The Bodhisattvapiṭaka

Its Doctrines, Practices and their Position in Mahāyāna Literature

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Abstract

This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive study of the Bodhisattvapitaka with specific emphasis on the bodhisattva ideal. The content of the Bodhisattvapitaka indicates that its exposition belongs to the earliest treatises on the bodhisattva. The practices and doctrines that are expounded are invariably rudimentary and show little of the complexities that characterise their discussions in later bodhisattva literature. The Bodhisattvapitaka's inclusion into the Mahārātakūṭa rested probably on its pioneering account of the bodhisattvacaryā. Being by far the longest work on the bodhisattva in the whole collection, it expounds important practices and constitutes the hub for the remaining bodhisattva writings in the Mahārātakūṭa.

The study falls into five parts. The first chapter considers the position of the Bodhisattvapitaka in Mahāyāna literature. It investigates the various usages of the term Bodhisattvapitaka, it considers the relationship between the Bodhisattvapitaka and Akṣayamatinirdesa and discusses the scholastic affiliation of the Bodhisattvapitaka. In addition, exploring the contents and evolution of the Mahārātakūṭa collection, it establishes the scriptural context in which the Bodhisattvapitaka is placed. The second chapter provides an analysis of the Bodhisattvapitaka. It examines the structural and literary traits of the Bodhisattvapitaka, its chapter organisation and some aspects of the bodhisattva path in the Bodhisattvapitaka. Chapter three discusses the bodhisattva ideal in the Mahārātakūṭa collection. It distinguishes between the various categories of bodhisattva sūtras in the Mahārātakūṭa, it examines the bodhisattva practices and investigates whether there is evidence of a premeditated design that might have influenced the compilation of the Mahārātakūṭa sūtras into one collection. Chapter four considers the bodhisattva doctrine as it is propounded in the Bodhisattvapitaka within the context of other scriptural traditions. It discusses the evolution of the concepts of the cīttotpāda, apramāṇa, pāramitā and samgrahavastu and assesses the contribution of the Bodhisattvapitaka to that process. Chapter five consists of a translation of the eleventh chapter of the Bodhisattvapitaka.
I would like to express my gratitude to the following persons: to Tadeusz Skorupski, my supervisor who provided me throughout my research with unfaltering support, inspiration and guidance—without his patient and exacting supervision this thesis would have never been completed; to Phillip Denwood, Peter Schreiner and Renate Söhnen-Thieme who taught me Tibetan and Sanskrit over many years; to the members of the British Academy for granting financial assistance; to Allan Bloxham and Christopher Lamb who corrected my English; to my father whose continuing and generous financial support throughout the years allowed me to devote all my time to my research; and, last but not least, to my wife and son for their unfailing encouragement and support in times of difficulty when progress was slow and especially for putting up with those times when the thesis took priority over everything else, including family-life.
A Note on Orthography

With certain exceptions, all non-English terminology has been italicised. Words that have not been italicised include proper nouns (e.g., Dharma, nikāya), classifications of Buddhist practitioners (e.g., śrāvaka, arhat, buddha/pratyekabuddha and bodhisattva) including references to their respective vehicles that have also been capitalised and personal names (including references to the historical Buddha).

Generally, Sanskrit forms have not been pluralised except in the few cases that found their way into standard English vocabulary or where it seemed inevitable out of stylistic considerations. Exceptions are the following words: buddha/pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva/mahāsattva, bhikṣu/bhikkhu, sūtra/sutta and śāstra. I have decided to take this approach, because I do not wish to hybridise the Sanskrit word-forms. Although the hybridised forms have become widely accepted, from the linguistic point of view such adaptation is unfortunate since it denies Sanskrit the treatment that is given to Greek and Latin terms whose plural forms are generally not anglicised.
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**Bibliography**

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Introduction

The present dissertation aims at providing a wide-ranging study of the *Bodhisattvapitaka*. In the course of my research two main areas of investigation have emerged as being particularly important. First, there is the content of the *Bodhisattvapitaka*. Being one of the longest works on the bodhisattva in Mahāyāna literature, it provides a wealth of information on the training and dynamics in which the *bodhisattvacaryā* unfolds. Second, I have examined the *Bodhisattvapitaka*’s doctrinal propositions in the wider context of Mahāyāna thought. While it is possible to speak of these two aspects of my research as distinct targets, in practice they are closely interwoven and often go hand in hand.

My interest in the *Bodhisattvapitaka* was aroused by the frequent references in Mahāyāna sources to a text (or collection of texts) called *Bodhisattvapitaka*. As these references occur in practically all strands of post-nikāya sources, extending from the very earliest Mahāyāna sūtras to the latest phase of tantric Buddhism, it occurred to me that the *Bodhisattvapitaka* must be an important text that was esteemed by generations of Buddhists. Although referred to in various contexts and for different purposes, practically all references to the *Bodhisattvapitaka* recommend it for its treatment of the bodhisattva ideal.

Of course, I was not the first person to have come across these references. They have been noted and duly recorded by a number of distinguished scholars, including Étienne Lamotte, Jean Przyluski, Alex Wayman and Anthony Warder. However, preoccupied with their own particular research, none of them went beyond making some useful but rather general observations. The first attempts to collate and explore these references in the wider frame of Mahāyāna literature were undertaken by Priscilla Pedersen and Nancy Schuster in 1975/76. Both scholars, working primarily from Chinese sources, have collected a fair amount of material and tentatively propose interpretations of its position and nature. However, as neither of them attempts to produce a systematic study of the *Bodhisattvapitaka* the results of their investigations are somewhat limited. Not having read through the *Bodhisattvapitaka*, they differ in their evaluation of the references and disagree on the historical context in that they belong.

The *Bodhisattvapitaka* is part of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection. The majority of the forty-nine works included in the *Ratnakūṭa* are only extant in Chinese and Tibetan translations. In its
present format the Ratnakūta dates back to early eighth-century China. Its compiler, Bodhiruci, was a monk from South India. At the end of the seventh century, Bodhiruci travelled to China where he was commissioned by the T'ang Emperor Chung-tsung to translate the forty-nine sūtras into Chinese. It is said that he brought with him a complete Sanskrit copy of the Ratnakūta. After several years of editing and translating, he produced the first complete Chinese version.

Little is known of the history of the collection before Bodhiruci. While we have several fifth and sixth-century accounts mentioning the Ratnakūta in conjunction with other well-known sūtra collections, nothing concrete is known about its early contents and structure. Ratnakūta fragments found in Khotan, Tun-huang and Kucha indicate that its texts enjoyed particular popularity in Buddhist circles of Central Asia. We have practically no knowledge about its development in India. Tibetan historians say that it became greatly renowned by the second century AD, but there is no independent evidence supporting this claim. Indeed, I know of no reference to a collection bearing the name Ratnakūta anywhere in Indian literature.

The nucleus of the Ratnakūta collection is probably found in a relatively small body of sūtras that were put together sometime between the third and fifth centuries. The Buddhist traditions of India, China and Tibet preserved several sūtra lists where ten to fifteen Ratnakūta works constantly appear en bloc. The earliest of these enumerations goes back to third-century China. Although the origin of these lists is not known, their pan-Asian circulation indicates that they might have come into existence with the expansion of Buddhism across Asia. This would explain the complete silence of Indian sources and account for the difficulties in tracing the genesis of the Ratnakūta beyond Bodhiruci to a specific geographical area and a given historical context.

The hypothesis of a gradual formation would also accord with much of the content of the Ratnakūta texts. There is every indication that they were carefully compiled in a process that might have extended over several centuries. Its texts embrace a wide spectrum of Buddhist thought and address practically every aspect of Mahāyāna spirituality. Within this broad area of themes, the most frequently discussed topic is the bodhisattva ideal. Out of the forty-nine texts, roughly one half is concerned specifically with the bodhisattva. The longest and most important bodhisattva sūtra of the Ratnakūta is the Bodhisattvapītaka. In volume, it occupies roughly one seventh of the collection and is specifically dedicated to the pāramitā practice. Its length and the fact that there is practically no other text in the collection that discourses on
the pāramitā in detail, place the Bodhisattvapiṭaka in the centre of the Ratnakūṭa’s discussion of the bodhisattva. The Bodhisattvapiṭaka’s treatment of the pāramitā is supplemented by a variety of material on the bodhisattva in the remaining Ratnakūṭa sūtras that deal specifically with the bodhisattva practice. The thematic complementarity of these works is such that their propositions come close to representing a balanced cross-section of all major ideas in the development of the bodhisattva doctrine.

While it is difficult to establish the precise relationship between the various texts due to the uncertainties of their chronology, it is possible to distinguish several strands of bodhisattva thinking within the Ratnakūṭa works. The oldest thought on the bodhisattva is contained in sūtras such as the Kāśyapaparivarta and Ugrapariprcchā. Second-century translations of these texts confirm their antiquity beyond any doubt. Next, we have works that seem to set out to systematise the material that was introduced in these early sūtras. The Bodhisattvapiṭaka belongs to this category. Then, the collection contains several sūtras displaying a high degree of organisation in their expositions on the bodhisattva. One characteristic of these texts is the meticulous implementation of the daśabhūmika scheme. Examples of this type are the Svapnanirdesa and Aksayamatipariprcchā. Finally, there are a number of rather advanced sūtras. These tend to show less interest in the practical aspects of the bodhisattva training, but focus on doctrinal matters. Quite frequently, they represent the latest strand of Ratnakūṭa sūtras and include such works as the Śrīmālādevisimhanāda and Pitāputrasamāgama.

The above outline places the Bodhisattvapiṭaka among the earlier bodhisattva sūtras of the Ratnakūṭa. Its antiquity is supported by an array of internal and external evidence. First, there is the close association between the Bodhisattvapiṭaka and the second-century Aksayamati-nirdesa. Since the Aksayamatinirdesa is greatly indebted for its material to the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, the origin of our sūtra must predate that of the Aksayamatinirdesa. Second, we have a number of references to the pāramitā discussion of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka in other sūtras. While some of these date back to the second century, others are third or fourth-century compositions.

The most persuasive evidence is, however, found in the content of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka. The relatively undeveloped nature of the practices and their rudimentary organisation point to a period of composition when the thinking on the bodhisattva was still dominated by the spiritual ideal of early Buddhism. Although clearly a Mahāyāna text in orientation, several of the practices show traits that link them to the Śrāvakayāna. The fact that in later times many
of these early elements were modified and adjusted to doctrinal developments further confirms their antiquity.

If we compare the material that is included in the Bodhisattvapitaka with that of later writings on the bodhisattva, we note two things. First, most of what is being said about the bodhisattva in the Bodhisattvapitaka retained its validity and found its way into the scholastic treatises of the fourth and fifth centuries. It is often possible to trace to the Bodhisattvapitaka the individual building blocks of advanced works such as the Bodhisattvabhumi. Second, some of the structures of its bodhisattva practices were adopted in later literature. The internal divisions of the pāramitā, the blueprint of the ten cittotpāda and the outline of the wisdom-practices all had profound bearing on the development of the bodhisattva doctrine.

After consideration of all the evidence, there seems to be a strong case for not only placing the Bodhisattvapitaka among the earliest works on the bodhisattva, but also for looking at it as a text of fundamental importance to the evolution of the bodhisattva doctrine. Its pioneering exposition of the perfections, the lasting influence this exerted on generations of Buddhist thinkers and the frequent references to the Bodhisattvapitaka in a wide spectrum of Mahāyāna works all seem to point in this direction.

In spite of the Bodhisattvapitaka's influence, very little is known about its history and the circumstances in which it was composed. The fact that several of the early Indian schools possessed a collection of texts of this name alongside the traditional Tripitaka led some scholars to surmise that the Bodhisattvapitaka might have sprung from a body of loosely connected, but distinct works on the bodhisattva. Wayman, for example, proposed an association with the Mahāsāṅghika school by arguing that Mahāsāṅghika followers "gradually built up the theory of the bodhisattva modelled after the life and theoretical former lives of Gautama Buddha" and thus produced the Bodhisattvapitaka as "the ultimate form of this effort".¹ While it is incorrect to link the origin of the bodhisattva ideal specifically with the Mahāsāṅghika, he is probably correct in seeing a connection between the Bodhisattvapitaka and the jātaka-genre. In the Bodhisattvapitaka itself we find included altogether fourteen accounts of the Buddha’s former lives. Moreover, the jātaka-genre probably provided the first impetus to the formulation of the bodhisattva ideal and almost certainly inspired some elements of its practice. Warder went so far as to suggest that the early schools actually included the Jātaka collection in their Bodhisattvapitaka.² While there is no real evidence to support this hypothesis,

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² Warder, 1980, p. 357.
the importance of the jātaka to the bodhisattva doctrine in general and their presence in the Bodhisattvapitaka in particular might not be coincidental.

Even if we accept the existence of such a link, leading eventually to the composition of the Bodhisattvapitaka (either in the form of one unified text or a collection of independent works on the bodhisattva), it tells us little about the place, time and circumstances in which the Bodhisattvapitaka was conceived. Like Wayman, Warder also ascribes the origin of the Bodhisattvapitaka to Mahāsaṅghika circles in southern India. As evidence, he cites a pitaka list in the Satyasiddhiśāstra that includes the Bodhisattvapitaka as one of the five sections of the Buddhist canon. Since the Satyasiddhiśāstra is a Bahuśrutiya text, he infers that the Bodhisattvapitaka formed part of the Bahuśrutiya canon. The Bahuśrutiya was of course a sub-sect of the Mahāsaṅghika that is known to have been widespread around Nāgarjunikonda in South India.

This line of argument, although perfectly sound by itself, does not take into consideration either of two factors. First, the Mahāsaṅghika themselves do not include a Bodhisattvapitaka in their division of the canon. According to Hsüan-tsang, their scriptures consisted of a Sūtra-, Vinaya-, Abhidharma-, Samyukta- and Dharanipitaka. This alone does not disprove the South Indian Mahāsaṅghika connection—Hsüan-tsang was given this list at Rājagrha in the seventh century AD—but it raises the question whether it is possible to ascribe the Bahuśrutiya division to the Mahāsaṅghika in general. Second, the only other sect that is recorded to have been in possession of a Bodhisattvapitaka is a non-Mahasanghika sect, namely the Dharmaguptaka. This is significant in two respects. On the one hand, it indicates that we cannot speak of an exclusive Mahāsaṅghika connection for the Bodhisattvapitaka. Quite obviously, the Bodhisattvapitaka was known in Sthaviravāda and Mahāsaṅghika circles alike. On the other hand, it throws doubt on South India as the place of origin of the Bodhisattvapitaka. The little information we possess about the Dharmaguptaka indicate that their sphere of influence was limited to North-West India, Central Asia and China. Although the Dharmaguptaka might have adopted the Bodhisattvapitaka from the Bahuśrutiya later, the geographical separation makes a regular exchange of ideas (and texts) unlikely. Therefore we have two conflicting scenarios for the origin of the Bodhisattvapitaka. One points to the ancient Buddhist sites in southern India and the other to North-West India and possibly beyond. Apart from a likely jātaka content and a terminus ad quem in possibly the late

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Second century AD, we know little else about the early history of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.
Chapter One
The Bodhisattvapitaka in Mahāyāna Literature

The Term Bodhisattvapitaka

Throughout the centuries, in Mahāyāna literature the term Bodhisattvapitaka has been applied in a number of distinct ways. There are indications that it originated in the early, pre-Mahāyāna, schools. In later times, the term Bodhisattvapitaka was taken up by Mahāyāna writers who altered its scope of application and imbued it with new connotations. Yet, even in the later phases no single widely accepted interpretation evolved. In order to distinguish and indicate the various ways of its use and application, I propose to divide our sources into the following four working categories:

1. Treatises in which the term Bodhisattvapitaka is applied to Mahāyāna scriptures as a whole.
2. Sources that identify the term Bodhisattvapitaka as a distinct collection of works on the bodhisattva ideal.
3. Sources that associate the term Bodhisattvapitaka with the traditional six pāramitā and related practices.
4. Mahāyāna texts that refer to a specific work called Bodhisattvapitakasūtra.

Turning first to the question of its origin, there is no reference by which one could securely date the original formulation of the term Bodhisattvapitaka. It was first employed by members of the Dharmagupta and Bahuśrutiya schools who included a Bodhisattvapitaka in their Pañcapitaka. Here, the Bodhisattvapitaka is thought of as a body of literature and cited along with the Sūtra-, Vinaya-, Abhidharma- and Dhāraṇipitaka. No details have so far emerged as to the contents of their Bodhisattvapitaka. In all likelihood, these consisted of texts that formed part of the early development of the bodhisattva path as an alternative career to that of the arhat. Considering that both schools were part of the net-work of sects which belonged
to the proto-Mahāyāna movement, it is probable that the texts contained in their Bodhisattvapitaka have served as a foundation for the later developments of the bodhisattva doctrine. Unfortunately, as these texts are no longer extant we can only speculate on the role their thought may have played in the evolution of the bodhisattva ideal.

In Mahāyāna literature, the first occurrence of the term Bodhisattvapitaka is found in Lokakṣema’s second-century translation of the Kāśyapa-parivarta (Kp). Here, a text called Bodhisattvapitaka is recommended as “a scripture that the bodhisattva should study”.1 It is not clear, however, whether the expression Bodhisattvapitaka should be taken here to refer to a collection of texts or an individual work. The passage itself is highly ambiguous and does little to clarify this problem since, as Pedersen has observed, the Chinese expression p’u-sa-ts’ang-ching can be read as “sūtras of the Bodhisattvapitaka” and as “the” or “a Bodhisattvapitakasūtra”.2 Leaving aside these particular intricacies, this reference clearly shows that the term Bodhisattvapitaka was known already to the earliest Mahāyāna writers.

As I have stated above, the works that are included in the first category view the term Bodhisattvapitaka as an overall designation of Mahāyāna scriptures in general. Six texts, in particular, belong to this category.3 They are the Śrāvakabhumi, Bodhisattvabhumi (Bbh), Mahāyānasamgraha, Śūtrālankāra, Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa and a work found in the Tun-huang collection but known only through its colophon. The authorship of the first four treatises is traditionally ascribed to one person, Asaṅga.4 Hence, it is not surprising to find in them a far-reaching concurrence of interpretations of the term Bodhisattvapitaka.

In the Bbh we learn that the Bodhisattvapitaka corresponds to the vaipulya-genre of the twelve traditional branches of Buddhist scriptures.5 It is cited in the Dharma Study Chapter

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   References to the Bdp are taken from the twentieth-century reprint of the sTog Palace hKhah-hgyur, entitled: The Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur, 1979—Leh, Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemzod. All page/folio references and text specifications (length, chapters, structure etc.) that are drawn to Ratnakūṭa sūtras other than the Bdp refer (unless a Sanskrit version is available) to the Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition (ed. by DT Suzuki, Otani University, Kyoto, 1956, vol. 22–24).
2. Pedersen, 1976, p. 25
   Perhaps, this ambiguity reflects some uncertainty on part of the translator who himself might have been in doubt about the precise nature of the reference.
3. There are a number of other texts that, by implication, could be taken to fall within this category. In the Sgm (Mahāsaṃnipīṭā, 5), for instance, “not hearing and not accepting” the Bodhisattvapitaka is cited as one of the four dharma that obstruct the Mahāyāna (T 397 (5), vol. 13, p. 630; ref. Pedersen).
4. This traditional attribution is only a working hypothesis as it involves a whole range of uncertainties that have, as yet, to be resolved. For a discussion of the problematic in this assumption see: J. May, “La Philosophie Bouddhique Idéaliste”, Revue de la Société Suisse d’Etudes Asiatiques, xxv, 1971, pp. 279–301, especially, p. 293.
The Term Bodhisattvapitaka

(dharmaparyēṣaka) alongside the Śravakapitaka and non-Buddhist treatises (bāhyakāni śāstrāṇi); these include logic, medicine, grammar etc., besides arts and crafts of the world as those areas of learning that the bodhisattva should become acquainted with. The association of the Bodhisattvapitaka with the vaipulya-genre is by no means rare and is found in a number of treatises. In most of these instances it is used quite clearly as a synonym to the expression Mahāyānapitaka.

In the Śrāvakabhumi, for instance, the Paramārthagāthā opens with the following sentence:

“Among the [deliberation of the meaning of the Buddha and of the meaning of the versifications of the discourses] in the Vastuṣaṃgrahani and in the instruction of the Bodhisattvapitaka I shall set forth extensively the deliberation of the meaning of the discourses.”

Wayman remarks in a note to this passage that “it is a reasonable assumption that this method of instruction (avavāda) of this pitaka refers to the various aspects of the Yogācārabhūmi where Asaṅga has set forth the Mahāyāna, especially the bodhisattva doctrine.”

In the Bbh, Asaṅga adds: “This Bbh is also called Bodhisattvapitaka-mātrka and Mahāyānasamgraha”. Then he gives an explanation of the term ‘Mahāyānasamgraha’, stating that it bears this name because it includes the contents of “all subtle sutras that are included in the Bodhisattvapitaka”.

Elsewhere in the Bbh he enumerates eight characteristics essential for a text to be called Mahāyānasamgraha. The first three factors are that (1) the text in question must contain the instructions included in the Bodhisattvapitaka, (2) it has to reveal the real meaning of all dharma included in the Bodhisattvapitaka and (3) it reveals all the inconceivable powers of the buddhas and bodhisattvas that are in this Bodhisattvapitaka.

Asaṅga’s hitherto most explicit statement concerning the expression Bodhisattvapitaka is found in the Sūtrālaṃkāra:

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6. Akṣ-tikā, TTP, 104, p. 184.2.7; Bbh, p. 297.21
   According to the Abhidhh-sam (R), p. 139, the reason for this identification is the Bodhisattvapitaka’s exhaustive treatment of the pāramitā, particularly with regard to their characteristics, order, number and cultivation. In the same text, the adherence to the Bodhisattvapitaka figures among the principal marks of persons who subscribe to the Mahāyāna (op. cit., p. 147).
10. Msl, p. 53.16–18
   See also: Przyluski, Le Concile de Rājaagrha, 1926–8, pp. 357–9.
"Three baskets, this is Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma. If classed in terms of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, the three baskets fall into two, the Śrāvakapitaka and Bodhisattvapitaka."

On the basis of such passages it becomes clear, I think, that Asaṅga considers the term Bodhisattvapitaka synonymous with the notion of a Mahāyānapitaka, that is, the Mahāyāna literature in general.

Next, there are references to the Bodhisattvapitaka in the Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa and in a manuscript fragment found in Tun-huang. In both of them, the term Bodhisattvapitaka is cited in connection with the Avatāmsaka collection.

In the Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa, the term Bodhisattvapitaka appears in two instances. First, it is part of the overall title that runs, according to Chinese catalogues, as bodhisattvapitakān-Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa-mahāvaipulyasūtra.11 Second, it is mentioned in the formula that concludes the individual chapters. Curiously, it does not appear in all formulae but figures only in the later chapters.12

If we accept the results of Przyluski’s text-critical study that chapters one to three predate the other chapters by several centuries, we are led to conclude that in the early phase of the Mahāyāna the application of the term Bodhisattvapitaka was not particularly wide-spread. Quite evidently, in this context, it was introduced to supersede the ancient formula pāṭalavisara—a term virtually identical in meaning. Its association with the Avatāmsaka collection indicates, according to Przyluski, that the term Bodhisattvapitaka was interpreted to stand for Mahāyāna scriptures in general. Naturally, the Avatāmsaka is part of these.

In the other source that cites the Bodhisattvapitaka in connection with the Avatāmsaka, the colophon of the Tun-huang manuscript, we read: "Bodhisattvapitaka buddhāvatāmsaka Mahāyānasūtra kramena arvañā jñānakara nāma daśabhūmi nirdēsa parivarta".13 Unfortunately, this colophon is the only fragment extant of the text it names. On the basis of this

12. The formula runs as follows: bodhisattva pitaka avatamsakān Mahāyāna sūtram mañjuṣrī mūla kalpāc caturthaḥ | pratīma pāṭa vidhāna viśaraḥ prasamāpiṣṭaḥ.
In chapters one to three, the phrase runs differently: iti bodhisattva pāṭala viśaraḥ mañjuṣrī kumārabhūta mūla kalpāt triyō mandala vidhāna parivartaḥ.
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single statement, out of context, one can have no certainty as to the precise application of the term Bodhisattvapitaka.

Nancy Schuster has suggested that it might point to a Bodhisattvapitaka section in the Avatâmsaka. She argues that the title Daśabhūminirdesa presumably corresponds to the Daśabhūmika (Dbh) chapter (twenty-two or twenty-six) of the Avatâmsaka and is here to be interpreted literally as the ‘basket of bodhisattva practices’ in that collection. Her hypothesis receives support from the Bodhisattvagarbhasūtra; this lists the Bodhisattvapitaka in connection with the Dbh in sixth position of an eightfold division of Mahāyāna scriptures.

Apart from this reference, I have not been able to trace any further material in support of her thesis. It may be better to assign it a provisional value until further evidence has come to light in favour of her position, and meanwhile to take the term Bodhisattvapitaka to be a synonym for Mahāyānapiṭaka as in the case of the Maijuśrīmūlakalpa.

There is one more reference that speaks of the Bodhisattvapitaka in terms of the Mahāyānapiṭaka. It is found in a text called Nandimitravadana and proposes a kind of catalogue of a Bodhisattvapitaka. This text contains a list of thirty-seven Mahāyāna sūtras, including, among others, such works as the Prajñāpāramitā, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Buddhāvatāmsaka, Sukhāvativyuha and Vimalakīrtinardeśa. Having listed these sūtras, it says:

“Pareils sūtras du Grand Véhicule existe par centaines de myriades, distingués par groups et par catégories. En outre, il ya le recueil (piṭaka) du Vinaya du Grand Véhicule et la multitude des groupes et des espèces de recueil de l’Abhidharma. Tout celà forme l’ensemble du Recueil des Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattvapitaka).”

The second category of references to a Bodhisattvapitaka consists of a number of miscellaneous, apparently unrelated, literary documents. First, there are three works that classify Buddhist scriptures on the basis of the religious practitioners who take recourse to them. In all three, that is the Karunāpūṇḍarīka, Mahākarunāsūtra and Ajataśatruṇaukṛtyavinodana,

16. For a French translation of the Nandimitravadana, see: Lévi; Chavannes: “Relation sur la Durée de la loi, Enoncée par le grand Arhat Nandimitra” (JÀ, 8, 1916, p. 5 ff.). It is only extant in a Chinese translation entitled Ta a lo han nan t’i mi to lo so shuo fa chu chi (T 2030, 49, pp. 12–15; ref. Pedersen).
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the term Bodhisattvapitaka is contrasted with the Śrāvakapitaka and Pratyekabuddhapiṭaka.¹⁸

Second, there are five treatises that cite the term Bodhisattvapitaka in connection with the more traditional threefold classification of Buddhist scriptures. In the Satyasiddhiśāstra, it is listed as the fifth division, following the Sūtrapitaka, Vinayapitaka, Abhidharmapiṭaka and Samyuktapiṭaka.¹⁹ In the Daśabhūmikaviṃśhāśāstra, the term Bodhisattvapitaka is cited in connection with the traditional Tripitaka and a Maṭrka.²⁰ Paramārtha also places the Bodhisattvapitaka in fifth position, preceded by the Śutra, Vinaya, Abhidharma and Dhāranipitaka.²¹ In the Bodhisattvagarbhaśāstra, the Bodhisattvapitaka is referred to in combination with the Śrāvakapitaka and Vinayapitaka.²² Curiously, Hsiian-tsang who carried out the earliest translation of the Bodhisattvapitakasūtra (Rkt 12) does not mention it in his discussion of the classification of Buddhist scriptures current in Mahāsaṅghika circles.²³

Finally, there are two references which set the term Bodhisattvapitaka in the context of the twelvefold classification of Mahāyāna scriptures:

In the Abhidh-sam, the Bodhisattvapitaka is included in the Sūtrapitaka as a separate class of scriptures. On the one hand, it distinguishes those sections of the Buddhist canon which have traditionally been associated with early Buddhism, that is the Śutra, Geya, Vyākarana, Gāthā and Udāna. On the other hand, there are the Vaipulya and Adbhutadharma portions of the canon which the Abhidh-sam considers constituents of the Bodhisattvapitaka.²⁴

In the Ratnagotravibhāgaśāstra, a similar classification is employed.²⁵ Here, the Bodhisattvapitaka is contrasted with the Śutra, Geya, Vyākarana, Gāthā, Udāna and Nidāna. While these are dismissed because of their association with conventional truth (samvṛtisatya), the Bodhisattvapitaka is commended because it contains an exposition of the doctrine of absolute truth (paramārthasatya). To my knowledge, this is the only instance in which a classification

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¹⁸ Yamada, 1968, p. 211; T 380, 12, p. 971b; T 626, 15, p. 386 respectively (Taishō ref. Pedersen). In the Karunāp (pp. 14, 15–6), this threefold classification is complemented by the introduction of the Buddhapiṭaka as the fourth and highest division of Buddhist scripture. A text called Buddhapiṭaka is extant in both the Chinese Tripitaka (T 653, vol. 15) and in the Tibetan canon (TTP 35, no. 886).

¹⁹ Bareau, 1955, p. 296.

²⁰ Pedersen, op. cit., p. 33.

²¹ Bareau, 1955, p. 296.

²² Link, 1961, p. 282.

²³ He cites the traditional Tripitaka, plus a Samyuktapiṭaka and Dhāranipitaka serving as divisions of the Mahāsaṅghika classification of the Buddhist canon (Bareau, 1955, p. 296).

²⁴ Abhidh-sam (R), p. 132
This division is found only in the Sūtrapitaka since the type of texts associated with the Vinaya and Abhidharmapiṭaka, that is the Nidāna, Avadāna, Itivṛtaka, Jātaka and Upadeśa, are shared by both śrāvakas and bodhisattvas.

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involving the term *Bodhisattvapitaka* is explicitly based on doctrino-philosophical issues.\(^{26}\)

The third category of sources is significant in two respects. First, these sources are the only ones that associate the *Bodhisattvapitaka* with a well-defined set of spiritual practices. Second, they represent some of the earliest strands of Mahāyāna literature and are therefore particularly helpful in reconstructing the ‘original’ meaning of the term *Bodhisattvapitaka*.

As I have mentioned earlier, all texts of this group associate the *Bodhisattvapitaka* with the bodhisattvacarya\(^{2}\) and, in particular, with an exposition on the six traditional pāramitās. Among them the most prominent sūtras are the *Vkn, Kp, Saṃdhis, Ug* and *Prn*. Although none of these texts gives explicit information on the actual physical format of the *Bodhisattvapitaka*, the context implies that it is a title for a collection of works relating to the bodhisattva, rather than an independent treatise.

In the *Kp*, the term *Bodhisattvapitaka* is mentioned in connection with the training of a bodhisattva who is admonished to:\(^{27}\)

> “Seek out the proper Sūtra Dharma, the six pāramitās and the *Bodhisattvapitakasūtra* and all the vessels of the Buddha, [with a] heart free from anger [and] respectfully serving all the people under heaven in the ten directions, [whether] they are slave or great scholars.”

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26. There is another reference to a division of Buddhist scriptures featuring the term *Bodhisattvapitaka* that deserves our attention. It is contained in the *Kusalamulasamparigraha* where the author places “this Mahāyāna Dharmapiṭaka” side by side with “the sūtras of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka” (*T* 657, 16, p. 138a; ref. Pedersen). To all appearances, this reference is pointing to some undefined, implied distinction between Mahāyāna sūtras and texts contained in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. Unfortunately, we are left once more with limited information as to its contents and can do little more than guess about its composition and scope. Significantly, like the other references found in this source-category, it too refers to a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as an autonomous, distinct body of Buddhist scriptures.

27. I adopted Schuster’s translation (*op. cit.*, n. 491) which is based on Lokakṣema’s second-century Han translation. There exist some differences between the various Chinese translations of this passage. Also the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions exhibit differences. The two remaining Chinese translations run as follows:

Chin: “[A bodhisattva] delights in hearing the good Dharma, [and] does not delight in hearing false Dharma, delights in the six pāramitās *Bodhisattvapitaka*. He has humble thoughts without pride towards all beings” (*op. cit.*).

Ch’in: “[A bodhisattva] renounces evil Dharma [and] seeks the True Sūtra Canon, the six pāramitās *Bodhisattvadharmapitaka*, with a heart free from pride towards all beings, entirely humbled” (*Kp, p. 15*). Weller’s German translation, based on the Tibetan and Sanskrit version is: “Seitdem er sich so daran machte, die Sammlung von Werken für den bodhisattva als diejenige zu suchen, welche die sechs Vollkommenheiten enthält, sucht er die gute Überlieferung, doch die schlichte Überlieferung sucht er nicht; und daß er gegen alle Wesen ohne Überheblichkeit ist, gleich sei Gemüt dem des Hundef” (*Weller, 1962, p. 67*).
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In the *Vkn* we meet with the following definition of the term *Bodhisattvapitaka*:

"The texts which are contained in the *Bodhisattvapitaka* are profound, of profound aspects, difficult to perceive by the world, ... are marked with the seal of the kings of formulae and texts, reveal the irreversible wheel of the Dharma and originate in the six perfections. They teach the *bodhipākṣika dharma*, compassion and friendliness."

The *Samdhis* adds that the bodhisattvas "should have courage, faith in and understanding of the subtle doctrines of the true Dharma connected with the *pāramitā* of the *Bodhisattvapitaka*.”

In the *Vasudharasūtra* we are told that "this *sūtra* and other profound *sūtras* are included in the *Bodhisattvapitaka* and connected with the *pāramitā*.” In the *Prn*, a Ratnakīṭa *sūtra* that itself discusses the bodhisattva training in some detail we find the following definition of the term *Bodhisattvapitaka*:

"Further, O Pūrṇa, bodhisattvas who do not hear appropriate bodhisattva *sūtras*—which means the *sūtras* of the *Bodhisattvapitaka*, *sūtras* that generate the *bodhicitta*, *sūtras* that attract to matters of bodhisattvas, *sūtras* that are linked to the six *pāramitā*—because they do not listen to these, they do not practice as instructed; since they are not instructed correctly, they will renounce the Doctrine."  

A further reference is contained in the *Ug*. It distinguishes between those who "teach the *sūtras*, those who keep the precepts and those who adhere to the *Bodhisattvapitaka*" and admonishes those who adhere to the *Bodhisattvapitaka* to seek instruction in the *pāramitā* and skilful means (upāyakauśalya)."
At this point let us briefly review the collected evidence. The majority of sources examined so far agree to assign the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* the role of a scriptural classification of Buddhist texts. In a number of treatises, it is taken to correspond to a body of *sūtras* comprising the totality of Mahāyāna writings. In others, it is more specifically associated with the bodhisattva ideal, apparently with the aim of demarcating its teachings from those of current orthodoxy. In this context it is probably best understood as a collection of teachings preached to bodhisattvas.

We have practically no information as to the exact structure and content of that classification. The majority of texts investigated correlate the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* to issues connected with the *bodhisattvacarya*. Apart from its association with the six *pāramitā*, few details have emerged that clarify the nature of the practices included or their position in the evolution of the bodhisattva doctrine. On the basis of the rather vague nature of the evidence available, little can be said about the historical status of a collection of *sūtras* called *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. The numerous references found in almost all strands of Mahāyāna literature suggest that it must have been a widely known classification of scriptures over a fairly long period. However, since none of the references so far examined contains any information as to its structure and exact contents, we cannot exclude the possibility that the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* may have stood for the totality of scriptures that, in one way or another, deal with the bodhisattva ideal. In this event, the question of its historicity is most delicate since the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* may have existed solely as a vague concept in the minds of a few people.

As already indicated above, my forth working category refers to a number of texts that contain explicit references to a specific, individual text called *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra*. It is to these references that we shall turn next. In view of the heterogeneous nature of the sources included in this fourth category, I propose to divide the material into two subcategories:

First, there is a number of canonical and paracanonical sources that contain citations of a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. The most prominent texts of this category are the *Siksāsamuccaya* (*Sīkṣa*), *Lokadharaparipṛcchā* (*Lktdh*) and *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra* (*Bdp*) as well as three, as yet un

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*Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, who make wrongful accusations that are not in conformity with the *Sūtra*, *Vinaya* and liberation." The *Akn* mentions the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as part of an enumeration citing eighty-four ways of learning. In the middle of that list (no. 39) it differentiates between the way "...of studying the *prajñāpāramitā*, studying the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, studying the *samgrahavastu*, studying the *upāyakauśalya*" (p. 50.5.5).
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dentified, fragments found in the Tun-huang material.33

Second, there are the catalogues and compendia of the indigenous Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist traditions. Here, particular use will be made of Nanjio’s catalogue, the Mahāvyutpatti (Mvy) and, to a lesser extent, of Seng-yu’s Ch’u san tsang chi chi.34

The greatest number of references to a specific text entitled Bodhisattvapitaka is found in the Bdp. Here, the term Bodhisattvapitaka is mentioned sixty-four times. The majority of these references refer to the Bdp itself. There are, however, instances that contain ambiguity whether the reference in question points to a specific sūtra or a vaguely delineated body of texts considered above.35 Since such instances are very few indeed and often appear in a context in which it is virtually impossible to decide conclusively on their format, it seems preferable to leave them untreated, at least for a moment.

Four brief quotations will suffice to convey some idea of the way in which the Bodhisattvapitaka sees itself:

“Sitting in that seat, in order to benefit many sentient beings, the Tathāgata will explain a sūtra (mdo sde) called Bodhisattvapitaka which advances the bodhisattvacaryā and is commended as benefitting all sentient beings.”36

33. All three citations have been taken from, or are closely related to, the Bdp:
1. 705.2 (28) corresponds to R, folio 604.2–604.7
2. 705.2 (688) corresponds to R, folio 81.1, 86.1, 86.3
3. 635.32 bears close affinity in contents to chapter eleven of our sūtra. Amongst others, it discusses skill in viññāna and jñāna, skill in the bodhipāsika and skill in neyartha and nitartha sūtras and would therefore seem to correspond to extracts from R, folio 631.4–673.6. As in many cases the manuscript is almost unreadable, I have not succeeded in pinpointing all of its contents. There is a fourth reference (380.109) that cites a Bodhisattvapitaka. The content of this fragment corresponds loosely in style and topics to our sūtra, but again, positive identification has not yet been possible.

34. For an analysis of Seng-yu’s writings and his position in the Chinese Buddhist tradition, see: Link, 1957, 1960, 1961.

35. I base my conclusion, in addition to close contextual congruencies, on the following features of the Tibetan text. In the Bdp, the majority of references cite the term Bodhisattvapitaka in conjunction with demonstrative pronouns (Tib. tdi, de) which, in some cases, are reinforced by the reflexive pronoun ‘itself’ (Tib. tdi). I take this emphatic use of the demonstrative pronoun, which in Tibetan is quite optional, as an indication that the author had a particular text in mind, most probably the Bdp itself, when he refers to ‘this Bodhisattvapitaka’. Moreover, the context in which the references appear is always intimately linked to the subject matter discussed in that very passage. In addition, the term Bodhisattvapitaka is often supplemented by the syllables mdo sde whose principal meaning is, according to the compilers of the Mvy, sūtra or sūtrānta (350, 805, 1412, 1435). There are, however, instances in which the expression Bodhisattvapitaka appears to refer to a collection of texts. Furthermore, the Tibetan term mdo sde can optionally also carry the meaning ‘sūtra-class’. As I do not feel confident to resolve this contradiction positively, I wish to draw attention to the possibility that, originally, the Bodhisattvapitaka sūtra might have been comprised of various texts which, in the course of time, grew into a homogeneous whole.

"What are the riches of a bodhisattva's teacher? It is the Dharma enunciation of this Bodhisattvapiṭaka. When his teacher has recognised that the bodhisattva is speaking gently in every respect, he instructs him in the Dharma-enunciation of this Bodhisattvapiṭaka at great length. He teaches and proclaims it. He establishes him in it and analyses it. He clarifies and propounds it. A bodhisattva who abides securely in this Bodhisattvapiṭaka understands [how to] cut off poverty forever and quickly realises perfect enlightenment."37

"O Śāriputra, bodhisattvas who desire to attain swiftly their prediction (vyākaraṇa) should listen to the Dharma enunciation of this Bodhisattvapiṭaka. They should take hold of it and retain it. They should also propound it to others and teach it at great length."38

"If bodhisattvas take hold of this Bodhisattvapiṭaka and retain it, etc., they will persist in order to perpetuate the lineage of the three jewels and will never be separated from the four immeasurables. They will be training themselves vigorously in the six perfections and convert all sentient beings by means of the four means of conversion. O Śāriputra, this Dharma enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka is the path of enlightenment. And why? Because supreme and perfect enlightenment is connected to the Dharma enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka."39

The other sūtra that unmistakably refers to the expression Bodhisattvapiṭaka as an individual text is the Lkdh.40 In his study on the Karunāpūṇḍarīka, Yamada suggests that it refers to the Bdp.41 Whilst Schuster argues that there is not sufficient evidence to support such a view,42 I do not know why she asserts this; in my opinion it is beyond any doubt that we are dealing here with citations from the Bdp. The most conclusive example is found in chapter eleven of the Lkdh that discusses the bodhisattvacarīṇa and its mental concomitants. Here, the title

39. R, folio 735.4–736.3.
40. TTP, 34 p. 8.3.7–8; p. 7.46–7 and p. 32.1.3–4.
Bodhisattvapitaka is quoted in conjunction with an elevenfold enumeration of a bodhisattva’s skill. This corresponds closely to the Bodhisattvapitaka’s exposition on skill. The first six and the eleventh type concur verbatim, while the remaining five agree in contents. Moreover, the Lkdh reproduces several of the Bdp’s organisational irregularities. It cites, for instance, ‘skill in mindfulness’ when this type of skill is not mentioned in the Bdp’s introductory list on skill itself, but then is freely included in the exposition. It appears, therefore, very likely indeed that we are dealing here with a reference to our sūtra.

The above finding has an important bearing on the historical status of the Bdp. So far, the earliest reference to our sūtra that can be dated with any security has been Hsüan-tsang’s seventh-century translation. Apart from close textual affinities with the Akīn, there has been no evidence at all to confirm its existence prior to the seventh century. All this has changed since we know from Chinese sources that the Lkdh already existed by the fourth century AD. Therefore, we may now take the fourth century as the terminus ad quem for the Bodhisattvapitaka’s origin.

Next, there is a quotation in the Śiks that Śántideva (700–750 AD) attributes to a Bodhisattvapitaka. However, this quotation does not occur anywhere in the Bdp. This is not surprising, as the devotional flavour of the quotation that details ways of honouring a Tathāgata shrine is stylistically out of kilter with the pragmatic, factual tone of the Bdp.

This apparent incongruence raises another important issue. If we accept that this citation refers to one specific text (which is probable, considering its context and way of presentation),


44. R, folio 615.4–616.1; folio 649.2–662.3.

45. Apart from the list in the Lkdh which runs almost parallel, I have not found a single list which matches exactly the Bdp’s scheme of skill. Lists of skill are by no means exclusive to the Bdp. However, in general, they do not match in every respect and include several additional members. For references to several of these enumerations of skill, see: chapter four, note 654.

46. The Lkdh is extant in two Chinese translations. The first was carried out by Dharmarākṣa between 265 and 313 AD (T 481); the second by Kumārajiva between 402 and 412 AD (T 482).

47. The quotation runs as follows (Śiks, p. 311.13–312.2; trsl. Bendall, p. 278): "Again, in the holy Bodhisattvapitaka is described a way to increase merit: ‘He that cleans a shrine of the Tathāgata, he attains four purities of aspiration of perfection. And what are these four? Perfect purity of aspiration in form, in steadfast undertaking, in seeing the Tathāgata, in the multitude of lucky marks.’"

Again, in the same place it is said: "One who lays a flower on the shrines of the Tathāgatas or anoints them attains eight things without deficiency. And what are these eight? No deficiency in form, enjoyment, surroundings, virtue, tranquillity, knowledge, wisdom and aspiration."

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then there must have been at least one further sūtra known under the title of Bodhisattvapitaka. Against this it would have to be assumed that the text known as Bodhisattvapitaka has undergone considerable internal change since the early eighth century. These questions will be investigated next.

Chinese catalogues of the Buddhist canon enumerate five texts with the title Bodhisattvapitaka. Nanjio, following the Ming catalogue, lists three texts in the Mahāyāna Vinaya section which beside the Bdp have been known in the past as Bodhisattvapitaka.

1. A text called Bodhisattvapitakasūtra (T 1491, N 1103). Its Chinese translation consists of one fascicule only. This translation was carried out by Saṅghabharā during the Liang Dynasty between AD 506 and 524.

2. A sūtra that is listed currently under the title Mahāyānatirāśikṣamasūtra (T 1493, N 1090). Alternative titles cited in Nanjio are Karmāvaranapratisarana, Karamāvarana-praticchedana, and Triskandhaka. The Taishō index lists it also under the name Karmāvaranapratisrabdhisūtra. It was first rendered into Chinese by Jñāna-gupta and Dharmagupta during the Sui Dynasty ca. AD 590.

3. A text which Nanjio lists as Śāriputrakṣamasūtra (T 1492, N 1106). He adds that this sūtra is also known as Triskandhaka and that it is an earlier and shorter version of the translations cited under N 1090 and N 1103. Its Chinese translation is attributed to An Shih-kao who is said to have made it during the Eastern Han Dynasty between AD 148 and 170.

A text entitled Triskandhaka is also mentioned in the Mvy (1384) and by Bu-ston.48 In the Mvy it is found in the sūtra section of the Tibetan Tripitaka.49 A work of the same name is further cited in the Śiks and Ug.50 Here, the term Triskandhaka is mentioned primarily in a liturgical context. Schuster has suggested that, like the Bodhisattvapitaka, the expression Triskandhaka might also have had a twofold meaning, viz., that it might have referred to a particular text bearing that name and to a category of presumably brief treatises describing certain liturgical practices.51 Such a liturgical text would seem a likely candidate as the

49. Mvy 1384, TTP 950.
50. Śiks, p. 290.1–2.
source for Śāntideva’s brief citation from a Bodhisattvapitaka on stūpa worship in the Śiks. If the three translations cited in Nanjio’s catalogue (N 1090, 1103 and 1106) are approximately identical in content and have a shared interest in liturgical practices we are probably dealing here with texts that have little in common with our sūtra.

There is one more text that has been referred to in the past as Bodhisattvapitaka. It is the seventeenth work in the Ratnakūṭa collection and presently called Pūrnāparipṛcchā or Pūrṇaparivarta. Its alternative title as Bodhisattvapitakasūtra is attested in a number of sources. Bodhiruci’s translation of the Ratnakūṭa, for instance, gives Bodhisattvapitaka as its secondary title. Also Kumārajiva who rendered the Prn into Chinese between AD 402 and 409 referred to it under the title of Bodhisattvapitakasūtra. His translation is the only Chinese version that survived. Mochizuki, however, has discovered that the T’ang catalogue lists Kumārajiva’s translation as the second translation. According to the same source, the first translation (which also bears the name Bodhisattvapitaka) was made by Dharmarakṣa at the end of the third century AD. It is recorded as being a comparatively short text comprising only three fasciculi. This earlier version is no longer extant. In the Taishō, the term Bodhisattvapitakasūtra is still employed as the secondary name of the Prn.

In this sūtra the Buddha discourses on the bodhisattva path to a monk called Pūrṇamātrayānīputra. In the course of the exposition that culminates in a description of Pūrṇa’s attainment of the stage of irreversibility, the Buddha explains the generation of the thought of enlightenment, the manner in which an aspiring bodhisattva eliminates all enmity directed at him by a hostile world, and how he should cultivate the ‘faculty of hearing’. Pūrṇa’s personal quest is marred initially by his past exposure to evil influences that cause him to forget the goal of enlightenment. At a later stage, however, after he has overcome his unwholesome disposition he becomes successful in cultivating the four śīla dharma that generate in him roots of virtue, the resolve of ‘no-turning-back’ and finally the state of enlightenment.

Structurally, the exposition of Prn has many features in common with other Ratnakūṭa texts. It also makes an extensive use of tetrads as a particular means of explaining the complexities of the bodhisattva training. In the Prn, the tetrad section is extraordinarily long and covers roughly a quarter of the whole sūtra. Large parts of this section are dominated by

52. TTP, 760.18, T 310. 17.
54. See also: Bagchi, 1927, i, pp. 83, 84 who confirms this information.
55. Seng-yu, in his Ch’u san tsang chi chi, gives as its usual title Bodhisattvapitakasūtra and cites Pūrnāparipṛcchā and Mahākārunācitta as two alternative names (Shih, 1968, p. 76, no. 65).
The Term Bodhisattvapitaka

enumerative descriptions of the bodhisattva’s duties. Conceivably, it is its apparent preoccupation with providing instructions relevant to the bodhisattvacaryā that accounts for its alternative title as Bodhisattvapitakasūtra.

If we turn now to comparing the structure and content of the Prṇ with the references to a Bodhisattvapitaka that are found in the various strands of Mahāyāna literature, a number of important differences become apparent. As we have gathered from the quotations cited above, the Bodhisattvapitaka is associated with the six pāramitā, upāyakauśalya, maitrī, and with preserving and acquiring the Dharma. In the Prṇ these characteristics do not stand in the foreground. Most importantly, the Prṇ does not include a systematic exposition of the pāramitā. Naturally, they do receive some attention but are clearly not the raison d’être of its composition. Hence, it seems improbable that when the sources refer to a Bodhisattvapitaka they actually imply the Prṇ.

As already concluded above, in most cases the expression Bodhisattvapitaka served as an umbrella title for a group of texts which dealt in one way or another with the bodhisattvacaryā. Judging by the numerous references to the six perfections, the treatment of the pāramitā must have been the core of many of the sūtras that were included in that collection. We cannot exclude the possibility that the Prṇ was included among the body of such early bodhisattva sūtras. It is not probable, however, that the Prṇ can be indentified as the text such ancient sūtras as the Kp had in mind when they referred to a Bodhisattvapitaka.

Finally, there is a reference to a Bodhisattvapitaka in the Mvy.56 Here, a Bodhisattvapitaka is given as the fifth work in a list that enumerates one hundred and four Buddhist texts, between the Avatamsaka and Lalitavistara. The Avatamsaka is a composite work. Its two main recensions are divided into thirty-four and thirty-nine chapters, many of which are in fact separate sūtras that have been in circulation as independent texts. The Lalitavistara, in contrast, is a more homogeneous text that narrates the lives of Śākyamuni Buddha. Perhaps, by placing the Bdp between these two works, the authors of the Mvy intended to point to some affinity in structure or contents between the three works. They may have regarded the Bodhisattvapitaka as being composite in a similar way to the Avatamsaka. Alternatively, they may have considered the presence of jātaka-type stories in the Bdp to be a factor that links it to the Lalitavistara. It is also possible of course that the arrangement of sūtra titles bears no relation to their respective content. Yet, the sequence of their enumerations seems to indicate

56. ref. Schuster.
The Bodhisattvapitaka and the Aksayamatinirdeśa

the implementation of a premeditated design.  

57. The lists commences with the Śatasahasrikāprajñāpāramitā, Pañcavinśatisahasrikāprajñāpāramitā and Aṣṭasahasrikāprajñāpāramitā, followed by the Buddhāvatamsaka, Bodhisattvapitaka, Lalitavistara and Samādhīrāja. Considering the position assumed by these sūtras in Mahāyāna literature, the sequence might indicate an arrangement in which the texts are ranked in order of importance. The Ratnakūta is cited in the thirty-ninth position.
The Bodhisattvapitaka and the Aksayamatinirdesa

As part of the discussion of the Bodhisattvapitaka’s position in Mahāyāna literature, I shall next explore the relationship between the Bdp and Akn.58

The main body of the Akn consists of a detailed exposition of eighty inexhaustible (aksāya) faculties and attributes of a bodhisattva. Here, many of the more important practices of the bodhisattvacaryā are discussed and set into an early Mahāyāna context.59 Significantly, only the first ten of the eighty aksāya bear unmistakable marks of Mahāyāna thought. Virtually all

58. The earliest reference to the Akn is found in a Chinese catalogue of the Buddhist Canon where it is listed as an early fourth-century translation and is included as the twelfth section of the Mahāsāṃnipāta (Li tai san pao kī; 41.2a; Bagchi, i, pp. 90–91). This translation was carried out by Dharmarakṣa in AD 307. The work is still extant and catalogued as Taishō no. 397. According to Nanjio (no. 74, 77) it is in fact a co-authored translation carried out by Chi-hyen and Pao-yun soon after 427 AD. The Akn seems to have formed from the very outset a part of the Mahāsāṃnipāta collection which itself ranks among the earliest collections of Mahāyāna literature (Bagchi, i, p. 90). Bagchi lists the Mahāsāṃnipāta collection among the early Mahāyāna sūtras that were translated by Lokakṣema during the second half of the second century AD (Bagchi, i, p. 43). In the Tibetan Canon which does not know any collection entitled Mahāsāṃnipāta, the Akn has been included in the ‘sūtra section’ (TTP 34, no. 842). Judging by the remarks found in the prologue and epilogue of the Tibetan translation, it is clear that by the ninth century, at least, the Akn had become a part of the Indian Mahāsāṃnipāta collection. Wayman cites some internal evidence which suggest that the Akn was composed by the same circle of monks who composed the Satasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, Saptāśa-tikāprajñāpāramitā, Kuśalamūlaparidhāra, Buddhāpitaka and Saddhp (Wayman, 1980, pp. 212–214). The greatest number of citations from the Akn are contained in Śiks. Altogether, it refers twenty-two times to various sections of the Akn. Other citations are found in the Sūtrasamuccaya (TTP, 102, p. 85.1.2 ff); in Sthiramati’s sub-commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālakārika, that is the Sūtrālakārvṛtti-bhāṣya (TTP 109, p. 48.2.2); in Candrakirti’s Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin, 1913, p. 108.1–3) and in the Mpps (iii, pp. 1245–50, 1272, 1716). For a list of Akn quotations in Mahāyāna literature, see: Braavrig, 1989, pp. lvi–lx.

Despite the Akn’s apparent popularity with the later Mahāyāna writers it seems unlikely that it belonged to the very earliest strand of Mahāyāna sūtras. That is to say, it almost certainly postdates works such as the Asṭa and Saddhp, but may have appeared in the second wave of Mahāyāna texts alongside the Vkn or Śgs. First, its highly systematised and concise way of dealing with the various aspects of the bodhisattvacaryā, its main topic, indicates that it is not an early work. Second, there are some issues which await, as yet, clarification. In the Prajñā Chapter (p. 56.2.6), for instance, there is a reference to a Yogācārabhūmi, saying: “Wisdom is attached to all places in the Yogācārabhūmiśastra” (p. 56.2.6). The general nature of this citation does not allow us to infer that it is a reference to Asanga’s Yogācārabhūmi or to follow Wayman’s suggestion that it is the Yogācārabhūmi composed by Saṅgharāṣa. If we take it to be a reference to Asanga’s Yogācārabhūmi, then we have to discredit the various entries found in the Chinese catalogues which date the Akn’s first translation to 307 AD, since we know that the Yogācārabhūmi, in its present form, is at the earliest a late fourth-century work. On the other hand, Chinese sources do mention a partial, late second-century translation of Saṅgharāṣa’s Yogācārabhūmi. If we assume that it is this text to which our citation refers, then the possibility of the Akn belonging to an early literary phase of the Mahāyāna cannot be excluded (Demiéville, 1954, pp. 395–396).

59. As Wayman has demonstrated, it is this list of eighty aksāya that was taken as a basis in the Sūtrālakārika where the Akn is cited as authority for the twenty-two forms of generating the thought of enlightenment. Cast into twenty-two similes in the Sūtrālakārika, they correspond in number and sequence to the eighty aksāya listed in the Akn. The similes themselves, however, did not originate in the Akn, but stem from a number of sources, most notably from passages of the early Prajñāpāramitā literature. The list of the similes is, for instance, contained in three kārikā of the Abhisamayālāṃkāra (Conze, 1954, pp. 9–10).
other practices cited fall within the scope of pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism and figured, in one way or another, already in the suttas of early Buddhism.

A number of otherwise well-known Mahāyāna concepts are not included in the Aṣṇ, most notably the theory of gotra, the fivefold path as propounded in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra and the tenfold scheme of the bodhisattva’s career.60 Instead, more basic Mahāyāna concepts such as the generation of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotpāda), the cultivation of the six pāramitā and the attainment of the stage of irreversibility (avaivartikabhūmi) stand in the foreground. This preoccupation with ancient elements of Mahāyāna thought seems therefore to endorse the scriptural evidence found in Chinese catalogues that places the Aṣṇ in the early, formative period of Mahāyāna thought.

Next, we turn to comparing the issues that are central to the Aṣṇ with those found in the Bdp. In doing so, we note numerous themes which are common to both sūtras. In a number of instances, whole passages correspond word by word. Structural affinities are found also in the internal design and logical sequence in which the dialogues are construed. But the overall order of the practices differs in several respects. In the Bdp most of the concurrences are found in the Prajñā Chapter, while in the Aṣṇ they are more evenly spread out over the eighty aksaya. The reason for this lies in the differing concentration of bodhisattva practices. In the Bdp, most of the practices are allocated to chapter eleven, while in the Aṣṇ no such accumulation prevails.

Particularly striking is the frequent recurrence of long, almost identical, abhidharmic-type lists enumerating the various qualities and practices associated with the bodhisattva. Clearly, concurrences of that kind point either to the existence of some commonly accepted patterns of exposition current a the time of their composition, or to a particularly close connection between the Aṣṇ and the Bdp. Further below, I shall show at some examples that the direction of this influence must have flowed from the Bdp to the Aṣṇ and not vice versa.61

When we turn to the practices, we note that in both texts, the pāramitā are treated individually

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In the opening passage of the fourth aksaya, there is however one brief reference to ‘stages’ of the bodhisattva path. Since these are left undefined and do not seem to be part of the Aṣṇ’s overall scheme, we may be dealing here with a later interpolation, attempting to include a reference to the Dūh into the structure of the Aṣṇ (p. 41.5.3). The Aṣṇ-tīkā interprets the bodhisattva practices in the Aṣṇ in terms of the ancient scheme of the sambhāramārga, prayogamārga, darśanamārga and bhāvanāmārga. This scheme, however, is not explicitly put forward in the root text.

61. For a detailed analysis, see: Pagel. "The Aksayamatinirdesa and Bodhisattvapitaka". The Buddhist Forum. iii. forthcoming.
and are not linked to any path structure. Also, the material that is employed under the respective headings of the six perfections corresponds in many points. In the *Kṣānti* Chapter, a practically identical exposition on the nature of ‘highest patience’ is found. In their *Dhyāna* Chapters both texts cite a largely concurring list of about one hundred *samādhi*. In their *Vīrya* Chapters, both *sūtras* underline the importance that mental exertion assumes in the bodhisattva’s training and provide an identical way of explication. However, similarities in contents go well beyond the *pāramitā* chapters. They are found in about eighty percent of practices which occur in both works. Outstanding examples are provided by the discussions of *punya* and *jñānasamābhāra*, the treatment of *samatha*, *vipaśyāna*, *bodhyānāgā* and *āryāśṭāṅgamārga*. In fact, the *Akn* and *Bdp* are often so close that I found it possible at several occasions to draw on the *Akn-tīkā* to clarify obscure passages in the *Bdp*.

The first person to point to the textual parallels between the *Akn* and *Bdp* was Alex Wayman in an article published in 1980. Noting their association only in passing, he acknowledged their common ground on many topics and correlated a few of their sentences. Taking his article as a point of departure, I investigated the other areas in which the parallels occurred. Leaving aside a handful of uncertain cases, we can distinguish three categories of textual parallelism. First, there is a group of concurring enumerations. Second, there is a large body of formulaic sections of text, so common in *suttas* of early Buddhism. Third, there are several independent, non-formulaic passages that are shared by both works.

Of the three areas of parallelism, it is easiest to account for are the concurrences that appear in lists. Altogether, I encountered far-reaching agreement in six enumerations. These include a list of types of skill, an enumeration of thirty-two pairs of mental vigour (*cittavīrya*), the *samādhi* list of the *Dhyāna* Chapter and a catalogue of forms of learning. In theory, owing to

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62. *Bdp*, p. 46.4.2–47.1.2; *Akn*, p. 45.3.3–4.8
   In order to lend accuracy to the comparison between the relevant sections of the *Akn* and *Bdp*, I adopt for this section of my work the readings in the *Peking Tripitaka Edition* (Suzuki, Tokyo–1956).

63. *Bdp*, p. 55.3.6–5.3; *Akn*, p. 48.1.5.

64. Wayman has drawn our attention to some, in his opinion, significant philosophical shifts in emphasis between the *Akn* and the *Bdp*. However, on close examination of the respective passages in both *sūtras* and the *Akn-tīkā*, these discrepancies seem to be of a rather minor nature. For details, see: Pagel, 1991, pp. 8–12.


66. In the *Bdp*, these include ‘skill’ in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *satya*, *pratisamvid*, *pratisarana*, *vijñāna* and *jñāna*, *bodhipākṣika dharma*, *pratityasamutpada* and *mārga*, (pp. 77.2.3–87.5.6). In the *Akn*, the list runs as follows: ‘skill’ in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *satya*, *trikāla*, *yāna*, *pratityasamutpada* and *sarvadharma* (pp. 52.2.8–56.1.6). The five topics that do not appear in this context in the *Akn* are ‘skill’ in *pratisamvid*, *vijñāna* and *jñāna*, *bodhipākṣika* and ‘skill’ in the path. They are given elsewhere an independent treatment (pp. 62.2.7–63.48; p. 64.2.4–3.5; pp. 66.4.3–70.4.3 and pp. 70.4.4–71.2.1 respectively).
the tendency in oral traditions to adopt wholesale listings of any type for mnemonic purposes, it is possible that this concurrence is ascribable to a third source and not to direct borrowing between the Akn and Bdp. In spite of intensive research in this area, I have not been able to trace any enumeration from which they might have stemmed.\(^{67}\)

The second category comprises a number of parallel passages that are largely composed of set expressions, turns of phrase and formulae. They prevail, above all, in the exposition of the bodhipākṣika dharma, in skill in aggregates, elements and sensefields and in the section on the unique knowledge. While it was an easy task to identify them, it is virtually impossible to determine the texts from which their particular set phrases were originally taken. Being well acquainted with Buddhist sūtras, the authors of the Akn and Bdp probably recited them from memory without having in mind any specific work as point of reference. However, a number of interpolations of non-standardised text elements such as connecting phrases in the Akn shows beyond doubt that it was the Akn which drew on the Bdp.\(^{68}\)

Finally, the Akn and Bdp share a considerable number of non-formulaic text portions that are kindred in spirit and almost identical in phrasing and hence appear to be unique to the two sūtras. As will become clear further on, it is precisely this uniqueness that indicates the Akn’s indebtedness to the Bdp. The most interesting examples of this category are found in the sections dealing with ‘skill’ in satya, ‘skill’ in dharma and ‘skill’ in pratisarana.

Amongst the six concurring enumerations, the most interesting example is the list detailing the bodhisattva’s forms of learning. Wayman, noticing their agreement but not providing any reasons, saw in the list of the Bdp a kind of prototype for that of the Akn. While, in principle, I agree with his judgment, I wish to add precision to his observations and to corroborate them with additional findings. For one thing, Wayman thought that we are dealing with two, essentially identical lists. This is not the case. The first obvious variation is the difference in

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\(^{68}\) Pagel, op. cit., pp. 5–8.
the length of the lists. The Akn's enumeration gives eighty-four forms of learning, whereas the Bdp knows of only seventy-two.\textsuperscript{69} Furthermore, the Bdp contains thirteen items that are not found in the list of the Akn, raising the number of variant items to twenty-five—roughly a third of the sum total. This substitution of individual items suggests that one of the lists was carefully edited. The greater length of the Akn's list alone indicates posterity, because it is doubtful whether the Bdp would deliberately reduce its scope. On the contrary, if one's experience with other texts is anything to go by, material is usually added in the process of transmission rather than being taken away.

The majority of discrepancies that exist between the two lists are found in the second half of the enumeration. Up to \textit{ākāra} thirty-three, most items concur closely in both sequence and contents. After that, apart from two codified sets of practice (no. 49–52, 53–55), the items are generally ill-matched and display few parallels. Thus far, I have not managed to identify a rationale behind this process of restructuring. Apart from some well-known standardised groupings\textsuperscript{70}, no scheme springs to mind when comparing the organisations of the two lists.\textsuperscript{71}

Since both enumerations contain a remarkable comprehensive catalogue of practices, it is tempting to conjecture that their purpose was to gather all known bodhisattva practices in a single \textit{Abhidharma}-type \textit{mātrkā} list. Their placement before the main thrust of the bodhisattva practice adds weight to this theory.

In the other enumerations the situation is much clearer, since a close accord in number as well as contents is shown. This agreement makes it of course more difficult to determine the direction in which the borrowing took place. In these enumerations, the only clue is the presence of numbering schemes in the Akn that are not found in the Bdp. While the inclusion of these schemes, taken on its own, is not sufficient to substantiate the view that the lists of

\textsuperscript{69} It is worth noting here that also \textit{Śaṇṭideva}'s quotation in the Śiks of the Akn enumeration is at variance with the original. I suspect that these divergencies are not the result of a consciously undertaken selection but occurred inadvertently, since the number of items is very close (80) and does not show any new \textit{ākāra} (see: Appendix i).

\textsuperscript{70} E.g., \textit{Bdp} item no. 49–52: four hallmarks of Buddhism (\textit{bkah rtags kyi phyag rgya bzi}); item no. 53–55: three gateways to liberation (\textit{tiri vimoksamukhānī}); item no. 76–77: reliances (\textit{pratisarāna}); item no. 63–64: \textit{bodhipāksīka dharmā}; no. 65–71: buddha-powers (\textit{buddhabala}) etc.

\textsuperscript{71} As far as the individual items are concerned, one meets with a few inconsistencies that stand out at once. First, there is the item called "study of the \textit{Bodhisattvapitaka}" (no. 39, 35). Its position in the list, next to \textit{prajhdpāramitā}, \textit{samgrahavastu} and \textit{upāyakausalya}, suggests that it was conceived of as a (set of) practice and not as single text (or body of scriptures) as it is interpreted elsewhere. Second, one notes the discrepancy that exists between the title \textit{brahmavihāra} given to item 42/38 in the list and its designation in the text itself where these four practices are invariably referred to as the four \textit{apramāṇa}. While it is true that one cannot speak of a standard title for this set of practices, the incongruence in their titles might indicate that the list of learning was implanted in the texts in a prefabricated form and does not stand in any 'organic' relation to the exposition itself.
the Akn were taken from the Bdp, a number of unambiguous editorial modifications suggests this.

The most telling examples of this kind are found in the section which details the bodhisattva’s accumulation of merit (punya) and pristine cognition (jñāna). In the Bdp we meet here with the statement that bodhisattvas of pure resolve “appear in all worlds”. In the Akn this sentence has been altered to say that purity of resolve endows bodhisattvas with “power over all worlds”.

Now, it takes little acumen to see that this variation sprang from a shift in perception of the ‘model bodhisattva’. In all likelihood, it dates back to the period in which the early characterisation of the bodhisattva as a human being was superseded by a more transcendental concept of bodhisattvahood. Unfortunately, we have little information to indicate when this shift took place. If one follows Harrison’s findings—based on the earliest Chinese translations of Mahāyāna sūtras—it did not occur before the third century AD.73 Other scholars, basing their propositions either on iconographic evidence74 or by correlating the final stages of the dasabhūmika path with the emergence of mythical bodhisattvas75, have suggested the second century AD.76 Today, this view has been seriously challenged by Schopen in his masterly (re)interpretation of the various rock and pillar inscriptions. He shows that in epigraphical sources ‘mythical’ bodhisattvas are not attested before the 4th to 5th centuries AD.77 Thus, without entering the intricacies of the controversy (which, in any event, is based on rather slim documentation), there is enough reason to place the emergence of mythical bodhisattvas in a rather later period than commonly assumed.78 In principle, this dating fits in with the chronological order that I proposed for the Akn and Bdp.

Another variant reading that seemingly corroborates my theory is given in a tetrad enumerating the means that aid the bodhisattva to increase his accumulation of knowledge (jñānasambhāra). In the Bdp, we learn in this connection of the following four paths. 1. The path of the

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72. Bdp, p. 81.4.2; Akn, p. 65.3.7.
73. Paul Harrison. JIABS, 10, pp. 67–89.
75. See E. Conze. A Short History of Buddhism. 1982, p. 49.
76. Gregory Schopen’s findings about the Kusāna image of Amitābha has made this early date—by implication—unlikely (Schopen, 1987, pp. 111–125).
77. Schopen, op. cit., p. 119.
78. Epigraphic evidence and iconographic representations point to a considerable discrepancy between the literary forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism (dating back to the beginnings of our era) and their public manifestations. There was virtually no popular support for the Mahāyāna before the 4th/5th century AD that is documented in the various inscriptions, and even then it is chiefly of monastic origin and not by lay-supporters (Schopen, op. cit., p. 124; Schopen, 1985 pp. 9–47; Schopen, 1979, pp. 1–19).
The Bodhisattvapitaka and the Aksayamatinirdesa; 2. The path of the bodhipāksika dharma; 3. The noble eightfold path; 4. The path that leads to the pristine cognition of all knowing.\textsuperscript{79}

While this list is not particularly remarkable in itself, the \textit{Akn} reading of this tetrad contains one interesting deviation. It replaces the third limb, the ‘noble eightfold path’, with the ‘path of the stages’.\textsuperscript{80} Since the other three paths correspond to those of the \textit{Bdp}, preference to the scheme of stages indicates tangible doctrinal progress. It is plausible that the author of the \textit{Akn} felt compelled to account for this progress and consequently adjusted the \textit{Bdp} reading accordingly.\textsuperscript{81}

Another interesting, though somewhat more ambiguous, variant reading is found in the discussions of “reliance on the spirit and not on the letter” (arthapratisaraṇena bhavitavyah na vyañjanapratisaraṇena). While, in the \textit{Bdp}, we learn that the letter instructs the bodhisattva “not to abandon any sentient being”, the \textit{Akn} says that the letter teaches bodhisattvas “to renounce all possessions”.\textsuperscript{82} The \textit{Bdp}’s reading of this phrase is a reference to the bodhisattva’s moral obligation to pursue actively universal liberation. Historically, it probably stemmed from the thought contained in several early Mahāyāna scriptures that gives prominence to the ideal of the grhapti bodhisattva over that of the pravrajita bodhisattva. Texts such as the \textit{Vkn} and (the early versions of the) \textit{Ug} provide illustration of this literary strand. In contrast, the reading of the \textit{Akn}, advocating total renunciation of worldly possessions, belongs to a later period. Its message is strongly reminiscent of the later trend that replaces the lay-ideal with that of the pravrajita bodhisattva as ‘model bodhisattva’. The dating of Chinese translations of Mahāyāna texts suggests that this reorientation to the mendicant model of early Buddhism was well advanced by the fourth century AD. Again, this would accord with the proposed chronology of the \textit{Akn} and \textit{Bdp}.

There exists, however, a second possibility of interpretation. Mahāyāna sūtras of all ages agree in propounding generosity (dāna) as the cardinal virtue of the lay-bodhisattva. Generosity epitomises his obligations and efforts, and is the principal means by which the grhapti

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Bdp}, p. 82.3.1. \\
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Akn}, p. 66.3.4. \\
\textsuperscript{81} Since their expositions of the bodhisattva’s training, both in emphasis of practice and structure, have many elements in common, the time gap between the two works cannot have been very great. Both sūtras, for instance, do not employ the tenfold path structure although they must have been aware of it, since it is briefly referred to in several places. Had they originated wide apart, one could expect to meet with traces testifying differences in doctrinal views of the period that separated their formulation. But for three sets of new practices and some minor shifts in emphasis this does not seem to be the case. \\
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Bdp}, p. 79.5.7; \textit{Akn}, p. 63.5.6.
bodhisattva becomes cleansed from the three root defilements. Indeed, pure giving is often set forth on its own as a model for the grhapti bodhisattva's middle way which fares between affection and aversion—the two extremes against which he battles every day. Hence, the Akn's admonition could also be understood as referring to the grhapti bodhisattva's obligation to practice generosity at all times with the aim of universal liberation. In this event, the Akn and Bdp would subscribe to the very same ideal. However, the Akn's plea for a very severe form of generosity—which in its radicalism is fundamentally incongruous with the well-balanced middle way that is trodden by lay-bodhisattvas—renders this line of interpretation possibly less convincing.
The Scholastic Affiliation of the Bodhisattvāpiṭaka

At this stage I wish to offer some thoughts about possible scholastic affiliations of the *Bdp*. The first translation into Chinese of the *Bdp* was carried out by Hsiian-tsang in AD 645. He is reported to have undertaken it immediately on his return to China. The initial phase of his translation activity is recorded as follows:83

“On the first day of the seventh month [of the year of his return in China], the master started to translate the palm-leaf Sanskrit scriptures. At the beginning he translated the *Bodhisattvāpiṭaka-sūtra*, *Buddhabhumisūtra*, *Sanmukhadhāranisūtra* and *Prakaraṇāravacāsāstra*. He completed the translation of the *Sanmukhadhāranisūtra* on that same day and finished the translation of the *Buddhabhumisūtra* on the fifteenth day while the *Bodhisattvāpiṭaka-sūtra* and the *Prakaraṇāravacāsāstra* were done by the end of the year.”

The translation of the *Bdp* won Hsüan-tsang great praise from the emperor T'ang T'ai-tsung. In the same source we read:84

“The emperor also read the *Bodhisattvāpiṭaka-sūtra* which the master had submitted to him, and he highly praised it and ordered the crown prince to write an epilogue for this *sūtra*.”

The passage concludes by relating how Hsüan-tsang’s translation of the *Bdp* had even helped to bring about a change in the emperor’s disposition towards Buddhism which, so far, had been marked by indifference.85

It is well known that Hsüan-tsang’s motivation for travelling to India was to acquire a copy of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. He managed to obtain this text and subsequently translated it between AD 646 and 648 together with the *Mahāyānābhidharmasanyuktasaṅgīti*, *Mahāyānasamgraha*.

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84. op. cit., p. 225.
85. op. cit., pp. 224, 225.
Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya and Pratītyasamutpādaśūtra. Other texts, translated at a slightly later date, included the Sanmukhadhāraṇī, Prakaranaśrayavaca and Buddhabhūmisūtra.

If we consider the authorship and doctrinal affiliation of the texts that Hsüan-tsong had chosen to translate first along with the Yogācārabhūmi, we find that most of these texts are closely associated with Yogācāra thought. The Prakaranaśrayavaca and the Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya are attributed to Vasubandhu and so is a commentary on the Sanmukhadhāraṇī. Furthermore, Bu-ston knows of a commentary on the Pratītyasamutpādaśūtra which he ascribes to Vasubandhu. Obermiller pointed to a doctrinal affiliation between the Buddhabhūmisūtra and certain currents within the Yogācāra school. The Mahāyānābhidharmasamayuktasaṅgīti is attributed to Asaṅga while Āsvabhāsa is generally accredited with the composition of the Mahāyānasūtra-laṁkāra.

In the light of his preoccupation with Yogācāra literature, it seems natural to raise the question about the reasons lying behind Hsüan-tsong’s choice to translate first the Bdp. Does the Bdp form a part of the Yogācāra literary tradition? Did Hsüan-tsong know of some evidence that links our sūtra doctrinally or historically with the Yogācāra school? If so, he apparently regarded it as rather unimportant, since he does not mention it in any of his writings. Neither his Si-yu-ki nor his various biographies seem to contain such a reference.

As I shall discuss further below, Sthiramati is reported to have shown much interest in some of the Ratnakūta works. Tibetan historians accredited him with the composition of the Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā, the only surviving commentary of that text. The same sources attribute to Vasubandhu two other commentaries on Ratnakūta texts, namely, the Āmitābhavyāhaṭīkā

86. Obermiller, 1931–32, i, p. 146.
87. op. cit., i, p. 57.
89. Warder (1980, p. 553) gives the title of this commentary as Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana (TTP 1598).
90. Schuster (op. cit., p. 55, n. 123) believes that his motive was of a more mundane nature. She proposes that he wanted to have the Bdp available as propaganda fide. Knowing in advance that he would be given an opportunity to report about his extensive travels in foreign countries, he may have chosen to prepare an easily intelligible text of imposing dimensions which was previously unknown in China in order to impress the emperor. She argues that Hsüan-tsong must have been well aware that any of the other, more philosophically oriented, texts would have achieved just the contrary. One wonders, however, why he had chosen a text of such an extraordinary length. He must have suspected that the interest and patience of the indifferent and increasingly ailing emperor would hardly suffice to absorb a text of such length. Other equally imposing but much shorter texts must have been amongst the over six hundred works that he acquired on his travels. Furthermore, it seems improbable that Hsüan-tsong resolved to translate a lengthy text of little interest to himself for mere propaganda purposes at a time when a large number of works of high personal interest were awaiting examination. The prospect of an audience with the emperor may have influenced the sequence in which he decided to translate the Indian manuscripts, but it seems unlikely to have determined the nature of the texts themselves.
91. TTP 1523.
Scholastic Affiliation

(T 1524) and the Ratnacūḍabhāṣya (T 1526). Paramārtha knows of yet another Ratnakūṭa commentary whose authorship he ascribes to Vasubandhu, this is, a commentary on the Śrīmālādeviśiṃhanāda.\textsuperscript{92}

Hsüan-tsang himself is known to have been a strong advocate of Yogācāra thought. Shortly after his return to China, he founded the Fa-hsiang school whose basic tenets are derived from the Yogācārabhūmi and other related works. Considering his personal interest in Yogācāra Buddhism, it seems plausible that he should choose to translate first those works which bore closest affinity to Yogācāra doctrines. Such a view is further supported when we recall the two instances where the term Bodhisattvapiṭaka appears in conjunction with the title Avatamsaka, a collection of texts that is traditionally associated with the Yogācāra school. Moreover, if we accept the hypothesis that the list of sūtras found in the Mvy is based on some premeditated scheme, the listing of the Bdp next to the Avatamsaka could be interpreted to reflect some connection between our sūtra and Yogācāra thinking.

In the absence of any conclusive evidence, it is helpful to turn once more to the Akn, or rather, to its commentary, the Akn-ṭīkā. On reading the Akn-ṭīkā, one discovers soon that it interprets the Akn from a Yogācāra standpoint. One meets repeatedly with concepts such as ālayavijnāna, cittamātrata, prajñaptimātrata, trivabhāva and āśrayaparāvṛtti even though these concepts are not found in the sūtra itself.\textsuperscript{93} The author of the Akn-ṭīkā, whether it was Sthiramati or Vasubandhu (an issue that is not as yet resolved), regarded the Akn clearly as a work belonging to Yogācāra thought. In view of the close affiliation of the Bdp and Akn, this assumption warrants some consideration when discussing the scholastic affiliation of the Bdp. Furthermore, in chapter one of the Bdp we find recurring references to the term abhūtaparikalpa.\textsuperscript{94} The concept of abhūtaparikalpa is closely associated with Yogācāra thought and figures predominantly in works attributed to the advocates of its philosophy.

Finally, I propose to return to the history of the Bdp and its position in the formation of the Mahāyāna. It has been argued by several scholars that the Akn belongs to the earliest strands of Mahāyāna literature.\textsuperscript{95} The arguments cited most frequently in support of this view, are

\textsuperscript{92} The authenticity of this reference is disputed. Wayman thinks that it is apocryphal, saying that it applies to comments in the Buddhagotraśāstra which is attributed in Paramārtha’s Chinese translation of the Buddhagotraśāstra to Vasubandhu (Wayman, 1974, p. 7).

\textsuperscript{93} In conjunction with ‘skill’ in the aggregates, we read for instance (p. 194.2.6 ff): “The unwholesome aggregates are overcome by the change of basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) in the store-consciousness (ālayavijnāna) at the time of reaching enlightenment.”

\textsuperscript{94} R, folio 36.1, 43.7, 44.1 ff.

\textsuperscript{95} Wayman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 232.
based first on the contents of the Akn, second on its association with the Vkn\textsuperscript{96} (itself a very early text) and third, on its inclusion in the Li tai san pao chi catalogue\textsuperscript{97}, as having been translated by Lokakṣema in the second century AD.\textsuperscript{98} As I do not wish to repeat the argument in detail it should suffice to point out that so far no author has been able to bring forth any compelling evidence in support of the antiquity of the Akn other than circumstantial testimony. However, since the inferential grounds put forward are persuasive, I think it justifiable to accept the Akn's comparatively early date of composition—perhaps in the first or second century AD—as a working hypothesis.

Considering the nature of our findings about the relationship between the Akn and Bdp, such an early date for the Akn affects, of course, the dating of the Bdp; until now this has generally been held to be a rather late work.\textsuperscript{99} To some extent this was due to the late date of the Bdp's first Chinese translation, undertaken not before the middle of the seventh century AD.\textsuperscript{100} Other factors that were cited in support of this theory range from its alleged systematisation and use of comprehensive enumerations, including the presence of supposedly "fully matured Mahāyāna thinking” in its exposition.\textsuperscript{101} Although my reading of the Bdp has left me with a different impression, it is quite unnecessary to subscribe to a discussion of such difficult and subjective terms as 'maturity', 'comprehensiveness' or 'systematisation', since our analysis has provided us now with much more powerful evidence. If we accept the antiquity of the Akn, the terminus ad quem for the Bdp is pushed back from 645 AD (the date of Hsüan-tsang’s translation) and 265–313 AD (the dating of the Lkdh’s first translation) to the final quarter of the second century AD, the time when the Akn is reported to have been translated into Chinese.

Such early date of the Bdp would in many ways accord much better with the rather ill-organised, inconsistent internal structure of the Bdp and account for the rudimentary depiction that it gives of the bodhisattva career. In particular, it would validate my mātrka-theory for the list of seventy-two kinds of learning that I proposed in my paper on the Akn and Bdp.

\textsuperscript{96} Lamotte, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. lxxxvii; pp. 105, 197, 284.
\textsuperscript{97} Bagchi, 1927, pp. 43, 91.
\textsuperscript{98} Alex Wayman (\textit{op. cit.}, pp. 211–214) has further enlisted the rather uncommon use of the name Šāradvatiputra for the usual Šāriputra in support of the antiquity of the Akn.
\textsuperscript{99} E.g., Schuster, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 48, 51.
\textsuperscript{100} This argument is rather weak, since we know of several other early and important Buddhist works that came only relatively late to the attention of the Chinese translation teams. The Āgama and Vinaya, for instance, were all translated at a very late date (Demiéville, \textit{L'Inde Classique}, ii, pp. 418–419).
\textsuperscript{101} Schuster \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 48–51.
Undoubtedly, enumerations of this kind were particularly susceptible to change and expansion immediately after their compilation when the ideas they epitomised were still fluctuating. This last point applies to the Bdp’s exposition as a whole. That is to say, the author of the Akn would surely have shown greater restraint in modifying the wording of the Bdp had he seen it to embody an advanced account of the bodhisattva doctrine. It is tempting to deduce—if only by implication—that the Bdp stood more at the beginning of this evolution. Assuming that the length of the Bdp as it is preserved today reflects its original size, its exposition of the bodhisattva must have served as the foundation to many of the later bodhisattva treatises. I shall demonstrate in chapter four when exploring the practices and doctrines that this assumption is indeed borne out by the Bdp’s vision of the bodhisattva-ideal.

What is more, an early date of composition would also provide answers to a series of questions that, so far, have been resolved in an unsatisfactorily manner. It would account, for instance, for the references to a Bdp that are found in the Kp, Ug and Vkn—themselves amongst the earliest Mahāyāna texts. The physical format of the Bodhisattvapitaka they refer to is uncertain, but the fact that they associate it with the pāramitā, maitrī and bodhipāksika dharma—all themes that are discussed at great length in the Bdp—possibly indicates a references to some early, composite version of the Bdp. We do not know what exactly happened to the individual component parts, but it is conceivable that at a later stage these were incorporated into the structures of the present Bdp. As I shall show, its organisation of content and chapter divisions would certainly allow for this possibility. It would also explain Hsüan-tsang’s selecting the Bdp out of over six hundred texts for immediate translation. He was no doubt aware of its importance to the formulation of the bodhisattva ideal and so decided not only to record the place when he obtained it, but also to give it priority over all other texts in his translation work.
The Mahāratnakūṭa Collection

The Mahāratnakūṭa (hereafter Ratnakūṭa) collection comprises forty-nine sūtras of varying doctrinal orientation and literary affiliation. As a collection of Buddhist texts it is considered to be one of the most popular and important Mahāyāna works, along with the Buddhāvatamsaka and Prajñāpāramitā sūtras. As for the date of its compilation there is a certain disagreement among modern scholars of Buddhism. The antiquity of many of the texts it contains, however, has been established beyond any doubt. The collection as it stands today has been preserved in Chinese and Tibetan translations with only a few texts extant in the original Hybrid Sanskrit and Middle Indo-Āryan Prakrit idiom.

The sūtras included in the Ratnakūṭa cover a wide range of Buddhist thought. Most of its forty-nine texts share a common interest in the bodhisattva path. Indeed, it is arguable that this shared concern with the proper execution of the bodhisattva practices occasioned their inclusion into one collection. Although a certain thematic unity is provided by the incorporation of almost all basic Mahāyāna concepts, a tone of heterogeneity prevails. It is this very heterogeneous nature that may reveal the compiler’s intention of presenting a cross-section of Mahāyāna thought. One is left with the impression of a deliberately arranged overview of Mahāyāna doctrines.

By the time of its initial compilation the principal Mahāyāna tenets were evidently well-established in most of the Buddhist communities of northern India. Yet, some of the (earlier) Ratnakūṭa texts seem to derive their religio-philosophical message from what might be called the phase of transition between the early strata of Buddhist thought (fundamentally based on the teachings of the historical Buddha) and those introduced in later centuries. In many instances these early teachings are skilfully incorporated into the Mahāyāna frame of reference, thereby producing sūtras of great literary beauty.

The path and ideal of the bodhisattva are central to many of the works included in this collection. Some sūtras are wholly dedicated to the new ideal and provide detailed instructions on the pattern by which an aspiring bodhisattva should pursue his spiritual training. Other
texts integrate the teachings on the bodhisattva in an otherwise more philosophical exposition.

The lay and mendicant ideal are treated in a rather partisan fashion in a number of sūtras. In many instances, the respective positions are put forward with great conviction. But judging by my own reading, both ideals are advocated with equal strength. On the one hand, some texts as our Bdp unequivocally propose a monastic, celibate environment as the only appropriate framework for the bodhisattvacarya. On the other hand, there are numerous sūtras that place the bodhisattva ideal firmly within the reach of non-celibate layfolk.\footnote{Among the texts that belong to this second category figure most prominently the Šms (Rkt 49), Ug (Rkt 19), Aśokadattāvyākarana (Rkt 32) and Gangottaraparipṛcchā (Rkt 31).}

The topical references to the bodhisattva path prompted several scholars to conclude with Friedrich Weller that “the ethics of the bodhisattva career is just what all the forty-nine texts of the Ratnakūṭa sūtra have in common”\footnote{Weller, 1965, p. 19.} or with Schuster, “that it is this (common element), above all, which binds them together and gives them a recognisable identity”\footnote{Schuster, op. cit., p. 36.}

In India, the title ‘Ratnakūṭa’ was initially associated with the Kp, a text that at present is included as Rkt 43.\footnote{Chinese catalogues list another text that includes the title Ratnakūṭa in its name. It is called Ratnakūṭasūtra and was first translated into Chinese during the Eastern Han Dynasty in the second century AD. In the Taishō Tripitaka it is listed under the name of Buddhaśīta-ratnakūṭasamādhi-mahājusṛi-bodhisattva-paripṛcchā-dharmakāyāstūra (T 356). It was retranslated at the beginning of the seventh century bearing the title Ratnakūṭasūtra. Although it is not included among the forty-nine Ratnakūṭa works proper, it is nevertheless contained in the group of texts that the authors of the Taishō apparently considered to be related to the Ratnakūṭa (Lancaster, 1979, pp. 93–94).} The question arises concerning the grounds and the circumstances by which this title came to be applied to the entire collection. Sthiramati, the author of one of the major commentaries on Ratnakūṭa works\footnote{He is accredited with the composition of a work that, in the Chinese translations, bears the name Mahāratnakūṭasūtra-sāstra (Stael-Holstein, 1926, p. xv). The Tibetan tradition refers to it as Aṛya-mahāratnakūṭa-dharmaparyāya-parivarta-śatasāhasrikā-kāṣyapaparivarta-tīkā (Schieffner, 1868, p. 131). Stael-Holstein has convincingly shown that this commentary refers only to Rkt 43 and not to the whole collection (op. cit., pp. xiv–xv).} who is cited by both Bu-ston and Tāranātha offers the following explanation: “The title Ratnakūṭa was bestowed on the sūtra because this Dharmaśīla comprehends all the jewels of the Mahāyāna”. Then, Sthiramati lists sixteen Mahāyāna ‘jewels’ or virtues, for example, right conduct, and points to their presence in the Kp, calling it Ratnakūṭa.\footnote{Stael-Holstein, op. cit., pp. 2–7.} The Kp, as the majority of other Ratnakūṭa texts, sets these virtues in the context of the bodhisattvacarya and so intrinsically relates them to the bodhisattva training. Similar lists are found in the Bdp, Ug, Rp and Bhadra-vy to mention only a few of the more well-known Ratnakūṭa works. In many instances, these lists are structured in such a
way as to form groups of tetrads. Just as in other, predominantly early, Buddhist writings these tetrads served as mnemonic devices to facilitate the memorisation and recitation of complex texts. In the Ratnakūta the frequency of their recurrence and their typical association with the bodhisattvacaryā suggests that they became also guidelines for a wide range of practical training aspects. It is therefore likely that, as Schuster says, “the name Ratnakūta originally referred to the teaching of the bodhisattva conduct, epitomised in series of tetrads … for the edification of all those dedicated to the bodhisattva career”\textsuperscript{109}.

In order to convey some general idea of the principal doctrinal issues involved in the Ratnakūta texts, I have drawn up a tabulated list of the most salient points discussed in the collection.\textsuperscript{110} This survey is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the forty-nine texts included, but aims to show the major interests and themes that are common to many Ratnakūta sūtras.

Topics included in the content of the Ratnakūta literature:

1. Texts that discuss predominantly the nature, training and dangers associated with the lay-bodhisattva path: \textit{Rkt} 16, 18, 19, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38, 45, 47, 48.

2. \textit{Sūtras} that propound the monastic environment as the preferable setting for a bodhisattva’s training: \textit{Rkt} 1, 12, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 43, 44, 45, 49.

3. \textit{Sūtras} that focus in their discussion of the bodhisattva’s training on the distinction between ordinary or worldly and transcendental morality: \textit{Rkt} 3, 18, 19, 38, 41, 45, 47, 49.

4. Discourses containing \textit{jātaka}-type accounts and similar tales: \textit{Rkt} 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 37, 44.

5. Texts that include into their elaborations miraculous and magical elements such as charms or wonders: \textit{Rkt} 3, 18, 21, 38, 43.

\textsuperscript{109} Schuster, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{110} I am indebted to Nancy Schuster for suggestion of this type of tabulation.
6. Texts that elaborate on mythological buddha-fields and their buddhas: Rkt 1, 2, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 18, 47.

7. Sūtras that deal with caitya rituals, veneration of all buddhas or with vision of all buddhas: Rkt 1, 12, 15, 18, 19, 24, 25, 38, 43, 44.

8. Sūtras propounding the ideal of the female bodhisattva: Rkt 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, 48,

In addition, there are several sūtras that merit special attention because they contain important doctrinal discussions:

1. Trisamvaranirdeśaparivarta: on the affliction of clinging to the belief in the reality of the self.

3. Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa: on self-sacrifice and the impermanence of the body.

5. Sukhāvatīvyūha: on the resolves of the bodhisattva Dharmākara and the formation of his buddha-field.

6. Akṣobhyatathāgatasavyūha: on Akṣobhya’s buddha-field, (mental) dispositions required for rebirth there, on stūpa cult and on self-annihilation by one’s own fire-element.


13. (Ā)nandagarbhāvakrāntinirdeśa:
The Mahārājānākīta

14. Āyuṣmānndagarbhāvākṛtānirdeśa:

on rebirth, pregnancy and the notion of garbhā.

16. Pitāputrasamāgama:

on the virtues of meditation, the impermanence of the elements and the ‘empty’ nature of dharma.

17. Purṇaparipṛcchā:

on the cultivation of the bodhicitta, avaivartikacitta, kuśalamūla and abhijñā.

18. Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā:

on the virtues of the monastic (bodhisattva) path, self-sacrifice and aspirations to enlightenment.

19. Ugraparipṛcchā:

on dāna as the foundation of the bodhisattva training, śūnyatā, the virtues of grhapti bodhisattvas and caitya worship.

21. Bhadramāyākāravyākaraṇa:

on magic as a vehicle for the upāya of the Buddha and as a valid means for facilitating the comprehension of doctrinal matters.

24. Upāliparipṛcchā:

on serious misdeeds, the liturgy of the thirty-five buddhas, the code of conduct for (grhapti) bodhisattvas and its disagreements with the code of conduct of śrāvaka.

25. Adhyāśayasamceodanasūtra:

on proper conduct for mendicant monks and recluses.

28. Viradattaparipṛcchā:

a meditation manual for the bodhisattva, contem-
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plation of the body and its vileness, (also known as Yogācārabhūmisūtra).

41. Maitreyaparipṛcchādharmāsta: on the eight ‘profound’ dharma which are to be realised if bodhi is to be attained; it also deals with the cult of Maitreya.

43. Kāśyapaparivarta: discussions of bodhisattva ethics, concepts of śūnyatā and āryagotra and bodhisattvacaryā.

44. Ratnarāḥisūtra: elaborations on spirit and observance of monastic conduct, significance of the monastic robe and the spiritual benefits of forest life.

45. Aksayamatiparipṛcchā: on the significance of proper and genuine motivation for giving, the ten stages of bodhisattva, meditation, dhārani explanations.

46. Saptasatikaprajñāpāramitā: a concise discussion on what is essentially prajñāpāramitā thought.

47. Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā: on the significance of mindfulness and the training thereof for both monks and lay-followers; it provides a detailed treatment of the bodhipāksīka and pāramitā.

48. Śrīmālādevīśimhanāda: on the tathāgatagarbha doctrine, ekayāna doctrine, the (favourable) position of the lay spirituality in the Buddhist scheme of salvation. (Apparently one of the later sūtras in the collection).
The Mahasamarpanam

49. Rśivvāsapariprccchā: on forest-life, alms and dāna.

The History of the Maharatnakūṭa Collection

On the whole, rather little is known about the history of the Ratnakūṭa collection. Keeping with Buddhist tradition, each of the forty-nine texts is attributed to the Buddha. A brief prologue (nidāna) of the circumstances accompanying the formulation of the discourses is provided in their respective introductory sections. Thirty-five of the forty-nine sūtras are said to have been composed on either Mount Grdhra-kūṭa, near Rājagṛha, or in the garden of Anāthapiṇḍāda, in the Jeta Grove in the vicinity of Śravasti. Both locations are well known in Buddhist accounts and are frequently given as sites for the various sermons of the Buddha.

As for its original compiler, no reference is found in either the sūtras themselves or in the Chinese and Tibetan commentarial literature that would point to any specific person. None of the forty-nine texts contains any cross-references to the other texts included except for the unresolved references to the Bdp. Both Chinese and Tibetan sources point to a later date of compilation. It seems probable that the Ratnakūṭa collection as it is known to us, represents a rather later development of Buddhist literary activity. Yet, despite the fact that its compilation may have taken place as late as the early eighth century AD, many of the sūtras it comprises are of considerable antiquity and belong to the earliest strata of Mahāyāna Buddhism. This is evidenced by the doctrinal orientation of the texts in question and the early date of many of

111. Considering the comprehensive nature of this collection and the antiquity of many of its texts it is rather surprising to discover how little scholarly attention it has so far attracted. Out of the total of forty-nine works only twelve have been the object of academic investigation. These are the Sukhāvatīvyūha, Rāstrāpariprccchā, Kāśyaparivarta, Saptasatkaprajñāpāramitā, Ratnarāśi, Vinayaviniścaya-Upālipariprccchā, Ugrarpariprccchā, Śrimālādeviśimhanāda, Upāyakausalyaparivarta, Mañjuśrībudhakṣetragunavyūha and Bhadrakāravīyakarana. For details on the authorship, as well as the date and place of compilation of the respective studies, see: Appendix iii. To date, the best discussion of the history of the Ratnakūṭa collection is found in: Schuster, 1976, pp. 1-42. Other useful material has been collected by Stanton-Pedersen (1980).

112. Otani bKah-hgyur Catalogue, p. 231, n. 1 (folio 123a), where we are told that the (Tibetan translation of the) Ratnakūṭa collection was compiled on the basis of Indian originals, complemented by Khotanese and Chinese sūtras during the second half of the eighth century. In Taishō Daizōkyō (vol. 11, pp. 1b 20–2b 6; see: BTI, no. 28, p. 6), the early eighth century AD is given as the date of compilation of its Chinese translation.
The majority of sūtras included in the Ratnakūta collection are designated, according to their Sanskrit titles, questions (pariprcchā) or elucidations (nirdeśa). Thirty-four of the forty-nine texts fall into these two categories. Of the remaining texts, six are called predictions (vyākarana) or arrays (vyūha). Many of these texts are comparatively brief and resemble in structure the sutta of the Pāli nikāya. Often they are composed in a stereotyped question-and-answer format and lack the elaborations and grandeur of the more voluminous Mahāyāna vaipulya sūtras. The group of texts that contain the terms pariprcchā and nirdeśa in their titles includes most of the sūtras translated into Chinese during the second and third centuries AD.\footnote{Bagchi, 1927, pp. 40-44, 86-114.}

It is noteworthy that some of the works included in the Ratnakūta collection occur also as parts of other vaipulya sūtras (in the Chinese canon) or, by virtue of their content, are incorporated into other sections of the Tripitaka. The Saptaśatikaprajñāpāramitā, for instance, is a prajñāpāramitā text that is also found in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Section of the Chinese canon (T 232).\footnote{Lancaster, 1979, p. 7.} A translation of the Ratnacūḍapariprcchā (Rcḍ) is also included in the Mahāsamnipāta collection (T 397). Other texts, such as Rkt 1, 23, 24, and 44 bear strong resemblance to Vinaya texts. So, too, Rkt 13 and 14 exhibit close parallels to a section of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya.\footnote{Lalou compares both versions with their corresponding passages found in the Vinaya section of the Tibetan Canon, noting divergencies between the three texts (Lalou, 1927, pp. 240-243).}

In the Taishō Tripitaka, the bulk of the forty-nine Ratnakūta sūtras is followed by a large number of texts that were apparently considered to be closely related to the collection proper by Taishō compilers who base their opinions on older traditions (Ming, 1368–1644 AD). Among them are five translations of the Sukhāvatīvyūha (T 360–364), nine texts related to the themes found in the Sukhāvatīvyūha, such as the Smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha and the Amitāyurdhyāna (T 365–373), two translations of the Ratnakūta(samādhi)sūtra (T 355, 356), three versions of the Sarvabuddhaviśayāvatārasūtra, as well as a few miscellaneous earlier translations of Ratnakūta works, such as the Akṣobhyatathāgatasvayamavyūha (T 313), Daśadharmanakasūtra (T 314) and Manjūśrībuddhākṣetrasvayamavyūha.\footnote{Lancaster, 1979, pp. 24–27} It therefore cannot be ruled out

\footnote{Several of its titles contain references to well known personalities from the nikāya. The best known examples are Ugra and Ratṭhapāla (Rkt 18, 19). Others are addressed to figures who were among the very first converts of the Buddha at Vārāṇasi (Rkt 17, 26, 33).}
that, at some stage, the collection may have comprised more, or at least different, sūtras than those which are currently included.

The oldest (Chinese) translations of some of the Ratnakūṭa sūtras, according to the Taishō index, date back to the later years of the Eastern Han Dynasty (202 BC–AD 220). They are the Sukhāvatīvyūha (Rkt 5), Akṣobhyatathāgatasvavyūha (Rkt 6), Uğ (Rkt 19), Maitreyaparipṛcchādharmāṣṭa (Rkt 41) and Kp (Rkt 43). Records show that their translations were done between AD 150 and AD 185. Rkt 6, 19 and 43 are attested as Han translations by the oldest surviving catalogue of the Chinese Buddhist canon, the Chū san tsang chi chi of Seng-yu (T 2145), written in AD 515. A further seventeen to nineteen sūtras were rendered into Chinese between the fall of the Han (AD 220) and the fall of the Western Chin Dynasty in AD 317. Considering that three further sūtras among those which had already been translated during the Han Dynasty were retranslated within one hundred years, there must have been a sizeable interest among early Chinese translators in several of the Ratnakūṭa texts.

One of the main protagonists in this early translation period was a monk called Dharmarakṣa (AD 230–308). Born in Tun-huang of a Yueh-chih family, he was primarily active in Chang-an between AD 266 and 304. There, he translated at least thirteen Ratnakūṭa sūtras. Dharmarakṣa is not known to have travelled to India, but most of his translations are based on Sanskrit versions that he acquired in Central Asia. Although in the years following his death various translators continued to engage in the translation of Ratnakūṭa texts, there can be little doubt that in China the era of greatest interest in the collection was during Dharmarakṣa’s lifetime. During the fourth and fifth centuries interest in Ratnakūṭa texts must have waned as

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For a complete list of these texts see the respective entries in Appendix iii.
118. Lancaster, 1979, pp. 27–34.
119. Schuster, op. cit., p. 4; Link, 1958, p. 18.
120. According to the Ch’u san tsang chi chi, the number is seventeen while the Taishō Daizōkyō lists nineteen texts whose earliest (Chinese) translations fall within this period (Lancaster, 1979, pp. 24–35).
121. The Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra was rendered into Chinese at least four more times, the Uğ at least twice and the Kp once.
122. Dharmarakṣa dominated the Buddhist communities of his time at Tun-huang and Chang-an. He is accredited with the translation of over one hundred and fifty Buddhist texts, with the foundation of monasteries and with the propagation of Mahāyāna thought. Although born and educated in Tun-huang, he spent most of his time at Chang-an, the Chinese capital of that period. He remained there at work with a great number of disciples until he was driven out shortly before his death by invasions and warfare at the beginning of the fourth century AD (Demièville, L’Inde Classique, p. 414; Shih, 1968, pp. 33–37).
123. The Taishō Daizōkyō attributes the following sixteen Ratnakūṭa translations to Dharmarakṣa while others accredit him only with thirteen: Rkt 3, 4 (?), 5 (?), 10, 13, 15, 19, 21, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37 (?), 38, 42 (?) and 47. Those marked with a question mark have been contested. For further details see: Renou, 1953, § 2074; Schuster, op. cit., p. 3, n. 14; Bagchi, 1927, pp. 83–114.

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only a few texts are known to have been translated in that period. In all, twenty-two Ratnakūta had been rendered into Chinese by the end of the fifth century.\(^{124}\) No doubt, the frequency of their translation allows for inferences to be drawn about the importance that was assigned to these sūtras during the centuries when Mahāyāna Buddhism made major inroads into Chinese society.

The earliest reference in the Chinese canon to a Ratnakūta collection consisting of forty-nine sūtras dates back to the T'ang dynasty (AD 618–907). It gives an account of a South Indian Brahmin called Bodhiruci (AD 571–727) under whose supervision a team of translators edited and partly rendered the Ratnakūta into Chinese.\(^{125}\) On his arrival in China in AD 693, Bodhiruci is said to have been in possession of the Sanskrit originals.\(^ {126}\) These texts came to form the foundation of the collection as it is known to us. At first, however, Bodhiruci's assistance was sought by Śiksānanda who was then engaged in the translation of the Budhāvatamsaka (AD 695–698). Thus it was only in AD 706 that Bodhiruci set to work on the Ratnakūta. Out of a total of forty-nine sūtras Bodhiruci is accredited with the translation of twenty-six texts, apparently considering the remaining twenty-three (then extant) translations as being satisfactorily executed.\(^ {127}\) The translations which he incorporated into his edition of the Ratnakūta had been translated by a total of fifteen scholars from different backgrounds over a period of more than four hundred years.\(^ {128}\) Bodhiruci retranslated fifteen texts that had

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124. The number of texts cited in the Taishö index is higher. It lists twenty-six Ratnakūta translations that were undertaken in the second to the fifth centuries. However, this list does not seem to take into consideration duplicate translations. We are told of six translations of the Īg to have been completed by ca. AD 425, for instance, yet only three are extant and can be accounted for (Bagchi, 1927, p. 391).

125. The Ta pao chi ching (in the Taishö Shinshū Daizōkyō edition of the Chinese Tripitaka, ed. by J. Takakusu et al., no. 310 in vol. 11, p. 1a 1–659a 27) contains an Imperial preface (hsu) by Ju-i-tsung dated AD 713 (p. 1a 1–b 19). It refers to a collection of forty-nine sūtras called Pao chi pu (Ratnakūta section) which have been translated between AD 706 and 713 by a team of translators led by a certain Bodhiruci (BTI, 28, pp. 5–6).

126. There is agreement among Buddhist scholars that by the time Bodhiruci arrived in China a Ratnakūta collection of some form must have been in existence in India. Wayman writes that “Bodhiruci, a native of South India, who arrived in China in AD 693 ... brought with him the Sanskrit text of the Ratnakūta collection of individual Mahāyāna sūtras” (Wayman, 1974, p. 9).

Lü Ch’eng (1971) goes even further, stating that “Bodhiruci had brought to China a new (sic.) Sanskrit text of this [Ratnakūta] sūtra” and that “he took advantage of the special structure of the Mahāratnakūta sūtra ... making suitable adjustments in compiling and translating it”. Unfortunately, Lü Ch’eng does not document such an important statement by referring to his sources. In any event, he seems to be suggesting that on Bodhiruci’s arrival in Loyang he was already in possession of a well-structured collection of forty-nine Sanskrit texts which he then improved and rendered into Chinese. He does not say whether at that time the collection already bore the name under which it came to be known or whether it differed significantly from Bodhiruci’s edition. He also does not speak about the circumstances of its origin. See: Bagchi, 1938, pp. 541–543.

127. From among the already existing translations he selected the following works which included in his edition: Rkt, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 26, 32, 33, 36, 38, 39, 46, 47, 44.

128. For their names and biographical data, see my notes in Appendix iii.
apparently been badly done or were incomplete, and rendered for the first time into Chinese eleven texts that had so far not been translated. Thus he cast the collection into the form in that it exists today.\(^{29}\) He received the official request to engage in the translation of the Ratnakūṭa in AD 706 from the Emperor Chung-tsung. Supported by a team of assistant scholars of largely Indian origin, he was able to report on the completion of his task after seven years in AD 713.

The Tibetan Buddhist tradition appears to have modelled its version(s) of the Ratnakūṭa collection on that of Bodhiruci. The overall arrangement in all Tibetan editions corresponds closely to the structure of the Chinese version. Several of the sūtras included in the dKon-brtsegs (Ratnakūṭa) section appear to have been translated directly from the Chinese, thus giving further testimony to a close relationship between the Sino-Tibetan literary traditions.\(^{130}\) The vast majority of the Tibetan translations, however, are based on Sanskrit originals. Many of them had already been translated during the so called ‘first diffusion’ of the Buddhist faith in Tibet (AD 641–838) and were revised and rearranged at a later date into a collection of forty-nine texts.

When we consider the number of sūtras included in the various Tibetan editions of the Ratnakūṭa and their respective listing in the catalogues we find certain minor differences. The Ratnakūṭa version of sDe-dge edition seems to correspond most closely to the collection as compiled by Bodhiruci. It too lists forty-nine sūtras and the sequence of the texts is identical with those of the Chinese Ratnakūṭa. The Peking and sNar-thān editions, by contrast, contain irregularities. Although both of them comprise the forty-nine texts found in Bodhiruci’s edition, they do not agree in their sequence.\(^{131}\)

\(^{129}\) Bodhiruci’s translation of the forty-ninth parivarta, the Rśivyasapariprccha, breaks off abruptly shortly before the end. Roughly three hundred characters (tzu) are missing (ref. Schuster). The missing passages are easily restored from an earlier, still surviving, translation of the text in question (T 354). The question, however, remains whether this omission is simply the result of (accidental) mishandling, or whether it reflects a sudden change of mood in the minds of the royal sponsors. Clearly, after AD 716 the atmosphere at the court became more adverse to the translation efforts of possibly too ambitious monk-scholars. In AD 717, for instance, Šubhākarasimha’s request for royal support in his translation of Sanskrit Dhāraṇī texts was silently rejected by the emperor.

\(^{130}\) At least seven of the forty-nine texts had been translated directly from the Chinese. The sNar-thān edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka refers to the Varmavyhūnānirdesā (Rkt 7), (Ā)nandagarbhāvakrāntinirdesā (Rkt 13) and Dārikāvimalaśraddhāpariprcchā (Rkt 40) to have been translated by Chos-grub (Fa-cheng) directly from the Chinese. Recent research has established that the Raṃsasamantamuktainirdesā (Rkt 11), Āyuṣmānandagarbhāvakrāntinirdesā (Rkt 14), Pāṇapariprcchā (Rkt 17) and Vidyutprāptapariprcchā (Rkt 20) are also based on Chinese sources (Sakurabe, “Tibetto-yaku Dai-Hoshaku-kyo no Kenkyū”, Otani Gakuho, 11, p. 550).

\(^{131}\) Six sūtras are in particular affected: the (Ā)nandagarbhāvakrāntinirdesā (Rkt 13), Āyuṣmānandagarbhāvakrāntinirdesā (Rkt 14), Pāṇapariprcchā (Rkt 17), Rāṣtrapālapariprcchā (Rkt 18), Ratnārāṣī (Rkt 44) and Aksayamatipariprcchā (Rkt 45). In both editions their position in the overall scheme of the collection
Lalou pointed to three further documents that exhibit irregularities concerning the composition of the Tibetan *Ratnakūṭa*. First, there is the table of contents of the Peking *bKah-hgyur* which records only forty-four texts as belonging to the *Ratnakūṭa*. Second, there is a *bKah-hgyur* manuscript held in the Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin which cites only forty-seven sūtras. Third, there is the catalogue of the ‘Lhan-dkar collection’ commissioned by Khri-gtsugs-lde-brtsan (815–838 AD). According to its table of contents, as preserved in the Peking edition, the *Saptasatikaprajñāpāramitā* (*Rkt 46*) is not part of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection, but belongs to the *Prajñāpāramitā* Section. Despite such anomalies, the actual number of texts included in all editions of the Tibetan canon is forty-nine.

The history of the collection prior to Bodhiruci has not been subject to any systematic research. Uncertainty prevails with regard to the date, place and historical circumstances in which the *Ratnakūṭa* collection may have been shaped. The source material can be grouped into four major working categories. First, there is a sizeable body of Chinese translations of Indian Buddhist writings, including some indigenous exegical material. Second, there are Buddhist texts of Indian origin, usually in their original Hybrid Sanskrit idiom. Third, there are Tibetan translations of Sanskrit texts, commentarial and historical documents. Finally, there exists a small, but potentially significant, group of (fragmented) miscellaneous works of Khotanese, Singhalese and South Indian origin.

**Chinese Sources**

The earliest reference to a collection of sūtras bearing the name *Mahāratnakūṭa* is contained in the *Dasabhumikavibhāṣāstra* (*Dbh-v*), a commentarial work traditionally ascribed to Nāgārjuna. No Sanskrit or Tibetan versions of the text are known to exist. The only Chinese translation extant was done by Kumārajīva between AD 402 and 415, entitled *Shih chu p’i...*
Here a reference is made to a chapter (hui) of the Ratnakūța, called Kāśyapa-parivarta. It also cites a text called Aksayamatipariprcchā as belonging to the same collection. Another reference to an Aksayamatipariprcchā as forming a part of a Ratnakūța is found in the Chinese rendering of the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (Mpps). Both works are contained in Bodhiruci’s edition of the Ratnakūța collection, occupying the forty-third and forty-fifth position respectively. In addition, Japanese scholarship has shown that quotations in the Dbh-v from the Ug and the Vimaladatta-pariprcchā correspond to texts contained in the Ratnakūța under the same names (Rkt 19 and Rkt 33 respectively). Also, the twelfth sūtra of the Ratnakūța, the Bdp, is quoted in the Dbh-v. All this suggests that Kumārajiva was aware of some Ratnakūța collection. Since both works were produced in Kucha, such a collection was probably available in Central Asia. If we allow some time for the process of transmission, this evidence suggests the existence of a Ratnakūța collection during the fourth century AD. Yet very little can be said about its structure and content, except that it included the Kp and Aksayamatipariprcchā and possibly the Bdp, Ug and Vimaladatta-pariprcchā.

135. T 1521.
136. This way of reference to the individual sūtras of the Ratnakūța collection was subsequently adopted by Bodhiruci. In the place of sūtra (ching), he employed the term hui meaning assembly (or section, chapter), probably because he perceived the individual sūtras as forming a part in an overall scheme. This usage contrasts the terminology employed by the authors in the translations of individual sūtras executed in the preceding centuries. Here, as a rule, the term ching meaning sūtra is applied. Indeed, Kumārajiva’s rather unusual terminology could be taken to indicate that by the late fourth century AD some of the previously unassociated Ratnakūța sūtras had become a part of an overall structure.
137. Mpps, pp. 1245, 1272, 1762.
139. In the light of its importance for illuminating the earliest known literary form of our collection a closer examination of the history of the Dbh-v (T 1526) seems appropriate. It has already been mentioned that its authorship was ascribed to Nāgārjuna by Kumārajiva. Modern scholarship has cast some doubts on its authenticity since the ideas put forward do not seem to correspond to those normally associated with Nāgārjuna.

This fact was for the first time highlighted in an influential article published by A. Hirakawa in 1957 (IBK 5, 2, pp. 504 ff) where he challenges the claim of authenticity. Lamotte, on the other hand, holds the view that it has been composed by the founder of Madhyamaka thought (see: Lamotte, op. cit., p. xxvii). Ruegg, a well-known authority on Madhyamaka literature, takes a more cautious position by pointing to the need of further detailed research on this matter (see: Ruegg, 1982, p. 29, n. 67).
A number of Chinese sources clearly accredit this work to the founder of the Madhyamaka. In the Chinese translation of the Suvikrāntavikrāmāpariprcchā Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, for instance, it is listed among the works attributed to Nāgārjuna (cf. Hikata, R., 1958, pp. lii, sq. lxxii sq where it is mentioned along with the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Ta-chi-tu-lun and Bodhisambhāraśāstra). Chinese catalogues include it under the title of P’u sa hui kuo ching amongst the texts of Nāgārjuna allegedly translated by Dharmarakṣa between AD 265 and 313 at Chang-an (Bagchi, 1927, i, p. 100).

Lamotte (op. cit., p. xxvii) points to passages in the Ch’u san tsang chi chi (T 2145, ch. 2, p. 8b 17), a commentarial work composed in the first half of the sixth century, and the Li tai san pao chi (T 2034, ch. 6, p. 63a 23) both of which note the translation and remark: “The colophon says that it is an extract from the Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāstra of Nāgārjuna” (trsl. Lamotte). In any event, the fact that one of the translations of the Dbh-v is firmly accredited to Dharmarakṣa highlights the possibility that it was extant as early as the third, or possibly the second century AD. This suggests a new, as yet hypothetical, terminus ad quem for the existence of our collection.
The first reference to the *Ratnakūṭa* as being established amongst the major Buddhist scriptures is found in the *Li tai san pao chi*. Here we read how the Gandharan translator Jñānagupta (arrival in Chang-an in AD 559) relates that the following twelfold division of Buddhist scriptures was established in the south-east of the country of Che-chu-chia (modern day Karghalik): the *Māhāsāṃnipāta*, *Avatamsaka*, *Vaipulya*, *Ratnakūṭa*, *Laṅkāvatāra*, *Lalitavistara*, *Śāriputraśāṅkara*, *Puspakīṭadhārāṇī*, *Tūṣāgarbha*, *Māhāprajñāpāramitā*, *Prajñāpāramitā* in eight sections and *Māhāmeghasūtra*. This division places the *Ratnakūṭa* (collection) alongside the titles of other well-known major works. Jñānagupta’s account not only suggests a *Ratnakūṭa* collection in some form as early as the beginning of the sixth century, but also allows for inferences about its geographical area of circulation.

The first reference before the times of Bodhiruci that points to a *Ratnakūṭa* collection of considerable length and popularity is found in the biographies of Hsuan-tsang. On New Year’s Day in AD 664, he is said to have been approached by a group of scholar-monks who requested him to translate the *Ratnakūṭa* collection. He declined on the grounds that the collection was as long as the voluminous *Māhāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (T 220), whose translation he had just completed. At his advanced age he saw little prospects of mustering the strength required to complete such a formidable task. He eventually opened his manuscript after repeated appeals and began to translate a few lines, only to resign a few minutes later.

Three conclusions can be drawn from this account. First, some forty years before Bodhiruci’s
The Mahāratnakūṭa

translation Chinese scholar-monks knew of the existence of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection of a length comparable to that of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*. This raises the possibility that by then it already comprised many of the texts presently included in the *Ratnakūṭa*. Second, the *Ratnakūṭa* must have had great renown. Otherwise would such a venerated but aged *Tripitaka* master have been selected for the task of translating it at a time when other capable translators were at hand? Third, Hsüan-tsang seems to have been in possession of some Sanskrit version of the *Ratnakūṭa*, presumably brought from India.

Unfortunately, neither Hsüan-tsang’s biographers nor his *Si-yu-ki* mention the place where Hsüan-tsang might have procured the *Ratnakūṭa* texts. Only the acquisition of the *Bdp* is recorded. He received this text in the monastery of Shih-fei-to-pu-lo (Śvetapura), located on the river Ganges some eighty to one hundred *li* south of Vaiśālī. About the monastery and its inhabitants he reports that it was inhabited by Mahāyāna monks who paid close allegiance to the spirit and letter of both the Dharma and *Vinaya*.144

Of all six hundred and fifty works he brought home, the *Bdp* is one of the few texts that Hsüan-tsang gave details about the place and circumstances of its acquisition. It was also among the few texts that he chose to translate immediately on his return to China. Clearly, this suggests that he either held the *Bdp* personally in high esteem, or that it must have enjoyed great renown in India or, locally, in Śvetapura monastery.145

The texts that Hsüan-tsang brought from India but remained untranslated at his death (AD 664) were deposited in the Tzu-en temple in Chang-an. Their translation was held in abeyance after the master’s death. If our sources are correct, a copy of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection, or at

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145. His travel account, commissioned by the Emperor, does not contain any indications that Hsüan-tsang was aware of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as forming a part of an overall collection, although his knowledge of a collection of texts bearing the name *Ratnakūṭa* is recorded in his biography, in connection with his translation attempt in AD 664, twenty years after his return from India. The time elapsed between these two events prompted Schuster to speak about the possibility whether “the compilation of the *Ratnakūṭa* in forty-nine sections might not have been accomplished in China between AD 645 and 664, by putting together forty-nine texts from among the six hundred odd which Hsüan-tsang had brought with him from India”.

She concedes that this leaves us with several other problems. First, the collection’s Chinese origin seems irreconcilable with the (Chinese) account of Bodhiruci bringing a complete copy of the *Ratnakūṭa* from India in AD 693. Second, how likely is it that Hsüan-tsang knew of the precise extent of Dharmarakṣa’s translation activity at Chang-an between AD 265 and 308? Without such knowledge he could have hardly matched up his selection with those thirteen *Ratnakūṭa* texts Dharmarakṣa had rendered into Chinese four hundred years earlier and leave out those texts he could not correlate with the Indian manuscripts in his possession. Is it really conceivable that the scrupulous Hsüan-tsang, who went to such lengths in order to acquaint himself with genuine Indian Buddhism, conspired to create a new collection of sūtras? Acceptance this theory means that one would have to discount the evidence provided by the Tibetan Buddhist tradition that points to an Indian origin of a (basic) *Ratnakūṭa* collection. I think that we can thus safely rule out the possibility of Hsüan-tsang’s compilership of the *Ratnakūṭa*. 58
least large parts of it, would have been kept in the Tzu-en temple from 665 AD onwards. As I already observed, Chinese traditions maintain that on his arrival in China Hsüan-tsang had the entire collection in Sanskrit in his possession. However, no reference is made at any point to its structure or contents, nor are there indications of what happened to his Sanskrit collection after it had been deposited in the Tzu-en temple in our sources. If the Chinese traditions are correct, then by AD 630–644 (Hsüan-tsang’s period of travel) there must have been in some part of India a literary tradition associated with the Ratnakūṭa collection, perhaps even as it stands today. Schuster says that Bodhiruci’s biographer makes it sound as if he might have been requested to bring a full copy with him to the Chinese capital. If credence is to be given to this account, we may infer that by the late seventh-century Hsüan-tsang’s Ratnakūṭa Sanskrit version was either not available to the court translators, or that it had never been a complete one.

Indian Sources

The other major category of sources relevant to our research are, of course, the texts belonging to the Indian Buddhist tradition. These consist in the following (fragmented) Sanskrit versions of Ratnakūṭa texts: Sukhāvatīvyūha (Rkt 5), Māṇjuśrībuddhakṣetragunavyūha (Rkt 15), Rp (Rkt 18), Vinayaviniścaya-Upālipariprccha (Rkt 24), Kp (Rkt 43), Ratnarāśisūtra (Rkt 44) and Saptaśatikaprajñāpāramitā (Rkt 46). Since these works represent but a small fraction of the total body of the collection, by themselves they do not provide much ground to assess the manner of the collection’s formation or its date of compilation.

Besides these seven works, a number of quotations of Ratnakūṭa works have been preserved in later Buddhist literature. Most of them are contained in the Śīkṣ and Msī. Other short

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146. There are several other recorded cases where the scriptures of deceased Chinese scholar-travellers were deposited in local temples for safe-keeping. One such account tells of the texts that Wu-ching collected in India towards the end of the seventh century. After his death—he never reached his homeland as he died on the journey from Northern India—these were brought by his disciples to the Hua-yan temple. There, they were taken up in AD 716 by Śubhakarasimha for study. No such resumption of study of Hsüan-tsang’s material is known to have taken place (Hodge, The Buddhist Forum, forthcoming, pp. 9–10).


148. Almost all of these texts have already been the object of detailed studies. For the authorship, date and place of publication, see Appendix iii.

149. Seventeen out of the total of forty-nine works are referred to by name and quoted in these two texts. No mentioning, however, is made by either Asanga or Śāntideva of them as belonging to any kind of a collection (Śīkṣ, p. 367–371; Msī, p. 165).
quotations of *Ratnakūta* texts are contained in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*,\textsuperscript{150} in Prajinākaramati’s commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*,\textsuperscript{151} in Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapada*\textsuperscript{152} and in the *Buddhagotraśāstra* attributed to Vasubandhu.\textsuperscript{153} While these quotations are valuable from the philological point of view, they do not reveal any information on the history or structure of the collection as a whole. The exception to this is possibly the *Śiksā*. It contains a large number of quotations from the *Ratnakūta* taken from a total of fifteen texts. Although Śāntideva does not associate them with any overall collection, the mere fact that they are frequently referred to *en bloc* in doctrinally related contexts suggests that he was probably aware of their interconnection. However, we must conclude that the *Ratnakūta* was not widely known in India since he does not refer to them as being part of an established collection.

In the past there has been some confusion with regard to the origin of some of his quotations from the *Ratnakūta*. In seven instances the *Śiksā* says that they were taken from a work called *Ratnakūta*.\textsuperscript{154} Initially, this reference was taken to mean that Śāntideva was aware of a collection of that name on which he drew for canonical quotations. Baron von Stael-Holstein corrected this misunderstanding at the beginning of the twentieth century. He positively established that all quotations referred to by Śāntideva as belonging to the *Ratnakūta* were taken from a work which was known already to the Tibetan translators as the *Kp*.\textsuperscript{155}

Due to Śāntideva’s way of referring to the *Kp*, it is up to the present day that it is frequently referred to as the ‘old *Ratnakūta*’.\textsuperscript{156} Despite having given rise to some confusion, Śāntideva’s usage of the title *Ratnakūta* throws light on the role played by the *Kp* in the history of the collection. Frequently, the *Kp* is taken to have formed the nucleus of the *Ratnakūta* collection.

\textsuperscript{150} The quotations contained in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* are primarily taken from the *Śms*. They have been collected, arranged in the order of their appearance and published by Ui, H. in *Hoshoron kenkyū*, 1959, Tokyo.

\textsuperscript{151} La Vallée Poussin, 1901–1914, pp. 147, 153–4, 526, 527.

\textsuperscript{152} La Vallée Poussin, 1913, pp. 53.7–54.4, 121.4–122.2, 155.1–12, 191.2–9, 234.10, 256.12–258.5, 348.14–349.2, 408.10–409.6, 429.4–430.4, 474.7–10.

\textsuperscript{153} Stanton-Pedersen, 1980, p. 62. The text most frequently cited is here the *Kp*. For an array of references to the *Kp* in Mahāyāna sources, see: *Mpps*, pp. 1845–6.

\textsuperscript{154} See, for instance, *Śiksā*, pp. 54.11–14, 55.3–5. There we read: “…how this comes to pass is described in the *Ratnakūta*” or “the way to avoid the loss of the thought of enlightenment is still more clearly set forth in this same work, the *Ratnakūta*” (other references are found at pp. 52.12, 58.17, 146.4, 148.8, 196.11).

\textsuperscript{155} Stael-Holstein, 1926, p. xvi. The Tibetan equivalent of the title *Kāśyapaparivarta* is *hpags pa ṣod srūn kyi leḥu žes bya ba theg pa chen pohi mdo*.

\textsuperscript{156} Japanese scholars, in particular, seem to favour this term. In Bodhiruci’s edition, this work has been retitled *Samantaprabhāśabodhisattvapariprcchā*. Apparently this alteration was made in order to avoid confusion with the *Mahākāśyapaasāṅgītāśrīnāda, Rk* 23 in the *Ratnakūta* collection.
Śāntideva’s mode of reference (also adapted by the Me/) seems to support such a view. Starting from such an assumption, the Kp would have become already at an early stage a kind of doctrino-literary ‘flagship’ of the entire collection. In fact, large sections of it give a well-balanced doctrinal cross-section of Ratnakūṭa thought.\(^{157}\) As a literary document it is undoubtedly worthy of the title Ratnakūṭa (‘accumulation of jewels’).\(^{158}\) A similar development seems to have occurred in other collections. One only needs to reflect on the role of the Aṣṭa among the many texts that comprise the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Chronologically, an early version of the Kp might well have been among the first texts to be included in the Ratnakūṭa as it was among the very first texts to be translated into Chinese.\(^{159}\)

**Tibetan Sources**

Tibetan sources are of minor importance for research into the history of the Ratnakūṭa. Although the meticulously executed translations of the forty-nine sūtras are invaluable for determining the respective doctrinal positions, they yield little relevant data on the historical processes that shaped the collection as a whole.

Of far greater interest are the accounts composed by the Tibetan historians Bu-ston and Tāranātha. In his Chos-hbyun, Bu-ston observes that though the Ratnakūṭa consisted originally of one hundred thousand chapters, only forty-nine were still extant at his time.\(^{160}\) Since he makes similar remarks on almost all other major Mahāyāna scriptures, claiming that in their present form they represent only a fraction of their ‘original’ size, caution should be exercised about the historical value of his statement. It seems likely that the motivation behind his statement was a pious wish to exalt Buddhist scriptural heritage rather than scholarly exactitude.

Bu-ston and Tāranātha’s descriptions of the circumstances in which the ‘one hundred thousand books’ came to be known are of greater significance. The books are said to have first appeared at the time of the Third Buddhist Council organised by King Kaniṣṭha at around

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157. See, in particular, Kp, pp. 50-68, 92-100.
158. In the Asokavadāna, we read of an island called Ratnakūṭa. The location of this place is of course not known. According to this legend it is reached via the Magadha port of Tāmralipti (Przyluski, 1923, p. 104).
159. Stael-Holstein, 1926, p. iii; Tao-hsüan (Ta t’ang nei tien lu, T 2149-223c: 18) according to whom it was first translated in AD 179 by Lokakṣema.
AD 100 in Kashmir. The same sources inform us that the diminution of the collection to its present forty-nine texts took place in the years between the life-times of Mātrceta (second century AD) and Asaṅga (AD 290–350) "in a period when Buddhism endured a general decline in northern India". So far I have not been able to locate any third-party accounts which would confirm these details. Bu-ston and Tāranātha do not cite their sources. Existing archeological evidence and historical accounts contain little to indicate that there was a general decline in the fortunes of the Saṅgha during the second and fourth centuries. And yet, if credence is given to their reports, one would have to place the origin of our collection in India, in the early centuries AD.

Elsewhere in the same source Bu-ston relates that “this teacher (Sthiramati) has studied the Ratnakūṭa up to the forty-ninth chapter and composed a commentary on it.” A similar statement is contained in Tāranātha’s account. The commentary in question has been preserved in both the Tibetan and Chinese Buddhist traditions. Frauwallner, in his brilliant article “Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic”, places the dates of Sthiramati between AD 510 and 570. Japanese scholars have suggested even earlier dates, setting his period of activity between AD 470 and 550. Apparently, we have here a reference that places the dates of an Indian version of our collection as early as the fifth century AD.

Again, a more cautious approach seems to be in order if we consider the following factors. First, as mentioned above, when Sthiramati and other Indian Buddhists mention or quote from the Ratnakūṭa they usually refer to the Kp. Second, the compilers of the Mvy appear to have been unaware of a collection of texts called Ratnakūṭa. Although they enumerate as independent sūtras fourteen of the texts contained in Bodhiruci’s edition, they do not mention them as being part of a collection. Third, the catalogue of the sDe-dge edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka explicitly states that the Ratnakūṭa collection, consisting of forty-nine

164. Schiefner, 1868, p. 130.
165. Chinese: (T 1523), translated by Bodhiruci (the younger) between AD 508 and 535; Tibetan: TTP 5510.
166. WZKSO, 5, 1961, pp. 136–137.
168. Mvy 1355 (Rkt 3), 1330 (12), 1381 (15), 1333 (16), 1361 (18), 1396 (19), 1393 (26), 1407 (28), 1394 (37), 1364 (43), 1400 (45), 1391 (46), 1363 (47), 1392 (49).

In the Mvy, a work called Ratnakūṭa is listed in position thirty-nine (Mvy 1364). There is, however, no evidence indicating that the authors may have associated this sūtra with our collection.
The Mahāratnakūṭa

works, was compiled by putting together śūtras from India, China and Khotan.\(^{169}\) It seems that both Bu-ston and Tāranātha formulated their statements about the Ratnakūṭa on the grounds of a misinterpretation of Sthiramati’s usage of the term Ratnakūṭa.

The majority of Tibetan texts included in the Ratnakūṭa were translated during the first half of the ninth century. They were translated by translation teams that often comprised Sanskrit scholars from India, Bactria and Tibet working together, using Indian manuscripts. Apparently they did not hesitate to consult Central Asian or even Chinese copies of the text in questions in the event of doubt.\(^{170}\)

Many of these scholars participated also in the compilation of the Mvy. Written prior to the translation-work proper, the Mvy does not contain a complete list of the śūtras that, in due course, came to form the bKah-hgyur. Among the śūtra titles included there is a long list of works that form part of the present Ratnakūṭa collection. Interestingly, there appears to be far reaching agreement between the list contained in the Mvy and those found in the Indian Buddhist Sanskrit literature of the eighth century AD. In the Śīks, for instance, we find thirteen of the fifteen Ratnakūṭa works that occur in the Mvy.\(^{171}\) Of these thirteen, eleven are also mentioned by Bu-ston in his Chos-hbyun, ten of which appear also in the Mvy.

A great number of texts common to both the Śīks and Mvy are also found among the Tibetan documents of Tun-huang. Altogether, these manuscripts contain twenty fragments of Ratnakūṭa śūtras. In a few instances, entire texts have been preserved while in others little more than a brief citation or a reference in the colophon is extant.\(^{172}\) Ten of these texts concur with those quoted by Śāntideva while six accord with the Ratnakūṭa śūtras enumerated in the Mvy. The selection of the texts itself does not seem to reflect a premeditated choice. And again, there is no evidence to indicate that this group of nineteen texts was conceived of as a

\(^{169}\) Otani bKah-hgyur Catalogue, p. 231, n. 1, folio 123a; (ref. Kajiyama).

\(^{170}\) Ch’en, 1946, pp. 53 ff.

\(^{171}\) Śāntideva quotes from the following eighteen texts: Rkt 3, 9, 12 (?), 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 25, 28, 29, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48. See also Candrakirti’s Prasannapada which refers to seven Ratnakūṭa works: Rkt 3, 16, 24, 25, 43, 45, and 47 (Vallee-Poussin, 1903–1913). Note that all of these seven texts are also among those quoted by Śāntideva.

\(^{172}\) References to following Ratnakūṭa śūtras are contained in the various collections the Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang: Amitāyuryāvanīrdeśa (Rkt 5), Dharmadhātupratyāsaṃkhaṇedanīrdeśa (Rkt 8), Daśadharmakāśūtra (Rkt 9), Raśmisamantamuktanīrdeśa (Rkt 11), Bdp (Rkt 12), Hymn addressed to Pūrṇa (Rkt 177), Raśtrapālapiırīcchā (Rkt 18), Mahāpratihāryanīrdeśa (Rkt 22), Maitreyasiṃhanāda (Rkt 23), Vinayavinīścaya-Uśāparyścchā (Rkt 24), Adhyātyavāsanīcchā (Rkt 25), Viradattaghaṭpatipariścchā (Rkt 28), Śūnatidārikapariścchā (Rkt 30), Gāngottarapariścchā (Rkt 31), Śīharpālapiırīcchā (Rkt 32), Kp (Rkt 43), Ratnakūṭāśūtra (Rkt 44), Ratnacūṭāśūtra (Rkt 47) and a certain text called Mahāratnakūṭāśūtra which may be a reference to the Kp (Rkt 43). For their respective listing see: Lalou, M. Fonts Pelliot Tibetain, Paris, 1927, and La Vallée Poussin, Oxford, 1962.
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part of a greater collection or even to represent some cross-section of the latter. Since it is not possible to establish the exact period in which these documents were deposited in the Tun-huang caves, few chronological inferences can be drawn. Nonetheless, judging by the large number of references found to Ratnakūta sūtras in its materials, it is clear that the Ratnakūta must have been a popular collection in Central Asia.

Considering that Śāntideva’s list itself comprises only eighteen Ratnakūta citations, the degree of concordance with those of the Mvy and the Tun-huang material is very high. In none of these three source categories is there any explicit reference to a greater collection of which these texts might have formed a part. Therefore we may infer the existence of fluctuating, but commonly accepted, sūtra lists in circulation in Northern India during the eighth and ninth centuries AD. In due course, these were transmitted to the Buddhist circles of Central Asia and perhaps played a role in the formation of the Tibetan Tripitaka.

The earliest inventory of the Tibetan canon dates back to the beginning of the ninth century. Known as the catalogue of the ‘Lhan-dkar collection’ commissioned by Khri-gtsugs-lde-brtsan, it speaks of a Ratnakūta consisting of forty-eight texts. The exact circumstances in which this inventory was compiled are obscure, though it seems certain that it was drawn up as part of the conversion efforts by the royal family to establish Buddhism in Tibet. The authenticity of the Lhan-dkar listing is well established. Lalou has shown that the dating and bibliographical details (e.g., names of translators, locations, etc.) correspond to what we know from other sources about the initial translation activity in Tibet.

The authors of this catalogue carefully distinguish between translations that were done from the Sanskrit originals and those based on Chinese versions. Of the forty-eight Ratnakūta

173. There is no conclusive evidence when the caves themselves were sealed. Pelliot suggested that this may have taken place during the first half of the eleventh century while Uray proposed a date as early as 1002 AD. Tibetan literary activity itself appears to have diminished in the Tun-huang area in the first half of the ninth century (Rona-tas, Acta Orientalia Hungarica, 21, pp. 381–3).

174. Considering that Buddhist scholars from Central Asia and Bactria frequently participated in these translation teams, one cannot exclude the possibility that such lists might have even existed in Central Asian Buddhist circles other than those of Tun-huang. So far, however, I have not been able to trace any evidence which would support this thought.

175. Even if we accept this compilation mechanism, several question remain unanswered. Why, for instance, did the Tibetan compilers of the hKah-hgyur adopt the Chinese model of the Ratnakūta and, at the same time, fail to grant equal treatment to the Mahāsannipāta? The first attested reference to the compilation of the Mahāsannipāta in its present format goes back to AD 594. Given the popularity of this collection in China, the fact that more than two hundred years separated this date from the first wave of organised translation activity in Tibet and the adoption of the Ratnakūta format, one would expect to find this collection also in the hKah-hgyur. This, however, is not the case although all of its texts are included on an individual basis in the ‘Sūtra Section’. On the compilation of the Mahāsannipāta, see: L’Inde Classique, ii, pp. 437–438.

translations listed in this catalogue not a single text is identified as going back to Chinese translations. This indicates that the seven Chinese-based Ratnakūṭa translations we possess today were composed at a later date. Either the early Sanskrit-based translations had vanished during the years of civil strife or they were too poorly executed to warrant inclusion in the manuscript collections of the thirteenth century. Apart from the omission of the Saptasatikaprajñāpāramitā, the contents and structure of the Lhan-dkar Ratnakūṭa collection agrees closely with Bodhiruci’s edition. Thus, the earliest period for which we can affirm the existence of an almost complete Tibetan version of the Ratnakūṭa collection is the first half of the ninth century AD.

It is worth noting that this period coincides with the epoch in which a cautious revival of Sino-Tibetan relations after the signing of the peace treaty in 821/23 AD took place. This chronological concurrence is perhaps yet another factor in favour of our hypothesis that the formation of the Tibetan Ratnakūṭa was based on, or at least influenced by, Chinese editions. For, there can be little doubt that the political rapprochement which took place in that period between China and Tibet was accompanied, if not preceded, by a renewal of contacts in the cultural sphere. For even during years of bitter enmity cultural contacts with Tibet’s most powerful neighbour never appear to have been totally severed.

Miscellaneous Sources

The texts that comprise our fourth category of sources belong to a number of apparently unrelated literary traditions. Sthaviravāda sources, for instance, associate a certain Ratnakūṭa (whether the sūtra or the collection is uncertain) with Buddhist schools prevalent in South India.177 The Nikāyasamgraha, a fourteenth-century text of the Singhalese tradition on the history of Buddhism in India and Sri Lanka, speaks of three classes of non-orthodox literature that, after their origin in India, were brought at a later stage to Sri Lanka.178 These texts, it says, were doctrinally close to the Vaitulya and Vājiriya schools and included works embodying the ‘sciences’ such as the Ratnakūṭa. The same source relates that Ratnakūṭaśāstras were composed in the Andhaka schools (along with the Raṭṭhapālagajīta which may have been

the doctrinal predecessor of the *Rp, Rkt* 18 in Bodhiruci’s edition).179

The oldest surviving manuscript fragments of the entire *Ratnakūta* collection have been preserved in a Khotanese document. It is a manuscript discovered in the Khotan area at the beginning of the twentieth century by group of Japanese scholars. Fragments of it were identified and published by Kuno Horyū in 1938.180 They contain passages of the *Kp* which correspond to sections of the ninth-century Sanskrit manuscript edited by Stael-Holstein one decade earlier.181 It is assumed to have been composed sometime between the third and fifth century AD.182

Finally, I should mention a number of early South Indian inscriptions that are indirectly relevant for the study of *Ratnakūta* literature. They are found chiefly at the celebrated Buddhist sites of Amarāvati and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa in the Andhra country. As Wayman has shown in his study of the Śrīmālādevisimhānāda, many of these inscriptions are of importance since they allow us to infer the historical context in which the texts appeared.183 For the Śms, they allowed him to pinpoint the period and location of its origin with some precision to South India of the third century. By implication, many of Wayman’s findings on the Śms might be equally applicable to *Ratnakūta sūtras* of similar orientation, most notably Āsoka-dattāvyākaraṇa and Vimaladattāparipṛcchā which show close affinity in contents and setting.

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181. Stael-Holstein’s manuscript, damaged and some pages missing, was discovered in the 1890’s in Khotan and purchased by the Russian consul at Kashgar. To the present day it is kept in the State Library of the Leningrad Academy of Sciences. See: Mirmov, N.D.: *Catalogue of Indian Manuscripts At Leningrad*, Catalogi Musei Asiatici, i, St. Petersburg, 1914 (chapter xi, p. 333).
182. Another *Ratnakūta* text of which early fragments have been discovered in Central Asia is the *Ratnarāsi*. Published by Hörmle in 1916 it has been tentatively dated to the fifth to sixth century AD (*op. cit.*, p. xii–xxxii). Finally, there are a number of references to *Ratnakūta sūtras* in the *Book of Zambasta* (Emmerick, 1968). These are the *Bhadra-vyā* (p. 10), *Vup* (p. 189) and again the *Kp* (p. 139). In one fragment, well over twenty pages long, Maitreya appears as main protagonist alongside the Buddha (pp. 53–76). Although not positively identified, we have of course several texts in the *Ratnakūta* that seem to have been inspired by the cult of Maitreya (*Rkt* 23, 40, 41). While all of these postdate the *Kp* and *Ratnarāsi* fragments by approximately four centuries, they are testimony to the *Ratnakūta*’s enduring popularity in Central Asia. It is difficult to determine just exactly for how long this popularity lasted. It is striking, however, that in the same source the *Ratnakūta* does not figure in a section that gives three of the four major sūtra collections of the day, that is, the *Prajñāparamitā, Buddhāvatamsa* and *Mahāsaṃnipāta* (p. 187). This seems to suggest that it was more the individual sūtras of the *Ratnakūta* and not the collection itself which enjoyed popularity in Central Asia.
183. Wayman, A. 1974, pp. 1–16. In his study on the Śms (*Rkt* 48), Wayman utilises archaeological evidence discovered at these sites to place the date of composition of the Śms tentatively within the Iksavāku rule of the third century AD. He then cites inscriptions of the second and third centuries AD that have been found at the same locations. They indicate the presence of the Pūrvaśaila and Utarasaila, two late sub-sects of the Mahāsāṅghika school, and that of the Mahāsāṅghika sub-sect called Caitya from which they issued. These data and doctrinal parallels found in the *Mvu*, a text of the Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravāda, prompted him to associate the Śms with the Mahāsāṅghika school of the third century AD (Wayman, 1974, p. 3).
Conclusion

In the light of the available information and the wealth of its documentation, a few concluding observations seem appropriate.

The Ratnakūta collection as it stands today was edited at the beginning of the eighth century in China by Bodhiruci, a South Indian Tripitaka master. In addition to compiling the collection, he participated significantly in the translation of the texts. Before Bodhiruci the history of the collection is rather obscure, though there is evidence to suggest that it must have existed in a similar form some fifty years earlier. At that time it was esteemed by scholars as an important collection which enjoyed considerable prestige.

Little can be said that is conclusive about the earliest phases in the formation of the ‘original’ collection. It seems certain that the Ratnakūta was shaped in India. There is evidence that suggests that already from very early on (perhaps because of similarity in contents) certain Mahāyāna texts came to be informally grouped together. This group, which may have comprised as many as twenty or more sūtras, was rendered into Chinese in the third century by Dharmarakṣa. Śāntideva and other Buddhist writers of later centuries called on them as scriptural authorities. It is probable that by the time Hsūan-tsang visited India in the seventh century AD they had already assumed the shape of a formal collection entitled Mahāratnakūta. However, owing to the fact that Śāntideva, Candrakīrti and Asaṅga seem unaware of it, one suspects that, in its earliest phase, the collection had been restricted to some local tradition.

A number of sources point to South India, during the early centuries of our era, as the cultural context in which the Ratnakūta may have been originally compiled. However, little sound evidence has been uncovered to support such a view. Several texts that are currently included in our collection appear to have been of South Indian origin, and Bodhiruci, the person who played a major role in shaping the collection as it stands today, was a native of this area. Yet, no source apart perhaps from the relatively late Nikāyasamgraha actually confirms South India as the place of its compilation. The fact that Hsūan-tsang acquired the Bodhisattvapiṭaka in northern India would seem to suggest that the Ratnakūta collection had gained some wider circulation by the first half of the seventh century. Similarly, no evidence has as yet been produced that would associate the formation of the Ratnakūta with any specific personality. By the time Bodhiruci received the request for translating the Ratnakūta
sūtras, its overall structure had probably already been determined.

The South Indian origin of several of the texts included in the Ratnakūṭa and their doctrinal affinity to what appears to have been early Mahāsaṅghika thought, point perhaps to some connection between the Ratnakūṭa sūtras and the Āndhra schools.\(^{184}\) The Rp, for instance, appears originally to have been part of the literary tradition of these early South Indian schools.\(^{185}\)

The earliest references to a collection of sūtras bearing the name Mahāratnakūṭa are found in Chinese translations of Indo-Buddhist commentarial literature. There is a certain disagreement among modern scholars with regard to the authenticity of their Indian originals. In any event, their Chinese translations of the early fifth century AD contain several references to a Ratnakūṭa collection, consisting of at least five works from among those currently included. The bulk of the first translations were executed between the second and third centuries in Chinese Central Asia, suggesting that the Ratnakūṭa was an apparently well-known body of scriptures possibly as early as the third century AD. In this event, it would have been among the first Buddhist texts to have reached Central Asia and China, thus forming a part of the earliest cross-cultural expansion of Buddhist thought. Manuscript remains of early Ratnakūṭa texts found in the Khotan area support such a view.

Undoubtedly, the corpus of Ratnakūṭa sūtras enjoyed particular popularity in Central Asian regions. Not only has its oldest surviving manuscript been rediscovered in Central Asia but Chinese sources emphatically point to its wide circulation among Central Asian Buddhist communities.

The forty-nine sūtras comprising the Ratnakūṭa literature cover practically the complete spectrum of (early) Mahāyāna thought. The impression gained is that the collection may have been compiled as part of an early conversion activity, with the aim to provide a well-balanced cross-section of Buddhist thought. Such a motive for its compilation would account for the almost complete absence of evidence on the formation and existence of an Indian Ratnakūṭa collection. If this is the case it would strengthen its ties with those Central Asian areas where

\(^{184}\) The following five sects are usually listed as the principal schools of Āndhra Buddhism: the Caitika (an offshoot of the Bahuṣrutīya), the Pūrva Śāila, the Apara Śāila, the Rājagirika and the Siddhārthaśastra. These are reported to have originated during the reign of Śātavāhana Emperor Meghasvā (or -svādī) in the first century BC (HIB, p. 310).

\(^{185}\) Warder suggests, that “as to their (i.e., the Āndhra schools’) literary expression, some of the early (short) Mahāyāna sūtras long afterwards collected in the ‘Great’ Ratnakūṭa group may have been taken over from the Āndhra schools”. However, he goes on to concede that in many instances these may have been modified in ways that would be hard to trace (Warder, 1980, p. 329).
the earliest traces of the Ratnakūṭa literature have been discovered.

Doctrinally, large sections of the Ratnakūṭa are dominated by expositions on the path and ideal of the bodhisattva. Particular emphasis is laid on the cultivation and actual implementation of the practices that mark his spiritual progress. While the philosophy of śūnyatā has evoked immense attraction among generations of scholars and intellectuals, it was the teachings about the bodhisattva that made the Mahāyāna successful as a religion across Asia. Not only could it easily win admiration, but being adjustable to an infinite variety of human circumstances the bodhisattva doctrine could also be taken as the basis for immediate action. As a central component of Mahāyāna spirituality, the bodhisattva concept was therefore an integral part and corner stone of all missionary activity. Naturally, one would expect this doctrine to play a major role in a corpus of texts apparently compiled with the intention of serving as both the spiritual inspiration and doctrinal authority in such a conversion process.
Chapter Two

Analysis of the Bodhisattva Pitaka

The Bdp is the twelfth of forty-nine texts included in the Ratnakūṭa. As already shown, the exact historical circumstances in which the Ratnakūṭa sūtras were first collected are difficult to determine. From the viewpoint of historical analysis, we can only assume that it was compiled in the middle of the first millennium AD. Due to the lack of independent evidence the place of compilation and the motive for their being assembled remains uncertain.

Since external evidence is unsatisfactory and scarce, I propose to shift the focus of attention to the material that is included in the Ratnakūṭa sūtras themselves. Thereafter, we should be able to identify the rationale behind the Ratnakūṭa’s structure and learn something about the interconnections holding its sūtras together. Our evaluation, though not exhaustive, will furnish us with sufficient data to gain a clear idea of the principal concerns expressed in the Ratnakūṭa, and particularly of its vision of the bodhisattva.

The most suitable starting-point for the analysis of the bodhisattva ideal is undoubtedly the Bdp itself. Not only is it the sole text in the collection entirely devoted to the bodhisattva by title and in content, but it is also the longest of the forty-nine texts, containing the most comprehensive treatment of bodhisattva training. While other Ratnakūṭa sūtras discuss the bodhisattvacarya, none of them goes to such lengths in listing its principles and setting out how they should be implemented.

Because of the special position held by the Bdp in the Ratnakūṭa collection, I propose to begin with a structural analysis of its contents. The main-objective is to establish the framework in which the bodhisattvacarya is mapped out and to uncover the literary expedients that are employed to that end.

Structural and Literary Traits

The structure of the Bdp is lucid in its overall presentation, but somewhat obscured by the disagreement in its translations on the number and scope of the chapters. In Hsüan-tsang’s
seventh-century translation (T 310.12) the contents of the Bdp is divided into twelve chapters, each of which forms a logical, in substance well-delineated discussion of the assigned practices. This contrasts with the ninth-century Tibetan (P 760.12) and eleventh-century Sung (T 316) translations, both of which contain only eleven chapters. For no good reason they merge chapters eleven and twelve, making the prajñāpāramitā chapter final and leaving Hsüan-tsang’s last chapter without a title.

Without a Sanskrit original, there is no immediate explanation for this, since Hsüan-tsang’s more coherent lay-out is overshadowed by the Tibetan and Sung translations. On closer examination of the content and colophons of the individual chapters it becomes clear, however, that it is the twelvefold chapter division of Hsüan-tsang’s translation that has the soundest claim to originality.

To begin with, in Hsüan-tsang’s translation the contents of each chapter clearly mark in discrete sections identifiable aspects of the bodhisattva training. All major practices are given individual treatment and assigned to separate chapters. In all but the last chapter this pattern is also adhered to in the Tibetan and Sung translations. Here, the controversial final chapter inappropriately combines a lengthy, partially philosophical exposition of the Perfection of Wisdom, several sets of bodhisattva practices, a brief description of the means of conversion and a detailed account of Śākyamuni’s prediction of enlightenment. Such disarrangement of topics runs in marked contrast with the otherwise strictly observed thematic division.

Furthermore, the merging of topics is inconsistent with the path profile that is given at the beginning of chapter five. We learn here that a discourse on the bodhisattva training should comprise three successive areas of practice, that is, the pursuit of maitrī (presumably standing for the four immeasurables), practice of the pdramita and the cultivation of the samgrahavastu.

In view of the importance of this thematic outline (it is the only of its kind in the whole text),

2. R, folio 695.1
   For a comparison of Hsuan-tsang’s translation and Dharmarakṣa’s eleventh-century Sung version, see: Pedersen, 1976, pp. 15–23.
3. There is, however, one line of reasoning that might explain the merging of the prajñāpāramitā and samgrahavastu sections. According to the Bbh (p. 213.4–7), the samgrahavastu form a part of the training in prajñāpāramitā. Assuming that this proposition gained acceptance in Indian Buddhist circles (but I have found no other sources that hold this view) it could possibly account for the fusion of the two chapters in the later manuscripts on which the Tibetan and Sung are based.
5. In the Yogācārabhūmi of Sangharakṣa the apramāṇa are actually equated with maitrī-bhāvanā (Demiéville, 1951, pp. 359–363).
it is surely uncharacteristic that the text should not have been structured into the separation of practices by chapters, especially since even practices of lesser significance have been conscientiously kept apart.\(^6\)

Taking these organisational traits into account, it is improbable that the discrepancies that distinguish Hsüan-tsang's well-structured version from the convoluted Tibetan and Sung renderings are due to negligence on part of the translators. Rather, the relative proximity in date of the latter two translations and their shared structural details suggest that they may derive from a later, possibly corrupted, Sanskrit manuscript of a different reading.\(^7\) On the basis of these thoughts, I therefore propose to adopt Hsüan-tsang's division into twelve chapters as the original design of the *Bdp*.

The length of the twelve chapters varies considerably, ranging between fifteen and one hundred and sixty folios. Broadly speaking, we can differentiate three categories.

First, there is a group of short chapters each of which consists of no more than twenty folios. The subject matter that is included in these chapters is treated very succinctly. They are generally free from lengthy narratives or strings of examples and are reasonably easy to grasp. Chapters two, three, five, six and eight belong to this category.

Second, there are three chapters of moderate length, averaging fifty folios each. These are chapter one, ten and twelve. Their style is less concise than that of the first category and some recourse is taken to narratives and stereotyped literary expressions. Nevertheless, their contents are easy to follow and undue digressions are kept to a minimum.

Finally, there are four chapters of well over one hundred folios, namely, chapters four, seven, nine and eleven. The unmethodical arrangement of contents of some of these chapters obscures the otherwise unconvoluted exposition of the *Bdp*. Individual discussions are spread over many pages filled with examples, peripheral digressions and lengthy narrations so that

\(^6\) See, for instance, R, folio 671.4–679.6

Matters are further complicated by the disagreement that exists between the Tibetan and Sung translations. While Tibetan translations lack chapter headings for the sections on the Perfection of Wisdom, means of conversion and Śākyamuni's prediction (but nevertheless refer to a twelfth chapter at the very end of the discourse proper (R, folio 737.5)), the Sung translation treats the discussion of the Perfection of Wisdom as a separate, fully identified chapter. Yet, like the Tibetan it does not assign a chapter title to the section on the means of conversion and Śākyamuni's prediction.

\(^7\) We find similar parallels in contents between the Tibetan and Sung translations of the *Kp*. Here too, it is the Tibetan and the tenth-century Sung versions that correspond most closely among all extant versions (see: Weller, 1965, pp. 8–9).
thematico-logical connections tend to vanish in the wealth of material.\(^8\) Moreover, their expositions repeatedly fail to match the outlines of contents, leaving the reader confused over the direction of the discourse.\(^9\) Disorder and inconsistency increase in relation to the length of the chapters.

From the literary viewpoint, all twelve chapters are reasonably homogeneous and share many characteristics. All chapters, except for one, contain both prose and verse sections.\(^10\) The verse portions are regularly incorporated in the prose to summarise or restate in poetic form the issues previously raised. Also, verses are frequently (though not invariably) employed in direct speech, especially when it is addressed to the Buddha. The verse metre most frequently employed consists of seven syllables per line. This is followed closely by a metre consisting of nine syllables per line.\(^11\) While these two types of metre are generally kept apart in distinct verse clusters, they do intermingle in some rare instances.\(^12\)

The prose sections of the Bdp are dominated by a rather rambling narrative style. In the most common pattern of exposition the Buddha discourses on a selected theme in response to a brief question posed by the interlocutor. In the course of his discourse the Buddha switches freely between the first and third persons indicative singular, assuming the role of persons appearing in the narrative portions. Since the concise dialogue-format characterising the majority of Ratnakūta texts is found only in some isolated places, there are very few passages that contain well-defined and succinct statements. The narrative style with its wealth of examples tends to interfere with the flow of conceptual links between individual topics.

In some chapters, this situation is redressed by the incorporation of sets of mnemonic-type lists summarising the bodhisattva’s practices. The most frequent numerical configuration is that of tetrads followed by lists of tens and fives. All lists appear regularly in clusters, making up larger groupings and often provide the back-bone for the exposition. In chapters six and seven, for instance, lists of bodhisattva ethics stand at the very heart of the discussion and these constitute practically the only section dealing with the proclaimed theme.\(^13\)

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8. This applies, in particular, to chapter seven and nine. In chapter nine see, for instance, the portion of the text that describes the exploits of the two brothers, Saṃvara and Saṃvarasthiti (R, folio 486.2–513.6).
9. Compare, for instance, the heading that is given in chapter eleven (R, folio 615.6–616.1) with the actual contents of the subsequent exposition (R, folio 616.2–685.5).
10. The only chapter that has no verse section is chapter five (R, folio 262.1–284.5). Chapter eight contains only one short cluster of verses (R, folio 413.4–414.3).
12. See, R, folio 381.5–382.7; folio 493.7–495.1; folio 497.2–498.2.
longer chapters, they have the additional function of providing the framework in which the exposition unfolds. In view of the Bdp’s length, such lists become valuable structural expedients for breaking up the contents.

A common feature is that the internal chapter organisation is poorly systematised. While there is every indication that the overall structure of the Bdp follows a well thought-out plan, no obvious outline is followed in the chapters themselves. In the shorter chapters this lack of systematisation has less importance. Elsewhere, however, it challenges the reader’s ability to absorb and link the individual points of argument.

This situation arises from two factors. First, the issues that are raised in the discussions are poorly linked. This is especially evident in the longer chapters where sets of practices are only peripherally related and lack logical connection. Chapter nine, for example, though nominally on the perfection of vigour, deals with a broad spectrum of issues many of which have little direct bearing on vīrya.14 This is further aggravated by the extensive use of examples and parables. Again, most of these are found in the longer chapters, particularly in the ninth. While it is of course true that the extensive use of stock-phrases, picturesque language and many examples forms an integral part of the Indian literary heritage generally, there are only a few texts where they dominate the exposition to such an extent as in the Bdp.

The factor chiefly accountable for this internal intricacy is the frequency of references to jātaka-type stories.15 In all, we can distinguish fourteen samples of jātaka stories. Most of these are found in chapter nine. There are no jātaka references anywhere before chapter five—this is interesting because it is in this chapter that the instructions on the bodhisattvacāryā begin.16 All the following chapters with the exception of ten and eleven contain references to the previous lives of the Buddha.17 It is important to note that they are generally used to

14. In other chapters the situation is not very different. In chapter seven we meet with indiscriminately arranged descriptions of the bodhisatta’s moral conduct in the form of listed norms of conduct. Since the style in which these attainments is presented is predominantly descriptive and non-technical, I conclude that, apart from their primary task of defining the scope and nature of the bodhisatta training, their function was to serve as inspiration and to encourage others to take up the bodhisatta training.

15. A summarised account of the various rebirths of Śākyamuni in the Bdp is contained in Bu-ston’s Chos-hbyun (Obermiller, 1931–32, i, p. 125).

16. Compare this point of departure for the jātaka with the account that is given in the Mvu where we are told that jātaka related to the Buddha do not go back further than the eighth stage (Sēnart, 1882, p. 105.6–14).

17. The following references are given in the Bdp to previous buddhas: 1. Mahāskandha (R, folio 262.5); 2. Kuhanachanda (hchos mos?) (R, folio 295.5); 3. Prasamgraha (R, folio 297.4); 4. Varaśambhāra (R, folio 379.2); 5. Sālarāja (R, folio 385.4); 6. Vipaśyin (R, folio 448.1); 7. Abhyudgatarāja (R, folio 486.3); 8. Utaptavirata (R, folio 504.5); 9. Sucarita (R, folio 508.2); 10. Dipuṇkara (R, folio 519.5); 11. Padmottara (R, folio 539.3); 12. Ratnagarbha (R, folio 542.6); 13. Atuyuccagāmin (R, folio 546.7); 14. Mahāvīrya (R, folio 549.3).
illustrate a particular aspect of the teaching, rather than to retell the events of his lives. Nor is the Buddha always the main-protagonist in these stories. Frequently, the impression one gains is that recourse to jātaka-type settings was solely taken to lay down some historical frame of reference.

From a structural viewpoint their incorporation enhances the overall coherence of the exposition. They furnish the discourse with a temporal framework since all jātaka references appear in strict chronological order. As a result, the treatment of the bodhisattvacarya receives a sense a continuity and even dynamic purpose matching the Buddha’s career as a graded progress across his previous existences. The narrative framework and graphic style of presentation also simplifies the lines of argument. Many sections of the text are given an unmistakably descriptive flavour in which abstract thought-patterns are kept to a minimum.

The Bodhisattva Path

Having dwelt on the literary character of the Bdp, I now propose to look at the thematic structures by which the bodhisattvacarya is explained. In the foregoing section I pointed to the loose internal organisation that prevails in most of the Bdp’s chapters. The impression prevails that the individual practices serve to exemplify a greater scheme. The contribution of the jātaka-type narratives to this ‘sense’ of coherence has already been mentioned. There are also more important factors in play and I shall turn to these next.

The most powerful device for achieving the effect of continuity is without doubt the adoption of the traditional sequence of the pāramitā. Practically all treatises on the bodhisattva from early on have incorporated this scheme into their visions of the path so that it became soon accepted as the fundamental structure of the training. The training scheme of the Bdp

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18. The exception is the account of Śākyamuni’s prediction to buddhahood at the end of chapter twelve (R, folio 698.7–735.3) that seemingly serves no other purpose than to retell the actual event in full.
19. Much of the course of Śākyamuni’s career is traced in the Bdp, starting in his legendary encounter as Prince Caritavirya with the Buddha Mahāskandha and ending with his prediction to buddhahood by Dipamkara. Also the references that are drawn to events between those two cornerstones purport to follow the chronological order of their occurrence. This can be deduced from the cosmic dates that are assigned to the periods in which the events are placed. For references, see the passages in which the various buddhas are introduced.
20. It is important to bear in mind that this impression rests largely on factors that are associated with the historico-temporal plane. Except in chapter eleven, no such continuation is evident, although later treatises on the bodhisattva propose certain models of internal, conceptual continuation for the individual practices raised in the Bdp. I have discussed these schemes in chapter four.
21. The sixfold training structure is already attested in the Aṣṭā (pp. 163 ff; 292–93; 310, 322; 412–13) and Vkn...
is thus cast in the mould of a well-established pattern; the traditional order of the perfections
is kept and they are dealt with in individual chapters.

Apart from following the pāramitā sequence, we have other hints that point to the imple-
mentation of a particular overall plan. First, there are several passages in the text itself that
outline the order in which the bodhisattva training should proceed. The most important is
found in a section belonging to chapter five that sets out the description of the path as
follows:22

"O lord, what is the path to enlightenment? O Prince, the path to enlightenment
comprises benevolence towards all sentient beings, striving after the perfections
and compliance with the means of conversion. This is the path to enlightenment."

The order in which the practices are cited in this passage corresponds to the order in which
they appear in chapters five to twelve of the Bdp. Other references suggesting a successive
conceptual interconnection between the individual perfections are given in chapters seven
and eight.23

It is hence apparent that the text is not moulded in such a way as to depict the bodhisattva
career on the scheme of the ten stages.24 An explanation for this might be that the Bdp
predated the formulation of the tenfold design.25 Other scholars have suggested that because
of some geopolitical isolation at the time of its composition, the author was not aware of the

(pp. 17–18, 29, 96–7, 108, 130, 157, 167, 216, 240, 259). But, in neither of these two works has it been
implemented or does it become the guiding principle for the organisation of the bodhisattva training.
Rather, it is only referred to in passing without having any significant impact on the structure of the
exposition. Considering the very early date of both texts, this is perhaps not surprising. Other early works
that give greater importance to the structural role of the six perfections in the organisation of the bodhisat-
tvacarya are the Akṣ (pp. 42.3.1–55.2.7) and Rca (pp. 231.4.7–236.2.7).

22. R, folio 264.4–5

The description of the training proper ends on folio 698.7, just before the account of Śākyamuni’s prediction
to buddhahood begins. Thus, we note the following training structure: (1) cultivation of the apramāṇa
(chapter five); (2) pursuit of the sadpāramitā (chapter six to eleven); 3. practice of the samgrahavastu (first
part of chapter twelve). This path scheme occurs also on folio 582.6–584.4 where it includes the bodhipāksīta
dharma, samatha and vipaśyāna that dominate much of chapter eleven.

23. R, folio 302.2–7; folio 408.3; folio 409.7–10.2.

24. In his Chos-hbyun (Obermiller, 1931, i, p. 125), Bu-ston suggests correlating chapters six to twelve of the
Bdp to the first seven stages of the Dbh scheme. While it is not difficult to see why Bu-ston chose to draw
these parallels (chapter six deals with dānāpāramitā, hence stage one; chapter seven with śīlapāramitā,
hence stage two, etc., up to chapter twelve devoted to prajñāpāramitā), it is important to note that this
proposition is purely conjectural and not supported by the text itself. The Bdp contains no reference that
would suggest that its exposition of the bodhisattva training follows the tenfold scheme of the Dbh, or
indeed any other linear order.

existence of such a scheme. Today we can discount both hypotheses since I have found several instances in the text itself where explicit reference is made to the tenfold scheme.\textsuperscript{26} But this does not resolve our problem. We still do not know why our text favoured the basic scheme of the six perfections over the ten stages, especially since indications are that the ten gained rapid acceptance in Mahāyāna circles.\textsuperscript{27}

The best explanation for the present is that at the time of the \textit{Bdp}’s composition the tenfold scheme had not yet won universal approval. This might indicate that the acceptance of the ten stages might not have been as swift as generally assumed. In fact, there are several other early Mahāyāna works that refer to the tenfold scheme in passing but do not implement it in their description of the \textit{bodhisattvacarya}. There must have been for quite some time a substantial faction within the \textit{Sāṅgha} unconvinced of its merits. If we interpret the growing circulation of the \textit{Dbh} as a sign of the increasing acceptance of the scheme, it was probably not until the second/third century that this indecision was resolved.\textsuperscript{28} The fact that the \textit{Bdp} refers to the tenfold scheme on two occasions and even distinguishes the scope of the individual stages places its date of composition in the period that immediately preceded the formulation of the tenfold plan.\textsuperscript{29} At any earlier time the \textit{Bdp} would have been unfamiliar

\textsuperscript{26} The relevant passages on the bodhisattva stages run as follows:

- “The bodhisattva who abides on the eighth, ninth or tenth stage, this bodhisattva is of great wisdom. He dwells on the great stage (\textit{mahābhūmi})” (\textit{R}, folio 123.3–4).
- “When he has acquired these three states (viz., the state of Cakravartin, Indra and Brahmā), he accomplishes the ten stages of the \textit{bodhisattva}” (\textit{R}, folio 294.1).

\textsuperscript{27} The earliest reference to the ten stages of the bodhisattva that can be dated with some degree of certainty goes back to 188 AD. It is found in the appendix to a \textit{sūtra} called \textit{P’u sa net hsi liu po io mi ching} ‘\textit{Sūtra on the Bodhisattva’s inner Practice of the six Perfections}’ (\textit{T} 778) which was rendered into Chinese by Yen Fo-T’iau of the Eastern Han Dynasty (Rahder, 1929, p. 15) After that, the scheme gained prominence quickly and it became the major scheme to grade the bodhisattva’s spiritual progress. Early references to the tenfold scheme are found in the \textit{Mvu} (pp. 63–157) and \textit{Dbh} (\textit{Daśa-bh}, pp. i–xxvii, pp. 11–99). At a later stage, it was incorporated into the works of the \textit{Prajñāpāramitā} literature, most notably in the \textit{Pañca} (pp. 225, 379); while it is not found in the \textit{Aṣṭa} itself, it is also mentioned in the \textit{Śīp} (pp. 1454–73) and in the \textit{Aṣṭadaśasāh} (\textit{T} 220 ch. 490–91, pp. 490b–497b; ref. Rahder). A similar, though not identical scheme is put forward in the \textit{Gv} (pp. 369–374). In the fourth century, it was adopted and refined in the \textit{Bbh} (pp. 367–371). Finally, in the seventh century, it was taken up again by Candrakirti in his \textit{Madhyamakāvatāra}, where it serves as the structural framework for the exposition of the \textit{bodhisattvacarya}.

\textsuperscript{28} The first Chinese translation of the \textit{Dbh} was carried out in 297 AD. Beyond that, we have no firm evidence about the period in which it might have been written. Modern scholarship has come up with a variety of dates for its composition. The earliest dating (by Conze) suggests a date as early as 100 AD. Rahder thinks to have identified certain sections of the \textit{Dbh} in the \textit{Tathāgataviveśanāsūtra} (N 102); a text whose first translation goes back to 147–168 AD (Rahder, 1926, p. xxi). Other scholars have been less daring, allocating it to the late second or early third century. Whichever the precise date of composition, its doctrinal position indicates that it must have emerged some time after the \textit{Vin} and before the compilation of the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi}.

\textsuperscript{29} If we accept the logic behind this argument, we would have to place the composition of the \textit{Bdp} at the latest in the middle, or perhaps at the end, of the third century. However, since the earliest attested reference to the ten stages is already found in a work of the second century, it cannot be ruled out that the \textit{Bdp}’s date of composition might also go back to the second century. The latter estimate would match the date that was proposed by Wayman for the \textit{Bdp}. He allocated its origin to ‘around 100 AD’ (Wayman, 1991, p. 9).
with its structures, but at a later if it was not contemporary with it, it would have adopted them.

Chapter Organisation

In order to give an overview of the material included in the Bdp, I shall provide at this point a synopsis of the principal issues being raised. Since the content of the practices is discussed separately in chapter four, I limit myself here to the structures that underlie their presentation.

Chapter one essentially provides an introduction to Buddhist spirituality. Convinced of the vanity of conventional ways of perception, the Buddha identifies the principal failings of worldly existence and discourses on the illusory and conditioned frames of reference in which life takes place.\(^{30}\) After the portrayal of reality the Buddha states the fundamentals of Buddhist doctrine by pronouncing a series of definitions of key terms, such as renunciation, knowledge and liberation.\(^{31}\) The chapter concludes with a brief sermon on the three root evils.

Chapter two opens with the prediction to buddhahood of the yakṣa Kumbhirā. He is the chief deity at the location where the Buddha is about to preach, and so entrusted with the setting.\(^{32}\) Next, there follows a picturesque account of the local scenery of the preaching site and the preparations that precede the Buddha’s arrival. From the doctrinal point of view, this chapter is the least interesting. We learn practically nothing about the bodhisattva’s training or the doctrinal context in which it is pursued. Like chapter one, its main concern is to introduce the reader to the Buddha’s discourse.

Chapter three introduces the main topic of the Bdp. It begins with a string of questions on the conditions and circumstances in which bodhisattvas attain supreme enlightenment. What follows next is essentially a characterisation of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) and an evaluation of its intent (āśaya).\(^{33}\) As in chapter one, so also in this chapter the exposition

\(^{30}\) R, folio 13.7–51.2.

\(^{31}\) R, folio 51.5–56.2.

\(^{32}\) The only other reference I have found to the yakṣa Kumbhirā is located in the Mahāsaṃghasūtra. Here too, he is said to abide in the city of Rajagrha on the Vipula mountain and to be in control of many thousands of yakṣa. No more information is given (Waldschmidt in: Bechert, 1980, pp. 154, 162). See also: D II, pp. 253–62 for the Pāli version of this text.

\(^{33}\) R, folio 82.2–87.3.
concludes in a brief independently conceived discourse on a set of Buddhist fundamentals. Here, however, it is more in harmony with Mahāyāna thinking, spelling out its interpretation of impermanence, suffering, non-self and nirvāṇa.

Chapter four, entitled ‘On the Inconceivable Nature of the Tathāgata’, is entirely taken up with a description of the buddha-qualities. Structurally, it is the best systematised chapter, since it utilises the highly stylised mode of enumeration in which the buddha-qualities are traditionally presented. The description itself is exhaustive by all standards, detailing the Tathāgata’s pristine cognition, morality and meditation, his physical perfection, wonder-working powers, tenfold powers, four assurances, compassion, enlightenment and the eighteen exclusive buddha-qualities.34

Structurally, this chapter is important in three ways. First, it lays down the foundation for the successful completion of the bodhisattva training, that is, faith in the nature and powers of the Tathāgata. Indeed, in the passage immediately following this chapter we learn that it is only after the bodhisattva has generated this faith that he qualifies to embark on the path.35 Second, it is important since buddhahood constitutes the ultimate goal of every bodhisattva’s aspiration. In this respect, a description of the Tathāgata’s qualities and powers must surely have been expected to have an inspiring, reassuring and strengthen impact on the bodhisattva’s resolve while advancing on the path. Third, bearing in mind that tathāgatahood constitutes the fulfilment of the bodhisattva training, the Buddha might have thought it advantageous to define its scope and attributes as a benchmark for all other spiritual achievements. In this role, chapter four serves to set out the goal-post for the bodhisattvacaryā.

With the end of chapter four we have come to an important break in the contents of the Bdp. So far, all we have learned about the bodhisattvacaryā has revolved around preparatory exploits. In chapter five, we are introduced to the training proper. This is placed in the context of a jātaka narrative and also spelled out independently. This correspondence lends a personal note to the exposition and contrasts with the rather formal, detached tone of later

34. The impression of systematisation is reinforced by the fact that the whole chapter (which is the longest of the entire work) is organised into ten sections or limbs, each spelling out one of the ten Tathāgata-qualities. The sequence runs as follows: (1) body (folio 100.7); (2) roar (folio 106.3); (3) pristine cognition (folio 110.1); (4) radiance (116.6); (5) moral conduct and meditation (folio 123.5); (6) wonder-working powers (folio 136.2); (7) ten powers (folio 143.7); (8) four assurances (folio 196.7); (9) great compassion (folio 215.4); (11) eighteen exclusive buddha-qualities (folio 235.1).

35. R, folio 262.1–5

In chapter three a similar idea is expressed, postulating faith as a paramount prerequisite for the spiritual advance of bodhisattvas in general (R, folio 86.3–88.4).
works on the bodhisattva. Since the *jātaka* reference is the first of its kind it establishes a connection between the teaching and the Buddha’s personal spiritual advance. Both topics run parallel from now on and become progressively inseparable.

The common point of departure and thematic concurrence between the bodhisattva and *jātaka* underlines the significance of *jātaka* references, for there could be no better illustration of the bodhisattvacarya than the Buddha’s own past spiritual experience. Such linkage not only gives authority to the discourse, but also highlights the role played by the *jātaka*-genre in the formulation of the bodhisattva doctrine. In view of this connection, it is not surprising that training phases are nowhere mentioned. Since schemes of the path do not figure in the *jātaka* themselves, it makes sense that the accounts of the bodhisattvacarya that are modelled on the path of the historical Buddha should forgo these structural expedients. Following the opening passage, laying down the major areas of practice, the training proper begins with a discussion of the four immeasurables. Structurally, this section is of little interest since it presents the apramāṇa in a standard fashion and does not define their role in the general pattern of practice. Chapter five is thus a section that may demonstrate internally few intriguing structural features, but nonetheless is extremely important from the viewpoint of the overall composition.

Examination of chapter six reveals two points of structural significance. First, it formally initiates the discussion of the perfections and accordingly represents the first limb of the main body of the *Bdp*’s exposition. Judging by the length of the various chapters, one would assume that the treatment of the perfections varies greatly in detail. This impression is misleading, since the space that is actually given to the pāramitā is not always in proportion to the total length of the chapters. This is particularly true of chapter nine, that includes a wide range of practices that are only indirectly related to the pursuit of vīrya. If one were to

36. Today, there is widespread agreement among scholars that the roots of the bodhisattva doctrine go back to the earliest strands of Buddhist thought. In particular, the *jātaka* have been the focal-point of several investigations. To quote Warder (1983, p. 9) on this matter: “It would seem that between these stray references in the *jātaka* and Theragāthā and the full-fledged enumeration in the Buddhavamsa the doctrine (of the perfections) had been systematised as the ‘principles which make the Buddha’ (buddhakara dhamma, Bv, ii.116).” Elsewhere, he argues that “this intrusive note (on pre-Mahāyāna practice) only strengthens the impression that the Theravāda tradition on the perfections of the bodhisattva developed independently of Mahāyāna very likely from a common and pre-Mahāyāna origin in the *jātaka* tradition of the third century BC” (op. cit., p. 18). In the nikkhāya, these early doctrinal predecessors are particularly evident in the *jātaka* accounts of Sākyamuni’s previous lives. But there are also other early works that contain isolated traces of the bodhisattva doctrine. Besides the well-known expositions of the Buddhavamsa and Caritāyapiṭaka, a good picture of these early notions on the bodhisattva is found in the Nīdānakathā, the introduction to the *jātaka* commentary (i, pp.16–25, 45–7, 74).

purge it of all secondary issues, the relevant material would amount to little more than a third of its original length.

Another prominent feature of chapter six is that it introduces summaries of bodhisattva practices in the form of mnemonic-type lists. While lists of various types occurred already in earlier portions of the Bdp (most notably in chapters one and four\(^{38}\)), it is only in this chapter that they assume the mnemonic, stereotypical character.\(^{39}\) The lists themselves occur rarely in isolation, but tend to appear in clusters forming larger groups.\(^{40}\) Usually neither the order in which their items are enumerated nor the succession of the lists displays any particularly thought-out pattern of arrangement. Hence, the scope and items of the lists overlap at several points with factors cited elsewhere.\(^{41}\)

The custom of tabulating individual practices figures prominently in chapter seven. At one stage tetrads make up a section of well over twenty folios.\(^{42}\) By reason of the frequency with which enumerations recur, the impression is given that the entire exposition of chapter seven is founded on these lists. Although this is clearly not the case (there are numerous sections which dispose of lists altogether), from a structural point of view their incorporation is undeniably its most outstanding feature.

The conceptual organisation of chapter seven contains three major, largely independent, segments. The first section introduces the chapter’s principal theme, viz., the bodhisattva’s moral conduct, and expounds its spheres of application in the context of the doctrine of non-self.\(^{43}\) Other central elements are a list of ten mental factors and ten kinds of the thought of enlightenment.\(^{44}\) Since the relations between these three elements are reciprocal with each one of them conditioning the other two, the first part of chapter seven is conceptually coherent and largely independent.

The second part of chapter seven consists of numerous lists itemising the benefit accruing

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40. op. cit; R, folio 368.1–371.6.
41. A good example of such overlapping is found in chapter seven amongst the moral precepts (R, folio 368.1–371.6).
42. R, folio 341.1–364.6.
43. R, folio 300.6–306.1.
44. The mental factors encompass three broad categories. (1) Faith in the Dharma; (2) Veneration of the teacher; (3) Inclination to follow resolutely the path (R, folio 306.1–4).
from reverence and moral integrity.\textsuperscript{45} Culminating in an enumeration of sixty examples of pure moral conduct, it represents the core of the whole chapter.

In the third section, priority is given to those factors that impede moral conduct.\textsuperscript{46} In keeping with Buddhist fundamentals, the text singles out desire (rāga) as the most devastating force.\textsuperscript{47} Inspired by Mahāyāna reasoning, it is argued in the text that the best way to overcome this peril is to see its manifestation from the perspective of śūnyatā.

Chapter eight, much in contrast to chapter seven, displays a conceptually highly unified and coherent exposition. In part, this coherence is due to brevity. The points that are put forward are developed in logical sequence and build upon each other. The topic itself is introduced by means of a brief, definitive statement on the nature of the bodhisattva’s patience. This gives way to a discussion of the various spheres and manifestations of patience. Essentially, the text distinguishes three kinds of patience, that is, conventional patience, bodhisattva patience and highest patience.\textsuperscript{48} I have shown in chapter four that the actual contents of these types of kṣānti are far more intricate than their basic division would suggest.

In structure and organisation, chapter nine exhibits several features that distinguish its exposition from all preceding chapters. To begin with, it contains relatively few structural devices that punctuate so effectively the discussions in the other chapters. Therefore, it is rather difficult to break up its contents and to identify the individual teachings. But, it is second to none in the wealth of examples by which its postulates are illustrated. Since I have dwelt already on the effect these have on the comprehensibility of the text, it is sufficient only to draw attention to the particularly strong influence they have in chapter nine.

Next, we notice the astonishing diversity of material included in this chapter. So far, most chapters have been dominated by their main topics. With a few exceptions (most notably in chapter seven), they contained no significant digressions from the principal subject-matter. Chapter nine, in contrast, contains a great number of issues with ostensibly little bearing on the practice of vigour. Amongst the points raised we come across such seemingly unrelated

\textsuperscript{45} The nature of the qualities cited leaves little doubt that it is he rather than other people who chiefly benefits from these attainments. Most of them spring from the recognition of his previous faults and active training in teacher veneration.

\textsuperscript{46} R, folio 375.7–403.6.

\textsuperscript{47} It dedicates well over twenty folios to the various manifestations of desire during which the pitfalls of sexual desire figure most prominently (R, folio 375.7–403.6).

\textsuperscript{48} (1) conventional patience (R, folio 407.7–417.7); (2) bodhisattva patience (R, folio 418.1–420.5); (3) highest patience (R, folio 420.6–423.3).
subjects as the future-destiny of the Dharma, contempt of the Doctrine, failings of grhapati and pravrajita bodhisattvas, avarice, self-sacrifice and Dharma-teaching. The perfection of vigour figures expressly only in one section of the text. Having said this, it is important to note that some effort has been made to relate the secondary issues to the perfection of vigour. Several of the examples that are cited to illustrate these secondary issues are configured to match both the issues they are supposed to elucidate and also the viryapāramitā.

Chapter ten displays few structural peculiarities that have not been met elsewhere in the Bdp. Its rhetoric is filled with recurring statements, parallel phrasing, rich imagery and stereotyped lists of the kind I described in the foregoing sections. Structurally, it follows the internal organisation of the sets of practices it describes; enumerating and analysing in due order the four dhyāna, five super-knowledge, the interplay between means and knowledge, etc. As chapter ten makes only sporadic reference to examples and dispenses altogether with narratives, its exposition is rather methodical and orderly.

From the viewpoint of our structural analysis, the most interesting part is its concluding verse section. Unlike its counterparts in the other chapters, it does not summarise previous issues, but introduces new material in the form of a list of one hundred and one samādhi. The style of presentation of these meditations is rather perfunctory. Apart from the title and a few general attributes virtually no data of any significance are revealed. Since the verses are only vaguely related to the prose in both content and style, the whole section might have been composed independently.

In spite of its title, chapter ten has actually very little to do with the practice of meditation. While we learn a lot about the benefits resulting from meditation, we are told little about the practical and theoretical aspects of meditation itself. To all appearances, the chapter was designed primarily to spell out the significance of meditation in the bodhisattva training, to inspire faith in the workings and, above all, in the powers of meditative processes.

Conceptually, this preoccupation is borne out by the priority given to the ways in which

49. R, folio 429.5–448.1.
50. R, folio 448.2–453.1.
51. R, folio 477.7–483.4.
meditative attainments benefit the bodhisattva’s spiritual advance. Particular attention is paid to the role that is played in this process by the five abhijñā. Their explication spans over more than two thirds of the whole chapter and dominates the exposition more than any other practice.\(^{57}\) Again, as in the case of meditation practice, little is said about the psychic processes lying at the heart of their operation. Instead, much stress is laid on their effects and on the role they assume in the training.

Chapter eleven, entitled ‘On the Perfection of Wisdom’, contains some of the most interesting thought in the *Bdp*. As I shall discuss its content and structure at length in chapter four, I shall limit myself here to a few general remarks. Like chapter ten, it dispenses with all narrative and incorporates only a limited number of examples. Its verse sections are very few and generally rather short. Particularly striking, from the organisational viewpoint, is the frequent use of lists and sets of practices that organise its contents into well-delineated sections. Owing to the lack of picturesque language, its exposition is rather technical and displays only thought that is of immediate relevance to the Perfection of Wisdom.

The contents of chapter eleven falls into three technically distinct, but doctrinally interrelated portions. The first section is given over to propound the basic phases in the process of cognition, that is to say, the factors leading to the acquisition of wisdom and the attainments that spring from them. The most notable feature in this section is a list of seventy-two types of learning. Next, a series of practices intimately connected with wisdom is expounded. These include right view (ṣamyagdrṣṭi), correct seeing (yoniṣo darsana) and correct penetration (yoniṣo praveṣa). There are several indications that the discussion of these attainments is structured to reflect the first four phases of the Buddhist path, that is, the *sambhāramārga*, *prayogamārga*, *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga*.

The second section defines in greater detail those practices particularly relevant to mastery over Perfect Wisdom. Formally embedded in a list of ten types of ‘skill’ are included, amongst others, the *pratisamvid*, *pratisaraṇa*, *punya* and *jñānasamābhāra*, *bodhipākṣika dharma* as well as *ṣamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. As in section one, most of these practices were conceived of in relation to each other and represent a continuation of the cognitive processes initiated through the seventy-two forms of learning. The attainment of wisdom itself is marked by ‘skill’ in all *dharma* that signals true cognition of reality.

Turning to the structure of this tenfold division of ‘skill’, we notice certain ‘irregularities’\(^{57}\). R, folio 551.5–572.4.
in its organisation. First, the sequence in which the individual ‘skills’ are listed in the introductory outline of contents corresponds only approximately to the succession in which they are actually raised in the text. While it is true that all items are included, they do not comply with the proposed order. ‘Skill’ in discursive insight (vijñāna) and direct knowledge (jñāna), for example, figure as a subcategory to ‘skill’ in pratisaraṇa rather than (as announced) as an independent ‘skill’.\(^{58}\) In addition, the text discusses ‘skill’ in the accumulation of merit and knowledge and ‘skill’ in the bases of mindfulness as principal ‘skills’, even though they do not figure in the heading.\(^{59}\) It is perhaps worth noting that all irregularities occur in the mid-section. Whatever the reason behind these modifications, it is clear that their impact on the overall scheme is negligible. It could even be argued that they reinforce the coherence of the exposition, since training in the smṛtyupasthāna and jñānasamabhāra is certainly of advantage (if not altogether indispensable) to the generation of wisdom.

Approaching its conceptual climax, chapter eleven goes then on to define the exact cognitive contents of the perfection of wisdom.\(^{60}\) For this purpose, it deconstructs the word pra-jñāpāramitā in its component parts and discusses the nature of prajñā and pāramitā separately. In spite of this formal division, the two strands of analysis run largely concurrent and correspond in much detail.

Chapter twelve comprises two major sections. It begins with a comparatively brief exposition of the four means of conversion. Proportionally, their elucidation accounts for little more than a tenth of the chapter’s total content.\(^{61}\) It will be recalled that the means of conversion stand at the very end of the Bdp’s path scheme. However, it is left open as to whether this positioning was meant to grade them as the culmination of the path, or whether they were placed there out of structural convenience. While the exposition itself contains some interesting propositions, organisationally it is rather unremarkable.

The second part of chapter twelve consists of the well-known jātaka episode describing Śākyamuni’s meeting with Dipamkara and the subsequent prediction to buddhahood.\(^{62}\) Unlike preceding jātaka used to illustrate the bodhisattva practice, this story serves no other purpose.

\(^{58}\) R, folio 634.7–636.5.
\(^{59}\) R, folio 649.5–662.3; folio 639.7–649.2.
\(^{60}\) R, folio 685.7–690.1.
\(^{61}\) R, folio 695.1–698.7.
\(^{62}\) R, folio 699.1–737.4.

An identical version of the narrative of Śākyamuni’s prediction is found in the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya (Bareau, 1966, 1–16).
than to relate the events of the narrative. Since its incorporation has no practical bearing on the bodhisattvacarya (it contains virtually no information of any value on the training itself) apart from signalling the completion of the path, the whole point of it telling it here is perhaps simply to keep the tradition of the event alive.

Two considerations might have led to its placing at the end of the discourse. In an exposition that is largely dedicated to the training of the bodhisattva but frequently deployed in the context of the Buddha’s former lives, there could hardly be a more appropriate way of ending it than by retelling the final phases of Śākyamuni’s exploits. This stratagem not only brings the series of jātaka stories to its logical conclusion, but asserts the viability of the whole enterprise in an incontestable way. By singling out this ending, the Bdp not only re-enacts the context in which the bodhisattva training unfolds, but more importantly, sets it within a mythological frame of reference, thereby drawing ultimate authority from the experience of the Buddha himself.
Chapter Three

The Bodhisattva Ideal in the Mahāratnakūṭa Collection

In our survey of the content of the *Ratnakūṭa* in chapter one we have learned of the wide range of topics included in its forty-nine *sūtras*. It soon became apparent that many of them show a common interest in the bodhisattva. While examining the texts, I began to wonder whether this shared concern might have occasioned their being assembled into one collection.

In chapter two, I investigated the structural and literary features of the *Bdp*. Taking the findings of this analysis as point of departure, I shall now assess the structure and presentation of the *bodhisattvacarya* in the *Ratnakūṭa*. Particular consideration will be given to the role played by the *Bdp*'s teachings amongst these *sūtras*. The reasons for this emphasis are twofold. First, while many *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* contain material on the bodhisattva ideal, the *Bdp* is virtually the only text practically exclusively dedicated to the bodhisattva. Second, no other text in this collection provides a similar wealth of detail on the bodhisattva as that found in the *Bdp*. In length alone, it eclipses all other bodhisattva texts many times over. This raises the distinct possibility that its teachings might also have been invested with special role in the description of the bodhisattva ideal.

Taking into account the size and diversity of the collection a detailed analysis of all forty-eight texts would constitute a task so vast as to take it well beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I have selected twenty-three *sūtras* that are of particular relevance to the study of the bodhisattva ideal. Amongst these texts I include several *sūtras* that may contain little new in terms of practice, but exhibit intriguing and seemingly unprecedented perspectives of the path.

Let me stress, however, that this selection is not to imply that the remaining twenty-five works ignore the bodhisattva ideal. On the contrary, among them there are several *sūtras* containing some interesting insights. Generally, though, they treat other subjects more extensively and place the *bodhisattva* practice in a subordinate role or refer to it only in passing, and so are of minor importance to the present investigation.
Categories of Bodhisattva Texts

As already indicated I shall analyse only those *sūtras* containing most of the data on the bodhisattva. For this purpose, I distinguished two text groups. First, there are twenty-three *sūtras* that place the bodhisattva ideal in the centre of their exposition.¹ Since these works hold most of the relevant evidence, they become the bedrock for this study. Second, there is a group that comprises five texts containing isolated points of interest, but typically these refer to the bodhisattva ideal only in passing.²

For the sake of organisation, I propose to subdivide further the first text category by differentiating between:

1. *Sūtras* whose aim is the explication of the bodhisattva ideal.
2. *Sūtras* that discuss bodhisattva practices and attributes.
3. *Sūtras* that focus on the bodhisattva doctrine.

The following ten texts belong to the first sub-category:³ The *Rāṣṭrapālalaparipṛcchā*, *Ugraparipṛcchā*, *Kāśyaparivarvata*, *Svapnanirdeśa*, *Upāyakauśalyaparivarvata*, *Sumatidarikaparipṛcchā*, *Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā*, *Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā*, *Aksayamatiparipṛcchā* and *Darikavimalasuddha*.

The second sub-group consists of eight works:⁴ The *Vimaladattāparipṛcchā*, *Acintyabuddhavishayanirdeśa*, *Bhadramāyākāravyākarana*, *Mahāprātiḥāryopadeśa*, *Susthitatamatdevapu-...

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¹ These are the *Svapnanirdeśa* (Rkt 4), *Pūrṇaparipṛcchā* (Rkt 17), *Rāṣṭrapālalaparipṛcchā* (Rkt 18), *Ugraparipṛcchā* (Rkt 19), *Vidyutprātparipṛcchā* (Rkt 20), *Bhadramāyākāravyākarana*, (Rkt 21), *Mahāprātiḥāryopadeśa* (Rkt 22), *Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā* (Rkt 24), *Subāhuparipṛcchā* (Rkt 26), *Śurataparipṛcchā* (Rkt 27), *Viradattagṛhaparipṛcchā* (Rkt 28), *Sumatidarikaparipṛcchā* (Rkt 30), *Gāṅgottaraparipṛcchā* (Rkt 31), *AŚokadattāvyākarana* (Rkt 32), *Vimaladattāparipṛcchā* (Rkt 33), *Susthitatamatdevapuṭraparipṛcchā* (Rkt 36), *Upāyakauśalyaparivarvata* (Rkt 38), *Darikavimalasuddha* (Rkt 40), *Kāśyapaparivarvata* (Rkt 43), *Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā* (Rkt 45), *Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā* (Rkt 47) and *Śrīmālādeviśīnānāda* (Rkt 48).

² The most prominent examples of this group are the *Trisāṁvaranirdeśaparivarvata* (Rkt 1) *Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa* (Rkt 3), *Daśadhamakasūtra* (Rkt 9), *Pitāputrasamāgama* (Rkt 16) and *Acintyabuddhavishayanirdeśa* (Rkt 35).

³ Besides the *Bāp*, it is only the *Ug* (colophon of T 323), *Prn* (attested in the T'ang catalogue; Mochizuki, 1931–36, p. 3441a 5–25; ref. Schuster) and *Rp* (pp. 59.20–60.2) that contain references to the bodhisattva-caryā in their title.

⁴ In most cases, the relevant section is introduced by shifting the focal point to the bodhisattva training. See: *Prn* (23, pp. 231.3–32.5.4) *Vimaladattāparipṛcchā* (24, pp. 108.5.1–111.3.8), *Susthitatamatdevapuṭraparipṛcchā* (24, pp. 130.4.6–134.1.4), *Bhadramāyākāravyākarana* (23, pp. 7.3.3–9.3.7). In other cases, however, the distinction becomes more blurred with sets of practices being freely interpolated in the description of the main topic, e.g., *Viradattagṛhaparipṛcchā* (24, pp. 84.2.2–85.1.3) and *Mahāprātiḥāryopadeśa* (24, pp. 19.5.1–20.31; 20.3.5–21.3.7; 22.4.5–23.4.8).
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The third sub-category is comprised of three sūtras: The Śrīmālādevīsimhanāda, Aśokadattāvāyākaraṇa, Gangottaraparipṛcchā and the Sūrataparipṛcchā.  
Besides these twenty-one texts, there is one more sūtra that seemingly places the bodhisattva in the centre of its exposition. This is the Ratnarāṣisūtra. The reason why I declined to allocate a place in either of these categories to this sūtra is simple. It does not mention the bodhisattva. The Ratnarāṣisūtra discusses the conduct and practice of the religious practitioner (śramaṇā) in what is formally a Mahāyāna frame of reference, but curiously does not refer to him as bodhisattva. Since the centre of interest is the Vinaya observing monk, it is clear that the text presupposes the monastic environment as framework for the spiritual training. On the basis of eye-witness reports, we know that in practice bodhisattvas were bound to the spirit of the monastic code and often pursued their careers in monasteries. Thus, it seems that the disciplinary reprimands that are voiced in the Ratnarāṣisūtra are directed at all practitioners partaking in the monastic training and so apply also to the bodhisattva.  
Like practically all Mahāyāna sūtras, the Ratnakūta’s bodhisattva texts operate within the gnosoeologic parameter of Mahāyāna ontology. This is most ostensibly borne out by the frequency with which they draw connections with its axioms of emptiness (śūnya), sameness (sametā) and inapprehensibility (anupalambha) that most accept as the philosophic substratum for their expositions. The extent to which these principles come to play a role in the bodhisattva training varies greatly from text to text. While some sūtras refer to them only in passing, others assess the whole practice in strict accordance with these axioms. Frequently, it is achieved by defining every bodhisattva activity in terms of śūnyatā from the very outset.  

5. In chapter one, I pointed out that in an early T'ang catalogue the Prn carries the alternative title Bodhisattvatvapitaka. While it is true that virtually all portions of its exposition have some bearing on the bodhisattva ideal, it is only a relatively small part that contains explicit information on the bodhisattva training itself. Most of these data are found in its first chapter, entitled ‘On the bodhisattva-cārya’. However, since this chapter is extremely short, spanning barely ten out of one hundred and fifty folios, even this part of the Prn does not provide much information on the training. Hence, I did not include the Prn amongst the ten Ratnakūta works whose centre of interest is the bodhisattva-cārya.  
6. For the most part, these texts contain no explicit references to the bodhisattva training per se. Their importance lies chiefly in the doctrinal frame in which they set the pursuit of the bodhisattva ideal. This allows often for inferences about the theoretical dimensions of the bodhisattva doctrine as contrasted with the more practical aspects of its implementation in the training itself.  
7. Our knowledge of monastic customs is chiefly based on the reports we have from Chinese pilgrims who travelled to India and Central Asia around the middle of the first millennium AD. For details on the prevailing state of affairs in Buddhist monasteries, consult: Beal, 1884; Legge, 1886.  
8. The sūtras belonging to this category are most prominently the Rp, Ug, Svapnanirdesā and Ratnarāśi. In these, no attempt is made to link the tenets of Mahāyāna ontology with the practice itself. Thus, their teachings on the bodhisattva assume invariably a very realistic, urgent perspective.  
9. This applies in particular to the Vup, Sūmatidarikaparipṛcchā and Upāyakauśalyaparivarta. A similar
Owing to this somewhat defiant system of reasoning which challenges the validity of action in general, the bodhisattva thought inevitably becomes less persuasive.\textsuperscript{10}

Let me stress, however, that the texts that use unmitigated philosophical reasoning throughout are in a clear minority.\textsuperscript{11} The vast majority display an astonishing measure of spiritual pragmatism in their vision of the bodhisattva. This emphasis on practical concerns is best exemplified by the weight that many give to the ethical dimensions of the career. In addition, great heed is consistently shown to the more religious facets of the training, including concepts such as faith, veneration, discipline, vigour and purity.

\textit{Sūtras whose Aim is the Explication of the Bodhisattva Ideal}

Broadly speaking, in this category we can distinguish four different approaches in the discussion of the bodhisattva ideal.

First, there are \textit{sūtras} that display a high degree of informality and structural liberty in their description of the \textit{bodhisattvavacāryā}. Since they often belong to the oldest parts of the collection, their style of exposition is non-technical and lacks many of the elaborate subtleties that prevail in later strands of bodhisattva works.\textsuperscript{12} There is every indication that they present the early ideas of the Mahāyāna movement. Since, at this stage, the finer points of the bodhisattva doctrine had yet to be worked out, priority is given to more fundamental, inspiring considerations about the general scope and nature of the bodhisattva training.

The most prominent works of this type are the \textit{Rp} and \textit{Kp}.\textsuperscript{13} Both texts contain numerous

\textsuperscript{10} This approach is found, above all, in those \textit{sūtras} that I included for their indirect contributions to the bodhisattva doctrine. More will be said about the ways in which it affects the presentation of the bodhisattva.

\textsuperscript{11} The best-known of the more philosophical \textit{Ratnakūta} works are the \textit{Trisamvāraṇīrdeśaparīvarta, Saptasati-kāṇḍakāṇḍa-prajñāpāramitā, Aciṃtya-buddhi-viṣayānirdeśa, Pitānputrasamāgama, Mañjuśrī-buddhakṣetra-guṇavāyaṇa, Samantāukha-parīvarta}. Other less known works are the \textit{Vidyāprāptaparīvṛtccāḥ} and, perhaps, the \textit{Gangottaraparīvṛtccāḥ}.

\textsuperscript{12} The uncomplicated form of presentation corroborates details that we extricated from Chinese sources about the early date of their composition. Chinese translations of these texts attest that several of them go back to the early centuries of the Christian era. Two of them were first rendered into Chinese during the second century AD and many others followed suit in the third and fourth centuries. Altogether we know of five \textit{Ratnakūta sūtras} that reached China during the earliest phase of the translation activity in the late Han dynasty. Of these, two are linked to the devotional strands of Pure Land Buddhism (\textit{Rkt} 5, 6), one is associated with the cult of Maitreya (\textit{Rkt} 41) and two fall in the first category of bodhisattva \textit{sūtras} (\textit{Rkt} 19, 43). For an exemplary analysis of the characteristics that mark the relationship between the date, style and contents of these works, see: Weller, 1965, Einleitung, pp. 5–58.

\textsuperscript{13} Other examples from this category of works of inspiration are the \textit{Rcd}, \textit{Pṛṇ} and, of course, the \textit{Bdp}.
bodhisattva practices and disclose ways in which these interrelate. Apparently in order to distinguish the bodhisattva’s qualities from those of other religious practitioners, a marked effort has been made in both sūtras to describe the virtues and attributes particular to the bodhisattva. In the Kp, this process of delineation is cast in a somewhat negative mould, since the text invites conclusions by ‘rhetorically’ listing traits that fall well short of the bodhisattva’s high standards. Standing alone, this indirect mode of reasoning might indicate an early date of composition for the Kp at a time when the bodhisattva doctrine was still in its formative period and evolved in reaction against previously existing ideas.14

If we survey the practices that are included in these early sūtras, we note that most texts accentuate the principles of early Buddhist practice and, in particular, the ethical side of their production. Mahāyāna practices such as the pāramitā or upāyakauśalya are relegated to the background and figure only sporadically. What is more, none of the texts proposes any formal scheme for the bodhisattva training. The practices are cited either on an individual basis or otherwise are loosely drawn together in tetrads.15

Second, we have sūtras that display a high degree of organisation in their discussion of the bodhisattva. It would seem plausible that these texts were included to balance the structural latitude of works like the Kp and Rp. Two sūtras, in particular, stand out for their well-structured outlines of the training, that is, the Svapnanirdeśa and Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā.

In the Svapnanirdeśa, more than half of the exposition is dedicated to showing the interplay that links the diverse attainments of the ten stages.16 Priority is given to those factors that specifically correlate the notion of practice with that of progress along the path. The path-scheme itself emulates the tenfold design of the Daśabhūmika. The picture drawn of the career is rather sterile, since it is locked into the formal structure of the path and swerves nowhere from its linear order. This close adherence to the successive training-phases may point to the

14. This is also true of the Rp, since it too sets out to define the nature of the bodhisattva in opposition to the qualities of the śrāvaka (Ensink, pp. v–xvi).
15. There is ample room for speculation as to the reasons that led to this structural laxity. First, there is the fact that both works belong to the earliest strand of bodhisattva sūtras not only in the Ratnakūṭa, but probably in the Mahāyāna as a whole. Texts containing such early thought might be expected to be less organised in their presentation than those of later centuries when the bodhisattva doctrine had fully matured. Second, being conceived as works of inspiration, they might never have intended to provide a systematic description of the training. We know of several other Mahāyāna works where clarity and logical coherence are sometimes disregarded in favour of ‘emotional’ subject matter aimed at the more imaginative traits of the human mind. Thus, it might have well been thought that a terse, systematised style of exposition would inevitably diminish the appeal of texts whose chief function it was to attract following to newly formulated ideas.
16. 22, pp. 97.2.8–109.2.8.
rationale behind the $sūtra$’s incorporation in the *Ratnakūta*; namely, to furnish the collection with a text that systematically classifies, and sets in a well designed scheme practices that are elsewhere haphazardly cited.

In the *Aksayamatipariprucchā*, this sense for order is heightened to the point of practically encompassing the whole breadth of the bodhisattva training. It involves an abridged, highly systematised presentation of all major practices and phases of the bodhisattva’s career, including the *bodhicittotpāda*, *pranidhāna*, the ten stages and affiliated perfections, meditations and magic spells. From the structural point of view, the *Aksayamatipariprucchā*’s presentation of the *bodhisattvacaryā* excels all other path schemes in the *Ratnakūta*. Beginning with the *cittotpāda* and concluding in the bodhisattva’s acquisition of quasi-magical, buddha-like powers, it follows not only the chronological order of the career, but also points to the interrelationship between the successive attainments. The *pāramitā* are closely linked to the ten stages; the meditations are generated by sets of vows and, in turn, lead to the acquisition of magical powers.

Third, we have texts that are wholly dedicated to a specific set of bodhisattva practices. Good examples of such texts are the *Vup* and *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta*. As their titles indicate, the bodhisattva’s code of discipline in the *Vup* and skilful means in the *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta* lie at the heart of the discussion. While the *Vup* explores the foundations of moral integrity and its manifestations in the bodhisattva’s conduct, the *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta* explicates the operations of skilful means in the bodhisattva’s fulfilment of his pledge to universal liberation. Both practices are of cardinal importance to the completion of the career. The reluctance shown in both texts to discuss any topic not closely linked to their causes testifies to the enormous prestige of the practice of *śīla* and *upāyakauśalya*.

Fourth, there are *sūtras* that lay stress on the factors separating the lay path from that of the mendicant ideal. The most prominent *sūtras* of this class are the *Ug* and *Sumatidar-
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19. Other texts of this category are the Asokadātīvyākaraṇa, Viradātagrhapatiṣparīṣcchā, Gaṅgotra-āraṇaṣparīṣcchā and philosophically, the Śms.

20. As the Ug is a composite work whose focal-point shifted over the centuries, its conclusions were also subject to change. In the words of Schuster: "The three Chinese translations, the Tibetan and the Sanskrit fragments preserved in Śiks, do not represent the same recension of the text. All translations of the text present similar pictures of the lay and recluse bodhisattvas. Yet there is a radical difference of opinion between the oldest version of the Ug (T322) and all the others about what is the superior bodhisattva vocation, and why" (Schuster, op. cit., pp. 79, 315).

21. 23, pp. 11.4.4–23.4.5.

ikaparīṣcchā. First, both texts go to considerable lengths to present a complete picture of the nature and aptitude of grhaṇī bodhisattvas. Further, neither encourages the outright condemnation of its opposing ideal. Even in the passages where they directly contrast the qualities of grhaṇī bodhisattvas with those of its pravrajita counterpart, an amicable tone is maintained.

The Ug is most explicit in this matter and postulates that the highest form of bodhisattva practice consists in a combination of the virtues of both ideals. That is to say, it proposes to join the compassion, dedication and altruism of the grhaṇī bodhisattva with the discipline and renunciation of the recluse. The practices and attainments advocated in the Ug coincide with those qualities traditionally associated with the two schemes; for the lay path it is faith, generosity and reverence, whereas for the recluse it is contentment, concentration and deep understanding.

Sūtras that Discuss Bodhisattva Practices and Attributes

I now propose to widen our investigation and to consider those sūtras containing specific, if sporadic, discussions of bodhisattva practices and attributes. Since they appear generally out of context or are crudely integrated into the plot they serve to illustrate, it seems to me that many of these passages could indeed be interpolations of later times. Amongst the eight texts to be considered here, we can distinguish two principal currents of exposition.

First, there are texts where the passages focus quite specifically on the bodhisattva practice. These are primarily ‘action-oriented’ and contain only few references to the bodhisattva’s qualities or attributes. This is particularly evident in the Mahāprātiṣṭhānīṣpadeśa and Prn. In the Mahāprātiṣṭhānīṣpadeśa a long section is taken up by a detailed, itemised description of the mechanisms behind the practices themselves. There is virtually no reference to the
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immediate fruits that would result from such practices. In the Prn, too, an entire chapter is devoted to the bodhisattva training and the individual practices pursued in its course. It is structured in tetrads that allow for only brief comments on the practices themselves, unlike the corresponding passage in the Mahāprātihāryopadeśa that contains much more detail.

Second, we have several sūtras where the focal-point shifts towards descriptions of the bodhisattva. Here, emphasis is placed on the qualities of the bodhisattva rather than on the practice itself. Even the most outstanding practices, such as the pāramitā or samgrahavastu, do not appear in their expositions. The main objective is no longer to explain the practical concerns of the training, but forge a new ideal from traditional collections of religious maxims. Generally, they do not investigate the way these were accomplished in the first place. Examples of this shift in emphasis are contained in the Darikavimalaśuddha and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in the Subāñuriprcchā. The Darikavimalaśuddha places specific bodhisattva attributes and powers in the foreground, whereas the Subāñuriprcchā presents the bodhisattva ideal in subtly inspiring but more general terms. Apart from this difference in tone, both sūtras were clearly based on similar assumptions that place them side by side amongst the Ratnakūṭa works.

Sūtras that Focus on the Bodhisattva Doctrine

Much of our attention so far has been directed at the practical facets of the bodhisattva training. This is appropriate in view of the predominantly ‘action-oriented’ nature of most Ratnakūṭa sūtras. This feature however is not shared by all texts, as some concentrate on the theoretical perspectives of the bodhisattva ideal. These I have grouped together as sūtras that deal with doctrinal issues or contain only indirect references to the bodhisattva. They are

22. 24, pp. 15.5.7–16.3.5
The fruits and bodhisattva qualities that spring from the training are iterated separately towards the end of bam-po two (pp. 19.5.1–20.3.1) and again in the middle of bam-po three (pp. 22.4.5–23.4.8).

23. This is chapter one. Incidentally, this chapter, entitled: ‘On the bodhisattvacarya’, is the only one of all forty-nine texts (except the Bdp) that bears a title which is immediately related to the bodhisattva training (23, pp. 231.1.6–232.5.4).

24. The other texts containing passages that focus on the more active or dynamic aspects of the bodhisattva ideal are the Bhadra-va (24, pp. 7.3.3–9.3.7), Vimaladattāparipṛcchā (24, pp. 108.5.1–111.3.8) and Susthamatdevaputraparipṛcchā (24, pp. 130.4.6–134.1.4).

25. The third text which belongs to this category is the Viradattagratviparipṛcchā (in particular, pp. 84.2.2–85.1.3) and, of course, the Bdp.
separately examined further below, so it will suffice to note just two of their characteristics here.

First, all of them pass over the practical aspects of the bodhisattva training and include only a few statements immediately relating to the vision of universal liberation. At first glance, they do not seem to be of great import to the bodhisattva ideal. On closer examination, we find this is misleading. The Śrmiś is the text where such philosophical priority is most conspicuous. The work abounds with allusions to the doctrinal background of the various career-phases. It not only adds new thought, but also draws parallels with several other Mahāyāna works and traces correlations with their propositions.

Second, practically all sūtras in this category endeavour to highlight the issues separating the attainments of the śrāvaka from those of the bodhisattva, often over many pages. These discourses assume an overwhelmingly theoretical flavour with little illustrative material and not much interest is shown in the practical application.

On the basis of this preliminary investigation, it is now possible to venture some opinion on the motives behind the inclusion of the Bdp in the Ratnakūṭa. In chapter one, I pointed to textual evidence that suggests that the Bdp was widely esteemed for its treatment of the perfections. This finding is corroborated by the results from our survey of its contents, showing that the pāramitā stand at the centre of the Bdp.26

So far very little has been said about the pāramitā in the context of the Ratnakūṭa. The reason for this omission is that the Bdp is practically the only text in the entire collection that treats the six perfections with more than passing reference.27 This is astonishing, considering the great attention that is given to the bodhisattva in every other detail in the Ratnakūṭa. Without the Bdp its depiction of the bodhisattvacarya would lack the most prominent set of bodhisattva practices.

26. I know of no other Mahāyāna sūtra that propounds the pāramitā in quite the depth that the Bdp does. Even texts that are intimately linked to the bodhisattva’s cause mention them only in passing. In the Dhp, for instance, the perfections appear only briefly at the end of each stage (Dāsa-bh, p. 30; cf. Šgls, pp. 141–150). Likewise, in the Vīh they are cited only twice in full and also there little attention is given to their implementation (p. 96–7, 157). Even in the voluminous Pañca, we find only sporadic discussions of the pāramitā altogether amounting to little more than a tenth of its exposition (e.g., pp. 263–67, 400–4, 453–64, 488, 509–526). One is led to conclude that the perfections were either considered to be very elementary and therefore required no specific explanation, or (and this seems much more likely) that behind the Vīh and texts like it there might have been well-known sūtras where the pāramitā were propounded in detail so that to discuss them once again would have been otiose.

27. The only exception is perhaps the Red, since in this work the perfections do receive considerable attention at the beginning of the discourse (24, pp. 231.4.7–236.2.7).
With the *Bdp*’s exposition of the *pāramitā*, the picture becomes complete. Indeed, there is then practically no aspect of the bodhisattva training that is not discussed or touched upon at least once in the forty-nine texts. We find works of inspiration that provide general information on the scope of the training and extol the qualities of the bodhisattva’s accomplishments; texts that explore the major practices to be cultivated by bodhisattvas; *sūtras* that instruct in the order that the practices are to be undertaken and demonstrate how they interact with each other; works that propound especially selected practices warranting exclusive treatment; texts that address the controversy of the lay/mendicant distinction and lay down the frameworks for their respective training; and finally *sūtras* that give the bodhisattva ideal a more philosophically ‘objective’ treatment through examination of the theoretical principles lying at the heart of its doctrine. Clearly, in view of this thematic completeness, the notion that the *Ratnakūṭa* might have been compiled on the basis of a premeditated scheme now seems less absurd. On the contrary, it might well be argued that without a calculated plan such extraordinary degree of *balance in diversity* could not have been achieved.

The high standing of the bodhisattva in *Ratnakūṭa* works is confirmed by the multitude of practices that are introduced in the course of their expositions. Since I discuss many of these in the context of the *Bdp* in chapter four, I shall investigate here the extent to which they convey a complete picture of the *bodhisattvacaryā*. In particular, I shall probe whether their arrangement manifests any indications why they were included in the *Ratnakūṭa* collection.

*Bodhisattva Vow*

Adopting the order of the career progress, I suggest to look first at the ways in which the texts describe the bodhisattva’s vow (*pranidhāna*). The most advanced expositions of the bodhisattva vow are given in the *Śms* and *Aksayamatipariprccha*. In both texts the vow is divided into ten component parts each of which addresses one specific training-perspective.\(^{28}\) In the *Aksayamatipariprccha*, the enumeration follows the succession of the ten *pāramitā* with each vow containing a pledge to practice the corresponding perfection. Its presentation is accordingly very formal. In the *Śms* the situation is different. Here, the *pranidhāna* is embedded in the narrative and designates a specific point in Śrimālā’s spiritual advance. As a

\(^{28}\) 24, pp. 204.1.2–2.4; 24, pp. 252.1.5–5.2.
result, the description is very much alive and vibrates with her yearning for enlightenment.
The contents of the individual limbs do not seem to follow any formal design, but reflect the
underlying vision of the bodhisattva. Genuine desire for universal welfare is also displayed in
the vow that is set out in the Ug. As in the Śms and Akṣayamatipariprccha, it is cited at the
beginning of the discourse and introduces the spiritual quest of the main protagonist, in this
case the householder Ugra. Yet, in contrast to the former two, its formulation is rather archaic
and may well belong to the earliest examples of its kind.

All other sūtras containing references to the bodhisattva vow relate its function to a specific
purpose or mention it only in passing. Good examples are given in the Aṣokadattāvyākaraṇa,
Bhadra-vy and Rp. While none of these works discusses the bodhisattva vow in detail, all
uphold its cardinal importance for the bodhisattva career. In the Aṣokadattāvyākaraṇa, for
instance, it is listed amongst eight dharma that remove blemish from household life—an
issue of foremost concern to its defence of the lay path. The Bhadra-vy and Rp give
somewhat less attention to the bodhisattva vow. It appears inconspicuously halfway through
a long sequence of tetrads spelling out all sorts of bodhisattva practices. No attempt is
made to set the vow apart from the principles cited next to it. Neither is the reference itself
very explicit, since it broadly correlates the fulfilment of the vow to the accumulation of the
roots of virtue and learning.

Then, we have several sūtras that either build conceptually on the vow or allude to its
scope and effects. First, there are those texts where it constitutes the rationale behind many of

29. 24, pp. 101.2.5–3.3.
30. Bhadra-vy, pp. 43, 96 (§ 103); Rp, p. 14.11–12.

The vows themselves are very similar in contents and represent variations on what must be considered the
simplest and perhaps earliest form of the bodhisattva’s pranidhāna.
In the Bhadra-vy, the bodhisattva pledges (1) to abide in samsāra until he has saved all sentient beings; (2)
to strive to learn the disposition of all beings so that he can instruct them in a suitable manner; (3) to
acquire wholesome dharma, to defeat Māra and to accomplish enlightenment; and (4) to teach the Doctrine
to the world in just one word.
In the Rp the vow is vaguer (Ensink, op. cit., p. 15):
“There is no salvation, no refuge nor relief whatever for the world that errs on the way of the
conditioned. I must release all beings, therefore I make my vow to attain the highest enlighten-
ment.”
Both are conspicuously similar to the vows that are included in the Aṣṭa and Mvu; these are probably the
oldest of their kind. In the Aṣṭa (trsl. Conze, 1973, p. 254) it runs:
“We have crossed over, we shall help beings to cross over. Freed, we shall free them.
Recovered, we shall help them to recover. Gone to Nirvāṇa, we shall help them to go to
Nirvāṇa.”
In the Mvu (p. 138.16) the vow is given in precisely the same form as in the Aṣṭa. In this profile it is also
found in the Saddhp (pp. 122–3).
31. In the Rp there is another reference to the bodhisattva vow. This time it is made by prince Punyaraśmi
when he pronounces his willingness to follow the Buddhist path. Although very similar in contents to the
former, it is less accentuated and easily overseen (p. 44.17 ff).
their propositions. The best-known examples of this kind are the *Vup* and *Upāyakausalyaparivarta*, where the fulfillment of the vow is fundamental to their theses.\(^{32}\) Second, there are works that assimilate its significance, scope and implications without incessantly going back to the vow itself. A good example of this kind is the *Ug*. This text places the vow at the very heart of its teaching by linking its concomitants of altruism and selfless service with the moral and disciplinary zeal of the recluse.\(^{33}\)

**Bodhisattva Practice**

Broadly speaking, the training that leads to the implementation of the vow is composed of two categories of practice. First, it includes a number of principles that were adopted from the earlier strands of Buddhist practice. Although with the advent of the Mahāyāna these practices were ‘officially’ relegated to the background, many survived as the very bedrock of the bodhisattva training. Second, we have practices that were developed in the Mahāyāna itself. The most prominent amongst these are of course the *pāramitā*. It is their treatment in the *Ratnakūta* that I shall consider next.

The *Ratnakūta sūtras* approach the perfections in three different ways. First, there is one text that places the pursuit of the *pāramitā* in the centre of its exposition. This is the *Bdp*. However, one should also mention the *Aksayamatipariprccha* and *Rcd* since both contain some material on all six (or ten) perfections. In the middle section of the *Aksayamatipariprccha*, the *pāramitā* are briefly discussed and, thereafter, recur in connection with the various path-stages.\(^{34}\) And yet, since the *sūtra* is an extremely short work and does not explain the training in the *pāramitā* beyond a number of attributes, we learn little about how to pursue them.\(^{35}\) In the *Rcd*, the situation is not very different.\(^{36}\) Here too, we have a work that


\(^{33}\) In the *Ug*, by being placed at the very beginning of the discourse, the vow is employed in a very effective way. In a few lines it sets out the gist of the whole work and is easily memorised. Like those of the *Rp* and *Bhadra-yy*, it is early in both format and orientation and very close to that of the *Aṣṭa* and *Mvu*. It runs as follows (23, p. 259.3.1–2):

“I shall liberate those who have not yet been liberated, and release those who have not yet been released. Those who have not yet been comforted, I shall comfort. Those who have not yet been freed from affliction, I shall bring about their freedom from affliction.”

\(^{34}\) 24, pp. 204.2.6–205.4.7.

\(^{35}\) In the Peking edition of the Tibetan Canon the whole text extends barely over seventeen folios (24, pp. 203.3.7–206.5.4).

\(^{36}\) Besides Sthiramati’s commentary on the *Kp* and Chinese commentaries on the *Śms*, the *Rcd* is the only text
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considers all perfections, but does not place them in the centre of its exposition. Instead, it is the *bodhipākṣika dharma* that become the focal-point of much of the discourse.

Next, there are works that contain partial discussions of the *pāramitā*. In some of these, treatment is only nominal and rarely exceeds a few lines. This is the case in the *Kp, Prn, Sms, Sūratapariprcchā* and, perhaps, the *Bhadra-vy.* Typically, they refer to the six *pāramitā* only in passing or allude vaguely to their implementation. The *Kp* goes furthest by simply referring to another text for a more detailed exposition of their contents.

A limited treatment of selected perfections is also found the *Sumatidarikapariprcchā* and *Rp.* Here, however, the perfections are not explicitly referred to by name, but are implied by the nature of the practices. It is worth noting that the practices that occur with greatest frequency in this connection are those constituting the bodhisattva’s moral training (*adhiśīlasīksā*). That is to say, they are *dāna, śīla, ksānti* and also, according to some, *vīrya.*

Finally, there are several texts that discuss only one of the six (or ten) perfections. The selected the *pāramitā* is invariably explored at great length and stands at the centre of the discourse. This is the case in the *Ug, Vup* and, of course, in the *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta.* Each of them treats its selected perfection in exhaustive detail and looks at it from a number of perspectives, with very little overlapping between the discussions. The *Ug* explores *dāna,*

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37. The *Brd* begins with a discussion of the six *paramitā* (24, pp. 231.4.7–236.2.7) which is immediately followed by a lengthy exposition on the *bodhipākṣika dharma* (24, pp. 236.2.8–244.2.8). Its total volume spans well over one hundred folios (24, pp. 229.5.1–251.1.8). The positioning of the *bodhipākṣika* in the middle of the discourse and the detail with which they are treated indicates that they were thought to stand at the very heart of the bodhisattva’s training; probably right next to the *paramitā.* The description of the individual factors is carefully phrased and a lot more exhaustive than all other references to the *bodhipākṣika* elsewhere in the *Ratnakūṭa.* Hence, it becomes a distinct possibility that just as the *Bdp* was seen as the authority on the perfections, so the *Brd* might been held in high esteem for its contribution on the *bodhipākṣika dharma* and therefore warranted inclusion in the *Ratnakūṭa.*

38. 24, p. 189.2.6–7

For text-critical comments on the passage in which the *Kp* refers to the *Bdp* for the practice of the perfections, see: Weller, *op. cit.*, p. 67, § 6.1 (n. 5, 6). Other *Ratnakūṭa* internal references to the *Bdp* are found in the *Ug* (p. 267.2.5–6) and *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta* (p. 162.1.7–2.8).

39. The *dhyānapāramitā* corresponds to the *adhicittaśīksā* and the *prajñāpāramitā* represents the *adhiprajñāśīksā.* The allocation of the *vīryapāramitā* is less clear-cut and varies from author to author, some associating it with the *adhicittaśīksā* and others with the *adhisīlasīksā.* This threefold division of the *pāramitā* was widely accepted in Mahāyāna circles and probably represents attempts to reconcile the practices of the bodhisattva to those of early Buddhism. Amongst others, it is spelled out in the *Msgr, Bbh* and *Madhyamakāvatāra.* sGam-po-pa propounds a similar scheme (Guenther, 1971, p. 149). For further references to this scheme see: Eimer, 1976, pp. 113 ff.
the *Vup* expounds *śīla* and the *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta* explains *upāyakauśalya*. Generally, the chosen perfection is treated on its own and not linked with other practices.40

Treatment of the practices that complement the bodhisattva’s training in the *pāramitā* is generally rather uniform. But for shifts in emphasis (largely due to varying contexts in which the ancillary practices are called upon), few texts exhibit any substantial differences in their choice and discussion of these practices. Repeatedly, our attention is drawn to the *pañcaśīla*, *apramāṇa*, *samgrahavastu*, *ṛddhipāda*, *abhijñā*, *dhutanga* and *bodhipākṣika dharma*, to mention just a few of the more frequent principles.41 Besides these well-established sets, one meets also with a fair number of individual, less codified practices, such as reverence, eloquence, self-sacrifice, selfless service, faith and learning.

Also the framework in which these practices are embedded is remarkable uniform. Generally, they are summed up in mnemonic-type lists of the kind I have already discussed in connection with the *Bdp*. In view of this consistency, it is tempting to conclude that many of these better known principles might have been based on some ancient, uniform stock of practices. What is surprising, however, is the extent to which the texts exhibit similarities in style and tone. It has been generally assumed until now that the concise *sūtra* style is particular to the early phase of Mahāyāna literature. In the *Ratnakūṭa*, however, these features are shared by early and late works alike.42

40. The exception is the *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta*. Here, a specific practice, viz., the perfection of skilful means is related to numerous other training aspects to which it becomes the frame of implementation. Hence, although priority is given to showing how skilful means influences the training as a whole, it is set repeatedly in contexts that disclose its application to specific practices. At the beginning of the exposition (24, pp. 151.4.8–152.1.8), for instance, it is shown how *upāyakauśalya* affects the practice of the *pāramitā*. In section two and three (24, pp. 156.2.3–167.5.8) it is taken to account for the Buddha’s inexplicable past conduct. Thus, although *upāyakauśalya* is the focal-point that determines the perspective for all other practices, it is not the sole topic of the *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta*.

41. As complete sets of practice, these are found above all in the *Ug*, *Sūrataparipṛcchā*, *Ratnarāsi*, *Rcd*, *Rp* and *Kp*. In other texts, commonly just one or two aspects of these categories are cited or else the respective principles are not discussed under the official headings but listed on their own merits. This is particularly the case in the *Bhadra-vyā* (§ 79–121), *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa* and *Sumatīdārikaparipṛcchā*.

42. Compare, for instance, the style of exposition of such early works as the *Kp*, *Ug*, *Maitreyaparipṛcchādharmaśṭa* (trsl. second century) or *Rcd* (trsl. third century) with that of the *Aksayamatiparipṛcchā* (trsl. eighth century), *Śms* or *Pps* (trsl. fifth century). It will be noted that, although doctrinally far apart, all seven works show affinity in literary style and share a conspicuous preference for concision in the presentation of their cases.
Bodhisattva Path

When discussing the types of bodhisattva expositions existing in the Ratnakūṭa, I have pointed to the Svapnanirdeśa and Akaśayamatipariprcchā as two sūtras whose descriptions of the bodhisattvacarya emulate the daśabhūmika scheme. Identification of the tenfold design caused no difficulty, since the expositions of both texts are firmly locked into their structures. There are, however, Ratnakūṭa works where the path-design is less clear.

A good example is the daśabhūmika scheme that is found in the Śms. Being essentially a philosophical work, the Śms displays few clear-cut statements on the bodhisattva path. Much of what we know about its vision of the bodhisattva path is therefore based on exegetical works.43 A key passage pointing to the adaptation of the tenfold design is contained in the second chapter where Śrimālā speaks of the bodhisattva’s successive renunciation of body, life-force and possessions.44 Although, at first glance, no specific design emerges in this reference, it shows parallels with other works where the three types of renunciation are related to the ten stages. We learn in the Mahāvastu that from the eighth stage onwards bodhisattvas begin to renounce their property and take up the mendicant path.45 This ties in with what the queen, says: by renunciation of the body, bodhisattvas attain the buddha-body (presumably the transcendental body first attained on the acaḷābhūmi); renunciation of the life-force settles bodhisattvas in Dharma-activity (by common consent on the sādhumatībhūmi), and by renouncing all possessions they are certain to receive honours from all beings (at the dharmameghabhūmi when the bodhisattva is encircled by the Saṅgha).

Further evidence of the adoption of the daśabhūmika scheme is found in a series of references to four kinds of merit (guna).46 Of these, the Rgv links ‘limitless merit’ (gunaḥpram-eyatā) to the seventh stage, ‘completeness of merit’ (gunaśarvatā) to the eighth stage; ‘inconceivable merit’ (gunaḥcintyatā) to the ninth stage; and ‘pure excellence of merit’ (gunaḥviśuddhidadhiparamatā) to the buddha-stage.47

There are yet more passages in the Śms that allude to a scheme for grading the progress of the bodhisattva. These propose to divide the bodhisattva path into two major phases. According to the Mṣl, quoting a passage from the Śms, the practitioner goes first through a ‘progress-phase’

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43. For a list of commentaries that were written on the Śms in China, see Wayman, 1974, pp. 9–11.
44. 24, pp. 255.5.3–256.1.5.
45. Mṣl, p. 105.11–14 (ref. Wayman).
46. 24, p. 254.3.8–4.2.
47. Rgv, pp. 264–265 (ref. Wayman).
comprising the attainments of the śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha and ‘newly-set-out’ bodhisattva.\textsuperscript{48} Then he passes through the ‘fulfilment-phase’ that is set by the ‘three stages of the body made of mind’.\textsuperscript{49} These, Queen Śrīmālā associates with the advanced bodhisattva. Although the three path-stages are raised at several occasions in the Śms, at no point it is made fully clear to which phases they actually correspond.\textsuperscript{50} Also the commentaries do not offer conclusive advice. Instead, they cite references to three stages in other Buddhist scriptures.\textsuperscript{51}

The Śms belongs probably to the later strands of the Ratnakūṭa. This might have influenced the rather complex picture that it draws of the bodhisattva path. Our next example, the Ug, in contrast belongs to the earliest bodhisattva sūtras. Hence, it is not surprising that, like the Bdp, it does not follow any ‘prefabricated’ path scheme, but develops a plan of its own.\textsuperscript{52} In essence, many of its teachings revolve around the factors that distinguish the training of the pravrajita bodhisattva from that of its lay counterpart. While the controversy surrounding these two ideals is an old one, its conclusions are remarkable and warrant closer investigation. At several places in the Ug we are told quite clearly that the paths of the grhapti and pravrajita bodhisattva represent nothing but two consecutive career stages that eventually

\textsuperscript{48} Msl, p. 70.3–10

The quotation itself is however not found in the Śms.

\textsuperscript{49} Wayman associates the so-called ‘body made of mind’ to special cases of perception, to their reflected image in the three realms and to birth. Starting from these assumptions, he concludes that it must refer to a duplicate of the coarser body; and that indeed the ‘body made of mind’ is assigned to the ‘nonfluxional realm’ with its reflected image in the coarser body assigned to the ‘fluxional three realms’. I must admit that I am not certain that I understand his terminology and the reasoning behind his argument. Since it is only of minor import to our present discussion, I shall not digress, but refer to the passages in which Wayman develops his case; that is: Wayman. 1974, pp. 29–31.

\textsuperscript{50} 24, p. 254.3.8–5.4, pp. 255.4.2–257.4.5.

\textsuperscript{51} Chinese commentaries (Chi-tsang, p. 173) point, for instance, to an account that is given in the Lankāv that arranges the ‘three bodies made of mind’ alongside the ten bhūmi, correlating the first body to stages one to five, the second body to stages six and seven and the third body to the eighth, ninth and tenth stages (pp. 211–214).

\textsuperscript{52} The clearest indications of such scheme are found in a section on stūpa rites:

“When shall I [the bodhisattva] renounce the filth of household-life? When shall I abide and fare just in this way? I shall generate, just so, the thought of wishing to go forth to mendicant life, of no longer remaining in household-life at all and to pursue the conduct of supreme enlightenment. All those who go forth to mendicant life and hasten to the empty forest of solitude realise perfect enlightenment” (23, p. 265.4.6–5.2).

For further details, see: 23, pp. 265.5.3–267.1.6 and p. 270.3.2–4. These statements on the path phases are corroborated by the sequence in which the individual aspects of the bodhisattva training are cited in the Ug. The first section sets out to define the nature and training of the lay bodhisattva. It describes the typical lay attributes of faith, generosity, morality and veneration (HIB, pp. 67–84), each of which is then individually taken up in section two to six (§ 2, morality; § 3, healing; § 4, home; § 5, generosity; § 6, stūpa worship). Next, departing from the ideal of the householder, section seven lays out in detail the practices of the āryavamsa. In part, these are taken up again in section eight that deals with secluded dwelling. As in all preceding sections great stress is laid on the reasons lying behind the individual practices and, above all, justifying the renunciation of household-life in favour of forest seclusion. Finally, towards the end of the discourse, the training schemes of the lay and mendicant ideals are merged and five dharma are put forward that characterise the training of the new, combined path (23, pp. 272.3.6–4.7).
come together in the ideal of the ‘accomplished bodhisattva’. While it is the grhapti bodhisattva who comes closest to the realisation of buddhahood, he cannot achieve this without having first gone through the phases of renunciation and discipline of the mendicant path.

The text distinguishes three path-phases. First, there is the phase of the superbly motivated, though technically ill-equipped, householder. He has raised the thought of enlightenment and proceeds on the path to buddhahood, but his progress is hampered by lack in purity and understanding. Then follows a phase in which the bodhisattva spends his days as a recluse in the forest, exerting himself to attain the degree of insight and purity required to implement his resolution with utmost success. Finally, in the third phase of his training, the bodhisattva returns to the world of the householder and resumes his task of liberating all sentient beings.

Householder and Recluse

Out of the twenty-three bodhisattva works in the Ratnakūta, seventeen take up this somewhat controversial issue. Of the seventeen, eight uphold the training of the grhapti bodhisattva and nine endorse the pravrajita bodhisattva as the higher ideal. Numerically, there is almost parity between the two groups. But before rushing to conclusions, let us look at the ways in which the texts argue their cases. As in previous instances, I have selected from each group one sutra that is particularly well-suited to serve as an example.

The Aṣokadattaśvākaraṇa is in many ways representative for the advocates of the lay

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53. Ug, 23, p. 272.3.7–4.7.
54. 23, pp. 272.5.7–73.1.6.
55. 23, p. 270.2.4–4.6.
56. 23, p. 271.2.7–3.1:
   “And furthermore, O householder, in accordance with the Buddha’s instructions the pravrajita bodhisattva must live in the forest abode, thinking to himself: “In this place I shall accomplish all virtuous practices. Having adhered to it by reason of roots of virtue, afterwards, I shall go to towns and villages to preach the Dharma.”

A similar concept is found in chapter nine of the Bdp where the bodhisattva is encouraged to withdraw into solitude prior to promulgating the Dharma (R, folio 540–41).

57. These are the 1. Śms, 2. Sumattārikaparipṛcchā, 3. Aṣokadattaśvākaraṇa, 4. Vimaladattaśparipṛcchā, 5. Gangottaraparipṛcchā, 6. Susthitamativaprataparipṛcchā (24, pp. 139.3.3–142.2.3 only), 7. Viratvardaghataparipṛcchā, 8. Ug (in the Ug the position is less clear as it changed over the centuries). Of these seven works, number 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 endorse also the potential of the female bodhisattva.

58. These are the Bdp, Rp, Susthitamativaprataparipṛcchā, Bhadra-vy, Ratnarāśi, Sūrataparipṛcchā, Kāśyapa-paparivarta, Aṣayamataparipṛcchā and Pūrṇaparipṛcchā.
ideal. First, it belongs to those texts in which the *grhapti/pravrajita* distinction is vehemently brought to the fore and thus is probably the main reason for its composition. Like most of the *sūtras* propounding the lay ideal, it is rather short and deals with few other issues. Second, there is its vivid description of the challenge launched at even the most senior monks by Princess Aśokadatta. This is commonplace in this type of text, where the dialogue is typically sharp and full of irony. At the end (and this too is characteristic for the householder/recluse debate in the *Ratnakūṭa*), it draws up a set of practices that bridge the differences between the two ideals to produce the ideal of the ‘accomplished bodhisattva’ very much along the lines of the *Ug*. Doctrinally, this is achieved by merging the maxims of purity, insight and meditation of the recluse with the compassion, selfless service and self-sacrifice of the householder.

Our second example, the *Ratnārāśī*, is less accommodating to the householder. It advocates strict observance of the monastic code of conduct and encourages the revival of the mendicant ideal. The reasons standing behind these concerns are well-known from the early *suttas*. First, it is concerned with the personal benefit that accrues to the religious by way of physical and mental purity. Second, it wishes to ensure the *Sāṅgha’s* continuing ability to provide fields of merit for lay followers, as a loss might damage its financial standing. In order to kindle a desire for purity, the *Ratnārāśī* extols the benefits that spring from meticulous adherence to the *Vinaya* and praises those who genuinely withdraw into seclusion.

The assumption behind this commitment to a monastic-type discipline is that lay life is inevitably defiled and thus not suited to spiritual purification. Like the *Bdp*, the *Ratnārāśī* warns of the worldly evils of desire, greed and conceit and goes to great length to contrast them with the virtues of the disciplinarian framework of mendicant training.

59. 24, pp. 96.2.4–103.2.8.

60. The points include (1) to purify the body and gain faith in enlightenment; (2) to generate kindness and compassion; (3) to master all worldly affairs because of/with compassion; (4) to be able to give up one’s life and to achieve ingenuity; (5) to be able to make infinite vows; (6) to accomplish the perfection of wisdom and become detached from all views; (7) to develop unwavering, infinite courage and vigour; (8) to acquire unhindered pristine cognition as a result of attaining the realisation of the non-arising of *dharma* (24, p. 101.2.5–3.3).

61. 24, pp. 207.1.2–5.6.

62. 24, pp. 207.5.7–208.1.6; 208.3.5–209.1.5.

63. That is to say, it is to adopt wholeheartedly the practices that are included in the *āryavamsa* and to pursue the various meditative practices out of genuine desire for purification (24, pp. 208.1.6–4.2, 214.3.3–5.8). There is reason to believe that these ideals had not always been fully upheld, since the texts abound with examples that illustrate how the monk should not conduct himself (24, pp. 210.1.1–211.5.5). In keeping with *Vinaya* tradition, these episodes are presumably cited on the basis of some true occurrence and might well reflect the state of the *Sāṅgha* at the time of the composition of the *Ratnārāśī*. On evidence of moral laxity in the Buddhist communities of Central Asia during the fourth century where fragments of the *Ratnārāśī* have been found, see: *L’Inde Classique*, ii, p. 415. For further evidence of criticism of indiscipline in early Mahāyāna *sūtras*, see *Kp*, pp.162–171, § 111–120.
Two issues warrant particular attention, since they disclose rather conclusively what the *Ratnarāsi* considered an ideal environment. First, (and this is accentuated throughout the text) no monk should expose himself unnecessarily to contact with the laity. Every interaction between lay followers and bhikṣus has to be sanctioned by the monastic community and must strictly serve its interests.\(^{64}\)

The training that such isolation was intended to advance consists of two main components. On the one hand, we have a strictly regulated monastic regime of intense supervision and willing submission.\(^{65}\) The one issue that recurs constantly is the principle of personal accountability. Although it is applied to practitioners of all levels, it is argued that it is especially mandatory for those who hold a leading office in the monastic precinct.\(^{66}\)

The *Ratnarāsi* also spells out the less regulated path of the recluse. Since this career is beyond immediate control of monastic sanction and depends on the practitioner’s willingness to honour the norms of the Dharma, the sūtra’s tone changes from the prescriptive to a descriptive one. Rather than postulating strict rules of conduct, it gives practical advice and describes the kind of conduct that benefits a recluse’s progress. In essence, these take the form of guidelines in combining the spirit of the *Vinaya* with the practicalities of forest-dwelling.

As forest life is described after the monastic training, it could be argued that the *Ratnarāsi* proposes, like the *Ug*, some stratification in the training. At first, the practitioner is expected to subscribe to the disciplinarian rigour of monastic training. During this period he is being schooled in the fundamental precepts of Buddhist spirituality. Then, having mastered the concept of non-self and achieved a high degree of mental and moral stability, he is allowed to withdraw into seclusion in order to internalise what he was taught in the monastery during prolonged periods of meditation. Let me stress, however, that while such a succession of training phases would accord with the principles of spiritual purification and seems corroborated on contextual grounds, it is not explicitly proposed in the *Ratnarāsi*.

The practices themselves build largely on the aspiration and training of the arhant-ideal.\(^{67}\) Valid for the recluse and monk alike, they centre on the general categories of *śīla*, *samādhi*

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\(^{64}\) This implies meticulous observance of the *prātimokṣa* rules in general and, in particular, the strict adherence to those *Vinaya* precepts that regulate the moments when monks and laity come into contact with each other, viz, on alms-round, while travelling, at public ceremonies and so forth. For details on these rules see the *Pavāranakkhandhaka* and *Kathinakkhandhaka* sections of the *Culavagga* in the *Khandhaka* of the Pāli *Vinaya*.

\(^{65}\) 24, pp. 211.5.6–213.2.3.

\(^{66}\) 24, pp. 212.5.2–213.2.2.

\(^{67}\) See, in particular, 24, pp. 206.5.5–208.3.5.
and prajñā and the seven sets of bodhipāksika dharma. But what is perhaps more surprising than the absence of specific bodhisattva practices, is the general indifference of treatment to the bodhisattva’s chief aspiration of universal liberation. Except for one cluster of practices that encourage a generally positive disposition towards people, no explicit commitment to their liberation is made. Clearly, this disinterest in the fate of other beings and the implicit refusal to open the monk’s aspirations to the laity points to an early origin of the Ratnarāṣi.68

Bodhisattva Doctrine

These findings lead us to our next topic of examination, that is, the position of bodhisattva works in the Ratnakūṭa in the overall development of the bodhisattva doctrine. I have already pointed to four Ratnakūṭa sūtras (5, 18, 19, 43) that have features linking them with the earliest strands of the bodhisattva doctrine. Since they typically abound in lengthy descriptions of the bodhisattva qualities, I have called them works of inspiration. The earliest attested translations of these sūtras go back to the second century AD. While in at least two cases these have been subject to modifications, much of their original thought belongs without doubt to the earliest phase of the bodhisattva doctrine.69

Next, we have several sūtras where the links with early Buddhist practice are less evident.

68. There are several factors that might have accounted for the Ratnarāṣi’s unusual doctrinal orientation and the weight that it gives to the observance of monastic precepts. First, one will have to consider the time of its composition. The terminus ad quem of the Ratnarāṣi is the end of the third century AD since one of its Chinese translations (T 310.44) goes back to this period. Beyond that, we know little about its literary history. Other clues that might be of relevance to the Ratnarāṣi’s historical evaluation are given in a few manuscript fragments that were discovered at the beginning of this century in Central Asia. The language of the fragments is Sanskrit written in the Upright Gupta script (Hoernle, 1916, pp. ix–xxxii, 116). The use of the Upright Gupta script raises the possibility that the manuscript might date back to the fourth or fifth century AD (Hoernle, 1916, p. xiii). While this alone can scarcely be regarded as sufficient evidence for a secure dating, it is in line with the date of the earliest Chinese translation of the Ratnarāṣi. For details on the language of surviving manuscript fragments of the Ratnarāṣi, see: Hoernle, 1916, pp. 116–121. There is yet another hint to be gleaned from the few surviving lines of the Central Asian manuscript. This is the Ratnarāṣi’s area of circulation. It will be recalled that we have evidence of the Ratnakūṭa’s popularity in Central Asia. Most of these had been discovered in the caves of Tun-huang. The fragments of the Ratnarāṣi were located near Kucha, in the extreme north-west of present-day China. The geographical distance that separates both places underlines the Ratnakūṭa’s wide dissemination in Central Asia. More importantly, however, Kucha tells us about the Ratnarāṣi’s sectarian affiliation. Hsüan-tsang, in his report on Buddhism in Kucha, refers to Kucha explicitly as a town that was under strong Sarvāstivādin influence (Beal, 1884, i, pp. 19–20). Clearly, an affiliation with one of the prevailing sects of early Buddhism would account for the hinayānistic orientation of the Ratnarāṣi’s exposition. It would make good sense for Sarvāstivādins to take on travels in foreign lands those sūtras which teach the basics of Buddhist spirituality and lay down the framework in which it is to be pursued.

These embrace Mahāyāna thought more wholeheartedly and venture beyond the concepts of the early *suttas*. In these texts we meet with what were probably the first attempts to tackle the newly evolving thought in a systematic fashion. Much of their ‘pioneering spirit’ is directed at the bodhisattva practice itself which is typically reduced to its component parts. The most important works of this class are the *Bdp* and *Rcd*. Both contain detailed descriptions of individual bodhisattva precepts and set tentatively out to reinterpret śrāvaka practices. Yet, they do not draw up a scheme of the path or disparage the maxims of the mendicant ideal.

Then, we have a group of *sūtras* that seemingly take such basic matter for granted and shift the centre of their interest to subtler issues. For the most part, they define the ways in which the bodhisattva path differs from that of the śrāvaka. Another trait they have in common is the dexterity with which they employ Mahāyāna philosophy to defend their views on the bodhisattva. This is most graphically carried out in the *Āsokadattāvyākarana* and *Vimaladattāpariprcchā*; two texts in which all controversy about the need for purity and restraint is dissolved into Emptiness.

Other advanced bodhisattva *sūtras* place organisational concerns in the centre of their exposition. In them, the issue that receives most attention is the search for an ordered scheme to grade and allocate the practices to path-stages. This coordination is executed most effectively in the *Aksayamatipariprcchā* where practically all major practices are given a place on the path. The nature of the practices themselves is of little concern in these texts.

Finally, there is a small group of *sūtras* that include doctrinally the most advanced thought on the bodhisattva. The complexity of their content indicates that, by then, all the fundamental components of the bodhisattva doctrine were in place. Here, we find few references to the actual bodhisattva training, since familiarity with it is apparently taken for granted. The best-known exponent of this category is the *Śms*.

*Literary and Structural Characteristics*

Having explored thematic considerations, I shall examine next the formal aspects of the collection and investigate whether previous findings can be corroborated by stylistic or

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70. The most prominent *sūtras* of this category are the *Vinayaviniscaya-Upālipariprcchā*, *Upāyakauśalyapariprcchā*-varta. Other less-known works are the *Svapmanirdeśa*, *Virudattaghapatipariprcchā*, *Sumatidarikapariprcchā* and *Acintyabuddhaviśayanirdeśa*.  

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literary evidence. Surely, if we are to accept the hypothesis that the Ratnakūṭa’s present format is the outcome of religio-literary arbitrariness, we would expect to find a variety of uncoordinated styles and literary genres. Moreover, its overall tone could be trusted to reflect the fortuity of its composition and exhibit a wide spectrum of religious and literary ‘miscellanea’. If, on the other hand, its compilation proceeded on a premeditated plan with a specific objective, the chances are that its contents would display a certain stylistic and thematic coherence. Selected literary genres might be expected to recur in a number of works and favoured techniques of exposition would prevail throughout.

Since the evaluation of these issues is subject to interpretation and rests on personal judgment, it is perhaps wise to concentrate on matters that are verifiable through statistical investigation. It is these that I shall address first.

A feature common to practically all Ratnakūṭa sūtras is the brevity and succinctness of their expositions. With the notable exception of the Bdp, only a few of the texts exceed one hundred Tibetan blockprint folios. Indeed, the majority fall well short of this mark, with a considerable number averaging thirty folios or less. The range of topics discussed in these discourses is invariably narrow. Owing to the brevity of the expositions, formal chapter-divisions are found only in seven out the total of forty-nine sūtras.

The briefness of the physical format is paralleled by a conceptual succinctness. In most sūtras little consideration is given to issues not immediately related to the main topic. Since the use of examples is generally kept to a minimum, the reasoning follows clearly perceptible lines of thought. It is very rare for these to be interrupted by lengthy, picturesque or explanatory digressions. Despite this conciseness the Ratnakūṭa is by no means a particularly technical, or even philosophical collection. The themes that are raised in the discourses explain typically basic Mahāyāna tenets, elucidated with much common sense and persuasively in brilliant dialogues.

71. Out of the total of forty-nine texts, thirteen sūtras belong to this category of short works. They are Rkf 10, 13, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 42, 43 and 44. A further sixteen sūtras are of moderate length, that is, they measure seventy-five folios or less. These are Rkf 4, 8, 9, 14, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 35, 41, 43, 46 and 48. The average length of the remaining twenty works is one hundred folios plus, with the notable exceptions of the Bdp (well over five hundred folios), Pps (three hundred and fifty folios) and Tathā-gaṭacīntyāgūhyānirdesa (two hundred and thirty folios).

72. These appear above all in the Rp (pp. 34–59), Upāyakausalyaparivarta (pp. 156.2.3 ff.), Mañjuśrībudhdakṣetraṅgūnayatiha and Bdp (chapter vii, ix, xii).

73. Exceptions to this rule are those Ratnakūṭa works which cast their expositions in predominantly abstract, philosophical terms. Good examples are found in the Acintyabuddhaviśayanirdesa, Pitāputrasamāgama, Saptasatikaprajñāpāramitā, Ayūśmannandagarbhāvokrāntinirdesa, Bhadrapālasreṣṭhipariprcchā, Raṣmī-samantamuktanirdesa and Susthitamatidevaputrapariprcchā.
This leads us to another characteristic that is shared by practically all Ratnakūṭa sūtras, that is, the extensive use of swift-paced, sharp interlocution. Unlike the tendency to prolixity of later strands of Buddhist scriptures, in the Ratnakūṭa dialogue is employed with great effect throughout. First, by maintaining the focus of the question its dialogues avoid discursive, drawn-out monologues. Second, a frequent variation of the interlocutors ensures that the subject is looked at from various angles. Finally, perhaps accounting for the collection’s popularity, the dialogues enliven the discourse and imbue it with a degree of wit and surprise. Controversial issues are not concealed behind long-winded descriptions, but brought to the fore and become subjected to unrelenting probing.

Another stylistic feature that is widely shared by Ratnakūṭa sūtras is the use of lists as a means of summarising the various facets of the bodhisattvacarya. The most frequent configuration is that of tetrads, closely followed by lists of tens and fives. Some scholars have suggested that these lists might have influenced, or even led to, the compilation of the sūtras into one single collection in the first place. While one cannot but acknowledge the conspicuous frequency with which these mnemonic-type lists recur throughout, I fail to see the rationale for such a motive. These lists have no intrinsic value on their own except for explication. I find it difficult to accept that a structural expedient, however widespread and well-suited, should have prompted the amalgamation of forty-nine sūtras. I suspect that the regular recurrence of these lists is little more than a consequence of their prevalent use in the early bodhisattva sūtras. It seems quite natural that they should figure in a collection full of texts that place the bodhisattva ideal in the centre of their exposition.

The reasons that lie behind their original incorporation are straightforward and well-attested

75. To my knowledge, amongst the bodhisattva works there are only three texts that dispose of them altogether, that is, Rkt 31, 32 and 35. The most frequent configuration is that of tetrads: Rkt 12 contains thirty-six tetrads, Rkt 17 thirty tetrads, Rkt 18 twelve tetrads, Rkt 19 ten tetrads, Rkt 21 forty-three tetrads, Rkt 30 eight tetrads, Rkt 33 six tetrads, Rkt 35 four tetrads, Rkt 43 twenty tetrads and Rkt 44 sixteen tetrads. Other popular lists are those of ten (particularly frequent in Rkt 12, 17, 19, 27, 35, 43, 44, 45 and 48) and those of thirty-two (see: Rkt 12, 27, 38, 43 and 45).
76. This proposition becomes even more questionable if we recall the kind of sūtras included in the Ratnakūṭa. While such solution is conceivable when it is a matter of relatively unimportant, miscellaneous texts, it is very much less so in a collection of works of the class of the Kp, Amitābhavyūha or Ug. Moreover, this explanation does not account for the inclusion of those sūtras that are entirely devoid of lists. None of the following ten works contains any lists: 5, 6, 11, 15, 20, 31, 35, 38, 39, 46. At least five of these contain well-known, important expositions that surely prompted the inclusion in their own right.
77. It will have been noted that virtually all sūtras in which such lists appear are works that concentrate in one way or another on the bodhisattva. Indeed, their occurrences are conspicuously infrequent amongst sūtras which do not deal with the bodhisattva. This suggests that the employment of series was largely restricted to elucidating the individual aspects of the bodhisattvacarya and not, as it has been suggested, a structural feature common to all Ratnakūṭa sūtras.
The Bodhisattva Ideal in the Mahāratnakūṭa

in many early *suttas*. On the one hand, tetrads were undoubtedly intended to facilitate memorisation. For a tradition that relied over many centuries on oral transmission, such structural device was both ingenious and indispensable for its survival. On the other hand, the adoption of enumerations had the effect of organising its tenets and gave the impression of completeness to its structures.

Somewhat surprisingly, this care for order is not always reflected in the overall design of the *sūtras*. More often than not, the sections making up the expositions display little thematic coherence. While in some *sūtras* this does not present much of a problem (either because the subject is well-known from other sources, or because the chain of reasoning is perfectly lucid and self-explanatory), there are several others where the lack of conceptual continuity undermines the intelligibility of the contents. Owing to interruptions in their lines of thought, these texts may appear thematically fragmented.

Finally, I wish to draw attention to some minor, although not altogether insignificant, literary characteristics typical of *Ratnakūṭa* works. First, presumably by reason of the prevalent dialogue-format, it is only in isolated cases that we come across extended narrative portions. Generally, narrations are kept short and occur only at places where their inclusion clarifies some enigmatic pronouncement. This dispensation with embellishing components intensifies the impression of succinctness that is otherwise conveyed by the brevity and thematic conciseness of the *sūtras*.

Buddhist scholarship has shown that several of the *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* underwent change in the course of their history. Conclusive signs of such modifications are found, above all, in the *Kp* and *Ug*. Comparisons between the various Chinese translations of the *Kp* have

78. The best example of this type of list is probably found in the *Silavagga* of the Dighanikāya (D, I, pp. 3–26) where they make up roughly half of the *Brahmajālasutta*. They occur also in a number of other early *suttas* in an almost identical form, which suggest that they probably go back to a common, pre-Buddhist source (M I.79; M I.76, 77; M II.3; *Mahāvagga* v, 8.3). Like the *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*, its lists address ethical concerns predominantly and give a broad outline of Buddhist conduct. As a matter of fact, many of the issues raised in the tetrads of the *Ratnakūṭa* have parallels in those early enumerations. That, in turn, invites the conclusion that the precepts of the bodhisattva, too, might have grown out of these ancient rules of conduct. However, it is difficult to establish a direct link between them, since most of these precepts are little more than general norms of behaviour not exclusive to Buddhists.

79. See, typically, *Red* (24, p. 248.1.3–249.5.8) where the Buddha illustrates the practices of the bodhisattva with the help of examples of his own conduct during previous lives. This pattern is a relatively common one and can be observed in a number of *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*. Other examples are contained in the *Kp* (pp. 34–58) and in the *Upayakausalyaparivarta* (24, pp. 156.2.3 ff).


81. Other texts that contain some indication that their contents might have been subject to revision are the *Bhadra-vy* and *Rp*. In contrast to the *Kp* and *Ug*, however, here the case is less clear-cut and rests largely on conjecture. For a brief evaluation, see: Régamey, 1938, p. 9; Ensink, 1952, p. x–xi.
revealed that a portion roughly equivalent to a tenth of its total length has been interpolated at the end of the work. This insertion grew over the centuries and found its way eventually into the ninth-century Tibetan translation. The same methodological principles have also disclosed the composite, evolving nature of the \textit{Ug}.  

\textsuperscript{82} For an analysis of the nature, extent and development of interpolations in the \textit{Kp}, see: Weller, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 9–10; Stael-Holstein, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. x–xiii.  

\textsuperscript{83} An evaluation of the various kinds of bodhisattvas that are described in the \textit{Ug} is given in: Schuster, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 325, 328 (cf. pp. 184–194, 214–223). On the basis of his seventh-century Sanskrit manuscripts, Bodhiruci seemingly felt the need to retranslate both the \textit{Kp} and \textit{Ug}. Thus, it is only the later versions of these texts that are currently included in the \textit{Ratnakūṭa} collection. This is true of great many \textit{Ratnakūṭa sūtras}. The details of their translations are given in Appendix iii.
Conclusion

If we take now a step back from the detail of the preceding analysis and evaluate the information we have so far extricated, two conclusions come to the fore. First, it emerges that amongst the forty-nine Ratnakūṭa sūtras there is not a single text that gives a complete account of the bodhisattva career. On the contrary, we have several texts that limit their expositions specifically to a few selected aspects.

The reasons that led to a specific choice of topic vary of course. In some cases, the subject no doubt reflects the doctrino-historical circumstances that prevailed at the time of composition. In others, the selection was probably the outcome of careful reflection in response to acutely felt omissions, new inspiration or reinterpretation. In others again, a particular preference might have been prompted by recurring misinterpretation or misdemeanour. Whatever the reasons for the various styles, topics and organisational features, their diversity makes it quite plain that the texts drew on a multiplicity of backgrounds and motives for inspiration.

This leads us to the second conclusion. Amongst the twenty-three sūtras under consideration, there are not even two works that concur exactly in their approach to the bodhisattva ideal. In practically every sūtra, the focal-point rests on a different assumption or exemplifies some specific point of view. Moreover, the texts differ not only in thought and structure, but frequently display methodological dissimilarities also.

We have noted further a large degree of coordination and complementarity between the individual sūtras. Indeed, there is not a single, major issue that is dealt with twice. Repetitions occur only in minor instances, or at occasions rendered inevitable by the context. Needless to say, this coordination is not the merit of the texts themselves, but attributable to the learning and skill of the person(s) who brought them together in the Ratnakūṭa. The outcome of their endeavours has been of great success, providing a well-balanced, comprehensive account of the bodhisattva that covers virtually every key idea of his career.

It has been argued in the past that this complementarity is coincidental and a mere by-product of an arbitrarily executed textual selection. While it is difficult (if not impossible) to establish that this was not the case, I doubt that a random assortment of this size could possibly yield such perfectly consistent patterns of thought. Even less, if we recall the proclivity to repetition...
and assimilation (in both content and approach) that is a feature of Mahāyāna sūtras in general. A haphazardly compiled collection would undoubtedly have inherited this propensity for reduplication. Furthermore, echoing local or sectarian preferences, its contents would almost certainly tilt in favour of some prevalent textual tradition. There are no indications pointing to the predominance of any one specific tradition amongst Ratnakūta works.

But let us return to the objection that it is precisely because the sūtras do not exhibit an all-embracing conceptual framework that they cannot have been assembled to a premeditated plan. While it is true that there are several areas of thought that stand in isolation, rather than stressing the connections that do not exist (and I admit there are some), I propose to look at the issues linking the individual texts. Of these, the most conspicuous is the constantly recurring reference to the bodhisattva ideal. The other, most noticeable, connecting element is a close affinity in literary style. With a few exceptions, practically all forty-nine texts are written in a very factual, perspicuous and concise idiom that forgoes the stylistic niceties of long-winded embellishments.

One should also bear in mind that what is apparent to us today might not have been so in the middle of the first millennium AD (and vice versa). It is entirely conceivable that the compilers might have sought to implement a scheme whose logic is no longer perceptible by us. It would be a mistake to conclude that because we fail to discern any intent behind its present structures no such objective ever existed.

Finally, one is surely ill-advised to proceed from the assumption that its compilers had access to the whole range of Mahāyāna scriptures as we know it today. The wide dissemination of Mahāyāna thought renders it improbable that, even if the collection had been assembled at a time when all currently known Mahāyāna sūtras were already extant, its compilers could have been aware of all of them. From their point of view the collection might have been fully comprehensive though today we know that this may not be the case.

Whichever its omissions with regard to Mahāyāna doctrines in general, we have seen that the Ratnakūta’s treatment of the bodhisattva ideal is all-inclusive and considers every relevant career-aspect. What is more, the general picture emerging of the bodhisattva is extremely well-balanced. The scale of this systematisation suggests that calculated efforts were at work at least during those phases when the bodhisattva works were being put together. It is too early to say if such a plan existed for the other topics, although it is difficult to see why it
should have been specific to the bodhisattva.

In chapter one, I proposed that the Ratnakūṭa might have been compiled for missionary purposes. This view appears corroborated by the predominantly non-technical nature of its bodhisattva sūtras. Clearly, more than anything else it is the initial appeal of a text that determines its success in persuading listeners of the logic of its propositions. For new thought to gain acceptance it is necessary to use simplicity in reasoning and an inspiring tone. We have seen that in the Ratnakūṭa these two qualities are widely shared by its bodhisattva works.

The role assigned to the Bdp in this missionary process rested on two of its features. First, it was highly esteemed for the detail in which it describes the training of the bodhisattva. Above all, its exposition was commended for the treatment of the six perfections. Cross-references in the collection itself suggest that, at least as far as the pāramitā are concerned, the Bdp was thought to be at the very heart of the Ratnakūṭa's vision of the bodhisattva.

The Bdp also contributed to the missionary efforts by furnishing the collection with the hugely popular jātaka-genre. To the present day, iconographic depictions and wall-paintings across Asia bear witness of the repute and affection in which the accounts of Śākyamuni's former lives were held. In the Bdp, these were taken up and coupled with the training of the bodhisattva. The outcome was twofold. On the one hand, the jātaka served to authenticate the practices themselves. On the other hand, their role was to inspire faith in the image of the bodhisattva. They not only made the scope of the new ideal clear, but more importantly for the conversion of other peoples, they provided the urgently required proof that its sublime accomplishments were attainable. Since the Bdp is the only major Ratnakūṭa text combining the bodhisattva ideal with the former exploits of Śākyamuni, it must have enjoyed great popularity amongst the newly converted peoples of Asia.
Chapter Four

The Bodhisattva Doctrines and Practices in the Bodhisattvapitaka within the Context of other Scriptural Traditions

Our discussion of the Bdp's structure in chapter two has shown that large parts of its exposition are dedicated to the six perfections (pārāmitā). This fact has given great acclaim to the Bdp and developed into something of a hallmark by which it came to be widely known. In addition to the pārāmitā, two other sets of practice are singled out and granted special status in the Bdp, that is, the immeasurables (apramāṇa) and the means of conversion (samgrahavastu). Taken together, these three sets of practice constitute the skeleton of the bodhisattvacarya in the Bdp.

The description of the path is not limited to these cardinal areas of instruction, but encompasses a number of other well-known practices. However, these are rather subordinate in rank and are incorporated in the discussion of the pārāmitā. Prominent examples include the super-knowledge (abhijñā), learning (śrūta), ‘skill’ (kausālya), unique knowledge (pratisamvid), reliance (pratisarana), accumulation of merit (punyasambhāra) and pristine cognition (jñānasambhāra), thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (bodhipākṣika dharma), perfect mental quietude (śamatha) and insight (vipaśyanā).

In addition to these well established groups, we meet with a number of precepts that are discussed individually.1 The majority of these is found in chapter eleven where they are introduced in a list of seventy-two types of learning and involve such practices as penetration (praveśa), good conduct (pratipatti), application (prayoga) vision (darśana), reflection (manasakāra), reverence (pradakṣīṇa) and attentiveness (avikṣepa).2 Although they are classed together under the heading of learning at the beginning of chapter eleven, the exposition of these practices in the text itself does not follow the order or organisation of their introductory listing.

1. In my discussion of the bodhisattva practices, I shall consider only those practices that are known to promote and hence precede the attainment of buddhahood. By this criterion, the attributes, practices and powers of the Tathāgata fall outside my investigation. The contents of chapter four which deals exclusively with the buddha-qualities—most notably the powers (bala), assurances (vaiśāradya), wonder-working powers (rddhi), liberations (vimokṣa), great compassion (mahākarunā) and exclusive buddha-dharma (āvenika-dharma)—has therefore been excluded.

2. I have provided a list of these practices in Appendix i.
The Thought of Enlightenment

The first reference to the bodhisattva in the Bdp occurs in chapter three. Chapters one and chapter two are introductory to the whole exposition and do not consider the training of the bodhisattva. In chapter three, entitled ‘On the Thought of Enlightenment’, Śāriputra raises the topic of the bodhisattva ideal by asking the following question:\(^3\)

"By what means do [bodhisattvas] enter into enlightenment?
What is the goal of these heroes?
How do they accomplish excellent enlightenment?
Please explain these distinguished teachings.

How do the heroes act
In order to [dispense] medicine to all living beings?
Through the production of what kind of dharma
Do they become buddhas, the most excellent of men?

How do [bodhisattvas] convert sinners
After they dwelled on the seat of enlightenment?
How do they attain supreme and perfect enlightenment
After they traversed ten million buddha-fields?"

In response to this question, the Buddha speaks of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) and says:\(^4\)

"O Śāriputra, when a bodhisattva is in possession of a certain single dharma, he takes hold of buddha-qualities and other immeasurable [qualities]. Which is this single dharma? It is the thought of enlightenment of excellent intent. O Śāriputra, when he is in possession of just that single bodhisattva dharma, he shall grasp the

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3. R, folio 81.4-7.
4. R, folio 81.3-5.
buddha-qualities and other immeasurable [qualities].”

In the ensuing discussion, the Buddha considers the thought of enlightenment from several points of view. First, he examines its nature and attributes. Particular attention is given to the bodhisattva’s intent (āśaya). In the Bdp, intent is primarily described as a stabilising factor that assists the generation of the bodhicitta. As an ethical concomitant to the bodhicitta, āśaya is rooted in conventional experience and arises from compassion. Intellectually, it operates in the cognitive realm specifically with regard to the vision of true reality. Eventually, these interacting currents are drawn together to result in the unfolding of ‘pure intent’.

The other important concomitant to cittotpāda is determination (adhyāśaya). However, owing to their conceptual proximity, differences between āśaya and adhyāśaya tend to blur. Some clarification is provided by the description of adhyāśaya in the Bbh. Here, adhyāśaya is characterised as persistence, understanding and resolve—preceded by faith and insight in the Dharma—towards the buddha-qualities. It is therefore primarily concerned with the bodhisattva’s own spiritual progress. Āśaya, in contrast, designates a broader principle and is more intimately connected with the cittotpāda, since its main purpose is to achieve rapid progress in the implementation of the vow. According to the Bbh, it is divided into the subcategories of seven virtuous intentions for sentient beings (kalyānāśaya) and ten pure intentions (āśayaśuddhi). Above all, however, we find that āśaya promotes the practice of the six perfections to which it lends impulses of six different kinds.

Intent and determination are often complemented by correct conduct (prayoga) as the third major factor influencing the progressive implementation of the bodhisattva’s resolve. In the Msl, we read to this effect:

The first production of the thought of enlightenment of the bodhisattva is likened to earth because it is the basis from which all buddha-qualities and related accumulations spring. Accompanied by intent (āśaya), the production of the thought of enlightenment resembles fine gold because his intent towards the welfare and

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9. Msl, p. 102.13; Msg, pp. 188 ff.
benefit [of beings] is not susceptible to change. Accompanied by correct conduct
(prayoga), it resembles the new moon on the fifteenth day of the month because his virtuous qualities (kuśaladhāma) increase. Accompanied by determination
(adhyāśaya), it resembles fire because he acquires more and more attainments like a
fire that consumes all types of fuel.”

In the Śūtrālamkāravṛttiḥāṣya¹², these categories of cittotpāda signal four junctions in
the bodhisattva’s career and are linked with the attainments of each level.¹³ Thus, the first
type of cittotpāda is associated with adherence (ādhiṃśika) operating during the preliminary
phase of training (ādhiṃticaryābhūmi).¹⁴ The second cittotpāda is dominated by pure
determination (suddhādhyāśaya) and leads to progress on the first seven stages. It is called
pure because it is free from the subject/object dichotomy and because it is attained through
equipoise (upekṣā). The third type of cittotpāda is characterised by its ability to accomplish
the maturation (vaipākika) of sentient beings, because at this level (stage nine and ten)
non-discriminating awareness (avikalpajñāna) arises in conjunction with the spontaneous
practice of the pāramitā. Finally, the fourth kind of cittotpāda, operating at the tenth stage, is
called obstruction-free (anavaranika) since it is untainted by misconceived emotion and
discursive thinking.¹⁵

The above exposition of the cittotpāda is clearly advanced and draws on a rich heritage of
ideas. An early predecessor to this scheme is found in the Bdp. Like the Śūtrālamkāravṛttiḥāṣya,
it distinguishes several phases in the generation of the thought of enlightenment and proposes
a certain dynamic. In all, the Bdp speaks of ten forms of cittotpāda. However, their allocation

¹³. Msl, pp. 16.5–17.9.
¹⁴. The relevant passage in the Msl (p. 14.5–6) runs as follows:
“That mind directed towards enlightenment is zealous application (ādhiṃśika); it is pure in
determination (adhyāśaya) on another [stage]. It is thought of as a matured state, and likewise,
freed from obstruction.”
¹⁵. The division of the cittotpāda is most elaborate in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (pp. 18–37) where it is divided
into twenty-two kinds of cittotpāda. In agreement with the Msl, the first three are said to be accompanied
by chanda, āśaya and adhyāśaya marking three successive stages during the ādikarmikasambhārabhūmi.
In disagreement with the Msl, the fourth cittotpāda is attended by prayoga. It operates on the
ādhiṃticaryābhūmi corresponding to the prayogamārga. Next follow ten kinds of cittotpāda each of
which is associated with one of the ten perfections. The following five cittotpāda are accompanied by the
abhiṣīja, punyajñānasambhāra, bodhipākṣika dharma, samathavipaśyanā and dhāraṇipratibhāna that,
taken together, account for the viśeṣamārga of the last five stages (Kosa, vi, p. 278). Cittotpāda number
twenty is attended by the four dharmaṭānā and becomes functional on the preparatory path of the
buddhabhūmi. Finally, the last two cittotpāda are generated in two distinct phases of the buddhabhūmi
where they are accompanied by the ekayānamsārga and the dharmakāya.

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to specific path phases it rather vague and bears little resemblance to the ten stages of the *Dbh.*\(^{16}\) Curiously, the ten *cittotpāda* are not included in chapter three but occur in the *śilapāramitā* chapter.

According to this scheme, the first two *cittotpāda* are most fundamental in that they bring about understanding of impermanence, impurity and insubstantiality of the body and carry as reward—if sustained by Tathāgata worship—the attainment of the perfect buddha-body.\(^{17}\) The third and fourth kinds of *cittotpāda* concern mistaken conduct of the past, in particular lack of reverence towards superiors and ill-contemplated pursuit of sense pleasures. Awareness and correction of these faults lead to rebirth among men and place the bodhisattva in contact with virtuous friends.\(^{18}\) As a collateral, the fifth *cittotpāda* bestows insight into one’s past conceit and violence, makes the bodhisattva understand the workings of the law of karma and removes confusion that led previously to evil conduct. Through possessing these five kinds of *cittotpāda*, the bodhisattva becomes fearless, attains means (*upāya*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) and increases his meritorious deeds.\(^{19}\) Having understood the causal link between ignorance, irreverent comportment and ill-regard for the Dharma, the bodhisattva generates the sixth, seventh and eighth *cittotpāda* that render him inseparable from religious instruction. He is accomplished in learning, benevolence, buddha-worship and dwells in the company of the noble ones, abiding in high abodes.\(^{20}\)

Through the ninth *cittotpāda* the bodhisattva perceives that aimlessness used to mar his conduct. It calls to mind the need for constant mental concentration on enlightenment and unreserved devotion of all resources to its attainment. Furthermore, the ninth *cittotpāda* gives a clear picture of the bodhisattva’s resolute wandering and cites numerous practices that pertain to it. These include faith, honesty, solitude, reverence, modesty, chastity as well as pursuit of the *pāramitā* and *bodhipāksika dharma*. At this stage, being rewarded for insight into past mistakes, the bodhisattva becomes familiar with the perfections (which he now pursues with great vigour) and, supported by pristine cognition and merit, prepares to take up the seat of enlightenment.\(^{21}\)

\(^{16}\) Note that also the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (*Mavbh.*, pp. 12.13–13.1) and *Daśabhūmika* speak of ten *cittotpāda*. Apart from the number and a certain dynamic towards the more advanced path-stages, the *Bdp* does not seem to share much with these schemes. This is not surprising, if we recall that the *Bdp* ignores the plan of the ten stages while it is the rationale behind the ten *cittotpāda* in the *Daśabhūmika* and *Madhyamakāvatāra*.

\(^{17}\) R, folio 309.5.

\(^{18}\) R, folio 314.2.

\(^{19}\) R, folio 320.6; 324.5–325.3.

\(^{20}\) R, folio 238.4–329.1.

\(^{21}\) R, folio 336.6.
Finally, the bodhisattva fully grasps the eminence of his teacher and appreciates his erudition in faith, moral conduct, learning, modesty, chastity, renunciation and wisdom. This prompts him to express approval of the teacher’s thinking and to pay lip-service to all instructions. He is now himself accomplished in moral conduct and becomes a receptacle of buddha-compassion.  

In the discussion of the *cittotpāda* in chapter three, we find no allusions to the existence of this sketch in the *śīlapāramitā* chapter. Its characterisation of the thought of enlightenment is kept general and sheds light on only two areas. First, it describes the attributes that differentiate the *cittotpāda* from ordinary mentation. By and large, these attributes correspond to those of the bodhisattva’s intent. That is to say, it is pure, steady, persistent, luminous and so forth. Then, also in analogy to intent, it is portrayed as the foundation of buddha-qualities, including the fivefold dharma-aggregate (*dharmaskandha*), powers, assurances and āvenika dharma.  

In the next passage we learn about the fruits that result from the *cittotpāda* and āśaya. The presentation is very straightforward and consists essentially of an enumeration of the benefits that accrue from the *cittotpāda* and āśaya. Already at this early stage the bodhisattva is destined for enlightenment and attains a physical appearance beyond blemish; he is invincible, not affected by worldly dharma, skilled in the path and becomes a benefactor, guide and refuge to all sentient beings. In particular, he attains clear vision (*vidarsana*) that establishes faith in the law of karma and causes him to refrain from the ten non-virtuous paths of action (*akuśalakarmapatha*). If he receives early support from spiritual friends, he comprehends dependent co-origination, culminating in true dharma vision.  

Considerable emphasis is given to the notion of renunciation, in general, and the need to become a monk, in particular. Ordination into mendicant life is considered a natural imperative as it provides the framework to a successful completion of the practice.

Three factors that are to recur throughout the exposition of the training figure as concomitants to the *cittotpāda*. These are learning (*śrūta*), conscientiousness (*apramāda*) and correct reflection (*yoniśo manaskāra*). Their areas of application are briefly dwelt on, viz., knowledge of teachings for learning, constraint of senses for conscientiousness and insight.

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24. R, folio 85.4–86.4.
26. R, folio 88.4–91.3.
into causation and the non-existence of dharma for correct reflection. These allow the bodhisattva to penetrate the four axioms of the teaching (dhammadāna), proposing that karmic formations (samskāra) are impermanent and suffering; that dharma are non-self and calm nirvāṇa. Appreciation of these postulates prompts the bodhisattva to comprehend impermanence; to eliminate all traces of desire; to produce the entrance to liberation and meditation on emptiness and to become acquainted with the notion of signlessness.

If we turn now to evaluate the Bdp’s vision of the cittotpāda and compare it with the schemes found in other sources, we note at first a general consent on its chief elements. The Bdp agrees that the two most important components of the bodhicittotpāda are an unshakable desire for enlightenment (sambodhikāmanāsahagata) and a paramount concern for the welfare of all other beings (parārthālambana). By implication, it also recognises two separate phases of its production, that is the actual taking of the vow (bodhipraṇidhīcitta) and the ensuing implementation (bodhiprasthānacitta).

Many Mahāyāna sūtras argue that the bodhicittotpāda is not a static entity generated only once at the beginning of the path proper but that it is continuously retaken and evolves through practice. In the Akn, for instance, it is generated in conjunction with the accumulation of merit and pristine cognition, six perfections and four immeasurables which determine the attainments that result from its generation. This is also the view of the Bdp since it proposes at several places a close association between the cittotpāda and pāramitā and other practices.

Differences occur only when we look in detail at the psychological processes that prompt and accompany the generation of the thought of enlightenment. I shall now turn to the Bodhisattvabhūmi in order to explore the nature of some of these differences.

In line with its overall organisation, the Bbh introduces the first raising of the bodhicitta as the second support (dhāra) of the training. The treatment is divided into two sections. To begin with, the text lays down the attributes and modes of the cittotpāda. It suggests five different approaches of investigation. First, there is a perfect resolution (samyakpranidhāna) that is upheld throughout the training and generates the aspiration (prārthana) for universal liberation. This aspiration itself represents the cittotpāda proper. Next, the Bbh defines...
the scope and object (ālambana) of the bodhicitta, namely, enlightenment for himself and deliverance of his fellow beings. As an auspicious force in its own right, the cittotpāda accumulates (saṃcaya) all those roots of virtue occasioning enlightenment and weakening the three root evils in beings. Besides, it is seen as the root of enlightenment, source of the bodhisattva’s compassion and foundation (saṃnīśraya) of moral conduct.

The conditions (prātyaya), causes (hetu) and powers (bala) that bring about the engendering of the thought of enlightenment are as follows. As for the conditions, the Bbh gives learning about the Tathāgata’s miraculous powers, hearing the Doctrine and observance of the imminent decline of the Dharma. Each of these factors suffices to inspire the generation of the bodhicitta. The causes that prompt the cittotpāda are of a more personal and immediate nature. They include the cause of lineage (gotra) that leads inevitably to cittotpāda due to previous achievements, the presence of virtuous friends (kalyāṇamitra), compassion, knowledge, meditation, investigation and great enthusiasm for enlightenment. The powers that inspire the cittotpāda generally depend on the bodhisattva’s own capabilities. In particular, they are brought about by the roots of virtue accumulated during previous rebirth or meritorious conduct in the present life.

Having generated the bodhicitta, the bodhisattva becomes immediately a field of merit that others can draw on through reverence and devotion. Thus, the raising of the thought of enlightenment launches him automatically onto the path and creates a valuable source of merit. Moreover, it increases the bodhisattva’s resources derived from his gotra, guarantees success with magic spells (mantrapadāni) and bestows experience in dealing with the lower

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35. In the Dbh (Daśa-bh, p. 15.1–6), we learn that the production of the thought of enlightenment is inspired by the fourth of ten vows taken by the bodhisattva while he dwells on the early phase of the pramuditabhāmi:
   “In order to attain the bodhicittotpāda, supported by the true instruction of the path of the stages that incorporates the entire bodhisattvacaryā ... he takes the fourth vow (pranidhāna).”
The Msg, distinguishes three motives prompting the generation of the thought of enlightenment (iii.5). These are (1) recognition that innumerable beings reach enlightenment every moment, (2) the wish to attain the intent (āśaya) to practice generosity and related virtues in order to attain enlightenment; (3) desire for universal perfection arising from unlimited moral conduct.
37. Compare these with the causes that are given in the Msl (p. 14.10–15) which speaks of compassion as the root (miśla); the welfare of beings as intent (āśaya); zealous application (ādhimokṣika) as practice; questions relating to knowledge as object (ālambana); confident zeal (chanda) as vehicle; moral observance as basis (pratiṣṭhā); encouragement and approval of giving to adversaries as obstacle; faith in virtue as advantage (anuśamsa) since it accumulates merit and knowledge; constant application to the perfections as deliverance (nīryāna).
destinies.41

If we now revert to the Bdp’s cittotpāda exposition and compare its vision with that of the Bbh, the first thing to notice is the limited scope of the Bdp’s explanations and its basic logical structures. In the Bdp we meet with repetitions and a fair amount of inessential material. Structurally, although not entirely without its own internal logic, the Bdp’s account therefore lacks the organisation of the Bbh’s description.

In content, however, the two works do not stand as much apart as it might seem at first sight. They share the two fundamental elements of the cittotpāda, that is, the personal aim of full enlightenment and the aspiration of universal liberation. Furthermore, the two texts agree that the cittotpāda functions as the root of compassion and provides the foundation of moral conduct. While this point is not illustrated in the Bbh, the Bdp refers to the ten virtuous deeds (kusālakarmapatha).42 Both works also concur in their evaluation of the impact of the cittotpāda by making tathāgatahood the secured long-term achievement.43

Differences arise only when we turn to the conditions that induce the cittotpāda. The Bdp does not cite any of the factors that are given in the Bbh as cittotpāda causes. Association to virtuous friends and learning, for instance, are given amongst its concomitants, but not explicitly as causes.44 Other factors, such as fearlessness, lineage (gotra) or awareness of the decline of the Dharma do not figure at all in the Bdp, whereas learning of the buddha-qualities is mentioned as a motive.

With regard to the advantages that accrue from a successful cittotpāda, the Bdp and Bbh run very close in spirit. According to the Bbh the bodhisattva produces at first the gates (dvāra) that lead to virtuous practice that turns him into a supreme field of merit.45 In the

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41. According to the Dbh, the bodhisattva immediately upon generating the thought of enlightenment achieves ten rewards. (1) He surpasses the stage of ordinary men; (2) he embarks on the fixed career (niyāma) of the bodhisattva; (3) he is born in the Tathāgata family; (4) he becomes faultless in all kinds of speech; (5) he abandons all worldly conduct; (6) he enters into supramundane conduct; (7) he dwells in the ultimate essence of bodhisattva practices; (8) he is settled in the bodhisattva-abode; (9) he reaches the equality of the three times; (10) he becomes fixed in the Tathāgata lineage certain of perfect enlightenment (Dāsa-bh, pp. 11–12, U).

In the Madhyamakavṛtti (xviii, 5), quoting the Maitreyavimokṣa, we are told that:

"Just as the son of a king almost immediately after his birth—being in possession of the royal characteristics—surpasses by the greatness of this lineage (gotra) all officers, even the most senior ones; in the same way, the bodhisattva almost immediately on generating the first thought of enlightenment—being born in the royal family of the Tathāgata—surpasses even the most senior śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas by virtue of the power of his bodhicitta and compassion."

42. R, folio 87.1–5.
43. R, folio 85.2.
44. R, folio 88.2; 88.4; 89.4–90.1.
Bdp a major point is the bodhisattva’s permanent escape from the grasp of Māra and the ensuing immunity from worldly dharma.  

The most interesting difference lies in the role they ascribe to intent (āśaya). We have seen that in the Bbh (and Msl) āśaya figures alongside adhyāśaya and prayoga as the most important concomitant of cittotpāda. Thus it comes as a surprise to learn that neither adhyāśaya nor prayoga are present in the Bdp’s treatment of the cittotpāda. What is more, āśaya is not portrayed as an ‘independent’ principle supportive of the cittotpāda, but as an attribute of the latter. No doubt, these differences are important and probably ascribable to the different dates of composition of the Bdp and Bbh. The treatment of the cittotpāda in the Bbh is clearly doctrinally more advanced and includes several issues that are not considered in the Bdp. In essence, however, their evaluations of the scope and function of the cittotpāda agree and are founded on similar assumptions about its role in the bodhisattva training.

46. R, folio 85.4–86.2.
The Four Immeasurables

Having introduced the spiritual foundation of the bodhisattva ideal, the Bdp spells out the buddha-qualities. This is done in chapter four. The reasons for dealing here with the buddha-qualities I have discussed in chapter three. I excluded them from my investigation, since they do belong to the bodhisattva practice proper.

The first bodhisattva practices that are expounded in the Bdp are the four ‘immeasurables’ (apramana). These include benevolence (maitri), compassion (karuna), sympathetic joy (mudita) and equipoise (upekșa). While the sequence in which these are discussed corresponds to the standard order of their presentation, their interpretation displays several divergences from other treatises on the apramana.

For the historical Buddha the practice of the appamañña was always twofold. First, its four members—benevolence towards sentient beings, compassion with their suffering, sympathetic

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47. Alternative titles for this group of practices are brahmavihāra (residences of Brahmā)—a term that is particularly widespread in early canonical literature—and cetovimukti (thought liberation). In Pāli sources, we can distinguish two principal conceptual contexts for the brahmavihāra. First, there is the famous sutta where the Buddha is shown instructing Dona on the various types of brahmins (A III, pp. 224–5). Here, among a long list of qualities, the Buddha cites the four instructions as practices that assist in making a brahmin equal to Brahmā. The Buddha goes on to say that a brahmin who pursues the four ‘ways of living like Brahmā’ (brahmavihāra) attains rebirth in the charming world of Brahmā. Elsewhere, Brahmā himself is described as possessing universal benevolence (M I, pp. 370–1)—a subject that was taken up by the commentators (Manorathapuruṣaṇi, p. 204)—showing that if an individual developed Brahmā’s virtues, he himself could attain the status of Brahmā after death. As the ‘ways of living like Brahmā’ refer to the cultivation of maitri, etc., in a meditative context (D I, pp. 250–1; Vism, iii.30; Aronson, 1975, pp. 81–83)—usually at the level of the first dhyāna—the commentaries take them to represent absorptions or states of mind that spring from the cultivation of benevolence, etc., (Ps, ii, p. 353). We have therefore two principal ways of translating the term brahmavihāra. First, if interpreted as ‘way of living like Brahmā’ it refers to an individual who cultivates universal benevolence just as Brahmā does. Second, if looked at from a meditative context, brahmavihāra is best understood as ‘sublime way of living’ modelled on the fourfold instructions of the Teviggasutta. The latter interpretation is favoured by Buddhaghosa, although he acknowledges both possibilities (Vism, ix.106). For a full treatment of these variants in interpretation, particularly with regard to the Theravāda commentarial tradition, see Aronson, 1975, pp. 96–110.

48. To my knowledge, the only comprehensive study of the four immeasurables to date is that by H.B. Aronson, entitled: Love, Compassion, Sympathetic Joy and Equanimity in Theravāda Buddhism; PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975. In addition, drawing on the findings of his doctoral research, Aronson published several articles and one monograph on this subject (see: bibliography). References to the apramana (brahmavihāra) in Buddhist sources are numerous. In the nikāya, useful material is found in D II, p. 196; III, p. 220; Th, i.649; Jātaka i, p. 139; II, p. 61. For a Theravāda interpretation, see: Vism, i, pp. 111, 295; As, p. 192. For Sanskrit sources, see: Kosā, viii, pp. 196–203; Saddhp, p. 142; Dhsgn, § 16; KP, p. 15, § 25.25; Msl, pp. 121.10–124.2, 163.13–172.20, 184.3–8; Bbh, pp. 241–49. Other references are found at Amṛt (B), pp. 188–9; Abhidh-d, p. 428; Mslg, x.10, pp. 290–91; Akn, 34, pp. 56.3.7–58.5.6; Pañca, pp. 181–183, Vkn, pp. 96, 155. For further references in Chinese (translations of) Buddhist texts, see: Lamotte, 1973, p. 52*.
joy with their happiness and equipoise towards sensual attachment and hostility—played a role in placing the practitioner in the heavenly abodes. Second, finding their way into the gnoseologic scheme of the Buddhist path, the appamāṇa assumed importance in the meditative processes that culminate in liberating insight—the pinnacle of Buddhist cognition.⁴⁹

In a well-known passage from the Āṭṭhakasutta, the appamāṇa are cited as one of eleven practices that liberate the mind, eliminate all hindrances and prompt freedom from bondage.⁵⁰ In essence, they are seen as an integral part of those meditations that secure a high rebirth and further progress on the path to liberation up to the stage of the non-returner. According to the Aṅguttaranikāya⁵¹, if accompanied by insight in the particular and general features (svasāmānyalakkhaṇa) of aggregates, they lead to the realisation of the first three paths and fruits, while for those who are established in insight and pursue equipoise at the level of the fourth absorption attain rebirth in the Śuddhāvāsa heaven.⁵²

The mental processes leading to the generation of insight in conjunction with the appamāṇa are laid down in the Vatthūpamasutta.⁵³ Here, the Buddha describes how a monk on realising the defiled nature of greed, conceit, hostility and so forth attains a steadfast conviction in the triratna and—by means of cultivating the appamāṇa—acquires true cognition. Buddhaghosa explains that the main advantages of their cultivation, as a basis supporting insight during meditation is that they free the mind from defilements through suppression.⁵⁴ As the resulting

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⁴⁹. Despite some excellent research in this field, the exact origin of the four immeasurables has not yet been resolved. Back in 1928, C. A. F. Rhys Davids pioneered the view that they might not be the brainchild of the Buddha but that he adopted them from some other teacher. One of the central arguments to this hypothesis has always been a passage in the Śākyasuttavāda (S V, pp. 115–21) where a group of non-Buddhist āṇḍava let it be known that they too cultivate a practice involving benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy and equipoise and wish to learn in how far theirs differs from the Buddha’s. Supporting evidence in non or pre-Buddhist sources is rather thin and limited to several passages in the Upāniṣad (Chānd. 815.1). Buddhist scriptures themselves (D II, pp. 220–252) preserve an account where the Buddha, during previous lives, receives instructions in the absorption of compassion from the Brāhmaṇa tradition. A similar point is made in the Mahāsudassanasasutta (D II, pp. 186–7) where we learn that, as a bodhisattva, he practised benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy and equipoise. Today it is virtually impossible to determine whether the accounts of the Buddha’s previous conduct are accurate depictions of his pre-enlightenment training or whether they simply superimposed post-enlightenment practices on his early struggle to buddhahood. What appears certain, however, is that in the discourses they were not considered unique to the Buddha’s vision but practised also in early non-Buddhist circles (Arsonson, 1984, p. 21).


⁵¹. Cited in Manoratapārani, iii, p. 126.

⁵². A similar, though not identical scheme is proposed in the Haliddavasanassasutta (S V pp. 119-121) where the thought of benevolence leads to rebirth in the realm of the Subhakṣaṇa gods; the thought of compassion in the sphere of the infinitude of space (ākāsānantaṭṭāyatana); the thought of sympathetic joy in the sphere of the infinitude of consciousness (vijñānantaṭṭāyatana) and the thought of equipoise in the sphere of nothingness (ākāścanyayaṭṭāyatana). The main difference between the schemes is that the Haliddavasanassasutta allows for rebirth in the arūpyadhātu while the Manorathapārani restricts becoming to the rūpadhātu.


⁵⁴. Vism, p. 693.
mental clarity persists for some time after the yogin has emerged from this meditation, he is able to apply this newly gained awareness to the development of insight in the characteristics of the component parts of that particular meditation. The four appamañña thus play a significant role in the process of mental purification and operate as a force that conduces to dharma discernment.

On another occasion, the Buddha connects the appamañña practice with the gnoseologic training by differentiating the usual instructions leading to rebirth in the heavenly abodes from those conducive to insight and total liberation:55

"Monks, with regard [to that question], a monk cultivates the factor of enlightenment of mindfulness in connection with benevolence, ... he cultivates the factor of enlightenment of equanimity in connection with benevolence." (The same formula is repeated for compassion, etc.)

This union, coupling the immeasurables with the factors of enlightenment, is perhaps the clearest indication of the contribution that was made by the Buddha to the doctrine of the immeasurables. By linking benevolence, etc., with the cultivation of the cognitive faculties pertaining to liberating insight, he shifted emphasis away from their prevalent ethical and psychological yield to integrate them in the gnoseological structure of the path.56

In the Mahāyāna the apramāṇa became integrated into the scheme of the bodhisattva. As a result, modifications occurred with regard to the motive, scope and cognitive foundation of

56. In later Abhidharma works and some commentaries, the immeasurables receive detailed attention in particular with regard to their aspects, objects and benefits. See, for instance, As (pp. 192–7) which contains an exemplary exposition on the mental states that pertain to the four brahmavihāra. See also: Satya (Ś), ii, pp. 369–374.

In the Kośa we learn that they are only practised by and exclusively directed towards sentient beings who dwell in the kāmaloka (op. cit., pp. 200–203), with benevolence directed towards those who are happy (sukhita), compassion towards those who are suffering (duhkha), sympathetic joy towards those who are rejoicing and equipoise leading to an impartial attitude towards all beings (op. cit., pp. 197–200). Compare also Warder who proposes that the apramāṇa were chiefly intended to be by practised by monks and recommended to laymen only in a few instances (1980, p. 197). More importantly, the Kośa allot the four practices to the various stages of meditation, saying that sympathetic joy is restricted to the first two dhyāna, while the remaining three operate in all four dhyāna and at the stages of the anāgāmya and dhyānāntara (op. cit., pp. 197–199). For a summary of their functioning, see Kośa, pp. 200–201.

An alternative Sarvāstivāda view on the impact of the apramāṇa is given in the Amṛtarasa (Amṛt (B), pp. 188–89). Here, each of the four members is said to eliminate one or several passions, to generate right speech and right action and to produce forces that are dissociated from thought. In detail, maitrī is held to eliminate spitefulness (vyāpāda); karunā overcome harm (vihimsā); muditā eliminates dissatisfaction (arati) and upekkhā suppresses both malice and desire (rāga). This enumeration follows closely a list that is given in the D III, pp. 248–9 and is also found in the Abhidhāda, p. 428 (cf. Mpps, iii, p. 1242).
their implementation. We have seen that the śrāvaka practised the apramāṇa chiefly for the sake of their own mental purification and meditative advance. For the bodhisattva, echoing their origin in the cittotpāda, the chief purpose of the apramāṇa lies in their usefulness in bringing about universal welfare. In a sense, rather than meditative in nature, the area of application is closer to that of the notion of universal benevolence, etc., attributed to them in a famous passage in the Aṅguttaranikāya. The bodhisattva achieves this through the dedication of all merit that accrued to him by practising the apramāṇa:

“O son of good family, if a bodhisattva considers all beings in this way, how does he produce great benevolence? O Manjusri, a bodhisattva who considers them thus, says to himself: ‘I am going to expound the Law to beings in the way that I have understood it.’ Thus he produces towards all beings a benevolence which is truly protective (bhūtisaraṇmaitrī) ... What is great compassion to the bodhisattva? It is the abandoning to sentient beings without retaining any of all good roots enacted or accumulated. What is the great sympathetic joy of the bodhisattva? It is rejoicing in and not regretting giving? What is the great equipoise of the bodhisattva? It is benefiting impartially without hope of reward.”

The qualities that are ascribed to the apramāṇa and in particular to benevolence are numerous. They are said to be free from passion and attachment, to be unperturbed, pure and of good intention, to ripen sentient beings, to penetrate true reality and indeed, to be spontaneously awakened. They are associated with the six perfections that supersede the factors of enlightenment as regular concomitants of the apramāṇa. We read in the Pañca that a bodhisattva who courses in the apramāṇa practises the six perfections in a way that allows him to specifically utilise his expertise in the pāramitā. In the Vkn a similar idea is expressed where the apramāṇa are linked with the perfections since they inspire their appropriate pursuit. They are fixed to giving because they lead to generosity in teaching; to morality because they assist in maturing sentient beings; to patience because they protect the bodhisattva himself and other people; to vigour because they help to bear the burden of all beings; to

57. Vkn, p. 96.
60. Vkn, op. cit., pp. 155–6; Akn, pp. 56.3.7–58.5.6; Mpps, iii, p. 1258.
meditation because they abstain from tasting its flavour and wisdom because they obtain it in
due time.\(^\text{62}\)

Another difference between the śrāvaka and bodhisattva interpretation of the *apramāṇa* is
the object and domain in which they operate. Unlike the śrāvaka who develop the *apramāṇa*
in response to grievances in the *kāmadhātu*, the bodhisattva extends their application to all
spheres of the universe.\(^\text{63}\) Indeed, it is this spatial expansion that is usually given as the
etymological explanation of the word *apramāṇa*:\(^\text{64}\)

"A bodhisattva dwells in a thought connected with benevolence, etc.—a thought
that is vast, extensive, non-dual, unlimited, ... a thought that radiates friendliness
in the ten directions of the world confined only by the *dharmaḍhātu* and the
sphere of space."

Or, in the words of the *Akn*:\(^\text{65}\)

"Just as the sphere of beings is immeasurable—there is no exhaustion—just so the
bodhisattva’s cultivation of friendliness is immeasurable and in that there is no

\(^{62}\) *Vkn*, op. cit., p. 157.

\(^{63}\) Note, however, that their limitation to the *kāmadhātu* has been refuted by Buddhaghosa in connection
with his analysis of *samādhi* (*Vism*, iii.20). Implying that ‘immeasurable meditations’ are free from the
restrictions that prevail in the *kāmadhātu* and can serve as basis for the higher levels of *dhyāna*, Buddhaghosa
proposes that the *appamāṇa* represent intentions associated with the liberation of mind that operate both
in *kāmadhātu* and *rupadhātu* (*Vism*, iv.74). Moreover, they are measureless not only because of the types
of mind they accompany, but also because of the nature of their objects (*Vism*, ix.110):

“All of them, however, occur with a measureless scope, for their scope is measureless beings:
and instead of assuming a measure such as *maitri*, etc., should be developed only towards a
single being, or in an area of such an extent’, they occur with universal pervasion."

In both their scope of object and development, for Buddhaghosa the *appamāṇa* are therefore immeasurable.
The association of *maitri*, etc., with the adjective immeasurable is however not totally new. It occurs
already at one place in the Dīghanikāya (III, pp. 233-4) where Śāriputra in summing up the teachings
of the Buddha describes the fourfold instructions as ‘the four immeasurables’ (*catasso appamāṇāyō*).
However, the specific designation of *maitri*, etc., as referring to state of mind that is measureless—either
in terms of object or development—appears to be rather late as it is only found in the *Abhidhamma* (*Vism*,
ix.105-10; Aronson, 1975, pp. 66-76). And yet, according to some, *maitri*, etc., are not universally
immeasurable in the Mahāyāna sense, since they do not operate in the *arūpyadhātu* (cf. *Kośa*, viii, pp.
199-200).

\(^{64}\) *Pañcā*, pp. 181 (trsl. Conze); an almost identical passage is found in the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 34; L).

\(^{65}\) *Akn*, p. 56.4.2-3

In the *Mpps*, this definition is given further details by adding two distinct sets of measurement (iii, p.
1262). First, there is the ‘true’ immeasurable, that is to say, those things that cannot be measured by any
person or saint. These include space, *nirvāṇa* and the nature of beings (*satvasvabhāva*). Second, there are
those things that although in principle measurable are beyond reckoning of ordinary beings and become in
this sense immeasurable. These consist of items such as the weight of Mt. Sumeru or the number of drops
in the ocean. Since the measurement of such objects is known by the Buddha, they do not serve as a gauge
for the *apramāṇa*.  

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exhaustion.”

Finally, there is a distinction in their implementation. On this matter, we read in the Akn:66

“Benevolence is threefold. What are the three? Benevolence directed at living beings as object pertains to the bodhisattvas who have produced the first thought of enlightenment. Benevolence directed at dharma as object pertains to bodhisattvas who have embarked on religious practice. Benevolence without object pertains to those bodhisattvas who have attained the conviction of the non-arising of all dharma.”67

This interpretation has grown, of course, out of the philosophical vision of Mahāyāna ontology, denying independent own-being (svabhāva) to worldly existence. Tuned to this conception of reality, the apramāṇa exhibit three degrees of purity. On the first level, when the bodhisattva pursues them with the conviction that he is dealing with ‘real’ people, he is still subject to impurity.68 When he replaces sentient beings with dharma as the object of his benevolence, he is exposed to both purity and impurity, depending on his mental awareness. It is only after he has realised the true nature of sentient existence (bhūtalakṣaṇa) and becomes convinced of the non-arising of dharma that his practice of the immeasurables becomes pure.69

The Bdp shares many of these Mahāyāna features about the apramāṇa. Beginning with maitri, the Bdp takes up the question of scope and explains that the bodhisattva’s benevolence

66. Akn, p. 57.2.3–5
   The Sanskrit of this passage is preserved as a quotation in the Śiks, p. 212.12–14. An identical presentation of the three modes of benevolence is also found in the Msl (p. 121), Dhsgr (§ 130) and Bbh (pp. 241–2). For further references to the three types of maitri, see: Mpps, iii, pp. 1250–51.
67. Note that the three kinds of maitri are traditionally compared to the giving of ordinary objects, to the giving of precious objects and to the giving of the cintāmanī (Mpps, iii, pp. 1253–4).
68. In the Śiks (pp. 212.15–213.2; trsl. Bendall), the first level of practice are presented in a slightly different light:
   “Benevolence has the Buddha as its object of thought, the bodhisattvas, the disciples, all creatures as its object of thought. Here when it has all beings as its object of thought, it comes first by accumulating benefit and blessing upon a beloved being with meditation. Upon such a one he should accumulate benevolence; then upon acquaintances; then upon strangers; then upon neighbours; then upon fellow-villagers and so with other villages; and so on until he continues devoted to one region, spread all over it, covering it. So with the ten regions. But this procedure does not apply to the benevolence towards buddhas and the rest.”
69. Mpps, iii, p. 1245.
is called immeasurable as it demands application in a sphere of beings that is beyond measure.  70
Presumably, this explanation is also valid for the remaining three apramāṇa, although it is
not applied to them explicitly in the appropriate sections.  71 After that, the Bdp gives a brief
overview of the application of benevolence. It is simultaneously seen as a personal protection
for the bodhisattva and as practice for the benefit of others. The aspects that are cited,
however, refer invariably to the bodhisattva himself. Through the apramāṇa he is freed from
malice, anger, passion, fear and negligence and acts in accordance with the noble path. The
liberation of sentient beings—being mentioned only once—does not stand in the foreground.

Among the advantages that accrue from benevolence, the Bdp discusses in particular wealth,
honour and fame, vast accumulations of merit, physical perfection, rapid advance on the path
and rebirth among gods and men.  72 The fate of sentient beings receives little attention and is

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70. The alternative explanation of their title 'immeasurable' is often that the amount of merit produced
through the practice of benevolence, etc., exceeds all measure (Kosā, viii, p. 196; Mpps, iii, p. 1243).
According to the early sources, however, the merit that is generated through them is not of any kind, but
specifically brahmanic merit (brahmāpunya) which can only be consumated in the seventeen heavens of
the Brahmaloka (A V, p. 76; Kosā, iv, pp. 250–1).

71. Reference only to maitri in the explanation of the apramāṇa is by no means particular to the Bdp. As an
issue, it is specifically raised in the Mpps (v, p. 2257) and occurs in several other stīras. The reason
behind this choice is the assumption that benevolence is the most important of the four apramāṇa and
accrues the greatest amount of merit. Therefore, it is held to outshine the other apramāṇa not only in the
quantity of merit, but also in quality and to be the only type of meditation that is pure (anāśravabkhāvana).
This raises the question of the relationship between the four apramāṇa. While the nikāya are virtually
silent in this respect, the commentaries propose an ideal topical progression through the four members.
Particularly in the Vism this point is made. At first, the meditator wishes for the welfare of all sentient
beings. Next, he recognises the great suffering that afflicts his fellow beings and generates great compassion.
Then, he ponders the great prosperity of the very same beings for whom he cultivated benevolence and
compassion and takes sympathetic joy in it. Even if they are not prosperous in the present life, he rejoices
at their future wealth. Having done so, his conduct towards beings has come to an end and he observes
sentient beings as a neutral observer (Vism, ix.109). This scheme is of course rather theoretical, since if
progress depends on external circumstances, there would be no possibility of advance beyond compassion.
Hence, in actuality, progress is dependent on skill in each subject of meditation and ignores external
circumstances. We have therefore in the apramāṇa something approaching an ideal hierarchy of meditation
in which the meditator advances through the rarefied spheres of existence. This interpretation has, in the
past, generated the misconception that upakṣā—being the last in the traditional sequence—would supplant
or supersede the other three. Based on the the causal link between upakṣā and equanimity as a factor of
enlightenment (Ps, i.85; Vism, xiv.157; Aronson, 1975, p. 274) not shared by the other apramāṇa, it was
suggested that upakṣā eclipses maitri, karuṇā and muditā. That this is not the case has been shown by
Aronson, 1979, p. 8. Although completing the practice of the apramāṇa and therefore at the pinnacle of
their cultivation, the four remain at all times fundamentally complementary in nature. Cf. Mpps, iii, pp.
1255–58.

72. Note the parallels to the benefits that are cited in the Bbh as stemming directly from the practice of the
apramāṇa which, while considering the fate of sentient beings, emphasise personal attainments. They
include dwelling in supreme bliss, generation of an immeasurable accumulation of merit, strengthening
the intent (āsaya) of enlightenment and holding back all suffering in samsāra (Bbh, pp. 248.23–49.6).
For the Mpps too the benefits are chiefly of a personal nature. Thus, a bodhisattva who embarks on the
practice of benevolent meditation (maitrisamādhi) escapes burning when he is immersed in fire, he
survives poisoning, he escapes injury during military service, he does not die a violent death and is
protected by benign divinities (Mpps, iii, p. 1273). The same list of advantages is also said to spring from
practices of the remaining immeasurables despite their allegedly inferior nature. However, the fruits
themselves are only attainable by persons belonging to the āryan-fold since the practice of the immeasurables

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only indirectly referred to when the bodhisattva is described as “accomplished in protection of the simple-minded”. Much greater emphasis is given to the personal purity of the bodhisattva and his progress along the path.

In this context, the *Bdp* links benevolence with the six perfections, indicating that it prepares the ground for their successful cultivation. We saw that by doing so it concurs closely with apramāṇa expositions in other Mahāyāna works. Next, the Buddha distinguishes between the ‘ordinary benevolence’ of the śrāvaka that is solely directed at personal liberation and the ‘great benevolence’ of the bodhisattva that aims at universal welfare.

In conclusion, the *Bdp* draws attention to the different kinds of maitrī. That is, benevolence that has living beings as its objects and is based on the generation of the bodhicitta; benevolence that has dharma as its objects and is realised when the bodhisattva is established in the path; and benevolence that is objectless and reserved to bodhisattvas who are accomplished in patience (ksānti). While the exact scope of these three categories is not elaborated, it is well known from later sources.

According to the *Bbh*, the three modes of reference (sattvālambana, dharmālambana, anālambana) apply to all four immeasurables and are not restricted to benevolence. Philosophically, it makes the point that the object of the ‘objectless application’ corresponds to the foundation of being (dharmadhātu) or thusness (tathātā). Whilst the first level is also attainable by adherents of heterodox thought, the second by śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas, the third is restricted to bodhisattvas. Benevolence, compassion and sympathetic joy are is well beyond the scope of ordinary beings (*Mpps*, iii, p. 1272; other lists at *Mpps*, pp. 792, 2257, 2362. Compare this list with the advantages given in M II, pp. 207–8, A II, p. 129; IV, p. 150; V, p. 342, *Vinaya* (v, p. 140), *Patis* (ii, p. 130) and *Vism* (p. 253); *Kośa*, iv, p. 124; *Mvu*, pp. 421–22 and *Catuḥsatakaṭikā* (TTP, 98, p. 222.5.1–3; ref. Lang).

75. *R*, folio 268.3.
76. A similar division is proposed in the *Mpps* (ii, pp. 1253–4).
79. The same point is also made in the *MsI* (p. 221) and in the *Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra* (*Mpps*, iii, p. 1250, n. 1). In the *Mpps*—reflecting pure Madhyamaka thinking—it is regarded as synonymous to the true character of things (*dharmānāṁ bhūtalaksanāṁ*), pure and simple, without the idealistic connotations of *Bbh*’s model.

Also consult the *Mpps* on these issues that contains a particularly detailed account on the scope of application of the apramāṇa (iii, pp. 1242–1279). To sum up, at first, it compares benevolence, compassion and sympathetic joy with regard to their objects, scope and actual effect on the yogin’s psyche. Then, having established their exact function, it defines the three areas of application. Benevolence directed at sentient beings is only practised by ordinary beings (prthagjana) who engage in meditational exercise or by those adepts who undergo training (*saikṣa*) that is still subject to impurity. Those who generate benevolence with regard to dharma are either arhats who have destroyed all impurities, pratyekabuddhas
assembled with a resolution to bring about bliss while equipoise is brought about by the resolution of profit.\(^8\) Whichever the orientation of the apramāṇa, in the end all of them are founded on compassion engendered by the perception of worldly misery.\(^2\)

Of the four apramāṇa, compassion is granted the most detailed treatment in the Bdp.\(^3\) Depicting it as the spiritual basis to the whole bodhisattva ideal, the Buddha explains:\(^4\)

> “O Prince, what is the bodhisattva’s great compassion? O Prince, his great compassion is the basis of his desire for supreme and perfect enlightenment. For instance, just as the basis of the life-faculty of sentient beings is inhalation and exhalation of breath, in the same way, O Prince, is great compassion the basis of the bodhisattva’s accomplishment in the great vehicle.”

After this opening passage, the Bdp spells out the ten factors that prompt bodhisattvas to unfold universal compassion.\(^5\) Most of these factors relate to the perception of the wretchedness of worldly existence and its inherent conceptual flaws such as belief in a self, wrong views, desire for perverted pleasure, exposure to the five obstructions (āvarana)\(^6\), delusion and conceit. In response to these conditions, the bodhisattva generates compassion that is sustained or buddhas. This level of attainment is conditional on elimination of the perception of a self (ātmāsamjñā) and transcending the notion of identity and difference (ekatvāyatvasamjñā). The third level of attainment in benevolence is reserved to the buddhas, since operating beyond objects (anālambana), it does not rest in either the conditioned or unconditioned. Knowing that all objects are unborn, unreal and misconceived, their benevolence does not lean at, or function within, time but rests in non-distinction. Notwithstanding, they do not abandon sentient being to their fate but, relying on wisdom relative to the true character of things, unfold their benevolence to best effect. The same division is also applicable to the thought of compassion (karunācitta), but it is not put forward for sympathetic joy and equipoise.

or buddhas. This level of attainment is conditional on elimination of the perception of a self (ātmāsamjñā) and transcending the notion of identity and difference (ekatvāyatvasamjñā). The third level of attainment in benevolence is reserved to the buddhas, since operating beyond objects (anālambana), it does not rest in either the conditioned or unconditioned. Knowing that all objects are unborn, unreal and misconceived, their benevolence does not lean at, or function within, time but rests in non-distinction. Notwithstanding, they do not abandon sentient being to their fate but, relying on wisdom relative to the true character of things, unfold their benevolence to best effect. The same division is also applicable to the thought of compassion (karunācitta), but it is not put forward for sympathetic joy and equipoise.

82. The Bbh underlines this point by including a list of one hundred and ten kinds of suffering (Bbh, pp. 243.2–47.2) and discussing a group of nineteen specific forms of suffering that constitute its object (Bbh, p. 247.8–18).
Two of these are also hinted at in an important section in the Mal where in chapter seventeen (pp. 222–224.3), twelve verses are devoted to the immeasurables. At first, close agreement prevails between its exposition and that of the Bbh. Both works classify the apramāṇa practice in three levels, viz., practice targeted at sentient beings, practice aimed at dharma and practice directed at objectlessness, born out by thuness (tathāta) and reserved to those who are free from false imagination (te hy avikalpatvād anālambanāḥ).
83. Note, that unlike the discussions of maitri, muditā and upeksā that concur almost verbatim to their counterparts in the Akn, the Bdp’s exposition of compassion contains strikingly many discrepancies from the karunā section in the Akn (p. 57.2.6–5.6)
84. R, folio 269.5–270.1.
85. R, folio 270.5–276.4.
86. These are desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), delusion (moha), regret (vipratisara) and doubt (samsaya). On the various types of obstruction attested in Buddhist literature, see: Kośa, i, p. 51; iv, p. 18, 20; vi, p. 276; Siddhi, pp. 639–657; Dhsg, § 115, 118.
by contemplation, imperturbability, reverence, purity, practice and vigour. It becomes the motivating force (including pristine cognition) that establishes an intense communication between the bodhisattva and sentient beings, exposure to which nourishes, in turn, compassion.

The third immeasurable, sympathetic joy (muditā) is the least distinctive in the Bdp's discussion of the apramāṇa. Its characterisation amounts to little more than a list of enchanting examples taken from the bodhisattva's conduct. The bodhisattva delights in all aspects of the Dharma, he takes pleasure from solitude and the accomplishment of the six perfections, he approves of congeniality, lack of hatred, physical purity and rejoices in spiritual exertion. In order to underline this commitment, the text gives a string of examples that illustrate the bodhisattva's devotion to his teachers, parents, sentient beings and good conduct in general. Judging by this passage alone, the main benefit of sympathetic joy is indefatigableness in the pursuit of enlightenment since it rekindles enthusiasm for the path in times of weariness.

Acquisition of the fourth immeasurable—equipoise (upeksā)—is divided into three phases, depending on the object at which it is directed. At first, the bodhisattva learns to assume equipoise towards defilement (kleśa). He maintains high spirits when rejected and defamed or, conversely, is not deluded when praised. He stays calm and unaffected in both misery and bliss and does not develop preferences for either friends or foes, but attains complete impartiality. Whatever the circumstances to which he is exposed, the bodhisattva abides in perfect mental equilibrium and does not allow any factors such as appreciation or aversion, pleasure or distress to influence his judgement and conduct.

Next, he trains in equipoise that applies to situations in which the bodhisattva is exposed to physical abuse and torture. Entitled, 'equipoise to protect oneself and others'
(ātmaparāraṇakṣanāpeksā)\textsuperscript{93}, it allows him to stay aloft over all types of anguish and to forego the thought of retaliation. This type of equipoise springs from the bodhisattva’s resolution and is sustained through constant exertion in search for virtue.\textsuperscript{94}

The third manifestation of upeksā is applied to right and wrong moments (kālākālopeksā).\textsuperscript{95}

Now, the bodhisattva maintains composure when confronted with irreverence, blame, impurity and despicable demeanour. He abides in equanimity when challenged by persons who do not share his faith in the Dharma, who engage in practices at a wrong time (in particular with regard to the perfections\textsuperscript{96}) or who are otherwise ill-synchronised in their conduct. In sum, whatever challenge he is confronted with, the bodhisattva carefully weighs the situation, judges with a tranquil and impartial mind, and adjusts his response accordingly.\textsuperscript{97}

If we compare these features with the apramāṇa in other writings, we note several parallels. First, the Bdp speaks of a threefold mode of apramāṇa practice, distinguishing between sattvālambana, dharmālambana and anālambana. We have seen that this is a theme that is common to virtually all Mahāyāna treatises. It is invariably ascribed to the Akn and not to the Bdp from which the Akn appears to have taken it.\textsuperscript{98} In the Bdp, the standard formula is extended to include the stages where the various levels of practice are reached, viz., the sattvālambana practice at the first generation of the thought of enlightenment (prathamacittotpāda), the dharmālambana practice at the moment of constancy in the path, and the anālambana practice at the acquisition of patience (ksānti). In the Akn this formula is divided into two sections, the first gives the levels of practice and the second provides the moment at which they become operational.\textsuperscript{99} Moreover, by making the ‘conviction of the non-arising of dharma’ (anupattikādharmaṃksānti) the terminus ad quem for the anālambana practice, the Akn modifies the occurrence of the third level. In the path scheme of the Dbh, this would mean that the anālambana practice is not attained before the acalabhūmi, while the Bdp’s ‘accomplishment in patience’ might conceivably be already attained at the prabhākaribhūmi.\textsuperscript{100} However, as the treatises on the bodhisattva are completely silent on this

\textsuperscript{93} R, folio 282.1–283.2.
\textsuperscript{94} R, folio 282.7.
\textsuperscript{95} R, folio 283.1–284.1.
\textsuperscript{96} R, folio 283.3–6.
\textsuperscript{97} In the Bdp it is explicitly said that none of three types of upeksā are conferred by the buddhas, but are self-attained and form a distinct part of the his resolution (R, folio 282.7).
\textsuperscript{98} E.g., Śīkṣ, p. 212; Mppś, iii, p. 1272 (other occurrences in Bbh, pp. 241.18–242.51 and Msl, p. 121.11–12).
\textsuperscript{99} Akn, p. 57.2.3–5.
\textsuperscript{100} Daśa-bh, p. 36.16–17.
matter, their positioning must remain uncertain.

The Bdp agrees with those sources that confirm that maitri reaches greatest effectiveness when it is coupled with other practices, in particular the pāramitā or bodhipāksika dharma. It also speaks of these practices as forces on which the apramāṇa rely for inspiration.101 Other parallels exist in its assessment of compassion as the foremost of the apramāṇa and its explanations for their immeasurability.

Points where the Bdp differs concerns the profits of the apramāṇa, the nature of equipoise and the presentation of the material. We have seen that many texts—early and late—devote at least some attention to the states of rebirth gained as a result of apramāṇa practice. This is not the case in the Bdp. In the whole chapter there is not one explicit reference to ‘ways of living like Brahmā’ (brahmavihāra).102 Rebirth in the rūpadhātu or arūpyadhātu, so central to most other expositions of the apramāṇa, does not figure at all. Instead, every reward is immediately dedicated to universal liberation. Another peculiarity is the division of equipoise. Apart from the Ākn no other text proposes to divide upeksā into three distinct categories of application. What is more, neither of the types of upeksā is taken up independently in any of the texts I consulted. Whether this omission constitutes an oversight or was deliberate we cannot tell. The inclusion of apramāṇa quotations in other sources from the Ākn that are purged of the threefold division points to the latter.

Then there is also the lack of coordination between the different apramāṇa in the Bdp. Deviating from standard practice to grant a degree of cohesion to the four members—be it only through a collective set of benefits—the Bdp looks at each of the apramāṇa in isolation. For instance, no use is made of the integrating function of meditation as frame of reference for their implementation. As a result, the presentation appears fragmented and in want of structural coherence. This lack of integration is most noticeable with upeksā. In other sources the exposition of upeksā is completely interwoven with the practice of meditation as it quietens the emotions, stirred up by benevolence, compassion and sympathetic joy. In the Bdp no such link is proposed.103 Without the technical language of dhyāna, its account is essentially descriptive and serves to demonstrate the scope of the bodhisattva’s attainment in

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Note, that in the translation of the Śikṣāsamuccaya, the position of the Ākn has been misquoted by replacing the ‘conviction of the non-arising of dharma’ as the beginning of the third level with ‘patience preparation for a future state’ (Ākn, p. 57.2.5; Śiks, p. 212.14; trsl. p. 204).

101. R folio 268.5–69.1
102. In the Bdp, there is only one reference to Brahmā and that makes no mention of the notion that a bodhisattva might gain rebirth in the Brahmāloka (R folio, 267.4).
103. Mpps, iii, p. 1258.
equipoise.
Chapter six introduces the main body of the bodhisattva practices. It marks the formal beginning of the exposition of the six perfections, starting with generosity (dana). The subsequent chapters deal with one paramita each.

Methodologically, much of what has been said about the Bdp’s presentation of the four apramāṇa holds also true for the treatment of the dānaparamitā. The whole account of dāna is primarily descriptive and offers little information on the psychological impact of its practice. The chapter begins by enumerating the objects that are typically to be given. These fall into two categories, that is, external gifts (bāhyam dānam) and internal gifts (ādhyātmikam dānam). Although not defined as such by name, this division clearly governs the Bdp’s classification of gifts. First, the bodhisattva gives material gifts (āmiśadāna) such as food, clothes, jewels, pleasure-grounds including relatives and dear ones. Then, he trains in giving away his own body in self-sacrifice. The order in which these gifts are listed suggests a ranking according to the degree of difficulty. That is to say, at the lowest level, the bodhisattva provides food, drink and clothing. Then, embarking on higher levels of dāna, he renounces precious objects. Next, the bodhisattva trains to abandon his family and finally, at the highest level, sacrifices his body. The gift of the Doctrine (dharmadāna), a major factor in the practice of generosity and acknowledged by most texts, is not cited in chapter six.

104. Candrakīrti, in his commentary to the Catuhsataka (TTP, 98, p. 215.3.2-4.4; ref. Lang), gives the following etymological explanation of the word dāna. He begins by deriving dāna from the root do meaning ‘to cut’ saying that it alludes to death. Hence, the word dāna is said to give pleasure to a practitioner since it induces disgust (udvega) for the cycle of birth and death. Then, he acknowledges a relation between dāna and the root dā meaning ‘to give’, noting that the three types of giving include all perfections (āmiśadāna covering dāna; abhayadāna covering sīla, ksanti; dharmadāna covering dhīyāna, prajñā—with all three are linked with virya) and as a channel of the teachings pleases the bodhisattva. Finally, he says that dāna may also be derived from the root de meaning ‘to guard’ and da ‘to purify’. The rationale behind these associations is that the bodhisattva’s body, speech and mind are, as yet, in need of guarding and purification since future births are determined by the presence of desire. Thus, because dāna reminds the bodhisattva of other births, it inspires joy in bodhisattvas (cf. Mpps, ii, pp. 698–700).

105. This twofold division is well known from dāna treatment in the sāstras. See, for instance, Bbh (pp. 114–123) and Mpps (v, p. 2238).


107. On the bodhisattva’s practice of alms-giving, see: Msg, pp. 224–25. If, however, limited in his possessions by the constraints of mendicant life, the bodhisattva dispenses writing instruments (lekhāni), ink (maṣṭi), manuscripts (pustaka) and the gift of the doctrine (Vup, p. 30, § 20).

108. This scheme is also found in the Mpps, ii, pp. 750–51. At another place, however, the Mpps distinguishes between āmiśadāna as inferior giving; giving of the body as mediocre giving and generosity accompanied by mental detachment as the supreme type of giving (Mpps, i, p. 297).

109. It is, however, discussed in chapter nine (folio 539–546), ten (folio 563) and eleven (folio 628–631).
After listing the objects of dāna, the Bdp describes the mental states that accompany the practice of giving. It distinguishes forty different factors (divided into four lists of ten each) that turn ordinary generosity into pure generosity. Major concerns are the need for impartiality, dedication of generosity to enlightenment and the objective of universal liberation. A gift should not be bestowed out of wrath or pleasure, it must not have any detrimental effect on the recipient and need not be motivated by desire for retribution. In other words, the whole

Looking at the development of the concept of giving, we note that, at first, references to a consciously perceived division in the objects of dāna are less articulated. In the four principal nīkāya, a division between dāna objects is attested only once. In the Anguttarnikāya (A I, p. 89), we read:

"Monks, there are two gifts. What are these two? The material (āmisa) and the spiritual (dhamma). These are the two. Of these two, the spiritual gift is preeminent."

Yet, already in early Mahāyāna sūtras, the concept of the gift of the doctrine was fully acknowledged and enhanced in value. In the Kp, the gift of the Doctrine is elevated to the supreme task of a bodhisattva, eclipsing even compassion, benevolence and communication of the thought of enlightenment (p. 79, § 20). It is undertaken with a pure heart and virtuous motives without expectancy for anything in return (p. 79, § 20.1) if correctly performed, involving uniform, impartial and open-handed preaching (p. 73, § 12.3; § 44), the gift of the Dharma secures immeasurable merit and prompts the state of unobserved insight (p. 80, § 22.1). He teaches the Doctrine to all beings just as he received it himself and does not hold anything back (p. 61, § 1.2). By doing so, he imparts the thought of enlightenment and inspires sentient beings to strive to buddhahood (p. 79 § 20.3; p. 73, § 12.2).

In later literature this distinction grew in importance. The gift of the doctrine is cited in the Paścica (p. 459) as the only dāna object alongside material gifts and figures in the Ug and Vip among the objects of generosity of householders (Vip, p. 30, § 20; Ug, p. 259.5.5). Its exact contents is defined in the Kosa (iv, p. 252) as "correct, undefiled teaching of the sūtra literature". Those who teach the Doctrine with an impure mind or out of mistaken design such as gain, respect or reputation forfeit all merit that would otherwise fall to them.

In the Mpps the condition of the gift of the Dharma, whether that of the śrāvakas or bodhisattvas, depends for status on the intention (cetanā) and mental state with which it is being given. If it is preached for personal gain, with mistaken views about the self or otherwise overshadowed by delusion, it is wholly impure and of laukika rank. If, however, it is taught out of pure intention and with wholesome thought the gift of the Doctrine attains lokottara status and introduces to the Buddhist path (Mpps, ii, pp. 693–5). Besides the gift of the Dharma and material gifts, the Mpps distinguishes a third category of dāna, that is the 'gift of homage and respect' (pajñāsatārādāna). It consists in showing veneration and is inspired by pure faith (prasādācittavīśuddhi). Pure faith figures also amongst the causes and conditions that give rise to giving in general. In the Mpps, these are compassion, faith and respect (or a combination of both); an object that is to be given (pure or impure) and a recipient who operates as a field of merit (either destitute or honoured).

Note the contribution of the MsI and Msg with regard to dāna by extending the traditional division into material and the spiritual objects to include the gift of security (abhaya dāna). According to the commentary of the Msg, it serves to constrain violence (ghātakanivārama), assists the shy or apprehensive (bhīrutarirāma) and anchors the bodhisattva's altruistic intention in his practice (Msg, pp. 224–5). Defined as protection from the fear of lions, tigers, seizure, kings, thieves, water, etc., (Bbh, p. 133.17–19), it pertains, however, more to the realm of śīla and reflects the bodhisattva's rejection of violence. (Meadows, p. 176.10; Lin Li-kouang, 1949, p. 250; Mpps, ii, p. 700). The Dhgr (§ 105) cites in the place of 'giving of fearlessness' the 'giving of benevolence' (maitri dāna) that is probably an elucidation of the more obscure concept of abhayadāna.

Somewhat surprisingly, the gift of security does not figure as an independent category in the Bbh. Instead, we find the traditional division into external objects and internal objects (p. 144.23). The gift of the Dharma—identified as the supreme gift (pp. 127.11–128.1)—falls as an individual object in the class of external gifts, but does not form a separate category (pp. 119.25–120.3). It is, however, cited at p. 133.12–13 where the Bbh gives material objects, the Dharma and security as the three objects that lead to bliss in this world and the next.

110. R, folio 287.7–288.5.
111. These precautions are not essential to the Ug, where it is argued that to fulfil other people's desires is the highest aim of the dānapāramittā (pp. 261.2.6–3.2). The negative side-effects that total compliance with
section warns of aspects that might render an act of giving worthless and even counterproductive by way of mistaken attitudes or motivations. By doing so, the Bdp establishes a connection between the practice of generosity and morality. That is to say, it qualifies the act of giving in moral terms and determines its value on the basis of the donor's intention and the choice of objects that are given. It is only if both are of high moral standard and fully compatible with the ideal of the bodhisattva that pure generosity is accomplished.

This association of generosity and morality is not particular to the Bdp. It occurs already in the nikāya and is given prominent treatment in the Ug. The rationale for the joined practice of dāna and śīla is twofold. First, moral impurity defiles the spirit of giving since it leads to corruption and expectations of reward, and hence obstructs the attainment of pure generosity. Second, there is the incompatibility of attachment and impartiality. Impartiality is a decisive

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112. An exemplary account of the ideal circumstances of generosity is found in the Bhā. As some of the early sūtras, the Bhā devotes considerable attention to the objects and circumstances where the bodhisattva's dāna operates (pp. 132.23–133.2). The overriding purpose behind the practice of giving is to mature sentient beings. Gratification of sense desire is acknowledged to occur but regarded as an unavoidable by-product (pp. 117–118). The bodhisattva takes great care to differentiate between the needs of beings and gives only objects that promote their spiritual interest. The chief reward for the donor becomes exemption from rebirth in the lower destinies, provided that he gives with a pure, impartial state of mind that does not allow favouritism. The bodhisattva does not take advantage of others or seeks personal benefits from giving (p. 121.3–4). His practice of giving is marked by faith and devotion, proceeds in a timely fashion and does not lead to any harm (p. 132.26–7).

An important requirement for correct giving is knowledge of what constitutes the appropriate gift in a given situation and the awareness that ultimately no objects exist (pp. 123.18–124.22; 129.8–11). The gifts of the bodhisattva comprise specifically the four apramāṇa, as they have great impact on the recipient’s spiritual welfare (p. 129.12–15). The chief impediments to a successful pursuit is lack of habit, lack in worthy gifts, attachment to pleasing objects and delight in the prospect of future reward (p. 129.16–21). Delay in the progress in giving occurs particularly when a bodhisattva only owns a few objects that are worth giving and is requested to hand these over to his enemy; when he is asked to renounce what is dearest to him or what he has become accustomed to and when he must give away those dharma that he has acquired with great trouble himself (p. 132.3–12). The most effective antidotes against these obstacles are intellectual penetration (prativedhā), endurance of suffering (duḥkha-duḥkhaśīvanā), cognition of misconception (viparyūṣaparijñāna) and insight into the emptiness of karmic formations (saṃkārasaśāvatvadarsana) (p. 131.6–13). As reward for practising dāna—if practised with determination (adhyāśa) and in conjunction with the pratisamvid—the bodhisattva comes eventually face to face with true reality (p. 131.20–27).

Compare this position with the Mpps (ii, pp. 670–72) that informs that dāna reaps greatest reward if the gift is valuable, uncommon, well-timed, adjusted to local circumstances, in harmony with the requirements of mendicants, offered to members of the Sāṅgha, continually and conditioned.

113. A connection of similar type is also established in the Kp, where offerings of material objects such lamps, if only to acquaintances, are said to contribute to the final elimination of traces of impurities (kesāvāsanā) only if they are undertaken in conjunction with moral conduct.

114. Ug, 23, p. 264.4.3–5.7.
factor in the bodhisattva’s practice of dāna since it is intrinsically connected to the pledge of universal liberation. Violation of the principle of impartiality by whatever means would affect the very foundation of the bodhisattva’s quest and place him on the level of a śrāvaka.

Depending on the context, attachment comes into play on two levels. In the nikāya, the Buddha speaks of it in terms of sensual desire. The implication is that sensual desire corrupts the monk’s psyche in general and renders him unfit to follow in the mendicant path. In the Ug which discourses on the lay path, the bodhisattva is warned of inappropriate attachment to his family and worldly possession, since this would obstruct his balanced pursuit of the middle path between worldly desire and renunciation. In a sense, giving is therefore dependent on disciplinarian vigour to fully unfold. However, morality is also reinforced by the practice of giving. For it is through unlimited generosity that the root evils of desire, hatred and delusion are most effectively weakened.

Having discussed the moral dimension of dāna, the Bdp gives three lists detailing the benefits derived from internal and external giving. Benefits accruing from material gifts are predominantly physical in nature or generate spiritual gain relevant to this world. The system of retribution that governs the granting of daily requisites follows well-established patterns, promising future affluence in precisely the items that were renounced. The gift of luxurious items and family members, however, pertains to a higher order and is rewarded with physical perfection or important spiritual faculties such as the dharmaskandha, pristine cognition (jñāna) or divine ear (divyasrotra). The borderline between those two categories is rather fluid as reward patterns occasionally become blurred. Self-sacrifice and renunciation of all worldly pleasure are of the highest category, since they place the bodhisattva practically on the level of the Tathāgata through giving the buddha-qualities and all-knowing.

115. In the progressive talk formula (anupubbikathā) we read to this effect: “Then the lord gave a progressive talk ... namely talk on giving, talk on moral conduct and talk on heaven. He revealed the danger, elimination and impurity of sensual desires, and the benefit of desirelessness. When the lord knew that the mind of ... was ready, soft, without hinderances, uplifted, settled, then he revealed the special dhamma teaching of buddhas: suffering, arising, cessation, the path” (D I, p. 110; trsl. Gethin).


118. R, folio 292.3–7

Compare these benefits with the rewards of generosity that are typically cited in the nikāya. In the Silasutta (A III, pp. 38–41), for instance, the Buddha distinguishes five advantages that accrue through giving—four in this life and one in the next. In this life, the benefactor is well-thought of and friend of many people. The wise will always be eager to accompany him and he attains great renown. Whatever company he enters, he moves with confidence and converses freely. At death, as a result of his generosity, he is assured a rebirth in the heavenly realms of the gods. A similar set of benefits is found at A III, pp. 32–33.

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For the *Bdp* the most important determinant of the amount of merit that springs from *dāna* is therefore the object that is given and the purity of the donor’s (*drāyaka*) thought. It disregards the role of the beneficiary (*pratigrāhaka*) as a field of merit (*punyakṣetra*). Already in the early *suttas*, we learn that the amount of *dāna* reward depends not only on the act of generosity and its object, but even more so on the spiritual state of the donor. In the *Vacchagottasutta*, the Buddha explains:

“O Vaccha, gifts given in the case of the virtuous are of great fruit, not those given in the case of the wicked. By ‘virtuous’ I mean one who has abandoned five qualities and possesses five qualities. What are the five qualities he has abandoned? Sensual desire is abandoned, malevolence, sloth and torpor, excitement and flurry, doubt and wavering are abandoned. These are the five. And of what five qualities is he possessed? He possesses the constituents of morality possessed by the adept, the constituents of concentration, the constituents of insight, the constituents of emancipation, the constituent of release by knowledge and vision of the adept. He has these five qualities. Thus, where five qualities are abandoned and five possessed, a gift is of great fruit, I declare.”

Thought to this effect is also expressed in the *Dakkhinavibhangasutta* where the Buddha discourses on the four degrees of the purification of offerings. Distinguishing offerings purified by the donor, by the beneficiary, neither by the donor nor by the beneficiary and by both the donor and the beneficiary, he rejects all but the last variant as insufficient and concludes that the supreme gift is always that which is given by an accomplished monk person to an accomplished monk.

Building on this proposition the nikāya came to differentiate various degrees of *dāna* purity. Besides the donor/beneficiary factor, it is above all the intention behind an act of giving that determines its value. In the *Sangītisutta*, the Buddha speaks of eight bases of giving that influence the result of *dana*. These include the presence of a recipient, fear, and...

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119. On the notions of *punya* and *punyakṣetra*, see Lamotte’s notes in *La Concentration de la Marche Héroïque*, pp. 231–33.
122. According to the *Abhidh-sam*, the value of the act of giving (*dānakarma*) depends on the purity of its base (*nidāna*) and endeavour (*utthāna*)—non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion—the choice of objects and his mental, vocal and physical bearing at the moment of giving. It is called accomplished, only when
reciprocity, hope for reciprocity, knowledge of the virtue of generosity, altruism, desire for fame or repute and peace of mind. The point is made that in order to maximise the value of generosity, the donor should carefully assess his thinking and purify the intent that motivates his act of giving. For an act of generosity to be fully purified, it requires faith, respect, personal commitment, timeliness and must be executed without causing distress to the recipient.

According to the *Kośa*, the mechanism of retribution evolves in four areas of operation. Vasubandhu postulates that gifts can either be beneficial to oneself, to others, to both or neither. Merit itself is divided into two categories. On the one hand, there is merit that arises by virtue of the sole fact of abandoning during the process of dāna (tyāgānvayapunya). It is generated through the production of a mental dharma of abandoning (parityāgadharma), constituting the intention to give and represents the act of giving proper. This form of merit accrues when gifts are presented to a caitya. On other hand, there is the merit produced by its enjoyment (paribhoganānvayapunya). It is merit that results from joy by the recipient in the objects that were bestowed.

The amount of merit depends, besides the benefactor's mental state, also on the status of the beneficiary. We saw that spiritual achievement in both the donor and beneficiary constitutes the purest form of giving and entails supreme merit. Thus, we read in the *Kośa*, citing a sutra from the *Madhyamāgama*, that retribution proceeding from gifts made to the āryan community increases with the holiness of the beneficiary.

Corresponding to the standing of the beneficiary, the resultant merit falls into four categories. First, there is the field of merit characterised by destinies (gati). Here, the condition of birth of the recipient has great impact on the amount of merit that is acquired through giving.

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123. D III, p. 258 (see: also A IV, p. 236)  
The *Amṛtarasa* (*Amṛt* (B), p. 89) records a tradition of seven mistaken ways of giving. These include giving with pride (*abhimanena*), giving for the sake of glory (*kirtaye*), giving for the sake of power (*balaya*), giving accompanied by violence (*sabrsa*), giving with motivation (*hetupratyaya*), giving with the hope of reward and giving to the *Sangha* with discrimination (*vibhanga*). In contents, this enumeration contains little new and is based on the lists in D III, p. 258, A IV, p. 60, pp. 236–37; cf. *Kośabhāsyā*, p. 270.


128. *Kośa*, iv, p. 244

Cf. *Amṛt* (B), pp. 87–88 for a variant interpretation of this mechanism of retribution.

129. Madhyamāgama, TD 1, p. 722b 22.
Second, there is the factor of suffering. A gift to a needy person—sick, disabled or in any other physical distress—confers incalculable merit on the donor. In third place the Kośa cites “excellence through benefactor” as a condition that influences the field’s quality. For illustration, Vasubandhu quotes gifts to one’s father, mother or other benefactors as producing particularly abundant merit.130 Third, we read that a field of merit excels through its qualities. Thus, “a retribution one hundred thousand times greater than a gift made to a persons who uphold moral conduct” will accrue to sponsors of bodhisattvas.131

Having examined some of the aspects of dāna in non-Mahāyāna texts, I return to the Bdp and appraise its exposition of dāna. The Bdp agrees with most other sources that a major benefit of generosity is the elimination of the fault of avarice (mātsaryadosa).132 This is a very fundamental proposition which is found in even the earliest expositions. In addition, it speaks of freedom from birth in the lower destinies (durgati) as a reward for the practice of dāna.133 This too is consistent with the early views, but it is at odds with later thinking that postulates the need for unabating selfless service and self-sacrifice in the bodhisattva training. Next, the Bdp takes up the ancient scheme of three causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) that give rise to generosity and determine the amount of merit produced. However, by focusing on the object (deya) and motivation (cetanā) of giving, but largely ignoring the issue of the beneficiary’s purity, it shows more concern for the active side of dāna practice.134

Perhaps as a collateral, the Bdp pays little attention to the benefits that accrue to the beneficiary from dāna practice. That this is inconsistent with the reciprocity of the ideal of

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130. This category refers primarily to the seven aupadhika-punyakriyavastu (on the aupadhika-punyakriyavastu and the punyakriyavastu in general, see: note 132 in my translation of chapter eleven).

131. Kośa, iv, pp. 234-38
This passage seems to fit ill with an explanation found in the Dakkhinivibhangasutta (M III, pp. 254-5) that proposes that gifts given to the Saṅgha produce greater merit than offerings bestowed to the Buddha. For a brief discussion of the import of the Majjhimanikāya passage, see: La Vallée Poussin, 1980, p. 237 n. 3.

132. E.g., Mpps, v, pp. 663, 2388
In the Mpps (p. 2388), we find also a convenient overview of the various types of renunciation (tyāga). First, there is giving of gifts through the abandoning of material goods. Second, there is the attainment of bodhi through the abandonment of the fetters (sanyojana). Both are fully attained at the seventh stage. Other types of tyāga are given as internal (ādhyātmika) and external (bāhya), light (laghu) and difficult (guru), the material gift and the gift of the doctrine, the mundane and supramundane gift, the latter being exempt from discrimination (avikalpita) and imagination (asamkalpita).

133. R folio 296.7.

134. The only passage in the Bdp that could be interpreted as taking into account the role of the beneficiary is a jātaka narrative that describes the offerings of the weaver Dhāvani to the Tathāgata Kūhana Chanda. This weaver attains innumerable auspicious rebirths culminating in enlightenment solely by virtue of his gifts to a Buddha—the highest of all recipients. But even here, the focus is quite clearly on the gifts that he offered and his persistence in doing so, and not on the spiritual status of the Tathāgata (R, folio 296.3–298.6).
giving, founded on the interchange of āmiśa and dharma or āmiśa and punya, need not be emphasised. To all appearances, the Bdp views dāna above all as a pursuit that is advantageous to the bodhisattva's own advance. Characteristically, preaching of the Dharma—traditionally wellspring of the altruistic dimension of giving—is cited only once in passing.

It could of course be argued that giving of material items has a dual function. On the one hand, it brings to maturation the buddha-qualities and, on the other hand, attracts sentient beings to the Buddhist path. This interpretation would link the practice of āmiṣadāna with the dānasamgrahavastu. As the other three samgrahavastu could be categorised as dharmadāna (they are all concerned with preaching), also material giving raises the prospect of substantial spiritual benefits to other beings.

Towards the end of the chapter, the Bdp elucidates the overall context in which the dānapāramitā operates. It qualifies the reward mechanism by stressing that happiness in this world is only a by-product and does represent the raison d'être of dāna. Since they are subject to the law of karma worldly benefits occur automatically in response to wholesome deeds, whether desired or not. In spite of such demotion, they are nevertheless valued and indeed become the 'launching pad' for the career of the bodhisattva. The Bdp explains this in the following words:

"O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva, mahāsattva who persists in perfect enlightenment when giving worldly objects becomes not only a universal monarch but also acquires the states of Indra and Brahmā, even though he might not desire them. Once he has attained these three states, he accomplishes the ten stages of the bodhisattva and acquires the ten powers and four assurances of the Tathāgata. ... It is in this way, O Śāriputra, that the Tathāgata attain deliverance by means of the retribution of their [worldly] deeds."

This thought is expanded in the next passages where the practice of giving is linked with

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135. U̥g, p. 260.5.4–5; Kośabhāṣya, pp. 268–69; Amrt (B), p. 86.
136. R, folio 300.1.
137. The samgrahavastu appear in the Bdp on folio 695.1–698.7.
138. For a lucid account of the interrelation of dāna and the other pāramitā, see: Mpps (ii, p. 750–769). Another account of the relationship between the pāramitā and dāna, showing how grhapī bodhisattvas cultivate śīla, etc., in granting alms to beggars, is found at U̥g, p. 263.1.6–2.6.
the \textit{cittotpāda} and becomes the platform of the whole of the bodhisattva practice:140

“O Śāriputra, once he has generated benevolence towards beggars, a bodhisattva who pursues generosity acquires by virtue of his \textit{cittotpāda} the uninterrupted buddha-contemplations . . . . O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva assumes all forms of wonder-working powers. O Śāriputra, when former Tathāgata pursued the \textit{bodhisattvacarāyā} they procured such buddha-qualities by means of worldly gifts. O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva who aspires to non-dying, enlightenment and \textit{nirvāṇa} engages in giving worldly objects.”

Finally—setting a precedence for \textit{pāramitā} illustration in all subsequent chapters—the Bdp gives an example of the \textit{jātaka}-genre in order to demonstrate the worthwhile effects of practising \textit{dāna}. The association of \textit{jātaka}-type narratives and \textit{dāna} practice has of course long been recognised. In particular, it was brought into connection with the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism.141 Many scholars have indicated the rising popularity of the \textit{jātaka}-genre in the proto-Mahāyāna movement and suggested that its description of the Buddha’s former practice prepared the ground for the ascent of ‘new’, revised sets of practices in Buddhism.142 Above all, this holds true for the practice of generosity. The Buddha’s willingness in the \textit{jātaka} to abandon all possessions including his own life must have left a lasting impression on the minds of many people.143 Their popularity and wide circulation is well attested by their numerous recensions144 and reproductions in iconography across Asia.145

Ample testimony of this change is found in the literary documents of the Mahāyāna. The

140. R, folio 294.6-295.3.
141. Much has been written on the circumstance in which this transformation might have taken place and numerous, partly contradictory, scenario were proposed. For a survey of these theories, including a good bibliography, see: Bauman, 1988.
143. Particularly enchanting examples of the bodhisattva’s selfless service and self-sacrifice are found in the \textit{Vessantarājātaka} (Cone; Gombrich, Oxford, 1977), \textit{Mahājanakājātaka} (Jātaka, vi, p. 34); \textit{Candraprabhājātaka} (Mppś, ii, pp. 715–6) \textit{Sarvadājātaka} (Jātaka, no. 514; tīkā, v, pp. 36–57). For an example of such edifying stories preserved outside the \textit{jātaka} collection, see the narrative of Velāma in \textit{Anguttaranikāya IV}, pp. 392–396.
first Mahāyāna sūtra to devote an entire chapter to the practice of giving was the Ug. Firmly anchored in the conduct of lay-bodhisattvas and acknowledged as fundamental to their training, dāna stands in the Ug at the centre of the whole discourse. The chief beneficiaries of the lay bodhisattva’s dāna practice are mendicant monks. As his most elevated gifts are given to the Saṅgha, the bodhisattva trains to achieve the standards of morality of the monks.146 Since he is in equal measure wealthy and devoted to universal liberation, generosity becomes the grhapti bodhisattva’s best-known practice and lends viability to his training in society.147 In the Ug, the practice of giving consists chiefly of material objects.148 On an immediate level, the imparting of his wealth is intended to alleviate the suffering of beings. However, if perfected, it becomes the discipline by which he purifies himself of the three root defilements149 and supports the conviction of the non-existence of a self.150 Not before the bodhisattva has rid himself of all three defilements becomes this transformation into all-knowing feasible.151 What is more, his practice of dāna becomes also the very basis for all other attainments, most notably the remaining five perfections—that, in turn, sustain his accomplishments in generosity. Giving free from expectations for reward is here characterised as the perfection of wisdom.152 Indeed, by promoting insight through a series of mental exercises relating to generosity that guide on his path153, dāna practice becomes something of a middle path between the extremes of worldly life.154 In the end, the grhapti bodhisattva’s entire activity is undertaken in and for the practice of giving, since it is at once the principal means of liberation and, when perfected, liberation itself.

The grhapti bodhisattva receives the inspiration to dāna from mendicants who dwell in temples and whom he visits frequently for instruction.155 Ironically, in terms of dāna practice,
the householder soon becomes superior to the mendicants, since they postpone dāna cultivation proper until after dharma-cognition. In the Ug dāna constitutes therefore an important link connecting the householder with the mendicant ideal. Initially aroused by bhikṣus, it perfects the conduct of the grhapti bodhisattva. At a later stage the monks are set to join him in order to train themselves in dāna.

Another early text that discusses generosity in some detail is the Akn. Its treatment of dāna has many features in common with the Bdp. It too discusses the practice of giving in the context of the six perfections. In both the Kp and Ug dāna is treated largely independently of the other perfections. The Akn’s exposition consists mainly of lists that enumerate the various objects of dāna and the mental states that accompany pure generosity. These enumerations address concerns similar to those of the Bdp and share a large stock of practices with the lists in the Bdp. Other parallels exist in the reward mechanism. Like the Bdp the Akn explains that gifts of luxury lead to physical perfection, the giving of family members to high spiritual attainments and the giving of the body to the buddha-body. Differences are only found in the concluding passages, where the Akn sets out to define the cognitive processes that accompany the practice of dāna. Here, we learn that dāna, when perfected, is pervaded by the absence of distinguishing marks (ānimittapaṇibhāvita), operates in the sphere of emptiness (śūnyatākapraśādhita) and is not entangled in the affairs of the triple world (traidhātukāṃṣaṃprastāta).

The dāna exposition in the Akn represents an important watershed in the treatment of the practice of generosity. After it, departing from the enumerative, highly laborious schemes of the early Mahāyāna texts, sūtras adopted a more succinct style in their discussion of generosity. Increasingly, descriptions of dāna became replaced by investigations in its conceptual foundations and scope of operation.

Early traces of this re-orientation are found in the Rcd which shows much greater interest in

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156. op. cit., p. 272.2.4–3.2

The mental preparation for the householder’s practice of dāna is laid down in a list of fourteen deliberations that encourage liberal giving. These include recognition of the transiency of dharma, seeing the reality of non-self and perceiving that dāna frees the practitioner from fear, bonds of saṃsāra and the threat of Māra (Ug, p. 262.3.7–4.7).

157. 34, pp. 42.3.1–44.4.2.

158. Note that in Akn like the Bdp the gift of the Doctrine receives only scant attention and does not stand in the foreground. In a lengthy enumeration of items that are being given by bodhisattvas (pp. 42.2–43.1.1), the gift of the Doctrine figures only indirectly in five places (pp. 42.5.1–6), but is even then never clearly established as the object of dāna.

159. op. cit., p. 43.2.8–3.1.
the mental operations underlying and manifest pure generosity.\textsuperscript{160} At first, the \textit{sūtra} lays down the conditions that are favourable to the pursuit of generosity.\textsuperscript{161} These consists in unreserved impartiality in the act of giving towards all beings whether evil and virtuous; generation of the mind of enlightenment with the knowledge of the sameness of all \textit{dharma} (\textit{sarvadharma-samata}); resolve that the roots of virtue accrued through giving do not become transformed into personal gain; unshakable faith in the three aspects of giving.

Then, proceeding from this first, largely preparatory practice, the Buddha defines those attributes that transform giving into pure giving. Above all, these consist of cognitive processes that dominate the donor's mind at the time of giving. The bodhisattva discards the eight mistaken views concerning the self and becoming; he is free from propensities (\textit{vāsanā}) linking the donor with desire and the lower vehicles; his body, speech, mind and intention are fully purified; he passes beyond desire for reward; transcends the fears of pride, conceit and evil works and realises emptiness all around.\textsuperscript{162} Throughout the practice, his mind is set on the welfare of beings, budha-qualities, marks of a \textit{mahā-puruṣa} and budha-field.

The \textit{Red}'s trend towards succinctness and conceptualisation is set forth in the \textit{Vān} that is entirely devoid of lists of \textit{dāna} objects. Casting aside old established precepts on alms-begging and its footing in morality, Vimalakīrti advocates for unity of the benefactor, beneficiary and the object given (\textit{trimandala-pariśuddhi}) to become the basis of pure \textit{dāna} practice.\textsuperscript{163} By doing so, he dismisses practically all early principles of \textit{dāna} practice and adjusts the notion of giving to the Mahāyāna tenet of 'universal sameness' (\textit{sarvadharma-ta}).\textsuperscript{164} As a collateral of this overturn, he rejects the validity of distinctions in the objects of \textit{dana}. Thus, the gift of the doctrine is no longer restricted to preaching, but includes material goods as Dharma offering (\textit{dharmayajña}).\textsuperscript{165}

After the \textit{Vān}, this thought was taken up in numerous Mahāyāna \textit{sūtras} and became the basis for \textit{dāna} practice. A good example is found in the \textit{Pañca}. Acknowledging the validity of the threefold purity, it distinguishes a mundane and supramundane mode of generosity. On worldly \textit{dāna} application, we read:\textsuperscript{166}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{160} 24, pp. 231.4.6–232.4.3.
\item \textsuperscript{161} \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 231.5.2–232.1.8.
\item \textsuperscript{162} \textit{op. cit.}, p. 232.2.1–3.3.
\item \textsuperscript{163} \textit{Vān}, pp. 51–52.
\item \textsuperscript{164} M III, pp. 256–7; A I, pp. 161–2.
\item \textsuperscript{165} \textit{Vān}, p. 112.
\item \textsuperscript{166} \textit{Pañca}, p. 264 (trsl. Conze).
\end{enumerate}
“Held by three ties the bodhisattva gives a gift. What are the three? The notion of the self, the notion of others and the notion of a gift. To give a gift held by these three ties, that is called the worldly perfection of giving; it is called ‘worldly’ because one does not swerve from the world, does not depart from it, does not pass beyond it.”

Rooted in the conviction of the inapprehensibility (anupalambha) of dharma, supramundane giving takes as its object the threefold purity of giving.\(^1\)

“The supramundane perfection of giving, on the other hand, consists in threefold purity. What is threefold purity? Here a bodhisattva gives a gift, and he does not apprehend a self, a recipient, or a gift; also no reward for his giving. He surrenders that gift to all beings, but does not apprehend those beings, or himself either. And, although he dedicates that gift to the supreme enlightenment, he does not apprehend any enlightenment. ... It is called supramundane because one swerves from the world, departs from it, passes away from it.”

Crucially important to both modes of giving, is the bodhisattva’s willingness to transfer the gift itself and all the merit he gained through it to his fellow beings.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Panca, p. 253a (trsl. Conze)

\(^2\) Panca, p. 176 (trsl. Conze)

The notions of mundane and supramundane levels of giving are taken up in the *Mppś*. Mundane giving (*laukikadāna*) consists in ordinary generosity or gifts granted by members of the āryan-fold, but accompanied by impure thoughts. This last point is subject to controversy as some have argued that every gift from the ārya, even if of impure motivation, is by definition, supramundane since they have cut off all fetters (*sanyojana*) of existence through the *apranihitamādi* (op. cit., i, pp. 322–23). Supramundane giving (*lokottaradāna*) has as its object items that are unreservedly pure and conforms to the true character (*bhūtalaksana*) of the Dharma. It includes also relinquishing one’s own life, if it is done out of concern for the welfare of beings (*Mppś*, ii, pp. 688–691). Every act of giving exclusively aimed at escape from *samsāra* is impure, since it ignores the suffering of sentient beings and lacks interest in the ‘true’ teaching of the Dharma (*Mppś*, ii, p. 677). This position is fundamentally based on a passage in the *Vēlaṃasutta* (A IV, pp. 392–96) where the Buddha recounts an episode of his previous life as bodhisattva. Similar criteria apply to the donor. Persons who freely give away their riches but fail to abandon giving are mundane in character. Those, however, who resolve to renounce material objects and the concept of giving—knowing that they both are ultimately non-existent (anupalabdha)—are supramundane operators (*Mppś*, ii, p. 724).

In the final analysis even this tenuous link with conventional reality must be abandoned, since any thought of having given something away might lead to pride and satisfaction. In the words of the *Vajracchedikā*:

“A gift should not be given by a bodhisattva who is supported by an object; a gift should not be given by a bodhisattva who is supported anywhere. A gift should not be given by a bodhisattva who is supported by matter, sound, scent, taste, touch or mind objects. For Subhūti, a gift is to be given by a bodhisattva mahāsattva in such a way that he does not support himself even on the notion of a sign” (*Vajracchedikā*; Vaidya, 1961, p. 76; ref. Meadows).
“Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the perfection of giving of a bodhisattva who courses
in perfect wisdom and gives gifts consists in that, with attention associated with
the knowledge of all modes, he turns over to full enlightenment that gift which he
gives, after he has made that wholesome root [which results from the act of
giving] common to all people.”

It is on this note that Bdp concludes its discussion of dāna. Linking generosity with the
cittotpāda, it sums up the fundamental principles of dāna practice as follows:169

“O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva who is skilful gives [gifts] to many people, even if
[what is given] is small. His practice excels by virtue of the power of his pristine
cognition. It is strengthened by the power of his wisdom. It is without limit by
virtue of his power of dedication.”

This survey of the development of the concept of dāna allows us to draw some conclusions
about the treatment of generosity in the Bdp. The nature of presentation suggests that the
Bdp’s exposition of generosity belongs to the earliest strands in Mahāyāna sūtras. The
extensive use of enumerations, the predominantly descriptive tone and the application of the
jātaka-genre as a vehicle of explication all point to an early date of composition. It is difficult
to establish the period of time of its formulation, but the fact that the Bdp does not expose the
practice of dāna to the principles of Mahāyāna ontology and shows no interest in conceptualising
indicates that it probably predates the discussions of the Vkn, Pañca and Reś. For the
bodhisattva in the Bdp, the practice of dāna involves quite clearly true hardship and unfeigned
renunciation. That the Bdp does not include the gift of the Dharma among the objects of
giving is further evidence of its antiquity because it suggests that teaching had not yet

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become a major concern of the bodhisattva. In later texts this position was fundamentally revised and _dharmadāna_ became a major, if not the most important, aspect of the practice of generosity.

It is also of interest to note the connection between generosity and morality. When the _Bdp_ discusses the forty manifestations of _dāna_ and the mental states that accompany pure giving, it is clearly concerned to show that giving is an intrinsically moral practice that can only flourish if it is applied within the confines of pure morality. We have seen that this link between _dāna_ and _śīla_ is not particular to Mahāyāna thinking but had already been established by the Buddha in the Dighanikāya. In the Mahāyāna, the _dāna/śīla_ association is most evident in the early _sūtras_. Apart from the _Bdp_, it is found in the _Ug_, _Kp_, _Rp_, _Akn_, _PraS_ and _Sukhāvatīvyūha_. In response to shifts in perception that were occasioned by the increasingly powerful presence of the ontological postulates of _śūnyatā_ and _samatā_ this connection waned in later literature. Already in the _Vkn_ it became delegated to the background and it is altogether absent from the _Pañca_. In a sense, its disappearance was inevitable and represents the logical outcome of a vision of reality that rejects the validity of all worldly experience and operates beyond the parameter of purity and impurity. The fact that it is found in the _Bdp_ and placed very much in the centre of the exposition of _dāna_ is yet another indication that the _Bdp_ is a work of great antiquity and belongs to the earlier strands of Mahāyāna _sūtras_.

152
The Perfection of Morality

"For ordinary people, for those who originate in the word [of the buddha],
For persons who are predestined to the awakening of pratye kabuddhas,
And for sons of the buddha there is no other cause but morality
[That leads to] supreme happiness and worldly delight." 170

This verse, composed in the seventh century by Candrakirti, is eloquent testimony of the high esteem in which Buddhists of all ages held moral integrity. Valued for the disciplinarian rigour and purificatory effect morality impressed on those who subscribed to its observance, the practice of morality formed from early on a pillar of Buddhist spirituality. Echoing this importance, it was juxtaposed to meditation and wisdom and became one of the three cardinal practices the Buddha grew never tired of expounding.

In particular, moral conduct was valued for its preparatory role in the spiritual development. In the Dasuttarasutta, the Buddha included the following counsel amongst eight conditions that occasion wisdom: 171

"Self-restraint in accordance with the pātimokkha code, equipped with wholesome conduct, recognising danger in even the smallest transgression, [a monk] trains in the moral precepts (sikkhāpada)."

The sāmañṇaphala stage by stage account of the path in the silakhandhavagga of the Dīghanikāya draws a clear picture of the dynamics governing the progress of spiritual purification. This process starts with sīla as the preliminary stage, proceeds through its intermediate stages with the practice of samādhi and culminates in the cultivation of paññā. 172

The spirit of this scheme is encapsulated in a well-known passage of the

172. This progressive characterisation of the path recurs numerous times in the nikāya. In the Majjhimanikāya (M I, pp. 178–89, pp. 267–71, pp. 344–8; III, pp. 33–6, pp. 134–7), we find several examples of slightly abbreviated versions. The same pattern, if adjusted to an altered frame of reference, is epitomised in the scheme of the seven perfections (visuddhi) of the Rathavinitasutta and, of course, in the overall structure of the Visuddhimagga.
Mahāparinibbānasutta:  

"Such is sīla, such is samādhi, such is paññā. When imbued with sīla, samādhi is of great fruit and benefit. When imbued with samādhi, paññā is of great fruit and benefit. When imbued with paññā, the mind is rightly freed from the āsava, namely the āsava of sensual desire, the āsava of becoming, the āsava of views, the āsava of ignorance."

In spite of this hierarchical structure, it would be a mistake to infer that morality, meditation and wisdom are practised in isolation and succession. For, in practice all three are inextricably linked together and can only flourish in conjoint efforts:

"Just as Gautama, one might wash hand with hand or foot with foot, even so paññā is fully washed by sīla and sīla is fully washed by paññā. Where there is sīla there is paññā, where there is paññā there is sīla. One who has sīla has paññā, one who has paññā has sīla. [Sīla] and paññā together are declared the summit of the world."

The best canonical treatment of sīla is not to be found among the scattered references of the four principal nikāya, but in the Patissambhidamagga. For the Paṭis, the quality of sīla is primarily determined by its scope and depth of application. Measured by as a series of factors that compromise moral integrity, these include transgressions motivated by considerations of gain, fame, family, physical well-being and life-and-death. It is only when sīla is wholly unaffected and well beyond such worldly concerns that it fosters spiritual growth and becomes the basis for nibbāna.

In order to be fully beneficial to these attainments, moral conduct must have its foundation in cognition and operate in combination with restraint, non-transgression, volition and

173. D II, p. 81; repeated on pp. 84, 91, 98 (trsl. Gethin; my punctuation).  
175. D I, pp. 124 (trsl. Gethin; my punctuation)  
Samādhi is omitted in this scheme as the Sonadandassutta, from which this quotation stems, investigates the path phases only in terms of moral conduct and wisdom.  
177. A commentary on this section is found in Vism, i, p. 12.  
178. Paṭis, i, p. 44.
consciousness-concomitants (cetasika). According to Buddhaghoṣa\textsuperscript{179}, quoting canonical sources, morality as restraint refers above all to the restraint through the pātimokkha code\textsuperscript{180}, mindfulness, knowledge, patience and energy.\textsuperscript{181} Siła as non-transgression applies to compliance with whatever commitments of virtue one has undertaken. Since these vary with the respective vows, śīla ranges from non-violation of the pañcasīla to full adherence to all Vinaya rules. Conceptually, morality as volition and consciousness-concomitants go hand in hand as they represent two aspects of the same mental factor. The volitional dimension refers to the positive intention (cetanā) that is present in one who refrains from killing, etc., while, its consciousness-concomitants are those aspects of consciousness that arise together as the factor of abstinence.\textsuperscript{182} If applied to the ten wholesome acts of refrain, morality as volition accounts for the cetanā that generate the first seven non-actions, while its consciousness-concomitants generate the three remaining states of non-covetousness, non-ill-will and right view.\textsuperscript{183}

On the basis of these distinctions, the Pāṭis draws up five categories of siła, namely, abandoning, abstention, volition, restraint and non-transgression, and relates them to each of the ten non-virtuous actions. The most important benefit that flows from these five modes of siła is ‘non-remorse cognition’.\textsuperscript{184} It is so because it prepares the ground for higher understanding of the path which prompts the practitioner to carry out all practices as required.\textsuperscript{185}

Buddhaghoṣa, greatly expanding on the siła section of the Pāṭis, proposes nineteen aspects of morality.\textsuperscript{186} Of particular interest for the present study is his understanding of mundane and supramundane morality. Citing a passage from the Vinaya, he establishes that siña that is still subject to the cankers is essentially mundane.\textsuperscript{187} It brings about improvement in future states of existence and constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for deliverance. Supramundane morality, in contrast, operating beyond worldly constraints, is capable of leading directly to

\textsuperscript{179} Vism, i, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{180} According to the Kośa (iv, pp. 47–48), propounding a Sautrāntika point of view, the discipline of the prātimokṣa code falls into four categories. Morality (śīla) redressing that which is unjust; good conduct (sucarita) that is praised by the wise; action (of body and speech) because it is action by nature; and discipline (samvara) because it constrains body and speech.
\textsuperscript{181} D I, p. 70; M I, pp. 10-11; Sn. 1035.
\textsuperscript{182} Cf. Atthasalini, iii, chpt. v, pp. 103–106.
\textsuperscript{183} Vism, i, p. 7
\textsuperscript{184} See also A V, p. 1 where we read: “Ānanda, profitable habits (virtues) have non-remorse as their aim and non-remorse as their benefit.”
\textsuperscript{185} Pāṭis, i, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{186} Vism, i, pp. 10–51.
\textsuperscript{187} Vin, v, p. 164.
nibbāna and represents the plane of ‘reviewing knowledge’.\textsuperscript{188}

Purification itself is brought about through four modes of practice and behaviour.\textsuperscript{189} First, there is purification by teachings. This form of purity originates in hearing and observing the rules of the Pātimokkhasutta. Second, purification by restraint refers to consciously undertaken abstention from sensual indulgence. It evolves from a resolution to that effect and varies according to the commitments. Third, purification by search is achieved through conscientious probing resulting in rightful acquiring of requisites. Fourth, purification by reviewing emerges from mindful scrutiny of those objects that one plans to appropriate prior to the acquisition proper in order avoid unintended offence.\textsuperscript{190}

The Mahāyāna sūtras incorporated many of the above concerns into their interpretation of śīla. This is attested by the great number of śīla expositions that revolve around the issues that are expressed in the tenfold virtuous activity (kuśalakarmapatha). But they also went beyond this scheme which was expanded to comprise numerous other qualities and practices. Religiously, many of these new precepts grew out of the resolve to achieve universal deliverance and accommodate therefore a much greater spiritual ideal. This led to a conceptual expansion of the notion of śīla beyond the parameter of the prātimokṣa code.

Cognitively, this expanded interpretation of morality required a new frame of reference to

\textsuperscript{188} Vism, i, p. 13.

Next, Buddhaghosa distinguishes moral conduct that is natural, necessary, customary and due to previous causes (Vism, i, p. 15). A similar characterisation of the nature of moral conduct is found in the Bbh where we read that śīla should be understood as adopted, natural, habituated or conjoined with means. Adopted morality is that on which the threefold morality of the Bbh is modelled. Natural morality is undertaking physical and vocal activity that is entirely pure because of the nature goodness of the mental continuum that is established in the bodhisattva fold. Habituated morality characterises the moral conduct by which the bodhisattva has grown accustomed to the threefold morality in his previous lives. Morality that is conjoined with means refers to the bodhisattva’s reliance on the four means of conversion in order to encourage to virtuous activity of body and speech (Bbh, p. 184.6–22).

According to the Kośa, combining material from two discourses of the Anguttaranikāya (II, p. 121; IV, p. 364), morality is of four types. First, there is morality of fear. One observes this out of concern for loss of the daily necessities, out of concern for a bad reputation, out of fear of chastisement and out of fear of birth in the evil destinies. Second, there is mercenary morality that one adheres to out of attachment to life in the good destinies, to pleasures and to honours. Third, there is morality that is suitable to the factors of enlightenment that pertain to persons of right view. Fourth, there is pure morality that, being free from stain, is free from vices (Kośa, iv, p. 248).

\textsuperscript{189} Vism, i, pp. 43–44.

\textsuperscript{190} In the Kośa (iv, pp. 247–8), moral purity is attributed to rejection of the causes of immorality (viz, the kleśa and upakleśa), to the workings of the four bases of mindfulness (vi, p. 158) and to reliance on the peace of nirvāṇa. Then, it considers five additional causes of moral integrity. These are purity of the deed itself (renouncing of evil deeds); purity of their attendants (renouncing the preparations or the means of killing, etc.); absence of the disturbance from viśāraka (kāma, vyāpāda and viṃśāvīśāraka); its supervision through mindfulness (Buddha, Dharma and Sangha—that includes the renunciation of undefined actions) and its application to nirvāṇa (op. cit., iv, p. 248).

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allow integration into the revised philosophical tenets of Mahāyāna thinking. The calls for purity of body, speech and mind indexed to a world that itself had no independent claim to existence beyond the level of convention must have startled the minds of many Buddhists of the day. In order to allay this bewilderment and to reconcile what appeared to be contradictory demands, Mahāyāna thinkers drew up a blueprint that distinguished two levels of truth. On the lower or conventional level, the need for moral integrity was upheld. On a higher level of understanding—reserved to those of rare spiritual gifts—‘reality as it is’ (yathābhūta) revealed itself as having the characteristics of same (sama), unborn (anutpanna) and calm (sānta), operating beyond the categories of purity and impurity. Seen from this absolute viewpoint, all endeavours in morality lose in their meaning and become harmful to liberation since they obstruct conceptual ‘unbecoming’ by superimposing non-existent predicates on reality.

It was from this kind of changes in perception that there eventually emerged a new type of ethics—the bodhisattva morality (bodhisattvaśīla). Based on the amalgamation of the vastly expanded mission and the new vision of reality, Mahāyāna sūtras came to propose a moral ideal that was tailored to the spiritual aspiration of the bodhisattva. Dismissing the early prohibitive schemes of the śrāvaka as inadequate, the bodhisattva morality superseded the ancient conventions and replaced them with a scheme that allowed for a free interplay between cognitive realisation and the religious obligation of universal liberation.

That this process was slow is attested in several early Mahāyāna sūtras where we find the treatment of śīla still bearing close resemblance to the ideal of early Buddhism. That is to say, it continues to revolve around the tenfold virtuous activity, to emphasise the threat of desire and to operate within (be at the margin of) the confines of śrāvakayāna ontology. A good example is the Ug. Here, the treatment of śīla is still dominated by an exposition of the pañcaśīla. Following well-established pattern, it discusses the five limbs and points to the

191. Asūta, p. 427; for a list of eleven, see Asūta, p. 324 (cf. Saddhp, pp. 275–296).

Another example is the Dbh. The Dbh, however, stands out for the fruits it proposes arise from the kuśālakarmapatha. According to this text the kuśālakarmapatha lead to the state of pratyekabuddhahood when purified through the insight of its attainment. They encourage purification of the bodhisattva’s stages, perfections and conduct if practised in the spirit of the bodhisattva’s pranidhāna and lead, if fully purified, to the state of buddhahood itself (Daśa-bh, p. 26.1–13).

192. As if appended to the chapter, the Uga adds in a few lines the remaining five śīla of the akuśālakarmapatha so that in fact all ten factors are present (pp. 261.2.6–3.5). The pañcaśīla correspond to the first five precepts in a list of rules known in Pāli as the sikkhāpādāni (Skt. siksāpādāni). Both refer essentially to those precepts a layman is expected to observe when he enters into the Buddhist community and, to some extent, define his spiritual status. In the Buddhist training, their role is chiefly preliminary as they prepare the commitment to higher disciplinary practices. In substance there is no difference between the pañcaśīla observance of śrāvaka and bodhisattvas since it spells out a basic moral ideal that is quite independent from the cittotpāda and pranidhāna. In a controversial article
disadvantages arising from their violation, with desire (rāga) rated as the most serious obstacle.\textsuperscript{193} Traces to the new ideal are few and do not affect the spirit of the treatise. They occur only once in a brief passage indicating compassion behind harmlessness and in a reference to ‘caring generosity’.

In the \textit{Rcd}, \textit{ṣīla} is given a more advanced treatment. In particular, it displays several concepts that link it unambiguously with the Mahāyāna. First, it states that the bodhisattva’s whole practice of morality is rooted in the \textit{cittotpāda}.\textsuperscript{194} Whatever its manifestations, the overriding purpose of the \textit{ṣīla} practice is the universal liberation of beings. This objective is achieved by the traditional practice of the \textit{daśakuśala} in conjunction with selfless service and resolve. The motivation behind the bodhisattva’s moral training is therefore Mahāyāna, while the means to achieve progress therein are outlined along the conventional understanding of \textit{ṣīla}. For the author of the \textit{Rcd}, no doubt, moral purification takes place in a world of ‘real’ obstacles, genuine impurity and is achieved through a set of practices specifically designed to overcome them.

In the \textit{Akn} this understanding of morality is taken up and further integrated into Mahāyāna ontology. At first, like the \textit{Rcd}, the \textit{Akn} looks at morality from a conventional point of view and enumerates a great number of attributes that pertain to moral perfection.\textsuperscript{195} Although the list commences with the \textit{daśakuśala}, many of the items go well beyond its scope and link \textit{ṣīla} specifically with bodhisattva practices.\textsuperscript{196} Next, the \textit{Akn} investigates the nature of morality in the light of the doctrine of non-attribution (\textit{asamāropā}), concluding that morality of the foundation of being (\textit{dharmtāśīla}) prevails when there is absence of names and signs

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\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Ug}, p. 261.1.2–2.6.
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Rcd}, p. 232.4.5.
\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Akn}, pp. 43.4.2–44.1.7.
\textsuperscript{196} The \textit{Akn} includes, for instance, unloquacious morality (\textit{amukharāśīla}), peaceful morality (\textit{sāntiśīla}), morality which grasps adequately gentle speech (\textit{suvacahpraṇādakṣinaśīla}), morality of bringing sentient beings to maturity (\textit{sattvaparipācanaśīla}) and morality guarding the Dharma as manifestations of \textit{ṣīla} (p. 44.4–6).
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(nāmasamketa), since “morality is where there is no attribution of body, speech and mind”.\textsuperscript{197} If seen from the paramārtha point of view and subjected to the same philosophical rigour as all other phenomena, it becomes a non-practice (adharma) of no independent existence. With such propositions in hand, the \textit{Akn} draws a clear line in the understanding of morality. By fully integrating moral conduct in cognition and by making its purity dependent on insight rather than practice, it blurs the distinctions between \textit{śīla}, \textit{samādhi} and \textit{prajñā} as never before. It is true that also in the \textit{Akn} the cognitive dimension is still dominated by practical concerns of morality; and yet, its cognitive propositions clearly herald a new type of understanding of \textit{śīla}.\textsuperscript{198}

The first \textit{sūtra} to undertake a clear commitment to this ontological interpretation was the \textit{Kp}. Here, in a memorable passage, we learn:\textsuperscript{199}

“Die Moral, Kāśyapa, wird Moral genannt, bei der kein Selbsthaftes, kein Wesen, kein Nominalismus des Wesen, kein zu Tuendes, kein nicht zu Tuendes, kein Bewirken, kein nicht Bewirken, kein Wandel, kein Nichtwandel, keine Ausführung, keine Nichtausführung, kein Name, keine Gestalt, kein Attribut, kein Nichtattribut, keine Ruhe, keine Beruhigung, kein Erfassen, kein Aufgeben, kein zu Erfassendes [existiert]. ... O Kāśyapa, die Moral is ohne Einflüsse, nichts zugehörig, abgesondert von der Dreiwelt, fern von all Basis im Leben.”

It is argued that monks who still considered moral conduct as a ‘real’ concern involving independently existing beings and of sensory experience that is based on mistaken assumptions (\textit{upalambhadṛṣṭika})—however conscientiously they might have observed the precepts—failed to accomplish moral purity.\textsuperscript{200} In the words of Candrakīrti:\textsuperscript{201}

“If [a bodhisattva] sees in moral purity an own-being (\textit{svabhāva})

By that very reason, his morality is not pure.”

Besides this reinterpretation of \textit{śīla}, the \textit{Kp} makes another important contribution to the

\textsuperscript{197.} \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.1.8–2.4.
\textsuperscript{198.} \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.2.4–7.
\textsuperscript{200.} \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 191–2, § 134.
\textsuperscript{201.} \textit{Mahābhārata}, p. 37.17–18.
understanding of morality. We have seen that so far conventional morality is chiefly concerned with the daśakaśala, either set in the context of prohibitive regulations or aligned to the thought of enlightenment. This concept is not absent from the Kp. It encourages repeatedly constraint of the senses\textsuperscript{202}, correct conduct\textsuperscript{203} and genuine observance of monastic precepts\textsuperscript{204} as the principal means to overcome evil propensities.\textsuperscript{205} Where it differs is the stipulation for extensive roots of virtue (kuśaladharma) to complement compliance with the regulative strands of śīla so that they may result in maximum benefit. This recognition, it is true, is not totally absent in other texts. However, in the Kp it is for the first time that the accumulation of roots of virtue—if only tentatively—is proposed as a regular concomitant of morality.\textsuperscript{206} In later Buddhist literature, most notably the Bbh, this association contributed to making the accumulation of roots of virtue an integral part of bodhisattva morality.

In the Vkn, apparently building on the concerns of the Kp, but leading them to a logical conclusion, Vimalakīrtti clarifies the impact of mind on moral conduct:\textsuperscript{207}

"A fault exists neither on the inside, nor on the outside, nor between the two.\textsuperscript{208} And Why? Because the Blessed One has said: 'By the defilement of the mind are beings defiled, by the purification of the mind are they purified. Honourable Upāli, the mind exists neither on the inside, nor on the outside, nor between the two. So it is with a fault as it is with the mind, and with all dharma as with a fault: they are not separated from suchness.' ... All dharma are without arising, disappearance and duration, like an illusion, a cloud or a flash of lightening. Those who know this are called the true guardians of the discipline.\textsuperscript{209}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[202.] Kp, p. 46, § 22.1.
\item[203.] op. cit., p. 13, § 6.2
\item[204.] op. cit., pp. 18–19, § 8; pp. 191–2, § 134.
\item[205.] op. cit., p. 45, § 21.1.
\item[206.] Kp, pp. 10–19; pp. 41–44, § 5, 6, 8, 19, 20
\item[207.] Vkn, pp. 71–73 (trsl. Lamotte).
\item[208.] The advantages that accrue from the roots of virtue are manifold, but always personal to the bodhisattva. The means by which a bodhisattva accumulates roots of virtue are fourfold, viz., delight in solitude, practice of the means of conversion, selfless service and self-sacrifice and insatiability for roots of virtue (op. cit., p. 41, §19). In the Kp, the only factor capable of removing their accumulation is mind (citta) that, though utterly insubstantial, represents a real threat to the bodhisattva's morality since it is associated with the sense pleasures but difficult to trace (op. cit., p. 149, §102).
\item[209.] On the notion of non-separation the Vkn (p. 192; trsl. Lamotte) adds:
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The *Pāñca*, introduces a third element that, while tacitly present in all Mahāyāna sūtras, has never before been specially mentioned as a factor affecting śīla practice. This is the bodhisattva’s resolve to mature all sentient beings.\(^{210}\)

"Coursing in the perfection of morality ... endowed with this skill in means, the bodhisattva grows in wholesome roots, courses in the perfection of morality, matures beings, and purifies the buddha-field. But he does not aspire for any fruit from his morality, which he could enjoy in *samsāra*, and it is only for the purpose of protecting and maturing beings that he courses in the perfection of morality."

While it is difficult to assess the influence such a passage might have had on subsequent developments, it is striking that many of its key elements found their way into later scholastic literature.\(^{211}\) In the *Bbh*, for instance, one meets with exactly the same śīla division proposing discipline, collecting wholesome roots and ripening of beings as chief components of moral conduct.\(^{212}\)

The first element, entitled morality of the vow (*sāṃvarasāśīla*) is said to vary according to the seven commitments that are open to Buddhist followers.\(^{213}\) Recognising the variety of


\[^{211}\] For a concise, if slightly inaccurate, survey of sources in which these issues occur, see: *Hōbōgirin*, 1929–1930, "Bosatsuza", pp. 142–146.

\[^{212}\] *Bbh*, p. 138,24–27

\[^{213}\] Altogether, action of discipline falls into three categories: (1) action included in the discipline of the *prātimokṣa* vow, (2) action included in the discipline of meditation (*dhyānasamvara*), (3) action included in the discipline of (supramundane) purity (*anāsravasamvara*). As discipline of the *prātimokṣa* vow Buddhism distinguishes eight kinds of commitment—not seven (*Abhidh-sam* (*R*), p. 90). These are the discipline of monks (*bhikṣusamvara*), nuns (*bhikṣunisamvara*), of
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human circumstances, the Bbh integrates both the lay and monastic side in its vision of the bodhisattvaśīla.\textsuperscript{214} However, the description of the bodhisattva’s saṃvaraśīla suggests that it is in fact firmly placed within the monastic environment.\textsuperscript{215}

The second component of śīla involves the accumulation of factors of virtue (kuśaladharmaśīla).\textsuperscript{216} The bodhisattva achieves this through a variety of practices, including reverence, mindfulness, compassion, seclusion and of course the practice of the pāramitā. Of particular interest are the five aspects of wisdom. These enable the bodhisattva to learn about the advantages that accrue from virtue, the causes of virtue, distortions (viz., the four mistaken views), non-distortions and about the obstacles to accumulating virtue.\textsuperscript{217}

The third aspect of morality is directed at the welfare of sentient beings (sattvanugrāhakāśīla) and specifically concerned with those practices that allay their suffering.\textsuperscript{218} It includes training in skilful means, means of conversion, generosity\textsuperscript{219}, protection\textsuperscript{220}, compliance when appropriate

\begin{itemize}
  \item those who undergo training (śikṣamānasamvara), novices (śramaṇerasamvara), female novices (śramaṇerīsamvara), lay-followers (upāsakasamvara), female lay-followers (upāsikāsamvara) and the discipline of fasting (upavāsasamvara). Possibly Asanga saw a correlation with the seven groups of moral observance that are comprised in the discipline of the prātimokṣa vow, viz., pārājika, saṅghāvaseṣa, aniṣṭa, niḥsarga-pāyantika, pāyantika, prātidesanīya and satkṣa. A good summary of some of the issues pertaining to the eight types of discipline is found in the Kośa (iv, pp. 41–47).
  \item The discipline of meditation refers to abstention from indulgence in sense pleasures at a time when the seeds of defilement stemming from immorality, particularly those of sexual desire, are cut off during the first three stages of meditation. The Kośa (iv, p. 41) adds that while the prātimokṣaśīla belongs to the kāmadhātu, the dhyānasamvara operates only in the rūpadhātu.
  \item Discipline of (supramundane) purity constitutes pure abstention that is attained through internal insight of truth by the force of one’s attention to pure realms (Abhidh-sam R), pp. 90–91). They exist among the gods of the kāmadhātu and rūpadhātu (with the exception of the asamjhasattva and the gods of the intermediate dhyāna), though never in the arūpayadhātu since discipline belongs to the sphere of matter which the arūpayadhātu gods cannot possess (Kośa, iv, p. 105).
  \item The discipline that arises from meditation and the pure discipline are concomitants of the mind; not the prātimokṣa discipline since it continues to exist in persons whose mind is bad or neutral, or who is unconscious (Kośa, iv, p. 51).
\end{itemize}

For further detail on the prātimokṣa morality, see: Kośa, iv, pp. 87, 94–101; Paṭis, pp. 43–44. For an appraisal of the upavāsasamvara see: Kośa, iv, pp. 64–72 and Mppi, ii, pp. 825–39.

\textsuperscript{214} Bbh, p. 138.18–23

While, in general, this attitude is very common in Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras, it is rare that it becomes as explicitly expressed as it is here in the Bbh. In most cases, the proposition that the bodhisattvacaryā can either be pursued in a monastic environment or as a layman is tacitly assumed. Notable exceptions to this rule are the Vkn, Ug, Up and Upāsakaśīlasūtra. For a succinct discussion of the various aspect that pertain to the lay and monastic ideal, including a list of references in Pāli and Sanskrit sources, see: Vkn, pp. 75–77.

\textsuperscript{215} Bbh, p. 141.2–6

For an account of the kinds of action that infringe on discipline (asamvara), their impact on the bodhisattva’s spiritual development and the psychological reactions they occasion, see Abhidh-sam (R), pp. 91–98.

\textsuperscript{216} Bbh, p. 139.1–3.

\textsuperscript{217} op. cit., p. 144.9–16.

\textsuperscript{218} op. cit., p. 140.4–28.

\textsuperscript{219} op. cit., p. 147.7–25.

\textsuperscript{220} op. cit., p. 146.14–19.
and resistance when necessary\textsuperscript{221}, sympathetic joy\textsuperscript{222} and performance of wonder-working powers.\textsuperscript{223}

For the cultivation of the threefold morality to become successful several preconditions have to be met.\textsuperscript{224} First, the bodhisattva requires a learned instructor in order to correctly receive his śīla instructions. Second, it is essential that the bodhisattva acquires a fully purified intention (adhyāsaya) since it determines judgement in the application of the precepts.\textsuperscript{225} If he is thus equipped, two more dharma emerge, viz., an undertaking to correction after failure and mindful avoidance of failure through respect. Accurate reception, pure intent and reverence are by themselves highly effective in preventing breaches of the bodhisattvaśīla.\textsuperscript{226}

In the Bhū, the reception of the bodhisattvaśīla is inextricably linked with the taking on a commitment (samvara) in moral observance. Having solemnly declared his yearning for instructions in morality, the bodhisattva pledges:\textsuperscript{227}

> “I, of such and such a name, declare before all the Tathāgata and bodhisattvas of the great stage of the ten directions. Before them I undertake all the moral precepts of the bodhisattva and the entire bodhisattva morality; the morality of the vow, the morality of accumulating factors of virtue and the morality accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings that the bodhisattvas of the ten directions of the past, present and future have trained in.”

The scope and effectiveness of this samvaraśīla is thought to be superior even to the prātimokṣa vow—the most demanding of the eight traditional commitments. Theoretically, it enables the bodhisattva to train himself by following his own judgement. In practice, however,

\textsuperscript{221} op. cit., pp. 147.25–150.13.
\textsuperscript{222} The bodhisattva applauds in particular those beings who have attained the qualities of faith, morality, learning, renunciation and wisdom (op. cit., p. 150.13–19).
\textsuperscript{223} A summary of the impact of this practice is given in a section detailing the eleven modes by which the bodhisattva is established in the morality of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. However, since this covers much common ground I shall not go into the detail of these factors (op. cit., pp. 144.23–152.17).
\textsuperscript{224} op. cit., p. 137.14–25.
\textsuperscript{225} I have found no other text in which these requirements are stipulated. Most treatises simply refer for the foundations of morality either en bloc to the combined practice of the dasakūśala (Mppś, ii, pp. 782–819, Dasā-bh, pp. 26–27), or accentuate absence of (sexual) desire and hatred in conjunction with correct views as factors generating morality (Mavbh, p. 33.3–6).
\textsuperscript{226} Bhū, pp. 137.26–138.7

These three elements correspond to cardinal issues around which much of the exposition in the Bdp revolves (folio 306.1–4, 314.2–320.6).
\textsuperscript{227} Bhū, pp. 181.21–182.2.
he is advised to listen regularly and to consult the basket of the bodhisattva scriptures (bodhisattvapitaka) since it assists him in the observance of the moral precepts.228

Modelled in name and number on the ‘defeats’ (pārājika) of the śrāvaka Vinaya, the Bbh lays down four factors that signal failure in morality. Characteristically, these do not refer to moral violation in the traditional sense, but address backtracking in the bodhisattva’s resolve. The four are (1) desire for praise and respect, (2) close-fistedness in wealth and Dharma, (3) anger and (4) repudiation of the bodhisattvapitaka.229

Repeated intentional violation of these leads to instantaneous and permanent forfeiture of his roots of virtue and loss of the cittotpāda.230 However, should the bodhisattva show only weak or medium involvement—even if his undertaking is relinquished—he retains the opportunity to receive once again the vow of morality in the same lifetime.231 Moreover, once the vow is taken in accordance with the regulations and not abandoned, it maintains validity throughout the numerous life-cycles of his career.232

228. Bbh, p. 156.7–11
   To the Mппś (ii, p. 586) moral conduct is self-promoting. It proposes that attainments in the pañciśila of the śrāvaka inspire the tenfold morality of the śramaṇa that, in turn, when perfected, lead to the discipline of the monks (prātimoksa). This, again, occasions the next higher form of morality, morality springing from meditation (dhyānaśila), from which arises—once accomplished—pure morality (anāsravasīla). Cf. Bbh (p. 186.16–19) that distinguishes, unfortunately without further elaborating, five modes of morality that are furnished with giving, patience, vigour, meditation and wisdom.

229. Bbh, p. 158.2–5
   This list of pārājika is not the only one that was drawn up for the bodhisattva. In the Brahmajālasūtra—a late text of doubtful authenticity—we meet with ten dharma that entail defeat and deprive the bodhisattva of his status. These include, besides the pañciśila, bringing others into disrepute, avarice, boastfulness at the expense of others, malevolence and calumny of the three jewels (DeGroot, 1967, pp. 32–39; Eidman, 1958, pp. 392–3).

230. The second factor leading to the relinquishment of all moral undertakings is the bodhisattva’s abandonment of his resolution (pp. 159.23–160.2).

231. Bbh, p. 159.9–24
   It appears that the concept of the opportunity of regeneration was introduced by the Vup. We saw that the bodhisattva’s observance of morality—like all other aspects of the training—is decisively influenced by his determination (adhyaśaya). Expressed and strengthened in the commitment of the vow and resolution, it provides the bodhisattva with a stable and firm basis for his entire conduct. Since it is raised consciously and deliberately, this intention creates a mental shield that resists evil and, should it be breached, allows for swift restoration.

For the śrāvaka, the only means of spiritual renewal is given in the highly formalised confession-ritual (Vin, ii, p. 126, 192; iv, p. 18). While this is also available to the bodhisattva, it has lost much in formality and has gained a more personal note. In the Vup, the issue that matters most is no longer exact compliance with procedure, but the candidate’s genuine regret and his undertaking to prevent a repetition of the transgression (Vup, pp. 36–38).

On the provisions for a confession of sins, see: Bbh, p. 181.6–21; Vup, pp. 31–37; Ug (cited in Śikṣ, p. 290.3–6, but attributed to the Vup); Kp, p. 170, § 119; Saddhp, p. 210; Lai, p. 379. Passages raising the possibility of private confessions are also found in the nikāya: D I, p. 85; M I, p. 438; III, pp. 244–7; S I, p. 24; II, p. 127, 205; A I, p. 238; II, p. 146; IV, p. 377.

232. This is not the case of śrāvaka discipline, where commitment to the discipline is only valid for the present life-time (Kośa, iv p. 63). The argument behind this proposition is that the person one would become would be different, that this new person would not be able to apply himself to the rules and that he would not remember undertaking them (Kośa, iv, pp. 63–64).
The gravity of moral transgressions other than the four defeats depends (as in the śrāvaka Vinaya) very much on the circumstances in which they were committed.\textsuperscript{233} In general, acts committed out of indolence, irreverence, greed, desire, pride, negligence or ill-will—the very antitheses to the bodhisattva’s resolution—are considered transgressions involving defilement. If developed out of forgetfulness, illness, mental distraught or ignorance, the fault is a transgressions without defilement.\textsuperscript{234}

Finally, infringement on morality that originates in the bodhisattva’s prāṇidhāna is entirely free from fault or stigma.\textsuperscript{235} In order to elucidate this precarious issue, the Bhī draws up several scenarios where the violation of each of the daśakuśala is not only condoned, but becomes a vital expedient to the promotion of spiritual welfare among beings.\textsuperscript{236} Hence, according to the Bhī, “there is nothing that is categorically a fault” on the bodhisattva’s path. This thought is carried further in a preamble to examples that describe the scope and flexibility of the bodhisattva’s moral conduct:\textsuperscript{237}

> “Even in the case of what is reprehensible by nature, the bodhisattva acts with such skill in means that no fault ensues; rather there is a spread of much merit.”

In other words, by virtue of his expertise in skilful means\textsuperscript{238}, the bodhisattva is allowed—at times even encouraged—to commit transgressions of disobedience (pratikṣepanasāvadya) if, by doing so, he benefits sentient beings.\textsuperscript{239} We saw that for the śrāvaka, moral contravention occurs only within the sphere of physical and vocal activity. Mental inaptitude is not directly addressed by the prātimokṣa rules. This does not hold true for the bodhisattvaśīla where mental improbity (cittāpatti) is fully recognised as a source and manifestation of moral infringement.\textsuperscript{240}

\textsuperscript{233.} Bhī, pp. 160.10–165.1.
\textsuperscript{234.} Bhī, p. 180.10–12.
\textsuperscript{235.} The text gives an example in which the bodhisattva is invited to a house but chooses not to accept the invitation. If he rejects it out of enmity or resentment he has committed a defiled fault, but if he does not attend because he learned of the opportunity to hear a Dharma discourse of great value he is free from fault (Bhī, pp. 162.25–164.7).
\textsuperscript{236.} Bhī, pp. 164.19 ff.
\textsuperscript{237.} Bhī, pp. 165.26–166.1.
\textsuperscript{238.} Cf. Mṣg, p. 216.
\textsuperscript{239.} He is, for instance, encouraged to accept vast quantities of robes, alms-bowls, beds, rugs and even gold and silver to redistribute them among sentient beings (Bhī, p. 165.8–22).
\textsuperscript{240.} Mṣg, p. 214.

Generally, rather than actively transgressing certain rules, it is abstention from required actions that is regarded as a severe violation of the bodhisattva’s morality. For instance, should a bodhisattva who is in
But now to the Bdp. In emphasis and orientation, its treatment shares a common understanding with that of early Buddhism. Since moral improbity is held to lead inevitably to spiritual ruin, its main concern revolves around the need for conventional moral integrity. The presentation possesses therefore many of the hallmarks of the prohibitive vinaya-type approach, while, at the same time, it allows for adjustment to the increased scope of the new ideal.

The bedrock for the whole exposition is the insistence on the conscious and intentional abstention from the ten evil paths of action (akusalakarmapatha).\textsuperscript{241} It takes up over a third of the chapter and is divided into the spheres of body (killing, theft and sexual misconduct), speech (falsehood, slander, harsh and frivolous talk) and mind (covetousness, animosity and wrong views):\textsuperscript{242}

“There are ten modes of auspicious action. 

The bodhisattva who is skilled adheres to them. 

The wise one who does not act through body, speech and mind 

Is said to be in possession of moral conduct.”

And yet, in spite of this accentuation, the treatment of the dasakusala itself provides little insight into the workings of purification. Instead of discoursing on the psychological processes that practice of them triggers, the Bdp devotes most attention to the benefits flowing from possession of wonder-working powers fail to employ them in a situation where they would inspire faith, he would be guilty of a serious transgression. Similarly, should he fail to rebuke people who are in need of reproach or does not mete out a punishment for wrongdoing when he would be perfectly capable of doing so, he commits a defiled fault (Bbh, pp. 179.18–180.10). Passivity with regard to his duties articulated in his pranidhāna weighs more heavily than infringement on the letter of the prātimokṣa precepts. A concise list of attributes pertaining to pure morality appears at the end of the Śilappatāla (op. cit., pp. 186.23–187.15).

241. The Sanskrit terms are as follows: (1) prāṇāīghāta, (2) adattādāna, (3) kāmamithyācāra, (4) mṛṣāvāda, (5) paśuṇyavāda, (6) pārṣuyavāda, (7) sambhinnapralāpa, (8) abhidhyā, (9) vyāpāda and (10) mithyāḍṛṣṭi (Mvy 1687–1698). For references in the nikāya, see: M I, pp. 42, 360; III, p. 23; IV, p. 313; V, p. 469; A, I, p. 226. Sanskrit references are found at Mva, i, p. 107.13; Daśa-bh, p. 23.6; Śiks, p. 69.13 and Dhsgr § 56 (cf. Amrt (B), pp. 89–91). For a full discussion of the akusalakarmapatha, see: Mpś, ii, pp. 782–819. On their role in the bodhisattva-path, the Daśa-bh comments (Daśa-bh, pp. 26.5–9): “The ten good paths of action—as they are completely purified by the wide, immeasurable state, by the arrival at great compassion, by grasping skilful means, by the state of being bound to the next vow, by non-abandoning of all beings, by taking hold of the broad buddha-knowledge—conduce to the complete purity of the stages of the bodhisattva, to the complete purity of the perfections and to the full extent of the career.”

242. R, folio 304.2–3

This list recurs three times during the discussion of the Śilapāramitā (R, folio 368.2–6; 403.7–404.3). As it introduces at each occasion a new aspect of the practice of moral conduct, it was probably conceived of as laying down the individual areas of application that make up the overall scope of the bodhisattva’s morality. This tenfold division is of course very ancient and is well known from the nikāya (cf. D III, p. 214; A, I, pp. 49, 52, ff).
their cultivation and the impact they have on the bodhisattva’s advance.

The acquisition of such benefits is dependent on the interplay of two factors. On the one hand, adjusting to Mahāyāna ontology, the _Bdp_ invalidates moral conduct and denies it any role in the path.\(^{243}\) As we have seen, this is common practice in Mahāyāna sūtras and represents the _paramārtha_ point of view. On the other hand, on a conventional level, _śīla_ becomes a major force in the _bodhisattva_ practices. It is held indispensable for the completion of the path, in general, and gives rise to a series of important mental factors. In the _Bdp_, such factors include faith, vigour, trust in retribution of deeds, trust in morally and wholesome deeds, aspiration to the noble lineage (_āryavamsa_)\(^{244}\), respect and veneration of teachers, withdrawal in search for the Dharma and unreserved commitment to enlightenment.\(^{245}\) Although it stops short of pronouncing a causal relationship between them and the _kuśalakarmapatha_, the _Bdp_ indicates that they operate on a reciprocal basis and arise simultaneously to reinforce each other’s presence.\(^{246}\)

Through the roots of virtue that are generated by the _kuśalakarmapatha_ in conjunction with faith, etc., the bodhisattva produces ten forms of _cittotpāda_. These are based on moral integrity, reverence and yearning for spiritual instruction, and lay down the phases in his cognitive growth.

In spite of the shared context in which the ten _kuśalakarmapatha_, ten mental _dharma_ and ten _cittotpāda_ occur—except for a broad association with the practice of morality—no connection between their members seems to exist. It is true that the ten mental factors and the forms of _cittotpāda_ cover roughly the same ground (both emphasise the role of reverential conduct towards one’s teacher and include search for the Dharma and insight into the workings of karma), yet at no point is there any indication of the relation in which they might develop.

\(^{243}\) R, folio 302.5–304.1

\(^{244}\) According to the _Ug_ (pp. 271.5.1–272.1.7) acquisition of the _āryavamsa_ is one of the chief manifestations of pure morality in _pravrajita_ bodhisattvas. Other concomitants include practice in the thirteen _dhutaguna_, seclusion, honesty, correct reflection, rejection of mistaken views, calm insight into the workings of the body, fearless acceptance of emptiness and signlessness and the generation of compassion. Apart from a broad contextual agreement with the mental factors in the _Bdp_, these show few parallels.

\(^{245}\) R, folio 306.1–4

There is a certain overlap between these ten factors and the five _indriya_ cited as antidotes to moral impurity in the _Aṅguttarani_ (A V, p. 192). Moreover, several of them appear repeatedly in conjunction with moral conduct to define the attributes of true _bhikkhus_ and figure among practices conducive to enhanced aspiration and high rebirth (M III, pp. 99–103). In this context, their chief function becomes to provide for the cognitive stability that is required for sound refraining from the three root evils. On the benefits, see: D II, p. 86; M I, p. 33; A III, pp. 251–2 and _Vism_, i, p. 14.

\(^{246}\) The single most important factor underlying the bodhisattva’s moral stance becomes the resolution undertaken in his vow to benefit all sentient beings. Although not explicitly mentioned in this capacity, the orientation of the _śīla_ practice leaves not doubt that it is that intention which rules his conduct at all times (R, 307.2).
Furthermore, both schemes do not agree on the position in which they list the shared practices. Faith and vigour, for instance, the first two limbs of the ten mental \textit{dharma}, figure in the \textit{cittotpāda} at the very end. Moreover, some of the key issues of the \textit{cittotpāda} do not occur at all among the ten mental \textit{dharma}. Correct understanding of the body, the threat of desire, hatred and delusion, and headlong pursuits are only found among the ten \textit{cittotpāda}.

In the absence of any positive evidence, we cannot stipulate any firm connection between the \textit{akusalakarmapatha}, mental factors and the types of \textit{cittotpāda}. The only common denominator is a shared, if broad, association with moral conduct. This link, however basic, is rather pronounced and recurs on several occasions. For one thing, the generation of the ten mental \textit{dharma} is conditioned by abstention from killing, etc. This would link them with the ten \textit{cittotpāda}, as these too cover some common ground with the mental \textit{dharma}.

Other parallels are found in the ethical connotations that are raised by the ten \textit{cittotpāda}. We have seen that the first two, as if producing basic mental requirements, lead to a correct understanding of the body. To view the body as empty, essentially impure and impermanent weakens the propensity for attachment and removes the foundation of desire. Next, recognition of previous anger, violence and bitterness (realised with the fourth and sixth \textit{cittotpāda}) instigates the mental processes that inspire the abandonment of hatred (\textit{dveṣa}). Finally, appreciation of the faults of past misconduct—as manifested in lack of respect, mental confusion, ignorance of causation and purposeless straying—refers to delusion (\textit{moha}), the third of the three root evils. All ten \textit{cittotpāda} therefore have a bearing on the very factors that cause moral impurity. The destruction of desire, hatred and delusion is achieved with the tenth \textit{cittotpāda} in which moral conduct is fully realised in conjunction with faith, modesty, chastity, learning, renunciation and wisdom.\footnote{Cognitively, pure moral conduct triggers a series of insights into the workings of phenomenal existence. Evolving in conjunction with correct reflection (\textit{yonīṣo manasakāra}), the bodhisattva develops aversion towards karmic formations, loses interest in sense pleasures, rejects empirical knowledge and develops a defence mechanism against hatred and desire.\footnote{On the pillars of moral impurity, the \textit{Akn} records: “Morality is the absence of evil causal dispositions, the non-arising of mistaken views and elimination of hindrances like regret; morality does not abide by unwholesome roots of covetousness, anger and delusion” (p. 44.3.2–3).} First, on the emotional level, he trains in order to see in every sentient being his mother and father of

\footnote{R, folio 376.1.}
previous lives. This allows him to recognise in situations that arouse sensual desire his mother as the object of passion. Likewise, in situations of great injustice, he restrains his anger by recognising his father as the aggressor.

Since it leads—if entwined with incorrect reflection—to unfavourable rebirth in the evil destinies, desire is singled out as the most acute threat to the bodhisattva’s moral integrity. In order to eradicate desire, the Bdp proposes three methods that protect the bodhisattva from attachment. First, it advises him to consider—as deterrent and cause for compassion—the

249. R, folio 384.7–387.2.
251. In this context, serving to exemplify the pitfall of sensual desire, we find a diatribe against the wife (folio 389.1–395.2) similar to that contained in the Ug (pp. 263.5–264.3.4). Judging by later discussions of Mahāyāna morality, this view was not destined to last. In the Vup—marking an important stepping stone in the development of the bodhisatvaśīla—it is lack of altruistic compassion and hatred that replaces desire as the most severe and resilient impediment to moral perfection (Vup, pp. 50–51). In an earlier passage the Buddha adds the third member, delusion, that he qualifies as a grave defilement that is difficult to eliminate since (Vup, pp. 31–32):

”Attachment under the influence of the ramification of transmigration becomes the seed of rebirth; hatred, because it is quickly eliminated becomes a step towards the evil destinies; delusion, because it is difficult to eliminate becomes the cause occasioning one’s fall into the eight hells.”

While this is not exactly the position of the Bdp in chapter seven, elsewhere we meet with statements that run very close in intent (R, folio 415.1–2):

”Māra obtains the opportunity to harm a bodhisattva whose mind is wrathful even after he has entered the great vehicle. If he obtains this opportunity, the bodhisattva will be cut off from supreme and perfect enlightenment, for a bodhisattva who is evil-minded becomes inattentive when pursuing enlightened conduct.”

252. In the Bdp desire is defined as attachment to the objects of the five senses, and above all, to the fetter of form (rupa). It is seen to obstruct hearing of the Dharma, taking refuge in the triratna, seeing the Buddha, receiving the (eighteen) blessings as well as preventing faith, moral conduct, learning, chastity, modesty and wisdom to unfold (R, folio 390.2–7). As such, it is identified as the most potent threat to the training of the bodhisattva.

However, according to the Vup, an even greater threat to moral integrity is posed by conceit (adhimāna). Interpreted as a side-aspect of delusion in the threefold root defilements, it bars the bodhisattva from attaining his goal by deceptively magnifying his own attainments (ātikārśa) and depreciating those of others ( aparājāti) (Sidhi, p. 346). The means by which conceit is overcome vary with the spiritual outlook of the practitioner. For the śrāvaka, it is above all avoidance of speculative and inconclusive thought that prevents its arising. The bodhisattva, however, is advised to eschew premature judgement on the quality of his progress in training and to learn to distinguish mistaken views from correct ones (Vup, pp. 53–54). For unlike other defilements, liability to conceit not only subsists in the more advanced stages of the path but, moreover, increases in attraction with the rate of progress in purification (Asta, pp. 385–95).

In the Vup, the Buddha distinguishes two areas of conceit. First, it draws attention to conceit operating on the moral plane. It occurs when the bodhisattva compares his degree of purification with that of ordinary beings and, judging it inferior, concludes that its holders of little worth (§ 47). This form of moral conceit may also arise on the basis of his spiritual powers and attributes (§ 48)—illusory or real—on the basis of attainments such as the buddha-qualities and even through perceived superiority in material wealth or worldly position (§17). Second, conceit arises at the cognitive level in response to insensational speculation (Vup, p. 54). This issue is also taken up in the Samdhis (ÉIa), pp. 47.19–48.15. Since deliverance is only achieved by totally abandoning thought representation (sarvakalpaśrava) in favour of the acceptance of inconceivability (Vup, pp. 53, 64), all discursive thinking is detrimental to liberation and becomes, particularly if of academic hypothesis, a potential cause of vanity (Vup, p. 55):

”By means of what measure do monks evade conceit? The Tathāgata replied to the venerable Upāli: Monks are altogether liberated from conceit if they do not harbour wrong views (abhiniśeṇa) concerning the inconceivability springing from all-knowing.”

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suffering of beings. The prospect of exposure to such a high degree of misery alone prevents immoral behaviour from arising. Second, the Bdp recommends as an incentive the contemplation of the excellent qualities of the members of the āryan-fold. Without complete purity, such excellence will always be beyond the reach of a bodhisattva. Third, the practitioner is reminded of the illusory character of sensory perception and the unreliability of the data it provides. In the spirit of purest Mahāyāna thinking, the Bdp—taking the example of sight—shows that all perception is utterly devoid of own-being and, hence, cannot give cause to meaningful attachment.

The location on the path of such an attainment is only vaguely indicated. Judging by the benefits that accrue to a bodhisattva from the roots of virtue, it pertains to the more advanced stages. He is in the position to attain cessation at will, he possesses great powers and physical perfection, and is separated from buddhahood by only five rebirths. There can be

255. On generating these two antidotes, the bodhisattva ponders (R, folio 395.3–397.1):
   “I shall tread the path of excellent beings and not the path of miserable beings. I shall tread neither the path that leads to hell nor the path that leads to the birth-destiny of animals. I shall not tread the path that leads to the realm of Yama. I shall not tread the path of moral transgression. I shall not tread the path that is associated with moral transgression ... .”
256. R, folio 395.3–396.4.
257. R, folio 400.5–403.6.
258. R, folio 403.4

The importance of correct reflection for moral integrity is attested in practically all Mahāyāna treatises that address the issue of purification. A good example is the Vup that follows the trend and submits the notion of morality to the philosophical rigour of its ontological propositions. Proceeding from the conviction of the non-arising of dharma, it concludes that all moral conduct is perpetually accomplished and not subject to training, progress or retribution (Vup, p. 60):
   “Once acknowledged that all dharma are by nature quiescent (samāhita)
   Desire, hatred and delusion become non-existent.
   And if dharma are themselves deliverance and free from desire,
   Provided that they are unsupported, they exist already in nirvāṇa.”

Repudiation of such insight is above all based on mistaken views concerning the self and the possibility of moral acquisition. As long as these two misconceptions prevail, moral conduct, however elated, is prone to the defilement of conceit and misapprehension. It is not before the bodhisattva has achieved the revolution at the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) born from wisdom that he becomes capable of generating pure morality (Msg, p. 16):
   “The mistaken view concerning the self is wrongful clinging to the [notion of the] self and mine. Through its influence, conceit of the self becomes. When one leans at the self or mine, one becomes conceived. Born from genuine affection, that is to say, born from attachment towards the self, the defilements of the mistaken belief in a self and conceit arise.”

Pure morality it therefore always dependent on the presence of correct vision. For the Vup, this is ‘seeing reality as it is’. In other words, moral perfection is always subject to understanding its operations from the paramārthasatya level and cannot be attained through conventional understanding (samvrtisatya). Unless the paramārthasatya vision has been attained, conceit will remain a serious impediment to the bodhisattva’s advance (Vup, p. 53).
261. This information can be gleaned from the number of rebirths that are cited before the bodhisattva attains buddhahood (R, folio 341.2–364.6). From the moment of his attainment in moral conduct, he will be
no doubt that the foundation of these qualities lies in the bodhisattva’s accomplishment in the perfection of morality: 262

“O Śāriputra, one who pursues the bodhisattva’s moral conduct for the sake of [understanding] the meaning of the bodhisattvapitaka and venerates and honours his teacher obtains such virtuous, most excellent, boundless, inconceivable and measureless blessings. It is in this way, O Śāriputra, that the bodhisattva who firmly pursues the bodhisattvapitaka attains great power and cultivates the bodhisattvacarya through pure moral conduct.”

After the description of the benefits that accrue to bodhisattvas who are accomplished in moral conduct, the Bdp draws up fifty qualities that pertain to moral purity. 263 Close to fifty percent of these attributes fall into easily recognisable groups. The first ten qualities coincide with the kuśalakarmapatha, five are characterised by the pāramitā, four are linked with the apramāṇa and three with the refuge in the triratna. 264

The remaining twenty-seven concomitants spell out (without any discernible order) the general facets of the bodhisattvasila. Going beyond the narrow interpretation of morality, the Bdp announces that the bodhisattva dwells in hermitages as part of his moral training; that he examines his own mistakes rather than condemning others; that he develops sentient beings, grows content with little, and weakens his attachment to worldly phenomena. As a reward, he attains a whole array of qualities that lend support to his training. 265 He acquires patience, confidence and composure; he becomes invincible, reclusive, faithful, truth-loving and realises the impermanence of karmic formations; 266 he attains fearlessness, passes beyond low rebirth

262. R, folio 367.7–8; see also folio 341.1, 362.2.
263. R, folio 368.2–371.4.
This enumeration recurs almost verbatim at the end of the chapter, coinciding in 44 out of the 53 items that are listed there (R, folio 403.7–407).
264. The same association of morality is proposed in the Akñ where śīla is linked with the practice of the pāramitā (p. 43.5.6–8) and apramāṇa (p. 43.5.4–5).
265. R, folio 371.5–372.3.
266. A more structured approach to the benefits is given the Bbh, proposing three blessings that keep the bodhisattva in touch with the needs of sentient beings. First, he is accomplished in practice (śīkṣā); that is, he does not violate any moral precepts and learns of evil conduct as soon as it is committed. Second, he attains an excellent intent (āśaya). This involves monastic ordination, dedication to roots of virtue and constant focus on the Doctrine rather than on livelihood. Third, he is furnished with the blessing of the previous cause (pūrvavahetu). By virtue of previously accumulated acts of merit, he never lacks daily requisites. On the contrary, the retribution of wholesome deeds committed in former lives provides him
and learns to devote selflessly his resources to the liberation of beings.

Thus, the practice of the šilapāramitā revolves not only around his personal moral integrity but includes, in equal measure, the purity and fate of his fellow beings. The differing degrees to which both aims are discussed suggest that the Bdp gives greater weight to the bodhisattva’s personal moral attainment. That this is only a temporary priority is eloquently expressed in the following verse:

“Now I act benevolently towards sentient beings without exception. Now I guide sentient beings who paid allegiance to evil. Accomplished in the joy of the Dharma, with my mind free from desire, I seek the basket of enlightened conduct.”

with great wealth that he readily shares with all beings (Bbh, pp. 182.14–183.16). Compare this list with the benefits that are cited in the Msg (p. 215) and MsI (p. 104.14–17). The Bbh adds that up to the moment of full enlightenment, the bodhisattva experiences five advantages arising from the training in šīla (Bbh, p. 187.19–27). He comes to the notice of the buddhas; he dies in a state of great elation; in whatever state he is reborn, he is always accompanied by fellow bodhisattvas that are of equal moral attainment; he is furnished with the infinite aggregate of merit that fulfils the perfection of morality in this life and he acquires a form a natural morality whose essence always is with him in perpetuity. Cf. Kp, p. 195, § 136; Samādhi, Dutt, 1941–53, ii, pp. 329–331, 332–4.

267. E.g., Mpps, ii, pp. 853 ff; Daśa-bh, p. 26, Q.

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The Perfection of Patience

In the suttas of early Buddhism the practice of patience (Pāli: khanti; Skt: ksānti) did not play a very prominent role. It rarely receives independent treatment, but is generally explained in conjunction with other practices such as benevolence (to which it becomes an important prerequisite) or is cited as a concomitant to morality and wisdom. A good example of its treatment is given in a stanza in the Mahāpadānasutta in which the Buddha recounts the pātimokkha rehearsal of Vipassi:

"How may you best discipline the flesh?
Be patient, monks, be forbearing.
What is the highest, what is the best?
O monks, the buddhas say it is nibbāna.

For he is no wanderer who harms

269. The exact linguistic origin of the term ksānti does not appear to be as straightforward as it is generally taken to be. In Mahāyāna literature, one finds two kinds of meaning. First, when linked with general suffering and injury, ksānti—taken from the root kṣam: ‘to endure, bear’—is generally translated as ‘patience’ or ‘tolerance’. This corresponds closely to the Pāli term khanti. There are, however, several other instances, the most prominent example of which is the term anupattikadharmaksānti, where ksānti carries the meaning of ‘intellectual receptivity’ (Edgerton, p. 199, col. 2). In those cases it would seem to go back to the root form kām, meaning ‘to like, to be inclined to’, of which the form ksānti would then be an incorrect Sanskritisation of the Pāli form khanti.

In a study of this problem, Sasaki suggested that the word ksānti is a Buddhist Sanskrit development of the Pāli khanti that, since stemming from the root kām, should be understood as ‘willing to’ and not as ‘endurance’ or ‘tolerance’. Citing numerous passages from both the Pāli and Sanskrit, Sasaki proposes that the correct Sanskritisation of khanti should have been kānti going back to the root kām. Passages from the Kośa referring to ksānti as ‘adhimātra satya-kṣamanād iti uṣmaginationyām mrdu satyam ksamate rocate’ and its commentary by Haribhadra defining ksānti as ‘ksamanarūpa ca ksāntaya utpadyante’ (Ākv, p. 611) seem to suggest a more positive connotation than is expressed by ‘endurance’. This is also borne out by numerous texts in the Pāli Abhidhamma and by Buddhaghosa’s usage of the term khanti in the Vism itself. In the Dhammasaṅgani (p. 230), we read for instance: ‘yāḥ khanti khammanatā adhivāsanaḥ accandikkam anasarupero attamanatā cittassa, ayam vucaṭi kṣānti’. That this willingness is implied in the idea of anupattikadharmaksānti has been recognised by most modern scholars.

If we are to accept his argument, the question remains whether all occurrences of the word ksānti in bodhisattva works imply this positive mental disposition. For the bodhisattva ideal, such adaptation would not present much of a problem, since—according to doctrine—the bodhisattva should gladly succumb to all forms of suffering, injury and torture as he thereby removes past karma and brings patience to a climax. Grudging endurance tallies only ill with the grandeur of the ideal and is probably not what was intended.

270. See, for instance, S I, p. 222 where patience is recommended when dealing with fools, weak beings or persons of otherwise inferior disposition who require a monk’s benevolence in order to progress spiritually (cf. Vism, ix, pp. 295–96).

271. D II, p. 49 (the same verse occurs also at Dhammapada, no. 184).
His fellow man; he is no recluse
Who inflicts injury on his neighbour."

The context and wording of this verse suggests a close correlation between patience and the observance of the pātimokkha precepts. Quite clearly, the Buddha wishes to make the point that impatience deprives the monks of composure and thus leads to ill-contemplated actions that violate the disciplinary code. Although rarely explicitly stated, a correlation between morality and patience figures at several places in the nikāya. The role of khanti in these contexts is generally of a supportive nature. It appears as a complementary virtue that facilitates moral observance, since it removes those āsava that might otherwise obstruct śīla. In other contexts, patience is not aimed at one particular area of defilement, but weakens—if accompanied by vision, control, use, avoidance, elimination and mental development—the whole range of the āsava and contributes to the attaining of nibbāna.

The Patis expands the interpretation of khanti so as to include in its meaning in addition to its moral dimension also a cognitive aspect. On the one hand, patience is held to weaken sense-desires, to inspire renunciation and generally to induce the practitioner to follow the path of the arhant. On the other hand, khanti is recognised as part of the mental processes that prepare the monk for the more taxing doctrines of the Dhamma. This applies above all to the teaching of the marks of existence (salakkhana) and mental instability. Indeed, willing acceptance of the notion of anatman prior to full penetration of its reasoning becomes indispensable for spiritual progress. At a later stage, having comprehended the validity of this proposition and seeing the general characteristics of dhamma the practitioner attains patience that conforms to reality. In due course, this allows him to enter upon the certainty of truth and makes the fruits of the path available to him.

It would appear therefore that khanti constitutes some important element of the Buddhist training. First, it bestows psychological strength, resilience and confidence to resist the ‘attractions’ of moral transgression and increases the monk’s receptivity to the more daunting

275. op. cit., i, p. 106.

The advantages that accrue from the practice of patience correspond, for the most part, to the blessings that arise from generosity and morality; A III, p. 253.
aspects of Buddhist thinking. Second, it figures among the five principal aspects that characterise the ideal of the recluse.\textsuperscript{278} And yet, there is no passage in the \textit{nikāya} that gives a coherent account of its role and position in the training.\textsuperscript{279}

History has shown that this obscurity was not to last. The timelessness, intense worldly exposure and philosophical abstractions accompanying the emergence of the bodhisattva ideal meant that the practice of patience was to rise ‘phoenix-like from the ashes’ and figure among its most important practices.

However, this process was a gradual one and took several centuries to complete. In the earliest strand of Mahāyāna literature, the role of \textit{ksānti} was at first limited to patient endurance of outright physical hostility and to the ‘conviction of the non-arising of \textit{dharma}’ (\textit{anutpattikadharmaksānti}).\textsuperscript{280} In the \textit{Rgs} both elements are merged to form the introductory verse to the perfection of patience:\textsuperscript{281}

\begin{quote}
“When he hears someone else speaking to him harshly and offensively,

The wise bodhisattva remains quite at ease and contented.

[He thinks:] ‘Who speaks? Who hears? How, to whom, by whom’?

The discerning is [then] devoted to the foremost perfection of patience.”
\end{quote}

Although not clearly differentiated as separate aspects of \textit{ksānti} in this incipient phase, most early texts already distinguish what later treatises describe as \textit{sattvaksānti} and \textit{dharmaksānti}.\textsuperscript{282} The distinction is found in the \textit{Pañca}\textsuperscript{283} and recurs as the most fundamental one in many other discussions of \textit{ksānti}.\textsuperscript{284} As alluded to in the \textit{Rgs}, the role of \textit{dharmaksānti}

\textsuperscript{278} A III, p. 362: “Patience and forbearance are the [recluse’s] aim; wisdom is his quest; virtue is his resolve, nothing is his want, \textit{nibbāna} is his ideal.”

\textsuperscript{279} \textit{Khañi} as a \textit{pārami} does, of course, appear in several instances in the Pāli literature. It is mentioned in the \textit{Jātaka} (i, pp. 45–7) and occurs at numerous instances in the commentarial literature to the \textit{Buddhavamsa} (\textit{Madhuratthavilāsini}, i, p. 76) and \textit{Cariyāpiṭaka} (Dhammapāla: \textit{Cariyāpiṭakakāṭikā}, pp. 321–22). Since these references are late and were produced almost certainly in response to Mahāyāna developments, they fall outside the present context.

\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Rgs}, xxx. 8–14; \textit{Saddhp} (pp. 136.10, 266.1, 327.4, 403.8, 419.6, 437.1); \textit{Śgs} (p. 143, § 28, p. 160, § 48); \textit{Sukhāvatīvyūha} (\textit{SBE}, pp. 39–40, 51) and \textit{Kp} (p. 18, § 8.4, p. 39, § 18.2, p. 49, § 24.17). The references in the \textit{Saddhp} and \textit{Sukhāvatīvyūha} have been largely misinterpreted. H Kern (p. 134) rendered the term \textit{anutpattikadharmaksānti} as ‘acquiescence in the eternal law’ while M. Müller took it to mean ‘resignation of consequences that have not yet arisen’.

\textsuperscript{281} \textit{Rgs}, xxx. 8 (tsrl. Conze).

\textsuperscript{282} \textit{Mpps}, ii, p. 865.

\textsuperscript{283} \textit{Pañca}, p. 512 (tsrl. Conze).

\textsuperscript{284} \textit{Akn}, pp. 44.4.5–45.4.8; \textit{Recd}, pp. 233.3.6–234.1.1; \textit{Bdp}, folio 407.3–423.4; \textit{Sgm} (cit. in \textit{Śiks}, pp. 102.30–103.27); \textit{Pps} (cit. in \textit{Śiks}, pp. 101.10 ff), \textit{Gv} (cit. in \textit{Śiks}, pp. 101.4 ff).
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is generally one of support. It represents a mental precondition for the acquisition and retaining of spiritual fruits and prepares the practitioner for the moment when he comes face to face (abhimukhi) with reality itself.285

From early on it was recognised that this conviction could not be a static attainment but is subject to progression.286 In the Aṣṭa where it is discussed in the context of the first five stages and operates as a purely verbal profession (ghosānugā) kṣānti designates preliminary acceptance of reality based on faith and approbation.287 Once attained through the power of previous prayers, it is wholly dependent on will-power (adhimukti) and does not involve cognitive factors.288 Shortly before the bodhisattva becomes aware of the sameness of all dharma (sarvadharmasamataḥ), he attains the preparatory condition of patience proper (anulomikākṣānti), but is still deprived of the conviction of their non-arising.289 According to the Dbh, this event is a precondition for reaching the abhimukhibhūmi and stands in direct relation to insight into the own-nature of dharma while, in the Sukhāvatīvyūha, it is attributed to service that the bodhisattva renders to former buddhas.290 This process culminates in the definite and final acquisition of the anupattikadharmakṣānti.291 Granting the bodhisattva true insight into the workings of reality, it raises him beyond worldly concerns:

“A bodhisattva who possess the conviction of the profound dharmatā does not become impassioned toward that which draws to desire, nor does he become

286. Allusions to the various degrees of anupattikadharmakṣānti are found in the Aṣṭa (pp. 38–39), Vkn (pp. 25, 222) and Sukhāvatīvyūha (Müller, 1968, p. 51). Compare these standard versions with the more unusual scheme in the Dhyānasmādhistūra (T 641, k. 2, p. 285a 10 ff) that distinguishes between utpādakāksānti enduring all injury, torment and insult that is inflicted on the bodhisattva; anulomikākṣānti constituting the recognition of impermanence and the insight that bhūtalaksana is alaksana; and anupādakāksānti that marks merely further progress in the anulomikākṣānti practice (ref. Lamotte).
287. Aṣṭa, p. 232.18–20
In the Samādh (Dutt, 1941–53, ii, pp. 280.17–281.5), the preconditions of ghoṣānugākṣānti are well-illustrated by a lyric (pp. 276.1–280.16) said to induce its realisation. Primarily, these factors relate to cognitive abandonment of the notion of self in persons and dharma (p. 279.2–10), to giving up all forms of attachment and aversion (pp. 278.15–279.2), to listening to the Doctrine (p. 280.1–4) and to seclusion (p. 280.9–12).
288. Müller, 1968, SBE, p. 51
289. Cf. Rp, p. 34.13–14: nāham rāṣṭrapāla teasam ānulomikām api kṣānti vadāmi, kutah punar buddhajñānam. “O Rastrapalá, I do not attribute to them even the conviction preparing (lit. conforming) to (anupattikadharmā), still less to buddha-knowledge.” Ensink’s translation of the term ānulomikām ... kṣānti as ‘conformable patience’ is an unfortunate choice as it fails to convey the preparatory connotation of ānulomikāksānti (Ensink, 1952, pp. 32–33).
290. Daśa-bh, p. 47.17–21
For translations of the passages leading to the attainment of anupattikadharmakṣānti see: Suzuki, 1975, pp. 226–7; Müller, 1968, p. 51.
291. Saddhp, pp. 136.9–10, 266.1, 419.6, 437.1; Lal, pp. 36.9, 440.21.
292. Samādh, Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 95.6–7.
irreversibility. With the bodhisattva’s final prediction to buddhahood and to furnish him with the status of
ensue from the conviction of the non-arising of dharmas. Few texts agree on the individual fruits that
in particular to performance of past prayers. Few texts agree on the individual fruits that
ensue from the conviction of the non-arising of dharmas. In general, it is thought to coincide
with the bodhisattva’s final prediction to buddhahood and to furnish him with the status of
irreversibility.

In addition to these variants, some texts make also a distinction between different types of
anutpattikadharmaksānti. In the Pañca, the Buddha cites two varieties that are differentiated

293. Dāsa-bh, pp. 63.26–64.6; Msl, p. 134.16
Virtually all later commentaries agree on allocating this event to the eighth stage (Msl, pp. 122.2, 131.17; Bbh, p. 350.27; Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 105.10). The only exception is the Mpps that places anutpattikadharmaksānti on the seventh stage (v, p. 2462). Satvaksānti, in contrast, the Mpps places on the second stage (v, pp. 2401–2), a proposition that is tenuously confirmed by the Dāsa-bh (Dāsa-bh, p. 23.23).

Born of patience and kindness (kṣāntisauratya), the bodhisattva is at this point no longer found in the six destinies but assumes the dharmakāya in order to convert beings with greatest effect (Mpps, i, pp. 330–31). On the notion of kṣāntisauratya (khanīsoracca), see: S I, pp. 100, 222; A II, p. 68; Saddhp, pp. 234.8, 236.9; Dāsa-bh, pp. 13.19, 37.11; Bbh, pp. 20.12, 143.27; Śiksā, cit. Akn, p. 183.14.

In the Avatamsaka an entire chapter (Śikṣānanda: chpt. xxix) is devoted to the various kinds of kṣānti that a bodhisattva generates in the course of his career. The first kṣānti refers to accepting the teachings of the Buddha without fear or hesitation. The second designates the bodhisattva’s acquiescence in reflecting on the nature of dharmas and maintaining of mind of purity and serenity. The third corresponds to the anutpattikadharmaksānti. The fourth to the tenth are acquired when the bodhisattva realises that dharmas are like an illusion (māyāyama), etc., (T 279, k. 44, p. 232b 9–10; ref. Suzuki, 1975, pp. 126–27).

In the Jen Wang hou kouo po lo mi king (T 245, 246) ‘Perfection of Wisdom of the Good Law that Protects the State’, a Chinese work of apocryphal origin, five kinds of kṣānti are listed. These include damaksānti, śraddhaksānti, anulomikikṣānti, anutpādaksānti and nirodhaksānti. Apparently adjusted to suit the tenfold stages of the Daśabhūmikā, damaksānti is practised in the preparatory stages leading up to the adhimukticaryābhūmi; śraddhaksānti on the pramudita-, vinītra- and prabhākarībhūmi; anulomikikṣānti on the acrismatī-, sudurjayā-, abhimukhibhūmi; anutpādaksānti on the dūrāngama-, acalā- and sādhumatībhūmi and nirodhaksānti on the dharmamegahābhūmi (T 245, k. 1, p. 826b 23–24; ref. Lamotte).

295. Several texts state that the acquisition of the ‘conviction of the non-arising of dharmas’ coincides with the definite prediction (vyākarana) of the bodhisattva to buddhahood: See, for instance, Saddhp, p. 266.1–2; (cf. Lal, p. 35.21; Msl, pp. 20.15, 141.27, p. 166.5–12); Akn, p. 45.4.8; Śgm, TTP, 33, p. 52.3.7; Samādh, Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 82.11–14.

Note that in the Vyp (pp. 30–31), none of these attainments is cited but anutpattikadharmaksānti leads to three categories of renunciation (vyāga), viz., ordinary renunciation, great renunciation and absolute renunciation. Here, ordinary renunciation refers to giving up of royal power (rajkṣāparītyāga), great renunciation to abandoning of family members and absolute renunciation to sacrificing body and life. The practice of kṣānti is thus set in close relation to the cultivation of the dāna for whose perfection it becomes a precondition. This association is not an isolated case. A similar statement is found in the Rp (p. 12.2) where kṣānti is cited in conjunction with the abandoning of all personal possessions (sarvasttraparītyāga).

297. At several places in Mahāyāna sūtras one meets with phrases that clarify the implication of the three modes of kṣānti. In the Tathāgatācintyagāhyanirdesa (cit. Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 362.8), for instance, the
according to the conditions that lead to their existence. These comprise a kind that is founded in the non-origination of defilements and another that arises due to persistence of cognition. Unfortunately, the text is silent on the attributes that mark these types from each other and neither does its commentary, the Mpps, elaborate upon them.

The basis for the generation of patience is constituted by the thought of enlightenment, as it carries sufficient force to render the bodhisattva’s body, speech and mind naturally exempt from vengeful thought. In turn, patience towards injury assists in safeguarding other qualities since it forestalls animosity which would otherwise exterminate his accumulation of roots of virtue. Knowing that even if he were subjected to severe torture, the degree of suffering would be minuscule compared with his torment in hell had he retaliated, the bodhisattva exercises restraint at all cost. In the words of Candrakirti:

“Because hatred directed against the sons of the Jina

Destroys in a moment the merit of generosity and morality

Accumulated over a hundred thousand years,

There is no defilement other than non-patience.”

second type of patience is called śīnyatānullomikṣaṇī ‘conviction conforming to emptiness’. In the Vajracchedikā (Conze, 1958, p. 58.9), it is referred to as nirāmyakevanutpatikṣeṣu dharmesu kṣaṇī while in the Lal (p. 36.9) it is characterised only as anutpatikṣeṣu dharmesu kṣaṇī (ref. Lamotte).

In the Samādhī, a whole chapter is devoted to the description of the three kinds of patience. In particular with regard to its the characterisation of the ghosāngākṣaṇī, this shows many parallels to the Gv. Having discussed the three types of kṣaṇī, the Samādhī defines the three stages of the dharmanidhyānaksaṇī in terms of śrutamayī, cintamayī and bhāvanāmayī, saying (Dutt, 1941-53, ii, p. 82.7–10):

“That which arises from learning and reflection is called ‘in accord’ as it is conducive to realisation. That which arises from contemplation is the conviction of the non-arising of dharma.”


The Mpps distinguishes three types of dharmanaksāṇī. First, when practised in its purest form, the bodhisattva does not see the attributes of patience, he does not see himself, he does not see those who do the insulting and he does not speculate on dharma. Second, if accompanied by perfect wisdom, the degree of patience does not regress (avivartana) and is free from agitation (aśobhana). He is released from all anger and offensive words, he does not inflict physical harm and experiences no doubt with regard to dharma. Third, bodhisattvas who recognise the true character of the perfection of wisdom see no longer dharma since their thought operates beyond the categories of opinion (abhiniveśa) and their subject. This last aspect furnishes them with the inner strength to assist even those persons who inflict serious harm on them (ii, p. 926).

301. Māvbh, p. 47.14–19

According to the Msī (p. 29.11), however, the bodhisattva’s patience is based on his lineage (gotra), membership in which may precede the cittotpāda (Bbh, p. 3.1–8).

303. op. cit., p. 50.15–18.
304. Māvbh, pp. 50.19–51.2

This position is corroborated by a passage in the Sgm where it is implied—though not explicitly stated—that if he were to seek revenge the bodhisattva would automatically forfeit all the roots of virtue and regress to the very beginning of his career (Siks, p. 184.12).
Emotionally sustained by the thought of enlightenment, the bodhisattva realises the omnipresence of suffering, discerns its origin in past desire and resolves to abandon its causes. Suffering is manifested to him in the eight categories of support (adhisthāna), viz., attendance to the bases of mendicant life (niṣraya), worldly conditions (lokadharma), modes of behaviour (īryapatha), properties (parigraha) of dharma, aspects of mendicant life (bhikṣākavrta), untiring application (abhyogaklama), working for the benefit of sentient beings (sattvārthakriya) and attendance to duty (karanīya). On the one hand, the eight categories indicate that suffering is a constant companion to the bodhisattva. Committed by his pledge to giving universal liberation, he complies with the aspects of mendicant life and works for the benefit of beings. On the other hand, by being exposed to them, the bodhisattva retains his vigour and endures suffering with patience. That is to say, they furnish him with meditative qualities that allow him to maintain composure at all times. Once he accomplished patience by accepting suffering (duḥkhādhivasāṅsānti), he constantly concentrates on enlightenment with a purified rejoicing mind that is free from distraction.

Having described some of the most fundamental features of kṣānti, we may now examine its characterisation in the Bdp. Broadly speaking, its treatment of the perfection of patience is divided into two sections. In the first part, the Bdp looks at the practice of patience with regard to dharma (dharmakṣānti) and sentient beings (sattvakṣānti). According to the

306. These are gain (lābha) loss (alābha), fame (nīdā), ill-fame (praśamā), praise (yaśa), blame (ayaśa), happiness (sukha) and unhappiness (duḥkha) (Mvy 873; Lal, pp. 352.10; 275.5). In the Bbh (p. 193.9–16), however, a slightly different list is given, including alābha, ayaśa, nīdā, duḥkha, nāśa, kṣaya, jāra, vyādhi and marana. Compare this list with its Pāli equivalents in D III, p. 260, A IV, pp. 156 ff., Paṭis, i, pp. 22, 122, Vibh, p. 387 and that given in the Mvy (2342–48) which cite invariably eight dharma.

In the sūtra literature of the Mahāyāna, exemplifying the interplay between practice and cognition, this twofold division into sattvakṣānti and dharmakṣānti forms almost invariably the bedrock of kṣānti discussions. According to some, complementary virtues that prepare for the practice of patience include moral impeccability, pursuit of the means of conversion, benevolence and compassion (Red, p. 233.3–4.4). These, governing the bodhisattva's relationship to fellow beings, contribute to the prevention of ill-contemplated retaliation arising from anger but affect only patience on an ordinary level. Also perceived as ordinary patience, sattvakṣānti and dharmakṣānti are characterised in the Akn by thirty-two manifestations (Akn, p. 44.4.6–5.6). These fall into four categories. First, absence of those factors that run contrary to patience, e.g., hate, anger or aversion, etc.; second, the generation of factors that promote patience, e.g., pursuit of compassion, insight, etc.; third, the Akn details the impact of these preparatory practices, e.g., purity of body, speech and mind, confidence, friendliness, etc.; and fourth, the reward that follows from the cultivation of patience, viz., high rebirth, aloofness, accumulation of roots of virtue, etc. The enumeration of these attributes in a closed list and its separation from pure patience
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Mpps, the rationale behind both types of patience is the notion of universal sameness (samatā). Having realised that beings and dharma lack distinguishing marks (lakṣaṇa) that would allow for differentiation between the pure and impure, conditioned and unconditioned, the bodhisattva exercises total impartiality in his thought, recollection, affection and service. In other words, both kinds of patience rest on penetration of the doctrine of non-duality (advayadharmaparyāya) which enables him to enter into the ‘suppression of controversy’ (nirdvandva). In the Bdp, however, this reasoning is excluded from the initial sattva/dharmakṣānti discussion and pertains only to the highest patience (prakṣānti).

Patience with regard to dharma is subdivided into external and internal aspects. External patience refers to all those factors of distress that are influenced by the environment, including cold, heat, wind, sun, etc. Internal patience is applied to the suffering resulting from the eight worldly conditions, sickness and death.

According to the Mpps, patience with external objects refers primarily to the bodhisattva’s reluctance to apprehend the six categories of objects (śadbāhyasthūla) while forbearance with internal objects guards him from becoming engaged in any of the inner attractions (śadādhyaśmilakaruči).

(viśuddhiḥkṣānti) and higher patience (sātvyantakṣānti) suggests that it is conceived of as basic. Since a similar distinction is also upheld in the Bdp and Red where the discussion of (basic) patience is followed by deliberations on pure and highest patience (prakṣānti), it represents perhaps an antecedent to the threefold kṣānti classification that is found in the Sukhāvativyūha, Gy or Dh.

According to the Red, the next higher form of patience, pure patience (viśuddhiḥkṣānti), arises from the efficacy of careful investigation (pratīvekṣā) with regard to body and mind and from contemplation (bhāvāna) with regard to all dharma (Red, p. 233.5.1–3). Here, kṣānti arising from the examination of body and mind refers undoubtedly to physical and mental endurance of discomfort, insult and injury. Kṣānti founded in contemplation of dharma is called sarvadharmavivekākṣānti ‘conviction of the solitude of all dharma’ and affirms their non-arising (Red, p. 233.5.4–5). Eventually, these two factors converge to form a type of kṣānti that acknowledges the selflessness of persons (pudgalanairātmya) and convinces one of the non-existence of all dharma. Although slightly differently phrased, this concept accords closely to the notion of anuptattikadharmakṣānti. Hence, the Red concludes by distinguishing two modes of pure kṣānti practice, viz, patience that affects the body and patience that corresponds to all dharma ‘as they are’ (Red, pp. 233.5.8–234.1.1). In the Akn, however, this distinction between the forms of viśuddhiḥkṣānti is not made (pp. 44.4.7–45.1.7).

310. Mpps, i, pp. 325–327
For a more detailed discussion of the notion of the sameness of dharma and beings, see: Bhbh, p. 286.11–24. On the conceptual proximity of samatā and kṣānti see also Pačca (p. 4) where bodhisattvas are described as ‘in possession of patience and sameness’ (samata/ksāntipratīlabdha). As Conze has pointed out (1975, p. 37), the Tibetan and Mpps differ on the interpretation of this compound, suggesting that it should be translated as a tatpurusa meaning ‘he acquires the patience acceptance of the sameness (of all dharma)’.

311. R, folio 420.5–423.5
313. In the Bdp, we read of “six kinds of suffering that emerge from the body, abuse, heat deprivations of life and death” (R, folio 407.5–6). In most other texts, including the Mpps, we find the eight conditions of existence (Mpps, ii, p. 905).
314. The śadbāhyasthūla include cold, heat, wind, rain, etc., whereas the śadādhyaśmilakaruči comprise hunger, thirst, old age, illness, death and so forth (Mpps, ii, p. 904). The Mpps’s third type of patience—patience towards defilements (kleśa/ksānti)—rests on the recognition
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As both types of kṣānti are concerned with non-mental objects (acittadharma), they are strongly influenced by the bodhisattva’s advanced power of cognition and his resolution to postpone his entrance into nirvāṇa indefinitely. The former allows him to perceive the manifestations of reality ‘just as they are’ and saves him from the traps of Māra. Aware of the delusive character of phenomena, he gains sufficient inner strength to patiently endure all discomfort and hostility. The latter precludes the untimely elimination of the samyojana, since this would prompt him to abandon samsāra.

Until he has severed the fetters and attained the ‘path devoid of depravity’ (anāsravamārga), the bodhisattva is compelled to trust and accept the Doctrine on the basis of faith. Above all, this implies accepting the three seals of the Doctrine (trividhadharmamudrā) and eschewing the fourteen unanswered questions (caturdasavyāktyavastu) without exposure to the obstacles (āvarana) or loss of the Middle Path. The Bdp does not dwell on external/internal dharmakṣānti, but proceeds directly to patience with regard to sentient beings. This too comprises two areas of application. First, the bodhisattva bears verbal abuse with patience. Fearing that he might lose his roots of virtue and remaining firmly rooted in compassion and equipoise, he does not return the abuse but renewes his pranidhāna. When in difficulty, the bodhisattva sustains his patience through recollecting (anusmṛti) the Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha which brings all dithering to an end. Second, the bodhisattva exercises self-control and forbearance towards beings who of exposure to worldly influence. Until he has fully overcome all defilements, fetters (samyojana) and effects of the work of Māra that bind him to samsāra, the bodhisattva must put on his armour of patience (i, pp. 906–908). Paraphrasing a passage from the Sn (v. 426b–428), the Mpps enumerates desire (kāma), sadness (arati), hunger and thirst (ksūtpipāśa), craving (ṛṣṇā), languor and torpor (ṣyānamiddha), fear (bhaya), doubt (vicikitsā) and anger (krodha) and hypocrisy (mraksā) as the eight most damaging influences of Māra (cf. Lal, p. 261).

The Bdp (R, folio 415.3–7) distinguishes ten kinds of influence of Māra: (1) desire for food, (2) desire for clothing, (3) desire for worldly enjoyment, (4) desire for praise, (5) lack of desire for ordination, (6) lack of desire for virtuous dharma, (7) lack of pleasure in seclusion, (8) lack of desire for enlightenment, (9) desire for things other than pristine cognition, (10) irreverence towards one’s teacher and benefactor.

316. The Mpps looks at the various aspects of patience from twenty different viewpoints. However, since most of these express little remarkable thought and show conceptual overlapping, I shall not discuss them in detail (Mpps, ii, pp. 903–12).
318. As in the Bdp, the argument is enlisted that if he were to succumb to his suffering—and presumably retaliate against aggressors—he would be no better from ordinary beings. (op. cit., p. 906).
319. A list of these questions is contained in the Cūlamāhāṃkyasutta (M I, pp. 311–12).
324. R, folio 410.3–412.2

Since it is held crucial for the bodhisattva to regain his composure, several texts assign a particularly
inflict physical harm upon him.\(^{325}\) Aware that wrath or retaliation in response to any such attack would cloud his mind and lead to inattentiveness, he puts on the armour of dedicated patience. Absent-mindedness is particularly damaging to the bodhisattva’s prospect of buddhahood, since it renders him susceptible to the influence of Māra which would cut off enlightenment.\(^{326}\) For this reason, he is not only encouraged to meet hostility with indifference or tolerance, but moreover, to generate delight and joy:\(^{327}\)

“When I am pelted with rocks, beaten with weapons and suppressed for a hundred thousand million world-ages I shall not forsake life for a single moment but think: ‘Alas, this is marvellous. Sentient beings are noble, I shall not kill them.’”

Taking into account human psychology, the \(Bdp\) introduces then a new aspect of \(sattvakṣānti\), that is, conceit through exposure to praise and flattery.\(^{328}\) So far, \(kṣānti\) found only application in antagonistic situations of hostility and menace. Now, we learn that praise too—appropriate or not—can have a damaging impact on the training and needs to be ignored.\(^{329}\)

A concise overview of the factors that pertain to the \(duḥkhādhivāsana\) and \(parāpakāramārṣana\) aspects of the \(kṣānti\) is found in the \(Śīksāsamuccaya\). For Śāntideva, endurance of suffering (\(duḥkhādhivāsana\)) signifies “bearing and patience with personal pains, lamentations, unhappiness, despondency and anguish of mind”.\(^{330}\) Its chief obstructing force is the fear of unhappiness\(^{331}\) since fear alone is capable of leading to hatred (\(dveṣa\)) and despondency (\(līnatā\)).\(^{332}\) Since both emotions are incompatible with the ideal of the bodhisattva\(^{333}\), the practitioner should resist delight in happiness and gloom in misery.\(^{334}\) For the \(grhapti\)
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bodhisattva, it is furthermore important to avoid bias and to abide unaffected by the eight worldly conditions as their threat to the spiritual equilibrium is particularly great.335

Despondency is overcome by the casting aside of imprudent (laghu) and irresolute (sukumāra) thoughts and by cultivating an invincible (aparājīta) and steadfast (aksobhya) intention to eradicate the kleśa.336 By doing so, the bodhisattva learns to withstand the onslaughts of Māra and maintains—even when exposed to torture or in intense pain—the sensation of happiness (sukhasanā).337 A decisive role in the struggle for patience is played by the sarvadharmasukhākhrāntasamādhi since it turns all sensations of pain into pleasant, non-painful or indifferent experiences.338 For its unfolding, this samādhi is dependent on the bodhisattva’s resolution (pranidhāna) of universal liberation no matter how much hostility is shown towards him. Manifesting universal benevolence, he settles in the sarvadharmasukhākhrāntasamādhi.339

The second concomitant to duḥkhādhivanāksānti is sympathetic joy (muditā).340 Distinct from physical bliss (sukha) in that it is primarily mind-based (caitasika)341, muditā governs those training-areas that are free from despondency, sorrow (daurmanasya) and ill-temper (arati).342 Finally, complementing sympathetic joy and absorption in the sarvadharmasukhākhrāntasamādhi, the bodhisattva penetrates to the foundation of being (dharmatā). He realises that all sensations are based on illusion (māyākṛta) whose creation is traceable to mental constructions (vīthapanapratyupasthāna) that, in turn, proceed from past deeds (karmavipāka) of no predicable agent.343

The exposition of ‘patience in enduring the misdeeds of others’ (parāpakāramarṣaṇāksānti) is entirely based on the Sūtram. In brief, it distinguishes three types of antagonistic demeanour344, viz., injury, contempt and injustice, all of which the bodhisattva endures in composure without intent for retaliation (vyāpāda).345 The same elements are also found in the kṣānti

335. op. cit., p. 180.2 (cit. Ug).
337. op. cit., p. 182.5–8 (cit. Pps).
338. op. cit., p. 181.13–14 (cit. Pps)
Note that in the Samādhi (Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 79.9–12) it is patient endurance of injury caused by others—not suffering—that depends on the joint practice of meditation (leading to an unwavering mind) and wisdom (eradicating anger). Acceptance of suffering itself encourages the distinction of neyārtha from niārtha texts, to acquire vision of sameness (samatā) and to show devotion to the dharmatā (op. cit., pp. 78.1–4, 78.5–6, 77.15–16).
341. Mpps, iii, p. 1256.
342. In the Mpps (ii, pp. 906–7) Arati is the name that is given to the second of Māra’s inner hosts.
344. op. cit., p. 184.9–4.
345. op. cit., p. 185.5.
discussion of the *Bdp*. However, being a much earlier texts than the Śākṣ it does not provide as clear a distinction as Śāntideva but refers to them rather freely and in conjunction with other aspects of *kṣānti*.

So far, the *Bdp*’s exposition followed essentially ‘patience in accepting suffering’ (*duḥkhaṅghivāsanāṅkaṃśānti*) and ‘patience in enduring the misdeeds of others’ (*parāpākāraṃparṣanāṅkaṃśānti*). Presented in terms of *satvāṅkaṃśānti* and *dharmāṅkaṃśānti*—but never using this terminology—it did not address the cognitive dimension of patience. That is to say, the *Bdp* looked at *dharmāṅkaṃśānti* solely from an empirical viewpoint and not from the standpoint which requires the bodhisattva to put up with suffering because of the intrinsic non-existence of *dharma*.

Summed up as ‘patience consisting in contemplating and adhering to the Dharma’ (*dharmanidhyāṅgaṅkāṅkāṅkāṃśānti*), this type of *kṣānti* is brought about by resolute and astute investigation into the Doctrine. Like *duḥkhaṅghivāsanāṅkaṃśānti*, it is established by means of eight factors, viz., by determination (*adhimukti*) in the qualities of the *triratna*, by examining the meaning of reality (*tattvārtha*) and the laws of causation, by the force of buddhas and bodhisattvas, by personal attainments, means of attainment and by the sphere that is to be known (*jñeyagocara*).

It is this cognitive maturity that leads the bodhisattva of the *Bdp* to the third level of *kṣānti* practice, namely, highest patience (*rab tu bzod pa, praksānti*). Passing through the process of

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346. The discussion of this aspect—falling under the category of *dharmanidhyāṅgaṅkāṅkāṅkāṃśānti*—occurs in the second section of the chapter. Partly repeating what has already been said concerning *duḥkhaṅghivāsanāṅkaṃśānti* (internal and external) and *parāpākāraṃparṣanāṅkaṃśānti*, it reconsiders them under the heading of ‘bodhisattva-patience’ (R, folio 417.3, 419.4). Then, separately, it introduces ‘highest patience’ (*praksānti*). Although all three belong technically to the category of bodhisattva-patience, the conceptual proximity of the first two and the fact they are textually intermingled suggests a breach between them and ‘highest patience’. Bodhisattva-patience itself is characterised by twenty-two attributes and attainments that accrue to the bodhisattva in the course of his career. But for the almost obligatory absence of anger, hatred, etc., few of these relate specifically to patience. That is to say, it accues—if perfected—to bodhisattvas who are free from malice, wrath, harmful intention, quarrel and violence; to those who are watchful, caring, mindful of body, speech and mind, correctly reflecting, detached from *nirvāṇa*, aware of the law of karma, physically, vocally and mentally pure, in contact with the gods, in possession of the marks of a Tathāgata, in possession of his voice and of all roots of virtue; beyond inflicting injury and above all accusations. In short, in possession of all the buddha-qualities (R, folio 418.1–419.4).

347. The concept of *dharmanidhyāṅgaṅkāṅkāṃśānti* goes back to the earliest stratum of Buddhist thinking. Corresponding to the Pāli *dhammanijjāṅkāṅkāṃśānti*, it occurs already in the *Cāṇkīsūta* of the Majjhima Nikāya (II, p. 175). Here, with faith in the foreground of the discourse, it follows on ‘hearing *dhamma*’ (*dhammasavana*), ‘retaining *dhamma*’ (*dhammadhāraṇā*) and ‘considering meaning as secondary’ (*atthupapariṅkhā*) because ‘one who considers meaning sees that in truth it is *dhamma* that support knowledge’ (*yasmā ca kho atthāṁ upapariṅkhāti, tasmaṁ dhammā niñjhanam khamanti*). This patience, in turn, prepares and reinforces zest (*chanda*) from which emerges activity (*ussāha*).

examination that characterises dharmānīdhyānādhimuktākṣānti, the bodhisattva learns to
eschew the forms of patience that participate in discursive thinking or are otherwise based on
misconception:349

“Patience that inquires ‘Who is abusing and who is the abused?’ is a patience that
construes duality. This is not the highest patience. Patience that inquires ‘Who
abuses here?’ is patience that counts dharma. ... Patience that inquires ‘I course
in [good] conduct, but he courses in bad conduct’ is patience [that engages in]
duality. This is not the highest patience.”

Progressively refining his understanding of reality, the bodhisattva overcomes all forms of
dichotomy and attains a vision of patience that operates beyond all predication:350

“What then is the highest patience? It is to understand emptiness without ever
suppressing heretical doctrines or imputing emptiness. It is to understand emptiness
without ever suppressing discrimination or imputing signlessness. It is to understand
emptiness without ever suppressing one’s resolution or imputing wishlessness. ... It is to understand emptiness without ever suppressing samsāra or imputing nirvāṇa.
Patience practised in this way is the highest patience.”

This process of realisation culminates in the bodhisattva’s ‘conviction of the non-arising of
dharma’ (anupattikadharmāksānti) when he sees that:351

“Everything is unborn, unproduced and unarisen. The unarisen is without origination
whatsoever. Since it is without origination, it is inexhaustible. The inexhaustible
is the highest patience. It is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. It is never
misconceiving. The non-established, non-increasing, genuinely non-multiplying,
non-gathering and non-diminishing is without birth. That which is without birth is
inexhaustible. If he is patient in this way [the bodhisattva] realises that dharma
are unarisen.”

349. R, folio 420.6–421.3.
351. R, folio 422.7–423.4.
This final deliberation bears all the hallmarks of the *dharmanidhyanādhimuktikṣānti*. Having analysed conventional understanding of patience within the subject/object dichotomy, the bodhisattva now begins to fathom the meaning of emptiness. Thus, in a sense, he treads the middle way between categoric denial and mistaken imputation. This insight establishes him on the path leading to the highest patience that culminates in the recognition that dharma function beyond the parameter of origination or destruction in a space of no independent reality.

The spiritual ideal that is proposed in the *Bdp* as the highest patience was taken up by the *Akn* as absolute patience (*śin tu bzod pa, atyantakṣānti*). Intrinsically invulnerable (atyantāvraṇatā), it operates beyond apprehension (anupalambha) and the duality of antidotes (pratipakṣaprahāṇa). Hence, absolute patience of the *Akn* epitomises the bodhisattva’s true cognition of reality. That is to say, it prompts avoidance of the construct of suppression/imputation (prativedhasamghata) and allows him to see that dharma are established beyond the predicate of patience. Although the text stops short of using the term anupattikadharmaṃkṣānti to define its understanding of this highest or absolute form of patience, there can be little doubt that it propounds this very concept.

The *Akn*, like the *Bdp*, shows no indication that it was aware of the possibility of progression in anupattikadharmaṃkṣānti. Adopting a purely cognitive approach to lay bare the reasoning leading up to the conviction of the non-arising of dharma, it does not contain any reference

352. I have found only one sūtra where the threefold division into injury, suffering and dharma is not taken up. This is the *Sāṅkaraparipṛcchā* (TTP, 33, pp. 248.5.5–50.3.8) where we meet with a division of ksānti into the four śramāṇakārakadharmaṃs of abuse (ākruṣṭa), anger (roṣita), reproach (bhaṇḍita) and beating (tāḍita). In the *Sāṅkaraparipṛcchā*, these are set in direct relation to the stage of irreversibility, to the thirty-two marks of a great being, to possession of a buddha-field and to proficiency in the abhisṣā— in brief to buddhahood itself (*Mvy* 8708). The cognitive dimension, implied in *dharmanidhyanādhimuktiṃkṣānti*, is treated separately but follows exactly along the lines of anupattikadharmaṃkṣānti which is referred to as term (p. 250.1.4–7) and mentioned in conjunction with a prediction.

353. *Akn*, p. 45.1.7–8

The *Akn*’s understanding of the absolute patience runs therefore close to that of the *Rp* (p. 12.2) that employs the very term anupalambhadharmaṃkṣānti to characterise anupattikadharmaṃkṣānti.

354. Contrast this interpretation of absolute ksānti with that found in the *Pañca* (pp. 3–4) where, according to the Tibetan, it is likened to the ‘conviction of the sameness of all dharma’ (samatāsāravadharmakṣānti).

355. *Akn*, p. 45.7–8:

“That kind of patience that is conviction concerning the non-originated and conviction that things are unoriginated (anupādakṣānti) is absolute patience.”


356. This is also the case in the *Red, Bdp, Kp* and many other early Mahāyāna sūtras where patience is discussed as an individual perfection.
to the terms ghośānugā-, anulomikī- and pratilabhākṣānti or to the thought that lies at their heart. With some reservation, this holds also true for the division into duḥkhādhiḥvāsana-, parāpakāramarṣaṇa- and dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti since none of these terms actually appears in the Ṛkn. And yet, the apportionment of contents into three identifiable sections dealing with ordinary patience, pure patience and absolute patience suggests, perhaps, that it was known to the Ṛkn, if only in a rudimentary form.357

The benefits that accrue to the bodhisattva from the practice of kṣānti are manifold but do not always agree. Hūang-tsang, commenting on the three types of patience, explains that parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti becomes the cause of the bodhisattva’s ripening of sentient beings (sattvavipākapravṛttiḥetu) while duḥkhādhiḥvāsanakṣānti, granting powers to cope with pain, induces buddha-qualities. The third form of patience, dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti functions as support (āśraya) for the two preceding types of kṣānti and describes the bodhisattva’s attitude towards the Doctrine.358 The Msī gives a more pragmatic account, citing indifference to animosity and flattery, concern for benefit and welfare, death free from repentance and rebirth amongst gods and men as the fruits that spring from the pursuit of patience.359

Among the sūtras, the most advanced account is found in the Samādhīrajasūtra. Here, we are told that a practitioner who has penetrated the ghośānugāmi level of anupattikadharmakṣānti abstinents from disputes, penetrates the illusory nature of dharma, acquires knowledge of the scriptures, understands their meaning on the neyārtha and nītārtha level, attains faith and resolves to attain all-knowing. He reaches the stage of increased cognition (jñānavivṛddha)

357. A similar situation is found in the Sgr (33, pp. 50.1.5–54.4). Here too, one meets with the ingredients of later developments but does not find any technical terminology. That is to say, the sūtra introduces kṣānti by affirming its important role in the bodhisattvacaryā that is renders the bodhisattva inseparable from the thought of enlightenment. Furthermore, it prompts him to generate the intent (āśaya) of the six perfections (p. 50.3.4–6) and, sustained by great compassion, establishes a lasting link between the bodhisattva and other humans, buddhas and gods (p. 50.4.3–5). Patient endurance with regard to injury of body and speech refer to all intents to duḥkhādhiḥvāsana and parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti while patience with regard to the mind discusses the motive behind the bodhisattva’s struggle. The cognitive element enshrined in the term dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti is dealt with in the last section where Sāgaramati is giving a long discourse on the nature of dharma (pp. 52.3.7–53.4.1). Perception of it arises from the perfection of meditation and wisdom. Through meditation, the bodhisattva gains the required composure for the vision of dharma with insight (vipaśyanā) in meditation to unfold (p. 53.2.6–8). This vision itself is wisdom and training in the perfection of wisdom leads to true realisation with regard to the characteristics (laksana) of dharma (p. 52.4.2–3).

358. Msī, p. 191
The same division, but without commentary, is also found in the Siddhi, p. 621 (cf. Šgs, p. 143, § 29).

359. Msī, p. 10816–21
This set of five was almost certainly taken from the Anguttaranikāya where we come across a very similar scheme (A III, p. 254).
and becomes fully settled in the teachings of the Buddha.\textsuperscript{360} Since most, if not all of these attainments are attributable to the bodhisattva’s careful Dharma-pursuance, the text’s comparison of the \textit{ghosānugāmi} practice with the attainment of \textit{srutamayīprajñā} is quite appropriate.

At the \textit{anulomikī} level\textsuperscript{361}, the bodhisattva ceases to waver in his undertakings. He attains the perfection of meditation, acquires the \textit{abhiṣīna} and \textit{pādāpa} and transcends all mental limitations.\textsuperscript{362} Thus, accomplished in insight (\textit{vipaśyanā}) and perfect mental quietude (\textit{samatha}), he is wholly composed and traverses one hundred buddha-fields.\textsuperscript{363} Considering the intense meditative and reflective practice that marks this level of attainment, the juxtaposition to \textit{cintāmīyīprajñā} is all but far-fetched.

Finally, at the \textit{pratilabdha} level of \textit{anutpattikadharmākṣaṇī} the bodhisattva sees innumerable buddhas teaching sentient beings and is conversant with their demeanour and armour. Jambudvīpa becomes his buddha-field where he rules with inconceivable wonder-working powers and teaches the Dharma to all beings.\textsuperscript{364} He abides wholly unaffected by mundane profit or renown. Established in the non-arising of \textit{dharma}, he attains buddha-cognition and achieves the highest degree of benevolence and compassion.\textsuperscript{365} According to the \textit{Samādhīrīja}, this events takes place when the bodhisattva embarked on the sixth stage and received his final prediction buddhahood.\textsuperscript{366}

In appreciation of these benefits, the bodhisattva also sets out to suppress anger in other beings.\textsuperscript{367} Thus, we learn in the \textit{Bodhisattvaprātimokṣasūtra} that the bodhisattva cultivates patience not only in himself, but equally admonishes others to follow suit. Aware of the effects of anger and animosity, “he consoles and placates those who are angry, he appeases and heartens them”\textsuperscript{368} and explains:\textsuperscript{369}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{360} Dutt, 1941–53, ii, pp. 77.2–79.8.
\item \textsuperscript{361} Dutt, 1941–53, ii, pp. 79.9–80.12.
\item \textsuperscript{362} TTP, 31, p. 281.2.2–3.
\item \textsuperscript{363} Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 79.9–11.
\item \textsuperscript{364} TTP, 31, p. 281.2.4–7.
\item \textsuperscript{365} Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 80.13–81.10
\item \textsuperscript{366} Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 82.11–14
\item \textsuperscript{367} \textit{Msl}, p. 105.18–19 (cf. S I, pp. 162–3).
\item \textsuperscript{368} \textit{Śīkṣa}, p. 188.17–18.
\item \textsuperscript{369} \textit{Pañca}, p. 562–3.
\end{itemize}
"There is nothing real or substantial from that your wrath is produced. An unreal fancy is this wrath. No real entity corresponds to it, nor is there a real entity that offends you, makes you feel anger or ill-will, or that makes you belabour others with sticks or swords, or rob one another of life. For when you get angry as a result of an unfounded imagination, you will be hurled into the hells, the animal world, the world of Yāma or any other place of low rebirth where you will experience painful feelings—intense, harsh and bitter."

In the Bdp the bodhisattva does not show such concern with the welfare of sentient beings. As in the previous chapters, the focus of the exposition rests rather narrowly on the training of the bodhisattva and ignores the wider issues that are involved in its application. We learn therefore very little about the benefits that accrue to him on the basis of the practice of ksānti and the impact it has on the goal of universal liberation.

The description itself concurs to a large extent with the principles that underlie the discussions of patience in other Mahāyāna sūtras. That is to say, it speaks of dharma- and sattvaksānti, it distinguishes between duḥkhādhivāsanāksānti, parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti and dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti and recognises the principle of anuttattikkadharmakṣānti as the highest manifestation of patience. There is however no direct reference to these technical terms as their contents is incorporated in the flow of the exposition.

The position of these main-components on the path is only vaguely indicated. Duḥkhādhivāsanāksānti which corresponds in the scheme of the Bdp to ordinary patience is the lowest type of patience and is practised during the initial stages of the path. Although its exact position is not indicated, from the information on the next higher type of patience we may deduce that it probably prevails from the pramuditābhūmi to the prabhākarībhūmi. After that, the bodhisattva embarks on the so-called bodhisattva-patience. Corresponding to the apakāramarṣaṇakṣānti, this type of patience becomes manifest when the bodhisattva has acquired wisdom. That is to say, when he is accomplished in the bases of mindfulness, when he has attained correct reflection, possesses a fully purified disposition and has mastered the factors of enlightenment. It is not clear for how long the parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti dominates the ksānti practice of the bodhisattva. According to the Bdp it extends over the whole width of the path and leads to the acquisition of the buddha-qualities. This generates difficulties since it is at odds with the position of the dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti which is generally
thought to fully manifest as *anutpattikadharmaśānti* on the *acalābhūmi*. However, as the *Bdp* is completely silent on its positioning and does not distinguish it contextually from the bodhisattva-patience, we may assume that the *parāpakāramarṣaṇaśānti*, *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* and *anutpattikadharmaśānti* (including perhaps the *duḥkhādhirājanākaśānti*) manifest concurrently from the eighth stage onwards. In other words, although they are initially accomplished in succession, from a certain level of attainment onwards (probably the eighth stage) all three types of patience merge into the ‘conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*’ where they coexist and find their true fulfilment.
The Perfection of Vigour

"Vigour is a steadfast mental effort (cetaso 'bhyutsähā) leading to wholesome dharma. It is of armour (saṁnāha), practice (prayoga), free of weakness (alinatva), irreversible (avyāvṛtti) or insatiable (asantusti). Its purpose is to effect completion and attainment of favourable bearings."

This definition of vigour, given in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, sums up many of the issues standing at the heart of the bodhisattva’s vīrya practice. First, it establishes the psychology of vigour. Second, it maps out the various phases where vigour becomes manifest. Although, at first sight no more than random attributes, saṁnāha, prayoga, etc., represent in fact rather distinct stages in the cultivation of vigour. Finally, Asāṅga defines the rationale behind vīrya. The phrasing is by no means coincidental, but takes into account changes in its objectives, leading from concern for personal advance to selfless devotion to universal liberation. For Buddhism to produce such an elaborate concept of vigour, it had to mature over many centuries.

In early Buddhism, vigour (viriya) figures as a frequently cited but little elaborated aspect of the śrāvaka training. It is never expounded on its own but is invariably touched upon in connection with other virtues whose generation it assists. Viriya is discussed as part of the lists of the seven excellent qualities of monks, five faculties (indriya) and powers (bala). It appears under the five limbs of striving (padhāna), seven factors of enlightenment (bodhyāgā), five factors conducive to ripening, eight conditions causing wisdom (paññā), ten conditions that make for warding and need to be remembered, and is

371. M I, p. 356
372. S V, p. 225; D III, pp. 239, 278.
373. S V, p. 197; A III, pp. 2, 11; A V, p. 15.
374. M II, pp. 95, 128; A III, pp. 152, 155; D III, p. 237.
376. A IV, p. 357.
particularly associated with the moral precepts of the *pātimokkha* code.\(^{380}\)

The contexts in which it is discussed suggests that *viriya* was recognised as an important practice. Its opposite, indolence, is listed among the eight principal stains\(^ {381}\) and mars renunciation of agitation, intemperance and immorality.\(^ {382}\) Moreover, *viriya* is expressively perceived as a contributing force to many cardinal attainments of the Buddhist path, including mindfulness, ripening, recollection and wisdom.\(^ {383}\) Quite clearly, for the Buddha *viriya* constituted a high-ranking *dhamma* in its own right:\(^ {384}\)

"O monks, this *Dhamma* is for the energetic, this *Dhamma* is not for the indolent."

In spite of such pre-eminence, references to *viriya* are predominantly succinct and summary-like. It is rarely analysed but surfaces in passages which follow stereotyped patterns of exposition that recur, without variation, in two or three variant readings throughout the nikāya.

The most frequent formula identifies *viriya* as the *raison d'etre* of the *sammappadhāna* for which it serves along with faith, good health, honesty and wisdom as precondition.\(^ {385}\) Accounting for approximately eighty percent of references to *viriya* in the nikāya, it typically runs as follows:\(^ {386}\)

"He dwells with stirred up energy for the sake of abandoning unskilled mental states. For the sake of acquiring skilful mental states, he is firm, of steady valour, perseverance in purpose amid skilful mental states."

In several places this type of reference is expanded to include the monk's refusal to abandon the burden of teaching and good qualities in illustration of his vigorous resolve.\(^ {387}\) It appears that for the early Buddhists *viriya* was above all a mental factor:\(^ {388}\)

\(^{380}\) A IV, pp. 153–5, 357.
\(^{381}\) A IV, p. 195.
\(^{382}\) A V, p. 146.
\(^{383}\) These links are established in A V, pp. 23–24; IV, p. 357; V, pp. 90–91; IV, p. 153.
\(^{384}\) A IV 233; see also: M I, p. 481.
\(^{385}\) M II, p. 95.
\(^{386}\) M I, p. 356 (trsl. Gethin).
\(^{387}\) A I, p. 117.
\(^{388}\) S V, p. 111.
"O monks, that which is physical energy is always energy as a factor of wisdom. That which is mental energy is always energy as a factor of wisdom."

The *As*\(^{389}\), citing this very passage, concludes that there is thus only mental energy and that whatever action results from the ‘initial generation of energy’ (*viriyārmbha*), it springs from the psychological disposition towards *viriya*.\(^{390}\) In spite of its operational restriction to the mental realm, the impact of *viriya* goes of course beyond psychic processes as its purpose is to overcome idleness (*kosajja*) through energetic practice. While its foundation is also mental, the method and means that manifest energetic conduct vary according to circumstances.\(^{391}\) The principal characteristics of *viriya* are grasping, strengthening and support of those wholesome mental states that are most liable to deterioration.\(^{392}\) In this sense, it is specifically cited in the *As* in conjunction with *sīla*\(^{393}\) and recognised as the chief force that instigates and completes purification.\(^{394}\)

"Livelihood purification is to be undertaken by means of *viriya*. For that is accomplished by energy because the abandoning of wrong livelihood is effected in one who has rightly applied energy. Abandoning, therefore, unbefitting wrong striving, this should be undertaken with energy by means of the right kind of striving consisting of alms round, etc."

This quotation introduces striving (*padhāna*) as the other major aspect of *viriya* that (in particular as a concomitant to the four *sammappadhāna*) motivates to virtuous conduct.\(^{395}\) If

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\(^{389}\) *As*, p. 145.  
\(^{390}\) In the *Kośa*, the situation is very similar. Here (ii, p. 160), we learn that *vīrya* is primarily mental effort. It is said to refer at all times to wholesome action. The same thought is expressed in the *Pañcasālando*: "*Vīrya* is energy of the mind concerned with the wholesome, the opposite to indolence."  
\(^{391}\) *As*, p. 120.  
\(^{392}\) A vivid description of *viriya* in its supportive function is found in the *Milindapañha* (36): "Just as, your majesty, a man might support a house that was falling down with an extra piece of wood, and being thus supported that house would no fall down—in the same way, your majesty, energy has the characteristic of supporting. Supported by *viriya*, no skilful dhamma are lost."  
\(^{393}\) *As*, p. 120.  
\(^{394}\) *Vism*, p. 40 (trsl. Nāṇamoli)  
\(^{395}\) In the *Vism*, Buddhaghosa goes so far as to say that *viriya* is nothing but an alternative name for *padhāna* (*Vism*, p. 697), while in *Bodhirājājumarasutta* (M II, p. 95) *viriya* is listed besides faith, health, integrity and wisdom as one of the independent qualities of striving. According to the *Kośa* (vi, p. 283), giving the constituents of vigour, *vīrya* comprises the four *samyakpradhāna*, limb two of the bodhyyāga and the *samyagvyāyāma* member of the Eightfold Path.
vigour has exertion as its characteristic, it functions to strengthen the coexistent states and manifests resistance to surrender to unwholesome dhamma. In this context, agitation (uddhacca)—the basic condition for generating viriya—becomes the proximate cause of energy and gives it an important role in the completion of the training.

"Energy (viriya) is the state of one who is vigorous (vīra). Its characteristic is marshalling [driving]. Its function is to consolidate conascent states. It is manifested as non-relapse. Because of the words ‘bestirred, he strives wisely’ its proximate cause is a sense of urgency; or its proximate cause is the ground of the initiation of viriya. When rightly initiated, it should be regarded as the root of all attainments."

The application of viriya and knowledge thereof is inextricably linked with understanding the meaning of exertion. According to the Patīs, it is acted out through training in the four sammappadhāna and produces the undertaking to abandon the seven obstacles in favour of renunciation. In this respect, its presence becomes a precondition "for the maintenance, non-corruption, strengthening, plentifulness, development and perfection of the arahant path" that is limited to those who fully subscribe to the practice of endeavour (padhāna) and bestirring (ārabhata).

As one of the five indriya, it has its origin in adverting unwholesome dharma, in zeal and attention through the influence of exertion, in focusing through the influence of the faculty of energy leading to the abandonment of idleness. Once in place, it is important that the faculty of viriya does not dominate any of the other four indriya as this would impede their development. Above all, however, it is imperative that the practitioner should balance

396. As, p. 121.
397. Mil, i, p. 57.
399. Patīs, pp. 103-4.
400. Patīs, p. 104.
401. Several discourses in the Samyuttanikāya indicate that the viriyendriya and sammappadhāna conceptually cover exactly the same ground:
   "What is the faculty of energy? Here the noble disciple dwells as one who has established energy. For the sake of abandoning unskilful dharma and arousing skilful dharma he is firm, of steady valour, unrelinquishing in purpose with regard to skilful dharma" (S V, p. 197).
   Or, even more explicit (S V, pp. 196):
   "In the four sammappadhāna there is the viriyendriya to be seen."
402. Patīs, pp. 211, 209.
403. This, of course, is also true for the other four faculties as too strong a practice of any of them would obstruct the performance of their collective functions (Vism, iv. 46, p. 129; Vin, i, pp. 179-85, A III, pp. 374-6).
vigour with concentration. The reason is that idleness poses a threat to meditation in those who possess little vigour, since concentration favours inactivity. Agitation, on the other hand, occurs in those who possess great energy but are restless in meditation since energy favours agitation.404

“When the sign arises, one bhikkhu forces his energy, thinking: ‘I shall soon reach absorption.’ Then his mind lapses into agitation because of the mind’s over-exerted energy and he is prevented from reaching absorption. Another who sees the defect in over-exertion slacks off his energy, thinking: ‘What is absorption to me now?’ Then his mind lapses into idleness because of his mind’s too lax energy and he too is prevented from reaching absorption. Yet another who frees his mind from indolence even when it is only slightly idle and from agitation when only slightly agitated, confronting the sign with balanced effort, [that one] reaches absorption.”

In the Mahāyāna, the notion of virya has been modified in several respects. First, adjusted to the requirements of the new ideal, vigour is no longer targeted towards the bodhisattva’s personal advance, but is devoted to the welfare of all beings.405

“They [the bodhisattvas] have pure and courageous minds and are linked with other beings and persons. [When] they are practising the perfection of vigour, as a maid servant is submissive to her master who is not subject to anyone else, so do the firmly wise submit to subjection by all beings.”

Second, its practice is given a new meaning because of the unlimited duration of the bodhisattva path. In the nikāya, viriya was essentially interpreted as a supportive quality that promoted the generation of a wholesome mind-set. Its presence is especially required in meditation and has great impact on purification. Above all, it is related to practice and did not address the issue of time as a priority. With the expansion of the spatio-temporal dimension of Mahāyāna cosmology, the previous ideas on the length of the training became dramatically

404. Vism, iv.72, p. 137 (trsl. Gethin)
See also S V, pp. 112–114 where the Buddha construes the famous simile of the fire that cannot burn by lack of dry fuels (i.e., idleness) and cannot be put out by dry fuels (i.e., agitation), (cf. Vism, pp. 136, 138).
amended. As a consequence, even very early Mahāyāna sūtras draw connections between the need for perfect vigour and the formidable length of the path, arguing that it requires beings of truly extraordinary zeal. Such thinking is already attested in the Rgs and indeed figures in practically all Mahāyāna treatises on vīrya.406

Third, by applying their philosophical axioms on existence to the training itself, Mahāyāna sūtras merged their ontological absolutism with the realism of the practice itself. For the perfection of vigour, as indeed for all other practices, this led to a radical shift in interpretation culminating in the admission of the futility of all endeavour:407

“When one has no notion of either body, thought, or being,
Abiding without perception and coursing in the Doctrine of non-duality
That has been called by the Buddha ‘perfection of vigour’
Of those who long for blissful, imperishable unsurpassed enlightenment.”

In spite of (or perhaps, because of) the predicament posed by the dismissal of conventional experience, the bodhisattva proceeds to train in vigour with unabated zeal:408

“To some he gives sons and daughters, and to others a kingdom. For the sake of others he sacrifices himself. In this way he works the weal of beings by whatever device it can be worked. It is thus that the bodhisattva who courses in perfect wisdom and is endowed with mental vigour fulfils the perfection of vigour even though dharma are signless.”

This last quotation points to an important departure from early conceptions of vīrya. We have seen that for the śrāvaka vigour was primarily a mental dharmma. In the Mahāyāna, this definition is no longer upheld. Already in the incipient phase, its sūtras speak of physical and mental vigour. While it is probably true to say that mental vigour is still regarded superior as it creates the psychological foundation for the practical implementation, both are recognised and valued for their contributions.409

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407. Rgs, xxx.7 (trsl. Conze).
409. Pañca, p. 513:
   “Here, the bodhisattva who courses in perfect of wisdom and is endowed with mental vigour
Also mental vigour itself underwent some modifications.\(^{410}\) In the early Buddhism of Śākyamuni, it was always interpreted as an inherently dynamic force which promotes and sustains wholesome states, or prevents and destroys unwholesome states. For the Mahāyāna this is no longer the case, as mental vigour received a predominantly cognitive role.\(^{411}\)

"The bodhisattva who courses in perfect wisdom and is endowed with mental vigour ... does not misconstrue anything whatsoever as permanent or impermanent, ease or ill, self or not-self, conditioned or unconditioned." 

 Thus, rather than operating as the driving force behind the bodhisattva’s exploits in \(\text{vīrya}\), mental vigour became an agency bringing \(\text{vīrya}\) practice in line with Mahāyāna ontology. Its task was to free the bodhisattva from delusion and establish him in knowledge of sensefields, non-duality and \(\text{dharmatāsthiti}\), culminating in the conviction of the non-arising of \(\text{dharma}\).\(^{412}\)

It is in consideration of these developments that the \(\text{vīrya}\) exposition in the \(\text{Bdp}\) needs to be examined. The \(\text{Bdp}\) introduces the discussion of vigour by pointing to the interaction between \(\text{ksānti}\) and \(\text{vīrya}\). For those who are dedicated to scriptural learning, it becomes a \textit{sine qua non} for progress, as they meet with persistent envy and hostility.\(^{413}\)

Such explicit association of learning and vigour is rarely found in Mahāyāna literature. In the few cases where a connection is established, rather than physical protection, vigour is directed more to accomplishing the task of learning itself. Thus, we learn in the \(\text{Nārāyanaparipṛcchā}\) of the bodhisattva’s great vigour in preaching the Dharma.\(^{414}\)

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\(^{410}\) Cf. \textit{Ratnameghasūtra} (cited in \textit{Śikṣ}, pp. 51.21–52.3).
\(^{412}\) \textit{Sgm}, 33, pp. 62.5.8–63.1.7.
\(^{413}\) R, folio 424.1–426.3.
\(^{414}\) \textit{Śikṣ}, pp. 189.7–190.3.

It is in this context that Śāntideva gives the well-known quotation of the \textit{Aṣṭa}\’s eighty types of learning to that I have referred on several occasions already. For the exact contents of this list, see: Appendix i. In the \textit{Dbh} (\textit{Daśa-bh}, p. 33.23–27, J), as a precondition for the practice proper and leading to the first \textit{dhyāna}, the bodhisattva focuses his vigour on the search for learning and the Dharma at the \textit{prabhākāriṃbhūmi}.

The \textit{Dbh} itself contains very little on the practice of the \textit{vīryapāramitā} (\textit{Daśa-bh}, p. 40.12–14, I). In the exposition on the \textit{acrismatibhūmi}—the phase where training in \textit{vīrya} should theoretically stand in the foreground—only one sentence addresses the bodhisattva’s practice in \textit{vīrya}, describing it as attentive (\textit{aprasraṇḍha}), pure (\textit{aparikṣita}), unfaltering (\textit{apratyudhāvartya}), extensive (\textit{vipulya}), infinite (\textit{ananta}), earnest (\textit{uttapta}), unequalled (\textit{asama}), indestructible (\textit{asamḥārya}), aimed at the benefit of all sentient beings (\textit{sarvasattvaparipācana}) and saying that it discerns correct conduct from incorrect conduct (\textit{nayānayavibhakta}).
The combination of virya and ksānti is, in contrast, much more commonly attested in Mahāyāna sūtras. It is in particular the attainment of anuttarapurushavardhaka that virya is related to.\(^{415}\)

"O householder, how does the pravrajita bodhisattva, living in the aranyavāsa, cultivate and fulfil the perfection of vigour? To this end, the bodhisattva should train himself thus: ‘I shall not depart from this place, for it is essential that I should realise the conviction of the non-arising of dharma.’"

The rationale behind this association is the bodhisattva’s change of body at the moment of anuttarapurushavardhaka.\(^{416}\) Immediately after the first production of the thought of enlightenment, his attainments are weak and incomplete and he strives to attain perfection in his training by means of practice in generosity, moral conduct and good intentions. Throughout this period, stretching from the pratamacittotpada to the attainment of the perfection of meditation, his endeavours are physical, since they operate on the material plane where he experiences truly physical hardship. With the production of the abhijñā at the point of mastery in meditation, physical effort is no longer required as he is now capable of transforming himself into whatever shape is best suited to assist sentient beings.

In the Bdp, however, the link with ksānti is initially interpreted in the conventional sense. The bodhisattva is required to bear with the physical and vocal animosity directed at him under Māra’s influence.\(^{417}\) In this respect, perfection in vigour provides a degree of psychological steadfastness in the pursuit of the path.\(^{418}\)

\(^{415}\) Ug, p. 271.1.3–5.
\(^{416}\) Mpps, ii, pp. 970, 711–12, n. 1.
\(^{417}\) R, folio 243–246
\(^{418}\) R, folio 243–246

In the Mpps, the connection between virya and ksānti includes the conventional and ontological frame of reference of patience. First, the bodhisattva shows great diligence in quietly enduring all pain and hostility—be it physical or verbal—and remains unaffected by the fame and homage shown to him (ii, p. 986). Second, the bodhisattva is not deterred by the difficulty of his undertaking. Working for the benefit of beings, he shows great patience with their shortcomings and accomplishes even the most difficult tasks through the combined presence of virya and ksānti (ii, p. 949). This attainment of the abhijñā coincides with the ‘conviction of the non-arising of dharma’ (Daśa-bh, p. 71.22–26), at which stage he obtains a new body called the ‘body born from the Dharma-realm’ (dharmadhatujakāya). From now onwards he is no longer concerned with physical vigour that dominated his ‘body born from fetters and acts’ (bandhanakarmajakāya) since the production of the thought of enlightenment, but enters the realm of mental vigour. As this latter body is born from the teachings of the Doctrine, it is in perfect concordance with reality and is no longer subject to the restraint of his samsāric corporeal existence. Depending for realisation on the state of anuttarapurushavardhaka, the link between virya and ksānti fits well into scheme of the path.
Rooted in pure altruism, the motivation is not the prospect of future happiness, but the aspiration to achieve universal welfare:\textsuperscript{419}

"O Śāriputra, while delighting in purification, he accomplishes vigour not solely for the purpose of acquiring the \textit{sāmbhogakāya} of mine. Rather, he enters into [vigour] in order to bring happiness and benefit to all sentient beings; to prompt sentient beings to understand [the \textit{bodhisattvapitaka}] ... to prompt them to guard the noble path."

Immediate application of vigour is found in the practice of the \textit{pāramitā} and the unfolding of benevolence and compassion.\textsuperscript{420} While diligent training in the \textit{pāramitā} leads to the roots of virtue for the bodhisattva himself, resolute altruism reinforces his commitment to universal liberation. Hence, vigour is of fundamental importance to the bodhisattva’s quest for buddhahood:\textsuperscript{421}

"Vigour is the finest of virtuous \textit{dharma} because on its basis there occur subsequent benefits. Through vigour pleasant dwellings and success arise, both mundane and supramundane. Through vigour one achieves the desired enjoyment in life. Through vigour, those [virtues] become purified. Through vigour [bodhisattvas] transcend reification and attain supreme enlightenment."

Motivated by the \textit{cittotpāda} and supported by the armour of vigour, the bodhisattva embarks on the course of training.\textsuperscript{422} The term ‘armour’ (\textit{sāmnāha}) points here to one of the three phases of \textit{virya} practice.\textsuperscript{423} Definitions of \textit{sāmnāhayā} fall broadly into two categories.

\textsuperscript{419} R, folio 428.4–7.
\textsuperscript{420} R, folio 426.1–3
For an account of the interaction between \textit{virya} and the other perfections, see: \textit{Mpps}, ii, pp. 927–35.
In the \textit{Mṣl} (pp. 105.25–106.5) vigour is classified into seven types corresponding to its function and contents. These are vigour in moral conduct, meditation and wisdom, physical and mental vigour, zealous (\textit{satkṛtya}) and constant (\textit{sātātya}) vigour.
\textsuperscript{421} \textit{Mṣl}, p. 114.4–14 (cf. \textit{Mṣl}, p. 32.4–5)
See also \textit{Bbh} (p. 201.21–25):
"Nothing else but vigour is the chief and best cause for maturing in this way all the virtuous \textit{dharma} that generate [the bodhisattva’s] enlightenment. For that reason, the Tathāgata points to vigour for the supreme and perfect enlightenment."
\textsuperscript{422} R, folio 445.6.
\textsuperscript{423} It is also the only member that is common to all schemes of vigour. The scholastic treatises of the Mahāyāna propose two classification of \textit{virya}. First there is a scheme which recognises three types of
First, we have a number of texts where armoured vigour is related to cognitive processes. In the *Sgm*, for instance, armour is fundamental to the purification of the body and mind. As a mental dharma, its chief task is to generate sufficient resilience and strength for the bodhisattva to pursue pristine cognition (*jñāna*). Specifically, if combined with *ksānti*, it prepares for the conviction of the non-arising of dharma and thereby enables him to persist in the practice and search of the pure Dharma. Furthermore, it promotes insight into the psychological operations of name-and-form; it leads to understanding of the cessation of the subject/object dichotomy and prompts the bodhisattva to abandon grief, doubt, illness and conceit.

Second, we have texts where the need for armoured striving is located in the demanding nature of the training itself, in its infinite length and vast objective. A good example of this type is the *Akn*. Here, the focus rests on the need for steadfastness in the actual practice—above all in the *pāramitā*—and the pledge to postpone *parinirvāṇa* until all beings have been placed in the thought of enlightenment.

In the *śāstras*, however, it is generally agreed that armoured striving is motivated by both factors. It is understood to stand at the very beginning of the vīrya practice as producing encouragement and a firm commitment to the training in general, and strengthening vīrya in particular. In the *Mṣl*, these aspects are brought together in a single verse, although the vigour, that is, ‘armoured vigour’ (*samnāhavirya*), ‘vigour in accumulating wholesome dharma’ (*kuśaladharmasamgrāhakavirya*) and ‘vigour in working for the benefit of sentient beings’ (*sattvārthakriyāvāyirya*). Among others, it is given in the *Śiddhi* (p. 622) and *Bbh* (p. 200.10–11). Variants of this classification are found in the *Mṣl* (p. 114.17–18) or *Msg* (pp. 191–2) where vigour falls into ‘armoured vigour’ (*samnāhavirya*), ‘vigour in practice’ (*prayogavirya*) and ‘spirited, imperturbable, insatiable vigour’ (*alinam āksobhyam asamtuṣṭi vīrya*). A further variation is given in the *Dhṣgr* (§ 108; cf. *Mahāyānasūtrasamgraha*, Vaidya, p. 338.1–2) which distinguishes between *samnāhavirya*, *prayogavirya* and ‘vigour directed at the supreme end’ (*paraniṣṭhā/parinirvāṇavitṛṣṭvāvīrya*). The only major treatise that does not adopt either of these threefold schemes is the *Mppś* (ii, p. 946). Following the categorisation of the *Pāṇca*, it differentiates between mental and physical exertion (*kāyikacaitasikāśāraṃsanaṇā*). For the perfection of vigour itself, it proposes five constituent characteristics, including dynamism in action, ease in enterprise, steadiness of will power, eagerness of mind and perseverance in action (ii, p. 946). As the composition of these attributes indicates, it is probable—though not explicitly stated—that these cover vigour in both its mental and physical dimension.

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424. 33, pp. 62.5.3–63.2.1.
425. *op. cit.*, p. 63.1.6–2.3.
426. *op. cit.*, p. 62.5.5–6.
427. *Akn*, p. 46.3.2–4.5.
430. *Bbh*, pp. 200.26–201.2

According to Tsong-kha-pa, armoured vigour is based on former exertion and operates as a preliminary resolve (*pranidhāna*), leading to enthusiasm of mind, infinite accumulations of merit, freedom from obscurity and becomes the cause of irreversibility. A bodhisattva who generates faith and conviction in armoured vigour, attains steadfastness in his cause and accomplishes even the most difficult tasks with ease provided that he is motivated by yearning for enlightenment that it consolidates (*Lam-rim-chen-mo*; trsl. Wayman, 1990, pp. 172–3). Like in the *Akn*, the need for armoured striving is defended by the extraordinary length of the training and extent of suffering the bodhisattva has to undergo in the
distinction between *samnāhavīrya* and *prayogavīrya* becomes somewhat blurred.\(^{431}\)

“Bodhisattvas generate vigour in amour and application that is without equal in order to cleanse themselves and others of defilement and in order to attain supreme enlightenment. On account of this vigour they establish all sentient beings in the three types of enlightenment. And because they have attained pristine cognition, they equip the world with vigour forever.”

In the *Bdp*, as in the *Sgm*, the focus of armoured vigour lies in cognition and learning. Highly meritorious in its own right, it produces roots of virtue far beyond the merit that is generated through *dāna*. It promotes birth under auspicious circumstances, pure associations and mental lucidity.\(^{432}\)

In addition, armoured vigour draws the bodhisattva’s attention to the ten obstructive conditions that, in turn, inspires discipline, compassion, mindfulness and joy in solitude.\(^{433}\) Appreciation of these factors operates as a catalyst which prompts the bodhisattva to overcome the obstructive conditions in other beings.\(^{434}\) For this purpose he pledges to persist in the true teachings at all times and does not fall prey to heterodox thought.\(^{435}\) Fear of Dharma misinterpretation is thus a chief concern for the practice of vigour.\(^{436}\) Besides vigour in studying the Doctrine, the bodhisattva works for the survival of the Dharma through endless preaching and altruistic

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\(^{431}\) Ms/, p. 108.22-25.

\(^{432}\) R, folio 435.2-4

The *Samādhi* knows of ten concrete blessings that accrue from the cultivation of vigour. That is, bodhisattvas become generally difficult to satiate, they are received by buddhas and protected by the gods, they do not distort the teachings they have heard but retain the Dharma just as they have learned it, they enter the fold (gotra) of meditation, they experience little illness, attain happiness, possess sufficient food-stuff and do not turn into a lizard (*musala*) but resemble a lotus (Dutt, ii, 1941–53, pp. 335.14–336.2). For variants in the Tibetan, see: TTP, 31, p. 310.2.7–3.8.

\(^{433}\) R, folio 439.3–6

These are (1) exposure to the sayings of Māra, (2) physical blindness, (3) physical illness, (4) a distracted mind, (5) hatred and anger, (6) disputes and malice, (7) exposure to Māra and its works, (8) adherence to mistaken doctrine in times of decline of the Dharma, (9) desire for alms-bowls, robes and food among the monks, (10) sensual pleasure (R, folio 436–42).

\(^{434}\) The *Tathāgataśintyaguhyanirdesa* (cit. in *Siks*, p. 274.3–11) proposes ten concrete ways of improving the force of the bodhisattva’s vigour. These include (1) renouncing the body and life but not the Dharma, (2) showing reverence to all beings, (3) feeling compassion with weak creatures and not to dislike them, (4) granting food to those who are hungry, (5) granting protection to those who are fearful, (6) dispensing medicine and cure those who are ill, (7) delighting the poor with great riches, (8) repairing shrines dedicated to the Tathāgata, (9) adopting pleasant speech when speaking to people and sharing the fate of poverty with those who are poor and (10) carrying the burden of those who are exhausted. Cf. *Mpps*, ii, p. 943.

\(^{435}\) R, folio 447.1–3.

\(^{436}\) R, folio 436.2–438.6.
efforts.

Thus inspired, he sets out to train in ‘vigour accumulating roots of virtue’ (kuśaladharma-samgrāhakāvīrya) and manifests unaltering, bold courage (anivartyaparākramavīrya). This type of vigour is essentially bifocal. First, the bodhisattva is not discouraged from the path by the sheer distance of the goal, but devotes all resources to the practices concerned.

437. The exact scope and nature of the kuśaladharma-samgrāhakāvīrya is little explained in Mahāyāna literature. I have found only two treatises that provide some detail on its generation. First, there is the exposition in the Śgdm which recognises the contributions of four specific dharmas (op. cit., p. 62.1.5–5.3). These are exertion (ārambhā), courage (viśva), investigation (patekeśa) and good conduct (pratipatti).

438. Each of these dharmas is applied to specific sets of practices whose potential they aim to maximise. Exertion is primarily applied towards the cītāvādita, dāna, śīla and śraddhā (preparing the entry into the path) while courage focuses on the accumulation of roots of virtue and, in particular, on kṣānti (leading to the sukla-dāraśāṇa stage, the first of seven śrāvakabhūmi stages). Investigation is employed to identify those things that bring greatest benefit to sentient beings, to dhīyāna and to prajñā (leading to mental purity: cītāpratāvatāthā). Finally, good conduct means bearing with committed dharma and engaging in skilful means (leading to irreversible pristine cognition: avaiśvārikajñā). On a personal level, exertion purifies and leads to recollection of the body; courage purifies speech and leads to recollection of feeling; investigation cleanses the mind of impure dharma and leads to recollection of thought; good conduct purifies dharma and leads to their recollection (op. cit., p. 62.2.6–7, 4.7). Exertion cognises suffering, courage abandons the origin, investigation generates the path and good conduct realises cessation (op. cit., p. 62.4.6).

439. In the Bbhr (p. 201.6–25), the accumulation of roots of virtue is dependent on diligent application to the six perfections and consists of seven qualities. First, it is not moved by harm which resulted from mistaken considerations, defilements, false teachers and suffering. Second, it is certain because of his paying respect (saṅkriyā). Third, it is infinite because it is founded in, and leads to, all areas of knowledge. Fourth, it is furnished with means that are designed to lead to the irreversible path and to penetrate sameness. Fifth, it is perfect vigour because the bodhisattva aspires to obtain things that ought to be obtained. Sixth, it is victorious because it is furnished with lasting application and seventh, it is free from pride because his undertakings in vigour are free from the thought-objects (arāmbha). If his practice of vigour includes these seven qualities, the bodhisattva is predicted to accomplish all six perfections rapidly and to obtain enlightenment.

At the highest level, vigour in the accumulation of roots of virtue refers to the bodhisattva’s diligence in acquiring the buddha-qualities. This means to accumulate the sum-total of roots of virtue including those that spring from the perfections and bodhipāksīka (Akn, op. cit., pp. 47.5.7–48.1.2).

440. R, folio 468.1–476.5

In the Akn (op. cit., p. 46.4.5–5.1) we have a similar subsection, entitled: ‘imperishable courage’ (aṅkṣaya parākrama). Here, the purpose of courageous vigour is sixfold. It is found in the bodhisattva’s effort to see the Tathāgata, to hear the Dharma, to ripen sentient beings, to accumulate the roots of virtue and to attain all-knowing. It is called courageous because the bodhisattva enters into the world for the sake of other beings in order to discipline their faculties and to bring about their liberation. Its action is the undertaking to enter in the world intent to benefit other beings, its cause is the bodhisattva’s great compassion and its essence is the unaltering firmness of its commitment to vigour (op. cit., p. 46.5.1).

According to the Bbhr (p. 203.13–22), there are six factors that contribute specifically to the consolidation of the bodhisattva’s unaltering courage (dṛṣṭha-parākrama). These include persistent vigour because it ties to the cycle of existence; reverential vigour because it ties to exertion; naturally caused (nīṣyānā) vigour because of the power of previous causes; vigour arising from practice (prayoga) because, investigating and contemplating, it is bound to good morals; non-enraged (akopa) vigour because he is not angered by pain or injury; and insatiable (asamtyā) vigour because for him mediocrity is not sufficient. Although not stated, one suspects that these should be understood as both conditions for and the ideal manifestations of unaltering courage.

441. Sīkṣ, p. 275.1–6 (33, p. 61.2.7–3.2).
Viryapāramitā

"O Sāgaramati, a bodhisattva who has committed himself to vigour must incessantly be of a steady and bold courage. The bodhisattva who is earnestly striving [to buddhahood] must not lay down his burden. O Sāgaramati, for bodhisattvas who exert themselves vigorously the supreme and perfect enlightenment is not difficult to attain. Why? O Sāgaramati, where there is vigour, there is enlightenment. But for those who are indolent, it is far off. There is no generosity, morality, patience, vigour, meditation or wisdom on the part of the indolent. They do not work for the benefit of others."

Second, it aims at universal liberation. For this purpose, the bodhisattva anchors his practice in samsāra, but dedicates his accumulation of roots of virtue to buddhahood. Indeed, according to the Sgm, it is this ‘double-tracked’ approach that transforms the bodhisattva’s vīrya into a practice of pāramitā status:440

"Vigour by means of which [the bodhisattva] does not let go his yearning for all-knowing, by means of which he holds on to the generation of the power of the thought of enlightenment and is bound to samsāra while beginning to accomplish roots of virtue constitutes the perfection of virtue."

Thus, it is primarily the bodhisattva’s perfection in vigour that prevents him from untimely entering into nirvāṇa.441

The implementation of vigorous courage manifests mental and non-mental striving.442

440. Śiks, p. 187.9–11 (33, p. 51.1–2).
441. Mpps, ii, p. 982; R, folio 468.4–6.
442. The distinction of vīrya into a mental and non-mental dimension is undoubtedly the oldest and most fundamental classification of vigour. Already proposed in the nikāya, it was adopted in numerous early Mahāyāna sūtras as the basic division of vigour. Good examples of such early adoptions are the Ākn and Pañcā. In the Ākn, the entire discussion of the viryapāramitā is structured according to its mental/non-mental dimension. Non-mental vīrya is perceived in terms of its various sub-aspects, showing the bodhisattva’s eight principal objects on which he focuses his energy. These include armoured striving (sammāhāvīrya), courageous striving (parākramavīrya), vigour in attaining (samudānavīrya), vigour in ripening sentient beings (sattvaparipākavīrya), vigour in accumulating merit (punyasaṁbhāravīrya), vigour in accumulating knowledge (jñānasamsābhāravīrya), vigour in accumulating wisdom (prajñāsamsābhāravīrya) and vigour in attaining buddha-qualities (sarvabuddhadharmasamudānāvīrya). The Ākn, holding the mental dimension of vīrya to be superior distinguishes (like the Bdp) a mentally active part that inspires physical and vocal action and a mentally inactive part that is in tune with the Dharma teachings on the nature of reality (34, p. 48.3.5–4.2):

"One who is established in all activity in order to fulfil the imperishability of mental vigour and is separated from all distinguishing marks (saranirmitāpāgata), that one not only enters
Although the non-mental plane refers primarily to exertion in body and speech, it is not limited to physical and vocal activity, but includes the commitment to universal liberation. First, it is aimed at the encounter with the Buddha when the bodhisattva receives his final prediction to buddhahood. Second, emerging as a collateral, the bodhisattva commits himself to the liberation of all sentient beings. These two prospects impel the bodhisattva to train with utmost vigour, whereby he accumulates incalculable roots of virtue as a matter of course. The magnitude of this task turns vigour quite naturally into a major practice. It causes the bodhisattva to honour his commitments even after he has attained enlightenment and allows him to venture fearlessly into the more daunting areas of Buddhist cognition.

This confidence is rooted in the bodhisattva’s unshakable trust in the path and in his increasingly accurate understanding of reality. On the first, the Bdp comments:

“The bodhisattva boldly thinks: ... ‘although the defilements of all sentient beings are incalculable and numerous, I shall seek to obtain a matching accumulation of wisdom and pristine cognition by means of this enunciation. I shall work hard and apply myself diligently. With vigour, I shall wholly appease the torment of desire, hatred, delusion of all sentient beings. I shall free them from this poison, suppress it and deliver them. I shall cause them to transcend it and establish them in the path leading to nirvāṇa.’ ”

This attitude of confidence and courage appertains to the category of physical/verbal vigour, because it belongs to the more active, engaging part of the bodhisattva practice. Progress in the cognitive realm, in contrast, is firmly rooted in mental vigour. Superior to vigour of body

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443. R, folio 468.2.
444. R, folio 468.4.
445. R, folio 469.2, 469.5.
446. R, folio 472.6.
or speech, it becomes the driving force behind all other types of vigour and is thus crucial to the completion of the viryapāramitā. In the Bdp, mental vigour is distinguished by an active and inactive mode of operation. While the exact relationship between the two is not explained, their contents and areas of application point to their complementarity:

“What is vigour of the mind? It is activity and stillness of the mind. What is activity of the mind? It is endeavouring to enlightenment. What is stillness of the mind? It is non-appeasing the thought of enlightenment. What is its activity? It is great compassion towards all beings. What is its stillness? It is acceptance that there is no self.”

Being essential to the fruition of all others practices, the ultimate reward of vigour is, of course, nothing less than perfect enlightenment. This view is also expressed in the Bdp. More immediate benefits include a set of ‘factors of elevation’. These ensure that the bodhisattva prospers because he pleases the present buddha, adheres to virtuous friends, attains birth under favourable conditions, is accomplished in inexhaustible and virtuous practices and follows the example of bodhisattvas who persist in the vow.

Misinterpretations of vigour differ depending on the status of the practitioner. In the case of the grhapti bodhisattva, they include the abandonment of beings to their fate out of personal gain; to succumb to the pleasures of worldly life in violation of the moral code; to obstruct the Buddha’s teachings in others while adhering to them himself; to fraternise with people.

448. R, folio 473.7–474.2.
450. For the most comprehensive treatment of mental and physical vigour, I propose to turn once again to the Mpps (ii, pp. 970–72). Beginning with a definition of physical/vocal vigour as mental vigour transformed into corporeal forces or speech, the Mpps proceeds to elucidate the characteristics of mental and non-mental vigour. (1) While physical/vocal vigour manifests itself in action related to the perfection of generosity and morality, mental vigour is operational in conjunction with the ksānti, dhyāna and prajñāpāramitā. (2) It is called bodily vigour when it is applied to external objects, but it is mental when it involves a special effort towards oneself (ādhyaṭmikaprayoga). (3) Coarse vigour is physical and subtle vigour is mental. All vigour that produces merit is physical while mental vigour generates wisdom. (4) The accumulation of wealth for distribution is physical vigour while self-transformation for the sake of others in order to attain buddhahood is mental vigour. (5) The practice of the six perfections is physical vigour while in possessing the true dharmakāya and producing the six pāramitā, the bodhisattva pursues mental vigour. (6) To implement the bodhisattva training without ever showing concern for life is physical vigour, but never to relax in search of dhyāna and prajñā is mental vigour.
452. R, folio 476.3.
453. R, folio 476.6–77.2.
who despise the Dharma and to reproach people whose care he was entrusted with in an unjust, harsh fashion. Any of these five mistaken modes of conduct bars the bodhisattva from spiritual advance:

“O Śāriputra, a grhapti bodhisattva who acquires the five [mistaken modes of conduct] fails to please the present buddha. He fails to adhere to virtuous friends. He does not obtain birth under favourable conditions. He truly wastes the roots of virtue that he has accomplished. He does not follow the example set by bodhisattvas, mahāsattvas who adhere to their vow, and thus fails to acquire supreme and perfect enlightenment swiftly.”

For the pravrajita bodhisattva the situation is different. Here, misunderstood vigour manifests in moral transgression, abuse of the Doctrine, desire for profit, honour or praise, mistaken views about the self and avarice for the houses of others. Of these five dharma, however, only avarice is set in direct relation to the practice of vigour, presumably because its consequence (fear of rebirth in hell, blindness and, when reborn as man, of life in the distant border-regions) are particularly daunting. The overriding concern for the rejection of avarice lies therefore in its threat to the bodhisattva’s personal advance. This preoccupation links unfaltering vigour with vīrya practice concerned with the accumulation of roots of virtue.

The third area in which vigour finds application is the bodhisattva’s commitment to bring about universal liberation (sattvārthakriyāvīrya). In the Bdp this is expressed through a

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455. R, folio 480.7–81.2.
456. R, folio 483.1–3
458. The Mpps (ii, p. 1020), based on canonical sources, speaks of four qualities that manifest vigour in the pravrajita bodhisattva. These include observance of moral conduct (śīlasampatti), control of senses (indriyeṣu guptadvāratā), moderation in eating (bhōjane mātrājaññā) and application while staying awake (jāgaryām anuyoga). Lamotte identified at A II, pp. 39–40 one of their occurrences in the nikāya. See also: S II, p. 219; A I, p. 113.
459. R, folio 514.2–539.1
455. R, folio 480.7–81.2.
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455. R, folio 480.7–81.2.
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458. The Mpps (ii, p. 1020), based on canonical sources, speaks of four qualities that manifest vigour in the pravrajita bodhisattva. These include observance of moral conduct (śīlasampatti), control of senses (indriyeṣu guptadvāratā), moderation in eating (bhōjane mātrājaññā) and application while staying awake (jāgaryām anuyoga). Lamotte identified at A II, pp. 39–40 one of their occurrences in the nikāya. See also: S II, p. 219; A I, p. 113.
459. R, folio 514.2–539.1

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series of *jātaka*-type stories depicting the edifying effects of Śākyamuni’s previous selfless service on the spirituality of innumerable beings. Three elements dominate the narratives. First, we have the recurring use of the physician/patient simile. This is designed to elucidate the bodhisattva’s commitment to humankind and to underline his unique influence to their well-being. Second, physically his endeavours are sustained through the practice of vigour that endows him with great resilience. Third, a key role in the practice of ‘vigour in working for the benefit of beings’ falls to the *dharmakāya*. On the one hand, it braces the bodhisattva for the enormous hardship and gives him sufficient stamina to pursue the path without wavering.

“O lord, of what nature is the bodhisattva’s *dharmakāya*? The lord replied: ‘O Śāriputra, his *dharmakāya* is firm, steadfast, unaltering, compassionate, non-perishing and unborn. He converts [sentient beings] by means of various bodies. Although it is multiplied by the power of converting beings, like a *vajra*, it does not perish in fire or is hurt through weapons. It is firm and does not waver. O Śāriputra, it is in this way that the bodhisattva who is of unaltering vigour and persists in the *dharmakāya* pursues effortlessly the perfection of vigour.”

On the other hand, the *dharmakāya* introduces to the dichotomies of worldly convention and establishes the bodhisattva in true reality.

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460. This point is dramatically exemplified at the example of Śākyamuni’s endurance when his body is carved up in order to appease the suffering of beings following the demise of Dipamkara (R, folio 519.4–527.1).

461. R, folio 527.1–528.2.

462. R, folio 532.4–7

In the *Śgs* (pp. 144–45), the entire exposition of the perfection of vigour is dominated by this very theme, showing that the bodhisattva while nominally still functioning within a samsāric frame of reference has indeed passed well beyond its concerns, fetters and physical limitations. In the *Śgs*, the reason behind this elevated state of existence is the bodhisattva’s entry into the *śīlamānasamādhi* that takes place on the tenth stage (op. cit., pp. 131–2, § 21). We might infer from this information that the attainments cited in the *Bdp* under the heading of mental vigour culminating in the acquisition of the *dharmakāya* belong likewise to a later, if not the latest, phase of the bodhisattva career.
“O Śāriputra, again, a bodhisattva who is endowed with the dharmakāya—although freed from time, origination and destruction—teaches in terms of origination and destruction in order to ripen sentient beings. Although subject to death, he knows that all dharma are non-dying and that the accumulation of karmic formations is non-existent. Although born, he knows that all dharma are unchanging and undying. Although becoming, he knows that all dharma are unborn. One who relies on the Doctrine and its body, on nourishment and power in order to ripen sentient beings pursues the perfection of vigour with unfaltering spirit by means of the spontaneously arisen, previous resolution.”

While it is possible to distinguish these two roles of the dharmakāya as conceptually separate aspects, in practice no such distinction can be upheld. For, in essence, they epitomise of course nothing but the interplay between the cognitive faculties and practical means that, if well-balanced and truly interactive, become the only means of achieving any of the perfections.
The Perfection of Meditation

The perfection of meditation (dhyānapāramitā), examined in chapter ten, represents the penultimate pāramitā in the training-scheme of the Bdp. In type and conceptual emphasis, the exposition shows all hallmarks of what—for want of better terminology—has been termed as a Mahāyāna approach to dhyāna. That is to say, the thrust of the discussion does not revolve around the psychological processes at work during meditative experience, but investigates the ways in which meditation contributes to the implementation of the bodhisattva vow. As a result, dhyāna is described not so much for the technical detail of the mental processes at the heart of meditation as for its impact on the spiritual advance of the practitioner himself and, more importantly, on that of his fellow beings. For the Bdp, meditation is not solely an instrument of thought purification, but constitutes above all a means of moral edification.

In the Bdp the true scope of meditation therefore extends well beyond the psychological experience. It is at once contemplation and gnosis; it becomes the foundation to a broad range of cognition, culminating in supreme enlightenment; it frees the bodhisattva from doubt and lends itself to refined speech; it disentangles him from mistaken views and generates the conditions for acts in miracles. Dhyāna assumes therefore a unique position amongst the pāramitā and retains great importance until the very last phases of his career.

Ordered to retrace the bodhisattva’s progress through meditation and the benefits thereof, these practices come as a series of individual building blocks. Altogether, we can distinguish ten, perhaps eleven, such units. Following the order of their occurrence in the text, these include (1) a passage on the traditional four dhyāna, (2) the abhijñā, (3) the distinction

463. Chapter ten of the Bodhisattvapitaka has already been object of an academic investigation. It is the topic of a PhD-dissertation, written by Dr. K.P. Pedersen at Columbia University, New York, 1976. Since Dr. Pedersen utilised only Chinese translations of the Bdp which—judging by her English translation—do not always agree with the Tibetan versions, her discussion was of limited help to my examination. Furthermore, her analysis of the contents contains some rather significant methodological shortcomings, particularly with regard to the choice of material she consulted and the depth to which she carried out her analysis. Notwithstanding its weakness, her contribution has its distinct merits, not least because it allowed me to draw comparisons between the Chinese and Tibetan versions. As a study of the dhyānapāramitā, however, it should be treated with caution because Dr. Pedersen has failed to bring out many of the important features that mark its treatment in the Bdp. Not wishing to diminish her labour, I shall draw attention to these shortcomings only when my findings appear irreconcilable with her analysis.

464. Pedersen, 1976, p. 79.
465. R, folio 550.2–51.3.
466. R, folio 551.7–72.4.
between abhijñā and jñāna⁴⁶⁷, (4) the realisation of dharma-sameness (dharmasamata) brought about by jñāna⁴⁶⁸, (5) the interplay between prajñā and upāya⁴⁶⁹, (6) the role of the abhijñā in the training⁴⁷⁰, (7) the nature of non-regressing abhijñā (acutyābhijñā)⁴⁷¹, (8) the non-apprehension of dharma⁴⁷², (9) the marks and nature of the bodhisattvadhyāna⁴⁷³ and (10) an enumeration of fifteen foremost (pūrvaṃgama) contemplations of the dhyānapāramitā⁴⁷⁴, including a list of one hundred and one samādhi.⁴⁷⁵ Setting out with the assumption that these blocks were not positioned in an arbitrary fashion but represent individual thoughts that form a scheme of conceptual coherence, it is clearly essential to identify the rationale behind their concatenation.

The least problem in this regard is posed by the first two sections. Section one, dealing with the four dhyāna in what is the traditional way of exposition, is easily discernable as the basis to the whole discussion.⁴⁷⁶ Briefly citing the respective mental attainments that mark progress along the four dhyāna, its function is to sketch the psychological states that equip the bodhisattva with the refined awareness of worldly existence and prepare the more elevated phases of cognition. This role is amply documented in Mahāyāna literature and therefore needs not be discussed here.⁴⁷⁷ It occurs invariably at the beginning of discussions on dhyāna and—epitomising a practice adopted from early Buddhism—generally receives little attention. Typically, it does not extend beyond an enumeration (and brief characterisation) of the major

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⁴⁶⁷ R, folio 572.4–73.7.
⁴⁶⁸ R, folio 574.2–75.7.
⁴⁶⁹ R, folio 576.1–78.3.
⁴⁷⁰ R, folio 578.4–80.2.
⁴⁷¹ R, folio 580.2–81.1.
⁴⁷² R, folio 581.2–84.4.
⁴⁷³ R, folio 584.5–86.2.
⁴⁷⁴ R, folio 586.3–87.1.
⁴⁷⁵ In her study of this chapter, Pedersen identified eight more units bringing the total number to eighteen. Apart from a number of obvious, but not very ground-breaking distinctions (between the individual abhijñā, for instance), these do not help in understanding the structure of the chapter and so have been omitted here.

⁴⁷⁶ Descriptions detailing the psychological processes and attainment experienced by practitioners during meditation are very stereotyped and occur in virtually all strands of Buddhist literature. For references in the nikāyā, see: Mpps, ii, pp. 1023–4.
In Sanskrit literature, they are extant in the Lal (p. 129), Pañca (p. 167), Daśasāhasrikā (pp. 98–99), Dābh (Daśa-bh, pp. 33.28–34.17), Kośā (ii, p. 199; iii, pp. 2, 22–3, 167; vi, pp. 177, 198, 221-3) and are even included in the Mvy (1478–81, 1492–5). A particularly lucid, if exhaustive treatment of the various experiences pertaining to Buddhist meditation is found in the Vism (pp. 84–90 up to p. 373) and, above all, in the Kośā (viii, pp. 127–224).
In view of its rich documentation, I shall not reiterate the states that accompany the practitioner’s progress through the various dhyāna and samāpatti but point to a highly recommendable summary of these experiences in Lamotte’s introduction to the Śgs (pp. 16–26).

⁴⁷⁷ Akn, p. 49.1.2–2.3; Bbh, p. 207.2–7; Ug, p. 271.1.5–8; Daśa-bh, pp. 33.28–34.17.

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categories of meditation levels. The reason for their apparent neglect in Mahāyāna sūtras is probably twofold. First, all of these are also attainable by śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas and so are not particular to Mahāyāna thinking. Second, their impact on the bodhisattva’s vow is relatively small, since they primarily occasion personal advance that has no direct effect on the well-being of sentient beings.

In exegetical writings on the pāramitā, this class of meditation bears an independent status and is called ‘meditation leading to a blissful abode in this life’ (drṣṭidharmasukhavāhāra dhyāna). Its chief task consists in suppressing vain imagination (vikalpa), pride (manyanā), attachment (trṣṇā) and marks (nimitta) and in promoting mental and physical tranquillity, repose and a blissful life in this world. Invariably listed as the first type of meditation, drṣṭidharmasukhavāhāra dhyāna is unmistakably regarded as the lowest type of meditation and has little more than a preparatory function to dhyāna practice proper.

Dhyāna practice proper is epitomised by the second phase of meditative training that, in later literature, came to bear the title ‘meditation of production’ (abhinnirvānadhīya). Building on the contemplations of the first phase, it is characterised by the abhijñā and their preparatory concentrations. As most of the preliminary absorptions are shared with the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas, it is abhijñā and pristine cognition (jñāna) that figure prominently

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478. For a analysis of these classes of meditation, see: Mppā, iii, pp. 1209–1309.
479. In the Abh (pp. 48.4.5–49.1.2) the traditional list of meditations is replaced by an enumeration of sixteen types of dhyāna that are specific to the bodhisattva. While these are presented as independent forms of meditation, their nature makes it clear that they sum up the various aspects of the bodhisattvadhyāna. These are (1) meditation that is not attached to anything as it is aimed at the tathāgata dhyāna (not included in dhyāna list of Pañca, pp. 198–203), (2) meditation that is not to be tasted (Bbh, p. 208.13–16), (3) meditation that has as object compassion since it is aimed at the purification of defilement, (4) meditation that allows for return to the kāmadhātu, (5) meditation completing preparation for the abhijñā, (6) meditation leading to fitness of thought since it represents knowledge of the power of thought, (7) meditation of knowledge of all forms of dhyāna and the ways of departing, (8) totally peaceful meditation that surpasses the samādhi of all vehicles, (9) meditation wholly undisturbed due to its infinite certitude (Mṣī, xix.38, p. 166. 25), (10) meditation that serves as antidote to mistaken practice since it subdues all vice, (11) meditation that amounts to penetration into wisdom since it operates beyond all worlds, (12) meditation that is preceded by the intention to liberate all beings, (13) meditation that prevents the interruption of the triratna since it fulfills the tathāgata dhyāna, (14) meditation that is not slackening since it is always concentrated, (15) meditation that leads to control over all dharma since it fulfills the buddha-qualities and (16) meditation that pervades space on account of its vast knowledge.
480. Bbh, p. 207.10–11; Siddhi, p. 622; Msḍ, p. 192.
481. Bbh, p. 207.9–10; Msḍ, commentary, p. 192.
482. According to the Siddhi (p. 622), its full title is bodhisattvasamādhiṣṭhāna-nirābhāra dhyāna.
483. These include, besides unspecified meditations particular to the tathāgata dhyāna, eight vimoksas, ten kṛṣṇāyatana, four abhībhūvāyatana, prāṇidhījāna, arāṇājāna and, according to the Bbh, also the four pratīsambhavajāna (p. 207.21–23).

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in Mahāyāna texts. In the Akn, the different roles of the two are neatly summed up:

“For what serves meditation as preparation? Fulfilment of the abhijñā and pristine cognition. What is abhijñā and what is pristine cognition? Vision of the appearance of all forms is abhijñā. Knowledge that the dharma of all forms are imperishable without realising the imperishable Dharma is pristine cognition. Hearing of all words is abhijñā. Knowledge that all sounds are ineffable and timeless is pristine cognition. Knowledge of the thoughts of all sentient beings is abhijñā. Refraining from realising the cessation of thought when perceiving the cessation of thought is pristine cognition.”

Broadly speaking, this characterisation holds also true for the Bdp. As indicated in the list of topics, the theme that follows immediately on the drśtidharmasukhavihrāvyadhyāna phase is abhijñā with the discussion of pristine cognition being third. The vast majority of Buddhist sources, both Pāli and Sanskrit, expound the abhijñā in the following sequence: (1) ṛddhividhijñāna, (2) divyasrotrajñāna, (3) paracittajñāna (also called cetahparyāya,jñāna), (4) pūrvanivāsanusmṛti,jñāna, (5) divyacakṣujñāna (also called cyutypapādajñāna) and (6) āsravaksayajñāna. As the last item, knowledge of the destruction of the āsrava, is a characteristic of arhantship and occurs only in the life that ends in entry into nirvāṇa, it is not applicable to the long-term training of the bodhisattva and Mahāyāna sūtras tend to exclude

484. For examples among the sūtras, see: Akn, p. 49.1.2–2.2; Pañca, p. 514; Daśa-bh, pp. 34.19–24; For the śāstras, see, for instance: Bbh, p. 207.17–25; Msg, p. 192; Siddhi, p. 622. The one exception is the Ug (p. 271.1.6–7) that indicates that the bodhisattva engages already during phase two in a teaching and conversion activity. According to the Msg (pp. 221–224), this phase includes besides the practice of the mahārdādi and dūskaracaryā, the cultivation of the six pāramitā, the deliberate generation of ten kinds of roots of virtue, the attainment of ten buddha-qualities, the ripening of sentient beings, the purification of the buddha-field and the production of buddha-attributes. Attainment of the five/six abhijñā manifestations is dependent on the successful practice of meditative absorption. Passages attesting this dependency are already found in the earliest strands of Buddhist literature. Thus, we read in the Samaññaphalasutta (M I, p. 77) that their presence arises only in “a concentrated mind that is pure and composed, free from fault, unstained, supple, alert, stable and wholly unperturbed”. This association between meditation practice and the cultivation of the abhijñā has ever since formed the backbone to the Buddhist understanding of the abhijñā.

485. Akn, p. 49.1.2–7.

486. References to the six abhijñā are plentiful and spread throughout the Buddhist canon. For a selection of occurrences, see: Mppē, iv, pp. 1809. For references to the abhijñā in Sanskrit literature, see: Kośa (vii, pp. 97–126), Caituparinīṣṭūra (Waldschmidt, 1957, pp. 432–34), Daśa-bh (pp. 34–36), Pañca (pp. 83–87), Bbh (p. 58.13–18), Śiks (p. 243), Mṣī (p. 25.2–10, p. 185.11–17) and Dḥṣgr (§ 20).

487. Of these pūrvanivāsanusmṛti,jñāna, cyutypapādajñāna and āsravaksayajñāna correspond to the three sciences (vidyā) of the same name that the Buddha attained during the three watches in the night preceding enlightenment (D III, pp. 220, 275; A V, p. 221; Kośa, vii, p. 107).
it from their discussions of *abhijñā*.\(^{488}\) The *Bdp* is no exception.

Where it does differ from most texts, however, is the order of presentation, discussing first *divyacaksus*, second *divyaśrotra*, third *paracittajñāna*, fourth *pūrṇavāsānusmṛti jñāna* and fifth *rddhividhi jñāna*.\(^{489}\) No reason for this change of sequence is given in the *Bdp* itself.

The *Dhyānasastrā* (cited in the *Mpps*) provides the following explanation.\(^{490}\) At first, the bodhisattva obtains divine sight. Having seen all beings, but being unable to hear their sounds, he then seeks the *abhijñā* of divine hearing. Furnished with divine sight and hearing,

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488. Representing this view, the *Vin* explicitly excludes the sixth super-knowledge from the *abhijñā* practice of the bodhisattva (p. 130; trsl. Lamotte):

“A domain where the six super-knowledge are explored, but without arriving at the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (*āsravaksayajñāna*), such is the domain of the bodhisattva.”

This position is slightly qualified in the *Mpps* (iv, pp. 1817–18) arguing that a bodhisattva who has destroyed his impurity (*ksitāsrava*) may elude *nivāna* provided that the traces (*vāsanā*) of his impurity still prevail. Traditionally, destruction of impurity motivated by the yearning for personal liberation meant arhantship and subsequent *nivāna*. In the Mahāyāna, this proposition was modified to make room for the ideal of the bodhisattva. Accordingly, for a bodhisattva who utterly destroyed his *klesa* and the flow of *vāsanā*, the attainment of *āsravaksaya* occurs only at the tenth stage, shortly before he achieves buddhahood. However, incomplete exhaustion of impurity, viz., with the *vāsanā* still intact, means that a bodhisattva—determined to utilise the remaining *klesavāsanā* to prolong his liberating activity—sheds all constraints while traversing *sāmāra*. Held to take place on the eighth stage (*Mpps*, ii, p. 1801), it enables him to assume the manifestations of the *dharmadāhātukāya* in this quest for universal liberation and to return to *sāmāra* without fear of contamination.

The *Rgv* (pp. 245–6), citings the *Sgm*, distinguishes eight factors that prevent the bodhisattva from actually realising the destruction of the *āsrava*. These are (1) non-satiety in seeking merit, (2) intentional acceptance of existence through origination, (3) earnest desire to meet with the buddha, (4) indefatigability in repeating sentient beings, (5) strenuous effort to acquire the Dharma, (6) diligent application to benefiting sentient beings, (7) non-abandoning of the propensity of desire for dharma and (8) non-reluctance from fetters of the highest virtue. Referred to as ‘defilements endowed with virtuous roots’ (*kuśalamūlasamprayuktā klesā*), they fasten the bodhisattva by means of compassion to this world but protect him by means of cognition from personal exposure to worldly defilements. Springing from the cultivation of the five *abhijñā* fostered through meditation, all eight become collectively operational on the sixth stage (*abhīmukkhitihāsā*)—the moment when the bodhisattva comes for the first time ‘face to face’ with reality—and prompt him to abide in meditation in order acquire the *bodhyāṅga* (op. cit., pp. 250–2).

Also in the *Rgv* (op. cit., pp. 227–28) we find an interesting passage elucidating the relationship between *āsravaksaya*, *āsravaksayajñāna* and the five mundane *abhijñā*. Likening their contributions to the manifestations of a lantern, the text suggests that the worldly *abhijñā* have a “characteristic of engaging in (*pratyupasthāna*) the extinction of darkness that is opposite to knowledge which perceives an object (*arthanībhava*)”; that knowledge of the destruction of the *āsrava* resembles ‘heat’ because of its characteristic of engaging in consuming the fuel of the active force and defilements, leaving no residue; and that the actual destruction of the *āsrava* resemblance colour because of its perfect purity resulting from moral and cognitive attainments. When becoming simultaneously manifest at the ‘immaculate sphere’, they are inseparable from each other, identical and in union with the absolute.

In spite of the tendency to discuss all six *abhijñā* en bloc, there are a few texts in which *āsravaksayajñāna* is excluded. Apart from a few instances in the nikāya (e.g., S II, pp. 121–22) this applies particularly to works belonging to the Sanskrit tradition, viz., *Mvu* (i, p. 284..3; ii, pp. 33.11, 96.1), *Divya*, p. 321.3; *Sadhop* (pp. 134.11, 141.9, 254.14) and *Śiks* (p. 243.13).

489. I have found just three texts in which the *abhijñā* are discussed in the same sequence, that is, the *Dhsgr* (§ 20). *Pāramitāsāmasā* (Meadows, p. 228–232. vss. 40–66) and *Ākn* (pp. 58.5–61.5.3). Apart from these, only the *Mvy* (202–208) appears to list the *abhijñā* in this order. Most other texts place the faculty of *rddhi* at the beginning of the list and the *divyacaksus* at the end (e.g., *Pañca*, pp. 460–61, *Dāsa-bh*, pp. 35–6, M)

but still ignorant of their languages, sorrow and joys, he seeks the unique knowledge of language (niruktipratisamvid).\(^{491}\) Knowledgeable in other people’s languages, but ignorant of their thought, the practitioner seeks knowledge of the thoughts of others. Still not knowing their place of origin, he sets out to acquire the abhijñā of their previous existence and to heal their mental ailments (cittavyādhi). For this purpose he seeks the abhijñā of the destruction of the impurities. However, even though he has mastered five abhijñā, the bodhisattva is not able to carry out transformations (nirmāṇa) and is therefore still unable to liberate beings in great numbers, so he resolves to pursue the abhijñā of magical powers.\(^{492}\) The reason why the rddhividhyā is generally cited at the beginning is not because it is attained before the other abhijñā, but because of its great impact on the liberation of beings.\(^{493}\) In this sense, for the bodhisattva, it is the most important of all six. Divyacakṣus, on the other hand, is cited first because, being the easiest to acquire, it is the natural starting point for the pursuit of the

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\(^{491}\) Clearly, this reference to the niruktipratisamvid comes as a surprise and raises some questions about the scope of the divyaśrotrajñāna. Does the text indicate that the attainment of the niruktipratisamvid precedes the acquisition of the abhijñā? What is the relationship between the divyaśrotrajñāna and niruktipratisamvid? The idea in the Dhyānasūtra is that the divyaśrotrajñāna enables the bodhisattva merely to hear the sounds of all beings—not to understand their meaning. This interpretation is borne out in several other passages where the cognitive factors are suspiciously omitted (e.g., Mpps, iv, p. 1822). Conceptually, however, both types of knowledge operate on the same level as the divyaśrotrajñāna and niruktipratisamvid, operating in the kāmadhātu and the first dhyāna, fall into the category of samvṛti-jñāna (Mpps, ii, p. 1042, iii, p. 1619). Thus, while it may carry personal benefit, for a compassionate practitioner to win maximum benefit from the divyaśrotrajñāna—for both himself and others—the text advises him to complement it with knowledge of vocal expressions (nirukti).

The key to a correct understanding of the appearance of the concept of niruktipratisamvid is found when recalling that in the Dhyānasūtra we have a text belonging to early Buddhism. Its interpretation of the niruktipratisamvid has therefore to be seen in a Śrāvakayāna frame of reference. The view that divyaśrotrajñāna does not lend itself to understanding languages and sounds is not found in Mahāyāna works (Mpps, i, pp. 330–31, 1822; Bh, pp. 67.25–69.10). On the contrary, it is highly valued and figures among the chief benefits that accrue to the bodhisattva from meditative practice (Msg, p. 224, § 8.8–9).

\(^{492}\) According to the Mpps (ii, p. 1043) the bodhisattva’s power of transformation increases with his advance through the four dhyāna stages. It springs from the thought of creation (nirmāṇacitta) and, during the first dhyāna, is operational on the kāmadhātu. During the successive stages it functions also in the rūpadhātu (cf. Kośa, vii, p. 114). As all types of rddhi have matter as object (rupālambana), arising successively, the bodhisattva is compelled—should he wish to see, hear or touch any object—to call again on the cognition of the Brahmaloka experienced during the first dhyāna (Mpps, i, p. 330). Altogether, one distinguishes fourteen different types of nirmāṇacitta, accomplishing eight kinds of creation. These include decrease, increase, taking away weight, exercising power (vaśīvakaṇa) over physical shapes, possessing the superhuman power of Indra, drawing apart and together, causing earthquakes and personal transformation. Finally, there are four additional types of creation that address transformation of substances. These spring either from learning in magic, the abhijñā, the forces of retribution and meditation—all dealing invariably with matter—and are bound to the kāmadhātu (Mpps, i, pp. 381–3).

\(^{493}\) In fact, the Mpps (iv, p. 1820) states quite emphatically that the advanced nature of the cognitive requirements for the attainment of the rddhi are such that, being linked with space and observing the mark of emptiness, it cannot but stand at the end of a long process of schooling. A similar view is also held by the Kośa (vii, p. 104), adding that this preparation (prayoga) leads in each and every case to mastery (vaśītā) in rddhi, that is the eighth of the ten vaśītā that manifest on the acalābhūmi (Daśa-bh, p. 71.15–16).
abhijñā.\textsuperscript{494}

In the \textit{Bdp}, the rationale behind the cultivation of \textit{abhijñā} is twofold. By means of those \textit{abhijñā} that involve cognition, the bodhisattva gains a complete picture of samsāric existence and penetrates the processes that sustain and perpetuate its \textit{continuum ad infinitum}.\textsuperscript{495} Exposing him to the vastness of sorrow that particularly prevails in the evil destinies, they strengthen his resolve to dedicate all resources to its complete eradication.\textsuperscript{496} This cognitive aspect of the first four \textit{abhijñā} is complemented by a second, active element that shows the ways in which their cosmic knowledge has an immediate, practical effect on the training proper. The most effective of these means is provided by \textit{rddhividhyabhijñā} itself.\textsuperscript{497} As it depends for profitable implementation on knowledge acquired through the four preceding \textit{abhijñā}, it is cited in the \textit{Bdp} in last position.

The actual division into cognitive and practical elements is somewhat blurred in the \textit{Bdp}, since its functional demarcation is not always implemented. This is particularly true of the \textit{divyacaksus} that is credited with immediate and \textit{de facto} influence on the conduct of beings.\textsuperscript{498}

For example, it said to grant the bodhisattva power over the moral conduct of beings\textsuperscript{499} and to introduce beings to the practice of the \textit{pāramitā}:\textsuperscript{500}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{494} The distinction between ‘easy’ and ‘difficult’ \textit{abhijñā} applies to all beings except the most advanced bodhisattva. This, at least, is the reason that is given by the \textit{Mpps} in reply to the question why the bodhisattva Śākyamuni, during the night preceding his enlightenment, began his \textit{abhijñā} practice with the \textit{rddhi} and not the \textit{divyacaksus} (\textit{Mpps}, iv, p. 1825).
  \item \textsuperscript{495} R, folio 553.3-5.
  \item \textsuperscript{496} R, folio 555.5.
  \item \textsuperscript{497} A survey of the types of \textit{iddhi/rddhi} that arhants and bodhisattvas attain in the course of their career is given below, note 516.
  \item \textsuperscript{498} According to the \textit{Mpps} (i, pp. 330-31), divine sight falls into two major categories, depending on the causes that lead to its unfolding. First, there is the kind that arises from exercise (\textit{bhāvanā}). This form of divine sight is wholly based on the practice of the \textit{abhijñā} and is undoubtedly the kind exhibited in the \textit{Bdp}. The second kind of \textit{divyacaksus} arises on the basis of retribution (\textit{vipāka}). Strictly speaking, its presence is independent of training in the \textit{abhijñā} as it arises on the basis of insight. To be precise, it is only attained by bodhisattvas who, having reached the ‘conviction of the non-arising of \textit{dharma}’, are not found in the six destinies but appear by virtue of their \textit{dharmakāya} in the world in order to convert beings. This form of \textit{divyacaksus} is not found among worldly, newly-set-out bodhisattvas who have not attained the \textit{dharmakāya}.
  \item \textsuperscript{499} R, folio 554.2.
  \item \textsuperscript{500} R, folio 555.3-556.1
\end{itemize}

In the \textit{Ratnolakādhārani} (\textit{Śiks}, p. 328.1-9; trsl. Bendall) we read in connection with the effects of miraculous feats:

\begin{quote}
  “Some instruct all creatures in a thousand expedient by means of the Tathāgata’s worship, by means of infinite gifts and generosity, by means of the practice of all [types of] asceticism, some by means of indestructible and imperturbable patience, by means of the heroism of austerity and vows, by means of meditation and calm in the hermitage, by means of the knowledge discriminating what is good, by means of thousands of expedients ... by means of the miracles of the conduct of the great vehicle” (cf. \textit{Mpps}, pp. 1049, 1111; \textit{Śiks}, pp. 334–7).
\end{quote}

The \textit{Bbh} (p. 210.3–17) adds that the bodhisattva who is established in the \textit{dhyānapāramitā} disciplines sentient beings by the three types of miraculous display (\textit{rddhiprāthārāya}), that he grants elocution to the ill-spoken and bestows memory to the forgetful.
"His divine sight means that he does not show hostility towards those who seek [instruction]; that he is not angered by those who transgress the moral precepts, but that he watches over their harmful thoughts. It means that he encourages the indolent and instructs the agitated in the branches of meditation. It gives true sight of wisdom to those who are of aberrant wisdom."

Spanning much of *samsāra*\(^{501}\), the *divyacākṣus* is particularly important since it endorses the bodhisattva’s vision of suffering and liberation. On the one hand, it generates awareness of and compassion towards the afflicted sentient beings—the *raison d’être* of the vow itself.\(^{502}\) On the other hand, allowing for glimpses at the state of buddhahood, it kindles a personal ambition and encourages in times of weariness.\(^{503}\) Both points are clearly expressed in the *Bdp* and, although conceptually not correlated, unmistakably form the backbone to its treatment of the *divyacākṣus*.\(^{504}\)

The twofold approach, distinguishing cognitive and practical elements, is also adopted in the discussion of divine hearing (*divyaśrōtra*). Here, the point is made that the bodhisattva’s

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501. Strictly speaking, the *divyacākṣus* operates—like the *ṛddhi* and *divyaśrōtra* and, according to some, also the *paracittajñāna* and *cyutypapādaññāna*—only in the *kāmadhātu* and *rupadhātu* as it depends for its objects on matter. Hence it arises only from the four *dhyāna* and not from the formless *samādhi* (*Kośa*, vii, p. 102). In the *Kośabhāṣya* (pp. 429.17–430.3) we are told that the scope of the *divyacākṣus* varies according to the persons who generate it. If they do not make any specific effort, śrāvaka are able of survey one Sāhasra universe, pratyekabuddhas one Dviśāhasra universe and buddhas one Trīśāhasra universe. However, should they apply themselves to the *divyacākṣus* vision, śrāvaka can extend their sight to one Dviśāhasra universe, pratyekabuddhas to one Trīśāhasra universe and buddhas to infinite universes. Like the *divyaśrōta*, the *divyacākṣus* is only attainable by persons who have eliminated all desire. This state is achieved when the practitioners is freed from all passions pertaining to the *kāmadhātu* when he embarks on the *dhyāna* of the *rupadhātu* (*Mpps*, v, p. 2273).

The *Msl* (p. 143.8–10) distinguishes five kinds of sight springing from the cultivation of *ṛddhipāda*. These are the (1) eye of flesh (*māṃsacākṣus*), (2) divine sight (*divyacākṣus*), (3) noble vision of wisdom (*āryaprajñācākṣus*), (4) Dharma-vision (*dharmacākṣus*) and (5) the buddha-vision (*buddhacākṣus*).

502. This thought is of course not exclusive to the *Bdp*, but occurs in most Mahāyāna *sūtras* where the *abhiñāṇa* are discussed (cf. *Mpps*, ii, pp. 1055–6). That it found its place with this role into the scheme of the path at a very early stage is attested by a passage in the *Aṣṭa* (p. 403; trsl. Conze) where we read that:

> “[The bodhisattva] surveys countless beings with his heavenly eye, and what he sees fills him with great agitation: so many carry the burden of a karma which leads to immediate retribution in the hell, other have acquired unfortunate rebirth, other are doomed to be killed, or they are enveloped in the net of false views, or fail to find the path, while other who have gained a fortunate rebirth have lost it again. And he attends to them with the thought that: ‘I shall become a saviour to all those beings, I shall release them from all their suffering.’ ”

503. *R*, folio 554.3–5:

> “Having seen [the congregation of buddhas and bodhisattvas], the divine sight prompts the bodhisattva to accomplish the armour of the holy person, [to acquire] correct conduct and practice, recollection (*smṛti*), mindfulness (*samprajñāna*), steadfastness in the path and in pristine cognition [showing that] all dharma are liberated, skill in pristine cognition in the attainment of dhāraṇi including skill in wisdom, knowledge and means.”

504. Both points are, for instance, raised next to each other in *R*, folio 553.2–554.3.

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capability to understand the whole range of sound—human and non-human—has important implications not only because it allows him to grasp the teaching in their true compassion-inducing spirit and retain them in their entirety\textsuperscript{505}, but moreover, to transmit these faithfully to his audience.\textsuperscript{506} In particular, it enables the bodhisattva to attune his discourses to the need and receptivity of his listeners.\textsuperscript{507} For the Bdp the ground that is covered by the divyaśrotā is therefore in many ways comparable to that of the Mahāyāna conception of niruktipratisamvid, a point which as was already made in connection with a reference in the Dhyānasūtra.

The third abhijñā, knowledge of the thought of others (paracittajñāna), grants insight into the mental disposition of all beings, irrespective of spatial or temporal constraints. In particular it allows the bodhisattva to assess the degree that their faculties have been exposed to, or moulded by, the bodhisattva practices\textsuperscript{508} and so permits him to ease beings into the appropriate vehicle.\textsuperscript{509} The main purpose of learning other people's thought is therefore to dispense instruction in the most suitable way.\textsuperscript{510}

“Even though [the bodhisattva] goes among his listeners, he discerns all of them immediately; and having discerned [their aptitude], he teaches the Dharma to sentient beings in exact accordance with their disposition.”

Since it influences the speed and success rate of the bodhisattva's conversion activity—the only gauge against which his progress is ultimately measured—knowledge of the thought of others clearly plays an important role.

The fourth abhijñā, knowledge of the recollection of previous births (pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñāna) is aimed chiefly at the bodhisattva's personal advance.\textsuperscript{511} According to the Bdp, the main benefit of this type of knowledge is not so much the recollection of the previous existences \textit{per se}, but penetration into the circumstances that brought them about in the first place.\textsuperscript{512} The rationale behind this emphasis is the need for awareness of the mechanisms

\textsuperscript{505} R, folio 558.2.
\textsuperscript{506} R, folio 558.6.
\textsuperscript{507} R, folio 558.7–559.2.
\textsuperscript{508} R, folio 560.6–61.3.
\textsuperscript{509} R, folio 562.3–563.2.
\textsuperscript{510} R, folio 564.4–5.
\textsuperscript{511} For discussion of the psychological processes that underlie the \textit{pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñāna} and their parallels in Indian systems contemporary to the Buddha, see Eliade: \textit{Yoga: Immortality and Freedom}, 1969, pp. 180–85, 186–199. Consult also Demiéville, P.: “La mémoire des existences antérieures” (\textit{BEFEO}, 1927, pp. 283–98) from which much of Eliade’s detail is drawn.
\textsuperscript{512} R, folio 566.6–67.2.
that determine becoming and the assumption of a suitable attitude towards existence. In particular, it has the benefit of preventing conceit to arise.\textsuperscript{513}

"O Śāriputra, taking into account [the marks of] suffering, transience, non-self and emptiness, the bodhisattva is not infatuated with beauty, wealth, servants, sovereignty or with a yearning to become a cakravartin, Indra, Brahmā and world-guardian ... assuming these existences intentionally (saṃcintya) only in order to ripen all sentient beings."

He acknowledges, disapproves and repents his previous impure action and undertakes to dedicate his roots of virtue to the cause of enlightenment.\textsuperscript{514} Pledging to continue the lineages of the three jewels, the bodhisattva sustains his recollection through the supporting power of the dharmadhātu that leads to equipment in punya, jñāna and pāramitā, since:\textsuperscript{515}

"It is in this way that all the dharma of the past, present and future are kept in memory by the power that generated this recollection."

That such an accumulation of qualities is foremost a personal achievement is amply documented in Buddhist literature. Also in the Bdp training in the recollection of previous births is primarily of personal benefit and has little immediate impact on others.

In contrast the abhijñā of magical power (ṛddhi) is entirely oriented towards the spiritual advance of sentient beings. While many texts diverge on the scope and kinds of magical power that are included in ṛddhi, virtually all agree that its prime objective is the conversion

\textsuperscript{513} R, folio 567.2–5.  
\textsuperscript{514} R, folio 567.6–7.  
\textsuperscript{515} R, folio 568.1–5, folio 568.5–7.  
\textsuperscript{516} Compare, for instance, the types of īddhi in the S V, p. 264 with those cited in the Daśa-bh (pp. 34–36). Later Mahāyāna scholars produced further subdivisions that allocate the ṛddhi elements to thematic groups. A good example of such academic digression is found in the Mppś (ii, pp. 329–30). Here, distinguished by their character as either displacement (gamana), creation (nirmana) or noble magic power (āryāṛddhi), the ṛddhi-pāda fall into three major categories. The gamana-class consists of four ṛddhi types, that is (1) unobstructed movement by flying like a bird, (2) instantaneous change of location, (3) plunging and emerging and (4) instantaneous disappearance. The ṛddhi of the nirmana-class consist in the change of the (1) size, (2) power of multiplication and (3) the possibility to create at will whatever is desired. Finally, the ṛddhi of the āryāṛddhi-class concern the conversion of impure substances into pure ones. This last type of ṛddhi is held to be available only to a Buddha (cf. D III, p. 112; Kośa, vii, p. 111, viii, p. 210). According to the Kośa (vii, p. 113), the gamana-class of ṛddhi comprises only three ṛddhi, that is transportation, miracles (adhimoksa) and rapid displacement with the speed of thought. Adopting a slightly different classification, the Kośa distinguishes ṛddhi by the method of production (vii, pp. 122–3). Accordingly, on one level, it differentiates between ṛddhi stemming from cultivation (bhāvanā)
of beings.\textsuperscript{517} With this function, \emph{iddhi} assumed great importance in the Mahāyāna where their application is strongly encouraged and praised as a factor of immense potency. This thoroughly positive attitude constituted a departure from the dogmatism and more cautious approach among the more conservative circles of early Buddhism. In many Pāli sources, the Buddha appears to endorse their performance only hesitantly and with a series of stringent reservations.\textsuperscript{518}

or meditation (dhyāna) and innate (upapattilābhikā) \emph{rddhi}. Expanding on this division, it considers also \emph{rddhi} springing from spells (mantrakra), \emph{rddhi} springing from herbs (osadhikra) and \emph{rddhi} springing from acts (karma) as distinct categories of \emph{rddhi}. As it does not give examples of these five classes, concentrating instead on further ever more complex subdivisions, we are dealing here probably with a division of little but academic bearing.

517. E.g., \textit{Mpps} (iv, pp. 1819–22), Śgs (p. 221), \textit{Daśa-bh} (p. 36), \textit{Saddhp} (pp. 72.1–78.5), \textit{Bbh} (pp. 63.1–69.10, 152.10–14), \textit{Msl} (p. 185.10–16) and \textit{Msg} (p. 294, § 15).

The other important use to which the \emph{rddhi} are put to is that of \textit{buddhapiṭa}. Several treatises mention this as a specific purpose of the bodhisattva’s attainments in \emph{rddhi} (e.g., \textit{Mpps}, ii, p. 1055, \textit{Saddhp}, pp. 404–422).

Compare with the list that is given in the \textit{Msl} (pp. 142.13–143.16) distinguishing six types of realising the \emph{rddhipāda}, consisting of (1) sight (darśana), (2) instruction (avavāda), (3) stable miraculous power (sthitivikridita), (4) resolution (pranidhā), (5) mastery (vaśīta), (6) Dharma attainment (dharmaṇaprāpti).

518. The question of the Buddha’s attitude to the use \emph{iddhi} as part of the conversion process has long occupied Buddhist scholarship. The single most important source for this controversy has always been the \textit{Kevaddhasutta} (D III, pp. 211–15). In a series of comments in the introduction to his translation of the \textit{Kevaddhasutta}, TW Rhys Davids suggests that the Buddha strongly disapproved of their use. Half a century later, this proposition was taken up by Louis Gomez, arguing that the Buddha rejected the use of \emph{iddhi} chiefly because two of three types of wondrous display (\emph{pāṭhārīya}) are not the exclusive property of the enlightened and are available to practitioners of the magical arts of Gandhāra (Gomez, in: Lancaster, 1977, p. 221). The validity of this argument has been challenged by Gethin on the basis of an alleged linguistic misinterpretation (Gethin, 1987, p. 196). The gist of Gethin’s criticism of this position revolves around the assumption that the practice of the \emph{iddhi} were ‘unnatural’ to the nikāya in the sense that stand apart from Buddhist practice. Springing from meditative absorption just as the \textit{jhāna}, the \emph{iddhi} appear indeed fully integrated into the śrāvaka training. The reason why the Buddha disapproved of Kevaddha’s request for an \emph{iddhi} demonstration, he argues, is not because he dismissed \emph{iddhi} as such but because he feared that the public display of their kind would yield no tangible results in terms of conversion.

Arguing that for the faithful, the performance of miracles would only serve to reinforce the trust and amazement that they hold anyway, while the sceptic would dismiss it as a magical trick with no deeper significance, Gethin contends that the Buddha thought the same way. As a result, in contrast with those monks who were willing to comply and conjure miracles, the attainments of the arhant would clearly lose in standing for the laity—an effect the Buddha had clearly every interest to avoid. While somewhat failing to explain the Buddha’s apparent readiness to endorse the other two types of wondrous display, that is the wondrous display of mind-reading (\emph{ādesanā}) and the wondrous display of instruction (\emph{anusāsanā}), Gethin’s argument has undeniable attractions. Above all, it tallies well with the \textit{Vinaya} rule (ii, p. 112; trsl. Gethin) that the Buddha pronounced in response to Piṇḍola Bhāravāja’s performance of miracles before the inhabitants of Rājagaha:

“O monks, a display of miraculous \emph{iddhi} beyond the capacity of ordinary men is not to be exhibited to the householders. If someone exhibits [such], there is a dukkha offence.”

The reason that given in support of this rule is that:

“It is neither [conducive] to trust for those without trust, nor to growth for those with trust. Indeed, O monks, it is [conducive] to lack of trust for those without trust and to loss [of trust] for some of those with trust.”

Today, it is of course impossible to know for certain what exactly led the Buddha to this attitude. Buddhist sources record several well-known instances in the early days of his ministry where he seemed quite prepared to engage in the public display of \emph{iddhi}. Perhaps, he was guided in this judgement by his personal experience at Uruvelā, when hoping to convert Kassapa, the ascetic, he was confronted with the absurd situation of a ‘thraumaturgic impasse’.

The \textit{Kośa} (vii, pp. 111–12) cites as additional reason for the Buddha’s apparent criticism of the display of \emph{rddhi} the fact that \emph{rddhiprāthārya} (as well as \emph{ādesanāprāthārya}) captivates the minds of the audience for only a short time, while the \emph{anusāsanāprāthārya} inspires the production of wholesome and benefiting
By the time the earliest Mahāyāna sūtras appeared, much of the disquiet about the suitability of miracles to further the cause of Buddhism had apparently evaporated. The rich imagery found in the Saddhp\textsuperscript{519} and the tentative inclusion of miraculous feats in the otherwise rather technical discussions of the Asta\textsuperscript{520} bear testimony to their early presence in Mahāyāna literature.

Whatever the dissent concerning the use to which rddhi could be put, Pāli and Sanskrit works show broad agreement on the conditions that lead to their mastery. In virtually every source that discusses the performance of rddhi, we learn that they depend for generation on extensive and deep meditation.\textsuperscript{521} In particular, acquisition of magical powers is associated with training in the four bases of success (iddhipāda).\textsuperscript{522}

\textsuperscript{519} The Saddhp contains what is probably the best known early example of the use of rddhi for benefiting others in Mahāyāna sūtras. The passage I have in mind is, of course, that of the image of the burning house conjured up in order to encourage sentient beings to leave the world and follow the path of Buddhism (pp. 72.1–78.5). Other examples of rddhi are found in chapter fourteen (op. cit., pp. 297–314) describing the emergence of bodhisattvas from suddenly appearing gaps in the earth.

\textsuperscript{520} Asta, pp. 381, 383–4, 464a–465, 466.

\textsuperscript{521} The fullest canonical account of the method of their generation is found in the Patis (ii, pp. 205–6). Here, we read that the iddhi depend for unfolding on four ‘planes of success’ (iddhiyābhūmiyo), on the four iddhipāda, on ‘eight footings of success’ (iddhiyāpadānī) and on ‘sixteen roots of success’ (iddhiyāmūlānī). Referring to this passage in the Vism (xii.49–50, 54–5), Buddhaghosa explains that the four levels are nothing but the four jhāna (xii.49); that the eight footings denote the iddhipāda—each one considered from the aspect of concentration and from that of its basis (that is chanda, viriya, citta and vimānsā)—and that the sixteen roots target the various obstacles that perturb consciousness (xii.54–55). He adds that before a monk can become proficient in the seven iddhi, he has to master all eight ‘basic absorptions’, meaning that he is capable of entering each of the eight attainments on the basis of all eight kasina at will (Vism xii.2–7). Although held to be extremely difficult to achieve and therefore limited to very few, he allows for the option that, besides buddhas and pratyekabuddhas, very advanced disciples may acquire iddhi at the threshold of arhatship (xii.11).

\textsuperscript{522} In the Pāli Canon, the iddhipāda are regularly presented in the following stereotyped description (D II, pp. 213–4; trsl. Gethin):

"Here a monk develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration (samādhi) gained by means of desire to act (chanda), and with forces of endeavour (padhānasamkhāra). He develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of vigour (viriya) and with forces of endeavour. He develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of mind (citta) and with forces of endeavour. He develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of investigation and with forces of endeavour."

As indicated by this brief passage, the iddhipāda consist primarily in an interplay of three elements: meditation, forces of endeavour and the four factors that bring about absorption (chanda, viriya, citta, vimānsā). It is therefore slightly incorrect to associate the bases of success with any of these three factors in particular. The commentaries on the Sānyuttaniyāka and Vibhanga leave no doubt that the significance of the interaction lies in the sustaining and promoting of the process of meditative attainments (Vibh, § 303). The exact nature of chanda, viriya, citta and vimānsā is left undiscussed in most iddhipāda contexts of the nikāya. Gethin points to an simile in the Sv (ii, pp. 642–3), indicating that their chief objective is to represent progressively easier means of achieving one’s purpose—the person who is endowed with vimānsā being in the best position (Gethin, p. 174).

This view tallies approximately with the interpretations found in the Sanskrit sources of the northern tradition. Here, chanda-, viriya-, citta- and mimāṃsāsamādhi are typically interpreted as mental one-
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Generation of four bases of success is also the point of departure for the Bdp's exposition on ṛddhi, where their presence becomes a chief requirement for any kind of magical prodigy (ṛddhiprātiḥārya).523 Of particular interest is the Bdp's listing of desire, intimidation and sovereignty alongside the traditional ṛddhipāda of chanda, virya, citta and mīmāṃśā.524 The reason for their presence becomes clear when we look at the areas in which the bodhisattva's magical force is displayed. First, setting out to attract following by addressing people's yearning for physical beauty, he assumes exquisite shapes and colours.525 Second, by demonstrating immense strength, the bodhisattva disheartens conceited, wrathful or presumptuous beings, thereby creating favourable conditions for their instruction in the Dharma.526 Finally, equipped with ṛddhipāda, the bodhisattva generates vast miraculous powers (adhiṣṭhāna) that allow him to transform phenomena at will.527 By so doing, he creates pointedness attained through proper application of zeal, constant application of virya, the power of concentration previously cultivated, hearing the Dharma and insight (Abhidh-sam (R), p. 121). In close concurrence with the Pāli formula, Sanskrit sources speak of the first ṛddhipāda as being furnished with chandasamādhi and prahānasamsākāra, with chandasamādhi being acquired through the strengthening (adhipati) of chanda and so forth for virya, etc. Sanskrit sources do not identify the prahānasamsākāra with virya (as they propose for the four samyakprahāna), but associate it with desire to act (chanda), striving (vyāyāma), faith (śraddhā), peace (prāsrabdhi), mindfulness (smṛti), clear comprehension (samprajanya), volition (cetāna) and equipoise (upekṣā), (Sātya (S), ii, p. 42; Abhidh-sam (R), p. 121; Mvs, p. 51.11–52.3, iv.4).

For a considered assessment of the place of the iddhipāda in the Buddhist path, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 155–199).

According to the Śgs (p. 221), ṛddhiprātiḥārya are manifested in eighteen different kinds. However, the text does not elaborate on the nature of these eighteen types and I have found no passage that could be interpreted to illuminate this reference.

A concise Mahāyāna definition of the three types of miraculous display (prātiḥārya) is found in the Rgv (p. 363):
"It is indicated that the omnipresence [of the Buddha] through the display (vikurvita) of the body in all the worlds of the ten directions constitutes the miraculous display through feats (ṛddhiprātiḥārya). The illumination of the thicket of mental conduct of living beings, as involved in the mind, by knowing the variety of thoughts is the miraculous display through mind-reading (ādeśānakṣamāṇaḥ). And with reference to the path leading to deliverance, [the Buddha] preaches and instructs in the path by the example of the utterances of his voice—this is the miraculous display through instructions (anuṣṭānaprātiḥārya)."  

R, folio 569.3.

R, folio 569.6–70.2.

Similar, but more elaborate descriptions of the lengths the bodhisattva is prepared to go in transforming his body are found in the Vkn (pp. 183–184; cit. in Śiks, pp. 324–27), Ratnolkaḥāraṇi(Śiks, pp. 330.13–332.8) and Mpps (ii, p. 984; cf. p. 1055).

On the contributions of krtsnāyatana, vimokṣa and abhibhvāyatana to the transformation powers of the bodhisattva, see: Mpps, iv, pp. 1820–21, iii, pp. 1291–1307.

The meaning of the term adhiṣṭhāna is somewhat ambiguous in this place. Although it may carry several meanings, on contextual grounds, I do not believe that any other translation than 'miraculous power' is appropriate here (Edgerton, pp. 15–16). Being itself a widely attested meaning, it occurs with this sense several times in similar contexts in the Śgs (pp. 187, 194, 196, 212, 222).

In this section, the Bdp proposes that a bodhisattva who possesses the adhiṣṭhāna of miraculous power becomes capable of performing feats of magnification and diminution on a vast scale, such as reducing the size of the ocean to a cow's footprint and vice versa. This example and others are reminiscent of passages in the Vkn, describing similar feats (Vkn, pp. 138–39, 140).
immense rapture in his audience, prompting his listeners to adopt the Buddhist faith and resolve to work for enlightenment themselves.\footnote{528}

A further peculiarity is the type of classification that the Bdp proposes for rddhi. In later Mahāyāna writings, rddhi is generally differentiated by its areas of operation. The best known division is that of the Bbh where rddhi is distinguished by action affecting transformation (pārinīmika)\footnote{529} and by action affecting creation (nairmānīka).\footnote{530} Elsewhere, this twofold classification is extended by a third aspect, displacement (gamana), allowing the bodhisattva to appear in every location at will.\footnote{531} The rddhi classification of the Bdp into form (rupa), power (bala), miraculous power (adhiśṭhāna) and prodigy (rddhipṛāthārya) has a much narrower focus, since its members are specifically designed to eradicate tendencies of desire (kāma) and intimidation (vibhiṣāna).\footnote{532} Consequently, the display of rddhi shows little diversity and concentrates on the impact of rūpa, bala and adhiśṭhāna.\footnote{533}

The Bdp next distinguishes the scope of the abhijñā from that of pristine cognition (jñāna).

This difference is primarily one of focus. That is to say, to a bodhisattva the abhijñā are less

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{528}{R, folio 572.1-4.}
\footnotetext{529}{According to the Msg (p. 221), rddhi of transformation allows the bodhisattva to set in motion (kampana) houses, etc.; to set his body ablaze (jvalana); to illuminate (spharana); to render visible (vidarśana); to transform the four great elements (anyatībhāvavakaranā); to come and go in saṁsāra freely (gamanā); to decrease and increase phenomena (samkṣepaprathāna); to insert all matter into his body (sarvarūpakāyapravesāna); to adapt to the customs of others (sabhdgatopasamkranti); to appear and disappear with a great retinue (avirbhāvatirobhāva); to submit other beings to his will (vasitvakarana); to overpower the magical powers of others (pararddyabhibhāva); to grant insight (pratibhādāna), memory (smṛtidāna) and bliss (sukhaddāna) and to emit light-rays (rasmipramoksa). This list is also found in the Bbh (pp. 58.23–59.2). Cf. Msl (pp. 148.14–153.10) and Daśa-bh (pp. 34–35, M).
\footnotetext{530}{In the Bbh (p. 63.25), rddhi of creation involves either the body (kāyanīrmāṇa) giving rise to appearance similar or different from the complexion of the agent, or creation of voice (vāgnīrmāṇa) with the sole purpose of teaching the Dharma. In the Buddhahūmiśāstra (6, p. 318, col. 2; 7, p. 325, col. 1–2; ref. Lamotte), however, a third dimension, that of the mind (cittanīrmāṇa) is added to the creation of body and voice, giving rise to images in the bodhisattva’s own mind (svasambaddha) or in that of other beings (parasambaddha), (cf. Siddhi, pp. 794–795).
\footnotetext{531}{Mpps, i, pp. 328–30.}
\footnotetext{532}{R, folio 569.3.}
\footnotetext{533}{I have found only one other text that cites these three aspects as distinct elements in its rddhi discussion. This is the Ratnolkkadhāranī (Śiks, p. 330.11) where we come across the following sentence: “With miracles of rddhi manifesting the psychic powers of the Tathāgata, through form, miraculous power and strength altogether (samatāti), through their ability of mind-reading, through revealing (anmāśāti) their rddhi they convert sentient beings.”}
\end{footnotes}
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important for the knowledge they impart than for the contribution they make to the active aspects of his training. They allow him to traverse the fields of all buddhas, to appear in the five spheres of existence and to overwhelm with brightness even the most purified heavenly abodes.\textsuperscript{534} The \textit{abhijñā} have therefore immediate bearing on the bodhisattva's conversion activity. Pristine cognition, in contrast, operates on the cognitive plane. Where the \textit{abhijñā} generate unlimited sound perception, \textit{jñāna} realises ineffability. When the \textit{abhijñā} allow the bodhisattva to observe the minds of all beings, \textit{jñāna} sees the cessation and non-cessation of thought.\textsuperscript{535} In other words, while he is dependent for his active training on the \textit{abhijñā}, it is to \textit{jñāna} that he owes insight into the frame of reference in which they manifest.

The bodhisattva learns of the mental defilements that pervade \textit{samsāra} through the branches of \textit{dhyāna} and his miraculous powers of mind (\textit{citādhiṣṭhāna}). This inspires him to win \textit{dhyāna} in equal number.\textsuperscript{536} Thus committed (\textit{samādāna}) and sustained by the conviction of the equality of practice, he achieves a high degree of concentration (\textit{samāpatti}) in sameness.\textsuperscript{537}

On the basis of this insight, the bodhisattva acquires tranquillity\textsuperscript{538} and discernment. These

\textsuperscript{534} R, folio 573.2-5.
\textsuperscript{535} Compare this picture of the relationship between the \textit{abhijñā} and cognition with the account that is given in the \textit{Kosa} (vii, pp. 98-112). Here the \textit{abhijñā} (vii, pp. 100–1), given the same status as all other religious practices, represent the knowledge of the path of deliverance (\textit{vimukti-mārgaprajñā}). The \textit{rddhi}, \textit{divyacaksus}, \textit{divyasrotra} and \textit{purvanivasdusmṛtyupasṭhadāna} belong to the sphere of conventional knowledge (\textit{samvṛti-jñāna}). The \textit{abhijñā} manifesting \textit{paracittajñāna} allows specifically for the attainment of \textit{dharma-jñāna}, \textit{anvayajñāna}, \textit{mārgajñāna}, \textit{samvṛti-jñāna} and, of course, \textit{paracittajñāna}. As the \textit{ārasvākasvajñāna} (resembling the tenth of the \textit{tathāgatatabala}), it leads to six or ten types of knowledge (\textit{Mpps}, iii, pp. 1472, 1508) and belongs to all stages of \textit{dhyāna} (\textit{Kosa}, vii, p. 101). The first five \textit{abhijñā}, in contrast, leaning on the four \textit{dhyāna} but not on the \textit{ariyapasamāpatti} for their object, consist of matter and are always bound to the \textit{dhyāna} stage (or the next lower one) on which they became manifest (\textit{Kosa}, vii, p. 104). All \textit{abhijñā} are either acquired by means of detachment (\textit{vairāgya}) if already practised in previous lives, or are otherwise mastered by present effort (\textit{prayoga}). Founded on the practice of mindfulness, they correspond to specific bases of mindfulness (\textit{Kosa}, vii, pp. 105–7). The \textit{abhijñā} of \textit{rddhi}, \textit{divyacaksus} and \textit{divyasrotra} correspond to the \textit{kāyasmrtyupasṭhadāna} since they have matter as their object (cf. \textit{Mpps}, iii, pp. 1121–2). The \textit{abhijñā} of \textit{paracittajñāna} includes the \textit{smṛtyupasṭhadāna} of \textit{vedanā}, \textit{citta} and \textit{dharma} because it has thought and mentation as its object. Finally, the \textit{abhijñā} of \textit{purvanivasāsāsmṛtyupasṭhadāna} and \textit{ārasvākasvajñāna}, having as their objects the five \textit{skandha}, have as their nature all four \textit{smṛtyupasṭhadāna} (\textit{Kosa}, vii, p. 106). In moral terms, all six \textit{abhijñā}—but for the \textit{divyacaksus} and \textit{divyasrotra}—are wholesome (\textit{subha}) since they improve spiritual practice (\textit{Kosa}, vii, p. 107).

\textsuperscript{536} R, folio 573.7–74.1.
\textsuperscript{537} In the \textit{Akn} (p. 49.2.4), the argument runs slightly different, suggesting that the bodhisattva becomes concentrated because he is established (\textit{sthita}) in sameness and not because he is accomplished in meditation. On the other points, however, both texts concur closely. The doctrinal foundation at the heart of this thought is well-known from a number of other, perhaps earlier, Mahāyāna \textit{sūtras}. It is found, for instance, in the \textit{Śgs} (pp. 125, 131, 133, 139, 234) and \textit{Vkn} (pp. 55–56, 122–23 and the whole of chapter vii, discussing non-duality (\textit{advaya})).

\textsuperscript{538} Here, in an effort to describe the composure of the bodhisattva's disposition it is likened to the stability of the four \textit{mahābhhātas}. This is a well-known simile that occurs in a number of Mahāyāna \textit{sūtras} (e.g., \textit{Akn}, p. 49.4.3–4) describing the bodhisattva's serenity of mind.

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allow him to manifest all forms of worldly activity without ever ceasing to uphold his practice (dharma) and meditation (samāhita). It frees his practice from dithering and commotion, leads to moderation in speech (amukharatā), equips him with knowledge of suitable meditation conditions and sustains serenity.

In the Red, it is explicitly stated that ‘entry into certainty’ (nyāmāvavrānti), realisation of attained fruits and non-accumulation (anabhisamkāra) are not the aims of meditation. Its chief function consists less of realising attainments (here epitomised by the trivimokṣa) than to guide other people towards them. Thus, even when meditating on ‘emptiness furnished with the best of all excellent forms’ (sarvakāravopetaśānyatā) that allows him to see the non-arising of dharma, the bodhisattva persists in his altruistic outlook. He generates conduct that is indiscriminating, faultless and unconcerned with its own flavour (svarasavdhin).

By virtue of his meditation, he achieves

539. R, folio 575.7
The notion of the perpetually meditating bodhisattva is common to several early Mahāyāna sūtras. In the Śgs (p. 145), for instance, it forms the backbone of the entire discussion of the dhyanapāramitā. Realising that all dharma are eternally concentrated (sadbhāmasamāhita), the bodhisattva holds on to meditation in order to subdue his thoughts (citramanomārtha) and to convert sentient beings with greatest efficiency. While the bodhisattva of the Śgs is of the highest stage (p. 183), in full possession of all rddhi, there are other examples of less-advanced bodhisattvas who abide incessantly in meditation.

540. R, folio 575.4–7
This list of attributes is the closest the Bdp comes in spelling out the benefits that accrue through meditation. In contrast with the other perfections, Buddhist sūtras produced relatively few of such lists on dhārāṇa. One example of such rare enumeration is found in the Samādh, distinguishing the following ten kinds of benefits: (1) persistence in training, (2) performing good conduct, (3) living a life free from affliction, (4) possessing well-guarded faculties, (5) experiencing joy, (6) liberation from desire, (7) serenity despite the impressive accumulation of meditation, (8) liberation from the sphere of influence of Māra, (9) dwelling in the sphere of the Buddha and (10) ripening (others) to liberation (Dutt, 1943–53, ii., p. 338.6–11; cf. TTP, 31, p. 310.3.8–4.8). Compare the realism of this list with a characterisation of ‘pure samādhi’ in the Ugs (p. 272.1.8–2.3) that focuses on the psychological attainments of one-pointedness, cognition of the non-abiding of thought (apratisthitacitta), non-differentiating thought (aprapaññacacitta), mastery of thought (cittavasitā) and unperturbed thinking (aksobhācitta). Another example of a more advanced list of the benefit arising from the practice of meditation is found in the Mgs (pp. 223–4). Here, we read of ten exploits (duṣkaraçarya) that accrue to the bodhisattva from superior thought (adhicītta).

But for a number of points that relate, in the Mahāyāna, to the path of the bodhisattva, the Śrāvakayāna understanding of benefits that arise from concentration agrees is in broad agreement. For a good example of the Theravāda view, I propose to turn to the Vism where Buddhaghosa identifies (1) blissful abiding, (2) insight, (3) super-knowledge, (4) the prospect of higher rebirth and (5) cessation as the principal advantages that spring from meditation (Vism, pp. 371–372).

541. Red, op. cit., p. 234.4.5–6
According to the Bbh (p. 358.2), the attainment of nyāmāvavrānti represents the third vihāra of the śrāvakabhūmi scheme. Edgerton (pp. 314, 298) suggests to take nyāma for niyama, thus rendering nyāmāvavrānti as ‘entry into certainty’ but this does not tally with the Tibetan ‘absence of defect’. For a discussion of the term nyāmāvavrāntivihāra, see: Gv, p. 320.22; Aṣṭa, pp. 331.10, 322.5.

542. Red, op. cit. p. 234.4.6–5.2.
543. Rgv, op. cit. p. 264
The notion that the mediator must not become attached to the flavour (rasa) of his absorption is a well-established maxim in Buddhist meditation. Indeed, any dhārāṇa that is associated with enjoyment (āsvadanasamprayukta) is regarded as impure and accordingly condemned in most sūtras (e.g., Lahkāv, p. 212.14; Msl, p. 160.14; Kośa, viii, p. 144). One reason why the texts do not tire of warning the recluse from this mishap is the danger of confusing attachment (āsānga) with the practice of dhārana as both induce the mind to focus on a conceived object (Mpps, ii, pp. 1056–7). The bodhisattva succeeds in
impeccability (avikala) in the perfections, incessant exertion in ripening sentient beings and acquisition of buddha-qualities.\(^{544}\)

An important element of these meditative attainments is the interplay of means (upāya) and wisdom (prajñā).\(^{545}\) While it is not necessary to go into the detail of this well-known pattern it is perhaps of interest that meditation is a constituent in both practices. That is to say, the Bdp quite explicitly maintains that dhyāna practice is essential to the generation of means and wisdom. The difference between the two is then not one of substance, but of focus. When aimed at the suffering in the world, dhyāna generates compassion, ripens sentient beings, produces buddha-qualities and manifests miraculous powers; but when concerned with outright cognition, dhyāna inspires a vision of reality where sentient beings do not exist, roots of virtue vanish and buddha-fields resemble space.\(^{546}\) It is therefore only by the combined presence of prajñā and upāya that the bodhisattva decides to return to the kāmadhātu and continues his quest of universal liberation.\(^{547}\) One ramification of this paired operation is that, depending on context and purpose, meditation is capable of performing either on the

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\(^{544}\) Red, op. cit., pp. 234.5.2–35.1.8 (cf. Rgv, op. cit., p. 265)

According to the Mpps (ii, p. 984), the bodhisattva returns to the world from meditation in solitude only when he has obtained the power of the abhijña. Assuming all types of form in order to convert sentient beings when he dwells in their midst, the bodhisattva guides them by whatever instructions and means he deems appropriate to their deliverance.

\(^{545}\) R, folio 576.1–78.4.

\(^{546}\) In a passage of the Ug (op. cit., p. 272.4.2–4), upāyakausalya is given credit for holding the grhapti bodhisattva in this world in spite of his attainments in meditation:

"Furthermore, O householder, with regard to the empty house (presumably a quiet secluded place) the grhapti bodhisattva practises the four dhyāna but does not enter into the samāpatti by virtue of his skilful means."

This sentence seems to suggest that without upāyakausalya the bodhisattva would cease his work in sansāra and withdraw into blissful realms of the samāpatti. Although this point is not made in the Bdp, the gist that the bodhisattva stays in the world in spite of the opportunity to retire temporarily from suffering is perhaps implied by the untiring reiteration that upāya means worldly engagement while dwelling in the samāpatti (R, folio 576.2–78.3).

Compare this proposition with a passage in the Dbh (Daśa-bh, p. 36, M) where we learn that:

"The bodhisattva enters into and emerges from dhyāna, vimokṣa, samādhi and samāpatti but is not born by their power (vāsa), except when he arises by the power of his resolution, witnessing the fulfilment of the factors of enlightenment. Why? Because the bodhisattva possesses the mental continuity (cittasamātati) achieved by skilful means."

\(^{547}\) Mpps, ii, p. 1044

This touches on another important distinction between the śrāvaka- and bodhisattvadhūryāna. Unlike any other being, the bodhisattva may enter into dhyāna while still in possession of a thought of the kāmadhātu. He is capable of doing so by reason of his cultivation of virtue (guna) and because his fetters (samyojana) are weak (op. cit., p. 1446).
conventional (sāṃvṛti) or absolute (paramārtha) level of reality.548

"Equanimity and realisation while attaining all conceivable factors of enlightenment stand for means. Completely purified, untroubled pristine cognition of the Tathāgata, bliss of objectless meditation, discernment of unobstructed perception, purification of all perception, meditation on the perfection of all bodhisattvas, practice of meditation devoid of meditation stand for wisdom."

Meditation doctrinally assumes thus the role of a nexus, linking the mundane practices of dāna, śīla, ksānti (and vīrya) with supramundane cognition of prajñā.549 On the one hand, it depends for cultivation on the four worldly pāramitā. Elimination of the five major obstacles to meditation (viz., covetousness, malice, indolence, regret, wastefulness and doubt) and generation of the five dharma that conduce to its unfolding (viz., zeal, vigour, recollection, thoughtfulness and mental one-pointedness) clearly require schooling in generosity, etc.550 On the other hand, meditation enhances training in first three perfections, since it provides the required mental focus.551

Adopted to the abhijñā, these variant planes of dhyāna led the Bdp to recognise two types of abhijñā, viz., ordinary super-knowledge and non-regressing super-knowledge (acutyābhijñā).552 As indicated by their titles, the difference between the two is one of progress or degree of perfection. That is to say, the practice of ordinary abhijñā is chiefly concerned with the five traditional areas of application and focuses on the conversion of sentient beings.553 Granting supernatural powers in vision, hearing, mind-reading, recollection and rddhi, it guides to the ‘great entry’ (mahāpravṛtti), engineers the attainment of pristine cognition, operates as a factor that conduces to deliverance (nirvedhabhāgiya) and addresses supramundane practices (lokottaradharma).554 The time-span of its operation is not fully

548. R, folio 577.6–578.1.
549. Mpps, ii, pp. 984–990, 928.
550. These ten dharma are cited in the Mpps (op. cit., pp. 1013–23) as the chief causes-obstacles to a successful meditation. Although this list is by no means the only one that is proposed in Buddhist literature, it does seem to cover the contents of most other enumerations.
551. Mpps, ii, pp. 985, 1055
Besides the association with the other pāramitā, it is the connection to mastery over the bodhipāksika that most texts underline. It is mentioned in the Pañca (pp. 514–15), appears in the Dhā in the stage following his attainments in dhyāna (Dāsa-bh, pp. 38–39, C) and is listed in the Mpps (ii, p. 1043) alongside the other samādhi the dhyānapāramitā brings about.
552. R, folio 578.4, 580.2.
indicated in the Bdp. Its link with the mastery (vaśīta) over all dharma\textsuperscript{555} and the abhiśekas conferral suggests that it extends from the acalābhūmi to the dharmameghabhūmi.\textsuperscript{556}

This advanced positioning on the path is corroborated by a list of one hundred and one samādhis that appear at the very end of the chapter.\textsuperscript{557} We know of several instances in Mahāyāna sūtras where the attainment of samādhi—enumerated in lengthy lists—signals the completion of the path.\textsuperscript{558} Generally, these samādhis do not represent individually attained meditations, but point to modalities in that the bodhisattva’s final meditation manifests itself. Accommodating all practices simultaneously cultivated\textsuperscript{559}, they represent the highpoint of training when the bodhisattva operates purely from within an infinite sphere of absorption.\textsuperscript{560}

Needless to say—relying on the dharmakāya while moving through an empty, unmarked and purposeless space\textsuperscript{561}—the bodhisattva does so with greater efficiency than he has ever been able to achieve.

It is only at this point that the third and last phase of meditation sets in. Entitled ‘meditation
Dhyanaparamitā

at the service of others’ (sattvārthakriyādhyāna), it is wholly targeted at the universal suppression of sorrow.⁵⁶² According to the Bbh, the sattvārthakriyādhyāna involves total compliance with the wishes, customs and, above all, spiritual needs of beings. It compels the bodhisattva to teach the Dharma, to appease physical misery, to protect from terror, to show gratitude and generosity as appropriate and to dispense impartial rebuke.⁵⁶³ Clearly, such diverse requirements allow only bodhisattvas of advanced stages in possession of the dharmakāya to attain the sattvārthakriyādhyāna.

The characterisation of non-regressing abhijñā is more problematic, since the Bdp offers few benchmarks against which it could be measured. It is implied—but not stated—that the acutyābhiṣijñā presupposes the attainment of the five ordinary abhijñā. The basis of its manifestation is complete mental purity cultivated during intentional (samcintya) absorption in the four dhyāna, eight vimokṣa, three samādhi and nine samāpatti. It represents liberation from the fetters of impurity (kleśa) and is beyond residence on the summit of contrariness (viparyāyagrāśraya).⁵⁶⁴ Based on knowledge of the sameness of all dharma, it precludes attachment (abhiniveśa)⁵⁶⁵ to either dharma or adharma.

Abhiniveśa itself is the object (artha) of all practice (dharma).⁵⁶⁶ In a nutshell, the Bdp argues that non-attachment is the foundation to spiritual maturity that prevents delusion, indolence and impassioned disputes to cloud the bodhisattva’s judgement. It prepares acceptance of universal sameness and immunity to imputation (aparyāpanna) and—repudiating form (samsthāna) and appearance (nimitta)—leads via pursuit (anvaya) to spiritual realisation (adhisthāna).⁵⁶⁷

In the present context, pursuit and realisation constitute two different, yet acutely overlapping and complementary aspects of the bodhisattva’s training. Taken separately, each represents a major path-element; with pursuit standing for untiring cultivation of individual practices and realisation denoting understanding of their ontological invalidity. In practice, however, this

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⁵⁶². Hence, its alternative title that is given in the Siddhi (p. 622) as ‘meditation of the accomplishment of duty’ (kṛtyānuṣṭhānādhyāna).
⁵⁶³. Bbh, pp. 207.25–208.9
⁵⁶⁴. R, folio 580.6 (phyin ci log gi rtse mohi gnas); cf. Edgerton, p. 491.
⁵⁶⁵. According to Edgerton (p. 53), abhiniveśa carries two possible meanings, viz., when leaning on classical Sanskrit it is ‘strong attachment’ or, in affinity to Pāli abhiniveśa, any false belief, that in Buddhism is particularly the ‘heretical belief of the existence of a self’ (Śīks, p. 198.21). In the context of dharma-sameness the word abhiniveśa could possibly be interpreted in either terms, with ‘strong attachment’ beings perhaps the more plausible translation.
⁵⁶⁷. R, folio 581.6–82.3.
distinction becomes meaningless as pursuit and realisation merge into one another to produce the pledge to universal liberation in spite of the conviction of the non-arising of dharma.

“He shows benevolence but knows that there is no self. He is compassionate but knows that there are no beings. He cultivates sympathetic joy but knows that there is no life-force. He abides in equipoise but knows that there is no person. ... He ripens sentient beings but his mind is of pristine purity. He retains the holy Doctrine but knows the indistinguishable dharmadhātu. ... He turns the wheel of the Dharma, but knows that there is no turning. He instructs on passing into great nirvāṇa, but knows of its sameness of own-being of saṃsāra.”

In an apparent allegory on the miraculous powers of the abhijñā, pursuit and realisation produce holy beings (satpurusa) that are capable of performing miracles (āścaryā) and supernatural feats (adbhuta). The text is silent on the reasons behind this comparison. However, we are probably not much off the mark in interpreting it as an effort in the enhancement of the standing of more ordinary practices. Echoing the views of Śākyamuni Buddha, it was probably feared that a display of miraculous feats would make a far greater impression on an ill-informed laity clamouring for supernatural interventions than the rather less spectacular selfless striving of dedicated bodhisattvas. Hence, the departure from the dazzling descriptions of rddhi practices that dominated much of the first part of the dhyāna chapter to the more austere analysis of the principles underlying the training proper.
The Perfection of Wisdom

The last of the six major pāramitā, prajñāpāramitā, is discussed in chapter eleven. Of all twelve chapters of the Bdp, this chapter is the most important with regard to the bodhisattva practice. For, it contains as part of the discussion of prajñā not only those elements traditionally associated with expositions of prajñā, but includes also a large number of ancillary wisdom practices. In its description of them, the Bdp draws substantially on Mahāyāna thinking. The style of composition indicates that it comes from a time when descriptions of these practices were still not fixed. What is perhaps most striking is not the content but the arrangement of the material. In apparent disregard of well-established structures found elsewhere, the Bdp develops a picture of wisdom that contains little evidence of a particular design despite the fact that it acknowledges some sense of organisation. In order to show what is meant, I have drawn up a list of contents:

1. Śrūta, praveṣa, pratipatti
2. Saṃbhāra
3. Prayoga
4. Darśana
5. Bhāvanā
6. Skill in skandha, dhātu and āyatana
7. Skill in satya
8. Skill in pratisamvid and pratisarana
9. Skill in punyasambhāra and jñānasambhāra
10. Skill in smṛtyupasthāna
11. Skill in bodhyanga
12. Skill in āryāṣṭāṅgamārga
13. Skill in śamatha and vipaśyanā
14. Skill in samyakprahāṇa, indriya and bala
15. Skill in ekayānamārga
16. Skill in pratītyasamutpāda and dharma
Prajñāpāramitā

While the contents of the types of ‘skill’ presents no difficulty—virtually all practices discussed here are understood to contribute to the generation of wisdom—^570—the order of their arrangement proved complex and difficult to unravel. The concatenation of śruta, praveša and pratipatti; the position of samyakprahāna, indriya and bala behind the āryāstāṅgamārga; the role of ‘skill’ in skandha, dhātu, āyatana, satya in relation to the pratisamvid and pratisaraṇa, to indicate just a few issues, diverge from established patterns and are problematic.

Initial Phases in the Training of Wisdom

The exposition of Perfect Wisdom begins in the Bdp with a survey of the factors that generate wisdom. By identifying (1) seventy-two types of learning (śruta), (2) forty-one methods (praveśa) of acquiring learning and (3) good conduct (pratipatti) as causes, the Bdp emulates the ancient scheme of ‘wisdom arising from learning’ (śrutamayāprajñā), ‘wisdom arising from reflection’ (cintāmayāprajñā) and ‘wisdom arising from contemplation’ (bhāvanāmayāprajñā).^571

Virtually all abhidharmic treatises on the path agree that wisdom generated through learning, reflection and contemplation belongs to the earliest phase of the training. It is associated with the four bases of mindfulness and becomes manifest on the path of equipment (saṃbhāramārga).^572 In the Bdp, this allocation is confirmed by their position at the very beginning of the discussion of prajñā.

The first limb, śruta, does not present much of a problem since it accords closely with the established notion that learning is the first, and most fundamental, precondition for the arising of wisdom. Focusing on the wording of the instructions rather than on their meaning, it introduces the practitioner to the teachings of the Dharma and initiates the cognition

570. For the three conditions leading to prajñā, see: MBT, ii, pp. 198–99, § 9; Śrotabhūmi, TTP, 109, p. 296.3.1–5. For ‘skill’ in skandha, dhātu and āyatana, satya and pratiṣṭhānupāda, see: Mvś (N), p. 37. For the pratisamvid and pratisaraṇa, see: Bbh, pp. 214.10–14, 257.16–22. For punya and jñānasambhāra, see: MBT, iii, p. 12.20–22. For the bodhipāksika, see: Kośa, vi, pp. 282–4; Mvś (N), p. 50–55 and quotations in Mpps, iii, pp. 1119, 1132–36. For samatha and vipaśyanā, see: MBT; iii, p. 1.7–13; Bugault, 1982, p. 92.


572. Kośa, vi, pp. 159, 287; Abhidh-d, p. 362; Abhidh-h (W) p. 140; Abhidh-sam (R), pp. 116–7; Amṛtar (B), pp. 201-2; DPP, p. 20.
process. At first sight, however, our list of seventy-two forms of learning appears to go well beyond this definition. Instead of learning, it is more concerned with the study of the bodhisattva practices proper. At this early stage, śrutamayiprajñā is founded on confidence in the words of the Buddha and is sustained by faith. In the Aṅk-ṭīkā, Vasubandhu explains that the individual types of learning do not represent learning itself, but those factors that lead to learning. He says that each factor is the cause of learning, that it has learning as cause and that it shares its own-being with wisdom. Hence, our seventy-two forms of learning stand not so much for learning in the narrow sense of the word, but point to a series of complex interactions facilitating the attainment of wisdom.

The second type of wisdom, cintāmāyiprajñā, leads to a sound understanding of the four noble truths. Chiefly, though not exclusively, concerned with meaning, it occasions a type of certainty that is founded in rational examining (yuktiṇidhyāna) wholly independent of faith or external authority. Like śrutamayiprajñā, it is dialectical in nature and of provisional value. It still pertains to the laukika domain and operates in a defiled consciousness (sāsrava vijñāna). The applicability of the cintāmāyiprajñā concept to the Bdp's list of forty-one methods of acquiring learning is ambiguous. For one thing, the terminology does not correspond; instead of founding it on cintā, the Bdp says that it springs from yoniṣo manasakāra. Vasubandhu does not give much weight to this difference, perhaps because he is aware that yoniṣo manasakāra often occurs in its verbal form manasi karoti as a synonym to cintayati.

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573. This is particularly true of the items in the latter portion of the list, starting with item no. 29. The whole list is given in the Appendix i.
574. A IV, p. 82; Kosa, vi, p. 143.
575. Aṅk-ṭīkā, TTP, 104, p. 181.3.6–4.1.
577. The Vaibhāṣīka hold that the relationship between names (nāma) and meaning (artha) is reciprocal, saying that cintāmāyiprajñā secures the meaning by means of the wording (vyākhyāna) as much as it secures the wording by means of the meaning (Kosa, vi, p. 143). This thesis is refuted by the Theravāda Abhidhamma saying that cintāmāyiprajñā arises separated from hearing (Vibh, pp. 324–5).
578. M I, p. 265.
579. The nature and relationship between the three is illustrated by a simile in Kosa (vi, p. 143). The gist of this interpretation, suggesting a temporary value for the first two types of wisdom, but explained by means of the artha/vyākhyāna pratisarana, is also found in the Samdhis (p. 105.1–26). To sum up, during the śrutamāyī phase, the bodhisattva, having turned towards deliverance, focuses on the literal meaning of the texts, but fails to realise the meaning of designations. Then, he includes the meaning of the letters into his investigation. Progressing towards liberation he is now capable of realising worldly designations. Finally, through contemplation he learns of the intentions of the texts and—indeed, independent of the notion of dharmā that pertain to liberation.

For alternative explanations of their relationship see: Msl, pp. 54.9–14, 85.3–6. According to the Msl (p. 56.4–10), however, the three types of wisdom do not supersede each other, but are jointly required in order to penetrate the basis of reality (dharmālambana).
581. Rp, p. 59.4; Daśa-bh, p. 12.21 (for further references see: Edgerton, p. 418, col. 1).
He postulates that praveśa corresponds with yoniśo manasakāra\(^{582}\) that he likens elsewhere to insight concerned with reflection (cinta)\(^{583}\), thereby practically identifying praveśa with cintā. Since, in the Bdp, yoniśo manasakāra is the method by which śrūta is acquired, a strong link between praveśa and cintā is established.\(^{584}\) The methods by which the bodhisattva acquires what he has studied are divided into forty-one practices.\(^{585}\) Of these, however, only twenty-three are included in the list of seventy-two types of learning.\(^{586}\)

This together with the actual phrasing indicates that emphasis is not so much placed on content as on progress to the state of perfect wisdom.\(^{587}\) Typically, the forty-one methods begin by taking up one of the forms of learning and discuss its effect on the training. This becomes the basis of knowledge and leads to understanding arising from reflection (manasakāra). Finally, having attained this type of understanding, the bodhisattva performs good conduct which announces bhāvanā as the last and supreme condition of wisdom.

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582. Akn-tikā, p. 181.3.2–3. Statements underpinning the identity of cintā, yoniśo manasakāra and praveśa in their relationship to śrūta are found at several places. In the Msľ, we read that śrūta and yoniśo manasakāra are jointly required for the bodhisattva to enter into the ‘character of the knowable’ (jetayālaksanapraṇeva). Elsewhere we are told that at the moment when thought associated with correct reflection (yonisomanasakārasamprayuktākāra)—corresponding to right view (samyagdṛṣṭi)—is born, mental perception (manovijñāna) that has been impregnated with learning (śrutavāsana) is being eradicated (Msľ, p. 65). Both factors are thus closely united in operations that are directed at the acquisition of transcendental cognition (lokottaracitta) and co-function in a way reminiscent of the śrūta/cintā interaction. Corroborating this interpretation, the Mpps (ii, p. 1110) underlines the conceptual proximity between manasakāra and cintāmayi on the one hand, and its link with learning (śravana) on the other hand, by pointing to their combined presence in the schooling of the bodhisattva who penetrates the dharma-character (dharmalaksana).


584. R, folio 590.6. This very thought is also expressed in the Msľ (p. 7.3–4) that says that “on the basis of learning (śrūta) correct reflection (yonisomanasakāra) arises; from that reflection emerges a knowledge that has thusness (tattva) as its object”.

585. In the Akn (p. 51.1.6–2.7) we meet with a parallel list as far as context and title are concerned. Although professing to itemise the ways of penetrating correct reflection, it contains only thirty-two elements and shows an altogether different content. Unlike the Bdp that addresses a broad selection of aspects, including all six perfections, the bodhipākyika, veneration and dedication, the Akn superimposes a distinctly cognitive-meditative orientation on its list. Virtually all of its members deal with mental penetration into seeing ‘reality as it is’ and neglect the more practical aspects by which this is brought about. These contemplative overtones led Vasaubandhu to comment that, in the Akn, the ways of penetrating correct reflection exemplify both the cintāmayi and bhāvanāmayi factors of prajñā (Akn-tikā, p. 185.4.1–4). While this assessment is doubtlessly correct and fairly unproblematic for the Akn, in the Bdp—as I shall show—the case is somewhat more ambiguous.

586. I have given a list of these items in note 13 of my translation.

587. Hedinger (1984, p. 53) describes bhāvanā as a generic term, subsuming all other meditative practices. He cites as evidence a passage from the Vism (pp. 101 ff) that draws up forty areas of application of bhāvanā and an alternative division of bhāvanā into stages that was proposed by Bhāvaviveka (Frauwallner, 1956, pp. 230 ff). Whatever the benefit of these, somewhat artificial, schemes, it is probably fair to say that to date the best and most coherent exposition of bhāvanā is still Kamalaśīla’s account in the Bhāvanākrama (MBT). On the different definitions of contemplation (bhāvanā) in Sarvāstivāda thought, see: Kośa, iv, pp. 248–50; vi, pp. 283–88; vii, pp. 15–25, 49–54, 64–66.
According to the *Bdp*, bhāvanāmāyiprajñā manifests 'good conduct' (*pratipatti*). In content, however, it is purely cognitive and consists of transcendental, non-defiled (*anāsrava*) knowledge (*jñāna*). As the chief characteristic it bears a sound understanding of *dharma*.

I have found in several sources evidence that underpins this analogy between śruta, praveśa and *pratipatti* on the one hand and śrutamāyī-, cintāmāyī- and bhāvanāmāyiprajñā on the other hand. To begin with, there is the commentary on the *Akn* that speaks of passages in the *Akn* that are similar to those in the *Bdp* as corresponding to śrutamāyī-, cintāmāyī- and bhāvanāmāyiprajñā. The *Akn-tikā* identifies quite explicitly the śruta and praveśa sections of the *Akn* with the concepts of śrutamāyī- and cintāmāyīprajñā. There are however difficulties with regard to bhāvanāmāyiprajñā. According to the commentary, 'wisdom arising from contemplation' is included in the *Akn*’s discussion of praveśa. In fact, the notion of *pratipatti* is altogether missing in the *Akn*. This raises the question as to whether *pratipatti* plays any part in the threefold scheme of wisdom or whether it is an independent ‘wisdom practice’. In order to resolve this problem, we have to consider the following factors.

First, it is important to note that *pratipatti* is appended to the *Bdp*’s exposition of praveśa. We have seen that *pratipatti* follows after the practice of śrutamāyī- and cintāmāyīprajñā and seemingly eclipses both in attainment. The wording of the *Bdp* leaves no doubt that it builds on the realisations of śrūta and cintā and brings them to their logical conclusion. This matches the characterisation of bhāvanāmāyiprajñā in the *Samdhis* and is not incompatible with the explanation in the *Kośa* which assigns a temporary value to śrutamāyī- and cintāmāyīprajñā. The variant interpretation in the *Akn-tikā* could be explained by the absence of *pratipatti* in the *Akn* which compelled Vasubhandhu to account for all three types of

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588. *Satya-s* (S), ii, pp. 485–88; *Kośa*, vi, pp. 143–44
For the *Bbh*, the definition of wisdom is broader. That is to say, it distinguishes three central areas of attainments that add up to prajñā. These are 'skill' in penetrating reality (i.e., realising that it is empty, without characteristic, etc.), 'skill' in the five classical sciences (*vidhyā*) and in three types of accumulation (i.e., benefiting, non-benefiting and neither ... nor ...) and 'skill' in benefiting sentient beings. Although listed as such only once, all three elements recur many times as the chief components throughout its discussion of prajñā and are clearly central to its understanding of prajñāpāramitā (*Bbh*, pp. 212.10–213.1).

589. *R*, folio 599.6–7
This interpretation is wholly in line with the fruits that accrue to the practitioner in the Bhāvanākrama. Citing a passage from the *Samādh*, it proposes that *pratipatti* is central to the recognition of the unbornness of *dharma* (*MBT*, i, pp. 198–99). The reasoning that lies at the heart of the bodhisattva’s insight of the non-origination of *dharma* springing from śrūta and cintā is then spelled out by Kamalaśīla on pages 199–202 (§ 10).

According to the *Mś*, śrutamāyī and cintāmāyīprajñā are realised well before the bodhisattva has embarked on the path proper. That is to say, he attains them prior to the adhimukticaryābhūmi. Bhāvanāmāyiprajñā, in contrast, becomes manifest for the first time on the adhimukticaryābhūmi, but is still subject to refinement during the remaining stages (p. 75.12–15).

590. *Akn-tikā*, p. 185.4.1–7 (translations of the relevant sections are given in my notes in chapter five).
wisdom through śrūta and cintā alone. That this caused difficulties is attested by the atypically convoluted style of explanation in his annotations on the śrūta and praveśa sections.

Second, there is a passage in the Satyasiddhiśāstra where bhāvanāmayiprajñā is defined as ‘practice in conformity with the Dharma which is applied in one’s actions and in one’s life’ (dharmānudharmapratipatti).591 A similar connection is also made in the Bhāvanākrama where pratipatti, echoing the interplay between means and wisdom, becomes the locus of the bodhisattva’s cognition.592

Third, the Dīghanikāya contains a passage that defines the factors of path-attainment (sotāpattyanga) as learning the good Dharma (saddhammasavana), correct reflection (yoniso manasakāra) and dhammānudhammapatipatti.593 These are the very components that are cited in the Bdp. What is more, the attainments of the sotāpanna consist in freedom from the view of individuality (sakkayaditthi), freedom from doubt (vicikicchā) and observance of the precept and vow (silabbataparamasa) (with the last two being merely examples of wrong view (micchāditthi))594 which are all linked with right view (sammāditthi) or wisdom (paññā).

Fourth, there is a section in the Bhāvanākrama that says that the cultivation of the three types of wisdom follows immediately after the practice of the five preliminary perfections.595 This is exactly the case in the Bdp. Although Kamalaśīla does not cite his sources—and he may have been inspired by any text—the parallels to the scheme of the Bdp are obvious.596

Having completed its discussion of the three types of wisdom, the Bdp proceeds to describe the fruits that spring from the practice of learning, reflection and contemplation. Summed up

591. Satya (S), ii, p. 486 (cf. Geiger, Pāli Dhamma, Munich, 1921, pp. 115–6)
Note also in this connection the integration of śrūta and pratipatti. On this, the Vkn says, in one place, that “bodhi is the seat of learning (śrūta) because it consolidates religious practice (pratipatti)” while it affirms elsewhere that “skill in learning results from practice” (pp. 97, 109 respectively). On the role and interaction of learning and religious practice, see: Rahula, History of Buddhism in Ceylon, Colombo, 1956, pp. 158–9 and Manorathapurāṇi (i, p. 93) which sums up the reasons for the preference that was given historically to learning in Theravāda communities.

592. MBT, ii, pp. 222.4–223.5.

593. D III, p. 227 (the fourth factor, “association with good persons” (sappurisamvvesa), is cited at a later place in the Bdp).

594. For references to the sanyojana, see: M I, p. 9; S V, p. 12; for the explanation that doubt and lack of vow observance are nothing but manifestations of wrong view, see: Dhs, pp. 75–80, 182–3 (ref. Gethin).

595. MBT, ii, p. 198.4–8
According to DPP, p. 20, the generation of the three types of wisdom is an essential feature of the samabhārāmārga. As I shall demonstrate, this is exactly the path-phase we are concerned with at present.

596. Of interest in this context is also the picture that is given to the conditions of wisdom in the Bbh. Apart from the customary factors of learning and reflection, it speaks of a power of careful consideration (pratisamkhyaśabala) and a power of contemplation (bhāvanābala). The former is said to determine the bodhisattva’s conduct in the world—promoting virtue and preventing mistakes—while the latter establishes him in infinite wisdom of the stage of uniformity (samāhitabhūmika), being the eighth stage (Bbh, p. 213.8–14).
as ‘correct vision’ (yonisodrṣī), these revolve around dharma cognition. Although not explicitly stated, the context indicates that this particular type of vision is founded on mindfulness concerning dharma (dharmasmrtyupasthāna). For, dharmasmrtyupasthāna—whose practice subsumes the other three smrtyupasthāna and corresponds to insight (vipaśyanā)597—is decisive to the perception of dharma.698 Specifically counteracting the misconception of the self (ātmaviparyāsa) (but in Mahāyāna treatises generally extended to include the empty and uniform nature of dharma599) dharmasmrtyupasthāna is intimately bound up with prajñā, itself defined as Dharma-discernment (dharmapravicaya).600

At this early stage of the path insight arising from mindfulness of dharma is still hampered by the presence of natural defilements (rāga, moha, dveṣa) and certain weak types of misconception (viparyāsa). Of inferior quality when practised on the saṃbhāramārga601, the resulting Dharma-discernment is therefore imperfect and extends only to the particular and general characteristics (svasāmānyalakṣāna) of things.602 However incomplete, it enables the bodhisattva of the Bdp to distinguish between virtuous and non-virtuous dharma.603 This faculty of differentiation is of crucial importance to the completion of the saṃbhāramārga. First, on the level of day to day conduct, it allows the bodhisattva to re-focus his efforts in accordance with his purified intention. For this re-evaluation to take place the bodhisattva engages in deep meditation in order to attain the light of wisdom (prajñāloka)—an indispensable factor for experiencing reality directly.604 Second, in the long-term, recognition of virtue is necessarily a precondition for the planting of the roots of virtue that lead to deliverance (mokṣabhāgiya kuśalamūla). As their accumulation lies at the very heart of the training on the saṃbhāramārga, adherence to kuśaladharma and abandoning of akuśaladharma assumes immense importance.605
When the bodhisattva has thus identified dharma according to their general features and accumulated roots of virtue, he embarks on the prayogamarga and enters into meditation in order to penetrate true reality. In the scheme of the Bdp, he undertakes initially to free himself from those obstructions (āvarana) that threaten to impede his practice. Following the ancient path model, he achieves this goal through the four perfect efforts (samyakprahāna). The practice of the perfect efforts takes place immediately after the smṛtyupasthāna and signals the bodhisattva’s entrance into the path of application at the mūrdhan level of the nirvedhabhāgya. The function of the samyakprahāna is twofold; to cultivate skilful dharma and to abandon gross obstacles that impede the unfolding of perfect wisdom. Since the Bdp does not specify which obstructions are overcome through the samyakprahāna at this stage, it is difficult to ascertain on textual grounds alone whether it refers exclusively to the kleśāvarana or also includes the jñeyāvarana. But according to general opinion it is only the obstructions of the defilements that are addressed here. Their elimination prepares for the transition from the worldly (laukika) to the transcendent path (lokottaramarga), which is heralded by the attainment of right view (samyagdrsti) and cleanses the entry into the light of the doctrine (dharmālokamukha).

The acquisition of right view is dependent on two causes. First, the bodhisattva must learn...
to listen to other people’s statements.\textsuperscript{613} Recognising the danger of pride to those who are isolated from the Dharma the \textit{Bdp} regards congenial listening to the words of others as a factor stimulating liberation by itself.\textsuperscript{614} Second, the bodhisattva has to reflect correctly on the contents of what he has heard. Since failure to do so inevitably leads to misconduct on the path, the \textit{Bdp} places correct reflection and listening to other people’s statements on the \textit{prayogamārga}.\textsuperscript{615} As a methodological prerequisite, \textit{sruta} and \textit{cintā} are not restricted to the path of equipment, but also figure also on the path of application.

Having dealt with methodology, the \textit{Bdp} defines the actual contents of \textit{prayogamārga}. Perhaps in numerical analogy to the \textit{nirvedhabhāgiya}, it gives as its principal components correct practice (\textit{yoniśo prayoga}), correct vision (\textit{yoniśo dṛṣṭi}), correct penetration (\textit{yoniśo praveśa}) and correct speech (\textit{yoniśo vāc}).\textsuperscript{616} Of these four, correct practice and penetration serve as causes to the attainment of \textit{samyagdṛṣṭi}, while correct vision and speech represent its conditions.

\textsuperscript{613} This concept is not new to the Mahāyāna but occurs already in the nikāya as the two conditions bringing about right view (\textit{M I}, p. 294; \textit{A I}, p. 87). Both factors are fundamental to a correct perception of the Dharma and in conjunction with wisdom arising from learning, reflection and contemplation stand at the very core of a monk’s cognitive progress. This point is fully scrutinised in the \textit{Nett} (p. 8, trsl. Gethin): “The teacher or a fellow practitioner in the position of a teacher teaches someone \textit{Dhamma}. Having heard this \textit{Dhamma} he gains confidence. Therein, whatever is investigation, energy, consideration, examination, this is wisdom produced by hearing. Whatever is investigation, consideration, examination, contemplation in dependence on what is thus heard, this is wisdom produced by reflection. The knowledge that arises at the stage of seeing or the stage of development for one engaged in bringing to mind by means of these two kinds of wisdom is wisdom produced by development. From the utterance of another there is wisdom produced by hearing; from appropriate bringing to mind undertaken individually there is wisdom produced by reflection; the knowledge that arises both as a result of the utterance of another and as a result of appropriate bringing to mind undertaken individually is wisdom produced by development.”

In the Mahāyāna, the role of these two factors became integrated into the respective visions of the path. For Yogācāra followers, statements of others (\textit{paratā ca ghoṣah}) and correct inner reflection (\textit{adhyātman ca yonīsah manasadakāraḥ})—being also the cause to right view—perfume (\textit{bhāvayanti}) either knowledge springing from learning (\textit{śrotavijñāna}), mental perception (\textit{manovijñāna}) or both. In due course, at the arising of correct reflection, both types of knowledge vanish and are replaced by \textit{lokottara} thinking pertaining to right view and leading to transcendental purification (\textit{Mṣg}, p. 65).

A rather different interpretation of the term \textit{parato ghoso} was introduced by Peter Masefield. According to Masefield (1986, p. 50), \textit{parato ghoso} does not refer so much to the worldly realm of instructions from teachers, but is an expression indicating a channel of communication between the beyond and religious experience. Translating it as ‘sound from the beyond’, Masefield suggests that this type of transcendental sound is channelled to the śrāvaka only by the Buddha (and his closest followers), implying that right view or religious truth is wholly dependent on the disclosure of this sound for unfolding. This interpretation of the term \textit{parato ghoso} has been disputed, not least because it fails to take account of several other contexts where it quite clearly does not carry this metaphysical connotation. For a discussion, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 424–25.

\textsuperscript{614} R, folio 604.7.

\textsuperscript{615} By placing the focus on \textit{sravana} and \textit{yonīśo manasadakāra} as factors promoting right view, the \textit{Bdp} underlines once again its conceptual proximity to a proposition in the \textit{Mppō} (ii, p. 1110) according to which it is these two elements that have greatest bearing on the generation of wisdom.

\textsuperscript{616} R, folio 606.5, 606.6, 608.7, 610.1 respectively.
In the true spirit of Mahāyāna ontology, the Bdp states that correct practice is based on recognition of the sameness of all dharma. Thus, if fully accomplished, correct practice does not manifest any verbal or physical activity but unfolds in non-practice.\textsuperscript{617} Conceived as practice free from obstruction, doubt or predication, it steadies the roots of virtue accumulated on the saṃbhāramārga and brings their development to a high-point—an event close to the mūrdhan phase of the nirvedabhāgiya.\textsuperscript{618} Next, as if to mirror the arrangement at the beginning of the chapter where yoniṣo darśana followed on śrūta, yoniṣo manasakāra and pratipatti, the Bdp specifies the concept of ‘vision of all dharma’.\textsuperscript{619} Above all, this constitutes insight into dharma-sameness.\textsuperscript{620} Then, taking up the notion sarvadharmaśamatā, the Bdp develops a vision of reality that—sustained by the conviction of the non-arising of dharma—precludes dharma-predication of any kind and effects withdrawal from path-activity.\textsuperscript{621} Once again, it is possible to see parallels to the nirvedabhāgiya scheme. For a bodhisattva who enters into its first phase, called uṣmagata, reality loses much of its ‘true objectivity’ as he begins to grasp (albeit only incompletely at his early stage) the empty and non-existent character (svabhāva) of external worldly phenomena.\textsuperscript{622}

While the notions of correct practice and correct seeing are well expounded, their mutual relationship is unclear. Echoing conventional perception that practice (prayoga) precedes seeing (darśana), correct seeing is said to be based on correct practice.\textsuperscript{623} However, since correct practice becoming non-practice presupposes recognition of dharma-sameness—the very foundation of correct seeing—one cannot help but to conclude that practice and seeing are supportive of each other.

As if to accentuate this reciprocity, in correct penetration and speech the order of their relationship is reversed. That is to say, by proposing that penetration constitutes the basis of correct speech, the cognitive element is placed ahead of the practical aspect and becomes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{617} R, folio 605.7.
\item \textsuperscript{618} DPP, p. 35.
\item \textsuperscript{619} R, folio 601.3.
\item \textsuperscript{620} R, folio 612.4-6.
\item \textsuperscript{621} R, folio 607.3-608.2
\item This section, being repeated almost verbatim at a later stage, is of considerable importance for the understanding of the argument, since it indicates that correct practice/correct vision and correct penetration/correct speech have equal influence on the bodhisattva’s cognition. That is to say, both enable him to see dharma in accordance with reality, to attain non-seeing, and finally to enter into the certainty of truth.
\item \textsuperscript{622} Siddhi, pp. 578-9.
\item \textsuperscript{623} See, for instance: R, folio 606.5, 612.5.
\end{itemize}
essential to its occurrence.624

Correct penetration consists of two important components.625 First, there is the cognitive element that allows the bodhisattva to penetrate phenomenal existence. This springs from perfect mental quietude (śamatha), insight (vipaśyanā) and discrimination (vikalpa)626, and unfolds before the bodhisattva’s eyes a world that is impermanent, dependently originating, empty, signless and wishless. Yet, by virtue of his commitment to universal welfare—the second element of penetration—this newly won understanding, although alone sufficient to guarantee entry into nirvāṇa, does not tempt him to abandon samsāra.627 On the contrary, he assumes rebirth in the kāmadhātu, cherishes the Doctrine, develops compassion and cultivates skilful means.628 Accommodating in equal measure cognition and compassion, correct penetration is thus perfectly balanced.

If this binary disposition is juxtaposed to the nirvedhabhāgiya, parallels to the kṣānti phase immediately spring to mind. At this stage, having shed all misconception concerning the self (as subject) and dharma (as object) of perception, the bodhisattva is no longer subject to low rebirths; yet he continues his endeavour for deeper understanding and greater welfare in the world. This postponement, that involves trusting accepting the validity of the noble truths without further scrutiny, constitutes an important crossroad, since it determines the practitioner’s allocation to the gotra of the śrāvaka, pratyekabuddhas or buddhas.629

The fourth constituent, correct speech, is acquired through the interplay of the factors that prepare right vision (samyagdrsti). Presumably it is selected for its dual function; reflecting personal maturity and representing the principal means of conversion, correct speech is described as congenial, well-founded and in perfect harmony with true reality. By characterising

\[624. \text{R, folio 608.6–7.} \]
\[625. \text{Compare these with the four components of the nirvedhabhāgiya (Abhidh-sam (R), p. 105; Kośa, vi, pp. 169–178).} \]
\[626. \text{R, folio 608.7–609.1} \]
\[\text{Śamatha and vipaśyanā are of key importance to the psychological processes that mark prayoga cognition—and indeed beyond. While śamatha has already occurred on the saṃbhāramārga, its impact is still felt on the path of application as its fruit becomes manifest on the prayogamārga. Vipaśyanā in contrast, representing the bodhisattva’s cognitive faculties, although directed at the very same vision of reality does not arise prior to the path of application (DPP, p. 34). Most sources agree, however, that beyond the early path phases, śamatha and vipaśyanā operate as a syzygy. Constituting the perfect path if practised jointly, they are best understood as one-pointedness of mind (cittāikāgratā) observing the nine stations of mind (cittasthiti) and exact analytical investigation of reality (bhūtāpratyevksā), (MBT, iii, p. 3; Śrāv-bh, pp. 363–5). For their manifestations on the lokottara consciousness, see; Msg, pp. 167, 171. Their role on the laukikamārga during the four basic dhyāna is explained in: MBT, iii, pp. 15–17.} \]
\[627. \text{R, folio 609.1–4.} \]
\[628. \text{R, folio 609.7–610.1.} \]
\[629. \text{Kośa, vi, p. 175.} \]
correct speech as speech of reality and truth, the *Bdp* inspires once again a comparison with the *nirvedhabhāgiya* model where the last phase, called *laukikāgradharma*, is marked by the direct perception of the characteristics of the noble truths. As in the *Bdp*, this attainment is based on the four *pratisaraṇa*. It issues from unobstructed meditation (*ānantaryasamādhi*) but still within the *laukika* domain and prevails independently of sense perception. Confirming the *laukika* status, the *Bdp* says that at this stage, even if the bodhisattva is accomplished in penetration and speech, his vision lacks clear insight (*vidāraṇā*) and he is still subject to discursive thinking (*vikalpa*) like ordinary beings.

To rid himself of the residues of mistaken mental apperception, the bodhisattva embarks on the *darśanamārga*. Heralding entry in the *lokottara* phase of the path, it consists of a series of thought moments no longer concerned with the general characteristics of *dharma*, but with the four noble truths.

In the *Bdp*, entry into this path-phase is announced by stating that persons who accomplish either correct practice and correct vision or correct penetration and correct speech are assured of the prospect of vision of *dharma*. As already implied, this type of vision is transcendental by nature and echoes the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*:

“What is looking at all *dharma* in accordance with reality? It is non-seeing.
Non-seeing is an expression for unborn. Unborn is an expression for unarisen.
What is unarisen? It is an expression for invisibility.”

For the *Bdp*, correct vision is not specifically linked with the abandoning (*praḥāṇa*) of defilements or with patience (*kṣānti*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) concerning the noble truths, but it accrues from right vision (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) for those who penetrate the sameness of practices and attainment. Yet, the fundamental psychological experience that marks the progress through the thought-moments of the *darśanamārga* follows the *Abhidharma* accounts rather

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630. *Siddhi*, pp. 575, 581; *DPP*, p. 36.
632. R, folio 611.4, 608.7–609.1
   The presence of *vikalpa* would suggest that the bodhisattva has not yet reached the *darśanamārga*, but dwells still on the *prayogamārga*.
633. *Kośa*, vi, p. 290; *Abhidh-d*, p. 362; *Amṛtar* (B), p. 74; *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 107. For a discussion of the various types of *darśanamārga*, that is the *tatvadarśanamārga*—a path that is characterised by non-discursive knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*)—and the two categories of the *laksanamārga*, that is *avyavasthitasatyadarśanamārga* or the *vyavasthitasatyadarśanamārga*, see: *Siddhi*, pp. 588–600.
635. *Kośa*, vi, p. 183.
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closely. The Bdp describes a vision of reality where the practitioner sheds all misconceptions (viparyāsa), especially the view of individuality (satkāyadrṣṭi)636, and acquires a direct comprehension (abhisamaya) of conditioned reality.637 His wisdom becomes unobstructed (andrava) and he identifies the general characteristics of dharma. He realises that the nature of dharma is impure and yet congruent with nirvāṇa, that dharma are (like persons) without self and utterly indistinguishable.638 In spite of the removal of all tendencies to passion (anusaya) and understanding conditioned existence, he is still subject to the laws of samsāra since the path of vision—merely eliminating those defilements abandoned by seeing—leaves countless innate defilements (sahajaklesa) untouched.

In order to eliminate these, the bodhisattva embarks on the next path-phase—the path of contemplation (bhāvanāmārga).639 The moment of entry into the bhāvanāmārga marks a critical threshold in the bodhisattva’s career-stages. For, immediately on entry the bodhisattva penetrates the certainty of truth (samyaktvaniyādnti)—the first fruit of religious life (srāmanyaphala)—that guarantees irreversible progression to liberation.640 As this attainment, drawing on cognition acquired during the first fifteen thought-moments of darśanamārga, marks admission into the fold of noble persons (āryapudgala),641 it is the clearest indication yet that the Bdp’s bodhisattva has advanced to the transcendental domain.642 The exact entry-level, however, is left undetermined, since (at least among the Sravaka) penetration into the certainty of truth may lead to a variety of spiritual conditions, depending on the degree of

637. The various types of direct comprehension (abhisamaya) that occur on the darśanamārga are discussed in the Siddhi (pp. 601–605).
640. This is the view of the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda school (Bareau, 1955, pp. 140, 212). Mahāsāṃghika and Mahīsāsaka sources refute the notion of the irreversibility of the śrotapañna (Bareau, 1955, pp. 66, 185).

Besides the lokottara bhāvanāmārga, which is the standard level of cultivation (tracing the career of the śrāvaṇa, sakṛdgaṁin and anāgāmin), the texts speak also of a laukika bhāvanāmārga. This path is impure and inferior to its lokottara counterpart as it does not progress through ‘reflection on the nature of things’ (tattvamanasakāra) and the person on it fails to grasp the general characteristics of dharma. But it has still considerable preparatory value as the Buddha has demonstrated. Being an ordinary person when he approached the Bodhi-tree, the Buddha had previously eradicated all innate passions of the world by laukika meditation. All that was left to him therefore was to comprehend the four noble truths in their sixteen aspects and to destroy a set of nine innate passions linked with the naivasamjñāvatana and bhavāra that he could not eradicate on the laukika bhāvanāmārga level (for explanation of this restriction, see: Kośa, vi, p. 233). Applying to each of them the prahānamārga and vimuktimārga thought, he then reached bodhi in thirty-four thought-moments (Kośa, ii, p. 206; vi, p. 177). The problem with the attainment of the fruits of the laukika bhāvanāmārga is that its disconnection from the klesa is only temporary (Kośa, vi, p. 233) and leads, unless carried further, only to rebirth among the Brahma gods. (For further detail, see: HIB, pp. 617–8; Kośa, vi, pp. ix–xi; Abhidh-sam (R), pp. 110–113).
residual attachment.\textsuperscript{643} For the \textit{Bdp} the proposition of non-regression would seem to indicate that its location on the path is rather more advanced, since true irreversibility does not occur before the eighth stage.\textsuperscript{644}

Having introduced the \textit{bhāvanāmārga}, the \textit{Bdp} spells out the attainments that accrue through repeated meditation (\textit{punah punarāmukhikaraṇa}). The \textit{bhāvanāmārga} of the bodhisattva, agreeing in content with the śrāvaka model, is characterised primarily by the destruction of hitherto intact defilements. Based on wisdom and affecting innate defilements in the \textit{kāma}-, \textit{rūpa-} and \textit{arūpyadhatu}, the bodhisattva is no longer linked with any conditioned \textit{dharma}, but permanently emancipated from the fetters of worldly phenomena.\textsuperscript{645} He has dispelled practically all obstacles constituted by defilement (\textit{kleśāvaraṇa}) including adventitious bonds\textsuperscript{646} and rises above conditioned activity to pursue his career beyond the parameter of good and evil.\textsuperscript{647}

\begin{quote}
"He is emancipated from the eight worldly conditions. He is emancipated from the twenty secondary defilements including self-conceit, grave conceit and perverted conceit. … He is emancipated from all lowly and wicked \textit{dharma}. He is emancipated from the activity of all evil, including contentious and defiled activity, activity of the aggregates, activity of the lord of death and activity of the Evil One … He is emancipated from avarice and generosity, morality and immorality, patience and malice, vigour and indolence, meditation and disquietude, wisdom and folly, furtherance and impediments of the perfections, knowledge and nescience."
\end{quote}

Prepared now by the destruction of the defilements through direct comprehension, he gradually eliminates the obstacles to knowledge (\textit{jñeyāvaraṇa}).\textsuperscript{648} Having cast aside all heterodox views based on the belief of the self, he relinquishes discursive thinking and rejects the dichotomies of classification.\textsuperscript{649}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{643} The actual entry level is determined by the degree to which he has eliminated the concomitants of desire. For details, see: \textit{Abhidh-sam (R)}, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{644} \textit{Daśa-bh}, p. 71.12; \textit{Bbh}, p. 290.21 (cf. p. 235.18); \textit{Msl}, p. 176.22; \textit{Mvu}, i, pp. 1.3, 63.13–14.
\textsuperscript{645} R, folio 613.4.
\textsuperscript{646} R, folio 613.5, 614.2.
\textsuperscript{647} R, folio 614.3–6.
\textsuperscript{648} \textit{Siddhi}, pp. 610–11.
\textsuperscript{649} R, folio 614.3–7.
\end{footnotes}
“He is emancipated from all multiplicity, including multiplicity of buddha-fields, buddhas, sentient beings and *dharma*. He is emancipated from conditioned reflection of all sentient beings, including nescience, knowledge, discursive insight, conventional and absolute truth. He is emancipated from the bases of all reflection, thought and consciousness; including perseverance [in] formlessness, signlessness, causelessness and unconditioned wisdom.”

While not very different in meaning and content from the *bhāvanāmārga* of the srāvaka, there is divergence on the factors that prompt its attainment. For the srāvaka, the *bhāvanāmārga* represents the abandonment of defilements through the vision of the noble truths.650 As we have seen, in the *Bdp* the bodhisattva’s rejection of conditioned existence is not so much due to the systematic analysis of the noble truths, as by recognition of the sameness of *dharma* through Perfect Wisdom.651

*Perfect Wisdom and Skill*

With the end of the *bhāvanāmārga* section we have come to an important break in the *Bdp*’s exposition of *prajñāpāramitā*. So far, much of chapter eleven followed the ancient model of the srāvaka career. In the remainder of the chapter (which constitutes approximately seventy-five percent of its overall length) the scheme of progress is not immediately evident. That is to say, although not without a sense of order—all but three out of eighteen subsections show clear traits of systematic arrangement—no principle emerges that would establish an *overall* connection between the various practices. For this we shall have to turn to other treatises on the bodhisattva.

The content of this section is defined by eighteen types of ‘skill’. Through the practice of ‘skill’ the bodhisattva attains an increasingly refined understanding of reality that culminates eventually in the acquisition of wisdom. The various types of ‘skill’ indicate the practices that play a role in this process. They include, for example, the *pratisarana*, *pratisamvid*, *bodhipākṣika dharma*, *samatha* and *vipaśyanā* and *punya*- and *jñānasambhāra*. The overriding

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purpose of these practices, and therefore also the purpose of 'skill', is to investigate the nature of reality. This investigation manifests different points of emphasis and proceeds from various angles, depending on the nature of the individual practices. 'Skill' in skandha, dhātu, āyatana and satya, for instance, aims to destroy the belief in a self (ātmadrsti), whereas 'skill' in vipaśyanā is designed to reveal to the bodhisattva the non-existence of dharma (dharmanairatmya).

In spite of this topical fragmentation, all eighteen 'skills' share the same objective, namely, the attainment of wisdom. In the Bdp, wisdom is defined as 'skill' in all dharma. The method by which such 'skill' is acquired is called 'discerning wisdom' (prajñāpravicaya) and comprises all the practices that are included in the various types of 'skill'. In essence, 'skill' represents therefore the means of investigation through which the bodhisattva accomplishes Perfect Wisdom.

The practice of 'skill' (kauśalya) is not particular to the Bdp but is found in numerous treatises on the path. It occurs in the Añ, Dbh, Lkdh, Prṇ, Rtm, Samdhis, Bbh, Śrotabhūmi, Śbh, Prbh, Mvś and Vism. Although there is some overlapping in contents between the

652. R, folio 615.5–7
Already in the nikāya, we note a close connection between discernment (usually Dharma-discernment) and wisdom (M III, p. 85; S V, p. 111). Taken up by the abhidhamma literature (Dhs, p. 11), it developed into one of the chief characteristics of wisdom to appear besides the traditional factors of 'knowledge of the destruction of the impurities' (āsravaksayajñāna) and 'knowledge of their non-arising' (anupādajñāna); e.g., Kośa, vi, p. 240; Siddhi, p. 313; MBT, iii, pp. 14–15. See also, Mppś, ii, pp. 1101–1104.

653. Note that this interpretation is at odds with the explanation of 'skill' in the Alm-tikā (pp. 194.5.5–195.1.2). Here, we read that 'skill' is not so much a tool of investigation as a designator of the objects (ālambana) or things (vastu) to be understood by wisdom.

654. The Bbh (pp. 308.9–309.6) distinguishes ten kinds of 'skill'. These are (1) 'skill' in means in order to remove hostility in angry beings, (2) 'skill' causing ordinary beings to enter (the path), (3) 'skill' causing beings who have entered (the path) to ripen, (4) 'skill' in delivering sentient beings who have been ripened, (5) 'skill' in worldly sāstras, (6) 'skill' in discerning the arising of mistaken observance in moral conduct of commitments, (7) 'skill' in the unsurpassed resolve, (8) 'skill' in the Śrīvakayāna, (9) 'skill' in the Pratyekabuddhayāna, (10) 'skill' in the Mahāyāna. Altogether, these produce the five cardinal actions of a bodhisattva. By the first four types of 'skill', the bodhisattva achieves his own benefit and that of his fellow beings. The fifth 'skill' renders him invincible. The sixth 'skill' establishes him in the vow-observance. By the seventh type of 'skill' he accomplishes all future objectives and by the eighth, ninth and tenth types of 'skill', the bodhisattva teaches the Dharma in accordance with the faculties, lineages and resolutions of the people whom he tries to convert. These objectives are clearly quite different from those postulated in the Mvś or Bdp and do not appear to be connected to their types of 'skill'.

Compare these lists with the rather different enumeration that is found in the Ratnameghasūtra (35, p. 182.5.1–3), distinguishing the following ten kinds of 'skill' of bodhisattvas: (1) 'skill' in the non-existence of a self (anātman), (2) 'skill' in the ripening of deeds (karmavipāka), (3) 'skill' in the conditioned (samskrta), (4) 'skill' in the flow of existence (samsārasanata), (5) 'skill' in the transitoriness of existence (samsārinivṛtta), (6) 'skill' in the Śrīvakayāna, (7) 'skill' in the Pratyekabuddhayāna, (8) 'skill' in the Mahāyāna, (9) 'skill' in refraining from evil deeds (mārakarmatāya), (10) 'skill' in non-regressing wisdom (anirṛtyantaprajñā). An alternative sixfold list is given in the Samdhis (pp. 116.15–119.4), distinguishing (1) 'skill' in the production of the thought, (2) 'skill' in the duration of thought, (3) 'skill' in the destruction of thought, (4) 'skill' in the increase of thought, (5) 'skill' in the decrease of thought, (6) 'skill' in means.

The Vism (pp. 128–136) lists ten kinds of 'skill' in absorption (appanākosalā). These include (1) 'skill' in
various expositions of ‘skill’, I have not discovered two lists that match exactly. In most
texts, the purpose of the enumerations of ‘skill’ is mainly organisational, that is, to break up the
(bodhisattva) practice into smaller units in order to make the discussion more managable.
The topics that are included in the discussions of ‘skill’ vary greatly, ranging from very
general themes (such as ‘skill’ in the three vehicles) over specific bodhisattva practices (such
as ‘skill’ in liberating sentient beings) to practices of cognition (such as ‘skill’ in the non-
existence of a self). In spite of this diversity there are some types of ‘skill’ that appear in
most lists. Above all, these are ‘skill’ in skandha, dhātu, āyatana, satya and pratityasamutpāda.
These five ‘skills’ figure in the Bdp, Akn, Prn and in all commentarial discussions of ‘skill’.
Generally, they occur in the order in which I have cited them and stand at the beginning of
the exposition of ‘skill’. The factor that ties these five types of ‘skill’ together is that all of
them deal with cognition and introduce the practitioner to the futility of the belief in a self.
They are included in sections that discuss the nature of reality or form a part of the expositions
of wisdom (prajñā) and knowledge (jñāna).

This applies also to the Bdp. In addition to the ‘skills’ of skandha, dhātu, āyatana, satya
and pratityasamutpāda the Bdp includes in its exposition of prajñā ‘skill’ in pratisamvid,
pratisaraṇa, punyasamabhāra and jñānasambhāra, smṛtyupasthāna, bodhyāṅga,
āryāśṭāṃgamārga, śamatha and vipāsyanā, sanyakprahāṇa, indriya, bala, ekayānāmārga
and dharma. ‘Skill’ in each of these practices contributes to the attainment of wisdom. While
the content of the practices follows mostly well-established traditions of thought, the exact
use to which they are put in the Bdp is less obvious. As the text itself contains practically no
clues that would explain their role in the training of wisdom I have turned for explication to
exegetical writings.

The most instructive account of the practice of ‘skill’ is found in the Madhyāntavibhāga. In
chapter three, entitled ‘Tattvaparipṛcchā’, the Madhyāntavibhāga discusses ‘skill’ in skandha,
dhātu, āyatana, pratityasamutpāda, sthānāsthāna, indriya, adhvan, satya, yāna and
samskṛtasamskrta dharma. According to the commentary, all ten types of ‘skill’ contribute
cleansing the basis, (2) ‘skill’ in maintaining balanced faculties, (3) ‘skill’ in the sign, (4) ‘skill’ in timely
exertion, (5) ‘skill’ in timely restraint, (6) ‘skill’ in timely encouragement, (7) ‘skill’ in timely equipoise,
(8) ‘skill’ in avoiding poorly concentrated persons, (9) ‘skill’ in cultivating concentrated persons, (10)
‘skill’ in resoluteness upon concentration. These form part of the general description of the development
of samādhi, as they serve to describe the general mental and physical attitudes conducive to concentration
and do not appear not to be related to the ten ‘skills’ cited in the Bdp, Rtm, Mvs or Bbh.

According to the commentary, all ten types of ‘skill’ contribute

655. Mvs (N), pp. 44–49.
Note that with the eight types of ‘skill’ of the Akn the Mvs shares all but two kinds, viz., ‘skill’ in the
inevitable/impossible and ‘skill’ in faculties. These are exactly the two items by which the list in the Mvs
to the destruction of the belief in a self (ātmadṛṣṭi) and have important bearing on the understanding of reality.\textsuperscript{656} Each of the ‘skills’ addresses one particular aspect of the belief in a self. The \textit{Mvś} reduces the belief in a self to ten component parts. In an order corresponding to the ten ‘skills’ these are: (1) the illusion of oneness (ekatvagrāha); (2) the illusion of causality (hetutvagrāha); (3) the illusion of the experiencer (bhoktṛtvagrāha); (4) the illusion of the agent (kartrtvagrāha); (5) the illusion of independent action (svatantragrāha); (6) the illusion of dominion (adhipatitvagrāha); (7) the illusion of permanence (nityatvagrāha); (8) the illusion of the support of defilement and purity (samklistavyavadānatvagrāha); (9) the illusion of the meditator (yogitvagrāha); (10) the illusion of an entity that is either released or bound (amuktamuktatvagrāha).\textsuperscript{657} Of these ten illusions, number 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 and 10 are relevant to our study of the \textit{Bdp} since they are destroyed through forms of ‘skill’ that are also found in the \textit{Bdp}. They are ‘skill’ in \textit{skandha}, dhātu, ayatana, pratītyasamutpāda, satya and samskṛtasamskṛta dharma.\textsuperscript{658}

According to the \textit{Mvś}, ‘skill’ in aggregates prevents the bodhisattva from falling prey to the view that there exists a single reality—an ātman—in the five \textit{skandha}.\textsuperscript{659} The \textit{Akn-ṭīkā}, commenting on a parallel passage in the \textit{Akn}, corroborates this view through a list of examples that illustrate the empty, non-substantial nature of the aggregates.\textsuperscript{660} Like the \textit{Bdp}, in order to broaden its explanation, the \textit{Mvś} peruses the aggregates in relation to the world and draws the conclusion that it also shares the same characteristics of manifold conditions (anekatva), compression (abhisamkṣepa) and divisions (pariccheda).\textsuperscript{661}

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\textsuperscript{656} \textit{Mvś (N)}, p. 37, 10b.5, p. 40.1–2.

\textsuperscript{657} \textit{Mvś (N)}, p. 44.14a.1–2.

\textsuperscript{658} I ignore here the fact that the \textit{Bdp} cites also ‘skill’ in faculties (indriya) among its eighteen factual types of ‘skill’ (R, folio 673.3–75.2) as this has practically nothing in common with the \textit{Mvś}’s ‘skill’ in indriya. I have discussed the implications of this nominal parallelism below. For a definition of kaushalya/kausalya, see: Šrāvakamāndala, p. 303.2.8–5.2.

\textsuperscript{659} \textit{Mvś (N)}, p. 45.14a.6–14b.1.

\textsuperscript{660} For the context in which these are set, see my notes to the translation of chapter eleven.

\textsuperscript{661} \textit{Mvś (N)}, p. 45.6–7.
Skill in elements is important for the destruction of the belief in a self, since it removes the notion of causality. The fault with causality lies in imagining that a self exercises true causal activity by bringing the various dhātu into existence. In order to repudiate this misconception, the Mvś likens dhātu (divided into internal dhātu, external dhātu and cognition-dhātu) to seeds (bijā) alternating simultaneously as cause and effect. Although the problem of the origin of the bija’s potency to generate is not addressed, ‘skill’ in elements eliminates the misconception that the self is capable of causal activity by removing agency from its realm to that of karma. This interpretation corresponds with the treatment of ‘skill’ in dhātu in the Bdp. Postulating that the elements do not bear any characteristic (lakṣaṇa) by which they would be established as independently existing, the Bdp points out that their sameness is rooted in insubstantiality and non-becoming. Clearly, things that lack substantiality and becoming, being neither conditioned nor unconditioned, are not subject to any causal agency.

Roughly comparable with the illusion of causality is the illusion of agency. Appearing in the Mvś in the fourth place, it also addresses causal misconception, except that causality is limited to cognition, whereas the illusion of an agency embraces all types of effects. Both Bdp and Mvś indicate that the mistaken belief in a self as agent is best met by ‘skill’ in the law of dependent co-origination. More interested in eradicating the misconception that an agent persists in experience than in the twelve members, both works propound that there is no independent agency to trigger any operation outside ignorance, superficial reflection and the causal series itself.

Having discussed causality, the Mvś proceeds to the question of experience. It argues that all experience—whether based in the present life or linked with future retribution—cannot be rooted in a self but is conducted through sensefields. For the Bdp, however, ‘skill’ in sensefields implies, above all, recognition of the sameness of all sensefields. This assumption

663. For an ingenious attempt to solve this problem, see: Siddhi, pp. 102–9.
664. The Akn-tikā, says that the meaning of dhātu corresponds with the meaning of holding characteristics and has the meaning of cause—with khaṃs, bija and dbyins being synonyms for ‘cause’ giving rise to the powers, etc., of the Tathāgata (p. 195.5.2–4).
665. In the Bdp, ‘skill’ in pratityasamutpāda is placed last in the ten skills. The rationale for this positioning is obvious, since penetration of dependent co-origination figures among the factors signaling the attainment of wisdom. In a sense, it brings the discussion of prajñā to its logical conclusion, followed only by ‘skill’ in dharma. On contextual grounds I have decided to treat it alongside the first four types of ‘skill’, although it will figure again in my discussion of the Bdp’s path scheme.
667. R, folio 682.6–683.3; Mvś (N), p. 45.14b.4–6; cf. Kośa, iii, p. 56.
668. Mvś (N), p. 45.14b.3.
reduces discrimination between virtue and non-virtue \textit{ad absurdum} and prompts the bodhisattva to discourage others from sensefield activity since it only increases mental instability. Even though he identifies the sensefields for what they are—and so abides unperturbed and unaffected by worldly experience—the bodhisattva persists in the path experience.\footnote{That is to say, he draws them away from the ten ignoble paths of \textit{samsāra} (\textit{Akn-tikā}, pp. 197.5.6–203.4.8; \textit{Msl}, p. 124.3–15).}

So far, we have had little difficulty in interpreting the \textit{Bdp}'s ‘skills’ in terms of the \textit{Mvś}’s thought on the belief in a self. The very nature of the objects under discussion—\textit{skandha}, \textit{dhātu} and \textit{āyatana}—reveals this purpose. Matters become less clear when we investigate ‘skill’ in \textit{satya} for its influence on the illusion of the belief in a self. According to the \textit{Mvś}, ‘skill’ in truth refers above all to the four noble truths.\footnote{\textit{Mvś (N)}, p. 47.15b.3.} This view is also expressed in the \textit{Bdp} where four out of six passages deal with the noble truths.\footnote{The passages that do not touch on the concerns of the four noble truths investigate the relationship of the various levels of experience, that is to say, conventional truth (\textit{samvṛtisatya}), absolute truth (\textit{paramārthasatya}) and the truth of characteristic (\textit{laksanasatya}). As these sections have already been subject to scrutiny, I shall refrain from discussing them again. For interpretations of the concept of the three truths in Buddhism, see: Wayman, 1980, pp. 220–21; Freeman, 1991, pp. 97–115; Sasaki, 1964–5, pp. 236–251; Pagel, 1990, pp. 8–10. Note, however, that in the introductory passage to ‘skill’ in \textit{satya} it is the four noble truths that are explicitly cited as the object of this type of ‘skill’ (\textit{R}, folio 620.4–6).} Besides an interest in the truths, these five passages have one shared concern. They assume the insubstantiality of the person and attempt to demonstrate that the self has no effect on the validity of the noble truths. At first we learn that knowledge of suffering is to see that the aggregates are unborn, that suffering is without origination and destruction, indeed that all \textit{dharma} are uniform.\footnote{\textit{R}, folio 620.6–621.2.} The aggregates themselves—though they are the basis of truth-perception—are in fact empty, unborn and in a complete state of cessation.\footnote{\textit{R}, folio 622.1–6.}

Looking at these propositions in conjunction with the belief in a self based on the illusion of support of defilement and purity (\textit{saṃkliṣṭavyavadānatvagrāha}), the connection between ‘skill’ in \textit{satya} and the doctrine of non-self becomes obvious. Common (defiled) perception would require purity and defilement—the two cardinal facets of the noble truths—to possess a support or subject which could be defiled or pure.\footnote{\textit{Hsien yang sheng chiao lun} (T 31, p. 545c; trsl. O'Brien): “Because the fruit of one’s past deeds inclines one to practice evil deeds we imagine that there is someone who is defiled. Because it inclines one to practice right deeds, we imagine that there is someone who is purified. But this illusion comes from not understanding the four noble truths.”} The significance of ‘skill’ in \textit{satya} lies not only in the perception of defilement (\textit{duḥkha/samudaya})\footnote{\textit{Kośa}, vi, p. 122.} and purity (\textit{nirādha/mārga})\footnote{\textit{Hsien yang sheng chiao lun} (T 31, p. 545c; trsl. O'Brien): “Because the fruit of one’s past deeds inclines one to practice evil deeds we imagine that there is someone who is defiled. Because it inclines one to practice right deeds, we imagine that there is someone who is purified. But this illusion comes from not understanding the four noble truths.”}
but—as shown by the Bdp—it rejects also the need for a self to sustain their presence. Knowledge of truth provides a self-contained explanation of their arising and destruction, revealing a fluctuating basis (the aggregates), the character of this basis (non-existence), the nature of the experience (ferry-like) and its origination (no-birth)—four notions that render the presence of a self superfluous to sustain purity and defilement.

To take stock and return briefly to the question of this chapter’s overall organisation, we can make two observations concerning the purpose of the types of ‘skill’ investigated so far. First, the texts make it plain that their primary role is to remove the misconceptions about the self. In this sense, the Bdp’s first four kinds of ‘skill’ (including perhaps the more distant ‘skill’ in dependent co-origination) display a common objective and so were presumably conceived en bloc.

This hypothesis, however plausible, leaves several questions unanswered. If the eradication of the belief in a self is limited to ‘skill’ in skandha, dhātu, āyatana, satya (and pratityasamutpāda) what is then the role of the remaining types of skill? Moreover, if perceived as a group of practices, what is their exact location on the path? It seems unlikely that such a major feature of the training should have been devised without thought being given to its position.

In general, descriptions of the path tend to place the elimination of the belief in a self at the beginning of the path.677 There is evidence in the Bbh that supports an early position for our five types of ‘skill’ also. Here, we learn that they (plus ‘skill’ in the inevitable/impossible) function as bases of knowledge mastered by śrāvaka, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas alike. The remaining types of ‘skill’ are only accessible to bodhisattvas.678 We may infer, therefore, that ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., represents a kind of a spiritual foundation on which the bodhisattvacaryā is built.679 Furthermore, as revealed by passages in the Šbh and Prbh, the

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676. Kośa, vi, p. 120 (cf. Kośa, i, p. 8).
677. For the tenfold scheme, see: Daśa-bh, pp. 31.10, 43.17; for the fivefold scheme, see: DPP, pp. 21, 37.
678. Bbh, p. 4.6–8
Note that the descriptions of ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., follow closely the definitions that are given in the Šbh and contain many traits of śrāvakayāna orientation (cf. Śrāv-bh (Sh), pp. 237–49). A useful indicator of the degree to which the first five types of ‘skill’ are associated with the śrāvakayāna in the Šbh is obtained if we look at the sources on which the Šbh drew for inspiration (Śrāv-bh (Sh), pp. 240–49).
679. This, at least, is the opinion of the Bbh, which remarks (p. 3.14–18):
"Among them, the lineage of all the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas becomes pure through the purification of the obstructions of defilement, not through purification of the obstructions pertaining to the knowledgeable. However, the lineage of bodhisattvas becomes pure not only through purification of the obstruction of defilement, but also through purification of the obstruction pertaining to the knowledgeable."
scope of ‘skill’ even differs between the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha.680 For a śrāvaka, only the ‘skills’ in skandha, dhātu, āyatana, pratītyasamutpāda and sthānasthāna are attainable whereas a pratyekabuddha also transforms satya into an object of ‘skill’.681 The scope and advancement in ‘skill’, it seems, becomes a type of gradation demarcating the three vehicles.

By themselves, these findings do not explain the position of ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., in the overall scheme of the Bdp. The key to this problem is found outside the Bdp. A glance at the list at the beginning of the current investigation shows that ‘skill’ in skandha, dhātu, āyatana and satya is placed between the discussion of the bhāvanāmārga and ‘skill’ in pratīsamvid. The chief characteristics of the bhāvanāmārga are the practice of meditation and the attainment of the śrāmanyaphala. In the Śbh, ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., occurs precisely in conjunction with these two training aspects. They are an important attribute particularly for the śrotaāpanna682 and become objects of meditation (ālambana) in the śrāvaka training.683 This would seem to tally with the contemplative practice supposedly undertaken on the bhāvanāmārga in general, and in its laukika phase in particular.684 Hence, there appears to be a case for linking ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., with the discussion of bhāvanāmārga—the implication being that ‘skill’ forms a part of it.685

To find a connection between ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., and ‘skill’ in pratīsamvid has proved more problematic. Essentially, we find two apparently contradictory views. One propounds that the pratīsamvid lead to ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., and the other that ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., provides a basis for the acquisition of the pratīsamvid. Having considered the evidence, I am inclined to adopt the first opinion.

In support of the first view we have a statement in the Śbh:686

681. For the pratyekabuddha, ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., is present in all three major phases of this training. Judging by the brief passages in the Prbh, it prepares the ground for the ‘penetration of the certainty of truth’ via direct comprehension (abhīsamaya) and the eventual attainment of the state of certainty itself (op. cit.). This interpretation would place ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., on the darśanamārga.
682. Śrāv-bh (Sh), pp. 177.8–183.11.
683. op. cit., pp. 193.4–258.13
For a superior edition of this passage, see: Schmithausen, 1982, pp. 460–472. A parallel account of the psychological experiences underlying these meditations is found in the Abhidh-sam (R), pp. 134–36.
684. For details on these meditations during the bhāvanāmārga, see: Kośa, ii, pp. 134–6, 180, 205; iii, p. 196; vi, pp. 186–189 and chapter viii; Abhidh-sam (R), pp. 110–11; Mppś, iii, pp. 1213–1328; MBT, iii, pp. 1–8.
The association of the pratīsamvid with meditation is further corroborated in a key passage in the Bhbh that affirms that they constitute knowledge springing from meditative practice (bhāvanāmayam ... jñānam). Bhbh, pp. 258.6–7, 258.9–10, 258.12–13, 258.15–16.
685. According to the Bhbh, the three types of wisdom (i.e., śrutamayī-, cintāmaya- and bhāvanāmayiprajñā) themselves are conducive to the attainment of the lower six kinds of ‘skill’ (Bbh, p. 33.10–15).
“By the unique knowledge of own-being of things (arthapratisamvid), the bodhisattva enters into the attainment of ‘skill’ in aggregates, elements, sensefields, truth and dependent co-origination.”

A similar proposition is also found in the Bbh:687

“Reliance on the bodhisattva’s four [kinds of] unique knowledge should be known to lead to ‘skill’ in the five bases of the bodhisattva; being ‘skill’ in aggregates, elements, sensefields, dependent co-origination and the inevitable/impossible.”

This passage also underpins what we have already inferred from the Šbh and Prbh concerning ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., being cognitive foundations. Ironically, it is this function that gives weight to the alternative position. To this effect we read in the Visuddhimagga:688

“Now, the things classed as aggregates, sensefields, elements, faculties, truths, dependent co-origination, etc., are the soil (bhumi) of this understanding [of the unique knowledge]. Two purifications, viz., purification of virtue and consciousness are its roots. Five purifications, viz., purification of view, purification by overcoming doubt, by knowledge and vision of the path ... are the trunk [of their understanding].”

To the Vism knowledge of the aggregates, etc., is quite clearly a cornerstone to the development of the patisambhidā.689 Likewise, it is probably no coincidence that knowledge of the aggregates and knowledge of the four noble truths are discussed immediately before the unique knowledge.690 Additional support for this proposition, however, is thinly spread and subject to interpretation.

Introducing this statement on the relation between ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., and the pratisamvid the Dbh comments that the bodhisattva “understands by the unique knowledge of designations the methodical (asambheda) ‘skill’ distinguishing the knowledge of dharma” (op. cit., p. 77.22–23).

688. Vism, p. 443.
689. Having discussed the qualities of the patisambhidā, as if to underline the importance of a correct understanding of the aggregates, etc., to their generation, the Vism dedicates the next seventy pages to a description of their nature, functions and attributes (Vism, pp. 444–516).
690. Vism, p. 440.
In the Śbh the context places the practice of 'skill' into a meditative structure, specifically, on the bhāvanāmārga. Apart from the practice of the dhyāna, etc., advancement through the bhāvanāmārga involves a number of ancillary practices, particularly the noble eightfold path and joint practice of 'perfect mental quietude' (śamatha) and 'insight' (vipaśyanā). If we accept that 'skill' pertains to the bhāvanāmārga or, at least, to meditation, by implication it is possible to draw a link between 'skill' and śamatha/vipaśyanā. This connection allows us to utilise a passage in the Samdhis where we learn that:692

"Bodhisattvas who cultivate perfect mental quietude and insight possess the unique knowledge of the own-being of things and the unique knowledge of designation."

This statement suggests that the attainment of (at least two) pratisamvid springs from the practice of śamatha and vipaśyanā; that is to say, from meditation on the bhāvanāmārga. In other words, it arises from the very context in which 'skill' in skandha, etc., is being developed. This position is sustained by the content that is given to the pratisamvid in the Samdhis. In common with the Bdp, the Samdhis dwells on precisely those practices that were the focus of 'skill'. More than just the fact of it referring to the problem of the self and defining the aggregates, elements, sensefields and noble truths693, it is the brevity in which these are treated that suggests that the bodhisattva was assumed to acquire 'skill' prior to the pratisamvid. In this sense, 'skill' in skandha, etc., would provide the cognitive foundation on which the pratisamvid would develop.

And yet, on balance, I do not think that these clues—however persuasive—allow us to disregard the unequivocal statements of the Dbh and Bbh. They say quite clearly that it is the pratisamvid that lead to 'skill' in skandha, etc., and not vice versa.694 It is perhaps appropriate

693. Samdhis (ELa), pp. 99.12–13, 99.16–23, 100.12–14, 102.15–19, 103.1
694. It is conceivable that the relationship between 'skill' and pratisamvid has changed in the course of Buddhist history. However, the chronological closeness of the Bdp and Dbh, on the one hand, and the Bbh and Vism on the other hand apart from the fact that such re-interpretation would have involved a total reversal of whichever position was the original, renders this possibility remote.
to consider both positions as equally valid within their own textual traditions until further evidence comes to light to clarify the matter.

But now let us move on to look at the actual treatment of the *pratisamvid*. In contents the *Bdp* adopted what have become well-established patterns of exposition.695 Under the heading of *arthaprasamvid* it discusses the own-being of things and scrutinises reality from the viewpoint of the absolute truth, including some of the broader principles that pertain to the path attainments.696 Similarly, *dharmaprasamvid*, revealing knowledge of instructions and designations that introduces to the names and characteristics of phenomena, deals largely with standard issues.697 *Niruktiprasamvid* and *pratibhanaprasamvid* bestow intimate knowledge of languages and confer great eloquence.698 Traditionally appreciated for their role in conversion activity, they have less bearing on the cognitive dimension of the training than on that aspect of the vow committing the bodhisattva to spread the Buddha’s teachings.699 As

695. More specifically, it agrees, for instance, with the *Mpps* (iii, p. 1619) that the *pratisamvid* manifest three levels of attainment, depending on whether they are practised by śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas or bodhisattvas. It also agrees with the *Vibhāṣā* (op. cit., p. 1616) that the object of the *arthaprasamvid* is the absolute truth (*paramārtha*).

It is perhaps worth noting that the *Bdp* contains by far the most detailed analysis of the *pratisamvid*, covering almost nine folios in the Peking edition. In the *sūtras*, the next best presentations are found in the *Samdhis* (*ÉLa*), pp. 98.1–103.5, and *Daśa-bh.*, pp. 77.1–79.3, while in the *śāstras* it is the *Mpps*, *Bbh* and *Msl* that give the best account (references see below).

696. R, folio 624.2–625.5.

697. R, folio 626.7–628.5.

698. R, folio 628.6–631.2.


While the nature of the four *pratisamvid* is generally well-explained, their exact scope is only insufficiently indicated. Two passages in the *nikāya* would indicate that in early Buddhism they did not belong to the most elevated path practices. They were apparently within the reach of ‘ordinary’ monks’ (A I, p. 24, A II, p. 161) and, for Śāriputra, attainable only a few months after ordination (A II, p. 160). Although by nature inseparable and simultaneously acquired, differences in ranking exist. For the *Kośa* (vii, pp. 89–94), the *pratisamvid* fall into two categories. First, the *dharma-* and *niruktiprasamvid* pertain to the sphere of worldly knowledge (*samvṛtiśāhana*) and operate only in the stages of the kāmadhātu and dhvāna (the *niruktiprasamvid* is restricted to the first dhvāna, while the *dharmaḥśāhaka* pertains to all four dhvāna stages; *Kośa*, vii, p. 93). The reason given is that they have as objects nāmakāya and languages. The other two, *arthā- and pratibhanaprasamvid*, belong, by implication, to the lokottara consciousness. Found in all nine stages of meditation and corresponding respectively to the ten and nine kinds of knowledge (*jñāna*)—the nirodhaśāhāna being excluded from the *pratibhanaprasamvid* (*Kośabhasya*, pp. 418–19) and only attained by masters of meditation (*samādhiḥśāhaka*)—they were evidently regarded to be of a higher order. To some extent, this grading is echoed in the Mahāyāna interpretation of the unique knowledge, in particular with regard to the *pratibhanaprasamvid*. The contents of the first two, that is, *arthā- and dharmaḥśāhaka* correspond largely to the śrāvaka interpretation, in the sense that the chief concern is the examination of reality (*Siddhi*, p. 70). Employing a comparable methodology but producing variant results, both śrāvaka and bodhisattvas investigate through them the own-nature (*swalakṣaṇa*) of phenomena and the terminology commonly used to designate them. Differences only arise with the *niruktiv- and pratibhanaprasamvid*. For the śrāvaka, *niruktiprasamvid* has as object ‘expressions of language relative to the thing designated and the designation’ (*atthadharmatvaḥśāhikā* or more generally speech (*vāc*). This led to its emphasis being placed on philological knowledge of grammatical
these general facets of the pratisamvid are widely documented, I shall confine my analysis here to those issues in which the Bdp deviates from the standard model.700

Differences relate primarily to organisation and allocation. The first, most noticeable, difference lies in the order in which the artha-and dharmapratisamvid occur. Most texts I consulted place the dharmapratisamvid at the beginning of the four, followed artha-, nirukti- and pratibhānapratisamvid. In the Bdp—perhaps for reasons of continuity—the sequence between dharma- and arthapratisamvid has been reversed so that it is artha that introduces the unique knowledge.701 Second, the allocation of some of the topics diverges from that of other texts. For instance, the Bdp incorporates in arthapratisamvid the theme of the non-characteristics of dharma and a reference to the pratisarana—two issues belonging to the dharmapratisamvid according to the Mpps.702 Similarly controversial, though possibly correct, is the inclusion of the eighty-four thousand types of dharmaskandha under dharmapratisamvid. These, according to the Mpps, pertain to the pratibhānapratisamvid.703 The Bdp’s incorporation of a number of specific path features in the arthapratisamvid is also striking, when in most other texts its treatment does not go beyond the own-characteristics (śvalaksana) of dharma.704

forms, syntax, etc. (Vibh, pp. 295–9; Prajñāptapādaśāstra cited in Kośa, vii, pp. 93–4). Now, judging by the material included in Mahāyāna treatises on the subject, for the bodhisattva, knowledge of nirukti is more a question of fluency in languages—human and non-human. Philological detail is rarely mentioned and is certainly not the focus of attention (Bbh, pp. 258.11–13, 353.17–354.26). The reason for this adjustment is the central role of preaching in the bodhisattva training, particularly during the final stages. Recognising the need for effective communication, the pratibhānapratisamvid sets the previous pratisamvid to best effect. Being the last and highest form of unique knowledge, it merges the data of the previous three in order to pass them on to others for conversion and designates “l’habileté dans le discours qui procède de la connaissance des êtres à convertir” (Siddhi, p. 652). The bodhisattva is now in the position to adapt his exhortations to the spiritual faculties of beings (Mpps, iii, pp. 1622–23); he is accomplished in wisdom and magical powers which allow him to alter his appearance and birth-destiny at will; he is well-versed in all branches of knowledge and their texts. In short, he has assembled all necessary ingredients for an effective communication of the teachings of the Dharma. It is no coincidence that this attainment takes place close to the pinnacle of his career (Daśa-bh, pp. 77.1–81.3; Bbh, pp. 353.8–354.11), since it is only from the eighth stage onwards that he himself is fully accomplished in the Dharma, skilful means and magical powers. During the sādhumatibhumi (corresponding to the pratisamvidvihāra of the Bbh), these three factors are then complemented with attainments in languages and eloquence to become the pillars of his conversion activity.

700. Good accounts of the general nature and scope of the pratisamvid can be found in the Vibh, pp. 293–305; Vism, pp. 372–76; Mpps, iii, pp. 1616–24; Kośa, vii, pp. 89–94; Kośabhāṣya, pp. 418–21; Amṛtar (B), pp. 214–15; Bbh, pp. 258.4–17; Msl, pp. 138.19–139.16 (for further ref. see: Msg, pp. 53–54*).

701. The standard order, for instance, is found in the Daśa-bh, Samdhis, Kośa, Abhidh-sam (R), Amṛtar (B), Bbh, Msl, Dhsgr and Msg while that of the Bdp is only attested in the Vism, Pañca, Ako, Samādh and Mpps. Dayal suggests (p. 262) that these differences reflect a shift away from the formula that is found in the nikāya, giving precedence to the pratisamvid of artha over dharma. Taking into account the meagre evidence for such a claim (there being only one occasion in the primary nikāya where this sequence is attested; but see: Patis, i, pp. 88, 119; ii, pp. 150, 157, 185, 193; Vibh, pp. 293–305; Vism, pp. 440 ff), he later acknowledges that this is pure speculation (p. 264).

702. R, folio 625.5; Mpps, iii, p. 1621.

703. R, folio 627.3–628.5; Mpps, iii, p. 1623.

704. See, however, Samdhis (ELa), p. 104.7–27.
If nothing else, these discrepancies show that the contents of the individual pratisamvid were exposed to change longer than their consistency in later treatises might imply.\(^{705}\) This itself is not surprising, considering that most early sources provide a bare outline of their contents. In the four principal nikāya, the only references to the patisambhidā are found in the Ānuttaraniṇikāya and even these give away little of their scope.\(^{706}\) Even many of the early Mahāyāna sūtras are silent on the contents of the pratisamvid. The Āṣṭa, Vkn, Kp, Up, Śgs, Saddhp and Bhadra-vy, to name just a few, contain only a handful of allusions.\(^{707}\) Apparently, interest in the details of the pratisamvid only arose with the second wave of Mahāyāna sūtras, producing the kind of exposition we find in the Bdp, Akn, Dbh and Saṁdhis.

Much of what has been said about the pratisamvid applies also the pratisarana that follow on the pratisamvid in exposition of the Bdp.\(^{708}\) They are not found as a complete set in the early suttas, though they are already attested in their initial stages in the Digha- and Majjhimanikāya.\(^{709}\) From a few scattered references in Śākyamuni’s discourses the pratisarana progressed to a fully developed set of practices with a secure place in the bodhisattva training.\(^{710}\) As is so often the case when concerned with bodhisattva practices, one is well advised to look for the most instructive account to the Bbh.\(^{711}\)

But first to the Bdp. The discussion of the pratisarana in the Bdp is rather unusual in several respects. First, there is the astonishing amount of detail about the individual reliances. Except for the Akn, I have found no other text that comes anywhere near its exposition in length. Second, the Bdp casts its treatment of the pratisarana in a non-standard order, leading

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705. Note that in the Vkn, the contents of artha- and dharma-pratisamvid appear to have merged into a single concept. In chapter xii, § 11 (p. 260), we meet with the term bhūtārtha-dharma-pratisamvid that Lamotte took to mean “infallible penetration concerning the Law in its true meaning”. I do not know what prompted Lamotte to swerve from the pratisamvid context here, but to translate it as “unique knowledge concerning the own-being and designations of reality” seems more appropriate.

706. A II, p. 160; III, pp. 113, 120
The earliest canonical account of any length is found in the Patis (i, pp. 86–87, 121–22), while the most detailed analysis of the Abhidhamma is given in the Vibh (pp. 293–305).

707. Vkn (p. 260), Śgs (pp. 150, 188), Saddhp (pp. 202, 204), Bhadra-vy (R), p. 20.17–18; Pañca (p. 211); they are altogether absent from the Āṣṭa, Kp and Ug.

708. During the first half of this century, much useful material on the pratisarana has been collected by Étienne Lamotte and Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Most of this has been published in footnotes to the Abhidharmakosa (Koṣa, ix, pp. 246–48) and Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse (Mpps, i, pp. 536–41) and in “La critique d’interprétation dans le Bouddhisme” (Annaire de Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et Slaves, 9, 1949, pp. 341–61).


710. The first sūtra to give a detailed account of the four pratisarana appears to have been the Catuspratisarana-sūtra. This text, however, extant in several Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese versions, is a relatively late composition. Nevertheless, it is still regarded as one of the principal sources on the pratisarana and is regularly cited in conjunction with the four reliances (viz., Mpps, i, p. 536; Lamotte, 1949, p. 4).

711. Bbh, pp. 256.23–58.3.
to repetitions and some convolution. Third, taking full advantage of the samvrtisatya/paramārthasatya dichotomy, its uniform technique of explication is surprising.

The first pratisarana discussed is ‘reliance on the spirit as opposed to the letter’ (artha/vyañjana). The Bdp provides many examples to explain why it is the spirit that is given ultimately precedence. The thought that only the spirit contains the true meaning of the Dharma in the final analysis, whilst the letter is little more than an expedient for expressing and reaching it, is of course not new. It is already mirrored in the famous stanza of Śāriputra uttered in response to Aśvajit’s admission that, as a novice, he could not propound the Dharma in full:712

“Let it be so, my friend. Tell me a little or a great deal of it, but speak to me of its spirit. I need only the spirit, so why be preoccupied with the letter?”

Such preoccupation with the meaning stems from the conviction that purely literal exegesis is certain to produce incomplete or even mistaken interpretations and will fail to lead to liberation.713 Equally, it was always appreciated that flawless preservation of the letter is essential to discovering the correct meaning, for:714

“If the phrases and syllables are wrongly arranged, the meaning in turn is impossible to discover.”

Recognition of a combined need for a clearly formulated textual basis and perception of the spirit as the ultimate bearer of Buddhist thought also inspired the Bdp in its discussion of the artha/vyañjana pratisamvid. Taking a more positive view by proposing complementarity (but pertaining to different levels of cognition), the text does not tire in reiterating the benefits that spring from their integration:715

“The letter—disciplining body, speech and mind—instructs in achieving all attainments of learning and purity. The spirit—not apprehending body, speech and

712. Vin, i, p. 40.
713. Lakhāv, p. 196.4–11.
715. R, folio 632.4–633.3.
mind—purifies the non-accumulation of karmic formations. ... The letter, being the receptacle of all that has been heard, is the root of wisdom. The spirit is the ineffable meaning. The letter instructs in the practice of the thirty-seven bodhipāksika dharma. The spirit realises the fruit of their practice. The letter instructs in suffering, its origin and the path. The spirit realises its cessation.”

After the discussion of the artha/vyañjana pratisamvid, the Bdp expounds direct knowledge and discursive insight (jñāna/vijñāna). At first, however, for reasons that are not entirely clear, it interposes a brief section introducing reliance on sūtras of precise/provisional meaning (nītārtha/neyārtha) and reliance on the foundation of being/person (dharmatā/pudgala). This interpolation is practically devoid of information beyond the standard formula. Both pratisaraṇa are explained in detail after the jñāna/vijñāna pratisarana, and yet they are styled to conclude the entire fourfold pratisarana discussion even though jñāna/vijñāna pratisamvid has not been mentioned. This is probably another piece of evidence of the Bdp’s conceptual ‘immaturity’.716 Things are further complicated by the introductory passage to the jñāna/vijñāna section which says that—in apparent reference to the artha/vyañjana pratisamvid—direct knowledge and discursive insight fall under ‘skill’ in the letter. Tellingly, the Akn that otherwise follows the Bdp so closely does not show these incongruities.717

After a fruitless search for an explanation in the standard works, I came across the following passage in the Tchou wei mo kie king:718

“There are two sorts of dharma. First, vyañjana or the letter. Second, artha or the spirit. One should not rely on vyañjana. There are two sorts of artha. First, artha known through discursive insight (vijñāna). Second, artha known through direct knowledge (jñāna). Vijñāna only seeks after the five false and illusory object of desire (kāmaguṇa). It does not seek after the real truth. Whereas jñāna seeks after the real truth and destroys the five objects of desire. Thus one should rely on artha known through jñāna and not rely on artha known through vijñāna. It is in order to seek after artha known through jñāna that one relies on jñāna.”

716. I have discussed this convolution in greater detail in note 114 of my translation.
717. Akn, p. 64.2.4.
718. T 1775, chpt. 10, p. 417a.10-25 (I follow here Lamotte’s translation; Lamotte 1976, p. 262). Note that in early Mahāyāna literature most lists of the pratisarana begin with the pair dharmatā/pudgala, the only exception being the Bhadra-vy (R), p. 100.
To us, the significance of this interpretation concerns the inclusion of jñāna/vijnāna under 'skill' in the letter. Uniquely among treatises on the pratisarana, it establishes a logical connection between the four pratisarana and explains the late reference to vyanjana. Kumārajiva’s choice to place the focus on artha—not vyanjana—and to make it the target of jñāna and vijnāna, introduces a further complication, though it throws some light on the underlying structure of the Bdp’s treatment of the pratisarana. In order to link the exposition of jñāna/vijnāna with that of artha/vyanjana, the Bdp returned to artha/vyanjana so as to provide vyanjana as the object of jñāna/vijnāna. The fact that direct knowledge is not in the least concerned with literal understanding—perception of words being by definition part of conventional (vyavahāra) knowledge—is apparently ignored.719

“The bodhisattva attaches great importance to direct knowledge of realisation and not to mere discursive insight of the letter or the spirit, arising from listening and reflecting. Understanding that what should be known through knowledge arising from contemplation cannot be recognised through discursive insight arising from listening and reflecting [alone], he abstains from rejecting or denying the teachings given by the Tathāgata, profound as they are.”

Next, the Bdp contrasts the attributes of jñāna with those of vijnāna. It establishes direct knowledge in the lokottara domain and defines discursive insight as the ordinary cognition subject to false mental constructions.720

“Discursive insight persists in the sphere of conditioned dharma but does not wander in the unconditioned [while] direct knowledge is perception of the unconditioned.”

In essence, the treatment of the third pratisarana, contrasting sūtras of provisional meaning (neyārtha) with those of precise meaning (nītārtha), is rather similar with the artha/vyanjana


Perhaps because it noted this incongruity, the Pelliot manuscript omits the paragraph which contains the reference to 'skill in letter' (Pelliot, 977, 1b.7–2a.2).

pratisaraṇa. This is the case because of the conceptual closeness of artha and nītārtha on the one hand, and vyañjana and neyārtha on the other hand.721

“The bodhisattva who resorts to the spirit (artha) and not to the letter (vyañjana) penetrates all enigmatic words (saṃdhāyabhāṣita) of the lord buddhas.”

In order to distinguish those texts to be taken literally from those requiring interpretation, the Bdp goes to some lengths to describe the attributes of neyārtha and nītārtha sūtras. As main criteria it suggests purpose, content, style and philosophical explicitness. Depending whether a text advocates the perpetuation of path activity or supports the immediate cessation of all action; whether it sets out to elucidate the conventional truth or absolute truth; whether it explains impurity or achieves complete purification; whether it partakes in duality or not, we are dealing with either a neyārtha or nītārtha sūtra. Texts that add non-essential material, written in a pleasing style, are neyārtha whereas sūtras that are terse and profound are nītārtha.722 The fact that most, if not all, of these criteria are highly subjective and produce no overall and generally valid guidelines is not addressed in our text.723 Aware that literal interpretations (yathārthārthagṛha) fail to accomplish Dharma comprehension724, Buddhist scholars of all ages frequently drew attention to this problem.725

722. Kośa, i, p. 75:
“Rien n’établit que ce sūtra soit de sens clair; le fait qu’il s’exprime en termes de définition ne prouve rien; car Bhagavat donne des définitions qui portent seulement sur l’élément essentiel ou capital de l’objet à définir.”
723. In fact, to my knowledge Buddhism has never succeeded in establishing such a general principle of identification, even though several attempts were made to this effect.
See, for instance, a section in the Mapp (i, pp. 539–40) where Kumārajiva proposes that sūtras containing allegations that are obvious and readily comprehended are nītārtha, while texts where the meaning is unclear and teach views through skillful means that seem at first incorrect and require explanation are neyārtha.
For the Samādh (Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 78) it is above all a question whether a text seemingly acknowledges the reality of the self:
“Whoever knows the value of texts that have a precise meaning knows the way in which emptiness has been taught by the Sugata; but wherever reference is taken to the individual, human being or man, he knows that all those texts should be regarded as possessing provisional meaning.”
For Buddhaghosa, in contrast, texts that wish to lay claim to nītārtha status, must deal with impermanence, suffering and non-self, because “independent of the Tathāgata’s appearance in the world, causality—this fundamental essence of things remains”. Sūtras that deal with individuals and speak of the pudgala should be treated as neyārtha since from the absolute point of view no individuals exist (Manorathapirapi, ii, p. 188; ref. Lamotte). See also Madh. vṛtti (p. 43) that accepts principles of distinction that are rather similar to the first two and last five of the Bdp.
725. Bbh, pp. 257.8–16.
“A bodhisattva who places faith and confidence in the Tathāgata—only trusting his very word—relies on sutras of precise meaning and not on sutras of provisional meaning. By relying on sutras of precise meaning, he cannot swerve from the Dharma and Vinaya. Indeed, in sutras of provisional meaning the interpretation of the meaning—[typically] diffused in several directions—is ill-defined and causes hesitation. Hence, if a bodhisattva does not adhere to sutras of precise meaning, he might swerve from the Dharma and Vinaya.”

The last pratisarana, advocating reliance on dharmatā as opposed to the person, is in many respects the most fundamental of all four. Summing up the concerns that led to the formulation of the ‘four great authorities’ (mahāpadesa), it establishes the superiority of Dharma ‘compatibility’ over personal authority, however respected the person in question might be. In recognition of the many shortcomings that taint the human mind, the acceptance of the Dharma should not rest on blind faith but it should grow out of sound reasoning based on personal experience and understanding. To quote once again from the Bbh:

“He who relies on sound reason and not on a person’s [authority] does not swerve from the meaning of thusness. He does not depend on others when confronted with the Dharma.”

The Bdp, however, is not so much concerned with the benefits that accrue through this pratisarana, than to define the concepts of pudgala and dharmatā themselves. Thus, instead of arguing from the changeableness of the human mind, it explains that the Buddha’s use of the term pudgala is nothing but an expedient means and should not be taken literally. Warning that undue attachment to the pudgala would harm one’s prospects of liberation, the Bdp invites one to strive for a complete understanding of reality and to turn this into one’s

727. M I, p. 133.
730. Note, that we have a number of inconclusive variant readings in the Bdp, alternating between dharma (folio 638.1) and dharmatā (folio 631.5, but Pelliot, 977, 1a.2: dharma; 638.7; 639.4). Judging by the context no difference in meaning is intended.
refuge. Since reality bears the characteristics of sameness and lies beyond discrimination, perception must not be conducted through sensory cognition (dhātu), but is to be gained only through dharma-observance and reliance on the foundation of being.\footnote{Prajñāpāramitā, R, folio 639.1-5.}

Accumulation (sambhāra) of merit (punya) and pristine cognition (jñāna) is the first major practice ‘skill’ in which is not included in the introductory list.\footnote{Although by far the best known types, Buddhist sources record a number of alternative and frequently numerous kinds of accumulation. In the Lalitavistara, for instance, we meet with accumulation in punya, jñāna, samatha and vidarśana, while in the Śīks (p. 191.4–5) we learn of a dharmasambhāra and a sarvadhyaṇāprajñāgasambhāra (p. 182.18). The Aṣṭi speaks besides the standard accumulations of punya and jñāna of a prajñasambhāra and buddhadharmasambhāra (pp. 47.1–7–48.1.3). The longest list of sambhāra I have discovered is found in the Karunāp (1) (i, pp. 338.5–341.7) containing forty different types of accumulation.}

Building on attainments of the pratisamvid and pratisarana, both types of accumulation form a highly esteemed aspect of the training and, according to some, are rivalled only by generosity (dāna) in benefit.\footnote{Bbh, p. 216.4–11}

\footnote{732. R, folio 639.1–5.}

\footnote{733. Although by far the best known types, Buddhist sources record a number of alternative and frequently numerous kinds of accumulation. In the Lalitavistara, for instance, we meet with accumulation in punya, jñāna, samatha and vidarśana, while in the Śīks (p. 191.4–5) we learn of a dharmasambhāra and a sarvadhyaṇāprajñāgasambhāra (p. 182.18). The Aṣṭi speaks besides the standard accumulations of punya and jñāna of a prajñasambhāra and buddhadharmasambhāra (pp. 47.1–7–48.1.3). The longest list of sambhāra I have discovered is found in the Karunāp (1) (i, pp. 338.5–341.7) containing forty different types of accumulation.}

In the Togārāhadānī, we meet with the following explanation:

"There are four kinds of accumulation. First, the accumulation of merit. Second, the accumulation of pristine cognition. Third, the accumulation of the past. Fourth, the accumulation of the present. The accumulation of merit is that by which one obtains the regular equipment and the abundant jewels; by which one meets the truly rich fields as his good teachers and friends; by which one becomes free from many obstructions and applies oneself to discipline. The accumulation of pristine cognition is that by which one accomplishes the brilliant knowledge and has powers and faculties; by which one discriminates the doctrines of right and mistaken views; by which one attains the regular doctrine, meaning, teaching and exhortation. The accumulation of the past is that by which one attains now the accomplishment of the various faculties owing to the gathering of good faculties in previous lives. The accumulation of the present means that in this state of existence one—wishing to attain virtue—ripen his faculties and equips himself with restraint of morality and faculty\footnote{Because [the bodhisattva] augments the accumulation of merit, he becomes insatiable. Because he seeks the accumulation of pristine cognition, he becomes a person of unaltering vigour. Because he gathers an accumulation of benevolence and pity he becomes a man of unweary intention."} (T 30, p. 446b; trsl. Honda, 1968, p. 216)."

\footnote{734. Bbh, p. 216.4–11}

According to the same text (op. cit., p. 35.2–5), the two sambhāra become collectively the primary causes of enlightenment. While merit is the principal (pradhāna) cause, it is pristine cognition that is of supreme importance. The causes of ripening, ripening itself and the reward springing from ripening all stem from merit but merit depends on pristine cognition (jñānasrūtra) which removes all defilements (samklesa), (op. cit., p. 34.26–27; cf. Msl, p. 139.18–19). This view is mirrored in a passage in the.Dbh (Daśa-bh, p. 67.16) where, at the eighth stage, the accumulation of the roots of virtue (kasalamlālasambhāra) is held essential to the acquisition of supernatural faculties. On the effects of punya and jñānasambhāra, the Dbh remarks (Daśa-bh, p. 45.1–4):

"Because [the bodhisattva] augments the accumulation of merit, he becomes insatiable. Because he seeks the accumulation of pristine cognition, he becomes a person of unaltering vigour. Because he gathers an accumulation of benevolence and pity he becomes a man of unweary intention."

A further indicator of the importance of punya and jñāna is perhaps their inclusion in a number of lists at the upper end of the path containing factors that mark the attainment of the next higher path-stages (Daśa-bh, pp. 55.6, 63.20, 82.4). For another overall correlation of the two sambhāra with the various path phases, see: Msl, p. 140.10–14.

An even greater role is played by punya and jñāna in the implementation of the commitments of the bodhisatta’s vow (Msl, p. 44.7–11):

"For the sake of sentient beings, I shall acquire an accumulation of merit and pristine cognition. When an accumulation of merit and pristine cognition has been assembled, all living beings will obtain absolute purity up to the degree of strength of the ten powers (dasabala) as the highest point of unobstructed knowledge."
They liberate the bodhisattva from personal affliction while he is coursing in *samsāra*; they remove all types of misconception and settle him in the four sciences (*caturvidha*), including in the accumulation of ‘skill’ in *skandha*, etc.\(^{735}\)

In the *Bdp*, these rewards are not specifically mentioned, because its exposition is less concerned with the fruits that spring from *punya* and *jñāna* than with the factors that promote their acquisition. This is particularly evident in the discussion of *jñānasambhāra* where a careful distinction is made between the causes and conditions that lead to the accumulation of pristine cognition. In the section dealing with *punya*, the chain of reasoning is somewhat blurred by the wealth of examples brought together in order to illustrate the kind of conduct that is particularly conducive to the accumulation of merit. At first, taking up the ancient formula of the bases of meritorious works (*punyakriyāvastu*), the *Bdp* considers merit acquired through generosity, morality, contemplation, benevolence, vigour, gratitude and virtue transformation.\(^{736}\) Then, abandoning the structures provided by the *punyakriyāvastu*, it introduces a further dozen or so randomly arranged ‘ancillary’ practices. Central elements to this assortment are the virtues of teaching, generosity, morality, patience, vigour and reverence.\(^{737}\) Their presence here is expected, since in particular *dāna*, *śīla*, *ksānti* (and *vīrya*) constitute the chief components of the accumulation of merit.\(^{738}\) Having defined the kind of practice that is particularly profitable to the acquisition of merit, the *Bdp* turns its attention to the underlying reward mechanism. In the *Bdp*, as in most other works\(^{739}\), the highest reward for the accumulation of merit is the acquisition of a perfect body—the buddha-body.\(^{740}\)

Praised for its purity, physical beauty and intellectual impeccability, it is portrayed as an

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\(^{735}\) See also *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* (cit. in *MBT*, ii, pp. 12.20–12.21) where this very position is concisely put forward:

“The accumulation of pristine cognition has as its aim the destruction of all defilements; the accumulation of merit serves to assist all beings. O lord, this is why the bodhisattva *mahāsattva* endeavours to acquire the accumulation of pristine cognition and merit.”

\(^{736}\) R, folio 639.7–640.5

A discussion of the principles that underlie the *punyakriyāvastu* is found in note 132 of my translation of chapter eleven.

\(^{737}\) R, folio 640.5–41.3.

\(^{738}\) *Bbh*, p. 33.3–15; *Kośa*, vii, p. 78.

\(^{739}\) *Mavbh*, pp. 62.19–63.2.

\(^{740}\) The perfect buddha-body accruing to a bodhisattva on the basis of merit is the *rupakāya*. Encompassing the *sambhoga* and *nirmanakāya* (*Mavbh*, pp. 62.19–63.1), it is characterised by innumerable forms of merit, manifesting wonderful and incomprehensible attributes (cf. La Vallée Poussin, *JRAS*, 1906, p. 234; *Msl*, pp. 38.18–21, 41.11–14, 44.17–45, 47.19–21).
embellishment of great distinction that, no doubt as a reference to the bodhisattva’s eventual attainment of buddhahood, adorns the Dharma, Bodhi-tree and Bodhi-seat (bodhimanda).\textsuperscript{741} Moreover, the \textit{punyasambhāra} frees from rebirth in the lower destinies, consolidates merit, leads to unshakable faith in the Doctrine and buddha-qualities.\textsuperscript{742}

In view of the above detail, it is surprising that in the exposition of \textit{jñānasambhāra} the prospect of reward does not figure at all. Instead, practically all attention is given to the causes that generate and augment pristine cognition. For the \textit{Bdp}, there are three causes of \textit{jñānasambhāra}. First, the bodhisattva develops an ardent longing (\textit{chanda}) for pristine cognition. This manifests itself in desire to procure the Doctrine whose meaning he studies with great zeal.\textsuperscript{743} Second, there is the support of virtuous friends (\textit{kalyānāmitra}). Guiding the enquiring mind to the Dharma, the virtuous friend becomes a source of inspiration, support and information transforming the bodhisattva’s initial and feeble Dharma interest into a potent force.\textsuperscript{744} Third, there is the application of the advice that the bodhisattva has received from virtuous friends.\textsuperscript{745} Intent on wholesome conduct, in particular with regard to meditation, reflection and moral purity the bodhisattva strives to apply the teachings of the Dharma just as told.\textsuperscript{746} In contrast to the practices aimed at the acquisition of merit, pristine cognition focuses chiefly on facets that are conducive to understanding, such as contemplation and investigation.\textsuperscript{747}

Thus matured, the bodhisattva manifests the conditions that accompany the accumulation of wisdom.\textsuperscript{748} For the \textit{Bdp} these are untarnished understanding of reality, modesty and virtuous

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{741} R, folio 641.4–642.3.
\item \textsuperscript{742} R, folio 643.2.
\item \textsuperscript{743} R, folio 643.4.
\item \textsuperscript{744} R, folio 643.5–7.
\item \textsuperscript{745} Another factor that is given in the \textit{Bbh} (p. 34.2–7), viz., previous exercise in the accumulation of pristine cognition, does not appear in the \textit{Bdp} as a separate cause of \textit{jñānasambhāra}. However it could be argued that the last portion, entitled “exertion in the accumulation of pristine cognition” refers to the bodhisattva’s previous practice in pristine cognition. For the \textit{Bbh}, this exercise must have taken place in the past. Yet, as the exact point in time is undefined, we may assume that previous exercise was meant in the broadest terms, that is, exercise prior to the attainment of \textit{jñānasambhāra} (\textit{Bbh}, p. 34.4).
\item According to the \textit{Bbh}, the three causes apply not only to \textit{jñānasambhāra} but also to \textit{punyasambhāra} (\textit{Bbh}, p. 34.2). Moreover, there they are conceived in sequence. That is to say, longing for the Dharma leads to the acquisition of pristine cognition, the presence of a virtuous friend stabilises it and previous practice increases its accumulation (\textit{op. cit.}, p. 34.3–4). In the \textit{Bdp}, this distinction is not explicitly made, although the passage “after [his virtuous friends] have realised that he is a receptacle of the Dharma, they instruct him constantly with great concentration in the Doctrine; after he has heard the Doctrine, he exerts himself in the accumulation of virtuous practices” could well be interpreted in this light.
\item \textsuperscript{746} Note that the \textit{Bbh} (p. 33.5–6) associates pristine cognition with \textit{prajñāpāramitā} only.
\item \textsuperscript{747} This is roughly in line with the thinking of the \textit{Bbh} (p. 33.21–24), proposing that it is \textit{prajñā} springing from learning, reflection and contemplation—in conjunction with \textit{vīrya} and \textit{dhyāna}—that has the greatest effect on the accumulation of pristine cognition.
\item \textsuperscript{748} Cf. \textit{Bbh}, p. 33.22.
\end{itemize}
conduct. Through merging the cognitive dimension with the more practical side of the path the bodhisattva maintains his commitment to the welfare of sentient beings whilst recognising the futility of discursive, binary thinking.749

Having discussed the causes and conditions that generate the accumulation of pristine cognition, the Bdp looks further afield to define the practices that increase its size and scope. Echoing the widely affirmed connection between the pāramitā and sāṁbhāra, these primarily consists of generosity, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, wisdom and (skilful) means.750

749. R, folio 645.3.
750. Each of these practices is discussed in one of the twelve tetrads that make up much of the concluding section of the treatment of the jñānasāṁbhāra. Excepting the perfection of generosity, their presentation is sequential and very straightforward. The dānapāramitā differs from the rest in that it extends over three tetrads—all others are dealt with in one—with a fourth on the powers (bala) being appended. Generosity has a special position in the Bdp where three types of giving are itemised, viz., the granting of material objects and respect (tetrad one), the granting of protection (tetrad two) and the bestowal of support (tetrad three). The rationale for the inclusion of the bala at this point is not fully clear. In all, I have identified three potential avenues of thought that might help us to understand this rather curious positioning of the bala.

First, there is the possibility that the inclusion of the bala here was intended to complement or qualify the three types of dāna. Generosity is less concerned here with the customary giving of wealth or Dharma, but refers chiefly to the granting of support and protection. These two spheres of dāna naturally require strength and resolve. Building on the assumption that the bala constitute a more active force than the indriya, that they are the indriya made strong and of greater intensity in application, the Bdp may have wished to substantiate the claims of protection and support through their interpolation. As Gethin has shown, the image of, or association with, physical strength is by no means foreign to the characterisation of the bala (M I, pp. 121, 244). The second train of thought revolves around the interpretation of śraddhā—the first of the five bala. Investigating the perception of śraddhā in Vedic literature, Köhler (and after him Hara) has unearthed a significant amount of material suggesting that to early Vedic priests śraddhā meant, above all, generosity (Spendefreudigkeit). In later times (with the Samhitā and Brāhmaṇa), with the increasing demystification of the universe, he argues (pp. 44, 57), the notion of generosity gained more and more independence from its concomitant ‘devotion’ (Hingabe) and eventually became the dominant meaning of the term śraddhā. He places this last phase in the period of the Upaniṣad (Chānd. Up and Brhad Up; pp. 68–70). Proposing that this trend towards rationalisation continued in the times of the Buddha, he presents a series of quotations from the nikāya to show that generosity is besides faith the second cardinal meaning of śraddhā in early Buddhism. As Gethin observed, he is rather selective in doing this and discusses chiefly contexts involving the granting of alms, thereby blurring the act of giving with a mental predisposition of faith (S I, pp. 22, 32, 42; A III, p. 34). While śraddhā in these quotations appears to support his views, the rather specific context weakens his argument.

Leaving aside the findings in the nikāya, his conclusions for the Veda alone seem to establish some connection between dāna and śraddhā in the sense of Hingabe. Of particular interest is a passage from the Yoga Sūtra that lists five requirements for yogic meditation (Yoga-S I 1.20). These correspond verbatim to the five bala (or indriya for that matter). Now, according to the commentary, śraddhā is here best interpreted as devotion (yogasīve cetasah prasadāh) (p. 70). In our context, this could be taken to link dāna and protection. For giving to have greatest effect, the presence of an affective element is certainly of advantage and an addition to merit. In a very loose sense, it is thus perhaps not too far-fetched to see a trace of this association in the addendum of the bala to dāna.

Third, we note a certain parallelism between the five supports (upastambhana) that are cited in the Mvu (ii, p. 280.16–17) and our list of bala. To be precise, all five supports, except the first, are identical with the five powers. The first support, instead of being śraddhā as in the bala, is chanda. Now, the question is whether there is any evidence for us to construe a link between śraddhā and chanda. The answer to this is yes. According to the Abhidh-sam (R) (pp. 7–8), the purpose of śraddhā is to provide a foundation for chanda, in turn giving a base to vírya (cf. Siddhi, pp. 309–10). Moreover, in the Nett (p. 15) we learn that chandasamādhī appears in the context of the iddhipāda as mental one-pointedness, possessing sādhd as dominant force. The link between śraddhā and chanda is further reinforced by the interpretation of the
Besides the six/seven perfections, it is only insatiability and the powers (bala) that are seen to augment the accumulation of pristine cognition.751 However, if we read on to the end of the discussion, we find that neither of them is included among the practices that promote jñānasambhāra. Instead, it is the four merit-generating apramāṇa that occur alongside the perfections.752

This choice is problematic and raises several questions. First, virtually all the texts I have consulted agree that dāna, śīla and ksānti play no role in the generation of jñānasambhāra.753 They are applicable to punyasambhāra, so their inclusion here among the factors that generate jñānasambhāra clearly comes as a surprise. The picture is less clear with regard to virya and dhyāna about which differences in opinion prevail, depending on the circumstances of their cultivation.754 Then, why has the cultivation of upāya been omitted in the final round-up if it figured as an apparently independent (pāramitā-like) practice in the tetrads? The answer is that probably upāya had not yet been fully recognised in status as a fully-fledged perfection, and was thus excluded from the final count. Also the inclusion of the apramāṇa is problematic, since all accounts agree that they do not appertain to jñānasambhāra. Conversely, the powers—forming part of the bodhipāksīka dharma that belong to the jñānasambhāra producing practice of dhyāna—do figure in its acquisition, but are not cited in the resumé.

751. A third factor, the accumulation of paths, rather than increasing jñānasambhāra is held to prompt its penetration and stands so apart in function (R, folio 648.1–2).
752. For the Kośa (vii, p. 78), the practice of the dhyānapāramitā, if manifested in the cultivation of the four apramāṇa, contributes to the accumulation of merit. If dealing with the cultivation of the bodhipāksīka, it promotes the accumulation of pristine cognition (cf. Kośa, viii, pp. 196–205 and Daśa-bh p. 45.1–3, citing besides a punya- and jñānasambhāra also a maitri- and kṛpāsambhāra).
753. According to the Māvbh (p. 62.18–19), this role pertains only to dhyāna and praṇā, while virya constitutes a kind of ancillary practice required for both punya and jñāna (cf. Samdhis (ELa), pp. 72.5–10, 131.19–22).
Practices that Conduce to Enlightenment

The bodhipākṣika dharma themselves occupy a central position in much of the remainder of chapter eleven. Taking up over a fifth of its content, they constitute the most distinct category of practices included in the discussion of prajñāpāramitā. The reason for their preponderance is obvious. First, since they operate as ‘factors contributing to enlightenment’, their cultivation becomes mandatory for every bodhisattva who courses in Perfect Wisdom. Then, prajñā itself is a chief member of the ten or eleven ‘ingredients’ (dravya) of the bodhipākṣika, represented by the four smṛtyupasthāṇa, prajñendriya, prajñābala, dharmapavicaya and samyagdrṣṭi. Moreover, the thirty-seven practices originate themselves in wisdom arising from learning, reflection and cultivation—the very foundations of prajñā.

While in spirit very close to those bodhipākṣika expositions found elsewhere in the Mahāyāna, their discussion in the Bdp manifests several peculiar features. Primarily, these affect organisational abnormalities, the actual phrasing of the formulae and their inclusion into an expanded list of practices. Since the scope, intent and nature of the bodhipākṣika have been already adequately researched by others, I shall limit my analysis to facets where the Bdp differs from the more ‘standard’ interpretations.

One is struck first by the extent to which the wording of the Bdp’s description deviates from that of other bodhipākṣika accounts. A comparison with formulae from both Pāli and Sanskrit sources reveals that, except for the samyakprahāna, it stands very much on its own. Having examined most texts on the subject, I found only two works containing a

755. Mpps, iii, p. 1119. For other definitions following these very lines, see: Kośa, vi, p. 282; Satya-s (S), ii, p. 41; Abhidh-d, pp. 357–8.
756. Śsp (Ghosa), pp. 55–56.
757. Kośa, vi, pp. 283–84; Amṛtar (B), p. 208; Abhidh-d, p. 358.5–14; Mpps, iii, p. 1046 (cf. Śrotabhūmi, p. 291.2.1–3).
759. The bodhipākṣika dharma have already been subject to several investigations. The most exhaustive and resourceful study—albeit limited to their treatment in the nikāya and Pāli Abhidhamma works—is that by Rupert Gethin (PhD Dissertation, University of Manchester, 1987). Other, often rather brief or partial investigations have been carried out by Étienne Lamotte (Mpps, iii, pp. 1119–1207) and J. Bronkhorst (BSOAS, 1985, pp. 305–20). References to the bodhipākṣika are extremely numerous in both Pāli and Sanskrit literature. In the Mahāyāna, they are known to occur in the following sūtras: Bdp, TTP, 23, pp. 82.3.8–85.3.4; Kp, § 95; Ug, p. 269.3.8–4.3 (part.); Rp, p. 2.9 (part.); Rcd, 24, pp. 235.3.4–44.2.6; Akn, 34, pp. 66.4.3–71.2.1; Arthav (S), pp. 28–42. For references in the Daśabh, Pañca, Šsp, Karunāp, Samādhi and Lal and many others, see: Dayal, p. 80, Edgerton, p. 402 and Lamotte, p. 1120. See also Gethin (1987, p. 661) for references in Sarvāstivāda literature and, of course, for a complete table of references in Pāli sources.
760. The most common specimen of such bodhipākṣika quotations have been conveniently collected by
similar phrasing. These are the Akn and Arthavniścayasyātra (Arthav). I have already pointed to the far-reaching borrowing between the Akn and Bdp and so resemblances in the wording of the bodhipāksika are not surprising. Of greater interest are the parallels between the Bdp and Arthav, since they represent texts of rather different orientation and purpose.761 Here, the borrowing is only partial (affecting merely the faculties (indriya) and noble eightfold path (āryāstāṅgamārga)) and appears to be indirect.762 Comparison with the wording in the Bdp and Akn reveals a very close verbal proximity with that of the Akn that suggests that the Arthav adopted the passages on the indriya and āryāstāṅgamārga from the Akn—not from the Bdp.763 While the dating of the Arthav is, as always, problematic, analysis of its contents has shown that most of its portions post-date both the Akn and Bdp by several centuries.764 Assuming the Bdp’s influence on the Akn, we have a textual lineage that covered may be as many as five centuries, starting with the Bdp’s lending to the Akn from which its contents reached the Arthav, to be finally included in the Śiks, where the indriya section is also quoted from the Akn.765

The Bdp’s apparent uniqueness in description does not extend to the spirit of its bodhipāksika exposition. Virtually every aspect raised has counterparts in meaning in some other bodhipāksika discussion elsewhere in Mahāyāna works.

Starting with the smṛtyupasthāna (the second type of ‘skill’ not cited in the heading), the proposition is that each type of mindfulness combats one of the principal four misconceptions (viparyāsa)766; this is frequent among post-canonical strands of Buddhist literature. Though not found in the nikāya, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma adopted it as the chief task of the smṛtyupasthāna and it is also found in most Mahāyāna treatises on the subject.767

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761. Unlike the Bdp, the Arthav is a highly technical work consisting of stereotyped explanations of twenty-seven groups of practices. Likened by Ferrari in contents and nature to the Dhṣgr and Mvy, it proceeds step by step through the aggregates, elements, sensefields, bodhipāksika, pratisamvid, etc., on each of which it contains definition-like descriptions. For an assessment of its contents, see the introductions to Ferrari’s and Samtani’s editions of the Arthav.

762. Arthav (S), pp. 32.6–33.1 for the indriya; pp.320–22 for the āryāstāṅgamārga.

763. I have given the Sanskrit text of the Arthav’s indriya and āryāstāṅgamārga sections in notes to the edition.


766. On the misconceptions, see: A II, p. 52; Vibh, p. 451; Kośa, v, p. 21; Amṛt (B), pp. 226–227; Mpps, ii, p. 925; iii, p. 1150.

767. In the nikāya, the connection between the vipallāsā and satipaṭṭhāna is not clearly stated. See, however, A
drawing on these traditions, the Bdp confirms that to consider the body mindfully—internally and externally—leads to a pure body of sound conduct. The same holds true for the discussions of feeling, thought and dharma that explain mindfulness as distinguishing pleasant from unpleasant feeling, permanence from impermanence and self from non-self. But the Bdp differs in the stress it places on viparyāsa itself. When discussing kāyasmrtyupasthāna, for instance, it is only in the very last passage that the issue of purity/impurity is raised. Much of the preceding material revolves around the theory of non-self with regard to the body and the use to which the body is put. With the exception of vedanāsmrtyupasthāna, that is entirely dedicated to the correct interpretation of feeling, very little is also said about viparyāsa in the remaining bases of mindfulness. Both cittasmrtyupasthāna and dharmasmrtyupasthāna touch on viparyāsa almost incidentally and give greater consideration to issues that develop from the affirmation of impermanence and non-self. In the discussion of mindfulness concerning thought it is the distinction between ‘creation’ and ‘foundation of thought’ that stands in the foreground, whereas in the exposition of mindfulness concerning dharma the concept of dharma-sameness prevails.

In addition to the references to the viparyāsa there is one more element in the Bdp that is common to all four types of mindfulness. This is the adaptation of the individual members to the bodhisattva’s concern for the welfare of sentient beings. When speaking of kāyasmrtyupasthāna, the Bdp commits the body to universal subsistence, to the conversion of gods and men and the postponement of entry into nirvāṇa. Likewise, investigation into feeling is explicitly aimed at explaining feeling to others. Through mindfulness concerning thought the bodhisattva acquires the paracittajñāna that allows him to perceive samsāric delusion and, in turn, sustains the resolve for universal liberation. A similar mechanism is

II, p. 52 and Vibh, p. 376. For the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, see: Amṛt (B), pp. 203–4; Kośa, vi, p. 162. For the Mahāyāna, see: Kp, pp. 137–9, § 94–95; Red, pp. 236.2.8–239.4.3; Arthav-† (S), p. 208; Śrāv-bh (Sh), pp. 303–12; Mpps, iii, pp. 1144, 1150.

768. R, folio 651.6.
769. Reference to these position can be found on R, folio 652.1–653.2; folio 655.1–7; folio 596.1–660.1 respectively.
770. This is a common feature of the discussions of the smrtyupasthāna in the Mahāyāna. In the Kāśyapaparivarta (Kp, p. 139, § 95), for instance, these notions become the raison d’être of the smrtyupasthāna exposition. In most traditional accounts, eradication of the notion of a self is only a side-issue to the bases of mindfulness. See, for example: D II, pp. 290–314; M III, pp. 83–5, 135–6; S V, pp. 149–50; Kośa, vi, pp. 159–161; Vism, p. 464. There is, however, one passage in the Dighanikāya that appears to be heralding future concerns (D II, p. 216).
771. See: R, folio 656.3–657.6; folio 660.1–661.3 respectively.
772. R, folio 651.7.
773. R, folio 652.6–653.2.
774. R, folio 657.7–658.2.
at work in the examination of dharma. Having recognised the sameness of non-arising dharma, the bodhisattva sees that all dharma are pure. And yet, retaining awareness of the suffering in saṃsāra he does not give way to the conclusions of no-birth, but reappears in order to look after sentient beings.\footnote{775}

It is hardly surprising that the commitment to universal liberation should figure in the smṛtyupasthāna of a work such as the Bdp. It is also found in the Rcd and referred to in number of other bodhisattva scriptures.\footnote{776} Other widely shared points include references to the mahābhūta and Tathāgata-body in the kāyasmṛtyupasthāna\footnote{777}, the enumeration of the different types of sensations in the vedanāsmṛtyupasthāna\footnote{778} and, of course, the philosophic background postulating a vision of reality that—exceeding the limits of suffering, impurity, non-self and impermanence—envisages universal purity, sameness and non-origination.\footnote{779}

The most remarkable among the bodhipākṣika in the Bdp are probably the perfect efforts (samvakrahāna).\footnote{780} Where other accounts explain their operations rather mechanically in terms of types of vigour (vidhavirya), the Bdp presents a logically coherent explanation of their functioning.\footnote{781} Once again the key term in its explication is correct reflection (yonīṣo manasakāra). As a conceptual synonym for zeal (chanda) concerned with avoiding unwholesome dharma, it stands at the very heart of the bodhisattva’s spiritual training.\footnote{782} Causing persistant preventive refrant from non-virtue and the withdrawal from already produced unwholesome dharma, it becomes the cognitive foundation for the training in general and precludes the presence of unskilful dharma. The nature of the unskilful dharma, however, is kept rather vague; they are not characterised beyond their incompatibility with morality, meditation and wisdom. Conversely, we learn about the factors that lead to their presence and the antidotes that do away with them. Epitomised by the root evils of desire,
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hatred and delusion, they arise from attachment, anger and ignorance and are removed by considering the antidotes of impurity, benevolence and causality.\textsuperscript{783} By virtue of dharmasameness, pacification itself induces abandonment in the sense of non-apprehension (anupalambha) and hence becomes a stepping-stone in the bodhisattva’s attitude towards reality.\textsuperscript{784}

Having distinguished virtuous from non-virtuous dharma through correct reflection, the bodhisattva applies himself to generating wholesome dharma.\textsuperscript{785} This process consists of three phases, that is, initial intent (chanda), acquisition of diligence (vīrya) and perseverance (āśhitiṃkriyā). While each of these is fundamental to the planting of roots of virtue, it is only through their combined presence in the practitioner’s mind that virtue hitherto unarisen is produced. The magnitude of the bodhisattva’s aspiration means that this operation knows no limit.\textsuperscript{786} Motivated by the commitment to universal welfare, the bodhisattva does not allow his newly accumulated merit to disperse uncontrolled. On the contrary, he goes to great lengths in securing the roots of virtue in order to transform them into enlightenment. Such roots persist, says the Bdp, because the thought that led to their becoming was itself supramundane and because they are founded in lokottara practices independent of the traidhātuka. By this context, the Bdp indicates that the generation of wholesome dharma itself pertains to the lokottara realm.\textsuperscript{787} Since the perfect efforts are anchored in laukika practice, the Bdp appears to be drawing a line between a laukika effort and a lokottara realisation of that effort.\textsuperscript{788}

In a way, the Bdp therefore has accommodated its discussion of the samyakprahāṇa to the ancient belief that the four correct efforts embrace the whole Buddhist path. Already characterised in the nikāya as general endeavours of restraint, abandonment, development and protection—and thus furnishing each part of the formula with a positive content—the

\textsuperscript{783} R, folio 673.5–7.
\textsuperscript{784} R, folio 673.7–674.1.
\textsuperscript{785} For the Śbh (Śrāv-bh (Sh), pp. 318.12–320.19), a person who cultivates the samyakprahāṇa possesses eight types of effort-predisposition (prahānamsamskāra) that are designed to destroy his propensities (anusaya) and to fulfil his meditations. These are (1) zeal (chanda), (2) endeavour (vīyāma) corresponding to vigour (vīrya), (3) faith (śraddhā), (4) tranquillity (praśrabdha), (5) mindfulness (smṛti), (6) awareness (samprajānya), (7) volition (cetanā) and (8) equipoise (upeksā).
\textsuperscript{786} R, folio 674.2–3.
\textsuperscript{787} R, folio 674.7–675.2.
\textsuperscript{788} Such a position would seem to echo the view of the Vibhaṅga commentary (Vibh-a, p. 219; ref. Gethin, p. 630) which distinguishes between lokiya and lokottara interpretation of the sammappaddhāna. Here, depending whether the perfect efforts pertain to the ‘prior stage to all’ (sabbapubbabhāga)—which represents a kind of preparatory phase indicating advance to the practice proper—or go beyond this stage, the sammappaddhāna are either worldly or transcendental in nature.

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samayakprahāṇa epitomise for the Bdp a blueprint of the course of practice complete in itself. The difference between the nikāya and Bdp are that while the former provide a specific focus for the four practices (restraint being characterised as the guarding of senses; abandonment as the renunciation of thoughts governed by desire and hatred; development as the cultivation of the bodhyānga and protection as the contemplation of ugliness), the latter puts principles rather than individual practices in the foreground.

In most discussions of the bodhipākṣika, probably all according to Gethin, the practices to follow on the samayakprahāṇa are the bases of success (ṛddhipāda). In the Bdp, however, the ṛddhipāda are not discussed following the samayakprahāṇa. In fact, there is no full treatment of the ṛddhipāda anywhere in the Bdp, though its author must have been aware of them because of several brief references to the ṛddhipāda in the Dhyāna Chapter. Today, it is difficult to establish the reasons that prompted their omission without comment in the Prajñā Chapter. A contributing factor for this may have been the consideration that the ṛddhipāda are not an absolute requirement for the destruction of the āsrama. Being particularly associated with mastery over meditative attainments and powers, they are not part of those practices that aim at wisdom-acquisition, but pertain to the domain of meditation (dhyāna). We have seen that for the Bdp the single most important means to prajñā is investigation (pravicaya). Now, if we adopt Cousins’s distinction between the samatha- and vipaśyanāyāna, investigation is doubtlessly closer to the ‘vehicle of insight’ so neglect of the ṛddhipāda might almost be expected. Moreover, the fact that they have already been referred to in the Dhyāna Chapter—albeit only sketchily—might have been reason enough for their omission in the prajñā context.

Bypassing the ṛddhipāda, the Bdp therefore moves directly from the samayakprahāṇa to the faculties (indriya). However, of all the faculties’ traditional members only śraddhā is given full consideration. Characterised as confidence in the existence of other worlds, in the law of karma, in the bodhisattvacayā, in causality and in the ontological doctrines of the Mahāyāna,

792. R, folio 569.3–570.2
Note that the ṛddhipāda are also omitted from a list of bodhipākṣika dharma on folio 277.7.
793. Compare, for instance, the lists of khīnāsāvaraṇa that are found in A V, p. 175 and Pāṭis, ii, pp. 173–4 with that of the D III, pp. 283–4 where the iddhipāda have been omitted (Gethin, 1987, pp. 496–7, 498).
794. Cousins, BSHS, pp. 56–68.
795. For a definition of the five spiritual indriya, see: Kośa (ii, pp. 154–7) and Siddhi (pp. 309–314).
faith becomes in the Bdp very much a spiritual foundation.\textsuperscript{796} Again, this role of faith is already attested in the nikāya\textsuperscript{797} where—essentially affective in nature and directed at the Buddha or his enlightenment—it is to instigate and set in motion a process culminating in wisdom, for which it also provides continuing support.\textsuperscript{798} As if to underline this point, the remaining indriya are only mentioned by name and in relation to the forces that shape the succession of their occurrence. In order to obtain the result in which he believes, the bodhisattva makes an effort (vīrya).\textsuperscript{799} When he exerts effort, mindfulness (smṛti) is initiated. From mindfulness springs concentration of mind (samādhi) as to avoid distraction and from that arises consciousness that corresponds to the object (prajñā). The logic behind this concatenation is perfectly sound and it is perhaps not very surprising that there is an almost verbatim passage in the Koṣa.\textsuperscript{800}

Of still greater interest are the advantages that accrue from the indriya. For the Bdp, these are of the highest order since they include the buddha-qualities and access to the stage of prediction (vyakaranabhūmi) which is generally held to correspond to the acalabhūmi.\textsuperscript{801} Most other schemes place mastery over the indriya well before the eighth stage.\textsuperscript{802} Yet, the association of the faculties with the event of the prediction might provide the key to their

\textsuperscript{796} This, of course, is true for Buddhism in general. See, for example, the nature and names of the seven categories of ārya where the śraddhānusārin occupies the lowest rank (Koṣa, vi, 273–282). Note, however, that in Koṣa (vi, p. 289) all indriya are actually aimed at supramundane dharma. For the Theravāda, the five spiritual indriya are the exclusive domain of the ārya-pudgala and are therefore always lokottara (Gethin, p. 264).

\textsuperscript{797} M I, pp. 142, 294, 444, 479; S IV, pp. 226, 298–9; A III, p. 165.

\textsuperscript{798} Research documenting the reciprocal relationship between śraddhā and prajñā has been carried out by a number of scholars. For summaries of their findings, see: Carter, Dhamma, Tokyo, 1978, pp. 103–6; Ergardt, 1977, pp. 144–6; La Vallée Poussin, 1908, ii, pp. 32–43.

\textsuperscript{799} According to the Abhidh-sam (R), pp. 7–8, śraddhā first must provide a basis to chanda that, in turn, becomes a foundation for the generation of vīrya.

\textsuperscript{800} Koṣa, vi, p. 287

A similar relation between the five indriya is also posited in the Mpps and Rcd. The Mpps includes, like the Bdp, faith in the bodhisattva training, faith in causality and moral integrity and confidence in emptiness, sameness, etc., as manifestations of the śraddhendriya (Mpps, iii, pp. 1195–96). For the Rcd, it is above all rejection of the heretical views positing a self (ātmadrṣṭi) and faith in buddha-qualities (pp. 240.5.6–41.2.7). Compare these with the expositions on śraddhā given in the Śbh and Kp. But for one or two minor points, their explanations have virtually nothing in common with that of the Bdp. In the Kp we learn that the five faculties function as antidotes to doubt, inertness, forgetfulness, distraction of mind, absent-mindedness and misconceptions (pp. 137–39, § 95–96). In the Śrāvakabhūmi, the faculty of faith should be taken as the four types of faith verified, vigour as the perfect efforts, mindfulness as the bases of mindfulness, meditation as the four dhyāna and wisdom as insight into the noble truths (Śrāv-bh (S), p. 232.7–18; cf. Mvs (N), p. 53.4–8).

\textsuperscript{801} The various types and occasions at which predictions to buddhahood take place, I have discussed in note 233 of my translation of chapter eleven.

\textsuperscript{802} According to the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Koṣa, vi, pp. 287–89, Abhidh-d, p. 362.16–17), the attainments of the indriya correspond to the kṣānti stage of the nirvedhabhāgiya that, traditionally, is situated on the prayogamārga. For alternative locations on the path, but always situated on the prayogamārga, see: Abhidh-sam (R), pp. 116–7 and Abhidh-h (W), ii, p. 140. For Mahāyāna schemes, see: Daśa-bh p. 39.3–4; Bbh, pp. 338.24–341.6.
unusual arrangement after the bodhyanga and āryāstāṅgamārga. But more of this later.803

The discussion of the five powers (bala) does not pose any of such difficulties.804 Conforming to the well-known proposition that the powers represent little more than an advanced, actively more effective phase of indriya practice, the Bdp’s main concern is to illustrate the bodhisattva’s invincibility in śraddhā, viṛya, etc.805 To this effect, the Bdp sets each of the bala in contexts that render their practice particularly laborious and concludes that even in the most adverse situations faith, etc., is unassailable at the level of bala. That is to say, the bodhisattva’s faith in the Dharma is not deflected by the treachery of Māra.806 He is unsurpassed in vigour by even the combined determination of all gods and men. His mindfulness cannot be shattered by intrusion of any type of defilement. When contemplating, he maintains deep absorption during the first dhyāna regardless of persisting in altruistic conduct that involves him in the bustle of worldly life; he sustains investigation during the second dhyāna, sympathetic joy during the third dhyāna and finally disquiet at universal suffering during the fourth dhyāna. Indefeatable in cognition, he acquires the most formidable crafts and skills that, springing from wisdom and knowledge, he puts to use in his quest of liberation.807 The presence of such impediments is, of course, far from accidental. For, his initial resolve (pranidhāna) constrains not only escape from the pressures of samāsāra but, more to the point, actually requires that

803. It is evident that the only viewpoint from which the Bdp examines the faculties is a spiritual one. That is to say, it excludes from consideration the remaining seventeen constituent indriya that shape human experience in general (La Vallée Poussin, Nirvāṇa, 1925, Paris, p. 237). For the Mś, in contrast, it is chiefly these ‘controlling principles’ that stand in the centre of its discussion of ‘skill’ in indriya. Giving the illusion of dominion in the sense that certain powers are held to fall to specific faculties for specific purposes—e.g., the eye having the ability to see objects and hence be sovereign over the object—the Mś (Mś (N), p. 46.23) warns that there is no agent that rules over these faculties since they are independent. For our purposes, it is of interest that the five spiritual indriya are thought to pertain to worldly purification (laukikavaiśuddhi) only, while the ‘faculties of knowing what is not known’ (anājñatamājñāsyaṃindriya)—the second type of purification—are sovereign with regard to transcendental purification (lokottaraviśuddhi). This confirms what we learned about their status from Sarvāstivāda schemes and tallies with the positioning in the Akn and its commentary. The anājñatamājñāsyaṃindriya are manifest on the darānamārga and inspire desire to know the four truths, etc., (Kośa, ii, p. 117) while lokottaraviśuddhi is ‘eradication of defilements through transcendental conduct’ (lokottaramārgenañkalīsanāṃ prahānam; Mś-I, p. 156.7).

804. For parallels in the fruits of bala see: Red (pp. 241.2.7-242.1.4) and Amrt (B), p. 205.
805. For Pāli references to this effect, see: M I, pp. 121, 168, 244; S V, p. 220; Pāṭis, i, pp. 6-7 and Atthasālīṇī, p. 295. A good Sanskrit reference is found in the commentary to the Arthav (Ś), pp. 226-7; cf. Kośa, vi, p. 286.
806. See, Red (p. 241.2.7-3.1) where we come across exactly the same theme in conjunction with the śraddhābala. The Red abounds with other, rather interesting, manifestations of bala (pp. 241.2.7-42.1.4). For, instance, it proposes that śraddhā causes the acquisition of the seven riches (5.4) and power over zealous application (adhimukti); power of viṛya leads to the accomplishment of the bodhyanga (5.4) and power over liberation (3.7); smṛti entails the six recollections of the bodhisattva (5.5) and power over the fifth dharmaskandha (3.7); dhyāna eliminates the seven bases of consciousness and prompts great mental power (3.8); prajñā removes the eightfold mistaken conduct (5.5-6) and purifies the conduct of all beings (3.8).
he expose himself to the very conditions from which he seeks release. Taking account of these constraints, the Bdp merges two concepts in its exposition of the five bala. On the one hand, it follows the traditional line that the bala are superior to the indriya in attainment, while on the other hand, it employs typical bodhisattva imagery to illustrate the origin, scope and nature of the obstacles that must be overcome by the cultivation of faith, etc.\textsuperscript{808}

Few traces of such adaptation are found in the treatment of the factors of enlightenment (bodhyan	extgreek{g}). Emulating the bodhip	extgreek{k}sika tradition of early Buddhism, the Bdp provides rather terse, definitive accounts of the focus and nature of each of the seven limbs. Judging by my reading of s	extgreek{utra} material, its explanations have no parallels in other texts. In spirit and practice, they correspond for the most part to ancient interpretations. Only in the ontological domain do differences prevail. For example, there is the conclusion in the smrtibodhy	extgreek{g}a that the recollection of dharma establishes knowledge of the lack of own-being of dharma—an opinion seemingly at odds with the ancient ideas of reality.

The Bdp explains smrti in terms of recollection and presence of mind that, manifesting careful examination and analysis, command a vision of things just as they are. Next, the bodhy	extgreek{g}a of Dharma-discrimination (dharmapravicaya) is explained in terms of contextually adjusted approaches to the various types of instructions that make up the Dharma. As Gethin shows, this interpretation is one of several aspects that stand at the very heart of the concept of dharmapravicaya in the nik	extgreek{y}a.\textsuperscript{809} Vigour (v	extgreek{y}a) is portrayed as a quality of strength and dedication, specifically directed at those factors that contribute to awakening, viz., Dharma-discrimination, purification, meditation and equipoise.

This choice of ‘vigour targets’ contains a clue to the bond between the next two bodhy	extgreek{g}a, namely, joy (pr	extgreek{ti}) and tranquillity (pra	extgreek{r}abdha). Traditionally linked as factors that bring about a positive mental disposition, pr	extgreek{ti} and pra	extgreek{r}abdha are intimately related to each other in practice and result.\textsuperscript{810} The nature of this relationship is best summed up in the ancient

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[808.] R, folio 679.6
Note also that preference is given to the bala over the indriya as practices leading to the accumulation of pristine cognition. Here, as in the bala section proper, each of the bala is specifically adapted to the bodhisattva training, when it says that faith promotes reverence; vigour is targeted at learning; mindfulness prevents oblivion of the thought of enlightenment; meditation helps faith in dharma-sam	extgreek{ness} and that wisdom assists acquiring the power of learning (R, folio 646.1–3). For examples of sources where reference to the bala (when subsequent to the indriya) are given only scant attention, see: Abhidh-sam (R), pp. 123–4; Amrt (B), p. 205; Mv	extgreek{s} (N), p. 52.20; Mpps, iii, p. 1200; Satya-s (S), p. 43.


\item[810.] See, for instance, Mah	extgreek{pp}arir	extgreek{v}	extgreek{a}nas	extgreek{t}ra (Waldschmidt, 1956, p. 292, 30.27) where we read that joy (pr	extgreek{ti}) associated with the body leads to tranquillity (pra	extgreek{r}abdha) of the mind (cf. Mvy 1587–95).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
formula, saying that “the body of one whose mind is joyful becomes tranquil and one whose body is tranquil experiences happiness”. As this cohesion of emotional fulfilment and mental quietude is mediated through the body and involves purification of body and mind in meditation, priti and praśrabdha are closely coupled and, to some degree, dependent on each other. It is not a coincidence that we also find close terminological parallels echoing this link in the Bdp’s description of the bodhyānga of joy and tranquility.

The sixth bodhyānga, meditation (samādhi), has two aspects, on the one hand effecting realisation of the Dharma and, on the other hand, awakening to the workings of dharma. In a sense, this characterisation goes beyond the standard definitions of the samādhibodhyānga which content themselves with one-pointed, sustained meditative examination of the nature of dharma. However, since both aspects contribute equally to the destruction of the depravities (āsrava) and go hand in hand, this deviation should perhaps not be given undue weight. Equipoise (upekṣā), to early Buddhism, is essentially a feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant (aduḥkhasukhā vedanā). As a bodhyānga, however, it is less a feeling pertaining to the vedana-skandha than a skilful mental factor of the samskāraskandha. Having the quality of balance, specifically regarding co-nascent dharma—that in the context of the bodhyaṅga must mean perfect balance between smṛti, etc.—it settles a restless mind into a state of equipoise thereby rendering it conducive to enlightenment. It is exactly these concerns that are addressed in the upekṣābodhyānga of the Bdp. Eschewing the latent tendencies to attraction and dislike, it is characterised as a quiescent mental state that is not diverted by the extremes of worldly experience. In other words, it is thought freed from all types of turbulence and anxiety, unaffected by hatred and desire and in harmony with the noble path.

The idea that praśrabdha affects body and mind in equal measure is disputed by the Sarvāstivāda because it would expose a factor of awakening, belonging by definition to the lokottara path, to the impurities of the body pertaining to the laukika domain. For a full discussion, see: Kośa, ii, pp. 157–59.

Cousins, Religion, III (1973), pp. 120–2.

Amṛt (B), p. 206:
“Ici, quand il médite, le corps et la pensée sont légers, dociles et en sécurité (yogakṣema) et ils s’adaptent à la concentration (samādhyamuvartin)—c’est le membre relaxation.” Cf. Mpps, iii, p. 1202.

Vism, xiv, p. 139; Mpps, iii, p. 1201; Amṛt (B), p. 207; MsI, p. 144.18–19; cf. Rcd, p. 242.1.4–5.2
For a considered discussion of the operational scope of meditation in Theravāda Buddhism, see: Cousins, Religion, iii, 1973, pp. 115–131 (especially, p. 122).


A good account of the different viewpoints on the intent, scope and operations of upekkhā in early Buddhist literature is found in Aronson, 1979, pp. 1–18. For a resourceful interpretation of Aronson’s findings, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 302–8.
The noble eightfold path (āryāstāṅgamārga) is itself the object of investigation under the ninth type of ‘skill’. Here, in contrast to its ‘mainstream’ description of the bodhyāṅga, the Bdp casts aside the old-established explanations of the nikāya to replace them with a set of altogether new interpretations. The picture that emerges of the eight limbs—although in spirit compatible with the ideal of the path itself—is to my knowledge unique to the Bdp.820

I shall give here a brief outline of the standard presentation in the nikāya to show just how much it differs.821 In this scheme, right view (sammaddīṭṭhi) is knowledge concerning the constituents of the four noble truths and becomes accordingly a form of wisdom. Right resolve (sammāsankappa) covers three areas of thought, that is, thoughts of non-desire (nekkhamma), non-hatred (avāpāda) and non-violence (avihīṃsā). Right speech (sammāvācā) is manifested by refrain from falsehood (musāvāda), slander (pisunāvācā), harsh speech (pharussavācā) and idle talk (samphappalāpa). It is right conduct (sammākammanta) to refrain from assaults on sentient beings (pāṇatiṇī), not taking what is not given (adinndāna) and avoidance of violations of celibacy (abrahmacariya). The contents of right livelihood (sammājīva) are rarely spelled out, but generally explained as “renouncing wrong modes of livelihood and making a living by means of right livelihood” (micchājīvaṃ pahāya sammājīvena jīvitam kappeti). Right effort (sammāvāyāma) is explained in terms of the basic sammappadhāna formula in the same way that it is found in the Bdp. Right mindfulness (sammāsati) is characterised by the basic satipatthāna formula822 and right meditation (sammāsamādhi) is illustrated by way of the customary sketch of the four jhāna.

Before contrasting this presentation with the eightfold path in the Bdp, I wish to make three general remarks. First, as already observed by Gethin, the wording and type of characterisation of the eight members is not coincidental, but was designed to link into many of the regularly recurring themes of the nikāya.823 This might have put constraints on its phrasing and

819. The discussion of the individual factors of enlightenment extends in the Bdp over three folios, starting on folio 662.7 and ending on folio 665.4.
820. To be precise, it is only found in the textual lineage where the Bdp appears to be the foundation text. As indicated, it is also contained almost verbatim in the Akn (pp. 70.4.4–71.2.1) and Arthav (S), pp. 320–322.
821. M III, p. 251; see also: D II, p. 311; S V, pp. 8–10; Patis, i, pp. 40–2; Vibh, pp. 104–5. The bare list of the eight factors appears, of course, at many more places throughout the nikāya. According to Gethin (1987, p. 314), it is itemised no less than sixty-four times.
Prajñāpāramitā
terminology. Second, several of the definitions have close parallels where their members form part of other sets of practice. So, right view, right effort, right mindfulness and right meditation all display practically identical explanations in the faculties (and powers) of wisdom, vigour, mindfulness and meditation. Finally, the contents of right speech, right conduct and right livelihood epitomise the very concerns of the early Buddhist ideal of morality. Recurring as principal items in the silakkhandhavagga of the Dighanikāya, identical to four of the pañcasila and corresponding to six of the ten kuśalakarmapatha, they rank among the most visible indicators of a monk’s spiritual progress.

If we turn now to the description of the noble eightfold path in the Bdp, we immediately notice that such features are absent. In content, none of the descriptions of the eight factors shows any traces of linking either its definition with the wider frame of reference of the bodhisattva training—be it through the inclusion of key terminology or adaptation of otherwise well-known formulae—or to secure moral conduct as its spiritual epicentre. On the contrary, the whole presentation has a generality of tone that is practically devoid of references to concrete practices.

The first limb, right view (samyagārṣṭi), is explained in terms antithetical to its opposite, wrong view (mithyārṣṭi), and displays little positive argument. This also holds true for the explanation of right resolve (samyaksamkalpa), only declaring that right resolve does not result in rāga, dveṣa or moha, but that it establishes the five pure aggregates (dharmaskandha) co-resident with bodhi. The following three factors, that is, right speech (samyavac), right conduct (samyakkarmanta) and right livelihood (samyagājīva), traditionally epitomising ethical integrity, do not contain any of the ‘morality markers’ that are brought up in the early formula. In their place, the Bdp rather sweepingly defines right speech as intrinsically worthwhile and innocuous dialogue that abounds with beneficial application and is persuasive of the truth of the sameness all paths. Right conduct is measured by the kind of reward it is likely to

824. For concurring definitions with the indriya and bala see, for instance: S V, pp. 196–200.
826. R, folio 666.5–6

According to the Kp (p. 209, § 144), cited here in Weller’s German translation, these five skandha define nirvāṇa:

“Die geistige Sammlung, die Weisheit, die Erlösung, die Schau des Erkenntnisses der Erlösung, ihr Ehrwürdigen, wandern nicht durch die Wiedergeburten und erlöschen nicht völlig. Durch diese Gegebenheiten, ihr Ehrwürdigen, wird das Nirvāṇa angedeutet, doch sind diese Gegebenheiten leer, abgesondert, nicht zu fassen als reale Objekte.”

For Pāli references, see: D III, p. 279; S I, p. 99; A I, p. 162. Alternative titles of the dharmaskandha are found in Dhgr § 23 (lokottaraskandha); Mvy 104–8 (asamasamāskandha); Kośa, i, p. 48; vi, p. 297; Kośavyākhyā, p. 607.10 (anāsravaskandha), (ref. Lamotte).
produce. *A fortiori*, it excludes unwholesome action, but—aspiring to a lasting cessation of all consequences of action—is aimed ultimately at the exhaustion of all types of activity.

The next limb, right livelihood, being characterised by a series of concrete attributes, is the single exception to these general descriptions. Its content is the ideal of mendicant life and, in particular, the four precepts of the *āryavamsa* conduct.\(^{827}\) Besides, it is free from foolishness, hypocrisy and violence but governed by modesty, vigilance, contentedness and moral purity. In spirit, many these characteristics are very close to the path ideal that was introduced in the *silapāramitā* which might, therefore, be legitimately taken to provide for the moral base in the eightfold path. The references to the mendicant ideal and, specifically, to the *āryavamsa* seem to suggest, however, that these facets go well beyond the moral domain, and trace, in fact, a paradigm of the bodhisattva’s way of life interpreted in terms of right livelihood.

Right effort (*samyagvyāvāma*) marks a return to the rather condensed and yet imprecise explanations. Accordingly, we learn very little of its exact application other than generalities. Right effort is held to advocate virtuous conduct against mistaken conduct, to promote the eradication of the propensities of defilement and to introduce to the truths and the noble path itself.

In its explanation of right mindfulness (*samyaksmṛti*)—notably eschewing references to the stock formula of *smṛtyupasthāna*—the *Bdp* draws on elements that pertain to mindfulness in the *nikāya*.\(^{828}\) That is to say, it is seen as a self-possessed, composed and attentive state of mental awareness manifesting in the practitioner a high degree of presence of mind.\(^{829}\) Then, it examines the phenomena that surround the bodhisattva and tests them for their usefulness or inadequacy—as the case may be—in relation to the path. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, *samyaksmṛti* is a force of recollection calling to mind the commitment to the path and, by implication, to universal liberation.

It is this concern with the suffering of beings that also resonates in the definition of right meditation (*samyaksamādhi*). Its psychological content—in principle no doubt related to the experience of the śrāvaka—is declared as composure towards reality, particularly in view of

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827. R, folio 667.4.
829. This association with mental awareness is not particular to the *nikāya*, but became a generally characteristic of mindfulness. For the Sarvāstivāda, we read:

“The faculty of mindfulness is a name for accurate designation concerning the body, etc., as it is discerned by wisdom. A mind that has become acquainted with [mindfulness] does not experience loss of object. Such lack of loss is the faculty of mindfulness” (*Abhidh-d*, p. 360.14–16).
its constituents (*dharma*). To the *Bdp*, however, this alone does not suffice to turn ‘meditation’ into ‘right meditation’. For this transformation to take place, it is vital that serenity is acquired with a higher, very specific goal in mind, namely, the liberation of all sentient beings. As if to underline this element of altruism, preaching is included as an important aspect of right meditation.830 This adjustment grew no doubt from the re-invigorated concern for the fate of the world the Buddhist communities in ancient India became preoccupied with and so is by no means coincidental.

The differences in approach between the path formulae of the *nikāya* and *Bdp* are so evident that they require, I think, no further illustration. As shown, apart from the reinterpretation of right meditation, most do not affect the spiritual core of the path, but centre on stylistic matters and detail of explanation. Most striking perhaps is the lack of reference to key bodhisattva terminology and the little use of established formulae. This is not a general feature of *āryāstāṅgamārga* descriptions in Mahāyāna literature. Usually, the eight factors are harmonised with the other bodhisattva practices in terms of a large degree of common vocabulary.831 A good example of this is the account given in the *Rcd*.832 Its explanations of the individual members are interspersed with a wealth of key concepts that occur elsewhere in connection with the bodhisattva training. Thus, right view is explained in terms of *śūnyatā* and *advaya*833; right resolve consists of ‘skill’ in *samatha* and *vipaśyanā*, producing insight into *dharma*-sameness834; right livelihood is specifically developed in order to purify and ripen other beings835; mindfulness means, above all, recollection of the practice of the *pāramitā* and postponement of entry into *nirvāṇa*836 while meditation, although overtly concerned with the four noble truths conduces to a profound understanding of emptiness and all-knowing.837

A similar abundance of key terminology is manifest in the Mahāyāna interpretation of the *āryāstāṅgamārga* given in the *Mpps*.838 Here, however, emphasis is not so much placed on specific bodhisattva practices as on philosophical concepts, such as *bhūtalakṣaṇa*, *anabhisamkāralakṣaṇa*, *śūnyatā*, *sarvajñānjñāna* and *sarvakarmasamātā*. Although not as

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831. E.g., *Śsp* (*Ghoṣa*), pp. 1427–39; *Ug*, p. 269.3.8–4.2; *Rcd*, pp. 242.5.2–44.3.6; *Arthav* (*S*), pp. 34–42; *Śrāv-bh* (*Sh*), pp. 327.8–330.18; *Mpps*, iii, pp. 1203–7; *Abhidh-sam* (*R*), pp. 123–4.
832. 24, pp. 242.5.2–244.2.6.
833. *op. cit.*, pp. 243.1.3–2.5.
834. *op. cit.*, pp. 243.3.3.
836. *op. cit.*, pp. 244.4.1–8.
837. *op. cit.*, pp. 244.2.2–5.
Prajñāpāramitā convincing an example as the account in the Red, the Mpps nevertheless documents the tendency in the Mahāyāna to adjust the descriptions of the eightfold path to contemporary thinking. For good reason, this trend is not manifested in the Bdp.

Interpolated into the discussion of the bodhipākṣika dharma, between the noble eightfold path and the perfect efforts, is an exposition of ‘skill’ in perfect mental quietude (śamatha) and insight (vipaśyanā).839 One key element in the description of śamatha is mental composure (cittasānta). Effecting serenity, contentment, patience, ease of mind and imperturbability with regard to the senses, it stands at the very heart of the bodhisattva’s meditative experience and is as such recognised in the Bdp. The attainment of composure itself signals the eradication of a series of factors certain to obstruct absorption. According to the Bhāvanākrama, these include indolence (kausidyā), forgetfulness with regard to the object of meditation (ālambanavismarana), distraction (vikṣepa), agitation (auddhatya), absence of effort (avyāyama) and effort (vyāyama).840 In the Bdp, none of these is explicitly referred to, but we find their presence in a number of terms that betray their elimination.841 Further details of the meditative contents are revealed by the inclusion of reflection (manasakṣara) and thorough examination (pratyavekṣanā).842 According to the Bhāvanākrama, reflection plays an important role particularly during the first phase of śamatha practice where it is concerned with the body and dharma—objects that are also given in the Bdp. It is essentially a preparatory practice, technically known as ‘images devoid of concepts’ (nirvikalpakapratibimba), because the bodhisattva has not yet succeeded in evaluating their true value, that leads to full investigation (‘images accompanied by concepts’ savikalpakapratibimba) during vipaśyanā.843 As structure,

839. For references to śamatha/vipaśyanā in the nikāya, see: M I, p. 494; III, pp. 289, 297; S IV, pp. 194–95, 295, 350, 352; V, p. 52; A II, p. 157. For the Mahāyāna, see the contribution made by the Samdhis on śamatha/vipaśyanā (Samdhis (ELa), pp. 88.1–97.27). Good expositions in the scholastic literature are found in the Bhāvanākrama (MBT, ii, pp. 205–214; iii, pp. 1–13).

840. MBT, ii, § 14, pp. 207–8; MBT, iii, pp. 9–11.

841. R, folio 669.2–3.

842. At first sight, to find references to pratyavekṣanā and manasakṣara in the śamatha section comes somewhat as a surprise, since both terms are elsewhere specifically associated with vipaśyanā. See, for instance, Sgs, p. 256; Samdhis (ELa), pp. 89, 92, 96 and MBT, iii, pp. 4.16, 5.17. However, as made clear by the context, for the Bdp their focus is not the nature of the pudgala or dharma—as it is during vipaśyanā practice—but the functioning of the yogin’s body. Therefore, in the Bdp they carry less the meaning of the sharp, analytic investigation that is the characteristic of them during vipaśyanā practice than an generally observing purpose. For a discussion of these terms in the context of meditative practice, see: Demiéville, 1987, pp. 79–80.

843. MBT, iii, pp. 1.13–2.5

The Bhāvanākrama stresses that part of this reflection is particularly concerned with the body of the Tathāgata—a topic not mentioned in the Bdp. For a list of alternative objects of meditation during the
the \textit{Bdp} accepts the traditional eight branches of meditation supplemented by the \textit{apramāṇa}—a division also found in the \textit{Saṁdhīs}.\footnote{\textit{Samdhis} (ÉLa), p. 93.1–10} In contrast to the \textit{Bhāvanākrama}\footnote{\textit{MBT}, iii, pp. 3.4–4.12.}, the setting of \textit{samatha} practice and its preparations are little discussed in the \textit{Bdp}, although it indicates that seclusion away from the bustle of worldly life is the ideal location.

The bodhisattva, having come into contact with true reality through reflection, produces insight (\textit{vipaśyāna}) into the nature of reality. For the \textit{Bdp}, this newly won realisation is threefold.\footnote{The threefold division of \textit{vipaśyāna} in the \textit{Bdp} is mirrored in the account of the \textit{Bhāvanākrama} (\textit{MBT}, iii, pp. 5.18–8.17). For an alternative division, see: \textit{Samdhis (ÉLa)}, p. 92.14–30.} First, focused on his own body, it allows him to penetrate its true nature and to conclude that the individual (\textit{pudgala}) does not exist. Then, he widens his field of vision and applies the principles behind this insight to the world at large. Grasping the workings of causality and fruit attainment, he penetrates reality and sees that \textit{dharma} are non-existent (\textit{dharmanairṛatmya}).\footnote{\textit{MBT}, iii, p. 7.14–15.} According to the \textit{Bhāvanākrama}, it is exactly this vision of reality, manifesting insight into \textit{pudgalanairṛatmya} and \textit{dharmanairṛatmya}, that distinguishes \textit{vipaśyāna} from other types of cognition and turns it into correct analysis (\textit{bhūtapratyavēka}).\footnote{\textit{D III}, pp. 213, 273; \textit{M I}, pp. 494, 289; \textit{A II}, pp. 156–7; \textit{Paśīs}, ii, p. 92; See also: \textit{Śīks}, p. 119; \textit{Bbh}, p. 207. 2–6; \textit{Msl}, p. 91.25–26; \textit{MBT}, iii, p. 10.4–7. For further references, see: \textit{Kośa}, viii, p. 131.} Finally, having acquired accurate vision of \textit{dharma} and the context where they occur, the bodhisattva shifts his attention to the objects of his meditation (\textit{ālambana}) only to realise that they also lack own-being (\textit{svabhāva}).\footnote{\textit{R}, folio 670.1–2.} At this stage, his understanding of reality has passed beyond all mental constructions to allow him to perceive the absence of concepts (\textit{nirvikalpa}) and developments (\textit{nisprapañca}).\footnote{\textit{R}, folio 670.6.} Thus accomplished, insight is no longer to him a part of conventional cognition, but rests in equal measure on seeing and non-seeing. Also called perfect seeing (\textit{samyagdarśana}), it establishes him in the highest form of bodhisattva activity that incurs no karmic traces whatsoever.

For this achievement to take place, it is essential that \textit{samatha} and \textit{vipaśyāna} are practised jointly throughout. As the two principal factors in meditation, they are inextricably linked like “two oxen harnessed to a plough”, to quote a canonical simile.\footnote{\textit{R}, folio 670.6.} With well-developed
vipaśyānaḥ but weak samatha, thought is agitated like a lamp exposed to strong winds so that reality is not clearly seen. But, if samatha prevails over vipaśyānaḥ, sleep is close at hand and reality will never be perceived. Hence, the view that samatha precedes as practice the cultivation of vipaśyānaḥ—although ocassionally expressed in Buddhist literature and also implied in the Bdp—appears to be a more theoretical proposition.

The Acquisition of Wisdom

The last type of ‘skill’ that is considered in the Bdp is ‘skill’ in dharma. Not included amongst the ten primary kinds of ‘skill’, but appended to the introductory statement, its function is to conclude the prior discussion. The key element in all six examples of ‘skill’ in dharma is the bodhisattva’s dexterity in transforming attainments of the conditioned into attainments of the unconditioned. He transforms the predisposition (saṃskāra) of body, speech and mind into all-knowing; he does not depreciate Perfect Wisdom through the five preliminary perfections; he leads sentient beings to enlightenment through the means of conversion; he does not cut the fetters of saṃsāra, but cleanses himself of worldly defilements; he remains unaffected by impurity in spite of his presence in the traidhātuka; he is acquainted with the teachings of emptiness, etc., and yet, he does not realise the unconditioned.

The significance of these examples is twofold. First, it is shown that a bodhisattva who is skilled in dharma—conditioned and unconditioned alike—is in fact equipped with all-knowing. Second, since spiritual realisation devoid of ‘skill’ and wisdom cannot produce liberation, it testifies to their indispensability and discloses the benefits skilful interaction between the conditioned and unconditioned delivers. Emulating the ancient model of the integration of means (upāya) and wisdom (prajñā)—the former being part of the conditioned, the latter epitomising the unconditioned—‘skill’ in dharma accentuates the functional relationship

852. MBT, iii, p. 9.22–10.5; Samdhis (ÉLa), p. 90.15–21.
853. In a sūtta of the Anguttaranikāya, for instance, we have Ānanda declaring that a bhikkhu who claims to have attained arhatship is in possession of one of four paths, that is, the path cultivating vipassanā preceded by samatha; the path cultivating samatha preceded by vipassanā; the path in which both are yoked together or a path where the bhikkhu’s mind is agitated by dhamma (A II, pp. 156–7). See also Papañcasūtani (v, p. 504) where Buddhaghosa proposes that samatha and vipassanā belong to different moments (nānākhhikā), leading to a serial attainment of the three marks and vipassanā (ref. Ruegg; cf. Kośa, viii, p. 131). In Māhāyana texts, consult: Samdhis (ÉLa), p. 90.3–14; Siddhi, p. 597; MBT, iii, pp. 1–3; DPP, p. 17.
coupling the actual practices to the cognitive realm. This accounts also for the positioning of ‘skill’ in dharma at the very end of the discourse outside the formal structure of the ten skills. For, ‘skill’ in dharma sets out to establish their interconnection by fusing the worldly pāramitā with the perfection of wisdom; by uniting learning, reflection and contemplation; by merging the pratisarana with the pratisamvid; by joining punyasambhāra with jñānasambhāra; and by blending samatha and vipaśyanā.

This interpretation, obvious on textual grounds and well-known from other sources, does not present much of a problem. Difficulties arise, however, if we attempt to reconcile the Bdp’s intent behind ‘skill’ in dharma with that of the ten ‘skills’ in the MvŚ. As already seen, for the MvŚ ‘skill’ is essentially a means of illustrating the futility of the belief in a self (ātmadṛṣṭi). In line with this thinking, ‘skill’ in conditioned and unconditioned dharma (likewise placed as the tenth ‘skill’ at the end of the discussion) is employed to show the ‘illusion of an entity that is either bound or released’ (amuktamuktatvagraha).856 The idea is that such illusion consists in imagining that a self is at first tied to samsāra by defilements and later liberated from them. Since only conditioned dharma are subject to the samyojana, ‘skill’ in conditioned and unconditioned (i.e., all) dharma is explained to counteract this illusion.857

While this approach to ‘skill’ in dharma is consistent with the interpretation of the preceding nine types of ‘skill’, it does not show any obvious relation to our passage in the Bdp. The only link with the MvŚ’s standpoint is perhaps the Bdp’s proposition that the transformation to enlightenment takes place on the basis of discerning all dharma as unconditioned enlightenment in the first place.858 This eliminates the need for purification and explains the abstention from realising the unconditioned. It would also account for the bodhisattva’s twofold approach to reality. Moreover, in a sense, it removes by implication the process of deliverance from the individual that is of key concern to the MvŚ.

Phases in Perfect Wisdom

I now propose to investigate the structural principles that underlie the arrangement of the

856. MvŚ (N), p. 44.10.
858. R, folio 683.7.
prajñāpāramitā practices. Following the bodhisattva practice proper, the Bdp discusses material that seems to include a blueprint of the bodhisattva’s career phases. This blueprint—integrated into the discussion of ‘skill’ in solitary wandering—gives an approximate idea of the scope and nature of the various phases. However, since the text itself is anything but explicit I have had to turn once again to the Akn-tika that contains a brief passage on a parallel section in the Akn. Guided by its analysis, it became possible to break up the contents of ‘skill’ in solitary wandering as follows. At first, during the initial phase extending from the first cittotpāda to the adhimukti-parābhūmi, the bodhisattva practises only in his own interest, as he is unable to dispense instruction and benefit to others. During this period, wholly independent and self-sufficient, he lives the life of a recluse and is isolated from the world. In spite of immense effort, his practice of the paramitā is flawed. The process of pāramitā purification takes place during the second phase and follows on the attainment of patience. Although the Akn-tika does not indicate the span of this period, our analysis of kṣānti has revealed that this is unlikely to occur prior to the seventh (sudurjaya-parābhūmi) or possibly the sixth stage (arcrīṣmati-parābhūmi). Still left to his own devices, he secures the perfections all by himself and resolves to achieve unsurpassed attainments. Advance to the third phase is marked by the acquisition of the vision of dharma-sameness. Having removed all obstacles related to defilements (kleśāvarana) and having decisively weakened those pertaining to knowledge (jñeya-varana), the bodhisattva attains mastery of the means of conversion (samgrahavastu). This allows him to develop fellow beings and plant the roots of virtue with unprecedented impact. Finally, at the fourth stage, freed from all impurity, he overcomes the last remaining obstacles and, taking a seat on the vajra-throne, attains enlightenment. This, of course, signals the end of the bodhisattva’s advance to buddhahood.

Clearly, this division, however plausible, is rather general. Moreover, it does not seem to stand in direct relationship to the content of the Prajñā Chapter, since it apporaches the bodhisattva path in a much broader fashion. I suggest to leave its evaluation on the side for

859. For reasons that will become apparent, I take them to include the pratisamvid, pratisaraṇa, punyajñānasambhāra, bodhipāksika as well as śamathavipaśyānā.

860. Akn, pp. 72.1.8–73.2; Akn-tika, pp. 271.4.4–272.2.1.

861. Text references to key sentences in the Akn-tika and discussions of the terminology are given in my notes to the translation of chapter eleven.

862. Akn-tika, p. 272.1.1; Bbh, pp. 84.21–85.7, 86.4–11.

863. As reference to the means of conversion is omitted in the Bdp but found in the Akn, we must ignore the samgrahavastu phase. This, however, is immaterial to the characterisation of the path phases since vision of dharma-sameness is in any event fixed to the eighth stage (ṣgs, p. 131) at which point the bodhisattva has already attained mastery over the samgrahavastu and sets out to ripen beings with immense effect (Dāka-bh p. 57.16).
the time being and to turn instead to the structures of the wisdom-practices themselves.

Reading through the chapter, the first thing one notices is the break between the section leading up to 'skill' and the discussion of 'skill' itself. The former section, starting with the seventy-two kinds of learning and ending with the bodhisattva’s emancipation from defilements, is markedly less structured than the other parts of this chapter. Although much of its material is well-known from earlier sources, insufficient use of ‘context markers’ introduces some ambiguity regarding the conceptual interrelation between the practices and the training phases they represent. Notwithstanding, it is possible to outline a general structural pattern. As shown, large areas of the arrangement of the practices bear reminiscence to the first four of the five traditional path phases, comprising the saṃbharamārga, prayogamārga, darśanamārga and bhāvanāmārga. In establishing this correlation, I considered the few ‘context markers’ available and compared the Bdp’s position with the contents of the various stages known from other sources. The picture that emerged from this analysis—although not beyond controversy in detail—supplies continuity between the individual practices.

Next, the Bdp introduces a series of ‘skills’ that are apparently related to the foregoing accomplishments. Most commentaries agree that the first four of these represent the cognitive attainment of the śrāvaka. Since their objective (that is, the eradication of the belief in a self) is not particular to the training of the śrāvaka, but equally pertains to the bodhisattvacarya, they are cited also in the Bdp. When we turn to the pratisamvid difficulties arise because these exhibit no clear conceptual link with the destruction of the belief in a self. What is more, our sources disagree on their position in the path, some arguing that the pratisamvid spring from ‘skill’ in skandha, etc., while others assert the contrary. Judgement on this matter will have to await further research. Whatever their exact relation to the first four types of ‘skill’, the pratisamvid are an integral part of prajñāpāramitā and their overall task is well attested by their content. Above all, they introduce the bodhisattva to those areas of knowledge that will be of greatest demand in his career; that is, they give an accurate understanding of reality—in conventional and absolute terms—and the ability to communicate effectively with other beings. Their relation to the bodhipāksika is of utmost importance to the bodhisattva. For, not only do they allow for the perception of the individual dharma ‘in accordance with

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864. Bbh, p. 4.6–8.
866. In the Akñ-tikā (p. 242.1.4–7), this interpretation is brought out by the purpose to which the pratisamvid are set, that is the ‘attainment of power in teaching’.

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The rationale for joining the *pratisarana* with the *pratisamvid* poses fewer difficulties, since both are closely related in contents and spirit. This is particularly true of the *arthapratisamvid* and *dharmapratisamvid*, as knowledge of the own-being of things and designations becomes almost a prerequisite for considered reliance on any of the four *pratisarana*. The impact of the *niruktipratisamvid* on the *pratisarana* is smaller, since the knowledge of languages has immediate bearing only on the *arthavasyajana* and *neyārthaniyārthā* distinction. In a sense, three out of four *pratisamvid* represent something of a basis of cognition to the *pratisarana* therefore. Once established, their conceptual proximity could be taken to explain the irregular order in which the *pratisarana* are presented. That is to say, by beginning the discussion of the *pratisarana* with the *arthavasyajana* combination in the place of the *dharmatā/pudgala* pair—which most other texts cite as the first *pratisarana*—the *Bdp* might have intended to express a parallelism with the *pratisamvid* where *artha* is cited as the first item.868

Being thus trained in knowledge and well-focused in his practice, the bodhisattva embarks on the training proper. Dual aspected from the very beginning, it begins with the accumulation of merit and pristine cognition. By accumulating merit, the bodhisattva works for the benefit of sentient beings, since it furnishes him with the roots of virtue that he dedicates to their liberation. By the accumulation of pristine cognition, in contrast, he accomplishes the destruction of his own, personal defilements. This division—although rather theoretical since both practices go hand in hand—is remarkably well-delineated in the *Bdp*, with each accumulation mirroring its designated task. For the *Akn-tikā*, referring to the slightly edited path model of the *Bdp* in the *Akn*, this path phase represents the very beginning of the bodhisattva’s ‘organised career’, that is, it coincides with the *sambhāramārga*.869 This, of course, is a standard classification

868. Note that in the scheme of the *Bbh* (pp. 256.23–259.6) and *Msl* (pp. 138.3–139.17), the *pratisarana* precede the *pratisamvid* on the basis that the former give rise to the latter. This view is also expressed in the *Bhadra-vy* (pp. 45.31–46.2). While Régamey (p. 100) is certainly mistaken in considering the *pratisarana* to be a “free interpretation of the four normal *pratisamvid*”, in terms of their conceptual proximity, his observation is perhaps not as out of place as might at first appear. Of some interest in this context is the *Bbh*’s comment that the *pratisamvid* are the agency giving rise to the cultivation of the *bodhipākṣika dharma* (p. 259.9–11). This gives a logical connection to its order of beneficial dharmas listed in the *Bodhipakṣyapajata*, viz., *pratisarana, pratisamvid, punyatānasambhāra, bodhipākṣika, samathayavipākanā*. But for the reversal of the *pratisarana* and *pratisamvid* (and perhaps the positioning of the *samyakprahāṇa, indriya* and *bala*), this is exactly the order that is found in the *Bdp* (note that the same order of practices is also found in the *Msl*, pp. 138.3–149.4).
that need not be discussed here. Of far greater import to the present context is the question whether this position is reconcilable with our earlier identification of *sambhāramārga*. If not, we would have to reconsider most of our observations on the first section of chapter eleven. However, as this problem is not isolated but recurs on three other occasions and requires detailed analysis, I shall postpone its discussion for the time being.

Subsequent to accumulation, that according to the *Akn-ṭikā* constitutes the only element of the *sambhāramārga*\(^{871}\), the *Bdp* introduces the four *smṛtyupasthāṇa*. To the *Akn-ṭikā* their practice, emulating the Sarvāstivāda path model, signals entry on the *prayogamārga*.\(^{872}\) While this classification is in itself not remarkable and is found with minor variation at several places, its adaptation for the *Bdp* raises a whole series of questions. The reason for this is quite simple. In the *Akn*, the bases of mindfulness introduce the traditional order of the *bodhipākṣika* (with the *samyakprahāṇa*, *ṛddhipāda*, *indriya* and *bala* all part of the *prayogamārga*), whilst in the *Bdp* the *smṛtyupasthāṇa* are immediately followed by the *bodhyanga*. According to the Sarvāstivāda path, this would mean that for the *Bdp* the *prayogamārga* consists only of the bases of mindfulness, since the *bodhyanga* already herald entry into the next phase—the *darsanamārga*\(^{873}\). Practically all sources agree that the *darsanamārga* consists only of one set of practices, be it the *bodhyanga* or *āryaśṭāṅgamārga*\(^{874}\). Depending on which choice is made for the *darsanamārga*, the *bhāvanāmārga* as the penultimate stage of the path is occupied either by the factors of enlightenment or the eightfold path. According to the explanations of the *Akn-ṭikā* on the parallel scheme in the *Akn* this would be the *āryaśṭāṅgamārga*.\(^{875}\) The eightfold path, being traditionally the last of the seven sets, concludes the treatment of the *bodhipākṣika* in most texts.\(^{876}\)

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\(^{870}\) Siddhi, pp. 564–74; *Abhidh-sam (R)*, pp. 104–3; DPP, pp. 33–34.

\(^{871}\) *Akn-ṭikā*, pp. 248.5.3–49.4.2.

\(^{872}\) *Abhidh-d*, p. 140; *Mvś*, iv.8–10

There exists some disagreement on the distribution of the *bodhyanga* and *āryaśṭāṅgamārga* to the *darsana*- and *bhāvanāmārga*. For the *Kosa* (vi, p. 288) and the *Abhidh-d* (p. 362), the *bodhyanga* represent the *bhāvanāmārga* with the *darsanamārga* being taken up by the eightfold path, while the opposite is asserted by the Vaiḥāṣīka (*op. cit.*) and the *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 266.1.3). The differences between the two schemes have, however, little bearing on substance, since both paths form part of the transcendental realm; it is chiefly a question of reconciling the traditional order of the *bodhipākṣika* with the view that the meditative context of the *bodhyanga* should be associated with the contemplation of the *bhāvanāmārga*.

\(^{873}\) *Abhidh-d*, p. 365; *Kosa*, p. 288; *Mvś (N)*, pp. 33.14–16; *Abhidh-sam (R)*, pp. 116–7 (different terminology); *Abhidh-h (W)*, p. 140.

\(^{874}\) *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 267.3.5.

\(^{875}\) For references to examples in the nīkāya, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 501, 510, 524–6; for Mahāyāna references, consult any of the following texts: *Kp*, § 95; *Vkn*, p. 20; *Daśa-bh*, pp. 38.16–39.11; *Red*, pp. 235.3.4–44.2.6; *Akn*, pp. 66.4.3–71.2.1; *Arthav (S)*, pp. 28–42; *Pañca*, pp. 204–208.
model is also endorsed in the Bdp, since the practices that immediately follow on the āryāśṭāṅgamārga, that is, śamatha and vipaśyānā, do not belong to the bodhipākṣika. On their analogous occurrence in the Akn, the commentary remarks that śamatha and vipaśyānā constitute the means by which the practical aspects of the path are taught.\textsuperscript{877} I shall demonstrate below that this position, although unusual, is not irreconcilable with other path interpretations. The presence of the samyakprahāṇa, indriya and bala following śamatha and vipaśyānā poses far greater difficulty.

In order appreciate the problems given by this presentation, it may be helpful to recall some of the more general features of the bodhipākṣika dharma. Embodying Buddhist spiritual training at the higher stages of the path, the bodhipākṣika are not a random assortment of practices, but constitute a coherent body of methods specifically designed to bring about enlightenment. On the one hand, whether in the form of individual sets, or from the point of view of their ‘ingredients’ (dravya), each of the seven categories is understood to reproduce the Path in its own right. On the other hand, epitomising the collective and individual means of reaching awakening, full development of any one of the sets brings to fulfilment all seven. Thus, as a spiritual unity whose individual members stand in close relation to each other, they constitute the very hub of the path.

This and the mnemonic constraints of oral literature, led to an early standardisation in their presentation, including stockphrases and formulae to aid elucidation. As a result, beyond abhidharmic detail, explanations of their contents generally display few differences in substance. Also the number of practices shows little variation, so that all thirty-seven are usually discussed en bloc. The order in which they are treated is nearly always the same, starting with the smṛtyupasthāna and ending with the āryāśṭāṅgamārga. Even in expanded lists it is extremely rare that the seven sets are separated. When juxtaposed to other practices, the thirty-seven dharma regularly stand at the centre with the remaining practices clustered around them.

When differences occur, these are mainly due to variations in context affecting the status of individual practices. In several works expanded lists of bodhipākṣika are met with. Generally, this occurs in the context of meditation practices. Depending whether they are addressed collectively on the lokottara path or individually in conjunction with higher applications of śamatha and vipaśyānā in the phase immediately preceding the emergence of lokottara consciousness, the bodhipākṣika are ranked either as lokottara or as laukika practices.

\textsuperscript{877} Akn-ṭikā, p. 267.3.6.
Finally, in their attempts to draw up a coherent scheme of the Buddhist experience, scholars have developed several models correlating the seven sets to the stages of the path. Of these, the best documented account is by the Sarvāstivāda school. However, even their distribution of the bodhipākṣika fluctuates, showing that these endeavours were never brought to a conclusion. Indeed, we also meet with propositions that indicate a continuous and simultaneous presence of all thirty-seven factors at the higher, transcendental levels of the path.

With these considerations in mind, let us return now to the bodhipākṣika in the Bdp and reassess those areas where anomalies occur. The first incongruity we have noted is the isolation of the smṛtyupasthāna on the prayogamārga, with three of its traditional co-residents being separated from the bulk of the bodhipākṣika. Editorial adjustments in the order of their presentation in the Akn—resulting in the interpolation of the samyakprahāṇa, rdhipāda, indriya and bala between the smṛtyupasthāna and bodhyāṅga—indicate that such positioning was already viewed with suspicion in ancient Indian Buddhist circles. Besides depriving the prayogamārga of much of its contents, their position at the very end overturns a whole tradition. For, as Gethin has shown, the order of the seven sets was already established during the four primary nikāya and rapidly assumed an air of inviolability. Indeed, judging by Gethin's survey of Pāli sources and my own reading in the Mahāyāna, the Bdp's sequencing has no parallel anywhere in Buddhist literature.

The sole presence of the smṛtyupasthāna on the prayogamārga is less problematic. First, as already noted, Buddhism never produced any fixed and final scheme of distribution of the bodhipākṣika to the stages. Discrepancies are greatest with regard to the first two path phases, some placing the smṛtyupasthāna on the sambhāramārga, others on the prayogamārga or their equivalents. Second, the very nature of the smṛtyupasthāna could conceivably be taken to allow for this interpretation. Since they are well-known from the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta as embodying on their own the whole Buddhist path and of great importance as basic instructions in meditation, the smṛtyupasthāna—it could be argued—stand at the centre of all types of practice. This consideration, it seems, led the compiler of the Kośa to refer to the smṛtyupasthāna twice, distinguishing a lower and higher level of cultivation; first, as the practice dominating especially the ādi karmikamārga and, second, as the foundation to all

878. Akn, pp. 66.4.3, 68.5.1, 69.3.2, 69.4.1, 69.5.6, 70.2.3.
880. Compare, for instance, the schemes of the Kośa, vi, pp. 287–88; Abhidh-d, p. 362; Abhidh-h (W), p. 140; Abhidh-sam (R), p. 116–7; Mvś (N), pp. 50–55 and Mppś, iii, pp. 1148–1149.
four nirvedhabhāgīya.\textsuperscript{882} Since the nirvedhabhāgīya are the very practices that make up the contents of the prayogamārga\textsuperscript{883}, the Bdp’s identification of the smṛtyupasthāna with the prayogamārga perhaps is less inept than it appears at face value.

Having already considered the omission of the rddhipāda and the inverted correlation between the bodhyānga/āryāṣṭāṅgamārga and darśana/bhāvanāmārga, I shall proceed directly to the interpolation of śamatha and vipaśyanā. To be sure, the occurrence of śamatha and vipaśyanā alongside the bodhipāksīka is by no means unusual. They are found in a great number of expanded bodhipāksīka lists from both the Pāli and Sanskrit traditions.\textsuperscript{884} Furthermore, the meditative experiences pertaining to perfect mental quietude and insight are integral to most aspects of bodhipāksīka cultivation. While for some texts this connection is only manifest in selected sets\textsuperscript{885}, others define all thirty-seven factors in terms of their association with śamatha and vipaśyanā. A good example of the latter approach is found in the Satyasiddhiśāstra where all but three of the bodhipāksīka practices are identified as belonging either to śamatha or vipaśyanā.\textsuperscript{886} However, the exact role of perfect mental quietude and insight in relation to the thirty-seven bodhipāksīka is little discussed. Gethin, quoting a passage from the Nettipakaraṇațṭha, suggests that in certain lists the seven sets might have served to exemplify how śamatha and vipaśyanā are fulfilled.\textsuperscript{887} In other contexts, most notably the Dhammasaṅgani and Visuddhimagga, they further the arising of active skilful consciousness that operates in the phase prior to (pubhabhāga) the lokottara path.\textsuperscript{888} This would place śamatha and vipaśyanā in the final phase of the prayogamārga.

\textsuperscript{882} Kōsa, vi, pp. 159–178, 287.
\textsuperscript{883} This view is expressed in numerous texts. It is found in the Abhidh-sam (R), pp. 105–6; Kōsa, vi, pp. 169–78; Mvī (N), pp. 33.14–16, 52; Abhidh-d, p. 362 and is discussed in DPP, pp. 20, 34–37. There are only a few texts that reject the nirvedhabhāgīya at the heart of the prayogamārga. One such example is the Abhidh-h (W), ii, p. 194. However, rather than outright rejection, their omission from the prayogamārga is perhaps the outcome of a different terminology, since the association of the perfect efforts, bases of success, faculties and powers with striving (vyāyāma), one-pointedness (cittakāgratā), weak (mrdu) and sharp (tiksna) is also present in the description of its equivalent to the prayogamārga.

\textsuperscript{884} For examples of such lists, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 510, 524–26

See also: Śrotabhumi (p. 287.3.2–7) which interpolates the pratisamvid between the eightfold path and śamatha and vipaśyanā.

\textsuperscript{885} See, for instance, the Śbh (Śrāv-bh (Sh), pp. 325–7) relating śamatha and vipaśyanā to the bodhyānga, with praśrābda, samādhi and upekkṣā manifesting śamatha; dharmapravicaya, viṣya and priti constituting vipaśyanā while smṛti is held to consist of both śamatha and vipaśyanā.

\textsuperscript{886} According to this text, śamatha is manifest in the first three types of smṛtyupasthāna, in all rddhipāda, in the first four indriya and bala, in three of the bodhyānga and two of the āryāṣṭāṅgamārga. All others, with the exception of the three śīla factors of the āryaṣṭāṅgamārga, the smṛtendriya and smṛtibala are held to pertain to vipaśyanā (op. cit., ii, pp. 448–9).

\textsuperscript{887} Gethin, 1987, p. 515.

\textsuperscript{888} Dhs, pp. 9–29; Viṣam, pp. 137–38, iv.74–5; p. 459, xiv.121; pp. 669–70, xxii.129–30; Sp, ii, p. 494; Sv, ii, p. 564; iii, pp. 883–4; Ps, iii, 243–4. For these and further references, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 625–27.
In Mahāyāna works, their relationship to the bodhipākṣika is explained differently. Typically cited after the description of the bodhipākṣika, they are given a firm place in the lokottara consciousness and interpreted as the culmination of the seven sets. Thus, we read in the Bbh that šamatha secures non-discrimination (avikalpana) of the bodhipākṣika, whilst vipaśyanā embodies their accurate perception in accordance with the highest truth and differentiation (vyavasthāna). It is probably in this context that one has to interpret the statement in the Akn-ṭīkā that šamatha and vipaśyanā jointly embody the practice of the bhāvanāmārga. That is to say, dwelling on the path of contemplation linked with wisdom, the bodhisattva is no longer concerned with the individual practices or their particular fruits of realisation, but looks at them from the absolute point of view. Citing smṛti as example, the Bbh explains:

“In which fashion does the bodhisattva perceive the thirty-seven bodhipākṣika dharmā from the viewpoint of the Mahāyāna? Here, the bodhisattva dwells considering the body as body, but he does not perceive the body as an existing body, nor as a body that does not exist in any way. He perceives the exact nature of the foundation of being of the body. This is for him to consider the body from the absolute point of view.”

For the bodhisattva, šamatha and vipaśyanā are therefore not so much part of the dhyānic processes that lead to the acquisition of the bodhipākṣika, as the group of factors that establish their position in the Mahāyāna scheme of things. In the Bdp, awareness of this frame of reference is dependent on composure and reflection and produces a vision of reality whose parameter consist in pudgalanairātmaya, dharmanairātmaya and animitta. Inevitably, the pursuit

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889. E.g., Śrotabhiṣmi, p. 287.2.4–5
This is only true if cited in conjunction with the bodhipākṣika dharmā. Their overall functions in the path as a whole are far more multifarious and vary, depending on the respective phase of the training. A description of their changing roles on the path—starting with their function as causal basis to the attainment of the adhimukticaryābhāmīmi and ending with their contribution to the purification of the buddha-field during the eighth, ninth and tenth stages—is given in the Msl (p. 146.10–26).
892. R, folio 671.3.
894. Besides šamatha and vipaśyanā, these include the four pratisamvid and a general knowledge of means. They prompt the bodhisattva to look at the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment in accordance with reality, but without realising them (Bbh, p. 259.9–11).

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of the bodhipākṣika within this framework cannot but be affected by such understanding, generating a novel type of consummation that is based on their very non-existence (anupaladhitām upādāyā). This insight does not occur by chance, but is inspired by the meditative and cognitive exercises that lie at the heart of the seven sets themselves. Thus, as factors finalising the conceptual context for the bodhisattva’s bodhipākṣika practice, the positioning of śamatha and vipaśyanā after the bodhipākṣika proper makes particularly good sense since it takes into account the role of the thirty-seven practices in securing their realisation.

This cannot be said about the position of the samyakprahāna, indriya and bala. Apart from infringing on the traditional order of exposition, their location beyond the bodhipākṣika series raises the question of their status. That is to say, since they follow on practices that are to all intents part of the lokottara consciousness, is it safe to conclude that they also pertain to the lokottara phase of the path? If not, what are the effects on our scheme? Does it mean that our signposts have to be cast aside or re-interpreted?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the status of the bodhipākṣika in general, and that of the samyakprahāna, indriya and bala in particular. In the Kośa, echoing the ancient view that all bodhipākṣika pertain to the higher stages of the path, we learn that the seven sets may be without āsrava. By implication, this must mean that all thirty-seven factors are potentially part of the lokottara consciousness. Summing up the Theravāda position on this matter, Gethin writes:

“Strictly speaking, from the point of view of abhidhamma, we can only say that the satipaṭṭhāna, sammappadhāna, iddhipāda, bala, bojjangā and magganga function truly and fully when brought to the stage of the lokuttaracitta; this is their natural and proper level.”

Conceding that this is not the whole truth since the Pāli commentaries do in fact allow for

895. Mppś, iii, p. 1135.
896. A very revealing passage to this effect is found in the Msl, where it says that śamatha, here likened to stillness (sthāna) of thought, and vipaśyanā, held to correspond to dharma investigation, are in fact based on the bodhipākṣika factors of samyaksaṃādhi and dharmapravicaya (p. 146.6–10). Indeed, their positioning following the bodhipākṣika is found in a number of important works. It is given in the Bbh (p. 259.15–22), Msl (p. 146.6–27), Abhidh-sam (R), (p. 126), Pañca (pp. 208–210; as parts of the string of meditative attainments) and in the Vkm, p. 40.
897. Kośa, vi, pp. 284, 290.
laukika cultivation of the bodhipāksika, Gethin draws attention to the work of Bareau who established that worldly indriya practice is also catered to in the Vātsiputriya path. Here, the indriya are ranked as laukika in the context of the four nirvedhabhāgiya, to be precise, as laukikāgradhāma immediately preceding the emergence of lokottara consciousness. The proposition of the Vātsiputriya ties thus in with the distribution of the bodhipāksika to the various path phases. As already indicated, according to the Sarvāstivāda, the samyakprahāna, indriya and bala fall all into the prayoga phase. Allocated to three of the four nirvedhabhāgiya—with the mūrdhan level reserved for the missing rddhipāda—in terms of the path at least, they are thus clearly of laukika rank.

For the commentaries of the Pāli tradition the situation is more fluid than that. Proposing that the shift from the laukika to the lokottara experience rests more than anything on the context in which they are pursued (that is to say, depending on whether they are practised during the ‘prior stage’ separating ordinary practice from transcendental practice or during the lokottara path and fruit itself) the bodhipāksika are either laukika or lokottara in nature. In theory, it seems, this would allow for both levels of cultivation of the thirty-seven factors. Yet, in practice, as Gethin has shown, this principle does not apply evenly to all seven sets, but is only valid for the samyakprahāna, indriya and bala—with the other sets pertaining invariably to the lokottara mind.

Now, without going into the details of why this is so, we note that it is precisely these three practices which are ‘out of order’ in the Bdp. Bearing in mind what has been said on the laukika/lokottara potential of the bodhipāksika, two explanations spring to mind. First, we cannot discount the possibility that the samyakprahāna, etc., had been randomly positioned in their present location. This would explain the presence of laukika practices in a section of the path that, by common agreement, arises within the lokottara consciousness. Spotted as an error by a learned reader, it was not allowed to perpetuate itself, but got redressed and brought into line with the traditional bodhipāksika sequence when adopted for the Akn. The problem with this interpretation lies in the improbability that such a major structural defect

900. Note that the interpretation of their status is far from resolved. To the Vibhajyavāda, for instance, the five indriya are exclusively lokottara because they are held to have immediate bearing on the acquisition of four fruitions of arhatship (Bareau, 1955, p. 172). The Sarvāstivāda protagonists, in contrast, appear to have adopted the Theravāda view and interpret the indriya as characterising the five components in their generality (op. cit., pp. 143, 145–6). For a full treatment of the understanding of the indriya formula in Pāli literature, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 231–269
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should have escaped notice, particularly in view of the renown and early codification of the seven bodhipākṣika sets.  

Alternatively, if not a mistake, their placement is deliberate and grew out of some undisclosed consideration. Whatever the reason, their installation towards the end of the path suggests that the three were not interpreted as laukika practices in their prayogamārga context, but in the bodhipākṣika’s original role as spiritual exercises of the highest order. Epitomising the ‘practice’ of the bhāvanāmārga, they could arguably represent a phase that develops the meditative pursuits of the smṛtyupasthāna, bodhyānga, āryāṣṭāṅgamārga, samatha and vipaśyanā. Their contents would seem to correspond to the practices that the bodhisattva undertakes after emerging from meditation. Moreover, taken together, they cover most of the antidotes designed to prevent meditative defeat, viz., faith, zeal, effort, tranquillity, mindfulness, attentiveness, reflection and equipoise.

Needless to say, if this interpretation is accepted we cannot maintain the allocation in the Akṅ-tīkā, since this would interfere with the presumed lokottara status of the samyakprahāna, indriya and bala. We would also be at a loss to explain the editorial modifications in the Akṅ. One would think that such carefully devised scheme would not be abandoned without due consideration. Equally intriguing is the fact that Buddhist literature does not record the rationale behind this scheme. I have not found a single text in which the samyakprahāna, indriya and bala are similarly placed.

Taking all factors into consideration, it would thus appear that their positioning—novel but probably deliberate and, in a sense, consistent with the Bdp’s path model—failed to attract support in Buddhist circles, became isolated and was soon forgotten. Even when encountered (as it must have been by the author of the Akṅ), its structure was not accepted but modified and brought into line with the established order of the bodhipākṣika. While the rationale may therefore be lost, the very fact of its survival in the Bdp reminds us, once more, of the fluctuations in thought that influenced the shaping of the bodhisattva doctrine and the multiple

902. The possibility that the Bdp was unaware of the traditional sequence can be safely ruled out, as it gives a complete and orderly listing of the seven sets at R, 630.3–6. In other places, however, without apparent reason or clear pattern, it gives only a selection of the bodhipākṣika (R, folio 592.1; 596.5–98.1).

903. Theoretically, there is still the possibility that their presence on what is to all purposes the bhavanāmārga might point to the impure (anāsrava) or laukika phase of path of contemplation (Kośa, vi, p. 119, ii, p. 117, v, pp. 103–4). Their positioning after the noble eightfold path and after the lokottara practices of samatha and vipaśyanā, however, does not give much credibility to this hypothesis. Cf. Abhidh-sam (R), p. 110, which distinguishes between a laukika and lokottara phase of the bhāvanāmārga.

904. MBT, iii, pp. 9.1–11.20.

905. MBT, iii, p. 10.8–12.
forces that were party to this process.

Leaving behind the intricacies of the *bhāvanāmārga*, we shall now turn to the last phase of the bodhisattva path. Interpreted by the *Atn-tīkā* as ‘isolated awakening’ (*pratyekabodhi*), it covers the attainment of enlightenment and the cognitive realisations that stand in wisdom at its very heart. For the *Bdp*, as for most other treatises, the chief components of *prajñā* are penetration into the laws of dependent co-origination and insight into the general characteristics of *dharma*. Accordingly, the *Bdp* divided the climax of the path into ‘skill’ in solitary wandering (*ekāyānāmārga*), ‘skill’ in dependent co-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and ‘skill’ in all *dharma*.

The connotations of ‘skill’ in solitary wandering are many and vary to some degree within each context in which they appear. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish five concepts that are united in the term *ekāyānāmārga*. First, there is the idea that the *ekāyānāmārga* covers the totality of Buddhist practices, specifically with reference to the seven categories of *bodhipākṣa dharma*. Second, it describes the mystical nature of a path that is well-delineated and easily followed since it does not deviate into side-roads. Third, being only wide enough for one person, it can only be travelled alone. Fourth, the path is one in the sense that it is traversed and accomplished only by the best, the Buddha. Finally, the *ekāyānāmārga* is one in as much as it leads to only one place, namely *nirvāṇa*. The reason why I have reiterated the findings of previous research here is straightforward. Practically all of these aspects of the *ekāyāna* concept are mirrored, in one way or another, in the *Bdp*’s ‘skill’ in solitary wandering. That the ‘single path’ is all-encompassing and includes all practices corresponds to the bodhisattva’s commitment to the six perfections. Its description as a path that unified, well-defined and without forks is played on when the bodhisattva’s conduct is characterised as self-sufficient and independent of others. On a path whose course is straight and unambiguous, external guidance is obviously unnecessary. Next, as the path is

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906. The term *ekāyāna* is, of course, not a new entity to Buddhist research and has already attracted the attention of several scholars. For interpretations of the term *ekāyāna* in the context of the *smṛtyupasthāna*, see: Gettin, 1987, pp. 117–129 and Ruegg, 1969, p. 178; for an assessment in *Prajñāpāramitā* works, in the *Vīṇa* and *Samdhis*, see: Lamotte, 1976, pp. 109–111.


908. Böhltlingk; Roth (pw).

909. These interpretations are largely taken from the Pāli commentaries where they occur at several places. See, for instance, *Sv*, iii, pp. 743–4, *Ps*, i, pp. 229–30 (ref. Gettin). The gist of these meanings is corroborated by the *Wörterbuch* (Bechert, vi, p. 442), attributing the following interpretations to *ekāyana*: ‘zu nur einem Ziel gehend oder führend’; ‘sicher, zuverlässig’; ‘notwendiger Weise zu einem bestimmten Punkt hin oder vorbei führend’ and ‘der einzige Weg’.
narrow and grants place only to one traveller, the bodhisattva is unaccompanied and on his own. Knowing that it is only travelled by the best, the bodhisattva resolves to accomplish attainments that have not been achieved by any other member of the āryan-fold. The idea that the ekayāna is one in the sense that is has only one destination is expressed in terms of ending in enlightenment under the Bodhi-tree. Appropriately, this is attained through one thought-moment only after the bodhisattva has defeated the host of Māra single-handedly.

The import of this imagery for the path scheme is obvious. The presence of all pāramitā, the proposition that the ekayāna is only traversed by the most advanced practitioners, their total independence from other agencies, the vision that its final destination is nothing less than enlightenment—all these attest great achievement and place the bodhisattva very close close to the goal of buddhahood. In other words, ‘skill’ in solitary wandering is a metaphorical way of signalling the conclusion of the training in Perfect Wisdom. Drawing on imagery belonging to the ekayāna concept, it illustrates the bodhisattva’s resolve, strength and independence as well as the uniqueness of the attainment itself.

The exact contents of these achievements are laid down in ‘skill’ in pratītyasamutpāda and ‘skill’ in dharma. First, the bodhisattva discerns the causal mechanisms underlying conditioned existence. Realising that causality is not limited to sentient life but lies at the basis of all phenomena, he perceives dharma as inactive, motionless and non-self and therefore fundamentally inapprehensible (anupalambha):911

“All dharma are subject to causes, conditions and their combinations. What is subject to causes, conditions and their combinations is not the basis of a self, life-force or person. It is without reckoning whatever.”

Notwithstanding this recognition, the bodhisattva does not abandon sentient beings to their fate, but subscribes to attainments in ‘non-cessation’ and ‘non-exhaustion’. Thus schooled in the conditioned and unconditioned, the bodhisattva now reaches the pinnacle of his training. No longer concerned with his personal advance or the prospect of merit, he dedicates his resources entirely to universal liberation. Since he is in perfect command of all practices and

910. See, for example, the scheme of the Abhisamayālankāra (I, 1e, 21) where the penultimate generation of the bodhicitta is linked with the ekayānamārga. Subordinate in importance only to the cittopāda of the dharmaśākya, the ekayānamārga manifests unmistakably only towards the very end of the path.
911. R, folio 682.6–683.1.
fully acquainted with true reality, he does not fall prey to the defilements of the world in spite of constant exposure to their influence. The reason for this immunity lies in the integrated presence of 'skill' and wisdom that, being the underlying principles of his progress through the final path phases, will lead him eventually to all-knowing.\cite{912}

\footnote{912. The reference to the combined presence of 'skill' and wisdom in a truly accomplished bodhisattva adds another dimension to our perception of the role of 'skill'. We have seen that so far, 'skill' is primarily portrayed as a means bringing about understanding of reality—in short, wisdom. It contributes to the elimination of the belief in a self and involves training in a number of ancillary practices. Now, however, it is cited alongside wisdom as a separate factor of apparently equal importance. This shift in interpretation is not wholly unexpected but reflects the general drift in the description of 'skill' in dharma, announcing in clear terms the interaction between 'means' and 'wisdom'. The nature of their interaction and its manifestations are not discussed in the Prajñā Chapter, but are given separate treatment in the chapter twelve in the context of the samgrahavastu.}
The Means of Conversion

No practice exemplifies the coordinated interaction between cognitive attainments and practical ‘skills’ better than the means of conversion (sangrahavastu). Technically pertaining to Perfect Wisdom although essentially complementary, the samgrahavastu achieve great momentum particularly during the final stages of the path. They enable the bodhisattva to attract the attention of his fellow beings and secure conditions where he can effectively communicate the Dharma. By virtue of this capacity, the samgrahavastu are frequently considered as a sub-species of skilful means particularly concerned with the maturation of sentient beings. Like so many other bodhisattva practices, their presence in the path has its origin in the suttas of early Buddhism. Starting as secondary practices in the nikāya, their status increased dramatically in the Mahāyāna where they came to rank amongst the most important bodhisattva practices. The basic constituents of the samgrahavastu are giving (dāna), friendly speech (prīyavāditā), service rendered (arthacāryā) and pursuit of a common aim (samānārthatā). Judging by a passage in the Bdp and the explanations of the Bbh, acquisition and function of each member is to some extent dependent on the presence of the former.

First let us consider the account of the Bbh. People are attracted to the bodhisattva through his generosity, thinking that to listen and behave as proposed by the bodhisattva is profitable. Then, having shown generosity, the bodhisattva prompts them to accept his reasoning through...
friendly speech. Thus enchanted by his logic and instructed in the Dharma, they are separated from evil tendencies and introduced to virtue through his service. Finally, providing an example to others, the bodhisattva adjusts his own conduct to the ideal of the Dharma so that beings will not accuse him of hypocrisy, but will emulate his behaviour.\textsuperscript{918}

In the \textit{Bdp}, while accepting the gist of this account, the connection between the individual elements is explained differently:\textsuperscript{919}

"Giving is of bodhisattvas who have generated the thought of enlightenment for the first time. Friendly speech is of bodhisattvas who persist in their practice. Service rendered is of bodhisattvas who are irreversible. Pursuit of a common aim is of bodhisattvas who are held back by only one birth."

This passage contains three important elements.\textsuperscript{920} First, it suggests that the practice of the \textit{samgrahavastu} is not reserved to advanced bodhisattvas, but figures right from the beginning in the training. Second, it indicates that the acquisition of the members is separated by vast time-spans. Let us recall that even the most conservative estimate separates the four points that are mentioned here by one world-age (\textit{asamkhyeya}) each.\textsuperscript{921} Third, it hints at some form of interconnection between the \textit{samgrahavastu} and suggests that the attainment of each member builds on the preceding one. The exact nature of this link is eloquently expressed in the imagery of the next paragraph:\textsuperscript{922}

"Giving is the ground of the roots of enlightenment. Friendly speech is the developed shoot of enlightenment. Service rendered is the blossoming flower of enlightenment. Pursuit of a common aim is the resulting fruit of enlightenment."

In its characterisation of the \textit{samgrahavastu}, the \textit{Bdp} draws a great deal on material from the foregoing chapters. It describes giving as generosity inspired by thoughts of benevolence; friendly speech as charming words rich in sympathetic joy; service rendered as exertion in

\textsuperscript{918} \textit{Bbh}, pp. 112.18–113.6.
\textsuperscript{919} \textit{R}, folio 698.2–4.
\textsuperscript{920} Compare this distribution of the \textit{samgrahavastu} with the scheme that is drawn up in the \textit{Msl} (p. 117.3–9).
\textsuperscript{921} \textit{Daśa-bh}, p. xvii
\textsuperscript{922} For further detail on the length of the bodhisattva's career, see: \textit{Siddhi}, pp. 731–33.
\textsuperscript{923} \textit{R}, folio 698.4–6.
worldly conduct born from compassion and pursuit of a common aim that is marked by equipoise transformed to all-knowing. Alternatively, it speaks of generosity in terms of the dānapāramitā; of friendly speech in terms of the śīla- and kṣāntipāramitā; of pursuit of a common aim as the dhyāna- and prajñāpāramitā. To interpret the samgrahavastu in terms of the apramāṇa and pāramitā is rather unusual and not found in any of the standard reference works. This is perhaps of particular interest to the Bbh, since this work—like the Bdp—discusses the samgrahavastu immediately after the pāramitā.

In substance, however, most sources give remarkably uniform descriptions of the means of conversion. Thus, the dānasamgrahavastu is invariably held to encompass material and spiritual gifts. Since a supreme value is placed on the giving of the Dharma, their focus rests invariably on dāna-factors that affect the bodhisattva’s preaching activity. To a large degree this is also valid for the Bdp, although it includes ‘protection’ as the third object of giving. Also the prīyavāditāsamgrahavastu is chiefly referred to in conjunction with the gift of the Doctrine. Having established the Dharma as focus, it is here the positive attitude to preaching that stands in the foreground. When practising arthacaryā, the bodhisattva’s perspective in teaching shifts once more. Now, it is no longer the mode or tone of his words that matters, but the concern to demonstrate the practical and spiritual benefits of the Dharma. For the spiritually more advanced, the bodhisattva acts as guide and supervises their progress along the path. That is to say, he dispenses instructions in the three vehicles, he establishes people in equipoise and the accumulation of merit and knowledge, he praises the advantages of solitude and meditation.

These characteristics, all taken from the Bbh, aim quite clearly at the benefit of others. For the Bdp, however, rendering service is also concerned with the bodhisattva’s own progress. This proposition is surprising since, according to the Bdp’s own scheme, the arthacaryāsamgrahavastu is not practised before the stage of irreversibility. The most likely explanation is that the arthacaryāsamgrahavastu is seen to link up with the samānārthatāsamgrahavastu at which the bodhisattva is expected to display personal achievements for others to emulate. For these to be perfect, he would naturally make his personal advance an objective of the previous samgrahavastu.

925. Bbh, pp. 217.5–221.7; Msl, p. 116.2–9.
927. R, folio 695.5.
According to the *Bbh*, progress in the *samānārthatāsamgrahavastu* falls into four phases.\(^{928}\) At first, the bodhisattva does not show his capabilities to the full as he does not wish to boast about them. Then, having become more confident, he modestly begins to explain them to beings, always looking for the most appropriate means. Next, in order to instruct in the accumulation of merit, he encourages to the maxims of his own conduct. Finally, now facing a well-disposed audience, he censures heterodox practices and warns his listeners not to swerve from the Buddhist path. His attitude during these phases does not change. He guides sentient beings to roots of virtue; he adheres to the *Vinaya* and acts in accordance with the Dharma, hoping that others will emulate his conduct.

These concerns also dominate the *Bdp*’s understanding of the *samānārthatāsamgrahavastu*. Committed to the liberation of beings, the bodhisattva promotes only those aspirations that he himself considers to be of highest quality. For this purpose he generates the thought of all-knowing with the firm intention to pass it on as soon as he himself acquired it.\(^{929}\) As in the *Bbh*, the rationale is twofold, that is, to establish beings in the Dharma and to fulfil for himself the buddha-qualities.\(^{930}\)

The one issue in which the *Bdp* differs markedly from the views of the *Bbh*, and indeed most other works I have consulted, is the spiritual status of the persons to whom he addresses the *samgrahavastu*. For the bodhisattva of the *Bdp*, these are invariably mendicants (yācanaka) who have renounced worldly concerns and subscribe to a life of renunciation. Accordingly, giving means for him pleasing mendicants; friendly speech is paying respects to mendicants; rendering service means attaining the goal of the mendicants and to pursue a common goal is pursuing a goal similar to theirs.\(^{931}\) For the *Bdp*, the practice of the *samgrahavastu* is therefore confined in scope.

Several reasons could have led to this attitude. First, there is the possibility that the *Bdp* was composed at a time when the path was not yet fully open to the laity. If this could be proved, it would lend further support to my hypothesis that we are dealing in the *Bdp* with Mahāyāna text of very early origin. Then, it might reflect historical circumstances where the bodhisattva—himself a recluse or wandering ascetic—would shun the distraction of worldly life and mix only with like-minded practitioners. Alternatively, it is not inconceivable that

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929. R, folio 696.7.
930. R, folio 697.7.
the mendicant audience was simply a device to raise the status of the bodhisattva. For a bodhisattva to be in the company of bhiksus and ascetics would surely have added to his prestige, at a time when lay participation was on the increase.

Whatever the reasons for this limitation, it is clear from later literature that it was not destined to last. The vast majority of Mahāyāna sūtras, including many of the śāstras leave no doubt that the path with all its practices—if not expressively pursued by monks and laymen alike—was unanimously understood to embrace all categories of sentient beings in its final objective of universal liberation.
Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of the Bdp’s practices and doctrines now provides sufficient data for us to establish the approximate position of the Bdp in Mahāyāna literature. Comparison with other texts has shown that its treatment of the bodhisattva ideal bears all the hallmarks of an early date of composition. Evidence of its antiquity is found in practically all areas of discussion, including the nature of the practices, the doctrinal frame in which they are developed, in the path structure and in the ideal itself.

First to the presentation of the practices. Repetitions in their discussion, the loose rambling style of presentation, the predominantly descriptive approach and a certain lack of organisation all suggest that the underlying structures of the practices were still fluid and had not yet been codified by the time the Bdp was composed. This is most evident in the treatment of the dāna-, kṣānti- and vīryapāramitā but applies also to the bodhipākṣika dharma. In each of these we find repetitions, variant classifications, interjections of unrelated thought and outlines of contents that are not adhered to. In later writings many of these structural ‘anomalies’ are corrected and brought into line with the current thinking on the bodhisattva. Immediate evidence of this process is contained in the Akn whose editorial adjustments of the material of the Bdp clearly reflect discontent with some detail of its overall design. In addition, the Bdp gives little information on the interrelation between the various practices. Explanatory comments are generally restricted to the practices themselves and do not clarify the context where they occur. For instance, the Bdp goes to great lengths to enumerate the objects of generosity and to describe the hardship encountered during the training in patience. And yet, it gives little attention to the psychological processes underlying both dāna and kṣānti. This is particularly evident in its discussions of the apramāṇa and dhyāna where there is virtually no information on the meditative experience itself. Here, as in most other chapters, the Bdp is mainly concerned with providing a description of the practices themselves and to illustrate their implications for the bodhisattva’s spiritual progress. Hence, we learn a lot about the scope of their implementation and the benefits they bestow, but are left in ignorance about the psychological mechanisms of their functioning. We have seen that such emphasis on detailed descriptions and lengthy enumerations is particularly widespread among the earlier
bodhisattva works.

The *Bdp*’s antiquity is also borne out by the nature of its practices, many of which show traits of early Buddhism. The exposition of the *akusalakarmapatha* in the *Ṣīla* Chapter, the detailed discussion of the *bodhipākṣika dharma* and its insistence on traditional moral discipline indicate that the *Bdp* originated at a time when early Buddhist maxims had still considerable influence on Mahāyāna thinking. In its exposition of *ṣīla*, for example, the *Bdp* closely follows the prescriptive approach of the śrāvaka *Vinaya* and does not allow for adjustments in moral observance even if the bodhisattva’s vow should require it. Furthermore, it identifies desire as the chief source of moral impurity. We have seen that in both respects significant shifts in interpretation occur in later literature. Further evidence is found in the *Bdp*’s conception of *prajñā*. Unlike later sources which tend to conceive of *prajñā* predominantly as *dharmanairātmya*, the *Bdp* emphasises the destruction of the belief in a self and realisation of dependent co-origination. Also its threefold division of wisdom, distinguishing *śruta*, *yonīśo manasakāra* and *pratipatti* as the fundamental causes of *prajñā* is, in a variant form, already found in the earliest strands of Buddhist literature. The fact that the scheme in the *Bdp* shows some terminological divergencies indicates that it was conceived before the exact terms had been codified.

The description of the practices themselves is marked by a high degree of realism. That is to say, it is conceived in terms of real sacrifice, hardship and struggle. In all chapters, except for the eleventh, the impact of Mahāyāna ontology is very small and does not affect the implementation of the bodhisattva practice. Again, this is a common feature especially among the works belonging to the first waves of Mahāyāna *sūtras*.

Also of interest is the *Bdp*’s position on skilful means. References to the term *upāyakauśalya* occur at three places altogether. And yet, despite this lack of technical referral, there is an implicit employment of principle of skilful means throughout. In chapter eleven, for example, skilful means is closely associated with compassion and the welfare of others. Here, it becomes instrumental to both the bodhisattva’s personal accomplishments and to the spiritual purification of sentient beings. In chapter ten, skilful means is placed at the very centre of the discussion and becomes the underlying force behind the bodhisattva’s training in the *abhijñā*. Epitomised by the joint cultivation of ‘meams’ (*upāya*) and ‘knowledge’ (*jñāna*), it allows the bodhisattva effective communication of his insights to this fellow beings. *Upāya*, in this context, stands above all for the practice of the *abhijñā* which create the conditions through
which he learns of people’s spiritual requirements. Adaptation to other people’s needs is, of course, the very foundation of the concept of upāyakauśalya. And yet, there is no provision of a separate chapter of skilful nor is it treated in anywhere near the detail of the other pāramitā. The conclusion must be that at the time of the Bdp’s composition upāyakauśalya had not yet received the status it was granted in later centuries when it became a pāramitā in its own right.

Training in the practices themselves proceeds within the narrow confines of the mendicant ideal and is only open to practitioners who have renounced all ties with society. Except for one brief section, the Bdp does not even contemplate the possibility of a lay path for bodhisattvas. On the contrary, the Buddha warns repeatedly of the blemish of worldly life and strongly urges that the mendicant life should be taken up. The dismissal of the lay ideal is not surprising if we recall that most of the discourse is set in a loose narrative of Śākyamuni’s previous lives. Traditionally, his strivings have always been closely associated with the mendicant ideal and physical austerity.

Other indications for an early origin of the Bdp are found in the bodhisattva doctrine. The exposition of the cittotpāda, for instance, lacks several important elements that found their way into later discussions. It does not mention either adhyāśaya or gotra and is rather unclear about the relationship of the cittotpāda and āśaya. Also the distinctions between the various types of cittotpāda are rather vague. Although the Bdp speaks of ten different kinds of cittotpāda and indicates that these are generated successively, in content all ten are very similar and allocated only approximate places on the path. Since later treatises distinguish quite regularly between ten types of cittotpāda, it is fair to assume that the scheme in the Bdp must have been something of an ‘embryo’ for later developments.

This applies also to the Bdp’s treatment of the apramāṇa and pāramitā which contains many of the ingredients that, in later times, were brought together into a coherent doctrine. For instance, it proposes the pāramitā context for the practice of the apramāṇa and recognises three levels of training in maitri. It does not endorse the reward of a high rebirth, but distinguishes between a śrāvaka and bodhisattva way of apramāṇa practice. In dāna the Bdp differentiates between external and internal gifts and associates the practice of giving with the generation of the thought of enlightenment. When discussing kṣānti, it discriminates between patience with regard to suffering, hostility and dharma. Also its thought on vigour is divided into three spheres, that is, armoured vigour, vigour in the accumulation of roots of
virtue and vigour in benefiting sentient beings. In the context of dhyāna, the Bdp speaks of nine preparatory types of meditation and distinguishes between meditation of production (marked by the abhijñā) and meditation that is aimed at the welfare of beings. We have seen that it was exactly these divisions that became the cornerstone of the pāramitā practice in later works. The loose fashion in which the Bdp speaks of these divisions is evidence of its position at the beginning of the development of the pāramitā doctrine. In the perfection of vigour and meditation, for example, no formal division is put forward, but the contents of their expositions allow us to identify three distinct categories of vīrya and dhyāna. For kṣānti the Bdp proposes its own division. Although the individual types differ by name, in contents, they run in fact very close to the kṣānti categories of later treatises. In addition, the dynamics of the practices invariably match the order of the more advanced schemes. First, the Bdp expounds the preparatory practices, followed by the practice proper aimed at the bodhisattva’s personal advance and finally it introduces a shift in concern towards the welfare of beings.

There are, however, issues that later writers criticised. When these were of little significance, they were simply not adopted and fell into oblivion. This appears to have happened to the threefold division of upeksa, to the order of the abhijñā and their division into ordinary and non-regressing abhijñā. More important matters were modified or supplemented with additional material. Examples of such changes are found in the Akn’s samādhi list and in its eighty-four types of learning, both of which originated in the Bdp.

Other adjustments affected the arrangement of the practices. We have seen that the Bdp does not possess any formalised, linear path structure. Progress to buddhahood is primarily conceived in terms of practices, beginning with training in the apramāna and ending in mastery of the samgrahavastu. History has shown that this design did not win acceptance. The first changes occurred already in the Akn that places the apramāna well behind the pāramitā and brings the means of conversion forward into the middle of the path before the pratisamvid, pratisarana and bodhipāksika dharma. The Akn also altered the order of the seven sets of bodhipāksika dharma to comply with their traditional presentation. Quite clearly, these changes were deliberate editorial adjustments that did not occur by chance, but were meant to improve on the Bdp’s arrangement of practice.

These modifications are significant in two respects. First, they allow us to trace the development of the bodhisattva doctrine and highlight some of the concerns that led to changes in the perception of the training. Second, they are testimony of the communication
existing between the various Buddhist circles in ancient India. Although we do not know for
how long this exchange of ideas persisted, it must have continued for several centuries since
we find elements of the Bdp’s path design in the Bhb and MsI. While it is not possible to
establish that the parallels between the Bdp and Bhb/MsI are the result of direct borrowing,
the fact that they occur in no other texts allows for few alternatives. This would mean then
that the arrangement of practices in the Bdp—although criticised in detail—was highly esteemed
even two or three centuries after its composition. Rivalry with the dasabhitikika plan probably
never occurred, since the Bdp’s account of the training is not based on a set of codified career
stages, but revolves around a concatenation of practices.

In summary, we can distinguish the following training-phases in the Bdp. First, having
generated the thought of enlightenment, the bodhisattva subscribes to the preliminary aspects
of the path. This involves the practice of the apramâna and schooling in the perfections of
dânâ, sûla, ksânti, ârya and dhyaña. Coursing in the lower levels of their practice (that is, the
preparatory level and the practice proper), the bodhisattva passes through the sambhâramârga,
prayogamârga, darśanamârga and bhâvanamârga. When he has reached the bhâvanamârga,
the bodhisattva begins to train in skill. In order to establish a sound psychological basis for
the more advanced phases, he focuses at first on the destruction of the belief in a self. Next,
the bodhisattva endeavours to acquire knowledge and merit to secure his personal progress.
For this purpose he trains in the pratisamvid, pratisarana, punya and jñâna. These practices
liberate the bodhisattva from the obstructions of defilements and mistaken views, establish
him in moral conduct and bestow the powers and faculties. Thus schooled, he is able to
embark on the pursuit of the bodhipâksika dharma. He now devotes most of his attention to
the practice of meditation through which he acquires proficiency in faith, vigour, recollection,
wisdom, etc. On the basis of these attainments, the bodhisattva comprehends eventually the
insubstantiality of dharma (dharmânairatmya). This insight is reached for the first time
during the joint practice of samatha and vipaśyanâ and signals the high-point in his cognitive
training.

In order to acquire mental stability the bodhisattva withdraws into seclusion. Referred to as
’solitary wandering’, it establishes the bodhisattva in emotional independence and cuts him
off from all worldly constraints. Moreover, as the penultimate phase of the training proper, it
leads him directly to the seat of enlightenment, thus placing buddhahood within reach. The
acquisition of wisdom occurs when the bodhisattva penetrates ‘skill’ in dependent co-origination
and attains mastery over all *dharm*ā. It brings the bodhisattva ‘face to face’ with reality and creates the preconditions for universal liberation. The scope and nature of the liberation-process are summed up by the four practices that are included in the means of conversion. The bodhisattva bestows gifts, uses benign language, renders service and adopts unsurpassed conduct for others to emulate. When he has mastered all four *samgrahavastu*, he is only one birth away from buddhahood. Apart from the immense gnoseologic realisation, this achievement marks also the bodhisattva’s return to the world. That is to say, he abandons his training in the *ekayānamārga* and resumes his duties towards humankind.

This leads us to the bodhisattva ideal. For the *Bdp*, entry in the bodhisattva path is entirely in the hands of the practitioner and takes place independent of external forces. For this all important step to take place, the bodhisattva must acquire a high degree of moral purity and be equipped with a determined resolve towards enlightenment. In addition, he must possess personal initiative and self-responsibility as there is no outside support apart from the sustaining power of the buddhas. Although devotional elements such as teacher veneration occur in several passages in the *Bdp*, buddha-worship itself plays no active role in the process of purification.

The *Bdp*’s position on the bodhisattva’s relationship with sentient beings is ambiguous. On the one hand, it affirms repeatedly and with great eloquence that the overriding concern of all practices is universal liberation. However, this commitment is not borne out by the description of the practices. On balance, the *Bdp* gives notably more attention to their acquisition than to exploring how they could be used to liberate sentient beings. The discussion of the *samgrahavastu* covers less than five folios while the exposition of the perfections runs into hundreds of pages.

This kind of indifference is also found in its exposition of *dāna* where freedom from birth in the lower destinies is given among the benefits that accrue from perfect giving. The lower realms are clearly excluded as an outcome for more advanced bodhisattvas. Accordingly, hell figures only as a deterrent and is never promulgated as a particularly beneficial ‘training ground’. Once bodhisattvas have attained the stage of the prediction their interaction with beings of the evil destinies abates and gods and men become the object of their attention.

Quite clearly, the *Bdp*’s vision of the bodhisattva contains a high degree of spiritual realism. It is primarily concerned with the practical aspects of the training and shows little interest in the more breathtaking prospect of universal liberation. The picture it draws of the bodhisattva
Conclusion

is of a person who is wholly absorbed by his yearning for enlightenment. Aiming to show how this goal is realised, the *Bdp* goes to great lengths to explain the underlying processes of purification. In a sense, the spirit of the exposition is therefore not so far removed from descriptions of the śrāvaka training. It speaks of the importance of moral integrity, it emphasises the need for a disciplined spiritual environment, it urges self-reliability and warns of complacency. Moreover, references to the śrāvaka are generally amicable and free of antagonism. These factors alone would point to a period of composition when the two ideals had still very much in common.

Further weight is lent to this hypothesis by the fact that many of the *Bdp*’s propositions belong to the incipient phase of the bodhisattva doctrine; the early nature of the practices and their loose divisions, the formal exclusion of skilful means, the basic path structure and the ill-organised form of presentation, they all imply an early origin of the *Bdp*. We have thus identified in the *Bdp* a text of fundamental importance in the evolution of the bodhisattva ideal. Looking back at the history of the *Bdp*, we notice that we are not the first to do so. The composers of the countless texts referring to the *Bdp* for its exposition of the *pāramitā*, the compilers of the *Ratnakūta* collection who placed the *Bdp* at the centre of their bodhisattva works and last, but not least, Hsūn-tsang, all of these have come to the same conclusion many centuries ago.
Chapter Five

Translation of Chapter Eleven of the Bodhisattvapitakasūtra

Introduction

The original version of the Bdp in the Indic language in that it was composed is no longer extant. As so many other Mahāyāna sūtras, it is preserved only in Chinese and Tibetan translations. For the present study, I utilised the following versions of the Bdp.

   In editing and translating chapter eleven, I used or consulted the following four editions of the Tibetan \textit{hKhah-hgyur}.
   a. sTog Palace (R), Leh—1979, vol. 37, folio 590.1–695.1
   b. sD-dge (D), vol. 42, folio 315.1–384.2
   c. Peking (P), vol. 23, pp. 73.1.7–89.2.2
   d. sNar-thaṅ (N), vol. 3 (ga), folio 327.3–386.4
2. Tun-huang Manuscript: Bibliothèque Nationale (Lalou, 1950), Pelliot, item no. 977
3. Tun-huang Manuscript: India Office Library (La Vallée Poussin, 1962), item no. 380.109, 635.32, 705.2

In addition, I utilised several works that either paraphrase passages of the Bdp or contain selected quotations. These are:

1. \textit{Aksayamatinirdeśasūtra}: \textit{hphags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo} (P 34, pp. 35.2.3–74.2.2).
2. \textit{Aksayamatinirdeśatikā}: \textit{hphags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pahi rgya cher ḡrel pa} (P 104, pp. 137.1.1–273.3.7).
5. \textit{Śikṣāsamuccaya}: Bendall, C, 1902.
On several occasions, I was able to identify passages from the *Bdp* that are found in later Buddhist Sanskrit literature. For the most part these are not attributed to the *Bdp* but were taken from the *Akn*. While they show some minor divergencies from the Tibetan of the *Bdp*, they do give us a fairly good impression how the original Sanskrit text might have looked like.

Having said this, it is important to bear in mind that the conventional usage of the notion of a 'Sanskrit original' is rather misleading, since the Indic versions themselves were often subject to interpolation, rearrangement or shortening. Whether this was also the case with the *Bdp* is impossible to tell, although we have no reason to assume that it was exempt from such alterations. Assuming that certain changes were made, the Tibetan of the *Bdp* reflects only the Sanskrit text that existed in India in the eighth/ninth century that was used by the Indo-Tibetan translation team as basis for their work. Whether they founded their translation on only one version or had access to several manuscripts we cannot tell.

As we are dealing in the Tibetan with a translation from the Sanskrit (which turns my translation into a translation of translation), it was important not to lose the Sanskrit referent out of sight. For this purpose, I endeavoured to gain as close an understanding of the underlying Sanskrit as possible. In order to communicate my understanding to the reader, I provided in the notes Sanskrit equivalents to Tibetan technical terms. In establishing these, I drew generally on the vocabulary of the *Mahāvyutpatti*. While the use of (reconstructed) Sanskrit terms is helpful to demarcate the context of the discussion and to provide translation markers, it has the potential to create a whole series of linguistic problems. Wishing to avoid a fully-fledged discussion of each reconstruction, I limited myself to those terms that occur with some frequency in Buddhist literature. Even then, they are to some degree tentative and should be used only with caution.

In the translation of the technical terms my overall objective was to be as consistent as possible. Whenever the context allowed I would use the same English word for a given Tibetan/Sanskrit term. While this worked fine in many instances, in others it did not. When in difficulties, I provided the Tibetan or Sanskrit term in order to draw attention to my 'non-standard' rendering. In these cases my interpretation is generally based on the available commentarial sources that indicate the particular meaning of a word.

The most important commentary for the study of the *Bdp* is the *Akn-ṭīkā*. The textual parallels between the *Bdp* and *Akn* allowed me to draw quite regularly for explication on the annotations in the *Akn-ṭīkā*. Whenever the explanations of the *Akn-ṭīkā* affected my translation, I indicated this in the notes. Other texts of importance are the *Arthav* and *Śiks* since both contain quotations from the *Akn*.

With my English translation I hope to have produced an accurate and readable version of the meaning and contents of chapter eleven. In doing so, I found myself often confronted to chose between the literal meaning and that what I thought the text intended to say. The
principle of guidance in those situations was to be as literal as possible so long as it was reconcilable with the syntactical requirements of the English language. At times, this generated a rather Tibetanised English. Whenever in doubt, I followed the literal reading of the Tibetan, hoping that future research will throw light on those passages that I failed to penetrate fully. Not wishing to temper with the wording of the Tibetan, I kept additions or interpolations in my translation to a bare minimum. Again, this did not always further its readability, but constitutes, I believe, a methodological requirement for every translation activity, especially if presented to an academic audience for scrutiny.

The division of the text into sections is not found in the Tibetan but was introduced by me in order to make it more manageable. In essence, the choice by which I divided the text and the wording of the section-headings reflects my understanding of the content and are thus interpretative. Apart from exposing the structure of the exposition, their value is primarily methodologic in that they facilitate references to my edition.

Finally, the in-text folio numbering to the \textit{Bdp} in my translation and edition refers to the sTog Palace Edition. For reasons of legibility, I based the translation and edition on the large type of the sTog Palace manuscript. All other reference to the Tibetan canon, whether in the notes to my translation or elsewhere in this dissertation, relate invariably to the Peking Edition.
Translation of Chapter Eleven

Section I

1.1 Accumulation

(590) O Śāriputra, what is the Perfection of Wisdom of a bodhisattva, mahāsattva who cultivates the bodhisattvacaryā whenever he applies himself to it? Concerning this, O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva listens diligently to the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka. He takes hold of it and retains it. He reads it and fully absorbs it. He also explains it to others and propounds it at length.

O Śāriputra, when a bodhisattva has diligently listened to the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka, when he has taken hold of it, retained it, read it, fully absorbed it, and when he has also explained it to others and propounded it at great length, he attains the following forms of wisdom. But that wisdom, what is its form and what is the method by which it is acquired? Its form is learning and the method by which it is acquired is correct reflection.

1. hjug pa: praveśa (Böhtlingk; Roth, pw, pp. 1082–1083).
2. In the Akñ-tikā, founded on the variant reading in the Akñ (34, p. 50.4.6) we read:
   “What is the form (ākāra) of wisdom? What is its mode of acquisition (praveśa)? Learning is the form and correct reflection is its mode of acquisition.”
   Vasubandhu explains that the form of wisdom is learning (sruta) and that learning constitutes the own-being (svabhāva) of wisdom, whereas discerning the marks of dharma indicates correct reflection. He qualifies this position by stating that the eighty-four types of learning originate in wisdom and says—with ākāra being likened to hetu—that the question ‘What is the cause of wisdom?’ corresponds to the question ‘What is the form of wisdom?’ (104, p. 181.3.2–6).
3. tshul bzin yid la byed pa: yoniṣo manasakāra
   As a general term indicating close mental examination, the meaning of yoniṣo manasakāra is well-defined. According to the Kośa (ii, p. 154) it is “earnest application (ābhoga) of thought (cetas); submitting or applying the thought to its object”. In the nikāya, it is depicted as the first sign heralding the acquisition of the ṇājñatāgamārga and to be preparing the attainment of the samyakprahāna (S V, p. 31). For the Mahāyāna, manasakāra became an essential ingredient to wisdom that was thought to arise on the basis of learning (Msl, p. 7.3). Its role on the path grew steadily until it was proposed that “a single instant of seeing founded in wisdom-based correct reflection (yoniṣomanasakāraprajñāpratyaveksanā) can eradicate innumerable defilements of action” (Kp, p. 106, § 71.8). Cf. Śrotabhumi, 109, p. 287.5.3–4.

Buddhist sources came to differ, however, on the exact scope of yoniṣo manasakāra. Depending on the context and viewpoint from which it is commented upon, we find a number of variant explanations. The Abhidh-sam (R), p. 7, defines manasakāra as earnest application of thought (cetasa ābhoga), intended to fix thought (cittadhārana) on the object (ālambana). Discussing the means by which the bodhisattva enters into the first dhyāna (p. 112), the Abhidh-sam lists seven kinds of reflection, viz., (1) reflection penetrating the characteristics (laksanapratisamveda), (2) reflection adhering to determination (ādhi-mokṣika), (3) reflection adhering to the state of solitude (pravivikta), (4) reflection attracting contentment (ratisangrahamāka), (5) reflection that investigates (mimāṃsaka), (6) reflection of accomplishing practice (prayoganiṣṭhāphala) and (7) reflection of the fruits of the accomplishment of practice (prayoganiṣṭhāphala).
1.1.1 Seventy-Two Forms of Learning

What are the forms of learning? They are zest⁴, intent⁵, determination, spiritual friend, lack of conceit, (591) reverence⁶, veneration⁷, congeniality, compliance in speech, reverend service, willingness to listen, paying respect, correct reflection, attentiveness, considering the sacred word as a jewel, considering it as a remedy, considering it as calming all ailment, a

Capable of manifesting three different degrees of intensity (intense-weak, intense-mediocre and intense-intense, p. 160), it is either innate (upapattiprāțilambhika), arising from learning (srutamayi), arising from reflection (cintamayi) or arising from contemplation (bhāvanamayi). According to the Kośa (ii, p. 328), the first three types of manasakāra take place within the kāmadhātu, whereas the fourth can either operate in the rūpa or arūpyadhātu. See also Kośa (ii, p. 325) where—in a discussion of prerequisites for path-entry—we meet with three other types of manasakāra, viz., reflection directed at specific characters (sva-lakṣaṇanamanasakāra), reflection directed at common characters (sāmānyalakṣaṇanamanasakāra) and reflection of earnest application (adhinuktimanasakāra).

Edgerton’s observation (p. 418, col. 1) that in its verbal form (manasi karoṭi) correct reflection appears often in conjunction with cintayati led Meadows (1986, p. 109) to infer that manasakāra represents specifically the “method by which one acquires praṇāṇa consisting in pondering (cintāmâyipraṇāṇa)”. While a general association of cintā with manasakāra is no doubt correct, the view of the Kośa linking manasakāra on equal terms with learning, reflection and contemplation (and inborness) casts some doubt on her narrow interpretation. Furthermore, according to the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (p. 81), the second type of manasakāra, adhimokṣikamanasakāra, transcends both learning (sruta) and reflection (cintā) to realise samatha and vipaṣyāna. The Akn-tīkā (p. 185.4.1–4), commenting on the parallel passage in the Akn, explains:

“Reflecting and contemplating in accordance with [the noble path and cessation] is correct reflection. By means of correct reflection one penetrates things in accordance with reality, thus it is called penetration (praveśa) through correct reflection. Concerning penetration into meaning (artha); the meaning is understood after one has discerned through the wisdom arising from contemplation (bhāvana) the dharma that were discerned with the wisdom arising from reflection (cintā). Hence, [correct reflection] is to be known as wisdom concerned with reflection and contemplation.”

In the Bdp itself, manasakāra figures at thirteenth place amongst the seventy-two kinds of learning. It is identified with the bodhisattva’s keen wish that bad, unwholesome dharma that have hitherto not arisen are not produced (R, folio 672.1–3). It is said to prompt him to abandon those unwholesome dharma that have already arisen (R, folio 673.3–4) and it is accredited with the elimination of desire (råga) by way of contemplating impurity (R, folio 673.5–6).

Note that the Patīs (p. 195), when discussing breathing exercises, speaks of seventy-two kinds of knowledge through insight. However, as these are exclusively concerned with the three marks of existence and restricted in their operation to a meditative context, it shows no parallels to our list.

4. Taking zest (chanda) as example of all other forms of learning, Vasubandhu explains their role as follows. First, as the cause of both learning and wisdom, each of them leads to wisdom. Second, the forms of learning itself becomes the cause of chanda, etc., with which it forms jointly the basis to wisdom. Third, each of the types of learning represents also the own-being of wisdom (Akn-tīkā, p. 181.3.6–4.1):

“Zest is the keen wish to hear the Dharma. From the keen wish to hear, learning and insight occur but without the keen wish they do not. Hence, zest should be understood as the cause (hetu) through which wisdom arises. Again, zest arises from learning, but not from non-learning. Hence, learning becomes the cause from which zest arises. If the two are taken together, they are therefore the one cause [of wisdom]. Again, what is the own-being of wisdom? The form of zest means that the own-being of insight is zest. With regard to the following items, the form of resolve, etc., should be understood accordingly.”

5. As part of its explanation of intent (āśaya), the Akn-tīkā (p. 181.4.3–4) draws attention to a passage in the Bbh (p. 18.17–21). However, this passage deals with adhyāṣaya and not with āśaya—a confusion that exemplifies the conceptual proximity of both terms (cf. Edgerton, pp. 17–18). A good definition of āśaya is found further below in the Bbh (p. 313.4–6), stating that the intent of the bodhisattva is based on faith and Dharma-discrimination and manifests a resolute belief accompanied by certain knowledge and determination towards the Buddha’s teachings.

receptacle of recollection, knowledge arising from awakening⁸, search for understanding,
penetration of reason, insatiability through hearing the Buddha’s doctrine, propagation of
renunciation, erudition through restraint⁹, adherence to great learning, experiencing joy in
devotion, bodily cheerfulness, joyful mind, untiring listening, pursuit of the own-being of
things, pursuit of designations, pursuit of good conduct¹⁰, lack of desire for other vehicles,
pursuit of the perfections, pursuit of the bodhisattvaptaka¹¹, pursuit of the means of conversion,
pursuit of skilful means, pursuit of the pure abodes, pursuit of the super-knowledge (592),
pursuit of the bases of mindfulness, pursuit of the perfect efforts, pursuit of the bases of
success, pursuit of dependent co-origination, pursuit of impermanence, suffering and non-self,
pursuit of serenity, pursuit of emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness, pursuit of non­
accumulation of karmic formations, pursuit of the accumulation of roots of virtue, self-assertion,
reflection on the Doctrine, contemplation of unsuitable associations, severing of all defilement,
delight in skilfulness, adherence to noble ones and rejection of ignoble ones, pursuit of noble
qualities, faculties, bases of mindfulness, factors of enlightenment and the noble eightfold
path, the Tathāgata’s powers, assurances, great benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy,
equipose¹², unique knowledge (593) and eighteen exclusive buddha-qualities.

⁸. Vasubandhu’s commentary on this term runs as follows (Akn-tikā, pp. 182.4.5-7):
“Awakening is wisdom arising from reflection. Also, wisdom arising from reflection has two
different aspects, e.g., the assumption and non-assumption of composure. But he who is
awakened since he is knowledgeable, that one is of knowledge arising from awakening. By
means of the teaching of the knowledge arising from awakening, he acquires composed
wisdom.”

Now, the term rtogs pa šes pa (gatibodhana) is ambiguous as it may carry several meanings (Edgerton,
pp. 208, 402). In his English rendering of the Śīksāsamuccaya (1981, p. 185) Bendall translates gati­
boḍhana—erroneously I think—as ‘illuminating the destinies’. This interpretation was also adopted by
Meadows (1986, p. 107), translating it as ‘understanding the course’, while Braarvig (1989, p. 254)
follows Vasubandhu’s understanding. Since gati may indeed mean ‘awakening’ (Edgerton, p. 208)—a
meaning that brings it much closer to Vasubandhu’s commentary of the term gatibodhana—Meadows and
Bendall are probably misguided in their translation. In addition, to render gatibodhana as ‘knowledge
arising from awakening’, being possibly an antecedent to the technical term cintāmānīprajñā fits the
context in which it is cited in the Bdp, while the translation ‘illuminating the destinies’ does not.

⁹. This is one of the few instances in which, in spite of a common Sanskrit source term, the Tibetan
translations of the Akn and Bdp do not correspond. While in the Bdp the Sanskrit term dātāyāneya is
rendered as sbyin nas mi smod pa, we find in the Akn the phrase dul žin can šes pa. Notwithstanding these
discrepancies in wording, both phrases concur closely in their respective meanings. Vasubandhu’s explana­
tion of that term runs as follows (Akn-tikā, pp. 183.2.1–183.3. 5):
“As regards restraint, he is restrained since he is endowed with improved meditative expedients
and does not enter into the realm of the sense organs such as that of the eye, etc. He
suppresses the defilements such as passion, etc. That is the cause. He who is restrained in that
way is all-knowing. He is all-knowing, because he arrives at the place where he should be
walking to all the time via the true path. That is the fruit. The true path is the union of
knowledge and means, the noble eightfold path, that of the four noble truths and so forth. As
regards the place to which he should be going, this is nirvāṇa. Thus it is that the learned one
who originates in learning, although he is marked by the characteristic of the fruit and cause
[of the noble path becomes erudite through restraint.”

¹⁰. According to the Akn-tikā (p. 183.4.1), good conduct is here understood to apply to practices that are
included in the āryaṣṭāhgamārtha since it is primarily these that liberate the practitioner from suffering.

¹¹. Vasubandhu informs us in this context that the Bodhisattvapattra is the vaipulya of the twelvefold
division of scriptures. (Akn-tikā, p. 184.2.7).

¹². These four preceding items constitute, of course, the four immeasurables (apramāṇa), (Mvy 1504–7).
1.1.2 Forty-One Methods of Acquiring Learning

Thus, O Śāriputra, in whatever one is learned in that one becomes knowledgeable and being knowledgeable one performs good conduct. Why?

One who aspires to the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, he will listen to it. On hearing it, he becomes knowledgeable and being knowledgeable, he performs good conduct.

One who pursues with determination the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, he will listen to it. 

One who applies himself to the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, he will listen to it. 

One who adheres to a virtuous friend, he will listen to it. 

One who is free from conceit, he will listen to it. 

One who is well-disposed towards the greatly learned, he will listen to it. 

One who honours the greatly learned, he will listen to it. 

One who persists in congeniality towards them, (594) he will listen to it. 

One who is compliant towards them, he will listen to it. 

One who pays respect to the greatly learned, he will listen to it. 

One who is willing to listen, he will listen to it. 

One who venerates the greatly learned, he will listen to it. 

One who reflects on great learning, he will listen to it. 

One who considers the sacred word as a jewel, he will listen to it. 

One who honours the greatly learned, he will listen to it. 

One who is compliant towards them, he will listen to it. 

One who pays respect to the greatly learned, he will listen to it. 

One who honours the greatly learned, he will listen to it. 

That unlike the ten powers (bala), four assurances (vaisārādyya) and four unique knowledge (pratisamvid), the apramāṇa are listed individually and not subsumed under their title.

13. Each of the following forty-one examples, specifying the acquisition of learning, concludes in the stock phrase | ... de ni thos par khyur ro | thos nas bar du šes so | šes nas nan tan byed do || 

These I have translated as: “... will listen to it. On hearing it, he becomes knowledgeable (prajñātī) and being knowledgeable, he performs good conduct (pratipadyate).”

In order to achieve a better English reading, I omitted these rather cumbersome, prolix and repetitive phrases. The omissions have been indicated by the insertion of three ellipsis points in the appropriate hiatus. Of the forty-one methods of acquisition of learning, only sixteen have been directly taken from the list of seventy-two forms of learning, that is akāra no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 22, 27. A further seven methods of acquisition have counterparts in spirit, though not in letter, in the list of learning. These are no. 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 26, 28. None of the remaining nineteen methods of acquisition exhibits any immediate parallels to the forms of learning. More importantly, none of the Bdp’s forty-one methods of acquisition corresponds to the thirty-two methods of acquisition of correct reflection that are given in the Akn. Both lists seem to have been construed along differing lines and have little in common except for the context in which they appear and the shared purpose to represent a further stage in the cognitive process leading to wisdom (Akn, p. 51.1.6–2.7).

14. My translation of this phrase is based on a passage in the Abhidh-sam (R), p. 137, saying that application (ādāhāna) is correct reflection (yonīśo manasākāra) that has great learning (bahuśruta) as object.

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One who wishes for understanding of the sacred word, he will listen to it. .... 
One who after hearing the sacred word experiences mental inspiration, (595) he will listen to it. .... 
One who is insatiable in hearing the sacred word, he will listen to it. .... 
One who after hearing a discourse on giving considers the act of renunciation, he will listen to it. .... 
One who after hearing a discourse on moral conduct guards morality, he will listen to it. .... 
One who after hearing a discourse on forbearance acts with patience, he will listen to it. .... 
One who after hearing a discourse on vigour acts with flawless vigour, he will listen to it. .... 
One who after hearing a discourse on meditation acts with his mind free of inattention, he will listen to it. .... 
One who after hearing a discourse on wisdom exerts his mind to suppress the impurities, (596) he will listen to it. .... 
One who generates joy in great learning\(^5\), he will listen to it. .... 
One who attains bodily cheerfulness\(^6\) on listening to the Dharma, he will listen to it. .... 
One who rejoices on hearing the Dharma, he will listen to it. .... 
One who on hearing of the Mahāyāna aspires to it, he will listen to it. .... 
One who produces a friendly disposition on hearing about the means of conversion, he will listen to it. .... 
One who embarks on mindfulness with regard to body, feeling, thought and dharma on listening to a discourse on the bases of mindfulness, he will listen to it. .... 
One who becomes shameful and embarrassed by non-virtues that have already been sown and arisen on listening to a discourse on the perfect efforts, he will listen to it. .... 
One who constantly retains in mind virtuous dharma that have already been sown and arisen, (597) he will listen to it. .... 

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\(^5\) According to Edgerton the term *man du thos pa* (bahuṣrūta) carries several, albeit related, meanings. He gives ‘sacred word’ (p. 536, col. 1)—that is most often the Dharma—and ‘great learning’ (p. 399, col. 1) as the most frequently occurring ones. Monier-Williams (p. 726, col. 1) gives ‘one who has studied much’, ‘very learned’, ‘being of deep erudition’ as the principal meanings of the term *bahuṣrūta*. Already in the *nikāya*, great learning (*bahuṣsutta*) assumed an important position and monks bearing this title were greatly revered. It occurs in the *Vinaya* (ii, p. 95), Majjhimanikāya (III, p. 11) and at two places in the Anguttaranikāya (II, p. 22; III, p. 114) where it is cited among the four things that bestow the rank of Elder on a monk: “He has heard very much and memorised what he has heard. He retains in his mind what he has heard; the teachings are good at the beginning, in the middle and at the end in the sense that the meaning and letter are good. He follows the way of the *brahmacarīyā* in every respect and with great purity. To these teachings he has listened very often, he has borne them in mind, repeated them aloud, investigated them for their meaning and well understood them through right view.” 

The *bahuṣrūta* par excellence was, of course, Ānanda who was singled out in recognition of this quality as the person responsible for the preservation of the Doctrine (D II, pp. 144–46). Listed among important qualities (A I, pp. 24–25; for its place in an alternative list of seven see; D III, p. 252; M III, p. 23), it became a title that bestowed great prestige and covered the *sutta*, *vinaya* and *mātikā* (A II, pp. 147, 170).

\(^6\) I follow here Bendall (1981, p. 185) in translating the term *lus sim pa* (kāyāudbīlya) as ‘bodily cheerfulness’. 

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On listening to a discourse on the bases of success, one whose body, mind and determination become agile, he will listen to it. ....

On listening to a discourse on meditation, one who establishes his mind in unfaltering reflection, he will listen to it. ....

On listening to a discourse on the immeasurables, one who becomes benevolent towards all sentient beings, greatly compassionate towards the poor, well disposed towards the Dharma and remains in the state of equipoise with regard to non-virtue, he will listen to it. ....

On listening to a discourse on the faculties, one who applies his mind to the faculty of faith, vigour, mindfulness, meditation and wisdom, he will listen to it. ....

On listening to a discourse on the factors of enlightenment, one who applies his mind in order to understand all the dharma perfectly, he will listen to it. ....

On listening to a discourse on the path, one who applies his mind to the pursuit of nirvāṇa, (598) he will listen to it. ....

One who directs his mind towards unsurpassed and perfect enlightenment on listening to the immeasurable teaching of the Buddha, studying the Tathāgata’s powers, assurances, benevolence, compassion, joy, equipoise, unique knowledge and the eighteen exclusive buddha-qualities, such a person learns. On learning, he becomes knowledgeable and being knowledgeable, he performs good conduct.

O Śāriputra, these are the forty-one methods of acquiring the forms of learning. O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that a bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

1.1.3 Good Conduct

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, when a bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom has properly listened to the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, when he has taken

17. In the Akn (p. 51.1.6), the contents of this section is called “thirty-two methods of acquisition by means of correct reflection”. For the Akn, this ties well to the introductory passage of ‘learning’ where learning is identified as the form (or cause) of wisdom and correct reflection as the method of acquisition. Accordingly, Vasubandhu explains that “acquisition (pravesa) is either to persist in correct reflection or realise own-being and distinction by means of these [manifestations of] correct reflection” (Akn-tīkā, p. 185.4.5–7). In view of the purely cognitive orientation of the Akn’s thirty-two methods of acquisition this interpretation is appropriate (Akn, p. 51.1.5–2.7).

In spite of the fact that the list contained in the Bdp does not match the contents of that in the Akn, the same assumption can be made for the Bdp’s enumeration. While it is true that the cognitive element in the forty-one kinds of penetration is less evident, its presence, joined with bhāvanāmāyiprajñā, is difficult to overlook in the phrase: “On hearing it, he becomes knowledgeable and being knowledgeable, he performs good conduct”. The concept of knowledge implies no doubt the element of reflection and correct conduct could be interpreted to correspond to contemplation (bhāvanā) of those insights that were revealed to the bodhisattva in the course of the foregoing cognitive process. In the Bdp we have therefore a catalogue of forces that promote the generation of wisdom, given in the order in which they influence each other. First, there is learning, divided into seventy-two kinds. Second, if combined with a wholesome mental disposition the forms of learning lead to knowledge of what has been learned. Third, comprehension then modifies the bodhisattva’s practice and causes him to apply himself correctly to its cultivation.
Translation of Chapter Eleven

hold of it, retained it, read it, fully absorbed it, when he has also explained it to others and propounded it at great length, he performs good conduct

What is his good conduct with regard to dharma? Just as one complies with the instructions, he performs good conduct with regard to dharma.

Furthermore, performing good conduct with regard to dharma is non-apprehension any dharma. Why? If one apprehends dharma, one's conduct becomes misguided. As regards people who adhere to grasping dharma; (599) there is no place or occasion that arises from these dharma. They are unestablished. But even people who do not apprehend them because they are cleansed and are established in good conduct become insecure towards these dharma, how much more those who grasp dharma? Hence, non-apprehension of any dharma is good conduct.

Furthermore, one who is unobstructed with regard to dharma is of good conduct. One who lacks assertion, grasping and attachment towards dharma and realises that they are unarisen and unceasing is of good conduct. In addition, seeing the absence of increase and decrease in dharma is good conduct.

Furthermore, I have not explained much here. Just as it did not become perceptible in accordance with the explanation, in the same way all dharma are imperceptible, inapprehensible and have one characteristic. What is this characteristic? It is the lack of characteristic. The characteristic is without characteristic. This is due to two factors. Why? Binary reflection and right understanding themselves, I declare to be without characteristic. This is their characteristic, but it is a non-characteristic. Consequently, one who understands that all dharma are imperceptible, inapprehensible and without characteristic is of good conduct. Embark diligently on good conduct. Attain the vision that all dharma are pure. (600)

18. nan tan ṅin por byed pa yin pa: pratipattisāra (Mvy 1810)
According to the Bhāvanākrama (MBT, ii, p. 222 § 21), good conduct of bodhisattvas is at all times aimed at the welfare of sentient beings. Based on perfect knowledge and exempt from despondency, agitation or meditative faults, a bodhisattva ponders on the illusory nature of the skandha, dhatu, dyatana, etc., without, however, to bring the realisation of their insubstantiality to conclusion. Wishing to establish beings in true vision of all dharma (survadharmayathābhūtadarśana), he observes the three areas of practice (adhiśīla, adhicitta, adhiprajñā) in order to set an example and manifests vigour and purity in conduct of body, speech and mind. Judging by the number of references Edgerton cites in his entry of pratipatti, these elements constitute for most texts the cardinal aspects of good conduct (p. 364). Precise definitions, however, are rare largely because the concept of pratipatti itself is rather broad and ill-delineated, changing with context and doctrinal orientation.

19. The Tibetan gnas dan skabs could conceivably represent a misinterpretation of the Sanskrit term avasthita (gnas skabs; Abhisaml, p. 119) or avastha (Mvy 7588), in which case the translation 'condition' would be more appropriate. While this would make better sense, expressing that unestablished dharma do not produce any conditions that might perpetuate the causal chain, the Tibetan reading does not support this interpretation.

20. the tshom du gyur pa: samṣayita (Edgerton, p. 542; Monier-Williams, p. 1117, col. 3).
21. kun brtags pa: parikalpita; yah dag par brtags pa: sampratipannā.
Then, on that occasion, the lord composed these verses:

Whoever fares in truly good conduct  
According to the Bodhisattvapitaka  
Such a wise person does not cling to phenomena.  
Thus, non-clinging emulates good conduct.

A man who obtains dharma does not profess emptiness.  
The wise one does not take pride in empty dharma.  
He has not attachment to empty dharma whatsoever.  
Thus non-attachment resembles good conduct.

One does not grasp nor reject the dharma.  
There is non-practice of grasping dharma.  
Hence non-grasping is the characteristic of dharma.  
It is this kind of emulation that is good conduct.

Why is the bodhisattva never attached to dharma?  
His pristine cognition does not apprehend dharma.  
He does not even attach himself to the non-grasping pristine cognition.  
It is this kind of emulation that is good conduct.

The wise one should abide in the qualities of purification.  
He should apply himself to these dharma.  
When he has persisted in good behaviour and comportment.  
At that time, his introduction to the Doctrine becomes pure.

When he has purified his deportment,  
He understands such teaching.  
Then, he also perceives the resolve of the thought of enlightenment.  
Truly, at that time, once he has perceived this resolve, the wise one explains such teaching.

After he has acquired knowledge of the absolute truth of this profound teaching.

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22. sbyans pahi yon tan: dhūtaguna (Edgerton, p. 286, col. 1).
23. sgo: mukha ('entrance', 'ingress', 'introduction')
   Cf. Edgerton, p. 433, col. 2; Monier Williams, p. 819, col. 3 ff. See also entries for dharmamukha (Edgerton, p. 280, col. 1) and dharmālokamukha (Edgerton, p. 281, col. 2) on which my translation is based.
He will always abide in truth.
He is noble due to his infinite conduct and excellent qualities.
The great learning of this wise man is like an ocean.

Truly, as regards the meaning and words of this teaching (601),
Their limit is beyond comprehension.
Both, words and meaning are infinite.
One who fares in good conduct remains unperturbed.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

1.1.4 Vision

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, after the bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom has properly listened to the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka and has taught it in great detail to others, he attains light as regards all dharma, because he has dispelled the impenetrable, shadowy darkness of clouding ignorance. This is the light of wisdom. Since he has attained this vision, he knows virtuous and non-virtuous dharma. For the sake of life, he never adheres to non-virtuous dharma. But, because he abandons non-virtuous dharma and comprehends the teachings that he has thus heard he is virtuous, mighty and calm.

Then, on that occasion, the lord composed these verses:

Just like one who has entered into a house
That is dim and filled with darkness,

24. šes rab kyi snyan: praṇīñaloka
If praṇīñaloka corresponds to jñāñaloka, it would indicate the presence of the first nirvedhāhāgiya, viz., usmāgata or ‘heat’. Sprunging from the simultaneous pursuit of samatha and vipaśyanā, light of knowledge reveals to the śrāvaka for the first time the meaning of the four noble truths in their sixteen aspects (DPP, p. 20). The evidence suggesting such identity of praṇīna and jñāna as it is postulated by the Kośa (vi, p. 246), we have little material to go by. Most of the standard treatises do not contain any reference to praṇīñaloka. It is not found in the Mppś, Kośa, Abhidh-sam, Mśl or Mśg and appears unknown even to the Bbh. Indeed, besides two highly ambiguous references in the Mvp (iii, p. 332.15), the only text in that I located the term praṇīñaloka is the Dbb. Here, it appears on its own on the ninth stage, standing for the ‘light of wisdom’ that the bodhisattva continually discharges into samsāra to benefit beings (p. 71, R). Elsewhere in the Dbb (p. 62, N), the bodhisattva applies himself on the seventh stage to all practices by means of the light of the attainment, wisdom and knowledge (samāpattipraṇīñajñanālokena). The most instructive reference yet to praṇīñaloka is found on the prabhākarabhumī (Dbb, p. 32, H) where the bodhisattva—contemplating the nature of conditioned existence—realises that to perceive all things truly is impossible unless by unproduced wisdom whose light (āloka) is dependent for unfolding on ‘skill’ in learning (srutākauśalya). It appears, therefore, that for praṇīñaloka to become manifest, the bodhisattva is required to devote himself to learning (and teaching)—a proposition that tallies well with the context in which praṇīñaloka is mentioned in the Bdp.

25. dge ba thub pa ži ba: śubhamuniśānta.
Does not see with his eyes even those shapes  
That exist in that house,

In the same way, by some of those in whom  
impurity has arisen,
Virtuous and non-virtuous dharma  
Are not perceived unless they listen to the Bodhisattvapitaka.

Once they have listened to it, they distinguish dharma.  
On listening to it, they relinquish sin.  
Once they have listened to it, they renounce all harm.  
On listening to it, they attain nirvāṇa. (602)

Since they desire to learn, their erudition increases.  
By learning, their wisdom increases.  
By wisdom, their intentions become pure.  
Once they have attained pure intentions, they attain happiness.

Those who reach the goal have sharp minds.  
At the time when they reach nirvāṇa,  
Being secure in the Doctrine and skilled in purity,  
They attain great happiness.

As regards the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka;  
Once they have listened to it, they abide in the essence of the Doctrine.  
After they have realised it in the world,  
They will cultivate enlightened conduct.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

1.2 Application  
Furthermore, O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom generates the notion of a virtuous friend towards a person who adheres to the Bodhisattvapitaka. Having done so he purifies him in this very Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka. He purifies him completely. He generates in him a keen wish for this Bodhisattvapitaka. He causes him to strive and apply himself diligently. He causes him to retain it in his mind and
to endeavour zealously to that end\textsuperscript{26}. Since he has fully penetrated the four perfect efforts he attains freedom from obstruction concerning any \textit{dharma} whatsoever.\textsuperscript{27}

Then, at that time, the lord pronounced these verses:

A person who pronounces the Dharma
Is thought of as a virtuous friend.
Once he permanently fares in good conduct,
He applies himself to the Doctrine and studies it. (603)

He never reduces his determination.
His vigour is always unsurpassed.
His wisdom is irrevocably completely purified.
He constantly abides in pristine cognition.

He understands my Dharma.
Due to his faith, he lives in this world.
He understands it as the imperturbable Dharma
That was fully explained by the Buddha.

The wise ones are skilled in analysing words.
Being learned, they comprehend their meaning.
They practice perpetually wholesome conduct.
They renounce perpetually unwholesome conduct.

Their minds are always free of blemish.
They are truly free from despondency concerning any teaching.
Just as easily as a body, they attain swiftly

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{yah dag par rab tu hjog par byed pa: samyakpradadhāti} (cf. Edgerton, p. 370, col. 2).

\textsuperscript{27} According to the \textit{Abhidh-sam} (R), p. 120, adopting the line of reasoning that prevails in the nikāya, the fruit of the cultivation (bhāvanāphala) of the four correct efforts (samvakprahāṇa) consists chiefly of the abandonment of dharma that are detriment (vipakṣa) to skilful dharma and the growth of dharma that counteract (pratipakṣa) unskilful dharma. Marking the stage of usmajata, the practitioner succeeds in eliminating the coarse impediments and prepares for entry on the transcendental path (Kośa, vi, p. 287). In the Bdp, by saying that the samyakprahāṇa contribute to the elimination of all hindrances (āvarana), no immediate connection to such a fruit of perfect effort is attested. Moreover, it is also left open whether the bodhisattva is freed from the klesāvarana and jñeyāvarana—the standard division of the Bbh (pp. 3.13, 37.6) and Māl (pp. 2.25–3.4)—or whether he is still subjected to one of them. The fact that the Bdp makes a point in saying that he is liberated from hindrances of all dharma, suggests perhaps the former. In this event, the attainment of the samyakprahāṇa would establish the bodhisattva on the transcendental path—a remarkable progress from the cultivation of the usmajata phase of the prayogamārga that tallies ill with other path-schemes (cf. Kośa, vi, p. 184; Māl (N), pp. 53.13–54.19). The likelihood of imminent entry into the lokottara path is however strengthened by the content of the following section since this lays down the attainments of the darśanamārga that mark the first phase of the transcendental path.
The mind of enlightenment, vigour and determination.

By listening to the Doctrine, their wisdom increases.
Because of realisation arising from pristine cognition, their recollection stays flawless.
Once they constantly persist in pristine cognition and recollection,
They fully understand virtuous and non-virtuous dharma.

On learning the highest teachings,
They attain the supreme powers of understanding, recollection and wisdom.
Having studied like myself for a long time,
They know the disposition of sentient beings.

Once they have listened to the Doctrine they acquire excellence.
On acquiring excellence, their pristine cognition having become pure,
They perceive the disposition of sentient beings.
For this reason they teach the Dharma in accordance with the disposition of sentient beings.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

(604)

1.3 Seeing

1.3.1 Right View

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom, having thus purified his mind and cleansed his entry into the light of the Doctrine, studies in the following way. So far as the emergence of the noble, right view is concerned, it has two causes and two conditions. What are the two? These are other people’s statements and correct inner reflection.

He considers thus: “What are the statements of other people and what is correct inner reflection?” While he reflects correctly in this manner, he considers the following in his mind: “Those who cultivate yoga do not hear the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka.

28. The word seems can is not found in the Tibetan text. I assume that its presence is implied, since seems can is the object of the preceding verse to which this verse is contextually closely related.

29. The origin of this concept goes back to early Buddhism. It is found at several places in the nikāya and was adopted at a later stage by the Mahāyāna. “Statements of others (parataś ca ghosah) and inner correct reflection (adhyātman ca yoniśo manasakāra) are the causes of right view” (A I, p. 87; Kośa, ii, p. 245; iv, p. 100; Msg, p. 65).
After they have obtained gratification through meditation alone without hearing the noble Dharma and Vinaya, they fall into great conceit through the power of pride. They are not liberated from birth, old-age, disease, death, misery, lamentations, suffering, grief and agitation. They are not liberated from the mass of suffering.

Pondering these, the Tathāgata proclaimed: “One who listens congenially to the statements of others becomes liberated from old-age-and-death.”

The lord spoke again:

On hearing these teachings, bodhisattvas understand them.
On hearing them, they do not commit offences. (605)
On hearing them, they abandon harm.
On hearing them, they attain nirvāṇa.

A listener who wishes to learn becomes exuberant,
Because it is by learning that wisdom increases.
His intentions are purified through wisdom.
When he reaches the goal, he gains happiness.

Those who reach the goal have sharp minds.
At that time, they reach nirvāṇa.
Those who are skilled in pure dharma are purified
And attain supreme happiness.

1.3.2 Practice and Seeing

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva should study carefully the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka as the noble Dharma and Vinaya. He should take hold of it and retain it. He should read it and fully absorb it. He should also explain it to others and propound it in great detail. O Śāriputra, those who do not hear this Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka and do not engage in correct practice violate the noble path.

Pondering this, the Tathāgata proclaimed: “Correct inner reflection is liberation from old-age-and-death.”

He studies in this way: “On contemplating the bodhisattva’s correct practice, viz., what this practice is actually like, he learns that a bodhisattva, mahāsattva does not pursue any dharma; he learns that he does not pursue any practice. Correct practice is an expression for non-practice.

Furthermore, the bodhisattva who practises correctly does not send out sound or murmurs. (606) He does not construe a place from which sound emerges. But, investigating its starting-
point and end-point, he thinks: “Sound emerges from and disappears into sound itself”. He
studies, thinking: “If one researches all sounds ever pronounced, by whom they were pro­
nounced, for what purpose they were pronounced and in order to comprehend what they were
pronounced, without apprehending sound as an aspect of the past, present or future, this is
correct practice.  
How does the bodhisattva who practises correctly in this manner see correctly? He studies
in this way. At the time when the bodhisattva sees that all dharma are suppressed by their
nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time when he sees that all dharma are appeased
by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time when he sees that all dharma are
tranquil by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time when he sees that all
dharma are unattained by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time when he
sees that all dharma are unborn by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time
when he sees that all dharma are unarisen by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the
time when he sees that all dharma are absolutely unbecome by their nature, at that
time he sees correctly. At the time when he sees that all dharma are in a state of nirvāṇa by
their nature, at that time he sees correctly. Also investigating by whom they are seen, he
realises that they are altogether unseen and unexamined. If he sees it in this way he is of
correct vision.
Once again, he studies in this way. A bodhisattva who practises correctly has no doubt or
uncertainty concerning any dharma whatsoever. He is free from obstruction concerning any
dharma whatsoever. He who practises correctly will always be at the door to liberation
concerning any dharma whatsoever. He who practises correctly does not exert himself to
renounce any dharma whatsoever. He who practises correctly does not exert himself to
contemplate any dharma whatsoever. He who sees rightly all dharma and looks at them in
accordance with reality is of right view.
What is looking at all dharma in accordance with reality? It is non-seeing. Non-seeing is
an expression for unborn. Unborn is an expression for unarisen. What is unarisen? It is an
expression for invisibility.
Pondering this, the Tathāgata proclaimed: “If one realises that all karmic formations are
unborn, one penetrates the certainty of truth. (608) Penetration of the certainty of truth is

30. The syntax of this paragraph is ambiguous and I am not certain that I have correctly interpreted the
thought that stands behind it.
32. According to the Bbh (p. 294.14–20) to see dharma in accordance with reality involves four fields of
cognition. These are (1) seeking out names (nāma), (2) seeking out things (vastu), (3) seeking out the
manifestations of own-being (svabhāvatāraṇājñapti) and (4) seeking out manifestations of distinction
(viśesaprajñapti).
33. yan dag pa niḥ du nes pa: samyakntvaniyata
The term samyakntvaniyata has two related, though conceptually somewhat different, meanings. On the one
hand, it represents one of three categories (rāṣṭi) classifying the various people according to the degree of
spiritual attainments. First, there is the category of beings that are ‘permanently fixed in falsehood’
right view."

He studies in this way, thinking: "Why is it called penetration of the certainty of truth? Because all dharma are completely uniform with the buddha-qualities; therefore it is penetration of the certainty of truth."

Hence, those who wish to penetrate the certainty of truth should listen carefully to this very Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka. They should take hold of it and retain it. They should read it and fully absorb it. Indeed, they should apply themselves correctly to this very Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

1.3.3 Penetration and Speech

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, when the bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom, having thus purified his mind and cleansed his entry into the light of the Doctrine, penetrates correctly he realises correct speech. What is correct penetration? What is correct speech?

A bodhisattva’s correct penetration is as follows. He penetrates the basis of perfect mental quietude and the binary thinking of insight34. This is correct penetration. (609) Although he

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34. The association of binary thinking (vikālpa) and insight (vipaśyānā) indicates that we dealing here still with the preparatory phase of vipaśyānā. For, when brought to its highest point, vipaśyānā is no longer subject to recollection (smṛti) and reflection (manasākāra), but operates as non-discursive knowledge (nirvikalpa-niyāna) manifesting analytical investigation (of the real) (bhūtāpratyaavekkā) that is devoid of mental and verbal proliferation (prapācāpaśama). According to the Bhāvanākrama (MBT, iii, pp. 15–16), recollective attention and reflection figure only during the initial stages of vipaśyānā development, while, at the pinnacle of its evolution, asmṛti and amanasākāra—springing from analytical investigation—become
The hub of the yogin's vipaśyāna experience (MBT, iii, pp. 15–17). This division is also borne out by the vipaśyāna account in the Abhidh-sam (R), p. 126, where, at first, insight is characterised by examination (vicaya), discernment (pravicaya), judgment (prativitarka) and investigation (mimāṃsā). Cf. Samdhis (ELa), p. 90.3–22.

35. The Śrotabhāmi (109, p. 286.5.2–3) distinguishes five objects from which the bodhisattva achieves freedom when abiding in the 'body of solitude'. These are bad conduct (duścarita), desire (kāma), utensils (pañciśāra), sexual intercourse (samsarga) and defilements (klesa).


37. roig pa spros pa: prapañca

Prapañca is a difficult term of which Edgerton's translation as 'spreading out', 'activity', 'error of false statement' or 'false imagining'—although linguistically sound—is not quite adequate (Edgerton, p. 380, col. 2). He comes somewhat closer when, on the basis of Chinese translations, he proposes 'frivolous talk' as its meaning. According to Stcherbatsky, prapañca is the "expression of conceptually differentiated reality in words" (Nirvāṇa, 1975, p. 38*, pp. 137, 168, 216). The same line of thinking is taken up by Honda, when (citing Stcherbatsky as authority) he defines prapañca as "diffusion or diversification as function of craving, the expression of conceptual conceit and wrongly differentiated reality in words and view, or the expression of conceptually differentiated reality in words" (1968, p. 233).

38. The role of upāyakauśalya is twofold. On the one hand, it brings about personal welfare for the bodhisattva and, on the other hand, it furthers the liberation of beings. Taking this division as foundation, the Bh (pp. 261.6–272.8) distinguishes several aspects within each category. First, as regards the bodhisattva's own welfare—epitomising the acquisition of buddha-qualities—it involves compassionate attention to sentient beings, accurate knowledge of all conditioned dharma, thirst for knowledge of unsurpassed enlightenment, non-defiled passing through the round of rebirth and ardent vigour (p. 261.6–19). Second, skilful means in the service of others—accomplishing the ripening of beings—is dominated by the cultivation of the four means of conversion (samgrahavastu). Through their presence, manifesting six kinds of effect, the bodhisattva multiplies the otherwise negligible fruits that accrue from the small roots of virtue of beings; he occasions the acquisition of great roots of virtue with little effort; he averts obstacles that would prevent beings from embracing the Buddha's teachings; he causes beings who are yet undecided to embark on the path; he ripens those who have already embarked on the path and he liberates those who have already ripened (p. 261.20–27).

The Msl (p. 147.3–9) speaks of five different types of means. First, there is non-constructive knowledge (nirvikalpajñāna) that occasions the acquisition of the buddha-qualities. Second, the means of conversion
O Śāriputra, what is correct speech? His speech is logical. Furthermore, O Śāriputra, it is attentive. It consists of sound and is articulate. It is investigative, non-contradictory and amiable. It is imperturbable, inapprehensive and compliant. It is judicious and well-balanced. It is unborn and lacks all foundation of quarrel. It is dependable and devoid of acrimony.39

It is speech of suchness. It is speech of thusness, genuine thusness, unfailing thusness, truth and actuality.40 It is speech of the sameness of the three times. It cuts off the fetters and is independent of form, feeling, perception, karmic formations and consciousness.

It is independent of the element of the eye, form and visual consciousness. It is independent of the element of the ear, sound and auditory consciousness. It is independent of the element of the nose, scent and olfactory consciousness. It is independent of the element of the tongue, flavour and gustatory consciousness. (611) It is independent of the element of the body, touch and tactile consciousness. It is independent of the element of the mind, its objects and mental consciousness.

His speech relies on the spirit, foundation of being, pristine cognition and on sutras of precise meaning.41 O Śāriputra, this is correct speech.

It is in this way that a bodhisattva who applies himself to correct penetration and sees correct speech does not realise seeing. He sees just like one who lacks vision and clear insight42. When he sees in this way, he is of correct vision.

Again, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva who practises correctly will never become confused concerning any dharma whatsoever. A bodhisattva who practises correctly will always be at the door to liberation concerning any dharma whatsoever. He who practises correctly does not exert himself to renounce any dharma whatsoever. He who practises correctly does not assist sentient beings to mature. Third, the confession of faults, joy in the Buddha, invitation to the buddhas and transference (of merit) that speed up the attainment of enlightenment. Fourth, cultivation of meditations (samādhi) and formulae (dhāraṇī) that purify his conduct. Fifth, generation of unsupported (apratīṣṭhita) nirvāṇa that prevents the bodhisattva from interrupting his course in samsāra (ref. Lamotte).

39. Up to this point, the characterisation of correct speech shows many parallels to the discussion of the bodhisattva’s ‘unique knowledge of eloquence’ (pratibhānapratīṣṭhamāna) that is discussed at 2.5.4 in my translation of chapter eleven (folio 629.6–631.4). However, the cognitive element, associating correct speech with insight and thus turning the bodhisattva’s speech into a mirror of his profound understanding of the nature of reality, is specific to correct speech and not touched upon in the discussion of the pratibhānapratīṣṭhamāna.

40. The four preceding attributes are translations of the following technical terms (Mvy 1709, 1711, 1716) that, but for the last, serve as synonyms for the absolute (paramārtha): (1) de bīzn niid: tathātā, (2) gzan ma yin pa de bīzn niid: ananyatathātā, (3) ma log pa de bīzn niid: tathātā, (4) ji lta ba bīzn: yathāvat.

41. This sentence, qualifying the foundation of speech, contains a reference to the bodhisattva’s four types of reliance, viz., reliance on the spirit (artha) as opposed to the letter (vyājana); reliance on the foundation of being (dharmatā) as opposed to the person (pudgala); reliance on pristine cognition (jñāna) as opposed to discursive insight (vijñāna); and reliance on sutras of precise meaning (nīthārtha) as opposed to those of provisional meaning (neyārtha). The exact nature and scope of the bodhisattva’s four reliances is considered in great detail at 2.6 as one of the skills leading to ‘discerning-wisdom’.

42. rnam par mtho dp a: vidarṣaṇa (Mvy 1141)

On the conceptual closeness of vipaśyana and vidarṣaṇa, see: Abhidh-d, pp. 355–7 (n. 440); Kośa, vi, pp. 279–281.
exert himself to contemplate any dharma whatsoever. He who sees rightly all dharma and looks at them in accordance with reality is of right view.

What is looking at all dharma in accordance with reality? It is non-seeing. What is non-seeing? It is an expression for unborn. What is unborn? It is an expression for invisibility.\(^{(612)}\)

Just as it was previously discussed at great length, in the same way it should be formulated. It is in this way that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom studies in this way. “It is correct that all dharma are like the self.” He realises that just as the self is non-self, so all dharma are non-self. He realises that just as the sentient being is non-self, so all dharma are non-self. When he looks at them in this way, he sees correctly.

Seeing correctly that the sphere of samsāra is endowed with the sphere of nirvāṇa; this is correct practice.\(^{(4)}\) Then, he realises that the own-being of all dharma is invariably that of impurity. Indeed, he does not take pride in either yoga or non-yoga. Through correct practice, he sees correctly. Correct practice is as manifold as all bases of sentient beings. Not seeing the bases of sentient beings and to be imperturbable concerning the basis of the Doctrine; this is correct practice of the bodhisattva. O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the forms of learning, correct penetration, correct vision and those which are the result of accurate vision are called wisdom.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom. (613)

1.4 Emancipation

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom is by virtue of his wisdom not linked to any conditioned dharma\(^{(45)}\). That is to say, he is emancipated from ignorance. Having become strengthened through emancipation from karmic formations, he is emancipated from old-age-and-death. Since he is emancipated from the belief in a self, he is emancipated from the sixty-two heretical views that are based on the belief in a self.\(^{(47)}\)

\(^{43}\) This passage starting with “Again, O Śāriputra” up to “invisibility” is almost identical with a previous section on folio 607 starting with “Once again, he studies …” (folio 607.3–608.2).

\(^{(4)}\) The thought of the identity of samsāra and nirvāṇa is taken up in greater detail at 2.3, discussing the bodhisattva’s ‘skill’ in elements (dhātu).

\(^{(45)}\) hādus byas la spyod pahi chos thams cad mi gnas pa
lit.: ‘to be independent of all dharma that participate in the conditioned’.

\(^{(46)}\) lhan cig tu mi gnas: sahānvasthāna.

\(^{(47)}\) The doctrinal foundations to most of the sixty-two heretical views (drṣṭi-gata) are either the views of existence or non-existence (bhavābhavadṛṣṭi) or the views of eternity or annihilation (sāsvatocchedadrśti). Representing the beliefs in extremes (antagrāhadrśti) that run counter to the ‘middle path’ of the Buddhists, they are rejected in equal measure by early Buddhists and later Mahāyāna writers alike. For references in the nikāya, see: D I, pp. 52–59; S II, p. 17; S III, p. 135; fine expositions of the Mahāyāna position are
He is emancipated from lofty and wretched thoughts. He is emancipated from the eight worldly conditions. He is emancipated from the twenty secondary defilements including self-conceit, grave conceit and perverted conceit. He is emancipated from all defilements, including minor, mediocre and major ones. Having become ensnared by the impenetrable, obscuring, dark mist of delusion, he is emancipated from all lowly and wicked dharma. He is emancipated from the activity of all evil, including contentious and defiled activity, activity of the aggregates, activity of the lord of death and activity of the Evil One.

He is emancipated from all heretical views concerning the self, including the belief in a self-conceit, grave conceit and perverted conceit. He is emancipated from all defilements, including minor, mediocre and major ones. Having become ensnared by the impenetrable, obscuring, dark mist of delusion, he is emancipated from all lowly and wicked dharma. He is emancipated from the activity of all evil, including contentious and defiled activity, activity of the aggregates, activity of the lord of death and activity of the Evil One.
self, a living being, a life-force, a feeder, a person, a human being and an individual. (614) He is emancipated from all continuity brought about by the traces, including the obstruction of action, impurity, dharma, heretical views, retribution and nescience. He is emancipated from reflection, binary thinking, marks, mental constructions [brought about through] seeing, hearing and recollection, discursive knowledge and all adventitious bonds\(^{51}\). He is emancipated from [the dichotomy of] avarice and generosity, morality and immorality, patience and malice, vigour and indolence, meditation and disquietude, wisdom and folly, furtherance and impediments of the perfections, knowledge and nescience.

He is emancipated from antitheses of all dharma, including truth, falsehood and perjury, virtue and depravity, reproach and approval, samsāra and nirvāṇa. He is emancipated from all multiplicity, including multiplicity of buddha-fields, buddhas, sentient beings and dharma. He is emancipated from conditioned reflection\(^{52}\) of all sentient beings, including nescience, knowledge, discursive insight, conventional truth and absolute truth. (615) He is emancipated from the bases of all reflection, thought and consciousness; including perseverance [to] formlessness, signlessness, causelessness and unconditioned wisdom. He is emancipated from these and other incalculable, conditioned dharma. It is in this way that the wisdom of a bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom is emancipated from all conditioned dharma.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

SECTION II

2. Skill

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva who adheres to the Bodhisattvapiṭaka and courses in the Perfection of Wisdom is skilled in discerning the Perfection of Wisdom. He attains skill in all dharma.

What is discerning wisdom? It is tenfold, viz., skill in aggregates, skill in sensefields, skill in elements, skill in truth, skill in unique knowledge, skill in reliance, skill in discursive insight and direct knowledge, skill in the factors of enlightenment, skill in the path and skill in dependent co-origination.\(^{53}\) (616) Investigation by means of these ten kinds of skill is discerning wisdom.

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51. sgros hdogs pa: āropita (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 151, col. 1).
52. mthun ma yid la byed pa: nimittamanaśakāra (cf. Edgerton, p. 207, col. 2).
2.1 Skill in Aggregates

What then is skill in aggregates? He expounds the aggregates by way of allegories. That is to say, he shows that they are like froth, a mirage, a water bubble, a plantain tree, an illusion, a dream, an echo, an illusory appearance and a reflected image.

Matter is like froth and froth too is without a self, a living being, a life-force, a person, a man, a human being or an individual. The own-being of froth is also the own-being of matter. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.

Feeling is like a water bubble and a water bubble too is without a self, a living being, a life-force, a person, man, a human being or an individual. The own-being of a water bubble is also the own-being of feeling. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.

Perception is like a mirage and a mirage too is without a self, a sentient being ... or an individual. The own-being of a mirage is also the own-being of perception. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.

54. Vasubandhu, in his commentary on the Akn, elucidates the meaning of ‘skill’ in aggregates on pages 193.5.8–195.5.1. The corresponding passage in the Akn is found on page 52.2.8–4.6. According to the Akn, ‘skill’ in aggregates means that the bodhisattva is capable of explaining the nature and role of the aggregates by way of comparisons. This is also the only instance where both Bdp and Akn cite an equally phrased, direct answer to the question that is posed at the beginning of each kind of ‘skill’. After that, only the Akn provides brief direct answers to the initial questions, whereas the Bdp does not re-refer to the question (for details, see: Akn-tikā, pp. 194.1.1–2.6, 194.2.6–195.3.6, 195.3.6–5.1).

55. According to the Mvy, the Tibetan term ran bzin has two principal meanings, viz., (1) svabhāva meaning ‘own-being’ (Mvy 3390, 4458, 7498) and prakṛti meaning chiefly ‘nature’ (Monier-Williams, p. 1276, col. 1; p. 654, col. 1 respectively). Both meanings do overlap of course and it is difficult to decide with certainty which of the two is intended in this passage. Although prakṛti is listed as the first, and thus principal term, I believe that it is in this context more appropriate to translate the term ran bzin as ‘own-being’ since reference is taken to the very nature, character or indeed ‘own-being’ of the dharma in question. The term ‘nature’ has a broader, slightly more encompassing and hence rather vague connotation that, I think, is here out of place.

56. The Akn-tikā comments (p. 194.3.1–3; cf. Akn, p. 52.2.8–3.1):

“That is to say, in the great ocean some people see froth possessing matter and colour like crystals. Believing that it possesses substance and own-being, they grasp for it with their hands, but it flies away and disintegrates, whereupon they think: ‘Alas, this is only froth, this is worthless, vain and lacks own-being.’”

57. In the words of the Akn-tikā (p. 194.3.8–4.4; cf. Akn, p. 52.3.1–2):

“When rains falls into water, some people perceive the water bubbles as if they constitute various types of crystals or gems. Thinking that they possess substance and are suitable [to be worn as] adornments, [people] grasp for them with both hands in order to arrange them but they disintegrate. Even those that they did not reach for burst as soon as they arise. Realising that they are devoid of substance, they learn and exclaim: ‘Alas, these are water bubbles, without a self and own-being. They are worthless and vain.’ It is in this way that also the aggregate of feeling [whether pleasant, unpleasant, etc.]—lacking a self or own-being—is worthless and vain just like the water bubbles. If grasped with the eyes and hands of wisdom, examining them whether they are existent or non-existent, one realises that all of them bear the mark of suffering and perish by nature as soon as they have arisen.”

58. To quote again from the Akn-tikā (p. 194.4.4–8; cf. Akn, p. 53.3.2–3):

“Perception is to grasp the distinguishing marks of objects. Objects are matter, sound, etc. Distinguishing marks are the [colours of] white, red, etc. To grasp is to decide ‘this is white—not red’. The perception aggregate is like a mirage. Why? It lacks a self and is insignificant. That is to say, thirsty people who are tormented by the sun during the hot season see mirages such as fountains of water with their eyes. Believing them to be of water, they hurry to drink it. On discovering that it is not water, they exclaim: ‘Alas, this is a mirage. It lacks a self and own-being. It is worthless and vain.’ Likewise, with the eye of wisdom,
Karmic formations are like a plantain tree and a plantain tree too is without a self, a living being, a life-force ... or an individual. The own-being of a plantain tree is also the own-being of karmic formations. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.\(^59\)

Consciousness is like an illusion and an illusion too is without a self, a living being, a life-force, a person, a man, a human being, an individual or a being that arises and feels. The own-being of an illusion is also the own-being of consciousness. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.\(^60\)

Furthermore, the aggregates are of this world and the world, too, bears the characteristic of destructibility.\(^61\) The own-being of the worlds is also the own-being of aggregates. But what is the own-being of the world? Its own-being is that of impermanence and suffering.\(^62\) This, too, is the own-being of aggregates. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in aggregates courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

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59. The Abi-tika explains (p. 194.5.1–6; cf. Akn, p. 52.3.3–4):
   "Karmic formation create various kinds of wholesome, unwholesome and neutral [actions]. The sum total of karmic formations is great. Why is the aggregate of karmic formation is like a plantain tree? It lacks a core. People who wish for a hard tree and cut down a plantain tree, stripping it off its bark from top to bottom, see that there is no core when they examine it in this regard and exclaim: 'Alas, this has the core of a plantain tree; it is empty, without substance or own-being.' In this way, when contemplating on the presence of a core or essence in the aggregate of diverse karmic formations [concerned with wholesome, unwholesome and neutral actions], one realises—when looking at it with the eye of wisdom—that it is thought-only (cittamārata), unborn, beyond being and non-being. Having thus contemplated with effort on the duality of existence and non-existence, one sees that it is just like a plantain tree beyond one or many, self or others, without a core, essence or a self."

60. In the words of the Abi-tika (pp. 194.5.7–195.1.4; cf. Akn, p. 52.3.4–5):
   "Consciousness is perception of objects such as form, etc. It consists of eight types, viz., consciousness pertaining to the eye, etc. The consciousness aggregate is like an illusion. Why? It is insubstantial. A magician conjures up with his art of magic trickery various illusory forms of gods, men, demons and animals. But, even though they are perceived with the eye, if one examines them with the expectation that they might possess an own-being and a lasting existence, on realising that they lack own-being and perish all the sudden, one exclaims: 'Alas, this is only an illusion; it is empty and devoid of own-being.' In the same way, if one examines with the eye of wisdom the own and general own-being in the consciousness aggregate generated by the different traces of action, expecting it to possess own-being and lasting existence, one realises that it perishes each moment like an illusion and is empty of own-being."

61. hjig rtus yas hjig pa: loko 'pi lugla (cf. Mvy 3061 which gives hjig pas na hjig rtus for brightata iti loka).

62. This section is explained in the Abi-tika in terms of Yogācāra thinking (p. 195.4.1–4; cf. Akn, p. 52.4.4–6):
   "The meaning of impermanence is the meaning of non-existence. The imagined that is empty of own-being as it is universally non-existent—bearing the character of being imagined like the horn of a hare—is impermanent. The sūtra says that it is undergoing suffering by nature. The meaning of imagining the non-existent is the meaning of undergoing suffering by nature. Again, it bears the characteristic of dependence (paratantra-lakṣānta). To the degree to which one imagines object and subject through paratantra [vision], to that degree the own-being of suffering comes into being and becomes the cause of various types of suffering."
2.2 Skill in Elements

Next, what is skill in elements? That is to say, although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of earth, it has not the characteristic of compactness. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of water, it has not the characteristic of moisture. (618) Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of fire, it has not the characteristic of heat. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of air, it has not the characteristic of volatility.

63. Vasubandhu (pp. 193.5.1-196.4.5) explains that ‘skill’ in elements signifies ‘skill’ in pristine cognition that penetrates the elements of dharma—that is, the qualities and practices of a bodhisattva (p. 195.5.4)—with the element (dhatu) representing the cause and condition leading to the attainment of the individual buddha-qualities—that is the dharma themselves (p. 195.5.5). Note also the usage of the term dhatu in the Akn (pp. 52.4.6-53.2.3) that distinguishes carefully between kham and dbyi, a distinction that is not upheld in the Bdp. Theoretically, it is possible that chos kyi kham refers here to the twelfth dhatu or sixth kind of external object (vijaya), viz., the class of non-sensuous objects. Contextual considerations render this explanation implausible, since they point to the ‘sphere of the Doctrine’ or Dharmadhatu—of which chos kyi kham is a highly unusual translation—and not to the series of elements (dhatu) that are represented in the composition of an individual stream of life (santana). What is more, in the Akn’s parallel reading the term chos kyi kham (except for one unambiguous reference to non-sensuous objects) is invariably replaced by the ‘correct’ rendering of chos kyi dbyi. This modification establishes beyond any doubt that, in the Akn, it is the Dharmadhatu and not the dharma that is referred to. All other occurrences of the term kham, whether in conjunction with nam mkhah, bdod pahi or otherwise are preserved as they occur in the Bdp. Thus, the Akn puts forward what is in effect a (re)interpretation of the Bdp’s reading. As we have seen, this is a general feature of their relationship and does not pose much of a problem.

What is puzzles me is the mechanism by which this particular incongruity arose in the Tibetan, since their chronological order could not have been of any concern to the translators. They found presumably in both texts—assuming that they were translated from the Sanskrit which seems certain—the term dharmadhatu. And yet, they opted for a different term to translate the same word in the same sentence, passage and context, singling out chos kyi kham for the Bdp and chos kyi dbyi for the Akn. In the Akn, their choice might have been influenced by the explanation given in the Akn-tika (pp. 195.5.1-7), since it establishes quite clearly the Dharmadhatu and not non-sensuous objects as point of reference. But again, we cannot be certain that the commentary was at hand when the translators set about their task. In search for an explanation, I thought to find the key to this discrepancy in the terminological revision (sgra gsar bead) that took place in Tibet at the beginning of the ninth century. That is to say, I expected to learn that the Bdp had been translated before the Great Revision and was then left unrevised. This assumption proved ill-founded, since its translation was carried out by the very persons who played a major role in the Great Revision, namely Surendrabodhi, Shiendrabodhi and Dharmatśila (Simonsson, 1957, p. 241). Even if they translated the Bdp before receiving the royal command to undertake the general revision, they surely would have redrafted it afterwards. Moreover, already the first unrevised translation of the Akn contains the terms chos kyi dbyi. I then discovered that Dharmatśila had not only part in the translation of the Bdp, but also revised the early translation of the Akn. It is probably safe to assume that he would have employed consistent terminology had he held the word dharmadhatu to refer to the same concept in both texts. Alternatively, he might have contributed to the translation of the Akn after he had worked at the Bdp and neglected to go back to it for revision. In any event, it is quite unthinkable that he should have failed to notice the close parallelism that exists between the Akn and Bdp while working at them. Today, it is impossible to say whether Dharmatśila translated the Bdp before or after revising the old Akn version, but given that an unrevised translation of the Akn was already extant, one would expect him to turn first to the Bdp. On the other hand, being a thorough and accomplished scholar, he might as well have given priority to correcting the old faulty translations before looking at new texts. To whatever view one chooses to subscribe, there seems to be no hard and fast evidence to support either of them. As far as the translation of the passage is concerned, it is probably safe to follow the reading of the Akn. First, it fits the context very well and it is confirmed by Akn-tika. And yet, it fails to address the question that lies at the heart of the problem, that is, why such incongruence arose in the first place. Furthermore, it raises the methodological problem of basing the translation of a passage on a reading that is not found in the text itself, however close its affiliation to this text may be. Finally, it does not account for the highly unusual practice to employ the term chos kyi kham to render Dharmadhatu ('sphere of the Doctrine') into Tibetan.

64. For alternative meanings and translations of the term dharmadhatu, see: Ruegg (1962, p. 327) and Kośa (i, pp. 54–65, 100).
of wind, it has not the characteristic of agitation.

Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of visual consciousness, it has not the characteristic of seeing. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of auditory consciousness, it has not the characteristic of distinguishing sound. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of olfactory consciousness, it has not the characteristic of perceiving scent. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of gustatory consciousness, it has not the characteristic of savouring flavour. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of tactile consciousness, it has not the characteristic of contact. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of mental consciousness, it has not the characteristic of cognition.

The sphere of the self and the sphere of the Dharma are identical. The spheres of desire, form and non-form are identical. The spheres of nirvāṇa and samsāra are identical.65 Thus, the sphere of all dharma and the sphere of space are identical. Since they are identical with emptiness, they are uniform. Since they are identical with non-becoming, they are uniform. Because of penetrating the spheres of the conditioned and unconditioned, his teaching about them is infinite.66 (619) By means of that penetration, he investigates; this is skill in elements.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva, mahāsattva who is skilled in elements courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.3 Skill in Sensefields

Next, what is the bodhisattva's skill in sensefields?67 Concerning this, the bodhisattva perceives the eye in accordance with reality, thinking: "It is empty in itself and by itself, such is its own-being." This is the bodhisattva's skill in sensefields. Corresponding to the former, the bodhisattva perceives also the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind in accordance with reality, thinking: "They are empty in themselves and by themselves, such is their own-being."68 Not encouraging those who gather various objects and items in their sensefields for the sake of accumulating virtue, he does not discriminate virtuous and non-virtuous dharma.69 This is the bodhisattva's skill in sensefields.

Although he thus looks unperturbed at the eye and form, thinking: "This is the visual sensefield and that is the tactile sensefield", he does not realise [absolute] imperturbability.

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66. Akn-tikā p. 196.3.4–4.3.
67. Akn-tikā, pp. 196.4.5–197.5.6
   In the Akn, the corresponding passage is found on page 53.2.3–4.4. Here, the passage on sensefields is slightly longer than that of the Bdp, interpolating an introductory section modelled on that of the preceding topic which runs as follows: "Even though the sensefield of the Dharma ..., it has not the characteristic of ...
68. In my translation, I disregarded the Tibetan clause yid kyi since reference is clearly taken to all five remaining sense organs—not only to the mind (R, folio 619.4).
69. Akn-tikā, p. 197.1.3–2.1 (lit.: '.. he does not embark on two notions (viz., dual thinking) concerning ...').
This is the bodhisattva’s skill in sensefields. Corresponding to the former, although he thus looks unperturbed at the ear and sound, nose and scent, tongue and taste, body and touch as well as at the mind and mental objects, he does not realise [absolute] imperturbability. (620)

This is the bodhisattva’s skill in sensefields.

The sensefields consist also of noble and ignoble sensefields. Now, while a noble sensefield causes appreciation of the path, an ignoble sensefield causes withdrawal from the path.70
This is to say, while the bodhisattva who persists in the path generates great compassion in support of sentient beings who have relinquished their zeal on the path, he himself never renounces the sensefields of the path. This is the bodhisattva’s skill in sensefields.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in sensefields courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.4 Skill in Truth
What then is the bodhisattva’s skill in truth?71 The bodhisattva’s skill in penetrating truth is fourfold. That is to say, it is knowledge of suffering, knowledge of its origin, knowledge of its cessation and knowledge of the path.

What is knowledge of suffering? Knowledge that the aggregates are unborn is knowledge of suffering. What is knowledge of its origin? Knowledge that thirst has been vanquished is knowledge of its origin. What is knowledge of its cessation? Knowledge that suffering is free from origination and destruction is knowledge of its cessation. What is knowledge of the path? Not drawing mistaken inferences72 concerning uniform dharma is knowledge of the path. (621) Even when he thus understands these four truths by means of wisdom, the bodhisattva does not realise them in order to develop sentient beings. This is skill in truth.73

70. Quoting a passage from the *MsI* (p. 124.3–15), Vasubandhu cites ten kinds of ignoble paths. These are the paths of (1) beings that are set alight with desire for bliss and sense-pleasure, (2) beings that have fallen under the power of Māra, (3) beings that are afflicted by suffering, (4) beings that are enveloped by obstruction, (5) beings that follow a path leading to the evil destinies, (6) beings that are tied by great fetters, (7) beings that long for indulgence in food, (8) beings that lose their way, (9) beings that follow a wrong path and (10) beings that are of little strength. On the basis of his infinite compassion, the bodhisattva does not forsake these wretched sentient beings but extends his sympathy to them (*Akn-tīkā*, p. 197.4.1–5.5).

71. In the *Akn*, the corresponding passage is found on pages 53.4.4–54.2.8. Judging by the great attention Vasubandhu devotes to this section in the *Akn-tīkā*, he must have considered ‘skill’ in truth as central to the training in prajñā (pp. 197.5.6–203.4.8).

72. *sgro mi hdogs pa*; adhyāropa (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 23, col. 2).

73. *Akn-tīkā*, pp. 198.5.6–199.1.3:
   “To comprehend the own characteristic is wisdom, but to understand the general characteristic is pristine cognition. Here, however, the quoted wisdom is just wisdom and pristine cognition is to understand the notion of emptiness just as it is explained above; this is included (parighita) in wisdom. For the sake of sentient beings [the bodhisattva] does not realise [wisdom and pristine cognition] but, according to the sūtra, ripens sentient beings. Although the bodhisattva understands the four noble truths, he does not realise nirvāṇa, but being totally at ease like the śrāvaka he ripens sentient beings with great compassion and numerous means for their benefit. This then is included in means. Knowledge of the four truths as expounded above is included in wisdom and means; this is the bodhisattva’s ‘skill’ in truth.”
Furthermore, skill in truth is threefold. These are the conventional truth, absolute truth and the truth of characteristic. Now, conventional truth is just worldly convention and is expressed by letters, language and symbols. This is the conventional truth. What then is the absolute truth? The mind itself does not wander, how much less letters? This is the absolute truth. What then is the truth of characteristic? That is to say, all characteristics are of one characteristic and one characteristic is also a non-characteristic. The bodhisattva does not tire of explaining the conventional truth. He does not lapse into realising absolute truth. He discerns the truth of the characteristic by way of the non-characteristic. This is the bodhisattva’s skill in truth.

Furthermore, truth is one, not two. This is the truth of cessation. He does not draw mistaken inferences concerning the one truth, but establishes in truth sentient beings who have lapsed into mistaken inferences. This is the bodhisattva’s skill in truth.

Furthermore, the five aggregates are suffering. (622) That the five aggregates bear the characteristic of suffering, this is the noble truth of suffering. Knowledge that the characteristic of suffering bears the characteristic of emptiness, this is the noble truth of suffering. That heretical views arising from thirst are the cause for the proclivity to the five aggregates, this is the noble truth of the origin of suffering. That heretical views are also the cause of thirst—without drawing mistaken inferences concerning them, holding on to them or asserting them—this is the noble truth of the origin of suffering.74 That heretical views are also the cause of thirst—that they have not arisen in the past, do not exist in the present and will not perish in the future—this is the noble truth of cessation. To attain, following persistence in the path, besides knowledge of suffering, its origin and cessation also consecutive knowledge75 is the noble truth of the path that leads to the cessation of suffering. Reflection on knowledge of truth causes erroneously projecting sentient beings to discern it; this is skill in truth of bodhisattvas.

Furthermore, all feelings are suffering. Knowledge of feeling through discernment and understanding; this is the noble truth of suffering. The cause by which feeling is known as it is when it arises, the cause of its perception, this is the noble truth of suffering. Renouncing feeling and prompting [others] to experience non-feeling, investigating its cessation, but not realising the cessation of feeling, this is the noble truth of the bodhisattva’s cessation of suffering. (623) The feeling by which one is attracted to the path is like a ferry; there is

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74. The structure of this sentence is unclear. I follow in my translation the interpretation given in the *Akaṇṭikā* (p. 201.3.5–7).

75. *rjes las rtogs pa: anvayajñāna*

According to the *Kośa*, 'consecutive knowledge' is a type of understanding that—being a non-propositional form of knowledge—arises in the practitioner after he has experienced and accepted the validity of the four noble truths in the three spheres of existence (*Kośa*, vi, p. 184). As a consequent knowledge bearing on the subject (*grāhaka*), it is one of the four factors that are brought in relation with each of the four truths (*āryasaśya*). Arising in response to the gradual comprehension of each of these four truths, it represents three of the fifteen events making up the *dārśanamārga*, while the appearance of consecutive knowledge in response to the experience of the last truth—the path—belongs already to the *bhāvanāmārga*. 339
neither a requirement for feeling nor is feeling a requirement of the path, this is the noble truth of the path that leads to the bodhisattva’s cessation of suffering. After he has understood them in this way, realising that the four truths are uniform, his vision is never fully purified; this is the bodhisattva’s skill in truth.

Furthermore, birth is suffering. Knowledge that arises from careful investigation in no-birth, this is knowledge of suffering. Birth arises through the condition of becoming. Knowledge that things existing perish is knowledge of its origin of suffering. Knowledge that everything born is unborn and that—there being absolutely no cessation in the unborn—it is unceasing, this is knowledge of its cessation and exhaustion. This kind of considering, evaluating, pursuing, discriminating and penetrating knowledge is knowledge of the path. Although he is placed in this knowledge of truth, [the bodhisattva] does not persist in this knowledge of truth; this is the bodhisattva’s skill in truth.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in truth courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.5 **Skill in Unique Knowledge**

Next, what is the bodhisattva’s skill in unique knowledge? The unique knowledge of the bodhisattva is fourfold. (624) What are the four? These are the unique knowledge of the own-being of things, the unique knowledge of designations, the unique knowledge of languages and the unique knowledge of eloquence.

2.5.1 **Skill in the Unique Knowledge of the Own-being of Things**

What is the unique knowledge of the own-being of things? It is knowledge that the

76. The *Akn-tikā* (p. 203.2.3–4.3), quoting the *Mśl* (p. 58.8–13), distinguishes eleven types of penetration. These are (1) sudden, adventitious penetration (*āgantukatvaprativedhata*), (2) penetration into the aspects of reckoning (*samkhyananimittaprativedhata*), (3) penetration into the inconceivability of objects (*arthānapalambhaprativedhata*), (4) penetration into the inconceivability of reality (*upalambhdnapalambhaprativedhata*), (5) penetration into the sphere of the Dharma (*dhamiadhatuprativedhata*), (6) penetration into the insubstantiality of a person (*pudgalanairdtyaprativedhata*), (7) penetration into the insubstantiality of dharma (*dharmanairdtyaprativedhata*), (8) penetration into inferior intent (*hināsasyaprativedhata*), (9) penetration into the most exalted intent (*udramahādityaśayaprativedhata*), (10) penetration into differentiation according to the accomplished Dharma (*yathādhigamadharmavyavasthānaprativedhata*); and (11) penetration into dharma arrangement (*vyavasthyāpitadhrnaprativedhata*).

77. Vasubandhu’s annotation of the corresponding passage in the *Akn* is found on pp. 240.2.7–244.5.4. In the *Akn* (and thus also in the *Akn-tikā*) the bodhisattva’s unique knowledge (*pratisamvid*) is not being dealt with in the section on ‘skill’, but figures as an independent *aksaya*.

78. The term *artha* carries several meanings, with ‘purport’, ‘aim’ and ‘meaning’ being probably the most frequent ones. In the present context, however, none of these renderings seems appropriate. As Lamotte has shown, the most accurate translation of the term *artha* here is ‘thing’ or ‘object’, referring to the ‘own-being’ (*svalaksana*) or ‘chose designated’ (*bhāsitārtha*) of the item in question (*Mpps*, pp. 1614, 1616, n. 1). This interpretation is supported by the *Akn-tikā* (p. 240.3.3–4), stating that “in order to instruct in knowledge of the characteristic (*laksana*) of the item in question, it is asked what is the unique knowledge of the own-being of things?” For further evidence of this position, see: *Bbh*, p. 258.8–10, *Mśl*, pp. 138.21–139.1, *Āloka*, p. 455. 25 ff; *Kośa*, vii, pp. 89–94; *Abhidh-d*, pp. 393.1–94.1; and for the nikāya: *A I*, p. 24; *II*, p. 160; *III*, pp. 113, 120. For references to the *pratisamvid* in the āgama and Chinese translations of Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma*.
teachings of the Buddha are statements of absolute truth\textsuperscript{79}. It is knowledge of the causes, conditions and circumstances of non-duality. It is knowledge of the infinitude of interconnections. It is knowledge of the basis of spiritual fruition. It is knowledge of the pure sphere of the Dharma. It is knowledge in conformity with thusness. It is knowledge of the unclassifiability\textsuperscript{80} of nirvāṇa.

It is knowledge arising from\textsuperscript{81} the realisation of emptiness. It is knowledge arising from the understanding of signlessness. It is knowledge that wishlessness is wishlessness. It is knowledge that the non-accumulation of karmic formations is a non-accumulation of karmic formations. It is knowledge penetrating sameness.\textsuperscript{82}

It is knowledge penetrating the non-existence of the living being and self. It is secure knowledge that the life-force comes to an end and that the non-existence of the person is the absolute truth. It is knowledge that the past is determined, that the future is without limit and that the present is everywhere. It is knowledge that the aggregates are an illusion, that the elements resemble venomous serpents and that the sensefields are defined as emptiness.\textsuperscript{83}

It is knowledge that diseases abate, that there is no agitation in the beyond and that there is no substance\textsuperscript{84} to objects. It is knowledge that mindfulness is the basis of spiritual fruition. It is knowledge that comprehension is absorption, that understanding is realisation and that truth is awakening. It is knowledge that suffering is non-existent, that its origin is a non-accumulation of karmic formations, that its cessation is signless and that the path is salvation.

It is knowledge that the Doctrine consists of versatile statements. It is knowledge that the faculties penetrate and that the powers are invincible. It is knowledge that perfect mental quietude is the basis of spiritual fruition and that insight is true vision. It is knowledge that illusions are fabricated, that mirages are deceptive and that dreams are untrue vision. It is knowledge that echoes occur only in certain circumstances and that miraculous appearances are subject to change.

It is knowledge that diversity of characteristic is one-characteristic, that unity is separation.

\textsuperscript{79} Here, the Bdp agrees with the Mpps which gives also the absolute truth (paramārtha) as the object of the arthapratisamvid (Mpps, iii, p. 1616). Other texts, however, most notably the Kośa, Vibh and Nyāyānusāra, give artha as its object while, for the Aloka, it is dharmalaksana (Mpps, iii, p. 1616, n. 3).

\textsuperscript{80} mi gnas pa: anisrita (cf. Edgerton, p. 25, col. 2).

\textsuperscript{81} rjes su rtogs pa ses pa: anvayajñāna (Mvy 1224, 1228, 1232, 1236).

\textsuperscript{82} tsul gcig: ekārīpa

Akn-tīkā, pp. 240.5.8–241.1.1:

"That is, [the bodhisattva] realises that the characteristics of all dharma are of one characteristic, that their nature is of one characteristic."

\textsuperscript{83} "nes pa rtog pa: nīrtipaṅkā (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 554, col. 1).

\textsuperscript{84} yul med pa: aviśaya (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 110, col. 2).
It is knowledge that purification does not lead to future rebirth⁸⁵. When concerned with the Śrāvakayāna, it is knowledge understanding in conformity with statements. When concerned with the Pratyekabuddhayāna, it is knowledge understanding causal dependence and unsurpassed knowledge of solitude. When concerned with the Mahāyāna, it is knowledge of all kinds of accumulation of roots of virtue. This is the bodhisattva’s unique knowledge of the own-being of things. (626)

Furthermore, as regards the unique knowledge of the own-being of things; it is to rely on the spirit conforming to reliance on the spirit of every dharma-foundation of all dharma. Why? All dharma being without exception empty, emptiness is the own-being concerned. All dharma being without exception signless, signlessness is the own-being concerned. All dharma being without exception wishless, wishlessness is the own-being concerned. All dharma being without exception non-manifest⁸⁶, non-manifestation is the own-being concerned. All dharma being without exception devoid of a living being, a life-force or a person, personlessness is the own-being concerned.⁸⁷

Such understanding of dharma is the unique knowledge of the own-being of things. The teaching of the own-being of things is an unestablished and inexhaustible teaching. This unique knowledge is a teaching of the awakened truth⁸⁸. It is conferred by the lord buddhas and gives lasting pleasure. It is genuine, authentic and factual; it is well-realised⁸⁹ through wisdom and altogether beyond reproach. This is the bodhisattva’s unique knowledge of the own-being of things.

2.5.2 Skill in the Unique Knowledge of Designations

Next, what is the unique knowledge of designations?⁹⁰ It is knowledge penetrating dharma

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⁸⁷. According to the *Mpps*, reliance on dharmatā as opposed to pudgala and the resultant recognition of the own-being of dharma pertains to the sphere of the dharmapraṇitādhyāna (*Mpps*, iii, p. 1621).
⁹⁰. In my translation of the term dharmapraṇitādhyāna I follow once again Lamotte (*Mpps*, iii, pp. 1614, 1617, n. 1), who cites several passages that liken it to ‘knowledge of instruction’ (dēṣāṇā) (*Vibhanga*), ‘knowledge of enunciation’ (paryāya) (*Āloka*) or ‘knowledge of names’ (nāmaṇ) (*Nyāyānusāra*). The dharmapraṇitādhyāna is hence primarily a knowledge that assists the bodhisattva to understand the designations (bhāṣātārthha), names (nāmaṇ), phrases (pada) or syllables (vyāhjana) that are employed to designate any kind of object. In practice, however, the scope of the dharmapraṇitādhyāna is much more limited. That is to say, it is only concerned with the word of the Buddha (*Vibh*, p. 294.22–24). In the words of the *Abhidhāna* (p. 393.5–6):

“The pratisamvid is the indestructible knowledge concerning the categories of names, etc., that are contained in the twelve branches [of the Dharma]. It relates to matters of expression and pertains to discussion.”

In the *Bbh* (p. 258.4–8) no such detail is found in the dharmapraṇitādhyāna it is only taken to address, rather generally, the characteristics of dharma (*dharmanakṣaṇa*). The text is similarly unhelpful with regard to the objects of the other pratisamvid (p. 258.8–24).

According to the *Ākīn-tikā* (p. 242.3.5–8; cf. *Ākīn*, pp. 62.5.4–63.2.4), the difference between artha and dharma is one of voice:

“While it is true that between artha and dharma there is no difference, artha should be
that pertain to virtue and non-virtue, reproach and approval, impurity and purity, worldliness and supra-worldliness, conditioning and non-conditioning, contamination and the fortune of purification, samsāra and nirvāṇa. It is knowledge of the sameness of the sphere of the Dharma, knowledge of the sameness of enlightenment and knowledge of the sameness of the elements. This is [the bodhisattva’s] unique knowledge of designations.

Furthermore, as regards the unique knowledge of designations; it is knowledge of the thoughts of those who act with desire, fictitious desire, severe desire, slight desire, unarisen desire, constant and infinite desire as well as with presently conditioned desire.

It is knowledge of sentient beings who act with desire. That is to say, it is knowledge of those who, while being externally free from desire crave internally; of those who, while being internally free from desire crave externally; of those who are internally as well as externally free from desire; of those who crave internally and externally; of those who, while being free from desire for sound crave for form; of those who, while being free from desire for form crave for sound; of those who crave for both form and sound; of those who do not crave for either sound or form; of those who, while craving for form are free from desire for scent; of those who, while craving for scent are free from desire for touch; of those who, while craving for touch are free from desire for flavour and of those who, while craving for flavour are free from desire for form or scent.

By means of this acumen, there being twenty-one thousand modes of desire, twenty-one thousand modes of hatred, twenty-one thousand modes of delusion and twenty-one thousand modes of conduct that partake uniformly in desire, hatred and delusion, it is knowledge of the thoughts of eighty-four thousand modes of conduct.

It is knowledge of appropriate instructions and knowledge of instructions that are neither too long nor too short. It is knowledge of sentient beings who transcend desire and knowledge of those who are superior receptacles. It is knowledge of instructions that are efficacious. This is the unique knowledge of designations.

perceived as the object that should be instructed in and understood, but dharma should be perceived as the agent that instructs and prompts understanding. Again, dharma are conditioned and unconditioned things, etc., that are cited by name, while artha is the meaning of them that should be discerned and examined. Again, knowledge of artha is accurate cognition (aviparitādhigāma) of the characteristics of all dharma while knowledge of dharma is knowledge of the names of these dharma.”

93. In the fourth item, ‘partaking in the three uniformly’, our text deviates from elsewhere well-established patterns. Most texts, like the Kośa (i, p. 47; ii, p. 297), cite ‘pride’ (lobhā) as the fourth member of the root-defilements of rāga, moha and dvesa.
94. The notion that the dharma-aggregate of the Buddha consists of 84,000 units covering the mental conduct of all beings is, of course, an ancient one. It is found, for instance, in the Saddhp (p. 254.11), Kośa (i, pp. 46–47), Rgv (p. 232) and is cited in the Mśg (p. 229). The division into the 21,000 varieties of desire, hatred, delusion and pride is less frequent as it is only found in the Kośa (i, p. 47). Note that according to the Mpps (iii, p. 1623) knowledge of the dispositions of sentient beings falls within the scope of the pratiḥānapratisamvid—not the dharmapratisamvid.
2.5.3 Skill in the Unique Knowledge of Languages

Next, what is the unique knowledge of languages? Penetrating all languages non-verbally, he explains the Doctrine to people by way of the language of gods, nāga, yakṣa, gandharva, mahoraga, southern mahoraga, kinnara and ancestors as well as by way of sounds and melodies. This is the unique knowledge of languages. (629)

It is in this way that he should discern, acquire and retain the practices. It is in this way that he should model his practice to the letter.

The bodhisattva knows the appellation of words that are in the singular, dual or plural. He knows words that are of feminine, masculine or neuter gender. He knows contracted and expanded words. He knows abusive and laudatory words. He knows words of the past, present and future. He knows how to infer by means of one letter. He knows how to infer by means of many letters. This is the unique knowledge of languages.

Again, as regards the unique knowledge of languages; it is free of error, neither repetitive nor hasty. He is well-acquainted with texts that clarify the meaning of practices. By all means, this knowledge is of insightful cognition, profound, versatile and prompts delight in saṃsāra. It is embellished with conventional and absolute truth. It is subject to self-induced cognition. It is conferred by the Buddha and gives pleasure to all sentient beings. This is the bodhisattva’s unique knowledge of languages.

2.5.4 Skill in the Unique Knowledge of Eloquence

Next, what is the bodhisattva’s unique knowledge of eloquence? It is articulate speech that teaches instructions free-speakingly. It is speech that is fluent, eloquent, spirited and dynamic. It is impeccable and non-evasive. It is completely flawless, non-contradictory,

95. For the Mahāyāna, the object of the nirukti-pratisasamvid is primarily knowledge of languages. This departure from the early conceptions according to which it covers chiefly grammar (Kosabhāṣya, p. 419.17-18) mirrors a revised understanding of the training requirements that sprang from the bodhisattva’s pledge to universal liberation (Akn-ṭīkā, p. 243.3.3-4; cf. Akn, p. 63.2.4-3.5):

“In order to instruct in knowledge of language conventions (vyavahārajñā), it is asked what is the unique knowledge of languages?”

For further evidence of this interpretation see: Bbh (p. 258.11-13) and Msl (p. 139.1).

96. yohs su byaṅ ba: paricita (Mvy 2412).

97. Akn-ṭīkā, p. 243.5.4-5; cf. Akn, p. 63.3.5-4.8:

“In order to instruct in knowledge of expression (abhilāpañjñā), it is asked what is the unique knowledge of eloquence?”

Once again, this interpretation is also attested in the Bbh (p. 258.14-17) and Msl (p. 139.1-2). The reasons for the bodhisattva’s eloquence are explained in the Śgs (p. 188):

“Pourquoi le bodhisattva est-il doué d’éloquence (pratibhānasampanna)? Le devaputra – Le bodhisattva parle sans utiliser la notion du soi (ātmasamjñā), sans utiliser la notion d’autrui (parasamjñā) et sans utiliser la notion de dharma: il est donc ‘doué d’éloquence’. Lorsqu’il prêche la Loi, les phonèmes (aksāra) sont inépuisables (aksaya), et les dharma aussi sont inépuisables. Parlant ainsi, il ne parle pas de dualité (dvaya): il est donc ‘doué d’éloquence’. Kulaputra, si le bodhisattva ne rejette pas le caractère de magie (māyālakṣana) inhérent aux dharma et ne rejette pas le caractère d’écho (pratīṣrūkālakṣana) inhérent aux sons (śvara), il est ‘doué d’éloquence’.”

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non-contentious and preoccupied with the Doctrine. It is patient, profound and versatile. It is eloquent in conventional and absolute truth. It is eloquent attending to all forms of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation and wisdom. It is eloquent in mindfulness, right efforts, bases of success, faculties, powers, factors of enlightenment, path, perfect mental quietude and insight. It is eloquent in that it knows all entrances into contemplation, liberation, meditation, attainment and truth. It is eloquent in all vehicles as well as in the mental activity of all sentient beings.

It is eloquent in that it is of resourceful, congenial and orderly speech. It consists of subtle, smooth, taintless, emancipated, nonpartisan, honourable, articulate, fitting, impeccable, renown, sympathetic and laudatory speech. It is speech that is praised by all noble ones. Its sound reverberates with knowledge of infinite buddha-fields. Its pure sound resembles melodies. It is the one sound that induces awakening. By means of this buddha-bestowed eloquent, [the bodhisattva] teaches the Doctrine to humans and other living beings. Also this liberating Dharma-discourse of his brings to a halt suffering in those who practice it. This is the bodhisattva’s unique knowledge of eloquence. This is bodhisattva’s skill in eloquence.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in eloquence courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.6 Skill in Reliance

Next, what is the bodhisattva’s skill in reliance? The reliances of bodhisattvas are four. What are the four? They rely on the spirit rather than on the letter. They rely on direct

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98. This is the only instance in the Bdp where the bodhipáksika dharma are listed in their entirety. All other references to their categories, including their detailed discussion as one of the bodhisattva’s skills under 2.7.2 and 2.8–10, fail to mention the ‘four bases of success’ (rddhipádo).

99. For a commentary on the terms and concepts that are involved in this section, see: Akn-tikā (1) spirit/letter: pp. 244.5.8–246.3.8, (2) direct knowledge/discursive insight: pp. 246.3.8–247.2.5, (3) sūtras of precise/provisional meaning: p. 247.2.6–5.3 and (4) foundation of being/person: pp. 247.5.6–248.4.7. The translations of the Sanskrit terms included in this category has not been agreed upon. Compare, for instance, those of Wayman (1974, p. 103), viz., ‘meaning/letter’, ‘doctrines/personalities’, ‘knowledge/perception’ and ‘final meaning/provisional meaning’ with those of La Vallée Poussin (Kosa, ii, p. 246). In my translation, I was guided by the terminology that is employed by Lamotte in his article: “La critique d’interprétation dans le bouddhisme’ (Annuaire de l’Institut de Philologie et Histoire Orientales et Slaves, 9, 1949).

The concept of the four reliances is no doubt an ancient one. It is already found in several of the early suttas. For brief, often archaic statements on individual aspects of the four pratisarana, see for instance: D III, pp. 127–129; M I, p. 265; II, p. 240; A I, p. 60; Mahāvagga I, p. 23. 4; Nett, p. 21. Other early commentarial references to the pratisarana are found in the Dipavamsa (ed. Oldenburg, p. 36), in the introduction to the commentary on the Kathāvatthu (JPTS, 1889, p. 3), Vism (pp. 473, 499) and Atthasālīni (p. 91; ref. La Vallée Poussin).

In many of these early works comparatively little importance is being attached to their attributes. Their rise to one of the major sets of practices in the spiritual training of the religious seems to have taken place in the later scholastic or analytic period of Buddhist thought. In particular, Asanga has made major contributions to the process of defining the exact scope and application of the pratisarana. In both the Msl (p. 138.1–14) and Bbh (pp. 256.23–58.3), for instance, we have detailed passages where their significance is analysed with considerable scholastic exactitude. I have incorporated this material into my discussion of the pratisarana in chapter four.
knowledge rather than on discursive insight. They rely on sūtras of precise meaning rather than on sūtras of provisional meaning. They rely on the foundation of being rather than on persons.

2.6.1  Skill in Reliance on the Spirit and not on the Letter

What is the spirit? What is the letter? The letter penetrates the activity of mundane dharma. The spirit realises supramundane dharma. The letter instructs in generosity, benignity, discipline and bravery. The spirit perceives benignity, tranquillity, non-arising and non-decaying. (632) The letter proclaims the teachings100 of samsāra. The spirit relies on inconceivability. The letter proclaims the qualities of nirvāṇa. The spirit does not discriminate dharma that by their nature are in nirvāṇa101. The letter preaches according to the differentiation of the vehicles. The spirit is knowledge that arises from realising dharma-sameness. The letter instructs not to abandon any sentient being. The spirit purifies the three spheres of giving102.103

The letter—disciplining body, speech and mind—instructs in achieving all attainments of learning and purity. The spirit—not apprehending body, speech and mind—purifies the non-accumulation of karmic formations. The letter, suppressing malice, anger, pride and self-conceit instructs in patience and bravery. The spirit achieves the conviction of the non-arising of dharma. The letter instructs in vigour concerning all roots of virtue104. The spirit is vigour independent of apprehension or renunciation. The letter instructs in contemplation, liberation, meditation and attainment. The spirit is knowledge of entering the attainment of cessation.105

(633)

The letter, being the receptacle of all that has been heard, is the root of wisdom. The spirit is the ineffable meaning. The letter instructs in the practice of the thirty-seven bodhipāksika dharma.106 The spirit realises the fruit of the practice107 of the thirty-seven bodhipāksika dharma.

100. Cf. Pelliot, 977, la.3 which has rgyus meaning ‘knowledge’, ‘intelligence’, ‘history’, ‘tale’ instead of yonīs su bśad pa.
101. ran bzin gyis yonīs su mya nyi nas haśas pa; prakṛtipārītvā (cf. Edgerton, p. 356, col. 2).
102. lḥkor gsum: trimañḍalapariśuddha (Mvy 2537; cf. Edgerton, p. 258, col. 1).
103. Pelliot, 977, la.2–4:

“The spirit penetrates the meaning of the supramundane. The letter penetrates the activity of mundane dharma. The spirit perceives benignity, tranquillity, non-arising and non-decaying. The letter preaches generosity, benignity, diligence and great joy. Furthermore, the letter is proclaimed through causes of samsāra. The spirit looks at the inconceivable. The letter proclaims praise of the qualities of nirvāṇa. The spirit does not discriminate dharma that by nature are in nirvāṇa.”

104. I follow here the Pelliot reading.
105. Pelliot, 977, folio la.5–1b.1:

“The letter—disciplining body, speech and mind—instructs in achieving all attainments of learning and purity. The spirit—when seeing body, speech and mind—purifies the accumulation of karmic formations. Furthermore, the letter heals the defilement of malice, anger, pride and self-conceit and instructs in patience and joy. The spirit achieves the conviction of the non-arising of dharma. Furthermore, the letter instructs in vigour concerning all roots of virtue. The spirit is free from discrimination and discernment. It is vigour that is independent.”

106. Pelliot, 977, 1b.2–3:

“The letter generates the practice of the thirty-seven bodhipāksika dharma.”

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dharma. The letter instructs in suffering, its origin and the path. The spirit realises its cessation. The letter instructs in ignorance, etc., up to old-age-and-death. The spirit realises the cessation of ignorance, etc., up to the cessation of old-age-and-death. The letter instructs in the accumulation of perfect mental quietude and insight. The spirit realises knowledge and deliverance.

The letter explains the Doctrine to those who act with desire, hatred or delusion or who partake uniformly in all three. The spirit is the unperturbed liberation of the mind. The letter points to all dharma that cause obstruction. The spirit is the unobstructed pristine cognition and liberation. The letter displays the incalculable, excellent qualities of the three jewels. The spirit accomplishes the imperturbable state of being and the unconditioned qualities of the Sangha.

The letter instructs in learning and attainments that are accomplished by the bodhisattva, starting with the first production of the thought of enlightenment, the point of departure, up to the seat of enlightenment. The spirit is perfect enlightenment arising from pristine cognition of all-knowing since is endowed with a single moment of thought. In brief, that which instructs in up to eighty-four thousand dharma-aggregates is the letter. The ineffable meaning of all sounds, letters and syllables is the spirit.

108. Pelliot, 977, 1.b3–4:
   “Furthermore, the letter explains the Doctrine to those who partake uniformly in desire, hatred or delusion. The spirit is the unperturbed liberation. Furthermore, the letter points to all obstructing dharma. The spirit is the unobstructed pristine cognition and liberation. Furthermore, the letter analyses the colour of the qualities of the three jewels.”
109. *byan chub kyi shin po*; *bodhimanda*
   The Tibetan rendering of the term *bodhimanda* is explained in the *Āloka* (p. 206.7):
   “The *bodhimanda*, used as a seat, is a spot so named because the *manda*, that is the quintessence of bodhi, is present there.”
   There exist two types of interpretation of the concept of *bodhimanda*. First, when understood as a seat, it refers to the seat underneath the Bodhi-tree under which all buddhas are held to attain enlightenment (*Saddhdp*, p. 316.3–4). As a physical entity, the seat of enlightenment became soon subject to a cult. Already during Mauryan times, the tree of enlightenment received royal attention and became a sanctuary that was enclosed by brick walls and regularly worshipped (Bloch, *Inscriptions d’Asoka*, p. 112, *Divya*, p. 404.2). By the seventh century the cult of the *bodhimanda* had progressed to assume cosmic dimensions. Hsüan-tsang (Beal, 1981, ii, pp. 115–6) saw in the enclosure surrounding the Bodhi-tree a ‘diamond seat’ (*vajrāsana*) of which he was told that it would appear at the beginning of a Bhadrakalpa and stood, immovably, at the exact centre of the trichiliomegachiliocosm. Second, as a spiritual concept, the term *bodhimanda* stands for the presence of the Dharma as it is preserved in the *sūtras* or as it is embodied by the *dharmakāya* of all buddhas. As such it is non-spatial and may be found in any location where the presence of the Dharma is manifest. To this effect, we read in the *Saddhdp* (p. 391.6–13, trsl. Kern):
   “And wherever on earth, son of good family, this Dharma-enunciation shall be made known, read, written, meditated, expounded, studied or collected into a volume, be it in a monastery or at home ... in that place one should erect a *stūpa* in dedication to the Tathāgata; for such a spot must be regarded as a *bodhimanda*.”
   The same thought is also expressed in the *Vīn* (p. 99, trsl. Lamotte) when Vimalakirti announces that all bodhisattvas “whether they go somewhere or return from it, whether they advance or stop ... come always from the seat of enlightenment.” For these and further references to the development of the concept of *bodhimanda*, see: Lamotte, 1976, p. 94, n. 105.
110. Pelliot, 977, 1b.6–7:
   “The spirit is perfect enlightenment arising from pristine cognition of all-knowing composed
Next, what are *sūtras* whose meaning is provisional? Texts that propound the letter should be absorbed meticulously just as they are preached. These are *sūtras* of provisional meaning.

What are *sūtras* whose meaning is precise? Texts that propound the spirit should be absorbed meticulously just as they are preached. These are *sūtras* of precise meaning.\(^{111}\)

Why does one rely on the foundation of being rather than on persons? Since the provisional meaning is that of persons, one does not rely on these. Rather, since the precise meaning corresponds to the foundation of being, one relies on it.

These are the bodhisattva’s four reliances.\(^{112}\) It is in this manner that the bodhisattva, *mahāsattva* who is skilled in reliance courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.\(^{113}\)

Next, what is the bodhisattva's skill in the letter?\(^{114}\) Concerning this, the bodhisattva who is skilled in two *dhatma* courses in the Perfection of Wisdom. What are the two of a single moment of thought. In brief, that which preaches all eighty-four thousand dharma-aggregates is the letter. That which is truly ineffable through any sound or letter is the spirit."

111. Pelliot, 977, folio lb.7-2a.1: "Next, what are *sūtras* whose meaning is provisional? Sayings that should be absorbed meticulously just as they are preached, these are *sūtras* of provisional meaning. What are *sūtras* whose meaning is precise? Sayings should be understood in detail just as they are preached, these are *sūtras* of precise meaning."

112. This is evidently not the case, as the pair *jhāna/vijñāna* has not yet been treated. For a discussion of this incongruity, see note 114. In the Akṣ, this confusion has been redressed.

113. Pelliot, 977, 2a.1–2a.2: "How does one rely on the foundation of being rather than on persons? That which is the provisional meaning is the meaning of the person. Through that there is no liberation. That which is the precise meaning corresponds to the foundation of being. Through that there is liberation."

114. The sequence in which the material is presented is quite evidently out of order. This irregularity appears in all blockprint editions consulted by me, that is, the sDe-dge, sNar-than, Peking and sTog-Palace *bKah-hgyur* and, to a lesser extent, also in the Pelliot manuscript. Although it is true that one cannot speak of a universal agreement as to the sequence in which the four pairs of *pratisarana* should be cited (compare, for instance, the sequence proposed in *Mvy* 1545–49 and *Kośa*, ii, pp. 246–8), the actual order in which the pairs are discussed corresponds invariably to that put forward in the respective subject listings. To my knowledge, the *Bdp* is the only text in which this is not the case. What is more, in the *Bdp* the pairs *nīthārtha/neyārtha* and *dharmatā/pudgala* are dealt with twice. The sequence runs as follows:

1. *Artha/vyāṇa* (R, folio 631.6–634.4; Pelliot: 1a.2–2a.7)
2. *Nīthārtha/neyārtha* (R, folio 634.4–5; Pelliot: 2a.7–2b.1)
3. *Dharmatā/pudgala* (R, folio 634.5–6; Pelliot: 2b.1–2b.2)

Interpolation

Stockphrase: ‘It is in this manner that … ’ This phrase concludes elsewhere major sections in the *Bdp*.

Re-introduction of the theme, linking the discussion of *jhāna/vijñāna* to ‘skill’ in the letter. This connects not only the discussion of the pair *jhāna/vijñāna* to the previously interrupted exposition, but leads also to the sequence found in the subject heading (R, folio 631.3–6, viz., *artha/vyāṇa; jhāna/vijñāna; nīthārtha/neyārtha; dharmatā/pudgala*)

Coursing in the Perfection of Wisdom is acted out by ‘skill’ in two *dharma*, that is, *jhāna* and *vijñāna*.

End of Interpolation

4. *Jhāna/vijñāna* (R, folio 634.7–636.5; Pelliot: 2b.2–3a.1)
5. *Nīthārtha/neyārtha* (R, folio 636.6–638.1; Pelliot: 3a.2–3b.1)
6. *Dharmatā/pudgala* (R, folio 638.1–639.4; Pelliot: 3b.1–3b.7)

The whole interpolation is absent in the Pelliot manuscript. Here, the discussion of the pair *dharmatā/pudgala* is immediately followed by an exposition of *jhāna/vijñāna*.
2.6.2 Reliance on Direct Knowledge and not on Discursive Insight

What is discursive insight? What is direct knowledge? As regards discursive insight; there are four abodes of discursive insight. What are the four? Matter in which discursive insight rests and is firmly rooted is its abode. Feeling, perception and karmic formations in which discursive insight rests and is firmly rooted are its abodes. This is discursive insight.

What is direct knowledge? Cognition that persists in the five appropriating aggregates and knows the aggregate of consciousness, this is direct knowledge. Perception of the element of earth, fire, water or wind is discursive insight. Cognition that does not attend to the four elements, but perceives the pure sphere of the Dharma, this is direct knowledge.

Furthermore, as regards discursive insight; perception of form, sound, scent, flavour, touch or mental objects through the respective consciousness is discursive insight. Tranquillity in internal sensefields, imperturbability in external sensefields and non-apprehension of any dharma whatsoever by relying on direct knowledge, this is direct knowledge.

Furthermore, as regards discursive insight; knowledge that is born from false mental constructions and imagination is discursive insight. Imperturbability and refrain from grasping, asserting, construing and discerning, this is direct knowledge.

Furthermore, discursive insight persists in the sphere of conditioned dharma but does not wander in the unconditioned. Perception of the unconditioned, this is direct knowledge.

Furthermore, discursive insight attends to the notions of birth and decay. Independence of the unborn and unceasing, this is direct knowledge.

2.6.3 Reliance on Sutras of Precise and not on Sutras of Provisional Meaning

Next, what are the sutras whose meaning is precise? What are the sutras whose meaning is

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115. This paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.

In the Akṣṭāṅgaśāstra, this subcategory is explained on pages 246.3.7–247.2.5. For a discussion of the terms vijñāna/jñāna, see: Wayman, 1980, p. 251–267.

116. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.3–4:
"What is direct knowledge? Cognition that does not persist in the five appropriating aggregates and knows the aggregate of pristine cognition, this is direct knowledge."

117. gzogs par mi byed pa: sammiṃdhampayate (cf. Edgerton, p. 58, col. 2).

118. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.5–6:
"Furthermore, as regards discursive insight; [absorption of external objects through consciousness], starting with absorption of form through the eye and ending with absorption of mental objects through mentation, this is discursive insight. Tranquility concerning internal sensefields, inactivity concerning external sensefields and non-apprehension of any dharma whatsoever for the sake of proceeding to pristine cognition, this is direct knowledge."

119. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.7–2b.1:
"Furthermore, discursive insight penetrates conditioned dharma. Discursive insight does not participate in the unconditioned. Knowledge through the unconditioned, this is direct knowledge. Furthermore, discursive insight attends to the notions of birth and origination. Non-attending to the unborn and unceasing, this is direct knowledge."
provisional? Sūtras that introduce to the path are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that introduce to its fruit are of precise meaning. Sūtras that cause to accomplish the conventional truth are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that preach the absolute truth are of precise meaning.

Furthermore, sūtras that introduce to action and duties are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that are taught in order to bring action and impurity to a final halt are of precise meaning.

Furthermore, sūtras that are taught in order to explain impurity are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that are taught for the sake of complete purification are of precise meaning. Sūtras that cause weariness with saṃsāra are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that do not partake in the duality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are of precise meaning. Sūtras that are taught with manifold words and letters are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that are taught in order to bring action and impurity to a final halt are of precise meaning.

Furthermore, sūtras that are taught in order to explain impurity are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that are taught for the sake of complete purification are of precise meaning. Sūtras that cause weariness with saṃsāra are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that do not partake in the duality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are of precise meaning. Sūtras that are taught with manifold words and letters are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that are taught in order to bring action and impurity to a final halt are of precise meaning.

Furthermore, sūtras that proclaim with various words a self, a living being, a life-force, a person, a man, a human being, an individual or a being that arises and feels saying that there is an owner when there is no such owner are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that instruct in

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120. This section contains a good example of the doctrinal advance of the Akṣ over the Bṛ. Preserved in the Sanskrit of the Madh. vṛtti (p. 43.4-6), the Akṣ reads:

"Sūtras that have been expounded in order to teach the path of penetration (mārgāvatāra) are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that have been expounded in order to teach the fruit of penetration (phalāvatāra) are of precise meaning."

It continues:

"All sūtras that instruct in emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, non-accumulation (anabhīṣaksā), non-birth (ajāta), non-origination (anupāda), non-becoming (abhava), non-self, the absence of life-force, person and a master (svāmin), such texts are of precise meaning" (Madh. vṛtti, p. 43.6–9).

A corresponding section is found in the Bṛ at 637.5–638.1.

121. Pelliot (977, folio 2b.1–3) has:

"Sūtras that preach the conventional truth are of provisional meaning. Sūtras that preach the absolute truth are of precise meaning."

According to the Mpps (ii, p. 539), sūtras are of provisional meaning if they contain the following sayings:

"Among all omniscient, the Buddha is the foremost; among all texts, the sūtras are the foremost; among all beings, monks are the foremost."

These Lamotte identifies as the three agraprajñāpti proclaiming the superiority of the triratna (A II, p. 34; III, p. 35; Itv, p. 87). In addition, nitārtha sūtras explain that “one acquires great merit through generosity, that morality allows for rebirth among the gods”. Neyārtha sūtras, in contrast, are held to teach that a master of the Doctrine (dharmācārya) gains the following five advantages (anuṣṭhā): (1) great merit, (2) affection from human beings, (3) beauty, (4) renown and (5) eventual arrival at nirvāṇa. These, of course, are exactly the benefits that are said elsewhere (A III, p. 41) to accrue to persons who engage in generosity.

122. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.3–3:

"Furthermore, sūtras that introduce to action are of provisional meaning."

123. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.3–6:

"Furthermore, sūtras that are taught in order to cleanse impurity are of provisional meaning. ... Furthermore, sūtras that delight the minds of sentient beings with many classifications are of provisional meaning. Those which are straightforward for the mind in [showing] few classifications and words are of precise meaning."

124. bdag po med pa bdag po yod pa: asvānikasvānika (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 124, col. 1).
emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness, in non-birth, non-arising and non-becoming, in the non-existence of a living being or person as well as in the gateways to liberation from the three times are of precise meaning.\footnote{125}{Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.6-7: “Furthermore, those which explain the assembly of a self, a living being, a being that feels and a person are of provisional meaning.”}

2.6.4 Reliance on the Foundation of Being and not on the Person

Next, what is the foundation of being?\footnote{126}{Pelliot, 977, folio 3a.1-1: “Next, what is the foundation of being?”} What is the person? One who attends to the belief of the existence of a person and pursues religious practice, this is the person.\footnote{127}{The structure of this sentence is ambiguous. I follow here the interpretation of the parallel passage in the \textit{Akn} (p. 64.4,7-8) as proposed by Vasubandhu in the \textit{Akn-\textit{ṭikā}} (pp. 247.5.3–248.1.1).} The Dharma-continuance of one who acquires the belief of the existence of a person, this Dharma-sphere is the foundation of being.

Furthermore, as regards the person; in order to convert sentient beings the Tathāgata explains everything with the help of conventional methods in terms of persons, saying: “The unique person who is born in this world and appears for the sake of the benefit and well-being of many sentient beings, who feels compassion for the world and accomplishes the welfare, benefit and happiness of hosts of beings among gods and men, viz., the Tathāgata, Arhant, Samyak Sambuddha as well as lay persons, virtuous lay persons, faithful persons, Dharma-observing persons, persons of the eighth rank,\footnote{128}{aryastamaka The term \textit{āryastamaka} is problematic. Given in the Pāli as \textit{āthamaka}, it is interpreted by the \textit{PED} and \textit{CPD} as a reference to that person among the \textit{āriya-puggala} who has reached the eighth stage, that is to say, he is a person who has just entered on the lowest stage of the śrāvaka-path (\textit{sotāpattipālha-sacchikirīya patipanno}; Puggalapaññatti, p. 73). While such a definition is quite acceptable, difficulties arise since there appears to be no reference to a seventh, sixth, etc., person. In the \textit{Nett} (pp. 49–50; ref. Gethin), the term \textit{āthamaka} serves to define the anāgamī. On the basis of these findings, but somewhat evading the problem, Nāṇamoli suggests to consider the meaning of \textit{āthamaka} as corresponding with that of \textit{patipannaka} (‘one who has entered on the path’) — an assumption that is probably correct in essence as the practice of \textit{āthamaka} refers in the \textit{Netti} (pp. 95–6) to a person practising on the transcendental path. La Vallée Poussin comes to a similar conclusion (1907, p. 266, n. 2). The \textit{Mvy} (1143) speaks of an \textit{āstamakabhūmi}, which is the third of the seven \textit{bhūmi} of the śrāvaka (cf. Edgerton, p. 81).} stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners, arhants, pratityakabuddhas and bodhisattvas, [all these are persons].” Now, those who become attached to such [appellations] have nothing to rely on.\footnote{129}{rt\textit{on pa ma yin pa: apratisarana}} In order to establish beings in understanding, the lord said that rather than to rely on the notion of the person they should rely on the foundation of being. (639)

Next, what is the foundation of being? All dharma bear the characteristics of unbecome, unmade, unproduced and unaccomplished; of changeability, fluctuation, rootlessness and complete sameness, viz., sameness in equality, non-equality and in both equality and non-equality; of non-discrimination, non-undertaking, certainty and lack of own-being. This is the
foundation of being.

Those who rely on the foundation of being never rely on elements. Hence, because they rely on all dharma by means of penetrating the door to Dharma-observance, [they know that] the totality of dharma is such foundation of being.130

These are the four reliances of bodhisattvas. This is the bodhisattva’s skill in reliance. It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in reliance courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.131

2.7 Skill in Accumulation

2.7.1 Skill in the Accumulation of Merit

Next, what is the bodhisattva’s skill in accumulation? The accumulation of the bodhisattva is twofold. What are the two? These are the accumulation of merit and the accumulation of pristine cognition.

What is his accumulation of merit? It contains the bases of meritorious work that arise from generosity, moral conduct and contemplation.132 (640) It contains the bases of meritorious

130. Lit: ‘the totality of dharma is such foundation of being.’
Pelliot, 977, folio 3a.4–7:
“What is the foundation of being? Existence has the foundation of the unmade, unproduced, unestablished and unsupported. All dharma bear the characteristics of complete sameness, viz., non-equality and equality, of non-discrimination, non-undertaking, non-originating and lack of own-being. This is the foundation of being. The dharma of those who rely on the foundation of being do not reappear. Hence, having relied on all dharma by means of entering into the door of Dharma-observance, they seize them. All dharma are such a foundation.”

131 This paragraph, starting with ‘These are’ up to ‘of Wisdom’ is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.

132. bsod nams bya bai diros po punyakriyāvastu
In the suttas of the Pāli tradition, we find three kinds of bases of merit, viz., the basis of meritorious work arising from generosity, arising from morality and meditation (dāna-, sīla-, and bhāvanāṃpunyakriyāvastu). Brief references to these three are found in D III, p. 218 and Ittv., p. 51. In the Anguttaranikāya IV, p. 241, the Buddha expounds the various fruits that accrue to practitioners of the three bases of meritorious work, in particular, the sublime spheres of rebirth.
The most instructive explanation of their role and functioning is found in the Kosa (iv, pp. 231–33). Distinguishing, like the Pāli, meritorious action arising from generosity, morality and meditation (dāna-, sīla-, bhāvanāpunyakriyāvāstu), it characterises each of the three as merit (punya), action (kriyā) and basis (vastu). Dāna, sīla and bhāvanā themselves are the bases of meritorious action (punyakriyā), because in process of their realisation the practitioner undertakes the preparation for merit.

Generosity, consisting of vocal and physical action is that which produces the action. But it is not so much the object that is given that matters and determines the resulting merit, than the reason why a certain thing has been granted. Hence, volition (cetanā) or the collection of thought and mentation (cittacittatakālāpā) is crucially important to the accumulation of merit of which dāna, sīla and bhāvanā are merely objects (vastu) or bases (adhīṣṭhāna). Depending on cetanā, generosity can either display a pure or impure disposition. Founding its views on the eight factors of the Saṅgītisutta (D III, pp. 258–60), the Mppś (v, p. 2249) distinguishes sixteen types of impure giving, including generosity out of desire for retribution, out of hope for heavenly rebirth, fame, etc. Pure generosity, in contrast, is always motivated by the desire to purify one’s thought and to adorn the spirit, and leads to nīrṇāṇa.

Morality as a basis of meritorious work is like generosity manifested in vocal and physical action. According to the Mppś, its scope of application is limited to the pañcaśīla consisting in abstention from killing, theft, lying, adultery and intoxication. Capable of showing three degrees of accomplishment (low, mediocre and high) and qualified by the motivation and circumstances surrounding moral violations, the amount of merit it produces varies with the integrity of the practitioner (A IV, pp. 241–43).
work that are furnished with a calm, benevolent disposition, compassionate conduct, exertion for all roots of virtue and the elimination of one’s own and other peoples’ sins.

It contains the bases of meritorious work that are furnished with gratitude towards all sentient beings of all times for their roots of virtue, viz., towards all learned ones and unlearned ones, towards all pratyekabuddhas and those who have produced the thought of enlightenment for the first time, towards all who have embarked on virtuous conduct, towards all irreversible bodhisattvas, towards those who are separated from buddhahood by just one birth and towards the buddhas of the past, present and future. It contains the bases of meritorious work furnished with the request of the Doctrine from all buddhas and noble ones. It contains the bases of meritorious work that are furnished with the transformation of all virtue into enlightenment.

He generates the thought of enlightenment in sentient beings who have not generated the thought of enlightenment. He teaches the Path of the Perfections to those who have generated the thought of enlightenment. He provides the poor with riches and dispenses medicine to the ill. He pays homage to the worthy ones. He is patient and congenial with the weak. He does not conceal his sins but eliminates evil. (641) He shows all forms of reverence and worship to those lord buddhas who dwell in the world and to those who have passed into nirvāṇa. He venerates his instructors and preceptors just as the teaching. He is diligent in seeking the Doctrine like a priceless jewel. He delights in the Dharma-pronouncement and even goes one hundred miles to hear them. He is not satisfied with hearing to the Doctrine, but explains it without aiming at worldly rewards. He honours his father and mother. He observes and stands by his deeds. He refrains from wickedness and is insatiable for accumulating merit.

Since he constrained his body, speech and mind with vows, he is free from physical, verbal

133. rjes su yi rah ba: anumodhand (cf. Edgerton, p. 32, col. 2).
134. skye ba gcig gis thogs pa: ekajatipratibaddha.
135. Pelliot, 977, folio 3b.5-4a.1:
   “Bodhisattvas generate the thought of enlightenment for those who have generated the thought of enlightenment. ... They conceal their sins and eliminate sin. ... They are not satisfied with hearing to the Doctrine, but explain the stainless Doctrine. ... They know, recollect and feel their deeds.”

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or mental hypocrisy. He attains pure merit by building a Tathāgata-śūpā. He accomplishes the marks of a great person by gathering endless offerings. He accomplishes the eighty secondary marks by accumulating numerous stores of roots of virtue. His body is adorned with freedom from conceit. His speech is adorned with freedom from all offensive speech. His mind is adorned with freedom from intellectual impediments.\(^\text{136}\)

He is an embellishment of the buddha-field through the miracles of the super-knowledge. He is an embellishment of the Dharma-characteristic by virtue of his purified pristine cognition. He is an embellishment of the great retinue by renouncing slander, despondency and dissent-sowing words.\(^\text{642}\) He is an embellishment of the imperturbable Doctrine by retaining the Doctrine. His Dharma-discourse does not intimidate since he applauds when he is pleased, saying: "Well done!". He explains in a fruitful manner by listening to the Doctrine with devotion and casting sin and ignorance aside. He is an embellishment of the Bodhi-tree by offering meditation-groves to the Buddha. He is an embellishment of the seat of enlightenment by virtue of retaining the thought of enlightenment—the factor that precedes all roots of virtue.

His life and death are pure since he does not generate actions and impurities. His hand is blessed since he gives away all his jewels and precious objects. His wealth is inexhaustible through the attainment of an inexhaustible resolution.\(^\text{137}\) Since he does not contract his eye-brows angrily, sentient beings gain faith as soon as they see him and greet with a smiling face.\(^\text{138}\) He is an embellishment of sameness by directing light-rays at all sentient beings.\(^\text{139}\) Since he does not despise the ill-instructed, he emits much light. By virtue of accumulating moral merit, his birth is pure. Because he does not abuse lowly people, the womb is completely pure at his birth.\(^\text{140}\)

By virtue of the complete purity of his tenfold virtuous activity,\(^\text{141}\) he is born as god or man.

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136. Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.2–3:
"His body is adorned with emanations by accomplishing the marks [of a great person], by gathering endless offerings, by accomplishing the eighty secondary marks and by accumulating numerous stores of roots of virtue."

137. According to Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Dhū (Daśa-bh, p. 219), the accumulation of merit is the first of four blessings (guna) that pertain to bodhisattvas who have progressed to the seventh stage with a set of ten superior practices and is held to generate great wealth:
"Superiority in wealth and personality is obtained according to requirement. Superiority of wealth and personality depends on the accumulation of merit."


139. I adopted here the argument found in Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.7.

140. Pelliot, 977, 4a.7–7:
"He attains sameness by uniformly [directing] light-rays at all sentient beings. Since he exerts himself for the ill-instructed, he emits adorned emanations. By virtue of accumulating moral merit, his birth is pure. On account of his prediction, the womb is completely pure at his birth."

141. Here, the tenfold virtuous conduct of the bodhisattva refers, in all probability, to abstention from the traditional ten akusalakarmapatha, viz., killing, theft, sexual misconduct, falsehood, slander, harsh and frivolous talk, covetousness, animosity and wrong views. This conclusion is, however, not completely safe as Buddhism developed several other enumerations of dharma consisting of ten kinds of virtue. There is, for instance, a group of ten pārājika dharma in the Brahmajālasūtra, containing besides the pañcaśīla (6).
He has conquered desire for worldly objects\(^{142}\) by contemplating all precepts.\(^{143}\) Since he readily shares his knowledge\(^{144}\) he masters the Doctrine. Due to his pure resolve, he appears in all worlds. He has faith in the magnificent Doctrine since he is not intent on the limited practice of the layman-observing-two-of-the-pañcaśīla\(^{145}\). (643) Since he does not give up the mind of all-knowing, he retains all of his merit. He acquires the seven riches of the universal monarch\(^{146}\) since he is motivated by faith. Acting in accordance with\(^{147}\) his previous resolution, he does not deceive the worlds. He acquires all buddha-qualities by accomplishing virtuous dharma. This is the bodhisattva's skill in the accumulation of merit.

### 2.7.2 Skill in the Accumulation of Pristine Cognition

Next, what is the bodhisattva's skill in the accumulation of pristine cognition? Pristine cognition arises on the basis of causes. He contemplates all causes and conditions of pristine cognition in this way.

What are its causes and conditions? He endeavours zealously to procure the Doctrine. He adheres to friends who comply with pristine cognition. He relies on the pristine cognition of the Buddha rather than on that of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas. Rather than assuming a

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\(^{142}\) gdon mi za bar:  avasya; lit.: 'hoarfrost' (cf. Edgerton, p. 76, col. 1).

\(^{143}\) Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.7-4b.3: "By virtue of the complete purity of his tenfold virtuous activity, he is born as god or man. He attains certainty by holding steadfastly on to all precepts."

\(^{144}\) slob dpon kyi dpe mkhyud pa: acaryamusti; lit.: 'close-fistedness of a teacher to share things with his pupils' (cf. Edgerton, p. 89, col. 1).

\(^{145}\) hi tshe bahi spyod pa: pradesakārīn (Mvy 1610)

The meaning of the term pradesakārīn is ambiguous. If one were to follow the context in which it is presented in the Mvy where pradesakārīn appears among the twenty-eight types of religious austerity, it would appear to refer to some form of ascetic practice that is practised in a certain region or place (pradesa). This interpretation is not supported by the Koṣa (iv, p. 73) and Mpps (ii, p. 821) that clearly associate the term pradesakārīn with a type of upāsaka adhering to a selection of the pañcaśīla. In the Koṣa, this upāsaka is said to observe two of the five rules, while in the Mpps he may observe two or three of the pañcaśīla. As neither of these texts mentions which of the five rules the pradesakārīn chooses to observe, we learn little of the moral maxims pertaining to this class of upāsaka.

\(^{146}\) According to the Mvy (3621–28), these are a parasol (cakra-ratna), elephant (hasti-ratna), horse (asva-ratna), jewel (mani-ratna), royal consort (stri-ratna), householder (grhapati-ratna) and an officer or minister (parinayaka-ratna). Compare the contents of this enumeration with a list of seven treasures (dhana) of the bodhisattva (Mvy 1565–72), viz., faith (śraddha), morality (sīla), sense of shame (kṛṣṇa), fear of blame (aparyāpātya), learning (śruti), renunciation (tyāga) and wisdom (prajñā). The seven riches are well known from the nikāya where they occur, for instance, in D III, p. 163, p. 251 and in A IV, p. 4. The same list occurs in the Bdp on folio 337.5–338.3.

\(^{147}\) ņams su len pa byed pa: asthitikṛtya (cf. Edgerton, p. 111, col. 2; p. 86, col. 2).
proud attitude towards his superiors and teachers, he rejoices in them. When his virtuous friends have realised that he possesses a good resolve, they do not hesitate to instruct him in all discourses of pristine cognition. When they have realised that he is a receptacle, they instruct him constantly\(^{148}\) with great concentration in the Doctrine. After he has heard the Doctrine, he exerts himself in the accumulation of virtuous practice. Exertion in the accumulation of virtuous practice itself is exertion in the accumulation of pristine cognition.

What is exertion in the accumulation of virtuous practice? (644) He is content with little profit, little activity and few words. He sleeps neither at dawn nor at dusk and applies himself diligently to yoga. He contemplates the meaning of dependent co-origination and attempts subsequently to grasp it. His mind is unperturbed. He conquers sin. He knows when he is liberated from sin.\(^{149}\) He is free from grudge and manifestations of evil tendencies\(^{150}\). He performs good conduct and endeavours in virtuous practice. He is inclined to, and has a propensity for, virtuous practice. He applies himself to it as if his head and clothes were constantly alight.\(^{151}\)

He persists in his search for pristine cognition. He is vigilant and sustains his efforts. He gains distinction and withdraws into seclusion\(^{152}\). He takes delight in solitude and contemplates the bliss of quietude. He cherishes the [four practice of] the noble lineage. He does not turn away from purification. He takes delight in the great joy of the Doctrine and aspires to it. He does not heed the esoteric formulae of the materialists. He is impeccably mindful in his search for supramundane dharma. When contemplating, his mind is well-focused on the meaning.\(^{153}\) His understanding operates in accordance with the path. He exercises constraint

\(^{148}\) bar chad med pa: nirantara (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 539, col. 2).

\(^{149}\) Itün ba las ḥyönu bar śes pa;

The meaning of this sentence is ambiguous since it does not indicate the scope of the attainment. That is to say, it is not clear whether it refers to the sixth abhijñā conferring ‘knowledge of the destruction of defilements’ (āsravaksayajñāna), or whether it is simply an expression of the bodhisattva’s control over the process of purification. The wording of the Tibetan suggests that it has a more general meaning since, according to Mvy (209), āsravaksayajñāna has its equivalent in zag pa zad pa śes pa. On the other hand, the concept of ‘knowledge of the purification of sin’ runs arguably rather close to that of āsravaksayajñāna and might overlap. Since ‘knowledge of the destruction of defilements’ is a highly technical concept—its application being practically restricted to the attainment of arhantship or buddhahood—the taking of a more cautious approach, pointing to vague parallels only, is perhaps appropriate.

\(^{150}\) kun nas ldan pa med pa: paryuṣṭhāna (cf. Edgerton, p. 335, col. 2).

\(^{151}\) Pelliot, 977, folio 4b.7–5a.1:

“Contemplating the meaning of exertion, he removes afterwards the defilement of indolence—the ruin of the mind. ... He is not covered by it. He is not encircled by it. Being endowed with good conduct, he endeavours in virtuous practice. ... In this way, he persists in his search for pristine cognition.”

\(^{152}\) Ḥdu ḥdzis dben pa: samsarga

lit.: ‘to be solitary as to conmingling’ (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 1119, col. 3).

Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.2:

“He is vigilant and does not long for honour. He does not gain distinction but withdraws into seclusion.”

\(^{153}\) This last phrase is essentially a paraphrase of the Tibetan clause. The literal translation would run as follows: “When contemplating, he complies with understanding the meaning.” See also: Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.3.
with regard to sense-pleasure.\textsuperscript{154}

He penetrates pristine cognition by way of its conditions.\textsuperscript{155} He is an embellishment of modesty and chastity. He treads the path of the Buddha. He removes nescience, ignorance and the mist of delusion.\textsuperscript{156} (645) His eye of wisdom is stainless. He is fully purified. His understanding is excellent. He reveres his superiors. His mind is extremely versatile. He acquires direct knowledge\textsuperscript{157}. In his attainments, he does not depend on others and he does not boast with them. He discerns alien attainments.\textsuperscript{158} He undertakes wholesome actions\textsuperscript{159}. He does not refute the ripening of deeds, though he knows that deeds are perfectly pure. This is the bodhisattva, \textit{mahāsattva}'s accumulation of pristine cognition.

Furthermore, his accumulation of pristine cognition is acquired through four kinds of giving.

1. He gives bark of the birch tree, pencils, ink and books to reciters of the Doctrine.
2. He gives various cushions to them.
3. He gives all kinds of goods, shows respect and composes verses for them.
4. He shows sincere gratitude to reciters of the Doctrine for bringing together all teachings.

These four kinds of giving augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There are four kinds of guard that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

1. He guards the body of the reciters of the Doctrine.
2. He guards their welfare.\textsuperscript{160}
3. He guards them when they enter into his region and district.
4. He guards propitious objects.

These four kinds of guard augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There are four kinds of support\textsuperscript{161} that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{154} Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.2-3:
\quad "He adheres to the vow."
\bibitem{155} I follow here Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.3 which reads: \textit{rkyen gyis ye šes chud pa}.
\bibitem{156} Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.3:
\quad "Disapproving of nescience, he does not cleanse the mist of ignorance and delusion."
\bibitem{157} \textit{mnon sum tu šes pa; pratyakṣajñāna} (cf. Edgerton, p. 374, col. 1).
\bibitem{158} Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.3-4:
\quad "He does not (sic) discern alien attainments."
\bibitem{159} \textit{legs par bya bāhi las byed pa; suktakarmakārin} (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 1220, col. 2).
\bibitem{160} Omitted in Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.7.
\bibitem{161} \textit{né par rton pa; upāsthamāna} (cf. Edgerton, p. 143, col. 2).
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The \textit{Mahāvastu} (ii, p. 280.16–17) cites five kinds of support that enable the bodhisattva to display his noble, fearless smile (āryasmita). These are zeal (chanda), vigour (vīrya), recollection (smṛti), meditation (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā). According to the \textit{Dbh} (\textit{Daśa-bh}, p. 15), the bodhisattva depends for...
(1) It is support of the teachings of the reciters of the Doctrine. (646)
(2) It is support of pristine cognition.
(3) It is support of worldly possessions.
(4) It is support of enlightenment.\textsuperscript{162}

These four kinds of support augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There are five powers that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the five?

(1) It is the power of faith in order to pay homage.
(2) It is the power of vigour in order to attain learning.
(3) It is the power of mindfulness as not to forget the thought of enlightenment.
(4) It is the power of meditation in order to gain faith in dharma-sameness.
(5) It is the power of wisdom for the sake of the power of learning.

These five powers augment his accumulation of pristine cognition.\textsuperscript{163} There are four kinds of moral conduct that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

(1) It is moral conduct that is assured in the Doctrine.
(2) It is moral conduct that pursues the Doctrine.
(3) It is moral conduct that has faith in the Doctrine.
(4) It is moral conduct that transforms into enlightenment.

These four kinds of moral conduct augment his accumulation of pristine cognition.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{162} Pelliot, 977, folio 5b.1: 
"It is support of intelligence (buddhi)."

\textsuperscript{163} These five kinds of power (bala) correspond to the five bala of the thirty-seven bodhipāksika dharma, viz., sraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi and prajñā. They are treated in greater detail in section 2.10.5 (R, folio 677.2–679.5).

\textsuperscript{164} Compare these types of moral conduct with those proposed by later exegetical writers (Bbh, p. 138.21–23), distinguishing morality of the vow (sanvargaśīla), morality involving the accumulation of virtue (kusala-harmasamgrahaśīla) and morality involving efforts directed at the welfare of sentient beings (sattvārthakriyāśīla).
are four kinds of patience that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

(1) Since he exerts himself diligently to attain the Doctrine, he bears patience with the words of those who speak evil and utter slander.
(2) Since he exerts himself diligently to attain the Doctrine, he endures patiently wind, warmth, cold, heat, thirst and hunger.
(3) Since he exerts himself diligently to attain the Doctrine, he complies patiently with his instructors and preceptors.
(4) Since he exerts himself diligently to attain the Doctrine, he is patient towards the empty, signless and wishless nature of dharma.

These four kinds of patience augment his accumulation of pristine cognition.165 (647) There are four kinds of vigour that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

(1) It is vigour in learning.
(2) It is vigour in retaining.
(3) It is vigour in teaching.
(4) It is vigour in application.

These four kinds of vigour augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There are four factors of contemplation that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

(1) He takes delight in seclusion
(2) And in solitude.
(3) He seeks pristine cognition and the super-knowledge.
(4) He enters the pristine cognition of the Buddha.

These four factors of contemplation augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There

165. Of all classifications of bodhisattva practices presented in this section, it is the scheme of patience that bears closest resemblance to the divisions of later scholasticism (Bbh, p. 189.7–11). That is to say, the first type corresponds to the category of parāpakāramārasanakṣānti, representing patience supporting injury and verbal abuse at the hand of other. The second type runs parallel to the bodhisatta’s willingness to put up with painful sensations caused the four elements (duḥkhādhivāsanakṣānti), while the fourth type, ‘patience towards the empty, signless and wishless nature of dharma’ is close to the bodhisatta’s ‘conviction of the non-arising of dharma’ (anupattikadharmakṣānti) that is the highest development of patience contemplating dharma (dharmanidhyanakṣānti). It is only the third type of patience, bearing with instructors and preceptors, that is not accounted for as an independent category in later writings.
are four wisdom-manifesting dharma that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

(1) He refutes the notion of nihilism.
(2) He impugns the notion of permanence.
(3) He does not challenge dependent co-origination. 166
(4) He rejoices in the belief of the non-existence of the self.

These four wisdom-manifesting dharma augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There are four dharma that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition of means. 167 What are the four?

(1) He complies with the world.
(2) He complies with the sūtras.
(3) He complies with the Doctrine.
(4) He complies with pristine cognition.

These four dharma become his accumulation of pristine cognition of means. There are four dharma that cause him to penetrate the pristine cognition of the accumulation of paths. (648) What are the four?

(1) It is the path of the pāramitā.
(2) It is the path of the bodhipākṣika dharma.
(3) It is the Noble Eightfold Path.
(4) It is the path that leads to pristine cognition of all-knowing.

These four dharma cause him to penetrate the pristine cognition of the accumulation of paths. There are four kinds of insatiability that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

(1) He is insatiable for learning.
(2) He is insatiable for instructions.
(3) He is insatiable for investigation.
(4) He is insatiable for pristine cognition.

166. Pelliot, 977, folio 5b.6: "Assembling causes and conditions, he does not challenge origination."
167. Cf. Pelliot, 977, 5b.7 which reads thabs dañ ye sès kyï tshogs.
These four kinds of insatiability augment his accumulation of pristine cognition.

Furthermore, as regards his accumulation of pristine cognition; complying with all sentient beings and with all buddha-fields, the accumulation of pristine cognition should be seen as arising from giving. The accumulation of pristine cognition should be seen as arising from morality, patience, vigour, meditation, wisdom, benevolence, compassion, joy and equipoise. Why? Because all undertakings of the bodhisattva are dependent on, as well as motivated and supported by, pristine cognition. By persisting in pristine cognition, the holder of pristine cognition becomes a universal support. Moreover, none of the evil ones obtains an occasion to harm him. He acquires not only the sustaining power of the Buddha, but he is also established in the pristine cognition of all-knowing. 168 (649)

These two are the bodhisattva’s accumulations of merit and pristine cognition. A bodhisattva, *mahāsattva* who is skilled in these two kinds of accumulation courses in the Perfection of Wisdom. 169

### 2.8 Skill in Bases of Mindfulness

Next, what is skill in the bases of mindfulness of bodhisattvas? They generate the four bases of mindfulness of bodhisattvas. What are the four? They generate the basis of mindfulness considering the body as body. They generate the basis of mindfulness considering feeling as feeling. They generate the basis of mindfulness considering thought as thought. They generate the basis of mindfulness considering *dharma* as *dharma*. 170

#### 2.8.1 Skill in the Basis of Mindfulness concerning the Body

What is the generation of the basis of mindfulness considering the body as body? O

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168. Pelliot, 977, folio 6a.2–4:

> "Furthermore, as regards his accumulation of pristine cognition; complying with all sentient beings and with all buddha-fields, also giving should be seen as the accumulation of pristine cognition. Also morality, patience, vigour, meditation, wisdom, benevolence, compassion, joy and equipoise should be seen as the accumulation of pristine cognition. ... Having persisted in pristine cognition, he gathers all sentient beings [around him]. None of the evil ones obtains an occasion to harm him and he is established in the pristine cognition of all-knowing."

169. This paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript. The section that follows in Pelliot 977 on ‘skill in accumulation’ appears in all block-print editions of the *Bdp* at the very end of chapter eleven. In my edition, it corresponds to section 3.1 and 3.2 (R folio 686.4–690.1).

170. On the relationship between the *smṛtyupāsthaṇā* and *prajñā*, the commentary on the *Arthavinīścayāsūtra* remarks (*Arthav-īś (Ś),* pp. 210.6–211.3):

> "When considering the body, feeling, thought and *dharma*, the bodhisattva acquires a thought that is exempt from misconception (*viparyāsa*). He considers the body as body; that is to say, he considers it in accordance with reality; this is the sense of ‘considering’. This is valid in equal measure with regard to mindfulness concerning feeling, thought and *dharma*. Because they take as object a personal series, a series of others and both (*svaparobhayasantatālambanatvat*), the bases of mindfulness have individually as own-being (*svabhāva*) the threefold science (*trāvīdaya*); that is to say, their own-being consists of wisdom springing from learning, reflection and contemplation."
Šāriputra, a bodhisattva who dwells, considering the body as body contemplates the origin, present condition and future destiny of the body:

“Alas, this body is arisen from delusion\textsuperscript{171}. It is born from causes and conditions. It is motionless, inactive, non-self and without proprietor. For instance, by reason of dharma that are neither a self nor of a self, neither permanent, steadfast or abiding this body that resembles grass, bricks, wood, ass or a mirage and consists of the aggregates, sensefields and elements is empty just like the grass, tree branches, plants or forests, that too emerge from causes and conditions and are without a self or proprietor. Rather than developing a sense of ownership for my body, I should patiently put up with the fact that the own-being of my body is insubstantial.

What is substantial? The body of the Tathāgata is substantial. The Tathāgata’s body is the body of the Doctrine. It is the vajra-body. It is imperishable and firm.\textsuperscript{172} I shall accomplish this most distinguished body of all three worlds. Though indeed this body of mine has produced sin through many offences, notwithstanding, it will become the Tathāgata’s impeccable body.”

Once he has duly realised thus through his powers of investigation, he guards his body—the abode of the mahābhūta—carefully and thinks: “May this body of mine perish [complying with] every requirement whatsoever of sentient beings. May this body of mine that has arisen from the mahābhūta become the subsistence of sentient beings through the assorted doors, bases, enunciations and enjoyments, just like the four external mahābhūta, viz., the element of earth, water, fire and wind support sentient beings through the various doors, bases, \textsuperscript{(651)} enumerations, favours and enjoyments.”

Although it is true that he has discerned the body to be impermanent, he truly does not weary of death and birth. Although it is true that he has discerned the body to be suffering, physical suffering does not distress him. Although it is true that he has discerned the body to be non-self, he does not weary of developing sentient beings. Although it is true that he has discerned the body to be calm, he does not enter into indifference through a calm body. Although it is true that he has discerned the body to be empty and solitary, he does not enter into nirvāṇa.\textsuperscript{173}

When he dwells, considering the body as a body he does not consider it to be substantial or

\textsuperscript{171.} \textit{phyn ci log: viparyāsa} (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 974, col. 2).

\textsuperscript{172.} The \textit{Red} (p. 236.3.3–5) employs the same argument in its description of the bodhisattva’s mindfulness concerning the body:

“By means of this defiled body I shall attain unassisted the body of the Tathāgata; the body of the Dharma, the body of merit and pristine cognition, the vajra-body, the blissful and non-afflicted body; a body that exalts in innumerable deeds in the triple world, a body that, when seen in its shape, appeases all sentient beings.”

Descriptions of the Tathāgata’s body in these terms are by no means uncommon and found in several other sūtras. See, for instance: Mahāyāna \textit{Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra} (T 374, k.3, p. 382c27; ref. Lamotte).

\textsuperscript{173.} Very similar thought is expressed in \textit{Bbh}, p. 259.15–22.
real. When he dwells, considering the body internally he does not permit the arising of internal, consequential defilements. When he dwells, considering the body externally he is emancipated from external, consequential defilements.

Since his body is without defilements, the bodhisattva is rich in pure physical activity. After he has purified his body, he attains a body that is adorned with the eighty secondary marks. After his body has been adorned, he converts gods and men. This is the bodhisattva’s generation of the basis of mindfulness considering the body as body. (652)

2.8.2 Skill in the Basis of Mindfulness concerning Feeling

Again, how does the bodhisattva generate the basis of mindfulness considering feeling as feeling? Concerning this, the bodhisattva thinks: “Whatever I feel, it is all suffering.” Even though he experiences pleasant sensations, because he realises feeling that is awakened by pristine cognition, wisdom and means he is not inclined towards the propensity of desire. Although affected by painful sensation, he produces great compassion for all those who are born in the evil destinies, but he is not inclined towards the propensity of hatred. Even though he is affected by feelings that are neither pleasant nor painful, he is not inclined towards the propensity of delusion. He experiences every sensation—whether it be pleasant, painful, unpleasant or painless—through a recollection subsequent to that feeling and sees their origin. In order to fully understand and appease the feelings of all sentient beings, he penetrates these himself, thinking:

“Since sentient beings do not know the origins of their feelings, they rejoice in pleasant sensations. They become angry at painful sensations. At sensations that are neither pleasant nor painful, they are confused. But me, my sensations being awakened by wisdom and pristine cognition, I have carefully purified all feelings. (653) By virtue of my accomplishments that I attained through skilful means and great compassion, I shall teach the Doctrine in order to bring all feelings of sentient beings to a final halt.”

Why is it called feeling? An awakened feeling leads to happiness. A feeling that is not awakened leads to suffering. What then are awakened feelings? Concerning this, although there is no self, sentient being, life-force or person that produces feeling, feeling is attachment; feeling is appropriation; feeling is grasping; feeling is delusion; feeling is binary thinking; feeling is inclination to false doctrines. Feeling is the notion of the eye up to the notion of the mind, this is feeling. Feeling is the notion of form up to the notion of mental objects, this is

174. The Akñ-tikā explains (p. 256.2.2–5; cf. Akñ, p. 67.2.1–4.4):
“...{quote}What is [the bodhisattva’s] feeling? Persisting in mindfulness concerning feeling, he achieves transcendence beyond the three kinds of suffering and experiences an unstained, pure and peaceful feeling. Thus, it is asked how do bodhisattvas generate the basis of mindfulness considering feeling as feeling? Feeling is understood by bodhisattvas and should be contemplated. That feelings are pleasant or unpleasant is stated elsewhere."{quote}

175. rtogs pahi tshor ba' adhigamavedanā.
feeling. Any sensation that emerges from the condition of touch in conjunction with the eye—whether it be pleasant, painful, unpleasant or painless—this is feeling. Corresponding to the former, any sensation that is linked with external or internal dharma and emerges from the condition of touch in conjunction with mental processes—whether it be pleasant, painful, unpleasant or painless—this is feeling. (654)

Furthermore, by way of enumeration feeling is one, viz., knowledge by a single moment of thought176; feeling is twofold, viz., internal and external; feeling is threefold, viz., knowledge of the past, present and future; feeling is fourfold, viz., knowledge of the four elements; feeling is fivefold, viz., reflection on the five aggregates; feeling is sixfold, viz., mistaken imagining of the six sensefields; feeling is sevenfold, viz., the seven states of consciousness177; feeling is eightfold, viz., the eight mistaken modes of practice178; feeling is ninefold, viz., the nine abodes of sentient beings179; feeling is tenfold, viz., the path of tenfold virtuous activity.180

Corresponding to the former, all this is feeling. To the degree that there exists mental construing and reflection, everything will be felt. Hence, the feeling of incalculable sentient beings is infinite.

Now, the bodhisattva who dwells, considering feeling as feeling generates pristine cognition of the feelings of all sentient beings as they arise, persist and disappear. He who knows feeling with regard to the virtuous and non-virtuous feelings of all sentient beings has generated

176. sens gcig pus rnam par rig pa

It appears that this statement is an indirect reference to the sixteen moments (ksana) of thought that mark the practitioner’s gradual cognition of the four noble truths (Kosa, vi, pp. 178–193). Rejecting the notion of gradual advance as postulated by the Sarvastivāda (Kosa, vi, pp. 185–9), the Bdp follows the view of the Mahāsāṅghika and early Mahāsākāra (Masuda, 1929, pp. 21, 59) suggesting that comprehension of the four noble truths occurs simultaneously and is not subject to measured progress. Since the reasoning on which this theory rests is very complex, I shall mention only one explanation for this proposition. According to the Aloka (ii, 12, p. 171) intuition of the darsanamdṛga as a single-moment intuition (ekaksanābhīsamaya) takes place because of the emergence of pure knowledge (anāsravijñāna). This knowledge makes known the nature of all modes and has within its scope the totality of all factors (sarvadharmaśāyā). Being fully comprehensive, it allows only for the presence of one thought-moment. An excellent account of the psychological intricacies that are involved in the controversy between those who propose that comprehension (abhīsamaya) takes place on the basis of a gradual progress and those maintaining that it is subject to simultaneous/instantaneous attainment has been produced by Ruegg, 1989, pp. 150–182.

177. According to the Kosa (iii, pp. 16, 21–22), the seven bases of consciousness are (1) beings diverse in body and mentation (nānātva-kāya-vasamjñā), (2) beings diverse in body but identical in mentation (nānātva-kāya-āksamjñā), (3) beings of identical body but diverse mentation (ekatva-ka-yāikatvasamjñā), (4) beings of identical body and mentation (ekatva-ka-yā-ka-yakatasamjñā), (5) beings belonging to the infinitude of space (ākāśanantyāyatana), (6) being belonging to the infinitude of consciousness (vijñānānāntyāyatana) and (7) beings belonging to the infinitude of nothingness (ākiñcanyāyatana). References in the nikāya are found in D II, p. 68; III, p. 253 and in A IV, p. 39. The same list is also found in the Mvy (2289–95).

178. log par nes pahi sbyor ba smamnyo'jan (lit.: ‘to put into effect or employment’).

179. These nine abodes of feelings (saṁvādāsa) consist of the seven basis of consciousness (vijñānāsthiti), of the abode of beings beyond perception (asamjñīśattva) and of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (naivasamjñānaśasamjñāyatana). For canonical references, see: D III, pp. 263, 263; A IV, p. 401, (cf. Amṛt (D), p. 219).

180. Canonical sources speak of two, three, five, six, eighteen, thirty-six and one hundred and eight kinds of feeling (S IV, pp. 231–32). The most common variety is that which distinguishes between pleasant (sukha), unpleasant (dukkha) and neither pleasant nor unpleasant (adukkhāsukha) feelings (cf. Mpps, iii, p. 1174).
the bodhisattva’s basis of mindfulness considering feeling as feeling.

2.8.3 **Skill in the Basis of Mindfulness concerning Thought**

Next, what is the bodhisattva’s basis of mindfulness considering thought as thought? The bodhisattva is mindful of the thought of enlightenment; he guards it, secures it and does not turn his attention away from it. He looks at it in this way:

“Once a thought has arisen, it disintegrates. It is induced. Since it is fickle, it does not persist internally and it does not perish outwardly. The thought of enlightenment that I produced at first has disappeared. It does not exist. It changed. It is not found in any place. Since it is not found anywhere, I am not able to retain it. The thoughts that produced my roots of virtue have also disappeared. They do not exist. They changed. They are not found in any region or quarter.

Even the thoughts that transform [roots of virtue] into enlightenment do not bear any characteristic of own-being. Thought is not discerned by thought. Thought is not seen by thought. If thought is not known by thought, what then is the thought by which I shall attain supreme and perfect enlightenment? The thought of enlightenment is not tied to the thought of roots of virtue. The thought of roots of virtue, too, is not tied to the thought of the transformation into enlightenment. The thought of the transformation into enlightenment, too, is not tied to either the thought of enlightenment or to the thought of roots of virtue. If he ruminates thus, he does not become terrified, frightened or fearful but thinks again:

“Truly, in the profound law of dependent co-origination the causes and retribution are imperishable. Yet, even though the foundation of thought has such own-being all dharma are dependent on causes and conditions; they are motionless, inactive and non-self. Because I act just as I wish, I shall apply myself diligently to creation and not weaken this foundation of thought.”

What is the foundation of thought? What is creation? Thought is like an illusion. There is

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181. On the basis of mindfulness concerning thought, the *Akn-tikā* comments (p. 257.4.6–5.1; cf. *Akn*, pp. 67.4.4–68.2.5):

“What is an established (pratisthita) bodhisattva? He traverses the basis of mindfulness concerning thought as thought. He transcends all states of consciousness and accomplishes the infinite bodhisattva-meditation. Thus, it is asked what is the bodhisattva’s basis of mindfulness concerning thought as thought? That which is to be cultivated by the bodhisattva is the thought of enlightenment.”

182. *Akn-tikā*, p. 257.5.1–4:

“Unlike the practice of recollection concerned with the impermanence of one’s own thought of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas do not forget through mindfulness and unfailing memory the first thought of enlightenment.”

183. We find the same argument—investigating the nature of thought and reconciling its apparent transitoriness with role of the thought of enlightenment—in the *Red’s* discussion of the mindfulness concerning thought (pp. 237.4.7–38.2.1).

184. Cf. *Akn* (p. 67.5.5) which has *rnam par sggrub pa* (vithapanā) for the *Bdp’s* sggrub pa. Both texts agree on the second member of the pair, that is, *sens kyis chos ŋid* (cittadharmatā).

185. Compare this section on *cittadharmatā* and *vithapanā* with *Bdp’s* thirty-two pairs of mental vigour.
nobody whosoever that causes its obstruction. This is the foundation of thought. To transform all possessions after one has renounced them into the pledge that effectuates the buddha-field is creation. Thought is like a dream and bears the characteristic of calm. This is the foundation of thought. Gathering the accumulation of the vow and transforming it swiftly into intuitive knowledge of all methods is creation. Since thought disintegrates like an illusion, decay is the foundation of thought. To transform the power of patience and bravery in order to accomplish the pledge of enlightenment is creation. Since thought is solitary like the reflected image of the moon in water, solitude is the foundation of thought.

To transform all undertakings of vigour in order to accomplish all buddha-qualities is creation. (657) Thought is inapprehensible and imperceptible. This is the foundation of thought. To transform all contemplations, liberations, meditations and compositions of mind into buddha-meditation is creation. Thought is beyond form. It is inobservable, intraceable and not verifiable. This is the foundation of thought. To transform knowledge of all instructions in the various wordings as requested in order to accomplish buddha-knowledge is creation. Thought arises towards various objects. This is the foundation of thought. To produce a disposition for the roots of virtue is creation. Thought does not arise in the absence of its cause. This is the foundation of thought. To produce the mental conditions of the bodhipāśika dharma is creation. Thought does not arise in the absence of an object. This is the foundation of thought. To produce the mental conditions of the buddha-sphere is creation.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva generates the basis of mindfulness considering thought as thought.

When he dwells, considering thought as thought he converges with thought for the sake of acquiring the super-knowledge. After he has acquired the super-knowledge, the bodhisattva perceives the thoughts of all sentient beings by means of a single thought. (658) Truly, once he has perceived them he explains the teaching of such own-being. Furthermore, when the bodhisattva dwells, considering thought as thought he converges with thought for the sake of attaining great compassion. By virtue of the attainment of great compassion, he does not weary of developing all sentient beings.

When he dwells, considering thought as thought, he does not sustain thought for the sake of achieving the cessation and final end of thought. Rather, he generates thought through the fetters of the stream of existence. Even though knowledge of the recollection of thought persists by means of dharma that settle him in certainty of the unarisen and unbecome, he does not descend on to the level of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha. And until he has accomplished all buddha-qualities he perpetuates the succession of thought. It is by virtue of wisdom that is endowed with a single moment of thought that he acquires supreme and perfect enlightenment.

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186. her bar sbyor ba: upasamhāra (cf. Edgerton, p. 142, col. 2).
O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva generates the basis of mindfulness considering thought as thought.

2.8.4 Skill in the Basis of Mindfulness concerning Dharma

O Śāriputra, how does the bodhisattva generate the basis of mindfulness considering dharma as dharma?187 O Śāriputra, concerning this, bodhisattvas who look at dharma with the eye of noble wisdom are not confounded until they reach the seat of enlightenment. (659)

When they dwell, considering dharma as dharma they do not see dharma of even the size of an atom that are exempt from emptiness, signlessness or wishlessness, the unborn, unarisen, non-accumulated or beingless. They do not perceive dharma of even the size of an atom that are exempt from dependent co-origination. When the bodhisattva dwells, considering dharma as dharma he perceives their foundation of being, but he does not perceive them incorrectly.188

What is the foundation of being? The truth of the non-existence of a self, a sentient being, a life-force or a person, this is the foundation of being.

What is incorrect? Belief in a self, a sentient being, a life-force or a person, the belief in nihilism or permanence and belief in origination or destruction, this is incorrect.

Again, O Śāriputra, all dharma are truth. All dharma are error. Why? Because of understanding emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness, all dharma are truth. (660) Because of mistaken inclinations to consider dharma as a self or of a self, all dharma are error.189

Now, when the bodhisattva dwells, considering dharma as reality he sees not even a dharma of the size of an atom amongst all dharma that is not a buddha-quality and becomes transformed into enlightenment, buddhahood, the path, liberation or deliverance.190 After he has realised that all dharma exist he acquires a great compassion called 'Unobstructed'191.

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187. On the basis of mindfulness concerning dharma, the Aku-tikā says (p. 259.2.8–3.2; cf. Aku, p. 68.2.5–5.1): “What is a purified bodhisattva? He persists in the basis of mindfulness concerning dharma. He transcends possession (paryavasthana) of hindrances, fetters, ties, latent defilements and impurities and attains mastery over all dharma. Thus, it is asked ... .”

188. According to a brief discussion of the Vaiśeṣika understanding of dharma and adharma in the Kośa (iv, p. 7), dharma corresponds to merit and adharma to demerit. Elsewhere (Kośa, iv, p. 155; iii, p. 207), the meaning of adharma is given as given as stain or passion (rāga).

189. Philosophically, this interpretation of the nature of dharma and adharma evolves from the postulate of the sameness of all dharma (sarvdharmasamatā). Fundamentally, it rests on the proposition that “this indifferenciation (anānārthatā) is a mark of reality because of the sole flavour of emptiness (śūnyatāyāyikara-satvāt)” (Madh. vṛtti, p. 375.7). On the moral level, suggesting that both dharma and adharma are causes of birth and destruction of all types of phenomena, the Bdp seems to follow the view of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, postulating moral neutrality for dharma (Kośa, iv, p. 7).

190. Aku-tikā, p. 259.4.7–5.4 (cf. Aku, p. 68.3.5–6): “Therefore, [because of universal emptiness, non-existence and non-apprehension] the bodhisattva who considers dharma does not see any dharma that is not a buddha-quality, deliverance, the path, liberation or the way leading out [of the triple world].”

191. ņon moins pa med pa: anāvāraṇa (cf. Edgerton, p. 23)
In the Śiks (p. 236.8), quoting the Aku, a samādhi bearing this name is found. This samādhi recurs in the Āloka (Obemiller (DDP), p. 36) where it signals—if accompanied by the anvayajñāna concerned with subjects (grāhaka)—acquisition of the fourth nirvedhabhāgīya, that is, the laukikāgradharma. It therefore constitutes the last psychic experience of laukika status and—being traditionally associated with the
Recognising that even the defilements of all sentient beings show no trace of impurity, he considers them to be contrived.

Why? Thus penetrating true meaning, bodhisattvas are enlightened because they themselves are awakened by the insight that there is neither an accumulation of impurity nor a substance to the aggregates. The own-being of impurity is also the seat of enlightenment. The seat of enlightenment is also the own-being of impurity. Although bodhisattvas are mindful of this, they do not achieve even a little. They do not advance or secure [anyone].\(^{192}\) They realise that intransitoriness\(^{193}\) is the foundation of being. Hence, the sphere of the Doctrine is intransitory. The place where the sphere of the Doctrine is situated, there is also the sphere of sentient beings. The place where the sphere of sentient beings is situated, there is also the sphere of space. Hence, all dharma are identical with space.

When the bodhisattva dwells, considering dharma as dharma he relies on the teaching of the Buddha. Even though considering all dharma, he delights in the teaching of the Buddha. Although it is true that he is aware of destruction, he does not realise unconditioned destruction. Although it is true that he is aware of no-birth, he does not give way to the conclusions of no-birth but reappears in order to look after sentient beings.

This basis of mindfulness establishes him in mindfulness of all dharma. However numerous the dharma and dharma-designations of the śrāvaka, pratyekabuddhas or buddhas are, he is established in their impeccable, unfailing recollection that is not darkened until the end of time.

This basis of mindfulness considering dharma as dharma is an infinite teaching because it does not belong to the sphere of ordinary conduct, but is included\(^{194}\) in all teachings of the Buddha and because it (662) appeases the minds of all sentient beings, suppresses all evil and is spontaneous awakening. O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva generates the basis of mindfulness considering dharma as dharma. These are the four bases of mindfulness.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in the four bases of mindfulness courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

\[\text{2.9 Skill in the Factors of Enlightenment}\]

Next, what is the skill in the factors of enlightenment of bodhisattvas?\(^{195}\) The factors of attainment in bala—allows the bodhisattva to pass into the darśanamārga. As the darśanamārga itself is taken up by the cultivation of the seven bodhyānga—the next set of practices in the Bdp—it is probably safe to see in this reference (and, in particular, in the modification of the Akn, turning anāvaranā from a type of compassion to a form of meditation) a further indication of a consciously perceived path-structure in the Bdp.

\(^{192}\) I take the Tibetan terms še bar hjog pa to stand for upasthāpayanti; rab tu hjog pa for prasthāpayanti and hjog pa for sthāpayanti.

\(^{193}\) gnas pa niid: sthititd (Mvy 1720).

\(^{194}\) yan dag par hdus pa: samavasarana (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 1157, col. 3).

\(^{195}\) According to the Akn-tika (p. 266.1.3), the factors of enlightenment make up the path of seeing (darśana-mārga): "The title to summarise these seven factors is darśanamārga."
enlightenment of bodhisattvas are seven. What are the seven? These are the factor of enlightenment of mindfulness, the factor of enlightenment of Dharma-discernment, the factor of enlightenment of vigour, the factor of enlightenment of joy, the factor of enlightenment of tranquillity, the factor of enlightenment of meditation and the factor of enlightenment of equipoise. O Śāriputra, these are the seven factors of enlightenment of bodhisattvas.

What is the factor of enlightenment of mindfulness? It is recollection by which they consider the Doctrine mindfully, by which they examine and investigate it thoroughly, by which they research, analyse and distinguish it. By that recollection they are led to the characteristic of the own-being of dharma. Again, what is knowledge of the characteristic of the own-being of dharma? It is recollection and realisation that all dharma are empty of own-characteristic. This is the factor of enlightenment of mindfulness.

What is the factor of enlightenment of Dharma-discernment? It is knowledge discerning the eighty-four thousand dharma-aggregates. It is discerning the Dharma just as it should be discerned, viz., discerning its teachings that are of precise meaning in terms of precise meaning, teachings that are of provisional meaning in terms of provisional meaning, teachings that are of conventional truth in terms of conventional truth, teachings that are of absolute truth in terms of absolute truth, symbolic teachings in terms of symbols and investigative teachings in terms of investigation. This is the factor of enlightenment of Dharma-discernment.

What is the factor of enlightenment of vigour? It is exertion to attain joy of Dharma-discernment, purification, meditation, equipoise and the receptacle of pristine cognition; it is exertion to attain perseverence, power, valour, irreversible aspiration, strength, resolute ardour and intuitive perception of the path. This is the factor of enlightenment of vigour.

What is the factor of enlightenment of joy? It is delight, joy and supreme pleasure in the Doctrine leading to fearlessness and courage. It is fearless delight that purifies not only the body and mind, but removes also impurity. This is the factor of enlightenment of joy.

What is the factor of enlightenment of tranquillity? It is pacifying body, mind and defilements, freedom from obstruction and one-pointedness while in meditation. This is the factor of enlightenment of tranquillity.

On the factors themselves, Vasubandhu comments (Akn-tikā, p. 266.1.3–5; cf. Akn, p. 70.2.3–4.4):

"As regards the factors of enlightenment; enlightenment is knowledge of destruction and non-origination. It has the own-being of lack of thought-construction. These seven factors, mindfulness, etc., are its causes or associates (sahāya); hence they are called factors."

Note that according to the Abhidh-sam (R), p. 118, the sahāya are associates to the factors of enlightenment and not the factors themselves (ref. Braavrig).

196. Akn-tikā, p. 266.1.6–7:

"A bodhisattva who is linked with mindfulness acquires certainty that he will reach truth and attains the factor of enlightenment of mindfulness."

197. Akn-tikā, p. 266.2–3:

"A bodhisattva who is linked with discernment progresses in the factor of enlightenment of Dharma-discernment."

An identical formula is used in the commentary to introduce the remaining five factors of enlightenment.

enlightenment of tranquillity.199

What is the factor of enlightenment of meditation?200 It is a composed mind by means of which knowledge and realisation of the Doctrine becomes—not a distracted mind. It is a composed mind by means of which awakening to dharma becomes—not a distracted mind. Apart from those who apply themselves to dharma-sameness and the Doctrine, no sentient beings understand this since they are ensnared by attachment. This is the factor of enlightenment of meditation. (665)

What is the factor of enlightenment of equipoise? It is thought that is quiescent because it is not seized by dharma taking part in pleasure or discomfort, that is not diverted by worldly dharma, but dwells in perfect rest. It is thought that is free from turbulence, discomposure and anxiety, that does not take up desire or hatred, but is in harmony with the noble path itself. This is the factor of enlightenment of equipoise.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that bodhisattvas who are skilled in the seven factors of enlightenment course in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.10 Skill in the Path

2.10.1 Skill in the Noble Eightfold Path

Next, what is the bodhisattva’s skill in the path? The path of bodhisattvas is eightfold. What are the eight? These are right view, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right meditation. These are the eight limbs of the path of bodhisattvas.201

What is right view? (666) It is a view that is noble and transcends the mundane realm. It

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199. In several places in the Samyuttanikāya (S V, pp. 66, 104, 111) a distinction is proposed between tranquillity of the body (kāyapassaddhi) and tranquillity of the mind (cittapassaddhi). Following this differentiation, the Dhs (pp. 14–5, 66) defines kāyapassaddhi in terms of calmness of the aggregates of feeling (vedāna), perception (saññā) and formations (samkhāra), while explaining cittapassaddhi as calmness of the consciousness-aggregate (vijñāṇa). By implication, it is then vedāna, saññā and samkhāra that link the practitioner’s physical and mental experience and might be taken to bridge the attainment in joy and tranquillity—with the former pertaining to the body and the latter to the mind (Waldschmidt, 1956, p. 292, 30.27).

200. Akn-tikā, p. 267.1.1–2:
“Meditation by means of which thusness is known through one’s own [effort] and then realised; this is the factor of enlightenment of meditation.”

201. Vasubandhu indicates in the Akn-tikā that the eightfold path constitutes the bhāvanāmārga (p. 267.3.5–6):
“Out of these, the summarising title (piṇḍārtha) ‘path of cultivation’ is taught by means of the noble eightfold path while its ‘practice’ is taught by means of perfect mental quietude and insight.”

The eightfold path itself is defined as follows (Akn-tikā, p. 267.3.8–4.2; cf. Akn, pp. 70.4.4–71.2.1):
“The path is pristine cognition by means of which the aryā attain unsurpassed enlightenment. The eight [factors], viz., right view, etc., are called limbs since they are associates of the pristine cognition of the path. They are right because they have turned away from mistaken views of the world.”

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does not arise from the belief in a self, a sentient being, a life-force or a person; it does not arise from the belief in nihilism or permanence, origination or destruction. It does not arise from heretical views, starting with that which distinguishes virtue and non-virtue and ending with the view of [permanent] nirvāṇa; this is right view.202

What is right resolve? A resolve through which impurities such as desire, hatred and delusion, etc., prevail does not suffice. Rather, it is a resolve through which morality, contemplation, wisdom, deliverance and the knowledge and vision of deliverance come into being203; this is right resolve.204

What is right speech? It is right speech through which neither oneself nor others are distressed. It is rich in utterances of beneficial application205. It is through this speech that one penetrates path-uniformity; this is right speech.206

What is right conduct? Concerning unwholesome action; a bodhisattva does not perform action of the kind that produces evil retribution. (667) Concerning wholesome action; he performs action of the kind that produces wholesome retribution. Concerning wholesome/unwholesome action; he does not perform action of the kind that produces wholesome/unwholesome retribution. Concerning action that is neither wholesome nor unwholesome; he performs action of the kind that leads to the exhaustion of action since it produces no retribution. Hence, confidence in one’s doings and diligent exertion to right action, this is right conduct.207

What is right livelihood? It is to live without abandoning the noble lineage208 or the virtues


203. Akn-tikā, p. 267.5.1–2: “Right resolve does not construct objects that generate kleśa, it does not generate the origination of kleśa.”

204. Akn-tikā, p. 267.4.7–8: “A bodhisattva who professes good resolve attains right resolve on the bhāvanāmārga.”

205. rjes su sbyor ba: anuyoga (cf. Edgerton, p. 32, col. 2).

206. Akn-tikā, p. 267.5.1–2: “A disciplined bodhisattva who is attracted to the bhāvanāmārga by right speech acquires moral conduct that was approved by the ārya.”

207. Akn-tikā, p. 267.5.6–7: “A composed bodhisattva who is attracted to the bhāvanāmārga by right conduct acquires moral conduct that was approved by the ārya.”

208. hphags pahi rigs: āryavamsa

To define right livelihood in terms of the āryavamsa is significant, since it throws some light on the Bdp’s position regarding the bodhisattva’s sphere of conduct. The āryavamsa, literally ‘lineage of noble ones’ describes a set of ascetic disciplines that are held conducive to liberation. Their purpose is to lead to contentment and the eradication of desire. Although its practice is technically known as ‘lineage’, it is by virtue of one’s way of life rather than birth that membership is attained. Unlike the notion of gotra to which one belongs by birth (for exceptions to this rule, see: Bbh, pp. 1–11), the āryavamsa—although notionally parallel to gotra—is a matter of personal decision.

Its frequent occurrences in the nikāyas suggest that the āryavamsa gained high esteem from relatively early on. Detailed discussions of the practices that belong to the āryavamsa are found, for instance, at M I, p. 2 and A II. 27, 28 (ref. Schuster). The practices that are included in the āryavamsa are (1) contentment with robes made of rags (civarā), (2) contentment with alms-food consisting of scraps (pindiyālopa), (3) contentment with roots of trees (rukhamūla) as lodging and (4) contentment with strong-smelling urine (putimutta) as medicine.

Besides the more explicit references, the four practices appear in number of other places in the early
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of mendicant life. It is to live without joking, hypocrisy or violent retaliation and to be easily satisfied with food and medicine. It is to live without assuming negligence in one’s training or to envy others’ property, but to be content with one’s own belongings. It is to live beyond reproach as it was prescribed by the noble one; this is right livelihood.

suttas. First, all but the last practice are included in the dhitānga (Vism, pp. 24, 30–36, 40). Second, among the practices that Devadatta wished to make obligatory for all monks, we note that it was mainly the concerns of the first three āryavamsa practices that stood at the centre of his aspirations (Vin, iii, x.11, Cullavagga, vii.3).

That the āryavamsa continued to enjoy high esteem is shown by Buddhaghosha’s (Vism, pp. 93–94) recommendation of four texts that should be used by monks as guides to their practice. These include besides the Āriyaṃcaṇḍita, the Rathavinitasutta (M i, p. 24), Malakasutta (Sn, iii.11) and Tuvatākasutta (Sn, iv.14), all of which are concerned with issues of discipline and contentment. Similar concerns are also expressed in the seven suttas that are cited by Asoka in his Bihāra edict as works that monks, nuns and lay-persons should study in detail (Warder, 1980, pp. 255–57). Finally, mirroring the ideal of practitioners who elected the disciplinary vigour of seclusion, the āryavamsa correspond to the four types of requisites that a pratyekabuddha is allowed to possess, viz., robes, almsfood, a place to rest and medicine (Kloppenberg, 1974, p. 26). All of this suggests that the ascetic ideal that is epitomised by the four āryavamsa practices—always voluntary and free from the extremes of self-mortification—enjoyed broad support among the Buddhist community during the first centuries of Buddhism.

Not surprisingly, this concern for discipline, moderation and self-control did not wane in the course of time, but maintained much of its appeal for later generations of Buddhists. In scholastic writings, the four āryavamsa are treated in the Kösa (iv, pp. 146–8), Mpps and the Sarvāstivāda Dharmaśankhā (chpt. vi).

Among the early sūtras of the Mahāyāna, they are given prominent treatment in the Ug (pp. 268.1.6–69.3.1), Rp (p. 13.17–18, p. 14.7–8) and Kp (pp. 13–14, 174, 179–181; § 6, 123, 126). In particular, the Ug stands out for its detailed discussion. Here, they dominate practic ally the whole of section seven and stand at the heart of the bodhisattva’s training in solitude and contentment. Two aspects of its discussion are especially noteworthy. First, there is the fact that the Ug’s presentation of the four practices corresponds almost verbatim to that of A II.28, pp. 26–7. This reinforces the assumption that the āryavamsa acquired great renown already in ancient times for it to enjoy the use of stockphrase in its description. Second, we note a tendency in the Ug, Kp and Rp to make the āryavamsa specifically the domain of the pravrajita bodhisattva.

All three texts make it obvious that they consider it elemental to the proper conduct of recluse bodhisattvas. In them the āryavamsa epitomise the basic mental disposition that is conducive to a proper attitude in training, but are nowhere near the actual attainment of bodhi. In the Kp their mastery is also open to those of inferior understanding and is little more than preparatory to meditation practice.

Undoubtedly, this attitude reflects the Buddha’s thinking when he decreed that their practice should not be made obligatory since he thought that they were of benefit only to those who already possessed a disposition of asceticism. It appears, therefore, that the interpretation of the āryavamsa had changed little since the early days. During the incipient Mahāyāna, the role of the āryavamsa is associated only with a minority of practitioners—the pravrajita bodhisattva—and is valued as a preliminary practice to meditation that instilled discipline, quietude and contentment in the adept. It is only with the rise of scholasticism, that this general appreciation became refined, leading to the detailed accounts in the Kösa and Vism.

The Bdp’s position on the āryavamsa does not match fully either of these strands. On the one hand, to include them in right livelihood would seem to assign the āryavamsa practices to the general model of Buddhist conduct and not specifically to the pravrajita environment. On the other hand, their positioning as the first practice of right livelihood suggests that they enjoyed a certain preeminence over the other factors (e.g., absence of hypocrisy, violence, jest). This prominence appears strengthened through the practices that follow after the reference to the āryavamsa. Most of them speak of moderation, contentment and moral integrity as the ideal life-style of wandering mendicants. By implication their inclusion in the general category of right livelihood would seem to point to the modest, reclusive life epitomised by the āryavamsa as the model training for the Bdp’s bodhisattva to follow.

210. dga′n sla` ba′ sloopa′ sgo sla` ba′ sbspar (cf. Edgerton; p. 600, col. 1; p. 601, col. 1).
211. Aki-tika, p. 268.1.2–3:

“A peaceful bodhisattva who is attracted to the bhāvanāmārga by right effort acquires moral conduct that was approved by the ārya.”

Most other works on the bodhipākṣika include in the exposition of right livelihood as brief account of the five mistaken forms of livelihood (mithyājīva). These include (1) hypocrisy in order to obtain alms
What is right effort? Effort that preaches mistaken conduct, effort that leads to the propensities of defilements of desire, hatred and delusion—this is not intended. Rather, it is effort that—introducing to the noble path and truth—accords with the effort that establishes in the path leading to nirvāṇa; this is right effort.213

What is right mindfulness? It is mindfulness that is well-composed, self-possessed, sincere and truthful; it is mindfulness that investigates the faults and defects of the bodhisattva on the path to nirvāṇa; it is mindfulness that causes recollection and is not oblivious of the noble path; this is right mindfulness.214

What is right meditation? It is composure towards reality and all dharma. When one dwells in this [type of] meditation, one penetrates reality. If one dwells in this [type of] bodhisattva-meditation in order to liberate all sentient beings and penetrates reality, that is right meditation.215

(kuṇāṇā), (2) boasting (lapānā), (3) divination (nāimapītikā), (4) extraction of gifts from the laity (nāipaśeṣikā) and (5) unceasing concern for profit (lābhena lābham nīścikīrṣatā). In the nikāya, they are found in D I, pp. 8, 67; M III, p. 75; A III, p. 111; for Sanskrit references, see: Kosavyākyā, p. 420; Bbh, pp. 168.21–169.2; Abhīdh-d, p. 309.9–11 and Śiks, p. 183.15. A fine summary of the significance of the five terms is given in the Abhīdh-d (p. 310.1–5):

“...”

The best analysis of the five types of mistaken livelihood in European languages is probably that by Wogihara (Bbh, pp. 21–26*). For other references of their occurrence in Buddhist literature, particularly in exegetical material, see: Mpps, iii, pp. 1182–3.

212. iṣṇa mons pa bag la ṣal ba: klesānusayā (cf. Edgerton, p. 198, col. 1)

The exact relationship between the klesa and anusaya is frequently glossed over in Buddhist literature. In many texts both terms are used as near-synonyms and are only inadequately distinguished. Even in scholastic works, their differences are not always made clear. According to the Dīgha (§ 67) and Śuddhi (p. 343), the klesa are sixfold, viz., desire (rāga), aversion (pratīkā), conceit (māna), ignorance (avidya), mistaken views (kudrṣṭi) and doubt (vickitsa). In the Kośa (v, p. 2) these six factors (replacing the last two with drṣṭi and vīmāti respectively) are said to characterize the anusaya.

In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Jhñapratishṭhāna, T 26, p. 943a27; ref. La Vallée Poussin), this list of anusaya is extended to include ten kinds of anusaya by subdividing the kudṛṣṭi into the (1) belief in a self (satkāvadrṣṭi), (2) false views (mihyādrṣṭi), (3) belief in the extremes (antagṛhadrṣṭi), (4) the esteeming of views (drṣṭiparāmarṣa) and (5) the esteeming of moral and ascetic practices (śilavrataparāmarṣa).

Creating further subdivisions and addressing specific viewpoints, the basic list of six has been variously expanded with the highest number of anusaya amounting to ninety-eight (Kośa, v, p. 13).

A key passage in the Kośa (v, p. 6) explains that the anusaya are not different from the klesa but constitute klesa in a state of sleep. They are said to be the opposite of paryavasthāna (active defilement) that is, klesa in an awakened state. Because the anusaya are non-manifested they are in a latent state, bearing the characteristics of a seed belonging to a person who engendered the previous klesa. While the anusaya are the cause of the klesa, they are not solely responsible since the klesa depend for arising on the presence of dharma as objects and on incorrect preparation. In the words of the Kośa (v, p. 72):

“Klesa arise from the non-abandoning of the anusaya, from the presence of their object and from erroneous judgement.”

213. Akñ-tikā, p. 268.1.6–7:

“A bodhisattva who has gone forth to mendicant life acquires right livelihood on the bhāvanāmārga.”

214. Akñ-tikā, p. 268.2.1–2:

“A bodhisattva who is full of joy acquires the ability to retain words and meanings on the bhāvanāmārga.”

215. As this sentence differs from the preceding one only by qualifying meditation as bodhisattva-meditation, it
After the bodhisattva has intuitively grasped the inexhaustible path of the lord buddhas of all times he preaches, explains and fully elucidates it. This is right meditation.  

These are the eight limbs of the path of bodhisattvas. This is the bodhisattva’s skill in the path.

2.10.2 Skill in Perfect Mental Quieted and Insight

Furthermore, as regards their skill in the path; the path of bodhisattvas is twofold. What are the two? (669) These are perfect mental quietude and insight. This is the twofold path.

What is perfect mental quietude? It is composure, serenity and stillness. It is imperturbability, restraint with regard to senses and congeniality. It is freedom from conceit, arrogance and folly. It is resoluteness, watchfulness and self-possession. It is non-delusion of mind, joy in solitude, quietude and seclusion. It is reflection on physical seclusion, mental quietude and the door to solitude. It is ease of mind and modesty. It is purity of life, excellence of practice and guarded conduct. It senses timeliness. It is contentment with food and medicine. It is analytical investigation. It is mental poise and patient endurance of the words of those who speak evil. It is generating the thought of enlightenment at the door to yoga. It is taking pleasure in deep absorption and contemplating the branches of meditation. That is to say, it producing benevolence, acquiring compassion, persisting in sympathetic joy, assuming equipoise and attaining successively all eight [types of] meditation. This is perfect mental quietude.

Again, the accumulation of perfect mental quietude is infinite. Guidance to that accumulation is perfect mental quietude.

What is insight? (670) It is the path of contemplation connected to wisdom. It is knowledge appears that the Bdp intends to point to a difference between the śrāvaka-meditation and the bodhisattva-meditation. That is to say, the śrāvaka is concerned with his own liberation and may pass from the state of meditation into nirvāṇa, but the bodhisattva’s motivation of his meditative practice is the goal of universal liberation.

216. Akn-ṭika, p. 268.2.6-7: “A bodhisattva who is of great power attains the accomplishment of his intended aims on the bhāvanāmārga.”

An Italian translation of the parallel passage in the Aṅk (as preserved in the Arthav) was composed by Alfonso Ferrari, 1944, pp. 603-4. I have reproduced the Sanskrit of that passage in the notes to my edition. Note, however, that her translation is based on the Tibetan, since in 1944 the Sanskrit text of the Arthav was not yet available.

217. so sor rtog pa: pratayekeśā

For a definition of pratayekeśā, see: MBT, iii, pp. 3, 5, 14–15, Bbh, p. 109.18–22.

218. According to the Bbh (p. 260.15–23), samatha falls into four categories. First, there is samatha that is knowledge indicating the absolute truth (paramārthikasāṃkṣetikājñāna). Second, there is samatha that—being the fruit of the first type—is effortless perception of discursive proliferation (prapāṭhā). Third, samatha is characterised as penetration of the ineffability of things and their signlessness. Fourth, by cleansing the mind of all discrimination, samatha leads to the essentially uniform single flavour of all dharma (sāravdharmaśānti). By means of these four aspects of samatha, its practice accomplishes the pristine cognition of enlightenment. Other, less specific, classifications of samatha are found in the Saṃdhī (ELa), p. 93.1–10.

219. sgom pahi lam: bhāvanāmārga

At first sight, this reference to the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga) is surprising. According to the Siddhi (p. 569) vipaśyanā constitutes the central vision of the darśanamārga and plays a decisive role in
seeing the imperturbability of dharma. It is knowledge seeing that there is no sentient being, life-force or person and that the aggregates are illusory. It is knowledge seeing that the elements are like the sphere of the Doctrine. It is knowledge seeing that the sensefields are like an empty city and that the eye scrutinises discursively. It is knowledge seeing that dependent co-origination is non-contradictory and that it is beyond the heretical view stipulating the existence of a sentient being. It is knowledge seeing that causes and effects ripen. It is knowledge seeing the manifestation of the fruit-attainment. It is knowledge seeing that penetrating reality is attainment.

Again, as regards insight; it is accurate seeing of dharma. It is seeing the suchness of dharma. It is seeing the unfailing thusness of dharma. It is seeing the emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness of dharma.

Again, as regards insight; it does not consist of seeing through causes or the absence of causes. It does not consist of seeing through causes that arise, abide and perish or that are mentally construed; and although it is insight, one sees not even a little.²²⁰ (671)

Furthermore, as regards insight; it is seeing by seeing and non-seeing by seeing. When one sees in this manner, then one sees rightly. When one sees rightly, one acquires skill in insight. Now, concerning the insight of bodhisattvas; they neither fall into karma-producing activity nor attend to accumulating roots of virtue; this is the insight of bodhisattvas.²²¹

²²⁰ The syntax of this passage is ambiguous and I am not certain whether my translation represents its chain of reasoning accurately. The commentary on the Āṅk is of little help here, since the crucial portion is not found in the root text (Āṅk, p. 71.3.5–8; Āṅk-tīkā, pp. 268.4.1–269.5.6). However, some light is shed on the meaning of this passage by a paragraph in the Sāṁdhikī (ĒLa) (pp. 90.21–91.17) that discusses the ways in which thought perceived during meditation differs from ordinary thought.

²²¹ Like samatha, also vipāsyaṇā displays four levels of operation. First, at the lowest level, vipāsyaṇā encompasses all four aspects of samatha. Second, vipāsyaṇā removes the remaining mistaken mental assumptions (samādhopa) concerning dharma. Third, vipāsyaṇā eradicates all blame and contradiction (apavāda) and fourth, through infinite methods of differentiation vipāsyaṇā penetrates dharma analysis (BDh, pp. 260.23–261.5). Compare these four types of vipāsyaṇā with the three types that are proposed in the Sāṁdhikī (ĒLa) (p. 92.14–29). Here, we learn that vipāsyaṇā may either spring from notions (nimittamavya), striving (prayāvekṣāṇamavya) or from analytical investigation (prayāvekṣāṇamavya). The first is concerned with images that carry reflection (vikalpaśīmba) perceived during meditation. The second addresses dharma that the bodhisattva penetrated only partially through wisdom. The third type of vipāsyaṇā investigates accurately the Dharma in order to reach the bliss of enlightenment. Further material on the various divisions and aspects of samatha and vipāsyaṇā is found in the Abhidhāna (R), p. 126.

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It is in this way that the bodhisattva who is skilled in perfect mental quietude and insight courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.10.3 Skill in Perfect Efforts

Furthermore, as regards skill in the path; the path of bodhisattvas is fourfold. What are the four?

They generate the keen wish that bad, unwholesome dharma that have hitherto not arisen are not produced. They strive and apply themselves diligently, they control their mind and endeavour zealously to that end.

They generate the keen wish that bad, unwholesome dharma that have already arisen are abandoned. They strive and apply themselves diligently, they control their mind and endeavour zealously to that end.

They generate the keen wish that virtuous dharma that have hitherto not arisen are produced. They strive and apply themselves diligently, they control their mind and endeavour zealously to that end.

They generate the keen wish that virtuous dharma that have already arisen persist, reappear, prevail and endure. They strive and apply themselves diligently, they control their mind and endeavour zealously to that end.

‘He generates the keen wish that bad, unwholesome dharma that have hitherto not arisen are not produced’ is an expression for correct reflection. ‘He strives and applies himself diligently to that end’ is an expression for not abandoning this correct reflection. ‘He controls the mind and endeavours zealously to that end’ is an expression for correct, careful investigation. Why? Because correct practices do not manifest unwholesome dharma.

What are unwholesome dharma? Unwholesome dharma are the detriment of moral conduct, meditation and wisdom. What is the detriment of moral conduct? Dharma that corrupt moral conduct and some others that impair it, viz., dharma that are detrimental to the morality-aggregate, these are the detriment of moral conduct.

What is the detriment of meditation? Dharma that corrupt religious practice and some others that distract the mind, viz., dharma that are detrimental to the meditation-aggregate, these are the detriment of meditation.

222 Playing at the ambiguity of the word-formation of prahāna/pradhāna, Vasubandhu comments (Akn-ṭikā, p. 260.5.4–6):

"It is fitting to call ‘bad, unwholesome dharma that have hitherto not arisen are not produced’ and ‘those that have already arisen should be abandoned’ perfect abandoning (samyakprahāna). But how can ‘so that virtuous dharma that have hitherto not arisen are produced’ and ‘those that have arisen should endure’ be called perfect abandoning? To designate the two in this way appears illogical, but there is no inconsistency here since ‘perfect abandoning’ is taken to mean to abandon the detriment (vipakṣapraḥāna), to produce and make the virtuous dharma endure and to abandon the detriment that takes place in order to produce and make endure [virtuous dharma]."
What is the detriment of wisdom? *Dharma* that corrupt vision and some others that obscure his vision overwhelmingly, viz., *dharma* that are detrimental to the wisdom-aggregate, these are the detriment of wisdom. These are bad, unwholesome *dharma*.

Due to correct reflection he generates the keen wish that such bad, unwholesome *dharma* are abandoned. He strives and applies himself diligently, he controls his mind and endeavours zealously to that end. Hence, these unwholesome *dharma* do not accumulate in his mind and do not prevail in any region or quarter.

He perceives that these unwholesome *dharma* that—wandering in the mind—have arisen from conditions and obstructions, viz., from desire by way of the disposition of affection, from hatred by way of the disposition of anger and from delusion by way of the disposition of ignorance. Then, the disposition of correct reflection acts to appease desire by way of contemplating\(^{223}\) impurity, to appease hatred by way of contemplating benevolence and to appease delusion by way of contemplating dependent co-origination.\(^{224}\) Pacification of these impurities is abandoning after having qualified them.\(^{225}\) One who abandons does not apprehend anything. (674) Since he is aware that all *dharma* are uniform, because of that, he abandons correctly. This is the second right effort.

Again, the expression ‘he generates the keen wish that virtuous *dharma* that have hitherto not arisen are produced. He strives and applies himself diligently, he controls his mind and endeavours zealously to that end’ has an infinite basis. Why? Because the virtuous *dharma* that should be accomplished by the *mahāsattva*, bodhisattva are incalculable. Here, ‘keen wish’ is the foundation of all roots of virtue. ‘Acquisition of diligence’ is the foundation of all roots of virtue. ‘Perseverance\(^{226}\) in controlling the mind’ is the foundation of all roots of virtue.\(^{227}\) This is the third right effort.

Again, ‘he generates the keen wish that all virtuous *dharma* that have already arisen persist, prevail and endure. He strives and applies himself diligently, he controls his mind and endeavours zealously to that end’ is an expression for the roots of virtue that have been transformed into enlightenment.

Why? Roots of virtue that have been transformed into enlightenment endure until he has

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\(^{223}\) The word ‘contemplating’ (tib.: *sgom pa*) is not found in the Tibetan text, but is to be supplied on contextual grounds.

\(^{224}\) Compare this proposition with the view expressed in the *Siddhi* (pp. 359, 351) that defilements of speculation (*parikalpitaklesa*) can be abandoned through seeing (*darśana*) because they are coarse and hence easily abandoned while innate defilements (*sahajaklesa*) because they are difficult to abandon are eliminated through contemplation (*bhāvanā*).

\(^{225}\) *tha sḥad du btags paḥi phyir* (lit.: ‘after having named them’)

The idea behind this thought appears to be that the bodhisattva cannot proceed to eradicate unwholesome *dharma* until he has positively identified them.

\(^{226}\) *ñam su len par byed pa*: *āsthitikriyā* (cf. Edgerton, p. 111, col. 2).

\(^{227}\) Most other works do not elaborate the differences between the two poles of the *samyakprahāṇa*. For instance, in the *Kp* (p. 139; § 95) the four perfect efforts are collectively the remedy (*cikitsā*) that prompts the abandonment of non-virtuous *dharma* and leads to the fulfilment (*pāripūri*) of all virtuous *dharma*. 377
settled on the seat of enlightenment. Why? Because a thought thus produced is not dependent on the triple world. (675) Roots of virtue that depend on the triple world perish. Why? Because a thought thus produced is dependent on the triple world. All roots of virtue that are transformed into all-knowing are independent of the triple world and do not perish. This is the fourth right effort.228

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in the fourfold path courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.10.4 Skill in Faculties

Furthermore, as regards skill in the path; the path of the bodhisattva is fivefold. What are the five? These are the faculty of faith, the faculty of vigour, the faculty of recollection, the faculty of meditation and the faculty of wisdom.229

What is the faculty of faith? It is faith through which he gains confidence in four dharma.230 What are the four?

(1) While in samsāra, he has faith in worldly right view231. He relies on the ripening

228. For the Ākṣṭṭikā, the attainment of the four efforts mirrors the bodhisattva’s progress in vigour. To begin with, during the first perfect effort, the bodhisattva exerts himself to produce the antidote to unwholesome dharma, viz., vigour (p. 260.5.7). Second, in order to abandon those bad dharma that have already arisen, he appeases them (p. 262.1.2–3). Third, now in possession of vigour, the bodhisattva promotes the becoming of wholesome dharma (p. 262.2.7–8). Fourth, being established in vigour, he consolidates those wholesome dharma that have already arisen (p. 262.3.6–7).

229. An Italian translation largely paralleling our ‘skill’ in faculties (as cited in the Arthav from the Ākn, but made on the basis of the Tibetan) was composed by A. Ferrari (op. cit., pp. 601–2). I have reproduced the Sanskrit of that passage in the notes to my edition of chapter eleven.

230. The section of ‘skill’ in faculties is one of the few passages of the Bdp that are extant in the Sanskrit. It is found in the Śīka citing from the Ākn (pp. 316.13–317.13). An abbreviated Sanskrit version of the parallel passage in the Ākn is also found in the Arthav (Ś), pp. 31.6–33.2 and in its commentary (Arthav-t (Ś), pp. 223–25).

According to the Ākṣṭṭikā (p. 263.5.4–5):

“A bodhisattva who possesses supreme faith progresses in the faculty of faith. Supramundane faith is superior to mundane faith, it is distinguished, greater and unsurpassed.”

231. laukika sanyagdrṣṭi: ‘worldly right view’

According to the commentary on the Arthav, faith in worldly right view refers to the bodhisattva’s belief in the existence of the other world (paraloka) and pertains to laukika consciousness (Arthav-t (Ś), pp. 223–25). Merely concerned with the bodhisattva’s receptivity to, and knowledge of, the structure of samsāra, it is to be distinguished from the sanyag drṣṭi of the āryastāṅgamārga (Koṣa, vi, p. 290). The Sarvāstivāda understood laukika sanyagdrṣṭi as ‘prijāś associated with (samprayukt) mental perception (manovijñāna)’ that allows for vision of dharma. Wholesome by nature, but impure (sāśra) it is not the right view of the arhat which is always pure (Koṣa, ii, p. 81). This would establish the indriya in the Bdp as pertaining to the laukika consciousness—a possibility that is acknowledged by the Sarvāstivāda (Bareau, 1955, p. 143).

The issue of the feasibility of ‘worldly right view’ is hotly debated and the Sarvāstivāda view remained by no means unchallenged. Criticism came, for instance, from the Theravāda tradition, arguing that there exists neither a laukika right view nor a laukika faculty of faith (op. cit., p. 66). For them, all mundane qualities—be it faith, vigour, mindfulness, meditation or wisdom—exist, by definition, outside the way to deliverance. As such, they are clearly distinct from the indriya, because they do not fulfill the purpose of the indriya, namely, the abandonment of delusion and extermination of desire that can only be achieved through pure wisdom and pure faith (op. cit., p. 67). The Ākṣṭṭikā (p. 264.1.2–5), defines ‘worldly right view’ as perception of the conduct of ignorant laymen, as knowledge of the ripening of deeds in retribution.
of deeds and refrains from sinful actions for the sake of life.

(2) He has faith in the bodhisattva training and, once embarked on this training, does not long for another vehicle.

(3) He has faith in the precise meaning of the absolute truth, in the profound law of dependent co-origination, in investigation concerning the sentient being and in the notion that all dharma bear the characteristics of emptiness and signlessness.

(676) He does not harbour inclinations towards any heretical belief.232

(4) He has faith in all buddha-qualities, in the powers and assurances. After he has heard of them, he becomes convinced and gathers these qualities trustingly. This is the faculty of faith.

What is the faculty of vigour? He produces dharma in that he has faith through the faculty of vigour; this is the faculty of vigour. He retains dharma that he gathered with vigour through the faculty of recollection; this is the faculty of recollection. He focuses his thought by means of the faculty of meditation on dharma that he retained through the faculty of recollection; this is the faculty of meditation. He examines by means of the faculty of wisdom dharma on which he focused his thought through the faculty of meditation; knowledge of these dharma is the faculty of wisdom.

It is in this way that his five faculties are connected with each other and cause him to accomplish all buddha-qualities. They cause him also to attain the stage of prediction. For instance, just like those who possess the five transcendental super-knowledge do not predict a foetus in the womb until he has attained male or female faculties, (677) in the same way also the lord buddhas do not predict bodhisattvas until they have attained these five faculties.233

and as knowledge of existence of the triratna. The issue of the laukika/lokottara distinction does not figure in the Akan-tikā’s explanation of the passage on the śraddhendriya beyond the statement that worldly observance of śraddha, etc., contains the preconditions for the indriya to become a transcendental practice (pp. 263.5.4–6, 264.3.4).

232 lita barbyas pc. drṣṭikṛta (cf. Edgerton, p. 269, col. 2).

233 This allusion to the prediction of buddhahood refers no doubt to the fourth and last prediction of the bodhisattva. Being public and made in the presence of the person concerned (sammukhapudgalavyākaraṇa), it is only conferred after the bodhisattva has developed the spiritual indriya (that, according to Kumārajīva, are of lokottara rank) and observes constantly the brahmacaryā ideal, when he has attained the conviction of the non-arising of dharma (anupattikadharmaksanti) and resides on the acalabhūmi (Śgs, pp. 212–13; Mśl, p. 166.9–17; Bbh, p. 290.6–7). The preceding three vyākaraṇa are explained as follows: The first prediction (anutpāditabodhicittotpādavyākaraṇa) is conferred on a person who abides in the lineage of the buddhas (gotrastha) but has not yet generated the thought of enlightenment. He is endowed with weak faculties (tikṣṇendriya) but of honest aspiration (udārādhimukti). Such a person is identified in the five destinies by the Buddha through his great sight (aprathītahabuddhacaksus) and prophesied to generate the bodhicitta in due course. The second prediction is conferred on a bodhisattva who has already generated the thought of enlightenment (upādātacittavyākaraṇa). It is conferred on those who have developed their roots of virtue, who have planted and cultivated the seed of enlightenment, who possess acute faculties, who accomplish superior conduct (kṛtyacaryā) and show compassion towards beings. At this stage, their attainments are already irreversible (avaiśvartika) and free from the eight unfavourable conditions of birth (aśṭākṣaraṇa). The third prediction (asamaksavyākaraṇa or rohavyākaraṇa) is secret in the sense that it is only known to the
This is his fivefold path. It is in this way that the bodhisattva who is skilled in the fivefold path courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.10.5 Skill in Powers

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, what is the bodhisattva’s skill in the fivefold path? The five limbs are the power of faith, the power of vigour, the power of recollection, the power of meditation and the power of wisdom.234

What is his power of faith? It is faith, confidence and devotion that is invincible. Even if Māra were to assume the appearance of the Buddha and approached [the bodhisattva], someone who has faith in the pristine cognition of the Doctrine would tell them apart, saying: “These teachings are not the Doctrine of the Buddha.” Even if he deters him and dissuades him from his resolution, by persisting in thorough investigation the mahābhūta are completely transformed. However, this does not happen to a bodhisattva who trusts the power of faith. Thus, Māra cannot separate him from the bodhisattva’s power of faith.

What is the bodhisattva’s power of vigour? Whatever vigour they acquire and however many virtuous dharma they practice, although they attain a degree of firm power in these, the worldlings including the gods are not able to repulse, describe or generate the degree of his power unless they are liberated in his place235. (678) This is the bodhisattva’s power of vigour.

What is the bodhisattva’s power of recollection? In whatever state or dharma his mind is established through the bases of mindfulness, no defilements whatsoever can perturb or distract him from them. Through the force of the power of recollection he overcomes all defilements. His recollection is truly invincible. This is the bodhisattva’s power of recollection.

What is the bodhisattva’s power of contemplation? He practises with composure in the midst of all bustle of worldly affairs. When he reflects on all sounds of worldly paths, the thicket of sound does not become an impediment to his first contemplation.236 Although he

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234. The difference between the practice of the indriya and bala is that (Akn-tikā, p. 264.4.3–6):

“When treated as faculties [the bodhisattvas] attain only mastery in realising and fulfilling the practices in which one should have faith, etc., but they are not such that they overcome their antitheses. When treated as powers, however, faith, etc., provided that they are cultivated and purified, gather force and become a bala in order to overcome its antitheses, viz., distrust, etc.”

This explanation runs very close to the reasoning that is given in the Abhidh-sam (R), p. 123, where we learn that the paticcabala are called power because they eliminate the danger posed by their antitheses and because of their distinction.

235. The last subclause represents only an approximate translation of the Tibetan phrase gnas der ma bsgral gyi bar du (R, folio 678.1). A more literal rendering would be: “unless they are removed from that place”.

236. The allegory likening sound to a thicket is also found in the Kathavatthu (pp. 202, 572–3; ref. Braavrig).
discriminates when pursuing virtuous investigation, it does not become an impediment to his second contemplation. Although delight and happiness arise in him and persist, it does not become an impediment to his third contemplation. Although he is not indifferent for the sake of developing sentient beings and to uphold the holy Doctrine, it does not become an impediment to his fourth contemplation. (679) When he dwells in these four contemplations, he is invincible by virtue of his contemplation and liberation. He does not renounce the state of contemplation and is not reborn by reason of the power of contemplation. This is the bodhisattva’s power of contemplation.

What is the bodhisattva’s power of wisdom. It is pristine cognition that is unconquerable by mundane and supramundane dharma. As soon as the bodhisattva is born in this world, he accomplishes without a teacher all excellent practices, formidable actions and arduous attainments in every manual skill. Indeed, it is by means of these supramundane dharma that he delivers the worlds. Gods or men cannot defeat these dharma since they originate in the bodhisattva’s power of wisdom and pristine cognition. This is the bodhisattva’s power of wisdom. This is the other fivefold path.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in these five limbs courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.10.6 Skill in Solitary Wandering

Furthermore, in brief, the path of bodhisattvas is solitary. That is to say, it is a path that is traversed alone. The bodhisattva is unaccompanied and on his own. (680) Being without companion, he puts on his armour with the resolution that upholds the force of his diligent power for the sake of unsurpassed and perfect enlightenment. He is self-sufficient and does not dependent on others. He practises all by himself. He excels by virtue of his own power. Having put on a hardened armour, he reflects:

“I shall achieve that which no other sentient being has achieved. I shall achieve that which no other noble one or newly-set-out bodhisattva has achieved. Generosity is not my companion, but I am a companion of giving. Moral conduct, patience, vigour, meditation and wisdom are not my companions, but I am their companion. I am not to be raised by the perfections, but the perfections are to be raised by me. Corresponding to the former, I shall meticulously


According to the *Akn-tikā* (pp. 271.4.4–272.2.1), the bodhisattva who pursues solitary wandering approaches enlightenment. He practices his training effortlessly and is distinguished by four traits:

“A bodhisattva who practices without effort is of four kinds. First, he is unable to dispense (aviksipa). Second, he has attained patience (ksāntiprāpta). Third, he persists in equality (samatāvihārin) and, fourth, he is free from hindrances (nirāvarana).”

238. *Akn-tikā*, p. 272.1.1:

“A bodhisattva who is unable to dispense, strives to attain mundane and supramundane qualities only for himself.”

239. *Akn-tikā*, p. 272.1.3:

“A bodhisattva who has attained patience, purifies the perfections by himself.”

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understand all roots of virtue, that is, I shall not be raised by any roots of virtue, but all roots of virtue shall be raised by me.\(^{240}\) Once I took a seat on the vajra-throne without recourse to such dharma\(^{241}\) and defeated Māra with his host single-handedly, I shall acquire supreme and perfect enlightenment by means of wisdom that is furnished with just one moment of thought.\(^{242}\)

Earnest and determined practice\(^{243}\) to that end, this is the bodhisattva’s solitary wandering along the path. It is in this manner that one who is skilled in the bodhisattva’s solitary wandering along the path courses in the Perfection of Wisdom. This is the bodhisattva’s skill in the path.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in the path courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

### 2.11 Skill in Dependent Co-origination

Next, what is the bodhisattva’s skill in dependent co-origination? After the bodhisattva has thus retreated into solitude and become absorbed in meditation, he ponders:

“What is the origin of this whole mass of suffering?” Then, he reflects: “Because superficial reflection\(^{244}\) has arisen, ignorance arises. Because ignorance has arisen, karmic formations arise. Because karmic formations have arisen, consciousness arises. Because consciousness has arisen, name-and-form arise. Because name-and-form have arisen, the six internal sensefields arise. Because the six internal sensefields have arisen, contact arises. Because contact has arisen, feeling arises. Because feeling has arisen, thirst arises. Because thirst has arisen, grasping arises. Because grasping has arisen, becoming arises. (682) Because becoming has arisen, birth arises. Because birth has arisen, old-age-and-death arises. Because old-age-and-death has arisen, suffering, lamentations, misery, grief and despair arise.”

And again, he reflects: “I know that just as all these dharma that emerge from causes of virtue, non-virtue, stillness and nirvāṇa are still, inactive and non-self and arise from conditions—sentient beings establishing by cause of action faculties that are cause of correct

\(^{240}\) Akṣṇātikā, p. 272.1.4–5: “A bodhisattva who persists in sameness attains the four means of conversion, dharma that ripen sentient beings.”

In the Śgs (pp. 129–31), the Buddha addresses a brief discourse on the identity and non-reality of the Tathāgata to a Brahmā god called Samatāvibhāra. Arguing from the empty and illusory nature of dharma, he shows that all dharma are in fact same—an attribute that he then applies to the Tathāgata. Having comprehended the gist of this teaching, Samatāvibhāra, advancing to the eighth stage, gains at the end the ‘conviction of the non-arising of dharma’.

\(^{241}\) According to the Akṣṇātikā (p. 272.1.7–8), dharma should here be taken to include mundane and supramundane qualities (guna), the six perfections and four means of conversion.

\(^{242}\) Akṣṇātikā, p. 272.1.6: “A bodhisattva who is without hindrances overcomes the hindrances so that he attains supreme enlightenment by himself.”

\(^{243}\) nes par rtog pahi bsam pahi sbyor pa: avakalpanāśayaprayoga.

\(^{244}\) tshul bzin ma yin pa: ayonika (cf. Edgerton, p. 64, col. 2)

knowledge and by cause of fruition of correct knowledge superior practice\textsuperscript{245}—in the same way arise the assembled causes for the acquired and non-acquired \textit{dharma}.” This is the bodhisattva’s skill in dependent co-origination.

Then, he reflects: “But, what is cessation? Because superficial reflection has ceased, ignorance ceases. Only when by reason of the cessation of ignorance karmic formations have come to a final halt, only then ceases this whole mass of suffering.”

It in this way that knowledge with regard to this [causal flow] becomes skill in dependent co-origination.

Then, he reflects: “But, all \textit{dharma} are subject to causes, conditions and their combination. What is subject to causes, conditions and their combination is not the basis of a self, a life-force or a person. (683) It is without reckoning whatsoever.”

Such reflection is skill in dependent co-origination. It is in this manner that, as conditions for his enlightened disposition, the bodhisattva raises all buddha-qualities and discerns that these conditions are truly exhausted and ceasing; but, for the sake of looking after sentient beings he attains also non-cessation and non-exhaustion. This is the bodhisattva’s skill in dependent co-origination.

\subsection{2.12 Skill in all Dharma}

What then is the bodhisattva’s skill in all \textit{dharma}? As regards the sum total of \textit{dharma}; it comprises conditioned and unconditioned \textit{dharma}. Thus, the bodhisattva should be skilled in the conditioned and unconditioned.

What is skill in the conditioned? His predispositions of body, speech and mind are pure. He transforms the virtuous [predispositions]\textsuperscript{246} of body, speech and mind into all-knowing by reason of discerning them as unconditioned enlightenment; this is skill in the unconditioned.

\textsuperscript{245} The meaning of this sentence is rather obscure. If one were to go by sense only, it would appear that the Tibetan have misinterpreted this passage, translating a \textit{bahuvrhi} compound as a \textit{tatpurusa} compound (private communication with David Ruegg).

\textsuperscript{246} Akñ-tīkā, p. 218.2.5–3.1.
Furthermore, as regards skill in the conditioned; (684) it is gathering the five perfections that lead to the perfection of wisdom, viz., the perfection of giving, morality, patience, vigour and meditation. Again, due to knowledge of the unconditioned, he does not depreciate the perfection of wisdom with the five perfections; but, aspiring to skill in the entire accumulation of perfections and to unstained enlightenment, he transforms them into all-knowing; this is skill in the unconditioned.

Furthermore, as regards skill in the conditioned; it is attracting sentient beings by means of all-penetrating light-rays that are directed at all of them and through the four means of conversion. Because he is free from conceit, not believing in a self, he is skilled in the means of conversion; and since he aspires to unconditioned enlightenment, he transforms them into all-knowing; this is skill in the unconditioned.

Furthermore, as regards skill in the conditioned; he does not cut off the fetters of the stream of existence, but rids himself of the impurities of the stream of existence; he continues practices that are connected to enlightenment without taking up the practice of laymen who observe only one of the pañcaśīla247; this is the skill in the conditioned.

Knowing that he should be acquainted with the teachings of emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness, he is manifestly skilled in them; (685) and although he settles in enlightenment without depending on others, he does not realise the unconditioned; this is skill in the unconditioned.

Furthermore, to be unaffected by the impurities of worldly conduct in spite of acting in the triple world, this is skill in the conditioned. Not to fall into the sphere of deliverance, in spite of knowing pristine cognition that liberates from the triple world; this is skill in unconditioned.

As regards skill in all dharmas; it is an expression for ‘all-knowing’. Since the attainment of realisation that arises from pristine cognition of all-knowing does not lead to liberation if it lacks wisdom or skill, on account of that, he is skilled in all dharmas. It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in all dharmas courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.248

O Śāriputra, it is in this way that a bodhisattva, mahāsattva who persists in the Bodhisattvapitaka and courses in the Perfection of Wisdom and—being skilled in discerning wisdom—is truly proficient in these ten kinds of skill courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

247. sbyor ba phyogs gcig pa: ekadesaprayoga
   Cf. Mvy 1609 which gives sna gcig spyod pa for ekadeśakārin (Kośa, iv, p. 73; Mpps, ii, p. 821).
3.1 Wisdom

What is wisdom? What is the meaning of perfection? Wisdom is comprehensive knowledge of virtuous and non-virtuous dharma. Wisdom is realisation of dharma that are conducive to the four states of penetration. Wisdom is correct knowledge because it leads to the realisation of the noble Doctrine. Accurate discernment of dharma leads to correct knowledge. Wisdom is discernment of all heretical views, manifestations of vices, impediments and obstructions. Wisdom is separation from prayers concerned with wishes, yearning or desires. Wisdom is the source of happiness by virtue of complete purification. Wisdom is the source of delight because it does not cut the connection to joy in the Doctrine. Wisdom is support because it realises complete pristine cognition. Wisdom is the basis of all bodhipāksika dharma. Wisdom bears the characteristic of attainment, because it realises spiritual fruition in accordance with the vehicles. Wisdom bears the characteristic of perfectly knowing naturally illuminating pristine cognition. Wisdom is deliverance because it ferries across all rivers. Wisdom is guidance to true reality. Wisdom is the receptacle of all virtuous dharma.

249. nes par ḡbyed paḥi cha daṅ ḡthun paḥ: nirvedhabhāgiya
The four states of penetration are 'heat' (uśmagata), 'summit' (mūrddhan), 'patience' (ksānti) and 'highest mundane dharma' (laukkāgradhārma). In the Sarvastivāda scheme of the śrāvaka-training, the nirvedhabhāgiya constitute the four major practices of the prayogamārga. Being states conducive to enlightenment, they mark the practitioner's meditative progress particularly in respect to the understanding of the four noble truths. During the 'heat phase', representing a state of complete perfect mental quietude (samatha) and insight (vīpāśyāna), the light of knowledge (jñānāloka) concerning the truths in their sixteen aspects is revealed for the first time. In due course, the other three states add to this understanding, leading to full intuition (abhisamayā) of the truths at the first moment of the darsanamārga. For the bodhisattva, the experience of the nirvedhabhāgiya is similar in order but different in contents. Having entered the 'uśmagata phase', he sees with the clear light of intuition the unreality of external phenomena. Springing from the meditation on emptiness practised before the sambhāramārga, his attainment is still weak but is called 'heat' because it is "like the heat that precedes the fire of direct knowledge of the truth on the darsanamārga" (Āloka, Mineae, pp. 41a.16–41b.1; ref. Obermiller). The 'mūrddhan phase' consolidates the attainments of the 'uśmagata phase', effectively preventing that the bodhisattva's accumulation of roots of virtue is brought to a standstill by klesa. At the 'ksānti phase', the bodhisattva is fully awakened to the unreality of worldly phenomena. Now he begins to focus his mind on the unreality of the subject of experience, leading to a "meditative state that is characterised by the origination, for the first time, of the clear light of knowledge, revealing the unreality of subjective elements" (Āloka, op. cit., p. 48a.5, ref. Obermiller). It bears the name ksānti because it establishes the bodhisattva in the 'conviction of the non-arising of dharma', leading to liberation from rebirth in the evil destinies. Subsequent to the 'ksānti phase', having shed all distinctions of the subject/object dichotomy, the bodhisattva passes into the unperturbable meditation (anantaryasamādhi) from where he attains direct knowledge of reality. Entitled 'phase of highest mundane virtues' (laukkāgradhārma), he is still an ordinary being and well below the rank of the arhat. Hence, the bodhisattva does not intuit as yet the Dharmaḥātū and his knowledge of it is largely based on faith. Most path-schemes do not allocate the four nirvedhabhāgiya to any of the stages proper, but associate it to the preliminary efforts of the adhimukticaryābhūmi (Msl, p. 27.7–11, p. 93.6–23; Kośa, vi, pp. 169–177; Amṛt (B), pp. 156–159).

For references to the nirvedhabhāgiya in Pāli sources, see: D III, pp. 251, 277; S V, p. 345; A III, p. 427; Nett, pp. 21, 48, 143 ff, 153 ff and Vism, pp. 15, 88. Note, however, that while the term nibbedhabhāgiya itself is canonical, the list of the four items is not. Most of these Pāli references are taken up by Rahula in his discussion of the nirvedhabhāgiya in śrāvaka sources (Rahula, 1980, pp. 105–6, n. 4).

250. sim par byed paḥ: prahādāndkārin (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 701, col. 3).
251. Pelliot, 977, folio 6a.4–6b.2:
Wisdom is the source of purification of all propensities of impurity. Wisdom is the supreme attainment, the crown of all dharma. (687) Wisdom is excellence in the much needed realisation arising spontaneously from pristine cognition. Wisdom is separation from causation since it is not stained by the triple world. Wisdom is obtained by all noble ones. Wisdom is elimination of prayers since it abandons all reflection on the marks. Wisdom is detrimental to indolence since it is wholly separated from the darkness of delusion.252

Wisdom is the practice of all those who are established on the stage of meditation. Wisdom is guidance to those who persist in the path to pristine cognition of all-knowing. Wisdom is a source of light since it suppresses the dark cloud of mist formed by the air of ignorance. Wisdom gives perfect sight to those who delight in its sight accordingly. Wisdom is free from impurity because it transcends the sphere of the eye and the sphere of form. Wisdom is absolute truth since it issues from truth. Wisdom is imperturbable because it is fully tamed. Wisdom is the light at the gates to pristine cognition. Wisdom, unfolding in all directions, is inexhaustible.

Wisdom is not contradicted because it is seen as the entrance to dependent co-origination. Wisdom is the path of liberation, since it prompts severing of all fetters of grasping. Wisdom is unstained since it is emancipated from all sinful dharma.253 (688)

O Śāriputra, thus the scope and application of the bodhisattva’s wisdom and pristine cognition

252. Pelliot, 977, folio 6b.2-5:
"[Wisdom] is the source of purification, because it is separated from reflection of the defilements of the propensities of disease. It is unsurpassed because it proceeds to the crown of all dharma. It is contentment because it realises teachings through spontaneously arisen pristine cognition. It is separation from causes since it is not stained by the triple world. It is attainment because it is attained by all noble ones. It is elimination of prayers because it removes all reflection on the marks. It is non-self because it is wholly separated from the darkness of delusion."

253. Pelliot, 977, folio 6b.5-7a.3:
"[Wisdom] is practice because it accomplishes the deeds of all those who are established on the stage of meditation. It is travelling because it abides in all noble paths of pristine cognition. ... It is the source of vision because it guides everyone in accordance with that vision. It is freedom from impurity because it transcends the path of intrigues through the eye of wisdom. It is absolute truth because it understands the great noble truth. ... It is splendour because it becomes the gate of pristine cognition. It is inexhaustible knowledge because it illuminates all that which is moving. It is non-cessation because it sees constantly and extensively. ... It is separation from abodes because it is emancipated from all impure, defiled dharma."
are truly as manifold as the mental activity of all sentient beings. The exploring of the bodhisattva's wisdom and pristine cognition is truly as manifold as the aspiration of all sentient beings. The doors that lead to the bodhisattva’s wisdom are truly as manifold as the doors to the impurities of all sentient beings. The basis of his persistence in wisdom is truly as manifold as the knowledge of śrāvaka, pratyekabuddhas and fully accomplished buddhas. A bodhisattva should study this by all means. This is the wisdom of the bodhisattva.

3.2 Perfection

Next, what is the meaning of ‘perfection’? What is wisdom is also the meaning of ‘perfection’. Comprehensive knowledge of virtuous [and non-virtuous] dharma is the meaning of ‘perfection’. Corresponding to the former, one should examine also the wording of all perfections accordingly.

Furthermore, the meaning of excellently accomplishing the bodhisattva-training is the meaning of ‘perfection’. Furthermore, the meaning of accomplishing pristine cognition of all-knowing is the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of withdrawing from conditioned and unconditioned dharma is the meaning of ‘perfection’. (689) The meaning of realising the faults of samsāra is the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of showing the inexhaustible Dharma-depository of knowledge is the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of accomplishing unstained liberation is the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of realising the uniformity of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation and wisdom is the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of ascertaining is the meaning of ‘perfection’.

254. Cf. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.4 which has sems can thams cad kyi mos pa instead of sems can thams cad kyi bsam pa, thus clarifying the meaning of bsam pa.
255. Cf. Pelliot, 977, folio 7b.6, which has ses rab gyi spyod pa instead of ses rab la gnas pa.
256. Cf. Akn-ṭikā, pp. 218.5.7–222.5.7.
257. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.3–7:
   “O Śāriputra, in this way I have instructed you briefly the characteristics of wisdom. As regards the wisdom of bodhisattva, mahāsattvas, it should furthermore be known to be infinite and without limit. Why? The scope and application of the wisdom and pristine cognition of bodhisattvas, mahāsattvas are truly as manifold as the mental activity of all sentient beings. The activity of the wisdom and pristine cognition of bodhisattvas, mahāsattvas should be known to be truly as manifold as the aspiration of all sentient beings. The magnificent gates to the wisdom of the bodhisattvas, mahāsattvas should be known to be truly as manifold as the gates to the impurities of all sentient beings. The basis of the activity of wisdom should be known to be true as manifold as the knowledge of śrāvaka, pratyekabuddhas and fully accomplished buddhas. O Śāriputra, concerning all bases of wisdom; the bodhisattva, mahāsattva should study these attainments with vigour. This is the seizure of wisdom of bodhisattvas, mahāsattvas.”
258. This paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.
259. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.7–7b.6:
   “Furthermore, O Śāriputra, that is the meaning of the perfection of bodhisattvas, mahāsattvas? O Śāriputra, all knowledge that the joy of all virtuous dharma turns into the perfection, this should be known as the meaning of ‘perfection’. Again, O Śāriputra, corresponding to the former, the accumulation of wisdom should be known as the meaning of ‘perfection’s. Furthermore, all meanings of the excellent accomplishment of the conduct of bodhisattvas should be known as the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of non-attachment to any of the dharma of the past, present and future should be known as the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of constantly realising the incalculable great non-reality of samsāra should be
The meaning of penetrating the sphere of all sentient beings is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of attaining the conviction of the non-arising of dharma is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of accomplishing the stage of irreversibility is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of acquiring the buddha-field is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of developing sentient beings is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of [going to] the seat of enlightenment is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of defeating all evil ones is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of accomplishing all buddha-qualities is the meaning of 'perfection'. Furthermore, the meaning of being firmly planted in the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka is the meaning of 'perfection'.

Section IV

O Śāriputra, if one studies the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka one accomplishes all perfections. O Śāriputra, hence, a son or daughter of good family who persists in the Mahāyāna should retain the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka. He should take hold of it and read it. He should explain it also to others and propound it at great length.

Why? O Śāriputra, when he has listened to the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka, when he has taken hold of it, retained it, read it, fully absorbed it and when he has explained it also to others and propounded it at great length he obtains ten excellent blessings. What are the ten?

1. When he is reborn in another existence, he is skilled in all arts
2. And crafts.
3. He is of high lineage and well-respected.
4. He is renown for his great powers.
5. His words are valued.
6. He possesses great wealth.

known as the meaning of ‘perfection’. Knowledge of the meaning of non-absorbing or non-realising any dharma whatsoever should be known as the meaning of ‘perfection’. Understanding the meaning of the absolutely inexhaustible Dharma-depository should be known as the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of accomplishing the unstained liberation should be known as the meaning of ‘perfection’. ... The meaning of ‘skill’ in supreme discernment should be known as the meaning of ‘perfection’.”

Pelliot, 977, folio 7b.6–8a.3: “The meaning of going to all spheres of sentient beings is the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of attaining the conviction of the non-arising of dharma is the meaning of ‘perfection’. Accomplishing the end of irreversibility is the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of purifying the buddha-field is the meaning of ‘perfection’. ... The meaning of taking a seat on the throne of enlightenment after having come to the seat of enlightenment is the meaning of ‘perfection’. The meaning of defeating the host of Māra is the meaning of ‘perfection’. ... Furthermore, the meaning of firmly abiding in the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka is the meaning of ‘perfection’.”
(7) He is exalted among gods and men.
(8) He becomes an universal monarch.
(9) He becomes Brahmā.
(10) He is never separated from the thought of enlightenment.

He obtains these ten excellent blessings. Furthermore, he obtains ten other excellent blessings. What are the ten?

(1) He is not drawn into the disputes of the ascetics. (691)
(2) He does not hold the belief of the existence of a self.
(3) He does not hold the belief of the existence of a sentient being.
(4) He does not hold the belief of the existence of a life-force.
(5) He does not hold the belief of the existence of a person.
(6) He does not hold the belief of nihilism.
(7) He does not hold the belief of permanence.
(8) He does not hold the view that all things exist.
(9) When he goes forth to mendicant life, he accomplishes joyfully the production of the thought of enlightenment.
(10) He understands swiftly the words that he has heard.

He obtains these ten excellent blessings. Furthermore, he obtains ten other excellent blessings. What are the ten?

(1) He acquires recollection.
(2) He acquires intellect.
(3) He acquires spiritual realisation.
(4) He acquires aspiration.
(5) He acquires wisdom.
(6) He obtains the favourable condition of birth\(^{261}\).
(7) He recollects his former lives.
(8) His desire is small by nature and restrained; hence, he is not afflicted by the torment of desire.
(9) His hatred is small by nature and restrained; hence, he is not afflicted by the
torment of desire.

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\(^{261}\) These are the opposites of the conditions of birth that are unfavourable to the religious life (*asamayā brahmacaryāvāsāya*), viz., birth in the destiny of the hellbound (*narakā*), animals (*tiryāka*), hungry ghosts (*preta*), gods of long life (*dṛghāyuśo devā*); possession of defect faculties (*indriyaviśayā*), false views (*mithyādārśana*) and life in periods when Tathāgata do not appear (*tathāgatānām anupāda*). References in the nikāya are found in D III, pp. 263–64, 287; A IV, pp. 225, 227; for Sanskrit sources, see: *Mvu*, ii, p. 363.3; *Lal*, p. 412.14; *Śiks*, p. 2.4; *Gv*, p. 116.16; *Dhsg*, § 34 (ref. Lamotte).
torment of hatred.

(10) His delusion is small by nature and restrained; hence, he is not afflicted by the torment of delusion.

He obtains these ten excellent blessings. Furthermore, he obtains ten other excellent blessings. (692) What are the ten?

1. He attains marvellous wisdom.
2. He attains astute wisdom.
3. He attains acute wisdom.
4. He attains sharp wisdom.
5. He attains awesome wisdom.
6. He attains profound wisdom.
7. He attains discerning wisdom.
8. He attains unproduced wisdom.
9. After he has met the Tathāgata, he praises him with melodies of verse.
10. On posing well-contemplated questions to the Tathāgata, he receives answers.

He obtains these ten excellent blessings. Furthermore, he obtains ten other excellent blessings. What are the ten?

1. He gives pleasure to all virtuous friends.
2. He loosens all fetters of evil.
3. He defeats all evil ones.
4. He rebukes all impure ones.
5. He is aggravated about actions that appertain to any karmic formation.
6. He shuns all paths that lead to the evil destinies.
7. He sees the path that leads to nirvāṇa.
8. He bestows offerings that deliver from the whole round of rebirth.
9. He complies with the methods of all bodhisattvas. (693)
10. He complies with the pronouncements of all lord buddhas.

He obtains these ten excellent blessings.

O Śāriputra, when he has listened to the Dharma-enunciation of the Bodhisattvapitaka, when he has taken hold of it, retained it, read it, fully absorbed it and when he has explained it also to others and propounded it at great length he obtains all of these excellent qualities.
Then, in order to elucidate in great detail this very meaning, the lord composed these verses:

Those who retain this king of sūtras,
These wise ones attain infinite wisdom.
They become not only skilled in practices and their meanings,
But excel also in parts of speech and accomplish the letter.

Every monk who retains this king of sūtras,
Once joy and delight have arisen in him,
Explains the Doctrine in this way
And bestows unceasingly the gift of the Doctrine.

After sentient beings have heard much about the Doctrine,
They say: “Alas, when will he who explains the Great Attainment
Instruct us in such a Doctrine?
When will we take hold of such a sūtra?”

Chiefs who are endowed with such wisdom
Do not become dismayed about dharma.
By means of their recollection and wisdom
They teach sayings of noble and unsurpassed pristine cognition. (694)

Those who retain this king of sūtras,
Noble, eminent and praised, confer it unceasingly
And prompt others to seek the well-taught sayings of the Doctrine.
Since they have learned it, they are exalted in perpetuity.

After they have learned it, they cause others to grasp its meaning.
He who is endowed with wisdom does not pursue the letter.
By investigating the meaning his understanding increases.
His pristine cognition is infinite in perpetuity.

Also the meaning of infinite pristine cognition is untold.
He who is of infinite reflection is skilled in absolute truth.
Apply yourself to his attainments,
For his are the attainments of learning.
His desire and hatred are small.
His delusion is very small.
Also his mind attains purity.
For his are the attainments of learning.

After he has obtained wealth he does not become self-conceited,
But reflects on its purpose, thinking: "Is there substantiality in this wealth?"
After he has realised that wealth is insubstantial,
He disregards it and goes forth to mendicant life.

He withdraws from worldly life and abides in solitude.
Being always free from indolence,
He is not satisfied by listening to teachings.
When he confers the Doctrine he is free from avarice.

Since he went and posed questions
To the protector of the world,
Because of that, his pristine cognition increases.
Now, there is no abating in his virtue.

O Śāriputra, this is the Perfection of Wisdom of bodhisattvas. A bodhisattva who applies himself diligently to it pursues the bodhisattva conduct; this is diligent application to the Perfection of Wisdom.
## Appendix I: Forms of Learning in the Bdp and the Akn

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1 Numbers in brackets indicate Sanskrit equivalent to Bdp terms.

* Items not cited in Bdp

1 Sīkṣ: apramāṇa 2 closer to Bodhisattvapitaka 3 omitted in Sīkṣ 4 gaurava is here repeated in Sīkṣ 5 omitted in Sīkṣ 6 omitted in Sīkṣ

Akn: TTP pp. 50.4.7–51.1.5; Bdp: TTP pp. 73.2.3–4.1; Sīkṣ: pp. 190.4–191.3
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<td>105</td>
<td>byaṅ chub lam na lag me tog sbyin pa</td>
<td>*bodhyāṅgapūṣpadāna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>nam par grol baḥi ḍbras bu sbyin pa</td>
<td>*vimuktiphaladāna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>mi hiḥ daḥyaṅs</td>
<td>*amṛtasvara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>dmigs med rluṅ bzin ḍgro</td>
<td>*yathāvāyvanālambanagamaṇa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>rin chen mṭhaḥ</td>
<td>ratnakoti (Mvy 564)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>rgya mtsoh ṃughs hdzin</td>
<td>*arnavavegadhārin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>ri daṅ brag rmams rdob par byed pa</td>
<td>*girīśailāṣphalana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>rdzu hphrul don chen yaḥ dag bkyed pa</td>
<td>*mahardhyartha-samutpāda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>sans rgyas dpag med pa mṭhoṅ ba</td>
<td>*aprameyabuddhadāraṇa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>thos pa thams cad hdzin</td>
<td>*sarvaśrutadhāra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>mi g.yen</td>
<td>*avikṣipta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>g.yel ba med pa</td>
<td>*atandrita</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>skad cig gcig la ye sès sbyin pa</td>
<td>*ekakṣanajñanadātra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>yon tan mṭhaḥ yas rgya mṭso mam par dag</td>
<td>*ananta-guṇaviśuddhārṇava</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Reconstructed by Braavrig (1989; pp. 146–48)
2 Numbers in brackets indicate location of Bdp samādhi in the Akn samādhi list.

* Conjectural reconstructions

Akn: TTP pp. 50.2.2–4.2; Bdp: TTP: pp. 72.4.5–73.1.3
The Mahāratnakūṭa Collection
A Bibliographical Guide

Sanskrit Title: ārya-Mahāratnakūṭa-dharma-paryāya
Chinese Title: Ta pao chi ching, forming the Pao chi pu (Ratnakūṭa Section) of the ‘ching’ (sūtra division of the Chinese Ta ts’ang ching).
Tibetan Title: hphags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa chen poḥi chos kyi rnam graṅs ston phrag brgya pa

1. Trisamvaranirdeśaparivarta

Chinese Title: 1. San Lü’i hui [T. 310.1]
2. Ta fang kuang san chieh ching [T. 311]
Tibetan Title: sdom pa gsum bstan paḥi leḥu žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.1; TTD 45]

2. Anantamukhapariśodhanirdeśa

Chinese Title: Wu pien chuang yen hui [T 310.2]
Tibetan Title: hphags pa sgo mthah yas pa rman par spyon ba bstan paḥi leḥu žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.2; TTD 46]

3. Tathāgataćintyaguhyanirdeśa

Chinese Title: 1. Mi chi chin kang li shih hui ching [T 310.3]

1. The bibliographical data listed here have been taken from the following catalogues: Demiéville, P. et al. (1978); Lancaster, L. (1979); Nanjio, B. (1883); Skorupski, T (1985).
2. As reconstructed from the Tibetan versions.
3. Hereafter, the pre/suffixes (ārya-... -nāma-mahāyāṇa-sūtra) will be omitted.
6. Tsl. by Bodhiruci (572–727AD) (3 chūan), [T 2154–570b: 15]. Bodhiruci, born a Brahmin, was of South Indian origin. He became a Buddhist in 631 AD and arrived in China in 693 AD where he died in 727 AD. His original name was Dharmaruci II. He also translated the Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra and a number of works on tantric ritual [Bagchi, ii, pp. 540 ff].
7. Tsl. by Dharmakṣema between 414 and 426 AD [T 2154–520c: 17].
8. Tsl. by Bodhiruci (chūan 4–7).
Appendix iii

Tibetan Title:  hphags pa de bzin gshegs pa'i gsal ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa bstan zes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo

English (part, trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 8, 125, 157, 225, 251, 283, 314 (quot.).
Obermiller (1931), i, pp. 15, 29, 84, 91, 94; ii, p. 101 (quot.).

German (part, trsl.): Winternitz (1930), pp. 37, 45.

2. Ju lai pu ssu i pi ta ch'eng ching [T 312]

4. Svapnanirdeśa

Chinese Title: Ching chū t'ien tzu hui [T 310.4]

Tibetan Title: hphags pa rmi lam bstan pa žes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo [TTP 760.4; TTD. no. 48]

5. Amitābhavyūha

Chinese Title: no corresponding translation.

Tibetan Title: hphags pa ṭod dpag med kyi bkod pa žes bya ba theg pa cben po'i mdo [TTP 760.4; TTD 49]

Edition: Müller; Takakusu (1932).

6. Aksobhyaṭathāgatasyavyūha

Chinese Title: 1. Pu tung ju lai hui [T 310.6]

Tibetan Title: hphags pa de bzin gshegs pa'i ḍkhrugs pa'i bkod pa žes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo [TTP 760.6; TTD 50]

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1. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa II between 1018 and 1058 AD (chūan 8–14), [T 2154–493b:16].
2. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I between 265 and 313 AD (chūan 15–16) [T 2154–496c:20].
3. No Sanskrit original appears to be extant. If the original version of the Amitābhavyūha corresponds to the Large Sukhāvatīvyūha [extant in Sanskrit and various Chinese translations], then the translation of Bodhiruci [T.: No.310.5] is the most relevant here. No corresponding Mongolian and Tibetan versions of the Large Sukhāvatīvyūha appear to have been preserved. Large Sukhāvatīvyūha: a) Wu liang shou ju lai hui [T.: 310.5] b) Wu liang ch'ing ching p'ing teng chiao ching [T 61].
4. Trsl. by Lokakṣema between 147 AD and 186 AD in Loyang [T 2153–389a; 18].
5. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chūan 19–20).

K'ai -yüan gives 147 AD for the date of translation [T 2154–478c: 5].
7. Varmavyūhanirdeśa

Chinese Title: Pei chia chuang yen hui [T 310.7]
Tibetan Title: ḍphags pa go chahi bkod pa bstan pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.7; TTD 51]

8. Dharmaḥātuprakaṭyasambhedanirdeśa

Chinese Title: Fa chiai t’i hsing wu fen pieh hui [T 310.8]
Tibetan Title: ḍphags pa chos kyi dbyins kyi rahn bzin dbyer med pa bstan pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.8; TTD 52]

9. Daśadharmaka

Chinese Title: 1. Ta ch’eng shih fa hui [T 310.9]
2. Ta ch’eng shih fa ching [T 314]
Tibetan Title: ḍphags pa chos bcu pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.9; TTD 53]

English (part. trsl.) Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 5, 8, 114 (quot.).

10. Samantamukhaparivarta

Chinese Title: 1. Wen shu shih li p’u men hui [T 310.10]
2. P’u men p’in ching [T 315]
Tibetan Title: ḍphags pa kun nas sgoḥi lehu žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.10; TTD 54]


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1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 21–25).
2. Trsl. by Mandrasena in 503 AD (chüan 26–27). He arrived in Nan-ching/Nanking in the same year from Fu-nan (Lower Cambodia) [T 2154–537b: 12].
3. Trsl. by Buddhāšānta in 539 AD (chüan 28). Native of North India; in China from 508 to 539 AD (Loyang) [T 2154–542a: 26].
4. Trsl. by Sanghabhadra between 506 and 520 AD [T 2151–364b: 24].
5. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 29).
11. Raśmisamantamuktanirdēsa

Chinese Title: Ch’u hsien kuang ming hui [T 310.11]
Tibetan Title: hphags pa ḥod žer kun du bk ye ba bstan pa žer bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.11; TTD 55]

12. Bodhisattvāpiṭaka

Chinese Title: 1. T āp’u sa ts’ang hui [T 310.12]
2. Ta ch’eng p’u sa ts’ang cheng fa ching [T 316]
Tibetan Title: hphags pa byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod ces bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.12; TTD 56]
English (part. trsl.): Pedersen (1976).

13. (Ā)nandagarbhadvārāntinirdēsa

Chinese Title: 1. Fo wei a nan shuo ch’u t’ai hui [T 310.13]
2. Pao t’ai ching [T 317]
Tibetan Title: hphags pa dgaḥ bo mḥal na gnas pa bstan pa theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.14; TTD 57]

14. Ayuṣmannandagarbhadvārāntinirdēsa

Chinese Title: Fo shuo ju t’ai ts’ang hui [T 310.14]
Tibetan Title: hphags pa tshe daṅ ldan pa dgaḥ bo mḥal du hjug pa bstan pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.13; TTD 58]
German (trsl.): Huebotter (1932)

1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 30–34).
2. Trsl. by Hsüan-tsang in 645 AD (556/600/602–664 AD), who travelled to Central Asia and India from 629 to 644/645 AD [T 2154–555c: 5].
3. Alternative title: P’u sa tsang cheng fa ching; trsl. by Dharmarakṣa II between 1018 and 1058 AD [Ono. vol. 12, p. 184a].
4. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 55).
6. Alternative title: Fo wei nan t’u shuo chu chia ju t’ai ching; trsl. by I-ching (I-tsing) in 710 AD, who travelled abroad from 671 to 695/98 AD. He died in 713 AD (chüan 55).
15. Mañjuśrībuddhaksetra

Chinese Title: 1. Wen shu shih li shou chi hui [T 310.15]¹
2. Wen shu shih li fo t’u yen ching [T 318]²
3. Ta sheng wen shu shih li p’u sa fo ch’a kung te chuang yen ching [T 319]³

Tibetan Title: ḡphags pa hjam dpal gyi sans rgyas kyi žin gi yon tan bkod pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.15; TTD 59]


French (part. trsl.): Lamotte (1960), pp. 20–23.

16. Pitāputrasamāgama

Chinese Title: 1. P’u sa ch’ien shih hui [T 310.16]⁴
2. Fu tzu ho chi ching [T 320]⁵

Tibetan Title: ḡphags pa yaḥ daṅ sras mjal ba žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.16; TTD 60]


17. Pūrṇaparīścchā

Chinese Title: Fu lou na hui [T 310.17]⁶

Tibetan Title: ḡphags pa gañ pos žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.18; TTD 61]

18. Rāṣṭrapālaparīścchā

Chinese Title: 1. Hu kuo p’u sa hui [T 310.18]⁷

¹ Trsl. by Śikṣānanda between 695 and 707 AD in Loyang. Native of Khotan (chūan 58–60), [T 2154–566a: 22f.]
² Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 290 AD in Loyang (2 chūan), [T 2148–289a: 4; T 2151–790c: 18].
³ Trsl. by Amoghavajra between 720 and 774 AD in Loyang (3 chūan), [T 2157–881a: 17; T 2157–980a: 8].
⁴ Trsl. by Narendrayāsaṇa in 568 AD. Arrival in China from Uḍḍiyāna (North India) in 556 AD [T 2154–543c: 10].
⁵ Trsl. by Jih-ch’eng and Dharmarakṣa II between 1058 and 1072 AD [Ono. vol. 12, p. 184b].
⁶ Alternative titles: Fu lou na wen ching, P’u sa ts’ang ching; trsl. by Kumārajīva in 405 AD [T 2154–512: 15].
⁷ Trsl. by Jñānagupta towards the end of the sixth century AD. Native of Gandhāra (523–600 AD), [T
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19. Ugrapariprcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Yū chieh chang che hui [T 310.19]  
2. Fa ching ching [Dharmādārāsūtra, T 322]  
3. Yū chieh lo yüeh wen p’u sa-hsing ching [T 323]  
Tibetan Title: hphags pa khym bdag drag sul can gyis žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.19; TTD 63]  

20. Vidyutprāptapariprcchā

Chinese Title: Wu chin fu ts’ang hui [T 310.20]  
Tibetan Title: hphags pa glog thob kyis žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.20; TTD 64]  

21. Bhadramāyākāryākaṇa

Chinese Title: 1. Shou huan shih po t’o lo chi hui [T 310.21]  
2. Huan shih jen hsien ching [T 324]  
Tibetan Title: hphags pa sgyu ma mkhan bzaṅ po luṅ bstan pa žes bya ba theg pa

1. Trsl. by Dānapāla in 994 AD (4 chūan), [Ta-chung-lu, vol. 8 p.23 b: 26b].  
2. Trsl. by Sanghavarma from Sogdia in 252 AD (chūan 82), [T 2154–487a: 3]. According to Schuster (citing Hirawaka, A.) by Dharmamitra I a Kaśmirian who stayed in China from 424 to 442 AD.  
3. Trsl. by An Hsiian (a Parthian layman) and Yen Fo-t’iao (the first known Chinese Buddhist monk from An Hui) in 181 AD (1 chūan), [T 2151–350a: 14].  
4. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I between 266 and 300/10/13 AD (1 chūan), [T 2151–353a: 26].  
5. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chūan 83–84).  
6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chūan 85).  
7. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I (1 chūan), [T 2151–353a: 26 f.].

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Edition: Régamey (1938).

22. Mahāprātiḥāryopadeśa

Chinese Title: Ta shen pien hui [T 310.22]¹
Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa cho ḥphrul chen po bstan pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.22; TTD 66]²

23. Maitreyamahāsimhanāda

Chinese Title: Mo ho chia she hui [T 310.23]
Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa byams paḥi sen gehi sgra chen po žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.23; TTD 67]
English (part. trsl.): Obermiller (1931), i, p. 12 (quot.).

24. Vinayaviniscaya-Upālipariprccha

Chinese Title: 1. Yu po li hui [T 310.24]³
2. Chüeh ting p’i ni ching [T 325]⁴
3. San shih wu fo ming li ch’an wen [T 326]⁵
Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa ḥdul ba nman par gtan la dbab ne bar ḥkhor gyis žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.24; TTD 68]
English (trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 161, 165, 173, 264 (quot.).
French (trsl.): Python (1973).

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1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 86–89).
2. TTP, TTD: Mahāprātiḥāryanirdeśa.
3. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 90).
4. Translator unknown (Chin Dynasty 266 AD to 420 AD in Tun-huang). The text mentions Tun-huang San-ts’ang as the translator, who is often identified with Dharmarakṣa I (1 chüan), [T 2145–12a: 21].
5. Trsl. by Guravarman during the Liu Sung Dynasty.
6. Trsl. by Amoghavajra between 720 and 774 AD in Loyang. Completely different version which in many respects is reminiscent to extracts of the Theravāda Vinaya. No corresponding Tibetan translation is known to exist (ed. by H. Bechert, Göttingen 1984) (1 chüan), [T 2157–881a: 17].

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25. Adhyāṣayasaṃcudana

Chinese Title: 1. Fa sheng chih le hui [T 310.25]¹
2. Fa chio ching hsin ching [T 327]²

Tibetan Title: hphags pa lhag paḥi bsam pa bskul ba žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.25; TTD 69]

English (part. trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 17, 100, 105–114, 310 (quot.).

26. Subāhupariprcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Shan pei p’u sa hui [T 310.26]³
2. Su p’o hu t’ung tzu ch’ing wen ching [T 895]⁴
3. Miao pei p’u sa so wen ching [T: no. 896]⁵

Tibetan Title: hphags pa lag bzas gis žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.26; TTD 70]

27. Sūratapariprcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Shan shun p’u sa hui [T 310.27]⁶
2. Hsu lai ching [T 329]⁷

Tibetan Title: hphags pa ņes pa žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.27; TTD 71]


28. Vīrādattagṛhapattipariprcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Ch’üan shou chang che hui [T 310.28]⁸
2. P’u sa hsiu hsing ching [T 330]⁹
3. Wu wei shou so wen ta ch’eng ching [T 331]¹⁰

Tibetan Title: hphags pa khyim bdag dpas byin gyis žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.28; TTD 72]

English (part. trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 37, 217 (quot.).

¹ Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 91–92).
² Trsl. by Jñāṅa Gupta in 595 AD (2 chüan), [T 2151–366a: 3].
³ Trsl. by Kumārajiva between 402 AD and 412 AD (chüan 93–94), [T 2154–514c: 26].
⁴ Trsl. by Śubhakarṣaṇa in 726 AD (3 chüan), [T 2157–874c: 3].
⁵ Trsl. by Fa-t’ien between 973 and 988 AD (4 chüan), [T 2035–398b: 23; Ta-chung-lu vol. 6, p. 16b–17b].
⁶ Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 95).
⁷ Trsl. by Chih-shih-lun in 373 AD [T 2157–815c: 26].
⁸ Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 96).
⁹ Trsl. by Po Fa-t’zu between 290 and 306 AD (1 chüan), [T 2153–399c: 25].
¹⁰ Trsl. by Dānapāla in 983 AD (3 chüan), [T 2035–398b: 25].
29. Udayanavatsarājaparipṛcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Yu t'o yen wang hui [T 310.29]
2. Yu t'ien wang ching [T 332]
3. Ta ch'eng jih tzu wang so wen ching [T 333]

Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa bad sahi rgyal po ḥchar byed kyis žus pa žes bya baḥi lehu [TTP 760.29, TTD 73]

English (part. trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), p. 85 (quot.).
Obermiller (1931), ii, p. 169 (quot.).

30. Sumatidarikāparipṛcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Miao hui t'ung nū hui [T 310.30]
2. Hsü mo t'i p'u sa ching [T 334]
3. Hsū mo t'i ching [T 336]

Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa bu mo blo gros bzaṅ mos žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.30, TTD 74]


31. Gaṅgottaraparipṛcchā

Chinese Title: Heng ho shang yu p'o i hui [T 310.31]

Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa gaṅ gahi mchog gis žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.31, TTD 75]


32. Aśokadattāvyākarana

Chinese Title: 1. Wu wei te p'u sa hui [T 310.32]
2. A sheh shih wang nū a sha ta p'u sa ching [T 337]

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1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chūan 97).
2. Trsl. by Fa-chü between 290 AD and 306 AD (1 chūan), [T 2151–355a: 15].
3. Trsl. by Fa-t'ien in 984 AD (1 chūan), [Ta-chung-lu, vol. 4, p. 1a: 3b].
4. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chūan 98a).
5. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I between 265 and 313 AD (1 chūan), [T 2151–353a: 26].
6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci in 693 AD (1 chūan).
7. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chūan 98b).
8. Trsl. by Buddhasānta in 539 AD (chūan 99), [T 2154–542a: 28].
9. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 317 AD (1 chūan), [T 2154–493c: 9].
Appendix iii

33. Vimaladattāpariprcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Wu kou shih p’u sa (fen pieh) ying pien hui [T 310.33]¹
2. Li kou shih nü ching [T 338]²
3. Te wu kou nü ching [T 339]³

Tibetan Title: hphags pa dri ma med kyis byin pas žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.33; TTD 77]


34. Guṇaratnasamkusumitapariprcchā

Chinese Title: Kung te pao hua fu p’u sa hui [T 310.34]⁴

Tibetan Title: 1. hphags pa yon tan rin chen med tog kun tu rgyas pas žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.34; TTD 78]
2. hphags pa sans rgyas bcu pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 938; TTD 272]

35. Acintyabuddhaviṣayānirdeśa

Chinese Title: 1. Shan te t’ien tzu hui [T 310.35]⁵
2. Wen shu shih li so shuo pu ssu i fo ching chieh ching [T 340]⁶

Tibetan Title: hphags pa saṅs rgyas kyi yul bsam gyis mi khab pa bstan pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.35; TTD 79]


36. Susūhitamati(devaputra)pariprcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Shan chu i t’ien tzu hui [T 310.36]⁷

Tibetan Title: hphags pa mya ṇan med kyis byin pa lun bstan pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.32; TTD 76]

English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 115–133.

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¹ Trsl. by Nieh Tao Chen and Dharmarakṣa I between 280 and 312 AD at Ch’ang-an (čhūan 100), [T 2154–501a: 2].
² Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 289 AD (1 čhūan), [T 2154–493c: 11].
³ Trsl. by Gautama Prajñāruci in 541 AD (1 čhūan), [T 2157–840c: 24; T 2157–841b: 5].
⁴ Trsl. by Bodhiruci (čhūan 101a).
⁵ Trsl. by Bodhiruci (čhūan 101b).
⁶ Trsl. by Bodhiruci in 693 AD (2 čhūan), [T 2153–380a: 8].
⁷ Trsl. by Dharmagupta between 605 and 617 AD. Arrival from South India (Lata) in Ch’ang-an in 590 AD.
37. **Simhaparipṛcchā**

**Chinese Title:**
1. A she shih wang tzu hui [T 310.37]^3
2. T'ai tzu shua hu ching [T 343]^4
3. T'ai tzu ho hsiu ching [T 344]^5

**Tibetan Title:**
1. ḡphags pa saṅs rgyas thams cad kyi gsāṅ chen thabs la mkhas pa byaṅ chub sems dpah ye šes dam pas žus paṅ paṅ leḥu žes bya ba thēg pa chen poṅi mdo [TTP 760.37; TTD 81]
2. ḡphags pa thabs mkhas pa žes bya ba thēg pa chen poṅi mdo [TTP 927; TTD 261]

**English (part. transl.):**
Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 5, 53 (quot.).

38. **Upāyakausālayaparivarta**

**Chinese Title:**
1. Ta ch'eng fang pien hui [T 310.38]^6.
2. Hui shang p'u sa wen ta shan ch'üan ching [T 345]^7
3. Ta fang kuang shan ch'iao fang pien ching [T 346]^8

**Tibetan Title:**
1. ḡphags pa saṅs rgyas thams cad kyi gsāṅ chen thabs la mkhas pa byaṅ chub sems dpah ye šes dam pas žus paṅ paṅ leḥu žes bya ba thēg pa chen poṅi mdo [TTP 760.38; TTD 82]
2. ḡphags pa thabs mkhas pa žes bya ba thēg pa chen poṅi mdo [TTP 927; TTD 261]

**English (transl.):**
Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 70, 161, 163, 164, 165 (quot.).
Obermiller (1931), i, p. 134 (quot.).

**German (part. transl.):**

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(1) [T 2154–552b: 22].
1. Trsl. by Prajināruci in 541 AD (3 chūan), [T 2149–269c: 24].
2. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I (3 chūan; var. 4), [T 2151–353a: 26].
3. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chūan 106a).
4. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I (1 chūan), [T 2151–353a: 26f].
5. Translator unknown. Listed in the *Hsi-chin-lu* as having been translated between 265 and 316 AD (1 chūan), [T 2154–587b: 23].
6. Trsl. by Nandi (from Western China) in 420 AD at Lo-yang (chūan 106b–108), [T 2154–509a: 6].
7. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 285 AD (2 chūan), [T 2145–8a: 12].
8. Trsl. by Dānapāla in 1005 AD (4 chūan), [Ta-chung-lu. vol. 13, p.1a–4a].
39. Bhadrapālaśreṣṭhipariprcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Hsien hu chang che hui [T 310.39]¹
Tibetan Title: hphags pa tshoṅ dpon bzaṅ skyon gis Ḹuṣa pa Ḹeṣa bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.39; TTD.: 83]

40. Dārikāvimalaśraddhāpariprcchā

Chinese Title: Ching hsin t'ung nü hui [T 310.40]²
Tibetan Title: Bu mo nam dag dad pas Ḹuṣa pa Ḹeṣa bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.40; TTD: 84]

41. Maitreyapariprcchādharmāṣṭa

Chinese Title: 1. Mi le p'u sa wen pa fa hui [T 310.41]³
2. Ta ch'eng fang teng yao hui [T 348]⁴
Tibetan Title: 1. hphags pa byams pas Ḹuṣa pa bṛgyad pa Ḹeṣa bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.41/2; TTD 85/6]
2. hphags pa byams pas Ḹuṣa pa Ḹeṣa bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 816; TTD 149]

42. Maitreyapariprcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Mi le p'u sa wen hui [T 310.42]⁵
2. Mi le p'u sa so wen pen yuān ching [T 349]⁶
Tibetan Title: 1. hphags pa byams pas Ḹuṣa paḥi leḥu Ḹeṣa bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.42/41; TTD 86/85]
2. hphags pa byams pas Ḹuṣa paḥi leḥu Ḹeṣa bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 816; TTD 149]

¹ Alternative title: I shih ching; trsl. by Jñānagupta (from Gandhāra) in 591 AD (chüan 109–110), [T 2154–548b: 8].
² Trsl. by Divākara in 680 AD (2 chüan), [T 2153–397a: 7; Ono.: 630 AD].
³ Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 111a).
⁴ Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 111b).
⁵ Trsl. by An Shih-Kao between 148 and 170 AD (1 chüan), [T 2151–349a: 12].
⁶ Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 111c).
⁷ Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 303 AD (1 chüan), [T 2157–791a: 10].
43. Kāśyapaparivarta

Chinese Title: 1. P'u ming p' u sa hui [T 310.43]
2. I jih me ni pao ching [T 350]
3. Mo ho yen pao yen ching [T 351]
4. Ta chia she wen ta pao chi cheng fa ching [T 352]

Tibetan Title: hphags pa hod srüns kyi lehu žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo
[TTP 760.43; TTD 87]

English (trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), p. 52, n. 1; pp. 53, 54, 55, 144, 147, 190, 235 (quot.).

German (trsl.): Weller (1965).


44. Ratnarāśi

Chinese Title: Pao liang chū hui [T 310.44]

Tibetan Title: hphags pa rin po cheḥi phuṅ po žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo
[TTP 760.45; TTD no. 88]


45. Aksayamatipariprcchā

Chinese Title: Wu chin hui p' u sa hui [T 310.45]

Tibetan Title: hphags pa blo gros mi sad pas žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.44; TTD 89]

46. Saptasatikaprajñāpāramitā

Chinese Title: 1. Wen shu shuo pan jo hui [T 310.46]
2. Ta pan jo po lo mi to ching (chapter 7) [T 220.7]
3. Wen shu shih li so shuo mo ho pan jo polo mi ching [T 232]
4. Wen shu shih li so shuo pan jo po lo mi ching [T 233]

Tibetan Title: hphags pa ̵ sgs草 kyi pha rol tu phyin pa bdun brgya pa ̵ gsum bya ba theg pa chen po ̵ hdi mdo [TTP 760.46; TTD 90]


47. Ratnacūḍapaśparīpaṭīcha

Chinese Title: Pao chi p’u sa hui [T 310.47]

Tibetan Title: hphags pa ̵ gtsug na rin po ches gsum pa ̵ gsum bya ba theg pa chen po ̵ hdi mdo [TTP 760.47; TTD 91]

English (part. trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 115, 120, 217, 219, 222, 222, 249, 284 (quot.).
Obermiller (1931), ii, p. 115 (quot.).

48. Śrīmālādevīśimhanāda

Chinese Title: 1. Sheng man fu jen hui [T 310.48]
2. Sheng man shih tsou hou i cheng ta fang pien fang kuang ching [T 353]

Tibetan Title: hphags pa lha mo dpal hphreng gi sen ge ̵ sgra gsum bya ba theg pa chen po ̵ hdi mdo [TTP 760.48; TTD 92]

English (trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), p. 44 (quot.).

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1. Trsl. by Mandrasena in 503 AD (chūan 115b–116), [T 2154–537b: 12].
2. Trsl. by Hsüan-tsang between 659 and 663 AD (2 chūan), [T 2154–555b: 28; T 2149–282b: 10].
3. Trsl. by Mandrasena in 503 AD (1 chūan), [T 2154–537: 12].
4. Trsl. by Saṅghabhara between 509 and 520 AD at Lo-yang (2 chūan), [T 2151–364b: 24].
5. Trsl. by Dhammarakṣa I in 290 AD (chūan 117–118), [T 2154–493b: 21].
6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chūan 119).
7. Trsl. by Guṇabhadra in 436 AD (1 chūan), [T 2154–528a: 15]. A translation made by Dharmakṣema in 433 AD was no longer extant by the time of the Yüan Dynasty. (See: Wayman, 1974, pp. 9–13).
49. (Ṛṣi)vyāsāpariprcchā

Chinese Title: 1. Kuang po hsien jen hui [T 310.49]
2. P’i yeh p’o wen ching [T 354]

Tibetan Title: ḍhphags pa draṅ sroṅ rgyas pa žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.49; TTD 93]

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1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 120).
2. Trsl. by Gautama Prajrāruci in 542 AD (2 chüan), [T 2157–841a: 1].
Appendix IV

Tibetan Text of Chapter Eleven of the Bodhisattvapitakasūtra

Section 1

1.1

(590) śā riḍi bu de la byañ chub sems dpaḥ chen po gaṅ la brtson na | byañ chub sems dpaḥi spyad pa spyod par ḥgyur baḥi byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen poḥi šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa gan že na | śā riḍi bu ḥḍi la byañ chub sems dpaḥ byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs rab tu ūn par byed | ḥḍzin par byed | ḥchaṅ bar byed | klog par byed | kun chub par byed | gžan dag³ la yaṅ ḥḥad cin rgya cher yaṅ dag par rabs tu ston par byed de ||

śā riḍi bu de la byañ chub sems dpaḥ⁴ byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs ūn tu mñaṅ | blaṅs | bzuṅ | bklags | gžan dag⁵ la yaṅ bṣad cin rgya cher yaṅ dag par rabs tu bstan na | šes rab kyi rnam pa ḥḍi dag ḥṭhob par ḥgyur ro || šes rabs de yaṅ rnam pa gaṅ⁶ | hjug pa gaṅ že na | de la šes rabs⁷ thos pa ni rnam paḥo || tshul bžin yid la byed pa ni hjug paḥo ||

1.1.1

thos pa yaṅ⁸ rnam pa gaṅ že na | ḥḍi lta ste⁹ | ḥḍuṅ¹⁰ paḥi rnam pa daṅ | bsam paḥi rnam

1. In my edition of chapter eleven, I have adopted the punctuation and Arabic page/folio numbering as it is found in the modern reprint of the sTog Palace Kanjur (Leh—1979). Whenever it seemed appropriate to point to the inclusion of additional sad in other editions of the canon, I have indicated thus in the footnote section. Round brackets serve to indicate conjectural insertions, while square brackets indicate deletions. Whenever available, I reproduced in the footnote section the reading of the Tun-huang manuscript (Pelliot 977) of the Bdp. Since it is independent of the various blockprint versions, I decided to treat the Tun-huang manuscript as a variant in its own right. Thus I have not edited the text, but faithfully recorded its readings. Like many Tun-huang works, it contains a fair amount of non-standard spellings, such as ‘śa ri bu’ for ‘śā ri bu’, ‘myed’ for ‘med’ or ‘yin ba’ for ‘yin pa’, etc. In order to keep the manuscript portions on the same page as the text of the sTog Palace reading, I have broken it up by paragraphs to match those to the main body of the text.
2. P add: len pa byed.
3. D N gžan dag.
5. N gžan dag.
6. D daṅ.
7. D N add: kyi; R add: kyis.
8. N gaṅ.
9. I provide here the Sanskrit equivalents of the 72 technical terms that are given in the Tibetan:

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Appendix iv

pa dan | sbyor bahi rnam pa dan | dge bahi bses gnen gyi rnam pa dan | na rgyal med pa hi rnam pa dan | rab tu (591) hdud pa hi rnam pa dan | ri mor byed pa hi rnam pa dan | hthun¹ pa hi rnam pa dan | bkaḥ blo bde bahi rnam pa dan | bsūfen bkur byed pa hi rnam pa dan | rna blags te² ñan pa hi rnam pa dan | bkur sti byed pa hi rnam pa dan | yid la byed pa hi rnam pa dan | ri po cher³ hdū śes pa hi rnam pa dan | sman du ḭdu śes pa hi rnam pa dan | nad thams cad rab tu ži bar byed pa hi Ḧdu śes pa sa: sarvavyādiḥśāmanā; 12. dran pa snod: smṛtiḥbhajana; 19. rtogs pa śes pa sa: tyagavṛtiḥana; 24. sbyin nas mi smod pa: dāntājanya; 25. maḥu du thos pa sten¹ pa hi rnam pa dan | gus par dgah ba myon bar byed pa hi rnam pa dan | lus sim pa hi rnam pa dan | sems raṇs pa hi rnam pa dan | mi skyor ba ūn pa hi rnam pa dan | dgas gāz (dag) la Ḧdu med pa med par


1. R mthun (throughout the text).
2. R rna ba blags te te.
3. P dkon mchog.
Appendix iv

ñan¹ paḥi rnam pa daṅ | pha rol tu phyin pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | byan chub sems dpaḥi sde snod ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | bsdu baḥi dṅos po ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | thabs mkhas pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | tshaṅs paḥi gnas pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | mfono pa ṇes pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa (592) daṅ |
dran pa ŋe bar bzung pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | yāṅ dag par spoṅ ba ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | rdzu ḥ_phrul gyi rkaṅ pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | rten ciṅ ḥ_drel par ḥbyun ba ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | mi rtag pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | sduṅ bsṅal ba² ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | bdag med pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | zi ba ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | sṭon pa ṇid ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | mṭshan ma med pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | smon pa med pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | mfono pa ṇe ḥdus byed pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | raṅ dbaṅ du gyur paḥi rnam pa² daṅ | chos⁴ ṇan par ḥdu ṇes paḥi rnam pa daṅ | kun tu ḥdre ba mi ḥthun paḥi phyogs su ḥdu ṇes paḥi rnam pa daṅ | ḷon mōṅs pa thams cad tshar gcod paḥi rnam pa daṅ | mḥkas pa la mfono par dgaṅ baḥi rnam pa daṅ | ḥphags pa sten⁵ paḥi rnam pa daṅ | ḥphags pa ma yin pa yoṅs su spoṅ⁶ baḥi rnam pa daṅ | ḥphags pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | dbaṅ po ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | rjes su dran pa sgom pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | byaṅ chub kyi yan lag ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | ḥphags paḥi lam yan lag bṛgyad pa ṇan paḥi rnam pa daṅ | de bźin gšegs paḥi stobs daṅ | mi hiṅgs pa daṅ | byams pa daṅ | sfiṅ rje daṅ | dgaṅ ba daṅ | btaṅ sṅoms chen po daṅ | (593) so so yāṅ dag par rīg pa daṅ | saṅs rgyas kyi chos ma ḥdres pa bcu bṛgyad rnamṣ ṇan paḥi rnam pa ste |

1.1.2

ṣā riḥi bu de ltar gaṅ na thos pa de ni⁷ ṇes paḥo || gaṅ na ṇes pa de ni nan tan no || de ciḥi phyir ḷe na | gaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs la mos pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu ṇes so || ṇes nas nan tan byed do ||

gaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs la bsam pa yod pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu ṇes so || ṇes nas nan tan byed do || gaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs la sbyor ba yod pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu ṇes so || ṇes nas nan tan byed do || gaṅ dge baḥi bšes gṛṇ la rten⁸ par byed pa de ni thos par

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1. P om: par ṇan.
2. P sduṅ bsṅal.
3. P bdag la ral laḥs paḥi rnam pa, for D N R raṅ dbaṅ du gyur paḥi rnam pa.
5. D N R bṣten; P bṣtan.
6. D R ṇaṅ.
7. D R ṇaṅ; N om: pa de ni.
8. D P sten; N bṛten.
Appendix iv

ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन नार्ग्याल मेड पा डे नी ठोस
पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन मान दु ठोस पा (दे) ला
रब तु ह्दुड पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन
मान दु ठोस पा de1 ला रि मोर ब्येड पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस
नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन ह्त्हुन पर ह्द्जिन पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so ||
छेस नस नन (594) tan ब्येड do || गाॅन ब्काह ब्लो ब्डे बा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु
छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do ||

gान मान दु ठोस पा (दे) ला ब्सनेन ब्कुर ब्येड पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस
so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन र्ना बा ब्लांग्स टे नान पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब
tu छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन मान दु ठोस पा (दे) ला ब्कुर sti2 ब्येड पा डे नी ठोस
पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन ह्स्क्हाड पा डाॅ || गाॅन मान
dु ठोस पा (दे ला)3 यिद ला ब्येड पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नन
नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन मान दु ठोस पा (दे) la4 रिन पो चेर5 ह्दु छेस पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर
रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन मान दु ठोस पा (दे) ला र्त्सीर6 ह्दु
छेस पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन मान दु
ठोस पा ठोस नस ह्दोड चाः डाॅ || जे स्दां डाॅ || ग्तिम रुग रुब टु फिर ह्दु छेस पा डे नी ठोस पर
ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन मान दु ठोस पा ठोस नस7
ह्द्जिन पर ह्दु छेस पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do ||
gाॅन चोस नांम्स र्तोग्स पर क्हो न दु चुड पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so ||
छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन मान दु ठोस पर ब्लो ग्ऱ्स ह्दोड पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस
नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन मान दु ठोस पा ठोस नस | ब्लो र्नाम पर मि8
g. यो बा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || (595) ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do || गाॅन
ठोस पा मि नंम्स पा डे नी ठोस पर ह्युर रो || ठोस नस रब तु छेस so || छेस नस नन तन ब्येड do

| 1. N om: de. |
| 2. N bsti. |
| 3. D P R thos par; N pa. |
| 5. P द्कोन मंचोग दु. |
| 6. P स्मान दु. |
| 9. N sbyin pa ग्तो न बर ब्येड पा. |
nas nan tan byed do || gan bzod paḥi gtam thos nas bzod par byed pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan brtson ḥgrus kyi gtam thos nas brtson ḥgrus ma ḡams par byed pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan bsam gtan gyi gtam thos nas sms mi g.yeṅ bar byed pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan ṣes rab kyi gtam thos nas zag pa zad pa la1 sms gzol bar byed pa de ni thos par (596) ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do ||

gan maṅ du thos pa (de la)2 dgaḥ ba skye ba de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan chos thos nas lus sim par byed pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan chos thos nas raṅs par byed pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan theg pa chen po thos nas mos par ḥgyur ba de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan bsdu baḥi dṅos po thos nas gan bsdu bar sms skyed3 pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan dran pa ḡe bar bzung paḥi gtam thos nas | dran pa lus la žugs pa4 daṅ | dran pa tshor ba la žugs pa daṅ | dran pa sms la žugs pa daṅ | dran pa chos la žugs pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan yaṅ dag par spon baḥi gtam thos nas mi dge ba skyes śiṅ byuṅ ba dag la5 khrel žin no tsha bar ḥgyur ba de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan dge baḥi chos skyes śiṅ byuṅ ba la mi gton bar blo hjug pa (597) de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do ||

gan rdzu hphrul gyi rkaṅ paḥi gtam thos nas lus yaṅ ba daṅ | sms yaṅ ba daṅ | ḡdun pa6 yaṅ ba skye ba de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan bsam gtan gyi gtam thos nas ōṅs par7 rtog pa la sms gton8 ba de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu sēs so || sēs nas nan tan byed do || gan tshad med paḥi gtam thos nas sms can thams cad la byams pa daṅ | ḥphoṅs9 par gyur pa mams la śiṅ rje che ba10 | chos la dgaḥ ba

1. N las.
2. D N P R thos par.
4. P soṅ ba (also in the following three instances).
5. P gis.
6. P sred pa.
7. P om: ōṅs par.
8. P gzol.
9. D N phoṅs; P des.
10. D om: che; N chen po.
daṅ | mi dge ba la btaṅ sñoms pa de ni thos par Ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gaṅ dbaṅ poḥi gtam thos nas dad paḥi dbaṅ po daṅ | brtson Ḥgrus kyi dbaṅ po daṅ | dran paḥi dbaṅ po daṅ | tiṅ ne Ḥdzin gyi dbaṅ po daṅ | śes rab kyi dbaṅ po la sems Ḥjug par byed pa de ni thos par Ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do ||

gañ byaṅ chub kyi yan lag gi gtam thos nas chos thams cad khoṅ du chud par bya bahi phyir sems Ḥjug par byed pa de ni thos par Ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do ||

gañ lam gyi gtam thos nas mya ṇan laś (598) Ḥdaṅ bar Ḥgro ba la sems Ḥjug pa de ni thos par Ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do ||

śā riḥi bu Ḥdi ni³ thos paḥi rnam pa la Ḥjug pa rnam pa bźi bcu rtsa gcig ces bya ste | śā riḥi bu de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpah⁴ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la⁵ spyod do ||

1.1.3

śā riḥi bu gžan yaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpah śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa | byaṅ chub sems dpah śe sdne kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs sīn tu mīn | blaṅs | bzuṅ | bklags | kun chub par byas | gžan la yaṅ⁶ bṣad cīn rgya cher yaṅ dag par rab tu bstan na⁷ nan tan sīṅiṅ por byed pa yin no || chos rnam la nan tan byed pa gaṅ že na | gaṅ ji ltar bstan pa bźiṅ du gnas pa ste | de ni chos la nan tan byed paḥo⁸ ||

gžan yaṅ chos la nan tan byed pa de⁹ ni gaṅ chos thams cad mi len paḥo || de ciḥi phyir že na | chos rnam len na¹⁰ yaṅ log paḥi nan tan du Ḥgyur te | gaṅ zag (599) gaṅ chos len par gnas pa de¹¹ ni chos de dag las Ḥbyun bar Ḥgyur bahi gnas daṅ skabs med de | de ni gnas med

1. P gzol (also in the next three occurrences of the term 'ḥjug').
2. P dag daṅ, for D N R yaṅ dag par bslab pa.
3. P gžan, for D N R Ḥdi ni.
4. N dpahī.
5. P om: la (also in all further instances of this regularly reoccuring stock phrase).
7. N P nas.
paḥo || gaṇ zag mi len par spyod pa rnams kyaṅ bṣal¹ bahi phyir | chos ḥdi dag la nan tan du bzaŋ² pa the tshom du ḥgyur na | chos len par spyod pa rnams lta smos kyaṅ ci dgos te | de bas na chos thams cad mi len pa ni³ nan tan no ||

gzan yaṅ gaṇ chos rnams la mi sgrib pa de ni nan tan ņes byaḥo || gaṇ chos rnams la rlom sems⁴ med pa daṅ | gaṇ chos rmam mi len pa daṅ | mi rlom pa daṅ | mi skye ba daṅ | mi ḥgog pa de ni nan tan ņes byaḥo ||

gzan yaṅ⁵ chos rnams la bṣan⁶ pa med pa daṅ | bṣal ba med pa de ni nan tan ņes byaḥo || gzan yaṅ gaṇ du cuṅ zad kyaṅ ma bṣad | ji ltar bṣad pa bźin du mi snaṅ ba de lta bu ni chos thams cad mi snaṅ ba⁷ | mi blaṅ ba | mtshan ņid gcig paḥo || mtshan ņid gaṇ ḥe na | ḥdi lta ste | mtshan ņid med paḥo || mtshan ņid ces bya ba⁸ ni mtshan ņid med pa ste | de ni gāṅ ga las ḥgyur ro || de ciḥi phyir ḥe na | kun brtags pa ḥam | yaṅ dag par brtags pa de ņid mtshan ņid⁹ med par bṣad pa yin no || ḥdi ni mtshan ņid do | ḥdi ni mtshan ņid ma yin paḥo ņes | ḥdi lta ste | chos thams cad la mtshan ņid med pa | mi snaṅ ba | blaṅ ba med par rtogs pa de ni nan tan ņes byaḥo || nan tan la brtson par gyis ɕig | chos thams cad mi sgrib par snaṅ ba thob par gyis ɕig || (600)
de nas deḥi tshe bcom ldan ḥdas kyis tshigs su bcd pa ḥdi dag gsunṣ so ||

gaṅ ʑiṅ byaṅ chub sems dpahi sde snaṅ la ||
šin tu ņes par nan tan gnaṣ byed pa ||
mkhas pa de ni chos la ḥdzin¹⁰ mi byed ||
mi ḥdzin paś na nan tan de ḥdraḥo ||

mis ni chos ńred stoṅ par mi byed do ||¹¹
chos lahaṅ de ni stoṅ par rlom sems med¹² ||
stoṅ pahi chos la rlom sems¹³ gaṅ yaṅ med ||

¹ P bṣaṅ (also in all subsequent occurrences of the word ‘ṣel ba’).
² N gzaṅ.
³ N len pahi.
⁴ D N R rlom sems; P sfiems pa.
⁵ P add: kyaṅ.
⁶ D P bṣaṅ.
⁷ N om: mi snaṅ ba.
⁸ N om: ba.
⁹ P om: mtshan ņid.
¹⁰ P om: mtshan ņid.
¹¹ P len (also in the next line).
¹² P choṅ ńred stoṅ pa ņid du mi byed min.
¹³ P stoṅ pa sfiems mi byed.
¹⁴ P sfiems pa (also in the following three occurrences of the word ‘rlom sems’).
rlom sms med phyir nan tan de ḡdraḥo ||

chos la len pa med cin ḡdor ba med ||
chos ni chos la len par byed pa med ||
len pa med phyir ḡdi ni chos kyi mtshan ||
ḥdi³ ḡdra ba ni nan tan žes byaho ||

gaṅ phyir chos la nams kyaṅ de mi chags ||
de la de yi ye śes blanś mi ḡgyur ||
ye śes ma blanś de lahaṅ rlom sms med ||
ḥdi ḡdra ba ni⁶ nan tan žes byaho ||

mkhas pa³ sbyanś pah⁴ yon tan gnas par gyis ||
chos ḡdi dag la šin tu brtson par gyis ||
cho ga spyod pa dag la gnas gyur na ||
deḥi tshe de yi sgo ni dag par ḡgyur ||

sgo dag na ni chos ḡdi ḡdra ba śes ||
de na sms la bsam pahāṅ śes par ḡgyur ||
mkhas pas de tshe bsam pa śes nas ni ||
ḥdi ḡdra ba yi chos kyaṅ hchad par ḡgyur ||

zab moḥi chos la don dam mkhas⁵ gyur nas ||
ṛṭag tu don la nṃam par gdon mi za⁶ ||
spyod pa mthaḥ yas yon tan nṃams kyis ḡphags ||
mkhas pa maṅ du thos pa rgya mtsho⁷ ḡdra ||

1. D N de.
2. D P R la; N lahaṅ.
3. D N pas.
4. P nan tan.
5. P bstsal.
7. P add: mi nṃams.
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1.1.4

šā riḥi bu de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpah śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do³

ji ltar mun pas khyab bsgrigs pā⁸
khyim du ŋugs par gyur na ni
yod par gyur pahi gzugs⁹ rnam kyaṅ
mig gis mthon bar mi ḥgyur ro

de bžin du ni ḥdi la yaṅ
la¹⁰ lahi mi dag skyes gyur kyaṅ
dge ba daṅ ni sding pahi chos

---

1. P yi ge (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term ‘tshig ḡbru’).
2. P mthaṅ ma khon du chud par mi nus te.
3. P paho (also in all subsequent occurrences of this stock-phrase).
5. P add: na (also in all subsequent occurrences of this stock phrase).
6. R gsal.
7. D N add: de.
8. P pahi; N pas.
10. D rtal.

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ma thos par ni šes mi hgyur

thos nas chos rnam s rnam par šes
thos nas s dtig pa sten² mi byed
thos nas gnod pa spon bar (602) byed
thos nas mya šan ḥdas pa ḥthob

thos par ḥdod pas thos pa ḥphel
thos pas šes rab ḥphel bar hgyur
šes rab kyis³ ni don rnam sbyoṅ
don thob nas ni bye ḥthob hgyur

don thob de ni yid mno⁵ ste
tshe ḥdi la ni mya ḥdas
chos la sbyor żiṅ gtsan la mkhas
šin tu bye ba ḥthob par hgyur

byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod ni
thos nas chos ſid gnas par hgyur⁶
hjig rten la⁷ ni snaṅ gyur nas
byaṅ chub kyi ni⁸ spyad pa spyod
šā riḥi bu de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do

1.2

šā riḥi bu gzan yaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa | byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snot⁹ ḥdzin pahi gahn zag la dge bahi bšes gñen du ḥdu šes bskyed nas |

1. R nus.
2. N bstan; R bsten.
3. P byaṅ chub šes rab kyis; N šes rab kyi.
5. P gznus.
6. P thos nas chos ſid la gnas te.
7. P gyi.
8. P byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi.
byañ chub sems dpahi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs ḡdi niṅ la śin tu byañ bar byed |
 rnam par dag par byed do || byañ chub sems dpahi sde snod ḡdiṅi don gyi phyir ḡdun pa
 skyed | ḡbad par byed | brtson ḡgrus rtsom par byed | sems la rab tu ḡdzin par byed | yaṅ dag
 par rab tu ḡjog par1 byed de | de yaṅ dag par spoṅ ba bźi la rab tu žugs pas | chos thams cad
 la šgrīb pa med pa ḡthob po ||

des nas dehi tshe bcom ldan ḡdas kyis tshigs su bcad pa ḡdi dag gṣuṅs so ||

chos smra ba ni ḡaṅ yin pa ||²

de la dge baḥi (603) bṅes su sems ||³

 rtag par nan tan gnas gyur nas ||
chos la nan tan byas te ḡiān ||

 rtag par ḡdun pa ḡbri mi byed ||
 rtag par brtson ḡgrus śin tu ḡphags ||
 rtag par⁴ bṅes rab rnam par sbyoṅ ||
ye bṅes la ni rtag tu gnas ||

de ni bdaṅ niṅ chos bṅes te ||
dad pahi phyir ni ḡgro mi byed ||
sangs ḡgyas kyis ni ḡaṅ bṣad pa⁶ ||
mi ḡyo ba yì chos bṅes so ||

mkhas pa de dag tshig rnamḥs ḡbyed la⁷ mkhas ||
bslabs pa don la khoṅ du chud par byed ||
de dag ḡkar poḥi phyogs ni rtag par sbyoṅ ||
nag poḥi phyogs ni rtag tu spyoṅ bar byed ||

de yi sems la nams kyaṅ ḡams pa med ||

1. P smon par, for D N R rab tu hjog par.
2. P gaṅ dag chos ni smra ba la.
3. P dge baḥi bṅes gſen du ḡdi sems.
5. P daṅ.
6. P pahi.
7. P gi rnam pa, for D N R rnamḥs ḡbyed la.

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de ni chos rnam gāñ laḥān žum pa med1 ||
lus yān2 de bžin sems daň htrson ḥgrus daň ||
hṣun pa yan bāḥan3 myur du ḥthob par ḥgyur ||

chos thos nas ni šes rab ḥphel bar ḥgyur ||
ye šes rnam par rtogs nas dran mi řiams ||
dran daň ye šes la ni rtag gnas nas ||
dge daň mi dgeḥi chos ni rab tu šes ||

bla na med paḥi chos rnam bslabs nas ni ||
rtogs daň dran pa šes rab stobs mchog thob ||
ji ltar bdag fiḏ4 yun riṅ bslabs pa bžin ||
des ni sems can rnam kyi bsam pa šes ||

chos bslabs nas ni khyad par ḥthob ḥgyur te ||
khyad par thob cĩn ye šes dag gyur nas ||
de ni sems can rnam kyi bsam pa šes ||
de phyir bsam pa bžin du chos ston to ||

šā riḥi bu de ltar na byaṅ chub (604) sems dpah šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do || bam po bcu bdun pa ||5

1.3

1.3.1

šā riḥi bu gžan yaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpah šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin la spyod pa de ltar blo sbyaṅs pa daň | de ltar chos snaṅ bahi sgo śin tu yons su dag pas ḥdi ltar slob ste | ḥphags paḥi yaṅ dag par lta ba hbyuṅ ba (de) ni rgyu gñis daň | rkyen gñis te | gñis gaṅ že na | gžan

1. P ni ḥgyur.
2. P yan ba; R kyan.
3. P yod pa, for D N R yan bāḥan.
4. P gis.
gyi sgra dañ | bdag ŋid1 tshul bźin yid la byed paho ||
dé ḡdi sñam du sems te | gźan gyi sgra de gañ | bdag ŋid tshul bźin2 yid la byed pa de gañ že na | dé de ltar tshul bźin yid la byed pa na | ḡdi sñam du sems par ḡgyur te | rnal ḡbyor spyod pa gañ dag byaṅ chub sems dpahi sde snod kyi chos kyi nram graṅs ḡdi ma thos | ḡphags paṅi chos ḡdul ba ma thos par | tinh ḡe ḡdzin tsam gysi dgah ba rḥed3 nas | ḡna ḡryal gyi dbaṅ gysi che baḥi ḡa ḡryal du lhun ba de dag ni skye ba dañ | rgā ba dañ | na ba dañ | ḡchi ba dañ | mya ḡan dañ | smre sṅags ḡdon pa dañ | sduṅ bṣañal ba dañ | yid mi bde ba4 dañ | ḡkhrug pa las yoṅs su mi thar | sduṅ bṣañal gyi phuṅ po las yoṅs su mi thar te | de dag la de bźin gṣegs pas dgoṅs nas ḡdi skad gsuṅs so || pha rol la ṛjes su ḡthun pa thos pa ni rga ba dañ ḡchi ba las nram par grol baḥo ||
yaṅ bcom ldan ḡdas kyis gsuṅs so5 ||
chos rṇams thos nas rnam par śes ||
thos nas (605) sdi g pa mi byed do ||
thos nas gnod pa spoṅ bar ḡgyur ||
thos nas mya ḡan ḡdas pa ḡthob ||

thos ḡdod6 thos pa ḡphel bar ḡgyur ||
thos pas śes rab ḡphel bar ḡgyur ||
śes rab kyis ni don rṇams sbyoṅ ||
don rṇed nas ni bde ḡthob ḡgyur ||
don rṇed de ni yid rno ste ||
tshe ḡdi la ni mya ḡan ḡdas ||
chos gtsaṅ mkhas pa gtsaṅ ba7 dañ ||
mchog8 tu bde ba ḡthob par ḡgyur ||

1. P la (also in the next phrase).
3. P tshor.
4. P yi mug pa, for D N R yid mi bde ba.
5. D N P R pa.
6. P pas.
7. D gtsaṅ ma.
8. P śin.
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1.3.2

śā rīḥi bu de ltar byaṅ chub sems dpah¹ byaṅ chub sems dpahi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs ḥphags paḥi chos ḥdul ba śin tu mñaṅ par bya | blaṅ bar bya | gzuṅ bar bya | bklag par bya | kun chub par bya | gzān la yaṅ rgya cher yaṅ dag par rab tu bstan par byaḥo ||

śā rīḥi bu gaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpahi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs ḥdi mi ŋan pa daṅ | tshul bzin du sbyor bar mi byed pa de dag ni ḥphags paḥi lam las yoṅs su ŋams pa² hgyur te | de la dgoṅs nas de bzin gšegs pa ḥdi skad du | bdag ŋid tshul bzin yid la byed pa (de) ni rga ba daṅ³ hchi ba las grol baḥo || žes gsuṅ ḥo ||

de ḥdi ltar slob ste | byaṅ chub sems dpahi tshul bzin sbyor ba ni gaṅ ji ltar na⁴ byaṅ chub sems dpah tshul bzin sbyor bya yin sṅam nas | de ḥdi ltar slob ste | byaṅ chub sems dpah sems dpah chen po ni chos gaṅ laḥaṅ sbyor bar mi byed | rab tu sbyor bar mi byed do || tshul bzin du sbyor ba žes bya ba de ni mi sbyor baḥi tshig bla dags so ||

gzaṅ yaṅ byaṅ chub (606) sems dpah tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni sgra ḥbyin par mi byed | zlos pa ḥbyin par mi byed | gaṅ nas sgra ḥbyuṅ ba de yaṅ mi dmigs | sgra de ŋid gaṅ nas byuṅ⁵ gaṅ du ḥag ces sṅon gyi mthaḥ daṅ phyi mahi mthaḥ la rtog par byed do || gaṅ smras ba daṅ | gaṅ smra ba daṅ | gaṅ smra bar hgyur ba daṅ | gaṅ gi⁶ smras ba daṅ | gaṅ gi smra ba daṅ | gaṅ gi smra bar hgyur ba daṅ | gaṅ gi⁷ spoṅ baḥi phyir smra ba daṅ | gaṅ spoṅ baḥi phyir smra ba daṅ | gaṅ khaṅ du chud par byaḥi phyir smras ba daṅ | gaṅ khaṅ baḥi phyir smra ba daṅ | gaṅ khaṅ du chud par byaḥi phyir smra ba daṅ | gaṅ khaṅ du chud par byaḥi phyir smra bar hgyur ba de thams cad yoṅs su btsal na ḥdas paḥi rnam pa daṅ | ma ḥoṅs paḥi rnam pa daṅ | da ltar byuṅ baḥi rnam par mi dmigs pa de ni | deḥi tshul bzin du⁸ sbyor baḥo || žes de de ltar slob bo ||

byaṅ chub sems dpah de ltar tshul bzin du sbyor bas ji ltar na⁹ tshul bzin du mthoṅ že na | de ḥdi ltar slob ste | gaṅ gi tse na byaṅ chub sems dpah chos thams cad raṅ bzin gyis ḥgags par mthoṅ ba deḥi tshel tshul bzin mthoṅ ṇo || gaṅ gi tse chos thams cad raṅ bzin gyis ŋe bar

1. D R dpas.
2. P bṛi bar.
3. D add: na ba daṅ.
5. N ḥbyuṅ.
6. D N gaṅ giš (also in the following two clauses).
7. P gaṅ gi (also in the following two clauses).
zi bar¹ mthon ba deši tshe tshul bzin mthon no || gan gi tshe chos thams cad rnam par zi bar mthon ba deši tshe tshul bzin mthon no || gan gi tshe chos thams cad rañ bzin gyis sñoms par ma žugs par mthon ba deši tshe tshul bzin mthon no || (607) gan gi tshe chos thams cad ma skyes par mthon ba deši tshe tshul bzin mthon no || gan gi tshe chos thams cad ma byun bar mthon ba deši tshe tshul bzin mthon no || gan gi tshe chos thams cad sin tu yañ dag par ma byun bar mthon ba deši tshe tshul bzin mthon no || gan gi tshe chos thams cad mya ñan las ḡdas par mthon ba deši tshe tshul bzin mthon no || de gan gis mthon ba de la yañ rtoṣ te | ci nas kyañ mi mthon ba dañ mi rtoṣ pa de ltar mthon no | de ltar mthon na tshul bzin mthon ba žes byaḥo ||

yañ ḡdi ltar slob te | byañ chub sems dpañ tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni | chos gañ la yañ the tshom dañ rmoṅs pa med do || tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ la yañ² thar pahi sgor mi hgyur ba med do || tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ la³ yañ ṣpañ bar bya bahi phyir ḡbad ba med do || tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ la yañ rtoṣ pa bya bahi phyir ḡbad ba med do || gan chos⁴ thams cad yañ dag par mthon ba dañ | ji lta ba bzin du mthon no ba de ni yañ dag par lta baḥo ||

chos thams cad ji lta ba bzin du mthon no ba gañ že na | ḡdi lta ste | ma mthon baḥo || ma mthon ba žes bya ba de ni ma skyes pahi tshig bla ḡdas so || ma skyes⁵ pa žes bya ba de ni yañ dag par ma byun bahi tshig bla ḡdas so || ma skyes pa žes bya ba de ni yañ dag par ma byun bahi tshig bla ḡdas so | (608) de bzin gšeṅs pa de la ḡdoṅs nas ḡdu byed thams cad mi skye bar mthon na yañ dag pa ṣnid du ṣnes pa⁶ la ḡjug ste | ḡdi lta ste | yañ dag pa ṣnid du ṣnes pa la ḡjug paḥo || žes de skad gsnu no ||

de ḡdi sñaṃ du sems te | de cihi phyir že⁷ na | yañ dag pa ṣnid du ṣnes pa la ḡjug žes bya žes do⁸ || ḡdi ltar slob te | chos thams cad gañ dañ mñaṃ pa saṅs rgyas kyi chos de dañ mñaṃ ste | de bas na yañ dag pa ṣnid du ṣnes pa la ḡjug paḥo⁹ ||

de lta bas na yañ dag pa ṣnid du ṣnes pa la ḡjug pa ḡdoṅ pa ṣnaṃs kyiś | byañ chub sems dpañ sde ṣnaṃ kyi chos kyi ṣnaṃ graṅs ḡdi ṣnid śiṅ tu mñaṃ par bya | blaṅ bar bya | gzuṅ bar bya | bklag par bya | kun chub par byaḥo || byañ chub sems dpañ sde ṣnaṃ kyi chos kyi ṣnaṃ

1. N om: zi bar; P om: ŋe bar.
2. D P R add: gañ.
5. N skyed.
6. P skyon med pa, for D N R ṣnid du ṣnes pa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term ‘ḥnid du ṣnes pa’).
7. D N om: že.
8. P add: de ltar rtoṣ pa laš; N add: la.

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graṃs ḭḍi ṅid laṁaṅ tshul bţin du sbyor bar bya ste | śā riṅi bu de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpāṅ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

1.3.3

śā riṅi bu gţan yaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpāṅ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa¹ de ltar blo śin tu yoṅs su sbyaṅs pa daṅ | de ltar choś² snaṅ baṅi sgo śin tu yoṅs su dag pas tshul bţin du hţjug pa la brtson na | tshul bţin gyi tshig mthoṅ no ||

de la tshul bţin du hţjug pa gaṅ tshul bţin gyi tshig gaṅ že na | de ltar byaṅ chub sems dpāṅ tshul bţin du hţjug pa ni | ḭḍi ita ste | zi gnas kyi gnas³ la hţjug pa daṅ | lhag mthoṅ nma par rtog pa la hţjug pa⁴ ni (609) tshul bţin du hţjug paho || lus dben par hţjug pa daṅ | sems yid du hoṅ bar hţjug pa daṅ | chad pa ma yin par hţjug pa daṅ | rtag pa ma yin par hţjug pa daṅ | rgyu daṅ rkyen la hţjug pa daṅ | rten ciṅ ḭbral par ḭbyuṅ ba la hţjug pa daṅ | sems can med pa daṅ | srog med pa daṅ | gaṅ zag med pa la hţjug pa daṅ | ma hoṅs ma phyin mi gnas pa la hţjug pa daṅ | ma ḭoṅs ma phyin mi gnas pa la hţjug pa daṅ | mi ḭpho ba daṅ | rgyu daṅ ḭbras bu chud mi za ba daṅ | rgyu ston pa ḭid du nma par ḭbyed pa² la hţjug pa daṅ | mtshan ma med par ḭris par bya ba la hţjug pa daṅ | smon pa med par rab tu śes pa la hţjug kyaṅ ston pa ḭid daṅ | mtshan ma med pa daṅ⁵ smon pa med pa len par hţjug pa ma yin pa daṅ |

tiṅ ne ḧdzin daṅ sṅoms par hţjug pa⁶ len pa la hţjug kyaṅ | tiṅ ne ḧdzin gyi dbaṅ gis skye ba la mi hţjug pa daṅ | mṇon par śes paṅi ye śes len pa la hţjug kyaṅ | zag pa zad pa la mi hţjug pa daṅ | mi skye bar rtog pa la hţjug kyaṅ | nes par gyur bar ḡgro ba⁷ la mi hţjug pa daṅ | sems can thams cad⁸ bdag med par rtog par hţjug kyaṅ | sṅiṅ ḭje chen po gtoṅ ba la mi hţjug pa daṅ | skye ba thams cad hţjig par mthoṅ ba la hţjug kyaṅ⁹ | srid pa bsam gys mi khyab pa len pa la (mi) hţjug pa daṅ | mya ḭan ḧdas bar ḧdod pa la hţjug kyaṅ | chos mṇon du bya ba la mi hţjug pa daṅ | ḧdod paṅi yon tan gyi dgaṅ ba btaṅ sṅoms pa¹¹ la hţjug kyaṅ | chos kyi dgaṅ ba ḧdor

1. P add: na.
3. P byin gyi rlaḥs (also in the next occurrence of the term ‘gnas pa’ (adhisthāna)).
5. P rab tu rtogs pa
   In P, ‘rab tu rtogs pa’ regularly substitutes the D N R compound ‘nma par ḭbyed pa’ (pravicaya).
7. P bţag pa; N hţjug pa la.
8. P skyon med pa las ḧdaṅ pa, for D N R ḍes par gyur bar ḡgro ba.
11. N dgaṅ bar btaṅ sṅoms; P dgaṅ bar ḍes sṅoms pa.
ba la mi hjug pa dañ | (610) rtog pa spros pa thams cad gtoñ ba la hjug kyañ | thabs mkhas pa
gtoñ ba la mi hjug pa ste | šā rihi bu de ni tshul bzin du hjug pa žes byaho ||

šā rihi bu de la¹ tshul bzin gyi tshig ces bya ba gañ že na | rigs pañi tshig de ni tshul bzin
gyi tshig go | šā rihi bu gzan yan tshul bzin gyi tshig de ni tshul gyi² tshig go | de ni sgoñi
tshig go | de ni khañi tshig go | de ni rgyuñi tshig go | de ni rab tu rnam par ḫbyed pañi tshig
go | de ni mi ḫgal bañi tshig go | de ni mi spros pañi tshig go | de ni mañ sfood kyi tshig go |
mi len pañi tshig dañ | mi ḫdoñ bañi tshig dañ | mi spros pañi tshig dañ | mi bsran pañi tshig
dañ | ma brañ bañi tshig dañ | mi skye bañi tshig dañ | rtsod bañi gzi med pañi tshig³ dañ | mi
dog pañi tshig dañ | gñen po med pañi tshig dañ |
de kho nañi tshig dañ | de bzin kho nañi tshig dañ | ma log pa de bzin ſid kyi tshig dañ |
gzán ma yin pa de bzin ſid kyi tshig dañ | de bzin ſid kyi tshig dañ | ji ḫta ba bzin gyi tshig
dañ | dus gsum mñam pañi tshig⁴ dañ | yons su chad pañi tshig dañ | gzugs rnam par ſes pañi
gnas med pañi tshig dañ | tshor ba dañ | ḫdu ſes dañ | ḫdu byed dañ | rnam par ſes pa gnas
data med pañi tshig go |
de ni mig dañ | gzugs dañ | mig gi rnam par ſes pañi khamas gnas med pañi tshig go | de nirna ba dañ | sgra dañ | rna bañi rnam par ſes pañi khamas gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni sna
dañ | dri dañ | snañi rnam par ſes pañi khamas gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni ḫtse dañ | (611) ro
dañ | ḫtseñi rnam par ſes pañi khamas gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni lus dañ | ḫeg dañ⁵ | lus
kyi rnam par ſes pañi khamas gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni ſid dañ | chos dañ | ſid kyi rnam
par ſes pañi khamas gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni don la rton pañi tshig go | de ni chos la rton
pañi tshig go | de ni ye ſes la rton pañi tshig go | de ni nes pañi don gyi mdo sde la rton pañi
tshig ste | šā rihi bu de ni tshul bzin gyi tshig go ||
de ḫtar byañ chub sems dp añ tshul bzin du hjug pa la ḫrtson pa | tshul bzin gyi tshig mthon
ba (de) ni gañ gis mthon ba de ſid mi mthon ste | ji ḫtar⁶ mi mthon | rnam par mi mthon ba⁷
de ḫtar mthon no || de ḫtar mthon na tshul bzin mthon ba žes byaho ||

šā rihi bu gzan⁸ yan byañ chub sems dp añ tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ la yañ rmoñs
par mi ḫgyur ro || byañ chub sems dp añ tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ yañ⁹ thar pañi

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1. D P om: de la.
2. P rigs pañi, for D N R tshul gyi.
3. D N R rtsod bañi gzi med pañi tshig; P mi ḫthab pañi tshig.
4. P R dus gsum mñam pañi tshig, for D dus gsum mñam pa ſid kyi tshig.
5. P om: ḫeg dañ.
7. P om: rnam par mi mthon ba.
sgor mi ḥgyur ba med do || tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gaṅ yan spoṅ baḥi phyir ḥbad pa med do || tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gaṅ yan rtogs par bya baḥi phyir ḥbad pa med do ||

gañ chos thams cad yan dag par¹ mthoṅ ba daṇ | ji tta ba bzin du² mthoṅ ba de ni yan dag par lta baḥo ||

chos thams cad ji tta ba bzin du mthoṅ ba gaṅ že na | ḥdi lta ste | mi mthoṅ baḥo || mi mthoṅ ba gaṅ že na | de ni ma skyes baḥi tshig bla dags so || ma skyes pa žes bya ba gaṅ že na | de ni (612) mi snaṅ baḥi bar gyi tshig bla dags te | rgya cher ji ltar snaṅ bzlas³ pa de ltar de bzin du bzlas par bya ste | de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpah šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

šā riḥi bu gzan yan byaṅ chub sems dpah šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa ḥdi ltar slob ste | chos thams cad ni bdaq bzin du tshul bzin te⁴ || ji ltar bdag la bdag med pa de bzin du chos thams cad bdag med par mthoṅ no || ji ltar sems can bdag med pa⁵ de bzin du | chos thams cad bdag med par mthoṅ ste | de ltar mthoṅ na bzin du mthoṅ no ||

gañ tshul bzin ḥkhor baḥi khams mthoṅ ba [de tshul bzin]⁶ | mya ḥn paḥi khams daṅ ldan par mthoṅ ba ste | de ni tshul bzin du sbyor ba žes byaḥo || de ni chos thams cad kyi raṅ bzin la ṭon moṅs paḥi raṅ bzin du bye brag med pa daṅ ldan par mthoṅ no⁷ || rnal ḥbyor daṅ rnal ḥbyor ma yin par yan⁸ mi sṅems so || tshul bzin du⁹ sbyor bas tshul bzin mthoṅ ste | tshul bzin gyi sbyor ba ji sṅed pa sems can gyi gnas thams cad kyaṅ de sṅed do || sems can gyi gnas¹⁰ kyaṅ mi mthoṅ¹¹ | chos kyi gnas kyaṅ ḥkhrug par mi byed pa de ni byaṅ chub sems dpahi tshul bzin sbyor ba ste |

šā riḥi bu de ltar na mam pa ḥdi daṅ | thos pa ḥdi daṅ | tshul bzin du ḥjug pa ḥdi daṅ | tshul bzin mthoṅ ba ḥdi daṅ | ji tta ba bzin du mthoṅ baḥi rgyu ḥthun pa ḥdi daṅ ḥdi dag ni šes rab ces bya byaḥo¹² | šā riḥi bu de ltar na byaṅ (613) chub sems dpah šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

1. P ḥaḥi.
3. R ḥdas.
4. P bdag tshul bzin du byed paḥo
6. P gaṅ tshul bzin byed pa la ḥkhor baḥi khams mthoṅ ba de tshul bzin byed pa ni.
7. P daṅ ldan par khyad par med par mthoṅ no, for D N R du bye brag med pa daṅ ldan pa(r) mthoṅ no.
10. P byin gi rlabs (also in the next phrase).
11. P giton.
12. D N R ste.

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1.4

śā riḥi bu ḵzan yañ byaṅ chub seems dpaḥ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa | ḥdus byas la spyod paḥi chos thams cad la śes rab kyi gi gnas pa yin te1 | ḥdi lta ste | ma ṛig pa daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | ḥdu byed rnam daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas pa nas rgyas par byas te2 | rga śiḥi bar daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | bdag tu lta ba daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas pa nas3 | bdag tu lta baṅi rtsa ba las byuṅ baṅi lta ba rnam pa4 drug beyu rtsa gnis daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | mtho bar sems pa daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | dmaḥ bar sems pa daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | ḥiḥi gti chos bṛgyad rnam daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | ṅa rgyal5 daṅ | che baṅi ṅa rgyal daṅ | log pahi ṅa rgyal nas | ṅe baṅi ṅon moṅs pa ṅi śuṅi bar daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | chen po daṅ | ḥbriṅ po daṅ | phra mo nas | ṅon moṅs pa thams cad kyi bar daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | gti mug gi mun pa rab ṛib kyi līṅ thog sgrīb pa daṅ chod par byed pa kun tu dkris te ḥdug pa nas6 | dmaḥ baṅi chos thams cad kyi bar daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | rtsod pahi riṅog pa7 daṅ | ṅon moṅs pa daṅ | phuṅ po daṅ | lhaṅi bu daṅ | ḥchi bdag gi bdud nas | bdud thams cad kyi las kyi bar daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas |

bdag daṅ | sems can daṅ | srog daṅ | gso daṅ | gaṅ zag daṅ | śed bu daṅ | śed las skyes pa (614) nas | bdag du lha ba thams cad kyi bar daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | las kyi sgrīb pa daṅ | ṅon moṅs paḥi sgrīb pa daṅ | chos kyi sgrīb pa daṅ8 | lta baṅi sgrīb pa daṅ | rnam par smin paḥi sgrīb pa daṅ | mi śes paḥi sgrīb pa nas | bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor bar thams cad kyi bar daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | kun tu rτog pa daṅ | rnam par rτog pa daṅ | mtshan ma daṅ | dmigs pa daṅ | mthoṅ ba daṅ | thos pa daṅ | ṛan pa daṅ | rnam par ṛig pa9 daṅ | mdud paḥi sgro ḥdogs pa thams cad daṅ lhan cīg tu mi gnas | ser sna daṅ | gtoṅ ba daṅ | tshul khrsims daṅ | ḥchal paḥi tshul khrsims10 daṅ | bzod pa daṅ | gnod sems daṅ | brtson ḥgrus daṅ | le lo daṅ | bsam gtan daṅ | g.yen ba daṅ | śes rab daṅ | ḥchal paḥi śes rab nas | pha rol tu phyin paḥi

1. P ḥdus byas kyi spyod pa thams cad la śes rab daṅ gnas pa yin te, for D N R ḥdus byas la spyod paḥi chos thams cad la śes rab kyi gi gnas pa yin te.
2. P rgya cher, for D N R rgyas par byas te.
4. D N R lta bar ḥyur pa.
5. D N R ṅa rgyal; P ṅa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term ‘ṅa rgyal’).
6. N tog gis bṣgrīb pa; P gti mug gi mun pa rab ṛib stug po sgrīb pa sgrīb par byed pa, for D R gti mug gi mun pa rab ṛib kyi līṅ (t)ogh (b)sgrīb pa daṅ chod par byed pa kun tu dkris te ḥdug pa nas.
7. P ṅus ṅaṅ paḥi riṅog pa; R rτson paḥi riṅog pa.
10. P tshul khrsims ṅaṅ pa, for D N R ḥchal paḥi tshul khrsims.
Appendix iv

phyogs\(^1\) daṅ | mi ḡṭhum paḥi phyogs daṅ | ṣes pa daṅ | mi ṣes paḥi bar thams cad daṅ lhan cig tu mi gnas |

ñes pa daṅ | ma ṣes pa daṅ | log pa ṣes pa daṅ | dge ba daṅ | mi dge ba daṅ | kha na ma tho ba daṅ | kha na ma tho ba med pa daṅ | ḡkhör ba daṅ mya ḡnā las ḡdas pa nas | chos thams cad kyi ḡṇēn poḥi bar daṅ lhan cig tu mi gnas | ḡṇiṅ sna tshogs daṅ | saṅs ḡgyas sna tshogs daṅ | sems can sna tshogs daṅ | chos sna tshogs nas | sna tshogs thams cad\(^2\) kyi bar daṅ lhan cig tu mi gnas | mi ṣes pa daṅ | ṣes pa daṅ | nmam par ṣes pa daṅ | kun rdzob daṅ | (615) don dam pa nas | sems can thams cad kyi mtshan ma yid la byed dag daṅ lhan cig tu mi gnas | ṣes rab mi ḡgyu ba daṅ | lus med pa daṅ | mtshan ḡnīd med pa daṅ | mtshan ma med pa daṅ | ḡḥdus ma byas pa\(^3\) nas | yid la byed pa thams cad daṅ | sems daṅ nmam par ṣes paḥi gnas dag gi bar\(^4\) daṅ lhan cig tu mi gnas te | de dag daṅ ḡẓan yaṅ ḡḥdus byas la spyod paḥi chos dpag du med pa dag daṅ lhan cig tu mi gnas so ||

de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpah ṣes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod paḥi\(^5\) ṣes rab de ni ḡḥdus byas kyi spyod pa thams cad daṅ lhan cig tu mi gnas te | śā riḥi bu de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpah ṣes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

Section ii

2.

śā riḥi bu ḡẓan yaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpah byaṅ chub sems dpahi sde snod la gnas pa | ṣes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa na\(^6\) | ṣes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa nmam par ḡḥbyed mkhas pa yin te | chos thams cad la mkhas pa ḡjes su ḡṭhob po ||

de la ṣes rab nmam par ḡbyed pa gaṅ ḡe na | ḡḥdi ṭa ste | phuṅ po la mkhas pa daṅ | khams la mkhas pa daṅ | ḡskye ḡmched la mkhas pa daṅ | bden pa la mkhas pa daṅ | so so yaṅ dag par ḡrig pa la mkhas pa daṅ | ḡṛton pa\(^7\) la mkhas pa daṅ | ḡnmam par ṣes pa daṅ ye ṣes la mkhas pa daṅ | byaṅ chub kyi yan lag la mkhas pa daṅ | lam la mkhas pa daṅ | ḡṛten ciṅ ḡḥbreł par (616) ḡḥbyun ba la mkhas pa daṅ bcu ste | mkhas pa nmam pa bcu po ḡḥdi dag gi\(^8\) nmam par ḡḥbyed pa gaṅ

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1. P ḡṇēn po.
2. P om: thams cad.
5. D P R add: gaṅ.
7. P ḡṛten pa (in P, ‘ṛton pa’ is frequently substituted by ‘ṛten pa’).
8. D R gyi; P gaṅ.

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yin pa de ni šes rab rnam par ḭbyed pa žes byaḥo ||

2.1

de la phuṅ po la mkhas pa gaṅ že na | gaṅ ḏhi phuṅ po rnam kyi dper bya ba bstan pa¹ ḏi lta ste | dbu² ba rdos ba lta bur bstan pa daṅ | smig rgyu lta bur bstan pa daṅ | chu bur lta bur bstan pa daṅ | chu śiṅ³ lta bur bstan pa daṅ | sgyu ma lta bur bstan pa daṅ | rmi lam lta bur bstan pa daṅ | brag cha lta bur bstan pa daṅ | mig yor lta bur bstan pa daṅ | gzugs brṅan lta bur bstan paḥo ||

gzugs ni chuḥi dbu ba lta bu ste | dbu ba la yaṅ bdag med | sms can med | srog med | gaṅ zag med | skyes bu med | šed bu⁵ med | šed las skyes⁷ med do || dbu baḥi raṅ bžin gaṅ yin pa gzugs kyaṅ deḥi raṅ bžin⁶ te | gaṅ de la mkhas pa de ni phuṅ po la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||

tshor ba ni chuḥi chu bur lta bu ste | chu bur la yaṅ bdag med | sms can med | srog med | gaṅ zag med | šed bu med | šed las skyes med | skye ba po med⁷ | skyes bu med de⁸ || chu bur gyi raṅ bžin gaṅ yin pa tshor ba yaṅ deḥi raṅ bžin yin te | gaṅ de la mkhas pa de⁹ ni phuṅ po la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||

ḥdu šes ni smig rgyu lta bu ste | smig rgyu la yaṅ bdag med | sms can med pa nas | skyes buḥi bar du med do || smig rgyuḥi raṅ bžin gaṅ yin pa ḡdu šes kyaṅ deḥi raṅ bžin yin te | gaṅ de la mkhas pa de ni (617) phuṅ po la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||

ḥdu byed rnam ni chu śīṅ lta bu ste | chu śīṅ la yaṅ bdag med | sms can med | srog med pa nas | skyes buḥi bar du med do¹⁰ || chu śiṅ gi raṅ bžin gaṅ yin pa ḡdu byed dag kyaṅ deḥi raṅ bžin yin te | gaṅ de la mkhas pa de ni phuṅ po la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||

rnam par šes pa ni sgyu ma lta bu ste | sgyu ma la yaṅ bdag med | sms can med | srog med | gaṅ zag med | šed bu med | šed las skyes med | skyes bu med | byed pa po med | tshor ba po med do¹¹ || sgyu maḥi raṅ bžin gaṅ yin pa rnam par šes paḥaṅ deḥi raṅ bžin yin te | gaṅ de la mkhas pa de ni phuṅ po la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||

1. P dpe hjog cin hchad pa.
2. N lbu.
3. P add: skyes (also in all further occurrences of the term 'chu śiṅ').
4. P šed can (also in all further occurrences of the term 'šed bu').
5. N skyes pa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term 'šed las skyes').
7. P om: skye ba po med.
10. D N P R med pa ste.
11. D N P R med pa ste.

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gžan yaṅ phuṅ po rnams ṣes¹ bya ba (de) ni hjig rten yin te | hjig rten yaṅ hjig paḥi mtshan ńid do || hjig rten rnams kyi raṅ bžin gaṅ yin pa phuṅ po rnams kyaṅ deḥi raṅ bžin yin no || yaṅ hjig rten gyi raṅ bžin gaṅ yin že na | ḥdi lta ste | mi rtag paḥi raṅ bžin daṅ | sduṅ bsnal gyi raṅ bžin te | phuṅ pohāṅ deḥi raṅ bžin no || gaṅ de la mkhas pa de ni phuṅ po la mkhas pa ṣes byaḥo ||

de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpah phuṅ po la mkhas pa ṣes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.2
de la khams la mkhas pa gaṅ že na | ḥdi lta ste | chos kyi khams de² ni saḥi khamṣ mod kyi | chos kyi khams sra bahi mtshan ńid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (618) (de) ni chuhi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams rlan paḥi mtshan ńid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni mehi khamṣ mod kyi | chos kyi khams tsha bahi mtshan ńid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni rłuṅ gi khamṣ mod kyi | chos kyi khams g.yo bahi mtshan ńid ma yin no ||

chos kyi khams (de) ni mig gi rnam par śes paḥi khamṣ mod kyi | chos kyi khams mthoṅ bahi mtshan ńid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni rna bahi rnam par śes paḥi khamṣ mod kyi | chos kyi khams sgra rtogs paḥi mtshan ńid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni snaḥi rnam par śes paḥi khamṣ mod kyi | chos kyi khams dri snom paḥi mtshan ńid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni ltseḥi rnam par śes paḥi khamṣ mod kyi | chos kyi khams ro myoṅ bahi mtshan ńid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni lus kyi rnam par śes paḥi khamṣ mod kyi | chos kyi khams reg paḥi mtshan ńid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni yid kyi rnam par śes paḥi khamṣ mod kyi | chos kyi khams nam par sgom paḥi mtshan ńid ma yin no ||

chos kyi khams daṅ bdag gi khamṣ de ni mtshuṅs so || ḥdod paḥi khamṣ daṅ | gzugs kyi khamṣ daṅ | gzugs med paḥi khamṣ de (ni) mtshuṅs so || ḥkhor bahi khamṣ daṅ mya ṇan las ḥdas paḥi khamṣ de (ni) mtshuṅs so || de ltar chos thams cad kyi khamṣ daṅ nam mkhaḥi khamṣ de (ni) mtshuṅs te | ston pa ńid daṅ mtshuṅs pas mtshuṅs³ | ni ḥgyur ba daṅ mtshuṅs pas mtshuṅs te | ḥdus byas kyi khamṣ su ḥjug pa daṅ | ḥdus ma byas kyi khamṣ su ḥjug paḥi (619) phyir | de la bṣad pa dpag du med do || gaṅ khamṣ la ḥjug pa des rab tu rnam par ḥbyed pa⁴ de ni mkhas pa ṣes byaḥo ||

de ltar na khamṣ la mkhas paḥi byaṅ chub sems dpah sems dpah chen po śes rab kyi pha rol

1. ṣes (in N, all initial ‘z’ turn into ‘s’ when preceded by a final ‘s’).
2. D P R om: de.
3. D P R mtshuṅs par.
4. P stogs par byed pa; R rab tu ḥbyed pa.
tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.3

de la byan chub sems dpahi skye mched la mkhas pa gañ že na | ḡdi la mig bdag dañ bdag gis stoñ pa te | byan chub sems dpahi mig gi rañ bźin ni\(^1\) ḡdi lta buho || žes yañ dag pa ji lta ba bźin du rab tu şes te | de ni byan chub sems dpahi skye mched la mkhas paño ||

goñ ma bźin du sbyar te | de bźin du rna ba dañ | sna dañ | Itse dañ | lus dañ | yid bdag dañ bdag gis stoñ pa de | byan chub sems dpahi yid kyi rañ bźin ni ḡdi lta buho || žes yañ dag pa ji lta ba bźin du rab tu şes te | dge ba\(^2\) sogs pañi phyir gañ skyed mched la kun sogs pa dañ | sna tshogs sogs pa de dag sogs par mi byed ciñ | dge ba dañ mi dge bañi choñ mams la ḡdu şes gñis su mi hjug ste\(^3\) | de ni byan chub sems dpahi skye mched la mkhas paño ||

ḡdi ni mig gi skye mched do || ḡdi ni gzugs kyi skye mched do || žes\(^4\) de ltar mig dañ gzugs mams la ḡdod chags med par mthon yañ | ḡdod chags med pa mñon du mi byed pa de ni byan chub sems dpahi skye mched la mkhas paño || rna ba dañ sgra | sna dañ dri | Itse dañ ro | lus dañ reg | yid dañ choñ | goñ ma bźin du sbyar te | de ltar byan chub sems dpahi yid dañ chos (620) kyi bar du ḡdod chags med par mthon mod kyi | ḡdod chags med pa mñon du mi byed pa | de ni byañ chub sems dpahi\(^5\) skye mched la mkhas paño ||

skyed mched ces bya ba de (ni) yañ ḡphags pañi skye mched dañ | ḡphags pa ma yin pañi skye mched do || de la ḡphags pañi skye mched ni gañ lam sdud par byed paño || ḡphags pa ma yin pañi skye mched ni gañ lam gtoñ bar byed pa\(^6\) | ḡdi lta ste | byan chub sems dpahi lam la gnas pa ni sems can lam la brtson pa bor žiñ gnas pa\(^7\) la sñiñ rje chen po ḡthob ciñ | lam gyi\(^8\) skye mched kyañ mi gtoñ ba ste | de ni byan chub sems dpahi skye mched la mkhas paño \|\(^9\)

de ltar na byan chub sems dpahi\(^{10}\) skye mched la mkhas pa şes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

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1. D P R om: ni.
2. P add: las.
3. P om: ḡdu şes gñis su mi hjug ste.
4. P add: ḡdu şes gñis su mi hjug ste.
5. P dpahi.
7. P om: la brtson pa bor žiñ gnas pa.
8. R mi.
9. D add: de ltar na byan chub sems dpahi skye mched kyañ mi gtoñ ba ste | de ni byan chub sems dpahi skye mched la mkhas paño.

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2.4
de la byañ chub sms dpahi bden pa la mkhas pa gañ že na | byañ chub sms dpahi bden pa la hjug pa mkhas pa ni rnam par bži ste | ḡdi lta ste | sdug bsñal šes pa dañ | kun ḡbyuṅ ba šes pa dañ | ḡog pa šes pa dañ | lam šes paḥo

de la sdug bsñal šes pa gañ že na | gañ¹ phun po rnam la mi skye bar šes pa de ni sdug bsñal šes pa žes byaḥo || de la kun ḡbyuṅ ba šes pa gañ že na | gañ sred pa ḡjom pa² (šes pa) de ni kun ḡbyuṅ ba šes pa žes byaḥo || de la ḡog pa šes pa gañ že na | gañ mi ḡbyuṅ (ba) mi hjig par šes pa de ni ḡog pa šes pa žes byaḥo || de la lam šes pa gañ že na | (621) gañ mñaṃ pa ŋiḍ³ thob paḥi chos rnam la sgro mi ḡdogs pa de ni lam šes pa žes byaḥo || gaṅ gi tshe byañ chub sms dpas bden pa ḡdi bži de ltar šes rab kyis šes kyaṅ sms can yoṅs su smin par bya bahi phyr mñoṅ du mi byed pa de ni bden pa la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||
gžan yaṅ bden pa la mkhas pa (ni) rnam pa gsum ste | ḡdi lta ste | kun rdzob kyi bden pa dañ | don dam paḥi bden pa dañ | mtshan ŋiḍ kyi bden paḥo

de la kun rdzob kyi bden pa (gañ že na)⁴ | hjig rten gyi tha sñaḥ ji sñaḥ pa dañ | yi ge dañ | sgra dañ | brdar bstan pa⁵ ste | de ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa žes byaḥo || de la don dam paḥi bden pa gañ že na | gañ la sms kyi rgyu ba yaṅ med na⁶ yi ge⁷ lṭa ci smos te | de ni don dam paḥi bden pa žes byaḥo || de la mtshan ŋiḍ kyi bden pa gañ že na | ḡdi lṭa ste | mtshan ŋiḍ thams cad mtshan ŋiḍ gcig la | mtshan ŋiḍ gcig pa ni⁸ mtshan ŋiḍ med paḥo || de la byañ chub sms dpahi kun rdzob kyi bden pa ḡchad pas mi skyo || don dam paḥi bden pa mñoṅ du byed par mi ltuṅ | mtshan ŋiḍ kyi bden pa mtshan ŋiḍ med pas rtoṅs par byed pa⁹ de ni byañ chub sms dpahi bden pa la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||
gžan yaṅ bden pa ni gcig bu | gñaḥ ma yin pa¹⁰ ste | ḡdi lṭa ste | ḡog paḥi dben paḥo || de la dben pa gcig bu la gañ sgro mi ḡdogs pa dañ | sms can sgro ḡdogs par lhun ḡra nṃams la bden pa sbyor bar byed pa de ni byañ chub sms dpahi bden pa la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||
gžan yaṅ phun po lṇa (622) rṇams ni sdug bsñal ba ste | gaṅ phuṅ po lṇa rṇams kyi sdug bsñal gyi mtshan ŋiḍ de ni sdug bsñal (gyi ḡḥags paḥi bden pa) žes byaḥo || gaṅ sdug bsñal

1. N om: gaṅ.
2. R add: žes bya ba.
3. P gñaḥ.
4. D N P R ni.
5. P kun rtog pa ḡchad pa, for D N R brdar bstan pa.
6. P gaṅ sms de ŋiḍ kyaṅ rab tu mi rgyun, for D N R gaṅ la sms kyi rgyu ba yaṅ med na.
7. P add: dag.
8. P ḡaṅ.
10. P gñaḥ po med pa, for D N R gñaḥ ma yin pa.

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gyi mtshan ſid kyi stoñ pa ſid kyi mtshan ſid rtogs pa de ni sdug bṣnāl ḥphags paḥi bden pa žes byaḥo || gaṅ phuṅ po lňa rnam bkaigion la ḥṇa rgyu sred pa las byuṅ bahi lta ba de ni kun ḥbyuṅ bahi bden pa žes byaḥo1 || gaṅ sred paḥi ḥgyu lta ba de la yaṅ sgro mi ḥdogs (pa) mi len (pa) mi sņems pa de ni kun ḥbyuṅ ba ḥphags paḥi bden pa žes byaḥo || gaṅ phuṅ po lňa2 rnam bsin tu zad paḥi phyir ḥgog pa sňon gya mthar ma byuṅ ba | phyi maḥi mthar mi ḥpho ba | da lta byuṅ bar mi gṇa pa de ni ḥgog pa ḥphags paḥi bden pa žes byaḥo || gaṅ lam la brten nas3 sdug bṣnāl šes pa daṅ | kun ḥbyuṅ ba šes pa daṅ | ḥgog pa šes pa la yaṅ reg par byed la | rjes las rtogs paḥi šes pa yaṅ thob par byed pa de ni sdug bṣnāl ḥgog par ḥgyur bahi lam ḥphags paḥi bden pa žes byaḥo || gaṅ bden pa šes pa de la rnam par rtog pa daṅ | sems can yoṅs su bdrtag pa la rtog par byed pa de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi bden pa la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||

gzan yaṅ tshor ba thams cad (ni) sdug bṣnāl ba ste | de la tshor bar4 rnam par ḥbyed5 pa daṅ | blos riṇ pa ſid de ni | sdug bṣnāl ḥphags paḥi bden pa žes byaḥo || ḥgyu gaṅ gis kun ḥbyuṅ bar šes paḥi ḥgyu de ji lta ba yaṅ dag par rab tu šes pa de ni kun ḥbyuṅ ba ḥphags paḥi bden pa žes byaḥo || gaṅ tshor ba gtoṅ žiṅ ma tshor ba tshor bar byed pa daṅ | ḥgog pa la yaṅ so sor rtog (623) la | tshor ba ḥgog pa yaṅ mñoṅ du mi byed pa de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sdug bṣnāl ḥgog pa ḥphags paḥi bden pa žes byaḥo || tshor ba gaṅ gis gziṅs daṅ ḥdra bahi lam de sdud par byed la | tshor bar dgos pa yaṅ ma yin | lam gyi dgos pa yaṅ ma yin pa de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sdug bṣnāl ḥgog par ḥgro bahi lam ḥphags paḥi bden pa žes byaḥo || de ltar rtogs nas bden pa de6 bži la mňam par mṭhoṅ žiṅ | mṭhoṅ ba śin tu dag pa yaṅ ma yin pa de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi bden pa la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||

gzan yaṅ skye ba (ni) sdug bṣnāl ba ste | gaṅ mi skye ba la so sor rtog pa šes pa de ni sdug bṣnāl šes pa žes byaḥo || srid paḥi ḥkyen gyis skye ba ste | gaṅ srid pa ḥṣiṅ pa ḥes pa de ni kun ḥbyuṅ ba ḥes pa žes byaḥo || skye ba thams cad gaṅ gis mi skye bar šes la7 | de la ḥhog pa gaṅ yaṅ med ciṅ | gaṅ mi ḥgog par šes pa de ni zad pa ḥgog paḥi8 šes pa žes byaḥo || gaṅ de ltar tshor ba9 daṅ | hjal ba daṅ | yoṅs su tshol ba daṅ | rnam par rtog pa daṅ | ḥjug paḥi šes pa de ni lam šes pa žes bya ste | gaṅ bden paḥi šes pa de la gẑog par byed kyaṅ | bden paḥi šes

1. P R bden paḥo.
2. D P R om: lḥa.
3. P gaṅ lam rtogs nas.
4. D N R add: bya ba; Aṅk (p. 54.1.8) om: bya ba.
5. P rdzogs.
7. N pa.
8. P par.

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pa de la mi gnas pa\textsuperscript{1} de ni bya\text成为中国字符 chub sems dpa\text成为中国字符 h bden pa la mkhas pa ste |

de ltar na bya\text成为中国字符 n chub sems dpa\text成为中国字符 h bden pa la mkhas pa \text成为中国字符 ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ∥

2.5

de la bya\text成为中国字符 n chub sems dpa\text成为中国字符 h so so ya\text成为中国字符 n dag par rig pa la mkhas pa ga\text成为中国字符 n že na \text成为中国字符 | (624) bya\text成为中国字符 n chub sems dpa\text成为中国字符 h so so ya\text成为中国字符 n dag par rig pa ni bżi po ḡdi dag (yin te) | bżi ga\text成为中国字符 n že na | ḡdi lta ste |
don so so ya\text成为中国字符 n dag par rig pa dañ | chos so so ya\text成为中国字符 n dag par rig pa dañ | ñes pa\text成为中国字符 hi tshig so so ya\text成为中国字符 n dag par rig pa dañ | spobs pa so so ya\text成为中国字符 n dag par rig paño ∥

2.5.1

de la don so so ya\text成为中国字符 n dag par rig pa ga\text成为中国字符 n že na | ga\text成为中国字符 n chos rnam la don dam pa\text成为中国字符 hi tshig tu \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | gnis su med pa\text成为中国字符 hi rgyu \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | rkyen \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | ḡdus pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | mtha\text成为中国字符 h\text成为中国字符 3 med pa\text成为中国字符 hi rjes su hgro ba \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | rten pa\text成为中国字符 4 la hjug pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | chos kyi dbyin\text成为中国字符 s dbyer med pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | de bžin \text成为中国字符 ni\text成为中国字符 d kyis\text成为中国字符 5 rjes su hjug pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | ya\text成为中国字符 n dag pa\text成为中国字符 hi mtha\text成为中国字符 h mi gnas pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | stoñ pa \text成为中国字符 ni\text成为中国字符 d rjes su rto\text成为中国字符 gs pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | mtsham ma med pa rto\text成为中国字符 gs pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | smon pa med pa la smon pa med par \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | m\text成为中国字符 non par ḡdu mi byed pa la m\text成为中国字符 non par ḡdu mi byed par \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | tshul gcig tu hjug pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | sems can med pa hjug pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | bdag med par hjug pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | srog med par byed pa gcig pa \text成为中国字符 6 \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | ga\text成为中国字符 n zag med par\text成为中国字符 7 don dam par \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | ḡdas pa\text成为中国字符 hi dus la ma chags par \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | ma ḡohns bahi dus la mtha\text成为中国字符 h med par \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | da ltar byuñ bahi dus la thams cad du \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | phuñ po rnam la sgyu mar \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | khams rnam la sbrul gdug pa lta bur\text成为中国字符 8 \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | skye mched rnam la stoñ pa \text成为中国字符 ni\text成为中国字符 d du (625) \text成为中国字符 nes par rto\text成为中国字符 g pa \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | nañ (du) ḡi bar\text成为中国字符 9 \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | phyi rol tu mi rgyu bar\text成为中国字符 10 \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | yul la yul med par \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | dran pa la gnas su \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | rto\text成为中国字符 gs pa la khoñ du chud par \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | blo gros la\text成为中国字符 11 m\text成为中国字符 non sum du \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | bden pa la rab tu rto\text成为中国字符 gs par \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | sdug bshal la mi ḡbyuñ bar \text成为中国字符 ses pa dañ | kun ḡbyuñ ba la m\text成为中国字符 non par

1. P gnas par byed pa, for D N R gnas pa.
2. N dpa\text成为中国字符 h.
3. P ḡhog pa.
4. P rten cihn ḡbrel pa; N brten (also in the next occurrence of the term ‘rten pa’).
5. D kyis.
8. D N dañ mtshuns par.
10. D N P R ba.

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łdu mi byed par şes pa dañ | ḥgog pa la mtshan ńid med par şes pa dañ | lam la sgrol bar şes pa dañ |
chos la tshig rab tu tha dad par şes pa dañ | dbañ po mams la ḥjug par şes pa dañ | stobs mams la mi rdzi1 bar şes pa dañ | ḥi gnas la gnas su şes pa dañ | ḥlag mthoñ la snañ bar şes pa dañ | sgyu ma la bsgrub par şes pa dañ | smig rgyu la ḥkhrul2 bar şes pa dañ | rmi lam la mi bden pa mthoñ bar şes pa dañ | brag cha la rkyen la ḥjug par şes pa3 dañ | mig yor la ḥpho bar şes pa dañ | mtshan ńid sna tshogs la mtshan ńid gcig tu şes pa dañ | ḥdu ba la ḥbral bar şes pa dañ | rab tu sbyañs pa la phyir4 mtshams sbyor ba med par şes pa dañ | ñan thos kyi theg pa la sgrañi rjes su ḥgro bar ḥjug par5 şes pa dañ | rañ sañs rgyas kyi theg pa la rten pa la ḥjug pa şes śin dben pa la6 mchog tu şes pa dañ | theg pa chen po la dge bañi rtsa bañi tshogs bsags pa thams cad şes pa ste | de ni byañ chub sems dpañi don so so (626) yañ dag par rig pa şes byaho ||

gzhan yañ don7 so so yañ dag par rig pa ni gañ don la rton pa ste | chos thams cad kyi chos ńid kun gyi don la rton pa ńid kyi rjes su ḥbrañ baño8 | de ciñ phyir že na | chos thams cad ma lus par9 ston pa ste | ston pahi don gañ yin pa de ni don no | chos thams cad ma lus par mtshan ma med pa ste | mtshan ma med pahi don gañ yin pa de ni don no | chos thams cad ma lus par smon pa med pa ste | smon ma med pahi don gañ yin pa de ni don no | chos thams cad ma lus par mam par phye ba ste | nmam par phye bañi don gañ yin pa de ni don no | chos thams cad ma lus par sems can med | srog med | gañ zag med pa ste | gañ zag med pa ste | gañ zag med pa ste | gañ yin pa de ni don no | gañ de lta bañi chos mams rtogs pa de ni don10 so so yañ dag par rig pa şes bya ste | gañ don ston pa de ni gnas med pa ston pahi | de ni mii11 zad pa ston pahi | so so yañ dag par rig pa ni rtogs pahi don ston pa yin te | sañs rgyas bom ldan ḥdas mams kyi gnañ ba | rjes su yi12 rañ ba | yañ dag pa | de kho na | gzhan ma yin pa | şes rab kyi śin tu rtogs pa | thams cad tu kha na ma tho ba med pa de ni byañ chub sems dpañi don so so yañ dag par rig pa şes byaho ||

1. P mi thoms pa; R mi brdzi pa.
2. D ḥkhrug.
3. P rten ciñ ḥbral pa şes pa, for D N R rkyen la ḥjug par şes pa.
4. P sbyañs pa la slar, for D N R rab tu sbyañs pa la phyir.
5. P rjes us rtogs pa ḥjug pa, for D N R rjes su ḥgro bar ḥjug pa(r).
8. N ḥbrañ no; P chos thams cad kyi chos so | chog gi don la rten pa ńid la rten pahi.
9. P kun (also in the following five instances of the phrase ‘ma lus par”).
2.5.2

de la chos so so yan dag par rig pa gaṅ že na | gaṅ dge ba daṅ | mi dge ba daṅ | kha na ma tho ba daṅ bcas pa daṅ | kha na ma tho ba med pa daṅ | zag pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ | (627) zag pa med pa daṅ | hjig rten pa daṅ | hjig rten las ḡdas pa daṅ | ḡdus byas daṅ | ḡdus ma byas daṅ | kun nas1  ḡion moṅs pa daṅ | rnam par byaṅ bahi cha daṅ ḡthun pa daṅ | ḡkhor ba daṅ mya ṇaṅ las ḡdas par ḡe bar ḡgro bahi chos rnam la ḡhjug pa ḡes pa daṅ | chos kyi dbyiṅs mṇaṁ pa ḡid ḡes pa daṅ | byaṅ chub2  mṇaṁ pa ḡid ḡes pa daṅ | kḥams mṇaṁ pa ḡid ḡes pa ste | de ni chos so so yan dag par rig pa ḡes byaṅo ||

gzan yan chos so so yan dag par rig pa ni | gaṅ ḡdod chags spyod pa rnam la sems3  ḡjug pa4 daṅ | bcos pahi5 ḡdod chags spyod pa rnam daṅ | ḡdod chags brtan par spyod pa rnam daṅ | ḡdod chags chuṅ du spyod pa rnam daṅ | rnam par mi ḡdaṅ bahi ḡdod chags spyod pa rnam daṅ | mṭaḥ mār6 ṭag tu med paḥi ḡdod chags spyod pa rnam daṅ | da ltar byuṅ ba la rkyen gyis ḡdod chags spyod pa rnam la ḡhjug pa ste |

sems can gaṅ dag naṅ du ḡdod chags la7 | phyi rol tu ḡdod chags med pa daṅ | phyi rol tu ḡdod chags la | naṅ du ḡdod chags med pa daṅ | naṅ duḥaṅ ḡdod chags med | phyi rol tuḥaṅ ḡdod chags med pa daṅ | naṅ daṅ phyi rol tu8 ḡdod chags pa daṅ9 | gzugs la ḡdod chags la | sgra la ḡdod chags med pa daṅ | sgra la ḡdod chags la | gzugs la ḡdod chags med pa daṅ | gzugs daṅ sgra la ḡdod chags pa daṅ | (628) gzugs daṅ sgra la ḡdod chags med pa daṅ10 | gzugs la ḡdod chags la11 | dri la ḡdod chags med pa daṅ | dri la ḡdod chags la | reg la ḡdod chags med pa daṅ | reg la ḡdod chags la | ro la ḡdod chags med pa daṅ | ro la ḡdod chags la | gzugs la ḡdod chags med pa daṅ | dri la ḡdod chags med pa de ni ḡdod chags spyod pa rnam kyī ḡhjug pa ste |

ḥjug pa deḥī sgoṣ ḡdod chags spyod pa rnam la ṇi khri chig ston | ḡe sdaṅ spyod pa rnam la ṇi khri chig ston | gti mug spyod pa rnam la ṇi khri chig ston | cha mṇaṁ par spyod pa rnam la ṇi khri chig ston ste | gaṅ de dag gi spyod pa bṛgyad khri bzi ston gi sems ḡjug pa

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1. P om: kun nas.
3. P spyod pahi sems, for D N R spyod pa rnam la sems.
5. P spyu maḥi.
6. D P R ma.
7. P kyi (also in the seven following occurrences of the term 'la' of the present context).
11. D gzugs la ḡdod chags la; N daṅ.
Appendix iv

2.5.3

de la ̃nes pahi tshig so so yaṅ dag par rig pa gaṅ že na | gaṅ skad thams cad la skad med par ̃hjug pa ̃ses pa daṅ | lhaḥi skad daṅ | kluḥi skad daṅ | gnod sbyin gyi skad daṅ | dri zahi skad daṅ | mi ḥam ciḥi skad daṅ | lto ḥphye chen poḥi skad daṅ | mi daṅ mi ma yin pahi skad daṅ | ḥgro ba snar skyes pahi sems can mams kyi skad daṅ | sgra daṅ dbyaṅs² mams las skad des de dag la ḥchad pa stẹ | de ni ̃nes pahi tshig so so yaṅ dag par rig pa ̃ses byaḥo || (629)

de ltar chos de dag brtag par byaḥo || de ltar chos de dag bsdu bar byaḥo || de ltar chos de dag rjes su rgyun chags par byaḥo || de ltar chos de dag yi ge mams kyis sbrel bar byaḥo || de tshig gcig gi bla dags ̃ses | tshig gniḥ pahi bla dags ̃ses | tshig maḥ poḥi bla dags ̃ses | bud med kyi tshig ̃ses | skyes pahi tshig ̃ses | ma niṅ gi tshig ̃ses | bsduḥ bahi tshig ̃ses | rgyas pahi tshig ̃ses | smad pahi tshig ̃ses | stod pahi tshig ̃ses³ | ḥdas pahi tshig ̃ses | ma ḥons bahi tshig ̃ses | da ltar byuṅ bahi tshig ̃ses | ye gi gcig gis sgro btags pa ̃ses | ye gi maṅ pos sgro btags pa ̃ses | de ni ̃nes pahi tshig so so yaṅ dag par rig pa ̃ses byaḥo ||
yan dehi ̃nes pahi tshig so so yaṅ dag par rig pa ni ḥkhrul ba ma yin | zlos pa ma yin | brtags pa ma yin | don gsal bahi yi ge⁴ yonṣ su byaṅ ba stẹ | ci nas kyaṅ ḥkhor yaṅ dag par dgaḥ ba sna tshogs pa zab pa | zab par snaṅ ba | kun rdzob daṅ don dam pas brgyan pa⁵ | bdag gis⁶ sems mthoṅ bahi ̃ses pa la rag lus pa | saṅs rgyas kyis gnaṅ ba | sems can thams cad dgaḥ bar byed pa stẹ | de ni byaṅ chub sems dphaḥi ̃nes pahi tshig so so yaṅ dag par rig pa ̃ses byaḥo ||

2.5.4

de la byaṅ chub sems dphaḥi spobs pa so so yaṅ dag par rig pa gaṅ že na | gaṅ tshig bzaṅ ba⁷ | mi gnas par luṅ bstan pa ston (630) pa | rgyun mi ḥchad pa | spobs pa myur ba | spobs pa mgyogs śin myur ba | spobs pa ma⁸ rmoṅs pa | spobs pa ji ltar dris pa bžin pa | spobs pa

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1. P ḥchad (also in the next two occurrences of the term ‘bstan’).
2. N dbyiḥs.
3. D Rbstod pahi tshig ̃ses; P om: bstod pahi tshig ̃ses.
5. P dam pahi rgyan.
7. P gaṅ mdzes pahi tshig.
yons su ma Ñams pa | sobs pa mi Ḥgal ba | sobs pa rtsod pa med pa | sobs pa chos la rab tu
dgaṅ ba1 | sobs pa bzod pa la gnas pa | sobs pa zab pa | sobs pa sna tshogs | kun rdzob
dan don dam pa la sobs pa | sbyin pa dañ | tshul khrims dan | bzod pa dan | brtson Ḥgrus dan
| bsam gtan dan | ñes rab thams cad la gnas pañi sobs pa | dran pa ñe bar bžag pa dan | yañ
dag par spoṅ ba dañ | rdu zhi phrul gyi rkañ pa dañ | dbaṅ po dan | stobs dan | byaṅ chub kyi
yan lag dan | lam dan | ži gnas dan | lhag mthoṅ la sobs pa | bsam gtan dan | nam par thar pa
dan | tiṅ ñe Ḥdzin dan | sñoms par Ḥjug pa dañ | bden pa la Ḥjug pa thams cad ñes pañi sobs
pa | theg pa thams cad la sobs pa | ñems can thams cad kyi ñems kyi2 spyod pa la sobs pa |
tshig mi ikug pañi sobs pa3 | tshig mi rtsub pañi sobs pa | tshig mi Ḥchal bañi sobs pa |
tshig rtsub mo ma yin pañi sobs pa | tshig mën4 pañi sobs pa | tshig dag pa | tshig groł ba
| tshig ma chags pa | tshig bsun pa | tshig Ḥbreł ba | tshig ldan pa | tshig ma Ñams pa | tshig
sñañ ba | tshig Ḥjam pa | tshig ma smad pa | tshig Ḥphags pa thams cad kyi bstod pa ste | žiṅ
mthaṅ yas pañi rnam par ñes pañi rjes su (631) son bahi sgra | tshaṅs pañi sgra skad kyi
dbyaṅs dan Ḥdra ba | rtogs par byed pañi sgra gcig pa | saṅs Ḥgyas kyi gnañ bahi sobs pas
ñems can gzan dan gāṅ zag gāṅ dan lachos ston5 to || deḥi chos bstan pa de yāṅ Ḥbyuṅ bari
byed pa | de byed pañi sduṅ bṣal yāṅ dag par zad par6 Ḥgyur ba ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems
dpañi sobs pa so so yāṅ dag par rig pa žes byaṅo || de ni byaṅ chub sems dpañi sobs pa la
mkhas pa ste |
de Itar na byaṅ chub sems dpañ7 sobs pa la mkhas pa ñes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la
spyod do ||8

2.6

de la byaṅ chub sems dpañi rton pa la mkhas pa gāṅ9 že na | byaṅ chub sems dpañ rnam
kyi rton pa Ḥdi bzi dag10 ste | bzi gāṅ že na | Ḥdi lta ste | don la rton11 gyi | tshig Ḥbru la ma
yin pa dañ | ye ñes la rton gyi | rnam par ñes pa la ma yin pa dañ | ñes pañi don gyi12 mdo sde

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1. P sobs pa chos dan hgrugs na bde ba.
2. D N R dan.
3. P tshig lug bzin du mi ikug pañi sobs pa.
5. P Ḥchad (also in the next phrase for ‘bstan’).
7. D N dpañi.
8. D add: bṣam po bcu brgyad pa; P add: Ḥphags pa byaṅ chub sems dpañi snoon sde ces bya ba theg pa chen
    poñi bṣam po bcu brgyad pa.
Appendix iv

2.6.1

de la don gaṅ | tshig ḡbru gaṅ že na | tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni gaṅ ḡṣig rten gyi chos kyi bya ba la ḡṣug paṅho || don žes bya ba ni gaṅ ḡṣig rten las ḡdas paṅi chos rtogs paṅho || tshig (632) ḡbru žes bya ba ni sbyin pa daṅ | dul ba daṅ | sdom pa daṅ | des pa bstan² paṅho || don žes bya ba ni dul ba daṅ | ži gnas daṅ | gsar³ pa ma yin pa daṅ | sfiṅ ma yin par šes paṅho || tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni ḡkhor ba yoṅs su bṣad pa sgrab paṅho⁴ || don žes bya ba ni mi dmigs pa la rton⁵ paṅho || tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni mya ņan las ḡdas paṅi yon tan yoṅs su sgrab paṅho || don žes bya ba ni choṣ raṅ bžin gyis yoṅs su mya ņan las ḡdas pa nams la nams la ram par mi rtog paṅho || tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni theg pa jì ṭar nams par bṣag⁶ pa bžin du ḡchad paṅho || don žes bya ba ni choṣ tshul gcig pa rtogs par šes paṅho || tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni sems can thams cad mi gtoṅ bar bstan paṅho || don žes bya ba ni ḡkhor gsum yoṅs su dag paṅho ||

tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni lus daṅ | nāg daṅ | yid sdom žiṅ bslaṅ pa daṅ | sbyaṅs baṅi yon tan thams cad yāṅ dag par len par bstan paṅho || don žes bya ba ni lus daṅ | nāg daṅ | yid mi dmigs sfiṅ mṇon par ḡdu mi byed pa yoṅs su dag paṅho || tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni gnod sems kyi⁸ tha ba daṅ | kḥo ba daṅ | nā rgyal daṅ | rgyags pa daṅ | dregs pa ḡjom žiṅ bzod pa daṅ des pa bstan paṅho || don žes bya ba ni mi skye baṅi chos la bzod pa thob paṅho || tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni dge baṅi rtsa ba la brtson ḡḥrus rtsom pa thams cad bstan paṅho || don žes bya ba ni mi

1. Pelliot, 977, folio 1a.1–2
de la byaṅ chub sems dpahi so sor rton pa la mkhas pa gaṅ že na | de ni nam pa bzi ste | don la rton gyi tshig ḡbru la ma yin ba daṅ | ye ŭes la rton gyi nam par šes pa la ma yin ba daṅ | ŭes paṅi don gyi mdo sde la rton gyi draṅ baṅi don gyi mdo sde la ma yin ba daṅ | chos la rton gyi gaṅ zag la ma yin ba daṅ bṣag⁹ ||

2. N ṭbrtan (also in the next occurrence of the phrase “des pa bstan paṅho”); ḡchad (also in the following thirteen occurrences of the word “bstan paṅ”).

3. D N sar.

4. P tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni ḡkhor baṅi ḡchḥab ba yoṅs su sgrab paṅho, for D N R tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni ḡkhor ba yoṅs su bṣad/bcad pa sgrab paṅho.

5. P rtog.


7. Pelliot, 977, folio 1a.2–5
de la don ni gaṅ | tshig ḡbru ni gaṅ že na | de la don ces bya ba ni ḡṣig rten las ḡdas paṅi chos kyi bya ba ni sdom pa btan toṣa | tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni gaṅ ḡṣig rten gyi chos bya ba la ḡṣug paṅho | don ces bya ba ni dul ba daṅ ži gnas daṅ | gsar riṅ myed par šes paṅho || tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni sbyin ba daṅ ḡnal ba daṅ myi gycul ba daṅ | sfiṅ tu dgaṅ ba bṣad paṅho || ḡṣan yaṅ tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni ḡkhor baṅi ḡryus rab tu bgraṅs paṅho | don ces bya ba ni mi dmigs pa la ḡtsa paṅho || tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni mya ņan las ḡdas paṅi yon tan bṣaṅs pa yoṅs su bsaṅs paṅho || don ces bya ba ni raṅ bžin gyis mya ņan las ḡdas paṅi chos la nams la rtoṅ pa myed paṅho || ḡṣan yaṅ tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni ci ṭar theg pa nams par ḡṣag pa bṣad paṅho || don ces bya ba ni tshul gcig gyi chos so sor chud bar šes paṅho || ḡṣan yaṅ tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni mi sems can thams cad yoṅs su myi ḡtan bar bṣad paṅho || don ces bya ba ni khor sum yoṅs su dag paṅho ||

8. P daṅ.

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len (pa) mi gtoñ ba la¹ gnas pañi brtson hgrus so || tshig hbru žes bya ba ni bsam gtan dañ ||
rcnam par thar pa dañ | tiñ ne hdzin dañ | sñoms par hjug pa² bstan paño || don žes bya ba ni
hög pañi sñoms par hjug pa³ (633) šes paño ||⁴

  tshig hbru žes bya ba ni thos pa thams cad hdzin pa šes rab kyi rtsa bañ⁵ || don žes bya ba
ni brjod du med pañi don to || tshig hbru žes bya ba ni gañ byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi chos⁶
sum cu rtsa bdun gyi chos rnambs ra bstan paño || don žes bya ba ni gañ byañ chub kyi
phyogs kyi chos gsum bce rtsa bdun gyi chos rnambs nan tan du byed pañi hbras bu mnôñ
sum du byed paño || tshig hbru žes bya ba ni sdug bsnal⁷ dañ | kun ḃbyuñ ba dañ | lam rab tu
bstan paño || don žes bya ba ni hģog pa mnôñ sum du byed paño || tshig hbru žes bya ba ni
ma rig pa la soñs⁸ te | rga ṣihi bar du bstan paño || don žes bya ba ni ma rig pa hģog pa nas |
rga ṣihi bar du hģog paño || tshig hbru žes bya ba ni ži gnas dañ lgth mnôñ gi tshogs bstan
paño || don žes bya ba ni rig pa dañ rnam par grol ba šes paño ||⁹

  tshig hbru žes bya ba ni gañ ḃdod chags dañ | že sdañ dañ | gti mug dañ | cha mnâm par
spyoñ pa rnambs la chos bstan paño || don žes bya ba ni sems kyi rnam par grol ba ni hķhrugs
paño || tshig hbru žes bya ba ni sgrîb par byed pañi chos thams cad rab tu bstan paño || don
žes bya ba ni sgrîb pa med pañi ye šes rnam par thar paño || tshig hbru žes bya ba ni dkon
mchog gsum gyi yon tan bsnâgs pa mthâñ med ba yañ dag par rab tu bstan paño || don žes
bya ba ni gañ chos ḃdod chags (634) med pa dañ | ḃdus ma byas pañi dge ḃdun gyi yon tan
bsgrub paño¹⁰ ||¹¹

1. N om: la.
2. P ṣiḥaŋ pa.
3. P ṣiḥaŋ pa.
4. Pelliot, 977, folio 1a.5-1b.1
  tshig hbru ni lus dañ nag yid kyi sdom ba ste | bslab pa dañ bṣyañ pañi yon tan thams cad gzuñ ba bṣad
paño || don ces bya ba ni lus dañ nag yid mthon bar hbu byed pa yin bar yons su dag paño || gžan yan tshig
hbru žes bya ba ni gnôd sems kyi drî ma (…) khön khoñ ba dañ rgyags pa dañ | dregs pa kun bcos śiṅ bhzod
pa la śīn tu dgah ba bṣad paño || don ces bya ba ni mi ykye bahi chos la bżod pa so so rṇèd paño || gžan
yân tshig hbru žes bya ba ni dge bahi rtsa ba thams cad la brtson hgrus bṣad paño || don ces bya ba ni rnam
par miy rṭog cīn rṭog pa myed de | miy gnas pañi brtson hgrus so ||.
5. P rtsa ba šes rab tu ḃgyur baño, for D N R šes rab kyi rtsa baño.
6. P om: kyi chos (also in the next occurrence of the phrase ‘phyogs kyi chos’).
7. N sdug bsnal pa.
8. P las stosgs.
9. Pelliot, 977, folio 1b.1-1b.3
  gžan yan tshig hbru žes bya ba ni thos pa thams cad hdzin pa šes rab kyi rtsa baño || don ces bya ba ni
brjod du myed pañi don to || gžan yan tshig hbru žes bya ba ni byañ cub kyi phyogs sum cu rtsa btun gyi
chos rab tu skye baño || don ces bya ba ni gañ byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi chos rnambs kyi nan tan gyi hbras
bu mnôñ du byed paño || gžan yan tshig hbru žes bya ba ni sdug bsnal dañ kun ḃbyuñ dañ lam rab tu dbye
baño || don ces bya ba ni hģog pa mnôñ tu byed paño || gžan yan tshig hbru žes bya ba ni ma rig pa thog
mar ḃgro bas na śi bahi bar duñho kun bye paño || don ces bya ba ni ma rig pa ḃgags pas rga śihi bar du
hģog paño || gžan yan tshig hbru žes bya ba ni ži gnas dañ lgth mthon gi tshogs bṣad paño || don ces bya
ba ni rig pa rnam par grol ba šes paño ||
10. D yon tan sgrub paño; N R yon tan bsgrub paño; P yon tan no.

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tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni gañ byaṅ chub sems dpahi thog ma sems bskyed nas | byaṅ chub kyi sfiṅ poḥi bar du' bslab² pa daṅ yon tan rtsom pa bstan paḥo || don žes bya ba ni sems kyi skad cig gcig daṅ ldan pa³ | thams cad mkhyen paḥi ye Žes mnön par rdzogs par byaṅ chub paḥo || mдор na chos kyi phun po brgyad khri bži ston gi bar du bstan pa de ni tshig ḡbru žes byaḥo || sgra daṅ | yì ge daṅ | gaṅ sgra daṅ yi ge thams cad kyis brjod du myed pa de ni don ces byaḥo⁴ ||

dè la draṅ baḥi don gyi mdo sde gaṅ dag yin⁶ že na | gaṅ tshig ḡbru bṣad pa ji ltar bstan pa bžin du rgya cher khoṅ du chud par bya ste | ḡdi dag ni draṅ baḥi don gyi mdo sde dag go ||

nes paḥi don gyi mdo sde gaṅ dag yin⁷ že na | don gaṅ bṣad pa ji ltar bstan pa bžin du rgya cher khoṅ du chud par bya ste | ḡdi dag ni Žes paḥi don gyi mdo sde dag go ||

dè ji ltar na chos la rton gyi | gaṅ zag la ma yin že na | gaṅ draṅ baḥi don de ni gaṅ zag gi don yin pas de la ni rton gyi | gaṅ Žes paḥi don de ni chos Žid ji lta ba bžin pas de la rton pa ste | ḡdi dag ni byaṅ chub sems dpahi rton pa bži paḥo || de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpahi sems dpahi chen po rton⁸ pa la mkhas pa Žes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||¹⁰ bam po bcu brgyad pa¹¹ ||

de la byaṅ chub sems dpahi rnam kyi tshig ḡbru (635) la mkhas pa gaṅ že na | ḡdi la byaṅ

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11. Pelliot, 977, folio 1b.3–1b.5
gzan yān tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni lbchod chags žed sdaṅ gti mug cha mñam ba spyod pa la chos lbchad paḥo ||
don ces bya ba ni lhhrug pa myed paḥi mam par groč baḥo || gzan yān tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni lbsgrigs pa thams cad la chos lbchad paḥo ||
don ces bya ba ni lbsgrigs pa myed paḥi ye Žes mnam par thar paḥo || gzan yān tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni ekon mchog gsum gyi yon tan kha dog rab tu phye baḥo ||
don ces bya ba ni lbchod chags myed paḥi chos Žid de || dge ḡdun gyi yon tan ḡdus ma byas sgrub paḥo ||.

1. P kyi.
2. N bslabs.
3. P sems skad cig tu sbyor bas.
4. I follow here Pelliot, 1b.7; P sgra daṅ yì ge thams cad kyi ḡbru ... ||, for D N R sgra daṅ | yì ge daṅ | tshig ḡbru thams cad ... ||.
5. Pelliot, 977, folio 1b.5–7

gzan yān tshig ḡbru žes bya ba ni gaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpahi thog ma sems bskyed pa nas sfiṅ po byaṅ cub kyi bar du bslab paḥi yon tan brtsam ba bṣad paḥo || don ces bya ba ni sems skad cig ma gcig gyis sbyor ba thams cad mkhyen paḥi ye Žes mnon bar byaṅ chub paḥo || mдор na ci tsam tu chos kyi phun po brgyad khri bži ston bṣad pa ni tshig ḡbru žes byaḥo | gaṅ sgra daṅ yì ge thams cad kyis brjod du myed pa de ni don ces byaḥo ||.
8. Pelliot, 977, folio 1b.7–2a.1
de la draṅ baḥi don gyi mdo gaṅ že na gaṅ gsuṅs pa bḥyed pa ji ltar bṣad pa bžin rgyas par chud par bya ba ste | de ni draṅ baḥi don gyi mdöḥo žes byaḥo || de la Žes paḥi don gyi mdo gaṅ že na | gaṅ gsuṅs pa gaṅ ji ltar don bṣad pa bžin du rgyas par Žes par byaḥo || de ni Žes paḥi don gyi mdo žes byaḥo ||.
10. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.1–2a.2
de la ji ltar na chos la rton gyi gaṅ zag la ma yin (...) že na | gaṅ draṅ baḥi don pa de gaṅ zag gyi don te | de las bḥyun ba ma yin no | gaṅ Žes paḥi don de chos Žid ji lta ba bžin te des bḥyun no ||.

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chub sems dpah¹ chos gñis la mkhas pa šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do || chos gñis gañ že na | ḥdi lta ste | rnam par šes pa la mkhas pa dañ | ye šes la mkhas pa yin no ||²

2.6.2
de la rnam par šes pa gañ | ye šes gañ že na | rnam par šes pa žes bya ba ni | ḥdi lta ste | rnam par šes pañi gnas pa bži³ ho || bži gañ že na | gzugs la žugs⁴ pañi rnam par šes pa yoñs su gnas śiṅ gnas pa dañ | tshor ba la žugs pa dañ | ḥdu šes la žugs pa dañ | ḥdu byed la žugs pañi rnam par šes pa yoñs su gnas śiṅ gnas pa ste | de ni rnam par šes pa žes byaho ||⁵
de la ye šes gañ že na | gañ len pañi phuñ po lña⁶ rnam s la gnas pa | rnam par šes pañi phuñ po yoñs su šes pa de ni ye šes žes byaho || gañ sañi khams rnam par šes pa dañ | chuñi khams dañ | meñi khams dañ | rlung gi kham s par šes pa de ni rnam par šes pa žes byaho || gañ yañ ye šes khams bži la mi gnas pa | chos kyi dbyiṁs tha mi dad pa šes pa de ni ye šes žes byaho ||⁷
gžan yañ rnam par šes pa žes bya ba ni gañ mig gi rnam par šes pas šes par bya bahi gzugs rnamṣ⁸ šes pa dañ | ma bahi rnam par šes pas šes par bya bahi sgra rnam s dañ | sañi rnam par šes pas šes par bya bahi dri rnam s dañ | Itseñi rnam par (636) šes pas šes par bya bahi ro rnam s | lus kyi rnam par šes pas šes par bya bahi reg rnam s dañ | yid kyi rnam par šes pas šes par bya bahi chos rnam s šes pa de ni rnam par šes pa žes byaho || gañ yañ nañ gi skye mched rnam s la ḥe bar ži žiṅ | phyi rol gyi skye mched rnam s la rgyu ba med pa ye şes la rton pas⁹ | gañ yañ chos gžog par mi byed pa de ni ye šes žes byaho ||¹⁰

1. D dpahi.
2. This paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.
3. P bži dag ste.
4. P su són, for D N R la žugs (also in the following three occurrences of the phrase ‘la žugs’).
5. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.1-2a.3
de la ji lta na ye šes la rton gyi rnam par šes pa la ma yin že na | de la rnam par šes pa žes bya ba ni rnam par šes pa gnañ bži ste | bži gañ že na | gzugs la ņe bar són bahi rnam par šes pa kun tu gnas pas gnas so || de bžin du tshor ba dañ | ḥdu šes dañ | ḥdu byed la són bahi rnam par šes pa kun tu gnas pas gnas te | de ni rnam par šes pa žes byaho ||.
6. Akn bži.
7. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.3-2a.5
de la ye šes gañ že na | gañ len pañi lña phuñ la myi gnañ śiṅ ye šes kyi phuñ po yoñs su šes pa de ni ye šes šes byaho || gañ sañi khams rnam par rig pa dañ | de bžin du chu dañ mye dañ rlung gi khams rnam par rig pa de ni rnam par šes pa žes byaho || gañ khams bži la myi gnañ pañi ye šes chos kyi dbyiṁs ma bye bar šes pa de ni ye šes žes byaho ||.
9. P mi rgyul ye šes la hjúg pañi phyir, for D N R rgyu ba med pa ye šes la rton pas.
10. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.5-2a.6
gžan yañ rnam par šes pa žes bya ba ni myig gis (...) rnam par šes pañi gzugs rnam par chud pa nas yid kyi rnam par rig pañi chos rnam s chud pañi bar de ni rnam par šes pa žes byaho || gañ nañ gi ydu mchêd ži žiṅ phyiṁs hdu mchêd la rab tu myi spyod de | ye šes la so sor ḥbyuñ bahi phyir chos gañ la yañ myi hjog pa de ni ye šes žes byaho ||.
 gzan yan nram par šes pa Žes bya ba ni dmyigs pa las nram par šes pa skye ba dañ | yoñs su rtog\(^1\) pa las nram par šes pa skye ba ste | de ni nram par šes pa Žes byaho || gan yan mi hdzin pa | mi sñems pa | mi dmyigs pa | nram par mi rig pa | mi ḫkhrugs pa de ni ye šes Žes byaho ||

gzan yan ḫdus byas la spyod paḥi chos nrams la nram par šes pa\(^2\) gnas kyi | ḫdus ma byas la nram par šes pa rgyu ba med de | gan yan ḫdus ma byas šes pa de ni ye šes so ||

gzan yan skye ba dañ ḫjig pa la gnas pa ni nram par šes paḥo || gan yan\(^3\) mi skye (ba)\(^4\) mi ḫgag (ba) mi gnas pa de ni ye šes Žes byaho ||\(^5\)

2.6.3

de la ŏes paḥi don gyi mdo sde gan | ḫran baḥi don gyi mdo sde gan Že na | mdo sde gañ dag lam la ḫjig par byed pa de dag ni ḫran baḥi don Žes byaḥo || mdo sde gañ dag ḫbras bu la ḫjig par byed pa de dag ni ŏes paḥi don Žes byaḥo || mdo sde gañ dag kun ḫdzob ṣgrub par byed pa de dag ni ḫran baḥi don Žes byaḥo || mdo sde gañ dag don dam par bstan\(^6\) pa de dag ni ŏes paḥi don Žes byaḥo ||\(^7\)

gzan yan mdo sde gañ dag las kyi\(^8\) bya ba (637) la ḫjig pa de dag ni ḫran baḥi don Žes byaḥo || mdo sde gañ dag las dañ ŏon moňs pa zad par bstan pa de dag ni ŏes paḥi don Žes byaḥo ||

gzan yan mdo sde gañ dag kun nas ŏon moňs pa yoñs su bšad paḥi phyir bstan pa de dag ni ḫran baḥi don to || mdo sde gañ dag nram par byaḥ ba nram par dag paḥi phyir bstan pa de dag ni ŏes paḥi don to || mdo sde gañ dag ḫkhor ba ṣkyo bar byed pa de dag ni ḫran baḥi don to || mdo sde gañ dag ḫkhor ba dañ mya ŏan las ḫdas pa gniis su mi ḫjig pa de dag ni ŏes paḥi

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1. N rtogs.
4. cf, Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.1 and Akn (p. 64.3.5).
5. Pelliot , 977, folio 2a.6–2b.1
gzan yan nram par šes pa Žes bya ba ni dmyigs pa las nram par šes pa skyes pa dañ | yoñs su rtog pa las nram par šes pa skyes pa de ni nram par šes pa Žes byaḥo || gan myi hdzin | myi bsñems | myi dmyigs | nram par chud pa myed ciñ myi skur de ni ye šes Žes byaḥo || gzan yan ḫdus byas kyi spyod paḥi chos la nram par šes pa ḫjig go | ḫdus ma byas la nram pa šes pa skyod pa myed do || gan ḫdus ma byas šes pa de ni ye Žes so || gzan yan skye ba dañ | ḫgyur ba la so sor gnas pa nram par šes paḥo || gan ma skyes myi ḫgog pa | so sor myi gnas pa de ye šes Žes byaḥo ||

6. P ston (also in the following six occurrences of the term 'bstan').
7. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.1–3
de la ŏes paḥi don gyi mdo sde ni gañ | ḫran baḥi don gyi mdo sde gañ Že na | mdo sde gañ gis lam la ḫjud pa de ni ḫkri baḥi don ces byaḥo || mdo gañ gis dag ḫbras bu ḫjud pa de ni ŏes paḥi don ces byaḥo || gzan yan mdo sde gañ gis kun ḫdzob bšad pa de ni ḫran baḥi don ces byaḥo || mdo sde gañ las (...) don dam pa bšad pa de ni ŏes paḥi don ces byaḥo ||
8. Akn (p. 64.3.7) dañ.
9. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.3–3
gzan yan mdo sde gañ gis bya ba la ḫjud pa de ni ḫran baḥi don ces byaḥo || gañ gis las dañ ŏon moňs pa zad paḥi phyir bšad pa de ni ŏes paḥi don ces byaḥo ||

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don to || mdo sde gaṅ dag yi ge daṅ tshig sna tshogs su bstan pa de dag ni draṅ bahi don to || mdo sde gaṅ dag zab pa || blta ḏkaḥ ba || rto gs par ḏkaḥ ba de dag ni ņes paṅi don to || mdo sde gaṅ dag tshig ḡbru maṅ ba1 sems can rnam kyi sems raṅ2 par byed pa de dag ni draṅ bahi don to || mdo sde gaṅ dag tshig daṅ tshig ḡbru ņuṅ la ņes par rto gs par3 byed pa de dag ni ņes paṅi don to ||

gzan yaṅ mdo sde gaṅ dag bdag daṅ || sems can daṅ || srog daṅ || skies bu daṅ || gaṅ zag daṅ || śed bu daṅ || śed las skies daṅ || byed pa po daṅ || tshor ba poḥi sgra sna tshogs bdag po med pa bdag po yod pa bzin du bstan pa de dag ni draṅ bahi don to || mdo sde gaṅ dag stoṅ pa ṇid daṅ || mtsñan ma med pa daṅ || smon pa med pa daṅ || mi ḡbyun ba daṅ || ma skies ba daṅ || yaṅ dag par mi ḡbyun ba daṅ || sems can med pa daṅ || gaṅ zag med pa daṅ || dus gsum (638) las rnam par thar paṅi sgo bstan pa de dag ni ņes paṅi don to5

2.6.4

del la chos gaṅ || gaṅ zag gaṅ že na || gaṅ7 gaṅ zag tu lta ba la gnas te || chos8 la rtsom pa de ni gaṅ zag ces byaḥo || gaṅ gaṅ zag tu lta ba rtsom pa de diḥi chos gnas pa chos kyi dbyiṅs de ni chos žes byaḥo9 ||

gzan yaṅ gaṅ zag ni so soḥi skye bohi gaṅ zag daṅ || so soḥi skye bo dge bahi gaṅ zag daṅ ||
dad paṅi rjes su ḡbraṅ bahi11 gaṅ zag daṅ || chos kyi rjes su ḡbraṅ bahi gaṅ zag daṅ || brgyad

1. Akn (p. 64.4.3) add: žiṅ.
2. P rīṅs.
3. P sems rtog par; R ņes par rtog par.
4. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.3–6
5. N žes byaḥo.
6. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.6–3a.1
9. N gnas paṅi dbyiṅs de ni chos žes paṅi, for D P R gnas pa chos kyi dbyiṅs de ni chos žes byaḥo.
10. Pelliot, 977, folio 3a.1–1
11. P hjug paṅi (also in the next clause).
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paňi gaň zag daň | rgyun du žugs paňi gaň zag daň | lan cig phyir hoň bahi gaň zag daň | phyir mi hoň bahı gaň zag daň | dgra bcom paňi gaň zag daň | raň saňs rgyas kyi gaň zag daň | byaň chub sems dpahi gaň zag daň | skye bo maň po la phan pa daň | skye bo maň po la bde ba daň |

|hji g ren l la thugs1 brtsé ba daň | lha daň mihi skye bo phal po chehi don daň | phan pa daň | bde bahi phyir gaň zag geć hji g ren du skye žin hbyun bu2 hgyur bu | ḥdı lta ste | de bźin gšegs pa dgra bcom pa yaň dag par rdzogs paňi saňs rgyas te | gaň zag gi sgra de thams cad de bźin gšegs pa kun rdzob kyi gnas kyis sems can rams gzuď3 paňi phyir bstan paňo || de la gaň mňon par chags pa de dag ni rton pa ma yin pa4 žes byaňo || de dag rdto5 pa la dgdog paňi phyir chos ňid la rton par byaňi gaň zag la ma yin no || žes | (639) bcom ldam ḥdas kyis gsuňs te p

de la chos ňid gaň že na | ḥdı lta ste | mi hgyur bu | sgro ma btags pa | mi byed pa | rnam par mi byed pa | mi gna pa | gnas med pa7 | rtsa ba med pa | thams cad du mňam pa | mňam pa la mňam pa | mi mňam pa la mňam pa | mňam pa daň mi mňam pa la mňam pa | rnam par mi rtog pa | mi rtsom pa | ňes par hgyur ba8 | thob pa | chos thams cad la šin tu ňo bo ňid med paňi mtshan ňid de ni chos ňid ces bya ste | gaň dag chos ňid9 la rton par byed pa de dag10 ni khaňs gaň lahaň rton par mi byed do || de bas na chos kyi tshul gyi sgo la ḥjug pa ḥdis chos thams cad la rton paňi phyir chos thams cad de lta buňi chos ňid yin no11 ||12

1. P om: thugs.
2. D N skye ba(r) hbyun bu bar.
3. P gšag.
5. N rton.
6. Pelliot, 977, folio 3a.1–3a.4
gṣan yaň gaň zag ni ma raňs so || gaň zag ni ma raňs dge baho || daň pas rjes su ḥbraň baho || chos kyi rjes su ḥbraň baho || gaň zag ni bryaň paňo || rgyun tu žugs paňo || lan cig phyir hoň baho || phyir myi hoň baho || sgra bcom baho || raň saňs rgyas so || byaň chub sems dpaho || hgro ba maň po la phan bha phyir bde bahi phyir || hji g ren las bṛtse bahi phyir || lha daň mi daň hgro bha njas pa chen po la phan ba daň bde bahi phyir gaň zag geć hji g ren du skye bas skyeňo || de ni de bźin gšegs pa dgra bcom bao yaň dag par rdzogs paňi saňs rgyas so || gaň zag gi sgra de thams cad ni de bźin gšegs pas kun rdzob kyi rims kyis sems can gṣun bahi don tu bšad paňo || de la mňon bar chags pa de ni so sor myi ḥbyuň bu žes byaňo || so sor rton pa de dag la gṣag paňi phyir bcom ldam ḥdas kyis gsuňs pa || chos ňid la so so sor rton par kyahi (conjec-
tural reading) gaň zag la ma yin no ||.
7. P mi ḥḍug pa.
8. D P ňes par gyur pa.
11. P de lta ba daň ḥdra bar hgyur te, for D N R de lta buňi chos ňid yin no.
12. Pelliot, 977, folio 3a.4–7
de la chos ňid gaň že na | de ni hgyur bu maŷed pa bskyed pa daň | rnam par myi bya ba daň | myi gna pa daň | so sor myi gna paňi rtsa bho || thams cad tu mňam ba daň | myi mňam ba daň mňam ba | rnam par rtog pa maỹed pa | rtsom ba maŷed pa | myi hgyur bu thob pa | chos thams cad šin tu ňo bo ňid mey paňi mtshan ňid ste | de ni chos ňid ces byaňo || gaň chos de la so sor rton pa ni chos gaň gi phyir yan myi ḥbyuň no || de bas na deňi chos kyi sgor ḥjug pas chos thams cad la rton pa naň bucň ste | chos thams cad de lta buňi no bo ňid yin no || žes gsuňs so ||.

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2.7

de la byaṅ chub sems dpahi tshogs la mkhas pa gaṅ ža na | byaṅ chub sems dpahi rnams kyi tshogs ni ḡdi gñis te | gñis gaṅ že na | ḡdi Ita ste | bsod nams kyi tshogs daṅ | ye ḡes kyi tshogs so ||

2.7.1

de la bsod nams kyi tshogs gaṅ že na | sbyin pa las byun bahi bsod nams3 bya bahi dṅos po daṅ | tshul khrims las byun bahi bsod nams bya bahi dṅos po daṅ | sguom la las byun bahi bsod (640) nams bya bahi dṅos po daṅ | byams paḥi sems la sñoms par ḡjug pa daṅ | sñiṅ rjeḥi sbyor ba daṅ | dge bahi rtsa ba thams cad la brtson4 pa daṅ | bdag daṅ pha rol gyi sdig pa ḡchags pa daṅ | dus gsum du gtogs paḥi sems can thams cad daṅ | slob pa thams cad5 daṅ | mi slob pa thams cad daṅ | ḡan saṅs rgyas thams cad daṅ | sems daṅ po bskyed pa rnams daṅ | spyod pa la žugs pa thams cad daṅ | phyir mi ldog pa rnams daṅ | skye ba7 gcig gis thogs paḥi byaṅ chub sems dpahi rnams kyi sems bskyed pa la rjes su yi raṅ ba daṅ | ḡdas pa daṅ | ma byon pa daṅ | da ltar byun bahi saṅs rgyas bcom ldan ḡdas rnams kyi dge bahi rtsa ba8 thams cad kyi rjes su yi raṅ ba daṅ ldan paḥi bsod nams bya bahi dṅos po daṅ | saṅs rgyas thams cad daṅ | ḡchags pa thams cad la chos9 gsol ba ḡdebs pa10 daṅ ldan paḥi bsod nams bya bahi dṅos po daṅ | dge ba thams cad byaṅ chub tu bsṅo ba daṅ ldan paḥi bsod nams bya bahi dṅos po daṅ |11

1. The last paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.
2. Pelliot, folio 3a.7–7
de la byaṅ chub sems dpahi tshogs la mkhas pa gaṅ že na | byaṅ chub sems dpahi tshogs ni rnam pa gñis te | de ni bsod nams daṅ | ye ḡes kyi tshogs so ||
3. P sbyin paḥi bsod nams (also in all following instances of the same context).
5. N thiṅ.
6. P thog mar.
7. P tshhe.
8. D N P ‘dge ba’ only.
11. Pelliot, folio 3b.1–4
de la bsod nam gyi tshogs gaṅ že na | sbyin ba las bsod nams bya bhi dṅos po daṅ | de bžin du tshul khrims daṅ | sguom na las bsod nams bya bhi dṅos po daṅ | byams paḥi sems sñoms par sgrub pa | sñiṅ rjeḥi sbyor ba daṅ | dge bahi thams cad kyi rtsa ba rtsom ba | bdag daṅ pha rol gyi sdig ḡchags pa | dus gsum gñis bsduṣ pa | sems can thams cad daṅ | bslob pa daṅ | myi slob pa thams cad daṅ | ḡan saṅs rgyas thams

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sems can byaṅ chub tu sems ma bskyed pa rnams byaṅ chub tu sems skyed pa daṅ | byaṅ chub tu sems bskyed pa1 rnams la pha rol tu phyin pañi lam ston pa daṅ | dbul po rnams la loṅs spyod kyis sdu pa daṅ | nad pa rnams la sman2 sbuin pa daṅ | gus par bsñen bkur byed pa daṅ | mthu chun ba rnams la bzod ciṅ daṅ du len pa daṅ | lhun ba rnams mi hchab3 pa daṅ | sdig pa hchags pa daṅ | saṅs (641) rgyas bcom ldan ḡdas rnams4 ḍzugs pa daṅ yoṅs su mya ṅan las ḡdas pa rnams la bsñen bkur daṅ ri mo5 thams cad byed pa daṅ | slob ḍpon daṅ mkhan po rnams la ston pa bziṅ du ri mo byed pa daṅ | chos la rin po che rin tham med pa bziṅ du yoṅs su tshol baṅi bṛtson ḡgrus daṅ | chos smra ba la ḍgaṅ ẑiṅ dpag tshad bṛgyar yaṅ soṅ ste | chos ẑiṅ pa ḡchad pa daṅ | pha daṅ ma la rim gro6 byed pa daṅ | byas pa gzo ba daṅ | byas pa ẑes pa daṅ | ḡgyod pa med pa daṅ | bsod nams (bya baṅ dīṃs po) bsags pa chog mi ḡes pa daṅ |

lus bsdam paṅi lus la8 tshul ḡchos pa med pa daṅ | ṽag bsdam paṅi ṽag la tshul ḡchos pa med pa daṅ | de bziṅ gṣegs paṅi mchod rten bṣegs paṅi phyir thams paṅi bsod nams yoṅs su ḡdzin pa daṅ | mchod sbiṅ gtan pa med pa bsags9 pa ṽtshan ṽiṅ10 yoṅs su rṇdzogs pa daṅ | ḡde baṅi rtsa baṅi tshogs sna tshogs bsags pa ḡpe byed bzaṅ po yoṅs su rṇdzogs pa daṅ | ṽa rgyal med pas lus bṛgyan pa daṅ | ṽag gi ḡes pa thams cad ṽaṅs pa ṽag bṛgyan pa daṅ | ḡlo thogs pa med pas sems bṛgyan pa daṅ |

cad daṅ | thog ma sems bskyed pa rnams daṅ | ṽyad pa rṇdzogs pa rnams daṅ | phyir myi ḡdog pa rnams daṅ | skye ba gcig gis thogs paṅi byaṅ chub sems ḍpaṅ rnams kyi sems bskyed paṅi ṽjes su yi raḥ ṽo | ḡdas pa daṅ | ma ṽoṅs pa daṅ | da ṽar gyi saṅs ḡras bcom ldan ḡdas rnams kyi ḡde ba thams cad kyi ṽjes su yi raṅ ba daṅ | ṽtan gcig soṅ baṅi bsod nams yoṅa밖 dīṃs poḥo | saṅs ḡras thams cad daṅ | bṣegs paṅi thams cad la ḡos gṣo la ba daṅ ṽtan gcig soṅ baṅi bsod nams yoṅa밖 dīṃs poḥo | ḡde ba thams cad byaṅ chub tu ḡrjod pa daṅ ṽtan gcig soṅ baṅi bsod nams bya baṅi dīṃs poḥo |.  
1. N om: daṅ | byaṅ chub tu sems bskyed pa.  
3. P hchags.  
4. ḡ P ṽom: rnams.  
5. P gus pa (also in the following two instances of the term ‘ri mo’).  
6. P bsñen bkur.  
7. Pelliot , 977, folio 3b.5–4a.1  
byaṅ chub tu sems bskyed pa rnams byaṅ cub sems ḍpaṅ rnams kyi sems bskyed paḥo || byaṅ chub tu sems bskyed paṅi byaṅ chubs sems bskyed paṅi byaṅ chubs sems bskyed paṅi byaṅ chubs sems bskyed paṅi byaṅ chubs sems bskyed pa | dbul po rnams loṅs spyod kyis bsus paḥo || na ba rnams la sman rab tu byin te riṃ ḡr Tomato ḡkuru sti byed paḥo || mthu chun ba rnams la bzod ciṅ zi ḡbho | ṽtuṅ ba so sor ḡyogs bḥo | sdig bsṅs paḥo | saṅs ḡras bcom ldan ḡdas bṣegs pa daṅ | mya ṅan las ḡdas pa thams cad la ri mo ḡkuru sti byed paḥo || slob ḍpon daṅ mkhan po la ston par ri mo byed paḥo | ḡchos la rin tham ṽyed paṅi ṽiṅ po che tshol baṅi bṛtson ḡgrus so | ḡchos ḡchad pa la ḍgaṅ ṽe ḡdpi tshad bṛgyar kyaṅ ṽiṅ pa ṽyid ṽiṅs pa | ma ṽhres paṅi ṽhos ḡchad pa | pha ma la ḡrを中心 ṽo byed pa | ṽyas pa ṽes pa | ṽyas pa dʁan ba | ṽyas pa tsho bha | ḡgyod pa ṽyed pa | bsod nams bsṭsags pa ṽyid ṽiṅs pa |.  
8. ḡ D ṽRN lus bsdam ṽiṅ.  
9. N ṽbsṭsags (also in the next occurrence of the term ‘bsṭsags’).  
10. ḡ D ṽRN ṽtshan.  
11. Pelliot , 977, folio 4a.1–3  
lus bsdam pa sgyu ṽyed pa | ṽag bsdam pa ṽag la sgyu ṽyed pa | yid bsdam pa ṽid la sgyu ṽyed pa |
mñon par šes pa sprul pas saṅs rgyas kyi źin gi rgyan¹ dañ | ye šes yoṅs su dag pas chos kyi mtshan ſid kyi² rgyan dañ | phra ma dañ | Že good pa dañ | dbye baḥi tshig yoṅs su spaṅs pas (642) ḥkhor maṅ poḥi rgyan dañ | chos ḥdzin pas ḥdod chags med paḥi chos kyi³ rgyan dañ | rab tu dgaḥ nas legs so Žes⁴ bya ba byin pas chos kyi ḥtam mi ḥjiṅs par byed pa dañ | sgrīb pa dañ sgrīb par byed pa° mam par spaṅs ſiṅ gus par chos ſian pas ḥbras bu yod par chos ḥchad pa dañ | saṅs rgyas rnam la dkaḥ thub kyi nags tshal phul bas byaṅ chub kyi ſiṅ gi rgyan dañ | dge baḥi rtsa ba thams cad sṅon du ḥgro źin byaṅ chub kyi sems mi goṅ bas byaṅ chub kyi sṅiṅ poḥi rgyan dañ⁶
las dañ ſon moṅs pa mi dmigs pas tshe dañ ši ḥpho yoṅs su dag pa dañ | rin po che phaṅs paḥi dṅos po thams cad yoṅs su goṅ bas rin po cheḥi lag pa⁷ dañ | mi zad paḥi smon lam thob pas loṅs spyod mi zad pa dañ | ḥkho gñer med pas mt hon ma thag tu sems can rnam s dad ciṅ bžin ḥdzum pas gsoṅ por smra ba dañ | sems can thams cad la ḥod zer sṅoms pas⁸ mṅam pa ſiṅ kyi ḥgyan thob pa dañ | ma lbs pa la mi brṅas pa⁹ ḥod maṅ po goṅ ba¹⁰ dañ | tshul khrims kyi bsod nams bsags pas skye ba yoṅs su dag pa dañ | Ituṅ ba la mi rtsod pas mᠨal yoṅs su dag pa dañ¹¹
dge ba bcuḥi las yoṅs su dag lha daṅ mir skye ba daṅ | rjes su bstan pa¹² thams cad la

¹. Akn (p. 65.2.8–3.3) gives 'rgyan du ḥgyur ba daṅ' in this and in the following five instances of the phrase 'rgyan daṅ'.
². N kyis.
³. N kyis.
⁴. P R om: Žes.
⁵. D N R chod pa.
⁶. Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.3–5
⁷. N pa.
⁸. D N R lag na rin po che.
⁹. P zii gyis mi gnon pas, for D N R mi brṅas pas.
¹⁰. D mthon ba.
¹¹. Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.5–7
¹². P bstan par bya ba, for D N R rjessubstan pa.

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rab tu rtog pas gdon mi za bar gnon pa dañ | chos la slob dpon gyi dpe mkhyud med pas chos kyi dбаn phyug dañ1 | lhag pañi bsam pa yoṅs su dag pas ḷig ṭen thams cad la mñon sum pa dañ | ṇi ṭse baḥi spyod pa mi (643) ḷodod pas rgya chen poḥi chos la dad pa dañ | thams cad mkhyen pañi sems mi ḷodor bas bsod nams thams cad yoṅs su ḷdzin pa dañ | dad pa ṭson du ḷgro bas nor bdun yoṅs su ṭrdzogs pa dañ | ṭhon dam bcas pa ṇams su len par byed pas2 ḷig ṭen thams cad mi slu ba dañ | dge baḥi chos yoṅs su ṭrdzogs pas saṅs rgyas kyi chos thams cad yoṅs su ṭrdzogs pa ste | de ni byaḥ chub sems dpañi bsod nams kyi tshogs la mkhas pa ḷes byaḥo ||3

2.7.2

de la byaḥ chub sems dpañi ye ṣes kyi tshogs la mkhas pa gañ ṭe na | rgyu gañ gis ye ṣes skye ba ste | de ṭtar rgyu dañ ṭkren4 gañ gis ye ṣes ṭrots paḥo ||
de la rgyu gañ | ṭkren gañ ṭe na | chos tshol ba la rab tu ṭdun pa dañ | ye ṣes kyi rjes su soṅ baḥi bšes gñen bsten pa dañ | saṅs rgyas kyi ye ṣes la ṭron gyi | ṇan ṭhos dañ raṅ saṅs rgyas kyi ye ṣes la mi ṭron pa dañ | de dag la ṭa ṭrgyal mi byed pa | bla ma la ṭgaḥ ba dañ | ṭton pa la ṭgaḥ ba dañ | deḥi dge baḥi bšes gñen de dag gis ḷdi ni bsam pa dañ ldan bar ṣes nas | ye ṣes kyi gtam gañ yaṅ mi ston pa med pa dañ | snod du ṣes nas bar chad med par sems ṭse gcig tu chos ston pa dañ | des chos de thos nas chos kyi tshogs la ṭbṭson par5 byed de | gaṅ chos kyi tshogs la ṭbṭson par byed pa de ḷiḍ deḥi ye ṣes kyi tshogs la ṭbṭson pa yin no ||6
de la chos kyi tshogs la ṭbṭson (644) pa gañ ṭe na | ṭhi ṭta ste | don ṇuṅ ba dañ | bya ba ṇuṅ

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1. P chos la slob dpon gyis mi ḷchab pas chos la dбаn phyug daṅ, for D N R chos la slob dpon gyi dpe mkhyud med pas chos kyi dIÓN phyug dañ.
2. D N ṇams su lon par byed pas; P sgröl bas.
3. Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.7–4b.3
dge ba bcuḥi las yoṅs su dag pa lha daṅ myiḥ skyebo || bstan pa thams cad la yid ches pas bsgrims pa gdon myi za bāḥo || chos la mkhaṅ po myi ḷchab pas chos la dhaṅ paho | lhag pañi bsam pa yoṅs su dag pas ḷig ṭen thams cad kyi bla yin no | ṇi ṭse paḥi ṭspy od lam mos pas rgya chen paḥi chos la ṭad paho || thams cad mkhyen paḥi sems mi ḷodor bas bsod nams thams cad yoṅs su ḷdzin paho || ṭad pa ṭhoṅ mar ḷgro bas nor bṭun yoṅs su ṭrdzogs paho | ṭson dam bcas pa las bṣgal paḥi ṭbyiṛ ḷig ṭen thams cad myi bsu bāḥo || dge baḥi chos yoṅs su ṭrdzogs pas saṅs rgyas kyi chos thams cad yoṅs su ṭrdzogs paho || de ni byaḥ chub sems dpañi bsod nams kyi tshogs la mkhas pa ḷes byaḥo ||.
5. P rnaḷ ḷbyor (also in the following three occurrences of ‘ṛbṭson par’: 1. D R P rnal ḷbyor, 2. P rnal ḷbyor, 3. P rnal ḷbyor pa).
6. Pelliot, 977, folio 4b.3–6
de la byaḥ chub sems dpañi ye ṣes kyi tshogs la mkhas pa gañ ṭe na | rgyu gañ gis ye ṣes bskeyed pa ste | de ṭtar rgyu daṅ ṭkren gis ye ṣes chud paḥo || de la rgyu daṅ ṭkren gañ gis ye ṣes pa ṭste | de la rgyu daṅ ṭkren gañ ṭe na || chos tshol ba la rab tu mos pa | ye ṣes kyi ḷes su soṅ baḥi bšes ḷen bsten pa | saṅs rgyas kyi ye ṣes la ṭrton te | ṇan ṭhos daṅ raṅ saṅs rgyas kyi ye ṣes la ṭmyi ṭrton paho | de dag la ṭa ṭned pa | bla ma la raṅs pa | mkhaṅ po la raṅs pa | de dag dge baḥi bšes ḷen ḷyis bsam ba phun ṭum tshogs par ṭiṅ nas ye ṣes kyi gtam gañ yaṅ myi ṭston pa ṭmyoṛ de || snod ṭu ṭiṅ ṭas ṭḥšams ṭmyed pa ṭbad de | de la chos ṭḥchad do || ṇe ṭdeḥi chos thos nas chos kyi tshogs la ṭbṭson par byed do | gaṅ chos kyi tshogs la ṭrton ba de ḷiḍ ye ṣes kyi tshogs la ṭbṭson bāḥo ||.

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ba dañ | sgra ḫuṅ ba dañ | srod dañ tho raṅs la mi ēñ ḫiṅ rnal ḫbyor la brtson pa dañ | ḫbrel paḥi don la yoṅs su rtog pa dañ | phyir ḫiṅ yoṅs su tshol ba dañ | sems la rṅog pa med pa dañ | sgrīb pa gnone pa dañ | ḫtuṅ ba las ḫbyuṅ bar ḫes pa dañ | ḫgyod pa med pa dañ | kun nas ldaṅ ba med pa dañ | nan tan sṅīṅ por byed pa dañ | chos la gzol ba dañ | chos la ḩbab pa dañ | chos la bab pa dañ¹ | chos la brtul ba dañ | rtag par mgo dañ lus² la me ḫbar ba lta bu dañ |³

ye ḫes tshol ba de ḫiṅ la gnas pa dañ | mi lhod pa dañ | brtson ḫgrus mi gtoṅ ba dañ | khyad par du ḫgro ba dañ | ḫdu ḫdzi las dben pa dañ | gcīg pur⁴ ḫgah ba dañ | dgon paḥi bde ba yid la byed pa dañ | ḫphags paḥi ḫrigs la ḫgah ba dañ | sbyaṅs pa las mi ḫgyur ba dañ | chos kyi kun ḫgah (ba) la ḫgah ḫiṅ mos pa⁵ dañ | ḫhjīg ṛten ḫrgaṅ phan paḥi gsaṅ tshig la ri mo⁶ mi byed pa dañ | ḫhjīg ṛten las ḫdas paḥi chos tshol ba la dran pa mi ḫṇams pa dañ | rtogs pa la don rtogs paḥi ḫrjes su ḫgro ba dañ | blo gros la lam gyi ḫrjes su ḫthun par byed pa dañ | mos pa la sdom pa dañ |⁷

rkyen la ye ḫes kyi ḫrjes su ḫrig pa⁸ dañ | khrel yod pa dañ⁹ | ḫno ḫsha ḫes paḥi rgyaṇ¹⁰ dañ | saṅs ḫrgyas kyi ḫgrōs kyi ḫrjes su ḫgro ba dañ | mi ḫes pa se la ba dañ | ma ḫrig pa dañ gti mug gi liṅ tog (645) sel ba dañ | ḫses ḫrab kyi mig ḫnam par ḫdag pa dañ | ḫrab tu ḫnam par ḫdag pa dañ | blo ḫrgya che ba dañ | bla ma ḫẓum pa dañ | blo ḫrab tu thad pa dañ | ḫmṇoṅ sum du ḫes pa dañ | gẑan (dag) la ḫrag ma lus paḥi yon tan dañ | ḫraṅ gi yon tan ḫgyis mi sṅiems pa dañ | ḫpha ḫro ḫgyi yon tan la ḫtog pa¹¹ dañ | legs par bya baḥi las¹² byed pa dañ | las kyi ḫnam par sṁin pa la mi¹³ ḫḥal bar byed pa¹⁴ dañ | las yoṅs su ḫdag par ḫes pa¹⁵ ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpah

1. ḫR om: chos la bab pa dañ.
2. ḫD ḫP ḫR ḫgos.
3. Pelliot , 977, folio 4b.6–5a.1
   de la chos kyi tshogs la brtson ba gaṅ ḫe na | de ni don ḫuṅ ba | bya ba ḫuṅ ba | sgra ḫuṅ ba | nam gyi cha stod dañ cha smad la mi ēñ ḫal bar brtson ba dañ ldaṅ ba | brtson baḥi don la yoṅs su rtog pa phyi phyir yoṅs su ḫhjīg pa sems ma sṅoms paḥi (conjectural reading) bsgrīb pa ḫnam par sel ba | ḫuṅ ba las ḫbyuṅ bar ḫes pa | ḫgyod ba myed pa | ḫyons su ḫbskṛ ḫpa myed pa | ḫnan tan gyi sṅīṅ po can ḫchos la gzol ba | ḫchos la ḩhbab pa | ḫchos la bab pa | ḫchos la sgrīm ba | ḫrtag par mgo dañ gos la mye ḫhār ba ḫḥīṅ ḫu la ḫes tshol baḥi de ḫśīd la ḫnas pa ]
4. ḫP ḫR ḫbu; ḫN ḫpu.
5. ḫP ḫchos la kun ḫgah ḫžīṅ ḫgah bas ḫgah ba, for ḫD ḫN ḫR ḫchos (kyi) kun ḫgah (ba) la ḫgah ḫžīṅ mos pa.
6. ḫN ri ḫmor.
7. Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.1–3
   ḫmyi lhod pa ḫbkur ba myi ḫḥod pa | ḫkhyad bar du myi ḫḥgro ba | ḫhdu ḫdzī dañ tha ḫdad pa | gcīg pur ḫgah ba | dgon paḥi ḫsgr ḫyid la byed pa | ḫphags paḥi ḫrigs la ḫgah ba | sbyaṅs pa las myi ḫgyur ba | ḫchos la kun ḫgah ḫžīṅ ḫgah bas ḫgah ba | ḫhjīg ṛtang pa (phyal baḥi) sṅaṅs la ḫbkur si myi ḫbyed pa | ḫhjīg ṛtang las ḫdas paḥi ḫchos tshol baḥi dran ba myi ḫṇams ba | ḫrig paḥi don gyi ḫgrōs su ḫgro ba | blo ḫhgrōs lam tu ḫmtun ba | sdom ba brtan pa ]
8. ḫP ye ḫes su ḫtogs pa.
9. ḫP om: khrel yod pa dañ.
10. ḫnP ḫno ḫsha ba ḫad mḍzes paḥi rgyaṅ.
11. ḫP mi ḫtorg pa.
12. ḫD ḫR legs par bya baḥi las bya baḥi las; ḫP ḫbhad por byed paḥi.
13. ḫN om: mi.

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sems dpah chen poći ye śes kyi tshogs Žes byaĥo \|

gzan yan ye śes kyi tshogs ni sbyin ba rnam par\textsuperscript{2} bzi ste |

(1) chos smra ba lā gro ga daњ | smyu gu daњ | snag tsha daњ | glegs bam sbyin pa daњ |
(2) chos smra ba lā chos kyi stan sna tshogs sbyin pa daњ |
(3) chos smra ba lā rṇed pa daњ | bkur sti daњ | tshigs su bcad pa thams cad sbyin pa daњ |
(4) chos smra ba lā chos kun bsdu baĥi phyir g.yo med par legs so || Žes bya ba sbyin pa ste |

sbyin pa bzi po de dag \[ni\] ye śes kyi tshogs sogs\textsuperscript{3} par ḡgyur ro || kun sruњ ba bzi\textsuperscript{4} rnamms ye śes kyi tshogs sogs par ḡgyur te | bzi gaњ že na |

(1) chos smra ba rnamms kyi lus [kun]\textsuperscript{5} sruњ ba\textsuperscript{6} daњ |
(2) dge ba sruњ ba daњ |
(3) yul daњ ljon su hjug pa la sruњ ba daњ |
(4) phan paĥi dnos po [kun]\textsuperscript{7} sruњ ba ste |

[kun]\textsuperscript{8} sruњ ba bzi po de dag (ye śes kyi tshogs sogs par ḡgyur ro)\textsuperscript{9} || ņe bar rton pa\textsuperscript{10} bzi ye śes kyi tshogs (sogs par)\textsuperscript{11} ḡgyur te | bzi gaњ že na |

(1) chos smra ba rnamms kyi chos ņe bar (646) rton pa daњ |
(2) ye śes ņe bar rton pa daњ |
(3) zaњ žin ņe bar rton pa daњ |
(4) byaњ chub ņe bar rton paĥo \|\textsuperscript{12}

14. P byed pa mi gton ba, for D N R mi ḡgal bar byed pa.
15. R byed pa.
1. Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.3–5
2. D N P om: rnam.
3. N stsogs (but for one, also in all further occurrences of the word ‘sogs’ in this tetrad section); this applies also to the parallel passage in the Akn (p. 66.1.3–3.6).
5. Akn (p. 66.1.3) om: kun.
6. R yons su sruњ ba (also in the next three clauses).
7. Akn (p. 66.1.4) om.
8. Akn (p. 66.1.4) om: kun.
9. Given in Akn (p. 66.1.4).
10. N ņe bar brtan pa; P rton pa (also throughout this stanza).
11. Given in Akn (p. 66.1.4) as ‘stsogs par’.
12. Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.6–5b.1

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(ñe bar rton pa bzi po de dag ye šes kyi tshogs sogs par ḥgyur ro ||)¹ stobs lña ye šes kyi tshogs (sogs par)² ḥgyur te lña gan žes na Ḫđi lta ste |

(1) mos pahi phyir dad pahi stobs dañ |
(2) thos pa tshol bañi phyir brtson ḥgrus kyi stobs dañ |
(3) byañ chub kyi sems³ mi brjed pahi phyir dran pahi stobs dañ |
(4) mñaam pa ņid kyi chos la ņes par rtogs pahi phyir tiñ ne Ḫđzin gyi stobs dañ |
(5) thos pahi stobs kyi phyir ņes rab kyi stobs ste |

stobs lña po de dag ye šes kyi tshogs su (sogs par)⁴ ḥgyur ro || tshul khrims bži ye šes kyi tshogs sogs⁵ par ḥgyur te bži gañ že na Ḫđi lta ste |

(1) chos la ņes pahi⁶ tshul khrims dañ |
(2) chos Ḫṭshol bañi tshul khrims dañ |
(3) chos la ņes par rtogs pahi tshul khrims dañ |
(4) byañ chub tu bšno bañi tshul khrims te |

tshul khrims bži po de dag ye šes kyi tshogs sogs par ḥgyur ro || bzod pa bži ye šes kyi tshogs sogs par ḥgyur te bži gañ že na Ḫđi lta ste |

(1) chos tshol ba la mñon par brtson pas ņan du smra ba dañ ņan du brjod pahi tshig (rnaments)⁷ bzod pa dañ |
(2) chos tshol ba la mñon par brtson pas rluñ dañ tsha ba dañ grañ ba dañ dro ba dañ skom pa dañ bkres pa bzod pa dañ |
(3) chos tshol ba la mñon par brtson pas slob dpon dañ mkhan poñi rjes su hjug pa dañ |

gzan yañ ye śes kyi tshogs rmam pa bži ste chos Ḫchad pa la Ḫgro ba dañ ga la ma dañ snag tsa dañ glegs bam byin ba dañ chos Ḫchad pa la mam par bdba bañi stan sbyin ba dañ chos Ḫchad pa la bṛṭen pa dañ bku sti dañ tshigs su bcad pa thams cad sbyin ba dañ chos Ḫchad pa la chos kun bṣdu bañi phyir Ḫđelö žes bya ba sbyin ba dañ bži ni ye śes kyi tshogs btsogs par ḥgyur ro || gzan yañ kun tu bṣruñ ba bži ye śes kyi tshogs su ḥgyur te bži gañ že na chos Ḫchad pahi lus kun bṣruñ ba dañ yul dañ joñs su ḥogs la kun tu bṣruñ ba dañ phan bañi dchos po kun tu bṣruñ ba dañ bžiho || gzan yañ bṛṭan ba bži ye śes kyi tshogs su ḥgyur te bži gañ že na chos Ḫchad pa la chos bṛṭan ba dañ ye śes bṛṭan ba dañ zañ žiñ kun bṛṭan ba dañ blo bṛṭan paho || (R folio 645.3–646.1).
1. Given in Akn (p. 66.1.6).
2. Given in Akn (p. 66.1.6) as ‘stsogs par’.
4. Given in Akn (p. 66.1.8) as ‘stsogs par’.
5. N bsags.
6. P bde bar gnas pahi, for D N R ņes pahi.
7. P ņan par hoñs pahi tshig rmanns, for D N R ņan du brjod pahi tshig.

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(4) chos tshol ba la mňon par brtson pas | ston pa ſid [pa] daň | mtshan ma med pa daň | smon pa med pahi chos bzod pa ste |

bzod pa bţi po de dag (647) ye ſes kyi tshogs sogs par ḏgyur ro || brtson ḏgrus bţi ye ſes kyi tshogs sogs par ḏgyur te | bţi gaň že na | ḏi ita ste |

(1) thos pahi brtson ḏgrus daň |
(2) ḏzin pahi1 brtson ḏgrus daň |
(3) bstan pahi2 brtson ḏgrus daň |
(4) nan tan gyi brtson ḏgrus te |

brtson ḏgrus bţi po de dag ye ſes kyi tshogs sogs par ḏgyur ro ||3 bsam gtan gyi yan lag bţi4 ye ſes kyi tshogs [kyi] sogs par ḏgyur te | bţi gaň že na | ḏi ita ste |

(1) dben pa daň |
(2) gcig bur dgah ba daň |
(3) ye ſes daň | mňon par ſes pa tshol ba daň |
(4) saňs rgyas kyi ye ſes la ḏjug pa ste |

bsam gtan gyi yan lag bţi po de dag ye ſes kyi tshogs sogs par ḏgyur ro || ſes rab snaň baňi chos ḏi bţi ye ſes kyi tshogs sogs par ḏgyur te | bţi gaň že na | ḏi ita ste |

(1) chad pa la mi gnas pa daň |
(2) rtąg pa la mi ḏjug pa daň |
(3) rten ciň ſhrel par ḏbyuň ba daň mi ḏgal ba daň |

1. D N R gzuns kyi (Akn ḏzin pahi).
2. D R brtan pahi; P ḏchad pahi (Akn bstan pahi).
3. Pelliot, 977, folio 5b.1–5
4. Akn add: byaň chub sems dpahi.
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(4) bdag med pa la mos pa' ste |

šes rab snañ bahi chos bzi po de dag ye šes kyi tshogs sog s par ḡgyur ro || chos ḡdi bzi thabs kyi ye šes kyi\(^3\) tshogs (sogs par)\(^3\) ḡgyur te | bzi gañ že na | ḡdi lta ste |

(1) ḡjig rten pahi rjes su ḡjug pa dañ |
(2) mdo sdehi\(^4\) rjes su ḡjug pa dañ |
(3) chos kyi rjes su ḡjug pa dañ |
(4) ye šes kyi rjes su ḡjug pa ste |

chos bzi po de dag thabs kyi ye šes kyi tshogs (sogs par)\(^3\) ḡgyur ro\(^6\) || chos ḡdi bzi lam gyi ye šes kyi tshogs\(^7\) (648) la ḡjug par ḡgyur te | bzi gañ že na | ḡdi lta ste |

(1) pha rol tu phyin pahi lam dañ |
(2) byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi lam dañ |
(3) yan lag brgyad pahi lam dañ \(^8\)
(4) thams cad mkhyen pahi ye šes su ḡgro bahi lam ste |

chos bzi po de dag lam gyi ye šes kyi tshogs\(^8\) la ḡjug par ḡgyur ro\(^10\) || mi noms pa ḡdi bzi ye šes kyi tshogs sog s par ḡgyur te | bzi gañ že na | ḡdi lta ste |

(1) thos pas mi noms pa dañ |
(2) bstan pas mi noms pa dañ |
(3) dpyod pas mi noms pa dañ |
(4) ye šes kyis mi noms pa ste |

mi noms pa bzi po de dag ye šes kyi tshogs sog s par ḡgyur ro ||\(^11\)

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1. Given in Akn (p. 66.3.1) as ‘bzod pa’.
2. N thabs kyi; Akn (p. 66.3.1–2) has: thabs bzi po de dag byaṅ chub sems dpah mams kyi ye šes kyi tshogs stogs par ḡgyur ro.
3. Given in Akn (p. 66.3.2) as ‘stsogs par’.
4. Akn (p. 66.3.2) replaces ‘mdo sde’ with ‘sems can’.
5. Given in Akn (p. 66.3.5) as ‘stsogs par’.
6. Akn (p. 66.3.3) has ‘thabs bzi po de dag byaṅ chub sems dpah mams kyi ye šes kyi tshogs stogs par ḡgyur ro’.
7. D N P R lam gyi tshogs kyi ye šes.
8. Akn (p. 66.3.4) has ‘sahi lam dañ’ for ‘yan lag brgyad pahi lam dañ’ (D N P R).
10. Akn (p. 66.3.4–5) has ‘tshogs stogs par ḡgyur ro’, for ‘tshogs la ḡjug par ḡgyur ro’ (D N P R).
11. Pelliot, 977, folio 5b.5–6a.2
gzan yañ bsam gtan bzi ye šes kyi tshogs su ḡgyur te | dben ba dañ | dag pa (conjectural reading) | gcig pur

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gzan yan ye šes kyi tshogs ni gañ sems can thams cad kyi rjes su hgro ba dañ | žīn thams cad kyi rjes su hgro ba ste | sbyin pa las kyan ye šes kyi tshogs su b ila ho || tshul khrims dañ | bzoł pa dañ | brtsom hgrus dañ | bsam gtan dañ | šes rab dañ | byams pa dañ | sfin rje dañ | dgah ba dañ | btan sňoms las kyan ye šes kyi tshogs su b ila ho ||

de cihi phyir že na | ji tsam du byañ cha sems dpahi rtsom pa de thams cad ye šes las rag las pa² | ye šes shion du hgro ba | ye šes la rton pa ste | de ye šes la gnas par³ ye šes can thams cad kyi rton par hgyur te⁴ | bdud thams cad kyis kyan de la glags mi rňed do || saňs rgyas kyi byin gyi rlabs kyan hthob | thams cad (649) mkhyen pahi ye šes la yan hjog⁵ par byed do ||

de gniš ni byañ cha sems dpahi bsoš nams kyi tshogs dañ ye šes kyi tshogs te | byañ cha sems dpahi chen po tshogs rnam par gniš de⁷ la mkhas pa šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||⁸

2.8

de la byañ cha sems dpahi rnam kyis dran pa ñe bar bžag pa la mkhas pa gañ že na | ldi bhži ni byañ cha sems dpahi rnam kyis dran pa ñe bar bžag pa sgm pa ste | bhži gañ že na | bsd la ste | lus la lus kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar bžag pa sgm pa dañ | tshor ba la tshor bahi rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar bžag pa sgm pa dañ | sems la sems kyis rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe

dgah ba dañ | ye šes kyi mnoon bar šes pa thol ba dañ | sňas rgyas kyi ye šes la hjug paho || šes rab kyi snañ bahi chos bhži ye šes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | chad pa la so sor myi gnas pa dañ | rtag pa la myi hjug pa dañ | rkyen dañ bdu ba tshogs te bhuñ ba ma hgsas pa dañ | bdug myed pa la dañ paho || chos bhži bži thabs dañ ye šes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | hjig rten gyi rjes su hjug pa dañ | mdơ sedeši rjes su hjug pa dañ | chos kyi rjes su hjug pa dañ | ye šes kyi rjes su hjug paho || chos bhži lam gyi tshogs kyi ye šes la hjug par hgyur te | pha rol tu phyin pahi lam dañ | byan cha kyi phyogs kyi lam dañ | yan lag bryead kyi lam dañ | thams cad mkhyen pahi ye šes kyi rjes su hgro bahi lam mo || myi no(m)s pa bžis ye šes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | thos pas myi noms pa dañ | bsd pas myi noms pa dañ | dpyod pas myi noms pa dañ | ye šes kyis myi noms paho || (R folio 647.2–648.4).

1. P R gtañ.
2. D N R ye šes kyi khar las pa.
3. N gnaš pa.
4. P ye šes thams cad mkhyen pahi ye šes la rten par hgyur žīn.
5. D N R gžog.
6. Pelliot, 977, folio 6a.2–4
gzan yan ye šes kyi tshogs ni sems can thams cad kyi rjes su hgro ba dañ | žīn tham cad kyi rjes su hgro ba ste | sbyin ba yan ye šes kyi tshogs su bila ho || tshul khrims dañ | bzoł pa dañ | brtsom hgrus dañ | bsam gtan dañ | šes rab dañ | byams pa dañ | sfin rje dañ | dgah ba dañ | btan sňoms kyan ye šes kyi tshogs su b ila ho || de jihi phyir že na | ji tsam tu byañ cha sems dpahi brtsom ba de thams cad ye šes kyi khar las so || ye šes thog mar hgroho || ye šes la so sor rton to | de ye šes la gnaš nas sems can thams cad so sor hkor bar hgyur ro || bdud thams cad kyis de la glags myi rňed de | thams cad mkhyen pahi ye šes su hjog go || šes suňnis so ||
7. D N P R rnam pa de gniš.
8. As in the previous instances, this connecting phrase is here missing in the Pelliot manuscript. Moreover, the next sentences do not correspond to those in the following section of the blockprint editions but are found in a much later part defining wisdom (cf. R folio 685.7), thus effectively jumping almost a third of the entire chapter.

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bar bzag pa sgom pa dan | chos la chos kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa ne bar bzag pa sgom pa ho ||

2.8.1

de la lus la lus kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa ne bar bzag pa sgom pa gan je na | sa rihi bu hdi la byan chub sems dpah lus la lus kyi rjes su lta zin gnas pa de lus kyi scon gyi mtha la ya so sor rtog | lus kyi phyi ma hi mtha hi la ya an so sor rtog | lus kyi da ltar byun ba la ya an so sor rtog ste | kye ma ho lus hdi ni phyin ci log las byun ba ste | rgyu dan rkyen las skyes ba | g.yo ba med pa | byed pa med pa | bdag po med pa | yo ngs su hdzin pa med pa | hdi lta ste | dper na phyi rol gyi rtswa dan | shin gel ba dan | sman dan | nags ts hal dag rgyu dan rkyen las byun zin (650) bdag po med pa1 | yongs su hdzin pa med pa | de bzin du lus hdi hna rtswa | rtsig pa dan | shin dan | bone ba2 dan | mig yor lta ba du3 | phun po dan | kham s dan | skye mched yongs su hdzin pa dan | bdag dan bdag gi ham | rtag pa ham | brtan pa ham | ther zug gam | mi hgyur bahi chos kyi sto ni ste | lus de la na yir mi byahi | lus sinn po med pa de sinn po bla n bar bya ho4 ||
de la sinn po gan je na | hdi lta ste | de bzin gseg s pa hi sku ho || de bzin gseg s pa hi sku ni chos kyi sku | rdo rje hi sku | mi phyed pa hi sku | sra bahi5 sku | hjig rten gsum po6 thams cad dan khyad zugs pa hi sku bdag gis bsgrub par bya ho || bdag gi lus hdi nes pa du mahi skyon chags mod kyi | hon kyan nes pa thams cad dan bral ba hi de bzin gseg s pa hi sku thob par bya ho || zed de so sor rtog pa hi mthus legs par mtho nas | hbyun ba chen po hi gnas kyi lus yo ngs su srun bar byed do || nahi lus ni sems can thams cad kyi ci7 dgos par zad pa ho ||
hdi lta ste | dper na phyi rol gyi hbyun ba chen po bzi po sahi kham s dan | chu hi kham s dan | mehi kham s dan | rlu n gyi kham s sgo sna tshogs dan | dmigs pa sna tshogs dan | rmam gra n sna tshogs dan | yo byad sna tshogs dan | lo n s spyod8 sna tshogs kyi sems can rmam s ne bar hts ho ba de bzin du | bdag gi hbyun ba chen po bzi las gyur pa hi (651) lus hdi sgo sna tshogs dan | dmigs pa sna tshogs dan | rmam gra n sna tshogs dan | lo n s spyod sna tshogs rmam s kyi is9 sems can rmam s kyi ne bar hts ho bar gyur cig | snam mo ||

1. N om: pa.
2. P gseg ma.
4. P de la sinn po med pa ho, for D N R des sinn po bla n bar bya ho.
5. P brtan pa hi.
7. N cir.
8. D N R yongs su spyod pa (also in the next occurrences for the term 'lo n s spyod').
9. D P R mams kyi; N kyi.

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2.8.2

yaň ji ltar na byaň chub sems dphaň tshor ba la tshor baňi10 rjes su lta ba dran pa ē bar bžag pa sgor pa yin že na | hdi la byaň chub sems dphaň gaň ci tshor11 yaň run12 de thams cad sḏug bṣān lao || žes de sḏaṁ du sems te | de ye žes kyis rtoṅs pa daň | žes rab kyis rtoṅs pa daň | thabs kyis rtoṅs pahi tshor ba śin tu rtoṅs pas bde bar tshor ba tshor bar13 byed mod kyi | ṭḥod chags kyi bag la ēlan ba yaň bag la ēlan bar mi byed do14 || sḏug bṣān baňi tshor bas reg nas kyaň nan soň du skyes pa thams cad la sḏiň tje chen po skyed ciň khoň khro baňi15 bag la ēlan yaň bag16 la ēlan bar mi byed do || bde ba yaň ma yin | sḏug bṣān ba yaň ma yin paňi tshor

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1. P tše.
2. D N P R skyeho; Akn (p. 66.5.8) skyoňho; see also next occurrence of term ‘skyeho’.
3. N om: haň (also in the next clause).
4. D N R bya ba la.
5. N ba.
8. N R ṭdu.
9. D N P R baňi (also in all subsequent occurrences of this stockphrase).
14. P mi ēlan lo, for D N R ēlan bar mi byed do (also in the following two occurrences of the phrase ‘ēlan bar mi byed-do’).
Appendix iv

bas reg¹ kyaṅ ² ma rig paḥi bag la ṭal yan bag la ṭal bar mi byed do ||³ de tshor bahi rjes su soṅ bahi dran pas bde ba ḥam | sdug bṣnal ba ḥam | bde ba yan ma yin | sdug bṣnal ba yan ma yin paḥi tshor ba gaṅ tshor ba yan tshor ba de dag las ḥbyuṅ bar lta ba yin no || sems can thams cad kyi tshor ba yons su śes śiṅ ḥi bahi phiyir yan ḥjug ste |

sems can ḥdi dag ni tshor ba la ḥbyuṅ bar mi śes pas de dag bde bahi tshor ba la ḍgaḥ bar byed | sdug bṣnal bahi tshor ba la ḍe sdaṅ bar byed | bde ba yan ma yin | sdug bṣnal ba yan ma yin paḥi tshor ba⁴ la ṭmoṅs par byed kyir⁵ | bdag ni (653) śes rab daṅ ye śes kyis rjes su rtogs paḥi tshor ba | tshor ba thams cad so sord sbyaṅs pa daṅ | thabs mkhas pa daṅ śiṅ rje chen pos yons su bzuṅ bahi rtsom pas | sems can de dag gi tshor ba thams cad rgyun good paḥi phiyir⁶ chos bstan paḥo ||

ciḥi phiyir tshor ba žes bya (ba) ḍe na | rtogs paḥi tshor ba⁷ ni bde bar ḥgyur ro || ma rtogs paḥi tshor ba ni sdug bṣnal bar ḥgyur ro ||
de la rtogs paḥi tshor ba gaṅ ḍe na | ḥdi la bdag gam | sems can nam | srog gam | gaṅ zag gaṅ du⁸ yan tshor bar byed pa med do⁹ || chags pa ni tshor baḥo || yoṅs su ḥḍzin pa ni tshor baḥo || len pa ni tshor baḥo || phiyin ci log ni tshor baḥo || ṭnan par rtog pa ni tshor baḥo || lta bahi bag la ṭal ba ni tshor baḥo || mig tu ḥdu śes pa tshor ba yin pa nas | yid kyi ḥdu śes paḥi bar du ni tshor baḥo || gzugs su ḥdu śes pa tshor ba yin pa nas | chos su ḥdu śes paḥi bar du ni tshor baḥo || gaṅ mig gi ḥdus te reg paḥi rkyen las byuṅ bahi tshor ba bde ba ḥam | sdug bṣnal ba ḥam | bde ba yan ma yin | sdug bṣnal ba yan ma yin paḥi bar du de ni tshor ba žes byaḥo ||
goṅ ma bzin du naṅ daṅ phyiḥi chos ṭnams la sbyar te | yid kyi bar du ḥdus te reg paḥi rkyen las byuṅ bahi tshor ba bde ba ḥam | sdug bṣnal ba ḥam | bde ba yan ma yin | sdug bṣnal ba yan ma yin paḥi bar du ni tshor žes byaḥo || (654)

gžan yan ṭnan graṅs kyis tshor ba gcig ste¹⁰ | de ni sems gcig pus¹¹ ṭnam par rig paḥo ||

1. P add: nas.
2. P bde ba yan med | sdug bṣnal yan med paḥi tshor ba med kyi mdo | de.
3. duṅkhaṅṅa ṭvedanayāḥ ṭṣṛṣṭaḥ sarvapāṇāḥ sūtraṃ putpañnantāḥ ṭupādhayatī || pe || api tu khaṅṅu paṅunar abhiṅṅeṣvāḥ ṭvedanā ṭparāṅgarḥo ṭvedanopādāṅgam ṭvedanopālambho ṭvedanā ṭvipyāṅśo ṭvedanā ṭvikalpo ṭvedaneyāṇī || (Aṅk as cited in Śikṣ, p. 233.6–8).
4. N ma yin pa, for D P R ma yin paḥi tshor ba.
6. N om: phiyir; P so sord sbyaṅ bahi phiyir; R rgyun bcad paḥi phiyir.
7. P tshor bas ma rtogs pa ni, for D N R rtogs paḥi tshor ba (also in the two following occurrences of the phrase ‘rtogs paḥi tshor ba’).
9. P rtogs par byed pa med paḥo, for D N R tshor bar byed pa med do.
10. P ni ḥdi lta ste (also in the next six phrases of this paragraph in which the numerical structure of feeling (tshor ba) is introduced).
11. P puṅi.
tshor ba gnis te | (de ni)¹ phyi daň naň giho || tshor ba gsum ste | (de ni)² ḡdas pa rnam par rig pa daň | ma ḡoňs ba rnam par rig pa daň | da ltar byuň ba rnam par rig paňo || tshor ba bži ste | de ni khams bži rnam par rig paňo || tshor ba lňa ste³ | de ni phuň po lňa yid la byed paňo || tshor ba drug ste | de ni skye mched drug yoňs su rtog paňo || tshor ba bdun te | de ni rnam par ſes pa gnas pa bdun no || tshor ba brgyad de | de ni log par ſes paňi sbyor ba brgyad do || tshor ba dug ste | de ni sems can gyi gnas dguňo || tshor ba bcu ste | de ni⁴ dge ba bchuň las kyi lam³ mo ||

   goň ma bźin du sbyar te | thams cad ni tshor ba ste | dmigs pa ji sňed pa daň | yid la byed pa ji sňed pa de thams cad tshor bar byaňo⁶ || de bas na sems can tshad med pahi⁷ tshor ba tshad med pa ſes byaňo⁸ ||

de la byaň chub sems dpah tshor ba la tshor baňi rjes su lta ſiň gnas pas | sems can thams cad kyi tshor ba skye ba daň | ḡijig pa daň | gnas pa la ye ſes bs kýed par bya ste | gaň sems can thams cad kyi dge ba daň mi dge baňi tshor ba la tshor ba ſes pa de ni byaň chub sems dpah tshor ba la tshor baňi rjes su lta ba dran pa ſe bar bžag paňo ||

2.8.3

de la byaň chub sems dpah tsi sems la sems kyi (655) rjes su lta ba dran pa ſe bar bžag pa gaň že na | ⁶byaň chub sems dpah dehi⁹ mi brjed pa daň | sba ba daň | kun bsruň ba daň | mi g.yen baho || de ḡdi ltar so sor rtog pa ste | sems ni skyes nas ḡijig ciň ſu ste mi gnas pas¹¹ | naň na yaň mi gnas | phyi rol tu yaň mi ḡpho ste | gaň bdag gis thog mar sems bs kýed pa de yaň zad | med¹² | rnam par gyur te | yul na mi gnas | phyogs na mi gnas pas de rňed par mi nus te | sems gaň gis dge baňi rtsa ba bs grubs pa de dag kyaň zad | med | rnam par gyur te¹³ | yul na mi gnas | phyogs na mi gnas so ||

gaň yaň byaň chub tu bsňos paňi sems de yaň Ṽo bo ſid kyiš mtšaň ſid med pa ste | sems

1. Akn (p. 67.3.7–4.3) upholds parallel phrasing throughout this passage, using the term ‘gaň ḡdi’ instead of ‘de ni’.
2. See previous note.
3. R tshor ba lňa gaň že na.
4. Akn (p. 67.4.1) add: mi.
5. P add: rnams.
6. P yin par rig par bya ste, for D tshor bar bya baho.
7. N pas.
8. P de bas na sems can dpag tu med pa rnams kyi tshor ba dpag tu med pa ſes byaňo.
10. Akn (p. 67.4.5) add: byaň chub kyi sems.
11. N nas.
13. P med par gyur te, for D N R med | rnam par hgyur.

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kyis sems rab tu mi šes te¹ | sems kyis sems mi mthon | sems kyis sems mi tshor na | gaṅ gis bdag bla na med pa yaṅ dag par rdzogs paḥi byaṅ chub mṇon par rdzogs par ṭtshaṅ rgya² paḥi sems de gaṅ yin | gaṅ byaṅ chub kyi sems de ni dge baḥi rtsa baḥi sems daṅ mi ḥgrogs³ | gaṅ dge baḥi rtsa baḥi sems de yaṅ bsṅo baḥi sems daṅ mi ḥgrogs | gaṅ bsṅo baḥi sems de yaṅ byaṅ chub kyi sems daṅ | dge baḥi rtsa baḥi sems daṅ mi ḥgrogs so || žes de | de ltar so sor rtog pa na⁴ | mi skrag mi dṇaṅ dṇaṅ bar mi ḥgyur gyi⁵ | de yaṅ ḥdi sṅam du sems te |

ten ciṅ ḥbrei par (656) ḥbyun ba zab mo rgyu daṅ ḥbras bu chud mi za baḥo || gal te sems kyi chos ſiṅ de lta bu sems kyi raṅ bžin ſiṅ yin yaṅ chos thams cad rgyu daṅ rkyen la lag las pa | g.yo ba med pa | byed pa med pa | bdag po med pa | ji ltar ḥdod pa de bžin du ḥgrub kyiš | bdag gis sgrub⁶ pa la brtson par² byaho || sems kyi chos ſiṅ de mi ḥbri bar byaḥo ||
de la sems kyi chos ſiṅ gaṅ | sgrub pa gaṅ že na | sems ni sgyu ma daṅ ḥdra ba ste | de la sbyin⁷ par byed pa yaṅ su yaṅ⁹ med de | de ni sems kyi chos ſiṅ de | gaṅ yaṅ bdog pa thams cad yoṅs su btaṅ nas sāṅs rgyas kyi žiṅ nam par sgrub paḥi rgyan du¹⁰ sṅo bar byed pa de ni sgrub par byed paḥo || sems rmi lam daṅ ḥdra ba rab tu ži baḥi mtshan ſiṅ de ni sems kyi chos ſiṅ de | gaṅ yaṅ tshul khrims sdom paḥi tshogs sogṣ so || chog¹¹ de thams cad myur baḥi mṇon par šes par sṅo ba de ni sgrub paḥo || sems smig rgyu lta bu šīn tu zad pas zad par gyur pa¹² de ni sems kyi chos ſiṅ de | gaṅ yaṅ bzod paḥi stobs daṅ | des pa¹³ byaṅ chub kyi rgyan bsgrub paḥi phyir sṅo ba de ni deḥi sgrub paḥo || sems chu zla lta bu šīn tu dben pa de ni sems kyi chos ſiṅ de | gaṅ yaṅ brtson ḥgrus rtsom pa thams cad sāṅs rgyas kyi chos thams cad yoṅs su rdzogs par byaḥi phyir sṅo ba (657) de ni deḥi sgrub paḥo || sems gzuṅ du med pa mi mṭhon ba de ni sems kyi chos ſiṅ de | gaṅ yaṅ bsam gtan daṅ | rnam par thar pa daṅ | tiṅ ne ḥdzin daṅ | mṅam par gzag pa thams cad sāṅs rgyas kyi tiṅ ne ḥdzin du sṅo ba de ni deḥi sgrub paḥo ||
sems gzugs med pa | mi mṭhon ba | mi thogs pa¹⁴¹⁵ rnam par mi rig pa de ni sems kyi

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1. D P R om: te.
2. P sāṅs rgyas.
3. P ldan (also in the following two occurrences of the word ‘ḥgrogs’).
5. P mi ḥjigs mi skrag | skrag par mi ḥgyur gyi, for D N R mi skrag mi dṇaṅ dṇaṅ bar mi ḥgyur gyi.
7. P sbyor bar.
8. N D sgrib.
12. P šīn tu zad ciṅ med pa.
13. P ḥgrogs na bde ba.
14. D mi thos pa.
15. R add: rnam par mi thogs pa.
chos ཉིད de | gaṅ yaṅ dris paḥi tshig tha dad pa bstan pa thams cad šes pa | saṅs rgyas kyi ye šes yoṅs su rdzogs par sño ba de ni deḥi sgrub paḥo || dmigs pa sna tshogs la sems skye ba de ni sems kyi chos šiṅ de | gaṅ yaṅ dge baḥi rtsa ba la dmigs paḥi sems še bar sbyor ba' de ni deḥi sgrub paḥo || rgyu med pa las sems mi skye ba de ni sems kyi chos šiṅ de | gaṅ yaṅ byaḥ chub kyi phyogs kyi chos kyi rgyuḥi sems skyed pa de ni deḥi sgrub paḥo || gaṅ yul med par sems mi skye ba de ni sems kyi chos šiṅ de | gaṅ yaṅ saṅs rgyas kyi yul gyi rgyuḥi sems še bar sbyor ba de ni deḥi sgrub paḥo ||

śā riḥi bu de ltar na byaḥ chub sems dpah sems la sems kyi rjes su lta ba² dran pa še bar bžag pa sgom paḥo || de sems la sems kyi rjes su lta žiṅ gnas pa na | mnōn par šes pa thob paḥi phyir sems šin tu ḥbrel par byed de | de (658) mnōn par šes pa thob nas sems gcig gis sems can thams cad kyi sems rab tu šes te | šes nas kyaṅ deḥi raṅ bzin gyi³ chos ḥchad do ||

g žān yaṅ byaḥ chub sems dpah (sems la)⁴ sems kyi rjes su lta žiṅ gnas pa na | šin rje chen po thob paḥi phyir sems še bar ḥbrel par byed de | šin rje chen po thob pas sems can thams cad yoṅs su smin par byaḥ baḥi phyir⁵ yoṅs su mi skyoḥo⁶ || sems la sems kyi rjes su lta žiṅ gnas pa na | sems zad pa daṅ sems ḥgog par byaḥ baḥi phyir sems gnas par mi byed kyi | ḥkhor baḥi rgyun gyi kun tu² sbyor ba ṅams kyi is sems mnōn par sgrub ste | sems kyi dran pa šes pa de ma skyes pa daṅ mi skye ba nes par gyur pa la žugs paḥi chos ṅams kyi gnas te | fiṅ thos daṅ raṅ saṅs rgyas kyi sar yaṅ mi ṭuṅ no || saṅs rgyas kyi chos thams cad yoṅs su rdzogs par ma gyur kyi bar du | sems kyi rgyud de rgyun chags par byed de | sems kyi skad gcig gcig daṅ ldan paḥi šes rab kyi bla na med pa yaṅ dag par rdzogs paḥi byaḥ chub mnōn par rdzogs par htshaṅ rgya ste | śā riḥi bu de ltar na byaḥ chub sems dpah sems la sems kyi rjes su lta ba⁸ dran pa še bar bžag pa sgom mo ||

2.8.4

śā riḥi bu ji ltar na byaḥ chub sems dpah chos la chos kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa še bar bžag pa sgom pa yin že na | śā riḥi bu hiḍi la byaḥ chub sems dpas ḥphags paḥi šes rab kyi mig gis chos gaṅ (659) mnōn ba de dag byaḥ chub kyi šin poḥi bar du bar ma dor⁹ rmoṅs par mi

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1. P bsfin pa byed pa (also in the next occurence of the phrase 'še bar sbyor ba').
2. D N P R žiṅ.
3. P no bo šiṅ du, for D N R raṅ bzin gyi.
4. Given in Akn (p. 68.2.1).
5. D N R bya ba la.
7. P ḥkhor ba daṅ ḥbrel ciṅ; R ḥkhor baḥi rgyun gyi kun nas.
8. D N P R žiṅ.

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Appendix iv

ह्युर ते | दे चोस ला चोस क्यी रज्स सु ल्ता झिं ग्नास पा ना | गान स्तों पा न्यिद दु मा ग्तोग्स पा दाँ | ग्तशन मा मेड पर मा ग्तोग्स पा दाँ | न्मोन पा मेड पर मा ग्तोग्स पा दाँ | न्मोन पर ह्दु मि भयेड पर मा ग्तोग्स पा दाँ | 

dनोस पो मेड पर मा ग्तोग्स पाहि चोस र्दुल त्साम¹ यान मि म्थों नो || 

gान र्तेन चिं हब्रेल पर ह्युञ्ज बर मा ग्तोग्स पाहि चोस र्दुल त्साम यान यान दाङ पर रज्स सु मि 
m्थों नो || भयान चुब सेंम्स द्पाह डे चोस ला चोस क्यी रज्स सु ल्ता झिं ग्नास पा ना | चोस न्यिद यान 
dाङ पर र्ते सु म्थों गि | चोस मा यिन पा मि म्थों नो || 

de ला चोस गान झे ना | ह्दी ल्ता स्टे | ब्दाङ मेड पाहि दोन दां | सेंम्स चन मेड पाहि दोन दां | 
s्रोग मेड पाहि दोन दां | गान जांग मेड पाहि दोन टे | दे नि चोस न्येस ब्याहो || 

de ला चोस मा यिन पा गान झे ना | ह्दी ल्ता स्टे | ब्दाङ दु ल्ता बा दां | सेंम्स चन दु ल्ता बा दां | 
s्रोग टु ल्ता बा दां | गान जांग टु ल्ता बा दां | चाद पर ल्ता बा दां | र्ताग पर ल्ता बा दां | ह्युञ्ज बर 

ल्ता बा दां | ह्जिंग पर ल्ता बा दां | दे नि चोस मा यिन पा न्येस ब्याहो || 

यान झा तिं बु चोस थांम्स बाद चोस सो || चोस थांम्स साड़ू चोस मा यिन पाहो || 

de चीति फ्यिर 

(660) झे ना | स्तों पा न्यिद दां | ग्तशन मा मेड पा दां | स्मोन पा मेड पा न्स पाहि फ्यिर चोस 

थांम्स बाद चोस सो || ब्दाङ दां ब्दाङ गिर ल्ता बाहि बाग ला नाल बाहि फ्यिर चोस 

थांम्स बाद चोस मा 

यिन पाहो || 

de ला भयान चुब सेंम्स द्पाह³ चोस ला चोस र्ते सु ल्ता झिं ग्नास पा ना | चोस डे दाङ ला गान यान 

सांस र्ग्यास क्यी चोस मा यिन पा गान लास भयान चुब टु मि ह्युर बा दां⁴ | गान लास सांस र्ग्यास सु 

मि ह्युर बा दां | गान लास लाम दु मि ह्युर बा दां | गान लास थार पर मि ह्युर बा दां | गान लास 

ह्युञ्ज बर मि ह्युर बाहि चोस र्दुल त्साम यान मि म्थों टे | दे चोस थांम्स बाद ह्युञ्ज बर 

न्स स्ग्रीब पाद मेड पा न्येस ब्या बाहि स्निं र्जे चेन पो ह्त्होब टे | सेंम्स चन थांम्स 

क्यी भून न्शों म्स पा⁵ यान डे दाङ न्धो न्मों पा दां ब्कास पा मा यिन ग्यि | डे दां न्धो न्मों पा मेड 

पाहो न्येस ब्को माल ह्दु न्स स्क्यॆड दो ||⁶ 

de चीति फ्यिर 

(660) झे ना | दे ल्तार डे दाङ नि न्स पाहि दोन ला यान दाङ पर ह्जुग पार टे | न्धो न्मों पा 

र्नाम्स ला बसाः पा हाम | फ्नूङ पोहि न्दो सो मेड डे | डे दां न्यिद र्ते सु र्तोग्स पाहि 

फ्यिर

1. P phra rab tsa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the phrase 'rdul tsa').
4. P om: ba ḍaṅ (also in the next three occurrences of the phrase 'mi hgyur ba ḍaṅ').
5. D P add: la.
6. yathā tāvad arātha | dharme dharmāṇudarāṇī viharaṇ bodhisattvo na kaḍīḍa dharmam suṣumnaśayaṇi | yato 

na buddhāḥdharmaḥ yato na bodhiḥ | yato na mārgo | yato na niḥsanāṇi | sa sarvadharmaḥśanāṇi iti | 

viditva 'nāvaraṇam nāma mahākaruṇaśamādhiṃ samāpadyaye | sa sarvadharmaḥ śravaṇāṇaḥ ca kṛṣṇaṃ 

asamjñānām pratilabhate | niḥkṣeṣa ete dharmāḥ | na ete sakṣeṣaḥ | tathā hy ete nītārthe 

samavasaranti nāsti klesāṇām saṃsārayo | na rāgabhāvo na dveṣabhāvo na mohabhāvo | esām 

eva klesāṇām abhavat bhūteḥ | yat svabhāvaḥ ca klesās tat svabhāvaḥ bodhir ity evam śmṛtīm 

upasthāpayati iti || (Akn as cited in Śīkṣ, p. 236.6–13).
7 N om: hi ḍoṅ po.
byaṅ chub po || ŋon moṅs paḥi raṅ bžin gaṅ yin pa byaṅ chub kyi raṅ bžin yaṅ de yin no ||
byaṅ chub kyi raṅ bžin gaṅ yin pa ŋon moṅs paḥi raṅ bžin yaṅ de yin te | de ltar dran pa ŋe
bar bzag¹ kyaṅ | cuṅ zad kyaṅ ŋe bar hjog pa med | rab tu hjog pa med | (661) mi hjog pa
med de | chos ŋid de gnas pa ŋid du rab tu śes so || de bas na chos kyi dbyiṅs de ni gnas pa
ňid ces byaḥo || chos kyi dbyiṅs gnas² gaṅ la gnas pa | sems can gyi kham kyaṅ gnas de la
gnas so || sems can gyi kham kyaṅ gnas gaṅ la gnas pa | nam mkhaṭi kham kyaṅ gnas de la gnas
te | de bas na chos thams cad nam mkhaṭ daṅ mtshuṅs žes byaḥo ||

byaṅ chub sems dpah de chos la chos kyi rjes su lṭa žiṅ gnas pa na saṅs rgyas kyi chos la
rton pa yin | chos thams cad saṅs rgyas kyi chos su mos par byed de | de zad pa śes pa yaṅ
bskyed moṅ kyi | ḥdus ma byas paḥi zad pa yaṅ mñoṅ du mi byed | mi skye ba śes pa yaṅ
mñoṅ par bsgrub [pa] mod kyi | sems can la lṭa baḥi phyir yaṅ skye la | mi skye baḥi mṭhaḥ
de yaṅ mi gtoṅ no || dran pa ŋe bar bzag paḥo žes bya ba ni chos thams cad dran pa de la bzag
par byed ciṅ | ēn thos sam | raṅ saṅs rgyas sam | saṅs rgyas kyi chos ji sṛṇed chos su btags³
pa de dag thams cad ma lus par dran pa de la bzag ste | dran pa de yaṅ brjed⁴ par mi byed |
phyi mṭhaḥi bar du mṭoṅs paṅ mi byed do ||

chos la chos kyi rjes su lṭa ba dran pa ŋe bar bzag paḥo žes bya ba de ni bstan pa dpag tu
med pa ste | kun tu spyod yul ma yin pa | saṅs rgyas kyi chos thams cad la (662) yaṅ dag par
ḥdus ba⁵ | sems can thams cad kyi sems tshim par byed pa | bdud thams cad ḥdul ba | raṅ
byuṅ ba ṭogs paḥi phyir te |

śa riḥi bu de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpahchos la chos kyi rjes su lṭa ba dran pa ŋe bar bzag
pa sgom mo || de dag ni dran pa ŋe bar bzag pa bzi žes byaḥo ||

śa riḥi bu de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpah dran pa ŋe bar bzag pa bzi po de dag la mṭhas pa
śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.9

de la byaṅ chub sems dpah nrams kyi byaṅ chub kyi yan lag la mṭhas pa gaṅ že na | byaṅ
chub sems dpah nrams kyi byaṅ chub kyi yan lag ḥdi bdun te | bdun gaṅ že na | ḥdi lṭa ste |
dran pa yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag daṅ | chos nram par ḥbyed pa yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi
yan lag daṅ | brtson ḥgrus yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag daṅ | dgaḥ ba yaṅ dag byaṅ chub

1. D P R gzog; N gzag.
3. D bdags; N P gdags.
4. P brjod.
5. D R yaṅ dag par ḥdus ba; N yaṅ dag par bdul ba; P yaṅ dag par rjes su hjug pa.
kyi yan lag danh | sin tu sbyaams pa yan dag byaan chub kyi yan lag danh | tin ne hdzin yan danh
byaan chub kyi yan lag danh | btaa snoms yan dag byaan chub kyi yan lag ste | sa rihi bu de dag
ni byaan chub sems dpah rnam kyi byaan chub kyi yan lag bdun no ||

de la dran pa yan dag byaan chub kyi yan lag gan ze na | dran pa gan gis chos rtog par byed |
chos la so sor rtog par byed | chos la dpyod par byed | chos (663) yons su tshol bar byed cin |
chos rnam par hbyed par byed pa danh | chos la rnam par rtog par byed de | de dran pa des gan
chos rams kyi no bo nids kyi mtshan nid de yan rjes su rtogs so || yan chos rams kyi no bo
nids kyi mtshan nid ses pa gan ze na | chos thams cad ran gi mtshan nid kyi1 ston pa ste | gan
de ltar dran zin khoon du chud pa de ni dran pa yan dag byaan chub kyi yan lag ces byaho ||

de la chos rnam par hbyed pa yan dag byaan chub kyi yan lag gan ze na | gan chos kyi phun
po brgyad khri bzi sto n rab tu rnam par hbyed pa ses pa ste | nes pahi don kyaan nes pahi don
du | dran bahi don kyaan dra bahi don du | kun rdzob kyi don kyaan kun rdzob kyi don du |
don dam pahi don kyaan don dam pahi don du2 | brdahi kyaan brdahi | rnam par gtan la bab
pahi kyan rnam par gtan la bab pahi3 chos de dag ji ltar rab tu dbye bar bya ba de bzin du |
de dag rnam par hbyed par byed de | de ni chos rnam par hbyed pa yan dag byaan chub kyi
yan lag ces byaho ||

de la brtson hgrus yan dag byaan chub kyi yan lag gan ze na | gan chos rnam par hbyed pa
de nids kyi dgaab ba danh | sin tu sbyaams pa danh | tin ne hdzin danh | btaa snoms danh | ye ses kyi
bar du hdzin pa danh | spro ba danh | stobs danh | rtul ba danh | mi zlogs pahi mos pa danh | mthu
danh | brtson pa mi hdor ba danh4 | (664) lam mohon par rtogs pahi phyir5 brtson hgrus rtsom6
pa ste | de ni brtson hgrus yan dag byaan chub kyi yan lag ces byaho ||

de la dgaab ba yan dag byaan chub kyi yan lag gan ze na | dgaab ba gan danh | chos la dgaab ba
gan danh | chos la mchog tu7 dgaab ba gan gis sems mi zum zin danh ba ste | ma zum pahi dgaab
ba des gan lus sam | sems kyaan sin tu byaan bar8 byed la | kun nas fion mens pa yan sel ba de
ni dgaab ba yan dag byaan chub kyi yan lag ces byaho ||
de la sin tu sbyaams pa yan dag byaan chub kyi yan lag gan ze na | gan lus sin tu sbyaams pa

1. D N P kyi.
2. A kn D don dam pa yan don dam par; P R don dam pahi don kyaan don dam pahi don du.
3. P mthshan ma yan mthshan mar rnam par gdon mi za ba danh | rnam par gdon mi za bar, for D N R brdaahan
brdar | rnam par gtan la bab pa yan rnam par gtan la bab par.
4. P brtson hgrus mi gton ba danh.
5. D N R rtogs par bya ba la.
7. P rab tu.
8. P spyod par, for D N R sin tu byaan bar.
Appendix iv

daṅ | sems śin tu sbyaṅs pa daṅ | ņon moṅs pa śin tu sbyaṅs pa daṅ | sgrīb¹ pa med pa daṅ |
tīṅ ne ḥḍzin du dmigs pa la sems ņe bar gzag pa ste | de ni śin tu sbyaṅs pa yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yaṅ lag ces byaḥo ||

de la tīṅ ne ḥḍzin yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yaṅ lag gaṅ že na | gaṅ sems mñaṃ par gzag pas² chos śes pa rtogs par hgyur gyi³ | sems mñaṃ par ma gzag pas ni ma yin pa daṅ | sems mñaṃ par gzag pas⁴ chos de dag mnoṅ par rdzogs par ḥṭshaṅ rgyaḥi | sems mñaṃ par ma bzung pas ma yin te | chos mñaṃ pa śiṅ daṅ | chos la gzol ba ma gtogs par rjes su chags paḥi kun nas dkris pas rtogs par mi byed de⁵ | de ni tīṅ ne (665) ḥḍzin yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yaṅ lag ces byaḥo ||

de la btaṅ sṅoms yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yaṅ lag gaṅ že na | gaṅ yid bde ba daṅ | gaṅ⁶ yid mi bde baḥi cha daṅ ḥṭhun paḥi chos rams⁷ la sems mi ḥḍzin pa daṅ | ḥiṅg rten gyi chos kyis mi ḥphrogs pa daṅ | mtho⁸ dman du mi gnas paḥi phyir rab tu mi g.yo (ro) || mi ḥkhrug |
rab tu mi ḥkhrug | yaṅ dag par mi ḥkhrug | chags par mi byed | že sdaṅ bar mi byed kyi | ḥphags paḥi lam de śiṅ daṅ ḥṭhun par byed pa ste | de ni btaṅ sṅoms yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yaṅ lag ces byaḥo ||

śā riḥi bu de ltar na byaṅ chub sens dpāḥ rams kyi⁹ byaṅ chub kyi yaṅ lag de bdun la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||¹⁰

2.10

2.10.1

de la byaṅ chub sens dpāḥ rams kyi lam la mkhas pa gaṅ že na | byaṅ chub sens dpāḥ rams kyi lam ni ḥdi brgyad do || brgyad gaṅ že na | ḥdi lta ste | yaṅ dag paḥi lta ba daṅ | yaṅ dag paḥi rtog pa daṅ | yaṅ dag paḥi nag daṅ | yaṅ dag paḥi las kyi mthah daṅ | yaṅ dag paḥi

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1. N sgrībs; P R bsgribs.
2. R ma bzung pas, for D N P bzung pas.
3. D R N te.
4. R ma bzung pa.
5. P lta ba bag la ḥlā daṅ kun nas bskor ba de dag spāṅs kyan mnoṅ par rdzogs par ḥṭshaṅ mi rgya ba, for D N R rjes su chags paḥi kun nas dkris pas rtogs par mi byed de.
7. P yid mi bde ba stan pa la phan paḥi chos.
8. N mthon.
10. P add: ḥphag pa byaṅ chub sens dpāḥi sde snod ces bya tsheg pa chen poḥi mdo || bam po cu dgu pa; D has 'bam po bcu dgu pa' only.

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Appendix iv

htsho ba daň | yaň dag pahi rtsol ba¹ daň | yaň dag pahi dran pa daň | yaň dag pahi tiň ňe hdzin te | de dag ni byaň chub sems dpah rnams kyi lam yan lag brgyad paňo ||

de la yaň (666) dag pahi lta ba găn že na | lta ba găn hphags pa højig rten las ḭdas pa ste | bdag tu lta ba las laňs pa ma yin | sems can du lta ba las laňs pa ma yin | srog tu lta ba las laňs pa ma yin | găn zag tu lta ba las laňs pa ma yin | chad pa daň | rtag pa daň | ĥbyuň ba daň | højig par lta ba las laňs pa ma yin | dge ba daň mi dge bar lta ba las laňs pa ma yin pa nas | mya ňan las ḭdas par lta baňi bar las² laňs pa ma yin pa ste | de ni yaň dag pahi lta ba žes byaňo ||

de la yaň dag pahi rtoq pa găn že na | rtoq pa³ găn gis ḏdod chags daň | že sdaň | gits mug la sosgs pahi ňon moňs pa gnas par ḟgyur baňi rtoq pa de ldaň bar mi byed⁴ kyi | rtoq pa găn gis tshul khrims daň | ňin ne hdzìn daň | šes rab daň | rnam par grol ba daň | rnam par grol baňi ye ňes mthoň ba ĥbyuň bar ḟgyur ba de la rtoq pa ste | de ni yaň dag pahi rtoq pa žes byaňo ||

de la yaň dag pahi ňag găn že na | yaň dag pahi ňag⁵ găn gis bďag daň gţan la mi gduň žin | de phan pahi rjes su sbyor baňi ňag daň ldaň pa yin te | ňag des lma mňam pa la ḟgyur pa (ste) | de ni yaň dag pahi ňag ces byaňo ||

de la yaň dag pahi las kyi mthah găn že na | găn las (667) gnag la⁶ rnam par smin pa gnag pa de lta bu mňon par ḟdu mi byed pa daň | găn las dkar la⁷ rnam par smin pa dkar ba de lta buňi las mňon par ḟdu byed pa daň | găn las dkar gnag la rnam par smin pa dkar gnag tu ḟgyur ba⁸ de lta buňi las mňon par ḟdu mi byed pa daň | găn las dkar gnag ma yin (pa) la rnam par smin par mi ḟgyur ba las zad par ḟgyur ba de lta buňi las mňon par ḟdu byed pa ste | de las bďag gir bya ba la⁹ rton pa yaň dag pahi las la brtson (pa ste | de ni)¹⁰ yaň dag pahi las kyi mthah žes byaňo ||

de la yaň dag pahi ḟtsho ba găn že na | găn ḟhphags pahi rigs daň | sbyaňs pahi yon tan mi gtoň ba daň | kha gsag¹¹ med pa daň | tshul ḷchos pa med pa | thob kyis hjal ba¹² med pa daň | dgaň sla ba daň | gso sla ba daň | cho ga mi lhod pa daň | gţan gyi rňed pa la phrag dog med

1. P ḛbad pa.
2. ḅk (p. 70.4.8) ḭdas par lta baňi bar las; D N R ḭdas par lta ba las; P ḭdas pahi bar lta ba las.
4. P ḟgyur.
6. P po.
7. P po.
9. P de raň gi las (...) byuň ba las, for D N R de las bďag gir bya ba la.
10. D N P R pas.
11. N bsag.
12. P gzog slons, for D N R thob kyis hjal ba.
Appendix iv

pa dan | bdag gi med pas chog Ses pa dan | kha na ma tho ba med pa dan | hphags pas gnan
bahi htsho ba ste | de ni yah dag pahi htsho ba zes byaho ||
de la yah dag pahi rtsol ba gah ze na | rtsol ba gan1log par spyod par b£ad pa hdod chags
dah | ze sdan dah | gti mug gi2non mohs pa bag la nal bahi rtsol ba de mi hdod kyi | rtsol ba
gah hphags pahi lam dah bden pa la hjug pa mya han las hdas par hgro bahi lam du hjug
par3byed pahi rtsol ba dehi ijes su hgro ba ste | de ni yah (668) dag pahi rtsol ba ies byaho ||
de la yah dag pahi dran pa gah ie na | dran pa gah Sin tu he bar gzag4 pa dah j tha mal pa
ma yin pa dah | dran ba dah | gya gyu med pa dah | hkhor bahi nes pa dah skyon la lta ba dah |
mya han las hdas pahi lam du hdren pahi dran pa dah | dran par byed pa dah | hphags pahi
lam mi bijed pa ste | de ni yah dag pahi dran pa ies byaho ||
de la yah dag pahi tin he hdzin gah ie na | yah dag pa nid du5 mnam pa | chos thams cad
la mnam pa ste | tin he hdzin de la rab tu gnas na yah dag pa nid du hjug ste61gah yah byah
chub sems dpahi tin he hdzin de la gnas na7 sems can thams cad rab tu thar par bya bahi
phyir | yah dag pa nid du hjug pa de ni yah dag pahi tin he hdzin ies byaho || hdas pa dah | ma
byon pa dah | da ltar byuh bahi sahs rgyas bcom ldan hdas mams kyi lam8 mi zad pa hdi
byah chub sems dpas mhon par rtogs nas hchad pa dah | ston pa dah | yah dag par rab tu ston
pa | de ni yah dag pahi tin he hdzin ies byaho |]9
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8
9.

N om: gan.
R gan; D dan.
D R lam du hjug par, N lam du hjog par; P nan tan gton bar.
D N P R gzog.
P yan dag par (also in the next occurrence of the term ‘yah dag da hid du’).
P yah dag pahi mi hgyur ba la hjug par byed de, for D N R yah dag pa hid du hjug ste.
N nas.
Akn (p. 71.1.6) ‘tin he hdzin’ for Bdp ‘lam’.
tad yatha samyagdrstih samyaksamkalpah samyagvak samyakkarmantah samyagajlvah samyaksmrtih
samyaksamadhiSca |j tatra katama samyagdrstih | ya lokottara
natmadrstisamutthitanasattvanajivanaposanapurusanapudgalanamanujanamanavadrstisamutthita
noccheda^a^vatadrstisamutthita na bhavavibhavadrstisamutthita na kuSalakuSalavyakrtadrstisamutthita ya
ca na samsaranirvanadrstisamutthita j iyamucyate samyagdrstih || tatra katamah samyaksamkalpah j yaih
samkalpai ragadvesamohakleSah samuttisthanti | tan samkalpan na samkalpayati | yaih samkalpaih
SilasamadhiprajMvimuktijfianadarSanaskandha samuttisthanti | tan samkalpan samkalpayati | ayamucyate
samyaksamkalpah || tatra katama samyagvak | yaya vaca natmanam na paramSca tapayati natmanam na
paramSca kleSayati natmanam na paramSca upakaroti taya aryayuktanukulya vaca
samadhipritivacanairyukto bhavati | iyamucyate samayagvak |j tatra katamah samyakkarmantah | yatkarma
krsnam krsnavipakam tatkarma nabhisamskaroti | yatkarma Suklam Suklavipakam tatkarmabhisamskaroti |
yatkarma Sulkakrsnam vartate Sulkakrsnavipakam vartate tatkarma nabhisamskaroti | yatkarma
krsnaSulkavipakam krsnaksayaya samvartate tatkarmabhisamskaroti | satkarmabhisamkaroti
satkarmapratisaranakarmantah | iyamucyate samayakkarmantah || tatra katamah samyagajlvah j yada
aryavamSena gunasamlekhanutsaijanata na kuhanata na lapanata na naispesikata ^uratacara^ilata
paralabhesu na irsya atmalabhasantustih anavadyata aryanumatanavadyajivika | ayamucyate
samayagajivah || tatra katamah samyagvyayamah | yo vyayamo mithya yasmadragadvesamoha anu^erate
tam vyayamam necchati | yo vyayamah samyagaryamargasatyavataro nirvanagami pratipadarpayati tarn
vyayamam samanugacchati | ayamucyate samayagvyayamah || tatra katama samyaksmrtih | ya supasthita
aprakampya rjuka akutila samsaradvesadinavadarSika nirvanapatliapranetri smrtih
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2.10.2
gāñ yan lam la mkhas pa ni byaṅ chub sems dpah rnam kyi lam yan lag gnis pa ste | yan
lag gnis gaṅ že na | ḡdi lta ste | ži (669) gnas daṅ | lhag mthoṅ ste | de ni lam yan lag gnis pa
ţes byaṅ ||
de la  ži gnsa gaṅ že na | gaṅ sems kyi ži ba daṅ | rab tu ži ba daṅ | ņe bar ži ba daṅ | mi
g.yeṅ ba daṅ | dbaṅ po rnam bsdam pa daṅ | mi rgod pa daṅ | ma kheṅs pa daṅ | mi ḡphyar
ba daṅ | mu cor mi smra ba daṅ | des² pa daṅ | sbas pa daṅ | g.yo (ba) med pa daṅ | yid du
hoṅ ba daṅ | gcig pur dgaḥ ba daṅ | ḡdu ḡdzi sel ba daṅ | dben par dgaḥ ba daṅ | lus dben pa
daṅ | sems ma ḡkhrul ba³ daṅ | dgon paḥi sgo yid la byed pa daṅ | chog şes pa daṅ | ḡdod pa
ńuṅ ba daṅ | ḡtsho ba yoṅs su dag pa daṅ | cho ga phun sum tshogs pa daṅ | spyod lam sbas
pa daṅ | dus şes pa daṅ | tshod şes pa daṅ | droḍ⁴ şes pa daṅ | dgaṅ sla ba daṅ | gso sla ba daṅ
| so sor rtog pa daṅ | mi mtho mdaḥ ba daṅ | tshig ŋan pa smras pa bzod pa daṅ | rnal
ḥbyor gyi sgoṛ sems skyed pa daṅ | naṅ du yaṅ dag ḡjog la mṅon par dgaḥ ba daṅ | bsam gtan
gyi yan lag yid la byed pa daṅ | byams pa skyed pa daṅ | sňiṅ rje mṅon par sgrub pa daṅ |
dgaḥ ba la gnas pa daṅ | btaṅ sňoms sgom pa daṅ | bsam gtan daṅ po nas | brgyad kyi bar du
mthar gyis sňoms par ḡjug pa ste | de ni ži gnsa şes byaṅ || yaṅ⁵ ži gnsa kyi tshogs tshad
med pa ste | tshogs de la⁶ gaṅ rjes su rtogs pa de ni ži gnsa şes byaṅ || (670)
de la lhag mthoṅ gaṅ že na | gaṅ şes rab kyi cha daṅ ḡthun paḥi⁷ sgom paḥi lam ste | chos
rnam la g.yo ba med pa daṅ | sems can med pa daṅ | srog med pa daṅ | gaṅ zag med pa daṅ |
phuṅ po rnam la sgyu maḥi phuṅ por mthoṅ baḥi şes pa daṅ | kham snam la chos kyi
kham su mthoṅ baḥi şes pa daṅ | skye mched rnam la groṅ ston par mthoṅ baḥi şes pa daṅ |
mig la rab tu rnam par phye bar mthoṅ baḥi şes pa daṅ | rten ciṅ ḡbrel par ḡbyuṅ ba la mi
ḥgal bar mthoṅ baḥi şes pa daṅ | sems can du lta ba daṅ bral bar mthoṅ baḥi şes pa daṅ | ḡryu

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1. D P om: ‘bam po bco dgu pa’ at this place.
2. P mňen.
3. P ḡkhrug pa.
4. P ḡid tshod.
5. N gaṅ.
6. P lás.
7. P cha la phan paḥi, for D N R cha daṅ ḡthun paḥi.

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dañ ḫbras bu ram par smin pa mthon bahi šes pa dañ | ḫbras bu thob pa mthon sum du bya ba mthon bahi šes pa dañ | yañ dag pa ſiḍ du hjug pa la hjug par byed pa¹ mthon bahi šes paḥo
||

yañ lhag mthon ſes bya ba ni | ḥdi lta ste | chos rnams ji lta ba bži tu mthon ba dañ | chos rnams kyi² de kho na ſiḍ mthon ba dañ | chos rnams kyi gžan ma yin pa ſiḍ mthon ba dañ | chos rnams kyi ston pa ſiḍ mthon ba dañ | mtshan ma med pa mthon ba dañ | smon pa med pa mthon baḥo || yañ lhag mthon ſes bya ba ni rgyus mthon ba med pa dañ | rgyu med par mthon ba med pa dañ | skye ba dañ | hjig pa dañ | gnas pahi rgyus mthon ba med pa dañ | dmigs pahi rgyus mthon ba med ciṅ lhag par mthon (671) yañ | cuṅ zad kyaṅ³ lhag par mi mthon baḥo ||

gžan yañ lhag mthon ni mthon bas kyaṅ mthon la | mthon⁴ ba yañ mi mthon ba ste | gaṅ gi tshe de ltar mthon ba deḥi tshe yañ dag par mthon baḥo || yañ dag par mthon na lhag mthon la mkhas pa yañ rjes su ḥthob ste | de la byañ chub sems dpañ lhag mthon⁵ la | mthon par ḥdu byed par yañ mi ltuṅ ſiṅ | dge bahi rtsa ba mñoṅ par ḥdu byed pa la yañ mi gnas te | de ni byañ chub sems dpañ lhag mthon Ṉo ||
de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ ži gnas dañ | lhag mthon la mkhas pa šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.10.3
gžan yañ lam la mkhas pa ni byañ chub sems dpañ rnams kyi lam rnam pa bži ste | rnam pa bži gaṅ ſe na | ḥdi lta ste | s.damage pa mi dge bahi chos ma skyes pa rnams ma skyed pahi phyir ḥduṃ pa skyed⁶ | ḥbad bar byed | brtson hgrus rtsom | sems rab tu ḥdzin | yañ dag par rab tu hjog go ||² s.damage pa mi dge bahi chos⁸ skyes pa rnams span bahi phyir ḥduṃ pa skyed | ḥbad bar byed | brtson hgrus rtsom | sems rab tu ḥdzin | yañ dag par rab tu hjog go | dge bahi chos ma skyes pa rnams bskyed pahi phyir ḥduṃ pa skyed | ḥbad bar byed | brtson hgrus rtsom | sems rab tu ḥdzin | yañ dag par rab tu (672) hjog go || dge bahi chos skyes pa rnams gnas pa

1. P yañ dag pahi mi ḥgyur ba la hjug pa.
4. D N R blṭa.
6. P skye bar dad pa skyed, for D N R skyed pahi phyir ḥduṃ pa skyed (also in all subsequent occurrences of this phrase, with ‘pañ/bahi phyir ḥduṃ pa skyed’ being invaribly replaced by the phrase ‘par/bar dad pa skyed’).
7. P smon lam yañ dag par rab tu ḥdebs pa dañ, for D N R yañ dag par rab tu hjog pa dañ (also in the three subsequent occurrences of this phrase in this section).
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daṅ phyir žiṅ hḥbyuṅ ba daṅ | ūams par mi hḥgyur ba daṅ | chuṅ mi za bar bya bahl phyir ḡdun pa skyed1 | ḡbad bar byed | brtson hḥgrus rtsom | sems rab tu ḡdzin | yaṅ dag par rab tu ḡhog paṅho ||

gaṅ sdiṅ pa mi dge bahl cho mskyes pa ṃams mi skyed pahi phyir ḡdun pa skyed ces bya ba ni tshul bžin yid la byed pahi tshig bla dags so || ḡbad par byed | brtson hḥgrus rtsom žes bya ba ni tshul bžin yid la byed pa de mi gtoṅ ba(hi tshig bla dags so)² || sems rab tu ḡdzin | yaṅ dag par rab tu ḡhog ces bya ba ni tshul bžin la so sor rtog pahi tshig bla dags so || de cìḥ phyir že na | tshul bžin la rab tu sbyor ba ni mi dge bahl cho mams mi hḥbyuṅ bahl⁴ phyir ro ||
de la mi dge bahl cho mams gaṅ že na | ḡdi lṭa ste | tshul khṛims kyī mi ḡthun pahi phyogs⁵ daṅ | tīṅ ne ḡdzin gyi mi ḡthun pahi phyogs daṅ | šes rab kyī mi ḡthun pahi phyogs so ||
de la tshul khṛims kyī mi ḡthun pahi phyogs gaṅ že na | ḡdi lṭa ste | tshul khṛims ūams pa daṅ | gaṅ gžan la la⁶ tshul khṛims ūams par ḡgyur bahl cho mams (tshul khṛims kyī phyuṅ poḥi mi ḡthun pahi phyogs)⁷ te | de ni tshul khṛims kyī mi ḡthun pahi phyogs žes byaḥo ||
de la tīṅ ne ḡdzin gyi mi ḡthun pahi phyogs gaṅ že na | gaṅ cho ga ūams pa daṅ | gaṅ gžan la la sems g.yen bar byed pahi cho tīṅ ne ḡdzin gyi phyuṅ poḥi mi ḡthun pahi phyogs te | de ni tīṅ (673) ne ḡdzin gyi mi ḡthun pahi phyogs žes byaḥo ||⁸
de la šes rab kyī mi ḡthun pahi phyogs gaṅ že na | ḡdi lṭa ste | lṭa ba ūams pa daṅ | gaṅ gžan la la lṭa ba kun nas ldaṅ bahl⁹ sgrīb par byed pahi cho [gaṅ] | šes rab kyī phyuṅ poḥi mi ḡthun pahi phyogs de ni šes rab kyī mi ḡthun pahi phyogs žes bya ste | de ni sdiṅ pa mi dge bahl cho mams žes byaḥo ||

tshul bžin yid la byed pa gaṅ gis sdiṅ pa mi dge bahl cho d la bu de dag spaṅ bahl phyir ḡdun pa skyed | ḡbad par byed | brtson hḥgrus rtsom | sems rab tu ḡdzin | yaṅ dag par rab tu

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1. P sgoṃ pa mi brjed pa daṅ | ma stor bar dad pa skyed, for D N R phyir žiṅ hḥbyuṅ ba daṅ | ūams par mi ḡgyur ba daṅ | chuṅ mi za bar bya bahl phyir ḡdun pa skyed (also in partially corresponding passages below).
2. AKN (p. 68.5.6) reads 'yid la byed pahi tshig bla dags so'. BDP reads 'yid la byed pa de mi gtoṅ baḥo'.
4. P rgyu ba mi ḡgyur bahl, for D N R mi hḥbyuṅ bahl.
5. P log pahi ghen po, for D N R mi ḡthun pahi phyogs (also in all subsequent occurrences of this phrase in this section).
6. P gaṅ gžan yaṅ la la (also in the following two occurrences of this phrase).
7. Given in AKN (p. 69.1.1); see also the following parallel phrases in the BDP.
8. [pāpakāṇām aksaḷaṇāṃ dharmānāṃ prahāṇāya chandaṃ janayatotyatra prastāve ēyāni cānyāni punah] kāṁcicid ānyāṇi api cītaviṣekpākarāṇi ēyāni samādhīskandhāsyā vipāḳsāya sāṃvartante | āyam ucyante samādhiṣvīpāḳṣaḥ | yāvad ime ucyante pāpakā | aksaḷā | dharmā iti || (AKN as cited in ŚIKŚ, p. 117.13–16).
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hjog pa ste | de bas na mi dge bahi chos de dag sems la phun por gyur pa ma yin | yul na mi gnas | phyogs na mi gnas so ||

gan yan mi dge bahi chos de nams sems la rgyu ba sdug pa| nam pas hdod chags sam | khon kdro bahi nam pas ze sda na nam | ma rig pa| nem pas gti mug gam | rgyu da| sngril pa gan dag las byun ba sles shin | de la tshul bzin yid la byed pa| nem pa mi gtsan bas hdod chags zi bar byed | byams pas ze sda| zi bar byed | rten ci| hrel par hbyun bas gti mug zi bar byed de | gan kun nas nnon mo| pa de dag zi ba de ni tha s|ad du btags pahi phyir spo| ba zes byaho || gan spo| ba (674) ni gan yan rned par mi hgyur ro || mfi| pa| nid kyis2 chos thams cad mnon sum pas [na] de| phyir3 yan dag par spo| ba zes bya ste | de ni yan dag par spo| ba gnis paho ||

gan yan dge bahi chos ma skyes pa nams skyed pa| phyir hdun pa skyed | hbad par byed | brtson hgrus rtsom | sems rab tu hdzin | yan dag par rab tu hjog pa| zes bya ba de ni gnas4 tshad med pa ste | de ci| phyir ze na | gan bya| chub sems dpah sems dpah chen pos yan dag par bsgrub par5 bya bahi dge bahi chos tshad med pahi phyir ro ||

de la h|un pa ni dge bahi rtsa ba thams cad kyi rtsa baho || brtson hgrus yan dag par bsgrub pa ni dge bahi rtsa ba thams cad kyi rtsa baho || sems rab tu hdzin pa| f|ms su lon par byed pa6 de ni dge bahi rtsa ba thams cad kyi rtsa ste | de ni yan dag par spo| ba gsum paho ||

gan yan dge bahi chos skyes pa nams gna| pa da| | f|ms par mi hgyur ba da| | chud mi za bar bya bahi phyir hdun pa skyed | hbad par byed | brtson hgrus rtsom | sems rab tu hdzin | yan dag par rab tu hjog ces bya ba de ni dge bahi rtsa ba byan chub tu bs|os pa| tshig bla dags so || de ci| phyir ze na | dge bahi rtsa ba byan chub tu bs|os pa| ni mthah byan chub kyi s|in| po| rab tu slar chud za bar mi| hgyur ro || de ci| phyir ze na | de ltar khams gsum la mi gna| par sems skyed pa| phyir ro || (675) gan khams gsum la gna| pa| dge bahi rtsa ba de ni zad par hgyur ro || de ci| phyir ze na | de ltar sems bskyed pa de ni khams gsum la7 gna| pa| phyir ro || gan yan dge bahi rtsa ba khams gsum la mi gna| thams cad mkhyen par bs|os pa| de ni zad par mi hgyur te8 | de ni yan dag par spo| ba bzi pah| ||

1. P rgyu ba gtsan pahi, for D rgyu bahi sdug pahi.
2. N kyi.
4. P tshig.
5. P bsdu bar, for D N R yan dag par bsgrub par (also in the next occurrence of the term ‘yan dag par sgrub pa’).
6. P sgrol ba, for D N f|ms su lon par byed pa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term ‘f|ms su lon par byed pa’).
7. N om: gna| par sems skyed pa| phyir ro || gan khams gsum la gna| pa| dge bahi rtsa ba de ni zad par hgyur ro || de ci| phyir ze na | de ltar sems bskyed pa de ni khams gsum la.
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de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpal lam yan lag bzi pa la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do

2.10.4

gzan yaṅ lam ma mkhas pa ni byaṅ chub sems dpal lam yan lag lha pa ste | lha gana že na | hdi lta ste | dad pahi dpaṅ po daṅ | brtson hgrus kyi dpaṅ po daṅ | dran pahi dpaṅ po daṅ | tiṅ ne ḡdzin gya dpaṅ po daṅ | śes rab kyi dpaṅ po ste |

de la dad pahi dpaṅ po gaṅ že na | dad pa gaṅ gischos bzi la dad par byed pa ste | bzi gaṅ že na |

(1) ḡkhor ba na spyod pahi ḡjig rten pahi¹ yaṅ dag par lta ba la mñoṅ par dad de | de las kyi rnam par smin pa la rton pa yin te | srog gi phyir yaṅ sdig pahi las mi byed pa daṅ |
(2) byaṅ chub sems dpal spyod pa la yaṅ dad de | spyod pa la žugs pa de theg pa gzan la ḡdod par mi byed pa daṅ |
(3) don dam pa ŋes pahi don daṅ | rten ciṅ ḡbrel par ḡbyun ba zab mo daṅ | sems can la rnam par dpypod pa² daṅ | stoṅ pa ŋiṅ daṅ | mtshan (676) ma med pahi mtshan ŋiṅ kyi chos thams cad la dad de | lta bar byas pa³ thams cad bag la ņal bar mi byed pa daṅ |
(4) saṅs rgyas kyi chos thams cad daṅ | stobs daṅ | mi ḡjigs pa rnam la dad ciṅ thos nas the tṣom med de⁴ | nem nur med par chos de rnam sduṅ par byed pa de ni dad pahi dpaṅ po Ńes byaḥo ||
de la brtson hgrus kyi dpaṅ po gaṅ že na | chos gaṅ la dad pa de brtson hgrus kyi dpaṅ pos skyed par byed pa ste | de ni brtson hgrus kyi dpaṅ po Ńes byaḥo || chos gaṅ dag brtson hgrus kyi sbsdus pa de dag dran pahi dpaṅ pos chud mi za bar byed pa de ni dran pahi dpaṅ po Ńes byaḥo || chos gaṅ dag² dran pahi dpaṅ pos chud mi za bar byed pahi chos de dag tiṅ ne ḡdzin gya dpaṅ pos rtse gcig tu byed pa de ni tiṅ ne ḡdzin gya dpaṅ po Ńes byaḥo || chos gaṅ dag tiṅ ne ḡdzin gya dpaṅ pos rtse gcig tu⁶ byed pa de dag śes rab kyi dpaṅ pos so sor ḡtog par byed de | gaṅ chos de dag śes pa de ni śes rab kyi dpaṅ po Ńes byaḥo ||
de ltar na dpaṅ po lha po de dag lhan gcig tu ḡbrel pa ste | saṅs rgyas kyi chos thams cad yons su rdzogs par byed do || luṅ bstan pahi sa yaṅ thob par byed de | hdi lta ste | dper na phyi rol kyi mñoṅ par śes pa lha daṅ ldan pa dag mḥal na ḡdug pa | bud med daṅ skyes pahi dpaṅ por ma gyur kyi bar du mḥal na ḡdug pa la luṅ mi ston pa de (677) bzin du | saṅs rgyas bcom

1. P kyi (Akn, p. 86.3.4, gyi)
2. N rnam par spyod pa; P ḡtog.
3. D bya ba.
4. D P R med pa; N med.
6. D N P R pa.

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ldan ḥdas mams¹ kyan byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ dбаṅ po lña po de dag даn² mi ldan gyi bar du luṅ mi ston te de ni lam yan lag lña pa po la mkhas pa şes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ lam yan lag lña pa la mkhas pa şes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.10.5

gzan yan śā rihi bu byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ lam yan lag lña la mkhas pa gaṅ že na | yan lag lña ni | ḥdi lta ste | dad pahi stobs dañ | brtson hgrus kyi stobs dañ | dran pahi stobs dañ | tiṅ ne ḥdzin gyi stobs dañ | şes rab kyi stobs so ||

de la dad pahi stobs gaṅ že na | gaṅ mos pa dad pa mgo gcig pa mi brdzi ba ste⁴ | gal te dehi druṅ du bdud sdig can saṅs rgyas kyi gzugs su bsgyur te ḥoṅs nas | chos kyi ye şes la dad pa gaṅ yan ruṅ ba la la ḥig gis chos ḥdi dag ni saṅs rgyas kyi chos ma yin no || şes ḥbral bar byed | ḥdun⁵ pa zlog par byed kyan | yons su brtag pa bzun na ḥbyuṅ ba chen po bźi rnams ni gzan du ḥgyur gyi | dad pahi stobs la mos pahi⁶ byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ ni de lta bu⁷ ma yin no || de ltar byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ stobs las ḥbral bar mi nus pa de ni dad pahi stobs so ||

de la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi brtson hgrus kyi stobs gaṅ že na | gaṅ brtson hgrus rtsom Şin dge bahi chos (678) gaṅ dañ gaṅ la mnon par sbyor ba de dān de dag la bṛtān⁸ pahi stobs kyi mthu thob kyan | gnas der ma bsgral gyi bar du stobs kyi mthu de la lha dañ bca pahi hjig

1. P om: mams.
3. katumā pañca | śraddhendriyam vyāryendriyam śmrīndriyam samābhendriyam prajñendriyamitī | tatra katamā śraddhā | yatā śraddhayā caturu dharmān abhiśraddadhāti | katamāṁ ca caturah | samsāravacarīṁ laukikīṁ samyagṛṣṭīṁ śraddadhāti | sa karvapiṇākapatratiṣṭhāno bhavati | yad yat karma kariyāmi tasya tasya karmanah phalaipīkṣaṃ pratyānubhavīṣāmiḥ | sa jīvītaheti api pāpam karma na karoti | bodhisattvacārīkāṁ abhiśraddadhāti | tat cāgṛtpratipannāṁ cāyātra yāne śṛṣṭāḥ notpāyati | paramārthaśīlāṁ gambhīravipatītasamaptāda

nairātmyaniḥsattvaniḥvijñānapugalavahārasūnyātiśāntījñaprapñiḥsattvānīśa ruddharmān śrutvā śraddadhāti | sarvādṛṣṭikṛtāṁ ca nonuṣṭe sarvabuddhaharmān balavaśārādya-prabṛṭhīṁ ca śraddadhāti | śraddhāya ca vigata-kathā-kathastān buddhaharmān samudānayati | idamucate śraddhendriyam || tatra katamād vyāryendriyam | yān dharmān śraddhendriyāna śraddadhāti tān dharmān viyārindriyēna samudānayātīdūrmat vyāryendriyāna || tatra katamat śmrīndriyam | yān dharmān śraddhendriyēna samudānayātī | idamucate śmrīndriyam | tatra katamat samābhendriyēna | yān dharmān śmrīndriyēna na viprapāśeyati | idamucate śmrīndriyam | tatra katamat prajñendriyēna | yān dharmān prajñendriyēna na viprapāśeyati tān samābhendriyēnaikāgrikarotāi tāna samābhendriyēnaikāgrikarotāi tāna samābhendriyēnaikāgrikarotāi tāna samābhendriyēna pratyāvēkṣante pratyāvihāyati | yad etesu dharmeṣu pratīyātānām aparāpratīyātānām idamucate śmrīndriyam || evam imāni pañcendriyēna sahitāni anuprābhyāti sarvabuddhaharmān paripūrayati vyākaraṇābhumīnān cāyātani || (Akṣ as cited in Śikṣā, pp. 316.13–317.13)

4. P phyogs gcig pa mi tshoms pa ste, for D N R mgo gcig pa mi brdzi ba ste (with ‘mgo gcig pa’ being below invaribaly rendered ‘phyogs gcig pa’).
5. P dad.
6. P mos pahi stobs la gnas pahi, for D N R dad pahi stobs la mos pahi.
8. R bstan.

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rten rnam kyis¹ rnam par zlog pa ham | bstan pa ham² | rnam par bslaṅ bar mi nus te | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpahi brtson Ḇgrus kyi stobs žes byaḥo ||

de la byaṅ chub sems dpahi dran pahi stobs gaṅ že na | chos gaṅ daṅ gaṅ la dran pa ņe bar bţag pas sems ņe bar bţag³ pa ste | de ni ņon moṅs pa gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba dag gis gtor ba ham⁶ | g.yeṅ bar mi nus te | dran pahi stobs kyi mthu⁵ des ņon moṅs pa thams cad Ḇjom žiṅ dran pa de yaṅ mi choms pa ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpahi dran pahi stobs žes byaḥo ||

de la byaṅ chub sems dpahi tiṅ ņe Ḇdzin gyi stobs gaṅ že na | gaṅ Ḇdu Ḇdzin thams cad du⁶ dben par spyod pa ste | gaṅ dag gi lam gyi sgra thams cad la yaṅ rtog la | deḥi bsam gtan daṅ poḥi sgraḥi tsher ma la sgrīb par mi byed pa daṅ | dge bar rtog pa la yaṅ rnam par rtog [pa] mod kyi | (deḥi) bsam gtan gņis pa la yaṅ sgrīb par mi Ḇgyur ba daṅ | de Ḇgaḥ ba daṅ bde ba skyes te gnas mod kyi | deḥi bsam gtan gsum pa la sgrīb par mi Ḇgyur ba daṅ | de sems can yoṅs su smin par bya ba daṅ | dam pahi chos yoṅs su guṅ bar bya bahi phyir btaṅ sṅoms pa yaṅ ma yin mod kyi⁷ | (deḥi) bsam gtan (679) bţi pa la sgrīb par⁸ mi Ḇgyur ba ste | de bsam gtan de bţi la gnas na bsam gtan daṅ rnam par thar pas gţom⁹ pa mi nus te | de tiṅ ne Ḇdzin gyi gnaṅ kyi mi gtoṅ la | tiṅ ne Ḇdzin gyi dbaṅ gis kyaṅ mi skye ba ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpahi tiṅ ne Ḇdzin gyi stobs so ||

de la byaṅ chub sems dpahi ņes rab kyi stobs gaṅ že na | gaṅ Ḇhjig rten¹⁰ daṅ Ḇhjig rten las Ḇdas pahi chos rnam kyis mi choms pahi ye ņes te | byaṅ chub sems dpahi skyes ma thag tu bzoṅi gnaṅ hujig rten na ji sṇed spyod pa dam pa daṅ | dkaḥ¹¹ bar byed pa daṅ | sṇed dkaḥ ba de dag thams cad slob dpon med par mṇon du Ḇgyur te | gaṅ Ḇhjig rten las Ḇdas pa de¹² dag kyaṅ gaṅ gis Ḇhjig rten dag sgröl bar byed de | de dag byaṅ chub sems dpahi ņes rab daṅ ye ņes kyi stobs kyis¹³ byuṅ ba | lha daṅ mi rnam kyis¹⁴ mi choms pa ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpahi ņes rab kyi stobs so || Ḇdi ni yan lag lha pahi lam gţan no ||

de ṇtar na byaṅ chub sems dpahi (lām)¹⁵ yan lag lha la mkhas pa ņes rab kyi pha rol tu

1. N om: kyis.
2. R om: bstan pa ham.
4. D R gtor ba ham; N btoṅ ba ham; P bsre bahi ma.
5. Akn, D N R hskyed pa.
7. P yal bor gtoṅ pa yaṅ ma yin., for D N R btaṅ sṅoms pa yaṅ ma yin mod kyi.
11. N Ḇgaḥ.
15. Cf. concluding parallel phrases in the preceding passages on 'skill in the path'.

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phyin pa la spyod do

2.10.6
gząn yan mдор bsdu na byaⁿ chub sems dpah rṇams kyi lam ni mgo gcig pa ste | ḥdı lta ste¹ | lam bgrod pa gcig paho || ḥdı lta ste | byaⁿ chub sems dpah gcig pu (680) gņis su med pa | bla na med pa yaⁿ dag par rdzogs pahi byaⁿ chub tu grogs med par śin tu brtson pahi stobs kyi mthu yońs su gzuṅ bahi bsam pas go cha bgos pa ste | gzano gcis ma bstan² pa | gzano gi³ drin mi hjog pa | bdag ŋid⁴ byed pa | bdag gi stobs kyi yan dag par ḥphags pa ste | de ltar go cha sra bar⁵ bgos nas | gaⁿ sems can thams cad kyi ma thob⁶ pa de bdag gis thob par byaḥo || gaṅ ḥphags pa thams cad daṇ | gaṅ theg pa la gsar du žügs pahi byaⁿ chub sems dpah thams kyi ma thob pa de bdag gis thob par byaḥo ||

sbyin pa ni naḥi grogs ma yin gyi | na ni sbyin pahi grogs poho⁷ || tshul khrims daṇ | bzod pa daṇ | brtson ḥgrus daṇ | bsam gtan daṇ | šes rab ni naḥi grogs ma yin gyi⁸ | na ni de dag gi grogs poho⁹ || na ni pha rol tu phyin pa rṇams kyi bslaṅ¹⁰ bar bya ma yin gyi | pha rol tu phyin pa rṇams nas bslaṅ bar byaḥo || goṅ ma bżin du sbyar te¹¹ | dge bahi rtsa ba thams cad la rgyas par şes par byaḥo || na ni dge bahi rtsa ba thams cad kyi bslaṅ bar bya ma yin gyi | dge bahi rtsa ba thams cad nas bslaṅ bar byaḥo || ŋes de ltar buḥi chos rṇams la grogs med ciṅ na gcig pu gņis su med par¹² rdo rje hu gdan la ḥdug nas | bdud stobs daṇ bcas pa bṣul te | (681) skad cig¹³ gcig daṇ ldan pahi şes rab kyi bla na med pa yaⁿ dag par rdzogs pahi byaⁿ chub mḥon par rdzogs par ḥṭshaṅ rgya bar byaḥo ||¹⁴ ŋes | de la ŋes par rtoṅ pahi¹⁵ bsam pahi

1. D de nas; R de ni.
2. P bsad.
3. D gcis.
5. D R sra bar; N sra ba; P dam du.
6. P rしたこと (also in the following three occurrences of the term ‘thob’).
7. D N P R so.
9. D N P R so.
11. P de bżin du bsdu te, for D N R goṅ ma bżin du sbyar te (also in similarly phrased sentences of that sense below).
12. P R pas.
13. P gcis ma.
14. eko bodḥisasattvo ‘dvitiyo śāḥyo ‘nuttarāyāṁ samyak-śambodhau sammāham samnadhायati | sa viryabalaparigrhitenādhyāśayena aparāvākāśavayāṃkāri | svabalabalodgatah | sa evam dr̥hasamnāhaḥ samnadhāḥ | yat kiccit sarvasattvānāḥ pariprā cittavāyam bhavisyati tad aham pariprācittavāyam bhavisyati tad aham pariprācittavāyam bhavisyati tad aham pariprācittavāyam bhavisyati tad aham pariprācittavāyam bhavisyati tad aham pariprācittavāyam bhavisyati tad aham pariprācittavāyam bhavisyati tad aham pariprācittavāyam bhavisyati | yat sarvārāḥ sarvanavāyānāramprasthitāḥ bodhisattvāḥ na pariprācittavāyaḥ tad aham pariprācittavāyaḥ tad aham pariprācittavāyaḥ tad aham pariprācittavāyaḥ tad aham pariprācittavāyaḥ tad aham pariprācittavāyaḥ tad aham pariprācittavāyaḥ tad aham pariprācittavāyaḥ tad aham pariprācittavāyaḥ tad aham pariprācittavāyaḥ | na mama dānam sahāyaṃ | aham punar dānasya sahāyaṃ | na mama śilākṣāntiviryāhyānaprajñāḥ sahāyikāḥ | aham punaḥ śilākṣāntiviryāhyānaprajñāṇam sahāyo | nāham pāramitābhīr upasthātvya mayā punaḥ pāramitāḥ upasthātvyaḥ | evam samgrahavastuṣu sarvakusalamuleṣu caleyaṃ | yāvad ekākīnā mayā dvitiyenaśāḥayena vajramaye mahimaṃḍale sthitena sabalab sahānam māram dharmśāyytvā ekacittakaṃsāmāyuktayā prañīṇāḥ ‘nuttarāḥ samyak-śambodhāḥ abhisambodhāya || (Akn as cited in Śiks, 481
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sbyor ba1 de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi lam2 bgrod pa gcig pu3 žes bya ste | de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi lam bgrod pa gcig pu la mkhas pa šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ rnam s kyi lam4 la mkhas pa ste | de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ5 lam la mkhas pa šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.11

de la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ rnam s kyi rten cin ḱbrel par ḱbyun ba la mkhas pa gaṅ že na | ḱdi ltar byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ gcig pu dben par soṅ ste | naṅ du yaṅ dag pa6 bzung nas ḱdi ltar sems la rtog pa ste7 |

sdug bsṅal gyi phun po chen po ḱdi gaṅ las ḱbyun bar ḱgyur sṅam pa daṅ | de ḱdi ltar sems te | tshul bzin ma yin pa byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir ma rig pa ḱbyun8 | ma rig pa byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir9 ḱdu byed ḱbyun | ḱdu byed byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir rnam par šes pa ḱbyun | rnam par šes pa byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir miṅ daṅ gzugs ḱbyun | miṅ daṅ gzugs byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir skye mched drug ḱbyun | skye mched drug byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir reg pa ḱbyun | reg pa byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir tshor ba ḱbyun | tshor ba byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir srd pa ḱbyun | srd pa byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir skye ba ḱbyun | skye ba byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir rga si ḱbyun | rga si byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir mya ḱna daṅ | smre sṅags ḱdon pa10 daṅ | sdug bsṅal ba daṅ | yid mi bde ba daṅ | ḱkhrug pa rnam s ḱbyun bar ḱgyur ro || žes de sṅam du sams so11 ||
de yaṅ ḱdi sṅam du sams par ḱgyur te12 | ji ltar mi g.yo ba daṅ | mi byed pa daṅ | bdag po med pa daṅ | dge baṅ rgyu las byuṅ ba daṅ | mi dge baṅ rgyu las byuṅ ba daṅ | mi g.yo baṅ rgyu las byuṅ daṅ | mya ḱna las ḱdas paṅi rgyu las byuṅ baṅ bahi chos de dag thams cad rkyen las byuṅ ba ste | gaṅ yaṅ las kyi rgyu gaṅ dag gis sams can gaṅ dag gi daṅ poṅi rgyu tshad ma

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p. 278.4-14)

15. D P R pa.
1. P de ltar brtsam paṅi sbyor ba rtog pa, for D N R de la űs par rtog paṅi bsam paṅi sbyor ba.
3. P lam phyogs gcig pu.
5. D add: rnam s kyi.
7. N skyes te.
8. P naṅ du yaṅ dag űs pa sdug bsṅal gyi phun po chen po ḱdi gaṅ las ḱdu bar ḱgyur te űs de ltar sems kyi rtog pa skye ba las tshul bzin ma yin pa ḱbyun ba las ḱgyur te, for D N R from naṅ du yaṅ dag (pa) to rig pa ḱbyun.
9. P byuṅ ba las (also in the following occurrences of the phrase 'byuṅ baṅ bahi phyir' in this section).
10. P mya ḱna slots pa, for D N R smre sṅags ḱdon pa.
11. D N R sṅam mo.
12. D N R de yaṅ ltar sems te.

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Appendix iv

daṅ | lhag paḥi cho gahi rgyu tshad maḥi ḏbras buḥi rgyu ḏgrub pa daṅ | de ltar zin pa daṅ mi
zin pa la gaṅ rgyu ḏudas pa byuṅ ba de thams cad rab tu šes pa ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems
dpaḥi rten ciṅ ḏbrel par ḏbyuṅ ba la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||

de yaṅ ḏag gaṅ že na | tshul bzin ma yin pa¹ yid la byed pa ḏgags paḥi phyir ma ḏig² pa
ḥag ḏag go || ma ḏig pa ḏag⁳ paḥi phyir ḏdu byed ḏag pa nas | sduṅ bsnał gi yin po chen
po ḏbaḥ ņig gi bar du ḏag par ḏgyur ro || žes de sṇam du sems te | de ltar gaṅ de la šes pa de
ni rten ciṅ ḏbrel par ḏbyuṅ ba la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||

de yaṅ chos thams cad ni rgyu la rag las | ḏkyen la⁴ rag las | ḏudas pa la raglas pa ste | (683)
gaṅ rgyu daṅ | ḏkyen daṅ⁵ | ḏudas pa la rag las pa de ni ḏdag gi byin gi rlaus ma yin | srog
daṅ gaṅ zag gi byin gi rlaus ma yin te | de la ḏgraṅ ba gaṅ yaṅ ma yin do || žes de ltar (sṇam
du) sems te | gaṅ de ltar sems pa de ni rten ciṅ ḏbrel par ḏbyuṅ ba la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||

de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sans rgyas kyi chos thams cad byaṅ chub kyi rnam paḥi
ṛkyen du słoṅ bar byed la | ḏkyen de dag la yaṅ zad pa daṅ ḏag pa so so ḏrog la | sems caṅ
la lta baḥi phyir zad pa daṅ ḏag pa ma yin pa yaṅ⁶ thob par byed pa de ni | byaṅ chub sems
dpaḥi rten ciṅ ḏbrel par ḏbyuṅ ba la mkhas paḥo ||

2.12

de la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi chos thams cad la mkhas pa gaṅ že na | chos thams cad ces bya
ba ni | ḏdi lta ste | ḏudas byas daṅ ḏudas ma byas so || de la byaṅ chub sems dpas ḏudas byas daṅ
ḥodus ma byas la mkhas par bya ste |

de la ḏudas byas la mkhas pa gaṅ že na | gaṅ lus kyi ḏdu byed daṅ | ṅag gi ḏdu byed daṅ |
yid kyi ḏdu byed dag pa ste⁷ || gaṅ yaṅ⁸ lus daṅ | ṅag daṅ | yid kyi dge ba de dag ḏhus ma
byas paḥi byaṅ chub la so ḏrog paḥi phyir⁹ | thams cad mkhyen pa fiṅ du sṅo ba de ni
ḥodus ma byas la mkhas paḥo ||

gzan yaṅ ḏhus byas la mkhas pa ni | ḏdi lta ste | (684) gaṅ sbyin paḥi pha rol tu phyin pa
daṅ | tshul khrims daṅ | ḏzod pa daṅ | ḏrton ḏgrus daṅ | ḏsam gtan daṅ | šes rab kyi pha rol tu

1. D paḥi; P la.
2. N ḏigs.
3. N ḏgags.
4. N las (also in the next clause).
6. P mi zad pa yaṅ ḏag pa de yaṅ, for D N R zad pa daṅ ḏag pa ma yin pa yaṅ.
7. D N R ḏdu byed do; ḏknon (p. 55.5.3) add: mnon par ḏudas byas ba de dag thams cad byaṅ chub la ḏrog pas
thams cad mkhyen pa fiṅ du yøṅs su bṣno ba ḏdi ni dehi ḏhus ma byas la mkhas pa žes byaḥo ||
8. D N gaṅ la.
9. D N ḏag kyi dge ba de dag ḏhus ma byas paḥi byaṅ chub la ḏhus ma byas par ḏrog pas, for P
yid kyi dge ba de dag ḏhus ma byas paḥi byaṅ chub la so ḏrog paḥi phyir.

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phyin pahi¹ dañ | pha rol tu phyin pa lña rhaps sdud paño || gañ yan ḭuds ma byas pahi śes pas | śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la pha rol tu phyin pa lña rhaps kyis smod par mi byed ciṅ | pha rol tu phyin pahi tshogs thams cad la mkhas pa dañ | zag pa med pahi byaṅ chub de la mos pas gañ thams cad mkhyen pa ſïid du bsño ba de ni deḥi² ḭuds ma³ byas la mkhas paño ||

gzan yan ḭuds byas la mkhas pa ni (gañ) sems can thams cad la ḥod zer thogs pa med pa dañ | bsdu ba bžis sems can⁴ sdud paño⁵ || gañ yan śñaems pa med pahi phyir sems can la bdag med par ḥdzin pa dañ⁶ bsdu ba la mkhas śīṅ | ḭuds ma byas pahi byaṅ chub la mos nas | thams cad mkhyen pa ſïid du bsño ba de ni deḥi ḭuds ma byas la mkhas paño ||

gzan yan ḭuds byas la mkhas pa ni gañ ḥkhor bāḥi rgyun gyi kun nas⁷ sbyor ba rhaps yan dag par mi geod la | ḥkhor bāḥi rgyun gyi ſōn moṅs pa rhaps yan dag par geod pa dañ | byaṅ chub tu dmigs pahi sbyor ba rhaps rgyun chags par byed pa⁸ dañ | sbyor ba phyogs gcig pa rhaps mi sdud par spyod pa⁹ de ni ḭuds byas la mkhas pa ſes byaḥo || gañ yan ston pa ſïid dañ | mtshan ma med pa dañ | smon pa med pahi chos rhaps la ḥdris par (685) bya ba¹⁰ śes śīṅ mnon sum du mkhas pa dañ | byaṅ chub tu gzan gyi drīṅ la mi hjog mod kyi¹¹ | ḭuds ma byas kyaṅ mnon sum du mi byed pa de ni ḭuds ma byas la mkhas paño ||

gzan yan khamg sgm na spyod kyaṅ khamg sgm na spyod pahi ſōn moṅs pa rhaps kyis mi gos¹² pa de ni deḥi ḭuds byas la mkhas paño || gañ yan khamg sgm las byuṅ bāḥi ye śes rab tu śes kyaṅ | ḥbyuṅ bāḥi khamg su mi ltuṅ ba de ni ḭuds ma byas la mkhas paño¹³ ||

gaṅ chos thams cad la mkhas pa ſes bya ba de ni thams cad mkhyen pa ſïid kyi¹⁴ tshig bla dags so || gaṅ thams cad mkhyen pa ſïid kyi ye śes rtogs pa yoṅs su rdzogs pa de ni śes rab dañ mkhas pa med na ḥbyuṅ bar mi ḥgyur bas | deḥi phyir chos thams cad la mkhas pa ſes bya ste | de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpah chos thams cad la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

1. D N R pa dañ, for P pahi.
3. Akn (p. 55.5.5) om: ma.
5. P bsdu pa ſïid dañ.
7. Ḫkhor bar hjug pahi sbyor ba, for D N R Ḫkhor bāḥi rgyun gyi kun nas sbyor ba.
8. P kyi tjes su sbyor ba, for D N R rgyun chags par byed pa.
11. D N R ciṅ.

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Section III

3.1

de la\textsuperscript{1} šes rab ni gan | pha rol tu phyin pa rnams kyi don ni gan že na | šes rab ces bya ba ni dge ba dañ mi dge bâhi chos (686) rnams rab tu šes pañho | šes rab ni ŋes par ḥbyed pañhi cha dañ hθun pañhi\textsuperscript{2} chos rnams kyi mnon sum mo | ḥphags pañhi chos mnon sum du gyur pañhi phyir tshad mar gyur pa ni šes rab bo | chos yañ dag pa ji lta ba bźin du rtogs pa ni\textsuperscript{3} tshad mar gyur pañho | šes rab ni lta bar gyur pa thams cad dañ | kun nas ldañ dañ | sgrīb pa dañ | sgrīb par byed pañhi chos rnams rab tu rtogs pañho | šes rab ni ḥdod pa dañ | tshol\textsuperscript{4} ba dañ | smon lam thams cad kyi smon lam dañ bral bañho | šes rab ni śin tu sbyañs pañhi phyir

\textsuperscript{1} In P (pp. 87.5.5–88.2.2), large parts of the section on the nature of wisdom (R folio 685.5–688.1) are cast in a slightly different order from that of D N and R. In meaning, however, they correspond closely to that of the other editions. In P, they run as follows:

de la Šes rab ni gan | pha rol tu phyin pa rnams gyi don ni gan že na | šes rab ces bya ba ni dge ba dañ mi dge bâhi chos rnams par rab tu šes pañho | šes rab ni ŋes par rtogs pañhi phyogs kyi chos rnams kyi mnon sum mo | ḥphags pañhi chos mnon sum du gyur pañhi phyir tshad mar gyur pa ni šes rab bo | chos yañ dag pa ji lta ba bźin du rtogs pa ni šes rab bo | lta bar gyur pa thams cad dañ kun nas ldañ dañ | sgrīb pa dañ sgrīb par byed pañhi chos rnams la smon pa dañ bral ba ni šes rab po | ḥdod pa tshol pa thams cad lhañ | sün par byed pa ni Ḇuñ ba thams cad gton pañhi phyir šes rab po | chos kyi dañ ba la dmñga śin rnams par gud pañhi phyir dañ bar byed pa ni šes rab po | ye šes thams cad mnon sum du gyur pañhi phyir rten pa ni śes rab po | byan chub kyi phyogs kyi chos thams kad kyi gnañ ni šes rab po | rñed pañhi mthon fhid ni śes rab po | tshad mar gyur pañho | šes rab ni lta bar gyur pa thams cad dañ | kun nas ldañ dañ | sgrīb pa dañ sgrīb par byed pañhi chos rnams rab tu rtogs pañho | šes rab ni ḥdod pa dañ | tshol ba dañ | smon lam thams cad kyi smon lam dañ bral bañho | šes rab ni śin tu sbyañs pañhi phyir

\textsuperscript{2} P nes par rtogs pañhi phyogs kyi.

\textsuperscript{3} D pañhi phyir; P R pañhi.

\textsuperscript{4} N tshor.
sim par byed paho || šes rab ni chos kyi dgaḥ bar la dmigs pa rnam par mi gcod pahi phyir rab tu dgaḥ bar byed paho || šes rab ni ye šes thams cad mnon sum du gyur pahi phyir rten¹ paho || šes rab ni byaṅ chub kyi phyogs kyi chos thams cad kyi gnas so || šes rab ni theg pa ji lta ba bzin du² hbras bu rttogs pahi phyir thob pahi mtshan ņid do || šes rab ni raṅ bzin gyis ye šes snaṅ ba rab tu šes pahi mtshan ņid do || šes rab ni chu bo thams cad las grol bahi phyir rab tu sgrol paho || šes rab ni yaṅ dag par gyur pa la ḫdren paho || šes rab ni dge bahi chos thams cad rab tu ḫdzin paho ||³

šes rab ni ſon moṅs pahi bag la ṅal thams cad daṅ bar byed paho || šes rab ni (687) chos thams cad kyi spyi bo thob pahi mchog go || šes rab ni raṅ ḫbyuṅ bahi ye šes rttogs par bya ba la⁴ dam paho || šes rab ni khams gsun daṅ ma ḫdres pas rgyu⁵ daṅ bral bahi || šes rab ni ḫphags pa thams cad kyis⁶ sin tu bzuṅ bahi || šes rab ni mtshan mar yoṅs su rttog pa thams cad spaṅs pas smon lam mam par ḫad paho || šes rab ni mun pa mun gnag daṅ bral bas bag med pahi gṛṇ paḥo ||⁷

šes rab ni nraṅ ḫbyor spyod pahi sa la gnas pa thams cad kyi sbyor bahi || šes rab ni thams cad mkhyen pahi ye šes kyi lam la⁷ gnas pa rnamz kyi rab tu ḫdren paho || šes rab ni ma rig pahi ḫruṅ gi mun par rab rib kyi sprin ḫjom par byed⁸ pas snaṅ bar byed paho || šes rab ni

¹. N brten.
². P tu, for D N R gyi.
³. Pelliot, 977, folio 6a.4–6b.2
⁴. D P R om: la.
⁵. D rgyu ba.
⁶. N kyi.
⁷. Pelliot, 977, folio 6b.2–5
⁸. N om: la.
⁹. D byas.

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mig la ji ltar mos pa rnams kyi mig thams cad sbyin par byed paho || šes rab ni mig daṅ gzugs kyi lam las ḥdas paḥi phyir zag pa med paho || šes rab ni bd'en pa las byuṅ bas¹ don dam paho || šes rab ni śiṅ tu dul baḥi phyir mi ḥkhrugs paho || šes rab ni ye śes kyi sgoḥi snaṅ baḥo || šes rab ni thams cad du rgyu ba² mi zad paho ||

šes rab ni rten cin ḥbrel par (ḥbyuṅ ba) la ḥjug par mthon baḥi phyir ḥgal ba med paho || šes rab ni len paḥi ḥchiṅ ba thams cad good par byed pas thar paḥi lam mo || šes rab ni sgrīb par byed paḥi³ chos thams cad daṅ ḥlan cig tu (688) mi gnas pas ma ḥdres paho ||

šā riḥi be de ḥta bas na sems can thams cad kyi sems kyi⁴ spyod pa ji śiṅed pa byaṅ chub sems dpah rnams kyi śes rab kyi⁶ las daṅ || ye śes kyi spyod pa yaṅ de śiṅed do || sems can thams cad kyi bsam pa ji śiṅed pa byaṅ chub sems dpah śes rab kyi dpyod⁷ pa daṅ || ye śes kyaṅ de śiṅed do || sems can thams cad kyi ḥion móṅ paḥi sgo ji śiṅed pa byaṅ chub sems dpah śes rab la ḥjug paḥi sgo yaṅ de śiṅed do || ḥiṅ thos daṅ || raḥ saṅs ḥgyas daṅ || yaṅ dag pa rdzogs paḥi sans ḥgyas rnams kyi yoṅs su śes pa ji śiṅed pa śes rab la gnas paḥi gnas kyaṅ de śiṅed do || byaṅ chub sems dpas thams cad la⁸ bslab par bya ste || de ni byaṅ chub sems dpahi śes rab ces byaḥo ||¹⁹

1. D ba.
2. N baḥi.
4. Pelliot, 977, folio 6b.5–7a.3
5. D N R daṅ,
6. P daṅ (also in the next occurrence of the term ‘śes rab kyi’).
7. D R spyod.
9. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.3–7

sbyor baḥi śes ṛab yin te | rnal ḥbyor spyod paḥi sa la gnas pa thams cad las mṭon bar grub baḥi phyir ro || bsgrod par byed paḥi śes ṛab yin te | ḥphags paḥi ye śes kyi lam thams cad la ṛab tu gnas paḥi phyir ro || śnaṅ bar byed paḥi śes ṛab yin te | ma ḥig paḥi ṛun kyis ṛab gyi mun pa thams cad yoṅs su bṣal baḥi phyir ro || myig sbyin bar byed paḥi śes ṛab yin te | myig bṭiṅ du thams cad ṛab tu ḥdren par byed paḥi phyir ro || zag pa ṛyed paḥi śes ṛab yin te | śes ṛab kyi myiṅ gṣ la ḥyul la ṛam la ṛaṅ dag pa ṛdas paḥi phyir ro || ḥon daṃ paḥi śes ṛab yin te | ḥphags pa ḥen poḥi bṭen ba ṛab tu ṛogṣ paḥi phyir ro | (thad pa ṛyed paḥi śes ṛab yin te | śin tu ṛul ḥar ḥyur paḥi phyir ro || śnaṅ baḥi śes ṛab yin te | ye śes mamas kyi ḥgor ḥyur paḥi phyir ro || zad ḥiṅ śes paḥi ḥes ṛab yin te | ṛje su ṛgyu ba thams cad kun tu snaṅ bar byed paḥi phyir ro | ḥphag pa ṛyed paḥi śes ṛab yin te | ṛtaṅ ṛaṅ ḥṣa ṛgya ṛchen ṛṭhon baḥi phyir ro || ṛnam pa ṛgroḥ baḥi lam gyi śes ṛab yin te | ḥ˚džin paḥi ḥchiṅ ba thams cad ghan du spon baḥi phyir ro || gnaṅ daṅ bral baḥi śes ṛab yin te | ṛṭhon poḥi sgrīb phyir ro chos thams cad daṅ ḥlan cig miṅ gyaṅs paḥi phyir ro ||

D N R daṅ.

P daṅ (also in the next occurrence of the term ‘śes rab kyi’).

D R spyod.

N om: la.

9. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.3–7

śa ri be de ḥta ye śes kyi miṣhaṅ ṣṭid ḥas mṭor bṣas ḥas bṭsan pa yin te | byaṅ chub sems dpah sems dpah chen po rnams kyi ṛab ni gzan yin tshad ṛyed dpag tu ṛyed pa śiṅed yol par ṛig par ṛbyaḥo || de cilḥi phyir ḷe na sa ṛa ri ṛa ḥdi ṛaṅs sems can thams cad kyi sems kyi spyod pa ci śiṅed pa | byaṅ chub sems dpah sems dpah chen po rnams kyi ṛes ṛab kyi lam daṅ || ye śes kyi spyod pa de śiṅed yol pas so | de bṭiṅ du sems can thams cad kyi mos pa ci ṛab byaṅ chub sems dpah sems dpah chen po rnams kyi śes ṛab kyi spyod pa daṅ || ye śes kyaṅ de śiṅed yol par ṛig par ṛbyaḥo || de bṭiṅ du sems cad kyi ḥion móṅ paḥi sgra ci śiṅed pa byaṅ chub sems dpah sems dpah chen po | rnams kyi śes ṛab ḥgya ṛchen sgra yin de śiṅed yol par ṛig par ṛbyaḥo || de bṭiṅ du ṛaṅ thos daṅ || raḥ saṅs ḥgyas daṅ || yaṅ dag pa rdzogs paḥi saṅs ḥgyas thams cad gyi yoṅs su mkhyen pa ci śiṅed pa | byaṅ chub sems dpah sems dpah chen po rnams kyi śes ṛab kyi spyod paḥi gnaṅ kyaṅ de śiṅed yol par ṛig par ṛbyaḥo || śa ri be de ḥta ṛes ṛab kyi gnaṅ thams cad la byaṅ chub sems dpah sems dpah chen po rnams kyi nan tan ḥrṇ paḥi bslab par bya ste || ḥdi ni byaṅ chub sems dpah sems dpah chen po rnams kyi śes ṛab kyi nom ba śes ṛbyaḥo ||

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de la pha rol tu phyin pañi don gañ ze na | šes rab gañ yin pa pha rol tu phyin pañi don kyañ de yin te | dge bañi chos mams rab tu šes pa de ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don žes byaho ||
goñ ma bžin du sbyar te | pha rol tu phyin pa thams cad kyi tshig³ kyañ de bžin du dpyad par byaho² ||³

gzan yañ byañ chub sems dpahi spyod pañi khyad par yoñs su rdzogs pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || gzan yañ thams cad mkhyen pañi ye šes yoñs su rdzogs pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || hduk byas dañ hduñ ma byas (689) pañi chos la mñon par ma chags pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || hkhor bañi ŋes pa khoñ du chud pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to³ || zad ma šes pañi chos kyi mdzod ston pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || sgrub pa med pañi nmam par thar pa yoñs su rdzogs pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || sbyin pa mñam pa ŋid dañ | tshul khrims dañ | bzdod pa dañ | brtson hgrus dañ | bsam gtan dañ | šes rab mñam pa ŋid rtogs pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || nmam par ŋes pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to ||³

sems can thams cad kyi khams la⁶ hjug pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || mi skye bañi chos la bzdod pa yoñs su rdzogs pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || phyir mi ldog pañi sa yoñs su rdzogs pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || sañs rgyas kyi žiñ yoñs su rdzogs pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || sems can yoñs su smin pañi⁷ don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to || byañ chub kyi sñin po yañ dag par thob pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin

1. N om: kyi tshig.
2. P sbyar ro, for D N R dpyad par byaño.
3. This paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.
4. N om: hkhor bañi ŋes pa khoñ du chud pañi don ni pha rol tu phyin pañi don to.
5. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.7–7b.6
7. D R smin par bya bañi.
pahi don to || bdud thams cad rab tu ḡdul bahi don ni pha rol tu phyin pahi don to || saṅs rgyas kyi chos thams cad yonś su rdzogs pahi don ni pha rol tu phyin pahi don to || gzan yaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpahi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs bzag1 par byed pahi don ni pha rol tu phyin (690) pahi don to ||

śā riḥi bu byaṅ chub sems dpahi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs bslabs na | pha rol tu phyin pa thams cad kyi pha rol tu soḥ bar ḡyur ro ||2

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śā riḥi bu de bas na theg pa chen po la gnas pahi rigs kyi buḥam | rigs kyi bu mos byaṅ chub sems dpahi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs ḡdi blaṅ bar bya | gzuṅ bar bya | bklag par bya | gzan la yaṅ bṣad par bya | rgya cher rab tu bstan par byaḥo ||
de ciḥi phyir že na | śā riḥi bu byaṅ chub sems dpahi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs śin tu mñaṅ | blaṅs | bzuṅ | bklags | kun chub par byas | gzan la yaṅ bṣad | rgya cher yaṅ dag par rab tu bstan na | yon tan bcu po ḡdi dag ḡtob par ḡyur ro3 || bcu gan že na | ḡdi ṭa ste |

(1) tshe rabs gzan du ḡphos nas⁴ bzoḥi gnas daṅ |
(2) las kyi gnas thams cad⁵ rtogs par khoṅ du chud par ḡyur |
(3) rigs mtho žiṅ btsun⁶ par ḡyur |
(4) dbaṅ che bar grags par ḡyur⁷ |
(5) tshig btsun par ḡyur |
(6) loṅs spyod che bar ḡyur |
(7) lha daṅ mi rams la ḡphaṅs par ḡyur |

1. D N P R gzog.
2. Pelliot, 977, folio 7b.6–8a.3
3. N ṭob par ḡyur ro (also in all subsequent occurrences of the phrase ‘ḥtob par ḡyur ro’).
5. D N add: la.
7. P mthu che bar ḡyu, for D N R dbaṅ che bar grags par ḡyur.
(8) ḥkhor los sgyur baḥi rgyal po ḥthob par ḥgyur |
(9) tshaṅs par ḥthob par ḥgyur |
(10) thams cad du byaṅ chub kyi sems daṅ mi ḥbral bar ḥgyur te |

yon tan gyi phan yon¹ ḥṭhob par ḥgyur ro || de gžan yaṅ yon tan gyi phan yon bcu ḥṭhob par ḥgyur te | bcu gaṅ že na | ḥdi lta ste |

(1) gcer bu pahi² rtsod pa daṅ | (697) ḥdres³ pa ma yin par ḥgyur ba daṅ |
(2) bdag du mi lta ba daṅ⁴ |
(3) sems can du mi lta ba daṅ |
(4) srog du mi lta ba daṅ |
(5) gaṅ zag tu mi lta ba daṅ |
(6) chad par mi lta ba daṅ |
(7) rtag par mi lta bar ḥgyur ba daṅ |
(8) dños po thams cad la mi lta ba daṅ |
(9) rab tu ḥbyuṅ ba la dgaṅ bar sems skyed pa ḥṭhob pa daṅ |
(10) thos pahi tshig ḥbru myur du khoṅ du chud par ḥgyur ba ste |

yon tan gyi phan yon bcu po de dag ḥṭhob par ḥgyur ro || de gžan yaṅ yon tan gyi phan yon bcu ḥṭhob par ḥgyur te | bcu gaṅ že na | (ḥdi lta ste )

(1) dran pa daṅ ldan par ḥgyur ba daṅ |
(2) blo gros daṅ ldan par ḥgyur ba daṅ |
(3) rtogs pa daṅ ldan par ḥgyur ba daṅ |
(4) mos pa⁵ daṅ ldan par ḥgyur ba daṅ |
(5) šes rab daṅ ldan par ḥgyur ba daṅ |
(6) dal ba phun sum tshogs pa⁶ riṅed par ḥgyur ba daṅ |
(7) tshe rabs dran par ḥgyur ba daṅ |
(8) raṅ bzin gyis ḥdod chags chuṅ ste | ḥdod chags bdo ba ma yin⁷ la | de śin tu ḥdod chags kyi gduṅ bas yoṅs su mi gduṅ ba daṅ |
(9) raṅ bzin gyis že sdaṅ chuṅ ste | že sdaṅ bdo ba ma yin la | de śin tu že sdaṅ gi gduṅ bas

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1. P legs pa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term 'phan yon').
2. P gcer bu can gyi.
3. N ḥdren.
4. P om: ba daṅ (also in the following four occurrences of the phrase 'lta ba daṅ').
5. P dgaṅ ba.
7. P mi drag, for D N R bdo ba ma yin (also in the next two occurrences of this term).

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yoṣs su mi gduñ ba dañ |
(10) rañ bžin gyis gti mug chuñ ste | gti mug gi bdo ba ma yin la | de śin tu gti mug gduñ bas yoṣs su mi gduñ bar mi ḥgyur ba ste |

yon tan gyi phan yon bcu po de dag ḥthob par ḥgyur ro || de gžan yan yon tan gyi phan yon bcu ḥthob (692) par ḥgyur te | bcu gañ že na | ḥdi lta ste |

(1) śes rab Ṉo mtshar du ḥgyur |
(2) śes rab myur bar ḥgyur |
(3) śes rab Ṉo bar ḥgyur |
(4) śes rab mgyogs par ḥgyur |
(5) śes rab rgya che bar¹ ḥgyur |
(6) śes rab zab par ḥgyur |
(7) śes rab ḃes par ḃhyed par ḥgyur |
(8) śes rab ma chags par ḥgyur |
(9) de bžin gšegs pa mṁon du mthon žiṅ mthoṅ nas tshigs su bcad paḥi dbyaṅs kyis bstod pa dañ |
(10) de bžin gšegs pa la tshul bžin du² žu ba yoṅs su žu žiṅ tshul bžin du³ žu ba⁴ žus nas lan ldon par ḥgyur ba ste |

yon tan gyi phan yon bcu po de dag ḥthob par ḥgyur ro || de gžan yan yon tan gyi phan yon bcu ḥthob par ḥgyur te | bcu gañ že na | ḥdi lta ste |

(1) dge bahi bŚes ghen thams cad ma Ṉes bar byas par ḥgyur ba dañ |
(2) bdud kyi bcin⁵ ba thams cad lhod par byas par⁶ ḥgyur ba dañ |
(3) des bdud thams cad tshar gcod par ḥgyur ba dañ |
(4) ņon moṅs pa thams cad smad par ḥgyur ba dañ |
(5) ḥdu byed thams cad du gtogs pa las yid bskyod⁷ par ḥgyur ba dañ |
(6) ḥgro ba ḃan par ḥgro bahi lam thams cad la rgyab kyis phyogs par⁸ ḥgyur ba dañ |
(7) mya ḃaṅ la ḥdaṅ⁹ par ḥgro baḥi¹⁰ lam mṁon du ḥgyur ba dañ |

1. P om: rgya che bar.
2. D N P R gyi.
3. D P R gyi.
5. N bcīṅs.
7. D P R bskyed.
8. P las skyo ba, for D N R la rgyab kyis phyogs par.
10. D ḥgyur bahi.
(8) ḥkhor ba thams cad las sgrol baḥi sbyin pa byin par ḥgyur ba daṅ |
(9) byaṅ chub sems dpah thams cad kyi cho gahi rjes su žugs par ḥgyur ba daṅ | (693)
(10) saṅs rgyas bcom ldan ḥdas thams cad kyi bkahī rjes su žugs par ḥgyur ba ste |

yon tan gyi phan yon bco po de dag ḥṭhob par ḥgyur ro || śā riḥi bu byaṅ chub sems dpahī sde snod kyi chos kyi nam graṅs śīn tu māṇ1 | blaṅs | bzuṅ | bklags | kun chub par byas |
gzan la yaṅ bṣad ciṅ rgya cher yaṅ dag par rab tu bstan na | yon tan gyi phan yon ḥdi sñed ḥṭhob par ḥgyur ro ||
de nas bcom ldan ḥdas kyis don de niṅ rgyas pa2 bstan paḥi phyir | deḥi tshe tshigs su bcad pa ḥdi dag gsunṣ so ||

gaṅ dag mdo sdeḥi rgyal po ḥdi ḥdzin pa ||
mkhas pa de dag śes rab mthah yas ḥgyur ||³
chos daṅ don r名义 la yaṅ mkhas par ḥgyur ||⁴
tshig kyaṅ khyad par ḥphags śīṅ yi ge rdsogs ||⁵
gaan żig mdo sdeḥi rgyal po ḥdi ḥdzin pa ||
de ni rab dgaḥ śīn tu mgu skyes nas ||
dge sloṅ de ni ḥdir yaṅ chos ḥchad de ||⁶
rtag tu chos kyi sbyin pa byed par ḥgyur ||

sems can r名义s ni maṅ du chos thos nas ||
kye maḥo yon tan chen po ḥchad byed pa ||
nam żig bdag cag ḥdi ḥdraḥi chos ston ciṅ ||
mdo sde ḥdi ḥdra ḥdzin par ḥgyur žes zer ||⁷
gaan dag de ḥdra śes rab ldan mchog r名义s ||
chos r名义s gaan la yaṅ žum par mi ḥgyur te ||⁸

1. N gślan.
2. P śīṅ tu.
3. P mkhas pa śes rab mthah yas bar yaṅ ḥgyur.
4. P chos r名义s daṅ ni don r名义s la ḥdi gsal.
5. P tshig la mkhas śīṅ yi ge yonis su rdsogs par ḥgyur.
6. P dge sloṅ chos ḥdi ḥchad pa byed pa daṅ.
7. P mdo sde ḥdi ni ḥdzin par ḥgyur žes ḥdod.
8. P chos gaan laḥaṅ śes rab žum par mi ḥgyur te.
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dran dañ ye šes kyis ni ḥphags pa dañ ||
bla na med pahi ye šes tshig ston¹ ḥgyur || (694)

gañ dag mdo sdeḥi rgyal po hdi ḥdzin pa ||
de ni ḥphags pas rtag bṣḥags rgyal bas gnah ||
chos tshig legs par bṣad pa tshol bar byed ||
de ni thos pas rtag tu ḥphags pa ḥgyur ||²

thsos nas don ni ſe bar³ ḥdzin par byed ||
šes rab ladan pa ḥbru la mi sṅegs te⁴ ||
don la lta bas rtoṅs pa ḥphel bar ḥgyur ||
de yī ye šes rtag tu tshad med do ||

ye šes mthah yas don kyaṅ mthah yas te ||
sems dpah⁵ mthah yas dam pahi don la mkhas⁶ ||
de yī yon tan phyogs daṅ phyogs su ḥgro⁷ ||
de yī thos pahi yon tan ḥdi dag go ||

de yī ḥdod chags chuṅ la že sdaṅ chuṅ ||
de yī gti mug śin tu rab tu chuṅ ||
sems kyaṅ⁸ śin tu dag pa⁹ rṇed par ḥgyur ||
de yī thos pahi yon tan ḥdi dag go ||

loṅs spyod rṇed nas rgyags par mi ḥgyur te ||
ḥdi la sṅiṅ po ci žes don la rtoṅ ||
loṅs spyod sṅiṅ po med par rab šes nas ||
de ni loṅs spyod mi lta rab tu ḥgyuṅ ||

1. P hchad.
2. P thos nas rtag tu mṇon par dgaḥ bar ḥgyur.
3. P mṇon par.
4. D sṅems te; P rgyug sté.
5. N P R sems pa.
6. P gtsal.
7. N dgro.
8. P kyi.
khyim nas¹ byun ste dgon par gnas ||
rtag tu g.yel ba² med pa dahn ||
chos rnams thos pas mi noms te ||³
chos sbyin pa la ser sna med ||

hjig rten mgon pohi druñ nid du ||
soñ ste žu ba žu byed pas ||⁴
de phyir de yi ye şes⁵ ḥphel ||
de la dkar po ḥbri ba med ||

śa rihi bu de ni byaṅ chub sems dpah rnams kyi şes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ste | byaṅ chub sems dpah de la brtson pa byaṅ chub sems dpahi spyad pa spyod do⁶ || de ni şes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la brtson pa žes byaḥo ||
Abbreviations

List of Abbreviations

A:  Aṅguttaranikāya (Hardy, E)
AAWG:  Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Göttingen
Abhidh-d:  Abhidharmadipā (Jaini, P)
Abhidh-h (A):  Le Coeur de la Loi Supreme: Abhidharmahrdaya (Armelin, I)
Abhidh-h (W):  The Essence of Metaphysics: Abhidharmahrdaya (Willemen, C)
Abhidh-sam (R):  Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine d’Asanga:
   Abhidharmasamuccaya (Rahula, W)
Abhidh-sam:  Abhidharmasamuccaya (Pradhan, P)
Abhisaṃ:  Abhisāmayālamkāra (Conze, E)
Adsp (C):  Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Conze, E)
Akn:  Aksayamatinirdeśa (TTP 842)
Akn-ṭīkā:  Aksayamatinirdeśa-ṭīkā (TTP 5495)
Akv:  Abhidharmakośa-vibhāṣā (Haribhadra)
ALB:  Adyar Library Bulletin, Madras
AM:  Asia Major
Amṛtar (B):  La Saveur de l’Immortel: La version chinoise de l’Amṛtarasā de 
   Ghoṣaka (T 1553) (Broek, J)
AOH:  Acta Orientalia, Hungarian Academy of Science
Arthav (S):  Arthavinīscaya Sūtra (Samtani, NH)
As:  Atthasalini (Buddhaghosa: Müller, M)
Aṣṭa:  Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Vaidya, PL)
Āloka:  Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka (Wogihara, U)
Bbh:  Bodhisattvabhūmi (Wogihara, U)
BEFEO:  Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême Orient
Bdp:  Bodhisattvavapiṭaka (R 11.11)
Bhadra-vy:  Bhadramāyākārayākaraṇa (TTP 760.21)
Bhadra-vy (R):  Bhadramāyākārayākaraṇa (Régamey, C)
Bpm:  Bodhisattvapratimokṣasūtra (TTP 915)
Brhad:  Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
BRS:  Bihar Research Society
BSHS:  Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalaya Saddhatissa
BSHWR:  Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula
BSR:  Buddhist Studies Review
BTI:  Buddhist Text Information
Bv:  Buddhavaṃsa (Jayawickrama, NA)
Chānd:  Chāndogya Upaniṣad
CPD:  A Critical Pali Dictionary (Copenhagen, 1924)
CSTCC:  Ch’u San tsang Chi Chi of Seng-yu (T 2145)
D:  Dighanikāya (Rhys Davids, TW; Carpenter, J E)
Daśa-bh:  Daśabhūmika-Sūtra (Rahder, J: Daśabhūmika Sūtra et 
   Bodhisattvabhūmi)
Abbreviations

Dbh-v: Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāstra
Dbh: Daśabhūmikasūtra (TTP 572)
Dhs: Dhammasaṅgāṇi (Müller, M)
Dhsg: Dharmaśāṅgītisūtra (TTP 904)
Dhsgv: Dharmaśāṅgītra (Müller, M; Wenzel, H)
Divya: Divyāvadāna (Cowell, EB; Neil, RA)
DPP: The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra of Maitreyā (Obermiller, E)
Gv: Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra (Suzuki, TD; Idzumi, H)
HIB: History of Indian Buddhism (Lamotte, E)
HJAS: Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
IBK: Indogaku Bukkyūgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies)
IHQ: Indian Historical Quarterly
IIJ: Indo-Iranian Journal
IT: Indologica Taurinensia, Turin
Itv: Itivuttaka (Windisch, E)
JA: Journal Asiatique
JAOS: Journal of the American Oriental Society
Jātaka: Jātaka with Commentary (Fausboll, V)
JIABS: Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIH: Journal of Indian History
JIP: Journal of Indian Philosophy
JRAS: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
Karunā (Y): Karunāpuṇḍarīka (Yamada, I)
Kv: Kāraṇḍavyūha (Samasrami, SV)
Kośa: Abhidharmakośa (La Vallée Poussin, L)
Kośabhāṣya: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan, P)
Kośavyākhyā: Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (Wogihara, U)
Kp: Kāśyapaparivarta (Stael-Holstein, A)
Lal: Lalitavistara (Lefmann, S)
Laṅkāv: Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Nanjio, B)
Lkdh: Lokadhara-paripṛcchā (TTP 841)
M: Majjhimanikāya (Trenckner, V; Chalmers, R)
Madh. vr̥tti: Prasannapadā Madhyamakavr̥tti (La Vallée Poussin, L)
MBT: Minor Buddhist Texts (Tucci, G)
Mavbh: Madhyamakāvatāra (La Vallée Poussin, L)
MCB: Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques
Mīl: Milindapañña (Trenckner, V)
Mmg: Mahāmeghāsūtra (TTP 898)
MN: Monumenta Nipponica
Mpps: Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse: Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra (Lamotte, É)
Msg: La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asaṅga: Mahāyana Sarasvātī (Lamotte, É)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Msl</td>
<td>Mahāyānasūtra-āṃkāra (Lévi, S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mvš</td>
<td>Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mvš (N)</td>
<td>Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (Nagao, G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mvu</td>
<td>Mahāvastu (Sénart, E)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka (Nanjio, B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAWG</td>
<td>Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nett</td>
<td>Nettipakaraṇa (Hardy, E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nidd</td>
<td>Mahānīddesa (La Vallée Poussin, L; Thomas, EJ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ono</td>
<td>Ono Gemmyo, ed. Bussho kaisetsu daijiten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otani</td>
<td>A Comparative Analytical Catalogue of the Kanjur Division of the Tibetan Tripitaka at Otani University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pañca</td>
<td>Pañcavimśatisāhasirikā Prajñāpāramitā (Dutt, N)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paṭīṣ</td>
<td>Paṭīṣambhīdāmaggā (Taylor, AC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PED</td>
<td>Pali English Dictionary (Rhys Davids, TW; Stede, W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEFEO</td>
<td>Publicación de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIT</td>
<td>Publicazioni di Indologica Taurinensia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pps</td>
<td>Pitāputrasaṃgamaśūtra (TTP 760.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PraS</td>
<td>Pratyutpanna-Buddha-Saṃmukhāvasūṭha-Saṃmādi-Sūtra</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prbh</td>
<td>Pratyekabuddhabhūmi (Wayman, A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pṛṇ</td>
<td>Pūrṇaparipṛcchā (TTP 760.18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ps</td>
<td>Papañcasūdani (Buddhaghoṣa: Woods, JH; Kosambhi, D; Horner, IB)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>The Pali Text Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>pw</td>
<td>Kleines Peters burg Wörterbuch (Böhtlingk; Roth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>sTog Palace Kanjur (Leh—1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rcd</td>
<td>Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā (TTP 760.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rgv</td>
<td>Ratnagotravibhāga (Takasaki, J)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>Rocznik Orientalistyczny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rp</td>
<td>Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā (Finot, L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rtm</td>
<td>Ratnameghasūtra</td>
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<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Samyuttanikāya (Feer, L)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saddhp</td>
<td>Saddharmapūndarīka (Kern, H.; Nanjio, B)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samādh</td>
<td>Samādhirājasūtra (Dutt, N)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satya (S)</td>
<td>Satyasiddhiṣṭastra (Sastri, A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saṃdhis (ÉLa)</td>
<td>L’Explication des Mystères: Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Lamotte, É)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBE</td>
<td>Sacred Books of the East (Müller, M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sgm</td>
<td>Saṃgrataparipṛcchā (TTP 819)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siddhi</td>
<td>Viṣṇuṭīmātramātisasiddhi (La Vallée Poussin, L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SII</td>
<td>Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sn</td>
<td>Suttanipāta (Andersen, D; Smith, H)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sp</td>
<td>Saṃmatapāśādikā (Buddhaghoṣa: Takakusu, J.; Nagai, G)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sv</td>
<td>Su maṅgalavilāsīni (Buddhaghoṣa: Rhys Davids, TW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Śbh</td>
<td>Śrāvakabhūmi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Śbh (S)</td>
<td>Śrāvakabhūmi (Shukla, K)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śgs</td>
<td>La Concentration de la Marche Héroïque: Śūraṃgamasamādhīsūtra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations

(Lamotte, É)
Śikṣ: Śikṣāsamuccaya (Bendall, C)
Śms: Śrimālādeviśirīḥanāda (TTP 760.48)
Śsp: Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Ghosa, P)
T: Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Edition of the Chinese Buddhist Canon (Takakusu, J; Watanable, K)
Th: Theragāthā (Oldenberg, H)
To: A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon (Ui, H)
TP: T’oung Pao
TSWS: Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series
TTD: Tibetan Tripitaka sDe-dge Edition
TTP: Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition (Suzuki, DT)
Ug: Ugraparipṛcchā (TTP 760.19)
Vibh-a: Vibhaṅga Commentary (Buddhadatta, AP)
Vibh: Vibhaṅga (Rhys Davids, CAF)
Vism: Visuddhimagga (Buddhaghosa: Warren, HC; Kosambhi, D)
Vin: Vinayapitaka (Oldenberg, H)
Vkn: The Teaching of Vimalakirti: Vimalakirtinirdeśa Sūtra (Lamotte, É)
Vup: Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā (Python, P)
WZKSO: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens
ZDMG: Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft
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Errata Corrige

p. 19.17  for: Sukhāvatīvyūha, read: Sukhāvatīvyūha (ibid., p. 50, n. 111)
p. 21.15  for: Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra, read: Bodhisattvapiṭaka
p. 23.21  for: forth, read: fourth
p. 26, n. 45 for: additional, read: variant
p. 33.7  for: chapters, read: discussions
p. 40.10 for: Asāṅga while Asvabhāsa, read: Asvabhāva while Asāṅga
p. 49.13 for: bodhisattva, read: bodhisattvas
p. 54, n. 129 for: Rśīvyasaparipṛcchā, read: Rśīvyāsaparipṛcchā
p. 54, n. 129 for: Śūbhakarasimha’s, read: Śūhakarasimha’s
p. 56, n. 139 for: T 1526, read: T 1521
p. 56, n. 139 for: In the Chinese translation of the Suvikrāntavikrāmaparipṛcchā Prajñāpāramitāśūtra, read: In Seng-yu’s catalogue
p. 56, n. 139 for: include it under, read: include its abstract under
p. 63.23 for: nineteen, read: twenty
p. 66.17 for: Vimaladattaparipṛcchā, read: Vimaladattāparipṛcchā
p. 71, n. 2 for: Hsuan-tsang, read: Hsūn-tsang
p. 90, n. 10 for: Trisāṃvaranirdeśaparivarta, read: Trisāṃvaranirdeśaparivarta
p. 90, n. 13 for: Bdp, read: Ug
p. 94, n. 25 delete: and, of course, the Bdp
p. 99.15 for: selected the pāramitā, read: selected pāramitā
p. 99, n. 36 for: twenty-one, read: twenty-three
p. 103, n. 57 for: Viradattagṛhapatiparipṛcchā, read: Viradattagṛhapatiparipṛcchā (ibid., p. 107, n. 70)
p. 108.17 for: out the, read: out of the
p. 110, n. 80 for: pp. ix–x, read: pp. 5–15
p. 117, n. 5 for: Msl, read: cf. Msl
p. 118.6 for: signals, read: signal
p. 118.13 for: stage nine and ten, read: stage eight and nine
p. 121.11 for: parārthālambana, read: parārthālambana
p. 121.14 for: calm nirvāṇa, read: that nirvāṇa is calm
p. 125, n. 47 for: Tevīggaśutta, read: Tevijgaśutta
p. 126, n. 52 for: arūpyadhātu, read: ārūpyadhātu (ibid., p. 129, n. 63; p. 136.11; p. 162, n. 213; p. 243.8; p. 315, n. 3)
p. 128.15 for: giving?, read: giving.
p. 129.14 for: friendliness, read: benevolence
p. 130, n. 68 for: are presented, read: is presented
p. 138, n. 104 for: are linked with, read: being linked with
p. 141.6 for: to follow in, read: to follow
p. 148, n. 158 for: pp. 42.2 read: pp. 42.3.2
p. 149.1 for: manifest, read: manifesting
p. 149.20 delete: (sarvadharmatā)
p. 151, n. 168 for: by absence of duality, gift, read: by absence of duality, his gift
p. 157.22 for: śrāvakayāna, read: Śrāvakayāna
p. 161, n. 212 for: sādhanāsādharanāśiksāviveśa, read: sādhanāsādharanāśiksāviveśa
p. 166.15 for: daśakusāla, read: akuśalakarmapatha
p. 169, n. 252 for: holders of little worth, read: holders are of little worth
p. 175, n. 283 delete: (trsl. Conze)
p. 176, n. 287 for: cognitive abandonment, read: trusting abandonment
p. 177, n. 295 for: maintaining of mind, read: maintaining a mind
p. 177, n. 297 for: bhāviṣant, read: bhāviṣyant
p. 180, n. 309 for: higher patience (sātyantakṣānti), read: absolute patience (atyantakṣānti)
p. 189.25 for: apakāramarṣaṇakṣānti, read: parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti
p. 195.14 delete: the bodhisattva’s
p. 197.13 for: between kṣānti and virya, read: between kṣānti and śruta, and kṣānti and
virya
p. 197.14 for: it, read: the joint presence of kṣānti and śruta
p. 214.9 for: rddhividhya, read: rddhividhyabhijñā
p. 219, n. 518 for: apakaramarsanaksanti, read: parapakaramarsanaksanti
p. 221, n. 522 for: cetāna, read: cetanā
p. 224, n. 540 for: concentration agrees is, read: concentration is
p. 226.13 for: in first, read: in the first
p. 231, n. 570 for: Śrotabhumi, read: Śrutamaylbhumi (ibid., p. 245.14; p. 247, n. 655, 688,
p. 266, n. 750; p. 267, n. 757; p. 291, n. 884; p. 292, n. 889; p. 314, n. 3; p.
329, n. 35)
p. 233, n. 584 for: This very thought is also, read: The opposite thought is
p. 234, n. 588 for: vidhyā, read: vidyā
p. 237.7 for: mürdhan, read: uṣmagata
p. 243.5 for: repeated meditation, read: repeated confrontation in meditation
p. 253.17 for: ‘skill’ prior, read: ‘skill’ in them prior
p. 256.6 for: Up, read: Ug
p. 262, n. 734 for: pity, read: compassion
p. 263.2 for: caturvidha, read: caturvidyā
p. 273.14 for: vyakaranabhumi, read: vyākaraṇabhumi
p. 279.7 for: many these, read: many of these
p. 281.19 for: images, read: reflection (ibid., p. 281.20)
p. 294.17 for: other, read: bodhyaṅga and āryāstāṅgamārga
p. 296.23 for: that unified, read: that is unified
p. 296, n. 909 for: ekāyana, read: ekāyāna
p. 302.26 for: with Mahāyāna text, read: with a Mahāyāna text
p. 311.11 for: hKah-hgyur, read: bKah-hgyur
p. 315, n. 4 for: itself becomes, read: themselves become
for: insight, read: wisdom; for: resolve, read: intent
p. 315, n. 5 for: adhyaśāya, read: adhyāśāya
p. 316, n. 8 for: Braavrīg, read: Braavrig
p. 317, n. 13 for: acquisition of correct reflection, read: acquisition by correct reflection
p. 318, n. 15 for: brahmaṇacariyā, read: brahmaṇacariya
p. 324.21 for: any teaching, read: any teachings
p. 328, n. 33 for: the heaven of Amitābha … of the first category, read: the Pure Land of
Amitābha … of the second category
p. 330, n. 40 for: ma log pa de bzin šnid: tathāta, read: ma log pa de bzin šnid:
aviparyāsaṭatathā, for tathātā, read: tathātā
p. 351, n. 128 for: aṭṭhamaka, read: aṭṭhamaka
p. 353.17 for: passed into nirvāṇa, read: passed into parinirvāṇa
p. 355, n. 146 for: śraddha, read: śraddhā
p. 365, n. 181 for: thought as thought, read: thought
p. 383, n. 245 for: is not the object, read: not the object
p. 387, n. 257 for: briefly the characteristics, read: briefly in the characteristics
p. 387, n. 259 for: that is the meaning …, read: what is the meaning … ?
p. 387, n. 259 for: great non-reality of samsāra, read: great punishment of samsāra
p. 389.14 for: that all things exist, read: that all things are inherently existent
p. 501.29 for: May, Jacques M, read: Lounsberry, G.C.