be bought from reluctant Dinka and tribesmen and transported over difficult terrain on the hoof, so that it was both difficult and expensive to obtain while demand was about ten

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1. "Record of Meeting held in the Deputy Civil Secretary's Office on 12th October 1947 to discuss the implications of Juba Strike". Attendance included Sanders (Acting Civil Secretary), Marwood (Governor Equatoria Province), Chick (Acting Financial Secretary), Les (Acting Director of Establishment), Disney (Acting Director, Economics and Trade), Beaton (Deputy Governor, Equatorial Province), Keen (Assistant Civil Secretary (co)), Abdel Garder Yusuf (Acting Labour Officer), see 2 Dakhlia, 1/5/24.
times more than before the war. Yet pressure by Government for labour for roads and buildings and development generally was very great. In view of equal pressure to supply schools, hospital staff, army and the police with local grain it must be realised that every labourer and employee in Juba was a man taken from agricultural production. While the Government had piles of grain at Khartoum North as a matter of policy to break any attempt at undue price raising under "free trade", there were no such piles anywhere in the South and no precaution taken against undue price raising by Northern merchants.

War-time needs and post-war developments had not only greatly increased the labouring population in Juba in particular and the South in general, but the decision to amalgamate (which also entailed integration of the Southern and Northern economies) negated all arguments for maintaining separate and lower scales of pay for Southern officials and employees. The point is better stated by one Field officer thus:

... why should a Southerner working at Juba whose home is 5 miles away have his pay reduced for that reason as compared with his colleagues whose homes are further away. A scale 'J' Northern native of Tuti Island (located at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles) gets the same pay whether he works in Khartoum or in Umkedada. The 'working at home' argument for lower pay has long been nonsense.


2. Ibid.

Southern officials and employees in these circumstances perhaps needed to demonstrate a degree not so much of political sophistication as of minimum political consciousness if their grievances were to be redressed. After all, interest adjudication follows interest articulation as demand is antecedent to supply.

On studying the implications of the Juba strike the Central Government concluded that "just grievances must be fully met and a general minimum (of rate of pay) fixed which must enable a worker to support himself and his family at a reasonable level." Sample personal budgets had indicated that a worker just could not keep himself on existing wages. As interim measures it was proposed to raise the basic daily rate of unskilled labour in Juba by thirty per cent (from 30-35\text{m}/ms to 45\text{m}/ms). Similarly, rates paid to Article II staff were to be scaled up by the same amount. The idea was that no adult worker in Juba should be paid less than 125 P.T.\(^2\) per month (inclusive of cost of living allowance). The rises were to take effect retrospectively from 1st October 1947. It was also absolutely essential that urgent steps be taken to ensure the reliability of the police. A proposal was made to pay a station allowance of 50 P.T. for Juba and 30 P.T. for Wau and Torit police forthwith, again, retrospectively from the date the strike first broke out. A

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1. Record of a meeting held in the Deputy Civil Secretary's office on 12th October 1947, to discuss the implication of the Juba Strike, File 2 Dakhlia 1/5/24.

2. Ten milliemes equals 1 piastre (P.T.); 1 P.T. is only slightly over one penny in value.
firm promise was also given to the effect that a Committee would be appointed to review Southern scales as a whole. The station allowance of 50 P.T. normally paid to Article II clerks was extended to cover the trainees as well.¹

Seen from the Southern angle the strike had paid off. Apart from loss of pay for the days absent no further disciplinary action was taken against the strikers.²

The Governor-General admitted that while genuine hardship experienced by the labourers and lower-paid employees was the occasion of the strike, the participation by the Southern Government officials was political rather than economic:

> It was the culmination of a feeling of dissatisfaction which had been growing over the past two years, in a hot-house atmosphere of political propaganda and unrest, at the allegedly inferior position of Southern Government servant vis-a-vis his Northern confrere and his disappointment at the lack of any visible step taken as the result of the Juba conference towards the unification of establishments with the North.³

The quote is significant as it provides a hint to the origins and development of political consciousness in Southern Sudan. The withdrawal of the patronising hand of the British meant that the South had but to feel the full impact of unification with the North. Shielded from external pressures and influences by natural as well as man-made barriers for far too long, the Southerners soon

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¹. Civil Secretary to Financial Secretary (implications of Juba Strike) (Strictly Confidential) CS/SCR/36.M.15, 14th October 1947.


experienced the shock wave of sudden exposure to the wider world in general and the Northern Sudan in particular. The key to comprehending political awakening in the South is thus to be sought in its continuous contacts with the North at all levels of human activity since amalgamation. For political consciousness (like knowledge) does not come all at once or dramatically but gradually and by stages each time adding a spark of enlightenment. The Juba Strike was a manifestation as well as the initial stage of the development of the Southern consciousness.

B - The Transition to Self-rule 1948-52.

"The All-Sudan Legislative Assembly with 13 Southern members present opened on 15th December 1948, and until the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 12th February 1953, this period witnessed great economic, educational, and administrative advancement in the Southern Sudan; the Zande scheme, with all its branches, became a going concern; sawmills were established in Kateri, Gilo and Loka, and communications improved; a unified system of education introduced including the teaching of Arabic; local government was established in practically all districts; permits to trade licences were freely given for Sudanese whether Southerners or Northerners, and free movements between the two parts of the country were relaxed." 1

Despite initial difficulties of language and working in

1. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan During August, 1955 (Chairman, Justice Tawfik Cotran), 10 October 1956, Ministry of the Interior, Khartoum. The impartiality of the proceedings and findings of this report has never been questioned, hence it is quoted extensively in the remaining part of this chapter.
a foreign milieu the hand-picked Southern members by their Provincial Governors, reportedly showed a keen interest and an understanding of the proceedings of the Assembly. Between sessions the more prominent among them took the opportunity to talk to their respective communities about the Assembly in Khartoum, but "the masses of the people remained unconcerned."\(^1\)

Increasing signs of awakening political consciousness were nonetheless discernible among Southern officials and employees and some Chiefs. To this very small class of politically motivated beings the members of the Assembly explained the meaning of "self-government" and "independence". The Governor of Upper Nile Province was able to report that it would have been incorrect in previous years to say that "to many Chiefs the Legislative Assembly and the Sudan politics meant something but this is now certainly a fact."\(^2\)

Meantime the members, despite continuing tribal loyalties, clearly viewed themselves as "Southern" representatives and quickly formed the personal loyalties (and sometimes animosities) which facilitated the formation of later parliamentary bloc politics. Thus between 1949 and 1950 when the Umma Party was vigorously pressing for immediate self-government the Southern members were solidly opposed to the idea. The granting of early self-rule and

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independence was seen as not being in the special interest of the Southern Sudan. Not that they were unpatriotic or anti-nationalist; far from it. They would genuinely welcome self-government and independence but only when "backward areas ... which had been neglected in the last fifty years ... reach the same standard of the North in civilisation."¹ Like their predecessors at the Juba Conference in 1947, the thirteen Southern members of the Legislative Assembly insisted on the attainment of economic and educational parity with the North as an essential pre-condition of full union and independence. Towards the end of the life of the Assembly a Political Committee was formed in Juba. On 13th December 1952 it issued a memorandum over the signature of its President, Paulo Logaal, when it became clear that self-government was just around the corner. The memorandum was not opposed to the principle of self-government as such, but to the question of timing:

The people of the South are anxious to co-operate with their brothers in the North in the self-government of the Sudan. They differ strongly however from the northern view that self-determination should take place in three years. The south consider that it is not yet in a position to enter into an entirely free and democratic union with the northern Sudan.²

Once again the memorandum pointed out the extremely backward condition of the South vis-a-vis the Northern Sudan.

The demand by the Southern members that self-determination

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be delayed to enable the South to "catch up" with the North in the vital spheres of economic and educational development, though understandable, was obviously unrealistic. It was political naivete to suppose that the South, despite its numerical inferiority whether in the Assembly or outside it, could possibly hope to block or arrest rapid constitutional advance of the Sudan for the furtherance of its own interest. Nor, to take the other possibility, could the Southerners count on the traditional British paternalism any more. The fact of the matter was that in the struggle of the major Northern political parties for the power-legacy of the British, there was little disposition to attend to the special need of the South. As a result of this internal power-contest the Sudan Government itself found it necessary to enter into alliance with Sayed Abdel Rahman and the Umma Party. Indeed, after the hearing of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute at the United Nations Sudanese support became absolutely indispensable. Britain's presence in the Sudan was tenable only on the ground that she was preparing the Sudanese for self-government, which the Egyptian claim tended to negate. To gain a measure of credibility this argument had to be backed by demonstrable Sudanese support for the British policy of gradual "constitutional advance" towards self-rule and independence. In the circumstances the Sudan Government ceased to be the arbiter and manipulator

1. The composition of the Assembly was as follows:- 13 nominated members from the South, 76 members (elected and nominated) from the North and 6 British.
of Sudanese politics; it became just another participant in the struggle for political influence in the Sudan.¹

The British strategy worked out well. The seventy-six Northern members of the Legislative Assembly were all from the Umma-Ansar bloc or rural Chiefs and notables (and their urban equivalents). Despite internal differences these were all more or less on the same side of the political fence in that they rejected any form of union with Egypt. Furthermore, all the Ministers (members of the Executive Council) and some Under-Secretaries belonged to the Umma Party and the Ansar and were able, therefore, to speak within the Assembly as "the Government." Sayed Abdel Rahman and the Sudan Government needed, and cherished, the continuing support of each other. Pitted against the Ansar and the Independence Front were the Khatmiya and the Unionist parties supported by Egypt. This pro-Egyptian bloc boycotted the Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council as a means of progressively restricting the room for manoeuvre of the Sudan Government in the diplomatic "power-game". In this realignment of political forces the Southerners found very little or no room for accommodation and the closer the Sudan seemed to self-determination, the higher grew the stakes in this internal conflict. The point worth remembering is that "nationalist struggle" in the Northern Sudan was conducted largely by the wise instrument of diplomacy and the process of liquidation of

¹. A lengthy examination of the struggle for the power-legacy of the British may be found in Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim's Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, (London, 1969), Part Two.
British power was carried out as a game of chess. Sayed Abdel Rahman and Sayed Ali al-Mirghani were old masters at the diplomatic game. They had learned the rules and tricks of the game between the wars when the Sudan Government, by use of sophisticated techniques, was able to play one faction against the other while retaining firm control over the affairs of the country. The little educated and less experienced Southern members of the Legislative Assembly had not had the same training in the northern school of diplomacy. Their appearance as stark novices at a game which was already well-advanced and well-developed put them at once at an incalculable disadvantage.

If the Northern politicians, locked up in a power-contest, showed lack of sympathy or insensitivity to Southern demands one should not feel surprised. After all, had not the British opponents of amalgamation long warned of the danger of inevitable preoccupation of Khartoum with Northern problems of greater urgency or proximity, or, of the South being swamped by the North? The first indication of fulfillment of this prophecy came in early 1951 when a Constitution Commission was created to study and make recommendations for the next step to be taken in realisation of full self-government. The Chairman and Secretary were British but the seventeen members were all Sudanese inclusive of only one Southerner. The report of the Chairman recommended the establishment

1. The Commission was dissolved on 26th November 1951 before completion of its work because of deadlock over the issue of sovereignty following Egyptian abrogation of the Treaty and the Agreement.
of a fully self-governing Parliament based on the "Cabinet system of government." To allay Southern fears and suspicion there was to be instituted a "Minister for Southern Affairs who should himself be a Southerner selected by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Governor-General and with the Southern Members of Parliament." The Minister of Southern Affairs himself would be assisted by an "Advisory Board" for Southern Affairs selected by the Minister in consultation with the Governors of the three Southern Provinces.¹

In the lengthy and protracted debate that followed (January-April 1952) the Northern members of the Assembly severely criticised the recommendations on the South. In particular it was stressed that the proposal for the establishment of a Southern Ministry and an Advisory Board not only weakened the position of the Prime Minister but that it amounted to the creation of two cabinets in the country. Behind the proposal Northern representatives suspected the hands of British administrators in the South some of whom were still opposed to "the new Southern Policy". The Northern Sudanese also pointed to Darfur, the Beja area and the Nuba Mountains which made no demand for special treatment although these were in no less backward conditions than the Southern Provinces. On his personal initiative, the Governor-General Sir Robert Howe, was able to extract concessions from the Northern representatives for the backward areas in general and the South in particular. Under the Draft

Self-Government Statute passed into law in May 1952 the Governor-General retained the power of veto over any bill which he deemed affected in adverse manner the "special interests" of the South. ¹

A Sudan Government report later charged that some British Southern administrators were responsible for instilling into the Southerners the fear of northern domination. The fact of the matter is that at the close of the life of the Legislative Assembly fear and suspicion reigned in the minds of the Southerners, as they did afterwards. "The most important feature of this period", continued the report, "is that through more political contact with Khartoum, increase in education and the expansion of social services, the Southern people have become more politically conscious than they ever were before."²


The period of self-government proved yet more thorny and turbulent for the Southern Sudan than the first democratic experiment. It was a period dominated by North-South relations in which the Sudan Government in the person of the Governor-General was consigned to the back-seat, playing the role of the spectator. The grievous errors committed by the Northern politicians and Government could have been avoided and thus averted bloodshed while also

¹. Governor-General to Civil Secretary (SCO/1.A.20/9), 2nd March 1952 (S.G.A. Khartoum).
regaining the confidence of the Southerners. The inevitable spill-over to the South of the struggle for control of the Government in Khartoum was partly to blame for the gradual deterioration in the relations between the North and South. In the political virgin land of the South, Northern politicians courted Southern voters as one courts an inexperienced lover; they sponsored Southern candidates and above all, made wild promises the fulfillment of which was immediately impossible to achieve. These empty promises, made in an attempt to capture votes, were regrettable. Great damage was also caused to North-South relations when Northern administrators sympathetic to one or either of the rival Northern political parties abused their official position to promote partisan interests while denying the Southerners minimum privileges. The clamour for Southern voters may have generated intense political activity resulting in increased political awareness in the South, but the cumulative effect was evidently undesirable: it was responsible for the progressive loss of Southern confidence, fear, suspicion and mistrust which led directly to the tragic events of August 1955.

As a standard practice events in the Southern Sudan must be related to the mainstream of political development in the North in an attempt to render them comprehensible. This has to be dealt with, perforce, summarily. Once again, outside developments exercised a profound influence on the course of events inside the country. Already, the Wafd government in Egypt was annoyed that the Sudan Government had allowed the discussion of the motion on self-government in the Legislative Assembly without the
prior consent or consultation with Egypt as a co-domini
power. On 8th October 1951, the Egyptian Government
denounced the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the 1899
Condominium Agreement. This precipitated a constitutional
crisis for the Sudan Government, but it was a bonus to
the Sudanese nationalists. The Egyptian abrogation of the
Treaty and Agreement caused extreme embarrassment to
the British in the Sudan. The Sudanese nationalists
argued, rightly, that there was no legal basis for the
continued existence of the Governor-General. The British
Government in turn denounced the Egyptian announcement as
an unilateral action and therefore utterly invalid. The
truth of the matter was that "however much legal pundits
might argue, the Treaty, and Agreement had in fact been
torn up by Egypt and the Sudan was free."

Meanwhile, there was a growing rapprochement between
the Ansar and the Khatmiya, though not the Ashigga. On
January 1952, they called for the right of the Sudanese
people to exercise self-determination by means of a
plebiscite to be held under the auspices of the United
Nations backed by the Ashigga and the majority of Sudanese
parties. They sent a delegation to the United Nations
for this purpose, but nothing came out of it. At the same
time the Egyptian Government persisted in its campaign to
discredit the continued presence of the British in the Sudan
despite the abrogation of the Treaty and the Agreement and

1. J.S.R. Duncan, The Sudan, A Record of Achievement,
against the wishes of the Sudanese people. But Great Britain was the de facto Power and power politics precluded any hasty or panic measures. So the British stuck to their programme of gradual constitutional advance toward self-rule and self-determination. Privately, however, the changed circumstances had compelled the Sudan Government "to hasten along with [the] plans for self-government and to explain carefully to the people [the] reasons for doing so."¹

The Sudanese nationalist received a further surprise bonus on 23rd July 1952 when General Najib seized power in Egypt, in a military coup that toppled the monarchy. Born of a Sudanese mother and a former student of the Gordon Memorial College, Najib was naturally sympathetic to Sudanese nationalism. His first diplomatic success was to reach an agreement with the Umma or the Independence Front which paved the way for self-government. In the meantime, the Sudanese nationalists had closed their ranks. The Ashigga were now joined by seven other unionist parties into a single Nationalist Unionist Party headed by Azhari. Together with the representatives of the Socialist Republicans and the Umma, they went to Cairo for further negotiations with the revolutionary Government. On 10th January 1953, the Political Parties Agreement was concluded which effectively denied cooperation with the Sudan Government save for the implementation of self-

¹ J.W. Robertson to all Governors with copies to District Commissioners (CS/SCO/1.A.20/9) 12th February 1952, (S.G.A. Khartoum).
government and self-determination. The British Government, which had professed the right of the Sudanese to self-government and self-determination as against union with Egypt, had no choice but to concede the unanimously reached Egyptian-Sudanese Agreement. The result was the signing, on 12th February 1953, of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement concerning self-government and self-determination. The transitional period to self-determination was not to exceed three years.¹ On 19th December 1955 Parliament passed the Independence motion and on 31st December the Transitional Constitution of the Sudan was approved. On 1st January 1956 the Sudanese people celebrated the Independence of their country. The Union Jack and the Egyptian flag were lowered for the last time.

The list of Southern grievances provoked by this somewhat hectic decolonisation began with the exclusion of the Southerners from the Political Parties delegation to Cairo in 1953:-

When major Northern parties went to Egypt shortly before the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 12th February 1953 to negotiate with the Egyptians re the Agreement, none of the Southerners were represented in any of the parties. The Southerners considered that they had been belittled because their views were not asked for.²

To argue that the Southerners did not have a party of their own to represent them in the talks was to commit an error

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² Commission of Enquiry, p. 20.
of judgement. As has been seen, a Political Committee was already in existence in Juba which issued a memorandum stating the position of the South prior to the Cairo negotiations. Its founders were prominent Southern politicians such as Abdel Rahman Sule (a Muslim and staunch Southern Sudanese nationalist), Stanslaus Paysama, Buth Diu and Paul Logaali. Though not formally registered as a political party its members were competent enough to be consulted by Northern politicians. The real motive for the exclusion of the Southerners from the Sudanese delegation was that the Southern demand for the slowing down of constitutional pace might frustrate the Northern (particularly the Umma) desire for early independence. Be that as it may, the action of the Northern parties, who had agreed in the Legislative Assembly to the Governor-General's special powers, in cutting them out when they made their agreement, did cause a rebirth of suspicion and distrust. As the Civil Secretary Sir James Robertson later put it: "How could the Southerners trust the promises of those who speedily went back on what they had agreed."3

The Southerners reacted to the 1953 Cairo episode with the formation of the Southern Party. The Party enjoyed the support of majority Southern intelligentsia and "it can safely be said that the Southern Party has

also the support of the great bulk of Southerners".¹

The Southern Party changed its name in 1954 to the Liberal Party in an attempt to attract Northern members but as none were forthcoming both names were used interchangeably. The South also needed a political party of its own to contest the elections of November and December 1953. During the elections each of the major political parties tried to gain the votes of the Southerners. The Southern Party stood for complete independence as did the Umma Party, and little canvassing was done by the latter party in the South. The leaders of the National Unionist Party (N.U.P.) and the Egyptian Government representative Major Salah Salem paid a visit during the elections to the Southern Sudan. "Rash and irresponsible promises were made to the Southerners by N.U.P. politicians." The Egyptian representative even went to the extent of promising the Southerners forty posts as Governors, District Commissioners and Assistant District Commissioners when the British left.²

On 1st January 1954 the first Parliament met and the N.U.P. was returned to power with a slight overall majority. Of the twenty-two Southern members (roughly a quarter of the House of Representatives) twelve were Southern Party, six were N.U.P. and the remaining four were Independents. One important decision of Parliament was the appointment of a Sudanisation Committee on 20th February to consider

posts in the Civil Service which should be Sudanised, with the Public Service Commission to advise on the promotion of Sudanese. Outside of Parliament the relations between Government and Opposition began to take on an ugly look. In August Umma-Liberal politicians led by Buth Diu, M.P., visited the Southern Sudan where during the course of several meetings disparaging remarks to discredit the Government were made. N.U.P. supporters in Equatoria, mostly northern trades (Jallaba), hurled charges against the Umma Party, while reminding the Southerners that the leader of the Umma Party (Abdullah Bey Khalil) and his followers were the descendants of their bitter enemies the slave-traders. They warned the Southerners of Mahdist oppression if they supported the Umma Party. The Umma-Liberal speakers in turn charged the northern merchants with exploitation of the Southerners. The Jallaba interrupted the Umma-Liberal meetings and the result was a deterioration in relationship between the Southern and Northern Sudanese. When some Southerners demanded that their M.P.s who had joined the N.U.P. should resign from it, the Government reacted by issuing a warning on 15th August 1954, that "they were fully aware of the conspiracies that are being worked out in the South" and threatened the Southerners that "they shall use the force of iron in dealing with any Southerners that will dare attempt to divide the nation." "This", continued the Commission report, "angered all Southerners irrespective of party; and 'Our Northern brothers will use force against us' slogan by agitators started."

The results of the Sudanisation Commission announced in October 1954 came as a further disappointment for the Southerners. Out of an estimated 800 senior administrative posts Sudanised the Southerners were given only a handful of posts, four as Assistant District Commissioners and two as mamurs. This was in serious default of the election promises and fell far short of the expectations of the Southerners. A month before the Commission's announcement the Southern N.U.P. members in a memorandum to the Prime Minister dated 25th September had demanded three Governor posts, eight Assistant District Commissioner, and twelve full mamur. Feeling cheated and let down, some Southern N.U.P. members resigned membership and joined the Liberal Party. Fears of domination became widespread among the educated Southerners: "The educated Southerners feared that, once the Northerners come South and occupy the administrative posts, they themselves will find their future prospects blocked."¹ This feeling of frustration and resentment was not confined to the few disgruntled Government officials; the feeling was general and found expression in the exaggerated fear of a Gongrial Dinka who wrote to his MP. thus: "the Report of the Commission/ means that our fellow Northerners want to colonise us for another hundred years."² Cashing in on Southern fears and career resentments the Southern Liberal Party grew

² Commission of Enquiry, p.114.
from strength to strength and its activities also increased.

Meanwhile, a Conference of the Liberal Party was held in Juba in October 1954 where the effect of Sudanisation was debated and a resolution was passed to demand federal status with the North, "with a call to all Southerners to be ready for sacrifices." Against the background of the Liberal Party Conference and amidst reports of a successful Umma-Liberal Party tour in the South coupled with dissatisfaction by the Southern members from within his own party, the Prime Minister (Ismail el-Azhari) accompanied by some prominent N.U.P. politicians undertook a tour of the Southern Sudan. Except for Government officials and the Northern merchants, who staged a welcome at Juba Airport, a few Southerners turned up: They were booed and ill-received everywhere. Feelings were running high and to counter-effect the success of the Liberal Conference a rise in the salaries of the prison warders, police, and clerks to accord with Northern scales were at once announced. This was regarded by Southerners as a bribe and in any case created discontent as it did not include Article III Clerical Category, who form the great majority of clerks in the South ... 1

The visit of the Prime Minister and his colleagues was followed by a series of blunders in the administrative, political and industrial fields. For instance, a Governor who seemed to have gained a limited confidence of the Southerners was transferred and the activities of the Liberal Party (to which practically all Southerners belonged) increased. In May 1955 two Southern N.U.P. Ministers left

the Cabinet (one resigned and the other dismissed) apparently because of disagreement with the Prime Minister on his handling of Southern affairs. The Liberal Party welcomed them in its fold and extended invitations to all Southern M.P.s irrespective of parties, to join in a Southern bloc to pursue the demands of the Southerners. Another Liberal Party Conference was planned for June in Juba to discuss the main issue of federation. The Prime Minister responded with further threats. To frustrate the proposed Liberal Party Conference, the Government sought to employ politically minded administrators in Equatoria to arrange telegrams to be despatched to Khartoum denouncing the aims of the Conference, and in support of the Government. For this purpose the District Commissioner of Yambio and his Assistant toured the district, obtained signatures of the Chiefs (who for all practical purposes were Government Officials) by both fraud and compulsion and arranged for a telegram in the name of his Assistant supporting the Government against the Juba Conference.

The Report of the Commission of Enquiry commented:

The fact that the Assistant Commissioner himself interfered in politics in such a way is deplorable both in a moral sense and in an administrative sense ... It is manifestly wrong for an administrator to allow his party loyalties to carry him beyond his duty to his people and the Public Service.

It will be remembered that following the departure of two Southern Ministers from the Cabinet the Prime Minister issued a blunt warning that any Southern official who actively

participated in politics would be dismissed.

The telegram from Yambio was used for propaganda purposes by the State wireless station in Omdurman. A Zande M.P. called Elyas Kuze elected on the Independence ticket was campaigning on behalf of union with Egypt, but without success. He decided to exploit the telegram to his advantage. He called a meeting in Yambio on 7th July at which he demanded the removal of the signatories from office:

The motion was passed with enthusiasm, excitement ran high, and the offended Chiefs demanded his arrest. He was brought back from Juba, tried with four others by a court of the Chiefs he had denounced, and sentenced on 25th July to twenty years imprisonment on a charge of criminal intimidation.¹

In the opinion of the Commission the trial was a farce and a usurpation of the machinery of Justice; its intention was wrong as members were judging their own case, it was a Chiefs Court, quite incompetent to stage the trial of an M.P.; the sentence imposed was illegal and vindictive in nature; and it violated the often-repeated golden rule that Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done. As expected the conviction was quashed by higher legal authorities, but great harm had been caused to the public image of the (northern) administration.² The incident which followed the announcement of the sentence is significant, for a crowd of about 700 staged a demonstration. Police and S.D.F. troops were called in who used tear gas against the crowd. The latter dispersed but small bands raided a

shop belonging to a Northern trader. Some Northerners were also assaulted and about 6 p.m. order was restored.¹

In order to assess the significance of the blunder committed in the industrial field it is necessary first to consider the activities of the Anti-Imperialist Front in Equatoria Province. "Communist propaganda" seemed to have been diffused in the semi-industrial zone of the Zande Scheme by Northern officials and Egyptian expatriates. Towards the end of December 1954, these activities increased. In the Zande and Moru districts of Equatoria, where there was a concentration of labour in the cotton industry, there were a few Trade Unions established including one at Nzara. Propaganda literature had been translated into Zande language and distributed to many Chiefs, Government officials and natives alike. The theme of these leaflets differed widely. Some emphasized the strength and efficacy of collective industrial strikes in pressing wage demands; a few were devoted to explaining the causes of Southern poverty and the method to combat it, but more importantly, other leaflets advocated local autonomy for the South within the framework of a united Sudan. In January and February 1955, such propaganda received a further boost when prominent Northern politicians from the Front toured Nzara and other parts of Equatoria. Despite these activities there was little evidence to suggest that Southern intelligentsia and the Southern community as a whole cared much about abstract theories, but extracts about "equal pay for equal work" and "three little

¹. Commission of Enquiry, p.96.
Parliaments in Juba, Wau and Malakal" interested them, and those anti-Northern passages stuck to their mind. Against the background of growing Southern political (and industrial) awareness the management of Equatoria Projects Board dismissed en masse some three hundred workers in July 1955. The dismissals occurred at a time when the number of Northern technical staff had comparatively risen as a result of Sudanisation. The Southerners interpreted the mass dismissals as an attempt by the Northern-dominated management to deprive Southerners of a means of livelihood and to substitute Northerners for Southern workmen.

On 26th July indications of ill-feelings against the Northern officials were manifest at Nzara, the industrial centre of the Zande Scheme. This was followed by a demonstration for higher wages under threat of strikes. The demonstration got out of hand and three shops belonging to Northern merchants were looted. Reinforcements consisting of five policemen, each with a tear gas bomb and eleven Equatorial Corps soldiers from Yambio, proved inadequate to contain the crowd and had finally to open fire, killing four and fatally wounding two. Two others died when trampled upon by the fleeing crowd. The Assistant District Commissioner (a Northerner) personally participated in tear-gas bomb throwing. The effect on the morale of the troops of having to fire on their fellow-Southerners must have been considerable. Nonetheless, "No enquiry was made, and instead a further threatening ultimatum from Khartoum was circulated and broadcast."2

On 7th August 1955, a conspiracy to mutiny in the Equatorial Corps involving most of the N.C.O.s was discovered. The authorities were too weak to make any arrests in the Army, as the Southern Corps was the only force they could rely on. However, two civilians who appeared to have been implicated in the mutiny were arrested in Juba. Once again a demonstration took place and the mob demanded the release of the accused. The mob was dispersed by the use of tear-gas bombs. The report of the Commission continues:

> When the administration lost the confidence of every shade of opinion in the South, frantic calls to Khartoum to send in Northern troops were made. Khartoum, neither understanding nor appreciating the situation, was reluctant, but finally sent a company by air, whose equipment and support had not yet arrived. Rumours started flying about ... and the last straw came about when the Army Command in Equatoria decided "for its prestige and dignity" to persist in their order that No. 2 Company Southern Corps should move to Khartoum when they and everybody else in Equatoria knew that the Company would refuse to obey orders and mutiny, and when the only reliable force left to preserve law and order and protect life and property was a Company of 200 Camel Corps Nubas, crippled by lack of equipment, transport and mortar support in a Province as large as Italy! 1

A mutiny actually broke out in Torit, the Headquarters of the Equatorial Corps on 18th August 1955. The mutineers shot their Northern officers and killed Northern civilians including women and children. The total casualty in Torit itself was seventy-eight souls. The property and shops of Northern Sudanese were also looted.

All communications with the outside world were completely cut save the Southern Corps signals which the mutineers used for sending out messages to the Prime Minister, the Kaid, British Troops in Sudan and British Troops in Nairobi. The mutineers also communicated with Sir Knox Helm, the Governor-General, on his return from England. From British troops both in Nairobi and the Sudan the rebellious troops in Torit expected moral and material support, but this was not forthcoming. From the Prime Minister and the Kaid in Khartoum, they demanded the evacuation of Northern troops stationed in Juba and their replacement by British contingents. These demands were rejected. When the mutineers could not solicit any external support they agreed to surrender on the Governor-General's personal guarantee of fair trial. On 31st August, Northern troops re-occupied Torit but found the town deserted. Fear of possible revenge at the hands of Northern troops had driven both the mutineers and civilians into the bush, some of whom were later to form the nucleus of Southern Sudanese guerrilla forces.

The mutiny in Torit quickly engulfed the whole of Equatoria. All over the Province Northern residents were killed, usually as a direct result of the rumour that Southerners in Juba had been massacred. There were, however, isolated cases of loyal N.C.O. or Chief or Missionary who managed to save a few individuals and some Northerners were able to escape to Uganda or to the Congo. The majority of those in Maridi and Yambio made their

way to the relative safety of Wau, but left behind 45 dead in Yambio and Nzara, the scene of earlier political and industrial unrest.

At Wau in the Bahr-el-Ghazal the Dinka played a role in defusing a potentially explosive situation. Of the 276 men at Wau garrison two-thirds were Equatorial tribesmen and one-third Dinka, but the senior N.C.O. was himself a Dinka. On receiving the news of the disturbances in Equatoria the Governor, Daud Abdel Latif, thought it appropriate to request Khartoum to send in a Dinka Minister, Santino Deng, who arrived by air on 20th August accompanied by another Dinka M.P., Philemon Majok. The Senior N.C.O. had guaranteed Dinka loyalty but not that of the Non-Dinka. Thus when it became known that Northern troops might be flown in from Khartoum excitement and tension increased among the non-Dinka soldiers and police. Things went out of hand; there were some desertions while others took control of the Wau airstrip. At this point the Governor reckoned that the Southern Minister stood a better chance of saving the lives and property of Northern residents if he and his senior staff handed over power to the Dinka politician and withdrew to Khartoum. On 21st August the Governor and his staff left Wau at night by the steamer Dal for Khartoum. In retrospect this was a very wise decision for, the following morning, when it became publicly known that the Governor had left, "everybody was immensely relieved." While the Governor and other senior Northern officials maintained a presence in Wau the possibility of a relief force from Khartoum loomed large, and the "greatest amount of goodwill could never, in those days, convince
the Southerners in Bahr-el-Ghazal that the Northern troops were only coming to preserve law and order. The sudden departure of the Governor and senior Government officials had a cooling down effect and the two M.P.s, assisted by a Dinka officer, the Senior N.C.O., and other Southern officials restored order without any loss of life until a new Northern Governor arrived on 9th September.

In the Upper Nile Province the news of the mutiny became publicly known in Malakal township on the morning of 19th August 1955. The authorities had managed to disarm No. 4 Company, Southern Corps, on realising that one of the N.C.O.s was implicated in the abortive plot of 7th August in Equatoria. The ammunition was then stored away in a safe location. On 18th August the Company was eventually persuaded to board a steamboat for Khartoum a day of schedule, while a force of Nuba mounted police provided a stabilising influence. A Company of Northern troops destined for Juba arrived at Malakal on 21st August and as a precautionary measure it was resolved to disarm the Southern police and warders the next day. This led to a shooting incident in which five Southerners and one Northerner were killed. Efforts to stir up troubles elsewhere in the Province were easily contained because the majority of the police and the Nilotic tribesmen remained loyal. The official known fatal casualties of the whole revolt were 336 Northerners and 77 Southerners, excluding those killed at Nzara in July.

On the Commission's findings the revolt was political,
not religious; the great Nilotic tribes were barely involved; the crisis was provoked by irresponsible political propaganda, Northern as well as Egyptian, making extravagant promises which could not be fulfilled. Among the non-Nilotics influence had shifted in five years from the Chiefs to the educated few. The Northern administrator had failed to realise that the Southerner regarded him, as much as he regarded the former British District Commissioner, as a "coloniser". For a harmonious future relationship between the two parts of the country the Report recommended a complete change of attitude towards the South by the Northerner, both administrator and merchant.
CONCLUSION

The intimation of British colonial neglect of Southern Sudan made in this thesis calls for some clarification. It is worth noting at this point that whatever might be the nature and extent of that neglect, it certainly cannot be presumed to be total or uniform in its effects. One cannot, for instance, underestimate the administrative difficulties and problems of the early decades, which precluded the possibility of any form of initiative for development. Nor can there be any question of downgrading the efforts and concern, however belated, showed by the Administration during the hectic period prior to independence. In either case, the various opposing forces (political, diplomatic or otherwise) presented a redoubtable enough barrier: the administrator's predicament may merit even sympathy. Yet, these reservations aside, it is equally impossible to avoid the impression that the South was treated by its colonial masters more or less as a 'Cinderella' vis-a-vis the Northern Sudan.

British conquest of the Southern Sudan was undertaken with the primary aim of securing the sources of the Nile. This involved efforts by the Sudan Government to keep out the French and Belgians who threatened territorial encroachments in the Upper Nile valley. To this end, everything else was subordinated. There was not, for instance, the attempt to institute close administration in the early years, even in areas already pacified. Apart from opening the South to a trickle of missionary personnel and raising the Equatorial Corps to act as bulwark against further Islamic penetration
of the South, Khartoum urged peace and economy. The two proved to some extent incompatible, however, and the one could obtain only at the expense of the other. The preservation of law and order entailed close or thorough administration, but the Sudan Government lacked financial as well as manpower resources to impose its will throughout the Southern Sudan. Consequently, only the very minimum of administration was attempted especially in the period prior to World War I. The few duties of the field officials included the collection of taxes in administered areas, the construction of roads and keeping open lines of communications.

The British presence itself and the demands made on the natives were nonetheless unacceptable to many Southern tribesmen, who revolted against the Government. The official standard response in such cases was punitive expedition which burned villages and confiscated cattle. The result was the alienation of the natives, particularly the Nilotics who led the majority of the uprisings. When after the war the efficacy of 'government by routine patrol' became questionable, the Administration resorted to full scale warfare but at the cost of total loss of confidence of the Southern Sudanese. Nevertheless, the point was driven home to them that continued resistance could only bring destruction to both lives and property. Even when the majority of the Southern peoples had succumbed to British authority, very little was done by way of close administration. British officials in Khartoum had neither the will nor the incentive to initiate concrete development programmes for the South and were almost completely absorbed in events in the Northern Sudan.
The first twenty years or so of British government in the North witnessed the foundations of modern education, of health and development schemes, the construction of roads and railways, and the raising of the general standard of living. Every effort was also made to gain the confidence of the people, particularly Muslim notables, and the respect paid to 'orthodox' Islamic leaders almost amounted to appeasement.

It has been advanced that there obviously were not enough funds to go round. The British knew very little about the peoples of the Southern Sudan - their languages, customs and tribal institutions. The difficult terrain, the long distances and poor communications made even the exploration of Southern Sudan a hard task indeed. True, the Southerners had learnt to mistrust foreign domination and some had raised a blank wall against all forms of external influence. Composed of different tribal groups with sub-divisions, the Southerners had frequently been at war with each other and among themselves. The superior technology of their British conquerors, they saw as something to be harnessed to one's advantage in the perpetual war against traditional enemies. More importantly, they valued their independence above everything else. The majority of these arguments applied with cogency, but not without reservations, to the first two decades of the Condominium rule and of course before it. In the inter-war period, which had been an era of settled administration, some of these arguments had lost their force or validity. The Sudan Government had no excuse whatsoever for delaying or denying the South proper attention. Yet, down to about
1945 the Sudan Government's chosen path for the administration of Southern Sudan followed the course of least resistance and minimum expense.

The principle that Southern Sudan should be administered with as little money and few men as possible found abundant expression in the policy of indirect administration formally adopted in 1921. There is nothing intrinsically immoral or inhuman in native administrative policy if conceived in the right spirit and executed to the best of one's ability. Only when its application tends to hold up economic and social development of a people, to arrest educational expansion whether sideways or upwards, to preserve a people in a kind of "Whipsnade" does indirect rule policy call for a second thought. In the Southern Sudan there was not, once again, a strongly felt interest to develop native rule beyond judicial devolution such as did by comparison pertain in the North.

The small experiments in native courts which were tried here and there in the South achieved only marginal success. Very often the District Commissioner had to review all the decisions of the courts. He was the Paramount Chief himself, without much check from above, and his extensive power was only slightly modified by his dependence upon interpreters and other intermediaries. The truly autocratic (and aristocratic) chieftaincies were already destroyed or weakened in the course of pacification, and the appointed Chiefs (particularly among the Nilotics) were more or less figureheads.

Another conspicuous aspect of Southern native administrative practice consisted in the lack of trained
indigenous executive officers to act as supporting bureaucracy. For a long time in the South, there were not even enough mission-educated 'boys' to act as Chiefs court clerks. This need was especially felt in the Nilotic areas, where the District Commissioner supervised minute administrative details, often typing all correspondence for want of a clerk to help him. In his District Headquarters, everything was on a small scale, his office was probably a hamlet conveniently located in the centre of the district. He spent most of the time settling cattle-disputes in a leisurely manner under a tree, or trekking from one administrative post to another.

It is the unbroken theme of administration on the cheap that also dictated Government policy on education. Whereas a two-tier educational system applied in the North, Southern education was entrusted almost in its entirety to Christian missionary societies. The aims of Southern education were very restricted indeed. Elementary education was ideal recruiting ground for Christian converts while the three intermediate schools turned out clerks and accountants for government offices. As an appreciation of missions' services, the Government made subventions to mission education, but on a scale which did not encourage educational expansion. As a matter of fact, there was no higher education and pupils were supposed to return to tribal life as required by indirect rule policy. But mission education itself tended to be disruptive of tribal order and the predominance of Italian Roman Catholics in Southern education was a permanent source of anxiety to the Administration.
One of the cardinal principles of the colonial administration was a refusal to expand educational facilities beyond the elementary and intermediate stages. Not only did the Sudan Government fail to open schools of its own throughout the inter-war period, but Martin Parr (the Governor of Equatoria in 1936) actually frustrated efforts by the C.M.S. mission to raise the status of Loka intermediate to that of a secondary school. The South had a dire need for higher education of one kind or another, such as was readily available in the Northern Sudan. In retrospect enlightenment from whichever source, whether through the agency of a Christian organisation or the state, was definitely in the long term interest of the Southerners. This would have avoided creating the impression of native ignorance, colonial neglect and general backwardness, the cause of subsequent bitterness and resentment in the South.

The claim to protect the Southern Sudan from marauders, which crystallised in the form of Southern Policy had mixed motives. Between the predominantly Arabized and Muslim North and the almost exclusively black African and 'pagan' South, British administrators in the Sudan could hardly discern any bond or thread of unity. Both geography and history provided additional grounds for the application of separate regional policies to the South and North. In the context of the South this meant the exclusion of Islamic and Arabic influences south of the twelfth parallel of latitude. The political motive here aimed at forestalling neo-Mahdist uprisings in which a lately Islamized Southern Sudan might be involved. As a rule, no imperial or colonising power may be expected to assume responsibility for integrating
communities which were socially, culturally, racially, linguistically, and geographically distinct. Such an enterprise would have been so demanding and exacting as to repel the would-be enthusiast of integration. It would also have tended to generate local response that went counter to the imperial interest itself. Not surprisingly, the aphorism 'divide and rule' was the golden rule in imperial strategy.

British administrators in the South did not really wish to Christianise the natives. On the contrary the 'bog baron' (as Southern administrators of the 'twenties and 'thirties were then nicknamed after the sudd or swamps) sought to preserve the natives in lovable primitive state. As for the missionary, Southern Sudan was something of a virgin land - poor, backward, 'primitive', and uncontaminated - ideally suited to experimenting in Christian acculturation. The British Foreign Office and Khartoum on the other hand, regarded the Christianization of the South as a necessary (and a lesser) evil. It was felt that England as a Christian country could not rightfully be expected to supervise the conversion to Islam of the pagan and black African Southern Sudan whose cultures and religion were different from those prevailing in the Northern Sudan. In a characteristic paternal fashion it was reasoned that should necessity arise for the South to abandon some of its cultural values, then it must not do so in return for a second best. The Arabic and Islamic civilization, the British naturally assumed, was not the most appropriate cultural species to offer to the Southerners.

Administrative indifference in other fields paralleled inattention in the economic development sphere. Despite
innumerable hindrances in the way of the socio-economic emergence of the South, favourable conditions existed in some parts of the region to merit early and serious experiments in development projects. Expressed differently, if the South was neglected during the period up to the end of World War II, not all of it was necessarily negligible. The peoples of the Western district of Bahr el-Ghazal province and most parts of Equatoria were, by 1920, ready to accept major changes in their traditional way of life. The Azande and related peoples, for instance, were more or less peaceful, docile, amenable, and ready to offer their labour for money or in return for trade goods which were in great demand. What is more, good agricultural soil was available in Zande-land, at that time regarded as the cream of the Bahr el Ghazal.

To overcome the problem of remoteness, communications could have been improved, trade stimulated and local markets developed. Also, given improved communications and a better transportation system, sound export trade in timber, oil seeds, beeswax, rubber and even rain-grown cotton would have produced import of useful and valuable consumers' goods in a manner which could have only raised the general standard of living in the South. The material betterment of Southern Sudan seemed to hinge on the introduction of a railroad, which was out of the question for lack of funds but also because it would not have paid its way. A possible consideration is that the Government in Khartoum suspected Islam would come to the South by rail, which it was official policy to restrict. For this same reason, the activity of Northern merchants and traders who were prepared to do
business anywhere in the South was curbed. In the meantime, the few Syrian and Greek merchants who had official backing confined most of their commercial activity to the very few provincial townships.

A key feature of the post-1945 period consisted of the forces of nationalism unleashed by the war both in the Northern Sudan and Egypt. The British had the difficult task to strike a delicate balance between opposing interests, without offending one party or the other. The consideration of British interests in the Suez Canal zone combined with nationalist pressure in the Northern Sudan forced a review of Southern Policy. The Southern Sudanese, yet inexperienced, less sophisticated than the nationalist agitators in the North and holding a blind faith in the myth of British justice and fair play, hesitantly accepted the principle of unity with the North in 1947. A 'representative' element was then brought into the administration above tribal level and the South was thrown open to Northern traders.

The South was now exposed not just to the external influences of Islam and Arabic education, but also to the forces of the modern market economy. The Southerner began to experience, almost for the first time, the pangs of ever-rising prices and inflation which appeared to go on unchecked. Unity with the North also meant that Northern Sudanese could now take up jobs and positions of responsibility in the South in ever-increasing numbers. The Southerner soon discovered he was not sufficiently equipped, educationally or otherwise, to compete on equal terms with his Northern compatriot for jobs and positions of authority.
His outlook differed markedly from that of the majority of the people he encountered in Parliament, the Civil Service or the Army. Moreover, Northern Sudanese tended to look down upon their fellow countrymen from the South, regarding them as 'half-educated'. The first generation of educated Southerners and politicians naturally began to perceive the extent of the backwardness of the South; they were indignant, felt cheated and swamped by the North. The storm that had been gathering strength for years past came in the form of the Southern disturbances of August 1955. The outburst marked the beginning of a civil war, which went on intermittently long after the British had left the Sudan.

Meanwhile, tendencies had been afoot during the war period itself which shook the traditional administrative attitude towards Southern development. In 1946 something of a 'crash' programme of economic and social development of the South was initiated. These proposals included state intervention in Southern education, the development of local government councils in the South and the launching of Zande development scheme. Dinka cattle trade was encouraged, but progress was slow. A rice scheme was started at Aweil in the Bahr el-Ghazal, this too did not fully mature till after independence. By and large, these development efforts had little time to correct the existing social, economic and political imbalance between the North and South and were overtaken by events in Khartoum.

At independence, therefore, only a small strip of territory in the far south and south-west, together with
the provincial centres had had any serious contact with the
money economy. Western Bahr el-Ghazal and most parts of
Equatoria were also considerably detribalised due, largely,
to the influence of the missions. Outside the very few towns,
mission stations were very much the civilising centres in
the South. For this reason Equatoria Province became the
most 'developed' of the three Southern provinces. Elsewhere,
in the Nilotic heartland, ostensible improvement or progress
of any sort was hard to identify.

The Sudan Government's discriminatory tendency against
the South (and in favour of the North) was reflected in the
calibre of Southern administrators. It has been claimed,
rightly, that the Sudan was ruled by an elite of the British
colonial service.\footnote{R.O.Collins, "The Sudan Political Service: A Portrait of
the 'Imperialist'", African Affairs, Vol.71 (1972), pp.293-303; Collins' precise suggestion is that the
Sudan was a country of 'blacks' ruled by 'blues'.}

The point is illustrated by the fact
that down to about 1951, members of the Sudan Political
Service were recruited mainly from honours graduates of
the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Between 1915
and 1933, for instance, about 85 per cent of the University
recruits came from Oxbridge.\footnote{Sir Harold MacMichael, The Sudan Political Service, 1899-
1956, (Oxonian Press, 1951), also known as 'the Book of
Snobs', is very informative on the careers of the members of
the Sudan Political Service.} The essential fact is that
the South, as a rule, received none of these graduates
until the 1940's. With very few exceptions, Southern
administrators were drawn from British officers of the
Egyptian Army and were subject to recall at short notice.
Administrative personnel engaged in the North were, on the
whole, skilled diplomatists on pensionable terms and subject
to frequent transfers from one district to another to gain experience for promotion. By contrast, the officers-administrator employed in the South were 'contract' men, who were not eligible for promotion above the rank of District Commissioner. The few exceptions were provincial Governors who tended to be seconded from the Sudan Political Service.

These Southern District Commissioners, sometimes known as the bog barons, were renowned for their defiance of superior authority. As "Fergie Bey" once recorded in his diary: "I never obey any orders that I consider detrimental to my work ..."¹ A chief characteristic of the 'bog barons' entailed a strong propensity to identify themselves with their 'peoples'. Indeed, so strong was this tendency to identify with the local population that they were thought to have 'gone native'. As a matter of fact the Nilotics quite often attempted to assimilate the District Commissioner into their cattle culture. As late as 1942 the District Commissioner of central Nuer felt that it was he who had to struggle to maintain at least a vestige of his European culture.²

from their counterparts in the Northern Sudan. This critical status difference between Northern and Southern administrators contributed a great deal to the general picture of colonial neglect of the Southern Sudan. This is not to say the 'bog barons' were necessarily bad or poor administrators. The fact that the Southern administrators stayed in one province (and sometimes the same district) for long periods meant that they had ample opportunities to learn the language and customs of their subjects, which could have only made them better administrators. The crux of the matter is, provided they were posted to the North or South, British officials felt themselves to be Arabists or Africanists accordingly. In 1944 Sir Douglas Newbold (then Civil Secretary) on being impressed by a Southern student at Makerere College, East Africa, could still remark: "I do not think I shall ever be a good 'African' - though I like these blacks - my heart has been too long with Arabs in Kordofan and Kassala". On the other hand, the typical Southern D.C. preferred to make passage arrangements to England for a holiday via East Africa to avoid contact with 'Arab' administrators in the North and Khartoum.

This scheme of things was not, in the least, healthy to the progress and development of Southern Sudan. After all, the seat of the Government was in Khartoum and the Governor-General and the 'three secretaries' might be presumed to be Arabists. In 1936 Sir Stewart Symes, the Governor-General, ordered the amalgamation of Mongalla and Bahr el-Ghazal

provinces against the better judgements and opposition from the Southern provincial governors. Was he an Arabist?

Six years later Mr. Martin Parr, the Governor of the amalgamated province reported:

My six years experience of Equatoria has convinced me that so large an area (150,000 sq. miles) with five international frontiers, 10 District Headquarters, three separate and independent mission bodies, 25 political officers, some 15 major languages ... cannot be satisfactorily administered by an officer of the status and with the staff of a Provincial Commissioner, who must be subordinate in so many details to departmental heads and to the Central Government in Khartoum.1

Khartoum wielded the ultimate power of the purse and if the 'diplomatists' in the North were contemptuous of the Southern administrator, holding him to ridicule, they could not take him seriously either. V.H. Fergusson who first served amongst the Dinka before becoming District Commissioner of western Nuer in the 1920's, could be regarded as the archetype of the 'bog baron'. He initiated a programme of forced labour on cotton-cultivation, roads, landing stages and causeways with the prospect of a hut tax to follow. It all sounded too good to be true and he wrote: "I am going to lie low and say nothing at all about it, because no one would believe me. But the sick, the cotton, and the financial returns will make people sit up and take notice."2 On another occasion, the estimates of his cotton crop and the lists of requirements headed by

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a demand for £20,000 cash to pay out to the natives almost shocked his superiors.¹

It is difficult to state precisely who was or was not against development in the South and there clearly were limits to what a District Commissioner could do without money. It can be asserted, however, that when money did become available in a limited way after 1945, it was 'bog barons' like Major Wyld who executed quite energetically the Zande Scheme.

In summary, the separation of the South (on top of the obvious geographical, racial, social, economic, and historical factors) was the reflection of a division within the colonial administration itself. Colonial officials obviously did not create the divisions of the Sudan, but their attitudes to the peoples they governed, and to each other, did nothing to alleviate the situation.

APPENDIX NO. 1

Governors-General of the Sudan

APPENDIX NO. 2

Provincial Governors

Fashoda:

Jackson, H.W. 1898-1899.
Sparkes, W.S. 1899-1900.
Blewitt, A. 1900-1902.
Mathews, G.E. 1902-1903.

Upper Nile

Bassett, J.R. 1916-
Stigand, C.S. 1917-1919.
Struve, K.C.P. 1919-1926.
Willis, C.A. 1926-1930.
Coryton, E.G. 1935-1939.
Armstrong, C.L. 1939-1941.

1. Called Fashoda down to 1903; its capital was moved in May 1914 from Kodok (or Fashoda) to Malakal. Its southern portion became Mongalla in 1906.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
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<tr>
<td>Corfield, F.D.</td>
<td>1948-1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longe, J.</td>
<td>1950-1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winder, J.</td>
<td>1953-1955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bahr el-Ghazal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sparkes, W.S.</td>
<td>1901-1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boulnois, W.A.</td>
<td>1904-1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutherland, A.</td>
<td>1905-1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill, H.B.</td>
<td>1907-1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saville, R.V.</td>
<td>1908-1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon, H.</td>
<td>1909-1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielden, R.M.</td>
<td>1910-1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Hawarden, E.W.</td>
<td>1917-1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheatley, M.J.</td>
<td>1921-1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brock, R.G.C.</td>
<td>1928-1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingleison, P.</td>
<td>1934-1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owen, T.R.H.</td>
<td>1948-1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colborne-Mackrell, J.E.</td>
<td>1953-1955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mongalla Province**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameron, A.</td>
<td>1906-1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owen, R.C.R.</td>
<td>1908-1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northcote, C.S.</td>
<td>1918-1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigand, C.H.</td>
<td>1919-1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodland, V.R.</td>
<td>1920-1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bence-Pembroke, R.A.</td>
<td>1924-1925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The Egyptian flag was hoisted at Meshra-al-Raik in September 1898, but a military force first reached the place on December 13, 1900.

2. Created in 1906 and the frontier readjustment with Uganda dated January 1, 1914.
Skrine, A.W. 1925-1929.

Equatoria Province.

Parr, M.W. 1936-1942.
Marwood, B.V. 1945-1948.

1. Created on 1st January, 1936 as a result of the amalgamation of Bahr el-Ghazal and Mongalla provinces. It was split into two again in 1948, but the name was retained.
APPENDIX NO. III.

Distance of various points in the Southern Sudan from Khartoum and Port Sudan along the 1956 lines of communication in miles. (Distance by rail Kosti-Khartoum: 238 miles).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Khartoum</th>
<th>Port Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road</td>
<td>River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renk</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasir</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boma via Bor</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumbek via Shambe</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raga</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapoeta</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yambio</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Yobu</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. The extension of rail road in recent years to Wau (the Provincial Capital of the Bahr el-Ghazal) has shortened its distance from Khartoum - and Port Sudan - to some extent. Otherwise, the figures quoted above speak for themselves.
APPENDIX NO. IV.

Regulations and Conditions under Which Missionary Work is Permitted in the Sudan

1. No Mission station is allowed to be formed north of the 10th parallel of latitude in any part or district of the Sudan which is recognised by the Government as Moslem.

2. South of the 10th parallel definite spheres of action are allotted as follows:-

British Missionary Societies Sphere:-

It is bounded on the north by the Bahr el-Ghazal. On the east by the line drawn south from a point on the White Nile. About half way between the mouths of the Bahr-el-Zeraf and the Bahr-el-Jebel to Ajiung, and thence southwards to Kabaij. From Kabaij the line proceeds due east until it meets the Abyssinian frontier to the Uganda border on the 5th parallel of the North Latitude.

On the south it is bounded by the northern border of the Congo Free State, the Lado Enclave and the Uganda Province (N.B. The terry, formerly known as the Lado Enclave, having reverted to the Sudan in 1910, was declared an open sphere). On the west by a line drawn from Meshra-el-Rek to a point near M'vuto (Mvuto) where the frontiers of the Congo Free State, French Congo and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan meet.
The Austrian Catholic Mission Sphere:

The left bank of the White Nile south of Kadok into the Bahr el-Ghazal, their eastern limit being defined by a line drawn from Meshra-el-Rek to N’doruma on the Congo-Nile watershed.

The American Mission Sphere:

The valleys of the Sobat and the Zeraf up to the Abyssinian frontier.

3. Each Mission must be a separate body under the sole control of its local head resident in the country.

4. The members of each Mission are unreservedly subject to all the laws and regulations of the Government.

5. The heads and all the members of Missions will act only with the approval and permission of the Governor-General of the Sudan and with the concurrence of the local authorities of the Government in the stations and provinces in which they work.

6. Missionaries are not permitted to act as intermediaries between natives and the Government. Complaints etc., requiring action by the Government must be taken by the complainant direct to the nearest Government post, in the ordinary way, and Missionaries must avoid any suggestion of being concerned in such cases.

7. Trading is forbidden in any form. Missionaries may possess such trade goods as are necessary with which to purchase by exchange articles for their own use or with which to pay tribesmen who are labouring for them. On occasions of famine, Missionaries, whose stations are never far from a Government post, should at once inform the nearest official, who will make the necessary arrangements for
the supply of grain to the famine district, thus obviating any suggestion of trading on the part of the Missions.

Bartering for personal necessaries only is not included in the prohibition of trade, but it must be distinctly understood that this permission does not authorise any transaction affected with the object of subsequently selling at a profit whatever has been obtained by such barter.

8. Missionary Societies may be permitted to occupy land for the purpose of a Mission station on the following terms:

A lease will be granted for 80 (eighty) years at a nominal annual rental of P.T. 10, and will be renewable at the option of the Lessees and determinable on breach of the conditions under which it is granted, or in the event of Government withdrawing the permission for missionary work to be carried out in the particular district concerned. In the case of renewal of a lease the annual rental shall be re-assessed.

The lease further provides that the land shall be used solely for the purpose of carrying on the authorized Missionary work, and that the Lessees may not part with any portion thereof except with the previous consent in writing of the Government.
APPENDIX V

Sudan Government Memorandum.

On General Administrative Policy, 1921.

The Administrative Policy of the Sudan Government towards the native population is one of decentralized control.

The Milner Report of 1920 said of the Sudan:

"Having regard to its vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision ... Decentralization and the employment, wherever possible, of native agencies for the simple administration needs of the country, in its present stage of development, would make both for economy and efficiency."

These words embody the ideals which the Sudan Government has long had in mind and to which it has already been able to give some degree of practical effect. It remains to consider what native authorities and agencies there are, and to what extent these are at present fitted for the work required of them or capable of adaption to the purpose.

They fall into two groups. The first and most important consists of the tribal Chiefs and Sheikhs as such, that is as administering their own tribes. The second are executive officials selected for the public service from the ranks of the native population.

Experiments have already been made with the second group. A number of Sudanese Civilian Sub-Mamurs, chosen for their qualities of character, and for preference drawn
from good families, have been appointed, and a training course for candidates is held yearly. The result has been satisfactory and the process will be continued and extended.

A number of native Sheikhs, again, have been given magisterial powers as members of courts held under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and have proved themselves of considerable assistance.

In Khartoum a fresh field has been opened to the influential native by the institution of a Municipal Council.

In certain Southern Provinces, too, courts of Chiefs have been employed in advisory and consultative capacities and for the settlement of disputes in which questions of native rights and customs are involved; and it is proposed to develop the system in the light of experience gained.

As regards the first group - the tribal Chiefs and Sheikhs considered as such - a few preliminary remarks may not be out of place.

In the days before the Turkish conquest of 1821 tribal organization was highly developed and universal, though subject in many districts to the central authority of the Fung Kingdom. The Turks obliterated the rule of the Fung and substituted their own over a greatly extended sphere, but they interfered as little as possible with tribal organizations and left to the local chieftains most, if not all, of the powers of which they found them possessed. Provided the latter were amenable and collected the taxes assessed upon their people and restrained them from any action prejudicial to the interests of the Government, they were left to their own devices and their authority was upheld.
Sixty years later the discontent bred by the continuous extortion and injustice on the population at the instance of, or owing to the neglect of, the Government, found vent in the Dervish plot.

The period which followed was one of autocratic despotism, terrorism and internecine conflict, and the patriarchal ideal of administration which had to some considerable extent obtained in pre-Dervish times was perforce replaced in all but a few outlying districts by militarism in its worse form. In other words the tribal Sheikh generally gave way to, or himself became, the commander of an unruly contingent of freebooters instead of being the leader and arbiter of a peaceful community. If, as Sheikh, he was unfitted for this regime he was replaced by another more virile and ruthless than himself.

This was the state of affairs when we re-occupied the Sudan in 1898. The problem before us fell under two heads. First, as regards personnel, to divide the sheep from the goats, to eliminate the mere free-booters and to retain and support such men as had commanded general respect, whether as Sheikhs of tribes, as Councillors, as Kadis or otherwise. Secondly, as regards administration, to adopt or adapt whatever was found good and to reject or modify whatever was found bad. The two aims are of course interconnected, and the second was very cogently expressed by Sir C.J. Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak, in 1871:

The common mistake Europeans make in the East is to exalt western civilisation almost to the exclusion of the native system, instead of using them as mutually corrective. There are two ways in which a Government can act. The first is to start
from things as it finds them, putting its veto on what is dangerous or unjust, and supporting what is fair and equitable in the usage of the natives, and letting system and legislative wait upon occasion. When new wants are felt it examines and provides for them by measures rather made on the spot than imported from abroad; and to ensure that these shall not be contrary to native customs, the consent of the people is gained for them before they are put in force.

Progress in this way is usually slow, and the system is not altogether popular from our point of view; but it is both quiet and steady, confidence is increased, and no vision of foreign yoke to be laid heavily on their shoulders, when opportunity offers, is present to the native mind.

The other plan is to make there and here a clean sweep and to introduce something that Europeans like better in the gap. A criminal code of the latest type ... or a system of taxation and police introduced bodily from the west is imposed with the full assurance of its intrinsic excellence, but with too little thought how far it is likely to suit the circumstances it has to meet.

To expatiate on this thesis is unnecessary, and it is almost superfluous to direct attention to the obvious fact that the practical application of the principle must vary in kind and in degree with local conditions.

In the Southern Sudan it is negro tribes that are concerned and much depends on the existence and efficacy of their local or tribal organization. Where such exists it can be fostered and guided along the right channels; where it has ceased to exist it may still be possible gradually to re-create it.

Among the sedentary semi-Arab population living further north there is little organization that has survived their settlement in permanent villages and the consequent
removal of any need for tribal cohesion and co-operation. In proportion, as they have become individualistic it is unavoidable for the Government to deal direct with the individual, but something can still be done to maintain such minor powers as pertain by custom to the village Sheikhs and Omdas.¹

The case of the nomads is very different, but presents no great inherent difficulties. With one or two exceptions the power of the headman of these tribes is far less at the present day than it was in pre-Dervish times. Between 1882 and 1898 the nomad tribes disintegrated. Some sections joined the Dervishes; others resisted their authority; all alike were decimated by continuous punitive expeditions and internecine quarrels. As a natural consequence the traditional authority of the Sheikhs greatly diminished and the settled conditions of the last twenty years have not sufficed altogether to restore it. Fortunately, however, the theory of the paramount authority of the Sheikh is as old as the nomad habit itself and is so deeply implanted as to have the force of an instinct. In so far, therefore, as we support or revive the authority of the Sheikhs we have public opinion very strongly on our side.

By immemorial custom it is for the nomad Sheikh to decide all disputes as between his own people and to hear complaints by men of other tribes against them and to enforce any satisfaction that he deems to be due. He also

¹. N.B. An Ordinance entitled "The Village Courts Ordinance 1925" has now been passed by the Governor-General's Council.
expects and prefers to be responsible for the collection of all taxes due to Government from members of his tribe.

This procedure is of course necessarily modified by the insistence of the Government that certain more serious offences must be referred to it for trial or for approval of any settlement agreed upon; but, generally speaking, it works satisfactorily. It has the great incidental advantage of reducing the number of officials that would be needed under a system of direct control, but its greatest merit is that, subject to reasonable safeguards, it leaves the work of internal administration in the hands of those best fitted to perform it.

An intensive system of direct Governmental control in the case of nomads has indeed singularly little to recommend it. Remarkable qualities of insight, sympathy, imagination, firmness, patience and knowledge are needed in the senior staff to make it successful, and a large junior staff is unavoidable if records are to be kept. But, on the other hand, the nomad is more contented in proportion as he is left without alien interference, and no foreigner has the knowledge and insight, and few the patience and power of restraint which a good Sheikh possesses.

The crux of the matter lies in the character of the individual Sheikh, and here our policy is clearly defined. So long as the Sheikh remains loyal to the Government, carries out its orders with reasonable expedition and efficiency, and retains the respect of his people, he is supported. If he proves himself disloyal or if from moral failure he ceases to retain the respect of his people, he is replaced. If he is merely inefficient he is given
every chance and is only deposed if his failure is complete — in which case he would almost certainly have also lost the respect of his people.

It is realized that there are two pitfalls of which we must beware:— on the one side, if we leave the Sheikh too free a hand he may abuse his powers — but let it be remembered that a native prefers to submit to a few abuses at the hands of his own Sheikh rather than to be pestered with rules and regulations of alien origin, and that to the native his own standards of conduct are at least as reasonable as our own. On the other side, if we too often interfere the people not only give us little thanks for it, but they cease to look to the Sheikh for their redress or to obey him. They play him and the Government off the one against the other, and consequently the Sheikh has no effective power, finds himself in an impossible position, and is tempted to make a catspaw of the Government.¹

To sum up:—

Decentralization is the keynote of our administrative policy. In the case of the nomad and the negro alike the system is, as a general rule, rendered easier of application by its familiarity and acceptability to the parties chiefly concerned. The main requisites for its success are, first, the choice of the right men as Chiefs or Sheikhs and, secondly, firmness and insight in the administrator, coupled with a determination to interfere as little as possible.

¹. N.B. Subsequently to this Memorandum being written Ordinance entitled "The Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance" and "The Village Courts Ordinance" have been passed by the Governor-General's Council.
In the case of the sedentary agricultural population a certain amount of latitude can be accorded to village Sheikhs and Omdas, but not to an extent comparable with that allowed in the case of communities organized on a tribal basis.
Civil Secretary's Office,
Khartoum, January 25th, 1930.

The Governor, Upper Nile Province, Malakal.
The Governor, Mongalla Province, Mongalla.
The Governor, Bahr al Ghazal Province, Wau.

His Excellency the Governor General directs that the main features of the approved policy of the Government for the administration of the Southern Provinces should be re-stated in simple terms.

In the strictly confidential memorandum which accompanies this letter an attempt has been made to do this, though it will of course be seen that innumerable points of detail arising are not dealt with seriatim.

2. Your attention is directed to Part II of the memorandum, and I should be obliged if you would forward, as soon as possible, your comments on the criteria suggested and any suggestions you may wish to make for additions to the list.

3. The carrying out of the policy as described may lead from time to time to various financial implications or commitments though it is hoped that these will not be great. It will be convenient that any such foreseen should be notified to the relevant authority without delay for consideration.

4. Application of the policy will obviously vary in detail and in intensity according to locality. It is essential however, that the ultimate aim should be made clear to all who are responsible for the execution of the policy, and
the memorandum should therefore be circulated to and studied by all your District Commissioners. Sufficient copies for this purpose are sent herewith. Copies are also being sent to such Heads of Departments in Khartoum as are concerned.

CIVIL SECRETARY

CS/I.C.I.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

Part I

The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self contained racial or tribal units with structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.

The measures already taken or to be taken to promote the above policy are re-stated below.

A. Provision of non-Arabic-Speaking Staff (Administrative, Clerical and Technical)

a). Administrative Staff.

The gradual elimination of the Mamur, whether Arab or black. This has already begun, and it is intended that the process of reduction shall continue as opportunity offers.

b). Clerical.

It has been recognized policy for some years that locally recruited staff should take the place of clerks and accountants drawn from the North and that the language of Government offices should be English.

In the Bahr al Ghazal Province the change to English has already been made and a large number of local boys are employed.
The process has to be gradual. It is recognized that local boys are not fit at present to fill the higher posts in Government offices, and the supply of educated English-speaking boys depends on the speed with which the two missionary Intermediate Schools in Mongalla Province and the Intermediate and Stack Schools at Wau can produce them. The missions must retain a certain number of these boys as teachers for their Elementary schools (which are an integral part of the educational system) but since the employment of local boys in Government offices is a vital feature of the general policy every encouragement should be given to those in charge of mission schools to cooperate in that policy by sending boys into Government service. Province officials must aim at maintaining a steady supply of boys for the Elementary Vernacular schools which feed the Intermediate schools.

c). Technical

Generally speaking, the considerations mentioned above apply also to the supply of boys for the technical departments - Agriculture, Medical, Public Works, etc.; but in certain cases it may not be essential that boys going to these departments should complete the Intermediate school course.

B. Control of Immigrant Traders from the North

It is the aim of the Government to encourage, as far as is possible, Greek and Syrian traders rather than the Gellaba type. Permits to the latter should be decreased unobtrusively but progressively, and only the best type of Gellaba, whose interests are purely commercial and pursued in a legitimate manner should be admitted. The limitation of Gellaba trade to towns or established routes is essential.
C. Fundamental Necessity for British Staff to Familiarize themselves with the Beliefs and Customs and the Languages of the Tribes they Administer.

a). Beliefs and Customs.
The policy of Government requires that officials in the South, especially administrative officials, should be fully informed as to the social structure, beliefs, customs and mental processes of pagan tribes. Study on these lines is of vital importance to the solution of administrative problems, and it is with this fact in view that a highly qualified expert has been detailed to work in the South.

b). Language.
The Rejaf Language Conference recommended the adoption of certain 'group languages' for use in schools. It is clearly impossible to develop all the languages and dialects of the Southern Sudan and the development of a limited number of them may tend to cause the smaller languages one by one to disappear, and be supplanted by 'group languages'.

It is, of course, true that the adoption of this system carries with it the implication of the gradual adoption of a new, or partly new, language by the population of the areas in which the 'smaller languages' are used at present. Such a result is, indeed, inevitable in the course of time, for 'smaller languages' must always tend to disappear.

It is also recognised that in such places as Wau itself, Arabic is so commonly used that the local languages have been almost completely excluded. Special concessions may be necessary in these places.

The Rejaf Conference did not regard these factors as seriously affecting the policy of 'group languages', and it
was held to be a matter of first importance that books for the study of the 'group languages' should be available for missionaries and officials and that a specialist should be appointed to study the question. A linguistic expert, Dr. Tucker, has therefore been appointed for a period of two years, and his chief function will be to advise as to the production of suitable books. The Secretary for Education and Health has already circulated a memorandum on his duties.

The production of grammars and vocabularies will facilitate the study of the local vernaculars. But this will take time and meanwhile it is the duty of our officers to further the policy of the Government without delay. It cannot be stressed too strongly that to speak the natural language of the people whom he controls is the first duty of the administrator. Arabic is not that language, and indeed to the bulk of the population of the South it is a new, or partly new, tongue. Officials should avoid the error of thinking that by speaking Arabic they are in some way conforming to the principle that the administrator should converse with his people in their own language.

D. The Use of English Where Communication in the Local Vernacular is Impossible

The time has not yet come for the adoption of a general lingua franca for the Southern Sudan, and it is impossible to foretell what, if ever that time comes, the language would be.

At the same time there are, without doubt, occasions when the use of a local vernacular is impossible, as, for instance in the case of heterogeneous groupings such as the Sudan Defence Force or the Police.
The recent introduction of English words of command in the Equatoria Corps of the Sudan Defence and their use in the Police Forces in the Provinces concerned is a step in the right direction, but more is required. Every effort should be made to make English the means of communication among the men themselves to the complete exclusion of Arabic. This will entail in the various units the opening of classes in which the men would receive instruction in English, and a concentrated effort on the part of those in authority to ensure that English is used by the men when local vernaculars cannot be. It is believed that in a comparatively short time men of these forces could learn as much English as they now know of Arabic.

It is hoped that those in charge of mission schools will assist in providing instructors for the classes referred to above.

Similarly, an official unable to speak the local vernacular should try to use English when speaking to Government employees and servants, and even, if in any way possible, to chiefs and natives. In any case, the use of an interpreter is preferable to the use of Arabic, until the local language can be used.

The initial difficulties are not minimized. Inability to converse freely at first will no doubt result in some loss of efficiency, and the dislike of almost every Englishman to using his own language in conversing with natives is fully recognized; but difficulties and dislikes must be subordinates to the main policy.

Apart from the fact that the restriction of Arabic is an essential feature of the general scheme it must not be
forgotten that Arabic, being neither the language of the governing nor the governed, will progressively deteriorate. The type of Arabic at present spoken provides signal proof of this. It cannot be used as a means of communication on anything but the most simple matters, and only if it were first unlearned and then relearned in a less crude form and adopted as the language of instruction in the schools could it fulfil the growing requirements of the future. The local vernaculars and English, on the other hand, will in every case be the language of one of the two parties conversing and one party will therefore always be improving the other.

Incidentally it may be argued that if a District Commissioner serving in the South is transferred to the North, a knowledge of Nilotic Arabic is more of a hindrance than a help to him in learning the Arabic of the Northern Sudan.

In short, whereas at present Arabic is considered by many natives of the South as the official and, as it were, the fashionable language, the object of all should be to counteract this idea by every practical means.

PART II

Progress of Policy

His Excellency the High Commissioner in approving this policy has suggested the need for criteria by which progress may be measured.

With this end in view it is intended to tabulate various important features of the policy and to set down the progress
made at stated intervals.

It is suggested that the matters to be included in the table should be the following:

a). The number of non-Mohammedans in relation to the total Government staff under headings of administrative, clerical, and technical, with a report on the use of English by Government employees of non-British origin.

b). The number of British officials who have qualified in the local languages.

c). Number of immigrant traders of various nationalities from the North.

d). Number of Mission schools, elementary, intermediate and technical respectively.

e). Number of Government schools.

f). The amount spent on education including:
   Subsidies to mission schools;
   cost of Government schools;
   cost of supervisory educational staff.

5). Introduction of English words of command in military or police forces, with a report as to the extent to which Arabic is disappearing as the language in use among the men of these forces.

h). Notes on the progress of the use of English instead of Arabic where communication in the vernacular is impossible.

i). Progress made in the production of text-books in the group languages for use in the schools, and grammars and vocabularies for use of missionaries and officials.

It is proposed to give information in the Annual Report under these heads for the years 1924, 1927 and 1930 and for each subsequent year.

Civil Secretary's Office, Khartoum, January 25th, 1930.
APPENDIX NO. VII

1946 Memorandum on Southern Policy

Subject: Southern Sudan Policy

CS/SCR/I.C.I.

Civil Secretary's Office,
Khartoum, December 16th, 1946

Financial Secretary (2)
Legal Secretary (2)
Kaid (3)
Director of Agriculture & Forests (3)
Director of Economics & Trade (2)
Director of Education (3)
Director of Medical Service (3)
General Manager, Sudan Railways (2)
Director, Veterinary Service (2)
Governor, Equatoria Province (12)
Governor, Upper Nile Province (10)

Will you please refer to Khartoum Secret Despatch No. 89 of August 4th, 1945, of which copies were sent to you (or to your predecessors in Office) personally under this number.

2. You will see that in paragraph 2 of the despatch there are contemplated three possible political futures for the Southern Sudan. The crucial sentence is:

"It is only by economic and educational development that these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their lot be eventually cast with the Northern Sudan or with East Africa (or partly with each)."

3. Since the despatch was written, and since the decisions on policy which it records were taken not only have further decisions on policy for the South been taken (of which a list
is attached) but great changes have taken place in the political outlook for the country as a whole. Whatever may be the final effect, inside the Sudan, of the present treaty negotiations, it is certain that the advance of the Northern Sudan to self-government, involving the progressive reduction of British executive authority, and public canvassing of the Southern Sudan question, will be accelerated. It is therefore essential that policy for the Southern Sudan should be crystallized as soon as possible and that it should be crystallized in a form which can be publicly explained and supported and which should therefore be based on sound and constructive social and economic principles. These principles must not only bear defence against factious opposition, but must also command the support of Northern Sudanese who are prepared to take logical and liberal points of view: while the relief of doubts now in the minds of British political and departmental staff who have the interests of the South at heart is also pressing and important.

4. You will see from the foregoing paragraph that I do not suggest that the future of the two million inhabitants of the South should be influenced by appeasement of the as yet immature and ill-informed politicians of the Northern Sudan. But it is the Sudanese, northern and southern, who will live their lives and direct their affairs in future generations in this country: and our efforts must therefore now be concentrated on initiating a policy which is not only sound in itself, but which can be made acceptable to, and eventually workable by patriotic and reasonable Sudanese, northern and southern alike.
5. Apart from the recent rapid political development in the North the following conclusions have further emerged since His Excellency's 1945 despatch and enclosures were written:

  a) with reference to Appendix I to the despatch, Section 7 last sentence of penultimate paragraph. East Africa's plans regarding better communications with the Southern Sudan have been found to be nebulous, and contingent on the Lake Albert Dam. Whatever the possibilities we have no reason to hesitate between development of trade between the South and E. Africa and development of trade between the Southern and the Northern Sudan. Our chance of succeeding depends I think upon confining ourselves to the one aim of developing trade in the South, and between the North and the South.

  b) In Education, I believe that while the South may hope to have a secondary school, it cannot hope to support post-secondary education, and I believe that Southerners should get this at the Gordon Memorial College – Arabic is not essential there, but should I think be taught to Southerners as a subject from intermediate school level upwards.

  c) The distinction in rates of pay and other conditions of government service, the artificial rules about employment of Southerners in the North, attempts at economic separation, and all similar distinctions are becoming more and more anomalous as the growing demand for Northerners to be employed in Southern Development Schemes, the rapidly growing communication
and travel between North and South, and the very
application of the policy of pushing forward in the
South, break down the previous isolation of the Southern
Provinces and strain these distinctions further.

6. The preceding paragraphs are an attempt to indicate
briefly the reasons which have led me to think that an
important decision on Southern policy must now be taken.
The biennial report to His Britannic Majesty's Government
is due early next year. Subject to your comments on this
letter, I propose to advise His Majesty's Government to
approve that two of the alternatives mentioned in paragraph
2 above be ruled out as practical politics at the present
time. It may in future be proved that it would be to the
advantage of certain of the most southerly tribes, e.g. of
OpAI or Kajo Kaji, to join up with their relatives in
Uganda. It may be that the feeling which now exists
among a few of the wisest Northern Sudanese, that they
should not, when self-governing, be asked to shoulder the
financial and communal burden which they believe the
South will always prove to be, may become an important
political policy among them. But we should now work on
the assumption that the Sudan, as at present constituted,
with possibly minor boundary adjustments, will remain one:
and we should therefore restate our Southern policy and do
so publicly, as follows:

"The policy of the Sudan Government
regarding the Southern Sudan is to
act upon the facts that the peoples
of the Southern Sudan are distinctively
African and Negroid, but that geo-
graphy and economics combine (so far
as can be foreseen at the present time)
to render them inextricably bound for
future development to the middle-eastern and arabicized Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future."

7. Certain changes of detail, in each sphere of Government activity in the South, would I think have to follow the approval and publication of a policy so defined. You will wish to suggest briefly the major points.

8. Will you please consider this matter carefully, consult the senior members of your staffs upon it (particularly of course those who have experience of the South), and let me have your views as briefly as possible. Those of any individual member of your staff which you wish to forward separately with your comments will also be welcome.

The views of senior Sudanese in whose judgment and discretion you have confidence may also be asked for.

9. Finally I ask you to read again the late Sir Douglas Newbold’s note to Council No. CS/SCR/I.C.14 of 3.4.44, reproduced as Appendix 'B'(1) to the despatch, and to bear in mind that urgency is the essence of the problem. We no longer have time to aim at the ideal: we must aim at doing what is the best for the Southern peoples in the present circumstances.

J. W. ROBERTSON,
Civil Secretary

Copies to: Governors: Blue Nile Khartoum - 2 copies each Darfur Kordofan Kassala Northern Sudan Agent, Cairo (2) Sudan Agent, London (2)
APPENDIX NO. VIII

Proceedings of the Juba Conference on the
Political Development of the Southern Sudan,
June 1947

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The following were present:

J.W. Robertson, Esq., MBE, Civil Secretary, Chairman
F.D. Kingdon, Esq., Governor Upper Nile
B.V. Marwood, Esq., Governor Equatoria
G.H. Barter, Esq., Director of Establishment
M.F.A. Keen, Esq., Assistant Civil Secretary (Councils)
T.R.H. Owen, Esq., Deputy Governor Bahr al Ghazal
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti
Ibrahim Eff. Badri
Kamyangi Ababa
Sgt. Major Philemon Majok
Clement Mboro
Hassan Fertak
James Tembura
Chief Cir Rehan
Chief Gir Kiro
Pastor Andrea Apaya
Chief Ukuma Bazia
Edward Adhok
Buth Diu
Chief Lolik Lado
Chief Lapponya
Father Guido Akou
Siricci Iro
Chief Tete
Chief Luoth Ajak
Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman
Dr. Habib Abdulla
Sheikh Serur Mohd. Ramli

The meeting opened at 9.30 a.m. on Thursday, June 12th.
The Chairman in his opening speech said:

Gentlemen,

I should first of all like to say how glad I am to see you all here today, and on behalf of those of us who are visitors I wish to thank the Governor, Mr. Marwood, and the other residents in Juba, who have welcomed us so hospitably and generously.

The origin of this meeting lies in the recent developments of administration and policy in the Northern Sudan. Last year, the Governor-General, Sir Hubert Huddleston, set up a Conference in the North to seek ways and means of associating the Sudanese more closely with the government of their country. As you know, there has been in the Northern Sudan for the last three years, an Advisory Council, and one of the recommendations made by the Conference is to develop the Advisory Council into a more authoritative and responsible body, with the power of making laws and to some extent, of controlling the work of the administration.

The Advisory Council has not had power to concern itself with the two Southern Provinces of Equatoria and the Upper Nile and there are therefore no Southern Sudanese on the Advisory Council. The report of the Conference however, which has just been published, recommends that the Southern
Sudan should send representatives to the new Assembly which it is proposed should be set up, and in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this report you will find its recommendations and the reasons for them.

The reasons are important; the main consideration is that the Sudan, though a vast country in area, is small in wealth and population, and if the Sudan is ever really to become self-governing and self-dependent it must not be divided up into small weak units. Those who prepared the report believe that the sooner Southern and Northern Sudanese come together and work together, the sooner they will begin to coalesce and cooperate in the advancement of their country. This belief is sincerely and genuinely held by many Northern Sudanese, and they hope that by including Southern Sudanese in the future Assembly, the process of unification will be hastened. I am confident that their recommendations are based on the very highest motives, and think they do not seek opportunities of exploiting backward tribes in the South.

The Conference in Khartoum did not include Southern representatives, but I invited the Governors of Equatoria and the Upper Nile to attend in order that they should know what was being proposed, and should be able to inform the Conference of conditions and feelings in the South. This they did.

Now that the report of the Conference has been submitted to the Sudan Government and action on it is expected, I have summoned this meeting here of men both from the North and the South, in order to consider the unification of the two parts of the country. I should like to explain to you
present Government policy in regard to the South.

The policy was defined in 1945 as follows:

It is only by economic and educational development that these peoples can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their lot be eventually cast with the Northern Sudan or with East Africa, or partly with each.

Since 1945 there have been developments both economically and educationally in the South, and it has begun to be clear, I think, that the Southern Sudan, by its history and by the accidents of geography, river transport and so on, must turn more to the North rather than to Uganda or the Congo, and I believe that our policy regarding these areas should be restated as follows:

The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of Southern Sudan are distinctly African and negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the Middle East and Arabs of the Northern Sudan and therefore to ensure that they shall by educational and economic developments be equipped to take their places in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.

If this is to be the Government's policy regarding the Southern Sudan I should like the views of this meeting on one or two points of immediate importance.
You have all received copies of a Memorandum giving the terms of reference of this meeting and I think have already had opportunity to discuss them and form your opinion.

Memorandum

The Sudan Administration Conference, in paragraphs 12 and 13 of its report dealing with the future closer association of the Sudanese with the Central Government has made certain recommendations about the Southern Sudan.

In order to study the implications of these recommendations about which I shall have to advise His Excellency the Governor-General, I have decided to hold a meeting in the Southern Sudan at which I wish to discuss the proposals with Southern Sudanese and with officials, who have Southern experience, both British and Sudanese. I have therefore arranged for a meeting to be held at Juba on June 11th, 1947 at which I hope representatives from Equatoria and the Upper Nile Province will attend.

The terms of reference of the meeting will be:

1) to consider the recommendations of the Sudan Administration Conference about the Southern Sudan;

2) to discuss the advisability of the Southern Sudanese being represented in the proposed assembly and if it is decided to be advisable to decide how such representation can best be obtained in the present circumstances; and whether the representation proposed by the Sudan Administration Conference is suitable;

3) to discuss whether safeguards can be introduced into the forthcoming legislation setting up the new Assembly, to ensure that the Southern Sudan
with its difference in race, tradition, language, customs and outlook is not hindered in its social and political advancement;

4) to discuss whether or not an Advisory Council for the Southern Sudan should be set up to deal with Southern affairs from which representatives might be appointed to sit on the assembly, as representatives of the Southern Sudan;

5) to consider the recommendations of the Sudan Administration Conference in paragraph 13 of their report which deals with matters not strictly relevant to the political development of the Sudan, which the Conference recommended as essential if the unification of the Sudanese peoples is to be achieved.

Chief Ukuma Bazia then laid before the meeting a set of written answers to the points raised in the Civil Secretary's Memorandum.

Minutes of the Preliminary Meeting of the Members Referring to Civil Secretary's Memorandum

2) No, but to send people who will sit and merely study.

3) To leave the matter of race tradition; language customs and outlook die by itself, through education and civilization. More safeguards to be added.
4) We agree to set up our Advisory Council in the South but in link with the North. Before passing laws for the whole Sudan the Legislative Council in the North should consult the Advisory Council here until such time when the South will be capable to send representatives to voice for itself. Since we consented in para. 2 we also welcome people from the North to attend our meetings and advise us. People to be sent should be of legal respect.

5) Permits to trade order 1928 to be cancelled on the following conditions:
   i) Only the people with good capitals should be admitted.
   ii) That these capitalists should build their shops in red bricks and corrugated iron sheets in places permitted by this council.
   iii) That Southern Sudanese should be encouraged to trade and the only way of doing this is by employing agents from the South.

5a) One educational policy to be adopted for North and South. The teaching of language should be in bush schools. English and Arabic in Elementary to Higher Schools.

5b) The improvement of communications between the two parts, encouragement of transfers, the unification of the system of establishment should be the same and should be started NOW.

Mohamed Saleh Eff. Shingeiti referring to Answer No.2 asked if the Southerners could explain why the South should be
unable to send representatives to the Central Legislative Assembly just as the other outlying tribes and areas of the North, for instance the Bejio, the Kababish, etc. If Southerners were going to attend the Assembly why should they not take part in it, and speak for their own people? Since the more distant tribes of the Northern Sudan were to be represented in the proposed assembly why should not the South?

Kamyangi Ababa replied that Southerners were like recruits compared with old soldiers and the Southerners wanted more training before they could take part in an assembly with Northerners. The other tribes which the last speaker mentioned had already had some experience in the Advisory Council which Southerners had not had. They did not wish to close the door to Southern representation in the Legislative Assembly, but the time was not yet ripe.

The Chairman referred the meeting to the basic question as to whether they considered that the South was essentially to be one with the North.

James Tembura said that education had not advanced far enough in the South to allow for full representation.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti returned to the point that many of the Northern tribes were as backward as anyone in the South and had not previously had Councils of their own. We suggested that there should be Province Councils in each of the Southern Provinces which should send representatives.

Chief Ukuma Bazia asked why the South had not been included in the Advisory Council.

Mr. Kingdon said that Sir Douglas Newbold had answered that question at the time when the Advisory Council was first started. He said Southerners had not reached a standard of
education which would enable them to represent their com-
patriots in such a Council.

Chief Ukuma Bazia asked if, when Sir Douglas Newbold
gave this explanation, the Northern Sudanese were satisfied
with it.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti replied emphatically that the
Northern Sudanese were not satisfied.

Sgt. Major Philemon stated that the Southerners were
like children in their relations with the grown-up
Northerners and that, as children must drink milk before
they eat kisra, so the Southerners must first study self-
government before participating in governing.

Chief Cir Rehan said that the South was distinct from
the North. If he went to the North, would the Northerners
listen to his words as the pre-representative of the Southern
peoples?

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said they would.

Chief Cir Rehan replied that the Southerners should go
on learning under their British Administrators and in due
course they would acquire understanding. He could not see
that at the present time, Northerners could understand the
needs of Southerners.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that he was understanding
them now and that if they came to the North then the Northerners
and the Southerners would have the opportunity of understanding
each other even better.

Chief Cir Rehan was still dissatisfied and said that the
Southerners must have training in Councils before they could
represent their people.
Dr. Habib Abdulla remarked that in his opinion all the Southerners present were labouring under the misconception that all Northerners have great training and Southerners was much less than they thought, in fact it was negligible. The Southerners should not be afraid of being at disadvantages via à vis the Northerners in matters of self government.

Sgt. Major Philemon admitted that that was in fact what he was afraid of, and could not see why the Northerners should not simply invite them North to enable them first of all to observe the procedure. He added that the Southerners could not ignore past history.

Hassan Fertak, replying to Judge Shingeiti, said that everything had to have a beginning. The North had had its Advisory Council for four years and was now ready for the next steps, a Legislative Assembly. They were like pupils who had been through class I and now were going into class II. The South had not yet been through Class I, and it would be absurd to put them straight into class II.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti explained that members of the Advisory Council had not all been in the same stage, some were more advanced than others and the less advanced had learnt a lot from the more advanced.

Hassan Fertak pointed out that the less advanced had at any rate many contacts and much in common with the more advanced members.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti drew attention to the fact that the Conference in which they were engaged was very similar to a meeting of the Advisory Council, and if Southerners could speak for themselves in this Conference why should they not do so in a legislative Assembly?
Mr. Marwood stressed the difference between an Advisory Council and a Legislative Assembly which would have powers to make laws and would have some control over the administration. Judge Shingeiti had not yet given any convincing reason why the first step of an Advisory Council which had been found necessary in the North should not be equally necessary in the South.

Sheikh Serur Mohd. Ramli wished to return to the basic point of whether the Sudan was to be a single united nation. Before details of representation were discussed it was necessary to have that point settled.

Mr. Marwood nominated a speaker to reply but objection was taken to this by Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti who said that if anybody wanted to speak they should do so without prompting from the Governor.

The Chairman asked whether anybody present had any objection to the Unity of Sudan.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti complained that this was outside the meeting's terms of reference but the Civil Secretary refused to admit this. The Civil Secretary again addressed the meeting and said that if nobody spoke on this subject, then they would assume agreement on the principle of the Unity of the Sudan.

Chief Lapponya stated that the principle of unity could only be decided later when the Southerners were grown up, by which time they would be in a position to decide whether to join the North or go to the Belgian Congo or Uganda.

The Chairman explained that people could not get up and go where they like just like that.
Mr. Owen addressed the Northern Sudanese present and explained that they were still suffering from the sins of Zubeir Pasha and the slavers. "The sins of the Fathers shall be visited upon their children even unto the third and fourth generation". He said that the South had not forgotten the days of oppression even if the North had done so, and even today the Southerners would never willingly join the North until the latter should prove by their acts, not merely by their words, that they had undergone a change of heart.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti stressed that Northerners had no desire to dominate the South. They maintained that the country was one and the policy of this country was made in Khartoum, so the Northerners wanted the Southerners to join with them in the formation of policy for a whole country. Mr. Owen had referred to the slave trade ... but he felt bound to point out that the British had in their time been the biggest slave traders in history. The West Indies were populated by Africans who had been enslaved in the past by the British but with the growth of public opinion the British had come to realize the evils of the slave trade. What had happened in England had now happened in the Northern Sudan where it was fully realized that slavery was barbaric and harmful. It has happened that, under this Government, slaves had been introduced into the Sudan from Abyssinia. He had himself been a Sub-Mamur in the White Nile at that time and had personally taken part in the freeing of these slaves. This trade had been discovered by the vigilance of Sudanese Officials. Northerners had no evil intentions towards the South. If they had they would not have been prepared to put up the money for
the Zande Scheme.

Chief Lapponya said that when British and Northerners had first come to their country in 1914 the Northerners had despised and insulted Southerners. Southerners were also envious of the Northerners because they were paid at higher rates.

Chief Gir Kiro admitted that the Sudan was a single country but said that this was the first time they had ever taken part in a conference of this kind how could they be expected to send representatives to an assembly in Khartoum. The Northerners were their older brothers and were inviting them to swim across the river with the Northerners.

Chief Cir Rehan said that he and Chief Gir Kiro were answerable to their people and must speak for them. At the Gogrial and Tonj Councils their people had said they had no objection to live as brothers with the Northerners but they wanted first to wait and learn before joining them. That is what he and Chief Gir Kiro were saying now.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that the Southerners could best learn in the course of the work they would do in the Province and District Councils.

The Chairman summed up at this point and said that so far the discussion boiled down to two facts. Firstly, that most Southerners present (Shingeiti Eff, "All of them") were agreed that the Sudan was one country. Secondly, that the Southerners were not yet advanced enough to take part in the legislative Assembly but would in their opinion, be able to participate after a period of educational training in Southern Councils.
The meeting then adjourned for fifteen minutes.

The Chairman referred to note 2 of the Minutes of the Preliminary Meeting. If it was proposed to send people to the Legislative Assembly as learners, how many would they wish to send and how would they be chosen? The administration Conference had recommended that there should be fifteen representatives from the South.

Chief Ukuma Bazia said that this point had not been discussed as they did not know if the suggestion would be accepted. They would certainly wish to select them themselves rather than they should be appointed by Government.

Siricio Iro said that they would wish at first to send a large number, probably more than the number suggested. 

Mr. Kingdon asked what languages would be used in the Legislative Assembly. If there were too many it would cause serious delay in the proceedings.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that the proceedings would be in English and Arabic, but there would be no difficulty in having them translated into the language of any member who did not understand either of these.

Mr. Kingdon pointed out that the absence of a large number of the leading personalities for prolonged periods would cause a serious delay in the advance of local Government.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that the Government of the people must be representative and that the foundation of Representative Government lay in the Town, Rural District, and Province Councils. Thus he considered that in the South there should be town councils in places like Juba, and Wau, Rural Councils in the Districts, and a Province Council.
formed from the leaders of the Town and Rural Councils. This he considered could be achieved in one year in the South. Some three or four of the Southern representatives of the Legislative Assembly could be chosen from the Province Council. The Province Governor could nominate others, being guided only by the interests of the Province. In due course these nominated members to the Legislative Assembly would be replaced by Members selected or elected from the Province Council, which in the normal course of its deliberations would automatically effect the necessary training and education of its members. All this had already taken place in the North, and he saw no reason why the same should not happen in the South.

Clement Mboro asked what would happen if the Legislative Assembly were to meet before these Province Councils are set up.

The Chairman pointed out that it was hoped that the Legislative Assembly would be set up fairly soon, but there might be some delay.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti presumed that Governors would nominate representatives in that case, but emphasized that Southern representation was essential or the North would have everything its own way.

Clement Mboro thought that considerably more than thirteen should be sent from the South, even though they did not take part in the debates, in order to study the art of government.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti pointed out that the place to learn the art of government was in Local Government.

Clement Mboro pleaded for patience till the Southerners were sufficiently advanced to play their part in the Assembly.
Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that the North could not wait until the South caught up. If Southerners could take part in an Advisory Council they could take part in a Legislative Assembly.

Clement Mboro again stressed the essential difference between an Advisory Council and a Legislative Assembly. The number of representatives to be sent to the North should be more than thirteen. When asked by the Chairman to explain his reasons for this, he said it would form a wider field for selection when the time came to appoint the thirteen members to the Legislative Assembly proper.

Mr. Owen asked Clement Mboro if these Southerners would go to the North to study the Legislative Assembly only, or would they have to report back to a Southern Advisory Council.

Clement Mboro said they would have to report back to the Southern Advisory Council.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti protested that the Conference was useless as long as Southern Members present came with fixed ideas which they had conceived before the Conference began.

The Chairman replied that the Conference was quite open and that what was taking place now was an elucidation of the Southerners' reasons for the various decisions they had come to.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti repeated that the Southerners' ideas had already been fixed and that therefore the Conference was fruitless.

The Chairman summed up the previous discussion as follows: first, that the Southerners were agreed to send a number of representatives to the North in order to observe the process
of Government, to broaden their minds, and to report back to
the Southern Advisory Council. Secondly, that no fixed
numbers had been agreed upon but that more than thirteen
should go. He went on to ask how these representatives were
to be selected.

Clement Mboro replied that the Government should begin
now with Local Councils which in due course would be able to
send representatives, but in the meantime the Government should
nominate representatives.

Dr. Habib Abdulla deprecated the separatist tendency that
would be fostered by any proposals to treat the Southern Sudan
on a different footing from the North.

Father Guido Akou said that the North wanted immediate
Southern representation in an Assembly which would legislate
for the whole Sudan. Southerners were afraid of this because
they felt that, through lack of understanding, their
representatives might agree to laws which would prove harmful.

Edward Adhok considered that there was no-one from Upper
Nile capable of representing his people in such an assembly.
The Shilluk Council had not been a success so far owing to lack
of experience of members. He himself did not feel qualified
to represent his own people or take the responsibility of
committing them to laws which, owing to a lack of understanding
on his part, might not be for the benefit of his people.

Ibrahim Eff. Badri said that when a man thinks he is
backward it is difficult to persuade him that he is not, and
that the Northern Sudanese must appreciate this difficulty.

Chief Lolik Lado regretted that he was not ready for these
discussions as he had not been able to consult his people before
coming to Juba. He said however, that a girl who has been
asked to marry a young man usually wants time to hear reports of that young man from other people before consenting; likewise before coming to any fixed decisions about their relations with the Northerners. The ancestors of the Northern Sudanese were not peace-loving and domesticated like cows. The younger generation claim that they mean no harm, but time would show what they would in fact do. He agreed to unification with the North but insisted on the Southerners' need for protection and for further time to consider the matter in conference with the elders of the people. An immediate decision could not be taken now.

Sheikh Serur Mohd. Ramli thought that Southerners need have no fear of laws which interfered with their customs for they could be administered with discretion. He quoted the law against pharaonic circumcision which had been passed by the Sudan Government at the request of the Advisory Council. This law was only enforced on the express direction of the Governor who took into account all the circumstances. Any laws passed by the Legislative Assembly which ran counter to Southern customs could doubtless make similar provision.

Chief Tete said that Northerners still despised and frequently insulted Southerners. A child must be brought up gradually and Southerners must learn to walk before they try to run.

The Chairman then referred to para. 3 of the Memorandum and the minute of the preliminary meeting, and asked what safeguards the Southerners had in mind.

Chief Ukuma Bazia instanced the customs of his people to draw their teeth and feared that Northerners who think this a barbarous custom might try to stop it by law.
Dr. Habib Abdulla said that the best safeguard was that Southerners should be members of the Legislative Assembly.

Chief Buth Diu said that Northerners claim to have no desire to dominate the South, but this was not enough and there must be safeguards. There should be no settlement by Northerners on land in the South without permission. Secondly there must be no interference from the North in Local Government in the South. Thirdly there should be a law to prevent a Northerner calling a Southerner a slave.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti pointed out that such an insult was in fact punishable under the penal code.

James Tembura said, on the subject of safeguards, that they must ensure that Northerners who have children by Southern women must not desert them when they go back to the North.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti replied that this was the Government's fault since the Government bids these wives and children to go North.

James Tembura in reply to a question by the Chairman asserted that he was referring to cases where Northerners were properly married to Southern women both by local custom and by Muslim law.

Dr. Habib Abdulla thought that the reason for these cases of desertion were to be found in the variety of laws governing marriage in the Sudan, and that this could be rectified by future legislation.

The Chairman thought that further discussion on this point would not be profitable as it had little to do with the safeguards they were at present discussing.

Mr. Marwood said that one sort of safeguard he had in mind was that laws affecting local customs could only be
enforced at the discretion of the Governor.

The Chairman then referred to the suggestion to set up an Advisory Council for the Southern Sudan and the Minute from the Preliminary Meeting on this point. In particular he asked what was meant by the expression "people of legal respect".

Clement Mboro said that they had intended by this phrase men who had experience of Local Government and of the working of Councils and people who know and sympathize with Southerners.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti asked how long such an Advisory Council would last.

Clement Mboro thought that it would be like the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan and last a few years only, but that it might possibly be necessary to keep it in existence after Southern representatives had taken their place in the Legislative Assembly.

Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman felt that this would mean separation of North and South.

The Chairman deplored the tendency to regard any suggestion that Southern problems should be treated in a different manner from those in the North as a conspiracy to divide North from the South.

Dr. Habib Abdulla thought that there would be some delay in setting up the Legislative Assembly and that if in the meanwhile real progress should be made with the advancement of Local Government and Local Councils, Southerners might feel that a suitable form of representation could be worked out by them in which they could have confidence.

Hassan Fertak thought that a Southern Advisory Council would have the merit of providing a reserve of potential representatives to the Legislative Assembly.
The Chairman pointed out in reply that this could equally well be done by Province Councils once they started.

Sheikh Serur Mohd. Ramli considered that the differences between North and South would no longer present any difficulty once Local Government developed in the South.

The meeting then adjourned until 9.30 a.m. on June 13th, 1947.

The Conference reopened at 9.30 a.m. on Friday, June 13th. The Chairman explained that the nature of the conference was exploratory only and that no decisions were being taken. They were all there to learn each others' ideas. The decisions, if any, would be taken later by the Central Government. He deplored the mutual suspicion which seemed to exist between Northerners and Southerners. The Northerners on the one hand were suspecting the Southerners of wanting to separate from the North (and the Government of desiring this separation). The Southerners on the other hand were suspecting that the Northerners wished to dominate them.

It was essential to get away from these suspicions so that they would all talk together.

Summing up the discussion of the day before the Chairman said that the following conclusions had been arrived at:

Firstly that the Southerners want a unified Sudan.
Secondly, that they want to participate in the proposed Legislative Assembly, but that
Thirdly, they were not sufficiently advanced to do so immediately.
Fourthly, it was important to hasten the establishment and the development of Local Government in the South.
Fifthly, that at first Southerners should attend the Legislative Assembly as observers. These should be more than the thirteen eventual members.

Questions were asked about safeguards but they had been misunderstood. Southern spokesmen had referred to these specific hurts they wished to be defended from rather than the general method to be adopted to protect them from these hurts.

The Chairman referred to para. 4 the Southerners' answers to the Questions put in his Memorandum. Some reference had been made to it the day before but the discussion had not been complete. He personally thought that a Southern Advisory Council was unnecessary, and the Province Councils would be adequate. In Province Councils there would be great opportunity for more people to meet and discuss and thereby learn the art of Government. He also thought that this would be more agreeable to the people of the North. The Chairman invited comments on this subject.

Dr. Habib Abdulla referred to the differences of opinion and suspicions between the North and South which had been mentioned by the Chairman, and asked permission to go over the ground of yesterday's debate to bring out certain important points. There were certain essential things which must be agreed before other matters could be discussed. Firstly, the Sudan is one country because of geographical condition. Secondly, there was no reason why laws made for the Sudan as a whole should be harmful to one part of it. There were two kinds of laws, laws which protected person and property which were welcome to everybody, and laws relating to taxation, etc., which nobody liked. Reference
had frequently been made to political backwardness of Southerners. This was purely a relative matter. There were some 200 tribes in the Sudan, each with its own customs and conditions. They were all of the same economic standard for they were all poor and in need of economic advance.

Religion might differ, but each had his own. There was no reason to say that any one section was more backward than another. It was true that some Southerners went naked, but some Northerners never wash. No one wished to upset the Government. The Government wished to teach the Sudanese to govern themselves and told them they could not learn to do so without taking responsibility. Finally he wished to know why the Southern members had asked for an Advisory Council for the South.

The Chairman pointed out this had been answered the previous day when the Southerners had said that the North had had practice in an Advisory Council for four years, that a baby had to drink milk before it could eat kisra. This appeared to be a full answer to the question. The point now before the meeting was whether there should not be Province Councils instead of a single Advisory Council.

Siricio Iro thought that Province Councils would be a good thing and that Southern Members to the Legislative Assembly could later be drawn from these councils. There was no wonder or mystery about these councils. It was a matter of common sense and the councils would be comparable to the present Chief's courts. The experience gained in these councils would assist the Southerners in their deliberation with the Northerners.
Kamyangi Ababa referred to the difference between Northern and Southern rates of pay for work which was, in effect, the same, and to the reasons given for this by his District Commissioner, that is to say, lack of education in the South, and lower rates of taxation in the South. He referred also to the higher standard of housing enjoyed by Northern officials, and concluded that although they were the sons of one father it seemed to him that father was treating his brother better than himself.

Clement Mboro stated that since the conference of the day before he had fundamentally changed his mind and now considered that the best way to which the Southerners could protect themselves would be to go to Khartoum now to legislate together with the Northerners. Any Councils formed in the South would be defenceless before the Legislative Assembly. An Advisory Council was advisory only and its advice could easily be rejected by the Legislative Assembly or similar body. It was best for the Southerners to go and legislate now in spite of their backwardness; since the Southerners could speak for themselves in the present conference there was no reason why they could not speak for themselves in a Legislative Assembly. If any law was proposed which was not agreeable to the South they could stand up and object. The Southerners must defend themselves and speak and think for themselves.

Mr. Owen asked Clement Mboro what his safeguard would be if in spite of the Southern objections in the Legislative Assembly a law was passed which was against the interests of the Southerners.
Clement Mboro replied that the Government would protect them.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti protested against Mr. Owen's question. His protest was over-ruled.

Clement Mboro went on to say that if the Government could not protect them there must be rules and legislation in the Legislative Assembly which would do so. Meantime the Government must press on without delay with the establishment of Province, District, and Town Councils in the South.

Chief Cir. Rehan said that in their country they had originally been given courts, and when they had learnt to use them the Government had set up a Council of about forty men with three officials who were responsible for the work of the court, and for the chest. They had found this very different from the Court work and had it not been for the help of the D.C. they could not have made work at all. They had found this conference different again. When they discussed amongst themselves the first day they took five hours to reach their decisions. He was certain that Northerners would have completed the business in one hour (laughter).

What they had said yesterday was not their own opinion only but that of their people. They had agreed to join the North in a Government for the whole Sudan only if they were given time. Was he to go back and tell his people that the Northerners insisted on their coming in at once or not at all? He did not feel that it showed a brotherly feeling to try to force them.

James Tembura said that he agreed emphatically with what Clement Mboro had said with regard to immediate representation in the Legislative Assembly.
The Chairman asked him why he had changed his mind since the previous day.

James Tembura replied that Judge Shingeiti had said that if they did not do so they would have no say in the future Government of the Sudan, and he had thought this over very carefully the previous night after considering what had been said during the day.

Chief Tete said he wanted to study in the South until he was clever enough to go to the North. One could not begin to do work which one did not understand.

Sgt. Major Philemon Majok said that they were speaking on behalf of their people and that they, as spokesmen, could see more clearly than the people. He thought that if the Southerners adopted a "go slow" policy now they would never reach the required level. The Southerners could speak their mind in a Legislative Assembly just as a Chief could speak to Chief's Court or as a Major Court member could speak to D.C. presiding. In a Legislative Assembly there would be somebody to defend them and guide them. In spite of his statement the day before he now thought that there was no danger in sending Southerners to the North to join in the Legislative Assembly as soon as it was formed.

Chief Lolik Lado said that the day before they had spoken for their people and could not change their words today. The Southerners wanted to send representatives to the North but so far they had found nobody to send. The Government would later select the right people to go to speak on their behalf.

Chief Lapponya thought that if representatives were to be sent to a Legislative Assembly they should have had
previous experience in councils of their own. It was impossible to send untrained recruits into battle. When the Governor thought they were sufficiently trained he would send them into the firing line.

Hassan Fertak said that they were all, or nearly all, agreed that the Sudan was one country and that was the most important decision that had to be made. They were also agreed that Province Councils should be formed. He wanted to know when the Legislative Assembly was likely to be set up.

The Chairman said they hoped it would be very soon but he could not say exactly when.

Hassan Fertak could see no reason why their representatives should not, for the time being, watch the proceedings in order to learn, without being full voting members.

The Chairman said that there seemed to have been a change of mind among some of the Southern members but that the discussion had been a useful one. He would now like to return to the question he asked at the beginning of the session. Did they wish to have one Advisory Council for the south or a Province Council for each Province. From what had been said, it appeared that they favoured Province Councils, and that these Councils should send representatives to the Legislative Assembly. There was some difference of opinion whether these representatives should be full voting members from the start, or whether they should at first watch the proceedings until they had some experience of procedure.

Chief Buth Diu thought the Southerners should send representatives to the North not only to study but to participate in legislation, finance, and administration. He
referred to para. 2 of the Civil Secretary's Memorandum, and thought that the best way of representing the South would be to send people who had been attached to outstations for three or four years, and also those who had served a long time with the Government. The Government could appoint the best representatives. Four representatives from Upper Nile Province were enough. Of the ten members to be nominated by the Governor General, two could be from Upper Nile Province. An Advisory Council for the South would be the first step towards separation. It was much better to have Province Councils. Laws made by the Legislative Assembly should not be enforced without the consent of the Governor or the Governor-General.

The Chairman explained that in any case according to the report of the administration Conference all laws made by the Legislative Assembly would be referred to the Governor-General for his comments.

Chief Luoth Ajak agreed with Buth Diu.

The meeting adjourned for fifteen minutes. When the conference reopened the Chairman referred the Members to para. 5 of his Memorandum, and said that some of the subject matter therein had already been discussed by the Southerners at their own meeting held prior to the opening of the present conference. With regard to Permits to Trade the Southerners had expressed their opinion in their para. 5 sub-para. 1, 2 & 3. The Council referred to in para. 5, sub-para 2 was presumably a Local Council, District or Province.

Sheikh Serur Mohd. Ramli said that if the conditions stipulated by the Southerners were necessary it would be a matter for the Local Council to decide.
The Chairman asked whether the condition laid down by the Southerners had reference to Northern traders only or to all non-Southern traders.

Chief Ukuma Bazia and others explained that they referred to all non-Southern traders.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti explained that the licensing authority would probably be the Local Council who would have power to attach what conditions they like to the licence. It was not necessary to define these conditions now. If the Local Councils were given adequate power the conditions attached to trader's licences could safely be left to them.

The Chairman asked Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti if he was speaking on behalf of the Legal Secretary or for himself only.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that he was speaking for himself only.

The Chairman explained that his reason for asking that question was that the Legal Secretary adhered firmly to the view that licences should be bought over the Merkaz counter and that there should be no restrictions.

Mr. Marwood pointed out that Local Government Authorities were not, in law, the issuing authority for traders' licences. If Judge Shingeiti's proposal to hand over this authority to Local Governments and to enable them to impose what conditions they liked were adopted, it would presumably apply in the North as well as in the South.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti said that in the North there were no restrictions (apart from certain temporary restrictions resulting from the war) attached to the issue of traders' licences. It was open to the conference however,
to recommend that Local Authorities be empowered to make such restrictions.

The Chairman explained that in the South there were two licences which a non-Southern trader had to take out. One was the ordinary trader's licence without restrictions, and the other a special licence under the Permits to Trade Order. The reason for this was that in the past many Gellaba with little capital and a tendency to exploit the unsophisticated came to the South and the Permits to Trade Order was brought in to protect the tribesmen from this type of trader. If the Permits to Trade Order was cancelled, how was the South to be protected from a possible influx of such people?

Chief Buth Diu said that at the preliminary meeting they had decided to recommend that the Permits to Trade Order be cancelled under certain conditions. The reason for this was that the Sudan Administration Conference had felt strongly that the Permits to Trade Order was a hindrance to the unification of the Sudan. The majority at that meeting were against the cancellation of this Order, but the minority had persuaded the majority to agree, provided certain conditions were laid down.

Chief Luoth Ajak emphasized the fear of the Southerners that a crowd of hungry Gellaba would invade the South and swamp them and cheat the people.

James Tembura said that the feeling at the preliminary meeting was that rich traders from the North and elsewhere should be restricted to the big towns, leaving the bush shops for Southerners who wished to learn shop-keeping.

Mr. Owen asked James Tembura if he thought there were
enough Southerners who wanted to open bush shops, as in his experience there were disappointingly few who wished to do so.

James Tembura replied that he thought that there were enough.

Chief Lolik Lado was sure that many Southerners wanted to open shops.

Chief Tete agreed and added that many ex-soldiers wanted to open shops with their gratuities.

The Chairman thought that what the Southerners wanted was a safeguard that Northerners should not come and open shops in the villages but that village shops should be reserved for Southerners. He asked Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti if the Legal Secretary would agree to that. Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti thought that he would.

The Chairman thought there was little difference between this and the old Permits to Trade Order.

Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman thought that the difference lay in this: that although local Authorities should have power to refuse a licence disappointed applicants would still have the right of appeal against their decision.

Mr. Marwood thought that present legislation in the Sudan was deficient. A permit to trade was merely a piece of financial machinery, but there was no Ordinance governing the proper conduct of trade in the Sudan. Some legislation was necessary to ensure the proper conduct of trade, and this legislation should apply to the whole of the Sudan. The proposed Legislative Assembly might consider this in due course.

Clement Mboro explained that what the Southerners had intended was that adequate opportunity should be left to the
Southerner to become a trader.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti explained Mr. Marwood's point that before conditions could be attached to the issue of a trader's licence a law must be enacted to that effect.

The Chairman said this seemed to imply a Permit to Trade Order for the whole Sudan in fact (laughter).

Chief Ukuma Bazia thought that 1928 Order should stand until they heard what the Legislative Assembly had to say about it.

Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman thought that there was no basic difference of opinion between Northerners and Southerners with regard to the need for protecting villagers against adventurers of whatever nationality.

The Chairman considered that that was what the Permits to Trade Order was, in effect, doing at present. There was a good deal of muddled thinking about this Order in the North.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti agreed that this may be so, but explained that the Northerners considered that the Permit to Trade Order was being applied in such a way as to hinder economic development in the South. The best remedy lay in ensuring that disappointed applicants should have right of appeal to a Court of Justice.

Mr. Marwood thought there was a common misconception that his office was full of rejected applications to trade. Up till very recently he had received no application from people outside the province. In the past three or four months only one or two had come in. In one of these cases he had asked the trader where he wanted to trade, and what
capital he had to build shops and buy lorries for transport etc. He awaited his reply. The Permits to Trade Order had been interpreted exactly as this meeting would have liked it to be interpreted. Small traders with a capital of only £10 or so were not wanted. Responsible traders with capital are wanted. The last thing he wanted to do was to hinder economic development.

The Chairman summed up and thought they were all agreed that it was necessary to improve trade and that merchants with capital were wanted to improve and develop the country, and that people should be protected against adventurers and exploiters. He thought that the Southerners wanted to stress that there should be enough places left in the villages to give Southerners the opportunity to set up as traders and in due course build up bigger businesses of their own. When they returned to Khartoum they would consider the recommendations of this meeting.

The next point for discussion was the question of unification of educational policy in the North and South, and the teaching of Arabic.

Mr. Owen asked for a clarification of the phrase "one educational policy".

Mr. Kingdon thought that the reply to this question by the preliminary meeting of the Southerners in their minute 5a was self-contradictory.

Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman thought that this meant merely that the curricula in Northern and Southern schools should be the same. He did not find any contradiction in the recommendation that education in bush schools should be in vernacular and that English and Arabic should be taught in
Elementary and Higher schools.

James Tembura said that the Southerners felt strongly that a boy should first learn to read and write in his own language and could later go on to other languages.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti felt that it should be left to the educationalist to say if a boy could learn two foreign languages in the elementary stage.

The Chairman pointed out that the essential difference in practice between North and South was that in the North a boy learnt in Arabic to the end of the elementary stage and did not start to learn a foreign language before then. The meeting felt that Arabic should be taught as soon as the boy was able to learn it, but that it should be left to the educationalist to say when this stage was reached.

Pastor Adrea Apaya asked if the introduction of Arabic would apply to Mission Schools.

The Chairman thought that this was the general opinion of the meeting.

Dr. Habib Adballa thought that Southerners were still thinking of education in terms of preparation for government service, an idea still held by many Northerners, and he thought that the reasons Southerners were so anxious for the same education as the Northerners was to strengthen their claim to receive the same rates of pay as the Northerners.

The Chairman referred to the great shortage of teachers in the North and doubted if Northerners would be prepared to restrict their educational expansion to send Arabic teachers to the South.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti felt that the available teachers should be equally distributed between North and
South, and even more generously to the South to help them catch up. If the Northerners were not willing to do this they should not claim that the Sudan was a single country.

Buth Diu thought that there must be no delay in the introduction of Arabic to Schools to enable them to catch up with the North.

Chief Lolik Lado thought that there might be some difficulties caused by introduction of Arabic. He had found that Catholics and Protestants did not readily cooperate, and he feared that this would be a new complication.

Pastor Andrea Apaya said that both English and Arabic were difficult languages and doubted if boys at the elementary stage could assimilate both. He was not against the introduction of Arabic, and in fact welcomed it, but doubted if it was feasible at that stage.

The Chairman felt that it must be left to the Director of Education to say at what stage a pupil could start learning a second language.

Father Guido Akou asked for an explanation of the phrase "single educational policy".

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti thought that it meant firstly that the standards of equivalent schools should be roughly equal, and secondly that a boy leaving a Southern Intermediate School should be able to go straight to a Northern Secondary School. In addition pupils of both parts of the country should have a similarity of outlook.

Father Guido Akou asked if this unification of policy was to be implemented at once.

The Chairman thought that there was a misunderstanding in the use of this phrase, in that the bush schools
corresponded to Sub-Grade Schools in the North, elementary schools in both areas were on the same footing, and so were Intermediate schools and from this point of view educational policy was in fact the same in North and South.

Mr. Marwood said that for the last ten years the Education Department had been exercising more and more supervision in Mission Schools and the Inspector had devoted much time and energy to working with the Mission School authorities to ensure that curricula and standards should approach those of the North as closely and quickly as possible.

Hassan Eff. Ahmed Osman was grateful to Mr. Marwood for dispelling much of the misunderstanding which existed on the question of unified education. He thought it not irrelevant to request that the sending of Southern boys to Uganda should be discontinued. The medium of instruction in the North is English in Higher and Secondary education, and Arabic was studied only as a subject. Southern boys should therefore go North for Higher and Secondary education.

The Chairman said that the sending of boys to Uganda had been a temporary expedient since the schools in the North were too full to take them. In due course there would be a Secondary School for the South and Southerners would go to Gordon College for higher education.

The Chairman then raised the question of improvement of communications. The meeting was generally in favour of an improvement of communications between North and South.

The Chairman then went on to consider the question of transfer of officials, and thought that this could be best discussed in a small committee with the Director of Establishment as it did not concern all the Members present.
Mr. Marwood thought that the Chiefs were concerned in so far as the proposed Local Council would require educated staff and must find money to pay this staff. In the North he believed that at present most local Councils employed seconded government officials on government rates of pay, but that the time will come when the Council would employ staff independently of the government. In the south the local Councils would have to decide how much they could afford to pay for their staff, and choose between a highly paid government official and a local boy requiring less remuneration.

The Chairman wanted to know what the Southerners meant by the term "encouragement of transfers". A transfer was a transfer and brooked no discussion. He referred to instances where some Northerners had attempted to evade service in the South on medical grounds.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti admitted that such instances had occurred, but said that most Northerners who came South wanted to stay on there.

Buth Diu thought that Northerners were unwilling to come South not only because they were afraid of losing their children through malaria, but also because they were afraid of lions. He suggested that better housing would remove this unwillingness. The Southerners on the other hand were unwilling to go North because of the extensive use of Arabic in offices.

Clement Mboro referred to para. 5b of the minute of the Southerners' preliminary meeting, and he said he wished to stress how strongly they adhered to the unification of the system of establishment. This must be decided in this
conference. And not in separate committee. Refusal to unify establishments was in his opinion the greatest obstacle in the way of a unified Sudan.

The Chairman considered that it was not easy to discuss such an intricate matter at this conference. He noted the Southerners' view. But thought a small committee was best fitted to consider the matter in detail. Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti asked if they could not agree on the broad lines.

The Chairman replied that the Southern members present were already agreed on the broad lines.

The Chairman in closing the conference thanked the members for coming and felt that the deliberations had been of considerable value to Southerners, to Northerners, and to the Government. He could not promise that every suggestion would be carried out, nor when it would be carried out, but he thanked them for their advice and recommendations which were of definite value.

Mr. Marwood said that this was the first opportunity that Southerners had had to come together from all over the Southern Provinces to discuss these things. He himself had felt, after the report of the Sudan Administration Conference, that it was essential that Northern Sudanese and members of the Central Government should hear from their own lips what Southerners felt about these proposals. He was very grateful to the Civil Secretary and the other members who had come from the North for affording them this opportunity.

Mohd. Saleh Eff. Shingeiti on behalf of the Northern Sudanese Members thanked the Civil Secretary and the two Governors. The Civil Secretary as Chairman had given
everyone complete freedom to speak his mind. This was an essential feature of such a conference. He thanked Mr. Marwood for giving them this opportunity to meet the Southerners and hear their point of view. He had been much impressed with what the Southerners had said and the way they had said it, and wished them then every success in the Local Councils so that they would be able to send representatives to take a full part in the Government of Sudan.
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