POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN MOROCCO DURING
THE EARLY CALAWĪ PERIOD (1659–1727)

by

Patricia Ann Mercer

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of London
1974
ABSTRACT OF THESIS

This thesis has two aims: firstly, to provide a summary of Moroccan political history over the years 1659–1727, which saw the Alawi dynasty established; and secondly, by making use, for the most part, of contemporary source material, to provide a critique of indigenous tradition concerning the period, as summed up in the nineteenth century *Kitab al-Istigaṣ*.

Contemporary material suggests that the Alawi dynasty was effectively launched from Fes, the metropolitan base of the parvenu sultan al-Rashid. Thereafter came imperial emancipation from Fasi tutelage, and the inauguration of a deteriorating relationship between sultan and metropolis. Isma'il, al-Rashid's successor, moved his capital to Meknes. There he fostered a personal military and magnate following, developed along culturally standard lines. This won him dynastic victory, and brief military ascendency in the critical regions of the Sus and Algerine march, tricked out with easy gains from a prestige programme of mujahid warfare.

Isma'il's tide turned in 1692, with Algerine invasion of his territory. The subsequent decade was characterised by renewed and strenuous efforts at maintaining territorial maxima. The empire was scoured for slave recruits to the standing army. This swollen army failed to save the sultan, in 1701, from the Algerine trouncing which precipitated his retirement from personal campaigning. Thereafter, Isma'il was a palace ruler of fluctuating territory, and the object of repeated filial challenge. Assets which shored up his central authority were: a link with the
commerce of a debilitated Fes; a continuing working relationship
with tribute-bearing magnates, involving gross power-delegation;
and a force of troops held in reserve as a military deterrent.

Contemporary evidence eliminates the view of Isma'îl as a
swingeing monarch who, by 1692, had reduced all his provinces to
orderly submission. By emphasising his latter-day problems, it
points to his longevity as the key to the establishment of the
'Alawî dynasty.
FOR MY MOTHER AND FATHER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis has been an unconscionable time "a! growing". I would never have completed it without the support of others. My thanks are overwhelmingly due, in the first place, to my personal supervisor, Dr. Michael Brett. For three and a half years, in vacation as well as term, he has been willing to give me uncountable and careful hours of his time, in order to point out ways and ideas, modules, errors and booby-traps. It was his unfortunate lot to have in myself a first Ph. D. student somewhat over-given to displays of temperament. But he has a sovereign patience, as well as gaiety and sympathy. Without him, I could never have written. For his perfectionist's sake, I particularly regret mistakes and shortcomings that may be found in what, eventually, I have written.

I am also grateful to Professor Roland Oliver, and to the staff of the African History section of the School of Oriental and African studies, among whom it is necessary to mention, in particular, Dr. Humphrey Fisher, and Professor Richard Gray, the kindly mentor of my M.A. studies, who first set me on the path of research. The School is also to be thanked for its financial support over the academic year 1972-3.

During my all too brief stay in Morocco, I was given the willing and courteous, if slightly mystified help of the staff of the Bibliotheque Generale and National Archive in Rabat. I should like, in particular, to note the attention given by M. Boujendar. In Rabat, also, I spoke with M. Germain Ayache, M. Paul Berthier, M. Bernard Rosenberger and Dr. Rose E. Dunn. All gave me valuable information and advice. M. G-S. Colin, in addition to giving me his time and interest, had the generosity to allow me to photocopy.
a manuscript in his private possession. My personal Maghribi horizons were also broadened in England, in discussions with Allan Meyers, Thomas Whitcomb and Dr. Abdelkader Zebadia.

Finally I must pay due to the support of two "home-bases". Over the last two years my parents have, with gentleness and concern, withstood the financial and personal stresses of having an adult daughter in the latter-day throes of producing a thesis. The work was partly written in their house, and can only be dedicated to them, with love. In London, there was much appreciated comradeship. This has come from all the fellow-inhabitants of an eccentric Camden Town ménage. Among these, I must mention Dr. John Tosh, a willing and interested master of constructive criticism and gamesmanship; and my dear brother Nicholas, a mathematician who never bothered to count the hours he spent upon a sister, never failed to understand the loneliness of long hours of writing, never failed to listen and never failed to understand.

******************************************************************************
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of contents</td>
<td>7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of maps</td>
<td>8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A note upon orthography and transliteration</td>
<td>9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of abbreviations employed in the thesis</td>
<td>10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I: THE CALAWI CAPTURE OF FES</td>
<td>45.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II: A SULTANATE OF FES BECOMES A SULTANATE OF MEKNES</td>
<td>76.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III: ISMA'CIL'S YEARS OF INCREASING ASCENDANCY</td>
<td>117.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV: THE POLITICS OF EQUILIBRIUM: ADMINISTRATION,</td>
<td>158.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUCCESSION AND RURAL PACIFICATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and Palace</td>
<td>158.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Udâya Succession</td>
<td>166.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Pacification</td>
<td>176.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V: YEARS OF HUBRIS AND NEMESIS</td>
<td>186.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI: THE PALACE RULER</td>
<td>238.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN EPILOGUE: THE MYTHOLOGY OF ISMA'CIL'S REIGN</td>
<td>279.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part I: The &quot;Black Army&quot; and &quot;tamhîd&quot;</td>
<td>279.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II: The shadow of Sayyîd Muhammad III</td>
<td>310.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A: The term &quot;hartañ/haratin&quot;</td>
<td>335.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B: The geographical connotations of &quot;Udâya&quot;</td>
<td>338.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>340.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**************
LIST OF MAPS

i) "A new map of the kingdoms of Fez, Morocco etc.": reproduction of an anonymous eighteenth century English work........................................p. 11

ii) Sketch map to illustrate the three global Berber language blocs of Morocco.................................................................p. 23

iii) Sketch map of the "Cherg" or north-eastern march of the Maghrib al-Aqsa.................................................................p. 57

iv) "Carte Generale des Etats du Roy de Fez qui regne aujourd'hui, composee par Talbe-Bougiman, Docteur de l'Alcoran": reproduction from Mouttte's "Histoire des conquestes de Mouley Archy etc.".............p. 62

v) END-PIECE: Sketch map of the Maghrib al-Aqsa.................................p. 354
A NOTE UPON ORTHOGRAPHY AND TRANSLITERATION

These were tangled matters for decision. Proper names posed the greatest problems. It will be seen that I have adopted an "orthodox", diacritically marked format for the proper names of all Muslims, with the exception of modern writers in European tongues who have chosen for themselves a Roman spelling of their names. For toponyms I have adopted, in most cases, the European format, whether French, English or Spanish, which I considered to be the most familiar and easily identifiable. Exceptions were made in the case of obscure toponyms without any well-known European nomenclature (e.g. "Jabal Fazzaz"), and in the case of places which no longer exist (e.g. Dila; Dar ibn Mash'al). For the names of indigenous groupings I have, in most cases, adopted a precise Arabic format, making exceptions in the case of the global Berber linguistic groups "Chleuh" and "Beraber", and in the case of the Snassen (properly Banū Yisnasin), whose name denotes a well-known region as well as a people.

In transliteration, I have adopted the equivalence recommended by the Encyclopaedia of Islam, with the following exceptions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{j} & \text{ (instead of 'dj' )} \\
\text{q} & \text{ (instead of 'k' )} \\
\text{Iya} & \text{ (instead of the terminal 'iyya')}
\end{align*}
\]

The 'q' in the word "sharāna" is a rendering of the Maghribī letter (.setTextSize(152,250)).
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED IN THE THESIS

A.M. ........................................... "Archives Marocaines"

B.M. .............................................. British Museum

B.N.P. .......................................... Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris

C.O. .............................................. Colonial Office Papers of the Public
Record Office, London.

E.I. .............................................. Encyclopaedia of Islam

S.I. .............................................. "Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire
du Maroc" ed. H. de Castries and
continuators.

S.P. .............................................. State Papers of the Public Record
Office, London.
Anonymous but common eighteenth century English map of the Maghrib al-Aqsa, here reproduced from the frontispiece to J. Braithwaite's "History of the Revolutions in the Empire of Morocco, upon the Death of the late Emperor Muley Ishmael" (London, 1929)
A PROLOGUE: THE SOURCE MATERIAL AND ITS PROBLEMS.

The period from 1659 to 1727 covers the years between the political emergence of al-Rashîd, first al-Walî sultan of the Maghrib al-Aqṣa, and the death of his brother and successor, Isma‘îl. Source material for this period is unevenly distributed, both geographically and chronologically. Geographically there is a marked bias towards the affairs of the northerly part of the region. Within indigenous source material, this bias is the product of interplay between a court and a city. The affairs of the al-Walî imperial capital, which was based first at New Fes, and then at nearby Meknes, rebounded upon the affairs of the citizenry of metropolitan Old Fes. And the corporate intellectual and literary tradition of this last-named metropolis has predominated within the Maghrib al-Aqṣa from the period until the present day (1).

A parallel northerly bias within European source material is the outcome of European predilections: diplomacy, focused upon the al-Walî capital; maritime commerce, for which Sale and Tetuan were the major Moroccan entrepôts; and residual crusading fervour that was phasing into mercantile imperialism. This last-noted enthusiasm drew its mass of "copy" from matters bound up with the wrack of fifteenth and sixteenth century European expansionism: the affairs of the small and squalid European enclaves which studded the Atlantic and Mediterranean littorals of the far Maghribi north-west.

The chronological imbalance in source material divides the period at around the opening of the eighteenth century. Under this division,

---

(1) Fes dominates the al-Walî sections of E. Lévi-Provençal's classic study of Moroccan historiography and biography: "Les Historiens des Chorfa" (Paris, 1922). Here the Murrakushî intellectual sphere figures comparatively peripherally. It is only in the present century that Murrakushî scholars have attempted to imitate the Fasî in producing works of tabaqat literature designed to give a collective expression to the Murrakushî contribution to the cultural life of the Maghrib al-Aqṣa. (Lévi-Provençal, pp. 385-6 cf. M. Lakhdir: "La vie littéraire au Maroc sous la dynastie Alawide" (Rabat, 1971) pp. 5-6.
the period falls into a primary span, for which political developments within the Maghrib al-Aqsa can be relatively well-documented, and a secondary span for which available evidence is considerably more tenuous. The imbalance is the result of a complex of accidents. It will be seen that, by an ill chance, the most valuable bodies of indigenous and of European source material fall into debility together, at around 1700. Furthermore, in 1701, the ageing sultan Isma'il entered a long period of retirement. He no longer conducted campaigns personally, and rarely even left his palace in Meknes. A number of his sons struggled with each other for pre-eminence. Their main sphere of activity lay within the south of the Maghrib al-Aqsa, beyond the immediate interests of Fes or of European commentators. For much of this period the north was a region of relative political quiescence, lightly percolated by vague and shocking rumour from the south.

The received version of the history of the Maghrib al-Aqsa within the early "Alawi period is dominated by an indigenous literary tradition. This literary tradition has been summed up within the relevant section of the "Kitab al-Istiqsa..." of al-Nasiri (2), the work which, during the Protectorate, gained acceptance as the consummate authority upon all but the final disorderly years of pre-Protectorate Moroccan history. The "Kitab al-Istiqsa..." was written during the reign of Hasan I. Its author was a minor government official of Saletin birth, whose postings enabled him to gather material from throughout the country (3). Al-Nasiri's work was remarkable in that it was the first known attempt

(2) Ahmad ibn Khalid al-Nasiri al-Slawi: "Kitab al-Istiqsa li-akhbar duwal al-maghrib al-agha" (Cairo, 1894. Second edition: Casablanca, 1956). A French translation of part IV of this work, the section relevant to the "Alawi sultans, was made by E. Fumey, and published as "Chronique de la dynastie alaouie au Maroc" in "Archives Marocaines" (henceforward A.M.) Volumes IX and X. (Paris, 1906 and 1907)

(3) Biographical and bibliographical details concerning al-Nasiri and the "Kitab al-Istiqsa..." are contained within Levi-Provencal's "Les Historiens des Chorfa" (pp. 350-368)
by a Moroccan to write a national history. It is otherwise unsurprising:
a lengthy and painstaking but essentially traditional piece of Muslim
historiography. Its author largely repeated or conflated evidence from
established sources for each period. Early Alawi history was not this
author's major concern. For his liveliest sphere of interest was not the
dynasty, but the jihad, the struggle with Christendom. The tormented
political viewpoint to which the jihad was central, is expressed very
clearly within al-Masiri's final chapter, scratched to a finish upon
Hasan's death in 1894. Its keynote was an atavistic nationalism, aligned
with something approaching despair. The author regarded his country as
the last repository of decent Muslim values and of relatively low prices
(4). Yet he was obsessed by its political weakness in the face of the
military and technical ascendency of Christian powers, and by the
relentless inflation which he associated with the encroachment of the
European economy. Circumspectly, he repudiated the road he knew to have
been taken by the Sudanese Mahdi, and fell enthusiastically into agreement
with Hasan's policy of eschewing war with European powers. An unsolicited
fatwa of his own composition defended at length the sultan's placation of
Christendom (5). Yet the author took an obvious and personal literary

(4) "...ahlqil-maghrib agall al-umam ikhtilatan bihim, fa-hum ankhes al-nas
as-Caran. wa arfatunum Ca-shah, wa ab adehum ziyyen wa Ca-ada min
ha'ula'i al-fran, wa fi dhalikta min salama dinihim, ma la yuqha
bihilla miir wa 'il-sham wa ohayihhe min el-amsar, fa-innehu
yubilhuna Canhun ma yasaamu Can el-adhaan."  
text Vol. IX pp. 184-192
compensation for the political humiliations of his own day, by recounting the past victories of Maghribi Muslims. In the context of the author's work as a whole, the entire Alawi period to date was thereby effectively diminished. For none of al-Nasiri's eighteenth and nineteenth century sources could match, for example, the high mediaeval glories which studded the "...Rawd al-Diras..." (6)

But indeed it would have been impossible for al-Nasiri extensively to laud, or even to document the reigning Alawi dynasty's opening years, from the material he had to hand. For the period 1659-1727, the author made use of four major sources. In chronological rank, these were the "Nuzhat al-Hadi..." of al-Ifrani (7), the "Nashr al-Mathani..." of Muhammad ibn al-Tayyib al-Qadir (8), the "Bustan al-Zarif..." of al-Zayyan (9), and the "Jaysh al-Qaramtam..."


(7) "Nuzhat al-Hadi bi-akhbar muluk al-garn al-hadi". This work, issued during the latter half of the reign of Isma'il (Levi-Provençal: pp. 112-114 and 120-121) is today best known in the edition and companion French translation of G. Houdas: "Nuzhat al-Hadi: Histoire de la dynastie saadienne au Maroc (1511-1670)" (Paris, 1908 and 1909)

(8) "Nashr al-Mathani li-ahl al-garn al-hadi ashr wa l-thani". This work, issued in 1769 (Levi-Provençal: p. 323) was lithographed in Fes in 1310/1892-3, and issued in two volumes, the division being made at the year 1080/1669-70. From the lithograph, a French translation was made of the part of the work covering the eleventh century A.H. This was issued in two parts, as volumes of "Archives Marocaines", under the title "Nashr al-Mathani de Mouhammad al-Qadir". The first part (A.M. Vol. XXI, Paris, 1913) covers the period 1000-1049 A.H. = 1591-2 to 1639-40, and was translated by A. Graulle and M.P. Maillard. The second part (A.M. Vol. XXIV, Paris, 1917) covers the period 1050-1100 A.H. = 1640-41 to 1688-9), and was translated by E. Michaux-Baillet.

(9) "Al-bustan al-zarif fI daawlat awlad mawlay CalI al-sharif". This work, which draws to a conclusion in 1816, remains in MS form. The MS consulted was that numbered D. 571, in the possession of the Archive of the Bibliothèque Générale in Rabat.
of Muhammad Akansus (10). These are four diverse works. But they have a common negative factor. None was written out of a primary devotion to early Alawi history. Within all four works, the formalities of acknowledgement and interest were extended to the establishment of the dynasty, under its first two sultans. But, in each case, the relevant matter was recounted relatively briefly, by an author fundamentally absorbed in the treatment of other business.

Thus the "Muzhat al-Hadi..." is essentially an history of the Sa'di sultans, who preceded the Alawi line as the dynasty governing the Maghrib al-Aqsa. Four final chapters, which trace the Alawi genealogy and rise to power, merely provide a brief coda to the work as a whole. In such a context, the author's assertion that the Alawi sultan Isma'il ruled territories wider than those of the cynosure of latter-day conquerors, Ahmed al-Dhahabi al-Mangur al-Sadi (11) reads simply as glib obeisance. Al-Ifrani's disparity in concern for the Sa'di and Alawi dynasties is extraordinary for a work written during the reign of the Alawi sultan Isma'il, and as such has aroused comment (12). It is indeed possible that a secondary work by al-Ifrani, a short and thin biography of Isma'il (13), which grants greater detail to the safe topics of Isma'il's ancestry, and to preliminary Alawi history, than to events of the sultan's own day, was tossed off as a form of insurance, to counter the possibility that the author's major work might bring him into ill-favour at court. In this light, the "Muzhat al-Hadi..." itself may be seen as a work written for personal amusement. It exhibits a delight in folk-tales, word-play and chronogrammes. And its historical content obviously derives from its author's sense of personal identification.

(10) "Al-iyash al-Caranram al-khuma al-wlah al-wlad mawlena C al-
      al-si'ilma al-Fes lithograph of 1336=1918
(11) "Muzhat al-Hadi... ed./tr. Houdas p. 305 of the text, 505 of the
      translation.
(12) Levi-Provencal pp. 121-2
(13) This work, the "Zill al-warif fî maw'dikh mawlena Isma'il ibn al-
      shirîf" was issued in Fes in 1133=1720-21. When Levi-Provencal wrote,
      it was considered "lost" ("Les Historiens des Chorfa" P. 114). It has
      since been discovered and privately printed (Rabat, Imprimerie Royale,
      1962).
with Marrakesh. He was "Ifrānī by origin, but Marrakesh was his den" ("al-wufrānī al-nījār, al-nufrākūshī al-wująr") (14). And the "Nuzhat al-Hādī..." can be seen to express the author's devotion to the Sādī, as a dynasty based upon Marrakesh. Circumspectly, al-Ifrānī virtually ignored the fortunes of Marrakesh as an ex-capital, under the early Alawī rulers. His comment was confined to a subdued keening for one of the city's lost architectural glories, the al-Badi palace of Ahmad al-Mansūr al-Sādī, which the sultan Ismāʿīl ordered to be demolished (15).

The "Nashr al-Mathānī..." of al-Qādirī is essentially a work of biography rather than history. It is the major work of tabaqāt literature to come from the eighteenth century Maghrib al-Aqsa, and has dominated subsequent compilations referring to its period (16). Its author, an Hasānī shafi, came from an established family of Fāsi religious literati. His work was essentially Fāsi hagiography, designed to cover the eleventh and twelfth Hegiran centuries chronologically, by an annual grouping of obituaries. For many individual years, the author rounded up the relevant tāriḥāt by setting down events of the year. As one authority for his annal material, al-Qādirī cited Abū ʿAbd Allah al-Tayyib ibn Muhammad al-Fāsī (17). This scholar seems identifiable as a clan member of one of the leading religious communities of the city of Fes, the zawiyat al-Fāsī. As he died in 1701 (18), this "al-Fāsī chronicler" cannot have been the lone source writer of al-Qādirī's annals. Certain of these annals precurse his lifetime; others post-date his death. But his hand may be traced within the notable expansion of al-Qādirī's annal-material evident for

(15) ibid. pp. 113-4 of the text, 193-4 of the translation.
(16) For biographical and bibliographical details referring to this author and the work in question, see Lévi-Provencal pp. 319-326 and Lakhdar pp. 112-115.
(18) For biographical details concerning this scholar, see Lévi-Provencal (pp 242 and 283-4), who knew nothing of his connection with the "Nashr al-Mathānī...", but was aware of his hand in other works.
the second half of the seventeenth century. The sparse eighteenth century annals of the "Nashr al-Mathani..." may be attributed to a weak continuator. If strung together, these notes from an "al-Fasi chronicle" provide evidence for the existence of a "lost" seventeenth century source of major importance: a bedrock of archaic material from which al-Qadiri, in the "Nashr al-Mathani..." made one of the major surviving selections.

This chronicle material has its limitations. It obviously emanated from a prosperous but narrow milieu: the savant oligarchy of 'Ulama' associated with the Qarawiyyin, "queen"-mosque of Fes. The priorities of this circle are reflected within the annalist's "Barchester"-like obsession with religious politics. Its worldly comfort is illustrated by one telling detail: the annalist's summing up of the rigour of 1673 siege conditions with the note that, during that year, many were forced to invalidate the festivities of Id al-kabir by the immolation of a calf rather than a sheep (19). The chronicle material is heavily biased towards Fes. Only rarely are events from other parts of the Maghrib, or the outer world, even noted. They appear occasionally, as events of high significance, "news" brought in from outside. Further, the annals are clogged by a standard chronicler's pre-occupation with signs and portents, and with natural catastrophe, often as fleeting and localised as thunder and hailstorms.

However, the chronicle material has three characteristics that give it peculiar value. Although not impeccably accurate, this material has some claim to chronological reliability, in so far as this can be judged by its dating of events well-known to general history. It gives a correct date for a major Ottoman campaign in the

Balkans (1094 A.H./1683 A.D.) (20), for the abandoning of Tangier by the English (1095 A.H./1684 A.D.) (21), and for the opening of the siege of Ceuta (1106 A.H./1694 A.D.) (22). Further, for the textually rich period of the latter seventeenth century, the chronicle contains evidence of the varying economic fortunes of the city of Fes, as expressed in notes upon fluctuations within the relative values of silver and copper currencies, and within the price of city market grain. As a last virtue, there may be cited the chronicle's remarkable political inertia. The annals of the "Nashr al-Mathani..." are quite alien in tone from the laudatory formal tarajim of 'Alawi sultans included within the main text. They exhibit no compunction over the admission of a sultan's ill-success. The ruler's misfortunes would be recorded, because these had socio-economic repercussions upon the city. Thus, note upon a rumour that the sultan Isma'Il had been defeated outside Tlemsen, during the famine year of 1680, was accompanied by information that the "black market" price of the "ṣaʿa al-nabawī", or standard corn measure, had shot up to twice the officially appointed rate (23).

Al-Qadiri's annals were obviously not constructed purely from material taken from this putative "al-Fasi chronicle". Occasionally the annals contain acknowledged interpolations from oral traditions current during al-Qadiri's own lifetime. And there are certain trimmings by which the latter author showed his personal deference to the dynasty. Thus, clear "al-Fasi" information that the rising power of al-Rashid had, in 1664, aroused Fes to armed opposition, is followed in

(20) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 357
(21) ibid. p. 371
(22) "Nashr al-Mathani..." Fes lithograph. Vol. II p. 159 of the first notation. (The notation of this volume is irregular.)
(23) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 338
al-Qadir's text by the sugary assertion that God had ordained that 
al-Rashid should obtain power, and that his reign would be blessed by 
the majority of the faithful (24). But such hedging was unusual. For 
the most part, al-Qadir would seem to have transmitted chronicle 
material in a fashion that was straightforward, albeit, as will be 
seen later, incomplete.

The "Bustan al-Zarif..." of al-Zayyani (25) was overwhelmingly 
al-Nasiri's most important source for the early Alawi section of his 
"Kitab al-Istiqsa...". The work can be seen to have provided al-Nasiri 
with a framework for insets taken from the other three major sources, 
as well as from minor works of reference. Al-Zayyani was for half a 
century an high government servant to the Alawi sultans Muhammad III 
(1757-1790) and Sulayman(1792-1822). He was also the chief architect 
of an historical tradition concerning Alawi rule within the Maghrib 
al-Aqsa, down to the days of his own retirement in Sulayman's last 
years. The "Bustan al-Zarif..." is al-Zayyani's major work of 
Alawi history, and deals with the dynasty from its origins until 
1816. A second historical work by the same author, the "Turjuman 
al-Murrib..." (26), is an universal history, of which the thirteenth 
and final chapter (27) contains a more succinct account of roughly 
the same period. A third work of al-Zayyani's, the "Turjumanat al-
Kubra..." (28), is a compendium of geographical notes and personal

(24) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Micheaux-Bellaire Ar. M. Vol. XXIV p. 165 
(25) For additional biographical and bibliographical details concerning 
this author, see Lavi-Provencaal pp. 142-199 and Lakhdar pp. 319-26 
(26) In full: "Al-turjuman al-murrib an duwal al-mashriq wa 'l-magrib" 
(27) This chapter, edited and translated by O. Houdas as "Le Maroc de 
1631 à 1812" (Paris, 1886), is comparatively well-known. It is to 
this work that the reference "Turjuman" will hereafter refer. 
(28) "Al-turjumanat al-kubra allatI jamaC at akhbar maC mur al-Calam barran 
wa bahran". This work was probably issued c. 1820. It contains notes 
on events from the latter end of the second decade of the nineteenth 
century. The work has recently been published in an edition made by 
'Abd al-Karim al-Filali. (Casablanca, 1967)
memoirs, containing passages which illuminate the author's general outlook.

Al-Zayyānī's CAlawī history is focused upon the years following the accession of Sayyidī Muhammad III. For the period from 1757 onwards, the author's copious personal information, culled from a close association with government, makes his writing of history akin to the writing of memoirs. But the author had less of a close interest in the years preceding 1757. And his record of the earliest CAlawī history, that covering the years preceding the death of Ismaīl, can be seen to have its own peculiar purpose: that of serving as a somewhat stylised prologue to the author's main matter.

The material from which this prologue was constructed may be divided into three: a skeletal framework of Fāsī material; a body of Central Atlas traditions deriving from the author's own ethnic inheritance; and items, both traditional and documentary, that would seem to have been inserted in support of the view of early CAlawī history current at court during the author's own lifetime. The three strands of material are susceptible to differentiation on grounds of content and narrative style. Of the three corpora, the Fāsī material will be seen to be relatively reliable. But the Atlas strand to al-Zayyānī's narrative is demonstrably an overblown will-o'-the-wisp. Similarly, the author's "court" material can be shown to be misleading, even when it has documentary basis. The conclusory section to this thesis is designed to illustrate aspects of the mythology associated with early CAlawī history. The myths have all been derived from acceptance of al-Zayyānī's Atlas and court material at its face value.

Al-Zayyānī's Fāsī material has clearly been derived from a source identifiable with the "al-Fāsī chronicle" underlying the annals included in the "Nashr al-Mathānī...". It includes a number of passages that are identical with passages within al-Qādirī's annals. These are unlikely to have been simply derived from the "Nashr al-Mathānī...", the earlier
work. For there are other narrative points at which al-Zayyānī gives an essentially Fes-oriented passage in more precise detail than is found within the "Nashr al-Mathānî..." Examples are al-Zayyānī’s notes upon al-Rashīd’s currency reforms, and upon the campaign of Ismā’īl in 1677 against Ahmad ibn Ābd Allāh al-Dīlā’ī, which was followed by a Fasi triumph (29). There are yet further passages, given by al-Zayyānī alone, which seem to derive from the same Fasī body of material. They have the same terse style, and show a marked obsession with the concerns of Fes. This is evident in minutiae, such as the inclusion within the record of major campaigns, of the enumerated fatalities of the rumāt fās, or citizen militia of musketeers (30). To set al-Zayyānī’s information upon Fes against his meagre notes for the period upon other major cities of the Maghrib al-Āṣār, is to demonstrate very clearly the Fasī bias to al-Zayyānī’s early Ālāwī history. For this period, the affairs of Marrakesh and of Tarudant are noted only in connection with major crises in the history of the dynasty. Even less attention is granted to other urban centres. Thus, within the "Turjumān” version of the fifty-five year long reign of Ismā’īl, Sale is not mentioned once.

Al-Zayyānī’s Central Atlas material consists of a string of rural campaign stories recounted in a discursive manner, and with the misleading immediacy of folk-tale. All this material refers to peoples of one language group: the Atlas Sanhaja of tamazīght-speakers, referred to by linguists as “Berbèr” (31). The inclusion of this material is a reflection of the author’s complex cultural heritage. The Zayyānī

(29) "Turjumān” pp. 11 and 14 of the text, 22 and 27 of the translation; "Bustān al-Zarīf...” MS. pp. 27 and 30
(30) "Turjumān” pp. 14 and 17 of the text, 27 and 33 of the translation; "Bustān al-Zarīf...” MS. pp. 30 and 33
Sketch to illustrate the three global Berber language blocs of Morocco: those of tashalhalt, tamsuzhight and zenativa-speakers.
The sketch is a modern outline, drawn up by the Laboratory of Physical Geography in Rabat, and reproduced on Page 45 of the "Géographie du Maroc" of J. Martin et al. Its relation to linguistic boundaries over the period 1659-1727 must therefore be taken as only approximate.
grouping of the author's own day formed one branch of the Ayt U Mālū, a confederation of "Beraber" peoples from the region of the "Jabal Fazzāz", or hill-country rising above that stretch of terrain between Fes and Marrakesh that is called the Tadla. Al-Zayyānī claimed that one of his forefathers, a rural īmām from Argū, in the Adekhsan region of the Tadla, had been brought to the notice of the sultan Ismā'-Iīl, when that sultan was on campaign in the area; subsequently the īmām had been co-opted into the sultan's home-bound following (32). As Lévi-Provençal has noted, al-Zayyānī himself knew his ancestral region well, although he had been born and bred in Fes: he traced his own rise in government, from the status of clerk, to that of trusted political advisor, to an incident in 1773, when his knowledge of the Adekhsan region saved an army of Sayyīdī Muḥammad III from ambush (33). Further, al-Zayyānī maintained a sense of ethnic identity. In one autobiographical note, he claimed to be "no sharīf, but a city-bred Berber" (34). And, by Berber, al-Zayyānī meant "Beraber". For, although the author knew the global usage of berber, as a distinguishing term opposed to ċarab, he was accustomed to use berber upon its own, exclusively to indicate members of his own language group. He employed a medley terminology of proper names to cover those groupings of Berbers, tashalhight or zenatiya speakers (35) who were linguistically alien to him.

However, the ultimate determining factor in al-Zayyānī's approach

(32) "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 36
(33) "Turjuman" pp. 79-80 of the text, 145-6 of the translation cf. Lévi-Provençal pp. 151-2. The French author relied here upon the "Kitāb al-īstiqsa..." (Cairo text, Vol. IV pp. 108-9) for a fuller version of the incident. The original full text is to be found upon pp. 109-10 of MS No. D. 1571 of the "Bustan al-Zarīf..."
(34) Lévi-Provençal p. 144 The quotation is based upon a note that he had taken from a variant Saletin MS of the "Turjuman al-Mufrīd..." (f. ii) to which he had access.
(35) Lack of source material prevents the construction of an adequate language map of Morocco for the period. For a twentieth century list of self-acknowledged Moroccan Berber groupings, as subdivided by language, see the Preface to E. Laoust's "Mots et Choses Berbères". A modern language map is here reproduced. (See preceding page)
to early ʿAlawī history, was his career as a government servant. As the Adekhsan incident indicates, the author was proud to note that service to the makhzan, the central imperial administration, had been of primary concern to him, even in his ancestral country. It is curious to note that both al-ʿQādirī and al-ʿNaṣīrī were capable of expressing a sentimental nostalgia for Dilaʿ, the great zawiya, or religious house, in the Tadla region (36), whose authority over Fes and the central Maghrib al-ʿAqṣa was superseded by the rise of the ʿAlawī (37). There is no trace of such sentiment within the writings of al-Zayyanī.

The author’s bias towards the reigning dynasty led to the inclusion within his early ʿAlawī "prologue", of material reflecting dynastic priorities: a bloc of traditions concerning the political emergence of the ʿAlawī; information upon the origin of military forces associated with the dynasty; and architectural notes upon the construction of Meknes as an imperial capital. The bias led the author into standard paths of modification: reticence concerning defeat, and the occasional ennoblement of a sultan's enemies to a rank which did not disgrace him. Thus the "al-Fāsi chronicle" record of an encounter during the winter of 1678-9 between the army of the sultan Ismaʿīl, and Ayt ʿAtta Berbers from the Saharan flank of the Anti-Atlas (38) was adapted by al-Zayyanī into a notice of an hard-fought battle with three rebel brothers (39).

But the major dynastic distortion imposed by al-Zayyanī upon his material was not standard, but particular. It hinged


(38) "Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above. p. 289

(39) "Turjuman" p. 17 of the text and 33 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarīf...", MS p. 33
upon the central position with which the author endowed the career and policies of Sayyid Muhammad III. This was the sultan whom al-Zayyani served in various capacities throughout his reign, and for whom he felt an affection that survives within personal anecdotes. By the time al-Zayyani completed his major historical writings, Muhammad III had been dead for more than a quarter of a century. Yet the author did not disguise his relative contempt for the reigning sultan Sulayman ibn Muhammad, whom he seems to have considered a weakling by comparison with his father. Even in his concluding panegyric to the "Turjuman al-Murrib...", al-Zayyani felt bound to point out that Sulayman was not so great a ruler as his father had been, and that he had at times taken ill advice (40). And, in al-Zayyani's late work, the "Turjumanat al-Kubra...", whose completion post-dated a period during which Sulayman had been the victim of intense internal unrest, the sultan was subjected by the author to deft criticism for his soft dealings with the Beraber (41). The conclusory section of this thesis will illustrate al-Zayyani's tailoring of early Alawī historical material with specific dynastic intent: that of ensuring that Sayyid Muhammad III would not be overshadowed by his ancestry, any more than he was overshadowed by his son.

The "Jaysh al-aramram..." of Muhammad Akansus is the fourth, the latest, and quantitatively the least significant of al-Nasiri's major

(40) "Turjuman" p. 107 of the text, 195 of the translation.
(41) "wa lam bawuy'a waledahu amir al-mu'minīn mawla al-sulaymān mulk... sasahum siyasa wālidibhi bi 'l-riqa wa 'l-hilm wa 'l-ighfa' C an hafawathim fa-'atfahum hilmihi wa afsadahum 'adlihi wa lam varhuf lihim hadd."
("And then authority was vested upon his son, our master Sulayman commander of the faithful. He governed them (the Beraber) according to his father's government, with gentleness and kindness, averting his attention from their offences, Indeed he smothered them with kindness, and ruined them with fair dealing, and no sword was sharpened against them")
("Turjumanat al-Kubra..." ed. al-Fīlāfī p. 71)
sources for the early \^Alawi period. Its author was by origin a "Chleuh", or tashalhah\^t-speaking Berber from the Sus, who became a well-known religious and literary figure of mid-nineteenth century Marrakesh (42). He claimed to have served in his youth as waz\^r to Sulay\^m, and was court poet to two subsequent sultans. He was led by court associations into an identification with the \^Alawi dynasty as strong in its own way as that exhibited by al-Zayy\^n. Among his minor works were letters set into his "Rasa\^il adab\^iya", written in the name of the sultan Sulay\^m, and including ruminations upon the burden of the exercise of government (43). The "Jawh al-Caramram..." was essentially an \^Alawi history down to the author's own day. Akans\^u borrowed heavily from standard sources until the recounting of affairs with which he was personally acquainted. He was particularly dependent upon al-Zayy\^n. However, he could criticise al-Zayy\^n for being both careless and crudely outspoken. And he did make minor independent accretions to al-Zayy\^n's text: pieces of tradition emanating from his own interests as a Sus\^i, a man of letters, and a government servant.

The literary tradition sewn together within the "Kit\^ab al-Istigs\^a..." has largely framed the view of early \^Alawi indigenous history that is set forth within standard modern works (44). It has thus far been found impossible to comment upon the literary tradition with evidence from an

(42) For biographical and bibliographical details concerning this author, see Levi Proven\^al pp. 200-217 cf. Lakhdar pp. 342-351 cf. R. Louiro\^o D\^ia: "Ensayo Historiografico sobre el sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b. "Abd Allah" (Granada, 1967) pp. 54-55

(43) Lakhdar pp. 340-9

indigenous archive. No central corpus of archives survives from the early ʿAlawī period (45). And it will be seen later that it is improbable that government of the period was sufficiently sophisticated administratively for the creation of an orderly archive at the centre of makhzan affairs (46). However, there do exist three bodies of evidence with the combined potential for a reformulation of the "Istighaṣī"-bound view. The first of these is the archaic skein of Fasī material set into the "Nashr al-Mathanī..." and the works of al-Zayyānī. The second comprises contemporary and near-contemporary indigenous sources extraneous to the main tradition. The third is European material. Thus far, no recognition has been given to the peculiar value of the Fasī material within the main tradition. And thus far extraneous sources from the two latter categories have been used essentially to supplement rather than to criticise the "Istighaṣī" tradition. It is the aim of this thesis to go further: to use the three corpora of "alternative evidence" firstly to reconstruct a modified outline of early ʿAlawī political history, and secondly to illuminate the major distortions which have been imposed upon that history by the iron views of al-Zayyānī.

Note will now be taken of some of the chief indigenous and European items from the latter two corpora of "alternative evidence". Additional sources from Fes are amid works of indigenous material that are extraneous to the "Istighaṣī" tradition. Because no central archive exists, particular importance attaches to a published corpus of makhzan letters.

(45) The pre-Protectorate material within the palace archives of the Bibliothèque Royale in Rabat has now been classified. Recently, material dating from 1790 onwards has been set open to view. According to M. Germain Ayache, who worked upon these archives until the mid 1960s, earlier material within this palace corpus is scanty and, for the early ʿAlawī period under examination, non-existent. See: "La Question des Archives Historiques Marocaines" in "Hesperia-Tamuda" Vol. II (Rabat, 1961) pp. 311-326 cf. personal conversation April, 1972.

(46) See Chapter IV pp. 164-167
addressed to two successive shuyūkh of the zawiyat al-Fasī, whose
descendants kept them within the family (47). Roughly half these
letters are attributable to the sultan IsmaʿIl, on grounds of seal
or signature. Of the remainder, two at least were despatched on behalf
of Zaydan ibn IsmaʿIl, heir-presumptive over the central part of
IsmaʿIl's reign; others came from notable government officials.
The most striking among these letters are ten which concern IsmaʿIl's
standing guard of ʿabīd or black slaves, and the vexed question of
the legal recognition of their relationship to the sultan as his
slaves or, at the very least, as his lawfully conscripted soldiers.
From the al-Fasī side of this correspondence, there survives one
fatwā (48), tactful, but essentially a rebuttal of imperial demands.

A further Fasī record, from an unusual slant, is the Hebrew
chronicle begun by Sādyā ibn Danān, and continued by his transcriber
and descendant, Samuel ibn Sālī ibn Danān. This chronicle, in the form
worked upon by its editor and translator Vajda (49), seems to date
from the early eighteenth century. Its extracts recount, in an
erratic and garbled form, events from 1646 onwards, as seen from the
claustrophobic viewpoint of the Fasī millāh or Jewry.

There are two major sources which provide the nearest approach to
an indigenous and provincial counter-weight to the period's prevailing Fasī
bias. Together, they provide complementary evidence on the impingement,
at the distant local level, of the early ʿAlawi makhzan. The first of

---

(47) Muhammad El-Fasī: "Lettres Inédites de Moulay Ismaël" in "Hesperia-
Tamuda" Special edition, 1962, as issued in honour of the tri-
centenary A.H. of IsmaʿIl's accession (pp. 31-85). Hereafter this
source will be referred to as "Lettres Inédites..."

(48) Edited and published by Muhammad El-Fasī, as an appendix to his
brief celebratory "Biographie de Moulay Ismaël", which formed a
companion article to the edition of the letters noted above.

(49) G. Vajda: "Un recueil de textes historiques juıedo-marocaines" Texts
Nos. XXI to XXVI in "Hesperis" Vols XXXV (Paris, 1948) pp. 352-8
and XXXVI (Paris, 1949) pp. 139-162
these bodies of material is provided by texts relevant to the
period to be found within the corpus of Tawatī documents upon which
A.-G.-P. Martin based much of his "Quatre Siècles de l'Histoire
Marocaine 1504—1912" (50). Obvious caution must be exercised in the
use of this material. Martin, an officer-interpreter in the Tawatī
region newly occupied by the French at the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth centuries, was a cavalier historian.
He was accustomed to paraphrase rather than to translate the
chronicle material of which he made use. Only vaguely did he
indicate the whereabouts of original texts. Yet his transcribed
administrative documents have a rarity value, as evidence as to the
character of the leading reins which held a remote Saharan complex
in some degree of peaceable fiscal subjection to sultans based
within the Atlas arc. And one skein of the chronicle material
used by Martin has some claim to individual respect. This is the
material which the author footnoted as being derived from the
eighteenth century chronicler "Sidi Bahaia", otherwise Mawlay Hashim
ibn Ahmad. A descendant of this scholar collaborated with the local
French administration early in the twentieth century (51), and may be
considered some guarantor for the translation. And "Sidi Bahaia"
himself may be seen to amplify notes upon Saharan affairs that are
touched upon in material from the inner Maghrib al-Aqsa.

Orderly and even peaceful administration is the keynote to much
of Martin's Tawatī material. Warfare and intrigue create the face of

(50) Paris, 1924. A.-G.-P. Martin had intended to publish much of the
evidence contained within this work as part of his
earlier volume "Les Oasis Sahariennes" (Paris, 1908). However, the
information was suppressed until after the establishment of a French
Protectorate over Morocco, because it contained data as to the
authority which Moroccan sultans had established over Tawat at
intervals from the late sixteenth century onwards, and thus went
to support Moroccan claims to the region, as against those of
France in Algeria.

(51) Martin: "Quatre Siècles..." p. 62 (Note 4) It is to the
"Quatre Siècles..." that the reference Martin will hereafter refer.
government shown within the "Rihla du Marabout de Tasaft" (52), the translation of an unusual rustic composition which spotlights the confusion wrought by a central government assault upon the Tagoundaft region of the High Atlas, during a short period in the early eighteenth century. The work is a product of filial piety. It tells of the reaction of local political leaders, and particularly of the author's father, the "marabout" of the title, to the stresses of two government expeditions. The second of these, which brought troops and artillery into high mountain reaches, induced clusters of mountain "Chleuh" who were customarily regarded as inaccessible to plains government, to make an obeisance to the Alawi sultan. The author's father, however, maintained a dogged resistance to all government approaches.

The peculiarly quaint character of this composition arouses a certain unease as to its authenticity. But its rambling style, together with its narrative focus upon the minutiae of a political crisis as it affected one family, make it unlikely that any but its first person author would have wished to fabricate a work quite so personal in its untidiness. Furthermore, the existence of one of its central characters, its "villain", Abd al-Karim, Bashâ of Marrakesh, unknown to the mainstream of source material, is vouched for by one obscure note in which an English consul recorded his death (53).

Two keen students of this work, Justinard the translator, and Robert Montagne, the sociologist of High Atlas Berberdom (54), saw in it essentially a precious record of local history, and in particular, a source

(53) S.P. 71 (16) f. 563 Memo. of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 11/8/1718
of evidence for the depth in time of the mechanics of High Atlas "laffs" or checkerboard systems of alliance (55). Montagne was also concerned to stress the alien culture of the mountain. He seized upon an isolated incident, the pre-campaign consultation of mountain jinn by an agricultural grouping, as their acknowledgement of the "true gods" of the mountain (56). He thereby set aside the stolid provincial piety which pervades the text as a whole, and ignored the role of the author's father as an uncompromisingly Muslim and well-respected local imam. Such an approach distorts the tone of al-Zarhūni's work, which is not a cliché in Berber separatism. Its author was separatist in that, like al-Zayyāni, he knew a cultural identity defined by language: his home country, in its widest sense, was the Sus, seen as the land of the "Chleuh" or tashalhāt speakers (57). But he and his rural compatriots saw in the 'Alawi makhzen a fact of life, and in its doings a source of varied fascination. Further, the intransigence of the author's father was singular. His co-equals and friends knew, in appropriate circumstances, how to capitalise upon the opportunities a central government provided, using the web-lines of bribery and marriage alliance by which that government had infiltrated their mountain country.

To pass from the rural Tasaft narrative to a discussion of contemporary European material is violently to cross cultures. Quantitatively, European material has been of great significance to this study. It has the predictable deficiencies of approach and

---

(55) For the most lengthy exposition of the "laff" system, see R. Montagne: "Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc" (Paris, 1930) pp. 182-216
(56) Montagne: "Un épisode de la 'siba'..." p. 90
(57) al-Zarhūni of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 139-140
cover inseparable from alien commentary, but the advantage of contemporaneity. However, its most valuable corpus, the French, parallels indigenous material by faltering at around the same chronological point: the end of the seventeenth century. Renewed wealth, to be found within English material, dates only from the very end of the early DʿAlawi period.

European material chiefly details European interests marginal to the internal politics of the Maghrib al-Aqsa. For the most part this material was the by-product of two inter-twined concerns: firstly, the inroads into European shipping made by Moroccan corsairs; and secondly, the affairs of European nationals who were held captive in Morocco, largely as a result of these corsair degradations. These captives formed a group of limited size (58) which pride and ideology made the object of acute diplomatic and religious concern. In Catholic Europe there were religious orders entirely devoted to the ransom of Catholic captives held in "Barbary". Protestant governments took the initiative on behalf of their own nationals. The twin priorities of shipping and ransom dominate published "Barbary" literature in particular. The books were normally a by-product of diplomatic missions, or of the activities of ransom pressure-groups. Frequently they were, nominally or in truth, the work of grateful ransomees, and written to a formula, with the obvious aim of arousing a generous pity for Christian sufferings at the hands of the infidel. Only a small proportion of this literature holds value for the student of internal Moroccan political history. The most outstanding of the individual authors who lend spice to the dough will be noted within the following brief and eclectic account of European source material for the period.

(58) See H. Koehler: "Quelques points d'histoire sur les captifs chrétiens au Maroc" in "Hespéria" Vol. VIII (Paris, 1928) pp. 177-187, for the view that it was rare during this period for Christian captives in Morocco, of all nationalities combined, to number more than a thousand.
This European source material is best classified by language. For the product of diplomacy, commerce and religious interest is inter-related. And even the formal distinction between archival and published sources has been blurred by the massive serial publication of archives, bound up with re-editions of early published texts, that was inaugurated by de Castries (59). The archival surveys of J.-L. Miege suggest that, for many languages, the Italian, the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Scandinavian, surviving material for the period, relevant to Morocco, is thin to non-existent (60). Geographical proximity makes the Spanish lacuna particularly tantalising. But, for the source-starved latter half of the period which corresponded with the ravaged early years of Felipe V (1700-1746), the documentation of the Archivo General de Simancas is known to be in a state of acute general debility (61). And the mass of known documentation upon relations between Morocco and Spain dates only from 1766, the year which saw Muhammad III's somersault into friendship with the ancient Spanish enemy (62).

It remains true that, for the period, the only unbroken line of free Christian Europeans resident within the Moroccan interior was Spanish. Its men were friars, representing a medical mission founded in Saadi times, and financed by the Spanish government. Its aim was to maintain the Christian morale of Spanish captives in Morocco. The

---

(59) H. de Castries et al.: "Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc: Première Série (Dynastie Saadienne); Deuxième Série (Dynastie Filalienne)." (Paris, from 1905 and in progress. Henceforward S.1, 1st or 2nd together with Volume number and details.


mother-house of the mission followed the capital. During the period it shifted from Marrakesh to Fes and thence to Meknes. For all but the years 1674-80, its personnel was Franciscan. Documents of the Franciscan order provided the basis for the early eighteenth century "Mission Historial de Marruecos" (63). This is an ecclesiastically authorised work of monumental length, but relatively limited historical value. Its approach to infidel politics and society is myopic and hostile, and it contains only dispersed jottings upon matters unrelated to the "cure of souls". Surviving Franciscan archives held within the later Tangier mission have been examined by the Franciscan authors Castellanos (64), Rosende (65) and Koehler (66). The records are quite literally parochial, and for the most part, post-date the period.

There is voluminous surviving material in French for the second half of the seventeenth century. Flurries of writing were provoked by the exchange of embassies. Two important diplomatic ventures from France to Morocco were those of St. Amans in 1682-3, and of Pidou de St. Olon in 1693. Two Frenchmen, Germain Mouitte and Jean-Baptiste Estelle, dominate European comment upon Morocco for this first half of the period.

Mouitte was an individual captive, taken at sea by a "Sallee-man" in 1670, and ransomed in 1681, after successive periods of residence within Sale, Fes and Meknes. Two works attach to his name. The "Relation..." (67) is an hasty and racy piece, typical of fund-raising

(63) Fray Francisco Jesus Maria Del Puerto: "Mission Historial de Marruecos" (Seville, 1708)

(64) M.P. Castellanos: "Apostolado Serafico en Marruecos" (Madrid and Santiago, 1896). Only part one of this mission history was ever written. It ends at 1704.

(65) P. Rosende: "Los Franciscanos y los cautivos en Marruecos" in "Archivo-Ibero-Americano" (Madrid, Vol. I, Jan-Feb 1914)

(66) H. Koehler: "L'Eglise chrétienne du Maroc et la Mission Franciscaine 1221-1790" (Paris 1934) A piece of sentimental hagiography, countered by the sober and generous article cited above (P. 33 Note (58))

(67) G. Mouitte: "Relation de la captivité du sieur Mouitte dans les Royaumes de Faz et de Maroc" (Paris, 1683).
ransom literature. But the "Histoire..." (68) is a serious work. It was drafted while the author was still resident in Morocco (69) and purports faithfully to recount the fortunes of the reigning Alawi dynasty from its origins, up to the year of the author's departure for France. It is the most detailed, as well as the earliest account of its period. Culturally it is oddly hybrid, swerving from a Christian to a Muslim bias, for, together with his own journal, and information taken from fellow-captives, Mouitte made use of a mass of material taken from a single Muslim informant, a Fasi talib whose name he transliterated as "Bougiman". This talib was kātib to one of al-Rashīd's generals, and subsequently an employee of Isma'īl's, whom Mouitte assisted in his calligraphic work upon palace buildings (70). The ensuing friendship captured the devout Catholic Mouitte into the orbit of Fasi reporting. At many points the "Histoire..." parallels indigenous "al-Fasi chronicle" material. For one event, the murder of the general who had been "Bougiman"'s master, the two sources give an identical date (71). And it is possible to see Fasi, or at least northerly weakness in Mouitte's occasional collapse from relatively sober narration into the transmission of tall tales of the military glory and wealth to be won in remote Saharan regions (72). These are likely to be echoes

(68) G. Mouitte: "Histoire des conquêtes de Mouley Archy, connu sous le nom de roy de Tafilet, et de Mouley Ismaël ou Semæín, son frère et son successeur à présent régnant, tous deux rois de Faz, de Maroc, de Tafilet, de Sus etc., contenant une description de ces royaumes..." (Paris, 1683) A re-edition of this work, to be cited hereafter, is contained within S.I. 2nd France Vol. II pp. 1-201
(69) ibid. pp. 1-3
(70) ibid. pp. 8-9
(72) Mouitte: "Histoire..." pp. 43-4 and 135-7
of the trans-Saharan expeditions which had taken place during the reign of Ahmad al-Manṣūr al-Sādī.

France maintained consuls in Sale and in Tetuan from 1683 until 1716. Among these consuls, the outstanding personality was Jean-Baptiste Estelle, representative of France in Sale between 1690 and 1698 (73). He conducted a dense diplomatic correspondence (74). And his information may be traced within much of the material set into the published work of the ambassador Pidou de St. Olon (75), whom Estelle accompanied from Tetuan to Meknes. Estelle's reports have the limitations imposed by their being made most usually from Sale, an hispanophone town (76) at the periphery of Moroccan politics. But their vigour and intelligence is unquestionable. Their author was perhaps over-wily for his own good. It is not impossible that, with the aid of forged correspondence, he engineered the very embassy of 1693 with which he was associated: a diplomatic abortion which set Franco-Moroccan relations for the period upon a downward track (77).

He was apparently ousted from Sale by local authorities, in the dealings

Footnotes (1) and (3).
(74) See S.I. 2° France Vols. III and IV passim.
(75) F. Pidou de St. Olon: "L'estat present de l'empire de Maroc" (Paris, 1694) tr. Peter Motteux as "The Present State of the Empire of Morocco" (London, 1695). Future references are to the Motteux translation.
(76) Motteux: "Relation..." Preface p. iii
(77) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. XXII pp. 159-211 Memo. of Pidou de St. Olon dated Toulon, 7/11/1693. This memorandum includes a translation of a letter from Isma il to the ambassador, insisting that the sultan had requested Jean-Baptiste Estelle merely to further the import of French goods, and not to arrange an embassy. The allegation would explain the puzzled and cool reception which the French ambassador received. Bogus diplomacy, with the aid of forged correspondence, was characteristic of the period. Over the years 1710-1713, Ventura de Zari, a "Moroccan ambassador" to Queen Anne was maintained in London at varying degrees of formality, before finally being unmasked as a "broken Greek" sent to England to purchase spotted deer for the sultan's park (S.P. 71 (15) f. 237 to (16) f. 204 passim.)
which preceded a similarly futile embassy from Morocco to Versailles (78). His tame successors were to be decreasingly informative.

It has been noted previously that European material upon Morocco in the early eighteenth century is thin. It is dominated by two parallel works of French ransom literature, written in the aftermath of three separate missions undertaken by Trinitarian and Mercedarian fathers in unison. The expeditions were made in 1704, 1708 and 1712. Their grand total of success was the liberation of forty-three slaves from captivity in Meknes. The earlier and more informative work is that of the Trinitarian Dominique Busnot (79) whom Chenier, French consul at Mogador in Muhammad III's day, and the first European to write a general history of Morocco (80), used "faute de mieux", as a continuator to Mouette. Busnot was not writing as an historian. He used a captive's eye view of episodes in recent Moroccan political history, along with atrocity and escape stories, to pad out the meagre details of his thwarted personal experiences overseas. The result was "Grand Guignol". Its avowed aim was to give "une vive idee du Genie des Maures" (81). Yet Busnot's work is not valueless as a source. It includes snippets of information which can be checked against alternative material, including the author's own correspondence from Morocco (82). The companion work,

(78) S.I. 2° France Vol. V. No. LXXIII p. 473 J.-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Marseille, 6/11/1699. The letter indicates that the consul was afraid to return to the Salatin post, from which he had come on "leave" the previous year.

(79) D. Busnot: "Histoire du Règne de Moulay Ismael" (Rouen, 1714)

(80) L.-S. de Chenier: "Recherches Historiques sur les Maures et l'Histoire de l'Empire du Maroc" (Paris, 1787) translated into English as "The Present State of the Empire of Morocco" (London, 1788; two volumes, of which the second is the "History"). Future references are to this translation.

(81) Busnot, p. 60

(82) This has been partly reproduced within S.I. 2° France Vol. VI.
the "Relation... de la Mercy" (83) was produced a decade later, apparently as a Mercedarian fund-raiser to counter the earlier Trinitarian work, whose content it follows very closely. The Mercedarian piece has a disarming flow which suggests "ghosting" and, although it contains details alien to Busnot's text, was clearly written with an eye upon the earlier composition.

Much of the original material in English contemporary with the period falls into two chronologically riven categories. The first is associated with the English possession of Tangier between 1662 and 1684. The second post-dates the English capture of Gibraltar in 1704. "Tangier" material is voluminous, but rarely touches upon events vital to the internal politics of Morocco (84). Its most valuable items are the correspondence and pamphlets associated with the inept Howard mission from Tangier to Fez in 1669, and with the final period of the English possession, dating from governor Kirk's visit to Meknes in 1681, until the port's evacuation. The latter-day "Gibraltar" material is of more value, particularly for the last decade of the period, during which Great Britain was becoming the Christian power with which Morocco had closest relations. Symbolically, the termination of the French consulates in 1716 was succeeded, in the following year, by the appointment of Anthony Hatfield, a Tifawí merchant, as the first English consul to Morocco since the days of Charles I (85).

Embassies were most productive of information. Two luckless naval

---

(83) Anon: "Relation de ce qui s'est passé dans les trois voyages que les Religieux de l'Ordre de Notre-Dame de la Mercy ont faits dans les Etats du Roy de Maroc pour la rédemption des captifs en 1704, 1708 et 1712, par un des Pères Députéz pour la Redemtion..." (Paris, 1724) The mass of this work has been reproduced in an edition contained within S.I. 28 France, Vol. VI (pp. 613-812)

(84) This material has already been the object of a bland study written from the English imperial viewpoint: E.M.G. Routh's "Tangier: England's lost Atlantic Outpost" (London, 1912)

missions to Meknes in 1713-14 and 1718 were followed by the highly successful 1721 embassy of Commodore Stewart, of which a by-product was the publication of John Windus's compendium of first and second-hand material: "A Journey to Mequinez..." (86). Among the sources acknowledged by the author, particular importance appertains to unpublished material taken from a "Mr. Corbiere", said to have lived in Morocco, and known the court at Meknes (87). Corbiere is otherwise known from a passing note in Busnot's work, referring to the first decade of the eighteenth century (88), and an English archival note from 1713 (89). No direct acknowledgments to Corbiere are made within Windus's text. But his contributions are tentatively identifiable by style. Windus, as narrator of the events of 1721, wrote in a beguilingly light vein. But his text is periodically interspersed by ponderous and disdainful notes upon the Meknes court and episodes in its recent history. These read like the work of another hand.

Braithwaite's book (90) emerged from a further and far less satisfactory embassy from Gibraltar to Meknes, undertaken in 1727-8, in the months following the death of the sultan Isma'il. It is a sardonic and for the most part independent work. Its author, a young army captain from the Gibraltar garrison, was perhaps the most acute of all the European commentators noted so far. He was certainly the only author who refused to discuss the Christian captives of Meknes within the usual conventions of martyrology (91). Unfortunately, the scope of Braithwaite's

(86) J. Windus: "A Journey to Mequinez etc" (London, 1721)
(87) op. cit. Preface p. ii
(88) Busnot p. 239
(89) S.P. 71 (16) f. 93 Memo. of "Mr. Corbiere" dated 12/5/1713, detailing the current fighting strength of Moroccan corsair vessels.
(90) J. Braithwaite: "The History of the Revolutions in the Empire of Morocco upon the Death of the late Emperor Muley Ishmael" (London, 1729)
(91) ibid. pp. 352-4
work is limited, and merely grazes the period under direct examination.

English bibliography has its share of ransom literature. The memoirs of Francis Brooks, and the anonymous autobiography edited by Simon Ockley (92) form perhaps the most valuable items from this weak collection. As a maverick to such literature comes the problematic "autobiography" of Thomas Pellow (93), supposedly the first-hand reminiscences of an English renegade who, as court page and then army officer, lived in Morocco for twenty-three years between 1715 and 1738, before making his escape and returning in peace to Cornwall and the Anglican church. Since its resurrection in 1890 by the bibliographer Brown (94), the work has been variously estimated. Its most recent student, Mme. Morsy-Patchett, is willing to discount its more overt borrowings, and to treat the work as fundamentally an whole, recounting the experiences of a single individual (95). The renegade Pellow certainly existed (96). And there is equally no doubt that the author of the autobiography as it stands was acquainted with one or more informants who knew contemporary Morocco well. But to equate this author with an individual "Pellow", even via the mediation of a "ghost writer", is to belie the nature of the work. The book is patch-work, thrown together to create a picaresque novel of the Defoe school. It is possible to identify much of the published material which, as text or inspiration, went to create it. The "lees" not otherwise accounted for, amount to banal


(93) "The history of the Long Captivity and Adventures of Thomas Pellow in South Barbarv" written by Himself (London, no date).

(94) "The Adventures of Thomas Pellow of Penryn, Mariner: three and twenty years in captivity among the Moors" ed. R. Brown (London, 1890)


(96) Braithwaite p. 192 cf. S.P. 71 (16) ff. 583–8 A list of English captives at Meknes, dated 29/9/1719 and including, in the listed crew of the "Frances" of Falmouth, one "Tho. Pellow: Boy Turn'd Moor".
and undated campaign records, accompanied by a profusion of personal
and place names that are frequently verisimilitudinous in their
outlandish spelling. But these mean little within an obviously
fictional context.

Certain fundamental cautions should be applied to the appreciation
of European material for the period. The material is not always simple
contemporary commentary. Published work, and even some archival
reporting, forms part of a loose tradition at the head of which
stands the monumental "Descrittione dell'Africa..." of Leo Africanus
(97), which dates from the early 1520s. Either directly, or by way
of Marmol Carvajal (98) this work continued to serve as a standard
mine of supplementary information to seventeenth and eighteenth
century European authors attempting to give a general account of
Morocco. The "Descrittione..." is a work of unrivalled value. It
includes the only extensive survey of the Maghrib al-Aqsa made prior
to the nineteenth century. And this survey is unique, as the work of
a "Moor" deliberately attempting to interpret his homeland for the
benefit of aliens. Much of its information may indeed be treated as
static, recording circumstances known still to have prevailed in the
nineteenth century and later; these may include many of the details
of life in Fez, Leo's beloved home city (99). But some of the notes
cannibalised by later authors are likely to have been erroneous for
the early Alawi period. A striking example is Leo's account of Marrakesh.

---

(97) After stylistic polishing, this work was published within the
compendium of Giovanni Battista Ramusio: "Delle navigationi et
viaggi" ff. 1-95 inclusive (Venice, 1550) as "Della descrizione
dell'Africa et delle cose notabili che quivi sono". Its most
recent edition has been a French "Description de l'Afrique",
edited and translated by A. Epaulard et al. (Paris, 1956)
del.

(98) Luis Marmol Carvajal: "Descripción general de Africa" (Granada and
Malaga, 1573 and 1599). The author of this work used vast tracts of
Leo's "Descrittione..." to pad out evidence culled from his own
crusading experiences within Morocco. In 1667 his work was
seminally translated into French by N. Perrot d'Ablancourt as
"De l'Afrique Vols. I and II (Paris publication).

(99) See R. le Tourneau: "Fes avant le Protectorat" (Casablanca, 1949)
pp. 76-7 and 292
His plangent and antiquarian notes upon the ruined former capital of the Almoravides and Almohades re-emerged in writings that post-dated the spectacular building programme of Ahmad al-Mansur al-Sa'di (100).

The existence of Leo's master-text was peculiarly convenient in that the horizons of contemporary first-hand European knowledge of Morocco were, during the early Alawi period, usually limited. Merchants were for the most part confined to the ports. With rare exceptions, diplomatic and religious envoys knew only the road from coast to capital. And from 1680 onwards, European captives were congregated in Meknes as servants to the palace community (101): their only opportunity for wide geographical experience was co-option into the train of a military expedition.

Intellectually, European horizons were similarly constrained. European commerce was a natural and prevailing obsession. Its importance for the country at large may be set into perspective by notes upon the size of coastal merchant communities (102). Captives, and the ransom missionaries they spoke to were fascinated by imperial palace politics. But the fascination was customarily expressed in the lurid terms of backstairs gossip. Mouette was the only captive-turned-author capable of extensive literary elevation above this level.

Sympathy is indeed a rare factor in European comment upon Moroccan society and politics of the period. Hostility prevails. According to Simon Ockley, Professor of Arabic at Cambridge in the early eighteenth

(100) For an example, comparison may be made between the Murrakushi notes of Leo (ed. Ramusio f. 17-18) and those of Pidou de St. Olon (tr. Motteux pp. 15-17).

(101) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 125

(102) The privateer Doublot who visited Agadir in 1683 found that its "Doane" where European merchants were housed, contained two individuals besides himself (S.I. 2e France Vol. 1 no. CXCII p. 596 Extract from the Journal of Jean Doublot. Exact dating obscure) Braithwaite listed the entire expatriate community of Tetuan for 1727. It was made up of five English or Irish merchants, one French merchant, one Greek merchant and two Spanish friars (p. 59).
century, and heavy-handed editor of an afore-mentioned piece of ransom-literature, Morocco was a land in:

"Temper, Genius and Breeding... as much inferior to that of the Polite Asiaticks (amongst which the Persians do most deservedly claim the Preference) as can be conceived." (103)

Such an opinion was an abstraction from persistent cultural tensions expressed most succinctly in the alley-way jihad of the inland towns, where Europeans were subjected to hooting and stone-shying (104). These tensions seem to have been particularly acute within the Maghrib al-Aqsa. Braithwaite echoed Ockley in exempting from condemnation "they of Algier, Tripoli, Tunis" and "the Turks" as comparatively "polished and civilised" (105). This polarisation of European sympathies in relation to North Africa is well-expressed by reaction to one event. In 1692, an Algerine expeditionary force triumphed over Alawi defending forces, upon Alawi territory. Jean-Baptiste Estelle expressed the hope that the sultan’s disgrace "devroit luy abattre un peu de sa fierte" (106). Meanwhile, his English and French counterparts in Algiers rejoiced in gleeful fellowship with the Algerines: "Our Dey" (107), "notre invincible monarque" (108) had been victorious.

(103) "Ockley" Preface p. xix
(107) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXLV Consul Lemaire to the "Echevins" of Marseille, Algiers, 13/8/1692
CHAPTER 1: THE ALAWI CAPTURE OF FES

Leo, in his division of Africa, split the northernmost reaches of the continent into "Barbary", the maritime region of rationality and law, and "Numidia", across the Atlas, the land of the palm-groves, and first of the regions beyond the pale of civilisation. For the Maghrib al-Aqsa* the distinction is certainly valid geomorphically: rigorous relief all but divides the area today known as Morocco into a green sweep of interior land, and an outer world of steppe, desert and oasis. Yet, in human terms, this division should be seen as a two-way filter. The Atlas requires a deep respect in winter, but has nevertheless been in one sense a spur to communication. The ecological diversity of its inner and outer flanks has promoted a trading pattern dominated by the counter-change of dates for grain. For the north of the green interior, a land corresponding to Leo's "kingdom of Fes", the prime date country is the oasean complex of Tafilet, spanning the valleys of the Ziz and Rheris. A more southerly sphere, Leo's "kingdom of Marrakesh" has a corresponding bond with the great oasis of the Darâa valley.

The interior lands present their own linguistic and cultural patchwork. Athwart this diversity there is one major cleft. It is enshrined in the "Chleuh" parlance that would divide the land from the Anti-Atlas to the Mediterranean into a "Sus" or familiar, mountain-hedged south, and a "Gharb", paradoxically the "north": the land beyond Marrakesh (1). These regions are a "greater Sus" and "greater Gharb", englobing far more territory than their lesser namesakes, the riverain plains of the Wâdi Siâs and Sebu.

Before the present century, government within the Maghrib al-Aqsa* oscillated between two centres. Periodically it was based at or near to Fes, economic hub of the Maghrib al-Aqsa's most fertile grain

(1) See, for example, the customs and beliefs cited in E. Westermarck: "Ritual and Belief in Morocco" (London, 1926) Vol. I pp. 178 and 179
country; and periodically at Marrakesh, a city built upon arid and stony ground, but nevertheless, a capital strategically better placed for challenging the fiscally tantalising lands of "greater Sus", which combined a prosperous and multi-faceted economy, with a grimly defensible terrain. The sixteenth century had seen the re-establishment of government at Marrakesh, under the Sa'IDI princes, a dynasty of Dar'IDI origin and "sharifian" claims. But the years which followed the death of its most notable ruler, Ahmad al-Mansur, in 1603, saw the disintegration of the comprehensive Sa'IDI state. The mid-seventeenth century can be seen as an hiatus between the dissolution of a Murrakushi centre of political gravity, and the re-establishment of a wide-ranging government, to be based this time within the "greater Gharb", firstly at Fes, and then at Meknes, an half-day's journey away, across the plain of Sa's.

From around 1640, the authority of Sa'IDI sultans shrivelled dramatically, to cover little beyond Marrakesh and its Hawz, or surrounding plain (2), home of the Shabbanat, and of other Arabic-speaking peoples with whom the Sa'IDI rulers were closely associated. Elsewhere within the Maghrib al-Aqsa, there had developed scattered nodes of political and military authority. This was most commonly exercised by leaders who were endowed with the grace of religious prestige, but whom it might be best to follow al-Qadiri in describing as "ru'asai", or "chieftains". The bases of all four major chieftains of the 1650s were associated with route-ways rather than great urban centres. Thus the southernmost of these strongholds, Illigh, was a mountain zawiya sited in the coastal reaches of the Anti-Atlas. It overlooked the Atlantic route from the "Qibla" or western Sahara.

(2) In the terminology of the Maghrib al-Aqsa, hawz, may cover the rural skirt of any city. However, the unqualified usage of the term indicates the environs of Marrakesh. This last usage will be followed within this thesis.
But it was distant by nearly an hundred rugged miles from the city of Tarudant, on the Wadi Sus, which was the southernmost of the Maghrib al-Aqsa's major commercial centres. The northernmost base, Alcazarquivir, capital of the mujahid chieftain al-Khadir Ghaylan, was a moderate market town of the far north west, set midway between Sale and Tetuan, the country's two chief marts for maritime trade.

Dila', a second mountain zawiya was sited beneath the southernmost range of the Middle Atlas, in the Tadla region (3), overlooking the most direct route between Fes and Marrakesh. Sills of Dila'i suzerainty seeped across the Atlas into Tafilet. Here, and across the hills dividing the oasean region from Fes, there was political confrontation between Dila' and a fourth chieftaincy, this last being based within Tafilet itself.

This last Filali chieftaincy was the perquisite of certain members of a clan of local shurafa', the 'Alawi. In Tafilet, as elsewhere, shurafa' were literally nobles, in that they claimed descent from the Prophet, and consequential privilege and respect. However, in Filali society, nobility was spread wide and thin. In terms of real social ascendancy, the significance of "sharifian" status was minimal. Arabs, Berbers and shurafa' were simply three broad categories into which the population could be divided (4). The society of the Filali plain was dispersed among qusur, the characteristic mud-fortresses which the region had known for centuries (5). Within such a society, it was

---

(3) See Prologue P. 25 (Note 36)

(4) Mouette wrote, by hearsay, of "Tafilet": "Les peuples de cet état sont de trois sortes, et sont composez de chérifs, d'Arabes et de Barbares. Les premiers sont descendus de l'imposteur Mahomet..." ("Histoire..." p. 195)

(5) In translation, Idrisi's description of "Sijilmassa", a section of Tafilet, runs: "...elle n'a point de citadelle, mais elle consiste d'une série de palais (qusur), de maisons (divar) et de champs cultivés le long des bords d'un fleuve..." R. Dozy & M.J. de Goeje: "Description de l'Afrique et de l'Espane par Edrisi" (Leyden, 1866) p. 69 of the text, 69 of the translation.
difficult for a political leader to rise above the status of *primus inter pareres*, master of his home-geer. Even in the 1690s, the puzzled Jean-Baptiste Estelle was, by hearsay, to describe the capital city of Tafilet as a single "castle" flanked by wattle and daub huts (6). During the 1630s, al-Sharīf, known to dynastic history as the founder of the Alawi political fortunes, would seem to have been notably unsuccessful in his bid for extensive suzerainty. His political career, which combined the *inter-qusur* raiding endemic to the region, with an attempt to play off against each other two powerful chieftains, the murabitan of Dila and of Illigh, ended with a period of captivity in the hands of the latter. Muhammad, the eldest of al-Sharīf's more prominent sons, was thus able to come to prominence during his father's lifetime. He knew greater success as a raiding leader, and became known as *amīr* of Tafilet (7). Undoubtedly his political ambitions spread beyond that region. But the most important extensions to his suzerainty would seem to have been oasean, possibly westwards into the Dar (8), and certainly south-eastwards, into the Tawārīkh knot of settlements, whither he led armies in 1645 and again in 1652, and whither he was able to send his quwwad (9). He is likely to have been the *amīr al-bilād* of Sijilmasa who, in 1652, granted letters of introduction to the pilgrim al-‘Ayyāshī, to cover a journey to Tuat, and who was then accepted as suzerain as far to the east as Aougrout (10).

At this period, the social and economic links between Fes and Tafilet are likely to have been such as to give the city firmly the

---

(9) Chronicle of "Sidi Baha" quoted Martin pp. 51 and 52-3
edge over the oasis. The city had attracted a resident Filāli community which represented a cross-section of society. It included acknowledged shurafa, and a prosperous core sufficiently numerous to be transferred willy-nilly, later in the century, to inhabit houses evacuated by the entire Jewish community of Meknes (11). Probably, however, it was dominated by needy migrants, the "vil popolo" of south-eastern caseans, noted by Leo as willing to undertake menial tasks around Fes (12). Tafilelt is unlikely to have had a reciprocal attraction for the Fāsī. The Filāli economic heart of Sijilmasa along the lower Ziz, should not be equated commercially with the high mediaeval Sijilmasa, major desert port of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. Contemporary evidence for the mid-seventeenth century points to a maritime route, by way of the coastal Sus, as the most significant path for the direct import into the inner Maghrib al-Aqṣā of the vital long-range commodity, trans-Saharan gold. Details from the narrative of the pilgrim al-ʻAyyāshī, show that Tafilelt did have links with the Saharan gold market: southern merchants might travel out from Tafilelt as far as Tuat, to profit from a bi-metallic rate of exchange that stood at twenty-four silver muzūnat to the gold mithçal, an improvement over the standard Filāli rate of forty (13). But this did not deprive Tafilelt itself of a Fāsī reputation as a poverty-stricken region (14), source only of its own typical products: dates, mutton, and the bolts of peculiarly fine woollen cloth that were known to Europeans as "filleris". In her demand for these commodities, Fes was a "buyer's market", for Fes was

(11) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 144 and 349
(12) Leo ed. Ramusio P. 74
(13) al-ʻAyyāshī ed./tr. Berbrüger pp. 22-23
(14) Moulltes "Histoire..." p. 195
a source of grain. And for grain, the inhabitants of Tafilelt would bring their goods up to the metropolis (15).

Seventeenth century Fes was "the general Store-House of all Barbary" (16):

"...grandement riche, d'auquant que c'est où se fait tout le trafic du pays, et c'est elle qui fournit Tafilet et les autres provinces éloignées de tout ce qu'elles ont de besoin." (17)

From Leo's notes, it may fairly be assumed that the traffic of Fasi daily life, including the provision of foodstuffs, timber, charcoal, and the raw materials for industry, involved not only peoples from the city's immediate environs, and from the nearby dir or "piedmont" of the Middle Atlas, but also groupings from the landward slopes of the Rif, from as far to the north-east as Tetuan. In the early eighteenth century it would be recorded that, under peaceable conditions, weekly caravans passed between Tetuan and Fes (18). Other routeways had periodic significance. These included the upland way from Tafilelt, which came into its own after the autumn date harvest (19). More important was the route which led eastwards from Fes into the "Cherg" or march-country dividing the northern Maghrib al-Aqsa from the Ottoman Regency of Algiers. For the most highly developed complex of Fasi export trade was that associated with Muslim lands to the east. A major enterprise was that associated with the overland pilgrimage from the northern

---

(15) S.I. 2E France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J.-B. Estelle putatively dated to October 1698 p. 704
(16) Pitou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 140
(17) Nouette: "Histoire..." p. 183
(18) Braithwaite p. 66
(19) Leo ed. Ramusio p. 8. In the final days of the caravan trade, it would be noted that, during the date season, the caravan traffic between Tafilelt and Fes multiplied eight-fold. See E. Aubin: "Le Maroc d'Aujourd'hui" (Paris, 1904) p. 297
Maghrib al-Aqsa, as much a mercantile as a religious expedition (20).

The making-up of the pilgrimage caravan was, ideally, an annual event (21). Customarily it congregated around Fes (22), and passed by way of the Taza corridor into Ottoman territory, one tributary to the grand stream that would eventually travel from Cairo to Mecca.

Access to valid military sanctions was of vital significance to the security of the Fasi pattern of trade and supply. The citizenry was thus caught up in a standard dilemma, expressed in an ambivalent relationship between "Fas al-Bali", and "Fas al-Jadid", the "old" and "new" cities of the metropolis. Fas al-Bali was the citizens' town; Fas al-Jadid had been, since its construction in Marinid days, the site of palace and "government presence". The society of Fas al-Bali was dominated by an urban aristocracy of men of high religious standing, including Idrissid shurafla who claimed descent from the city's founder (23). According to its genealogical heritage, this aristocracy had seen a number of reigning dynasties come and go. And in Wattasid days, Leo had noted a contemptuous reluctance on the part of such "huomini di riputazione e di bontà" for any personal association with Fas al-Jadid (24). Yet, in the absence of strong imperial government, it was upon the urban aristocracy that there fell the responsibility for ensuring the external order necessary to the equable conduct of Fasi life. Incidents from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries

(20) Developed, if late accounts of the pattern of trade associated with this caravan are contained within W. Lempriere's "A Tour from Gibraltar..." (London, 1791) pp. 343-353 and R. Thomassy's "Le Maroc et ses Caravanes ou Relation de la France avec cet Empire" (Paris, 1845) pp. 30-64

(21) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, directed via Marseille, 19/7/1690 p. 316

(22) In 1728, Braithwaite saw the pilgrimage caravan being made up outside Meknes, as Fes, its customary starting point, was under siege. He was told that the caravan was only half the customary size (pp. 256-7).


(24) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 43
suggest that it was religious leaders who were accustomed to lead the civic militia. So it may be assumed that these city fathers knew the pragmatic advantages of recognising a political authority that proved capable in the field.

Early in the 1640s there had been established within Fās al-Jadīd a governor and garrison loyal to Muhammad al-Ḥājj, the murabit of Dīla', who was then paramount within the central Maghrib al-Aqsa. Dīla' was militarily most notable for its command of rural contingents of tamazight-speaking Berbers from the Central Atlas region. However, the Dīla' garrison within Fās al-Jadīd would seem to have been made up of Filālī troops (25), presumably drawn from the factions said to have rallied to Dīla' during a period of overt confrontation in Tafilalet between Muhammad al-Ḥājj and the ᶜAlawī leader al-Šarīf(26). A brawl between this garrison and the old city disturbed the summer of 1650 (27). The most notable consequence of this brawl was the summons into Fās al-Šalī of Muhammad ibn al-Šarīf of Tafilalet, and his proclamation as the city's sultan (28). The move is likely to have resulted from civic defiance of Dīla', rather than from any specific desire to woo the ᶜAlawī. For the new sultan's credit was brief. Ten weeks after his entry into the city, following defeat by Dīla' troops from the Central Atlas, Muhammad was summarily ejected from Fās al-Šalī (29), as a military inadequate. After some months, the "old city" returned to a peaceable relationship with Dīla', with civic honour saved by the appointment of a new governor, son to Muhammad al-Ḥājj himself (30). Two years later

(26) "Tur jumān" p. 2 of the text and 4 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 9
the city profited from its re-recognition of Dila'. Fasi religious leaders (fugahā') travelled to Dila' itself and were able successfully to negotiate the aid of Muhammad al-Ḥājj and the zawiya forces in the punishment of the Ḥayayna, a grouping from the city environs who had been pillaging citizens' property (31).

But such aid from a centre over one hundred miles distant from Fes was ponderous of access, and is not known ever to have been obtained again. The city annals of subsequent years are shot through with the flicker of economic uncertainty. Three times over the years 1653-6, the civic currency required adjusting, once because the ānā, or standard petty bronze coin for daily transactions, had lost all credence in the market (32). These fluctuations may signify interruptions in the pattern of supply to the city. Concurrently the Fasi were, apparently of their own initiative, sending harakat, punitive military expeditions, into regions economically vital to themselves. In 1655 the aim was punishment of the Banū Zarwāl (33) "Jabalī", or "hill-men" from the south-western Rif, whose territory verged upon the route from Fes to Tetuan, and who, in Leo's day, had been subject to the Wattasid sultans of Fes (34). In the following year, military aid was sent to Taza, first town along the eastward trunk-route (35). The season of this attack co-incided with the season of date-caravans which, according to Leo could, in the Taza region, all too easily devolve into skirmishes (36).

The period from 1653 onwards saw, also, expansion of the chieftaincy at the westerly edge of the Fasi political horizon. Al-Khadir

---

(31) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 57
(32) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above, pp. 62, 81 and 86
(33) ibid. p. 73
(34) Leo ed. Ramusio ff. 51-2
(35) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. pp. 86-7
(36) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 54
Ghaylan, the muāhid (37), extended his authority over the peoples of the north-western flood-plains which fanned out "even as a Bowling-green" (38) from the Sebu crossing, north of Fes, to the Atlantic. Demographically this region was unpromising as a sphere for the flexing of political ambition. Seventeenth and eighteenth century European eyewitnesses reiterated that its itinerant Arabic-speaking population was notably scanty. The "douars" or tent-crescents which excited the commentators' disgust at fascination, were rare objects (39). However, Ghaylan is likely to have had relatively easy access, if not to men, at least to European munitions. The sleazy Christian enclaves strung out along the coastal edge of his domain, were typically centres for arms trading (40).

Three deaths of political significance to the Maghrib al-Aqsa occurred in 1659. In Fes there died Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Hājj, second and last of the city's governors from the house of Dīla'. The succession of a ṣāwīya nominee was barred by the usurpation of one al-Duraydī, allegedly an insubordinate garrison officer from Fās al-Jadīd (41). At around the same time, Marrakesh saw the end of Ahmad al-Dabbās (42), the last titular Sa'dī sultan. He was treacherously assassinated by his khal or "kinsman-on-the-mother's

---

(37) For further information upon this warrior, see A. Peretti: "Le Rais El-Khadir Ghailan" in A.M. (Vol. XVIII, Paris, 1912) pp. 1-186. This is a copious study, based partly upon English Tangier material.

(38) Windue p. 82

(39) See, for example, Pidou de St. Alon tr. Frotheau p. 21 cf. Windue pp. 82-3 and 205-6 cf. Braithwaite pp. 136 and 138-9

(40) For arms-smuggling in Tangier under the English, see: Anon: "A discourse concerning Tangier" (London, 1680) p. 28


side (43). Karūm al-Ḥajj, chieftain of the Shabbanat from the Hawz,
Kārum al-Ḥajj thenceforward became master of Marrakesh. Meanwhile, in
Tafilet, the death of the ʿAlawī founding-father al-Sharīf had,
according to tradition, driven one of his younger sons, al-Raḥīd,
into flight from his mistrustful brother Muḥammad (44)

Memory of the early period of al-Raḥīd’s travels survives only
within a medley of dateless folk-weave. Two relatively early and
elaborate accounts of the prince’s progress are given by Mouḥtte in
his “Histoire”, and by al-Qādirī in the “Nasḥr al-Mathānī...” (45). They
seem to represent successive stages in Fāsī tradition concerning
the ʿAlawī. Both would have it that the prince left Tafilet
virtually alone, and that he subsequently travelled between centres
of contemporary authority, incognito until his inevitable unmasking.
Slaves figure in both versions of the story. According to Mouḥtte’s
complicated tale, there was a “black” involved in al-Raḥīd’s two bids
at escaping from his brother (46). And al-Qādirī passed on a legend,
at once racy and sentimental, which told how the prince, after
discovery and flight from Dīlā, proved himself, along the road,
worthy both of his ancestors, and of his political future, by rescuing
a caravan from rural ambush. In this he was aided by two black slaves,
who alternately loaded the two muskets with which he demonstrated a
sultan’s marksmanship (47). In Mouḥtte’s version of the story, al-
Raḥīd had offered his services to Dīlā as a mercenary. The bedrock

(43) The term khal (pi. akhwal) signifying “maternal uncle”, was employed
by authors of the period to cover a member of the grouping
identified with a man’s mother. Ideally the relationship between a
man and his akhwal should have been peculiarly close.

(44) “Nuzhat al-Hādi...” ed./tr. Houdas p. 301 of the text, 499 of the
translation cf. “Turjuman” p. 7 of the text, 12 of the translation
cf. “Bustān al-Qarīf...” MS p. 21

Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 97-101


beneath these tales could be the memory of a period during which al-
Rashīd had acted, not quite as a lone adventurer, but as a condottiere
upon a small-scale: the master of a petty force of black slave-
soldiers or abīd. Such soldiers were noted to be in al-Rashīd’s
company, by an eyewitness, at an early stage in his career when he
was still an adventurer (48).

All accounts of al-Rashīd's travels would agree that, at some point
prior to 1664, they brought him into the "Cherg" or eastern march-
country. The "Cherg" is a complex of widely variant peoples and
regions. It includes the Angad desert, a necessary obstacle to travellers
moving eastwards from Taza. This bleak region provides the Maghrib al-
Aqā with a natural eastern frontier: a grey wilderness of sandy earth,
terebinths and wandering pastoralists. Reporters from either side of
the period dwell both upon the hostility, and upon the elusive
character of the Angad peoples, many of whom would seem to have
followed a transhumance pattern of enormous sweep that could take
them seasonally as far as the oasis of Fīguīg (49).

Other "Chergī" groupings were sedentary and thronging. The hill-
peoples whose territories flanked the Angad were zenātia-speaking
Berbers. Probably, as today, they were unusually numerous for rural
populations (50). Leo had noted that the Snassen hills, which lie

(48) S. I. 2° France Vol. I No. XL1 R. Fréjus: "Relation d'un
Voyage fait dans la Mauritanie..." (hereafter: Fréjus ) p. 154

(49) Early reporters on the Angad and its peoples include Leo (ed.
Ramusie p. 56) and the eighteenth century L. R. Desfontaines
(ed. M. Durée de la Malle, as "Fragment d'un Voyage dans les
Régences de Tunis et d'Alger fait de 1783 à 1786" in "Voyages
dans les Régences de Tunis et d'Alger" (Paris, 1838 p. 177)
Further data is given by the nineteenth century commentator
M. E. Carière in "Du commerce de l'Algérie avec l'Afrique
centrale et les États barbaresques" (Paris, 1844) quoted
Thomasy pp. 66-7.

(50) A population map of contemporary Morocco, prepared by the
Laboratory of Physical Geography in Rabat, notes Snassen
country in particular as an area of extraordinary density in
rural population, inexplicable in terms of natural circum-
stances alone (J. Martin et al: "Géographie du Maroc"
Paris, 1964 p. 59)
THE "CHERG"

Sketch-map of the "Cherg" or north-eastern march of the Maghrib al-Aqsa.

Scale: 1:2,000,000

--- 100 km.
between the Angad town of Oujda and the lower Moulouya were, although harsh and difficult of access, densely populated and capable of furnishing ten thousand fighting men (51). In the eighteenth century, Shaw was to re-iterate his judgements, adding a note upon the difficulty of subjecting these "Beni Zenessel... Kabyles" to "Tingitanian" taxation (52). In Leo’s day, the wide bay to the west of the Moulouya mouth, and the north of the Snassen hills, had been one customary anchorage for Venetian galleys trading with Fes (53). During the mid-seventeenth century, the region seems still to have supported a Mediterranean trade in wax (54) and in foodstuffs (55). A cornucopian capacity to supply comestibles cheaply was one of the northern Maghrib al-Aqsa’s most notable economic propensities (56). It seems clear that the populations adjoining this northern stretch of coast willingly exploited the propensity, and ignored the Islamic legal ban upon supplying Christian traders with goods vital to subsistence. This attracted the French who, during the 1660s, reconnoitred the nearby offshore Shafarina islands, with a view to the establishment of a naval and trading base which might encroach upon the existing Italian connection (57).

The "Sebkā" or salt-flat between Tlemcen and Oran was alien

(51) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 62
(52) T. Shaw: "Travels and Discoveries relating to several Parts of Barbary" (Oxford, 1738) p. 17
(53) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 52
(54) Frélue p. 183
(55) Moultte: "Histoire..." p. 179
(56) S.P. 71 (13) f. 789 Memo. of Lord Howard on the question of victualling Tangier, dated Tangier, 14/12/1669
(57) S.I. 2\emph{e} France Vol. I No, XIX pp. 49-50 François de Beaufort to Colbert, Majorcan waters, 24/4/1662.
from Angad plain and hill-country alike. This was the country of the Banū ČAmir, a settled Arabic-speaking people who were noted by Marmol Carvajal in the sixteenth century for their ability to defy the Turks (58), and who later continued to be "numerous and warlike" (59). During the seventeenth century, the Banū ČAmir lived effectively under the suzerainty of the Spaniards of the presidio of Oran, to whom they paid protection money (60). It was by way of these people that there was funnelled a profitable trade in grain, between "Oranie" and southern Spain (61).

From the landward Muslim viewpoint, the entire rural "Cherg" would seem to have been, in the mid-seventeenth century, politically "no-man's land". Its economic centre was the city of Tlemsen. But Tlemsen, the capital of an independent mediaeval kingdom, had fallen into the shadow of Algiers, headquarters of the Ottoman Regency into which Tlemsen itself had been absorbed as an Ottoman outpost. The one-time capital is likely already to have collapsed into a fraction of the space enclosed by its own walls (62). Allegedly it could be held by a garrison of fifty or sixty janissaries (63). Such a force was of a size to police a town, but not a march.

It was within this march that al-Rashīd was able to raise the popular following that would hoist him to power. There is a tradition that al-Rashīd's success within the "Cherg" had been prefaced by an

(58) Marmol Carvajal tr. Parrot d'Ablancourt Vol. I p. 80
(59) Shaw p. 52
(60) "Ockley" p. 23
(61) S.I. 2\textsuperscript{e} France Vol. III No. XXII Memo. of Pidou de St. Olon dated Toulon, 23/8/1693 p. 201
(62) In the mid-1730s, Shaw had noted that: "...There is not above one sixth part remaining of the old Tlemsen, which, as I compute, might have been above four Miles in Circuit." He attributed this decline to a Turkish sack of 1670 (op. cit. p. 49). However, J. Ogilby's version of O. Dapper's "Africa", published in London in 1670, already pointed to a notable diminution in the economy and size of Tlemsen. (*)
(63) S.I. 2\textsuperscript{e} France Vol. I No. XXIX p. 84 Memo. of Admiral Trubert from the flagship off Alhucemas, 1/11/1664
(*) p. 208
expansionist "Chergi" episode in the career of his elder brother Muhammad (64). This tradition must be discounted. It will be seen to rest solely upon the evidence of an undated and textually dubious letter from an unknown "Dey of Algiers" to an unnamed "sharif". This was incorporated into the dynastic tradition by al-Zayyani, upon Muhammad's behalf (65). Al-Rashid's own real venture into the "Cherg" must therefore be recognised as the acceptance, within the march, of a total alien as military commander.

It was the teeming sedentaries rather than the thieving pastoralists, with whom al-Rashid's ties were crucial. Snassen and Banū ČAmir alike were to be among the groupings associated with his name. It seems to have been within Snassen country that al-Rashid, the future sultan, was first accepted as a political leader in his own right. A spectrum of accounts would all suggest that the key to this acceptance was al-Rashid's capture, by "coup de théâtre", of a point named Dār ibn Mash'al.

Dār ibn Mash'al as a town or fortress no longer exists. But its existence, and indeed its strategic importance in the seventeenth century seem unquestionable. It appears to have been a stronghold, and also a centre around which local forces could be recruited. In 1609, it had been used as a base from which two Sādi princes in flight from a third had gathered an army of shorāga, or "easterners", with which they went on to take Fes (66), as al-Rashid was to do. After al-Rashid's death, the place was to be used again, as one centre for the

---

(64) "Tuzīyūn" pp. 3-5 of the text, 5-9 of the translation cf: "Bustān al-Jārīf..." MS pp. 10-13
(65) See Epilogue Part II Pp. 322-327
operations of his nephew, Ahmad ibn Muhriz, a contender for the succession (67). The site of Dar ibn Mashal can now be assessed only approximately. There seems little doubt that it lay within or adjoining Snassen territory, as was remembered in eighteenth-century Snassen tradition (68). A number of maps of Morocco standard in Europe during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries include the toponym. Of these maps, possibly the most reliable is the crude sketch drawn up by Mouitte, with the help of his chief informant "Bougiman" (69). This inserted Dar ibn Mashal as a fortress at the edge of the Snassen hill-country, to the east of the Moulouya, well inland, and overlooking the Angad routeway from Taza to Oujda. Here a stronghold would have been well-poised both to command the main route from Fes into the Regency, and to make contact, by way of the Moulouya, with trading points on the Mediterranean coast. In the eighteenth century, the Alawi makhzen would maintain a pair of major fortresses within this region (70). In the mid-seventeenth century, an independent master of Dar ibn Mashal would have been finely sited to agglomerate, for his own benefit, the profits of tribute and commerce alike.

Al-Rashid's venture against Dar ibn Mashal can only tentatively be reconstructed from beneath a mass of coralline legend. No date can be attached to this venture. The relatively late author al-Zayyan is alone in suggesting that mass force was involved, and in associating this storming with the aftermath of al-Rashid's victory over his

(67) Mouitte: "Histoire..." p. 73
(68) "Mashr al-Methani..." ed./tr. Micheaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 101. This was one of two variant traditions concerning the site of Dar ibn Mashal, reported by al-Qadiri.
(69) Mouitte: "Histoire..." p. 9. The relevant section of this map, here reproduced, is taken from the frontispiece to the second volume of S. I. 2e France.
(70) Shaw p. 16 One of these fortresses, "Borg el Wed", is marked upon this author's frontispiece map.
The Germain Mouitte — "Bougiman" map of the Maghrib al-Aqsa, as reproduced in the frontispiece to "Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc" : Deuxième Série France. Volume II
brother Muhammad (71). Possibly he extrapolated from the earlier suggestion that it was at Dar ibn Mashkal that Muhammad was buried (72). Earlier source-writers (73) set the attack upon Dar ibn Mashkal into the haze of al-Rashīd's primal association with the "Cherg", and imply that the place was taken by stealth and trickery: a successful guerrilla exploit. This is a credible version of events. And it can be believed that al-Rashīd's attack upon Dar ibn Mashkal was made with the connivance of a local rural chieftain "Shaykh al-Lawātī" (74), apparently an acknowledged leader among the Snassen (75) Dar ibn Mashkal could have been a focus for the envy of his followers.

Despite early suggestions to the contrary, caught even by Europeans on the fringe of Maghribī politics, it is unlikely that "Dar binmeshaal" was, in al-Rashīd's day, actively "commanded" by the Jewish "petty Prince" (76), who, in one or another "avatar" is set into all standard Arabic sources. As B.A. Mojetan has pointed out in a recent thesis (77), Maghribī society of this date is unlikely to have been sufficiently flexible to encompass an independent Jewish ruler. Mojetan takes the extreme view that the Jew of Dar ibn Mashkal never existed, but was instead a fabrication of early Ḥalawi propaganda, designed to win over to the parvenu sultan al-Rashīd a gullible populace nurtured upon an age-old corpus of Maghribī legends.

(71) "Turjuman" pp. 7-8 of the text, 15 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarif..." MS p. 22
(72) "Nasr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 164
(74) "Nasr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above, p. 100
(75) Mouet: "Histoire..." p. 19
in which Jewish princes figure. Certainly the tales of al-Rashīd's assassination of the Jew of Dār ibn Mash'ūl read like anti-Semitic versions of the tale of Aladdin's cave. Yet it seems unnecessary to eliminate the Jew altogether. Moute set two figures within the "castle" of "Dar-Michal", a governor, and a Jew who had dominated the local trade. It was standard practise for Jewish financiers to be associated with Maghribi magnates of the day's parallel figures to the "king's Jews", bound for their own security, and a specialised complex of financial purposes, to European mediaeval monarchs (78).

Even at the zāwīya of Dīlāt, where political authority was associated with Islamic intellectualism, there was a Jewish community established (79). And the contemporary provincial population of the Maghrib al-Aqsa's northern fringes had its Jewish element. The merchant adventurer Fréjus, on his journey of 1666 through the Middle Rif, gave "Moors and Jews" as the typical description of populations he by-passed.

A wealthy Jew associated with the fortress of Dār ibn Mash'ūl could have been an arms trader. Within the 1669 account of the "gentleman of the Lord Ambassador Howard's retinue", which is decidedly hostile towards al-Rashīd personally, there lie two accounts of the disposal of individual prominent Jews by "Muley Archeid". The two accounts are suspiciously parallel. The first involves the "petty prince" of "Darbinmeshaal" as noted above. It is a tale of vicious treachery towards a Jewish host, excused by "a small provocation culled from the Law of Mahomet" (80). The second

(78) For further information see J. W. Parkes: "The Jew in the Mediaeval Community" (London, 1938)


(80) S.L. p. 2
is a more sober and detailed account of judicial murder:

"Another Jew named Joseph Ben-Simon, a very great Trader, and one that had Correspondents in many Places, did run the same Fortune. He supplied the Moors with many Commodities, especially with Powder and Shot, Guns and other Weapons, which he conveyed out of Spain by stealth. At last his Wealth made him guilty of Death, for he was accused of Adultery, and although common report pronounced him innocent, he lost his Life and had his Estate seized for the Kings Use." (81)

This reads like a second version of the same incident, and is credible. The Jewish gun-runner, with widespread commercial contacts and particularly close links with the Peninsula, fits well into the context of Judeo-Moroccan trade of the period. Like most of the maritime commerce of the Maghrib al-Aqsa, the arms-trade, both open and clandestine, was dominated by Jews (82). The sordid elimination of a local arms-trader could well have been a touch-piece for the transformation of al-Rashid's relations with the Snassen and neighbouring groupings, providing him perhaps with a cache of arms, as well as the wealth with which rumour would accredit the capture of Dar ibn Mash' al.

The acquisition of a strategic base, together with the flamboyant distribution of booty can account for al-Rashid's metamorphosis from alien mercenary into raiding leader. It was part of dynastic tradition that al-Rashid bought himself the loyalty of a rural following (83). Mouffe suggests that the capture of Dar ibn Mash' al was followed up by the acclamation of al-Rashid as "king" by Shaykh al-LawatI and his allies (84). But the anonymous English

(81) S.L. p. 3
(84) Mouffe: "Histoire..." p. 19
statement that al-Rashīd was not yet "king or Emperor" but "General or Great Mouskadem" (85) seems to pinpoint the truth. The Ṣīlālī alien became a local war-leader of increasing geographic range. His first move away from Dar ibn Mashāl is said to have involved leading al-Lawātī's men against their neighbours of "Quiviane" (86). But his most notable victories seem to have lain in his "wonderful success against the East Arabs" (87). Even al-Zayyānī, who was cautious in his treatment of Āl Ādī ventures in the border region (88), allowed that raiding in Snassen company took al-Rashīd as far as Oujda (89). And ventures further east are implied by this author's analysis of al-Rashīd's āskar of "easterners" or sharāba: a ravel of Arab and Berber recruits from the Regency (min wilāyat al-turk) (90), including Banū Āmīr from "Dranis" and Banū Snūs, zenātīr-speaking hill-farmers from the south of Tlemsen (91). In order to sweep up such a following, al-Rashīd the mugaddam is likely, during the early 1660s, to have directed activities far into territory that, in Algiers, would have been regarded as Ottoman.

The rise of a war-lord with a nexus of power within the "Cherg" was bound to threaten the security of Fāsī-Tilimsānī traffic. But, in the early 1660s, Fes was in no fit state politically to cope with any external military threat. In the aftermath of al-Duraydī's coup within Fās al-Jādīd, the old city dissolved into faction-fighting, with the Andalus quarter supporting and the Qarawiyyīn quarter

(85) S.L. pp. 28
(86) Mouffe: "Histoire..." pp. 19-21
(87) S.L. loc. cit.
(88) See: Epilogue Part II pp. 327-8
(89) "Turīyān" pp. 7 and 8 of the text, and 14 and 15 of the translation
(90) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 22
(91) ibid. pp. 22 and 27 cf. (for the topographical information) Shaw pp. 47 and 51-2
Opposing al-Duraydî's authority (92). Meanwhile the military power of the once-sovereign Dila'î was disintegrating. In 1660, at the end of a duel with al-Khadîr Ghaylân for the mutual definition of rural territory, Dila'î forces had been dramatically worsted. A Fâsi note that from this point the power of Dila'î was tottering (93) has European corroboration: a renegade Spaniard who took part in the major battle reported to the "gentleman" of Howard's entourage that, after this battle, there had been mass deflection towards Ghaylân by former subjects of the Dila'î "Santo" (94). Over the years 1662–3, Dila'î efforts to have al-Duraydî ejected from Fas al-Jedîd were made in the shadow of this defeat, and against a backdrop of severe famine. When, in 1663, Muhammad ibn al-Sharîf descended upon the environs of Fes as a marauder, leading his hungry Fâsi following in a raid upon Hayâyna territory, Dila'î refused the Fâsi military aid. It was an Hasanid sharîf from Tafilelt, resident within Fes, who led the civic expedition which expelled his "kinsman", the one-time sultan, from the city's environs (95). Subsequently, in the autumn of 1663, Muhammad al-Hajj ventured as far as Azrou, half-way from Dila'î to Fes. Circumspectly the city's religious leaders entered into negotiations with him. But, once he and they had


(93) "Nashîr al-Mathanî..." Volume cited above. p. 107

(94) S.I. p. 22 This European account of the battle has a different chronology from that of the "Nashîr al-Mathanî...", but its close alignment with the latter in topography makes it clear that the same encounter is under discussion. The context of events into which the indigenous dating is set, gives it the greater reliability.

returned to home territory, their oath to him was broken (96).

During the following summer of 1664, the military renown of
al-Rashid escalated dramatically. Muhammad ibn al-Sharif, presumably
alarmed at his brother's expansionist moves, took an army up to meet
that brother upon the Angad plain (97). Al-Rashid was the victor. He
is said to have scooped up his elder brother's following (98).
Delicate-minded indigenous authors insist that Muhammad was neatly
eliminated during the fighting. Al-Ifran would have him felled by
the battle's first shot (99). But earlier European reporters suggest
that there was fratricide after the encounter (100).

Fes took acute alarm. The encounter on the Angad plain precipitated
a marshalling of the defences of the city, and of its immediate
environs. Citizens were ordered to purchase guns and horses. And, in
a meeting with representatives of surrounding rural groupings, a common

(96) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 22 Both the Michaux-Bellaire
translation of the "Nashr al-
Mathani..." (A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 158) and the Houdas edition of
the "Turjuman" (p. 7 of the text and 14 of the translation),
seem to give garbled accounts of this incident. The manuscript
version reads:

"balacha muhammad al hajj azru wa nazala bihi wa tawajjaha lihi
ahl-fas wa 'ula'muhim wa shurafa'uhum wa beyo'huwa reaj'a
wa baqa hunali 'illa fas al-shita wa reaj'a thumma halafa
ahl-fas ma'a al-dureydi"

("Muhammad al-Hajj reached Azrou and pitched his camp there. The
people of Fes together with their 'Ulama' and shura'faw went out
to him, swore an oath of allegiance to him and returned home. He
remained there until the rains broke, then returned home himself.
Thereupon the people of Fes went into alliance with al-Duraydi")

(97) "Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above p. 164 cf.
"Turjuman" pp. 7 of the text and 14-15 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 22

(98) "Nuzhat al-Hadi..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 302 of the text, and 500
of the translation

(99) ibid. loc. cit.

(100) S.L. p. 28 cf. S.P. 71(13) f. 121 Memo. of Captain Fitzgerald
dated Sale, 8/11/1664
Mouette's more extreme suggestion ("Histoire..." p. 23) that
Muhammad was pursued as far as Tafilet before his death, seems
contradicted by these earlier accounts.
decision was taken that a stand should be made against al-Rashid (101). But there was to be no attack upon the metropolis as yet. Instead, al-Rashid moved into Tafilelt, where he spent nine months in establishing his suzerainty, ousting his nephews, the sons of Muhammad, and gaining the allegiance of shura‘a from its patchwork of qaṣr (102). As an historian of the dynasty, al-Zayyānī was at a loss to account for this deviation from the straight road to Fes, except in terms of an arcane strategy or "caql" (103). It could indeed be argued that, by adding Filālī to "Chergī" power, al-Rashid was developing the capacity to impose a pincer threat upon Fes. But al-Rashid's moves over the period 1664-6 seem better understood in terms of escalating opportunism than of all-encompassing strategy. And there is no evidence that Filālī power was of particular significance to the ʿAlawī raider’s ultimate capture of the metropolis.

In the spring of 1665, al-Rashid made a move in the direction of Fes, by establishing a military base at Taza. The Fasi militia, together with Hayayna levies, went out to challenge him, to their own disgrace. They did not join battle, but were pursued in disorder as far as the Sebu river (104). However, a subsequent skirmish outside the walls of Fes was inconclusive (105). So, presumably with the

---


(102) "Nasr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above. loc. cit. cf. Mouffe: "Histoire..." p. 23

(103) "fa-balagha al-rashīd amrhum, a ḍarada ḍanhum li-kamāl ḍaglihi. wa tawajahā min taza li-sijilmaṣa

("News of their doings (i.e. the Fasi defence preparations) reached al-Rashid. With an absolute cunning he turned his back upon them, and set off from Taza towards Sijilmasa.") "Turjuman" p. 8


aim of maintaining his following in rewarding employment, al-Rashîd turned to his old activity of rural raiding. The chosen sphere was the Middle Rif, the hinterland of Alhucemas, and of the little Spanish presidio of Penón de Velez. This was a zenata-speaking area, and a region of sedentary agriculture and Mediterranean trade (106) that had economic links with Taza (107). The area had certain parallels with Snassen country. And here al-Rashîd seems to have conducted something of a replay of the pattern of events associated with Dâr ibn Mashâl. From two garbled European accounts it seems possible to gather that al-Rashîd allied with local enemies of the major regional clan, the Acrâs; that he picked a personal quarrel with the shaykh of this clan; and that he captured both Alhucemas and the shaykh's own personal fortress and treasure (108). The Acrâs were driven en masse into exile in the presidio (109). One justification for the attack may have been the very existence of friendly relations between the Acrâs and the presidio; a possible parallel to the earlier association between Dar ibn Mashâl and Jewry. From around this time, al-Rashîd is known to have laid a veto upon the formerly free and open Muslim provisioning of the Christian enclaves at the edge of his sphere of influence. Skirmishing replaced trade (110). The veto added to al-Rashîd, the bandit mugaddam, a touch of the mujâhid. It also inaugurated, in embryo, the standard early Alawî policy of forbidding a trade with Christendom in provisions, and particularly in grain. (111).

(106) S.I. 2e France Vol. I. No. XXIX p. 84 Memo. of Admiral Trubert, from the flagship off Alhucemas, 1/11/1664
(107) Fréjus p. 183
(108) Fréjus pp. 125-8 cf. Mouûtta; "Histoire" pp. 23-4 and 27-8
(109) Mouûtta: "Histoire..." p. 23
(110) Fréjus p. 129
(111) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Notteux pp. 21 and 76 cf. Windus p. 207
However, religious scruples did not veto the negotiations which led to al-Rashid's entry into Fès the next year. Moustte's record of crucial dealings between the Jewish communities of Taza and Fès (112) prefaces information aligning with Arabic and with Jewish material. All three agree that al-Rashid's entry into Fès, in June 1666, was made secretly, at night, by way of the Jewry (113). Al-Zayyani was sufficiently embarrassed by this record to refer to the millah or Jewry concerned, as an anodyne piece of nowhere: the "millah-al-muslimIn" or "Jewry-of-the-Muslims" (114). But the chronicle of Sa°dya ibn Danan, supported by Moustte, counters this muffling with notes upon the specific plight of the Fasi millah in 1666. The Jewry, sited between Fas al-Gali and Fas al-Jadid, had suffered particularly from the disorder which had followed al-Duraydi's coup. Caught in the cross-fire between Fas al-Jadid and the Qarawiyyin quarter of the old city, the millah had had its traffic with the two subjected alternately to pillage and to total interruption. The Jewish community had known hunger and emigration, punctuated by demands from al-Duraydi, the "persecutor", for heavy contributions (115). Muhammad al-Hajj al-Oila*i was no attractive alternative as master of the city. He is said once to have ordered his governor of Fès to destroy synagogues. (116). But the newcomer al-Rashid promised the Jewish community peace. He kept his word. His days would be remembered within the Fasi millah.

(112) Moustte: "Histoire..." p. 24
(114) "TurJuman" p. 8 of the text and 17 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Farif..." MS p. 24
(116) Chronicle of Sa°dya ibn Danan loc. cit.
as an age in which "the lord restored his people Israel" (117).

A quaint legend came to allow for the annual election of a "Lord of Misrule" by students of the Qarawiyyin university. This legend, a late and extreme piece from the Dār ibn Māshʿal corpus, told how al-Rashīd took the "house" of the Jew "ibn Māshʿal" with the aid of the tullāb of Fes (118). The actuality of al-Rashīd's capture of Fes with the aid of its Jews, provides a striking inversion of this legend.

Following entry by way of the Jewry wall, in the company of a small assault force (119), al-Rashīd was able, militarily speaking, to become master of Fes within two days. He took first the "new" and then the "old" city. Al-Duraydī and the two citizen leaders representing the Qarawiyyin and Andalus communities of Fas al-Balī all fled, but were variously recaptured and put to death within the fortnight (120). But capture of the city cannot be equated with acknowledgement as its sultan. For such acknowledgement, a bay'a was necessary. A civic bay'a was a formal declaration of allegiance, signed by citizens of known standing and intellectual worth. Once a dynasty was established, a bay'a would automatically be drawn up on behalf of a dynastic claimant to power who could pull local political weight. But when the Maghrib al-Aqṣā had no widely acknowledged dynasty, the grant of a bay'a was not a "douceur" automatically granted to the nearest man capable of exercising

---


(119) Moustte: "Histoire..." p. 25

military power around Fes. Muhammad al-Hajj of Dila', a murabit whose authority was, in its best days, wielded with sufficient grace and geographical extension for his partisans to think of him as "possessor" of the Maghrib (121), seems to have been granted the Fasi oath of allegiance. But al-Duraydi, a petty military dictator with only localised power, seems not to have received the honour: "hilf", or "confederation" had been considered the apposite term for moments of truce between the religious leaders of Fas al-Bali, and this particular master of Fas al-Jadid (122).

It seems clear that the city fathers were not at first disposed towards an extension of the baya to al-Rashid. Eighteenth century tradition was driven to exonerate shura and funah for their lack of initial support for the invader. The claim arose that, at the time of al-Rashid's entry into Fes, these eminent citizens, although staunch partisans of the intruder, were all incapable of acting on his behalf, as they were prisoners in al-Duraydi's house (123). This earnest and transparent piece of folklore does not account for the delay of three months which intervened between al-Rashid's capture of Fes, and the formal reading out in his presence of the baya by which citizens proclaimed him sultan (124). However, the delay is understandable. For two years, since the victory of the Angad plain, al-Rashid had been regarded as a threat to Fes: a brigand, with a mass

(121) "wa ka'na ra'is muhammad al-hajj malaka al-maghrib..." ("And the chieftain Muhammad al-Hajj had possessed the Maghrib...") al-Yusi: "Al-Muhadarat" quoted al-Zayyani: "Turfuman" p. 9 of the text and 19 of the translation.

(122) See P. 68 (Note (96)) for a juxtaposition of two relevant verbs: baya and halafa.

(123) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 178-9 Here the author is citing traditions current in his own day among the Fasi intelligentsia.

(124) According to "al-Fasi chronicle" material, the date of al-Rashid's entry into Fes was 3/Dhū'l-Hijja/1076 = 5/6/1666. The date of the formal reading of the baya was 18/Rabi' I/1077 = 18/9/1666. ("Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above, pp. 177 and 185)
following of rural "easterners", his *sharīfa*. Now he had taken the city by stealth, with the aid of its socially degraded Jewish community. Against this, apart from the factor of brute military power, there stood only al-Rashīd's claim to "sharīfian" birth. This, since the days of Sa'dī power, may have been commonly regarded as essential to the status of a sultan. Al-Rashīd could and did exploit the advantage of his birth, in accordance with this doctrine (125). But "sharīfian" birth was hardly unusual.

Al-Rashīd, however, combined this birth with pragmatic military ascendancy. And, in the three months following his capture of Fes, the conqueror was able to consolidate the rural basis to this ascendancy. He secured his connections with two populous regions where he had been a successful raider, by entering into marriage alliances. Al-Lawātī of the Snassen was established in Fes as al-Rashīd's father-in-law, with his own palace, and a guard of *cabīd* (126). The father-in-law developed a further, somewhat stylised role, that of "good genius" with a recognised licence to plead with al-Rashīd for the lives of others. Selectivity within one of these pleas, which obtained mercy for a number of Christian nonentities, but sent a former captain-general of Melilla to his death (127), seems to indicate that al-Lawātī maintained his ties with Snassen country, which was within easy reach of Melilla. Parallel to the Snassen link was al-Rashīd's developed association with the Middle Rif. Here al-Rashīd adopted a policy of rapprochement with the A'rasī. The clan was

(125) "...and that he might oblige the People to a greater obedience, and more fidelity, he hath given out that he is of the Race of their Prophet Mahomet, and that according to that Law none ought to command in Chief, but one lineally descended from Mahomet."

(S.L. p. 28)

(126) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 26-7
(127) Mouette: "Relation..." p. 56
restored to its Middle Rif influence, and one of its daughters, whom
al-Rashīd had first taken to wife in the dealings of the previous year,
brought into Fes (128).

Al-Rashīd went on to prove that, unlike his elder brother Muhammad,
the one-time ten-weeks sultan of Fes, he could act efficaciously in the
open field. In the late summer of 1666, in an expedition mounted from
Fes, al-Rashīd went out to defeat al-Khadir Ghaylān, near to that
chieftain's home-base of Alcazarquivir (129). To Fes, the victory meant
the removal of one potential menace. For Ghaylān had once, during his
tussle with Dilā', come raiding as far as the city's environs (130). It
is possible that the victory was accepted within the city as clear
validation of the potential usefulness of al-Rashīd's martial
capacities. On this point, understanding between al-Rashīd and Fes
could have been mutual. Following the battle, the victor made no
immediate attempt to winkle the defeated Ghaylān out of his coastal
refuge in Arzilla, or to establish personal authority over the bare
regions which Ghaylān had dominated. Instead, he returned to Fes,
and was swiftly granted a bayā', formal acceptance as sultan (131).
The metropolis had fully accepted the "poacher" at last. He was
willing to turn "gamekeeper".

*****************************************************************************
(128) Frejus p. 125 and Mouûtte: "Histoire..." pp. 27-8
(129) "Nashr al-Mathāni..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 185
cf. "Turjuman" p. 9 of the text and 18 of the translation
(130) "Nashr al-Mathāni..." Volume cited above. p. 106
(131) ibid. p. 185
CHAPTER II: A SULTANATE OF FES BECOMES A SULTANATE OF MEKNES

Al-Rashid's government within Fes began as the token rein of an alliance: in its "sultan" the city had a military champion rather than a potent sovereign. Subsequently relations tautened. As al-Rashid's territorial reach fanned out over the Maghrib al-Aqsa until "only some Petty Lords of the Craggy Mountains" did "resist his Power" (1), he increased his scope for subordinating the knightly to the regal aspects of his government. But his interlock with the metropolis endured. Quintessentially al-Rashid was always the "sultan of Fes". He continued to consult the interests of his capital, and to return there, as to his home base. Never, after the bay'a of 1666, did he set eyes upon the "Cherg" or Tafilelt.

In his first months, the new sultan secured control of Meknes (2), the nearest town to Fes of any independent significance (3). He outrode a feeble challenge from Dilia': a Berber force, mounted within the Central Atlas for an attack upon Fes, dissolved before making any impact upon the city's rural environs (4). The hispanophone magnates of Sale freely acknowledged al-Rashid's authority. To Mouêtte, this was craven behaviour for the citizenry of a "free town" (5). But, in its recent history, Sale had been noted more for turbulence than genuine political freedom (6). Moreover, it was, topographically, an estuary population cluster with an hinterland that contained only the forest of Mamora, and an area of

---

(1) S.L. p. 29
(2) "Nasir al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 185
(3) Leo ed. Remusio f. 31
(4) "Nasir al-Mathani..." Volume cited above. loc. cit. cf. Mouêtte: "Histoire..." pp. 30-31
(5) "...et Sallé, qui estoit une ville libre, aima mieux implorer sa clémence et se soumettre à luy que d'attendre qu'il l'allast visiter." (Mouêtte: "Histoire..." p. 29)
(6) See the thesis of B.A. Mojuetan Chapter III passim
thinly populated downland (7). Therefore it was a town whose prosperity
depended upon the sea: upon privateering and upon maritime trade, and
consequently upon the long-distance communications that were feeders
to this trade. Al-Rashid's defeat of Ghaylan, former master of the
Saletin hinterland, and protector to the town's most recent pair of
qa'idan (8), imposed upon Sale the necessity for a swift obeisance to
the victor.

Tetuan, like Sale, was a town with a significant cosmopolitan trade.
Like Sale, it contained an high proportion of inhabitants of "Morisco"
descent (9). But whereas Sale faced the ocean from a bleak strand,
Tetuan was embedded within a bustling rural economy and society. The
interweave of Tetuan with its surrounding hill-country is clearly
apparent from Braithwaite's Tetuan notes, particularly those which
describe a concerted rebellion of townsman and hill-folk against attack
by a former governor (10). Tetuan's refusal of immediate capitulation
to al-Rashid in 1666 is therefore comprehensible. But, as noted
previously (11), Tetuan and its environs were economically important
to Fes. Further, Martil, the port of Tetuan, carried maritime pilgrims
from the metropolis (12). Therefore, as "sultan of Fes", al-Rashid's
first task was to draw Tetuan and the route thither back into the FasI
economic orbit.

Early in 1667, al-Rashid returned to Taza, possibly to round up
a rural following from the Middle Rif, aliens to the so-called "Jabalī" domiciled to their west. After a spring return to Fes, he departed for the Western Rif, on what was effectively a Fasī errand. He first attacked the Banū Zarwāl, the "Jabalī" grouping who, during the previous decade, had been the object of independent Fasī punitive action. The local chieftain was sent back a prisoner to Fes (13). Two months later came al-Rashīd's capture of the town of Tetuan, and the arrest of leading members of its dominant clan, the Naqsīs (14). A campaign which seems to have taken place in the Taza region (15), and was perhaps ancillary to the demobilisation of a rural following, rounded off the military year.

Thus far, the new sultan had simply set his talents as a mugaddam to employment within the Fasī economic orbit, to the benefit of the city as well as himself. His expedition of 1668 against Dilāʻ was politically a more sophisticated scheme. Fes had indeed shrugged off the DilāʻI administrative yoke. But the eighteenth century nostalgia of the Fasī author of the "Nashr al-Mathānī...," previously referred to (16), is clear indication that the zawīya of Dilāʻ long retained a lingering religious prestige within Fes. Elimination of Dilāʻ therefore set al-Rashīd the hair-line task of crushing a centre of political power, while avoiding the manufacture of martyrs. Adroitly, the sultan evaded the slur of impiety by nominating, as city governor for the period of the campaign, a civic religious leader who epitomised an

---


(15) Here the "Turjuman" in its Houdas edition (loc. cit.) contains what appears to be a misreading, indicating, most improbably, a campaign against the Snaaṣān (Banū Yisnasin). A parallel passage within the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." (MS p. 24) reads "Banū Yisnāga", and may thus refer to rural groupings of "Sanhaja", domiciled between Taza and the Middle Rif proper.

(16) See Prologue P. 25
urbane fusion of *fiqh* and *wird*; Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Fasi, a *faqih*
from the city's own most noted religious community, the Jazuli *zawiya*
of the al-Fasi (17). This institution was affiliated to the same
tariqa as was Dila'i itself. But, as Gellner has recently pointed out,
an urban setting gives to a religious fraternity functions and
overtones quite alien from those pertaining within a rural setting (18),
even today, when no *zawiya* is an independent political power. In 1668,
after the political tensions of the previous two decades, members of the
*zawiya* al-Fasi may well have looked upon Dila'i with more rivalry than
brotherhood.

According to Mouette's informant, the Dila'i following within the
Central Atlas had, since al-Rashid's accession, been divided to the
point of incapacitation (19). But something of a Dila'i force was
gathered to oppose al-Rashid's approaching army, only to be defeated
in the Tadla in the June of 1668. Subsequently, the Dila'i religious
community and its immediate dependents, including its Jews, were
evacuated from the *zawiya* buildings, and escorted with a studied
chivalry, into Fes (20). The buildings were then razed to the ground.

A succession of embarrassed authors, reporting this event, took refuge
in a respect for both victor and vanquished (21). The prevailing tone

---

(17) "Nasr al-Rathani..." ed./tr. Micheaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 191
Further information upon the al-Fasi clan, together with a relevant
family tree, is to be found within E. Levi-Provencal's "Les Historiens
des Chorfa" pp. 240-247


(19) Mouette:"Histoire..." pp. 30-31

(20) "Nasr al-Rathani..." Volume cited above, p. 200 cf.
"Turjuma" pp. 9-10 of the text and 19-20 of the translation cf.
Chronicle of Sa'dy a ibn Danan ed./tr. Valde Text. no. XXI (Part II)
from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hesperia" Vol. XXXVI pp. 139-40

(21) Two eloquent proponents of this generous viewpoint were al-Qadir in his
"Nasr al-Rathani..." (Volume cited above, p. 200) and al-Nasiri
"Fumev translation, A.M. Vol. IX pp. 49-51)
A chivalrous exchange emanating from this literary theme is quoted
by the contemporary Moroccan scholar Lakhdir. It epitomises regret
that an imperfect world had thrust al-Rashid and the Dila'i into
mutual enmity ("La vie litteraire..." p. 50)
was set by a re-iterated quotation from the "Muhadarat" of the shaykh al-Yūsī, the Maghrib al-Aqṣā's most famous seventeenth century man of letters (22). He was resident in the ʿawwa at the time of its fall, and later wrote of the event in terms that had less to do with Central Atlas politics, than with setting up his master Muhammad al-Hajj as an Islamic type of the philosopher king: an old man calming his anguished kinsmen with his understanding that God had decreed the end of their era (23).

This literary set-piece has drawn attention away from the pragmatic consequences of the fall of Dila'. Among these was a hasty scattering by al-Rashīd's other political opponents. Al-Khādir Ghaylān, who had been skulking in Arzilla, took to the sea and retreated first to English Tangier (24) and then to Algiers (25). Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Shārīf, most prominent of the sultan's truculent nephews, withdrew from Tāfilelt, apparently into the hills to its north (26). During the following months it was possible for al-Rashīd to send a qaʿīd out beyond Tāfilelt to Tuat (27). And, still upon his crest of prestige, it was possible for the sultan, in the February of 1669, to exile the Dila'ī to Tlemsen (28). Clearly his absentee hold over the "Cherg" was sufficiently sure for him to trust that this holy family would be incapable of becoming a focus for "Chergi" disaffection.

(24) Routh: "Tangier..." pp. 94-6
(27) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 60
No Fasi source is so indelicate as to associate booty with the fall of Dila*. But the extirpation of the great zawiya was followed by a period during which silver was readily available within Fes. The metal was used to the mutual advantage of city and sultan. Al-Rashid borrowed fifty-two quintals of silver from Fasi merchants, as capital to finance the reconstruction of the Sebu bridge, which lay on the main route between Fes and Tetuan (29). And, in the May of 1669, there was minted a new silver currency, the Rashidiya muzuna (30). Its circulation seems to have put an end to the currency crises which had marked the previous decade.

Along with financial stability came stronger government. The sultan's next major military expedition was his bid for Marrakesh. In his absence, Fes would have, instead of a prominent civic faish, an 'Alawi khalifa as governor. This khalifa, first of a pair of recognised and parallel lieutenants established by al-Rashid, is virtually certain to have been Isma'ili, the future sultan, and a prince known to the English of Tangier as "the king's only brother..." (31). Isma'ili was by no means al-Rashid's only brother by blood. Mouette listed eight such brothers sufficiently prominent to be known to him by name (32). Further, disparity in age makes full-brotherhood unlikely. In 1669, al-Rashid

---

(29) "Nashr al-Mathan..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 201 cf. "Tur juman" p. 11 of the text and 21 of the translation. During 1669, an English Tetuan merchant noted that construction work for a bridge was actively underway, commanding the labour of masons and horses from towns in northern Morocco. (S.P. 71 (13) f. 196 Memo of Robert Ffarindaill, Tetuan, 19/8/1669)

(30) "Nashr al-Mathan..." loc. cit. cf. "Tur juman" loc. cit. The Rashidiya coinage was still a prominent currency in Tetouan, in the early twentieth century (Martin: "Quatre siecles..." pp. 13-14)

(31) S.P. 71 (13) f. 196 Memo of Robert Ffarindaill, Tetuan, 19/8/1669

was approaching forty (33), while Isma'il was in his early twenties (34). Isma'il must be seen as an "only brother" by designation, a distinguished cadet, singled out from a plethora of agnatic kinsmen because he was able and also young enough to be believed dependable. He had already been granted Meknes as a personal appanage (35). This in itself may have been a distinction. In Leo's day, Meknes had been granted to a favourite brother of the reigning Wattasid sultan (36).

The extension of al-Rashid's authority over Marrakesh and its Hawz is an enterprise which indigenous authors slide into the months immediately following the fall of Dila' (37). The event indeed poses an acute problem of chronology. But it seems most likely to have taken up the summer and autumn of 1669 (38).

It has been noted that, with the withering of Sa'di government, Marrakesh had fallen to the domination of the Shabbanat (39): an Hawz people of remarkable warrior panache, who had been bound to Sa'di sultans by a series of marriage alliances spanning the period between

(33) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 56 for the note that al-Rashid was in his fortieth year when he died.

(34) al-Ifrānī: "Zill al-warif..." p. 32 for the note that Isma'il was born in 1656 = 1646-7

(35) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 28

(36) Leo ed. Remusio f. 31 cf. (for the identification of the prince)

(37) The "al-Fasi chronicle" seems to have recorded that Marrakesh had fallen to al-Rashid by the beginning of September 1668, less than three months after the fall of Dila' ("Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Micheux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 200 cf. (for a more impressionistic chronology) "Turjuman" p. 10 of the text and 20 of the translation.)

(38) This is the chronology of Mouëtte ("Histoire..." pp. 33-6) and, less precisely, of contemporary English evidence (S.P. 71 (13) ff. 196 and 260-263 Name of R. Ffrindail dated Tetuan, 19/6/1669 and Letter of Lord Howard to Charles II dated Tangier 13/11/1669 ). As well as conflicting with the "al-Fasi chronicle" as noted above (Note (37)), this chronology conflicts with the Spanish text of Del Puerto, which also dates al-Rashid's capture of Marrakesh to 1668. However, the latter text is internally suspect. It associates the capture with negotiations said to have taken place in Fes during the months of 1668 when al-Rashid was pre-occupied with Dila' (Sk. V; Ch XXXIX; p. 595)

(39) See Chapter I Pp. 54-5
the reign of Ahmad al-Mansur and the regicide of 1659 (40). In al-Zayyani's day, the Shabbanat would be classed, along with associated Arabic-speaking peoples, as "Maqil", supposedly the descendants of immigrants from the south, or "Qibla", who had come to serve the Sa'di rulers in a military capacity (41). But, in the seventeenth century, the Shabbanat had their own peculiar myth of origin, which may have served to heighten amongst them a sense of "nous autres", by setting them apart even from Arabic-speaking neighbours. It was claimed that their ancestors were European captives, brought from Spain by the Almohade, Ya'qub al-Mansur (42).

The Murrakushi government of Karum al-Hajj, the usurping Shabbanat chieftain, was variously estimated. Al-Ifrani allowed him a sketchy note of approval (43), but European commentators reported that his rule was unpopular (44). He died during the months before al-Rashid moved upon Marrakesh (45) and was briefly succeeded by his son Abu Bakr. Del Puerto alleged that the death of Karum al-Hajj actually precipitated a Murrakushi civic invitation to the "sultan of Fes" (46). Such collusion would explain the remarkable ease with which


(41) "wa amma ha'ulâ'i zi'râra wa 'l-shabbanât wa awlād jirār wa awlād mta fa-înnahum kānū jundi'ya ma a mulûk al-e'dîya" ("As for the Zirâra and the Shabbanat and the Awlad Jirâr and the Awlād Mta, they were the military force of the Sa'di kings") ("Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 30)


(44) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 34 cf. Del Puerto Bk. V Ch. XXXIX p. 595

(45) "Nuzhat al-Hadi..." loc. cit.

(46) Del Puerto loc. cit.
al-Rashīd took the "red city". After conducting a casual lateral campaign into the "Jabal ʿAyyāshī" (47), a north western cheek of the High Atlas, the northern column was able swiftly to enter the southern capital and there obliterate the authority of Abū Bakr ibn Karūm al-Ḥājj. This acceptance of a "sultan of Fas" within Marrakesh "sin correr mucha sangre" (48), could have had an economic undertow. Al-Ifrānī associated the rule of Karūm al-Ḥājj with a Murrakushi famine (49). And it is known to have been customary during the period for the region of Marrakesh to import grain from its north (50). During a period of unusual food-shortage, al-Rashīd's army could have taken on the guise of a relief-column. A gaggle of merchants typically accompanied any ḥaraka (51). On this occasion, such merchants, bringing with them the comestible spoils of a lateral raid, could well have been taken into Marrakesh as welcome visitors.

Lack of Murrakushi civic opposition provided al-Rashīd with scope for a political purge which offered a sharp contrast to the gloved treatment he had meted out to the Dilāʿī. Abū Bakr and a number of other living members of the family of Karūm al-Ḥājj were executed. And, with gruesome symbolism, the body of the dead chieftain himself was exhumed from its place within the Saʿdī tombs and burned (52). Here it would seem that al-Rashīd was exaggerating his own honour with a pageant of concern for the defunct Saʿdī, implying that it was less majesté.

---

(47) "Nashr al-Mathanī..." ed./tr. Michaoux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 201
(48) Del Puerto Bk. V Ch. XXXIX p. 595
(49) "Nuzhat al-Hadī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 287 of the text and 477 of the translation.
(50) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 700
for Karum al-Hajj, a simple warlord, to have put a "sharifian" sultan to death.

In its metropolitan role, Marrakesh was entrepôt to a wide segment of the inward-facing Atlas. This made it appropriate for the conqueror to forge his way from the biddable "red city" into the less biddable mountains. In an extension of his summer campaign, al-Rashid took mountain fortresses (53), and seems to have been able to cross the Atlas into inner Sus (54). But he was drawn back from Sus by northerly concerns. A group of his dissident kinsmen, headed by sons of his brother Muhammad, had infiltrated the mountains above Taza (55) at a season when, for this particular year, the pilgrimage caravan might be threatened. So al-Rashid prepared to withdraw to Fes. He appointed a second khalifa, a nephew, Ahmad ibn Muhriz, to be keeper of the city of Marrakesh.

The role of Ahmad ibn Muhriz did not exactly counter-balance the role of Isma'Il within Fes. The lad was less than twenty years of age (56) and his command, absolute in formality, may be interpreted as the installation of a figurehead to Alawí forces. Although established "pour califfe ou vice-roy du royaume, avec une autorité absolue" he had "pres de luy des capitaines experimentez" (57). Associated with elevation to office was the khalifa's marriage with Lalla Maryam, a Sa'íd princess (58). The alliance may have been designed to epitomise

(53) S.P. 71 (13) f. 196 Memo. of Thomas Warren, dated Tangier 30/8/1669
(54) Mouitte: "Histoire..." p. 36 cf. S.P. 71 (13) f. 265 Lord Howard to Charles II, Tangier, 13/11/1669
(55) Mouitte: "Histoire..." p. 48, as compared with the garbled "al-Fasi" chronicle material reproduced in the "Nashr al-Mathani..." (ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 209), citing the sultan's nephews as the nephews of "al-Abyad". English notes support Mouitte's identification of the sultan's enemies (S.P. 71(13) (second notation) ff. 37 and 131 Lord Howard to Charles II, Tangier, 10/2/1670 N.S. and 24/4/1670)
(56) Mouitte: "Histoire..." pp. 57-8
(57) ibid. p. 35
for the benefit of the Murrākushī, an ʿAlawī succession to Saʿdī
government of their city. At the same time, it neatly disassociated
al-Rashīd himself from any suggestion that he might need such a
buttress to his personal authority. As Lalla Maryam was also kin
to the Shabbanāt, the marriage may also be seen as a diplomatic
bauble tossed in the direction of the Shabbanāt masses, still
undefeated in the Ḥawz (59).

The winter of 1669–70 saw the flight or execution of al-Rashīd's
enemy kinsmen from the Taza region (60). Their removal set al-Rashīd
free to make a definitive bid for the elimination of Illigh, and the
military mastery of inner Sus, which was now the only significant
region of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā which did not see al-Rashīd as its
suzerain. To bid for the entire Sus was ambitious. In addition to a
mountain shell, the region had its man-made defences:

"...quantité de châteaux et de villages ou les Barbaras
sont fortifiés. Ils y ont chacun deux ou trois armes,
pour changer, en quoy ils fondent leurs richesses. Les
Susis sont plus adroits aux armes et plus guerriers que
tous les autres Barbaras." (61)

The fire-arms and associated gunpowder were largely of local
manufacture, but could be respected by an European commentator (62)

Yet the attractions of the Sus were manifold. The region had the
glint of riches. The "inner Sus" valley had been noted in commonplace,
from the time of Idrīsī, for its canny industry (63). And comment from
the early ʿAlawī period vouches for Susī prosperity. The region was

(59) Mouâtté: "Histoire..." pp. 37-8
37 and 131 Lord Howard to Charles II, Tangier 10/2/1670 N.S. and
27/4/1670
(61) Mouâtté: "Histoire..." p. 198
(63) Dozy and de Goeje: "Description de l'Afrique..." pp. 61-2 of the text
and 71-2 of the translation.
known for its mineral wealth, which included veins of the money metals silver and copper (64). In food-production, it countered a degree of aridity with a rich and commercially developed sea-fishery (65). Most vitally, the Sus seems to have contained, at this period, the most significant route by which trans-Saharan gold filtered into the Maghrib al-Aqṣā. This point is open to question (66). Contemporary European reporters from the early ʿAlawī period tend to give remote-hand accounts of Moroccan "Guinea" trade, which lack attention to precise detail (67). But there are notes which suggest that, over northerly reaches, the predominant trans-Saharan route in employment was aimed at the Sus, and swung even further to the west than did Jawdar Pasha's Lektaoua road to Timbuktu (68). ʿAlī Abu Ḥassān, murābit of Illīgh for over thirty years (69), is said to have enjoyed the profits of a periodic caravan trade with Timbuktu (70). In his prime he had been described, presumably with geographical grandiloquence, as:

(64) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. XCIII Memo. of consul Périllière on Moroccan trade, Sale, Jan. 1689 p. 234
(65) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo of J.-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 703
(66) The mid-seventeenth century is a dark age for the study of trans-Saharan traffic. It lies midway between two rich fields of study: the classic gold-centred mediaeval period, of which the most recent investigation is contained within the work of V. Magalhães-Godinho: "L'économie de l'empire Portugais aux XV° et XVI° siècles" (Paris, 1969) pp. 100-127; and the nineteenth century, which has provoked re-examination of the trade as a comprehensive exchange of commodities, work pioneered by J.-L. Miège in "Le Maroc et l'Europe..." Vol. II pp. 146-54; Vol. III pp. 74-5 and 358-66; and Vol. IV pp. 381-85
(67) See, for example, the "Relation de Thomas le Gendre" pp. 706-12 and Windue pp. 210-13
(68) See H. de Castries: "La Conquête du Soudan par al-Mansour (1591)" and its appendix "Relation de l'Anonyme Espagnol" in "Hesperia" Vol. III (Paris, 1923) pp. 433-478, for an analysis of the route from the Oar'a to the Niger bend, which would seem, from comparison with Leo (ed. Ramusio p. 73) to have prevailed within trans-Saharan traffic from the Maghrib al-Aqṣā, throughout the sixteenth century.
(69) "Relation de Thomas le Gendre" p. 705
"Siddy Ali of the South, who hath cutt of the golden trade and usurpes in Suz the province scituate between Atlas and the river Senega." (71)

It seems probable that, over this period, any Fasi bound for the Niger bend made use of a prevailing perabolic westerly route that avoided the appalling Tanezrouft, rather than travel more directly by way of Tafilet and Tuat. Fasi rumour of Mouëtte's day associated the road to the "country of the blacks", and access to its fabled wealth, with control of the Sus (72), rather than control of Tafilet or Tuat. And, towards the end of the seventeenth century, imperial gold caravans are said to have proceeded towards the north of the empire by way of Tamanart in the coastal slopes of the High Atlas (73).

The extension of al-Rashid's military authority southwards to cover the entire Sus may therefore be seen as an enterprise likely to have had Fasi backing. But the sultan seems nevertheless to have made the city a concession, in order to purchase its continuing support over the period of his absence. This probable concession was the removal of an imperial nuisance from the civic environs: those sharaqa, or "easterners", who had accompanied al-Rashid in his progress towards Fes. Upon the city's northerly outskirts were laid the foundations of a fortress, the "Qasbat al-Khamis". Its name is associated with the sharaqa, a party of whom were supposedly detailed to build it (74). But it is known that, at the time of Mouëtte's ransom, in 1680, the fortress remained incomplete, supposedly because of the threat to Fes which

---

(71) S.I. 1r Anglaterre Vol. III No. XCIII Anon. Leconfield MS No. 73: "A brief relation of some latter occurrents in the state and kingdom of Morocco" dated by the editor to c. 1638 p. 468

(72) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." pp. 43, 135-7 and 197

(73) S.I. 2r France Vol. IV No. CI Memo. of J-B. Estelle. Sale, 29/7/1697 p. 529

(74) "Turjuman" p. 11 of the text and 23 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 27
its commanding position would have allowed it to impose (75). This lack of completion is in line with a tradition recorded by al-Zayyānī; that the Fāṣī were able to persuade al-Rashīd to set his shorāqā at a distance from the city, and quarter them upon lands between the Sebu and Warga (76). Here the shorāqā could present no immediate threat to Fes, or to its suburban stipple of orchards and vegetable plots (77); but, as a "laysh", or grouping distinguished for land-tenure by military service, they could act to Fāṣī advantage, as a rough-handed "government presence" near to a section of the route from Fes to Tetuan. A clue to the date of the displacement is an incident from 1670: the public execution within Fes of a party of highway robbers from the Awlād Jama’a (78), a grouping from the rural region to which al-Rashīd’s shorāqā were allegedly dismissed. Their arrest could have been symptomatic of the activity of newly settled shorāqā.

Isma‘īl, the khālīfa of Fes may thus have been deprived of a close-settled horde of ẒAlawī supporters. But he was granted a fillip to his personal status. In the April of 1670, apparently as a preliminary to the coming campaign, the sultan arranged for his brother a marriage, celebrated with sufficient splendour to receive notice within "al-Fāṣī chronicle" (79). The alliance seems likely to have been politically significant, designed to balance the favour

---

(75) "Hors la ville, dans un lieu appelé le Commice, est un château que Moulay Archy avoit commence, et qui est demeuré imperfect, pour le prejudice qu’il apporterait si ceux qui auraient este dedans s’y fussent souleuez, a cause qu’il est sur un lieu eminent et commande la ville, qui est dans une plaine" (Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 188)

(76) "Bustān al-Zārif..." MS p. 27


previously granted to Ahmad ibn Muhriz. But there seems no justification for al-Nasir's allegation that Ismail's bride was, like the bride of his fellow-khalifa, a woman of Sa'di birth (80). It is possible that she was the "princesse de Touet", whom Mouette alleged had been married to Isma'il in 1666, as a preliminary to an earlier campaign (81). For, in 1666, al-Rashid is unlikely to have been in contact with Tuat, then granting temporary shelter to his exiled nephew Muhammad ibn Muhammad. But by 1670, his qalid al-Nasir is known to have laid claim to the region (82). This marriage may have cemented the claim.

But, for 1670, any Tawat link was overshadowed by the Susi venture. Al-Rashid's High Atlas victories of the previous year were enough to give even the Shabbanat the hope of rich Susi pickings to come. When al-Rashid's southbound army reached Marrakesh, Shabbanat warriors abandoned their skirmishes with the forces of Ahmad ibn Muhriz, and rallied to the sultan of the "Gharb" (83). This may have amounted to al-Rashid's re-inforcement by several thousand cavalymen (84). The Shabbanat were followed by a mass of Haha peoples who flooded to al-Rashid's haraka as it took the coastal route southwards. They were joining a general with an unbroken record of victory who no longer needed formally to ally himself with rural hordes; all offers of matrimonial connections were refused (85).

The Susi campaign was no total pacification of the "Chleuh" heart-

---

(81) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 28
(82) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin pp. 59 and 60-61
(83) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 40-41
(84) Both Mouette and an anonymous English commentator casually but independently put the fighting strength of the Shabbanat, within their "Hauz" home-country, at six thousand ("Histoire..." P. 67 cf. S.P. 71 (14) f. 259 Anonymous Memo. dated Sale, 1/5/1673)
(85) "Tous les checqs des Arabes...le vinrent trouver avec plusieurs présens et lui amenerent plusieurs de leurs filles...Mouley Archy... refusa les filles qui lui avoient été presentées, et, sans les voir, les charges de présens et les remit entre les mains de leurs pères" (Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 41)
land. But it involved the elimination of Illigh as a node of political power. The reigning murabit, Muhammad ibn 'Ali Abu Hassun, was brought into confrontation with al-Rashid at the end of a decade during which Illigh had been at the eye of complex internecine rivalry (86). In 1670, his divided clan definitively lost to al-Rashid the control of major Susi economic centres, including Tarudant (87). The murabit himself fled southwards from Illigh. Allegedly he went towards an allied "kingdom of the Sudan" (88). By this kingdom, contemporaries presumably meant Bambara Segu. Despite rumours to the contrary, echoes perhaps of the trans-Saharan expeditions of the reign of Ahmad al-Manṣūr, it seems highly unlikely that al-Rashid pursued his enemy southwards across the desert, or came into personal confrontation with the forces of Segu (89).

For, over the winter of 1670-71, the sultan is known to have been back within the "Gharb" (90). In his train came the Shabbanat who, together with ḍabid or black slave soldiers, were the troops most closely associated with al-Rashid's two last years (91).

Fes may thus have engineered the removal of one alien body of troops, only to be irked by the proximity of the equally alien Shabbanat. And by this date, the sultan's line of victories may be

---

(86) "Relation de Thomas le Gendre" p. 705
(88) Mouffe: "Histoire..." p. 43
(89) This rumour, apparently an eddy within an European tradition of writing headed by Mouffe, was still current, with flamboyant ramifications, in the days when James Grey Jackson was consul in Mogador, more than a century after the supposed event ("An account of the Empire of Morocco" London, 1809 p. 295 and footnote to pp. 295-6). The developed tale, with its unconvincing suggestion of a counter-invasion of the Sus from Segu, was taken up by M. Delafosse and set into "Haut Sénégal-Niger" (Tome I) (Paris, 1912 pp. 247-8) and into the same author's "Les débuts des troupes noires au Maroc" in "Hesperia" Vol. III (Paris, 1923 pp. 1-11)
(91) Mouffe: "Histoire..." pp. 44, 48 and 67
thought to have set him above the challenge of a querulous citizenry as to his personal following. Echoes of al-Rashīd's heightened power around the metropolis in the aftermath of the 1670 Susī campaign are to be found in Mou&ette's allegation of the sultan's latter-day bullying of citizens (92). But there were concurrent compensations for Fes. Much of the profit of the Susī campaign seems to have been ploughed back into the metropolis. A Fasī building programme gives some indication of the scale of these profits. Into this programme there was set the most impressive of grace-notes to relations between sultan and city: the madrasat al-Sharratīn, allegedly "le plus magnifique" (93) of any such institution in Fes. A library was added to the southern face of the Qarawīyyīn (94). And a new palace was built in Fas al-Jadīd, for al-Rashīd himself (95). Its associated economy would have been tied firmly to the metropolis.

The sultan could now afford luxuries outside the range of finance. Such were certain niceties of prestige appropriate to a Muslim ruler: a local pilgrimage for himself, and the despatch of a mūılıhid cavalry force to harass English Tangier (96). These moves aligned with ordinances designed to enforce public morality (97). All, together with the building programme, filled out al-Rashīd's governmental image. Further, the once tireless military champion made a bid towards becoming a palace ruler. He set a subordinate general from the A'ra's in command

(92) Mou&ette: "Histoire..." p. 45
(93) ibid. p. 185 cf. "Turjuman" p. 11 of the text and 22 of the translation
(94) Lakhdar: "Le vie littéraire..." p. 48. The information is taken from an inscription set into the relief of the library masonry.
(95) Mou&ette: "Histoire..." pp. 186-7 cf. "Turjuman" pp. 11 of the text and 22-3 of the translation
(96) "Turjuman" pp. 11-12 of the text and 23 of the translation of "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 27
(97) Mou&ette: "Histoire..." p. 45
of a follow-up expedition into the Sue (98). It was probably from this expedition that there was despatched the token force which, in the September of 1671, arrived in Timbuktu to receive the formal allegiance of its warring "Orman" factions (99).

In less than six years, al-Rashīd had risen from the standing of a marauder at the gates of Fea, to that of suzerain over a vast territorial span. But, outside of Fea, where his government can be seen in terms of a rough, but on-going understanding with the citizenry, al-Rashīd's authority seems to have had little basis beyond the prestige that sprang from an accumulated chain of striking but lucky victories. Further, there was an in-built flaw to this authority. The elevation of two khalīfatān carried obvious risk. And, while al-Rashīd hunted in the Rif, during the early months of 1672, he heard that Ahmad ibn Muhriz had gone, with Marrakesh, into open rebellion (100). The episode was short-lived. The young prince was betrayed and captured while trying to make for Christian soil. He was sent in disgrace to Tafīlalt (101). His uncle thereby inaugurated the imperial Alawi development of Tafīlalt as a spreading "dower house" for less favored kinfolk (102). Marrakesh submitted once again to al-Rashīd. Chance prevented this submission from being more than a passing nod. In the April of 1672, al-Rashīd died in his prime: he was unexpectedly killed in a riding accident in a


(100) Mouotté: "Histoire..." p. 54 of "Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above. loc. cit.

(101) Mouotté: "Histoire..." p. 58

(102) For this function of Tafīlalt in Isma'īl's day, see Buannot (Chapter:III passim). Gerhardt Rohlfs described the developed "Alawi percolation of nineteenth century Filali society ("Reise durch Marokko" Bremen, 1868, part translated by de Tonnac as "Le Tafīlalt d'après Gerhardt Rohlfs" in "Renseignements Coloniaux" Aug. 1910 Vol. II pp. 243-57).
One memory of al-Rashīd would be that of a sultan whose reign had compounded the civic delights of open roads and low prices. Mouëtte passed on Fāsī nostalgia to this effect (103). The nostalgia was probably heightened by the disorder which followed al-Rashīd's death. The main current within this turbulence may be seen, ironically, to have been determined by al-Rashīd's own pre-arrangement of the political arena within his empire. This current was immediately vitalised by the unexpected removal of its author. Succession to al-Rashīd in 1672 was bound to involve a tussle. Al-Rashīd had sons of his own (104). But the two boys "en bas age" noted as being under the Fāsī tutelage of Ismaīl at the end of their father's reign (105) are likely to have been offspring of one or both of the sultan's politically significant Akrāsī and Qasasen marriages. If adult, princes of such birth would have been able to attract the military support of their akhwaí or maternal "kin". But the succession of a minor was out of the question. Further, al-Rashīd's expulsion of rival chieftains from the Maghrib al-'Aqsa meant that only an ālāwī prince could make a swift bid to be sultan. And, of ālāwī candidates, only the two khalīfatan, Ismaīl and Ahmad ibn Muḥriz, were possessed of significant political and military status. A third prince, al-Ḥarrān, brother to al-Rashīd and to Ismaīl, had shadowy ambitions. But, in 1672, he had only the weak base of Tafilelt, where he had been al-Rashīd's ālāwī governor (106).

The immediate succession crisis was a predictable race for acclamation

(103) "...les chemins qui avoient toujours eté remplis de voleurs, furent rendus libres. Et par ce moyen le commerce estant assuré, l'abondance commença a regner en tous lieux, et toutes choses devinrent à...bon marché" (Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 45)
(105) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." pp. 61-2
(106) ibid. p. 28
between Isma'il and Ahmad ibn Muhriz. Isma'il had the immediate advantage of proximity to Fes, and the city formally acknowledged him (107).

Ahmad ibn Muhriz, despite the support of al-Harran, and a summons from Tafilt by his Murrakushi allies, was unable to organise his position in the south with sufficient speed to prevent Marrakesh also from falling to his rival (108). So, following the standard dissident's pattern of retreat to a strategically placed rural region, the former Murrakushi khalifa withdrew to the High Atlas. There he allied with the shaykh of "Guilaca", or "Glawli", who dominated the "al-Fayja" mountain saddle which separated the "Hawz" of Marrakesh from the Daroho valley (109)

Meanwhile Isma'il, in Marrakesh, arranged for a symbolic move which implied rejection of the southern capital, and a counter-identification of al-Rashid's memory both with Fes and with himself. He brought his brother's remains northwards, to be re-interred within the mausoleum of a Fasi scholar-saint, CalI ibn Hirzihim (110). As a "douceur" towards Fes, this failed. Fas al-Bali was set to negotiate the terms upon which it would truly accept a successor to al-Rashid. In the late August of 1672, the Fasi citizenry mounted a surprise attack upon a column of Isma'il's troops, about to leave the city's outskirts for Tafilt (111). The city then summoned Ahmad ibn Muhriz, barely known within the north, to be a figurehead to its resistance (112). The defection of the metropolis touched off a wider dissolution of Isma'il's authority.


(108) MouBtte: *Histoire...* pp. 62-4

(109) ibid. p. 65


Shabbānāt precipitately abandoned the new sultan, and returned, bag and baggage, to the Hawz, in order to lay siege to Marrakesh upon their own account (113). Peoples of the Sebu valley, or "inner Gharb", summoned al-Khadir Ghaylān back from his exile in Algiers. In the November of 1672, he was ushered by the Algerine Turks towards Tetuan, in the company of certain Tištānī Naqāsīs exiles. He was well received throughout his own former sphere of influence (114).

Meanwhile, Ahmad ibn Muhriz had left the al-Fayja region, and come by a date route from Tafilelt to Taza, by way of Debdu (115). He came in the autumn, and was accompanied by a Filāšī force (116) which could well have been a rabble of date-vendors. In Taza he received notable re-inforcements, sent out from Fās al-Balī (117). Yet he did not dare to approach the metropolis. Meanwhile, Ismāʿīl was reluctant to confront the capital. He maintained a small garrison of ḍabīd in Fās al-Jadīd (118), but moved the mass of his available troops against Taza (119), leaving orders that the garrison should not engage in combat with the Fāsī citizenry upon its own initiative (120). Civic leaders organised attacks upon the fortifications surrounding the "old city". One notable sortie was led by

---

(113) "...en plein midy, plians leurs bagages, les mirent sur leurs chameux, avec leurs femmes et leurs enfans...ils furent mettre le siège devant Maroc, après avoir ruiné tout le país par où ils passèrent." (MouBtte: "Histoire..." pp. 67-8) cf. S.P. 71 (14) ff. 259 and (copy) 260 Anonymous Memo. dated Sale, 1/5/1673


(118) MouBtte: "Histoire..." p. 70

(119) ibid. p. 69

(120) S.P. 71 (14) ff. 259 and (copy) 260 Anonymous Memo. dated Sale, 1/5/1673
an Idrissid sharif (121). In the spring of 1673, the Fasi "Grandees" were allegedly "resolved to dye rather than surrender" (122). They could be resolute in the unlikelihood of starvation; it is for this period that the "al-Fasi chronicler" delineated the deprivations of the "Grandees" under siege conditions in terms of the difficulties of obtaining sheep for the due celebration of the sacrifice of 'Id al-Kabir (123).

Isma'il gained the ascendancy after deciding upon a lateral military gamble that proved successful. He shifted his attentions away from Ahmad ibn Muhriz in Taza, and towards the western plains, where Ghaylan was established. A minor spring campaign, led by a lieutenant of Isma'il's, failed to dislodge the mujahid (124). So, in the June of 1673, Isma'il himself moved the mass of his forces into the environs of Alcazarquivir. Here they met with Ghaylan's followers, dispersed and placidly harvesting (125). The mujahid was killed during the ensuing battle. Isma'il was able to take control of routes which Ghaylan had previously dominated. These included the routes linking Fes with Tetuan and with Sale. Subsequently Isma'il moved upon Fes, in order peaceably to open negotiations with the city (126). After intensive debate, the city fathers decided to receive him (127). But their ceremonial reconciliation with their sultan was devoid of any civic humiliation. 

Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi, shaykh of the city zawiya, and, in Moutte's terms "le plus fameux magicien de toute la ville", went hand in hand

---

(121) "Mouley Drice, l'un des plus fameux de leurs saints et qui descendait du fondateur de cette ville." (Moutte: "Histoire..." p. 70)
(122) S.P. 71 (14) ff. 259 and (copy) 260 Anon. Memo. dated Sale, 1/5/1673
(123) See Prologue p. 18
(124) S.P. 71 (14) ff. 259 and (copy) 260 Anon. Memo. dated Sale, 1/5/1673
(125) Moutte: "Histoire..." pp. 71-2
(126) ibid. pp. 73-4
(127) ibid. p. 74
with Isma'Il to the tomb of al-Rashid, and there exacted from the sultan an oath of peace (128). This was an identification of al-Rashid with Isma'Il that was made upon the terms of the city, rather than the terms of the sultan.

Entry into Fes gave Isma'Il an immediate advantage in his dynastic duel. Ahmad ibn Muhriz had made use of his rival's westward diversion against Ghaylan to repeat certain of the "Chergi" moves which had preceded al-Rashid's career of victory. He had allied himself with sons of al-Lawati, and captured Dar ibn Mash'al (129). These moves were now pre-empted. Isma'Il was able to move eastward from Fes along the Taza corridor. By the spring of 1674, he had established his authority over Dar ibn Mash'al and its environs, and punished the groupings who had rallied to his rival. Ahmad ibn Muhriz withdrew to Tafilt, where presumably his Filali following dissolved. He then retreated to the Dar'a (130). Dynastic victory did not restore Isma'Il's personal confidence in the political security of the "Chergi". It seems to have been at this period that the Dilâ'î exiles within Tlemcen were summoned back westwards, and ordered to settle in Fes (131).

The city was about to receive the counter-blow for its proudly calculated period of one year, two months and eighteen days' resistance to Isma'Il (132). He prepared to slide from under the inherited mantle


Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi had an indigenous reputation as a miracle-worker, to which one of his sons devoted a work of filial piety, entitled "Tuhfat al-sâhir fi manaqib al-shaykh Abd al-Qadir" (Lakhdar: "La vie littéraire..." p. 79)

(129) Mouffe: "Histoire..." p. 73

(130) ibid. pp. 75-6

(131) This summons took place at some point preceding a Tlemcenî revolt against its Turkish garrison, dated to Rajab 1085 = Oct.-Nov. 1674. Al-Qadirî rendered thanks that, by this date, the Dilâ'î had left Tlemcen and were therefore safe from harm ("Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above. p. 244)

(132) "Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above. p. 234
of a "sultan of Fes", by abandoning personal identification with the metropolis, and associating the seat of government with a more docile town: his old appanage of Meknes. Preparations for the withdrawal began in 1674, when the foundations of a new Miknasi palace complex were begun (133). Meknes, at a distance of forty miles, was too near to Fes to be considered in political isolation from the great city. In the mid eighteenth century, Chénier noted that, in good weather, it was possible to make the return journey from Meknes to Fes within a single day (134). But there was a tradition of enmity between the two places (135). Meknes was the nearest urban centre to Fes with any pretensions to economic independence. Its environs were noted for agricultural prosperity, and for the existence of a large and valuable salt pan (136). In the declining days of the Wattasid sultanate, the Miknasi orbit had allegedly produced one third of the revenues of the "kingdom of Fes" (137). The place was therefore well-suited to the establishment of a gobbling palace economy.

The initial palace establishment was skeletal, comprising building labourers and guards. But even the transfer of building labour from Fes to Meknes meant the transfer of an enterprise and a consumer group. The enterprise was considerable. The qa'id who was made superintendent of the building site was also made titular governor of Meknes, and of Tamesna, the modern Chaouia, in order that he might have financial

(133) Moulitte: "Histoire..." p. 111
(134) L.-S. de Chénier, 1788 English translation Vol. I. pp. 82-3
(135) Leo had somewhat naively noted of the Miknasi populace: "tengono grande odio col popolo di Fez, ne si fa alcuna manifesta cagione" (ed. Ramusio f. 31)
(136) Busnot p. 248
(137) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 31
scope for buying in the materials necessary for the construction of the palace (138). The consumer group was similarly considerable. The palace building force may never have reached the vast complement of 30,000 attributed to it in the late estimate of Windus (139). But it is likely always to have numbered thousands. For the mode of construction in use, that of pounding "tabby", an earth-lime mixture, between a framework of wooden boards (140), did require intensive labour. The Meknes building workers are a body whom it has been customary to regard simply with compassion (141). But its small and, from the point of view of source-material, heavily over-exposed Christian minority, is known to have been by no means penniless (142). And its sad indigenous majority, made up from rural levies, and from convicted criminals (143), did at least require feeding.

Three years would elapse before there was any major transfer of high palace personnel from Fes to Meknes. In the interim, Isma'il survived a double political crisis centred upon Marrakesh. In the summer of 1674, the sultan took an haraka through the Tadla, defeated the Shabbanat force which had come up to meet him, and re-took the southern capital. There he set up an A'ras ga'id. He then retired northwards, conducting a punitive campaign into the "Jabal Fazzaz" on the return journey (144). In the following year, 1675, Isma'il

(138) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Matteux pp. 116-117
(139) Windus p. 114
(140) Buenot pp. 155-6 cf. Windus p. 24
(141) The anonymous "Relation... de la Mercy" contains a rare extension of European compassion to the "Moorish" majority of the work-force (p. 655)
(142) Braithwaite pp. 352-3
(143) "Turjuman" pp. 13 and 29 of the text, and 25 and 54 of the translation.
(144) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 77-9
was brought back to the "Hawz" by the need to face Ahmad ibn Muhriz once again (145). This prince had come to Marrakesh by way of the Dar°a and Tarudant. His political acceptance within "inner Sus", in combination with his old Glawi connection in the "al-Fayja" region could have been sufficient to re-fuse his links with Marrakesh. So no great credence need be given to Mouitte's narrative details which suggest that the boudoir politics of the SaĆdī woman Lalla Maryam were vital preliminaries to her husband being invited back into the southern capital (146). However, the woman's position as symbolic inheritrix of the SaĆdī tradition within Marrakesh may have been diplomatically significant in drawing the Shabbanān into a coalition with Ahmad ibn Muhriz that used the "red city" as its base.

Ahmad ibn Muhriz was able to hold Marrakesh for two years, in a defence marked by at least one battle sufficiently significant to warrant report in "al-Fasī chronicle" (147). The period was otherwise notable chiefly for strife within the besieging forces. At this period, IsmaĆIL "shrugged off" those allies from northern hill-country who had been particularly associated with his brother al-Rashīd, and whom, in a sense, he had inherited. He rounded upon the Aдрas, whom he accused of conspiracy with their clan-fellow, his qa'id who still remained in Marrakesh. The clan, including members left behind in Fes, was all but extirpated (148). Al-Lawatī of the Snassen figured equivocally alongside this episode. He was allowed personally to survive, possibly because he held the status of father-in-law to IsmaĆIL himself. But his

(145) Mouitte: "Histoire..." p. 80
(146) ibid. pp. 80-81
court status evaporated (149). His lapse from favour was probably consequent upon the earlier disloyalty of his offspring. He was the father of sons who had allied with Ahmad ibn Muhriz two years previously.

It is probable that Isma'il was able to dispense with allies whom he considered dubious, because he had the resources to buy others. Windus accounted for Isma'il's progress over this period in terms not only of "Courage and Vivacity", but also of:

"...the Help he met with from the Jews, particularly Memonan their Governor, who supplied him with Money to carry on the War against his Opposers." (150)

This note is not written in any tone of Sheridanseque anti-Semitism. And it has the corroboration of indigenous Jewish tradition, in which this period was remembered as particularly notable for Jewish merchant association with the expansion of Isma'il's authority (151).

The surrender of Marrakesh to Isma'il in the summer of 1677 followed private dynastic dealings. After employing his brother al-Harran as go-between, Isma'il is said to have agreed to allow his nephew to withdraw in peace into "inner Sus" across the High Atlas, with the independence of his government over the Wadi Sus and Dar'a valleys recognised (152). Ahmad ibn Muhriz would never again "stand in" as heir to the Sa'dI: symbolically, he left Lalla Maryam behind him in her Murrakushi palace (153).

Following the withdrawal of Ahmad ibn Muhriz and his personal

(149) Mouitte: "Histoire..." p. 89
(150) Windus p. 117
(152) Mouitte: "Histoire..." pp. 102-5
(153) ibid., p. 104
military entourage, Isma'īl's army was allowed into the city of Marrakesh. Partial sack followed, and a number of Marrakushi magnates were either put to death or mutilated (154). This provided a grim contrast with the courteous 1673 dénouement to the siege of Fes. However, punishment for Isma'īl's former opponents was not inevitable. Those Shabbanīt who had chosen not to follow Ahmad ibn Muhiriz into retreat had their proffer of service to Isma'īl accepted. But this was to be service at a distance. The force was, in the first instance, ordered to migrate to the environs of Melilla (155). Here they were neatly interposed between Snassen country and the region once dominated by the Aṭrāṣ.

Subsequently, while the sultan was still engaged in the punishment of Marrakesh, he received news of the political intrusion into the Central Atlas region of a lone Dilaʾī, Ahmad ibn 'Abd Allah, grandson to the murabit Muhammad al-Hajj. This young Dilaʾī had gone on pilgrimage from Tlemsen, but taken the opportunity of Isma'īl's involvement in the "Hawz" to return from the east. He had picked up a small Turkish escort for the last lap of his journey. Hastily Isma'īl gathered together a rag-bag local following:

"Cette nouvelle fit cesser les cruautez que le Roy exerçoit sur le peuple de Maroc et luy fit publier un pardon général pour tous ceux qui voudroient l’accompagner dans son retour à Fes. Il fit suivre ses troupes de toutes les caiîles ou pauplês d’Arabes, qui vinrent se mettre sous son obeissance..." (156)

There were concurrent dynastic disturbances within Tafilalt (157). But dealing with this secondary problem was postponed. Three successive

---

(155) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 106
(156) ibid. p. 108
expeditions into the Central Atlas were undertaken in order to eliminate the final spasm of Dila*I military power. The last and most brutal was led by Isma*I himself. It failed to take hold of the Dila*I leader, but was nevertheless a complex and crushing demonstration of the military power which Isma*I could muster at this juncture (158).

Loyal service to Isma*I during the siege of Marrakesh and its Central Atlas coda made political fortunes. This was a period for the advancement of "new men", to whom rumour would persistently allot improbably humble origins (159): a shorthand indication that their power came not from local ascendancy, but from the sultan's fostering.

In 1677, Ghaylan's former sphere of influence in the western plains received a new qa'id, 'Umar ibn Haddu al-HammamI (160). Like Ghaylan he was based at Alcazarquivir, and was destined to have close, if Janus-faced relations with the Christian infidel: these combined harassment of the enclaves, at the head of a local following of mujahidun (161), with the conduct of diplomatic relations with Europeans (162). A kinsman of 'Umar, 'Ali ibn 'Abd Allah al-HammamI, was set over Tetuan (163). Members of this HammamI clan, mujahid captains recognising the sultan, would dominate both western plains and Western Rif throughout the remainder of the reign. They were men of ability, as would be averred by the Europeans whom they encountered. Samuel Pepys, for instance,


(159) Examples of such rumours are given by Pidou de St. Olon (tr. Motteux pp. 116 and 121) and by Windus (p. 202)

(160) Routh: "Tangier..." pp. 160-161

(161) Motteux: "Histoire..." p. 112

(162) For the qa'id's reception of the Kirke mission from Tangier in 1681, see: Anon: "The last account from Fez...containing a Relation of Colonel Kirke's Reception at Magueinez etc" (London, N.D.) pp. 1-4

recognised in ʿAmīr ibn ʿAbd Allāh a "Moor" of personal distinction (164).

Advancement similar to that of the Hammāmī came in 1677 to men of
the Rūsī clan. ʿAbd Allāh al-Rūsī, who had been a companion of Ismāʿīl
in the mahalla or military camp outside Marrakesh, was appointed
governor of Fās al-Bālī in absentia. After the third and final Central
Atlas campaign against the Dilārī intruder, ʿAbd Allāh, one of that
campaign's victorious generals, was able to enter Fās in triumph, to
take up his post. His father was made master of probate (abū ʿI-
mawārith)(165). Members of his clan would for fifty years continue to
be Ismāʿīl's effective representatives within Fās al-Bālī.

The crisis of 1677 may also have seen the nascence of a military
corps later to be closely associated with the sultan: the corps of
Udāya, a crack cavalry force which would stand in relation to Ismāʿīl as
the Shabbanāt had stood in relation to Saʿdī sultans. An individual
general, "Leudaya", was a distinguished cavalry commander during the
third Central Atlas campaign of 1677 (166). It is possible that he led
a body of the troops swept together from the environs of Marrakesh.
Memory of this service may lie embedded in al-Zayyānî's "just-so-story"
as to how Ismāʿīl, in 1677, founded the Udāya, as a corps gathered from
among his own akhwal, serendipitously located in the Ḥauz (167)

Tradition was later to amplify al-Zayyānî's association of the
Udāya with the Shabbanāt (168). But, in Ismāʿīl's day, the two groupings

(164) "The Alcade (ʿAmīr ibn ʿAbd Allāh) and his company appeared like very
grey and sober men. His discourse and manner were very good and, I
thought, with more presence of mind than our master's..." S.Pepys
ed. J. Smith: "Journal at Tangier" from "The Life, Journals and

(165) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Micheaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 260

(166) Moutte: "Histoire..." p. 110

(167) "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 29 cf. Epilogue Part II Pp. 317-18

(168) "Bustan al-Zarīf..." loc. cit. cf. al-Nasiri: "Kitāb al-Istiqās..."
Al-Nasiri's developed tradition, which would make the Shabbanāt one
division of the Udaya would seem to spring from military nomenclature among
the "Udaya" of his own day, quartered on lands to the south of Salé. See:
J. le Coz: "Les tribus guichs au Maroc: essai de géographie agraire" in
were distinct. Isma'Il made no attempt to associate the Shabbanat personally with himself. After the first dismissal, outside Marrakesh, the force was scattered into different provinces. Thus, one troop of Shabbanat was sent into the Tadla, to be met there by St. Amans in 1683 (169). And, according to al-Zayyani, other Shabbanat, in association with members of a fellow Hawz grouping, the Zirara, were sent to garrison Oujda, to build three neighbouring "Chergi" forts, and to contain the Snassen (170). Al-Zayyani knew the eastern march forts personally (171). So his notes on their garrisoning may be accredited. But his concept of the policy behind their deployment may be dismissed. He claimed that the Shabbanat and Zirara had been the oppressors of the Hawz, and that the Snassen, against whom they were pitted, owed allegiance to the Regency (172). But it has been seen that, during the very early years of Alawi history, the Snassen had been noted most particularly for their association with al-Rashid. And it is thus straightforward to assume that Isma'Il's aim in setting Shabbanat and Zirara around Snassen country was simple neutralisation: the tilting against each other of two bodies of warrior tribesmen who had each been closely associated with other political leaders, including Isma'Il's living rival Ahmad ibn Muhriz, and whose loyalty to Isma'Il personally was thus equally to be thought questionable.

(169) "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" pp. 337-8
(170) "Turjumân" p. 18 of the text and 34 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarîf..." MS. p. 34
(172) "limâ kânu C alÎavhi min al-zulm wa l-jawr bi-qabâ'il al-hawz..." (reference to a Zirari qâ'id)...we amaruhi bi 'l-tadyîq Câlā bani yisnaa'n idh kânu shîr at al-turk"
("Since they (the Shabbanat and Zirara) oppressed and maltreated the peoples of the "Hawz", ...he ordered him (their qâ'id) to constrain the Snassen, who were disposed to favour the Turks")
("Turjumân" loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."

"Turjumân..." loc. cit."
From 1677 onwards, Isma'il had Meknes as his own capital, to be the cynosure for forces loyal to himself. Following his Central Atlas victory, the sultan travelled to his new Meknes palace, and, with a wolf-sacrifice, inaugurated its habitation (173). Imperial authority over Fes was affirmed from the Meknes base. In the December of 1677, Isma'il appointed a new qadi of Fes, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Bardalla (174), who may be presumed to have been outstanding in his loyalty as a "sultan's man", as he was still in office twenty years later (175). Soon afterwards in a pageant-like gesture that was typical of his style of government, the sultan conducted a personal Fasi victory parade, to clinch the earlier al-Rusi triumph. He brought the recently rebellious al-Harran of Tafilet with him to the metropolis. There, as "the sultan benignant", he ceremonially pardoned his errant brother in full view of the Fasi citizenry. Thereafter, he graciously consented to be the guest of the city fathers, over the feast of ʿId al-Kabīr (176). Significantly, this was the season at which it was appropriate to present formal hadāya or gifts to the ruler (177). Then, having demonstrated to Fes an easy exercise of the upper hand, Isma'il retired to Meknes.

The palace at Meknes would never be completed to its master's satisfaction. As is well-known, the sultan was his own grand architect, and as much "addicted" to the issue of summary demolition orders, as to the issue of instructions for building (178). Physically, therefore,

(173) Maußte: "Histoire..." p. 111
(175) "Lettres Indérites..." No. 12 p. 53
(176) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above. p. 261
(177) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J.-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 pp. 694-5
(178) Windus pp. 115-116 For an analysis of the Meknes palace complex from an architectural point of view, see H. Terrasse "Histoire du Maroc" Vol. II pp. 266-8
the Miknāsī palace complex underwent more than half a century of heaving protean development, before its present outline emerged. Yet the palace had its permanent aspects. It dominated the "pittiful Country Town" (179) that Meknes had previously been, like a gigantic mahalla or imperial camp. Its lime-white walls and glittering green-tile roofs caught the eye from a distance of miles (180). Local assets, such as lime-kilns (181) were requisitioned to serve its needs. A gaggle of "camp-followers" came to settle in "nouala" or reed-huts, outside the town gates (182). Within the town, palace denizens and dependents eventually predominated (183). And, even in Mouffe's day, the palace guard alone could be estimated as eight thousand (184). Among the palace dependents there must be counted the Miknāsī Jews. The qā'id of the Jewish community of the Maghrib al-Aqsa seems to have moved to Meknes with the sultan. He was granted the contract for provisioning the palace (185), and was also responsible for the preliminary quartermastery of imperial campaigns (186). It seems likely that the price for this Miknāsī contract was paid in real estate. The old town houses of the Miknāsī Jews were surrendered to the sultan in 1682, as residences free for his renting out (187). The bargain was apparently worth-while. The new Miknāsī Jewry, built with labour detached from the palace building site (188), came to be seen as the most visibly prosperous commercial centre of the developed capital (189).
The analogy of the mahalla or military camp could be extended to the Miknasī palace personnel. According to a classic analysis, Islamic government could be divided between the spheres of the "pen" and the "sword" (191). It will be stressed later that Ismā'īl's government maintained the "pen" at a rudimentary stage of development (192). Men of the "sword" were the buttresses of the state. In this, Ismā'īl's government conformed to tradition of recent centuries. Leo's account of the sixteenth century Wattāsid administration within Fes portrays a government whose designated officials were for the most part military captains, holding posts of responsibility either within the household staff of the sultan's army as arrayed for campaign, or as tax-gathering military governors within the provinces. At the head of a list of captains, quartermasters, stable-masters, rural commissaries and the like, there figured only two civil servants of high degree: a "maggior consigliere", presumably a "wazīr", and a "secretario" who trebled as "thesoriere" and "maggiodomo" (193). The military bias to this list is echoed to an even more striking degree in a second and more haphazard piece of itemisation drawn up by Mouffe: his conclusory list of the "Familles Illustres" of Morocco (194). Here, amid a plethora of magnate families and individuals, of generals governors and saints, and of the living and the dead, there are to be found only two men who might be thought of as purely civil officials: a defunct "visir", and the somewhat specialised "maistre-d'hôtel ou des serrails de Fes". "Zelquetin", the officer named as "tresorier", is known

(191) ibn Khaldūn: "Fugaddima..." ed./tr. de Slane as "Les Prolegomenes d'ibn Khaldoun" (Paris, 1865) Vol. II pp. 46-8
(192) See Chapter IV pp. 164-166
(193) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 43
(194) Mouffe: "Histoire..." pp. 200-201
from his later career to have been a general.

Yet although Ismail's government was of a markedly military cast, the forces at the sultan's disposal were as yet unremarkable. The troops with which Ismail won control of the region within the Atlas arc, during the first five years of his reign, were probably dominated numerically by followers of provincial quwwad. Mouette described the practicalities of muster during Ismail's early years as follows:

"Il range lui-même ses troupes en bataille, les paye par ses mains et en fait la revue en personne; et afin de voir si le nombre qu'il a payé à ses alcaydes est complet, il les fait assembler sur les bords de quelque profonde rivière, dont les quais de côte et d'autre sont gardez... Puis, le premier jour, il fait passer l'infanterie, le second la cavalerie des Arabes, et le troisième les troupes de sa maison..." (195)

Cavalrymen were not only "Arabes" or rural horsemen. They came from town and country alike. A proportion of such troops from both town and country would seem to have owed the sultan the favoured but onerous jaysh service, known to have existed since Sadi times. This involved liability to regular military service in exchange for the remission of taxation (196). For townsmen, such service went along with the grant of a mount (197). However, the majority of troops in the first two categories noted by Mouette may be thought of as na'iba troops. These owed military service to the sultan by lot, and simply as his subjects. They were allowed no remission of taxation. Indeed, in the towns, the muster of such troops was carried out with the aid of the tax-roll (198).

(195) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 149
(196) A zahir of Ahmad al-Mansur, dating from 1588, demanded permanent jaysh service from a branch of the Shabbanat domiciled in the Agadir region, and granted remission of taxation in exchange. (J. le Coz: "Les tribus quiëches au maroc" pp. 3-4)
(197) S.I. 2ª France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo, of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 695
(198) ibid.
The sultan's askar or standing guard (199) which formed the third body of troops mentioned by Mouëtte, was as yet, by the standards of the second half of Isma'il's reign, a force of limited proportions and mixed constitution. It was an institution cast in an ancient and not even particularly Islamic mould: that of the bodyguard alien from the fabric of local society, and identified with the ruler in person. It was already dominated by the force of abid which had germinated in the days of al-Rashid. However, in Mouëtte's day, these abid had not yet come numerically to swamp the sultan's following of a'la'i, or European renegades. Renegades had been prominent within Isma'il's forces outside Marrakesh (200). And, of the three gates to the Meknès palace of Mouëtte's day, two were said to be guarded by "blacks" and one by renegades (201). Tentatively this may be put forward as an indication of the contemporary ratio of the sultan's abid to the sultan's a'la'i.

Abid and a'la'i may both be seen as living socially in limbo except for the bonds by which they were linked to a military commander. The showy little procession which celebrated a Christian's conversion did not mark the convert's acceptance into Muslim society (202). It merely marked a formal surrender of the mores of Christendom. Co-option into military service was the general rule (203). And Mouëtte noted

(199) When describing a military force, al-Zayyani would use either of the two terms jund or askar. The latter term seems to have indicated "standing army". This was the meaning retained by the word in the latter nineteenth century (R. Mauduit: "Le Makhzen Marocain " in "Renseignements Coloniaux" Paris, 1903 p. 302)

(200) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." pp. 96 and 106
(201) Mouëtte: "Relation..." p. 148
(202) The social distinction was symbolised by a bar against the convert's marriage to any but a slave girl, or the daughter of another renegade. For casual note of this bar, see Buënot p. 157 and Braithwaite p. 349. For subsequent commentary in greater sociological detail, see de Chénier (English translation of 1788) Vol. I., pp. 155-6 and Lamprière p. 342

(203) Thus the English renegade "Pilleau" was described as "...at present a Soldier, as all the Renegades are, who have no particular Trade or Calling." (Braithwaite p. 192)
with satisfaction that the life of an European who had "turned Moor"
continued to be one of slavery (204). In an ethnic sense, however, the
al a L i may be seen as the tail-end of one military tradition, about to
give way to another. From its earliest Islamic centuries, successive
rulers within the Maghrib al-Aqṣa had employed cohorts of European
troops, including the primordial sagaliba (205), the rum or free
Christian mercenaries of the later Middle Ages (206), and the Sa dī
g aI. All these had been troops of honourable status. Europeans could
describe the g aI or "elches" of Ahmad al-Manṣūr al-Sa dī as his "best
souldiers" (207), and followers of his grandson as "elshes of quality"
(208). But during the early CAlawī period, the status of the g aI
collapsed. European respect for the renegade as a soldier gave way to
embarrassed scorn for the "poor white". Renegades were Mouffe's "enfans
perdus" (209) and, later, Braithwaite's "worst Set of People of all here...
sad, drunken, profligate Fellows, half-naked and half-starved" (210).
This plummet in reputation is likely to reflect a real deterioration in
the quality of European soldiery willing to undertake Maghribi service.

(204) Mouffe: "Histoire..." p. 175
(205) As an instance, sagaliba were cited by al-Bakri (tr. W. MacGuckin de
Slane as "Description de l'Afrique Septentrionale par el Bekri"
Algiers, 1913 pp. 93 of the text and 187-8 of the translation) in
a context in which they appear as advantaged slave troops who, around
the year 900 A.D. demanded their freedom from the lord of the Middle
Rif state of Makur.
(206) For information on the rum, see J.M.J.L. Mas Latrie: "Relations et
commerce de l'Afrique septentrionale au Maghreb avec les nations
chrétiennes du moyen age" (Paris, 1866) and J. Alamany:
"Milicias Cristianas al Servicio de los Sultanes Musulmanes del
Almagreb" from "Homenaje a D. Francisco Codera" ed. D. Eduardo
Saavedra (Saragossa, 1904) pp. 137-155
(207) S.I. 1st Angleterre Vol. II No. LXXXIV George Tomson to Robert
Cecil, Marrakesh, 30/10/1603 p. 233
(208) S.I. 1st Angleterre Vol. III No. XCIII Leconfield MS No. 73
p. 467
(209) Mouffe: "Histoire..." p. 93
(210) Braithwaite p. 349
In a period of expanding European armies (211), when "the recruiting officer" could become an established European literary figure, early Alawi sultans offered no unusual financial draw to bring in European mercenaries from a wide catchment (212). They had access to two narrow and erratic stocks of European recruits: captives taken by the corsairs, and fugitives from the enclaves. Of these, the fugitives in particular were men unlikely to be malleable into troops of high quality (213).

The salvation of the early Alawi askar was the development of an imperial corps of abid. The corps was, for the seventeenth century, an Alawi innovation. It will be stressed later that no major force of black troops attached to the Saadi sultans (214). The early association of abid with al-Rashid has already been noted (215). By the end of al-Rashid's reign, abid were being employed, not simply as the sultan's personal guards, but in sufficient numbers to be despatched upon a tax-raiding haraka, under the commander whom Mouitte knew as "Bousta" (216). The services of "Bousta" were inherited by Ismail (217). A round figure for Ismail's following of black troops, tossed out for 1672, was two thousand (218). By the end of the 1670s, the black guard, quartered in

(211) See G.N. Clarke: "War and Society in the Seventeenth Century" (London, 1958)
(212) Braithwaite dismissed the renegade pay of his day as "20 Blanquils a Month, which is twenty Twopences, and a little Flower". Officers were paid in proportion (p. 349)
(213) Such fugitives were commonly criminals and pressed men, deserting from the appalling conditions of service which characterised all the enclaves with the exception of Portuguese Mazagan. Tangier literature endorses Mouitte's picture of a drain in sorry manpower from these alien pustules. An anonymous author of 1680 strongly urged an improvement in the terms of Tangier service, as "melancholy drunken fits" took many men into "running to the Moors" (Mouitte: "Histoire..." pp. 182 and 194-5 cf. Anon: "A Discourse concerning Tangier" (London, 1680) p. 22)
(214) See Epilogue Part I Pp. 286-8
(215) See Chapter I Pp. 55-6 and the present chapter P. 91
(216) Mouitte: "Histoire..." p. 44
(217) ibid., pp. 78 and 201
(218) ibid. p. 68
tents around the new Miknași palace (219) had expanded so far that, as noted previously, one estimate of its size could be eight thousand (220).

It is possible that, from the beginning of his reign, Ismaał was wary of the possibility of a military coup along the lines which, in 1671, had led to the seizure of the reins of Algerine power by the diwan of janissaries. For, in his first decade, Ismaał established the pattern by which he would conduct relations with his ğebid, to the very end of his reign. In the days of Mouëtta, as in the days of Windus, he meted out to his guard an adroit blend of vicious discipline and gaudy favour, that produced docility towards himself, and a compensatory insolence towards his subjects (221). Further, he would allow only adolescents from his corps of black page-boys close to his person. These pages were the musket-toting lads known to all European reporters (222). Busnot knew them as the "Chafferates" (223), a possible rendering of shafarât. These adolescents are likely to have graduated to a corps d'élite within the Miknași guard, and thus given to the officer echelons of Ismaał's ğaskar an increasingly negroid aspect. Few renegades were taken young enough to fulfil an apprenticeship within the sultan's service parallel to that undergone by the "little Blacks" (224).

Counter to the accepted tradition, set into al-Zayyani's texts for the latter 1670s, it can be maintained that the primary guard of ğebid was built up without recourse to any dramatic raking of the country for slave recruits. There was a domestic source of natural increase for the

(219) Mouëtta: "Relation..." pp. 151-2
(220) See the present chapter P. 108 (Note (184))
(221) Mouëtta: "Histoire..." pp. 175-6 cf. Windus pp. 139-143
(222) See, for example, Mouëtta: "Histoire..." p. 176 cf. Pidou de St. Olon tr. Matteaux pp. 113 and 150 and Windus loc. cit.
(223) Busnot p. 205
(224) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Matteaux p. 150
For whereas the European renegade woman was an exotic rarity, black slaves of both sexes were brought into the Maghrib al-Aqsa. Leo alleged that his own contemporaries in the Dar̃-a region specifically encouraged their slaves to breed (225). And the young pages of Mouâttet’s day were said to be the sons of palace serving women (226), Harāṭin, dark-skinned sedentaries from the oases (227), formed a further pool of manpower that could have been tapped on the sultan’s behalf. During the reign of Muhammad III, direct recruitment from the oases is known to have been an accepted mode of replenishing the ranks of the sultan’s army (228). This practise aligned with the oasean antecedents of the ʿAlawī. And it is known from Tawātī records that slaving was ancillary to mid-seventeenth century oasean warfare (229). Finally, there was the self-generating process by which ḥadāya, presentations of tribute to the sultan, added recruits to the very military sanction which rendered ḥadāya politic. Magnates and tribes alike are recorded as having included, within their “douceurs” to the sultan, numbers of black slaves that could run into hundreds (230).

Hadāya were also a regular source for the supply of cavalry horses (231). Half the ʿabīd guard of Mouâttet’s day was mounted (232). And, in time, the sultan’s stables would become one of the wonders of Meknès.

---

(225) Leo, ed. Ramusio, p. 73
(226) Mouâttet: "Histoire..." p. 176
(227) See Appendix A, pp. 335-337
(228) Thus in 1172/1758-9, the harāṭin from three oasean groupings along the Ziz were pressed into military service, on the pretext that they were dissident. Nine years later, a qālid who was himself a wasīf, or high ranking palace slave, was despatched to gather in a force of ʿabīd from the "Qibla" or western Sahara. ("Bustan al-zarif..." MS pp. 100 and 108)
(229) Timmi MS and the chronicles of al-Tawātī and al-Amūrī quoted Martin, pp. 47, 55 and 56
(230) Mouâttet: "Histoire..." pp. 98, 99 and 111
(231) ibid. pp. 98 and 99 cf. Del Puerto, Bk. I, Ch. XV, p. 59
(232) Mouâttet: "Histoire..." p. 176
recognised as such in both indigenous and European writing (233).
The stables are evidence of a glory in horse-flesh that was, at this
period of the history of the Maghrib, distinctive to the martial
mores of the Maghrib al-Aqsa. In the neighbouring Regency of
Algiers, the prime soldier was the janissary infantryman. But
cavalry, in the early Alawi Maghrib al-Aqsa, was rated far above
infantry:

"...a Horseman being in the highest Esteem imaginable
amongst them, and the Foot the contrary, insomuch that
those who command thousands of them are not esteemed
equal to the Commanders of fifty Horse..." (234)

It was the ġabīd cavalry who fought alongside the sultan's person
in battle (235). Cavalry skills and glittering trappings governed
military and political displays almost exclusively. Tilting, or
its musket-bearing development, "ka'b al-barud" were the standard
expressions of festivity and welcome (236). An anonymous companion
of governor Kirke of Tangier, who had witnessed "Moorish"
celebrations could assert that:

"...their chief breed of Horses...for shape and speed
are certainly the most Noble and Rarest Kind in the
World. Their Horses Habits and Furniture, on Festival
Dales, make up a Figure of extraordinary State and shew
their emulating one another...and though they are plain
and poor in everything else, yet the Trappings of their
Bridles and Saddles are rich and fine to an incredible
degree." (237)

It will be seen that Isma-ţi's cavalry was perhaps more effective
as an expression of conspicuous display around Meknes, than as
the spearhead of a war-machine, poised to combat an alien army.

**************************************************************************
(233) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 72-3 cf. Windus p. 175
       cf. "Turijman" p. 15 of the text and 28 of the translation
(234) Windus p. 143
(235) Moute: "Histoire..." p. 159
(236) For examples, see the "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" p. 317, cf.
       S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan
       June 1693 pp. 78-9 cf. Windus pp. 8-9 and 152-155
       cf. Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 67-8
(237) "The Last Account from Fez..." p. 2
CHAPTER III: ISMA'IL'S YEARS OF INCREASING ASCENDANCY

Foreshortening within the indigenous tradition has granted to Isma'il, for the first half of his reign, a standard image: that of the tireless and aggressive warrior who, for twenty-four seasons, never passed an entire year in his palace (1). This is iconography. After 1677, when he was relatively sure of his military supremacy within the Atlas arc, Isma'il frequently proved that, as a war-leader, he could be cautious, procrastinatory and fickle. Only gradually did he accommodate himself to the burdens of territorial expansion beyond the Atlas arc. It is true that the period 1678-90 can superficially be seen in terms of successful aggression. These years saw the full extension of Isma'il's purely dynastic suzerainty within the Maghrib al-Aqsa. They also saw peripheral victories in the jihad. But these victories form part of an overall paradox to Isma'il's reign. They came to the sultan when his military policies were not at their most heavy-handed.

Over the years 1678-80, retreat enabled Isma'il and his household to survive a major trial by natural disaster. During the early months of 1678, a serious outbreak of plague swept inland from Tetuan (2). It did not subside for over two years. "Al-Fasi chronicle" noted the ferocious measures undertaken in the spring of 1678 for the protection of the sultan and his entourage. Abid troops were set at river-fords

(1) Thus, al-Zayyani noted, with reference to the year 1104/1692-3:
"fa-innahu anama fī tamhīd al-maghrib wa hurūb al-thawārī wa 'l-khawārī; cēš dawlat arba' wa ishrāyin sana. lam yuqum biha fī darīhi sana wahida"
(Thus he spent twenty-four years of his reign in setting the Maghrib to order, and in wars against rebels and dissidents. During that time there was not a single year in which he remained in his own house.)
("Turjuman" ed. Houdas p. 25 of the text cf. 46 of the translation)

with orders to slaughter travellers attempting to reach Meknes or Fes from plague-stricken northern towns. But the miasma reached Fes, and the city's extramural "Suq al-Khamis" was fired, in an attempt at hygiene (3).

The crisis forced Isma'il into the conduct of an extensive haraka. For the first time, as sultan, he would cross the Atlas. This move had some of the trappings of venture and aggression. But it was fundamentally governed by the sultan's interest in self-preservation. In the May of 1678, Isma'il completed what muster he dared. This included a summons to the Fasi militia, the last men allowed to travel between Fes and Meknes before communications between the cities were ruptured (4). Muhriz, the sultan's eldest son was left in Fes as vice-roy (5). But the mass of the imperial household and army was lumbered clear away from Sala, on to the plateau of the upper Moulaya (6). The subsequent track of this monstrous caravan, during a twenty month long expedition was, for the most part, an extensive promenade of Isma'il's eastern and southern territorial perimeters.

The journey involved the sultan in incidental forays, in certain of which he was involved personally. But these forays were atypical. Mouette, in his "Histoire..." gives an extensive account of this haraka, as experienced by a party of European captives who, as orderlies, formed part of its company (7). His narrative makes it clear that much of the expedition was militarily flaccid. Its first expression of aggression was a feeble...
summer tax-raid upon Moulouya peoples, ending in negotiation. A subsequent move into Tafilalet, Isma'il's only known visit, as sultan, to the dynastic homeland, was essentially a royal progress among the minor shura. That clique of Alawi kinsmen, including the recently pardoned al-Harran, which was opposed to Isma'il's authority, avoided confrontation with the haraka in Tafilalet, by slipping into "Chergi" country far to the north, and awaiting the sultan's departure.

It was at this stage that Isma'il took the major risk of the expedition. After summoning reinforcements from Fes, where the plague was still rampant (8), he took his army westward into the difficult country of the Ayt Atta Beraber, which centred upon the "Jabal Saghrur", or north-eastern spur of the Anti-Atlas. The mountain Ayt Atta were able so to maul the infantry of the imperial military column (9) that Isma'il's demands of them had to be reduced to the bare essentials of peace with honour: formal submission, the promise of an open road for travellers through Ayt Atta country, bound for Marrakesh, and, as a peculiarly chimerical token of suzerainty, an acknowledgement of the sultan's right to demand of these hill-folk jihad-service at need (10).

It is possible that Isma'il was demoralised by his effective defeat at Ayt Atta hands. He shrank from the possibility of further military encounter. Rather than remain in Ayt Atta country, or take his following west or south into regions currently under the suzerainty of Ahmad ibn Muhriz, the sultan took the risk of a midwinter crossing of the High Atlas by way of the snow-fraught "al-Fayja" region. He met with no military challenge here. For although the Glawi sheikh who was local chieftain

---

(10) Mouhite: "Histoire..." loc. cit.
was father-in-law to Ahmed ibn Muhriz, he had been insulted by his son-
in-law's contraction of a further marriage alliance with a rival Susî
chieftain. He accepted Ismaîl's bribe, and let the alien army pass.
However, as a security measure, to prevent provocative looting, the
sultan was forced to execute a number of his own thievish followers.
Dire weather conditions involved the expedition in heavy losses in
manpower, beasts, treasure and equipment (11).

The next seasonal year, from January 1679 to January 1680, was a
period in which the sultan's moves lacked military drama, carry a
certain implication of exhaustion. The plague continued to smoulder within
the cities. So Ismaîl continued his perambulation. He "lived off the
land", levying contributions from the open plains of "Tamesna", the
modern Chaouia, before striking inland into the Tadla, the region where
his Dila'i enemy Ahmad ibn 'Abd Allah still lurked. No major moves were
made against this enemy. The sultan merely supervised the construction
of a bridge and a fort, while a subordinate general conducted minor
forays into the hills (12). The sultan had now been absent from Meknes
for over a year. Possibly he was uneasy as to the surviving strength of
loyalty to himself within Meknes and Fes. For while he was still absent
from these, the cities of Saiûs, he arranged for his authority to be
blazoned there, in the grim melodrama of a showpiece execution. 'Abd
al-Rahman al-Manzârî, the sultan's wazîr, who may once have been governor
of Fas al-Jadîd (13), and who had more recently been a companion of the

(11) Mouâttê: "Histoire..." pp. 121-2 and 161-2 of "Turjuman" pp. 18-19
of the text and 33-4 of the translation of "Bustan al-Zarîf..." MS
p. 43

(12) Mouâttê: "Histoire..." p. 124

(13) This is to accept al-Wasîrî's MS reading of the wazîr's name, and the
consequent identification, and to reject the reading "Emltrari" given
by Houdas ("Kitâb al-Istiga..." Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 48 and
51; "Turjuman" ed./tr. Houdas p. 19 of the text and 34 of the
translation.)
long haraka, was executed upon a trumped-up charge of personal morality. His remains were despatched to be dragged through Fes and then through Meknes (14). Clearly this calculated piece of frightfulness was an example of Isma'il's technique of "government by pageant".

Chance then favoured the sultan. Ahmad ibn 'Abd Allah al-Dilâ'î was taken by the plague. His death seems to have enabled Isma'il confidently to return to Meknes, with an advance guard of his cabīd only. This return, in the January of 1680 (15), can hardly be deemed the triumph (16) that al-Wasiri wished to imply. But it was the return of an accepted ruler. It was the festival season: "la Pasque de Leide Cubir", and "tous les grands du royaume...vinrent faire leurs compliments avec de présens" (17). The sultan was now free to widen his military horizons.

During the period 1680-90, and indeed down to 1701, Isma'il had three major spheres of military concern: the "Cherg", the Sus and the jihād. The significance of both "Cherg" and Sus is relatively easy to gauge. Both were regions which were prosperous in themselves and they were crossed respectively by the major pilgrimage route, and what was probably the major gold-route of the Maghrib al-Aqsa. Between the two there was an obvious geographical polarity which would eventually involve the sultan in two-way military tension. But, for a decade, Isma'il's cautious approach to military entanglement allowed the two regions to alternate as spheres of military priority.

---

(15) Mouffe: "Histoire..." p. 125
(16) "wa wasala al-sultan ila miknasa. fa-ihtalla bi-dar mulkihi. wa inta'ada arka izzihi" ("And the sultan reached Meknes, took possession of his royal palace and sat upon his glorious throne") ("Kitāb al-İstigna...", Casablanca text, Vol. VII p. 61)
By comparison with the demands of "Cherg" and Sus, the jihad, a coastal struggle, may be seen as merely ancillary to imperial policy. It was never the object of personal campaigning on the part of the sultan. Isma's was essentially an inland empire, to which the coast was literally of marginal significance. Isma's great officers were typically haraka generals. There existed no Moroccan parallel to the Algerine ta'ifa of the ru'sa or privateer captains. And, on Isma's behalf, the mujahid Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammami would make the boast:

"...My master, whom God preserve, has no need of the sea, or of maritime affairs to make him great and prosperous... for less than would suffice for the building and entertaining of one ship, he can maintain a thousand horsemen, that are more worth than a thousand ships." (18)

When faced with the nascent "gunboat" policy of European powers, bent on putting an end to the depredations of Moroccan corsairs, Isma, although he had a private and, as will be seen later (19) increasing interest in the little Saletin corsair fleet, was loth to spare troops to defend his own ports against alien reprisal. Watch and ward along the coast was habitually assigned to local men, or to troops of low quality. A landward bias also kept Isma's practical involvement in warfare with the Europeans of the enclaves at a low level. Here the jihad was essentially petty, localised warfare. From 1680 onwards, it was to be carried out in the sultan's name, and with at least the token assistance of imperial troops. But fundamentally it was the concern of regional qawwal commanding peoples of the Habs and Western

(18) Translation of a letter from the "Alcaid Hamet" to "The captain of Tangier, Kirke the English", included in S. Pepys: Miscellanea Vol. II p. 381 and quoted in Routh: "Tangier..." p. 234 (Footnote)

(19) See Chapter V Pp. 227-8
Rif whose territories adjoined the coastal outposts of the aliens.

But the *jihad* was nevertheless an instrument of imperial policy. It will be seen that the victories of the *mujahidun* were systematically publicised by the sultan, in an attempt to enhance the glamour and legitimacy of his rule. To public opinion within the *Maghrib al-Aqsa*, Christendom was the ideal enemy. It has been noted that, in one of its rare touches upon foreign affairs, the "al-Fasi chronicle" which emanated from the literary intelligentsia, recorded the victories of the Ottoman Balkan campaign of 1683 (20). And there were wider expressions of martial religious fervour. Northern townsfolk, apparently unconcerned that in celebrating a seasonal midsummer festival they were carrying out a practice belonging essentially to the *jahiliya* rather than to Islam, would on "St. John's Day" organise processions and mock-battles in celebration of the holy war:

"...at which time the gravest People will be passing through the streets with wooden Horses, Swords, Launces and Drums, with which they equip the Children that can scarce go, and meet in Troops in the Street, and engaging, say 'Thus we destroy the Christians!'" (21)

It was against such an ideological backdrop that Ismail was working when he aligned military manoeuvres of his own in accordance with the progress of the coastal war with the Christians.

The sultan Ismail's formal intervention in the *jihad* dates from the spring of 1680, and should be set into the context of widespread natural disaster. The plague was in its final spasms, and throughout

(20) See Prologue Pp. 18-19

(21) Windus p. 46 Leo simply recorded that on "St. John's Day" it was customary for the Fasi to light straw bonfires throughout their city (ed. *Ramusio* f. 38). The more developed notes of Windus imply the grafting of latter-day ideological content on to an ancient festival, after the fashion in which Guy Fawkes Day developed.
the Maghrib al-Aqsa, the spring rains failed catastrophically (22). Set into both the "Nashr al-Mathani..." (23) and Mouette's "Histoire..." are detailed accounts of elaborate religious ceremonies involving prayers for rain. The final processions within Meknes were led by Isma'il himself, as imam of the people (24). The cloudless skies would seem to have demanded acts of public expiation. When the sultan, in March (25), issued a command to Oumar ibn Haddou al-Hammad that he should lay siege to Tangier, he may well have been making a gesture of flamboyant piety, parallel, on the grand scale, to his orders for the destruction of the little Catholic shrines within the Miknas building site (26).

The siege marked the intensification of the jihad rather than its move into an entirely novel phase. Oumar ibn Haddu, the lieutenant of Isma'il's who had slipped into Ghaylan's old sphere of influence, had been skirmishing intermittently with the Tangier troops ever since 1677 (27). And the sultan's hard military commitment to this siege was of the lean cut that became standard in such affairs. Isma'il despatched to the mujahid commander's aid "quelques troupes de...Noirs" from his own guard. They were to accompany the locally raised army which the ga'id

(22) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 9 and 135
(23) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 335-6
(24) Mouette recorded that "une sécheresse générale...avait gâté tous les grains et les fruits" and noted that, after several processions, Isma'il "le 17 mars,...se revêtit d'un vieil habit tout crasseux et d'un mechant turban sur la teste, et, les pieds nus, il sortit du palais, accompagné de tous ceux de sa Cour, aussi pieds et testes nues, et de tout le peuple de la ville en pareil estat. En cet equipage, il visita toutes les mosquées des saints de sa loy..." ("Histoire..." p. 126)
mustered at his own provincial capital Alcazquivir (28). The deployment of a few cabid outside Tangier is unlikely markedly to have weakened the military forces at Isma'il's own disposal. The sultan himself never visited the siege.

The mass of Isma'il's forces were, for this campaigning summer, destined for the "Cherg". The preliminaries to this, the sultan's first major eastward move, suggest that he wished to preface the campaign by establishing an understanding with the city of Fes. Late in April, Isma'il summoned to Meknes the aged 'Abd al-Qadir al-Fasî, shaykh of the zawiyat al-Fasî. He came personally to receive the shaykh at the most notable sanctuary in Meknes, lodged him in one of the new-built wings of the palace and, in his honour, proclaimed a general amnesty for prisoners. It is possible that the sultan was also financially generous to his guest. Immediately upon his return to Fes, the shaykh began extensions to the buildings of his zawiya (29).

This visit may signify more than the public establishment of amity with a notable civic sage. It is possible that the sultan was toying with the idea of a bid for Tlemcen, and that he wished the shaykh to activate in his favour the unofficial diplomatic links by which Tlemcen was connected with Fes. Fes and Tlemcen were sister cities, linked by the transverse eastward route of the northern pilgrimage. Under political or economic pressure, merchants of either city might shift their business to the other. During the seventeenth century there seems to have been a marked westward shift by Tilimsanî who were opposed

(28) Moustte: "Histoire..." p. 128
to government from Algiers (30). Of those citizens who remained, there may have been a number who, during the first decade of Isma'il's reign, seriously considered exchanging Algerine for Alawi rule. The religious expression of such political views would have been association with the dominant Shadhiliya tariqa, to which all the important fraternities of the contemporary Maghrib al-Aqsa, including the Jazuli "way" of the al-Fasi, were also affiliated (31). The minority sympathy with Algiers was expressed, in Tlemsen, by association with the Qadiriya clan of the Aulad Sayyidi Shaykh (32). During a Tilimsani uprising against the Turks, in the autumn of 1674, the city's Shadhiliya zawiyah of Sayyid Abu Madyan had been destroyed (33). In 1680, Moukette alleged that Tilimsani "Moors" were continuing to request Isma'il's aid against Algerine forces, as they had been doing for some time (34).

Fasi citizens of 1680 would have had an interest in the sultan's acquisition of Tlemsen. Its capture would have removed the fiscal barriers to trade (35) between the two cities. And it is possible that, in an hungry year for Fes, this would have facilitated a westward flow of grain from the agricultural whorl to which the smaller city of Tlemsen was hub. According to "al-Fasi chronicle", the Fasi granaries

(30) D. Dapper: "Africa..." ed./tr. Ogilby p. 208. The origin of this piece of secondary source material is unknown. But the existence of a Tilimsani community in Fes earlier in the seventeenth century is vouched for by al-Ifrani, who noted mob attacks upon this community during 1610 riots ("Nuzhat al-Hadj..." ed./tr. Houdae p. 234 of the text and 388 of the translation)

(31) For a summary of Qur'i religious affiliations in the Maghrib al-Aqsa, see E. Michaux-Bellaire "Les Confréries Religieuses au Maroc" in A.M. Vol XXVII (Paris, 1927) pp. 1-86 and in particular pp. 72-82

(32) A. Cour: "L'établissement des dynasties des chérifs au Maroc, et leur rivalité avec les Turcs de la Régence d'Alger 1509-1830" (Paris, 1904) p. 247

(33) "Mashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 244

(34) Moukette: "Histoire..." p. 134

(35) The existence of such barriers is implied within "Ockley"'s allegation that, within Morocco, traders from the Ottoman Empire paid lower taxes than did other alien merchants (p. 40).
had been exhausted since the time when the jihad had been declared; there seems to have been heavy associated inflation in the city (36). But it will be seen that Fasi hopes were dashed by the actual course of the "Chergi" campaign. The expedition demonstrated that Isma"II was no military champion of purely Fasi interests, and that fundamentally the concerns of city and sultan were divergent.

Before his departure eastward, Isma"II received a fillip to his prestige at second hand: the capture of two outlying bastions to the Tangier defences, Fort Charles and Fort Henrietta. A truce with the English followed (37). The victory was blazoned forth, and the victor received in triumph at the palace gates (38). This mujahid victory was the only remarkable achievement by Isma"II's forces during the year 1680. It will be noted that al-Zayyan endowed Isma"II's first easterly expedition with considerable military and political moment (39). But, as recounted by Mou"otte (40), the sultan's heraka of 1680 emerges as an expedition quite as dilatory and self-preservatory as the long heraka of the previous two years. Isma"II's priority seems to have been the feeding of his army during a famine-summer, and, once again, its preservation from plague. In late June, the sultan's column moved eastwards, away from the capital's pestilence. It moved into the territory of groupings from the Angad plain, who are alleged two years previously to have rallied

(36) Naibr al-Mathani... ed./tr. Mieaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 335 and 358
(38) The sultan: "...envoya publier par toutes les rues de Miquenez, qu'Amar Hadou son esclave avait remporté une signalée victoire sur les Anglois, en ayant tué un grand nombre, fait quantité de captifs, et pris dix-huit pièces d'artillerie...et lorsqu'Amar arriva avec ses dépouilles, le Roy l'alla recevoir comme triomphant hors des portes de son château." (Mou"otte: "Histoire..." p. 131)
(39) See Epilogue Part II pp. 328-9
(40) Mou"otte: "Histoire..." pp. 131-2 and 133-4
to his dissident Filal kinsmen, refugees within their country during
the sultan's temporary occupation of Tafilet (41). Local murabiti
persuaded the sultan to accept a mediated settlement. But only at the
end of the presumably harvest-stripping summer did Isma'il stir his
following into a move upon Tlemcen. By this time, the Turkish garrison
of its citadel had been efectively re-inforced, in expectation of his
attack. The sultan was presented with a letter from Algiers, threatening
positive military action if he did not confine himself to accepted
frontiers. After petty wrangling, he received news that Meknes was
plague-free and withdrew.

A startling note within "al-Fas chronicle" implies that, within
Fes, the haraka had been expected to move more decisively in the eastern
march. For late August, there is recorded the news that the sultan had
been defeated outside Tlemcen and that, in consequence, the already
inflated price of grain had taken an additionally vicious upward flight
(42). The news of defeat is dismissable as rumour. But it may still be
inferred that Isma'il's military moves had failed to match Fes's economic
hopes. The expedition seems also to have fallen below Isma'il's
expectations. He may have hoped that the expectant Tilimani populace
would rise on his behalf. And his mood upon his return to Sala may be
judged from the plaintive note within "al-Fas chronicle" that, upon his
passing through Fes al-Jadid, after having reached the gates of Tlemcen,
the sultan refused to spend even a single night in the proximity of Fes
itself, but went on straight to Meknes (43).

(41) Mouitte: "Histoire..." p. 116
(42) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Micheaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 338
(43) "Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above. loc. cit.
The return is here dated to 3/Shaban/1091 = 29/8/1680. Mouitte's
narrative ("Histoire..." p. 134) implies a September date that
overcrowds his later tale-telling.
Within weeks of his inglorious return to Saïs, Ismaïl nipped a political development in the bud by demoting the titular vice-roy of Fes: the ill-beloved eldest son Muhriz, whom two years previously he had left in token authority over the plague-ridden metropolis. Fasi notables journeyed to Meknes in support of the claims of Muhriz (44). It seems probable that these Fasi notables had made of the young prince a civic protegé. It is consequently likely to have been for his father's political security, rather than for the licentiousness adduced by Mouette (45), that the young prince was dismissed to Tafilelt, along with the sons of al-Rashîd (46).

The successor of Muhriz within Fes was his half-brother Muhammad. Muhammad was still a child, too young for his beguiling by the Fasi yet to be of great significance to his father. Twelve was the most advanced estimate of his age given by any member of Kirke's Tangier mission, which met with the young prince during his first year of office (47). However, unlike Muhriz, who was henceforward to be a minor political figure, Muhammad was to be significant dynastically for the next quarter of a century. His singling out at a young age for titular eminence, and his later retention of that eminence can most plausibly be accounted for by the suggestion that personal charm graced both the boy and his mother. All that is known of the mother is that she was European. Her nationality was variously attributed by European commentators and is irrelevant. As a "Renegado Christian" (48) she was, in the terms of local society, effectively of slave origin and without kin. Her union with Ismaïl could thus have brought him no political advantage whatsoever. Yet, along with

(44) "Nashr al-Mathâni..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 338
(45) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 134
(46) "Nashr al-Mathâni..." Volume cited above, loc. cit.
(47) "The last account from Fes..." p. 3
(48) ibid., loc. cit.
her son, she was set up in al-Rashīd’s former palace in Fās al-Jadīd, with her own court: the move was a combination of estrangement and promotion.

The removal to Fās of an European "queen" may have co-incided with an increase in the Miknāsī palace status of another of Isma‘īl’s womenfolk, Ğayisha Mubārka the "Black Queen" (49). Unlike the alien mother of Muḥammad, Ğayisha was a woman about whose person followers of her husband would congregate, in the role of real or notional kinfolk. As will be seen, Ğayisha came eventually to symbolise the relationship of the cavalry corps of Udaya to Isma‘īl (50). In 1680, the corps of Udaya is known to have been developing. During that year, a fort known to MouĪtte as "Ludīya" was constructed next to the new Miknāsī palace, as a citadel for its defence (51). It has been noted that the Udaya are likely to have originated in 1677, with the sultan’s scooping into his train of a rabble of Hawż and Murrākushī men (52). Tradition suggests that the Udaya force expanded in stages, and that the second wave of its recruits came from beyond the Atlas (53). For the year of dearth 1680, there may have been an influx of potential Udaya recruits, migrants from "the Province where old Muley was born" (54) and from similar oasisan regions, brought across the Atlas by drought.

Drought may also have provided the impulse to the extension of Isma‘īl’s suzerainty across the Atlas, as far to the south-east as Tuat.

(49) "La Reyna Negra" : Del Puerto Bk. V. Ch. 43 p. 616
(50) See Chapter IV Pp. 170–174
(52) See Chapter II Pp. 103 and 105
(53) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 29
(54) Thus Braithwaite described the place of origin claimed by the "Lydyres" of his own day p. 24
As noted previously, al-Rashīd had maintained a representative in Tuat for a period at the end of his reign (55). But it seems improbable that there was any direct continuation of a link between Sāsī and Tuat during Ismā'īl's early years. Until 1677, Ismā'īl was engrossed in his duel with Ahmad ibn Muhriz for mastery within the Atlas arc. During this period, the politics of the south-eastern oases are likely to have been conducted in effective isolation from those of the interior Maghrib al-Aqṣā. In 1677, Ismā'īl sent out to Tafīlīt a qa'id of his own, Hamdūn (56). However, the sultan seems to have wielded little Filālī authority over the next few years, except during his short period of personal intrusion into Tafīlīt in 1678. Ismā'īl's half-brother al-Harrān is likely to have been seen as primus inter pares among the leading Filālī shurāfā. However, at a point probably to be dated to the autumn of 1680, the sultan was able to command his qa'id Hamdūn to lead a Filālī hāraka out as far as Tuat. Other commanders, including al-Harrān, seem to have accompanied the qa'id on this expedition (57). This Filālī coalition may well have been a "spin-off" from economic disarray. Tafīlīt, dependent upon the lower Ziz and Rheris for the irrigation of its palm-groves, is likely to have been affected by the 1680 drought. But Tuat, which draws its water from subterranean reservoirs ("foggara") (58), may well have been spared disaster. The expedition seems to have taken revenue in kind, as well as

(55) See Chapter II p. 90

(56) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." pp. 106 and 116

(57) The chronology is that of Mouëtte ("Histoire..." p. 135). But the expedition he noted seems identifiable with that dated to 1678, and set into the Tawātī record of one "al-Tamentiti" (quoted Martin p. 64). This expedition was said to have been led by three of Ismā'īl's qa'id, one of the Hamdūn, the other "al-Mahdī" and "Allī, all accompanied by al-Harrān. It seems necessary to subordinate this chronology to that of Mouëtte, who noted that in 1678, al-Harrān, then at odds with Ismā'īl, had retired to the Angad region. ("Histoire..." p. 116)

in "Rashidlya" currency (59). It may be seen as the instrument with which Saïs and Tafilt reached out to Tuat together, to compensate for the failure of the September date harvest in oasis regions nearer to the Atlas. In broader terms, it marked a new period in the economic subjection of Tuat to a sultan in Saïs. Three further Tawlit expeditions would be mounted from Saïs during the early 1680s (60).

The extension of Isma'ill's authority over Tuat is remarkable in terms of distance. The Sus, Dar'a and "Qibla", which included regions far nearer to Meknes than was Tuat, had as yet been left to the suzerainty of Ahmad ibn Muhriz. The disproportion is evidence of the comparative ease with which an intermittent authority based upon the haraka could be extended along a geographically open route. It may also be evidence of Isma'ill's continuing reluctance to engage with his nephew in the rough country that hedged "inner Sus".

There was to be no urgency to Isma'ill's movements against Ahmad ibn Muhriz, for as long as the nephew's interests remained limited to "Chleuh" country and to its southern fringe. It is true that an army supposedly pitched against Ahmad ibn Muhriz was mustered in Saïs during the spring of 1681 (61). But in Mouëtte's opinion this army was destined only for Marrakesh (62). The campaign which Isma'ill envisaged may have been essentially defensive: a counter demonstration of force in the face of a nephew whose military reputation was soaring. During the previous year, Ahmad ibn Muhriz had been occupied in a "Qiblan" war, of which reports had come back to Meknes, along with a gift of twelve eunuchs, which the nephew presented to Isma'ill (63). The reports included the tale of a mighty victory,

(59) "al-Tamentiti" quoted Martin p. 64
(60) "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 65
(62) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 145
(63) ibid. pp. 135-7
won by Ahmad ibn Muhriz at Taghaza, over a Sudanic prince, son to a fabulously wealthy king. This tale may well have been simple rumour, a by-product of the exotic gift, and one further northerly echo of the Sudanic expeditions of the reign of Ahmad al-Manṣūr. The character of the tale is to be judged by its details on the bravura of Ahmad ibn Muhriz in storming the walls of Taghaza. Taghaza was a bleak salt-mine, which by this date is likely to have been in its last stages of habitation, if not deserted (64). Even in its heyday, it had been simply an huddle of huts and caverns (65). The Saharan battle reports need evince nothing more than the pre-occupation of Ahmad ibn Muhriz, in a drought year, with the protection of his southern frontier from the greenward migration of desert peoples. The gift to Isma'il may even be seen as a wheedling indication that the nephew, currently under pressure, desired to maintain the established territorial delimitation. Nevertheless, both "al-Fāsī chronicle" (66) and the drama of Mouatte's narrative make it clear that, by 1681, an highly enhanced opinion of the military prowess of Ahmad ibn Muhriz had become widespread within Sāfs. This added menace to a northward diversion of the prince’s interests. He moved into his father-in-law’s High Atlas territory of the Banū Zaynāb, adjoining the "al-Fayja" region (67). From here he was well-poised to make a bid for Marrakesh.

But in 1681, Isma'il’s threat of a southerly counter-move was not to be carried out. The affairs of the Jihad intervened. In early April, peace was made with the English of Tangier (68). In the aftermath, the mujāhidūn, under the leader of ‘Umar ibn Haddu, were diverted towards Mamora, the

(64) R. Mauny: "Tableau Géographique de l'Ouest Africain au Moyen Age..." (Dakar, 1961) p. 116
(67) "Turjumān" p. 19 of the text and 35 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 34
least defensible of the Spanish enclaves. Within four days, Mamora, whose water-supplies had been cut, was ready to capitulate (69). The capitulation was carefully staged as a theatrical set-piece for the enhancement of the sultan's glory. The Spanish authorities within Mamora were willing tamely to accept terms which involved the surrender of the town's heavy field-pieces, and the enslavement of its garrison, barring the six officers and a chaplain (70). Ratification of these terms was deliberately delayed until the sultan, summoned post-haste, could arrive at Mamora in person, to receive the ceremonial submission of its captain general (71). Subsequently, provincial governors throughout Isma'il's domains were commanded each to organise a week's celebrations (72). The show did not betray the regional interest which lay at the centre of mujahid political gravity. Isma'il took the guns and the captives, but 'Umar ibn Haddu was kept complaisant. He and his following were granted the town's booty. They built two new settlements on the outskirts of the former Spanish fort (73).

It is possible that this capture of Mamora, a second port to Sale (74), endowed Isma'il with sufficient glory to outweigh, within the Atlas arc, the risen prestige of Ahmad ibn Muhriz. The whole campaigning season lay ahead, and the incidents surrounding Mamora's capitulation had not been of a weight sufficient to induce military exhaustion. But the projected


(70) Mouette: "Histoire..." pp. 147-8


(72) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 148


(74) S.I. 2ª France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J.-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 705
southward move against Ahmad ibn Muhriz was abandoned. The indefatigable reporter Germain Mouëtte, who was ransomed in the May of 1681, could view the land he so gratefully left as a divided empire, whose towering unifier al-Rashid had been succeeded by two rival princes (75).

It seems likely that Ahmad ibn Muhriz only drew down upon himself attack from Isma'il in the north, by his own renewed intervention in the "Cherg". Both indigenous and European sources record the rumour that, before the opening of the campaigning season of 1682, the southern prince made diplomatic contact with Baba Hassan, Dey of Algiers, with a view to a dual-pronged attack upon Isma'il (76). It also seems possible that, with the understanding of the Dey, Ahmad ibn Muhriz entered into dealings with frontier groupings from the politically sensitive eastern march. St. Amans, waiting in Algerine waters on the eve of his embassy to Morocco, recorded the rumour that "un chef d'Arabes" had organised "quelques levees" in the name of the "roy de Sus", nephew to the Moroccan sultan (77); the context implies a border location for this activity.

However, events of 1682 ruptured any possibility of collusion between Algiers and the ruler of the Sus, Baba Hassan indeed brought an army westwards (78). He was able to punish Tlemcen in a sack that was well-remembered in the day's of Shaw's eighteenth century travels (79).

(75) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 60
(77) S.I. 2° France Vol. II No. XXI p. 254 St. Amans to Seignelay, 11/9/1682. St. Amans' informant was Père Jean le Vacher, who straddled the roles of vicar apostolic and French consul in Algiers.
(79) Shaw: "Travels and Observations..." p. 49 cf. S.I. 2° France Vol. III p. 75 Memo. of consul Piolle in Algiers, dated 17/5/1687, and recalling, in the context of a renewed threat from Isma'il against "Tlemessen", the "pillage que Babassan avoit fait en cette ville".
By mid-June, there was an uncouth envoy of Isma'Il's in Constantinople (80), presumably despatched to protest against border incursions by the Algerine troops, incursions which al-Zayyānī's tradition inflated into an invasion of Snassen country and the capture of Dar ibn Mash'al (81). However, by this time, Algerine border aggression was evaporating under external pressure. Cherchell lay under the threat of bombardment by a French fleet under Duquesne, and Baba Ḥasan was forced to retreat to its defence. He made peace with Isma'Il, who had brought an army into the "Cherg" against him. As part of this agreement, the Dey is alleged himself to have put down the rising of frontier peoples who favoured his Sūsī ally (82). Isma'Il himself was currently at peace with major European naval powers. The early months of the year had seen Moroccan ambassadors in both Paris and London. But there was a convenient religious veto against conflict with fellow Muslims under pressure from the infidel (83). This freed the sultan from "Chergi" involvement, and offered him the opportunity to turn southward in pursuit of Ahmad ibn Muhīriz.

Isma'Il's entry into "inner Sus" was an unprecedentedly bold venture. It marked a serious and complex expansion of the sultan's military horizons. Unlike the relatively open "Cherg", the Sus was protected by terrain from being the object of relatively brief summer campaigning. Prior to this first Sūsī expedition, Isma'Il's army was seen, in the June of 1682, massing

---

(80) S.I. 2° France Vol. II No. XII p. 229 Guilleragues to Louis XIV, Pera, 13/6/1682

(81) "al-turk la'u bi-mehallatihim wa istawāl alā ba'nī yiznāsin wa alā dar ibn mash'al"

("...the Turks came with an armed force and took possession of Snassen (country) and of Dar ibn Mash'al") "Turjuman" p. 19 of the translation cf. 36 of the translation.


(83) It could be alleged that Isma'Il would have pursued the Algerine army in 1682, "si les docteurs de se loy ne l'eussent empesché, luy ayant representé que c estoit contre leur religion de poursuivre leurs frères tandis qu'ils estoient attaqués par des Christiens" (S.I. 2° France Vol. II No. XX p. 252 Prat to Seignelay, Marseille 15/8/1682)
outside Sale (84). It was not to return to Sāfs until the November of 1683 (85). For Ismāʿīl the expedition was unfortunate. Paucity of eye-witness evidence makes it impossible to detail Sūsī opposition to the sultan of the "Gharb". But the course of Sūsī events suggests that around the figure of Ahmad ibn Muhriz there had coalesced both the civic force of Tarudant, and the rural resistance of "Chleuh" countryfolk, and that Ismāʿīl had therefore to wade across a recalcitrant province. When the French embassy of St. Amans reached Ismāʿīl's mahalla in the December of 1682, it was still stationed in High Atlas mountain country, considerably to the north of Tarudant (86). The city of Tarudant itself was only invested during the following spring, when Ahmad ibn Muhriz retreated thither (87). At this point, Sūsī opposition to Ismāʿīl reached a violence discernable even as filtered through the medium of "al-Fasī chronicle". 1683 saw three successive and bloody encounters in the region of Tarudant. In all of these, Ismāʿīl would seem to have been worsted (88). His situation may have been complicated by commissariat problems: this was yet another year of dearth (89). In the late summer of 1683, Ismāʿīl accepted a renewal of peace with his nephew (90), and retreated to Sāfs, leaving Ahmad ibn Muhriz peaceably to re-inforce his

(84) S.I. 2e France Vol. II No. XIV p. 234 St. Amans to Seignelay, Toulon, 2/7/1682. Information from Sale, by way of the "echevins" of Marseille.
(85) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Micheaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 357
(86) "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" pp. 328-9
(87) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above, p. 356
(88) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ibid. loc. cit. cf. "Turjumān" pp. 19-20 of the text and 37 of the translation
(89) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." Volume cited above, p. 357

"Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 35
own authority within the Sus. In the September of 1683, the nephew, in a genial mood, was re-establishing mastery over the Susāl port of Agadir (91). The uncle's mood was such that, on his return to Sāsī in November, he refused to receive a courtesy visit from the Fāsī ādāmān (92).

The sultan may have been well aware that these ādāmān had made good use of his absence. The unlucky dry spring of 1683 had caused considerable social disturbance within their metropolis. Hungry members of the Fāsī populace had forcibly to be made to return to the city, after fleeing their responsibilities (93). Civic dignitaries seem to have extracted what advantage they could from this social miasma. The adolescent vice-roy Muhammad was set up in public, to distribute free food to the starving. The distribution was made, not from the palace, but from the ḍawiyat al-Fāsī (94). The location of this hieratic action suggests that, during the period of his father's southern absence, the young prince, like his half-brother and predecessor Muhriz before him, had been drawn into a degree of identification with the magnates of Fās al-Balī. The advantage of such an identification would have been mutual. In this context, "al-Fāsī chronicle" gave to the young vice-roy the sobriquet of "the scholar" ("al-ālīm"). This implies that Muhammad, the prince without maternal kin, had already become identified with a "pressure group" who might act for him in lieu of such kinfolk: the 'ulama'. Henceforward, this growing son of Ismā'īl's would always be Muhammad al-ālīm, the schoolmen's prince. And, for as long as his father allowed him to remain within the city of Fes, he may be thought of as an inheritor of the

---

(91) S.I. 2° France Vol. II No. CXCII Extract from the journal of the privateer Jean Doublet pp. 597-9 (Dating corrected in Volume V of the series No. LXXXI p. 529)
(92) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Micaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 357
(93) "Nashr al-Mathani..." Volume cited above. p. 356
(94) "Nashr al-Mathani..." ibid. loc. cit.
tradition of al-Rashīd: an ʿAlawī prince who identified himself with Fāsi interests.

Ismāʿīl's warrior credit cannot have been high during the early months of 1684. But the sultan's prestige was about to receive a gratuity. Since the summer of 1683, the evacuation of Tangier by its English garrison had been a prospective certainty (95). There were blatant preparations for departure, including the destruction of the port's fortifications and famous mole. Meanwhile, the enclave was kept under token and amicable siege, at the command of the qaʿīd of Tetuan, ʿAbd Allah al-Hammāmī (96), whose following came from the Western Rif. Samuel Pepys, a witness to one stage of the evacuation procedures, was able to meet this "Alcade", exchange pleasantries with a "Moorish" sentry, and watch the mujāhidūn idly pacing their own camp "almost like ghosts, all in white" (97). When the evacuation was completed, in February 1684, these mujāhidūn needed only to enter and rebuild the ruined town (98). To this acquisition of the hulk of a small port, a prize was added by chance. The move into Tangier concentrated ʿAbd Allah's followers in the town's general vicinity when, in early April, a flagship of Spain ran aground near to Ceuta. Its abandoned cargo, which was effectively presented to the Muslim infidel, included coined money and a battery estimated at 80 cannon. A contingent from Fes was sent out to aid the local Rifī Ghumāra in the thankless task of dragging the cannon into Meknes (99).

(95) Routh: "Tangier..." pp. 274-251
(99) "Turjuman" loc. cit. cf. S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXIII Nemo of J-B. Estelle dated 19/7/1690 p. 312
Their safe delivery may be assumed to have proved Ālī ibn Ābd Allāh a loyal servant to Isma'īl.

In Meknes, the latter end of 1684 is likely to have been taken up with preparations for Isma'īl's second bid to take the Sus. One sullen captive from the Miknasī palace building site, who was only too relieved at the sultan's departure from his own vicinity, carefully noted the date upon which the great hareka made for the south: January 1st, 1685. He further remarked that, whatever the outcome, "Fight Dog, Fight Bear", it was two or three years before the sultan's return was to be expected (100). In envisaging such an unprecedented period of absence from the lands within the Atlas arc, campaigning in a region where he had already met with severe defeat, Isma'īl had clearly subordinated his characteristic caution to a straightforward desire for the acquisition of his nephew's rich territory.

There was little threat to his own sovereignty within the Atlas arc. But the devolution of power associated with the sultan's absence from the region influenced particular political fortunes. As vice-roy, at the centre of government in Meknes, there was left the adolescent prince Zaydān (101), Isma'īl's eldest son by Ayisha Mubārka, the woman to be associated with the cavalry corps of Udaya (102). This seems to have been Zaydān's first induction to political prominence. As will be seen, his status among Isma'īl's sons would later be paramount. Maintenance of order within the provinces was entrusted to great qawwād. Bias within European source material makes Tetuan the best known of such provincial commands.

(100) T. Phelps: "A true account of the captivity..." pp. 8 and 12. The author's terming January 1st "New Year's Day" indicates that he was using the "New Style" chronology.

(101) It was to Zaydān as vice-roy that Isma'īl, still within the Sus in the November of 1686, addressed a letter giving instructions for the protection of the restored Spanish Franciscan mission in Meknes (Del Puerto, Bk. VI Ch. IV pp. 648-9).

(102) For discussion of the problem of Ayisha Mubārka's relationship to the growing corps of Udaya, see Chapter IV. Pp. 160-174.
It is from this period of Isma'il's second Susi campaign that 'Ali ibn 'Abd Allah can be seen to have held court and government like a petty sultan. His state was publicly demonstrated when, in the September of 1685, he arranged a magnificent wedding in Tangier for one of his sons (103), a ceremony that was possibly ancillary to the son's establishment as governor over the new Muslim town. The qalîd of Tetuan had a responsibility which particularly distinguished him. He conducted diplomatic relations with European powers, acting always in the sultan's name but enjoying a wide scope for discretion (104). The first of this qalîd's known series of letters written to Louis XIV on behalf of his master, dates from the month following Isma'il's second departure for the Sus (105). Within the developing diplomatic status of 'Ali ibn 'Abd Allah there may be discerned the embryo of the "niyaba" of Tangier, the pre-Protectorate government office through which all European correspondence with the sultan was necessarily channelled (106).

During the sultan's three years of absence from Sais, over the period 1685-7, the mechanism of his government continued at least to turn over. Tuat was granted the remission of half its taxation as customarily assessed (107). But no known graces were extended to peoples within the Atlas arc. Obligations in the matter of defence are those for which most evidence survives. During Isma'il's first Susi expedition, the coastal regions had enjoyed peace. But during this second expedition, the Atlantic

(103) S.I. 2° France Vol. II No. CIV Extract from the journal of the French naval officer Brodeau pp. 536-9
(104) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. V. Extract from the journal of Pierre Estelle, at Tangier, for the November of 1686 p. 10
(107) Imperial zahir discovered at Aougrout and reproduced in translation by Martin p. 65
littoral was under persistent threat from the sea. Correspondingly, demands were made upon coastal peoples, and upon the militia of the inland towns. Three months after the sultan’s departure, the citizens of Sale were fined for failing to keep an adequate guard of the coast: a night-raid by English ships had destroyed two Saletin corsair vessels sheltering in Mamora harbour (108). During the following year, 1686, when a French fleet under d’Estrées cruised off Tangier for several weeks of the early summer, a force from the interior, under the nominal command of one of Isma-il’s sons, was brought to the assistance of Alī ibn Aḥmad Allāh. This reinforcement was rumoured largely to be made up of the citizen militia of Fes and Marrakesh (109). These men had been made to pay towards the waging of the campaign. Allegedly they were terrified that they might be ordered to march south, to join companions who were with the sultan himself, under an al-Rūdī commander (110).

The sultan, once reluctant to become involved in the Sus, was now making a determined effort towards its acquisition. The immediate campaign was concentrated around Tarudant, in a siege that took two years. This siege was punctuated by bloody skirmishes, and by a series of attempts to undermine the city walls (111). It was the city with which Isma-il was at war. His dynastic rival-in-chief Aḥmad ibn Mūhriz

(109) "‘...la plus grand partie est composée de marchands et d’autres gens de famille de Fès et de Marrackash” (S.I. 2° France Vol. II No. CXLVIII p. 652 Consul Perillie to Seignelay, Sale, 8/8/1686)
(110) Perillie to Seignelay loc. cit. cf. "Turjuman" p. 21 of the text and 40 of the translation
(111) A near-contemporary supplement to the indigenous tradition on this siege is to be found within the unpromisingly entitled work of a former English slave, Francis Brooks: "Barbarian Cruelty". Brooks knew personally the three survivors among four Englishmen who had bought their freedom by joining the sultan’s corps of “pioneers” outside Tarudant, and remaining there until the successful conclusion of the siege.
was eliminated from the struggle at a relatively early stage (112). He left the city on a private errand, accompanied only by a small guard of his *gabd*, ran across a similarly small party of Ismaili's men, and was shot dead during the ensuing skirmish (113). His death ended more than thirteen years of personal opposition to Ismaili, but was of minimal significance to the siege. As figurehead to Rudani resistance Ahmad ibn Muhriz was smoothly replaced by his uncle al-Harran, who had opted to join nephew rather than brother in the dynastic struggle (114). The succession was in line with the Rudani formality that resistance to an *Alawi sultan from the "Gharb" should, whenever possible, be made in the name of an *Alawi prince. But the ease of this particular succession suggests that any *Alawi prince might be adopted by the city, with equal convenience.

The death of Ahmad ibn Muhriz may have caused more pertinent dismay to Ismaili himself than to his enemies within the city walls. Dynastic tradition is incorrect in asserting that Ahmad ibn Muhriz was killed incognito (115). More contemporary information suggests that the man who killed "Mully Hammet" knew the identity of his victim perfectly well, and innocently expected a reward for having put an end to the sultan's rival. Instead he was dragged at the mule-tail. His body was afterwards exposed at "a place where the Country People used to come into the Camp" (116), as a warning to the army and to local "Chleuh" alike that the persons of members of the dynasty were to be regarded

(112) S.I. 2° France Vol. II No. CV pp. 543-4 Perillie to Seigneley, Sala, 18/11/1685


(115) "Turjuman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustân al-Zarb..." MS p. 35

(116) Brooke pp. 18-20 (Quotation: p. 20)
as inviolable.

In the March of 1687, Isma'il's forces were able to breach the wall of Tarudant and take the city (117). The storming and massacre implied in al-Zayyani's narrative (118) should be taken as literary convention. Isma'il's victory seems to have been relatively leisurely, and preceded by negotiation. The memory of al-Harran's "escape" (119) may conceal his pre-arranged evacuation of Tarudant, analogous with the evacuation of Marrakesh by Ahmad ibn Muhriz before its capture by Isma'il in 1677. As for the fate of the populace:

"Mully Ishmaell entred his men and took both the City and Castle, and promised the people he would be kind to them; but when he took the Town, he secured their Arms, Ammunition and Treasure, and carried the people of that place to Macqueness." (120)

The note on "Treasure" aligns with northern rumours concerning an heavy and systematic spoliation of Tarudant, aimed at the city's social and economic ruin (121). The allegation of mass deportation interlocks with the chronicle record that a new population, the Rif community of Fes, was ordered to migrate to Tarudant, after

(117) S.I. 2ª France Vol. III No. XVII p. 41 Catalan, French consul in Cadiz, to Seignelay, 14/4/1687, quoting information recently received from Pierre Estelle in Tetuan. Al-Zayyani's chronicle material dated the capture of Tarudant to Jumada I 1098, a month crossing the March and April of 1687 ("Turjuman" p. 21 of the text and 40 of the translation)

(118) "fa-dakhalaha` anwatan bi 'l-sawf" ("He entered it (the city) by force at sword-point")
("Turjuman" loc. cit.)

(119) "wa haraba al-harran" ("And al-Harran fled") "Bustan al-Zarif..."
(M. p. 36)
Al-Ifrani's glutinous "Zill al-Warif..." suggests that al-Harran was pardoned by his brother and exiled to the Hijaz ( p. 56)

(120) Brooks pp. 20-21

(121) S.I. 2ª France Vol. III No. XVII p. 41 Catalan to Seignelay, Cadiz, 14/4/1687 cf. No. XCIII Memo. of consul Perillé on Moroccan trade, dating from January 1689 p. 234
Ismā'īl had made the place into a "ghost city" (122).

In terms of al-Ifrānī’s dynastic myopia, the "fath rudāna", or victory over Tarudant, was an event of great moment which marked the accomplishment of Ismā'īl’s "tamhīd" or ordering of his empire. Decorously he shifted its date by seven months, into an alignment with the year’s festival of 'Īd al-‘Adha, or Day of Immolation. And he claimed that the city’s fall entailed willing submission by the peoples of “further Sus” (123). This view is open to wide question.

It will be seen that, in the long term, Ismā'īl’s capture of Tarudant was an hollow victory. It did not lead to the city’s economic ruin. Mushroom-like, Tarudant was within two years noted as functioning, apparently efficiently, as the economic centre for “Moorish” and Jewish merchants of the Sus, and as the clearing-house for debts contracted in the course of Agadir trade (124). Nor did the fath rudāna entail the shrivelling of Susī opposition to government from the “Gharb”. On the contrary it may be seen as having committed Ismā'īl to a protracted military occupation of "further Sus", a region which would come to be regarded as "the thorn in the sultan’s foot" (125).

Admittedly, the fall of Tarudant carried an immediate éclat. As news of the city’s surrender spread, the victor was granted

(122) "wa amara bi-khurūj ahl al-rīf alladhīna bi-fās yītūna li-suknā tarudant havthu lam yubq bihā ahad" (“And he gave orders for the migration of the Rīfī community of Fes, and for their coming to settle in Tarudant. For not a single person remained there.”) ("Turjuman" p. 21 of the text cf. 46 of the translation)

(123) al-Ifrānī: "Zill al-Warīf..." p. 56

(124) S.I. 2<sup>8</sup> France Vol.III No. XCIII Memo. of Perillie dating from January 1689 pp. 234 and 235

(125) "Cette espine que le roy de Marroc a daine le pied luy fait une grande peine." (S.I. 2<sup>8</sup> France Vol. IV No. CIII 3-8. Estelle to Pontchartrain Sale, 23/10/1697 p. 535)
ostentatious expressions of loyalty. In Tetuan, Ālī ibn Ābd Allāh organised "grandes festes" by way of victory celebrations (126). And Muhammad al-Ālīm, the vice-roy of Fes, journeyed all the way to Tarudant with an escort of Fasī ʿulmaʾ, shuraṭaʾ and aʿyan, in order to congratulate his father (127). The deputation may symbolise Fasī hopes for the subsequent exploitation of the Sus.

Meanwhile, in Algiers, there were rumours that conflict with the victorious sharīf was imminent (128). These rumours were apparently fed by the sharīf himself. In the May of 1687, the Dey al-Majj Husayn, commonly known as "Mezzomorto", is said to have received a bombastic communication from Isma-Il. This communication approximated to a declaration of war. Allegedly it harked back to "Chergi" events of five years previously, and amounted to a demand by Isma-Il for the surrender of Tlemcen, together with the value of depredations made by Baba Hassan within that city (129). Rumour rebounded back into the Maghrib al-Aqsa. A consignment of tents, which Isma-Il commissioned from Sale, were believed in that city to be destined for a projected "Chergi" campaign (130).

However, even by the time Isma-Il's letter was said to have arrived in Algiers, a chill had fallen upon the euphoria of the Rudānī victory. The sultan had already discovered that the subjection of Tarudant was not the subjection of the Sus. He was not militarily

---

(126) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. XVII Catalan to Seignelay, dated Cadiz, 14/4/1687, and containing information from Pierre Estelle in Tetuan, p. 41

(127) "Tur jumān" p. 21 of the text and 40 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 36


(129) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. XXIX Memo, of Piolle, Algiers, 17/5/1687 p. 75

(130) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. LIV Perillie to Seignelay, Sale, 26/7/1687 p. 133
free to come north to put force behind his threat of a "Chergi" campaign, or to defend his own Atlantic littoral, under renewed French naval threat. News came to Sale of a six months' veto upon any departure from the supposedly victorious sultan's army (131). The coast was left essentially to its "home-guard" pattern of defence (132). In the July of 1687, the news in Tetuan was that the sultan was still engaged at "Tolidan" (133). Laudatory accounts of his exploits need indicate no more than that he was still engaged in heavy fighting. The eventual date at which Isma-Il abandoned personal campaigning within the Sae is likely to have been autumnal, and a matter of season rather than decisive victory. A lieutenant "Zacatin", whom Mouitte had known as Isma-Il's "treasurer" (134), and who was sufficiently close to the sultan to be referred to in conventional parlance as his "uncle" (135), was detached from the sultan's army, set in command of a sizeable body of cavalry (136), and left in the Sae with orders to prosecute Isma-Il's interests. Isma-Il himself led the main body of his troops northwards. A tax-raiding force, headed by an al-Rusi commander, would seem to have been hived off from this army upon its homeward march, and despatched to Tuat. There, from the end of January 1688, susur-ruining government troops made up for the previous two and an half years of fiscal lenience (137).

(131) S.I. 2e France Vol. III No. XXIV p. 70 Perillée to Seigneley Sale, 12/5/1687
(132) S.I. 2e France Vol. III Nos. XXIV and LIV pp. 70 and 133, Perillée to Seigneley, Sale, 12/5/1687 and 26/7/1687
(133) S.I. 2e France Vol. III No. LII pp. 126-9 Pierre Estelle to Seigneley, Tetuan, 26/7/1687
(135) "Dekley" p. 54
(136) S.I. 2e France Vol. III No. LXII p. 162 Perillée to Leony Sale, 10/2/1688
(137) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" and corroborative Timmi document, quoted Martin pp. 65-7
Meanwhile, the sultan himself returned to Meknes (138).

In Meknes, Isma'il received news of challenge within both Sus and "Cherg". "Zacatin"'s forces were embroiled with "Chleuh" mountain men (139). To the east, a muted confrontation was being mounted within the Regency. For, since the victory over Tarudant, Isma'il's reputation within Algiers had allegedly been "redoutable" (140). From the spring until the November of 1687, Mezzomorto had dawdled about his own capital, allegedly expecting that Isma'il would make some move against him (141).

And, in the January of 1688, following a short expedition against his own southern march (142), the Dey moved an army into the "Cherg". The timing of this move suggests that the Algerine troops were poised to face the shairif who had newly come northwards. But a pose of neutrality was carefully preserved. The Dey's forces were turned, not against Tlemcen or against rural peoples of the march, but against the Spanish presidio of Oran, which they beset as mujahidun from the January of 1688 until the following August (143).

It is possible that Mezzomorto's donning the mantle of a mujahid saved Isma'il from the immediate obligation of carrying out a threat to Tlemcen which he had issued in the bubble of victory over Tarudant, and which he may not have wished to make good. However, at the end of August 1688, the moral barrier posed by the siege of Oran was lifted. Thereafter, Isma'il was urged to move eastwards even by Porte diplomacy.

(138) S.I. France Vol. III No. LX p. 152 Translation of a letter from Abd Allah al-Rusi to Périllie dated Meknes 12/1/1688, and suggesting that the consul come to the capital for an audience of the sultan.

(139) S.I. France Vol. III No. LXII p. 162 Périllie to Lezey, Sale, 10/2/1688

(140) S.I. France Vol. III No. LV p. 138 Memo of Piolle, Algiers, 2/10/1687

(141) S.I. France Vol. III Nos. LV and LVI Memo of Piolle, Algiers 2/10/1687 and 29/11/1687 pp. 138 and 140-141

(142) S.I. France Vol. III No. LVI Memo of Piolle, Algiers, 29/11/1687 p. 141

(143) L. Galindo y de Vera: "Historia, vicissitudes..." pp. 279-282.
Mezzomorto was currently at odds with his suzerain, the Ottoman sultan Sulayman III. An Ottoman envoy, Khalîl Aga, was despatched towards the Maghrib al-Aqsa with a letter that was rumoured to grant its sharîf a diplomatic "free hand" to move against the Regency (144). However, the "free hand" was kept in rein. Khalîl Aga was kidnapped by Mezzomorto as his ship passed through Algerine waters in the October of 1688 (145). Ismeâ'il's only immediate reprisal for the insult was an act of petty high-handedness: in November he seized a party of French captives who had been taken by Algerine corsairs, but afterwards disembarked upon the Alawi territory (146).

The Sue was still an escalating military commitment. Reinforcements to "Zacatin"'s army of occupation, under the command of Ahmed ibn Haddu al-Attar (147) passed through Sale in the December of 1688 (148). Yet, even in the same month, there was a prefiguration of a separate and major campaign. A consignment of military baggage carts was set under construction by Salatin joiners, at the imperial command. The labour was singular, in that wheeled traffic was little known in the contemporary Maghrib al-Aqsa. Périllie, the French consul in Sale, believed that the carts were destined for the "Cherg" (149).

The new year brought further indications that the sultan might be intending to move eastwards. Ismeâ'il was at pains to refurbish his relations with Fasî notables, after a fashion reminiscent of the

---

(144) S.I. 2 France Vol. III No. XC p. 223 Vauvray to Seignelay, Toulon, 9/11/1688
(147) This officer is not to be confused with the mujahid captain Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammami al-Battawi.
(149) S.I. 2 France Vol. III No. XCI p. 228 Périllie to Seignelay, Sale 25/12/1688
preliminaries to his first "Chergi" campaign. Isma'il was not a ruler noted for lavish hospitality or financial ostentation. His personal frugality and public stinginess were standard points for European comment (150). Yet, in February 1689, he invited the C'ulama' of Fes to feast with him, in celebration of the conclusion of a series of lectures in commentary upon the Qur'an. Money was distributed at the feast (151). In March, Algerine vessels were noted to be flitting Moroccan ports (152). According to report, Algerine troops were brought to mass in the region of Tlemsen (153).

Yet Isma'il failed to carry out the expected eastward venture. The Franco-centric Perillie saw this reluctance to expand along a geographically open north-eastern frontier as Isma'il's betrayal of his own "grand dessein" (154). It is simpler to see that caution once again prevented the sultan from making an aggressive move that might have had dire consequences. There was continuing unrest within the Sus, and rumours of further unrest in Marrakesh and in Tafilelt (155). All could have provided considerations to weigh against Isma'il making any flamboyant gesture against the Regency.

The sultan turned instead to the jihad as a source of renown to be obtained with greater military economy. Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammami, sadid of the north-western plains, and brother and heir to Umar ibn Haddu, the victor over Mamora (156), was ordered to muster an army at his provincial capital of Alcazarquivir, for an attack upon the presidio of Larache. He

(150) For examples of such comment, see Pidou de St. Olon tr. Metteux p. 60 cf. Busnot pp. 40 and 52 cf. Windus pp. 121 and 137
(151) "Nashr al-Matbani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol.XXIV p. 411
(152) S.I. 2^e France Vol. III No. XCVII p. 244 Perillie to Seigneley, Sale, 25/3/1689
(153) S.I. 2^e France Vol. III No. CII Perillie to Seigneley, Sale 16/7/1689 p. 264
(154) ibid. pp. 263-4
(155) ibid. p. 263
(156) "Turjuman" p. 19 of the text and 36 of the translation.
was granted the services of a party of French renegade "pioneers" (157),
but seems otherwise, at this stage of events, to have been left to his
own resources. The siege was opened in the August of 1689 (158) and
lasted four months. Its chief distinction was an heavy use of the
"pioneers" gunpowder (159). An early estimate of the army of attack at
24,000 foot to 4,000 horse (160) is doubtless highly inflated. But the
proportions given are not unsuitable to siege warfare. And, when seen
within the wider context of a society besotted with cavalry skills,
they tell their own tale as to the quality of the soldiery brought to
mill around the presidio. The sultan took no personal part in the
assault upon Larache. He was not even summoned formally to take part in
its highlights. But it seems that he remained in Meknes while the siege
continued, leaving subordinates to suppress Murrakushī disturbances, and
to direct the continuing Susī warfare (161). At the end of October,
the muḥābīdat took the town of Larache, as distinct from its little
citadel (162). From this point onwards, a Muslim victory was inevitable.
Deftly the sultan sent in a detachment of his own cābīd, together with
levies from the civic militia of a number of towns (163). Three weeks
later, in mid-November, the defending forces surrendered upon terms

(157) "Ockley" p. 12
cf. S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CIII Périllie to Seignelay, Sale
8/9/1689 pp. 266-9
(159) L. Galindo y de Vera: "Historia, vicisitudes..." pp. 283-4 cf.
al-Ifrānī: "Nuzhat al-Madi..." ed. Houdas pp. 406 of the text and
506-7 of the translation.
(160) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CIII Périllie to Seignelay 8/9/1689
p. 269
(161) ibid.
(162) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CV Périllie to Seignelay, Sale 6/11/1689
(163) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CV Périllie to Seignelay, 6/11/1689
loc. cit.
which non-Spaniards delighted to record as shameful: the chief officers and friars arranged to go free, along with their possessions and church plate. Isma’il took the cannon and ammunition, and was permitted to enslave almost the entire surrounding populace, which was estimated at above 1,600 and included around one hundred officers (164). Ahmed ibn Haddu’s followers were allowed to repopulate the port (165), which became a quiet haven for ship-building, fishing and “pirating in Row-boats” (166). The qā‘id built a residence in the town: the “Summer-house” Braithwaite saw nearly forty years later (167).

Capture of this shallow-water port was of no particular advantage to Isma’il’s total command of the Maghrib al-Aqsa. Yet, from a partisan Muslim viewpoint, the taking of Larache was a noble achievement. It was a victory for the forces of Islam which, unlike the taking of Mamora and of Tangier, had involved a period of genuine warfare. It was celebrated in poetry which forebore to stress the sultan’s absence from the scene, and which, somewhat ill-advisedly, went on to threaten Ceuta and Oran (166). The victory was carefully wrung for its propagandist value. The Larache gates were dragged into Meknes (169).

And, according to “al-Fāsi chronicle”, there was issued in January 1690 an imperial zahir that black shoes were no longer to be worn; for their

---


(165) Turjuman p. 23 of the text and 43 of the translation cf. Bustan al-Zarif... MS p. 40

(166) Braithwaite pp. 295 and 299

(167) ibid. p. 296

(168) Al-Nasiri referred to three such pieces of verse, and quoted in extenso two poems, the works of Fāsi literati of Isma’il’s day (Kitāb al-Iltizām... Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp. 73-76 cf. Fumey translation, A.M. Vol. IX pp. 99-103)

(169) Windus, thirty years later, saw the gates set up in Isma’il’s palace.
wear was alleged to have begun as a sign of mourning for the surrender of Larache to the Spaniards in 1610 (170).

Politically Isma'il was now in the ascendant. Victory in the jihad co-incided with a maximal extension of his Miknasī grip over the Sus. By the March of 1690, Ahmad ibn Haddū Ḥaddū al-Attār had returned from the Sus. He was granted high palace favour, and appointed governor of Sale, Safi and Agadir (171). The honours indicate that the commander's previous year's campaigning within "Chleuh" country had made its mark. And indeed it would be two years before any further rumour of Susī unrest reached the French consulate in Sale. More than four years would pass before Ahmad ibn Ḥaddū Ḥaddū al-Attār had to return to the re-inforcement of "Zacatin"'s army of occupation (172). The early 1690s may thus be seen as years during which the sultan of the "Gharb", by way of his lieutenants, achieved a degree of authority over "Chleuh" country that he will be seen to have found difficulty in regaining at later stages of his reign. This Susī victory seems to have been a valid, if temporary expression of forcible pacification, which should properly overshadow al-Zayyānī's well-known tales of pacification among the Beraber of the Central Atlas (173).

Recognition within the Sus had brought Ahmad ibn Muhriz into alliance with "Qiblan" peoples of the western Sahara (174). Now that Isma'il in his turn was overlord of the Sus, he may have made parallel alliances. Windus transmitted the memory of such an alliance in the language of

---

(171) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, directed by way of a Marseille intermediary and dated 6/7/1690 pp. 297-8
(173) See Prologue Pp. 22-24 and Epilogue Part I Pp. 294-303 for notes upon the weakness of this Beraber material.
(174) Mouffe: "Histoire..." p. 135
decorously riggish romance, saying of Isma-Cil that:

"In the year 1690, before he was Master of Sahra, there came a Woman from that People to him who, hearing of her coming, went to meet her on Horseback, at the head of twenty thousand Men. She told him the People of Sahra were desirous to put themselves under his Protection, but that he must fight her at Launce-play, if he had a mind to have her, at once the Pledge of their Fidelity, and the Prize of his Victory. She set him hard at first, but afterwards suffered herself to be over-powered, was put among the rest of his Women, and Troops were sent to protect the Frontiers of Sahra." (175)

The anecdote echoes an indigenous tradition concerning a marriage alliance between Isma-Cil and a Saharan woman that, as a result of dynastic metabolism, would later be blown out of all due proportion (176). Behind Windus's stylised narrative there seems to lie only the suggestion that Isma-Cil was now sufficiently prestigious a ruler for certain desert peoples freely to accept his suzerainty, and to seal the bond with the gift of one of their daughters. The note upon "Troops" subsequently being sent to the south suggests that the sultan was able to capitalise upon the alliance by making some moves in sheltered territorial expansion. Thus it is known that, during the 1690s, imperial renegade troops were being sent, in the mass, to the Dar-Ca valley (177). It is even possible that the despatch of a force of Isma-Cil's soldiery to Timbuktu dates from this expansionist period. Timbuktu lay at the end of the Susi gold-route. And the existence of Isma-Cil's Timbuktu garrison is vouched for by a latter day note upon sub-Saharan strife of the early 1740s, in which a part was played by troops who bore the name

(175) Windus p. 136

(176) See Epilogue Part II Pp. 313-16 for further discussion of this matter.

(177) "Ockley" p. 26
of Isma'îl's Maghribî men (178). It is likely to have been such intervention which astonishingly made "Isma'îl, sultan of the Arabs" (sultan al-‘arab) a name to conjure with at the Niger bend, even in the mid nineteenth century (179).

In the July of 1690, Jean-Baptiste Estelle, as the newly appointed French consul in Sale, remitted one of his first and most dutifully copious consular reports (180). The report gave a brief assessment of the contemporary situation of Morocco and of its ruler. Estelle was young (181) and eager; and in tailoring his information for the benefit of a government currently at war with Spain, he may well have accentuated the positive aspects of Isma'îl's sovereignty, in the hopes of encouraging French interest in a Moroccan alliance. Yet, as son to the contemporary French consul in Tetuan (182), the young Estelle was no stranger to Maghribî affairs. In their chronological context, his notes may be regarded with respect: a respect ironically heightened by afterknowledge of the reverses which Isma'îl was to see during the coming decade. The affairs of Sus, jihâd and "Cherg" all find their place within the report. All serve to demonstrate Isma'îl calmly in the ascendant. The sultan was described as being currently dynastically secure and thus, within a context that specifically included the Sus, "paisible possesseur de ces grands et vastes pays" (183). In writing of the sultan's disputes

---

(178) "Tadhkirat al-Nisvan..." ed./tr. Houdaï and Benoist, p. 74 of the text and 119 of the translation.
(179) B.N.P. A. MS 5259 f. 66B Shaykh Ahmad al-Bakkav to al-Hâ’î Cûmar (information from Dr. A. Zebadia).
(180) S.I. 2e France Vol. III No. CXIII pp. 310-319 Memo, dated 19/7/1690 and directed by way of a Marseillais intermediary.
(182) See Prologue p. 37 (Note (73)).
(183) S.I. 2e France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo of J-B. Estelle directed via Marseille, 19/7/1690 p. 311.
with "le Roy Catholique", the consul noted that Memora and Larache had already fallen to ill-armed forces of attack. He could therefore predict an imminent Moroccan capture of the three remaining Spanish enclaves (184). There was little for Estelle to say concerning conflict within the "Cherg". Concentrating upon the actions rather than the rumours of the previous decade, he recorded that war with the Algerines was a rarity (185). In suggested explanation he pointed out that Moroccans, even though they regarded the Turks as heretics, had commercial and pious interests in remaining at peace with their eastern neighbours: for it was important that the annual pilgrimage caravan be allowed to proceed freely towards Cairo and Mecca (186).

One facet to Estelle's account of Isma'il's person is interesting but questionable, even for 1690, and even within a context designed to delineate the sultan as a savage worthy of respect. The reporter described Isma'il as "naturellement valeureux et indefatigable à la guerre" (187). The judgement suggests that its author had been over-influenced by the sight of a deal of ceremonial tilting and 1aš b al-barud around Meknes. For Estelle was here perpetuating a commonplace. Since the capture of Marrakesh in 1677, Isma'il's record in the field would seem only partially to justify his glorification as a warrior. Only the Sus, during Isma'il's two expeditions thither, had seen bitter warfare to which the sultan had personally been a war-leader; and even in the Sus, credit for the degree of makhzen ascendancy obtaining in 1690 would seem to have rested with the

---

(184) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-R. Estelle directed via Marseilles, 19/7/1690 pp. 315-16

(185) ibid. p. 315

(186) ibid. p. 316

(187) ibid. p. 315
commanders who had followed up their master's unfinished rural campaigning. The "Cherg" had been associated less with war than with "alarums and excursions". And military credit within the jihad must obviously go to the great mujahid captains. Estelle's praise for Isma'CII the warrior suggests that this sultan's majesty was wielded with one important sleight: a capacity for extensive delegation without personal loss of martial reputation.

*******************************************************************************
CHAPTER IV: THE POLITICS OF EQUILIBRIUM

ADMINISTRATION, SUCCESSION AND RURAL PACIFICATION

Administration and Palace

Alien contemporaries, with eyes upon Meknes, and little knowledge of the deep Moroccan interior, could describe Isma'il as a despot. According to Jean-Baptiste Estelle, the sultan was able to govern "ce vaste Empire avec un pouvoir si absolu que tout tremble sous ses ordres" (1). The claim aligns with the historians' common view that Isma'il achieved an ascendancy over the Maghrib al-Aqsū that was of a force and magnitude which made it alien in nature from the government of his successors, and which was unsurpassed until the imposition of the Protectorate (2). Conversely, the claim accords ill with modern sociological assessment of byegone and beleaguered Maghribī polities. Gellner has summed up the "traditional North African state" as hopelessly weak: no "oriental despotism", but a flimsy net, capable of catching an hold over meek towns, but incapable of achieving an impress upon a rural society defined by tribalism and Islam, rather than the fiat of a central government (3).

It is possible to take a median view, and to maintain for Isma'il's empire the concept of monarchy, while modifying its absolutism. Contemporary European assessment of Isma'il's government as absolutism is obviously to be treated most gingerly. It resulted from the transposition to an alien society of contemporary European thought-patterns. Thus Mouette was thinking in Erastian terms when he stated that the sultan was spiritual.

---

(1) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to the October of 1698 p. 687
and temporal sovereign of his empire, because he appointed the qudah (4).

Other Europeans saw the hallmark of a centralised monarchy in the sultan's lack of any formal council. To Jean-Baptiste Estelle, this was government at the royal whim (5), not government whose forms were rudimentary. In the same vein, Busnot was able to dismiss the sultan's great officers or "Alcaydes" as courtiers, surrounding their master "par forme", while his council was kept "tout entier dans sa tête" (6). The European view of Isma'Il as a despot was in all probability intensified by the more grisly rituals of Riknash court life. The sultan was the object of formalised gestures of deference. Great officers walked shabby and barefoot in their master's presence, and attendants contorted their bodies in accordance with his physical movements (7). The execution of criminals and of palace offenders, by the sultan's orders and often by his hand was, as every foreign eyewitness stressed, casual and commonplace. All this was part of the display of majesty according to the conventions of pageant: ceremony which served to heighten the distinction of a ruler whose grandeur lay in the size of his bodyguard, and whose apparel and public demeanour generally held nothing to indicate great rank (8). Court phenomena of this nature cannot be translated into evidence for an absolute authority over the empire at large.

At an opposite pole, discussion of the sultan's wider authority in terms of land-tenure gives that authority the appearance of an unrealistically precarious economic basis. For, if Moultte is to be believed, there was no recognised array of crown estates, and it was

---

(4) Moultte: "Histoire..." p. 160
(5) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo of J-B. Estelle putatively dated to the October of 1698 p. 693
(6) Busnot p. 45
necessary to define the sultan's revenue in terms of tribute (9).

Oblique corroboration for the general truth of this assertion, in relation to lands within the Atlas arc, if not to Tafilet, may be traced within the sultan's efforts throughout his reign to acquire property in a private capacity. His acquisition in 1682 of the Jews' houses in Meknes provides one example of such behaviour. The consequences of the dynasty beginning its sovereignty in comparative poverty may perhaps be traced within the standard European stress upon the sultan's relentless financial avarice. Europeans in general did not appreciate the territorial limitations within which this avarice might be expressed. Even the regions of Isma'il's empire whose relief made them relatively accessible must be seen as honeycombed with waqf, or, in the local terminology, "hubus" territories: islands of relative fiscal and administrative immunity, tied to pious foundations. Braithwaite, on his journey from Tetuan to Meknes, passed through an hubus region which seems identifiable with the territorial orbit of Wazzan, a provincial zāwīya whose founding šarīf had first risen to local prominence in the mid-seventeenth century (10). Here was "the seat of a living Saint, the most famous one in the whole Country", the people of whose town were "all his Vassals, and the Produce of the Country all round the Town, at his Disposal, the People paying no other Taxes but to him." (11)

Yet, lack of a "demesne", and the existence of territorial immunities did not deprive the sultan of a power basis. That power basis is best understood in terms of authority over men. Windus gave the quintessence

---

(9) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 164


(11) Braithwaite pp. 129 and 131
of the sultan Isma'īl's provincial administration in the following words:

"His manner of governing is by Alcayde, who have no Commission, but receive their Authority only by his saying, 'Go govern such a Country, be my General or Admiral!'" (12)

The bonds linking the sultan with such quwwad may be seen as the sinews of Isma'īl's government. For it was the quwwad who brought tribute to Meknes.

It is impossible fully to analyse the administrative role of quwwad. Only an handful of individual governors are known by name, and not all of these held power contemporaneously. The combined territorial cover of the quwwad is therefore impossible to estimate. But it is possible to say that quwwad were the personae of "sultan's men". They were not merely "autonomous power-holders who had their positions ratified from the center" (13). It is true that certain well-known quwwad originated as local chieftains. But in accepting the role of provincial qa'id they became identified with the sultan. Thus, 'Ali ibn Yehshu, the Zammūr leader who became one of Isma'īl's generals while retaining authority within Beraber territory at the Middle Atlas foot, would be murdered at his master's death (14). New quwwad who had ousted previous local chieftains were identified with the sultan from the time of their advancement. The conventional expression of such identification was the myth of humble birth, which has been noted as being attached to the Ḥamāmī and the Rūsī, "new men" of the latter 1670s (15). Further, there were certain quwwad who rose

(12) Windus p. 121
(13) Gellner: Introduction to "Arabs and Berbers" p. 15
(14) S.I., 2° France Vol. IV No. LXI 3-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain Journal for August 1695 p. 355 of "Turjuman" pp. 24-5 and 30 of the text and 45-6 and 56 of the translation.
(15) See Chapter II Pp. 104-5
from the ranks of the palace guard (16). It would seem unquestionable that these last were popularly identified with the central government.

It was conventionally believed that a sultan's qa'id began his political career destitute at the sultan's hands. An informer of Windus gave a cynical account of the preliminaries to the advancement of a new imperial governor:

"Now...the Emperor never beats a Man soundly, but the Man is in the high way of Preferment, and it is ten to one but His Majesty passing by him in Chains a few Days after, and finding him in a sad pickle, he calls him his dear Friend, Uncle or Brother...sends for a Suit of his own Cloaths (which is a great Compliment) makes him as fine as a Prince, and sends him to govern some of his great Towns; for by this means he is sure he has not left him worth a Groat, and will make a careful Computation of what he may get in his Government..." (17)

Retention of the post of qa'id and identification with the central government were both maintained together by the rhythmic transmission to the capital of festival hadāva. The making-up of a tribute caravan was complex and costly (18) and, in Braithwaite's words:

"...it was Muley Ishmael's Policy to extort so much from his Governors that in return they had no way left to supply him but by making themselves odious to the People, and in this lay his greatest Security." (19)

Following a visit to Meknes, the sultan's favour to a qa'id could be delicately expressed by the gift of a caftan or of a queen's ribbon (20). The real reward was permission to continue in office. To this there might be added a degree of influence at court. A major governor was

(17) Windus p. 145
Both sources independently describe the make-up of a qa'id of Tetuan's annual hadīya.
(19) Braithwaite p. 36
(20) J., de la Faye: "Relation en forme de journal de voyage pour la réédemption des captifs aux royaumes de Maroc et d'Alger...pendant les années 1723, 1724 et 1725" Paris, 1726 p. 240
likely to maintain a courtier as his agent (21). And Jean-Baptiste Estelle noted that the sultan was "facile à se laisser seduire... par ses alcaydes ou gouverneurs de provinces et de villes" (22).

Away from Meknes, the provincial qa'lid enjoyed the profitable aspect of his persona as "sultan's man": the localised devolution upon himself of much of the sultan's authority. Like the power of the sultan, the power of a qa'lid was not to be expressed in terms of landownership. No estates were attached to the office of governor as such (23). However, in granting a governorship, the sultan made the grant of a territorial sphere open for exploitation. The qa'lid had the power to extract tribute, to deploy troops upon his own as well as the sultan's behalf (24) and, pragmatically, to levy contingents of forced labourers into his personal service (25). He also enjoyed the profits of what might be termed "low justice": cases involving offences which were less than capital, and could therefore be settled in the absence of qa'lid or sultan (26).

A qa'lid maintained his own khalifa to act over periods when he was resident at court. He also maintained an infrastructure of subordinate officers (27). The latter would seem to have been civil as well as military. A characteristic of early 'Alawī government was dispersal of bureaucracy. Much of the incidental tedium and expense of administration was localised. Quwwād were responsible for assessing as well as gathering

---

(22) S.I. 2 Français Vol. III No. CXIII Memo of J-B. Estelle dated 19/7/1690 directed via Marseille p. 312
(23) Windus p. 227
(24) S.I. 2 Français Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo of J-B. Estelle putatively dated to the October of 1698 pp. 694-5 & 696
(25) Braithwaite p. 12
(26) S.I. 2 Français Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo of J-B. Estelle putatively dated to the October of 1698 p. 696
(27) ibid. p. 694

cf. Del Puerto Bk. I, Ch. XIV p. 54
in rural tribute (28). Urban tax-rolls were kept by the town governors (29). Similarly the records of the Sahlit customs dues were worked out by the kuttān of the governor of Sale port and, as a rule, maintained within Sale. They would be summoned to the sultan's notice in evidence only if the sultan were dissatisfied with the relevant sums that came to him in revenue (30).

Certain Tawātī documents admirably illustrate the administrative format by which much paper-work was localised. Incoming open letters from the central government contain demands for the Qur'ānic zakāh, or a proportion thereof, expressed in the most amiable and general terms (31). By contrast, the documents drawn up locally, to record the make-up of a "dīfa" or fiscal "meal" for the sultan, are detailed and complex (32). They list contributions towards the whole, as gathered from various groupings within the oasean population. The wide range in the sums as listed carries the implication of care within local assessment.

The corollary of dispersed bureaucracy was the retention of the Miknāsī civil administration in relatively low profile. Aliens

(28) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Matteux p. 107

The practicalities of a peaceable early 'Alawi "sharīma" are unlikely to have altered far beyond the pattern described in relation to groupings or "caste" of the attenuated Sa'di realm of the 1630s: "...the chief Alcaid who is designed for the service, being come to the country where the aqām is to be levied, sends to the chief Sheck of the cast, which may consist of three or fewer hundred dorea, of him informing himself of the true number, hee sends to the particular Sheck of each dūer, and allotteth to each tent a soldiuer..."

(29) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Mem. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to the October of 1698 p. 695

(30) ibid. p. 709

(31) Martin: translations of open "sharīfian" letters formally addressed to the inhabitants of the Tawātī complex and dating from Sha'ban 1096 (= 3-31 July 1685) and 10/She'ar/1111 (= 7/8/1699) pp. 65 and 74

(32) MSS found at Timmi and Aoulef containing taxation records of the Tawātī contributions of 1099 (1687-8) and 1108(1696-7) reproduced in translation by Martin pp. 65-7 and 71
customarily floundered in the attempt to grapple with the nerves of this administration, and might list an highly eclectic team of central government officials. Thus Pidou de St. Olon grouped together a "Grand Mufti", a chief eunuch, a treasurer whom he identified with the contemporary Rūsī governor of Fes, and, fourthly, the superintendent of the Mīknāsī palace building site (33). It would seem that the sultan had no minister fulfilling the European imaginative mould of the "Grand Vizier" as drawn from the Ottoman court of the "Grand Signior".

The conventional clerical companion of the Maghribī sultan was a simple ṭālib, demurely holding a copy of the Qur'ān, mute guarantee of the legality of the sultan's decisions (34). The term wazīr has already been noted as being in administrative use. But no wazīr seems ever to have enjoyed outstanding court rank. Thus ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Manzārī, the wazīr of the plague years was remembered chiefly for the circumstances of his death, as the victim of a showpiece execution which implies that man and office combined token status with expendability. A later wazīr, Muhammad ibn al-Wahhāb, had insufficient personal authority for a letter sent under his name alone to be thought fit to carry weight with the shaykh of the al-Fāsī zawiya; he wrote in tandem with ʿAbd Allāh al-Rūsī the sultan's qāʿid of Fes (35). A certain al-Yahmadī would be remembered in sentimental nineteenth century tradition...

(33) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux pp. 116-118. By the "Grand Mufti", the author may have meant the qāʿid of Fes or of Meknes. J-B. Estelle was better informed than Pidou de St. Olon was, in 1698, he noted that Morocco had no "grand mouphity" as such (S.I. e French Vol. IV. No. CXLIV p. 697). A note within al-Fāsī chronicle pertaining to a clerical squabble of 1677, carries the suggestion that in Fes, the country's greatest centre of learning, it was customary for the function of "muftī" to be subsumed within that of "qāʿid". ("Nashr al-Mathani..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 261)

(34) "Il fait toujours porter devant lui l'Archoran par son Talbe, comme la regle de ses Conseils, et le niveau de sa Conduite." (Busnot p. 48)

(35) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 25 dated 9/Muharram/1109 = 28/7/1697 p. 72
as Isma'Il's most notable minister, and the personal companion of his sorrows (36). This al-YahmadI existed, and was a man of some personal standing. There survives, in addition to government correspondence of his own (37), a volume of verse dedicated to this wazir by the poet 'Ali Misbah al-Zarwali, who acted as his private secretary (38). However it seems possible to suggest that al-YahmadI's posthumous fame grew as a fictionalised notoriety within literary circles, fired by the verses, and by the wazir's own reputation as a bibliophile (39). The minister was unknown to European commentators on the Meknasi politics of his period, the 1690s. Further, he may be seen as an isolated figure who founded no administrative tradition. The great court figures of Isma'Il's closing years who came to the notice of Windus, would include, in addition to members of the royal family, generals, guardian eunuchs, principal Jews and the merchant manager of a crown monopoly (40). But Windus knew of no great minister. And in the months following Isma'Il's death, Braithwaite would dismiss Isma'Il's administration as a government markedly uncouth in that therein "none but military Men" had been "encouraged" (41).

Among the variety of notables whom a succession of European commentators considered to hold the office of "treasurer", the most credible is the guardian eunuch noted by Windus (42). For Isma'Il's

(37) Three of the "Lettres Inedites..." carry al-YahmadI's name, as recipient of the first and author of the second and third. They are the letters numbered 20 (8/Al-Qa'da/1104 = 12/7/1693); 23 (2/Ramadan/1108 = 25/3/1697); and 24 (undated) pp. 67 and 69-70
(38) "Sana al-muhtadi ila marfakhir al-wazir al-yahmadI" cited by Lakhdar in "La vie litteraire..." pp. 172-3
(39) Lakhdar op. cit. p. 53
(40) Windus pp. 109, 152-5, 186, 196-8, 209 and passim.
(41) Braithwaite p. 351
(42) Windus p. 109
"treasury" was essentially "treasure": it consisted of a growing hoard of trophies, jewels and ornamental saddles as well as coined money (43). The army might receive donations from this hoard, but not the palace administration. The running expenses of the palace were ordered separately. Thus the revenues earmarked to cover that most grandiose of governmental economic enterprises, the construction of the Miknas palace itself, were, as has been noted previously, gathered and dispersed in a system that was quite separate from the central coffer (44). Similarly, the women's quarters were administered as a distinct institution: here the sultan's principal queen oversaw the doling out of appropriate supplies (45).

The monstrous plethora of imperial children born within the women's quarters would seem to have been raised with the greatest thrift that circumstances allowed. The sole ornaments of price worn by most of Isma'il's sons and daughters were the baubles with which they were each presented at birth by the country's Jewish community (46). The sultan's prestige allowed him customarily to dispose of his daughters without granting them a dowry (47). And the sons were brought up as urchins, "thievish and ravenous as kites" (48). The education received by Muhammad al-Alim was quite exceptional. Most of Isma'il's sons were endowed only with a slave, an horse, and the limited care their mothers could give them (49). European visitors to Meknes were astonished that,

(43) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 693
(45) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 694
(46) de la Faye p. 160
(47) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 loc. cit.
(48) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 97
(49) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 loc. cit.
in this capital, a prince would accept a small "tip" (50).

Only the sons of Isma-Il's favourites could hope for more than "what was absolutely necessary for their Subsistence" (51). In accordance with the pattern set for Isma-Il's eldest son Muhriz, the majority of these boys were regularly dismissed, at adolescence, to Tafilelt, the one region where the sultan seems to have been able to dispose of land in quantity. In Tafilelt, each son was customarily granted a plantation of date-palms (52). Early in the 1690s it was noted that the export of dates was a Filali monopoly, by imperial decree (53). Isma-Il was a sultan whom Mouette is well-known to have credited with the outlook of a grocer (54). In this particular matter of Filali trade, he may well have been fostering the commercial interests of members of his own immediate family.

The Udaya Succession

Exile to the simple life and political nullity was never the fate of certain of Isma-Il's sons. And even recall from Tafilelt was possible. Thus, Muhriz was occasionally noted in battle upon his father's behalf, after the date of his first dismissal (55). Favourite sons continued to be made titular vice-roys within towns and provinces. A seventeenth century work of dynastic eulogy, which recounted Alawi history down to the 1690s selected eight of Isma-Il's sons to name as notables of whom their father might be proud (56). These sons had been nurtured to battle

(50) Buisnot pp. 59-60
(51) Braithwaite p. 205
(52) Windus p. 190
(53) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 34
(54) Mouette: "Relation..." pp. 150-151 quoted Ch.-A. Julien p. 228
(55) For example in the "Relation de St. Amans" (5.I. 2e France Vol. II No. XXXVII Diary note for 10/12/1682 p. 340)
(56) Ahmad ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Alawi: "Al-anwar al-husniya..." c. 1690/1102 Published Casablanca, 1966 pp. 88-9
from childhood. Jean-Baptiste Estelle in 1690 described the nine and
ten year old princes playing at full-tilt, bare-back astride war-
horses. He further noted that sons of full age, some "alcaydes de
dIVERS pays, provinces et cantons", were already the protagonists of
an endemic internecine warfare which gave a straightforward preview
of the power-struggle inevitable at Isma'il's death (57).

The sultan could well have taken an ambivalent approach to this
squabbling. To a certain extent he could afford to regard the tussles
with a bland equanimity. In Estelle's words:

"Celuy qui regne aujourdhuy dit que...cela donne lieu a tous
les enfants d'etre guerriers." (58)

Such an attitude upon Isma'il's part need not have been impolitic.
Mutual combat kept his sons occupied; and, at this period, their
struggles had not yet been grafted on to provincial or civic unrest.
Nevertheless, in 1690, it was already clear to contemporaries that
Isma'il had cut one swathe through his sons' rivalries, by designating
an heir. This heir-presumptive was Zaydan, who had first come to
prominence as the adolescent vice-roy of Meknes, during the years of
his father's second Sus campaign (59). In 1690, Estelle recorded
that Zaydan was paramount among the sultan's sixty mounted sons, and
that he was the one adult son who was kept close to his father's
side (60).

Zaydan's grooming for pre-eminence is likely to have been
associated with Isma'il's fostering within Sahs of the cavalry corps
of the Udāya. For this corps was bound up with the figure of Zaydān's mother. The heir-presumptive, his mother, and the Udāya may be thought to have risen together in Miknasī prominence. All three are likely to have been fostered deliberately by a sultan concerned to manufacture a military following linked with himself and his line, as the Shabbānāt had been linked with Sa'dī sultans.

The corps of Udāya was a creation of Isma'il's which eventually came to number several thousand (61). During Isma'il's reign members of this corps were stationed only within Sa'id, firstly at Meknes and latterly also at Fās al-Jadīd (62). The force seems to have undergone considerable metamorphosis during its first decades. Contemporary trace-references and dynastic tradition alike suggest that the Udāya company was built up in stages, beginning with an initial recruitment which swept a Murrākushī and "Hawz" rabble into the train of Isma'il's fierce Central Atlas campaign of 1677 (63). By the middle years of Isma'il's reign, the Udāya had become a corps with a distinctively aristocratic air. In their close personal association with the monarch, the Udāya could be compared with the wider corps of Cabīd. But there was one marked distinction between Cabīd and Udāya. It was not a distinction of complexion. Udāya were commonly dark-skinned. It was a distinction of status. The Udāya were free warriors, bound to the sultan in alliance rather than servitude. The bonds were those of a social fiction: that the Udāya were an agnatic kin-group, communally linked with Isma'il through relationship to a woman, his "black queen".

(61) Braithwaite p. 157
(62) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 29-30 cf. Del Puerto Bk. V Ch. 43 p. 616 and Bk. VI Ch. 3 p. 639
(63) See Chapter II Pp. 103-4
Del Puerto described the Udaya in their "imago" state as:

"Los primeros hombres...todos Mulatos obscuros de un linage, que llaman LUDEAS que son Cavalleros de el Rey, y oy los mas estimados, porque son parientes de la Reyna Negra; y assi essan los mas fantasticos y sobervios. Es buena gente de guerra, pero no salen sino quando el Rey se pone en campana; y por eso tienen todos sus armas, y cavallos, sin pagar garrama." (64)

It will be noted later that dynastic mythology came to associate the Udaya with Isma'il's mother (65). But there is no doubt as to the identity of the "Reyna Negra" who formed the personal linchpin to the Udaya alliance. She was ĈAyisha Mubarka, named within the chronicle material transmitted by al-Zayyani (66), and unquestionably wife rather than mother to Isma'il. Facets of her role as Isma'il's principal queen are indicated in the variety of names attached to her within the historical notes of Busnot. Here she appears variously as "la Sultane", "Lalla Aicha", "l'infame Loudais" and, most frequently, and in deference to the name of her eldest son, as "Zidana".

During the 1690s, when this son had reached warrior age, ĈAyisha Mubarka came to enjoy notoriety and palace power. She cut a startling figure about Meknes. Free from the restraints which palace custom imposed upon her women companions, she would appear in public, girt with a sword and carrying a lance (67). She was alleged to have considerable influence over her husband. Bemused Europeans who saw in her only "a Mollatto, of a very plain and disagreeable Person" (68)

(64) Del Puerto Bk. V. Ch. 43 p. 616
(65) See Epilogue Part II Pp. 317-319
(66) "Turjuman" p. 18 of the text and 34 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp. 33-4
(67) "Ockley" p. 96 cf. Busnot p. 54
(68) "Ockley" pp. 95-6
were delighted to attribute this influence to witchcraft (69).

Zaydān's designation as heir-presumptive, and the associated court enhancement of his mother, together raise problems as to Āyisha's identity, and as to the nature of her relationship to the Udaya to whom she was formally "sister". It seems certain that Āyisha had been associated with Ismā'Il from the beginning of his reign. The association is vouched for by European estimates as to the approximate age of Zaydān when he came to be of military note (70). Yet Āyisha seems not to have taken paramount status among Ismā'Il's womenfolk until some years after her marriage. Moussette covered the first nine years of Ismā'Il's reign in detail. He tattled away upon the Murrākushī politics that were supposedly conducted by Lalla Maryam, principal wife of Ahmad ibn Muhriz (71). But he gave no indication that any wife of Ismā'Il held any comparable status or position of influence. And while he knew three of Ismā'Il's sons by name, he made no mention of the boy Zaydān. Yet, in different contexts, he knew "Udaya" as the name of both a general and a fort (72).

A possible solution to the problem may lie in the identification of the dark-skinned Āyisha Nubarka with the "princesse de Touet" allegedly bestowed upon Ismā'Il by al-Rashīd (73). European commentary of Ismā'Il's middle years retained a garbled tradition that the sultan's principal

---

(69) Thus Jean-Baptiste Estelle wrote of the sultan's "première femme, qui est mère de Moulay Zidan, qu'y est maîtresse de l'esprit de ce prince (et, ce dit-on, la magie y a part)..." (S.I. 2nd France Vol. IV No. XLI Memo, dated Sale, 2/5/1694 p. 267) cf. Buonot p. 53 cf. "Ockley" p. 96

(70) Jean-Baptiste Estelle in the July of 1690 described Zaydān as being aged around eighteen to nineteen (S.I. 2nd France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo, directed by way of Marseille 19/7/1690 p. 315)

(71) Moussette: "Histoire..." pp. 80-81

(72) Moussette: "Histoire..." p. 110 and "Relation" p. 148

(73) Moussette: "Histoire..." p. 28
wife had been given to him long previously by his brother (74). One officer who definitely claimed blood relationship with Ayisha had as his patronymic "ibn cAtta" (75). This was the patronymic cited by al-Zayyani as belonging to the second of Isma'il's principal Udaya commanders (76). The Ayt cAtta, a wide confederation of Beraber peoples seem even during the seventeenth century to have percolated out from their "Jabal Saghrū" heartland as far to the south-east as Tuat, a region from which they had, around 1660, been able to exact tribute (77).

If the identification of Ayisha with the "princesse de Touet" is correct, then her court anonymity during Isma'il's early years could be explicable in terms of a break in the political and fiscal links between Sās and Tuat which al-Rashīd had forged (78). However, the re-opening of Alawī political contact with Tuat, late in 1680, could well have encouraged the rallying to Isma'il of men claiming clan-fellowship with a Tawātī and cAtta bride whom Isma'il had married in the days of his brother. The very exoticism of free recruits from a distant oasian region could have encouraged Isma'il to employ such men as the focus to a rag-bag force of recruits with a "Qiblan" (79) name, which he was already in the process of agglomerating. The consequence could have been privilege for Ayisha and her sons, and a blanket identification of the corps

(74) Thus Del Puerto alleged that "la Reyna, principal Mujer de Muley Ismael...oy la Senora Reynante", had originally been a slave-girl bought from al-Rashīd. A similar rumour was passed on by Busnot. Its grounding would seem to have been European slave gossip of the early eighteenth century. ("Mission Historial..." Bk. I. Ch. X p. 36 cf. Busnot p. 52)

(75) Braithwaite p. 95 The reference relates to a named maternal uncle of Ahmad al-Dhahabi, Isma'il's successor, and second son to Ayisha Mubarka.

(76) "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 30

(77) Martin pp. 55 and 56, quoting the oasian chroniclers al-Tawātī and al-Amuri, of whom the first was an eighteenth century author. For an extended discussion of Ayt cAtta expansion desertwards from the Jabal Saghrū, see Ross E. Dunn: "Berber Imperialism: the Ait Atta Expansion in South-East Morocco" in "Arabs and Berbers" ed. E. Gellner and C. Micaud pp. 89-107

(78) See Chapter II P. 90 and Chapter III P. 131

(79) See Appendix B. Pp. 338-339
with the newcomers, as the "single lineage" Del Puerto believed he knew (80). Evidence that the corps had not always been monolithic would survive within al-Zayyānī's tradition of successive waves of Udāya recruits, and of two distinct founding Udāya generals, of whom the second, Muhammad ibn 'Attā, would be regarded as "son" to Abu Shafra, the first (81).

The period crucial to the consolidation of the Udāya as a force close to the monarchy is likely to have been the period of Isma'īl's second expedition into the Sus, over the years 1685-7, when Zaydān, "sister's son" to the Udāya was made titular Miknāsī vice-roy. Loyal Udāya service over this period may even have accounted for the subsequent securing of Zaydān's status as heir-presumptive, and also for the establishment of Udāya officers themselves as a military elite around Meknes. Al-Zayyānī noted that these officers were endowed with a particular slice of imperial revenue: the nawa'īb or customary dues received from zawāya (82). From Isma'īl's middle years, Udāya are known to have predominated among the inhabitants of al-Riyād, an area of the capital in which Isma'īl's most prominent courtiers built their houses, and which formed the nearest Miknāsī equivalent to a fashionable suburb. In Del Puerto's early eighteenth century account of Meknes, the area was noted as an Udāya quarter (83). And it was described by al-Zayyānī, in the plangent context of its razing to the ground in the

(80) See the present chapter P. 171 (Note 64)
(81) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 29-30. For a more extended discussion of the problems posed by the indigenous tradition as to the origin of the Udāya, see Epilogue Part II Pp. 317-321
(82) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 29
(83) "REAT El AMBAR...donde viven los principales Alcaydes, por ser lugar privilegiado de Justicias; porque sus moradores son aquellos LUDEAS" (Del Puerto Bk. VI Ch. III p. 639)
early 1730s, as:

"...the town of al-Riyād which was an ornament to Meknes... in it were the houses of the governors, and the secretaries, and the Udaya and the administrative officials of the sultan Isma‘īl." (84)

European notes support the indigenous tradition of al-Zayyānī, which states that Isma‘īl detached a body of troops from his primal Miknasī force of Udaya, and sent them to garrison Fas al-Jadīd. No firm date can be attached to the posting of these troops to the metropolis. But the move is likely to have preceded 1693, a date for which Pidou de St. Olon recorded that Old Fes was known to have a "white" and New Fes a "black" population (85). For the remainder of the reign, Udaya cavaliers, whose numbers were to reach an estimated three to four thousand, would exercise within the environs of Fes "the power of collecting the King's Taxes, and gathering into the King's Magazines his Wheat, Barley etc." (86). The garrison's existence would provide an obvious line of tension between sultan and city. In the days of al-Rashīd, the Fāsī had wished to prevent the establishment, within the immediate environs of their city, of a sizeable body of alien troops: al-Rashīd's "shirāna" (87). Now the citizens were constrained to live cheek-by-jowl with a corps of "sultan's men", and accept the inevitable associated harassment. According to Braithwaite, the "Ludyres...practised" their assigned duties with a "rigorous...hand" (88).

(84) "madīnät al-rīyād allātī kānat zīna mīknáṣa...wa fīnā dūr al-qummāl wa il-kuttāb wa il-ūdaya wa ahl-dawlat al-sultan imāmīl"
("Tūrjumān" p. 39 of the text cf. 71 of the translation)
(85) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 27
(86) Braithwaite p. 157
(87) See Chapter II P. and "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 27
(88) Braithwaite pp. 157-8
Rural Pacification

For Isma'il, the opening 1690s were years slicked over with an appearance of consolidation: years during which the sultan enjoyed the profits of a far-flung taxation frontier, possessed the renown of a victor, and could hope for an orderly "Udāya" succession that would align with one joint of his military power-base. One cautionary note must be inserted. This stage of Isma'il's reign has long been falsely lit by a will o' the wisp. Within a myth which al-Zayyānī built into the indigenous tradition, the years leading up to 1692 were years during which Isma'il crowned the elimination of dynastic opposition to his person with the completion of a rigorous pacification of his kingdoms. To al-Zayyānī this pacification was "tamhīd": a more trenchant "tamhīd" than the establishment of a merely dynastic supremacy, for which al-Ifrānī made use of the same word (89). This "tamhīd" involved a purposeful military programme that was expressed in a series of memorable rural campaigns. According to al-Zayyānī's view of Isma'il's reign, this programme of pacification was brought to a definable conclusion in 1692, with a momentous expedition into the "Jabal Fazzāz" or Central Atlas (90). Problems connected with this largely dubious body of tradition will be examined in the "Epilogue" to this work.

The rural pacification that may genuinely be attributed to Isma'il's period is better understood in terms of equilibrium than forcible achievement. Its essence was the provision of security for bona fide travellers passing across the sultan's territories. This

---

(89) al-Ifrānī: "Zill al-Warfī..." pp. 52-56
was a theme summed up in a quaint saw gleaned by Shaw during his "Chergi" travels of the 1730s:

"...that, during the long Reign of the late Muley Ishmael ...a Child (according to their Manner of speaking) might safely carry a Piece of Money upon his Hand from one End of the Kingdom to another..." (91)

and continued in the most frequently repeated of al-Zayyānī's literary flourishes concerning Ismā'īl's period: that during the sultan's latter days, a dhimmi or a woman could travel from Oujda to Wādī Nūn without fear of molestation (92). These commonplaces belong to the world of a sultan's public image, and do not imply dogged imperial police work. Al-Zayyānī's own expansion of the theme of the undisturbed traveller implies that, even ideally, the provision of rural security was a localised responsibility, analogous with the localised responsibility for bureaucratic paper-work. Further, it was security for the notable and well-to-do: no security at all for travellers who could not prove their good faith. Thus the author claimed that the paradisaical Maghrib al-Aqsa of Ismā'īl's day had been a land in which:

"...there remained no place in which pretenders or criminals might find a refuge. A stranger seeking a night's lodging at a wayside hamlet or village would not be accepted. Instead he would be seized until he had produced an authentication for his appearance. For if they (the local populace) let him go,"

(91) Shaw p. 17

(92) "Turjuman" p. 28 of the text and 52 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 40-41

The artificiality of this flourish is underlined by its employment of the word "dhimmi", inappropriate to the society al-Zayyānī knew, which held only one protected community, that of the Jews, customarily referred to by the author as "al-yahud".
they would be held responsible for anything he stole or plundered, and for any crime he committed." (93)

Contemporary material supports tradition in implying the successful imposition of localised responsibility for security, within those regions known to Europeans. Thus Pidou de St. Olon praised Isma'il's "Justice...in respect of Robbers and Murthereers", and noted that clearing of the highways had been effected at the local level by the sultan "causing those who live near the Place where...the crime is committed to be punish'd with Death or a Fine" (94). Jean-Baptiste Estelle noted that the local populations who were held communally responsible for crimes committed within their region, would watch travellers carefully, and prevent them from journeying by night (95).

The sultan should not be seen as personally involved in such peace-keeping at the local level. It is indeed true that, in the days when al-Rashid was newly sultan and "champion of Fes", out to prove his mettle, direct onslaught upon rural brigandage had involved the sultan and his personal following. But delegation of such duty is likely soon to have become the rule. Thus it has been seen that the party of Awdād Jama's bandits, whose execution was an highlight of Isma'il's vice-regality of Fes, are likely to have been brought to justice, not by the sultan, or even his khalīfa, but by al-Rashid's

---

(93) "wa lam yubqa minhum li-ghl al-dehswa 'l-fasād mahall wa' wūna ilayhi wa yattamana'una (Text: yamtani'una) bihi hattā anna mahul al-nāl idhā bīta fī hillat aw dashra, yagbidūnahu ila an tutubayyana šarā'atuhu, wa-in sarrajūhu yu'addūna mā saragahu wa nahabahu aw igtarefahu min al-haram" ("Turjumān" p. 29 of the text of. 55 of the translation)

(94) Pidou de St. Olon tr. Notteux pp. 103-4

(95) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 p. 693
estranged shamiaa troops (96). Even at this point, Isma'il's involvement with the safety of travellers may have been, as it later became, ritualised: a matter of public relations, expressing the "good ruler"'s personal association with peace and order. Thus, as sultan, Isma'il would execute highway robbers in public, with his own hand, as a show for the benefit of the representative of a foreign power (97). He would amiably cross-question high-ranking visitors as to their security upon the routeway, knowing that such visitors had had the scrupulous escort of a series of great quwwad (98). And, paternally, he would berate local ahuyukh who came to be received in Meknes, with an insistence upon their responsibility for keeping the roads clear (99).

There is no straightforward link between Isma'il's fort-building and the degree of rural peace established during his reign. Al-Zayyani made a well-known note that Isma'il was responsible for the construction of seventy-six fortresses (100). Taking this note as his starting point, de la Chapelle worked to demonstrate that forts provided a web which traced out the major routeways of Isma'il's empire. And he dated a majority of these forts to Isma'il's own period (101). In the Epilogue to this work, it will be suggested that evidence for dating any fort specifically to Isma'il's reign is rarely definitive. This sultan's reputation as "fort-builder extraordinary" may be too comprehensive. More significantly, it must be pointed out that the building of a rural fort did

---

(96) See Chapter II p. 89
(97) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, as interpreted by Magny, Marseille, 6/7/1690 p. 300
(98) "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" p. 332
(99) al-ZarhunI of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 112
(100) "Turjuman" p. 16 of the text and 31 of the translation.
not necessarily imply pacification, either in the real or the
euphemistic sense. The character of the fort’s garrison, and the
relationship of that garrison to the society in which it was
embedded, was of greater significance than its physical defences. For
these defences were not always impressive. The Maghrib al-Aqsa lagged
behind seventeenth century developments in Vauban-esque fortification.
Some of the Moroccan works still standing in 1808, and attributable
in part to Isma‘īl’s reign, were indeed sufficiently massive and
complex to arouse at least the qualified appreciation of Napoleon’s
envoy Burel (102). But these fortifications were chiefly citadels. Many
rural forts, particularly those now lost entirely to sight, are likely
to have been less imposing. The first “Qasba Tadla” of Isma‘īl’s reign
was built, under the sultan’s own supervision, inside three months (103).
It seems probable that such a fort followed a form noted by de Chénier
and, later, in greater detail, by Burel, as being common in areas of
rural Morocco: that of the simple blank-walled enclosure, devoid of
towers or machicolation, and inhabited only under crisis conditions (104):
the Maghrībi version of a “peel tower”.

In her recent study of Isma‘īl’s military policy (105), Magali Morsy

---

(102) A. Burel: “Mémoire Militaire sur l’Empire de Maroc présenté a Sa
Majesté Impériale et Royale le 3 Juin 1810, redigé en avril 1810”
ed. J. Caillé as “La Mission du Capitaine Burel au Maroc en 1808”
(Paris, 1953) pp. 75-76

The “Qasba Tadla” that still stands, which local tradition came to
attribute to Isma‘īl (Ch.-E. de Foucauld: “Reconnaissance au Maroc
1883-4” Paris, 1888 p. 57) may indeed date from Isma‘īl’s reign, but
seems to have been built under the direction of his son Ahmad al-
Dhahabī, viceroy in the Tadla region during the latter part of his
father’s reign (“Turjuman” p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation)

(104) de Chénier Vol. I pp. 86-7 cf. Burel op. cit. p. 77

(105) M. Morsy: “Moulay Isma’il et l’armée de métier” in “Revue de l’histoire
moderne et contemporaine” Vol. XIV April-June 1967 pp. 97-122
focused attention upon one particular province, Tamesna, the modern Chaouia. She concluded that here, during Isma'il's reign, there were six forts providing an adequate "infrastructure politico-militaire" for maintaining the local populace in direct submission to Meknes. (106)

As the author admitted, Tamesna is likely to have been a relatively placid province during the period. It included the hinterland of Sale, and is thus the probable regional source for Jean-Baptiste Estelle's observation that, on the authority of the local qā'id, a single qā'id could go out tax-collecting among villagers, armed only with a baton (107). It seems over-bold to attribute such placidity to the shadow of government fortifications. The existence of two of the author's six named forts, and the garrisoning of both by renegades, seem vouched for only by references taken from the late and dubious source "Pellow" (108) of the remaining four establishments, two are described as "forteresses de tribus", garrisoned by local contingents. No evidence appears to survive as to the garrisoning of the fifth or sixth fort. But the last-named, Mers el Guemennat, was merely a simple fortified enclosure. It guarded a market place, and may indeed have been a "peel tower", functioning essentially to the benefit of local society.

In regions more notable than Chaouia for their defiance of central government behests, the construction of forts is likely to have been a matter of some political and social moment. But the fort's essential significance rested in its men, rather than its "tabby" walls. In certain key regions it was Isma'il's policy to deploy alien garrisons, literally "foreign bodies", as a scattered irritant across rural society. According

(106) M. Morsy op. cit. pp. 111-112
(107) S.I. 20 France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, 19/7/1690 directed by way of Marseille p. 314
(108) For notes upon the deficiencies of "Pellow" as a source, see Prologue Pp. 41-2
to an indigenous tradition noted previously, the pattern was set by
the instructions given to the Maqil followers of the Zarafid of
Oujda in the late 1670s: that his followers should build three new forts
at key points within Snassen country, to be used as bases for harassment
of the Snassen, and in particular for their constraint (tadyiq) from
trespass upon the Angad plain (109). Al-Zayyani was not so invariably
blunt in describing relations between rural groupings and neighbouring
garrison troops. Orderliness is implicit in his note that local
populations from around individual forts were detailed to bring their
lawful Qur'anic dues into the appropriate fort, for the sustenance of
its troops and their horses (110). But the frequent working of the
system in practice may have been well summed up in Braithwaite's
callous but succinct account of the life-style of typical renegade
detachments:

"...generally sent to garrison remote Castles upon the
Confinés of the Country, where they are obliged to rob for
their Subsistence, until the Country People knock them on
the Heads."

The value of a fort as an indication of a "government presence"
is likely to have varied with the pattern of surrounding dwellings.
In the Central Atlas dir or piedmont, where the local populace were
tent-dwellers as late as the 1890s (112), the qasr of the makhzan
had the advantage of being the only local buildings. This singularity
is picked out by one credible word in al-Zayyani's conclusion to his
folk-memory tale of Isma'il's last great Central Atlas campaign: the

(109) "Turjuman" p. 18 of the text and 34 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 34 of Chapter II P. 106
(110) "Turjuman" pp. 18-19 of the text and 35 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS loc. cit.
(111) Braithwaite p. 350
(112) W.B. Harris: "The Nomadic Berbers of Central Morocco" in "The
note that the loyalist Yimmūr na'id ʿAlī ibn Barka was instructed to set up at Tishghalin, for his thousand followers, a building described not as a fort (gal'a) but as an "house" (dar) (113). In oasean qaṣr-country, where the typical domicile was the communal mud-castle, government forts would have been less noticeable. As one agglomerated sedentary group among many, the makhzanī of the governor's following would have slotted with particular ease into the pattern of local rivalries. But their walls would have given them no strategic advantage. Muhammad al-Safar, sent to Tuat in 1693, with orders there to establish a permanent base centred upon the reconstructed Sa'dī gāsba, seems notable for having proceeded about his governorship with diplomacy and delicacy (114).

In no region were forts seen as the final expression of central political authority at the local level. Even al-Zayyānī, who made fort-building part of the stylised framework of his campaign accounts, made it obvious that the building of forts did not mean the definitive subjection of rural populations. The author, as will be seen, gave a mass of data upon fort-building in Snassen country and in the Central Atlas (115). But his narrative suggested that, within both regions, punitive expeditions were necessary after the forts had been built. And in Tuat, a region that was customarily upon relatively placid terms with the makhzan, the one recorded major insurrection against Muhammad al-Safar is said to have been put down, not by the relatively helpless governor himself, but by the interposition of a relief

(113) "Turjumān" p. 24 of the text and 46 of the translation
(114) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin pp. 70-71
(115) For a critique of this data, see Epilogue Part I Pp. 284-5 and 308-9
expedition led by the qa'id ra'isihi (116) Ghazī Abu Alfra (117).

Throughout the empire, the ultimate government sanction for ensuring compliance and the raising of taxes for a central coffer, was not the static fort, but the armed haraka, tautologically mobile. The threat of such an expedition seems to have been a more effective curb to rural peoples than the reality of a fort. Among the most competent inhabitants of the Maghrib al-Aqsa during the early Alawī period were the sparse itinerant groupings from the tent crescents of the downlands and flood plains of the far north-west, the regions best known to European observers. These were regions without rural forts. But they were regions easily vulnerable to expeditions mounted from Meknes or Tetuan. Significantly, even the populace of the "Jabal Habīb", who were set into a finger of the Western Rif, and thus had the advantage of relatively difficult terrain, were customarily willing to buy off the threat of an haraka by negotiations with the governor of Tetuan (118). The inhabitants of more open north-western country seem to have been, from the makhzen viewpoint, ideally behaved. Their placatory approach towards the representatives of authority, or towards those who lay under its peace, is epitomised in their swift and free supply of provisions to those travelling under government auspices (119). Herein lay true pacification. For the intensity of the repugnance that could lie behind such good offices is

\begin{footnotes}
(116) The title of an expeditionary commander who was not a provincial governor: "...he sends them to gather the Tribute of some Country, with the Title of an Alcayde; and if he remains by him without any employment...he is called Alcayde of his Head, which is a sort of Alcayde titular or Reforms." (Windus p. 144 cf. for a note employing the same title) al-Nasiri: "Kitab al-Istiqās..." Casablanca text, Vol. VIII p. 35 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 313

(117) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahia" quoted Martin p. 79

(118) Windus pp. 77-8

\end{footnotes}
to be inferred from Busnot's record of the purification by fire of
the sites along the Sale-Meknes route where his Christian party
had rested, duly fed and guarded for the night (120).

(120) Busnot p. 12
CHAPTER V: YEARS OF HUBRIS AND NEMESIS

The decade 1691-1701 was, for Isma'Il, a period that began in military ascendency and Islamic splendour. But it continued with reverses which the sultan's boldest military experiments and endeavours were unable to stave off. And it ended in débâcle.

During the early months of 1691, the one source of possible unease for Isma'Il was the continuation of signs pointing to impending war in the "Cherg". In the February, there was a two-man Moroccan embassy to Algiers. Its errand was superficially cordial, but it was dismissed by al-Ḥājj Shābān Dey as a "spy" embassy (1). In May the honours were icily returned. An envoy from Algiers spent a month in Meknes demanding reparations for losses resulting from border-raids carried out by Isma'Il's subjects (2). He seems to have gained no satisfaction, and Jean-Baptiste Estelle veered towards the opinion that a "Chergi" war with the Regency was imminent (3).

But Isma'Il took no personal eastward initiative. Over the summer and autumn of 1691, the sultan's own interests seem to have run to a politic self-indulgence. Still capitalising on the fall of Laracha, he awaited a grandiose exchange of captives: the barter of the hundred officers taken from the fallen presidio for more than a thousand "Moors" from Spain (4). The suggestion of rescue implicit within the exchange

(1) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXXXI Lemaire, French consul in Algiers to Pontchartrain 13/2/1691 p. 345
(2) S.I. 2° France Vol III No. CXXXI Memo. of J-B. Estelle , Sale, 16/6/1691 p. 375
(3) ibid. loc. cit.
(4) Negotiations leading towards this barter had one delightful by-product: the "Rihlat al-wazir fī ʾftikak al-asīr" written by Isma'Il's envoy to Spain, the kātib Hammū al-Wazīr al-Chasani. As an account of the author's experiences in Madrid, the work is alive with fascination combined with cross-cultural astonishment, and constitutes a worthy counter-blow to the number of contemporary and for the most part disdainful works which emerged from European embassies to early Alawi Morocco. (See the translation by H. Sauvaire as "Voyage en Espagne d'un ambassadeur marocaine" Paris, 1884 cf. Lakhdar "La vie littéraire..." pp. 122-125)
may, for many of the "Moorish" ransomees, be misleading. At this period "Moors" resided in Spanish ports in considerable numbers. Some were slaves, or at least open to impressment as such (5). But the allegation that, in this case, normal Spanish currency restrictions had been relaxed in order to allow the ransomed "Moors" to bring home their earnings (6) suggests that the slave status of many among the vast party was marginal. However, the barter gave Isma'il scope for the enactment of one of the major pageants of the reign. On the 18th, October 1691, the ransomees arrived in Meknes for a long and euphoric ceremony of individual welcome by the sultan. Jean-Baptiste Estelle, an eyewitness, described the ceremony. The qā'id of Tetuan approached:

"...venant avec douze tambours audevant battant à leur mode, et deux grands pavillons verts, couleur de son Prophète, qu'on lui portoit devant; les Mores le suivojent. Ensuite le Roy les attendoit à la porte de son palais...Ils s'approchoient tous de luy et ce prince...les baisa tous l'un après l'autre au visage, les hommes; pour les femmes, il ne voulut pas les voir. Le nombre de mille Mores estoit compose de 700 hommes et de 300 femmes. En après, il leur donna un habit a chacun, tellement que l'honnesteté que ce prince fit a ces Mores le mirent (sic) si bien dans le coeur de ses sujets que l'on entendit partout que: "Vive le Roy et qu'il regne de longues années!" Il avoit besoin de cette politique pour se mettre bien dans le coeur de ses sujets..." (7)

This Māknāṣi euphoria was soon to be cooled from the east, by the most severe military crisis of Isma'il's reign: the threat and eventual reality of a Turkish invasion. The pious sultan would be subjected to a punishment


(5) "...amongst the several towns situated on the coast of Spain, there may be Moors purchased at very reasonable rates, such as are aged, blind or lame, Its no matter, all will pass so they have life."
(S.P. 71 (16) p. 271 Padden, naval envoy to Morocco, to Bolingbroke, Tetuan, 5/4/1714)

(6) S.I. 2ª France Vol. III No. CXXXVI Letter from a Spanish Franciscan to Ahmad ibn Ḥaddū al-Ḥammāmī, Ceuta, 12/9/1691 p. 397

conflict of 1691-2 is contained within the "Daftar al-Tashrifat" of one Muhammad, an Algerine kātib, and a fervent admirer of al-Hājj Shaṭbān Dey (8). This "Daftar al-Tashrifat" suggests that preliminary aggression came from the west: that in November 1691, Zaydān, acting upon his father's orders, led an army northwards from the Sahara upon an extensive border raid that culminated in a battle with the Turkish Tilimsānī garrison. The narrative is invective-ridden: Isma'īl was a qa'amī or petty commander, his son a bastard, and his following maḥṣūsī or heathens. The narrative is also stylised. Thus, the invaders were said to have come three days' march into Algerine territory, to have fought with the Turks for three days and three nights, and to have precipitated a declaration of war that was made against them after three days of deliberation in the dīwan of Algiers (9). Beneath the bluster and the neatening there seems to lie the record of a limited but relatively successful raid in the Tlemsen region, led by the young Zaydān. It is possible that here rests, in embryo, the foundation of al-Zayyānī's puzzling tale of dynastic "derring-do": the narrative of Zaydān's expulsion of the Turks from Tlemsen in 1700, and of his subsequent raid upon the palace of a "Bey of Mascara" (10).

The November raid could have been treated as an act of impudence. But it was seized upon by al-Hājj Shaṭbān Dey as justification for a major campaign designed to put an end to such incursions. Isma'īl's potential strength was respected. Both the sea and the land forces of Algiers were

---

(8) Portions of the "Daftar al-Tashrifat", together with a nineteenth century and a modern French translation have been reproduced within de Castries' "Les Sources Inédites..." Vol. III as text No. CLXIV pp. 499-513, which will be cited hereafter.

(9) "Daftar al-Tashrifat" pp. 501-2 of the text and 505-6 of the modern French translation cf. F. 2° France Vol. III No. CXLVII p. 432 Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 31/12/1691

(10) "Turīyān" p. 25 of the text and 48 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 41-2 Further discussion of al-Zayyānī's treatment of this affair will be given in the Epilogue to this work, Part II p. 332-3
mobilised against him with smooth and efficient deliberation. In December a force of three thousand janissaries was despatched by sea to Kerchtil, the nearest port to Tlemcen that was not in infidel hands (11). For 1692, the customary naval support lent by Algiers to the Ottoman fleet was refused in advance. Corsair activity was forbidden for three months. All available vessels were required as troopships (12). Isma'il took alarm and, as a gesture of goodwill, sent off to Algiers the hundred and twenty out of his thousand-odd ransomed "Moors" who were of Algerine birth. With them there allegedly came the promise of an embassy which would explain away the recent border clash (13). But inexorably the Algerine preparations continued. The mass of the forces at the Dey’s disposal were for this year loaded in the direction of Tlemcen and beyond (14). Only a token force was despatched to the eastern march with the Regency of Tunis (15). In the spring, further reinforcements, janissaries, spahis and Kabyles, were sent by sea to the Tlemcen region. Overland there was sent an haraka, centred upon a small force of Turks, to which were gathered indigenous groupings from the Regency. On the 6th April, the Dey himself left Algiers in style, to join his army (16).

Given the unease of contemporary Algerine politics, and the parallel weakness of his eastern to his western frontier (17), it would seem that

(12) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXLVI Dusault, French Algiers merchant, to Pontchartrain 30/12/1691 p. 430
(13) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXLIX Dusault to Pontchartrain 14/1/1692 pp. 437-8
(15) "Daftar al-Tashrifat" pp. 502 of the text and 505-6 of the modern French translation
(16) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXLI Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers 19/5/1692 p. 486
(17) For a general history of Algiers during the period see H.-D. de Grammont "Histoire d’Alger sous la domination Turque (1515-1830)" Paris, 1887 Chapter XVIII
the Dey was staking his political survival upon the assumption of a short and sharp victory in the field. Shortly before his departure, it was predicted that only the "vieux barbons de la milice" would be left as a token of his government within Algiers (18). But the gamble succeeded admirably. A mass of border groupings rallied to the Dey's army until he was over-loaded with "Moorish" cavalry (19). This could have been an embarrassment, had it not been for the total incompetence of the defence-forces with which he was met. Ismaīl forebore to go into the field himself. Instead he entrusted his army to the care of the young Zaydān (20), who can have been little more than twenty. More senior generals are known to have been with Zaydān (21). But the military history of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā over the previous fifteen years would suggest that none were accustomed to full-scale battle in open country.

The Dey’s army was given sufficient leeway to reach al-Mashārī, a ford across the Moulouya. There it was not even challenged. According to reports reaching the French consulates, the Regency forces were able to attack Zaydān’s army while it was in camp. Its survivors fled from the carnage amid heavy losses in horses and equipment (22). The way to Fes lay wide open. But the Algerine troops advanced only as far as Taza, two days' journey from Fes itself (23). There the Dey encamped. In all

(18) S.I. ² France Vol. III No. CLV Dusault to Pontchartrain, Algiers 22/3/1692 p. 475
(19) S.I. ² France Vol. III No. CLXII Dusault to Pontchartrain, Algiers cf. Brooks p. 79
(21) In the following year, ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Hammānī, qaḍī of Tétouan was reportedly still suffering from a wound in the arm, received during this campaign (S.I. ² France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle Tétouan, 11/8/1693 p. 76)
likelihood he was waiting to be bought off. His alternative would have been the drastic step of laying siege to Fes, a city which may already have grown disgruntled with Isma'il (24), but which would probably not freely have opened its gates to an Hanafi invader.

In Meknes, Isma'il opened his treasury with a startlingly free hand (25) and gathered up an heterogeneous following, ranging from members of his own guard of ab id to Christian slaves (26). The last were troops whose use epitomised military desperation. Then, accompanied by men of religion who would act as mediators (27), the sultan went to meet the Dey. Peace was swiftly brought about, and the Algerine army withdrew (28). According to Jean-Baptiste Estelle, Isma'il, in Taza, made to the Dey a number of clear-cut diplomatic concessions (29). It seems over-sophisticated to see the interim Taza agreement in these terms. The "Daftar al-Tashrifat" in its own theatrical style, recorded only a request by Isma'il for "pax": the "aman" (30). English report alleged that Isma'il bought peace with an advance payment of "an horse and furniture which cost 200,000 crowns and forty-eight Mules laden with Gold" (31). Such notes ring true. Formal submission reinforced with heavy bribery was the standard Maghribi

(25) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to the October of 1698 p. 693
(27) Memo. of J-B. Estelle (as immediately above) loc. cit.
(28) According to al-Zayyani's chronic material, Isma'il joined Zaydan after Id al-Sa'hor which, in 1692, fell in mid-June ("Turismar'" p. 24 of the text and 44 of the translation). According to the "Daftar al-Tashrifat", the bulk of the Algerine troops, transported by sea, were back in Algiers before the end of July (p. 504 of the text and 508 of the modern French translation).
(30) "Daftar al-Tashrifat" loc. cit.
(31) S.P. 71 (3) p. 245/495 Memo. of consul Baker, Algiers, 15/7/1692 O.S. cf. Brooke p. 82 (which, curiously, quotes the same sum in treasure.)
response to defeat by a punishment *haraka*.

A more serious bid to forge a durable agreement between Isma'i and Algiers followed in August, when the Dey and his forces were back in their capital (32). An *Alawī* embassy travelled to Algiers. It contained high-ranking government officials, and was formally led by *Abd al-Malik* (33), a son of Isma'i's who was newly rising to prominence. But this prince was as yet an adolescent of around fifteen (34). And the embassy as a whole seems to have been dominated by *ulama* (35). Its numbers included Muhammad al-Tayyib ibn Muhammad al-Fasi, identifiable as the major original "al-Fasi chronicler" (36). It is possible to see this embassy partly in Fasi terms, as an attempt by the city's religious aristocracy to restore the peaceable relations with the Regency that the recent blow to *Alawī* military reputation had presumably made necessary to the future security of the pilgrimage caravan. For it would seem that the city identified closely with the mission, and feared for its safety. The chronicler reported, presumably with satisfaction, that when the city received a false report that the entire embassy party had been murdered, the consequence was communal civic mourning, which postponed celebration of the feast of *Ashūra* until there was reassurance that the envoys were safe (37). The envoys were indeed safe. But it will be seen that their mission brought no secure peace to the "Cherg". For

---

(32) "Daftar al-Tashrifat" p. 504 of the text and 508 of the modern French translation.

(33) ibid. p. 504 of the text and 509 of the modern French translation of "Nashr al-Mathani". Fes lithograph of 1892 Vol. II p. 157 of the first notation

(34) S.I. 2° France Vol. III No. CLXVII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale, 12/9/1692 p. 528

(35) According to the "Daftar al-Tashrifat", the mission numbered one hundred and twenty, and was dominated by "grands marabouts" (p. 509 of the modern French translation).

(36) "Nashr al-Mathani" Volume cited above. loc. cit.

For an identification of the major "al-Fasi chronicler" see Prologue p. 17

(37) "Nashr al-Mathani" Volume cited above. loc. cit.
the defeat of 1692 was no curb to Isma'il's military style. Indeed, his ignominious capitulation to the Algerine Turks outside Taza urged the sultan into moves which may be interpreted as attempts to recoup losses in men, in resources, and in military prestige.

The most expansive of these attempts by Isma'il to restore his own strength, was impressment into the corps of *cabīd* of a mass of raw recruits scoured from within the Atlas arc. The consequences of this impressment reverberated for years, and its memory was simplistically to be enshrined within the well-known indigenous tradition as to the foundation of Isma'il's army of "*cabīd al-Bukhārī*" (38). This impressment may have followed immediately upon defeat. In the August of 1692, the qa'id of Tetuan included, within his annual *hadīya*, uniforms for *cabīd* (39). The item was also included within the *hadīya* for the following year (40). Direct references to mass conscription date from 1693. For the spring of that year, Jean-Baptiste Estelle recorded that negotiations of his own, concerning the reception of the French ambassador Pidou de St. Olon by the aforementioned qa'id of Tetuan, had fallen to pieces, allegedly as a result of the qa'id's pre-occupation with fulfilling the sultan's summary demand for twelve thousand blacks (41). Of this vast and presumably nominal quota, some hundreds seem actually to have been assembled and despatched to Meknes. On its own journey to Meknes, the embassy party met a force of *cabīd* drawn up at a ford, for the benefit of the Christians. Pidou de St. Olon

(38) For a critique of this tradition, see: *Epilogue* Part I pp. 279-292


guessed that these men were the Titwani recruits (42). From the July
of 1693 there survives an administrative memorandum which refers to
the mustering and registration of ābīd from two associated Arabic-
speaking groupings of the Sebu plain, the Banū Mālik and the Sufyān
("al-tajammū'at (sic)...wa ʾl-dīwān ...al-mushtamil ālā ābīd bani
mālik wa sufyān") being carried out according to the sultan's instructions
while he himself was on campaign (43).

The practical mechanics of conscription are likely to have been
flagrantly questionable. The proportion of recruits who were genuine
slaves cannot be known. Pragmatically, co-option could frequently have
been carried out upon the basis of colour alone. Free negroes and
mulattos, the detritus of the slave population of previous generations,
had long formed a section of Maghribi society (44). De Chenier was to
note that it was:

"...customary among the Moors to marry their male and female
negroes, and, after a certain period, to restore them to
freedom." (45)

But he tarted his own sentimental picture of the merry and simple
lives led by communities of these free negro labourers by the proviso
that they were "considered as slaves among the Moors, even after they"
were "restored to liberty" (46). This last note adds to the credibility
of an extended account of Isma'īl's quest for slaves that is contained

---

(42) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. XXII Mem. of Pidou de St. Olon
Toulon, 7/9/1693 p. 170

(43) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 20 Muhammad ibn Qasim to Muhammad ibn
al-Hassan al-Yahmadi 8/ Dhu 'l-Qa'da/ 1104 = 12/7/1693 p. 67

(44) Thus, from the high mediaeval period comes al-Bakrī's curious account
of an independent community of negroes (sudān) living in a disease-
wasted creek between the Sebu mouth and Arzila (al-Bakrī ed./tr.
de Slane p. 87 of the text and 176 of the translation, noted by
M. Brett in "Ifriqiya as a Market for Saharan Trade from the Tenth
to the Twelfth Century A.D.", "Journal of African History" Vol. X (3)
(London, 1969) p. 355

(45) de Chenier (English translation Vol. I) p. 280

(46) Ibid. p. 282
within the narrative of John Windus. This account, associated in the
text with a 1698 bid for the co-option of manpower from the city of
Fes, alleges that:

"...the Emperor appointed all the Records of the Country to
be searched, that Discovery might be made of such as were
descended from Slaves or Renegadoes. In this Search were
committed a great many Cruelties; and many thousands of
poor People, either for private or public Piques, or being
of a dusker Complexion than ordinary, if they could not
produce long Scrolls of their Genealogies, notwithstanding
their having lived free for Ages, and enjoyed comfortable
Fortunes, were declared Slaves, their Estates and Persons
seized for the Use of the Emperor; and some were forced by
Torture, to desire their Friends to call them their Slaves:
and if they happened to be poor, after the pretended Patron
had received a Ducat, or sometimes less from the Emperor's
Officers, he was forced to be at the Expense of two or
three more, to send them handsomely cloathed to the
Emperor." (47)

Horror-stricken though its reporting of the crudities of impressment
may be, this account does indicate that it was necessary for makhzan
agents of the quest for recruits to work within at least a show of
paper legality. All available evidence, including the late material
set into al-Zayyānī's texts (48), would suggest that the mass of
recruits to Isma'īl's expanded cābid force was taken from regions
socially and economically central to the sultan's domain. Here, where
impressment was blatant, the sultan was acutely concerned to obtain a
slick of legal acquiescence to the activity which built up his "slave
army". Complaisant jurists expressed such acquiescence by adding their
signatures to a diwan or muster-roll of recruits to the new force (49):

(47) Windus pp. 215-216
(48) "Tur Juman" p. 15 of the text and 29 of the translation cf.
"Dustān al-Zarīf..." PG pp. 31-32
(49) Thus Muhammad ibn Qasim wrote to al-Yahmādī, with reference to the
diwan: "bana (sic) cūlāma' fās al-mashhūrin kullihīm wāga cū aydahum
calayhi" 
("It was brought to the attention of all the most famous Fāsī scholars.
They set their hands to it."

"Lettres Inédites..." No. 20 dated 8/Dhū 'l-Qa'da/1104 = 12/7/1693
p. 67
documentation which seems identifiable with the sultan's list noted by Windus:

"...a Register made of the unfortunate People found, or forced to be Slaves, signed by all his Cadies...so that they and their Children are become Slaves by a Form of Law." (50)

There exists a curious manuscript which, in deference to a margin note linking it with the reign of Isma'īl, has been judged to be a copy of part of this register (51). It lists, grouping by grouping, an astonishing total of 6586 slaves ("wusfān") from a rural region within the economic orbit of Fes: the country of the Banū Zarwal, and of two associated "Jabali" peoples. Its vocabulary is, for the most part, carefully legal. It stresses the slave status of the individuals named, sometimes to the extent of referring to them as "al-namalīk al-arqāq' al-wusfān". But the standard ascription of ownership within this text is given in terms associated with inheritance ("irth /mawrūth"). Such terminology gives rise to a suspicion that the relevant slave-ownership was frequently technical: that individuals living as free men may well, as Windus alleged, have been classed for makhzan purposes, as the slaves of prominent neighbours, on the pretext that a master-slave or master-client relationship had existed between their mutual ancestors. This might account for the record that "slaves" in thousands were to be found within a region whose rural economy might be thought to have held little place for them. Leo described

(50) Windus p. 216

(51) The MS is now in the possession of M. G. S. Colin, who believes it to be a copy of an authentic register. The copy itself is written on paper of a quality no more than a century old, and would appear to be the work of a scribe practising calligraphy. Its relationship to an original diwan would be incapable of precise definition. Perhaps the best argument for its authenticity in general, if not in detail, lies within its format: a mass of names set within a framework of repetitious formulae. It would seem an unlikely candidate for late, original composition.
the country of the "Beni Guazerwal" as a densely populated and agriculturally rich region, whose inhabitants were noted for their frequent skirmishes amongst themselves (52). Such a pattern of life, which may be assumed to have persisted, would have given rise to a mass of "publick and private Piques", to which a government levy in manpower would have provided a rich opportunity for the resolution.

During the 1690s, recruits to the new "slave army" or "jund min al-musfan" (53) were kept near to the capital, ready for deployment when they were not actively in the field. In 1698, Jean-Baptiste Estelle would state, in relation to slave troops, that Isma'il:

"...peut avoir a present vingt-cinq mil, tous armés d'un sabre et d'un fusil, et chacun son cheval. Il en tient deux mil a Miquanes pour sa seureté, et le reste aux environs de Miquanes, a dix lieues autour, pour les avoir dans un jour assemblés, quand il en pourra avoir besoin." (54)

This division between an inner two thousand and an outer mass could reflect an important contemporary split within the "black army", of which Estelle, with the blanket racial perceptions of an European may have been unaware. As indicated previously (55), the cabíd of Isma'il's early years had been militarily an highly regarded and, in part, lengthily-trained corps. Many had grown up in the imperial service, graduating by way of the sultan's personal guard of musket-toting adolescent pages. These "Young Rogues" (56) seem most commonly to have been born and, more latterly, deliberately bred from parents of

(52) Leo ed. Ramusio ff. 51-2
(53) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 10 Isma'il to Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Qadir al-Fasl 25/Dhū 'l-Hijja/1108 = 15/7/1697 p. 50
(54) S.l. 2° France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-S. Estelle putatively dated to October 1698 p. 692
(55) See Chapter II Pp. 113-115
(56) Windus p. 142
recognised slave status (57). During the mid 1690s, however, when the sultan's army of \textit{Cabīd} would seem to have been swollen with raw adult recruits, pressed men in thousands, that army can no longer have been dominated numerically by a professional core. But such a core may have continued distinct and, at least in part, resident within Wajh \textit{Araūs}, the \textit{Cabīd} garrison suburb to the north-west of Meknes (58).

For an understanding of Isma'īl's military circumstances in the mid-1690s, it is necessary to reverse, upon the pivot of its own chronology, the traditional two-tier model of the development of Isma'īl's slave army. As will be seen (59), this tradition tells of a primary generation of raw recruits, taken in the late 1670s, and succeeded, some sixteen years or so later, by a steadily expanding force constituted from among its own progeny, and trained in the sultan's service from childhood. This tradition would date Isma'īl's first recruitment of children for training to 1100 A.H./1688-9 A.D. (60). The chronology implies that, during the mid-1690s, when this first group of boys rose to military age, there opened a period of marked increase in the quality of troops at Isma'īl's disposal. In actuality, the mid-1690s, as the years of mass-impressment, are likely to have known an increase in the quantity, but a severe adulteration in the overall quality of the troops claimed by the sultan as his slaves. During this period Isma'īl could...
and did deploy "blacks" in thousands. Such deployment did not
necessarily mean, as it would have done in his early years, that the
sultan was setting "crack regiments" into the field. It may indicate
instead the use of newly pressed men in large numbers. Such gross
but makeshift manoeuvres may be seen as a clue to the chequered
character of Isma'Cild's military career during the nine years
following the al-MashariO defeat.

Over the winter of 1692-3, which followed this disgrace, Isma'Cild prepared personally to take the field, with the aim of recouping both
honour and authority among the populous groupings of his eastern march.
At the time of the Turkish
invansion, the fluid limit of cAlawi suzerainty in the "Cherg" had
shifted alarmingly far to the west. A show of cAlawi force within
march country was necessary to the regaining of the old cAlawi eastern
taxation frontier. This put Isma'Cild to the politically awkward
necessity of campaigning at the edge of the Regency without provoking
a second counter-move from Algiers. So, at court, before the campaign
opened, he was careful verbally to insist upon his regard for the
friendship of the Ottoman sultan (61). And he chose, as the designated
victims of his eastward heraka, the Banu cAmir of "Oranie". This
grouping inhabited open country, and could be envisaged as easy and
suitable prey for a swift summer expedition. More vitally, the Banu
cAmir were "mores de pazes", effectively subject not to Algiers, but to
the Spaniards of Oran. Consequently, an heraka aimed at their punishment
could be given a mujahid gilding, as a blow aimed at a people "qui

(61) Thus Pidou de St. Olon recorded that, during his audience of the
sultan in the June of 1693, which immediately preceded the "Chergi"
heraka, Isma'Cild welcomed the French as fellow allies of the "Grand
Seigneur" (St. 2° France Vol. IV No. XXII Memo. of Pidou
de St. Olon, Toulon, 7/9/1693 p. 172).
frequentoit parmi les Chrestiens sans ordres et sans aucun raison" (62). and who had recently joined the Spaniards in a raid upon fellow Muslims (63). The expedition was preceded by a pilgrimage to the shrine of Idrīs I at Zerhoun (64). And it could be referred to by a makhzan official as an "harakat al-sa'idat al-mubarakah" (65): a pious venture.

In Fes, a city whose ulama had recently helped to forge a peace treaty with the Regency, the pious venture may well have been seen as dangerous meddling along the eastern march. Isma'il seems to have believed that the loyalty of Fes was not to be relied upon in his absence. For he took the precaution of removing Muhammad al-‘Alim from the vice-royalty of the city (66), setting into Fes as his temporary successor, the as yet innocuous adolescent ‘Abd al-Malik (67). By this date Muhammad al-‘Alim had been vice-roy in Fes for thirteen years, and his identification with the city may be seen as a political bond far stronger than the aura of simple popularity based upon virtue, which Jean-Baptiste Estelle cited as the reason for the prince’s destitution (68). That destitution may be seen as a signpost pointing towards the divergence of imperial and civic interests.

The haraka into "Oranie" was bloodthirsty and brief. The sultan

---

(64) S.I. 2^e France Vol. IV No. XXII Memo. of Pidou de St. Olon, Toulon 7/9/1693 p. 188
(65) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 20 Muhammad ibn Qasim to Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Yahmadi 8/Dhu l-Qa‘da/1104 = 12/7/1693 p. 67
(66) S.I. 2^e France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed 19/10/1694, and referring to events of the previous year p. 296
(68) "Les Moros de Fez adoroient ce prince, qui est liberal, sage et d’une retenue peu commune à ses Moros...qualités, of course, attributed to Muhammad’s part-European parentage! (S.I. 2^e France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle completed 19/10/1694 loc. cit.)
left for Taza, where his troops were mustering, in the late June of 1693 (69). He was to be back in Meknes before mid-September (70). In the interim, the Banū CʿAmīr, warned of the sultan's approach, had retreated en masse towards the protecting Spanish fortress of Oran (71). Ismāʿīl subjected the fortress to a token day's mujāhid siege (72). But it was neighbouring peoples under Algerine suzerainty who bore the brunt of the expedition's punishment. The consequence was Algerine protest (73) but not Algerine reprisal.

It is thus probable that the expedition was successful in thrusting eastwards the Alawi taxation frontier, and that this success had repercussions at both the local, and the international level. Locally the next three years saw a series of successor raids. They may be seen as a form of "beating the bounds": markedly destructive and essentially rural. There is no known evidence that they were associated with any bid for Tlemsen. Jean-Baptiste Estelle could sum up the ravaging simply as "field-burning" (74). These raids were to be variously led. Their usual commander was a noted black general Muḥammad ibn al-Raḥmān, qaḍī of Taza. His scratching at the march was quite separate from Ismāʿīl's "Chergi" ambitions as conducted at the level of international politics.

(70) S.I. 28 France Vol. IV No. XXV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 13/10/1693 p. 221
(72) Galindo y de Vera: "Historia, vicisitudes..." p. 284
(74) S.I. 28 France Vol. IV No. XCVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 29/7/1697 p. 514
Upon the wider scale, Isma'Cil toyed with the idea of recouping military prestige in relation to Algiers, by means of an offensive alliance with Tunis. In the January of 1694 there was a Tunisian envoy within Meknes, who came to Isma'Cil loaded with gifts from Muhammad Bey, and left amicably (75). For this year, al-Hajj Sha'ban Dey was known to be planning a bold venture against Tunis. According to Tunisian rumour, it was agreed in Meknes that Isma'Cil should, as a diversion, lead an expedition towards Algiers as soon as he knew the Dey's army to have left for the Tunisian march. He would thus provide the Bey with an opportunity to turn aggressor instead of victim (76). Phantasmagorically, the Dey claimed afterwards that this arrangement was linked with an agreement that, at the conclusion of the projected double-pronged campaign, Isma'Cil would be ceded Ottoman territory as far to the east as Tunis itself, while the Bey would take an empire stretching as far as Cairo, within which territory Isma'Cil would be his wazir (77). At the heart of this flummery could be a trace of proposals for some border adjustment by which the Bey, "ce traitre", had promised, in the event of major victory, "de mettre le pays ottoman aux mains des arables" (78).

This projected international venture of Isma'Cil's was doomed to abortion. Preparations for a major venture into Algerine territory were made and then abandoned, leaving the sultan both at peace with the Regency and in possession of his Tunisian bribe. Jean-Baptiste Estelle, with an over-sophisticated sarcasm, saw in this an example

(75) S.I. 28 France Vol. IV No. XXXI J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Sale, 20/2/1692 pp. 241-2

(76) S.I. 28 France Vol. IV No. XXXVIII Auger-Sorhainde, French consul in Tunis, to Pontchartrain p. 263


(78) ibid., p. 419
of admirably astute policy on the part of a barbarian (79). But the sultan's behaviour suggests timidity in the event, rather than cunning duplicity. There seems no doubt that in the spring of 1694 Isma'Cüil intended to move eastwards. He arranged for his son Zaydan to spend April in Taza, supervising the mustering of an army (80). And he himself was rumoured to have been uncommonly open-handed to the troops assembled there (81). However, it is not certain that this army ever even left Taza. It may have been stalled following the reception of information that al-Hajj Sha'bân Dey had despatched a token Algerine force to his western march, when sending the main body of his troops eastwards (82). The Dey would later claim a clear military victory over Alawi forces (83). The claim was probably bluster. During 1694, no rumour of any armed encounter in the "Cherg" percolated through to Jean-Baptiste Estelle in Sale.

Isma'Cüil's relapse into caution may, as Estelle believed, have been influenced by a threat from within his own domains. Muhammad al-Alim had refused to reconcile himself to a peaceable Filâli exile. He had made the standard gambit of a prince fallen upon hard times: that of moving into an alliance, sealed by marriage, with a strategically placed rural grouping. His allies were Ayt ČAtta (84), whose westernmost territories fringed a Dar-C-Marrakesh routeway.

---

(79) "Sa politique pour un barbare est assurément à admirer. Il se moque de toute la Barbarie" (S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 p. 298)
(80) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. XXXV J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Sale 8/4/1694 p. 256
(81) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. XLIII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Sale, 16/5/1694 pp. 276-7
(82) S.I. 2e France Vol IV No. XL Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers 30/4/1694 p. 265
(84) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 p. 297
Remote from Saïs as it was, this activity of Muhammad al-Alim's provided a milestone to his father's career. It was the first act of open filial defiance with which Isma'il had been faced.

The projection and subsequent abandoning of the "Chergi" campaign of 1694 was a signpost to deterioration in Isma'il's standing. It proved the sultan unreliable as an ally of a foreign power. And it is unlikely to have strengthened his grip within his own domains. To subjects who remembered the Turkish victory of 1692, failure to move eastwards is likely to have appeared weak rather than astute. The appearance of imperial debilitation may have fired southern resentment against rule from the "Gharb". For over a year the Sus had grumbled with disturbance (85). By the October of 1694, it was necessary to re-inforce militarily government authority within southern regions. An army of 'abid, estimated at three to four thousand, went southwards under the leadership of Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Attar, and of the young 'Abd al-Malik (86). The general went on to inner Sus; the young prince remained as a disciplinarian viceroy in Safi, the contemporary port for Marrakesh (87).

At this point, when Isma'il's prestige in both "Cherga" and Sus would seem to have been low, the sultan turned to the jihad, his source of easy glory in earlier years, and determined that his mujahidun should capture Ceuta. He may be presumed to have been confident of cheap victory, likely to bring him no greater military difficulty than the siege of Larache had brought. This confidence was

(85) S.I. 2a France Vol. III No. CLXXXI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 27/2/1693 p. 560
(86) S.I. 2a France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 pp. 302-3
(87) S.I. 2a France Vol. IV No. LI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 24/12/1694 p. 312
The mounting of the siege of Ceuta, in the autumn of 1694, was sudden, but carried out according to formula. Ali ibn Abd Allah, the qālid of Tetuan, who was in Meknes upon his annual tribute-paying visit, was given summary orders to take the Spanish fortress. He is said to have protested the lateness of the season (88). His protests were overruled. He was granted a force of five-hundred abid cavalry (89); a troop of renegades to man fourteen cannon, and to serve as "pioneers" (90); and the formal permission to muster a mass-rabble of his own following of Rif-men, "Brabers or Country People, arm'd in a very strange and unusual Manner", with casual implements (91). Hostilities commenced at the end of October (92). At around the same time, a parallel siege is said to have been laid against the smaller Spanish presidio of Melilla (93). Thus began a conflict which, at an oscillating intensity, was to involve mujahid forces, and to compromise the sultan's Islamic prestige for the remaining thirty-two and a half years of his reign.

In the Sus, Isma'il's autumn expeditionary force met with relative success. By the January of 1695, Isma'il's writ ran once again far enough to the south for him successfully to order the enfranchisement of the crew of an alien barque, run aground at

---

(88) S.I. 2ª France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 p. 302

(89) "Dockley" p. 10

(90) S.I. 2ª France Vol. IV No. XLVIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 19/10/1694 loc. cit.

cf. "Dockley" Chapter I: passim.

(91) "Dockley" p. 10

(92) S.I. 2ª France Vol. IV No. XLIX Pierre Estelle to Pontchartrain Tetuan, 14/11/1694 p. 305

(93) ibid. p. 306
Agadir (94). And by early April, the entire inner Sus was alleged to be quiescent under the authority of Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Attar, who had sent the ringleader of previous disturbances as a prisoner to the sultan (95).

Meanwhile, within the hitherto uncomplicated *ijāda*, the fortunes of war went decidedly awry. Ceuta had been well re-inforced, and its captain-general showed no inclination to surrender. In the December of 1694, disgruntled civic contingents were sent to swell the numbers of *mujāhidūn*. Jean-Baptiste Estelle recorded the difficulties experienced by the governor of Sale in rounding up his quota of two hundred civic "volunteers" (96). The civic troops are likely to have included Fasi, recorded in chronicle material as having contributed to the siege a detachment of five hundred musketeers, of which the personnel was changed every six months (97). Like other *mujāhidūn*, the newcomers faced a harsh winter (98) and no military progress. In the June of 1695, Isma'īl added an estimated two thousand *ṭabīd*, together with further civic detachments, to the forces of attack (99) to no avail. No longer could there be any idea that Ceuta would fall with the ease of Larache. The contrast was difficult for Isma'īl to comprehend. Heavy suspicion of collusion with the enemy fell upon the *mujāhid* captain 'Ali ibn 'Abd Allah (100). In August and in

---

(94) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. LIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 26/2/1695 p. 328

(95) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. LXI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 29/9/1695 p. 345

(96) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. LI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 24/12/1694 pp. 316-17

(97) "Turjuman" p. 23 of the text and 43 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 40

(98) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. LVI J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Sale 20/3/1695 p. 333


(100) "Turjuman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.
September, two successive and independent auwwād were sent to estimate the strategic worth of Ceuta's defences. Both, honourably or no, are alleged to have vindicated Āli ibn Ābd Allāh by confirming the impossibility of taking the place (101). Ismā'īl refused to accept their verdict, and sent up to Ceuta a further force of abīd, estimated at four thousand (102). By the criterion of manpower, he was committed to the jihad as never before.

A lateral threat to Saïs boiled up within the "Chergi". In the high summer of 1695, there had been an Algerine embassy in Meknes, protesting at the border incursions of the previous two years. Its summary dismissal (103) provoked the massing of Turkish forces within the Tilimeānī march, a move which the French consul in Algiers could interpret in terms of war (104). In November, as a counter-move, Muhammad al-Alīm, who had slid back into his father's service, was sent eastward at the head of yet another abīd army, said to number four thousand (105). Three months later, in the February of 1696, the prince was ambushed by Turkish troops while he was on a minor tax raid. He was heavily defeated (106). The aftermath was a rumoured threat of invasion from the east (107).

This "Chergi" threat provoked a flurried redeployment of manpower. A force originally destined to accompany Zaydān towards...
a proposed vice-regality in Marrakesh was diverted towards the eastern march (108). The siege of Ceuta lapsed into subordinacy. Four thousand of its inhabitants are said to have been withdrawn thence and taken into the centrally constituted army (109). Yet more recruits were hauled into the sultan's service. Zaydan was belatedly sent to Marrakesh to raise thence a corps of five hundred cavalry; his adolescent brother Hafiz had orders to raise a similar number of troops from Tamesna and Dukkala; and other sons of Isma'il were despatched to various points of the empire (110), presumably upon similar errands. Once again, as in the aftermath of al-Mashari, the sultan was scouring his domains for men. The terms upon which these latest troops were gathered in are likely to have been those of impressment. And it may be thought, from the part "white" and part "black" make-up of a recent Saletin contingent pressed in for Ceuta (111), that in a crisis, the military role of the "pressed man" and that of the "military slave", newly taken, was impossible to differentiate. The two may have been distinguishable only along the hazy line of colour.

In the event, the newly pressed troops were not required to defend the eastern march. Isma'il was rescued from the threat of invasion by a turn of fortunes within the Regency. In the August of 1696, news came to Algiers of desertion from (112) and finally of mutiny within the Algerine mahalla in the Tilimsan march, with the

---

(108) S.I. 2nd France Vol. IV No. LXVII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sales 2/4/1696 pp. 401 and 402
(109) ibid. pp. 406-7
(110) ibid. pp. 405, 406 and 407
(111) S.I. 2nd France Vol. IV No. LI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed Sale, 24/12/1694 p. 316
(112) S.P. 71 (3) f. 677 Memo. of consul Cole, Algiers, 31/8/1696 N.S.
election there of a new Dey, who turned his troops eastwards upon the capital (113). This left the pathway open for a force of Isma'īl's own, under Mas'ūd ibn al-Nāṣirī, to carry out the fourth in a series of annual raids into Regency march territory (114). The force was rumoured to have reached "Dranie" before meeting any opposition sent out from Algiers (115).

However, southern crises developed and eventually swallowed many of the troops now available to Isma'īl. The autumn of 1696 saw an inept conspiracy within Marrakesh that involved the heir-presumptive Zaydān (116). The conspiracy had alleged Sūsī connections but, like all post-1677 disaffection based upon Marrakesh, as distinct from the ultramontane Sūsī heartland, it fizzled pathetically. Like other recent offences upon Zaydān's part (117), his role in this affair was dealt with as a youngster's peccadillo. The heir-presumptive suffered merely a spell within sanctuary, and recall from Marrakesh to Meknes (118). But the fact that the prince had been caught so swiftly by southern disaffection put an end to his vice-regality over "treacherous" (119) Murrākushī. And the affair seems to have

(113) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. LXXI Lemaire to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 31/8/1696 p. 425
(114) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. LXXIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 12/12/1696 pp. 436-7
(115) S.P. 71 (3) p. 685 Memo. of consul Cole, Algiers, 15/9/1696 N.S.
(116) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. LXXIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 12/12/1696 pp. 435-6
(117) For example, the murder of imperial officials in Fes, noted both by Jean-Baptiste Estelle (S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. LXI Memo. completed in Sale, 29/9/1695 p. 355) and, with a different chronology, by al-Zayyani ("Turjuman" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation.)
(118) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. LXXIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 12/12/1696 p. 436
(119) Isma'īl had a blanket opinion of Murrākushī and other southerners as traitors. In 1692, he explicitly confined negotiations with the French for the ransom of "Moorish" galley-slaves, to men born within towns of the "kingdom of Fes", and gave Murrākushī treachery as his reason for leaving unfortunate southern captives to their fate. (S.I. 2e France Vol. III No. CLI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Marseille, 2/3/1692 p. 457)
spawned more serious disturbances further south. By the spring of 1697, it could be claimed that the entire "kingdom of Sus" was in a state of disturbance sufficiently severe to warrant the despatching thither of a force of "blacks" estimated at six thousand (120). They were to re-inforce the former "Chergi" army of Mas'ud ibn al-Rami which had already been transferred southwards (121), presumably to the gross weakening of Isma'il's eastern flank.

The jihad necessarily lapsed into a state of comparative shadow, and could be said to lack "la chaleur qu'ona le comenca" (122). But there was no question of the siege of Ceuta being abandoned. By this date it supported a localised armaments industry, under the surveillance of an Irish renegade (123) who seems identifiable with the John Carr whom Braithwaite met thirty years later, when he and his "Foundery" had been absorbed into the palace economy of Meknes (124). The siege also pinned down imperial troops. The Ctabl were chiefly infantry, and therefore, presumably, low quality soldiery; but they were still maintained outside Ceuta in thousands, and were thought to outnumber the "Moors" of the besieging army (125).

During 1697, with forces split between Sus and jihad, Isma'il showed signs of approaching the exhaustion of his available manpower. Over the summer there were rumours that the petty siege of Melilla

(120) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. LXXXIX Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 1/5/1697 p. 489
(121) ibid. loc. cit.
(122) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. LXXXVIII Pierre Estelle to Pontchartrain, Tetuan, 29/4/1697 p. 477
(124) Braithwaite pp. 180, 185-6 and 196
(125) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CV Extracts from the printed "Nouvelles du Siege de Ceuta", based upon Dutch information issued in the Hague, and reproduced within the "Gazette de France". Information from the March and April of 1697 p. 540
had been abandoned (126). And in June, following the defeat of Mas'ud ibn al-Rumî in the Sus, the re-inforcements sent to him at first, under the command of Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Attar, were estimated in hundreds rather than in the customary thousands (127). However, in the July of 1697, it was alleged that a member of sultan's governing clan within Fes, the Rusî, had been appointed commander of a further army intended for the Sus (128). Significantly, this appointment coincided with the first stages of a remarkable legal tussle between the makhzan and leading Fasî 'ulama'.

In al-Zayyâni's chronicle material it was recorded that, during Dhû 'l-Hijja 1108, an Hegirian month crossing the May and June of 1697, there was sent to Fes an open imperial letter, addressed to the qâdi and to the 'ulama', and censuring their refusal to accept the sultan's legal ownership ("tamlik") of the cabîd listed within the diwan, or military register (129). During the following months, in the year A.H. 1109, there followed a second communication, formally demanding recognition of the sultan's rights to the tamlik of Fasî haratin (130)

(126) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. XCIX Pierre Estelle to Pontchartrain Tetuan, 30/7/1697
(127) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. XCIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale 16/6/1697 pp. 509 and 510
(128) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. CI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale 30/9/1697 pp. 527 and 529
(129) "Tur jumân" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarîf..." MS p. 41
(130) "warâda kitâb min 'indahu 'ala 'l-minbar" ("There came a letter from him concerning the ownership of Fasî haratin. It was read out from the pulpit") ("Tur jumân" loc. cit.)

A clue to the dating of this communication may be found within a private letter concerning the haratin, from whose date the year is missing, leaving only "the first day of Rabi", which for 1697 would have corresponded with the 17th, September. ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Isma'il to Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Qadir al-Fasî p. 57)
A storm of private correspondence seems to have been associated with these public communications. A portion of this correspondence, consisting of letters addressed to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi, survives in an accessible form (131). The afore-named recipient of these letters was an high civic dignitary. He lacked the precise status of an official functionary. But, as shaykh of the city zawiya of the al-Fasi, he represented the clerisy who were the moral leaders of the city. Further, he was son to the man who, in 1673, had led Isma'il by the hand to swear peace with Fes at the tomb of his brother al-Rashid (132). He was thus an appropriate diplomat for negotiations between sultan and city. And he had the additional significance of being closely associated with the organisation of jihad service by representatives of the Fasi civic militia (133).

The "al-Fasi" correspondence of July 1697 indicates urgency: imperial letters ranging in tone from the defensive to the unctuous were being despatched at intervals of a few days (134). The letters themselves do not spell out the precise occasion for this urgency. Indeed, one particularly detailed and querulous letter would imply that the sultan was currently incurring unaccountable legal opposition to a fait accompli. It suggests that the sultan was requesting merely

(131) Five of the "Lettres Inédites..., those numbered 10, 11, 12, 13 and 25 (pp. 48-57 and 70-72) would seem clearly to pertain to the crisis of 1697. Of these, the letters numbered 10 and 13 contain passages of particularly detailed argument.

(132) See Chapter II Pp. 97-8

(133) A ragged section of one imperial letter to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi, associates the "shaykh" with "those five hundred musketeers who were at Tangier" ("tilka al-khamsum'at al-rim-allati kanat bi-tanja", and with the forces currently outside Ceuta. ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Date imperfect p. 57)

(134) Thus, of the "Lettres Inédites..., No. 10 is dated from 25/ Dhu 'l-Hijja/1108 = 15/7/1697. Letter No. 11 dates from three days later, and letter No. 12 from three days later still ("Lettres Inédites..." pp. 50, 52 and 55)
a straightforward legal affirmation of his proprietorship of a slave force already in existence (135), and that in this matter, his concern was only for military discipline, as slaves had personal qualities of which the free soldier was devoid (136). The suggestion is too bland to explain controversy in 1697. For, as has been seen, efforts to obtain jurist signatures to the diwan of the abid had been made as early as 1693 (137), and had then met with no known difficulty. Indeed the sultan insisted that Muhammad ibn CAbd al-Qadir himself had lent his legal skills to an appropriate definition of the status of the "wusfan al-gaba'il" (138), presumably the rural "slave" recruits.

(135) "...intaqana minhum jundan bi-mujarrad ijtima'ihi min wasat gaba'ilihim, wa idkhalihim jund al-jaysh; ijtima'ina li-hadha il-jund min al-wusfan, wa qulna lihim an antum qultum la yasugh shira' na'ula'i al-wusfan"

(136) "wa l-wusfan min al-najda wa l-hazm wa l-qabiliya wa l-sabr ma laysa fī qhayrihim min al-qibr; wa hīna yajudda tarakhiyah min haḍī il-dabt alladhi huwa dalayhi aw falt la yashbiyya 'anha shay'; wa yestruka mā dekhala fīhi min diwan al-muslimin, wa yagidu qabilatahu"

(137) See present chapter Pp. 195-196

(138) "wqad tababa'ta amma wusfan al-qaba'il kullihā aw julliha hattā istahqatatum bi'il-milīb al-sharī' alladhi lam yahna li-qaba'il fīhi mā yaghulu"
taken into the army over the years since al-Mashārī. The correspondence of 1697 redounds with imperial castigation of contemporary scholars, "talabat al-waqt" (139), and implies a reversal of previously acquiescent attitudes.

This reversal seems explicable only as the outcome of a novel bid for the enlistment of slave troops from within Fas al-Bālī, a city previously exempt from such recruitment. The prospect of this recruitment could well have cast into a flurry of dismay the civic ulamā who had acquiesced, without blenching, in the practical crudities of impressment outside the city walls. A bid for Fasī slave recruits was certainly made, and may be equated with al-Zayyānī's note upon the sultan's demand for proprietorship of the "harātīn fasī". One letter from Ismā'īl to Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fasī specifically relates to "the quest for Fasī harātīn" ("al-bahth fī harātīn fasī") (140). It states that responsibility for this quest had devolved upon ʿAbd Allāh al-Rūsī (141), father to the Rūsī general who in the July of 1697 had been set in command of a Susī expedition, and who may therefore be presumed to have been in urgent need of troops from that date onwards. Significantly, ʿAbd Allāh al-Rūsī was himself the co-author of a letter to the al-Fasi shaykh which urged the shaykh to be amenable to the sultan's requests (142). Further memory of recruitment pressure put upon Fas is to be found within the

(139) "Lettres Inédites..." For such castigation see, in particular, letter No. 11: Ismā'īl to Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fasī, dated the 28/Dhu 'l-Hijja/1108 = 18/7/1697 pp. 50-52 passim.

(140) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Ismā'īl to Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fasī Date imperfect. p. 55

(141) Ibid. loc. cit.

(142) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 25 ʿAbd Allāh al-Rūsī and Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Wazīr to Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fasī, 9/Muharram/1109 = 28/7/1697 pp. 71-72
account of Isma'II's mass co-option of slaves as given by Windus. He recorded that the FasI, although "in some better Condition than the rest of the Country" had, at the culmination of Isma'II's great "Search", been approached by the sultan's officials (143).

To hinge the entire legal furor of 1697 upon the narrow issue of a civic quest, is to pose a minor problem of chronology. The first letters of the relevant correspondence with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-FasI date from the last month of 1108 A.H., rather than 1109 A.H., the year of the sultan's public claim to proprietorship of the haratin Fas. But it is possible that pragmatic attempts at impressment, together with a generalised "feeler" correspondence concerning the entire question of the "Iund min al-wusfan", antedated the formal claim for civic conscripts. The first surviving letter of Isma'II's to the al-FasI shaykh Muhammad contains a pointed reference to the current inadequacy of the military support which the sultan was obtaining from Fes along traditional lines of recruitment (144).

The tussle of 1697 brought sultan and city to loggerheads. The more placatory passages within the letter to the al-FasI shaykh Muhammad in which Isma'II expatiated upon his demand for haratin Fas, suggest that the sultan was meeting with powerful civic opposition

(143) Windus pp. 214 and 215-216

(144) (With reference to the city of Fes) "...hāluhā...min al-da'f kathīran hatta innānā qirāna'ā an nakharrūjā minhā alfaynā aw thalāthat 'alāf (lacuna) lā yuṣalid yun 'alayhi wa yazumūna inna kum lā yangūrūnā ʾalā '1-wusul li-hadha '1-ʾadad" ("Its condition...is frequently of such a debility that it gives us a refusal if we try to get two or three thousand men out of it (lacuna) they do not help in this matter, and they pretend that they are unable to reach this quota")

("Lettres Inédites..." No. 10, Isma'II to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-FasI 25/Dhu 'l-Hijja/1108 = 15/7/1697 p. 48)
to this demand. The strength of this opposition is likely to have been based upon the difficulty of isolating and categorising "haratin fès". The term "haratin" (eg. hartani) is highly ambiguous in its racial and social connotations. It can only be used with its full ramification of meaning within the context of oasean society, wherein it denotes the share-cropping serf-cultivators who characteristically form a sizeable, if depressed, sector of the population, and who are commonly dark-skinned (145). In the Fes of Isma'Cil's day, the term seems loosely to have covered Saharan immigrants. In this period, as in later centuries, Fes was broadly divided socially according to the criterion of complexion, and dominated by famâlies of "haute blanca". Del Puerto could maintain that the "Moros de Fez" were a "white" population who only admitted dark-skinned people into their society as a servant class (146). This was the potential source of civic dehiscence which the makhzan, in its demand for haratin, attempted to exploit. It was insisted that Isma'Cil's demands for recruitment were directed only at the city's "red-hided" oasean famine-migrants, lawless natural slaves, who were unfit to inhabit a sophisticated

(145) For an amplified discussion of the connotations of the term hartani/haratni, see Appendix A Pp. 335-337

(146) "...es toda la gente muy blanca, y no admiten negros, sino es para criados." (Del Puerto Bk. V. Ch. XLII p. 615)

In amplification of this note there may be cited a nineteenth century Gobineau-esque sketch of the Fasi population spectrum: "Le noyau...consiste en Maures...On les remarque à la couleur claire de leur peau et à leurs beaux traits distingués; ce sont des marchands habiles, tranquilles et dignes dans leur conduite...les couches inférieures de la population, les ouvriers, les postefai; les petits marchands, sont en grands partis des Negres esclaves liberes, des métis de Negres et d'Arabes..." D. Lenz: "Timbuktu" tr. Lehautcourt as "Timbuctou—Voyage au Maroc, au Sahara et au Soudan" (Paris, 1886 Vol. I p. 149)
urban environment (147). The combination of invective and flattery slurred over a dangerous demand. It may be supposed that the race-line was quite impossible to draw precisely, and that the threat of its imposition as a criterion for military impressment cast a broad shadow. Even though the sultan's own chancery-letter implied that persons of genealogical respectability would not be classed as slaves (148), it was made clear that the onus of proving genealogical immunity lay with the individual (149). Men of substance may well have been thereby threatened. For there were recognised

(147) "wa qad Calimta...ma tagaddama fī hadhā 'ilm-charb min al-zayoh wa 'l-fitan wa mā hiya al-Gāda fī 'l-nās min al-shu'ūl wa 'l-jawāl fī 'l-aqār, wa khawa'am fī hadhā 'ahl al-jīlāt. Famahma kanat mā 'at au masghaba....wa fīs hiya madīna kabīra wa hadira min al-hawādir. Yahūzū al-nās C al-īhīyāz ilayha 'l-tamaddun wa 'l-khayr wa 'l-sanā'ī... wa la yuhklaqū min ahl hadhā 'ilm-īldat al-rajaba min tamaddun wa tanūsī."

("And you know...what has happened here in the west, how there is misdoing and disorderliness, and how here it is the custom for the populace to work and to roam throughout the provinces. And this is especially typical of these red-hided folk, whenever there is famine or hunger....And Fes is a great city and a metropolis. The disposition of its people is towards civilisation and excellence and skills. Civilisation and society are not perfumed by people from this slave race.") ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Isma'il to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi. Date imperfect. p. 56)

(148) "wa lā ya'lamu bi 'l-farā'alladhī huwa minhu innahu ishtamala 'alayhi al-rīq" 

("...And if he does not know the clan to which he belongs, then let him be taken into slavery") ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 as cited above loc. cit. )

(149) "yajibu al-bāth wa 'l-taftīsh fī harātīn al-madīna min ajall hadhā mā nā li ya'rīfa kull wahid ayya asluhu wa ayya 'l-farā'alladhī huwa minhu"

("...It is necessary that there should be a quest and an investigation among the harātīn of the city, to establish, in the case of each and every one, his place of origin, and the clan to which he belongs.")

("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 as cited above loc. cit. )
oasean immigrants in Fes who were not men of the "sweeper" class to which Leo had drawn attention (150). In 1682, Isma'il had been able to demand rents from Filal residents of Fes whom he summarily ordered to leave the great city for the evacuated Jewish houses of old Meknes (151).

The sultan's argument on the harātīn fas, as expressed to shaykh Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir, was clinched by a superficially generous offer, tossed in the direction of the "white" burgesses: that a proportion of the city's militia of musketeers, the "rumāt fas", currently liable for jihad service outside Ceuta, should be replaced by "red-hides" who would be military wusfan in the eyes of the law (152). This was an adroit suggestion. Jihad service was more often irksome than glorious. Over the past fourteen years it had involved Fāsi contingents in cannon-dragging, coast-guarding and camping outside the Ceuta walls. And it was the responsibility of established family men, who were expected to supply their own rations and gunpowder (153). The provision of a substitute warrior was already the customary and lawful mode of evading such service (154).

(150) Thus, of the "Beni Gümî" whose home territory lay 150 miles to the south-east of "Segelmesse", it was noted that "gli habitatori sono poveri e fanno ogni vil mestiero in Fez", The inhabitants of "Segelmesse" itself were likewise a "...vill popolo: e quando vanno fuori, fanno tutto li vil mestieri" (Leo ed. Ramusio f. 74)

(151) "Nashr al-Mathāni..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV p. 349

(152) "... (lacuna) wa min hadda naṭabiru mas'ala shmar al-jild hadda
(lacuna) rumāt fas yagādāmu fi salahihim, wa nahnu nakhlafu
lihiCAD ādahum min al-wusfan alladhīnīa hum jund, allah subhānahu
("...thus we have a solution to the problem of these "red-hides"...
( ) The Fāsi musketeers should come forward as is appropriate, but we are setting up a substitute force of like number, from among the slaves who are part of the army, God be praised for it!"
("Lettres Inédites..." No. 13 Isma'il to Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Fāsi
Date imperfect, p. 57)


(154) ibid. loc. cit.
This offer of mass substitution, on the sultan's terms, could have been designed to expose the Fasi "clergy" to pressure from the Fasi "laity". For it was the "laity" who were bound to perform *jihad*-service. The rank and file of the clerisy, *fuqaha*, *shura* and members of religious fraternities, were customarily exempt from the obligation (155).

The offer was not taken up. There were, of course, individual *ulama* willing to be accommodating. There survives a letter from one unknown *alim* to Muhammad ibn *Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi*, urging complaisance, and insisting upon the security of the sultan's legal ground (156). But, as a body, the lawmen stood sufficiently firm to be castigated *en masse*, during the following Hegiran year (157). There is no evidence that Muhammad ibn *Abd al-Qadir* himself ever yielded to the sultan a truly conciliatory reply. His only known *fatwa* upon the question of impressment asserted that received opinion was unanimous as to the freedom of any man whose slave status could not be proven (158): a noble and accurate delineation of the relevant

(156) Anonymous letter quoted in translation by Muhammad El-Fasi: "Biographie de Moulay Ismaïl" p. 16
(157) "wa fī tam 1110 fa'it kitab al-sultan li-Fasī, yandehu al-ḥamma wa yadhumu al-ʿulama"("And in the year 1110 there came a communication to Fes from the sultan, praising the populace, but castigating the clerisy")
(158) "wa amma man lam tathbut ragīyatuhu li-ahad, fāla kalām la-nā fīhi iḥd la-ḥiṣār fī mukhiṣi amr nafṣīhi. wa la tasallata. li-ahad al-ṣāliḥi bi-bay wa la bi-chawrihi. li-anna al-ṭalī fī iľ-nūs huwa al-hurrīya."("As for any man for whom the status of a slave is not established, we cannot say otherwise than that there is unanimity concerning his ownership, as regards his own person. He may not be subordinated to any authority, by sale or by any other process. For the fundamental human condition is one of freedom.") Muhammad El-Fasi: "Biographie de Moulay Ismaïl" Appendix p. 29 cf. pp. 19-20 of the main French text.
tenet of Islamic fiqh (159), to be appreciated, in spite of its author's previous co-operation with the sultan's policy of slave conscription outside the walls of Fes. The gādi of Fes, Bardalla, a makhzan appointee with less of a facility for intransigence than the al-fāṣi šaykh, seems likely to have shifted his ground uneasily in reaction to the sultan's demands. A fatwa which he had sent to the sultan by the late July of 1697 was apparently acquiescent (160). But his temporary demotion during the following year (161) would suggest that, throughout the crisis as a whole, he proved himself less than fully co-operative. In the sultan's legal defence, Akansūs asserted that Isma'īl had taken pains to obtain fatwās that were favourable to the building up of his army, from the "Mashriq" as well as the "Maghrib" (162). Such endeavour seems to under-write the weakness rather than the strength of the backing which the sultan could obtain from his own lawmen.

There is no evidence that these lawmen met with any "lay" pressure towards compliance. Windus, in his own quaintly Whiggish terms, summed up Fāṣi resistance as defiantly communal, a defence


(160) fa-la budd min...tashihikim li-mā tadammānathu 'l-ahwab allatī waradat min qabul 'l-gādi bardalla wa sahibi idh la yikunyu al-i 'tinad ala mujarrad fatawāhuma duna mutala'atikim wa gubulikim"

("For it is essential that...your corrected interpretation should for this reason go along with answers already received from the gādi Bardalla and his companion, as it is impossible to place confidence in the fatwās of these two alone, without your pronouncement and assent.") ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 12 Isma'il to Muhammad ibn Ābd al-Ġadir al-Ġašī, 2/Muharram/1109 = 21/7/1697 p. 53)

(161) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 41

of "Liberties" much dearer than "Lives or Estates" (163). Less oratorically, Fasi rejection of the sultan's demands may be interpreted as appreciation that these demands amounted to the "thin end of a wedge". The years 1693 and 1696 are known both to have been noted for heavy-handed impressment of slave troops. During the summer of 1697, when the threat of such impressment seems first to have been imposed upon Fes, the degree and complexity of the sultan's real and potential military involvement in "Cherg", Sus and jihād alike, would have made it clear that conscription along any established pattern would be an on-going process. To grant to the sultan the right to recruit inhabitants of Fes as members of a slave corps, rather than members of a free citizen militia, was a concession heavy with the capacity for escalation.

Moreover, the demand came at a point when there was a relatively low correlation between the demands of sultan and city. The sultan could insist that the military support he was demanding was the foundation of the khilāfa divinely laid upon him (164). He could complain that relations with Fes were not as they had been in the days of his brother al-Rashīd, and recall the relative strength of

(163) Windus p. 216

(164) "wa lā ya'zību c an thāqīb fahmikīm ma aqāmānā 'llāh fīhi min hadhā 'l-mansīb allāhi aqāmānā wa tawwaqānā min hamīl a'brā' hadhā 'l-khila'fā...naṣarna fī 'l-iund allāhī calavhi madār asās al-khila'fā"

("A man of your piercing intellect will not have forgotten what God determined for us in connection with this office to which he appointed us. He hung about our neck the task of bearing the burden of this regency...and we recognised, in the army, the foundation of the regency, to which it is the core.")

("Lettres Inédites No. 10 Isma'Il to Muhammad ibn Ābd al-Gādir al-Fasī 25/Dhū 'l-Ḥijja/1108 = 15/7/1697 p. 48")
military aid granted by the city to that former sultan (165). In its political context this argument seems naive. As has been noted, al-Rashid had been, in effect, the "sultan of Fes", keeping court within that city, moulding policies that were in accordance with Fasi interests, and ploughing back into his capital a proportion of the profits of his inexorably successful warfare. In 1697, Isma'Il, the "sultan of Meknes", confronted Fasi civic leaders comparatively as a failure, and as a ruler whose policies cut across civic interests. The sultan's bid to maintain control of the turbulent Sus seems to have been associated with the threat that inhabitants of the city would be swallowed into military slavery. The once-successful prosecution of the jihad had, in the siege of Ceuta, come to be waged as an expensive and fruitless cannonade that made no more than banal ideological sense. And, most significantly for Fes, the sultan's eastward adventures had been unprofitable. They had failed to bring Tlemsen within the western orbit. In 1692 they had brought a Turkish army to within two days' journey of the city walls. And they had come to hamper the commerce of Fasi merchants. The mid 1690s were a period of rolling agricultural glut for the "kingdom of Fes" (166). Yet, eastward tensions had

(165) (With reference to Fasi troops) "...gasārū an al-Qaddār
al-mawṣūf lihim qablu fī ayyam akhīna 'l-rashīd"
("They fall short of the number agreed earlier, in the days of our brother al-Rashid") ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 10 Isma'Il to Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi 25/Dhu 'l-Hijja/1108 = 15/7/1697, p. 48)

(166) In a general account of Morocco, dating from 1698, Jean-Baptiste Estelle described the "kingdom of Fes" as the granary of Isma'Il's entire empire, and noted that the previous four years had seen a particularly low price for grain: forty sous to the quintal. (S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dating from the October of 1698 p. 696)
brought Isma'Il to veto the provisions trade with the Regency (167), probably the one trade in which the Maghrib al-Aqsa had the edge over eastern neighbours (168).

It is improbable that relations between Isma'Il and Fes ever fully mended after 1697. Such evidence as exists for the period following 1697 goes to suggest that the spasmodic cordiality discernable for the earlier part of Isma'Il's reign, was at an end. Indeed, henceforward it is possible tentatively to trace a pattern of overall deterioration in relations between sultan and city, bound up with the sultan's successive demands for military and financial aid. The downward slide saw particularly acute crises in 1708, and again in 1718. It saw its logical culmination, after Isma'Il's death, in the effective mid-eighteenth century shift of the major Alawi centre of government from Saïs to Marrakesh.

Yet in the summer of 1697, there could be a flicker of hope. Isma'Il's eastward embarrassment diminished briefly. The previous four summers of "Chergi" ravaging by Maghribi troops had come to

(167) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. CI Memo of J-B. Estelle, completed Sale, 30/9/1697 p. 530

(168) Lemprière, at the end of the eighteenth century, was to record the disadvantage to Maghribi traders upon the pilgrimage route that stemmed from "The manufactures indeed of both ALGIERS and TUNIS" being brought to a greater perfection than those of MOROCCO" (p. 346). It is unlikely that the gradient in quality was any different a century earlier. However the climate of northern Morocco gave it, in European eyes, a cornucopian capacity for agricultural production. It is known that the Regency was accustomed to purchase provisions from the west. Thus, in the August of 1706, there was an Algerine complaint against the French capture of a peaceful vessel sent from Algiers "vers les côtes du Chérif de Maroc, pour y acheter du blé" (Husayn Day to Vauvray tr. Péris de la Croix and quoted E. Plantet: "Correspondance des Days..." Vol. II p. 50)
provoke a diplomatic protest from Constantinople (169), one of the rare occasions upon which the Porte deigned to grant to the "sharif of Fes" (170) diplomatic attention of its own initiation. On the feast day of "Arafa 1108, which corresponded to the 29th June 1697, a deputation presented Isma'il with a letter from the Ottoman sultan, adjuring him to make peace with the Algerine Turks. Isma'il appears to have complied with the behests of the embassy with an ingratiating haste. He loaded the chief envoy with gifts, and granted the party an escort overland back to Algiers (171). Open commercial relations with the Regency were re-established in September (172).

The "Chergi" peace set Isma'il free for a short time to concentrate upon the Sus, where his troops were opposing "Zacatin" whom the sultan had once called his "uncle" (173), but who was now a major dissident commander (174). Government forces had fallen back northwards, and were attempting to assert control over a prime Suesi strategic point: the mountain gasba of Tamanart, set where the High Atlas ranges fall towards the coast, and said by

---


The suggestion within the "Bustan al-Zarif..." (MS p. 41) that there was a double protest, over the Hegiran years 1107 and 1108, is associated with the name of an anachronistic Ottoman sultan, and appears to be the result of textual confusion. On this point, the "Tur iuman" (p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation) is equally to be discredited, as it attaches the name of yet another anachronistic Ottoman sultan to its dating of a single embassy to the year 1107 A.H. (12th. August 1695-30th. July 1696).

(170) See A. Cour: "L'établissement des dynasties..." p. 207, for an account of Isma'il's attempt, early in the eighteenth century, to ingratiate himself at the Porte, and of the Ottoman ruler's refusal to allow him the title of "sultan".


(172) S.I. 2e France Vol. IV No. CI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed Sale, 30/9/1697 p. 530

(173) See Chapter III p. 147

(174) Busnot pp. 80-81
Jean-Baptiste Estelle to dominate the main Meknes-Guinea routeway (175). Here, traders and governor alike were defying the sultan for the first time in eight years, in a stance which had warranted the withdrawal of John Carr, the master-bombardier, from outside Ceuta, and his posting to Tamanart (176). In the autumn of 1697, \(^{0}\)Alawi princes, firstly Zaydān (177) and secondly Muhammad al-\(^{0}\)Alim (178) were despatched to the Sus. The latter prince would seem to have been the more successful general. He was credited, in addition, with having won the trust of customarily skittish southern peoples (179).

However, it was to be impossible to consolidate government of the Sus from Meknes before the "Cherg" was re-activated as a sphere of war. An highly placed but maverick prince, \(^{0}\)Ali, third son to Isma\(^{\text{Il}}\) and \(^{0}\)Ayisha Mubārka (180), had gone over to Algiers during the summer of 1697. At the opening of 1698, he came back westwards to the Tilimsānī march, at the head of an Algerine raiding party (181). The intrusion betokened more than a family squabble. Relations between Isma\(^{\text{Il}}\) and Fes were still tense, and the "Cherg" was the politically sensitive region which, within living memory, had launched al-Rashīd to power, and to the capture of Fes. Peace between the sultan and economic capital was therefore patched up.

---

(175) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed in Sale, 30/9/1697 p. 529
(176) ibid. pp. 527 and 529
(177) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CIII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain Sale, 23/10/1697 p. 535
(178) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CVIII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain Sale, 23/11/1697 pp. 549 and 550
(180) Breithwaite p. 20 cf. Anon. "Relation de ce qui c'est passe dans le Royaume du Maroc depuis 1727 jusqua'en 1737" (Paris, 1742) p. 222
Both sources describe \(^{0}\)Ali as being full-brother to Isma\(^{\text{Il}}\)'s successor Ahmad al-Dhahabī, known to have been full-brother to Zaydān.
Windus recorded that, in 1698, Isma'īl abandoned, for the time being, his efforts at obtaining slaves from Fes, "ordered" the citizens "to pay one hundred Quintals of Plate, and gave over his Search;" (182). The fine was accompanied by a gesture of displeasure: the demotion of the qādī and of the shuḥūd, or official civic notaries (183). But the demotion of the qādī may only have been a token disgrace. Bardalla is known to have been back in office during the following decade (184).

Meanwhile, at the military level, the sultan initiated counter-moves against Ālī and his Regency troops. The swift intensity of the father's reaction contrasts remarkably with the inaction which, four years previously, had greeted Muhammad al-Ālī's flight to the Filālī Ayt Ātta, and the indulgence with which Zaydān's Mūrākushī plotting of 1696 had been met (185). Further troops were withdrawn from Ceuta, whose besieging force, by February 1698, is said to have stood at half the size of that of the previous spring (186). And successive contingents were drawn up from the Sus. At the end of January, Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Čātār came north (187). In February he was followed by Zaydān (188). And, lastly, Mustād ibn al-Rāmī was brought back to his old "Chergi" posting (189). The departure of these three generals left Muhammad al-Ālī as sole major custodian of the Sus, a natural successor to "Zacatin" who had been quietly

---

(182) Windus p. 216
(183) "Rustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 41
(184) al-Zarhuni of Tesart ed./tr. Justinard p. 163
(185) See the present chapter p. 209
(186) S.I. 2ª France Vol. IV No. CXVIII Extract from the "Nouvelles du Siège de Ceuta", for the month of February 1698 (p. 717) The information is alleged to have been obtained from a "Moorish" captive.
(188) ibid. p. 598
eliminated (190). At a less rigorous moment it had been said that his father dared not leave this charming prince for more than two months together in the same region (191). Now, with no fellow-custodians to watch over him, he had been left in command of the empire's most potentially breakaway region. Fortuitously, the sultan had set up a framework for a division of his own empire that would not be of his own making.

Northern affairs remained sufficiently complex for Muhammad to be left in Susi isolation. Campaigns of 1698 failed to eliminate °Ali from the "Cherg" (192). Meanwhile the jihad diversified. The siege of Ceuta was still maintained, muttering spasmodically, and showing a brief flare-up over the summer (193). But the vital area of confrontation between the sultan and Christendom shifted from land to sea, and from attack to defence. In the May of 1698, the French naval commander Coetlogon was sent out against the Sale corsair fleet (194). By this date, such a move was a declaration of political and economic war upon Isma'il himself.

During the 1690s, the sultan's interests had come to overlay the corsair activities of his subjects. At Martil, the port of Tetuan, there was mounted in 1693 a project for constructing a fleet which might police the straits of Gibraltar, and raid the coasts of Spain (195). Three vessels were ultimately built (196). Sale also saw a

(190) "Ockley" p. 55
(193) S.I. 2® France Vol. IV No. CXLVIII Extracts from the "Nouvelles du Siège de Ceuta" covering the period Feb.-Nov. 1698 pp. 717-721
(194) S.I. 2® France Vol. IV No. CXXII Instructions from Louis XIV to Coetlogon, Versailles, 28/5/1698 pp. 617-619
(195) S.I. 2® France Vol. III No. CLXXI Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan 17/2/1693 p. 559
(196) S.P. 71 (16) f. 93 Memo. of Mr. Corbiere, 12/5/1713
period of ship-building by the sultan's order (197). As is well-known (198) Sale also saw the effective imperial monopolisation of corsair activity. In 1690, there had been six Saletin corsair vessels, of which two, said to be the worst-armed, had been the sultan's property (199). However, the seven Saletin vessels of 1698 were effectively Isma'il's fleet; he was owner of all but one. The exception was the property of his admiral 'Abd Allah ibn 'Ayisha (200), who, as the empire's sole corsair of note had, during the 1690s emerged as one of its magnates (201).

But the sultan's personal interest in corsair activity did not mean that the sultan now considered the ports a strategic priority. In response to the demonstration of the French flag before Sale, he procrastinated. In the September of 1698, he allowed for the arrangement of an eight-month truce, by negotiation with d'Estrees, Coetlogon's successor in command, and sent ibn 'Ayisha as ambassador to France. The backing-and-forth of the eventually fruitless negotiations at Versailles (202) suggest that the admiral was personally far more concerned than was his Meknes-based master for the elimination of the French naval threat, but that he dared not

(197) S. I. 2° France Vol. IV No. XXVII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain Sale, 6/12/1693 pp. 233–4
(198) See Brignon et al: "Histoire du Maroc..." pp. 247–8, for speculation upon the depressant economic significance of this development for Saletin corsair activity.
(199) S. I. 2° France Vol. III No. CXIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Sale, directed by way of Marseille, 19/7/1690 p. 318
(200) S. I. 2° France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dated to October 1698 pp. 705–6
(201) "Ockley" p. 55
(202) A summary and attempted analysis of these negotiations, stressing French redemptionist concerns, forms an introduction to the fifth volume of "Les Sources Inédites..." 2° Série, ed. Ph. de Cossé-Brissac (Paris, 1953) pp. 1–10. This volume is dominated by texts relating to the ibn 'Ayisha embassy, an unwarrantably over-exposed episode whose consequences for the Maghrib al-Aqsa were negative and peripheral. Its most interesting feature was ibn 'Ayisha's seizing the opportunity for sounding out the possibilities of private and peaceful commercial adventuring with a French merchant house.
agree to the relatively bleak terms he was offered. These contained no suggestion that munitions, as well as "Moorish" captives might be bartered for French captives, along the pattern which would be entertained by the English and Dutch, who were not obliged to nod to the papal ban upon arms trading with the infidel (203). By holding out, in hope for the supply of French munitions, Isma'il was, in the long run, inviting French attack from the sea.

In the spring of 1699, Mas'ud ibn al-Ramî was able to penetrate "Oranie", and to persuade the insubordinate prince 'Ali first to parley, and then to return to his father in Meknes (204). Isma'il presumably feared any repetition of princely meddling in the "Cherg" as a stratagem for advancement, and took up the attitude that 'Ali's return had been made too much of a royal progress. 'Ali was threatened with execution, and given the exemplary, but very real physical punishment of a musket-shot drag at the mule-tail. Fines were imposed upon Mas'ud ibn al-Ramî, who might be thought to have served his master well, and upon those members of the al-Rusi clan who had welcomed the prince as he passed through Fes (205).

The sultan's public torment of his own son opened what is likely to have been a period of unease in high circles: a period of "the pageant of the sultan malignant" in which show-piece executions became policy. Isma'il's régime was, of course, popularly famed.

---

(203) Busnot p. 8 cf. S.P. 71 (15) ff. 1-185 (first notation) passim, for documentation covering peace negotiations of 1700 and the aftermath, carried out by 'Ali ibn Abd Allah of Tetuan, on behalf of Isma'il, with representatives of William III of Orange. These resulted, over four years, in the ransom of over two hundred English, Dutch and Huguenot captives.


(205) ibid. p. 270
during his lifetime and later, for being that of a blood-boltered ogre (206). And indeed, his style of government was never devoid of casual killings (207), or of the liquidation of dangerous political figures, of which the elimination of the once-beloved "Zasatin" had provided a recent example. But the public execution of a notable, as an instrument of state, had been alien to Isma'-Il's rule for a period of twenty years preceding 1699. Its last known victim had been the wazir al-Manzar, whose execution had followed the sultan's disastrous 1679 winter passage of the High Atlas (208). The punishment of Ali was politically rather than personally vindictive. The prince seems thereafter to have lived within Meknes in ease and favour (209). But his first fate marked the beginning of a series of carefully staged pieces of "frightfulness", and of selective victimisation, presumably designed to encourage an obedience upon which Isma'-Il no longer had the self-assurance to rely. Consequently, fear for life within high circles may be seen as one strand to the subsequent political history of Isma'-Il's empire.

In the June of 1699, 'Abd Allah ibn 'Ayisha returned to Sale, loud with complaints of French duplicity (210). The truce was

(206) Thus an English consul in Algiers, presumably reflecting popular contemporary Algerine opinion, could say of Isma'-Il: "that Inhumane monster diverts himself after dinner by killing his people about him as Domitian did Flies" (sic) (S.P. 71(3) Memo of Baker, Algiers 7/1/1691-2 0.S. f. 455)

(207) The number of these was always prone to vertiginous exaggeration. In one area susceptible to investigation in detail, that relating to Christian captives, Koehler, after a close examination of the Miknas Christian burial register, noted that, in forty years, 109 captives were recorded as having met their deaths by the sultan's hand or order: a number of unfortunates that is minimal by comparison with easy customary relevant estimates in thousands. ("Quelques points d'histoire sur les captifs..."
p. 184)

(208) See Chapter III Pp. 120-121

(209) Windus p. 181

(210) S.I. 2° France Vol. V No. LI "Journal de Louis Bermond" Note for the 10/6/1699 p. 311
ended, and the sultan's Saletin fleet resumed full-scale depredations. Indeed it was expanded. By the end of the year, its numbers had increased from seven to ten (211). Care concerning the possibility of reprisal was tossed aside. In November 1699, a letter to Louis XIV ranted its assertion that bombardment from a French fleet was likely to fall only on open plain ("al-faṣīḥ min al-arḍ") and palm-trees, and that it was therefore impossible to threaten the sultan as neighbouring Barbary powers could be threatened (212). From a ruler based at Meknes, this was hyperbole thrown out from a nub of hard strategic truth (213). But it invited attack from the sea, at a period when the military demands of Sus and "Cherg" were escalating yet again.

Within both regions, it was essentially rural resistance to CAlaṭ authority that was increasing. In the Sus, Muḥammad al-CAlīm, still his father's vice-roy, was, by the opening of 1700, rumoured to have been driven back upon Tarudant by hordes of mountain "Chleuh" (214). By the following spring, there were similar rumours of massive disaffection within the eastern march, mounted by "Arabes"

(211) S.I. 2° France Vol. V No. LXXX Description of Sale by the S. de la Maisonfort, Rouen, 28/12/1699 p. 520

(212) "aw zannu an va mālūna nahnu kā-ahl tūnis wa tarābulus wa adālāt al-jazā'īr, fa-nahnu wa 'l-hām al-lāh ma ġindanā shay'i bi 'l-kušta" ("Do they think that they can deal with us as with the people of Tunis and Tripoli, or with the garrison of Algiers? Praise be to God that there is nothing of importance to us along the coast.") (S.I. 2° France Vol. V No. LXXII Isma'il to Louis XIV 12/Jumada 1/1111= 5/11/1699 p. 460)

(213) It may be compared with the tale passed on by Burel, that Sayyidī Muḥammad III had once asked the French consul Salva for an estimate of the cost to Louis XIV's government of an expedition aimed at the destruction of his coastal fortresses, and then mockingly offered to destroy them himself for half the price ("Mémoire Militaire..." pp. 66-7)

who had rallied to the token Turkish force of occupation currently based there (215). This disaffection seems to mark a second collapse of the "Oranie" taxation-frontier, as re-established in 1693. The collapse may be seen as a consequence of events of the previous three years: Isma'Il's open capitulation to the Ottoman embassy of 1697, which had returned to Algiers by way of the "Cherg"; and the subsequent adventuring of 'Ali within the region, which may have aroused disturbance that far outran his personal removal from the scene. In Sale, the deterioration of Isma'Il's "Chergi" authority could be said to threaten the sultan's relations with an already bitterly malcontent Fes (216). And, over the following year, Isma'Il would once again treat the "Cherg" as an area of increasingly vital military concern: a testing ground for the efficiency of his authority.

In the May of 1700, the sultan was said to have sent all his available cavalry into the "Cherg" (217), while 'Abd al-Din infantry, under the black qa'id Malik, was despatched to Tangier, which had come under threat from a French squadron (218). At the beginning of July came a two-day bombardment of Tangier. This was Morocco's first recent experience of real, as distinct from looming aggression from the sea, and an example of the growing advance of Europe in the

(215) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. XCI Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 25/5/1700 (p. 149) (The author was in name, if not title, the successor to Jean-Baptiste Estelle in Sale. He was a protege of 'Abd Allah ibn 'Ayisha's French commercial partner.) cf. for the relatively small scale of the Turkish force within the rural "Cherg", i.e. "fifty tents" consul Durand to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 20/8/1700, quoted in de Grammont: "Correspondance des consuls d'Alger" in "Revue Africaine" Vol. XXXI (Paris, 1887) pp. 437-8

(216) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. XIII Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, as above loc. cit.

(217) ibid. loc. cit.

(218) ibid. loc. cit.

cf. S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 4/8/1700 p. 197
tactical use of naval warfare. An eyewitness from a French vessel could describe the enemy, "nègre" and "Moraille", wading into the sea, evidently expecting a musket-exchange with a landing-party, but subjected instead to cannon-fire from the calm distance of a musket shot and an half (219). The alien fleet was still in adjacent waters at the end of July (220). But Ismāʿīl's landward interests prevailed. He withdrew the force of ʿabīd infantry from the coast, and there was concomitant news that horses were being levied from throughout the empire (221). This suggests that the sultan attempted hastily to issue his infantry with mounts, before sending them eastwards. The urgency implied by the use of ill-trained troops is likely to have resulted from opportunism. The main forces of the Regency were set to face the Tunisian march (222). This involvement of al-Ḥājj Mustafā Dey at a far distance may be thought to have aroused in Ismāʿīl hope for an untrammelled opportunity to refurbish his eastern frontier.

One rogue ʿAlawi prince, ʿAlī, had already disturbed his father's interests in the "Cherg". The opportunity would not be offered to another. Zaydān, so far from taking the eastern command, and leading a raid upon Mascara, as the indigenous tradition would suggest (223), was at this point denied the leadership of troops for the "Cherg" (224), who were left to the ultimate authority of Masʿud ibn al-Rāmī. In

(219) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XVI Extract from the "Journal du Chevalier de Fabreuges" on board the galley "Victoire", 4-5/7/1700 pp. 171-2
(220) ibid. for the 29/7/1700 p. 180
(221) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closérie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 4/8/1700 p. 197
(222) de Grammont: "Histoire d'Alger..." p. 270
(223) "Tur.iuman" pp. 25-6 of the text and 48 of the translation of, "Bustan al-Zarîf..." MS pp. 41-2
(224) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closérie to Pontchartrain, as above loc. cit.
the September of 1700, while on a minor tax-raid, this general was surprised and defeated by the Algerine battalion of the march. He was perhaps mindful of the fate of Ālī, the prince whom he had conducted back to Meknes the previous year, and also of the fine which he himself had recently paid: for he deserted immediately to the Algerines (225). Meanwhile the main forces of the Dey were still operating far to the east, pitted against a Tunisian invading army which they defeated, on the routeway from Constantine to Algiers, in early October (226). At this stage of events, Isma'īl can be seen as drawn on by the bait of continuing opportunity, and driven on by the loss of his leading "Chergi" commander. To extricate himself from this quandary, the sultan made a move unparalleled since 1693. He left a junior son Hafiz as vice-roy in Meknes (227), and went out into the "Cherg" to take command of his troops in person. He reached the march in mid-winter (228).

At first, Isma'īl's "Chergi" aims would appear to have been restricted, rural and strictly punitive: in sum, a forcible bid at maintaining his taxation frontier at its outermost limit. Tlemcen was ignored. The Ālī mahalla skulked within the western reaches of the Regency, bedevilling the cold seed-time of agricultural hill-peoples (229). Its activities soon roused Algiers. In the January of

(225) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. XX Manier de la Closarie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 19/9/1700 pp 206-
(227) Del Puerto Bk. VI Ch. XL p. 804
(228) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. XXVI Durand to Pontchartrain Algiers, 16/2/1701 p. 241
(229) ibid. loc. cit. Consul Durand's February estimate of Isma'īl's distance from Algiers as "trois grandes journées" could have been gleaned from over-alarmist city-gossip. It contains the repetitive Algerine number three, which had adorned the "Daftar al-Tashrif" (See. P. ) Yet the rumour does indicate that Isma'īl had ventured way beyond bounds acceptable to Algiers.
1701, the Algerine diwan resolved that the Dey should carry out a spring campaign against Isma'il (230). This campaign was to be less deliberate and comprehensive than that of 1692. On this occasion there was no naval transport of the troops who were to combat the Alawi menace; the Algerine corsair fleet was sent eastwards to bring back Regency forces remaining in the Tunisian march (231). But in February an interim force was sent overland against Isma'il (232). And al-Hajj Mustafa Dey moved westwards in the following April (233). With him were all three "Beys" of the Regency of Algiers. Yet the estimated size of his army, sixteen thousand, was compact by comparison with that of Isma'il: its core was made up of six thousand Turks, of whom five thousand were infantry (234).

It was probably disparity in numbers which led Isma'il, at this point, into the greatest miscalculation of his military career. The sultan was generally reckoned to have agglomerated an army of cavalry that significantly outnumbered the Turkish force (235). Abandoning the caution of half a lifetime, Isma'il took this following out along the road to Algiers, to meet the advancing...
Dey at Djidioua (236). There his army, ill-disciplined, ill-armed and ill-supplied (237) was cut to pieces in an afternoon (238) by the veteran Turkish infantry (239). Its survivors had to retreat through the march country of peoples whose coming harvest Isma'il had spent the previous four months trying to ruin. The physical horror of this retreat stains even the muted record of the campaign allowed to survive within al-Zayyani's texts; these elide the defeat, but note that numbers of Maghribi soldiers died of thirst on their return journey towards SaSa (240).

For Isma'il himself, rumoured to have been wounded in the field (241), the episode was crucial, both as regards eastward ambition, and as regards the sultan's mode of government. After Djidioua, Isma'il accepted a "Chergi" frontier at the river Tafna, and sent his east-bound troops no further than Snassen country. And he abandoned personal campaigning; there is no record of his ever having commanded an haraka after 1701. At its limits, Isma'il's empire

---


The toponyms cited in both texts indicate a battle-site as noted above, along the Mascara-Algiers routeway, and near to the river Cheliff. Buonot set the battle in the region of "Tremezen". This asserts ill with his own account of the over-extended supply-lines of Isma'il's troops (pp. 85-6)


This latter text reported poverty in arms and supplies among "Alewî" troops in the "Cherg", for a date as early as the August before the battle.

(238) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XXIX Extract from the "Gazette de France" 21/5/1701 loc. cit.

(239) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI p. 250 (Note 2). Durand to Pontchartrain Algiers, 22/6/1701

(240) "Turjuman" p. 26 of the text and 48 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 42

(241) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XXIX Extract from the "Gazette de France" 21/5/1701 loc. cit.
continued fiscally and politically dependent upon the haraka; at its heart, for the next quarter-century, there was a palace-ruler.
CHAPTER VII: THE PALACE RULER

"Vivre dans une habitation fixe, c'est le plus grand des malheurs: c'est sur le dos des chevaux que se trouve la place du Sultan." (1)

The indigenous tradition of al-Zayyanī, broadly accepted by major secondary sources, would divide Ismā'īl's reign into two periods: an era of successful internal military effort, followed by an era of comparative ease and security (2). This viewpoint has spawned a complex of subsidiary problems: queries as to why Ismā'īl, the pacifier of his realms, was unable, during the latter phase of his reign, to establish an Alawī state more viable than the polity which dissolved at his death into an anarchy torn by his fratricidal sons (3).

There is indeed a case for seeing Ismā'īl's reign as divided into two. But Ismā'īl's last personal campaign, which culminated in the defeat at Djidioua, provides the most illuminating point of division. The milestone significance of this battle does not only rest in its transformation of the sultan into a palace ruler. By making defeat the pivot of Ismā'īl's reign, it lends to the latter half of that reign a perspective that is grim rather than triumphant. This perspective dissipates the need for speculation as to Ismā'īl's short-comings as a state-builder over the long term. During the latter


(2) "Turijumān" p. 25 of the text and 46 of the translation cf. Terrasse Vol. II p. 260 and 263-4 cf. Ch.-A. Julien p. 229 cf. Brignon et al. p. 244. Of the secondary authors, even Terrasse the most cautious, allows to Ismā'īl a latter day "vingtaine d'années de paix" (p. 264)

(3) See, for example, Terrasse Vol. II pp. 277-9 cf. Brignon et al. pp. 245-6
half of the reign, the warrior credibility of the ageing sultan's
government may be seen as ever open to question. The interest of
this period centres upon the tactics by which the palace ruler
maintained his authority.

Understanding of this entire second half of Isma'il's reign
is, as has been noted (4), bedevilled by the problem of meagre
source material. Indigenous chronicle coverage of the period is
thin, and there survives no contemporary alien commentary of the
calibre that Germain Mouette and Jean-Baptiste Estelle provide for
periods within the seventeenth century. It is therefore possible
to give only a comparatively and increasingly brief resume of
Isma'il's latter years.

These years began with a period during which Isma'il was
subjected to internal military challenge. The battle of Djidioua,
in April 1701, touched off a major escalation in Susi secession.
Thereafter, the old tri-partite pattern of an imperial military
concern divided between "Cherg", Sus and "jihad", was superseded.
The sultan's military investment in "jihad" and "Cherg" shrivelled
away, and the politics of the Maghrib al-Aqsa came to be dominated
by the question as to whether the Sus would be maintained as part
of Isma'il's empire.

In the early summer of 1701, the formal defection of the Sus
began. Muhammad al-'Alim declared himself independent of his newly
defeated father (5). He thus became one of a series of 'Alawi princes

(4) See Prologue, Pp. 12-13 and 33
(5) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Sa'd ibn Danan ed./tr. Vajda Text no. XXV from
"Un recueil de textes..." in "Hesperis" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p. 154
Paris, 29/6/1701 (pp. 254-5). The news Estelle had received, presumably
by way of Sale and Marseille, did not include the name of Isma'il's
secessionist son. Out of an high regard for Muhammad al-'Alim, Estelle
guessed the delinquent, wrongly, to be an half-brother Abu 'l-Nasir.
of the period whose ambitions were grafted on to "Chleuh" secession. Like his cousin Ahmad ibn Muhriz before him, Muhammad was regarded in the Sus as an independent sultan. His declaration of independence was carried out with deliberation. The Rudani bay'a in Isma'ili's favour was annulled by a body of local funahā' of Murrakushi education; Isma'ili was informed of the development by letter; and the irate replies issued by the Miknasī chancery were ceremonially burned in the middle of the Rudani market place (6).

There was a particular religious bias to this secession which gave it the flavour of an internal Islamic jihād. Muhammad had smoothly carried over into the Sus the tactic of alliance with the clerisy which had previously marked his long vice-regality within Fes (7). In the Sus he was, once again, the prince who loved the schoolmen (8). Here was a deft transference of affection. For the Sus held schoolmen of an alien cast. It was a region from which Fes was regarded as so far slovenly in religious matters as to have all but one of its major mosques incorrectly orientated (9). Susī rejection of Sa'īsi domination could therefore be made in the name of true religion. Muhammad's Rudani clerical supporters were said to have given "new birth to the sunna which had vanished from the capital city of Tarudant" (10). The theme of legitimation by piety was employed upon Muhammad's behalf even within his relations with aliens. Thus, an English Agadir merchant was sent to beg recognition

(6) al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 159-160
(7) See Chapter III Pp. 138-139
(8) al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 159
(9) ibid. p. 138
(10) ibid. p. 159

For discussion of the literary tradition concerning relations between Muhammad al-'Alim and Susī scholars, see Lakhdar: "La vie littéraire..." (pp. 116-122)
of queen Anne for the government of: "the Indulgent Father, our
Priest-like lord and Dove-like King, Prince of the Believers,
Protector of Religion, our lord Mahamid", and adjured to tell England
of his "truth and sincerity, his justice and piety, his Mercy and
Clemency to Christian captives as well as to Mohametan beleivers" (11).

By the nineteenth century, tradition, as passed on by the "Chleuh"
author Akansüs, was to see the entire episode of Muhammad al-CAlim's
secession as an expression of regional disaffection which the clerisy
had dominated. Thus, Akansüs could say of Muhammad's Sus following:

"I speak comprehensively of the region of the Sus, because
his (Muhammad's) activities were entirely confined to that
region, and because most of those (Sus) who were qualified
in knowledge and in piety were with him, as his ardent
partisans." (12)

The regional aspect to the secession was evident to contemporaries.
Thus, an European merchant reporter would allege that Muhammad had
been "crowned...by the free consent of all the adjacent Countreys"
(13). The very declaration of independence would seem to have won
Muhammad local support sufficient to remove the pressure of the

---

(11) S.P. 71 (15) ff. 127 and 129 Translation of a letter to queen Anne
from "Abdalah ben Abdelcader the Andalusian", dated Agadir, Safar
1115 = 16/6/1703-14/7/1703 A.D., and accompanied by diplomatic
instructions for its courier, the merchant John Treville.

The letter's florid ascription of Muhammad may be contrasted
with his father's relatively curt diplomatic title: "amir al-
mu'minin al-mujahid fi sab'il rabb al-alam" ("Commander of the
faithful and warrior upon the path of the master of earthly beings")
See, for examples, S.I. 28 France Vol. II Nos. XXVIII, LVI and LXV
Iama ii to Louis XIV Dates various. pp. 293, 406, and 434

(12) "wa gauluna C-ammat ahl al-qutr al-sus li-ann zuhurohu al-tamm innama
kana hunolika wa li-an jull man yantasibu ila 'l-cilm wa 'l-
galab minhum kana ma'ah muwafigina lihi"

(Akansüs quoted al-Nasirî: "Kitab al-Istiasa...." Casablanca text,

(13) S.P. 71 (15) f. 159 Memo. of Bartholomew Vergell, London, 7/9/1706
"Chleuh" mountain men who had been milling around Tarudant for over a year (14). For, in the October of 1701, two European traders had to travel inland as far as Tata, past Tarudant and across the Anti-Atlas, in order to reach Muhammad and his victorious mahalla (15).

In 1701, Isma'il was in no position to counter his disloyal son. He was in financial straits. The Djidious defeat had entailed losses in equipment and in "Chergi" revenue. And the defection of Muhammad al-Alim deprived the sultan of resources that came from or by way of the Sus. Busnot cited Muhammad's retention of a northward-bound Susi gold caravan, as an early indication of the son's defiance of his father (16). Desperately, the sultan attempted to recoup his losses. Allegedly the ad hoc negotiations of the period threatened even the Fasi millah with compulsory imperial purchase at a knock-down price; the demand was later waived in lieu of an extraordinary contribution from the Jewish community, to be given in money and in military equipment (17).

Politically, Isma'il's priority was concentration upon preventing imperial authority from disintegrating at the empire's heart. There was an exemplary execution. Abd al-Khalig, the Rusi governor of Fes, was put to death upon the delayed and feeble charge of his having killed one of the sultan's abid al-dar or palace guards; he was immediately replaced in office by his own brother, Hamdun al-Rusi (18).

(14) See Chapter V p. 231
(15) S. I. 2° France Vol. VI No. XXXIII Pierre Bougard to the house of le Gendre, Agadir, 16/11/1701 pp. 260-261
(16) Busnot pp. 80-81
The fruitlessness of intercession upon the unfortunate Abd al-Khaliq's behalf by Fasi civic religious leaders (19) makes it seem possible that one ground for the governor's selection as victim was a rapprochement between the Rusi and Fas al-Bali that might have given Fes another al-Duraydi (20): a localised military despot. The execution may be seen as an oblique shot, fired for the warning of city and governing clan alike. In 1701, Isma'Cil dared not flout Fes more directly. After the execution, Zaydan was sent to Fas al-Jadid as vice-roy (21). The prince's inauguration was accompanied by an appeal to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi for his mediation between the prince and officers of the civic militia (22). This appeal made no mention of the harātin fās, and gave the city the option of deciding the terms upon which its military service should be given: terms current in the days of one or the other of two conquerors, Ahmad al-Dhahabi al-Manṣūr or al-Rashīd (23).

CAlī ibn Abd Allah of Tetuan, the qa'id now regarded as the most eminent of Isma'Cil's officers (24) was rumoured, in 1701, "to have set up for himself" (25). It is possible that his loyalty was retained through his extensive employment by the sultan in his old subsidiary role of diplomat. Henceforward this role would eclipse, although not eliminate the qa'id's role as mujāhid. Europe was

---

(19) "Turjuman" p. 26 of the text and 48-9 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 42

(20) See Chapter I p. 54


(22) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 15 Isma'Cil to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-Fasi Muharram 1113 = 8/6/1701-7/7/1701 pp. 58-9

(23) Ibid. p. 59 cf. Introduction to the "Lettres Inédites..." p. 38

(24) Ockley p. 55

(25) S.P. 71(15) p. 119 Admiral G. Rooke to William III, Straits of Gibraltar 8/9/1701 N.S.
seething towards the war of the Spanish Succession. As a neighbour of the Peninsula, the qa'id of Tetuan was, like his master, aware of the possible adverse consequences for his own authority of a Bourbon union between France and Spain. In 1701, a naval peace with England, foreshadowed for a year, was finally patched up (26). Through QAlI ibn QAbd Allah, ImsaCil now proffered a Janus-face to Christendom. The now workaday siege of Ceuta (27) was conducted by the same qa'id who, in negotiations with the English, could make the offer of a naval base outside Tangier to a Christian power (28). In no external relations could ImsaCil afford to be brazen. The year 1702 saw an embassy from Meknes to Algiers, designed to reassure al-Hajj Mustafa Dey that no further distress would come to him from the west (29).

Miknasi authority within the south of the empire continued to slide. The efforts of ImsaCil's loyalist son Hafiz to counter Muhammad al-CAlim in the western High Atlas were a total failure and entailed heavy military losses (30). And, probably during the latter months of 1702, a second loyalist son of ImsaCil's, QAbd al-Malik, fled northwards to take sanctuary in Zerhoun. He had been ousted from his Dar'a vice-regality by Abu 'l-Nasir (31), a second dissident brother (32), and in consequence was clearly afraid for his life. Muhammad al-CAlim grew bolder. Thus far he had limited his

(26) S.P. 71 (15) ff. 73-97 passim
(27) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XXIV J-B. Brouillet and P. Gautier to Père Blandinières, Sale, 20/1/1701 p. 266
Herein lies the allegation that the siege of Ceuta was currently being waged at no cost to the sultan.
(28) S. P. 71 (15) f. 125 Memo of Admiral G. Rooke, Straits of Gibraltar, Date imperfect cf. S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XXXVIII J-B. Estelle to Pontchartrain, Marseille, 3/2/1702 p. 280
(29) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI p. 250 (Note 2). Reference to Archives Nationales, Affaires Étrangères B1 118 f. 236 Author unknown.
(30) "Relation...de la Mercy" p. 688
(31) "Tur iuman" p. 26 of the text and 49 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 42 The reference gives only the year 1114 A.H., but sets the incident anterior to events from the beginning of 1703.
(32) "Relation...de la Mercy" loc. cit.
ambitions to territories behind the High Atlas. Now he aped his Susi precursor Ahmad ibn Muhriz, in taking steps which, from his father's point of view, made his extirpation vital. He crossed the mountains and threatened lands within the Atlas arc. In the February of 1703, it was known in Sale that Muhammad's troops were laying siege to both Marrakesh and Safi (33). At the beginning of March, the prince took Marrakesh (34), allegedly with the support of Hawz peoples (35). In Marrakesh, piety did not prevent brisk action: Muhammad had the city governor and notables executed, and their houses razed to the ground (36).

At this point, Muhammad had reached the cultural fault-line between "greater Gharb" and "greater Sus". He was countered by the old sultan's setting Zaydan against him (37), in a duel which meant, pragmatically, a defence of Zaydan's designation as heir. The duel and its consequences were to eliminate both princes as personal foci of political interest; after them, no other sons of Isma'il were fully to possess the political ascendancy achieved by either.

The priority was the recapture of Marrakesh and its Hawz into the political orbit of Safi. This was a project into which Isma'il

---

(33) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. XL Fabron, French consular "chancellor" in Sale, to Pontchartrain, 22/2/1703 p. 288


(35) Busnot p. 86

(36) "Tur juman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

invested an heavy and apparently escalating concentration of `abīd (38). Over the high summer of 1703, the struggle was indecisive.

Marrakesh, deprived of its victuals by Muhammad (39) opened its gates to Zaydān, only to suffer an hideous sack (40). This grim civic victory did not entail Muhammad's immediate withdrawal from the "Haouz". He may already have been in contact with the Turks of the Regency (41); his subsequent rural defeat of Zaydān (42) co-incided with Turkish troop-movements in the region of Tlemsen (43). For a brief span, Isma'il's situation was sufficiently alarming for him to send to Sa's for master-carpenters to mount the previously ornamental cannon of Meknes into firing position (44). But then the tide turned. Zaydān drove Muhammad to retreat into inner Sus. Allegedly Muhammad suffered heavy losses in the Glawāf pass (45). These may indicate a winter crossing rather than military harassment, as Muhammad's withdrawal seems to have been made in good order. With him went a number of high-ranking prisoners, including two notable generals,


The latter author cited as his informant "Brahim bou "Abdelli", a petty chieftain from the inner High Atlas dir, whose court connections by marriage with leading Udaya had forced him to flee Muhammad's north-bound army, and who was subsequently used by Zaydān as a messenger to his mother Ayisha Mubārkā in Meknes.

(39) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XLII Père Blandinieres to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 16/7/1703 p. 294


(41) Ginoux, a French Agadir merchant was, for the following year, to refer to links between Muhammad al-'Alim and the Algerines as already in existence. (S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. L' Ginoux to Pontchartrain Agadir, 20/1/1705 p. 324)

(42) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XLII Père Blandinieres to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 16/7/1703 pp. 294-5

(43) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. XLIV Memo. of Perillie, Sale, 8/9/1703 p. 303

(44) ibid. loc. cit.

(45) al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 161
Ali Abu Shafra, commander of the Udaya of Fas al-Jadid (46), and the black qa'id Malik (47). The qa'id of Marrakesh was also of the company (48). Ali Abu Shafra, who maintained a stealthy contact with the Udaya queen Ayisha Mubarka, was later put to death by Muhammad (49). The other captive magnates threw in their lot with the dissident. Muhammad was able to re-establish political authority over inner Sus, but was unable to prevent Zaydan from penetrating the High Atlas in 1704 (50).

Effectively, Isma'īl's southern frontier now corresponded once again to the delimitation he had accepted in 1677, when he had left the Sus and Dar'a to Ahmed ibn Muhriz. Thereafter, the sultan was willing to await events. In 1704, the astonished Busnot believed that Isma'īl was pottering within the eye of a political typhoon:

"Nous avons même vue avec surprise dans le temps de la révolte de Mouley Mahamet, que tout était en trouble dans ses principaux Roayumes, qu'on se voyait à la veille d'un revolution générale, pendant que lui seul paroissoit comme un homme sans affaires, donnant Audience aux Etrangers, se plongeant dans les plaisirs de son Serail, employant le reste de son temps à presser les travaux de ses Esclaves, a donner le dessein de ses Batimens, et à en conduire lui même a l'exection, comme s'il avoit été quelque particulier qui n'eut eu autre chose a faire, que d'entrer dans le detail de son tranquille Domestique..." (51)

But the sultan now had some basis for domestic tranquillity. The theatre of conflict between his two most militarily significant sons had been removed to the Sus. The geographical distance of their

(46) Busnot pp. 87-8 and "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 29
(47) "Relation de la Mercy..." p. 691
(48) ibid. p. 692
(49) Busnot p. 90
(50) "Relation de la Mercy..." p. 691
(51) Busnot p. 46
war provided their father with an hiatus during which his authority could be re-affirmed within the Atlas arc. Fiscal and admonitory punishment could now be meted out to regions still within the sultan's political reach. Al-Zayyānī's chronicle material records that, in the aftermath of Muhammad al-ʿAlīm's retreat into inner Sus, demands for extraordinarily heavy fiscal contributions were made of the city of Fes. These demands were associated with the short vice-regality of the sultan's son Ḥafīz, and with the months that immediately followed it (52). The demands were accompanied by the public execution of a number of Fasi citizens, at the order of Hamdūn al-Rūsî (53) whose brother's fate seems to have assured his own loyalty to Meknes. By the standards of Fes, a city in which there was no living memory of brutality upon the scale of military sack, the vice-regality of Ḥafīz was a reign of terror. Echoes of its stringency percolated through to Mercedarian fathers who never saw Fes (54). The period features prominently within the Fasi Jewish chronicle of Samuel ibn Saʿūl ibn Danān. His account naturally concentrates upon hardship as experienced inside the Fasi millah. But he noted that numbers of Fasi Muslims took an hasty refuge within the millah upon hearing of the accidental death of Ḥafīz (55). This massed bolt for cover suggests that the much-squeezed Fasi Muslims believed that the sultan would interpret the accident that had befallen his son while toying with a pistol, as vengeful design.

---


(53) "Turuğman" p. 25 of the text and 50 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS loc. cit.

(54) "Relation...de la Mercy..." pp. 688-9

upon the part of the city. However, the vice-roy's death passed without notable repercussions.

By the following year, 1705, the sultan had developed a scheme for amassing revenue from Fes that was more sophisticated than brusque demand. He "moved into" Fasi trade as previously he had "moved into" Saletin corsair activity (56). His method was the granting out of commercial monopolies to privileged Fasi traders who may be assumed to have paid for their privilege. In 1705, a group of Fasi merchants are known to have negotiated with the sultan the grant of an "estancar" or monopoly of the wax and leather trade which formed the staple of contemporary Moroccan commerce with Europe. The result was a sharp rise in the indigenous price of wax and leather products (57). Consequently the number of European merchants in Morocco dwindled, and their trade was re-routed into channels of indigenous commerce linked with Cadiz (58). Because it brought about an adverse change in the terms of trade encountered by European merchants, this monopoly of trade in goods destined for Europe is well known (59). But it is likely that maritime trade was merely a subsidiary aspect of the total Fasi "estancar". At a later period, Windus noted that the great pilgrimage caravans were:

"....governed by a Person who farms most of the Wax of the Emperor, and for that reason is called the Stankero." (60)

(56) See Chapter V Pp. 227-8
(57) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. LII Périllie to the Marseille merchant Boyer, Sale 21/12/1705 pp. 329-330
(58) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI pp. 332-3 Note (3) Memo. of consul Bonnal Sale, 1712 and letter from consul la Maqdelaine to Pontchartrain Tetuan, 13/6/1713.
(59) For information upon this and other aspects of European trade with Morocco during the latter half of Isma'il's reign, see S.I. 2° France Vol. VI pp. 332-3 (Note (3)) and pp. 572-9, for the Euro-centric editorial essay "Etienne Pillet, l'Aventure de 1716 et la Suppression du Consulat de Sale".
(60) Windus p. 207
The "Stankero" business was said to be "very great" and to involve a clan of "Brothers" all working together in partnership (61). The clan is identifiable with the Adayyil of Fes. An Adayyil was wax-farmer in 1716 (62). And the Adayyil are known to have been prominent in Fasi trade and politics during much of the eighteenth century (63). They had close ties with the Fasi millah (64) as well as the pilgrimage (65). And they were "sultan's men": one member of the clan, al-Khayyat Adayyil, would be an early victim of the disturbances which followed Isma'il's death (66).

Initiation of the "estancar" policy may be seen as an attempt to shore up the sultan's finances against the outcome of the Susi struggle between Muhammad al-Alim and Zaydan. In 1705, Isma'il won an extension of his political hiatus. Events turned in favour of Zaydan, who was as yet maintaining the formalities of filial piety. During the summer, he defeated Muhammad in Haha, at the maritime fringe of the High Atlas (67), presumably while Muhammad was attempting to defend his control of the northward gold-route. The battle took an heavy toll of Muhammad's ulama' partisans (68). But Muhammad himself was able to fall back upon Tarudant (69). Zaydan sent his father a large party of eminent

(61) Windus p. 207
(62) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI: "Etienne Pillet, l'Avanie de 1716..." p. 575
(63) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp. 69, 70 and 74 cf. S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. XCVII Coutille, Saletin merchant, to Achard, 24/7/1716 pp. 601-2
(64) Chronicle of Samuel ibn Saül ibn Danan ed./tr. Vaïde Text no. XXV from "Un recueil de textes..." in "Hesperis" Vol. XXXVI (Paris, 1949) p. 157
(65) "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 69
(66) "Turjuman" p. 34 of the text and 62 of the translation
(67) al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 162 cf. "Relation... de la Mercy..." p. 691
(68) al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard loc. cit.
(69) Busnot p. 89
prisoners, including the qa'id Malik and the former qa'di of Marrakesh (70). These provided Isma'il with the opportunity for a wallow in public execution and mutilation (71) that provided a macabre advertisement for his authority. At the same time, the sultan seems to have been refurbishing the military prop to that authority. In the May of 1706 a new demand was made of Fes: that each of its households should provide the sultan with a saddle (72). The demand suggests that the sultan was attempting to mount a new force of cavalry.

Later in the May of 1706, Tarudant fell to the besieging Zaydan. Its populace was butchered (73). Muhammad al-`Alim was captured and despatched to Meknes as a prisoner. He provided the victim within a pageant that was, theatrically speaking, the acme of his father's policy of showpiece brutality. In a grisly ceremony outside Meknes, the prince's left foot and right hand were lopped off; a fortnight later, he died of his wounds (74). This execution was perhaps the most widely publicised event of Isma'il's reign, and brought the sultan and his martyred son into curious eddies of notoriety that rippled into eighteenth century French romance (75) and twentieth century "Qiblan" folklore (76) alike. Even hardened contemporaries seem openly to have regarded the execution as distasteful. Fasi `Ulama', led by the qa'di Bardalla, officiated at Muhammad's

(70) Busnot p. 91 cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." pp. 691-2
(71) Busnot pp. 91-96 cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." loc. cit.
(72) "Turjuman" pp. 26-7 of the text and 50 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 42
(73) S.P. 71(15) f. 159 Memo of Bartholomew Vernell, Agadir merchant who had fled from Zaydan's army, London 7/9/1706 cf. "Turjuman" p. 27 of the text and 50 of the translation cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 693
(75) Seran de la Tour: "Histoire de Mouley Mahamet, fils de Mouley Ismael, roy de Maroc", Geneva, 1749
funeral and, in mourning, suspended classes at the Qarawiyyin university for one day (77). Admittedly these tokens of respect provided an opportunity for expressing generalised Fasi resentment against the sultan with some degree of impunity. But they were nevertheless an appropriate tribute to the fallen "schoolmen's prince".

Meanwhile, Zaydān the victor remained within the southern empire he had won. He made no formal renunciation of obedience to his father. But he seems to have kept the revenues of inner Sus to himself (78). He arranged for the repopulation of Tarudant, and of the trading post of Agadir, whose people had scattered at his first approach (79). Resolutely he refused to send back to his father the troops demanded of him in a series of letters which proclaimed the urgent military needs of the north and the ḥijāb (80).

A strange episode occurred over the winter of 1706-7. According to information reaching Cadiz, Isma'il remained immured within his palace for a period of nearly two months (81). His non-appearance gave rise to widespread disorder and dismay (82), that was not dispelled by Āyisha Mubārka's public reassurances that the sultan lived (83). It is possible that the sultan was merely suffering from

(78) S.I. 28 France Vol. VI No. LXVIII Père Busnot to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 15/4/1708 p. 401 cf. "Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 696
(80) Busnot p. 115
a serious illness. But, by the April of 1707, when Isma'Cil was once again to be seen in public in Meknes, it could be widely believed that his disappearance from his subjects' view had been a piece of trickery: a gambit designed to beguile Zaydan into believing his father dead, and consequently, into bringing his troops northwards, to make a bid for power within open country (84). However, Zaydan was not to be lured away from Tarudant and his de facto Suse independence.

Yet Zaydan did not succeed in taking the Dar'C. This was a region which had fallen away from MiknasI control in 1702 (85). Abu 'l-Nasir the dissident prince who had then become suzerain of the Dar'C, had subsequently allied with Muhammad al-'Alim (86). After Muhammad's defeat, Abu 'l-Nasir fled southwards from the Dar'C, allegedly towards the "Soudan" (87). The political vacuum he left was filled by the old sultan his father. An incident from 1707 is evidence for a renewal along the Dar'C of the long reach of Meknes. In that year Mawlāy Ahmad ibn Nasir, shaykh of the Nasiriya zawiya of Tamgrout, and the paramount Dar'C religious leader, was planning his third pilgrimage along the southern, ocean route. From the remote distance of his zawiya he acceded to MiknasI demands first that he should come to Meknes to take leave of the sultan, and then that he should postpone his projected journey altogether (88).

---

(84) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. LXIII Pere Forton to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 8/5/1707 p. 381

(85) See present chapter p. 244

(86) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. L Ginoux, Agadir merchant, to Pontchartrain 20/1/1705 p. 323

(87) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. LXV Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain, Cadiz, 29/10/1707 p. 388

(88) A. Berbrugger: "Voyage de Moula Ahmad, depuis la Zaouia en Nasiriya jusqu'a Tripoli et retour", being translated sections of a rihla modelled upon that of al-'Ayyashi, and contained in "Voyages dans le Sud de l'Algerie et des Etats barbaresques de l'Ouest et de l'Est" reproduced in "Exploration scientifique de l'Algerie" Vol. IX (Paris, 1856) pp. 168-9

According to Lempriere, it was necessary for magnates and court officials to obtain the sultan's express permission to go on pilgrimage. (pp. 344-5)
In the early autumn of 1707, Zaydān died in Tarudant. Indigenous and European reports pass on a variety of predictable allegations as to foul play (89). At the sultan's order, the prince's body was brought back northwards through the Tadla for burial within Meknes. It was escorted by a funeral cortège of several thousand men (90). These possibly represented a proportion of the troops who had gone south with Zaydān in 1703, and who were now, at last, returning to the sultan's command. Effectively Zaydān had two successors: one to the status of heir-presumptive, the other to his southern pre-eminence. A full-brother Ahmad, somewhat pretentiously surnamed al-Dhahabī, in deference to the great Ahmad al-Mansūr (91), succeeded Zaydān immediately as recognised heir (92). This Ahmad al-Dhahabī was decidedly undistinguished personally (93). Thus far he had been remarkable only for the fomentation of violent scuffles around the palace (94). The ease of his advancement underwrites the primacy which, in the sultan's view, invested the sons of Ayisha Mubārka. However, Isma'īl did not take the risk of fostering Ahmad militarily.

(89) According to contemporary rumour reaching Cadiz in the October of 1707, the prince had been poisoned. Inside three months, it was to be regarded as certain that he had been murdered by his wives. (S.I. 2ème France Vol. VI Nos. LXV and LXVII Letters from Père Busnot to Pontchartrain, Cadiz, 29/10/1707 and 15/1/1708 pp. 388 and 396) Al-Zayyānī alleged that the prince had been murdered by "al-kātib al-wazīr," by whom he may have meant to indicate the man of letters Hammū al-Wazīr al-Ghassānī ("Turjuman" p. 27 of the text and 50 of the translation and Chapter V p. 186 (Note (4))

(90) S.I. 2ème France Vol. VI No. LXV Père Busnot to Pontchartrain, Cadiz 29/10/1707 p. 389

(91) "Al-Dhahabī" was the contemporary sobriquet of al-Mansūr al-Sā'īdī. ("Lettres Inédites..." No. 15 Isma'īl to Muhammad ibn "Abd al-Qadir al-Fāṣil Muharram 1113 = 8/6/1701 - 7/7/1701 p. 59)

(92) Del Puerto in his "Mission Historial...", published in 1708, noted "Muley Hamete Hebi" as Isma'īl's most prominent son (Bk. 1 Ch. 10 p. 41).

(93) Braithwaite pp. 1-2

(94) S.I. 2ème France Vol. VI No. XVIII Manier de la Closerie to Pontchartrain, Sale, 4/8/1706 p. 137 cf. Busnot pp. 120-121
as Zaydan had been fostered. The new heir was sent to govern the
Tadla, and there act as warden of the route from Saïs to Marrakesh (95).
He constructed a major fort within the region (96). There, as a
political maroon, he would seem to have stayed for much of the
remainder of his father's reign. His Tadla base was near to the site
of ruined Dila'. However, the region seems not to have been re-fused
politically by the proximity of an important ʿAlawi prince. Zaydan's
successor as vice-roy of the Sus was of greater immediate political
significance than his successor as heir. This southern inheritor
was the former Darʿ rebel prince, Abu 'l-Nasir, who chose this
point to slide back from exile into a grateful father's good graces
(97). His subsequent four years of filial obedience slurred over
Isma'il's fundamentally endemic Sus problem.

Quiescence in the Sus did not entail any renewal of Isma'il's
"Chergi" ambitions. In 1707, following a period of crisis on the
Tunisian march (98), the see-saw of Algerine military interest had
tipped once again to the west. Since the June of 1707, a Turkish
force had been laying siege to Spanish Oran (99). Long ago, in 1693,
Isma'il himself had cast a token shot at this presidio (100). However,
in 1707, he was reduced to extracting from the conflict around Oran
the opportunity for making an amicable and pan-Islamic gesture: he

(95) "Turjuman" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 41
(96) "Turjuman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS loc. cit.
(97) S.I. 2ème France Vol. VI No. LXVII Para Busnot to Pontchartrain
Cadiz, 15/1/1708 pp. 395-6
(98) S.I. 2ème France Vol. VI No. LI Pontchartrain to Ginoux, Versailles
17/10/1705
(99) Galindo y de Vera p. 294
(100) Ibid. p. 284
sent the Turkish mujahidun two hundred quintals of gunpowder (101).

Oran fell to the Turks in the January of 1708 (102). Its surrender provoked an oblique demonstration of the degree to which Isma'il's own waging of the jihad had become hollow. The sultan subjected his own mujahid captain 'Ali ibn 'Abd Allah to a token deposition (103) for having in thirteen years failed to take Ceuta. This was merely a temporary imperial tantrum, directed against an indispensable lieutenant. By the April of 1708, the qaid was back in office, and in possession of the "estancar" of Titwani trade with Europe in wax and leather (104). The mujahid was thus rewarded for his loyalty to Isma'il through difficult years. In relation to Christendom, he was now a local tycoon as well as a diplomat. Certain conventions were maintained. The qaid continued officially to reside in the "camp before Ceuta". There he received alien envoys, including the Christian merchants with whom he traded (105). His blockade of the presidio was generally regarded as a façade for his flourishing personal interests (106). However, it was punctuated by a regular Friday cannonade, for which stones were the customary and effective ammunition, and for which the gunpowder was provided by the Titwani Jewish community (107), itself closely enmeshed in commercial links.

---

(101) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. LXVIII Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 15/4/1708 p. 402
(102) Galindo y de Vera p. 295 cf. "Nashr al-Mathani..." Fes lithograph p. 107 of the second notation
(103) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. LXVIII Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain Cadiz, 15/4/1708 p. 403
(104) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI p. 332 (Note 1) Etienne Pillet to Pere Nolasque Neant, Sale, 4/4/1708
(105) S.I. 2e France Vol. VI No. LXXXIV Bonnal to the Deputes de Commerce de Marseille, Tetuan, 1/3/1712 p. 490
(106) Busnot, in an eyewitness account of Ceuta, noted that: "Quoique le camp des Maures ne soit qu'a une portee de Fusil de la Place, on peut dire qu'elle n'est proprement que bloquee... et que l'Alcayd Ali qui les commande est bien aise d'avoir un pretexte pour demeurer sur les Cotes, et se tenir une porte ouverte aux Negotiations qu'il entretient avec les Etrangers," (p. 229)
(107) Busnot pp. 229 and 230
with southern Spain. During the remainder of Isma'īl's reign there was
to be only one flare to disturb this ritualised confrontation; and
this clash would be of Spanish, not "Moorish" initiation.

By 1708, Isma'īl felt sufficiently secure of his authority within
Sale to re-open an old quarrel with Fes. Rumour of the associated furor
reached ransom missionaries waiting in Sale for permission to approach
Meknes. According to the Mercedarian version, it was heard:

"...que le roy de Maroc avoit ôté à la ville de Fes les
privileges dont elle jouissoit de tout temps et la réduisoit
par là sur la même pied des autres villes. Ces privileges
consistant en partie en ce que les habitans jouissaient
d'une espèce de liberté qui empêchoit ce Prince de les
traiter comme des esclaves..." (108)

and that, in consequence, a deputation of Fāsī "talbes" had gone to
Meknes, and had openly upbraided the sultan for his failure to behave
as a true "Mussulmin" (109). Busnot's version of the tale concentrated
upon successive imperial demands for financial contributions (110). At
the nub of the controversy, faintly comprehended within the Mercedarian
reference to "esclaves", there lay a renewal of the sultan's insistence
upon Fāsī jurist signatures to his military diwan or register, the
deftar al-

(108) "Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 714
(109) ibid. pp. 714-15
(110) Busnot pp. 130-131
(111) "Tur.iuman" p. 27 of the text and 50 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43 cf. Windus p. 217
(112) See Chapter V P. 211
may have been tacitly understood that, once the *diwan* had been legally acknowledged, potential slave recruits would be allowed to purchase the right to be left alone. The dispute with the jurists may thus be seen partly in Busnot's terms, as a dispute involving matters fiscal as well as military.

Upon this occasion the sultan was firm. Al-Zayyānī's chronicle material records that non-jurors among the lawmen were arrested, and that one particular family of civic notables, the Awlād Jissūs, was singled out for exemplary persecution (113). This was persecution only by the standards of Fes and restrained by comparison with other episodes from the sultan's previous decade of showpiece brutality: the family was robbed of its possessions, and one of its leading members, a jurist identified by al-Nāṣirī with Abū Muhammad ʿAbd al-Salam Jissūs (114) who had two years previously been a prominent mourner at Muhammad al-ʿAlīm's funeral (115), was put to public shame in the Miknāsī market place. This fate was sufficient to secure his compliance with the sultan's demands. He was sent back to Fes, personally to arrange for the rounding up of *harātīn* Fes and their despatching to Meknes (116). It seems likely

(113) "Turjumān" p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43


(115) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 163

(116) "wa wa'īshahahu li-fas li-yuzājja al-harātīn li-miknāsā. famādama wa azīmahum fī rabīʿ C al-awwal C am 1120"

("And he sent him to Fes to round up the *harātīn* for Meknes. He came and rounded them up in Rabiʿ I, 1120 (* = 21/5/1708-19/6/1708)

("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43) On this point the text of the "Turjumān" (p. 27 and 51 of the French translation) is confused and seems to have been mistranslated by Houdas.
that it was only within later, clerkly tradition that this Jissiū
dāghī was transmuted into a martyr to the shirā, by the allegation
that he was subsequently murdered by the Rūbī governor of Fes (117).
The rival dynastic tradition that he was murdered by the Fasi
populace (118) seems more credible. For the dāghī's ultimate
complicity with the sultan would seem equivalent to the setting up of
a Fasi dīwan al-harrātīn. This dīwan is known to have existed subsequently,
preumably as a register of real or potential civic recruits. A
casual reference to this dīwan for the year 1732 (119), makes it
clear that its management was a lucrative post.

So Ismaīl won in his tussle with Fes over the matter of the
dīwan. His victory can be seen as ultimately Pyrrhic. For it seems
to have led to an overall debilitation in Fasi civic life. From this,
Ismaīl's own revenues were bound ultimately to suffer. Indigenous
and European comment upon the period 1708-9 refers to the emigration
into the Algerine Regency of a number of Fasi citizens (121). There
were attempts to prevent this eastward drift. But, as Windus was to
note, the ravelling of trade with piety in the Fasi pilgrimage
caravan made a veto upon eastward migration "pretty difficult" (122).
Upon at least one occasion, the caravan route was diverted. In 1710

(117) Al-Nasirī, basing his information upon the report of a local Salatin
shaykh, Abu ʿAbd Allāh Māḥūba al-Sulāwī ("Kitāb al-Iṣṭiqṣā"…
pp. 129-30)

(118) Akansūs, who claimed to have obtained his information from the sultan
Sulaymān; quoted by al-Nasirī ("Kitāb al-Iṣṭiqṣā..." Casablanca text

(119) "Turjumān" p. 38 of the text and 71 of the translation

(120) "Turjumān" p. 28 of the text and 51 of the translation cf.
"Relation...de la Mercy..." p. 715

(121) "Turjumān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(122) Windus p. 209
the al-Nasirī shaykh of Tamgrout, who had at last been permitted to proceed to the holy places, returned homewards by the southern route. On the way, he met the out-going Fāsī caravan at Ain Medī, travelling together with pilgrims from Tafilelt (123). It may be presumed that would-be pilgrims from the "kingdom of Fes" had been ordered to take the desert route that provided an arduous proof of genuine zeal, and was less convenient as a cover for straightforward emigration. Subsequently the Fāsī caravans returned to the aorta leading from Fes to Tlemsen, which was in customary use during the years preceding Windus's record of 1721 (124). Despite their being governed by loyal ḌAdayyil, these caravans were the object of intense government suspicion, and of official interference that amounted to the application of a partial tourniquet. From the standpoint of 1721, Windus noted, with reference to the traders' "holy pretence of Pilgrimage" that:

"Some Years ago there was an Order to open all the Loads that passed, under the Pretence of searching for Jewels, which made those concerned in the Trade engage to deliver all their Jewels, and pay ten Ducats per Load, to save their being searched; but there did not go the fourth part of what were used to go before." (125)

Over several years, Isma'īl's authority was able to survive in juxtaposition with a maimed Fes, and the disaffection of those Fāsī who were not bound up with the "astancar". Indeed, given the violence of the times, the decade leading up to 1718 can be seen as a "St. Martin's summer" for the "sultan of Meknes". It was a decade studded with armed rebellion. But these rebellions were all at the empire's

(123) "Voyage de Moula Ahmad..." ed./tr. Berbrunner p. 315
(124) Windus p. 208
(125) ibid. pp.207-8
And they were all overcome, to Ismaril's advantage.

The period saw war in the Sus between two of Ismaril's sons, Abu 'l-Nasir and 'Abd al-Malik (126). By 1712, this war had ended in victory for the former, who declared himself independent of his father (127). However Abu 'l-Nasir's dissidence would lack the time and scope for development along the lines traced out by Muhammad al-CAlim. The years 1711-1714 saw a flexing of the sultan's grip over lands along the southern perimeter of his empire. In 1711, a TawatI revolt against the local imperial governor was crushed by an expedition mounted from Meknes, and commanded by Ghazi Abu Hafra (128), a qa'id newly risen to court prominence (129). This revolt was followed in 1712, by a mass expedition to Meknes on the part of TawatI notables, eager to demonstrate their loyalty (130). In the same year, Ismaril was able to affirm his authority over the Daro, and have its governor executed (131). And, when Abu 'l-Nasir was killed in a localised "Qiblan" battle, also in 1712 (132), 'Abd al-Malik, his 'AlawI successor in the Sus, made no attempt to bid for his predecessor's independent status. Indeed, in 1714, Ismaril was able successfully to command 'Abd al-Malik to pay a filial visit to Meknes, and to bring with him his personal military following of 'Abd, for the re-inforcement of his father's central military authority (133).

(126) Busnot p. 127
(127) "Turjuman" p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf. S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No LXXXVI, Père Busnot to Pontchatrain Cadiz, 10/7/1712. pp. 494-5
(128) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" and Oufrane MS, quoted Martin pp. 79-80
(129) Busnot p. 133
(130) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 81
(131) "Turjuman" p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 43
(132) "Turjuman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS loc. cit.
(133) Al-Zarhuni of Tagart ed./tr. Justinard p. 18
By this stage, Isma'il's imperial and paternal authority had a military power basis that had seen changes since the close of the sultan's warrior years. The two major props of the makhzan were still the provincial quwwad and the standing guard. But the roles of both quwwad and guard had undergone development and diversification.

Among the quwwad there were now individuals who were territorial magnates upon a titanic scale. These men were most usually referred to by the title of "bāšā", which was imprecise in its distinction from qālid, but which apparently denoted a peculiarly sweeping degree of political or military power. Two highly significant provincial bearers of this title were firstly the Bāšā Ahmad of Tetuan, who in 1713 succeeded his father Ǧ Ali ibn Ġ Abd Allah, as governor and mujahid captain (134); and secondly, the Bāšā Ġ Abd al-Karīm, who is known, by the same year, to have been Isma'il's governor in Marrakesh (135). The sphere of influence granted to Ġ Ahmad ibn Ǧ Ali of Tetuan had, by Windus's day, apparently engulfed the neighbouring government of his kinsman Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Hammāmī of Alcazarquivir, and could be compared in area with the kingdom of Portugal (136). Ġ Abd al-Karīm was, from 1713 onwards, granted an even more extensive range for his "free hand": the whole of greater Sus, stretching southwards from Marrakesh to the "Qibla" (137). Such men were locally paramount: local sultans. During Isma'il's latter years, the Bāšā Ahmad was said never to appear in public with an escort of less than four to five hundred men (138), and to be as "absolute in his Province

(134) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. LXXXVIII Ahmad ibn Ġ Ali ibn Ġ Abd Allah to Pontchartrain, Tetuan, 28/Ramadan/1125 = 18/10/1713 pp. 512-517
(135) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasāft ed./tr. Justinard p. 18
(136) Windus p. 67
(138) de la Faye p. 91
as any Monarch whatsoever" (139). Yet dutifully, if no longer necessarily annually, these greatest of all Isma'Il's magnates made periodic visits to Meknes, accompanying the hadāya which guaranteed welcome and reconfirmation in office (140). It is not surprising that such magnates preferred the overlordship of the militarily inert Isma'Il to government by any of his more martial sons. Their continued acknowledgement of Isma'Il himself was acceptance of an established, stabilising authority which, even though palace-based, possessed in its standing army a military deterrent to which there was now added a peculiar innovation.

By the second decade of the eighteenth century, Isma'Il's army included a new and distinct force: this was the body of abīd based at the mahalla or imperial military camp that was set up in the isolated spot of Mashra' al-Raml, at the edge of the Mamora forest region, near to Sale. According to a complex indigenous tradition concerning Isma'Il's abīd, which will be examined hereafter (141), the sultan maintained troops at Mashra' al-Raml in increasing tens of thousands. This indigenous tradition is questionable at many points. But there is no doubt that the mahalla existed during Isma'Il's latter years, and that it contained a notably sizeable body of men (142). Tradition would retroject the establishment of the mahalla into the first decade of Isma'Il's reign. But the chronology of the camp's establishment can reliably be pinned inside a much later timespan. The mahalla did not exist in 1698, when Jean-Baptiste Estelle

---

(139) Windus p. 24
(140) Abd al-Karīm of Marrakesh, during the five years he is known to have been in office, went three times to greet the sultan in Meknes (al-Zarhūnī of Tazaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 18, 48 and 147)
(141) See Epilogue Part I pp. 281-3
(142) John Ryadon to Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 25/3/1728 N.S., quoted by Braithwaite p. 329 cf. S.P. (71) 17 f. 162 Peter Butler to consul Russell, Tetuan, 29/7/1728 (Both letters from Titwani merchants.) The latter source wildly computed the complement of the mahalla at "sixty thousand, half horse".
stated that troops from Isma'il's standing army of "noirs" were all stationed within a day's muster of Meknes (143). Reliable references to the camp date only from 1714, for which a chronicle note recording the execution of four of the camp's qawwād and seventeen of its qābīd (144) is illuminated by al-Zarhūnī's note that, during that year, the sultan had accidentally been wounded at the camp, during a session of la'b al-barūd (145). The foundation of the mahālla must thus be set between 1698 and 1714. It is likely to have been an experiment of the sultan's retirement from personal campaigning, following the shock of Djidioua, and may have been one aspect of an attempt by Isma'il carefully to cultivate a new élite corps from amid the rag-bag army of qābīd that he had gathered in the 1690s.

The isolation of such an élite seems to be associated with the attachment to a proportion of Isma'il's qābīd of the sobriquet "Bwākhīr". Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft knew the slave troops of Mašhra al Raml as the qābīd al-Bukhārī (146), thus giving these troops the name by which all of the Ālawī qābīd became later known. The sobriquet, quasi-religious in its evocation of the "Sahīh" of al-Bukhārī, may have been coined as a northern counter-blow to the overtones of Sūsī righteousness which invested the venture of Muḥammad al-Ālim against his father. For it was unknown to contemporary seventeenth century commentators, and seems to date from the period of Muḥammad al-Ālim's dissidence. Al-Zarhūnī described Muḥammad as hearing by letter that  

(143) S.I. 28 France Vol. IV No. CXLIV Memo. of J-B. Estelle, putatively dating from the October of 1698 p. 692
(144) "Turjuman" p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation of "Bustan al-Zarīf" MS p. 43
(145) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 47-8
(146) ibid. p. 160
his father was sending a troop of "Swakhir" against him (147). And Busnot, following a Christian slave's garbling of indigenous nomenclature, described the followers of Zaydân who took Muhammad prisoner as "noirs de l'alcayd Ablebocari, qui sont comme les Dragons du Roi, et ses plus braves Soldats" (148). However, the years of the war with Muhammad seem over-troublous to associate with the foundation of the camp at Mashra' al-Raml, which involved the concentration of manpower in placid rural isolation. It seems most likely that Isma'il first settled his chosen troops at the mahalla during the comparative political lull which followed 1708.

Isma'il's purpose in setting up this isolated military camp may well have been that of creating a gross military deterrent. For Mashra' al-Raml constituted a static military reserve which counter-balanced the dynamic authority of great territorial magnates. And the "Swakhir" were superficially impressive; in the eyes of al-Zarhûnî, a rustic clerk, the cavaliers of Mashra' al-Raml were "fine warriors" (149). Yet these warriors from Mashra' al-Raml seem only rarely to have been actively deployed by their master. As well as a deterrent, they can be seen as the "toy soldiers" of the sultan's dotage, flamboyantly trained but only parsimoniously doled out into the field. The deployment of cabîd in thousands, that had characterised the period between 1693 and the fall of Muhammad al-'Alîm, was no longer the rule. Isma'il's last two decades saw territorial magnates and other haraka generals being allotted the services of cabîd only in cautious hundreds. A consequent inexperience of real warfare may explain the poor showing

(147) Al-Zarhûnî of Tesafr ed./tr. Justinard p. 160
(148) Busnot p. 97
(149) Al-Zarhûnî of Tesafr ed./tr. Justinard p. 51
exhibited by the forces of Mashra\textsuperscript{C} al-Raml when they were first set into battle as a body, following Isma\textsuperscript{C}Il's death (150).

Yet the \textsuperscript{C}\textit{abid} of Mashra\textsuperscript{C} al-Raml may not have been simply an unwieldy ornament to the \textit{makhzen}. Isma\textsuperscript{C}Il was renowned for his policy of keeping his dependents physically employed:

"...for, says he, if I have a Bag full of Ratts, unless I keep that bag stirring, they will eat their way through." (151)

Windus, in 1721, was informed that the "large plain of Mamora", among "many other parts of the country" was "sown by the Emperor's Negroes to supply his Magazines" (152). In the light of this information, Mashra\textsuperscript{C} al-Raml, set within "fine champaign country" (153), may be seen as an agricultural extension of the palace economy of Meknes, as well as a military base.

The years 1715-1717 were the height of Isma\textsuperscript{C}Il's "St. Martin's summer". During these years, the sultan can be seen as personally secure and aggressive at one remove, as he doled out detachments of \textsuperscript{C}\textit{abid} to lieutenants who took the offensive. In the August of 1715, the siege of Melilla was briefly renewed, under the command of "Takar\textsuperscript{C}", qa\textsuperscript{C}id of its hinterland. After the customary fashion of the \textit{jihad}, a "Batallon de Negros" was added to the qa\textsuperscript{C}id's forces (154). During the same year, two generals, \textsuperscript{C}Abd al-Kar\textsuperscript{I}m, B\textsuperscript{I}sha of Marrakesh, and al-Shar\textsuperscript{I}f, a dutifully filial full-brother to Muhammad al-\textsuperscript{C}Alim, set out upon the two year \textit{harsaka} which was to threaten the Wadi Naf\textsuperscript{I}s.

\begin{flushright}
(150) S.P. 71 (17) f. 161 Peter Butler to consul Russell, Tetuan, 29/7/1728 N.S. cf. Breithwaite p. 20
(151) Windus p. 116
(152) ibid. p. 84
(153) Grey Jackson p. 14
(154) Marques de Olivart: "Relation del Sitio de la villa de MELILLA en Africa", being an edition of an anonymous eighteenth century MS, published in Madrid in 1909 (pp. 6-7).
\end{flushright}
and Glawî regions of the High Atlas as well as the Sus, and which provides the dominant skein within al-Zarhûnî's wandering tale of "Chleuh" dissidence. In recognition of the magnitude of this proposed expedition, the commanders were granted the aid of a detachment from Mashrâc al-Raml; but allegedly this detachment numbered only around two hundred men (155). 1717 was a notable year for "beating the bounds". A new and forceful governor, Mahmûd al-Ghanjewî, was sent to Tuat, to replace its resident qa'id of twenty-four years' service. He too had the assistance of a detachment of Cabîd in the conduct of an heavy-handed perambulation of the Tawa'tî oases (156). Also in 1717, the governor of Oujda took an expedition through Snassen country that was sufficiently brutal to result in the despatch to Meknes of an hundred Snassen heads (157). This successful punishment of the Snassen may have led Ismâîl briefly to toy once again with the idea of "Chergi" expansion. It is known that, early in 1718, all communication between the Maghrib al-Aqṣâ and Algiers was once again forbidden (158). This could have indicated more than a further attempt to prevent the economic assets of the region of Fes from dribbling eastwards. For it will be seen that the power of Algiers to threaten her western neighbour was on the wane.

But Ismâîl's empire was not to enter any new period of expansion. The flourish of success at the periphery of the sultan's domains, which characterised the years 1715-1717, had a tenuous basis

(155) Al-Zarhûnî of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 51
(156) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin p. 82
(157) "Bustân al-Zarîf..." MS p. 43
(158) S.P. 71 (16) f. 549 Memo. of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 24/5/1718
within the potentially breakaway regions of the south. Here, grimmer years for imperial authority would follow. A crucial turning point for Isma'il's fortunes in the south of his empire came with the death of one man.

In the summer of 1718, 'Abd al-Karim of Marrakesh died, upon haraka, near Demnat (159). Allegedly "the Emperor...seemed so concerned that none durst speak further about it" (160). The concern is understandable. Unlike the Hammami of Tetuan, this basha of Marrakesh had not been in a position of localised authority long enough for the establishment of a sub-dynasty. His death led to the collapse of the network of allegiance he had built up within "greater Sus": the evaporation of a political power "as if it had never existed" (161).

Immediately, in 1718, Isma'il sent out to Marrakesh Ghazi Abu Hafra (162), an officer noted for his loyalty, and for his court proximity to the sultan (163). The intervention of this officer did not prevent fission in the administration of the south, in developments which indicate that southern affairs were once more slipping beyond the grasp of Meknes. The new basha never matched up to his political predecessor in Marrakesh. He made a bad start by failing to take control of 'Abd al-Karim's armed following. The core of the forces who had been at Demnat fell to an 'abd general, the Bashin Musahil (164). Acting independently of Ghazi Abu Hafra, this general made for "inner Sus", apparently with the intention of taking command of the troops of that

(159) S.P. 71 (16) f. 563 Memo. of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 11/8/1718; and al-Zarhuni of Tazaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 153
The chronology of the former is to be preferred to that of the latter, who gives a seasonally equivalent date for the previous year,

(160) S.P. 71 (16) f. 563 Memo. of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 11/8/1718
(161) Al-Zarhuni of Tazaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 155
(162) S.P. 71 (16) f. 539 Memo of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 23/4/1718
(163) S.P. 71 (16) f. 539 Memo of Anthony Hatfield, Tetuan, 23/4/1718
(164) Al-Zarhuni of Tazaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 154
region. There he was forestalled by a third party, the ga'id of Tarudant, an ally and subordinate of the dead Ḍābīdīd al-Ḵādir. This ga'id had foiled a local military coup by depriving Ḍābīdīd stationed in "Chleuh" country of arms, horses and even shoes. He kept these troops in the south, and kept his own governorship independent (165).

It may have been this southern crisis that drove Isma'Cil back upon an embittered Fes, with a new round of demands. In 1718, the citizens received two open imperial letters. The first promised remission of taxation, but the second was an hectoring demand for mass citizen military service (166). Theoretically the demand was not extraordinary. The citizens were offered a choice between two traditional patterns of military service: enrolment as ever-ready, tax-exempt Ḥaysh troops, or conscription into Ḍāibī service, which was less onerous, but which made demands of the tax-payer (167). But this offer must be seen in the context of the long tussle over the ġaradīn fas. It aroused violent opposition that was presumably based upon a widespread fear that, in practice, conscription would be carried out upon harsh terms. The leader of this opposition was one Wālīd al-Sahrāwī, whose nisba would seem to indicate that he was a man of faṣafrin immigrant origin, and thus highly at risk in terms of the policy of impressment by way of the diwan al-ḡaradīn, as established in 1708. Al-Sahrāwī was put to death by the city governor, Abū Ḍālī al-Rūsī, for voicing the civic demand that there should be face-to-face negotiations with the sultan before any Fasī

(165) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard p. 154

(166) "Turā'im" pp. 27-8 of the text and 51-2 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 44

(167) See Chapter II p. 110
took up arms on his behalf (168). A period of disorder, studded with further murders, followed within the city; and there was a turnabout of city governors (169).

The central authority faltered. Isma'il seems at this point to have been incapable of dispatching harakat to the far reaches of his dominions. In Tuat, 1719 was a year noted for exemptions from taxation (170). And the hard governor, Mahmud al-GhanjawI, was replaced in Tuat, as makhzan representative, by a son of his predecessor Muhammad al-Safar: a governor so innocuously acceptable to the distant overseas for it to be possible to send him out to his posting with an escort of only twenty horse (171).

Wheedling as well as bullying entered into the sultan's attempts to gain Fasi co-operation. In 1720, Isma'il issued a command for the total architectural restoration of the shrine of Idris the Younger, the building that was the city's spiritual heart. He also arranged for the re-ordering of the shrine's Friday ritual (172). But, in attempting to win the Fasi by adorning their city as al-Rashid had adorned it fifty years previously, Isma'il was making a gesture that came too late, and was cancelled out by a punitive demand for a civic financial contribution (173) which indirectly forced the city itself to foot the bill for the restoration of its shrine. The demand provoked

(168) "Turjuman" pp. 27-8 of the text and 52 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 43

(169) "Turjuman" p. 28 of the text and 52 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS loc. cit.

(170) Martin: documents noted p. 82


(173) "Turjuman" p. 28 of the text and 53 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 44
a new spur to emigration among the wealthier Fāsi (174).

Meanwhile, events within the south of Iṣmāʿīl's empire proceeded steadily in the sultan's disfavour. Ghāzi Abū Hafra, the bāshā of Marrakesh, and Abū ʿAzīz ibn ʿAṣduq, governor of Tarudant, died within two months of each other (175), most probably in the autumn of 1720 (176). In the aftermath of these deaths, inner Sus entered its third period of dissidence under an ʿAlawī prince. The prince was ʿAbd al-Malik, who had recently been resident in Marrakesh, acting dutifully in tandem with the bāshā Ghāzi. The power vacuum induced by the deaths of the two southern governors presented ʿAbd al-Malik with his opportunity. He shifted his base from Marrakesh to the strategically more sheltered Tarudant (177), where he is known to have been established, in command of an army, in 1721 (178). His move can probably be equated with the setting up of an independent military administration. Braithwaite recorded, for 1727, that "Muley Abdimalek had for several Years past lived in a state of Independency, and...refused to pay his Father the customary Taxes", being then looked upon to be in a state of rebellion" (179). The authority he built up within the Sus lacks the memory of cultural grace that is...
associated with the government of Muhammad al-Ḍālim, and may be
guessed as distinctly martial; for "Abdelmeleck" was, among
IsmaʿIl's sons:

"...reckoned the best Soldier, but cruel in his Temper
and brutal in his actions, and...only esteemed by his
Army." (180)

This third and final loss of the Sus marked the end of IsmaʿIl's
"St. Martin's summer". The sultan was now in his seventies, and in
his old age would seem to have learned a certain resignation. For
he maintained diplomatic relations with ʿAbd al-Malik (181), despite
his loss of Susī revenue. But he would not risk his "Bwākhir" of
Mashraʿ al-Raml in a Susī war. To Marrakesh, he sent an ʿabd
general, Hammu ibn Ṭarīfa (182) "who was remarkable for Stratagems"
(183), and might deter ʿAbd al-Malik from venturing within the
Atlas arc. But, for his part, ʿAbd al-Malik made no move to cross
the mountains. He was rumoured to be patiently awaiting a duel, at
his father's death, with his brother Ahmad al-Dhahabi (184).

IsmaʿIl's latter-day government suffered a northern disgrace
which was contemporaneous with the southern amputation of the Sus.
In the autumn of 1720, the regenerated Spain of Felipe V and
Alberoni injected an angry spasm of life into the calcified confrontation
around Ceuta. Spanish troops, under the command of the Marques de Lede
were sent massively to re-inforce the presidio. They made successful
raids upon "the camp before Ceuta", and upon a fort along the route
from Ceuta to Tangier. The mujāhidun suffered notable losses in men

(180) Windue p. 94
(181) Braithwaite p. 2
(182) Al-Zarhūnī of Tasāft ed./tr. Justinard p. 167
(183) Braithwaite p. 20
(184) ibid. p. 3
and in equipment, and the quarters of the Basha Ahmad himself were destroyed (185). For the Spaniards, the episode was a fire-cracker. It failed permanently to raise the siege of Ceuta, whose stylised ritual was to be resumed during the years preceding the sultan's death (186). But the attack was of lasting significance for Isma'il's relations with Christendom. It drove the sultan into making a pact with a Christian power: an ironic coda to his pose as a patron of the jihad.

Since the Moroccan embassy to London in 1700, there had been a series of intermittently bruised maritime truces between Morocco and Great Britain. But these had not involved the betrayal of the local religious ban upon the supply of provisions to the infidel (187). Thus, in 1709, the request of an envoy of Queen Anne that British ships should be allowed to revictual in Moroccan ports had been refused (188). Subsequent peace negotiations, backing and filling between Gibraltar and Tetuan, had been dilatory for many years. A British mission to Meknes in 1718 had resulted only in the envoy's loss of temper (189). But the Spanish sortie of 1720 ended vacillation. 1721 saw the Stewart embassy from Gibraltar to Meknes. This embassy succeeded in drawing up a treaty allowing for complete freedom of trade.


(186) Braithwaite p. 10

(187) According to Braithwaite's understanding: "The Law of Mahomet forbids the exporting of corn, which they strictly observe here, tho the Turks and Moors of Tunis, Tripoli and Algier, dispense with it, for the sake of the great profit it brings them in..." (p. 342)

(188) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI No. LXXXIII Declaration of the former captive Francois Fily, on board ship out of Sale, 20/11/1711 p. 485

(189) S.P. 71(16) ff. 571-3 Translation of a letter from Musa ibn Hatter, court Jew, and Isma'il's master of customs, to Admiral Byng, "the camp before Ceuta", 13/11/1718.
between Morocco and Britain, and for the duty-free provisioning of British ships in Moroccan ports (190).

The disgraced mujahid, Ahmad of Tetuan, travelled to Meknes in company with the embassy party. He was accompanied by all sixteen of the kinsmen who held administrative posts within his sphere of influence (191). Despite his defeat in battle, and a previous three years of absence from Meknes, the bashā was subjected to no more than a display of verbal violence, and a demand from the sultan for an increase in the size of his hadīva (192). However, while the pact with the Christians was being ratified, Ismaīl picked out the bashā's favourite katib for exemplary execution (193). The charges were ideological: that the katib, when about his master's business in Gibraltar, had indulged in riotous living in Christian company. This execution had a dual significance. As a ritual of displacement, it diverted attention and guilt from the agreement into which the sultan was currently entering, which set aside religious principle, in favour of diplomatic nostalgia for the old Sa'dī alliance with England (194). More narrowly, the execution was an indirect and, it might be hoped, prophylactic punishment of the bashā Ahmad for his defeat at Spanish hands.

In the shadow of Ismaīl's recent loss of the Sus, the bashā of Tetuan himself, as the sultan's principal northern lieutenant, was personally indispensible and inviolate. He was swiftly restored

(190) Treaty of 7/8/1721, reproduced by Windus pp. 230-231 and 236
(191) Windus p. 81
(192) ibid. pp. 90-91 and 200
(193) ibid. pp. 156-8
(194) "We are upon the same foot of friendship with your Majesty that your ancestors were with our kinsmen the Sherifs of Marocco, and Kings of the West in their times." (S.P. 71 (16) f. 524 Translation of a letter from Ismaīl to George I, accompanying the peace treaty of 7/8/1721).
to formal favour. In the spring of 1722, he was granted extensions to his government, and the additional "douceur" of an Alawī wife attended by forty slaves (195). During Isma'īl's final years, the bashā of Tetuan lived in high style (196), and to aliens epitomised active Moroccan government. In his gaudy and bellicose public state, as described by an eyewitness from the winter of 1724-5 (197), he now outshone his master. For by this date Isma'īl, who, even in his sixties, had been able to leap into the saddle (198), was physically become a Tithonus: he was brought into public audience in a small open carriage (199).

But it would be unwise to conclude from this physical decrepitude that Isma'īl, during his last quinquennium, was become negligible. This little-known period is likely to have been characterised by the anticipation of political opportunity, as princes and magnates awaited the sultan's death. But, while he lived, the sultan remained the linchpin of government. He was not simply a figurehead. His heir-presumptive Ahmad al-Dhahabī remained a political untouchable (200).

During these last years, Isma'īl ruled a contracted domain which did not include the Sus. In the year 1724, it was a domain ravaged by famine (201), and by southern rebellion (202). Yet there

(195) S.P. 71 (16) f. 635 Anthony Hatfield to Cartaret, Tetuan, 13/5/1722
(196) Brandes pp. 7-25 passim
(197) de la Faye pp. 90-91 and 240-241
(198) Busnot p. 37
(199) de la Faye p. 150
(200) Consul Hatfield, who had put forward a plea by way of Meknès courtiers, recorded that he had "proposed to them to interest Muley Hamet in it and do it by his hand and they say it is not feazable, for the Emperor would not take it from him, as too much interposing in his government" (S.P. 71 (16) f. 652 Hatfield to Cartaret, Tetuan, 26/8/1722)
(202) S.P. 71 (17) f. 16 Hatfield to Newcastle, Tetuan, 18/5/1724
was no deliquescence of the central authority. Revenue was still clawed into Meknes by the sultan's lieutenants. Ahmad of Tetuan continued to be a loyal visitor to the capital (203). So did Hammu ibn Tarifa, the basha of Marrakesh (204), whose tax raids are known to have penetrated High Atlas reaches (205). Revenue even came in from distant Tuat, funnelled to the capital by way of Tafilet, where the Alawi vice-roy Yusuf remained a loyal son to his father (206). Further, the sultan retained his hold over major economic assets. The empire's only concentrated and large-scale armaments industry was attached to the Miknas palace (207). And the imperial Fas "estancas" continued to flourish, and to infiltrate high governmental circles. A magnate as considerable as Hammu ibn Tarifa was willing, when in Meknes, to run a debt-collecting errand for the favoured Adayyil (208).

In external affairs, the sultan enjoyed a latter-day piece of good fortune. Wilting Ottoman power enabled him to recover his balance in dealings with the Turks. Early in 1724 there was a Porte embassy to Meknes. Hatfield, the British consul in Tetuan was told that its aim was to request safe harbourage for any Ottoman vessels that might be driven back upon Moroccan ports during a proposed Ottoman expedition towards Malta (209). Isma'il, who had been obsequious towards the Ottoman embassy of 1697 (210), could afford to

---

(203) de la Faye p. 240
(204) ibid. p. 196
(205) Mzouda MS ed./tr. J. Berque, and quoted in Moray: "Moulay Isma'il et l'armée de métier" p. 105
(206) Letters from Isma'il to Yusuf (7/Dhu 'l-Qa'da/1137 = 18/7/1725) and from Yusuf to Isma'il (6/Rabi 'II/1138 = 12/12/1725) quoted Martin pp. 85-6
(207) Windus p. 105 and Braithwaite p. 196
(208) de la Faye p. 196
(209) S.P. 71 (17) f. 7 Anthony Hatfield to Cartaret, Tetuan, 12/2/1723 O.S.
(210) See Chapter V pp. 223-4
be off-hand in his dealings with this later envoy, whom he kept waiting in Tetuan (211). The closer Turkish authority in Algiers seems no longer to have posed any threat to the Maghrib al-Aqsa, either by sea or by land. By 1726 it had become customary for Algerine vessels driven into Moroccan ports to be subjected to fines (212). Diplomatic protest from Algiers was doomed to failure. For it could no longer be backed by the naval power deployed so efficiently against Isma'il in 1692; and the Algerines were loth to invade Alawi territory without the support of their fleet (213). This Algerine debility dissipated the shadow of Djidioua, Isma'il's greatest military disgrace.

In the March of 1727, after a reign of fifty-five years, "The Old Emperor died of a Mortification in the lower part of his Belly, in extreme old Age" (214). His length of days invited an immediate maximisation of his achievements. Thus the contemporary "Chleuh" author, al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft, was delighted to trace out the geographical limits to which, to the best of his knowledge, the suzerainty and coinage of this sultan of the "Gharb" had run (215).

(211) S.P. 71 (17) f. 1 Hatfield to Carteret, Tetuan, 25/1/1723 O.S.
(212) S.P. 71 (17) f. 68 Hatfield to Charles Delafaye, Tetuan, 20/7/1726
(213) "The Algerines talk very bold, yet something reasonable, for they say that their soldiery must be supported, and now that they have lost their marine force, they must seek to succour them by other methods" (S.P. 71 (17) ff. 68-9 Hatfield to Delafaye, Tetuan, 20/7/1726)
(214) Braithwaite pp. 5 and 4
(215) "Il s'étendit jusqu'au pays du Sahara, au côte du Sud, jusqu'au pays des Almoravides Lemtouna; et jusqu'aux Ghוזlan et à leurs voisins Arabes de l'Oued Dra', et jusqu'au Touat et à Sijilmassa et jusqu'au pays de Figuig, dans l'est...et jusqu'au pays de Bou Semghoun, au pays des dattes, à cinq étales duquel est la limite où sa monnaie avait cours..." (Al-Zarhūnī of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 167-8)
It was convenient thus to maximise Isma'il's government in terms of quantity rather than quality. Delineation of the major events of Isma'il's reign has shown that "Cherg" and Sus, the spheres of the sultan's chief territorial ambitions, were also the spheres of his most notable ill-success. Further, this delineation has failed to show that Isma'il was anything of a political strategist as distinct from tactician. His government had histrionic style rather than vision. He built a palace at Meknes, not a sophisticated state. And he built up bodies of troops, rather than any "New Model Army". But, in his dealings with Fez, he "tamed the shrew", tying an enervated city to his own economic advantage. And his long life established the Alawi as a dynasty. During the decades of strife that followed Isma'il's death, only Isma'il's sons were, in practise, eligible for the position of sultan. And Isma'il's line continued.

Consequently, much of the mythopoeia that came to work upon the life and times of this long-lived ruler was dynastic mythopoeia. As such, it was tailored to suit the sensibilities of his descendants.

********************************************************************
AN EPILOGUE: THE MYTHOLOGY OF ISMA'IL'S REIGN

Many dubious traditions concerning Isma'Il's reign can be traced to the writings of al-Zayyānī. It has been indicated, in the Prologue to this work, that the early Alawī period is marginal to the main content of al-Zayyānī's history (1). The matter of al-Zayyānī's major historical texts is essentially a tale of turbulence followed by calm. It is hinged at 1757, the date of the accession of Sayyidī Muhammad III which, in the historian's eyes, marked the end of the political disorder consequent upon the death of Isma'Il, and the inauguration of a new period of orderly government. Alawī history for the years before 1727 stands uneasily at the head of this matter, as introductory material. It is told comparatively briefly, and its skeleton of Fes-orientated chronicle material is hung about with a cluster of ill-assorted traditions.

Part I: The "Black Army" and "tamhīd"

Two important and related traditions associated specifically with the reign of Isma'il concern, firstly, his fostering of an army of tabīdī or black slaves, and, secondly, the pacification of his empire: a tamhīd supposedly underpinned by the construction of a network of forts which tabīdī were customarily set to garrison. Together, tabīdī and tamhīd have been seen as aspects of a successful pattern of heavy-handed provincial government peculiar to the reign of Isma'il (2).

It has been customary to treat of "the black army" almost by analogy with "the buildings of Meknes", as a curiosity to be discussed in isolation from the political and military history of Isma'il's reign.

(1) See Prologue Pp. 21 and 25-6
(2) For examples of this viewpoint, see Terrasse Vol. II pp. 256-7 and 258, and the recent article by Morey: "Moulay Isma'il et l'armée de métier".
This approach was determined by al-Zayyānī, who was concerned only to
tell a tale of Isma‘īl’s recruitment of an ḍabīd force as an
entertainment and as a necessary precursor to his main matter. The
author regarded the ḍabīd equivocally. He saw ḍabīd as the prime
agents of disorder during the interregnum which followed Isma‘īl’s
death. More than once he explicitly compared Isma‘īl’s ḍabīd with
the Turkish slave troops of al-Mu’tasim ibn al-Rashīd al-ʿAbbāsī (3).
And he constructed a quaint criticism of Isma‘īl’s own internal use
of his ḍabīd forces: the wish that Isma‘īl’s fortresses had all been
ships which could have transported their slave garrisons across the
sea, to a glorious reconquest of Spain (4). But al-Zayyānī seems to
have realised that the ḍabīd of Isma‘īl’s day were a force bound up
with the good name of the dynasty, and that it was proper for him
to provide a counter-weight to his own chronicle notes upon the
disputes concerning the imperial right to the proprietorship of
Ṭabīd and ḍarāṭīn (5). For he included within his texts a "received
version" of Isma‘īl’s acquisition of his slave army. Both the "Bustān
al-Zarīf..." and the "Turjumān" contain a variation of this "received
version" (6). In each case, the material falls into two parts. The
first part outlines the gathering of a foundation corps of raw recruits;

(3) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 32-3 and 37

(4) "wa hadhā ʿl-adad alladhī jamāʿa al-sultan isma‘īl min al-ʿabīd
law khāṣa fī ʿl-bahr li-ʿl-andalus wa tilka al-qal‘a kanat marāṣib
bi-hawz al-ʿasākir la-malaka bihi al-andalus kulliha."

("This being the number of black slaves which the sultan Isma‘īl collected,
had he plunged across the sea to Spain, and had these forts been ships
for transporting his armies, certainly he would have conquered all of
Spain with it (the number of slaves).") ("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 37)

(5) See Chapter V Pp. 211-221 and Chapter VI Pp. 257-259

(6) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 31-2 and 37 cf. "Turjumān" pp. 15-16
of the text and 29-31 of the translation.
the second part describes the training from childhood of the slave army proper, the offspring of the foundation corps.

It was claimed that Isma'il began his reign with an army composed of free men (7). However, when in Marrakesh, following its capture from Ahmad ibn Muhriz in 1677, the sultan is said to have been approached by a Murrakushi talib surnamed 'Alilish, whose father had been a kālib in Saḍi service. 'Alilish showed the sultan a register (daftar) of ġabīd who had formed part of al-Mansūr's army, and assured him that there were many such slaves still to be found within the city, and among the tribes of its surrounds. He was promptly charged with rounding up this remnant of al-Mansūr's following, for Isma'il's benefit. Imperial letters were sent to regional auwwād requesting cooperation. And the following year saw the gathering in of every aswād within the region (8). The recruits were registered. If bachelors, they were provided with wives, bought slave-girls (ima') or co-opted serf-women (hartanīyat). They were then despatched to Meknes, provided with arms, and grouped under commanders. Further companies were subsequently rounded up from other regions; governors of the major towns were ordered to buy up men and women slaves; and recruits were brought in from named provinces of the northern and central Maghrib al-Aqsa, according to the pattern set within the environs of Marrakesh. With two exceptions (9), each regional contingent was in turn sent off from Meknes to the rural camp of Mashra' al-Raml near to Sale. There

(7) "wa kana yuktabu al-qaṣer min al-ahmar" ("And the army was recruited from among free men") ("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 31)

(8) "...hattā lam yatruk bi-tilka al-qaṣā'il kullihā aswād sawā' kāna mamlūk aw hurr aswād aw hartanī" ("...until he left not a single black, slave, free or serf, within any of those tribes")

("Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 32)

(9) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." version only. loc cit.
they were said to have been joined by an *heratin* force gathered by the sultan upon an expedition he supposedly made to Chinguetti in 1678 (10). According to the figures scattered through the version of this material set out in the "Bustan al-Zarif...", the number of recruits first sent to Mashra* al-Raml totalled ten thousand, including the *heratin*. These, the majority, were set to build their own homes, till the earth and beget children (11). A minority, the four thousand recruits from Tamesna and Dukkala, were said to have been retained for immediate military service (12).

The second section of the narrative concentrates upon the children born in the *mehalla* at Mashra* al-Raml. At the end of a ten-year interval, and thereafter annually, successive groups of these children are said to have been brought to Meknes for a six-year period of training which comprised, for the boys, three years at work on the palace buildings (khidma), followed by three years training in the use of arms and in horsemanship. Meanwhile, the girls were educated in domestic service. At the end of this period came formal mass-weddings and registration. There was then renewal of the cycle. The young *cabid* were grouped in companies under older officers, and despatched straight back to Mashra* al-Raml (13). According to the terms of the narrative, many must be supposed to have remained there. For, by the end of Isma'il's reign, when the number of registered *cabid* was said to have risen to 150,000, half this quota was allegedly stationed at the

(10) "Turjuman" pp. 16-17 of the text and 31-2 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 32
(11) "Turjuman" version, p. 16 of the text and 30 of the translation
(12) "Bustan al-Zarif..." version, MS p. 32
(13) ibid. p. 37
Mahalla. Of the remainder, twenty-five thousand were in Wajh Carūs, the garrison suburb of Meknes; the others were distributed in forts throughout the country.

Al-Zayyānī claimed to have taken his information upon Ismāʿīl’s cabīd from two sources: a tarīkh or kunnash, attributed to a certain "al-Ḥamīdī" (14); and a daftar which had been in the possession of the kātib Sulaymān ibn Ṭāb al-Qādir al-Zarhūnī (15). Nothing seems known of al-Ḥamīdī. In the "Kitāb al-Istīqa..." his name does not appear, being supplanted by that of Ismāʿīl’s wāzir al-Ḥamadī (16). This substitution should probably be dismissed as a late attempt further to authenticate the material. The "Bustān al-Zarīf..." does contain biographical notes on the kātib al-Zarhūnī. These state that he worked for the administrations (dawlatayn) of both al-Rashīd and of Ismāʿīl, and that he died in Tarudant in 1138 A.H. /1725-6 A.D., in possession of a roster of Ismāʿīl’s entire army, including those troops who were centrally based, and those who were dispersed among the forts (17). These details are open to question. The "Nashr al-Mathānī...", an earlier work than the "Bustān al-Zarīf...", contains an obituary notice for a kātib Abu ʿl-Rabiʿ Sulaymān ibn Ṭāb al-Qādir al-Zarhūnī, also said to have served both al-Rashīd and Ismāʿīl. This obituary notice is for the year 1098 A.H./1686-7 A.D. (18). As it

(14) "Tarīkh": "Turjuman..." p. 16 of the text and 31 of the translation cf. "kunnash": "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 37

(15) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.


(17) "wa kana ʿindahu daftar al-qaṣāʾir kulmā ṭāl-ṣawād al-āz Zam wa l-muṭaffarīqūn fī qalī al-maghrib"

("... and he possessed a register of all military forces, the majority in the central cantonment, and the detachments dispersed among the forts of the Maghrib") "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.

(18) "Nashr al-Mathānī..." ed./tr. Michaux-Bellaire A.M. Vol. XXIV pp. 385-6
is unlikely that there were two katīban of the same name who had served both ʿAlawī brother sultans, al-Zayyānī’s attribution of late military source material to the katib al-Zarhūnī is thus rendered highly suspect. It is likely that al-Zayyānī had two pieces of written material to hand, when he composed his matter upon the cabīd. But both sources are best regarded as of unknown origin. They will be referred to hereafter as "al-Hamīdī" and "pseudo al-Zarhūnī".

The mass of al-Zayyānī’s general information upon the gathering and training of cabīd is likely to have been "al-Hamīdī" material. But the daftar of the "pseudo al-Zarhūnī" was specifically claimed as the source for certain statistics associated with this material (19). This daftar is likely also to have been the source for a separate skein of data within al-Zayyānī’s texts: a series of notes purporting to record, in rounded hundreds or thousands, the military complement allotted to forts allegedly built in association with Ismaʿīlī’s programme of tambīd or rural pacification. The two bodies of information are linked by a common reference to the stocking of two forts at Adekhsan and Dīlah with the four thousand cabīd from Dukkala and Tamesna (20). All this statistical information is open to query. Garrison figures of two thousand for individual rural forts such as Adekhsan and Dīlah seem astonishingly inflated when compared with contemporary European notes upon the size of Moroccan garrisons. For around 1680, Mouëtte estimated the palace guard of Fās al-Jadīd at three hundred (21). And in 1699, the cabīd garrison of the citadel in New Sale, the present day "Casbah des Oudaias", and one of the country’s most notable fortresses, was said by a French naval reporter to number around two hundred, to the exclusion of its teeming women and children (22).

(19) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 37
(20) ibid. pp. 32 and 36
(21) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 186
(22) S.I. 2° France Vol. V No. LXXX Study of Sale, addressed from de la Maisonfort to de Combes, Rouen, 28/12/1699 pp. 551-2
Nor can credit be given to the dates al-Zayyānī attached to the garrisoning of individual forts. The tales of Isma'īl's pacification of the Maghrib al-Aqsa, to which these garrison notes are attached, will be shown to be highly dubious in themselves. And the garrison notes would appear arbitrarily to have been spliced with these tales, as part of a literary construction that was not carried out with overall care. For these notes clash with the chronology attributed to the "al-Hamīdī" tale which concentrates upon the build-up of the force at Mashra C al-Raml. According to the "Bustan al-Zarīf..." version of this material, fifteen named forts were stocked with *cabīd over the period 1680-1688 (23); and the implication covers other forts. The most conservative calculation, based here upon the "Bustan al-Zarīf..." figures, suggests that the number of *cabīd thus detailed for garrison duty approached ten thousand; and the text implies that a far greater number of men were actually involved. However, according to the "al-Hamīdī" chronology, the only recruits then available for garrison duty were the *cabīd of "Tamesna" and Dukkala, destined for two forts only. For in "al-Hamīdī" terms, the main force of *cabīd was still located placidly at the mahalla at Mashra C al-Raml, from which the first recruitment of ten-year old children was allegedly made only in 1100 A.H./1688-9 A.D. In terms of this chronology, the first body of trained *cabīd could not have become operational until around 1694.

The schemata of "al-Hamīdī" and of "pseudo al-Zarhūnī" are both questionable in the light of external evidence. The "pseudo al-Zarhūnī" notes concerning the numbers and deployment of *cabīd all waver in the light of evidence that one such note is false. Al-Zayyānī would date the building of Qasba Tadla, and its garrisoning with a thousand *cabīd to 1688 (24). But Rouxette's "Histoire...", published in 1683, recorded the

(23) "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 34, 35 and 36
(24) "Turjuman" p. 22 of the text and 41 of the translation.
building of this fort, and its garrisoning with renegade troops, as taking place in 1679, as an incidental to the return lap of the long haraka of the plague years (25).

Similarly, the more generalised "al-Hamidi" material upon the primal ingathering and training of abid is demonstrably weak: a medley of traditions in which the memory of genuine circumstances seems to have been distorted and interwoven with decorous fiction. The suggestion that Isma'il's abid were in any way inherited from Ahmad al-Mansur al-Sa'di is false. The obvious point that, in 1677, genuine survivors from al-Mansur's period were likely to be few and antique, is relatively unimportant. The major error lies in the suggestion that al-Mansur or his Sa'di successors had ever employed black slave troops in any quantity. The suggestion would seem to have been carelessly extrapolated from memories of the trans-Saharan expeditions of al-Mansur's day. These had indeed led to the import of slaves. But the slaves would seem to have been seen as luxury commodities, rather than as potential military recruits. An account of the tribute caravan with which Jawar Pasha, the "conquistador" of Songhai, returned to Marrakesh in 1599, set at the end of its exotic catalogue:

"great quantity of eunuchas, dwarves and weomen and men slaves, besydes fifteen virgins, the Kings daughters of Gago" (26)

The composition of al-Mansur's army, at the end of his reign, is well known from both European and indigenous material. An English eyewitness who attempted to outline, for the benefit of James I, the opposition to be expected were he to undertake a "godly and christianlike"

(26) S.I. 158 Angleterre Vol. II No. XLIX Jasper Tomson, Barbary merchant, to his brother Richard Tomson, Marrakesh, 24/6/1599 p. 146
bid for the subjection of Morocco, listed among the paid imperial
"Maganies" (makhazinīva):

"Of Ellches, being runnegades, the best solduares, 4000.
Of Andalousies, being runnegade Moores out of the mountains
of Granado, 4000. Of Suagostes, that are Moores of the
Mountaines, 1500. And of Turkess and others, to make up
them above forty thousand..." (27)

In ethnic range, this summary aligns with al-Ifrānī's version of al-
Fishtālī's account of al-Mansūr's army on parade (28). This describes
an harlequin array, including the indigenous juyūsh al-sūr, the
shorāna or "easterners", the renegades, the Andalusians and the
Turks. There is no mention here of any force of black troops. And in
such a context, an example of a literary theme delighting in variety
(29), it is difficult to believe that any major force could have
been overlooked.

Al-Mansūr may have had black slaves close to his person. There
survives a trace-reference to one Masūd ibn Mubarak, the "sahib al
sāif" or "master of the personal guard", whom al-Mansūr once designated
to be commander of the Murrākushī citadel in the eventuality of plague
(30). He was described as a "wasīf" (31), and his name is redolent of
Islamic black slavery. But the saif he commanded is likely to have
been a small personal bodyguard (32). It did not develop into a larger

(27) S.I. 79

(28) "Nuzhat al-Ḥadī..." ed./tr. Houdas pp. 115-118 of the text and
195-201 of the translation

(29) See, for example, the account of the polychrome Fatimid army of the
mid eleventh century, on parade at the ceremony of the opening of the
Nile sluices, as described by the Persian traveller Nasir-i Khusraw:
pp. 445-6

(30) "Nuzhat al-Ḥadī..." ed./tr. Houdas p. 184 of the text and 298 of the
translation

(31) The term wasīf may indicate close personal association with a master.
Sources for the period frequently note a wasīf individually, by his
personal name, and in the execution of a particular duty.

(32) Dozy's "Supplément..." (Vol. I p. 663) defines "sāif" as an intimate
guard, in derivation from its original sense of "portico".
Sa'di "black army". Europeans dominated the forces associated with the rump of the Sa'di state. An anonymous English eyewitness of the late 1630s described the Murrakhushi sultan's "magazine" as a "pretorian band, not unlike they Janizaries of the Grand Seignor", that was disciplined by "elshes", renegades whose commander was a Frenchman (33).

On the other hand, it has been seen that Cabid were with the Alawis from the outset. The "al-Hamid" material is incorrect in suggesting that Isma'il began his reign with a military backing limited to free men. Besides his own renegades, he had a black slave force inherited from his brother al-Rashid, and led by the commander "Bousta" (34). Even during the first decade of Isma'il's reign, Mouitte could insist upon the military prominence of the sultan's black guards:

"...ses meilleurs soldats...qui combattent toujours proche de sa personne avec des armes a feu; ceux qui rendent de meilleurs combats obtiennent les principales charges de l'armée ou le gouvernement de quelque place." (35)

But this author gave no evidence that the force of "Noirs" had been dramatically enlarged during his period of residence within Morocco. His "Histoire..." is devoid of any reference to a country-wide round-up of negro slaves following Isma'il's 1677 capture of Marrakesh, or to the establishment of an experimental mahalla at Mashra al-Raml. Indeed, Mouitte's detailed record of the sultan's activities during the plague years 1678-80, has been seen to point up Isma'il's preoccupation with self-preservation. Here Mouitte is borne out by material from the "al-Fasi" chronicle. Both sources suggest that, amid

(33) S.I. i(2) Vol. III No. XCIII Anon. Laconfield MS No. 73 pp. 466-7
(34) See Chapter II Pp. 213-214
(35) Mouitte: "Histoire..." p. 176
the havoc of the plague, neither the administration nor the society of the Maghrib al-Aqsa was in any fit state for the elaborate experiment in social surgery that a widespread levy of slaves would have involved. It has been seen that Isma’il’s employment of abid during this crisis was not experimental but brutally pragmatic; that they were posted with orders to slaughter travellers on the routes leading into Saïs from the pestilence-ridden north (36).

The obvious foundation for the first part of the "al-Hamidi" material is quite distinct: a memory of the wide-ranging but rough-handed quest for new abid recruits that was thrust into operation during the mid-1690s, in the aftermath of the disastrous Algerine invasion of 1692 (37). This was the period for which a southern clerk named Alī'lish was a known governmental figure (38).

The quest for abid had required jurist justification in the 1690s. And governmental white-washing of the affair continued. Thus, de Chénier was told, in the mid eighteenth century, that Isma’il had, chiefly by gift or purchase, collected an army of slaves who were sun-worshippers whom he converted to Islam, and set beneath the auspices of al-Bukhārī (39). Al-Zayyānī’s "al-Hamidi" material constitutes a variation in Alawī governmental justification of the great quest. It is comparatively robust, acknowledging the rounding up of free negroes and negresses (40).

(36) See Chapter III pp. 117-118
(37) See Chapter V pp. 193-197
(38) "Lettres Inédites..." No. 6 Isma’il to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Qadir al-Fāṣil, 28/Dhu ‘l-Qa‘da/1104 = 31/7/1693, includes the name of "our servant (khādira) Muḥammad Alī'lish" p. 45.

The southern origin of this clerk is vouched for by later, embittered references to the man, as a Murrākūshī "Quisling", in the text of al-Zarhūnī of Tazaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 16-17 and 149.


(40) "'ra isma'il kull mā wajadu hatta lam yubqaa aswad bi 'l-magrib fi ḥādira wa la badiya, wa law kāna hurr aswad aw hurrā aswād!" ([And they gathered in every one they found until there was not a single black remaining in the city or countryside of the Maghrib. There was not even a free negro or a free negress]) "Turjumān" p. 15 of the text cf. 29 of the translation.
into an imperial service that was de facto slavery. But al-Zayyānī, who was himself associated with the training of pressed recruits in the days of Muhammad III (41), is unlikely to have been abashed at the material he was using. In the mid nineteenth century, his material would be refined further by the scandalised Akansū, who worked out a loyal and logic-chopping defence of the sultan Ismā'īl. This defence ended with an admission of the facts of co-option, but nevertheless stressed that the makhzan had kept within the bounds of the law. The defence was based partly upon silence: the silence of the moral voice of the shaykh al-Yūsī, the most renowned literary sage of Ismā'īl's day. But Akansū claimed also that he had personally examined the military records of Ismā'īl's day, and could vouch for the existence of different categories of "personnel" within the muster-rolls of the abīd forces: those in a state of slavery ("raqiya"), those in the free state ("huriya"), and "those in the middle category" ("wasita baynahuma"). On the basis of the "al-Hamdi" material, he accounted for these distinctions with the suggestion that the "slaves of al-Mansūr", although gathered together after scrupulous investigations as to their identity, had yet been recognised as a group distinct from those bought on the open market for cash; and that consequently, any argument concerning the legitimacy of the sultan's actions should turn upon the impressment of free men into the army, rather than upon their enslavement, to which, strictly, the sultan had never pretended.

It has been suggested that there were possibly recognised distinctions between men from Ismā'īl's primal and palace educated guard of abīd.

(41) "Tur iuman" pp. 85-6 of the text and 157 of the translation

and the men taken, under various circumstances, into the swollen army of the 1690s (43): that Cabīd who had been trained as court pages ranked higher than pressed adults. The "al-Ḥamīdīn" material would disguise such a distinction by suggesting that the majority of the first, pressed generation of Cabīd was never militarily employed, and that the creation of a corps of court pages, and of a standing guard in Meknes, were clean and secondary developments within Ismāʿīl's military policy. But there was no such two-tier development. In Mouëtte's day, the sultan's "Noirs" already fulfilled all the standard military roles of Alawī service. There were Cabīd in the standing guard. There was a corps of adolescent black pages. And there were negro troops set to garrison forts "hors la veue de leur maistre" (44).

Other details from the "al-Ḥamīdīn" material have piecemeal external corroboration, suggesting that many aspects of Ismāʿīl's deployment and training of Cabīd were standard. Throughout Ismāʿīl's reign, the sultan's conduct of mass-weddings on behalf of his military slaves was a topic for the prurient delight of alien commentators, especially as it frequently entailed compulsory miscegenation for renegade soldiers (45). This was a matter of common policy, with a view to breeding new generations of imperial troops. It had no necessary connection with Mashrak al-Raml, which no known contemporary commentator mentions in such a context. Similarly, it seems to have been customary throughout Ismāʿīl's reign for the sultan casually to turn his Cabīd on to the palace building site as masons. Mouëtte commented that:

(43) See Chapter V Pp. 197-199

(44) Mouëtte: "Histoire..." p. 176

(45) See, for example, Pidou de St. Olon tr. Motteux p. 128 cf. "Ocklev" pp. 80-81 cf. Windue p. 138
These periods of khidma would seem to have been entirely arbitrary. According to Windus, the page-boys who had been toiling one day with "Earth, Stones or Wood" might the next day appear "gay and under Arms" (47). The suggestion within the "al-Hamid" material that the three years of formalised building labour constituted some rugged aspect of military training, seems to have been put forward as a pathetic attempt to align Isma'il's force of cabid with those major Islamic armies whose recruits had been selected in youth for a period of orderly instruction. However, comparison with the education of the embryonic Almohade "hariz" (48), the embryonic Egyptian "mamluk" (49), or the embryonic Ottoman janissary (50), all of whom were educated in religion and polite literature as well as the arts of war, serves only to underline the rough nature of the handling with which the young cabid were "broken in".

The cabid were undoubtedly held in great indigenous regard during Isma'il's own day. The sight of the sultan at the head of his ten thousand blacks was held out in promise to the embassy party of Pidou de St. Olon, as a finer panoply than France could offer (51). But it has been seen that cabid were no match for Turkish-trained troops either at al-Mashari or at Djidjoua. And, internally, the significance of cabid to the maintenance of MiknasI authority must be

(46) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 176
(47) Windus p. 141
(50) H. Dernschwam: "Tagebuch einer Reise nach Konstantinopel und Kleinasien" ed. F. Babinger (Munich and Leipzig, 1923) p. 80
(51) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. XIII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, Tetuan, 11/6/1693 p. 74
evaluated within a wide and evolving general context. There was no necessary correlation between the effective might of the central power, and the number of ṣabīd in the sultan's askar or standing army. It has been seen that the sultan Ismail's years of escalating internal authority were the years preceding 1690; years during which the imperial corps of ṣabīd was compact by comparison with the swollen hordes gathered in by the great military quest of the mid-1690s. Ismail could not take the loyalty of this enlarged ṣabīd army for granted. During the war between Muhammad al-ʿAlim and Zaydān, and its aftermath, imperial ṣabīd showed themselves as capable of following a sultan's son as of following the sultan himself (54). It was within this early eighteenth century political context that the mahalla of Mashraʾ al-Raml came into being. The creation of this mahalla was not, as the "al-Hamidi" material would suggest, a foundation stone to the creation of a centralised Alawi standing guard. It was its coping-stone: a latter-day experiment by which the sultan Ismail built up a massive reserve force which counter-balanced the active power of his sons and magnates (55). Among the forces which these sons and magnates could command were, as during decades past, their own miniature forces of personal ṣabīd (56).

A set focus upon the massed troops of Mashraʾ al-Raml and Meknes, such as characterises the "al-Hamidi" material, is ill-assorted with the view that the key to Ismail's mastery of his empire was the scattered deployment of his ṣabīd. Yet this view, set alongside the "al-Hamidi" material, is also traceable to al-Zayyānī, within whose stylised schema of Ismail's reign the sultan's "tamhid", or "setting

(54) Busnot Chapters III and IV passim (*)
(55) See Chapter VI P. 263
(*) An error in transcription resulted in (52) and (53) being omitted from the numerical series of footnotes.
in order" of his kingdoms is recounted as having been completed after twenty-four years of energetic campaigning (57). The associated tactics were summed up in the assertion that Isma'il had built forts at all the way-stations and garrisoned them with *CabId* (58). Bold claims have been made for the consequences of these tactics: that the forts and garrisons were a mechanism for the elimination of a "*hilād al-sība*" or "country of dissidence" (59), a concept alien to the vocabulary of indigenous authors of the period.

It is true that, stylistically, al-Zayyānī built up the concept of "*tamhid*" as a goal which Isma'il achieved, as distinct from an incidental chore of military government. Each of the author's major historical texts contains five related passages (60) which provide a bloc of evidence upon Isma'il's pacification of his kingdoms. They are set within the narrative of the period 1680-1692, and describe punitive expeditions undertaken against rural groupings. Judged in isolation, these episodes would read unremarkably, as evidence of a fairly commonplace bludgeoning of countryfolk. Yet within the context of the short account of

(57) "*Tur, Jumān*" p. 25 of the text and 46 of the translation.

(58) "*tamahhada mulk al-maghrib wa'l-sūs wa'l-sahrā' al-sultan ismā'il wa bana jami' qal'ihī bi 'l-manāzil kulliha wa shahanahā bi 'l-manāzil kulliha*"

("*Tur, Jumān*" p. 23 of the text cf. 43 of the translation)

(59) The concept of the "*hilād al-sība*", or territory beyond effective government, is built into the French historiography of Morocco. But it has almost universally been waived for the latter part of Isma'il's reign. Terrasse considered it controversial to credit Isma'il with the abolition of "offensive dissidence" only (op. cit. Vol. II p. 264). More recent work, including "A history of the Maghrib" by J. M. Abun-Nasr (London, 1971) p. 231, has returned to the old theme of rigour and sweeping success. And Magali Moray in her "Moulay Isma'il et l'armée de métier" concluded that the sultan's deployment of *abīd* throughout the Maghrib al-Aqsa, in an "infrastructure politico-militaire", effectively abolished *sība*.

Isma'il's reign, the space and detail allotted to these five expeditions has implied that they were of peculiar significance to the sultan in themselves, and even that they marked stages in a systematic policy of disarming the entire rural populace.

The first of these episodes was a campaign into the "Cherg", allegedly undertaken by the sultan as a measure for the support of those Ma'qil groupings whom he had ordered to migrate thither from the Hawz of Marrakesh (61). The four remaining episodes were expeditions which allegedly led to the sultan's mastery of various Beraber groupings from the Central Atlas region. Certain motifs are common to all five episodes: the punishment of hill-folk by the confiscation of their arms and horses, and, as noted previously, the building and garrisoning of forts.

The episodes are related in an increasingly discursive manner, and given increasing moment. Their culmination was the final Central Atlas campaign, dated to 1104 A.H./1692 A.D. The tale of this expedition is sonorous, and related with a wealth of military, geographical and anecdotal detail which gives to the campaign the appearance of a major politico-military undertaking. Isma'il was said, erroneously, to have prefaced the expedition by appointing three sons as vice-roys in Fes Marrakesh and Meknes (62). Thereafter he supposedly led a great and heavily armed haraka towards the Central Atlas. With him there was allegedly a bevy of commanders including, with some chronological improbability, the Bāša Musahil, a noted ġābd general of the last decade of his reign (63). The haraka was said successfully

(61) See Chapter II P. 106
(62) The three sons' names were attached to appropriate vice-regalities. But Muḥriz had been appointed vice-roy of Fes in 1678, Ma'mun vice-roy of Marrakesh in 1677, and Zaydan vice-roy of Meknes in 1685 (Mouftte: "Histoire..." pp. 108 and 112 and Chapter III P. 140 Note (101))
to have penetrated high mountain defiles. The vaunted consequence
was defeat for a triple dissident confederation from the "Jabal
Fazzāz", and the lateral crushing of a fourth grouping, the Garwān,
at the hands of loyalist Beraber. In trophy, the mekhzan forces
were said to have won ten thousand guns, thirty thousand horses
and innumerable heads (64).

This tale of measured brutality has a particular stylistic
significance which goes beyond its narration as a major military
undertaking. It would seem to have been written up, most notably
within the "Bustān al-Zarīf...", as a literary "set-piece", central
to al-Zayyānī's account of Isma'īl's reign. And it was explicitly
elevated to climactic status, dividing the sultan's years of
energetic campaigning from his years of relaxation (65). The
implication of triumph was hammered home by the trenchant assertion
that, after 1692, weapons and horses remained in the possession of
only four groupings within Isma'īl's empire: the Ayt Yimmūr, loyalist
Beraber set to guard the "Fazzāz"; the ahl al-rīf, designated
mujāhidūn; the ḍabīd; and the Udāya (66).

The entire body of material to do with pacificatory campaigning
seems to have fused several of al-Zayyānī's more dubious sources of
information: court tradition; the notes of "pseudo al-Zarhūnī" upon
the garrisoning of rural forts; and the folk-memory of the "Jabal Fazzāz";

(64) "Turjumān" pp. 23-25 of the text and 43-45 of the translation cf.
"Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 40-41. A close reproduction of the
latter version of this tale is to be found within al-Nāṣirī's "Kitāb
al-Istigsa...", Casablanca text, Vol. VII pp.79-81 and 86-7 cf. Fumey
translation A.M. Vol. IX pp 105-9 and 119

(65) The "Bustān al-Zarīf..." version of the tale concludes thus:
"wa bi 'l-istīla alayhim kamāla lihi ṣafat al-maghrib, wa lam yubqo
bihi man yanbidū lihi ḍīrg."  
("And with their conquest his triumph over the Maghrib was brought to
fulfilment. There remained within the region no race that strove against
him.") "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41

(66) "Turjumān" p. 24 of the text and 46 of the translation cf.
"Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.
the Central Atlas region of the author's ancestry. The result has been firstly to suggest that the Central Atlas was of particular significance to Ismā'īl; secondly to imply that it was internal victory rather than external defeat which brought about the sultan's switch from campaigning to palace retirement; and thirdly to insist that rural pacification and the disarmament of rural peoples were viable goals to whose consummation a date could be set.

The association of four out of the five of the recorded campaigns with the Central Atlas is likely to reflect simply the personal interest of the author in memories of campaigning carried out within the region associated with his own language group. The Central Atlas can have had little intrinsic attraction for the makhzan. As a region of transhumant pastoralism (67) it is likely to have been sparsely populated by comparison with territory such as the inner Sus valley, where intensive agriculture prevailed. The northern fringes of the Middle Atlas were important to the cities of Saâs, as a near and vital source of timber (68); but this trade seems not to have involved the more southerly "Fazzaz". For a sultan based within Saâs, the greatest significance of the Central Atlas is likely to have been strategic. Its northern sector contains the upland way from Saâs to Tafilelt; and the "Jabal Fazzaz" overlooks the direct route from Saâs to Marrakesh, passing by way of the Tadla. Both routeways were particularly danger-prone. For they cut across the lines of transhumance along which


Many of al-Zayyani's campaign stories, and in particular an account from Muhammad III's day, in which the author displayed his knowledge of local movements in the "Fazzaz" region, suggest the long establishment within the southern Central Atlas, of a transhumant cycle to rural behaviour (See, in particular, the "Turjuman" pp. 79-80 of the text and 145-6 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp. 109-111)

(68) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 56 of Mouffe: "Histoire..." p. 190
groupings of herdsmen would move back and forth, from altitude to altitude according to the season.

There seems no need to assume that any specific ethnically-based hostility lay at the root of attacks made against Beraber groupings (69), or that the series of Central Atlas campaigns was major and comprehensive, as distinct from minor and typical. Under close examination, much of al-Zayyani's pacificatory campaign material withers. The skein of notes pertaining to forts supposedly built in conjunction with these campaigns has already been suggested to be "pseudo al-Zarhuni" material, and unreliable. Further, it seems suspicious that no single one of the five pacificatory campaigns has any firm place within the "al-Fasi" chronicle material as reproduced within later texts. Al-Nasiri attempted neatly to align the preliminary campaign into Snassen and Angad country with a well-

(69) The theory that the pacification of the peoples of the Central Atlas region was one of Isma'Il's military priorities has, by way of a straightforward reading of al-Zayyani, become an established theme within French writing upon his period. The most developed expression of this theory is that set out by F. de la Chapelle in his article "Le Sultan Moulay Isma'il et les Berberes Sanhaja du Maroc Central" (A.M. Vol. XXVIII Paris, 1931). This sets the Central Atlas campaigns of Isma'Il's reign within a highly questionable historical framework, derived in its current form from G. Margais ("Les Arabes en Berbérie du XII au XIV siècle", Constantine and Paris, 1914). This framework delineated an age-old pattern of conflict between grand, ill-knit, yet ethnically identifiable conglomerations of peoples, acting out their racial destiny within the Maghrib upon a vast historical and geographical scale. According to this schema, there was an ethnically based enmity between the Beraber of the Central Atlas, part of the wider "Sanhaja" grouping, and Isma'Il, a Filali sharif of quintessentially Arab stock. Their tussle could be interpreted as one episode in the struggle between the Sanhaja and a series of ethnic rivals for control of the Western Maghrib (See also F. de la Chapelle's "Ésquisses de l'Histoire du Sahara Occidental" in "Hespéris" Vol. XI Paris, 1930 pp 35-95).

This viewpoint ignores the evidence that Isma'Il and all his successors had the support of certain Beraber groupings. Its development seems attributable in part to the interpretation in seventeenth century terms of certain factors important at the time of the establishment of the Protectorate: the weakness of the sultan's forces in the face of the Zimmur, a people claiming Beraber origin, who had come to dominate the routeway linking Safi with Rebat; and the difficulties encountered by Lyautey's troops in subduing the peoples of the Central Atlas itself. (See, for the situation in 1903, R. Mauduit: "Le Makhzen Marocain..." p. 295; and, for the difficulties faced by the Protectorate troops, A. Guillaumet: "Les Berbères marocaines et la pacification de l'Atlas Central 1912-1933" (Paris, 1946) passim.
known expedition into the further "Cherg" (70). But the identification is far from obvious, as the details of the two "Chergi" campaigns are vastly different. As for the dates allotted to the four Central Atlas campaigns, these are best explained in terms of tortuous interpolation into an overall framework of "al-Fasi" annal material. For al-Zayyani seems here to have attempted to knit together, as strands of equal weight, two conflicting series of annals, the one metropolitan and the other regional. It is possible that the latter series was a record kept within al-Zayyani's family. As an appendix to an account dated to 1688, the author included the note that a forefather of his had been co-opted into the sultan's train (71).

Comparison of the Hegiran dating of the Central Atlas campaigns with its Gregorian equivalent, points up weaknesses within the "regional" strand to al-Zayyani's chronology which would not have been immediately apparent to a Muslim historian writing years after the event. Thus, after recording Isma'il's return to Meknes in 1683, following his first Susi campaign against Ahmad ibn Muhriz, al-Zayyani's narrative improbably suggests that, almost immediately, the sultan set out for the Middle Atlas, with the aim of subjecting a Beraber grouping, the Idrāsin. As the return from the Sus was dated, within Fas material, to Dhu 'l-Qa'da 1094 (72), the author, who apparently wished to have both events stand in the same year, was forced to set the beginning of the Idrāsin campaign into Dhu 'l-


(71) "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 36

Hijja 1094. This month, which covered late November to late December 1683, was at an unlikely point in the seasonal year for the opening of a campaign against hill-folk. And the dating is clearly belied by the narrative of the Idrāsin campaign itself. This describes an expedition begun in summer and maintained until winter by the blockading of the Idrāsin within high pasture country until famine and the decimation of their herds forced them to descend and sue for peace (73).

A similar problem besets the narrative of the second Central Atlas campaign, dated by al-Zayyānī to 1096 A.H./1685 A.D. The sultan is described as, on this occasion having spent almost a year by the upper Moulouya, supervising fort-building and blockading peoples of the north-eastern Atlas into submission (74). Yet the English slave Phelps recorded that on January 1st, 1685, Isma'īl set out for the Sus (75) where, even upon al-Zayyānī's own reckoning, he must have been situated in the following autumn. For he is known to have been outside Tarudant when Ahmad ibn Muhirz was found murdered (76).

When grooming his "set-piece" upon the grand final campaign into the "Jabal Fazzāz", al-Zayyānī seems to have been forced to defer the dating he would have preferred. He asserted that the campaign was planned in the year 1103 A.H., but postponed until the beginning of the following year by the sultan's sudden deflection of military purpose into a "Chergi" campaign against the Turks, in the company of his son Zaydān (77). This suggestion of a postponement was probably

(73) "Turjumān" p. 20 of the text and 37-8 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 35
(74) "Turjumān" p. 20-1 of the text and 38-9 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.
(75) T. Phelps: "A true account of the captivity..." pp. 8 and 12
(76) "Turjumān" p. 21 of the text and 39 of the translation cf. Chapter III p. 143
(77) "Turjumān" p. 23 of the text and 44 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 40
based upon the author's knowledge of "al-Fasi" material. In this material it was admitted that, during the latter months of 1103 A.H., which correspond to the high summer of 1692 A.D., Isma'-I's concerns were dominated by a threat from the Algerine Regency that was only dissipated finally with the return of an embassy from Algiers at the beginning of the following Muslim year (76). The threat was one of the major crises of the reign. As has been seen, it included a Turkish invasion, and the battle of al-Mashari, a disastrous defeat for Alawi forces upon home territory (79). Al-Zayyani glided over the memory of this disgrace. But he made it one quiet concession: a forward shift to his tale of the last victory in the "Fazzaz", a victory which, according to his own logic, was crucial to Isma'-I's mastering of his own empire. In so doing, he destroyed the credibility of his "Fazzaz" campaign narrative. For the early months of 1104 A.H. correspond with the autumn of 1692. And it is highly improbable that any major campaign into a mountain region would have been undertaken so late in the year. Further deferral into the following summer campaigning season is unsatisfactory. During the summer of 1693, Isma'-I is known to have been occupied with the conduct of a major campaign into the "Cherg" (80).

The most straightforward solution to this problematic chronology of pacification is to suggest that al-Zayyani's record of Isma'-I's punitive expeditions vastly distorts and inflates events that were of relatively minor significance to the makhzan. It seems likely that it was only within Beraber folk-memory that the sultan could be thought,

---

(76) "Nashr al-Mathani..." Fes lithograph Vol. II p. 157 of the first notation.
(79) See Chapter V Pp. 188-190
(80) See Chapter V Pp. 199-201
in person, and upon successive occasions, to have devoted entire years to the subjection of mountain groupings. It is possible that most of the pacificatory action which al-Zayyānī recorded in isolation was actually incidental to expeditions that were geographically and politically of a wider scope: "mopping up" campaigns conducted laterally while the sultan's haraka was on the main routeway. Al-Rashīd apparently conducted such an expedition from the Tadla, while first on the road to Marrakesh (81). And Ismā'īl directed similar forays during the leisurely return lap of his expedition of the plague years. While he himself organised the rebuilding of a bridge over the Oum er-Rbia, "Serhony, son bacha, qui avoit un camp volant, faisoit souvent les escarmouches avec les Barbares" (82). Al-Nasīrī's alignment of nearer and further "Chergī" campaigns in 1680 is thus made credible; for the attacks upon Snassen and Angad peoples recorded by al-Zayyānī can be seen as examples of a routine punishment of rural peoples, undertaken on the sultan's homeward march from an ill-fated Tilimsānī expedition. Similarly, the three campaigns into the Central Atlas which al-Zayyānī dated to the 1680s can all be seen as ancillary to the sultan's two major Susī expeditions of the decade. In this light they present no chronological problems. And their raids for arms and horses may be seen in context, as the snatching of supplementary military equipment.

The final "Fāzzāz" campaign of 1692 is less easy to dovetail with imperial harakāt of wider range. But it is possible that the campaign was minuscule as seen from Meknes. Ismā'īl himself need not have been involved. The cut, and even perhaps the memory of the affair may be

(81) See Chapter II  p. 84
(82) Moustte: "Histoire..."  p. 124
discerned within contemporary European notes upon a genuine Central Atlas campaign. In the June of 1691, the qā'id Ahmad ibn Haddu al-Attar, who was briefly in court disgrace, was sent, for his own punishment, upon a mountain expedition. Two months later, his heraka returned, trailing plunder and a party of rustic heretics (83). His campaign would seem to have been of the diminutive cast later noted as commonplace in the report of Napoleon's envoy Burel:

"...petites expéditions contre les Bébèères qui occupent les gorges de l'Atlas du côté de l'Ouest...ces expéditions sont-elles courtes et peu lointaines; les armées sont formées avec célérité dans les provinces voisines des lieux où il faut opérer, et composées en grand partie de la population du lieu jointe à une portion de troupes de l'empereur." (84)

The note upon the significance of rural auxiliaries to these "petites expéditions" recalls al-Zayyanī's racy details upon the activities of loyalist Beraber during Isma'īl's campaigns into the "Fazzāz".

It must be allowed that, even if minor or lateral, "Chergi" and Central Atlas campaigns were pacificatory in a certain ephemeral sense. Pro-dynastic sentiment would see "tamhīd" in any expedition that involved the sultan or his men in scorching a path along a major rural thoroughfare. And it has been seen that, to contemporary eyes, the protection of wayfarers was the duty of a shāri'īf and a good sultan (85). Eighteenth century legend credited al-Rashīd in person with fulfilling the obligations of his birth by the protection of a caravan (86).

This theme of the protection of travellers infiltrated al-Zayyanī's own tales of "tamhīd". Thus, in 1680, Isma'īl was said to have

(83) 5.1. 28 France. Vol. III Nos. CXXXIII and CLI Memoranda of J. B. Estelle, completed Sale, 24/7/1691 and 2/2/1692 respectively. (pp. 385 and 448-9)

(84) Burel: "Mémoire Militaire..." p. 58

(85) See Chapter IV: Pp. 176-7 and 179

(86) See Chapter I P. 55
ordered the construction of forts at intervals of a day's journey along the pilgrimage route between Sās and Qujda, and to have set up shelters for caravanners in association with these forts (87). The tale of the 1683 campaign against the Idrāšin, whose grazing-grounds verged upon Azrou, where the routes from Tafilelt and Marrakesh into Sās meet, was clinched by the assertion that the region was freed from brigandage along the Sās routeway (88). Similarly, the massacre of the Garwān by their loyalist Zimur neighbours, which is set into the "Fāzāz" tale of 1692, was supposedly permitted as retribution for the Garwān having endangered a section of "the road to the desert" (89).

These last Central Atlas notes of al-Zayyānī's may be taken as the sententiousness of a "law-and-order" man who believed that, even in his own rough country, tough campaigning could have lasting results (90). It is indeed true that Ismā'īl's reign was considered by contemporaries to be remarkable for its high degree of routeway security. But this was, for the most part, security locally maintained (91). And, in the rugged Central Atlas region, this security was only intermittent. For the key Tadla route between Fes and Marrakesh, it is impossible to trace any makhzān-induced mid-reign climacteric separating routeway lawlessness from routeway orderliness. In 1683, ten years before the supposed climacteric of

---

(87) "wa bi-kull qal'ā fandag limā bavt al-guful" ("And in each fort a shelter to house caravans") "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 34

(88) "fa-istaraha min caythihim bi-tariq sa'ī" ("And he was freed from their depredations along the Sās routeway") "Turjumān" p. 20 of the text cf. 37 of the translation

(89) "Turjumān" p. 24 of the text and 45 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 40-41

(90) See Prologue P. 26 Note (41)

(91) See Chapter IV: Fp. 177-178
pacification, the party of the French ambassador St. Amans travelled peaceably through the Tadla, upon its return journey from the Sus (92). Yet, after 1692, this passage was at times difficult. Thus, in 1696, it was planned that Zaydan, as vice-roy designate of Marrakeesh, should travel from Meknes to his post by way of Sale (93). His route implies that the Tadla path was considered dangerous. And in 1707, Zaydan's own funeral cortège, which numbered several thousand men, was only permitted to pass beneath the "Fazzâz" upon the payment of a bribe to local peoples (94).

There is thus reason to doubt the validity of al-Zayyani's claim that, by 1692, Ismaîl had achieved massive and lasting success in pacifying the rural populace of his empire. It is particularly unlikely that he had deprived the mass of his people of their arms and mounts. There is a contemporary reference to a disarmed body of Ismaîl's subjects. This refers to the civic population of Sale. With the exception of the governor, and of a few favoured possessors of hunting licences, the men of this town were said, in 1699, to be armed only with knives (95). But the rural scene is likely to have been very different. A passage in Braithwaite's narrative, from less than a year after Ismaîl's death, tells of a rural warrior array as seen a few days' journey to the north of Fes (96). The sight was very similar to the display made by Berber mujahidûn outside Tangier in the days of al-Rashîd (97). In both cases, the tribesmen were a mob of

---

(92) "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans" pp. 337-8
(93) S.I. 2° France Vol. IV No. LXVII Memo. of J-B. Estelle, completed Sale, 2/4/1696 p. 401
(94) S.I. 2° France Vol. VI Pere Busnot to Pontchartrain, Cadiz, 29/10/1707 p. 389
(95) S.I. 2° France Vol. V. Maisonfort to de Combes, Rouen, 28/12/1699 p. 526
(96) Braithwaite pp. 135-6
(97) Anon: "The Interest of Tangier" appendix to "A Discourse Concerning Tangier" (London, 1680) pp. 37-8. Internal evidence suggests that the appendix was written in 1664, the year of the death of the Earl of Teviot.
dexterous horsemen, of whom a proportion toted fire-arms. The intervening reign of Isma"il would here seem to have made little difference to rustic possession of the requisites of battle.

Over the period, Susi men would probably have been better armed than men of the "greater Gharb". In the High Atlas, which was rich in the appropriate minerals, the possession of locally manufactured muskets and ammunition seems to have been widespread throughout Isma"il's reign. The party which, in 1709, skirted the outer reaches of the Atlas, in the company of the pilgrim Ahmad al-NasirI of Tamgrout was armed (98). And the text of al-ZarhunI of Tasaft is riddled with references to home-made fire-arms and ammunition.

A letter of rebuke, directed at the sultan Isma"il, and attributed to the shaykh al-YusI, has been called in defence of the theory that Isma"il systematically disarmed his subjects. The letter is quoted in full in the "Kitab al-Istigaa...", in the context of comments made upon it by Akansu (99). Akansu seems to have been arrested by its single reference to a population deprived of horses and arms. Al-Zayyani had supplied his master-text for Isma"il's period. And, on this point, the letter aligned with al-Zayyani's re-iterated motif of "tamhid": "al-khayl wa'il-silah", the mounts and weapons surrendered to Isma"il by subject peoples. Some literary connection between this letter and al-Zayyani's writing seems possible. But the direction of the derivation is not obvious. The letter is anonymous. None of its surviving MSS possesses a date (100). The work therefore cannot be said for certain to antedate the period of Akansu himself. Its pre-occupation with the related themes of the Jihad, coastal defences and Tetuan may be considered suspicious.

(98) "Voyage de Moula Ahmad..." ed./tr. Berbruger p. 176
(100) Berquet: "Al-YousI..." p. 139
Within the letter they are linked with the period of al-Rashīd and of Ismaʿīl. But these sultans' names could have been employed as filters for the secure expression of alarm aroused by the Spanish Moroccan conflict of 1859-60, which had taken place while Akansūs was writing (101). And, even if genuine, the letter would add little to al-Zayyānī's evidence. It is generalised, floridly polite and decidedly hectoring (102). Amid a full-scale condemnation of oppression and heavy taxation, it suggests that, instead of depriving Muslims of their arms and horses, Ismaʿīl, as sultan, should leave these in the possession of the people, or even donate them as an aid to the waging of the jihād. The parallels between this text and the more detailed notes on disarmament given by al-Zayyānī are limited to the simple theme of the sultan's confiscation of arms and horses. The Ayt Yūsī were among the Beraber confederations who had supposedly submitted to the sultan in the aftermath of the campaign dated by al-Zayyānī to 1685 (103). Berque concluded that the letter was written in the aftermath of this campaign, which the sage al-Yūsī had seen as the epitome of unjust government (104). For this there is no proof. The letter makes no mention of the Ayt Yūsī, and is geographically precise only in insisting that the entire Maghribī coastline from

(101) The "Jaysh al-Caramram..." terminates with the year 1282 A.H./ 1865 A.D.

(102) In itself the angry tone of the letter need not indicate that the document is spurious, although it may suggest that the work was intended for discreet literary perusal only. Berque noted the survival of a further letter, allegedly written by al-Yūsī to the sultan Ismaʿīl, and dated to 1675 ("Al-Yousī..." pp. 58 and 139). This second letter was similarly irate in tone, and declared the saint's desire to counter the sultan's wishes by leaving Fes for the peace of the countryside. Its theme, an invective against city life, is typically literary, and likely to have been intended simply for circulation within a literary "milieu".

(103) "Turītum..." p. 20 of the text and 38 of the translation cf. " Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 35

(104) Berque: "Al-Yousī..." pp. 91-2
Qalbiya to Massa should be set on a war footing. Further, it has been seen that al-Zayyānī’s details concerning the pacificatory campaign dated to 1685 are far from reliable (105). Equally uncertain is the seventeenth century alignment of the Ayt Yūsī. One tradition suggests that this population was counted among the loyalist groupings of Isma‘īl’s day, and was employed by the sultan to guard the Sefrou section of the Fes–Tafilalet routeway against attacks from neighbours (106).

According to al-Zayyānī’s view of “tāmhid”, disarmament was one wing to rural pacification, and fort-building the other. Al-Zayyānī believed Isma‘īl to have built seventy-six forts spanning his empire (107). And undoubtedly, many forts were built or restored during Isma‘īl’s long reign. Indeed, al-Zayyānī’s boast that the forts spanned the region between Oujda and Wādī Nūn (108) was an underestimation. At the end of Isma‘īl’s reign, he had a “small Castle” at Cape Blanco (109), somewhat nearer to the Senegal than to Wādī Nūn. However, the role of this castle in relationship to Meknes is impossible to estimate. It is difficult to believe that its garrison had close ties with the capital. And it has been suggested already that it is impossible to equate the construction of a fort with local pacification, or with effective government from Meknes (110).

It is unnecessary to associate fort-building with the sultan’s superintendence, or with the years prior to 1692. Thus, Abd al-Karīm, the great bāsha of Marrakesh, is recorded as having overseen the construction of an High Atlas piedmont fort at Amizmiz, on the Wādī

(105) See the present chapter Pp. 299-301
(107) "Tāriquman" p. 16 of the text and 31 of the translation
(108) ibid. loc. cit.
(109) Braithwaite p. 335
(110) See Chapter IV: Pp. 181-185
Nafis, in the autumn of 1713 (111). Nor was fort-building peculiar to Isma'il's reign. It is probable that, as "fort-builder extraordinary" this sultan was conveniently accredited with a number of constructions for which his predecessors and successors were responsible. A modern attempt by de la Chapelle to identify, with the aid of both written and oral tradition, the entire array of forts at Isma'il's command, racked up a total of fifty-seven (112). Of these, a number were admitted to be of Sa'di or Dila'i origin. Others post-dated Isma'il's reign. Thus, de Chenier, who in 1781 visited one listed construction, the beetling fortress of Boulaouane, noted that its major recent restoration had been the work of Isma'il's son, Abd Allah (113). Similarly, certain of the listed Tadla forts could have been of nineteenth century origin. For their names were culled from the chronicle of "Si Brahim Nasiri", attributed to a contemporary of Isma'il, but extant only in a twentieth century manuscript in which, as its editor admitted, traditions from Isma'il's day were confounded with others from the time of the nineteenth century sultan Abd al-Rahman (114).

A deeper understanding of Isma'il's precise contribution to fort-building in the Maghrib al-Aqsa awaits planned archaeological investigation. However, for the purpose of understanding Isma'il's government, it may always be necessary to rate Isma'il as the architect of the Miknas palace and its grasping economy, as of greater significance than Isma'il as the master of a chain of rural forts. For fort-garrisons were, as Mouette put it, "hors la veue de leur maistre" (115).

(111) Al-Zarhuni of Tasaft ed./tr. Justinard pp. 45-6
(112) F. de la Chapelle: "Le Sultan Moulay Isma'il et les Berberes..." (Footnotes to pp. 25-6)
(113) de Chenier English translation of 1788 Vol. I pp. 87-9
(114) A translation of the chronicle of "Si Brahim Nasiri" by Lt. Reyniers, was set as an appendix to de la Chapelle's article (A.M. Vol. XXVIII, Paris, 1931) pp. 37-42, and referred to within the article's text by de la Chapelle as editor (pp. 8 and 37-41)
(115) Mouette: "Histoire..." p. 176
Part II: The shadow of Sayyid Muhammad III

At the heart of al-Zayyānī's Alawī history lay the figure of his master Sayyid Muhammad III, a sultan who delighted in seeing himself as political heir to the towering figure of Ahmad al-Mansūr al-Sa'dī. The comparison probably sprang from Muhammad III's capture in 1769 of the Portuguese enclave of Mazagan, an echo of the battle of Alcazarquivir, which, in 1578, had destroyed a king of Portugal, and given al-Mansūr his sobriquet. Muhammad III made a conscious attempt to imitate al-Mansūr in the incidentals of his court behaviour, ferreting for details in the "Manāhil al-Safā..." of al-Fishtālī, al-Mansūr's court historian. On pilgrimage near Aghmat in 1784, the sultan attempted to draw his bemused entourage into literary exchanges based upon the impromptu versification credited to al-Mansūr and his courtiers on a journey in the same region. Finding his own following at a loss to understand the references, Muhammad is said to have had the relevant passages of the "Manāhil al-Safā..." read out to them, in order that they should be learned by heart (116).

Al-Zayyānī bowed to his master's predilection. His discussion of Sayyid Muhammad III opened symbolically with an account of his being sent to Marrakesh as vice-roy to his father ʿAbd Allāh. There he pitched his tent amid the ruins of Sa'dī palaces. Later he restored Marrakesh as an imperial city and, within it, the mosque which al-Mansūr had built (117). The erection of Ahmad al-Mansūr and Muhammad III into twin pinnacles was bound to diminish intervening rulers. The latter

(116) "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 117 ff.
(117) "Turtuμān" pp. 67 and 69 of the text, and 123 and 126 of the translation of "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 82 and 83.
Sa'di were swiftly disposed of (118). And disorderly government was
made a backdrop to the rise of the Alawi political founding father,

al-Sharif, who was said to have gained power in Sijilmasa while the
Sa'di sultan Abd al-Malik ibn Zaydān led, within Marrakesh, a life
abandoned to pleasure (119). However, early Alawi history was less
easy for al-Zayyāni, as an historian of the Alawi dynasty, to
subordinate to his own main matter, to which Muhammad III stood as
focus. Isma'il was a figure whose longevity and achievements made
him peculiarly difficult to set aside. But the author took care that
the grandfather did not overshadow the grandson.

Al-Zayyāni glorified the reign of Isma'il with an antiquary's
superficiality, as a period of "curiosities". Notes relating to
the sultan's vast numbers of children and of captives (120) were set
forth upon the same level as notes upon the massive palace complex
of Meknes, upon the ābādī and upon the rural forts (121). The
repetitious stress was upon quantity and bulk. Taken all together,
the details endorsed the view that Isma'il had been, in his day, a
fascinating and remarkable figure. But they invoked criteria quite
separate from those by which Muhammad III would be judged, and so
could not diminish him. In the matter of the jihād, al-Zayyāni may
have sensed the possibility of competition. In this sphere, Isma'il
could well have been portrayed as exemplary. In al-Zayyāni's day, his

(118) Lévi-Provençal, who had access to a MS of the "Turjuman" containing
a chapter on the Sa'di, noted that it was heavily dominated by
an account of the reign of Ahmad al-Mansūr. Only cursory treatment
was granted to that sultan's successors. ("Les Historiens des Chorfa"
p. 176)

(119) "Turjuman" p. 1 of the text and 2 of the translation

(120) "Turjuman" pp. 28-9 of the text and 54-5 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 44-5

(121) "Turjuman" pp. 13 and 14-15 of the text cf. 25-6 and 28-31 of
the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 30 and 31-2
reign was credited with having seen the capture of four coastal
enclaves from the Christians: Mamora, Tangier, Larache and, inaccurately,
Arzilla (122). This run of success could have unshadowed Muhammad III's
single victory over Mazagan, and his policy of commercial alliance
with Christian powers, among whom Spain, the ancient enemy, was the
chief (123). Significantly, al-Zayyānī recorded the victories of the
muḥāḥidun during Ismaīl's reign in curiously brief and prosaic terms.
Al-Nasirī seems later to have gone to some effort towards padding this
material out in Ismaīl's honour: his account of the capture of
Larache contains information taken from five indigenous prose-writers,
together with further notes from the Spanish historian Castellanos;
and he crowned the affair by quoting a lengthy praise-poem (124).

In al-Zayyānī's summing up of Ismaīl's reign, the period was
allowed to represent that standard item of folk-memory, the "good
old days": an idyllic period of peace and order, plenty and low prices,
during which the peoples of the Maghrib al-Aqṣā had supposedly become
as dutiful as the Egyptian fallāḥūn (125). But this collapse into
nostalgia was spliced with darker Fāsī material giving laconic notes
upon disasters dating from Ismaīl's final decade: the Spanish victory
outside Ceuta, and the fiscal belabouring of Fes (126). Further, the
author carefully delimited certain achievements which redounded to
Ismaīl's fame, by pointing out that the idyll germinated its own

(122) "Turjuman" pp. 19, 20 and 22-3 of the text cf. 35-6, 38 and 42-3
of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 34, 35 and 39-40
(123) For a contemporary summary of Muhammad III's commercial relations
with European states see: de Chenier English translation of 1788
Vol. II pp. 294-301 and 357-372
cf. Fumey translation, A.M. Vol. IX pp. 97-103
(125) "wa sara ahl al-maghrib ka-fallāḥūn ahl misr" ("And the people of
the Maghrib took on the demeanour of the peasant populace of Egypt")
("Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 44)
(126) "Turjuman" p. 28 of the text and 53 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarīf..." loc. cit.
destruction, and that order was only re-born in the time of Muhammad III. It was stressed that, following Isma'Il's death, his cabid became sultan-making masters of the country, amid disorders that brought about their own ruin. It was the achievement of Muhammad III effectively to re-found this force, and to restore the Alawi cabid to prosperity and order (127). Similarly, it was his achievement to put an end to the rural disorder which had burst forth in 1727, producing brigand-infested routeways. Among insubordinate local peoples, the Beraber in particular were said to have lost no time in re-equipping themselves with arms and horses (128). And, according to al-Zayyani's final historical notes:

"Because of them (the Beraber) these circumstances afflicted the people of the Maghrib, until God had the mercy to send them the reign of Sayyidi Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah...He governed them with discernment and firmness." (129)

The focusing of al-Zayyani's Alawi history upon the figure of Muhammad III produced a curious retrospective twist to the purely dynastic history of Isma'Il's reign. This was imposed by the author's desire to enhance the court status, during Isma'Il's lifetime, of Khunatha bint Bakkar, daughter to a shaykh of the Afare, a "Qiblan" grouping, and mother to Isma'Il's son 'Abd Allah, through whom the

(127) "wa lam yudarrik minhum al-sultan sayyidi muhammad lemmâ buyîna ilâ al-qailî. wa huwa alladhi jama'ahum wa ahyahum bi 'add."
("And very few of them (the cabid) remained with the sultan Sayyidi Muhammad when he received the oath. It was he who gathered them together and revitalised their numbers.")  

(129) "wa sa'ah al-afrî ahl magrib mahahum ila an rahimahum allah bi-wilayat al-sultan sayyidi muhammad ibn 'abd allah... fa-saahum bi-hilmih wa hazmihi"
("Turjumanat al-Kubrah...") ed. al-Filali  p. 71
direct line of authority continued. Khunatha was linked with Muhammad III by more than the simple association of grandmother with grandson. During "Abd Allah's first period of government, she made a dynastically famed pilgrimage to Mecca, in the company of Muhammad, who was then as small boy (130). And when "Abd Allah suffered the first of several oustings from power, both he and Muhammad his son were granted asylum, for more than two years, by the Mafra who, as Khunatha's people, were "Abd Allah's akhwal (131).

Khunatha is known to have figured in palace politics during Isma'il's declining years as a "Concubine...of great Interest" (132). But she was not counted among the sultan's wives (133). It was for later dynastic tradition, as set forth by al-Zayyanî, to grant to her union with Isma'il an unparalleled significance and fanfaronade. It was claimed that, in 1678, Isma'il had taken an expedition into the deep south. On the route, and apparently with ease and brevity, he pacified the Sus. He then continued, by way of the Darâ, as far as Chinguetti. In the course of this expedition, Isma'il was said to have collected a force of two thousand habarain to be joined to his new force, supposedly clustering at this date at Mashra al-Raml. It was also claimed that the sultan received the voluntary submission of eight named Arab-speaking groupings.


(131) "Turjuman" p. 40 of the text and 74 of the translation cf. "Bustân al-Zarîf..." MS p. 57

(132) Braithwaite p. 6

(133) An account of the "Disposition of Presents to the Court of Macouines by the Hon. Chas Stewart Esq." linked with the 1721 embassy, lists the names of four queens and "Lala Chineta" as recipients of gifts (S.P. 71 (16) ff. 613-617 Memo., dated Meknes, 24/7/1721)
from the "Qibla" and desert fringe or "Sāhil", including the Mafra, the Shabbānāt, the Jirār and the Mta. Associated with this mass declaration of allegiance was the sultan's marriage with Khunātha (134).

This account of a "Qiblan" royal progress is likely to be fictional. It has been seen that the penetration of Ismā'īl's authority south of the Anti-Atlas is unlikely long to have pre-dated 1690 (135). And it is doubtful whether Ismā'īl at any point in his reign personally led an expedition into the "Qibla". There seems no evidence of such a venture outside of al-Zayyānī's record. And there was certainly no expedition along the southern route described by al-Zayyānī during 1678, a plague year for which the skulking and prophylactic track of Ismā'īl's movements is known in detail from Mousette's "Histoire". In this year, Ismā'īl went no further south-westwards than the head of the Darā. He was far from any "pacification" of the Sus, which was then under the suzerainty of Ahmad ibn Muhriz. Indeed he would seem, at this date, to have been at pains to avoid a southern confrontation with his nephew. For, rather than enter his rival's "sphere of influence", he made his disastrous decision to attempt an High Atlas crossing in winter (136).

The dating of Ismā'īl's union with Khunātha to 1678 is in itself suspiciously early. Windus recorded that, in 1721, the "mother of Muley Abdallah"'s own mother was alive and well able to carry messages for her daughter (137). It is possible that the chronology here adopted by al-Zayyānī was of complimentary significance, designed to link Khunātha with the foundation of the corps of Ābu'īd, which in the terms of

(134) "Turjumān" pp. 16-17 of the text and 31-32 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 32
(135) See Chapter III Pp. 135-155
(136) See Chapter III Pp. 119-120
(137) Windus p. 128
of al-Zayyānī's "al-Ḥamīḍ" material was the re-foundation of the army of al-Mansūr. It has been seen that Khunātha's marriage was given literary juxtaposition with a trawl for harāṭīn recruits for Mashrāq al-Raml. These two thousand harāṭīn, allegedly brought back from the "Qibla" in 1678, may thus be seen symbolically as a contribution from Khunātha: a "dowry" presented to al-Mansūr's restored army. Similarly, the setting of Khunātha's name and people at the heart of a mass rallying to Isma'il by desert groupings was dynastically complimentary at a level other than the obvious. Three of these groupings, the Shabbānāt, Jīrār and Mtar, may be assumed to have been regarded by al-Zayyānī as the cognate kin of peoples he had noted as military followers of Sa'dī kings (138). The tradition thus provides yet another grace-note to the implied association between Muhammad III and al-Mansūr, the greatest of Sa'dī rulers.

As ancestress to the continuing line of ʿAlawi sultans, Khunātha seems comparable to the surface text of a palimpsest. Her memory, within indigenous tradition, all but obliterates the memory of another and previously significant Saharan woman. For all but the last decade of Isma'il's reign, contemporary evidence seems devoid of reference to Khunātha or to ʿAbd Allāh her son. By contrast, there is a mass of evidence that, from the 1690s until her death in 1715, unrivalled prominence as mistress of the palace belonged to ʿAyisha Mubārka, mother to the successive heirs presumptive Zaydān and Ahmad al-Dhahāblī. This was a woman whom al-Zayyānī's texts acknowledged only within the discreet obituary notice of an "umm al-shurafa" (139).

(138) In the "Bustān al-Zarīf..." these three names, together with the name of the Zirārāt, were listed together with the note: "kanū 'l-jundīya maṣa' al-mulūk al-sa'dīya" ("They were the troops of the Sa'dī kings") MS p. 30

(139) "Turājūtan" p. 27 of the text and 51 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 43
This displacement of Āyisha Mubārka by Khunātha, in dynastic tradition, is chiefly significant as an explanation for al-Zayyānī's glancing and "folklorique" treatment of the origins of Ismā'īl's corps of Udāya: the "parientes" of his "Reyna Negra" Āyisha (140). Within the narrative allotted to Ismā'īl's period, the "Turjuman" contains only a single reference to the Udāya. And this is set within the highly suspect text which states that, from 1692 onwards, horses and weapons were retained by only four military groupings, of which the Udāya formed one (141). To this fleeting note, the "Bustan al-Zarīf..." adds a bloc of roughly composited information on the entry of the Udāya into Ismā'īl's service: an introductory "just-so" story of pleasant naiveté, which expands into a corpus of inchoate and dateless detail.

According to this account, it was after the fall of Marrakesh to Ismā'īl, in 1677, that the sultan went hunting one day in the Bahīra plain to the north of that city. There he met an herdsmen foraging for his beasts by cutting away at the lotus trees: a man with a knife, "Abū ʾI-Shafra". The sultan's interrogation of this herdsmen led to the joyous discovery that the man and his "brothers" were the sultan's own personal akhwāl. They were of Udāya descent (142) but had been driven northwards by drought (jadb) from the "Qibla" by way of the Sus, and were currently associated with peoples of the "Hawz". The herdsmen's own particular grouping dwelt with the "Hawz" Shabbanāt. After a kindly chiding for not having come previously to greet the sultan, the herdsmen was urged to bring his chattels into Marrakesh. There he was set at the head of a body of cavalry, with

(140) See Chapter IV: P. 171 Note (64)
(141) "Turjuman" p. 24 of the text and 46 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41
(142) See Appendix B Pp. 338-9
orders to gather in his scattered kinsmen and conduct them to Meknes, where they were registered as the sultan's troops and domiciled next to the palace at al-Riyād. Subsequently a new body of recruits from the "Qibla" proper came into Meknes to join their "brothers". One detachment from this total force was later set into Fās al-Jadīd, to replace a body of Zirāra and Shabbānāt troops who had been there under the command of al-Duraydī. At the head of these Fāsī Udāya there was placed one Muhammad ibn Ḥattā. He was said to be the son of Ali Abū Shafra, by whom al-Zayyānī may be presumed to have meant the original Bahīra herdsman, now become the Udāya commander in al-Riyād. After a period of regular alternation, the two generals permanently exchanged posts (143).

This bloc of material, as summarised above, hastily foreshortens information that can be teased out over the history of much of Isma'īl's reign. Its style is quite alien to the treatment which al-Zayyānī awarded to the Udāya in the course of his narrative of Alawī history for the years following 1727. Into this later narrative, the activities of the Udāya as a military and political pressure group are tightly knit. The author's sketchy account of Udāya origins arouses suspicion. It is known that the Udāya formed a notable force at the time when al-Zayyānī was writing. For the year 1808, when Sulaymān was sultan, Burel noted the influence and favour at court enjoyed by the "alcaldes" of the "Loudaya". He estimated the corps at eight thousand "étalbis.autours de Fes et servant près de l'Empereur qui les aime beaucoup" (144). It seems unlikely that al-Zayyānī would have slid through the early history of such a force, merely by oversight.

(143) "Bustan al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 29-30
(144) Burel: "Mémoire Militaire..." pp. 59 and 61
The clue to the author's reticence lies within the suggestion that the Udaya were constituted as the akhwal or maternal kin of Isma'il himself (145). It is true that, in the days of Ahmad al-Dhahabi, Isma'il's immediate successor, the Udaya were accustomed to call themselves "uncles" of the sultan. Braithwaite explained, with reference to 'Abd al-Malik Abu Shafra, the Udaya commander he knew, that his "Stile and Title" of "Uncle" was "a common form, old Muley calling all the Lydyres his Relations" (146). But, for Isma'il himself, a formal relationship with the Udaya as akhwal is unlikely. Even as a courteous fiction, it is improbable that the Udaya were constituted as the kinfolk of Isma'il's mother. All that is recorded of this woman is that she was a slave girl: according to al-Zayyani, a "jariva" born among the Mafra (147). In the light of the author's interest in stressing the Mafra connections of the Alawi dynasty, the ethnic element within this tradition may well be seen as dubious. It is certainly irrelevant. As al-Nasiri later pointed out, servile status would have rendered null any of the woman's associations by birth or upbringing (148). Further, it has been seen that there is strong European evidence that, in Isma'il's own day, the Udaya were regarded collectively as kin, not to the sultan's mother, but to Ayisha Mubarka, the sultan's wife, and the mother to the heirs presumptive of his lifetime (149).

But there was purpose behind al-Zayyani's suggestion that the

(145) "antum akhwal" ("You are maternal uncles") are the very words with which Isma'il was said to have greeted his first Udaya recruits ("Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 29)

(146) Braithwaite p. 24

(147) "jariya min mauludat al-Mafra" ("A slave-girl of Mafra birth") "Turjuman" p. 3 of the text cf. 5 of the translation.


(149) See Chapter IV: Pp. 170-171
corps of Udaya originated in the chance meeting between Isma'Il and a lost kinsman of his own. It deftly removed any implication of illegitimacy from the association current in the author's own times between the Udaya, and sultans from the line of 'Abd Allah ibn Isma'Il, the prince who emerged from internecine warfare as his father's effective successor. Hints at further links between Isma'Il's Udaya and the Shabbānāt, or the Mafra, may be construed as weak attempts to attach to the Udaya traditions which al-Zayyānī associated with Khunātha, 'Abd Allah's mother, and Muhammad III's ancestress.

Al-Zayyānī's bloc of notes upon the Udāya resembles his evidence concerning the foundation of the corps of Abīd. It contains a number of details open to an individual external verification. But, as a composite whole, the developed tradition is misleading, and can be seen to have been warped to provide a dynastically appealing "received version" of events. Thus the surnames "Abu Shafra" and "ibn Āṭta" were each associated with Udāya generals known to European reporters (150). But it is likely that simple word-play upon the first name suggested the legend-like motif of the "man-with-a-knife" as the first Udaya commander. Similarly, the dating of the foundation of the corps of Udaya to 1677 seems uncannily accurate. It has been seen that there was an ingathering of troops from Marrakesh and its surrounds, following the city's capture from Ahmad ibn Muhriz (151). But this ingathering was not the serendipitous consequence of a placid hunting expedition. It was thrust into operation in the face of a last flicker of political menace from Dīlā'. And it only began the metamorphosis of the Udāya from rabble into crack corps. As has been suggested,

(150) Busnot Chapter III passim cf. Braithwaite pp. 23 and 95
(151) See Chapter II Pp. 103 and Mouffe: "Histoire..." p. 109
the Udāya are likely to have reached political maturity along with their "nephew-by-courtesy", Zaydān, the Udāya queen's eldest son (152).

Pre-occupation with the priorities of Muḥammad III brought more than a narrowly dynastic warp to al-Zayyānī's early Ālāwī history. The imperial master's interests would seem to have underlain another and quite distinct strand to the story: al-Zayyānī's intricately tailored account of confrontation in the "Cherg" between early Ālāwī princes and the forces of Algiers.

The Algerine administration acknowledged the suzerainty of distant Constantinople. And rapprochement with the Porte was an highlight of Muḥammad III's foreign policy. During his reign, large sums in aid were despatched to the Ottoman sultan. Formally this aid had pious motivation: support for the Ottoman jihād against the forces of Catherine the Great's Russia. At another level, the gifts constituted an attempt to buy a "free hand" in dealings with Algiers. Perhaps, also, the gifts may be seen as a covert bid by Muḥammad, as the wealthy ruler of a louche domain, at buying enhanced dignity in his dealings with the "Grand Signior", the most prestigious of Muslim princes (153).

In 1786, al-Zayyānī travelled to Constantinople as Muḥammad III's ambassador (154). He seems to have been infected with admiration for the Ottoman state. Later, in a summary of Ālāwī history, he was to insert a reference to a proportion of these Ālāwī troops as "janissaries" ("inkīshaʿīriya") (155). He visited Constantinople a

(153) For a recent account of Muḥammad III's relations with the Ottoman empire, see R. Lourido Diaz: "El sultanato de Sidi Muḥammad b. Abd Allah (1757-1790)" (Granada, 1970) pp. 127-138. See also Terrasse Vol. II pp. 295 and 297
(154) "Turjumanat al-Kubrā..." ed. Al-Īfīlī pp. 96-126
(155) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 87
second time, in a private capacity. There he spent a period studying the Ottoman history to which he gave a significant place within the pre-Alawi chapters of his "Turjuman al-Murrib..." (156). The Ottoman empire was set into this work as the state which crowned the history of the Muslim east, parallel, by the author's implication, to Alawi Morocco, whose story culminated his survey of the Muslim west.

This sense of honourable demarcation had not always governed Alawi relations with the Turkish power immediately to their east, the Algerine Regency. It has been seen that, over the years 1680-1701, march peoples had suffered a series of raids designed to give the sultan Isma'il's wavering taxation frontier an eastward thrust, and that these raids had precipitated two massive defeats for Alawi armies by Algerine forces. Within al-Zayyani's texts, this border confrontation is given only skinny acknowledgement, in notes that are quite overshadowed by a lengthy preliminary section of narrative. This tale purports to recount an episode in Alawi relations with the Regency, dating from the pristine days of Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf, elder brother to al-Rashīd and to Isma'il.

According to this tale, Muḥammad, around the year 1640, went voluntarily from his base in Tafilalet into the "Cherg". There, with the aid of "Chergi" Arabs from the Angad plain, he took the town of Oujda. Subsequently he used Oujda as a base for operations of a remarkable sweep, which ranged from Snassen country, out as far as the Saharan posts of Ain Madi, Laghouat and el-Ghasoul, lying two hundred miles to the south of Algiers. His depradations provoked a "Bey of Mascara" into demanding reinforcements from the capital. The Dey, ʿUthmān Pasha, sent an heavily armed expedition westwards through

(156) Lévi-Provençal: "Les Historiens des Chorfa" pp. 169-170
country which Muhammad had lain waste. In face of this threat, Muhammad withdrew to Sijilmassa without joining battle. Later, he received a four-man embassy from Algiers, bearing a lengthy letter of protest. Muhammad's first response was fury. But, after counter-changes in which the envoys explained that their opponent's conduct had been unworthy of a sharīf, the prince's fury turned to profound repentance. Claiming that he had been duped by the "Arab devils" ("shayāţīn Qərab"), his allies, into serving their nefarious ends, he solemnly swore never again to cross the river Tafna into the Regency, on an unlawful errand (157).

It is possible to see this tale of Muhammad's "Chergi" raiding as entirely fictitious. It has no place in the earlier writings of al-Ifrānī, who was well able to detail Muhammad ibn al-Sharīf's casaran exploits, his bid for Fes, and his final assault upon his brother al-Rašīd (158). Nor was the episode mentioned in the notes upon Muhammad given by the early dynastic historian al-‘Alawi (159). The tale involves the suggestion of conflict with a "Bey of Mascara" at a time when Mascara was not yet the seat of a beylicate, and of counter-moves by an "Uthman Day", unknown to Algerine history, in which the office of Dey did not figure before 1671. In itself the tale is bizarre. It echoes the better documented "Chergi" exploits of other al-‘Alawi princes, al-Rašīd and Zaydān ibn Isma‘īl, but is ill-assorted with what is known of the career of Muhammad ibn al-Sharīf. It implies that, for a period, Muhammad was willing and able

(157) "Turjuman" pp. 3-5 of the text and 5-9 of the translation cf. "Astan al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 10-13


(159) Al-‘Alawi: "Al-Anwar al-Husniva..." pp. 76-77
to abandon Tafilelt for a "Chergi" base, and to adopt an alien following of shirāq, only to return afterwards, peaceably to his former political base at Sijilmasa upon the Ziz. This delineation of Muhammad's career would seem to have puzzled al-Nasirī. In his "Kitāb al-Istigqa..." he transferred the tale of Muhammad's move upon Oujda into the aftermath of that sharīf's 1650 assault upon Fes (160). This re-alignment is unsatisfactory. By 1652, Muhammad ibn al-Sharīf is known to have been back in Tafilelt, from which he led a harka out to Tuat (161).

The inspiration for the entire narrative of Muhammad's "Chergi" raiding is likely to have been the long letter of florid rebuke which al-Zayyānī associated with Muhammad, and quoted in full within his "Bustān al-Zarīf..." (162). The letter includes a plethora of proper names, detailing peoples and places supposedly associated with the marauding of the man to whom it was addressed. A number of well-known "Chergi" groupings figure within this context, including the Banū 'Amir. There also figure the toponyms Ain Madi, Laghouat and al-Ghasoul. The high degree of correlation between this body of nomenclature and the names set into the saga of Muhammad ibn al-Sharīf's "Chergi" adventuring, renders it highly unlikely that the letter and its associated narrative were written independently. The letter may be seen as the primary document, providing notes from which the skeleton of the raiding story was constructed. For the letter is less anachronistic than the narrative. It lacks any reference to a "Bey of Mascara". And its note that the Banū 'Amir


(161) Chronicle of "Sidi Bahaia" quoted Martin pp. 52-3

(162) "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS pp. 10-12
were currently acknowledging infidel suzerainty (163) records circumstances true for the seventeenth century, when Oran, at the edge of Banū CAmir country, was a Spanish "presidio". It is written in the name of one Muhammed ibn CAbd Allah, otherwise unknown. And it contains no trace of reference to the mysterious CUthman Dey, who may perhaps be dismissed as an eponymous "Ottoman".

However, the letter raises its own problems. It is not a diplomatic missive, but a literary creation, written throughout in rhymed prose. Its text within the Bustan al-Zarif... lacks the date with which al-Nāṣir later provided it (164). And it is addressed, informally, to an unnamed sharif, son of "al-Sharif". This "sharif" is likely to have been Isma'il, as the letter implies that he was third of his house (165). It is improbable that he was ever intended to receive the letter. It is equally improbable that the letter, in its extant form, was written in Algiers. For it contains no invective of the type which characterised the Daftar al-Tashrifat (166), and no trace of the contempt with which the Alawi sovereign to the west, an "Arab" chieftain of "miserable black-faced Moors" (167)

(163) "wa zayyanat sawlatuka li-banu CAmir li-qadat al-nuffer li-kanaf al-kawafir"
("And your attack has provoked the leaders of the Banū CAmir into flocking to the protection of the infidel")
(Bustan al-Zarif... MS p. 11)

(164) Al-Nāṣir: "Kitāb al-İstisna... Casablanca text Vol. VII p. 27 cf. Fumey translation A.M. Vol. IX p. 36. The date given is the 15/Rajab/1064 = 1/6/1654

(165) "awwal al-dawlat thā'ir; wa 'l-thā'ī muqtaf lihi sa'ir; wa 'l-thālīth li-kanāl niyar nā'ir"
("A rebel the first of the house; the second a follower in his path; and the third brings the kindling of war to its fulfilment.")
(Bustan al-Zarif... MS p. 12)

(166) See Chapter V  P. 188

(167) Al-Haïj Shaṭān Dey to Pontchartrain, Algiers, 25/Muharram/1102 = 29/10/1691, quoted in translation in E. Plantet: Correspondance des Deyes... Vol. I p. 380
was customarily regarded in higher Algerine circles. For, while criticising the "sharīf", the letter serves also to glorify his martial capacity, by suggesting that his exploits had sent a tremor through the lives of peoples of the Maghrib al-Awsat, living as far to the east as Constantine and the Djerid. And its overall tone is sternly moralising rather than strictly hostile. It refers to the sharīf's ill-directed courage (ṣaḥīla), and to the machinations of the "ahl-sibta", presumably the Spanish Cuta garrison. The obvious implication is that the sharīf would have been better occupied in waging the jihād than in raising dust among "Chergi" peoples. A possible source for the expression of such opinions would have been the Qadiriya community of Tlemsen: pro-Ottoman, but equivocally placed in the march (168). The letter ends with a demand that the sharīf leave the environs of Tlemsen (169), and cease from interfering in the squabbles of its neighbouring migrant peoples (170).

It is conceivable that the letter was picked up by al-Zayyānī during his eighteen months exile spent in Tlemsen over the years 1792-3. It is known that at this period he took a close interest in history, and read widely (171). He may have associated the document with the early days of Muhammad ibn al-Sharīf, on the grounds that

(168) See Chapter III p. 126

(169) "aḥi tajannab awḥad tilīmsān. wa la tazāhūmāhā bi-miḥan jumūt rumat wa la fūraḥān"
   ("O turn aside from the approaches to Tlemsen. Do not press it to ordeal with your cohorts of musketeers and cavaliers.")
   ("Bustān al-Zarīf...") MS p. 12

(170) "inna ishtahat al-aḥrab ghara ala baḏīhīm baḏā ... wa yaḏimuhum cinda al-duwal ma yaḏimy al-makhāna al-kuffār"
   ("For the nomad groupings desire to skirmish amongst themselves... and a responsible member of any government treats with them as he would treat with the treacheries of the infidel.")
   ("Bustān al-Zarīf...") MS loc. cit.

(171) "Turjumānāt al-Kubrā..." ed. Al-Fīlālī p. 144
it was addressed to a "sharīf" and not to an acknowledged sultan, and afterwards proceeded to utilise it as raw material for the construction of a scene-setting prologue to the "Chergi" content of his current work. As finally wrought, the tale of Muhammad ibn al-Sharīf's eastern adventure usefully involved a retrojection of the period of most significant conflict between the ʿAlawī and the forces of the Algerine Turks into the days of a shadowy "ur-sultan". It credited an ʿAlawī prince with far flung raiding that enhanced the military honour of the dynasty. But it carefully absolved the dynasty from the guilt of aggression by stressing that Muhammad had been duped into trespassing within the Regency. The blame for his actions was squarely laid with march groupings of "Arabs". Upon this point, the author's personal bitterness may be discerned. Surprise attack by "Chergi" peoples near Oujda in 1792 had led to his own disgrace and enforced Tilimsānī exile (172).

The most important aspect of the tale of Muhammad ibn al-Sharīf's "Chergi" adventuring, is that it was clinched with the establishment of a political maxim governing ʿAlawī relations with the Regency of Algiers: peace with honour, based upon the mutual acceptance of a frontier at the Tafna, the river flowing between Oujda and Tlemcen. This aligned with circumstances accepted for most of Muhammad III's reign, but left al-Zayyānī with the task of explaining away the trespasses of the early ʿAlawī period. For this reason the author's notes upon the Tafna frontier form a particularly distorted vein within his general narrative. Evidence of eastward transgressions by ʿAlawī armies was customarily slurred over, or treated as, in some sense, a pardonable aberration from the norm.

(172) "Turjumānāt al-Kubrā..." ed. Al-Fīlālī p. 140
Al-Rashīd's career was easily contained within the schema. It was implied that his early "Chergī" adventuring took him only as far as Oujda (173), and that he repeated his brother's written guarantee of acceptance of a Tafna frontier (174). But the "Chergī" campaigning of Ismā‘īl gave rise to a tradition of greater convolution, with its individual prologue. Late in the 1670s (175), Ismā‘īl was said to have invaded the "Cherg". He moved to the south of Tlemcen, where he received the massed allegiance of nine named Arab groupings. With their support, and the particular encouragement of the Banū C‘Amīr, Ismā‘īl went on as far as the upper Chālīf, where he was confronted by an heavily armed expeditionary force from Algiers. A night of Turkish cannon and mortar fire terrified the sultan's Arab following. Headed by the Banū C‘Amīr, they fled, leaving the sultan with the support only of the C‘aškar with which he had set out. Subsequently he received a letter from the Turks, bidding him keep within traditional boundaries. It was accompanied by written evidence that his brothers Muhammad and al-Rashīd had accepted the Tafna frontier. Battle was thus rendered dishonourable as well as militarily indiscreet. Ismā‘īl made peace and retired. But never again would he trust the Arabs (176).

Elements within this tale recall the earlier narrative of Muhammad's adventures. Here again are the motifs of unwitting trespass, Arab

(173) "Turjuman" p. 7 of the text and 14 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 22

(174) "Turjuman" p. 17 of the text and 32 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 33

(175) The "Bustān al-Zarīf..." (loc. cit.) would date this campaign to 1089 A.H. and the "Turjuman" (loc. cit.) to 1090 A.H. These years include the campaigning summers of 1678 and 1679 respectively.

(176) "wa min ya‘ma‘i‘īhin lam ve‘mun fi al-C‘arb wa lam yethiq bihim" ("And from that day forth, he had neither faith nor confidence in the Arabs.") ("Turjuman" p. 17 of the text cf. 33 of the translation)
duplicitly, and the halting of an eastward march by a Turkish letter. However, this tradition concerning Isma'il seems in part to be rooted in the memory of a genuine campaign: Isma'il's first major "Chergi" haraka of 1680. As has been seen, Moulette's account of this expedition includes notes upon a peaceful meeting between Isma'il and Arabic-speaking groupings, confrontation with a powerful Turkish force, and the cessation of hostilities upon the receipt of a brusque letter from Algiers adjuring Isma'il to remain within the boundaries traditionally accepted by the "roys de Fes" (177). But within al-Zayyani's narrative, the vapour of plague and famine which surrounded the 1680 campaign has been dissipated, and the geographical scope of the actual feeble Tilimsanî expedition, nobly increased. There has also been added to the tale a refrain upon the fickle loyalties of "Chergi" peoples.

The result is a narrative developed to suit the internal logic of dynastic tradition. It recapitulates the theme of Alawi acceptance of a Tafna frontier. It functions as a pointer towards subsequent campaign stories. And, as, within al-Zayyani's texts, it follows upon the tale of Isma'il's supposed expedition into the "Qibla" (178), it balances this earlier episode, while stressing the contrast between the two ventures. Both harakât were allegedly distinguished by the ingathering of a following. But the allegiance of "Qiblan" groupings entailed loyal service; a similar declaration of loyalty by shiraga from the east was followed by treachery.

It seems that al-Zayyani wished to imply that "Chergi" expeditions aimed at the belabouring of eastern traitors were amply justifiable. He could thus use the theme of punitive campaigning within the eastern march as a sleight for containing the memory of incursions beyond the

(177) See Chapter III Pp. 127-128
(178) See the present section P. 314-315
Beyond the Tafna, one relevant episode was set into the author's narrative at the year 1680. It is the first of the corpus of five campaign narratives associated with Isma'il's "tāmīd" or "setting to order" of his domains, and it lists rural groupings compelled to accept disarmament (179). According to the nomenclature of the "Bustan al-Zarif...", three out of the four Arabic-speaking groupings involved were peoples who had supposedly abandoned Isma'il by the Cheliff in his hour of need, during the previous campaign. Within the narrative structure, these were peoples receiving their just deserts for an act of treachery in the field. One of these groupings, the Hamiyan, was from beyond the Tafna (180). This circumstance was left unremarked. Similarly, for the year 1682, a year for which contemporary European sources rumoured a confrontation in the Tilimsani march, between the forces of Isma'il and an army from Algiers (181), al-Zayyani's narrative suggested that Isma'il's eastward move had been directed solely against the Banū Āmir (182), the arch-traitors of the first "Chergī" campaign. The Banū Āmir were inhabitants of "Oranie", well beyond the Tafna. But the author avoided any implication that Isma'il's supposed attack upon their territory had precipitated any Turkish counter-move. His tale of a subsequent Turkish invasion of Snassen country was linked solely with the machinations of Ahmad ibn Muhriz (183).

Traditions concerning the confrontation between the forces of Isma'il and the forces of the Regency over the decade 1691-1701, were

(179) "Turijumān" pp. 18 of the text and 34-5 of the translation cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 34
(181) See Chapter III pp. 135-6
(183) "Turijumān" loc. cit. cf. "Bustan al-Zarif..." MS loc. cit.
too strong for al-Zayyānī to ignore. The period was marked off by events associated with the two major Alawī defeats at al-Mashārī and at Djidioua. And the entire decade was scarred by Alawī raids upon Algerine territory (184). The author was compelled to present both aggression and defeat in an acceptable fashion. To this end, his major narrative device was carefully to set the figure of Zaydān rather than the figure of Isma'īl at the centre of the "Chergi" disorders. Within al-Zayyānī's writings, in which memory of Isma'īl's design for an "Udaya succession" was obliterated, Zaydān was dynastically a marginal figure, without the pre-eminence that is vouched for by European sources contemporary with Isma'īl's middle years. He was said to have been the boldest cavalier among Isma'īl's sons ("afrās awlādīhī") (185). But there is no record of his ever having been heir presumptive. Tradition reserved the distinction of "waliy cahd" in his father's lifetime for Ahmad al-Dhahabi (186). Zaydān was therefore conveniently well-suited to the role of unruly son, a maverick for whose deeds his father could not necessarily be held responsible.

The foundation for this line of approach is likely to have been a genuine tradition concerning Zaydān's leadership of his father's troops within the "Cherg" over the years 1691-2: a leadership which had culminated in the debacle at al-Mashārī. It has been seen that al-Zayyānī discreetly left this first defeat unspoken of. A blurred precis of the entire encounter survives, limpet-like at the edge of the author's great set-piece of internal pacification: the final

(184) See Chapter V passim.
(185) "Turjumān" p. 23 of the text and 44 of the translation
(186) ibid. p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation
campaign into the "Jabal Fāzzāz" (187). The precis simply records Zaydān's leadership of the campaign, and Isma'īl's supposedly short-term swerve aside from his campaign against Beraber groupings, into joining his son in making peace with the Turks. Any literary trace of the invasion by Algerine forces was neatly erased by the suggestion that peace had been made at the frontier town of Oujda (188).

Within al-Zayyānī's texts, subsequent ġAlawi ravaging of the "Cherg" survives only within a record which shaped events into a narrow but acceptable drama. The role of Zaydān was made crucial and vigorous. In 1694, when it was probable that the troops under Zaydān's command went no further than Taza (189), the prince was said to have raided the Turks of Tlemcen, and to have brought back booty (190). On this occasion, his father's fundamental goodwill towards Algiers and Constantinople was vouched for by an immediately subsequent note within the narrative. This described Isma'īl's reception of an embassy from the Porte, and his swift compliance with its demands that he should make peace with Algiers (191). It has been seen that the embassy was a genuine occurrence, but that Isma'īl's regard for the peace it had brought was short lived. Grim raiding of Tilimehnī march peoples was soon resumed from the west. But within al-Zayyānī's texts the tedious pattern of this raiding was transmuted. Zaydān was made entirely to blame for the renewed rupture of relations with the Algerine Regency. In 1699-1700, as the sultan doled out vice-regalities, Zaydān was said to have been allotted the "Cherg". Thereafter, in what

(187) See the present section, Part I Pp. 295-6
(188) "Turjuman" p. 24 of the text and 44 of the translation
(189) See Chapter V P. 203
(190) "Turjuman" p. 25 of the text and 47 of the translation cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS p. 41
(191) "Turjuman" loc. cit. cf. "Bustān al-Zarīf..." MS loc. cit.
seems to have been a colourful misremembering of his raid of 1691
(192), Zaydan was alleged to have cut a swathe through Algerine
territory. The incursion was put forward as the crime of a bold young
warrior: successful, and carrying a touch of bravura. It was claimed
that the prince had expelled the Turkish garrison from Tlemcen, and
had raided the palace of the Bey of Mascara (193): both achievements
are apparently unknown to contemporary comment, and may be assumed to
be fiction. Within this context, no trace survives of Isma'il's
personal involvement, at this date, in raiding beyond the Taifna.
Al-Zayyani carefully dissociated the sultan from the raiding, by
insisting that Isma'il respected the peace he had made with the
Turks, and disapproved of his son's actions, to the point of
depriving him of command (194).

Nevertheless, in terms of this narrative, the transgression of
the son was to be visited upon the father. The encounter of 1701 was
made the outcome of the previous year's raiding. The plundered Bey was
said to be with the army that came from Algiers to punish Isma'il.
Battle, and, by implication, defeat, were upon this occasion admitted
(195). Either, however, the author was unaware of the battle site or
he suppressed it. The simple insertion of the toponym Djidioua would
have shattered his carefully moulded version of relations between
Isma'il and the Turks, with the bald demonstration that Isma'il had

(192) See Chapter V P. 188 and the "Dafter al-Tashrifat" p. 502 of
the text and 506 of the modern French translation.

(193) "Turiuman" p. 25 of the text and 48 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS pp. 41-2

(194) "Falamme balsaha dhalika al-sultan ikhtaza 'alavhi wa 'azalahu
li-il-sulh alladhi kana baynahu wa bayna al-turk"
("And when this reached the sultan he was furious with him (Zaydan),
and deprived him of command, because of the peace that there was
between him and the Turks")
("Turiuman" pp. 25-6 cf. 48 of the translation.)

(195) "Turiuman" p. 26 of the text and 48 of the translation cf.
"Bustan al-Zarif..." MS p. 42
See also Chapter V P. 236
provoked his own undoing by an undisguisable invasion of the Regency.

For Djidjoua lies half way along the road between the Tafna and Algiers.
APPENDIX A

THE TERM Hartāni/Haratīn

It is impossible to use the term hartāni (pl. haratīn) with sociological precision, as its connotations are part racial and part economic. It is a term particularly characteristic of oasean society in the western Sahara and its fringes. Here it denotes the sedentary serf-cultivator who tends the palm grove of a migratory master. To date, there has been no serious full-scale study of the hartāni in this context.

Oasean serf-cultivators are known to have existed as early as the time of Leo Africanus (1). For centuries they have been regularly distinguished both from free men and from slaves. Thus, according to a chronicle edited by A-G-P. Martin, the death-roll of a seventeenth century Tawātī famine affecting the settlement of Makhra was enumerated in categories of "harratines" and "negres" (2). Such serfs remained "haratīn" even if they left the land. In the context of a 1719 civic "brouhaha" in Timbuktu, the dependents of oasean shurafa' who had settled within this city were carefully referred to as haratīn, as distinct from ḍabīd proper (3).

Outside of the oases, haratīn seem best regarded as the "coloureds" of north-west Africa. They are today frequently of a bronzed or mulatto appearance, and have been seen by the ethnologically romantic as the remnant of an ancient and

(1) Leo ed. Ramusio ff. 73-4
(2) al-Tawātī quoted Martin p. 54
(3) "Tadhkirat al-Niâyēn..." pp. 29-30 of the text and 47-8 of the translation.
aboriginal bronze race. Such speculation has been passed on, with qualified approval, within certain of the passing notices to which discussion of the *hartānī* has been so far confined (4). However, these people are more likely to represent a stock resulting from centuries of miscegenation within settlements strung along the major slave-trading routes. In the nineteenth century they were noted as being particularly typical of the DarCa valley (5) where, in the early sixteenth century, Leo had noted that slaves were a particularly prominent section of the population (6).

Within the Atlas arc, the term *hartānī* may, in certain contexts, have been used to denote "freedman". In his annotated reproduction of al-Zayyānī's account of the setting up of the *cabīd* army, al-Naṣirī, as part of his defence of Ismā'īl's recruitment policy, defined *hartānī* as "`atānī", or "emancipated slave" (7). As root of the term, he gave the etymologically impossible "al-hurr al-thānī", or "second class freeman". But this was a prim and blinkered interpretation of the total connotation of the word. De Foucauld, an author who was al-Naṣirī's contemporary, passed on a significant if grubby little gibe:

"Parlez-vous mariage?" dit un proverb., "l'Arabe demande: 'est-elle de bonne maison?'; le Chleuh, 'est-elle riche?'; le Hartani, 'est-elle blanche?'" (8)

For the period covered by the thesis, the weakness of a lawyer's

---

(4) See, for example, the relevant passages within R. Mauny's "Tableau Géographique de l'Ouest Africain au Moyen Age" pp. 444-5, and within "Le Sahara Français" Vol. II of R. Capot-Rey's "L'Afrique Blanche Française"(Paris, 1953) pp. 169-72

(5) de Foucauld p. 88

(6) Leo ed., *Remusio* p. 73


(8) de Foucauld *loc. cit.*
limitation of the term to the meaning "freedman" is illuminated by the contemptuous term "red-hide" ("ahmar al-jild") employed, as a synonym for haratini within the sultan Isma'il's own chancery (9). The connotation "freedman" may also be undermined by the fragment of a register possessed by M. G.-S. Colin (10). This document, which covers a section of rural "Jabali" society, regularly employs haratin as a synonym for wusfan: "slaves". There is no clarification here of the precise meaning of haratin. But the meaning "freedmen" would seem to be eliminated.

(9) See Chapter V Pp. 216-217

(10) See Chapter V P. 196 (Note 51)
APPENDIX B

THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONNOTATIONS OF 'UDAYA'

The name "Udaya" is distinctively Saharan, but, for the period covered by the thesis, cannot be attached with precision to any narrow ethnic grouping or limited region.

In the sixteenth century "Udaya" seems to have had "Qiblan", that is, western Saharan connotations. The name was employed by Portuguese authorities of the early sixteenth century to denote both the desert hinterland of the stretch of coast facing Arguin island (1), and the Arabic-speaking section of the inhabitants of this region (2). Leo, from the same period, listed the "Vodei" as a sub-fraction of the "Mahchil" Arabs, a grouping "di numero quasi infinito" inhabiting the desert between Wadan and Walata (3). These were peoples who could be reached by way of the D'ara valley. A rebellious nephew of Ahmad al-Mansur al-Sa'adi, Dāwūd ibn Ābād al-Mu'min, is said to have fled southwards along this route "to lead a nomadic life among the Udaya Arabs of the south" (4).

However, by the early nineteenth century, the name seems to have been subjected to a shift inland. On a map drawn at this date by Grey Jackson, once British consul in Mogador, to illustrate trading connections between Morocco and Timbuktu, the term "Ludaya Arabs" was set sprawling across a region sited between "Tuat Encampment", and the similarly vast region of the "Mograffra Arabs" (M'arras?), set to the west of the "Ludaya", and within the

(2) "Ludea": D. Pacheco Pereira: "Esmeralda de Situ Orbis" ed. A.E. da Silva Dias (Lisbon, 1905) p. 77
(3) Leo ed. Ramusio f. 4
hinterland of Cape Bojador. This map must be admitted to contain gross errors. Grey Jackson belonged to the school which believed the Niger to be the Upper White Nile, and all his information for regions beyond the Atlas came at second hand. But for Saharan, as distinct from West African geography, the drafterman's major points of reference seem to align relatively well with points along the coastline, which here provides an approximately accurate frame to the whole (5).

(5) Grey Jackson Map facing page 283.
A. Primary Sources

Included within this category are primary works from the entire pre-Protectorate period. The list is limited to works referred to within the text of the thesis. Certain of the major items printed or reprinted in whole or part within the series inaugurated by de Castries; "Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc" (S.I.) are listed separately, with a cross-reference to the relevant volume of that series. In determining the order of reference, anonymous works have been listed chronologically. "Al-", "Ibn" and the Arabic letter "ayn (א)" have been alphabetically ignored. Compendia have been listed under the names of their editors.

Printed Works


Anon: "The tragical life and death of Muley Abdala Melek, the late King of Barbarie. With a proposition or petition to all Christian Princes, annexed therunto: written by a gentleman employed into those parts" (Delft, 1633) Extract reprinted within S.I. 1re Angloterre Vol. III pp. 191-206

Anon: "A brief relation of some latter occurrents in the state and kingdom of Morocco" Longfield MS No. 73 from Petworth House, printed in S.I. 1re Angloterre Vol. III pp. 461-489, and putatively dated by the editor to 1638.

Anon: (initialled S. L.) "A letter from a gentlemen of the Lord Ambassador Howard's Retinue" (London, 1670) Listed in the B.M. catalogue under the heading "Tangier". No. 1046 d. 25

Anon: "Relation de M. le G**" ou "Lettre eescrite en répons de diverses questions curieuses sur les Parties de l'Afrique ou règne aujourd'hui Muley Arxid, roy de Tafilète" (Paris, 1670). Reprinted within S.I. 1re France Vol. III pp. 691-740, under the title used within the thesis "Relation de Thomas le Gendre".

Anon: "A Discourse touching TANGER in a LETTER to a person of quality, to which is added 'The Interest of Tangier' by another hand" (London, 1680) Listed in the B.M. catalogue under the heading "Tangier", No. 583 c. 37

Anon: "The last Account from Fez, in a Letter from one of the Embassy to a Person of Honour in London, containing a Relation of Colonel Kirk's Reception at Maguez, by the Emperor, with several passages in Relation to the Affairs of Tangier" (London, N.D.) (1681?) Listed in the B.M. catalogue under the heading "Tangier", No. 583 i 3/8
Anon: "Voyage de Monsieur le baron de St. Amant, capitaine de vaisseau, ambassadeur du Roy Très-Chrétien vers le Roy de Maroc, par un officier de marine." (Lyons, 1698) Extracts reprinted within S.I. 2° France Vol. II pp. 312-338, under the title used within the thesis: "Journal du Voyage de St. Amans."

Anon: "Relation de ce qui s'est passé dans les trois voyages que les religieux de l'ordre de Nostre-Dame de la Mercy ont faits dans les États du Roy de Maroc pour la rédemption des captifs en 1704, 1708 et 1712, par un des Pères Deputez pour la Rédemption, de la congrégation de Paris, du même ordre." (Paris, 1724) Edited and reprinted (with deletions) within S.I. 2° France Vol. VI pp. 613-812, under the title: "Relation de la Merci". Short title within the thesis: "Relation...de la Merci"


Anon: "Relation de ce qui s'est passé dans le royaume de Maroc depuis l'année 1727 juchu'en 1737" (Paris, 1724). A work frequently attributed to one "Adrien-Maurice de Meirault".


Akansū: "Al-taysh al—caramram al-khumai fī dawlat awlad mawlāna al-siilmasl*. Lithographed in Fes, 1918

"E. Aubin" (pseud): "Le Maroc d'aujourd'hui" (Paris, 1904)

al-Cāyyashi: see Berbrugger


ibn Battuta: "Rihla". Extracts translated and edited as "Extraits titrés des Voyages d'ibn Battuta" by R. Mauny, V. Monteil, A. Djendidi, S. Robert and J. Devisse (Dakar, 1966)
A. Berbrugger: Extracts from the "Rihlatayn" of al-Ayyashi, and of Mawlay Ahmad al-Nasiri of Tamgrout, translated as "Voyages dans le Sud de l'Algerie et des Etats barbaresques de l'Ouest et de l'Est" ("Exploration scientifique de l'Algerie" Vol. IX (Paris, 1856)
Short title within the thesis: al-'Ayyashi ed./tr. Berbrugger; Moula Ahmad ed./tr. Berbrugger.

J. Braithwaite: "The History of the Revolutions in the Empire of Morocco upon the death of the late Emperor Muley Ishmael" (London, 1729)

F. Brooks: "Barbarian cruelty, being a true history of the distressed condition of the Christian Captives under the tyranny of Muley Ismail, Emperor of Morocco" (London, 1693)
Short title within the thesis: "Barbarian Cruelty"

A. Burel: "Memoire Militaire sur l'Empire de Maroc, presente a Sa Majeste Imperiale et Royale le 3 juin 1810, redige en avril 1810" Edited by J. Caillé as "La Mission du Capitaine Burel au Maroc en 1808" (Paris, 1953)
Short title within the thesis: "Memoire Militaire..."

D. Busnot: "Histoire du reine de Mouley Ismail" (Rouen, 1714)

H. de Castries and continuors: "Les Sources Inedites de l'Histoire du Maroc" (Paris, from 1905 and in progress) The following volumes within the series are footnoted within the thesis:

Premiere Série (Dynastie Saadienne)  Pays-Bas Vol. I (1906)
Pays-Bas Vol. V (1920)
France Vol. III (1911)
Angleterre Vol. II (1925)
Angleterre Vol. III (1936)

Deuxième Série (Dynastie Filalienne)  France Vol. I (1922)
France Vol. II (1924)
France Vol. III (1927)
France Vol. IV (1931)
France Vol. V (1953)
France Vol. VI (1960)

Short reference within the thesis: S.I. 1st or S.I. 2nd together with volume number and details upon the particular document cited.


F.J.M. de San Juan Del Puerto: "Mission Historial de Marruecos" (Seville, 1708) Short title within the thesis: Del Puerto

H. Dernschwam: "Taebuch einer Reise nach Konstantinopel und Kleinasieng" edited by F. Babinger (Munich and Leipzig, 1923)
L.-R. Desfontaines: MS edited by M. Dureau de la Malle as "Fragments d'un Voyage dans les Régences de Tunis et d'Alger fait de 1783 à 1786" in "Voyages dans les Régences de Tunis et d'Alger" (Paris, 1838)


J. de la Faye: "Relation en forme de journal du voyage pour la réédemption des captifs, aux royaumes de Maroc et d'Alger pendant les années 1723, 1724 et 1725" (Paris, 1726)

V. Fernandes Alema: MS edited and translated by P. de Cenival and Th. Monod as "La Description de Valentim Fernandes" (Paris, 1938)

Ch.-E. de Foucauld: "Reconnaissance au Maroc 1883-1884" (Paris, 1888)

R. Fréjust: "Relation d'un voyage fait dans la Mauritanie, en Afrique, par le sieur Roland Fréjust de la ville de Marseille, par ordre de Sa Majeste, en l'année 1666, vers le roy de Tafilet, Muley Arxid, pour l'établissement du commerce dans toute l'étendue du royaume de Fas; et de toutes ses autres conquêtes" (Paris, 1670) edited and reprinted within S.I. 2 Emanuel France Vol. I pp. 118-188

Short title within the thesis: Fréjust

al-Ghassānī: "Rihlat al-wazīr fī 'l-tikāk al-asīr" translated by H. Sauvaire as "Voyage en Espagne d'un ambassadeur marocain (1690-1691)"


Idrisī: Extract from the "Nuzhat al-Mushtaq..." edited and translated by R. Dozy and M.-J. de Goeje as "Description de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne par Edrisi" (Leiden, 1866)

al-Ifrānī: "Zill al-warīf fī mafākhīr mawlāna ʿisāʾil ʿibn al-shārīf" (Rabat, Imprimerie Royales, 1962) Short title within the thesis: "Zill al-warīf..."


J. Grey-Jackson: "An account of the Empire of Morocco" (London, 1809)

F. Justinard: see al-Zahrūnī

Le Gendre: see Anon: "Relation de M. le G**

W. Lemprière: "A tour from Gibraltar to Tangier, Sallea, Mogodore, Santa Cruz, Taroudant and thence over mount Atlas to Morocco" (London, 1791) Short title within the thesis: "A tour from Gibraltar..."


L. del Marmol Carvajal: "Descripción general de Africa" Three volumes, (Granada and Malaga, 1573 and 1599) Translated by N. Perrot d'Ablancourt as "De l'Afrique" Three volumes, (Paris, 1667).


G. Mourette: "Histoire des conquêtes de Moulay Archy, connu sous le nom de roy de Tafilt, et de Moulay Ismaïl ou Semhìn, son frère et son successeur à présent régnant, tous deux rois de Fez, de Maroc, de Tafilt, de Sus etc., contenant une description de ces royaumes, des loix, des coutumes et des moeurs des habitants, avec une carte du pays, à laquelle on a joint les plans des principales villes et forteresses du royaume de Fez, dessinées sur les lieux par le sieur G. Mourette, qui y a demeuré captif pendant onze années" (Paris, 1693), edited and reprinted within S.I. 2 France Vol. II pp. 1-201 Short title within the thesis: Mourette: "Histoire..."

G. Mourette: "Relation de la captivité du Sieur Mourette dans les Royaumes de Fez et de Maroc" (Paris, 1683) Short title within the thesis: Mourette: "Relation..."


al-Nāṣirī of Tamgrout: see Berbrugger

Volume four of the Cairo text was translated by E. Fumey as "Chronique de la dynastie alaouite du Maroc" and published in A.M. Vols. IX and X (Paris, 1906 and 1907).

Volume two of the Cairo text, covering the Almohade and Marinid periods, was translated by I. Hamet and published in A.M. Vols. XXXII and XXXIII (Paris, 1927 and 1934).

S. Ockley: "An account of south-west Barbary" (London, 1713)
Short title within the thesis: "Ockley"

D. Pacheco Pereira: "Emesrado de Situ Orbis" edited by A.E. da Silva Dias (Lisbon, 1905)

"T. Pellow": "The History of the long Captivity and Adventures of Thomas Pellow in South Barbary" written by Himself (London, N.D.) For the deficiencies of this work as a "primary source", see Prologue Pp.

"T. Pellow": the work cited above, edited by R. Brown as "The Adventures of Thomas Pellow of Penryn, Mariner: three and twenty years in captivity among the Moors" (London, 1890)


T. Phelps: "A true account of the captivity of Thomas Phelps" (London, 1685)


E. Plantet (ed.): "Correspondance des devs d'Aloer avec la Cour de France (1579-1883)" Two volumes (Paris, 1889)

al-Qādirī: "Nashr al-mathanī li-shī al-qarn al-hādi: ashūr wa 'l-thāni." Lithographed in two volumes (Fes, 1892-3)

The first of these volumes was translated and published in two parts, as "Nashr al-Mathani de Mouhammad al-Qadirī" Part I, translated by A. Graulle and M.P. Maillard, was published as A.M. Vol. XXI (Paris, 1913). Part II, translated by E. Micheaux-Bellaire, was published as A.M. Vol. XXIV (Paris, 1917).

Short title within the thesis "Nashr al-Mathānī..." together with details of the volume cited.

G-B. Ramusio: see Leo Africanus

Sa’dya ibn Danan: see Vajda

Samuel ibn Sa’ul ibn Danan: see Vajda

"Sidi Bahaia" (Mawlāy Ḥaṣūm ibn Ahmad): see A-G-P. Martin

T. Shaw: "Travels and Observations relating to several parts of Barbary and the Levant" (Oxford, 1738)


J. Windus: "A journey to Mequinez, the residence of the present Emperor of Fes and Morocco, on the occasion of Commodore Stewart’s embassy thither for the redemption of the British Captives in 1721" (London, 1721)

Short title within the thesis: "A journey to Mequinez..."


al-Zayyānī: "Al-turjūman al-muṭrib fī an ḍawāl al-mashriq wa’l-mashrīb" Thirteenth and final chapter edited and translated by D. Houdas as "Le Maroc de 1631 à 1812" (Paris, 1886). The references within the thesis to the "Turjuman" are to this abbreviated Houdas edition.


Two extracts from this work have been translated and reproduced within A.M. Vol. VI (Paris, 1906):

E. Coufourier: "Description géographique du Maroc d’Az-Zyanv" pp. 436-456

G. Salmon: "Liste de villes marocaines" pp. 457-460

Unpublished works:

Manuscripts:

Anon: MS in the possession of M. G-S. Colin (See Chapter V P. 196 (Note 51))

Archives of the Public Record Office in London

Files footnoted within the text of the thesis:

State Papers (S.P.) No. 71 (Barbary States)

(3) and (4): Consular correspondence with Algiers, 1685-1712

(13) to (17) inclusive: Consular and miscellaneous correspondence referring to Morocco, 1637-1733

Colonial Office Papers (C.O.) No. 91 (Gibraltar)

(1) Miscellany of eighteenth century Gibraltar papers

B. Secondary Sources

These have been subdivided. The aim has been to keep the list brief. However, to those sources footnoted within the text of the thesis, there have been added certain general works which helped to mould the background against which the thesis took shape. These additional works include two gaudy "lives" of Moulay Isma'il, the works of Blunt and of "Maxange-Defontin". Their content is ripe with "copy" suitable for exclusion from any considered study of their hero's period.

Published Books

I. S. Allouche and A. Regragui: "Catalogue des MSS Arabes de Rabat" Two volumes, (Paris 1954, and Rabat, 1958). This catalogue notes additions to the library from the year 1921 onwards, and was designed to supplement the earlier catalogue of E. Lévi-Provençal (q.v.).

I. Bauer y Landauer: "Apuntes para una bibliografía de Marruecos" (Madrid, N.D.)


P. Berthier: "Les anciennes sucreries du Maroc et leurs réseaux hydrauliques: un épisode de l'histoire de la canne à sucre" (Rabat, 1966) Two volumes.

W. Blunt: "Black Sunrises: the life and times of Mulai Ismail, Emperor of Morocco 1646-1727" (London, 1951)


R. Capot-Rey: "Le Sahara Francais" being Vol. II of "L'Afrique Blanche Francaise" (Paris, 1953)
(Madrid and Santiago, 1896) (Vol. II was never written.)

M. P. Castellanos: "Historia de Marruecos" Third edition (Tangier, 1898)

G. N. Clarke: "War and Society in the Seventeenth Century" (London, 1958)


The tone of Cour's work is redolent of a period when an independent Morocco was formally to be considered a threat to French Algeria. And the work itself is riddled with errors. Nevertheless, it is a piece of some interest. It provides the sole attempt, to date, at a study of relations between the Maghrib al-Aqsa and the Maghrib al-Awsat over its chosen period. And, for the reign of Isma II, it has the strength of an appreciation of this sultan's interest and involvement in the "Cherg", an interest which standard histories, concentrating upon Morocco in isolation, have virtually obliterated.

O. Dapper: see Ogilby

M. Dawud: "Tarikh Titwan" Volumes I-II (Tetuan, 1959)

These volumes preface the author's major interest, the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-1860


A. Delcourt: "La France et les établissements français au Sénégal entre 1713 et 1763" (Dakar, 1952)


The title of this work is over-comprehensive. The book is, in affection and content, heavily biased towards the Ottoman Regencies, and Algiers in particular. It is virtually devoid of information upon Morocco during the period.

L. Galindo y de Vera: "Historia, viciosidades y política tradicional de España respecto de sus posesiones en las costas de Africa" (Madrid, 1884)


E. Gellner and C. Micaud (editors): "Arabs and Berbers" (London, 1972)

H.-D. de Grammont: "Histoire d'Alger sous la domination turque (1515-1830)" (Paris, 1887)

M. Hajji: "Al-zawiya al-dila'īva wa dawruhā al-dini wa 'l-dīlmī wa 'l-siyāsi" (Rabat, 1964) Short title within the thesis: "Al-Zawiya al-Dilā'īva...

J. F. P. Hopkins: "Mediaeval Muslim Government in Barbary until the sixth century of the Hijra" (London, 1958)


H. Koehler: "L'église chrétienne du Maroc et la Mission Franciscaine 1221-1790" (Paris, 1934)

M. Lakhdar: "La vie littéraire au Maroc sous la dynastie Alaouïde (1075-1311 = 1664-1894)" (Rabat, 1971)

E. Laoust: "Mots et choses berbères" (Paris, 1920)


R. Lebel: "Le Maroc et les écrivains anglais aux XVIè, XVIIè, et XVIIIè siècles" (Paris, 1927)

R. Le Tourneau: "Fès avant le Protectorat: étude économique et sociale d'une ville de l'Ouest Musulman" (Casablanca, 1948)

E. Lévi-Provençal: "Les manuscrits arabes de Rabat" (Paris, 1921)

It is to this work that the catalogue of Allouche and Regragui (q.v.) was designed to form a supplement.


R. Lourido Diaz: "Ensayo historiografico sobre el sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah" (Granada, 1957)

R. Lourido Diaz: "El sultanato de Sidi Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah (1757-1790)" (Granada, 1970)

V. Magalhães-Godinho: "L'économie de l'empire Portugais aux XVè et XVIè siècles" (Paris, 1969)
G. Marçais: "Les Arabes en Berbérie du XIᵉ au XIVᵉ siècle"  
(Constantine and Paris, 1913)

A-G-P. Martin: "Quatre siècles d'histoire marocaine (1504-1912);  
au Sahara de 1504-1902 - au Maroc de 1894-1912"  
(Paris, 1924) See the Prologue to the thesis (P. 30 Note 50)  
for the relationship of this work to the author's  
earlier book "Les Oasis Sahariennes" (Paris, 1908),  
and for the particular significance of Martin's  
references to the chronicle of one "Sidi Bahaia"  
(Mawlay Hashim ibn Ahmad).  
Documents cited within the text of the thesis as  
quoted by Martin have been culled from the "Quatre  
siècles d'histoire marocaine (1504-1912)."

J. Martin, H. Jover, J. le Coz, G. Maurer and D. Noins "Géographie  

J.M.J.L. Mas Latries: "Relations et commerce de l'Afrique septentrionale  
au Maghreb avec les nations chrétiennes du  
moyen âge" (Paris, 1886)

R. Dauny: "Tableau Géographique de l'Ouest Africain au Moyen Âge  
d'après les Sources Écrites, la Tradition et l'  
Archéologie" (Dakar, 1961)

"Maxange-Defontin" (pseud.): "Le Grand Ismail, empereur du Maroc"  
(Paris, 1929)

F.W.B. Meakin: "The Moorish Empire" (London, 1899)  
An old-fashioned work, but useful for its annotated  
bibliography.

J-L. Miège: "Le Maroc et l'Europe (1830-1894)" Three volumes,  

R. Montagne: "Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc"  
(Paris, 1930)

J. Ogilby: "Africa: being an accurate description of the regions of  
Aegypt, Barbary, Lybia and Bilicalicrid...with all the  
adjacent islands...belonging thereunto...Collected and  
translated from most authentic authors, and augmented  
with later observations..." (London, 1670).

This work is an adapted translation from the "Naukeurige  
Beschrijvingen der Afrikaensche Gewesten van Egypten" of  
the Dutch compiler Olfert Dapper, published in  
Amsterdam in 1668.

Short title within the thesis: "Africa"


being part IV of the "Bibliography of  
Barbary States" in "Supplementary Papers of  
the Royal Geographical Society".

Seran de la Tour: "Histoire de Moulay Mahemet, fils de Moulay Ismael, Roy de Maroc" (Geneva, 1749)


Although open to challenge on many points, this standard work still gives the best short general summary of the period covered by the thesis.

R. Thomassey: "Le Maroc et ses caravanes ou Relations de la France avec cet empire" (Paris, 1845)

E. Westermarck: "Ritual and Belief in Morocco" Two volumes, (London, 1926)

Published Articles

J. Alemany: "Milicias Cristianas al Servicio de los Sultanes del Almagreb" in "Homenaje a D. Francisco Codera" edited by E. Saavedra (Saragossa, 1904) pp. 133-169


M. Bodin: "La Zaouia de Tamegrout" in "Les Archives Berbères" (Paris, 1918) pp. 259-296


R.F. Dunn: "Berber Imperialism: the Alt Atta expansion in South-East Morocco" in "Arabs and Berbers" edited by Gellner and Micaud (q.v.).


P. Rosende: "Los Franciscanos y los cautivos en Marruecos" in "Archivo Ibéro-Américano" Vol. I (Madrid, Jan-Feb 1914)


Thesis

B.A. Mojuetan: "The rise of the 'Alawi dynasty in Morocco, 1631-1672"

Personal informants noted in the text of the thesis:

M. G. Ayache
M. G-S. Colin
Dr. A. Zebadia